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Empirical and participatory democratic theories : the limits of the debate Addis, Timothy Michael 1984

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EMPIRICAL AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRATIC THEORIES: THE LIMITS OF THE DEBATE By TIMOTHY MICHAEL ADDIS B.A., T r i n i t y College, Dublin, 1980 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1984 © Timothy Michael Addis, 1984 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s o r her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of 1 o' 1 -The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 - i i -TABLE OF CONTENTS I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 CHAPTER I E L I T E S , PARTICIPATION, AND EQUALITY: THE STATE OF THE DEBATE 10 E l i t i s m and t h e E m p i r i c a l T h e o r y 10 Two C o n c e p t s o f P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n . . . . 24 I I NORMATIVE AND PROCEDURAL CONSENSUS IN DEMOCRACY • . .43 The E m p i r i c a l T h e o r y 43 The P a r t i c i p a t o r y C r i t i q u e 48 R e l a t i v i s m i n t h e D e b a t e . . . . . . . . . ...52 I I I DEMOCRACY AS GOVERNMENT BY CONSENT 64 P a r t i c i p a t i o n and C o n s e n t 64 A u t h o r i t y and C o n s e n t .69 Two T y p e s o f D e m o c r a t i c C o n s e n t 76 IV DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL EQUALITY 86 E q u a l i t y i n t h e D e b a t e 86 P o l i t i c a l E q u a l i t y as a Norm 90 CONCLUSION 100 BIBLIOGRAPHY 105 - i i i -ABSTRACT D e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y i s c u r r e n t l y d i v i d e d i n t o two o p p o s i n g s c h o o l s : t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y , whose t e s t o f democracy i s d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government, unambiguous p o p u l a r c o n s e n t , and e q u a l i t y o f i n f l u e n c e on- d e c i s i o n s ; and t h e E m p i r i c a l , w h i c h i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h l e v e l s o f i n d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t a c i t c o n s e n t , and m a j o r i t y r u l e , i n t h e W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s . T h i s s t u d y s e e k s t o show t h a t t h e two s c h o o l s s h a r e maj'or a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e d e f i n i t i o n and t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f democracy. They assume t h a t democracy s u b s i s t s p u r e l y i n a s e t o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s , and t h a t t h e o n l y j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e p r o c e d u r e i s i t s p l u r a l i s t a p p r o a c h t o demands. E m p i r i c a l and P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s d i s p u t e t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , p l u r a l i s m , and • p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y , b u t t h e y c o n c u r t h a t democracy r e q u i r e s a 'consensus on t h e s e p r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e s o n l y . They a l s o d i s p u t e t h e i d e a l f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t by c o n s e n t , b u t t h e y a g r e e t h a t t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n s r e s t s on t h e e x t e n t o f i n d i v i d u a l c o n s e n t . The l i m i t s o f t h e d e b a t e a r i s e f r o m a c o n f u s i o n - i v -between d e m o c r a t i c p l u r a l i s m and m o r a l r e l a t i v i s m . P r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e s d e f i n e d e m o c r a c y o n l y where t h e y a r e p a r t o f a s e t o f norms w h i c h i n c l u d e s t h o s e o f a u t h o r i t y , r a t i o n a l i t y , and t h e common good; a p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s c a n g u a r a n t e e democracy o n l y where i t i s b a c k e d by a -shared commitment t o t h e s e n o n - p r o c e d u r a l o r s u b s t a n t i v e norms. S i n c e t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s depends on t h e i r c o n f o r m i t y w i t h r a t i o n a l i t y and t h e common good, and n o t o n l y on t h e i r p l a c e o f o r i g i n , an a d e q u a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f democracy must d e m o n s t r a t e a l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n between t h e s e s t a n d a r d s and th e d e m o c r a t i c s y s t e m . T h i s s t u d y s t a t e s t h e c a s e f o r s u c h a ' C o n n e c t i o n , and f o r a n o r m a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , c o n s e n t , p l u r a l i s m , and p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y . INTRODUCTION The major e m p i r i c a l democratic t h e o r i e s a r i s e from the f i n d i n g s of the b e h a v i o u r a l i s t p r o j e c t known as the v o t i n g s t u d i e s . The v o t i n g s t u d i e s c h a l l e n g e the t h e s i s , which they a t t r i b u t e to c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i e s , t h a t democracy presupposes widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n and a fundamental s o c i e t a l consensus. L e s t e r M i l b r a t h f i n d s that at l e a s t o n e - t h i r d of the U n i t e d S t a t e s e l e c t o r a t e i s p o l i t i c a l l y a p a t h e t i c , while a f u r t h e r 60% are " s p e c t a t o r s " : "they 1 watch, they cheer, they vote, but they do not do b a t t l e . " McClosky, P r o t h r o , and Gr i g g r e p o r t t h a t there i s a low l e v e l o f agreement among United S t a t e s c i t i z e n s on s e l e c t e d 2 democratic p r i n c i p l e s . Assuming t h a t the United S t a t e s i s a democracy, the v o t i n g s t u d i e s show the need f o r a r e v i s e d theory of democratic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . As R.A. Dahl s t a t e s the case, what we c a l l 1 d e m o c r a c y d o e s seem to operate with a r e l a t i v e l y low l e v e l of c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Hence i t i s i n -v accurate to s t a t e t h a t one of the necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r 'democracy' i s ex t e n s i v e c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . ^ Since the 1960s, the most prominent c r i t i c s of the e m p i r i c a l theory have been the t h e o r i s t s of p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. The debate between these s c h o o l s d e a l s l a r g e l y w i t h the i s s u e o f whether Western democracies, and by e x t e n s i o n the e m p i r i c a l theory, are e l i t i s t . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s argue t h a t i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s can secure f o r c i t i z e n s \ 2 such benefits of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as the a r t i c u l a t i o n and the protection of i n t e r e s t s . Although there i s no s o c i e t a l consensus on democracy, the Empirical theorists claim, there i s a supportive consensus among c i t i z e n s on the legitimacy of government p o l i c y . Dahl finds that the people of New Haven hold "slack" power; they are ready and able to p a r t i c i p a t e , should they be d i s s a t i s f i e d with 5 the goals of government. F i n a l l y , the Empirical theorists argue that Western democracies f u l f i l l the democratic condition that government proceeds by the consent of the governed. Those who vote consent expressly, these theori s t s claim, while non-participants consent t a c i t l y . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y theorists deny that the e g a l i -t a r i a n norms of democracy can help to j u s t i f y the empi-r i c a l theory. The research of the Pa r t i c i p a t o r y theorists suggests that those who p a r t i c i p a t e least are not those most s a t i s f i e d with government, but rather those with 7 a low sense of p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . The normative theory of t h i s school states that neither a comprehensive system of interest-groups nor a firm s o c i e t a l consensus can guarantee democracy. The representative and the group cannot secure a l l benefits of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , since these include the moral development of the c i t i z e n . Voting and non-participation do not meet the conditions of government by consent, since the p r i n c i p l e requires a continuous and unambiguous act of consent. The Participatory theorists conclude that the empirical theory does not a c c o u n t f o r t h e c e n t r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , c o n s e n s u s , and c o n s e n t i n c l a s s i c a l d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y . A l t h o u g h t h e d e b a t e t a k e s t h e f o r m o f a d i s p u t e a b o u t c l a s s i c a l d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y , t h e two s i d e s a g r e e b r o a d l y t h a t t h e t h e o r y s t a n d s f o r a s t r o n g o r l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e e g a l i t a r i a n norms o f d e m o c r a c y . The main p u r p o s e o f t h e i r r e f e r e n c e s t o c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y i s t o p o r t r a y , t h e d i s p u t e between th e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s as p e r m a n e n t i n d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y . The f o r m o f t h e d e b a t e makes us c h o o s e between th e e g a l i t a r i a n b u t Utopian democracy o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s , o l d and new, and t h e r e a l i s t i c b u t e l i t i s t democracy o f t h e p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t . The aim o f t h i s s t u d y i s t o d i s c r e d i t t h e v i e w t h a t t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s a r e , r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h e p r i n c i p a l a l t e r n a t i v e s and s u c c e s s o r s o f c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i s t s . The e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y i s n o t i n any s t r i c t s e n s e e l i t i s t , I w i l l a r g u e , and t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i e s do n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e 9 main p h i l o s o p h i c a l o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y . The two s c h o o l s do n o t s u b s c r i b e t o o p p o s i n g d e m o c r a t i c i d e a l s , b u t t o a s e t o f s h a r e d a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e d e f i n i t i o n and t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f d e m o c r a c y . The main s h a r e d p r e m i s e i n t h e d e b a t e i s t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f d e m o c racy as a s e t o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e s . P r o c e d u r a l o r f o r m a l d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y d i s t i n g u i s h e s between d e m o c r a c i e s by t h e p l a c e o f o r i g i n o f d e c i s i o n s . The