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Canada’s evolution towards dominion status : an analysis of American-Canadian relations, 1919-1924 Lomas, Donna Louise 1985

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CANADA'S EVOLUTION TOWARDS DOMINION STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS 1919-1924 By DONNA LOUISE LOMAS B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f V i c t o r i a , 1981 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (History) We accept t h i s tfTeijjis as conforming to the requi red s-teandard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1985 (c) Donna L o u i s e Lomas, 1985 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 D a t e A cJ^r/y^J /S'/VS' - i i -/ABSTRACT The purpose of t h i s study has been to address an imbalance e x i s t i n g i n the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y r e l a t i n g t o American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s i n the p e r i o d between 1919-1924. R e l y i n g p r i m a r i l y on American sources, t h i s study has attempted t o argue t h a t the Canadian government had a unique o p p o r t u n i t y to i n i t i c te and execute an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y by e x p l o i t i n g her p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e B r i t i s h Empire as w e l l as her c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the United S t a t e s . In c o n t r a s t t o a number of Canadian s t u d i e s which have argued t h a t the United S t a t e s impeded Canada's d i p l o m a t i c growth i n t h e p o s t World War I p e r i o d , t h i s work maintains t h a t the United S t a t e s t r i e d t o encourage Canada to assume a more autonomous p o s i t i o n because i t was i n A m e r i c a ' s i n t e r e s t t o do s o . Canada's s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e s w i t h the United S t a t e s towards the q u e s t i o n s of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , A s i a n immigration and A r t i c l e Ten i n the League of Nations' Covenant convinced the U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a t t h e C a n a d i a n government was p o t e n t i a l l y u s e f u l t o the American government i n h e l p i n g t o p r o t e c t i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s i n i n s t i t u t i o n s where i t was not r e p r e s e n t e d . The evidence presented i n t h i s study m a i n t a i n s t h a t i t was t h e C a n a d i a n and B r i t i s h governments t h a t were r e l u c t a n t t o c a r r y out the f i n a l steps of a p p o i n t i n g a separate Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to Washington i n the e a r l y 1920s. As a r e s u l t , Canada l o s t her o p p o r t u n i t y to e s t a b l i s h an indepen-d e n t p o l i c y because t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s found a l t e r n a t i v e methods of p r o t e c t i n g i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . - -Table of Contents A b s t r a c t i i Acknowledgements - i V I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 Chapter One „ 15 Chapter Two 5 8 Chapter Three 118 Con c l u s i o n 147 B i b l iography 155 - iv -Acknowledgements I would l i k e t o t a k e t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o thank t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s who have a s s i s t e d me i n the completion of t h i s t h e s i s . I would l i k e t o e x p r e s s my s i n c e r e t h a n k s to my s u p e r v i s o r Dr. A l l a n S mith, whose encouragement, c a r e f u l r e a d i n g , and p e r t i n e n t c r i t i c i s m s were i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the completion of t h i s work. I would a l s o l i k e to thank Dr. A. Norbert MacDonald, whose graduate reading course was extremely u s e f u l i n h e l p i n g me formulate and focus my i d e a s . As w e l l , t h i s t h e s i s would not have been completed without the extensive a s s i s t a n c e o f t h e I n t e r - L i b r a r y Loans o f f i c e o f the Main L i b r a r y at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. I would a l s o l i k e to thank David Dear f o r h i s encourage-ment and c o n f i d e n c e , and Ramona Rose f o r her p a t i e n c e and c a r e f u l proof r e a d i n g . I would a l s o l i k e to express a s p e c i a l thank-you to Lee Stewart L e v i n f o r her encouragement, f r i e n d -s h i p and a s s i s t a n c e . F i n a l l y , I would l i k e t o thank, my parents, Robert and Edna Lomas, f o r t h e i r support and encouragement. I cannot adequately express the a p p r e c i a t i o n I owe them and the other members of my f a m i l y . - 1 -I n t r o d u c t i o n The P a r i s Peace Conference of 1919 was a watershed i n the development of t w e n t i e t h century i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I t represented a c r o s s r o a d between t r a d i t i o n a l diplomacy, which stemmed from the ideas embodied i n the Enlightenment of the e i g h t e e n t h century, and the changing p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s and power s t r u c t u r e s of the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h century. The concept t h a t v i c t o r i o u s powers c o u l d convene a c o n f e r e n c e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f c r e a t i n g a l a s t i n g peace was not new. In 1815, t h e C o n g r e s s o f V i e n n a had been h e l d t o r e s t r u c t u r e t h e European balance of power.1 Two important elements t h a t made the P a r i s conference s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t , however, were the emergence o f new non-European powers p l a y i n g prominent r o l e s i n the f o r m u l a t i o n and composition of the world peace, and the a c t i v e presence of the B r i t i s h s e l f - g o v e r n i n g Domin-i o n s . ^  Never b e f o r e had former European c o l o n i e s r e c e i v e d i n d e p e n d e n t d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s w h i l e s t i l l members o f an i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e . As a r e s u l t of these f a c t o r s , the con-ference witnessed the development of i n t e r e s t i n g d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s between European powers, used to p o s i t i o n s of dominance but now i n d e c l i n e , and r e l u c t a n t emerging powers unsure of t h e i r new r o l e i n world a f f a i r s . In a d d i t i o n , the conference a l s o presented the new powers with an o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n i t i a t e and enhance the growth of d i p l o m a t i c t i e s with each o t h e r . In t h i s l a t t e r category, one of the most i n t e r e s -t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o enter a new, more complex stage was t h a t between two North American neighbours: the United S t a t e s and the B r i t i s h Dominion of Canada. Both t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Canada a t t e n d e d the peace c o n f e r e n c e f o r d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s . A l t h o u g h t h e A m e r i c a n government had begun to p l a y a more a c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e d u r i n g the 1890s, i t was not u n t i l the United S t a t e s p a r t i c i -pated at P a r i s t h a t American o f f i c i a l s d r a m a t i c a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d to the f o r m u l a t i o n of world p e a c e . 3 world War I had c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was p o t e n t i a l l y t h e world's foremost economic and m i l i t a r y power. Woodrow Wilson, the f i r s t American P r e s i d e n t to t r a v e l t o Europe d u r i n g h i s term i n o f f i c e , a r r i v e d at the conference determined to exert A m e r i c a ' s i n f l u e n c e and c o n v i n c e c o n f e r e n c e d e l e g a t e s t o compose a peace s e t t l e m e n t t h a t would ensure s t a b i l i t y and f u l f i l l Wilson's p l e d g e " t o b r i n g peace and s a f e t y t o a l l n a t i o n s and make the world i t s e l f at l a s t f r e e . " 4 Canada's r o l e at the conference was much more ambiguous. P r i o r t o 1919, Canada's f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s had been substan-t i a l l y c o n t r o l l e d by and conducted through, the o f f i c e s of the B r i t i s h government.5 The d e v a s t a t i o n o f t h e World War, however, had d e m o n s t r a t e d t o t h e C a n a d i a n government t h a t Canada had to g a i n c o n t r o l of i t s own f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n order to a v o i d becoming entangled i n f u t u r e c o n f l i c t s t h a t might not d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e Canada's s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . Emerging i n 1919 w i t h an economy t h a t had experienced an enormous expansion d u r i n g t h e war, Prime M i n i s t e r Robert Borden wanted Canada - 3 -to receive the recognition and international status which was commensurate with her c o n t r i b u t i o n and s a c r i f i c e s for the A l l i e d war e f f o r t and which would also recognize her growing economic p o t e n t i a l . Supported by the other self-governing Dominions in the B r i t i s h Empire, Canada convinced the B r i t i s h government that the P a r i s conference was an opportunity for Great B r i t a i n to demonstrate to the world powers the evolving constitutional position of the Dominions in r e l a t i o n to the Mother Country. Borden was determined to use the conference as a v e h i c l e f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a new diplomatic status that would enable Canada to sign the peace t r e a t y on her own behalf and become e l i g i b l e f o r membership i n the proposed League of Nations.6 It was important to the Dominions that Great B r i t a i n convince the United States that they were indeed autonomous nations capable of pursuing independent f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s . Certainly, i t was assumed by members of the B r i t i s h Empire that recognition from the United States would be tantamount to world recognition. For Canada, however, American recognition was especially c r u c i a l because of the growing complexity of t h e i r r e l a t i o n -ship. Prior to 1914, both nations had voiced t h e i r d i s s a t i s -faction with the awkward method of conducting relations through the B r i t i s h Embassy in Washington.? This method of indirect communication had often resulted in issues becoming hopelessly bogged down in confusion and misunderstanding. As well, on a - 4 -n u m b e r o f o c c a s i o n s , n o t a b l y , t h e W a s h i n g t o n T r e a t y i n 1 8 7 1 , t h e C a n a d i a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h n e g o t i -a t o r s w e r e p r e p a r e d t o s a c r i f i c e C a n a d a ' s i n t e r e s t s i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t G r e a t B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s n o t j e o p a r d i z e d . 8 A m e r i c a n d i p l o m a t s a n d b u s i n e s s -m e n h a d a l s o e x p r e s s e d t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n a t t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e t h a t e l a p s e d b e f o r e t h e y h a d a r e s p o n s e f r o m C a n a d a o n a n i m p o r t a n t i s s u e . A l l t h e s e p r o b l e m s w e r e e n h a n c e d b y t h e w a r w h e n t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s w e r e m a d e m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d b y i s s u e s s u c h a s C a n a d i a n r e c r u i t m e n t i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w h i c h r e q u i r e d t h a t a m o r e d i r e c t , i m m e d i a t e d i p l o m a t i c s t r u c t u r e b e e s t a b l i s h e d . A s l a t e a s 1 9 1 8 , r e p r e s e n -t a t i v e s f r o m b o t h c o u n t r i e s r e p o r t e d t o t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s t h a t : i n l o o k i n g b a c k o v e r t h e h i s t o r y o f s o m e o f t h e q u e s t i o n s a t i s s u e , i t i s e a s y t o u n d e r s t a n d h o w f a i l u r e t o a p p r e c i a t e o r c o m p r e h e n d t h e v i e w p o i n t a n d a i m s o f t h e o t h e r s i d e , a n d t h e l a c k o f s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t , m a y h a v e b e e n t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e o r i g i n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a n d t h e c a u s e o f t h e i r p e r p e t u a t i o n . 9 C o n s e q u e n t l y , B o r d e n h o p e d t h a t t h e P a r i s P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e c o u l d a l s o s e r v e b o t h n a t i o n s a s t h e f i r s t s t e p i n t h e p r o c e s s o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a s e p a r a t e C a n a d i a n p r e s e n c e i n W a s h i n g t o n . 1 ® T h e a c c e p t a n c e b y P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n o f C a n a d a ' s e v e n t u a l d u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a t t h e p e a c e c o n f e r e n c e a s b o t h a s m a l l p o w e r a n d a m e m b e r o f t h e B r i t i s h I m p e r i a l d e l e g a t i o n s e e m e d t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s p r e p a r e d t o r e c o g n i z e a n d s u p p o r t C a n a d a ' s e v o l v i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s . M o r e o v e r , t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s a c k n o w l e d g m e n t t h a t C a n a d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s - 5 -could sign the treaty on Canada's behalf and become members in the proposed League of Nation's Assembly, was further proof that the Wilson Administration would react favourably to a more independent Canada. This conclusion* however, was soon shattered when the American Senate refused to r a t i f y the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty or the Covenant of the League of Nations. Besides having tremen-dous r a m i f i c a t i o n s f o r the broader i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, the Senate's d e c i s i o n also had a detrimental e f f e c t on Canadian-American relations. Both the Canadian and B r i t i s h governments interpreted the Senate's action as a repudiation of Canada's new status and concluded that i t would severely retard the growth of diplomatic relations between Canada and the United S t a t e s . 1 1 Not u n t i l 1923 when Canada, for the f i r s t time, signed a non-commercial t r e a t y with the United States without the counter signature of a B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l , did a formal diplomatic relationship based on the recognition that Canada was achieving diplomatic autonomy begin to develop between the two countries. An analysis of the historiography relating to Canadian-American relations reveals that an imbalance e x i s t s i n the l i t e r a t u r e . Issues have been extensively studied only from the Canadian perspective and, for the most part, scholars have r e l i e d almost e x c l u s i v e l y on Canadian and B r i t i s h primary sources. An important focus for students of Canadian foreign p o l i c y has been the question: can Canada formulate and - 6 -execute an independent foreign p o l i c y not dominated by the United States? The fact that the Canadian government exhibited signs of wanting to achieve autonomy i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s following World War I has made t h i s period c r u c i a l for Canadian analysts. The l i t e r a t u r e relating to Canada's relationship with the United States i s voluminous and can be d i v i d e d i n t o three d i s t i n c t schools of thought. The f i r s t school emerged in the immediate post World War I period. Manifesting an animosity towards the United States because of the l a t t e r * s late entry into the war, members of t h i s group placed t h e i r emphasis on Canada's connection with Great B r i t a i n . Stressing the theme of imperial unity, scholars such as Chester Martin, argued that the Empire could only be maintained i f there was a s i n g l e f o r e i g n p o l i c y supported by a l l members. M a r t i n believed that a revised imperial structure which allowed a l l the Dominions to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a c t u a l formulation of foreign policy would eliminate the Dominions' complaints that t h e i r concerns and strategic interests were not being taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n by B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s . 1 2 Historians of th i s school concluded that i t was in Canada's best interest to remain within a reformed imperial structure that could act as a defense against aggressive American businessmen who were r a p i d l y expanding t h e i r i n f l u e n c e and investments i n the Canadian economy.13 An important theme contained in t h i s school of thought c a l l e d for the economic policy of imperial - 7 -preference to be i n s t i t u t e d as a method of o f f s e t t i n g America's t a r i f f l e g i s l a t i o n . Indeed, the American government's protec-t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s in the early 1920s increased t h i s school's tendency to look to the Empire for economic r e l i e f . If the emphasis of Canadian scholars in the early 1920s was on Canada's imperial connection, by the end of the decade and during the 1930s the mainstream of Canadian research, influenced by Harold Innis' staple thesis and Arthur Lower's concept of a " n a t i o n a l community," began to focus on the premise that Canada was a self-appointed "linch-pin" between the United States and Great B r i t a i n . ! 4 Bartlet Brebner, in his 1935 a r t i c l e "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," ar t i c u l a t e d the argument that Canada's developing special r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United States and l e g a l and emotional t i e s with Great B r i t a i n , afforded the Canadian government the enviable role of a mediator between the two world powers. 15 one of the results of t h i s s h i f t in emphasis was the attempt to analyze more f u l l y the impact that the United States was having on Canada's a b i l i t y to formulate a foreign poli c y . One result of t h i s was a focus on the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two countries' p o l i c i e s . By arguing the "l i n c h pin" theory academics created an i n t e r -national role for Canada that was used to j u s t i f y the Canadian government's insistence on achieving autonomy in i t s foreign a f f a i r s . 1 6 While a majority of Canadian scholars supported this - 8 -second school of thought, a t h i r d interpretation of Canadian-American relations began to appear in the 1930s and became an important influence in the post World War II era. I n i t i a l l y a r t i culated by Harold Innis and Donald Creighton, t h i s i n t e r -pretation described Canada's relations with the United States i n terms of a new c o l o n i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . R e j e c t i n g the premise that Canada had some f l e x i b i l i t y i n i t s f o r e i g n a f f a i r s when i t acted as a mediator between B r i t a i n and the United States, Innis argued that in the early 1920s "Canada moved from colony to nation to colony."! 7 This interpretation was enhanced when historians, writing in the post-World War II environment of the Cold War and the resulting p o l a r i z a t i o n of the world community, argued that Canada was not capable of executing a f o r e i g n policy that was fundamentally different from that of the United States. Scholars advocating t h i s view emphasized that the period from 1919-1924 was only s i g n i f i c a n t because Canada i d e n t i f i e d i t s strategic interests with those of the United S t a t e s . 1 8 Although the various interpretations have disagreed over whether Canada was capable of formulating an independent foreign policy in the early 1920s, a common conclusion shared by a l l schools of thought, and s t i l l being a r t i c u l a t e d in the lat e s t h i s t o r i c a l works, contends that during the early 1920s the United States did attempt to impede Canada's diplomatic s t a t u s . 1 ^ Unfortunately, t h i s c o n c l u s i o n has yet to be tested against the American documentation. Certainly, as the - 9 -smaller power, the diplomatic relationship was, and remains today, more c r u c i a l to Canada than to the United States. This fact, however, does not explain why American scholars have not exhaustively studied t h e i r country's p o l i c i e s towards Canada. An accusation that has been consistently l e v i e d against the U n i t e d States by Canadian scholars i s that the American government has demonstrated a lack of s e n s i t i v i t y and concern for i t s northern neighbor. America's position as a superpower has led her p o l i c y analysts to focus t h e i r research on the East-West r e l a t i o n s h i p and those areas of the world where America's i n t e r e s t s seem to be the most at risk.20 This apparent indifference towards Canada by American scholars has r e s u l t e d i n important issues between the two countries not being f u l l y examined or explained. The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s to t r y and address the imbalance in the historiography by testing some of the conclu-sions reached by Canadian scholars. To accomplish t h i s i t i s necessary to determine America's attitude and p o l i c i e s towards Canada in the c r u c i a l period from 1919 to the mutual signing of a convention re l a t i n g to America's policy of prohibition in 1924. How did the United States view and respond to Canada's attempts to develop a more autonomous f o r e i g n p o l i c y ? Did the United States deliberately try to impede Canada's r i s e to diplomatic status or was i t in America's interest to encourage a reluctant Canadian government to not only pursue an indepen-dent foreign policy but also, formally break i t s t i e s with - 10 -Great B r i t a i n and become a wholly independent nation existing outside the B r i t i s h Empire? A second area that needs to be examined more f u l l y i s how much did America's domestic p o l i t i c a l climate affect the American-Canadian relationship? On one l e v e l , the historian could answer t h i s question by focussing on b i l a t e r a l issues. To a great extent, t h i s has been the focus of most of the scholarly research completed thus f a r . The h i s t o r i a n could, however, a l s o examine the l a r g e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues and determine how America's domestic climate in re l a t i o n to these l a r g e r issues a f f e c t e d the American-Canadian relationship. Did the United States perceive Canada as a useful t o o l whose p o l i c i e s in re l a t i o n to Asian immigration, the.Anglo-Japanese Treaty, and A r t i c l e Ten in the League's Covenant so resembled America's position that America could "use" Canada to advance her own interests while p u b l i c l y appearing to remain diploma-t i c a l l y isolated? F i n a l l y , to what extent did the actions of the Canadian government and the debates in the Canadian House of Commons determine America's p o l i c i e s towards Canada? Did the misunderstanding and misconceptions i n the period p r i o r to the 1919 peace conference continue to plague the development of b i l a t e r a l relations because there was a genuine lack of concern on the part of the United States combined with c o n f l i c t i n g signs from the Canadian government? After examining these issues from the American perspective, i t w i l l be possible to understand more f u l l y the development of America's "special - 11 -relationship" with Canada. As well, i t w i l l also be possible to shed a d d i t i o n a l l i g h t on the question posed by Canadian scholars as to whether Canada—if the Dominion had exerted i t s e l f by forcing Great B r i t a i n and the United States to vie for Canada's support—had an opportunity in the e a r l y 1920s to formulate and execute an independent foreign p o l i c y . - 12 -Endnotes Introduction •I-For more information on the Congress of Vienna see: Peter Gay and R. K. Webb, Modern Europe Since 1815 (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); Charles K. Webster, The Congress of  Vienna. 1814-1815 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963). ^The four B r i t i s h Dominions present at the peace conference were: A u s t r a l i a , Canada, New Zealand and South A f r i c a . India was also represented but did not possess the status of a Dominion. For more information on Canada's r o l e at the conference see: P h i l i p Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth. B r i t i s h Canadian Relations 1917-1926 (Cambridge University Press, 1977); G. P. deT. Glazebrook, Canada at the Pa r i s Peace Conference (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1942). 3 p o r m o r e information on America's emerging diplomatic role at the turn of the century see: Walter LaFeber, The New Empire. An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of American Expansion 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975); Norman A. Graebner, ed. Ideas and Diplomacy. Readings in the I n t e l l e c t u a l Tradition of American Foreign P o l i c y (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1964); Arthur S. Link and W. M. Leary J r . , eds., The  Diplomacy of World Power. 1889-1920 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970). 4Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy, p. 449. ^For more information on Canada's foreign relations p r i o r to 1919 see: R. MacGregor Dawson, ed., The Development of Dominion Status. 1900-1936 (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1965); F. H. Soward, The Department of External A f f a i r s and Canadian Autonomy (Ottawa: Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Association, 1972); P. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: J . A. Cross, Whitehall and the Commonwealth. B r i t i s h Depart-mental Organization f o r Commonwealth R e l a t i o n s . 1900-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967). 6 I n a speech delivered in the Canadian House of Commons, Prime Minister Borden informed the Canadian p u b l i c that he "conceive[d] that the battle for Canadian l i b e r t y [was] being fought . . . on the plains of France and Belgium . . . " and that he intended to inform the B r i t i s h government that Canada expected to play a s i g n i f i c a n t role in the peace settlement. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa: King's Printer, May 18, 1917), p. 1541. Also see: Robert C. Brown, Robert L a i r d Borden. A Biography Vol 2 1914-1937 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), p. 134. - 13 -'As e a r l y as 1887, American Secretary of State Thomas Bayard, commented that the awkwardness of Canada's diplomatic situation, which he referred to as an "imperfectly developed s o v e r e i g n t y , " was " f e l t most s t r o n g l y by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . . . . " i n : John G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of  Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1951), p. 24. ^Lawrence Martin, The Presidents and the Prime Ministers:  Washington and Ottawa Face to Face (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1982), p. 31. 9United States, Department of State. Papers Relating to  the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 (Washington: Government Printing O f f i c e , 1930), p. 440. l^Canada, Department of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . "Canada's International Status, Developments at the P a r i s Conference 1919," in External A f f a i r s . Vol. 16 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), pp. 163-172. H c a r l Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, Aspects of English-Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Writing; 1900-1970 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 39. For more information p e r t a i n i n g to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n see: George M. Wrong, "Canada and the Imperial War Cabinet," Canadian H i s t o r i c a l  Review. Vol. 1 (No. 1 March 1920), pp. 3-25; Chester Martin, Empire and Commonwealth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929). 13por more information on America's economic expansion into Canada in the 1920s see: Hugh Keenleyside, Canada and the United S t a t e s . Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion (New York: Kennikat Press, 1971 ed.). 1 4Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, p. 137. l ^ B a r t l e t Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese All i a n c e and the Washington Conference," P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly. Vol. 50 (No. 1 March 1935), p. 45. 1 6 B r e b n e r elaborated on h i s " l i n c h - p i n " theory in his book: B a r t l e t Brebner, The North A t l a n t i c Triangle: TJie. Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great B r i t a i n (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945). l^ H a r o l d I n n i s , "Great B r i t a i n , the United States, and Canada," i n Mary Q. Innis, ed., Essays in Canadian Economic  History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956), p. 405. - 1 4 -i B F o r m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s e e : G e o r g e G r a n t , L a m e n t f o r a N a t i o n ( T o r o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d a n d S t e w a r t , 1 9 6 5 ) ; D o n a l d C r e i g h t o n , C a n a d a ' s F i r s t C e n t u r y f  1 8 6 7 - 1 9 6 7 ( T o r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 7 0 ) . l ^ E d e l g a r d E . M a h a n t a n d G r a e m e S . M o u n t , / A n I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o C a n a d i a n - A m e r i c a n R e l a t i o n s ( T o r o n t o : M e t h u e n , 1 9 8 4 ) , p . 1 1 3 . 2 0 R e c e n t l y , A m e r i c a n s c h o l a r s ' i n d i f f e r e n c e t o w a r d s l a r g e p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d h a s b e e n c r i t i c i z e d b y a c a d e m i c s w h o f e e l t h a t t h i s t e n d e n c y h a s r e s u l t e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a l w a y s r e a c t i n g t o a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n i n s t e a d o f d e v e l o p i n g a c o h e s i v e p o l i c y o v e r a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d o f t i m e . S e e : P a u l E . S i g m u n d , " L a t i n A m e r i c a : C h a n g e o r C o n t i n u i t y , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . V o l . 6 0 ( N o . 3 A m e r i c a a n d t h e W o r l d 1 9 8 1 ) , p . 6 2 9 . - 15 -Chapter One Before proceeding with an a n a l y s i s of America's a t t i t u d e towards Canada i t i s n e c e s s a r y to put i n t o some h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t t h e i m p o r t a n t d o m e s t i c f a c t o r s w h i c h i n f l u e n c e d A m e rican f o r e i g n p o l i c y makers i n t h e immediate p o s t war p e r i o d . In an a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d i n 1951, R i c h a r d L e o p o l d implored American s c h o l a r s t o begin the process of a n a l y z i n g America's diplomacy not j u s t i n terms of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n but a l s o , i n terms of domestic f a c t o r s . ! Leopold's c h a l l e n g e was e s p e c i a l l y p e r t i n e n t t o t h e s t u d y o f A m e r i c a n - C a n a d i a n r e l a t i o n s . The l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t i n g t o t h i s f i e l d c l e a r l y r e v e a l s a tendency on the p a r t of s c h o l a r s such as B a r t l e t B r e b n e r , t o a d v o c a t e an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s which s t r e s s e d the extent t o which American p o l i c y making was i n f l u e n c e d by e l e m e n t s which were c o n t i n e n t a l r a t h e r than n a t i o n a l i n c h a r a c t e r . 2 T h i s l e d to the de-empha-s i z i n g of determinants of American f o r e i g n p o l i c y which were d o m e s t i c i n o r i g i n . In p a r t i c u l a r , the c o m p e t i t i o n between the e x e c u t i v e and l e g i s l a t i v e branches of the American govern-ment f o r c o n t r o l of f o r e i g n p o l i c y making, the r o l e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n determining America's p o l i c i e s , and t h e American concept of i s o l a t i o n i s m , a l l of which had an enormous impact on American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s i n the e a r l y 1920s, have not r e c e i v e d the a t t e n t i o n they s h o u l d . The c o m p e t i t i o n between the Senate and the presidency f o r c o n t r o l o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y making d i d not b e g i n w i t h t h e - 16 -debate over the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. In the past, the Senate had exercised i t s options by rejecting or amending tre a t i e s negotiated by the State Department. 