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Canada’s evolution towards dominion status : an analysis of American-Canadian relations, 1919-1924 Lomas, Donna Louise 1985

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CANADA'S EVOLUTION TOWARDS DOMINION STATUS: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS 1919-1924 By DONNA LOUISE LOMAS B.A.,  The U n i v e r s i t y  A THESIS SUBMITTED  of Victoria,  1981  IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (History)  We  accept  this  tfTeijjis a s c o n f o r m i n g  to t h e requi r e d s-teandard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October  1985  (c) Donna L o u i s e Lomas, 1985  In p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of  requirements f o r an advanced degree at the  the  University  o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make it  f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference  and  study.  I  further  agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may department or by h i s o r her  be granted by the head o f representatives.  my  It i s  understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain  s h a l l not be  allowed without my  permission.  Department o f The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3  D  a  t  e  A cJ^r/y^J  /S'/VS'  written  -  i i -  /ABSTRACT The  purpose of t h i s study  existing  i n the  relations on  Canadian  and  execute  position  an  was  attitudes of  Article  Ten  United  States to  the  the  represented. i t was  interest  a  result,  dent  as In  argued  United  States  League the  American  to  in the  of  do  to  as  contrast  that  the  the  post  i n i t i c te  her to  Nations'  United  States  World  States  tried  in helping  to  Canadian  and  Canada l o s t because  her the  protect  its  i t was  not  study  maintains  governments  that  steps of a p p o i n t i n g a  opportunity United  i n the  States  methods o f p r o t e c t i n g i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  found  interests.  an  were  separate  e a r l y 1920s.  to e s t a b l i s h  the  potentially  where  in this  British  similar  convinced  government  presented  because  and  was  evidence  to  immigration  Covenant  institutions  I  the  government  in  War  of  Canadian  interests  close number  questions  Asian  her  a  Canada's  towards the  that  exploiting  well  so.  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to Washington  policy  by  United  Alliance,  r e l u c t a n t t o c a r r y out the f i n a l Canadian  argue  opportunity  Empire  that  to  assume a more autonomous p o s i t i o n  that  the  attempted  unique  Anglo-Japanese  The  Relying primarily  growth  maintains  the  1919-1924. has  have  imbalance  American-Canadian  States.  diplomatic  i n the  international  that  which  America's  renewal  useful  United  an  to  foreign policy  the  work  with  a  British  Canada t o  in  had  the  studies  Canada's  encourage it  with  this  study  independent  within  Canadian  period,  this  been t o a d d r e s s  relating  between  government  relationship  impeded  period  sources,  the  of  historiography  i n the  American  has  As  indepen-  alternative  -  -  Table of Contents Abstract  i i  Acknowledgements  -  Introduction Chapter  One  Chapter  Two  Chapter  Three  i V  1 „  15 58 118  Conclusion  147  B i b l iography  155  - iv  -  Acknowledgements I  would  like  individuals thesis.  reading,  and  completion Norbert  Dr.  take  have  I would  supervisor  useful  who  to  this  assisted  like  Allan  to  me  my  whose  criticisms  o f t h i s work.  to  thank  i n the completion  express  Smith,  pertinent  opportunity  sincere  thanks  I would a l s o  like  me  formulate  and  focus  to  my  i n the  t o thank Dr.  my  this  careful  instrumental  MacDonald, whose g r a d u a t e r e a d i n g c o u r s e was i n helping  of  encouragement,  were  those  A.  extremely  ideas.  As  well,  t h i s t h e s i s w o u l d n o t have been c o m p l e t e d w i t h o u t t h e e x t e n s i v e assistance Library  of  and  careful  and  also  proof  Loans  of B r i t i s h  and  reading.  Ramona  Rose  I would a l s o  office  of  the  Main  Columbia.  t o thank D a v i d  t o Lee S t e w a r t L e v i n  Dear  f o r h i s encourage-  f o r her  like  patience  and  to express a  special  f o r her encouragement,  friend-  assistance.  Finally, Edna  like  confidence,  thank-you ship  Inter-Library  at the U n i v e r s i t y  I would ment  the  Lomas,  adequately  I would  for their express  members o f my  like  to  support  thank, my  and  the appreciation  family.  parents,  encouragement. I owe  them  and  R o b e r t and I  cannot  the  other  - 1 Introduction The  Paris  development  of  represented  a  stemmed  from  eighteenth power that  between  the  embodied  victorious  the  emergence  the  ions. ^  independent imperial ference  convene  a  peace  was  Vienna of  witnessed  now  their  new  also  initiate  Two  of had  important  status  relationships  were  peace,  used  to  powers of  with  of  the  an con-  diplomatic positions  In  c a t e g o r y , one  t o e n t e r a new,  factors,  affairs.  growth  ting  members  emerging  the  made  prominent  reluctant  enhance latter  that  colonies received  still  powers,  new  the  s e l f - g o v e r n i n g Domin-  interesting  i n world  the 1815,  world  of  role  In t h i s  the  development  the  other.  of  European  presented  each  playing  these  and  for  however,  of  European  concept  In  elements  result  in decline,  and  The  and  restructure  powers  while  the  realities  new.  different,  British  former  a  not to  composition the  of  conference  held  non-European  As  the  new  been  significantly  between  unsure  conference  had  power.1  structure.  of  lasting  diplomatic  but  to  could  a  political  It  which  Enlightenment  powers  before  dominance  diplomacy,  twentieth century.  presence  relationships  i n the  changing  f o r m u l a t i o n and  Never  traditional  i n the  relations.  early  of  active  international  the  of  conference  i n the  a watershed  the  balance  Paris  was  and  of  the  roles  ideas  creating  Congress  European  and  crossroad  century,  of  o f 1919  twentieth century  structures  purpose the  Peace Conference  powers  addition, an  of  the  opportunity  diplomatic ties o f t h e most  with  interes-  more complex s t a g e was  that  between two  North  the B r i t i s h  Dominion of  Both  the  conference  American  United  for had  begun  during  1890s,  the  United  States  and  Canada. States  different  government the  neighbours:  and  Canada  reasons.  attended  Although  t o p l a y a more a c t i v e  i t was  not  until  the  the  the  peace  American  international  United  States  role  partici-  pated at P a r i s t h a t American o f f i c i a l s d r a m a t i c a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d to  the  f o r m u l a t i o n of world  demonstrated world's the  foremost  first  term  that  America's compose fulfill  arrived  peace  Wilson's  n a t i o n s and  settlement  that  pledge  bring  make t h e w o r l d  Canada's  role  Prior  to  tially  controlled  1919,  at the  demonstrated  to gain control  devastation to  of  involve  Canada's  the  war,  Prime  the  safety  of  been  the  substanof  the  World  War,  government  that  foreign  policy that  interests.  Robert  and  ambiguous.  Borden  i n order might  Emerging  e x p e r i e n c e d an enormous  Minister  to  to a l l  the o f f i c e s  in future conflicts strategic  to exert  stability  had  Canadian  i t s own  his  delegates  much more  through,  w i t h an economy t h a t had  during  was  during  free."4  conducted  a v o i d becoming e n t a n g l e d  1919  at l a s t  and  by and  had  directly  peace  conference  The  Europe  ensure  relations  however,  to  would  the  Woodrow W i l s o n ,  conference  foreign  government.5  had  itself  clearly  determined  Canada's  British  Canada  "to  to  conference  I had  potentially  power.  travel  convince  War  was  military  at the  and  world  3  States  President to  influence a  United  e c o n o m i c and  American  in office,  the  peace.  not in  expansion  wanted  Canada  -  to r e c e i v e the commensurate A l l i e d war economic  3  r e c o g n i t i o n and with  effort  her and  -  i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s which  contribution  and  which would a l s o  potential.  Supported  by  sacrifices  recognize  the  other  for  her  for  Great  evolving to  the  that  Britain  her  to  Paris  conference  demonstrate  to  Mother as  Country.  Borden was  a vehicle  for  the  an  British  opportunity  world  powers  behalf  and  determined  to  e s t a b l i s h i n g a new  t h a t would enable Canada to  own  was  growing  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of the Dominions i n r e l a t i o n  conference status  the  the  self-governing  Dominions i n the B r i t i s h Empire, Canada convinced the government  was  s i g n the  become e l i g i b l e  use  the  diplomatic  peace t r e a t y  f o r membership  in  on the  proposed League of Nations.6 It  was  important  convince the nations  United  capable  Certainly,  of  i t was  to  States  the  Dominions t h a t  that  pursuing  assumed by  Great  they were indeed  independent members of  autonomous  foreign  the  Britain  policies.  British  Empire  that r e c o g n i t i o n from the United States would be tantamount to world r e c o g n i t i o n . For crucial ship.  Canada, however, American because of the  P r i o r to 1914,  r e c o g n i t i o n was  growing complexity both nations  had  especially  of t h e i r  relation-  voiced t h e i r  dissatis-  f a c t i o n with the awkward method of conducting r e l a t i o n s through the  British  Embassy i n Washington.?  communication had  T h i s method of  o f t e n r e s u l t e d i n issues becoming  bogged down i n c o n f u s i o n  and misunderstanding.  indirect  hopelessly  As w e l l , on  a  number the  of  o c c a s i o n s ,  Canadian  a t o r s t o  were  e n s u r e  S t a t e s men  had  t h a t  t h a t  was  not  a l s o  r e l a t i o n s by  d i p l o m a t i c t a t i v e s  w h i c h  s t r u c t u r e  from  both  the  w i t h  at  were  that  r e p o r t e d  United  b u s i n e s s of  Canada by  were  As  l a t e  time on  the  made  r e c r u i t m e n t  more  order  the  enhanced  a  to  n e g o t i -  l e n g t h  from  1871,  i n  and  the  c o u n t r i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  c o u n t r i e s  B r i t i s h  d i p l o m a t s  C a n a d i a n  i n  i n t e r e s t s  r e s p o n s e  two  as  r e q u i r e d be  a  problems  s u c h  the  Canada's  f r u s t r a t i o n  between  T r e a t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  had  these  t h a t  American  t h e i r t h e y  A l l  Washington  s a c r i f i c e  i s s u e s  S t a t e s  the  B r i t a i n ' s  b e f o r e  when  -  c o n v i n c e d  j e o p a r d i z e d . 8  i s s u e .  U n i t e d  to  Great  important  c o m p l i c a t e d  was  expressed  e l a p s e d  t h e  n o t a b l y ,  government prepared  4  an war more  i n  t h e  d i r e c t ,  immediate  as  r e p r e s e n -  t h e i r  1918,  governments  t h a t :  i n l o o k i n g back over the h i s t o r y of some of the q u e s t i o n s at i s s u e , i t i s easy to understand how f a i l u r e t o a p p r e c i a t e or comprehend the v i e w p o i n t and aims of the other s i d e , and the l a c k of s u f f i c i e n t l y c l o s e p e r s o n a l c o n t a c t , may have been the reason for the o r i g i n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s and the cause of t h e i r perpetuation.9 Consequently, c o u l d of  a l s o  d u a l  t h e  hoped  both a  separate  acceptance  and  a  i n d i c a t e support  member that  by  Canada's  P r e s i d e n t ' s  of  as  t h e the  the the  B r i t i s h  e v o l v i n g  step  of  I m p e r i a l was  t h a t  the  p r o c e s s  Washington.1®  Canada's as  e v e n t u a l  both  a  d e l e g a t i o n  prepared  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  i n  i n  c o n f e r e n c e  S t a t e s  acknowledgment  P e a c e  presence  W i l s o n  peace  United  P a r i s f i r s t  Canadian  P r e s i d e n t  at  the  t h a t  n a t i o n s  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  power  and  serve  e s t a b l i s h i n g The  to  Borden  to  s t a t u s .  Canadian  s m a l l seemed  recognize Moreover,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  - 5  could  s i g n the  t r e a t y on  -  Canada's behalf  and  become members  i n the proposed League of Nation's Assembly, was that  the  Wilson A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  would  react  f u r t h e r proof  favourably  to  a  more independent Canada. This  conclusion*  however, was  American Senate refused  to  ratify  soon s h a t t e r e d  the  Versailles  the Covenant of the League of Nations. dous the  ramifications Senate's  for  the  decision  Canadian-American  of Canada's new retard the  the  relations.  States.  time, signed  States did  s t a t u s and  had  without  a formal  a  detrimental  or  tremenarena,  effect  and a  until  1923  repudiation  i t would  severely  when Canada, f o r  t r e a t y with  the  of a B r i t i s h  r e l a t i o n s h i p based on the  on  British  r e l a t i o n s between Canada  counter s i g n a t u r e  diplomatic  Canadian  concluded t h a t  a non-commercial  the  Treaty  having  Senate's a c t i o n as  Not  1 1  the  international  Both the  growth of d i p l o m a t i c  United  first  broader  also  governments i n t e r p r e t e d the  Besides  when  and the  United  official,  recognition  t h a t Canada was  a c h i e v i n g d i p l o m a t i c autonomy begin to develop  between the two  countries.  An American  a n a l y s i s of the  historiography  r e l a t i o n s reveals that  literature.  Issues  sources. policy  almost An has  important focus the  Canadian-  exists  in  only  the from  f o r the most p a r t , s c h o l a r s have  e x c l u s i v e l y on  been  imbalance  to  have been e x t e n s i v e l y s t u d i e d  the Canadian p e r s p e c t i v e and, relied  an  relating  Canadian  f o r students  question:  can  and  British  primary  of Canadian f o r e i g n  Canada  formulate  and  -  execute an  independent  United States? signs  of  6  -  foreign p o l i c y  not  dominated  by  the  The f a c t t h a t the Canadian government e x h i b i t e d  wanting  to  f o l l o w i n g World War  achieve  autonomy  in  foreign  affairs  I has made t h i s p e r i o d c r u c i a l f o r Canadian  analysts. The United  l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t i n g to Canada's r e l a t i o n s h i p with  States  distinct  i s voluminous  schools of thought.  immediate post towards the  World War  United  i n t o the war,  can  The  first  I period.  the  single  with  the  Empire  could  Great  only  foreign policy  believed  divided  into  M a n i f e s t i n g an  Britain. as  be  Chester  by  animosity late  entry  emphasis  Martin,  argued  i f there  was  a l l members.  Martin  i n the  actual formulation  f o r e i g n p o l i c y would e l i m i n a t e the Dominions' complaints  into  a  t h a t a r e v i s e d i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e which allowed a l l  Dominions t o p a r t i c i p a t e  their  on  S t r e s s i n g the theme  maintained  supported  three  s c h o o l emerged i n the  members of t h i s group p l a c e d t h e i r  i m p e r i a l u n i t y , s c h o l a r s such  that  be  States because of the l a t t e r * s  Canada's connection of  and  the  concerns and  strategic  c o n s i d e r a t i o n by  t h i s school concluded  i n t e r e s t s were not  British  t h a t i t was  officials.12  being  of  that taken  H i s t o r i a n s of  i n Canada's best i n t e r e s t to  remain w i t h i n a reformed i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t could act as a defense a g a i n s t a g g r e s s i v e rapidly Canadian  expanding  their  economy.13  An  school of thought c a l l e d  American  businessmen who  i n f l u e n c e and important f o r the  investments  theme c o n t a i n e d  economic p o l i c y  in  were the  in this  of i m p e r i a l  -  7  -  p r e f e r e n c e to be i n s t i t u t e d as a method of o f f s e t t i n g America's tariff legislation. tionist  policies  Indeed, the American government's p r o t e c -  i n the e a r l y  1920s i n c r e a s e d t h i s  tendency to look to the Empire f o r economic  school's  relief.  I f the emphasis of Canadian s c h o l a r s i n the e a r l y  1920s  was  on Canada's i m p e r i a l connection, by the end of the decade  and  during the  influenced concept  by  of  a  1930s t h e Harold  United  h i s 1935  " n a t i o n a l community,"  States and  article  special  legal  emotional  emphasis was  Britain.!4  that  the  United  formulate on  the  arguing  relationship ties  with  with  one  attempt  to  S t a t e s was  a foreign policy.  similarities the  focus  Bartlet  on  the  between  Brebner, i n  the  Great  analyze having One  " l i n c h p i n " theory  on  United  Britain,  States  and  a f f o r d e d the  of a mediator  more f u l l y on  result  between the two  government's i n s i s t e n c e  the  between  of the r e s u l t s of t h i s s h i f t  n a t i o n a l r o l e f o r Canada t h a t was  affairs.  Lower's  a r t i c u l a t e d the argument t h a t Canada's  powers. 15 the  Arthur  began t o  Canadian government the e n v i a b l e r o l e world  research,  "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and  developing  the two  Canadian  a self-appointed "linch-pin" Great  Washington Conference,"  and  of  I n n i s ' s t a p l e t h e s i s and  premise t h a t Canada was the  mainstream  the  impact  Canada's a b i l i t y of t h i s was  a  created  an  to  focus  countries' p o l i c i e s .  academics  in  By  inter-  used to j u s t i f y the Canadian  a c h i e v i n g autonomy  in i t s foreign  1 6  While  a majority  of  Canadian  s c h o l a r s supported  this  -  8 -  second school of thought, a t h i r d American  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Canadian-  r e l a t i o n s began t o appear i n the 1930s and became an  important  i n f l u e n c e i n the post  articulated  by Harold  World War  II era.  Innis and Donald Creighton,  p r e t a t i o n d e s c r i b e d Canada's r e l a t i o n s with in  t e r m s o f a new  colonial  premise  that  affairs  when i t acted  United  Canada  States,  had  Initially  this  inter-  the United  States  relationship.  some f l e x i b i l i t y  Rejecting  in i t s foreign  as a mediator between B r i t a i n  Innis argued t h a t  and the  i n the e a r l y 1920s  moved from colony t o n a t i o n t o c o l o n y . " !  the  "Canada  This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  7  was enhanced when h i s t o r i a n s , w r i t i n g i n the post-World War I I environment of the Cold War and the r e s u l t i n g p o l a r i z a t i o n o f the world  community, argued t h a t  executing  a foreign policy  Canada was  t h a t was  from t h a t of the United S t a t e s .  not capable  fundamentally  because Canada i d e n t i f i e d of the United  States.  Canada was  foreign policy  i t s strategic  the  significant  i n t e r e s t s with  those  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s have disagreed  capable  of formulating  an  over  independent  i n the e a r l y 1920s, a common c o n c l u s i o n  by a l l schools of thought, and s t i l l latest  t h i s view  1 8  Although the v a r i o u s whether  different  Scholars advocating  emphasized t h a t the p e r i o d from 1919-1924 was only  of  being a r t i c u l a t e d  shared i n the  h i s t o r i c a l works, contends t h a t during the e a r l y 1920s  United  status.1^  States  d i d attempt t o impede Canada's  Unfortunately,  this  conclusion  t e s t e d a g a i n s t the American documentation.  diplomatic  has y e t t o be  C e r t a i n l y , as the  - 9 smaller  power, the  diplomatic  r e l a t i o n s h i p was,  and  remains  today, more c r u c i a l to Canada than to the United S t a t e s . f a c t , however, does not e x p l a i n why exhaustively An  United  t h a t has  States  government has  by  l e d her  p o l i c i e s towards Canada.  been c o n s i s t e n t l y l e v i e d  Canadian  scholars  i s that  against the  neighbor.  the  American  demonstrated a lack of s e n s i t i v i t y and  f o r i t s northern has  American s c h o l a r s have not  s t u d i e d t h e i r country's  accusation  This  concern  America's p o s i t i o n as a superpower  p o l i c y analysts  to  East-West  r e l a t i o n s h i p and  America's  i n t e r e s t s seem t o  focus  those be  their  areas  the  research  of  most  on  the  the world where  at  risk.20  This  apparent i n d i f f e r e n c e towards Canada by American s c h o l a r s  has  resulted  not  i n important  issues  being f u l l y examined or The  purpose  of  between the  two  countries  explained.  this  thesis  i s to  t r y and  address  imbalance i n the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y by t e s t i n g some of the sions  reached by  Canadian s c h o l a r s .  the  conclu-  To accomplish t h i s i t i s  necessary to determine America's a t t i t u d e and p o l i c i e s towards Canada i n the of a convention 1924.  How  crucial  period  from 1919  r e l a t i n g to America's p o l i c y of p r o h i b i t i o n i n  d i d the United States view and  attempts to develop a more autonomous the  United  to the mutual s i g n i n g  States  respond to Canada's  foreign policy?  d e l i b e r a t e l y t r y to impede Canada's r i s e to  d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s or was  i t i n America's i n t e r e s t to encourage  a r e l u c t a n t Canadian government to not only pursue an dent  Did  f o r e i g n p o l i c y but  also, formally  break  indepen-  its ties  with  - 10 Great B r i t a i n and become a wholly independent n a t i o n o u t s i d e the B r i t i s h A second how  Empire?  area that  much d i d America's  needs  t o be examined  domestic p o l i t i c a l  American-Canadian  relationship?  could  q u e s t i o n by f o c u s s i n g  To  answer t h i s  a great  scholarly  extent, t h i s  determine how larger  has  On  been  one  examine t h e l a r g e r  affected  climate a f f e c t  level,  the  the  historian  on b i l a t e r a l  The h i s t o r i a n  international  America's domestic c l i m a t e  issues  more f u l l y i s  issues.  the focus of most of the  research completed thus f a r .  however, a l s o  existing  could,  issues  and  i n r e l a t i o n t o these  t h e American-Canadian  relationship.  Did the United States p e r c e i v e Canada as a u s e f u l t o o l whose policies  i n r e l a t i o n to Asian immigration, the.Anglo-Japanese  T r e a t y , and A r t i c l e Ten i n the League's America's p o s i t i o n that America could her own  interests while p u b l i c l y  tically  isolated?  Covenant  so resembled  "use" Canada t o advance  appearing t o remain diploma-  F i n a l l y , t o what extent d i d the a c t i o n s of  the Canadian government and the debates i n the Canadian House of  Commons  determine  America's  Did the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g and prior  to the  development  1919  peace  policies  towards  misconceptions i n the  Canada? period  c o n f e r e n c e c o n t i n u e to plague the  of b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s because t h e r e was a genuine  lack of concern on the p a r t of the United States combined w i t h c o n f l i c t i n g s i g n s from the Canadian government?  A f t e r examining  these i s s u e s from the American p e r s p e c t i v e , i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e to understand more f u l l y the development  of America's  "special  - 11 r e l a t i o n s h i p " with Canada.  As w e l l , i t w i l l  to  on  shed  additional  light  a l s o be  possible  the q u e s t i o n posed by  Canadian  s c h o l a r s as to whether C a n a d a — i f itself for  by  f o r c i n g Great  Canada's s u p p o r t — h a d  Britain an  the  and  Dominion  had  exerted  the United States to v i e  opportunity  i n the  early  to formulate and execute an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  1920s  - 12 Endnotes I n t r o d u c t i o n •I-For more i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e C o n g r e s s o f Vienna see: Peter Gay and R. K. Webb, Modern Europe Since 1815 (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); C h a r l e s K. Webster, The Congress o f Vienna. 1814-1815 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963). ^The four B r i t i s h Dominions present a t the peace conference were: A u s t r a l i a , Canada, New Z e a l a n d and South A f r i c a . I n d i a was a l s o represented but d i d not possess the s t a t u s of a Dominion. F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on Canada's r o l e a t t h e conference see: P h i l i p Wigley, Canada and the T r a n s i t i o n t o Commonwealth. B r i t i s h Canadian R e l a t i o n s 1917-1926 (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977); G. P. deT. Glazebrook, Canada a t the P a r i s Peace Conference (Toronto: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1942). 3p o r e i n f o r m a t i o n on America's emerging d i p l o m a t i c r o l e a t the t u r n o f the century see: Walter LaFeber, The New Empire. An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f American E x p a n s i o n 1860-1898 (Ithaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975); Norman A. Graebner, ed. Ideas and Diplomacy. Readings i n the I n t e l l e c t u a l T r a d i t i o n of American F o r e i g n P o l i c y (New Y o r k : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964); Arthur S. Link and W. M. Leary J r . , eds., The Diplomacy of World Power. 1889-1920 (New York: S t . Martin's Press, 1970). o r  4  m  Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy, p. 449.  ^For more i n f o r m a t i o n on Canada's f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s p r i o r t o 1919 s e e : R. MacGregor Dawson, ed., The Development of Dominion S t a t u s . 1900-1936 (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1965); F. H. Soward, The Department o f E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s and Canadian Autonomy (Ottawa: Canadian H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 1972); P. Wigley, Canada and the T r a n s i t i o n t o Commonwealth: J . A. Cross, W h i t e h a l l and the Commonwealth. B r i t i s h Departmental O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Commonwealth R e l a t i o n s . 1900-1966 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967). I n a speech d e l i v e r e d i n the Canadian House o f Commons, Prime M i n i s t e r Borden informed t h e C a n a d i a n p u b l i c t h a t he "conceive[d] that the b a t t l e f o r Canadian l i b e r t y [was] being fought . . . on the p l a i n s of France and Belgium . . . " and t h a t he intended t o inform the B r i t i s h government t h a t Canada expected t o p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the peace settlement. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa: King's P r i n t e r , May 18, 1917), p. 1541. A l s o see: Robert C. Brown, Robert L a i r d Borden. A B i o g r a p h y V o l 2 1914-1937 (Toronto: Macmillan o f Canada, 1980), p. 134. 6  - 13 'As e a r l y as 1887, American S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Thomas Bayard, commented t h a t the awkwardness of Canada's d i p l o m a t i c s i t u a t i o n , which he r e f e r r e d t o as an " i m p e r f e c t l y developed s o v e r e i g n t y , " was " f e l t most s t r o n g l y by t h e United States. . . . " i n : John G a l b r a i t h , The E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1951), p. 24. ^Lawrence M a r t i n , The P r e s i d e n t s and the Prime M i n i s t e r s : W a s h i n g t o n and Ottawa Face t o Face ( T o r o n t o : Doubleday Canada, 1982), p. 31. U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e . Papers R e l a t i n g to the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1 9 1 8 (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1930), p. 440. 9  l ^ C a n a d a , Department o f E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . "Canada's I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t a t u s , Developments a t t h e P a r i s C o n f e r e n c e 1919," i n E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . V o l . 16 (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , 1964), pp. 163-172. H c a r l Berger, The W r i t i n g of Canadian H i s t o r y , Aspects of E n g l i s h - C a n a d i a n H i s t o r i c a l W r i t i n g ; 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 7 0 (Toronto: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976), p. 39. For more i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g to t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n see: George M. Wrong, "Canada and t h e I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t , " Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review. V o l . 1 (No. 1 March 1920), pp. 3-25; Chester M a r t i n , Empire and Commonwealth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929). 13por more i n f o r m a t i o n on America's economic expansion i n t o Canada i n the 1920s see: Hugh Keenleyside, Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Some A s p e c t s of the H i s t o r y of the Republic and the Dominion (New York: Kennikat Press, 1971 ed.). 1 4  Berger,  The W r i t i n g of Canadian H i s t o r y , p.  137.  l ^ B a r t l e t Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and t h e Washington Conference," P o l i t i c a l Science Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 50 (No. 1 March 1935), p. 45. B r e b n e r e l a b o r a t e d on h i s " l i n c h - p i n " theory i n h i s book: B a r t l e t B r e b n e r , The N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r i a n g l e : TJie. I n t e r p l a y of Canada, the United States and Great B r i t a i n (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1945). 1 6  l ^ H a r o l d I n n i s , "Great B r i t a i n , the United S t a t e s , and Canada," i n Mary Q. I n n i s , ed., Essays i n Canadian Economic H i s t o r y (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press, 1956), p. 405.  - 14 F o r m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s e e : G e o r g e Grant, L a m e n t for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland and S t e w a r t , 1 9 6 5 ) ; D o n a l d C r e i g h t o n , C a n a d a ' s F i r s t C e n t u r y 1 8 6 7 - 1 9 6 7 ( T o r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 7 0 ) . i  B  f  t o p.  p t r p " 6  l^Edelgard E. M a h a n t and G r a e m e S. M o u n t , /An Introduction C a n a d i a n - A m e r i c a n R e l a t i o n s ( T o r o n t o : M e t h u e n , 1 9 8 4 ) , 113.  2 0 R e c e n t l y , A m e r i c a n s c h o l a r s ' i n d i f f e r e n c e t o w a r d s l a r g e a r t s o f t h e w o r l d h a s b e e n c r i t i c i z e d b y a c a d e m i c s w h o f e e l h a t t h i s t e n d e n c y h a s r e s u l t e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a l w a y s eacting to a crisis situation instead of developing a cohesive o l i c y o v e r a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d o f t i m e . S e e : P a u l E . S i g m u n d , L a t i n A m e r i c a : C h a n g e o r C o n t i n u i t y , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . V o l . 0 (No. 3 America and the World 1981), p. 629.  - 15  -  Chapter B e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g w i t h an towards  Canada  context  the  American  foreign  period.  In  implored  American  article  but  also,  i n terms  was  especially  a  relations  which  was  an  stressed  influenced  than n a t i o n a l  sizing  of  the  relating  part  by  of  extent  for control  legislative of f o r e i g n  The control  competition of  foreign  of  as  Bartlet  American-Canadian American  were  policy  continental  l e d t o t h e de-empha-  foreign  policy  the  making,  policy  which  the r o l e  policies,  a l l of which  they  such  clearly  were  govern-  relations  the a t t e n t i o n  field  branches of the American  of  received  challenge  between  concept  American-Canadian  formulation  competition  i n d e t e r m i n i n g America's isolationism,  this  which  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  opinion  on  to  This  analyzing  American-Canadian  t o which  elements  war  Leopold  Leopold's  scholars  in character.2  in origin.  post  Richard  of  interpretation the  influenced  of p o l i c y  study  d e t e r m i n a n t s of American  t h e e x e c u t i v e and ment  the  advocate  rather  domestic  on  historical  immediate  i n 1951,  i n terms  literature  attitude  begin the process of  just  to  some  which  of domestic f a c t o r s . !  tendency to  making  not  to  into  i n the  published  pertinent  The  Brebner,  of America's  factors  makers  scholars  diplomacy  reveals  domestic  policy  America's  relations.  analysis  i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o put  important  an  One  i n the  had  and an  early  the  of  American  enormous 1920s,  public  impact  have  not  should.  between t h e S e n a t e and t h e p r e s i d e n c y f o r policy  making  d i d not  begin  with  the  - 16 debate over the V e r s a i l l e s had  exercised  Treaty.  i t s options by  In the past,  rejecting  n e g o t i a t e d by the State Department.  3  T r e a t y debate, however, was the f i r s t contained  i n t h e American  the world's a t t e n t i o n .  The  the  or amending  Senate treaties  The 1919-1920 V e r s a i l l e s time that the ambiguity  Constitution  dramatically  Senate's r e f u s a l  came to  to r a t i f y  both  the t r e a t y and the Covenant of the League of Nations revealed a weakness i n the g o v e r n m e n t a l  cast  role.  W r i t i n g i n 1981, former Senator John G. Tower, addressed argued  that  an a c t i v e  serious  on A m e r i c a ' s  a m b i g u i t y when he  to play  and  doubt  this  ability  structure  because  international  senators  were  e l e c t e d to represent a s p e c i f i c s t a t e w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s , domestic i s s u e s had p r i o r i t y to what impact t h e i r foreign policy.4  and senators gave l i t t l e thought  d e c i s i o n s would have on t h e i r country's  Moreover, i n the immediate post World War  p e r i o d , the Senate was  I  a l s o attempting t o regain some of the  powers i t had l o s t to the e x e c u t i v e branch during the wartime crisis.  Exerting  i t s independence by r e j e c t i n g  the  treaty,  d e s p i t e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , was an opportunity f o r the Senate t o weaken t h e a u t h o r i t y presidency.  C o n s e q u e n t l y , as p o i n t e d  Foreign A f f a i r s Senate] had pate  i n 1923,  credibility  . . . [of the  i t been more convinced of i t s r i g h t  t o have  American-Canadian  to  partici-  of the country."5  s e r i o u s consequences  relations.  of the  out i n an a r t i c l e i n  "never i n the h i s t o r y  i n shaping the foreign policy  a t t i t u d e was  and  This  f o r the growth  of  - 17 C l o s e l y l i n k e d t o t h i s s t r u c t u r a l competition was the r o l e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n p o l i c y ography actual  relating impact  difficult  to this  formulation.  Again, the h i s t o r i -  i s s u e i s extensive.6  Although the  of p u b l i c o p i n i o n on government p o l i c y  to determine,  i s very  Thomas B a i l e y , i n h i s book Man i n the  S t r e e t . d e s c r i b e d Woodrow Wilson's  d e c i s i o n s t o t u r n the 1918  Congressional e l e c t i o n and h i s i l l - f a t e d speaking tour of 1919 i n t o c o n t e s t s f o r p u b l i c support  f o r h i s f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s as  two examples where the American people were asked t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the competition between the branches of the f e d e r a l ment.  7  govern-  In regards t o American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s , the general  p u b l i c ' s a t t i t u d e towards both the B r i t i s h Empire and Woodrow Wilson would  went a long way i n determining respond  how i n d i v i d u a l  senators  t o Canada's d e s i r e f o r d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n  from the United S t a t e s . The general p u b l i c had i t s f i r s t opportunity t o demonstrate its  opinion  Selig  election  o f 1918, which  A d l e r d e s c r i b e d as one o f the most c r u c i a l  history.8 and  i n the Congressional  Originally,  the Republicans,  both  national parties,  had agreed  American people  made a f a t a l to elect  t h e Democrats  t o run low keyed  that r e f l e c t e d wartime c o o p e r a t i o n . P r e s i d e n t Wilson  i n American  campaigns  In October 1918, however,  political  e r r o r by a s k i n g t h e  a Democratic Congress.  