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Chang Chün-Mai : a moral conservative in an immoral age Draper, Paul 1985

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CHANG CHUN-MAI:  A MORAL CONSERVATIVE  IN AN IMMORAL AGE By PAUL DRAPER B.A., San Jose State University, 1978 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES The Department of History  We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1985 © P a u l Draper, 1985  In p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of  requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the  the  University  o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make it  f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference  and  study.  I  further  agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may  be granted by the head o f  department or by h i s or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  my  It i s  understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain  s h a l l not be allowed without my  permission.  Paul Draper  Department o f  Hi g f m y  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main M a l l Van couve r , Canada V6T 1Y3 Date  September 24,  1985  written  ii ABSTRACT  Chang Chun-mai, prominent  known i n the West as Carsun  Chang, p l a y e d a  r o l e on the p o l i t i c a l stage o f wartime China.  As educator,  p h i l o s o p h e r , and p o l i t i c i a n , he v a i n l y attempted t o a l t e r the course o f China's p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l development. as  a liberal-democrat, this  traditionally-minded conservative.  Although commonly referred to  s t u d y shows Chang t o be  more o f a  Masked by the heavy use of a l i b e r a l -  democratic vocabulary, Chang maintained a f i r m commitment to p r i n c i p l e s t h a t owed much more t o c o n s e r v a t i v e Chinese t r a d i t i o n than t o Western liberalism. The  fact  that  Chang Chun-mai d i d r e l y  so h e a v i l y  on  liberal-  d e m o c r a t i c arguments and came t o be known by some as the F a t h e r o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n tends t o c l o u d h i s r e a l i n t e n t .  I t i s argued here t h a t h i s  e f f o r t s t o b r i n g a W e s t e r n - s t y l e c o n s t i t u t i o n t o China can b e t t e r understood by recognizing two major points:  be  f i r s t , Chang, as w e l l as many  others, used the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue i n an attempt to force Chiang K a i shek t o share p o l i t i c a l power; and, secondly, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e provided  Chang  with  the  c o n c e p t u a l and  rebuilding the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l relationships  institutional  vehicle  for  between the various elements  of Chinese s o c i e t y which had e x i s t e d b e f o r e the R e p u b l i c .  W i t h i n the  l a t t e r g o a l , Chang a l s o souqht t o c r e a t e a p o s i t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e and prestige f o r the c l a s s of i n t e l l e c t u a l s of which he was a part. This study explores one dimension of Chinese conservatism. Chang Chun-mai as a n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t whose  I t shows  b e h a v i o r was guided and  l i m i t e d by h i s image of the Chinese c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n — l i m i t a t i o n s which s i g n i f i c a n t l y contributed to h i s f a i l u r e .  Examining Chang's a c t i o n s i n  iii wartime China  sheds more l i g h t on the reasons  f o r the f a i l u r e of the  so-called " t h i r d force" elements that stood between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party.  Chang held himself aloof from the great mass of  h i s fellow countrymen, he championed a  D o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n which f a i l e d to  o f f e r a clear a l t e r n a t i v e to the a u t h o r i t a r i a n government of Chiang K a i shek,  and h i s philosophical and conservative viewpoint prevented him from  carrying his p o l i t i c a l opposition t o a p o i n t which s e r i o u s l y c h a l l e n g e d Chiang Kai-shek.  Although t h i s study does conclude that Chang's i d e a l i z e d  image of the C o n f u c i a n gentleman (chun-tzu) a c t e d as a handicap i n the p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u of wartime China, i t confines that conclusion to a given time and place, and under p a r t i c u l a r circumstances.  I t emphatically does  not p u r p o r t t o d i s c o u n t the v i a b i l i t y or a p p r o p r i a t n e s s o f t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese v a l u e s i n the modern world,  or w i t h some form of  democratic  system. Far from exhaustive, t h i s study i s , at best, p a r t i a l .  I t i s meant to  e x p l o r e a d i m e n s i o n of the Chinese e f f o r t t o r e c o n c i l e themselves and t h e i r c u l t u r e with a changing environment. and not w i t h o u t i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s .  Source materials are l i m i t e d  A major drawback i s t h a t much of the  Chinese-language material concerning Chang Chun-mai i s l a u d i t o r y i n nature and biased i n h i s favor.  I f time permitted, a more thorough study of the  p e r s o n a l accounts o f other a c t o r s i n v o l v e d would no doubt y i e l d a more b a l a n c e d p i c t u r e . F u r t h e r , the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  under which much of the  wartime materials were w r i t t e n required a good deal of circumspection on the p a r t of the w r i t e r s , and t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e s a good d e a l of "reading between the  l i n e s " by  the  modern reader.  c o n c l u s i o n s reasonable w i t h o u t translation.  I have t r i e d  i m p a r t i n g my own  t o keep  my  ideas to a d i f f i c u l t  iv  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page T i t l e Page  . . . . . .  i  Authorization  i  Abstract  i i  Table of Contents  iv  Abbreviations  v  Acknowledgement  vi  Chapter 1:  Introduction  1  Chapter 2:  Early Education:  Chapter 3:  Constitutions and State-Building  Chapter 4:  Conclusion  Beginning of a Synthesis  . . .  25 64 125  Bibliography  144  Glossary  156  V  ABBREVIATIONS  Chang Chiin-mai chuan-chj t s u - l i a o CCMHSNPCPCJK  Chang Chun-mai hsjen-sheng njen-piao chien-pien ch'u-kao  CCP  Chinese Communist Party  CKMCSHTCC  chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang chuanchi  CTCKSLTK  Chjn-tai chung-kuo shih-iiao ts'ung-K'an Ko_ k'ang-jih tang-p'ai i i hsuan-ch'uan huo-tung  KMT  Kuomintang  WYSSTH  Women yao. §m  shuo i i hua  vi  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  No paper of t h i s nature deserves t o be under a s i n g l e author's name. What began as a personal project soon drew on the talents and patience of many. reality.  I t i s t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s which, i n t r u t h , made t h i s paper a My g r a t e f u l thanks t o Edgar Wickberg whose exhaustive readings  and c o r r e c t i o n s t o t h i s paper have made i t f a r b e t t e r than a n y t h i n g I alone c o u l d have produced.  My a p p r e c i a t i o n a l s o t o Alexander Woodside  who, a t the most d i f f i c u l t t i m e , took up the task o f s u p e r v i z i n g t h i s paper i n i t s f i n a l stages.  I w i l l forever be i n debt t o Heather Trouche,  who time and again went f a r beyond her normal duties t o a s s i s t me.  Deep  thanks also t o Susan Mann f o r her c a r e f u l editing, and t o Steve Mann f o r h i s friendship and the many hours of computer time he made me.  available to  For my wife, Carol, who followed me, f i r s t , t o Canada, and, l a t e r , to  Asia, I have no words which could express my love, gratitude, and respect.  1  CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION  The p o l i t i c a l  history of China during the mid-twentieth century i s  understandably dominated by i t s two most prominent actors; the N a t i o n a l i s t Party or Kuomintang (KMT)  and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), one the  vanquished, the other the v i c t o r .  A focus on the duel between these two  p a r t i e s has often l e f t the impression that the only real a l t e r n a t i v e s open to China i n the 1930's and 1940's rested with the KMT We  are c e r t a i n l y  homogeneous u n i t s .  aware t h a t n e i t h e r  and the CCP.  the KMT  nor the CCP  were  Each c o n t a i n e d a v a r i e t y o f i n t e l l e c t u a l c u r r e n t s  which, a t t i m e s , worked a g a i n s t the l e a d e r s o f both p a r t i e s .  The World  War Two State Department dispatches of John Service and John Paton Davies, and the wartime accounts o f Theodore White and Jack Belden, have been j o i n e d by  the l a t e r  works o f H a r o l d I s s a c s ,  Lloyd  Eastman,  Joseph  Fewsmith, and others to more f u l l y reveal the d i v e r s i t y within the KMT i n particular.  But  what of those o t h e r c u r r e n t s  of i n t e l l e c t u a l  p o l i t i c a l thought that stood between the KMT and the CCP?  and  Chester Tan and  Ch'ien Tuan-sheng have spoken of them i n the context of more comprehensive works; Lawrence Shyu and A,  Shaheen have added t h e i r contributions t o our  knowledge o f c e r t a i n elements of t h i s "middle group," but as y e t no one has attempted a d e f i n i t i v e study o f the impact and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s group—not to mention a comprehensive  examination of t h e i r philosophical  and p o l i t i c a l contribution t o modern China. T h i s study does not presume t o attempt such a comprehensive  task.  What i t does attempt, however, i s t o add, i n some s m a l l measure, t o our understanding o f one p a r t o f t h i s "middle group."  I t i s hoped t h a t  through t h i s approach we might be b e t t e r a b l e t o understand why these elements were relegated to such minor roles i n the p o l i t i c a l denouement of  2  the 1940's. Among those who  stood between the KMT  and the CCP were some  embraced a more t r a d i t i o n a l , c o n s e r v a t i v e stance;  who  some of t h i s group  have been rather casually dismissed as irrelevant or anachronistic.  To a  degree t h i s i s understandable,  from  since t h e i r subsequent  disappearance  the p o l i t i c a l scene tends to confirm our suspicions that they were somehow "out of s t e p " w i t h modern China.  But d i d these t r a d i t i o n a l l y - m i n d e d  conservatives f a i l f o r the above reasons or f o r others? of  political  machinations,  or d i d they  fail  Were they v i c t i m s  because of t h e i r  own  inconsistencies or shortcomings? Of t h i s group, Chang Chun-mai, teacher, philosopher, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l expert, and p o l i t i c i a n , was perhaps representative. a generation of Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s who  He i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of  spent t h e i r youth i n Imperial  China and came t o m a t u r i t y i n R e p u b l i c a n C h i n a — i n t e l l e c t u a l s whose e d u c a t i o n and e x p e r i e n c e o f t e n combined t r a d i t i o n a l and modern, Chinese and Western.  Chang was by no means a r e v o l u t i o n a r y ; he t r i e d t o work  w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m — f o l l o w i n g g u i d e l i n e s from  the  t r a d i t i o n a l heritage, while being confined by the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by the KMT.  He r e j e c t e d the one-party d i c t a t o r s h i p of the KMT  " d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t " a l i k e .  and  the  Chang proposed an a l t e r n a t i v e  course f o r modern China, one which he believed was true to the s p i r i t of Chinese t r a d i t i o n yet adapted t o the needs of the modern world. Chang Chun-mai was  active  w r i t i n g , education and p o l i t i c s . t r a d i t i o n a l mode of behavior.  i n a v a r i e t y of f i e l d s :  publishing,  Taken together they i l l u s t r a t e a q u i t e  His l i f e i l l u s t r a t e s a conscious desire to  f u l f i l l h i s self-perceived r o l e as a Confucian gentleman, a modern ch'untzu.  while touching b r i e f l y on several of these areas, I w i l l concentrate  3 on Chang's a c t i v i t i e s i n the p o l i t i c a l arena, s p e c i f i c a l l y h i s e f f o r t s to g i v e China a modern d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n .  On  this latter  point,  Chang's c o n c e p t i o n o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n can b e s t be understood when viewed from a t r a d i t i o n a l s t a n d p o i n t .  While cloaked  i n modern  vocabulary,  Chang's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals were designed to mend the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l f a b r i c of China.  His goals were not to bring something foreign to China,  but r a t h e r t o r e b u i l d the essence o f a s o c i o p o l i t i c a l  system t h a t had  worked i n China for centuries, and had been destroyed by the Revolution of 1911. The issue of conservatism  i n China has been broached before.  In her  p i o n e e r i n g study of the T'ung C h i h R e s t o r a t i o n , f o r example, Mary C. Wright  showed the a b i l i t y  of the Ch'ing Government t o r i s e  to  the  challenge of the Taiping rebels, i n s t i t u t i o n a l decay, and a host of other economic and p o l i t i c a l i l l s .  The T'ung Chih Restoration was,  as i t s name  implies, a conservative attempt to restore the vigor of Imperial authority and i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Daniel Bays went on to look c l o s e l y at Chang Chih-tung,  a somewhat l a t e r conservative, who  t r i e d to preserve China c u l t u r a l l y  and  p o l i t i c a l l y by h i s famous marriage of the Chinese £!i ("essence") and  the  Western yung ("function").  More r e c e n t l y , w r i t e r s such as Hao  Chang,  Charlotte Furth, Benjamin Schwartz, and Guy A l i t t o have t r i e d to give the study of  Chinese conservatism  more comprehensive treatment.  Guy  Alitto,  i n p a r t i c u l a r , has turned h i s considerable energies to the study of Liang Shu-ming, the  philosopher  and  founder o f  the  Rural  Reconstruction  Association. While more heavily influenced by Buddhism than Chang Chun-mai, Liang Shu-ming was also deeply concerned with the health and s u r v i v a l of Chinese culture, and f e l t that one key to China's s a l v a t i o n was of selected parts of the t r a d i t i o n a l heritage.  the preservation  A major element of Liang's  4  program t o save China were  the model v i l l a g e s o r g a n i z e d under the  d i r e c t i o n of h i s Rural Reconstruction Association.  H i s g o a l was t o  simultaneously r e v i v i f y the communal v i r t u e s e x p l i c i t i n the t r a d i t i o n a l heritage, while bringing the benefits of modern s c i e n t i f i c agriculture to r u r a l China. As Liang Shu-ming was concentrating h i s e f f o r t s i n r u r a l China, Chang Chun-mai was busy focusing h i s energies within the e l i t e s t r a t a of Chinese society. Chang might be seen as t a n g e n t i a l l y  related to Liang Shu-ming,  r a t h e r than as an advance along a continuum  of conservative evolution.  Each man had found a d i f f e r e n t f o c a l point i n t h e i r common e f f o r t to save China as a c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y from the forces of domestic chaos and foreign aggression. This study w i l l focus on Chang Chun-mai* s work i n the n a t i o n a l - l e v e l p o l i t i c a l arena.  In doing so I w i l l a l s o q u e s t i o n the commonly  Western b e l i e f t h a t Chang Chun-mai was a W e s t e r n - o r i e n t e d democrat.  held  liberal-  Chang Chun-mai i s known t o most i n the West as Carsun Chang,  the author of The Third Force i n China, written i n the early 1950's a f t e r h i s s e l f - i m p o s e d p o l i t i c a l e x i l e from the R e p u b l i c o f China.  In t h a t  E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e work, Chang p o r t r a y e d h i m s e l f t o h i s p r e d o m i n a n t l y American audience as the l e a d e r o f the Chinese anti-communist, f a s c i s t , liberal-democrats.  anti-  P l a c i n g h i m s e l f i n o p p o s i t i o n t o both the  communist d i c t a t o r s h i p of Mao Tse-tung and the one-party d i c t a t o r s h i p of Chiang Kai-shek, Chang assumed the mantle of l e a d e r s h i p of China's l a s t hope f o r democratic government. Chang was commitment  much l e s s to l i b e r a l  I believe that t h i s study w i l l show that  "Westernized" than some b e l i e v e , d e m o c r a c y was  conservative, t r a d i t i o n a l bent.  extensively  and t h a t h i s  colored  by h i s  5 T h i s study i s an i n i t i a l e f f o r t which of n e c e s s i t y has focused on Chang Chun-mai's e f f o r t s to bring a constitution to l i f e i n C h i n a — o n l y a small segment of h i s interest.  Neither does t h i s study pretend to be an  i n - d e p t h study of Chang's p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought; h i s p h i l o s o p h y and i t s Western i n p u t s have been i n t r o d u c e d o n l y so f a r as i s n e c e s s a r y t o understand Chang's basic motives and drives.  A c l e a r e r , and perhaps truer  p i c t u r e of Chang Chiin-mai must await the research the subject deserves. To understand Chang Chiin-mai and the type of c o n s e r v a t i s m t h a t he represented, we need to examine i n t e l l e c t u a l history and  c e r t a i n major currents i n modern Chinese  t r y to juxtapose these with the p o l i t i c a l issues  of the day. The t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese v i r t u e s of c o n c i l i a t i o n and compromise, amply expressed i n terms o f v a l u e s and b e h a v i o r , o n l y s e r v e d t o g i v e form and regulation to a r i c h history of i n t e l l e c t u a l challenge and confrontation. For c e n t u r i e s , orthodox  Chinese s c h o l a r s had w i e l d e d t h e i r pens i n  defense of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the C o n f u c i a n r e a l i t y . These b a t t l e s , however, were waged with one overriding p r i n c i p l e i n mind: r e g a r d l e s s o f one's o r d e r i n g and emphasis of the C o n f u c i a n cosmology, those elements  per se went unchallenged.  As an e x p l a n a t i o n of  the  ultimate causes and the ultimate meaning of l i f e and as a v e h i c l e f o r the preservation of Chinese culture, Confucianism, of one sort or another, for  centuries  accepted as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Chinese  was  cultural  tradition. The study of modern Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l history, however, reveals new currents of thought which f o r c e f u l l y and sometimes convincingly eroded Confucianism's facade of i m m u t a b i l i t y . state,  the c u l t u r e ,  and  the a r t s  The t r a d i t i o n a l view t h a t the  were an  o r g a n i c whole,  dependent, and i n tune w i t h heaven began t o weaken.  mutually  The y e a r s 1898 and  6  1919  a r e s e e n by  some as " w a t e r s h e d s  i n the h i s t o r y  of  i n t e l l e c t u a l break with the values of Confucian c i v i l i z a t i o n . "  1  China's Whereas  the e a r l i e r date can be seen as a r e f o r m e f f o r t aimed a t i n h e r i t e d a n t i q u a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , the l a t e r date was  a profound a t t a c k on the  Chinese moral and s o c i a l order. NEC—TRADITIONAL INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS Between 1898  and 1919  t h e r e developed a wide range o f c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e l l e c t u a l currents i n China.  Competing f o r a chance to be heard were  r e p u b l i c a n s , a n a r c h i s t s , s o c i a l i s t s , monarchists, and more. Before 1919 and the t o t a l i s t i c iconoclasm that accompanied  i t , c e r t a i n neo-traditional  i n t e l l e c t u a l c u r r e n t s competed f o r influence.  These various schools of  n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t thought each sought the causes and solutions t o China's problems, not the l e a s t of which was the seemingly immediate threat to the existence of the Chinese state. Among these neo-traditional i s t s were those such as Chang P i n g - l i n and L i u Shih-p'ei, who thought  were prominent i n the " n a t i o n a l essence" s c h o o l o f  (Kuo-ts'ui hsueh-p'ai). The N a t i o n a l Essence Movement found  adherents among c l a s s i c a l scholars and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s who t h a t the v e r y substance o f Chinese c u l t u r e was  believed  t o be found i n unique  r a c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l i n g r e d i e n t s . The p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t posed t o the existence of Chinese culture by the "foreign" Manchu regime, the advocates o f W e s t e r n i z e d m o d e r n i z a t i o n , and l a t e r by the i c o n o c l a s t s o f the Fourth period,  May  produced a sense of m i l i t a n t nationalism i n followers of  the "national essence" movement. While Chang P i n g - l i n held that the Confucian c l a s s i c s were history, p l a i n and simple, and sought to replace Confucianism with a b e l i e f i n the "national essence," he was opposed by another group of n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s  7  with q u i t e d i f f e r e n t goals.  K'ang Yu-wei and T'an Ssu-t'ung were leaders  of the movement to make Confucianism China's state r e l i g i o n . In t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n the abysmal c o n d i t i o n of Chinese i n s t i t u t i o n s and  m o r a l i t y , K'ang Yu-wei c l a i m e d t h a t  the o r i g i n a l  t e a c h i n g s of  C o n f u c i u s had been p e r v e r t e d over the c e n t u r i e s by the s u b s t i t u t i o n of textual forgeries f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, or by basic misunderstandings of the o r i g i n a l s . contained  K'ang c l a i m e d t h a t the t r u e body of C o n f u c i a n canon was  in early  Han  texts.  Through t h i s  s t r a t e g y , K'ang c o u l d  acknowledge that there was "something wrong" with China, but t h i s i l l n e s s of the s p i r i t u a l and p o l i t i c a l body could not be blamed on the "genuine" p r i n c i p l e s of Chinese culture.  This so-called New  Text Confucianism  was  seen by K'ang as o f f e r i n g a natural c o r o l l a r y t o secular government;  New  Text C o n f u c i a n i s m c o u l d , as r e l i g i o n d i d i n the West, uphold morality. reformer  K'ang's New and  social  Text i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l s o c a s t C o n f u c i u s as a  Confucianism  as a p h i l o s o p h y of change.  In t h i s  way  Confucianism could o f f e r the s p i r i t u a l foundation necessary for a changing and modernizing China. Led  by  L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao  a f t e r h i s r e t u r n to China a f t e r  Revolution of 1911, yet a t h i r d group of neo-traditional i s t s was  the  promoting  i t s f o r m u l a f o r the s o l u t i o n o f China's p r e s s i n g s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l problems.  Where " n a t i o n a l  essence"  intellectuals  had  seen  China's  s p i r i t u a l l e g a c y embodied i n race, h i s t o r y , and a r t , L i a n g found the enduring and unique q u a l i t y of Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n i n what he termed the "national character" nature,  unique  (kuo-hsing). Every nation, according to Liang, had a  to i t s e l f ,  and  t o be  found  i n i t s people.  China's  "national character," as i d e a l i z e d by Liang, was "familism" (chia-tsu chui),  whose v i r t u e s "encouraged  a s p i r i t of c o l l e c t i v e s o l i d a r i t y and  self-  8 s a c r i f i c e i n building the future, and confirmed the moral legitimacy of a p o l i t i c a l e l i t e based on t a l e n t . . . N e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s o f every s t r i p e deserve c r e d i t f o r a t l e a s t f u l f i l l i n g the d i c t a t e s of t h e i r r o l e s . s o c i e t y was answers.  The whole f a b r i c o f Chinese  under s t r e s s , and Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s were l o o k i n g f o r  They  were putting t h e i r energies to the s o l u t i o n of a problem  to be found i n any healthy society; "to d i s t i n g u i s h between those elements of the past that must be preserved i n order t o prevent chaos and decadence and those which must be abandoned i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t r i g i d i t y stultification."^  and  While t h i s i s n o r m a l l y an ongoing, measured p r o c e s s ,  the i n t e l l e c t u a l and p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s i n China added a dimension o f immediacy and urgency. A g a i n s t the background  of t h e s e n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  intellectual  currents arose a dynamic and increasingly strong current of opposition; an opposition  which  traditionalists.  went  well  beyond  the  limits  s e t by  R e j e c t i n g the arguments o f those who  the  neo-  believed i n a  "national essence" or a "national character," as w e l l as those who touted Confucianism as a r e l i g i o n , t h i s group c a l l e d for a complete renunciation of  Chinese  tradition  and  culture.  Leading  this  intellectual  c o u n t e r c u r r e n t were such i c o n o c l a s t s as Ch'en T u - h s i u , Hu S h i h , and Lu Hsun. Taking an organismic view of China's Confucian t r a d i t i o n , Ch'en, f o r example, was unable t o s a l v a g e a n y t h i n g o f v a l u e from Chinese c u l t u r e . H i s approach  r e j e c t e d as l u d i c r o u s Chang Chih-tung's  mid-nineteenth  c e n t u r y maxim t o "take Chinese s t u d i e s as the fundamental  structure,  Western studies f o r p r a c t i c a l use" (t'i-yung). No such s e l e c t i v e borrowing c o u l d overcome Ch'en's b e l i e f  t h a t China's c u r r e n t m a l a i s e was  the  expected outcome o f the f u n d a m e n t a l l y p e r v e r s e n a t u r e o f t r a d i t i o n a l  9  i n s t i t u t i o n s , morals, and culture. Using a v e r y broad brush, Ch'en found n e a r l y a l l a s p e c t s o f Chinese t r a d i t i o n to be derivatives of Confucianism. was  In h i s view,  Confucianism  i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the modern w o r l d because i t ran counter t o the  5 modern way of l i f e whose essence was equality and  independence.  Hu Shih, a l e a d e r o f the l i t e r a r y reform movement and, a t one time, an advocate o f t o t a l W e s t e r n i z a t i o n , j o i n e d Ch'en i n a j o i n t statement which made t h e i r p o s i t i o n c l e a r : "The o l d l i t e r a t u r e , o l d p o l i t i c s , and old ethics have always belonged to one family, we cannot abandon one and preserve the others."^  These positions, coupled with Lu Hsuh's appraisal  that Chinese history was "cannibalistic,"^ offended the e n t i r e spectrum of n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t thought. I f the n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s and the iconoclasts of the May Fourth era had a n y t h i n g i n common i t was t h e i r awareness of the immediacy o f the threat to China, and a desire t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n that would preserve China as a discrete entity.  While the n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s sought the  solution  through the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f some a s p e c t s of Chinese t r a d i t i o n , i c o n o c l a s t s saw  the answer i n the a d o p t i o n o f a t o t a l l y "new  the  culture"  unsullied by the weaknesses of the past. As the c o n t e s t between the i c o n o c l a s t s and the n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s i n t e n s i f i e d with the upheavals of the May Fourth period, a group of neot r a d i t i o n a l i s t s c o a l e s c e d i n t o what Hao Chang has i d e n t i f i e d as Confucianists.  8  New  Chang sees t h i s group as r e f l e c t i n g a response t o the  i n t e l l e c t u a l a s s a u l t o f the i c o n o c l a s t s .  Where the " n a t i o n a l essence"  school of thought "defined Chinese national i d e n t i t y i n terms of general c u l t u r a l or r a c i a l t r a i t s , the New  Confucianists were i n c l i n e d to i d e n t i f y  Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n w i t h one p a r t i c u l a r t r a d i t i o n a l t r e n d ,  namely,  10 Confucianism. In C o n f u c i a n i s m , New  C o n f u c i a n i s t s saw  something of t r a n s c u l t u r a l  worth; values and concepts which had universal v a l i d i t y . New  Text Confucianism of K'ang Yu-wei, the New  Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism Confucianism.  Instead of the  Confucianists i d e n t i f i e d  as the embodiment of the t r u e s p i r i t  of  In t a k i n g t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l stand which t r i e d t o b r i d g e  p a s t and p r e s e n t , as w e l l as s e r v e as a guide t o the f u t u r e , the Confucianists saw  New  themselves as the modern defenders of the neo-Confucian  e t h i c o s p i r i t u a l symbolism.  10  In t r y i n g to discern why  New  Confucianists came t o t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e l l e c t u a l stance, Hao Chang presents an analysis from the standpoint of China's " c r i s i s of meaning and the reaction to s c i e n t i s m . " of meaning which Chang describes was  11  The  an intense s p i r i t u a l , and, we  a l s o suspect e m o t i o n a l , d i s o r i e n t a t i o n .  1 2  might  As i n every society, Chinese  had t r i e d throughout t h e i r history t o answer man's fundamental about the meaning of l i f e and the world.  crisis  questions  In approaching these questions  Chinese t r a d i t i o n had gradually encompassed an accepted set of symbols and concepts which u l t i m a t e l y became a part of the Confucian t r a d i t i o n . the l a t e nineteenth-century,  In  however, i n t e l l e c t u a l c u r r e n t s both from  w i t h i n China and from the West began t o c h a l l e n g e the c e n t r a l m o r a l p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s of the C o n f u c i a n t r a d i t i o n .  T h i s c h a l l e n g e not o n l y  t h r e a t e n e d the C o n f u c i a n moral o r d e r , but a l s o d i s p u t e d i t s u n d e r l y i n g metaphysics. The most s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e , i n the eyes of New C o n f u c i a n i s t s , came from scientism; the b e l i e f that science could provide not only the symbols and concepts, but a l s o the methodology t o answer n a t u r a l , human, and s o c i a l questions.  Scientism, whose appeal was widespread a f t e r 1919,  was  o f f e r i n g a complete r a t i o n a l philosophy as a replacement f o r Confucianism.  11  Among t h i s group of New Confucianists which emerged i n the post-May Fourth era, were Liang Shu-ming, the philosopher R e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t s , T'ang Chun-i, a l s o  and leader of the Rural  a philosopher,  and Chang Chiin-  mai, who i n a d d i t i o n t o our p r e v i o u s d e s c r i p t i o n , was a l s o head o f t h e Democratic S o c i a l i s t Party.  Casting themselves as defenders of t r a d i t i o n  d i d not a t a l l mean New Confucianists had t o reject science; scientism as an a l l - i n c l u s i v e philosophical system was t h e i r antagonist,  not science.  Time and a g a i n these New C o n f u c i a n i s t s were w i l l i n g , i n f a c t , t o adapt science or other modern concepts and i n s t i t u t i o n s t o t h e i r purpose;  as a  way o f l o o k i n g a t l i f e , a t man, and understanding them, however, they found science woefully inadequate. Related t o the i n t e l l e c t u a l struggles of the post-1911 period was the search for a "new p o l i t i c a l system that would bring prosperity, s t a b i l i t y and s t r e n g t h t o t h e Chinese nation."-^  This national-scale problem was  i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d t o the much l a r g e r u n i v e r s a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s that preoccupied  Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  That t h i s should be so i s n o t  surprising.  From a t r a d i t i o n a l standpoint the intimate l i n k between good  government  and conforming  established. universal  t o the universal  of the universe.  and government f o r g e d  scholar-officials  and e x e m p l i f i e d  insured that questions  purview of Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s . significant  order  Government, i n i t s organization and behavior,  harmony and o r d e r i n g  philosophy  moral  was  well  reflected the  The l i n k  between  by g e n e r a t i o n s  of  o f government f e l l within the  Also, the i n t e l l e c t u a l c r i s i s was, t o a  degree, l i n k e d w i t h Western i m p e r i a l i s m .  scientism and Western r a t i o n a l i s m had threatened  The t e n e t s o f  China i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ,  while Western arms threatened China p o l i t i c a l l y . What form should  China's new government  take?  Although some  12 reformers had earlier suggested a constitutional monarchy, the proposals l o s t a l l meaning a f t e r 1911.  14  The Revolution had established a basic  direction for the development of government in post-imperial China. It had been, after a l l , "republican," and Sun Yat-sen had hurried back to China to act as the republic's f i r s t Dresident, i f only shortly. Aside from Yuan Shih-kai's ill-advised attempt to exhume the monarchy, China seemed set on a course that would eventuallv lead to some form of democratic constitutional government. Various warlord governments toyed with constitution-making,  but in a  China divided into warlord fiefdoms these exercises were r e l a t i v e l y meaningless.  The ostensible unification of China under the banner of the  KMT,  however, gave constitutionalism i t s f i r s t real hope of success.  the  party of the late Sun Yat-sen, now termed the Father of the Country,  the KMT  carried a special stamp of legitimacy.  As  With i t s military power  and hands on the reins of government, that legitimacy took on new meaning. The Party canon, consisting of the W i l l and teachings of Sun, now became the orthodoxy. The evolution of China into a democratic nation would, for the next two decades, follow the guidelines set by Sun. At t h i s point the c r i s i s of meaning, which had i t s roots before the fall  of the Ch'ing, and  revolution came together.  the p o l i t i c a l New  crisis  p r e c i p i t a t e d by  the  Confucianists in particular were, at one  and the same time, seeking a reaffirmation of t r a d i t i o n a l symbols and values, and trying to establish a new p o l i t i c a l framework in which those values could operate. As mentioned earlier, the New  Confucianists, culturallv conservative  as they were, were not  opposed to things. modern.  Constitutional  democratic government was  seen as one modern Western element that could  and should be imported.  In p a r t i c u l a r , Chang Chun-mai believed that he  13  had found the source of w e a l t h and power p r e c i s e l y i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government.  15  had been made  Attempts such as t h i s to meld Chinese and Western concepts before.  Luminaries such as Yen Fu, K'ang Yu-wei, and Liang  Ch'i-ch'ao had a l l t r i e d t o bring together the best of East and West. It  needs t o be  stressed  that  Chang's promotion  of  democratic  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government was an i n s t i t u t i o n a l measure, not one which fundamentally  c h a l l e n g e d h i s New  Confucian c r e d e n t i a l s .  Levenson has c a u t i o n e d , "Chinese r e f o r m e r s viewed  Joseph  the West and  i n t e l l e c t u a l c l a i m s w i t h a good d e a l of ambivalence, . . . " was w i t h Chang Chiin-mai;  As  16  its  And so i t  he never r e v e a l e d any i n f a t u a t i o n w i t h  Western values of individualism and competition. a Western model of government  that  the  His infatuation was with  c o u l d p r o v i d e Chinese  with  an  a p p r o p r i a t e s e t t i n g or stage on which t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese v a l u e s c o u l d reassert t h e i r c l a i m to v a l i d i t y and demonstrate  t h e i r e f f i c a c y i n solving  modern problems. T h i s d r i v e t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r the b e s t of E a s t and West, so c l e a r l y seen i n Chang Chiin-mai, was, inherent tensions.  as Levenson pointed out, not without c e r t a i n  I t required, among other things, an i n d i r e c t denial of  the a g e - o l d C o n f u c i a n maxim t h a t a l l under heaven was  an i n t e g r a t e d ,  i n t e r c o n n e c t e d , m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e whole. Chang Chih-tung's t'i-yung dichotomy sought to separate s p i r i t and matter into d i s c r e t e spheres  and  deny t h a t the l a t t e r c o u l d be a product o r r e f l e c t i o n of the former.  In  a c c e p t i n g f o r e i g n f a c t o r i e s , a r s e n a l s , machinery and technology, Chang Chih-tung necessarily had to p o s i t that they were outside of and untainted by the culture which had produced them. While Levenson believes that e a r l y synthesizers such as Chang Chihtung embraced C o n f u c i a n i s m both as " h i s t o r y " and as "value," the same  14 could not be said f o r those who followed him. to t r a d i t i o n romantic.  was  intellectual,  Whereas Chang's attachment  that of l a t e r  Chinese would become  T w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y n a t i o n a l i s t s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , c o u l d no  longer embrace Confucianism because of i t s " v a l u e " — i t s p r a c t i c a b i l i t y to the  modern  world—but  touted  N a t i o n a l i s t s , such as Chiang  i t for i t s traditional  content.  Kai-shek and Chang Chun-mai, who were driven  ostensibly by a desire to do away with  the e v i l s of Imperial China, s t i l l  found themselves defending t r a d i t i o n ,  xhis paradoxical p o s i t i o n could  o n l y be h e l d by s e p a r a t i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n from the i n s t i t u t i o n s i t had spawned.  Mary Clabaugh Wright noted t h i s phenomenon i n Chiang Kai-shek.  She observed t h a t f o r "Chiang the C o n f u c i a n way o f l i f e  [had] l o s t i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l r a t i o n a l and universal q u a l i t i e s and [had] become imbued with a romantic nationalism.  I t [had] supreme value because  the source o f our g r e a t p a s t ,  the promise  i t [was] Chinese,  o f our g r e a t  future." ^ 1  Nationalists of t h i s s t r i p e could now "prescribe f i d e l i t y t o what history [had] e s t a b l i s h e d as Chinese,  rhey [could] never admit t h a t a Chinese  scholar careless of t r a d i t i o n [could] be a Chinese nationalist." ** 1  There are two p a r a l l e l currents to Chang's approach; change:  permanence  permanence and  as exemplified i n the continuation and preservation  of c e r t a i n t r a d i t i o n a l s t r a i n s of thought and culture, change as seen i n the overlay of new modern p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The resemblance here to  the t'i-yung f o r m u l a o f Chang Chih-tung i s undeniable.  I t can o n l y be  s a i d t h a t , i n Chang's case, h i s many y e a r s spent abroad i n study and teaching,  h i s wide-ranging  c o n t a c t and c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i t h Western  i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and h i s s e l e c t i v e use o f Western p h i l o s o p h y a l l tend t o b l u r the l i n e between a s t r i c t t'i-yung dichotomy.  