3 The 1919-1920 V e r s a i l l e s Treaty debate, however, was the f i r s t time that the ambiguity contained i n the American Constitution dramatically came to the world's attention. The Senate's refusal to r a t i f y both the treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations revealed a weakness in the governmental s t r u c t u r e and cast serious doubt on America's a b i l i t y to play an active international role. Writing in 1981, former Senator John G. Tower, addressed t h i s ambiguity when he argued that because senators were elected to represent a s p e c i f i c state with pa r t i c u l a r interests, domestic issues had p r i o r i t y and senators gave l i t t l e thought to what impact th e i r decisions would have on th e i r country's foreign policy.4 Moreover, in the immediate post World War I period, the Senate was also attempting to regain some of the powers i t had l o s t to the executive branch during the wartime c r i s i s . Exerting i t s independence by r e j e c t i n g the t r e a t y , despite the international implications, was an opportunity for the Senate to weaken the a u t h o r i t y and c r e d i b i l i t y of the presidency. Consequently, as pointed out in an a r t i c l e in Foreign A f f a i r s in 1923, "never in the history . . . [of the Senate] had i t been more convinced of i t s right to p a r t i c i -pate i n shaping the foreign policy of the country."5 This attitude was to have serious consequences for the growth of American-Canadian relations. - 17 -Closely linked to t h i s structural competition was the role of public opinion in policy formulation. Again, the h i s t o r i -ography r e l a t i n g to t h i s issue i s extensive.6 Although the actual impact of public opinion on government policy i s very d i f f i c u l t to determine, Thomas Bailey, in his book Man in the  Street. described Woodrow Wilson's decisions to turn the 1918 Congressional election and his i l l - f a t e d speaking tour of 1919 into contests for public support for his foreign p o l i c i e s as two examples where the American people were asked to parti c i p a t e in the competition between the branches of the federal govern-ment.7 In regards to American-Canadian relations, the general public's attitude towards both the B r i t i s h Empire and Woodrow Wilson went a long way in determining how individual senators would respond to Canada's desire for diplomatic r e c o g n i t i o n from the United States. The general public had i t s f i r s t opportunity to demonstrate i t s opinion i n the Congressional e l e c t i o n of 1918, which Selig Adler described as one of the most c r u c i a l in American h i s t o r y . 8 O r i g i n a l l y , both national parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, had agreed to run low keyed campaigns that reflected wartime cooperation. In October 1918, however, President Wilson made a f a t a l p o l i t i c a l error by asking the American people to elect a Democratic Congress. This opened the way for the Republicans to run the i r own partisan campaign. The Republican strategy was to unite large business interests with the anti-Wilson, a n t i - B r i t i s h vote. If successful, the > - 18 -Republicans hoped to sweep the Senate and force the President to demand the unconditional surrender of the Central Powers. This policy, the Republicans argued, would prevent a peace conference that could only result in the United States being t i e d to Europe.9 Many of the t h i r t y - s e v e n Senate seats up for election were located in areas of the country, s p e c i f i c a l l y the Mid-West and the North, that t r a d i t i o n a l l y voted Republican but in the previous election had supported W i l s o n . ^ In both of these areas the Republicans, c l o s e l y l i n k e d with l a r g e business interests, used Wilson's wartime economic p o l i c i e s as well as the economic p o l i c i e s of the B r i t i s h Empire, to entice support away from the Democratic Party. In the Mid-West, for example, Wilson's p o l i c y of s e t t i n g f i x e d g r a i n rates had severely affected the incomes of the farming community. When compared to other s e c t i o n s of the country, i n p a r t i c u l a r Wilson's n a t i v e South, where the p r i n c i p l e commodity, cotton, had been allowed to set i t s own p r i c e on the open market, the farmers of the Mid-West had not shared in the wartime pros-p e r i t y . 1 1 In the North, the Republican Party used the t a c t i c of appealing to a long standing a n t i - B r i t i s h bias t h a t was p a r t i a l l y the result of ethnic and economic factors. Ethnic I r i s h and German voters had opposed Wilson's d e c i s i o n to become involved in the war on the side of the B r i t i s h . Both groups could be counted upon to vote against Wilson's peace - 19 -proposals. Moreover, Republicans were also able to attract an a n t i - B r i t i s h vote amongst older, conservative Americans who were b i t t e r l y opposed to Great B r i t a i n because of that country's wartime economic p o l i c i e s . Prior to the United States* entry into the war, B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c i e s of black l i s t i n g American companies suspected of t r a d i n g with the C e n t r a l Powers, embargoing manufactured items ranging from shoes to farming equipment (which were p r i n c i p a l l y produced i n America's i n d u s t r i a l North-East), and proposing the p o l i c y of imperial p r e f e r e n c e , were i n t e r p r e t e d by many American voters as deliberate attempts by Great B r i t a i n to freeze out American e x p o r t s . ! 2 anger r e s u l t i n g from B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c i e s combined with a t h i r d domestic i n f l u e n c e , i s o l a t i o n i s m , to form a formidable threat to Wilson's peace p o l i c i e s . The American concept of i s o l a t i o n i s m was c l e a r l y a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r which p o l i c y makers had to take into account. A theme which has run throughout the American experience, i s o l a t i o n i s m i s a d i f f i c u l t concept to define because i t has, at various times, assumed d i f f e r e n t guises and meanings. In his often quoted farewell address, George Washington provided posterity with his d e f i n i t i o n of i s o l a -t i o n ism which included a warning to future administrations to avoid entangling alli a n c e s and, in p a r t i c u l a r , involvement i n the i m p e r i a l i s t i c p o l i t i c s of Europe. 1-^ p o r the most part, Washington's advice was heeded. During the nineteenth century, the United States, preoccupied with i t s physical - 20 -expansion across the continent, the development of an indus-t r i a l economy, and the b i t t e r c o n f l i c t between North and South over the issue of slavery, was generally successful in staying away from diplomatic controversies and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . This i s o l a t i o n , however, became harder to maintain during the 1890s because America's emerging economic strength brought with i t new, strategic interests beyond the continental shores of the United States. By the f i r s t decade of the twentieth century i t had become clear to many Americans, including two prominent Republicans, former Secretary of State Elihu Root and former President Theodore Roosevelt, that expanding American interests demanded that the United States play a more active international r o l e . 1 4 America's intervention in World War I brought the issue of what r o l e the United States should play i n the world community to the forefront of the nation's attention. Wilson's decision to announce his v i s i o n of world peace prior to both the war's conclusion and the Congressional election of 1918, provided the American e l e c t o r a t e with the opportunity to assess Wilson's proposals. It was clear that the President intended that the United States chart a different course and assume new international r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Wilson's support for the proposed League of Nations aroused fears that he was being naive and was s a c r i f i c i n g America's freedom of action to the concept of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . In p a r t i c u l a r , many Americans feared that the United States growing m i l i t a r y and - 21 -economic strength would be used by Great B r i t a i n to b o l s t e r i t s declining empire. In those states with large a n t i - B r i t i s h p opulations, again the North and Mid-West, t h i s fear was especially strong and was exploited by the Republican Party. In 1918, the Republican strategy was to use a l l these domestic factors to defeat the Democrats at the p o l l s and gain a majority in both Houses of Congress. The strategy worked because the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s gave the Republicans a Senate majority of two. Although i t was not as l a r g e a win as prominent Republicans wanted, the v i c t o r y was s i g n i f i c a n t because i t meant that they would be able to wrestle c o n t r o l of the important Senate committees away from the Democrats. Of these committees, the Republicans were e s p e c i a l l y eager to dominate the Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee because i t s members would review the treaty and present a report, at a time of the Committee's choosing, containing th e i r recommen-dations to the whole Senate. In short, the election had the result of turning Wilson into a "lame duck" President despite the fact that he s t i l l had two years to serve. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s changing domestic p o l i t i c a l climate for American-Canadian relations must be made e x p l i c i t . C l e a r l y when Wilson l e f t the United States f o r the peace conference he did not have the p o l i t i c a l support necessary to get h i s peace proposals u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y accepted by the Senate. Moreover, his refusal to include prominent Republicans amongst the American delegation was an additional insult that - 22 -assured the President that he would not receive the cooperation of Republican Senators. It was in the midst of thi s v o l a t i l e , bipartisan p o l i t i c a l atmosphere that Canada and her s i s t e r Dominions hoped to obtain diplomatic recognition from both the Wilson Administration and the American Senate. President Wilson's p o s i t i o n at P a r i s and the ensuing Senate t r e a t y debate c l e a r l y revealed, however, Canada's desires as well as the p r a c t i c a l i t y and b e n e f i t that the United States could derive from a closer relationship with the Canadian government, were of minor importance in the f i n a l determination of America's policy towards Canada in the post war period. Upon Wilson's a r r i v a l at the peace conference, B r i t i s h Prime Minister David Lloyd George o f f i c i a l l y informed the Pr e s i d e n t of the Dominions* d e s i r e to have some form of independent status at the conference. Lloyd George t o l d Wilson that "the B r i t i s h government could not have induced them to send a s i n g l e [ m i l i t a r y ] u n i t without t h e i r own consent." 1 5 In addition, the B r i t i s h Prime Minister t r i e d to make i t clear that there were many instances when an individual Dominion had p o l i c i e s and attitudes that d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from that of the whole Empire and these views had to not only be respected, but the Dominion had to be given an opportunity to explain i t s p o s i t i o n . F i n a l l y , Lloyd George pointed out that the enormous s a c r i f i c e s and contributions the Dominions had made towards the war e f f o r t gave them as much r i g h t to participate in the conference as other non-European n a t i o n s . 1 6 - 23 -I n i t i a l l y , Wilson was adamantly opposed to the concept of the Dominions being granted the status and rights of a small power. State Department records indicate that Wilson realized that i f the Dominions were granted separate voting p r i v i l e g e s i t would be used by the a n t i - B r i t i s h faction in the Senate to d i s c r e d i t h i s e n t i r e peace plan with the argument that the B r i t i s h were dominating the conference.* 7 As well, Wilson rejected the claim that the Dominions had s p e c i f i c concerns that needed to be p r o t e c t e d . In h i s view, "Canada had no s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . " ! 8 F i n a l l y , i n h i s arguments against granting the Dominions status Wilson sta t e d that the other small powers present at the conference would not have the backing of a large power l i k e Great B r i t a i n . " I t would be open to misconstruction," he argued, " i f the B r i t i s h Government insi s t e d , in addition, on two representatives of each of the Dominions."I 9 Despite his stated opposition to the concept of Dominion status, Wilson's genuine lack of substantial interest in the issue revealed that he did not consider the question to be important. The President did not d i s p l a y the s t u b b o r n , unyielding attitude on t h i s question that would l a t e r charac-t e r i z e his behavior towards issues which he deemed v i t a l to the success of his peace proposals. In early January 1919, Wilson began to demonstrate a more c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e towards Dominion status when he commented that "he himself was quite w i l l i n g to concede one" r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r each - 24 -Dominion.20 S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h i s statement was an attempt to demonstrate some f l e x i b i l i t y not because he believed that the Dominions should be represented but because he wanted to gain support for his more entrenched ideas relating to the League's Covenant and the terms of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. Wilson was not prepared to risk the conference's c a n c e l l a t i o n over the issue. Consequently, on January 13, 1919, at the meeting of the Council of Ten, the President agreed to support the Dominions' request for separate representation. In making his decision, Wilson did not attempt to appre-ciate or try to understand the changing status of the Dominions within the B r i t i s h Empire. Although the P a r i s conference guaranteed the Dominions an independent vote, i t i s clear from Wilson's subsequent actions that at no time d i d he see the Dominions as representing d i s t i n c t autonomous nations. While, for example, he recognized Belgium's status as a small power by offering to make the American consulate in Brussels a f u l l embassy, the same offer was not made to Canada or her s i s t e r Dominions. 2 1 In short, Wilson's reason for changing his stand on Canada's status was not motivated by c o n v i c t i o n but by diplomatic necessity. This fact was to have serious implica-t i o n s f o r American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s . When s u b s t a n t i a l o p p o s i t i o n to Canada's new status was voiced both i n the Senate and in the American public at large, Wilson waivered and attempted to repair the domestic p o l i t i c a l damage by down playing the significance of the Dominion's new status. - 25 -When the President arrived back in the United States he was met by a hos t i l e Senate that had already begun, before i t had seen the actual documents, i t s battle against the treaty and the accompanying League Covenant. Launching a three pronged attack, sixteen i r r e c o n c i l a b l e senators, united by thei r deep suspicion of Great B r i t a i n as well as the i r desire to keep the United States diplomatically isolated, s p e c i f i c a l l y opposed B r i t a i n ' s economic p o l i c i e s , B r i t a i n ' s role in Ireland, and the diplom a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n accorded the Dominions at Paris.23 Although Canada was intimately involved in a l l three i s s u e s , i t was the question of i n t e r n a t i o n a l status that c l e a r l y revealed how American senators viewed Canada. Because of the Senate's focus, the American government, i n c l u d i n g e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s and the p u b l i c s e r v i c e , was forced to c l a r i f y and define America's relationship with her northern neighbor. The i n i t i a l c r i t i c i s m s against Canada's status were made while the t r e a t y was s t i l l being negotiated. R e s e n t f u l at not being included i n the American delegation, leading Republicans c r i t i c i z e d the conference's decision to close the council meeting to the public. They accused Wilson of giving in to the European powers by permitting them to continue t h e i r t r a d i t i o n of n e g o t i a t i n g diplomatic settlements in secret. And when word reached the United States that the Dominions had been granted diplomatic status Wilson's opponents seized the opportunity to accuse the President of being naive because - 26 -he had permitted Great B r i t a i n to dominate the conference. 2 3 The senators opposed to Canada's s t a t u s , l i k e Wilson h i m s e l f , made no attempt to assess whether the Canadian government's demands were reasonable on the grounds that Canada had emerged as an autonomous nation deserving of the rights accorded a small power. The motivating factor behind the Senate alignment was domestic p o l i t i c a l expediency. In a l e t t e r to his wife, dated A p r i l 14, 1919, two months before the peace treaty was presented to Germany, a leading advocate of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e p o s i t i o n and an outspoken c r i t i c of Canada's new s t a t u s , Wisconsin Senator Robert La F o l l e t t e , commented that the p u b l i c was su s p i c i o u s of the Senate's opposition to Wilson's plans and consequently, had to be made aware that democracy was at risk because the President had grown too powerful and was s a c r i f i c i n g America's security.24 In his home state, La F o l l e t t e ' s most powerful appeal f o r manipulating p u b l i c opinion was h i s a n t i - B r i t i s h position. Using a st r a t e g y that combined f i l i b u s t e r t a c t i c s i n the Senate with a massive, aggressive newspaper campaign, La Fo l l e t t e and his supporters set out to defeat the Treaty of Ve r s a i l l e s without any regard to the diplomatic implications. In the c r u c i a l period prior to the treaty's being presented to the Senate the irreconcilables outlined t h e i r arguments to defeat Wilson's p o l i c i e s . An important element i n t h e i r opposition which d i r e c t l y affected America's attitude towards Canada, was the B r i t i s h Empire's policy of imperial p r e f e r -- 27 -ence.25 under t h i s umbrella p o l i c y , the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s argued that Canada could not be considered an autonomous nation because the Canadian government did not control i t s own economic p o l i c i e s . La F o l l e t t e maintained t h a t B r i t i s h commissioners s t i l l made recommendations to the Canadian government on how Canada's economy could best b e n e f i t the entire Empire. He concluded that Canada could only be consi-dered an autonomous nation with a r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n international forums when the Canadian government gave up i t s "special t i e s " with the B r i t i s h Empire.26 The question of just how independent the Dominions were and how they had achieved t h i s altered state was the focus of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s ' second important argument against Canada's s t a t u s . The d i f f e r e n c e s between the American and B r i t i s h constitutions played an important role in the irreconcilables* p erception of Canada's i n t e r n a t i o n a l status. The American" Constitution, they argued, was a s e l f contained document that could only be amended with the approval of both the federal and state governments. The B r i t i s h North America Act, on the other hand, was a B r i t i s h statute which could be amended only by the B r i t i s h Parliament. Moreover, neither i t nor any other a u t h o r i t y gave Canada the power to conduct i t s own foreign p o l i c y . Indeed, the irreconcilables maintained that Canada did not even possess the extensive resources and governmental s t r u c t u r e necessary for pursuing an independent f o r e i g n policy.27 - 28 -F i n a l l y , the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s appealed to the powerful combination of a n t i - B r i t i s h sentiment and i s o l a t i o n i s m . Focussing on the theory that i f the United States became a member of a League whose covenant permitted each B r i t i s h Dominion to have a separate vote in the Assembly, the irrecon-c i l a b l e s assumed that t h i s would put the B r i t i s h government into a p o s i t i o n of p o s s i b l y c o n t r o l l i n g American p o l i c y because B r i t a i n would have s i x votes compared to America's one. The irre c o n c i l a b l e s argued that t h i s could obligate the United States to become involved in disputes where America had no s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . To i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r p o i n t , the irreconcilables often argued that the United States might be call e d upon to a s s i s t the B r i t i s h in m i l i t a r i l y preventing a rebellion in Ireland or indeed, in Canada.28 The I r i s h question, which had long been a source of antagonism between the United States and B r i t a i n , had, by 1919, become an emotional issue that had lost a l l touch with p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . Fueled by an organized, well funded public campaign, the irreconcilables used t h i s issue to help focus the t r e a t y debate on the question of whether the Dominions were, in r e a l i t y , l i t t l e more than "oppressed peoples ripe for r e v o l t . " 2 9 Consequently, the irreconcilables made i t clear that they had no intention of granting diplomatic recognition to the Dominions i f i t would a s s i s t Great B r i t a i n i n her attempt to hold her Empire together. Working c l o s e l y with the irreconcilables but not o f f i -- 29 -c i a l l y associated with t h i s group was the majority leader i n the Senate and the new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Lodge had been considered one of the Republican Party's most l i k e l y candidates to become part of the American delegation attending the peace conference. His exclusion only i n t e n s i f i e d his personal feud with Wilson. As early as December 1918, Lodge p u b l i c l y stated h i s regret that the Senate had not been included i n the negotiating process and c l e a r l y warned the President that the Senate would examine the treaty c a r e f u l l y and, i f necessary, make recommendations and changes.30 Lodge c o n s i s t e n t l y demonstrated i n h i s speeches, both i n the Senate and i n p u b l i c , that he was prepared to permit his personal d i s l i k e for Wilson to affect his actions in the Senate. In addition to his personal motivations, Lodge was also very aware of the large I r i s h constituency in his home state of Massachusetts. Although not as d i s t r u s t f u l of the B r i t i s h as La F o l l e t t e , Lodge did demonstrate on a number of occasions his profound fear of the United States* becoming entangled in European, and, in p a r t i c u l a r , I r i s h - B r i t i s h controversies. In the p a s t , Lodge had a l s o shown some i n t e r e s t i n America's r e l a t i o n s h i p with Canada. Massachusetts* c l o s e t i e s with the Canadian Maritime provinces and special interests in the f i s h i n g t r e a t i e s that regulated the r i c h resources of the North A t l a n t i c made Lodge more aware of Canada's interests that most of t h i s senatorial colleagues. At the time of the - 30 -treaty debate, however, Lodge's i n t e r e s t i n the concept of Dominion status was l i m i t e d to adding a reservation to the League's Covenant which would prevent the Dominions from c a s t i n g t h e i r votes when any part of the B r i t i s h Empire was embroiled in a dispute with the United States. Clearly, Lodge could see the advantage of possessing closer t i e s with Canada. At the same time, however, he was not prepared to risk America's diplomatic freedom nor was he prepared to alienate his I r i s h constituency.31 His role and influence in both the Foreign Relations Committee and his leadership of the Republicans in the Senate, placed him in a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong position to effect the f i n a l outcome of the treaty and Canada's status. Wilson gave Lodge and the Senate their f i r s t opportunity to examine the treaty and the accompanying League of Nations' Covenant on J u l y 10, 1919. I t i s doubtful whether Wilson r e a l i z e d the extent of the op p o s i t i o n f a c i n g him i n the Senate. The President had only just returned from Europe and had not been kept w i l l informed of the changing domestic p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e . In h i s address before the Senate, the President discussed in general terms the need for a l l nations to safeguard peace by act i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the League. Wilson argued that recent world events had proven that i t was no longer possible for the United States to support a policy of isolationism.32 On July 31, 1919, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened i t s hearings on the t r e a t y . Senator Lodge q u i c k l y - 31 -revealed his strategy to drag out the committee process i n order to allow the irreconcilables valuable time to continue th e i r anti-treaty newspaper campaign. During the 45 days of committee hearings, senators listened to a number of expert witnesses give t h e i r analysis of s p e c i f i c parts of the treaty. In a d d i t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l s representing interest groups were also allowed an opportunity to present t h e i r views. In terms of the o v e r a l l hearings, the discussion per-taining to Dominion status was very limited and deemed of only minor importance. The lack of indepth d i s c u s s i o n was an indication that the Committee members, l i k e the President, did not r e a l l y view the issue as s i g n i f i c a n t . When, however, Canada's status was discussed i t became clear that the exami-n i n g senators were not so much i n t e r e s t e d i n gaining an understanding of what was meant by Dominion status as they were i n t e r e s t e d i n determining how they could best use the issue to help defeat the treaty. The testimony of David Hunter M i l l e r , a legal advisor to the President, made t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y c l e a r . When Senator Frank B. Brandegee of C o n n e c t i c u t questioned M i l l e r on how many votes the B r i t i s h Empire would have in the League of Nations Assembly, M i l l e r attempted to make the c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the c o l o n i a l Empire and the Dominions. His q u a l i f i c a t i o n was, however, brushed aside and he was forced to concede that, technically, i f a l l parts of the Empire were included, the B r i t i s h would have six votes in the Assembly. 33 - 32 -In response to further questioning from Senator Warren Harding, M i l l e r again attempted to inform the Committee of the meaning of Dominion status as c l a r i f i e d by the League's Covenant. In reference to the Dominion of Aust r a l i a , as an example, "the Covenant has gone," M i l l e r argued, very f a r i n the d i r e c t i o n of making Austr a l i a a separate entity internationally, I do not say that i t has reached that point, but I do say that i t has gone very far in that direction in my opinion.34 M i l l e r ' s comment was not, however, pursued by the Committee and the questions of the Dominions' status and voting rights in the League were l e f t to the individual members to interpret according to t h e i r own attitudes towards the treaty and, in pa r t i c u l a r , President Wilson's p o l i c i e s . The pro-treaty faction in the Senate looked to Wilson to lead the defense of the t r e a t y . As one of the p r i n c i p a l architects of the peace settlement, i t was assumed that Wilson was in the strongest p o s i t i o n to i n t e r p r e t and defend the s p e c i f i c a r t i c l e s that were under attack. On August 29, 1919, the President met with members of the Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee at the White House. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s meeting for American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s were enormous. As mentioned, in Paris Wilson had not displayed any real conviction towards Dominion status. In May 1919, however, Wilson d i d t e l l the Dominion prime m i n i s t e r s , at the i n s i s t e n c e of Canada's Robert Borden, that t h e i r status as determined by the peace settlement and in the League of Nations' Covenant - 3 3 -would be as independent sma l l powers. Once Wilson returned to the United S t a t e s and r e a l i z e d t h a t the q u e s t i o n of Dominion s t a t u s s e r i o u s l y j e o p a r d i z e d h i s e n t i r e peace s e t t l e m e n t , the P r e s i d e n t backed away from h i s p r e v i o u s statements by r e -d e f i n i n g what he had meant i n P a r i s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e q u e s t i o n s asked of the P r e s i d e n t r e l a t i n g to Dominion s t a t u s d i d not probe a r e a s o f A m e r i c a n - C a n a d i a n r e l a t i o n s b u t , i n s t e a d , c o n c e n t r a t e d on the i s s u e of v o t i n g r i g h t s i n the League. In r e s p o n s e t o a q u e s t i o n , a g a i n f r o m S e n a t o r Brandegee, W i l s o n a rgued t h a t i n any d i s p u t e between the United S t a t e s and the B r i t i s h Empire the Dominions would not be a b l e to c a s t a vote. "Disputes can a r i s e only through the Governments which have i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . In other words," Wilson reasoned: d i p l o m a t i c a l l y speaking, t h e r e i s o n l y one ' B r i t i s h Empire' . . . . The d i s p u t e , t h e r e f o r e , . . . would be between th e United S t a t e s as a d i p l o m a t i c u n i t and the B r i t i s h Empire as a d i p l o m a t i c u n i t . That i s t h e o n l y g r o u n d on w h i c h t h e two n a t i o n s c o u l d d e a l w i t h one a n o t h e r , whether by way of d i s p u t e or agreement.35 Although i n 1919, no one s e r i o u s l y a n t i c i p a t e d the Dominions t o use t h e i r v o t e s a g a i n s t Great B r i t a i n , Wilson's response d i d c l e a r l y compromise h i s e a r l i e r commitment to the Dominion prime m i n i s t e r s . In e f f e c t , the P r e s i d e n t removed even the p o s s i b i l i t y of the Dominions independently c a s t i n g t h e i r v o t e s . C l e a r l y , W i l s o n made the d e c i s i o n t h a t America's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the D o m i n i o n s — w i t h Canada—were i n s i g n i f i c a n t enough to r i s k o f f e n d i n g them and the B r i t i s h government. - 34 -Interestingly enough, at the same meeting Senator Philander C. Knox, a member of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e group, f e l t moved enough to c l a r i f y his understanding of Canada's diplomatic relationship with the United States. "The fact i s that i t i s technically true," Knox argued, that the B r i t i s h s e l f governing colonies deal d i p l o m a t i c a l l y through the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e , i t i s only true in a most t e c h n i c a l sense. They are a b s o l u t e l y autonomous, even i n t h e i r d i p l o m a t i c dealings, as to matters that affect them.36 Wilson's and Knox's d i f f e r i n g assessments of the same r e a l i t y i s another indication that Canada's international status was not the p r i n c i p a l concern. Instead, the Dominion's status was only the issue being used for the larger purpose of carrying on a feud between elements i n the Senate and the Wilson A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Consequently, no positive progress towards getting the treaty approved by the Foreign Relations Committee was achieved at t h i s meeting. In fact, the only results were negative. Wilson's d e c i s i o n not to defend the Dominions' status l e d to confusion and bitterness not only amongst his own supporters in the Senate who agreed with the concept of Dominion's status: his new position was also resented by the Dominions themselves.37 When the t r e a t y was f i n a l l y released by the Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee and presented to the f u l l Senate on September 20, 1919, f i f t e e n reservations had been attached to the o r i g i n a l document. These reservations were designed to "Americanize" the treaty by lessening the influence of Great - 35 -B r i t a i n . Three d i r e c t l y affected Canada and i t s international s t a t u s . One r e s e r v a t i o n c a l l e d f o r the United States to receive the same number of votes in the League of Nations as the B r i t i s h Empire. A second implied that the Dominions were mere puppets of Great B r i t a i n and t h e r e f o r e , when a dispute arose between the United States and any part of the B r i t i s h Empire the Dominions would not be allowed to cast t h e i r votes. The t h i r d maintained that the United States would not be bound by A r t i c l e Ten of the League's Covenant which c a l l e d for united action against aggression. In j u s t i -fying i t s opposition to A r t i c l e Ten, the Committee argued that they wanted to prevent the p o s s i b i l i t y of American m i l i t a r y power being used to subject Ireland or any of the Dominions to B r i t i s h rule.38 The actual treaty debate lasted from September 20, 1919, to March 19, 1920. The important d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s phase of the debate and the arguments that had been presented pr i o r to the treaty's being l a i d before the Senate was that the speeches now dealt with s p e c i f i c issues instead of abstract ideas. In respect to the Dominions' diplomatic position the main arguments continued to centre on the d e f i n i t i o n of the term Dominion status and the r o l e of the Dominions , i n the / i i League of Nations. The debate against the treaty continued to be led by the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s . In the period between September 20 and November 19, 1919, when the treaty was rejected by Senate for - 36 -the f i r s t time, Senators George W. N o r r i s , W i l l i a m S. Kenyon, and Hiram Johnson made repeated attempts to denounce the t r e a t y and the League's Covenant p r i n c i p a l l y because of t h e s t a t u s these documents accorded the Dominions. "I would be glad to see Canada," N o r r i s argued: an independent n a t i o n , but i f Canada wants t o be a f u l l f l e d g e d member o f t h i s [L]eague, i f she wants to have a f u l l vote i n t h e [ C ] o u n c i l or i n t h e [ A ] s s e m b l y , t h e n l e t her throw o f f t h e s h a c k l e s of the B r i t i s h Empire and be independent l i k e any other nation.39 N o r r i s ' s p e e c h f o c u s s e d on the number of votes he f e l t the B r i t i s h Empire would be a b l e t o command i n t h e L e a g u e ' s Assembly. T h i s i s s u e was a l s o the primary concern of Kenyon rfho argued t h a t " i f we must be p a r t n e r s , [the United S t a t e s and B r i t a i n ] c e r t a i n l y we ought to be equal ones, . . . " 4 0 A S with N o r r i s , Kenyon made i t c l e a r t h a t he was not s i g n a l l i n g the Dominions out f o r unfair, treatment. Instead, " i n standing f o r r e s e r v a t i o n s . . . [he was] not s t a n d i n g a g a i n s t any p l a n to c a r r y out the terms of the P a r i s Conference, . . ."41 The Senator's primary d e s i r e was to "Americanize" t h e League by g i v i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s the same number of votes as B r i t a i n . The f a c t t h a t t h i s meant, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , a d e n u n c i a t i o n of the Dominions' independent s t a t u s was i r r e l e v a n t . Not a l l senators were prepared to support the arguments of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s or of the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee. S h o r t l y a f t e r Lodge's submission of the m a j o r i t y r e p o r t from t h e Committee, S e n a t o r P o r t e r J . McCumber o f North Dakota - 37 -issued a minority statement in which he steadfastly maintained that the Dominions had a right to diplomatic status and the United States should welcome the opportunity to develop a closer relationship with her northern neighbor. 