T h i s opened  the way f o r the Republicans t o run t h e i r own p a r t i s a n campaign. The with  Republican  s t r a t e g y was t o u n i t e l a r g e business  the a n t i - W i l s o n , a n t i - B r i t i s h  vote.  interests  I f successful, the >  -  18  -  Republicans hoped to sweep the Senate  and  f o r c e the P r e s i d e n t  to demand the u n c o n d i t i o n a l surrender of the C e n t r a l Powers. This p o l i c y , conference  the Republicans  argued,  t h a t c o u l d only r e s u l t  would  prevent  a peace  i n the United S t a t e s being  t i e d to Europe.9 Many o f t h e  thirty-seven  Senate  s e a t s up  for election  were l o c a t e d i n areas of the country, s p e c i f i c a l l y the Mid-West and  the North, that t r a d i t i o n a l l y voted Republican but i n the  previous  election  had  supported  areas the R e p u b l i c a n s , interests,  closely  Wilson.^ linked  In both  with  large  away from the Democratic policy  other  native  of  Party.  setting  s e c t i o n s of the  South,  In the Mid-West, f o r example,  fixed  grain  where  the  country, principle  been allowed t o set i t s own  price  farmers  not  perity. In  of the Mid-West had  r a t e s had  severely  When compared  in particular commodity, on  shared  the  Wilson's  cotton,  had  open market,  the  i n the wartime p r o s -  1 1  the  North,  appealing  to  partially  the  Irish  business  to e n t i c e support  a f f e c t e d the incomes of the farming community. to  these  used Wilson's wartime economic p o l i c i e s as w e l l as  the economic p o l i c i e s of the B r i t i s h Empire,  Wilson's  of  and  a  the  long  result  Republican  standing  anti-British  of e t h n i c and  German v o t e r s had  become i n v o l v e d i n the war groups c o u l d be counted  Party used  the t a c t i c bias that  economic f a c t o r s .  opposed W i l s o n ' s  was  Ethnic  decision  on the s i d e of the B r i t i s h .  upon t o vote a g a i n s t W i l s o n ' s  of  to Both  peace  - 19 proposals.  Moreover, Republicans were a l s o able to a t t r a c t  anti-British  vote  amongst o l d e r , c o n s e r v a t i v e Americans  an who  were b i t t e r l y opposed to Great B r i t a i n because of t h a t country's wartime economic p o l i c i e s . i n t o the war, companies  Britain's policies  suspected  of  embargoing manufactured equipment  P r i o r to the United States* entry  (which  items  proposing  interpreted  d e l i b e r a t e attempts  by Great anger  combined with  ranging  were p r i n c i p a l l y  were  exports.!2  black  t r a d i n g with  i n d u s t r i a l North-East), and preference,  of  a third  by  domestic  the  from  shoes  produced  to  in  the p o l i c y  farming  America's  of i m p e r i a l voters  to f r e e z e out from  American  C e n t r a l Powers,  many American  Britain  resulting  listing  Britain's  as  American policies  influence, isolationism,  to  form a formidable t h r e a t to Wilson's peace p o l i c i e s . The  American  concept  significant  factor  which  account.  A  theme which  experience,  isolationism  of  isolationism  policy has  run  at v a r i o u s times,  and  In h i s o f t e n quoted  meanings.  clearly  to  throughout  the  American  concept  to d e f i n e  assumed  different  f a r e w e l l address,  Washington provided p o s t e r i t y with h i s d e f i n i t i o n tionism  which  the  imperialistic  politics  p a r t , Washington's advice was century,  the  of  into  guises George isola-  i n c l u d e d a w a r n i n g to f u t u r e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  to a v o i d e n t a n g l i n g a l l i a n c e s and, in  take  a  makers had  is a difficult  because i t has,  was  United  of  in particular, Europe. -^  heeded. D u r i n g  States, preoccupied  p  1  the  with  involvement o r  the  most  nineteenth i t s physical  - 20 expansion trial  across  -  the c o n t i n e n t , the  development of an  indus-  economy, and the b i t t e r c o n f l i c t between North and South  over the i s s u e of s l a v e r y , was  generally successful in staying  away from d i p l o m a t i c c o n t r o v e r s i e s and  responsibilities.  This  i s o l a t i o n , however, became harder to maintain during the 1890s because America's emerging economic s t r e n g t h brought with i t new,  strategic  United  i n t e r e s t s beyond the c o n t i n e n t a l shores  States.  By  the  first  decade of the twentieth  i t had become c l e a r to many Americans, i n c l u d i n g two Republicans,  of  former S e c r e t a r y  of S t a t e E l i h u  the  century  prominent  Root and  former  P r e s i d e n t Theodore Roosevelt, t h a t expanding American i n t e r e s t s demanded t h a t the United States p l a y a more a c t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l role.  1 4  America's of  what  role  i n t e r v e n t i o n i n World War the  United  States  I brought the  should  play  i n the  community to the f o r e f r o n t of the n a t i o n ' s a t t e n t i o n . d e c i s i o n to announce h i s v i s i o n of world the war's c o n c l u s i o n and provided assess  the  t h a t the United  assume new  international  I t was  concept  Americans  of  election  the  clear  responsibilities. aroused  to of  both 1918,  opportunity  t h a t the  States c h a r t a d i f f e r e n t  the proposed League of Nations  being naive and was the  Congressional  world  Wilson's  peace p r i o r  e l e c t o r a t e with  Wilson's proposals.  intended  for  American  the  issue  to  President course  Wilson's  and  support  f e a r s t h a t he  was  s a c r i f i c i n g America's freedom of a c t i o n to  collective  feared that the  security.  United  In  particular,  States growing m i l i t a r y  many and  - 21 economic s t r e n g t h would be i t s d e c l i n i n g empire. populations,  again  domestic  by Great B r i t a i n  the  North  and  fear  was  e x p l o i t e d by the Republican P a r t y .  the Republican  s t r a t e g y was  to  use  a l l these  f a c t o r s to defeat the Democrats at the p o l l s and gain  because  the  majority  election  o f two.  prominent  results  Although  Republicans  because i t meant that important  i t was  not  wanted, t h e  as  large was  Senate  these committees, the R e p u b l i c a n s  to  dominate  committees away from  the t r e a t y  and  a win  control  were e s p e c i a l l y  present  as  significant  eager  because i t s  a r e p o r t , at  of the Committee's choosing, c o n t a i n i n g t h e i r  dations t o the whole Senate.  Senate  the Democrats.  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee  review  a  they would be able t o w r e s t l e  Of  members would  s t r a t e g y worked  victory  the  the  The  gave the Republicans  of  result  bolster  Mid-West, t h i s  a m a j o r i t y i n both Houses of Congress.  time  to  In those s t a t e s with l a r g e a n t i - B r i t i s h  e s p e c i a l l y s t r o n g and was In 1918,  used  a  recommen-  In s h o r t , the e l e c t i o n  had  the  of t u r n i n g Wilson i n t o a "lame duck" P r e s i d e n t d e s p i t e  the f a c t that he s t i l l had two years to s e r v e . The  significance  of t h i s  changing  domestic  political  c l i m a t e f o r American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s must be made e x p l i c i t . Clearly  when W i l s o n  left  the  United  States  conference he d i d not have the p o l i t i c a l get  his  Senate.  peace  proposals  f o r the  support necessary  unconditionally  accepted  Moreover, h i s r e f u s a l to i n c l u d e prominent  amongst the American d e l e g a t i o n was  peace  by  to the  Republicans  an a d d i t i o n a l i n s u l t  that  -  22  -  assured the President that he would not r e c e i v e the cooperation of Republican Senators. bipartisan p o l i t i c a l Dominions hoped  I t was i n the midst o f t h i s  atmosphere  to obtain  the Wilson A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Wilson's  the  revealed,  practicality  Canada  diplomatic  and h e r s i s t e r  recognition  and the American Senate.  p o s i t i o n at P a r i s  debate c l e a r l y  that  volatile,  and t h e e n s u i n g  from  both  President  Senate  treaty  however, Canada's d e s i r e s as w e l l as  and b e n e f i t  that  the United  States  could  d e r i v e from a c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p with the Canadian government, were o f minor importance i n the f i n a l determination  o f America's  p o l i c y towards Canada i n the post war p e r i o d . Upon W i l s o n ' s Prime M i n i s t e r President  arrival  David  Lloyd  status  Wilson  "the B r i t i s h  that  t o send  consent."  George o f f i c i a l l y  o f t h e Dominions*  independent  them  at the peace conference,  desire  t o have  at the conference.  a single  Lloyd  government could  [military] unit  British  informed the some form o f George  not have  without  told  induced  their  own  In a d d i t i o n , t h e B r i t i s h Prime M i n i s t e r t r i e d t o  15  make i t c l e a r that there were many instances when an i n d i v i d u a l Dominion had p o l i c i e s and a t t i t u d e s t h a t d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from that of the whole Empire and these views had t o not only be  respected,  to  explain  that had  but the Dominion had t o be given an opportunity  i t s position.  Finally,  the enormous s a c r i f i c e s  Lloyd  George p o i n t e d out  and c o n t r i b u t i o n s  made towards the war e f f o r t  the Dominions  gave them as much r i g h t t o  p a r t i c i p a t e i n the conference as other non-European  nations.  1 6  -  I n i t i a l l y , Wilson was the  Dominions being  power. that  23  -  adamantly opposed to the concept of  granted  the  State Department records  s t a t u s and  r i g h t s of a  small  i n d i c a t e that Wilson r e a l i z e d  i f the Dominions were granted separate v o t i n g p r i v i l e g e s  i t would be used by the a n t i - B r i t i s h f a c t i o n i n the Senate to discredit British  his  e n t i r e peace plan  were d o m i n a t i n g  the  conference.*  r e j e c t e d the  claim  that  that  to  protected.  needed  be  special  interests."!  granting  the  small  Dominions had  at  the  of a l a r g e power l i k e  open to m i s c o n s t r u c t i o n , " insisted,  i n a d d i t i o n , on  Dominions."I  that  The  two  he  stated  was  that  Great B r i t a i n .  representatives  no  against  the  other  have  the  " I t would  of each of  be  the  to the concept of Dominion  of s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e r e s t i n  d i d not  President  a t t i t u d e on  success  towards  "Canada had  arguments  did  consider not  t h i s question  the  display  began  of h i s peace p r o p o s a l s . to  Dominion  quite w i l l i n g  demonstrate status to  the  the  to  be  stubborn, charac-  deemed v i t a l  In e a r l y January  to  1919,  a more c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e  when he  concede  question  that would l a t e r  t e r i z e h i s behavior towards i s s u e s which he  Wilson  concerns  c o n f e r e n c e would not  his stated opposition  revealed  important.  the  w e l l , Wilson  specific  view,  in his  Wilson  As  7  the  he argued, " i f the B r i t i s h Government  s t a t u s , Wilson's genuine lack  unyielding  his  argument that  9  Despite  issue  In  Finally,  8  Dominions s t a t u s  powers p r e s e n t  backing  the  with the  one"  commented t h a t  "he  representative  himself for  each  - 24 Dominion.20  Significantly,  demonstrate  some f l e x i b i l i t y  this  statement  was an attempt t o  not because he b e l i e v e d that the  Dominions should be represented but because he wanted t o gain support f o r h i s more entrenched ideas r e l a t i n g t o the League's Covenant not  prepared t o r i s k  issue. the  and the terms  Dominions' In  Wilson was  the conference's c a n c e l l a t i o n  Consequently,  Council  o f the V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y .  on January  over t h e  13, 1919, a t the meeting of  of Ten, the P r e s i d e n t agreed  to support t h e  request f o r separate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  making h i s d e c i s i o n , Wilson d i d not attempt  t o appre-  c i a t e or t r y t o understand the changing s t a t u s o f the Dominions w i t h i n the B r i t i s h  Empire.  Although  the P a r i s  conference  guaranteed the Dominions an independent vote, i t i s c l e a r from Wilson's subsequent  actions that  a t no time  d i d he s e e t h e  Dominions as r e p r e s e n t i n g d i s t i n c t autonomous n a t i o n s . for  example, he recognized Belgium's  by o f f e r i n g  t o make the American  While,  s t a t u s as a small power  consulate i n Brussels a f u l l  embassy, the same o f f e r was not made t o Canada or her s i s t e r Dominions.  In s h o r t , Wilson's reason f o r changing h i s stand  21  on Canada's s t a t u s  was n o t m o t i v a t e d  diplomatic necessity. tions  Senate  T h i s f a c t was t o have s e r i o u s  f o r American-Canadian  opposition  t o Canada's new  and i n the American  and attempted  by c o n v i c t i o n  relations. status  public  When  was v o i c e d  but by implica-  substantial both  a t l a r g e , Wilson  i n the  waivered  t o r e p a i r the domestic p o l i t i c a l damage by down  p l a y i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Dominion's new s t a t u s .  - 25 When the P r e s i d e n t  a r r i v e d back i n the United  was  met by a h o s t i l e Senate t h a t had already  had  seen the a c t u a l documents, i t s b a t t l e against  and  t h e accompanying  pronged a t t a c k ,  sixteen  League  Covenant.  irreconcilable  States he  begun, before i t the t r e a t y  Launching senators,  a  u n i t e d by  t h e i r deep s u s p i c i o n o f Great B r i t a i n as w e l l as t h e i r to keep the United States d i p l o m a t i c a l l y i s o l a t e d ,  three  desire  specifically  opposed B r i t a i n ' s economic p o l i c i e s , B r i t a i n ' s r o l e i n I r e l a n d , and  the diplomatic  Paris.23  recognition  accorded  t h e Dominions a t  Although Canada was i n t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e d i n a l l three  issues,  i t was t h e q u e s t i o n  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l status  c l e a r l y revealed how American senators  viewed Canada.  of the Senate's  government,  elected clarify  focus,  officials  t h e American  and t h e p u b l i c  and d e f i n e America's  that  Because  including  s e r v i c e , was f o r c e d t o  relationship with  her northern  neighbor. The while at  initial  c r i t i c i s m s against  the t r e a t y  not being  was s t i l l  included  being  Canada's s t a t u s were made negotiated.  i n t h e American  Resentful  delegation,  leading  Republicans c r i t i c i z e d the conference's d e c i s i o n t o c l o s e the c o u n c i l meeting t o the p u b l i c .  They accused Wilson o f g i v i n g  i n t o the European powers by p e r m i t t i n g them t o continue tradition  of negotiating  And  when word  had  been granted  the opportunity  diplomatic  reached the United diplomatic  settlements  States  that  their  i n secret.  t h e Dominions  s t a t u s Wilson's opponents s e i z e d  t o accuse the P r e s i d e n t of being naive  because  - 26 he had permitted Great B r i t a i n t o dominate the c o n f e r e n c e . The  senators  himself,  opposed  t o Canada's s t a t u s ,  made no attempt  government's  demands were  to assess reasonable  whether  like  23  Wilson  t h e Canadian  on t h e grounds  that  Canada had emerged as an autonomous n a t i o n deserving of the rights  accorded  the Senate letter  a small power.  alignment  The m o t i v a t i n g f a c t o r  was domestic p o l i t i c a l  t o h i s w i f e , dated A p r i l  behind  expediency.  14, 1919, two months  In a before  the peace t r e a t y was presented t o Germany, a l e a d i n g advocate of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  position  Canada's new s t a t u s ,  Wisconsin  commented  that  the p u b l i c  o p p o s i t i o n t o Wilson's aware t h a t  and an o u t s p o k e n Senator  plans and consequently, had t o be made because  grown too powerful  and was s a c r i f i c i n g  In h i s home s t a t e ,  La F o l l e t t e ' s  Using  public  Follette  with  t h e P r e s i d e n t had  America's  security.24  most p o w e r f u l  appeal f o r  o p i n i o n was h i s a n t i - B r i t i s h  a strategy that  Senate  La F o l l e t t e ,  was s u s p i c i o u s o f t h e S e n a t e ' s  democracy was a t r i s k  manipulating  Robert  c r i t i c of  combined  a massive,  filibuster  position.  tactics  a g g r e s s i v e newspaper  i n the  campaign, La  and h i s supporters s e t out t o defeat the T r e a t y o f  V e r s a i l l e s without any regard t o t h e d i p l o m a t i c i m p l i c a t i o n s . In the c r u c i a l p e r i o d p r i o r t o the t r e a t y ' s being presented to the Senate defeat  the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s o u t l i n e d t h e i r arguments t o  Wilson's  policies.  o p p o s i t i o n which d i r e c t l y Canada, was the B r i t i s h  An i m p o r t a n t  a f f e c t e d America's Empire's p o l i c y  element  in their  a t t i t u d e towards  of i m p e r i a l  prefer-  - 27 ence.25 argued  under that  this  umbrella  Canada c o u l d  not  policy, be  the  irreconcilables  considered  an  autonomous  n a t i o n because the Canadian government d i d not c o n t r o l i t s own economic  policies.  commissioners government on  still how  e n t i r e Empire. dered  La  He  Follette  made  maintained  recommendations  Canada's economy c o u l d concluded  that  British  the  Canadian  to best  benefit  the  t h a t Canada c o u l d only be c o n s i -  an autonomous n a t i o n w i t h  a  right  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums when the Canadian government gave up i t s " s p e c i a l t i e s " with the B r i t i s h Empire.26 The and  how  q u e s t i o n of  j u s t how  independent the Dominions were  they had achieved t h i s a l t e r e d s t a t e was  the focus of  the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s ' second important argument a g a i n s t Canada's status.  The  d i f f e r e n c e s between  c o n s t i t u t i o n s played an important perception  of  Canada's  and  o n l y be  amended with  s t a t e governments.  other hand, was  policy.  gave  policy.27  British  irreconcilables*  status.  The  American"  a s e l f contained document t h a t  the approval  of both  the  federal the  a B r i t i s h s t a t u t e which c o u l d be amended only Moreover, n e i t h e r i t nor any  Canada t h e power to conduct  Indeed, the  d i d not even possess structure  and  The B r i t i s h North America A c t , on  by the B r i t i s h Parliament. authority  American  r o l e i n the  international  C o n s t i t u t i o n , they argued, was could  the  necessary  i t s own  other  foreign  irreconcilables maintained  that  the e x t e n s i v e resources and  governmental  for pursuing  an  independent  Canada  foreign  - 28 Finally, combination  the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s of a n t i - B r i t i s h  Focussing on the theory that member  appealed  sentiment  to the powerful  and  i f the U n i t e d  o f a League whose c o v e n a n t  isolationism.  States  permitted  became a  each B r i t i s h  Dominion t o have a separate vote i n the Assembly, the i r r e c o n cilables into  assumed that  a position  of p o s s i b l y  because B r i t a i n one.  t h i s would put the B r i t i s h government  would  have  controlling  American  policy  s i x votes compared t o America's  The i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s argued that  t h i s could o b l i g a t e the  United States t o become i n v o l v e d i n d i s p u t e s where America had no  strategic  interests.  irreconcilables called  often  The  which  the United  become an emotional issue  treaty  debate  had l o n g  preventing a  States that  been  a source of  and B r i t a i n , had, by  had l o s t a l l touch with  Fueled by an organized, w e l l  campaign, the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s the  States might be  or indeed, i n Canada.28  between  political reality.  the United  point, the  the B r i t i s h i n m i l i t a r i l y  I r i s h question,  antagonism 1919,  argued that  upon t o a s s i s t  r e b e l l i o n i n Ireland  To i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r  used t h i s  issue  funded  public  to help  focus  on t h e q u e s t i o n of whether the Dominions  were, i n r e a l i t y , l i t t l e more than "oppressed peoples r i p e f o r revolt." that to  2 9  Consequently, t h e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s  they had no i n t e n t i o n  t h e Dominions  made i t c l e a r  of g r a n t i n g d i p l o m a t i c  i f i t would  assist  Great  recognition  Britain  i n her  attempt t o h o l d her Empire t o g e t h e r . Working  closely  w i t h the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s  but not o f f i -  - 29  cially in  associated with  the  Senate and  this  the new  -  group was  the  chairman of the  majority Foreign  Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts.  Relations  Lodge had  considered one of the Republican Party's most l i k e l y to  leader  been  candidates  become p a r t of the American d e l e g a t i o n a t t e n d i n g the peace  conference.  His e x c l u s i o n only  with Wilson. his  regret  i n t e n s i f i e d his personal  As e a r l y as December 1918, that  the  n e g o t i a t i n g process  Senate  and  had  Lodge p u b l i c l y s t a t e d  not  been  in  the  c l e a r l y warned the P r e s i d e n t t h a t  the  Senate would examine the t r e a t y c a r e f u l l y make  recommendations  demonstrated public,  in his  t h a t he  was  feud  and  changes.30  speeches, prepared  both  included  and,  i f necessary,  Lodge c o n s i s t e n t l y  i n the  to permit  Senate  his personal  and  in  dislike  for Wilson to a f f e c t h i s a c t i o n s i n the Senate. In a d d i t i o n to h i s p e r s o n a l m o t i v a t i o n s , very of  aware of the  Massachusetts.  large I r i s h constituency Although  Lodge was  i n h i s home s t a t e  not as d i s t r u s t f u l of the  as La F o l l e t t e , Lodge d i d demonstrate on a number of his  profound  the  America's  British  occasions  f e a r of the United States* becoming entangled  European, and, In  also  in  in particular, I r i s h - B r i t i s h controversies. past,  Lodge  relationship  had  with  also  shown  Canada.  some  interest  Massachusetts*  in  close  t i e s with the Canadian Maritime p r o v i n c e s and s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n the  fishing treaties  that  regulated the  rich  resources  of  the North A t l a n t i c made Lodge more aware of Canada's i n t e r e s t s t h a t most of t h i s s e n a t o r i a l c o l l e a g u e s .  At the  time of  the  - 30 treaty  debate, however, Lodge's  Dominion  s t a t u s was l i m i t e d  League's  Covenant  casting embroiled  t o adding  which would  t h e i r votes  interest  i n the concept  of  a r e s e r v a t i o n t o the  prevent  t h e Dominions  when any p a r t o f the B r i t i s h  i n a d i s p u t e with the United S t a t e s .  from  Empire was  C l e a r l y , Lodge  could see the advantage of possessing c l o s e r t i e s with Canada. At the same time, however, he was not prepared t o r i s k America's diplomatic  freedom nor was he prepared  constituency.31 Relations the  to  alienate his Irish  H i s r o l e and i n f l u e n c e i n both  the Foreign  Committee and h i s l e a d e r s h i p of the Republicans i n  Senate, placed  him i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y  strong p o s i t i o n t o  e f f e c t the f i n a l outcome of the t r e a t y and Canada's s t a t u s . Wilson  gave Lodge and the Senate t h e i r f i r s t  opportunity  to examine the t r e a t y and the accompanying League of Nations' Covenant  on J u l y  realized  the extent  Senate. had  10, 1919.  I t i s d o u b t f u l whether  of the opposition  The P r e s i d e n t had only j u s t  n o t been  political  kept  climate.  will  informed  Wilson  f a c i n g him i n t h e  returned from Europe and  of the changing  In h i s a d d r e s s  before  domestic  the Senate, the  P r e s i d e n t d i s c u s s e d i n general terms the need f o r a l l n a t i o n s to  safeguard  Wilson no  peace by a c t i v e l y  argued t h a t recent world  longer  participating events  i n the League.  had proven t h a t i t was  p o s s i b l e f o r the United States t o support  a policy  of i s o l a t i o n i s m . 3 2 On J u l y 31, 1919, the Senate Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee opened i t s h e a r i n g s  on t h e t r e a t y .  Senator  Lodge q u i c k l y  - 31 revealed h i s s t r a t e g y t o drag  out t h e committee  order  t o allow the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s  their  anti-treaty  committee  newspaper  hearings,  v a l u a b l e time  campaign.  senators  process  During  listened  in  t o continue  the 45 days of  t o a number of expert  witnesses g i v e t h e i r a n a l y s i s of s p e c i f i c p a r t s of the t r e a t y . In  addition, individuals  representing interest  a l s o allowed an opportunity to present t h e i r In  terms  of the o v e r a l l  hearings,  groups were  views.  the d i s c u s s i o n per-  t a i n i n g t o Dominion s t a t u s was very l i m i t e d and deemed of only minor  importance.  indication  The  senators  understanding  d i s c u s s i o n was  an  members, l i k e  the P r e s i d e n t ,  view the i s s u e as s i g n i f i c a n t .  When, however,  Canada's s t a t u s was  were  of indepth  t h a t the Committee  d i d not r e a l l y  ning  lack  d i s c u s s e d i t became c l e a r t h a t the exami-  were not of what was  interested  so much  interested  meant by Dominion  i n determining  i s s u e to help defeat the t r e a t y .  how  they  in gaining s t a t u s as  c o u l d best  an  they  use the  The testimony of David Hunter  M i l l e r , a l e g a l a d v i s o r t o the P r e s i d e n t , made t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y clear.  When S e n a t o r  questioned have  Miller  on how  i n the League  make the c r u c i a l the Dominions. and he was  Frank  B.  Brandegee  many votes  of Nations  distinction  of  the B r i t i s h  Assembly, M i l l e r between  His q u a l i f i c a t i o n was,  Connecticut Empire would attempted to  the c o l o n i a l however,  f o r c e d to concede t h a t , t e c h n i c a l l y ,  Empire and  brushed  aside  i f a l l parts  of the Empire were i n c l u d e d , the B r i t i s h would have s i x votes i n the Assembly. 3 3  - 32 In  response t o f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n i n g  from  Senator  Warren  Harding, M i l l e r again  attempted t o inform the Committee o f the  meaning  status  o f Dominion  Covenant.  In reference  as c l a r i f i e d  by t h e L e a g u e ' s  t o the Dominion of A u s t r a l i a , as an  example, "the Covenant has gone," M i l l e r argued, v e r y f a r i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f making A u s t r a l i a a separate e n t i t y i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , I do n o t say t h a t i t has r e a c h e d t h a t p o i n t , but I do say t h a t i t has gone very f a r i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n i n my opinion.34 Miller's and  comment was not, however, pursued  the questions  by t h e Committee  o f the Dominions' s t a t u s and v o t i n g  rights  i n the League were l e f t t o the i n d i v i d u a l members t o i n t e r p r e t according  to their  own a t t i t u d e s towards the t r e a t y and, i n  p a r t i c u l a r , P r e s i d e n t Wilson's p o l i c i e s . The lead  pro-treaty  the defense  f a c t i o n i n the Senate looked  t o Wilson t o  of the t r e a t y .  As one o f t h e p r i n c i p a l  a r c h i t e c t s o f the peace settlement,  i t was assumed that Wilson  was i n the s t r o n g e s t  p o s i t i o n t o i n t e r p r e t and d e f e n d t h e  s p e c i f i c a r t i c l e s that were under a t t a c k . the  President  Committee meeting  met w i t h  a t t h e White  members  of the Foreign  House.  f o r American-Canadian  On August 29, 1919, Relations  The i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t h i s  r e l a t i o n s were enormous.  As  mentioned, i n P a r i s Wilson had not d i s p l a y e d any r e a l c o n v i c t i o n towards Dominion s t a t u s . tell  t h e Dominion  prime  In May  ministers,  Canada's Robert Borden, that the  peace  settlement  1919, however, W i l s o n d i d  their  at the i n s i s t e n c e of  status  as d e t e r m i n e d by  and i n the League o f Nations'  Covenant  - 33 w o u l d be the  as  independent  United  status  States  and  defining  backed what  questions not  away  he  asked  had  of  probe  League.  In  Brandegee, United  Wilson  States  able  to  and  cast  the  to  a  argued the  Paris.  issue  that  in  "Disputes  to  re-  status  from  only  the  Senator  between  Dominions  arise  but,  rights in  dispute  the  the  relations  the  would  not  through  the  Governments w h i c h have i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . words," W i l s o n  the  by  Dominion  again  to  Dominion  settlement,  voting  any  can  of  Significantly,  of  Empire  returned  statements  relating  question,  British  a vote.  question  American-Canadian  on  response  the  previous  President of  concentrated  in  Once W i l s o n  e n t i r e peace  his  meant  areas  that  his  from  the  instead,  be  realized  seriously jeopardized  President  did  s m a l l powers.  In  other  reasoned:  d i p l o m a t i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e r e i s o n l y one ' B r i t i s h Empire' . . . . The dispute, therefore, . . . w o u l d be b e t w e e n the U n i t e d S t a t e s as a d i p l o m a t i c u n i t and t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e as a d i p l o m a t i c u n i t . That i s the o n l y g r o u n d on w h i c h t h e two nations could deal with one another, w h e t h e r by way o f d i s p u t e o r agreement.35 Although to  use  did  in  their  clearly  prime  1919,  no  votes  one  s e r i o u s l y a n t i c i p a t e d the  against  Great  compromise h i s e a r l i e r  ministers.  In  effect,  the  Britain,  commitment President  p o s s i b i l i t y of the Dominions i n d e p e n d e n t l y Clearly,  Wilson  with  the  risk  offending  made  the  Dominions—with them and  decision  that  Canada—were the  British  Wilson's to  the  removed  Dominions response Dominion even  casting their America's  insignificant  government.  the  votes.  relations enough  to  - 34  -  I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, at the same meeting Senator Philander C. Knox, a member of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e group, f e l t moved enough to c l a r i f y h i s understanding of Canada's d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p with  the  United  States.  "The  fact  i s that  i t is technically  t r u e , " Knox argued, t h a t the B r i t i s h s e l f governing c o l o n i e s deal d i p l o m a t i c a l l y t h r o u g h the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e , i t i s only t r u e i n a most t e c h n i c a l sense. They a r e a b s o l u t e l y autonomous, even i n t h e i r diplomatic d e a l i n g s , as to matters t h a t a f f e c t them.36 Wilson's and is  another  Knox's d i f f e r i n g assessments of the  i n d i c a t i o n t h a t Canada's i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s  not the p r i n c i p a l concern. only on  the  a  same r e a l i t y  i s s u e being  feud  used f o r the  between  Administration.  Instead, the Dominion's s t a t u s  elements  was was  l a r g e r purpose of c a r r y i n g  i n the  Consequently, no  Senate  and  the  p o s i t i v e progress  Wilson towards  g e t t i n g the t r e a t y approved by the Foreign R e l a t i o n s Committee was  achieved  negative. status own  at t h i s meeting.  Wilson's  d e c i s i o n not  l e d to confusion  supporters  i n the  Dominion's s t a t u s :  In f a c t , the only r e s u l t s were  and  defend  b i t t e r n e s s not  Senate who  h i s new  to  agreed with  p o s i t i o n was  the  Dominions'  only  amongst h i s  the  concept  a l s o resented  by  of the  Dominions themselves.37 When t h e Relations  Committee  September 20, the  treaty  original  1919,  was and  presented  fifteen  document.  "Americanize" the  finally  released to  the  r e s e r v a t i o n s had  These r e s e r v a t i o n s  t r e a t y by  l e s s e n i n g the  by full  the  Foreign  Senate  on  been attached  to  were d e s i g n e d  to  i n f l u e n c e of  Great  - 35 Britain.  Three d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d Canada and i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  status.  One  reservation  called  f o r the United  States  to  r e c e i v e the same number of votes i n the League of Nations as the  British  Empire.  A second  were mere p u p p e t s o f G r e a t dispute British their  arose between  Britain  the United  Empire t h e Dominions votes.  The t h i r d  would not be bound which c a l l e d  that  t h e Dominions  and t h e r e f o r e ,  States  would  when a  and any p a r t  of the  n o t be a l l o w e d  maintained  by A r t i c l e  f o r united  implied  that  to cast  t h e United  Ten of t h e League's  a c t i o n against  aggression.  States  Covenant In j u s t i -  f y i n g i t s o p p o s i t i o n t o A r t i c l e Ten, the Committee argued that they  wanted  power being British  t o prevent the p o s s i b i l i t y  of American  used t o subject I r e l a n d or any of the Dominions t o  rule.38  The a c t u a l t r e a t y debate l a s t e d from September to March  military  19, 1920.  The i m p o r t a n t  difference  20, 1919,  between  this  phase o f the debate and the arguments t h a t had been presented prior  t o the t r e a t y ' s being  laid  before  the Senate was  that  the speeches now d e a l t with s p e c i f i c i s s u e s i n s t e a d o f a b s t r a c t ideas. main  In respect  arguments  t o the Dominions' d i p l o m a t i c  continued  term Dominion s t a t u s  to centre  p o s i t i o n the  on the d e f i n i t i o n  o f the  and t h e r o l e o f t h e Dominions , i n t h e  /  i i  League o f N a t i o n s . The debate against irreconcilables.  the t r e a t y continued  In t h e p e r i o d  between  t o be l e d by the September  20 and  November 19, 1919, when the t r e a t y was r e j e c t e d by Senate f o r  - 36 the  first  time,  Senators  -  G e o r g e W.  Norris,  and H i r a m J o h n s o n  made r e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s  and  Covenant  the  these see  League's  documents  accorded  Canada," N o r r i s  principally the  W i l l i a m S.  Kenyon,  t o denounce t h e because  Dominions.  of  the  "I w o u l d  treaty status  be  glad  to  argued:  an i n d e p e n d e n t n a t i o n , but i f Canada w a n t s to be a f u l l f l e d g e d member o f this [ L ] e a g u e , i f she wants t o have a f u l l v o t e in the [ C ] o u n c i l or i n the [A]ssembly, then l e t her throw o f f the s h a c k l e s of t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e and be i n d e p e n d e n t l i k e any o t h e r n a t i o n . 3 9 Norris'  speech  focussed  British  Empire  would  Assembly.  This  issue  rfho a r g u e d  that  " i f we  and  Britain]  with  Norris,  certainly  for to  out  Senator's giving The of  to  command  was  also  the  primary  must we  be  ought  partners, t o be  i t clear  [he was]  not  desire  was  United States the  to  the  a l l s e n a t o r s were  irreconcilables after  Lodge's  Committee,  or  in  he  he  . .  