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Does centralization of the bargaining structure contribute to the stabilization of industrial relations?… Kummer, Burkhard C. 1985

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DOES CENTRALIZATION OF THE BARGAINING STRUCTURE CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS? A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS by BURKHARD C. KUMMER A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l S cience) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February 1985 ^ B u r k h a r d C. Kummer, 1985 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6 (3/81) ABSTRACT Th i s t h e s i s examines on a conceptual l e v e l whether, i n Canada, government induced c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e i s apt to c o n t r i b u t e to a s t a b i l i z a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s measured i n terms of a r e d u c t i o n i n s t r i k e / l o c k o u t frequency. A micro-model of s t r i k e c a u s a t i o n , viewing the outbreak of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n as the r e s u l t of a d e l i b e r a t e gamble of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s , forms the core of the conceptual framework developed i n t h i s paper. Ac-cor d i n g to t h i s model c e n t r a l i z a t i o n lowers s t r i k e / l o c k o u t frequency i f i t (1) r a i s e s the r e l a t i v e costs of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n (2) induces the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s to i n t e g r a t e macro-goals i n t o t h e i r goal p o r t f o l i o (3) modifies c o l l e c t i v i t y i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t aggregation i n favor of i t s moderate seg-ments and (4) s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t e r n a l i z e s intra-group c o n f l i c t . On the b a s i s of t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and e x i s t i n g e v i -dence, the paper then seeks to e s t a b l i s h whether c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n can be expected to f u l f i l l these c o n d i t i o n s . The study suggests that the impact of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon v e r t i c a l i n t e r e s t aggregation takes the d e s i r e d d i r e c t i o n . Because of the design of the a n a l y s i s a general p r e d i c t i o n of the e f f e c t of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon h o r i z o n t a l i n t e r e s t aggregation can not be made. The r e l a t i v e costs of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n i n the 'average b a r g a i n i n g u n i t ' are diagnosed to remain u n a f f e c t e d by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . While c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g i i i s t r u c t u r e appears to be a necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r unions and employers to i n t e g r a t e macro-goals i n t o t h e i r goal p o r t -f o l i o , the a n a l y s i s can not show that i t i s a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n . F i n a l l y , contingent on the readiness of the government to a c t i v e l y back the r u l e of the m a j o r i t y , cen-t r a l i z a t i o n i s expected to i n t e r n a l i z e i n t r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t s u c c e s s f u l l y . i v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i LIST OF FIGURES v i I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 P a r t O n e I. STABILIZATION, BARGAINING STRUCTURE AND CENTRALIZATION 4 I I . STRUCTURAL POLICY OUTPUT OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS . . 8 I I I . SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT LITERATURE 12 P a r t T w o I. STRIKES AS A RESULT OF BARGAINING MISTAKES 19 I I . AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 23 P a r t T h r e e I. THE IMPACT OF CENTRALIZATION UPON THE COSTS OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION 28 I I . THE IMPACT OF CENTRALIZATION UPON CONFLICT INTENSITY. 33 The Concept of C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y 33 The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon the U t i l i t y Assignments of the Labor Market P a r t i e s 36 Leader versus Rank and F i l e U t i l i t i e s 36 The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon Leader U t i l i t i e s 40 The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon Rank and F i l e U t i l i t i e s 42 C e n t r a l i z a t i o n as a Means to Impart Macro-Goals to the Goal P o r t f o l i o of the Labor Market P a r t i e s 43 C e n t r a l i z a t i o n as a Means to I n t e r n a l i z e C o n f l i c t 54 The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n on the S t r u c t u r e of U t i l i t y Aggregation 69 Dimensions of U t i l i t y Aggregation 69 The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon H o r i z o n t a l U t i l i t y Aggregation 71 The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon V e r t i c a l U t i l i t y Aggregation 76 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 85 ENDNOTES 89 BIBLIOGRAPHY 103 v i LIST OF FIGURES 1. Representation of the Concept of ' C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y ' . . .33 2. Change of C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y as a Result of Ba r g a i n i n g P a r t i e s I n t e g r a t i n g Macro-Goals i n t o t h e i r Goal P o r t f o l i o 44 3. I n t e n s i t y of Wage C o n f l i c t : I n t e r n a l i z e d vs. E x t e r n a l i z e d 55 4. R e l a t i o n of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n of S t r u c t u r e to L e v e l of B a r g a i n i n g 90 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n It i s a s a l i e n t f e a t u r e of Canadian l a b o r p o l i c y that up to the very recent past governments never a c t i v e l y attempted to shape the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e they helped to c r e a t e . The measures designed to improve the performance of the Canadian i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system were modelled on e x i s t i n g b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s and i n the main aimed at im-proving the b a r g a i n i n g procedures.^ However, d e s p i t e the c o n s i d e r a b l e degree of s o p h i s t i -c a t i o n reached i n p r o c e d u r a l p o l i c y , the b a r g a i n i n g machinery continues to f u n c t i o n l e s s smoothly than the government would l i k e . Doubts concerning i t s e f f i c i e n c y arose p a r t i c u l a r i l y i n connection with the surge of i n d u s t r i a l unrest i n the s i x t i e s and s e v e n t i e s that c a t a p u l t e d Canada's s t r i k e record to a 2 l e v e l only surpassed by I t a l y . In response to what p o l i c y makers p e r c e i v e d as an i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s c r i s i s the f e d e r a l government appointed the 'Task Force on Labor R e l a t i o n s ' i n 1966 to i d e n t i f y the causes of the poor performance of the Canadian i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. The research sponsored by the Task Force t r i g g e r e d a process of r e t h i n k i n g on indus-t r i a l r e l a t i o n s p o l i c y i n Canada among d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a n t s , academics and i n t e r e s t e d observers a l i k e . In the quest of more adequate i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements, m o d i f i c a t i o n s of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e were 'discovered' as a p o t e n t i a l avenue 9, f o r improvement, with the r e s u l t that i n 1976 Paul Weiler could s t a t e : "The s t r u c t u r e of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s at the f o r e f r o n t of a n a l y s i s of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s p o l i c y i n 3 Canada r i g h t now." With Canada having one of the most de-c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s i n Western i n d u s t r i a l r e -4 l a t i o n s systems , the question as to whether or not a s h i f t to more c e n t r a l i z e d forms of b a r g a i n i n g would c o n t r i b u t e to a s t a b i l i z a t i o n of employer-employee r e l a t i o n s i n Canada r e -presented a n a t u r a l f o c a l p o i n t of t h i s a n a l y s i s . In view of the obvious p o l i c y relevance of the i s s u e s i n v o l v e d , i t may be s u r p r i s i n g that academics have shown l i t t l e i n t e r e s t so f a r i n t a k i n g up a major share i n the ongoing a n a l y s i s of s t r u c t u r a l p o l i c y . A c c o r d i n g l y , e m p i r i c a l and con-c e p t u a l research i n t o the consequences of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s s t i l l f a i r l y sparse and o f t e n h a r d l y capable of p r o v i d i n g the p o l i c y makers with a f i r m b a s i s f o r t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . It i s the purpose of t h i s paper to c o n t r i b u t e to the establishment of such a b a s i s . Our s p e c i f i c question w i l l be: Does c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e c o n t r i b u t e to the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s ? The paper i s organized i n three p a r t s . Part I serves, to d e f i n e and c l a r i f y the component pa r t s of the research question and to review the r e l e v a n t l i t e r a t u r e . The second part i s devoted to the search f o r an a p p r o p r i a t e t h e o r e t i c a l framework w i t h i n which the p o t e n t i a l impact of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 3 of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e upon s t r i k e / l o c k o u t i n c i d e n c e can be t r a c e d . F i n a l l y , i n the t h i r d part of the paper an attempt s h a l l be made to give an answer to the research question, that i s , i t s h a l l be determined as to whether or not c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e can be expected to s t a b i l i z e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 4 P a r t 0 n e I. STABILIZATION, BARGAINING STRUCTURE AND CENTRALIZATION In order to l i m i t the scope of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n we s h a l l conceive of s t a b i l i z a t i o n i n a f a i r l y narrow f a s h i o n : the i n c r e a s e of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ' c a p a c i t y to reach con-t r a c t terms i n a p e a c e f u l manner.^ S t a b i l i z a t i o n i n t h i s sense manifests i t s e l f most c l e a r l y i n the r e d u c t i o n of s t r i k e 2 frequency (number of s t r i k e s / l o c k o u t s per y e a r ) . The concept of b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e can best be c l a r i -f i e d by r e f e r e n c e to the l e g a l scheme of union c e r t i f i c a t i o n . According to t h i s c o n s t r u c t e x c l u s i v e b a r g a i n i n g r i g h t s are co n f e r r e d to the union, which i n an e l e c t i o n by the employees to be represented, gains a m a j o r i t y of votes. Which employees make up the e l e c t o r a t e i s decided by the r e s p o n s i b l e Labor Re-l a t i o n s Board. Guided by i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 'appropriate b a r g a i n i n g u n i t ' i t de f i n e s the ' l e g a l b a r g a i n i n g u n i t ' . The s t r u c t u r e of the network of l e g a l b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s i s termed the ' l e g a l b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e ' . A b a r g a i n i n g u n i t can be de f i n e d by type or by area or by a combination of both. I t s type i s given by the degree of o c c u p a t i o n a l h e t e r o g e n i t y of the u n i t with pure c r a f t u n i t s r e p r e s e n t i n g one extreme and i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s the other. The area of the b a r g a i n i n g u n i t r e f e r s to whether the u n i t em-compasses the employees of an department, a p l a n t , a s e c t o r or an i n d u s t r y . On the b a s i s of these c l a s s i f i c a t i o n c r i -t e r i a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e may be de-5 f i n e d as any t r a n s f o r m a t i o n from s i n g l e to m u l t i - o c c u p a t i o -n a l u n i t s or from departmental to p l a n t , to s e c t o r or to i n d u s t r i a l u n i t s (expansion of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s along these l i n e s are o f t e n concomitant with the geographic u n i f i c a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s ) . The l e g a l b a r g a i n i n g u n i t c o n s t i t u t e s the b a s i c nego-t i a t i o n u n i t . That i s , while the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s are f r e e to redraw the boundaries of the l e g a l b a r g a i n i n g u n i t f o r the purpose of n e g o t i a t i n g , and thereby c r e a t e the ' a c t u a l ' b a r g a i n i n g or n e g o t i a t i n g u n i t , they can do so only through c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . In t h e i r d e c i s i o n s on u n i t determination the labour r e -l a t i o n s boards of both the United States and Canada were i n -formed mainly by the goal of f a c i l i t a t i n g and encouraging c o l -3 l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . As i t i s e a s i e r to organize s m a l l e r , homo-geneous groups of employees concentrated i n one l o c a l i t y than o c c u p a t i o n a l l y more d i v e r s e and s p a t i a l l y d i s p e r s e d employee groups, the labour r e l a t i o n s boards tended to c e r t i f y occu-p a t i o n a l l y narrow and s m a l l b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s (muti-plant c e r t i -f i c a t i o n s so f a r have s t i l l been the exception r a t h e r than the r u l e ) . The product of these i n d i v i d u a l u n i t determinations has 4 been a very d e c e n t r a l i z e d l e g a l b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . It has proven to be conducive to the o r g a n i z i n g e f f o r t s of unions and hence to the spread of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g but o f t e n has not s a t i s f i e d employer and unions i n i t s f u n c t i o n as a n e g o t i a t i o n 6 s t r u c t u r e . In many cases at l e a s t one of the two p a r t i e s deemed i t advantageous to push f o r more comprehensive b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s ( under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , as w i l l be shown f u r t h e r below, a v a r i a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e i s bound to a f f e c t the 5 balance of power between the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s or the po-s i t i o n of the incumbent le a d e r s v i s a v i s t h e i r i n t e r n a l oppo-s i t i o n ) . Whatever the motives may be f o r the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s to deviate from the l e g a l b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e , one can note with John Dunlop that " [e] xcept i n few s i t u a t i o n s , t h i s bar-g a i n i n g u n i t (the ' l e g a l ' b a r g a i n i n g u n i t ) has very l i t t l e relevance to b a r g a i n i n g . . . T y p i c a l l y , c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s Q c a r r i e d out i n a u n i t much broader than the e l e c t i o n d i s t r i c t . " The forms of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n u t i l i z e d by the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s can or w i l l vary according to the degree of c e n t r a l i -z a t i o n envisaged f o r the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e and on the e x i s t i n g degree of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the l a b o r market p a r t i e s . If unions and employers r e s p e c t i v e l y , already combine more than one b a r g a i n i n g u n i t under t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l umbrella, c e n t r a -l i z a t i o n can be brought about simply by r e a l l o c a t i n g b a r g a i n i n g a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n union or company. For i n s t a n c e , the UAW c e n t r a -l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g at I n t e r n a t i o n a l Harvester by s e t t i n g up the 'Harvester Department' to which the l o c a l s then t r a n s f e r r e d 7 t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g a u t h o r i t y . In many i n s t a n c e s , however, the intended expansion of the b a r g a i n i n g u n i t exceeds that of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l coverage of the l a b o r market p a r t i e s . In such 7 cases ( i n Canada where a fragmented b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e i s p a r a l l e l e d by a fragmented union s t r u c t u r e t h i s may f r e q u e n t l y g occur) union and employer c o a l i t i o n s may provide the necessary o r g a n i z a t i o n a l super s t r u c t u r e . One of the more prominent examples of c o a l i t i o n b a r g a i n i n g i n Canada i s f u r n i s h e d by the n a t i o n a l r a i l w a y s i n d u s t r y where 16 separate and autonomous unions r e p r e s e n t i n g about 95000 workers form with 11 railways 9 the l a r g e s t s i n g l e n e g o t i a t i n g u n i t i n Canada. In c o n t r a s t to the previous two, the t h i r d avenue to c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g , the establishment of p a t t e r n b a r g a i n i n g , i s l a r g e l y i n f o r m a l i n c h a r a c t e r . By v o l u n t a r i l y adopting the c o n t r a c t terms reached i n the key bargain the p a t t e r n f o l l o w e r delegates b a r g a i n i n g a u t h o r i t y to the p a t t e r n s e t t e r . For i n s t a n c e , b a r g a i n i n g i n the Canadian s t e e l i n d u s t r y i s c e n t r a l i z e d i n that f a s h i o n . The agreement reached between S t e l c o i n Hamilton and the United Steelworkers s e t s the p a t t e r n f o r the e n t i r e i n d u s t r y . With respect to the goal of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s t a -b i l i t y the autonomous determination of the n e g o t i a t i o n s t r u c -ture proves to be r a t h e r problematic. As we mentioned above the m o d i f i c a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e can have major im-pacts upon the long term power d i s t r i b u t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s . A d e v i a t i o n from the l e g a l b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e w i l l t h e r e f o r e r a r e l y be i n the i n t e r e s t of both s i d e s . Due to the stakes i n v o l v e d , a l t e r a t i o n s of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e are bound to become c o n f l i c t laden b a r g a i n i n g i s s u e s and i t i s 8 hardly s u r p r i s i n g that [ d j i s p u t e s a r i s i n g from attempts to change the s t r u c t u r e of b a r g a i n i n g no doubt i n v o l v e the most d i f f i c u l t n e g o t i a t i o n s with the most s e r i o u s and longest work stoppages. 0 Canadian governments, so f a r , c o n f i n e d t h e i r s t r u c -t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s l a r g e l y to measures designed to m i t i g a t e the d e s t a b i l i z i n g s i d e e f f e c t s of the autonomous determination of the n e g o t i a t i o n s t r u c t u r e without a c t u a l l y d e p r i v i n g the bar-g a i n i n g p a r t i e s of t h i s autonomy. As the l e g a l instruments developed i n t h i s connection could a l s o be used as l e v e r s f o r a more i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t government p o l i c y , we s h a l l b r i e f l y sketch t h e i r e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s . I I . STRUCTURAL POLICY OUTPUT OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS The P r o v i s i o n s of the B.C. Labour Code f u r n i s h a good i l l u s t r a t i o n of the s t r u c t u r a l innovations that so f a r have been introduced i n v a r i o u s Canadian j u r i s d i c t i o n s . The B.C. Labour Code, enacted i n 1972, contains three l e g a l con-s t r u c t s by which e x i s t i n g b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s can be t r a n s -formed i n t o more comprehensive ones: (1) a c c r e d i t a t i o n of employer a s s o c i a t i o n s , (2) c e r t i f i c a t i o n of c o u n c i l s of trade unions and (3) s e l f r e p e a l of d e c i s i o n s concerning c e r t i f i c a t i o n and a c c r e d i t a t i o n . O r i g i n a l l y designed to s t a b i l i z e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y , the B.C. Labour Code has adopted the l e g a l scheme of a c c r e d i t i n g employers' a s s o c i a t i o n s as the 9 general i n s t i t u t i o n a l form of group b a r g a i n i n g . It i s open to a l l employers w i l l i n g to engage i n wider-based b a r g a i n i n g . By g r a n t i n g an employer a s s o c i a t i o n an a c c r e d i t a t i o n order, the a s s o c i a t i o n becomes the e x c l u s i v e b a r g a i n i n g agent f o r a l l the employers i n the group. Thus, i n i t s l e g a l consequences ac-c r e d i t a t i o n resembles the union c e r t i f i c a t i o n process. Both procedures remove the question of r e c o g n i t i o n from the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e and thus e l i m i n a t e one of the more s e r i o u s sources of i n d u s t r i a l s t r i f e . While i n B.C. the formation of an employer a s s o c i a t i o n f o r the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s v o l u n t a r y 1 1 , the B.C. Labor Code pl a c e s con-s i d e r a b l e r e s t r i c t i o n s upon members t r y i n g to withdraw from the a s s o c i a t i o n . In order to i n s t i l l the s t a b i l i t y which i s so o f t e n l a c k i n g i n v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s the B.C. l e g i s l a t o r s p r e s c r i b e d that once an employer has j o i n e d an a s s o c i a t i o n he can leave i t only with assent of the Labor R e l a t i o n s Board. That i s , t h i s employer w i l l have to adduce persuasive arguments that there i s good reason to be r e l e a s e d . Furthermore, s e c t i o n 59g s t i p u l a t e s that 4-5 months have to elapse a f t e r the execu-t i o n of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement before an employer may apply f o r the t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s membership i n the a s s o c i a t i o n . On the employee s i d e , the expansion of e x i s t i n g bar-g a i n i n g u n i t s i s f a c i l i t a t e d by the extension of the c e r t i -f i c a t i o n procedure to i n c l u d e labor c o u n c i l s , that i s , union c o a l i t i o n s , as b a r g a i n i n g agents. While c o n t i n u i n g to s t r e s s 10 v o l u n t a r i s m as the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e to b r i n g about a more c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e , the B.C. Labor Code vests the Labor R e l a t i o n s Board with the r i g h t to impose a c o u n c i l s t r u c t u r e upon unions i f t h i s i s deemed i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . In c o n t r a s t to the arrangements on the employer s i d e which mere-l y supply an ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l encouragement' to v o l u n t a r y cen-t r a l i z e d e c i s i o n making i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , the pro-v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 57 empowering the Board to f o r c e the unions i n t o a c o a l i t i o n ( i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n i s j o i n t l y formulated by the unions and the Board) have crea t e d a powerful i n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e r through which the i n t e r e s t of the p u b l i c can be imprinted 12 upon the shape of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . E q u a l l y powerful i s the t h i r d instrument the B.C. La-bor Code has accorded to the Labor R e l a t i o n s Board to t a i l o r a p p r o p r i a t e b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s . S e c t i o n 36 allows the Board to r e s c i n d i t s own d e c i s i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r those concerning c e r t i f i c a t i o n or a c c r e d i t a t i o n . T h i s i m p l i e s that the Labor Re-l a t i o n s Board can withdraw e x i s t i n g b a r g a i n i n g r i g h t s and r e -peat the c e r t i f i c a t i o n procedure on the b a s i s of r e d e f i n e d bar-g a i n i n g u n i t s . As the d o c t r i n e of e x c l u s i v e b a r g a i n i n g r i g h t s i s an i n t e g r a l part of North America's l e g a l t r a d i t i o n , r e c e r t i f i c a -t i o n may appear as the 'cleanest' way to c e n t r a l i z e the bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . On the other hand one can not conjure away the implementation problems t h i s mode of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s l i k e l y to encounter. Due to .the s m a l l e r number of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s i n the process of r e a s s i g n i n g b a r g a i n i n g r i g h t s many 11 l o c a l s , i f not whole unions, would loose t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . That i s , r e c e r t i c a t i o n would not only c e n t r a l i z e the bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e but would c o n s o l i d a t e the union s t r u c t u r e as w e l l . Thus f o r a segment of the l a b o r movement l a r g e s c a l e r e c e r t i f i c a t i o n campaigns would mean an a s s a u l t upon i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and, a c c o r d i n g l y , would evoke massive p r o t e s t and f i e r c e r e s i s t a n c e . In view of the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia which i s marked by f i r m l y entrenched unions, the Labor R e l a t i o n s Board has t h e r e f o r e favored the 13 c o u n c i l concept as the main avenue to a c e n t r a l i z e d bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . The r e l a t i v e l y short h i s t o r y of the B.C. Labor Code saw the Board u s i n g with utmost c a u t i o n the l e v e r of imposing a c o u n c i l s t r u c t u r e upon unions. So f a r , the Board has i n -voked s e c t i o n 57 only i n those cases where t r a d i t i o n a l pro-cedural p o l i c y has c l e a r l y proven i n s u f f i c i e n t . I f taken t o -gether, the l e g a l p r o v i s i o n s i n the B.C. Labor Code which em-power r a t h e r than order the Board to c e n t r a l i z e the b a r g a i n i n g S t r u c t u r e and the a c t u a l p o l i c y made by the Board seem