4 2 Throughout the treaty debate, McCumber was to consistently maintain that there were many small nations in the League's Assembly that contributed l i t t l e to the A l l i e d war e f f o r t . "Canada on the other hand, . . ." McCumber stated: with a population of nearly 8.5 m i l l i o n people, and which fought v a l i a n t l y through a l l the long years of the war . . . asks that she be given a vote in the Assembly not in the Council, carrying the same power that you give to black L i b e r i a , or H a i t i , • • • The Senator summed up his speech with a c r i t i c a l denunciation of the Foreign Relations Committee fo r not attempting to explore the meaning of Dominion status or the ramifications t h i s status could have on American-Canadian relations. "While Canada i s part of the B r i t i s h Empire . . ."he argued, "the t i e i s one of f r i e n d l y good w i l l and i n t e r e s t rather than dependency." 4 4 McCumber's strong stand in favor of Dominion status was met with r i d i c u l e from the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s who accused the North Dakotan of b l i n d l y t i e i n g the United States to a League that was v i r t u a l l y controlled by Great B r i t a i n . Although he d i d r e c e i v e some s u p p o r t , notably from Senator G i l b e r t M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, the minority leader i n charge of s e e i n g the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty s a f e l y through the Senate, - 38 -McCumber's arguments were not p e r s u a s i v e because he c o u l d not p o i n t t o a l e g a l p r e c e d e n t where a former colony had r i s e n t o the s t a t u s of a small power while s t i l l remaining i n the i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e . While, then, most senators opposed to the t r e a t y would not have argued w i t h McCumber's r e f e r e n c e s t o Canada's war c o n t r i b u t i o n or, indeed, h i s c l a i m t h a t she had a r i g h t t o a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the peace, they d i f f e r e d from him i n t h e i r i n s i s t e n c e t h a t Canada had to break a l l t i e s w i t h the B r i t i s h Empire, i f she were going to f u n c t i o n i n d e -p e n d e n t l y . 4 5 I t was c l e a r by e a r l y November t h a t Wilson's supporters would not be a b l e t o muster t h e n e c e s s a r y t w o - t h i r d s v o t e r e q u i r e d t o r a t i f y the t r e a t y . D i p l o m a t i c a d v i s o r s i n both the Wilson A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the S t a t e Department began t o seek a l t e r n a t i v e s i n o r d e r t o d e f u s e the arguments of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s and g a i n the s u p p o r t o f a l a r g e group o f moderate s e n a t o r s . U n t i l e a r l y November, 1919, both the B r i t i s h and Canadian governments had e l e c t e d t o remain s i l e n t , p r e f e r r i n g t o l e t t h e W i l s o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n defend the t r e a t y and the League Covenant. A f t e r the P r e s i d e n t became i l l , however, s e n i o r B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s began p r i v a t e l y to c o n s u l t with the State Department w h i l e r e f u t i n g or denouncing some of the i r r e c o n -c i l a b l e s ' arguments i n the newspapers. In p a r t i c u l a r , Lord Grey, a s p e c i a l envoy t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1919-1920, p u b l i s h e d a s e r i e s o f commentaries i n major American and - 39 -B r i t i s h newspapers. Grey p e t i t i o n e d the B r i t i s h government to p u b l i s h a s t a t e m e n t c l a r i f y i n g the Dominions' v o t i n g s t a t u s when an i s s u e i n v o l v i n g the Empire and the United S t a t e s came b e f o r e the League Assembly. S p e c i f i c a l l y , Grey wanted L l o y d George t o agree with Wilson's statements b e f o r e t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee t h a t t h e Dominions were not s e p a r a t e d i p l o m a t i c e n t i t i e s . 4 6 Although Lord Grey was one of the most respected B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s i n the United S t a t e s , h i s arguments d i d not have the d e s i r e d e f f e c t . Grey was accused by the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s of attempting t o i n t e r f e r e i n American domestic p o l i t i c s . During the second h a l f of the Senate t r e a t y debate, February 10, 1920 t o March 19, 1920, the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s r e i n f o r c e d t h e i r e a r l i e r arguments by p o i n t i n g out t h a t Grey's i n t e r f e r e n c e was only one example of what the United S t a t e s c o u l d expect i f i t j o i n e d the L e a g u e . 4 7 L o r d Grey a l s o r e c e i v e d a n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s e from the Dominions. Canada and South A f r i c a r e a c t e d by p r e s s u r i n g L l o y d George not to accept Wilson's r e - d e f i n i t i o n of Dominion s t a t u s . 4 8 Robert Borden i n s i s t e d t h a t Canada must be granted the r i g h t s of a smal l power. Although the Canadian government d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e b e s t p o l i c y was to make as few p u b l i c statements as p o s s i b l e on the debate, Borden d i d attempt t o a f f e c t t h e S e n a t e ' s arguments by h i s a g g r e s s i v e a c t i o n s i n the Canadian House of Commons. In f o r c i n g Great B r i t a i n t o acknowledge t h a t t h e supremacy of t h e C a n a d i a n Parliament - 40 -allowed i t to debate and r a t i f y the peace treaty for Canada, Borden's government sent a clear signal to the United States that Canada was prepared to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a small power. In his speech before the House on September 2, 1919, Borden t r i e d to bring to the attention of the American Senate the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s a c t i o n by i n s i s t i n g that Americans must make the e f f o r t to t r y and understand the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes that were taking place w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Imperial structure .49 C l e a r l y , the Senate had to be aware of the importance both the Canadian and B r i t i s h governments attached to the Dominion Parliament's separate t r e a t y r a t i f i c a t i o n . The State Department was kept f u l l y informed of the debate in the Canadian House of Commons and t h i s information was passed on to Wilson's supporters in the Senate. As well, the publication of Senate Document 26 in 1919 also provided a clear statement of the Dominions' evolving r o l e i n the process of t r e a t y r a t i f i c a t i o n . 5 0 The Senate document incorporated an important paragraph from S i r C. Hibbert Tupper's a r t i c l e i n which he pointed out that the Dominions' "steady growth and increasing strength c a l l t e d for] . . . some system of representation [to] be devised . . ."51 During the second part of the treaty debate pro-Wilson supporters did use Canada's r a t i f i c a t i o n as a symbol of the Dominion's becoming a small power. Again, however, the a n t i - t r e a t y forces chose not to explore t h i s issue. The irreconcilables did not deny or condemn the - 41 -significance of the Canadian a c t i o n ; instead, they simply chose to ignore the separate r a t i f i c a t i o n despite the d i p l o -matic damage i t would do to American-Canadian relations. A second action designed to enhance Canada's international status was Borden's d e c i s i o n to announce h i s government's intention to establish a separate representation in Washington. Newton W. Rowell, Canada's a c t i n g Secretary of State for External A f f a i r s , commented that: while the several B r i t i s h ambassadors at Washington have rendered admirable service to Canada, our business with the United States i s now on so large a scale that the government i s convinced that our interests can o n l y be adequately protected by a Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e s i d e n t i n Washington.52 This not only indicated to the B r i t i s h and Canadian publics Canada's i n t e n t i o n s but also was intended to r e f u t e the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s ' claim that Canada did not possess the govern-mental structure to pursue her own f o r e i g n p o l i c y . These comments were also used by supporters of the treaty to defend the concept of Dominion status. In a long speech advocating Canada's position, Senator Hitchcock stated: I know very well, however, that the people of these Dominions . . . have set t h e i r hearts upon that independent representation . . . . I understand that Canada i s also taking steps for representation with the United States and with other important nations of the world upon an independent b a s i s ; . . . [but] in the United States, instead of lending encouragement to that determined e f f o r t to obtain diplomatic independence, the Senate of the United S t a t e s proposes to slam the door of opportunity in the faces of these people, our neighbours here to the north.53 Hitchcock concluded that the actions of the Senate amounted to l i t t l e more than: refusing to our neighbour . . . the right to independent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . We are saying to them, in e f f e c t : you have got to be represented by London. We w i l l not consent to your independent represen-tation.54 As with the previous arguments, however, Hitchcock's speech did l i t t l e to convince the Senate to support the t r e a t y . Senator I r v i n e L. Lenroot of Wisconsin q u i c k l y pointed out to Hitchcock that as of February 1920, the Canadian government had not taken any d e f i n i t e action towards securing a permanent representative in Washington. As w e l l , Lenroot a l s o pointed to the debate raging in the Canadian House of Commons in which some parliamentarians expressed opposition to the plan f o r Canada having dual status in Washington. "She [Canada] asks [for] equality with the United States," argued Lenroot: at the same time she i s enjoying the p r i v i l e g e s and protection of the B r i t i s h Empire. Whenever Canada wants to bind the United States w i l l f u l l powers that the United States exercises, the United States w i l l be very glad to welcome Canada when she declares her independence and assumes the f u l l r i g h t s and p e r o g a t i v e s of a nation.55 C l e a r l y , the argument against Dominion status again boiled down to the issue of the Dominions* continued t i e s with Great B r i t a i n , and the fact that from the American point of view the Dominions wanted to have i t both ways: they wanted independence but also a continuing and active association with the Empire. An interesting element introduced into the l a t t e r stages of the Senate debate revolved around Canada's p o t e n t i a l usefulness as a spokesman and supporter of many key United States p o l i c i e s . Although the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s argued i n support of American isolationism, even they had to admit that there were important issues beyond America's borders that required the United States to take some form of ac t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , Hiram Johnson of C a l i f o r n i a , a member of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e group, was interested in the question of Asian immigration to the United S t a t e s . Johnson's concern was spurred by h i s c o n s t i t u e n t s who were upset by the number of Asians who were making C a l i f o r n i a t h e i r new home. The State of C a l i f o r n i a , along with other Western s t a t e s , had a long h i s t o r y of attempting to l i m i t the number of Asians l i v i n g within i t s borders. Johnson realized that the white Dominions, who shared a similar attitude, could prove to be useful in the League i f they used th e i r voting power to offset any charges of discrimination from Asian nations, in p a r t i c u l a r , Japan.56 Senator McCumber, on February 16, 1920, t r i e d to make the most of Johnson's waivering position by pointing out that i f "the United States had a dispute with Japan, I think that we could count on Canada being with us."57 McCumber went on to argue that even Lord Grey had admitted that on the issue of Asian immigration "Canada would generally be found on the side of the United States."58 i t was t h i s l i n e of argument that was the most effe c t i v e in trying to convince senators to - 4 4 -support the Dominions 1 status in the League. The i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s could not deny that there were a number of p o l i c i e s that Canada shared with the United States. For t h i s reason, the irreconcilables were always careful to point out in their statements that they were not p a r t i c u l a r l y opposed to Canada's achieving status so much as they opposed Canada's connection with the B r i t i s h Empire. The i r r e c o n -c i l a b l e s reasoned that i f Canada was completely independent of Great B r i t a i n then she would be much more u s e f u l to the United States because the Canadian government would not have to be concerned about accommodating B r i t i s h imperial p o l i c i e s . There i s no doubt that t h i s s i t u a t i o n did create a dilemma for many senators who could see the value to the United States of Canada's achieving diplomatic status. Many concluded, however, that the dilemma was more apparent than r e a l , for i f the United States rejected the treaty and the League's Covenant and retained her policy of isolationism the American government would not have to deal with the votes of the Dominions at a l l . 5 9 For them, the d e s i r e to defeat President Wilson's p o l i c i e s became more important than Canada's potential useful-ness as a diplomatic a l l y in the League. Another factor that also played a role in the Senate's debate was the increased need for the American government to have a more immediate and d i r e c t l i n k with the Canadian government. During the treaty debate a series of disputes between Canada and the United States made t h i s point clear to - 4 5 -both countries. A boundary dispute between Maine and New Brunswick, America's d e s i r e to improve the hydro-electric capacity of the St. Lawrence r i v e r , and a s e r i e s of trade issues required the close cooperation of both countries i f the disputes were to be se t t l e d . Again, senators pu b l i c l y opposed to the concept of Dominion status were faced with a dilemma. To support the treaty and the League's Covenant would ensure closer cooperation between Canada and the United States. As with the previous arguments, however, domestic p o l i t i c s took p r i o r i t y and many senators deliberately chose to postpone the problem of finding a s o l u t i o n to America's lack of d i r e c t communication with Canada. The r i g i d positions of the irreconcilables in the Senate combined with t h e i r p u b l i c i t y campaign, l e d to the f i n a l defeat of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s on March 19, 1920. For Canada, the Senate's rejection meant that the Canadian govern-ment had no independent status as far as the United States was concerned. The fact that both the Wilson Administration and the Senate had demonstrated l i t t l e concern f o r Canada's interests or objectives was a graphic example of a l a r g e r n a t i o n showing a lack of s e n s i t i v i t y to a l e s s powerful neighbor. In the wake of the Senate's d e c i s i o n , a wave of anti-American feeling swept Canada. P a r t i a l l y caused by the treaty's rejection but also stimulated by American patriotism that tended to overestimate the United States contribution to - 46 -th e A l l i e d war e f f o r t , t h i s a n t i - A m e r i c a n i s m was, i n t h e o p i n i o n of Hugh Kee n l e y s i d e , one of the d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s of the war and c o n t r i b u t e d t o p r e v e n t i n g the growth of a c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . 6 0 At the o f f i c i a l l e v e l , America's repeated r e j e c t i o n of the League of Nations was a great disappointment to the Canadian government because i t seemed to be a r e p u d i a t i o n of what Canada had come to term "North Americanism". Prominent Canadians f e l t t h a t the League o f f e r e d Canada and the United States a forum i n which to demonstrate to the world the "North American model f o r p e a c e . " 6 1 Using such American-Canadian i n s t i t u t i o n s as the I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o i n t Commission as an example of what was p o s s i b l e between n a t i o n s , Canadian p o l i t i c i a n s , i n c l u d i n g Robert Borden and l a t e r Mackenzie K i n g , t h o u g h t t h e y c o u l d c o n v i n c e t h e w o r l d powers t o e s t a b l i s h s i m i l a r commissions t h a t would mediate d i s p u t e s and e l i m i n a t e the need f o r wars. When the United S t a t e s r e j e c t e d the League Canada was l e f t t o espouse the North American model, t a r n i s h e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s non-involvement, to the r e s t of the w o r l d . 6 2 More i m p o r t a n t l y , America's r e j e c t i o n of the t r e a t y was a disappointment because i t was un c l e a r what e f f e c t the Senate's a c t i o n would have on the Canadian government's o b j e c t i v e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a s e p a r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Washington. As mentioned, d u r i n g the t r e a t y debate Canada had announced i t s i n t e n t i o n of s e c u r i n g p e r m i s s i o n from the B r i t i s h government to open a more d i r e c t l i n k with the United S t a t e s . On February - 47 -27, 1920, the State Department was o f f i c i a l l y n o t i f i e d by the B r i t i s h Charge d'Affaires in Washington, Ronald Charles Lindsey, that Canada would soon announce the appointment of a represent-a t i v e with the rank of M i n i s t e r of P l e n i p o t e n t . Lindsey informed the American government: t h a t while the new m i n i s t e r w i l l rank in the [British] Embassy immediately after the Ambassador and w i l l take charge in the l a t t e r ' s absence, he should at a l l times be the ordinary channel of communication with the United States Government in matters which concern Canadian interests a l o n e . 6 3 I n i t i a l l y , the American response to the Canadian position was c a u t i o u s . In a d d i t i o n to the Wilson Administration's being preoccupied with the passage of the treaty in the Senate, Administration o f f i c i a l s also had to contend with the recent r e s i g n a t i o n of Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the President's slow recovery from a d e b i l i t a t i n g stroke. U n t i l Wilson appointed a new Secretary of State the State Department was reluctant to take any action that might establish a prece-dent. Consequently, State Department o f f i c i a l s informed the B r i t i s h government that the United States had a number of concerns that needed to be addressed. The State Department was worried that the other Dominions would a l s o want to send representatives to Washington and would expect the ; United States to reciprocate. As well, Wilson's advisors were also concerned about the domestic pressure that would be brought to bear on the government to establish a diplomatic link with Ireland, a country that had not yet attained the status of a - 48 -Dominion. Administration o f f i c i a l s feared that t h i s issue c o u l d l e a d to a break-down i n Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s . F i n a l l y , the United States was quick to point out the continued dual status that Canada would have i f the proposed represent-ation plan went ahead. The Canadian o f f i c i a l ' s l i n k with the B r i t i s h Embassy created doubt as to which government he would ultimately be responsible. Formulating an argument composed of a l l these factors, the United States, although not completely rejecting the idea, did at f i r s t attempt to delay any public announcement of i t s p o s i t i o n . 6 4 By late A p r i l 1920, however, after having consulted with Americans stationed in the Dominions, the United States agreed to the British-Canadian plan. Indeed, the o f f i c i a l announce-ment of Canada's changing status was f i r s t made in Washington on A p r i l 26, fourteen days before the B r i t i s h and Canadian governments made the i r statements. 6 5 j . n accounting for t h i s dramatic change in the State Department's attitude i t must be pointed out that Wilson was attempting to minimize some of the diplomatic damage caused by America's rejection of the treaty. A Canadian representative in Washington provided the President with the opportunity to demonstrate to the American people the ;evolving position of the Dominions on the international stage i and that the United States was w i l l i n g to acknowledge and to some extent, a s s i s t in t h i s development. 6 6 More importantly, however, Wilson wanted to encourage the appointment of a Canadian because i t was in America's best interest to have a closer relationship with Canada. The s i m i l a r i t i e s in Canada's international outlook with the United States offered Wilson's government an a l l y that could be t r u s t e d . In b i l a t e r a l relations, the expansion of American investment in Canada and the growing number of outstanding issues between the two countries made i t absolutely necessary that direct communication be established.67 The American announcement appeared to clear the way for the Canadian government to a p p o i n t i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . Despite the urgency that Canada i n i t i a l l y attached to the issue, however, no representative was appointed. Instead, the question of Canadian representation in Washington became a p o l i t i c a l issue. In the Canadian House of Commons questions were r a i s e d by the o p p o s i t i o n , i n p a r t i c u l a r by W i l l i a m S. Fielding, member for Shelburne and Queen's, concerning the status of Canada's representative. 6 8 The dual role of serving as the B r i t i s h representative when the Ambassador was absent was c r i t i c i z e d . P u b l i c l y , Arthur Meighen, who had become Canada's Prime Minister in 1920, argued that the government had not been able to locate an individual with suitable q u a l i f i -cations who was w i l l i n g to assume the post. As w e l l , the government also maintained that the lack of o f f i c e space in Washington and the need to h i r e a t r a i n e d s t a f f were also preventing an appointment from being made.69 Certainly, the lack of trained personnel did play a role in Canada's decision to delay an appointment. In an e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d "Plan For Minister Dropped", however, the Washington Post stated: It [was] ... understood in Washington that the decision recently reached not to allow the appointment of a Canadian M i n i s t e r in Washington was due to the fear that i t would r e s u l t in closer relations between Canada and the United States than would be good f o r the Empire as a whole, ... The whole program was c a l l e d o f f wit h the e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t the P r i n c e of Wales ... and S i r Auckland Geddes had so pleased the Canadians that direct representation at Washington was no longer regarded as necessary.70 The Post's a r t i c l e was very astute. Clearly, once the wartime c r i s i s had diminished, Great B r i t a i n was reluctant to carry out e a r l i e r commitments made when she needed the support of the Dominions. The attitude displayed by Lord Grey during the treaty debate was only one example of Great Britain's attempting to resurrect her position as the sole authority for formulating the Empire's foreign p o l i c y . The p o s s i b i l i t y of the Empire's becoming divided over foreign policy issues was a very real threat and the United States was po t e n t i a l l y one of the most obvious sources for causing confrontation within the imperial •structure. This attitude does explain why the B r i t i s h govern-ment was so insistent that i f a Canadian representative was appointed he must be connected with the B r i t i s h Embassy and act i n the Ambassador's stead when he was absent.71 i n an a r t i c l e written in 1922, former Canadian Prime Minister Robert Borden concluded that Canadian representation in Washington could have been perceived as a "lessening of the t i e s which - 51 -connected Canada with Great B r i t a i n and her s i s t e r nations," and was therefore, in B r i t i s h eyes, to be avoided.72 Many historians have used the theme of imperial unity to expl a i n why Canada did not carry out i t s plan to appoint a representative.73 Undoubtedly, imperial unity was a factor that the Canadian government had to take into consideration. By i t s e l f , however, i t does not f u l l y explain Canada's reluc-tance to appoint a minister. After a l l , successive Conservative and L i b e r a l governments gave every indication that they were attempting to f i l l the post. Yearly allocations of money were provided for in the federal budgets and each year the government defended in the House of Commons t h i s appropriation of funds. Moreover, during the f i r s t session of the League of Nations Assembly both Canada and the Dominion of South A f r i c a wasted no time in establishing t h e i r separate voting rights by casting t h e i r b a l l o t in opposition to Great B r i t a i n . C l e a r l y , t h i s precedent established that there was a l i m i t to the Dominions* concern for imperial unity.74 When the histo r i a n begins to analyze the o f f i c i a l corres-pondence between Canada, Great B r i t a i n and the United States a systematic pattern begins to emerge. It become evident that an important reason why Canada d i d not appoint a separate representative in Washington was because the Canadian government was try i n g to preserve i t s freedom of a c t i o n from American o f f i c i a l s who wanted to manipulate Canada's new international position in the League, and her enhanced status within the B r i t i s h Empire, to protect American interests. In addition, Canada's importance in the imperial structure contributed to Great Br i t a i n ' s desire to r e s t r i c t Canada's involvement in the international community. Consequently, when Canada's request for separate diplomatic representation in Washington i s examined from the perspective of American interests and goals i t becomes clear that i t was the B r i t i s h and Canadian governments who were more of a hindrance to Canada's r i s e in international status than the United States. By examining f i r s t the broader international issues and then the b i l a t e r a l concerns between the United States and Canada i t becomes evident that i t was in the United States best inter e s t to have a more independent northern neighbor. In the early 1920s, the immediate problem that American o f f i c i a l s had to contend with was how to repair the damage caused by the Senate treaty debate and the rejection of Canada's international status. - 53 -Endnotes Chapter I ^Richard W. Leopold, "The Mi s s i s s i p p i Valley and American Foreign Policy 1890-1941: An Assessment and an Appeal," Missis- s i p p i Valley H i s t o r i c a l Review. Vol. 37 (No. 4 March 1950-51), p. 625. 2Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, p. 144. ^Denna Frank Fleming, The Treaty Veto of the American  Senate (New York: Garland Publishing, 1971 ed.), p. 6. For more information see: W. S t u l l Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate. A Study of the Struggle Between the President and Senate Over the Conduct of Foreign Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933). 4John G. Tower, "Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign P o l i c y , " Foreign A f f a i r s . Vol. 60 (No. 2 Winter 1981-82), p. 232. 5"Two Years of American Foreign Policy," Foreign A f f a i r s . Vol. 3 (No. 3 March 1923), p. 2. 6 F o r more information on the role of public opinion in policy formulation see: Gabriel A. Almond, The American People  and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960 ed.); Bernard C. Cohen, The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy-Making (World Peace Foundation, 1959); Thomas Bailey, The Man in the Street (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1964) . 7 B a i l e y , The Man in the Street, pp. 248-49. 8 S e l i g Adler, "The Congressional Election of 1918," South  A t l a n t i c Quarterly. Vol. 36 (No. 4 October 1937), p. 447. 9Arno J . Mayer, P o l i t i c s and Diplomacy of Peacemaking:  Containment and Counterrevolution at V e r s a i l l e s . 1918-1919 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1967), p. 58. 1 0 A d l e r , "The Congressional Election of 1918," p. 450. i ; L I b i d . , p. 450. 1 2 I b i d . , pp. 460-61. 1 3Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy, p. 74 - 54 -1 4 I b i d . , p. 385. l 5 U n i t e d States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the F o r e i g n Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1919 V o l . 3 (Washington: Government Printing O f f i c e , 1943), p. 483. 1 6 I b i d . , p. 483. 1 7 I b i d . 1 8 I b i d . , p. 484. 1 9 I b i d . , pp. 486-87. 2 0 I b i d . 2 1Congressional Record. June 20, 1919, p. 1428. 2 2 F o r a complete l i s t of the names of the irr e c o n c i l a b l e s see: Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables. The Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970) , p. 1. 2 3 Congressional Record. June 25, 1919, p. 1723. 2 4 B e l l e Case La F o l l e t t e and Fola La F o l l e t t e , Robert M. La F o l l e t t e . V o l . 11 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), p. 956. 2 5 F o r more information on the policy of imperial prefe-rence see: Denis Judds, Balfour and the B r i t i s h Empire: A Study i n Imperial E v o l u t i o n 1874-1932 (London: Macmillan, 1968); George C. Tryon, Imperial Preference. A Short History (London: P h i l i p Allan, 1931). ^Congressional Record. September 3, 1919, p. 4652. 2 7 I b i d . , p. 4652. 2 8 I b i d . , p. 4660. 2 9 I b i d . , p. 4723. 3 0 I b i d . , December 21, 1918, pp. 723-24. 