not  Porter  Kenyon States  . " 4 0  AS  signalling  Instead, " i n standing  s t a n d i n g a g a i n s t any Conference,  plan  . . ."41 the  League as  The by  Britain.  analysis, a denunciation  s t a t u s was  of the  of  [the U n i t e d  was  the  League's  concern  "Americanize"  prepared  felt  the  same number o f v o t e s  submission  Senator  votes  e q u a l ones,  that  of the P a r i s  the Dominions' independent  Shortly the  the terms  of  able  f a c t t h a t t h i s meant, i n t h e f i n a l  Not of  . . .  primary  the  number  f o r unfair, treatment.  reservations carry  the  be  Kenyon made  t h e D o m i n i o n s out  on  to  irrelevant. support  the  arguments  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee. of  the  majority  J . McCumber  of  report North  from  Dakota  -  37  -  i s s u e d a m i n o r i t y statement i n which he s t e a d f a s t l y maintained that  the  Dominions had should  a right  to d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s and  United  States  welcome t h e  opportunity  closer  r e l a t i o n s h i p with her northern  to  neighbor.  the  develop  a  Throughout  42  the t r e a t y debate, McCumber was  to c o n s i s t e n t l y maintain  that  there  i n the League's Assembly  that  were many small n a t i o n s  contributed  little  to the A l l i e d  war  effort.  "Canada on  the  other hand, . . ." McCumber s t a t e d : with a p o p u l a t i o n o f n e a r l y 8.5 million people, and which fought v a l i a n t l y through a l l the long years of the war . . . asks t h a t she be given a vote i n the Assembly not i n the C o u n c i l , c a r r y i n g the same power t h a t you give to black L i b e r i a , or H a i t i , •  The of  Senator the  •  •  summed up h i s speech with a c r i t i c a l  Foreign  explore  the  Relations  Committee  f o r not  denunciation  attempting  meaning of Dominion s t a t u s or the r a m i f i c a t i o n s  t h i s s t a t u s c o u l d have on American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s . Canada tie  i s p a r t of the B r i t i s h  i s one  of f r i e n d l y  dependency."  with  Empire  good w i l l  and  . . ."he interest  "While  argued,  "the  rather  than  44  McCumber's strong met  to  ridicule  stand  from the  i n favor of Dominion s t a t u s irreconcilables  who  accused  was the  North Dakotan of b l i n d l y t i e i n g the United States to a League that was did  virtually  receive  some  controlled support,  M. Hitchcock  of Nebraska, the  seeing  Versailles  the  by  Great  notably minority  Treaty  safely  Britain. from  Although  Senator  leader through  Gilbert  i n charge the  he  of  Senate,  -  McCumber's a r g u m e n t s were n o t point to  to  the  a  status  imperial treaty  would  right  war to  of  with  the  British  pendently.  the  to  Wilson  seek  or,  his  i n the  were  references  claim that  peace,  t h a t Canada had  i f she  to  muster  ratify  the  November the  treaty.  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and in  and  order gain  going  they  she  to had  differed  t o break a l l t i e s to  function  inde-  to  that  Wilson's  supporters  necessary  two-thirds  vote  Diplomatic  advisors  both  the  the  early  November, 1919,  governments  had  the  Administration  Wilson  Covenant.  After  elected  the  officials while  cilables'  arguments  special  published  a  to  State  Department  defuse  the  support  series  defend  of  in  began  arguments a  large  or  i n the  of  to  the B r i t i s h  silent, the  of  to the  group  to  i l l ,  some  newspapers.  In  United  commentaries  and  of  to l e t  however,  of  League senior  the  the  major  in  State  irrecon-  particular,  States in  Canadian  the  consult with  denouncing  the  and  preferring  treaty  became  privately  refuting  envoy  both  remain  President  began  Department  a  McCumber's  indeed,  participate  remaining  risen  senators.  Until  Grey,  with  still  had  the  early  able  irreconcilables  British  colony  not  t h e n , most s e n a t o r s o p p o s e d t o  by  alternatives  moderate  while  could  the  insistence  clear be  required  former  he  in  argued  Empire,  a  because  4 5  was  not  While,  actively  where  power  contribution  in their  would  small  have  him  It  a  not  from  persuasive  precedent  structure.  Canada's a  legal  -  38  Lord  1919-1920,  American  and  - 39 British  newspapers.  publish  a  Grey p e t i t i o n e d  statement  when an i s s u e  clarifying  involving  before  t h e League  George  t o agree with Committee  diplomatic  entities.46  officials desired  Lord  i n the United  attempting  to  March  earlier only  19,  Grey  Dominions. Lloyd  statements affect the  not  also  separate  British  During  d e b a t e , F e b r u a r y 10, 1920  out t h a t  received  reinforced  their  G r e y ' s i n t e r f e r e n c e was  States  a negative  and South  Africa  insisted  the best  as p o s s i b l e  that  Foreign  d i d n o t have t h e  could  expect i f  response  reacted  by  not t o accept Wilson's r e - d e f i n i t i o n  House  Lloyd  i t  4 7  the Senate's  acknowledge  the  respected  h i s arguments  o f what t h e U n i t e d  that  Canadian  wanted  came  a c c u s e d by t h e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s o f  o f a s m a l l power.  determined  were  status  States  i n American domestic p o l i t i c s .  Robert Borden  4 8  rights  was  by p o i n t i n g  Canada  George  status.  States,  1920, t h e i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s  the League.  Lord  t h e Dominions  o f t h e Senate t r e a t y  one example  joined  the  Grey  arguments  Grey  was one o f t h e most  to interfere  the second h a l f  and t h e U n i t e d  Specifically,  that  Grey  effect.  voting  Wilson's statements before  Relations  Although  government t o  t h e Dominions'  t h e Empire  Assembly.  the B r i t i s h  that  pressuring o f Dominion  must  be g r a n t e d  Although t h e Canadian  government  policy  was  Canada  from t h e  t o make  on t h e d e b a t e , B o r d e n arguments  o f Commons. t h e supremacy  a s few  d i d attempt  by h i s a g g r e s s i v e In f o r c i n g  public  Great  of the Canadian  to  actions i n Britain  to  Parliament  - 40 allowed i t to debate and  ratify  Borden's  a clear  that  government sent  Canada was  small power. 1919,  the  Americans  treaty  f o r Canada,  t o the United  States  responsibility  of a  In h i s speech before the House on September t o b r i n g to the a t t e n t i o n  significance  must  constitutional  of t h i s  make t h e e f f o r t changes  that  B r i t i s h Imperial s t r u c t u r e Clearly,  t h e Senate  both the Canadian Dominion  signal  prepared to assume t h e  Borden t r i e d  Senate  the peace  and  action  t o t r y and  were t a k i n g  was  had  British  that  understand  place  governments  kept f u l l y  the  within  the  of Senate Document 26 i n 1919 evolving  attached  to the  ratification.  The  informed of the debate i n the i n f o r m a t i o n was  to Wilson's supporters i n the Senate.  ratification.50  insisting  t o be aware of the importance  Canadian House of Commons and t h i s  of t h e Dominions'  American  .49  Parliament's separate treaty  State Department  by  of the  2,  passed on  As w e l l , the p u b l i c a t i o n  a l s o provided a c l e a r statement role  i n the p r o c e s s of  treaty  The Senate document i n c o r p o r a t e d an important  paragraph from S i r C. Hibbert  Tupper's  p o i n t e d out that the Dominions'  article  i n which  "steady growth and  he  increasing  s t r e n g t h c a l l t e d f o r ] . . . some system of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n [to] be devised . . ."51 pro-Wilson symbol  During the second p a r t of the t r e a t y debate  s u p p o r t e r s d i d use  o f t h e Dominion's  however, the a n t i - t r e a t y issue.  Canada's  becoming forces  ratification  a small  chose  not  power.  a  Again,  to explore  The i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s d i d not deny or condemn the  as  this  - 41 significance chose t o  of  the  Canadian  ignore  the  separate  action;  instead,  ratification  they  despite  simply  the  diplo-  matic damage i t would do to American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s . A second a c t i o n designed to enhance Canada's i n t e r n a t i o n a l status  was  Borden's d e c i s i o n  to  announce h i s  government's  i n t e n t i o n to e s t a b l i s h a separate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Washington. Newton W.  Rowell,  Canada's  acting  Secretary  of  State  for  E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , commented t h a t : while the s e v e r a l B r i t i s h ambassadors at Washington have rendered admirable s e r v i c e t o Canada, our b u s i n e s s w i t h the U n i t e d States i s now on so l a r g e a s c a l e t h a t the government i s convinced that our i n t e r e s t s c a n o n l y be a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t e d by a Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e resident in Washington.52 This  not  Canada's  only  i n d i c a t e d to the  intentions  but  also  British was  and  Canadian  intended  to  publics  refute  the  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s ' c l a i m that Canada d i d not possess the governmental s t r u c t u r e  to  pursue  her  own  comments were a l s o used by supporters the  concept of Dominion s t a t u s .  foreign policy.  These  of the t r e a t y t o defend  In a long  speech  Canada's p o s i t i o n , Senator Hitchcock s t a t e d : I know very w e l l , however, t h a t the people o f t h e s e Dominions . . . have set t h e i r h e a r t s upon t h a t independent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . . . . I understand that Canada i s a l s o t a k i n g steps f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s and w i t h o t h e r i m p o r t a n t nations of the world upon an independent b a s i s ; . . . [but] i n the United S t a t e s , i n s t e a d of lending encouragement t o t h a t determined e f f o r t to o b t a i n d i p l o m a t i c independence, the Senate of the United S t a t e s p r o p o s e s to slam the door of opportunity i n the faces of these people, our neighbours here to the north.53  advocating  Hitchcock concluded  t h a t the a c t i o n s of the Senate amounted to  l i t t l e more than: r e f u s i n g to our neighbour . . . the r i g h t to i n d e p e n d e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . We are saying to them, i n e f f e c t : you have got to be represented by London. We w i l l not consent t o your independent representation.54 As speech  with did  treaty.  the  previous  little  Senator  to  arguments, however,  convince  the  Senate  I r v i n e L. L e n r o o t  a permanent also  not taken  any  to  the  debate  1920,  raging  i n the  As  plan  f o r Canada having  [Canada] asks  quickly  the Canadian  well,  Lenroot  Canadian House of  Commons i n which some p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s expressed the  the  d e f i n i t e a c t i o n towards s e c u r i n g  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Washington.  pointed  support  of W i s c o n s i n  p o i n t e d out to Hitchcock t h a t as of February government had  to  Hitchcock's  o p p o s i t i o n to  dual s t a t u s i n Washington.  [for] e q u a l i t y with  the  United  "She  S t a t e s , " argued  Lenroot: a t t h e same t i m e she i s e n j o y i n g t h e p r i v i l e g e s and p r o t e c t i o n of t h e B r i t i s h Empire. Whenever Canada wants to bind the United States w i l l f u l l powers t h a t t h e United States e x e r c i s e s , the United States w i l l be very g l a d to welcome Canada when she d e c l a r e s her independence and assumes t h e f u l l r i g h t s and p e r o g a t i v e s o f a nation.55 Clearly,  the  argument  against  Dominion s t a t u s again  down to the i s s u e of the Dominions* continued  t i e s with  boiled Great  B r i t a i n , and the f a c t t h a t from the American p o i n t of view the Dominions wanted to have i t both ways:  they wanted independence  but a l s o a c o n t i n u i n g and a c t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n with the Empire.  An of  i n t e r e s t i n g element introduced i n t o the l a t t e r  the  Senate  debate  r e v o l v e d around  usefulness as a spokesman and States  policies.  Although  Canada's  supporter the  were  required  important  the  irreconcilables  Hiram  Johnson  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e group, was immigration spurred  by  of Asians  to  the  h i s c o n s t i t u e n t s who who  history  were making  living  of  borders  that  of a c t i o n .  In  a member o f  the  Johnson's  were upset  California  attempting  shared  in that  concern  by  their  new  the  to  limit  the  home.  number  Johnson r e a l i z e d  a similar  attitude,  was  number  along with other Western s t a t e s ,  w i t h i n i t s borders.  Dominions, who  argued  i n t e r e s t e d i n the q u e s t i o n of Asian  United States.  S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a , long  of C a l i f o r n i a ,  United  t o admit  i s s u e s beyond A m e r i c a ' s  United States to take some form  particular,  potential  of many key  support of American i s o l a t i o n i s m , even they had there  stages  that  The  had  of  a  Asians  the  c o u l d prove  white to  be  u s e f u l i n the League i f they used t h e i r v o t i n g power to o f f s e t any charges of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n from Asian n a t i o n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , Japan.56  Senator  McCumber, on  February  16,  1920,  tried  make the most of Johnson's waivering p o s i t i o n by p o i n t i n g that  i f "the United States had  a d i s p u t e with Japan,  that we c o u l d count on Canada being with us."57  to out  I think  McCumber went  on t o argue that even Lord Grey had admitted t h a t on the i s s u e of A s i a n immigration side  "Canada would g e n e r a l l y be found on  of the United States."58  t h a t was  the most e f f e c t i v e  i t was  this  the  l i n e of argument  i n t r y i n g t o convince senators to  -  support the Dominions The  1  -  44  s t a t u s i n the League.  irreconcilables  could  not deny  that  t h e r e were a  number of p o l i c i e s t h a t Canada shared with the United For  this  States.  r e a s o n , the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s were always c a r e f u l t o  p o i n t out i n t h e i r statements t h a t they were not p a r t i c u l a r l y opposed t o Canada's a c h i e v i n g  s t a t u s so much as they opposed  Canada's connection with the B r i t i s h cilables  reasoned  of Great B r i t a i n  that  Empire.  i f Canada was  The  irrecon-  completely independent  then she would be much more u s e f u l  to the  United States because the Canadian government would not have to be concerned about accommodating B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l p o l i c i e s . There i s no doubt t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n d i d c r e a t e a dilemma f o r many senators who could see the value t o the United States of Canada's a c h i e v i n g d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s .  Many concluded, however,  that  than  t h e dilemma  United  States  was  more a p p a r e n t  r e j e c t e d the t r e a t y  real,  f o r i f the  and the League's Covenant  and r e t a i n e d her p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n i s m the American government would all.  5  not have t o d e a l 9  F o r them,  with  t h e v o t e s of the Dominions at  the d e s i r e  to defeat  President  p o l i c i e s became more important than Canada's p o t e n t i a l  Wilson's useful-  ness as a d i p l o m a t i c a l l y i n the League. Another debate was have  factor  that  a l s o played  a role  i n the Senate's  the i n c r e a s e d need f o r the American government t o  a more  government.  immediate During  and  direct  the t r e a t y  link  with  the Canadian  debate a s e r i e s  of disputes  between Canada and the United States made t h i s p o i n t  c l e a r to  -  both c o u n t r i e s . Brunswick, capacity  4 5  A boundary  America's  -  dispute  desire  between Maine  t o improve  of the S t . Lawrence  river,  and New  the hydro-electric  and a s e r i e s  of trade  i s s u e s r e q u i r e d the c l o s e cooperation of both c o u n t r i e s i f the d i s p u t e s were t o be s e t t l e d . to the concept of Dominion To support the t r e a t y closer  Again, senators p u b l i c l y  opposed  s t a t u s were faced with a dilemma.  and the League's  Covenant  would  ensure  c o o p e r a t i o n between Canada and the United S t a t e s .  with the p r e v i o u s arguments, priority  however, domestic p o l i t i c s  As took  and many senators d e l i b e r a t e l y chose t o postpone the  problem  of f i n d i n g  a solution  t o America's  lack  of d i r e c t  communication w i t h Canada. The  r i g i d p o s i t i o n s o f the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s i n the Senate  combined defeat  with t h e i r  publicity  of the Treaty  campaign,  of Versailles  l e d to the f i n a l  on March 19, 1920. For  Canada, the Senate's r e j e c t i o n meant that the Canadian government had no independent s t a t u s as f a r as the United States was concerned. the  The f a c t  Senate  interests nation  that  both the Wilson A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and  had d e m o n s t r a t e d  or o b j e c t i v e s  showing  a lack  little  concern  was a g r a p h i c of s e n s i t i v i t y  f o r Canada's  example  of a  to a less  larger  powerful  neighbor. In  t h e wake  anti-American treaty's  of the Senate's  feeling  swept Canada.  decision, Partially  a wave o f  caused by t h e  r e j e c t i o n but a l s o s t i m u l a t e d by American  patriotism  that tended t o overestimate the United States c o n t r i b u t i o n t o  - 46 the  Allied  war  effort,  this  opinion  o f Hugh K e e n l e y s i d e ,  the  and  war  contributed  -  a n t i - A m e r i c a n i s m was,  one  of the detrimental  to preventing  the  growth  in  the  effects  of  a  of  closer  relationship.60 At League  the o f f i c i a l  o f N a t i o n s was  government had  come  felt  t o term the  and  the  would  mediate  the  Joint  Canada  Canadian  Mackenzie  powers disputes  States  North  to  would  establishing mentioned, intention to  open  Canadian  because  have a  the  separate  during of  on  the  securing  a more d i r e c t  an  t h e League  treaty  debate  permission  Canada  from  the  for  the  wars.  left  to  United  6 2  o f t h e t r e a t y was  objective  i n Washington. had  a  the Senate's  government's  representation  could  commissions  by  of the w o r l d .  what  including  Canada was  u n c l e a r what e f f e c t  Canadian  of  they  t h e need  tarnished  rejection  American  example  politicians,  eliminate  a  institutions  similar  model,  States  "North  establish  America's i t was  as  Canadians  United  thought  and  rejected  American  More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  action  the  King,  States non-involvement, to the rest  disappointment  Prominent  and  Commission  nations,  later  world  When t h e U n i t e d espouse  the  Using such American-Canadian  6 1  between  Borden  convince that  offered  International  possible  Robert  disappointment to  t o demonstrate to the world the  model f o r p e a c e . "  was  great  "North A m e r i c a n i s m " .  League  i n which  the  a  America's repeated r e j e c t i o n of the  b e c a u s e i t seemed t o be a r e p u d i a t i o n o f what Canada  that  forum  as  level,  announced  British  l i n k with the United States.  of As its  government On F e b r u a r y  - 47 27, 1920,  the S t a t e Department was  o f f i c i a l l y notified  by  the  B r i t i s h Charge d ' A f f a i r e s i n Washington, Ronald Charles Lindsey, t h a t Canada would soon announce the appointment of a r e p r e s e n t ative  with  the  rank  of M i n i s t e r of P l e n i p o t e n t .  Lindsey  informed the American government: t h a t w h i l e t h e new m i n i s t e r w i l l rank i n the [ B r i t i s h ] Embassy immediately a f t e r the Ambassador and w i l l take charge i n the l a t t e r ' s absence, he should at a l l t i m e s be t h e o r d i n a r y channel of communication with the United States Government i n matters which concern Canadian i n t e r e s t s a l o n e . 6 3  I n i t i a l l y , the American response t o the Canadian p o s i t i o n was  cautious.  In  addition  to the  Wilson  Administration's  being preoccupied with the passage of the t r e a t y i n the Administration  officials  resignation  of  President's  slow  S e c r e t a r y of recovery  Wilson appointed a new was  a l s o had  from  t o contend  S t a t e Robert  with the Lansing  a debilitating  recent  and  stroke.  the Until  S e c r e t a r y of State the State Department  r e l u c t a n t t o take any a c t i o n t h a t might e s t a b l i s h a prece-  dent.  Consequently,  British  government  State Department o f f i c i a l s t h a t the  United  concerns t h a t needed t o be addressed. worried  that  the  representatives  other  concerned on  and  informed  S t a t e s had  the  a number of  The State Department  Dominions would  t o Washington  States t o r e c i p r o c a t e .  bear  Senate,  would  As w e l l , Wilson's  also  want  expect  the  to ;  was send  United  a d v i s o r s were a l s o  about the domestic pressure t h a t would be brought the  government  to  I r e l a n d , a country t h a t had  establish  a diplomatic link  to  with  not y e t a t t a i n e d the s t a t u s of a  -  Dominion. could  Administration  lead  48  -  officials  t o a break-down  feared  that  this  i n Anglo-American  issue  relations.  F i n a l l y , the United States was quick t o p o i n t out the continued dual s t a t u s t h a t Canada would have i f the proposed a t i o n p l a n went ahead. British  The Canadian o f f i c i a l ' s  represent-  l i n k with the  Embassy c r e a t e d doubt as t o which government he would  ultimately  be r e s p o n s i b l e .  Formulating  an argument  composed  of a l l these f a c t o r s , the United S t a t e s , although not completely r e j e c t i n g the i d e a , d i d at f i r s t announcement o f i t s p o s i t i o n . By  late April  attempt t o delay  any p u b l i c  6 4  1920, however, a f t e r having  consulted  Americans s t a t i o n e d i n the Dominions, the United States to  the B r i t i s h - C a n a d i a n p l a n .  Indeed, the o f f i c i a l  ment of Canada's changing s t a t u s was f i r s t on  April  26, f o u r t e e n  governments made t h e i r dramatic  days before statements.  announce-  and Canadian  j . accounting n  agreed  made i n Washington  the B r i t i s h  65  with  for this  change i n the State Department's a t t i t u d e i t must be  p o i n t e d out t h a t Wilson was attempting  t o minimize some o f the  d i p l o m a t i c damage caused by America's r e j e c t i o n of the t r e a t y . A Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Washington provided the P r e s i d e n t with the opportunity t o demonstrate t o the American people the ; e v o l v i n g p o s i t i o n o f the Dominions on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  stage  i  and  t h a t the United States was w i l l i n g  some extent,  assist  however, W i l s o n  t o acknowledge and t o  i n t h i s development.  wanted  t o encourage  66  More importantly,  t h e appointment  Canadian because i t was i n America's best  of a  i n t e r e s t t o have a  c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p with Canada. i n t e r n a t i o n a l outlook with the government  an  ally  r e l a t i o n s , the the  growing  that  The  s i m i l a r i t i e s i n Canada's  United  could  be  States o f f e r e d Wilson's trusted.  In  bilateral  expansion of American investment i n Canada  number  of  outstanding  issues  between  the  and two  c o u n t r i e s made i t a b s o l u t e l y necessary t h a t d i r e c t communication be  established.67 The  the  American  Canadian  Despite  the  announcement appeared to c l e a r the way  government urgency  i s s u e , however, no question  of  political were  issue. by  that  appoint  Canada  opposition,  was  British  representative  criticized.  been able  cations  who  government  was  6 8  P u b l i c l y , Arthur  l o c a t e an willing  the  need  Instead,  the  to  to  questions William  Queen's, concerning The  the  dual r o l e of s e r v i n g Ambassador was  Meighen, who  had  absent become  argued t h a t the government had  i n d i v i d u a l with s u i t a b l e q u a l i f i assume the  a l s o maintained that  Washington and preventing  to  the  i n Washington became a  when the  Canada's Prime M i n i s t e r i n 1920, not  to  i n p a r t i c u l a r by  s t a t u s of Canada's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . the  attached  Canadian House of Commons  S. F i e l d i n g , member f o r Shelburne and  as  representative.  appointed.  representation  In the the  its  initially  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was  Canadian  raised  to  for  hire  the  post.  lack  As  well,  of o f f i c e  a trained  staff  the  space i n  were  also  an appointment from being made.69  C e r t a i n l y , the  lack of t r a i n e d personnel d i d p l a y  i n Canada's d e c i s i o n t o delay an appointment.  In an  a role  editorial  entitled Post  "Plan For M i n i s t e r Dropped", however, the Washington  stated: I t [was] ... understood i n Washington t h a t the d e c i s i o n r e c e n t l y reached not t o allow the appointment o f a C a n a d i a n M i n i s t e r i n Washington was due t o the fear t h a t i t would r e s u l t i n c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s between Canada and the United States than would be good f o r t h e Empire as a whole, ... The whole program was c a l l e d o f f w i t h t h e e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t t h e P r i n c e o f Wales ... and S i r Auckland Geddes had so pleased t h e C a n a d i a n s that d i r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at Washington was no l o n g e r r e g a r d e d as necessary.70  The  Post's  crisis out  a r t i c l e was very a s t u t e .  had d i m i n i s h e d ,  earlier  C l e a r l y , once the wartime  Great B r i t a i n  was r e l u c t a n t t o c a r r y  commitments made when she needed the s u p p o r t  the Dominions.  of  The a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y e d by Lord Grey during the  t r e a t y debate was only one example o f Great B r i t a i n ' s attempting to r e s u r r e c t her p o s i t i o n as t h e s o l e a u t h o r i t y f o r formulating the Empire's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . becoming  c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h i n the i m p e r i a l  T h i s a t t i t u d e does e x p l a i n why the B r i t i s h govern-  ment was so i n s i s t e n t  act  real  States was p o t e n t i a l l y one of the most  obvious sources f o r causing  appointed  o f the Empire's  d i v i d e d over f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s was a very  t h r e a t and t h e United  •structure.  The p o s s i b i l i t y  that  i f a Canadian  he must be connected with  i n t h e Ambassador's  stead  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was  the B r i t i s h  Embassy and  when he was absent.71  i n an  a r t i c l e w r i t t e n i n 1922, former Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r Robert Borden  concluded  that  Canadian  c o u l d have been p e r c e i v e d  representation  as a " l e s s e n i n g  i n Washington  of the t i e s  which  - 51 connected  Canada with Great  Britain  and her s i s t e r n a t i o n s , "  and was t h e r e f o r e , i n B r i t i s h eyes, t o be avoided.72 Many h i s t o r i a n s have used t h e theme o f i m p e r i a l explain  why Canada d i d not c a r r y  representative.73 that By  the Canadian  itself,  Undoubtedly,  out i t s p l a n t o appoint a  imperial  unity was a f a c t o r  government had t o take  into consideration.  however, i t does not f u l l y  tance t o appoint a m i n i s t e r . and  Liberal  e x p l a i n Canada's r e l u c -  A f t e r a l l , s u c c e s s i v e Conservative  governments gave every  attempting t o f i l l  unity to  the p o s t .  indication  that  they were  Y e a r l y a l l o c a t i o n s of money were  provided f o r i n the f e d e r a l budgets and each year the government defended  i n the House of Commons t h i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n of funds.  Moreover,  during the f i r s t  s e s s i o n o f the League o f Nations  Assembly both Canada and t h e Dominion of South  A f r i c a wasted  no time i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r separate v o t i n g r i g h t s by c a s t i n g their  ballot  i n o p p o s i t i o n t o Great  Britain.  Clearly,  this  precedent e s t a b l i s h e d that there was a l i m i t t o the Dominions* concern f o r i m p e r i a l  unity.74  When t h e h i s t o r i a n begins t o analyze t h e o f f i c i a l  corres-  pondence between Canada, Great B r i t a i n and the United States a systematic p a t t e r n begins t o emerge. an  important  reason  I t become evident t h a t  why Canada d i d n o t a p p o i n t  a separate  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Washington was because the Canadian government was  trying  officials position  t o preserve  i t s freedom o f a c t i o n  who wanted t o manipulate  from  American  Canada's new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n the League, and her enhanced  status w i t h i n the  British  Empire,  to p r o t e c t  Canada's importance  American  interests.  i n the i m p e r i a l  In  addition,  structure contributed  to  Great B r i t a i n ' s d e s i r e to r e s t r i c t Canada's involvement i n the international  community.  Consequently, when Canada's request  f o r separate d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Washington  i s examined  from the p e r s p e c t i v e of American i n t e r e s t s and goals i t becomes clear  that  i t was  the B r i t i s h  and  Canadian  were more o f a h i n d r a n c e t o Canada's r i s e s t a t u s than the United S t a t e s . international the the  who  in international  By examining f i r s t the broader  i s s u e s and then the b i l a t e r a l  concerns between  United States and Canada i t becomes evident t h a t i t was i n United States  northern neighbor. t h a t American the  governments  best  interest  In the e a r l y  to have a more  independent  1920s, the immediate  o f f i c i a l s had t o contend with was  how  problem  to repair  damage caused by the Senate t r e a t y debate and the r e j e c t i o n  of Canada's i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s .  - 53  -  Endnotes Chapter I ^Richard W. Leopold, "The M i s s i s s i p p i V a l l e y and American Foreign P o l i c y 1890-1941: An Assessment and an Appeal," M i s s i s s i p p i V a l l e y H i s t o r i c a l Review. V o l . 37 (No. 4 March 1950-51), p. 625. 2  B e r g e r , The W r i t i n g of Canadian H i s t o r y , p. 144.  ^Denna Frank F l e m i n g , The T r e a t y Veto o f the American Senate (New York: Garland P u b l i s h i n g , 1971 ed.), p. 6. For more i n f o r m a t i o n see: W. S t u l l H o l t , T r e a t i e s Defeated by the Senate. A Study of the Struggle Between the P r e s i d e n t and Senate Over the Conduct of Foreign R e l a t i o n s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933). J o h n G. Tower, "Congress V e r s u s t h e P r e s i d e n t : The Formulation and Implementation of American F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " Foreign A f f a i r s . V o l . 60 (No. 2 Winter 1981-82), p. 232. 4  5"Two Years o f American Foreign P o l i c y , " Foreign V o l . 3 (No. 3 March 1923), p. 2.  Affairs.  F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on the r o l e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n see: G a b r i e l A. Almond, The American People and Foreign P o l i c y (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1960 ed.); Bernard C. Cohen, The I n f l u e n c e of Non-Governmental Groups on F o r e i g n Policy-Making (World Peace Foundation, 1959); Thomas B a i l e y , The Man i n the S t r e e t (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1964) . 6  7  B a i l e y , The Man  i n the S t r e e t , pp. 248-49.  S e l i g A d l e r , "The Congressional E l e c t i o n o f 1918," South A t l a n t i c Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 36 (No. 4 October 1937), p. 447. 8  A r n o J . Mayer, P o l i t i c s and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and C o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a t V e r s a i l l e s . 1918-1919 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1967), p. 58. 9  1 0  Adler,  i ; L  1 2  13  "The Congressional  E l e c t i o n of 1918," p. 450.  I b i d . , p. 450.  I b i d . , pp. 460-61. G r a e b n e r , Ideas and Diplomacy, p. 74  - 54 I b i d . , p. 385.  1 4  l U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1919 V o l . 3 (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1943), p. 483. 5  1 6  I b i d . , p. 483.  1 7  Ibid.  1 8  I b i d . , p.  1 9  I b i d . , pp. 486-87.  20 2 1  I b i d  484.  .  Congressional  Record. June 20, 1919, p.  1428.  F o r a complete l i s t o f the names of the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s see: Ralph Stone, The I r r e c o n c i l a b l e s . The F i g h t Against the League of Nations (Lexington: U n i v e r s i t y of Kentucky Press, 1970) , p. 1. 2 2  2 3  Congressional  Record. June 25, 1919, p.  1723.  B e l l e Case La F o l l e t t e and F o l a La F o l l e t t e , Robert M. La F o l l e t t e . V o l . 11 (New Y o r k : M a c m i l l a n Co., 1953), p. 956. 2 4  F o r more information on the p o l i c y of i m p e r i a l p r e f e rence see: Denis Judds, B a l f o u r and the B r i t i s h Empire: A Study i n I m p e r i a l E v o l u t i o n 1874-1932 (London: Macmillan, 1968); George C. Tryon, Imperial Preference. A Short H i s t o r y (London: P h i l i p A l l a n , 1931). 2 5  ^Congressional  Record. September 3, 1919, p. 4652.  2 7  I b i d . , p. 4652.  2 8  I b i d . , p. 4660.  2 9  I b i d . , p. 4723.  3 0  I b i d . , December 21, 1918, pp. 723-24.  3 1  I b i d . , October 25, 1919, pp. 7488-7489.  3 2  I b i d . , J u l y 19, 1919, pp. 2336-2339.  • ^ U n i t e d S t a t e s , Congress, Senate, Treaty o f Peace with Germanyt Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign R e l a t i o n s . United States Senate. Senate Document 49, 66th Congress, 1st s e s s i o n , 1919, p. 414. 3 4  I b i d . , p. 417.  " U n i t e d S t a t e s , Congress, Senate, Meeting a t the White House Between P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n and t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Committee. T r e a t y o f Peace w i t h Germany. Senate Document No. 76, 66th Congress, 1st S e s s i o n , 1919, p. 44. 3 6  I b i d . , p. 422.  7 p r e s i d e n t Wilson's comments r a i s e d s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s i n the Dominions' p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e i r s t a t u s i n the League. In the C a n a d i a n House of Commons, t h e Honourable Henri Severin Beland (MP f o r Belauce) s t a t e d , "Mr. Speaker, I am a f r a i d that Canada i s g r a d u a l l y assuming more and more i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n s without any corresponding i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s . " Canada, House o f Commons, Debates. September 8, 1919, p. 89. 3  3 8  C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record. September 10, 1919, p. 5114.  3 9  I b i d . , October 29, 1919, p. 7689.  4 0  I b i d . , September 10, 1919, pp. 5154-55.  4 1  Ibid.  4 2  I b i d . , September 15, 1919, p. 5356.  4 3  I b i d . , p. 5357.  4 4  Ibid.  4 5  I b i d . , October 29, 1919, p. 7689.  - 56 L e o n E. Boothe, to t h e United S t a t e s , ( 1 9 7 1 ) , p . 83.  "A F e t t e r e d Envoy: 1919-1920," Review  4 6  47conaressional  Lord Grey's M i s s i o n o f P o l i t i c s V o l . 33  R e c o r d . F e b r u a r y 2, 1920, p p . 2356-57.  4 8  Boothe,  "A F e t t e r e d Envoy,"  4 9  Canada,  House  o f Commons,  p . 83. Debates,  September  2, 1919,  p . 