Chang Chiin-mai had  c e r t a i n l y moved further towards the Western yung than Chang Chih-tung ever dreamed possible.  15  Aside  from  Chang's  interest  in traditional  i n s t i t u t i o n s , there i s strong evidence p l a c e i n h i s new  and  modern  to believe that he yet reserved a  scheme of government f o r a new  r e p l a c e the o l d s c h o l a r - b u r e a u c r a t  values  e l i t e ; one which c o u l d  of i m p e r i a l days w i t h a dynamic,  f o r w a r d - t h i n k i n g , modern-educated s o c i a l l e a d e r — a man v e r y much l i k e himself, i n fact.  T h i s h i g h l i g h t s a t h i r d , r e l a t e d , c r i s i s f a c e d by a  large segment of the Chinese i n t e l l i g e n t s i a .  Aside from the philosophical  and p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s , many Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s a l s o found themselves f a c i n g a p e r s o n a l c r i s i s ; a c r i s i s which undermined t h e i r p o s i t i o n and function i n Chinese society. "Traditional Chinese society was  composed of three p o l i t i c a l s t r a t a :  the i m p e r i a l c o u r t , the g e n t r y - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - l i t e r a t i c l a s s , and common people. . . " ^  Most i n t i m a t e was  the  the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the  imperial court and the g e n t r y - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - l i t e r a t i class. While Chinese emperors indeed h e l d a monopoly on the use of f o r c e , t h e i r use of i t was not, g e n e r a l l y , as a r b i t r a r y as i t might seem. The relationship between the emperor and the scholar-bureaucrats who h i s government was, emperor.  i n many cases, dependent upon the c h a r a c t e r of the  A strong-willed, f o r c e f u l emperor could consolidate more power  i n h i s own and  staffed  hands, where a weak, t i m i d emperor might defer to his advisors  staff. The  Han  e r a , g e n e r a l l y , c o u l d be s a i d t o be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by  somewhat balanced bureaucrats.  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the emperor and  a  the s c h o l a r -  Han emperors were, t o be sure, omnipotent, but they were  amenable to moral remonstrance.  O f f i c i a l s of the period never t i r e d of  reminding the emperors that "the state was the empire of the Emperor i t d i d not belong to the i n d i v i d u a l  ruler."  20  Kuo,  16 Reminding emperors of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to a higher duty could be  a p o t e n t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e means of curbing  wielding  imperial prerogatives.  The  of power, besides being based on custom and precedent, was  also  h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by C o n f u c i a n moral p r i n c i p l e s . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the emperor accepted the notion that he needed the assistance and counsel of wise o f f i c i a l s ,  that these o f f i c i a l s should c r i t i c i z e him,  should accept t h e i r remonstrances.  21  theory and moral,  the  that  Confucianism.  [their] monopoly control of the  abstract  technical vocabulary that governed the whole universe  social,  and  political  a t t i t u d e s and  relationships."  c a r e t a k e r s of C o n f u c i a n i d e o l o g y , defenders of the f a i t h , i f you these o f f i c i a l s could act as a counterbalance to the  throne. -* 2  he  The only protection these o f f i c i a l s  had, and the source of t h e i r i n f l u e n c e and a u t h o r i t y , was "Central to that influence was  and  2 2  of As  will,  the a r b i t r a r y power of  Concurrent w i t h t h e i r moral a u t h o r i t y ,  governmental  i n s t i t u t i o n s developed that gave r e a l power and decision-making authority t o the scholar-bureaucrats.  The  Imperial Censorate which, t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  had the power t o i n v e s t i g a t e and charge any person w i t h i n the i n c l u d i n g the emperor, and  realm,  the o f f i c e o f Prime M i n i s t e r are cases i n  point. The effectiveness of t h i s moral and  i n s t i t u t i o n a l counterbalance  was  greatly reduced by the time of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), however.  The  imperial  and  i n s t i t u t i o n s which had  i n f l u e n c e were a b o l i s h e d .  The  given  the scholar-bureaucrats  power  reforms i n s t i t u t e d by Emperor T ' a i - t s u  eliminated  the  S e c r e t a r i a t , the C h i e f  M i l i t a r y Commission, and  the  Censorate.  These changes e f f e c t i v e l y concentrated power i n the emperor's  hands, and s i g n i f i c a n t l y altered the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the emperor and the s c h o l a r - b u r e a u c r a t s .  The system T ' a i - t s u i n i t i a t e d i n c l i n e d l a t e r  emperors towards "capricious and ruthless exercise of t h e i r authority over  17  the o f f i c i a l d o m . " ^ With t h e i r positions separated scholar-bureaucrats  from the top l e v e l s of government, the  had t o r e l y s o l e l y on p e r s u a s i v e  check emperors' abusiveness.  remonstrance t o  T'ai-tsu further proscribed his advisors'  freedom of action by attacking the Mencian precepts  which had  the  a s p e c i a l board  of  scholars which purged e i g h t y - f i v e passages from Mencius' works which  he  officials'  remonstrances.  T'ai-tsu created  justified  found offensive to a rulers' prerogatives. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , i t was  Mencius that Chang Chiin-mai appealed to i n  h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of Confucianism with democracy. was  In a fashion, Chang  a t t e m p t i n g t o r e s u r r e c t the r u l e r - m i n i s t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t  had  existed before the time of T'ai-tsu. The f a l l of the Ch'ing empire i n  1911  brought w i t h i t the destruction of the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l orders. so  and  cultural-moral  /As L i n Yu-sheng has observed, the concept of universal kingship,  i n t i m a t e l y s u p p o r t e d by  sociopolitical  and  C o n f u c i a n i s m , had  cultural-moral  orders.  held  together  Even i n the  face  the of  c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s i n the l a t e Ch'ing, the court's i n t e g r a t i v e f u n c t i o n had been the glue that held the empire together. concludes, society.  25  had  particularly  devastating  The empire's demise, L i n  consequences  for  Chinese  Tied as c l o s e l y as they were to the empire and the court,  g e n t r y - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - l i t e r a t i c l a s s , f o r example, were l e f t p o s i t i o n , s t a t u s , or f u n c t i o n .  the  without  They d i d not d i s a p p e a r as a c l a s s , they  simply became i r r e l e v a n t . /As the g e n t r y - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - l i t e r a t i c l a s s was another, "new i n the new  Western-oriented i n t e l l i g e n t s i a was  being e c l i p s e d ,  emerging i n the c i t i e s ,  s c h o o l s and u n i v e r s i t i e s , and among s t u d e n t s sent a b r o a d . "  "No longer educated f o r o f f i c e , i n t e l l e c t u a l s more and more stood  26  outside  18 the mainstream of p o l i t i c a l power . . ." f o r these new  And while i t was  27  only natural  e l i t e s t o seek a r o l e and a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r themselves,  t h e r e were no i n s t i t u t i o n s which c o u l d u t i l i z e t h e i r e x p e r t i s e or g i v e them the influence and authority they desired. T h i s new  breed of e l i t e s , i n a d d i t i o n t o a d d r e s s i n g the i m p o r t a n t  p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l c h a l l e n g e s of the day, were a l s o b u i l d i n g a case f o r t h e i r  own  existence.  By placing themselves between the  center  of a u t h o r i t y and the people, by a c t i n g as the spokesman f o r d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government, by supporting  the creation of new  institutions  which gave them p o s i t i o n and i n f l u e n c e , by a c t i n g as a moral check on government, and by mastering the vocabulary and claiming the authority to interpret  the tenets of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy, the new  were carving a new  niche f o r themselves i n modern China.  i s a c l e a r example of t h i s emerging group of new  intelligentsia Chang Chun-mai  elites;  blending  t r a d i t i o n a l and modern, Chinese and Western. Chang's b e h a v i o r i s as r e v e a l i n g as the c o n t e n t of h i s w r i t i n g s . F o l l o w i n g h i s c a r e e r seems, a t f i r s t , t o i n v o l v e s u c c e s s i v e changes of focus; one p e r i o d seems dominated by p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , the next  by  educational pursuits, the next l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t i e s , academic study, and  so  on.  Only when one recognizes that Chang's focus never wavers with respect  t o h i s g o a l does the task become c l e a r e r . I t i s o n l y the avenues Chang uses t o reach h i s g o a l t h a t change. Chang i s a man goal,  for himself  and  f o r China.  observable i n Chang were nothing long  ago  new  These s u c c e s s i v e  shifts  to Chinese culture.  observed t h a t Chinese c u l t u r e had  a l t e r n a t i v e s t o those who  i n p u r s u i t of a moral  were d r i v e n  from  in  Arthur  focus Wright  developed a " v a r i e t y of the  arena of power." **  Somewhat analogous to the Confucian scholar-bureaucrat  2  who,  driven from  Court, turned t o T a o i s t s e c l u s i o n or p o e t r y , Chang Chun-mai l i k e w i s e  19  t u r n e d t o l e s s c o n t r o v e r s i a l p u r s u i t s when h i s a c t i v i t i e s i n one arena angered h i s powerful antagonists. C e n t r a l t o understanding Chang Chiin-mai i s the r e c o g n i t i o n o f h i s self-perceived role.  As a c u l t u r a l l y conservative New Confucian, he not  only i d e a l i z e d c e r t a i n neo-Confucian  precepts, but he a l s o i d e a l i z e d the  r o l e of the Confucian gentleman (chun-tzu).  According t o Confucian dogma  the  sagehood and outer kingliness  "highest  commanded  a  ideal of Confucianism-inner  Confucian t o both engage i n i n t e r n a l moral s e l f - c u l t i v a t i o n  and t o e x e r t e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e upon o t h e r s f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the universal moral community." ^ 2  In t h i s c o n t e x t Chang's seemingly  swings i n focus and a c t i v i t y are more e a s i l y explainable.  abrupt  Thomas Metzger  observed that ". . . Confucian thought generally wavered between the poles of s e l f - c u l t i v a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . " ^  0  I t c o u l d be added t h a t  C o n f u c i a n s , as w e l l , wavered between those p o l e s .  As i s the case w i t h  Chang Chiin-mai, when one avenue of action was exhausted or frustrated he, w i t h o u t pause, s h i f t e d  to another.  "The r a n g e o f s e r v i c e s t h a t  C o n f u c i a n i s m sought t o d e l i v e r . . . i n c l u d e d r e g u l a t i o n , e d u c a t i o n , and the r e s o l u t i o n o f c r i s e s . " ^  1  Chang's p u r s u i t s e a s i l y covered a l l these  and more. Whether Chang Chiin-mai ever referred any s t r i p e ,  i s irrelevant;  t o himself as a Confucian, of  h i s actions and assumptions c l e a r l y  behavior that i s consistent with t r a d i t i o n a l patterns. shown t h a t  indicate  John Dardess has  "the o v e r a l l b e h a v i o r o f those who c o n s i d e r e d  themselves  C o n f u c i a n s was c o n s c i o u s l y aimed a t , and i n some ways a c h i e v e d , a s e l f definition  and a s o c i a l  consistency."^  role  i n which  one c a n s e e a  logical  Even i f chang d i d not openly acknowledge h i s behavior as  "Confucian" o r " t r a d i t i o n a l , " i t was o n l y too c l e a r  t o others.  His  20 political  antagonists  anachronism, and f e l t halcyon  days  j u d g e d Chang t o be l i t t l e  b e t t e r t h a n an  t h a t he "had spent h i s whole l i f e s t u d y i n g t h e  o f Ch'in  Shih  Huang-ti  and Han Wu-ti," and t h a t "he •so  completely  represent [ed] the i n t e r e s t s of the landlords.  J  I f we look f o r t h e " s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n " and " s o c i a l r o l e " t h a t Chang consciously aimed at, i t i s evident that i t was as a member of an e l i t e — a new e l i t e c e r t a i n l y , but one whose r o l e and r e l a t i o n s h i p s as a mediator between the "court" and the masses were quite t r a d i t i o n a l i n nature.  To  be sure, Chang d i d set himself apart from the masses, he d i d view himself as a member o f an e l i t e group possessing c e r t a i n expert knowledge, a view wholly  consistent  profession.^ place  4  with  D a r d e s s ' d e f i n i t i o n o f C o n f u c i a n i s m as a  Chang was one o f a "new l i t e r a t i "  f o r themselves  i n modern China.  t r a d i t i o n a l counterparts,  would,  as d i d t h e i r  continue t o a c t as mediators between the locus  of power and t h e people, solutions".-^  They  struggling to find a  "to s y s t e m a t i z e  . . . demands and p r o v i d e  The major d i f f e r e n c e now was t h a t t h e body o f expert  knowledge had changed somewhat from t r a d i t i o n a l times. t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese wisdom, t h i s "new l i t e r a t i "  Instead of purely  ( i n Chang's case New-  Confucianists) sought to "find a course of action from t r a d i t i o n a l China and from foreign s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i z a t i o n s t o save China . . ."^  6  Earlier  we n o t e d  that  Hao Chang had d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e New  Confucianists' reaction as against scientism rather than against science. Not wanting t o seem backward or obscurantist, Chang Chun-mai was ready t o use s c i e n c e t o h i s own ends.  Perhaps t o j u s t i f y h i s own d e s i r e s he  observed t h a t "today, s c i e n c e has reached the p o i n t where every k i n d o f knowledge has become a s p e c i a l t y , every kind of s k i l l has become a s p e c i a l ability.  National a f f a i r s can no longer be dealt with by people with only  general knowledge."-*  7  And what kind of expert  knowledge would Chang be  21 t a l k i n g about?  In a country t r y i n g i n many ways to emulate the West, what  kind of learning was most appropriate?  The answer, of course, i s obvious.  Without p o i n t i n g t o h i m s e l f , Chang suggests t h a t those p o s s e s s i n g expert  knowledge be given "status and p o s i t i o n . " ^  8  this  With possibly j u s t a  b i t of nostalgia Chang went on to suggest that once educational background and experience were set as standards, the government might use some kind of examination to further d i f f e r e n t i a t e these experts.-* 9 Even as Chang envisioned the new ideal,  others,  f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r service  l e s s convinced of h i s s i n c e r i t y ,  expectation that "everyone should and  chiin-tzu's  knowledge,"  40  or  that  "the  mocked him  for his  revere those statesmen of high v i r t u e success or  dependent on a hero to resolve them."  failure  of a l l t h i n g s  41  Much of what Chang Chun-mai t r i e d t o do i n the way  of c r e a t i n g  democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n China can be seen as e f f o r t s to r e e s t a b l i s h sociopolitical  is  a  structure that would accomodate h i s generation of e l i t e s .  His use of terms f a m i l i a r to Western democratic t r a d i t i o n , however, should not be m i s r e a d as a deep commitment t o populism. paternalism  inherent  The b a s i c s t r a i n s of  i n the Confucian t r a d i t i o n were c l e a r l y v i s i b l e i n  Chang's e f f o r t s to b u i l d a replacement for the i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure of I m p e r i a l China.  Through such e f f o r t s Chang sought t o r a t i o n a l i z e the  relationships between the various p o l i t i c a l elements of modern China, and to regain the harmony and order that would bring peace and prosperity to China.  22 CHAPTER ONE  NOTES ^Charlotte Furth, "Intellectual change: from the Reform movement to the May Fourth movement, 1895-1920," i n John K. Fairbank and Denis T w i t c h e t t , eds., The Cambridge H i s t o r y of China. V o l . 12, Republican China. 1912-1949. P a r t I (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1978-1983), p. 322. ^Ibid. pp. 354-361; Also see Lawrence A. Schneider, "National Essence and the New Intelligentsia," pp. 57-89; Martin Bernal, "Liu Shihp'ei and the National Essence, pp. 90-112; and Charlotte Furth, "The Sage as Rebel: The Inner World of Chang P i n g - l i n , pp. 113-150 a l l i n Charlotte Furth, ed., The. Limits of. Change; Essays QR Conservative Alternatives i n Republican China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 3  Furth, "Intellectual change," p.  362-363.  Page Smith, The Historian and History (New York: A l f r e d A. 1964), p. 150. 4  Knopf,  L i n Yu-sheng, The. C r i s i s of Chinese Consciousness; Radical A n t i t r a d i t i o n a l i s m i n the. May Fourth Era (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 73. 5  Chow Tse-tung, The May. Fourth Movement; Intellectual Revolution i n Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 289 6  7  Ibid.  p.  308.  °Hao Chang, "New Confucianism and the I n t e l l e c t u a l C r i s i s of Contemporary China," in Furth, Limits of Change, pp. 276-302. 9  Ibid.  1  277.  Ibid.  p.  278.  lbid.  p.  280.  1 0  u  p.  o  Ibid. pp. 280-282. Hao Chang i d e n t i f i e s three elements to t h i s s p i r i t u a l disorientation: moral, e x i s t e n t i a l , and metaphysical. The moral d i s o r i e n t a t i o n was a result of the r a d i c a l iconoclasm of the May Fourth era which rejected the whole Confucian moral t r a d i t i o n . The e x i s t e n t i a l d i s o r i e n t a t i o n resulted from the crumbling of t r a d i t i o n a l religious beliefs which had heretofore given Chinese emotional shelter. The metaphysical disorientation sprang from the assault on the traditional metaphysical world view of religion and philosophy by science. -"Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule. 1927-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. v i i .  23  ^Tuan Shih-k'ai's imperial presumptions some years l a t e r were shared by few and c o u l d h a r d l y be s a i d t o r e p r e s e n t a l e g i t i m a t e c u r r e n t o f thought. •^Chang Chun-mai, "Kuo-chia wei shen-me yao hsien-fa?" i n Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang chuan-chi (n.p.: Ts'ai-sheng she pien-chi pu, 1 9 4 6 ) , p. 5. H e r e a f t e r CKMCSHTCC. A l s o see P h i l i p C. Huang, L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese l i b e r a l i s m (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1 9 7 2 ) , and Benjamin Schwartz, In Search Q£ Wealth and Power: Yen FJI and the West (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1 9 6 4 ) . 1 6  F u r t h , " I n t e l l e c t u a l change," p. 3 2 4 .  M a r y Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih R e s t o r a t i o n . 1 8 6 2 - 1 8 7 4 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 17  1 9 5 7 ) , p.  307.  J . R . Levenson, "'History* and 'Value': T e n s i o n s o f I n t e l l e c t u a l Choice i n Modern China," i n A r t h u r F. Wright, ed., S t u d i e s i n Chinese Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), p. 1 7 1 . 18  R o b e r t Bedeski, State-Building i n Modern China: The. Kuomintang i n the Prewar Period (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 1 6 4 . 19  H a n s Bielenstien, The Bureaucracy of Han Times. Cambridge Studies i n Chinese H i s t o r y , P a t r i c k Hanan and Denis T w i t c h e t t , gen. eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 1 4 3 . 20  2 1  Ibid.  oo  "-'John w. Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy; professional Elites i n the Founding o f the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 2 8 8 . 23  Hill:  Y . C wang, Chinese intellectuals and the. West: University o f North Carolina,  1966),  p. x i .  1872-1949 (Chapel  C h a r l e s 0. Hucker, The. Ming Dynasty: Its. O r i g i n s and Evolving I n s t i t u t i o n s (Ann Arbor: Center f o r Chinese S t u d i e s , U n i v e r s i t y o f 2 4  Michigan, 1 9 7 8 ) , pp.  96-97.  L i n , Chinese Consciousness, pp. 1 1 - 1 7 . Furth also observed these "devastating consequences." He noted that the collapse of the concept of universal kingship and i t s attendant i n s t i t u t i o n , which had symbolized the interdependence of the Chinese value system and the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l order, was " p r o f o u n d l y d i s p i r i t i n g . " See F u r t h , " I n t e l l e c t u a l change," 2 5  pp.  350-351. 26  2  B e d e s k i , State-Building, p. 164.  7Furth  f  " I n t e l l e c t u a l change," p.  322-323.  24 Arthur F. Wright, "Values, Roles, and Personalities," i n Arthur F. Wright and Denis T w i t c h e t t , eds., C o n f u c i a n P e r s o n a l i t i e s ( S t a n f o r d : Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 15. L i n Yu-sheng, "The S u i c i d e o f L i a n g C h i : Moral Conservatism," i n Furth, L i m i t s of. Change.  An Ambiguous Case o f p. 160.  2 9  Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving P o l i t i c a l Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977),.p. 79. 30  31  Dardess, Ibid.  3 2  Confucianism and. Autocracy, p. p.  54.  6.  H s i a K'ang-nung, Lun. flu S h i h yu Chang Chun-mai. (Shanghai: c h i h s h u - t i e n ch'u-pan, 1946), p. 51. 3 3  34  Dardess,  Confucianism and. Autocracy, pp.  Hsin-  7-8.  G u y A l i t t o , The. L a s t Confucian: L i a n g Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1979), p. 199. 3 5  Wen-hua c h i a o - y i i y e n - c h i u h u i , Kp_ k'ang-jih tang-p'ai i i hsiianch'uan huo-tung (n.p.: Wen-hua chiao-yu h u i ch'u-pan, 1941), p. 197. Hereafter KKJTPTHCHT. 36  -"Ts'ai-sheng she, Women yao suo shuo t i hua, (n.p.: she ch'u-pan, 1946), p. 16. Hereafter WYSSTH. 3 8  Ibid.  3 9  Ibid.  4 0  H s i a K'ang-nung, Lun Hu Shih yu Chang Chun-mai. p.  41  p.  Ts'ai-sheng  18.  Wen-hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT. p.  211.  62;  p.  64.  25 CHAPTER TWO:  EARLY EDUCATION:  BEGINNING OF A SYNTHESIS  For the g e n e r a t i o n o f the 1880's the d e c l i n i n g y e a r s of the Ch'ing dynasty h e l d b o t h g r e a t u n c e r t a i n t y and g r e a t promise.  Some would no  doubt f e e l at a l o s s to explain the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l system they were intimately linked to by education, p o s i t i o n , or class. who,  Others,  f o r whatever reasons, were able t o bridge the chasm between Imperial  China and a " n a t i o n a l "  China, would f i n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o be i n the  forefront of those leading China i n t o the twentieth century.  This l a t t e r  group of men and women r e p r e s e n t e d both the more " r a d i c a l " and the more " p r o g r e s s i v e " elements of the spectrum  of p o l i t i c a l thought i n China.  Some would provide the leadership of the May Fourth Movement, others would help conceive and bring to l i f e the Chinese Communist Party, while others, more conservative by nature, would t r y a new  rapprochement with Western  c u l t u r e t h a t was r e l a t e d t o , but d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t from, the e a r l i e r e f f o r t s of the "Self-Strengtheners." As a member of the 1880's generation, Chang Chun-mai represents the l a t t e r , more conservative element. the adjustments  His early years were f a i r l y t y p i c a l of  and c h a l l e n g e s f a c e d by h i s contemporaries.  Forced by  circumstances, as much as driven by desire, Chang's early education set a pattern of fusing t r a d i t i o n a l and modern, Chinese and Western, that would continue throughout h i s l i f e . Chang's f a m i l y was, by a l l indications, a respectable one; natives of Chiangsu p r o v i n c e , h i s a n c e s t o r s had been s c h o l a r s s i n c e the century,  h i s grandfather  had  traveled  widely  e s p e c i a l l y i n the area of Sung Confucianism.!  and  seventh  studied broadly,  Much l i k e the son of a  scholar i n older times, Chang received h i s early education at home under the g u i d i n g hands of prominent l o c a l C o n f u c i a n s c h o l a r s .  2  Chang began  26 reading a t s i x , and by e l e v e n had been g i v e n the fundamentals of a s t a n d a r d C o n f u c i a n education.  H i s t u t o r s had l e d him through The  Four  Books, the Collected Works p i Tseng Kuo-fan (Ts'eng Wen-cheng kung ch'uanchi).  Ku  Yen-wu's A Record  QL  Daily  Knowledge  (JJJa c h i h 111),  and  introduced him to Tz'u chih t'ung chien. a 294 volume c h r o n i c l e by Ssu-ma Kuang c o v e r i n g a p e r i o d o f 1362 y e a r s down t o the p e r i o d o f the F i v e Dynasties.  3  An education so heavily infused with Confucian ethics and morality, combined with the natural influence on early development of a t r a d i t i o n l a d e n home environment, gave Chang a worldview, t r a d i t i o n a l i n nature, t h a t became a touchstone throughout h i s l i f e .  t o which he would r e t u r n a g a i n and  again  In view of Chang's l a t e r w r i t i n g s , i t seems c l e a r  that his appraisal of Western philosophy and h i s synthesis of Western and Chinese  thought  were  largely  p r i n c i p l e s as a standard. absorbed  guided  The importance  by  using  these e a r l y - l e a r n e d  of those early years at  i n the study of c l a s s i c a l t e x t s cannot,  home,  i n Chang's case, be  overlooked. The i n f l u e n c e of e a r l y e d u c a t i o n i s , o f course, a complex v a r i a b l e whose e f f e c t s are not uniform. h s i u , or i n i t i a l l y  In some cases, such as Lu Hsun, Ch'en Tu-  a t l e a s t , Yen Fu, the mature i n d i v i d u a l r e j e c t e d h i s  early education and denounced i t , sometimes i n the most v i l e terms. contrast, Chang's embrace of the Confucian world-view was, r e i n f o r c e d as he grew o l d e r .  4  In  i f anything,  H i s l i f e shows a steady and c o n s i s t e n t  pattern of behavior s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r to that of a "model" Confucian. In a r e b u t t a l t o Hu Shih's i c o n o c l a s m he once s a i d t h a t "Confucius i s the p i l l a r of China. . ." g r e a t sage.  5  and wondered i f Hu S h i h r e a l l y understood  the  And y e a r s a f t e r the " l o s s " of China t o the Communists Chang  authored a s e m i n a l work on Neo-Confucianism t h a t r e v e a l e d h i s s t r o n g  27  a f f i n i t y f o r the thought o f Wang Yang-ming. With h i s home education f i n i s h e d and a s o l i d Confucian foundation i n p l a c e , young Chang was e n r o l l e d i n one o f t h e "new s c h o o l s " which had m u l t i p l i e d i n t h e l a t t e r h a l f o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h century.  These "new  schools" sought t o combine Chinese learning and Western science t o t r a i n a new generation of Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s who, armed with the best of both cultures,  would l e a d China  i n i t s quest  f o r wealth  and power.  The decision t o place Chang, the eldest son, i n such a school must surely have been a s e r i o u s and r e l a t i v e l y b o l d one f o r t h e f a m i l y .  As Chang  l a t e r commented, "at t h a t t i m e . . . most people f e l t t h a t s t u d y i n g i n a f o r e i g n - s t y l e s c h o o l was tantamount t o not s t u d y i n g a t a l l . " ^  Credit  should be g i v e n t o Chang's mother who, a p p a r e n t l y , was the f o r c e behind the decision.  She c e r t a i n l y could not have foreseen the coming a b o l i t i o n  of the I m p e r i a l examination system, but she was a b l e t o see c l e a r l y i n what d i r e c t i o n China's f u t u r e l a y .  So, i n 1897 Chang was packed o f f t o  Shanghai and entered t h e I n s t i t u t e o f Modern Languages (Kuang-fang Yenkuan). Despite  i t s a p p e l l a t i o n as a s c h o o l o f " f o r e i g n l e a r n i n g " , t h e  i n s t i t u t e d i d not neglect more t r a d i t i o n a l courses.  While Chang studied  E n g l i s h f o u r days a week, he c o n t i n u e d t o study Chinese the other t h r e e days.  During the four days of English classes Chang was a l s o expected t o  master mathematics, chemistry,  physics, and world history.  His Uiinese  c l a s s e s s t i l l , t o a degree, f o l l o w e d the t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n o f reading h i s t o r i c a l anecdotes and w r i t i n g essays.  7  Only twelve, Chang was already  an amalgamation o f modern and t r a d i t i o n a l ; h i s e d u c a t i o n had brought together and fused the "new learning and the o l d ethics".  8  During t h e next f o u r y e a r s , as Chang f i n i s h e d h i s m i d d l e s c h o o l  28 education, he was by no means i s o l a t e d from or immune to the events about him. of  Like many others, he must have watched with keen interest the t i d e  reform t h a t was  r i s i n g a g a i n s t the Empress Dowager, Tz'u H s i .  The  reformist ideas of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao struck a responsive cord i n Chang Chun-mai; they planted a seed and sparked h i s interest i n a way t h a t would o n l y become apparent i n the f u t u r e .  9  K'ang and Liang's  emphasis on g r a d u a l reform and m o d e r n i z a t i o n , w i t h a s t r o n g s t r a i n o f Confucian moralizing, melded w e l l with the thrust of h i s "new"  education  and s a t i s f i e d h i s need to reconcile the past with the future. I t i s impossible to say what e f f e c t the f a i l u r e of the Hundred Days of Reform and the f l i g h t from China of K'ang and Liang had on Chang.  One  can o n l y imagine t h a t the p i c t u r e s of K'ang and L i a n g , along w i t h t h e i r a r r e s t w a r r a n t s , t h a t hung above s c h o o l doors i n China, must have g i v e n Chang pause to r e f l e c t and wonder about the future of the Empire. S t i l l following, more or l e s s , a t r a d i t i o n a l pattern, Chang returned to h i s home p r e f e c t u r e and s a t f o r the p r o v i n c i a l exams i n 1902.  The  evidence suggests that Chang sat f o r a t r a d i t i o n a l s t y l e exam, composing essays based on q u o t a t i o n s from the C l a s s i c s . earn a hsiu-ts'ai degree.  10  Chang d i d w e l l enough t o  Continuing h i s education, Chang spent a h a l f  year at the China I n s t i t u t e (Chen-tan hsueh-yiian), which he l e f t f o r lack of money, and then enrolled i n the Nanking kao-teng hsueh-hsiao.  I t was  not long, however, before Chang's maturing consciousness and China's c r i s i s would lead him i n new  own  directions.  The encroachment of Russia i n t o Chinese t e r r i t o r y fueled the flames of a growing nationalism i n China. Japan, Russia now of  Manchuria.  Humiliated only a few years e a r l i e r by  added to China's humiliation by Chang  Chun-mai began t o  occupying large areas  express  h i s own  sense  of  n a t i o n a l i s m and outrage, as w e l l as a w i l l i n g n e s s t o take a c t i o n ; w h i l e  29  s t i l l a student, he t r i e d t o e n l i s t i n the v o l u n t e e r army chien.ll  of Niu Yung-  Though nothing came o f Chang's m i l i t a r y i n t e n t i o n s , he was  stimulated t o seek h i s own future and the s a l v a t i o n of China through new avenues. Russia's defeat by Japan i n 1905 stunned the world. Chinese i t was simply  electrifying.  For Japanese and  Asians saw the Japanese v i c t o r y as  proof that the Western powers were not i n v i n c i b l e ; i t was possible for an Asian nation t o modernize and become equal with the West. Japan's greatest success,  though, was t h a t i t had been a b l e t o adopt a W e s t e r n - s t y l e  c o n s t i t u t i o n and become s t r o n g i n d u s t r i a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y w h i l e preserving i t s t r a d i t i o n a l heritage.  yet  Hatred and past humiliations aside,  many Chinese found that the Japanese had given them back a sense of pride and hope.  They now looked t o Japan f o r clues and guidance to China's own  redemption.  Chang Chiin-mai,  no l e s s than others, saw Japan as the place  to be; i n the period around 1905 the Chinese student population i n Japan had grown t o about 13,000, a 1,300 percent increase since 1900.  12  In the  spring of 1905 then, Chang, only recently married and j u s t twenty-one, set s a i l for Japan. O r i g i n a l l y , Chang had gone t o Japan as an overseas student sponsored by h i s home p r e f e c t u r e . was  A c c o r d i n g t o the c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s s t i p e n d , he  t o study the natural sciences.  Unfortunately, Chang could work up no  i n t e r e s t i n h i s courses, and soon l e f t the government-approved s c h o o l . Although he q u i c k l y gained entrance t o Tokyo's Waseda U n i v e r s i t y , h i s studies  in political  authorities  science  did l i t t l e  t o impress t h e p r o v i n c i a l  back home who c u t o f f h i s s t i p e n d  l e f t him d e s t i t u t e .  and e f f e c t i v e l y  13  After the f a i l u r e of The Hundred Days of Reform, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had  30  also gone to Japan. As a student, Chang had been content to follow the reformer throught his writings i n the Ufew. People's Miscellany (Hsin-min ts'ung-pao).  But now  the necessity of earning a l i v i n g provided the  impetus which brought Chang and Liang together.  Chang began  writing for  the New People's Miscellany and for the university newspaper.  Materially,  these were not the best of times.  Chang, who was helping to support his  younger brother who was also studying in Japan, was barely able to exist on what he earned writing and what his family  could contribute.  He and  his brother lived mostly on sweet potatoes, the cheapest food available. Intellectually, however, these were f r u i t f u l times.  Not only did Chang  begin a l i f e - l o n g relationship with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (which has been described both as a master-disciple and as a father-son relationship), but, he was now free to give f u l l vent to his intellectual curiosity. University l i f e i n Japan f o r overseas Chinese students was not a retreat to the hallowed h a l l s of learning; rather, i t put them i n the vanguard of the various movements to save China (whether through reform or revolution).  These young students involved themselves  activities within the university and without.  i n a host of  Students organized study  groups that discussed everything from poetry to p o l i t i c s , reform to revolution.  As Chang puts i t , ". . . everyone was interested in politics,  no one thought of education as an end i n i t s e l f . "  1 4  In other words,  these students were i n Japan to gain the tools, the s k i l l s , to a f f e c t change i n China.  Waseda University was also a center of the "New  Movement" inspired by Tolstoi and Kropotkin.  Village  No evidence suggests that  Chang p a r t i c i p a t e d i n any way i n the movement, but the v o l u n t a r i s t i c communal aspects of i t s philosophy may have added to and helped define Chang's own,  later, socialist agrarian p o l i c i e s .  15  The most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of Chang's tenure i n Japan i s his  31  association with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Liang's New  Through Chang's work on the s t a f f of  People's Miscellany i n 1907,  he  was  brought  into  the  mainstream of those advocating reform through constitutional government, rather than through v i o l e n t revolution. For almost a year, before the journal ceased publication, Chang, writing under the pseudonym L i Chai, was able to begin to define and give expression to his p o l i t i c a l views. Chang also joined the Political Information Society (Cheng-wen she), which had been established i n Tokyo by friends of Liang's. charter c a l l e d for "implementing  The society's  a parliamentary form of government,  establishing a 'responsible' government [probably a responsible cabinet system], establishing laws and the independence of judicial authority, the affirmation of local self-government, a program of cautious diplomacy/ and the protection of equal r i g h t s . "  16  Chang was  a contributor to the  Society's journal Discourses on P o l i t i c s (Cheng Lun), and helped handle the a f f a i r s of the society i n Japan after i t s headquarters moved to Shanghai.  The P o l i t i c a l Information Society was suppressed by the Manchu  government in 1908,  and Chang's involvement with the group seems to have  ceased shortly thereafter.  17  Almost impossible to gauge accurately i s the influence Liang had on Chang's i n t e l l e c t u a l development.  Liang's own i n t e l l e c t u a l evolution  charted a course that swung from anti-Manchu agitator to conservative reformer, from revolutionary to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarchist.  18  I t was  Liang, the reformer, who had f i r s t attracted Chang Chun-mai during his middle school days, and i t was Liang, the proponent of parliamentary government, whom Chang met in 1906. While not part of t h i s study, i t should be noted i n passing that to label Chang Chiin-mai as a "supporter" of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,  19  as some have,  32 i s to say very l i t t l e at a l l .  That Liang had a profound a f f e c t on Chang  there can be l i t t l e doubt; t h e i r thinking i s s i m i l a r i n many areas. At the time Chang worked on Liang's New People's Miscellany, they both firmly embraced peaceful reform as the most e f f i c a c i o u s means of r e c t i f y i n g China's i l l s .  Both shared the dilemma of how to reconcile the conflicting  meanings of Confucian principle and democratic government.  20  Liang's ideas  on economics, which "favored the development of private c a p i t a l under state c o n t r o l — a kind of 'state reformism' characterized by public ownership of u t i l i t i e s ,  f a c t o r y laws, regulation of monopolies,  progressive income taxes and similar measures . . ."  bear  21  a striking  resemblance to Chang's brand of "state socialism" that would appear in the 1930's.  22  The notion that cultures could be c r e a t i v e l y blended was, i n  the early twentieth century, also a notion that both men could use effectively.  23  Chang, i n fact, would continue to use this device long  after Liang had rejected Western c i v i l i z a t i o n i n toto.  24  To recognize t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s though i s only to highlight t h e i r differences.  The most striking and the most pertinent to this study are  their contrasting views on sovereignty, human rights, and constitutional government.  As Liang Ch'i-ch'ao moved away from his early b e l i e f i n  popular sovereignty, the notion  "that people might be sovereign through  some form of legislated a. p r i o r i rights [became] an idea incompatible with his  own b e l i e f that p o l i t i c a l U t o p i a would be arrived at through a  h i s t o r i c a l process of human " s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n . "  25  Chang had no  quarrel with the importance of self-actualization—Neo-Confucianism gave ample support for i t — b u t Chang added the existence and protection of human rights as a prerequisite to i t s realization. Self-actualization implies the existence and function of free w i l l . Free w i l l , in turn, was viewed by Chang systemically—it could not operate  33  f r e e l y i n one sphere while being denied i n another.  