3 1 I b i d . , October 25, 1919, pp. 7488-7489. 3 2 I b i d . , July 19, 1919, pp. 2336-2339. •^United States, Congress, Senate, Treaty of Peace with Germanyt Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate. Senate Document 49, 66th Congress, 1st session, 1919, p. 414. 3 4 I b i d . , p. 417. " U n i t e d States, Congress, Senate, Meeting at the White House Between President Wilson and the Foreign Relations Committee. Treaty of Peace with Germany. Senate Document No. 76, 66th Congress, 1st Session, 1919, p. 44. 3 6 I b i d . , p. 422. 37president Wilson's comments raised serious questions in the Dominions' pertaining to the i r status in the League. In the Canadian House of Commons, the Honourable Henri Severin Beland (MP for Belauce) stated, "Mr. Speaker, I am af r a i d that Canada i s gradually assuming more and more international obliga-tions without any corresponding international status." Canada, House of Commons, Debates. September 8, 1919, p. 89. 3 8Congressional Record. September 10, 1919, p. 5114. 3 9 I b i d . , October 29, 1919, p. 7689. 4 0 I b i d . , September 10, 1919, pp. 5154-55. 4 1 I b i d . 4 2 I b i d . , September 15, 1919, p. 5356. 4 3 I b i d . , p. 5357. 4 4 I b i d . 4 5 I b i d . , October 29, 1919, p. 7689. - 56 -4 6 L e o n E. Boothe, "A F e t t e r e d Envoy: Lord Grey's M i s s i o n to the United S t a t e s , 1919-1920," Review of P o l i t i c s V o l . 33 (1971), p. 83. 47c o n a r e s s i o n a l Record. February 2, 1920, pp. 2356-57. 4 8 B o o t h e , "A F e t t e r e d Envoy," p. 83. 4 9 C a n a d a , House of Commons, Debates, September 2, 1919, p. 22. 5 ® U n i t e d S t a t e s , C o n g r e s s , S e n a t e , R a t i f i c a t i o n of  T r e a t i e s : Methods and Procedures i n Fore i g n C o u n t r i e s R e l a t i v e  to R a t i f i c a t i o n of T r e a t i e s . Senate Document 26, 66th Congress, 1st s e s s i o n , 1919. 5 1 I b i d . , p. 37. 5 2 c a n a d a , House of Commons, Debates, May 5, 1919, p. 2075. 5 3 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record. March 8, 1920, pp. 4010-11. 5 4 I b i d . , p. 4011. 5 5 I b i d . , February 16, 1920, p. 2955. 5 6 I b i d . , November 18, 1920, p. 8733. 5 7 I b i d . , February 16, 1919, p. 2954. 5 8 I b i d . 5 9 I b i d . , March 3, 1920, p. 3801. 6 0 K e e n l e y s i d e , Canada and the United S t a t e s , p. 362. 6 1 D o n a l d M. Page, "Canada as the Exponent of North American I d e a l i s m , " i n Am e r i c a n Review of C a n a d i a n S t u d i e s . V o l . 3 (No. 2, Autumn 1973), p. 36. 6 2 I b i d . , p. 37. 6 3 L . C. C l a r k . , ed., Documents on C a n a d i a n E x t e r n a l  R e l a t i o n s . V o l . 3 f 1919-1925 (Ottawa: Department of E x t e r n a l - 57 -A f f a i r s , 1967), p. 14. 6 4 I b i d . , p. 16. b 5 G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of a Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington, p. 70. 6 6 C l a r k , Documents on Canadian External Relations. Vol 3. pp. 14-15. 6 7 I b i d . , p. 15. 6 8Canada, House of Commons, Debates f March 16, 1920, pp. 495-97. 6 9 I b i d . , A p r i l 21, 1921, pp. 2397-99. / w C l a r k , Documents on Canadian External Relations. Vol. 3. p. 26. 7 1Canada, House of Commons, Debates. May 7, 1920, p. 2178. 7 2Robert L. Borden, "The B r i t i s h Commonwealth of Nations," The Yale Review. Vol 12 (October 1922-July 1923), p. 781. '•^For more information see: Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth; Galbraith, The Establishment of a Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington. 7 4 W i g l e y , C a n a d a t h e T r a n s i t i o n , to C o m m o n w e a l t h , p. 115. - 58 -Chapter II The f i n a l d e f e a t of the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s came as a welcome r e l i e f t o t h e American p u b l i c . Regardless of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s f e e l i n g s towards the t r e a t y , most Americans, not used - . 0 f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s dominating the newspapers or absorbing the t i me of t h e i r e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , were a n x i o u s t o r e t u r n t o what R e p u b l i c a n p r e s i d e n t i a l nominee Warren H a r d i n g , r e f e r r e d t o as "normalcy."1 As t h e war receded i n t o memory, and the h y s t e r i a s u r r o u n d i n g t h e "Red S c a r e " of 1919-1920 s u b s i d e d , 2 Americans began to e x h i b i t s i g n s of the c r e a t i v e energy, i n d i v i d u a l i t y and m a t e r i a l i s m t h a t were l a t e r to c o n t r i b u t e to the image of the 1920s as a decade of s o c i a l u p h e a v a l . 3 The pent-up f r u s t r a t i o n s that had been s t o r e d d u r i n g the war were r e l e a s e d and America became p r e - o c c u p i e d w i t h her i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s and development. Warren Harding's 1920 p r e s i d e n t i a l v i c t o r y seemed t o be an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t Americans were determined to put the s t r e s s and o b l i g a t i o n s of the war years behind them. On t h e s u r f a c e , t h e 1920 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s p r o v i d e d proof t h a t the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e senators had won t h e i r p u b l i c o p i n i o n b a t t l e and had c o n v i n c e d t h e m a j o r i t y of Americans t h a t the United S t a t e s should r e j e c t the t r e a t y and t h e League of N a t i o n s . At the time, both p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n t e r p r e t e d the Republican v i c t o r y , which i n c l u d e d m a j o r i t i e s i n both Houses of Congress, as a s i g n t h a t "they [the American p u b l i c ] wished to keep out of European c o m p l i c a t i o n s and i n - 5 9 -p a r t i c u l a r not to join the League of Nations." 4 This attitude combined with the Republican Party's staunch stand i n the Senate against foreign involvement, had the ultimate effect of l i m i t i n g the options of the Harding Administration. It was soon evident to the Republican hierarchy that t h e i r aggressive, b i p a r t i s a n actions p r i o r to assuming the p r e s i d e n c y had e f f e c t i v e l y blocked t h e i r access to international organizations and had thus s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l e d t h e i r a b i l i t y to protect America's international interests. Amongst the world's diplomatic community, Harding's e l e c t i o n caused some confusion as to what type of foreign policy the United States could be expected to pursue. While in the Senate, Harding had established a modest record as an int e r n a t i o n a l i s t especially on issues re l a t i n g to trade. He had not, however, aggressively asserted his own opinions on a wide spectrum of foreign policy issues. Although Harding had been a member of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee during the treaty debate, h i s a c t u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the controversy had been minimal. He was a lo y a l supporter of Lodge's majority report and had c o n s i s t e n t l y voted for a t r e a t y which contained the reservations designed to "Ameri-canize" the document. 6 Yet, his lack of public comment, a deliberate p o l i c y to avoid becoming c o n t r o v e r s i a l and thus p l a c i n g h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l a s p i r a t i o n s in jeopardy, l e f t his actual opinions on America's international involvement ambi-guous. - 60 -Moreover, Harding's nomination on the tenth b a l l o t at the Republican Convention raised questions as to how much personal support he could muster within his own p a r t y . Viewed as a compromise candidate, Harding's r e l a t i v e l y weak p o l i t i c a l position meant that he had very l i t t l e input in the composition of the party's foreign policy platform. 7 Primarily written by Elihu Root, a prominent i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t , the platform was designed to be wordy and ambiguous in order to create some f l e x i b i l i t y for the party. Root wanted to appeal to both i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s and i s o l a t i o n i s t s . By r e f u s i n g to be s p e c i f i c , he hoped to s a t i s f y the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s while not r u l i n g out the p o s s i b i l i t y of the United States one day joining the League of Nations i f the covenant was changed to address American concerns. 8 Meeting the demands of the Senate was e s p e c i a l l y important to Root because the R e p u b l i c a n Convention had revealed the extent of the i n f l u e n c e and control which leading senators exerted over the Party. In his keynote address, Senator Lodge made i t very clear that regard-less of which p o l i t i c a l party the next President represented, the Senate would i n s i s t on maintaining a strong influence on America's foreign p o l i c y . 9 The c o n f l i c t within the Republican Party made the selection of a Secretary of State one of Harding's most d i f f i c u l t cabinet posts to f i l l . On March 5, 1921, Charles E. Hughes was appointed. Hughes brought to his position a record which advocated American involvement i n a r e v i s e d League. His - 61 -family background (he was from New York where he was well connected with the Eastern e l i t e s ) and interest in foreign a f f a i r s led Hughes to the conclusion that with the m i l i t a r y protection previously afforded by the B r i t i s h Navy in decline, the United States had to become more aggressive i n guarding i t s strategic i n t e r e s t s . 1 0 The fact that Hughes had not been a member of the Senate during the treaty debate made him much more w i l l i n g than Harding to challenge the authority of that body. For t h i s reason, the President allowed his Secretary of State to be p r i m a r i l y responsible for formulating America's foreign p o l i c y . 1 1 One foreign policy c r i t e r i o n that Harding did establish, however, was h i s i n s i s t e n c e that h i s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would not lead the United States to membership in the League "by the side door, back door, or c e l l a r door." 1 2 Motivated by p o l i t i c a l expediency, t h i s p o l i c y put Hughes in the awkward position of having to make elaborate attempts to avoid acknowledging the a u t h o r i t y of the League and indeed, i t s very e x i s t e n c e . During h i s f i r s t months i n o f f i c e , Hughes refused to allow State Department o f f i c i a l s to respond to correspondence received from the various o f f i c e s of the League. The Secretary of State's lack of direct cooperation continued u n t i l 1923, when he was severely c r i t i c i s e d by the American press, and, in p a r t i c u l a r , the New York Times. 1 3 Hughes' p o l i c y of non-cooperation soon proved to be pointless. The Secretary of State's desire to protect America's - 62 -i n t e r e s t s made i t necessary that he f i n d some method of informing the League of America's p o l i c i e s and a t t i t u d e s towards s p e c i f i c issues. Nagging problems remaining from the war s t i l l needed to be resolved by the League and Hughes wanted to ensure that America's position was presented. 1 4 The dilemma that he had to face was to fi n d a communication link that d i d not appear to be too cooperative nor jeopardized America's p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n . At f i r s t , the United States resorted to communicating with the League through the diplomatic o f f i c e s of t h i r d parties, for example, the Dutch government. 1 5 This method, however, was not satisfactory because the as s i s t i n g governments often did not share the same concerns or interests as the United S t a t e s . Consequently, the State Department began to search for a country that was a member of the League and with whom i t shared similar interests and p o l i c i e s . With t h i s i n t e n t i o n , State Department o f f i c i a l s began to explore the p o s s i b i l i t y of using Canada as a "front man" for American interests in the League. In short, America's need to ac t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n the world community while s t i l l p u b l i c l y appearing to be isolated, was the stimulus for establishing a di r e c t , close, unique relationship with the Dominion of Canada. When the sixty-seventh Congress assembled for the f i r s t time on March 4, 1921, both the House and the Senate i n i t i a l l y wanted to address a number of domestic issues that had been temporarily set aside by the treaty debate. The tone of the l e g i s l a t i o n that Congress would deal with had been established - 6 3 -by Harding's campaign promise to lower taxes.16 This policy of f i s c a l restraint resulted in budgetary cuts to public works projects, veterans allowances, and a proposal to make drastic cuts in the Naval Appropriations B i l l . It was t h i s l a s t issue which sparked the most controversy in the Senate and served as an indication to the American public of how d r a s t i c a l l y the war had altered America's international position. During the course of the debate senators began to rea l i z e that any cuts made in the naval expenditures for domestic p o l i t i c a l reasons would have serious implications for America's foreign p o l i c y . It became clear that America's relations with Great B r i t a i n , Japan, and China would be affected by any cuts that appeared to weaken the United States' m i l i t a r y presence in the P a c i f i c . As well, America's a t t i t u d e towards the question of world disarmament would also have to be revised i f the size of the navy was downgraded. In short, the Naval Appropriations B i l l c l e a r l y revealed that one of the las t i n g effects of the war was that domestic p o l i t i c a l expediency and f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues had become so inter-related that they could no longer be dealt with as separate entities.1? The foreign policy issue that was most frequently discussed in connection with the Naval Appropriations B i l l was the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . This a l l i a n c e , signed between Great B r i t a i n and Japan in 1902, had long been a concern of successive American administrations.! 8 Designed by Great B r i t a i n to be a method of preserving her d e c l i n i n g - 6 4 -role in the P a c i f i c , the a l l i a n c e served the dual purpose of p r o t e c t i n g B r i t a i n ' s Far East possessions from Imperial Russia while also preventing a possible c o n f l i c t with expan-s i o n i s t Japan. In essence, the a l l i a n c e , prior to World War One, allowed Great B r i t a i n to withdraw some of her naval strength in the P a c i f i c in order to meet the growing threat posed by Germany in the A t l a n t i c . In the United States, however, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was viewed by many o f f i c i a l s , notably Secretary of State Hughes, as a threat to both America's P a c i f i c possessions and to her policy of an Open Door in China. 1 9 As mentioned, the widespread a n t i - B r i t i s h sentiment in the United States caused American policy makers to be suspicious of the B r i t i s h govern-ment's motives in the P a c i f i c . As well, the State Department was equally concerned with Japan's intentions. That country's victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) had convinced many Western observers of the p o t e n t i a l m i l i t a r y strength of J a p a n . 2 0 With the collapse of Ts a r i s t Russia in 1917, and the conclusion of World War One in 1918, Japan c l e a r l y emerged as the foremost power in the Far East. Consequently, when the a l l i a n c e came up f o r renewal i n 1920, American o f f i c i a l s intended to make t h e i r strenuous objections known to both governments. The State Department maintained that the d e c l i n e of Imperial Russia had eliminated the o r i g i n a l purpose f o r the a l l i a n c e . I f renewed, the United States would i n t e r p r e t - 65 -t h i s a c t i o n as an attempt by Great B r i t a i n and Japan to counter American strength in the Pacific.21 For t h i s reason, the Naval Appropriations B i l l was especially pertinent because some senators, i n p a r t i c u l a r , Hiram Johnson of C a l i f o r n i a , argued that the United States could not a f f o r d to make any cuts that would weaken her position in the Pacific.22 Johnson's attitude was i r o n i c . A vocal member of the ir r e c o n c i l a b l e s , he admitted during the naval a p p r o p r i a t i o n s debate that indeed, the United States could no longer afford to ignore the p o l i c i e s of other n a t i o n s . In e f f e c t , Johnson lobbied the State Department to take whatever a c t i o n was necessary to inform the B r i t i s h government that the United States considered the a l l i a n c e detrimental to the development of a close Anglo-American relationship.23 During the Senate debate Johnson received support for his position from his colleague James D. Phelan, also from Cali- . f o r n i a , i n opposing the naval cuts. Phelan was especially concerned by the proposed renewal of the a l l i a n c e because both Japan and B r i t a i n were members of the League and seemed to be b e n e f i t t i n g from that body's authority.24 The League's decision to award the P a c i f i c island of Yap to the Japanese i r r i t a t e d American o f f i c i a l s who wanted the United States to control the strategic island. "The menace of Japan," Phelan stated in the Senate: [was] so manifest that he who runs may read, e s p e c i a l l y i n these l a t e r months when Japan, a member of the League of Nations, has cast off a l l disguise, a l l i e d - 6 6 -herself with the powers of Europe, where we are not represented, and has apparently-assumed an unfriendly position.25 Phelan then went on to argue that the United States was not alone i n i t s concern over Japan's perceived aggressiveness. At t h i s point in his speech the Senator noted that: there i s an i n s t i n c t i v e fear throughout the P a c i f i c among the nati v e t r i b e s , as well as among the Caucasians in C a l i f o r n i a , in Washington, Oregon, New Zealand, Canada and A u s t r a l i a that t h e i r very l i f e [was] threatened. 2 6 Phelan maintained that t h i s fear could only be eliminated i f the United States preserved a strong presence in the P a c i f i c and prevented the renewal of the a l l i a n c e . His i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the P a c i f i c Dominions was a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n that the Senate was becoming aware of the controversy existing within the Empire over the question of the alliance's renewal. This awareness was made even more e x p l i c i t by Senator James A. Reed of Missouri. Referring to the tense atmosphere which e x i s t e d i n B r i t i s h Columbia between the Asian and Caucasian communities, Reed argued that: i f an unprovoked war were to be made upon us by Japan and i f Great B r i t a i n were to c a l l upon Canada to help a brown race to attack the U n i t e d S t a t e s of America, Canada would be in a flame of revolt and would take her position beside the Christian c i v i l i z a t i o n of North America as against the paganism of the O r i e n t . 2 7 The common attitude which Western senators shared with the P a c i f i c Dominions and in part i c u l a r Canada, also extended into the thorny questions of Asian immigration and r a c i a l - 67 -equality. At the time of the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson, recognizing that Asian r a c i a l equality was an important issue in C a l i f o r n i a , Oregon and Washington, refused to include i n the League of Nation's Covenant a statement guaranteeing r a c i a l equality.28 During the Anglo-Japanese Alliance debate in the Senate, r a c i a l e q u a l i t y again became a contentious issue in the Western states and reached new heights of hysteria when the Hearst newspaper chain published a number of e d i t o r i a l s opposed to Asian immigration.29 Again, Senators Phelan, Lodge and Oscar Underwood from Alabama, recognized t h a t America's p o l i c i e s and attitudes were supported by the P a c i f i c Dominions.30 Senator Hitchcock, referring to an e d i t o r i a l i n the Montreal Gazette F make i t c l e a r to h i s s e n a t o r i a l colleagues that the Canadian government considered the questions of Asian immigration and r a c i a l equality p r i o r i t y issues that had to be on the agenda of the next Imperial Conference to be held in 1921.31 The Democratic Senator concluded that "Canada holds exactly the same views that the United States holds," and therefore, America should encourage the Canadian government to take a strong position.32 An important factor contributing to the Senate's knowledge of Canadian policy was the close relationship that was develo-ping between leading Republicans and Loring C h r i s t i e , an intimate advisor of Canadian Prime Ministers Robert Borden and A r t h u r Meighen. Born i n Nova S c o t i a , C h r i s t i e ' s family heritage and his own temporary employment in Washington when a - 6 8 -young man, caused him to be very sensitive and concerned about issues confronting both Canada and the United S t a t e s . 3 3 His policy papers to Borden and Meighen contained s o p h i s t i c a t e d analyses of America's position on a number of important topics affecting the B r i t i s h Empire and Canada in p a r t i c u l a r . In his a r t i c l e , "Loring C h r i s t i e and the Genesis of the Washington Conference," Canadian historian Arthur Lower maintained that i t was Christie's influence that was the determining factor in Canada's attitude towards the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . 3 4 Moreover, in February 1921, Ch r i s t i e was i n s t r u -mental in setting up meetings i n Washington between Newton Rowell and leading American o f f i c i a l s . During these discus-sions, the State Department made i t s a t t i t u d e towards the Anglo-Japanese Al l i a n c e , Asian immigration and r a c i a l equality very clear to the Canadian government. American o f f i c i a l s went to great lengths to outline the fr u s t r a t i o n they f e l t at not being able to receive a d e f i n i t i v e response from the B r i t i s h government. An examination of State Department records indicates that the United States t r i e d to make i t s p o s i t i o n on not only the renewal of the a l l i a n c e but a l l issues relating to the P a c i f i c known to the B r i t i s h government as e a r l y as 1919. Through i t s ambassador i n London, the American government made repeated attempts to ascertain the detail s of Britain's P a c i f i c p o l i c y . On May 10, 1920, the State Department went so far as to send a dispatch to London which outlined American - 69 -objections to the renewal of the present a l l i a n c e and the changes the United States deemed necessary i f the B r i t i s h government should decide to sign a revised treaty and s t i l l wanted to maintain a growing r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United States.35 Although the B r i t i s h attempted to plac a t e the United States, enough suspicion of B r i t i s h motives remained in American c i r c l e s to cause the State Department concern. As a result, the United States changed i t s t a c t i c of dealing solely with the B r i t i s h government and began to exploit i t s u n o f f i c i a l connections with Canada. Through Loring C h r i s t i e , American o f f i c i a l s encouraged the e f f o r t s of the Canadian government in convincing the B r i t i s h not to renew the alliance.36 Canada's reaction to the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e and the Asian immigration question was, to some extent, formulated in response to the a t t i t u d e of the United States. The two issues served to demonstrate to both countries the many s i m i l a r i t i e s existing i n t h e i r p o l i c i e s . Robert Borden had made i t clear that Canada would not support a p o l i c y which was opposed or deemed harmful by the United States.37 Moreover, the monetary cost of an adequate P a c i f i c defense, which so pre-occupied American Senators, was also a primary concern of the Canadian government. In a l e t t e r to the Secretary of State, the American Consul i n Montreal informed his government that Canada had decided that "in the matter of naval defense, i t [was] p e r f e c t l y obvious that Canada [was] i n no p o s i t i o n now, nor w i l l be for years to come, to undertake more that i s already being done. . . ."38 This statement was an indication to the State Department that Canada was beginning to identi f y i t s P a c i f i c defense with the United States. This explains why Canada was much more prepared to advocate ending the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e than her s i s t e r P a c i f i c Dominions. Both New Zealand and A u s t r a l i a looked to Great B r i t a i n f o r p r o t e c t i o n , and consequently, wanted to keep the powerful Japanese Navy as an a l l y instead of a potential foe.39 The a c t u a l part that Canada played in the debate over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been the source of controversy amongst Canadian and Commonwealth h i s t o r i a n s . 4 0 Although the historiography i s extensive, a detailed analysis of the American p e r s p e c t i v e has yet to be complete. An interesting question which needs to be explored i s : What role, i f any, did the United States envision Canada playing? An examination of the American documentation reveals that American policy makers believed that the Canadian govern-ment had the w i l l and the f l e x i b i l i t y to pursue an independent diplomatic course. Aware of B r i t a i n ' s d e s i r e to preserve imperial unity, American o f f i c i a l s b e l i e v e d that i f Canada made a strong stand against the a l l i a n c e B r i t a i n would be forced to adjust i t s p o l i c i e s . Consequently, in addition to the voices already heard in the Senate, the State Department, using indirect means, attempted to encourage Canada to be more assertive with her s i s t e r Dominions and Great B r i t a i n . 4 1 - 71 -This si t u a t i o n should have afforded Canada an unprece-dented diplomatic opportunity not only to f o s t e r her own independent foreign policy, but also to enhance the Canadian government's international status by exploring the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of having Great B r i t a i n and the United States v i e for Canada's support. Keeping in mind the B r i t i s h government's concern for maintaining imperial unity and the United States d e s i r e to gain a r e l i a b l e a l l y both i n the League and the B r i t i s h Empire, the s i t u a t i o n should have been r i p e f o r Canadian o f f i c i a l s to exploit. In order to understand why Canada did not use her unique position to f u l l advantage i t i s necessary to analyze the stance the Canadian government did take on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and then examine how Great B r i t a i n and the United States reacted to Canada's position. In early 1921, the question of the a l l i a n c e ' s renewal reached the stage where the B r i t i s h government had to make a decision. In an attempt to force B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s to l i s t e n to his government's arguments, Canada's Prime Minister, Arthur Meighen, informed London of his d e s i r e to assign a s p e c i a l Canadian representative, presumably Robert Borden, to Washing-ton in order to "get in touch with the new President of the United States and his Secretary of State . . . and discover, through informed and confidential conversations . . ." t h e i r r e a c t i o n i f the a l l i a n c e was renewed.42 paraphrasing the telegram sent by Meighen to the B r i t i s h government, Miles W. Lampson, an o f f i c i a l in the B r i t i s h Foreign Office argued - 72 -that: the Canadian government considered t h i s method of procedure the most appropriate because the P a c i f i c Dominions were i n r e a l i t y more v i t a l l y affected than other parts of the Empire, and also because the proposal, i f i t came from Canada, seemed best calculated to attract the government at Washington.43 "The Canadian people . . . " continued Lampson, would expect every e f f o r t to be made towards the policy of cooperation; as i t i n v o l v e d the f i r s t d e f i n i t e s t e p of primary significance in British-American r e l a t i o n s since the cessation of the war they would attach great importance to the present question. . . . Canadians had special opportunities to understand and to deal with Americans through long association and intercourse.44 It was clear to Lampson that Canada was attempting to f u l f i l l i t s d e s i r e d r o l e of a c t i n g as a mediator between the two world powers. Implicit in Meighen's request was the underlying threat that i f Canada was not granted permission to send a representative to Washington the Canadian government would be prepared to consider acting independently. Lampson was well aware that t h i s could mean the end of having only one foreign policy for the whole Empire. "Unless prompt a c t i o n [was] taken, . . . " Lampson warned: We may see an immediate move, independently of His Majesty's Government, between Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s on the problems of the P a c i f i c and Japanese policy in that region. . . .45 Lampson concluded his summary of Meighen's position by arguing that i f Canada pursued a course independent of the Empire the - 73 -Canadian government would be playing into the waiting hands of the United S t a t e s . Senator Lodge, i n h i s capacity as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had already expressed his opinion that i t would be acceptable to the United States i f the Canadian government sent a represen-tat i v e to Washington. 4 6 Lampson was not the only B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l to be concerned about American motives for encouraging Canada to appoint a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . " I f Canada i n s i s t s on moving, . . . " wrote Si r W. T y r r e l l , at Washington by the d i s p a t c h of S i r Robert Borden* without having come to an agreement with us, she w i l l be playing into the hands of Senator Lodge and h i s party who hope to u t i l i z e the question of Japanese a l l i a n c e f o r the purpose of detaching her and possibly Australia with a view to s h i f t the centre of the English speaking communities from London to Washing-ton . . .47 Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, Great Br i t a i n ' s Foreign Secretary, was al s o worried about the i m p l i c a t i o n s to the Empire's p o l i c i e s i f Canada should take independent action. Curzon wanted his o f f i c e to retain maximum f l e x i b i l i t y without being hindered by the attitudes and positions of the Dominions. In a telegram, c a r e f u l l y worded so as not to offend Canada and cause the Canadian government to react by working with the United States, Winston C h u r c h i l l , the B r i t i s h Secretary of Colonies, informed the Canadian Governor General that the B r i t i s h "Strongly urge[d] that the Canadian Government should not approach the Washington government independently. . . ."48 - 7 4 -This comment, combined with the B r i t i s h government's previous attempts to l i m i t the independent actions of the Dominions, was a further indication that Great B r i t a i n was attempting to renege on the commitments i t had made to the Dominions during the war and regain f u l l c o n t r o l of the Empire's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 4 9 Although C h u r c h i l l ' s telegram opposed the Canadian plan, Canada s t i l l had the option of acting independently and sending i t s representative to Washington. Clearly, t h i s was an opportunity f o r Canada to gain more c o n t r o l over i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . By ignoring the B r i t i s h o b j e c t i o n s and sending a representative to the United States i t was conceivable that t h i s would force the B r i t i s h government to recognize the special concerns and interests of Canada. The B r i t i s h govern-ment would be placed in the awkward position of either recog-nizing Canada's independent role as a policy maker and adapting i t s imperial p o l i c i e s to s u i t Canada's new position or, Great B r i t a i n could have risked a constitutional and imperial c r i s i s by attempting to prevent Canada's international growth. While B r i t i s h and Canadian o f f i c i a l s were discussing the question of sending a special Canadian envoy to Washington, the United States was kept f u l l y informed by i t s diplomatic corps. The information being received by the American govern-ment, however, tended to be i n c o n s i s t e n t making i t very d i f f i c u l t for the State Department to formulate a p o l i c y toward Canada.50 As mentioned, the State Department was f u l l y aware of the 1921 debates in the Canadian House of Commons pertaining to Canada's permanent representation in Washington. The fact that there was very l i t t l e opposition in Canada to the concept of independent representation and that the p o l i t i c a l debate was actually over the question of whether the Canadian re p r e s e n t a t i v e should be t i e d to the B r i t i s h Embassy, was interpreted by American o f f i c i a l s as meaning that a Canadian appointment would be made in the near future.51 Moreover, the State Department was also encouraged by the tone of the debate. Newton Rowell's argument that Canadian repres e n t a t i o n i n Washington "would not impair but would tend to improve the relations not only between Canada and the Mother Country, but also between Canada and the United States," c o i n c i d e d with the a t t i t u d e s possessed by American diplomats and p o l i t i -cians. 