o p p o s i n g i d e a l t y p e s o f d e m o c r a c y a r e e l i t i s m , w i t h r e s t r i c t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e , and d i r e c t , p a r t i c i p a t o r y decision-making. This study shows the need for a normative or substantive theory, which includes c r i t e r i a of evaluation of the substance of p o l i c i e s . Procedural theory reduces such c r i t e r i a to the procedural norms of equality and individualism. Thus, for both the Empirical and the Participatory theorists p o l i t i c a l authority i s power combined with consent; sovereignty refers to the ultimate power of the c i t i z e n r y in a democracy; and the common good i s the outcome eithe r of interest-group pluralism and majority rule, or of face-to-face discussions and unani-mous consent. Normative democratic theory holds that these c l a s s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s are esse n t i a l to the d e f i n i t i o n 10 and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of democracy. Chapter One i d e n t i f i e s the l i m i t s of the d i s t i n c t i o n between e l i t i s m and egalitarianism in an interpretation of the debate. Some early empirical theories respond to the voting studies by c a l l i n g for r e s t r i c t i o n s on popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and for an e l i t e consensus on democratic norms.' The f i r s t section of the chapter shows how the findings of the voting studies have led the Empirical theorists away from e l i t i s m , and towards the Participatory theorists' p o s i t i o n . Both schools hold that a democratic re s u l t requires the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of contending inte r e s t s , and that any e l i t e consensus w i l l be c o n s p i r a t o r i a l . I describe t h i s shared p o s i t i o n as r e l a t i v i s t , because i t does not allow f o r standards by which to test the l e g i -timacy of l e a d e r s h i p . The second s e c t i o n considers the argument that the E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s ' " i n s t r u m e n t a l " concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n commits them to an e l i t i s t p o s i t i o n . I show that both schools e x p l a i n and j u s t i f y p a r t i c i p a t i o n as an instrument to f u r t h e r i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y or power, and I s t a t e the case f o r a concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n as moral self-development. F i n a l l y , I argue that the instrumental and developmental concepts correspond not, as the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s a s s e r t , to e l i t i s m and e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , but to despotism and j u s t or normative l e a d e r s h i p . By means of an a n a l y s i s of the debate on consensus, the second chapter demonstrates the assumptions underlying the procedural d e f i n i t i o n of democracy. The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s define t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m by i t s a b s o l u t i s t ideology; they reason that f i r m c o n v i c t i o n about norms i s incompatible w i t h the f l e x i b i l i t y and tolerance r e q u i r e d by democratic p l u r a l i s m , and they j u s t i f y democracy by i t s l a c k of consensus on i d e o l o g i e s . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s r e j e c t consensus theory on the grounds that 1' i t j u s t i f i e s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and a biased form of p l u r a l i s m . Both schools conclude that democracy r e q u i r e s a consensus on the v a l i d i t y of the democratic procedure only, though they dispute the proper form of t h i s procedure. I argue that both p o s i t i o n s r e s t on the f a l s e assumption that r e l a t i v i s m i s the democratic philosophy. I conclude that procedural consensus presupposes a s o c i e t a l consensus on norms. The t h i r d c h a p t e r e x a m i n e s th e l i m i t s o f the p r o c e -d u r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f democracy as g o v e r n m e n t by the i n d i -v i d u a l c o n s e n t o f t h e g o v e r n e d . A l t h o u g h t h e y d i s a g r e e o v e r t h e i d e a l f o r m o f c o n s e n t , t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i -c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s c o n c u r t h a t any u n d i s p u t e d s i g n o f c o n s e n t i s a l s o an a d e q u a t e i n d i c a t o r o f democracy. My c r i t i q u e p r o c e e d s i n t h r e e s t a g e s . F i r s t , t h e d e f i -n i t i o n c a n n o t h e l p t o r a n k and t o j u s t i f y a c t u a l demo-c r a c i e s . S e c o n d , th e a u t h o r i t y o f a l l g o v e r n m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g d e m o c r a c i e s , must o v e r r i d e i n d i v i d u a l c o n s e n t . T h i r d , i f p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y a r i s e s f r o m p o p u l a r c o n s e n t , and i f l e g i t i m a c y i m p l i e s an o b l i g a t i o n t o obey, th e m a x i m i z a t i o n o f c o n s e n t i n a p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy u n d e r m i n e s t h e d e m o c r a t i c r i g h t t o d i s s e n t . I n c o n c l u s i o n , I show t h a t t h e l i m i t s o f t h e d e b a t e on c o n s e n t a r e a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e p r o c e d u r a l v i e w o f d e m ocracy. F o r b o t h t h e r i g h t t o o b j e c t t o a u t h o r i t y and t h e d u t y t o obey i t a r e c o n t i n g e n t on t h e ends o f g o v e r n m e n t . The d e b a t e between the E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s c o n c e r n s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p r o c e d u r a l norms o f p l u r a l i s m , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and c o n s e n t . The c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r o f t h i s s t u d y shows t h a t t h e two s c h o o l s d i s p u t e w h e t h e r t o d e r i v e t h e s e norms f r o m t h e p r i n c i p l e o f " p r o s p e c t i v e " e q u a l i t y , o r f r o m t h e s t r o n g e r , " r e t r o s p e c t i v e " e q u a l i t y . I a r g u e t h a t b o t h p r i n c i p l e s a r e s t r o n g i n t h a t t h e y a r e t a k e n by t h e i r p r o p o n e n t s t o 7 be s u f f i c i e n t n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s f o r d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n -making, and t h a t both p r i n c i p l e s are weak i n t h a t they cannot guarantee a d e m o c r a t i c r e s u l t . The p r o c e d u r a l norms are adequate to democracy o n l y where they are p a r t o f a s e t o f norms wh i c h i n c l u d e s those o f j u s t i c e , r a t i o -n a l i t y , consensus, and the common good. I f we are to r e t a i n them as d e m o c r a t i c norms, we must d e r i v e the p r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e s from a n o r m a t i v e concept o f p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y , w h i c h b o t h a l l o w s f o r and r e q u i r e s r e f e r e n c e to t h e s e s u b s t a n t i v e norms. 8 FOOTNOTES — INTRODUCTION L e s t e r M i l b r a t h , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n ( C h i c a g o , 1 9 6 5 ) , 21. See a l s o P a u l F. L a z a r s f e l d , B e r n a r d R. B e r e l s o n , and H a z e l G a u d i t , The P e o p l e ' s C h o i c e , t h i r d e d i t i o n (New Y o r k , 1 9 4 4 ) , 43;' Angus C a m p b e l l , G e r a l d G u r i n , and W.E. M i t c h e l l , The V o t e r D e c i d e s ( E v a n s t o n , 111., 1954), 29, 33, 339-40; B e r n a r d R. B e r e l s o n , P a u l F. L a z a r s f e l d , and W i l l i a m McPhee, V o t i n g ( C h i c a g o , 1954), 307; Angus C a m p b e l l , P.E. C o n v e r s e , W . E . / M i l l e r , and D.E. S t o k e s , The A m e r i c a n V o t e r (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 0 ) , 91, 542; R.A. D a h l , Who G o v e r n s ? (New Haven, Conn., 1 9 6 2 ) , 276-7; S i d n e y V e r b a and Norman H. N i e , P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n A m e r i c a (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 2 ) , 11, 27-32, 131, 338. F o r a summary o f t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s , see Eugene B u r d i c k , " P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y and t h e V o t i n g S t u d i e s , " i n A m e r i c a n V o t i n g B e h a v i o r , e d s . Eugene B u r d i c k , A r t h u r J . B r o d b e c k ( G l e n c o e , 111., 1959). 2 H e r b e r t M c C l o s k y , " C o n s e n s u s and I d e o l o g y i n A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c s , " A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l . S c i e n c e R e v i e w . 58 ( J u n e 1 9 6 4 ) , 365; James V/. P r o t h r o and C h a r l e s M. G r i g g , " F u n d a m e n t a l P r i n c i p l e s o f Democracy: B a s e s o f A g r e e m e n t and D i s a g r e e m e n t , " J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c s 22 (May 1960), 288. See a l s o Samuel A. S t o u f f e r , Communism,  C o n f o r m i t y and C i v i l L i b e r t i e s , s e c o n d e d i t i o n ( G l o u c e s t e r , Mass., 1963); D a h l , Who G o v e r n s ? , op. c i t . , 319. 3 R.A. D a h l , " H i e r a r c h y , Democracy and B a r g a i n i n g i n P o l i t i c s and E c o n o m i c s , " i n P o l i t i c a l B e h a v i o r , e d s . H e i n z E u l a u , Samuel J . E l d e r s v e l d , and M o r r i s J a n o w i t z ( G l e n c o e , 111., 1 9 5 6 ) , 87. C i t e d by Graeme Duncan and S t e v e n L u k e s , "The New Democracy," i n A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s , e d s . C h a r l e s A.McCoy and J o h n P l a y f o r d (New Y o r k , 1967), 168. 4 F o r W i l l i a m K o r n h a u s e r , The P o l i t i c s o f Mass S o c i e t y (New Y o r k , 1 9 5 9 ) , d i r e c t and i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i -c i p a t i o n l e a d s t o deep i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s i n s o c i e t y . I n t e r e s t - g r o u p p l u r a l i s m i s e s s e n t i a l t o p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . 5 D a h l , Who G o v e r n s ? , op. c i t . , 305. M o r r i s J a n o w i t z and Dwaine M a r v i c k , " C o m p e t e t i v e • P r e s s u r e and D e m o c r a t i c C o n s e n t , " i n P o l i t i c a l B e h a v i o r , e d s . E u l a u , E l d e r s v e l d , and J a n o w i t z , op. c i t . , 2 7 5 f f . See a l s o S.M. L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l Man ( G a r d e n C i t y , N.Y., 1 9 6 3 ) , 185; M i l b r a t h , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , op. c i t . , 145 . 