In worldly terms,  free w i l l was expressed i n an individual's a b i l i t y to operate f r e e l y within his environment.  This included the economic, religious, a r t i s t i c ,  social, and p o l i t i c a l spheres of everyday l i f e .  As an individual operated  in these various spheres, he realized spiritual freedom and moved towards self-actualization.  Man's environment,  as the reciprocal  of t h i s  equation, reflected man's spiritual freedom in "politics, ethics, and law, and maintained the existence of the nation. ** As the environment changed, 2  i t further allowed greater freedom for the expdsression and expansion of spiritual freedom.  This cyclical self-perpetuating relationship lead to  self-realization for the individual, and a state i n harmony with man and the universe. Chang linked personal freedom, s p i r i t u a l freedom, and p o l i t i c a l freedom.  Man's basic freedoms, which he would later c a l l people's rights,  were the basis of a l l other freedoms.  27  Chang further saw these  freedoms—human r i g h t s — a s the foundation of any t r u l y constitution.  28  democratic  In other words, i f Liang's " h i s t o r i c a l process of human  s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n " were to lead to a p o l i t i c a l Utopia, i t would, by Chang's lights, require In  the 1920's,  a. p r i o r i human rights to allow i t s operation. shortly  b e f o r e h i s death,  Liang  rejected  constitutionalism as "inadequate f o r China's needs, because Western,  legalistic,  the p o l i t i c a l l i f e  a n t i - C o n f u c i a n , and a proven  of China . . ,"  29  i t was  failure in  Though both men had viewed  constitutions as a means of strengthening and r a t i o n a l i z i n g the state, Chang also viewed them as instruments of balancing power and protecting human rights.  Both men undoubtedly looked at constitutions i n terms of  methodology; constitutions were Western instruments for applying Chinese  34 concepts  (another  e x p r e s s i o n o f t'i-yung). The h i t h e r t o  f a i l u r e of  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m i n China d i d not l e a d Chang t o r e j e c t i t as L i a n g had done, instead he found f a u l t with i t s a p p l i c a t i o n and with the s i n c e r i t y of those who had promoted i t . The h i g h hopes t h a t L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao had had f o r h i s "new c i t i z e n " disappeared i n h i s l a t e r years. spirit,  i n Liang's view,  ludicrous.  The masses' lack of education and public  made t h e assumption  of their  L i a n g , i n the preamble t o h i s own d r a f t  sovereignty  c o n s t i t u t i o n , had  s t a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y , "the s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e R e p u b l i c i s v e s t e d i n t h e s t a t e . . . and i s not v e s t e d i n t h e people."  3  0  denial of a fundamental Western democratic p r i n c i p l e .  T h i s was a d i r e c t While Chang had h i s  own doubts over the a b i l i t y of the people t o f u l l y comprehend and exercise t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y immediately, basic p r i n c i p l e .  he never wavered i n h i s support o f t h e  The preamble t o Chang's c o n s t i t u t i o n i s d i a m e t r i c a l l y  opposed t o Liang's and places sovereignty squarely w i t h i n the hands of the people. By examining  only these three factors, human rights, sovereignty and  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government, i t i s c l e a r that Chang was more than simply a supporter or follower of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; he was h i s own man with views t h a t c l e a r l y s e p a r a t e d him from L i a n g .  I n s h o r t , t o i d e n t i f y Chang t o o  c l o s e l y with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao i s t o obscure t h e i r substantial differences. Perhaps i t s h o u l d s i m p l y be s a i d t h a t Chang and L i a n g shared a common p r o p e n s i t y i n t h e i r approach t o p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y : extremes, a c o n c i l i a t o r y  "the avoidance o f  m i d d l e o f t h e road s t a n c e which o f t e n l e f t  [them] i s o l a t e d from the r e a l sources of p o l i t i c a l power."  31  A MODERN CHUN-TZU EMERGES The next twenty y e a r s would f u r t h e r broaden and shape t h e man who  35  would enter  the p o l i t i c a l  arena  i n the 1930's.  Chang Chun-mai's  experiences and education would arm him with a set of values, perceptions and assumptions that would determine the manner and character of his p o l i t i c a l participation.  These perceptions and assumptions, coupled with  a s t r i c t personal moral code, would color Chang's expectations about his p o l i t i c a l adversaries and about what he could reasonably accomplish. Although labeled a radical revolutionary by the Ch'ing court, Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao found himself supporting the Ch'ing reform program i n 1906  and,  had he been welcomed, would have returned to China to work with the Court. S i m i l a r l y , Chang Chun-mai did not equate his reform position to any disloyalty.  His opposition to the ruling Ch'ing and his support of  constitutional government i n no way mitigated his respect for other t r a d i t i o n a l symbols. On the contrary, i t only i l l u s t r a t e d the growing duality of Chang's character and education.  His early immersion i n  Confucian texts gave traditional symbols a continuing appeal. The admixture of Chinese and Western elements gave Chang both an appreciation and respect for Chinese t r a d i t i o n and culture, and the perspective and reason to i s o l a t e and evaluate i t s components. Unlike Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang was able to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between a f a i l i n g r u l i n g house and those elements of t r a d i t i o n that had supra-dynastic value. Somewhat analogous to ancient scholars who could focus their loyalty on ideology and institutions rather than on a ruling emperor,  32  Chang focused  on components of Chinese tradition (namely Neo-Confucianism) whose value transcended temporary illnesses of the body politic. It i s not surprising, therefore, that when Chang returned to China in 1910 he sat for the Imperial examinations for returned students.  He did  well i n the examinations, was awarded the chin-shih, degree, and installed  36  as a compiler i n the Hani i n Academy.  33  There i s no record of what further  expectations Chang had i n Imperial service, but with the Wuchang uprising i n October of the following year i t became a moot point. Taking h i s l e a v e of the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of Peking, Chang r e t u r n e d t o h i s n a t i v e Chiangsu and q u i c k l y i n v o l v e d h i m s e l f i n a bevy o f p o l i t i c a l and l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t i e s .  He helped to found the Republican  D i s c u s s i o n A s s o c i a t i o n (Kung-ho chien-she  t'ao-lun Imi)  Construction i n Shanghai.  Correspondence w i t h L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao i n Japan about the need f o r a  new  p o l i t i c a l party to r e v i t a l i z e the reform movement l e d to the founding  of  the Democratic Party (Min-chu tang).  Later, as a representative of that  party, Chang went to Japan to accompany Liang on h i s triumphal  return to  China. F o l l o w i n g the example of many o t h e r s , Chang founded h i s f i r s t magazine, Young China (Shao-nien chung-kuo). efforts  i n publishing  December, 1912  l e d to h i s f i r s t  Unfortunately, his f i r s t  political  setback.  i s s u e of Young China, Chang r a t h e r r a s h l y and  d e l i n e a t e d the major c r i m e s of Yuan S h i h - K a i .  Yuan, not a man  accepting c r i t i c i s m from an upstart l i k e Chang Chlin-mai, for  Chang's a r r e s t .  3 5  In a  34  naively used t o  issued an order  A warrant f o r one's a r r e s t i n modern China (a  s i t u a t i o n which hasn't changed  up t o the present)  was  cause f o r some  alarm.  Looking back on those days Chang would l a t e r say that  no way  . . . t h a t I c o u l d s a f e l y l i v e i n Peking." ** 3  "there  At the u r g i n g  was of  L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao and other f r i e n d s Chang q u i c k l y made arrangements t o leave the  country.  Perhaps at h i s own German, he embarked  suggestion, and the f a c t that Chang knew some  f o r Germany as the European correspondent  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l News A s s o c i a t i o n ( H s i e n - f a hsin-wen sJiej.  of the  I t was  not  Chang's i n t e n t i o n to become a j o u r n a l i s t , nor d i d i t absorb him on a f u l l -  37  time basis; rather i t provided him with a small income and allowed him to keep his hand i n politics.  So, l i k e an ancient scholar-official who  had  f a l l e n from favor at Court, Chang retreated to the wilderness and threw himself into study.  By March of 1913  he was  enrolled at B e r l i n  University pursuing a Doctorate i n p o l i t i c a l science.  This "retreat" to  an academic l i f e was, f o r Chang, simply another avenue to contribute to the e f f o r t to bring order and reason back to China; i t was no l e s s v a l i d or meaningful than other forms of participation.  The same drive to "save  China" that had galvanized students i n Japan continued to push Chang i n Berlin.  37  As Chang finished h i s studies i n B e r l i n , Yuan Shih-k'ai was finishing his plans for reviving the monarchy i n Peking.  Chang certainly  had heard of Yuan's plans and had deep feelings against a r e v i v a l of the monarchy.  When Chang heard the news of Yunnan's secession proclamation,  he resolved to return at once to China and take part i n the overthrow of Yuan.  38  This i s about as close as Chang ever got to anything resembling  "revolutionary" behavior. And how did Chang pursue his goal of overthrowing Yuan Shih-K'ai? Did he join the more militant followers of Sun Yat-sen?  No.  Thoroughly  consistent with his past behavior, he became active i n Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Research Clique, a group which sought to influence Peking politics through informal channels.  39  As an assistant editor of the Shanghai newspaper  China Times. (Shih-shih hsin-pao)  f  the well-known philosopher.  he worked closely with Chang Tung-sun,  And i n his role as educator, he lectured at  Peking University. Throughout the period 1916 to 1918 Chang seemed to jump from one activity to another, or to carry on several activities simultaneously; no  38 single organization or p o l i t i c a l forum seemed able to monopolize his_ concentration. His approach to p o l i t i c a l opposition was to spread his e f f o r t s across a broad front of p o l i t i c a l , educational, and l i t e r a r y activities. But pervading a l l concerns was the awareness that philosophic and moral considerations were basic. and  Amidst a l l of these activities, Chang  Liang, s t i l l found the time and resources to found the Pine Society  (Sung She).  The Society was to conduct scholarly research within and  actively exchange knowledge with outside scholars.  40  The Pine Society was  not a whimsical diversion from more important tasks, but underlined Chang's assumptions about how  understanding and influence came together.  As we w i l l see later, Chang placed great faith i n the ability of education and discussion to resolve disagreements and  influence events.  Another imperative i n the Neo-Confucian worldview was the need to regularize, extend, and preserve that unique body of thought that gave them t h e i r moral license and t h e i r d i r e c t i o n ; e a r l i e r we noted Chang's self-perceived role as a modern chlin-tzu, f u l f i l l i n g his service ideal.  among other things  "The moral cultivation of any individual person cannot  be sufficient . . . the fulfillment of one's moral l i f e depends upon one's willingness to dedicate oneself to helping others achieve moral s e l f fulfillment."  One important way of accomplishing these goals was  4 1  through academies or i n s t i t u t e s . purpose.  These i n s t i t u t i o n s served a multiple  First, "teachers were not simply to be moral guides, but, i t was  hoped, chun-tzu  and sages—indispensible active agents i n the symbolic  ordering of the world." they also f u l f i l l e d  42  Secondly, as teachers performed this function,  their own  drive toward inner s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n .  Thirdly, these institutions served as a training ground for cadre; young men who would form the backbone of the c i v i l service.  Providing, on the  39  one hand, expert knowledge applicable to government and, on the other hand, seeding government with men of high moral character, thus f u l f i l l i n g the Confucian tenet that held that "society could only be harmonized and set  in order when men who have approached the ideal of self-realization  are i n public o f f i c e . "  This outlook saw i n "government an agency to  4 3  bring to bear on society as a whole influence of superior men through the power of moral example and of education."  44  That there was an acute need for a new generation of cadre, Chang had l i t t l e doubt.  At one time he went so far as to blame a l l of China's  current problems on the bankruptcy of the scholars and o f f i c i a l s .  45  He  charged s c h o l a r - o f f i c i a l s with "cheating, jealousy, hypocrisy, seeking personal gain through public office, scheming and manipulation, baseless pride, avoiding work, and not accepting responsibility."  A far cry from  46  the "model" Confucian Chang and other Neo-Confucianists had in mind. The institutes that Chang Chun-mai was  involved with were probably  patterned after those that Confucius frequently developed;  a mixture of  the "features of a perpetual resort camp, a l i b r a r y , a seminar, and a club.  Living together amid s c e n i c a l l y beautiful and  scholastically  adequate surroundings the students and teachers made their influence f e l t through t h e i r writings and their example, whenever one of their number returned to public l i f e . "  4 7  This may seem passive to the Western  observer, but in China their influence was quite r e a l .  48  Chang f e l t that Chinese schools had reached their zenith during the Sung and Ming; schools of those times were also self-supporting and thus f r e e from  outside p o l i t i c a l  interference.  responsibility, Chang emphasized, was twofold:  The  schoolmaster's  to discuss knowledge and  learning, while never forgetting to cultivate moral character and to train  40 the  personality.  4 9  Education,  i n Chang's v i e w ,  had key s o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ; i n the present, education was the force which molded not only  the i n d i v i d u a l , but a l s o  the national  character.  A  nation's  c h a r a c t e r , l i k e man's h e l d o n l y the p o t e n t i a l f o r good. Chang f e l t t h a t "a good education can make . . . national character change f o r the better, a bad education can make i t change f o r the worse."  50  In the longer course  of h i s t o r y , e d u c a t i o n was t h e f o r c e and t h e v e h i c l e which a l l o w e d a culture t o continuously  develop.  By " p r e s e r v i n g  5 1  ancient men's knowledge and l e a r n i n g , "  t h e good p a r t s o f  education provides a culture with  52  a stable base upon which t o build. In 1923, Han Kuo-chun, t h e c i v i l i n v i t e d Chang t o head the National  governor o f Chiangsu  province,  I n s t i t u t e o f Self-Government ( K u o - l i  t z u - c h i h hsiieh-yuan) a t S h a n g h a i .  53  Chang r e o r g a n i z e d  the i n s t i t u t e ,  which became t h e N a t i o n a l P o l i t i c a l U n i v e r s i t y ( K u o - l i cheng-chih t a hsiieh). and i n 1925 moved i t t o Wusung.  54  Chang's f a i t h i n the a b i l i t y of  debate and discussion t o lead t o agreement and the resolution of c o n f l i c t i s obvious i n h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o g i v e c o n f l i c t i n g o p i n i o n s a forum a t National P o l i t i c a l University.  At one point, even Wen I-to,  the l e f t i s t  w r i t e r and poet who had castigated the "Confucian values o f 'moderation' for  having  death,"  5 5  induced the p o p u l a t i o n t o accept a l i f e between hunger and taught a t t h e u n i v e r s i t y .  As a c o u n t e r p o i n t ,  Chang  himself  l e c t u r e d on the m a t e r i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f h i s t o r y as w e l l as on c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s and philosophy. ** 5  Taking time from h i s d u t i e s a t t h e  university, Chang also traveled t o Wuhan to l e c t u r e on the importance of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between philosophy and p o l i t i c s . Chang's b e l i e f t h a t  5 7  a u n i v e r s i t y such as h i s c o u l d  a f f e c t the  e x t e r n a l w o r l d was amply demonstrated by t h e r a p i d i t y w i t h which t h e Kuomintang closed i t once i t f e l l within t h e i r power.  The growing tension  41  i n the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere i n l a t e 1926 once again prompted Chang to use a pseudonym f o r safety's sake. the Kuomintang-Communist  58  A f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n of  h i s views on  c o a l i t i o n i n Wuhan, the KMT f e l t the u n i v e r s i t y  had moved too f a r to the l e f t and closed i t . Eight years l a t e r Chang Chun-mai found himself i n Canton.  With the  support o f General Ch'en Po-nan, who was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the Southwest Political  Council, he founded the Hsueh-hai shu-yuan.  The Hsueh-hai shu-  yuan was a l s o an example o f Chang's s y n t h e s i s o f Chinese and Western education.  The i n s t i t u t e was  r e a l l y a r e f l e c t i o n of Chang's own makeup.  Besides Sung and Ming rationalism, Western philosophy taught. and  and l o g i c were also  The l i b r a r y had qood holdings i n Western l i t e r a t u r e ,  political  science.  5 9  The i n s t i t u t e ' s  aim was  philosophy,  to "research  the  profound meaning of the ancients' pursuit of perfection, and, at the same time, to absorb Western knowledge." Chang b e l i e v e d he c o u l d  60  By bringing East and West together,  make them both b e t t e r .  6 1  "The o b j e c t o f t h i s  i n s t i t u t e , " declared the i n s t i t u t e ' s c h a r t e r , " i s t o arouse our n a t i o n a l culture, to add Western concepts and methods, and blend them harmoniously t o r e b u i l d the f o u n d a t i o n o f a new Chinese c u l t u r e . "  6 2  The i n s t i t u t e ' s  instructors were to use the methods of Western learning, but to c u l t i v a t e character, they would use the p r e s c r i p t i o n s o f China's former C o n f u c i a n doctrine.  6 3  T h i s was a r a t h e r s h o r t - l i v e d v e n t u r e , as when Chianq K a i -  shek moved to suppress the Southwest P o l i t i c a l Council, Ch'en Po-nan was a l o s e r , and so was the i n s t i t u t e .  Chiang closed i t i n mid-1936.  A t h i r d and f i n a l attempt to r e a l i z e a true Confucian-style was made i n 1939.  academy  This was not wholly Chang's e f f o r t , since the project  was funded by t h e Kuomintang government and the s c h o o l was s t a f f e d by l o y a l Kuomintang i n s t r u c t o r s .  64  I t was i n the mountains j u s t below Tibet  42 that the new Institute of National Culture (Chung-kuo min-tsu wen-hua shuyuan) was imagine.  established.  A more beautiful setting would be hard to  The charter for the institute could not be a clearer statement  of the on-going attempt to imaginatively blend Chinese and Western thought.  The charter reads that the purpose of the institute i s : 1. 2. 3. 4.  To give college graduates a place to pursue scholarship without worrying about making a living. Mutual respect between students and teachers to cultivate talent. To cultivate frugality and the power of observation. Whereas most c o l l e g e s s t r e s s the attainment of knowledge, this institute emphasizes morality and wisdom.  The curriculum, in part, was as follows: Research Work: A. Study of the Classics 1. Logical conception of each writer, concept of law, p o l i t i c a l thought, economic thought, and s c i e n t i f i c method. B. History 1. Ancient and modern C. Social Science 1. P o l i t i c a l Science, economics, sociology, anthropology, problems stemming f r o m the country's environment D. Philosophy 1. Understanding Western philosophy 2. Establishing a philosophy for China 3. Recover the national s p i r i t 4. Adopt the s p i r i t of Western philosophy 5. Promote a new s p i r i t u a l d i r e c t i o n for China.65 The curriculum outlined above c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s a facet of the tension produced by trying to reconcile the best of the East with the best of the West.  As can be seen by the addition of Western-style s o c i a l  sciences and philosophy courses, the synthesis had gone far beyond Chang Chih-tung's marriage of Eastern s p i r i t and Western matter.  Also obvious  43 are what appear to be glaring contradictions i n trying to "recover the national s p i r i t " and y e t  f  "adopt the s p i r i t of Western philosophy" and  "promote a new s p i r i t u a l d i r e c t i o n for China."  Did one not deny the  other? It  is difficult  t o know what Chang had i n mind h e r e  r  and,  p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t to see how he divided the essence of national spirit  from  i t s direction.  In view,  though,  of Chang's l i f e l o n g  commitment to "democratic" reforms and constitutional government we might suggest what he had i n mind. The "national s p i r i t " that Chang sought to recover was probably an expression of those things that gave Chinese t h e i r Chineseness;  those  elements of race, history, and culture which were unique to the Chinese— those same elements ealier identified as the "national essence."  Included  here also would be those values and mores inherited as part of the Confucian tradition. What China suffered from, however, was the lack of a s o c i o p o l i t i c a l system which could muster and concentrate the innate strength of the national s p i r i t :  a system which could give f u l l vent to  the latent p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the Chinese.  Here, then, the West could  provide an institutional model and a philosophical element that would act as a catalyst to release those latent potentialities. Constitutional democracies could help to harmonize society by providing the arena for and the lines of communication between the various segments of society.  The s p i r i t of democratic government, with i t s  attendant emphasis on the protection of human rights, would release the individual so that he might advance i n his quest for s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . This was no mere attempt to copy the West. Disillusioned as were many by the failure of the West so brutally revealed in World War I, Chang Chunmai, we might assume, expected c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy i n a Chinese  44  setting to blossom into something of unparalleled perfection.  The West's  capitalistic foundation and emphasis on the supremacy of the individual would always act as brakes to l i m i t the advance of Western civilization. China, on the other hand, would point man i n the proper d i r e c t i o n to assume h i s proper place i n the someday-to-be-realized ta-t'ung (great harmony). Whether  Chang was  ever a b l e t o adequately r a t i o n a l i z e the  contradictions of his synthesis to his students w i l l remain unknown. It should be clear, however, that his appeal was  highly i n t e l l e c t u a l  and  directed at a narrow audience. The minutiae of his synthesis could have l i t t l e appeal to the mass of Chinese. As with the Hsueh-hai shu-yuan i n 1936, the I n s t i t u t e of National Culture ran afoul of the KMT.  Chang Chun-mai was accused of i n c i t i n g a  student demonstration i n the summer of 1942. The Institute was closed and Chang was kept i n Chungking under semi-restraint. The problems which Chang Chlin-mai encountered between his institutes and the government were neither unique nor new  to Chinese history.  Academies (shu-yuan) during the Ming dynasty, for example, went through several periods of imperial suppression. The suppression of academies showed that the throne recognized them as p o l i t i c a l as well as educational groups.  The association of academies during the Ming with p o l i t i c a l  factions and their overt p o l i t i c a l agitation led to their suppression. Much l i k e Ming rulers, the Nanking Government viewed academies as separate p o l i t i c a l organizations outside of the one legitimate national polity.  Nanking's efforts to co-opt men l i k e Chang Chlin-mai by providing  funds, f a c i l i t i e s , and teachers, mirrored the Ming program to transform private academies into o f f i c i a l or semi-official schools.***'  45 These schools represent an integral part of Chang Chun-mai's program for national salvation. Like t r a d i t i o n a l academies, these i n s t i t u t i o n s were to play  an  active role i n society by  bringing  together  philosophical and the scientific, the spiritual and the temporal.  the Their  curriculum not only demonstrated the intimate and indivisable relationship between philosophical absolutes and temporal phenomenon, but also the legacy of Chang Chih-tung's attempt to reconcile the Chinese t ! i with the Western yung.  The fact that, at t h e i r height, the National P o l i t i c a l  University had only 150-160 students and the Institute of National Culture about 1 0 0 — o n l y 13 of the students i n the latter case closely associated 67  with Chang Chun-mai —suggests that these academies were restricted to a 68  very small e l i t e group and did not represent any attempt at mass popular education. The goal of these academies was no l e s s than to produce chun-tzu? modern-day scholar-officials who  could bring t h e i r special talents and  moral force to bear on s o c i a l problems. segment of the "new  A l l t h i s i s an example of one  intelligentsia," adrift i n the intellectual  confusion  of the post May Fourth era and i t s attendant "crisis of meaning," unsure of what t h e i r roles were to be,^  9  searching for t h e i r own  and China's  salvation. The  f i n a l and posssibly the most important addition to Chang's  philosophical make-up, was the result of disillusionment and betrayal; disillusionment over the f a i l u r e of the West's much vaunted system of international law, and the betrayal of China by her wartime a l l i e s at the Paris Peace Conference. When Chang had l e f t Europe he was convinced that Germany would lose World War  I. At the time, he had strongly advocated China's entry into  the war on the side of the A l l i e s as a way of gaining release from the  46  unequal treaties.' " 1  As one of the v i c t o r i o u s A l l i e s , many Chinese  believed, China would not only  gain equal status and respect, but would  also realize the return of Chinese territory i n Shantung earlier ceded to Germany. Chinese, unfortunately, had not allowed for the d u p l i c i t y of their allies,  France and England, who, during the war, had made secret  agreements that transferred the German concessions to, of a l l people, the Japanese.  Appeals to international law and fairness among a l l i e s f e l l on  deaf ears i n Paris.  The Chinese, who had expected so much, were l e f t  powerless i n the face of brute force.  The anger and f r u s t r a t i o n of  Chinese at this new humiliation boiled over and climaxed i n the May Fourth Incident.  In a display of China's emerging nationalism, students,  merchants, and workers joined i n demonstrations and anti-Japanese boycotts.  Who could begin to convince Chinese that Woodrow Wilson's  platitudes of justice and fraternity were anything but cruel deception? Badly shaken i n his esteem for the West and  i t s institutions, Chang  searched f o r an explanation for the want of morality i n Paris and the reason for the terrible destruction the West had visited upon i t s e l f .  He  concluded that science, the very element that seemed to characterize Western culture, was also i t s undoing.  Chang began a search for a new  philosophical formula that would minimize the importance of science. The 71  institutions that had seemed to give the West i t s strength had, as well, revealed their flaws. International law, which had seemed to incorporate Western rationalism was shown by the action of China's a l l i e s to be nothing but a pious sham and a system designed to support and perpetuate the dominance of the West. words",  72  and rejected i t .  Chang saw i t now as  just so many "empty  47 Chinese were not alone i n t h e i r disillusionment with modern scientific society; some Europeans, as well, shared their revulsion at the destruction and slaughter of World War I. Some  asked how Western  civilization, founded as i t was on science and reason, could bring i t s e l f so close to i t s own destruction. Two such men were the Frenchman, Henri Bergson, and the German, Rudolph Eucken.  Chang met them both and both  would make major contributions to Chang's emerging synthesis of NeoConfucianism and Western idealism.  The center of gravity of Chang's focus  was shifting even more strongly to philosophical concerns.  Chang's  reaction against science and his turn to philosophy was much l i k e that of Bergson. The stunning defeat by Germany i n 1870 had l e f t France confused and unstable.  Bergson, much l i k e Chang  searched for something to  compensate France for her failure on the battlefield, something that would give her confidence in her survival and assurance of ultimate victory. He arrived at what he called "elan v i t a l ", the all-conquering w i l l .  7 3  Bergson's reaction to the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m and anti-metaphysical trends of his day was an attempt to "establish the primacy of mind over matter".  74  Science, according to Bergson, was limited i n i t s a b i l i t y to  perceive r e a l i t y , i t could enumerate, but i t could not feel-  "Feeling  belonged to another province of the mind!—intuition", and "intuition was the only means for perceiving the heart of t h i n g s " .  75  This "heart of  things" i s beyond the realm of scientific measurement or explanation. In Bergson's view, science i s blind to the forces of feeling and experience which do so much to shape reality. Eucken, also classed as an " i d e a l i s t , " shared much with Bergson, especially his emphasis on the importance of w i l l and intuition.  "Man's  soul", Eucken maintained, "differentiated him from the rest of the natural world and [that] the soul could not be explained only by reference to  48  natural processes."  76  This reinforced Bergson's views on the limitations  of scientific measurement. The European i d e a l i s t s did not appeal to Chang because of t h e i r o r i g i n a l i t y , but because they provided an equivalent to the foundation of his childhood.  Confucian  Neo-Confucian perceptions and explanations  s t i l l provided the sounding board for Eucken and Bergson. "foreign" concepts found equivalents i n Neo-Confucianism,  When these they were  accepted, and the resultant synthesis enriched. While never saying as much, Chang's perception of the universe and i t s ultimate form i s reminiscent of K'ang  Yu-wei's Ta-t'ung. and almost  certainly shows an affinity for Wang Yang-ming's concept of the unity of the universe with man at i t s c e n t e r . training was his belief that the physical  77  A product of Chang's early world, the spiritual world, and  the consciousness of man were i n t e r r e l a t e d parts of a larger r e a l i t y ; a r e a l i t y which held the potential for a world characterized by harmony, benevolence, and well-being. Drawing on Bergson and Wang Yang-ming, Chang saw man as an active agent i n the world; Chang accepted the a b i l i t y of human consciousness, or human w i l l , to influence reality.  In other words,  reality did not exist entirely outside of consciousness. It seems l i k e l y that Chang Chiin-mai saw the ease with which the i n t u i t i o n of Bergson and Eucken could be melded with Wang Yang-ming's concept of liang-chih (innate Knowledge). Both appear to give man the innate a b i l i t y to distinguish right from wrong. This intuitive ability, which a l l men possess, i s what Chang Chiin-mai seems to appeal to when he applies h i s philosophy to p o l i t i c s .  "He looked at a l l men from the  Mencian viewpoint that a l l men are born good, and thought that everyone was l i k e himself. . ."78  I  n  Chang's view, i f liana-chih was universal, i t  49 would u l t i m a t e l y lead a l l men  to the same conclusions.  What Chang c o u l d not f i n d i n Bergson or Eucken, he took from other philosophers.  One example was  Hegel's theorum t h a t " e x i s t e n c e i s a l l -  inclusive. . - i t comprises within i t the state of not-being as w e l l as of being.  The  idea that  [and that]  it  is  everything contains within i t s e l f i t s . own  impossible to conceive of anything without  at the same time i t s opposite . . ,"  79  opposite  conceiving  found i t s equivalent i n the y i n and  yang of the I-Ching (Book of Changes).  And r e a c h i n g even f u r t h e r back,  Chang compared Plato and Mencius, showing that "the sages of East and West shared the same nature."  80  The synthesis that Chang developed was,  i n nature, s i m i l a r to that of  e a r l i e r Chinese, and, i n the sense t h a t Chinese p h i l o s o p h y p r o v i d e s the base to which Western philosophical concepts were added, Chang f i t s the well-known t'i-yung formula.  In q u a l i f y i n g t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , i t  needs to be said that Chang's understanding  of Western philosophy was more  genuine and sophisticated than h i s predecessors. were an i n t e g r a l authority.  into  Additions from the West  p a r t of h i s s y n t h e s i s , not s i m p l y f o o t n o t e s t o l e n d  81  The degree t o which Chang had borrowed from Eucken, Bergson, and other  European p h i l o s o p h e r s  metaphysics debates of 1923. Chang "launched a vigorous as i t was  was  revealed  attack on the v a l i d i t y of ' s c i e n t i f i c method'  c u r r e n t l y being a p p l i e d by Chinese M a r x i s t s  s o l v e d , a r g u e d Chang, one undiscoverable 83  causes o f  and  Before an audience at Ch'ing-hua University,  China's s o c i a l and economic problems."  answers;"  i n the famous s c i e n c e  82  to  others  to  I f China's problems were to be  n e e d e d t o "go  life  and  which  back t o t h e  only  intuition  s i n c e s c i e n c e , or a " s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e " was  ultimately could  give  objective,  l o g i c a l , a n a l y t i c a l , c a u s a t i v e and u n i f o r m , i t c o u l d not hope t o answer  50 questions about l i f e , which was subjective, intuitive, undetermined, and unique.**  4  Chang was using Eucken and Bergson to show that human questions were beyond the pale of science; only i n t u i t i o n could unlock the secrets of life.  By proclaiming the supremacy of i n t u i t i o n , w i l l , and  Chang was  rejecting scientism  Confucianism.  and,  by  conscience,  implication,  defending  85  The s i g n i f i c a n c e of Chang's synthesis and his extended experience abroad i s i n i t s application to p o l i t i c a l problems i n China.  This  application has two major aspects: f i r s t , that Chang's Mencian view of human nature, his faith in the ability of intuition to reveal truth, and his  conviction that these principles are universal, determined the form  and parameters of Chang's p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; and, secondly, that these same underlying assumptions shape the character of the p o l i t i c a l document that Chang sought to make the law of the land.  Ultimately, the  question that begs answering i s whether Chang's synthesis, as i t i s manifested both i n his methods of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i n his constitutional draft, was  an appropriate response to China's intellectual  and p o l i t i c a l crises. PHILOSOPHY JOINS POLITICS Chang Chiin-mai was quite active i n the 1920's; i n addition to his d i r e c t o r s h i p of the National P o l i t i c a l University, he continued lecture, write, and comment on current events.  In 1924,  to  i n a lecture  delivered in Wuhan, Chang reminded his audience that "philosophy must not forget p o l i t i c s , and p o l i t i c s must not forget philosophy."  86  Two years  later Chang was commenting on the unfolding Northern Expedition which had just occupied Wuhan. Although I have not seen Chang's comments which  51 appeared i n the China Times, i t may have been t h e i r sensitive p o l i t i c a l nature which prompted him to use the pseudonym of Chang Shih-lin.  87  Growing KMT dissatisfaction with Chang was apparent i n the closing of the National P o l i t i c a l University.  That dissatisfaction intensified the  following year with the appearance of Chang's thoughts i n The New Way— again Chang was using the older pseudonym of L i Chai.  At this time Chang  was also l e c t u r i n g on the h i s t o r y of European p o l i t i c a l thought at the Chih-hsjLng hsueh-yiian [related to Wang Yang-ming's Chih-hsing ho-i (the unity of knowledge and action)?].  88  Between 1927 and 1930 Chang was shaken by two events: Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and his kidnapping by KMT agents.  the death of  The death of Liang,  of course, was a heavy emotional blow t o Chang who enjoyed a close personal relationship with Liang. A more frightening and, as i t was meant to be, intimidating event was his kidnapping—snatched off the streets of Shanghai, thrown into a car, blindfolded, and f i n a l l y held incommunicado for some weeks. The KMT was apparently, according to Chang, displeased with his comments i n The New Way.  89  Which event weighed more heavily on Chang i s d i f f i c u l t to know, but, i n any event, he l e f t China i n 1930 and returned to h i s o l d haunts i n Germany. After lecturing on Chinese philosophy at Jena, and collaborating with his old friend Eucken on a book entitled The Question of a. Philosophy of L i f e  (Jen-sheng kuan t i wen-t'i), Chang f e l t i t safe t o return to  China i n 1931. Tempering his return to China with caution, perhaps, Chang eschewed a p o l i t i c a l commentary and, instead, lectured on Hegelian philosophy at Yenching University.  I t would not be long, however, before Chang f e l t  compelled to once again turn his eye to other concerns.  52 NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY We  saw  how  Chang's educational work was an effort to bring together  theory and practice in the p o l i t i c a l arena;  his graduates were expected  to harmonize Chinese and Western learning, and then take them into the real world.  Another, more direct approach to p o l i t i c a l participation was  Chang's experiment in organizing a p o l i t i c a l party. Chang's approach to party p o l i t i c s was  colored by  his e a r l i e r  experience with the Political Information Society, and with Liang Ch'ich'ao's Research Clique.  These had been relatively informal groups that,  e s p e c i a l l y i n the case of the Research Clique, sought influence through behind-the-scenes activities on a personal level.  The National Socialist  Party (Kuo-chia she-hui tang) which Chang helped organize in 1932, was  the  offspring of a much more loosely organized group which f i r s t appeared in the spring of 1930.  That f i r s t unnamed group was l i t t l e more than an  informal discussion group composed of a few bankers and u n i v e r s i t y professors.  