to suggest that s t r u c t u r a l p o l i c y has so f a r been considered a measure of l a s t r e s o r t r a t h e r than a f u l l f l e d g e d a l t e r n a t i v e 14 or s i g n i f i c a n t supplement to procedural p o l i c y . Having d e f i n e d and c l a r i f i e d the components of our r e -search question ( i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s t a b i l i t y , b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e , c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ) and p o i n t e d out the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l e v e r s through which the Canadian government could c a r r y out 12 a p o l i c y of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n we s h a l l now turn to the l i t e r a t u r e which analyzes the r e l a t i o n s h i p between b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e and s t a b i l i t y of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . I I I . SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT LITERATURE A review of the l i t e r a t u r e r e v e a l s that the p o t e n t i a l impacts of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e upon s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e are the subject of s c a t t e r e d references r a t h e r than systematic e x p l o r a t i o n . Casual p r e s e n t a t i o n , the use of ad hoc hypotheses and frequent r e s o r t to t h e o r e t i c a l s h o r t c u t s c h a r a c t e r i z e the r e s p e c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n s . In order to gain per-s p e c t i v e , t h i s chapter w i l l give a b r i e f account of vari o u s p u b l i s h e d hypotheses r e l e v a n t to the impact of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e upon s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e . Perhaps the most b a s i c argument put forward by the advocates of c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g r e s t s on the tr u i s m that the c u r t a i l m e n t of b a r g a i n i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s caused by c e n t r a -l i z a t i o n e q u a l l y c u r t a i l s the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to l e g a l s t r i k e 15 a c t i o n . The caveat i n t h i s reasoning i s the t a c i t assumption that the re d u c t i o n of l e g a l s t r i k e o p p o r t u n i t i e s w i l l auto-m a t i c a l l y t r a n s l a t e i n t o reduced s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e . Such as-sumption, however, i s v a l i d only i f the e l i m i n a t i o n of bar-g a i n i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s does not a f f e c t the b a r g a i n i n g system's c a p a c i t y to r e s o l v e c o n f l i c t s and hence does not change the ba r g a i n i n g behavior of unions and employers. For in s t a n c e , 13 should the r e d u c t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s produce a s i t u a t i o n where many problems remain unaddressed the ensuing f r u s t r a t i o n s of those concerned may r a i s e the percentage of n e g o t i a t i o n s that r e s u l t i n i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n or seek an o u t l e t i n i l l e g a l forms of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n , f o r example w i l d c a t s t r i k e s . In the former case c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would mere-l y r e d i s t r i b u t e the s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e p r i o r to c e n t r a l i z a t i o n among fewer b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s . The f o l l o w i n g hypotheses are s i m i l i a r i n that they view the p o t e n t i a l impact of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon s t r i k e i n c i -dence as being mediated by changes i n the b a r g a i n i n g behavior of unions and employers. The hypotheses d i f f e r i n terms of the k i n d of 'transmission b e l t s ' l i n k i n g b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e with b a r g a i n i n g behavior. Three d i f f e r e n t ways can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by which c e n t r a l i z a t i o n may modify b a r g a i n i n g behavior. In the f i r s t c e n t r a l i z a t i o n presumably i n f l u e n c e s b a r g a i n i n g behavior by a l t e r i n g the balance of power between employers and unions, i n the second, by causing powershifts w i t h i n the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ; and i n the t h i r d , by i n c r e a s i n g the c a p a c i t y of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s to harm the p u b l i c . Arthur's and C r i s p o ' s study on a c c r e d i t a t i o n i n the 16 c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y may serve as an example f o r a hy-p o t h e s i s of the f i r s t type. I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n the North American c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y are known to be extremely un-s t a b l e . Both authors f e e l that r e s t o r i n g balance of power between employers and unions which i n t h e i r view has been 14 h e a v i l y t i l t e d i n f a v o r of the unions would improve the s t r i k e r e c o r d i n t h i s i n d u s t r y . The c r e a t i o n of c o u n t e r v e i l i n g power on the employer s i d e (by means of the formation of a c c r e d i t e d employer a s s o c i a t i o n s ) i s expected to have a 'sobering' e f f e c t upon the unions and b r i d l e t h e i r agressiveness at the bar-g a i n i n g t a b l e . While i n t u i t i v e l y appealing, the above argument looses some of i t s p l a u s i b i l i t y i f one a p p l i e s i t s u n d e r l y i n g b e h a v i o r a l assumptions to the explanation of the high s t r i k e / lockout i n c i d e n c e . p r i o r to c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . With Arthur and C r i s p o one would expect that the union as the stronger s i d e would act i n a very a s s e r t i v e f a s h i o n . One would however equal-l y expect that the weaker s i d e (here the employers) i n face of the power c o n s t e l l a t i o n , which according to Arthur's and C r i s p o ' s b e h a v i o r a l assumption should have a 'sobering e f f e c t ' upon i t , would show a low p r o f i l e at the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e and thereby compensate the agressiyeness of the union. As the high s t r i k e / l o c k o u t i n c i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h i s e v i d e n t l y does not happen i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y . I f c e n t r a l i z e d power does not have the d e s i r e d impacts on the employer one might ask why c e n t r a l i z e d power should have them on the union. For Arthur's and C r i s p o ' s hypothesis to be persuasive t h i s d i s -crepancy i n behavior needs e x p l a n a t i o n . 17 A s i m i l i a r c r i t i q u e can be l e v e l l e d against Chernish , who i n c o n t r a s t to Arthur and C r i s p o takes the view that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n leads to 'more frequent, l a r g e r , and longer s t r i k e s ' . He backs t h i s contention by r e f e r e n c e to the i n -15 creased power of the unions, which he deems the weaker party p r i o r to c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . According to t h i s reasoning the gain i n power w i l l tempt the unions to make more extensive use of the s t r i k e weapon. However, as the s h i f t i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l h a r d l y go unnoticed by the s i d e l o s i n g power, i t i s not l o g i c a l that only the h e r e t o f o r e weaker s i d e responds with a change i n b a r g a i n i n g behavior. One would ex-pect that the l o s i n g party changes tack as w e l l with the r e -s u l t that the i n c r e a s e d 'boldness' of the s t r o n g e r s i d e i s o f f s e t by the weaker s i d e ' s greater readiness to compromise. In the form s t a t e d Chernish's argument remains t h e r e f o r e i n -c o n c l u s i v e . While i n the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of Arthur and C r i s p o and Chernish c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a f f e c t e d s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e by a l t e r i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power between the b a r g a i n i n g IS p a r t i e s , the focus of Weiler's c o n t r i b u t i o n i s on the power d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n the s i n g l e b a r g a i n i n g camps. E f f e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i n l a r g e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s c a l l s f o r the s i n g l e employers and employee groupings making up each u n i t to give up some of t h e i r autonomy and to delegate d e c i s i o n making power to the c o l l e c t i v i t y . In Weiler's o p i n i o n i t i s t h i s f e a t u r e which renders c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a formidable weapon 19 against competitive b a r g a i n i n g . In competitive b a r g a i n i n g , unions bargain with the o b j e c t i v e of attaining c o n t r a c t terms which o u t s t r i p those concluded i n a r e f e r e n c e b a r g a i n i n g u n i t . In c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s these competing groupings are f o r c e d 16 to bargain as one u n i t . The i s s u e of wage s t r u c t u r e w i l l t h e r e -by i n c r e a s i n g l y become the subject of c o l l e c t i v i t y i n t e r n a l d e c i s i o n making. A c c o r d i n g l y , any grouping seeking to improve i t s p o s i t i o n i n the e s t a b l i s h e d wage h i e r a r c h y needs the con-sent of i t s competitors. Thus, to the extent that c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n succeeds i n b r i n g i n g p o t e n t i a l competitors under one orga-n i z a t i o n a l roof competitive b a r g a i n i n g w i l l vanish. While one can not q u a r r e l with the above argument Weiler's reasoning l e a d i n g him to the hypothesis that com-p e t i t i v e b a r g a i n i n g causes an i n o r d i n a t e amount of s t r i k e s / l o c k o u t s i s h a r d l y p e r s u a s i v e . In h i s o p i n i o n competitive bar-g a i n i n g i s ' s t r i k e prone' because i t i n v i t e s b a r g a i n i n g mis-takes. T h i s argument, however, i s p l a u s i b l e only i f i t i s true that competitive b a r g a i n i n g s e r i o u s l y impairs the c a p a c i t y of unions and employers to analyse the b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n i n a sober f a s h i o n and/or makes the assessment of c a p a b i l i t i e s and i n t e n t i o n s of the actors more d i f f i c u l t . These at-t r i b u t e s of competitive b a r g a i n i n g , however, are h a r d l y s e l f -e vident. Thus, f o r the hypothesized r e l a t i o n s h i p between com-p e t i t i v e b a r g a i n i n g and the making of b a r g a i n i n g mistakes to be p l a u s i b l e , s u p p o r t i n g evidence or arguments appear to be i n d i s p e n s a b l e . Unfortunately, Weiler has made no e f f o r t s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . The presumption that i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n i n c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s i s l i k e l y to i n f l i c t more harm upon the 17 p u b l i c than i n a d e c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e c h a r a c t e r i z e s the t h i r d type of c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n l i n k i n g b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e with s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e . A good example of t h i s s t r a n d i n the 20 l i t e r a t u r e i s Saunders' account of group b a r g a i n i n g . Re-c o g n i z i n g that s t r i k e s / l o c k o u t s i n c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s c a r r y the p o t e n t i a l of c o n s i d e r a b l e harm f o r the p u b l i c Saunders notes that c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g "...places i n c r e a s e d r e -s p o n s i b i l i t y on each of the p a r t i c i p a n t s to c o n s i d e r the im-pact of the r e s u l t s of t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s have on the p u b l i c 21 w e l f a r e . " He concludes that " . . . t h i s t h e r e f o r e , leads to 22 more r e s p o n s i b l e b a r g a i n i n g . " The p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h i s hy-p o t h e s i s r e s t s on the o p t i m i s t i c assumption that unions and employers grant the i n t e r e s t s of the p u b l i c precedence over those of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . While we can not exclude t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , i n view of h i s t o r i c a l experience the c a p a c i t y of organized i n t e r e s t s to act a l t r u i s t i c a l l y appears r a t h e r l i m i t e d In attempting to p r e d i c t the impacts of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e i t would t h e r e f o r e seem to be s a f e r to bank on the p a r t i e s ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t r a t h e r than t h e i r a l t r u i s m . The narrow scope, ambiguities and i n s u f f i c i e n t p l a u s i -b i l i t y of the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s d i s c u s s e d s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t t h e i r c a p a c i t y to inform i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s p o l i c y . We f e e l , however, that many of the shortcomings i n the l i t e r a t u r e c o u l d be overcome and, hence, a more accurate and comprehensive p i c t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e and 18 s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e be presented i f one chooses a more systematic approach and grounds the a n a l y s i s i n an e x p l i c i t concept of s t r i k e c a u s a t i o n . It i s the development of such concept to which the next part of t h i s paper i s devoted. 1 9 P a r t T w o I. STRIKES AS A RESULT OF BARGAINING MISTAKES For the design o i a t h e o r e t i c a l framework capable of t r a c i n g the impacts of a m o d i f i c a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c -t ure on s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e , s t r i k e t h e o r i e s appear as a n a t u r a l source of conceptual b u i l d i n g b l o c k s . However, not a l l s t r i k e e xplanations are of equal use.''" Since we conceive of the bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e as an i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e between the eco-nomic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l environment of employers and unions and t h e i r values on the one hand and t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g behavior on the other, a s u i t a b l e s t r i k e theory has to f e a t u r e the bar-g a i n i n g process as one of i t s i n t e g r a l components. It i s f o r t h i s reason that the s t r i k e e x p l a n a t i o n developed i n the con-text of b a r g a i n i n g t h e o r i e s stands at the center of the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n . The g i s t of t h i s type of s t r i k e e xplanation i s s u c c i n c t -l y expressed i n a much quoted dictum by Hicks: "Under a system of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . . .the m a j o r i t y of a c t u a l s t r i k e s are 2 doubtless the r e s u l t of f a u l t y n e g o t i a t i o n s . " According to Walton/McKersie ' f a u l t y ' n e g o t i a t i o n s and hence " . . . s t r i k e s occur, p r e c i s e l y because the n e g o t i a t o r s are not c l e a r about 3 the r e a l i n t e n t i o n s of the other s i d e . " In other words, " I f a s t r i k e occurs i t i s because of m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s which were 4 made and acted upon during the n e g o t i a t i o n process," These s t r i k e e x p l a n a t i o n s have two important drawbacks. F i r s t , t h e i r 20 authors f a i l to i d e n t i f y the c o n d i t i o n s under which the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s tend to make mistakes. Without such s p e c i -f i c a t i o n s s t r i k e explanations a l a Hicks remain mere tau-t o l o g i e s , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of s t r i k e s r a t h e r than p r e d i c t i v e t h e o r i e s . Second, and more importantly, over wide areas the m i s c a l c u l a t i o n hypothesis l a c k s o p e r a t i o n a l meaning. A c l o s e r look at i t s p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s w i l l e l u c i d a t e t h i s p o i n t . I f we f o l l o w Hick's a s s e r t i o n that "adequate knowledge 5 w i l l always make a settlement p o s s i b l e " , the key to s t r i k e r e d u c t i o n l i e s i n q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y of in f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s . However, f o r t h i s c o n c l u s i o n to have any p r a c t i c a l relevance the in f o r m a t i o n has to be r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e . T h i s requirement, however, can be met only by a f r a c t i o n of the inf o r m a t i o n . To a n t i c i p a t e 'opponent's' moves 'party' has to gain 6 knowledge of 'opponent's' c a p a b i l i t i e s and i n t e n t i o n s . The former comprise the f i n a n c i a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l resources 'opponent' can muster to s u s t a i n a s t r i k e or lockout. 'Oppo-nent's' u t i l i t i e s , h i s t a c t i c a l choices and h i s estimate of 'party's' c a p a b i l i t i e s , u t i l i t i e s and t a c t i c a l choices make up the l a t t e r . Information on such resources as s t r i k e funds, c r e d i t l i n e s , s t r i k e insurance, a v a i l a b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e jobs during s t r i k e s e t c . i s i n p r i n c i p l e a s c e r t a i n a b l e . With the same confidence t h i s can not be s a i d f o r the second cate-gory of resources, resources over which the c o l l e c t i v i t y has command only through the d e c i s i o n s of the i n d i v i d u a l member. I n d i v i d u a l savings and g e n e r a l l y the w i l l i n g n e s s to endure a lowered standard of l i v i n g f o r the time of the s t r i k e would f a l l under t h i s heading. It becomes apparent that at the l e v e l of the i n d i v i d u a l member of the c o l l e c t i v i t y the d i s t i n c t i o n between c a p a b i l i t i e s and i n t e n t i o n s i s somewhat b l u r r e d . To the extent that the m o b i l i z a t i o n of these i n d i v i d u a l resources i s at the s o l e d i s c r e t i o n of the member, inf o r m a t i o n as to t h i s component of the opponent's c a p a b i l i t i e s i s not a c e s s i b l e i n an o b j e c t i v e f a s h i o n . However, due to t h e i r being p a r t of an o r g a n i z a t i o n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e c i s i o n s w i l l be i n f l u e n c e d by the c o l l e c t i v i t y . The term ' o r g a n i z a t i o n a l resources' seeks to capture t h i s dimension of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e c i s i o n . It r e -f e r s to the c o l l e c t i v i t y l e a d e r ' s c a p a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e at w i l l the membership's i n d i v i d u a l resources. While conceptual-l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , on an e m p i r i c a l l e v e l even f o r the l e a d e r s themselves, t h i s category i s q u i t e e l u s i v e . I f i t encompasses more than o r g a n i z a t i o n a l coverage, c o l l e c t i v i t y c o n t r o l (more p r e c i s e l y l e a d e r c o n t r o l ) over the resources of the i n d i v i d u a l members takes on a concrete form only i f viewed as a h i s t o r i c a l -e m p i r i c a l magnitude. While we do not want to b e l i t t l e the i n -formation problems a s s o c i a t e d with those resources of the c o l -l e c t i v i t y which are c o n t r o l l e d by i t s i n d i v i d u a l members we f e e l that they are not s i g n i f i c a n t enough to c a l l i n t o ques-t i o n our c o n c l u s i o n that o v e r a l l information concerning the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ' c a p a b i l i t i e s i s o b j e c t i v e l y a t t a i n a b l e . 22 In c o n t r a s t , only the opponent has access to h i s i n -t e n t i o n s . That i s , even i f he c o u l d be f o r c e d to r e v e a l h i s i n t e n t i o n s , we have no way of knowing whether the i n t e n t i o n s d i s c l o s e d a c t u a l l y are the t r u e ones. A c c o r d i n g l y , we do not possess any method of s p e c i f y i n g ' r i g h t ' c a l c u l a t i o n s other than by r e f e r e n c e to the occurence or non-occurence of s t r i k e s or l o c k o u t s . That i s , s t r i k e explanations a l a Hicks are em-p i r i c a l l y meaningful only i f one can reasonably assume that c a p a b i l i t i e s alone determine the moves of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s . For c a p a b i l i t i e s to become the s o l e c r i t e r i o n , i n bar-g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n s , the antagonism between employers and unions has to have reached such p r o p o r t i o n s that the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s p e r s i s t e n t l y take p o s i t i o n s whose defence and t o p p l i n g r e s p e c t i v e l y , i s f e l t by each of the two s i d e s to j u s t i f y the costs of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n even i f the other s i d e i s expected to m o b i l i z e i t s e n t i r e resources. In the e a r l y , formative stages of a b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p such a s i t u a t i o n i s not uncommon. The b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s may not yet have reached a b a s i c understanding of the power d i s t r i b u t i o n and hence l a c k a b a s i s f o r the c o o r d i n a t i o n of e x p e c t a t i o n s . In Canada, how-ever, most b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s , having already been i n e x i s t e n c e f o r some time, -have passed t h i s stage. Reduced to i t s e m p i r i c a l l y meaningful core the conventional s t r i k e hypothesis has t h e r e f o r e l i t t l e relevance f o r the Canadian context and, consequently, i s i l l s u i t e d to serve as conceptual b a s i s f o r 2 3 our i n v e s t i g a t i o n . A more f r u i t f u l concept of s t r i k e c a u s a t i o n s h a l l be developed i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. I I . AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH In c o n t r a s t to the s t r i k e t h e o r i e s a l a Hicks the f o l l o w i n g concept of s t r i k e causation s t r e s s e s the h i s t o r i c a l dimension of b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t s t a r t s from the notion that b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s are l a s t i n g arrangements. Ne g o t i a t i o n s are t h e r e f o r e a r e c u r r e n t event where experiences made i n the past w i l l i n f l u e n c e present n e g o t i a t i o n s . Due to the nature of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t , the h i s t o r y of any b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l to a l a r g e extent be a h i s t o r y of d i s s e n t . However, i n most cases the b a r g a i n i n g h i s -t o r y w i l l a l s o have produced consensus. It f i n d s expression i n b a r g a i n i n g standards which serve as g u i d e l i n e s f o r the r e s o l u -t i o n of newly a r i s i n g d i s p u t e s . These standards, f o r i n s t a n c e , may s t a t e an e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t of the union i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e c u r i t y , l i m i t the demands of the union to the employer's a b i l i t y to pay and/or may d e f i n e forms of communication which 7 help the n e g o t i a t o r s to read each other. With both s i d e s having the c a p a c i t y to b u t t r e s s t h e i r claims by i n f l i c t i n g c o sts upon t h e i r opponents, the p o s s i b i l i t y emerges that due to massive r e s i s t a n c e of the other s i d e the c o s t s of pursuing a p a r t i c u l a r b a r g a i n i n g goal w i l l o u t s t r i p i t s b e n e f i t s . Thus, i n order to avoid the i n c u r r i n g of net l o s s e s each s i d e , when s e t t i n g b a r g a i n i n g goals, w i l l reason-2 4 ably have to take i n t o account the l i k e l y r e s i s t a n c e of the other s i d e . A c o r r e c t estimate of the l a t t e r r e q u i r e s knowledge not only of the opponent's c a p a b i l i t i e s but a l s o , and t h i s i s more d i f f i c u l t to come by, of h i s p r e f e r e n c e s . It i s here now that the b a r g a i n i n g h i s t o r y embodied i n the b a r g a i n i n g s t a n -dards comes i n . As the r e s u l t of the i n t e r a c t i o n of the bar-g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ' c a p a b i l i t i e s and preferences i n past nego-t i a t i o n rounds, the standards d e f i n e the s t a t u s quo of t h e i r long term b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s . By r e l a t i n g t h e i r demands to these standards and 'measuring the 'distance' to them' the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s r e c e i v e an i n d i c a t i o n of the r e s i s t a n c e t h e i r demands w i l l encounter. Demands or o f f e r s which f l o u t the b a r g a i n i n g standards w i l l be considered as an a s s a u l t upon i t s longterm b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n by the other s i d e and w i l l t h e r e f o r e evoke f i e r c e r e s i s t a n c e . Consequently, unless massive s h i f t s i n c a p a b i l i t i e s c a l l f o r a redrawing of long term bar-g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s cost conscious, and i n t h i s sense r a t i o n a l a c t o r s w i l l seek to p l a c e t h e i r demands w i t h i n the frame set by the standards. In t h i s f a s h i o n unions and employers c o o r d i -nate t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n s and thereby c o n t a i n c o n f l i c t at a l e v e l where the s i n g l e i s s u e s can be d e a l t with unencumbered by con-s i d e r a t i o n s concerning the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ' long term bar-g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . One can expect that i n most cases, e s p e c i a l l y where the b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p has already been i n e x i s t e n c e f o r some time ( i n Canada t h i s holds f o r the m a j o r i t y of b a r g a i n i n g r e -25 l a t i o n s h i p s ) , t h e t w o s i d e s w i l l b e a b l e t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n s s u f f i c i e n t l y a s t o g i v e r i s e t o w h a t i n t h e l i t e -8 r a t u r e i s r e f e r r e d t o a s ' r a n g e o f p r a c t i c a b l e b a r g a i n s ' o r 9 ' p o s i t i v e s e t t l e m e n t r a n g e ' . I t d e n o t e s a r a n g e o f p o t e n t i a l o u t c o m e s w h i t h i n w h i c h a n y c o n c e s s i o n i s f e l t b y b o t h s i d e s a s l e s s c o s t l y t h a n a s t r i k e o r l o c k o u t . I n t h i s r a n g e e a c h s i d e , t h e r e f o r e , i s l i k e l y t o b e g u i d e d b y t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f w h a t i t s o p p o n e n t w i l l a c c e p t . W i t h b o t h s i d e s s e e k i n g t o b u i l d s u c h e x p e c t a t i o n s i n t o t h e i r c a l c u l a t i o n s b a r g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n s b e c o m e i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . F o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l b a r g a i n e r i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e h a s t w o i m p l i c a t i o n s . F i r s t , h e h a s t o d e c i d e o n h i s m o v e s u n d e r c o n -d i t i o n s o f u n c e r t a i n t y . S e c o n d , h e c a n a c t i v e l y i n f l u e n c e t h e o t h e r s i d e ' s c a l c u l a t i o n s a n d t h e r e b y t i l t t h e b a r g a i n i n g o u t -c o m e i n h i s f a v o r . W h i l e i t i s t h e f o r m e r a s p e c t o f i n t e r -d e p e n d e n c e w h i c h i s a t t h e h u b o f s t r i k e e x p l a n a t i o n s a l a H i c k s t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f f e r e d h e r e f o c u s s e s u p o n t h e s e c o n d a s p e c t . M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e i n c i d e n c e o f s t r i k e s / l o c k o u t s i s c o n c e p t u a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ' c h o i c e o f t a c t i c s . T h i s c h o i c e i s v i e w e d a s a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e i n t e n s i -t y w i t h w h i c h u n i o n s a n d e m p l o y e r s s e e k t o p r o d e a c h o t h e r i n t o a c c e p t i n g t h e i r f a v o r e d t e r m s . T o b u d g e t h e o t h e r s i d e a b a r g a i n e r c a n c h o o s e a m o n g t w o g r o u p s o f t a c t i c s . T h e f i r s t s e e k s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e o p -p o n e n t ' s b a r g a i n i n g b e h a v i o r b y m a n i p u l a t i n g h i s p e r c e p t i o n o f u t i l i t i e s . T h e m o v e s m a d e i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n ( p o i n t i n g o u t a d -v e r s e r e p e r c u s s i o n s o f t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r d e m a n d s , 2 6 b u i l d i n g up i n v e n t o r i e s to reduce the costs of s t r i k e s e t c . ) are s m i l i a r i n that they do not aim at endangering the long term b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n of e i t h e r party. T h i s type of t a c t i c thus makes use only of the f e a t u r e s of the 'agreed on b a t t l e ' . In c o n t r a s t , the second group which i s a l s o r e f e r r e d to as commitment t a c t i c s uses the r i s k of e s c a l a t i o n (from t h i s 'agreed on b a t t l e ' ) to exact concessions."