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Chang Chün-Mai : a moral conservative in an immoral age 1985

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CHANG CHUN-MAI: A MORAL CONSERVATIVE IN AN IMMORAL AGE By PAUL DRAPER B.A., San Jose State University, 1978 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES The Department of History We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1985 © P a u l Draper, 1985 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Paul Draper Department of H i g f m y The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Van couve r, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date September 24, 1985 i i ABSTRACT Chang Chun-mai, known i n the West as Carsun Chang, played a prominent role on the p o l i t i c a l stage of wartime China. As educator, philosopher, and p o l i t i c i a n , he v a i n l y attempted to a l t e r the course of China's p o l i t i c a l and cultural development. Although commonly referred to as a l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t , t h i s study shows Chang to be more of a traditionally-minded conservative. Masked by the heavy use of a l i b e r a l - democratic vocabulary, Chang maintained a firm commitment to principles that owed much more to conservative Chinese t r a d i t i o n than to Western liberalism. The f a c t that Chang Chun-mai did r e l y so heavily on l i b e r a l - democratic arguments and came to be known by some as the Father of the Constitution tends to cloud his real intent. I t i s argued here that his e f f o r t s to bring a Western-style c o n s t i t u t i o n to China can better be understood by recognizing two major points: f i r s t , Chang, as well as many others, used the constitutional issue in an attempt to force Chiang Kai- shek to share p o l i t i c a l power; and, secondly, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue provided Chang with the conceptual and i n s t i t u t i o n a l vehicle for rebuilding the socio-political relationships between the various elements of Chinese society which had existed before the Republic. Within the l a t t e r goal, Chang also souqht to create a p o s i t i o n of influence and prestige for the class of intellectuals of which he was a part. This study explores one dimension of Chinese conservatism. It shows Chang Chun-mai as a n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t whose behavior was guided and limited by his image of the Chinese cultural t r a d i t i o n — l i m i t a t i o n s which significantly contributed to his f a i l u r e . Examining Chang's actions i n i i i wartime China sheds more light on the reasons for the failure of the so-called "third force" elements that stood between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Chang held himself aloof from the great mass of his fellow countrymen, he championed a D o l i t i c a l position which f a i l e d to offer a clear alternative to the authoritarian government of Chiang Kai- shek, and his philosophical and conservative viewpoint prevented him from carrying his p o l i t i c a l opposition to a point which s e r i o u s l y challenged Chiang Kai-shek. Although this study does conclude that Chang's idealized image of the Confucian gentleman (chun-tzu) acted as a handicap i n the p o l i t i c a l milieu of wartime China, i t confines that conclusion to a given time and place, and under particular circumstances. It emphatically does not purport to discount the v i a b i l i t y or appropriatness of t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese values i n the modern world, or with some form of democratic system. Far from exhaustive, this study i s , at best, partial. It i s meant to explore a dimension of the Chinese e f f o r t to reconcile themselves and their culture with a changing environment. Source materials are limited and not without inconsistencies. A major drawback i s that much of the Chinese-language material concerning Chang Chun-mai i s lauditory in nature and biased i n his favor. If time permitted, a more thorough study of the personal accounts of other actors involved would no doubt y i e l d a more balanced picture. Further, the circumstances under which much of the wartime materials were written required a good deal of circumspection on the part of the writers, and therefore, requires a good deal of "reading between the l i n e s " by the modern reader. I have t r i e d to keep my conclusions reasonable without imparting my own ideas to a d i f f i c u l t translation. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page T i t l e Page . . . . . . i Authorization i Abstract i i Table of Contents iv Abbreviations v Acknowledgement v i Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: Early Education: Beginning of a Synthesis . . . 25 Chapter 3: Constitutions and State-Building 64 Chapter 4: Conclusion 125 Bibliography 144 Glossary 156 V ABBREVIATIONS Chang Chiin-mai chuan-chj tsu-liao CCMHSNPCPCJK CCP CKMCSHTCC CTCKSLTK KMT WYSSTH Chang Chun-mai hsjen-sheng njen-piao chien-pien ch'u-kao Chinese Communist Party chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang chuan- chi Chjn-tai chung-kuo shih-iiao ts'ung-K'an Ko_ k'ang-jih tang-p'ai i i hsuan-ch'uan huo-tung Kuomintang Women yao. §m shuo i i hua v i ACKNOWLEDGMENT No paper of this nature deserves to be under a single author's name. What began as a personal project soon drew on the talents and patience of many. I t i s t h e i r contributions which, i n truth, made t h i s paper a reality. My grateful thanks to Edgar Wickberg whose exhaustive readings and corrections to t h i s paper have made i t f a r better than anything I alone could have produced. My appreciation also to Alexander Woodside who, at the most d i f f i c u l t time, took up the task of supervizing t h i s paper in i t s f i n a l stages. I w i l l forever be in debt to Heather Trouche, who time and again went far beyond her normal duties to assist me. Deep thanks also to Susan Mann for her careful editing, and to Steve Mann for his friendship and the many hours of computer time he made available to me. For my wife, Carol, who followed me, f i r s t , to Canada, and, later, to Asia, I have no words which could express my love, gratitude, and respect. 1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION The p o l i t i c a l history of China during the mid-twentieth century is understandably dominated by i t s two most prominent actors; the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), one the vanquished, the other the victor. A focus on the duel between these two parties has often l e f t the impression that the only real alternatives open to China in the 1930's and 1940's rested with the KMT and the CCP. We are c e r t a i n l y aware that neither the KMT nor the CCP were homogeneous units. Each contained a v a r i e t y of i n t e l l e c t u a l currents which, at times, worked against the leaders of both parties. The World War Two State Department dispatches of John Service and John Paton Davies, and the wartime accounts of Theodore White and Jack Belden, have been joined by the l a t e r works of Harold Issacs, Lloyd Eastman, Joseph Fewsmith, and others to more f u l l y reveal the diversity within the KMT in p a r t i c u l a r . But what of those other currents of i n t e l l e c t u a l and p o l i t i c a l thought that stood between the KMT and the CCP? Chester Tan and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng have spoken of them in the context of more comprehensive works; Lawrence Shyu and A, Shaheen have added their contributions to our knowledge of c e r t a i n elements of t h i s "middle group," but as yet no one has attempted a d e f i n i t i v e study of the impact and s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s group—not to mention a comprehensive examination of their philosophical and p o l i t i c a l contribution to modern China. This study does not presume to attempt such a comprehensive task. What i t does attempt, however, i s to add, i n some small measure, to our understanding of one part of t h i s "middle group." I t i s hoped that through t h i s approach we might be better able to understand why these elements were relegated to such minor roles in the p o l i t i c a l denouement of 2 the 1940's. Among those who stood between the KMT and the CCP were some who embraced a more t r a d i t i o n a l , conservative stance; some of t h i s group have been rather casually dismissed as irrelevant or anachronistic. To a degree this i s understandable, since their subsequent disappearance from the p o l i t i c a l scene tends to confirm our suspicions that they were somehow "out of step" with modern China. But did these traditionally-minded conservatives f a i l for the above reasons or for others? Were they victims of p o l i t i c a l machinations, or d i d they f a i l because of t h e i r own inconsistencies or shortcomings? Of this group, Chang Chun-mai, teacher, philosopher, constitutional expert, and p o l i t i c i a n , was perhaps representative. He i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of a generation of Chinese intellectuals who spent their youth in Imperial China and came to maturity i n Republican C h i n a — i n t e l l e c t u a l s whose education and experience often combined traditional and modern, Chinese and Western. Chang was by no means a revolutionary; he t r i e d to work within the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s y stem—following guidelines from the traditional heritage, while being confined by the limitations imposed by the KMT. He rejected the one-party d i c t a t o r s h i p of the KMT and the "dictatorship of the p r o l e t a r i a t " a l i k e . Chang proposed an a l t e r n a t i v e course for modern China, one which he believed was true to the s p i r i t of Chinese tradition yet adapted to the needs of the modern world. Chang Chun-mai was active i n a v a r i e t y of f i e l d s : publishing, writing, education and p o l i t i c s . Taken together they i l l u s t r a t e a quite traditional mode of behavior. His l i f e illustrates a conscious desire to f u l f i l l his self-perceived role as a Confucian gentleman, a modern ch'un- tzu. while touching b r i e f l y on several of these areas, I w i l l concentrate 3 on Chang's ac t i v i t i e s in the p o l i t i c a l arena, specifically his efforts to give China a modern democratic constitution. On t h i s l a t t e r point, Chang's conception of a c o n s t i t u t i o n can best be understood when viewed from a t r a d i t i o n a l standpoint. While cloaked i n modern vocabulary, Chang's constitutional proposals were designed to mend the sociopolitical fabric of China. His goals were not to bring something foreign to China, but rather to r e b u i l d the essence of a s o c i o p o l i t i c a l system that had worked in China for centuries, and had been destroyed by the Revolution of 1911. The issue of conservatism in China has been broached before. In her pioneering study of the T'ung Chih Restoration, f o r example, Mary C. Wright showed the a b i l i t y of the Ch'ing Government to r i s e to the challenge of the Taiping rebels, institutional decay, and a host of other economic and p o l i t i c a l i l l s . The T'ung Chih Restoration was, as i t s name implies, a conservative attempt to restore the vigor of Imperial authority and institutions. Daniel Bays went on to look closely at Chang Chih-tung, a somewhat later conservative, who tried to preserve China culturally and p o l i t i c a l l y by his famous marriage of the Chinese £!i ("essence") and the Western yung ("function"). More recently, writers such as Hao Chang, Charlotte Furth, Benjamin Schwartz, and Guy A l i t t o have tried to give the study of Chinese conservatism more comprehensive treatment. Guy A l i t t o , in particular, has turned his considerable energies to the study of Liang Shu-ming, the philosopher and founder of the Rural Reconstruction Association. While more heavily influenced by Buddhism than Chang Chun-mai, Liang Shu-ming was also deeply concerned with the health and survival of Chinese culture, and f e l t that one key to China's salvation was the preservation of selected parts of the traditional heritage. A major element of Liang's 4 program to save China were the model v i l l a g e s organized under the d i r e c t i o n of his Rural Reconstruction Association. His goal was to simultaneously revivify the communal virtues explic i t in the traditional heritage, while bringing the benefits of modern s c i e n t i f i c agriculture to ru r a l China. As Liang Shu-ming was concentrating his efforts in rural China, Chang Chun-mai was busy focusing his energies within the e l i t e strata of Chinese society. Chang might be seen as tangentially related to Liang Shu-ming, rather than as an advance along a continuum of conservative evolution. Each man had found a different focal point in their common effort to save China as a cultural and p o l i t i c a l entity from the forces of domestic chaos and foreign aggression. This study w i l l focus on Chang Chun-mai* s work in the national-level p o l i t i c a l arena. In doing so I w i l l also question the commonly held Western b e l i e f that Chang Chun-mai was a Western-oriented l i b e r a l - democrat. Chang Chun-mai i s known to most i n the West as Carsun Chang, the author of The Third Force in China, written in the early 1950's after his self-imposed p o l i t i c a l e x i l e from the Republic of China. In that English-language work, Chang portrayed himself to his predominantly American audience as the leader of the Chinese anti-communist, a n t i - f a s c i s t , liberal-democrats. Placing himself i n opposition to both the communist dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung and the one-party dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek, Chang assumed the mantle of leadership of China's l a s t hope for democratic government. I believe that this study w i l l show that Chang was much l e s s "Westernized" than some believe, and that his commitment to l i b e r a l democracy was e x t e n s i v e l y c o l o r e d by h i s conservative, traditional bent. 5 This study i s an i n i t i a l e f f o r t which of necessity has focused on Chang Chun-mai's efforts to bring a constitution to l i f e i n China—only a small segment of his interest. Neither does this study pretend to be an in-depth study of Chang's philosophical thought; his philosophy and i t s Western inputs have been introduced only so f a r as i s necessary to understand Chang's basic motives and drives. A clearer, and perhaps truer picture of Chang Chiin-mai must await the research the subject deserves. To understand Chang Chiin-mai and the type of conservatism that he represented, we need to examine certain major currents in modern Chinese intellectual history and try to juxtapose these with the p o l i t i c a l issues of the day. The traditional Chinese virtues of conciliation and compromise, amply expressed i n terms of values and behavior, only served to give form and regulation to a rich history of intellectual challenge and confrontation. For centuries, orthodox Chinese scholars had wielded t h e i r pens i n defense of t h e i r respective interpretations of the Confucian r e a l i t y . These battles, however, were waged with one overriding principle in mind: regardless of one's ordering and emphasis of the Confucian cosmology, those elements per se went unchallenged. As an explanation of the ultimate causes and the ultimate meaning of l i f e and as a vehicle for the preservation of Chinese culture, Confucianism, of one sort or another, was fo r centuries accepted as an i n t e g r a l part of the Chinese c u l t u r a l tradition. The study of modern Chinese intellectual history, however, reveals new currents of thought which forcefully and sometimes convincingly eroded Confucianism's facade of immutability. The t r a d i t i o n a l view that the state, the culture, and the arts were an organic whole, mutually dependent, and i n tune with heaven began to weaken. The years 1898 and 6 1919 are seen by some as "watersheds i n the h i s t o r y of China's intellectual break with the values of Confucian c i v i l i z a t i o n . " 1 Whereas the e a r l i e r date can be seen as a reform e f f o r t aimed at inhe r i t e d antiquated i n s t i t u t i o n s , the l a t e r date was a profound attack on the Chinese moral and social order. NEC—TRADITIONAL INTELLECTUAL CURRENTS Between 1898 and 1919 there developed a wide range of c o n f l i c t i n g intellectual currents in China. Competing for a chance to be heard were republicans, anarchists, s o c i a l i s t s , monarchists, and more. Before 1919 and the total i s t i c iconoclasm that accompanied i t , certain neo-traditional i n t e l l e c t u a l currents competed for influence. These various schools of neo-traditionalist thought each sought the causes and solutions to China's problems, not the least of which was the seemingly immediate threat to the existence of the Chinese state. Among these neo-traditional i s t s were those such as Chang Ping-lin and L i u Shih-p'ei, who were prominent i n the "national essence" school of thought (Kuo-ts'ui hsueh-p'ai). The National Essence Movement found adherents among classical scholars and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s who believed that the very substance of Chinese culture was to be found i n unique r a c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l ingredients. The perceived threat posed to the existence of Chinese culture by the "foreign" Manchu regime, the advocates of Westernized modernization, and l a t e r by the iconoclasts of the May Fourth period, produced a sense of militant nationalism in followers of the "national essence" movement. While Chang Ping-lin held that the Confucian classics were history, plain and simple, and sought to replace Confucianism with a belief i n the "national essence," he was opposed by another group of neo-traditionalists 7 with quite different goals. K'ang Yu-wei and T'an Ssu-t'ung were leaders of the movement to make Confucianism China's state religion. In t r y i n g to explain the abysmal condition of Chinese institutions and morality, K'ang Yu-wei claimed that the o r i g i n a l teachings of Confucius had been perverted over the centuries by the s u b s t i t u t i o n of textual forgeries for p o l i t i c a l reasons, or by basic misunderstandings of the o r i g i n a l s . K'ang claimed that the true body of Confucian canon was contained i n early Han texts. Through t h i s strategy, K'ang could acknowledge that there was "something wrong" with China, but this illness of the spiritual and p o l i t i c a l body could not be blamed on the "genuine" principles of Chinese culture. This so-called New Text Confucianism was seen by K'ang as offering a natural corollary to secular government; New Text Confucianism could, as r e l i g i o n did i n the West, uphold s o c i a l morality. K'ang's New Text i n t e r p r e t a t i o n also cast Confucius as a reformer and Confucianism as a philosophy of change. In t h i s way Confucianism could offer the sp i r i t u a l foundation necessary for a changing and modernizing China. Led by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao a f t e r h i s r e t u r n to China a f t e r the Revolution of 1911, yet a third group of neo-traditional i s t s was promoting i t s formula f o r the s o l u t i o n of China's pressing s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l problems. Where "national essence" i n t e l l e c t u a l s had seen China's s p i r i t u a l legacy embodied i n race, history, and a r t , Liang found the enduring and unique quality of Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n in what he termed the "national character" (kuo-hsing). Every nation, according to Liang, had a nature, unique to i t s e l f , and to be found i n i t s people. China's "national character," as idealized by Liang, was "familism" (chia-tsu chu- i ) , whose virtues "encouraged a s p i r i t of collective solidarity and s e l f - 8 sacrifice i n building the future, and confirmed the moral legitimacy of a p o l i t i c a l e l i t e based on ta l e n t . . . N e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s of every s t r i p e deserve c r e d i t for at l e a s t f u l f i l l i n g the d i c t a t e s of t h e i r roles. The whole f a b r i c of Chinese society was under stress, and Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s were looking f o r answers. They were putting their energies to the solution of a problem to be found in any healthy society; "to distinguish between those elements of the past that must be preserved i n order to prevent chaos and decadence and those which must be abandoned i n order to prevent r i g i d i t y and stultification."^ While this i s normally an ongoing, measured process, the i n t e l l e c t u a l and p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s i n China added a dimension of immediacy and urgency. Against the background of these n e o - t r a d i t i o n a l i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l currents arose a dynamic and increasingly strong current of opposition; an o p p o s i t i o n which went w e l l beyond the l i m i t s s e t by the neo- t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s . Rejecting the arguments of those who believed i n a "national essence" or a "national character," as well as those who touted Confucianism as a religion, this group called for a complete renunciation of Chinese t r a d i t i o n and c u l t u r e . Leading t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l countercurrent were such iconoclasts as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Hu Shih, and Lu Hsun. Taking an organismic view of China's Confucian tradition, Ch'en, for example, was unable to salvage anything of value from Chinese culture. His approach rejected as ludicrous Chang Chih-tung's mid-nineteenth century maxim to "take Chinese studies as the fundamental structure, Western studies for practical use" (t'i-yung). No such selective borrowing could overcome Ch'en's b e l i e f that China's current malaise was the expected outcome of the fundamentally perverse nature of t r a d i t i o n a l 9 institutions, morals, and culture. Using a very broad brush, Ch'en found nearly a l l aspects of Chinese tradition to be derivatives of Confucianism. In his view, Confucianism was inappropriate for the modern world because i t ran counter to the 5 modern way of l i f e whose essence was equality and independence. Hu Shih, a leader of the l i t e r a r y reform movement and, at one time, an advocate of t o t a l Westernization, joined Ch'en i n a j o i n t statement which made t h e i r p o s i t i o n clear: "The old l i t e r a t u r e , o l d p o l i t i c s , and old ethics have always belonged to one family, we cannot abandon one and preserve the others."^ These positions, coupled with Lu Hsuh's appraisal that Chinese history was "cannibalistic,"^ offended the entire spectrum of neo-traditionalist thought. If the neo-traditionalists and the iconoclasts of the May Fourth era had anything i n common i t was t h e i r awareness of the immediacy of the threat to China, and a desire to find a solution that would preserve China as a discrete entity. While the neo-traditionalists sought the solution through the preservation of some aspects of Chinese t r a d i t i o n , the iconoclasts saw the answer i n the adoption of a t o t a l l y "new culture" unsullied by the weaknesses of the past. As the contest between the iconoclasts and the neo-traditionalists intensified with the upheavals of the May Fourth period, a group of neo- t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s coalesced into what Hao Chang has i d e n t i f i e d as New Confucianists. 8 Chang sees t h i s group as r e f l e c t i n g a response to the i n t e l l e c t u a l assault of the iconoclasts. Where the "national essence" school of thought "defined Chinese national identity i n terms of general cultural or racial t r a i t s , the New Confucianists were inclined to identify Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n with one p a r t i c u l a r t r a d i t i o n a l trend, namely, 10 Confucianism. In Confucianism, New Confucianists saw something of transcultural worth; values and concepts which had universal validity. Instead of the New Text Confucianism of K'ang Yu-wei, the New Confucianists identified Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism as the embodiment of the true s p i r i t of Confucianism. In taking t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l stand which t r i e d to bridge past and present, as well as serve as a guide to the future, the New Confucianists saw themselves as the modern defenders of the neo-Confucian ethicospiritual symbolism. 1 0 In trying to discern why New Confucianists came to their particular intellectual stance, Hao Chang presents an analysis from the standpoint of China's " c r i s i s of meaning and the reaction to scientism." 1 1 The c r i s i s of meaning which Chang describes was an intense s p i r i t u a l , and, we might also suspect emotional, d i s o r i e n t a t i o n . 1 2 As in every society, Chinese had tried throughout their history to answer man's fundamental questions about the meaning of l i f e and the world. In approaching these questions Chinese tradition had gradually encompassed an accepted set of symbols and concepts which ultimately became a part of the Confucian tradition. In the late nineteenth-century, however, i n t e l l e c t u a l currents both from within China and from the West began to challenge the c e n t r a l moral- p o l i t i c a l values of the Confucian t r a d i t i o n . This challenge not only threatened the Confucian moral order, but also disputed i t s underlying metaphysics. The most serious challenge, i n the eyes of New Confucianists, came from scientism; the belief that science could provide not only the symbols and concepts, but also the methodology to answer natural, human, and social questions. Scientism, whose appeal was widespread after 1919, was offering a complete rational philosophy as a replacement for Confucianism. 11 Among this group of New Confucianists which emerged in the post-May Fourth era, were Liang Shu-ming, the philosopher and leader of the Rural Reconstructionists, T'ang Chun-i, also a philosopher, and Chang Chiin- mai, who i n addition to our previous description, was also head of the Democratic Socialist Party. Casting themselves as defenders of tradition did not at a l l mean New Confucianists had to reject science; scientism as an all-inclusive philosophical system was their antagonist, not science. Time and again these New Confucianists were w i l l i n g , i n f a c t , to adapt science or other modern concepts and institutions to their purpose; as a way of looking at l i f e , at man, and understanding them, however, they found science woefully inadequate. Related to the intellectual struggles of the post-1911 period was the search for a "new p o l i t i c a l system that would bring prosperity, s t a b i l i t y and strength to the Chinese nation."-^ This national-scale problem was in e x t r i c a b l y t i e d to the much larger universal philosophical questions that preoccupied Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s . That t h i s should be so i s not surprising. From a traditional standpoint the intimate link between good government and conforming to the universal moral order was w e l l established. Government, in i t s organization and behavior, reflected the universal harmony and ordering of the universe. The l i n k between philosophy and government forged and exemplified by generations of s c h o l a r - o f f i c i a l s insured that questions of government f e l l within the purview of Chinese intellectuals. Also, the intellectual c r i s i s was, to a s i g n i f i c a n t degree, linked with Western imperialism. The tenets of scientism and Western rationalism had threatened China i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , while Western arms threatened China p o l i t i c a l l y . What form should China's new government take? Although some 12 reformers had earlier suggested a constitutional monarchy, the proposals lost a l l meaning after 1911.14 The Revolution had established a basic direction for the development of government in post-imperial China. It had been, after a l l , "republican," and Sun Yat-sen had hurried back to China to act as the republic's f i r s t Dresident, i f only shortly. Aside from Yuan Shih-kai's ill-advised attempt to exhume the monarchy, China seemed set on a course that would eventuallv lead to some form of democratic constitutional government. Various warlord governments toyed with constitution-making, but in a China divided into warlord fiefdoms these exercises were relatively meaningless. The ostensible unification of China under the banner of the KMT, however, gave constitutionalism its f i r s t real hope of success. As the party of the late Sun Yat-sen, now termed the Father of the Country, the KMT carried a special stamp of legitimacy. With its military power and hands on the reins of government, that legitimacy took on new meaning. The Party canon, consisting of the Will and teachings of Sun, now became the orthodoxy. The evolution of China into a democratic nation would, for the next two decades, follow the guidelines set by Sun. At this point the c r i s i s of meaning, which had i t s roots before the f a l l of the Ch'ing, and the p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s precipitated by the revolution came together. New Confucianists in particular were, at one and the same time, seeking a reaffirmation of traditional symbols and values, and trying to establish a new political framework in which those values could operate. As mentioned earlier, the New Confucianists, culturallv conservative as they were, were not opposed to things. modern. Constitutional democratic government was seen as one modern Western element that could and should be imported. In particular, Chang Chun-mai believed that he 1 3 had found the source of wealth and power p r e c i s e l y i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government.15 Attempts such as this to meld Chinese and Western concepts had been made before. Luminaries such as Yen Fu, K'ang Yu-wei, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had a l l t r i e d to bring together the best of East and West. It needs to be stressed that Chang's promotion of democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government was an i n s t i t u t i o n a l measure, not one which fundamentally challenged his New Confucian credentials. As Joseph Levenson has cautioned, "Chinese reformers viewed the West and i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l claims with a good deal of ambivalence, . . ." 1 6 And so i t was with Chang Chiin-mai; he never revealed any i n f a t u a t i o n with the Western values of individualism and competition. His infatuation was with a Western model of government that could provide Chinese with an appropriate s e t t i n g or stage on which t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese values could reassert their claim to v a l i d i t y and demonstrate their efficacy in solving modern problems. This drive to bring together the best of East and West, so c l e a r l y seen i n Chang Chiin-mai, was, as Levenson pointed out, not without certain inherent tensions. It required, among other things, an indirect denial of the age-old Confucian maxim that a l l under heaven was an integrated, interconnected, mutually supportive whole. Chang Chih-tung's t'i-yung dichotomy sought to separate s p i r i t and matter into discrete spheres and deny that the l a t t e r could be a product or r e f l e c t i o n of the former. In accepting foreign f a c t o r i e s , arsenals, machinery and technology, Chang Chih-tung necessarily had to posit that they were outside of and untainted by the culture which had produced them. While Levenson believes that early synthesizers such as Chang Chih- tung embraced Confucianism both as "history" and as "value," the same 14 could not be said for those who followed him. Whereas Chang's attachment to t r a d i t i o n was i n t e l l e c t u a l , that of l a t e r Chinese would become romantic. Twentieth-century n a t i o n a l i s t s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , could no longer embrace Confucianism because of i t s "value"—its practicability to the modern w o r l d — b u t touted i t f o r i t s t r a d i t i o n a l content. Nationalists, such as Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Chun-mai, who were driven ostensibly by a desire to do away with the evils of Imperial China, s t i l l found themselves defending t r a d i t i o n , xhis paradoxical p o s i t i o n could only be held by separating the t r a d i t i o n from the i n s t i t u t i o n s i t had spawned. Mary Clabaugh Wright noted this phenomenon i n Chiang Kai-shek. She observed that for "Chiang the Confucian way of l i f e [had] l o s t i t s traditional rational and universal qualities and [had] become imbued with a romantic nationalism. It [had] supreme value because i t [was] Chinese, the source of our great past, the promise of our great future." 1^ Nationalists of this stripe could now "prescribe f i d e l i t y to what history [had] established as Chinese, rhey [could] never admit that a Chinese scholar careless of tradition [could] be a Chinese nationalist." 1** There are two parallel currents to Chang's approach; permanence and change: permanence as exemplified in the continuation and preservation of certain traditional strains of thought and culture, change as seen in the overlay of new modern p o l i t i c a l institutions. The resemblance here to the t'i-yung formula of Chang Chih-tung i s undeniable. I t can only be said that, i n Chang's case, h i s many years spent abroad i n study and teaching, his wide-ranging contact and co l l a b o r a t i o n with Western i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and his s e l e c t i v e use of Western philosophy a l l tend to blur the l i n e between a s t r i c t t'i-yung dichotomy. Chang Chiin-mai had certainly moved further towards the Western yung than Chang Chih-tung ever dreamed possible. 15 Aside from Chang's i n t e r e s t i n t r a d i t i o n a l values and modern institutions, there i s strong evidence to believe that he yet reserved a place i n h i s new scheme of government for a new e l i t e ; one which could replace the old scholar-bureaucrat of imperial days with a dynamic, forward-thinking, modern-educated s o c i a l l e a d e r — a man very much l i k e himself, i n fact. This highlights a t h i r d , related, c r i s i s faced by a large segment of the Chinese intelligentsia. Aside from the philosophical and p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s , many Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s also found themselves facing a personal c r i s i s ; a c r i s i s which undermined t h e i r p o s i t i o n and function in Chinese society. "Traditional Chinese society was composed of three p o l i t i c a l strata: the imperial court, the g e n t r y - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - l i t e r a t i c l a s s , and the common people. . ."