9 L e w i s L i p s i t z , "On P o l i t i c a l B e l i e f s : The G r i e v a n c e s o f t h e P o o r , " i n Power and Community, e d s . P h i l i p G r e e n and S a n f o r d L e v i n s o n (New Y o r k , 1969), 154; J a c k L. W a l k e r , "A C r i t i q u e o f t h e E l i t i s t T h e o r y o f Democracy," A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e R e v i e w 60 ( J u n e 1966), 290; M i c h a e l J . P a r e n t i , "Power and P l u r a l i s m : A View f r o m t h e Bottom up," i n An End t o P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , e d s . M a r v i n S u r k i n and A l a n W o l f e (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) , 130-1; R o b e r t P r a n g e r , The E c l i p s e o f C i t i z e n s h i p (New Y o r k , 1968), 27-8, 51-2; D o n a l d Keim, " P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n C o n t e m p o r a r y D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r i e s , " i n P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , e d s . J.R. P e n n o c k and J.W. Chapman (New Y o r k , 1975), 17-18; and Duncan and L u k e s , " T h e New D emocracy," op. c i t . , 175. Q C a r o l e Pateman, P a r t i c i p a t i o n and D e m o c r a t i c  T h e o r y ( C a m b r i d g e , 1 9 7 0 ) , d i s t i n g u i s h e s between t h o s e c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i s t s , s u c h as J . S . M i l l , R o u s s e a u , and C o l e , who r e c o g n i z e t h e " i n t r i n s i c " b e n e f i t s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and t h o s e , s u c h as Bent.ham and James M i l l , who do n o t . She a r g u e s t h a t t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y i s s u c c e s s f u l i n r e v i s i n g t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e l a t t e r g r o u p o n l y . 9 The c o m p l e m e n t a r y t h e s i s i s t h a t c l a s s i c a l d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y i s n o t e g a l i t a r i a n . I do n o t a r g u e t h i s t h e s i s , however, s i n c e an a n a l y s i s o f c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y c a n n o t r e s o l v e t h e s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s o f t h e d e b a t e . R e f e r e n c e s t o c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y i n t h e d e b a t e a r e r h e t o r i c a l ; w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f P a t e m a n 1 s work, t h e y a r e n o t c e n t r a l t o t h e arguments o f t h e two s i d e s . 10 W i l l i a m H. N e l s o n , On J u s t i f y i n g Democracy ( L o n d o n , 1 9 8 0 ) , 22. 11 The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s do n o t oppose t h e s y s t e m o f p l u r a l i s m , b u t o n l y t h e use o f t h e c o n c e p t i n d e s c r i b i n g W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s . As P u r c e l l n o t e s , t h e y have f o c u s e d t h e i r a t t a c k s on t h e a c c u r a c y o f ' p l u r a l i s m ' as a d e s c r i p t i o n o f A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y . . . D e b a t e h a s c e n t e r e d n o t on t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i d e a l . . . b u t on t h e i s s u e o f i t s p r a c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . Edward A. P u r c e l l , The C r i s i s o f D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y ( L e x i n g t o n , Ky., 1973), 267-8. 10 CHAPTER ONE 'ELITES,.PARTICIPATION, AND EQUALITY: THE STATE OF THE DEBATE P a r t One: E l i t i s m and t h e E m p i r i c a l T h e o r y The v o t i n g s t u d i e s c l a i m t h a t most c i t i z e n s i n W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s a r e p o l i t i c a l l y i n c o m p e t e n t . A c o h e r e n t r e s p o n s e to, t h i s f i n d i n g w o u l d e i t h e r r e s t r i c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s t o t h e c o m p e t e n t , o r e x t e n d i t t o a l l c i t i z e n s i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e y - w i l l a c q u i r e p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s . The main t a s k o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s t o d i s c o v e r w h i c h o f t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s h a v e c h o s e n . W a l k e r and B a c h r a c h c h a r g e t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y w i t h 1 e l i t i s m on two r e l a t e d c o u n t s . F i r s t , t h e t h e o r y s t a t e s t h a t p o l i t i c a l a p a t h y among n o n - e l i t e s i s f u n c t i o n a l t o t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f d e m o c r a c y . S e c o n d , i t s t i p u l a t e s t h a t d e m o c r a c y p r e s u p p o s e s an e l i t e c o n s e n s u s . The two t h e s e s a r i s e f r o m t h e f i n d i n g t h a t t h o s e who a r e l e a s t c o m m i t t e d • ' 2 t o d e m o cracy t e n d t o be n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s . B e r e l s o n c o n c l u d e s t h a t p o l i t i c a l a p a t h y among t h e s e c i t i z e n s h e l p s t o " h o l d t h e s y s t e m t o g e t h e r . " He s t a t e s : e x t r e m e i n t e r e s t g o e s w i t h e x t r e m e p a r t i s a n s h i p . . . w h i c h c o u l d d e s t r o y d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s , i f g e n e r a l i z e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e community.^ The t h e s i s of e l i t e consensus f o l l o w s from the f i n d i n g t h a t , i n McClosky's words, i t i s the a r t i c u l a t e c l a s s e s r a t h e r than the p u b l i c who serve as the major r e p o s i t a r i e s of the p u b l i c conscience, ^ and the c a r r i e r s of the democratic creed. David Truman and V.O. Key conclude that a s t a b l e demo-cracy presupposes agreement among these c l a s s e s on the democratic creed. Key s t a t e s that democracy r e q u i r e s "a s p r i n k l i n g of persons throughout the population concerned by the p u b l i c weal, and animated by a f a i t h 5 i n the system." Truman c a l l s f o r "a broad consensual per c e p t i o n of the t h r e a t s to the system'1 among the 6 ranks of t h i s e l i t e . Walker and Bachrach extend t h e i r charge of e l i t i s m to such j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of the e m p i r i c a l theory as Dahl's s l a c k power and Key's supportive consensus. Dahl's Who Governs? holds that n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s are powerful i n that leaders are o b l i g e d to a n t i c i p a t e t h e i r r e a c t i o n s to p o l i c i e s , and so consider t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . "The p o l i t i c a l stratum i s e a s i l y penetrated," he f i n d s , "by those whose concerns a t t r a c t them to the d i s t i n c t i v e 7 p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the stratum." M i l b r a t h and L i p s e t argue t h a t , i f c i t i z e n s opt not to a r t i c u l a t e grievances, they must be s a t i s f i e d with the goals of government. As L i p s e t puts the p o i n t , i t i s p o s s i b l e that nonvoting i s now, at l e a s t i n the Western democracies, a r e f l e c t i o n of the. s t a b i l i t y of the system, a response to the d e c l i n e of 12 major s o c i a l c o n f l i c t s . Key supports t h i s hypothesis by h i s finding that most of the major p o l i c i e s and rules of government are underpinned by opinion d i s t r i b u t i o n s that are function- g a l l y supportive i n the p o l i t i c a l system. The Empirical theorists hold that r e s t r i c t i o n s on p a r t i -c ipation and e l i t e consensus are compatible with demo-cracy where there i s a consensus among non-participants on e l i t e goals. The P a r t i c i p a t o r y theorists f i n d that non-participants are neither apathetic nor s a t i s f i e d with government. Parenti's respondents "had a rather precise notion of 10 what affected them." Their f a i l u r e to a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r complaints i s , Parenti claims, a r e s u l t of t h e i r ignorance of existing procedures, combined with the perception that 11 t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l not meet with success. Parent! explains non-participation as a pattern of negative reactions which attempts to avoid d i r e c t exposure to, and competition against, unresppnsive i t i e s . ^ and unsympathetic authori" Even i f there were a supportive consensus on government among non-participants, the Pa r t i c i p a t o r y theorists argue, i t could not j u s t i f y an e l i t e consensus. ' Bachrach states that e l i t e consciousness of t h e i r power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "would deepen, not lessen, the c r i s i s of American democracy." He points out that a democratic and broadly based attack against p r i v i l e g e could very l i k e l y be interpreted by powerful e l i t e s as an a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e s y s t e m . The main a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y p o s i t i o n i s t h a t a c o n s e n s u s r e s t r i c t e d t o l e a d e r s i s a s u f f i c i e n t -c o n d i t i o n o f e l i t i s m . Dye and Z e i g l e r d e f i n e a s o c i e t y as e l i t i s t w h e r e ' l e a d e r s s h a r e a c o n s e n s u s a b o u t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l norms u n d e r l y i n g t h e s o c i a l s y s t e r n . . . and CVhere t h e y ] a g r e e on more m a t t e r s t h a n t h e y d i s a g r e e o n . 1 The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s a p p e a r t o a c c e p t t h i s v i e w i n as much as t h e y j u s t i f y e l i t e c o n s e n s u s by showing t h a t i t r e c e i v e s p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . However, i f t h e t e r m " e l i t i s m " r e f e r s t o an u n d e m o c r a t i c f o r m o f g o v e r n m e n t , i t s c o n d i t i o n s o u g h t t o be more s t r i n g e n t t h a n Dye and Z e i g l e r ' s u p p o s e . F o r i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a w i d e l y a c c e p t e d e l i t e c o n s e n s u s w i l l c o n c e r n t h e s u b v e r s i o n o f the r u l e o f law. I n s p i t e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y c r i t i q u e , i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t an u n p o p u l a r e l i t e c o n s e n s u s w i l l u p h o l d d e m o c r a t i c v a l u e s . One c o n d i t i o n o f e l i t i s m i s c o h e s i o n among l e a d e r s . E l i t e s s h o u l d have a homogeneous b a c k g r o u n d , and t h e means t o r e s t r i c t t h e c i r c u l a t i o n o f e l i t e s . A s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n c o n c e r n s t h e c o n t e n t o f e l i t e c o n s e n s u s . E l i t i s m i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n s p i r a c y among l e a d e r s ; t h a t t h e r e i s a " c o m b i n a t i o n o f p e r s o n s f o r an e v i l o r 15 u n l a w f u l p u r p o s e . . . a p l o t . " L e a d e r s s h o u l d g i v e t h e i r own, s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s p r e c e d e n c e o v e r t h e common good. An e l i t i s t t h e o r y i s one t h a t j u s t i f i e s e l i t e c o h e s i o n and e l i t e c o n s p i r a c y . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f e l i t i s m i n t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y must t e s t t h e t h e o r y i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s . The t e r m " e l i t i s t " i s u s e d w i d e l y t o d e s c r i b e t h e c l a s s i c a l e l i t i s t s c h o o l , h e a d e d by P a r e t o , Mosca, and M i c h e l s . T hese t h e o r i s t s a r e e l i t i s t i n t h a t t h e y e x p l a i n and t h e y j u s t i f y t h e c o h e s i o n o f e l i t e g r o u p s . The c l a s s i c a l e l i t i s t s d i s t i n g u i s h b etween two s e c t i o n s o f s o c i e t y : t h e m a j o r i t y , who d e s i r e s e c u r i t y and p r o t e c t i o n , and t h e s m a l l b u t d o m i n a n t m i n o r i t y , who have a w i l l t o power. F o r t h i s s c h o o l t h e c o h e s i o n o f e l i t e s a r i s e s f r o m a t r a i t o f human n a t u r e w h i c h has the same c o n s e q u e n c e s i n e v e r y t y p e o f p o l i t y . M i c h e l s c o n c l u d e s f r o m h i s s t u d y o f t h e German S.P.D. t h a t a l l p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e s u b j e c t t o an i r o n law o f o l i g a r c h y . The c l a s s i c a l e l i t i s t s i m p l y t h a t e l i t e s w i l l be c o n s p i r a t o r i a l , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t h e y w i l l p u r s u e power and d o m i n a t i o n . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s f o l l o w t h e e l i t i s t s i n p o s i t i n g a p o s s i b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f e l i t e c o h e s i o n : e l i t e s s u b s c r i b e t o d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s , and n o n -e l i t e s t o p a r t i s a n i d e o l o g i e s . However, t h i s p o s i t i o n d i f f e r s f r o m t h a t o f the e l i t i s t s i n a t l e a s t one r e s p e c t . F o r t h e c l a s s i c a l e l i t i s t s t he w i l l t o power . i s n a t u r a l o r u n i v e r s a l ; i t i s g i v e n t o , o r p r e s u p p o s e d by t h e s o c i a l t h e o r i s t . By c o n t r a s t , t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y r e l a t e s d e m o c r a t i c and a u t h o r i t a r i a n i d e o l o g i e s t o t h e 15 c i t i z e n ' s l e v e l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I n M c C l o s k y ' s words, why s h o u l d c o n s e n s u s and s u p p o r t f o r d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s be s t r o n g e r among t h e p o l i t i c a l s t r a t u m t h a n among th e e l e c t o r a t e ? The answer p l a i n l y has t o do w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r ^ p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and i n v o l v e m e n t . L i p s e t and K o r n h a u s e r f i n d t h a t t h o s e w i t h t h e l o w e s t l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n a r e t h o s e most s u s c e p t i b l e t o a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c mass movements. J o s e p h F e m i a d e s c r i b e s t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s ' 18 e x p l a n a t i o n o f e l i t e i d e o l o g y as " i n s t i t u t i o n a l . " T h e s e t h e o r i s t s h o l d t h a t p o l i t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e o f o u t l o o k between e l i t e s and n o n - e l i t e s . The i n s t i t u t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t t h e t h e s i s o f e l i t e c o n s e n s u s i s n o t i n t e n d e d as a u n i v e r s a l law o f d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y . F o r Truman, S t o u f f e r , and Key, t h e t h e s i s i s a t e m p o r a r y measure; 19 a r e s p o n s e t o t h e movement known as M c C a r t h y i s m . L i p s e t s p e c i f i e s t h a t e l i t e c o n s e n s u s i s e s s e n t i a l t o d emocracy where t h e r e a r e sudden i n c r e a s e s i n p a r t i -20 c i p a t i o n among t h o s e o p p o s e d t o d e m o c r a c y . T h e r e i s no l o g i c a l r e a s o n why t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s s h o u l d n o t c o n c l u d e on t h e b a s i s o f t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s t h a t a l l c i t i z e n s w o u l d come t o s u b s c r i b e t o d e m o c r a t i c b e l i e f s i n a p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a c y . I n t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y , J o s e p h F e m i a n o t e s , t h e r e i s no s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s a r e i n n a t e l y s u p e r i o r . The key v a r i a b l e , i n t h i s a c c o u n t , i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l s y s t e r n s . . . T h i s l i n e o f 16 r e a s o n i n g i s f a i r l y t y p i c a l i n p l u r a l i s t l i t e r a t u r e . Y e t i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e q u i t e r a d i c a l ; r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e e d u c a t i v e i m p a c t o f a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l i n v o l v e m e n t e n a b l e d t h e o r i s t s l i k e R o u s s e a u , J . S . M i l l , and de T o c q u e v i l l e t o j u s t i f y the e x t e n s i o n o f p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and c o n t r o l . They p e r c e i v e d an i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and i n d i v i d u a l p s y c h o l o g y , and c o n c l u d e d t h a t a s t u p i d , n a r r o w and s e l f i s h c i t i z e n r y , f a r f r o m b e i n g w r i t t e n i n human n a t u r e , was t h e i n e v i t a b l e p r o d u c t o f a s o c i e t y b a s e d on p a s s i v e a c q u i e s c e n c e . 2 1 J u s t as t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s do n o t commit t h e Empi-r i c a l t h e o r i s t s t o t h e d e f e n c e o f e l i t e c o h e s i o n , t h e s t u d i e s do n o t a i d i n t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a c o n s p i r a c y among e l i t e s . The v o t i n g s t u d i e s r e p o r t t h a t most., c i t i z e n s c l a i m t o s u b s c r i b e t o d e m o c r a t i c v a l u e s ; t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s d i s c o v e r by means o f a c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e i r r e s p o n d e n t s t h a t most do n o t c o n s i s t e n t l y s u p p o r t t h e s e v a l u e s . F o r example, a m a j o r i t y o f c i t i z e n s e x p r e s s s u p p o r t f o r m i n o r i t y r i g h t s , b u t o n l y an e d u c a t e d and a c t i v e m i n o r i t y d e m o n s t r a t e a commitment t o t h e s p e c i f i c r i g h t s o f a c t u a l m i n o r i t i e s . Truman, S t o u f f e r , and Key c a l l f o r an e l i t e c o n s e n s u s on p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h most c i t i z e n s r e s p e c t , o r wo u l d l i k e t o r e s p e c t , b u t w h i c h few t h o r o u g h l y u n d e r s t a n d and f o l l o w . The f u n c t i o n o f e l i t e c o n s e n s u s i n t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y c a n be s e e n i n S t o u f f e r ' s c l a i m t h a t non-p a r t i c i p a n t s . a r e a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c b e c a u s e t h e y have n o t b e e n as y e t s u f f i c i e n t l y m o t i -v a t e d by r e s p o n s i b l e l e a d e r s o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n t o g i v e ' s o b e r s e c o n d t h o u g h t s ' t o t h e b r o a d e r and l o n g - r a n g e c o n s e q u e n c e s . 1 7 22 o f s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n s o f f r e e d o m . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y between e l i t e c o n s e n s u s and e l i t e c o n s p i r a c y . They demand an e l i t e c o n s e n s u s n o t " f o r an e v i l o r u n l a w f u l p u r p o s e , " but i n d e f e n c e o f d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s . The e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y o f e l i t e c o n s e n s u s i s n o t e l i t i s t - i n t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g u n d e m o c r a t i c . However, I have a r g u e d o n l y t h a t a p o s i t i o n i n s u p p o r t o f p a r t i -c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a c y i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e f i n d i n g s and t h e t h e o r i e s o f t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s ; I have n o t shown t h a t t h e s t u d i e s e n t a i l s u c h a p o s i t i o n . . I n o t e d t h a t a t l e a s t some E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s f a v o u r p o l i t i c a l 23 a p a t h y o v e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n f o r n o n - e l i t e s . W i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s , i t h a s become c l e a r t h a t t h e y do n o t s u p p o r t e q u a l l y an e l i t i s t and an e g a l i t a r i a n r e s p o n s e t o t h e i r own f i n d i n g s on p o l i t i c a l i n c o m p e t e n c e . I n f a c t , t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s o f t h e l a t e 1960s and the, 1970s a p p e a r t o c o n t r a d i c t b o t h the e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y o f a p a t h y , and s u c h j u s t i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e t h e o r y as t h e t h e s e s o f s l a c k power and s u p p o r t i v e c o n s e n s u s . The e a r l y v o t i n g s t u d i e s , s u c h as L a z a r s f e l d 1 s The P e o p l e ' s C h o i c e and C a m p b e l l ' s The V o t e r D e c i d e s , a t t e m p t t o p r e d i c t l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n by means o f t h e c i t i z e n ' s o p i n i o n s and b e l i e f s . T h e s e t h e o r i s t s c h o o s e t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e c i t i z e n ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h c u r r e n t a f f a i r s and p o l i t i c a l c a n d i d a t e s , and h i s e x p o -s u r e t o p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e f r o m o t h e r s . Those w i t h h i g h l e v e l s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and e x p o s u r e w i l l , t h e s e t h e o r i s t s h y p o t h e s i z e , p a r t i c i p a t e more f r e q u e n t l y t h a n 24 o t h e r s . One a s s u m p t i o n o f t h i s p r o j e c t i s t h a t the c i t i z e n f r e e l y c h o o s e s h i s l e v e l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h h i s v i e w s . D a h l and Key make the same a s s u m p t i o n i n t h e i r t h e s e s o f s l a c k power and s u p p o r t i v e c o n s e n s u s . The a s s u m p t i o n i s o p p o s e d by th e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e r e " i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s " on t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the l o w e r s o c i o - e c o n o m i c s t r a t a . F o r t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s s o c i o - e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s c a n b e s t p r e d i c t 25 i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r . The