^ By p l e d g i n g a p a r t i c u l a r course of a c t i o n i n an i r r e v o c a b l e manner the a c t o r puts on the l i n e h i s c r e d i b i l i t y f o r f u t u r e n e g o t i a t i o n s . Thereby, he adds a dimension of u t i l i t i e s to the envisaged b a r g a i n i n g outcome which touches upon the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ' long term b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . In t y i n g the attainment of the favored c o n t r a c t terms to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of i t s own long term b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n the s i d e making the commitment openly r a i s e s the stakes f o r i t s e l f to a l e v e l which renders indus-t r i a l a c t i o n a p r o f i t a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n . However, the pressure generated i n t h i s f a s h i o n w i l l t r a n s l a t e i n t o f a v o r a b l e terms only i f the commitment does not cause the other s i d e to r e -assess p o t e n t i a l b a r g a i n i n g outcomes. In other words the oppo-nent: must not f e e l that a concession w i l l weaken h i s long term b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . The f u l f i l l m e n t of t h i s c o n d i t i o n i s not u n l i k e l y . The s i d e committing i t s e l f has r i g g e d the b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n i n a way that a concession can e a s i l y be i n t e r p r e t e d as a move merely to preserve the p a r t i e s ' long term b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s . On the other hand, once u t i l i t i e s which c l e a r l y r e f e r to the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ' long term p o s i t i o n have been i n f u s e d i n t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s the f i n e l i n e s e p a r a t i n g r e -s t o r i n g from improving p o s i t i o n s may become b l u r r e d and, hence, commitments be regarded by the other s i d e as an a s s a u l t upon i t s long term b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . The 'range of p r a c t i c a b l e bargains' would then c o l l a p s e and the two s i d e s , presumably i n defense of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e long term p o s i t i o n s , engage i n t o i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n . These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggest that while commitment t a c t i c s may be more e f f e c t i v e than other t a c t i c s they a l s o appear more r i s k y . For the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s we s h a l l assume that s t r i k e / lockout i n c i d e n c e v a r i e s with the extent the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s employ commitment t a c t i c s . We hypothesize that the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ' readiness to r e s o r t to t h i s group of t a c t i c s and hence the s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e , v a r i e s p o s i t i v e l y with the i n t e n s i t y of c o n f l i c t and n e g a t i v e l y with the c o s t s of s t r i k e s / l o c k o u t s . A c c o r d i n g l y , one would p r e d i c t a r e d u c t i o n of s t r i k e / l o c k o u t i n -cidence i f c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e would lower c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and/or increase the c o s t s of the exer-c i s e of power. It w i l l be the subject of the remainder of t h i s paper to examine whether c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a c t u a l l y produces these e f f e c t s . 2 8 P a r t T h r e e I. THE IMPACT OF CENTRALIZATION UPON THE COSTS OF INDUSTRIAL ACTION Two f a c t o r s determine the costs of s t r i k e s / l o c k o u t s . F i r s t , the f e a t u r e s of the b a r g a i n i n g environment such as the s t r u c t u r e of the production process (the degree of i n t e g r a t i o n of o p e r a t i o n s , the p r o p o r t i o n of f i x e d to v a r i a b l e c o s t s e t c . ) , the business c y c l e ( f o r the employer s t r i k e s are more expen-s i v e i f they occur during the peak of the c y c l e than i n i t s trough) or the p r o p e r t i e s of the product (e.g. the i n t e r r u p -t i o n of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s e r v i c e s may cause only a temporary cash flow problem f o r the producer of durable goods but may i n f l i c t i r r e t r i e v a b l e l o s s e s to the producer of p e r i s h a b l e goods). Second, the b a r g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n s of employers and unions concerning the d u r a t i o n and scope of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n (where the l a t t e r denotes the p r o p o r t i o n of a b a r g a i n i n g u n i t ' s membership which i s here a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d ) . To t r a c e the p o t e n t i a l impacts of a change i n these c o s t s upon b a r g a i n i n g , the second cost component has to be c o n c e p t u a l l y n e u t r a l i z e d . Thus, the c o s t s of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n s h a l l here r e f e r to the costs per day and per b a r g a i n i n g u n i t i n which a l l members, and not only a f r a c t i o n thereof, as f o r i n s t a n c e i n r o t a t i n g s t r i k e s , are assumed to p a r t i c i p a t e i n i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n . Given the democratic c h a r a c t e r of unions and of em-p l o y e r a s s o c i a t i o n s i t i s to be expected that the costs per 29 c o l l e c t i v i t y member r a t h e r than the t o t a l c osts shape the bar-ga i n e r s ' d e c i s i o n s . The f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s i s confin e d to these r e l a t i v e c o s t s . In sho r t , by co s t s of power e x e r c i s e we mean the costs of s t r i k e s / l o c k o u t s per b a r g a i n i n g u n i t , per day and per c o l l e c t i v i t y member. C e n t r a l i z i n g a given b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s that the number of employers and employees covered by a c o l l e c t i v e agreement w i l l i n c r e a s e . It goes t h e r e f o r e near-l y without saying that the absolute costs of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n such as the t o t a l l o s s e s of production, revenue and income are bound to go up as w e l l . Whether the in c r e a s e of absolute c o s t s w i l l be p a r a l l e l e d by a r i s e of r e l a t i v e c o s t s , that i s , c o s t s per c o l l e c t i v i t y member, hinges, as we s h a l l see, on the i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g p r i o r to the v a r i a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . We s h a l l d i s t i n g u i s h between two b a s i c s c e n a r i o s , r e p r e s e n t i n g the two poles of a continuum. Most r e a l world s i -t u a t i o n s w i l l take a p o s i t i o n somewhere i n between these two extremes. The f i r s t s c e n a r i o i s epitomized by a s i t u a t i o n where n a t i o n a l l y organized l a b o r market p a r t i e s operate i n a bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e marked by l o c a l , or pl a n t b a r g a i n i n g . Under these c o n d i t i o n s s t r i k e or lockouts u s u a l l y a f f e c t only a f r a c t i o n of the t o t a l membership. The members i n v o l v e d i n i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n w i l l however be able to draw on the resources of the n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i n g members such as s t r i k e funds or c r e d i t l i n e s belonging to or granted to the labor market o r -30 g a n i z a t i o n as a whole. Thereby the costs per member of i n -d u s t r i a l a c t i o n can o f t e n be kept at a f a i r l y moderate l e v e l . Since the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e tends to reduce the discrepancy between the s t r u c t u r e of the labor mar-ket p a r t i e s and the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e , these cost advantages disappear. In case of an outbreak of s t r i k e s or loc k o u t s , due to the in c r e a s e d s t r e n g t h of 'opponent', 'party' would have to b r i n g out much l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n s of i t s membership with a corresponding d r a i n on the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s resources. Clegg e v i d e n t l y has t h i s s c e n a r i o i n mind when i n h i s c r o s s n a t i o n a l study, he a s s e r t s that s t r i k e s i n North America are cheaper to the unions than those i n other i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s . ...the United States i s predominantly a country of pl a n t agreements. In the f i v e c o u n t r i e s A u s t r a l i a , France, Sweden, United Kingdom and West Germany the great ma-j o r i t y of trade u n i o n i s t s are covered by i n d u s t r y - or r e g i o n a l agreements, or as i n A u s t r a l i a , by awards co v e r i n g an i n d u s t r y which i s e i t h e r statewide or i n t e r -s t a t e . Consequently, an o f f i c i a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r i k e may be c a l l e d i n the United States at l e a s t i n most p l a n t s i n manufacturing industry.-,- at much l e s s cost to the members as a whole than a s t r i k e to change the terms of most agreements (or awards) i n any of the other f i v e c o u n t r i e s . The second s c e n a r i o r e f e r s to a s e t t i n g where not only the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e but a l s o the union and/or the employer s t r u c t u r e i s fragmented. Un l i k e the f i r s t s c e n a r i o where c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e merely l e d to a r e a l l o c a t i o n of the members of already c e n t r a l i z e d labor market o r g a n i z a t i o n s to l a r g e r b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s , i n the second s c e n a r i o c e n t r a l i z a t i o n e q u a l l y means the c r e a t i o n of new o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s f o r employers and employees. To f u n c t i o n i n a c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e i n most cases the h e r e t o f o r e independent groupings of employers or employees w i l l band together i n the form of c o a l i t i o n s . This w i l l i n -clude a p o o l i n g of t h e i r resources. The i n c r e a s e i n absolute c o s t s of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n a s s o c i a t e d with the expansion of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s w i l l thus be o f f s e t by an equal i n c r e a s e i n resources. In consequence, the s t r i k e / l o c k o u t c o s t s per c o a l i -t i o n member do not i n c r e a s e as a r e s u l t of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . Moreover, i f one takes i n t o account that the widening of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l scope of the newly c r e a t e d l a b o r market p a r t i e s w i l l i n e v i t a b l y reduce the number of competing em-p l o y e r s , who co u l d take advantage of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n , one might even make the case that i n s c e n a r i o II f o r a small group of employers the r e l a t i v e c o s t s of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n w i l l not only not r i s e but may a c t u a l l y drop as the r e s u l t of c e n t r a l i -z a t i o n . The i n c a p a b i l i t y of the employer i n v o l v e d i n i n d u s t r i a l s t r i f e to d e l i v e r gives competitors the oppo r t u n i t y to s a t i s -fy the demand with t h e i r own products. Thereby, the employer i n v o l v e d i n i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n l o s e s the chance to recoup the revenue l o s s e s by i n c r e a s e d s a l e s a f t e r the resumption of nor-mal o p e r a t i o n s . The l o s s e s s u f f e r e d i n the course of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n become f i n a l . What i s more s e r i o u s , a f t e r the termina-t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n customers may not r e t u r n to t h e i r o r i g i n a l source of supply, amounting to a drop i n the market share. Costs of t h i s type accrue to producers whose goods or s e r v i c e s are too s i m i l i a r to those of t h e i r competitors as to 32 give r i s e to intense brand l o y a l t y . While c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e w i l l always cut down the number of competitors the r e d u c t i o n of competition w i l l only i n few cases be l a r g e enough as to have a n o t i c e a b l e impact upon the c o s t s of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n . In general, only the employers of the s h e l t e r e d sector, that i s , the s e c t o r of the economy which i s not exposed to i n t e r n a t i o n a l competition, can expect some r e l i e f . T h i s c i r c l e of p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i c i a r i e s w i l l f u r t h e r s h r i n k i f one con-s i d e r s that c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g i n Canada w i l l u s u a l l y mean ba r g a i n i n g at a r e g i o n a l or p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . Among the em-p l o y e r s who as a r e s u l t of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n could face reduced co s t s of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n one would f i n d , f o r instance, the employers of the c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y . T h i s i n d u s t r y belongs to the s h e l t e r e d s e c t o r and with few exceptions operates i n r e g i o n a l or p r o v i n c i a l markets. According to our s t r i k e / l o c k -out hypothesis c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e would then encourage r a t h e r than discourage the use of s t r i k e / lockout prone t a c t i c s on the part of t h i s i n d u s t r y ' s employers. In sum, while of course only c a r e f u l e m p i r i c a l ana-l y s i s c ould b r i n g greater c e r t a i n t y , with roughly 200 unions, of which only about h a l f have more than 10000 members, the 2 Canadian i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system appears to t i l t to s c e n a r i o I I . We would t h e r e f o r e expect that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e at the most has a moderate e f f e c t upon the c o s t s of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n and hence w i l l not have a 33 marked impact upon the i n c i d e n c e of s t r i k e s / l o c k o u t s . T h i s very general statement leaves room f o r d e v i a t i o n s at the l e v e l of i n d i v i d u a l i n d u s t r i e s . For i n s t a n c e , B r i t i s h Columbia's brewery or mining i n d u s t r i e s f i t s c e n a r i o I. Consequently, i n these i n d u s t r i e s c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would generate the d e s i r e d cost i n c r e a s e s ( i n the brewery i n d u s t r y f o r the union, i n the mining i n d u s t r y f o r the employers) and thereby c o n t r i b u t e to a lowering of s t r i k e and lockout i n c i d e n c e . I I . THE IMPACT OF CENTRALIZATION UPON CONFLICT INTENSITY The Concept of C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y C o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i s conceived of as the d i f f e r e n c e between the u t i l i t i e s which each s i d e a s c r i b e s to the poten-t i a l settlement p o i n t s of the range of p r a c t i c a b l e bargains. To v i s u a l i z e t h i s idea we s h a l l use the f o l l o w i n g c h a r t . F i g . 1. Representation of the Concept of ' C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y ' . o c >> O -P ID C H ^ 3 'H M -P T3 O v—' range of p r a c t i c a b l e bargains wage rate 34 It d e p i c t s two degrees of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y over the is s u e of wages. The curves AC, A'C r e s p e c t i v e l y , represent two p o s s i b l e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s of the employer, that i s the s e t s of values (degrees of s a t i s f a c t i o n ) he attaches to the wage ra t e s making up the range of p r a c t i c a b l e bargains. The u t i l i -ty f u n c t i o n s of the union f i n d expression i n the curves BD and B'D'. It i s assumed that f o r the union the u t i l i t i e s of a l t e r n a t i v e wage r a t e s i n c r e a s e with the wage l e v e l while they decrease f o r the employer. A c c o r d i n g l y , the u t i l i t y curve of the union has a p o s i t i v e slope the one of the employer a negative slope. For the sake of s i m p l i c i t y we s h a l l f u r t h e r assume that the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s are l i n e a r . Each set of u t i l i t y curves AC, BD and A ' C , B'D' represents a b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n which d i f f e r s from the other i n terms of i n t e n s i t y of c o n f l i c t . The degree of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y corresponds to the area enclosed by the r e s p e c t i v e u t i l i t y curves of emplo-yer and union. A c c o r d i n g l y , i n the above chart the b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d by AC, BD e x h i b i t s a higher degree of con-f l i c t i n t e n s i t y than that d e s c r i b e d by A ' C , B'D'. Due to the d i f f i c u l t y of c o n s t r u c t i n g and comparing u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s under r e a l world c o n d i t i o n s t h i s concept of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y does not lend i t s e l f to p r e c i s e measure-ment. In the context of our i n v e s t i g a f i o n t h i s d e f i c i e n c y how-ever, does not weigh too h e a v i l y . Since our c e n t r a l concern here i s to f i n d out whether c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g 3 5 s t r u c t u r e i s apt to reduce c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , the focus of our i n t e r e s t i s upon changes r a t h e r than absolute l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . It s u f f i c e s t h e r e f o r e to i d e n t i f y f a c t o r s which cause the u t i l i t y curves to s h i f t and to determine i n which d i r e c t i o n c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e would have to i n f l u e n c e them to generate sm a l l e r areas and hence lower i n t e n s i t i e s of c o n f l i c t . I f we take i n t o account that the concept of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i s s t a t e d at the aggregate l e v e l , that i s , u t i l i t i e s r e f e r to the c o l l e c t i v i t i e s r a t h e r than to t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t members, there e x i s t two p r i n c i p a l avenues through which cen-t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e could e f f e c t a lowe-r i n g of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . In the f i r s t , c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would e f f e c t a r e d u c t i o n of u t i l i t i e s o i a l l or some c o l l e c t i v i t y members. In the second avenue, while l e a v i n g the u t i l i t i e s un-changed, c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would a l t e r the weights with which the i n d i v i d u a l u t i l i t i e s enter the c o l l e c t i v i t y ' s i n t e r n a l aggre-ga t i o n process i n favor of those of the more moderate members. C o l l e c t i v i t y u t i l i t i e s can be disaggregated along ver-t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l l i n e s : the former y i e l d s l e a d e r and grass-roots u t i l i t i e s , the l a t t e r u t i l i t i e s of the var i o u s groupings of the rank and f i l e . These d i s t i n c t i o n s m i r r o r the q u a n t i t a -t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e h eterogenity of i n t e r e s t s among the c o l -l e c t i v i t y members. Unl i k e the cleavage between the i n t e r e s t s of leader and rank and f i l e which to a l a r g e extent grows out of t h e i r r o l e s i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n , the d i f -36 ference between the v a r i o u s f a c e t s of i n t e r e s t s of rank and f i l e segments eludes general s p e c i f i c a t i o n . It i s f o r that reason that i n the examination of the impacts of c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e upon the u t i l i t i e s of the rank and f i l e i t s i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t h e t e r o g e n i t y w i l l be ignored. T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n w i l l be dropped only at the second tack of our i n v e s t i g a t i o n where we s h a l l analyse the e f f e c t s of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon the d i s t r i b u t i o n of d e c i s i o n making power i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y . The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon the U t i l i t y Assignments of the Labor Market P a r t i e s Leader U t i l i t i e s versus Rank and F i l e U t i l i t i e s The t h r u s t of the g r a s s r o o t s i n t e r e s t i s d i r e c t e d at an improvement of i t s p o s i t i o n i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p to the b a r g a i n i n g opponent. In the case of union rank and f i l e f o r i nstance, t h i s i n t e r e s t manifests i t s e l f i n demands f o r higher income, i n c r e a s e d f r i n g e b e n e f i t s , job s e c u r i t y , l a r g e r share i n the company's d e c i s i o n making process e t c . Union leaders g e n e r a l l y have a s o c i a l background s i m i l i a r to that of the o r d i n a r y members and u s u a l l y are r e -3 c r u i t e d d i r e c t l y from the rank and f i l e . They can be expec-ted, t h e r e f o r e , at l e a s t q u a l i t a t i v e l y to i d e n t i f y with the i n t e r e s t s of the g r a s s r o o t s . Beyond that they have a leader s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t i n s e c u r i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n as leader and 37 extending the p r e s t i g e and b e n e f i t s a s s o c i a t e d with i t . T h i s " l a t t e r i n t e r e s t need not n e c e s s a r i l y be at variance with the i n t e r e s t of the rank and f i l e . Democratic forms of c o l l e c -t i v i t y government, and as Barbash assures us, " f j Q ' o p u l a r con-4 t r o l and p o l i t i c s are r e a l i n the n a t i o n a l union" , guarantee a c e r t a i n o v e r l a p of i n t e r e s t s . In such a set-up the c o l l e c -t i v i t y l eaders can r e a l i z e t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r goals (such as p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l growth or i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e c u r i t y ) only i f they f u l f i l l the a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e i r con-s t i t u e n t s . Thus, c o l l e c t i v i t y l e a d e r s w i l l have to t r e a t the 5 i n t e r e s t s of the gras s r o o t s as t h e i r own. However, although f o r the attainment of leader s p e c i f i c goals g r a s s r o o t s support i s necessary i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t . At l e a s t over the long haul leaders a l s o need a c e r t a i n measure of support, i n form of some voluntary r e c o g n i t i o n , by the b a r g a i n i n g opponent and the pub-l i c ( a s represented by the government). I t s d e s i r a b i l i t y i s owed to the f a c t that f o r c e d r e c o g n i t i o n r e q u i r e s a high degree of rank and f i l e m o b i l i z a t i o n which f o r longer periods of time w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to s u s t a i n . The p r i c e f o r voluntary r e c o g n i t i o n i s the e x h i b i t i o n of a 'r e s p o n s i b l e ' b a r g a i n i n g p o l i c y which u s u a l l y means a l e s s vigorous p u r s u i t of short term rank and f i l e i n t e r e s t s or g e n e r a l l y a l e s s a d v e r s e r i a l approach to b a r g a i n i n g . It i s here that the i n t e r e s t s of the leaders i n long term i n s t i t u -t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and growth w i l l c l a s h with the g r a s s r o o t s ' 38 i n t e r e s t i n more immediate b e n e f i t s e n t a i l i n g d i f f e r e n t u t i l i -ty assignments. The readiness of the leaders to take a more accommodative stand i n n e g o t i a t i o n s could be n e u t r a l i s e d or even outweighed by a s t r o n g i d e o l o g i c a l commitment to the rank and f i l e i n t e r e s t s . In view of the r a t h e r uniform ideo-l o g i c a l landscape i n North America i n comparison to say Euro-pean c o n d i t i o n s t h i s , however, appears as a r a t h e r remote p o s s i b i l i t y . O v e r a l l , t h e r e f o r e , we would expect the u t i l i t y curves of the leaders to run below that of the rank and f i l e . T h i s view accords with the r e s u l t s of a study by Parnes who concluded that " . . . i n the m a j o r i t y of cases the rank and f i l e i s more, r a t h e r than l e s s , 'extreme' than the l e a d e r s h i p i n 7 p r e s s i n g f o r c o n t r a c t demands." S i m i l i a r l y , i n B r i t a i n a government survey on workplace i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s r e v e a l e d that more than three managers i n four considered stewards to be l e s s m i l i t a n t than t h e i r members, a f i n d i n g which was con-g firmed i n a study by McCarthy and Parker. The very lac k of r i g i d i d e o l o g i c a l boundaries between employers and employees i n North America provides a f e r t i l e 9 ground f o r what Robert Michels c a l l e d 'embourgoisement'. A p p l i e d to the f i e l d of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s 1 0 the term de-notes a tendency among trade union leaders to adopt not only the l i f e - s t y l e and the demeanor of t h e i r opponents but a l s o , and t h i s i s more important here, t h e i r standards i n the assessment of b a r g a i n i n g i s s u e s . 