52 The combination of the House of Commons' debates and the confrontation between Canada and Great B r i t a i n over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese All i a n c e convinced the United States that Canada was preparing to sever i t s t i e s with the Empire. Less than a month a f t e r the Canadian House of Commons demonstrated i t s commitment to separate representation i n Washington, by all o c a t i n g funds in the federal budget, American consulates in Canada began sending a different signal to the State Department. Citing an e d i t o r i a l printed in the Montreal Gazette on May 7, 1921, the American consulate in Montreal informed Washington that Arthur Meighen had apparently decided - 76 -to heed the warnings of the B r i t i s h government and p u b l i c l y announced that Canada would not vigorously pursue c l a r i f i c a t i o n of i t s international status.53 Moreover, Meighen also stated that the 1917 d e c i s i o n to hold an i m p e r i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l conference at the conclusion of the war was "outside the realm of p r a c t i c a l t h i n g s , and indeed, d i r e c t l y counter to the p r i n c i p l e upon which the prosperity and even the existence of our commonwealth . . . " was e s t a b l i s h e d and t h e r e f o r e , was delayed indefinitely.54 "The people of the Empire," Meighen went on to state: have d i s c l o s e d no l i k i n g f o r abrupt constitutional changes, and seem unlikely to embark in the near future upon compli-cated invention in such a field.55 Meighen's comments l e f t American policy makers confused as to how to respond to the Canadian government's changed position. In the Senate, individual senators, such as William Borah of Idaho, concluded that Canada was not prepared to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of an autonomous nation and would not send an independent representative to the United States.56 In attempting to account for the Canadian government's apparent hesitancy h i s t o r i a n s have pointed to a number of factors. Certainly, the B r i t i s h government's o p p o s i t i o n to Canada's request to send an independent representative to the United States forms part of the answer. The Canadian government was well aware of the implications for Canada and the Empire as a whole, i f i t had chosen to break with the concept of imperial unity and follow an independent course. For Canada - i n -to have advocated th i s policy i t would have needed the support of a vast majority of Canadians. Not unlik e the American p u b l i c , however, Canadians had l o s t i n t e r e s t i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and were anxious to have t h e i r p o l i t i c a l leaders address many of the pressing domestic issues.57 A second factor contributing to Canada's lack of indepen-dent a c t i o n was a strong indication from the United States that i t was prepared to c a l l a conference for the purpose of discussing, among other things, the outstanding issues threa-tening world peace, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . On A p r i l 13, 1921, Senator Borah introduced into the Senate a resolution c a l l i n g upon the President to host a conference of the major powers to discuss world disarmament.58 Borah, attempting to enhance the Senate's t a r n i s h e d image, hoped that h i s r e s o l u t i o n would stem the t i d e of p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m against his stand on the League by p r o v i d i n g the United States with an alternative to permanent international obligations. The Senator's motivation for c a l l i n g the con-ference was an outgrowth of h i s concept of North American isolationism. Borah hoped the conference would ensure world peace without the United States' making a commitment to the concept of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y or n e c e s s i t a t i n g a f o r t r e s s mentality that would have required enormous expenditures on the m i l i t a r y , and the navy in particular.59 The Canadian government could c e r t a i n l y i d e n t i f y with Borah's motivation and goals. Canada's attitude towards world - 78 -peace was very similar to that of the United States. Moreover, i f the President c a l l e d f o r a conference, America's active p a r t i c i p a t i o n would remove the need for Canada to make a d e c i s i o n as to whether i t should act independently of the Empire. A t h i r d factor contributing to Canada's decision not to send a representative to Washington was the June 1921 Imperial Conference. This conference afforded the Canadian government an opportunity to a i r i t s views and grievances without taking the d r a s t i c step of a c t i n g independently. In regards to Canada's position on the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the conference provided Meighen with an opportunity to present the American and Canadian viewpoints. Canadian representatives wasted no time in making i t clear to the Imperial delegations why Canada f e l t i t had a special right to be heard and i t s a t t i t u d e s taken into account when the Empire was discussing i t s relationship with the United S t a t e s . "Canada does not claim," Meighen stated in his opening address: t h a t i n the g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n of the renewal or the non-renewal of the Treaty her voice must be especially heard. Not at a l l . The Empire i s concerned as an Empire, . . . But regards t h i s aspect, i t s effects on British-American relations, we do f e e l that we have a special right to be heard. . . . We know, or ought to know, the United States best, and because in the continuance and improvement of our r e l a t i o n s h i p with them we have a v i t a l concern. 6 0 W i t h i n t h i s statement, the underlying concern which the Canadian Prime Minister had for Canada's relationship with the United S t a t e s i s r e v e a l e d . Two days p r i o r t o h i s address b e f o r e the Imperial Confe-r e n c e , Meighen had e l a b o r a t e d on h i s f e a r t h a t A m e r i c a n -Canadian r e l a t i o n s were becoming too i n t e r t w i n e d . "The course of the United S t a t e s p o l i c y , . . . " Meighen maintained: i n e v e r y f i e l d a f f e c t s Canada. T h e i r numbers are many times the numbers of the Dominion i n p o p u l a t i o n . T h e i r d e c i s i o n s , t h e i r l i n e s of p o l i c y c o n s t a n t l y a f f e c t us i n a profound degree. We l i v e i n constant and v i t a l touch w i t h t h i s problem from day to day. . . . 6 1 W i t h i n t h i s comment l i e s t h e fundamental reason why Canada d e c l i n e d t o a s s e r t i t s e l f i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . The Canadian government f e a r e d the p r e s s u r e coming from the United S t a t e s would, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , l e a d Canada i n t o a s i t u a t i o n where she would become a t o o l f o r the United S t a t e s to manipu-l a t e f o r i t s own purposes. Meighen's government f e l t t h a t i t had the c h o i c e of e i t h e r becoming the American " f r o n t man" or remaining committed t o t h e Empire and w o r k i n g w i t h i n t h a t s t r u c t u r e t o present North America's concerns and a t t i t u d e s . Meighen's government chose the l a t t e r course because i t f e l t t h a t p o l i c y had the b e t t e r chance of succeeding while s t i l l p r e s e r v i n g f o r Canada some freedom of a c t i o n . Canada's d e c i s i o n n ot t o p l a y an i n d e p e n d e n t r o l e i n b r i n g i n g America's a t t i t u d e s t o the a t t e n t i o n of the B r i t i s h government was d i s a p p o i n t i n g both t o the United S t a t e s and to independently minded Canadians. S t i l l , American p o l i c y makers r e a l i z e d t h a t i n t h r e a t e n i n g i m p e r i a l u n i t y by f o r c i n g Canada - 8 0 -to ident i f y i t s interests with the United States, they had discovered a tool that could be used to t h e i r advantage in the future.62 In the Canadian historiography, Bartlet Brebner described Meighen*s role throughout the Anglo-Japanese Treaty dispute as helping: to c r e a t e a favorable opportunity f o r Charles Evans Hughes, . . . to i n v i t e the powers to a conference at Washington for naval disarmament and for redressing the balance of power in the P a c i f i c . . . .63 This i s a very substantial, c l a i m that i s only p a r t i a l l y v e r i f i e d in the American documentation. Certainly, Canada's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with American p o l i c i e s provided the United States with access to the i m p e r i a l c o u n c i l . The Canadian government's reluctance to assert i t s e l f , however, by forcing the issue and establishing a direct communication link with the United States meant that Canada did not play as substan-t i a l a role as the opportunity presented. By not seizing the i n i t i a t i v e Canada established a precedent that would charac-t e r i z e her response to future c r i s e s . Consequently, the c o n f l i c t i n g view of Canada's status that was presented to the United States government between February and June 1921, did more to hinder than help the development of a close American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s h i p . 6 4 The next opportunity for Canada and the United States to establish a close relationship was presented by the Washington Naval Conference scheduled for November 1921. With the - 81 -concept of a world disarmament conference f i n a l l y accepted by a l l the major powers, the State Department had to formally issue invitations to p a r t i c i p a t i n g nations. The question was soon r a i s e d as to whether the Dominions should receive a separate status as established at the Paris Peace Conference, or should be included in one i n v i t a t i o n to the B r i t i s h Empire. The United States chose the l a t t e r course thus making i t Great B r i t a i n ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to handle the demands and policy positions of her Dominions. In making t h i s d e c i s i o n , the United States sparked an h i s t o r i c a l controversy. The standard interpretation of Canada's lack of a separate i n v i t a t i o n to the Washington Conference was f i r s t put forward by Robert MacGregor Dawson i n The Devolopment of Dominion  Status. 1900-1936.65 Although Dawson was not completely unsympathetic to the American position, he did point out that the United States j u s t i f i e d ignoring the Dominions by arguing that t h e i r rejection of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s meant that the United States was not obligated to recognize the i n t e r -national status accorded the B r i t i s h Dominions by that docu-ment. 66 T h i s h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n continues to be accepted, in a modified form, by current studies. In t h e i r recent work An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations. Edelgard Mahant and Graeme Mount concluded that "the United States was slow and rather unwilling to recognize . . . " the Dominions' new status and t h e r e f o r e , d i d not i s s u e them separate invitations.67 - 82 -C e r t a i n l y , once the conference had been c a l l e d the American government did demonstrate an ambivalence towards the B r i t i s h Dominions. State Department records i n d i c a t e that American p o l i c y makers were w e l l aware that e d i t o r i a l s in Canadian newspapers maintained that Canada had reached the status of an equal partner with Great Britain.68 j n addition, in the immediate aftermath of the Imperial Conference, J u l y 11, 1921, i n a l e t t e r from t h e i r London Ambassador, the American government was advised that the Dominion Premiers must be allowed to play some role at the conference i f the United States wished to avoid causing a resurgence of a n t i -American feeling within the Empire.69 This l e t t e r was r e i n -forced four days later by a communication from Lord Curzon s t r o n g l y urging that the United States extend some form of diplomatic recognition to the Dominions. 7 0 At t h i s point in the correspondence i t appears that Dawson's interpretation was c o r r e c t and that i t was the American government, which had been informed of the Dominions' changing international r o l e , that was unwilling to grant any recognition to the Dominions. Further examination of the State Department records suggests, however, that the t h e s i s that the United States refused to acknowledge the Dominions' status i s not completely accurate. Many h i s t o r i a n s , especially John Galbraith, have pointed out that the Harding A d m i n i s t r a t i o n d i d have some options in the question of whether the Dominions could receive a separate i n v i t a t i o n . 7 1 In 1911, the Republican Administration - 83 -of William Howard Taft had established a precedent by i n v i t i n g Canada to attend a conference convened to update an i n t e r -national convention relating to the protection of i n d u s t r i a l property.72 Harding, i f he had so chosen, could have used Taft's example, which had been established at a time when the Dominions' were not demanding i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s , as a reason for sending the Dominions a separate i n v i t a t i o n . Based on the Taf t precedence, Harding could have argued that the Dominions were included because of the i r special interests in disarmament and the i n v i t a t i o n in no way committed the United States to recognizing a new status for the Dominions. A second f a c t o r that a l s o undermines the t r a d i t i o n a l h i s t o r i c a l interpretation stems from Harding's r e l a t i o n s h i p with the Senate. As a former senator, Harding was aware of the mistakes made by Wilson i n not c o n s u l t i n g the leading members of Congress. The President realized that the Senate was experiencing some public disfavour because of i t s bipartisan actions during the treaty debate and consequently, would not be in a strong position to dispute which countries should be i n attendance at the conference.73 Moreover, Harding's d e c i s i o n to include Senators Lodge and Underwood i n the American delegation helped to ensure the Senate's cooperation. A l l these factors contributed to providing the Harding Adminis-t r a t i o n with a f l e x i b i l i t y that Wilson had not possessed or indeed, attempted to cr e a t e . This f l e x i b i l i t y could have been used to gain support i n the Senate f o r extending an - 84 -i n v i t a t i o n to the Dominions. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , State Department records indicate that President Harding did attempt to explore some of his options. In a l e t t e r dated August 23, 1921, the State Department asked i t s London Ambassador to determine how many commissioners the B r i t i s h government f e l t each del e g a t i o n should i n c l u d e . "Presumably [the] B r i t i s h Government w i l l desire, . . . " wrote Secretary of State Hughes: to i n c l u d e Dominion representatives and of course t h i s would be very acceptable to the United States. . . . We do not desire to attempt to impose r e s t r i c t i o n s upon representation of other Governments but we consider that the Governments w i l l desire a s u b s t a n t i a l equality of representation and with t h i s in view i t would be desirable to l i m i t each commission to f i v e or s i x . We assume that in the case of the B r i t i s h Government six would give f u l l opportunity for Dominion representations which the U n i t e d States does not d e s i r e to make d i f f i c u l t . 7 4 Certainly, t h i s l e t t e r does imply that the United States was not prepared to accept the dual representation Canada and her s i s t e r Dominions had enjoyed at the Paris Peace Conference. At the same time, however, Hughes* l e t t e r does demonstrate a willingness on the part of the United States to recognize that a change in the Dominions' status had taken place within the imp e r i a l structure and should be acknowledged at the i n t e r -national l e v e l . America's London Ambassador, George Harvey, response to the Secretary of State's inquiry revealed his impression of the B r i t i s h government's attitude towards i t s Dominions. In a - 85 -telegram sent on August 26, 1921, a f t e r the Ambassador had received Hughes l e t t e r of the 23rd, Harvey informed the State Department that he had "had a long and most f r i e n d l y t a l k yesterday with Curzon."75 Harvey went on to state that on the issue of delegation size, Curzon: strongly recommended that o f f i c i a l represen-tation in actual membership of conference be limited to two or at most three. . . . Although Curzon did not say so I gather that he expects Lloyd George and himself w i l l thus represent the B r i t i s h Empire, . . . They c o n s i d e r . . . [dominion representation] a family a f f a i r and f e e l q u i t e competent and authorized to speak for the whole Empire. . . . they are so sensitive upon th i s point that I f e e l sure Curzon would have been disposed to resent a suggestion from me. . . .' 6 Harvey explained to the State Department that he had t r i e d to make i t clear to the B r i t i s h government that Dominion represen-tation was acceptable to the United States and the Ambassador did: present [Hughes'] tentative suggestion of f i v e to s i x d e l e g a t e s to a v o i d [the] p o s s i b i l i t y of f u t u r e c r i t i c i s m from Dominions that might be based upon the assumption that they were barred out of adequate p a r t i c i p a t i o n through any plan or act of yours.77 Harvey concluded his telegram with his personal assessment of the B r i t i s h government's a t t i t u d e towards i t s Dominions' demand for status. "Confidentially I f e e l , " Harvey wrote: s a t i s f i e d that Curzon and Lloyd George do not care to have [the] Dominions d i r e c t l y represented by t h e i r own delegates upon [the] same plane of a u t h o r i t y as them-selves .78 - 86 -This telegram became the basis from which the American government l a t e r determined the size of the delegations and the procedural methods the conference would adopt. On August 29, 1921, Secretary of State Hughes asked his Ambassador to make clear to the B r i t i s h government "that [the] idea should not get abroad that we have limited [the] size of delegation and thus made i m p r a c t i c a l Dominions' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Our willingness to have larger delegations should accordingly be apparent."79 The correspondence between London and Washington provides an indication that the United States was prepared to exercise some of i t s options by being f l e x i b l e on the issue of Dominion status. There are a number of factors which help to explain America's sudden w i l l i n g n e s s to grant the Dominions some diplomatic recognition. Certainly, i t can be argued that the American government's attitude was an extension of i t s o r i g i n a l p o l i cy of using the Dominions, especially Canada, to induce Great B r i t a i n to adopt p o l i c i e s advantageous to the United States. A major reason why the United States was prepared to accept the Dominions at the conference was that America could have used the Dominions' support on the issue of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e . The State Department had been informed that i t was u n l i k e l y that New Zealand or A u s t r a l i a would a t t e n d . 8 0 American diplomats assumed, however, that Canada would a v a i l h e r s e l f of the opportunity to demonstrate her diplomatic status at the conference by continuing to lobby - 87 -against the renewal of the a l l i a n c e . As well, i t can also be argued that Hughes* proposed that the Dominions should be represented as part of the B r i t i s h delegation because i t would provide the United States with the opportunity to appoint a number of prominent individuals, both Republican and Democrat, to their d e l e g a t i o n . 8 1 This t a c t i c would have helped to ensure that any agreement (s) r e s u l t i n g from the conference would gain support from both p o l i t i c a l parties and receive speedy passage in the Senate. A t h i r d factor contributing to Hughes* desire to have the Dominions present at the conference was the changing status of I r e l a n d . In h i s August 26, 1921 telegram, Ambassador Harvey warned the State Department that the I r i s h s i t u a t i o n , which had continued to cause f r i c t i o n in Anglo-American relations, could be substantially changed before the naval conference. 8 2 Harvey was r e f e r r i n g to the ongoing n e g o t i a t i o n s between B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s and representatives for Ireland. In the United States, powerful lobbies and prominent senators were anxious to see the United States immediately recognize any change i n Ireland's s t a t u s . 8 3 p o r t h i s reason, American o f f i c i a l s had to be c a r e f u l when handling the question of Dominion s t a t u s . The State Department would not have been able to j u s t i f y granting status to Ireland without extending the same recognition to the other Dominions. Despite a l l these factors, the United States decided to acquiesce in the B r i t i s h desire to keep Dominion representation - 88 -a "family a f f a i r , " and d i d not issue i n v i t a t i o n s to the Dominions. American o f f i c i a l s were reluctant to hinder the growth of the Anglo-American relationship. The appearance of the United States interf e r i n g in the internal a f f a i r s of the Empire would ce r t a i n l y have put a s t r a i n on any future relations with Great B r i t a i n . More importantly, however, the obvious back tracking of the Canadian government i n the events leading up to and including the June Imperial Conference, created an impression i n Washington that Canada was not serious i n i t s p u b l i c demands for diplomatic autonomy. 8 4 The fact that Canada did not strongly oppose the diplomatic arrangement l a i d out f o r the Washington conference f u r t h e r convinced the American government that Canada was not, at that time, anticipating an active role. Evidence of Canada's hesitancy was l a t e r revealed in the Canadian House of Commons when William Lyon Mackenzie King pointed out that any status the Dominions may have acquired at the Washington conference was due to the strident e f f o r t s of the South A f r i c a n government which had in s i s t e d that Great B r i t a i n take steps to ensure the Dominions access to the conference. 8 5 King accused the Meighen government of losing i t s resolve to make Canada diplomatically autonomous. He reasoned that by accepting a back seat at the conference the Canadian government had demonstrated, once again, i t s willingness to accept B r i t i s h control of i t s foreign p o l i c y . 8 6 While Canada did not play a prominent role at the con-- 89 -f e r e n c e , which was h e l d between November 12, 1921 and February 6, 1922, t h e Dominion d i d i n s i s t on s i g n i n g the r e s u l t i n g agreements on i t s own b e h a l f . In a d d i t i o n , Canada, using the T r e a t y of V e r s a i l l e s as a precedent, i n s i s t e d on the r i g h t of i t s P a r l i a m e n t t o r a t i f y any agreement b e f o r e i t became b i n d i n g on the Canadian government.87 Under p r e s s u r e , espe-c i a l l y from South A f r i c a , the B r i t i s h government l o b b i e d the C o n f e r e n c e on t h e Dominions' b e h a l f . Both these p r o v i s i o n s were accepted by the United S t a t e s . T h i s was another i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the American government was not opposed to the Dominions' g a i n i n g some form of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n . By p e r m i t t i n g the Dominions to s i g n America's e x e c u t i v e branch of government extended i t s r e c o g n i t i o n to a s t a t u s t h a t had o r i g i n a l l y been e s t a b l i s h e d at P a r i s . 8 8 At the c o n c l u s i o n of the Washington Conference the task f a c i n g the Harding A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was t o get the n a v a l agree-ments a c c e p t e d by t w o - t h i r d s of t h e S e n a t e . As w i t h the V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y debate, t h e r e s t i l l remained a small group o f v o c a l s e n a t o r s who were opposed t o any agreement t h a t i n f r i n g e d on the American government's a b i l i t y t o formulate an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y . R e s u r r e c t i n g some of the arguments t h a t had been used to defeat the T r e a t y o f V e r s a i l l e s , t h e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s focussed t h e i r arguments on the a b r o g a t i o n of t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e and t h e s i g n i n g of t h e n a v a l agreements by t h e D o minions. S e n a t o r R o bert La F o l l e t t e c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d to h i s c o l l e a g u e s t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n on the q u e s t i o n of the Dominions' s t a t u s had not changed. "I do not know," he commented: w h e t h e r t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n t would c o n t r o l , i f t h i s proposed t r e a t y went i n t o e f f e c t , t h a t these Dominions should each have a separate vote under the t r e a t y , as t h e y have under th e League of N a t i o n s .... At a l l events, we do know t h a t the Anglo-Jap[anese] p o l i c y of a g g r e s s i o n and i m p e r i a l i s m which made the B r i t i s h Empire and the Jap[anese] Empire c l o s e a l l i e s i n t h e p a s t , and w h i c h makes them c l o s e a l l i e s today, w i l l cause them to stand as a u n i t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p o l i c i e s o f any power i n t h e P a c i f i c which dares to i n s i s t t h a t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e w eaker p e o p l e t h e r e s h a l l be r e c o g n i z e d and p r o t e c t e d . 8 9 La F o l l e t t e ' s m i s t r u s t of the B r i t i s h was m i r r o r e d by h i s c o l l e a g u e Senator Thomas Watson of G e o r g i a . Watson argued t h a t t h e n a v a l t r e a t i e s t h r e a t e n e d t o d e s t r o y A m e rica's n a t u r a l advantage of having two oceans s e p a r a t i n g the United S t a t e s from her p o t e n t i a l enemies. Watson maintained that an a d d i t i o n a l n a t u r a l advantage e n s u r i n g America's s a f e t y was the a b i l i t y of the United S t a t e s t o "hold ... Canada as a hostage f o r the good behavior of England."50 Although both La F o l l e t t e and Watson represented a m i n o r i t y view, t h e i r comments demon-s t r a t e d t h a t t h e r e was s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t o p p o s i t i o n and a genuine lac k of understanding r e l a t i n g t o Canada's i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s . For the most p a r t , however, the Senate debate p e r t a i n i n g to the n a v a l agreements d i d demonstrate t h a t the m a j o r i t y of senators had a d i f f e r e n t view of both Canada's and America's r o l e s i n the world community. C e r t a i n l y , the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s - 91 -were able to prevent any "Association of Nations" that would have resembled a long term commitment by the United States.91 Yet, the tone of the debates on the naval agreements was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from that of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . Instead of emphasizing how Canada d i f f e r e d from the United States, advocates of the agreements focused on the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two nations. Symbolizing the changing attitude in the Senate, Senator Lodge, in his speech defending the agreement on the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Al l i a n c e , maintained "that the a l l i a n c e was a breeder of suspicion in North America, both in Canada and the United States."92 How does the his t o r i a n account for the change in attitude demonstrated by a number of American senators in the short period between the defeat of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty and the r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Washington Naval Agreements? Certainly, the long term commitment by the United States was not the same i n the Naval Agreements as compared with the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . As mentioned, there was no attachment to a forum such as the League of Nations, and staunch i s o l a t i o n i s t s could, and did argue, that by l i m i t i n g the size of the world's navies the United States could l i v e i n i s o l a t i o n without fearing the other world powers. Senator Borah r e f e r r e d to t h i s as a p o l i c y of strength through the combination of disarmament and isolationism.93 The Senate debate also revealed, however, that there was a growing r e a l i z a t i o n amongst a l l l e v e l s of the American - 92 -governmental structure that the i s o l a t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s of the previous century could no longer be applied.54 During the three years between the armistice in Europe and the Washington Conference questions relating to nations indebtedness to the United States, i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade b a r r i e r s , and America's concern f o r her overseas possessions required the State Department to i n i t i a t e a more i n t e r n a t i o n a l outlook. This r e a l i z a t i o n had contributed to America's desire to hold the Washington Conference and was also to have a l a s t i n g effect on the American-Canadian relationship. The Senate's r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Naval Agreements was, by extension, a r a t i f i c a t i o n of Canada's right to sign diplomatic agreements and present them to i t s Parliament. Moreover, despite the Canadian government's apparent unwillingness to aggressively pursue a separate and d i s t i n c t f o r e i g n p o l i c y , Canada had proven to be a useful "front man" in presenting to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum ideas, i s s u e s , and concerns t h a t reflected a d i s t i n c t l y North American p e r s p e c t i v e . 9 5 F i n a l l y , the American government was aware that Prime Minister Meighen had made i t clear at the Imperial Conference of 1921, that in a f f a i r s "affecting the United States and Canada, the Dominion should have f u l l and f i n a l a u t h o r i t y . 9 6 This type of f o r c e f u l statement demonstrated that by encouraging the autonomy of Canada the United States was p r o t e c t i n g i t s interests and gaining a l o y a l a l l y . In the wake of the Washington Conference, American o f f i c i a l s became even more convinced of the Canadian - 93 -government's potential usefulness. This becomes c l e a r when the role and policy positions of Canada's representatives in the League of Nations are analyzed. As mentioned, the American government had i n i t i a l l y t r i e d to ignore the existence of the League but when t h i s proved detrimental to America's interests, the United States began, at an u n o f f i c i a l l e v e l , to deal informally with the League's o r g a n i z a t i o n s and c o u n c i l s . At a number of conferences sponsored by the League, the United States sent observers who, although not permitted by t h e i r own government to play an active role, used informal opportunities to make known the i r government's p o s i t i o n on key issues.97 Even th i s method, however, proved to be an i n e f f i c i e n t way of protecting America's interests. Many countries resented what they viewed to be the United States abrogating i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s while attempting to enjoy some of the benefits the League offered.98 Aware of both t h i s resentment and the f u t i l i t y of trying to convince the American p u b l i c that the United States should join the League, the Harding A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n i t i a t e d a p o l i c y of p r i v a t e l y supporting and encouraging those countries whose p o l i c i e s most closely resembled those of the United States.99 Canada was the most l o g i c a l and convenient n a t i o n most closely suited to American purposes. One of the o b j e c t i o n s the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s had l e v i e d a g a i n s t Canada's involvement i n the League had been the argument that the Dominion would simply be the puppet of Great - 9 4 -B r i t a i n . 