22. ®United S t a t e s , Congress, Senate, R a t i f i c a t i o n of Treaties: Methods a n d P r o c e d u r e s i n F o r e i g n C o u n t r i e s R e l a t i v e t o R a t i f i c a t i o n o f T r e a t i e s . S e n a t e Document 26, 6 6 t h C o n g r e s s , 1 s t s e s s i o n , 1919. 5  Ibid.,  5 1  p . 37.  5 2  canada,  House o f Commons, D e b a t e s , May 5, 1919, p . 2075.  5 3  Congressional  R e c o r d . March  8, 1920, p p . 4010-11.  5 4  Ibid.,  p . 4011.  5 5  Ibid.,  F e b r u a r y 16, 1920, p . 2955.  5 6  Ibid.,  November  5 7  Ibid.,  F e b r u a r y 16, 1919, p . 2954.  5 8  Ibid.  5 9  Ibid.,  6 0  Keenleyside,  18, 1920, p . 8733.  March 3, 1920, p . 3801. Canada and t h e U n i t e d  S t a t e s , p . 362.  D o n a l d M. Page, "Canada a s t h e E x p o n e n t o f N o r t h A m e r i c a n Idealism," i n American Review o f Canadian S t u d i e s . V o l . 3 (No. 2, Autumn 1 9 7 3 ) , p . 36. 6 1  6 2  Ibid.,  p . 37.  L. C. C l a r k . , e d . , D o c u m e n t s Relations. Vol. 3 1919-1925 (Ottawa: 6  3  f  on C a n a d i a n External Department o f E x t e r n a l  - 57 Affairs, 6 4  1967), p. 14.  I b i d . , p. 16.  G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment Status a t Washington, p. 70. b 5  of a Canadian Diplomatic  C l a r k , Documents on Canadian E x t e r n a l R e l a t i o n s . V o l 3. pp. 14-15. 6 6  I b i d . , p. 15.  6 7  Canada, pp. 495-97. 6 8  f  I b i d . , April  6 9  / w  p. 26. 71  House o f Commons, Debates  March  16, 1920,  21, 1921, pp. 2397-99.  C l a r k , Documents on Canadian E x t e r n a l R e l a t i o n s . V o l . 3.  C a n a d a , House o f Commons, Debates. May 7, 1920, p. 2178.  R o b e r t L. Borden, "The B r i t i s h Commonwealth o f Nations," The Yale Review. V o l 12 (October 1922-July 1923), p. 781. 7 2  '•^For more i n f o r m a t i o n s e e : W i g l e y , Canada and t h e T r a n s i t i o n t o Commonwealth; G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of a Canadian Diplomatic Status a t Washington. 7 4  Wigley,  p. 115.  Canada  the Transition,  to  Commonwealth,  - 58  -  Chapter The  final  welcome  relief  individual's -.0  used  defeat to  absorbing anxious  the to  time  return  Harding,  receded  into  signs that  of of  decade of been  indication  with  her  obligations the  provided public  League  interpreted in  of  of the  the  wished  most A m e r i c a n s ,  not  the  newspapers  presidential  were  were  released  of  and  interests  determined  years behind  the  1920  had  States  Republican  out  of  1920s as  convinced should time,  a sign  had  became  development.  seemed put  to the  election  that  had  the  reject both  European  a  be  an  stress  them.  v i c t o r y , which  C o n g r e s s , as  "Red  exhibit  America  to  presidential  the  the to  the  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e senators  At  war  materialism  and  victory  war  and  the  surrounding  image  nominee  As  began  or  were  pent-up f r u s t r a t i o n s that  presidential  United  keep  the  a the  i n d i v i d u a l i t y and to  as  of  Americans  2  internal  the  Regardless  "normalcy."1  hysteria  The  3  war  Nations.  to  as  energy,  battle  b o t h Houses o f  public]  the  that  opinion that  to  came  representatives,  Republican  Americans  surface,  proof  Americans the  1920  treaty,  elected  contribute  the  Versailles  dominating  subsided,  during  that  the  the  s o c i a l upheaval.  Harding's  On  what  referred  l a t e r to  pre-occupied  and  to  of  public.  issues  their  creative  stored  Warren  towards  memory, and  the  Treaty  American  of  1919-1920  were  the  policy  Warren  Scare"  the  feelings  foreign  of  II  won  their  majority  the  treaty  political  included "they  results  of and  parties  majorities  [the  complications  American and  in  -  -  59  p a r t i c u l a r not t o j o i n the League of N a t i o n s . " combined with  the Republican  Party's  4  staunch  This attitude stand  i n the  Senate a g a i n s t f o r e i g n involvement, had the u l t i m a t e e f f e c t o f limiting  the options  of the Harding A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  soon evident t o the Republican bipartisan  actions  prior  hierarchy that t h e i r  t o assuming  I t was  aggressive,  the p r e s i d e n c y  had  e f f e c t i v e l y blocked t h e i r access t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s and  had thus s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l e d  their  ability  to protect  America's i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . Amongst election  the world's  caused  some c o n f u s i o n  p o l i c y the United in  diplomatic  States  could  community,  Harding's  as t o what type of f o r e i g n  be expected t o pursue.  While  the Senate, Harding had e s t a b l i s h e d a modest record as an  internationalist had  e s p e c i a l l y on i s s u e s  relating  to trade.  not, however, a g g r e s s i v e l y a s s e r t e d h i s own opinions  wide spectrum of f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s . been  a member  during  of the Senate's  the t r e a t y d e b a t e ,  controversy  treaty canize"  which  report  contained  t h e document.  actual guous.  Although Harding had Relations  Committee  He was a l o y a l  supporter  and had c o n s i s t e n t l y v o t e d  of  for a  the r e s e r v a t i o n s designed t o "Ameri6  d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y t o avoid placing  on a  h i s a c t u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the  had been m i n i m a l .  Lodge's m a j o r i t y  Foreign  He  Yet, h i s l a c k of p u b l i c comment, a becoming  c o n t r o v e r s i a l and t h u s  h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l a s p i r a t i o n s i n jeopardy, l e f t h i s opinions  on America's  i n t e r n a t i o n a l involvement  ambi-  -  Moreover, Harding's Republican Convention support  he  60  -  nomination  on the t e n t h b a l l o t at the  r a i s e d questions as to how  c o u l d muster w i t h i n h i s own  compromise  candidate,  Harding's  much personal  party.  relatively  Viewed  weak  p o s i t i o n meant t h a t he had very l i t t l e input i n the of the p a r t y ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y p l a t f o r m . Elihu  Root, a prominent  designed  to  flexibility  be  wordy  f o r the  internationalists specific, ruling  he  out  and  Root  possibility  address American c o n c e r n s . especially  Convention  had  the of  j o i n i n g the League of Nations  was  wanted  isolationists.  hoped to s a t i s f y the  the  ambiguous i n order  party.  important  to  revealed  the  platform  to appeal By  Root  was  to c r e a t e some to  both  r e f u s i n g to  United  while  States  i f the covenant was  Meeting  8  political composition  irreconcilables the  a  P r i m a r i l y w r i t t e n by  7  internationalist,  and  as  one  be not day  changed to  the demands of the Senate because  extent  of  the  the  Republican  influence  c o n t r o l which l e a d i n g senators exerted over the P a r t y .  and  In h i s  keynote address, Senator Lodge made i t very c l e a r t h a t regardl e s s of which p o l i t i c a l p a r t y the next the Senate would  insist  President  on maintaining  America's f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  represented,  a strong i n f l u e n c e on  9  The c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the Republican Party made the s e l e c t i o n of  a  Secretary  cabinet was  posts  appointed.  advocated  of  State  to f i l l .  one On  of  Harding's  March 5,  1921,  most  difficult  Charles E. Hughes  Hughes brought to h i s p o s i t i o n a record which  American  involvement  in a  r e v i s e d League.  His  - 61 family  background  connected affairs  with  (he  the  was  from  Eastern  l e d Hughes to the  New  York where he  elites)  and  interest  c o n c l u s i o n t h a t with  was  well  in foreign  the  military  p r o t e c t i o n p r e v i o u s l y a f f o r d e d by the B r i t i s h Navy i n d e c l i n e , the  United  States  its  strategic  had  to become more aggressive  interests.  The  1 0  in  guarding  f a c t t h a t Hughes had not been  a member of the Senate during the t r e a t y debate made him much more w i l l i n g  than Harding to challenge  the a u t h o r i t y of t h a t  body.  For t h i s reason, the P r e s i d e n t allowed h i s S e c r e t a r y of  State  to  foreign  be  p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r formulating  policy.  One  America's  1 1  f o r e i g n p o l i c y c r i t e r i o n t h a t Harding d i d e s t a b l i s h ,  however, was  his  insistence that  his Administration  would  not l e a d the United States to membership i n the League "by s i d e door, back door, or c e l l a r d o o r . "  the  Motivated by p o l i t i c a l  1 2  expediency, t h i s p o l i c y put Hughes i n the awkward p o s i t i o n of having  to make e l a b o r a t e  authority During State  of  his  attempts t o a v o i d acknowledging  the  League  and  first  months  in office,  Department  officials  indeed,  to  i t s very  to  when he  was  lack of d i r e c t  severely c r i t i c i s e d  i n p a r t i c u l a r , the New Hughes' p o l i c y pointless.  cooperation by  York T i m e s . of  allow  correspondence  r e c e i v e d from the v a r i o u s o f f i c e s of the League. of State's  existence.  Hughes refused to  respond  the  continued  The  Secretary  until  1923,  the American press,  and,  13  non-cooperation  soon  proved  to  be  The Secretary of State's d e s i r e to p r o t e c t America's  - 62 interests  made  informing  t h e League  towards s p e c i f i c war  still  i t necessary  that  he  find  some method  of America's p o l i c i e s  issues.  needed t o be  and  attitudes  Nagging problems remaining from the resolved  by t h e League  and Hughes  wanted to ensure t h a t America's p o s i t i o n was p r e s e n t e d . dilemma that he had to face was that  to f i n d  of i s o l a t i o n .  1 4  The  a communication l i n k  d i d not appear t o be t o o c o o p e r a t i v e  America's p o l i c y  of  At f i r s t ,  nor j e o p a r d i z e d  the U n i t e d  States  r e s o r t e d t o communicating with the League through the d i p l o m a t i c o f f i c e s of t h i r d p a r t i e s , f o r example, the Dutch government.  15  T h i s method, however, was not s a t i s f a c t o r y because the a s s i s t i n g governments o f t e n d i d not share the same concerns or i n t e r e s t s as  the United  States.  Consequently,  the State  Department  began t o search f o r a country that was a member of the League and this the  with whom i t shared s i m i l a r intention,  i n t e r e s t s and p o l i c i e s .  S t a t e Department o f f i c i a l s  began t o explore  p o s s i b i l i t y of using Canada as a " f r o n t man"  i n t e r e s t s i n the League. participate  With  f o r American  In s h o r t , America's need t o a c t i v e l y  i n the world  community  while  still  publicly  appearing to be i s o l a t e d , was the stimulus f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a d i r e c t , c l o s e , unique r e l a t i o n s h i p with the Dominion of Canada. When the s i x t y - s e v e n t h  Congress assembled f o r the  first  time on March 4, 1921, both the House and the Senate i n i t i a l l y wanted  t o address a number of domestic  temporarily  i s s u e s that  s e t a s i d e by the t r e a t y debate.  had been  The tone of the  l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t Congress would d e a l with had been e s t a b l i s h e d  -  63  -  by  Harding's campaign promise to lower taxes.16  of  f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t r e s u l t e d i n budgetary cuts t o p u b l i c works  p r o j e c t s , veterans  allowances,  and a proposal t o make d r a s t i c  cuts i n the Naval A p p r o p r i a t i o n s B i l l . which sparked an war  indication  This policy  the most controversy  I t was t h i s l a s t i s s u e  i n the Senate and served as  t o the American p u b l i c of how d r a s t i c a l l y t h e  had a l t e r e d America's i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n .  course  of the debate senators  began t o r e a l i z e  made i n the naval expenditures  During the  t h a t any cuts  f o r domestic p o l i t i c a l  reasons  would have s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r America's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . It  became c l e a r  that America's  Japan, and China  r e l a t i o n s with  Great  Britain,  would be a f f e c t e d by any c u t s t h a t appeared  to  weaken the United S t a t e s ' m i l i t a r y presence i n the P a c i f i c .  As  w e l l , America's  a t t i t u d e towards  the question  of world  disarmament would a l s o have t o be r e v i s e d i f the s i z e of the navy was downgraded. clearly was  In s h o r t , the Naval A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  revealed t h a t one o f the l a s t i n g  t h a t domestic p o l i t i c a l  expediency  i s s u e s had become so i n t e r - r e l a t e d  effects  o f the war  and f o r e i g n  t h a t they  Bill  policy  could no longer  be d e a l t with as separate e n t i t i e s . 1 ? The f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e t h a t was most f r e q u e n t l y discussed in  connection  with  the Naval  Appropriations  proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e .  Bill  was t h e  This a l l i a n c e ,  signed between Great B r i t a i n and Japan i n 1902, had long been a concern by  Great  of s u c c e s s i v e American a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . ! Britain  8  Designed  t o be a method of p r e s e r v i n g her d e c l i n i n g  - 64 role  i n the P a c i f i c ,  protecting  sionist One,  Far East  a l s o preventing  Japan.  allowed  strength  the a l l i a n c e served  Britain's  Russia while  In essence, Great  -  Britain  i n the P a c i f i c  the dual purpose o f  possessions  from  a possible conflict  Imperial  with  expan-  the a l l i a n c e ,  p r i o r t o World War  t o withdraw  some o f her n a v a l  i n order  t o meet the growing t h r e a t  posed by Germany i n the A t l a n t i c . In the United S t a t e s , however, the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was viewed  by many  officials,  notably  Secretary  of State  Hughes, as a t h r e a t t o both America's P a c i f i c possessions and to her p o l i c y  of an Open Door i n C h i n a .  widespread a n t i - B r i t i s h sentiment  As mentioned, the  1 9  i n the United  States caused  American p o l i c y makers t o be s u s p i c i o u s o f the B r i t i s h government's motives i n the P a c i f i c .  As w e l l , the State Department  was e q u a l l y concerned with Japan's i n t e n t i o n s .  That  country's  v i c t o r y i n the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) had convinced many Western Japan.  observers With  2 0  of the p o t e n t i a l  military  the c o l l a p s e of T s a r i s t  Russia  strength of i n 1917, and  the c o n c l u s i o n of World War One i n 1918, Japan c l e a r l y emerged as the foremost  power i n the Far East.  alliance  came up f o r renewal  intended  t o make t h e i r  Consequently, when the  i n 1920, American  strenuous  officials  o b j e c t i o n s known t o both  governments. The  State  Department  Imperial  Russia  had e l i m i n a t e d the o r i g i n a l  alliance.  I f renewed,  maintained  the United  that  States  the d e c l i n e of purpose would  f o r the  interpret  this  a c t i o n as  counter  an  -  65  -  attempt  by  Great  Britain  American s t r e n g t h i n the P a c i f i c . 2 1  the Naval A p p r o p r i a t i o n s B i l l was some s e n a t o r s ,  in particular,  argued t h a t the  United  and  Japan  For t h i s  to  reason,  e s p e c i a l l y p e r t i n e n t because Hiram Johnson of  States could  not  afford  California, t o make  any  c u t s t h a t would weaken her p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c . 2 2 Johnson's a t t i t u d e was he  admitted  ironic.  A v o c a l member of the  during  the  naval  irreconcilables,  appropriations  debate  that  indeed, the United States could no longer a f f o r d to ignore the policies  of  other  State Department  nations.  to  take  In e f f e c t ,  whatever  Johnson l o b b i e d  a c t i o n was  necessary  the to  inform the B r i t i s h government t h a t the United States considered the a l l i a n c e d e t r i m e n t a l to the development of a c l o s e AngloAmerican r e l a t i o n s h i p . 2 3 During the Senate debate Johnson r e c e i v e d support position  from h i s c o l l e a g u e James D. Phelan,  fornia,  i n opposing  the  naval  cuts.  for his  a l s o from  Phelan  was  Cali-.  especially  concerned by the proposed renewal of the a l l i a n c e because both Japan and B r i t a i n were members of the League and benefitting decision  that  to award the  irritated control  from  body's  Pacific  island  American o f f i c i a l s who  the  strategic  island.  authority.24 of Yap  wanted the "The  seemed to be The  to the United  League's Japanese States  menace of Japan,"  s t a t e d i n the Senate: [was] so m a n i f e s t t h a t he who runs may r e a d , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e s e l a t e r months when J a p a n , a member o f t h e League o f Nations, has c a s t o f f a l l d i s g u i s e , a l l i e d  to  Phelan  -  66  -  h e r s e l f with the powers o f Europe, where we are not represented, and has apparentlyassumed an u n f r i e n d l y p o s i t i o n . 2 5 Phelan alone  then  went on t o argue t h a t the United  i n i t s concern  over  Japan's p e r c e i v e d  States was n o t aggressiveness.  At t h i s p o i n t i n h i s speech t h e Senator noted t h a t : t h e r e i s an i n s t i n c t i v e f e a r throughout the P a c i f i c among t h e n a t i v e t r i b e s , as w e l l as among the Caucasians i n C a l i f o r n i a , i n Washington, Oregon, New Zealand, Canada and A u s t r a l i a t h a t t h e i r very l i f e [was] threatened. 2 6  Phelan  maintained  that t h i s  the United States preserved and prevented with  f e a r c o u l d only be e l i m i n a t e d i f a strong presence  t h e renewal of the a l l i a n c e .  the P a c i f i c  Dominions was a c l e a r  His i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  indication  Senate was becoming aware o f the controversy the Empire over the q u e s t i o n of t h e a l l i a n c e ' s awareness was made even more e x p l i c i t Reed of M i s s o u r i . existed  in British  i n the P a c i f i c  existing renewal.  by Senator  Referring t o the tense  that the within This  James A.  atmosphere  which  Columbia between the Asian and Caucasian  communities, Reed argued t h a t : i f an unprovoked war were t o be made upon us by Japan and i f Great B r i t a i n were t o c a l l upon Canada t o help a brown race t o attack the U n i t e d S t a t e s of America, Canada would be i n a flame o f r e v o l t and would take her p o s i t i o n beside the C h r i s t i a n c i v i l i z a t i o n of North America as a g a i n s t the paganism o f the O r i e n t . 2 7  The  common a t t i t u d e which Western s e n a t o r s  shared  with  the P a c i f i c Dominions and i n p a r t i c u l a r Canada, a l s o extended into  the thorny  questions  of Asian  immigration  and r a c i a l  - 67  equality.  -  At the time of the P a r i s Peace Conference, P r e s i d e n t  Wilson, r e c o g n i z i n g that Asian r a c i a l e q u a l i t y was an important i s s u e i n C a l i f o r n i a , Oregon and Washington, refused to i n c l u d e in  the  League o f Nation's  racial in  equality.28  the Senate,  Covenant a statement  During the Anglo-Japanese  racial  equality  again  guaranteeing  Alliance  debate  became a c o n t e n t i o u s  i s s u e i n the Western s t a t e s and reached new  h e i g h t s of h y s t e r i a  when the Hearst newspaper c h a i n p u b l i s h e d a number of e d i t o r i a l s opposed Lodge  to  and  America's  Asian Oscar  the  Underwood  Again,  from  Senators  Alabama,  Phelan,  recognized  that  p o l i c i e s and a t t i t u d e s were supported by the P a c i f i c  Dominions.30 in  immigration.29  Senator  Montreal  Hitchcock,  Gazette  F  referring  make i t c l e a r  to an  to h i s  editorial senatorial  c o l l e a g u e s that the Canadian government considered the questions of A s i a n immigration and r a c i a l  equality p r i o r i t y  i s s u e s that  had t o be on the agenda of the next Imperial Conference h e l d i n 1921.31 holds e x a c t l y  The Democratic  t o be  Senator concluded that "Canada  the same views that  the United S t a t e s h o l d s , "  and t h e r e f o r e , America should encourage the Canadian government to take a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n . 3 2 An important f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g to the Senate's knowledge of Canadian p o l i c y was ping  between  the c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p that was  leading Republicans  and  develo-  Loring Christie,  an  intimate a d v i s o r of Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r s Robert Borden and Arthur  Meighen.  h e r i t a g e and h i s own  Born  i n Nova  temporary  Scotia,  Christie's  family  employment i n Washington when a  68  -  -  young man, caused him t o be very s e n s i t i v e and concerned about issues confronting policy  both Canada and the United S t a t e s .  papers t o Borden  and Meighen  contained  3 3  His  sophisticated  analyses of America's p o s i t i o n on a number of important t o p i c s a f f e c t i n g the B r i t i s h Empire and Canada i n p a r t i c u l a r . article,  "Loring  Christie  In h i s  and the Genesis o f t h e Washington  Conference," Canadian h i s t o r i a n Arthur Lower maintained t h a t i t was C h r i s t i e ' s i n f l u e n c e that was the determining f a c t o r i n Canada's a t t i t u d e towards Alliance. mental  Moreover,  3 4  in setting  the renewal of t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e  i n February 1921, C h r i s t i e was i n s t r u -  up meetings  Rowell and l e a d i n g American s i o n s , the S t a t e  i n Washington  officials.  Department  between  During these d i s c u s -  made i t s a t t i t u d e  towards t h e  Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , Asian immigration and r a c i a l very c l e a r  Newton  t o the Canadian government.  American  equality officials  went to great lengths t o o u t l i n e the f r u s t r a t i o n they f e l t a t not  being able  to receive  a definitive  response  from t h e  B r i t i s h government. An examination o f State Department the U n i t e d the  renewal  Pacific Through  States  tried  t o make i t s p o s i t i o n  of the a l l i a n c e  known t o t h e B r i t i s h i t s ambassador  but a l l i s s u e s government  far  on n o t o n l y  relating  as e a r l y  i n London, t h e American  made repeated attempts t o a s c e r t a i n Pacific policy.  records i n d i c a t e s t h a t  the d e t a i l s  as 1919. government  of B r i t a i n ' s  On May 10, 1920, the S t a t e Department  as t o send a d i s p a t c h t o London which  t o the  outlined  went so American  - 69 -  o b j e c t i o n s t o the renewal changes  the United  of the present  States  deemed n e c e s s a r y  government should decide t o s i g n wanted  to maintain  States.35  Although  alliance  a growing  i f the B r i t i s h  a revised treaty  relationship  the B r i t i s h  and  still  with the United  attempted  to p l a c a t e the  United S t a t e s , enough s u s p i c i o n of B r i t i s h motives American c i r c l e s  and t h e  remained i n  t o cause t h e S t a t e Department concern.  As a  r e s u l t , t h e United States changed i t s t a c t i c of d e a l i n g s o l e l y with the B r i t i s h government and began t o e x p l o i t i t s u n o f f i c i a l connections with  Canada.  Through L o r i n g C h r i s t i e ,  American  o f f i c i a l s encouraged the e f f o r t s o f the Canadian government i n c o n v i n c i n g the B r i t i s h not t o renew the a l l i a n c e . 3 6 Canada's r e a c t i o n t o the proposed Japanese a l l i a n c e  and the Asian  some extent, formulated United S t a t e s .  Robert  immigration  i n response  of the Anglo-  q u e s t i o n was, t o  to the a t t i t u d e  The two i s s u e s served  c o u n t r i e s the many s i m i l a r i t i e s  renewal  t o demonstrate to both  existing  in their  policies.  Borden had made i t c l e a r t h a t Canada would not support  a p o l i c y which was opposed or deemed h a r m f u l States.37  which so pre-occupied  primary  concern  Secretary  informed  by t h e U n i t e d  Moreover, the monetary c o s t of an adequate P a c i f i c  defense,  the  of the  American Senators, was a l s o a  o f the Canadian government. o f S t a t e , t h e American  In a l e t t e r t o  Consul  i n Montreal  h i s government t h a t Canada had decided t h a t " i n the  matter  of naval  defense,  i t [was] p e r f e c t l y  Canada  [was] i n no p o s i t i o n  now, nor w i l l  obvious  that  be f o r years t o  come, t o undertake more that T h i s statement was Canada was  advocate  sister  that  i t s P a c i f i c defense with the  T h i s e x p l a i n s why Canada was much more prepared ending  Pacific  looked  being done. . . ."38  an i n d i c a t i o n to the State Department  beginning to i d e n t i f y  United S t a t e s . to  i s already  the Anglo-Japanese  Dominions.  to Great B r i t a i n  Both  New  alliance  than  Z e a l a n d and  for protection,  her  Australia  and consequently,  wanted t o keep the powerful Japanese Navy as an a l l y  instead  of a p o t e n t i a l foe.39 The  actual  part  that  Canada played  i n the debate over  the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e has been the source of controversy amongst Canadian and Commonwealth h i s t o r i a n s . Although the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y of  the  American  interesting  i s extensive, a detailed  perspective  question  which  has  needs  y e t t o be t o be  analysis  complete.  explored  4 0  is:  An What  r o l e , i f any, d i d the United S t a t e s e n v i s i o n Canada p l a y i n g ? An  e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e American  documentation  reveals  that American p o l i c y makers b e l i e v e d t h a t the Canadian government had the w i l l and the f l e x i b i l i t y to pursue an independent diplomatic imperial  course.  u n i t y , American  made a s t r o n g forced  Aware o f B r i t a i n ' s officials  stand against  t o adjust  desire  believed  the a l l i a n c e  i t s policies.  that  indirect  means, a t t e m p t e d  i f Canada  B r i t a i n would  be  Consequently, i n a d d i t i o n to  the v o i c e s already heard i n the Senate, the S t a t e using  t o preserve  t o encourage  Department,  Canada t o  more a s s e r t i v e w i t h her s i s t e r Dominions and Great B r i t a i n .  be 4 1  - 71 This s i t u a t i o n dented  diplomatic  independent  should  have a f f o r d e d Canada  opportunity  foreign policy,  not o n l y  an  unprece-  to foster  her  own  but a l s o to enhance the Canadian  government's i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s by e x p l o r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of having Great B r i t a i n and the United States v i e f o r Canada's support.  Keeping i n mind the B r i t i s h government's concern f o r  maintaining gain  a  i m p e r i a l u n i t y and t h e U n i t e d  reliable  Empire,  ally  both  i n t h e League  the s i t u a t i o n  should  to e x p l o i t .  In order  officials  States  have been  and  ripe  to understand  d e s i r e to  the  British  f o r Canadian why  Canada d i d  not use her unique p o s i t i o n t o f u l l advantage i t i s necessary to analyze  the stance the Canadian government d i d take on the  Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and then examine how Great B r i t a i n and the United States reacted to Canada's p o s i t i o n . In e a r l y 1921, the q u e s t i o n reached  the stage  decision.  of the a l l i a n c e ' s  where the B r i t i s h  renewal  government had t o make a  In an attempt to f o r c e B r i t i s h  officials  to l i s t e n  to h i s government's arguments, Canada's Prime M i n i s t e r , Arthur Meighen, informed  London of h i s d e s i r e t o a s s i g n  a  special  Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , presumably Robert Borden, t o Washington  i n order  United  t o "get i n touch  with  S t a t e s and h i s Secretary  through reaction telegram  informed  sent  of State  and c o n f i d e n t i a l  i f the a l l i a n c e by Meighen  W. Lampson, an o f f i c i a l  was  the new  President  . . . and d i s c o v e r ,  conversations  renewed.42  to the B r i t i s h  i n the B r i t i s h  of the  . . ." t h e i r  paraphrasing government,  Foreign  Office  the  Miles argued  - 72  -  that: t h e Canadian government c o n s i d e r e d t h i s method of procedure the most a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a u s e t h e P a c i f i c Dominions were i n r e a l i t y more v i t a l l y a f f e c t e d than o t h e r p a r t s of the Empire, and a l s o because the p r o p o s a l , i f i t came from Canada, seemed best c a l c u l a t e d to a t t r a c t the government at Washington.43 "The  Canadian people  ..."  continued  Lampson,  w o u l d e x p e c t e v e r y e f f o r t t o be made towards the p o l i c y of c o o p e r a t i o n ; as i t i n v o l v e d the f i r s t d e f i n i t e s t e p of primary s i g n i f i c a n c e i n B r i t i s h - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s s i n c e the c e s s a t i o n of the war they would a t t a c h great importance to the present question. . . . C a n a d i a n s had s p e c i a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s to understand and to d e a l with Americans through long a s s o c i a t i o n and intercourse.44 I t was its  c l e a r to Lampson t h a t Canada was  desired  role  world powers. threat  that  of  a c t i n g as  attempting  a mediator  to  between  fulfill the  two  I m p l i c i t i n Meighen's request was the u n d e r l y i n g  i f Canada was  not  granted  permission  to  send  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to Washington the Canadian government would prepared  to c o n s i d e r  a c t i n g independently.  aware t h a t t h i s c o u l d mean the end policy  f o r the whole Empire.  taken,  ..."  of having  "Unless  Lampson was  a be  well  only one f o r e i g n  prompt  action  [was]  Lampson warned:  We may see an immediate move, independently of His M a j e s t y ' s Government, between C a n a d a and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s on t h e p r o b l e m s o f t h e P a c i f i c and J a p a n e s e p o l i c y i n t h a t r e g i o n . . . .45 Lampson concluded that  h i s summary of Meighen's p o s i t i o n by  i f Canada pursued a course  arguing  independent of the Empire the  - 73 Canadian government would of  the United  chairman already  States.  be p l a y i n g  i n t o the w a i t i n g  S e n a t o r Lodge,  o f t h e Senate  Foreign  hands  i n h i s c a p a c i t y as  Relations  Committee, had  i t would  be a c c e p t a b l e t o  expressed h i s o p i n i o n that  the United States i f the Canadian government sent a represent a t i v e to Washington.  46  Lampson was not the only B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l t o be concerned about American  motives f o r e n c o u r a g i n g Canada t o a p p o i n t a  representative.  " I f Canada i n s i s t s  on moving,  . . . " wrote  S i r W. T y r r e l l , a t W a s h i n g t o n by t h e d i s p a t c h o f S i r Robert Borden* w i t h o u t h a v i n g come t o an agreement w i t h u s , she w i l l be p l a y i n g i n t o the hands of S e n a t o r Lodge and h i s p a r t y who hope t o u t i l i z e the q u e s t i o n of Japanese a l l i a n c e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f detaching her and p o s s i b l y A u s t r a l i a with a view t o s h i f t the centre of the E n g l i s h speaking communities from London t o Washington . . .47 Lord George N a t h a n i e l Curzon, Great B r i t a i n ' s Foreign S e c r e t a r y , was  also  policies  w o r r i e d about  the i m p l i c a t i o n s  i f Canada s h o u l d t a k e  to the Empire's  independent a c t i o n .  wanted h i s o f f i c e t o r e t a i n maximum  Curzon  f l e x i b i l i t y without being  hindered by the a t t i t u d e s and p o s i t i o n s o f the Dominions. a telegram, c a r e f u l l y cause United  t h e Canadian  British  government t o react  S t a t e s , Winston  Colonies,  worded so as not t o o f f e n d  Churchill,  informed the Canadian  In  Canada and  by working with the  the B r i t i s h Governor  Secretary of  G e n e r a l that the  "Strongly urge[d] that the Canadian Government should  not approach the Washington government independently. . . ."48  - 74 T h i s comment, combined with the B r i t i s h government's previous attempts was  to  limit  the  independent a c t i o n s of the  a f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t Great  B r i t a i n was  Dominions,  attempting  to  renege on the commitments i t had made to the Dominions during the  war  policy.  and  regain  c o n t r o l of  the  Empire's  foreign  4 9  Although  C h u r c h i l l ' s telegram  p l a n , Canada s t i l l sending an  full  opposed  foreign  Canadian  had the o p t i o n of a c t i n g independently  i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to Washington.  opportunity  the  for  policy.  Canada  By  to  gain  i g n o r i n g the  Clearly,  and  this  more c o n t r o l over British  its  objections  sending a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to the United States i t was  and  conceivable  t h a t t h i s would f o r c e the B r i t i s h government to recognize s p e c i a l concerns and  i n t e r e s t s of Canada.  n i z i n g Canada's independent r o l e as a p o l i c y maker and i m p e r i a l p o l i c i e s to s u i t Canada's new  the  The B r i t i s h govern-  ment would be p l a c e d i n the awkward p o s i t i o n of e i t h e r  its  was  recog-  adapting  p o s i t i o n or,  Great  B r i t a i n c o u l d have r i s k e d a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and i m p e r i a l c r i s i s by attempting  to prevent  While B r i t i s h and question the  of  United  corps.  The  sending  toward  Canadian o f f i c i a l s were d i s c u s s i n g the a special  States was  kept  Canadian envoy to Washington,  fully  informed  by  i t s diplomatic  i n f o r m a t i o n being r e c e i v e d by the American govern-  ment, however, difficult  Canada's i n t e r n a t i o n a l growth.  tended  f o r the  Canada.50  to  State As  be  i n c o n s i s t e n t making  Department  mentioned,  the  to  formulate  State  it a  very  policy  Department  was  f u l l y aware o f the 1921 debates i n the Canadian House o f Commons p e r t a i n i n g t o Canada's permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n Washington. The  fact  that  there was very l i t t l e  opposition  i n Canada t o  the concept o f independent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and t h a t the p o l i t i c a l debate was a c t u a l l y over the q u e s t i o n of whether  the Canadian  representative  Embassy, was  interpreted  s h o u l d be t i e d  by American  to the B r i t i s h  officials  as meaning t h a t  appointment would be made i n the near future.51  a Canadian  Moreover, the  State Department was a l s o encouraged by the tone o f the debate. Newton  Rowell's  Washington  "would  argument  that  not impair  Canadian  but would  representation i n  t e n d t o improve t h e  r e l a t i o n s not only between Canada and the Mother Country, but also the  between Canada and t h e U n i t e d attitudes  c i a n s . 52 the  p o s s e s s e d by American  coincided  with  d i p l o m a t s and p o l i t i -  The combination o f the House o f Commons' debates and  confrontation  renewal  States,"  between Canada and Great B r i t a i n  o f t h e Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e  States that  Canada was p r e p a r i n g  over t h e  convinced the United  t o sever i t s t i e s w i t h t h e  Empire. Less  than  demonstrated  a month a f t e r  i t s commitment  t h e Canadian House of Commons to separate representation i n  Washington, by a l l o c a t i n g funds i n the f e d e r a l budget, American consulates  i n Canada began sending a d i f f e r e n t  S t a t e Department. Gazette  s i g n a l t o the  C i t i n g an e d i t o r i a l p r i n t e d i n the Montreal  on May 7, 1921, t h e American  consulate  i n Montreal  informed Washington that Arthur Meighen had apparently decided  - 76 to heed the warnings of the  -  British  government and  publicly  announced t h a t Canada would not v i g o r o u s l y pursue c l a r i f i c a t i o n of  i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l status.53  that  the  1917  d e c i s i o n to  Moreover, Meighen a l s o s t a t e d  hold  an  imperial constitutional  conference at the c o n c l u s i o n of the war of  practical  things,  and  indeed,  was  directly  p r i n c i p l e upon which the p r o s p e r i t y and our  commonwealth  delayed  ..."  