f i n d i n g s o f The P e o p l e ' s C h o i c e and The V o t e r D e c i d e s do n o t , however, c o n f i r m L a z a r s f e l d ' s and 2 6 C a m p b e l l ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s . The s t u d i e s show t h a t d e m o g r a p h i c and s o c i o - e c o n o m i c v a r i a b l e s a r e the most a c c u r a t e i n p r e d i c t i n g l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Those who p a r t i c i p a t e most a r e w e l l - e d u c a t e d , h i g h l y 27 p a i d , C a u c a s i o n , s u b u r b a n , male, and so f o r t h . L a t e r v o t i n g s t u d i e s , s u c h as V e r b a and N i e ' s P a r t i -c i p a t i o n i n A m e r i c a c o n f i r m t h a t t h e s e a r e t h e m a j o r 28 c o r r e l a t e s o f l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . These s t u d i e s s u p p o r t t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s ' c r i t i q u e o f t h e 29 t h e s e s o f s l a c k power and s u p p o r t i v e c o n s e n s u s . V e r b a and N i e c o n c l u d e t h a t n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s do n o t have t h e r e s o u r c e s t o c o m p l a i n : The i n a c t i v e s a r e by no means s a t i s f i e d ; t h e y a r e more l i k e l y t o f a c e s e v e r e needs i n t h e i r d a y - t o - d a y l i v e s . I f t h e y a r e n o t a c t i v e , i t i s n o t b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o be a c t i v e a b o u t b u t , we b e l i e v e , b e c a u s e o f t h e i r low s o c i o - e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s . ^ F o r the l a t e r E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s p o l i t i c a l a p a t h y and e l i t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i m p l y d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s . The v o t i n g s t u d i e s l e a d t h e s e t o oppose s t r o n g l y any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o h e s i o n among e l i t e s . Truman, S t o u f f e r , and Key assume t h a t an e l i t e c o n s e n s u s n e e d n o t be c o n s p i r a t o r i a l ; t h e l a t e r E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s t a k e t h e s t a n c e t h a t i t n e c e s s a r i l y w i l l be. A c e n t r a l p r e m i s e o f t h e t h e s i s o f e l i t e c o n s e n s u s i s t h a t some c i t i z e n s w i l l s u b j e c t p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s t o t h e common go o d . The v o t i n g s t u d i e s d i s c r e d i t t h i s a s s u m p t i o n by t h e i r d i s c o v e r y t h a t p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s g o v e r n e d by a w i l l t o power. Note t h a t t h e r e i s a t e n s i o n between t h e b e h a v i o u r a l i s t p r o j e c t t o d e v e l o p u n i v e r s a l laws o f p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r , and Truman, S t o u f f e r , and K e y ' s e x c l u s i o n o f an a r t i c u l a t e , a c t i v e m i n o r i t y f r o m t h e s e l a w s . T h i s t e n s i o n becomes g r e a t e r when the s t u d i e s f i n d t h a t i r r a t i o n a l i t y and the p u r s u i t o f p r i v a t e power a r e t h e u n i v e r s a l norms o f p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r . The e a r l y v o t i n g s t u d i e s e s t a b l i s h t h a t p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s i r r a t i o n a l by r e f e r e n c e t o the f i n d i n g s on p o l i t i c a l i n c o m p e t e n c e . As B u r d i c k s t a t e s , i f r a t i o -n a l i t y i s g i v e n " t h e minimum d e f i n i t i o n . . . o f t h e 20 i n f o r m a t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o make a d e c i s i o n . . . the v o t e r i s , 31 by and l a r g e , n o t r a t i o n a l . " One i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s e f i n d i n g s i s t h a t t h o s e who a r e p o l i t i c a l l y ' i n f o r m e d may a c t a c c o r d i n g t o r e a s o n and n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s . L a t e r v o t i n g s t u d i e s summon added e v i d e n c e t o i n d i c a t e 32 t h a t p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s i r r a t i o n a l . The b r o a d i n t e n t -of t h e s e s t u d i e s i s t o d e c o n s t r u c t t h e r a t i o n a l , w i l l i n g s u b j e c t as a f a c t o r i n s o c i a l t h e o r i e s ; t o expose h i m as t h e p r o d u c t o f s o c i a l f o r c e s beyond h i s c o n t r o l . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s c a n n o t c o n t i n u e t o exempt a m i n o r i t y f r o m the t h e s i s t h a t p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s i r r a t i o n a l , s i n c e t o do so w o u l d be t o q u e s t i o n t h e s c i e n t i f i c v a l u e o f t h e t h e s i s . The v o t i n g s t u d i e s f i n d t h a t c i t i z e n s p a r t i c i p a t e i n o r d e r t o f u r t h e r t h e i r s e n s e o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . The f i n d i n g o r i g i n a t e s i n C a m p b e l l ' s The V o t e r D e c i d e s . C a m p b e l l t a k e s a s one v a r i a b l e i n h i s s e a r c h f o r c o r r e l a t e s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h e f e e l i n g t h a t i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n d o e s have, o r c a n have an i m p a c t on t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s , i . e . t h a t i t i s w o r t h w h i l e to p e r f o r m o n e ' s c i v i c d u t i e s . 3 3 He r e p o r t s t h a t " t h e r a t e o f v o t i n g t u r n - o u t was f o u n d t o i n c r e a s e u n i f o r m l y w i t h t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' 34 s e n s e o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . " L a t e r v o t i n g s t u d i e s a c c e p t as a p r e m i s e t h e t h e s i s t h a t c i t i z e n s p a r t i c i p a t e where t h e y have a h i g h s e n s e o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . They c o n f i r m t h a t c i t i z e n s p a r t i c i p a t e i n o r d e r t o 21 35 f u r t h e r t h a t s e n s e o f e f f i c a c y . The r e d u c t i o n o f t h e c i t i z e n ' s s e t o f norms t o t h e p u r s u i t o f power l e n d s s u p p o r t t o B a c h r a c h ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t an e l i t e c o n s e n s u s w i l l c o n c e r n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f e l i t e p r i v i l e g e s . I n one p o i n t o f e x p l i c i t agreement between t h e two s c h o o l s , Pateraan s t a t e s t h a t "one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t c o r r e l a t i o n s t o emerge f r o m e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r " i s t h a t between the c i t i z e n ' s p o l i t i c a l : i n v o l v e m e n t and h i s s e n s e o f p o l i -c a l e f f i c a c y . She a n n o u n c e s : we s h a l l . . . t a k e t h e s e n s e o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . . . t o be an o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n o f . . . t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t s r e f e r r e d t o by t h e o r i s t s o f p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a c y . S i m i l a r l y , D e n n i s Thompson a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o p e r r e s p o n s e t o the v o t i n g s t u d i e s i s t o e x t e n d p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy; he s t a t e s t h a t " t h i s b e l i e f i s s u p p o r t e d - b y e v i d e n c e . . . t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n may i n c r e a s e c i t i z e n s ' s e n s e o f e f f i c a c y . " Thompson t a k e s t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s t o be p a r t o f t h e c a s e 37 f o r p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y . Truman, S t o u f f e r , and Key d i f f e r f r o m " t h e c l a s s i c a l e l i t i s t s i n t h a t t h e y impute r e a s o n and n o r m a t i v e c o n d u c t t o p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s where t h e e l i t i s t s see o n l y t h e w i l l t o power. The l a t e r e m p i r i c a l t h e o r i e s t a k e a t h i r d p o s i t i o n . They a d o p t t h e w i l l t o power as an e x p l a n a t i o n f o r p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r , and t h e y e x p l a i n t h e b e h a v i o u r b o t h o f e l i t e s and o f n o n - e l i t e s by means o f t h e c o n c e p t . T h e s e t h e o r i e s a r e c l o s e t o t h a t o f t h e e l i t i s t s . F o r t h e 22 p o s i t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t c i t i z e n s i n a u t h o r i t y w i l l s u b j e c t p r i v a t e t o p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s o n l y where i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h e c k s o r o t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i n g c i t i z e n s l e a d him t o do s o . V e r b a and N i e s t a t e t h a t " t h e c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i a l s t a t u s , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and r e s p o n s i v e n e s s i s o u r m a j o r c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c s . " They i n f e r f r o m t h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t "government r e s p o n d s 38 o n l y t o t h e a c t i v e . " S i m i l a r l y , M i l b r a t h s t a t e s : when o n l y p a r t o f t h e p e o p l e p a r t i -c i p a t e , t h e g overnment i s l i k e l y t o be d i r e c t e d so as t o v i o l a t e t h e i n t e r e s t s . o f n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s . 3 9 The l a t e r E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s seem a l s o t o i m p l y t h a t an e l i t e c o n s e n s u s i s i n e v i t a b l y c o n s p i r a t o r i a l , and t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c r e s u l t r e q u i r e s t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f a l l c o n t e n d i n g p a r t i e s . I f so, t h e r e may be o n l y m i n o r d i f f e r e n c e s o f e m p h a s i s between them and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s . 