1 0 0 Canada, in conjunction with South A f r i c a , however, wasted no time in proving those senators wrong. As mentioned, at the f i r s t meeting of the League's Assembly, Canada voted against the position of Great B r i t a i n over the issue of world trade in raw materials. This incident demonstrated that Canada was prepared not only to exe r c i s e i t s vote i n the League assembly but also to d i f f e r with Great B r i t a i n when i t was in Canada's interest to do so. "Apparently one of the surprises of the assembly was the independent attitude of the represent-atives from the Dominions of the B r i t i s h Empire," reported Rowell to the House of Commons upon h i s return from the Assembly meetings. 1 0 1 He went on to state: the representatives from the majority of the s t a t e s a p p a r e n t l y went to Geneva believing that the views of the Dominions and t h e i r votes would necessarily follow the views and votes of Great B r i t a i n , and when they found t h i s view did not prev a i l there was very great s u r p r i s e . 1 0 2 The Canadian government also made i t clear during the f i r s t Assembly that Canada's p o l i c i e s were going to be guided by i t s s e n s i b i l i t i e s to the United S t a t e s . 1 0 3 What caught the a t t e n t i o n of American o f f i c i a l s was Canada's consistent adherence to North American idealism and in p a r t i c u l a r , peace through isolationism. During the 1920s, Canada established an extensive record of protecting i t s v i t a l interests, while tending to avoid many of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s membership in the League i m p l i e d . 1 0 4 Canada's main reason for joining the League had been to demonstrate and enhance her - 95 -international status. Canada quickly made i t known, however, that there were l i m i t s to how far she was w i l l i n g to cooperate with the League. The Canadian government's ac t i o n s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d that i t was not prepared to surrender any of i t s autonomy, not even to the world court. Speaking before the Assembly, Raoul Dandurand, a member of the Canadian delegation, argued that there was l i t t l e point in Canada adhering to the world court because "nine-tenths, i f not a l l , of the questions of difference that might arise between Canada and the outside world would be questions concerning the neighbouring Republic, and t h e i r Southern neighbour had not yet adhered to the Court of Justice .... Consequently, there was no pressing need for Canada to j o i n . " 1 0 5 in t h i s instance, the United States was a convenient scapegoat used to explain Canada's own reluctance at surrendering some of i t s sovereignty to a world organization. Where the Canadian government did show an aggressive stance at the League was in i t s opposition to the concept of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y and i n p a r t i c u l a r , A r t i c l e Ten of the League's Covenant. Canadian historians have been quick to point out that Robert Borden opposed A r t i c l e Ten when i t was f i r s t proposed at the P a r i s Peace Co n f e r e n c e . 1 0 6 In t h i s regard, Borden was more aware of the widespread p o p u l a r i t y amongst North Americans of the concept of isolationism than was Woodrow Wilson. When the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s was r a t i f i e d by the Canadian Parliament in September 1919, questions were raised in the House of Commons concerning A r t i c l e Ten and the - 96 -o b l i g a t i o n s i t would impose upon Canada. 1 07 Having j u s t emerged from one war, Canadians were not prepared to accept the prospect of being obliged to participate in future wars that may or may not involve immediate Canadian interests. Following the League's o f f i c i a l establishment, Canada submitted to the Committee on Amendments to the League Covenant a memorandum outlining Canadian objections to A r t i c l e T e n . 1 0 8 Amongst i t s arguments, the Canadian government maintained that i t had only joined the League because i t was under the impression that the covenant would be altered in such a way as to remove the arbitrary or compulsory a r t i c l e s . 1 0 9 in j u s t i -fying his government's position, the Canadian representative s t a t e d that i t was h i s b e l i e f that once A r t i c l e Ten was removed from the covenant the United States would j o i n the League. 1 1 0 It was thi s l a s t argument, combined with Canada's desire to remove any a r t i c l e s which might be used to oppose the Canadian government's position on such questions as Asian immigration, that constituted Canada's major a c t i v i t i e s in the League. A l t h o u g h Canadian represe n t a t i v e s made repeated attempts throughout the e a r l y 1920s to have A r t i c l e Ten removed from the covenant, they were not able to secure enough support from other nations. American o f f i c i a l s watched the Canadian a c t i v i t i e s against the League's Covenant with i n t e r e s t . Not only did Canada's actions provide the United States with the opportunity to see some of i t s concerns brought to the f l o o r of the - 97 -League's Assembly; the Canadian government's o p p o s i t i o n to A r t i c l e Ten a l s o helped to convince many members of the American Senate of Canada's usefulness and commitment to North American i d e a l i s m . 1 1 1 In a d d i t i o n , Canada's stated d e s i r e to avoid becoming involved i n future c o n f l i c t s i n Europe l e d a few senators to b e l i e v e that Canada could be convinced to break a l l i t s t i e s with Great B r i t a i n . 1 1 2 The Senate's new interest in Canada was best expressed by Senator John S. Williams of M i s s i s s i p p i in a speech he delivered in Memphis in June 1922. In, said Senator Williams, c o n s i d e r [ ing] Canada and o u r s e l v e s , ... [we see that] Nothing but a map l i n e divides us .... We are two nations, for Canada i s a n a t i o n i n a l l but name, ... but i n a l l e s s e n t i a l t h i n g s one people, with the same New World s p i r i t .... S h a l l we permit ourselves to 'be nagged' into antagonism to one another? And yet that i s just what i s being accom-p l i s h e d toward us i n Canada by t h i s h y p o c r i t i c a l complaint about Canada having a voice and a vote in an assembly where H a i t i and Nicaragua and Cuba v i r t u a l l y controlled by us, each has o n e . 1 1 3 Senator Williams' comments were just one more indication that some i n f l u e n t i a l Americans were beginning to see l i t t l e point in alienating a like-minded a l l y with diplomatic status i n the League. As with the Washington Conference, the League of Nations offered the Canadian government an opportunity to enhance Canada's own interests by forcing Great B r i t a i n and the United States to compete for Canadian support. Great B r i t a i n s t i l l wanted to maintain Canada's support in the League because the - 98 -B r i t i s h government was s t i l l trying to present to the rest of the world a u n i f i e d Empire with one f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The United States, on the other hand, wanted Canada to pursue a foreign policy which was d i s t i n c t from that of the Empire and r e f l e c t e d the North American view of the world. As with previous o p p o r t u n i t i e s , however, Canada d i d not seize the i n i t i a t i v e . The Canadian government did not use i t s position i n the League to f u l l advantage and, consequently, made no s i g n i f i c a n t gains i n i t s quest to achieve autonomy i n i t s foreign a f f a i r s . , By l a t e 1921 to e a r l y 1922, Canada had e s t a b l i s h e d enough of a precedent from i t s independent a c t i o n s i n the League to i n s i s t that Great B r i t a i n allow the Canadian govern-ment to appoint a representative to Washington who was not connected with the B r i t i s h Embassy. Certainly, the attitude of leading American o f f i c i a l s was such that they would have welcomed the a r r i v a l of a Canadian in th e i r c a p i t a l . 1 1 4 S t i l l the Canadian government delayed. As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , Meighen and l a t e r King, argued that the lack of t r a i n e d personnel and a suitable representative were responsible for t h i s delay. In r e a l i t y , however, the delay can be primarily attributed to Canada's e f f o r t s to maintain some of i t s manoeuvrability in the face of possible manipulation by the United States. The Canadian government's reluctance to appoint a representative to Washington stemmed from Canada's fear that once an appoint-- 99 -ment was made Canada would not be a b l e t o p r e v e n t American o f f i c i a l s from dominating Canadian p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . As i t stood i n 1921, Canadian o f f i c i a l s were aware of the pressure coming from the United S t a t e s to pursue an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h a t r e f l e c t e d North American i n t e r e s t s . The Canadian government was a b l e , however, to o f f s e t some of t h i s p r e ssure by f o r c i n g the United St a t e s t o conduct i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Canada t h r o u g h t h e B r i t i s h government. Canada's c o n c e r n to f i n d ways of p r o t e c t i n g i t s e l f from American i n f l u e n c e can even be seen i n t h e Canadian government's d e c i s i o n t o j o i n the League of N a t i o n s . Canada's involvement i n the League was due, i n no sm a l l measure, to the f e a r of becoming dominated by her s o u t h e r n n e i g h b o r . 1 1 5 Not u n l i k e many L a t i n and South American n a t i o n s , who j o i n e d t h e League d e s p i t e American o b j e c t i o n s , i n o r d e r t o minimize the e f f e c t s of the Monroe D o c t r i n e , Canada a l s o became a member a n t i c i p a t i n g t h a t t h i s would prevent the United S t a t e s from using i t s d o c t r i n e as an excuse f o r i n t e r f e r i n g i n Canada's domestic p o l i t i c s . 1 1 6 Canada's concern not to become a t o o l of American diplomats r e s u l t e d i n t h e C a n a d i a n government, f o r t h e most p a r t , t a k i n g the s a f e r route of r e c o n f i r m i n g i t s t i e s w i t h G r e a t B r i t a i n and working w i t h i n the i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e t o p r o t e c t i t s i n t e r e s t s . 1 1 7 The f a c t t h a t Canada's statements at the 1921 I m p e r i a l Conference and i n the League of Nations l e d to c o n f u s i o n i n the United S t a t e s as to what the Canadian govern-ment was a c t u a l l y t r y i n g t o accomplish d i d l i t t l e t o enhance - 100 -Canada's d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s amongst American d i p l o m a t s . For t h i s reason, the defeat of Meighen 1s Co n s e r v a t i v e government i n 1921 by King's L i b e r a l s was viewed as a p o s i t i v e development i n Washington. American o f f i c i a l s had been kept w e l l informed on the debates i n the Canadian House of Commons where th e L i b e r a l s had demanded t h a t the C o n s e r v a t i v e government take some a c t i o n on t h e i s s u e of a Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n W a s h i n g t o n . 1 1 8 The State Department a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t w i t h King's v i c t o r y , h i s government would take s w i f t a c t i o n t o appoint a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . Moreover, the adamant a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y e d by members of King's c a b i n e t , i n p a r t i c u l a r W.S. F i e l d i n g who had c o n s i s t e n t l y opposed any C a n a d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e B r i t i s h Embassy, l e d American o f f i c i a l s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t K i n g ' s e l e c t i o n would g i v e t h e S t a t e Department a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o encourage Canada to break away from i t s European c o n n e c t i o n . 1 1 9 The development of the Chanak C r i s i s e a r l y i n King's mandate, the F a l l of 1922, i n c r e a s e d the S t a t e Depart-ment's optimism and was to prove a p i v o t a l event i n the develop-ment of a c l o s e r American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s h i p . The Chanak C r i s i s e r u p t e d i n September 1922, when the B r i t i s h government, unable to reach a s u i t a b l e peace settlement w i t h T u r k e y , f o l l o w i n g World War I, asked i t s Dominions f o r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e i f i t should become necessary to impose a s e t t l e m e n t . 1 2 0 Almost immediately, New Zealand and A u s t r a l i a r e s p o n d e d p o s i t i v e l y to t h e B r i t i s h r e q u e s t . 1 2 1 Canada, - 101 -followed by South A f r i c a , decided to use the c r i s i s as a test of the constitutional development of the right of the Dominion parliaments to gain control over their own foreign a f f a i r s . Consequently, King's response to the B r i t i s h government was that Canadian troops would not be committed u n t i l the Canadian Parliament had debated the issue.122 nj.t i s neither right nor proper," stated Prime Minister King during the parliamentary debate on the government's handling of the c r i s i s , for any i n d i v i d u a l or f o r any group of individuals to take any step which in any way might l i m i t the rights of Parliament in a matter which i s of such great concern to a l l the people of our country.123 King asserted that the Canadian government had not been an active participant in the events leading up to the c r i s i s and so d i d not f e e l that Canada should a u t o m a t i c a l l y become in v o l v e d . In essence, King was declaring the supremacy of the Canadian Parliament in establishing whether Canada would, or would not, become involved i n the c r i s i s . "The L i b e r a l government of Canada's purpose," wrote W.K. Hancock: was to extend the old doctrine of respons-i b l e government further into the f i e l d of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , and to d i s e n t a n g l e Canadian policy from the imperial p o l i c y pursued by the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e . 1-24 American p o l i c y makers were kept w e l l informed of the events surrounding the Chanak C r i s i s . The diplomatic ramific-ations of the positions assumed by Canada and South A f r i c a , both in the imperial structure and in the world community, were made clear to the State Department by American representatives - 102 -s t a t i o n e d i n both c o u n t r i e s . In the February 1923 House o f Commons d e b a t e s , M a c k e n z i e K i n g d e f e n d e d h i s government's p o s i t i o n t h a t Canada had the competence t o decide f o r i t s e l f what k i n d o f commitment i t would make to i m p e r i a l p o l i c i e s t h a t i t d i d not c o n t r o l . In the United S t a t e s , King's s t a t e -ments were i n t e r p r e t e d as meaning t h a t the new L i b e r a l regime was prepared t o assume more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . 1 2 5 The s i g n a l s t h a t the s t a t e Department was r e c e i v i n g from Canada were confirmed by American o f f i c i a l s p o s t e d i n o t h e r D o m i n i o n s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , South A f r i c a . Q u o t i n g an e d i t o r i a l p u b l i s h e d i n the Cape Times on January 16, 1923, Charles J . P i s a r , a member of the American Consulate, concluded t h a t the c r i s i s had enormously a f f e c t e d the r o l e the Dominions would p l a y i n B r i t a i n ' s f u t u r e f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . P i s a r informed Washington t h a t the South A f r i c a n government b e l i e v e d "that the Canadian government i n t e n d [ e d ] t o demand a more d e f i n i t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n I m p e r i a l r e l a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . " 1 2 6 The e d i t o r i a l went on to s t a t e that Canada was w i t h i n i t s r i g h t s t o have i t s p o s i t i o n and amount of i n f l u e n c e w i t h i n t h e i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e c l a r i f i e d . The in f o r m a t i o n P i s a r p r o v i d e d warned the S t a t e Department t h a t Canada's demands meant t h a t A m e r i c a ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Dominions was about to enter a new phase of complexity.127 The C a n a d i a n government's p o s i t i o n d u r i n g t h e Chanak C r i s i s was c o n s i s t e n t with the a t t i t u d e i t had demonstrated i n - 103 -the League of N a t i o n s . K i n g was p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h a v o i d i n g any d i s p u t e s t h a t c o u l d p o s s i b l y l e a d to Canadian involvement i n a c o n f l i c t where Canada's i n t e r e s t s were not d i r e c t l y at s t a k e . The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s apparent commitment to North Americanism i n d i c a t e d t h a t Canada was d r i f t i n g away from th e Empire and i t s e n t a n g l e m e n t s . In an a r t i c l e i n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s p u b l i s h e d i n 1923, P h i l i p Kerr argued t h a t a f t e r t h e Chanak C r i s i s the emerging r o l e of the Dominions i n r e l a t i o n t o G r e a t B r i t a i n was s i m i l a r t o t h e American P r e s i d e n t "whose f o r e i g n p o l i c y , to be e f f e c t i v e , r e q u i r e d the c o n s e n t and c o o p e r a t i o n of t h e S e n a t e — i n our c a s e , t h e Dominions."128 Thus, i n February 1923, the S t a t e Department was once again reaching the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Canada was p r e p a r i n g t o a s s e r t i t s e l f d i p l o m a t i c a l l y and e s t a b l i s h a s e p a r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Washington. L e s s t h a n s i x months l a t e r , t h e American c o n s u l i n Montreal once again informed h i s government t h a t Canada had backed away from i t s more a s s e r t i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s . In a d i s p a t c h dated J u l y 1923, American o f f i c i a l s i n Canada t o l d t h e S t a t e Department t h a t the Canadian government had decided t o postpone i n d e f i n i t e l y any f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n w i t h B r i t a i n p e r t a i n i n g to a reformed i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t would resemble a f e d e r a t i o n and thus guarantee a g r e a t e r v o i c e f o r the Dominions i n p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . T h i s d e c i s i o n not to pursue a r e m o d e l l i n g of the i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e was a n o t h e r example o f Canada f a i l i n g t o c a r r y out i t s p u b l i c p o l i c y - 104 -statements. The Canadian government's i n a b i l i t y to turn words i n t o r e a l i t y r e s u l t e d i n the State Department's viewing Canada's steps towards diplomatic autonomy with s k e p t i c i s m . The Chanak C r i s i s had demonstrated that Canada would not allow i t s e l f to be dragged into a dispute without f i r s t r e c e i v i n g the sanction of the Canadian Parliament. Clearly, t h i s was a s i g n i f i c a n t step in Canada's quest for diplomatic autonomy. Yet, i n the areas of i n i t i a t i n g and carrying out separate diplomatic policy objectives, the Canadian government's lack of a g g r e s s i o n — i n t h i s case, forcing Great B r i t a i n to take tangible steps to ensure her Dominions a greater voice i n policy making—led Americans to conclude that Canada was not p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious to pursue an active, independent foreign policy of i t s own. Indeed, senior American o f f i c i a l s began to doubt that Canada would even c a r r y out i t s o b j e c t i v e of establishing a separate representation in Washington.130 The United States continued to watch the evolving nature of the Empire and encouraged Canada's a c t i v i t i e s in the League but American o f f i c i a l s , disappointed at Canada's apparent i n a b i l i t y to follow through on i t s stated desire for diplomatic autonomy, became more dependent on d e a l i n g d i r e c t l y , i f i n f o r m a l l y , with these organizations.131 j . n short, the net result of the Chanak C r i s i s was that Canada demonstrated that she would not n e c e s s a r i l y be o b l i g a t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n issues not deemed to be in Canada's interests but also, that she was not prepared to determine and carry out her own policy - 105 -positions. While these i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes and events had been taking place, a number of b i l a t e r a l issues between the United States and Canada had c l e a r l y demonstrated to both nations that they had to develop a more direct relationship. Canada not only feared American domination on international issues; i t becomes c l e a r when the h i s t o r i a n analyzes the t r a d e , f i s h i n g and prohibition disputes between 1919-1924, that the Canadian government was searching for a way of achieving some of i t s diplomatic objectives without conceding too much to her powerful southern neighbour i n purely b i l a t e r a l matters. Clearly, Canada realized that by using the imperial structure and having the support of Great B r i t a i n , i t had a much greater chance of protecting i t s interests. This was the dilemma that Canadians had to face. On the one hand, Canada could, and did, confront Great B r i t a i n and demand more diplomatic autonomy. This policy was e s p e c i a l l y e f f e c t i v e when the Canadian government threatened Britain's p o l i c y of i m p e r i a l unity by moving c l o s e r to the United S t a t e s . On the other hand, in i t b i l a t e r a l relations with the United States, Canada had to come to grips with the fact that she was at a d i s t i n c t disadvantage when negotiating with her more powerful neighbor. Consequently, Canada, i n the e a r l y 1920's wanted, on b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s , the diplomatic resources and support which Great B r i t a i n possessed. An a n a l y s i s of the relations and issues that developed between - 106 -the United States and Canada in the early 1920s reveals that because of Canada's dilemma i t was the Canadian government that was reluctant to take tangible steps towards e s t a b l i s h i n g a separate presence in Washington. - 107 -Endnotes Chapter Two b a i l e y , The Man in the Street, p. 7. 2 F o r more information on the "Red Scare" see: Stanley Coben, "Nativism and the Red Scare or 1919-1920," P o l i t i c a l  Science Quarterly. Vol. 79 (No. 1 March 1964), pp. 52-75. 3For a b r i e f examination of the 1920s see: F.L. Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper, 1931); J.D. Hicks, Republican  Ascendancy (New York: Harper, 1960). 4"Two Years of American Foreign Policy," p. 1. -'For more information on the point that American o f f i c i a l s f e l t hampered in th e i r attempts to protect America's i n t e r -n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s see: S e l i g Adler, The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941. American Foreign Policy Between the Wars (London: Ma c m i l l a n Co., 1965); Samual Flagg Bemis, The American S e c r e t a r i e s of State and Their Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929); Clarence A. Berdahl, The Policy of the United States With Respect to the League of Nations (Geneve: L i b r a r i e Kundig, 1932); Raymond B. Fosdick, Secretary Hughes and the League of Nations (New York: E i l e r t Printing Co., 1924). 6Berdahl, The Policy of the United States with Respect to the League Qf Nations, p. 62. 7 I b i d . , pp. 60-61. 8 I b i d . 9John C. Vinson, The Parchment Peace. The United States Senate and the Washington Conference. 1921-1922 (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1955), p. 39. i^Adier, The U n c e r t a i n G i a n t ; 1921-1941, p. 45. 1 3-Ibid., p. 47. -"••^Berdahl, The Policy of the United States with Respect to the League of Nations, p. 96. 13New York Times. 18 July, 1921. - 108 -1 4 A d l e r , The U n c e r t a i n G i a n t : 1921-1941. p. 57. 1 5 B e r d a h l , The P o l i c y of the United S t a t e s with Respect  to the League of Nations, pp. 100-105. l^See: P r e s i d e n t Hardings' Inaugural Address on March 4, 1921. C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record. March 4, 1921, pp. 4-6. 1 7 V i n s o n , The Parchment Peace, p. 44. 1 8 F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e see: A l f r e d L.P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1923) . For more i n f o r m a t i o n on America's concern over the a l l i a n c e see: Vinson, The Parchment  Peace: G r a e b n e r , Ideas and D i p l o m a c y : Thomas G. Paterson, ed. Major Problems i n American Fo r e i g n P o l i c y V o l . 2 (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1978). 1 9 U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g t o  t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1920. V o l . 2 (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1936), p. 680. ^ C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record. March 1, 1921, p. 4147. 2 1 U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g t o  t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f 1920. V o l . 2. p. 680. 2 2 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record, November 18, 1919, p. 8733. 2 3 I b i d . 2 4 I b i d . , March 1, 1921, p. 4148. 2 5 I b i d . , p. 4147. 2 6 i b i d . 2 7 I b i d . , March 8, 1922, p. 3557. 2 8 A r n o l d J . Toynbee, The Conduct of the B r i t i s h Foreign R e l a t i o n s Since the Peace Settlement (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1928), pp. 12-13. - 1 0 9 -2 9 V i n s o n , T h e P a r c h m e n t P e a c e , p . 4 4 . A l s o s e e : U n i t e d S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , P a p e r s R e l a t i n g t o t h e F o r e i g n  R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1 9 2 1 . V o l . 2 ( W a s h i n g t o n : G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 3 6 ) , p . 3 2 3 . 3 0 c o n a r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d . M a r c h 4 , 1 9 2 1 , p . 4 1 1 9 . 3 1 I b i d . , M a r c h 8 , 1 9 2 0 , p p . 4 0 1 0 - 4 0 1 1 . 3 2 I b i d . , p . 4 0 1 1 . 3 3 A r t h u r R . M . L o w e r , " L o r i n g C h r i s t i e a n d t h e G e n e s i s o f t h e W a s h i n g t o n C o n f e r e n c e , " C a n a d i a n H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , V o l . 4 7 ( N o . 1 M a r c h 1 9 6 6 ) , p . 4 0 . 3 4 I b i d . , p . 4 1 . 3 5 u n i t e d S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , P a p e r s R e l a t i n g t o  t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1 9 2 0 . V o l . 2 . p . 6 8 0 . 3 6 L o w e r , " L o r i n g C h r i s t i e a n d t h e G e n e s i s o f t h e W a s h i n g t o n C o n f e r e n c e , " p . 4 1 . 3 7 " E x t r a c t f r o m M i n u t e s o f t h e F o r t y - S e v e n t h M e e t i n g o f t h e I m p e r i a l W a r C a b i n e t , d a t e d D e c e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 1 8 , " i n R . A . M a c k a y , e d . , D o c u m e n t s o n C a n a d i a n E x t e r n a l R e l a t i o n s .  V o l . 2 , T h e P a r i s P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e o f 1 9 1 9 ( O t t a w a : D e p t . o f E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 1 7 . 3 8 u n i t e d S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , A m e r i c a n C o n s u l a t e G e n e r a l i n M o n t r e a l t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e H u g h e s , A p r i l 2 8 , 1 9 2 1 , R e c o r d s o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o t h e  I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s o f G r e a t B r i t a i n 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 9 , N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , W a s h i n g t o n ( m i c r o f i l m , 1 9 6 4 , 8 4 1 . 0 1 / I M 7 / 6 ) . 3 9 M e r z e T a t e a n d F i d e l e F o y , " M o r e L i g h t o n t h e A b r o g a t i o n o f t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e , " P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 7 4 ( N o . 4 D e c e m b e r 1 9 5 9 ) , p . 5 3 5 . 4 0 F o r d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f C a n a d a ' s r o l e s e e : T a t e a n d F o y , " M o r e L i g h t o n t h e A b r o g a t i o n o f t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e " ; B r e b n e r , " C a n a d a , t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e a n d t h e W a s h i n g t o n C o n f e r e n c e " ; M . S . F r y , " T h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r i a n g l e a n d t h e A b r o g a t i o n o f t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e , " J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n H i s t o r y . V o l . 3 9 ( N o 1 M a r c h 1 9 6 7 ) , p . 4 6 - 6 4 ; G a l b r a i t h , " T h e I m p e r i a l C o n f e r e n c e o f 1 9 2 1 - 110 -and the Washington Conference"; I r a K l e i n , " W h i t e h a l l , Washington, and the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e 1919-1921," P a c i f i c H i s t o r i c a l Review. V o l . 41 (No. 4 November 1972), pp. 460-483; Lower, "Loring C h r i s t i e and the Genesis of the Washington Conference." 4-1-Lower, "Loring C h r i s t i e and the Genesis of the Washington Conference," p. 41; also, Fry, "The North A t l a n t i c Triangle," pp. 50-53. Throughout 1920 and 1921, the State Department received numerous reports from i t s o f f i c i a l s in Canada. These reports outlined Canada's attitude towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and c o n t r i b u t e d to the American b e l i e f that Canada would firmly oppose the renewal of the a l l i a n c e . See: United States, Department of State, American Consulate General i n Montreal to Secretary of State Hughes, A p r i l 28, 1921; United States, Department of State, Consulate General in Ottawa to Secretary of State Hughes, A p r i l 29, 1921, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n . 1910-1929. (841.01/IM7/4). 4 2 G r e a t B r i t a i n , Foreign O f f i c e , Documents on B r i t i s h  Foreign P o l i c y . 1919-1939. F i r s t S e r i e s . V o l . 14 (London: Majesty's Stationary Offic e , 1966), Document No. 261, p. 272. 4 3 I b i d . 4 4 I b i d . , p. 274. 4 5 I b i d . , p. 275. 4 6 I b i d . p. 276. 4 ? I b i d . 4 8 G r e a t B r i t a i n , Colonial Offic e , Telegram from Winston C h u r c h i l l to Canadian Governor General, A p r i l 26, 1920, (F1696/63/23) in Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign Policy. 1919-1939. Vol. 14, p. 276. 4 9 K l e i n , "Whitehall, Washington, and the Anglo-Japanese Al l i a n c e , " p. 476. S^The information being received by the State Department tended to consist of public debates and newspaper accounts which often contradicted statements from Canadian government o f f i c i a l s . - I l l -See: United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1921. Vol. I. p. 25; and 63-64. 5*Canada, House of Commons, Debates, June 30, 1920, p. 4538. Also: Congressional Record. March 8, 1920, pp. 4010-4011. 52Quote from: Canada, House of Commons, Debates, March 4, 1921, p. 2399. For American attitude see: Congressional Record. March 4, 1921, p. 4119; and Ibid. March 8, 1922, p. 3557. 53united States, Department of State, American Consulate General in Montreal to Secretary of State Hughes, May 7, 1921, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n . 1910-1929. (841.01IM7/7). 5 4 I b i d . , p. 2. 5 5 I b i d . b 6Congressional Record. March 3, 1920, p. 3801. 5 7 G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington, p. 81. 5 8 p o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on Borah's r e s o l u t i o n see: Vinson, The Parchment Peace, p. 97. 5 9 I b i d . , p. 5. 6 0 C l a r k , Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy. Vol. 3. p. 178. 6 1 W a l t e r A. R i d d e l l , Documents on Canadian Foreign  P o l i c y . 1917-1939 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 64-65. 6 2 F r y , "North At l a n t i c Triangle," p. 53. 6 3Brebner, "North At l a n t i c Triangle," pp. 281-282. 6 4Reports being received by the State Department c l e a r l y indicated that American o f f i c i a l s in Canada were not certain - 112 -how the Imperial Conference of 1921, or the Washington Naval Conference had effected the Canadian government's international status. See: G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic  Status at Washington, pp. 82-84. "Dawson, ed., The Development of Dominion Status, p. 48. 6 6 I b i d . 6 7Mahant and Mount, An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations, p. 113. 6 8 U n i t e d States, Department of State, American Consulate General in Montreal to Secretary of State Hughes, June 6, 1921, Records i n the Department of State R e l a t i n g to the  Internal A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/15). 69rjnited States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1921. Vol. I. pp. 25-26. 7 0 I b i d . , p. 32. 7lGalbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921," p. 150. 7 2 i b i d . 7 3Vinson, The Parchment Peace, p. 139. 7 4 U n i t e d States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1921. Vol. I. pp. 60-61. 7 5 I b i d . , p. 63. 7 6 l b i d . , pp. 63-64. 7 7 I b i d . , p. 64. 7 8 I b i d . 7 9 i b i d . , p. 65. - 113 -o»Tate and Foy, "More Light on the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , " pp. 534-535. Slrjnited States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1921. Vol. I. p. 61. 