90  Consistent with Chang Chun-mai's e l i t i s t and academic approach to solving p o l i t i c a l and social problems, the National Socialist Party was  s t i l l a far cry from the Western concept of a p o l i t i c a l party.  (NSP) 91  In  i t s early days the NSP was chiefly composed of Chang's students and fellow professors. action,  Instead of an organization concerned with direct p o l i t i c a l  the NSP  confined  itself  to publishing  the party  journal,  Renaissance (Ts'ai-sheng). and acted more l i k e a group of scholastics come together to discuss and debate the issues of the day. function, Chang's NSP opposition party;  met  92  In terms of  f a i r l y well one author's c r i t e r i o n for an  that i s , the NSP did c r i t i c i z e the government and  administration, t r y , i n i t s own way, to check  the use of governmental  power, articulate the interests of a group, and harness the interests of  53  group loyalties to the nation. In the Chinese context, e s p e c i a l l y , the functions of c r i t i c i s m and checking the use of governmental power were c l o s e l y linked.  Public  c r i t i c i s m was believed by many to have the a b i l i t y to muster "public opinion" and use i t against the government. The c r i t i c a l element i n that equation i s the necessity of having a government, as Chang would have put it,  w i t h a "sense of shame."  Having been p r o p e r l y rebuked, the  supposition goes, the government would r e a l i z e i t s error, concede i t s f a u l t s , and a l t e r i t s policy. Had governments with a "sense of shame" been common in twentieth-century China, the gambit might have worked. Organizationally, the NSP was  i l l - s u i t e d to realize  i t s objectives:  f i r s t , up to 1938 the party was, as were other opposition parties, i l l e g a l under the Nanking Government and so remained a secret organization. fact  alone  was  not  crippling,  but  for a group advocating  compromise, and cooperation, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how  This  unity,  they hoped to do  these things and s t i l l remain underground. It would be d i f f i c u l t to point to any accomplishments of the NSP before the Sino-Japanese War. perhaps, than to employ the energies of i t s members.  other,  Second, being a  c o l l e c t i o n of bankers, professors, and students, none of whom devoted t h e i r energies f u l l - t i m e to the party, the NSP stability  and  lacked the q u a l i t i e s of  endurance needed to r e a l i z e i t s g o a l s .  organization was  94  The  party  so loose as to prompt Ch'ien Tuan-sheng to describe the  leadership of the NSP as an "anarchy under the t i t u l a r leadership of Carsun Chang.  95  One of the most serious handicaps of the NSP was i t s  lack of desire or even a b i l i t y to seek any kind of mass support. reasons for t h i s are twofold: educators and  The  f i r s t , NSP membership was dominated by  i n t e l l e c t u a l s who,  r i g h t l y or wrongly,  reserved for  54  themselves  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , c o n f e r r e d upon them by t h e i r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , t o l e a d the masses towards democracy.  As  special  mentioned  e a r l i e r , Chang Chiin-mai had expressed t h i s " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " i n modern terms by p o i n t i n g t o the need f o r e x p e r t s t o assume l e a d e r s h i p r o l e s . Chang, and many of those w i t h i n the NSP who shared t h i s d i s p o s i t i o n , took a dim view of mass movements. "They believed that the power to implement c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government was not i n the m a j o r i t y o f the people, but, rather, i n the wise and virtuous; those who those who  had the w i l l t o implement the c o n s t i t u t i o n , and i n those whose  hands the c o n s t i t u t i o n would be put working  understood the constitution,  into practice."  9 6  Instead of  t o e n l i s t mass support, Chang and the m a j o r i t y of the  g e n e r a l l y , c o n f i n e d t h e i r r e c r u i t m e n t e f f o r t s w i t h i n t h e i r own class.  NSP,  social  When they ventured outside t h e i r own c l a s s , they sought those  could provide influence, protection, or f i n a n c i a l support:  who  General Ch'en  Po-nan, who p r o v i d e d the funds f o r Chang's Hsueh-hai shu-yuan. and the Yunnan warlord General Lung Yiin  who  gave protection to anti-Chiang K a i -  shek elements i n 1944, are two good examples. Second, the i n t e l l e c t u a l  and  97  s c h o l a s t i c approach Chang and the NSP  took to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y could do l i t t l e to i n s p i r e peasant support even i t they had t r i e d .  Chang's d i s p o s i t i o n towards g r a d u a l e v o l u t i o n a r y  change i l l - s u i t e d the temper of the masses that the Communists seemed so w e l l able to read.  Estimates vary widely on the t o t a l membership of the  N S P — t h i s i s probably due to the extremely loose organization of the party and  the  fluctuating  commitment  of  some o f  i t s members—it  seems  reasonable, however, that those sources suggesting a membership of several hundred are acceptable.  98  Reflecting the d u a l i t y of Chang's own  personality and t r a i n i n g ,  the  NSP sought t o " f i n d a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n from t r a d i t i o n a l China and from  55  foreign s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i z a t i o n s to  save China (t'i-yung?)." *^ 5  The  party t r i e d to popularize Chinese history as one way of "reviving the people's self-confidence and building up character, a matter of supreme importance."  100  This kind of approach to p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y proved to  some observers that Chang and the NSP had no plan for "positive action" to solve China's problems.  101  If Chang was set on merely influencing present  events, the observation would have been true. larger more profound goal. attitudes; of Chinese.  He was  But Chang had his eyes on a  out to influence, even change,  he was bent on a program that would alter the very perceptions This was a spiritual or philosophical goal f i r s t , a p o l i t i c a l  program second. The sadness that surrounds Chang Chun-mai's p o l i t i c a l career comes, in part, from his involvement with his own National Socialist Party.  Had  the party remained as i t had begun, a r e l a t i v e l y small group of l i k e minded i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  i t may  have ended as Chang had  planned.  Unfortunately, as the war progressed and after the v i c t o r y over Japan, Chang's p o s i t i o n , and that of the party, was enhanced.  Domestic, and  later foreign pressures, gave Chang and the NSP a notoriety and prestige far outweighing their actual importance.  This development led some, who  had but a passing commitment to Chang's ideals, to join the NSP.  102  These  latter-day converts managed to tarnish the r e s p e c t a b i l i t y and bring suspicion upon  the motives of both the party and i t s leader.  The National Socialist Party gained a reputation among i t s opponents as merely a group of o f f i c e - s e e k e r s ,  103  and Chang was labeled a party  boss, who was simply using the party as a way of gaining p o s i t i o n and wealth.  104  chang himself even lamented to a friend that he dreaded seeing  p a r t y members, f o r a l l they ever wanted was  an i n t r o d u c t i o n or  56 position.  1 0 5  H i s b r o t h e r commented a f t e r Chang's death t h a t the p a r t y  Chang had founded became incompatible with h i s c h a r a c t e r .  106  Part of Chang's problems with h i s party are c e r t a i n l y due to h i s own misunderstanding; political  having borrowed the concept and o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a  p a r t y from  the West, he t r i e d t o run i t l i k e a s c h o l a r l y  debating society or a t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese p o l i t i c a l c l i q u e centered on a shu-yuan.  The f a i l u r e o f the NSP h i g h l i g h t s one o f Chang's fundamental  problems;  h i s understanding  o f Western d e m o c r a t i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s and  p o l i t i c a l behavior was, f o r a l l h i s experience abroad, s u p e r f i c i a l . was the p e r e n n i a l o b s e r v e r ,  never  conceptions about how democracies  a participant.  H i s t h e o r i e s and  operated were never tested.  his t r i p s t o London Chang had v i s i t e d Parliament.  Chang  On one of  He came away with the  notion that English parliamentary government worked because of the a b i l i t y of reasonable men to come together to debate and resolve t h e i r differences i n a public forum.  Somehow, he also came t o b e l i e v e that, i n wartime, the  U n i t e d S t a t e s Congress suspends e l e c t i o n s and the freedom o f speech i n order t o unite the c o u n t r y .  107  E q u a l l y as s e r i o u s were Chang Chun-mai's v i o l a t i o n s o f h i s own prescriptions f o r party a c t i v i t y .  As e a r l y as t h e 1920's Chang had  o u t l i n e d what a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y ought t o do.  He concluded t h a t a p a r t y  s h o u l d engage i n no scheming w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y .  I t s weapons were i t s  tongue, i t s pen and i n k , and the c r e a t i o n o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  Expenses  s h o u l d be s e l f - g e n e r a t e d , they s h o u l d not come from the government.  A  party should hold a s p i r i t of cooperation, r e f r a i n from buying voters or l e g i s l a t o r s , and i n t e r n a l party s t r i f e should not be s e t t l e d by c a l l i n g on f o r e i g n f i n a n c i a l or m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t .  1 0 8  r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h a n t i - C h i a n g Kai-shek  Chang's l a p s e s were i n h i s w a r l o r d s , and, s u r p r i s i n g l y  enough, i n h i s acceptance o f f i n a n c i a l support from the KMT.  Both o f  57  these transgressions cost the NSP and Chang independence and credibility. For a l l i t cost him,  the National Socialist Party did provide Chang  with something of overriding value;  a vehicle that could gain him access  to national-level politics and a voice in the counsels of government.  The  NSP was not the center of Chang's p o l i t i c a l l i f e , nor the sole avenue of his p o l i t i c a l participation.  The party never f u l f i l l e d any of the grand  intentions Chang held f o r i t , but, at the l e a s t , i t did give him  the  platform from which to push his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l demands. And, i n that sense, the National Socialist Party was a success.  58 CHAPTER TWO  NOTES ^ h ' e n g Wen-hsi, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng n i e n - p i a o c h i e n - p i e n ch*u-kao," hereafter CCMHSNPCPCK. i n Chu Ch'uan-yii, gen. ed., Chang Chunmai chuan-chi t s u - l i a o . 6 v o l s . ( T a i D e i : T ' i e n - i ch'u-pan she, 1979), 2:251. Hereafter CCMCCTL. Howard Boorman and Richard C. Howard, eds.. biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 19671971), 1:30. Chang Kunq-ch'uan, "Wo yu chia-hsiung Chun-mai," i n Wang Yiin-wu, e t a l . , eds., Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng ch'i-shih shou ch'ing chi-nien l u n wen c h i ( T a i p e i : Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng c h ' i - s h i h shou-ch'ing c h i nien lun-wen c h i pien-chi wei-yuan h u i , 1956), pp. 102-105. 3  A l t h o u g h r e j e c t i n g the o u t e r forms o f t r a d i t i o n a l c u l t u r e , and s p e c i f i c a l l y the C o n f u c i a n t r a d i t i o n , i c o n o c l a s t s such as Lu Hsun and Ch'en T u - h s i u were y e t unable t o escape t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e i r e a r l y education. See L i n , The C r i s i s o i Chinese Consciousness. 4  Ch'eng Wen-hsi, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng chih yen-hsing," Wang Yun-wu, et. a l . , eds., Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng c h ' i - s h i h shou-ch'ing c h i - n i e n lun-wen c h i ( T a i p e i : Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng ch'i-shih shou-ch'ing chi-nien lun-wen c h i pien-chi wei-yuan hui, 1956), p. 31. 5  ^Quoted i n Ch'eng Wen-hsi, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng n i e n - p i a o ch'ang-pien," i n Chu, CCMCCTL. 2:275. 7  Ibid.  8  Chang, "Wo yu chia-hsiung Chlin-mai," p.  104.  ^Boorman, Biographical Dictionary. 1:30. p.  •^Ch'eng, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng n i e n - p i a o ch'ang-pien," 277. i : L  I b i d . p.  278.  Andrew J . Nathan, Peking P o l i t i c s . 1918-1923: Factionalism arid the F a i l u r e of. Constitutionalism (Berkeley: university of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1976), p. 12. 12  Ch'eng, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng n i e n - p i a o ch'ang-pien," 279. 13  p.  C h a n g Chun-mai, "Wo ts'ung she-hui k'o-hsiieh t ' i a o - t a o che-hsiieh ching-kuo," Yli-chou hsun-k'an ("The Universe") v o l . 3, no. 11 (Dec. 5, 1935):10. 1 4  59  15  Wolfgang Bauer, China and. the. Search fox Happiness, trans. Michael (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 361.  16  Ch'eng, CCMHSNPJPCK. p.  Shaw  Ibid.  1 7  18  p.  254.  255.  Wang, Chinese I n t e l l e c t u a l s and the. West, pp.  l^Boorman, Biographical Dictionary.  221-223.  1:30.  S e e F r a n k Fe Wong, " L i a n g Ch'i-ch'ao and t h e C o n f l i c t o f C o n f u c i a n i s m and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l P o l i t i c s " ( Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of Michigan, 1965). 2 0  Wang, Chinese I n t e l l e c t u a l s and the  21  West, p.  248.  W e i Chu-hsien, Chung-kuo k£> tang JLQ p ' a i hsien-k'uang Shuo-wen she ch'u-pan, 1946), pp. 8-9. 2 2  J o n a t h a n D. Spence, The Gate o f Heavenly Peace: Their Revolution. 1895-1949 (New York: The Viking Press, 2 3  2 4  F u r t h , " I n t e l l e c t u a l change," p.  2 5  Ibid.  26  p.  (Chungking:  The Chinese and. 1981), p. 170.  364.  348.  "Chang Chun-mai ssu-hsiang kang-yao," i n Chu, CCMCCTL.  5:175.  S u n Ya-fu, e t a l . , ed., C h i n - t a i s h i h - l i a o ts'ung-k'an c h i . V o l . Chang Chun-maj hsien-sheng c h i u - c h i h tan-ch'en c h i - n i e n ts'e ( T a i p e i : Wen-hai ch'u-pan, 1978), p. 7. op „ '"'Chang Chun-mai, "Jen-ch'uan wei hsien-cheng c h i h pen," i n CKMCSHTCC. p. 13. 2 7  526:  29  Wong, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the C o n f l i c t of Confucianism," p.  3 0  Ibid.  p.  206.  3 1  Ibid.  p.  98.  239.  oo -^Bielenstein, The 33  Bureaucracy of Han Times, p.  143.  Ch'eng, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng chih yen-hsing," p.  13.  Ch'eng, CCMHSNPCPCK. p. 255. C h i a n g Yun-t'ien, "Chang Chiin-mai hsien-sheng i-sheng t a shih c h i , " i n Chu, CCMCCTL. 1:21. 34  35  C h a n g Chiin-mai, "Wo ts'ung she-hui k'o-hsueh t ' i a o - t a o che-hsueh c h i h ching-kuo," p. 9. 3 6  3 7  Ibid.  p.  10.  60  Ch'eng, "Chiin-mai hsien-sheng chih yen-hsing," p. 15.  38  Wong, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao a M t M C o n f l i c t pj£ Confucianism, p. 186. For details of the Research Clique, see Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 239. 39  Ch'eng, CCMHSNPCPCK. p. 256.  40  41  Chang, "New Confucianism," p. 296.  C h a r l o t t e F u r t h , " C u l t u r e and P o l i t i c s i n Modern Chinese Conservatism," i n Furth, ed., The Limits of Change, p. 38. 4 2  Benjamin Schwartz, "Some Polarities i n Confucian Thought," i n David Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, eds. Confucianism i n Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 52. 43  Ibid.  4 4  4 5  4 6  r s 'ai-sheng she, WYSSTH. p. 3. I b i d . , p. 4.  P a u l M. A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek: A P o l i t i c a l Study (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), pp. 179-180. 4 7  Chow, T h e May Fourth Movement, p. 12.  48  Chang Chiin-mai, "Hsi-yang t i ta-hsueh ho wo kuo t i shu-yuan," Yiichou hsiin-k'an ("The Universe") v o l . 2, no. 3 (June 5, 1935) :18. 49  Chang Chiin-mai, "Chiao-yii chia yu kuo-min ch'i-chih t i pien-hua," Yii-chou hsiin-k'an ("The Universe") v o l . 3, no. 10 (Dec. 15, 1935) :1. 50  Chang Chun-mai, "Shu-yuan chih-tu chih ching-shen yu hsiieh-hai shuyiian chih tsung-chih," Yii-chou hsiin-k'an ("The Universe") vol. 4, no. 7 (March 15, 193 6): 13. 51  5 2  53  Ibid.  Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, 1:31.  Chang had held the post of Deputy Director of the Wusung C i t y Planning Department in 1922. It may be that Chang's p o l i t i c a l connections i n that c i t y were a factor i n the move there of the National P o l i t i c a l University. 54  55  S p e n c e The Gate of Heavenly Peace, p. 299; p. 212. f  Ch'eng, CCMHSNPCPCK. p. 258.  56  5 7  Ibid.  5 8  Ibid.  p. 259.  61 H s i e h Yu-wei, CCMCCTL, 1:37-39. 5 9  60  "Wo  yu Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng,"  Chang, "Shu-yuan chih-tu", p.  6 1  Ibid.  6 2  Ibid.  6 3  Ibid.  i n Chu,  17.  64  Boorman, Biographical Dictionary. 1:22.  65  Ch'eng, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng chih yen-hsing," pp.  30-31.  ^ J o h n M e s k i l l , "Academies and P o l i t i c s i n the Ming Dynasty" i n C h a r l e s 0. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government i n Ming. Times. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 149-174. S h i h I, "Wo suo c h i h - t a o Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng t i shengp'ing," (shang) Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") v o l . 4, no. 20 (Dec. 30, 1953):12-13. For a d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l s on the c l o s i n g of t h e I n s t i t u t e o f National Culture and Chiang Kai-shek's role, see Chou Hsiang-kuang, "Chi m i n - t s u wen-hua shu-yuan c h i h c h ' u a n g - l i y u f e n g - p i " T s ' a i - s h e n g ("Renaissance") v o l . 4, no. 23 (Jan. 30, 1954):12-19. C a r s u n Chang, The. T h i r d Associates, 1952), p. 103. 6 8  F o r c e i n China (New  York:  Bookman  ** Lawrence A. Schnieder, A Madman Qt Ch'u: The Chinese Myth o f Loyalty and Dissent (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1980), p. 88. 9  Chang, "Wo kuo," p. 11. 70  71  ts'ung she-hui k'o-hsueh t'iao-tao che-hs'ueh chih ching-  Wang, Chinese I n t e l l e c t u a l s and the. West- p.  Chang, "Wo kuo," p. 12. 72  381.  ts'ung she-hui k'o-hsueh t'iao-tao che-hsueh chih ching-  P.A.Y. G u n t e r , ed.. BergSQn and the. E v o l u t i o n .Q! P h y s i c s (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), p. 17. 73  James Deotis Roberts, Jr.. F a i t h and Reason: A Comparative Study of P a s c a l . Bergson and James (Boston: C h r i s t o p h e r P u b l i s h i n g House, 1962), p. 26. 74  H e n r e y Thomas and Dana Lee Thomas, L i v i n g B i o g r a p h i e s Philosophers (Garden C i t y , New York: Garden C i t y Books, 1941), p. 7 5  Great 313.  N e w E n c y c l o p e d i a B r i t t a n i c a . M i c r o p a e d i a . 15th ed.. s.v. "Eucken, Rudolph Chris toph." 76  62 C a r s u n Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought. 2 vols. (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), 2:45. 77  78  Chang, "Wo yu chia-hsiung Chiin-mai," p.  79  Thomas, Living Biographies, p.  104.  209.  Ch'eng, "Chang Chiin-mai hsien-sheng nien-piao ch'ang-pien," p. 272. Also, when Chang studied with Bergson i n Paris, they often compared Chinese and Western philosophy. See Liang Ching-ch'un, "Chun-mai hsiensheng erh-san shih," i n Chu, CCMCCTL. 1:67. 80  See Chester C. Tan, Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought i n the Twentieth Century (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 254-255. 0±  oz  Spence, £h£ Gate of Heavenly Peace, p.  171.  Bauer, China and. the Search £QL Happiness, p.  83  364.  Chow, The May Fourth Movement, pp. 333-334.  84  85  Furth, "Culture and Politics," p.  86  Ch'eng, CCMHSNPCPCK. p. p.  37.  258.  8 7  Ibid.  259.  8 8  Ibid.  89  Chang, The Third Force, p.  24.  Wen-hua chiao-yii yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT. p. 197. Also see Tan, Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought, p. 253. 90  91 ^Chang's concept of a p o l i t i c a l party r e f l e c t s h i s synthesis of Western and Chinese learning and experience. Organizationally, although very weak, there i s some resemblance to a Western style p o l i t i c a l party. Functionally, however, the NSP exhibits none of the Western influence. See Shih I, "Wo suo chih-tao Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng t i sheng-p'ing," (Shang) p. 15 for opposing view. C h a n g C h i h - i , K'ang-chan chunq t i chena-tang ho p ' a j - p i e h (Chungking: Tu-shu sheng-huo ch'u-pan she, 1939) p. 79. 92  Angela Sutherland Burger, Opposition i n a Dominant-Party System: A Study of the Jan Sangh. the Praja Socialist Party and. the Socialist Party i n Uttar Pradesh. India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 19. 93  Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, ed., P o l i t i c a l Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 389. 94  63 Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, TJae Government and. P o l i t i c s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 355. 95  of  China  Wen-hua chiao-yii yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT. p. 205. Also see "Democracy vs. One-Party Rule in Kuomintang China: The L i t t l e Parties' Organize," Amerasia 7 (Mar.-Dec.) 1943:112. 96  x  Chang, K'ana-chan chung  97  i i cheng-tang ho. p'ai-pieh,  p.  Ch'ien, The Government and. P o l i t i c s QJL China , p. chung-kuo ko tang ko. p'aj hsien-K'uang, p. l . 98  Wang Chinese  99  100  10  Intellectuals and the West, p.  78. 354;  Wei,  197.  James Shen, "Minority Parties i n Asia," Asia 40 (Feb. 1940) :81.  i"Democracy  v s >  one-Party  Rule", p.  111.  S e e Burger, Opposition in a. Dominant-Party State, for her theory that those who are threatened with l o s s of status, role and function by p o l i c i e s of the dominant party w i l l seek representation i n opposition parties. 102  Wen-hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT. p. 203; Ch'ien, The Government and P o l i t i c s P i china, p. 355. 103  1 0 4  H s i a , Lunflu.Shih yii Chang Chun-mai,, p. 53; p.  105  L i a n g , "Chlin-mai hsien-sheng erh-san shih," p.  106  Chang, "Wo yu chia-hsiung Chun-mai," p.  67. 68.  104.  c h a n g Chlin-mai, reprinted from Ta-kung pao ("L'Impartial") Nov. 29, 1939, in Shen Yiin-lung, gen. ed. Chin-tai chung-kUP shih-liao ts'ungJcjan, vol. 805. Hsien-cheng yao-kuan/Hsing-hsien shu-yao. pp. 87-114. Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1966-. Hereafter CTCKSLTK. 1 0 7  -*- Shih I, "Wo suo chih-tao Chang Chlin-mai hsien-sheng t i shengp'ing," (Shang), p. 15. 08  64  CHAPTER THREE: CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE-BUILDING China's experience with constitutions has been a checkered one. Although the need for a constitution was widely accepted,  there was less  agreement about the form of government that i t would incorporate. Confounding the whole debate was the lack of commitment to liberal values by some, and the callous use of the constitutional movement for their own purposes by others. It might be constitutions and  said, generally, that those  holding power in China used  the promise of democracy as a ploy in their efforts to  maintain their power and difuse p o l i t i c a l opposition. Those without power used constitutions and  calls for democracy as means of limiting the power  of t h e i r opponents and gaining i t for themselves.  The Ch'ing Court had  tried the former approach i n i t s waning years, and Sun Yat-sen had tried the l a t t e r against Yuan Shih-k'ai. Wang Ching-wei  1  Or, l a t e r , for example, Sun Fo and  used both approaches.  They had  cynically  and  opportunistically "advocated democracy when they were excluded from power. But, each, when i n power had resisted the expansion of democratic procedures."  2  No less than five constitutions were issued by successive governments between 1912 and 1927.  None had much bearing on the course of politics,  but they a l l reflected constitution. gained new  the general concensus  that China needed a  The drive to f i n a l l y r e a l i z e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government  impetus  with the ostensible " u n i f i c a t i o n " of China by  Nationalist armies under Chiang Kai-shek in 1927.  Bringing a constitution  to l i f e under the Nanking regime f e l l into three distinct phases:  between  1933 and 1939 under the d i r e c t i o n of Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat-sen; between 1939 and 1943 under the authority of the People's P o l i t i c a l  65  Council;  and, l a s t l y ,  Consultative Conference.  between 1946 and 1947 under the P o l i t i c a l Each successive stage shows a d i l u t i o n of  Kuomintang dominance and increased participation and input by opposition elements.  3  This r e f l e c t e d neither the willingness of the KMT to share  power, nor the effectiveness of opposition strategy, but rather, the consequences of forces beyond the control of either. Constitutional development under the Nanking regime was motivated and channeled by a range of conflicting social and p o l i t i c a l currents.  In the  broadest sense, constitutions were seen by many as being prerequisites for modernity.  The major Western powers a l l had some form of constitutional  basis, and the example of Japan could only reinforce the b e l i e f that constitutions did bring unity, and modernity, and respect, and power. These were goals which were shared by Chinese across a broad spectrum of political beliefs. Internally, the KMT needed to promote constitutionalism for several reasons:  f i r s t , the KMT was never a monolithic party under the thumb of  Chiang Kai-shek.  In his role as "indisputable leader," (as explained  below) Chiang needed to continually balance and maneuver between the heterogeneous elements that made up the upper levels of the Party as well as the government. and  Increasing pressure from the likes of Wang Ching-wei  Sun Fo to share power, prompted Chiang to press for a speedy  inauguration of constitutional government as a way of maintaining consensus.  4  party  Keeping the various provincial interests satisfied with their  share of the p o l i t i c a l pie may also have been a factor. Since at l e a s t the Taiping Rebellion, regional forces had been expanding their power and prerogatives at the expense of the center.  While Chang Chun-mai saw  himself as a national politician, there were certainly many who took part  66 i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s as a means o f p r o t e c t i n g or enhancing regional power. fact,  deals with the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the provinces and the central  government. used  One of the l a r g e s t sections of the d r a f t constitution, i n  With some confidence we may assume that Chiang Kai-shek also  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s as an  avenue f o r c h a n n e l i n g and  c o n t r o l l i n g regional demands f o r p o l i t i c a l power. day-to-day governing, Chiang  Secondly, i n terms  of  needed to create a strong and v i a b l e state  apparatus; a c o n s t i t u t i o n would p r o v i d e the l e g a l framework f o r t h a t apparatus and l e g i t i m i z e Chiang's a u t h o r i t y . base o f the KMT  was  r e l a t i v e l y weak.  T h i r d l y , the i d e o l o g i c a l  The Three People's P r i n c i p l e s  p r o v i d e d a rough o u t l i n e o f a p a r t y i d e o l o g y , but " t h i s program d i d not have the power t o arouse popular commitment. . ."  5  of the KMT  The highest leadership  adopted the vocabulary of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l movement to gain  an additional i d e o l o g i c a l prop, and to c l a i m f o r i t s e l f the leadership of the p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e s .  And, l a s t l y , Chiang used the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o c e s s t o assuage the a n x i e t i e s o f h i s a l l y , the U n i t e d S t a t e s . became i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t t o encourage  the f i c t i o n  Chiang as the war  It  progressed, to  i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a t h i s government  was  democratic and, hence, deserving of support. Bedeski's model of state-building based on the development  of force,  power, and a u t h o r i t y p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l approach t o understanding the interplay between Chiang Kai-shek and opposition elements. Bedeski shows t h a t the d r i v i n g f o r c e behind Chiang's e f f o r t to e s t a b l i s h a sovereign p o l i t i c a l order.  In h i s model,  a c t i o n s was the  The Nanking regime had  inherited a state apparatus that was only p a r t i a l l y  independent, a huge  debt burden, and domestic chaos.  a p o l i c y that would  Chiang was pursuing  c e n t r a l i z e force i n h i s own hands, r e a l i z e power as expressed i n law, and wield authority through the l e g i t i m i z a t i o n of power.  No one could f a u l t  67  Chiang f o r t r y i n g t o pursue these g o a l s .  Bedeski's model i s u s e f u l , but  we need t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t beneath the l e g i t i m a t e d r i v e s o f the Nanking regime was a callous use of democracy as a weapon**—a weapon used by both the KMT  and Chiang Kai-shek.  I t needs t o be emphasized  here t h a t the Kuomintang, the Nanking  government, and Chiang Kai-shek s h o u l d be seen as s e p a r a t e , sometimes overlapping, sometimes antagonistic elements, each pursuing i t s own goals. In  the b r o a d e s t sense, the KMT  outlined.  and Chiang shared the g o a l s Bedeski  They d i v e r g e d on the q u e s t i o n o f who would c o n t r o l the s t a t e  apparatus that brought together force, power, and authority. The KMT,  heavily influenced by the Russian model, sought to create i n  China a party-state: over p o l i t i c a l ,  a condition which would reserve ultimate authority  social,  and i d e o l o g i c a l questions to the Party.  Chiang,  on the other hand, envisioned China as an authoritarian state with power c o n c e n t r a t e d i n h i s hands alone.  The c o n s t i t u t i o n was o n l y one o f the  arenas i n which the c o n t e s t f o r power took p l a c e . example, has shown the KMT. the  Joseph Fewsmith, f o r  another dimension of the struggle between Chiang and  In i t s attempt t o extend p a r t y - r u l e , the KMT  sought t o absorb  independent Shanghai Chamber of Commerce into the parry-run Merchant  Association.  In t h i s case, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce found an a l l y  i n i t s resistance to party-rule i n Chiang Kai-shek.  Chiang sided with the  Shanghai Chamber o f Commerce t o undermine the KMT  and i t s e f f o r t s t o  extend party-rule. In  terms  description  o f Chiang Kai-shek's aims,  o f China  authoritarian state.  under  Chiang  that  Fewsmith f u r t h e r o f f e r s a fits  his criteria  for  an  Fewsmith sees three factors as being c r i t i c a l to and  defining an authoritarian state:  an indispensable leader, a heterogeneous  68 e l i t e , and a "mentality."  Chiang Kai-shek, as the "indispensable leader,"  held together the myriad elements which made up the KMT government.  and the Nanking  By balancing favor and mutual suspicions, Chiang was  able to  not o n l y h o l d h i s government t o g e t h e r , but a l s o t o enhance h i s p e r s o n a l power.  By being the l o c u s o f l o y a l t y f o r a l l of the competing  elements, and yet maintaining  elite  a c e r t a i n "uncommittedness" to any s i n g l e  e l i t e i n t e r e s t , Chiang became the sole l i n k between the d i f f e r e n t parts of the c o a l i t i o n , and hence, indispensable. That  the  KMT  and  the  7  Nanking government  "heterogeneous e l i t e " i s well-known.  were comprised  The CC Clique, the P o l i t i c a l  C l i q u e , the B l u e S h i r t s , the co-opted ex-warlords,  a  Study  a l l gave Chiang K a i -  shek t h e i r l o y a l t y , but continued to i n t r i g u e against each other. e n l i s t e d t h e i r e f f o r t s t o advance h i s own  of  Chiang  nation-building vision  and  dispensed f a v o r s and mediated between them t o m a i n t a i n a semblance of cooperation. The mentality that Fewsmith describes i s not ideology, but rather an i n t e l l e c t u a l a t t i t u d e that i s present-orientated:  i n other words, an  a t t i t u d e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a pragmatism t h a t can sanction contradictory p o l i c i e s with the same ideology. mentality  was based i n KMT  8  In China's case, Fewsmith argues, the  ideology; the Three People's P r i n c i p l e s , Sun's  O u t l i n e f o r N a t i o n a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and the v a s t outpourings o f P a r t y ideologues were reduced to a "mentality" by t h e i r divorce from a concrete organization to enforce t h e i r meaning.  hierarchy of the KMT  counted  among the various competing e l i t e i n t e r e s t s i n Republican China;  i t too,  w i t h o t h e r e l i t e i n t e r e s t s , competed f o r i n f l u e n c e and power.  In the  Party's case,  The  however, t h e i r p o s i t i o n and  undermined by Chiang Kai-shek.  a u t h o r i t y was  effectively  In the d i r e c t c o m p e t i t i o n  authority, the Party l o s t to Chiang.  for state  Chiang continued to need the Party  69  as a l e g i t i m a t i n g device, but by 1930 the Party organization had no independent authority of i t s own.  9  Chiang Kai-shek was pursuing his own  aims of s t a t e - b u i l d i n g which i n c l u d e d administration from Party interference.  10  the need t o p r o t e c t h i s  Once Chiang's own position was  unassailable, that of the Party was reduced to propaganda work.  11  This struggle did not end of course after 1930. The constitutional process was one area where the KMT, as well as non-KMT elements, continued to seek inroads into Chiang's position.  Chiang, meanwhile, continued to  encourage the factionalism that buttressed his position as "indispensable leader."  His support of the constitution from the early 1930's, however,  was simply a p o l i t i c a l act necessitated by circumstances.  12  "As the most  ardent proponent of a strong central government. . . he r e l e n t l e s s l y pursued a p o l i c y of weakening regional and c e n t r i f u g a l forces which i n h i b i t e d the unitary s t a t e . "  13  Chang Chiin-mai and other  opposition  elements counted among those centrifugal forces, and were subject to any form of pressure, intimidation, or violence Chiang might wish to use. Even though the Three People's P r i n c i p l e s were a weak i d e o l o g i c a l base, they were not without prestige. Having been authored by a man of unimpeachable revolutionary credentials, the Principles gained a good deal of authority.  Since Chiang Kai-shek had very l i t t l e , other than h i s  connection with the l a t e Sun Yat-sen and his P r i n c i p l e s , as a source of legitimacy and ideology, he clung to them with an almost religious fervor. As  the s e l f - s t y l e d  i n h e r i t o r and executor of Sun's mandate t o  "democratize" China, Chiang could not ignore the p o l i t i c a l imperative of making the t r a n s i t i o n to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government, i f only i n form. While Sun's mandate was sufficiently vague to give him great latitude i n interpretation, i t s t i l l required him to keep a l i v e the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  70 drafting process.  While the process was alive the constitution could be  used as an instrument of peacekeeping within the KMT,  14  and as a way of  dissipating the energies of opposition forces. By channeling the energies of the o p p o s i t i o n , both w i t h i n and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l process, Chiang was  without the  KMT,  into  the  r e l a t i v e l y free to pursue his own  agenda of maximizing the center's power at the expense of a l l others. Forces which Chiang could not control were such things as the rising sense of nationalism among Chinese, Japanese infringements on Chinese sovereignty, f i r s t , and outright invasion, later, and the need to foster a democratic image for the benefit of his major World War United States.  II a l l y , the  It was the pressure of these forces that moved Chiang to  allow opposition participation in government, to allow, to a degree and for a time, the expression of opposition opinion, and to compromise on the substance of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l draft.  With the exception  of  the  Communists, who had more than a million men under arms at the end of the war, the opposition did nothing which, of i t s own, compromise.  could induce Chiang to  The fatal flaw of opposition leaders lay in their inability  to create forces which could be turned into p o l i t i c a l power.  They could  exploit conditions which worked against Chiang, but they could neither control nor sustain them. If the i n f i r m i t i e s of the opposition seem so clear today, why did they invest t h e i r e f f o r t s and risk their l i v e s i n a seemingly hopeless cause?  The answer, in Chang Chun-mai's case at l e a s t , l i e s i n his  idealism and sense of mission.  In his conscious role as a member of the  e l i t e , laden with a l l i t s traditional responsibilities, he was compelled to apply his energies to the s o l u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l problems. The "new  l i t e r a t i " , no l e s s than the o l d s c h o l a r - o f f i c i a l c l a s s , gained  their raison d'etre from their role as mediators and adjudicators.  As a  71  c l a s s they c a r r i e d the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p l a c e themselves between the government (court) and the masses.  As the b e a r e r s of "modern l e a r n i n g "  they were uniquely q u a l i f i e d , so they f e l t , to review, debate, and judge the merits of any issue a f f e c t i n g society. w i t h an o v e r l a y of Western i d e a l i s m , was Confucian problems.  Chang, as a New  Confucianist  f u r t h e r d r i v e n by the  Neo-  imperative to employ h i s knowledge to the r e s o l u t i o n of s o c i a l H i s i d e a l i s m , coupled w i t h h i s b e l i e f t h a t human w i l l c o u l d  a f f e c t r e a l i t y , gave him c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s u l t i m a t e success; h i s moral a u t h o r i t y , i n o t h e r words, c o u l d appeal t o the i n t u i t i o n and reason of others, and, thus, be translated i n t o p o l i t i c a l power. l i f e i n what he knows to be a f r u i t l e s s e f f o r t .  No man  spends h i s  To abandon h i s works, to  d i s c l a i m a concern f o r s o c i a l issues, to withdraw i n t o himself, would have refuted the very premise of Chang's philosophy.  WORLD WAR  I I AND  THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL  The p o l i t i c a l  landscape of China had changed considerably since the  tumultuous days o f the May F o u r t h era; gone were the " n a t i o n a l essence" and  " n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r " movements, as w e l l as the movement t o make  Confucianism  a religion;  ch'ao, and Chang P i n - l i n .  passed on a l s o were K'ang Yu-wei, L i a n g C h ' i Dominating the scene now  would h e l p determine the f u t u r e of China. Kuomintang and  were new  B e s i d e s the  the " l e f t i s t " Communist Party,  groups which  "conservative"  was  a s i g n i f i c a n t "middle  group"—sometimes refered to as the " t h i r d force."  Making up t h i s " t h i r d  force" were such groups as the National S o c i a l i s t Party, the China Youth P a r t y , the T h i r d P a r t y , the R u r a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n A s s o c i a t i o n , and  the  National Salvation Association. F a r t h e s t t o the r i g h t , and p o l i t i c a l l y v e r y a c t i v e , was Youth Party.  