4 0 V e r b a , N i e , and M i l b r a t h r e j e c t e l i t i s m , b ut t h e y do n o t p r o v i d e g r o u n d s f o r c a l l i n g some e l i t e s l e s s d e m o c r a t i c t h a n o t h e r s . They p o r t r a y a l l c i t i z e n s as p o w e r - h o l d e r s , and t h e y d i s t i n g u i s h e l i t e s o n l y by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y h o l d more power t h a n o t h e r c i t i z e n s . T h ese t h e o r i s t s o v e r l o o k t h e f a c t t h a t a g o v e r n i n g e l i t e h o l d s , o r g e n e r a l l y h o l d s , a d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f power t o t h a t o f p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s ; t h a t i s , l e g i t i m a t e power. The l a t e r E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s a r e t h e r e f o r e bound e i t h e r t o an a c c e p t a n c e o r t o a r e j e c t i o n o f e l i t e s , w i t h o u t 23 t h e p o s s i b i l i t y , o f a p p r o v a l o r d i s m i s s a l c o n t i n g e n t on t h e ends o f e l i t e r u l e . As S a r t o r i a r g u e s , we a r e p r e c l u d e d by t h i s v e r y d e f i n i t i o n t p f e l i t e s as power-holders3 f r o m l o o k i n g i n t o t h e d i s c r e p e n c y between e l i t e q u a l i t i e s ( a n d / o r s t a n d a r d s ) on t h e one hand, and power p o s i t i o n s ( u n d u l y a s s i m i l a t e d t o e l i t e p o s i t i o n s ) on the o t h e r . Thus t h e i n e v i t a b l e n e t i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t y p e s o f d e f i n i t i o n i s . . . e i t h e r g r a t u i t o u s l y t o impute e l i t e  v a l u e t o w h a t e v e r power s t r u c t u r e happens t o e x i s t , o r t o d e v a l u e w h a t e v e r may be o f v a l u e i n s u c h a power s t r u c t u r e . From t h i s we c a n a r r i v e a t t h e s h e e r s a n c t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u s quo o r , go-nversely, a t a w h o l e s a l e d e s e c r a t i o n . The p o s i t i o n o f t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s i s b e s t c o n s i d e r e d n e i t h e r as e l i t i s t n o r as e g a l i t a r i a n , b u t as p r o c e d u r a l o r r e l a t i v i s t . S a r t o r i t a k e s t h e o p p o s i n g , n o r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n when he c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n i n the e v a l u a t i o n o f a democracy i s n o t w h e t h e r t h e p o w e r f u l e x i s t , b u t w h e t h e r t h e y " r e p r e s e n t a u t h e n t i c 42 o r a p o c r y p h a l e l i t e s . " By t h e c r i t e r i o n o f e l i t e c o n s e n s u s , a t l e a s t some E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s a r e e l i t i s t . By o t h e r c r i t e r i a o f e l i t i s m t h e r e i s l i t t l e t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between t h e e m p i r i c a l and t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y s c h o o l s . M o r e o v e r , t h i s d i f f e r e n c e h a s l e s s e n e d w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s . The e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y h a s become more e g a l i t a r i a n ; i t does n o t f o l l o w , however, t h a t i t h a s become more c o n v i n c i n g l y s o . The t e x t s o f Truman, S t o u f f e r , and Key have t h e m e r i t t h a t t h e y s t i p u l a t e s t a n d a r d s by w h i c h we c a n c a l l some e l i t e s u n d e s i r a b l e ; f o r them a l e g i t i m a t e e l i t e s u b s c r i b e s t o s o c i a l j u s t i c e 24 and t o o t h e r d e m o c r a t i c norms. They a l s o a c c o u n t f o r the f a c t t h a t , i f t h e v o t i n g s t u d i e s a r e c o r r e c t a bout the e x t e n t o f a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c b e l i e f s , i t may be i m p o s s i b l e t o s e c u r e an e g a l i t a r i a n r e s u l t by means o f an e g a l i t a r i a n 43 p r o c e d u r e . The v o t i n g s t u d i e s d i r e c t t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s t o w a r d s a c o n v e r g e n c e w i t h t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s on a t h o r o u g h g o i n g e g a l i t a r i a n p o s i t i o n . Y e t t h i s p o s i t i o n i s b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d as t h o r o u g h g o i n g r e l a t i v i s m : i t e q u a t e s democracy w i t h e q u a l i t y ; l e a d e r s h i p w i t h e l i t i s m ; a n d . t h e d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r i s t ' s t a s k w i t h t h e measurement o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y among v a r i o u s s o c i a l s t r a t a . P a r t Two: Two C o n c e p t s o f P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s who s u b s c r i b e t o t h e t h e s i s t h a t democracy r e q u i r e s r e s t r i c t i o n s on p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e p l a c e d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h i n t e r e s t - g r o u p p l u r a l i s m . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s r e p l y t h a t g r o u p p l u r a l i s m r e s t s on t h e f a l s e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s an i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i v i t y o n l y ; t h a t t h e o n l y g o o d r e a s o n t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s i s t o a r t i c u l a t e and t o p r o t e c t p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s . I n the e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y , Pateman p o i n t s o u t , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s d e f i n e d as an i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i v i t y t h r o u g h w h i c h c i t i z e n s c a n i n f l u e n c e g o v e r n m e n t a l l e a d e r s ; i t i s a t e c h n i q u e f o r s e t t i n g g o a l s and c h o o s i n g p r i o r i t i e s . . . a 4 4 t e c h n i q u e f o r t h e a g g r e g a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t s . The n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l , o r i n t r i n s i c f u n c t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n c i t e d by Pateman and o t h e r s i s t h e d e v e l o p -m e n t a l one. I n t e r e s t - g r o u p s c a n n o t s e c u r e f o r the c i t i z e n a l l t h e b e n e f i t s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n s i n c e t h e s e a c c r u e t o t h e c i t i z e n d i r e c t l y f r o m the e x p e r i e n c e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and n o t o n l y f r o m i t s e f f e c t s on l e g i s l a t i o n and p o l i c y . F o r the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n commits t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y t o a r e j e c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l and d i r e c t c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s s u b s c r i b e t o an i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The v o t i n g s t u d i e s f i n d t h a t c i t i z e n s p a r t i c i p a t e n o t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r commitment t o s u c h n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s as t h e common good, b u t a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r s e n s e o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . I f , as Almond and V e r b a s t a t e , "a d e m o c r a t i c c i t i z e n s p e a k s t h e l a n g u a g e o f demands," i t f o l l o w s t h a t we s h o u l d e v a l u a t e h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n by i t s s u c c e s s 45 i n s e c u r i n g t h e s e demands. F o r V e r b a and N i e p o l i t i c a l a c t s " d i f f e r i n what t h e y c a n g e t the c i t i z e n . " They d e f i n e p a r t i c i p a t i o n as t h o s e l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s by p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s t h a t a r e more o r l e s s d i r e c t l y aimed a t i n f l u e n c i n g t h e s e l e c t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t ^ p e r s o n n e l a n d / o r the a c t i o n s t h e y t a k e . V e r b a and N i e ' s d e f i n i t i o n seems t o c o n f i r m the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s ' c h a r g e t h a t t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y f a i l s t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l b e n e f i t s o f p a r t i -c i p a t i o n . We s h o u l d q u e s t i o n , however, w h e t h e r the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s o f f e r a g e n u i n e a l t e r n a t i v e t o 26 t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t . Pateman s t a t e s t h a t p a r t i -c i p a n t s i n p o l i t i c s t e n d t o have "an a c t i v e , n o n - s e r v i l e c h a r a c t e r ; " t h a t t h e y " f e e l t h a t t h e y a r e t h e i r own m a s t e r ; " and t h a t t h e y l e a r n t o p a r t i c i p a t e more 47 • e f f e c t i v e l y . F o r M a r t i n Oppenheimer the l a c k o f s t r u c t u r e d l e a d e r s h i p . . . f o r c e s p a r t i c i p a n t s t o t h i n k f o r t h e m s e l v e s ... engage i n d i r e c t d e c i s i o n -.making, and t h u s become more s e l f -d e t e r m i n i n g and l e s s a l i e n a t e d . 4 8 R o b e r t P r a n g e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s between two t y p e s o f demo-c r a t i c c i t i z e n by t h e c r i t e r i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e i r p a r t i -c i p a t i o n f u r t h e r s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e i r c h a r a c t e r s . One o f P r a n g e r ' s t y p e s " o r i e n t t h e m s e l v e s upwards t o w a r d s t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t ; " t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a f o r m o f s u b m i s s i o n t o t h o s e i n power, and i t does n o t a i d i n t h e c i t i z e n ' s d e v e l o p m e n t . P r a n g e r ' s o t h e r t y p e o f p a r t i c i p a n t a c h i e v e s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t inasmuch as t h e y " d e - e m p h a s i z e h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e s , " and " l o o k 49 t o t h e p o w e r f u l as equals.." The b e n e f i t s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n a r i s e , i n t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e s e t h e o r i s t s , f r o m the p u r s u i t and t h e e x e r c i s e o f p o l i t i c a l power. The c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n u s e d by b o t h s i d e s i n t h e d e b a t e i s an i n s t r u m e n t a l one. As H a l l o w e l l n o t e s , power i s " r e l a t i o n a l " o n l y , and n o t s u b s t a n t i v e . Power i s n o t s u b s t a n t i v e and t a n g i b l e . . . a p o s s e s s i o n t h a t c a n be a c c u m u l a t e d , s t o r e d up, and m a n i p u l a t e d . . . b u t r a t h e r i t e x i s t s o n l y i n a c t i o n . B e c a u s e a c t i o n i s p u r p o s i v e , o r aimed a t some a p p a r e n t 27 g o od, i t c a n n o t be an end i n i t s e l f . L i k e w i s e , power ca n be o n l y an i n s t r u m e n t o r a means t o a good; i t i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t end o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . A n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n w o u l d r e f e r t o t h a t b e h a v i o u r w h i c h t r a n s c e n d s s e l f - i n t e r e s t , and w h i c h i s g u i d e d i n s t e a d b y . p u b l i c o r p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . Lawrence S.caff d i s t i n g u i s h e s between p a r t i c i p a t i o n as t h e q u e s t f o r power, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n as c o - o p e r a t i o n and com-m u n i t y : one c o n c e p t e m p h a s i z e s the i d e a o f s h a r i n g i n c o m m o n . l i f e and a c t i n g on t h e b a s i s o f r e c i p r o c i t y i n o r d e r t o p r o mote the ' p u b l i c g o o d . 