^ Most intimate was the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the imperial court and the gentry-administrative-literati class. While Chinese emperors indeed held a monopoly on the use of force, t h e i r use of i t was not, generally, as a r b i t r a r y as i t might seem. The relationship between the emperor and the scholar-bureaucrats who staffed h i s government was, i n many cases, dependent upon the character of the emperor. A strong-willed, forceful emperor could consolidate more power in his own hands, where a weak, timid emperor might defer to his advisors and staff. The Han era, generally, could be said to be characterized by a somewhat balanced r e l a t i o n s h i p between the emperor and the scholar- bureaucrats. Han emperors were, to be sure, omnipotent, but they were amenable to moral remonstrance. O f f i c i a l s of the period never tired of reminding the emperors that "the state was the empire of the Emperor Kuo, i t did not belong to the individual ruler." 2 0 16 Reminding emperors of their responsibility to a higher duty could be a potentially effective means of curbing imperial prerogatives. The wielding of power, besides being based on custom and precedent, was also heavily influenced by Confucian moral p r i n c i p l e s . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the emperor accepted the notion that he needed the assistance and counsel of wise o f f i c i a l s , that these o f f i c i a l s should c r i t i c i z e him, and that he should accept their remonstrances.21 The only protection these o f f i c i a l s had, and the source of t h e i r influence and authority, was Confucianism. "Central to that influence was [their] monopoly control of the abstract theory and the technical vocabulary that governed the whole universe of moral, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " 2 2 As caretakers of Confucian ideology, defenders of the f a i t h , i f you w i l l , these o f f i c i a l s could act as a counterbalance to the arbitrary power of the throne.2-* Concurrent with t h e i r moral authority, governmental institutions developed that gave real power and decision-making authority to the scholar-bureaucrats. The Imperial Censorate which, theoretically, had the power to investigate and charge any person within the realm, including the emperor, and the o f f i c e of Prime Minister are cases i n point. The effectiveness of this moral and institutional counterbalance was greatly reduced by the time of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), however. The imperial institutions which had given the scholar-bureaucrats power and influence were abolished. The reforms i n s t i t u t e d by Emperor T'ai-tsu eliminated the Secretariat, the Chief M i l i t a r y Commission, and the Censorate. These changes effectively concentrated power in the emperor's hands, and significantly altered the relationship between the emperor and the scholar-bureaucrats. The system T'ai-tsu i n i t i a t e d i n c l i n e d l a t e r emperors towards "capricious and ruthless exercise of their authority over 17 the officialdom."^ With their positions separated from the top levels of government, the scholar-bureaucrats had to r e l y s o l e l y on persuasive remonstrance to check emperors' abusiveness. T'ai-tsu further proscribed his advisors' freedom of action by attacking the Mencian precepts which had j u s t i f i e d the o f f i c i a l s ' remonstrances. T'ai-tsu created a s p e c i a l board of scholars which purged eighty-five passages from Mencius' works which he found offensive to a rulers' prerogatives. Not surprisingly, i t was Mencius that Chang Chiin-mai appealed to in his reconciliation of Confucianism with democracy. In a fashion, Chang was attempting to resurrect the r u l e r - m i n i s t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p that had existed before the time of T'ai-tsu. The f a l l of the Ch'ing empire in 1911 brought with i t the destruction of the sociopolitical and cultural-moral orders. /As Lin Yu-sheng has observed, the concept of universal kingship, so i n t i m a t e l y supported by Confucianism, had h e l d together the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l - m o r a l orders. Even i n the face of c e n t r i f u g a l forces i n the l a t e Ch'ing, the court's i n t e g r a t i v e function had been the glue that held the empire together. The empire's demise, Lin concludes, had p a r t i c u l a r l y devastating consequences for Chinese society. 2 5 Tied as closely as they were to the empire and the court, the g e n t r y - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - l i t e r a t i c l a s s , for example, were l e f t without p o s i t i o n , status, or function. They did not disappear as a c l a s s , they simply became irrelevant. /As the g e n t r y - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e - l i t e r a t i c l a s s was being eclipsed, another, "new Western-oriented intelligentsia was emerging in the c i t i e s , i n the new schools and u n i v e r s i t i e s , and among students sent abroad." 2 6 "No longer educated for office, intellectuals more and more stood outside 18 the mainstream of p o l i t i c a l power . . ." 2 7 And while i t was only natural for these new e l i t e s to seek a r o l e and a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for themselves, there were no i n s t i t u t i o n s which could u t i l i z e t h e i r expertise or give them the influence and authority they desired. This new breed of e l i t e s , i n addition to addressing the important philosophical and p o l i t i c a l challenges of the day, were also b u i l d i n g a case for their own existence. By placing themselves between the center of authority and the people, by acting as the spokesman for democratic constitutional government, by supporting the creation of new institutions which gave them p o s i t i o n and influence, by acting as a moral check on government, and by mastering the vocabulary and claiming the authority to interpret the tenets of constitutional democracy, the new intelligentsia were carving a new niche for themselves in modern China. Chang Chun-mai i s a clear example of t h i s emerging group of new e l i t e s ; blending traditional and modern, Chinese and Western. Chang's behavior i s as revealing as the content of his writings. Following his career seems, at f i r s t , to involve successive changes of focus; one period seems dominated by p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , the next by educational pursuits, the next l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t i e s , academic study, and so on. Only when one recognizes that Chang's focus never wavers with respect to his goal does the task become clearer. I t i s only the avenues Chang uses to reach his goal that change. Chang i s a man i n pursuit of a moral goal, for himself and for China. These successive s h i f t s i n focus observable in Chang were nothing new to Chinese culture. Arthur Wright long ago observed that Chinese culture had developed a "variety of a l t e r n a t i v e s to those who were driven from the arena of power."2** Somewhat analogous to the Confucian scholar-bureaucrat who, driven from Court, turned to Taoist seclusion or poetry, Chang Chun-mai lik e w i s e 1 9 turned to l e s s controversial pursuits when his a c t i v i t i e s i n one arena angered his powerful antagonists. Central to understanding Chang Chiin-mai i s the recognition of his self-perceived role. As a culturally conservative New Confucian, he not only idealized certain neo-Confucian precepts, but he also idealized the role of the Confucian gentleman (chun-tzu). According to Confucian dogma the "highest ideal of Confucianism-inner sagehood and outer kingliness commanded a Confucian to both engage i n internal moral self-cultivation and to exert external influence upon others for the construction of the universal moral community."2^ In t h i s context Chang's seemingly abrupt swings in focus and activity are more easily explainable. Thomas Metzger observed that ". . . Confucian thought generally wavered between the poles of s e l f - c u l t i v a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l action."^ 0 I t could be added that Confucians, as we l l , wavered between those poles. As i s the case with Chang Chiin-mai, when one avenue of action was exhausted or frustrated he, without pause, s h i f t e d to another. "The range of s e r v i c e s t h a t Confucianism sought to d e l i v e r . . . included regulation, education, and the resolution of c r i s e s . " ^ 1 Chang's pursuits e a s i l y covered a l l these and more. Whether Chang Chiin-mai ever referred to himself as a Confucian, of any stripe, i s irrelevant; his actions and assumptions clearly indicate behavior that i s consistent with traditional patterns. John Dardess has shown that "the o v e r a l l behavior of those who considered themselves Confucians was consciously aimed at, and i n some ways achieved, a s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n and a s o c i a l r o l e i n which one can see a l o g i c a l consistency."^ Even i f chang did not openly acknowledge his behavior as "Confucian" or " t r a d i t i o n a l , " i t was only too cl e a r to others. His 20 p o l i t i c a l a n t a g o n i s t s judged Chang to be l i t t l e b e t t e r than an anachronism, and f e l t that he "had spent his whole l i f e studying the halcyon days of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti and Han Wu-ti," and that "he •so completely represent [ed] the interests of the landlords. J If we look for the " s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n " and " s o c i a l r o l e " that Chang consciously aimed at, i t i s evident that i t was as a member of an e l i t e — a new e l i t e c e r t a i n l y , but one whose r o l e and relationships as a mediator between the "court" and the masses were quite traditional in nature. To be sure, Chang did set himself apart from the masses, he did view himself as a member of an e l i t e group possessing certain expert knowledge, a view wholly c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Dardess' d e f i n i t i o n of Confucianism as a profession.^ 4 Chang was one of a "new l i t e r a t i " struggling to f i n d a place for themselves i n modern China. They would, as d i d t h e i r traditional counterparts, continue to act as mediators between the locus of power and the people, "to systematize . . . demands and provide solutions".-^ The major difference now was that the body of expert knowledge had changed somewhat from traditional times. Instead of purely t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese wisdom, t h i s "new l i t e r a t i " (in Chang's case New- Confucianists) sought to "find a course of action from traditional China and from foreign s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i z a t i o n s to save China . . ."^6 E a r l i e r we noted t h a t Hao Chang had d i s t i n g u i s h e d the New Confucianists' reaction as against scientism rather than against science. Not wanting to seem backward or obscurantist, Chang Chun-mai was ready to use science to his own ends. Perhaps to j u s t i f y his own desires he observed that "today, science has reached the point where every kind of knowledge has become a specialty, every kind of s k i l l has become a special ab i l i t y . National affairs can no longer be dealt with by people with only general knowledge."-*7 And what kind of expert knowledge would Chang be 21 talking about? In a country trying in many ways to emulate the West, what kind of learning was most appropriate? The answer, of course, i s obvious. Without pointing to himself, Chang suggests that those possessing t h i s expert knowledge be given "status and position."^ 8 With possibly just a b i t of nostalgia Chang went on to suggest that once educational background and experience were set as standards, the government might use some kind of examination to further differentiate these experts.-* 9 Even as Chang envisioned the new chiin-tzu's f u l f i l l i n g their service i d e a l , others, l e s s convinced of h i s s i n c e r i t y , mocked him f o r h i s expectation that "everyone should revere those statesmen of high v i r t u e and knowledge," 4 0 or that "the success or f a i l u r e of a l l things i s dependent on a hero to resolve them."41 Much of what Chang Chun-mai t r i e d to do i n the way of creating democratic institutions in China can be seen as efforts to reestablish a sociopolitical structure that would accomodate his generation of elites. His use of terms familiar to Western democratic tradition, however, should not be misread as a deep commitment to populism. The basic s t r a i n s of paternalism inherent in the Confucian tradition were clearly v i s i b l e in Chang's efforts to build a replacement for the institutional structure of Imperial China. Through such e f f o r t s Chang sought to r a t i o n a l i z e the relationships between the various p o l i t i c a l elements of modern China, and to regain the harmony and order that would bring peace and prosperity to China. 22 CHAPTER ONE NOTES ^Charlotte Furth, "Intellectual change: from the Reform movement to the May Fourth movement, 1895-1920," in John K. Fairbank and Denis Twitchett, eds., The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 12, Republican China. 1912-1949. Part I (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1978-1983), p. 322. ^Ibid. pp. 354-361; Also see Lawrence A. Schneider, "National Essence and the New Intelligentsia," pp. 57-89; Martin Bernal, "Liu Shih- p'ei and the National Essence, pp. 90-112; and Charlotte Furth, "The Sage as Rebel: The Inner World of Chang Ping-lin, pp. 113-150 a l l in Charlotte Furth, ed., The. Limits of. Change; Essays QR Conservative Alternatives in Republican China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976). 3Furth, "Intellectual change," p. 362-363. 4Page Smith, The Historian and History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 150. 5 L i n Yu-sheng, The. Cris i s of Chinese Consciousness; Radical Antitraditionalism i n the. May Fourth Era (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 73. 6Chow Tse-tung, The May. Fourth Movement; Intellectual Revolution i n Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 289 7Ibid. p. 308. °Hao Chang, "New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China," in Furth, Limits of Change, pp. 276-302. 9Ibid. p. 277. 1 0 I b i d . p. 278. u l b i d . p. 280. 1 o Ibid. pp. 280-282. Hao Chang identifies three elements to this spiritual disorientation: moral, existential, and metaphysical. The moral disorientation was a result of the radical iconoclasm of the May Fourth era which rejected the whole Confucian moral tradition. The existential disorientation resulted from the crumbling of traditional religious beliefs which had heretofore given Chinese emotional shelter. The metaphysical disorientation sprang from the assault on the traditional metaphysical world view of religion and philosophy by science. -"Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule. 1927-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. v i i . 23 ^Tuan Shih-k'ai's imperial presumptions some years later were shared by few and could hardly be said to represent a le g i t i m a t e current of thought. •^Chang Chun-mai, "Kuo-chia wei shen-me yao hsien-fa?" i n Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang chuan-chi (n.p.: Ts'ai-sheng she pien-chi pu, 1946), p. 5. Hereafter CKMCSHTCC. Also see P h i l i p C. Huang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese liberalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), and Benjamin Schwartz, In Search Q£ Wealth and Power: Yen FJI and the West (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1964). 1 6 Furth, "Intellectual change," p. 324. 1 7Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration. 1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 307. 1 8J.R. Levenson, "'History* and 'Value': Tensions of I n t e l l e c t u a l Choice i n Modern China," i n Arthur F. Wright, ed., Studies i n Chinese Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), p. 171. 1 9Robert Bedeski, State-Building in Modern China: The. Kuomintang in the Prewar Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 164. 2 0Hans Bielenstien, The Bureaucracy of Han Times. Cambridge Studies i n Chinese History, Patrick Hanan and Denis Twitchett, gen. eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 143. 2 1 I b i d . o o "-'John w. Dardess, Confucianism and Autocracy; professional Elites in the Founding of the Ming Dynasty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 288. 2 3 Y . C wang, Chinese intellectuals and the. West: 1872-1949 (Chapel H i l l : University of North Carolina, 1966), p. x i . 2 4 C h a r l e s 0. Hucker, The. Ming Dynasty: Its. Origins and Evolving I n s t i t u t i o n s (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1978), pp. 96-97. 2 5 L i n , Chinese Consciousness, pp. 11-17. Furth also observed these "devastating consequences." He noted that the collapse of the concept of universal kingship and i t s attendant institution, which had symbolized the interdependence of the Chinese value system and the socio-political order, was "profoundly d i s p i r i t i n g . " See Furth, " I n t e l l e c t u a l change," pp. 350-351. 2 6Bedeski, State-Building, p. 164. 27Furth f "Intellectual change," p. 322-323. 24 Arthur F. Wright, "Values, Roles, and Personalities," in Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, eds., Confucian P e r s o n a l i t i e s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 15. 2 9 L i n Yu-sheng, "The Suicide of Liang Chi: An Ambiguous Case of Moral Conservatism," in Furth, Limits of. Change. p. 160. 30Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving P o l i t i c a l Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977),.p. 79. 3 1Dardess, Confucianism and. Autocracy, p. 54. 3 2 I b i d . p. 6. 3 3 H s i a K'ang-nung, Lun. flu Shih yu Chang Chun-mai. (Shanghai: Hsin- chih shu-tien ch'u-pan, 1946), p. 51. 3 4Dardess, Confucianism and. Autocracy, pp. 7-8. 3 5Guy A l i t t o , The. Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 199. 3 6Wen-hua chiao-yii yen-chiu hui, Kp_ k'ang-jih tang-p'ai i i hsiian- ch'uan huo-tung (n.p.: Wen-hua chiao-yu hui ch'u-pan, 1941), p. 197. Hereafter KKJTPTHCHT. -"Ts'ai-sheng she, Women yao suo shuo t i hua, (n.p.: Ts'ai-sheng she ch'u-pan, 1946), p. 16. Hereafter WYSSTH. 3 8 I b i d . 3 9 I b i d . p. 18. 4 0 H s i a K'ang-nung, Lun Hu Shih yu Chang Chun-mai. p. 62; p. 64. 41Wen-hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT. p. 211. 25 CHAPTER TWO: EARLY EDUCATION: BEGINNING OF A SYNTHESIS For the generation of the 1880's the d e c l i n i n g years of the Ch'ing dynasty held both great uncertainty and great promise. Some would no doubt feel at a loss to explain the disintegration of a p o l i t i c a l system they were intimately linked to by education, position, or class. Others, who, for whatever reasons, were able to bridge the chasm between Imperial China and a "national" China, would f i n d opportunities to be i n the forefront of those leading China into the twentieth century. This latter group of men and women represented both the more " r a d i c a l " and the more "progressive" elements of the spectrum of p o l i t i c a l thought i n China. Some would provide the leadership of the May Fourth Movement, others would help conceive and bring to l i f e the Chinese Communist Party, while others, more conservative by nature, would try a new rapprochement with Western culture that was related to, but d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t from, the e a r l i e r efforts of the "Self-Strengtheners." As a member of the 1880's generation, Chang Chun-mai represents the latter, more conservative element. His early years were f a i r l y typical of the adjustments and challenges faced by his contemporaries. Forced by circumstances, as much as driven by desire, Chang's early education set a pattern of fusing traditional and modern, Chinese and Western, that would continue throughout his l i f e . Chang's family was, by a l l indications, a respectable one; natives of Chiangsu province, his ancestors had been scholars since the seventh century, his grandfather had traveled widely and studied broadly, e s p e c i a l l y i n the area of Sung Confucianism.! Much l i k e the son of a scholar i n older times, Chang received his early education at home under the guiding hands of prominent l o c a l Confucian scholars. 2 Chang began 26 reading at s i x , and by eleven had been given the fundamentals of a standard Confucian education. His tutors had l e d him through The Four Books, the Collected Works p i Tseng Kuo-fan (Ts'eng Wen-cheng kung ch'uan- ch i ) . Ku Yen-wu's A Record QL Daily Knowledge (JJJa chih 111), and introduced him to Tz'u chih t'ung chien. a 294 volume chronicle by Ssu-ma Kuang covering a period of 1362 years down to the period of the Five Dynasties. 3 An education so heavily infused with Confucian ethics and morality, combined with the natural influence on early development of a tradition- laden home environment, gave Chang a worldview, t r a d i t i o n a l i n nature, that became a touchstone to which he would return again and again throughout his l i f e . In view of Chang's l a t e r writings, i t seems clear that his appraisal of Western philosophy and his synthesis of Western and Chinese thought were l a r g e l y guided by using these early-learned principles as a standard. The importance of those early years at home, absorbed i n the study of c l a s s i c a l texts cannot, i n Chang's case, be overlooked. The influence of early education i s , of course, a complex v a r i a b l e whose effects are not uniform. In some cases, such as Lu Hsun, Ch'en Tu- hsiu, or i n i t i a l l y at l e a s t , Yen Fu, the mature i n d i v i d u a l rejected his early education and denounced i t , sometimes in the most v i l e terms.4 In contrast, Chang's embrace of the Confucian world-view was, i f anything, reinforced as he grew older. His l i f e shows a steady and consistent pattern of behavior strikingly similar to that of a "model" Confucian. In a rebuttal to Hu Shih's iconoclasm he once said that "Confucius i s the p i l l a r of China. . ."5 and wondered i f Hu Shih r e a l l y understood the great sage. And years a f t e r the "loss" of China to the Communists Chang authored a seminal work on Neo-Confucianism that revealed h i s strong 27 a f f i n i t y for the thought of Wang Yang-ming. With his home education finished and a solid Confucian foundation in place, young Chang was enrolled i n one of the "new schools" which had m u l t i p l i e d i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the nineteenth century. These "new schools" sought to combine Chinese learning and Western science to train a new generation of Chinese intellectuals who, armed with the best of both c u l t u r e s , would l e a d China i n i t s quest f o r wealth and power. The decision to place Chang, the eldest son, in such a school must surely have been a serious and r e l a t i v e l y bold one for the family. As Chang l a t e r commented, "at that time . . . most people f e l t that studying i n a for e i g n - s t y l e school was tantamount to not studying at a l l . " ^ Credit should be given to Chang's mother who, apparently, was the force behind the decision. She certainly could not have foreseen the coming abolition of the Imperial examination system, but she was able to see c l e a r l y i n what d i r e c t i o n China's future lay. So, i n 1897 Chang was packed o f f to Shanghai and entered the I n s t i t u t e of Modern Languages (Kuang-fang Yen- kuan). Despite i t s a p p e l l a t i o n as a school of "foreign learning", the institute did not neglect more traditional courses. While Chang studied English four days a week, he continued to study Chinese the other three days. During the four days of English classes Chang was also expected to master mathematics, chemistry, physics, and world history. His Uiinese classes s t i l l , to a degree, followed the t r a d i t i o n a l pattern of reading historical anecdotes and writing essays.7 Only twelve, Chang was already an amalgamation of modern and t r a d i t i o n a l ; his education had brought together and fused the "new learning and the old ethics". 8 During the next four years, as Chang f i n i s h e d his middle school 28 education, he was by no means isolated from or immune to the events about him. Like many others, he must have watched with keen interest the tide of reform that was r i s i n g against the Empress Dowager, Tz'u Hsi. The reformist ideas of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao struck a responsive cord i n Chang Chun-mai; they planted a seed and sparked his interest in a way that would only become apparent i n the future. 9 K'ang and Liang's emphasis on gradual reform and modernization, with a strong s t r a i n of Confucian moralizing, melded well with the thrust of his "new" education and satisfied his need to reconcile the past with the future. It i s impossible to say what effect the failure of the Hundred Days of Reform and the f l i g h t from China of K'ang and Liang had on Chang. One can only imagine that the pictures of K'ang and Liang, along with t h e i r arrest warrants, that hung above school doors i n China, must have given Chang pause to reflect and wonder about the future of the Empire. S t i l l following, more or less, a traditional pattern, Chang returned to his home prefecture and sat f o r the p r o v i n c i a l exams i n 1902. The evidence suggests that Chang sat for a traditional style exam, composing essays based on quotations from the C l a s s i c s . Chang di d well enough to earn a hsiu-ts'ai degree. 1 0 Continuing his education, Chang spent a half year at the China Institute (Chen-tan hsueh-yiian), which he l e f t for lack of money, and then enrolled in the Nanking kao-teng hsueh-hsiao. It was not long, however, before Chang's maturing consciousness and China's own c r i s i s would lead him in new directions. The encroachment of Russia into Chinese territory fueled the flames of a growing nationalism i n China. Humiliated only a few years earlier by Japan, Russia now added to China's humiliation by occupying large areas of Manchuria. Chang Chun-mai began to express his own sense of nationalism and outrage, as w e l l as a willingness to take action; while 29 s t i l l a student, he t r i e d to e n l i s t i n the volunteer army of Niu Yung- c h i e n . l l Though nothing came of Chang's m i l i t a r y intentions, he was stimulated to seek his own future and the salvation of China through new avenues. Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905 stunned the world. For Japanese and Chinese i t was simply electrifying. Asians saw the Japanese victory as proof that the Western powers were not invincible; i t was possible for an Asian nation to modernize and become equal with the West. Japan's greatest success, though, was that i t had been able to adopt a Western-style c o n s t i t u t i o n and become strong i n d u s t r i a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y while yet preserving i t s traditional heritage. Hatred and past humiliations aside, many Chinese found that the Japanese had given them back a sense of pride and hope. They now looked to Japan for clues and guidance to China's own redemption. Chang Chiin-mai, no less than others, saw Japan as the place to be; in the period around 1905 the Chinese student population in Japan had grown to about 13,000, a 1,300 percent increase since 1900.12 In the spring of 1905 then, Chang, only recently married and just twenty-one, set s a i l for Japan. Originally, Chang had gone to Japan as an overseas student sponsored by his home prefecture. According to the conditions of his stipend, he was to study the natural sciences. Unfortunately, Chang could work up no int e r e s t i n his courses, and soon l e f t the government-approved school. Although he quickly gained entrance to Tokyo's Waseda University, his studies i n p o l i t i c a l science did l i t t l e to impress the p r o v i n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s back home who cut o f f h i s s t i p e n d and e f f e c t i v e l y l e f t him destitute. 1 3 After the failure of The Hundred Days of Reform, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had 30 also gone to Japan. As a student, Chang had been content to follow the reformer throught his writings in the Ufew. People's Miscellany (Hsin-min ts'ung-pao). But now the necessity of earning a li v i n g provided the impetus which brought Chang and Liang together. Chang began writing for the New People's Miscellany and for the university newspaper. Materially, these were not the best of times. Chang, who was helping to support his younger brother who was also studying in Japan, was barely able to exist on what he earned writing and what his family could contribute. He and his brother lived mostly on sweet potatoes, the cheapest food available. Intellectually, however, these were fruitful times. Not only did Chang begin a life-long relationship with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (which has been described both as a master-disciple and as a father-son relationship), but, he was now free to give f u l l vent to his intellectual curiosity. University l i f e in Japan for overseas Chinese students was not a retreat to the hallowed halls of learning; rather, i t put them in the vanguard of the various movements to save China (whether through reform or revolution). These young students involved themselves in a host of activities within the university and without. Students organized study groups that discussed everything from poetry to p o l i t i c s , reform to revolution. As Chang puts i t , ". . . everyone was interested in politics, no one thought of education as an end in i t s e l f . " 1 4 In other words, these students were in Japan to gain the tools, the s k i l l s , to affect change in China. Waseda University was also a center of the "New Village Movement" inspired by Tolstoi and Kropotkin. No evidence suggests that Chang participated in any way in the movement, but the voluntaristic communal aspects of i t s philosophy may have added to and helped define Chang's own, later, socialist agrarian policies. 1 5 The most significant aspect of Chang's tenure in Japan i s his 31 association with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Through Chang's work on the staff of Liang's New People's Miscellany in 1907, he was brought into the mainstream of those advocating reform through constitutional government, rather than through violent revolution. For almost a year, before the journal ceased publication, Chang, writing under the pseudonym Li Chai, was able to begin to define and give expression to his p o l i t i c a l views. Chang also joined the Political Information Society (Cheng-wen she), which had been established in Tokyo by friends of Liang's. The society's charter called for "implementing a parliamentary form of government, establishing a 'responsible' government [probably a responsible cabinet system], establishing laws and the independence of judicial authority, the affirmation of local self-government, a program of cautious diplomacy/ and the protection of equal rights." 1 6 Chang was a contributor to the Society's journal Discourses on Pol i t i c s (Cheng Lun), and helped handle the affairs of the society in Japan after i t s headquarters moved to Shanghai. The Political Information Society was suppressed by the Manchu government in 1908, and Chang's involvement with the group seems to have ceased shortly thereafter. 1 7 Almost impossible to gauge accurately is the influence Liang had on Chang's intellectual development. Liang's own intellectual evolution charted a course that swung from anti-Manchu agitator to conservative reformer, from revolutionary to constitutional monarchist. 1 8 It was Liang, the reformer, who had f i r s t attracted Chang Chun-mai during his middle school days, and i t was Liang, the proponent of parliamentary government, whom Chang met in 1906. While not part of this study, i t should be noted in passing that to label Chang Chiin-mai as a "supporter" of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,19 as some have, 32 is to say very l i t t l e at a l l . That Liang had a profound affect on Chang there can be l i t t l e doubt; their thinking is similar in many areas. At the time Chang worked on Liang's New People's Miscellany, they both firmly embraced peaceful reform as the most efficacious means of rectifying China's i l l s . Both shared the dilemma of how to reconcile the conflicting meanings of Confucian principle and democratic government.20 Liang's ideas on economics, which "favored the development of private capital under state control—a kind of 'state reformism' characterized by public ownership of u t i l i t i e s , factory laws, regulation of monopolies, progressive income taxes and similar measures . . ."21 bear a striking resemblance to Chang's brand of "state socialism" that would appear in the 1930's.22 The notion that cultures could be creatively blended was, in the early twentieth century, also a notion that both men could use effectively. 2 3 Chang, in fact, would continue to use this device long after Liang had rejected Western civilization i n toto. 2 4 To recognize their s i m i l a r i t i e s though i s only to highlight their differences. The most striking and the most pertinent to this study are their contrasting views on sovereignty, human rights, and constitutional government. As Liang Ch'i-ch'ao moved away from his early belief in popular sovereignty, the notion "that people might be sovereign through some form of legislated a. priori rights [became] an idea incompatible with his own belief that p o l i t i c a l Utopia would be arrived at through a historical process of human "self-actualization." 2 5 Chang had no quarrel with the importance of self-actualization—Neo-Confucianism gave ample support for i t — b u t Chang added the existence and protection of human rights as a prerequisite to its realization. Self-actualization implies the existence and function of free will. Free will, in turn, was viewed by Chang systemically—it could not operate 33 freely in one sphere while being denied in another. In worldly terms, free w i l l was expressed in an individual's a b i l i t y to operate freely within his environment. This included the economic, religious, artistic, social, and political spheres of everyday l i f e . As an individual operated in these various spheres, he realized spiritual freedom and moved towards self-actualization. Man's environment, as the reciprocal of this equation, reflected man's spiritual freedom in "politics, ethics, and law, and maintained the existence of the nation.2** As the environment changed, i t further allowed greater freedom for the expdsression and expansion of spiritual freedom. This cyclical self-perpetuating relationship lead to self-realization for the individual, and a state in harmony with man and the universe. Chang linked personal freedom, spiritual freedom, and p o l i t i c a l freedom. Man's basic freedoms, which he would later call people's rights, were the basis of a l l other freedoms.27 Chang further saw these freedoms—human rights—as the foundation of any truly democratic constitution. 