was  indefinitely.54  counter  realm  to  even the e x i s t e n c e  established  "The  "outside the  and  people of the  therefore,  the of was  Empire," Meighen  went on to s t a t e : h a v e d i s c l o s e d no l i k i n g f o r a b r u p t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes, and seem u n l i k e l y to embark i n the near f u t u r e upon complicated i n v e n t i o n i n such a f i e l d . 5 5 Meighen's comments l e f t American p o l i c y makers confused as how  to  to respond to the Canadian government's changed p o s i t i o n .  In the Senate, i n d i v i d u a l senators, Idaho,  concluded t h a t  Canada was  such as W i l l i a m  not  Borah  prepared to assume  of the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of an autonomous n a t i o n and would not send an independent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to the United In attempting  to account  apparent  hesitancy  factors.  C e r t a i n l y , the  Canada's request  f o r the  British  to send an  was  w e l l aware of the  as  a whole, i f i t had u n i t y and  Canadian  h i s t o r i a n s have p o i n t e d  government's  to a number of  government's o p p o s i t i o n  independent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to  United States forms p a r t of the answer.  imperial  States.56  f o l l o w an  the  The Canadian government  i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Canada and chosen t o  to  break w i t h  the  independent course.  the  Empire  concept For  of  Canada  - i n to have advocated t h i s p o l i c y i t would have needed the support of  a vast  majority  o f C a n a d i a n s . Not u n l i k e  public,  however,  Canadians  affairs  and were a n x i o u s  had l o s t  t o have  interest  their  address many of the p r e s s i n g domestic  t h e American in foreign  political  leaders  issues.57  A second f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o Canada's lack of independent  a c t i o n was a s t r o n g  that  i t was prepared t o c a l l  d i s c u s s i n g , among other t e n i n g world Alliance. the  peace,  i n d i c a t i o n from the United  a conference f o r the purpose of  t h i n g s , the outstanding  and i n p a r t i c u l a r ,  On A p r i l  States  issues  threa-  the Anglo-Japanese  13, 1921, Senator Borah introduced  Senate a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g  upon the P r e s i d e n t  into  t o host a  conference o f the major powers t o d i s c u s s world disarmament.58 Borah, attempting hoped  that  criticism United  h i s r e s o l u t i o n would  against  States  obligations. ference  t o enhance the Senate's t a r n i s h e d  with  h i s stand  stem  the t i d e  on t h e League  image,  of p u b l i c  by p r o v i d i n g t h e  an a l t e r n a t i v e t o permanent i n t e r n a t i o n a l  The Senator's m o t i v a t i o n  was an o u t g r o w t h  for calling  of h i s concept  the con-  o f North American  isolationism.  Borah hoped the conference would ensure w o r l d  peace w i t h o u t  the United  concept  of c o l l e c t i v e  mentality  that  S t a t e s ' making a commitment t o the  s e c u r i t y or n e c e s s i t a t i n g a f o r t r e s s  would have r e q u i r e d  enormous expenditures  on  the m i l i t a r y , and the navy i n p a r t i c u l a r . 5 9 The  Canadian government  Borah's motivation  and g o a l s .  could  certainly  identify  with  Canada's a t t i t u d e towards world  -  78  -  peace was very s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f the United S t a t e s . if  the President  participation decision  called  would  f o r a conference,  remove t h e need  as t o whether  i t should  Moreover,  America's a c t i v e  f o r Canada t o make a  a c t independently  of the  Empire. A third  factor  c o n t r i b u t i n g t o Canada's d e c i s i o n not t o  send a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o Washington was the June 1921 Imperial Conference.  T h i s conference  a f f o r d e d the Canadian government  an o p p o r t u n i t y t o a i r i t s views and grievances without the  drastic  step  of acting  independently.  taking  In r e g a r d s t o  Canada's p o s i t i o n on the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , the conference  provided Meighen with an opportunity t o present  the American and Canadian viewpoints.  Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  wasted no time i n making i t c l e a r t o the Imperial why Canada f e l t attitudes its  taken  i t had a s p e c i a l  right  delegations  t o be heard  and  its  i n t o account when t h e Empire was d i s c u s s i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p with  the United  States.  c l a i m , " Meighen s t a t e d i n h i s opening  "Canada does n o t  address:  that i n the general question of the renewal or the non-renewal o f the Treaty her v o i c e must be e s p e c i a l l y heard. Not at a l l . The Empire i s c o n c e r n e d as an Empire, . . . But r e g a r d s t h i s a s p e c t , i t s e f f e c t s on B r i t i s h - A m e r i c a n r e l a t i o n s , we do f e e l t h a t we have a s p e c i a l r i g h t t o be h e a r d . . . . We know, o r ought t o know, the United States best, and because in the continuance and improvement o f our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h them we have a v i t a l concern. 6 0  Within  this  statement,  the underlying  concern  which t h e  Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r had f o r Canada's r e l a t i o n s h i p with the  United  States  Two rence,  i s revealed.  days  prior  Meighen  Canadian  t o h i s address  had e l a b o r a t e d  before  on  the Imperial  h i s fear  that  American-  r e l a t i o n s were becoming t o o i n t e r t w i n e d .  of t h e United  States policy,  . . . " Meighen  Confe-  "The c o u r s e  maintained:  in every field a f f e c t s Canada. Their numbers a r e many t i m e s t h e numbers o f t h e Dominion i n p o p u l a t i o n . Their decisions, t h e i r l i n e s o f p o l i c y c o n s t a n t l y a f f e c t us i n a profound degree. We l i v e i n c o n s t a n t and v i t a l t o u c h w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m f r o m day to day. . . . 6  Within  this  declined  to assert  government would,  comment  feared  1  lies  itself  t h e fundamental  i n foreign affairs.  the pressure  i n the f i n a l  had  f o r i t s own p u r p o s e s . the choice  of either  remaining  committed  structure  to present  Meighen's  government  that  policy  preserving  North  America's the l a t t e r chance  concerns course  a  States  situation  S t a t e s t o manipufelt  that i t  "front  man" o r  and w o r k i n g  within  that  and a t t i t u d e s . because  of succeeding  d e c i s i o n not to play  was  independently realized  into  t h e American  t o t h e Empire  Canadian  i t felt  while  still  f o r Canada some f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n .  America's  government  Canada  Canada  the United  f o r the United  becoming  chose  from  why  The  M e i g h e n ' s government  had t h e b e t t e r  Canada's bringing  coming  analysis, lead  where s h e w o u l d become a t o o l late  reason  that  an  independent  role i n  a t t i t u d e s t o the a t t e n t i o n of the B r i t i s h  d i s a p p o i n t i n g both  States  and t o  American p o l i c y  makers  i m p e r i a l u n i t y by f o r c i n g  Canada  minded C a n a d i a n s . i n threatening  to the United Still,  -  to  identify  80  i t s i n t e r e s t s with  -  the  United  States,  they  had  d i s c o v e r e d a t o o l t h a t could be used to t h e i r advantage i n the future.62 In the Canadian h i s t o r i o g r a p h y , B a r t l e t Brebner d e s c r i b e d Meighen*s r o l e throughout the Anglo-Japanese Treaty dispute as helping: to c r e a t e a favorable opportunity for Charles Evans Hughes, . . . to i n v i t e the powers to a conference at Washington f o r naval disarmament and f o r r e d r e s s i n g t h e balance of power i n the P a c i f i c . . . .63 This  i s a very  verified  that  i n the American documentation.  identification States  substantial, claim  with  with  American  access  to  the  policies  i s only  C e r t a i n l y , Canada's provided  imperial council.  government's r e l u c t a n c e to a s s e r t i t s e l f , i s s u e and  the  United States meant t h a t Canada d i d not  terize  her  Canada e s t a b l i s h e d a precedent response  to  States  Canadian forcing  link  p l a y as  presented  the  charac-  Consequently,  and  with  substan-  t h a t would  future c r i s e s .  government between February  United  By not s e i z i n g  c o n f l i c t i n g view of Canada's s t a t u s t h a t was United  The  communication  a r o l e as the opportunity presented.  initiative  the  however, by  the  tial  establishing a direct  partially  to  June 1921,  the the did  more to hinder than help the development of a c l o s e AmericanCanadian The  relationship. next  6 4  opportunity  f o r Canada and the United States to  e s t a b l i s h a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p was Naval  Conference  scheduled  presented  f o r November  by the Washington 1921.  With  the  - 81 concept of a world disarmament conference f i n a l l y  accepted  all  to  the  major  powers, the  State  Department had  i s s u e i n v i t a t i o n s to p a r t i c i p a t i n g n a t i o n s . soon  r a i s e d as  separate  to  whether  the  question  should  positions  receive  i n v i t a t i o n to the B r i t i s h  responsibility of her  to  Dominions.  handle In  The standard  the  making  United States sparked an h i s t o r i c a l  a  Empire.  demands and this  Robert  Status.  decision,  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Canada's lack of a  MacGregor  Dawson  1900-1936.65  i n The  Although  policy  separate  f i r s t put  forward  Devolopment of Dominion  Dawson was  not  completely  unsympathetic to the American p o s i t i o n , he d i d p o i n t out the United that  States  their United  justified  States  was  not  national  status  ment. 66  This  accepted,  i n a modified  recent  work An  Edelgard States  Dominions' separate  historical  new  British  form, by  of V e r s a i l l e s meant t h a t recognize  status  invitations.67  and  the  Dominions by  current  to Canadian-American  u n w i l l i n g to therefore,  not  docuto  In  be  their  Relations.  "the  recognize did  inter-  that  studies.  Graeme Mount concluded t h a t rather  that  arguing  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n continues  Introduction  slow and  Treaty  o b l i g a t e d to  accorded the  Mahant and  was  i g n o r i n g the Dominions by  r e j e c t i o n of the  the  controversy.  i n v i t a t i o n to the Washington Conference was  the  was  United States chose the l a t t e r course thus making i t Great  Britain's  by  formally  s t a t u s as e s t a b l i s h e d at the P a r i s Peace Conference,  or should be i n c l u d e d i n one The  Dominions  The  by  United  ..." issue  the them  - 82 Certainly,  once  the conference  had been  called  the  American government d i d demonstrate an ambivalence towards the British  Dominions.  American  State  Department  p o l i c y makers were w e l l  Canadian newspapers m a i n t a i n e d  records  indicate  aware t h a t  that  editorials in  Canada had r e a c h e d t h e  s t a t u s o f an equal partner with Great B r i t a i n . 6 8 in  the immediate aftermath  11,  1921, i n a l e t t e r  o f the Imperial  from  their  American government was a d v i s e d must  be a l l o w e d  United  States  American forced  strongly  days l a t e r  urging  diplomatic  within  that  London  that  j  n  addition,  Conference,  July  Ambassador, t h e  t h e Dominion  Premiers  some r o l e at the conference i f the  wished t o avoid  feeling  four  t o play  that  causing  a resurgence  the Empire.69  T h i s l e t t e r was  by a communication t h e United  of a n t i -  States  r e c o g n i t i o n t o the D o m i n i o n s .  from  Lord  reinCurzon  extend some form o f 70  At t h i s p o i n t i n  the correspondence i t appears t h a t Dawson's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was correct  and t h a t  i t was t h e American  government, which had  been informed o f the Dominions' changing  international role,  t h a t was u n w i l l i n g t o grant any r e c o g n i t i o n t o the Dominions. Further suggests,  examination  however, t h a t  of the State  Department  the t h e s i s that  records  t h e United  States  refused t o acknowledge the Dominions' s t a t u s i s not completely accurate.  Many h i s t o r i a n s , e s p e c i a l l y John G a l b r a i t h , have  pointed  out t h a t  the Harding  options  i n the question of whether the Dominions could  a separate i n v i t a t i o n .  7 1  Administration  In 1911, the Republican  d i d have  some  receive  Administration  - 83 of W i l l i a m Howard T a f t had e s t a b l i s h e d a precedent by i n v i t i n g Canada t o a t t e n d national  a c o n f e r e n c e convened  convention r e l a t i n g  property.72  t o update  t o the p r o t e c t i o n  an i n t e r -  of i n d u s t r i a l  H a r d i n g , i f he had so chosen, c o u l d have  used  T a f t ' s example, which had been e s t a b l i s h e d at a time when the Dominions'  were n o t demanding  international  reason f o r sending the Dominions on  the Taft  Dominions  precedence,  status,  a separate i n v i t a t i o n .  Harding could  were i n c l u d e d because o f t h e i r  as a Based  have argued t h a t the special  interests i n  disarmament and the i n v i t a t i o n i n no way committed  the United  States t o r e c o g n i z i n g a new s t a t u s f o r the Dominions. A second historical with the  factor  that  interpretation  t h e Senate. mistakes made  also  undermines  stems from  the t r a d i t i o n a l  Harding's  relationship  As a former senator, Harding was aware o f by W i l s o n  members o f Congress.  i n not c o n s u l t i n g  The P r e s i d e n t  realized  the leading  that  the Senate  was e x p e r i e n c i n g some p u b l i c d i s f a v o u r because of i t s b i p a r t i s a n a c t i o n s during  the t r e a t y  debate and consequently, would not  be  i n a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n t o d i s p u t e which  in  attendance  decision  at the conference.73  to include  Senators  Lodge  countries Moreover,  should be Harding's  and Underwood  i n the  American d e l e g a t i o n helped t o ensure the Senate's c o o p e r a t i o n . A l l these f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e d t o p r o v i d i n g the Harding Administration  with a f l e x i b i l i t y  indeed, attempted been  used  to gain  that Wilson had not possessed or  to create. support  This  flexibility  i n t h e Senate  could  have  f o r e x t e n d i n g an  -  invitation  84 -  to the Dominions.  Significantly,  State  Department  records  indicate that  P r e s i d e n t Harding d i d attempt t o explore some of h i s o p t i o n s . In a l e t t e r dated August 23, 1921, the State Department asked i t s London Ambassador t o determine how many commissioners the British  government  "Presumably  felt  each  delegation  should  include.  [the] B r i t i s h Government w i l l d e s i r e , . . . " wrote  S e c r e t a r y o f State Hughes: to i n c l u d e Dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and of course t h i s would be very acceptable t o the United S t a t e s . . . . We do not d e s i r e t o attempt t o impose r e s t r i c t i o n s upon r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f other Governments but we consider t h a t the Governments w i l l d e s i r e a s u b s t a n t i a l equality of representation and with t h i s i n view i t would be d e s i r a b l e t o l i m i t each commission t o f i v e or s i x . We assume t h a t i n the case o f the B r i t i s h Government s i x would g i v e f u l l opportunity f o r Dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s which t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s does n o t d e s i r e t o make difficult.74 Certainly,  this  not prepared sister  letter  t o accept  does imply  t h a t the United  States was  the dual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n Canada and her  Dominions had enjoyed at the P a r i s Peace Conference.  At the same time, however, Hughes*  letter  does demonstrate a  w i l l i n g n e s s on the p a r t o f the United States t o recognize t h a t a change i n the Dominions' s t a t u s had taken p l a c e w i t h i n the imperial national  s t r u c t u r e and should  be acknowledged at the i n t e r -  level.  America's London Ambassador, George Harvey, response t o the  Secretary  of State's  i n q u i r y revealed h i s i m p r e s s i o n  the B r i t i s h government's a t t i t u d e towards i t s Dominions.  of In a  - 85 telegram  sent  on August  r e c e i v e d Hughes l e t t e r Department t h a t he yesterday  with  had  26,  1921,  after  the  Ambassador  of the 23rd, Harvey informed "had  Curzon."75  a long  and  most  Harvey went on  had  the S t a t e  friendly  talk  to state that  on  the i s s u e of d e l e g a t i o n s i z e , Curzon: s t r o n g l y recommended t h a t o f f i c i a l represent a t i o n i n a c t u a l membership of conference be l i m i t e d to two or at most t h r e e . . . . Although Curzon d i d not say so I g a t h e r t h a t he expects L l o y d George and h i m s e l f w i l l thus r e p r e s e n t the B r i t i s h Empire, . . . They c o n s i d e r . . . [dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ] a f a m i l y a f f a i r and f e e l q u i t e competent and a u t h o r i z e d t o speak f o r the whole Empire. . . . t h e y a r e so s e n s i t i v e upon t h i s p o i n t t h a t I f e e l sure Curzon would have been disposed to resent a suggestion from me. . . .' 6  Harvey explained to the State Department t h a t he had  tried  to  make i t c l e a r to the B r i t i s h government t h a t Dominion represent a t i o n was  acceptable to the United States and  the  Ambassador  did: present [Hughes'] t e n t a t i v e suggestion of f i v e to s i x d e l e g a t e s to a v o i d [the] p o s s i b i l i t y o f f u t u r e c r i t i c i s m from Dominions t h a t might be based upon t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e y were barred out of adequate p a r t i c i p a t i o n through any p l a n or act of yours.77 Harvey concluded the  British  h i s telegram with h i s personal assessment of  government's  demand f o r s t a t u s .  attitude  towards  i t s Dominions'  " C o n f i d e n t i a l l y I f e e l , " Harvey wrote:  s a t i s f i e d t h a t Curzon and L l o y d George do not care to have [the] Dominions d i r e c t l y represented by t h e i r own d e l e g a t e s upon [the] same p l a n e o f a u t h o r i t y as thems e l v e s .78  -  This  telegram  government  later  the procedural 29,  1921,  86  became the  -  basis  determined the  from which the  size  of the  delegations  methods the conference would adopt.  Secretary  of State  make c l e a r to the B r i t i s h abroad t h a t we  On  and  August  Hughes asked h i s Ambassador  government  have l i m i t e d  "that  not  get  and  thus made i m p r a c t i c a l Dominions'  willingness  American  [the]  idea  [the] s i z e of  should  delegation  representation.  to have l a r g e r d e l e g a t i o n s  should  to  Our  accordingly  be  apparent."79 The an  correspondence between London and Washington  i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the United  some of i t s options by being status.  States was  sudden  diplomatic  recognition.  Great  of  Britain  States. accept  using  willingness  the to  to  the  attend.  8 0  explain  Dominions  adopt  policies  be argued t h a t  The  State  u n l i k e l y that American  States was  on  the  t h a t America  i s s u e of the  Department had Zealand  or  h e r s e l f of  diplomatic  status  the the  opportunity conference by  to  United  prepared  been  to  could Anglo-  informed  A u s t r a l i a would  diplomats assumed, however, that  would a v a i l  at  New  the  induce  advantageous to the  the United  Dominions' support  some  an extension of i t s o r i g i n a l  the Dominions at the conference was  i t was  to  Dominions, e s p e c i a l l y Canada, t o  Japanese A l l i a n c e . that  grant  C e r t a i n l y , i t can  A major reason why  have used the  exercise  f l e x i b l e on the i s s u e of Dominion  American government's a t t i t u d e was policy  prepared to  There are a number of f a c t o r s which help  America's  provides  Canada  demonstrate  continuing  to  her lobby  -  against the renewal of the  87  -  alliance.  As w e l l , i t can a l s o be argued t h a t Hughes* proposed t h a t the  Dominions should  be  represented  as  part  of  the  British  d e l e g a t i o n because i t would provide the United States with opportunity Republican  to appoint and  from  the  a number of prominent i n d i v i d u a l s , both  Democrat, to t h e i r  would have helped  to ensure t h a t  c o n f e r e n c e would  p a r t i e s and  the  gain  delegation. any  This  8 1  tactic  agreement (s) r e s u l t i n g  support  from both  political  r e c e i v e speedy passage i n the Senate.  A t h i r d f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g to Hughes* d e s i r e to have the Dominions present Ireland.  In  warned the had  h i s August  State  continued  c o u l d be  British  to cause f r i c t i o n  referring  to  and  S t a t e s , powerful to  see  the  had  Dominion  status.  to  to be  justify  the  telegram, Ambassador the  Irish  l o b b i e s and States  status.  8 3  granting  State  acquiesce  situation,  the naval  p  prominent  o r  this  to  In  senators  immediately  the  the were  recognize  reason,  any  American  question  I r e l a n d without  82  between  for Ireland.  Department would not  status  which  conference.  negotiations  c a r e f u l when h a n d l i n g The  Harvey  i n Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s ,  ongoing  the same r e c o g n i t i o n to the other Despite  the changing s t a t u s of  representatives  United  in Ireland's  officials  able  1921  Department t h a t  officials  anxious change  26,  s u b s t a n t i a l l y changed before  Harvey was  United  at the conference was  of  have been extending  Dominions.  a l l these f a c t o r s , the  United  States  decided  to  i n the B r i t i s h d e s i r e to keep Dominion r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  - 88 a  "family  affair,"  Dominions.  and d i d n o t i s s u e  American  officials  growth o f the Anglo-American the  United  States  invitations  were r e l u c t a n t t o hinder the  relationship.  interfering  to the  The appearance of  i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f the  Empire would c e r t a i n l y have put a s t r a i n on any f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s with Great  Britain.  More importantly, the  Canadian  however, the obvious back t r a c k i n g o f  government  i n the events  leading  up t o and  i n c l u d i n g the June Imperial  Conference, c r e a t e d an impression  in  was n o t s e r i o u s  Washington  that  Canada  demands f o r d i p l o m a t i c  autonomy.  s t r o n g l y oppose the d i p l o m a t i c  the  Washington  conference  The f a c t t h a t Canada d i d  84  not  in its public  arrangement  further  convinced  laid  out  for  t h e American  government t h a t Canada was not, a t t h a t time, a n t i c i p a t i n g an active role.  Evidence o f Canada's hesitancy was l a t e r revealed  i n t h e Canadian House of Commons when W i l l i a m Lyon Mackenzie King  pointed  out t h a t  any s t a t u s  a c q u i r e d at t h e Washington conference efforts  B r i t a i n take  to t h e c o n f e r e n c e .  85  steps  King  have  was due t o t h e s t r i d e n t  t o ensure the Dominions  access  accused the Meighen government o f  i t s r e s o l v e t o make Canada d i p l o m a t i c a l l y autonomous.  He reasoned t h a t by accepting the  may  o f t h e South A f r i c a n government which had i n s i s t e d  that Great  losing  t h e Dominions  Canadian government  a back seat  had d e m o n s t r a t e d ,  at the conference once a g a i n , i t s  w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept B r i t i s h c o n t r o l o f i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . While Canada d i d not p l a y  a prominent  role  8 6  at t h e c o n -  f e r e n c e , w h i c h was 6,  1922,  the  Treaty its  of  i t s own  Versailles  Parliament  binding cially  on from  on  were a c c e p t e d that  gaining  any  insisted  agreement  the  British  Dominions'  behalf.  government was  some f o r m o f  signing  government.87  Africa,  established At  at  the  not  the  ments  accepted  Harding  Versailles of  vocal  infringed  Both  that  had  the  irreconcilables the  clearly  the  debate, who  by  the  the  right  i t  of  became  pressure,  espe-  lobbied  the  another  indication  opposed t o the  Dominions'  recognition.  Washington  used  to  By  permitting  branch of  government  had  originally  the  i n d i c a t e d to  the  still  the  been  remained to  any  As a  their  Dominions.  Treaty  arguments and  the  on  that  agree-  with  the group  agreement  that  to formulate  the  Robert  the  abrogation of La  an  arguments  Versailles,  signing  Senator  colleagues  of  task  small  R e s u r r e c t i n g some o f t h e the  the  naval  Senate.  government's a b i l i t y  Alliance  his  Conference  t o get  opposed  defeat  focussed  of  there  were  American  Anglo-Japanese  agreements  of  foreign policy.  been  using  provisions  a status that  two-thirds  senators  independent  resulting  these  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was  by  Treaty  on  on  February  Paris.88  conclusion  facing  the  government  T h i s was  international  i t s recognition to  and  before  Under  the Dominions to s i g n America's e x e c u t i v e extended  1921  I n a d d i t i o n , Canada,  by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .  the American  12,  on  a precedent,  ratify  the  insist  behalf.  Canadian  South  Conference  did  as  to  the  -  h e l d between November  Dominion  a g r e e m e n t s on  89  the  of  naval  Follette  his position  on  the  question not  of  the  know," he  Dominions'  status  had  not  changed.  "I  do  commented:  whether the B r i t i s h Government would c o n t r o l , i f t h i s p r o p o s e d t r e a t y went i n t o e f f e c t , t h a t these Dominions should each have a s e p a r a t e v o t e under t h e t r e a t y , a s they have under the League of Nations .... A t a l l e v e n t s , we do know t h a t t h e A n g l o - J a p [ a n e s e ] p o l i c y o f a g g r e s s i o n and i m p e r i a l i s m w h i c h made t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e and t h e J a p [ a n e s e ] E m p i r e c l o s e a l l i e s i n t h e p a s t , and w h i c h m a k e s t h e m c l o s e a l l i e s t o d a y , w i l l c a u s e them t o s t a n d as a unit i n opposition to the p o l i c i e s of any p o w e r i n t h e P a c i f i c w h i c h d a r e s t o i n s i s t that the r i g h t s of the weaker people there shall be recognized and protected. 8 9  La  F o l l e t t e ' s m i s t r u s t of the B r i t i s h  colleague that  Senator  the  natural States  naval  Thomas W a t s o n treaties  advantage from  her  of  two  to  oceans  enemies.  mirrored  Georgia.  threatened  having  potential  of  was  Watson  destroy  ability  the  of  United  f o r t h e good b e h a v i o r and  Watson  strated  States  there  "hold  of England."50  represented  that  to  ...  still  genuine lack of understanding  the  United  significant  as  b o t h La  their  that  s a f e t y was  Canada  Although  a m i n o r i t y view,  was  argued  Watson m a i n t a i n e d  n a t u r a l advantage e n s u r i n g America's  his  America's  separating  additional  by  a  an the  hostage Follette  comments  demon-  o p p o s i t i o n and  a  r e l a t i n g t o Canada's i n t e r n a t i o n a l  status. For to  the  naval  senators roles  the  had  i n the  most  part,  agreements a  different  world  however, t h e did  Senate debate p e r t a i n i n g  demonstrate  view  community.  of  both  that  the  Canada's  Certainly,  the  majority  and  of  America's  irreconcilables  - 91 were able to prevent any  "Association  of Nations" that  would  have resembled a long term commitment by the United States.91 Yet, the tone of the d e b a t e s  on  t h e n a v a l agreements  was  s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from that of the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . Instead  of emphasizing how  Canada d i f f e r e d  S t a t e s , advocates of the agreements between the two n a t i o n s .  from  the United  focused on the s i m i l a r i t i e s  Symbolizing the changing a t t i t u d e i n  the Senate, Senator Lodge, i n h i s speech defending the agreement on the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese  A l l i a n c e , maintained  "that the a l l i a n c e was a breeder of s u s p i c i o n i n North America, both i n Canada and the United States."92 How  does the h i s t o r i a n account f o r the change i n a t t i t u d e  demonstrated period  by  a number  of American  senators i n the s h o r t  between the defeat of the V e r s a i l l e s  ratification  of the Washington  T r e a t y and  Naval Agreements?  the  Certainly,  the long term commitment by the United States was not the same in  the  Naval  Versailles. such  as  Agreements  As mentioned,  as  compared  t h e r e was  with  the Treaty of  no attachment  t h e League o f N a t i o n s , and  staunch  to a forum  isolationists  c o u l d , and d i d argue, that by l i m i t i n g the s i z e of the world's navies  the U n i t e d S t a t e s  fearing  the other world powers.  this  as  a policy  disarmament and  of  could  strength  live  in isolation  Senator through  Borah the  without  referred  to  combination  of  isolationism.93  The Senate debate a l s o revealed, however, t h a t t h e r e was a growing  realization  amongst  a l l levels  of the  American  - 92  -  governmental s t r u c t u r e t h a t the previous  century  could  no  isolationist  longer  be  policies  applied.54  of  the  During  the  three years between the a r m i s t i c e i n Europe and the Washington Conference questions United  States,  concern  for  realization  to nations  international trade her  Department to  relating  overseas  initiate had  indebtedness to  b a r r i e r s , and  possessions  the  America's the  State  a more i n t e r n a t i o n a l o u t l o o k .  This  contributed  required  to America's d e s i r e to hold  Washington Conference and was  the  a l s o to have a l a s t i n g e f f e c t  on  the American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s h i p . The  Senate's r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Naval Agreements was,  extension,  a r a t i f i c a t i o n of Canada's r i g h t to s i g n d i p l o m a t i c  agreements and despite  the  present  Canadian  them t o  an  i t s Parliament.  government's apparent  a g g r e s s i v e l y pursue a separate Canada had  and  unwillingness  distinct  ideas,  issues,  the American government was  i n presenting  and  concerns  " a f f e c t i n g the United  should have f u l l and  Canada t h e  United  States  gaining a l o y a l a l l y . American o f f i c i a l s  Conference of 1921,  States  and  final authority.  statement demonstrated t h a t  9 5  to  that  Finally,  aware t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r Meighen  made i t c l e a r at the Imperial  affairs  to  foreign policy,  proven to be a u s e f u l " f r o n t man"  i n t e r n a t i o n a l forum  Moreover,  r e f l e c t e d a d i s t i n c t l y North American p e r s p e c t i v e .  had  by  by was  9 6  Canada, the  that in Dominion  T h i s type of f o r c e f u l  encouraging protecting  the  autonomy  of  i t s i n t e r e s t s and  In the wake of the Washington Conference,  became even more convinced  of the Canadian  - 93 government's p o t e n t i a l the  role  and  policy  usefulness.  positions  T h i s becomes c l e a r  when  of Canada's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n  the League of Nations are analyzed. As mentioned, the American government had i n i t i a l l y to  ignore the e x i s t e n c e of the League but  detrimental at  to America's  an u n o f f i c i a l  organizations  interests,  level, and  when t h i s  tried proved  the United S t a t e s began,  t o d e a l i n f o r m a l l y with the League's  councils.  At  a number  of  conferences  sponsored by the League, the United S t a t e s sent observers although active  not  role,  p e r m i t t e d by used  their  own  government t o p l a y  an  i n f o r m a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s to make known t h e i r  government's p o s i t i o n  on  key  issues.97  Even t h i s method,  however, proved t o be an i n e f f i c i e n t way of p r o t e c t i n g interests.  who,  America's  Many c o u n t r i e s resented what they viewed t o be the  United States abrogating i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s while attempting to  enjoy some of the b e n e f i t s the League offered.98  both t h i s the  resentment  American  League,  the  privately  and  public Harding  that  Canada was  the  most  against  of t h e  encouraging  logical  to  convince the  a policy  of  those c o u n t r i e s whose  those of the United States.99 and  convenient  nation  most  purposes.  o b j e c t i o n s the  Canada's  of t r y i n g  the United States should j o i n  resembled  c l o s e l y s u i t e d to American One  futility  Administration initiated  s u p p o r t i n g and  p o l i c i e s most c l o s e l y  the  Aware of  involvement  irreconcilables i n the  League  had  had  levied  been  the  argument that the Dominion would simply be the puppet of Great  -  Britain.  1 0 0  9 4  -  Canada, i n c o n j u n c t i o n with South A f r i c a , however,  wasted no time i n proving those senators wrong. at  the f i r s t  meeting  As mentioned,  of the League's Assembly, Canada voted  a g a i n s t the p o s i t i o n of Great B r i t a i n over the i s s u e of world trade i n raw m a t e r i a l s .  T h i s i n c i d e n t demonstrated  was  to e x e r c i s e i t s vote  prepared  not only  t h a t Canada  i n t h e League  assembly but a l s o t o d i f f e r with Great B r i t a i n when i t was i n Canada's i n t e r e s t t o do s o . of  "Apparently one of the s u r p r i s e s  the assembly was t h e independent  atives Rowell  a t t i t u d e o f the r e p r e s e n t -  from the Dominions of t h e B r i t i s h t o t h e House  Assembly m e e t i n g s .  1 0 1  o f Commons  upon  Empire,"  reported  h i s r e t u r n from t h e  He went on t o s t a t e :  the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the m a j o r i t y o f t h e s t a t e s a p p a r e n t l y went t o Geneva b e l i e v i n g that the views o f t h e Dominions and t h e i r votes would n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w the views and votes of Great B r i t a i n , and when they found t h i s view d i d not p r e v a i l there was very great s u r p r i s e . 1 0 2  The  Canadian  government a l s o made i t c l e a r  during the f i r s t  Assembly t h a t Canada's p o l i c i e s were going t o be guided by i t s s e n s i b i l i t i e s t o the United S t a t e s . What  caught  the a t t e n t i o n  Canada's c o n s i s t e n t  1 0 3  o f American  adherence t o North  i n p a r t i c u l a r , peace through  officials  American  isolationism.  was  i d e a l i s m and  During the 1920s,  Canada e s t a b l i s h e d an extensive r e c o r d o f p r o t e c t i n g i t s v i t a l i n t e r e s t s , w h i l e tending t o a v o i d many of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s membership i n the League i m p l i e d . joining  1 0 4  Canada's main reason f o r  the League had been t o demonstrate  and enhance her  - 95 international status.  