the C h i n a  Led by Tseng Ch'i, L i Huang, and Tso Shun-sheng, the P a r t y  72  was  strongly anti-communist and often found that i t could cooperate with  the Nanking Government. the  Government and  I t did, though, maintain  p e r s i s t e n t l y pressed  representation i n the government. both  the  People's  Political  i t s independence from  i t s claim to influence  and  In the c o n s t i t u t i o n - d r a f t i n g work of  Council  and  the  People's  Consultative  Conference, Chang Chiin-mai often found an a l l y i n Tso Shun-sheng. The Rural Reconstructionists were much l e s s p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e than the China Youth Party, but t h e i r leader, Liang Shu-ming, had a s i g n i f i c a n t p e r s o n a l f o l l o w i n g and, as mentioned e a r l i e r , had much i n common w i t h Chang Chiin-mai.  These two men  The T h i r d Party was of the KMT  who  could also work w e l l together.  p r i n c i p a l l y made up of l e f t - w i n g former members  had s u f f e r e d a t the hands o f Chiang Kai-shek d u r i n g  KMT-CCP s p l i t i n 1927.  C o n s i d e r a b l y t o the l e f t of the dominant KMT  the CC  Clique, but stopping short of embracing Marxism, T h i r d Party members f e l t more c o m f o r t a b l e  m a i n t a i n i n g an i n t e r m e d i a r y p o s i t i o n between the  two  poles. Widespread and  possibly the t h i r d l a r g e s t p o l i t i c a l group i n China,  the N a t i o n a l S a l v a t i o n i s t s espoused a p o l i c y o f r e s i s t a n c e t o Japan, p a t r i o t i s m , and l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s . v a r i e t y of autonomous groups c e n t e r e d teachers, party. KMT,  Loosely organized i n a  on s t u d e n t s ,  workers, women,  etc., the National S a l v a t i o n i s t s were never a formal  political  G e n e r a l l y l e f t i s t , they opposed the heavy-handed t a c t i c s of the  which suspected  they were a communist f r o n t o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Its  membership probably included some communists, but i t was neither dominated nor c o n t r o l l e d by them. The d i v e r s i t y of t h i s " t h i r d force" i s obvious. s p e c i f i c issues, they could a l l f i n d common cause.  But at times, and  on  Amidst these elements  73 was Chang Chun-mai and his National Socialist Party. For our purposes, i t should s u f f i c e to locate Chang roughly to the l e f t of the China Youth Party, but to the right of the National Salvation Association. Pressure on the Nanking regime to broaden i t s base increased i n the early 1930's.  Japan's invasion of Manchuria and the fighting i n Shanghai  inflamed and fed Chinese nationalism.  Intellectuals, students, workers,  merchants, and the media a l l rose i n a surge of anti-Japanese sentiment. Chiang Kai-shek's policy of appeasement only seemed to make his one-party dictatorship less popular.  As a sop to public opinion, Chiang  to establish some kind of people's representative c o u n c i l .  15  resolved  Increasing  pressure both from the Japanese and from Chinese anxious to resist Japan, led the government to invite non-KMT elements, including Chang Chun-mai, to participate i n reconciliation talks in mid-1937. e f f o r t by Chiang to defuse  These talks were an  the growing opposition to his p o l i c y of  passive resistance to the Japanese.  The talks, as well, were prompted by  the shock of Chiang's kidnapping only s i x months e a r l i e r i n Sian.  That  incident had been resolved by a "reconciliation" between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The r e c o n c i l i a t i o n c a l l e d for an end to Chiang's anti-communist extermination campaigns and the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front. The nationalism that Chiang was trying to deal with and harness also touched Chang Chlin-mai. Throughout his l i f e he had been conscious that his work and his study were in the service of China as a state, as well as China as a c u l t u r a l entity.  On t h i s point, the protection of China as a  sovereign state, Chang and the KMT could agree i n p r i n c i p l e , but d i f f e r sharply on policy.  After the Tsinan Incident i n 1928, when Japanese and  Chinese troops had clashed i n Shantung, Chang had bitterly condemned the KMT f o r i t s t i m i d response.  He c a l l e d on the country to " r i s e up and  74  condemn  [ t h e KMT]  foreigners."  for selling  out the country  and f a w n i n g  E a r l i e r , he had c l e a r l y s e t h i m s e l f a g a i n s t t h e KMT,  1 6  judging t h e i r d i c t a t o r i a l government a complete f a i l u r e , the KMT t o a b o l i s h i t s one-party d i c t a t o r s h i p . and  t h e KMT  on  t o broaden  17  The pressures on Chiang  i t s base and defuse  c o n s i d e r a b l e i f they c o u l d prompt them  and c a l l i n g on  dissent  were  surely  t o i n v i t e the l i k e s o f Chang t o  p a r t i c i p a t e i n the government. As the Japanese i n v a s i o n i n J u l y o f 1937 s p e l l e d death and anguish for  so many Chinese, i t was a l s o t h e l i f e - b l o o d o f t h e a n t i - C h i a n g  opposition.  Before  t h e i n v a s i o n "almost any e x p r e s s i o n o r a c t i v i t y  c r i t i c a l or h o s t i l e t o the government could expose the person responsible for  i t to prosecution."  1 8  Now, almost o v e r n i g h t , t h e government was  f o r c e d t o change i t s p o l i c y from appeasement t o a c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e . The need f o r a broadly based anti-Japanese unquestioned.  united f r o n t became immediate and  Chiang needed a t l e a s t the symbols of national unity.  In terms o f s u p e r f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l g a i n , Chang Chiin-mai and other opposition f i g u r e s fared w e l l immediately f o l l o w i n g the Japanese invasion. The government's f i r s t concession was t o i n v i t e non-KMT elements t o j o i n the newly-created  National Defense Advisory Council.  implies, a s t r i c t l y did,  I t was, as the name  advisory body with no r e a l power.  Significantly, i t  f o r the f i r s t time, give p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and groups other than the  KMT a voice i n the conduct of the government.  19  In addition, Chiang had  g i v e n Chang Chun-mai's N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t P a r t y recognition.  During  the f i r s t  year  a form  of d£ facto  o f the war a g a i n s t  Japan t h e  o p p o s i t i o n "enjoyed more c i v i l l i b e r t y than a t  any t i m e d u r i n g t h e  preceding  freedom of speech,  d e c a d e .. . ., t h e r e  was a r e l a t i v e  publication, and assembly, undreamed of since 1927,. . ."  20  75 But the opposition continued to press for an even greater role in the government, and they were successful, though not through t h e i r efforts.  own  The Japanese again provided the c a t a l y s t which boosted the  opposition's stock. Chiang's troops. 450,000 men,  Pushing south and east, Japanese armies decimated  By the end of 1937  the Chinese had l o s t 370,000 to  or between one-third and one-half of their fighting strength.  China had lost a l l her important centers of culture, commerce, industry, and p o l i t i c a l power.  21  Worse s t i l l , the "intervention by Western powers  f a i l e d to materialize . . . the gloomy outlook required the N a t i o n a l i s t 99  Government to seek whatever support i t could get from the people . . ." As a result Chiang Kai-shek organized the group he had alluded to back in 1931 after Japan's incursion into Manchuria. The National Defense Advisory Council was effectively expanded and evolved into the People's P o l i t i c a l Council (Kuo-min ts'an-cheng imi). The PPC, as i t came to be known, was much more broadly based than i t s predecessor; parties,  23  i t included a l l major opposition groups and  and could better claim to represent a united front.  minority In logic  only made possible by equating the Party with the public interest (kung), one  KMT  supporter  claimed  t h a t the PPC  was,  in fact,  representative body because i t s members were selected by the KMT by  the  government.  Since  the  KMT  had  a truly and not  been "entrusted" with  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of putting p o l i t i c a l power into practice, the argument continued,  to be chosed by the KMT  by the people.  was actually to be indirectly elected  24  The creation of the PPC was a two-edged sword:  on one hand, since  a l l PPC resolutions had to be approved by the Supreme National Defense Council headed by Chiang Kai-shek, the Council, i n essence, became a device through which Chiang "provided a safety-valve for opposition  76  w i t h o u t touching  the  apparatus of power.""  On  the other  bringing together probably the b e s t group of p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s  hand,  i n China,  which some b e l i e v e r e f l e c t e d q u i t e a c c u r a t e l y the popular w i l l , g i v i n g them a forum, Chiang was  by  2 6  and  f o r c e d t o defend the l e g i t i m a c y of h i s  p o l i c i e s i n public. Opposition leaders were c e r t a i n l y aware that they were p l a y i n g t o a l a r g e r audience than j u s t t h e i r f e l l o w Chinese; American p u b l i c o p i n i o n and the w i l l i n g n e s s of the American Congress t o support C h i n a were a f f e c t e d by t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s of the h e a l t h o f democracy i n China.  Representative  or not,  s i n c e the Japanese i n v a s i o n .  the opposition had made considerable A l s o beyond doubt was  gain  a l s o the f a c t t h a t  those gains were l a r g e l y , i f not wholly, a t t r i b u t a b l e to the n e c e s s i t i e s of the war,  not to opposition power.  The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the PPC  27  i s that i t widened dramatically the scope  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d r a f t i n g process.  Previously,  under the Nanking government, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d r a f t was,  b a s i c a l l y , an  issue between the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan and the Kuomintang. Beginning i n 1933  under the d i r e c t i o n of Sun Fo, the President of the  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan, d r a f t i n g committees produced constitutions which t r i e d to  reconcile  the  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan. a  supposedly  various  p o s i t i o n s both  within  the  KMT  and  the  Once a d r a f t had been approved by the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan,  representative  body,  Executive Committee (CEC) of the KMT, shek, f o r a p p r o v a l .  i t was  s u b m i t t e d t o the  which was  I f the d r a f t was  Central  c o n t r o l l e d by Chiang K a i -  found u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  it  was  r e t u r n e d t o the L e g i s l a t o r s w i t h a l i s t of g u i d e l i n e s f o r the needed revision.  The Kuomintang gave the d r a f t i n g work to the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan  to give the appearance that the c o n s t i t u t i o n was r e p r e s e n t a t i v e " body.  the work of a "people's  By h o l d i n g v e t o power over any d r a f t produced by  77 the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan, Chiang, through the CEC, could e f f e c t i v e l y guide the l e g i s l a t o r s t o the d e s i r e d end.  D u t i f u l l y , t h e r e f o r e , the L e g i s l a t i v e  Yuan f i n a l l y produced what Chiang John Wu  On May 5, 1936 the s o - c a l l e d  D r a f t , named a f t e r one o f i t s a u t h o r s , was  forever after The KMT  wanted.  promulgated  and,  became known as the 5-5 D r a f t (5th day o f the 5 t h month).  c a l l e d f o r the convening of the National Assembly  the following  year t o f o r m a l l y adopt the 5-5 D r a f t as the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f China. Japanese invasion made that impossible, process was temporarily  The  however, and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  suspended.  Bringing t o l i f e the dormant c o n s t i t u t i o n was high on the agenda of t h e PPC.  Within  the C o u n c i l  a Committee f o r the Promotion  Constitutionalism was appointed by the Speaker, Wang Shih-chieh.  28  of  That  the Committee was made up predominantly of Councillors of minor p a r t i e s and independents i s s i g n i f i c a n t . By i t s nature the PPC was, i n i t i a l l y at l e a s t , f a i r l y independent; i t was by no means i n Chiang's h i p pocket.  Mindful  o f the f a c t t h a t he  needed the semblance of a united f r o n t and a democratic government, Chiang had t o give opposition elements access to government that they f e l t meaningful. dressing,"  I f the PPC the o p p o s i t i o n  embarrassed Chiang.  had  been e n t i r e l y  would  an e x e r c i s e  was  i n "window  have b a l k e d a t p a r t i c i p a t i n g , and  Chiang Kai-shek could set l i m i t a t i o n s on the scope of  the PPC's a c t i v i t i e s ,  or as a f i n a l  resort n u l l i f y  i t s work, but the  p r o c e e d i n g s o f the C o u n c i l needed the a i r o f d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n . For these reasons  the s e l e c t i o n of committee  beyond Chiang's complete control.  members w i t h i n the PPC  I t i s possible that the heavy  was  minority  party and independent representation on the Committee f o r the Promotion of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m was supported and even promoted by one such as Wang S h i h - c h i e h as a l e v e r i n the on-going s t r u g g l e between Chiang and the  78  KMT—it  would not be the l a s t time KMT  f i n d common interests.  members and the opposition could  To l i m i t and circumscribe the committee's work as  much as possible, however, Chiang Kai-shek would only permit i t to use the 5-5  D r a f t as a b l u e p r i n t from which o n l y minor d e v i a t i o n s would  allowed.29  be  D e s p i t e s e r i o u s handicaps the committee produced i t s d r a f t  c o n s t i t u t i o n which i t presented t o the PPC on March 30, 1940.  The d r a f t  was b a s i c a l l y the work of Chang Chun-mai and Lo Lung-chi, who worked from the r e l a t i v e safety of Kunming under the protection of Chiang's erstwhile a l l y General Lung Yiin. Chang and Lo produced a d r a f t which t r i e d t o b a l a n c e the f o r c e s of authoritarianism and democracy.  Like Chiang Kai-shek, they also needed to  accommodate opposing f o r c e s , and y e t r e a l i z e t h e i r own o b j e c t i v e s .  On  the one hand, most Chinese engaged i n the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s shared the same g e n e r a l g o a l s : stable China.  a s t r o n g , e c o n o m i c a l l y advancing, and p o l i t i c a l l y  But the manner of achieving those goals, the relationships  between the i n d i v i d u a l and the s t a t e and between the r e g i o n s and the c e n t e r , and the form and degree o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , were a l l questions of intense debate. That Chiang Kai-shek had been forced to compromise seemed obvious; t o what degree he was w i l l i n g to compromise was as yet unknown.  I t was up t o  Chang and Lo t o temper the a u t h o r i t a r i a n demands o f Chiang and f u r t h e r t h e i r own democratic reforms.  Thier perspicacity and p o l i t i c a l experience  would determine the success or f a i l u r e of t h e i r e f f o r t s . CHANG APPROACHES THE CONSTITUTION The debate over the form of the c o n s t i t u t i o n had resolved i t s e l f i n t o a contest between those promoting some form of authoritarian government, and those seeking something more akin to the democratic governments of the  79  United States, France, or England.  Ideologues of both groups used  basically the same vocabulary, and their ostensible goals were similar. Not until one examines their respective proposals for a constitution do their differences become clear.  In general, Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT  supporters t r i e d to formalize, l e g a l i z e , and extend an authoritarian system already i n existence, participation  while giving  l i p - s e r v i c e to non-KMT  i n government. The heavy s t r a i n s of support for an  authoritarian government or even a  dictatorship within the KMT had been  reinforced by the ascendency of Chiang Kai-shek.  With h i s m i l i t a r y  background and base of support i n the military, i t i s not surprising that Chiang was a consistent advocate of fascism. "As late as 1935 Chiang was t e l l i n g an assembly of Blue Shirts," the bully-boys, enforcers, and assassins of the KMT, "that what the country needed was fascism."  30  That  China already had a dictatorship was p a i n f u l l y clear to Lo Lung-chi, an associate of Chang Chun-mai's the Blue Shirts,  who  and an attempted assassination target of  f e l t that China did not have simply a party  dictatorship, but rather, the dictatorship of a single man.-'- That Lo f e l t 3  this way i s not surprising.  He was certainly aware that Chiang Kai-shek  had emasculated the KMT and had e f f e c t i v e l y removed the Party from the center of government.  While Chiang may not have qualified as a dictator  in the strictest sense, he certainly sat at the pinnacle of power and had the f i n a l word on questions c r i t i c a l to his rule.  Opposition leaders, on  the other hand, tried to counter the legalization and extension of Chiang Kai-shek's rule by formalizing and l e g a l i z i n g checks on the government, hoping that circumstances or public pressure would  cause Chiang  to  respect them. World War I I , when i t began for the Chinese i n 1937, provided the  80 c a t a l y s t which made o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government p o s s i b l e . Realizing  h i s d e b t t o t h e war,  Fan C h ' a n g - c h i a n g  observed  that  "implementing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government and the war of resistance cannot be separated."  What he meant was that without the war there was no hope  32  for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government.  Chang Chiin-mai agreed. While supporters of  Chiang Kai-shek argued that implementing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government during wartime  would d i s p e r s e n a t i o n a l power, Chang countered t h a t , on the  contrary, acting according t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a r t i c l e s would c o n c e n t r a t e national power.  33  Chang Shen-fu, also a NSP member, explained that during  a war i s the best time, i n f a c t , t o implement  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government.  "The war o f r e s i s t a n c e , " he went on, "has made our people r e a l i z e t h a t without a nation they cannot e x i s t , they know that the i n d i v i d u a l and the n a t i o n have an i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p . "  3 4  What he was e x p r e s s i n g , o f  course, was the phenomenon and the e f f e c t of nationalism i n China. A major  h u r d l e f o r Chang Chiin-mai, as w e l l as f o r many o t h e r  o p p o s i t i o n p o l i t i c i a n s , was  the l e g a c y o f Sun Yat-sen. L i t e r a l l y a l l  p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n , sooner o r l a t e r , had t o come t o g r i p s w i t h Sun's e c l e c t i c , vague, and sometimes contradictory philosophy. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT  had canonized Sun's thought; i t became the B i b l e f o r P a r t y  members and the orthodoxy of Republican C h i n a .  35  Sun was not d e i f i e d f o r  h i s charismatic q u a l i t i e s or the profoundness of h i s thought, but because he c o u l d s e r v e as a symbol o f u n i t y .  3 6  L u c k i l y , the vagueness o f S u n i s t  i d e o l o g y a l s o made i t e l a s t i c enough t o be used by a l l . Chang Chiin-mai found Sun's t h e o r y o f the d i v i s i o n contradictory, and even though he refused to bow meetings o f the P P C ,  38  Principles,  Even though  of powers t o be  to Sun's p o r t r a i t before  he, too, sometimes found i t expedient t o invoke  Sun's name i n defense o f h i s p o s i t i o n . People's  3 7  The c a n o n i z a t i o n o f Sun's Three  t o some d e g r e e ,  a c t e d as  a brake  on  the  81  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debate.  By r e s t r i c t i n g the v o c a b u l a r y and d e f i n i n g the  l i m i t s of the debate, Sun's ideology may  have hindered the development of  democratic government, rather than advanced i t . L i k e other r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e o l o g i e s , Sun's thought c l a i m e d t o be absolute:  i t d i d not need, nor was  i t subject to external v e r i f i c a t i o n .  As the o n l y r e c o g n i z e d s t a n d a r d of knowledge, S u n i s t i d e o l o g y c o u l d not admit to an a l t e r n a t i v e source of truth.  Fewsmith has shown how  Sunist  ideology established an i d e n t i t y between the Party and the p u b l i c (kung): there could e x i s t no contradiction between true knowledge and the p u b l i c interest.  Truth, the Party, ideology, and the p u b l i c interest, then, were  j o i n e d i n a h o l i s t i c u n i t y which admitted no c h a l l e n g e .  3 9  While party  d i s c i p l i n e kept the i d e o l o g y above d i s c u s s i o n among members, the same c o n s t r a i n t s were g e n e r a l l y e f f e c t i v e o u t s i d e of the P a r t y as w e l l .  To  c r i t i c i z e Sunist ideology too sharply or d i r e c t l y was to r i s k l e s e majeste* and to speak heresy. New  Confucianists  s p i r i t u a l l y and l e g a l l y .  could  look  at  c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n two  ways:  S p i r i t u a l l y , democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n s could  embody the essence of Confucian values;  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e w o u l d be . . . t r u e t o t h e s p i r i t o f jen. [Confucians viewed] d e m o c r a c y as t h e most e f f e c t i v e a n t i d o t e t o t h e bane o f C h i n e s e political tradition—despotism . . . which they see as nothing l e s s than the c r u d e s t form of human egoism (ssu). As such i t goes a g a i n s t the s p i r i t of p u b l i c - m i n d e d n e s s (kung). which i s e s s e n t i a l to achieving moral s o l i d a r i t y . Democracy, c o n c e i v e d as an i n s t i t u t i o n which takes p o l i t i c a l power out o f p e r s o n a l hands and puts i t under p u b l i c c o n t r o l , i s seen as the utmost f u l f i l l m e n t of the s p i r i t  82 of public-mindedness . . . democracy as an i n s t i t u t i o n a l device to ensure p o l i t i c a l equality i s in keeping with the Confucian b e l i e f t h a t every individual has the potential to become a sage and hence should be respected as a morally autonomous being entitled to equal status with anyone else.40 Legally, the state was  given form through a constitution. A modern  c o n s t i t u t i o n and i t s supporting body of philosophical j u s t i f i c a t i o n provided the textual bedrock on which the state rested.  I t afforded a  moral and l e g a l authority of l a s t appeal; l i k e the C l a s s i c s and t h e i r commentaries, a constitution could provide a refuge from, and a brake on the capricious use of power.  A democratic constitution could provide the  locus and the cement to unite government and the scholar-bureaucratic c l a s s cast a d r i f t by the Ch'ing Dynasty t h i r t y - f i v e years before.  Once  again p o s i t i o n , status, and authority would f a l l to those of s p e c i a l a b i l i t y and education.  Fairbank suggests that by thus "revitalizing their  p o l i t i c a l community, [Chinese could bring] i t closer to the perennial ideal of 'public-mindedness'."  41  The state was p r i m a r i l y a s p i r i t u a l e n t i t y  i n Chang's view. I t i s  defined by a sense of nationalism that has a strong r a c i a l or ethnic component; people of the same blood, language, customs and history formed a basic unit that shared a common self-consciousness. consciousness  42  This common s e l f -  (nationalism) becomes the most powerful human concept in  bonding people together. "man's sentiment,  43  reason,  The state, then, becomes the expression of and w i l l .  I t i s i n the state that true  sentiment finds i t s expression i n love of country, reason i n creative thought and c u l t u r a l achievements, and good w i l l i n intentions towards others." state.  44  A constitution, therefore, should express the values of the  I t acts as both a statement of ideals as w e l l as a vehicle, a  83  means, f o r t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t .  In Chang's view, a c o n s t i t u t i o n need not  s p e c i f i c a l l y define a system of government; " p u b l i c foundation."  i t was  first  and foremost a  As l o n g as a c o n s t i t u t i o n embodied the s p i r i t of  d e m o c r a t i c government, s m a l l  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  necessitated by compromise were r e l a t i v e l y unimportant i n the The  essence of a c o n s t i t u t i o n , f o r Chang, was  short-run.  i n i t s f u n c t i o n as  framework, a set of rules, w i t h i n which disputes could be solved and f i n a l form of the  a the  state evolve.  Chang had said that to reform Chinese p o l i t i c s , one had to begin with people's attitudes; attitudes were more basic than systems. democratic system without reforming people's s t a t e the e q u a t i o n b a c k w a r d s . education  and  practice.  45  attitudes was,  To create a f o r Chang, to  A t t i t u d e s c o u l d be reformed through  Indeed, the basic moral truths of Confucianism  c o u l d o n l y be grasped through p r a c t i c e . * * 4  A democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n  provided the basic rules and the "classroom" f o r the practice.  Writing i n  Hsin Ln, Chang s a i d that "[the people] must l e a r n to swim, [they] jump i n t o the water . . . " nation was  47  should  P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e o f the  an expression of men's equality; p a r t i c i p a t i o n could make  men  r e a l i z e what t h e i r rights were, and d i s p e l the t r a d i t i o n a l attitudes of subservience  and s u b m i s s i o n t o d e s p o t i c power.  P r a c t i c i n g democracy  brought C h i n a c l o s e r t o t r u e democracy w h i l e changing a t t i t u d e s customs among Chinese—two inseparable g o a l s . are reformed the i n d i v i d u a l , incrementally, what we might c a l l here, b a s i c t r u t h s .  48  Naturally,  and  as attitudes  adds to h i s understanding of  In t h i s sense,  the p r a c t i c e o f  democracy, which gradually reforms attitudes and reveals truths, becomes a form of enlightenment; a process which becomes self-perpetuating and ever-expanding e f f e c t s — a kind of moral r i p p l e - e f f e c t .  has  84 A people's attitudes and customs, so Chang believed, determined the k i n d o f governmental o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t developed.  I f a new form o f  government were t o be introduced, there would need t o be a commensurate change i n a t t i t u d e s .  Chang's Mencian approach t o p o l i t i c s gave him  confidence that laws could be used t o mold men's minds, give r i s e t o new customs,  and encourage t h e emergence  o f men's b a s i c  good  nature.  Although Chang would not l i k e the comparison, h i s embryonic democracy i s , l i k e Chiang Kai-shek's second-stage o f government, a k i n d o f t u t e l a g e leading t o true democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government.  49  The r e a l i z a t i o n  of democratic government needed a l e g a l framework, but Chang saw the real stumbling blocks t o be i n men's imaginations.  50  Did men share a v i s i o n of  what d e m o c r a t i c government i n China s h o u l d be and a w i l l i n g n e s s t o s e t a s i d e t h e i r s e l f i s h concerns?  I f they d i d ,  then t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f  democratic government i n China was, as Chang supposed, only a question of time. Although idealism played a major role i n Chang Chun-mai's thought and i n h i s approach t o constitutionalism, i t d i d not b l i n d him completely t o the r e a l i t i e s of p o l i t i c s .  I t would c e r t a i n l y have been preferable i f a l l  a c t o r s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l arena r e s p e c t e d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n and a c t e d i n a s p i r i t of good w i l l towards others.  But, since t h i s was not the case, the  p o l i t i c a l system needed to incorporate a " l e v e l l i n g " mechanism;  a means  which balanced the power and influence o f the actors and fostered a s p i r i t of c o n c i l i a t i o n and compromise. of  where  the real  locus  The struggle b o i l e d down t o the question  o f power  l a y ; was i t i n t h e hands o f an  i n d i v i d u a l , i n some r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body, o r i n an i n t e r p l a y o f t h e two? For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, the c o n s t i t u t i o n became a t o o l i n the struggle for  power.  51  That government had c e r t a i n l e g i t i m a t e and necessary functions, Chang  85  did  not deny.  The form of government, though, was important.  Kai-shek's p o i n t o f view, government s h o u l d be that  maximized t h e powers  minimizing  From Chiang  o r g a n i z e d along  lines  and p r e r o g a t i v e s o f t h e "leader," w h i l e  the p a r t i c i p a t i o n and interference of a l l others. Chang Chun-  mai, meanwhile, wanted a system that granted the executive department i t s share of power, while d i s t r i b u t i n g a counter-balancing share of power t o other arms o f government and the people. making a  despotism  i m p o s s i b l e , and, a t t h e same t i m e , promote t h e  p r o c e s s o f c o o p e r a t i o n , give-and-take public-mindedness.  T h i s would have the e f f e c t o f  compromise, and the s p i r i t o f  A democratic form of government was also a means of  a v o i d i n g o r s t o p p i n g armed c o n f l i c t . evolutionary change was  Chang's d i s p o s i t i o n f o r p e a c e f u l ,  rooted i n h i s abhorrence of chaos. Revolution and  war were inherently without order and reason. i n the orderly flow of nature.  They symbolized a breakdown  Their courses could neither be c o n t r o l l e d  nor predicted. To a person such as Chang, who had an ordered explanation for  the universe, there was l i t t l e place f o r war and revolution.  one o f t h e  f l a w s Chang saw i n d i c t a t o r s h i p s ; they c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s  conducive t o c i v i l w a r . dissent  This was  52  and the p e a c e f u l  By s u p p r e s s i n g avenues f o r the e x p r e s s i o n o f resolution  of conflict,  Chang  reasoned,  dictatorships a c t u a l l y push t h e i r opponents t o the use of force. It  i s i n t e r e s t i n g that two men l i k e Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Chiin-  mai, both heavily influenced and r e s p e c t f u l o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l would come t o such loggerheads.  The d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e i r  culture, positions  r e p r e s e n t s a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e s r a t h e r than their feelings. would.  Chiang was a c t i n g and r e a c t i n g as a C o n f u c i a n  ruler  Chang Chun-mai, on the other hand, was basing h i s actions on the  presumed i n t e r e s t s o f a c l a s s o f e l i t e s t h a t e a r l i e r would have been  86 labled gentry-administrative-literati. Chiang Kai-shek had himself named Tsung-ts'ai or Leader, a p o s i t i o n o n l y j u s t below t h a t o f t h e canonized Sun Yat-sen.  A typical  Confucian  r u l e r , Fairbank t e l l s us, tends t o r u l e f o r l i f e .  He was an a u t o c r a t ;  w i t h i n h i s sphere he e x e r c i s e d a r b i t r a r y power even though he had t o sanction i t by the use of the c l a s s i c a l ideology.  The maintenance of h i s  power r e s t e d on h i s maintenance o f h i s i d e o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y i n t h e established system of p o l i t i c a l thought.  The Confucian ruler also brought  men t o accept h i s r u l e by h i s virtuous conduct and moral influence. such a r u l e r ' s p r e s t i g e was so c r i t i c a l distracted rebellion.  53  from  t o h i s power, a n y t h i n g  i t — s u c h as c r i t i c i s m — w a s  Since which  as s e r i o u s as o u t r i g h t  Confined by such an outlook, the Confucian ruler could never  submit h i s d e c i s i o n s t o review o r v e t o by others,  "he had t o take h i s  p o s i t i o n and stand upon i t as a s u p e r i o r l e a d e r , not as a 'servant o f t h e people.'  He was  t h e One  Man  at the top, c a r r y i n g the burden or  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and decision, and could not delegate i t without his  t i t l e t o power." As  Fairbank  forfeiting  54  pointed  out, and S t a n l e y  Karnow  detailed,  such  p e r c e p t i o n s were not c o n f i n e d t o t h e occupant o f t h e Dragon Throne, but extended w e l l beyond China.  This "mandarin mentality" made even the idea  of minority resistance reprehensible t o the r u l e r .  5 5  REVISION OF THE 5-5 DRAFT CONSTITUTION As t h e PPC took up t h e task of r e v i s i n g t h e 5-5 D r a f t w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s set by Chiang Kai-shek, c e r t a i n problems became apparent:  first,  the issue of g i v i n g formal l e g a l status i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n t o the phrase "The Republic of China i s a San Min C M I Republic,"  secondly,  the issue  87 of people's r i g h t s and t h e i r protection, of authority the  and  power which  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan, and  important, but thinking,  and  and  t h i r d l y , resolving the  b a s i c a l l y involved  issue  the National /Assembly,  the E x e c u t i v e . Other i s s u e s were c e r t a i n l y  these most d i r e c t l y y i e l d insights  into Chang Chun-mai's  i l l u s t r a t e the problems inherent i n t r y i n g to formalize  p o l i t i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c a l system such as h i s . A r t i c l e One of the 5-5 stated that "The  Republic of China i s a fjan. Min Chu 1 Republic."  t h i s simple statement the 5-5 Draft made i t s obligatory bow and  formalized  the  direct  link  between  Draft Through  to Sun Yat-sen  revolution  and  the  constitution.  Further,  of the s t a t e .  When s e a r c h i n g f o r a c l e a r , c o n c i s e d e f i n i t i o n o f what a  "San  i t established  the  a  the general i d e o l o g i c a l framework  Min Chu X Republic" i s , however, i t became apparent that A r t i c l e  created  One  more problems than i t solved. San Min Chu-I had, a f t e r a l l , been  the i d e o l o g i c a l base of the N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y (KMT), not a u n i v e r s a l l y accepted manifesto. I f the p r i n c i p l e that China was  a "San  Min Chu-I Republic" were given  l e g a l s t a t u s o f the h i g h e s t s o r t , i t would put the o p p o s i t i o n more d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n . put those who likened  As China's o f f i c i a l c r e e d San Min Chu-I would  d i d not share a b e l i e f i n i t i n l e g a l jeopardy.  that  i n an even  s i t u a t i o n to  living  J u s t i f i c a t i o n for such fear had  in terror  ample precedence.  and  One  critic  watchfulness.  In February 1927,  5 6  for  example, some months before the s p l i t which ended the two-year cooperation between the KMT  and the CCP,  Chiang Kai-shek warned P a r t y members t h a t  "whosoever goes against the aims and methods indicated by not be a comrade but an enemy who  [Dr. Sun]  must not remain among us."  57  By the  will end  of the year the communists had been purged from the KMT,  l e a v i n g behind  them between 10,000 and 30,000 o f t h e i r dead comrades.  The  Government  stepped up i t s l e g a l e f f o r t s to suppress dissent as well; the Regulations  88  for Punishing Counter-revolutionaries were decreed  in 1929  and  the  Emergency Law Governing Treason and Sedition was promulgated in 1931.  The  latter "prescribed capital punishment or l i f e imprisonment for those  who  engaged in seditious propaganda by writings, pictures, or word of mouth, with the intent to subvert the Republic."  Further, i n 1931 habeas  58  corpus had been suspended in cases involving newspaper criticism of the government or of the Three People's Principles.  59  The government viewed  both kinds of criticism in the same light i t viewed subversion.  That the  Principles had been given semi-divine status was already a limiting factor on p o l i t i c a l debate. To give i t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  sanction as w e l l would  give to those holding police power a formidable weapon. Chiang Kai-shek showed that i t could be a convenient p o l i t i c a l cudgel to intimidate opponents by charging them with disrespect  disarm or  or even disloyalty*  Chiang, in fact, used the Principles as a justification for increasing his repression of opposition.*  50  One can imagine the delicacy and circumspection with which Chang Chun-mai approached t h i s problem. Unfortunately, at t h i s point i n the war,  the  opposition's leverage  was  still  limited,  and  Chang  was  unsuccessful in his attempt to have the open-ended article removed.  The  best he could do at t h i s time was  to record an addendum to A r t i c l e One.  Chang added his voice to that of  Tso Shun-sheng, a leader of the China  Youth Party, i n asking the highest organs of the Kuomintang, or Chiang, himself, to a f f i r m , before the promulgation  of the constitution, that  Article One would not affect the unity of p o l i t i c a l parties, their basic philosophies, or their existence under the law.**  1  of asking Chiang to weapon.  This was a polite  way  forswear the use of A r t i c l e One as a p o l i t i c a l  89 While the vocabulary of people's rights drew heavily on l i b e r a l Western tradition, i t was also easily adaptable to the traditional Chinese beliefs of conservatives l i k e Chang Chun-mai. That people's rights became an issue i n modern China i s not surprising.  Those Chinese l i k e Yen Fu,  Liang Shu-ming, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and Chang Chun-mai, who saw the strength and s p i r i t of Western nations i n their democratic governments, recognized that at their root these democratic governments a l l took people's rights as fundamental and i n v i o l a t e .  People's rights, therefore, became a  prerequisite to the building of a strong, modern nation-state. To incorporate the notion of people's rights and the people's sovereignty into t r a d i t i o n a l thought was not t e r r i b l y d i f f i c u l t .  The  notion that sovereignty should be held by a l l the people could be fitted within the traditional Mencian concept that the Mandate of Heaven could be withdrawn i f the emperor were g u i l t y of misrule. The people, acting as agents of heaven's w i l l , could overthrow an u n f i t emperor and thus withdraw his mandate.  While this concept of sovereignty may not satisfy  some Western jurists, i t does confer on the Chinese masses the ultimate moral authority for rebellion and revolt.  Likewise, statements affirming  basic human freedoms could be construed to express the Confucian attitude that since a l l men are capable of reaching sagehood, there exists a basic equality among men.  