2 8 In other words, i f Liang's "historical process of human self-actualization" were to lead to a p o l i t i c a l Utopia, i t would, by Chang's lights, require a. priori human rights to allow its operation. In the 1920's, shortly before his death, Liang rejected constitutionalism as "inadequate for China's needs, because i t was Western, l e g a l i s t i c , anti-Confucian, and a proven f a i l u r e in the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of China . . ,"29 Though both men had viewed constitutions as a means of strengthening and rationalizing the state, Chang also viewed them as instruments of balancing power and protecting human rights. Both men undoubtedly looked at constitutions in terms of methodology; constitutions were Western instruments for applying Chinese 34 concepts (another expression of t'i-yung). The hitherto f a i l u r e of con s t i t u t i o n a l i s m i n China d i d not lead Chang to re j e c t i t as Liang had done, instead he found fault with i t s application and with the sincerity of those who had promoted i t . The high hopes that Liang Ch'i-ch'ao had had for h i s "new c i t i z e n " disappeared in his later years. The masses' lack of education and public s p i r i t , i n Liang's view, made the assumption of t h e i r sovereignty ludicrous. Liang, i n the preamble to his own dr a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n , had stated s p e c i f i c a l l y , "the sovereignty of the Republic i s vested i n the state . . . and i s not vested i n the people." 3 0 This was a d i r e c t denial of a fundamental Western democratic principle. While Chang had his own doubts over the a b i l i t y of the people to f u l l y comprehend and exercise t h e i r sovereignty immediately, he never wavered i n his support of the basic principle. The preamble to Chang's c o n s t i t u t i o n i s d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed to Liang's and places sovereignty squarely within the hands of the people. By examining only these three factors, human rights, sovereignty and constitutional government, i t i s clear that Chang was more than simply a supporter or follower of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; he was his own man with views that c l e a r l y separated him from Liang. In short, to i d e n t i f y Chang too closely with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao i s to obscure their substantial differences. Perhaps i t should simply be said that Chang and Liang shared a common propensity i n t h e i r approach to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y : "the avoidance of extremes, a c o n c i l i a t o r y middle of the road stance which often l e f t [them] isolated from the real sources of p o l i t i c a l power."31 A MODERN CHUN-TZU EMERGES The next twenty years would further broaden and shape the man who 35 would enter the p o l i t i c a l arena in the 1930's. Chang Chun-mai's experiences and education would arm him with a set of values, perceptions and assumptions that would determine the manner and character of his political participation. These perceptions and assumptions, coupled with a strict personal moral code, would color Chang's expectations about his political adversaries and about what he could reasonably accomplish. Although labeled a radical revolutionary by the Ch'ing court, Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao found himself supporting the Ch'ing reform program in 1906 and, had he been welcomed, would have returned to China to work with the Court. Similarly, Chang Chun-mai did not equate his reform position to any disloyalty. His opposition to the ruling Ch'ing and his support of constitutional government in no way mitigated his respect for other traditional symbols. On the contrary, i t only illustrated the growing duality of Chang's character and education. His early immersion in Confucian texts gave traditional symbols a continuing appeal. The admixture of Chinese and Western elements gave Chang both an appreciation and respect for Chinese tradition and culture, and the perspective and reason to isolate and evaluate i t s components. Unlike Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Chang was able to differentiate between a f a i l i n g ruling house and those elements of tradition that had supra-dynastic value. Somewhat analogous to ancient scholars who could focus their loyalty on ideology and institutions rather than on a ruling emperor,32 Chang focused on components of Chinese tradition (namely Neo-Confucianism) whose value transcended temporary illnesses of the body politic. It is not surprising, therefore, that when Chang returned to China in 1910 he sat for the Imperial examinations for returned students. He did well in the examinations, was awarded the chin-shih, degree, and installed 36 as a compiler i n the Hani in Academy.33 There i s no record of what further expectations Chang had in Imperial service, but with the Wuchang uprising in October of the following year i t became a moot point. Taking his leave of the uncertainties of Peking, Chang returned to his native Chiangsu and quickly involved himself i n a bevy of p o l i t i c a l and l i t e r a r y a c t i v i t i e s . He helped to found the Republican Construction Discussion Association (Kung-ho chien-she t'ao-lun Imi) i n Shanghai. Correspondence with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao i n Japan about the need for a new p o l i t i c a l party to revitalize the reform movement led to the founding of the Democratic Party (Min-chu tang). Later, as a representative of that party, Chang went to Japan to accompany Liang on his triumphal return to China. Following the example of many others, Chang founded his f i r s t magazine, Young China (Shao-nien chung-kuo). Unfortunately, his f i r s t e f f o r t s i n publishing l e d to his f i r s t p o l i t i c a l setback. 3 4 In a December, 1912 issue of Young China, Chang rather rashly and naively delineated the major crimes of Yuan Shih-Kai. Yuan, not a man used to accepting c r i t i c i s m from an upstart l i k e Chang Chlin-mai, issued an order for Chang's a r r e s t . 3 5 A warrant for one's arres t i n modern China (a s i t u a t i o n which hasn't changed up to the present) was cause for some alarm. Looking back on those days Chang would later say that "there was no way . . . that I could s a f e l y l i v e i n Peking."3** At the urging of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and other friends Chang quickly made arrangements to leave the country. Perhaps at his own suggestion, and the fact that Chang knew some German, he embarked for Germany as the European correspondent of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l News Association (Hsien-fa hsin-wen sJiej. I t was not Chang's intention to become a journalist, nor did i t absorb him on a f u l l - 37 time basis; rather i t provided him with a small income and allowed him to keep his hand in politics. So, like an ancient scholar-official who had fallen from favor at Court, Chang retreated to the wilderness and threw himself into study. By March of 1913 he was enrolled at Berlin University pursuing a Doctorate in political science. This "retreat" to an academic l i f e was, for Chang, simply another avenue to contribute to the effort to bring order and reason back to China; i t was no less valid or meaningful than other forms of participation. The same drive to "save China" that had galvanized students in Japan continued to push Chang in Berlin. 3 7 As Chang finished his studies in Berlin, Yuan Shih-k'ai was finishing his plans for reviving the monarchy in Peking. Chang certainly had heard of Yuan's plans and had deep feelings against a revival of the monarchy. When Chang heard the news of Yunnan's secession proclamation, he resolved to return at once to China and take part in the overthrow of Yuan.38 This is about as close as Chang ever got to anything resembling "revolutionary" behavior. And how did Chang pursue his goal of overthrowing Yuan Shih-K'ai? Did he join the more militant followers of Sun Yat-sen? No. Thoroughly consistent with his past behavior, he became active in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Research Clique, a group which sought to influence Peking politics through informal channels. 3 9 As an assistant editor of the Shanghai newspaper China Times. (Shih-shih hsin-pao) f he worked closely with Chang Tung-sun, the well-known philosopher. And in his role as educator, he lectured at Peking University. Throughout the period 1916 to 1918 Chang seemed to jump from one activity to another, or to carry on several activities simultaneously; no 38 single organization or p o l i t i c a l forum seemed able to monopolize his_ concentration. His approach to p o l i t i c a l opposition was to spread his efforts across a broad front of p o l i t i c a l , educational, and l i t e r a r y activities. But pervading a l l concerns was the awareness that philosophic and moral considerations were basic. Amidst a l l of these activities, Chang and Liang, s t i l l found the time and resources to found the Pine Society (Sung She). The Society was to conduct scholarly research within and actively exchange knowledge with outside scholars. 4 0 The Pine Society was not a whimsical diversion from more important tasks, but underlined Chang's assumptions about how understanding and influence came together. As we will see later, Chang placed great faith in the ability of education and discussion to resolve disagreements and influence events. Another imperative in the Neo-Confucian worldview was the need to regularize, extend, and preserve that unique body of thought that gave them their moral license and their direction; earlier we noted Chang's self-perceived role as a modern chlin-tzu, f u l f i l l i n g among other things his service ideal. "The moral cultivation of any individual person cannot be sufficient . . . the fulfillment of one's moral l i f e depends upon one's willingness to dedicate oneself to helping others achieve moral self- f u l f i l l m e n t . " 4 1 One important way of accomplishing these goals was through academies or institutes. These institutions served a multiple purpose. First, "teachers were not simply to be moral guides, but, i t was hoped, chun-tzu and sages—indispensible active agents in the symbolic ordering of the world."42 Secondly, as teachers performed this function, they also f u l f i l l e d their own drive toward inner self-realization. Thirdly, these institutions served as a training ground for cadre; young men who would form the backbone of the c i v i l service. Providing, on the 39 one hand, expert knowledge applicable to government and, on the other hand, seeding government with men of high moral character, thus f u l f i l l i n g the Confucian tenet that held that "society could only be harmonized and set in order when men who have approached the ideal of self-realization are in public o f f i c e . " 4 3 This outlook saw in "government an agency to bring to bear on society as a whole influence of superior men through the power of moral example and of education."44 That there was an acute need for a new generation of cadre, Chang had l i t t l e doubt. At one time he went so far as to blame a l l of China's current problems on the bankruptcy of the scholars and o f f i c i a l s . 4 5 He charged scholar-officials with "cheating, jealousy, hypocrisy, seeking personal gain through public office, scheming and manipulation, baseless pride, avoiding work, and not accepting responsibility." 4 6 A far cry from the "model" Confucian Chang and other Neo-Confucianists had in mind. The institutes that Chang Chun-mai was involved with were probably patterned after those that Confucius frequently developed; a mixture of the "features of a perpetual resort camp, a library, a seminar, and a club. Living together amid scenically beautiful and scholastically adequate surroundings the students and teachers made their influence felt through their writings and their example, whenever one of their number returned to public l i f e . " 4 7 This may seem passive to the Western observer, but in China their influence was quite real. 4 8 Chang felt that Chinese schools had reached their zenith during the Sung and Ming; schools of those times were also self-supporting and thus free from outside p o l i t i c a l interference. The schoolmaster's responsibility, Chang emphasized, was twofold: to discuss knowledge and learning, while never forgetting to cultivate moral character and to train 40 the p e r s o n a l i t y . 4 9 Education, i n Chang's view, had key s o c i a l responsibilities; in the present, education was the force which molded not only the i n d i v i d u a l , but also the national character. A nation's character, l i k e man's held only the p o t e n t i a l for good. Chang f e l t that "a good education can make . . . national character change for the better, a bad education can make i t change for the worse."50 In the longer course of history, education was the force and the vehicle which allowed a culture to continuously develop. 5 1 By "preserving the good parts of ancient men's knowledge and learning," 5 2 education provides a culture with a stable base upon which to build. In 1923, Han Kuo-chun, the c i v i l governor of Chiangsu province, invited Chang to head the National I n s t i t u t e of Self-Government (Kuo-li tzu-chih hsiieh-yuan) at Shanghai. 5 3 Chang reorganized the i n s t i t u t e , which became the National P o l i t i c a l University (Kuo-li cheng-chih t a - hsiieh). and in 1925 moved i t to Wusung.54 Chang's f a i t h in the a b i l i t y of debate and discussion to lead to agreement and the resolution of conflict i s obvious i n his w i l l i n g n e s s to give c o n f l i c t i n g opinions a forum at National P o l i t i c a l University. At one point, even Wen I-to, the l e f t i s t writer and poet who had castigated the "Confucian values of 'moderation' for having induced the population to accept a l i f e between hunger and death," 5 5 taught at the university. As a counterpoint, Chang himself lectured on the m a t e r i a l i s t conception of history as well as on current p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s and philosophy. 5** Taking time from his duties at the university, Chang also traveled to Wuhan to lecture on the importance of the relationship between philosophy and p o l i t i c s . 5 7 Chang's b e l i e f that a u n i v e r s i t y such as h i s could a f f e c t the external world was amply demonstrated by the r a p i d i t y with which the Kuomintang closed i t once i t f e l l within their power. The growing tension 41 in the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere in late 1926 once again prompted Chang to use a pseudonym for safety's sake. 5 8 After the publication of his views on the Kuomintang-Communist coalition in Wuhan, the KMT f e l t the university had moved too far to the l e f t and closed i t . Eight years later Chang Chun-mai found himself in Canton. With the support of General Ch'en Po-nan, who was associated with the Southwest P o l i t i c a l Council, he founded the Hsueh-hai shu-yuan. The Hsueh-hai shu- yuan was also an example of Chang's synthesis of Chinese and Western education. The institute was really a reflection of Chang's own makeup. Besides Sung and Ming rationalism, Western philosophy and logic were also taught. The library had qood holdings in Western literature, philosophy, and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e . 5 9 The i n s t i t u t e ' s aim was to "research the profound meaning of the ancients' pursuit of perfection, and, at the same time, to absorb Western knowledge."60 By bringing East and West together, Chang believed he could make them both b e t t e r . 6 1 "The object of t h i s institute," declared the institute's charter, " i s to arouse our national culture, to add Western concepts and methods, and blend them harmoniously to r e b u i l d the foundation of a new Chinese c u l t u r e . " 6 2 The i n s t i t u t e ' s instructors were to use the methods of Western learning, but to cultivate character, they would use the pr e s c r i p t i o n s of China's former Confucian d o c t r i n e . 6 3 This was a rather s h o r t - l i v e d venture, as when Chianq K a i - shek moved to suppress the Southwest P o l i t i c a l Council, Ch'en Po-nan was a loser, and so was the institute. Chiang closed i t in mid-1936. A third and f i n a l attempt to realize a true Confucian-style academy was made in 1939. This was not wholly Chang's effort, since the project was funded by the Kuomintang government and the school was s t a f f e d by loyal Kuomintang instructors. 6 4 It was in the mountains just below Tibet 42 that the new Institute of National Culture (Chung-kuo min-tsu wen-hua shu- yuan) was established. A more beautiful setting would be hard to imagine. The charter for the institute could not be a clearer statement of the on-going attempt to imaginatively blend Chinese and Western thought. The charter reads that the purpose of the institute is: 1. To give college graduates a place to pursue scholarship without worrying about making a living. 2. Mutual respect between students and teachers to cultivate talent. 3. To cultivate frugality and the power of observation. 4. Whereas most colleges stress the attainment of knowledge, this institute emphasizes morality and wisdom. The curriculum, in part, was as follows: Research Work: A. Study of the Classics 1. Logical conception of each writer, concept of law, political thought, economic thought, and s c i e n t i f i c method. B. History 1. Ancient and modern C. Social Science 1. P o l i t i c a l Science, economics, sociology, anthropology, problems stemming from the country's environment D. Philosophy 1. Understanding Western philosophy 2. Establishing a philosophy for China 3. Recover the national spirit 4. Adopt the s p i r i t of Western philosophy 5. Promote a new spiritual direction for China.65 The curriculum outlined above clearly illustrates a facet of the tension produced by trying to reconcile the best of the East with the best of the West. As can be seen by the addition of Western-style social sciences and philosophy courses, the synthesis had gone far beyond Chang Chih-tung's marriage of Eastern spirit and Western matter. Also obvious 43 are what appear to be glaring contradictions in trying to "recover the national s p i r i t " and yet f "adopt the s p i r i t of Western philosophy" and "promote a new spiritual direction for China." Did one not deny the other? It i s d i f f i c u l t to know what Chang had in mind here r and, particularly d i f f i c u l t to see how he divided the essence of national s p i r i t from i t s direction. In view, though, of Chang's lifelong commitment to "democratic" reforms and constitutional government we might suggest what he had in mind. The "national s p i r i t " that Chang sought to recover was probably an expression of those things that gave Chinese their Chineseness; those elements of race, history, and culture which were unique to the Chinese— those same elements ealier identified as the "national essence." Included here also would be those values and mores inherited as part of the Confucian tradition. What China suffered from, however, was the lack of a sociopolitical system which could muster and concentrate the innate strength of the national spirit: a system which could give f u l l vent to the latent potentialities of the Chinese. Here, then, the West could provide an institutional model and a philosophical element that would act as a catalyst to release those latent potentialities. Constitutional democracies could help to harmonize society by providing the arena for and the lines of communication between the various segments of society. The s p i r i t of democratic government, with i t s attendant emphasis on the protection of human rights, would release the individual so that he might advance in his quest for self-realization. This was no mere attempt to copy the West. Disillusioned as were many by the failure of the West so brutally revealed in World War I, Chang Chun- mai, we might assume, expected constitutional democracy in a Chinese 44 setting to blossom into something of unparalleled perfection. The West's capitalistic foundation and emphasis on the supremacy of the individual would always act as brakes to limit the advance of Western civilization. China, on the other hand, would point man in the proper direction to assume his proper place in the someday-to-be-realized ta-t'ung (great harmony). Whether Chang was ever able to adequately r a t i o n a l i z e the contradictions of his synthesis to his students will remain unknown. It should be clear, however, that his appeal was highly intellectual and directed at a narrow audience. The minutiae of his synthesis could have l i t t l e appeal to the mass of Chinese. As with the Hsueh-hai shu-yuan in 1936, the Institute of National Culture ran afoul of the KMT. Chang Chun-mai was accused of inciting a student demonstration in the summer of 1942. The Institute was closed and Chang was kept in Chungking under semi-restraint. The problems which Chang Chlin-mai encountered between his institutes and the government were neither unique nor new to Chinese history. Academies (shu-yuan) during the Ming dynasty, for example, went through several periods of imperial suppression. The suppression of academies showed that the throne recognized them as political as well as educational groups. The association of academies during the Ming with p o l i t i c a l factions and their overt political agitation led to their suppression. Much l i k e Ming rulers, the Nanking Government viewed academies as separate p o l i t i c a l organizations outside of the one legitimate national polity. Nanking's efforts to co-opt men like Chang Chlin-mai by providing funds, facilities, and teachers, mirrored the Ming program to transform private academies into official or semi-official schools.***' 45 These schools represent an integral part of Chang Chun-mai's program for national salvation. Like traditional academies, these institutions were to play an active role in society by bringing together the philosophical and the scientific, the spiritual and the temporal. Their curriculum not only demonstrated the intimate and indivisable relationship between philosophical absolutes and temporal phenomenon, but also the legacy of Chang Chih-tung's attempt to reconcile the Chinese t ! i with the Western yung. The fact that, at their height, the National P o l i t i c a l University had only 150-160 students and the Institute of National Culture about 100 6 7—only 13 of the students in the latter case closely associated with Chang Chun-mai68—suggests that these academies were restricted to a very small elite group and did not represent any attempt at mass popular education. The goal of these academies was no less than to produce chun-tzu? modern-day scholar-officials who could bring their special talents and moral force to bear on social problems. A l l this is an example of one segment of the "new intelligentsia," adrift in the intellectual confusion of the post May Fourth era and its attendant "crisis of meaning," unsure of what their roles were to be,^9 searching for their own and China's salvation. The f i n a l and posssibly the most important addition to Chang's philosophical make-up, was the result of disillusionment and betrayal; disillusionment over the failure of the West's much vaunted system of international law, and the betrayal of China by her wartime allies at the Paris Peace Conference. When Chang had left Europe he was convinced that Germany would lose World War I. At the time, he had strongly advocated China's entry into the war on the side of the A l l i e s as a way of gaining release from the 46 unequal treaties.' 1" As one of the victorious A l l i e s , many Chinese believed, China would not only gain equal status and respect, but would also realize the return of Chinese territory in Shantung earlier ceded to Germany. Chinese, unfortunately, had not allowed for the duplicity of their a l l i e s , France and England, who, during the war, had made secret agreements that transferred the German concessions to, of a l l people, the Japanese. Appeals to international law and fairness among allies f e l l on deaf ears in Paris. The Chinese, who had expected so much, were l e f t powerless in the face of brute force. The anger and frustration of Chinese at this new humiliation boiled over and climaxed in the May Fourth Incident. In a display of China's emerging nationalism, students, merchants, and workers joined in demonstrations and anti-Japanese boycotts. Who could begin to convince Chinese that Woodrow Wilson's platitudes of justice and fraternity were anything but cruel deception? Badly shaken in his esteem for the West and its institutions, Chang searched for an explanation for the want of morality in Paris and the reason for the terrible destruction the West had visited upon itself. He concluded that science, the very element that seemed to characterize Western culture, was also i t s undoing. Chang began a search for a new philosophical formula that would minimize the importance of science.71The institutions that had seemed to give the West its strength had, as well, revealed their flaws. International law, which had seemed to incorporate Western rationalism was shown by the action of China's a l l i e s to be nothing but a pious sham and a system designed to support and perpetuate the dominance of the West. Chang saw i t now as just so many "empty words",72 and rejected i t . 47 Chinese were not alone in their disillusionment with modern scientific society; some Europeans, as well, shared their revulsion at the destruction and slaughter of World War I. Some asked how Western civilization, founded as i t was on science and reason, could bring itself so close to i t s own destruction. Two such men were the Frenchman, Henri Bergson, and the German, Rudolph Eucken. Chang met them both and both would make major contributions to Chang's emerging synthesis of Neo- Confucianism and Western idealism. The center of gravity of Chang's focus was shifting even more strongly to philosophical concerns. Chang's reaction against science and his turn to philosophy was much like that of Bergson. The stunning defeat by Germany in 1870 had left France confused and unstable. Bergson, much lik e Chang searched for something to compensate France for her failure on the battlefield, something that would give her confidence in her survival and assurance of ultimate victory. He arrived at what he called "elan vital", the all-conquering w i l l . 7 3 Bergson's reaction to the intellectualism and anti-metaphysical trends of his day was an attempt to "establish the primacy of mind over matter".74 Science, according to Bergson, was limited in its ability to perceive reality, i t could enumerate, but i t could not feel- "Feeling belonged to another province of the mind!—intuition", and "intuition was the only means for perceiving the heart of things". 7 5 This "heart of things" is beyond the realm of scientific measurement or explanation. In Bergson's view, science is blind to the forces of feeling and experience which do so much to shape reality. Eucken, also classed as an "idealist," shared much with Bergson, especially his emphasis on the importance of will and intuition. "Man's soul", Eucken maintained, "differentiated him from the rest of the natural world and [that] the soul could not be explained only by reference to 48 natural processes."76 This reinforced Bergson's views on the limitations of scientific measurement. The European idealists did not appeal to Chang because of their originality, but because they provided an equivalent to the Confucian foundation of his childhood. Neo-Confucian perceptions and explanations s t i l l provided the sounding board for Eucken and Bergson. When these "foreign" concepts found equivalents in Neo-Confucianism, they were accepted, and the resultant synthesis enriched. While never saying as much, Chang's perception of the universe and its ultimate form is reminiscent of K'ang Yu-wei's Ta-t'ung. and almost certainly shows an affinity for Wang Yang-ming's concept of the unity of the universe with man at i t s center. 7 7 A product of Chang's early training was his belief that the physical world, the spiritual world, and the consciousness of man were interrelated parts of a larger reality; a reality which held the potential for a world characterized by harmony, benevolence, and well-being. Drawing on Bergson and Wang Yang-ming, Chang saw man as an active agent in the world; Chang accepted the a b i l i t y of human consciousness, or human will, to influence reality. In other words, reality did not exist entirely outside of consciousness. It seems l i k e l y that Chang Chiin-mai saw the ease with which the intuition of Bergson and Eucken could be melded with Wang Yang-ming's concept of liang-chih (innate Knowledge). Both appear to give man the innate a b i l i t y to distinguish right from wrong. This intuitive ability, which a l l men possess, is what Chang Chiin-mai seems to appeal to when he applies his philosophy to po l i t i c s . "He looked at a l l men from the Mencian viewpoint that a l l men are born good, and thought that everyone was like himself. . ."78 I n Chang's view, i f liana-chih was universal, i t 49 would ultimately lead a l l men to the same conclusions. What Chang could not f i n d i n Bergson or Eucken, he took from other philosophers. One example was Hegel's theorum that "existence i s a l l - inclusive. . - i t comprises within i t the state of not-being as well as of being. The idea that everything contains within i t s e l f its. own opposite [and that] i t i s impossible to conceive of anything without conceiving at the same time i t s opposite . . ," 7 9 found i t s equivalent i n the yin and yang of the I-Ching (Book of Changes). And reaching even further back, Chang compared Plato and Mencius, showing that "the sages of East and West shared the same nature." 8 0 The synthesis that Chang developed was, in nature, similar to that of e a r l i e r Chinese, and, i n the sense that Chinese philosophy provides the base to which Western philosophical concepts were added, Chang f i t s into the well-known t'i-yung formula. In q u a l i f y i n g t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , i t needs to be said that Chang's understanding of Western philosophy was more genuine and sophisticated than his predecessors. Additions from the West were an i n t e g r a l part of his synthesis, not simply footnotes to lend authority. 8 1 The degree to which Chang had borrowed from Eucken, Bergson, and other European philosophers was revealed i n the famous science and metaphysics debates of 1923. Before an audience at Ch'ing-hua University, Chang "launched a vigorous attack on the v a l i d i t y of 'scientific method' as i t was currently being applied by Chinese Marxists and others to China's social and economic problems." 8 2 If China's problems were to be s o l v e d , argued Chang, one needed to "go back to the u l t i m a t e l y undiscoverable causes of l i f e to which only i n t u i t i o n could give answers;" 8 3 since science, or a " s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e " was objective, l o g i c a l , a n a l y t i c a l , causative and uniform, i t could not hope to answer 50 questions about l i f e , which was subjective, intuitive, undetermined, and unique.**4 Chang was using Eucken and Bergson to show that human questions were beyond the pale of science; only intuition could unlock the secrets of l i f e . By proclaiming the supremacy of intuition, w i l l , and conscience, Chang was rejecting scientism and, by implication, defending Confucianism.85 The significance of Chang's synthesis and his extended experience abroad i s in i t s application to p o l i t i c a l problems in China. This application has two major aspects: f i r s t , that Chang's Mencian view of human nature, his faith in the ability of intuition to reveal truth, and his conviction that these principles are universal, determined the form and parameters of Chang's p o l i t i c a l participation; and, secondly, that these same underlying assumptions shape the character of the p o l i t i c a l document that Chang sought to make the law of the land. Ultimately, the question that begs answering is whether Chang's synthesis, as i t is manifested both in his methods of p o l i t i c a l participation and in his constitutional draft, was an appropriate response to China's intellectual and political crises. PHILOSOPHY JOINS POLITICS Chang Chiin-mai was quite active in the 1920's; in addition to his directorship of the National P o l i t i c a l University, he continued to lecture, write, and comment on current events. In 1924, in a lecture delivered in Wuhan, Chang reminded his audience that "philosophy must not forget p o l i t i c s , and p o l i t i c s must not forget philosophy." 8 6 Two years later Chang was commenting on the unfolding Northern Expedition which had just occupied Wuhan. Although I have not seen Chang's comments which 51 appeared in the China Times, i t may have been their sensitive p o l i t i c a l nature which prompted him to use the pseudonym of Chang Shih-lin. 8 7 Growing KMT dissatisfaction with Chang was apparent in the closing of the National Political University. That dissatisfaction intensified the following year with the appearance of Chang's thoughts in The New Way— again Chang was using the older pseudonym of Li Chai. At this time Chang was also lecturing on the history of European p o l i t i c a l thought at the Chih-hsjLng hsueh-yiian [related to Wang Yang-ming's Chih-hsing ho-i (the unity of knowledge and action)?]. 8 8 Between 1927 and 1930 Chang was shaken by two events: the death of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and his kidnapping by KMT agents. The death of Liang, of course, was a heavy emotional blow to Chang who enjoyed a close personal relationship with Liang. A more frightening and, as i t was meant to be, intimidating event was his kidnapping—snatched off the streets of Shanghai, thrown into a car, blindfolded, and finally held incommunicado for some weeks. The KMT was apparently, according to Chang, displeased with his comments in The New Way.89 Which event weighed more heavily on Chang is difficult to know, but, in any event, he l e f t China in 1930 and returned to his old haunts in Germany. After lecturing on Chinese philosophy at Jena, and collaborating with his old friend Eucken on a book entitled The Question of a. Philosophy of Life (Jen-sheng kuan t i wen-t'i), Chang f e l t i t safe to return to China in 1931. Tempering his return to China with caution, perhaps, Chang eschewed a p o l i t i c a l commentary and, instead, lectured on Hegelian philosophy at Yenching University. It would not be long, however, before Chang f e l t compelled to once again turn his eye to other concerns. 52 NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY We saw how Chang's educational work was an effort to bring together theory and practice in the political arena; his graduates were expected to harmonize Chinese and Western learning, and then take them into the real world. Another, more direct approach to political participation was Chang's experiment in organizing a political party. Chang's approach to party p o l i t i c s was colored by his earlier experience with the Political Information Society, and with Liang Ch'i- ch'ao's Research Clique. These had been relatively informal groups that, especially in the case of the Research Clique, sought influence through behind-the-scenes activities on a personal level. The National Socialist Party (Kuo-chia she-hui tang) which Chang helped organize in 1932, was the offspring of a much more loosely organized group which f i r s t appeared in the spring of 1930. That f i r s t unnamed group was l i t t l e more than an informal discussion group composed of a few bankers and university professors. 9 0 Consistent with Chang Chun-mai's e l i t i s t and academic approach to solving political and social problems, the National Socialist Party (NSP) was s t i l l a far cry from the Western concept of a political party. 