Canada q u i c k l y made i t known, however,  that there were l i m i t s to how with  the  indicated  League.  The  that  i t was  autonomy, not  f a r she was  w i l l i n g to  cooperate  Canadian government's a c t i o n s not  prepared  even to the world  to surrender  court.  clearly  any  Speaking  of i t s  before  the  Assembly, Raoul Dandurand, a member of the Canadian d e l e g a t i o n , argued t h a t there was  l i t t l e p o i n t i n Canada adhering  world court because "nine-tenths, i f not a l l ,  of the  of d i f f e r e n c e t h a t might a r i s e between Canada and world would be questions concerning  to  questions  the  the neighbouring  outside  Republic,  and t h e i r Southern neighbour had not yet adhered to the of J u s t i c e ....  Consequently, t h e r e was  Canada to j o i n . " convenient  1 0 5  the  Court  no p r e s s i n g need f o r  i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , the United States was  scapegoat used to e x p l a i n Canada's own  a  reluctance  at s u r r e n d e r i n g some of i t s sovereignty t o a world o r g a n i z a t i o n . Where t h e stance  Canadian  at the League was  collective  security  League's C o v e n a n t .  and  government  d i d show an  i n i t s o p p o s i t i o n to the concept in particular,  Canadian  Article  out t h a t Robert Borden opposed A r t i c l e  first  proposed  regard,  Borden was  amongst  North  the  raised  Ten  P a r i s Peace C o n f e r e n c e .  more aware of  Americans of the  was Woodrow Wilson. by  the  Ten  of  the  the  to  when i t was 1 0 6  In  this  widespread p o p u l a r i t y  concept  of i s o l a t i o n i s m  When the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s was  Canadian Parliament  of  h i s t o r i a n s have been quick  point  at  aggressive  i n September  i n the House of Commons concerning  1919,  ratified  questions  A r t i c l e Ten  than  and  were the  - 96 obligations emerged  i t would  impose  upon  Canada. 7  Having  10  from one war, Canadians were not prepared  the prospect  o f being o b l i g e d  to participate  just  to accept  i n future  wars  that may or may not i n v o l v e immediate Canadian i n t e r e s t s . Following  t h e League's  official  establishment,  Canada  submitted t o the Committee on Amendments t o the League Covenant a memorandum o u t l i n i n g Amongst that  Canadian o b j e c t i o n s t o A r t i c l e  i t s arguments,  i t had only  t h e C a n a d i a n government  joined  Ten.  1 0 8  maintained  the League because i t was under the  impression t h a t the covenant would be a l t e r e d i n such a way as to remove the a r b i t r a r y or compulsory a r t i c l e s . fying  h i s government's  stated  that  removed League.  i t was  position,  his belief  the Canadian that  from the covenant the U n i t e d 1 1 0  in justi-  1 0 9  representative  once  Article  Ten was  States  would  j o i n the  I t was t h i s l a s t argument, combined with  d e s i r e t o remove any a r t i c l e s  Canada's  which might be used t o oppose  the Canadian government's p o s i t i o n on such questions as Asian immigration, t h a t c o n s t i t u t e d Canada's major a c t i v i t i e s i n the League.  A l t h o u g h Canadian  attempts  representatives  throughout the e a r l y  1920s  made  t o have  repeated  Article  Ten  removed from the covenant, they were not able t o secure enough support from other n a t i o n s . American against  officials  watched  the League's Covenant w i t h  the Canadian interest.  activities  Not o n l y d i d  Canada's a c t i o n s provide the United States with the opportunity to  see some o f i t s c o n c e r n s b r o u g h t t o t h e f l o o r  of the  - 97 League's Assembly; the Canadian Article  Ten  American North  also  Senate  American  helped of  Canada's  idealism.  desire  t o a v o i d becoming  Europe  l e d a few  convinced Senate's John  t o break  new  to  convince  many members  addition,  to b e l i e v e  i n Canada was  S. W i l l i a m s of M i s s i s s i p p i  Memphis i n June 1922.  of  the  commitment Canada's  that  best expressed  i n a speech  in  Canada c o u l d Britain.  he  by  to  stated  involved in future c o n f l i c t s  a l l i t s t i e s with Great  interest  o p p o s i t i o n to  u s e f u l n e s s and In  1 1 1  senators  government's  1 1 2  be The  Senator  delivered in  In, s a i d Senator W i l l i a m s ,  c o n s i d e r [ i n g ] C a n a d a and o u r s e l v e s , ... [we see that] Nothing but a map line d i v i d e s us .... We are two n a t i o n s , f o r C a n a d a i s a n a t i o n i n a l l b u t name, ... b u t i n a l l e s s e n t i a l t h i n g s one p e o p l e , w i t h t h e same New World s p i r i t .... S h a l l we p e r m i t o u r s e l v e s t o 'be nagged' i n t o antagonism t o one a n o t h e r ? And y e t that i s j u s t what i s being accomp l i s h e d t o w a r d us i n C a n a d a by this h y p o c r i t i c a l complaint about Canada having a v o i c e and a vote i n an assembly where H a i t i and N i c a r a g u a and Cuba v i r t u a l l y c o n t r o l l e d by us, each has o n e . 1 1 3  Senator W i l l i a m s ' comments were j u s t  one more i n d i c a t i o n  that  some i n f l u e n t i a l Americans were beginning to see l i t t l e p o i n t in  alienating  a like-minded a l l y  with  diplomatic status in  the League. As with the Washington Conference, offered  the Canadian  Canada's own  government  an  the League of Nations  opportunity to  enhance  i n t e r e s t s by f o r c i n g Great B r i t a i n and the United  States t o compete f o r Canadian  support.  Great  Britain  still  wanted to maintain Canada's support i n the League because the  - 98 B r i t i s h government was the  world  United  a unified  still  Empire w i t h  one  foreign  policy.  reflected previous  the  the  North  distinct  The  American  view  gains  full  late  Canada  advantage and,  i n i t s quest  to  foreign a f f a i r s . By  of t h e w o r l d . d i d not  Canadian government d i d not use  League t o  significant  1921  As  connected  to  early from  made no  autonomy  1922,  in i t s  Canada  had e s t a b l i s h e d  i t s independent  a c t i o n s i n the  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o Washington  with the B r i t i s h  Embassy.  l e a d i n g American o f f i c i a l s  was  Certainly,  such  t h a t they  Meighen personnel  and and  government later  King,  a suitable  delayed. argued  As that  govern-  who  was  the  attitude  would  welcomed the a r r i v a l of a Canadian i n t h e i r c a p i t a l . Canadian  the  i t s position  consequently,  achieve  with  seize  League to i n s i s t t h a t Great B r i t a i n allow the Canadian ment t o appoint  a  ,  enough of a precedent  the  The  from t h a t of the Empire and  o p p o r t u n i t i e s , however,  initiative.  of  of  S t a t e s , on the other hand, wanted Canada to p u r s u e  f o r e i g n p o l i c y which was  in  t r y i n g t o present to the r e s t  1 1 4  not  have Still  previously stated, the  lack  of  trained  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r  t h i s delay. In r e a l i t y , however, the delay can be p r i m a r i l y a t t r i b u t e d to Canada's e f f o r t s to maintain some of i t s manoeuvrability i n the  f a c e o f p o s s i b l e manipulation  by  the United S t a t e s . The  Canadian government's r e l u c t a n c e t o appoint  a representative  to Washington stemmed from Canada's f e a r that once an appoint-  ment  was  made  officials stood  Canada  from  i n 1921,  would  -  not  dominating Canadian  99  be  able  Canadian  officials  were  from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o pursue  policy  that  North American  government  was  able,  by  the  United  forcing  Canada  through  to  ways o f p r o t e c t i n g  find  even  be  seen  the  her  i n no  i n the  Canadian  nations,  objections, Doctrine, would  in  who  also  to  i t s relations Canada's  the  influence  taking  the  Britain its 1921  in  the  the  Latin  safer  and  working  interests. Imperial  confusion ment was  route  1 1 7  of  of  using  reconfirming  The  Conference  the  fact and  imperial  that  trying  to  politics.  this as  an  1 1 6  diplomats  the  most  part,  i t s ties  with  Great  structure  League  accomplish  by  Monroe  that  to  protect  statements  at  of  led to  Nations  i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as t o what t h e C a n a d i a n actually  was  American  i t s doctrine  for  Canada's  i n the  join  South  the  anticipating  government,  within  to  and  despite  effects  i n Canada's d o m e s t i c  Canadian  can  i n t h e League  Canada's c o n c e r n n o t t o become a t o o l o f A m e r i c a n resulted  concern  decision  many  League  from  with  o f becoming d o m i n a t e d  a member  the United States  for interfering  pressure  American  unlike  minimize  became  some o f t h i s  involvement  Not  1 1 5  joined  order  Canada  prevent  excuse  neighbor.  foreign Canadian  government's  Canada's  the pressure  The  government. from  As i t  independent  conduct  itself  of  interests.  s m a l l measure, t o t h e f e a r  southern  American  to  British  t h e League o f N a t i o n s . due,  an  American  decisions.  aware  however, t o o f f s e t States  prevent  policy  coming  reflected  to  did l i t t l e  to  the  governenhance  - 100 Canada's this  reason,  i n 1921 in  diplomatic status the  amongst  of  American  Meighen s viewed  diplomats.  Conservative  1  by K i n g ' s L i b e r a l s was  as a p o s i t i v e  For  government development  Washington. American  debates had on  defeat  -  officials  had  been  Canadian  House  of  i n the  demanded t h a t the  The  issue  a  Canadian  government w o u l d t a k e s w i f t  opposed  in  British  Canadian  Embassy,  King's  election  W.S.  led  King's  mandate, t h e  ment's o p t i m i s m  The  Chanak  displayed Fielding  by who  give  officials  the  State  Canada t o b r e a k  development Fall  and was  ment o f a c l o s e r  on  the  Liberals  Washington.  that with King's v i c t o r y ,  American  would  The  1 1 9  the  of the  o f 1922,  1 1 8  his  representative.  members had  to  of  King's  consistently  representative's connection  o p p o r t u n i t y t o encourage connection.  Commons where  action to appoint a  adamant a t t i t u d e particular  any  informed  representation in  S t a t e Department a n t i c i p a t e d  cabinet,  well  t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e government t a k e some a c t i o n  of  Moreover, the  kept  with  conclude  Department  the that  another  away from i t s E u r o p e a n Chanak  Crisis  increased the  early  State  in  Depart-  t o prove a p i v o t a l event i n the develop-  American-Canadian Crisis  erupted  relationship. in  September  1922,  when  the  B r i t i s h government, unable t o r e a c h a s u i t a b l e peace s e t t l e m e n t with  Turkey,  military  assistance  settlement. responded  following  1 2 0  World  War  I,  asked  i t s Dominions  i f i t s h o u l d become n e c e s s a r y  Almost  positively  immediately, to  the  New  British  Zealand  to  and  request.  1 2 1  for  impose  a  Australia Canada,  - 101  -  followed by South A f r i c a , decided to use the c r i s i s as a t e s t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development of the r i g h t of the Dominion parliaments t o gain c o n t r o l Consequently,  King's  over t h e i r  response  own  foreign  t o the B r i t i s h  affairs.  government  was  that Canadian troops would not be committed u n t i l the Canadian Parliament had debated the issue.122 proper," s t a t e d  Prime M i n i s t e r  nj.t i s n e i t h e r r i g h t nor  King d u r i n g the p a r l i a m e n t a r y  debate on the government's handling of the c r i s i s , f o r any i n d i v i d u a l or f o r any group o f i n d i v i d u a l s to take any step which i n any way might l i m i t the r i g h t s of P a r l i a m e n t i n a matter which i s of such great concern to a l l the people of our country.123 King a s s e r t e d that  the Canadian  active participant  i n the events l e a d i n g up t o the c r i s i s and  so  d i d not  involved.  feel In  the Canadian or  would  that  essence,  Canada  government  should  K i n g was  had  not  been  an  a u t o m a t i c a l l y become  declaring  the supremacy of  Parliament i n e s t a b l i s h i n g whether Canada would,  not,  become i n v o l v e d  i n the  c r i s i s . "The  government of Canada's purpose," wrote W.K.  Liberal  Hancock:  was to extend the o l d d o c t r i n e of responsi b l e government f u r t h e r i n t o the f i e l d of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , and t o d i s e n t a n g l e Canadian p o l i c y from the i m p e r i a l p o l i c y pursued by the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e . 1-24 American  p o l i c y makers were kept  events surrounding the Chanak C r i s i s . ations  of the p o s i t i o n s assumed by  well  informed  of  the  The d i p l o m a t i c r a m i f i c -  Canada and  South  Africa,  both i n the i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e and i n the world community, were made c l e a r to the State Department by American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  - 102 stationed  i n both  countries.  Commons  debates,  Mackenzie  position  that  what that  kind  was  King  defended  Canada h a d t h e competence  o f commitment  i t would  i t d i d not c o n t r o l .  ments were  In the February  interpreted  h i s government's  t o decide  make  States,  that  for itself  to imperial  In the United  a s meaning  1923 H o u s e o f  policies  King's  state-  t h e new L i b e r a l  regime  p r e p a r e d t o assume more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l  affairs.125 The Canada  signals  were  confirmed  Dominions, editorial  that  and  the state  D e p a r t m e n t was r e c e i v i n g  by A m e r i c a n  in particular,  published  officials South  i n t h e Cape  posted  Africa.  Times  i n other  Quoting  on J a n u a r y  the c r i s i s  would p l a y  had enormously a f f e c t e d  "that  the Canadian  definite foreign  affairs."126  influence  information Canada's  within  Pisar  demands  Crisis  Canadian  t o have  the imperial  provided meant  warned  that  structure the State  a more  especially  on t o s t a t e  i t s position  America's  that  and amount  clarified.  The  Department  that  relations  with the  a new p h a s e o f c o m p l e x i t y . 1 2 7  government's  was c o n s i s t e n t  went  Pisar  believed  t o demand  relations,  The e d i t o r i a l  i t s rights  government  intend[ed]  i n Imperial  D o m i n i o n s was a b o u t t o e n t e r The  t h e r o l e t h e Dominions  t h e South A f r i c a n  government  understanding  Canada was w i t h i n of  concluded  i n B r i t a i n ' s future foreign p o l i c y objectives.  informed Washington t h a t  an  16, 1923,  C h a r l e s J . P i s a r , a member o f t h e A m e r i c a n C o n s u l a t e , that  from  position  with the a t t i t u d e  during  t h e Chanak  i t had demonstrated i n  the  League  avoiding  of  Nations.  any  involvement  a  at  to  Americanism  from  the  after in  stake.  Empire  Foreign  President consent  to  once a g a i n  to  assert  Crisis  reaching  itself  Less  told  away  the  six  again  from  dispatch  State  1923,  a  was  the  with  Canadian were  not  commitment  drifting  In  an  away  article  Kerr  argued  in that  role  of  the  Dominions  similar  to  the  American  e f f e c t i v e , required  Senate—in  February  1923,  our  the  and  the  case,  State  establish  the  Department  t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Canada was  later, his  July  1923,  indefinitely  federation  and  thus  the  preparing  a  American  government  separate  Canada  the  failing  the  Canadian  any  further  imperial guarantee  imperial to  in  Canada  officials  carry  had  Canada  government discussion  a  greater  had with  would  voice  d e c i s i o n not  structure out  in  structure that  in policy f o r m u l a t i o n . T h i s of  that  consul  foreign policy positions.  American  that  to a reformed  remodelling of  in  of  informed  postpone  Dominions  was  Philip  emerging  Britain  Department  pertaining  example  the  months  dated  Britain  a  in  to  apparent  Canada  i t s more a s s e r t i v e  to  pursue  that  lead  interests  Minister's  diplomatically  decided  the  Canada's  concerned  i n Washington.  than once  resemble  possibly  i t s entanglements.  Thus,  representation  a  could  Prime  cooperation  was  In  primarily  indicated  Great  Dominions."128  backed  was  "whose f o r e i g n p o l i c y , t o be and  Montreal  -  where  published  Chanak  relation  The  and  Affairs  the  that  conflict  directly North  King  disputes in  103  was  i t s public  for to  another policy  - 104 statements. into  The  reality  The  the  to be  sanction  significant Yet,  diplomatic  dragged  policy  areas  i n t o a dispute  of  initiating  p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s , the  steps  to  making—led  p o l i c y of i t s own. that  without  this  case,  e n s u r e her  and  but  American  allow  receiving  C l e a r l y , t h i s was  carrying  a  autonomy.  out  separate  Canadian government's  f o r c i n g Great B r i t a i n Dominions a g r e a t e r  to  lack take  voice  Canada was  a c t i v e , independent  in not  foreign  Indeed, s e n i o r American o f f i c i a l s began to  States  of the Empire and  first  Americans to conclude that  Canada would  United  skepticism.  for diplomatic  even  carry  e s t a b l i s h i n g a separate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n The  viewing  demonstrated that Canada would not  p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious to pursue an  doubt  Department's  autonomy w i t h  i n Canada's quest  aggression—in  tangible  State  of the Canadian Parliament. step  i n the  i n the  towards d i p l o m a t i c  Chanak C r i s i s had  itself  of  Canadian government's i n a b i l i t y to t u r n words resulted  Canada's steps  -  continued  out  i t s objective  of  i n Washington.130  to watch the  evolving  nature  encouraged Canada's a c t i v i t i e s i n the League  officials,  disappointed  at  Canada's  apparent  i n a b i l i t y to f o l l o w through on i t s s t a t e d d e s i r e f o r d i p l o m a t i c autonomy,  became more dependent  informally,  on  dealing  w i t h these organizations.131  directly,  j . short, n  the  if net  r e s u l t of the Chanak C r i s i s was  that Canada demonstrated that  she  obligated  would  i s s u e s not she was  not  necessarily  deemed to be  be  to  participate in  i n Canada's i n t e r e s t s but  also,  not prepared to determine and c a r r y out her own  that  policy  - 105 positions. While  these  i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes  t a k i n g p l a c e , a number of b i l a t e r a l States  and Canada  had c l e a r l y  i s s u e s between the United  demonstrated t o both  t h a t they had t o develop a more d i r e c t not it  only  nations  relationship.  Canada  feared American domination on i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s ;  becomes c l e a r when  fishing  and events had been  the h i s t o r i a n analyzes  the  trade,  and p r o h i b i t i o n disputes  between 1919-1924, t h a t the  Canadian government was searching  f o r a way o f a c h i e v i n g some  of i t s d i p l o m a t i c o b j e c t i v e s without conceding too much t o her powerful Clearly,  southern  neighbour  i n purely  bilateral  matters.  Canada r e a l i z e d t h a t by using the i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e  and having  the support  o f Great B r i t a i n , i t had a much greater  chance o f p r o t e c t i n g i t s i n t e r e s t s . T h i s was the dilemma t h a t Canadians had t o f a c e . one hand,  Canada c o u l d ,  demand more d i p l o m a t i c effective policy  the  United  autonomy.  Great B r i t a i n and  T h i s p o l i c y was e s p e c i a l l y  when t h e Canadian government threatened  of imperial  States.  and d i d , confront  unity  On t h e o t h e r States,  On the  by moving  closer  hand, i n i t b i l a t e r a l  Britain's  to the  United  r e l a t i o n s with  Canada had t o come t o g r i p s with  the f a c t  t h a t she was at a d i s t i n c t disadvantage when n e g o t i a t i n g her  more p o w e r f u l  early  1920's  resources analysis  neighbor.  Consequently,  wanted,  on b i l a t e r a l  and s u p p o r t  which G r e a t  Canada,  with  i n the  issues, the diplomatic Britain  o f t h e r e l a t i o n s and i s s u e s that  possessed.  developed  An  between  - 106 the  United  States  and Canada i n the e a r l y 1920s  reveals  that  because of Canada's dilemma i t was the Canadian government that was  r e l u c t a n t to take t a n g i b l e  separate presence i n Washington.  steps  towards e s t a b l i s h i n g a  - 107 Endnotes Chapter Two b a i l e y , The Man  i n the S t r e e t , p. 7.  F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on the "Red Scare" see: Stanley Coben, " N a t i v i s m and the Red Scare or 1919-1920," P o l i t i c a l Science Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 79 (No. 1 March 1964), pp. 52-75. 2  F o r a b r i e f examination of the 1920s see: F.L. A l l e n , Only Yesterday (New York: Harper, 1931); J.D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy (New York: Harper, 1960). 3  4  "Two Years of American Foreign P o l i c y , " p. 1.  -'For more i n f o r m a t i o n on the p o i n t that American o f f i c i a l s f e l t hampered i n t h e i r attempts t o p r o t e c t America's i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s see: S e l i g A d l e r , The Uncertain Giant: 1921-1941. American Foreign P o l i c y Between the Wars (London: M a c m i l l a n Co., 1 9 6 5 ) ; Samual F l a g g Bemis, The American S e c r e t a r i e s of State and T h e i r Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929); Clarence A. Berdahl, The P o l i c y of the United States With Respect to the League of Nations (Geneve: L i b r a r i e K u n d i g , 1932); Raymond B. Fosdick, S e c r e t a r y Hughes and the League of Nations (New York: E i l e r t P r i n t i n g Co., 1924). B e r d a h l , The P o l i c y of the United States with Respect to the League Qf Nations, p. 62. 6  7  I b i d . , pp. 60-61.  8  Ibid.  J o h n C. Vinson, The Parchment Peace. The United States Senate and the Washington Conference. 1921-1922 (Athens: The U n i v e r s i t y of Georgia Press, 1955), p. 39. 9  i^Adier, The U n c e r t a i n G i a n t ; 13  1921-1941, p. 45.  - I b i d . , p. 47.  -"••^Berdahl, The P o l i c y of the United to the League of Nations, p. 96. 13  New York Times. 18 J u l y ,  1921.  States w i t h Respect  - 108 1 4  Adler,  The  Uncertain  -  Giant:  1921-1941. p .  B e r d a h l , The P o l i c y o f t h e U n i t e d t h e L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s , pp. 100-105.  States  1 5  to  l^See:  President  57.  Hardings' Inaugural  with  Respect  A d d r e s s on March  4,  1921. Congressional 1 7  Vinson,  R e c o r d . March 4, The  Parchment  1921,  Peace,  pp. p.  4-6.  44.  F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e s e e : A l f r e d L.P. D e n n i s , The A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1923) . F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on A m e r i c a ' s c o n c e r n o v e r t h e a l l i a n c e s e e : V i n s o n , The Parchment P e a c e : G r a e b n e r , I d e a s a n d D i p l o m a c y : Thomas G. Paterson, ed. Major Problems i n American F o r e i g n P o l i c y V o l . 2 (Toronto: D.C. H e a t h and Company, 1 9 7 8 ) . 1 8  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , P a p e r s R e l a t i n g t o t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1920. V o l . 2 (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 3 6 ) , p . 680. 1 9  ^Congressional  R e c o r d . March 1, 1921,  p.  4147.  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , P a p e r s R e l a t i n g t o the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s 1920. V o l . 2. p . 680. 2 1  f  2 2  Congressional  R e c o r d , November  2 3  Ibid.  2 4  Ibid.,  March 1,  2 5  Ibid.,  p.  2 6  ibid.  2 7  Ibid.,  1921,  p.  4148.  1922,  p.  3557.  18,  1919,  p.  8733.  4147.  March  8,  A r n o l d J . Toynbee, The C o n d u c t o f t h e B r i t i s h F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s S i n c e t h e P e a c e S e t t l e m e n t (London: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 2 8 ) , p p . 12-13. 2 8  - 109 V i n s o n , T h e P a r c h m e n t P e a c e , p . 4 4 . A l s o s e e : U n i t e d S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , P a p e r s R e l a t i n g t o t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1 9 2 1 . V o l . 2 ( W a s h i n g t o n : G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 3 6 ) , p . 3 2 3 . 2  9  3 0 c o n a r e s s i o n a l  t h e Vol.  3  1  I b i d . ,  M a r c h  3  2  I b i d . ,  p .  R e c o r d . 8 ,  3  3  4  I b i d . ,  u n i t e d t h e F o r e i g n p. 680. 5  p .  7 " E x t r a c I m p e r i a l M a c k a y , 2 , T h e P n a l A f f a i 3  e 9 n a  p .  4 1 1 9 .  4 0 1 0 - 4 0 1 1 .  4 1 .  S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , P a p e r s R e l a t i n g R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1 9 2 0 . V o l .  6  3  G 1 I W  1 9 2 1 ,  4 0 1 1 .  L o w e r , " L o r i n g C o n f e r e n c e , " p . 4 1 . 3  h e . A . o l . x t e r  p p .  4 ,  A r t h u r R . M . L o w e r , " L o r i n g C h r i s t i e a n d t h e G e n e s i s o f W a s h i n g t o n C o n f e r e n c e , " C a n a d i a n H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , 47 (No. 1 March 1966), p. 40. 3  3  t R V E  1 9 2 0 ,  M a r c h  n e r a 2 1 , t e r n s h i n  t  l  a n d t h e G e n e s i s  f r o m M i n u t e s o f t h e F o W a r C a b i n e t , d a t e d D e c e d . , D o c u m e n t s o n C a n a d i a r i s P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e o f r s , 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 1 7 .  u n i t e d S t a t e i n M o n t r e a l R e c o r d s o f a l A f f a i r s o f g t o n ( m i c r o f i 8  C h r i s t i e  o f t h e  a n l t l 9  0  f n . o f  s ,  D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , A m e r i c a n C o n s u l a t e t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e H u g h e s , A p r i l 2 8 , t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o t h e G r e a t B r i t a i n 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 2 9 , N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s , l m , 1 9 6 4 , 8 4 1 . 0 1 / I M 7 / 6 ) . A b r o g a t i o n Q u a r t e r l y .  F o r d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f C a n a d a ' s r o l e t e a n d F o y , " M o r e L i g h t o n t h e A b r o g a t i o n o f g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e " ; B r e b n e r , " C a n a d a , t h e A n g l o - J a p l i a n c e a n d t h e W a s h i n g t o n C o n f e r e n c e " ; M . S . F r y , " T h e l a n t i c T r i a n g l e a n d t h e A b r o g a t i o n o f t h e A n g l o - J a p l i a n c e , " J o u r n a l o f M o d e r n H i s t o r y . V o l . 3 9 ( N o 1 6 7 ) , p . 4 6 - 6 4 ; G a l b r a i t h , " T h e I m p e r i a l C o n f e r e n c e o f 4  T A A A A 1  9  W a s h i n g t o n  r t y - S e v e n t h M e e t i n g o e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 1 8 , " i a n E x t e r n a l R e l a t i o n s 1 9 1 9 ( O t t a w a : D e p t .  M e r z e T a t e a n d F i d e l e F o y , " M o r e L i g h t o n t h e o f t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e , " P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Vol. 74 (No. 4 D e c e m b e r 1959), p. 535. 3  t o 2 .  s e t a n e N o r a n e M a r 1 9  e h s t s c 2  : e e h e h 1  - 110 and t h e Washington C o n f e r e n c e " ; I r a K l e i n , "Whitehall, W a s h i n g t o n , and t h e A n g l o - J a p a n e s e A l l i a n c e 1919-1921," P a c i f i c H i s t o r i c a l Review. V o l . 41 (No. 4 November 1972), pp. 460-483; Lower, "Loring C h r i s t i e and the Genesis of the Washington Conference." 4-1-Lower, "Loring C h r i s t i e and the Genesis o f the Washington Conference," p. 41; a l s o , Fry, "The North A t l a n t i c T r i a n g l e , " pp. 50-53. Throughout 1920 and 1921, the State Department r e c e i v e d numerous r e p o r t s from i t s o f f i c i a l s i n Canada. These reports o u t l i n e d Canada's a t t i t u d e towards the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e American b e l i e f t h a t Canada would f i r m l y oppose the renewal of the a l l i a n c e . See: United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consulate G e n e r a l i n Montreal t o Secretary of State Hughes, A p r i l 28, 1921; United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Consulate General i n Ottawa t o Secretary of State Hughes, A p r i l 29, 1921, Records of the Department of State R e l a t i n g t o the I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n . 1910-1929. (841.01/IM7/4). G r e a t B r i t a i n , F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Documents on B r i t i s h F o r e i g n P o l i c y . 1919-1939. F i r s t S e r i e s . V o l . 14 (London: Majesty's S t a t i o n a r y O f f i c e , 1966), Document No. 261, p. 272. 4 2  4 3  Ibid.  4 4  I b i d . , p. 274.  4 5  I b i d . , p. 275.  4 6  I b i d . p. 276.  4  ?Ibid.  G r e a t B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , Telegram from Winston C h u r c h i l l t o C a n a d i a n Governor G e n e r a l , A p r i l 26, 1920, (F1696/63/23) i n Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y . 1919-1939. V o l . 14, p. 276. 4 8  K l e i n , " W h i t e h a l l , Washington, A l l i a n c e , " p. 476. 4 9  and the Anglo-Japanese  S^The i n f o r m a t i o n being r e c e i v e d by the State Department tended t o c o n s i s t of p u b l i c debates and newspaper a c c o u n t s which o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t e d statements from Canadian government officials.  - Ill See: United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g t o the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1921. V o l . I . p. 25; and 63-64. * C a n a d a , House o f Commons, D e b a t e s , June 30, 1920, p. 4538. Also: Congressional Record. March 8, 1920, pp. 4010-4011. 5  52Quote from: Canada, House of Commons, Debates, March 4, 1921, p. 2399. For American a t t i t u d e see: Congressional Record. March 4, 1921, p. 4119; and I b i d . March 8, 1922, p. 3557. 53united S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , American Consulate General i n Montreal t o Secretary of State Hughes, May 7, 1921, R e c o r d s o f t h e Department o f State R e l a t i n g t o the I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n . 1910-1929. (841.01IM7/7). 5 4  I b i d . , p. 2.  5 5  Ibid.  b 6  Congressional  Record. March 3, 1920, p. 3801.  G a l b r a i t h , The E s t a b l i s h m e n t Status a t Washington, p. 81. 5 7  o f Canadian  58p more i n f o r m a t i o n on B o r a h ' s Vinson, The Parchment Peace, p. 97. o r  5 9  Diplomatic  r e s o l u t i o n see:  I b i d . , p. 5.  Clark, p. 178. 6 0  Documents on Canadian Foreign  W a l t e r A. R i d d e l l , P o l i c y . 1917-1939 (Toronto: pp. 64-65. 6 1  P o l i c y . V o l . 3.  Documents on C a n a d i a n F o r e i g n Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962),  6 2  Fry,  "North A t l a n t i c T r i a n g l e , " p. 53.  63  B r e b n e r , "North A t l a n t i c T r i a n g l e , " pp. 281-282.  R e p o r t s being r e c e i v e d by the State Department c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t American o f f i c i a l s i n Canada were not c e r t a i n 6 4  - 112 how the Imperial Conference of 1921, or the Washington Naval Conference had e f f e c t e d the Canadian government's i n t e r n a t i o n a l status. See: G a l b r a i t h , The E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f C a n a d i a n Diplomatic Status at Washington, pp. 82-84. "Dawson, ed., The Development of Dominion Status, p. 48. 6 6  Ibid.  Mahant and Mount, An I n t r o d u c t i o n to Canadian-American R e l a t i o n s , p. 113. 67  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consulate General i n Montreal t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, June 6, 1921, R e c o r d s i n t h e Department o f S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o t h e I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/15). 6 8  69rjnited S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g t o t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1921. V o l . I . pp. 25-26. 7 0  I b i d . , p. 32.  7 l G a l b r a i t h , "The Imperial Conference of 1921," p. 150. 7 2  7 3  ibid. Vinson,  The Parchment Peace, p. 139.  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g t o t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1921. V o l . I . pp. 60-61. 7 4  7 5  I b i d . , p. 63.  7 6  l b i d . , pp. 63-64.  7 7  I b i d . , p. 64.  7 8  Ibid.  7 9  i b i d . , p. 65.  - 113  -  o»Tate and Foy, "More L i g h t on Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , " pp. 534-535.  the  Abrogation  of  the  Slrjnited S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1921. V o l . I . p. 61. I b i d . , p.  8 2  64.  F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on the i n f l u e n c e o f the I r i s h l o b b i e s see: Kenneth R. Maxwell, " I r i s h Americans and the Fight f o r Treaty R a t i f i c a t i o n , " P u b l i c Opinion Quarterly. V o l . 31 (No. 4 Winter 1967-1968), pp. 620-641; John Duff, "The V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y and the I r i s h Americans," J o u r n a l of American H i s t o r y . V o l . 55 (No. 3 December 1968-1969), pp. 582-598. 8 3  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consulate General i n Montreal t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, June 6, 1921, R e c o r d s o f t h e Department o f S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o the I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/15) , pp. 1-4. 8 4  85  8 6  87  8 8  8 9  9 0  9 1  C a n a d a , House of Commons, Debates. March 13, 1922, p. Ibid. B o r d e n , "The  B r i t i s h Commonwealth of Nations," p.  783.  Ibid. Congressional  Record. March 22,  I b i d . , February Vinson,  Vinson,  23, 1922,  p.  1922,  p. 4228.  2941.  The Parchment Peace, p.  ^Congressional 9 3  43.  Record. February  The Parchment Peace, p.  214. 21, 1922,  p. 2834.  5.  F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o American p o l i c y makers' a t t i t u d e s towards i s o l a t i o n i s m i n t h e 1920s s e e : Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy. Chapter 8; Berdahl, The P o l i c y o f t h e United States with Respect to the League of Nations: A l e x a n d e r De Conde, I s o l a t i o n and S e c u r i t y (Durham: Duke U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957). 9 4  - 114 D u r i n g the Senate debate p e r t a i n i n g t o the Washington Naval Agreements, repeated reference was made t o Canada's r o l e at b r i n g i n g American concerns t o the a t t e n t i o n o f the B r i t i s h government. See: C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d . June 23, 1922, p. 9241. 9 5  G a l b r a i t h , The E s t a b l i s h m e n t Status a t Washington, p. 83. 9 6  9 7  p. 30.  Posdick,  Secretary  o f Canadian Diplomatic  Hughes and the League o f Nations,  Ibid.  9 8  " B e r d a h l , The P o l i c y of the United States with to the League o f Nations, pp. 100-105. 1 0 0  Respect  C o n a r e s s i o n a l Record. February 16, 1920, p. 2955.  C.A.W. Manning, The P o l i c i e s o f the B r i t i s h Dominions i n t h e League o f Nations (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1932), p. 130. 101  l 2ibid. 0  1 0 3  I b i d . , p. 73.  104p o r e i n f o r m a t i o n on Canada's a c t i v i t i e s i n the League of Nations see: Manning, The P o l i c i e s o f the B r i t i s h Dominions i n t h e League of Nations: Richard Veatch, Canada and the League of Nations (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press, 1975) . o r  m  M a n n i n g , The P o l i c i e s o f the B r i t i s h Dominions i n the League of N a t i o n s p. 45. 105  f  1 0 6 a t c h , Canada and the League o f Nations, p. 9. Ve  Canada, p. 104. 1 0 7  House o f Commons, Debates. September 8, 1919,  " M e m o r a n d a S u b m i t t e d by t h e C a n a d i a n Government," League o f N a t i o n s . 