39 Union leaders are exposed to a constant barrage of c r i t i c i s m s of t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g opponent who never becomes t i r e d of p o i n t i n g out the adverse r e p e r c u s s i o n s of t h e i r de-mands on the s t a t e and course of the 'boat' the employees pre-sumably share with the employers. To counter these a t t a c k s union leaders w i l l be hard pressed to formulate and to present t h e i r demands i n r e f e r e n c e to the economic o v e r - a l l p i c t u r e . In the d i r e c t i o n of the economy the economic order of Western c o u n t r i e s accords the owners of c a p i t a l the dominant r o l e . 1 1 T h i s i m p l i e s that f o r the economic system to f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y the concerns of the employers have to rank higher than those of the employees. For i n s t a n c e , ' s u f f i c i e n t ' investments w i l l come forward only i f i n the eyes of the c a p i t a l owners the d i s t r i b u t i o n between labor and c a p i t a l leaves them ' s a t i s f a c -t o r y ' p r o f i t s . In other words the systemic c o n s t r a i n t s which the union l e a d e r s have to take i n t o account are r i g g e d i n favor of the employers. G e t t i n g accustomed to p r e s e n t i n g and de-fending one's case i n r e f e r e n c e to the 'broader context' thus, f o r the union leaders harbours the r i s k of i n a d v e r t e n t l y adopting the b i a s i n the ranking of concerns inherent i n t h i s 'broader context'. In the f o l l o w i n g we s h a l l assume that the danger of union leaders succumbing to embourgoisement i s p o s i -t i v e l y r e l a t e d to the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d i s t a n c e between leaders and rank and f i l e . In sum, both the l e a d e r s ' dependence on the support of the opponent and the government i n a t t a i n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l se-40 c u r l t y and growth and t h e i r s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to 'embourgoisement 1 suggest that t h e i r u t i l i t y assignments are more moderate than those of the rank and f i l e . Consequently, the i n t e n s i t y of a given c o n f l i c t , i f measured i n leader u t i l i t i e s w i l l be lower than that measured i n rank and f i l e u t i l i t i e s . In the next step of our i n v e s t i g a t i o n we s h a l l examine as to whether or not c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c -ture w i l l lower the i n t e n s i t y of c o n f l i c t as seen from the per-s p e c t i v e , f i r s t , of the lea d e r s and, second, of the rank and f i l e . Since we have already analyzed q u i t e e x t e n s i v e l y the r e -l a t i o n s h i p between leader and gr a s s r o o t s u t i l i t i e s , the f i r s t part of the question may con v e n i e n t l y be answered i n r e l a t i v e terms, that i s , by a s c e r t a i n i n g whether c e n t r a l i z a t i o n w i l l f u r t h e r widen the gap between these u t i l i t i e s . The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon Leader U t i l i t i e s F o l l o w i n g the above reasoning one could expect the di s t a n c e between leader and rank and f i l e u t i l i t i e s to i n -crease i f c e n t r a l i z a t i o n renders the le a d e r s , f i r s t , more de-pendent on the vol u n t a r y r e c o g n i t i o n by opponent and govern-ment and, second, makes the leaders more s u s c e p t i b l e to 'embourgoisement'. To the extent that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n e n t a i l s a r i s e of i n t e r e s t h eterogenity i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y which w i l l normally be a s s o c i a t e d with a str e n g t h e n i n g of c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , one might argue that a l a s t i n g m o b i l i z a t i o n of the gr a s s r o o t s w i l l become more d i f f i c u l t . To ensure i n s t i -t u t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and growth the lea d e r s would t h e r e f o r e have to r e l y more h e a v i l y upon voluntary r e c o g n i t i o n . S t i l l , while p l a u s i b l e , we f e e l that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e r e s t h e t e r o g e n i t y and the l e a d e r s ' c a p a b i l i t y to m o b i l i z e the rank and f i l e which represents the l i n c h p i n of the argument i s too tenuous as to p r e d i c t a growing dependence of the lea d e r s upon t h e i r opponent and the p u b l i c . A somewhat stronger case can be made f o r the a s s e r t i o n that with c e n t r a l i z a t i o n l e a d e r s become more s u s c e p t i b l e to 'embourgoisement'. S i z e and i n t e r n a l h e t e r o g e n i t y of the bar-g a i n i n g p a r t i e s c r e a t e d by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n make i n t r a - o r g a n i -z a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t aggregation very i n t r i c a t e . The lea d e r s d i r e c t i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s can cope with the problems i n v o l v e d only with the a s s i s t a n c e of va r i o u s o f f i c i a l s and experts. Thus, c e n t r a l i z a t i o n w i l l i n e v i t a b l y give r i s e to bureaucracies on both s i d e s of the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e . However, the gain i n b a r g a i n i n g e f f i c i e n c y made hereby i s bought by an inc r e a s e i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d i s t a n c e between leaders and rank and f i l e , that i s , l e a d e r s w i l l r a r e l y be d i r e c t l y confronted with the concerns of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s . Before r e a c h i n g the n e g o t i a t o r s at the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e the wishes and grievances of the rank and f i l e u s u a l l y w i l l have passed through the f i l t e r of mul-t i p l e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l a y e r s . It appears p l a u s i b l e that leaders s h e l t e r e d i n t h i s way from immediate gra s s r o o t s pressures may 42 take a r a t h e r detached view at the concerns of the rank and f i l e . Used to p l a c i n g the demands of the membership i n a broader context the l e a d e r s may e a s i l y s l i d e i n t o the h a b i t of a p p l y i n g c r i t e r i a to the d e s i r a b i l i t y of p o t e n t i a l bar-g a i n i n g outcomes which are more congenial with the views of the opponent or ' n e u t r a l ' experts than with those of the rank 12 and f i l e . T h i s may, f o r i n s t a n c e , e x p l a i n why o f f i c i a l s at the headquartes of the 'IG M e t a l l ' (Germany's Metal Workers' Union), as has been a l l e g e d , are l e s s ' r a d i c a l ' than those 13 at the union's r e g i o n a l ( B e z i r k s - ) o f f i c e s . The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon Rank and F i l e U t i l i t i e s The r e l a t i o n s h i p between employers and employees i s marked by the coexistence of shared and c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . Most i s s u e s touch upon both types of i n t e r e s t s . A c c o r d i n g l y , the l e s s the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s are i n c l i n e d to assess the v a r i o u s i s s u e s i n the l i g h t of the c o n f l i c t i n g i s s u e s or the more they view them from the p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r common i n t e r e s t s the lower w i l l be c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . In the f o l l o w -ing i t w i l l be argued that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e c o u l d cause unions and employers to modify t h e i r per-c e p t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g i s s u e s i n the i n d i c a t e d d i r e c t i o n i f i t , f i r s t , induces the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s to i n t e g r a t e macro-goals i n t o t h e i r goal p o r t f o l i o and, second, i f i t c r e a t e s a s e t t i n g where in t e r - g r o u p c o n f l i c t i s purged from 14 i n t r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t . C e n t r a l i z a t i o n as a Means to Impart Macro-goals to the Goal P o r t f o l i o of the Labor Market P a r t i e s 'Macro-goals' denote the o b j e c t i v e s of the l a r g e r community i n which both b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s are embedded. Goals such as economic growth, monetary s t a b i l i t y , i n t e r n a t i o n a l competetiveness, f u l l employment e t c . f a l l i n t o t h i s category. T h e i r c a p a b i l i t y to reduce c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y d e r i v e s from the f a c t that u t i l i t i e s a s c r i b e d to p o t e n t i a l c o n t r a c t terms from the p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to micro-goals turn i n t o d i s u t i l i t i e s i f viewed from the p e r s p e c t i v e of macro-goals. The wage i s s u e may i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t . From the vantage of the micro-goal 'growth of short term income' the u t i l i t i e s of the unions w i l l vary p o s i t i v e l y with the -wage height. Suppose now that the macro-goal 'monetary s t a b i l i t y ' enters the assess-ment process. It may then w e l l be that from a c e r t a i n point onwards f u r t h e r wage i n c r e a s e s w i l l be viewed incompatible with the goal 'monetary s t a b i l i t y ' and thus be a s s o c i a t e d with 15 d i s u t i l i t i e s . The l a t t e r cause the u t i l i t y curve BD' i n f i g u r e 2 which embodies both micro- and macro-goals to veer o f f from the u t i l i t y curve BD which i s con s t r u c t e d with r e -spect to the micro^goal 'growth of short term income' alone. S i m i l i a r l y , the macro-goal 'increased growth', which i n modern economies u s u a l l y r e q u i r e s not only a r i s e i n the r a t e of c a p i t a l accumulation but a l s o one i n mo t i v a t i o n of the work-f o r c e , may m i t i g a t e the tendency of employers, d e r i v e d from the p r o f i t motive, to at t a c h high u t i l i t i e s to wage r a t e s 44 c l o s e to the lower end of the b a r g a i n i n g range. Analogous to the previous case of modified employee u t i l i t i e s the u t i l i t y curve A'C embodying micro- as w e l l as macro-goals w i l l l e v e l o f f with wage r a t e s approaching the lower spectrum of wage r a t e s . In both examples as a consequence of the i n t e g r a t i o n of macro-goals i n t o the frame of r e f e r e n c e of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s the area enclosed by the u t i l i t y curves has become sma l l e r i n d i c a t i n g a drop i n c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . F i g . 2. Change of C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y as a Result of B a r g a i n i n g P a r t i e s I n t e g r a t i n g Macro-Goals i n t o t h e i r Goal P o r t f o l i o . range of p r a c t i c a b l e bargains wage ra t e 45 For the p a r t i e s to make macro-goals part of t h e i r frame of ref e r e n c e two c o n d i t i o n s have to be f u l f i l l e d . F i r s t , macro-goals have to r e f l e c t common i n t e r e s t of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s and, second, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l environment of em-pl o y e r s and unions have to allow them to cope with the 'pub-l i c good' c h a r a c t e r of macro-goals. As the ex i s t e n c e of common i n t e r e s t s i s almost part of the d e f i n i t i o n of macro-goals, the f i r s t of these c o n d i -t i o n s may appear somewhat t r i t e . However, i f one cons i d e r s that macro-goals are u s u a l l y formulated by governments which are u l t i m a t e l y l e g i t i m i z e d only by m a j o r i t y vote, t h i s ap-parent s e l f - e v i d e n c e vanishes. For insta n c e , while i t i s easy to see that the macro-goal of f u l l employment c a t e r s to the i n t e r e s t of employees i n general and those out of work i n p a r t i c u l a r , one might doubt that t h i s w i l l e q u a l l y h o l d f o r the employers. Given that an in c r e a s e i n unemployment w i l l strengthen t h e i r power i n the labor market (which w i l l at l e a s t p a r t l y s p i l l over i n t o the e n t e r p r i s e i n t e r n a l em-ployer-employee r e l a t i o n s h i p ) , the macro-goal f u l l employment seems to l a c k the r e q u i r e d common i n t e r e s t component. A broader view of the question under c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggests i n t e r p r e t i n g the discrepancy i n the assessment of the de-s i r a b i l i t y of f u l l employment as one of degree r a t h e r than of kind. In democracies high unemployment r a t e s always hol d the danger f o r the employers that governments w i l l be pressured 46 i n t o e n a c t i n g sweeping economic reforms which are bound to endanger t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n i n the current economic order. It i s the employers' f e a r of adverse p o l i t i c a l r e -percussions of unemployment which guarantees i n t h i s i s s u e a c o n s i d e r a b l e overlap of i n t e r e s t s between employers and 17 unions. For macro-goals such as f u l l employment, growth, monetary s t a b i l i t y , i n t e r n a t i o n a l competitiveness, evening-out of business c y c l e s the general presumption can be made that at l e a s t at a q u a l i t a t i v e l e v e l they m i r r o r the r e a l i n t e r e s t s of a l l c o l l e c t i v i t y members. The second c o n d i t i o n p o i n t s to the 'p u b l i c good' IS c h a r a c t e r of macro-goals. From the p u b l i c choice l i t e r a t u r e we can d i s t i l l two d i s t i n c t p r o p e r t i e s of ' i d e a l type' p u b l i c goods: f i r s t , the producers of p u b l i c goods are unable to exclude non-producers from t h e i r consumption, and second, the b e n e f i t s f l o w i n g from the p u b l i c good are not f i x e d i n amount. In Sarauelson's words, "each i n d i v i d u a l ' s consumption leads to no s u b t r a c t i o n from any other i n d i v i d u a l ' s consumption of that 19 good" which i m p l i e s that the share of b e n e f i t s each i n d i -v i d u a l member r e c e i v e s from the p u b l i c good i s independent of the s i z e of the community f o r which i t i s produced. U s u a l l y meeting the two c r i t e r i a only p a r t i a l l y , ' r e a l l i f e ' p u b l i c goods r a r e l y reach the p u r i t y of ' i d e a l type' pub-20 l i e goods. The macro-goals we have i n mind here are pure i n terms of the second c r i t e r i o n ('non-competitiveness of consumption'). As the b e n e f i t s f l o w i n g from macro-goals such as growth, mone-t a r y s t a b i l i t y , i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , e l i m i n a t i o n of business c y c l e s e t c . are not f i x e d i n supply, the 'consump-t i o n ' of these goods by one i n d i v i d u a l w i l l not a f f e c t the consumption of another i n d i v i d u a l . Macro-goals e x h i b i t a l e s s homogeneous p i c t u r e with respect to the ' n o n - e x c l u d i b i l i t y ' c r i t e r i o n . While the 'producers' of monetary s t a b i l i t y or evening out of business c y c l e s are unable to exclude non-con-t r i b u t o r s from consumption, those of growth or i n t e r n a t i o n a l competetiveness enjoy some measure of c o n t r o l over the f r u i t s of t h e i r e f f o r t s . U n l i k e the former macro-goals i t i s p o s s i b l e to speak of growth or i n t e r n a t i o n a l competitiveness i n a micro-sense, as i n the growth of companies or i n d u s t r i e s . Primary b e n e f i t s from growth i n form of higher wages or dividends w i l l accrue s o l e l y t o the members of the growing company. However, i n an economy based on d i v i s i o n of la b o r with an attendant network of 'forward' and 'backward' li n k a g e s changes i n eco-nomic a c t i v i t y i n one u n i t are bound to s p i l l over to other companies and to generate secondary b e n e f i t s there. It i s these l a t t e r b e n e f i t s which elude the c o n t r o l of the producers and which c o n s t i t u t e the p u b l i c good component of macro-goals as growth or i n t e r n a t i o n a l competitiveness. The i n a b i l i t y of producers of p u b l i c goods to exclude non-contributors from the consumption of p u b l i c goods opens the door f o r some consumers to engage i n p a r a s i t i c a l behavior, that i s to share i n the consumption of the p u b l i c good without 48 having to p a r t i c i p a t e i n d e f r a y i n g i t s production c o s t s . In s i t u a t i o n s where none of the group members deems the pro-duction of the p u b l i c good p r o f i t a b l e i f he has to bear the production c o s t s alone the mere f e a s i b i l i t y of p a r a s i t i c a l behavior presents a s e r i o u s impediment to the supply of the p u b l i c good. In such a s e t t i n g i t i s u n l i k e l y that the co-o p e r a t i o n among group members which i s necessary f o r the pro-duction of the p u b l i c good comes i n t o being. Even i f the i n d i -v i d u a l member i s prepared to act i n the common i n t e r e s t i t would be n o n s e n s i c a l f o r him to c o n t r i b u t e to the p r o duction of the p u b l i c good i f he can reasonably assume that everybody e l s e i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y acts r a t i o n a l l y , that i s chooses the o p t i o n which o f f e r s the highest pay-off f o r the i n d i v i d u a l : the f r e e r i d e r one. As h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n alone w i l l be i n s u f -f i c i e n t to make up f o r the l a c k of cooperation of the r e s t of the c o l l e c t i v i t y an adherence by him to c o l l e c t i v e l o g i c r a t h e r than to i n d i v i d u a l l o g i c appears p o i n t l e s s l e a v i n g him but with the l o s s of h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n . The o pportunity of 'free r i d e r ' behavior thus c o n s p i r e s with the f e a r that i t w i l l be s e i z e d upon to prevent the common i n t e r e s t of the c o l l e c t i v i t y members t r a n s l a t i n g i t s e l f i n t o the supply of the p u b l i c good. Two ways are c o n c e i v a b l e by which the s i t u a t i o n could be remedied. The f i r s t would be to impart the c o l l e c t i v i t y members a 'new' m o r a l i t y which p o s t u l a t e s the supremacy of c o l -l e c t i v e over i n d i v i d u a l r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s o p t i o n , however, i s c l e a r l y beyond the purview of s t r u c t u r a l p o l i c y and i s t here-49 f o r e not p e r t i n e n t here. The second way to eliminate, the op-p o r t u n i t y to p r a c t i c e p a r a s i t i c a l behavior i s to vest the c o l l e c t i v i t y with the c a p a c i t y to e x e r c i s e c o e r c i o n . The r e -a l i z a t i o n of t h i s o p t i o n r e q u i r e s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l coverage of a l l p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the p u b l i c good. Only c a s u a l r e f l e c t i o n , however,' w i l l make i t p l a i n that such comprehen-s i v e coverage can not be accomplished by e n l a r g i n g formal b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s . The n o t i o n of the p r o v i n c i a l or even n a t i o n a l economy, f o r which macro-goals such as monetary s t a b i l i t y or growth are defined, turned i n t o one b i g b a r g a i n i n g u n i t appears q u i t e o u t l a n d i s h and, thus, does simply not represent a f e a s i b l e o p t i o n . What i s a t t a i n a b l e i s a l i m i t e d extension of c o e r c i v e s t r u c t u r e s i n form of a s h i f t f o r example from the p l a n t to the i n d u s t r y l e v e l . Such move would e n t a i l a reduc-t i o n of the number of independent a c t o r s i n the p r o v i n c i a l or n a t i o n a l economy and i n t h i s sense a r e d u c t i o n i n group s i z e . Recognizing these p o l i c y l i m i t a t i o n s , the only question we can r e a l i s t i c a l l y pose i s whether the scope of the c o e r c i v e s t r u c t u r e s c r e a t e d by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c -ture to i n d u s t r y l e v e l w i l l give the i n d i v i d u a l group members s u f f i c i e n t c o n t r o l over h i s f e l l o w member to prevent him from p r a c t i c i n g p a r a s i t i c a l behavior. In absence of c o e r c i o n , w i t h o l d i n g one's c o n t r i b u t i o n i s the only weapon the i n d i v i d u a l has to punish p a r a s i t i c a l behavior. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i s weapon depends on the 50 n o t i c e a b i l i t y of such withdrawal, that i s , on i t s impact upon the c o s t - b e n e f i t c a l c u l u s (concerning production and consump-t i o n of the p u b l i c good) of the other group members. Large groups i n which the a c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l members are h a r d l y n o t i c e a b l e , thus, only r a r e l y possess the c a p a c i t y to provide themselves with a p u b l i c good. Canada's d e c e n t r a l i z e d bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e f i t s the l a r g e group s c e n a r i o which at l e a s t p a r t l y e x p l a i n s why, to the dismay of governments and i n t e r -ested observers a l i k e , c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i n Canada func-t i o n s almost o b l i v i o u s l y to n a t i o n a l economic and s o c i a l con-21 cerns. As can be d e r i v e d from the above reasoning i t simply wouldn't make sense f o r the p a r t i e s of a small b a r g a i n i n g u n i t f o r example to e x e r c i s e r e s t r a i n t at the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e f o r the sake of monetary s t a b i l i t y i f there i s no guarantee that the other a c t o r s i n the system, and t h i s i n c l u d e s not only employers and unions but a l s o government, f o l l o w s u i t . C e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e could e f f e c t a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n from a l a r g e group i n t o what Olson c a l l e d an 22 o l i g o p o l y - s i z e d group . In a group of t h i s s i z e p a r a s i t i c a l behavior i s n o t i c e a b l e . A r e t a l i a t o r y withdrawal of coopera-t i o n by any member w i l l have a t a n g i b l e e f f e c t upon the wel-f a r e of the 'free r i d e r ' . If worst comes to the worst f o r the 'free r i d e r ' the p u b l i c good would not be produced at a l l which would e f f e c t i v e l y thwart h i s attempt to r e a l i z e a p a r a s i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and moreover would very l i k e l y leave him i n a worse p o s i t i o n than i f he had p a i d h i s share and r e c e i v e d the b e n e f i t s of the p u b l i c good. On the other hand the adverse im-pacts of p a r a s i t i c a l behavior upon the welfar e of the 'honest' members may not be pronounced enough to dissuade the l a t t e r from producing the p u b l i c good. T h i s makes an assessment of the group's c a p a b i l i t y to provide i t s e l f with a p u b l i c good d i f f i c u l t : . . . ( i n ) a group,...which does not have so many members that no one member w i l l n o t i c e whether any other member i s or i s not h e l p i n g to provide the c o l l e c t i v e good... a c o l l e c t i v e 9 g o o d may, or e q u a l l y w e l l may not, be obtained, While Olson acknowledges that the gap between i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y becomes s m a l l e r as one moves from the la r g e to the small or o l i g o p o l y - s i z e d group he a l s o recog-n i z e s that t h i s r e d u c t i o n i n d i s t a n c e i s not s u f f i c i e n t . In the clause f o l l o w i n g the above quote he adds "...but no c o l -l e c t i v e good may be obtained without some group c o o r d i n a t i o n 24 or o r g a n i z a t i o n . " C o n s i d e r i n g that the substance of such c o o r d i n a t i o n i n c l u d e s such matters as d e c i s i o n s on the r e l a -t i v e p r i c e each group member has to pay f o r the p r o v i s i o n of the p u b l i c good or on the d e s i r a b l e amount of the p u b l i c good one might w e l l doubt whether the r e q u i r e d c o o r d i n a t i o n can be accomplished i n absence of c o e r c i v e means. The ex-periences which the B r i t i s h made with t h e i r incomes p o l i c y show that such doubts are w e l l j u s t i f i e d . In 1974 the incoming government of Harold Wilson entered i n t o a ' s o c i a l c o n t r a c t ' with the TUC, B r i t a i n ' s trade union f e d e r a t i o n . In exchange f o r concessions at the 52 wage f r o n t the government o f f e r e d a package of measures st r o n g -l y advocated by the unions ( f o r i n s t a n c e , the re p e a l of the 1971 I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Act, changes i n the p r o g r e s s i o n of the income tax, a rent f r e e z e e t c . ) . Lacking c o n t r o l over i t s a f f i l i a t e s the TUC, d e s p i t e the best of i n t e n t i o n s , proved to be unable to l i v e up to i t s part of the bar g a i n . I r r e s p e c t i v e of i t s e x h o r t a t i o n s to abide by the terms of the agreement i n d i v i d u a l unions, as f o r inst a n c e the Miners, concluded agree-25 ments f a r i n excess of the wage g u i d e l i n e s . E f f e c t i v e commitments by employers and unions to a set of macro-goals seem to presuppose the ex i s t e n c e of a second l a y e r of d e c i s i o n making g r a f t e d upon the expanded b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s . For a v a r i e t y of reasons, the establishment of such a p o l i t i c a l b a r g a i n i n g arena overtaxes the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the instrument v a r i a b l e ' c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c -ture ' . A p o l i t i c a l b a r g a i n i n g arena as i t has m a t e r i a l i z e d 26 f o r i nstance i n A u s t r i a ' s ' P a r i t a e t i s c h e Kommission' r e -qui r e s h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d l a b o r market p a r t i e s . T h i s i m p l i e s that the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s would have to t r a n s -l a t e i n t o a comprehensive c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the o r g a n i z a t i o n s of management and la b o r . One might p l a u s i b l y argue that c e n t r a -l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e w i l l give some impetus to employers and employees to c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s w i t h i n the expanded b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s . But i t does 53 not seem very l i k e l y that these changes w i l l snowball and c r e a t e powerful and a l l embracing a s s o c i a t i o n s or f e d e r a t i o n s at the p r o v i n c i a l , l e t alone n a t i o n a l , l e v e l . Even i f we ad-mit the p o s s i b i l i t y that the l a t t e r w i l l a c t u a l l y happen there are at l e a s t two other f a c t o r s which i n Canada would m i l i t a t e against the 'spontaneous' r i s e of a c o e r c i v e s t r u c t u r e beyond the l e v e l of formal b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s . The f i r s t i s the fragmented government s t r u c t u r e i n Canada. I t s r a t h e r extreme f e d e r a l i s m , however u s e f u l i n other a p p l i c a t i o n s , i s not very conducive to c o r p o r a t i s t i c d e c i s i o n making which c a l l s f o r a high degree of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l aggre-27 g a t i o n on the part of i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s . The second impedi-ment to the i n s t a l l a t i o n of a f o r m a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l b a r g a i n i n g arena i n Canada i s the low union d e n s i t y , which n a t i o n a l l y amounts to only 40% of the work f o r c e . Unless p r o v i s i o n s are made to extend the a u t h o r i t y of the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the u n i o n i z e d s e c t o r to the non-unionized one, which i s c u r r e n t l y 28 p o s s i b l e only i n Quebec , a l a r g e segment of the economy would stay o u t s i d e the purview of the new s t r u c t u r e . And the en-visaged transmutation from a l a r g e i n t o an o l i g o p o l y - s i z e d group would then remain incomplete. Given the i d e o l o g i c a l pro-c l i v i t i e s of North Americans, the c o n f e r r a l of such a u t h o r i -t i e s to employer and union f e d e r a t i o n s , however, would hardly meet with the approval of the m a j o r i t y of Canadians. With the p o s s i b l e exception of Quebec, where the h i s t o r i c a l dominance of the C a t h o l i c Church has tempered the i d e o l o g i c a l i n f l u e n c e 54 of the E n g l i s h speaking m a j o r i t y of the continent, any form of c o l l e c t i v i s m i s bound to be seen as a severe encroachment upon i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and hence would encounter r e s i s t a n c e . From these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s one may draw the c o n c l u s i o n that f o r the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s to add macro-goals to t h e i r goal p o r t f o l i o , c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e may be a necessary but ha r d l y a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n . C e n t r a l i z a t i o n as a Means to I n t e r n a l i z e C o n f l i c t I n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t comprises both inte r - g r o u p as w e l l as i n t r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t . In d e c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s c o n f l i c t s of the l a t t e r type can not be r e s o l v e d i n d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n of the groupings i n v o l v e d . Instead, the bar-g a i n i n g opponent f u n c t i o n s as i n v o l u n t a r y go-between. In other words, before i n t r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t can be addressed i t has to be transformed i n t o i n t e r - g r o u p c o n f l i c t . In t h i s way the former c o n f l i c t exacerbates the l a t t e r c o n f l i c t . The wage is s u e may serve as an i l l u s t r a t i o n . Union rank and f i l e conceive of the f a i r n e s s of a par-t i c u l a r wage r a t e i n absolute and r e l a t i v e terms. The shape of the u t i l i t y curve of the rank and f i l e group A, U^, i n f i g u r e 3 i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s . While i t s p o s i t i v e slope expresses the i n t e r e s t of the ranak and f i l e i n absolute wage in c r e a s e s the curve's bend at w gg, the wage r a t e of the ref e r e n c e group B, m i r r o r s the r e l a t i v e or e q u i t y component of i t s u t i l i t y 55 F i g . 3. I n t e n s i t y of Wage C o n f l i c t : I n t e r n a l i z e d vs. E x t e r n a l i z e d . . assignments. 'Invidious comparison' holds down u t i l i t i e s i n the lower reaches of the b a r g a i n i n g range and allows them to r i s e only at a wage r a t e w eg. Analogous to f i g u r e 1 (p.33) the i n t e n s i t y of c o n f l i c t between employer and union rank and f i l e i s i n d i c a t e d by the area enclosed by the u t i l i t y schedule of the employer, U E, and that of the rank and f i l e , V 56 In a decentral ized bargaining structure where the s ingle employer- and employee groupings negotiate indepen-dently of each other i t i s eas i ly possible that, for example due to higher productivity , reference group B manages to exact a wage rate w Q + with weSjc > w eg. From the vantage of rank and f i l e grouping A such change would disturb the ex i s t ing equity equi l ibr ium c a l l i n g for a reassessment of the wage rates making up the range of pract icable bargains. As the wage rates lower than w e . + w i l l be attached low values the u t i l i t y curve U"A would be sh i f ted downwards and form the new curve IT.*. As a A* resul t of rank and f i l e grouping A's e f fort to maintain par i ty with reference group B, the c o n f l i c t intens i ty between employer and employees has r i sen by an amount represented by the area enclosed by the u t i l i t y curves and . The regulatory d e f i c i t with respect to intra-group con-f l i c t disappears with c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . Since the s ingle groupings or fact ions would have to bargain together, c o n f l i c t s among them can be addressed in a d irect fashion. In other words, cen tra l i za t ion in terna l i zes intra-group c o n f l i c t . As Joel Seidman puts i t "...management's present problem. . . would be converted into an in terna l union problem i f a s ingle indus-t r i a l type union, or a c o a l i t i o n of ex i s t ing unions, were es-29 tab l i shed ." The presumption that the intens i ty of c o n f l i c t between employer and union drops as a consequence of i n t e r -n a l i z a t i o n , however, obtains only i f intra-group conf l i c t can be solved more eas i ly in a se t t ing where those concerned nego-57 t i a t e d i r e c t l y with each other than i n a s e t t i n g where the b a r g a i n i n g opponent f u n c t i o n s as go-between. Unfortunately, authors who p e r c e i v e i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of c o n f l i c t s as an asset of c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s do l i t t l e to supply evidence or arguments demonstrating that t h i s i s i n f a c t the case. For i n s t a n c e , J o e l Seidman recog-n i z e s that c o n f l i c t s between employee groups do not simply disappear by i n t e r n a l i z i n g them: " I f a l l the employees were in a s i n g l e o r g a n i z a t i o n , the c o n f l i c t i n g demands would some-30 how have to be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . . . " ' How-ever, as he does not s p e c i f y any f u r t h e r t h i s 'somehow' we have to assume that he takes the s o l u t i o n of i n t e r n a l i z e d con-f l i c t s f o r granted. While Weiler has to be commended f o r at l e a s t seeing that the presumed c a p a c i t y of c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c -t u r e s to s o l v e i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s e f f i c i e n t l y i s not s e l f evident, the arguments he presents to support t h i s assumption are i n s u f f i c i e n t . With respect to j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d isputes owed to t e c h n o l o g i c a l change, a second c l a s s of c o n f l i c t s s u i t a b l e to i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , W eiler remarks: If there i s some k i n d of cohesive c o a l i t i o n of unions i n d e a l i n g with the employers... then the problem becomes manageable f o r n e g o t i a t o r s with the w i l l to s o l v e i t . One can then introduce i n t o a l l of the c o l l e c t i v e agree-ments a s i n g l e m e d i a t i o n - a r b i t r a t i o n system to deal„with the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l impact of t e c h n o l o g i c a l change. By f o c u s s i n g on the very narrow and l e g a l i s t i c concept of 'manageability of c o n f l i c t s ' Weiler f a i l s to address the ' r e a l ' i s s u e here. Instead of meeting the problem of i n t e r e s t 58 aggregation head on, Weiler merely s h i f t s i t from the l e v e l of c o n t r a c t terms to that of the r u l e s which govern h i s ad-j u d i c a t i v e body. There, the problem then i s brushed aside by p o i n t i n g to the n e c e s s i t y of 'negotiators with the w i l l to s o l v e i t [/the c o n f l i c t over j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d isputes J ' . In order to e s t a b l i s h the s u p e r i o r i t y of c e n t r a l i z e d over d e c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s i n r e s o l v i n g con-f l i c t s one could proceed along two l i n e s . F i r s t , one c o u l d t r y to demonstrate that i n c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s the s i n g l e groupings are l e s s i n t r a n s i g e n t i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s and t h e r e -f o r e more amenable to consensual s o l u t i o n s to i n t e r n a l con-f l i c t s . Second, one c o u l d seek to show that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n opens up the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e s o l v i n g divergent i n t e r e s t s by c o e r c i o n , that i s , by v e s t i n g a segment of the c o l l e c t i v i t y with the power to impose a c o n f l i c t ' s o l u t i o n ' upon the other c o l l e c t i v i t y members. To begin with the former and normatively more appealing p o s i t i o n , c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e could cause changes of two kinds i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the groupings of employers and employees, making an i n c r e a s e d f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e i r u t i l i t y assignments p l a u s i b l e . F i r s t , to h o l d t h e i r own i n employer-employee b a r g a i n i n g the groupings making up each s i d e have to d i s p l a y a u n i t e d f r o n t . Provided that i n t e r - c o l l e c t i v i t y c o n f l i c t i s viewed as the dominant f a c e t of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t by the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d (so f a r there i s l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n that t h i s i s not the case) f l e x i -59 b i l i t y i n c o l l e c t i v i t y i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t appears as the p r i c e f o r success i n i n t e r - c o l l e c t i v i t y b a r g a i n i n g . One could there-f o r e expect that i n c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s there w i l l evolve a tendency to s o l v e d i s p u t e s among groupings of employees or employers i n an accommodating s t y l e . The s t r o n g appeal which ' o b j e c t i v e ' procedures, such as job e v a l u a t i o n schemes i n the c o n f l i c t over wage s t r u c t u r e s enjoy, may be i n d i c a t i v e of such a tendency. Secondly, the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of c o n f l i c t s could modi-fy the c o l l e c t i v i t y members' p e r c e p t i o n of the c o n f l i c t nature. In a d e c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e where the groupings i n v o l v e d i n int r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t do not face each other i n d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s they may e a s i l y succumb to the d e l u s i o n that the gains made at the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e are e x c l u s i v e l y at the expense of the b a r g a i n i n g opponent. To maintain such a view would be d i f f i c u l t i f intra-group c o n f l i c t s were i n t e r -n a l i z e d . For inst a n c e , with the t o t a l wage b i l l becoming the primary magnitude i n employer-employee b a r g a i n i n g , c o n f l i c t s over an e q u i t a b l e wage s t r u c t u r e w i l l have to be i n t e r p r e t e d as c o n f l i c t s over the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r 'wage fund' which under given circumstances can be exacted from the employers. From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e the s h i f t s i n the wage s t r u c -ture which p r e v i o u s l y appeared as 'variable-sum' i n c h a r a c t e r w i l l now take on 'constant-sum' f e a t u r e s , that i s the gain of one grouping w i l l be .the l o s s of the other. An o p t i m i s t i c • 60 a p p r a i s a l of employee s o l i d a r i t y would suggest that the 'new' awareness of the nature of intra-group c o n f l i c t dampens t h e i r d e s i r e to t i l t the wage s t r u c t u r e i n t h e i r f a v o r . The bar-g a i n i n g goal 'extension of wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s ' may give way to the more moderate goal of 'removing i n e q u i t i e s ' . T h i s goal, and hence t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , has meaning only to the extent that there e x i s t s a consensus among those concerned as to what c o n s t i t u t e s an i n e q u i t y . Thus, a l l that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n can accomplish i n t h i s regard i s to b r i n g out a l a t e n t consensus more e f f e c t i v e l y . Conversely, the potency of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as a means to reduce c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i n a non-coercive manner co u l d be s a i d to be l i m i t e d by the scope of . t h e consensus on the i s s u e s at stake. Fathoming such con-sensus r e q u i r e s c a r e f u l e m p i r i c a l research which i s beyond the purview of t h i s paper. For that reason we s h a l l c o n f i n e our-s e l f to a more or l e s s i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c sketch of the con-sensus on one p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e : 'equitable wage s t r u c t u r e ' . Throughout i t s h i s t o r y 'equal pay f o r equal work' has been an important slogan of the la b o r movement. In the i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n that members of the same occupation o p e r a t i n g i n the same economic environment should r e c e i v e equal wages the slogan seems to meet widely h e l d views on the minimum r e q u i r e -ments of an e q u i t a b l e wage s t r u c t u r e . T h i s may e x p l a i n why i n Saskatchewan the i n t r o d u c t i o n of province wide u n i f o r m i t y of teacher s a l a r i e s i n the wake of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e d i d not e l i c i t notable r e s i s t a n c e among the 61 32 teachers concerned. The consensus which appears to. e x i s t on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of e q u a l i t y w i t h i n the same o c c u p a t i o n a l group melts away as one enters the i n t e r - o c c u p a t i o n a l f i e l d . While the widespread use of job e v a l u a t i o n schemes seems to i n d i c a t e l a r g e support f o r the idea that the wage s t r u c t u r e should r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n c e s i n a job's s k i l l content, hazards, i t s holder's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , e d u c a t i o n a l r e q u i r e -ments e t c . there e x i s t s l e s s unanimity as to how to weigh these q u a l i t i e s . Procedural means may overcome the l a t t e r d i s -agreements i f they a r i s e i n connection with the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 'new' jobs. However, as the h i s t o r y of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n a l l western c o u n t r i e s has shown even the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d job e v a l u a t i o n schemes f a i l to b r i n g about consensual s o l u t i o n s i f they e n t a i l the m o d i f i c a t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l wage d i f f e r e n -t i a l s among e s t a b l i s h e d o c c u p a t i o n a l groups. Those occupying i t s upper echolons w i l l resent any attempt to l e v e l or only to compress the present wage h i e r a r c h y . It appears thus that durable changes of t h i s type can be a s s e r t e d , i f at a l l , only by means of c o e r c i o n . As to what extent c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s possess such c a p a b i l i t i e s s h a l l be examined i n the remainder of t h i s chapter. C o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n by c o e r c i o n i s p o s s i b l e i f one seg-ment of the c o l l e c t i v i t y i s vested with the power of imposing i t s p a r t i c u l a r c o n f l i c t s o l u t i o n upon the r e s t of the c o l l e c -t i v i t y . In o r g a n i z a t i o n s where the unanimity p r i n c i p l e governs d e c i s i o n making no s i n g l e grouping has such powers. Few orga-62 n i z a t i o n s , however, can a f f o r d the 'luxury' of such a d e c i -s i o n r u l e . As f o r instance the e a r l y h i s t o r y of c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g i n Quebec's c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y or the 1981 ba r g a i n i n g round between the Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t and a c o a l i t i o n of c i v i c unions has amply demonstrated the r e q u i r e -ment of unanimous d e c i s i o n s s e r i o u s l y impairs a c o l l e c t i v i t y ' s 33 c a p a c i t y to a c t . Thus, i n the long run most o r g a n i z a t i o n s of employers and employees i n c o n s o l i d a t e d b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s can not help adopting the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e as d e c i s i o n r u l e and thereby acquire the formal c a p a c i t y to sol v e intra-group c o n f l i c t by c o e r c i o n . Formal c a p a c i t y , however, only gives a weak i n d i c a t i o n of the a c t u a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s mode of c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n under r e a l world c o n d i t i o n s . M a j o r i t y r u l e presupposes that the m i n o r i t y defers to the d e c i s i o n s of the m a j o r i t y . In view of the type of c o n f l i c t s we are d e a l i n g with here (the gain of one grouping i s the l o s s of the other) one can hardly assume that t h i s c o n d i t i o n w i l l always o b t a i n . Rather, we would expect the m i n o r i t y to bow to the d e c i s i o n s of the m a j o r i t y only i f i t pe r c e i v e s them as f a i r or f e e l s too powerless to mount e f f e c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e . In p a r t , the harshness of m a j o r i t y r u l e i s d i f f u s e d by the f a c t that ...the t y p i c a l union member i s not simply i d e n t i f i e d with the m a j o r i t y or the m i n o r i t y ; h i s i n t e r e s t s l i e with d i f f e r e n t groups on d i f f e r e n t i s s u e s . On wages, he may belong to a m a j o r i t y ; on f r i n g e b e n e f i t s to the mi-n o r i t y ; on working c o n d i t i o n s he may simply belong to one of the many m i n o r i t i e s that are backing s p e c i a l de-mands r e l e v a n t to p a r t i c u l a r job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , or de-partments.°^ I d e a l l y , the occasions i n which a p a r t i c u l a r c o l l e c t i v i t y member belongs to the m i n o r i t y w i l l be o f f s e t by those where he i s part of the m a j o r i t y . Unfortunately, the d e s i r e d a l t e r -n a t i o n i s not always forthcoming. Some group members may f i n d themselves i n a permanent m i n o r i t y p o s i t i o n or a t t a c h so much importance to one p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e that a m i n o r i t y p o s i t i o n w i l l become impossible to compensate f o r . For tradesmen, who i n i n d u s t r i a l unions represent an o c c u p a t i o n a l m i n o r i t y , the wage d i f f e r e n t i a l over t h e i r l e s s s k i l l e d co-workers appears to be such a s e n s i t i v e i s s u e . Ac-c o r d i n g to Weber i t was the compression of these d i f f e r e n t i a l s which i n many unions t r i g g e r e d the d r i v e f o r formal c r a f t r e -p r e s e n t a t i o n and, more p e r t i n e n t l y to our i n q u i r y , which ac-counted f o r many of North America's s k i l l e d trades r e v o l t s ( of which the w i l d c a t s t r i k e s by tradesmen i n the B.C. f o r e s t i n d u s t r y during the 1981 n e g o t i a t i o n round are a recent 35 example). On the other hand, these o c c u p a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s seem to f e e l l e s s s t r o n g l y about m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s which barred them from u n i l a t e r a l l y modifying the e s t a b l i s h e d wage s t r u c t u r e and thereby from s e t t i n g i n motion the c i r c l e of com-p e t i t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . For i n s t a n c e , with respect to the con-s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y Rose noted that i n those provinces which had moved to more c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s (as f o r instance B r i t i s h Columbia or Quebec) wage h i e r a r c h i e s ex-h i b i t e d a c o n s i d e r a b l y higher s t a b i l i t y than i n those with de-64 3 6 c e n t r a l i z e d systems. S i m i l i a r consequences of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 37 could be observed i n the n a t i o n a l r a i l w a y s and the Vancouver sh i p y a r d i n d u s t r y . In the l a t t e r i n d u s t r y the members of some trades ( f o r example plumbers and e l e c t r i c i a n s ) even d e f e r r e d to m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s which e l i m i n a t e d the wage premiums they \ 38 enjoyed v i s a v i s other trades i n the i n d u s t r y . Such be-havi o r , one could a l s o argue, t e s t i f i e s l e s s to the p e r c e i v e d f a i r n e s s of these d e c i s i o n s as to the pe r c e i v e d power d i f f e r -ence between m a j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y . C o n s i d e r i n g that the con-f l i c t s we are d e a l i n g with here are those where the gain of the ma j o r i t y i s the l o s s of the m i n o r i t y t h i s may i n e f f e c t be the more c r u c i a l f a c t o r . The power which a m a j o r i t y wields over the m i n o r i t y to a l a r g e extent i s d e r i v e d power. It i s c o n f e r r e d upon the ma-j o r i t y by the s t a t e through the i n s t i t u t i o n a l / l e g a l order. Since not only the la b o r markets themselves, but al s o the s t a t e as guardian of a country's i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s order, has an i n t e r e s t i n powerful c o l l e c t i v i t i e s , i t i s not par-t i c u l a r l y s u r p r i s i n g that the i n s t i t u t i o n a l / l e g a l framework of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i n North America has a b i a s i n favor of m a j o r i t y r u l e . In B r i t i s h Columbia's i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s order t h i s b i a s comes out most c l e a r l y i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n s of imposed union c o u n c i l s . The Labor R e l a t i o n s Board p r e s c r i b e s the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e