9 1 In its early days the NSP was chiefly composed of Chang's students and fellow professors. Instead of an organization concerned with direct political action, the NSP confined i t s e l f to publishing the party journal, Renaissance (Ts'ai-sheng). and acted more like a group of scholastics come together to discuss and debate the issues of the day. 9 2 In terms of function, Chang's NSP met f a i r l y well one author's criterion for an opposition party; that i s , the NSP did c r i t i c i z e the government and administration, try, in i t s own way, to check the use of governmental power, articulate the interests of a group, and harness the interests of 53 group loyalties to the nation. In the Chinese context, especially, the functions of criticism and checking the use of governmental power were closely linked. Public criticism was believed by many to have the a b i l i t y to muster "public opinion" and use i t against the government. The critical element in that equation is the necessity of having a government, as Chang would have put i t , with a "sense of shame." Having been properly rebuked, the supposition goes, the government would realize i t s error, concede i t s faults, and alter i t s policy. Had governments with a "sense of shame" been common in twentieth-century China, the gambit might have worked. Organizationally, the NSP was ill-suited to realize its objectives: fir s t , up to 1938 the party was, as were other opposition parties, illegal under the Nanking Government and so remained a secret organization. This fact alone was not crippling, but for a group advocating unity, compromise, and cooperation, i t is difficult to see how they hoped to do these things and s t i l l remain underground. It would be difficult to point to any accomplishments of the NSP before the Sino-Japanese War. other, perhaps, than to employ the energies of i t s members. Second, being a collection of bankers, professors, and students, none of whom devoted their energies full-time to the party, the NSP lacked the qualities of s t a b i l i t y and endurance needed to realize i t s goals. 9 4 The party organization was so loose as to prompt Ch'ien Tuan-sheng to describe the leadership of the NSP as an "anarchy under the t i t u l a r leadership of Carsun Chang.95 One of the most serious handicaps of the NSP was i t s lack of desire or even a b i l i t y to seek any kind of mass support. The reasons for this are twofold: f i r s t , NSP membership was dominated by educators and intellectuals who, rightly or wrongly, reserved for 54 themselves the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , conferred upon them by t h e i r s p e c i a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , to lead the masses towards democracy. As mentioned e a r l i e r , Chang Chiin-mai had expressed t h i s " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " i n modern terms by pointing to the need for experts to assume leadership roles. Chang, and many of those within the NSP who shared this disposition, took a dim view of mass movements. "They believed that the power to implement c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government was not i n the majority of the people, but, rather, in the wise and virtuous; those who understood the constitution, those who had the w i l l to implement the constitution, and in those whose hands the c o n s t i t u t i o n would be put into p r a c t i c e . " 9 6 Instead of working to e n l i s t mass support, Chang and the majority of the NSP, generally, confined t h e i r recruitment e f f o r t s within t h e i r own s o c i a l class. When they ventured outside their own class, they sought those who could provide influence, protection, or financial support: General Ch'en Po-nan, who provided the funds for Chang's Hsueh-hai shu-yuan. and the Yunnan warlord General Lung Yiin who gave protection to anti-Chiang Kai- shek elements i n 1944, are two good examples.97 Second, the intellectual and scholastic approach Chang and the NSP took to p o l i t i c a l activity could do l i t t l e to inspire peasant support even i t they had t r i e d . Chang's d i s p o s i t i o n towards gradual evolutionary change i l l - s u i t e d the temper of the masses that the Communists seemed so well able to read. Estimates vary widely on the total membership of the NSP—this i s probably due to the extremely loose organization of the party and the f l u c t u a t i n g commitment of some of i t s members—it seems reasonable, however, that those sources suggesting a membership of several hundred are acceptable. 9 8 Reflecting the duality of Chang's own personality and training, the NSP sought to " f i n d a course of action from t r a d i t i o n a l China and from 55 foreign s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i z a t i o n s to save China (t'i-yung?)."5*^ The party tried to popularize Chinese history as one way of "reviving the people's self-confidence and building up character, a matter of supreme importance." 1 0 0 This kind of approach to p o l i t i c a l activity proved to some observers that Chang and the NSP had no plan for "positive action" to solve China's problems.101 If Chang was set on merely influencing present events, the observation would have been true. But Chang had his eyes on a larger more profound goal. He was out to influence, even change, attitudes; he was bent on a program that would alter the very perceptions of Chinese. This was a spiritual or philosophical goal first, a political program second. The sadness that surrounds Chang Chun-mai's political career comes, in part, from his involvement with his own National Socialist Party. Had the party remained as i t had begun, a relatively small group of l i k e - minded i n t e l l e c t u a l s , i t may have ended as Chang had planned. Unfortunately, as the war progressed and after the victory over Japan, Chang's position, and that of the party, was enhanced. Domestic, and later foreign pressures, gave Chang and the NSP a notoriety and prestige far outweighing their actual importance. This development led some, who had but a passing commitment to Chang's ideals, to join the NSP.102 These latter-day converts managed to tarnish the respectability and bring suspicion upon the motives of both the party and its leader. The National Socialist Party gained a reputation among its opponents as merely a group of office-seekers, 1 0 3 and Chang was labeled a party boss, who was simply using the party as a way of gaining position and wealth. 1 0 4 chang himself even lamented to a friend that he dreaded seeing party members, for a l l they ever wanted was an introduction or 56 p o s i t i o n . 1 0 5 His brother commented a f t e r Chang's death that the party Chang had founded became incompatible with his character. 1 0 6 Part of Chang's problems with his party are certainly due to his own misunderstanding; having borrowed the concept and organization of a p o l i t i c a l party from the West, he t r i e d to run i t l i k e a sch o l a r l y debating society or a traditional Chinese p o l i t i c a l clique centered on a shu-yuan. The f a i l u r e of the NSP highlights one of Chang's fundamental problems; h i s understanding of Western democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l behavior was, for a l l his experience abroad, superficial. Chang was the perennial observer, never a part i c i p a n t . His theories and conceptions about how democracies operated were never tested. On one of his trips to London Chang had vi s i t e d Parliament. He came away with the notion that English parliamentary government worked because of the a b i l i t y of reasonable men to come together to debate and resolve their differences in a public forum. Somehow, he also came to believe that, in wartime, the United States Congress suspends elections and the freedom of speech i n order to unite the country. 1 0 7 Equally as serious were Chang Chun-mai's v i o l a t i o n s of his own pre s c r i p t i o n s f o r party a c t i v i t y . As early as the 1920's Chang had outlined what a p o l i t i c a l party ought to do. He concluded that a party should engage i n no scheming with the m i l i t a r y . I ts weapons were i t s tongue, i t s pen and ink, and the creation of public opinion. Expenses should be self-generated, they should not come from the government. A party should hold a s p i r i t of cooperation, refrain from buying voters or legislators, and internal party s t r i f e should not be settled by calling on foreign f i n a n c i a l or m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t . 1 0 8 Chang's lapses were i n h i s rela t i o n s h i p s with anti-Chiang Kai-shek warlords, and, s u r p r i s i n g l y enough, i n his acceptance of f i n a n c i a l support from the KMT. Both of 57 these transgressions cost the NSP and Chang independence and credibility. For a l l i t cost him, the National Socialist Party did provide Chang with something of overriding value; a vehicle that could gain him access to national-level politics and a voice in the counsels of government. The NSP was not the center of Chang's p o l i t i c a l l i f e , nor the sole avenue of his political participation. The party never fu l f i l l e d any of the grand intentions Chang held for i t , but, at the least, i t did give him the platform from which to push his constitutional demands. And, in that sense, the National Socialist Party was a success. 58 CHAPTER TWO NOTES ^h'eng Wen-hsi, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng nien-piao chien-pien ch*u-kao," hereafter CCMHSNPCPCK. in Chu Ch'uan-yii, gen. ed., Chang Chun- mai chuan-chi t s u - l i a o . 6 vols. (TaiDei: T'ien-i ch'u-pan she, 1979), 2:251. Hereafter CCMCCTL. Howard Boorman and Richard C. Howard, eds.. biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967- 1971), 1:30. 3Chang Kunq-ch'uan, "Wo yu chia-hsiung Chun-mai," i n Wang Yiin-wu, et al., eds., Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng ch'i-shih shou ch'ing chi-nien lun- wen c h i (Taipei: Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng ch'i-shih shou-ch'ing c h i - nien lun-wen chi pien-chi wei-yuan hui, 1956), pp. 102-105. 4Although re j e c t i n g the outer forms of t r a d i t i o n a l culture, and s p e c i f i c a l l y the Confucian t r a d i t i o n , iconoclasts such as Lu Hsun and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were yet unable to escape the e f f e c t s of t h e i r early education. See Lin, The Cr i s i s o i Chinese Consciousness. 5Ch'eng Wen-hsi, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng chih yen-hsing," Wang Yun-wu, et. a l . , eds., Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng ch'i-shih shou-ch'ing chi-nien lun-wen c h i (Taipei: Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng ch'i-shih shou-ch'ing chi-nien lun-wen chi pien-chi wei-yuan hui, 1956), p. 31. ^Quoted i n Ch'eng Wen-hsi, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng nien-piao ch'ang-pien," in Chu, CCMCCTL. 2:275. 7 I b i d . 8Chang, "Wo yu chia-hsiung Chlin-mai," p. 104. ^Boorman, Biographical Dictionary. 1:30. •^Ch'eng, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng nien-piao ch'ang-pien," p. 277. i : L I b i d . p. 278. 1 2Andrew J. Nathan, Peking P o l i t i c s . 1918-1923: Factionalism arid the Failure of. Constitutionalism (Berkeley: university of California Press, 1976), p. 12. 1 3Ch'eng, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng nien-piao ch'ang-pien," p. 279. 1 4Chang Chun-mai, "Wo ts'ung she-hui k'o-hsiieh t'iao-tao che-hsiieh ching-kuo," Yli-chou hsun-k'an ("The Universe") v o l . 3, no. 11 (Dec. 5, 1935):10. 59 1 5Wolfgang Bauer, China and. the. Search fox Happiness, trans. Michael Shaw (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 361. 16Ch'eng, CCMHSNPJPCK. p. 254. 1 7 I b i d . p. 255. 18Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the. West, pp. 221-223. l^Boorman, Biographical Dictionary. 1:30. 2 0 S e e Frank Fe Wong, " Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the C o n f l i c t of Confucianism and Constitutional P o l i t i c s " ( Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of Michigan, 1965). 21Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, p. 248. 2 2Wei Chu-hsien, Chung-kuo k£> tang JLQ p'ai hsien-k'uang (Chungking: Shuo-wen she ch'u-pan, 1946), pp. 8-9. 2 3Jonathan D. Spence, The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and. Their Revolution. 1895-1949 (New York: The Viking Press, 1981), p. 170. 2 4 Furth, "Intellectual change," p. 364. 2 5 I b i d . p. 348. 26"Chang Chun-mai ssu-hsiang kang-yao," in Chu, CCMCCTL. 5:175. 2 7 S u n Ya-fu, et a l . , ed., Chin-tai s h i h - l i a o ts'ung-k'an c h i . Vol. 526: Chang Chun-maj hsien-sheng chiu-chih tan-ch'en chi-nien ts'e (Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan, 1978), p. 7. op „ '"'Chang Chun-mai, "Jen-ch'uan wei hsien-cheng chih pen," i n CKMCSHTCC. p. 13. 29Wong, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Conflict of Confucianism," p. 239. 3 0 I b i d . p. 206. 3 1 I b i d . p. 98. oo -^Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times, p. 143. 33Ch'eng, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng chih yen-hsing," p. 13. 34Ch'eng, CCMHSNPCPCK. p. 255. 3 5Chiang Yun-t'ien, "Chang Chiin-mai hsien-sheng i-sheng ta shih chi," in Chu, CCMCCTL. 1:21. 3 6Chang Chiin-mai, "Wo ts'ung she-hui k'o-hsueh t'iao-tao che-hsueh chih ching-kuo," p. 9. 3 7 I b i d . p. 10. 60 38Ch'eng, "Chiin-mai hsien-sheng chih yen-hsing," p. 15. 39Wong, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao aM t M Conflict pj£ Confucianism, p. 186. For details of the Research Clique, see Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 239. 40Ch'eng, CCMHSNPCPCK. p. 256. 41Chang, "New Confucianism," p. 296. 4 2 C h a r l o t t e Furth, "Culture and P o l i t i c s i n Modern Chinese Conservatism," in Furth, ed., The Limits of Change, p. 38. 43Benjamin Schwartz, "Some Polarities in Confucian Thought," in David Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, eds. Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 52. 4 4 I b i d . 4 5 r s 'ai-sheng she, WYSSTH. p. 3. 4 6Ibid., p. 4. 4 7Paul M. A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek: A P o l i t i c a l Study (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), pp. 179-180. 48Chow, T h e May Fourth Movement, p. 12. 49Chang Chiin-mai, "Hsi-yang t i ta-hsueh ho wo kuo t i shu-yuan," Yii- chou hsiin-k'an ("The Universe") vol. 2, no. 3 (June 5, 1935) :18. 50Chang Chiin-mai, "Chiao-yii chia yu kuo-min ch'i-chih t i pien-hua," Yii-chou hsiin-k'an ("The Universe") vol. 3, no. 10 (Dec. 15, 1935) :1. 51Chang Chun-mai, "Shu-yuan chih-tu chih ching-shen yu hsiieh-hai shu- yiian chih tsung-chih," Yii-chou hsiin-k'an ("The Universe") vol. 4, no. 7 (March 15, 193 6): 13. 5 2Ibid. 53Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, 1:31. 5 4Chang had held the post of Deputy Director of the Wusung City Planning Department in 1922. It may be that Chang's political connections in that ci t y were a factor in the move there of the National P o l i t i c a l University. 5 5Spence f The Gate of Heavenly Peace, p. 299; p. 212. 56Ch'eng, CCMHSNPCPCK. p. 258. 5 7Ibid. 5 8 I b i d . p. 259. 61 5 9 H s i e h Yu-wei, "Wo yu Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng," i n Chu, CCMCCTL, 1:37-39. 6 0Chang, "Shu-yuan chih-tu", p. 17. 6 1 I b i d . 6 2 I b i d . 6 3 I b i d . 64Boorman, Biographical Dictionary. 1:22. 65Ch'eng, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng chih yen-hsing," pp. 30-31. ^ J o h n M e s k i l l , "Academies and P o l i t i c s i n the Ming Dynasty" i n Charles 0. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government i n Ming. Times. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 149-174. Shih I, "Wo suo chih-tao Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng t i sheng- p'ing," (shang) Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") v o l . 4, no. 20 (Dec. 30, 1953):12-13. For additional d e t a i l s on the c l o s i n g of the I n s t i t u t e of National Culture and Chiang Kai-shek's role, see Chou Hsiang-kuang, "Chi min-tsu wen-hua shu-yuan chih ch'uang-li yu f e n g - p i " Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") v o l . 4, no. 23 (Jan. 30, 1954):12-19. 6 8 C a r s u n Chang, The. Third Force i n China (New York: Bookman Associates, 1952), p. 103. **9 Lawrence A. Schnieder, A Madman Qt Ch'u: The Chinese Myth of Loyalty and Dissent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 88. 7 0Chang, "Wo ts'ung she-hui k'o-hsueh t'iao-tao che-hs'ueh chih ching- kuo," p. 11. 71Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the. West- p. 381. 7 2Chang, "Wo ts'ung she-hui k'o-hsueh t'iao-tao che-hsueh chih ching- kuo," p. 12. 7 3P.A.Y. Gunter, ed.. BergSQn and the. E v o l u t i o n .Q! P h y s i c s (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), p. 17. 7 4James Deotis Roberts, Jr.. Faith and Reason: A Comparative Study of Pascal. Bergson and James (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1962), p. 26. 7 5Henrey Thomas and Dana Lee Thomas, Liv i n g Biographies Great Philosophers (Garden City, New York: Garden City Books, 1941), p. 313. 7 6New Encyclopedia B r i t t a n i c a . Micropaedia. 15th ed.. s.v. "Eucken, Rudolph Chris toph." 62 7 7Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought. 2 vols. (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), 2:45. 78Chang, "Wo yu chia-hsiung Chiin-mai," p. 104. 79Thomas, Living Biographies, p. 209. 80Ch'eng, "Chang Chiin-mai hsien-sheng nien-piao ch'ang-pien," p. 272. Also, when Chang studied with Bergson in Paris, they often compared Chinese and Western philosophy. See Liang Ching-ch'un, "Chun-mai hsien- sheng erh-san shih," in Chu, CCMCCTL. 1:67. 0±See Chester C. Tan, Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought i n the Twentieth Century (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 254-255. ozSpence, £h£ Gate of Heavenly Peace, p. 171. 83Bauer, China and. the Search £QL Happiness, p. 364. 84Chow, The May Fourth Movement, pp. 333-334. 8 5Furth, "Culture and Politics," p. 37. 86Ch'eng, CCMHSNPCPCK. p. 258. 8 7 I b i d . p. 259. 8 8Ibid. 8 9Chang, The Third Force, p. 24. 90Wen-hua chiao-yii yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT. p. 197. Also see Tan, Chinese Political Thought, p. 253. 91 ^Chang's concept of a p o l i t i c a l party reflects his synthesis of Western and Chinese learning and experience. Organizationally, although very weak, there is some resemblance to a Western style political party. Functionally, however, the NSP exhibits none of the Western influence. See Shih I, "Wo suo chih-tao Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng t i sheng-p'ing," (Shang) p. 15 for opposing view. 9 2Chang Chih-i, K'ang-chan chunq t i chena-tang ho p'aj-pieh (Chungking: Tu-shu sheng-huo ch'u-pan she, 1939) p. 79. 9 3Angela Sutherland Burger, Opposition i n a Dominant-Party System: A Study of the Jan Sangh. the Praja Socialist Party and. the Socialist Party i n Uttar Pradesh. India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 19. 9 4Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, ed., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 389. 63 9 5Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, TJae Government and. Pol i t i c s of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 355. 96Wen-hua chiao-yii yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT. p. 205. Also see "Democracy vs. One-Party Rule in Kuomintang China: The x Little Parties' Organize," Amerasia 7 (Mar.-Dec.) 1943:112. 97Chang, K'ana-chan chung i i cheng-tang ho. p'ai-pieh, p. 78. 9 8Ch'ien, The Government and. Pol i t i c s QJL China , p. 354; Wei, chung-kuo ko tang ko. p'aj hsien-K'uang, p. l . 99Wang Chinese Intellectuals and the West, p. 197. 1 0 0James Shen, "Minority Parties in Asia," Asia 40 (Feb. 1940) :81. 10i"Democracy v s > one-Party Rule", p. 111. 1 0 2See Burger, Opposition in a. Dominant-Party State, for her theory that those who are threatened with loss of status, role and function by policies of the dominant party w i l l seek representation in opposition parties. 103Wen-hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT. p. 203; Ch'ien, The Government and P o l i t i c s P i china, p. 355. 1 0 4 H s i a , Lun flu. Shih yii Chang Chun-mai,, p. 53; p. 67. 1 0 5Liang, "Chlin-mai hsien-sheng erh-san shih," p. 68. 106Chang, "Wo yu chia-hsiung Chun-mai," p. 104. 1 0 7chang Chlin-mai, reprinted from Ta-kung pao ("L'Impartial") Nov. 29, 1939, in Shen Yiin-lung, gen. ed. Chin-tai chung-kUP shih-liao ts'ung- Jcjan, vol. 805. Hsien-cheng yao-kuan/Hsing-hsien shu-yao. pp. 87-114. Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, 1966-. Hereafter CTCKSLTK. -*-08Shih I, "Wo suo chih-tao Chang Chlin-mai hsien-sheng t i sheng- p'ing," (Shang), p. 15. 64 CHAPTER THREE: CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE-BUILDING China's experience with constitutions has been a checkered one. Although the need for a constitution was widely accepted, there was less agreement about the form of government that i t would incorporate. Confounding the whole debate was the lack of commitment to liberal values by some, and the callous use of the constitutional movement for their own purposes by others. It might be said, generally, that those holding power in China used constitutions and the promise of democracy as a ploy in their efforts to maintain their power and difuse political opposition. Those without power used constitutions and calls for democracy as means of limiting the power of their opponents and gaining i t for themselves. The Ch'ing Court had tried the former approach in its waning years, and Sun Yat-sen had tried the latter against Yuan Shih-k'ai. 1 Or, later, for example, Sun Fo and Wang Ching-wei used both approaches. They had c y n i c a l l y and opportunistically "advocated democracy when they were excluded from power. But, each, when in power had resisted the expansion of democratic procedures."2 No less than five constitutions were issued by successive governments between 1912 and 1927. None had much bearing on the course of politics, but they a l l reflected the general concensus that China needed a constitution. The drive to f i n a l l y realize constitutional government gained new impetus with the ostensible "unification" of China by Nationalist armies under Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. Bringing a constitution to l i f e under the Nanking regime f e l l into three distinct phases: between 1933 and 1939 under the direction of Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat-sen; between 1939 and 1943 under the authority of the People's P o l i t i c a l 65 Council; and, lastly, between 1946 and 1947 under the P o l i t i c a l Consultative Conference. Each successive stage shows a dilution of Kuomintang dominance and increased participation and input by opposition elements.3 This reflected neither the willingness of the KMT to share power, nor the effectiveness of opposition strategy, but rather, the consequences of forces beyond the control of either. Constitutional development under the Nanking regime was motivated and channeled by a range of conflicting social and political currents. In the broadest sense, constitutions were seen by many as being prerequisites for modernity. The major Western powers a l l had some form of constitutional basis, and the example of Japan could only reinforce the belief that constitutions did bring unity, and modernity, and respect, and power. These were goals which were shared by Chinese across a broad spectrum of political beliefs. Internally, the KMT needed to promote constitutionalism for several reasons: first, the KMT was never a monolithic party under the thumb of Chiang Kai-shek. In his role as "indisputable leader," (as explained below) Chiang needed to continually balance and maneuver between the heterogeneous elements that made up the upper levels of the Party as well as the government. Increasing pressure from the likes of Wang Ching-wei and Sun Fo to share power, prompted Chiang to press for a speedy inauguration of constitutional government as a way of maintaining party consensus.4 Keeping the various provincial interests satisfied with their share of the p o l i t i c a l pie may also have been a factor. Since at least the Taiping Rebellion, regional forces had been expanding their power and prerogatives at the expense of the center. While Chang Chun-mai saw himself as a national politician, there were certainly many who took part 66 i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l process as a means of protecting or enhancing regional power. One of the largest sections of the draft constitution, in fact, deals with the relationship between the provinces and the central government. With some confidence we may assume that Chiang Kai-shek also used the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l process as an avenue for channeling and controlling regional demands for p o l i t i c a l power. Secondly, i n terms of day-to-day governing, Chiang needed to create a strong and viable state apparatus; a c o n s t i t u t i o n would provide the l e g a l framework fo r that apparatus and l e g i t i m i z e Chiang's authority. Th i r d l y , the i d e o l o g i c a l base of the KMT was r e l a t i v e l y weak. The Three People's P r i n c i p l e s provided a rough ou t l i n e of a party ideology, but " t h i s program d i d not have the power to arouse popular commitment. . ."5 The highest leadership of the KMT adopted the vocabulary of the constitutional movement to gain an additional ideological prop, and to claim for i t s e l f the leadership of the progressive forces. And, l a s t l y , Chiang used the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l process to assuage the anxieties of his a l l y , the United States. I t became increasingly important to Chiang as the war progressed, to encourage the f i c t i o n i n the United States that his government was democratic and, hence, deserving of support. Bedeski's model of state-building based on the development of force, power, and authority provides a useful approach to understanding the interplay between Chiang Kai-shek and opposition elements. In his model, Bedeski shows that the d r i v i n g force behind Chiang's actions was the effort to establish a sovereign p o l i t i c a l order. The Nanking regime had inherited a state apparatus that was only p a r t i a l l y independent, a huge debt burden, and domestic chaos. Chiang was pursuing a policy that would centralize force in his own hands, realize power as expressed in law, and wield authority through the legitimization of power. No one could fault 67 Chiang for t r y i n g to pursue these goals. Bedeski's model i s useful, but we need to recognize that beneath the l e g i t i m a t e drives of the Nanking regime was a callous use of democracy as a weapon**—a weapon used by both the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek. I t needs to be emphasized here that the Kuomintang, the Nanking government, and Chiang Kai-shek should be seen as separate, sometimes overlapping, sometimes antagonistic elements, each pursuing i t s own goals. In the broadest sense, the KMT and Chiang shared the goals Bedeski outlined. They diverged on the question of who would control the state apparatus that brought together force, power, and authority. The KMT, heavily influenced by the Russian model, sought to create in China a party-state: a condition which would reserve ultimate authority over p o l i t i c a l , social, and ideological questions to the Party. Chiang, on the other hand, envisioned China as an authoritarian state with power concentrated i n h i s hands alone. The c o n s t i t u t i o n was only one of the arenas i n which the contest for power took place. Joseph Fewsmith, for example, has shown another dimension of the struggle between Chiang and the KMT. In i t s attempt to extend party-rule, the KMT sought to absorb the independent Shanghai Chamber of Commerce into the parry-run Merchant Association. In this case, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce found an a l l y i n i t s resistance to party-rule in Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang sided with the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to undermine the KMT and i t s e f f o r t s to extend party-rule. In terms of Chiang Kai-shek's aims, Fewsmith further o f f e r s a d e s c r i p t i o n of China under Chiang that f i t s his c r i t e r i a for an authoritarian state. Fewsmith sees three factors as being c r i t i c a l to and defining an authoritarian state: an indispensable leader, a heterogeneous 68 e l i t e , and a "mentality." Chiang Kai-shek, as the "indispensable leader," held together the myriad elements which made up the KMT and the Nanking government. By balancing favor and mutual suspicions, Chiang was able to not only hold his government together, but also to enhance his personal power. By being the locus of l o y a l t y for a l l of the competing e l i t e elements, and yet maintaining a certain "uncommittedness" to any single e l i t e interest, Chiang became the sole link between the different parts of the coalition, and hence, indispensable. 7 That the KMT and the Nanking government were comprised of a "heterogeneous e l i t e " i s well-known. The CC Clique, the P o l i t i c a l Study Clique, the Blue S h i r t s , the co-opted ex-warlords, a l l gave Chiang K a i - shek their loyalty, but continued to intrigue against each other. Chiang e n l i s t e d t h e i r e f f o r t s to advance his own nation-building v i s i o n and dispensed favors and mediated between them to maintain a semblance of cooperation. The mentality that Fewsmith describes i s not ideology, but rather an i n t e l l e c t u a l a t t i t u d e that i s present-orientated: i n other words, an att i t u d e characterized by a pragmatism that can sanction contradictory policies with the same ideology. 8 In China's case, Fewsmith argues, the mentality was based in KMT ideology; the Three People's Principles, Sun's Outline f o r National Reconstruction, and the vast outpourings of Party ideologues were reduced to a "mentality" by their divorce from a concrete organization to enforce their meaning. The hierarchy of the KMT counted among the various competing e l i t e interests in Republican China; i t too, with other e l i t e i n t e r e s t s , competed for influence and power. In the Party's case, however, t h e i r p o s i t i o n and authority was e f f e c t i v e l y undermined by Chiang Kai-shek. In the d i r e c t competition f o r state authority, the Party lost to Chiang. Chiang continued to need the Party 69 as a legitimating device, but by 1930 the Party organization had no independent authority of its own.9 Chiang Kai-shek was pursuing his own aims of state-building which included the need to protect his administration from Party interference. 1 0 Once Chiang's own position was unassailable, that of the Party was reduced to propaganda work.11 This struggle did not end of course after 1930. The constitutional process was one area where the KMT, as well as non-KMT elements, continued to seek inroads into Chiang's position. Chiang, meanwhile, continued to encourage the factionalism that buttressed his position as "indispensable leader." His support of the constitution from the early 1930's, however, was simply a political act necessitated by circumstances.12 "As the most ardent proponent of a strong central government. . . he relentlessly pursued a policy of weakening regional and centrifugal forces which inhibited the unitary state." 1 3 Chang Chiin-mai and other opposition elements counted among those centrifugal forces, and were subject to any form of pressure, intimidation, or violence Chiang might wish to use. Even though the Three People's Principles were a weak ideological base, they were not without prestige. Having been authored by a man of unimpeachable revolutionary credentials, the Principles gained a good deal of authority. Since Chiang Kai-shek had very l i t t l e , other than his connection with the late Sun Yat-sen and his Principles, as a source of legitimacy and ideology, he clung to them with an almost religious fervor. As the s e l f - s t y l e d i n h e r i t o r and executor of Sun's mandate to "democratize" China, Chiang could not ignore the political imperative of making the transition to constitutional government, i f only in form. While Sun's mandate was sufficiently vague to give him great latitude in interpretation, i t s t i l l required him to keep alive the constitutional 70 drafting process. While the process was alive the constitution could be used as an instrument of peacekeeping within the KMT,14 and as a way of dissipating the energies of opposition forces. By channeling the energies of the opposition, both within and without the KMT, into the constitutional process, Chiang was relatively free to pursue his own agenda of maximizing the center's power at the expense of a l l others. Forces which Chiang could not control were such things as the rising sense of nationalism among Chinese, Japanese infringements on Chinese sovereignty, first, and outright invasion, later, and the need to foster a democratic image for the benefit of his major World War II ally, the United States. It was the pressure of these forces that moved Chiang to allow opposition participation in government, to allow, to a degree and for a time, the expression of opposition opinion, and to compromise on the substance of the constitutional draft. With the exception of the Communists, who had more than a million men under arms at the end of the war, the opposition did nothing which, of its own, could induce Chiang to compromise. The fatal flaw of opposition leaders lay in their inability to create forces which could be turned into political power. They could exploit conditions which worked against Chiang, but they could neither control nor sustain them. If the infirmities of the opposition seem so clear today, why did they invest their efforts and risk their lives in a seemingly hopeless cause? The answer, in Chang Chun-mai's case at least, l i e s in his idealism and sense of mission. In his conscious role as a member of the elite, laden with a l l its traditional responsibilities, he was compelled to apply his energies to the solution of p o l i t i c a l and social problems. The "new l i t e r a t i " , no less than the old scholar-official class, gained their raison d'etre from their role as mediators and adjudicators. As a 71 c l a s s they c a r r i e d the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to place themselves between the government (court) and the masses. As the bearers of "modern learning" they were uniquely qualified, so they f e l t , to review, debate, and judge the merits of any issue affecting society. Chang, as a New Confucianist with an overlay of Western idealism, was further driven by the Neo- Confucian imperative to employ his knowledge to the resolution of social problems. His idealism, coupled with his b e l i e f that human w i l l could a f f e c t r e a l i t y , gave him confidence i n h i s ultimate success; his moral authority, i n other words, could appeal to the i n t u i t i o n and reason of others, and, thus, be translated into p o l i t i c a l power. No man spends his l i f e i n what he knows to be a f r u i t l e s s effort. To abandon his works, to disclaim a concern for social issues, to withdraw into himself, would have refuted the very premise of Chang's philosophy. WORLD WAR II AND THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL COUNCIL The p o l i t i c a l landscape of China had changed considerably since the tumultuous days of the May Fourth era; gone were the "national essence" and "national character" movements, as w e l l as the movement to make Confucianism a r e l i g i o n ; passed on also were K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i- ch'ao, and Chang Pin-lin. Dominating the scene now were new groups which would help determine the future of China. Besides the "conservative" Kuomintang and the " l e f t i s t " Communist Party, was a significant "middle group"—sometimes refered to as the "third force." Making up this "third force" were such groups as the National Socialist Party, the China Youth Party, the Third Party, the Rural Reconstruction Association, and the National Salvation Association. Farthest to the r i g h t , and p o l i t i c a l l y very active, was the China Youth Party. Led by Tseng Ch'i, L i Huang, and Tso Shun-sheng, the Party 72 was strongly anti-communist and often found that i t could cooperate with the Nanking Government. It did, though, maintain i t s independence from the Government and p e r s i s t e n t l y pressed i t s claim to influence and representation i n the government. In the c o n s t i t u t i o n - d r a f t i n g work of both the People's P o l i t i c a l Council and the People's Consultative Conference, Chang Chiin-mai often found an a l l y i n Tso Shun-sheng. The Rural Reconstructionists were much less p o l i t i c a l l y active than the China Youth Party, but their leader, Liang Shu-ming, had a significant personal following and, as mentioned e a r l i e r , had much i n common with Chang Chiin-mai. These two men could also work well together. The Third Party was principally made up of left-wing former members of the KMT who had suffered at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek during the KMT-CCP s p l i t i n 1927. Considerably to the l e f t of the dominant KMT CC Clique, but stopping short of embracing Marxism, Third Party members f e l t more comfortable maintaining an intermediary p o s i t i o n between the two poles. Widespread and possibly the third largest p o l i t i c a l group in China, the National S a l v a t i o n i s t s espoused a p o l i c y of resistance to Japan, patriotism, and liberal-democratic p r i n c i p l e s . Loosely organized i n a v a r i e t y of autonomous groups centered on students, workers, women, teachers, etc., the National Salvationists were never a formal p o l i t i c a l party. Generally l e f t i s t , they opposed the heavy-handed t a c t i c s of the KMT, which suspected they were a communist front organization. Its membership probably included some communists, but i t was neither dominated nor controlled by them. The diversity of this "third force" i s obvious. But at times, and on specific issues, they could a l l find common cause. Amidst these elements 73 was Chang Chun-mai and his National Socialist Party. For our purposes, i t should suffice to locate Chang roughly to the l e f t of the China Youth Party, but to the right of the National Salvation Association. Pressure on the Nanking regime to broaden its base increased in the early 1930's. Japan's invasion of Manchuria and the fighting in Shanghai inflamed and fed Chinese nationalism. Intellectuals, students, workers, merchants, and the media a l l rose in a surge of anti-Japanese sentiment. Chiang Kai-shek's policy of appeasement only seemed to make his one-party dictatorship less popular. As a sop to public opinion, Chiang resolved to establish some kind of people's representative council. 