1 The o t h e r l o o k s upon p a r t i c i p a t i o n as an a c t o f e x c h a n g e , as an i n s t r u m e n t a l means f o r g a i n i n g power i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e ^ t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e a l i z i n g p r i v a t e b e n e f i t s . S c a f f ' s d i s t i n c t i o n i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e work o f J.R. P e n n o c k . I n h i s L i b e r a l Democracy ( 1 9 5 0 ) , P ennock c a l l s f o r a "maxi-mum o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f p o l i c y ; " he j u s t i f i e s p a r t i c i p a t i o n by i t s p r o p e n s i t y t o s e c u r e " t h a t v e r y s e l f - d i r e c t i o n w h i c h i s t h e e s s e n c e o f l i b e r t y . " N o t e , however, t h a t P e n n o c k j u s t i f i e s t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y p r i n c i p l e a l s o by s a y i n g t h a t i t " f o l l o w s f r o m t h e v a l u e o f t h e v o l u n t a r y a c c e p t a n c e o f c o n s t r a i n t s and r e s t r i c t i o n s . " N o t e , t o o , t h a t i n a n o t h e r p a r t o f L i b e r a l Democracy P e n n o c k c o n s i d e r s and r e j e c t s t h e c l a i m t h a t " s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t " i s a v a l i d d e m o c r a t i c i d e a l . 5 2 By 1979, i n D e m o c r a t i c  P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y , P e n n o c k i s c l e a r l y t h i n k i n g o f t h e 28 p r i n c i p l e known e a r l i e r by him as s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t when he condemns p a r t i c i p a t o r y d emocracy f o r l e a d i n g , i n e x t r e m e c a s e s , t o " a n a r c h i s m , .immobil isme, and r u l e by a 53 s e l f - s e l e c t e d and s e l f - s e r v i n g m i n o r i t y . " B e c a u s e i t i s j u s t i f i e d b y - e n s u i n g l e v e l s o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y , and n o t by the v o l u n t a r y a c c e p t a n c e o f a u t h o r i t y , t h e c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e d e b a t e between t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s c o r r e s p o n d s t o P e n n o c k ' s s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . The two s i d e s i n the d e b a t e may d i s p u t e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f w i d e s p r e a d p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y as a j u s t i f i -c a t i o n f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d e m o c r a c y . F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s demand p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e c i s i o n -making e v e n where i t m i g h t u n d e r m i n e the s t a b i l i t y o f t h e s t a t e , w h i l e th e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s temper the p a r t i c i p a t o r y i d e a l by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . The two s c h o o l s may a l s o d i s a g r e e a b o u t the b e s t means t o w i d e l y d i s p e r s e d power; f o r example, t h e y d i f f e r i n t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t - g r o u p p l u r a l i s m . B u t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s c o n c u r i n j u s t i f y i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n by t h e power i t c o n f e r s on t h e c i t i z e n does l e a d t o f u r t h e r s h a r e d a s s u m p t i o n s i n t h e d e b a t e . F i r s t , b o t h g r o u p s o f t h e o r i s t s h o l d t h a t s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t r e q u i r e s the d e c l i n e o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , and t h e e x t e n s i o n o f e q u a l i t y . S e c o n d , b o t h a r e c o m m i t t e d t o t h e v i e w t h a t t h a t d e m o cracy i m p l i e s d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . T h i r d , b o t h 29 r e j e c t t h e c o n t r a c t u a l t h e o r y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as e l i t i s t and u n d e m o c r a t i c . We can now c o n s i d e r t h e s e p o i n t s i n t u r n . By r e f e r r i n g t o t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n as m o r a l s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t , we c a n a l s o i d e n t i f y t h e w e a k n e s s e s o f t h e t h r e e a s s u m p t i o n s . The i n s t r u m e n t a l and t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l c o n c e p t s h a v e i n common the f a c t t h a t t h e y a r e j u s t i f i e d by t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e c i t i z e n ' s c h a r a c t e r . They d i f f e r , however, i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t . The i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t a r i s e s f r o m th e R o u s s e a u i a n i d e a l o f d e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f c o n s t r a i n t s on b e h a v i o u r o r , i n C o c h r a n ' s p h r a s e , " s p o n t a n e i t y , l a c k o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n , o p e n n e s s , and 54 s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n . " T h i s c o n c e p t o f d e v e l o p m e n t i s f o u n d most n o t a b l y i n t h e works o f Henry K a r i e l . K a r i e l s t i p u l a t e s t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n must, by t a k i n g on t h e s p o n t a n e o u s c h a r a c t e r o f p l a y o r " a c t i o n f o r i t s own s a k e , " t r a n s f o r m " h i e r a r c h i c a l , g o a l - o r i e n t e d a d m i n i -s t r a t i v e s y s t e m s i n t o e q u a l i t a r i a n , p r o c e s s - o r i e n t e d o n e s . " K a r i e l a d m i t s c a n d i d l y t h a t i t i s " n o t the m o r a l i t y " o f h i s i d e a l " t h e g r e a t e s t d i v e r s i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e " t h a t f u r t h e r s t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c h a r a c t e r , b u t r a t h e r " t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f C l f s J e x p a n d i n g th e p o l i -55 t i c a l l i f e o f t h o s e s u b j e c t t o i t . " -The d e v e l o p m e n t a l o r n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t o f p a r t i -c i p a t i o n r e s t s on an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t as t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the i m p u l s e t o the r e f l e c t i o n 30 and t h e j udgement o f c o n s c i e n c e . F o r Y v e s Simon, men a c q u i r e m o r a l v i r t u e t o the e x t e n t t h a t t h e y s u b j e c t t h e i r d e s i r e s t o m o r a l s c r u t i n y b e f o r e a c t i o n . Simon a r g u e s t h a t s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t r e q u i r e s , n o t t h e r e m o v a l o f d e t e r m i n a n t s o f a c t i o n , b u t r a t h e r a " s u p e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 11 w h i c h e n a b l e s one " t o c h o o s e the p r o p e r means t o h i s ends f r o m the v a r i e t y a v a i l a b l e t o h i m . " S i m i l a r l y , Simon and C o c h r a n i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t o f " t e r m i n a l l i b e r t y , " w h i c h i s t h e power o f c h o o s i n g th e good a l o n e and w h i c h c o n s i s t s i n ^ t h e i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f t h e m o r a l law. T e r m i n a l l i b e r t y r e q u i r e s , i n t h e words o f B e r d a y e v , n o t " f o r m a l f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e , " b u t r a t h e r a c h o i c e w h i c h 5 7 " p r e s u p p o s e s a p r e v i o u s c h o o s i n g o f t h e t r u t h . " Simon and C o c h r a n ' s a p p r o a c h t o t h e c o n c e p t o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t d i f f e r s f r o m t h a t o f t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s i n one i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t . W h i l e t h e v o l u n t a r y a c c e p t a n c e o f j u s t c o n s t r a i n t s may be b e n e f i c i a l i n any t y p e o f p o l i t y , an a c t i v e , n o n - s e r v i l e , and p o l i t i c a l l y e f f i c a c i o u s p e r s o n a l i t y i s w e l l s u i t e d o n l y t o a p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a c y . A n o n - i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n must show t h a t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e . Y e t t h e t r a i t s c i t e d by t h e two s i d e s i n t h e d e b a t e a r e a p o s s i b l e h a n d i c a p i n an army, a s c h o o l , o r a f a m i l y . 5 8 Simon and C o c h r a n p r o v i d e a more c o n v i n c i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a n t h a t f a v o u r e d i n t h e debate 1. F o r i f i t i s g u i d e d by a w i l l t o p.pwer, t h e e x i s t e n c e o f g o v e r n m e n t and a s o c i a l o r d e r must r e s t r i c t p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. B u t i f we mean by p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e a s o n e d d i s c u s s i o n and c o - o p e r a t i o n , t h e r e i s no n e c e s s a r y c o n t r a d i c t i o n between p a r t i c i p a t i o n and g o v e r n m e n t . The main i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t u n d e r l y i n g i t , c o n c e r n s the l e g i t i m a c y o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . S i n c e the aim o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s , f o r t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s , s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and s i n c e a u t h o r i t y i s g o v e r n m e n t by e x t e r n a l f o r c e s , the e x t e n s i o n o f p a r t i -- 59 c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a c y r e q u i r e s t h e d e c l i n e o f a u t h o r i t y . F o r Pateman i t f o l l o w s f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y p r i n c i p l e t h a t the a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p must be t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m t h e u s u a l one o f s u p e r i o r i t y - s u b o r d i n a t i o n . . . t o one o f c o - o p e r a t i o n o r e q u a l i t y . ; One means t o an e g a l i t a r i a n a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p c i t e d by t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s i s d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . Pateman and Thompson s t a t e t h a t d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i s t h e " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l embodiment" and t h e "main r e c o n s t r u c t i v e i d e a l " o f p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy; t h e y i m p l y t h a t i t c a n s e r v e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e i r own, p a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i e s and c o m p e t i n g t h e o r i e s o f d e m o c r a c y . However, s i n c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s i s most l i k e l y to enhance t h e c i t i z e n ' s s e n s e o f e f f i c a c y where p o l i t i c a l u n i t s a r e s m a l l and power i s a c c e s s i b l e , the E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s a r e a l s o c o m m i t t e d t o t h e d e m o c r a t i c i d e a l o f d e c e n t r a -l i z a t i o n . D a h l s t a t e s : t h e f u n d a m e n t a l axiom i n t h e t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e o f p l u r a l i s m i s . . . t h i s : I n s t e a d o f a s i n g l e c e n t e r o f s o v e r e i g n power t h e r e must be m u l t i p l e c e n t e r s o f power, none o f w h i c h i s o r can be w h o l l y s o v e r e i g n . 