8 2 I b i d . , p. 64. 8 3 F o r more information on the i n f l u e n c e of the I r i s h lobbies see: Kenneth R. Maxwell, " I r i s h Americans and the Fight f o r Treaty R a t i f i c a t i o n , " P u b l i c Opinion Quarterly. Vol. 31 (No. 4 Winter 1967-1968), pp. 620-641; John Duff, "The V e r s a i l l e s Treaty and the I r i s h Americans," Journal of American  History. Vol. 55 (No. 3 December 1968-1969), pp. 582-598. 8 4 U n i t e d States, Department of State, American Consulate General in Montreal to Secretary of State Hughes, June 6, 1921, Records of the Department of State R e l a t i n g to the  I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/15) , pp. 1-4. 8 5Canada, House of Commons, Debates. March 13, 1922, p. 43. 8 6 I b i d . 8 7Borden, "The B r i t i s h Commonwealth of Nations," p. 783. 8 8 I b i d . 8 9Congressional Record. March 22, 1922, p. 4228. 9 0 I b i d . , February 23, 1922, p. 2941. 9 1Vinson, The Parchment Peace, p. 214. ^Congressional Record. February 21, 1922, p. 2834. 9 3Vinson, The Parchment Peace, p. 5. 9 4 F o r more information p e r t a i n i n g to American p o l i c y makers' a t t i t u d e s towards i s o l a t i o n i s m i n the 1920s see: Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy. Chapter 8; Berdahl, The Policy of the United States with Respect to the League of Nations: Alexander De Conde, I s o l a t i o n and S e c u r i t y (Durham: Duke University Press, 1957). - 114 -9 5 D u r i n g the Senate debate pertaining to the Washington Naval Agreements, repeated reference was made to Canada's role at bringing American concerns to the attention of the B r i t i s h government. See: Congressional Record. June 23, 1922, p. 9241. 9 6 G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic  Status at Washington, p. 83. 9 7 P o s d i c k , Secretary Hughes and the League of Nations, p. 30. 9 8 I b i d . "Berdahl, The Policy of the United States with Respect  to the League of Nations, pp. 100-105. 1 0 0 C o n a r e s s i o n a l Record. February 16, 1920, p. 2955. 101C.A.W. Manning, The P o l i c i e s of the B r i t i s h Dominions i n the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 130. l 0 2 i b i d . 1 0 3 I b i d . , p. 73. 104p o r m o r e information on Canada's a c t i v i t i e s in the League of Nations see: Manning, The P o l i c i e s of the B r i t i s h Dominions in the League of Nations: Richard Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) . 1 0 5Manning, The P o l i c i e s of the B r i t i s h Dominions in the League of Nations f p. 45. 106 V eatch, Canada and the League of Nations, p. 9. 1 0 7Canada, House of Commons, Debates. September 8, 1919, p. 104. 1 0 8"Memoranda Submitted by the Canadian Government," League of Nations. 1919-1947 Assembly. C o u n c i l . C i r c u l a r  Letters Documents, Category V (C215.M154) 1921. - 115 -1 0 9 I b i d . , p. 3. l l 0 I b i d . HiConqressional Record. June 23, 1922, p. 9241. 1 1 2 I b i d . , March 8, 1922, p. 3557. 1 1 3 I b i d . , June 23, 1922, p. 9241. H4The State Department's announcement in A p r i l 1920, that Canada was about to appoint a representative in Washington was a s i g n i f i c a n t sign that the Dnited States was prepared to welcome and make use of t h i s new diplomatic avenue with the Canadian government. As w e l l , numerous senators from both p o l i t i c a l parties expressed the d e s i r e to see the Canadian appointment made so that relations between the United States and Canada could be conducted on a more direct basis. Cert-ainly, both the Senate and the State Department were aware of the debate in the Canadian House of Commons over what t i e s the Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e should possess with the B r i t i s h government. This debate served to convince i n f l u e n t i a l Americans that a Canadian would be appointed once his r e l a t i o n -ship with the B r i t i s h Embassy was determined. For more information on the Senate's attitude see: Congressional Record. June 23, 1922, p. 9241; Ibid., May 9, 1921, pp. 1195-1205. For more information on the fr u s t r a t i o n f e l t by some senators at t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to deal d i r e c t l y with Canada see: Congressional Record, February 25, 1920, p. 3438; I b i d . , February 27, 1920, p. 3562. For more information on the Canadian debate concerning the relationship of Canada's proposed representative in Washington to the B r i t i s h Embassy see: Canada, House of Commons, Debates, May 7, 1920, p. 2178; Ibid., June 30, 1920, p. 4538. 115 V eatch, Canada and the League of Nations, p. 11 1 1 6 I b i d . 1 1 7 W i g l e y , Canada and the T r a n s i t i o n to Commonwealth, pp. 110-111. l l 8 C a n a d a , House of Commons, Debates. March 3, 1921, p. 525. 1 1 9 G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic - 116 -Status at Washington, pp. 79-85. 1 2 0 p o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e Chanak C r i s i s see: Dawson, The Development o f Dominion S t a t u s ; W.K. Hancock, Survey of B r i t i s h Commonwealth A f f a i r s . V o l . I: Problems of  N a t i o n a l i t y . 1918-1936 (London: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1937); Judd, B a l f o u r and t h e B r i t i s h Empire; Toynbee, The  Conduct o f B r i t i s h Empire F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Since the Peace  Settlement. ! 2 l H a n c o c k , Survey o f B r i t i s h Commonwealth A f f a i r s .  V o l . I. p. 251. 1 2 2 I b i d . l 2 3 C a n a d a , House of Commons, Debates, February 1, 1923, p. 33. 1 2 4 H a n c o c k , Survey of B r i t i s h Commonwealth A f f a i r s , V o l . I. P. 252. l 2 5 U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consulate General i n Cape Town, South A f r i c a , t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, January 22, 1923, Records of the Department of State R e l a t i n g t o the I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/25); United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American C o n s u l a t e i n London to S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Hughes, September 11, 1923, Records of the Department of S t a t e R e l a t i n g to the  I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/41); United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consulate i n Cape Town, South A f r i c a , to S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Hughes, December 20, 19 2 3, R e c o r d s R e l a t i n g t o t h e I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s o f G r e a t  B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (741.00/23). l 2 6 U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consulate General i n Cape Town, South A f r i c a , t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, January 22, 1923, Records of the Department of State  R e l a t i n g t o t h e I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929 (841.01GM7/25), p. 1. 1 2 7 I b i d . , pp. 1-3. 1 2 8 U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consulate General i n Cape Town, to S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Hughes, J a n u a r y 10, 1923, Records of the Department of S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o the  I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/25). - 117 -i ^ u n i t e d States, Department of State, /American Consulate General in Ottawa, to Secretary of State Hughes, J u l y 10, 1923, Records of the Department of State R e l a t i n g to the Internal A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM/32). !30in the correspondence between President Harding and Secretary of State Hughes r e l a t i n g to the P a c i f i c Halibut Treaty, both men had reached the conclusion that relations with Canada would continue to be handled through B r i t a i n . See: United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1923. Vol. I. pp. 472-475. 131 B e rdahl, The Policy of the United States With Respect to the League of Nations, pp. 100-105. - 118 -Chapter Three The vast majority of h i s t o r i c a l studies analyzing Canada's s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with the United States have focused almost e x c l u s i v e l y on b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . ! Even a cursory examination of both Canadian and American records during and after World War I reveals how complex and intertwined relations between the two countries had become in consequence of these issues. Matters ranging from economic concerns to immigration p o l i c i e s had to be s w i f t l y resolved and i t was becoming increasingly d i f f i c u l t for both nations to expeditiously handle these problems through Great B r i t a i n . As s t a t e d , Canadian h i s t o r i a n s have argued that i t was the United States whose p o l i c i e s hindered the growth of a direct relationship between the two c o u n t r i e s because Americans did not understand or recognize Canada's evolving diplomatic s t a t u s . 2 Yet, i n examining a number of key b i l a t e r a l issues between 1920-1924, one can see American o f f i c i a l s actually encouraging Canada to take steps that would make the relationship closer and more d i r e c t . This becomes especially evident when the historian analyzes these b i l a t e r a l concerns in comparison with America's attitude towards Canada on more international disputes involving other nations. An analysis of America's view of the manner in which i t thought i t s relations with Canada should be conducted makes i t e a s i e r to understand why the Canadian government would at times demand that Great B r i t a i n recognize Canada's status as - 119 -an independent policy maker and then retreat from t h i s position and be content with working behind the scenes. Canada's apparent inconsistency was in response to the pressure from the United States. The American government wanted to eliminate the B r i t i s h government from i t s dealings with Canada not only because th i s would increase the e f f i c i e n c y of the relationship but also, because the State Department f e l t that i t could more readily manipulate Canada i f the B r i t i s h were not part of the proceedings.3 On b i l a t e r a l issues, i t soon became evident to the Canadian government that having the support of Great B r i t a i n at or behind the conference table gave Canada advantages that she would not have on her own. American i n t e r e s t i n Canada's status, Canadians soon learned, grew d i r e c t l y out of the sense American o f f i c i a l s had of what kind of Canada could best serve t h e i r national interest. In the post war period, one of the f i r s t major issues to be brought to the attention of the American Senate was Canada's r e s t r i c t i v e laws pertaining to the export of pulpwood. The i s s u e came before the Senate i n February 1920, when the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty debate was entering i t s l a s t phase. Although the discussion on the pulpwood issue was a mere sideshow when compared with the treaty debate, the dispute did present an i n t e r e s t i n g dilemma f o r some senators who, in terms of the treaty, opposed the diplomatic status Canada had acquired at Paris yet, on s p e c i f i c b i l a t e r a l concerns, were frustrated by th e i r i n a b i l i t y to deal d i r e c t l y with the Canadian government.4 - 120 -The dispute arose when the Canadian provinces of Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick introduced laws which r e s t r i c t e d the amount of pulpwood that could be exported from crown lands.5 The provinces were attempting to conserve th e i r timber resources and encourage Canadian companies to create jobs in Canada by producing finished products instead of exporting raw resources. During the decade between 1910-1920, the amount of pulpwood exported to the United States had rapidly increased. By 1920, the depletion of America's forests combined with the need for larger amounts of newsprint, e s p e c i a l l y i n the North-East, resulted in various domestic lobbying groups putting pressure on the Senate to have the Canadian r e s t r i c t i o n s removed so that American newspapers could be assured of a steady supply of newsprint. 6 When the State Department informally discussed the issue with Canada, the Canadian government maintained that the provinces were within th e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n . 7 In an attempt to deal with t h i s s i t u a t i o n , Senator Oscar Underwood sponsored a r e s o l u t i o n to have a p r e s i d e n t i a l commission composed of f i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s appointed to discuss the pulpwood issue d i r e c t l y with the Canadian govern-ment.8 The debate on t h i s resolution was interesting because i t revealed that many senators, such as Asie S. Gronna of North Dakota, an outspoken c r i t i c of Canada's status at the P a r i s Peace Conference, had no r e a l understanding of how diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with America's northern neighbour were conducted or indeed, how varied and complex had become the - 121 -t i e s which l i n k e d the two c o u n t r i e s . 9 i n defending h i s resolution Senator Underwood attempted to o u t l i n e the major problems the State Department had to overcome when dealing with the Canadian government. In p a r t i c u l a r , Underwood noted that the cumbersome system of using the o f f i c i a l diplomatic channel, the B r i t i s h Embassy, had proven to be f r u i t l e s s . "Efforts have been made," Underwood argued in the Senate: in the past to work out an understanding with the Dominion government of Canada through d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s and they f a i l e d , because when i t goes through diplomatic channels i t must go through the Court of St. James and back to the Canadian government.I 0 Underwood emphasized that the: r e a l purpose of t h i s j o i n t r e s o l u t i o n ... [was] to make a direct e f f o r t with the Canadian government to secure the appoint-ment of a commission to deal with t h i s i n d u s t r i a l question that w i l l not become involved in the i n t r i c a c i e s of a diplomatic negotiation ... It ... [was] to appoint a commission to d e a l w i t h the Canadian government.11 Underwood's arguments were reinforced by Senator Hitchcock who added an additional dimension to the debate by maintaining that the Senate had to deal d i r e c t l y with the Canadian govern-ment so the l a t t e r would r e a l i z e how anxious the United States was to have the pulpwood issue s e t t l e d . Moreover, referring to the Canadian government's p u b l i c l y s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e of establishing a representative in Washington, Hitchcock argued that the resolution was an opportunity for the United States to i n i t i a t e a new r e l a t i o n s h i p with Canada. "At t h i s time," - 122 -Hitchcock stated: Canada i s desirous of taking to a large extent the control of her foreign relations and foreign a f f a i r s , and i s even contem-plating, as I understand, at the present time establishing in the United States her own diplomatic representative.12 Hitchcock's comments, expressed at a time when the Senate was divided over the treaty debate, forced those senators who opposed Canada's diplomatic status for reasons of p o l i t i c a l expediency to reconsider t h e i r positions. This was especially t r u e f o r those p o l i t i c i a n s r e p r e s e n t i n g N o r t h e r n and North-Eastern states. The pulpwood issue created the si t u a t i o n where p a r t i c u l a r members of the Senate were embarrassed by t h e i r a t t i t u d e s on the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. Many, such as Robert La F o l l e t t e , went to extreme lengths to j u s t i f y t h e i r p o s i t i o n s a g a i n s t the Canadian government being granted diplomatic status despite the fact, that diplomatic recognition would have made i t e a s i e r f o r the United States to pursue b i l a t e r a l issues with that country.13 At a time when the Senate was becoming preoccupied with f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t , the most i n f l u e n t i a l arguments against the Underwood resolution maintained that a s p e c i a l p r e s i d e n t i a l commission was simply too expensive to be j u s t i f i e d . Senator Gronna maintained that the projected cost of $50,000 was not warranted when American o f f i c i a l s could express to the B r i t i s h Embassy the United States opposition to Canada's r e s t r i c t i v e pulpwood l a w s . I 4 Gronna rejected Underwood's argument that the " o f f i c i a l route" for diplomatic correspondence with Canada - 123 -was either too slow or i n e f f e c t i v e . He b e l i e v e d that the. system had worked well in the past and would continue to meet the diplomatic needs of both the United States and Canada.!5 Building upon Gronna's economic argument, Senator William H. King of Utah, suggested that a presidential commission was redundant because the apparatus to discuss the pulpwood issue d i r e c t l y with the Canadian government already existed.16 Senator King was referring to the International Joint Commission which had been established by the United States and Canada in 1909. King b e l i e v e d that t h i s commission was p e r f e c t l y capable of handling any dispute that might arise between the two countries. In his view, the pulpwood issue presented an opportunity for the United States and Canada to prove to the world the effectiveness of the j o i n t commission structure.! 7 While King's arguments were persuasive and seemed to f i t i n well with the concept of "the North American model for peace," 1 8 the Senator demonstrated both an inadequate knowledge of just how complex the American-Canadian relations had become as well as a lack of understanding about the purpose or the extent of the mandate that had been granted to the Joint Commission. Putting the controversy surrounding the Underwood Resolu-tion into the context of both the Senate's V e r s a i l l e s Treaty debate and the larger international disputes, i t i s clear that c e r t a i n senators allowed domestic p o l i t i c s to intrude and determine t h e i r response to the pulpwood i s s u e . Having measured the p o l i t i c a l damage that would have resulted from - 124 -reversing t h e i r position on Canada's diplomatic status at the P a r i s Peace Conference, many senators, i n p a r t i c u l a r , the ir r e c o n c i l a b l e s , chose to ignore the opportunity to establish a p r e s i d e n t i a l commission that might have set a precedent for encouraging a more direct relationship with Canada. Very few American o f f i c i a l s disputed the point that a more e f f i c i e n t communication system was needed with the Canadian government. Clearly, however, the Senate debate revealed that the United States did not possess a consistent diplomatic p o l i c y towards Canada. Both the State Department and the Senate tended to respond to disputes with Canada on a day to day basis. Conse-quently, at t h i s time, there was an inconsistency in America's attitude towards Canada. On the one l e v e l , the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty debate, the American Senate was not prepared to accept Canada's status as established by the Paris Conference. On another l e v e l , b i l a t e r a l issues, the United States wanted a closer more direct relationship but American o f f i c i a l s were prevented from doing so because of the Senate's rejection of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. The debate on the pulpwood issue also had some positive elements that would eventually affect the American-Canadian relationship. A few members of the Senate, especially Porter 1 S. McCumber, had taken the time to t r y and assess Canada's constitutional position in re l a t i o n to Great B r i t a i n . I 9 Aware that during the f i r s t two decades of the twentieth century Canada had been a c q u i r i n g more autonomy i n her commercial - 125 -relations with other nations, Senators Underwood and Hitchcock reasoned that by encouraging Canada's independence in economic issues t h i s could be extended in t o other f a c e t s of the American-Canadian relationship.20 Undoubtedly, Underwood and Hitchcock were p a r t i a l l y motivated by their desire to use the pulpwood issue to change the minds of moderate senators who opposed the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty soley on the grounds of the Dominions' status and proposed roles in the League of Nations.21 Yet, the Resolution was a positive indication that there was a group within the Senate that was at least p a r t i a l l y aware of Canada's changing status within the Empire. Although the Underwood Resolution did receive passage in the Senate in 1920, the proposed commission was not estab-l i s h e d because i t was vetoed by President Wilson.22 The pulpwood issue, however, continued to i r r i t a t e the United States and in 1921, the dispute was once again brought before the Senate. The arguments that had been presented in 1920 were r e i t e r a t e d . For the purpose of t h i s paper, an interesting aspect of t h i s second phase of the pulpwood debate was that many senators were much more aware of Canada's objective of securing independent representation i n Washington. T h i s awareness l e d some American o f f i c i a l s to believe that the pulpwood issue could be used as leverage to force the Canadian and B r i t i s h governments to stop merely discussing Canada's diplomatic p o s i t i o n and a c t u a l l y take some t a n g i b l e steps towards achieving separate Canadian representation.23 j . n - 126 -short, Americans hoped that the complexity and importance of th i s b i l a t e r a l issue to the ove r a l l relationship between the United States and Canada would encourage the Canadian government to e s t a b l i s h more d i r e c t communication with the State Department. When the historian analyzes the o f f i c i a l correspondence between the State Department and the B r i t i s h and Canadian governments, i t becomes apparent that Canadian o f f i c i a l s q u i c k l y r e a l i z e d that the cumbersome system of using the B r i t i s h Embassy in dealings with the American government could be used to Canada's advantage. At i t s simplest i t meant that Canada did not have to confront American representatives. This, of course, was only useful to Canada when i t was the American government that was demanding s a t i s f a c t i o n on a part i c u l a r issue. When i t was the Canadian government that was desirous of d i s c u s s i n g a dispute with the United States the o f f i c i a l diplomatic structure was c l e a r l y a disadvantage. In the case of the pulpwood issue, however, Canada was able to fend o f f American anger by hiding behind the B r i t i s h Imperial representa-t i v e s . In i t s o f f i c i a l response to the American government's inquiries into the pulpwood i s s u e , the Canadian government made i t very clear in 1920 and again in 1921 that direct talks on the is s u e , such as Underwood's proposed p r e s i d e n t i a l commission, would not r e s u l t i n any s i g n i f i c a n t change in Canada's p o l i c i e s . 2 4 This statement had the effect of creating - 127 -confusion amongst those senators and American o f f i c i a l s who supported Canada's demand for recognition by the United States. It appeared that the Canadian government was not seizing the o p p o r t u n i t y to e s t a b l i s h i t s diplomatic autonomy. This incident, combined with Canada's lack of aggressive action on the more international issues, s p e c i f i c a l l y , the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , confirmed the arguments of those senators opposing Canada's claim for status. The i r r e c o n c i l -ables maintained that Canada's reluctance to discuss the pulpwood issue was proof that the Canadian government was neither prepared nor w i l l i n g to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of an independent foreign policy.25 Throughout the 1920s, the pulpwood issue continued to be a problem in American-Canadian re l a t i o n s . In 1923, Secretary of State Hughes t r i e d to circumvent both the arguments of those few senators who were opposed to a special presidential commission and the Canadian government's reluctance to deal d i r e c t l y with the United States, by i n f o r m a l l y using the American consulate i n Ottawa to present to the Canadian government the Harding Administration's position.26 Through th i s method and the more formal diplomatic channels, Hughes was able to establish a form of direct contact that was used to help s e t t l e the dispute. The p u l p w o o d q u e s t i o n was o n l y one a s p e c t of American-Canadian trade relations that sparked confusion and misunderstanding between the two nations in the early 1920s. - 128 -As the decade progressed many American l e g i s l a t o r s became more aware of the fact that when the United States passed t a r i f f l e g i s l a t i o n i t d r a s t i c a l l y affected the Canadian economy.27 In the past, American l e g i s l a t o r s had established a number of precedents by recognizing that the Canadian economy had a special relationship with that of the United States. Conse-quently, they had taken t h i s factor into consideration when designing t h e i r t a r i f f l e g i s l a t i o n . In his book Canada and the United States. Some Aspects of the History of the Republic  and the Dominion. Hugh Keenleyside pointed out that the Underwood T a r i f f of 1913 granted s p e c i a l concessions and exemptions to Canada in order to minimize the amount of damage to that country's economy.28 j n the post war period, however, a resurgent Republican Congress revised America's t a r i f f laws with the passage of the Fordney Emergency T a r i f f in 1921 which, when combined with the McCumber T a r i f f of 1922, removed most of the loopholes that had been favorable to Canada.29 The farming sector, in p a r t i c u l a r the wheat and vegetable farmers in western Canada, was especially hard h i t by the new l e g i s l a -t i o n . An analysis of the Senate debates on the t a r i f f l e g i s l a t i o n reveals that there was very l i t t l e concern about the effects the revised laws would have on the Canadian economy. Moreover, the senators supporting the higher t a r i f f s made no attempt to assess the effect the l e g i s l a t i o n would have on the overa l l American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s h i p . P r i m a r i l y concerned with - 129 -their l o c a l state economies, the strongest support f o r the protective t a r i f f s came from those senators whose constituencies would benefit the most from the revised laws.30 Many of these states were located in the Northern t i e r and th e i r representa-ti v e s should have been more sensitive to the impact these laws would have on Canada. During the debate on the Fordney Emergency T a r i f f , in February 1921, Senator F.M. Simmons of North Carolina, extended the scope of the arguments by raising the question of what e f f e c t the proposed h i g h t a r i f f p o l i c y would have on American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s . Simmons pointed out to h i s colleagues that Canada bought more goods in the United States that i t sold and that the Canadian government could r e t a l i a t e by supporting the policy of imperial preference and buy more goods from nations in the Empire.31 "Could Senators expect Canada to receive t h i s blow," Simmons maintained in a speech in the Senate: for i t w i l l be a severe blow to her i f the b i l l has the effect i t s proponents contend that i t w i l l have, ... I do r e a l l y apprehend that the effect of t h i s b i l l , largely aimed at Canada, i s going to make trouble between t h i s country and Canada and d i s t u r b the relations of the two countries, which have not only been harmonious, but which have caused Canada to become our very best customer i n a l l the world except Great Britain.32 Despite Simmons' arguments, the t a r i f f r e v i s i o n s did become law. The incident was just one more example of the United States responding to an isolated issue without taking - 130 -the time to assess the overall impact that p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c i e s would have on the i r foreign relations. The higher American t a r i f f s also sparked a heated debate i n the Canadian House of Commons. Alfred Stork, Member of Parliament for Skeena, angrily denounced the Canadian government for i t s lack of action in appointing a permanent representative in Washington. Stork maintained that Canada's reluctance to appoint a re p r e s e n t a t i v e had co n t r i b u t e d to the American misunderstanding of how severely their t a r i f f p o l i c i e s would a f f e c t the Canadian economy. In Stork's opinion, only a separate Canadian representative in the United States, with close t i e s to the American Senate, could have anticipated and lobbied against the t a r i f f legislation.33 C e r t a i n l y , Canada's economic i n t e r e s t s i n the United States had long been a major factor for the Canadian government wanting i t s own representative i n Washington. The primary reasons for the establishment of the Canadian War Mission in Washington in 1918, had been the government's desire to ass i s t Canadian businessmen in securing American m i l i t a r y contracts and encouraging American financiers to invest in Canada.34 When examining Canada's economic interests, however, an argument can al s o be made which helps to e x p l a i n why the Canadian government was reluctant to take the f i n a l step and select a representative. Clearly, Canada was not in a strong p o s i t i o n to pr o t e c t h e r s e l f from American p o l i c i e s . The Canadian government did not possess the resources necessary to - 131 -both inform and pressure the American Congress to reassess p o l i c i e s that were deemed detrimental to Canadian interests. Consequently, Canada needed the support and the diplomatic resources and options offered by Great B r i t a i n and the Empire in fending off America's economic p o l i c i e s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the enacting of the Fordney Emergency T a r i f f coincided with the pressure American o f f i c i a l s were p u t t i n g on the Canadian government to play an active role in forcing Great B r i t a i n and Japan to abrogate th e i r a l l i a n c e . The combination of t h i s d iplomatic pressure and America's demonstrated lack of concern and understanding f o r Canada's domestic interests convinced many Canadians that they should continue to have the Empire's diplomatic structure o f f i c i a l l y represent Canada.35 Thus, America's i n a b i l i t y to develop a l o g i c a l and consistent policy towards Canada i n both i n t e r -n a t i o n a l and b i l a t e r a l issues resulted in the defeat of i t s own objective: to encourage the Canadian government to break i t s t i e s with Great B r i t a i n . A t h i r d i m p o r t a n t b i l a t e r a l i s s u e to e f f e c t the American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the e a r l y 1920s was the perpetual problem of the offshore f i s h e r i e s on both coasts. As mentioned, the United States, as early as 1918, wanted to n e g o t i a t e the f i s h i n g issues d i r e c t l y with the Canadian government.36 As with other important b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s , however, Canada sought refuge i n the o f f i c i a l diplomatic channels because i t offered the Canadian o f f i c i a l s the best - 132 -opportunity to protect Canada's interests.37 Consequently, the problems relating to the f i s h e r i e s were allowed to grow. Although attempts were made to reach p a r t i a l agreements, these tentative settlements were n u l l i f i e d , for a number of reasons, by one side or the other.38 F i n a l l y , the United States and Canada agreed to establish a joint commission that would hold public hearings in both countries and make a series of recommen-dations that could be incorporated into an agreement. Although Canada had been actively p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the fishing negotia-tions since 1871, what made the ne g o t i a t i o n s of the e a r l y 1920s dif f e r e n t was Canada's insistence that a B r i t i s h repre-s e n t a t i v e ' s signature was not necessary on any agreement.39 The State Department's acceptance of t h i s c o n d i t i o n , a f t e r some hesitation, was an important sign from the United States that they were prepared to acknowledge Canada's changing diplomatic status and independent a u t h o r i t y on b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . 4 0 The negotiation and signing of the Halibut Treaty must be analyzed i n conjunction with the diplomatic developments o c c u r r i n g on the world stage. As mentioned, by 1923, the United States had been provided with a c o n f l i c t i n g interpreta-t i o n from i t s own repr e s e n t a t i v e s on whether the Canadian government was, or was not, preparing to assume a more active f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Certainly, American o f f i c i a l s were confused by Canada's i n c o n s i s t e n c y . 