This basic equality was easy enough to express i n  principle, but far less palatable i n practice. Following the age-old Chinese maxim that "society i s governed by men and not by laws," students of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law i n early twentiethcentury China saw the iron-clad protection of human rights as an obstacle to s o c i a l progress. C r i t i c s of a r i g i d l y defined, d i f f i c u l t to amend constitutional statement of people's rights  argued that as the conditions  of l i f e i n China improved, society would reflect a commensurate change.  90  The constitution would then f a l l out of step with the state and needs of society; r e f l e c t i n g old conditions and past r e a l i t y , the c o n s t i t u t i o n would act as a brake on further progress. men  In other words, i t was up to  62  to continually reevaluate and adjust law  and meet exigencies of the moment.  to promote social progress  The constitution, i n t h e i r eyes,  should not inhibit the ability of men to govern. For the most part, later participants in the constitutional debate show a views on people's rights.  consistency in Chinese  With the exception of Lo Lung-chi, who  that the freedom of speech was  felt  an inalienable right of the people,  admitting no interference even by l a w ,  63  most PPC c o u n c i l l o r s , Chang  included, were unwilling to put people's rights completely beyond  control  or revision. If Chang Chiin-mai had  a clear idea of the demarcation between  governmental power and personal freedom, he did a distinctly poor job of conveying i t to his fellow c o u n c i l l o r s or i n defining i t within the draft constitution.  PPC  Chang seemed unable to form a concise statement of  the l i m i t s on human rights he had already conceded were necessary.  In  terms of Chang's approach to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law t h i s omission was  no  profound failure.  In Chang's view the constitution was  designed only to  act as a set of general rules of behavior and to provide a stage for p o l i t i c a l action.  In more specific terms, Chang was  rhetoric and his true beliefs.  Throughout Chang's p o l i t i c a l l i f e he  used the issue of people's rights as a focal point. the KMT  caught between his  In his criticisms of  he had c a l l e d on the Government to respect people's rights.  had demanded that the people have the freedom to speak, and write, publish, and to p a r t i c i p a t e i n government.  had  He and  Chang knew f u l l well that  should the government grant those freedoms to "the people", they would  91 e f f e c t i v e l y be enjoyed by a small minority, of which he was a part. Interestingly enough, on the issue of people's rights, where we  might  expect t o see the widest diversion of opinion between the "authoritarians" and t h e "democrats", we f i n d , i n s t e a d , remarkable agreement.  Where we  might expect t o see the g r e a t e s t r e v i s i o n of the 5-5 D r a f t , we instead, very l i t t l e change.  Here was a  see,  point on which Chang and Sun Fo,  f o r i n s t a n c e , c o u l d , i n p r i n c i p l e , w e l l agree.  Sun had p o i n t e d out t h a t  i n h i s view,  not absolute."*  agreed.  "people's r i g h t s a r e  He saw  relative,  Chang  a r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p e o p l e and  s t a t e , each needing the o t h e r f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e . were t o be i n f r i n g e d upon, the l i m i t s criterion:  54  the interests of the state.  the  I f the people's r i g h t s  c o u l d o n l y be  judged by  one  In other words, Chang concluded  that i n d i v i d u a l freedom and state power had to seek a balance.  65  As a student o f h i s t o r y , Chang had seen t h e t e r r o r i s m o f the F r e n c h and Russian r e v o l u t i o n s , and a s c r i b e d i t t o an excess of f r e e d o m . E x c e s s i v e freedom  66  c o u l d , l i k e r e v o l u t i o n i t s e l f , l e a d t o the k i n d o f  i n s t a b i l i t y and chaos t h a t Chang wanted so t o a v o i d . On the o t h e r hand, excessive r e s t r i c t i o n s of freedom, as seen i n Germany and Russia, hampered the people's s o c i a l development.  Chang's i d e a l s t a t e would e x p l o i t the  advantages of both d i c t a t o r s h i p and democracy.  The powers and freedoms of  government and the people, each i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e sphere, would be inviolate.  6 7  Finding t h i s balance between power and freedom forced Chang  to deal with the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y of an oppressive one-party government, while remaining true to h i s basic b e l i e f s . Chang, and other non-KMT PPC c o u n c i l l o r s were  not so much opposed t o  the power t o l i m i t people's r i g h t s , as they were t o the manner and degree t o which i t had  been used.  In t h e i r p r o t e s t s some had p o i n t e d out t h a t  Sun Yat-sen had based h i s P r i n c i p l e of People's Rights (Min-ch'uan chu-i)  92  on a Russian model.  In such a one-party state model, where the  r i g h t s y i e l d e d t o the s t a t e ' s r i g h t s , was critics rights?  asked, 6 8  f o r Sun  people's  i t not a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , the  t o e x a l t b o t h p a r t y government and people's  Others p o i n t e d out t h a t t o g i v e t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly or the  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan power t o l i m i t the people's rights was t o elevate c i v i l law above c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l a w . at the r u l i n g KMT  69  These kinds of c r i t i c i s m s were directed  and i t s c o n t r o l l e d government organs, rather than at the  p r i n c i p l e of l i m i t i n g people's rights. The 5-5 D r a f t had guaranteed the people the freedoms o f d o m i c i l e , movement, speech, p u b l i c a t i o n , correspondence, b e l i e f , assembly, association.  and  But a f t e r each guarantee was a q u a l i f y i n g clause which added  t h a t the aforementioned freedom c o u l d not be l i m i t e d "except by l a w . "  70  This of course made the i n i t i a l guarantee, dependent on future l e g i s l a t i o n or  executive decree,  essentially  f u n d a m e n t a l l y opposed  w o r t h l e s s . I f Chang  been  t o t h e q u a l i f y i n g c l a u s e he would s u r e l y have  registered h i s opposition i n an addendum. silent.  had  Conspicuously, however, he i s  Only i n a j o i n t report to the PPC by some members of the d r a f t i n g  committee does Chang put himself on record.  In the report Chang and h i s  cc—signers reveal t h e i r suspicion that the q u a l i f y i n g clause could become a l e g a l l i m i t a t i o n on the people's freedom,  and could open a "convenient"  door f o r the government.  Admitting that the people's rights n a t u r a l l y had  limitations,  the o t h e r s i g n e r s  Chang and  q u a l i f y i n g c l a u s e was  could  o n l y say  "inadequate protection of those  that  rights."  the  Nothing  further than t o suggest that l i m i t a t i o n s on people's rights should be i n the  c o n s t i t u t i o n was o f f e r e d .  the  guarantees and l i m i t a t i o n s concerning people's r i g h t s out of the hands  of  the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan.  71  The c o u n c i l l o r s wanted, at l e a s t , t o keep  93  The awareness of the p l i a b i l i t y o f the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan and o f i t s s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to government control was the PPC,  supported the c o u n c i l l o r s  1  Government Advancement Association, stated  i t s members' o p p o s i t i o n  rights.  The A s s o c i a t i o n  widespread.  maneuver.  Others, outside of  The Kwangsi Constitutional  i n an open l e t t e r to the Government,  t o the use of law  t o r e s t r i c t people's  f e l t t h a t t o use laws i n such a manner would  r e s u l t i n a divergence of law  and the constitution.  They would support no  r e s t r i c t i o n s on people's r i g h t s other than those passed by the N a t i o n a l Assembly as amendments to the  constitution.  72  while an o f f i c i a l source  c l a i m s t h a t the i n t e n t of the PPC c o u n c i l l o r s was  t o use the q u a l i f y i n g  clause to place the power of l i m i t i n g people's r i g h t s i n a representative body,  73  i t seems more l i k e l y t h a t , a t the t i m e and  councillors  opinions  constitution,  t h e i r aim  recorded was  "puppet" representative body.  as  an  i n the l i g h t of  attachment  to  their  the  draft  t o keep such power out of the hands of a Whenever a representative body was  formed  along l i n e s acceptable to the c o u n c i l l o r s and with adequate independence, they would probably have f e l t comfortable giving i t the power to l i m i t the people's r i g h t s . The  7 4  non-KMT PPC  c o u n c i l l o r s , Chang among them, found themselves on  the horns of a dilemma. dictatorship, i t stood.  Had  they not been i n o p p o s i t i o n  t o a one-party  they probably could have accepted the q u a l i f y i n g clause as  Since they were s t i l l the objects of l e g a l p o l i t i c a l  repression  based on the q u a l i f y i n g clause, they naturally sought r e l i e f from i t .  The  f a c t t h a t Chang c o u l d p r o f f e r no a l t e r n a t i v e i s a c t u a l l y a testament t o his integrity.  He r e g i s t e r e d h i s o b j e c t i o n s t o the o f f e n d i n g c l a u s e i n  p r i n c i p l e , but o f f e r e d n o t h i n g i n i t s p l a c e because i t would have been, f i r s t , d i s h o n e s t , and s e c o n d l y , i m p o s s i b l e .  To support a statement of  i n v i o l a t e people's rights would have v i o l a t e d Chang's own  beliefs in  the  94  necessary balance of power between the state and the people. p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n of the impossible; intuition.  To write a  scope of people's r i g h t s would have been  f o r d e f i n i t i o n of that nature f e l l  w i t h i n the  realm  of  Any attempt to define i n d e t a i l the l i m i t s of people's r i g h t s  would be doomed to f a i l u r e by the task's complexity  and the i n a b i l i t y of  language to express the i n t u i t i v e process. In t e r m s o f people's r i g h t s the e s s e n t i a l l y a holding action. h i g h ground and people's  PPC  draft constitution  was  Chang Chun-mai, f o r example, took the moral  i m p l i e d t h a t the Government was  r i g h t s i n a democratic s p i r i t .  not p r o t e c t i n g  the  At most t h i s t a c t i c could make  the Government, i n an e f f o r t to avoid further damage to the United Front, more cautious i n i t s use of the law as a weapon of p o l i t i c a l  repression.  I f the o p p o s i t i o n c o u l d a t l e a s t g a i n some ground here, w h i l e the r e a l issues of power were decided elsewhere, the r h e t o r i c was could conclude that had the opposition gained make-up of  not wasted.  a measure of power and  One the  the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan and N a t i o n a l Assembly changed, Chang  would have dropped the i s s u e o f the q u a l i f y i n g c l a u s e a l t o g e t h e r . opposition was  His  not against the curtailment of people's rights through law,  but rather against the capricious use of that power by government organs so e a s i l y manipulated by Chiang Kai-shek. In wartime China r h e t o r i c e x i s t e d i n p a r t i c u l a r abundance.  The  reasons, as noted e a r l i e r , had much t o do w i t h the o p e r a t i c manuevers between Chiang Kai-shek and h i s opponents.  Spurred by p o l i t i c a l  m i l i t a r y f a c t o r s , Chiang had allowed a degree of open dissent. between dissent and treason, however, was  The  and line  a f i n e and sometimes changing  one, r e q u i r i n g the o p p o s i t i o n t o remain c i r c u m s p e c t  and c a u t i o u s .  added requirement, that any Chinese c o n s t i t u t i o n be true to the  The  teachings  95 of Sun Yat-sen, forced KMT  and non-KMT p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  debate t o defend p o s i t i o n s which, a t t i m e s , hinged on l i t t l e more than semantic  interpretation.  The q u e s t i o n o f i n c l u d i n g i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n the statement t h a t China was a "San Min Chu-1  Republic" had touched a most s e n s i t i v e nerve.  Once Chang Chun-mai and others of the opposition r e a l i z e d they could make no r e a l i n r o a d i n t o the statements' s a n c t i t y , they e s s e n t i a l l y conceded defeat and moved on t o aspects of KMT  ideology that could be more e a s i l y  undermined. I f Chang indeed wanted to produce a c o n s t i t u t i o n that would provide a framework and guidelines f o r peaceful, orderly p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , he had to go beyond philosophical platitudes.  He needed, i n some p r a c t i c a l  way,  t o c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would make p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y f a i r , and f r e e from capricious government interference.  To accomplish t h i s he needed t o  m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t the balance of power i n the constitution. The  legacy of  P r i n c i p l e s and  Sun  Yat-sen  as  expressed  h i s five-power c o n s t i t u t i o n , was  i n The  Three  People's  a serious impediment t o  those seeking t o i n s t i t u t e r e a l democratic government. Extravagant claims have been made showing that Sun's f i v e - p o w e r c o n s t i t u t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d a quantum leap i n less.  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l theory.  In r e a l i t y i t i s something much  Sun's i d e a o f a f i v e - p o w e r c o n s t i t u t i o n , s t r i p p e d o f i t s h i g h -  sounding d e m o c r a t i c v e r b i a g e , b a s i c a l l y party state owing much t o Russian influence.  c r e a t e s an authoritarian oneAt the core of Sun's theory  i s h i s answer t o the b a l a n c e o f power problem:  the s e p a r a t i o n o f power  and a b i l i t y (ch'uan-neng f e n - k ' a i ) . Sun had concluded  t h a t the g r e a t e s t  shortcoming of American s t y l e democracy was that the people, through t h e i r representatives, exercised only i n d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l power; there  was  no  r e a l check on t h e power o f the government. " P o l i t i c a l powers" (cheng-  96  ch'uan) should, i n Sun's view, be exercised d i r e c t l y by the people.  In  contrast, the government would be granted certain "governing powers" (chih-ch'uan) that would enable i t to e f f e c t i v e l y run the day-to-day operations of the state.  Vested i n the people would be the " p o l i t i c a l  powers" of election, r e c a l l , i n i t i a t i v e , and referendum.  Left to the  government were the "governing powers" included i n the executive, legislative, judicial, control, and examination departments. Somehow, Sun placed these "political powers" i n a representative body and blithely continued to c a l l them direct powers.  Sun's principle of the  separation of power and ability i s l i t t l e more than a circular argument intended to minimize, i f not remove, interference with government.  75  remainder of Sun's theory revolves around the unremarkable  The  melding of  Western and t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese institutions. The five-way division of power i s a composite of a western s t y l e executive, l e g i s l a t u r e , and j u d i c i a r y coupled with a Control Yuan, reminiscent of the Imperial Censorate, and an Examination Yuan to carry on the s p i r i t of a bureaucracy open to a l l through f a i r , open, and competitive examinations.  In terms of  the theoretical division of power, the National Assembly, the Executive, and the Legislative Yuan were the focal points. Chang Chun-mai considered Sun's five-power theory to be l i t t l e more than the heritage of absolute monarchy.  76  Under the 5-5  Draft the National Assembly, which held the four  "political powers," would meet but once every three years, and then only for one month. Add to t h i s the fact that the election machinery which produced national assemblymen was mostly i n the hands of the KMT, is  l e f t with l i t t l e  more than a "ghost" assembly.  and one  This would be  equivalent to a landlord making a quick c a l l once every three years to see  97 i f h i s house were s t i l l s t a n d i n g .  Could anyone s e r i o u s l y have expected  t h i s sort of assembly t o act as a responsible overseer of the government? Chinese l e g i s l a t u r e s o r p a r l i a m e n t s , u n l i k e those i n the American model, were not, i n the eyes o f KMT i d e o l o g u e s , regarded as b e i n g i n an adversary r e l a t i o n s h i p with the executive. years  earlier,  As explained by Hu Han-min ten  t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan was n e v e r d e s i g n e d  t o be a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body, nor was i t t o be opposed t o the e x e c u t i v e .  Hu saw  the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan from two perspectives; one p o l i t i c a l , and the other, party.  From the former the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan had a s t r i c t l y l e g i s l a t i v e  function;  i t acted  a s an arm o f g o v e r n m e n t t h r o u g h w h i c h  resolutions, and budgets flowed.  I t d i d not obstruct.  laws,  From the l a t t e r ,  i t acted according t o the w i l l of the party; any laws which were created in  o r passed  teachings  through t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan had t o be based on t h e  o f Sun Yat-sen and r e s o l u t i o n s o f t h e KMT.  organization o f the  Neither the  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan, nor laws passed by i t c o u l d  c o n t r a d i c t what Hu c a l l e d t h e " p r i n c i p l e o f p a r t y c o n t r o l . " To be more blunt, Hu stated that the w i l l of the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan and of the KMT were one.  77  The f a c t  t h a t members o f t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly and o f t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan had t o be confirmed by the Central Executive Committee of the KMT acted as a f i n a l guarantee of t h e i r responsiveness t o the party. As c h i e f executive, the president was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, could declare war, make peace, abrogate t r e a t i e s , declare m a r t i a l law,  review c r i m i n a l sentences,  c i v i l and m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . unimpeachable.  g r a n t pardons, and appoint and remove In p r a c t i c a l terms, t h e p r e s i d e n t was  He was, according t o the 5-5 Draft, responsible t o no one  but the National Assembly.  That was tantamount t o being responsible to no  one since the National Assembly was by i t s make up and function unable t o e f f e c t i v e l y exercise any power.  98 Given the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed on Chang and h i s f e l l o w members o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d r a f t i n g committee by Chiang Kai-shek, and the r e a l i t i e s of what the National Assembly and the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan were, the committee found a novel answer t o t h e i r problem. the presidency  Rather than t r y t o move power from  t o e i t h e r the National Assembly or the L e g i s l a t i v e Y u a n —  both t a c t i c s being  r e l a t i v e l y m e a n i n g l e s s — t h e committee c r e a t e d an  e n t i r e l y new body.  When Chang and Lo f i n i s h e d t h e i r d r a f t i n g work i n  Kunming and the d r a f t was presented t o t h e government, i t was met w i t h howls of protest.  The PPC d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n had  e f f e c t i v e l y turned the  r e l a t i o n s h i p between Chiang Kai-shek and t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly on i t s head. Quoting h e a v i l y from Sun Yat-sen and h i s " O u t l i n e f o r N a t i o n a l Reconstruction,"  from which t h e f i v e - p o w e r c o n s t i t u t i o n s p r i n g s , t h e  committee pointed out that the 5-5 Draft's greatest shortcoming was that i t allowed powers."  the people no means o f e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r d i r e c t Claiming,  with  tongue-in-cheek, t o r e c t i f y  "political  this  apparent  o v e r s i g h t and make t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n t r u l y r e f l e c t Sun's t e a c h i n g s , the committee created a Recess Committee of the National Assembly (Kuo-min t a h u i i-cheng h u i ) , which would meet when t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly was i n recess.  Not only would the Recess Committee exercise most of the normal  powers o f t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly, but i t would assume other p r e v i o u s l y r e s e r v e d t o t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan. e x p l a i n e d t h a t what some c o n s i d e r e d  powers  The committee's r e p o r t  "governing powers" were a c t u a l l y  " p o l i t i c a l powers" and t h e r e f o r e belonged t o t h e people.  Besides t h e  power t o declare m a r t i a l law, grant pardons, declare war, make peace, and conclude  treaties,  the Recess Committee could also hold referendums on  the budget and laws passed by the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan.  Possibly i n an e f f o r t  99 to lend support and put some backbone into the Control Yuan, the Recess Committee was empowered to accept impeachment b i l l s from that Yuan.  If  such b i l l s were directed against the president or vice-president and passed by two-thirds of the Recess Committee, the National Assembly would be c a l l e d to decide the issue.  If a l i k e number of committee members  passed an impeachment b i l l against the president  or vice-president of the  Executive, J u d i c i a l , L e g i s l a t i v e , or Examination Yuan, they would be forced to resign forthwith.  Not wanting to be wholly dependent on the  Control Yuan, the Recess committee could i t s e l f i n i t i a t e a vote of noconfidence against the above Yuan o f f i c i a l s . require the officials' immediate resignation.  A successful vote would 78  In a move directed more  o b v i o u s l y at Chiang Kai-shek, the PPC d r a f t e r s r e q u i r e d t h a t a presidential declaration of a state of emergency obtain the concur ranee of the Recess Committee. prerogatives.  This would have severely l i m i t e d p r e s i d e n t i a l  Tung Pi-wu, a communist c o u n c i l l o r , wanted to go even  further and proposed that the president's power to declare a state of emergency be rescinded altogether. Explaining their reasoning, the drafting committee pointed out that to expand the powers of the Legislative Yuan would be inconsistent with the teachings of Sun Yat-sen; to grant the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan " p o l i t i c a l powers" would violate the principle of the separation of powers.  As for  decreasing the number of delegates to the National Assembly or increasing the frequency of i t s meetings, again, Sun's teachings were c l e a r , and could not be tampered w i t h .  79  To protect the s p i r i t of t h e i r  new  constitution, the PPC drafters took the power to interpret i t out of the hands of the J u d i c i a l Yuan, and placed i t into the hands of a committee made up of members of the Recess Committee, the J u d i c i a l Yuan, and the Control Yuan. Further, i n an e f f o r t to chip away at the KMT-controlled  100  election process, the PPC drafters changed the basis for election to the National Assembly.  Instead of the previous complicated formula based on  population, they substituted one based on regional and professional d i v i s i o n s . Presumably, a regional electorate could d i l u t e the KMT's control of provincial election machinery. categories of representation device to insure that  The addition of professional  was, the drafters admitted  unabashedly, a  the outstanding, the wise and virtuous, and those  technically expert would have a chance of election. If the KMT could bend elections to t h e i r ends, the PPC drafters, so i t seems, f e l t they could also.  8 0  While going out of t h e i r way to claim that the PPC d r a f t  constitution f u l l y comported with the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, the drafters were actually doing their best to undermine them. In substance the PPC draft c o n s t i t u t i o n was nothing revolutionary.  short of  After Sun Fo, who as president of the Legislative Yuan had  much t o l o s e under the PPC d r a f t , launched  h i s attack  on the  constitutional draft, Chiang Kai-shek himself addressed the PPC. In a short but firm speech, Chiang reminded the councillors that any acceptable constitution had to take into account the realities of China's present situation.  In measured words, Chiang reaffirmed the unalterable  fact that China was, and would continue to be, a "San Min Chu-I republic," and there could be nothing  which contradicted the s p i r i t  of Sun's  principles of the separation of power and a five-power government. Chiang rejected the PPC drafters* argument about the true d e f i n i t i o n of "political" and "governing" powers.  Addressing himself directly to Chang  Chun-mai and Tso Shun-sheng, Chiang drove home his point that there could be absolutely no addendums to San Min Chu-I.  81  The actions of the PPC, from Chiang's point of view, were c l e a r l y  101 aimed at undermining his e f f o r t s to cope with the t r i p l e threat of Japanese invasion, communist subversion, and p o l i t i c a l disunity within his own ranks.  The proposed creation of the Recess Committee not only  threatened Chiang's attempt to realize power as expressed i n law, but i t challenged Chiang's authority because the legitimate use of power would be subject to oversight by a representative Chiang simply could not accept; authority and power.  body.  This was something that  i t challenged his fundamental views on  His c l a s s i c a l  education  and h i s extremely  conservative interpretation of Confucianism, coupled with his m i l i t a r y background, l e f t Chiang with no understanding of the "art of using power in a democratic government."  82  The actions of the PPC drafters violated  the long-standing KMT p r i n c i p l e that "the excercise of executive power must not be limited by inflexible regulations."  83  Chiang had reiterated  this principle in his speech to the PPC, and Sun Fo supported him. To bring the PPC more into l i n e with his own thinking, Chiang increased  i t s membership from around two hundred to about two hundred and  forty.  Whereas the F i r s t C o u n c i l had only about seventy  8 4  KMT  representatives, Chiang persistently added KMT members so that by 1943 the percentage of non-KMT representation had decreased.  85  As a prominent  member of the opposition, Chang Chun-mai had been given a seat on the PPC's presidium.  His effrontery i n having  so much to do with a  constitutional draft so opposed to Chiang's interests earned him special treatment.  In addition to his other missteps Chang had also helped to  found the Federation of Chinese Democratic P a r t i e s , which Chiang Kai86  shek suspected of having communist leanings.  The incident mentioned  earlier that led to the closing of Chang's National Culture Institute i n the summer of 1942 could only have reinforced Chiang's opinion that Chang Chiin-mai had overstepped his bounds.  By the meeting of the Third Council  102  in late 1942 Chang had been removed from the Council's presidium,  and,  as  a further inducement to his rehabilitation, he and Lo Lung-chi, were kept in Chungking under surveillance and semi-restraint.  87  The relative freedom of the period 1937-1938 was coming to an abrupt end.  The r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y of the Japanese front and the  communist-KMT frictions  increased  worked to draw the government's attention inward.  The PPC draft constitution was quietly referred to a government committee for review and, as Chiang planned, burial.  O f f i c i a l l y , the constitutional  issue was a dead l e t t e r from 1940 to 1943.  In November 1943 a new group  was established within the PPC  The loopholes which had allowed the f i r s t  drafting committee to embarrass the government were closed.  This  new  group, the Association to Assist in the Inauguration of Constitutionalism, included government leaders, as well as councillors, and Chiang Kai-shek served as i t s p r e s i d e n t .  88  The Association  reviewed the 5-5 Draft and  the earlier PPC draft constitution. In i t s report to the PPC in 1946  the  Association generally repudiated the work of the e a r l i e r drafters and presented Chiang with what he had wanted in the f i r s t place, untouched, cosmetically altered 5-5 Draft. As far as  a relatively  89  the constitutional issue was concerned, Chang Chun-mai was  relatively quiescent between 1942 and 1946. democratic reform was  impossible  He more or less conceded that  through the PPC.  His e f f o r t s at  constitution drafting had been l i t t l e more than an exercise in f u t i l i t y . Chiang Kai-shek had l e t him  go through the motions, but nothing  significance had been allowed to be implemented. house arrest, which may  have lasted into 1944,  activities to the China Democratic League. The  of  Following his period of Chang redirected his  League, which sprang from  a reorganization of the Federation of Democratic Parties in 1944, tried to  103 place i t s e l f between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). acting as a medium through  By  which the KMT and the CCP could negotiate, the  League hoped to moderate their respective positions and gain influence for i t s e l f . In any event, i n November 1944 Chang made one of those abrupt changes i n focus such as had occurred earlier i n his l i f e .  Abandoning the  leadership of the National Socialist Party, his League activities, and his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the PPC, Chang l e f t China to lecture i n India. After a series of lectures at Indian u n i v e r s i t i e s , Chang continued on to the United States where he took up his writing at Columbia University.  In  terms of direct personal participation, Chang had simply turned his back on Chinese politics. It would require  the combined forces of a worsening  domestic  situation i n China and the deteriorating relationship between China and the United States to give Chang once again the leverage he needed to participate i n a revived constitutional process. A SECOND ASSAULT ON THE TSUNG TS'AI The relationship and f r i c t i o n s between Chiang Kai-shek and the American government have been well documented elsewhere.  Suffice to say  that the strains and contradictions of the relationship were cause for a major rethinking of China p o l i c y i n Washington by 1947. following  the end of World War  Immediately  I I , the United States increased i t s  pressure on the Chinese government to seek an end to armed h o s t i l i t i e s with the Chinese Communists.  In a p o l i c y statement issued i n December  1945 President Truman declared that  the United States held  i t essential  that "a national conference of representatives of major p o l i t i c a l elements be arranged to develop an early s o l u t i o n " declaration went on  90  to China's problems.  The  to encourage the Government of China to broaden i t s  104 base by bringing i n other p o l i t i c a l elements. The reoccupation of Manchuria by Nationalist troops and increasing clashes with Communist forces created greater demands f o r American financial and material aid. In a major effort to find  a solution to the  China problem and disengage American troops, Truman dispatched General George Marshall to China. Besides Marshall's prestige as the President's personal envoy, his p o s i t i o n was further buttressed by his power to withhold American aid to Chiang.  Marshall's mission was to end the  KMT-  CCP fighting and build some form of coalition government i n China. E a r l i e r , seeing that the PPC was of l i t t l e further significance, Chinese, such as those i n the China Democratic League, had called on the Government to organize a new conference that would bring together the KMT, the CCP, and representatives of a l l other p o l i t i c a l elements. conference was  Such a  agreed t o , i n p r i n c i p l e , at h i g h - l e v e l KMT-CCP  negotiations, but Chiang had been reluctant to see i t through. the Marshall mission was announced, along  Not until  with the e x p l i c i t American  policy of mediation, did Chiang begin arrangements for the conference. The new  91  conference, dubbed the People's Consultative Conference  (PCC), was composed of t h i r t y - e i g h t delegates, twenty-two of whom were former PPC councillors.  92  When the conference opened on  Chang Chiin-mai was i n England.  January 11, 1946  By the time Chang received his invitation  and could return to China, the conference had already been i n session a week. Nonetheless, Chang lost not a moment, and immediately opted for a seat on the Constitutional Investigating Committee. The committee was made up of Sun Fo, Wang Ch'ung-hui, John C.H. Wu, Wang Shih-chieh representing the KMT;  Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, and  Chou En-lai and Ching Pang-hsien  joined f o r the CCP; Tseng Ch'i and Chen Chi-t'ien attended f o r the China Youth  Party;  and Chang Chiin-mai, Lo Lung-chi,  and Chang Po-chun  105  represented the Democratic League. the  work  of  the  Association  yj  These twelve men were to carry on to  Assist  the  Inauguration  of  Constitutionalism which had died a natural death with the PPC. World War II did much to reinforce Chang's support for the principle of democratic government. Japan's  success and  Four decades e a r l i e r Chang had attributed  i t s v i c t o r y over Russia to i t s adoption of a  democratic constitution.  The victory of the democratic a l l i e s over Japan  and Germany, whose democracies had both been subverted and corrupted, proved to Chang the innate strength of democratic government.  While  dictatorships could, i n the short run, do some things more e f f i c i e n t l y than democratic states, they could not, i n Chang's opinion, f u l l y muster the s p i r i t u a l and creative forces of t h e i r people.  The v i c t o r y of the  A l l i e s had, i n Chang's mind, resolved the debate over which system, democracy or dictatorship, was superior. The defeat of fascism proved to Chang that the dominant trend i n the world was  towards democracy.  Bringing democracy to China, therefore, was an important part i n the e f f o r t to modernize China and bring i t into the mainstream of world 94 progress.  H  While Chang's thinking on certain specifics of democratic government changed over the years, he never wavered i n his belief that a democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n could help to bring together the best of East and West. Chang never rejected the fundamental virtues of Chinese culture; rather, he sought their preservation and expansion through democratic government. To westernize China was never Chang's aim.  Quite the contrary; by  u t i l i z i n g democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government Chinese could give free expression to their own unique c u l t u r a l heritage.  On a more p r a c t i c a l ,  immediate side, Chang continued to press f o r l i m i t a t i o n s on executive  106 prerogative,  respect  for the rule of law,  and  an expanded role i n  government for non-KMT elements. As he approached the constitution Chang was  aware that i f any  constitution were to have a real chance of success in China, i t needed the support of the two strongest military camps, the KMT any constitution that sought legitimacy as a  and the CCP.  Also,  democratic document needed  the support of the so-called third-force elements: the small parties, the China Democratic League, and other non-KMT, non-CCP elements.  While no  single party or f a c t i o n had the power to force a constitution on China, each did have the power participation.  to seriously undermine a constitution by  non-  The problem, then, was to create a constitution that  the minimum demands of a l l three groups and  met  yet, s t i l l embodied a  coherent form of government that moved China closer to democracy. As a starting point, Chang established three basic criteria:  first,  to reach a compromise between Sun's five-power constitution and European and American style democratic government; secondly, to reach a compromise between the good and the bad aspects of the KMT  and the CCP; and, thirdly,  to incorporate, as much as possible, the proposals of the other parties. This was both a r e a l i s t i c and an honest  approach to the problem.  95  The  question was whether Chang could make these compromises and yet retain the s p i r i t and substance of both Chinese tradition and democratic government? As the drafting committee set to work Chang sought to give i t some o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n by o f f e r i n g his fellow committeemen a twelve-point outline of "Principles for Revising the Constitutional Draft." important points of Chang's outline system  were:  96  Among the  1) before the realization of a  of general presidential election, the president would be elected  by an e l e c t i o n organ made up of prefectural, p r o v i n c i a l , and central government level assemblies, 2)  the president would be recalled by  the  107  same method as his election, 3) the exercise of the powers of initiative and  referendum would be determined by law, 4) the members of the  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan would be elected  by the people d i r e c t l y , and i t s  authority would be similar to that of assemblies in democratic countries, 5) the members of the Control Yuan would be elected by the p r o v i n c i a l assemblies and by assemblies i n the autonomous regions, 6) the president of the Executive Yuan would be responsible to the Legislative Yuan, 7) the freedom and rights enjoyed by the people would be guaranteed by the constitution and not infringed upon i l l e g a l l y , 8) the power to the  constitution  revise  would be i n a j o i n t conference composed of the  L e g i s l a t i v e and Control Yuans.  Any r e v i s i o n passed by  this joint  conference would be referred to the body that elected the president.  97  These p r i n c i p l e s were accepted by the committee as a basis for i t s r e v i s i o n of the 5-5 Draft.  This was important, for even though these  principles had no legal force, and, in many instances, were f a i r l y vague, they s t i l l proposals.  provided some authority  on which Chang could base h i s  Taken together, the principles which Chang forwarded provided  a base from which to a l t e r the s p i r i t and intent of not only the 5-5 Draft, but also Sun's five-power constitution. Whether following  Chang's p r i n c i p l e s or not,  presenting proposals and draft interest.  each member began  a r t i c l e s i n which he had a special  Unfortunately, t h i s approach to drafting a constitution  s a c r i f i c e d continuity  and cohesion.  While each part might have i t s  virtues, brought together they were an i l l - f i t t i n g mosaic.  Sensing this  confusion, Chang took i t upon himself to write a complete draft.  Chang  f e l t that i n approaching a constitution one needed a "range of vision." By t h i s he meant an o v e r a l l view of the document as a complete system.  108 With no apparent display of condescension, Chang f e l t that he, alone, had such a "range of v i s i o n . "  9 8  Knowing that there was  l i t t l e point i n  pursuing the none too subtle stratagem of shifting power to some newlycreated body, such as had been t r i e d i n the PPC's d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n , Chang set about readjusting power within the given parameters. Unable to really make much of the National Assembly, Chang's strategy was similar to that of the PPC's draft constitution, i f only more subtle; to minimize the National Assembly's power elsewhere.  