1919-1947 Assembly. C o u n c i l . C i r c u l a r L e t t e r s Documents, Category V (C215.M154) 1921. 108  - 115 1 0 9  I b i d . , p. 3.  ll Ibid. 0  HiConqressional  Record. June 23, 1922, p. 9241.  1 1 2  I b i d . , March 8, 1922, p. 3557.  1 1 3  I b i d . , June 23, 1922, p. 9241.  H 4 T h e S t a t e Department's announcement i n A p r i l 1920, t h a t Canada was about t o appoint a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Washington was a s i g n i f i c a n t s i g n t h a t t h e Dnited S t a t e s was prepared t o welcome and make use of t h i s new d i p l o m a t i c avenue w i t h t h e C a n a d i a n government. As w e l l , numerous senators from both p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s expressed t h e d e s i r e t o see t h e Canadian appointment made so t h a t r e l a t i o n s between the United S t a t e s and Canada c o u l d be conducted on a more d i r e c t b a s i s . Certa i n l y , both t h e Senate and t h e S t a t e Department were aware o f the debate i n t h e Canadian House o f Commons over what t i e s the Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e should possess with the B r i t i s h government. T h i s debate s e r v e d t o c o n v i n c e influential Americans t h a t a Canadian would be appointed once h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the B r i t i s h Embassy was determined. For more i n f o r m a t i o n on the Senate's a t t i t u d e see: C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record. June 23, 1922, p. 9241; I b i d . , May 9, 1921, pp. 1195-1205. For more i n f o r m a t i o n on the f r u s t r a t i o n f e l t by some senators at t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o deal d i r e c t l y with Canada see: C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d , F e b r u a r y 25, 1920, p . 3438; I b i d . , February 27, 1920, p. 3562. For more i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e Canadian debate concerning the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f Canada's proposed r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Washington to the B r i t i s h Embassy see: Canada, House o f Commons, Debates, May 7, 1920, p. 2178; I b i d . , June 30, 1920, p. 4538. 1 1 5 a t c h , Canada and the League o f Nations, p. 11 Ve  1 1 6  Ibid.  Wigley, pp. 110-111.  Canada  ll Canada, p. 525.  House  1 1 7  8  1 1 9  Galbraith,  and t h e T r a n s i t i o n t o Commonwealth,  o f Commons, D e b a t e s . March  The E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f Canadian  3, 1921,  Diplomatic  - 116 Status  a t W a s h i n g t o n , pp.  -  79-85.  120p more i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e Chanak C r i s i s see: Dawson, The D e v e l o p m e n t o f D o m i n i o n S t a t u s ; W.K. Hancock, S u r v e y o f B r i t i s h Commonwealth A f f a i r s . V o l . I : Problems of N a t i o n a l i t y . 1918-1936 (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 3 7 ) ; J u d d , B a l f o u r a n d t h e B r i t i s h E m p i r e ; T o y n b e e , The C o n d u c t o f B r i t i s h E m p i r e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s S i n c e t h e Peace Settlement. o r  Vol.  !2lHancock, I . p. 251. 1 2 2  p.  l 33.  2 3  of  British  Commonwealth  Affairs.  Ibid. Canada,  House  Hancock, I . P. 252. 1 2 4  Vol.  Survey  of  Survey  Commons,  of  Debates,  British  February  Commonwealth  1,  1923,  Affairs,  l U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , American C o n s u l a t e G e n e r a l i n Cape Town, S o u t h A f r i c a , t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, J a n u a r y 22, 1923, Records of the Department of S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o t h e I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s o f G r e a t B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/25); U n i t e d S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , A m e r i c a n Consulate i n L o n d o n t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, September 11, 1923, Records o f the Department o f S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o the I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s o f G r e a t B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/41); U n i t e d S t a t e s , D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , A m e r i c a n C o n s u l a t e i n Cape Town, S o u t h A f r i c a , t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, December 20, 19 2 3, Records R e l a t i n g to the I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. ( 7 4 1 . 0 0 / 2 3 ) . 2 5  l U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , American C o n s u l a t e G e n e r a l i n Cape Town, S o u t h A f r i c a , t o S e c r e t a r y o f State Hughes, J a n u a r y 22, 1923, Records o f the Department of S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o t h e I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s o f G r e a t B r i t a i n 1910-1929 (841.01GM7/25), p . 1. 2 6  1 2 7  Ibid.,  pp.  1-3.  1 2 8 i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , American C o n s u l a t e G e n e r a l i n Cape Town, t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, J a n u a r y 10, 1923, Records of the Department o f S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o the I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s o f G r e a t B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM7/25). U n  - 117  -  i ^ u n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , /American Consulate General i n Ottawa, t o S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Hughes, J u l y 10, 1923, Records of the Department of S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o the I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (841.01GM/32). ! 3 0 i n t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between P r e s i d e n t Harding and S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Hughes r e l a t i n g t o the P a c i f i c H a l i b u t T r e a t y , both men had r e a c h e d the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t r e l a t i o n s with Canada would continue to be handled through B r i t a i n . See: United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1923. V o l . I . pp. 472-475. 1 3 1 r d a h l , The P o l i c y of the United States With Respect to the League of Nations, pp. 100-105. Be  - 118 Chapter  Three  The vast m a j o r i t y of h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s a n a l y z i n g Canada's special almost  relationship exclusively  examination  on  the  I r e v e a l s how  between the two  United  bilateral  of both Canadian  a f t e r World War  issues.  with  and  S t a t e s have  issues.! American  records d u r i n g  and  complex and i n t e r t w i n e d r e l a t i o n s  c o u n t r i e s had  had  to  be  swiftly  increasingly d i f f i c u l t  become i n consequence of these  historians  have  r e s o l v e d and  Great  argued  that  Britain. i t was  As  c o u n t r i e s because Americans  recognize examining  Canada's  stated,  a number of key  bilateral  Canadian  r e l a t i o n s h i p between  d i d not  understand  evolving diplomatic status.  can see American o f f i c i a l s  2  Yet,  or in  i s s u e s between 1920-1924,  a c t u a l l y encouraging Canada t o  take steps that would make the direct.  becoming  the United States whose  p o l i c i e s hindered the growth of a d i r e c t two  i t was  f o r both n a t i o n s to e x p e d i t i o u s l y handle  these problems t h r o u g h  one  a cursory  Matters ranging from economic concerns to immigration  policies  the  Even  focused  relationship closer  T h i s becomes e s p e c i a l l y  analyzes these b i l a t e r a l concerns  evident when the i n comparison  with  and  more  historian America's  a t t i t u d e towards Canada on more i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g other n a t i o n s . An  analysis  of America's  view of the manner i n which i t  thought  i t s r e l a t i o n s with Canada should be conducted makes i t  easier  to  times  understand  demand that  why  the  Great B r i t a i n  Canadian  government would at  recognize Canada's s t a t u s as  - 119 an independent p o l i c y maker and then r e t r e a t from t h i s p o s i t i o n and  be  content with working  apparent  i n c o n s i s t e n c y was  the United S t a t e s .  behind the scenes.  Canada's  i n response to the p r e s s u r e  from  The American government wanted to e l i m i n a t e  the B r i t i s h government  from i t s d e a l i n g s with Canada not only  because t h i s would i n c r e a s e the e f f i c i e n c y of the r e l a t i o n s h i p but a l s o , because the State Department  f e l t that i t c o u l d more  r e a d i l y manipulate Canada i f the B r i t i s h were not p a r t o f the proceedings.3 the  On  Canadian  b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s , i t soon became evident to  government  that  having the support of Great  B r i t a i n at or behind the conference t a b l e gave Canada advantages that  she would  Canada's  not have  on her own.  American  interest  in  s t a t u s , Canadians soon learned, grew d i r e c t l y out o f  the sense American o f f i c i a l s had of what kind of Canada could best serve t h e i r n a t i o n a l  interest.  In the post war p e r i o d , one of the f i r s t major i s s u e s to be brought to the a t t e n t i o n of the American Senate was restrictive issue  laws p e r t a i n i n g  came b e f o r e  the  t o the export of pulpwood.  Senate  i n F e b r u a r y 1920,  V e r s a i l l e s Treaty debate was e n t e r i n g i t s l a s t phase. the d i s c u s s i o n on the pulpwood compared  with the t r e a t y  interesting treaty,  dilemma  opposed  Canada's  i s s u e was  when  The the  Although  a mere sideshow when  debate, the dispute d i d p r e s e n t  f o r some senators who,  an  i n terms of the  the d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s Canada had acquired at  P a r i s y e t , on s p e c i f i c  b i l a t e r a l concerns, were f r u s t r a t e d by  t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to deal d i r e c t l y with the Canadian  government.  4  - 120  -  The d i s p u t e arose when the Canadian p r o v i n c e s of O n t a r i o , Quebec and New  Brunswick  amount of pulpwood that  introduced laws which r e s t r i c t e d c o u l d be  exported  from crown  the  lands.5  The p r o v i n c e s were attempting t o conserve t h e i r timber resources and  encourage Canadian  companies to c r e a t e jobs i n Canada by  producing f i n i s h e d products i n s t e a d of e x p o r t i n g raw r e s o u r c e s . During  the  decade between 1910-1920, the amount of pulpwood  exported to the United States had r a p i d l y i n c r e a s e d . the d e p l e t i o n of America's larger  on  especially  i n v a r i o u s domestic  the Senate  t o have the Canadian  6  i n the  North-East,  lobbying groups p u t t i n g p r e s s u r e  t h a t American newspapers c o u l d be of n e w s p r i n t .  1920,  f o r e s t s combined with the need f o r  amounts of newsprint,  resulted  By  restrictions  removed  assured of a steady  so  supply  When the S t a t e Department i n f o r m a l l y d i s c u s s e d  the i s s u e with Canada, the Canadian government maintained that the p r o v i n c e s were w i t h i n t h e i r In an attempt  jurisdiction.  t o d e a l with t h i s  Underwood  sponsored  a  commission  composed  of  resolution five  7  situation,  Senator  to  presidential  have  a  Oscar  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s appointed  to  d i s c u s s the pulpwood i s s u e d i r e c t l y with the Canadian  govern-  ment.  because  it  8  The  debate on t h i s r e s o l u t i o n was  revealed t h a t many s e n a t o r s , such  North  Dakota, an outspoken  Paris  Peace  diplomatic conducted  or  Conference, relations  critic  had  no  varied  as A s i e S. Gronna  of  of Canada's s t a t u s at the real  with America's  indeed, how  interesting  and  understanding  of  northern neighbour complex  had  become  how were the  - 121 ties  which  resolution problems  linked  the  two  countries.  Senator Underwood attempted t o o u t l i n e the State  Department  with the Canadian government. that  i n defending his  9  major  had to overcome when d e a l i n g In p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e cumbersome system of using  channel, the B r i t i s h  the  Embassy, had  Underwood noted  the o f f i c i a l  proven  t o be  diplomatic fruitless.  " E f f o r t s have been made," Underwood argued i n the Senate: i n the past t o work out an understanding w i t h t h e Dominion government o f Canada t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s and t h e y f a i l e d , b e c a u s e when i t goes t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c channels i t must go through the Court of S t . James and back to the Canadian government.I 0  Underwood emphasized that t h e : r e a l purpose of t h i s j o i n t r e s o l u t i o n ... [was] t o make a d i r e c t e f f o r t w i t h the Canadian government to secure the a p p o i n t ment o f a commission t o d e a l w i t h t h i s i n d u s t r i a l q u e s t i o n t h a t w i l l not become i n v o l v e d i n the i n t r i c a c i e s of a d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n ... I t ... [was] t o appoint a commission t o d e a l w i t h t h e C a n a d i a n government.11 Underwood's arguments were r e i n f o r c e d by Senator Hitchcock who  added an a d d i t i o n a l dimension to the debate by maintaining  that the Senate had to d e a l d i r e c t l y with the Canadian government so the l a t t e r would r e a l i z e how was  t o have the pulpwood  to the Canadian establishing  anxious the United States  issue s e t t l e d .  government's  publicly  Moreover, stated  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Washington,  referring  objective  of  Hitchcock argued  t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n was an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the United States to initiate  a new  relationship  w i t h Canada.  "At t h i s  time,"  - 122 Hitchcock  stated: Canada i s d e s i r o u s of t a k i n g t o a l a r g e extent the c o n t r o l of her f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s and f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , and i s even contemp l a t i n g , as I understand, at the p r e s e n t time e s t a b l i s h i n g i n the United States her own d i p l o m a t i c representative.12  Hitchcock's  comments, expressed at a time when the Senate  was d i v i d e d over the t r e a t y debate, f o r c e d those senators opposed Canada's d i p l o m a t i c  status  f o r reasons  expediency t o reconsider t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . true  f o r those  North-Eastern  politicians  states.  who  of p o l i t i c a l  T h i s was e s p e c i a l l y  representing  Northern  and  The pulpwood i s s u e c r e a t e d the s i t u a t i o n  where p a r t i c u l a r members of t h e Senate were embarrassed by their  a t t i t u d e s on t h e V e r s a i l l e s  Treaty.  Robert La F o l l e t t e , went t o extreme lengths positions  against  the Canadian  Many, such as to j u s t i f y  government  being  their  granted  d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s d e s p i t e the f a c t , t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n would  have made i t e a s i e r  f o r the United  States  t o pursue  b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s with t h a t country.13 At fiscal  a time when the Senate was becoming preoccupied restraint,  the most i n f l u e n t i a l  Underwood r e s o l u t i o n maintained t h a t commission was simply  arguments a g a i n s t the  a special presidential  too expensive t o be j u s t i f i e d .  Gronna maintained t h a t the p r o j e c t e d  with  cost  Senator  of $50,000 was not  warranted when American o f f i c i a l s could express t o the B r i t i s h Embassy the United  States  pulpwood  Gronna r e j e c t e d Underwood's argument  the  laws.I  "official  4  opposition  t o Canada's  restrictive that  route" f o r d i p l o m a t i c correspondence with Canada  - 123 was  either  system  too slow  or  -  ineffective.  He  believed  that  the.  had worked w e l l i n the past and would continue t o meet  the d i p l o m a t i c needs of both the United States and Canada.!5 B u i l d i n g upon Gronna's economic argument, Senator W i l l i a m H. King of Utah,  suggested  t h a t a p r e s i d e n t i a l commission  redundant  because the apparatus to d i s c u s s the pulpwood  directly  with  the  Canadian  government  already  was  issue  existed.16  Senator King was r e f e r r i n g t o the I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o i n t Commission which had been e s t a b l i s h e d by the United S t a t e s and Canada i n 1909.  King  believed  capable of handling any two  countries.  opportunity  that  this  commission  was  perfectly  d i s p u t e that might a r i s e between the  In h i s view, the pulpwood  i s s u e presented  f o r the United S t a t e s and Canada to prove  world  the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the  While  King's  joint  commission  arguments were p e r s u a s i v e and  an  to the  structure.!  seemed t o  f i t in  w e l l with the concept of "the North American model f o r p e a c e , " the Senator demonstrated how  both an  inadequate  7  knowledge of  18  just  complex the American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s had become as w e l l  as a lack of understanding about  the purpose  or the extent of  the mandate t h a t had been granted t o the J o i n t Commission. P u t t i n g the controversy surrounding the Underwood Resolution  into  the context of both  the Senate's  V e r s a i l l e s Treaty  debate and the l a r g e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s , i t i s c l e a r that certain  senators  determine measured  their the  allowed response  political  domestic to  the  politics pulpwood  to  i n t r u d e and  issue.  Having  damage that would have r e s u l t e d  from  - 124 r e v e r s i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n on Canada's d i p l o m a t i c s t a t u s at the Paris  Peace  C o n f e r e n c e , many s e n a t o r s ,  in particular,  the  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s , chose to ignore the opportunity t o e s t a b l i s h a presidential  commission  that  f o r encouraging a more d i r e c t  might  have s e t a precedent  r e l a t i o n s h i p with Canada.  Very  few American o f f i c i a l s d i s p u t e d the p o i n t that a more e f f i c i e n t communication Clearly,  system was  needed w i t h the Canadian government.  however, the Senate debate  revealed  that  the United  States d i d not possess a c o n s i s t e n t  diplomatic p o l i c y  Canada.  and the Senate tended t o  Both the S t a t e Department  towards  respond to d i s p u t e s w i t h Canada on a day t o day b a s i s .  Conse-  quently, at t h i s time, there was an i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n America's a t t i t u d e towards  Canada.  On  t h e one  level,  the  Versailles  Treaty debate, the American Senate was not prepared t o accept Canada's s t a t u s as e s t a b l i s h e d another  level,  bilateral  c l o s e r more d i r e c t prevented  by the P a r i s C o n f e r e n c e .  issues,  relationship  the United  but American  On  States wanted a officials  were  from doing so because of the Senate's r e j e c t i o n of  the V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y . The  debate on the pulpwood  elements that would relationship.  eventually  i s s u e a l s o had some p o s i t i v e affect  the  American-Canadian  A few members of the Senate, e s p e c i a l l y Porter  S. McCumber, had taken the time t o t r y and  a s s e s s Canada's  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to Great B r i t a i n . I that  during the f i r s t  Canada had  been  two  acquiring  decades  1  9  Aware  of the t w e n t i e t h century  more autonomy  i n her  commercial  - 125 r e l a t i o n s with other n a t i o n s , Senators Underwood and Hitchcock reasoned t h a t by encouraging Canada's independence i n economic issues  this  could  American-Canadian  be extended  into  relationship.20  other  facets  of the  Undoubtedly, Underwood and  Hitchcock were p a r t i a l l y motivated by t h e i r d e s i r e t o use the pulpwood  i s s u e t o change the minds of moderate senators  opposed the V e r s a i l l e s T r e a t y  soley  on t h e grounds  who  of the  Dominions' s t a t u s and proposed r o l e s i n the League o f Nations.21 Yet,  the R e s o l u t i o n  was a p o s i t i v e i n d i c a t i o n t h a t  there  was  a group w i t h i n the Senate that was at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y aware o f Canada's changing s t a t u s w i t h i n the Empire. Although  t h e Underwood  Resolution  d i d receive  passage  i n the Senate i n 1920, the proposed commission was not established  because  pulpwood States  issue,  by P r e s i d e n t  however, c o n t i n u e d  For the purpose of t h i s  of t h i s  many s e n a t o r s  representation  l e d some American  British  diplomatic towards  brought  before  paper, an i n t e r e s t i n g that  were much more aware of Canada's o b j e c t i v e o f  governments t o s t o p  separate  Canadian  This  t o b e l i e v e t h a t the t o f o r c e the Canadian  merely d i s c u s s i n g  p o s i t i o n and a c t u a l l y t a k e  achieving  i n Washington.  officials  pulpwood i s s u e c o u l d be used as leverage and  the United  second phase of the pulpwood debate was  independent  awareness  The  The arguments t h a t had been presented i n 1920 were  reiterated.  securing  Wilson.22  to i r r i t a t e  and i n 1921, the d i s p u t e was once again  the Senate.  aspect  i t was v e t o e d  Canada's  some t a n g i b l e  steps  representation.23  j.  n  - 126 s h o r t , Americans hoped t h a t the complexity this  bilateral  i s s u e t o the o v e r a l l  and importance o f  relationship  between the  United States and Canada would encourage the Canadian government to  establish  more  direct  communication  with  the State  Department. When t h e h i s t o r i a n between the S t a t e governments, quickly  analyzes  Department  i t becomes  realized  that  the o f f i c i a l  correspondence  and t h e B r i t i s h  apparent  that  t h e cumbersome  and Canadian  Canadian system  officials  of using the  B r i t i s h Embassy i n d e a l i n g s with t h e American government c o u l d be used t o Canada's advantage.  At i t s simplest i t meant t h a t  Canada d i d not have t o c o n f r o n t American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . of  course, was only u s e f u l t o Canada when i t was the American  government issue. of  that  was demanding  satisfaction  on a p a r t i c u l a r  When i t was the Canadian government t h a t was desirous  d i s c u s s i n g a d i s p u t e with  the United  S t a t e s the o f f i c i a l  d i p l o m a t i c s t r u c t u r e was c l e a r l y a disadvantage. of  This,  In the case  t h e pulpwood i s s u e , however, Canada was able t o fend o f f  American anger by h i d i n g behind the B r i t i s h Imperial representatives. In  its official  inquiries  response  i n t o t h e pulpwood  t o t h e American  government's  i s s u e , t h e Canadian  government  made i t very c l e a r i n 1920 and again i n 1921 t h a t d i r e c t on  t h e i s s u e , such  commission,  would  Canada's p o l i c i e s .  as Underwood's p r o p o s e d  not r e s u l t 2 4  talks  presidential  i n any s i g n i f i c a n t  change i n  T h i s statement had the e f f e c t o f c r e a t i n g  - 127  -  confusion  amongst those  supported  Canada's demand f o r r e c o g n i t i o n by the United S t a t e s .  I t appeared t h a t the opportunity  to  senators  and  American  Canadian government was  establish i t s diplomatic  officials  not  who  seizing  autonomy.  i n c i d e n t , combined with Canada's lack of aggressive  the This  a c t i o n on  the more i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , s p e c i f i c a l l y , the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , senators ables  the  arguments  opposing Canada's c l a i m f o r s t a t u s .  maintained  pulpwood  confirmed  that  i s s u e was  n e i t h e r prepared  Canada's  proof  that  The  reluctance the  to  Canadian  of  those  irreconcildiscuss  the  government  was  nor w i l l i n g to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of  an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 2 5 Throughout the a problem of  State  those  few  i n American-Canadian Hughes t r i e d senators who  commission directly American  1920s, the pulpwood i s s u e continued  and  with  the the  circumvent  1923,  b o t h the  arguments of  were opposed to a s p e c i a l p r e s i d e n t i a l  United  States,  i n Ottawa  to  by  present  Harding A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  to e s t a b l i s h a form of d i r e c t  help s e t t l e the The  to  the  Canadian  position.26  contact  the  Through  Hughes was  t h a t was  used  to  dispute.  pulpwood  question  American-Canadian trade misunderstanding  deal  i n f o r m a l l y using  t h i s method and the more formal d i p l o m a t i c channels, able  be  Secretary  Canadian government's r e l u c t a n c e to  consulate  government the  to  r e l a t i o n s . In  to  was  only  one  r e l a t i o n s t h a t sparked  between the  two  nations  i n the  aspect  of  confusion  and  e a r l y 1920s.  - 128  -  As the decade progressed many American l e g i s l a t o r s became more aware o f the legislation In  fact  that when the United States passed affected  the Canadian economy.27  the p a s t , American l e g i s l a t o r s had  e s t a b l i s h e d a number of  precedents special  i t drastically  tariff  by  recognizing that  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h a t of the  quently,  they  designing  had  their  taken  tariff  this  factor  legislation.  Canadian  economy had  United S t a t e s .  a  Conse-  i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n when In h i s book Canada  and  the United S t a t e s . Some Aspects of the H i s t o r y of the Republic and  the  Dominion.  Underwood  Tariff  Hugh K e e n l e y s i d e  of  1913  granted  pointed  special  exemptions to Canada i n order to minimize to  t h a t country's economy.28  a resurgent Republican  j  n  out  that  the  concessions  and  the amount of damage  the post war p e r i o d , however,  Congress r e v i s e d America's t a r i f f  laws  with the passage of the Fordney Emergency T a r i f f i n 1921 which, when combined with the McCumber T a r i f f of  the  loopholes  t h a t had  of 1922,  removed most  been f a v o r a b l e t o Canada.29  farming s e c t o r , i n p a r t i c u l a r the wheat and vegetable i n western  Canada, was  e s p e c i a l l y hard h i t by the new  The  farmers legisla-  tion. An a n a l y s i s of the Senate debates on the t a r i f f l e g i s l a t i o n r e v e a l s t h a t there was  very  little  concern  about the  the r e v i s e d laws would have on the Canadian economy. the senators supporting the higher t a r i f f s assess  the  effect  American-Canadian  Moreover,  made no attempt  the l e g i s l a t i o n would have on relationship.  effects  Primarily  the  to  overall  concerned  with  - 129 their  local  s t a t e economies, t h e s t r o n g e s t  support  f o r the  p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f s came from those senators whose c o n s t i t u e n c i e s would b e n e f i t the most from the r e v i s e d laws.30  Many of these  s t a t e s were l o c a t e d i n the Northern t i e r and t h e i r  representa-  t i v e s should have been more s e n s i t i v e t o the impact these laws would have on Canada. During  t h e d e b a t e on t h e Fordney Emergency T a r i f f ,  February 1921, Senator F.M. the  Simmons of North C a r o l i n a , extended  scope o f t h e arguments by r a i s i n g  effect  the proposed high  American-Canadian  tariff  relations.  the q u e s t i o n of what  policy  would  Simmons p o i n t e d  have  i t sold  and t h a t the Canadian government could  by supporting the p o l i c y goods  from n a t i o n s  of i m p e r i a l  i n the Empire.31  Canada to r e c e i v e t h i s  on  out t o h i s  c o l l e a g u e s t h a t Canada bought more goods i n the United that  in  States  retaliate  preference and buy more "Could Senators  blow," Simmons maintained  expect  i n a speech  i n the Senate: f o r i t w i l l be a severe blow t o her i f the b i l l has the e f f e c t i t s proponents contend that i t w i l l have, ... I do r e a l l y apprehend t h a t the e f f e c t of t h i s b i l l , l a r g e l y aimed at Canada, i s going to make t r o u b l e between t h i s country and Canada and d i s t u r b t h e r e l a t i o n s o f the two c o u n t r i e s , which have not only been harmonious, but which have c a u s e d Canada t o become our v e r y b e s t customer i n a l l t h e w o r l d e x c e p t G r e a t Britain.32 Despite become law. United States  Simmons' arguments, t h e t a r i f f The  i n c i d e n t was  just  revisions did  one more example  responding t o an i s o l a t e d  i s s u e without  of the taking  - 130 the time to assess the o v e r a l l impact that p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c i e s would have on t h e i r f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . The in  higher American t a r i f f s  the Canadian  Parliament for in  a l s o sparked a heated debate  House o f Commons.  A l f r e d Stork,  Member o f  f o r Skeena, a n g r i l y denounced the Canadian government  i t s lack o f a c t i o n i n appointing a permanent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e Washington.  appoint  Stork  maintained t h a t  a representative  misunderstanding affect separate  had c o n t r i b u t e d  of how s e v e r e l y  the Canadian Canadian  Canada's r e l u c t a n c e t o  economy.  their  tariff  In S t o r k ' s  representative  t o t h e American policies  opinion,  i n the U n i t e d  would only  States,  a  with  c l o s e t i e s t o t h e American Senate, c o u l d have a n t i c i p a t e d and l o b b i e d a g a i n s t the t a r i f f l e g i s l a t i o n . 3 3 Certainly,  Canada's  economic  i n t e r e s t s i n the United  States had long been a major f a c t o r f o r the Canadian government wanting  i t s own r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  reasons f o r the establishment  i n Washington.  The p r i m a r y  o f the Canadian War M i s s i o n i n  Washington i n 1918, had been the government's d e s i r e t o a s s i s t Canadian  businessmen  i n securing  American m i l i t a r y  contracts  and encouraging American f i n a n c i e r s t o i n v e s t i n Canada.34 When examining Canada's economic argument  can a l s o  be made which  i n t e r e s t s , however, an  helps  to explain  Canadian government was r e l u c t a n t t o take the f i n a l select  a representative.  position  to protect  why the step and  C l e a r l y , Canada was not i n a strong  herself  from  American  policies.  Canadian government d i d not possess the resources  The  necessary t o  - 131 both  inform and  policies  -  pressure the American  Congress  to  that were deemed d e t r i m e n t a l t o Canadian Canada needed t h e  resources and  options o f f e r e d by Great B r i t a i n and the Empire  Significantly, Tariff  and  interests.  Consequently,  i n fending o f f America's  support  reassess  the d i p l o m a t i c  economic p o l i c i e s .  the  e n a c t i n g of  the  Fordney  c o i n c i d e d with the p r e s s u r e American  putting  on  the  Canadian  government  Emergency  officials  t o p l a y an  were  active  role  i n f o r c i n g Great B r i t a i n and Japan t o abrogate t h e i r  alliance.  The  America's  combination  demonstrated domestic  of t h i s  lack  diplomatic pressure  of concern  and  and  understanding  i n t e r e s t s convinced many Canadians  f o r Canada's  that  they  continue t o have the Empire's d i p l o m a t i c s t r u c t u r e represent logical  and  national own  Canada.35  consistent policy  and  bilateral  objective:  third  bilateral  issue  i n the  channels  to  early  of the o f f s h o r e f i s h e r i e s  negotiate  the  1920s was  the  on  both c o a s t s .  1918,  wanted to  issues d i r e c t l y  with  As  other  bilateral  because  break  effect  fishing  however, Canada  inter-  government t o  as  government.36  a  i n the defeat of i t s  As mentioned, the United S t a t e s , as e a r l y the  to develop  Britain.  relationship  problem  officially  towards Canada i n b o t h  issues resulted  important  American-Canadian perpetual  inability  t o encourage the Canadian  i t s t i e s with Great A  Thus, America's  should  with  sought  refuge  i t offered  important i n the  the  Canadian issues,  o f f i c i a l diplomatic  the Canadian  officials  the best  - 132 opportunity  to protect  the problems r e l a t i n g  Canada's i n t e r e s t s . 3 7  Consequently,  t o the f i s h e r i e s were allowed  t o grow.  Although attempts were made t o reach p a r t i a l agreements, these t e n t a t i v e settlements by  were n u l l i f i e d , f o r a number o f reasons,  one s i d e or the other.38  Finally,  the United  States and  Canada agreed t o e s t a b l i s h a j o i n t commission t h a t would hold p u b l i c hearings  i n both c o u n t r i e s and make a s e r i e s o f recommen-  d a t i o n s t h a t c o u l d be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o an agreement.  Although  Canada had been a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the f i s h i n g  negotia-  tions  since  1871, what made t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s  of the early  1920s d i f f e r e n t was Canada's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t a B r i t i s h sentative's The  State  signature  was not necessary on any agreement.39  Department's a c c e p t a n c e  of t h i s  condition, after  some h e s i t a t i o n , was an important s i g n from the United that  they  were p r e p a r e d  diplomatic issues.  status  repre-  t o acknowledge  and i n d e p e n d e n t  Canada's  authority  on  States  changing bilateral  4 0  The  n e g o t i a t i o n and s i g n i n g o f the H a l i b u t Treaty must be  analyzed occurring  i n conjunction  with  the diplomatic  on t h e w o r l d  stage.  developments  As mentioned, by 1923,  the  United States had been provided with a c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r p r e t a tion  from  i t s own r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  government was, or was not, p r e p a r i n g foreign by  policy.  Canada's  on whether t h e Canadian t o assume a more a c t i v e  C e r t a i n l y , American o f f i c i a l s were confused  inconsistency.  4 1  have f e l t much more c o n f i d e n t  The American government would i n d e a l i n g d i r e c t l y with  Canada  - 133  -  i f the l a t t e r had been more f o r c e f u l dent p o l i c y  goal of encouraging the same and  was of  at the l a s t minute.42  y e t , the American  Canada to break i t s i m p e r i a l t i e s  the prospect  remained  of Canada n e g o t i a t i n g and  agreement, without  signing a  the c o - s i g n a t u r e of Great  Britain,  an opportunity f o r the United States to begin the fulfilling  would  not  until  Great  light  of the  had  indepen-  i n s t e a d of bowing to B r i t i s h pressure and conforming  to the i m p e r i a l p o l i c y  fishing  i n formulating an  i t s objective.  acknowledge the Britain  that  United  States,  agreement with  accepted  Chanak C r i s i s  p l a c e d on  assumed  had  The  this  new  of  process course,  Canada's s i g n a t u r e arrangement.  In  and  the s t r a i n  that t h a t i n c i d e n t  Canadian-Imperial  relations,  American o f f i c i a l s  the  British  government  was  not  in a  p o s i t i o n to v i g o r o u s l y oppose the proposed t r e a t y .  strong  The  State  Department d i d , however, leave the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h i s  legal  p o i n t up to the Canadian and B r i t i s h governments. In  February  message to the maintained  1923,  British  the  Canadian  Ambassador  Prime M i n i s t e r sent  i n Washington  i n which  a he  that: my m i n i s t e r s a r e o f the o p i n i o n t h a t as regards Canada the signature of Mr. L a p o i n t e , M i n i s t e r of F i s h e r i e s w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t , and t h a t i t w i l l not be necessary f o r you to s i g n as well.43  T h i s telegram Again, United  sparked  a controversy  within imperial c i r c l e s .  