1 5 Increasing pressure both from the Japanese and from Chinese anxious to resist Japan, led the government to invite non-KMT elements, including Chang Chun-mai, to participate in reconciliation talks in mid-1937. These talks were an effort by Chiang to defuse the growing opposition to his policy of passive resistance to the Japanese. The talks, as well, were prompted by the shock of Chiang's kidnapping only six months earlier in Sian. That incident had been resolved by a "reconciliation" between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The reconciliation called for an end to Chiang's anti-communist extermination campaigns and the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front. The nationalism that Chiang was trying to deal with and harness also touched Chang Chlin-mai. Throughout his l i f e he had been conscious that his work and his study were in the service of China as a state, as well as China as a cultural entity. On this point, the protection of China as a sovereign state, Chang and the KMT could agree in principle, but differ sharply on policy. After the Tsinan Incident in 1928, when Japanese and Chinese troops had clashed in Shantung, Chang had bitterly condemned the KMT for i t s timid response. He called on the country to "rise up and 74 condemn [the KMT] f o r s e l l i n g out the country and fawning on fo r e i g n e r s . " 1 6 E a r l i e r , he had c l e a r l y set himself against the KMT, judging their dictatorial government a complete failure, and calling on the KMT to abolish i t s one-party dictatorship. 1 7 The pressures on Chiang and the KMT to broaden i t s base and defuse dissent were surely considerable i f they could prompt them to i n v i t e the l i k e s of Chang to participate in the government. As the Japanese invasion i n July of 1937 spelled death and anguish for so many Chinese, i t was also the l i f e - b l o o d of the anti-Chiang opposition. Before the invasion "almost any expression or a c t i v i t y c r i t i c a l or hostile to the government could expose the person responsible for i t to prosecution." 1 8 Now, almost overnight, the government was forced to change i t s p o l i c y from appeasement to active resistance. The need for a broadly based anti-Japanese united front became immediate and unquestioned. Chiang needed at least the symbols of national unity. In terms of s u p e r f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l gain, Chang Chiin-mai and other opposition figures fared well immediately following the Japanese invasion. The government's f i r s t concession was to invite non-KMT elements to join the newly-created National Defense Advisory Council. It was, as the name implies, a s t r i c t l y advisory body with no real power. Significantly, i t did, for the f i r s t time, give p o l i t i c a l parties and groups other than the KMT a voice in the conduct of the government.19 In addition, Chiang had given Chang Chun-mai's National S o c i a l i s t Party a form of d£ facto recognition. During the f i r s t year of the war against Japan the opposition "enjoyed more c i v i l l i b e r t y than at any time during the preceding decade .. . ., the r e was a r e l a t i v e freedom of speech, publication, and assembly, undreamed of since 1927,. . ." 2 0 75 But the opposition continued to press for an even greater role in the government, and they were successful, though not through their own efforts. The Japanese again provided the catalyst which boosted the opposition's stock. Pushing south and east, Japanese armies decimated Chiang's troops. By the end of 1937 the Chinese had lost 370,000 to 450,000 men, or between one-third and one-half of their fighting strength. China had lost a l l her important centers of culture, commerce, industry, and political power.21 Worse s t i l l , the "intervention by Western powers failed to materialize . . . the gloomy outlook required the Nationalist 99 Government to seek whatever support i t could get from the people . . ." As a result Chiang Kai-shek organized the group he had alluded to back in 1931 after Japan's incursion into Manchuria. The National Defense Advisory Council was effectively expanded and evolved into the People's P o l i t i c a l Council (Kuo-min ts'an-cheng imi). The PPC, as i t came to be known, was much more broadly based than i t s predecessor; i t included a l l major opposition groups and minority parties, 2 3 and could better claim to represent a united front. In logic only made possible by equating the Party with the public interest (kung), one KMT supporter claimed that the PPC was, in fact, a t r u l y representative body because its members were selected by the KMT and not by the government. Since the KMT had been "entrusted" with the responsibility of putting p o l i t i c a l power into practice, the argument continued, to be chosed by the KMT was actually to be indirectly elected by the people.24 The creation of the PPC was a two-edged sword: on one hand, since a l l PPC resolutions had to be approved by the Supreme National Defense Council headed by Chiang Kai-shek, the Council, in essence, became a device through which Chiang "provided a safety-valve for opposition 76 without touching the apparatus of power."" On the other hand, by bringing together probably the best group of parliamentarians i n China, which some believe r e f l e c t e d quite accurately the popular w i l l , 2 6 and giving them a forum, Chiang was forced to defend the legitimacy of his policies in public. Opposition leaders were certainly aware that they were playing to a larger audience than just t h e i r fellow Chinese; American public opinion and the w i l l i n g n e s s of the American Congress to support China were affected by t h e i r perceptions of the health of democracy i n China. Representative or not, the opposition had made considerable gain since the Japanese invasion. Also beyond doubt was also the f a c t that those gains were largely, i f not wholly, attributable to the necessities of the war, not to opposition power.27 The significance of the PPC i s that i t widened dramatically the scope of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d r a f t i n g process. Previously, under the Nanking government, the constitutional draft was, basically, an issue between the Legislative Yuan and the Kuomintang. Beginning in 1933 under the direction of Sun Fo, the President of the Legislative Yuan, drafting committees produced constitutions which tried to reconcile the various p o s i t i o n s both within the KMT and the Legislative Yuan. Once a draft had been approved by the Legislative Yuan, a supposedly representative body, i t was submitted to the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the KMT, which was controlled by Chiang Kai- shek, for approval. I f the d r a f t was found unsatisfactory, i t was returned to the L e g i s l a t o r s with a l i s t of guidelines f o r the needed revision. The Kuomintang gave the drafting work to the Legislative Yuan to give the appearance that the constitution was the work of a "people's representative" body. By holding veto power over any d r a f t produced by 77 the Legislative Yuan, Chiang, through the CEC, could effectively guide the l e g i s l a t o r s to the desired end. D u t i f u l l y , therefore, the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan f i n a l l y produced what Chiang wanted. On May 5, 1936 the so-called John Wu Draft, named a f t e r one of i t s authors, was promulgated and, forever a f t e r became known as the 5-5 Draft (5th day of the 5th month). The KMT called for the convening of the National Assembly the following year to formally adopt the 5-5 Draft as the c o n s t i t u t i o n of China. The Japanese invasion made that impossible, however, and the constitutional process was temporarily suspended. Bringing to l i f e the dormant constitution was high on the agenda of the PPC. W i t h i n the C o u n c i l a Committee f o r the Promotion of Constitutionalism was appointed by the Speaker, Wang Shih-chieh. 2 8 That the Committee was made up predominantly of Councillors of minor parties and independents i s significant. By i t s nature the PPC was, i n i t i a l l y at least, f a i r l y independent; i t was by no means i n Chiang's hip pocket. Mindful of the f a c t that he needed the semblance of a united front and a democratic government, Chiang had to give opposition elements access to government that they f e l t was meaningful. I f the PPC had been e n t i r e l y an exercise i n "window dressing," the opposition would have balked at p a r t i c i p a t i n g , and embarrassed Chiang. Chiang Kai-shek could set limitations on the scope of the PPC's a c t i v i t i e s , or as a f i n a l resort n u l l i f y i t s work, but the proceedings of the Council needed the a i r of democratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n . For these reasons the selection of committee members within the PPC was beyond Chiang's complete control. It i s possible that the heavy minority party and independent representation on the Committee for the Promotion of Constitutionalism was supported and even promoted by one such as Wang Shih-chieh as a lever i n the on-going struggle between Chiang and the 78 KMT—it would not be the last time KMT members and the opposition could find common interests. To l i m i t and circumscribe the committee's work as much as possible, however, Chiang Kai-shek would only permit i t to use the 5-5 Draft as a blueprint from which only minor deviations would be allowed.29 Despite serious handicaps the committee produced i t s d r a f t constitution which i t presented to the PPC on March 30, 1940. The draft was basically the work of Chang Chun-mai and Lo Lung-chi, who worked from the relative safety of Kunming under the protection of Chiang's erstwhile a l l y General Lung Yiin. Chang and Lo produced a d r a f t which t r i e d to balance the forces of authoritarianism and democracy. Like Chiang Kai-shek, they also needed to accommodate opposing forces , and yet r e a l i z e t h e i r own objectives. On the one hand, most Chinese engaged i n the p o l i t i c a l process shared the same general goals: a strong, economically advancing, and p o l i t i c a l l y stable China. But the manner of achieving those goals, the relationships between the i n d i v i d u a l and the state and between the regions and the center, and the form and degree of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , were a l l questions of intense debate. That Chiang Kai-shek had been forced to compromise seemed obvious; to what degree he was willing to compromise was as yet unknown. It was up to Chang and Lo to temper the authoritarian demands of Chiang and further their own democratic reforms. Thier perspicacity and p o l i t i c a l experience would determine the success or failure of their efforts. CHANG APPROACHES THE CONSTITUTION The debate over the form of the constitution had resolved i t s e l f into a contest between those promoting some form of authoritarian government, and those seeking something more akin to the democratic governments of the 79 United States, France, or England. Ideologues of both groups used basically the same vocabulary, and their ostensible goals were similar. Not until one examines their respective proposals for a constitution do their differences become clear. In general, Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT supporters tried to formalize, legalize, and extend an authoritarian system already in existence, while giving lip-service to non-KMT participation in government. The heavy strains of support for an authoritarian government or even a dictatorship within the KMT had been reinforced by the ascendency of Chiang Kai-shek. With his military background and base of support in the military, i t is not surprising that Chiang was a consistent advocate of fascism. "As late as 1935 Chiang was te l l i n g an assembly of Blue Shirts," the bully-boys, enforcers, and assassins of the KMT, "that what the country needed was fascism."30 That China already had a dictatorship was painfully clear to Lo Lung-chi, an associate of Chang Chun-mai's and an attempted assassination target of the Blue Shirts, who f e l t that China did not have simply a party dictatorship, but rather, the dictatorship of a single man.3-'- That Lo felt this way is not surprising. He was certainly aware that Chiang Kai-shek had emasculated the KMT and had effectively removed the Party from the center of government. While Chiang may not have qualified as a dictator in the strictest sense, he certainly sat at the pinnacle of power and had the final word on questions critical to his rule. Opposition leaders, on the other hand, tried to counter the legalization and extension of Chiang Kai-shek's rule by formalizing and legalizing checks on the government, hoping that circumstances or public pressure would cause Chiang to respect them. World War II, when i t began for the Chinese in 1937, provided the 80 c a t a l y s t which made opposition p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government possible. R e a l i z i n g h i s debt to the war, Fan Ch'ang-chiang observed t h a t "implementing constitutional government and the war of resistance cannot be separated." 3 2 What he meant was that without the war there was no hope for constitutional government. Chang Chiin-mai agreed. While supporters of Chiang Kai-shek argued that implementing constitutional government during wartime would disperse national power, Chang countered that, on the contrary, acting according to constitutional a r t i c l e s would concentrate national power.33 Chang Shen-fu, also a NSP member, explained that during a war i s the best time, i n fact, to implement constitutional government. "The war of resistance," he went on, "has made our people r e a l i z e that without a nation they cannot exist, they know that the individual and the nation have an intimate r e l a t i o n s h i p . " 3 4 What he was expressing, of course, was the phenomenon and the effect of nationalism i n China. A major hurdle for Chang Chiin-mai, as well as f o r many other opposition p o l i t i c i a n s , was the legacy of Sun Yat-sen. L i t e r a l l y a l l p o l i t i c a l discussion, sooner or l a t e r , had to come to grips with Sun's eclectic, vague, and sometimes contradictory philosophy. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT had canonized Sun's thought; i t became the Bible f o r Party members and the orthodoxy of Republican China. 3 5 Sun was not deified for his charismatic qualities or the profoundness of his thought, but because he could serve as a symbol of u n i t y . 3 6 Luckily, the vagueness of Sunist ideology also made i t e l a s t i c enough to be used by a l l . 3 7 Even though Chang Chiin-mai found Sun's theory of the d i v i s i o n of powers to be contradictory, and even though he refused to bow to Sun's portrait before meetings of the PPC, 3 8 he, too, sometimes found i t expedient to invoke Sun's name i n defense of his pos i t i o n . The canonization of Sun's Three People's P r i n c i p l e s , t o some degree, acted as a brake on the 81 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debate. By r e s t r i c t i n g the vocabulary and defining the l i m i t s of the debate, Sun's ideology may have hindered the development of democratic government, rather than advanced i t . Like other revolutionary ideologies, Sun's thought claimed to be absolute: i t did not need, nor was i t subject to external verification. As the only recognized standard of knowledge, Sunist ideology could not admit to an alternative source of truth. Fewsmith has shown how Sunist ideology established an identity between the Party and the public (kung): there could exist no contradiction between true knowledge and the public interest. Truth, the Party, ideology, and the public interest, then, were joined i n a h o l i s t i c unity which admitted no challenge. 3 9 While party d i s c i p l i n e kept the ideology above discussion among members, the same constraints were generally e f f e c t i v e outside of the Party as well. To c r i t i c i z e Sunist ideology too sharply or directly was to risk lese majeste* and to speak heresy. New Confucianists could look at constitutions i n two ways: s p i r i t u a l l y and l e g a l l y . S p i r i t u a l l y , democratic constitutions could embody the essence of Confucian values; the establishment of a democratic s t a t e would be . . . t r u e to the s p i r i t o f jen. [Confucians viewed] democracy as the most e f f e c t i v e a n t i d o t e t o the bane of Chinese p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n — d e s p o t i s m . . . which they see as nothing l e s s than the crudest form of human egoism (ssu). As such i t goes against the s p i r i t of public-mindedness (kung). which i s essential to achieving moral s o l i d a r i t y . Democracy, conceived as an institution which takes p o l i t i c a l power out of personal hands and puts i t under p u b l i c control, i s seen as the utmost f u l f i l l m e n t of the s p i r i t 82 of public-mindedness . . . democracy as an institutional device to ensure political equality is in keeping with the Confucian b e l i e f that every individual has the potential to become a sage and hence should be respected as a morally autonomous being entitled to equal status with anyone else.40 Legally, the state was given form through a constitution. A modern constitution and i t s supporting body of philosophical justification provided the textual bedrock on which the state rested. It afforded a moral and legal authority of last appeal; like the Classics and their commentaries, a constitution could provide a refuge from, and a brake on the capricious use of power. A democratic constitution could provide the locus and the cement to unite government and the scholar-bureaucratic class cast adrift by the Ch'ing Dynasty thirty-five years before. Once again position, status, and authority would f a l l to those of special ability and education. Fairbank suggests that by thus "revitalizing their p o l i t i c a l community, [Chinese could bring] i t closer to the perennial ideal of 'public-mindedness'."41 The state was primarily a spiritual entity in Chang's view. It i s defined by a sense of nationalism that has a strong racial or ethnic component; people of the same blood, language, customs and history formed a basic unit that shared a common self-consciousness.42 This common self- consciousness (nationalism) becomes the most powerful human concept in bonding people together. 4 3 The state, then, becomes the expression of "man's sentiment, reason, and w i l l . It i s in the state that true sentiment finds i t s expression in love of country, reason in creative thought and cultural achievements, and good w i l l in intentions towards others." 4 4 A constitution, therefore, should express the values of the state. It acts as both a statement of ideals as well as a vehicle, a 83 means, for t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t . In Chang's view, a c o n s t i t u t i o n need not specifically define a system of government; i t was f i r s t and foremost a "public foundation." As long as a c o n s t i t u t i o n embodied the s p i r i t of democratic government, smal l i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s necessitated by compromise were relatively unimportant in the short-run. The essence of a c o n s t i t u t i o n , f o r Chang, was i n i t s function as a framework, a set of rules, within which disputes could be solved and the f i n a l form of the state evolve. Chang had said that to reform Chinese p o l i t i c s , one had to begin with people's attitudes; attitudes were more basic than systems. To create a democratic system without reforming people's attitudes was, for Chang, to state the equation backwards. 4 5 Attitudes could be reformed through education and practice. Indeed, the basic moral truths of Confucianism could only be grasped through practice. 4** A democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n provided the basic rules and the "classroom" for the practice. Writing in Hsin Ln, Chang said that "[the people] must learn to swim, [they] should jump into the water . . ." 4 7 P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the nation was an expression of men's equality; participation could make men realize what their rights were, and dispel the traditional attitudes of subservience and submission to despotic power. P r a c t i c i n g democracy brought China closer to true democracy while changing attitudes and customs among Chinese—two inseparable goals. 4 8 Naturally, as attitudes are reformed the individual, incrementally, adds to his understanding of what we might c a l l here, basic truths. In t h i s sense, the p r a c t i c e of democracy, which gradually reforms attitudes and reveals truths, becomes a form of enlightenment; a process which becomes self-perpetuating and has ever-expanding e f f e c t s — a kind of moral ripple-effect. 84 A people's attitudes and customs, so Chang believed, determined the kind of governmental organization that developed. I f a new form of government were to be introduced, there would need to be a commensurate change i n attitudes. Chang's Mencian approach to p o l i t i c s gave him confidence that laws could be used to mold men's minds, give rise to new customs, and encourage the emergence of men's basic good nature. Although Chang would not l i k e the comparison, his embryonic democracy i s , l i k e Chiang Kai-shek's second-stage of government, a kind of tutelage leading to true democratic constitutional government.49 The realization of democratic government needed a legal framework, but Chang saw the real stumbling blocks to be in men's imaginations. 5 0 Did men share a vision of what democratic government i n China should be and a willingness to set aside t h e i r s e l f i s h concerns? I f they did, then the r e a l i z a t i o n of democratic government in China was, as Chang supposed, only a question of time. Although idealism played a major role in Chang Chun-mai's thought and in his approach to constitutionalism, i t did not blind him completely to the re a l i t i e s of p o l i t i c s . It would certainly have been preferable i f a l l actors i n the p o l i t i c a l arena respected the c o n s t i t u t i o n and acted i n a s p i r i t of good w i l l towards others. But, since this was not the case, the p o l i t i c a l system needed to incorporate a "levelling" mechanism; a means which balanced the power and influence of the actors and fostered a s p i r i t of conciliation and compromise. The struggle boiled down to the question of where the r e a l locus of power lay; was i t i n the hands of an i n d i v i d u a l , i n some representative body, or i n an interplay of the two? For a l l practical purposes, the constitution became a tool in the struggle for power.51 That government had certain legitimate and necessary functions, Chang 85 did not deny. The form of government, though, was important. From Chiang Kai-shek's point of view, government should be organized along l i n e s that maximized the powers and prerogatives of the "leader," while minimizing the participation and interference of a l l others. Chang Chun- mai, meanwhile, wanted a system that granted the executive department i t s share of power, while distributing a counter-balancing share of power to other arms of government and the people. This would have the e f f e c t of making a despotism impossible, and, at the same time, promote the process of cooperation, give-and-take compromise, and the s p i r i t of public-mindedness. A democratic form of government was also a means of avoiding or stopping armed c o n f l i c t . Chang's d i s p o s i t i o n for peaceful, evolutionary change was rooted in his abhorrence of chaos. Revolution and war were inherently without order and reason. They symbolized a breakdown in the orderly flow of nature. Their courses could neither be controlled nor predicted. To a person such as Chang, who had an ordered explanation for the universe, there was l i t t l e place for war and revolution. This was one of the flaws Chang saw i n dictatorships; they create conditions conducive to c i v i l war. 5 2 By suppressing avenues for the expression of dissent and the peaceful reso l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t , Chang reasoned, dictatorships actually push their opponents to the use of force. It i s interesting that two men l i k e Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Chiin- mai, both heavily influenced and respectful of the t r a d i t i o n a l culture, would come to such loggerheads. The difference i n t h e i r positions represents a fundamental difference i n t h e i r perspectives rather than t h e i r f e e l i n g s . Chiang was acting and reacting as a Confucian ruler would. Chang Chun-mai, on the other hand, was basing his actions on the presumed in t e r e s t s of a c l a s s of e l i t e s that e a r l i e r would have been 86 labled gentry-administrative-literati. Chiang Kai-shek had himself named Tsung-ts'ai or Leader, a position only j u s t below that of the canonized Sun Yat-sen. A t y p i c a l Confucian r u l e r , Fairbank t e l l s us, tends to rule for l i f e . He was an autocrat; within his sphere he exercised a r b i t r a r y power even though he had to sanction i t by the use of the classical ideology. The maintenance of his power rested on his maintenance of his i d e o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y i n the established system of p o l i t i c a l thought. The Confucian ruler also brought men to accept his rule by his virtuous conduct and moral influence. Since such a ruler's prestige was so c r i t i c a l to his power, anything which di s t r a c t e d from i t — s u c h as c r i t i c i s m — w a s as serious as outright rebellion. 5 3 Confined by such an outlook, the Confucian ruler could never submit his decisions to review or veto by others, "he had to take his p o s i t i o n and stand upon i t as a superior leader, not as a 'servant of the people.' He was the One Man at the top, c a r r y i n g the burden or responsibility and decision, and could not delegate i t without forfeiting his t i t l e to power."54 As Fairbank pointed out, and Stanley Karnow detailed, such perceptions were not confined to the occupant of the Dragon Throne, but extended well beyond China. This "mandarin mentality" made even the idea of minority resistance reprehensible to the r u l e r . 5 5 REVISION OF THE 5-5 DRAFT CONSTITUTION As the PPC took up the task of re v i s i n g the 5-5 Draft within the l i m i t s set by Chiang Kai-shek, certain problems became apparent: f i r s t , the issue of giving formal legal status in the constitution to the phrase "The Republic of China i s a San Min CM I Republic," secondly, the issue 87 of people's rights and their protection, and thirdly, resolving the issue of authority and power which basically involved the National /Assembly, the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan, and the Executive. Other issues were c e r t a i n l y important, but these most directly y i e l d insights into Chang Chun-mai's thinking, and i l l u s t r a t e the problems inherent in trying to formalize a p o l i t i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c a l system such as his. A r t i c l e One of the 5-5 Draft stated that "The Republic of China i s a fjan. Min Chu 1 Republic." Through this simple statement the 5-5 Draft made i t s obligatory bow to Sun Yat-sen and f o r m a l i z e d the d i r e c t l i n k between the r e v o l u t i o n and the constitution. Further, i t established the general ideological framework of the state. When searching for a clear, concise d e f i n i t i o n of what a "San Min Chu X Republic" i s , however, i t became apparent that A r t i c l e One created more problems than i t solved. San Min Chu-I had, after a l l , been the i d e o l o g i c a l base of the N a t i o n a l i s t Party (KMT), not a u n i v e r s a l l y accepted manifesto. If the principle that China was a "San Min Chu-I Republic" were given l e g a l status of the highest sort, i t would put the opposition i n an even more d i f f i c u l t p osition. As China's o f f i c i a l creed San Min Chu-I would put those who did not share a belief in i t in legal jeopardy. One c r i t i c l i k e n e d t h a t s i t u a t i o n to l i v i n g i n t e r r o r and w a t c h f u l n e s s . 5 6 Justification for such fear had ample precedence. In February 1927, for example, some months before the s p l i t which ended the two-year cooperation between the KMT and the CCP, Chiang Kai-shek warned Party members that "whosoever goes against the aims and methods indicated by [Dr. Sun] w i l l not be a comrade but an enemy who must not remain among us." 5 7 By the end of the year the communists had been purged from the KMT, leaving behind them between 10,000 and 30,000 of t h e i r dead comrades. The Government stepped up i t s legal efforts to suppress dissent as well; the Regulations 88 for Punishing Counter-revolutionaries were decreed in 1929 and the Emergency Law Governing Treason and Sedition was promulgated in 1931. The latter "prescribed capital punishment or l i f e imprisonment for those who engaged in seditious propaganda by writings, pictures, or word of mouth, with the intent to subvert the Republic." 5 8 Further, in 1931 habeas corpus had been suspended in cases involving newspaper criticism of the government or of the Three People's Principles. 5 9 The government viewed both kinds of criticism in the same light i t viewed subversion. That the Principles had been given semi-divine status was already a limiting factor on p o l i t i c a l debate. To give i t constitutional sanction as well would give to those holding police power a formidable weapon. Chiang Kai-shek showed that i t could be a convenient p o l i t i c a l cudgel to disarm or intimidate opponents by charging them with disrespect or even disloyalty* Chiang, in fact, used the Principles as a justification for increasing his repression of opposition.*50 One can imagine the delicacy and circumspection with which Chang Chun-mai approached this problem. Unfortunately, at this point in the war, the opposition's leverage was s t i l l limited, and Chang was unsuccessful in his attempt to have the open-ended article removed. The best he could do at this time was to record an addendum to Article One. Chang added his voice to that of Tso Shun-sheng, a leader of the China Youth Party, in asking the highest organs of the Kuomintang, or Chiang, himself, to affirm, before the promulgation of the constitution, that Article One would not affect the unity of political parties, their basic philosophies, or their existence under the law.**1 This was a polite way of asking Chiang to forswear the use of Article One as a p o l i t i c a l weapon. 89 While the vocabulary of people's rights drew heavily on l i b e r a l Western tradition, i t was also easily adaptable to the traditional Chinese beliefs of conservatives like Chang Chun-mai. That people's rights became an issue in modern China i s not surprising. Those Chinese li k e Yen Fu, Liang Shu-ming, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and Chang Chun-mai, who saw the strength and spirit of Western nations in their democratic governments, recognized that at their root these democratic governments a l l took people's rights as fundamental and inviolate. People's rights, therefore, became a prerequisite to the building of a strong, modern nation-state. To incorporate the notion of people's rights and the people's sovereignty into traditional thought was not terribly d i f f i c u l t . The notion that sovereignty should be held by a l l the people could be fitted within the traditional Mencian concept that the Mandate of Heaven could be withdrawn i f the emperor were guilty of misrule. The people, acting as agents of heaven's w i l l , could overthrow an unfit emperor and thus withdraw his mandate. While this concept of sovereignty may not satisfy some Western jurists, i t does confer on the Chinese masses the ultimate moral authority for rebellion and revolt. Likewise, statements affirming basic human freedoms could be construed to express the Confucian attitude that since a l l men are capable of reaching sagehood, there exists a basic equality among men. This basic equality was easy enough to express in principle, but far less palatable in practice. Following the age-old Chinese maxim that "society is governed by men and not by laws," students of constitutional law in early twentieth- century China saw the iron-clad protection of human rights as an obstacle to social progress. C r i t i c s of a rigidly defined, d i f f i c u l t to amend constitutional statement of people's rights argued that as the conditions of l i f e in China improved, society would reflect a commensurate change. 