r o l e i n government and s h i f t i t s  Chang attacked the National Assembly from two angles:  its inability to either act as a check on executive power, or to exercise the people's four " p o l i t i c a l powers."  Since the p r o s c r i p t i o n that the  National Assembly could meet but once every three years seemed cast i n iron, Chang continued to ask i f such a body could r e a l l y be expected to competently discuss national a f f a i r s ,  or, i n any way oversee the  government." Under these conditions, Chang asked, would the president really be responsible to such a body?  100  To lessen the p o s s i b i l i t y of bribery or intimidation, Chang urged that the power to elect the president be taken from the National Assembly and returned to the p e o p l e .  101  Going a step further, he wanted the  National Assembly to abandon i t s powers of i n i t i a t i v e , r e c a l l , and referendum.  In other words, to abandon a l l pretense of exercising "direct  p o l i t i c a l power."  102  In a move familiar to corporate boardrooms, Chang  sweetened this p i l l by elevating the National Assembly's status, that i s to say "kicking i t upstairs" where i t could oversee and advise the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan, but exercise l i t t l e real power.  103  Saying what Chang  would not, Yeh Ch'ing, an alternate member of the KMT's CEC and a zealous supporter of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, observed that these changes in the National Assembly "were equal to i t s a b o l i t i o n . "  104  109  In h i s argument f o r removing " d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l powers" from the National Assembly, Chang t r i e d t o show that t h e i r was n o t i n tune w i t h obvious,  exercise by that body  the t e a c h i n g s o f Sun Yat-sen.  By p o i n t i n g out t h e  t h a t the N a t i o n a l Assembly was s t i l l a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body,  Chang demonstrated t h a t the 5-5 D r a f t was t r y i n g i n d i r e c t powers.  Approaching obliquely, Chang characterized the  as "an i n d i r e c t method o f d i r e c t people's p o w e r . " not,  t o mix d i r e c t and  Chang c l a i m e d , what Sun had i n mind.  Now,  105  results  T h i s was c l e a r l y  having taken these  "direct p o l i t i c a l powers" from the National Assembly and returned them to "the people," Chang introduced another element. The p r i n c i p l e of d i r e c t people's power was best shown i n the example of Switzerland, which, Chang mentions, was the model f o r Sun's conception of  a d i r e c t democracy.  But, by comparing the a r e a , p o p u l a t i o n , and  history of China and Switzerland,  Chang concludes that, unfortunately, a  system o f d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l power was, a t the p r e s e n t , not s u i t e d t o China.  1 0 6  So, how  t o r e c o n c i l e t h e need f o r the people t o d i r e c t l y  e x e r c i s e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power, as mandated by Sun's theory, and t h e i r present i n a b i l i t y  t o do so?  Chang seems t o c r e a t e a dilemma, and then  f i n d a s o l u t i o n through compromise. The solution Chang proposes f o r h i s self-manufactured dilemma i s t o ostensibly l e t a large constituency  (the p r o v i n c i a l  and p r e f e c t u r a l  assemblies) d i r e c t l y e l e c t the members of the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan.  In t h i s  way "the people" e x e r c i s e a degree o f t h e i r p o l i t i c a l powers through e l e c t i o n , and the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan becomes a t r u l y representative body, t e m p o r a r i l y e x e r c i s i n g f o r the people t h e i r powers o f i n i t i a t i v e and referendum.  Reassuring us that t h i s i s not h i s ultimate objective, Chang  adds that once a complete census has been made, and the people's l e v e l of  110 knowledge has been raised, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l powers would be slowly given to them.  107  Whereas  the  PPC  draft  constitution  of  1940  had  bypassed  the  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan and c o n c e n t r a t e d r e a l power i n the Recess Committee, Chang's d r a f t refocused on the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan.  This change of tack  was  probably due t o the f a i l u r e of the e a r l i e r strategy and the adoption of a more cautious approach.  In f a c t , by manipulating the vocabulary of Sunist  philosophy and making numerous small changes, Chang could reach the same goals the 1940  d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n sought with a f a r l e s s "revolutionary"  approach. The keys t o making the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan a meaningful body were f i r s t , in  disposing  of t h e N a t i o n a l Assembly as a sump f o r p o l i t i c a l power,  s e c o n d l y , having the L e g i s l a t o r s e l e c t e d by p r o v i n c i a l and p r e f e c t u r a l assemblies, rather than by the National Assembly, and t h i r d l y , the  power o f the L e g i s l a t i v e  Yuan.  expanding  By g i v i n g the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan  independence and power, Chang hoped t o i n t e r j e c t a counterforce i n t o the Nanking government. Quick to comment, Yeh Ch'ing found these proposals an anathema.  He  d i d not c a r e f o r the n o t i o n t h a t the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan should have any s u p e r v i s o r y powers over government.  He f e a r e d t h a t such a body c o u l d  c o n t r o l the p r e s i d e n t and f a s t become a " l e g i s l a t i v e d i c t a t o r s h i p . "  1 0 8  F u r t h e r , Yeh Ch'ing was s k e p t i c a l t h a t l e g i s l a t o r s chosen by the people would be q u a l i f i e d .  L e g i s l a t o r s , a c c o r d i n g t o Yeh Ch'ing needed t o be  well-educated and were best chosen by the National Assembly.  109  P r e s i d e n t i a l powers as outlined i n the 5-5 Draft were seen by some as little  more than a c l o a k f o r a d i c t a t o r s h i p .  Therefore,  tempering  e x e c u t i v e power and i n t e r j e c t i n g c o u n t e r v a i l i n g elements of p o l i t i c a l power i n t o t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g apparatus were keys t o " d e m o c r a t i z i n g "  Ill  China's government. . The most worrisome aspect of executive power was that i t was simply unchecked.  No opposition leader took seriously the idea that the National  Assembly could control the executive. state of emergency was  The president's power to declare a  r e l a t i v e l y unlimited, and,  the head of the  Executive Yuan, as w e l l as i t s various department chiefs and committee chairman, were responsible only to the president.  110  Executive power was  e f f e c t i v e l y isolated from the other arms of government and immune to interference. In coming to grips with this problem Chang Chun-mai was again seeking a balance.  His goal was not to destroy executive power, nor was i t to  concentrate a l l power i n the Legislative Yuan.  Much like the framers of  the American constitution, Chang sought a balance of power, giving  to the  executive branch i t s just and necessary powers, while preserving the prerogatives and protecting the interests of other p o l i t i c a l elements.  In  China's case, Chang was seeking to find once again the balance which had existed at earlier times between court and bureaucracy. Chang's assault on executive hegemony focused on the Executive Yuan rather than on the p r e s i d e n t .  111  Whether one c a l l e d that body below the  president the Executive Yuan or the cabinet was irrelevant to Chang.  In  either case i t needed to perform c e r t a i n v i t a l functions i n r e l a t i o n to the president and the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan. The p r e s c r i p t i o n Chang offered for dealing with the balance of power within revealing:  a democratic state i s  i t illustrates how Chang f e l t about the scope of executive and  legislative power and the nature of their interaction. To begin with, Chang clearly meant the executive organs of government to function as their name implies:  to lead, to direct.  To the Executive  112 Yuan, i n p a r t i c u l a r , Chang gave the a u t h o r i t y t o s e t government p o l i c y . This was  s o l e l y the purview of the Executive Yuan and should not, as i n  the U n i t e d S t a t e s , be i n t e r f e r e d w i t h by the l e g i s l a t u r e .  F u r t h e r , the  various m i n i s t r y heads could, as cabinet members, introduce l e g i s l a t i o n , attend sessions of the l e g i s l a t u r e , and explain t h e i r legislators.  In t h i s way,  viewpoints to the  Chang f e l t , the e x e c u t i v e branch c o u l d most  appropriately influence the l e g i s l a t u r e .  1 1 2  To balance the exclusive power of the Executive Yuan t o set p o l i c y , Chang introduced elements  of the English cabinet system.  L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan the power t o pass on  a vote  By g i v i n g the  of c o n f i d e n c e  E x e c u t i v e Yuan, Chang added the element of " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . "  in  Chang's  f i r s t step was to require that p r e s i d e n t i a l d i r e c t i v e s be countersigned the head of the Executive Yuan and the cabinet member concerned.  the  by  Then, by  making the Executive Yuan c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y responsible t o the l e g i s l a t u r e , Chang e s t a b l i s h e d a check on the apparatus o f power.  executive  Unable to d i r e c t l y control the president, Chang t r i e d to do i t  113  by hobbling the apparatus through which he exercised power. Unlike the 1940 PPC d r a f t constitution, Chang was  able  t h i s time to  w r i t e a s e r i e s o f a r t i c l e s t h a t gave u n q u a l i f i e d p r o t e c t i o n t o people's rights.  The well-known q u a l i f y i n g c l a u s e o f p r e v i o u s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  drafts was  dropped c o m p l e t e l y .  that p o l i t i c a l  114  Chang further, and s p e c i f i c a l l y , added  p a r t i e s , as w e l l as r e l i g i o u s groups, races and classes,  were equal under the law.  As good as a l l t h i s sounded, however, even  Chang's d r a f t included the c a t c h - a l l phrase i n A r t i c l e Twenty-Three that gave the government l i c e n s e to r e s t r i c t people's r i g h t s i n order to avert an imminent c r i s i s , maintain s o c i a l order, or advance the general welfare. In e f f e c t , t h i s l e f t a statement that, on one hand, s a t i s f i e d Chang's need  f o r a concise statement of people's rights, and,  on the other hand,  113 l e f t an avenue f o r those most q u a l i f i e d t o l e a d , c o n t r o l and d i r e c t s o c i e t y t o add the nuances n e c e s s a r y t o r e c o n c i l e those r i g h t s w i t h t h e needs o f s o c i e t y . Legislative  Yuan,  Given the p l a n s Chang had f o r a g r e a t l y s t r e n g t h e n e d Article  Twenty-Three c o u l d l e s s  easily  be  used  a r b i t r a r i l y by the president or the Executive Yuan. As drafted by Chang, the PCC Revised Constitutional Draft completely overthrew t h e s p i r i t o f the 5-5  Draft.  e a r l i e r PPC draft, although more subtle.  In essence i t was much l i k e the As was t o be expected, the new  d r a f t met stubborn resistance and strong c r i t i c i s m . knew e x a c t l y what reveals where  Yeh Ch'ing, f o r one,  Chang was t r y i n g t o do, and h i s c r i t i c i s m  clearly  he f e l t the threat was greatest.  A f t e r e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s moral p o s i t i o n  by r e g u r g i t a t i n g the maxim  that the five-power c o n s t i t u t i o n could not be amended because i t was part of t h e " w i l l and t e a c h i n g s  o f the F a t h e r o f the C o u n t r y , "  f o c u s e d on the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan. Ch'ing,  was  to create exactly  representative government. and  1 1 5  What the PCC had done, charged Yeh what  Sun had w a n t e d t o a v o i d :  Such a government was simply wrong,  u n s u i t e d t o China's n e e d s .  Yeh Ch'ing  1 1 6  By c o n c e a l i n g  a  inferior,  a representative  government i n the five-power constitution, Yeh Ch'ing implied that the PCC was " d e a l i n g i n s i n c e r e l y Principles."  1 1 7  w i t h the KMT and c h e a t i n g the Three People's  Coming t o the nub of the question, Yeh Ch'ing concludes  t h a t " f o r t h e people t o have power i s good, but f o r t h e government t o be without a b i l i t y i s even worse." Going i n t o the PCC the KMT  118  had wanted the c o n s t i t u t i o n t o r e a f f i r m  the p r i n c i p l e that China was a San Min Chu-I Republic, and t o e s t a b l i s h a p r e s i d e n t i a l form of government within Sun's five-power c o n s t i t u t i o n . ^ 11  For  h i s p a r t , Chang wanted the e l i m i n a t i o n o f the phrase San Min Chu-I,  114 d i d not think the five-power c o n s t i t u t i o n was  p a r t i c u l a r l y workable,  and  wanted a system somewhere between a p r e s i d e n t i a l and a c a b i n e t form o f government. The r e s u l t was something between both positions. S e t t l i n g f o r a compromise, Chang was a b l e t o water down the phrase "China i s a San Min Chu-I Republic." p r e v a i l e d on the KMT  After prolonged negotiations Chang  representatives to accept  a revised A r t i c l e  which read, "The R e p u b l i c of China, founded on the b a s i s of the San  One Min  Chu-I. s h a l l be a democratic republic of the people, t o be governed by the people and f o r the p e o p l e . "  120  Although unable to dispense with the f i v e -  power c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , Chang was  a b l e , i n good measure, t o  circumvent i t s obstacles to democratic government. Although he had a d r a f t which t o a large measure s a t i s f i e d him, Chang was s t i l l a l o n g way from r e a l i z i n g  i t s implementation.  In March the  C e n t r a l Committee o f the KMT disavowed the C o n s u l t a t i v e Conference. tightening of KMT  A  p o l i c y could be seen i n p o l i c e raids against the China  Democratic League, a secret service attack against a meeting i n Chungking celebrating the Consultative Conference, and the destruction of Communist newspaper o f f i c e s .  1 2 1  When both the KMT  and the CCP began reneging on  previous commitments, Chang could f e e l h i s c a r e f u l l y c r a f t e d compromise coming a p a r t .  By A p r i l 1946  he had become so d i s i l l u s i o n e d t h a t  thought h i s d r a f t had become l i t t l e  more than " w a s t e p a p e r . "  122  he The  e a r l i e r rapport between the KMT and opposition elements was struck a heavy blow with the assassination i n J u l y of L i Kung-p'u, a member of the China Democratic League, and Wen I-to, the well-known l e f t - w i n g poet. Able to make no further progress with h i s d r a f t , Chang went outside the PCC  f o r support.  He t r a n s l a t e d h i s d r a f t i n t o E n g l i s h and went  d i r e c t l y t o the American Ambassador Leighton Stuart.  Taking h i s case t o  even higher l e v e l s , Chang also met with General Marshall.  While nothing  115  concrete came o f either attempt, we do know that at the end of h i s mission i n China M a r s h a l l b e l i e v e d t h a t the l i b e r a l members o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c oppostion p a r t i e s were the only a l t e r n a t i v e t o the dogmatism of either the KMT o r the CCP. The assassinations o f L i and Wen had a much stronger e f f e c t , though. President Truman used the murders as cause t o warn Chiang Kai-shek American opinion was s h i f t i n g against China.  that  Truman t o l d Chiang that " i t  cannot be expected t h a t American p u b l i c o p i n i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e  in its  generous attitude towards your nation unless convincing proof i s shortly forthcoming  t h a t genuine p r o g r e s s  s e t t l e m e n t o f China's  i s being  made toward a p e a c e f u l  i n t e r n a l problems." 3  j  12  n  August Dean Acheson  announced t h a t "no more war weapons, i n c l u d i n g ammunition, would go t o China u n t i l i t formed a c o a l i t i o n government."  124  This external pressure  was matched by a growing d i s a f f e c t i o n w i t h Chiang's government w i t h i n China. In the year f o l l o w i n g the Japanese surrender, the Nanking government had found i t s e l f woefully incapable of dealing with the problems of peace. The  Nanking government's r e t u r n t o areas p r e v i o u s l y o c c u p i e d by t h e  Japanese was marred by confusion and m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  Industrialists  and businessmen i n "free China" suffered when the government defaulted on wartime compensation.  Their counterparts i n the occupied zones suffered  from the tremendous depreciation o f puppet currency which they were forced to exchange a t unfavorable conversion rates. the economy prolonged and  The o v e r a l l mismanagement of  the rampant i n f l a t i o n o f the war years.  t e a c h e r s were o f f e n d e d  by t h e heavy-handedness w i t h  Students which t h e  government sought t o r e e s t a b l i s h i t s c o n t r o l of the educational system. At another extreme, thousands of Taiwanese were slaughtered by Nationalist  116 troops i n early 1947 for pressing their demands for representation i n government.  That year a l s o saw  demonstrations. disaffection.  125  The  r e s u l t was  the Anti-Hunger A n t i - C i v i l the beginning  of popular  Chiang Kai-shek was trapped in a dilemma:  [he] could retain the residual support  War  urban  "the only way  [he] s t i l l enjoyed was by heeding  the demands for reform and/or by seeking a peaceful accommodation with the CCP."  126  He did neither.  Knowing the American policy and the KMT's need for American material support, the CCP did i t s best to destroy any hope of coalition government, while leaving the KMT  with the blame for i t s failure.  Chiang was forced  to look to the only other element that could soften the appearance of his one-party government and give the aura of a coalition: the non-CCP opposition.  he reached out to  I t i s not the intent here to t r y  bargaining between the KMT and the non-CCP opposition.  to trace the  I t i s enough to  say that concessions and promises by Chiang were sufficient to pull Chang Chun-mai with his Democratic Socialist Party and the China Youth Party out of the China Democratic League. Both parties agreed to participate in the upcoming National Assembly. of a c o a l i t i o n participate. opinion  127  This gave Chiang's government the appearance  and l e f t the CCP, b a s i c a l l y , alone i n i t s refusal to  This strategy was not only playing to American and world  and had l i t t l e effect  on Chiang's ongoing military strategy,  but was also a continuation of his heretofore successful strategy of d i v i d i n g his opponents and o f f e r i n g concessions to maintain some e l i t e groups engaged in "controlled" opposition. Suddenly, i n l a t e 1946 Chiang Kai-shek decided to use Chang Chiinmai's d r a f t a f t e r a l l .  1 2 8  I t was i f i t had been "reborn."  129  Even with  minor revisions the draft constitution s t i l l embodied what Chang wanted. A year l a t e r ,  emerging from  the committee process of the National  117  Assembly  the substance of Chang's d r a f t was passed a f t e r three readings  as the Constitution whether  of the Republic of China.  or not t h i s was a victory.  Only time would t e l l Chang  118  CHAPTER THREE NOTES pp.  •'•See Wong, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the C o n f l i c t of Confucianism," 67-68; and Spence, The Gate of Heavenly Peace, p. 94. Eastman, The. Abortive Revolution, p. 178.  2  Jeh-hang Lai, "A Study of a Faltering Democrat: The Life of Sun Fo, 1891-1949" (Ph.D dissertation, university of I l l i n o i s , 1976), p. 186. 3  Bedeski  4  f  State-Building, p. 75.  Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics i n Kuomintang China: 1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 27. 5  1927-  Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p. 178.  6  Joseph Fewsmith, Party, State, and Local Elites i n Republican China: Merchant Organisations and P o l i t i c s i n Shanghai. 1890-1930(Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1985, p. 170. 7  8  Ibid.  p. 171.  Q  ^Ibid. p. 11; also see Lloyd Eastman, "The Kuomintang i n the 1930's," in Furth, The. Limits of Change, pp. 206-207. Eastman notes that the "patrimonial concept of p o l i t i c a l leadership" led to a concentration of power at the very top of the regime. The result was that not only were the masses and non-KMT elite excluded from a p o l i t i c a l role, but also the vast majority of KMT members were reduced to passive subservience. P a t r i c k Cavendish, "The New China' of the Kuomintang" i n Jack Gray, ed., Modern China's Search for. a P o l i t i c a l Form (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 161. 1 0  n  x  Ibid.  1 2  13  Ibid.  p. 179.  Bedeski, state-Building, p. 31.  1 4  Ibid.  p. 96.  Lawrence N. Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament': The People's P o l i t i c a l Council, 1938-1945," i n Paul K.T. Sih, ed., N a t i o n a l i s t China During the Sino-Japanese War. 1937-1945 (Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1977), p. 274. 15  L i Chai [Chang Chun-mai], "Pen-pao t'ung-jen tui-yia chi-nan shihchien fa-sheng hou shih-chu chih chu-chang," Hsin Ln ("The New Way") vol. 1, no. 5 (Apr. 1, 1928) :1. 1 6  119 L i Chai [Chang Chun-mai], "I-tang chuan-cheng yii wo kuo," Hsin Lu ("The New Way") v o l . 1, no. 2 (Feb. 15, 1928):28-31. 1 7  Ch'ien, The Government and Politics p i China/ p. 370.  18  "Democracy vs One-Party Rule," p. 98.  19  Ibid.  2 0  p. 99.  Hsi-sheng Ch'i, N a t i o n a l i s t China s i War: M i l i t a r y Defeats and. P o l i t i c a l Collapse. 1937-1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1982), pp. 42-43. 21  S h y u , "China's 'Wartime Parliament'," p. 276.  22  B e s i d e s the National S o c i a l i s t Party, the China Youth Party, the National Salvation Association, the Rural Reconstruction Association, the Third Party, the Vocational Educational Society, and the Chinese Communist Party were represented in the PPC 23  T u - l i ch'u-pan she, Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui (Chungking: ch'u-pan she, 1938), p. 5. 2 4  Tu-li  Linebarger, The. China P i Chiang Kai-shek, p. 72.  25  26  Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'," p. 306.  S e e Ch'ien, The Government and P o l i t i c s of China, p. 370; Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'," p. 298, p. 297; A. Shaheen, "The China Democratic League and Chinese P o l i t i c s , 1939-1947" (Ph.D d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of Michigan, 1977), p. 15; and, Lawrence N. Shyu, "The People's P o l i t i c a l Council and China's Wartime Problems, 1937-1945" (Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), p. 27. 2 7  no A noted constitutional authority himself, Wang was a member of the Kuomintang and had held high government posts. He also had the prestige and independence to c r i t i c i z e Chiang Kai-shek when he was so moved. 29  30  Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'," p. 300.  Eastman,  TJae  Abortive Revolution, p. 40.  L o Lung-chi, "Wo t u i Chung-kuo tu-ts'ai cheng-chih t i i-chien," Yiichou hsiin-k'an ("The Universe") v o l . 1, no. 3 (Jan. 5, 1935) :1. 3 1  32  Shen,  CTCKSLTK. 805:116.  3 3  Ibid.  805:89.  Ibid. 805:116. Also see Ying Wei-min, "K'ang-chan yu hsiencheng." i n Shanghai chou-pao ("The Guardian") v o l . 2, no, 11 (Aug. 24, 1940) :274. Ying asserted that the people's l e v e l of knowledge had made great progress since the war began. He implied that the war had accelerated the rate of progress made by the people towards a readiness for constitutional government. 3 4  120  Chang, TJae Third Force, p.  35  59.  36  Bedeski, State-Building, p.  159.  37  Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.  169.  I n t e r v i e w with Chang Tun-hua (Chang Chiin-mai's daughter) at Saratoga, California, Feb. 15, 1985. 38  39  Fewsmith, Party, State, and Local Elites, pp.  40  Chang, "New  41  F u r t h , "Intellectual change," p.  42  Confucianism," p.  90-98.  300. 345.  chang, K'ang-chan chung t i cheng-tang ho. p'ai-pieh.  Wen-hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hiu, KKJTFi'riCHT, p.  43  Tan, Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought, p.  44  p.  67.  198.  255.  Chang Chiin-mai, L i kuo. chih tan, i n Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng chiu-chih tan-ch'en chi-nien ts'e. 2 vols. (Taipei: Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang chung-yang tsung-pu, 1976), 2:274. 45  46  Chang, "New  Confucianism," p.  300.  Quoted i n Hou Sheng, "Chiin-mai hsien-sheng t i cheng-chih ssuhsiang" (shang), Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") v o l . 4, no. 18 (Aug. 25, 1953):24. 47  AO  *°Chang, L i kuo chih tao p. f  4 9  Ibid.  p.  91.  5 0  Ibid.  p.  94.  143.  CI  -^Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p.  141.  Chang, "I-tang chuan-cheng yu wo kuo," p. 29. John K. Fairbank, China Perceived: Images and Policies in ChineseAmerican Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 108. I b i d . p. 109. 52  53  5 4  Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: & History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), p. 224, p. 235, p. 265, p. 267. Ngo Dinh Diem also saw opposition c a l l s f o r reform as iese ma jested and had l i t t l e regard for elections. His wife, Madame Nhu, promoted a sanctimonious program to protect traditional virtues that was similar to Chiang's New Life Movement of the 1930's. 55  121 C h u C h ' i n g - l a i , "Suo-wei san-min-chu-i kung-ho kuo" i n Min-kuo hsien-fa wen-t'i (Shanghai: Min-chih hsieh-hui, 1933), pp. 42-43. 5 6  S t e r l i n g Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty (New York: Publishers, 1985), pp. 219-220. 5 7  Harder & Row,  L e s l i e Jean Francis, "The National Salvation Association: The Case of the Seven Worthies,"( Master's thesis, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1982), p. 49. 5 8  59  S h y u , The People's P o l i t i c a l Council, p. 158.  60  shaheen, The. China  Democratic League, PP« 63-64.  Kuo-min ts'an-cheng h u i s h i h - l i a o pien-tsuan wei-yuan hui, Kuo-min ts'an-cheng h u i s h i h - l i a o ( T a i p e i : Kuo-min ts'an-cheng h u i s h i h - l i a o pien-tsuan wei-yuan hui, 1962), p. 167. 61  B a u Ming-chien, Modern Democracy Commonwealth Press, Ltd., 1925), p. 338. 0iS  63  Tan,  64  Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:106.  65  C h a n g , L i kuo c h i h t a o . p. 98.  66  i n China (Shanqhai:  The  Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought, p. 232.  Wen-hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hui, KKJTPJL'HCHT, p. 211.  67  C h a n g , L i kuo c h i h t a o . p. 149.  C h u Ch'ing-lai, "Min-kuo hsien-fa yu kuo-min-tang mjn hsien-fa wen-t'i. pp. 52-53. 68  tang-i" i n Kuo-  fi Q P'an T a - k u e i , " H s i e n - f a shang ssu t a wen-t'i" i n Kuo-min h s i e n - f a wen-t'i. p. 94. w:7  China Yearbook. 1937-1943; A. Comprehensive survey QJL Major Developments i n China i n S i x Years o f War (Chungking: Ministry of I n f o r m a t i o n , 1943), p. 120. A copy o f t h e 5-5 D r a f t which appears i n Kuo Wei, ed., Chung-hua min-kuo h s i e n - f a s h i h - l i a o hsuan-chi ( T a i p e i : Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, date unknown), pp. 47-59, and the March 30, 1940 PPC d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n which appears in Hu Ch'un-hui, ed., Chung-kuo h s i e n - t a i s h i h s h i h - l i a o hsuan-chi (Taipei: Chung-cheng shu-chu, 1978), pp. 925-944 are used f o r comparison. 70  ' "Wu-wu h s i e n - t s ' a o h s i u - c h e n g l i - y u CTCKSLTK. 805:61.  pao-kao shu" i n Shen,  ' L a w r e n c e K. R o s i n g e r , "A C h i n e s e M a n i f e s t o on Democracy. T r a n s l a t e d w i t h Notes and I n t r o d u c t i o n " Amerasia. v o l . IV, no. 8 (Oct. 1940):372. 73  Kup-min  ts'an-cheng hui s h i h - l i a o . p, 176.  122 In t h i s r e g a r d C o u c i l l o r Hsu Ch'ien i s most s p e c i f i c : "People's rights are not absolute, but phrases such as " s h a l l not be l i m i t e d except by law' must not l o s e the s p i r i t o f the c o n s t i t u t i o n , and must not t r a n s f e r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power t o the law . . ." See Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:103. 7  Chang Yu-yii, "Lun kuo-min ta-hui i-cheng hui", Shanghai chou-pao ("The Guardian") v o l . 2, no. 4 (June 1, 1940) :97. 75  76  Chang, The. Third Force, p.  61  H u Han-min. " L i - f a yuan t i h s i n g - c h i h ho t i - w e i " i n Wu-ch'iian hsien-fa wen-hsien chi-yao (Taipei: Chung-kuo wu-ch'uan hsien-fa hsuehh u i , 1963), pp. 178-179. 7 7  "Wu-wu h s i e n - t s ' a o h s i u - c h e n g l i - y u CTCKSLTK. 805:62-63. 78  Ibid.  7 9  p.  pao-kao shu" i n Shen,  63.  "Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui hsien-cheng ch'i-cheng hui t'i-ch'u chunghua min-kuo hsien-fa ts'ao-an hsiu-cheng ts'ao-an shuo-ming shu," i n Hu, Chung-kuo h s i e n - t a i s h i h - l i a o hsuan-chi. pp. 945-946. 80  " L i n g - h s i u tui-yu hsien-cheng s h i h - s h i h c h i h c h i h - s h i h " i n Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:86-87. po Hou Sheng, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng t i cheng-chih ssu-hsiang" (shang), p. 20. 81  "Kuo-min cheng-fu ch'ou-pei hsien-cheng ching-kuo pao-kao," i n Hu, Chung-kUQ hsjen-tai shih s h i h - l i a o hsuan-chi. p. 1027. 83  OA  °*Dorthy Borg, "People's P o l i t i c a l Council" X, no. 8 (May 5, 1941) :95.  Far Eastern Survey v o l .  T.A. B i s s o n , "China's P a r t i n a C o a l i t i o n War" F a r E a s t e r n Survey, X I I , no. 14 ( J u l y 14, 1943), p. 140.  85  vol.  °°Liang Shu-ming, Huang Yen-p'ei, Tso Shun-sheng, and Chang Chun-mai were among the founders o f t h i s group. I t l a t e r became the China Democratic League and was, some say, manipulated by the Communists. S h a h e e n , The China Democratic League, pp. "Democracy vs. One-Party Rule," p. 112. 87  88  S h y u , "China's 'Wartime Parliament" , pp.  89  Kuo-min ts'an-cheng h u i s h i h - l i a o . pp.  1  77-78.  A l s o see  301-302.  518-520.  A r t h u r M. Schlesinger, Jr., General Editor, The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History o f United States Foreign P o l i c y . 1945-1973. Volume IV, The F a r E a s t by R u s s e l l B u h i t e (New York: C h e l s e a House P u b l i s h e r s , 1973), p. 119. 90  123 91  Ch*ien, The. Government and. Politics pJL China, p. 375.  92  Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'", p. 290.  Chang, The Third Force, p. 193. Sources are not i n agreement on the committee's composition; L a i , i n h i s "A Study of a F a l t e r i n g Democrat", pp. 225-226, l i s t s only seven committee members—3 KMT, 1 independent, 1 China Youth Party, 1 CCP, and Chang Chun-mai. 93  Chang Chiin-mai, "Nien-yu nien l a i shih-chieh cheng-ch'ao tang chung women t i li-ch'ang," in CKMCSHTCC, pp. 50-53. 94  wang, Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng ch'i-shih shou-ch'ing nien-chi lun-wen £hi, p. 34. 95  Chiang Yiin-t'ien, "Chang Chiin-mai hsien-sheng i-sheng ta-shih chi" in Chu, CCMCCTL. 1:23. 96  97  9  Wei, Chung-kuo ko_ tang ko_ p'ai hsien-k'uang. pp. 14-16.  8lbid.  QQ "Chang Chun-mai "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang hui-i kai wu-wu hsien-ts'ao t i yuan-tse," i n CKMCSHTCC. p. 26. C h a n g Chiin-mai, "Kuo-min t a - h u i ("Renaissance") vol. 126 (Aug. 17,1946) :5. 1 0 0  1 0 1  wen-t'i,"  Ts'ai-sheng  Ibid.  102 Ibid, p 6. 1 0 3  Ibid.  Y e h Ch'ing, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang h u i - i hsiu-kai hsien-ts'ao chih p'i-p'an," i n Hu, Chung-kUO hsien-tai shih s h i h - l i a o hsuan-chi. p. 1065. Yeh Ch'ing was the psuedonym for Jen Chou-hsuan. 1 0 4  105  Chang Chiin-mai, "Kou-min ta-hui wen-t'i", p. 3.  1 0 6  Ibid.  p. 2.  1 0 7  Ibid.  p. 6.  l Y e h Ch'ing, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang p'i-p'an," p. 1058. 0 8  1 0 9  Ibid.  h u i - i hsiu-kai hsien-ts'ao  124 T h i s was p r o b a b l y the case f o r two reasons: f i r s t , i t was not only i m p o l i t i c but also dangerous to bring one's attack too close to the person of Chiang Kai-shek, and, secondly, t h i s type of i n d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l maneuver was more consistent with Chang's temperament, s p e c i f i c a l l y , and with Chinese p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n , generally. l C h a n g Chlin-mai, "Mei tsung-t'ung c h i h - t u yu cheng-hsieh h s i u cheng hsien-ts'ao," Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") Vol. 115 (June 1, 1946):4. 1 2  i l C h a n g Chun-mai, " P o l i t i c a l S t r u c t u r e i n the Chinese D r a f t Constitution," The Annals o f the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and Social Sciences 243 (January, 1946) :72. 3  - ^ S u n g I-ch'ing, " C h i - n i e n Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng c h i u - s h i h ming-tan," i n Chu, CCMCCTL. 1:97-98. H ^ Y e h Ch'ing, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang h u i - i h s i u - k a i hsien-ts'ao p'i-p'an," p. 1067. 1 1 6  Ibid.  p.  1054.  1 1 7  Ibid.  p.  1066.  1 1 8  Ibid.  p.  1065.  11 q  .,  Chang Chun-mai, "Chung-kuo h s i n h s i e n - f a ch'i-ts'ao ching-kuo" Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") v o l . 12, no. 2 (Dec. 12, 1972) :25. First appeared i n Ts'ai-sheng [Shanghai], 1946. 1 2 0  Ibid.  Jean Chesneaux, F r a n c o i s e Le B a r b i e r , and Marie-Claire Bergere, China from t h e 1911 Revolution to Liberation. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 319. 1 99  Chang, "Chung-kuo hsin hsien-fa ch'i-ts'ao ching-kuo," p. B u h i t e , The. Fax East, pp. 121-122. J o h n Robinson B e a l , M a r s h a l l i n China (Garden C i t y , New Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 177-178.  26.  1 2 3  1 2 4  York:  1 9R  -"-"Suzanne Pepper, C i v i l Ear. 2J1 China: The. P o l i t i c a l Struggle. 19451949 (Berkelely: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1978), pp. 423-427. 1 2 6  Ibid.  p.  427.  1 2 7  Ibid.  p.  270.  1 98  -^Chang, The. Third Force, p. 200. I f there remained any doubts as to with whom the f i n a l decision regarding the c o n s t i t u t i o n l a y , they were r e s o l v e d when Wu Ting-chang, the S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l o f the P r e s i d e n t i a l O f f i c e , informed Chang Chun-mai that h i s d r a f t would be adopted. -'•'"Chang, "Chung-kuo hsin hsien-fa ch'i-ts'ao ching-kuo," p.  26.  125  CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION Chang Chiin-mai i s important i n t h a t h i s b e h a v i o r , h i s b i a s e s , h i s philosophical and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s a l l help t o further i l l u m i n a t e how certain  segment  of  a generation of  c h a l l e n g e s of t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y China.  Chinese  intellectuals  met  a  the  Because he was c o n s e r v a t i v e i n  nature and supportive of c e r t a i n aspects of t r a d i t i o n a l c i v i l i z a t i o n , i t i s a l l too easy t o lump Chang w i t h the " c o n s e r v a t i v e " f o r c e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the government of Chiang Kai-shek, " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " f o r c e s i n 1949.  which c o l l a p s e d b e f o r e the  T h i s would be m i s l e a d i n g i n terms of  understanding Chinese conservatism, and unfair to a man l i k e Chang who  saw  himself opposed t o much of what Chiang Kai-shek stood f o r . The study of Chinese conservatism, noted Benjamin Schwartz, been popular.  1  has not  Perhaps t h i s i s due, i n part, to i t s association with the  r u l e of Chiang Kai-shek.  Perhaps Chinese conservatism, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n  the R e p u b l i c a n e r a , has been seen as r e a c t i o n a r y , opposed t o change, or  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f r e p r e s s i v e elements.  social  Sadly, t h i s view i s  a l l too broad and overlooks other veins of conservative thought which have l i t t l e t o do with Chiang Kai-shek and do not share any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r his f a i l u r e s . That Chang Chun-mai and  conservatives l i k e  him  also f a i l e d i s  undeniable, but t h e i r f a i l u r e and that of Chiang are of d i f f e r e n t sorts. The f a c t of t h e i r f a i l u r e either t o construct a democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government, o r t o f i n d a p l a c e f o r themselves i n China's s o c i o p o l i t i c a l system l e a d s us t o a number o f q u e s t i o n s .  Was  the type of d e m o c r a t i c  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government which Chang promoted a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o Chiang  Kai-shek's  programs?  Were the methods Chang used  p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n or t o reach  h i s goals p r a c t i c a l ?  Was  to voice Chang's  126 f a i l u r e due t o h i s own mis judgments or l i m i t a t i o n s ,  or t o p o l i t i c a l  intrigue? Chang Chun-mai's u l t i m a t e g o a l was n e i t h e r t o r e c r e a t e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s and s o c i a l structure  of t r a d i t i o n a l China, nor t o westernize  China i n t h e p a t t e r n o f modern France, England, or America. the s p i r i t of Chang Chih-tung's t'i-yung the b e s t o f China and the West;  Rather, i n  formula, Chang sought t o combine  a product equal t o the West i n s t r e n g t h  and wealth but exceeding the West i n s p i r i t u a l f u l f i l l m e n t .  By u t i l i z i n g  Western i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l theory,  Chang sought t o c r e a t e a  " n a t i o n a l r e n a i s s a n c e " which would unleash  the l a t e n t  Chinese  people.  Strengthening Confucian  Whereas t h e T'ung C h i h  Restoration  of the  and t h e S e l f -  Movement of the 1860*s through the 1880*s t r i e d t o rebuild  i n s t i t u t i o n s , Chang sought only t o r e t a i n t h e i r s p i r i t .  While i n s t i t u t i o n a l change was an important in  spirit  t h e 1940's i t s h o u l d  part o f Chang's e f f o r t s  be s e e n as a method r a t h e r t h a n a g o a l .  Democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s d i d not mold men's minds; they merely provided an environment w i t h i n which men c o u l d p e a c e f u l l y interact and rebuild the r u p t u r e d l i n e s o f communication between the v a r i o u s l e v e l s o f s o c i e t y . This reciprocal balanced  relationship  one, though.  between man and h i s environment i s n o t a  While environment can influence one's perceptions  and attitudes,  i t does so only as long as the individual remains ignorant  and p a s s i v e .  When and i f an i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e i v e s " t r u t h " and a c t i v e l y  follows the dictates  of h i s own i n t u i t i o n , he then becomes the dominant  p a r t o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p ;  a b l e t o a f f e c t h i s environment, even r e a l i t y .  T h i s r e l i a n c e on i n t u i t i v e reasoning and the b e l i e f t h a t the mind c o u l d influence r e a l i t y , such  a significant  part of New Confucian  reasoning,  explains much of Chang's behavior. In one sense s c i e n c e and New C o n f u c i a n i s m  agree; t h e r e do e x i s t  127  discoverable "absolutes."  