i n c o n t r a s t to those h i s t o r i a n s who States  growth, i t was  as  attempting  to  limit  have d e s c r i b e d  Canada's  the  diplomatic  the B r i t i s h Ambassador Auckland Geddes, not  an  - 134 American o f f i c i a l , who signature  had  Canadian  government  Majesty's Mr.  -  i n s i s t e d that a B r i t i s h  to appear on the t r e a t y . had  "been  Government to s i g n the  Treaty  Lapointe."  that  he  4 4  T h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n was  4 5  representative's  Geddes informed  the  i n s t r u c t e d by  His  i n a s s o c i a t i o n with f i n a l l y resolved when  the Canadian government made the p o i n t that the t r e a t y concerned  the  United  States  and  Canada.  British  officials  reasoned t h a t i t was  p r e f e r a b l e t o agree to Canadian  dence on  issues  bilateral  imperial crisis  unity  on  over the  world  and  still  maintain  than  risk  issues  i s s u e of the  by a Canadian and American  indepen-  the p o l i c y of  a constitutional  Dominions' d i p l o m a t i c  Consequently, on March 2, 1923,  solely  the H a l i b u t Treaty  status. was  signed  official.  Canadian and Commonwealth h i s t o r i a n s have o f t e n c i t e d signing  of  evolution  the  Halibut  Treaty  the  accept an  not  a significant  autonomy. be  full  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t s part  important  development  autonomy.  Imperial  47  and  principle  Conference when the  was  the  in  the  C e r t a i n l y , the  was  The  fact  prepared  i n the agreement,  i n Canada's quest  This  step  understated.  Canadian government n e g o t i a t e d  diplomatic 1923  as  of Canada's d i p l o m a t i c  agreement's importance should that  4 6  to achieve  recognized  Dominions' r i g h t  at  to was  full the  to s i g n a  b i l a t e r a l agreement that d i d not a f f e c t the Empire as a u n i t , was  established. The  powers had  United  4 8  States  was  been c l a r i f i e d  aware t h a t the  at the  Imperial  Dominions*  Conference.  treaty Alfred  - 135  -  Nutting, a c l e r k i n the American Consulate  i n London, kept the  State Department f u l l y informed of the Dominions* c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status.  Nutting  went  to  great  lengths  to  provide  as  much  i n f o r m a t i o n as p o s s i b l e and went so f a r as to warn h i s government t h a t  i n the  f u t u r e America's  Dominions would be more complicated on b i l a t e r a l entities. The accept  fact  that the Harding A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was  Canada's  signature  guarantee  its  on  the  Senate  attached  attempt British  that  the  approve  be  has to  applied  been  the  new  not the  prepared  Treaty  did  two-thirds  arrangement.  extensive  agreement  deny  to  a l l parts  Canada  and with  government, representing C e r t a i n l y , the  The  a  The  not,  of  the  Senate's  i n March the  to  1923,  provision  the  Empire.50  This  h i s t o r i a n s as  status  by  forcing  an the  the whole Empire, to become  Canadian government i n t e r p r e t e d  rejection  Canada's  diplomatic  Senate's c o n d i t i o n a l r a t i f i c a t i o n was  considered  Both Canada and her  wish  bound by  to be  of  Canadian  diplomatic  an i n s u l t .  signed,  Halibut  mandatory  i n t e r p r e t e d by  Senate's a c t i o n as  status.  on the  t r e a t y was  did  involved.51 the  separate  by Senator Wesley L. Jones of Washington S t a t e , t h a t  terms  action  because the United S t a t e s ,  i s s u e s , would have t o deal with them as  Senate would a l s o accept  the  a l l the  4 9  however,  debate  r e l a t i o n s with  insisted  a p p l y i n g to Canada.52  s i s t e r Dominions, who  a t r e a t y they  that  the  of  document  had be  d i d not  neither negotiated i n t e r p r e t e d as  or  only  - 136 Clearly,  the t r a d i t i o n a l  historical  Senate's a c t i o n i s r e l e v a n t . refer  to the  fishing  United  States  accuse  the  matic  and  growth  position.  As  T r e a t y was  not  with  Senator  primarily  designed  of  fully  foreign  to  British Jones'  fishing  i t was  to  vessels  very  i n the  past,  the  that  the any  create  for  Halibut domestic  the  to  force  Great  the  Canadian  Britain's  signature  on  away f r o m t h e  E m p i r e and  sovereignty.  The  arguments  Senate  the  Versailles  only  be  during  considered  membership three  i n the  years.  5 4  an  fishermen  from  i n the North the  Senator  choose  Pacific,  the  by  Treaty  debate  between  this  changed  regard,  the  support  accepting  finally  breaking of  some members that  autonomous n a t i o n when s h e had  image  opportunity  responsibilities  presented  little  the  resources.  another  t r e a t y , or  assuming the  Empire, In  the  to  number  stocks.53  i t presented  government  was  Westcoast  A second f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g the Senate's d e c i s i o n to that  to  home s t a t e  about  aggressively protecting his state's fishing  t h e J o n e s ' p r o v i s i o n was  the  diplo-  provision  in his  were c o n c e r n e d  depleting  to  the  position  E m p i r e o u t s i d e o f Canada w o u l d be r e s o l u t i o n helped  the  a t t i t u d e or  a f f e c t e d by A m e r i c a ' s  his  unlikely  Yet,  Canada's  American  i n t r o d u c t i o n of  enhance  of  between  Canada.  prevent the  many t r e a t i e s  Jones'  contracted  representing  explain  W a s h i n g t o n where f i s h e r m e n  Although  of  so  being  of t r y i n g  exempt f r o m b e i n g  politics.  of  not  interpretation  United States did c o n s i s t e n t l y  Britain  States  does  The  agreement as  Great  United  -  full  of  Canada  could  denounced  over  the  p r o v i s i o n was  the  her  ensuing clearly  - 137  -  c o n s i s t e n t with the American government's previous attempts to f o r c e Canada to assume d i p l o m a t i c European The the  independence by  ending  connection. negative  r e a c t i o n by  Senate's p r o v i s i o n was  both  Canada and  the  q u i c k l y made c l e a r  to  Empire t o the  State  Department.  American r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s t a t i o n e d throughout  Empire sent  back to Washington  those  Dominions  that  process  would not  Treaty  despite  analysis  its  of the  had  consider  the  Jones*  not  r e p o r t s which maintained been p a r t  themselves  the that  o f the n e g o t i a t i n g  bound  by  provision.55  The  Dominions' r e a c t i o n s was  sent  the  Halibut  most  detailed  to  the  State  Department by Charles M. Hathoway, J r . , the American c o n s u l a t e General  in Dublin.  Hathoway  stated  that  d i s c u s s i o n s with I r i s h o f f i c i a l s concerning he was  convinced  after  extensive  the H a l i b u t Treaty  t h a t they:  d i d not regard the Treaty as b i n d i n g on the I r i s h Free State and t h a t i f , by chance, i t s h o u l d happen t h a t any I r i s h i n t e r e s t should be concerned the Government of the I r i s h F r e e S t a t e would h o l d t h a t the Treaty d i d not apply to them, ...56 The  I r i s h a t t i t u d e was  tion.  A f t e r passing  Great  an  important  numerous J o i n t  bonus f o r Canada's p o s i Resolutions  B r i t a i n to r e s o l v e the I r i s h s i t u a t i o n ,  calling  i t was  upon  unlikely  that the American Senate would p l a c e i t s e l f i n the p o s i t i o n of undercutting the new ment.  a u t h o r i t y of the I r i s h Free State govern-  To deny Canada's r i g h t to n e g o t i a t e and s i g n a b i l a t e r a l  agreement would, i n e f f e c t , deny the Free State s i m i l a r  rights.  The Empire's r e a c t i o n helped to convince American o f f i c i a l s  - 138 that  the  Halibut Treaty  agreement  that  only  had  -  to  be  considered  i n c l u d e d themselves and  a  bilateral  Canada.  Conse-  quently, the t r e a t y d i d e s t a b l i s h Canada's r i g h t to n e g o t i a t e and  s i g n a d i p l o m a t i c agreement without  British  official.  significant  To  this  development  Both c o u n t r i e s r e a l i z e d  extent,  the c o - s i g n a t u r e of a  the  treaty  represents  i n American-Canadian  the value  of a s p e c i a l  that i n c l u d e d the use of appointed commissions.  a  relations.  relationship Moreover, the  H a l i b u t T r e a t y helped to convince the Canadian government t h a t i t c o u l d d e a l d i r e c t l y with the United States and s t i l l p r o t e c t Canadian i n t e r e s t s without the a c t i v e support of Great Although final lished  the Jones'  year delay  i n the  r a t i f i c a t i o n of the H a l i b u t T r e a t y , the precedent  estab-  i n 1923  p r o v i s i o n f o r c e d a two  helped  to c r e a t e a new  d i p l o m a t i c t i e s t h a t would be s i g n i n g of the P r o h i b i t i o n The 1920,  Britain.  to  States and  cause  Canada.  expanded upon i n 1924  Convention.  American d e c i s i o n t o  was  a series  enact  Prohibition  border Atlantic  i n Canada. and and  the  Pacific  coves  the  57  prohibition  in  January  became a s i g n i f i c a n t  United issue  running" became a l u c r a t i v e  The v a s t extent of the  numerous  with  of d i s p u t e s between the  between the two c o u n t r i e s when "rum business  environment f o r c l o s e r  and  coasts p r o v i d e d  American-Canadian  inlets ample  along  both  the  opportunity  for  smugglers to p l y t h e i r t r a d e . Initially,  the  American  government's  enforce p r o h i b i t i o n was very l i m i t e d .  commitment  to  Neither Congress nor the  - 139  -  Harding A d m i n i s t r a t i o n were prepared to a l l o c a t e the funds  to provide  f o r the  necessary  b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e and  massive  law enforcement t h a t would have been necessary to prevent or at least  limit,  States.58  the amount of a l c o h o l smuggled  As  a  result,  p o s i t i o n t h a t i t was ment t o p r e v e n t States  the  State  i n t o the  Department  assumed  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Canadian  liquor  from being  from Canadian p o r t s and  smuggled  border  take  aggressive  crossings.59  a c t i o n a g a i n s t the  the  govern-  i n t o the  became c l e a r to American o f f i c i a l s t h a t Canada was not to  United  United When i t  prepared  smugglers, the  United  States sought a d i r e c t meeting with the Canadian government i n order  to put pressure on Canada to take a c t i o n .  previous b i l a t e r a l meeting  with  Department  the  official  Embassy i n W a s h i n g t o n . While Canada was i v e l y preventing  by  insisting  channel  t h a t the  through  the  State  British  60  r e l u c t a n t to become i n v o l v e d i n aggress-  smuggling,  Canadian  officials  d i d want  demonstrate to the United States a c o o p e r a t i v e a t t i t u d e . Canadian government American  concerns  discussing  reasoned the  Canada's  November 1923,  the  i s s u e s , the Canadian government r e s i s t e d a  American o f f i c i a l s  use  As with  t h a t i f they were  United  States  would  to The  r e c e p t i v e to  r e c i p r o c a t e by  o p p o s i t i o n to American p o l i c i e s . 6 1  A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of the Treasury,  In  McKenzie  Moss, t r a v e l l e d to Ottawa where he met with Canadian o f f i c i a l s . T h i s meeting e v e n t u a l l y l e d to d i r e c t d i s c u s s i o n s t h a t r e s u l t e d in  the  s i g n i n g of an agreement between the United States  and  - 140 Canada i n June 1 9 2 4 . The  -  62  s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s convention was  not  so much that  i t helped to e l i m i n a t e some of the t e n s i o n that had over  the  smuggling  issue.  Its  of the f a c t that i t represented relations  because  negotiation important States dence.  the  without  role.  The  British  some ways more s i g n i f i c a n t Canada's  agreement.  right  playing  r e c o g n i t i o n by  i n 1923,  the  to  United  represent  itself  indepen-  Canada's s t r o n g  sign  i t applied  to  the in not the the the  n e g o t i a t i o n s took p l a c e i n the  p o s i t i o n during  which must have c o n t r i b u t e d  did  the Senate r a t i f i e d  adding a p r o v i s i o n that The  States or  an  United  t h i s Convention was  because the  B r i t i s h Empire as a whole. wake of  government's  Unlike the H a l i b u t Treaty,  agreement without  out  through d i r e c t  P r o h i b i t i o n Convention came a f t e r  s i g n i n g of the H a l i b u t Treaty  question  achieved  a t t a i n e d a form of d i p l o m a t i c  Although the  63  was  agreement was  t h a t Canada had  grew rather  a watershed i n American-Canadian  treaty  the  importance  developed  the  Chanak  Crisis  t o America's changed a t t i t u d e .  In a d d i t i o n , t h i s t r e a t y convinced both nations  that  6 4  mutually  s a t i s f y i n g agreements c o u l d be n e g o t i a t e d much more s u c c e s s f u l l y i f o f f i c i a l , permanent d i p l o m a t i c By  1924,  indicates dealing The  that  the  State  the  directly  Department  American  with  avenues were e s t a b l i s h e d . correspondence  government  Canadian  was  clearly  increasingly  departments and  agencies.  6 5  correspondence, on a wide v a r i e t y of i s s u e s , between Prime  M i n i s t e r King and  the Secretary  of State Hughes became exten-  - 141 sive.  As  well,  capitalized their  l e s s e r American and  on  t h i s new  counterparts  Convention  became  relationship  until  the  1927,  the  by  i t built  the  late  dealing  border.66  a p i v o t a l part  United  by  Canadian o f f i c i a l s  atmosphere by  across  because  been e s t a b l i s h e d Canada and  -  of  Halibut  Treaty  States  d i d not  1924,  both  directly  Prohibition  new  diplomatic  precedent i n 1923 .  exchange  nations  with  The  this  upon the  also  that  had  Although  representatives  had  established,  on b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s , a c l o s e working r e l a t i o n s h i p that excluded Great B r i t a i n  from the  negotiating  the  arguments p r e s e n t e d  new  r e l a t i o n s h i p had,  from the  process.  In  contrast  Canadian p e r s p e c t i v e ,  to this  i n no small measure, been e s t a b l i s h e d at  the i n i t i a t i v e of the American government.  - 142  -  Endnotes Chapter Three ^-This c o n c e n t r a t i o n on b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s can be p a r t i a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to the Canadian school of thought emphasizing the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two n a t i o n s . See: Brebner, The North A t l a n t i c T r i a n g l e . D a w s o n , The Development o f Dominion S t a t u s , p. 31; Mahant and Mount, An I n t r o d u c t i o n to C a n a d i a n - A m e r i c a n R e l a t i o n s , p. 113. 2  T h e State Department's d e s i r e to e l i m i n a t e Great B r i t a i n from i t s d e a l i n g s with Canada was a gradual process which can be t r a c e d i n the State Department's records from 1918 onwards. See: United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s : 1918 Supplement 2. The World War (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1933), pp. 655-656; I b i d . , V o l . 1, p. 440; I b i d . , 1919, V o l . 1, p. 268. I b i d . , 1921, V o l . 1, p. 299. 3  C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d . J a n u a r y 6, 1920, p. 1082. At t h i s p o i n t i n the Senate debate over the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty, Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman of I l l i n o i s , a strong opponent of Dominion S tatus, v o i c e d h i s f r u s t r a t i o n at not being able to d e a l d i r e c t l y with the Canadian government over the i s s u e of Canada's pulpwood export laws. F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on t h i s i s s u e see: W. Marr and D. Paterson, Canada: An Economic H i s t o r y (Toronto: Macmillan, 1980) . 5  6  I b i d . , pp.  364-65.  ^ U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1921. V o l . 1. pp. 301-302. 8  Congressional  9  I b i d . , p. 3563  1 0  Ibid.,  i ; L  1 2  Record. February 27,  February 25, 1920,  p. 3438.  February 27,  p. 3562.  Ibid.  Ibid.,  1920,  1920,  p.  3561.  - 143  -  1 3  I b i d . , February  16, 1920,  p. 2955.  1 4  Ibid.,  27, 1920,  p. 3563.  February  iSlbid. 1 6  I b i d . , p.  1 7  Ibid.  J-opage, Idealism," p. 1 9  2 0  3561.  "Canada 36.  as  the  Exponent  C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record. February Ibid.,  February  27, 1920,  of  16, 1920,  North  American  pp. 2953-2955.  p. 3562.  21underwood and Hitchcock were the two Democratic Senators' r e s p o n s i b l e f o r overseeing the s a f e passage of the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty through the Senate. For more i n f o r m a t i o n see: Evans C. Johnson, Oscar W. Underwood: A P o l i t i c a l Biography (Baton Rouge: L o u i s i a n a State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980). 2 2  2 3  I b i d . , p.  298.  C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record. February  27, 1920,  p. 3562.  U n i t e d States Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1921. V o l . 1. pp. 301-302. 2 4  2 5  Congressional  Record, June 3, 1922,  p. 8090.  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1923. V o l . 1 (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1938), pp. 495-496. 2 6  2 7  C o n g r e s s i o n a l Record. February  4, 1921,  pp.  2548-2550.  K e e n l e y s i d e , Canada and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , p. 376. Another aexample of the United States r e c o g n i z i n g i t s c l o s e economic t i e s w i t h Canada was the r e c i p r o c i t y agreement i n 1911. For more i n f o r m a t i o n see: Keenleyside, pp. 310-313. 2 8  - 144 2 9  I b i d . , p. 376.  •^Congressional 3 1  Ibid.  3 2  Ibid. Canada,  Record. February 4, 1921, p. 2548.  House o f Commons, Debates. May  14,  1923,  p. 2735. I b i d . , May 5, 1919, p. 2073.  3 4  G a l b r a i t h , The E s t a b l i s h m e n t Status at Washington, p. 83. 3 5  o f Canadian  Diplomatic  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g t o the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1918 V o l . I . p. 440. 3 6  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g t o t h e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1919. V o l . 1. p. 268. 3 7  ° F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n see;Papers R e l a t i n g t o the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1922. V o l . I . p. 669. J  • G a l b r a i t h , The E s t a b l i s h m e n t Status at Washington, p. 80. i 9  o f Canadian  Diplomatic  " u n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , Paper R e l a t i n g to the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1923. V o l . 1. pp. 467-482. 4  4 1  42  I b i d . , pp. 472-475. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, p. 48.  T o y n b e e , The Conduct o f B r i t i s h Empire Foreign R e l a t i o n s , p. 102. 43  I b i d . , p. 102; a l s o see: G a l b r a i t h , The Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic Status at Washington, p. 80. 4 4  45  T o y n b e e , The Conduct of B r i t i s h Empire Foreign R e l a t i o n s .  - 145 p.  102. Ibid.  4 6  47For more information see: Dawson, The Development of D o m i n i o n S t a t u s : W i g l e y , C a n a d a and t h e T r a n s i t i o n t o Commonwealth: G a l b r a i t h , The E s t a b l i s h m e n t of Canadian D i p l o m a t i c S t a t u s at Washington: Hancock, Survey of B r i t i s h Commonwealth A f f a i r s . V o l . 1. F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on the Imperial Conference of 1923 see: Dawson, The Development o f Dominion S t a t u s : Wigley, Canada and the T r a n s i t i o n to Commonwealth. 4 8  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consulate General, London, to S e c r e t a r y of State Hughes, September 11, 1923, R e c o r d s o f t h e Department o f S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o t h e I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s of Great B r i t a i n . 1910-1929. (841.01/IM7/41) pp. 1-6. 4 9  5 0  Congressional  Record. March 4, 1923, p. 5611.  51  Dawson, The Development of Dominion S t a t u s , p. 71.  T h e f a c t t h a t t h e o t h e r B r i t i s h Dominions would not agree to the Jones' p r o v i s i o n was made c l e a r t o the American S t a t e Department by i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n I r e l a n d . United S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , American C o n s u l a r Service, D u b l i n , t o W i l l i a m R. C a s t l e J r . , C h i e f of the D i v i s i o n of Western European A f f a i r s , A p r i l [date unknown] 1924, Records of t h e Department of State R e l a t i n g t o the P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i o n s B e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and G r e a t B r i t a i n 1910-1929. Washington: N a t i o n a l A r c h i v e s ( m i c r o f i l m , 1965, 711.41/123.5), pp. 1-11. 5 2  53For more i n f o r m a t i o n see: United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1923. V o l . 1. pp. 472-78. 5 4  I b i d . , p. 471.  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , American Consular S e r v i c e , D u b l i n , t o W i l l i a m R. C a s t l e , S r . C h i e f o f t h e D i v i s i o n o f Western European A f f a i r s , A p r i l [date unknown] 1924, R e c o r d s o f t h e Department o f S t a t e R e l a t i n g t o the P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i o n s Between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and G r e a t B r i t a i n 1910-1929. (711.41/123.5), pp. 1-11. 5 5  - 146 5 6  I b i d . , p. 5.  5 7 p n i l i p R e s n i c k , "Canada i n t h e American A c a d i e n s i s . V o l . 14 (No. 2 S p r i n g / 1985), p. 158.  Century,"  R i c h a r d N. Kottman, "Volstead V i o l a t e d : Prohibition As a Factor i n Canadian-American R e l a t i o n s , " Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review. V o l . 43 (No. 2 June,, 1962), p. 106. 5 8  5 I b i d . , p. 111. 9  F o r more i n f o r m a t i o n on America's attempts t o d e a l with "rum running" see: United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to the Foreign R e l a t i o n s of the United S t a t e s . 1922. V o l - 1. PP. 558-593. 6 0  61  Kottman,  "Volstead V i o l a t e d , " p. 111.  6 2 i b i d . , p. 112. u n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g t o the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1923. V o l . 1. pp. 228-231. 6 3  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , American Consulate i n Dublin t o Secretary of State Hughes, May 17, 1924, Records of the Department of State R e l a t i n g to the P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i o n s B e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and G r e a t B r i t a i n 1910-1929, (711.41/123.5) . 6 4  u n i t e d S t a t e s , Department o f S t a t e , Papers R e l a t i n g to the F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1924. V o l . 1. pp. 335-349. 6 5  6 6 i b i d . , p. 335.  - 147  -  Conclusion T h i s b r i e f a n a l y s i s of the American-Canadian r e l a t i o n s h i p between States to  1919-1924, has  d i d not,  impede  the  attempted  i n the post  war  development  of  to  prove  period,  t h a t the  United  d e l i b e r a t e l y set  Canada's d i p l o m a t i c  out  status.  A f t e r examining the r e l a t i o n s h i p from the American p e r s p e c t i v e , it  becomes evident  as Mahant and  t h a t the t h e s i s advocated by s c h o l a r s such  Mount, t h a t the United  States  the concept t h a t Canada could formulate  refused  to  accept  an autonomous f o r e i g n  p o l i c y , needs to be q u a l i f i e d . 1 Instead, the evidence presented suggests t h a t American o f f i c i a l s wanted Canada to achieve more independence i n i t s f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and its  p o s i t i o n s i n the  League o f  Nations  Empire to promote North American Certainly, Versailles  the  Treaty  s t a t u s Canada had Yet,  while  on  senators  Senate's  one  been granted  level,  were r e j e c t i n g the that t h i s was  cally  Many senators,  the  at  Canada.  irreconcilable  i n the  British  a  r e j e c t i o n of  the  repudiation  the  of  at the P a r i s Peace Conference.  great lengths to maintain aimed  and  use  ideals.  American  was,  then a g g r e s s i v e l y  group, w i l l i n g l y  t r e a t y , they went to not an attack  specifi-  i n c l u d i n g members of  acknowledged  that  they  would welcome Canada as a separate member of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community when the Canadian government c l a r i f i e d view  of  evolving Canadian  Canada's d i p l o m a t i c nature of the Ministers,  British  status  but  only i t s  also, defined  Commonwealth.  upon b e i n g  not  questioned  The i n the  fact  the that  House of  - 148 Commons, were not  able to d e s c r i b e the  which the Dominions achieved Great B r i t a i n , see how  -  their  new  legal  process  through  status i n r e l a t i o n  to  r e i n f o r c e d the American a t t i t u d e of w a i t i n g to  the Dominions evolved before g r a n t i n g them d i p l o m a t i c  status. Moreover,  the  Senate's  rejection  of  the  Versailles  T r e a t y , a l s o provided Canadian o f f i c i a l s with a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of  just  how  much A m e r i c a ' s  a f f e c t e d her f o r e i g n p o l i c y . midst  political  environment  The Dominions were caught i n the  of a s t r u c t u r a l b a t t l e between the Senate and P r e s i d e n t  Wilson  over  well,  there  the  domestic  the  i s no  Republican  effect  right  to c o n t r o l  f o r e i g n p o l i c y making.  doubt t h a t the e l e c t i o n t a c t i c s pursued  Party  i n 1918  and  on the American-Canadian  individual  senators  to support  expedient  for their  own  i n 1920,  had  relationship.  The  personal  by  a detrimental  p o l i c e s t h a t were  r e g i o n a l and  As  concern  of  politically  interests did  r e s u l t i n the United States developing an i n c o n s i s t e n t a t t i t u d e towards  Canada.  The  lack  of  a concise,  coherent  policy  towards t h e i r northern neighbor  helped to enhance the Canadian  government's  United  belief  that  the  S t a t e s was  preventing  Canada's d i p l o m a t i c growth. America's domestic offer  political  Canada a unique o p p o r t u n i t y .  d e s i r e to see  c l i m a t e d i d , however, a l s o Prime M i n i s t e r Borden's  Canada act as a mediator  between Great  and  the United States c o u l d have become a r e a l i t y  the  American  Senate's r e f u s a l to commit t h e i r  Britain  because of  government to  - 149 the League of Nations. Canadian  and  The  American  -  similarities  policies  that  did exist  led o f f i c i a l s  in  i n the S t a t e  Department to e n v i s i o n that Canada c o u l d be used by the United States  as  a tool  f o r g a i n i n g access  to the League and  c o u n c i l s of the B r i t i s h Empire while s t i l l p u b l i c l e v e l , America's attitude imperial  unity  competition Canadian and  mirrored  a foreign  support  policy  Canada's p o s i t i o n policies  that  developed  to  maintain  Consequently, and  a  a f f o r d e d the  opportunity t o formulate  that  was  while  d i d not  T h i s American  desire  policy.  a d o p t i n g American p o l i c y  t i v e s , the Canadian policy  foreign  government an unprecedented  By  imperial  one  f o r Canadian  execute  needs.  with  p r e s e r v i n g , at the  p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n i s m .  c o n f l i c t e d with Great B r i t a i n ' s  the  suited  to  Canadian  a t t i t u d e s which  still  conflict  adhering  closely  to  with Canadian  government c o u l d have e s t a b l i s h e d  those objec-  i t s own  positions.  Certainly,  this  young n a t i o n j u s t diplomacy  emerging  needs to be q u a l i f i e d .  into  the  Canada d i d not possess  bureaucratic consistent Canadian  argument  structure  foreign  precedent  that  Canada would  mediator  between  develop  a foreign  Canada's needs.  Great  that  an  was  the  and  extensive,  1920s d i d present  i t s potential and  a  international  o p p o r t u n i t y to e s t a b l i s h  use  Britain  policy  to develop  Yet, the e a r l y  o f f i c i a l s with a unique  of  the e x t e n s i v e resources  necessary  policy.  world  As  role  the as  a  United  States  to  particularly  suited  to  In s h o r t , s u c c e s s i v e Canadian  governments  - 150 d i d not take f u l l advantage o f t h e i r This Canada's  fact  example,  becomes c l e a r when America's a t t i t u d e  public  influence  opportunities.  attempts t o a s s e r t  t h e Empire's  Canada's  role  foreign  i t s diplomatic  policy  towards  views and  i s determined.  For  i n the debate surrounding the renewal  of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was seen as a p o s i t i v e development i n the United S t a t e s . against American ally  Article  Ten i n the League's  officials  that  Secretary  could  As w e l l , Canada's c o n s i s t e n t stand  that  Covenant  convinced many  the Canadian government  be depended  upon.  Writing  of State Hughes m a i n t a i n e d t h a t  was a  loyal  i n 1927, former  "the r e l a t i o n of  Canada t o t h e League g i v e s an opportunity f o r the p r e s e n t a t i o n and p r o t e c t i o n o f Canada's i n t e r e s t s , ... I t i s these i n t e r e s t s and our i n t e r e s t s which w i l l promote the most f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between  Canada and t h e U n i t e d  position  i n t h e League  States."  was viewed  p r o t e c t i n g America's d i p l o m a t i c  Clearly,  2  as an i m p o r t a n t way o f  interests.  T h i s p o l i c y , however, was s h a t t e r e d by Canada's to  confront  Great B r i t a i n  Canada's  and adamantly  inability  demand the r i g h t t o  formulate and execute a f o r e i g n p o l i c y that was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the Empire. not t o f o r t h r i g h t l y Washington  The Meighen Government's d e c i s i o n s  protest  Canada's  purpose  American  of status  at the  Naval Conference o r , c h a l l e n g e the B r i t i s h govern-  ment's advice not t o send a s p e c i a l the  lack  of discussing  officials,  resulted  envoy  t o Washington f o r  the Anglo-Japanese i n the United  Treaty  States  with  becoming  - 151 confused  about  the  -  objectives  Canadian government's d e s i r e  and  the  seriousness  for diplomatic  of  the  autonomy.  T h i s l a c k o f a s s e r t i v e n e s s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s was worse  by  Canada's  bilateral to  apparent  relationship.  appoint  a  on  the  and  pulpwood  helped  were  statements to  doubt  into  i t was  to  tangible  Prohibition  the  Convention  the  American  evidence suggests that  instigation  reluctant Instead, official thus  to the  of  negotiate  diplomatic  avoided  the  Canadian  facing  embark  of  ushered  nations.  the  1924,  understanding  the of  the  government  States  hesitancy Canadian  active  diplomatic  to turn  i t s public  l e d American  officials  Treaty  period  of  point,  and  the .  cooperation however,  c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s h i p was government. with took  through  full  the  Department  American  officials.  at was  officials.  advantage  British  to America's  Canada  the  of  the  Embassy  and  It  was  this  misunderstanding  status.  United what  an  this  American  type of a c t i o n which c o n t r i b u t e d  By  Canada's  Halibut  on  directly  State  o f Canada's d i p l o m a t i c  on  i n a new  Even  channel  United  and,  status.  between  the  two  the  of  closer  inability  i n Washington t h a t  r e s u l t s which  signing  a  Washington  with  Canada's i n a b i l i t y  Canada's d i p l o m a t i c  Clearly,  to  examples  impression  initiate  government's  directly  two  planning  In s h o r t ,  to  representative  i s s u e , are  not  Canadian  to deal  to c r e a t e the  officials policy.  The  permanent  Canada's u n w i l l i n g n e s s  reluctance  made  States  were  the  still  d i d not  Canadian  possess  a  government's  clear real  - 152 diplomatic  objectives.  The  -  conflicting  signals  from  the  B r i t i s h and Canadian governments combined with the i n c o n s i s t e n t reports from State Department o f f i c i a l s posted i n the Dominions, c o n t r i b u t e d to the American government's i n a b i l i t y to a cohesive  p o l i c y towards Canada.  Consequently,  formulate the  mid  1920s, the United S t a t e s g r a d u a l l y began to a c t i v e l y d e a l  with  i n t e r n a t i o n a l forums, s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t s own. had  the  by  the League of Nations,  on  T h i s slow thawing of America's o f f i c i a l i s o l a t i o n i s m effect  of  Canada as  a  Canada had  lost  removing America's  diplomatic her  tool.  immediate  This,  3  opportunity  to  need  in effect,  exercise  an  to  use  meant t h a t independent  f o r e i g n p o l i c y because the United States no longer needed Canada to help p r o t e c t her i n t e r e s t s . The  net  perspective United  result  has  focussing  revealed  States  affairs.  of  to  that  i t was  encourage  W r i t i n g i n 1925,  t h i s paper on  Canada's  explained.  4  i n the  e a r l y 1920s had  T h i s lack of a f u l l  never  explanation  to the imbalance i n the h i s t o r i o g r a p h y . goals and o b j e c t i v e s and determining vision  of  what  to take the  Washington.  first  C l e a r l y , the  steps  a  in  the  foreign  Keenleyside,  representative  been  adequately  i s primarily  due  By examining American  the American government's  international role  becomes much e a s i e r to e x p l a i n and reluctant  autonomy  to appoint  American  i n t e r e s t s of  Canadian h i s t o r i a n Hugh  commented t h a t Canada's i n a b i l i t y to Washington  i n the  the  Canada  could  understand why and  appoint  play,  it  Canada  was  a minister  Canadian government took  refuge  to in  - 153 the  -  i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e to o f f s e t the  from the  United  interests.  The  States fact  to act  that  an  as  a  enormous pressure " f r o n t man"  official  t a t i v e s d i d not take p l a c e u n t i l 1927, due role  to the as  British  the  Canada's r e l u c t a n c e and  turn  reality. pressure  of  to a g g r e s s i v e l y  i t s desire The  formulator  f o r an  to  imperial seize  independent  Canadian government had  represen-  to a l a r g e  government's d e s i r e not  primary  f o r American  exchange o f was,  coming  extent,  surrender policy  its  its  and  to  opportunities  foreign policy into  to choose between  the  from the United States to pursue a separate p o l i c y or  remain i n the  i m p e r i a l s t r u c t u r e and work towards i t s reform.  The  government  Canadian  chose  the  latter  course and  doing, convinced the United States that Canada was to develop and  in  so  not prepared  e x e r c i s e an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  - 154 Endnotes  Conclusion  -••Mahant and Mount, An R e l a t i o n s . p. 113.  I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Canadian-American  2charles E. Hughes, Our R e l a t i o n s to the Nations of the Western Hemisphere ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1928), pp. 34-35. B e r d a h l , The P o l i c y of the United to the League of Nations, pp. 100-105. 3  4  Keenleyside,  States With Respect  Canada and the United S t a t e s , p. 386.  - 155  -  Bibliography Secondary  Sources:  Articles  Adler, Selig. "The C o n g r e s s i o n a l E l e c t i o n s o f 1918," S o u t h A t l a n t i c Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 36 (No. 4 1 9 3 7 ) , p p . 447-465. B e r d a h l , C l a r e n c e A. 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