90 The constitution would then f a l l out of step with the state and needs of society; reflecting old conditions and past reality, the constitution would act as a brake on further progress.62 In other words, i t was up to men to continually reevaluate and adjust law to promote social progress and meet exigencies of the moment. The constitution, in their eyes, should not inhibit the ability of men to govern. For the most part, later participants in the constitutional debate show a consistency in Chinese views on people's rights. With the exception of Lo Lung-chi, who f e l t that the freedom of speech was an inalienable right of the people, admitting no interference even by law, 6 3 most PPC councillors, Chang included, were unwilling to put people's rights completely beyond control or revision. If Chang Chiin-mai had a clear idea of the demarcation between governmental power and personal freedom, he did a distinctly poor job of conveying i t to his fellow councillors or in defining i t within the PPC draft constitution. Chang seemed unable to form a concise statement of the limits on human rights he had already conceded were necessary. In terms of Chang's approach to constitutional law this omission was no profound failure. In Chang's view the constitution was designed only to act as a set of general rules of behavior and to provide a stage for political action. In more specific terms, Chang was caught between his rhetoric and his true beliefs. Throughout Chang's political l i f e he had used the issue of people's rights as a focal point. In his criticisms of the KMT he had called on the Government to respect people's rights. He had demanded that the people have the freedom to speak, and write, and publish, and to participate in government. Chang knew f u l l well that should the government grant those freedoms to "the people", they would 91 effectively be enjoyed by a small minority, of which he was a part. Interestingly enough, on the issue of people's rights, where we might expect to see the widest diversion of opinion between the "authoritarians" and the "democrats", we f i n d , instead, remarkable agreement. Where we might expect to see the greatest r e v i s i o n of the 5-5 Draft, we see, instead, very l i t t l e change. Here was a point on which Chang and Sun Fo, for instance, could, i n p r i n c i p l e , w ell agree. Sun had pointed out that i n h i s view, "people's righ t s are r e l a t i v e , not absolute."* 5 4 Chang agreed. He saw a r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the people and the state, each needing the other f o r i t s existence. If the people's r i g h t s were to be i n f r i n g e d upon, the l i m i t s could only be judged by one criterion: the interests of the state. In other words, Chang concluded that individual freedom and state power had to seek a balance. 6 5 As a student of history, Chang had seen the terrorism of the French and Russian revolutions, and ascribed i t to an excess of freedom. 6 6 Excessive freedom could, l i k e revolution i t s e l f , lead to the kind of i n s t a b i l i t y and chaos that Chang wanted so to avoid. On the other hand, excessive restrictions of freedom, as seen i n Germany and Russia, hampered the people's s o c i a l development. Chang's i d e a l state would e x p l o i t the advantages of both dictatorship and democracy. The powers and freedoms of government and the people, each i n t h e i r respective sphere, would be invi o l a t e . 6 7 Finding this balance between power and freedom forced Chang to deal with the p o l i t i c a l reality of an oppressive one-party government, while remaining true to his basic beliefs. Chang, and other non-KMT PPC councillors were not so much opposed to the power to l i m i t people's rights, as they were to the manner and degree to which i t had been used. In t h e i r protests some had pointed out that Sun Yat-sen had based his Principle of People's Rights (Min-ch'uan chu-i) 92 on a Russian model. In such a one-party state model, where the people's ri g h t s y i e l d e d to the state's r i g h t s , was i t not a contradiction, the c r i t i c s asked, for Sun to exalt both party government and people's r i g h t s ? 6 8 Others pointed out that to give the National Assembly or the Legislative Yuan power to l i m i t the people's rights was to elevate c i v i l law above constitutional law. 6 9 These kinds of criticisms were directed at the ruling KMT and i t s controlled government organs, rather than at the principle of limit i n g people's rights. The 5-5 Draft had guaranteed the people the freedoms of domicile, movement, speech, publication, correspondence, b e l i e f , assembly, and association. But after each guarantee was a qualifying clause which added that the aforementioned freedom could not be l i m i t e d "except by law." 7 0 This of course made the i n i t i a l guarantee, dependent on future legislation or e x e c u t i v e decree, e s s e n t i a l l y w o r t h l e s s . I f Chang had been fundamentally opposed to the q u a l i f y i n g clause he would surely have registered his opposition i n an addendum. Conspicuously, however, he i s silent. Only i n a joint report to the PPC by some members of the drafting committee does Chang put himself on record. In the report Chang and his cc—signers reveal their suspicion that the qualifying clause could become a legal limitation on the people's freedom, and could open a "convenient" door for the government. Admitting that the people's rights naturally had l i m i t a t i o n s , Chang and the other signers could only say that the q u a l i f y i n g clause was "inadequate protection of those rights." Nothing further than to suggest that limitations on people's rights should be in the constitution was offered. 7 1 The councillors wanted, at least, to keep the guarantees and limitations concerning people's rights out of the hands of the Legislative Yuan. 93 The awareness of the p l i a b i l i t y of the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan and of i t s susceptibility to government control was widespread. Others, outside of the PPC, supported the councillors 1 maneuver. The Kwangsi Constitutional Government Advancement Association, i n an open letter to the Government, stated i t s members' opposition to the use of law to r e s t r i c t people's rights . The Association f e l t that to use laws i n such a manner would result i n a divergence of law and the constitution. They would support no r e s t r i c t i o n s on people's r i g h t s other than those passed by the National Assembly as amendments to the constitution. 7 2 while an o f f i c i a l source claims that the intent of the PPC c o u n c i l l o r s was to use the q u a l i f y i n g clause to place the power of lim i t i n g people's rights in a representative body, 7 3 i t seems more l i k e l y that, at the time and i n the l i g h t of the c o u n c i l l o r s o p i n i o n s recorded as an attachment to t h e i r d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e i r aim was to keep such power out of the hands of a "puppet" representative body. Whenever a representative body was formed along lines acceptable to the councillors and with adequate independence, they would probably have f e l t comfortable giving i t the power to l i m i t the people's r i g h t s . 7 4 The non-KMT PPC councillors, Chang among them, found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. Had they not been i n opposition to a one-party dictatorship, they probably could have accepted the qualifying clause as i t stood. Since they were s t i l l the objects of legal p o l i t i c a l repression based on the qualifying clause, they naturally sought r e l i e f from i t . The f a c t that Chang could p r o f f e r no a l t e r n a t i v e i s a c t u a l l y a testament to h i s i n t e g r i t y . He registered h i s objections to the offending clause i n p r i n c i p l e , but offered nothing i n i t s place because i t would have been, f i r s t , dishonest, and secondly, impossible. To support a statement of inviolate people's rights would have violated Chang's own beliefs i n the 9 4 necessary balance of power between the state and the people. To write a precise d e f i n i t i o n of the scope of people's rig h t s would have been impossible; f o r d e f i n i t i o n of that nature f e l l within the realm of intuition. Any attempt to define i n detail the l i m i t s of people's rights would be doomed to failure by the task's complexity and the i n a b i l i t y of language to express the intuitive process. In terms of people's r i g h t s the PPC d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n was essentially a holding action. Chang Chun-mai, for example, took the moral high ground and implied that the Government was not protecting the people's rights i n a democratic s p i r i t . At most this tactic could make the Government, in an effort to avoid further damage to the United Front, more cautious i n i t s use of the law as a weapon of p o l i t i c a l repression. If the opposition could at l e a s t gain some ground here, while the r e a l issues of power were decided elsewhere, the rhetoric was not wasted. One could conclude that had the opposition gained a measure of power and the make-up of the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan and National Assembly changed, Chang would have dropped the issue of the q u a l i f y i n g clause altogether. His opposition was not against the curtailment of people's rights through law, but rather against the capricious use of that power by government organs so easily manipulated by Chiang Kai-shek. In wartime China r h e t o r i c existed i n p a r t i c u l a r abundance. The reasons, as noted e a r l i e r , had much to do with the operatic manuevers between Chiang Kai-shek and h i s opponents. Spurred by p o l i t i c a l and military factors, Chiang had allowed a degree of open dissent. The lin e between dissent and treason, however, was a fine and sometimes changing one, requiring the opposition to remain circumspect and cautious. The added requirement, that any Chinese constitution be true to the teachings 95 of Sun Yat-sen, forced KMT and non-KMT participants in the constitutional debate to defend positions which, at times, hinged on l i t t l e more than semantic interpretation. The question of including i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n the statement that China was a "San Min Chu-1 Republic" had touched a most sensitive nerve. Once Chang Chun-mai and others of the opposition realized they could make no r e a l inroad into the statements' sanctity, they e s s e n t i a l l y conceded defeat and moved on to aspects of KMT ideology that could be more easily undermined. If Chang indeed wanted to produce a constitution that would provide a framework and guidelines for peaceful, orderly p o l i t i c a l activity, he had to go beyond philosophical platitudes. He needed, in some practical way, to create conditions that would make p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y f a i r , and free from capricious government interference. To accomplish this he needed to materially affect the balance of power in the constitution. The legacy of Sun Yat-sen as expressed i n The Three People's Principles and his five-power constitution, was a serious impediment to those seeking to institute real democratic government. Extravagant claims have been made showing that Sun's five-power c o n s t i t u t i o n represented a quantum leap i n constitutional theory. In reality i t i s something much le s s . Sun's idea of a five-power c o n s t i t u t i o n , stripped of i t s high- sounding democratic verbiage, b a s i c a l l y creates an authoritarian one- party state owing much to Russian influence. At the core of Sun's theory i s h i s answer to the balance of power problem: the separation of power and a b i l i t y (ch'uan-neng fen-k'ai). Sun had concluded that the greatest shortcoming of American style democracy was that the people, through their representatives, exercised only indirect p o l i t i c a l power; there was no r e a l check on the power of the government. " P o l i t i c a l powers" (cheng- 96 ch'uan) should, in Sun's view, be exercised directly by the people. In contrast, the government would be granted certain "governing powers" (chih-ch'uan) that would enable i t to effectively run the day-to-day operations of the state. Vested in the people would be the " p o l i t i c a l powers" of election, recall, i n i t i a t i v e , and referendum. Left to the government were the "governing powers" included in the executive, legislative, judicial, control, and examination departments. Somehow, Sun placed these "political powers" in a representative body and blithely continued to call them direct powers. Sun's principle of the separation of power and ability is l i t t l e more than a circular argument intended to minimize, i f not remove, interference with government.75 The remainder of Sun's theory revolves around the unremarkable melding of Western and traditional Chinese institutions. The five-way division of power i s a composite of a western style executive, legislature, and judiciary coupled with a Control Yuan, reminiscent of the Imperial Censorate, and an Examination Yuan to carry on the spirit of a bureaucracy open to a l l through fair, open, and competitive examinations. In terms of the theoretical division of power, the National Assembly, the Executive, and the Legislative Yuan were the focal points. Chang Chun-mai considered Sun's five-power theory to be l i t t l e more than the heritage of absolute monarchy.76 Under the 5-5 Draft the National Assembly, which held the four "political powers," would meet but once every three years, and then only for one month. Add to this the fact that the election machinery which produced national assemblymen was mostly in the hands of the KMT, and one is l e f t with l i t t l e more than a "ghost" assembly. This would be equivalent to a landlord making a quick call once every three years to see 97 i f h i s house were s t i l l standing. Could anyone s e r i o u s l y have expected this sort of assembly to act as a responsible overseer of the government? Chinese l e g i s l a t u r e s or parliaments, unlike those i n the American model, were not, i n the eyes of KMT ideologues, regarded as being i n an adversary relationship with the executive. As explained by Hu Han-min ten years e a r l i e r , the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan was never designed t o be a representative body, nor was i t to be opposed to the executive. Hu saw the Legislative Yuan from two perspectives; one p o l i t i c a l , and the other, party. From the former the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan had a s t r i c t l y l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n ; i t acted as an arm of government through which laws, resolutions, and budgets flowed. It did not obstruct. From the latter, i t acted according to the w i l l of the party; any laws which were created i n or passed through the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan had to be based on the teachings of Sun Yat-sen and resolutions of the KMT. Neither the organization of the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan, nor laws passed by i t could contradict what Hu c a l l e d the " p r i n c i p l e of party control." To be more blunt, Hu stated that the w i l l of the Legislative Yuan and of the KMT were one. 7 7 The f a c t that members of the National Assembly and of the Legislative Yuan had to be confirmed by the Central Executive Committee of the KMT acted as a f i n a l guarantee of their responsiveness to the party. As chief executive, the president was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, could declare war, make peace, abrogate treaties, declare martial law, review c r i m i n a l sentences, grant pardons, and appoint and remove c i v i l and m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . In p r a c t i c a l terms, the president was unimpeachable. He was, according to the 5-5 Draft, responsible to no one but the National Assembly. That was tantamount to being responsible to no one since the National Assembly was by i t s make up and function unable to effectively exercise any power. 98 Given the limitations imposed on Chang and his fellow members of the constitutional drafting committee by Chiang Kai-shek, and the r e a l i t i e s of what the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were, the committee found a novel answer to their problem. Rather than try to move power from the presidency to either the National Assembly or the Legislative Yuan— both t a c t i c s being r e l a t i v e l y meaningless—the committee created an e n t i r e l y new body. When Chang and Lo f i n i s h e d t h e i r d r a f t i n g work i n Kunming and the d r a f t was presented to the government, i t was met with howls of protest. The PPC draft constitution had effectively turned the re l a t i o n s h i p between Chiang Kai-shek and the National Assembly on i t s head. Quoting heavily from Sun Yat-sen and h i s "Outline f o r National Reconstruction," from which the five-power c o n s t i t u t i o n springs, the committee pointed out that the 5-5 Draft's greatest shortcoming was that i t allowed the people no means of exercising t h e i r d i r e c t " p o l i t i c a l powers." Claiming, with tongue-in-cheek, to r e c t i f y t h i s apparent oversight and make the c o n s t i t u t i o n t r u l y r e f l e c t Sun's teachings, the committee created a Recess Committee of the National Assembly (Kuo-min t a - hui i-cheng hui), which would meet when the National Assembly was i n recess. Not only would the Recess Committee exercise most of the normal powers of the National Assembly, but i t would assume other powers previously reserved to the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan. The committee's report explained that what some considered "governing powers" were a c t u a l l y " p o l i t i c a l powers" and therefore belonged to the people. Besides the power to declare martial law, grant pardons, declare war, make peace, and conclude treaties, the Recess Committee could also hold referendums on the budget and laws passed by the Legislative Yuan. Possibly i n an effort 99 to lend support and put some backbone into the Control Yuan, the Recess Committee was empowered to accept impeachment b i l l s from that Yuan. If such b i l l s were directed against the president or vice-president and passed by two-thirds of the Recess Committee, the National Assembly would be called to decide the issue. If a lik e number of committee members passed an impeachment b i l l against the president or vice-president of the Executive, Judicial, Legislative, or Examination Yuan, they would be forced to resign forthwith. Not wanting to be wholly dependent on the Control Yuan, the Recess committee could i t s e l f i n i t i a t e a vote of no- confidence against the above Yuan o f f i c i a l s . A successful vote would require the officials' immediate resignation. 7 8 In a move directed more obviously at Chiang Kai-shek, the PPC drafters required that a presidential declaration of a state of emergency obtain the concur ranee of the Recess Committee. This would have severely limited presidential prerogatives. Tung Pi-wu, a communist councillor, wanted to go even further and proposed that the president's power to declare a state of emergency be rescinded altogether. Explaining their reasoning, the drafting committee pointed out that to expand the powers of the Legislative Yuan would be inconsistent with the teachings of Sun Yat-sen; to grant the Legislative Yuan " p o l i t i c a l powers" would violate the principle of the separation of powers. As for decreasing the number of delegates to the National Assembly or increasing the frequency of i t s meetings, again, Sun's teachings were clear, and could not be tampered with. 7 9 To protect the s p i r i t of their new constitution, the PPC drafters took the power to interpret i t out of the hands of the Judicial Yuan, and placed i t into the hands of a committee made up of members of the Recess Committee, the Judicial Yuan, and the Control Yuan. Further, in an effort to chip away at the KMT-controlled 100 election process, the PPC drafters changed the basis for election to the National Assembly. Instead of the previous complicated formula based on population, they substituted one based on regional and professional divisions. Presumably, a regional electorate could dilute the KMT's control of provincial election machinery. The addition of professional categories of representation was, the drafters admitted unabashedly, a device to insure that the outstanding, the wise and virtuous, and those technically expert would have a chance of election. If the KMT could bend elections to their ends, the PPC drafters, so i t seems, f e l t they could also. 8 0 While going out of their way to claim that the PPC draft constitution f u l l y comported with the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, the drafters were actually doing their best to undermine them. In substance the PPC draft constitution was nothing short of revolutionary. After Sun Fo, who as president of the Legislative Yuan had much to lose under the PPC draft, launched his attack on the constitutional draft, Chiang Kai-shek himself addressed the PPC. In a short but firm speech, Chiang reminded the councillors that any acceptable constitution had to take into account the realities of China's present situation. In measured words, Chiang reaffirmed the unalterable fact that China was, and would continue to be, a "San Min Chu-I republic," and there could be nothing which contradicted the s p i r i t of Sun's principles of the separation of power and a five-power government. Chiang rejected the PPC drafters* argument about the true definition of "political" and "governing" powers. Addressing himself directly to Chang Chun-mai and Tso Shun-sheng, Chiang drove home his point that there could be absolutely no addendums to San Min Chu-I.81 The actions of the PPC, from Chiang's point of view, were clearly 101 aimed at undermining his efforts to cope with the t r i p l e threat of Japanese invasion, communist subversion, and political disunity within his own ranks. The proposed creation of the Recess Committee not only threatened Chiang's attempt to realize power as expressed in law, but i t challenged Chiang's authority because the legitimate use of power would be subject to oversight by a representative body. This was something that Chiang simply could not accept; i t challenged his fundamental views on authority and power. His classical education and his extremely conservative interpretation of Confucianism, coupled with his military background, left Chiang with no understanding of the "art of using power in a democratic government."82 The actions of the PPC drafters violated the long-standing KMT principle that "the excercise of executive power must not be limited by inflexible regulations."83 Chiang had reiterated this principle in his speech to the PPC, and Sun Fo supported him. To bring the PPC more into line with his own thinking, Chiang increased its membership from around two hundred to about two hundred and f o r t y . 8 4 Whereas the F i r s t Council had only about seventy KMT representatives, Chiang persistently added KMT members so that by 1943 the percentage of non-KMT representation had decreased. 8 5 As a prominent member of the opposition, Chang Chun-mai had been given a seat on the PPC's presidium. His effrontery in having so much to do with a constitutional draft so opposed to Chiang's interests earned him special treatment. In addition to his other missteps Chang had also helped to found the Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties 8 6, which Chiang Kai- shek suspected of having communist leanings. The incident mentioned earlier that led to the closing of Chang's National Culture Institute in the summer of 1942 could only have reinforced Chiang's opinion that Chang Chiin-mai had overstepped his bounds. By the meeting of the Third Council 102 in late 1942 Chang had been removed from the Council's presidium, and, as a further inducement to his rehabilitation, he and Lo Lung-chi, were kept in Chungking under surveillance and semi-restraint. 8 7 The relative freedom of the period 1937-1938 was coming to an abrupt end. The relative s t a b i l i t y of the Japanese front and the increased communist-KMT frictions worked to draw the government's attention inward. The PPC draft constitution was quietly referred to a government committee for review and, as Chiang planned, burial. Officially, the constitutional issue was a dead letter from 1940 to 1943. In November 1943 a new group was established within the PPC The loopholes which had allowed the f i r s t drafting committee to embarrass the government were closed. This new group, the Association to Assist in the Inauguration of Constitutionalism, included government leaders, as well as councillors, and Chiang Kai-shek served as i t s president. 8 8 The Association reviewed the 5-5 Draft and the earlier PPC draft constitution. In its report to the PPC in 1946 the Association generally repudiated the work of the earlier drafters and presented Chiang with what he had wanted in the f i r s t place, a relatively untouched, cosmetically altered 5-5 Draft. 8 9 As far as the constitutional issue was concerned, Chang Chun-mai was relatively quiescent between 1942 and 1946. He more or less conceded that democratic reform was impossible through the PPC. His efforts at constitution drafting had been l i t t l e more than an exercise in futility. Chiang Kai-shek had l e t him go through the motions, but nothing of significance had been allowed to be implemented. Following his period of house arrest, which may have lasted into 1944, Chang redirected his activities to the China Democratic League. The League, which sprang from a reorganization of the Federation of Democratic Parties in 1944, tried to 103 place i t s e l f between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). By acting as a medium through which the KMT and the CCP could negotiate, the League hoped to moderate their respective positions and gain influence for i t s e l f . In any event, in November 1944 Chang made one of those abrupt changes in focus such as had occurred earlier in his l i f e . Abandoning the leadership of the National Socialist Party, his League activities, and his participation in the PPC, Chang l e f t China to lecture in India. After a series of lectures at Indian universities, Chang continued on to the United States where he took up his writing at Columbia University. In terms of direct personal participation, Chang had simply turned his back on Chinese politics. It would require the combined forces of a worsening domestic situation in China and the deteriorating relationship between China and the United States to give Chang once again the leverage he needed to participate in a revived constitutional process. A SECOND ASSAULT ON THE TSUNG TS'AI The relationship and frictions between Chiang Kai-shek and the American government have been well documented elsewhere. Suffice to say that the strains and contradictions of the relationship were cause for a major rethinking of China policy in Washington by 1947. Immediately following the end of World War II, the United States increased i t s pressure on the Chinese government to seek an end to armed h o s t i l i t i e s with the Chinese Communists. In a policy statement issued in December 1945 President Truman declared that the United States held i t essential that "a national conference of representatives of major political elements be arranged to develop an early solution" 9 0 to China's problems. The declaration went on to encourage the Government of China to broaden its 104 base by bringing in other political elements. The reoccupation of Manchuria by Nationalist troops and increasing clashes with Communist forces created greater demands for American financial and material aid. In a major effort to find a solution to the China problem and disengage American troops, Truman dispatched General George Marshall to China. Besides Marshall's prestige as the President's personal envoy, his position was further buttressed by his power to withhold American aid to Chiang. Marshall's mission was to end the KMT- CCP fighting and build some form of coalition government in China. Earlier, seeing that the PPC was of l i t t l e further significance, Chinese, such as those in the China Democratic League, had called on the Government to organize a new conference that would bring together the KMT, the CCP, and representatives of a l l other p o l i t i c a l elements. Such a conference was agreed to, in p r i n c i p l e , at high-level KMT-CCP negotiations, but Chiang had been reluctant to see i t through. Not until the Marshall mission was announced, along with the explicit American policy of mediation, did Chiang begin arrangements for the conference.91 The new conference, dubbed the People's Consultative Conference (PCC), was composed of thirty-eight delegates, twenty-two of whom were former PPC councillors. 9 2 When the conference opened on January 11, 1946 Chang Chiin-mai was in England. By the time Chang received his invitation and could return to China, the conference had already been in session a week. Nonetheless, Chang lost not a moment, and immediately opted for a seat on the Constitutional Investigating Committee. The committee was made up of Sun Fo, Wang Ch'ung-hui, John C.H. Wu, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, and Wang Shih-chieh representing the KMT; Chou En-lai and Ching Pang-hsien joined for the CCP; Tseng Ch'i and Chen Chi-t'ien attended for the China Youth Party; and Chang Chiin-mai, Lo Lung-chi, and Chang Po-chun 105 represented the Democratic League.yj These twelve men were to carry on the work of the Association to Assist the Inauguration of Constitutionalism which had died a natural death with the PPC. World War II did much to reinforce Chang's support for the principle of democratic government. Four decades earlier Chang had attributed Japan's success and i t s victory over Russia to i t s adoption of a democratic constitution. The victory of the democratic allies over Japan and Germany, whose democracies had both been subverted and corrupted, proved to Chang the innate strength of democratic government. While dictatorships could, in the short run, do some things more eff i c i e n t l y than democratic states, they could not, in Chang's opinion, fully muster the spiritual and creative forces of their people. The victory of the Al l i e s had, in Chang's mind, resolved the debate over which system, democracy or dictatorship, was superior. The defeat of fascism proved to Chang that the dominant trend in the world was towards democracy. Bringing democracy to China, therefore, was an important part in the effort to modernize China and bring i t into the mainstream of world 94 progress. H While Chang's thinking on certain specifics of democratic government changed over the years, he never wavered in his belief that a democratic constitution could help to bring together the best of East and West. Chang never rejected the fundamental virtues of Chinese culture; rather, he sought their preservation and expansion through democratic government. To westernize China was never Chang's aim. Quite the contrary; by u t i l i z i n g democratic constitutional government Chinese could give free expression to their own unique cultural heritage. On a more practical, immediate side, Chang continued to press for limitations on executive 106 prerogative, respect for the rule of law, and an expanded role in government for non-KMT elements. As he approached the constitution Chang was aware that i f any constitution were to have a real chance of success in China, i t needed the support of the two strongest military camps, the KMT and the CCP. Also, any constitution that sought legitimacy as a democratic document needed the support of the so-called third-force elements: the small parties, the China Democratic League, and other non-KMT, non-CCP elements. While no single party or faction had the power to force a constitution on China, each did have the power to seriously undermine a constitution by non- participation. The problem, then, was to create a constitution that met the minimum demands of a l l three groups and yet, s t i l l embodied a coherent form of government that moved China closer to democracy. As a starting point, Chang established three basic criteria: f i r s t , to reach a compromise between Sun's five-power constitution and European and American style democratic government; secondly, to reach a compromise between the good and the bad aspects of the KMT and the CCP; and, thirdly, to incorporate, as much as possible, the proposals of the other parties. 9 5 This was both a r e a l i s t i c and an honest approach to the problem. The question was whether Chang could make these compromises and yet retain the spirit and substance of both Chinese tradition and democratic government? As the drafting committee set to work Chang sought to give i t some overall direction by offering his fellow committeemen a twelve-point outline of "Principles for Revising the Constitutional Draft." 9 6 Among the important points of Chang's outline were: 1) before the realization of a system of general presidential election, the president would be elected by an election organ made up of prefectural, provincial, and central government level assemblies, 2) the president would be recalled by the 107 same method as his election, 3) the exercise of the powers of initiative and referendum would be determined by law, 4) the members of the Legislative Yuan would be elected by the people directly, and i t s authority would be similar to that of assemblies in democratic countries, 5) the members of the Control Yuan would be elected by the provincial assemblies and by assemblies in the autonomous regions, 6) the president of the Executive Yuan would be responsible to the Legislative Yuan, 7) the freedom and rights enjoyed by the people would be guaranteed by the constitution and not infringed upon i l l e g a l l y , 8) the power to revise the constitution would be in a joint conference composed of the Legislative and Control Yuans. Any revision passed by this joint conference would be referred to the body that elected the president. 9 7 These principles were accepted by the committee as a basis for i t s revision of the 5-5 Draft. This was important, for even though these principles had no legal force, and, in many instances, were fairly vague, they s t i l l provided some authority on which Chang could base his proposals. Taken together, the principles which Chang forwarded provided a base from which to alter the s p i r i t and intent of not only the 5-5 Draft, but also Sun's five-power constitution. Whether following Chang's principles or not, each member began presenting proposals and draft articles in which he had a special interest. Unfortunately, this approach to drafting a constitution sacrificed continuity and cohesion. While each part might have i t s virtues, brought together they were an i l l - f i t t i n g mosaic. Sensing this confusion, Chang took i t upon himself to write a complete draft. Chang f e l t that in approaching a constitution one needed a "range of vision." By this he meant an overall view of the document as a complete system. 