Where science uses experimentation,  measurement  and d e d u c t i v e reasoning t o d i s c o v e r these a b s o l u t e s , New C o n f u c i a n i s t s r e l y on i n t u i t i o n .  One a b s o l u t e t h a t Chang b e l i e v e d i n was t h a t  ( I - l i ) was the b a s i s o r r o o t o f human nature.  reason  T h i s b a s i s becomes human  morality and, more over, gives us our standards of r i g h t and wrong, good and e v i l .  2  S i n c e t h i s "standard" e x i s t e d i n a l l men, Chang sought a way  t o appeal t o i t , t o g i v e t o a l l men a method o f s e l f - e n l i g h t e n m e n t would end i n consensus and "public-minded"  cooperation.  that  In t h i s sense  democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s afforded an appropriate s e t t i n g f o r men t o come together,  t o debate,  compromise, and reach  a i r differences, realize a consensus.  own  faults,  W h i l e the e x e r c i s e was one o f  p r a c t i c a l government, i t was, more importantly, and s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n .  their  an exercise i n learning  By p r a c t i c i n g d e m o c r a t i c government, men  learned  what democratic government was, and p r a c t i c e moved ever c l o s e r t o theory. As men confined p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y t o the peaceful c o r r i d o r s of democratic government, they moved i n d i v i d u a l l y towards greater s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . t h i s way function.  democratic assemblies As F u r t h has  served  In  both a p u b l i c and a p r i v a t e  suggested, " p a r l i a m e n t s  were imagined t o  provide a f i n e l y a r t i c u l a t e d system of communication among a l l l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l process.  Confucianism  assumed that correct  p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n must be based upon commonly recognized p r i n c i p l e s , and so assemblies but rather  were valued not f o r moderating among a p l u r a l i t y of i n t e r e s t s , as  educative  common consensus."  3  and  expressive  instruments  T h i s "common consensus" t h a t F u r t h speaks o f  s o c i a l l y , as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l l y important, like  f o r achieving  Chang Chun-mai.  Systems, p o l i t i c a l  themselves s o l v e problems, men d i d .  a was  e s p e c i a l l y t o a conservative o r economic,  d i d not i n  A l s o t r u e was t h a t without the  128  support of the people or the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , a government, no matter how powerful m i l i t a r i l y ,  could not e f f e c t i v e l y rule China f o r long.  Only by  mustering the combined strength of a l l segments of society could solutions be found and implemented. o f view,"  Finding such a common consensus or "uniformity  then, was seen by some as a f i r s t s t e p i n s o l v i n g China's  4  problems. This  s e a r c h f o r a common consensus  underscores a p o i n t  which  conservative New Confucians l i k e Chang, and t o t a l i s t i c iconoclasts such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu had i n common;  they both sought t o rejuvenate a corrupt and  atrophied China by a transformation of the t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese world view and a t o t a l reconstruction of the Chinese mentality.  Both groups stressed  the p r i o r i t y o f i n t e l l e c t u a l and c u l t u r a l change over p o l i t i c a l , and economic changes.  5  social  But where Ch'en r e j e c t e d t h e whole o f Chinese  t r a d i t i o n , Chang maintained that such t r a d i t i o n gave China i t s foundation. T h i s f o u n d a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o Chang, p r o v i d e d s t a b i l i t y and gave China direction.  6  To l a c k r e s p e c t f o r h i s t o r y and t r a d i t i o n was, i n Chang's  view, t o s e r i o u s l y err. There  i s a certain  problem  inherent i n giving  priority to  i n t e l l e c t u a l and c u l t u r a l change, namely, how t o go about i t . that "to reform China's p o l i t i c s and economics, a t t i t u d e s . . ."  7  Chang said  we must begin a t people's  Once people's a t t i t u d e s had been reformed,  continued, a "new culture" would result.  Chang  Once China had a new c u l t u r e one  need n o t worry about not having a new p o l i t i c a l o r economic  system.  8  Chang s t r e s s e d a g a i n , though, t h a t i n c r e a t i n g t h i s new c u l t u r e the o l d need not be destroyed.  The problem,  rather, was t o c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t the  new culture while retaining aspects of the old.  Relying on man's common  n a t u r e and h i s i n t u i t i o n , Chang assumed t h a t each man would " n a t u r a l l y " know how t o s e l e c t what he wanted from the new culture and what he wanted  129  from the o l d culture. This i s a l l consistent w i t h New Confucian epistomology, but d i d Chang f u l l y r e l y on t h i s t o see China through a v e r y d i f f i c u l t t i m e ? have mentioned cultivation  Others  that Confucianism has wavered between the poles of s e l f -  and t h e task o f o r d e r i n g t h e w o r l d .  9  In h i s r o l e as  philosopher Chang tended t o move towards the former pole.  In h i s role as  p o l i t i c i a n he leaned toward the l a t t e r , and seemed better able t o adopt a more r e a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e towards t h e immediate need f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. In h i s r o l e as p o l i t i c i a n Chang seemed t o concede  that p o l i t i c a l  systems had more i n f l u e n c e on man than he c o u l d admit i n h i s r o l e as philosopher.  Chang had s a i d that a democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government  would help concentrate national power, people's l e v e l of knowledge, t h e i r business h a p p i l y .  1 3  10  protect human r i g h t s ,  1 1  r a i s e the  and make them l i v e peacefully and carry on  12  T h i s i s one r e f l e c t i o n o f Chang's C o n f u c i a n  outlook that the world i s i n a state o f imperfection. Indeed, every man held the p o t e n t i a l f o r perfection, or sagehood, but u n t i l that f i n a l stage of s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n was reached s o c i e t y needed an imposed order. dichotomy  This  i n C o n f u c i a n t h i n k i n g , which can be d e s c r i b e d s o c i a l l y as  democratic and p o l i t i c a l l y as p a t e n a l i s t i c , was evident i n Chang.  While  he spoke of democratic government, Chang continued t o reserve governmental authority t o a moral and educational e l i t e . so complex t h a t Chang f e l t q u a l i f i e d t o deal with them.  o n l y those 14  National a f f a i r s had become w i t h e x p e r t knowledge were  I t was the duty of "superior  t o s t a n d i n t h e f o r e f r o n t and l e a d China t o her d e s t i n y .  statesmen"  15  It fell,  a c c o r d i n g t o Chang, t o the p o l i t i c i a n s t o "grasp what i s i n the people's hearts and put i t i n t o e f f e c t w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l  system."  16  130 This  paternalistic  attitude  towards the masses  and  political  authority kept Chang divorced from the great mass of the people.  He had  l i t t l e t o say t o t h e people d i r e c t l y , y e t took i t upon h i m s e l f t o a c t as t h e i r spokesman.  As e a r l y as 1907, i n an a r t i c l e i n New C i t i z e n . Chang  said that "the impetus f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government must come from the people, i t cannot be conferred by the government." mean by "the people?" ignorant masses,"  18  17  But what d i d Chang  The g r e a t weight o f what Chang s a i d about "the  of "train[ing]  [the people] t o become independent  c i t i z e n s . . . [and e n a b l i n g them to] d i s t i n g u i s h between honor and shame."  19  a l l p o i n t s t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Chang's d e f i n i t i o n o f "the  people" was  quite  narrow.  Almost  exclusively,  Chang c o n f i n e d h i s  p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s t o the upper c l a s s e s and eschewed work i n mass movements.  20  The membership of h i s National S o c i a l i s t Party, f o r example,  was predominantely teachers, s t u d e n t s , some businessmen, s o l d i e r s , and other e l i t e elements.  The p o l i t i c a l organization that Chang founded to  f u r t h e r h i s p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l aims had l i t t l e t o do w i t h the masses. Genuine mass movements were not the kind of c l a s s warfare preached by the communists, but r a t h e r , Chang b e l i e v e d , an e x p r e s s i o n o f the people's self-realization.  2 1  If the consistency we look f o r — w h i c h presumably runs through Chang's t h o u g h t — i s d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c e r n from the above, i t may be t h a t we have touched on a problem shared by others of Chang Chun-mai's generation.  In  Chang, a t l e a s t , we do f i n d contradictions between what he states i n h i s r o l e as philosopher and what he says i n h i s role as liberal-democrat. the  On  one hand, Chang expends g r e a t energy speaking t o the fundamental  importance and i n v i o l a b i l i t y of people's r i g h t s , and bemoans the people's exclusion from the p o l i t i c a l process.  At other times, Chang reveals h i s  commitment t o more t r a d i t i o n a l and p a t e r n a l i s t i c v a l u e s when he makes  131  p o l i t i c a l action dependent upon proper l e v e l s of knowledge and i n other  words, r e s e r v i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and  l e a d e r s h i p , t o members of an educated e l i t e . w i t h i n conservative n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s who  education;  particularly  A study of the f r i c t i o n s  also espoused Western l i b e r a l -  democratic values would prove interesting. His separation from the lower classes of Chinese society l e f t Chang very much i n the dark as to t h e i r real desires. Chinese society was  While he recognized  that  divided by c l a s s b a r r i e r s , he grossly underestimated  the a n i m o s i t i e s and f r u s t r a t i o n s t h a t e x i s t e d , and o v e r e s t i m a t e d the chances f o r a v o i d i n g  class conflict.  The  n a t i o n a l group (min-tsu), Chang f e l t , was identification.  sense of being  part  of  a  a s t r o n g e r f o r c e than c l a s s  The Japanese i n v a s i o n , Chang i n s i s t e d , was a t h r e a t t o  China t h a t would o v e r r i d e c l a s s d i f f e r e n c e s ;  the h i g h and the low,  the  r i c h and the poor, the c a p i t a l i s t s and the workers, could not but unite i n the face of such a threat. said,  "The v e r t i c a l d i v i s i o n s of nationalism," Chang  "could wash away the horizontal d i v i s i o n s of c l a s s . "  2 2  I t appears  i r o n i c t h a t the Japanese i n v a s i o n , which Chang saw as a chance t o u n i t e Chinese of a l l classes, was  used so e f f e c t i v e l y by the Chinese Communist  Party to promote what were u l t i m a t e l y opposite ends. the nature of Chinese nationalism was We  might ask  This "misreading" of  one element of Chang's f a i l u r e .  i f Chang Chiin-mai's temperament and  philosophical  l e a n i n g s were advantages or handicaps i n the p o l i t i c a l environment o f China i n the 1940's. New  Throughout t h i s paper I have referred to Chang as a  C o n f u c i a n i s t and a c o n s e r v a t i v e .  c h a r a c t e r has been e x p l o r e d , sure, c o n s e r v a t i s m and New  The New  C o n f u c i a n aspect o f h i s  but not the c o n s e r v a t i v e element.  C o n f u c i a n i s m have p o i n t s i n common.  To  be  First,  they both accept the p r i n c i p l e that there are immutable laws of morality,  132 and t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s a t r a n s c e n d e n t moral o r d e r , t o which we ought t o conform  the  requirements prudence,  ways o f s o c i e t y .  Secondly,  o f good government, and  restraint,  o r d e r and  these can b e s t be a c h i e v e d  and r e s p e c t f o r t r a d i t i o n ;  ancestors i s not to be ignored.  stability  New  by  the wisdom of one's  Thirdly, v a r i e t y i s more desirable than  uniformity or the deadening egalitarianism of r a d i c a l systems. more important than equality.  are  Liberty i s  And, f i n a l l y , of course, conservatives and  Confucianists, a l i k e , wanted to "conserve" c e r t a i n selected p r i n c i p l e s  from a p a r t i c u l a r t r a d i t i o n .  2 3  A t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y Chinese  conservative l i k e  however, c o u l d expand the bounds of h i s New  Confucian conservatism to  include elements unavailable t o h i s predecessors. T'an Ssu-t'ung Chang found that democracy appeared models o f p o l i t i c s found i n a n t i q u i t y .  2 4  Chang Chun-mai,  Like K'ang Yu-wei and s i m i l a r t o the Utopian  Democracy offered a p o l i t i c a l  system i n which "everyone b e n e f i t e d by s t a b i l i t y and had a s t a k e i n preserving i t . "  2 5  L i k e c o n s e r v a t i v e s elsewhere,  Chang c o u l d support  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy "not because [ i t ] produces the b e s t or w i s e s t government but order."  2 6  because i t i s the s t r o n g e s t s a f e g u a r d o f peace  and  Democracy not o n l y f i t w e l l w i t h i n Chang's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  Confucianism, p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s Mencian elements, but i t also complemented h i s b e l i e f t h a t change needed t o be r o o t e d i n c o n t i n u i t y .  Democracy  allowed f o r change but assured that i t would be orderly and well-anchored i n precedent. The  issue of  change was  a  d i f f i c u l t one  f o r Chang  Chun-mai.  Confucianism was not inherently opposed t o change; Mencius had elaborated the theory of the "Mandate of Heaven—the so-called 'right of rebellion,'" and had a s s e r t e d t h a t any man  c o u l d become a s a g e .  27  And Edmund Burke,  one of the f i r s t conservative thinkers, had observed that "change i s the  133  means of our p r e s e r v a t i o n , " and  t h a t the "able statesman i s one  who  combines w i t h a d i s p o s i t i o n t o p r e s e r v e an a b i l i t y t o r e f o r m . "  It  appears t h a t Chang's c o n s e r v a t i s m was Confucianism.  2 8  s t r o n g e r on t h i s p o i n t than h i s  Although Mencius had s u p p l i e d the a u t h o r i t y f o r abrupt  change, Chang was  loathe to employ i t .  He much preferred "to r e l y on  the  spontaneous f o r c e s of s o c i e t y o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n a framework of g e n e r a l rules"  2 9  to e f f e c t change.  Unstructured,  unpredictable,  directionless,  v i o l e n t change held no charms f o r Chang. Chang could admire the intentions of the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n or the outcome of the German R e v o l u t i o n , w h i l e deploring strikes.  t h e i r e x c e s s i v e v i o l e n c e , d i s o r d e r , and the use of c o e r c i v e Summing up h i s f e e l i n g s Chang observed that: r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements cannot be separated from armed f o r c e , cannot renounce war, cannot be separated from chaos. The b a c k g r o u n d o f r e v o l u t i o n and the background of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n are not the same. Revolution i s destruction, national reconstruction depends upon thought and experience. Revolution depends upon c o n f l i c t , i t c a r e s not f o r the s p i r i t , while national r e c o n s t r u c t i o n depends upon calm heads. R e v o l u t i o n depends upon weapons and warfare, while national reconstruction depends on peace and l e g a l systems.30  In an age  of violence dominated by v i o l e n t men  the use of f o r c e o n l y w i t h extreme r e l u c t a n c e . the  p r i n c i p l e s of cooperation,  expected others to do likewise.  Chang could advocate  He c l u n g t e n a c i o u s l y t o  reconciliation,  and  compromise,  and  Change assumed that the "sense of shame"  that helped guide h i s l i f e would also proscribe immoral actions by others. He assumed t h a t p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s were c o n s c i o u s of the f a c t t h a t they must someday c o n f r o n t heaven and p o s t e r i t y .  3 1  He expected t h a t i f "one  134  r e c o g n i z e s h i m s e l f as incompetent, he would remove h i m s e l f [from problem] . . ,  3 2  the  I f what Chang wrote of Chiang Kai-shek up to 1949 can be  even p a r t i a l l y accepted a t f a c e v a l u e , he misjudged Chiang p r o f o u n d l y . The 1948  Democratic S o c i a l i s t Party platform i n d i r e c t l y charged the  and by i m p l i c a t i o n Chiang Kai-shek, opponents under the  with  attempting  p r e t e x t of u n i f i c a t i o n ,  spying  KMT,  t o wipe out i t s on  the  people,  surveillance of opposition p a r t y members, employing h o o l i g a n s t o cause trouble with other p a r t i e s , monopolizing the government, making themselves masters of the country, misrepresenting the people's wishes,  monopolizing  f i n a n c i a l c o n t r o l to enrich themselves, and using the people as  tools.  3 3  I f t h i s indictment were only p a r t i a l l y true, d i d Chang r e a l l y expect h i s methods t o succeed?  I f i t i s t r u e , as o t h e r s have charged, t h a t Chiang  Kai-shek used confiscation, a r r e s t , and a s s a s s i n a t i o n a g a i n s t those opposed the government, saw  34  why  d i d Chang continue the dialogue?  as constructive engagement, others saw  who  What Chang  merely as "useless and empty  t a l k " [ t h a t would not] r e s o l v e problems [but] o n l y added t o the d i s p u t e and obstructed China's development." In  sum,  the  combination  of  35  Chang's C o n f u c i a n  outlook  and  his  conservative d i s p o s i t i o n acted as self-imposed l i m i t s on the range of h i s p o l i t i c a l opposition.  H i s unwavering b e l i e f that s i n c e r i t y on h i s part  c o u l d e l i c i t s i n c e r i t y i n h i s a n t a g o n i s t s , h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the w i l l c o u l d overcome m a t e r i a l or p o l i t i c a l o b s t a c l e s , and h i s need t o keep change channeled into orderly processes a l l acted as i n h i b i t i n g f a c t o r s on Chang's a c t i v i t i e s . Chang once said that r e a l i z i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government i n China not a p o l i t i c a l problem but a question of w i l l . a NSP  member, remarked w i t h  more b l u n t n e s s ,  was  In contrast, F e i Ch'ing, "the a b i l i t y  to bring  135 constitutionalism t o l i f e i n China s t i l l rests i n the w i l l i n g n e s s of those who hold p o l i t i c a l power."  36  The difference between them i s that Chang  was viewing the problem from a philosophical standpoint, which questioned n e i t h e r one's s i n c e r i t y p o l i t i c a l problem.  o r motives, whereas F e i was l o o k i n g a t i t as a  The d i s t i n c t i o n between philosophy and p o l i t i c s may be  akin t o the difference between theory and practice; each i s a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e other and i f they a r e t o combine i n a h o l i s t i c  system they must  agree. From  Chang's p h i l o s p h i c a l  influenced through  p o i n t of view,  reason and i n t u i t i o n .  one's w i l l  c o u l d be  Chang continually held that i f  only everyone would s i t down, l a y t h e i r problems on the table and engage •37  i n f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n , t h e r e were no problems t h a t c o u l d not be s o l v e d . In  taking and i d e a l i z i n g c e r t a i n t r a d i t i o n a l values associated with neo-  Confucianism, Chang was including values such as harmony and compromise. It  was these k i n d s o f v a l u e s t h a t kept b r i n g i n g Chang back t o t h e  bargaining t a b l e . Chang was an i d e a l i s t , t o be s u r e , b u t he was a l s o a s t u t e enough t o demand o n l y what he thought he c o u l d get.  F e i argued t h a t China's new  c o n s t i t u t i o n "should not t r y t o adapt to the present r e a l i t y , " as Chiang Kai-shek proposed, "but r a t h e r s h o u l d take t h e k i n d o f government China wanted as i t s s o l e s t a n d a r d . "  38  Chang c o u l d agree w i t h t h e f i r s t p a r t  and, y e t , a c c e p t something l e s s than F e i ' s i d e a l .  Perhaps Chang had two  considerations; f i r s t , a constitution that e x p l i c i t l y  enunciated r e a l  democratic government might end as the PPC draft c o n s t i t u t i o n had, and, secondly, i f f o r some reason Chiang Kai-shek accepted such a c o n s t i t u t i o n but ignored and subverted i t , the c o n s t i t u t i o n along with the p r i n c i p l e of democratic appeal.  39  government would be so defamed as t o damage i t s f u t u r e  136  The  focal  point  of Chang's e f f o r t s  s o c i o p o l i t i c a l structure i n  towards r e e s t a b l i s h i n g the  C h i n a was the c o n s t i t u t i o n .  Fairbank i s  most c e r t a i n l y c o r r e c t i n s a y i n g t h a t a s s e m b l i e s , or p a r l i a m e n t s , were means of communication, but Chang had a t l e a s t two them.  other m i s s i o n s f o r  F i r s t , the assembly which Chang incorporated i n t o h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n  (the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan) was as a counterbalance  p r i m a r i l y concerned with power.  to the power of the president.  I t would act  I t would r e e s t a b l i s h  the equilibrium i n Chinese society and government that had been l o s t the Revolution.  Chang's assembly would once again give the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  a v o i c e i n government.  Secondly, we can deduce t h a t Chang's assembly  would give status, p o s i t i o n , prestige, and authority to a new o f Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s conversant government.  with  i n the v o c a b u l a r y  generation  of democratic  T h e i r mastery of the v o c a b u l a r y and theory o f d e m o c r a t i c  government would ensure them of the respect and authority  that belonged  to t h e i r imperial predecessors. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d r a f t , f o r which Chang Chun-mai i s recognized  as  b e i n g the p r i n c i p l e author, attempted a fundamental r e o r d e r i n g of the p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s quo.  We  can o n l y guess t h a t Chang was,  to a l i m i t e d  degree, a i d e d and a b e t t e d by d i s a f f e c t e d members of the Kuomintang, as w e l l as by other minority party members and independents. Since Chang Chun-mai joined Chiang Kai-shek i n supporting the concept of a strong c e n t r a l government and a powerful president, h i s e f f o r t s were not so much aimed at l i m i t i n g e i t h e r of them, but rather at inducing them to include other e l i t e elements (himself) i n the governing process. generation of Chinese e l i t e s ,  A  new  educated i n the best t r a d i t i o n of the East  and the West, could once again, then enjoy the i n s t i t u t i o n a l support that t h e i r imperial forebearers had enjoyed.  137 I t i s t h i s system that Chang thought to s t a f f with the graduates of his i l l - f a t e d institutes: the Western yung.  Men  men  who brought t o g e t h e r the Chinese £*_i and  w i t h the a b i l i t y and  t r a i n i n g t o a c t as  able  administrators, to provide an i n t e l l e c t u a l pool to draw on i n the advance of Chinese democracy, and t o a c t as moral exemplars f o r both the masses and,  i n twentieth century China, f o r the p o l i t i c a l leadership as well. I t i s no doubt t r u e t h a t C o n f u c i a n s , and a l s o c o n s e r v a t i v e s , t o a  degree, f e e l more comfortable i n a system which c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e s status, r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , prerogatives  , and outlines rules of behavior.  expect the c o n s t i t u t i o n t o do a l l of t h i s was unnecessary.  The  c o n s t i t u t i o n defined,  But  both u n r e a l i s t i c  a l t h o u g h not  without  to and  some  vagueness, the l i n e s of authority and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n government. I t a l s o o u t l i n e d the b a s i c r i g h t s o f the people. the c o n s t i t u t i o n was morality;  there was  silent.  There was  no need f o r i t .  h i s own  conscience,  putting  d i s c u s s i o n of e t h i c s  or  Those issues were handled quite w e l l  by reference to the t r a d i t i o n a l hereitage. by  no  Beyond t h i s , however,  A p o l i t i c i a n was  to be guided  i n t o p r a c t i c e time-honored  Chinese  p r i n c i p l e s of e t h i c a l and moral behavior. Naively, perhaps, Chang Chiin-mai expected others to respect the p o l i t i c a l status quo was  embodied i n the d r a f t constitution.  new  Once agreement  reached, he seemed to assume, the forces operative i n the t r a d i t i o n a l  heritage, coupled with the peculiar moral r e s t r a i n t s on Chinese leaders, would ensure t h a t p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o r  would be channeled i n t o the  new  structure. This,  unfortunately,  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l dreams.  may  have been another weakness of Chang's  Chang h i m s e l f , as w e l l as o t h e r s , bemoaned the  f a c t t h a t so many p o l i t i c i a n s were l i t t l e more than s e l f i s h seekers.  Those involved i n government i n Chang's era may  office-  simply have not  138  been of the c a l i b e r Chang imagined. by  t r a d i t i o n and consensus.  neither.  A democratic system i s held together  Wish as he might, Chang c o u l d produce  I f w i l l and good intentions were expected t o replace them, Chang  s e r i o u s l y miscalculated. Perhaps another important  f a i l i n g of Chang's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy  was h i s e f f o r t t o give power and authority t o a c l a s s of e l i t e s which had yet t o earn either.  Chang was t r y i n g to a r t i f i c i a l l y reshape the l i n e s of  power and a u t h o r i t y i n t o forms which bore no r e l a t i o n s h i p t o r e a l i t y . Chang could not, with the stroke of a pen,  give the opposition authority  and power when they c o u l d n o t command i t themselves.  D i d Chang ever  wonder why h i s periods of r e l a t i v e freedom coincided with the periods when Chiang  was under t h e g r e a t e s t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o those  pressure?  D i d he e v e r  e x t e r n a l f o r c e s which probably  opportunity t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n national a f f a i r s ?  g i v e due  gave him t h e  Without any evidence t o  the contrary, the answer must be no. In h i s l e t t e r of resignation as Chairman of the Democratic S o c i a l i s t P a r t y i n 1950 Chang looked back over h i s r e c e n t p o l i t i c a l f a i l u r e s .  He  s a d l y r e c a l l e d t h a t he had taken p a r t i n the People's P o l i t i c a l C o u n c i l o n l y as a way o f "seeking parties.  c o o p e r a t i o n between the v a r i o u s  [His] objective was only democratic government."  political  The r e s u l t , he  admitted, was that "cooperation was shattered, the c o n s t i t u t i o n was empty, and  what was d a i l y advocated and t h e r e a l p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n moved  f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r apart."  "Even though I was s i l e n t on t h e o u t s i d e , "  Chang r e c a l l e d , "I was ashamed on the i n s i d e . "  40  A few years l a t e r i n h i s  book The T h i r d Force. Chang a t t r i b u t e d h i s own f a i l u r e and the f a i l u r e of democracy i n China t o "tutelage."  Tutelage, as practiced by the KMT, was  "the d e s i r e t o perpetuate t h e c o n d i t i o n s which keep p o l i t i c a l power i n  139 t h e i r own hands. s i n c e t h e r e was  They merely gave l i p - s e r v i c e t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , no c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  no p a r l i a m e n t , and no r e s p o n s i b l e  c a b i n e t , a l l q u e s t i o n s , . . . were d e c i d e d by the P a r t y . no r i g h t t o question the Party."  The p e o p l e had  41  The i s s u e o f t u t e l a g e was not r e a l l y the p o i n t , nor was i t the which r e a l l y h e l d p o l i t i c a l  power.  KMT  Chang Chun-mai a c t u a l l y had  no  objection to the concept of t u t e l a g e — a l l he r e a l l y sought was t o be among the tutors.  His view of the masses' a b i l i t y to exercise t h e i r p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s i n a democracy was not d i s s i m i l a r t o Chiang Kai-shek's. Chiin-mai's r e a l complaint was real p o l i t i c a l  Chang  against Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to share  power or t o make h i m s e l f amenable t o Chang's  moral  remonstrances. Without t r y i n g to denigrate the t r a d i t i o n a l heritage, we must s t i l l conclude t h a t Chang Chun-mai was a v i c t i m o f i t .  By i d e a l i z i n g c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s o f the C o n f u c i a n h e r i t a g e , i n c l u d i n g the r o l e o f the chiin-tzu . Chang t r i e d t o b r i n g t o bear i n f l u e n c e s more a p p r o p r i a t e t o a C o n f u c i a n Utopian enviornment  than t o twentieth century China.  Jonathan Spence has  suggested that K'ang Yu-wei, either consciously or unconsciously, emulated Confucius.  I t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t Chang Chiin-mai, i n h i s own way,  4 2  t r y i n g t o b r i n g t o l i f e the i d e a l o f the C o n f u c i a n gentleman. Chang was a good example of what such a gentleman once was;  Indeed,  his classical  education, h i s success i n the Imperial examinations, h i s involvement literary  was  with  s o c i e t i e s , h i s t e a c h i n g and p h i l o s o p h i c a l p u r s u i t s , and h i s  preoccupation  with  national  affairs,  a l l indicate  a  man  who,  by  temperament and t r a i n i n g , f e l t himself q u a l i f i e d to address any issue that affected Chinese government and society. During  the l a t e r p a r t  Chungking near  o f World  the home of Chiang  War  Two  Kai-shek.  Chang kept a house i n In a  serene  setting  140  surrounded by woods, Chang's home was f u r n i s h e d i n V i c t o r i a n s t y l e . complete was  the i l l u s i o n that i t was  one was i n C h i n a .  4 3  So  almost impossible t o believe that  And p o s s i b l y Chang f e l t j u s t t h a t ; the C h i n a t h a t  e x i s t e d o u t s i d e h i s door was  not the r e a l C h i n a but o n l y a f l e e t i n g  anomaly soon t o be replaced with what should be.  Admitting much the same,  Chang's brother added that Chang's "personal i n c l i n a t i o n s and the domestic s i t u a t i o n were contradictory."  44  Chang t r u l y f e l t h i m s e l f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of what he c a l l e d "great untapped f o r c e s . " "naturally moderate and t h i s new  The Chinese, he h e l d , were  passion f o r extremism w i l l pass."  What  the world was witnessing, as seen through Chang's eyes, "was not the b i r t h of new China, but a v e r y o l d C h i n a i n d e e d . "  45  Not many y e a r s would pass  before Chang would see h i s "old China" s t i l l b o r n . Trying t o h u r l words at men the p r e s e n t r e a l i t y .  who  fought with guns, Chang was  denying  Jack Belden r e a l i s t i c a l l y observed t h a t men  like  Chang were unarmed, and as such were "no more e f f e c t i v e than a watchdog without a b i t e or a bark."  46  Without the pressures on Chiang Kai-shek by  the Japanese, the Communists, o r the American government, t h e r e was  no  compelling reason f o r him to give Chang a voice i n the government, or t o even t o l e r a t e h i s o p p o s i t i o n .  U n l i k e the i l l u s i o n s h e l d by G e n e r a l  Marshall as t o the r o l e the opposition could play i n China, other Chinese were more than aware that the prominence  Chiang Kai-shek afforded Chang  far outweighed h i s r e a l p o l i t i c a l significance.  141 CHAPTER FOUR NOTES ^Benjamin Schwartz, "Notes on Conservatism," i n F u r t h , L i m i t s p £ Change, pp. 3-21. 2  Hsieh, "Wo yu Chang Chiin-mai hsien-sheng," p.  3  F u r t h , " I n t e l l e c t u a l change," p.  39.  344.  Hsu Chao-shan, Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang, tsu-chih wei-yuan nui hsuan-yen: cheng-kang. cheng-chih l u - h s i e n (Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang fu-chien sheng tang pu, 1948), pp. 13-15. 4  5  L i n , Chinese Consciousness, p.  6  Chang, L i kuo c h i h t a o . p.  7  I b i d . , p.  8  Ibid.  9  L i n , Chinese Consciousness, p.  26.  140.  274.  53.  S h e n , CTCKSLTK. 805:89.  10  Chang, " P o l i t i c a l Structure i n the Chinese Draft Constitution," 67. 11  p.  1  o  Chang, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang h u i - i h s i u - k a i wu-wu h s i e n - t s ' a o yiian-tse," p. 25. 13  H s u , Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang, pp.  14  Ts'ai-sheng she, WYSSTH. p.  AJ  C h a n g , L i kuo c h i h t a o p. f  1 6  Ibid.  p.  6-7.  16. 90.  91.  'Chang, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng nien-piao ch'ang-pien," p. 18  C h a n g , L i kao. c h i h tap., p.  94.  19  H s i i , Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang/  pp.  6-7.  20  Chang, K'ang-chan chung t i cheng-tang hp. p'ai-pieh.  p.  78.  281.  142 L i C h a i [Chang Chun-mai], " H s i e n - s h i h cheng-ch'ao chung kuo-min c h i h n u - l i fang-hsiang," Hsin Lu ("The New Way") v o l . 1, no. 3 (March 1, 1928) :3. 2 1  W e i , Chung-kuo ko_ tang ko p'ai hsien-k'uang. hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT, p. 198. 22  p. 4. Also see Wen-  R o b e r t L i n d s a y S c h u e t t i n g e r , ed., The C o n s e r v a t i v e T r a d i t i o n i n European Thought (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), pp. 12-13, p. 27; and R u s s e l l Kirk, "Conservatism: A Succinct Description," National Review vol. XXXrv, no. 17(September 3, 1982) :1080-1081. 2 3  2 4  F u r t h , " I n t e l l e c t u a l change," p. 345.  25  L i n d s a y , Conservative Tradition, p. 14. Ibid.  2 6  D e r k Bodde, (Hinsdale, I l l i n o i s : 2 7  China's C u l t u r a l T r a d i t i o n : What Dryden Press, 1957), pp. 64-65.  2 8  Kirk,  2y  S c h u e t t i n g e r , Conservative Tradition, p. 28.  30  Chang, "Kuo-chia wei shen-me yao hsien-fa?" p.  and Whither?  "Conservatism," p. 1080.  31  C h a n g , L i kuo c h i h t a o . p. 97.  32  Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:91.  33  H s u , Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang, p. 3.  H o u Sheng, (shang), p. 20. 3 4  "Chun-mai hsien-sheng  5.  t i cheng-chih  ssu-hsiang,"  Hsia, Lun Hu Shih yu Chang Chun-mai. p. 66. F e i Ch'ing, "Ts'ung jen-min li-ch'ang p'i-p'ing wu-wu hsien-ts'ao," i n CKMCSHTCC. p. 36. 3 6  37  'Chang Chun-mai, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang h u i - i hsiu-kai wu-wu hsients'ao yuan-tse," p. 25. J  3ft J O  F e i , "Ts'ung jen-min l i - c h ' a n g , " p. 36.  T h i s was after a l l the case with " p o l i t i c a l tutelage." The KMT had so dominated the government t o the e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s t h a t the term tutelage l o s t any meaning. 3 9  H o u Sheng, (shang), p. 20. 4 0  41  "Chun-mai hsien-sheng  t i cheng-chih  Quoted i n Hsi-Sheng Ch'i, N a t i o n a l i s t China a t Ear.,  ssu-hsiang," p. 180.  143  42  Spence, Gate o f Heavenly Peace, p.  75.  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Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. and T w i t c h e t t , Denis, eds. Confucian P e r s o n a l i t i e s . Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.  156 GLOSSARY  Chang Chih-tung  (^  £ ^) )  Chang Chiin-mai [Carsun Chang] Chang P i n g - l i n  (  Chang Shen-fu  fl^Jlj:  (  Chang Tung-sun  fyjlfa  (  ^ $^ )  ) )  ( £ | | $J )  Chang S h i h - l i n [psuedonym f o r Chang Chun-mai] Ch'en C h ' i - t ' i e n Ch'en Po-nan  ( f£  (^  )  (jf£ fjfl  )  )  ( pjjr >(£ $ )  Ch'en Tu-hsiu  (  ^  ^ )  Cheng-ch'uan [ p o l i t i c a l powers]  (  Cheng Lun [Discourses on P o l i t i c s ]  ^ [ ) (jgfc^ )  Cheng-wen she [ P o l i t i c a l Information Society] Chiang Kai-shek  ($f-  )  Chia-tsu chu-i [familialism]  (  )  Chih-ch'iian [governing powers] C h i h - h s i n g h o - i [ t h e u n i t y o f knowledge and a c t i o n ] ( kp\^^— Chin-shin  )  ± )  Ch'in Shih Huang-ti Chou E n - l a i  (  $  (  % ^ )  jf.jJL)  Ch'iian-neng feng-kai [the separation of power and a b i l i t y ] Chiin-tzu  (%  $ )  Chung-kuo min-tsu wen-hua shu-yiian [Institute of National Culture] (  ¥ f ft tk  Fan Ch'ang-chiang F e i Ch'ing HanWu-ti  (f  ( s£,  3f)  t Ht >.£. )  )  157  Hsin Lu [The New Way]  ( fff  &)  Hsien-fa hsin-wen she [Constitutional News Association]  ( f, Hsin-min ts'una-pao [New People's Miscellany] Hsiu-ts'ai  (fe $  )  T  T  U  )  ?| ft )  ( SfljJL )  Hu Shih I-li  (  %  )  Hsueh-hai shu-yiian [Hsueh-hai Academy] ( Hu Han-min  (  [ p r i n c i p l e , reason]  (^»  )  J i b cJiih i n [A Record of D a i l y Knowledge] K'ang Yu-wei  (Q Z  )  )  Kuang-fang yen-kuan [Institute of Modern Languages]  ( fk i s t i t ) Kung [public]  (  )  Kung-ho chien-she t'ao-lun hui [Republican Construction Association]  I f it  ( # Kuo-chia she-hui tang  t  )  [National S o c i a l i s t Party]  Kuo-hsing [national character]  ( (§]  )  ( g j ifS^ )  K u o - l i tzu-chih hsueh-yiian [National I n s t i t u t e of Self-Government]  m i M  (  *  **> ft >  Kuo-min ta-hui i-cheng hui [Recess Committee of the National Assembly] (  S ) ft * f  1&  a* f  )  Kuomintang [Nationalist Party]  )  Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui [People's P o l i t i c a l Council] (  m$  $< t  }  ( \St) s f f i f e ^ $JfcJ)  Kuo-ts'ui hsiieh-p'ai [national essence school] Ku Yen-wu L i Chai [psuedonym f o r Chang Chun-mai] Liang Ch'i-ch'ao  (^  )  Liang-chih [innate knowledge]  (jt  )  158 Liang Shu-ming  (^  L i u Shih-p'ei  ( f,j  Lo Lung-chi Lung Yiin  5^  ^ p% )  (£$.f%%  (||  )  )  )  Mao Tse-tung  (  |t )  Min-chu tang [Democratic Party]  (^ i ^  Min-ch'uan chu-i [people's rights] Min-tsu chu-i [nationalism]  )  ( ffi  ( ^  H J|< )  Nanking kao-teng hsiieh-hsiao [Nanking High School]  < * * & I # *t )  Niu Yung-chien San-min-chu-i  (  ^  )  [The Three People's Principles]  Shao-nien chung-kuo [Young China] Shih-shih hsin-pao [China Times] Shu-yuan [academy]  (J  5f  ( (  ( 2. ^  ^  £  )  )  $» $ff $& )  pfc)  Sun Fo Sun Yat-sen  ( £ j >t ^  )  Sung She [Pine Society] Szu [private] Ssu-ma Kuang Ta-t*ung T'ai-tsu  (|±  ( #a ) ( s) ^  #j )  [great harmony] (%  T'an Ssu-fung T'ang Chiin-i  ( 7t J®) )  41 ) (^| ^  %  (j | f ^  ) )  T'i-yung [essence-function] Ts'ai-sheng [Renaissance] Tseng Kuo-fan Tseng  )  (ij^  J$) )  ( 4$.  )  («f g ) ? § )  wen -cheng kung ch'uan-chi fan] < * f * 2 £ $ $  [The Complete Works o f Tseng  )  Kuo-  159  ( fcify £  Tso Shun-sheng  )  Tsung-ts'ai [leader, party leader] T § U c h i h t'ung chien ( Wang Ching-wei  ( ~£  Wang Chung-hui  ( 5, $| j j ,  Wang Shih-chieh  ( JE 1 £  Wang Yiin-wu Wen I-to  (£  5§  ^  j | _ £|£  $f) ) )  j|? i L )  ( 9gL - |  )  Yang [brightness, negative, female] Yeh Ch'ing Yen Fu  ($  (  [psuedonym f o r Jen Chou-hsuan] f  )  Yin [darkness, p o s i t i v e , male] Yuan Shih-kai  )  ( j | I t Jfl.)  ( pj^ )  ) ( ||F  )  

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