as d e c i s i o n r u l e not only f o r s t r i k e votes, a s t i p u l a t i o n which holds o u t s i d e union c o u n c i l s as w e l l , but a l s o f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n votes and votes taken i n the 65 39 c o u n c i l ' s s t e e r i n g commitee. As counterpoise to these p r o v i s i o n s the s t a t u t o r y ob-40 l i g a t i o n of ' f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' appears to be only of l i m i t e d e f f e c t i v e n e s s . It may give some p r o t e c t i o n from d i s -c r i m i n a t i o n to a b a r g a i n i n g u n i t ' s non-union members or to r a c i a l or r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s but i s l i k e l y to have l i t t l e impact i n cases where ' f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' has not taken on the meaning of 'equal treatment'. For i n s t a n c e , the o b l i g a -t i o n of f a i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n seems ha r d l y apt to vest the tradesmen i n i n d u s t r i a l unions with the l e g a l c l a i m on the p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s t o t h e i r l e s s s k i l l e d co-workers. The t h r e a t of s e c e s s i o n i s another instrument f o r the m i n o r i t y to gain leverage over the m a j o r i t y . F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the l a t t e r t h i s weapon experiences very l i t t l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l support. In an a n a l y s i s of N a t i o n a l Labor R e l a t i o n s Board r u l i n g s Brooks and Thompson found that the Board e x h i b i t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e r e l u c t a n c e to break up e x i s t i n g m u l t i - p l a n t and 41 i n d u s t r i a l b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s . For example i t would not accede to severance p e t i t i o n s of craftsmen unless they won a m a j o r i -42 ty of c r a f t votes i n a l l the p l a n t s of the u n i t . In l a r g e and p h y s i c a l l y d i s p e r s e d b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s such a s t i p u l a t i o n i s l i k e l y to thwart most attempts at s e c e s s i o n . Whether the intra-group power d i s t r i b u t i o n between ma-j o r i t y and m i n o r i t y as i t i s enshrined i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e -l a t i o n s order c o i n c i d e s with the a c t u a l power d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l 66 depend on the government's readiness to enforce t h i s order. Two f a c t o r s seem to be of importance here: f i r s t , the harm which i l l e g a l a c t i o n s of the m i n o r i t y causes t h i r d p a r t i e s and, second, the p o l i t i c a l c o sts of e n f o r c i n g the law against the r e s i s t a n c e of the m i n o r i t y . The former f a c t o r decides whether and to what extent a m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y c o n f l i c t w i l l t u r n i n t o a p o l i t i c a l i s s u e and as such a t t r a c t s government a t t e n t i o n . The l a r g e r the s i d e e f f e c t s of i l l e g a l a c t i o n s of the m i n o r i t y f o r t h i r d p a r t i e s , one may p l a u s i b l y assume, the stronger w i l l be the pressure upon the government to i n t e r -vene. Which d i r e c t i o n t h i s i n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l take determines the second f a c t o r . We assume that the i n c l i n a t i o n of governments to en-f o r c e the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s order and hence to s i d e with the m a j o r i t y v a r i e s i n v e r s e l y with the p o l i t i c a l c o sts of doing so. The l a t t e r can be conceived as a f u n c t i o n of the p u b l i c support the m i n o r i t y can muster and i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . To i l l u s t r a t e these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s we may use them to e x p l a i n why tradesmen i n i n d u s t r i a l unions, u n l i k e other m i n o r i t i e s , have o f t e n been able to wrest s p e c i a l r e -p r e s e n t a t i o n r i g h t s from t h e i r unions. For i n s t a n c e , i n the UAW (United Automobil Workers of America) which i n the con-cess i o n s to i t s s k i l l e d tradesmen perhaps moved f u r t h e s t away from the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e , the craftsmen enjoy not only d i -r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on l o c a l and n a t i o n a l b a r g a i n i n g committees but a l s o have the r i g h t to h o l d separate r a t i f i c a t i o n and 67 s t r i k e votes on those c o n t r a c t p a r t s which r e l a t e e x c l u s i v e l y 43 to t h e i r group. Tradesmen occupy s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n s i n the production process of many i n d u s t r i e s . I l l e g a l a c t i o n s , f o r inst a n c e w i l d -cat s t r i k e s are t h e r e f o r e apt to d i s r u p t operations s e r i o u s l y . The damage caused t h i r d p a r t i e s (employers, customers, sup-p l i e r s e t c . ) not only gives the m i n o r i t y ' s grievances wide p u b l i c i t y but a l s o p l a c e s the government under pressure to en-fo r c e the law and thereby back the ma j o r i t y i n the int r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t . In the tradesmen, however, the government faces a formidable opponent. Aided by t h e i r pronounced c r a f t conscious-ness tradesmen have developed a cohesion which enables them to act i n a d i s c i p l i n e d and determined f a s h i o n . A group with these o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s i s u n l i k e l y to be i n t i m i -dated by mere t h r e a t s and may not be p a r t i c u l a r i l y impressed by court i n j u n c t i o n s . Thus, i n order to break t h e i r r e s i s t a n c e the government would have to r e s o r t to more d r a s t i c means (e.g. the removal of i l l e g a l p i c k e t l i n e s by p o l i c e f o r c e s , a r r e s t s of s t r i k e leaders e t c . ) . In democratic c o u n t r i e s such measures w i l l always be c o n t r o v e r s i a l even i f the m i n o r i t y does not enjoy much p u b l i c support. In short, the enforcement of the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s order against the r e s i s t a n c e of such powerful groups as the tradesmen i n the automobile i n -dustry i s beset with high p o l i t i c a l r i s k s which few demo-c r a t i c governments have been prepared to i n c u r . A c c o r d i n g l y , unions which experienced r e v o l t s of t h e i r s k i l l e d trades, as 68 f o r instance the Automobile Workers, the Rubber Workers or the Brewery Workers, were f o r c e d to r e s t r i c t the use of the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e by g r a n t i n g t h e i r tradesmen s p e c i a l repre-s e n t a t i o n r i g h t s . To sum up, two reasons were poi n t e d out as to why i n our o p i n i o n intra-group c o n f l i c t with constant-sum charac-t e r i s t i c s c o u l d be b e t t e r s o l v e d i n c e n t r a l i z e d than i n de-c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e s . F i r s t , a l a t e n t group con-sensus on some d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i s s u e s (as f o r i n s t a n c e i n t r a -o c c u p a t i o n a l wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s ) can be harnessed more e f f e c -t i v e l y . Second, c e n t r a l i z a t i o n opens up the p o s s i b i l i t y of ' s o l v i n g ' d i s p u t e s by c o e r c i o n . Our c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggested, however, that without government backing the l a t t e r remains a merely t h e o r e t i c a l o p t i o n . Intra-group c o n f l i c t p l a y s an important r o l e a l s o i n our next chapter which i s devoted to the e x p l o r a t i o n of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as a means to b i a s the c o l l e c t i v i t y ' s i n t e r n a l aggregation process i n f a v o r of i t s moderate members. 69 The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n on the S t r u c t u r e of U t i l i t y -Aggregation Dimensions of U t i l i t y Aggregation In the c o n f l i c t s which were the subject of the pre-vious chapter the i n t e r e s t s of the group members were assumed to be d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed. The l o s s of one group member meant the gain of the other. In c o n t r a s t , the c o n f l i c t s we turn now to have t h e i r o r i g i n i n d i f f e r e n t i n t e n s i t i e s with which commonly p e r c e i v e d i n t e r e s t s are he l d . For in s t a n c e , a l l union members may support the demand f o r pension b e n e f i t s but they may be i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s demand to a d i f f e r e n t de-gree. For example, one might suspect that o l d e r workers would l i k e to see t h i s i s s u e more v i g o u r o u s l y pursued than, say, younger workers. On the other hand the l a t t e r may show more i n t r a n s i g e n c e with respect to the wage i s s u e . E q u a l l y t r a d e s -men u s u a l l y have a s t r o n g i n t e r e s t i n r e s t r i c t i n g c o n t r a c t i n g -out, a goal to which common l a b o r e r s s i n c e u n a f f e c t e d may be qu i t e i n d i f f e r e n t . On each i s s u e one could so array the i n d i -v i d u a l c o l l e c t i v i t y members along a continuum ranging from ' i n d i f f e r e n t ' through 'moderate' to ' r a d i c a l ' with ' i n d i f f e r e n t ' and 'moderate' standing f o r low and ' r a d i c a l ' f o r high u t i l i -ty assignments. This suggests that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e could s c a l e down c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y among the l a b o r market p a r t i e s i f i t t i l t e d the d i s t r i b u t i o n of weights by which the member u t i l i t i e s enter the c o l l e c t i v i t y 70 i n t e r n a l aggregation process i n favor of the moderates. Such a power s h i f t w i t h i n unions and employer a s s o c i a t i o n s could take p l a c e h o r i z o n t a l l y , from one g r a s s r o o t s grouping to another, or v e r t i c a l l y between the leaders and the rank and f i l e . P revious a n a l y s i s has suggested that the lea d e r s tend 44 to be more moderate than the rank and f i l e . Consequently, c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would lower c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i f i t s t r e n g t h -ened the p o s i t i o n of the lea d e r s i n the aggregation s t r u c -t u r e . Less s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d i s the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the r e -qu i r e d h o r i z o n t a l power s h i f t . In c o n t r a s t to the v e r t i c a l dimension of i n t e r e s t aggregation where moderation or r a d i -c a l i t y i s a s s o c i a t e d with the r o l e the s i n g l e l a y e r s of the c o l l e c t i v i t y p l ay i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the c o l l e c t i v i t y the l i n e s e p a r a t i n g moderates from r a d i c a l s w i t h i n the rank and f i l e can be drawn only with respect to concrete i s s u e s and with knowledge of the c o l l e c t i v i t y composition and member p r e f -erences. A l a c k of info r m a t i o n about the s p e c i f i c s of the newly formed b a r g a i n i n g u n i t can not be o f f s e t by knowledge of i t s aggregation r u l e . For in s t a n c e , under the assumption that the m a j o r i t y r u l e governs h o r i z o n t a l i n t e r e s t aggregation c e n t r a l i z a t i o n c o u l d be s a i d to reduce c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i f i t p l a c e s r a d i c a l groupings, which h e r e t o f o r e bargained i n -dependently, i n t o a m i n o r i t y p o s i t i o n i n the enlarged bar-g a i n i n g u n i t . However, without knowledge of the c o n f l i c t i s s u e s and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the member preferences we are 71 unable to p r e d i c t whether the former w i l l a c t u a l l y c o n s t i t u t e the m a j o r i t y i n the newly c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e . Since an exhaustive i n v e s t i g a t i o n at a low l e v e l of g e n e r a l i t y i s beyond the purview of t h i s paper we have chosen to c o n f i n e o u r s e l v e s to p i c k i n g one case where ' d i l u t i o n ' of r a d i c a l u t i l i t y assignments by moderate ones as a consequence of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n appears as a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . It should go without saying that by i t s very nature the content of the f o l -lowing e x p o s i t i o n which centers upon the i s s u e of job s e c u r i t y i s extremely t e n t a t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r . Firm c o n c l u s i o n s t h e r e f o r e can not be drawn. The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon H o r i z o n t a l U t i l i t y Aggregation Viewed with some detachment the c o n f l i c t over job se-c u r i t y appears as a c o n f l i c t over the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the r e a l l o c a t i o n c o s t s of redundant l a b o r . While not e n t i r e l y wrong, t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n of the problem f a i l s to come to g r i p s with the f e a t u r e of the job s e c u r i t y i s s u e that makes i t one of the most i n t r a c t a b l e one i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s : the ex-tremely s u b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of ' r e a l l o c a t i o n c o s t s ' , which comprise not only m a t e r i a l but a l s o p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o s t s . De-s p i t e the ex i s t e n c e of support systems as unemployment i n -surance or government sponsored r e t r a i n i n g programs the bulk of adaptation c o s t s , p a r t i c u l a r i l y as f a r as i t s p s y c h o l o g i c a l 72 component i s concerned, s t i l l have to be borne by the i n d i -v i d u a l s who s u f f e r from s k i l l e r o s i o n or l o s e t h e i r jobs. For most people the prospect of having to give up a f a -m i l i a r environment and to embark upon a journey beset with r i s k through mostly unknown ' t e r r i t o r y ' , which the a c q u i r i n g of new s k i l l s o f t e n amounts to, does not h o l d much appeal, even i f the m a t e r i a l stakes have been lowered by employer or i government a s s i s t a n c e . I n e v i t a b l y , the r e l o c a t i o n c o s t s , per-c e i v e d by those d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d w i l l take on astronomical p r o p o r t i o n s . Consequently, even i n terms of these p e r c e p t i o n s moderate compensation demands are apt to be of such magnitude that conceding to them i n the eyes of the employer would be i d e n t i c a l to the t o t a l removal of the i n c e n t i v e f o r innova-t i o n . As the convulsions which l a b o r r e l a t i o n s underwent i n the newspaper i n d u s t r y , where r a p i d t e c h n o l o g i c a l change c o i n c i d e d with a union s t r u c t u r e based on narrowly d e f i n e d c r a f t s , have amply i l l u s t r a t e d , i f those d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by t e c h n o l o g i c a l change w i l l b argain with the employer alone, p e a c e f u l i n t e r e s t accommodation i s v i r t u a l l y impossible. It i s under such c o n d i t i o n s that broader based b a r g a i n i n g could i n -fuse an element of moderation. The expansion of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s would b r i n g i n a group of employees who may p e r c e i v e t e c h n o l o g i c a l change as a mixed b l e s s i n g . Given e f f e c t i v e i n t e r e s t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h i s group could share i n the b e n e f i t s of i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y caused by r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . On the other hand, however, due to 7 3 the f a i r l y u n p r e d i c t a b l e course of t e c h n o l o g i c a l change, the time span over which i t w i l l be able to enjoy these b e n e f i t s w i l l be cloaked i n u n c e r t a i n t y . T h i s group t h e r e f o r e combines the employers' o b j e c t i v e i n t e r e s t i n r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n with that of the employees immediately threatened by new t e c h n o l o g i e s i n s h i f t i n g from themselves the costs of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . Ra-d i c a l s o l u t i o n s to the i s s u e of job s e c u r i t y as they may be advocated by the employers and the employees d i r e c t l y a f f e c -ted are repugnant to t h i s i n t e r e s t p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , n e i t h e r the t o t a l i n s u l a t i o n of employees from adverse s i d e e f f e c t s of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n (which under c o n d i t i o n s of mode-rat e growth could be r e a l i z e d only at the p r i c e of a very low p r o d u c t i v i t y growth) nor the u n r e s t r i c t e d freedom of em-p l o y e r s to burden the employees with i t s costs w i l l represent acceptable b a r g a i n i n g goals f o r t h i s group. With the expansion of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s the l i k e l i h o o d i n c r e a s e s that t e c h n o l o g i c a l change or s h i f t s i n markets w i l l adversely a f f e c t only a m i n o r i t y at a time. In combination with the m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e as d e c i s i o n r u l e t h i s puts the moderate group f o r m a l l y i n a p o s i t i o n of t i l t i n g i n t e r e s t aggregation i n i t s f a v o r . Formal dominance of the moderate m a j o r i t y corresponds here with a c t u a l dominance. U n l i k e other m i n o r i t i e s employees immediately a f f e c t e d by r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n are u s u a l l y unable to challenge m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s . For i n s t a n c e , w i l d c a t s t r i k e s by these employees are bound to be l e s s d i s r u p t i v e than w i l d -74 c a t s by m i n o r i t i e s which occupy v i t a l f u n c t i o n s i n the pro-duction process (as f o r example i n many i n d u s t r i e s the s k i l l e d t r a d e s ) . That i s , t h e i r c a p a c i t y to i n f l i c t harm upon t h i r d p a r t i e s i s r a t h e r l i m i t e d . The v i c t i m s of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n h a r d l y f a r e b e t t e r with respect to a second source of m i n o r i -45 ty power : o u t s i d e support. Only i n r a r e occasions (e.g. i f an intended p l a n t c l o s u r e i s l i a b l e to s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t the economic s t a b i l i t y of a town or region) the m i n o r i t y can ex-pect to m o b i l i z e s u f f i c i e n t p u b l i c support to d i s l o d g e the p o l i c y of the m a j o r i t y . To give an example of a b a r g a i n i n g p o l i c y which grows out of the dominance of a moderate m a j o r i t y we may draw on i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n West Germany. Due to the comparative-l y l a r g e 'bargaining u n i t s ' the v a r i o u s r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n waves which i n the l a s t decade or so swept through the German econo-my ( t e x t i l e , automotive, e l e c t r i c a l equipment and port indus-t r i e s have been p a r t i c u l a r i l y a f f e c t e d ) immediately threatened only a m i n o r i t y of union members at a time. In accordance with our c o n s i d e r a t i o n s above, thus, most unions (exception: the IG Druck und Papier, the union o p e r a t i n g i n the p r i n t i n g indus-46 t r y ) s t e e r e d a 'middle of the road' course. Without q u e s t i o n i n g the n e c e s s i t y of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n t h e i r s t r a t e g y aimed at m i t i g a t i n g i t s adverse impacts, that i s , at keeping 47 the adaptation c o s t s to the s i n g l e employee at a low l e v e l . The unions pursued t h i s goal along two l i n e s : F i r s t , they sought to t r a n s f e r some of the costs to the community. (A product of such e f f o r t s , f o r example, are s t a t e funded e a r l y retirement schemes). Secondly, the unions demanded that the employers share i n sh o u l d e r i n g of some of the 'human' cos t s of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , f o r example, by o f f e r i n g compen-s a t i o n (severance pay) to employees who l o s t t h e i r jobs, by r e s t r i c t i n g downgrading or by g r a n t i n g those a f f e c t e d at l e a s t extensive t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d s . While our c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggest that a 'moderate' ma-j o r i t y i s u n l i k e l y to abandon a ' r a d i c a l ' m i n o r i t y a l t o g e t h e r , an i n f e r e n c e which the b a r g a i n i n g p o l i c i e s sketched above do not r e f u t e , the m a j o r i t y w i l l always be exposed to the charge of having defended the i n t e r e s t s of the m i n o r i t y only h a l f -h e a r t e d l y . As o b j e c t i v e standards of 'proper' i n t e r e s t r e p r e -s e n t a t i o n are l a c k i n g such judgements, however i n t u i t i v e l y p l a u s i b l e they may sometimes appear, remain purely s u b j e c t i v e statements which f o r our i n v e s t i g a t i o n are of l i t t l e i n t e r e s t . A l l that can reasonably be s a i d i n t h i s connection i s that from a normative p e r s p e c t i v e the d i l u t i o n of the i n t e r e s t s of ' r a d i c a l ' m i n o r i t i e s may be a l e s s s a t i s f y i n g method of r e -ducing c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . T h i s r e s e r v a t i o n on normative grounds holds f o r the next method we s h a l l examine as w e l l . 76 The Impact of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon V e r t i c a l U t i l i t y Aggregation In our d e a l i n g with h o r i z o n t a l i n t e r e s t aggregation we t a c i t l y assumed that the leaders of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s b l i n d l y execute the wishes of the m a j o r i t y . T h i s s i m p l i f y i n g assumption s h a l l now give way to the r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t that v i r t u a l l y a l l leaders possess the c a p a c i t y to i n f l u e n c e i f not dominate the b a r g a i n i n g p o l i c y of ' t h e i r ' c o l l e c t i v i -t y . The question which has to be answered i n the context of our i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s whether c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s apt to i n c r e a s e the r e l a t i v e weight of the leaders i n c o l l e c t i v i t y i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t aggregation. In other words i t has to be examined whether there e x i s t s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the degree of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and the l e a d e r ' s c a p a b i l i t y to convert h i s own preferences i n t o those of the c o l l e c t i v i t y . The power lea d e r s h o l d over the rank and f i l e can be regarded as an outgrowth of the d i v i s i o n of l a b o r i n the or-g a n i z a t i o n . Two f a c t o r s account f o r such i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n t i a -t i o n : indolence of the c o l l e c t i v i t y members and f u n c t i o n a l ne-c e s s i t y . As c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s o f t e n an i n t r i c a t e and time consuming business, i t r e q u i r e s an involvment that only few members are prepared to o f f e r . For i n s t a n c e , normally l o c a l union meetings do not draw more than 5 to 15% of the member-48 s h i p . The low p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e i s not unique to North-America. It i s about the same, f o r instance, i n West Germany 77 where union a c t i v i s t s make up about 10% of the t o t a l member-49 s h i p . C o l l e c t i v i t i e s respond to such s i t u a t i o n s by c r e a t i n g s p e c i a l i z e d s u b d i v i s i o n s , manned by a c t i v i s t s , which guide the o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h i s f i e l d of c o l l e c t i v i t y a c t i v i t y . Apart from reasons which r e s i d e with the i n d i v i d u a l members the very nature of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g makes the i n s t a l l a t i o n of a 'guiding hand' d e s i r a b l e . Since e f f e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s p r e d i c a t e d upon u n i f i e d a c t i o n some c o o r d i n a t i o n from above appears i n d i s p e n s a b l e . By d e l e g a t i n g b a r g a i n i n g to the leader l e v e l , the rank and f i l e e x t r i c a t e themselves from the burden of having to deal with a l l the c o m p l e x i t i e s inherent to b a r g a i n i n g . However, they e q u a l l y f r e e themselves from the o p p o r t u n i t y of l e a r n i n g the s k i l l s and g a i n i n g the experience that are necessary to c a r r y out b a r g a i n i n g s u c c e s s f u l l y . Whereas the rank and f i l e thus stagnate i n the development of b a r g a i n i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s the leaders due to t h e i r d i r e c t involvement, w i l l be able to accumulate a high degree of e x p e r t i s e . With the widening of the gap i n s k i l l s and experience the rank and f i l e w i l l become "...extremely dependent on the l e a d e r s h i p f o r guidance on what 50 i s e q u i t a b l e , what i s p o s s i b l e , and what i s a c c e p t a b l e . " Given that the v e r t i c a l d i v i s i o n of labour i s not j u s t an ephemeral phenomenon but has become entrenched i n v i r t u a l l y a l l labour market p a r t i e s and that the dynamics i t s e t s i n motion have been e f f e c t i v e f o r some time, one might conclude with Ross that 78 [V]rade union wage p o l i c y i s i n e v i t a b l y a l e a d e r s h i p f u n c t i o n . The reason i s not that the l e a d e r s h i p has w r e s t l e d d i c t a t o r i a l power from the rank and f i l e , but that i t alone i s i n the possession of the necessary knowledge, experience, and s k i l l to perform the func-t i o n adequately. 