108 With no apparent display of condescension, Chang felt that he, alone, had such a "range of vis i o n . " 9 8 Knowing that there was l i t t l e point in pursuing the none too subtle stratagem of shifting power to some newly- created body, such as had been tried in the PPC's draft constitution, Chang set about readjusting power within the given parameters. Unable to really make much of the National Assembly, Chang's strategy was similar to that of the PPC's draft constitution, i f only more subtle; to minimize the National Assembly's role in government and shift i t s power elsewhere. Chang attacked the National Assembly from two angles: its inability to either act as a check on executive power, or to exercise the people's four " p o l i t i c a l powers." Since the proscription that the National Assembly could meet but once every three years seemed cast in iron, Chang continued to ask i f such a body could really be expected to competently discuss national affairs, or, in any way oversee the government." Under these conditions, Chang asked, would the president really be responsible to such a body? 1 0 0 To lessen the possibility of bribery or intimidation, Chang urged that the power to elect the president be taken from the National Assembly and returned to the people. 1 0 1 Going a step further, he wanted the National Assembly to abandon i t s powers of i n i t i a t i v e , recall, and referendum. In other words, to abandon a l l pretense of exercising "direct political power."102 In a move familiar to corporate boardrooms, Chang sweetened this p i l l by elevating the National Assembly's status, that is to say "kicking i t upstairs" where i t could oversee and advise the Legislative Yuan, but exercise l i t t l e real power.103 Saying what Chang would not, Yeh Ch'ing, an alternate member of the KMT's CEC and a zealous supporter of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles, observed that these changes in the National Assembly "were equal to its abolition." 1 0 4 109 In h i s argument for removing "direct p o l i t i c a l powers" from the National Assembly, Chang tr i e d to show that their exercise by that body was not i n tune with the teachings of Sun Yat-sen. By pointing out the obvious, that the National Assembly was s t i l l a representative body, Chang demonstrated that the 5-5 Draft was t r y i n g to mix d i r e c t and indirect powers. Approaching obliquely, Chang characterized the results as "an i n d i r e c t method of d i r e c t people's power." 1 0 5 This was c l e a r l y not, Chang claimed, what Sun had i n mind. Now, having taken these "direct p o l i t i c a l powers" from the National Assembly and returned them to "the people," Chang introduced another element. The principle of direct people's power was best shown i n the example of Switzerland, which, Chang mentions, was the model for Sun's conception of a d i r e c t democracy. But, by comparing the area, population, and history of China and Switzerland, Chang concludes that, unfortunately, a system of d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l power was, at the present, not suited to C h i n a . 1 0 6 So, how to reconcile the need for the people to d i r e c t l y exercise t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power, as mandated by Sun's theory, and t h e i r present i n a b i l i t y to do so? Chang seems to create a dilemma, and then find a solution through compromise. The solution Chang proposes for his self-manufactured dilemma i s to ostensibly l e t a large constituency (the p r o v i n c i a l and pr e f e c t u r a l assemblies) directly elect the members of the Legislative Yuan. In this way "the people" exercise a degree of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l powers through e l e c t i o n , and the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan becomes a truly representative body, temporarily exercising f o r the people t h e i r powers of i n i t i a t i v e and referendum. Reassuring us that this i s not his ultimate objective, Chang adds that once a complete census has been made, and the people's level of 110 knowledge has been raised, their p o l i t i c a l powers would be slowly given to them. 1 0 7 Whereas the PPC d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1940 had bypassed the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan and concentrated r e a l power i n the Recess Committee, Chang's draft refocused on the Legislative Yuan. This change of tack was probably due to the failure of the earlier strategy and the adoption of a more cautious approach. In fact, by manipulating the vocabulary of Sunist philosophy and making numerous small changes, Chang could reach the same goals the 1940 draft constitution sought with a far less "revolutionary" approach. The keys to making the Legislative Yuan a meaningful body were f i r s t , i n disposing of the National Assembly as a sump for p o l i t i c a l power, secondly, having the L e g i s l a t o r s elected by p r o v i n c i a l and p r e f e c t u r a l assemblies, rather than by the National Assembly, and thirdly, expanding the power of the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan. By giving the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan independence and power, Chang hoped to interject a counterforce into the Nanking government. Quick to comment, Yeh Ch'ing found these proposals an anathema. He di d not care for the notion that the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan should have any supervisory powers over government. He feared that such a body could control the president and f a s t become a " l e g i s l a t i v e d i c t a t o r s h i p . " 1 0 8 Further, Yeh Ch'ing was s k e p t i c a l that l e g i s l a t o r s chosen by the people would be q u a l i f i e d . L e g i s l a t o r s , according to Yeh Ch'ing needed to be well-educated and were best chosen by the National Assembly. 1 0 9 Presidential powers as outlined i n the 5-5 Draft were seen by some as l i t t l e more than a cloak for a dictatorship. Therefore, tempering executive power and i n t e r j e c t i n g countervailing elements of p o l i t i c a l power i n t o the decision-making apparatus were keys to "democratizing" I l l China's government. . The most worrisome aspect of executive power was that i t was simply unchecked. No opposition leader took seriously the idea that the National Assembly could control the executive. The president's power to declare a state of emergency was relatively unlimited, and, the head of the Executive Yuan, as well as i t s various department chiefs and committee chairman, were responsible only to the president. 1 1 0 Executive power was effectively isolated from the other arms of government and immune to interference. In coming to grips with this problem Chang Chun-mai was again seeking a balance. His goal was not to destroy executive power, nor was i t to concentrate a l l power in the Legislative Yuan. Much like the framers of the American constitution, Chang sought a balance of power, giving to the executive branch i t s just and necessary powers, while preserving the prerogatives and protecting the interests of other political elements. In China's case, Chang was seeking to find once again the balance which had existed at earlier times between court and bureaucracy. Chang's assault on executive hegemony focused on the Executive Yuan rather than on the president. 1 1 1 Whether one called that body below the president the Executive Yuan or the cabinet was irrelevant to Chang. In either case i t needed to perform certain v i t a l functions in relation to the president and the Legislative Yuan. The prescription Chang offered for dealing with the balance of power within a democratic state is revealing: i t illustrates how Chang felt about the scope of executive and legislative power and the nature of their interaction. To begin with, Chang clearly meant the executive organs of government to function as their name implies: to lead, to direct. To the Executive 112 Yuan, i n p a r t i c u l a r , Chang gave the authority to set government p o l i c y . This was solely the purview of the Executive Yuan and should not, as in the United States, be i n t e r f e r e d with by the l e g i s l a t u r e . Further, the various ministry heads could, as cabinet members, introduce legislation, attend sessions of the legislature, and explain their viewpoints to the l e g i s l a t o r s . In t h i s way, Chang f e l t , the executive branch could most appropriately influence the l e g i s l a t u r e . 1 1 2 To balance the exclusive power of the Executive Yuan to set policy, Chang introduced elements of the English cabinet system. By giving the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan the power to pass on a vote of confidence i n the Executive Yuan, Chang added the element of " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " Chang's f i r s t step was to require that presidential directives be countersigned by the head of the Executive Yuan and the cabinet member concerned. Then, by making the Executive Yuan collectively and individually responsible to the l e g i s l a t u r e , Chang established a check on the apparatus of executive power. 1 1 3 Unable to directly control the president, Chang tried to do i t by hobbling the apparatus through which he exercised power. Unlike the 1940 PPC draft constitution, Chang was able this time to write a s e r i e s of a r t i c l e s that gave unqualified protection to people's rights. The well-known q u a l i f y i n g clause of previous c o n s t i t u t i o n a l drafts was dropped completely. 1 1 4 Chang further, and specifically, added that p o l i t i c a l parties, as well as religious groups, races and classes, were equal under the law. As good as a l l t h i s sounded, however, even Chang's draft included the catch-all phrase in Arti c l e Twenty-Three that gave the government license to restr i c t people's rights i n order to avert an imminent c r i s i s , maintain social order, or advance the general welfare. In effect, this l e f t a statement that, on one hand, satisfied Chang's need for a concise statement of people's rights, and, on the other hand, 113 l e f t an avenue for those most q u a l i f i e d to lead, control and d i r e c t society to add the nuances necessary to reconcile those righ t s with the needs of society. Given the plans Chang had for a greatly strengthened L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan, A r t i c l e Twenty-Three could l e s s e a s i l y be used ar b i t r a r i l y by the president or the Executive Yuan. As drafted by Chang, the PCC Revised Constitutional Draft completely overthrew the s p i r i t of the 5-5 Draft. In essence i t was much l i k e the earlier PPC draft, although more subtle. As was to be expected, the new draft met stubborn resistance and strong criticism. Yeh Ch'ing, for one, knew exactly what Chang was t r y i n g to do, and h i s c r i t i c i s m c l e a r l y reveals where he f e l t the threat was greatest. After establishing h i s moral p o s i t i o n by regurgitating the maxim that the five-power constitution could not be amended because i t was part of the " w i l l and teachings of the Father of the Country," 1 1 5 Yeh Ch'ing focused on the L e g i s l a t i v e Yuan. What the PCC had done, charged Yeh Ch'ing, was t o c r e a t e e x a c t l y what Sun had wanted to a v o i d : a representative government. Such a government was simply wrong, inferior, and unsuited to China's needs. 1 1 6 By concealing a representative government i n the five-power constitution, Yeh Ch'ing implied that the PCC was "dealing i n s i n c e r e l y with the KMT and cheating the Three People's P r i n c i p l e s . " 1 1 7 Coming to the nub of the question, Yeh Ch'ing concludes that "for the people to have power i s good, but for the government to be without a b i l i t y i s even worse." 1 1 8 Going into the PCC the KMT had wanted the constitution to reaffirm the principle that China was a San Min Chu-I Republic, and to establish a presidential form of government within Sun's five-power constitution. 1 1^ For his part, Chang wanted the e l i m i n a t i o n of the phrase San Min Chu-I, 114 did not think the five-power constitution was particularly workable, and wanted a system somewhere between a p r e s i d e n t i a l and a cabinet form of government. The result was something between both positions. S e t t l i n g for a compromise, Chang was able to water down the phrase "China i s a San Min Chu-I Republic." After prolonged negotiations Chang prevailed on the KMT representatives to accept a revised A r t i c l e One which read, "The Republic of China, founded on the basis of the San Min Chu-I. shall be a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by the people and for the people." 1 2 0 Although unable to dispense with the f i v e - power c o n s t i t u t i o n a l structure, Chang was able, i n good measure, to circumvent i t s obstacles to democratic government. Although he had a draft which to a large measure satisfied him, Chang was s t i l l a long way from r e a l i z i n g i t s implementation. In March the Central Committee of the KMT disavowed the Consultative Conference. A tightening of KMT policy could be seen in police raids against the China Democratic League, a secret service attack against a meeting in Chungking celebrating the Consultative Conference, and the destruction of Communist newspaper o f f i c e s . 1 2 1 When both the KMT and the CCP began reneging on previous commitments, Chang could feel his carefully crafted compromise coming apart. By A p r i l 1946 he had become so d i s i l l u s i o n e d that he thought his d r a f t had become l i t t l e more than "wastepaper." 1 2 2 The earlier rapport between the KMT and opposition elements was struck a heavy blow with the assassination i n July of L i Kung-p'u, a member of the China Democratic League, and Wen I-to, the well-known left-wing poet. Able to make no further progress with his draft, Chang went outside the PCC f o r support. He transl a t e d h i s d r a f t into English and went directly to the American Ambassador Leighton Stuart. Taking his case to even higher levels, Chang also met with General Marshall. While nothing 115 concrete came of either attempt, we do know that at the end of his mission i n China Marshall believed that the l i b e r a l members of the democratic oppostion parties were the only alternative to the dogmatism of either the KMT or the CCP. The assassinations of L i and Wen had a much stronger effect, though. President Truman used the murders as cause to warn Chiang Kai-shek that American opinion was shifting against China. Truman told Chiang that " i t cannot be expected that American pu b l i c opinion w i l l continue i n i t s generous attitude towards your nation unless convincing proof i s shortly forthcoming that genuine progress i s being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's i n t e r n a l problems." 1 2 3 j n August Dean Acheson announced that "no more war weapons, including ammunition, would go to China un t i l i t formed a coalition government."124 This external pressure was matched by a growing d i s a f f e c t i o n with Chiang's government within China. In the year following the Japanese surrender, the Nanking government had found i t s e l f woefully incapable of dealing with the problems of peace. The Nanking government's return to areas previously occupied by the Japanese was marred by confusion and maladministration. I n d u s t r i a l i s t s and businessmen in "free China" suffered when the government defaulted on wartime compensation. Their counterparts i n the occupied zones suffered from the tremendous depreciation of puppet currency which they were forced to exchange at unfavorable conversion rates. The overall mismanagement of the economy prolonged the rampant inflation of the war years. Students and teachers were offended by the heavy-handedness with which the government sought to re e s t a b l i s h i t s control of the educational system. At another extreme, thousands of Taiwanese were slaughtered by Nationalist 116 troops in early 1947 for pressing their demands for representation in government. That year also saw the Anti-Hunger A n t i - C i v i l War demonstrations. The re s u l t was the beginning of popular urban disaffection. 1 2 5 Chiang Kai-shek was trapped in a dilemma: "the only way [he] could retain the residual support [he] s t i l l enjoyed was by heeding the demands for reform and/or by seeking a peaceful accommodation with the CCP."126 He did neither. Knowing the American policy and the KMT's need for American material support, the CCP did its best to destroy any hope of coalition government, while leaving the KMT with the blame for its failure. Chiang was forced to look to the only other element that could soften the appearance of his one-party government and give the aura of a coalition: he reached out to the non-CCP opposition. It i s not the intent here to try to trace the bargaining between the KMT and the non-CCP opposition. It i s enough to say that concessions and promises by Chiang were sufficient to pull Chang Chun-mai with his Democratic Socialist Party and the China Youth Party out of the China Democratic League. Both parties agreed to participate in the upcoming National Assembly. This gave Chiang's government the appearance of a coalition and l e f t the CCP, basically, alone in i t s refusal to participate. This strategy was not only playing to American and world opinion 1 2 7 and had l i t t l e effect on Chiang's ongoing military strategy, but was also a continuation of his heretofore successful strategy of dividing his opponents and offering concessions to maintain some e l i t e groups engaged in "controlled" opposition. Suddenly, in late 1946 Chiang Kai-shek decided to use Chang Chiin- mai's draft after a l l . 1 2 8 It was i f i t had been "reborn." 1 2 9 Even with minor revisions the draft constitution s t i l l embodied what Chang wanted. A year later, emerging from the committee process of the National 1 1 7 Assembly the substance of Chang's draft was passed after three readings as the Constitution of the Republic of China. Only time would t e l l Chang whether or not this was a victory. 118 CHAPTER THREE NOTES •'•See Wong, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Conflict of Confucianism," pp. 67-68; and Spence, The Gate of Heavenly Peace, p. 94. 2Eastman, The. Abortive Revolution, p. 178. 3Jeh-hang Lai, "A Study of a Faltering Democrat: The Life of Sun Fo, 1891-1949" (Ph.D dissertation, university of Illinois, 1976), p. 186. 4Bedeskif State-Building, p. 75. 5Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China: 1927- 1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 27. 6Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p. 178. 7Joseph Fewsmith, Party, State, and Local Elites i n Republican China: Merchant Organisations and Politics i n Shanghai. 1890-1930(Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1985, p. 170. 8Ibid. p. 171. Q ^Ibid. p. 11; also see Lloyd Eastman, "The Kuomintang in the 1930's," in Furth, The. Limits of Change, pp. 206-207. Eastman notes that the "patrimonial concept of political leadership" led to a concentration of power at the very top of the regime. The result was that not only were the masses and non-KMT elite excluded from a political role, but also the vast majority of KMT members were reduced to passive subservience. 1 0 P a t r i c k Cavendish, "The xNew China' of the Kuomintang" in Jack Gray, ed., Modern China's Search for. a P o l i t i c a l Form (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 161. n I b i d . 1 2 I b i d . p. 179. 1 3Bedeski, state-Building, p. 31. 1 4 I b i d . p. 96. 1 5Lawrence N. Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament': The People's P o l i t i c a l Council, 1938-1945," in Paul K.T. Sih, ed., Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War. 1937-1945 (Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1977), p. 274. 1 6 L i Chai [Chang Chun-mai], "Pen-pao t'ung-jen tui-yia chi-nan shih- chien fa-sheng hou shih-chu chih chu-chang," Hsin Ln ("The New Way") vol. 1, no. 5 (Apr. 1, 1928) :1. 119 1 7 L i Chai [Chang Chun-mai], "I-tang chuan-cheng yii wo kuo," Hsin Lu ("The New Way") vol. 1, no. 2 (Feb. 15, 1928):28-31. 18Ch'ien, The Government and Politics p i China/ p. 370. 19"Democracy vs One-Party Rule," p. 98. 2 0 I b i d . p. 99. 2 1Hsi-sheng Ch'i, Nationalist China s i War: Military Defeats and. Political Collapse. 1937-1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1982), pp. 42-43. 2 2Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'," p. 276. 2 3Besides the National Socialist Party, the China Youth Party, the National Salvation Association, the Rural Reconstruction Association, the Third Party, the Vocational Educational Society, and the Chinese Communist Party were represented in the PPC 2 4 T u - l i ch'u-pan she, Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui (Chungking: Tu-li ch'u-pan she, 1938), p. 5. 25Linebarger, The. China P i Chiang Kai-shek, p. 72. 26Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'," p. 306. 2 7See Ch'ien, The Government and Poli t i c s of China, p. 370; Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'," p. 298, p. 297; A. Shaheen, "The China Democratic League and Chinese Pol i t i c s , 1939-1947" (Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan, 1977), p. 15; and, Lawrence N. Shyu, "The People's Political Council and China's Wartime Problems, 1937-1945" (Ph.D dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), p. 27. no A noted constitutional authority himself, Wang was a member of the Kuomintang and had held high government posts. He also had the prestige and independence to criticize Chiang Kai-shek when he was so moved. 29Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'," p. 300. 30Eastman, TJae Abortive Revolution, p. 40. 3 1Lo Lung-chi, "Wo tui Chung-kuo tu-ts'ai cheng-chih t i i-chien," Yii- chou hsiin-k'an ("The Universe") vol. 1, no. 3 (Jan. 5, 1935) :1. 32Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:116. 3 3 I b i d . 805:89. 3 4 I b i d . 805:116. Also see Ying Wei-min, "K'ang-chan yu hsien- cheng." in Shanghai chou-pao ("The Guardian") vol. 2, no, 11 (Aug. 24, 1940) :274. Ying asserted that the people's level of knowledge had made great progress since the war began. He implied that the war had accelerated the rate of progress made by the people towards a readiness for constitutional government. 120 3 5Chang, TJae Third Force, p. 59. 3 6Bedeski, State-Building, p. 159. 37Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p. 169. 3 8Interview with Chang Tun-hua (Chang Chiin-mai's daughter) at Saratoga, California, Feb. 15, 1985. 39Fewsmith, Party, State, and Local Elites, pp. 90-98. 40Chang, "New Confucianism," p. 300. 4 1Furth, "Intellectual change," p. 345. 42chang, K'ang-chan chung t i cheng-tang ho. p'ai-pieh. p. 67. 43Wen-hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hiu, KKJTFi'riCHT, p. 198. 4 4Tan, Chinese Political Thought, p. 255. 4 5Chang Chiin-mai, L i kuo. chih tan, in Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng chiu-chih tan-ch'en chi-nien ts'e. 2 vols. (Taipei: Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang chung-yang tsung-pu, 1976), 2:274. 46Chang, "New Confucianism," p. 300. 4 7Quoted in Hou Sheng, "Chiin-mai hsien-sheng t i cheng-chih ssu- hsiang" (shang), Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") vol. 4, no. 18 (Aug. 25, 1953):24. AO *°Chang, L i kuo chih tao f p. 143. 4 9 I b i d . p. 91. 5 0 I b i d . p. 94. C I -^Eastman, The Abortive Revolution, p. 141. 52Chang, "I-tang chuan-cheng yu wo kuo," p. 29. 5 3John K. Fairbank, China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese- American Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 108. 5 4 I b i d . p. 109. 5 5Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: & History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), p. 224, p. 235, p. 265, p. 267. Ngo Dinh Diem also saw opposition ca l l s for reform as iese ma jested and had l i t t l e regard for elections. His wife, Madame Nhu, promoted a sanctimonious program to protect traditional virtues that was similar to Chiang's New Life Movement of the 1930's. 121 5 6Chu Ch'ing-lai, "Suo-wei san-min-chu-i kung-ho kuo" i n Min-kuo hsien-fa wen-t'i (Shanghai: Min-chih hsieh-hui, 1933), pp. 42-43. 5 7 S t e r l i n g Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty (New York: Harder & Row, Publishers, 1985), pp. 219-220. 5 8 L e s l i e Jean Francis, "The National Salvation Association: The Case of the Seven Worthies,"( Master's thesis, University of Bri t i s h Columbia, 1982), p. 49. 5 9Shyu, The People's P o l i t i c a l Council, p. 158. 6 0shaheen, The. China Democratic League, PP« 63-64. 6 1Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui shih-liao pien-tsuan wei-yuan hui, Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui s h i h - l i a o (Taipei: Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui s h i h - l i a o pien-tsuan wei-yuan hui, 1962), p. 167. 0 i SBau Ming-chien, Modern Democracy in China (Shanqhai: The Commonwealth Press, Ltd., 1925), p. 338. 6 3Tan, Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought, p. 232. 6 4Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:106. 6 5Chang, L i kuo chih tao. p. 98. 66Wen-hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hui, KKJTPJL'HCHT, p. 211. 6 7Chang, L i kuo chih tao. p. 149. 6 8Chu Ch'ing-lai, "Min-kuo hsien-fa yu kuo-min-tang tang-i" in Kuo- mjn hsien-fa wen-t'i. pp. 52-53. fi Q w : 7P'an Ta-kuei, "Hsien-fa shang ssu t a wen-t'i" i n Kuo-min hsien-fa wen-t'i. p. 94. 7 0 China Yearbook. 1937-1943; A. Comprehensive survey QJL Major Developments i n China i n Six Years of War (Chungking: Minist r y of Information, 1943), p. 120. A copy of the 5-5 Draft which appears i n Kuo Wei, ed., Chung-hua min-kuo hsien-fa s h i h - l i a o hsuan-chi (Taipei: Wen-hai ch'u-pan she, date unknown), pp. 47-59, and the March 30, 1940 PPC d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n which appears in Hu Ch'un-hui, ed., Chung-kuo hs i e n - t a i shih s h i h - l i a o hsuan-chi (Taipei: Chung-cheng shu-chu, 1978), pp. 925-944 are used for comparison. ' "Wu-wu hsien-ts'ao hsiu-cheng l i - y u pao-kao shu" i n Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:61. 'Lawrence K. Rosinger, "A Chinese M a n i f e s t o on Democracy. Translated with Notes and Introduction" Amerasia. v o l . IV, no. 8 (Oct. 1940):372. 7 3Kup-min ts'an-cheng hui shih-liao. p, 176. 122 7 In t h i s regard C o u c i l l o r Hsu Ch'ien i s most s p e c i f i c : "People's rights are not absolute, but phrases such as "shall not be limited except by law' must not lose the s p i r i t of the con s t i t u t i o n , and must not transfer c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power to the law . . ." See Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:103. 7 5Chang Yu-yii, "Lun kuo-min ta-hui i-cheng hui", Shanghai chou-pao ("The Guardian") v o l . 2, no. 4 (June 1, 1940) :97. 7 6Chang, The. Third Force, p. 61 7 7Hu Han-min. " L i - f a yuan t i hsing-chih ho t i - w e i " i n Wu-ch'iian hsien-fa wen-hsien chi-yao (Taipei: Chung-kuo wu-ch'uan hsien-fa hsueh- hui, 1963), pp. 178-179. 78"Wu-wu hsien-ts'ao hsiu-cheng l i - y u pao-kao shu" i n Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:62-63. 7 9 I b i d . p. 63. 80"Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui hsien-cheng ch'i-cheng hui t'i-ch'u chung- hua min-kuo hsien-fa ts'ao-an hsiu-cheng ts'ao-an shuo-ming shu," i n Hu, Chung-kuo hsien-tai shih-liao hsuan-chi. pp. 945-946. 8 1"Ling-hsiu tui-yu hsien-cheng shih-shih chih chih-shih" i n Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:86-87. po Hou Sheng, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng t i cheng-chih ssu-hsiang" (shang), p. 20. 83"Kuo-min cheng-fu ch'ou-pei hsien-cheng ching-kuo pao-kao," in Hu, Chung-kUQ hsjen-tai shih shih-liao hsuan-chi. p. 1027. OA °*Dorthy Borg, "People's P o l i t i c a l Council" Far Eastern Survey vol. X, no. 8 (May 5, 1941) :95. 8 5T.A. Bisson, "China's Part i n a C o a l i t i o n War" Far Eastern Survey, vo l . XII, no. 14 (July 14, 1943), p. 140. °°Liang Shu-ming, Huang Yen-p'ei, Tso Shun-sheng, and Chang Chun-mai were among the founders of t h i s group. I t l a t e r became the China Democratic League and was, some say, manipulated by the Communists. 8 7Shaheen, The China Democratic League, pp. 77-78. Also see "Democracy vs. One-Party Rule," p. 112. 8 8Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament" 1, pp. 301-302. 8 9Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui shih-liao. pp. 518-520. 9 0Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., General Editor, The Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy. 1945-1973. Volume IV, The Far East by Russell Buhite (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), p. 119. 123 91Ch*ien, The. Government and. Politics pJL China, p. 375. 92Shyu, "China's 'Wartime Parliament'", p. 290. 9 3Chang, The Third Force, p. 193. Sources are not in agreement on the committee's composition; Lai, in his "A Study of a Faltering Democrat", pp. 225-226, l i s t s only seven committee members—3 KMT, 1 independent, 1 China Youth Party, 1 CCP, and Chang Chun-mai. 9 4Chang Chiin-mai, "Nien-yu nien l a i shih-chieh cheng-ch'ao tang chung women t i li-ch'ang," in CKMCSHTCC, pp. 50-53. 95wang, Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng ch'i-shih shou-ch'ing nien-chi lun-wen £hi, p. 34. 9 6Chiang Yiin-t'ien, "Chang Chiin-mai hsien-sheng i-sheng ta-shih chi" in Chu, CCMCCTL. 1:23. 9 7Wei, Chung-kuo ko_ tang ko_ p'ai hsien-k'uang. pp. 14-16. 98lbid. QQ "Chang Chun-mai "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang hui-i kai wu-wu hsien-ts'ao t i yuan-tse," in CKMCSHTCC. p. 26. 1 0 0Chang Chiin-mai, "Kuo-min ta-hui wen-t'i," Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") vol. 126 (Aug. 17,1946) :5. 1 0 1 I b i d . 102 Ibid, p 6. 1 0 3 I b i d . 1 0 4Yeh Ch'ing, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang hui-i hsiu-kai hsien-ts'ao chih p'i-p'an," in Hu, Chung-kUO hsien-tai shih shih-liao hsuan-chi. p. 1065. Yeh Ch'ing was the psuedonym for Jen Chou-hsuan. 1 0 5Chang Chiin-mai, "Kou-min ta-hui wen-t'i", p. 3. 1 0 6 I b i d . p. 2. 1 0 7 I b i d . p. 6. l 0 8 Y e h Ch'ing, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang hui-i hsiu-kai hsien-ts'ao p'i-p'an," p. 1058. 1 0 9 I b i d . 124 This was probably the case for two reasons: f i r s t , i t was not only impolitic but also dangerous to bring one's attack too close to the person of Chiang Kai-shek, and, secondly, this type of indirect p o l i t i c a l maneuver was more consistent with Chang's temperament, specifically, and with Chinese p o l i t i c a l tradition, generally. l 1 2 C h a n g Chlin-mai, "Mei tsung-t'ung chih-tu yu cheng-hsieh h s i u - cheng hsien-ts'ao," Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") Vol. 115 (June 1, 1946):4. i l 3 C h a n g Chun-mai, " P o l i t i c a l Structure i n the Chinese Draft Constitution," The Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and Social Sciences 243 (January, 1946) :72. -^Sung I-ch'ing, "Chi-nien Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng chiu-shih ming-tan," i n Chu, CCMCCTL. 1:97-98. H^Yeh Ch'ing, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang h u i - i hsiu-kai hsien-ts'ao p'i-p'an," p. 1067. 1 1 6 I b i d . p. 1054. 1 1 7 I b i d . p. 1066. 1 1 8 I b i d . p. 1065. 11 q ., Chang Chun-mai, "Chung-kuo hsin hsien-fa ch'i-ts'ao ching-kuo" Ts'ai-sheng ("Renaissance") vol. 12, no. 2 (Dec. 12, 1972) :25. F i r s t appeared in Ts'ai-sheng [Shanghai], 1946. 1 2 0 I b i d . Jean Chesneaux, Francoise Le Barbier, and Marie-Claire Bergere, China from the 1911 Revolution to Liberation. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 319. 1 99 Chang, "Chung-kuo hsin hsien-fa ch'i-ts'ao ching-kuo," p. 26. 1 2 3 B u h i t e , The. Fax East, pp. 121-122. 1 2 4 J o h n Robinson Beal, Marshall i n China (Garden C i t y , New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 177-178. 1 9R -"-"Suzanne Pepper, C i v i l Ear. 2J1 China: The. P o l i t i c a l Struggle. 1945- 1949 (Berkelely: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 423-427. 1 2 6 I b i d . p. 427. 1 2 7 I b i d . p. 270. 1 98 -^Chang, The. Third Force, p. 200. If there remained any doubts as to with whom the f i n a l decision regarding the constitution lay, they were resolved when Wu Ting-chang, the Secretary-General of the P r e s i d e n t i a l Office, informed Chang Chun-mai that his draft would be adopted. -'•'"Chang, "Chung-kuo hsin hsien-fa ch'i-ts'ao ching-kuo," p. 26. 125 CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION Chang Chiin-mai i s important i n that h i s behavior, his biases, h i s philosophical and p o l i t i c a l beliefs a l l help to further illuminate how a c e r t a i n segment of a generation of Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s met the challenges of twentieth century China. Because he was conservative i n nature and supportive of certain aspects of traditional c i v i l i z a t i o n , i t i s a l l too easy to lump Chang with the "conservative" forces associated with the government of Chiang Kai-shek, which collapsed before the "revolutionary" forces i n 1949. This would be misleading i n terms of understanding Chinese conservatism, and unfair to a man l i k e Chang who saw himself opposed to much of what Chiang Kai-shek stood for. The study of Chinese conservatism, noted Benjamin Schwartz, has not been popular. 