4 1 The American government would have f e l t much more confident in dealing d i r e c t l y with Canada - 133 -i f the l a t t e r had been more force f u l in formulating an indepen-dent policy instead of bowing to B r i t i s h pressure and conforming to the imperial policy at the l a s t minute.42 yet, the American goal of encouraging Canada to break i t s imperial t i e s remained the same and the prospect of Canada negotiating and signing a fis h i n g agreement, without the co-signature of Great B r i t a i n , was an opportunity for the United States to begin the process of f u l f i l l i n g i t s objective. The United States, of course, would not acknowledge the agreement with Canada's signature u n t i l Great B r i t a i n had accepted t h i s new arrangement. In l i g h t of the Chanak C r i s i s and the s t r a i n that that incident had placed on Canadian-Imperial relations, American o f f i c i a l s assumed that the B r i t i s h government was not i n a strong position to vigorously oppose the proposed treaty. The State Department did, however, leave the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h i s legal point up to the Canadian and B r i t i s h governments. In February 1923, the Canadian Prime Mi n i s t e r sent a message to the B r i t i s h Ambassador in Washington i n which he maintained that: my m i n i s t e r s are of the opinion that as r e g a r d s C a n a d a t h e s i g n a t u r e o f Mr. Lapointe, Minister of Fisheries w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t , and that i t w i l l not be necessary for you to sign as well.43 This telegram sparked a controversy within imperial c i r c l e s . Again, in contrast to those historians who have described the United States as attempting to l i m i t Canada's diplomatic growth, i t was the B r i t i s h Ambassador Auckland Geddes, not an - 134 -American o f f i c i a l , who insisted that a B r i t i s h representative's signature had to appear on the t r e a t y . 4 4 Geddes informed the Canadian government that he had "been i n s t r u c t e d by His Majesty's Government to sign the Treaty in association with Mr. Lapointe." 4 5 This confrontation was f i n a l l y resolved when the Canadian government made the point that the treaty solely concerned the United States and Canada. B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s reasoned that i t was preferable to agree to Canadian indepen-dence on b i l a t e r a l issues and s t i l l maintain the policy of imperial unity on world issues than r i s k a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s over the issue of the Dominions' diplomatic s t a t u s . 4 6 Consequently, on March 2, 1923, the Halibut Treaty was signed by a Canadian and American o f f i c i a l . Canadian and Commonwealth historians have often c i t e d the s i g n i n g of the Halibut Treaty as a s i g n i f i c a n t step in the evolution of Canada's diplomatic autonomy. 4 7 Certainly, the agreement's importance should not be understated. The f a c t that the Canadian government negotiated and was prepared to accept f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t s part in the agreement, was an important development i n Canada's quest to achieve f u l l diplomatic autonomy. This p r i n c i p l e was recognized at the 1923 Imperial Conference when the Dominions' right to sign a b i l a t e r a l agreement that did not af f e c t the Empire as a unit, was e s t a b l i s h e d . 4 8 The United States was aware that the Dominions* treaty powers had been c l a r i f i e d at the Imperial Conference. Alfred - 135 -Nutting, a clerk in the American Consulate in London, kept the State Department f u l l y informed of the Dominions* constitutional status. Nutting went to great lengths to provide as much information as possible and went so far as to warn his govern-ment that i n the future America's r e l a t i o n s with a l l the Dominions would be more complicated because the United States, on b i l a t e r a l issues, would have to deal with them as separate e n t i t i e s . 4 9 The fact that the Harding Administration was prepared to accept Canada's signature on the Halibut Treaty did not, however, guarantee that the mandatory two-thirds of the Senate would also accept the new arrangement. The Senate's debate on the t r e a t y was not extensive and in March 1923, the Senate did approve the agreement with the p r o v i s i o n attached by Senator Wesley L. Jones of Washington State, that i t s terms be a p p l i e d to a l l parts of the Empire.50 This a c t i o n has been i n t e r p r e t e d by Canadian h i s t o r i a n s as an attempt to deny Canada diplomatic status by f o r c i n g the B r i t i s h government, representing the whole Empire, to become involved.51 C e r t a i n l y , the Canadian government interpreted the Senate's a c t i o n as a r e j e c t i o n of Canada's diplomatic status. The Senate's conditional r a t i f i c a t i o n was considered an i n s u l t . Both Canada and her s i s t e r Dominions, who did not wish to be bound by a treaty they had neither negotiated or signed, i n s i s t e d that the document be i n t e r p r e t e d as only applying to Canada.52 - 136 -C l e a r l y , the t r a d i t i o n a l h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Senate's a c t i o n i s r e l e v a n t . The United S t a t e s d i d c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f e r t o the f i s h i n g agreement as being c o n t r a c t e d between the United S t a t e s and Great B r i t a i n r e p r e s e n t i n g Canada. Yet, to accuse the United S t a t e s of t r y i n g t o prevent Canada's d i p l o -matic growth does not f u l l y e x p l a i n the American a t t i t u d e or p o s i t i o n . As with so many t r e a t i e s i n the p a s t , the H a l i b u t T r e a t y was not exempt from being a f f e c t e d by America's domestic p o l i t i c s . Senator Jones' i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e p r o v i s i o n was p r i m a r i l y designed to enhance h i s p o s i t i o n i n h i s home s t a t e of Washington where fishermen were concerned about the number of f o r e i g n f i s h i n g v e s s e l s d e p l e t i n g the Westcoast stocks.53 Although i t was v e r y u n l i k e l y t h a t any f i s h e r m e n from t h e B r i t i s h Empire o u t s i d e of Canada would be i n the North P a c i f i c , Jones' r e s o l u t i o n helped to c r e a t e f o r the Senator the image of a g g r e s s i v e l y p r o t e c t i n g h i s s t a t e ' s f i s h i n g r e s o u r c e s . A second f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g the Senate's d e c i s i o n to support the Jones' p r o v i s i o n was t h a t i t presented another o p p o r t u n i t y to f o r c e the Canadian government t o choose between a c c e p t i n g Great B r i t a i n ' s s i g n a t u r e on the t r e a t y , or f i n a l l y breaking away from the Empire and assuming the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of f u l l s o v e r e i g n t y . The arguments presented by some members of the Senate d u r i n g the V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y debate t h a t Canada could only be c o n s i d e r e d an autonomous n a t i o n when she denounced her membership i n the Empire, had changed l i t t l e over the ensuing t h r e e y e a r s . 5 4 In t h i s r e g a r d , t h e p r o v i s i o n was c l e a r l y - 137 -consistent with the American government's previous attempts to force Canada to assume diplomatic independence by ending i t s European connection. The negative reaction by both Canada and the Empire to the Senate's provision was quickly made c l e a r to the State Department. American representatives stationed throughout the Empire sent back to Washington reports which maintained that those Dominions that had not been part of the negotiating process would not consider themselves bound by the Halibut Treaty despite the Jones* provision.55 The most detailed analysis of the Dominions' reactions was sent to the State Department by Charles M. Hathoway, J r . , the American consulate General i n Dublin. Hathoway stat e d that a f t e r extensive discussions with I r i s h o f f i c i a l s concerning the Halibut Treaty he was convinced that they: did not regard the Treaty as binding on the I r i s h Free State and that i f , by chance, i t should happen that any I r i s h interest should be concerned the Government of the I r i s h Free S t a t e would hold that the Treaty did not apply to them, ...56 The I r i s h attitude was an important bonus for Canada's p o s i -t i o n . After passing numerous Joint Resolutions c a l l i n g upon Great B r i t a i n to resolve the I r i s h s ituation, i t was unlikely that the American Senate would place i t s e l f in the position of undercutting the new authority of the I r i s h Free State govern-ment. To deny Canada's right to negotiate and sign a b i l a t e r a l agreement would, in e f f e c t , deny the Free State similar rights. The Empire's reaction helped to convince American o f f i c i a l s - 138 -that the H a l i b u t Treaty had to be considered a b i l a t e r a l agreement that only included themselves and Canada. Conse-quently, the treaty did establish Canada's right to negotiate and sign a diplomatic agreement without the co-signature of a B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l . To t h i s extent, the t r e a t y represents a s i g n i f i c a n t development i n American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s . Both countries realized the value of a special r e l a t i o n s h i p that included the use of appointed commissions. Moreover, the Halibut Treaty helped to convince the Canadian government that i t could deal d i r e c t l y with the United States and s t i l l protect Canadian interests without the active support of Great B r i t a i n . Although the Jones' provision forced a two year delay in the f i n a l r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Halibut Treaty, the precedent estab-lished in 1923 helped to create a new environment for closer diplomatic t i e s that would be expanded upon in 1924 with the signing of the Prohibition Convention. 5 7 The American decision to enact p r o h i b i t i o n i n January 1920, was to cause a seri e s of disputes between the United States and Canada. P r o h i b i t i o n became a s i g n i f i c a n t issue between the two countries when "rum running" became a lucrative business in Canada. The vast extent of the American-Canadian border and the numerous coves and i n l e t s along both the A t l a n t i c and P a c i f i c coasts provided ample opportunity f o r smugglers to ply their trade. I n i t i a l l y , the American government's commitment to enforce prohibition was very limited. Neither Congress nor the - 139 -Harding Administration were prepared to allocate the necessary funds to provide for the bureaucratic structure and massive law enforcement that would have been necessary to prevent or at l e a s t l i m i t , the amount of alcohol smuggled into the United States.58 As a r e s u l t , the State Department assumed the position that i t was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Canadian govern-ment to prevent l i q u o r from being smuggled into the United States from Canadian ports and border crossings.59 When i t became clear to American o f f i c i a l s that Canada was not prepared to take aggressive action against the smugglers, the United States sought a direct meeting with the Canadian government in order to put pressure on Canada to take action. As with the previous b i l a t e r a l issues, the Canadian government resisted a meeting with American o f f i c i a l s by i n s i s t i n g that the State Department use the o f f i c i a l channel through the B r i t i s h Embassy in Washington. 6 0 While Canada was reluctant to become involved in aggress-i v e l y preventing smuggling, Canadian o f f i c i a l s d i d want to demonstrate to the United States a cooperative attitude. The Canadian government reasoned that i f they were rec e p t i v e to American concerns the United States would r e c i p r o c a t e by d i s c u s s i n g Canada's o p p o s i t i o n to American policies.61 In November 1923, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, McKenzie Moss, tr a v e l l e d to Ottawa where he met with Canadian o f f i c i a l s . This meeting eventually led to direct discussions that resulted in the signing of an agreement between the United States and - 140 -Canada in June 1924. 6 2 The significance of t h i s convention was not so much that i t helped to eliminate some of the tension that had developed over the smuggling i s s u e . I t s importance grew rather out of the fact that i t represented a watershed in American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s because the t r e a t y was achieved through d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n without the B r i t i s h government's p l a y i n g an important role. The agreement was recognition by the United States that Canada had attained a form of diplomatic indepen-dence. 6 3 Although the Prohibition Convention came after the signing of the Halibut Treaty in 1923, t h i s Convention was in some ways more s i g n i f i c a n t because the United States did not question Canada's r i g h t to represent i t s e l f or s i g n the agreement. Unlike the Halibut Treaty, the Senate r a t i f i e d the agreement without adding a provision that i t applied to the B r i t i s h Empire as a whole. The negotiations took place in the wake of Canada's strong p o s i t i o n during the Chanak C r i s i s which must have contributed to America's changed a t t i t u d e . 6 4 In addition, t h i s treaty convinced both nations that mutually s a t i s f y i n g agreements could be negotiated much more successfully i f o f f i c i a l , permanent diplomatic avenues were established. By 1924, the State Department correspondence c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s that the American government was i n c r e a s i n g l y d e a l i n g d i r e c t l y with Canadian departments and agencies. 6 5 The correspondence, on a wide variety of issues, between Prime Minister King and the Secretary of State Hughes became exten-- 141 -sive. As well, lesser American and Canadian o f f i c i a l s a l s o c a p i t a l i z e d on t h i s new atmosphere by dealing d i r e c t l y with t h e i r counterparts across the border.66 The P r o h i b i t i o n Convention became a p i v o t a l part of t h i s new d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p because i t b u i l t upon the precedent that had been established by the H a l i b u t Treaty i n 1923 . Although Canada and the United States did not exchange representatives u n t i l 1927, by l a t e 1924, both nations had e s t a b l i s h e d , on b i l a t e r a l issues, a close working relationship that excluded Great B r i t a i n from the negotiating process. In c o n t r a s t to the arguments presented from the Canadian perspective, t h i s new relationship had, in no small measure, been established at the i n i t i a t i v e of the American government. - 142 -Endnotes Chapter Three ^-This concentration on b i l a t e r a l issues can be p a r t i a l l y attributed to the Canadian school of thought emphasizing the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two nations. See: Brebner, The North A t l a n t i c Triangle. 2Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, p. 31; Mahant and Mount, An I n t r o d u c t i o n to Canadian-American Relations, p. 113. 3The State Department's desire to eliminate Great B r i t a i n from i t s dealings with Canada was a gradual process which can be traced in the State Department's records from 1918 onwards. See: United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1918 Supplement 2. The World War (Washington: Government Printing O f f i c e , 1933), pp. 655-656; I b i d . , V o l . 1, p. 440; I b i d . , 1919, V o l . 1, p. 268. Ibid., 1921, Vol. 1, p. 299. Congressional Record. January 6, 1920, p. 1082. At t h i s point in the Senate debate over the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty, Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman of I l l i n o i s , a strong opponent of Dominion Status, voiced his f r u s t r a t i o n at not being able to deal d i r e c t l y with the Canadian government over the issue of Canada's pulpwood export laws. 5 F o r more information on t h i s issue see: W. Marr and D. Paterson, Canada: An Economic History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1980) . 6 I b i d . , pp. 364-65. ^United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1921. Vol. 1. pp. 301-302. 8Congressional Record. February 27, 1920, p. 3561. 9 I b i d . , p. 3563 1 0 I b i d . , February 25, 1920, p. 3438. i ; L I b i d . 1 2 I b i d . , February 27, 1920, p. 3562. - 143 -1 3 I b i d . , February 16, 1920, p. 2955. 1 4 I b i d . , February 27, 1920, p. 3563. i S l b i d . 1 6 I b i d . , p. 3561. 1 7 I b i d . J-opage, "Canada as the Exponent of North American Idealism," p. 36. 1 9Congressional Record. February 16, 1920, pp. 2953-2955. 2 0 I b i d . , February 27, 1920, p. 3562. 21underwood and Hitchcock were the two Democratic Senators' responsible for overseeing the safe passage of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty through the Senate. For more information see: Evans C. Johnson, Oscar W. Underwood: A P o l i t i c a l Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980). 2 2 I b i d . , p. 298. 2 3Congressional Record. February 27, 1920, p. 3562. 2 4 U n i t e d States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1921. Vol. 1. pp. 301-302. 2 5Congressional Record, June 3, 1922, p. 8090. 2 6 U n i t e d States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1923. V o l . 1 (Washington: Government Printing O f f i c e , 1938), pp. 495-496. 2 7Congressional Record. February 4, 1921, pp. 2548-2550. 2 8 K e e n l e y s i d e , Canada and the United States, p. 376. Another aexample of the United States recognizing i t s c l o s e economic t i e s with Canada was the reciprocity agreement in 1911. For more information see: Keenleyside, pp. 310-313. - 144 -2 9 I b i d . , p. 376. •^Congressional Record. February 4, 1921, p. 2548. 3 1 I b i d . 3 2 I b i d . Canada, House of Commons, Debates. May 14, 1923, p. 2735. 3 4 I b i d . , May 5, 1919, p. 2073. 3 5 G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic  Status at Washington, p. 83. 3 6 U n i t e d States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Vol. I. p. 440. 3 7 U n i t e d States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1919. Vol. 1. p. 268. J°For more information see;Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1922. Vol. I. p. 669. • i 9 G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic  Status at Washington, p. 80. 4 " u n i t e d States, Department of State, Paper Relating to the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1923. Vol. 1. pp. 467-482. 4 1 I b i d . , pp. 472-475. 4 2Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, p. 48. 4 3Toynbee, The Conduct of B r i t i s h Empire Foreign Relations, p. 102. 4 4 I b i d . , p. 102; also see: Galbraith, The Establishment  of Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington, p. 80. 4 5Toynbee, The Conduct of B r i t i s h Empire Foreign Relations. - 145 -p. 102. 4 6 I b i d . 47For more information see: Dawson, The Development of  Dominion S t a t u s : Wigley, Canada and the T r a n s i t i o n to Commonwealth: G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington: Hancock, Survey of B r i t i s h  Commonwealth A f f a i r s . Vol. 1. 4 8 F o r more information on the Imperial Conference of 1923 see: Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status: Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth. 4 9 U n i t e d States, Department of State, American Consulate General, London, to Secretary of State Hughes, September 11, 1923, Records of the Department of State R e l a t i n g to the  Internal A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n . 1910-1929. (841.01/IM7/41) pp. 1-6. 5 0Congressional Record. March 4, 1923, p. 5611. 5 1Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, p. 71. 5 2 T h e f a c t that the other B r i t i s h Dominions would not agree to the Jones' provision was made clear to the American State Department by i t s representative in Ireland. United States, Department of State, American Consular S e r v i c e , Dublin, to W i l l i a m R. Castle J r . , Chief of the Division of Western European A f f a i r s , A p r i l [date unknown] 1924, Records of  the Department of State Relating to the P o l i t i c a l Relations Between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. Washington: National Archives (microfilm, 1965, 711.41/123.5), pp. 1-11. 53For more information see: United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United  States. 1923. Vol. 1. pp. 472-78. 5 4 I b i d . , p. 471. 5 5 U n i t e d States, Department of State, American Consular S e r v i c e , Dublin, to W i l l i a m R. C a s t l e , Sr. C h i e f of the D i v i s i o n of Western European A f f a i r s , A p r i l [date unknown] 1924, Records of the Department of State R e l a t i n g to the P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i o n s Between the United States and Great  B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (711.41/123.5), pp. 1-11. - 146 -5 6 I b i d . , p. 5. 5 7 p n i l i p Resnick, "Canada i n the American Century," Acadiensis. Vol. 14 (No. 2 Spring/ 1985), p. 158. 5 8 R i c h a r d N. Kottman, "Volstead Violated: Prohibition As a Factor in Canadian-American Relations," Canadian H i s t o r i c a l  Review. Vol. 43 (No. 2 June,, 1962), p. 106. 5 9Ibid., p. 111. 6 0 F o r more information on America's attempts to deal with "rum running" see: United States, Department of State, Papers  Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1922. Vol- 1. PP. 558-593. 6 1Kottman, "Volstead Violated," p. 111. 62ibid., p. 112. 6 3 u n i t e d States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1923. Vol. 1. pp. 228-231. 6 4 U n i t e d States, Department of State, American Consulate in Dublin to Secretary of State Hughes, May 17, 1924, Records  of the Department of State Relating to the P o l i t i c a l Relations Between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929, (711.41/123.5) . 6 5 u n i t e d States, Department of State, Papers Relating to  the Foreign Relations of the United S t a t e s . 1924. Vol. 1. pp. 335-349. 66ibid., p. 335. - 147 -Conclusion This b r i e f analysis of the American-Canadian relationship between 1919-1924, has attempted to prove that the United States did not, in the post war period, deliberately set out to impede the development of Canada's diplomatic s t a t u s . After examining the relationship from the American perspective, i t becomes evident that the thesis advocated by scholars such as Mahant and Mount, that the United States refused to accept the concept that Canada could formulate an autonomous foreign policy, needs to be qualified.1 Instead, the evidence presented suggests that American o f f i c i a l s wanted Canada to achieve more independence in i t s foreign a f f a i r s and then aggressively use i t s positions in the League of Nations and i n the B r i t i s h Empire to promote North American ideals. C e r t a i n l y , the American Senate's r e j e c t i o n of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty was, on one l e v e l , a repudiation of the status Canada had been granted at the Paris Peace Conference. Yet, while senators were rejecting the treaty, they went to great lengths to maintain that t h i s was not an attack s p e c i f i -c a l l y aimed at Canada. Many senators, including members of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e group, w i l l i n g l y acknowledged that they would welcome Canada as a separate member of the international community when the Canadian government c l a r i f i e d not only i t s view of Canada's diplomatic status but a l s o , defined the evolving nature of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth. The f a c t that Canadian M i n i s t e r s , upon being questioned in the House of - 148 -Commons, were not able to describe the legal process through which the Dominions achieved t h e i r new status in relation to Great B r i t a i n , reinforced the American attitude of waiting to see how the Dominions evolved before granting them diplomatic status. Moreover, the Senate's r e j e c t i o n of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty, also provided Canadian o f f i c i a l s with a clear indication of j u s t how much America's domestic p o l i t i c a l environment affected her foreign p o l i c y . The Dominions were caught in the midst of a structural battle between the Senate and President Wilson over the right to control foreign policy making. As well, there i s no doubt that the election t a c t i c s pursued by the Republican Party in 1918 and in 1920, had a detrimental effect on the American-Canadian relationship. The concern of individual senators to support polices that were p o l i t i c a l l y expedient f o r t h e i r own regional and personal interests did result in the United States developing an inconsistent attitude towards Canada. The lack of a concise, coherent p o l i c y towards th e i r northern neighbor helped to enhance the Canadian government's b e l i e f that the United States was preventing Canada's diplomatic growth. America's domestic p o l i t i c a l climate did, however, also offer Canada a unique opportunity. Prime M i n i s t e r Borden's desire to see Canada act as a mediator between Great B r i t a i n and the United States could have become a r e a l i t y because of the American Senate's refusal to commit their government to - 149 -the League of Nations. The s i m i l a r i t i e s that d i d e x i s t i n Canadian and American p o l i c i e s l e d o f f i c i a l s in the State Department to envision that Canada could be used by the United States as a t o o l f o r gaining access to the League and the councils of the B r i t i s h Empire while s t i l l preserving, at the public l e v e l , America's policy of isolationism. This American attitude c o n f l i c t e d with Great Br i t a i n ' s d e s i r e to maintain i m p e r i a l unity with one f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Consequently, a competition for Canadian support developed and afforded the Canadian government an unprecedented opportunity to formulate and execute a f o r e i g n p o l i c y that was s u i t e d to Canadian needs. By adopting American policy attitudes which closely mirrored Canada's p o s i t i o n while s t i l l adhering to those imperial p o l i c i e s that did not c o n f l i c t with Canadian objec-t i v e s , the Canadian government could have established i t s own policy positions. C e r t a i n l y , t h i s argument needs to be q u a l i f i e d . As a young nation just emerging into the world of i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy Canada did not possess the extensive resources and bureaucratic s t r u c t u r e necessary to develop an extensive, consistent foreign po l i c y . Yet, the early 1920s did present Canadian o f f i c i a l s with a unique opportunity to establish the precedent that Canada would use i t s p o t e n t i a l r o l e as a mediator between Great B r i t a i n and the United S t a t e s to develop a f o r e i g n p o l i c y that was p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t e d to Canada's needs. In short, successive Canadian governments - 150 -did not take f u l l advantage of the i r opportunities. This fact becomes clear when America's attitude towards Canada's public attempts to assert i t s diplomatic views and i n f l u e n c e the Empire's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s determined. For example, Canada's role in the debate surrounding the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was seen as a positive develop-ment in the United States. As well, Canada's consistent stand against A r t i c l e Ten in the League's Covenant convinced many American o f f i c i a l s that the Canadian government was a l o y a l a l l y that could be depended upon. Writing in 1927, former Secretary of State Hughes maintained that "the r e l a t i o n of Canada to the League gives an opportunity for the presentation and protection of Canada's interests, ... It i s these interests and our interests which w i l l promote the most fr i e n d l y relations between Canada and the United States." 2 Clearly, Canada's p o s i t i o n i n the League was viewed as an important way of protecting America's diplomatic interests. This p o l i c y , however, was shattered by Canada's i n a b i l i t y to confront Great B r i t a i n and adamantly demand the right to formulate and execute a foreign policy that was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the Empire. The Meighen Government's decisions not to f o r t h r i g h t l y protest Canada's lack of status at the Washington Naval Conference or, challenge the B r i t i s h govern-ment's advice not to send a special envoy to Washington for the purpose of d i s c u s s i n g the Anglo-Japanese Treaty with American o f f i c i a l s , resulted i n the United States becoming - 151 -c o n f u s e d about t h e o b j e c t i v e s and t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of the Canadian government's d e s i r e f o r d i p l o m a t i c autonomy. T h i s l a c k of a s s e r t i v e n e s s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s was made worse by Canada's a p p a r e n t r e l u c t a n c e to i n i t i a t e a c l o s e r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . The Canadian government's i n a b i l i t y t o a p p o i n t a permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o Washington and, Canada's u n w i l l i n g n e s s to d e a l d i r e c t l y with the United States on the pulpwood i s s u e , are two examples of Canada's h e s i t a n c y and helped to c r e a t e the impression i n Washington t h a t Canadian o f f i c i a l s were not p l a n n i n g t o embark on an a c t i v e d i p l o m a t i c p o l i c y . In s h o r t , i t was Canada's i n a b i l i t y to t u r n i t s p u b l i c statements i n t o t a n g i b l e r e s u l t s which l e d American o f f i c i a l s t o doubt Canada's d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s . C l e a r l y , t h e s i g n i n g of the H a l i b u t T r e a t y and t h e . P r o h i b i t i o n Convention ushered i n a new p e r i o d of c o o p e r a t i o n between t h e two n a t i o n s . Even on t h i s p o i n t , however, the American evidence suggests t h a t the c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p was at t h e i n s t i g a t i o n o f t h e American government. Canada was r e l u c t a n t t o n e g o t i a t e d i r e c t l y w i t h American o f f i c i a l s . I n s t e a d , t h e Canadian government took f u l l advantage of the o f f i c i a l d i p l o m a t i c channel through the B r i t i s h Embassy and thus avoided f a c i n g S t a t e Department o f f i c i a l s . I t was t h i s type of a c t i o n which c o n t r i b u t e d to America's misunderstanding of Canada's d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s . By 1924, the United S t a t e s s t i l l d i d not possess a c l e a r u nderstanding o f what were t h e C a n a d i a n government's r e a l - 152 -diplomatic o b j e c t i v e s . The c o n f l i c t i n g s i g n a l s from the B r i t i s h and Canadian governments combined with the inconsistent reports from State Department o f f i c i a l s posted in the Dominions, contributed to the American government's i n a b i l i t y to formulate a cohesive policy towards Canada. Consequently, by the mid 1920s, the United States gradually began to a c t i v e l y deal with international forums, s p e c i f i c a l l y , the League of Nations, on i t s own. This slow thawing of America's o f f i c i a l isolationism had the effect of removing America's immediate need to use Canada as a diplomatic t o o l . 3 This, in e f f e c t , meant that Canada had lost her opportunity to e x e r c i s e an independent foreign policy because the United States no longer needed Canada to help protect her interests. The net r e s u l t of focussing t h i s paper on the American perspective has revealed that i t was in the interests of the U n i t e d S t a t e s to encourage Canada's autonomy in f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . Writing in 1925, Canadian h i s t o r i a n Hugh Keenleyside, commented that Canada's i n a b i l i t y to appoint a representative to Washington in the early 1920s had never been adequately explained. 4 This lack of a f u l l explanation i s primarily due to the imbalance in the historiography. By examining American goals and objectives and determining the American government's v i s i o n of what i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e Canada could p l a y , i t becomes much easier to explain and understand why Canada was reluctant to take the f i r s t steps and appoint a minister to Washington. Clearly, the Canadian government took refuge in - 153 -the imperial structure to offset the enormous pressure coming from the United States to act as a "front man" for American interests. The fact that an o f f i c i a l exchange of represen-tatives did not take place u n t i l 1927, was, to a large extent, due to the B r i t i s h government's desire not to surrender i t s r o l e as the primary formulator of i m p e r i a l p o l i c y and to Canada's reluctance to aggressively seize i t s o p p o r t u n i t i e s and turn i t s d e s i r e f o r an independent foreign policy into r e a l i t y . The Canadian government had to choose between the pressure from the United States to pursue a separate policy or remain in the imperial structure and work towards i t s reform. 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