5 1 While d e l e g a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s to the leaders and the ensuing dependence of the rank and f i l e on t h e i r s k i l l s and e x p e r t i s e w i l l guarantee the leaders broad areas of d i s -c r e t i o n i n shaping c o l l e c t i v i t y p o l i c y , these areas are not boundless. Whatever the extent of d i v i s i o n of l a b o r between leaders and g r a s s r o o t s i n democratic o r g a n i z a t i o n s the l a t t e r r e t a i n the r i g h t to monitor and c o n t r o l the performance of the l e a d e r s . The rank and f i l e can r e g i s t e r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h e i r l e a d e r s ' b a r g a i n i n g performance i n two ways. Borrowing from A. Hirschman these options can be termed 'voice' and 52 ' e x i t ' . The former leaves the rank and f i l e a choice between f o r c i n g the leaders to modify t h e i r p o l i c i e s or exchanging the leaders a l t o g e t h e r . The ' e x i t ' o ption i s u s u a l l y r e s o r t e d to i f both methods of the v o i c e o p t i o n have proven unworkable: In such s i t u a t i o n s the rank and f i l e w i l l 'leave' the c o l l e c -t i v i t y and, by means of the d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n process, oust the incumbent union. On the b a s i s of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , c e n t r a -l i z a t i o n can be expected to i n c r e a s e the weight of the leaders i n v e r t i c a l i n t e r e s t aggregation i f i t makes i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r the g r a s s r o o t s to f i n d adequate c o n t r o l standards f o r the l e a d e r s ' b a r g a i n i n g performance, hampers the recruitment of 79 a l t e r n a t i v e l e a d e r s , and c u r t a i l s the p o s s i b i l i t y of ' e x i t ' . If the b e n e f i t s of d e l e g a t i n g the b a r g a i n i n g f u n c t i o n to the union l e a d e r s are to be maintained the formation of performance standards has to f o l l o w l e s s complex l i n e s than the determination of the c o n t r a c t terms i n the b a r g a i n i n g pro-cess. For the g r a s s r o o t s , the e a s i e s t way of a s s e s s i n g the b a r g a i n i n g performance of t h e i r l e a d e r s i s to compare the con-t r a c t terms reached by them with those concluded by r e f e r e n c e groups i n other b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s . To the extent that these r e f e r e n c e groups w i l l l o s e t h e i r independence i n the wake of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e t h i s source of per-formance standards w i l l disappear. In p a r t , however, the rank and f i l e may be able to o f f s e t the l o s s by s e l e c t i n g new r e -ference groups. For i n s t a n c e , Gallagher and Wetzel observed that i n response to c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e i n Saskatchewan's p u b l i c school system the ' o r b i t of c o e r c i v e 5 3 comparison' s h i f t e d from d i s t r i c t s to school areas. Such means of compensation are absent as we turn to the impacts of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon the a v a i l a b i l i t y of more complex s t a n -dards . Because of the general u n w i l l i n g n e s s of the rank and f i l e to i n v e s t much time and energy i n t o c o l l e c t i v i t y a f f a i r s , the development of more s o p h i s t i c a t e d c o n t r o l standards w i l l accrue to the union a c t i v i s t s . The supply of complex c o n t r o l standards i s t h e r e f o r e i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d to the l a t i t u d e which the c o l l e c t i v i t y accords to i t s a c t i v i s t s o u t s i d e the leader 80 c i r c l e . The question of c o n t r o l standards here d i s s o l v e s i n t o the more general question of the freedom of s e t t i n g up i n t e r -n a l o p p o s i t i o n which w i l l be examined i n some d e t a i l f u r t h e r below. The c a p a b i l i t y of f o r m u l a t i n g c o n t r o l standards de-termines whether and to what extent the rank and f i l e can make use of i t s powers. I t does not t e l l us anything about the amount of power i t holds over i t s l e a d e r s . This r e v e a l s i t s e l f i n the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of ' e x i t ' and 'voice' and i n the ease with which these options can be r e a l i z e d . Within the North-American i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c -ture c u r t a i l s the ' e x i t ' o p t i o n i n two ways. F i r s t , by c u t t i n g the number of independent l a b o r market o r g a n i z a t i o n s ( s i n g l e employers, unions and c o a l i t i o n s of those) i t reduces the number of a l t e r n a t i v e s to the incumbent holders of represen-t a t i o n r i g h t s . Second, c e n t r a l i z a t i o n w i l l make i t more d i f f i -c u l t f o r the rank and f i l e to m o b i l i z e the m a j o r i t y of c o l l e c -t i v i t y members necessary f o r d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . These d i f f i c u l -t i e s a r i s e from communication problems inherent i n l a r g e and g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i s p e r s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s . We s h a l l deal with the l a t t e r problems i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l below when we reencounter them i n connection with our d i s c u s s i o n of the p o t e n t i a l im-pacts of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n upon the formation of c o l l e c t i v i t y i n t e r n a l o p p o s i t i o n and the recruitment of a l t e r n a t i v e leaders. 81 A common v e h i c l e of the 'voice mechanism' i s the referendum. The f a i l u r e of the membership to r a t i f y a t e n t a -t i v e settlement concluded by t h e i r leaders f o r c e s the l a t t e r to r e t u r n to the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e and to r e n e g o t i a t e the con-t r a c t . As t h i s power l e v e r i s anchored i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the c o l l e c t i v i t y , i t eludes the d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e of the bar-g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . Only by inducin g the union members to modi-fy the r e s p e c t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s c o u l d c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n deprive the rank and f i l e of t h i s weapon. That such ca-p a c i t i e s should accrue to c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s does not appear very l i k e l y . It i s simply i n c o n c e i v a b l e how c e n t r a l -i z a t i o n could generate the necessary pressures upon the c o l -l e c t i v i t y members. D i s l o d g i n g the incumbent l e a d e r s h i p i s another and more d r a s t i c way of e f f e c t i n g a change of bar-g a i n i n g p o l i c y . It i s with respect to t h i s second v a r i a n t of the 'voice mechanism' that a powershift i n favor of the lead e r s can be di s c e r n e d . In i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s systems where i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between the c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i e s are i n s i g n i f i c a n t and the la b o r market p a r t i e s have put behind them the pioneer phase i n t h e i r e v o l u t i o n , member involvement i n the c o l l e c t i v i -t y ' s a f f a i r s w i l l be s t r o n g l y motivated by the d e s i r e f o r per-5 4 sonal gains. Such rewards need not n e c e s s a r i l y be of a f i n a n c i a l nature. Prospects of more c h a l l e n g i n g jobs combined with gains i n s t a t u s may provide e q u a l l y strong i n c e n t i v e s . 82 A c t i v i s t s with such o r i e n t a t i o n s w i l l be s u s c e p t i b l e , to ca-t e r i n g to the i n t e r e s t of those who are able to o f f e r these rewards. As i n other o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the l a b o r market p a r t i e s these are the l e a d e r s . To cope with the complexity of b a r g a i n i n g i n c e n t r a -l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s , employers and unions develop a st r o n g demand f o r a broad v a r i e t y of s p e c i a l i z e d support s e r v i c e s , thereby 55 g i v i n g r i s e to an extensive bureaucracy. For the o r d i n a r y union member, a career i n t h i s bureaucracy represents an ac-56 cessable route to s o c i a l improvement. S t a f f p o s i t i o n s c a r r y t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r a b l e appeal f o r ambitious rank and f i l e a c t i v i s t s . Leaders have a s t r o n g say, i f not o u t r i g h t appoint-ment r i g h t , i n the recruitment process to these b u r e a u c r a t i c p o s i t i o n s . For example i n the UAW the p r e s i d e n t "...appoints and removes i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ; h i r e s l e g a l , t e c h n i -c a l or p r o f e s s i o n a l help f o r a l l departments except the o f f i c e 57 of the s e c r e t a r y - t r e a s u r e r ; " In German unions the executive boards have i n a d d i t i o n at l e a s t a veto r i g h t i n personel de-58 c i s i o n s of lower l e v e l bodies. As we noted above the c r e a t i o n of l a r g e c o l l e c t i v i t i e s caused by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n w i l l be ac-companied by the expansion of bureaucracies on both s i d e s of the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e . F o l l o w i n g the above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h i s should t i l t the balance of power between leaders and rank and f i l e i n fa v o r of the former. It in c r e a s e s t h e i r c a p a c i t y of 'buying out' ambitious rank and f i l e a c t i v i s t s and thereby to ward o f f a s s a u l t s by the g r a s s r o o t s upon t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . 83 S h o u l d r a n k and f i l e a c t i v i s t s p r o v e immune t o t h e s i r e n s o n g o f t h e s p o i l s c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s a r e a b l e t o o f f e r , two f u r t h e r k i n d s o f p r o t e c t i o n a r e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e l e a d e r s . B o t h , h o w e v e r , a r e e f f e c t i v e o n l y i n t h o s e c a s e s where c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f t h e b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e e n t a i l s a c o n s o l i -d a t i o n o f t h e l a b o r m a r k e t p a r t i e s , t h a t i s where t h e r e s p e c -t i v e c o l l e c t i v i t i e s merge r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y f o r m c o a l i t i o n s . T h e n c e n t r a l i z a t i o n c o i n c i d e s w i t h a b r o a d e n i n g o f t h e i n d i -v i d u a l l e a d e r ' s i m m e d i a t e c o n s t i t u e n c y . W i t h t h e l i k e l y r i s e o f t h e l a t t e r ' s i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t h e t e r o g e n i t y , t h e l e a d e r ' s r o l e as a r e f e r e e i n h o r i z o n t a l i n t e r e s t a g g r e g a t i o n , one o f t h e p r i m e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e l e a d e r , w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y t a x i n g . The l e v e l o f p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s n e c e s s a r y t o s u r v i v e a s a l e a d e r i n s u c h c o n d i t i o n s by f a r o u t s t r i p s t h a t r e q u i r e d 59 i n a d e c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e . As t h e r e a r e few o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r o r d i n a r y u n i o n members t o a c q u i r e p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s o t h e r 6 0 t h a n b y h o l d i n g u n i o n o f f i c e s t h e r a i s i n g o f e n t r a n c e b a r -r i e r s c a u s e d by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n w o r k s i n f a v o r o f t h e i n c u m b e n t l e a d e r s . A g a i n s t t h o s e a c t i v i s t s who h a v e managed t o o v e r c o m e t h e a b o v e h i n d r a n c e s t h e i n c u m b e n t l e a d e r s h o l d a l a s t t rump c a r d : t h e f a r r e a c h i n g c o n t r o l o v e r t h e f o r m a l means o f c o m -61 m u n i c a t i o n . F o r i n s t a n c e , i n West G e r m a n y ' s IG M e t a l l , p u b -l i c a t i o n o f p e r i o d i c a l s , p a m p h l e t s , p o s t e r s e t c , by t h e l o c a l s a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e n a t i o n a l o r i n some c a s e s 62 r e g i o n a l e x e c u t i v e b o a r d s . F u r t h e r m o r e , i n i t s c a p a c i t y as 84 p u b l i s h e r of the union newspaper, the n a t i o n a l executive board 6 3 appoints i t s e d i t o r s . 1 S i m i l i a r arrangements e x i s t i n North 64 American unions. I t i s t h e r e f o r e not p a r t i c u l a r i l y s u r p r i s i n g that f o r example ' S o l i d a r i t y ' , the o f f i c i a l newspaper of the UAW "'...makes no attempt to present any union views other than 65 those of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . " To d i s s i m i n a t e t h e i r d i s s e n t i n g views opponents to the incumbent l e a d e r s h i p w i l l t h e r e f o r e have to r e l y h e a v i l y upon i n f o r m a l means of communication. In small o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h i s does not c o n s t i t u t e a major disadvantage. In the l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , however, which c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s l i k e l y to cre a t e and where the membership may be d i s p e r s e d over a l a r g e area, r e s t r i c t e d access to the formal means of communication, may turn out to be an insuperable o b s t a c l e i n the formation of a v i a b l e o p p o s i t i o n . 85 S U M M A R Y AND CONCLUSION The t h e o r e t i c a l framework developed i n t h i s paper i d e n t i f i e d four d i s t i n c t avenues through which c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e could cause a lowering of s t r i k e / lockout i n c i d e n c e . The frequency of s t r i k e s and lockouts would decrease i f as a r e s u l t of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n 1. the r e l a t i v e costs of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n r i s e and/or 2. the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s i n t e g r a t e macro-goals i n t o t h e i r goal p o r t f o l i o and/or 3. the 'moderates' dominate c o l l e c t i v i t y i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t aggregation and/or 4. intra-group c o n f l i c t i s s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t e r n a l i z e d . There were two reasons which gave r i s e to the expec-t a t i o n that a l a r g e percentage of intra-group c o n f l i c t c o u l d be s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t e r n a l i z e d . F i r s t , c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s , i t was argued, are more e f f e c t i v e i n harnessing a l a t e n t con-sensus among the c o n f l i c t i n g groupings than d e c e n t r a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e s . Second, they vest the c o l l e c t i v i t i e s with the ca-p a c i t y to r e s o l v e intra-group c o n f l i c t by c o e r c i o n , l i m i t e d only by the degree of the s t a t e ' s readiness to back m a j o r i t y r u l e . Without knowledge of a given c o n f l i c t i s s u e and the composition of the c o l l e c t i v i t y ' s membership, 'moderates' and ' r a d i c a l s ' i n h o r i z o n t a l i n t e r e s t aggregation remain i n d i s -t i n g u i s h a b l e . A p r e d i c t i o n of the consequences of c e n t r a l i z a -86 t i o n f o r i n t e r e s t aggregation i n t h i s dimension i s t h e r e f o r e impossible. Problems of t h i s k i n d d i d not a r i s e i n connection with v e r t i c a l i n t e r e s t aggregation. An a n a l y s i s of leader and rank and f i l e i n t e r e s t s p o i n t e d to the former as the 'moder-ates'. As c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would strengthen t h e i r p o s i t i o n the t h i r d c o n d i t i o n would be s a t i s f i e d here. The b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s were not expected to i n t e g r a t e macro-goals i n t o t h e i r goal p o r t f o l i o as a r e s u l t of c e n t r a l -i z a t i o n . The expansion of b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s necessary to cope with the p u b l i c good c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of macro-goals exceeded a l l r e a l i z a b l e p r o p o r t i o n s . There was l i t t l e doubt, however, that f o r the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s to i n c l u d e macro-goals i n t o t h e i r goal system, c e n t r a l i z a t i o n represented a necessary con-d i t i o n . F i n a l l y , a general r i s e of the costs of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i o n as a r e s u l t of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n could not be diagnosed. However, s i n c e t h i s p r e d i c t i o n was d e r i v e d from the o r g a n i z a -t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Canada's labor market p a r t i e s as a whole, i t r e f e r r e d only to the 'average' b a r g a i n i n g u n i t . To p r e d i c t the s i t u a t i o n i n i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s , a d d i t i o n a l i n -formation on the s t r u c t u r e of the l a b o r market p a r t i e s i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r u n i t as w e l l as i n f o r m a t i o n on the market c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n which the u n i t ' s employers operate i s r e q u i r e d - information to which we had no access. Thus, while c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c -ture can h a r d l y be claimed to be a panacea with respect to 87 s t a b i l i t y of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , i t has the p o t e n t i a l of e f f e c t i v e l y lowering the incide n c e of s t r i k e / l o c k o u t s . To a c t u a l i z e t h i s p o t e n t i a l , however, the w i l l i n g n e s s of govern-ment to a c t i v e l y back a p o l i c y of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , by f o r c e i f necessary, appears i n d i s p e n s a b l e . The n e c e s s i t y of such a f a r reaching commitment h i g h l i g h t s the normative problems as-s o c i a t e d with government induced c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . As we noted, some s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t s of c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n flow from changes i n the power d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n and among p a r t i c i p a n t groups while others at l e a s t may have s i d e e f f e c t s upon the power d i s t r i b u t i o n . Changes i n the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e are t h e r e f o r e u n l i k e l y to be n e u t r a l with respect to the c o n t r a c t terms reached i n the b a r g a i n i n g process. In other words, i n modifying the e x i s t i n g b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e the government may not only i n f l u e n c e the s t a b i l i t y of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s but a l s o the chance of i n d i v i d u a l groupings a s s e r t i n g t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . The a n a l y s i s presented was mainly conceptual i n nature. I t s t h r u s t was d i r e c t e d at e l u c i d a t i n g the web of c o n d i t i o n s under which c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would c o n t r i b u t e to a s t a b i l i z a -t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . The focus chosen l e f t l i t t l e room f o r pursuing i n depth the e m p i r i c a l questions r a i s e d by the t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s . The e m p i r i c a l b a s i s on which the p r e d i c t i o n s made above r e s t e d was a c c o r d i n g l y crude. Re-ducing t h i s e m p i r i c a l d e f i c i e n c y , we f e e l , could provide an 8 8 agenda f o r f u t u r e r e s e a r c h . A second area i n which there i s room f o r improvement i s the design of the a n a l y s i s . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n was conducted e x c l u s i v e l y i n q u a l i t a t i v e terms. Neither the degree of cen-t r a l i z a t i o n nor the s t r e n g t h of i t s impacts was d i s c u s s e d here. To weigh c e n t r a l i z a t i o n against a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s , i t i s not only important to know whether c e n t r a l i z a t i o n con-t r i b u t e s to the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s but a l s o how e f f e c t i v e i t i s i n doing so. An expansion of the a n a l y s i s to i n c l u d e the q u a n t i t a t i v e aspects of c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , would d o u b t l e s s l y i n c r e a s e i t s u s e f u l n e s s to the p o l i c y maker. 89 ENDNOTES In t r o d u c t i o n The numerous experiments with va r i o u s forms of con-c i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n which have been conducted through-out t h i s century bear testimony to t h i s p r o p e n s i t y of Canadian p o l i c y makers; f o r a b r i e f survey of government p o l i c y i n t h i s area see: Stu a r t Jamieson, I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s i n Canada (Toronto: Macmillan 1973), chapter 5. A more exhaustive account of Canadian experiments with dispute settlement procedure i s given by H.D. Woods i n h i s Labor P o l i c y i n Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), chapter 5. 2 Stuart Jamieson, "The T h i r d Wave Reconsidered - Labor Unrest and I n d u s t r i a l C o n f l i c t i n Canada: 1960-1975," (Van-couver, B.C.: Department of Economics, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1977), p. 3. (Mimeographed.) For a d e t a i l e d de-s c r i p t i o n of the Canadian s t r i k e p r o f i l e the reader may con-s u l t : John, C. Anderson and Morley Gunderson, " S t r i k e s and Dispute R e s o l u t i o n , " i n Union Management R e l a t i o n s i n Canada, eds. John, C. Anderson and Morley Gunderson (Don M i l l s , Ont.: Addison Wesley, 1982), pp. 224-228. 3 Paul Weiler, "Fragmented or C e n t r a l i z e d B a r g a i n i n g , " i n Proceedings of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Trends i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labor R e l a t i o n s , ed. F. Bairstow (Montreal: I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Center, M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1977), p. 132. 4 Figu r e 4 i l l u s t r a t e s the degree of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the Canadian system of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i n comparison with that of the b a r g a i n i n g systems of other Western na t i o n s . 90 F i g . 4. R e l a t i o n of C e n t r a l i z a t i o n of S t r u c t u r e to L e v e l of B a r g a i n i n g High z g low • Austria • Norway • Sweden • Denmark • Finland • New Zealand • Australia • Germany « Japan • Belgium • France ^ • Ireland Netherlands • United Kingdom United States • Italy • * Canada 1 ' National Industry or region Enterprise or workplace LEVEL OF BARGAINING Source: C.A. B l y t h , "The I n t e r a c t i o n between C o l l e c -t i v e B a r g a i n i n g and Government P o l i c i e s i n S e l e c t e d Member C o u n t r i e s , " i n C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g and Government P o l i c i e s i n Ten OECD Countries ( P a r i s : OECD, 1979), p. 92. Part One The concept of s t a b i l i z a t i o n r e f e r s e x c l u s i v e l y to c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t s as opposed to c o n f l i c t s of r i g h t s (grievance d i s p u t e s ) ; f o r t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t see Oskar Kahn-Freund, "Inter-Group C o n f l i c t s and t h e i r Settlement," i n C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, ed. A. Flanders (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 72. While s t r i k e s i s s u i n g from c o n f l i c t s of r i g h t s make up a s i z a b l e p r o p o r t i o n of t o t a l s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e , f o r instance, i n B r i t i s h Columbia from 1945-75 they accounted f o r roughly a t h i r d of a l l s t r i k e s CE.G. F i s h e r , " S t r i k e A c t i v i t y and Wildcat S t r i k e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia: 1945-1975," R e l a t i o n s I n d u s t r i e l l e s 37 91 (1982): 285-291), they d i f f e r from those over c o n t r a c t terms ( c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t s ) i n nature and t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e a d i f f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n . In view of the n e c e s s i t y to l i m i t the scope of t h i s paper i t appears s e n s i b l e to address the ques-t i o n of a p o t e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c -t u r e and the frequency of s t r i k e s growing out of c o n f l i c t s of r i g h t s i n a separate i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 2 The s t r i k e s t a t i s t i c s p u b l i s h e d by governments i n many Western c o u n t r i e s (see f o r instance the s t a t i s t i c s pub-l i s h e d by Labour Canada or by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Labor O f f i c e ) s p e c i f y s t r i k e i n c i d e n c e not only i n terms of s t r i k e frequen-cy (number of s t r i k e s per year) but a l s o i n terms of s i z e (average number of workers i n v o l v e d per s t r i k e ) , d u r a t i o n (average days l o s t per worker on s t r i k e ) and the composite i n -dex s t r i k e volume d e f i n e d as the product of s t r i k e frequency, s i z e and d u r a t i o n (man-days l o s t per y e a r ) . 3 Douglas V. Brown and George P. S h u l t z , " P u b l i c P o l i -cy and the S t r u c t u r e of C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g , " i n The S t r u c - ture of C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, ed. Arnold Weber (Glencoe, 111. : The Free Press, 1961), p. 318; Paul Weiler, R e c o n c i l a b l e  D i f f e r e n c e s (Toronto: The Carswell Company Li m i t e d , 1980), p. 155. 4 Paul Weiler, "Fragmented or C e n t r a l i z e d B a r g a i n i n g , " i n Proceedings of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Trends i n  I n d u s t r i a l and Labor R e l a t i o n s , ed. F. Bairstow (Montreal: I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Center, M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1977), p. 135. 