1 Perhaps this i s due, i n part, to i t s association with the rule of Chiang Kai-shek. Perhaps Chinese conservatism, particularly in the Republican era, has been seen as reactionary, opposed to s o c i a l change, or representative of repressive elements. Sadly, t h i s view i s a l l too broad and overlooks other veins of conservative thought which have l i t t l e to do with Chiang Kai-shek and do not share any responsibility for his f a i l u r e s . That Chang Chun-mai and conservatives l i k e him also f a i l e d i s undeniable, but their failure and that of Chiang are of different sorts. The fact of their failure either to construct a democratic constitutional government, or to f i n d a place for themselves i n China's s o c i o p o l i t i c a l system leads us to a number of questions. Was the type of democratic constitutional government which Chang promoted a v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to Chiang Kai-shek's programs? Were the methods Chang used to voice p o l i t i c a l opposition or to reach his goals p r a c t i c a l ? Was Chang's 126 f a i l u r e due to his own mis judgments or l i m i t a t i o n s , or to p o l i t i c a l intrigue? Chang Chun-mai's u l t i m a t e goal was n e i t h e r t o r e c r e a t e the institutions and social structure of traditional China, nor to westernize China i n the pattern of modern France, England, or America. Rather, i n the s p i r i t of Chang Chih-tung's t'i-yung formula, Chang sought to combine the best of China and the West; a product equal to the West i n strength and wealth but exceeding the West i n sp i r i t u a l fulfillment. By u t i l i z i n g Western i n s t i t u t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l theory, Chang sought to create a "national renaissance" which would unleash the la t e n t s p i r i t of the Chinese people. Whereas the T'ung Chih Restoration and the S e l f - Strengthening Movement of the 1860*s through the 1880*s tried to rebuild Confucian institutions, Chang sought only to retain their s p i r i t . While institutional change was an important part of Chang's efforts i n the 1940's i t should be seen as a method ra t h e r than a g o a l . Democratic institutions did not mold men's minds; they merely provided an environment within which men could peacefully interact and rebuild the ruptured l i n e s of communication between the various l e v e l s of society. This r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between man and his environment i s not a balanced one, though. While environment can influence one's perceptions and attitudes, i t does so only as long as the individual remains ignorant and passive. When and i f an i n d i v i d u a l perceives "truth" and a c t i v e l y follows the dictates of his own intuition, he then becomes the dominant part of the relationship; able to a f f e c t his environment, even r e a l i t y . This reliance on i n t u i t i v e reasoning and the b e l i e f that the mind could influence reality, such a significant part of New Confucian reasoning, explains much of Chang's behavior. In one sense science and New Confucianism agree; there do e x i s t 127 discoverable "absolutes." Where science uses experimentation, measurement and deductive reasoning to discover these absolutes, New Confucianists r e l y on i n t u i t i o n . One absolute that Chang believed i n was that reason ( I - l i ) was the basis or root of human nature. This basis becomes human morality and, more over, gives us our standards of right and wrong, good and e v i l . 2 Since t h i s "standard" existed i n a l l men, Chang sought a way to appeal to i t , to give to a l l men a method of self-enlightenment that would end i n consensus and "public-minded" cooperation. In t h i s sense democratic institutions afforded an appropriate setting for men to come together, to debate, a i r differences, r e a l i z e t h e i r own f a u l t s , compromise, and reach a consensus. While the exercise was one of practical government, i t was, more importantly, an exercise in learning and self-realization. By practicing democratic government, men learned what democratic government was, and practice moved ever closer to theory. As men confined p o l i t i c a l activity to the peaceful corridors of democratic government, they moved individually towards greater self-realization. In t h i s way democratic assemblies served both a pub l i c and a private function. As Furth has suggested, "parliaments were imagined to provide a finely articulated system of communication among a l l level of participation i n the p o l i t i c a l process. Confucianism assumed that correct p o l i t i c a l action must be based upon commonly recognized principles, and so assemblies were valued not for moderating among a plurality of interests, but rather as educative and expressive instruments for achieving a common consensus." 3 This "common consensus" that Furth speaks of was socially, as well as p o l i t i c a l l y important, especially to a conservative l i k e Chang Chun-mai. Systems, p o l i t i c a l or economic, d i d not i n themselves solve problems, men did. Also true was that without the 128 support of the people or the intelligentsia, a government, no matter how powerful m i l i t a r i l y , could not effectively rule China for long. Only by mustering the combined strength of a l l segments of society could solutions be found and implemented. Finding such a common consensus or "uniformity of view," 4 then, was seen by some as a f i r s t step i n solving China's problems. This search for a common consensus underscores a point which conservative New Confucians l i k e Chang, and t o t a l i s t i c iconoclasts such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu had in common; they both sought to rejuvenate a corrupt and atrophied China by a transformation of the traditional Chinese world view and a total reconstruction of the Chinese mentality. Both groups stressed the priority of intellectual and c u l t u r a l change over p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic changes. 5 But where Ch'en rejected the whole of Chinese tradition, Chang maintained that such tradition gave China i t s foundation. This foundation, according to Chang, provided s t a b i l i t y and gave China d i r e c t i o n . 6 To lack respect f o r history and t r a d i t i o n was, i n Chang's view, to seriously err. There i s a c e r t a i n problem i n h e r e n t i n g i v i n g p r i o r i t y t o intellectual and cultural change, namely, how to go about i t . Chang said that "to reform China's p o l i t i c s and economics, we must begin at people's attitudes . . ."7 Once people's attitudes had been reformed, Chang continued, a "new culture" would result. Once China had a new culture one need not worry about not having a new p o l i t i c a l or economic system. 8 Chang stressed again, though, that i n creating t h i s new culture the old need not be destroyed. The problem, rather, was to carefully select the new culture while retaining aspects of the old. Relying on man's common nature and his i n t u i t i o n , Chang assumed that each man would "naturally" know how to select what he wanted from the new culture and what he wanted 129 from the old culture. This i s a l l consistent with New Confucian epistomology, but did Chang f u l l y r e l y on t h i s to see China through a very d i f f i c u l t time? Others have mentioned that Confucianism has wavered between the poles of s e l f - c u l t i v a t i o n and the task of ordering the world. 9 In his ro l e as philosopher Chang tended to move towards the former pole. In his role as po l i t i c i a n he leaned toward the latter, and seemed better able to adopt a more r e a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e towards the immediate need for i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. In h i s role as p o l i t i c i a n Chang seemed to concede that p o l i t i c a l systems had more influence on man than he could admit i n his r o l e as philosopher. Chang had said that a democratic constitutional government would help concentrate national power,1 0 protect human r i g h t s , 1 1 raise the people's level of knowledge,12 and make them l i v e peacefully and carry on t h e i r business h a p p i l y . 1 3 This i s one r e f l e c t i o n of Chang's Confucian outlook that the world i s i n a state of imperfection. Indeed, every man held the potential for perfection, or sagehood, but unti l that f i n a l stage of s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n was reached society needed an imposed order. This dichotomy i n Confucian thinking, which can be described s o c i a l l y as democratic and p o l i t i c a l l y as patenalistic, was evident in Chang. While he spoke of democratic government, Chang continued to reserve governmental authority to a moral and educational e l i t e . National affairs had become so complex that Chang f e l t only those with expert knowledge were qualified to deal with them. 14 It was the duty of "superior statesmen" 1 5 to stand i n the forefront and lead China to her destiny. I t f e l l , according to Chang, to the p o l i t i c i a n s to "grasp what i s i n the people's hearts and put i t into effect within the p o l i t i c a l system." 1 6 130 This p a t e r n a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e towards the masses and p o l i t i c a l authority kept Chang divorced from the great mass of the people. He had l i t t l e to say to the people d i r e c t l y , yet took i t upon himself to act as t h e i r spokesman. As early as 1907, i n an a r t i c l e i n New C i t i z e n . Chang said that "the impetus for constitutional government must come from the people, i t cannot be conferred by the government."17 But what did Chang mean by "the people?" The great weight of what Chang said about "the ignorant masses," 1 8 of "train[ing] [the people] to become independent c i t i z e n s . . . [and enabling them to] d i s t i n g u i s h between honor and shame."19 a l l points to the conclusion that Chang's d e f i n i t i o n of "the people" was quite narrow. Almost exclusively, Chang confined h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s to the upper classes and eschewed work i n mass movements.20 The membership of his National Socialist Party, for example, was predominantely teachers, students, some businessmen, s o l d i e r s , and other e l i t e elements. The p o l i t i c a l organization that Chang founded to further his p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l aims had l i t t l e to do with the masses. Genuine mass movements were not the kind of class warfare preached by the communists, but rather, Chang believed, an expression of the people's s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n . 2 1 If the consistency we look for—which presumably runs through Chang's t h o u g h t — i s d i f f i c u l t to discern from the above, i t may be that we have touched on a problem shared by others of Chang Chun-mai's generation. In Chang, at least, we do find contradictions between what he states in his role as philosopher and what he says i n his role as liberal-democrat. On the one hand, Chang expends great energy speaking to the fundamental importance and i n v i o l a b i l i t y of people's rights, and bemoans the people's exclusion from the p o l i t i c a l process. At other times, Chang reveals his commitment to more t r a d i t i o n a l and p a t e r n a l i s t i c values when he makes 131 p o l i t i c a l action dependent upon proper levels of knowledge and education; i n other words, reserving p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y leadership, to members of an educated e l i t e . A study of the f r i c t i o n s within conservative neo-traditionalists who also espoused Western l i b e r a l - democratic values would prove interesting. His separation from the lower classes of Chinese society l e f t Chang very much in the dark as to their real desires. While he recognized that Chinese society was divided by class barriers, he grossly underestimated the animosities and f r u s t r a t i o n s that existed, and overestimated the chances for avoiding c l a s s c o n f l i c t . The sense of being part of a national group (min-tsu), Chang f e l t , was a stronger force than c l a s s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The Japanese invasion, Chang i n s i s t e d , was a threat to China that would override c l a s s differences; the high and the low, the rich and the poor, the capitalists and the workers, could not but unite i n the face of such a threat. "The vertical divisions of nationalism," Chang said, "could wash away the horizontal divisions of class." 2 2 It appears i r o n i c that the Japanese invasion, which Chang saw as a chance to unite Chinese of a l l classes, was used so effectively by the Chinese Communist Party to promote what were ultimately opposite ends. This "misreading" of the nature of Chinese nationalism was one element of Chang's failure. We might ask i f Chang Chiin-mai's temperament and philosophical leanings were advantages or handicaps i n the p o l i t i c a l environment of China in the 1940's. Throughout this paper I have referred to Chang as a New Confucianist and a conservative. The New Confucian aspect of his character has been explored, but not the conservative element. To be sure, conservatism and New Confucianism have points i n common. F i r s t , they both accept the principle that there are immutable laws of morality, 132 and that there e x i s t s a transcendent moral order, to which we ought to conform the ways of s o c i e t y . Secondly, order and s t a b i l i t y are requirements of good government, and these can best be achieved by prudence, r e s t r a i n t , and respect for t r a d i t i o n ; the wisdom of one's ancestors i s not to be ignored. Thirdly, variety i s more desirable than uniformity or the deadening egalitarianism of radical systems. Liberty i s more important than equality. And, f i n a l l y , of course, conservatives and New Confucianists, alike, wanted to "conserve" certain selected principles from a particular t r a d i t i o n . 2 3 A twentieth century Chinese conservative l i k e Chang Chun-mai, however, could expand the bounds of his New Confucian conservatism to include elements unavailable to his predecessors. Like K'ang Yu-wei and T'an Ssu-t'ung Chang found that democracy appeared similar to the Utopian models of p o l i t i c s found i n a n t i q u i t y . 2 4 Democracy offered a p o l i t i c a l system i n which "everyone benefited by s t a b i l i t y and had a stake i n preserving i t . " 2 5 Like conservatives elsewhere, Chang could support c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy "not because [ i t ] produces the best or wisest government but because i t i s the strongest safeguard of peace and order." 2 6 Democracy not only f i t w e l l within Chang's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Confucianism, particularly i t s Mencian elements, but i t also complemented his b e l i e f that change needed to be rooted i n continuity. Democracy allowed for change but assured that i t would be orderly and well-anchored in precedent. The issue of change was a d i f f i c u l t one for Chang Chun-mai. Confucianism was not inherently opposed to change; Mencius had elaborated the theory of the "Mandate of Heaven—the so-called 'right of rebellion,'" and had asserted that any man could become a sage. 2 7 And Edmund Burke, one of the f i r s t conservative thinkers, had observed that "change i s the 133 means of our preservation," and that the "able statesman i s one who combines with a d i s p o s i t i o n to preserve an a b i l i t y to reform." 2 8 I t appears that Chang's conservatism was stronger on t h i s point than his Confucianism. Although Mencius had supplied the authority for abrupt change, Chang was loathe to employ i t . He much preferred "to rely on the spontaneous forces of society operating within a framework of general r u l e s " 2 9 to effect change. Unstructured, unpredictable, d i r e c t i o n l e s s , violent change held no charms for Chang. Chang could admire the intentions of the French Revolution or the outcome of the German Revolution, while deploring t h e i r excessive violence, disorder, and the use of coercive strikes. Summing up his feelings Chang observed that: revolutionary movements cannot be separated from armed force, cannot renounce war, cannot be separated from chaos. The background of revolution and the background of reconstruction are not the same. Revolution i s destruction, national reconstruction depends upon thought and experience. Revolution depends upon c o n f l i c t , i t cares not for the s p i r i t , w h i l e n a t i o n a l reconstruction depends upon calm heads. R e v o l u t i o n depends upon weapons and warfare, while national reconstruction depends on peace and legal systems.30 In an age of violence dominated by violent men Chang could advocate the use of force only with extreme reluctance. He clung tenaciously to the p r i n c i p l e s of cooperation, r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and compromise, and expected others to do likewise. Change assumed that the "sense of shame" that helped guide his l i f e would also proscribe immoral actions by others. He assumed that p o l i t i c a l leaders were conscious of the f a c t that they must someday confront heaven and p o s t e r i t y . 3 1 He expected that i f "one 134 recognizes himself as incompetent, he would remove himself [from the problem] . . , 3 2 If what Chang wrote of Chiang Kai-shek up to 1949 can be even p a r t i a l l y accepted at face value, he misjudged Chiang profoundly. The 1948 Democratic Socialist Party platform indirectly charged the KMT, and by i m p l i c a t i o n Chiang Kai-shek, with attempting to wipe out i t s opponents under the pretext of u n i f i c a t i o n , spying on the people, surveillance of opposition party members, employing hooligans to cause trouble with other parties, monopolizing the government, making themselves masters of the country, misrepresenting the people's wishes, monopolizing financial control to enrich themselves, and using the people as t o o l s . 3 3 If this indictment were only p a r t i a l l y true, did Chang really expect his methods to succeed? If i t i s true, as others have charged, that Chiang Kai-shek used confiscation, arrest, and assassination against those who opposed the government,34 why did Chang continue the dialogue? What Chang saw as constructive engagement, others saw merely as "useless and empty ta l k " [that would not] resolve problems [but] only added to the dispute and obstructed China's development."35 In sum, the combination of Chang's Confucian outlook and h i s conservative disposition acted as self-imposed l i m i t s on the range of his p o l i t i c a l opposition. His unwavering b e l i e f that sincerity on his part could e l i c i t s i n c e r i t y i n his antagonists, his conviction that the w i l l could overcome material or p o l i t i c a l obstacles, and his need to keep change channeled into orderly processes a l l acted as inhibiting factors on Chang's a c t i v i t i e s . Chang once said that realizing constitutional government in China was not a p o l i t i c a l problem but a question of w i l l . In contrast, Fei Ch'ing, a NSP member, remarked with more bluntness, "the a b i l i t y to bring 135 constitutionalism to l i f e i n China s t i l l rests i n the willingness of those who hold p o l i t i c a l power."36 The difference between them i s that Chang was viewing the problem from a philosophical standpoint, which questioned neither one's s i n c e r i t y or motives, whereas F e i was looking at i t as a p o l i t i c a l problem. The distinction between philosophy and p o l i t i c s may be akin to the difference between theory and practice; each i s a reflection of the other and i f they are to combine i n a h o l i s t i c system they must agree. From Chang's p h i l o s p h i c a l point of view, one's w i l l could be influenced through reason and intuition. Chang continually held that i f only everyone would s i t down, lay their problems on the table and engage •37 i n frank discussion, there were no problems that could not be solved. In taking and idealizing certain traditional values associated with neo- Confucianism, Chang was including values such as harmony and compromise. It was these kinds of values that kept bringing Chang back to the bargaining table. Chang was an i d e a l i s t , to be sure, but he was also astute enough to demand only what he thought he could get. F e i argued that China's new constitution "should not try to adapt to the present reality," as Chiang Kai-shek proposed, "but rather should take the kind of government China wanted as i t s sole standard." 3 8 Chang could agree with the f i r s t part and, yet, accept something l e s s than Fei's i d e a l . Perhaps Chang had two considerations; f i r s t , a c o n s t i t u t i o n that e x p l i c i t l y enunciated r e a l democratic government might end as the PPC draft constitution had, and, secondly, i f for some reason Chiang Kai-shek accepted such a constitution but ignored and subverted i t , the constitution along with the principle of democratic government would be so defamed as to damage i t s future appeal. 3 9 136 The f o c a l point of Chang's e f f o r t s towards reestablishing the s o c i o p o l i t i c a l structure i n China was the co n s t i t u t i o n . Fairbank i s most c e r t a i n l y correct i n saying that assemblies, or parliaments, were means of communication, but Chang had at l e a s t two other missions f o r them. F i r s t , the assembly which Chang incorporated into his constitution (the Legislative Yuan) was primarily concerned with power. It would act as a counterbalance to the power of the president. It would reestablish the equilibrium i n Chinese society and government that had been lost with the Revolution. Chang's assembly would once again give the intelligentsia a voice i n government. Secondly, we can deduce that Chang's assembly would give status, position, prestige, and authority to a new generation of Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l s conversant i n the vocabulary of democratic government. Their mastery of the vocabulary and theory of democratic government would ensure them of the respect and authority that belonged to their imperial predecessors. The constitutional draft, for which Chang Chun-mai i s recognized as being the p r i n c i p l e author, attempted a fundamental reordering of the p o l i t i c a l status quo. We can only guess that Chang was, to a l i m i t e d degree, aided and abetted by d i s a f f e c t e d members of the Kuomintang, as well as by other minority party members and independents. Since Chang Chun-mai joined Chiang Kai-shek in supporting the concept of a strong central government and a powerful president, his efforts were not so much aimed at limiting either of them, but rather at inducing them to include other e l i t e elements (himself) in the governing process. A new generation of Chinese el i t e s , educated in the best tradition of the East and the West, could once again, then enjoy the institutional support that their imperial forebearers had enjoyed. 137 It i s this system that Chang thought to staff with the graduates of his i l l - f a t e d i n s t i t u t e s : men who brought together the Chinese £*_i and the Western yung. Men with the a b i l i t y and t r a i n i n g to act as able administrators, to provide an intellectual pool to draw on i n the advance of Chinese democracy, and to act as moral exemplars for both the masses and, i n twentieth century China, for the p o l i t i c a l leadership as well. I t i s no doubt true that Confucians, and also conservatives, to a degree, feel more comfortable in a system which clearly identifies status, responsibilities, prerogatives , and outlines rules of behavior. But to expect the c o n s t i t u t i o n to do a l l of t h i s was both u n r e a l i s t i c and unnecessary. The c o n s t i t u t i o n defined, although not without some vagueness, the lines of authority and responsibilities within government. I t also outlined the basic r i g h t s of the people. Beyond t h i s , however, the c o n s t i t u t i o n was s i l e n t . There was no discussion of e t h i c s or morality; there was no need for i t . Those issues were handled quite well by reference to the traditional hereitage. A p o l i t i c i a n was to be guided by h i s own conscience, putting into p r a c t i c e time-honored Chinese principles of ethical and moral behavior. Naively, perhaps, Chang Chiin-mai expected others to respect the new p o l i t i c a l status quo embodied i n the draft constitution. Once agreement was reached, he seemed to assume, the forces operative in the traditional heritage, coupled with the peculiar moral restraints on Chinese leaders, would ensure that p o l i t i c a l behavior would be channeled into the new structure. This, unfortunately, may have been another weakness of Chang's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l dreams. Chang himself, as well as others, bemoaned the f a c t that so many p o l i t i c i a n s were l i t t l e more than s e l f i s h o f f i c e - seekers. Those involved i n government in Chang's era may simply have not 138 been of the caliber Chang imagined. A democratic system i s held together by t r a d i t i o n and consensus. Wish as he might, Chang could produce neither. If w i l l and good intentions were expected to replace them, Chang seriously miscalculated. Perhaps another important f a i l i n g of Chang's constitutional democracy was his effort to give power and authority to a class of el i t e s which had yet to earn either. Chang was trying to a r t i f i c i a l l y reshape the lines of power and authority into forms which bore no r e l a t i o n s h i p to r e a l i t y . Chang could not, with the stroke of a pen, give the opposition authority and power when they could not command i t themselves. Did Chang ever wonder why his periods of relative freedom coincided with the periods when Chiang was under the g r e a t e s t pressure? Did he ever g i v e due consideration to those external forces which probably gave him the opportunity to participate i n national affairs? Without any evidence to the contrary, the answer must be no. In his letter of resignation as Chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party i n 1950 Chang looked back over his recent p o l i t i c a l f a i l u r e s . He sadly r e c a l l e d that he had taken part i n the People's P o l i t i c a l Council only as a way of "seeking cooperation between the various p o l i t i c a l parties. [His] objective was only democratic government." The result, he admitted, was that "cooperation was shattered, the constitution was empty, and what was d a i l y advocated and the r e a l p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n moved further and further apart." "Even though I was s i l e n t on the outside," Chang recalled, "I was ashamed on the inside." 4 0 A few years later i n his book The Third Force. Chang attributed his own fail u r e and the fail u r e of democracy i n China to "tutelage." Tutelage, as practiced by the KMT, was "the desire to perpetuate the conditions which keep p o l i t i c a l power i n 139 t h e i r own hands. They merely gave l i p - s e r v i c e to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , since there was no c o n s t i t u t i o n , no parliament, and no responsible cabinet, a l l questions, . . . were decided by the Party. The people had no right to question the Party." 4 1 The issue of tutelage was not r e a l l y the point, nor was i t the KMT which r e a l l y held p o l i t i c a l power. Chang Chun-mai a c t u a l l y had no objection to the concept of t u t e l a g e — a l l he really sought was to be among the tutors. His view of the masses' a b i l i t y to exercise their p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s i n a democracy was not d i s s i m i l a r to Chiang Kai-shek's. Chang Chiin-mai's real complaint was against Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to share r e a l p o l i t i c a l power or to make himself amenable to Chang's moral remonstrances. Without trying to denigrate the traditional heritage, we must s t i l l conclude that Chang Chun-mai was a v i c t i m of i t . By i d e a l i z i n g c e r t a i n aspects of the Confucian heritage, including the r o l e of the chiin-tzu. Chang t r i e d to bring to bear influences more appropriate to a Confucian Utopian enviornment than to twentieth century China. Jonathan Spence has suggested that K'ang Yu-wei, either consciously or unconsciously, emulated Confucius. 4 2 I t i s probable that Chang Chiin-mai, i n h i s own way, was t r y i n g to bring to l i f e the i d e a l of the Confucian gentleman. Indeed, Chang was a good example of what such a gentleman once was; his class i c a l education, his success i n the Imperial examinations, his involvement with l i t e r a r y s o c i e t i e s , his teaching and philosophical pursuits, and his preoccupation with national a f f a i r s , a l l indicate a man who, by temperament and training, f e l t himself qualified to address any issue that affected Chinese government and society. During the l a t e r part of World War Two Chang kept a house i n Chungking near the home of Chiang Kai-shek. In a serene set t i n g 140 surrounded by woods, Chang's home was furnished i n V i c t o r i a n s t y l e . So complete was the i l l u s i o n that i t was almost impossible to believe that one was i n China. 4 3 And possibly Chang f e l t j u s t that; the China that existed outside h i s door was not the r e a l China but only a f l e e t i n g anomaly soon to be replaced with what should be. Admitting much the same, Chang's brother added that Chang's "personal inclinations and the domestic situation were contradictory." 4 4 Chang truly f e l t himself representative of what he c a l l e d "great untapped forces." The Chinese, he held, were "naturally moderate and this new passion for extremism w i l l pass." What the world was witnessing, as seen through Chang's eyes, "was not the birth of new China, but a very o l d China indeed." 4 5 Not many years would pass before Chang would see his "old China" stillborn. Trying to hurl words at men who fought with guns, Chang was denying the present r e a l i t y . Jack Belden r e a l i s t i c a l l y observed that men l i k e Chang were unarmed, and as such were "no more e f f e c t i v e than a watchdog without a bite or a bark." 4 6 Without the pressures on Chiang Kai-shek by the Japanese, the Communists, or the American government, there was no compelling reason for him to give Chang a voice i n the government, or to even t o l e r a t e his opposition. Unlike the i l l u s i o n s held by General Marshall as to the role the opposition could play in China, other Chinese were more than aware that the prominence Chiang Kai-shek afforded Chang far outweighed his real p o l i t i c a l significance. 141 CHAPTER FOUR NOTES ^Benjamin Schwartz, "Notes on Conservatism," i n Furth, L i m i t s p£ Change, pp. 3-21. 2Hsieh, "Wo yu Chang Chiin-mai hsien-sheng," p. 39. 3Furth, "Intellectual change," p. 344. 4Hsu Chao-shan, Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang, tsu-chih wei-yuan nui hsuan-yen: cheng-kang. cheng-chih lu-hsien (Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang fu-chien sheng tang pu, 1948), pp. 13-15. 5 L i n , Chinese Consciousness, p. 26. 6Chang, L i kuo chih tao. p. 140. 7 I b i d . , p. 274. 8 I b i d . 9 L i n , Chinese Consciousness, p. 53. 1 0Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:89. 1 1Chang, "P o l i t i c a l Structure in the Chinese Draft Constitution," p. 67. 1 o Chang, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang h u i - i hsiu-kai wu-wu hsien-ts'ao yiian-tse," p. 25. 1 3Hsu, Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang, pp. 6-7. 1 4Ts'ai-sheng she, WYSSTH. p. 16. A JChang, L i kuo chih tao f p. 90. 1 6 I b i d . p. 91. 'Chang, "Chang Chun-mai hsien-sheng nien-piao ch'ang-pien," p. 281. 1 8Chang, L i kao. chih tap., p. 94. 1 9Hsii, Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang/ pp. 6-7. 2 0Chang, K'ang-chan chung t i cheng-tang hp. p'ai-pieh. p. 78. 142 2 1 L i Chai [Chang Chun-mai], "Hsien-shih cheng-ch'ao chung kuo-min chih n u - l i fang-hsiang," Hsin Lu ("The New Way") v o l . 1, no. 3 (March 1, 1928) :3. 2 2Wei, Chung-kuo ko_ tang ko p'ai hsien-k'uang. p. 4. Also see Wen- hua chiao-yu yen-chiu hui, KKJTPTHCHT, p. 198. 2 3 R o b e r t Lindsay Schuettinger, ed., The Conservative T r a d i t i o n i n European Thought (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), pp. 12-13, p. 27; and Russell Kirk, "Conservatism: A Succinct Description," National Review vol. XXXrv, no. 17(September 3, 1982) :1080-1081. 2 4 Furth, "Intellectual change," p. 345. 2 5Lindsay, Conservative Tradition, p. 14. 2 6 I b i d . 2 7Derk Bodde, China's C u l t u r a l T r a d i t i o n : What and Whither? (Hinsdale, I l l i n o i s : Dryden Press, 1957), pp. 64-65. 2 8 K i r k , "Conservatism," p. 1080. 2 ySchuettinger, Conservative Tradition, p. 28. 3 0Chang, "Kuo-chia wei shen-me yao hsien-fa?" p. 5. 3 1Chang, L i kuo chih tao. p. 97. 3 2Shen, CTCKSLTK. 805:91. 3 3Hsu, Chung-kuo min-chu she-hui tang, p. 3. 3 4Hou Sheng, "Chun-mai hsien-sheng t i cheng-chih ssu-hsiang," (shang), p. 20. Hsia, Lun Hu Shih yu Chang Chun-mai. p. 66. 3 6 F e i Ch'ing, "Ts'ung jen-min li-ch'ang p'i-p'ing wu-wu hsien-ts'ao," i n CKMCSHTCC. p. 36. 37 J'Chang Chun-mai, "Cheng-chih hsieh-shang hui-i hsiu-kai wu-wu hsien- ts'ao yuan-tse," p. 25. 3ft J O F e i , "Ts'ung jen-min li-ch'ang," p. 36. 3 9 T h i s was after a l l the case with " p o l i t i c a l tutelage." 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Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. 156 GLOSSARY Chang Chih-tung ( ̂  £ ^) ) Chang Chiin-mai [Carsun Chang] ( ^ $^ ) Chang Ping-lin ( fl^Jlj: ) Chang Shen-fu ( fyjlfa ) Chang Tung-sun ( £| | $J ) Chang Shih-lin [psuedonym for Chang Chun-mai] ( ̂  ) Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien ( f£ ) Ch'en Po-nan ( pjjr >(£ $ ) Ch'en Tu-hsiu ( ^ ^ ) Cheng-ch'uan [po l i t i c a l powers] ( ^ [ ) Cheng Lun [Discourses on Politics] (jgfc^ ) Cheng-wen she [Political Information Society] (jf£ fjfl ) Chiang Kai-shek ($f- ) Chia-tsu chu-i [familialism] ( ) Chih-ch'iian [governing powers] Chih-hsingho-i [theunityof knowledge and action] ( kp\^^— ) Chin-shin ± ) Ch'in Shih Huang-ti ( % ^ ) Chou En-lai ( $ jf.jJL) Ch'iian-neng feng-kai [the separation of power and ability] Chiin-tzu ( % $ ) Chung-kuo min-tsu wen-hua shu-yiian [Institute of National Culture] ( ¥ f ft tk t H t ) Fan Ch'ang-chiang ( s£, >.£. ) Fei Ch'ing ( f 3 f ) HanWu-ti 157 Hsin Lu [The New Way] ( fff & ) Hsien-fa hsin-wen she [Constitutional News Association] ( f, Hsin-min ts'una-pao [New People's Miscellany] ( % ) Hsiu-ts'ai (fe $ ) Hsueh-hai shu-yiian [Hsueh-hai Academy] ( T T U ) Hu Han-min ( ?| ft ) Hu Shih ( SfljJL ) I - l i [principle, reason] (̂ » ) Jib cJiih i n [A Record of Daily Knowledge] ( Q Z ) K'ang Yu-wei ) Kuang-fang yen-kuan [Institute of Modern Languages] ( fk i s t i t ) Kung [public] ( ) Kung-ho chien-she t'ao-lun hui [Republican Construction Association] ( # I f it t ) Kuo-chia she-hui tang [National Socialist Party] ( (§] ) Kuo-hsing [national character] ( gj ifS^ ) Kuo-li tzu-chih hsueh-yiian [National Institute of Self-Government] ( m i M * **> ft > Kuo-min ta-hui i-cheng hui [Recess Committee of the National Assembly] ( S) ft * f 1& a* f ) Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] ) Kuo-min ts'an-cheng hui [People's P o l i t i c a l Council] ( m $ $< t } Kuo-ts'ui hsiieh-p'ai [national essence school] ( \St) sffife^ $JfcJ) Ku Yen-wu L i Chai [psuedonym for Chang Chun-mai] (jt ) Liang Ch'i-ch'ao ( ̂  ) Liang-chih [innate knowledge] 158 Liang Shu-ming (^ 5 ^ ^ ) Liu Shih-p'ei ( f,j p% ) Lo Lung-chi (£$.f%% ) Lung Yiin (|| ) Mao Tse-tung ( |t ) Min-chu tang [Democratic Party] (^ i ^ ) Min-ch'uan chu-i [people's rights] ( ffi Min-tsu chu-i [nationalism] ( ^ H J|< ) Nanking kao-teng hsiieh-hsiao [Nanking High School] < * * & I # *t ) Niu Yung-chien ( ^ ) San-min-chu-i [The Three People's Principles] ( 2. ̂  £ ) Shao-nien chung-kuo [Young China] ( 5f ^ ) Shih-shih hsin-pao [China Times] ( $» $ff $& ) Shu-yuan [academy] ( J pfc) Sun Fo Sun Yat-sen ( £ j >t ^ ) Sung She [Pine Society] ( | ± ) Szu [private] ( #a ) Ssu-ma Kuang ( s) ^ #j ) Ta-t*ung [great harmony] ( 7t J®) ) T'ai-tsu ( % 41 ) T'an Ssu-fung ( ̂ | ^ % ) T'ang Chiin-i ( j | f ^ ) T'i-yung [essence-function] ( i j ^ J$) ) Ts'ai-sheng [Renaissance] ( 4$. ) Tseng Kuo-f an («f g ) ? § ) Tseng wen -cheng kung ch'uan-chi [The Complete Works of Tseng Kuo- fan] < * f * 2 £ $ $ ) 159 Tso Shun-sheng ( fcify £ ) Tsung-ts'ai [leader, party leader] T§ U chih t'ung chien ( ^ 5 § j | _ £|£ ) Wang Ching-wei ( ~£ $f) Wang Chung-hui ( 5, $| jj, ) Wang Shih-chieh ( JE 1£ ) Wang Yiin-wu ( £ j|? i L ) Wen I-to ( 9gL - | ) Yang [brightness, negative, female] ( ) Yeh Ch'ing [psuedonym for Jen Chou-hsuan] ( ||F ) Yen Fu ( $ f ) Yin [darkness, positive, male] ( pj^ ) Yuan Shih-kai ( j | I t Jfl.)


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