5 I l l u s t r a t i o n s of power s h i f t s caused by c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n are f u r n i s h e d by Weiler, R e c o n c i l a b l e D i f f e r e n c e s , pp. 156-158. Q John T. Dunlop, "The S t r u c t u r e of C o l l e c t i v e Bar-g a i n i n g : Concepts and Trends - D i s c u s s i o n , " i n The S t r u c t u r e  of C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, ed. A. Weber (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1961), p. 26. 7 Robert B. McKersie, " S t r u c t u r a l F a c t o r s and Negotia-t i o n i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Harvester Company," i n The S t r u c - ture of C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, ed. Arnold Weber (Glencoe, 111. : The Free Press, 1961), p. 293. Q Regarding the fragmented c h a r a c t e r of the Canadian la b o r movement see John C r i s p o , The Canadian I n d u s t r i a l Rela- t i o n s System (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson,1979), pp. 173-183. 92 9 'R.C. Smith, "Fragmented or C e n t r a l i z e d B a r g a i n i n g , " i n Proceedings of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Trends i n  I n d u s t r i a l and Labor R e l a t i o n s , ed. F. Bairstow (Montreal: I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Center, M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1977), p. 149. 1 0 D e r e k C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and the  American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 256. In B r i t i s h Columbia the c o n s t r u c t i o n and the brewery i n d u s t r y have provided ample support f o r the above statement. See f o r an account of the developments i n these i n d u s t r i e s Joseph B. Rose, "A Note on B r i t i s h Columbia's C o n s t r u c t i o n Industry," R e l a t i o n s I n d u s t r i e l l e s 31 (1976): 312; Joseph B. Rose, P u b l i c P o l i c y , B a r g a i n i n g S t r u c t u r e and the Construc- t i o n - I n d u s t r y (Toronto: Butterworth & Co (Canada L t d . ) , chapter 7; Weiler, R e c o n c i l a b l e D i f f e r e n c e s , pp. 163-164. ''"•'"This e x c l u s i v e r e l i a n c e on v o l u n t a r i s m c o n t r a s t s with Quebec's more a s s e r t i v e approach, which makes membership i n the ' A s s o c i a t i o n of B u i l d i n g C o n t r a c t o r s of Quebec' manda-t o r y . See J.B. Rose, " C o n s t r u c t i o n Labor R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n s i n Canada," R e l a t i o n s I n d u s t r i e l l e s 32 (1977): 43. 12 Weiler j u s t i f i e s the d i f f e r e n c e i n treatment between employers and employees by p o i n t i n g to the h i s t o r i c a l r e l u c -tance of B r i t i s h Columbian unions to form a s s o c i a t i o n s on a voluntary b a s i s : "...the B.C. experience i s that such a volun-t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n r a r e l y comes about simply f o r t h i s reason: the presence of two unions i n the one i n d u s t r y i s an index of d i f f e r e n c e s of philosophy and a h i s t o r y of r a i d i n g and b i t t e r -ness which makes such cooperation i n n e g o t i a t i o n s q u i t e un-r e a l i s t i c . " Weiler, "Fragmented or C e n t r a l i z e d B a r g a i n i n g , " p. 137. 13 The c o u n c i l concept has the advantage over c e n t r a -l i z a t i o n by r e c e r t i f i c a t i o n by g i v i n g the p o l i c y maker the opportunity to shape the i n t e r n a l aggregation s t r u c t u r e of the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s . Some of the b a s i c p r o v i s i o n s of a t y p i c a l c o a l i t i o n c o n s t i t u t i o n imposed by the Labor R e l a t i o n s Board of B r i t i s h Columbia can be found i n Weiler, R e c o n c i l a b l e  D i f f e r e n c e s , p. 165. We should add here that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as envisaged by the Labor R e l a t i o n s Board does not r e q u i r e the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s to c e n t r a l i z e n e g o t i a t i o n s over a l l i s s u e s . M u l t i - t i e r b a r g a i n i n g systems as, f o r i n s t a n c e , p r a c t i c e d i n n a t i o n a l r a i l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n are w e l l compatible with the con-cept of c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g . 93 14 So f a r , the Labor R e l a t i o n s Board of B r i t i s h Columbia imposed a c o u n c i l s t r u c t u r e upon the Vancouver s h i p y a r d indus-t r y , B.C. R a i l and most r e c e n t l y upon the c o n s t r u c t i o n indus-t r y (May 1982). 15 See f o r example F. Bairstow, M. Dubinsky, and R. Smith, Report of the Inquiry Commission on Wider-Based  C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g (Ottawa: Labor Canada, 1978), p. 106 or Weiler, "Fragmented or C e n t r a l i z e d B a r g a i n i n g , " p. 139. 16 H.W. Arthurs and John C r i s p o , " C o u n t e r v e i l i n g Em-p l o y e r Power: A c c r e d i t a t i o n of Contractor A s s o c i a t i o n s , " i n C o n s t r u c t i o n Labor R e l a t i o n s , eds. C a r l Goldenberg and John Cr i s p o (Ottawa: Canadian C o n s t r u c t i o n A s s o c i a t i o n , 1968), p. 412. 17 W i l l i a m Chernish, C o a l i t i o n Bargaining: A Study of  Union T a c t i c s and P u b l i c P o l i c y ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), pp. 262-263. 18 Weiler, "Fragmented or C e n t r a l i z e d B a r g a i n i n g , " pp. 132-145. 1 9 I b i d . , p. 135. D. Saunders, "Group B a r g a i n i n g , " U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Business Review (1979): 197-201. 2 1 I b i d . , p. 200. 22 I b i d . Part Two "^For a survey of s t r i k e explanations see Richard Hyman, S t r i k e s , 2nd ed. (London; Fontana, 1977), pp. 56-65; or James Cronin, "Theory of S t r i k e s : Why can't they e x p l a i n the B r i t i s h Experience?" Journal of S o c i a l H i s t o r y 12 (1978) 200-210. 2 John Hicks, The Theory of Wages, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), p. 146. 94 Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, A B e h a v i o r a l  Theory of Labor N e g o t i a t i o n s (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 56. 4 I b i d . , p. 53. 5 H i c k s , The Theory of Wages, p. 146. Q F o l l o w i n g Walton and McKersie, A B e h a v i o r a l Theory of  Labor N e g o t i a t i o n s , we s h a l l use the names 'party' and 'op-ponent' to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s . 7 For a set of standards which a l l e g e d l y obtains f o r most North American b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s see Jack Barbash, " R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n the American Union," i n Essays i n Indus- t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Theory, ed. Gerald Somers (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969), p. 148. g F. Zeuthen, Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930), p. 105. 9 Walton and McKersie, A B e h a v i o r a l Theory of Labor  N e g o t i a t i o n s , p. 43. 1 (^The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t a c t i c s cooresponds roughly with that of s t r a t e g i e s made by H. Kahn i n the context of m i l i -t a r y c o n f l i c t : "...there are two b a s i c c l a s s e s of s t r a t e g i e s that each s i d e can use. One c l a s s of s t r a t e g i e s makes use of f e a t u r e s of the p a r t i c u l a r 'agreed b a t t l e ' that i s being waged i n order to gain an advantage. The other c l a s s uses the r i s k s of t h r e a t of e s c a l a t i o n or e r u p t i o n from t h i s agreed b a t t l e . " Herman Kahn, On E s c a l a t i o n (London: Paul M a l l Press, 1965; New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger), p. 7. Part Three Hugh Clegg, Trade Unionism under C o l l e c t i v e Bar- g a i n i n g (Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1976), p. 76. 2 John C r i s p o , The Canadian I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s System (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), pp. 173-183. 95 Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, Labor and the Ameri- can Community (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 143; s i m i l ar observations could be made in West Germany: M. Wilke, Die  Funktionaere (Munich: Piper 8s Co Verlag , 1979), p. 215. 4 Jack Barbash, American Unions: Structure, Government  and P o l i t i c s (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 143. 5 "Because of the prime importance of bargaining, mem-bers tend to have strong opinions about negotiat ions, and union leaders are under heavy constraint to pay close atten-t ion to these sentiments." (Bok and Dunlop, Labor and the  American Community, p. 77); In the same vein i s Ed Finn's observation: "Being elected and having to run for ree lec t ion every two or three years, most union leaders are unable to r e s i s t the never-ending pressure for 'more'." (Ed Finn , "Labor's Love Los t ," Macleans, May 1974, p. 90. It goes without saying that th i s hypothesis does not hold with respect to issues which are d i r e c t l y re lated to i n s t i t u t i o n a l secur i ty . 7 U.S. Parnes, Union Str ike Votes: Current Pract ice  and Proposed Controls (Princeton, N . J . : Industr ia l Relations Section, Department of Economics and Sociology, Princeton Univers i ty , 1956), p. 61, quoted in Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, A Behavioral Theory' of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hil l , 1965), p. 287. o Government Soc ia l Survey, Workplace Industr ia l Re- l a t ions (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Of f i ce , 1968), p. J.36; W . E . J . McCarthy and S.R. Parker, Shop Stewards and  Workshop Relat ions , Royal Commission Research Paper No. 10 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Of f i ce , 1968), p. 31. 9 Robert Michels , P o l i t i c a l Part i e s , trans . Eden and Paul Cedar (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1915, reprint e d . , 1958), pp. 312 f f . , in p a r t i c u l a r pp. 320-321. ^ I n coining th i s terms R. Michels had in mind the p o l i t i c a l rather than the i n d u s t r i a l leaders of the working c lass . See on th i s point Charles E . Lindblom, P o l i t i c s and  Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 170 f f . 96 For a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t approach u s i n g the con-cept of boundary r o l e see Walton and McKersie, A B e h a v i o r a l  Theory of Labor N e g o t i a t i o n s , pp. 283 f f . 13 Claus Noe, Gebaendigter Klassenkampf, T a r i f a u t o n o - mie i n der Bundesrepublik ( B e r l i n : Duncker & Humblot,1970), p. 176. 14 We should mention here a t h i r d way i n which c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y can be reduced.(This p o s s i b i l i t y has been poi n t e d out by A. Pizzorno, " P o l i t i c a l Exchange and C o l l e c t i v e I d e n t i -ty i n I n d u s t r i a l C o n f l i c t , " i n The Resurgence of C l a s s C o n f l i c t  i n Western Europe s i n c e 1968, eds. C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 276-298.) It e x i s t s where unions operate not only i n a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 'market' but a l s o i n a p o l i t i c a l market. In t h i s l a t t e r market the union pursues long term goals and i n s t e a d of the employer i t faces the government as b a r g a i n i n g p a r t n e r . C o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i n the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g market can drop i f both markets are l i n k e d i n a f a s h i o n that moderation i n the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n -ing market i s rewarded by concessions of the government i n the p o l i t i c a l market ( f o r instance by commitments to f u l l em-ployment, improved s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s e t c . ) . Although p r i n c i p a l l y p l a u s i b l e , t h i s way of red u c t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n -t e n s i t y , i t i s argued here, has l i t t l e relevance i n North America. F i r s t , P izzorno's p o l i t i c a l market does not have much i n common with the p o l i t i c a l market i n the conve n t i o n a l sense. In the l a t t e r , unions play the part of pressure groups. As other i n t e r e s t groups they d e l i v e r votes i n r e t u r n f o r bene-f i t s to t h i s group. In c o n t r a s t , i n Pizzorno's market the unions do not only threaten to w i t h o l d e l e c t o r a l support but, a l s o , threaten to withdraw support f o r the s o c i a l order. T h i s i n c l u d e s the c a l l i n g of s t r i k e s with the e x p l i c i t goal of causing 'urban d i s o r d e r ' and ' o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d i s r u p t i o n ' . Unions a c t i n g i n t h i s f a s h i o n c l e a r l y s t r a y beyond the bounds of a parliamentary or c o n g r e s s i o n a l form of government. As a permanent f e a t u r e such union behavior and hence the ex i s t e n c e of ' p o l i t i c a l exchange' i n Pizzorno's sense i s compatible only with systems where parliamentary democracy i s not f i r m l y en-trenched. While t h i s might be the case i n I t a l y or even France i t d e f i n i t e l y does not ob t a i n f o r Canada and the United S t a t e s . S t i l l , c o n f l i c t r e d u c t i o n along the above l i n e s i s conceivable a l s o i n a system with a conventional p o l i t i c a l market. T h i s takes us to the second poin t that makes Pizzorno's model un-s u i t a b l e f o r the North American i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. For a v a r i e t y of reasons North American unions, u n l i k e t h e i r European counterparts, have made few e f f o r t s to become a c t i v e 97 i n the p o l i t i c a l market. With p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s i n the p o l i -t i c a l market being of l i t t l e i n t e r e s t to the unions there are, thus,few i n c e n t i v e to e x e r c i s e r e s t r a i n t i n the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g market. Moreover, the r e l u c t a n c e of American and Canadian unions to make extensive use of p o l i t i c a l channels i s u n l i k e l y to be changed by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . Jack Barbash c i t e s three reasons f o r t h i s r e -l u c t a n c e : "...by comparison to c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g (a) i t s e f f e c t s the e f f e c t s of law and i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n on the terms of the employment r e l a t i o n i s l e s s c l e a r l y p e r c e i v e d by union people, (b) i t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y as responsive to union i n f l u e n c e and (c) i t i s not as adaptable to p a r t i c u l a r union i n t e r e s t s . " (Jack Barbash, Trade Unions and N a t i o n a l  Economic P o l i c y (Baltimore: John Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1972), p. 193). Of these three disadvantages only the second one has a remote chance, i f t h a t , of being e l i m i n a t e d by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e . The p r e c o n d i t i o n h e r e f o r e i s that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e leads to the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the union movement. T h i s , how-ever, as we s h a l l see f u r t h e r below (p.53 ) i s not very l i k e l y i n Canada. 15 The somewhat non-committal language has been de-l i b e r a t e l y chosen to make allowance f o r the f a c t that i n i t s q u a n t i t a t i v e aspects the r e l a t i o n s h i p between b a r g a i n i n g out-come and macro-goals i s s t i l l the subject of some controver-sy which t h e r e f o r e leaves the actors with c o n s i d e r a b l e leeway i n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p . see note 11. 17 How extensive t h i s o v e r l a p i s depends on the t o l e r -ance the p u b l i c shows towards unemployment. 18 See f o r an extensive survey of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e : Dennis C. Mueller, P u b l i c Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-v e r s i t y Press, 1979). 19 P. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of P u b l i c Expendi-t u r e , " i n Review of Economics and S t a t i s t i c s 36 (Nov. 1954): 386, quoted i n Mueller, P u b l i c Choice, pp. 12-13. 20 For an extensive c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of p u b l i c goods i n terms of t h e i r p u r i t y see Hans van den Doel, Democracy and  Welfare Economics, t r a n s . B r i g i d B i g g i n s (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1979), pp. 28-30. 98 21 See f o r instance John C r i s p o , I n d u s t r i a l Democracy  i n Western Europe - A North American P e r s p e c t i v e (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978), p. 153; the l a r g e group s c e n a r i o a s s o c i a t e d with a d e c e n t r a l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g s t r u c t u r e may a l s o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the f a c t that whenever the government of Canada deems wage and p r i c e r e s t r a i n t necessary i t has to r e -s o r t to s t r i c t c o n t r o l s r a t h e r than to more vol u n t a r y forms of incomes p o l i c i e s . 22 Mancur Olson, The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n , 2nd. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), pp. 44-46. ^ I b i d . , p. 50. I b i d . 25 To t h i s p o i n t see John F.B. Goodman, "Great B r i t a i n : Toward the S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , " i n Worker M i l i t a n c y and i t s Con- sequences , 1965-1975, ed. S. Barkin (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 79; Klaus von Beyme, Gewerkschaften und Arbeitsbeziehungen  i n k a p i t a l i s t i s c h e n Laendern (Munich: P i p e r & Co V e r l a g , 1977), p. 250; van den Doel, Democracy and Welfare Economics, p. 65. 26 For i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t a i l s see Paul M a l l e s , The I n s t i - t u t i o n s of I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s i n C o n t i n e n t a l Europe (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1973), pp. 78/79; Gerhard Lehmbruch, " L i b e r a l Corporatism and Party Government," Comparative P o l i t -i c a l Studies 10 (1977): 102-103. 27 According to Stuart Jamieson the fragmented govern-mental s t r u c t u r e i n Canada prevents that "...a s o r t of 'na-t i o n a l consensus' c o u l d be achieved with regard to f o r m u l a t i n g p r i o r i t i e s i n economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l goals on a na-t i o n a l s c a l e , or i n the measures needed to achieve them." (Stuart Jamieson, "Addendum to Paper on: The T h i r d Wave Re-considered," (Vancouver, B.C.: Department of Economics, Uni-v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1977), p. 3. (Mimeographed.) 28 Quebec i s the only province i n Canada which i n i t s ' C o l l e c t i v e Agreement Act' (1934) makes allowance f o r an ex-t e n s i o n of the p r o v i s i o n s of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement to a l l em-ployees and employers i n a p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y at the request of one of the p a r t i e s to the o r i g i n a l agreement. 29 J o e l Seidman, "Bargaining S t r u c t u r e : Some Problems of Complexity and D i s l o c a t i o n , " Labor Law Journal 24 (1973): 349. 99 30,,.. I b i d . 31 Paul Weiler, R e c o n c i l a b l e D i f f e r e n c e s (Toronto: The Carswell Company L i m i t e d , 1980), p. 175. 32 D. Gallagher and K. Wetzel, " C e n t r a l i z e d Multi-Em-p l o y e r N e g o t i a t i o n s i n P u b l i c Education: An Examination of the Saskatchewan Experience," Journal of C o l l e c t i v e N e g o t i a t i o n s  i n the P u b l i c Sector 9 (1980): 284. 33 J.B. Rose, " C o n s t r u c t i o n Labour R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a -t i o n s i n Canada," R e l a t i o n s I n d u s t r i e l l e s 32 (1977):42-43; " L a n s k a i l l i s t s GVRD t r o u b l e s . . . , " Vancouver Sun, 27 May 1981, business s e c t i o n . 34 Bok and Dunlop, Labor and the American Community, p. 113. 35 A. Weber, "The C r a f t - I n d u s t r i a l Issue R e v i s i t e d , " I n d u s t r i a l and Labor R e l a t i o n s Review 16 (1963): 403. 3 6 Joseph B. Rose, P u b l i c P o l i c y , B a r g a i n i n g S t r u c t u r e  and the C o n s t r u c t i o n Industry (Toronto: Butterworth & Co L t d . , 1980), p. 168. 37 W.P. K e l l y , "Fragmented or C e n t r a l i z e d B a r g a i n i n g , " i n Proceedings of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference on Trends i n  I n d u s t r i a l and Labor R e l a t i o n s , ed. F. Bairstow (Montreal: I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Center, M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1977), p. 148. 38 Weiler, R e c o n c i l a b l e D i f f e r e n c e s , p. 171. 3 9 I b i d . , p. 177. 40 The Labor Code of B r i t i s h Columbia (1973), s e c t i o n 7. 41 George W. Brooks and Mark Thompson, " M u l t i p l a n t U n i t s : The NLRB's Withdrawal of Free Choice," I n d u s t r i a l  and Labor R e l a t i o n s Review 20 ( A p r i l 1967): 363-380. 4 2 I b i d . , p. 374. 100 43 For an account of the v a r i o u s measures taken by i n d u s t r i a l unions to p a c i f y t h e i r s k i l l e d trades members see A. Weber, "The C r a f t - I n d u s t r i a l Issue R e v i s i t e d , " pp. 382-393. ^ s e e pp. 36 f f . 45 As to the determinants of a c t u a l (as compared to formal) m i n o r i t y power see pp. 65 f f . 46 U n l i k e the other German unions the 'IG Druck und Papier' has not c o n f i n e d i t s e l f to merely c u s h i o n i n g the ad-verse impacts of t e c h n o l o g i c a l change. Instead, i t asked f o r a complete i n s u l a t i o n from those im p a c t s ( f o r example by r e -s t r i c t i v e manning r u l e s ) . For t h i s d e v i a t i o n from the r u l e account the nature of t e c h n o l o g i c a l change i n t h i s i n d u s t r y and the union's o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In c o n t r a s t to other i n d u s t r i e s (e.g. the automotive i n d u s t r y ) r a t i o -n a l i z a t i o n i n the p r i n t i n g i n d u s t r y mainly d i s p l a c e d h i g h l y s k i l l e d craftsmen, i n p a r t i c u l a r t y p e s e t t e r s . Among the l a t t e r membership and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s higher than among most other occupations organized by the 'IG Druck und Papier'. Thus, while the t y p e s e t t e r s do not c o n s t i t u t e the m a j o r i t y i n the union they form i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l core. As such they gained a weight i n c o l l e c t i v i t y i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t aggregation which i s q u i t e of p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r numerical s t r e n g t h . T h i s became evident i n the 1978 b a r g a i n i n g round when they managed to b l ock the d i l u t i o n of t h e i r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s and, thereby, set the stage f o r the ensuing s t r i k e and lockout. 47 For a very c r i t i c a l review of t h i s p o l i c y see Josef Esser, Gewerkschaften i n der K r i s e (Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp, 1982), i n p a r t i c u l a r pp. 128-138. 48 Bok and Dunlop, Labor and the American Community, p. 74; Jack Barbash, American Unions: S t r u c t u r e , Government  and P o l i t i c s , p. 37. 49 J. Bergmann, 0. J a c o b i , and W. M u e l l e r - J e n t s c h , Gewerkschaften i n der Bundesrepublik - Gewerkschaftliche Lohn- p o l i t i k zwischen M i t g l i e d e r i n t e r e s s e h und oekonomischen  "S'ystemzwaehgen (F r a n k f u r t - Cologne: Europaeische Verlagsan-s t a l t , 1975), p. 272. 50 Arthur M. Ross, Trade Union Wage P o l i c y (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1956), p. 272. 1 0 1 5 1 I b i d . , p. 39 52 A l b e r t 0. Hirschman, E x i t , Voice and L o y a l i t y (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970. 53 Gallagher and Wetzel, " C e n t r a l i z e d Multi-Employer N e g o t i a t i o n s i n P u b l i c Education: An Examination of the Saskatchewan Experience," p. 284. 54 On t h i s p o i n t see Seymour Martin L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l  Man (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1963), pp. 417 f f . 55 See f o r i n s t a n c e Arnold Tannenbaum, "Unions," i n Handbook of O r g a n i z a t i o n s , ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 756. 56 Wilke, Die Funktionaere, pp. 215-216; Bergmann, Ja c o b i , and M u e l l e r - J e n t s c h , Gewerkschaften i n der Bundes- r e p u b l i k , p. 287; W. Streeck, "Das Dilemma der O r g a n i s a t i o n -Tarifverbaende zwischen I n t e r e s s e n v e r t r e t u n g und S t a b i l i t a e t s -p o l i t i k , " i n Verteilungskampf und S t a b i l i t a e t s p o l i t i k , eds. W. Mei^ner and L. Unterseher ( S t u t t g a r t : Kohlhammer Ve'rlag, 1972), p. 144. 57 Jack S t i e b e r , Governing the UAW (John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1962, Science e d i t i o n , 1967), p. 59. 58 J . Bergmann, 0. J a c o b i , and W. M u e l l e r - J e n t s c h , Gewerkschaften i n der Bundesrepublik, pp. 282 f f . 59 In our o p i n i o n one need not go as f a r as L i p s e t , Trow and Coleman who suggest that because of t h e i r i n t e r e s t h e t e r o g e n i t y i n d u s t r i a l unions w i l l have to be d i c t a t o r i a l (Seymour M a r t i n L i p s e t , Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, Union Democracy: The i n t e r n a l P o l i t i c s of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T y p o g r a p h i c a l Union (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1956), p. 308.). 6 0 I b i d . , p. 230. Q ^  On t h i s p o i n t see Bok and Dunlop, Labor and the  American Community, pp. 84-85 or Sara Gamm, "The E l e c t i o n Base of N a t i o n a l Union Executive Boards," I n d u s t r i a l and Labor  Relations- Review 32 (1978): 302. R 9 IG M e t a l l Satzung (1984), s e c t i o n 14 5. 102 a *3 I b i d . , s e c t i o n 18 0; J. Bergmann, 0. Jacobi and W. Muel l e r - J e n t s c h , Gewerkschaften i n der Bundesrepublik. p. 289. 64 On t h i s point see Jack S t i e b e r , Governing the UAW. pp. 140-141. 6 5 I b i d . , p. 120. 103 BIBLIOGRAPHY I. Books Bairstow, F.; Dubinsky, M.; and Smith, R. Report of the In- qu i r y Commission on Wider-Based C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1978. Barbash, Jack. 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