6 ! D i s p u t e s between t h e two s c h o o l s a r e c o n f i n e d t o t h e empi-r i c a l q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r the d e c e n t r a l i s t i d e a l i s s e c u r e d i n W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s . The d e b a t e does n o t , f o r example, a d d r e s s th e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r i t i s d e s i r a b l e , o r i n d e e d p o s s i b l e , t o h a v e m u l t i p l e c e n t e r s o f s o v e r e i g n t y i n a p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . A f u r t h e r i m p l i c a t i o n o f the i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n c e r n s th e r o l e o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n a d e m o cracy. The c i t i z e n ' s s e n s e o f e f f i c a c y a p p e a r s t o be h i g h e r where the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i s a rmeans f o r t h e f a i t h f u l t r a n s m i s s i o n o f demands t h a n where he has t h e a u t h o r i t y t o e v a l u a t e p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s i n t h e l i g h t o f h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e common good. The E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s d i f f e r w i d e l y o v e r the n e c e s s i t y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n d e mocracy, s i n c e one s c h o o l s t a n d s f o r t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f d i r e c t f o r r e p r e s e n t -a t i v e d e m o c r a c y . Y e t b o t h s c h o o l s a r e c o m m i t t e d by t h e i r t h e s i s t h a t t h e c i t i z e n ' s w i l l t o power d i r e c t s h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y t o t h e v i e w t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a compromise between t h e d e m o c r a t i c i d e a l and t h e r e q u i r e -6 3 ments o f t h e modern s t a t e . I f we must have r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , b o t h s c h o o l s a s s e r t , t h e y s h o u l d be " s a m p l e s , s p e c i m e n s 64 o r a n a l o g u e s " o f t h e g e n e r a l p o p u l a t i o n . T h e r e i s a c o n s e n s u s i n t h e d e b a t e i n f a v o u r o f d e s c r i p t i v e n o t i o n s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o v e r a s c r i p t i v e o r c o n t r a c t u a l o n e s . F o r V e r b a and N i e t h e main c r i t e r i o n o f democracy i s t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e a c t i v i s t p o p u l a t i o n r e s e m b l e s t h e e l e c t o r a t e i n i t s s o c i o - e c o n o m i c o r i g i n s and i n i t s 65 p o l i t i c a l p r e f e r e n c e s . S i m i l a r l y , f o r most t h e o r i s t s i n t h e d e b a t e a p o l i t y i s e l i t i s t where i n i t i a t i v e s o r i g i n a t e w i t h an i d e n t i f i a b l e m i n o r i t y . T h e r e i s l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l v a l u e i n a p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y w h i c h c o n s i d e r s l e a d e r s h i p and a u t h o r i t y t o be n e c e s s a r i l y u n d e m o c r a t i c . The i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n l e a d s th e t h e o r i s t t o t h e t h e s i s t h a t t h e l o c u s o f u l t i m a t e power i s t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f a c t o r i n a p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . I f a l l . p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n i s g o v e r n e d by a w i l l t o power, th e o n l y g u a r a n t e e o f l e g i t i m a t e g o v e r n m e n t i s t o d i s p e r s e .power as w i d e l y as t h e s y s t e m p e r m i t s . The E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s a l l e g e t h a t a c h o i c e b e t w e e n . r u l e by t h e many and r u l e by t h e few f a c e s e v e r y s t u d e n t o f g o v e r n m e n t . F o r t h o s e who s u b s c r i b e t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l c o n c e p t , by c o n t r a s t , o u r main p o l i t i c a l c h o i c e i s t h a t b e t w e e n d e s p o t i s m and t h e r u l e o f law. Simon, S c a f f , C o c h r a n , and'Penriock d i s t i n g u i s h and j u d g e g o v e r n m e n t s by t h e ends t h a t t h e p o w e r f u l p u r s u e . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s a r e c o r r e c t t o d i s -t i n g u i s h between two c o n c e p t s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c u r r e n t d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r i e s ; t h e y a r e a l s o c o r r e c t t o a s s o c i a t e t h e s e c o n c e p t s w i t h p a r a d i g m s o f t h e i d e a l d emocracy. 34 However, t h e s e t h e o r i s t s suppose w r o n g l y t h a t t h e i d e a l t y p e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l and t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l c o n c e p t s a r e r u l e by an e l i t e and r u l e by t h e p e o p l e . The p o s i t i o n o f t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s f o l l o w s f r o m t h e i r r e l a t i v i s t a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s a r e l i m i t e d t o m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s , and t h a t t h e judgement o f 66 i n t e r e s t s i s i n e v i t a b l y a v a l u e - j u d g e m e n t . These a s s u m p t i o n s a r e made a l s o by t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s when t h e y d e v e l o p a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y f r o m t h o s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a c t u a l d e m o c r a c i e s w h i c h c an be m e a s u r e d by t h e s c i e n t i f i c method. From t h e v i e w - p o i n t b o t h o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e and o f t h e t h e o r i s t , b o t h s c h o o l s assume, a l l p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s a r e o f e q u a l l e g i t i m a c y . A l t h o u g h t h e s e v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s may c l a i m t o r e p r e s e n t t h e common good, t h e y r e f l e c t m e r e l y t h e t a s t e s and t h e o p i n i o n s o f t h e c i t i z e n o r o f t h e c r i t i c . F o r b o t h s c h o o l s t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f c l a i m s t o t h e common good v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e x t e n t o f t h e i r p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . . Th u s , t h e y t a k e t h e o p p o s i n g i d e a l t y p e s o f dem o c r a c y t o be r u l e by t h e many and r u l e by t h e few. 35 FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER ONE J a c k W a l k e r , "A C r i t i q u e o f t h e E l i t i s t T h e o r y o f Democracy," A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review 60 ( J u n e 1 9 6 6 ) , 2 8 7 f f ; P e t e r B a c h r a c h , " E l i t e C o n s e n s u s and Democracy," J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c s 24 ( A u g u s t 1962)', ; 4 4 2 f f . 2 " James W. P r o t h r o and C h a r l e s M. G r i g g , "Funda-m e n t a l P r i n c i p l e s o f Democracy: B a s e s o f Agreement and D i s a g r e e m e n t , " J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c s 22 (May 1960), 288, f i n d t h a t a u t h o r i t a r i a n b e l i e f s a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o e d u c a t i o n , o c c u p a t i o n , and l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . They c o n c l u d e t h a t i t i s " f o r t u n a t e " t h a t t h o s e u n c o m m i t t e d t o democracy s h o u l d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e . However, S.M. L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l Man ( G a r d e n C i t y , N.Y., 1963), 116, warns t h a t i n 1 n o r m a l ' p e r i o d s a p a t h y i s most f r e q u e n t among s u c h i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t t h e y can be a c t i v a t e d by a c r i s i s , e s p e c i a l l y i f i t i s a c c o m p a n i e d by s t r o n g m i l l e n n i a l a p p e a l s . 3 B e r n a r d R. B e r e l s o n , P a u l F. L a z a r s f e l d , and W i l l i a m McPhee, V o t i n g ( C h i c a g o , 1954), 322, 314. 4 H e r b e r t M c C l o s k y , " C o n s e n s u s and I d e o l o g y i n A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c s , " A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review 58 (June 1964), 365. 5 V.O. Key, " P u b l i c O p i n i o n and the Decay o f Democracy," V i r g i n i a Q u a r t e r l y Review 37 (Autumn 1961), 494. D a v i d Truman, "The A m e r i c a n S y s t e m i n C r i s i s , " P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y 74 (December 1959), 493. T h i s a r t i c l e i s n o t t y p i c a l o f Truman's work; n o r m a l l y he i s f i r m l y c o m m i t t e d t o i n t e r e s t - g r o u p p l u r a l i s m , and o p p o s e d t o e l i t i s m . However, t h e a r t i c l e i s t y p i c a l o f many l i b e r a l p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s w r i t i n g a t t h e ti m e o f M c C a r t h y i s m . Truman and Key d i s t i n g u i s h .the e l i t e i n t h e i r t h e o r y f r o m a g o v e r n i n g e l i t e . Truman m e n t i o n s l e a d e r s o f i n t e r e s t - g r o u p s , and l e a d e r s i n i n d u s t r y and t h e a r t s ; Key numbers them a t between f i v e and t e n m i l l i o n . 36 7 R.A. D a h l , Who G o v e r n s ? (New Haven, Conn., 1962), 91. L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l Man, op. c i t . , 185. L e s t e r M i l b r a t h , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n ( C h i c a g o , 1965), 145, s t a t e s w i t h r e g a r d t o n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s : " T h e i r p a s s i v e r o l e h a s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f a c c e p t i n g t h i n g s .as t h e y a r e . " 9 V. 0. Key, P u b l i c O p i n i o n and W e s t e r n Democracy New Y o r k , 1 9 6 1 ) , 3 0 . 10 M i c h a e l J . P a r e n t i , "Power and P l u r a l i s m : A View f r o m t h e B o t t o m up," i n An End t o P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e , e d s . M a r v i n S u r k i n and A l a n W o l f e (New Y o r k , 1970), 131. See a l s o M i c h a e l J . P a r e n t i , Democracy f o r t h e Few (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 4 ) , 277. 11 P a r e n t i , "Power and P l u r a l i s m , " qp. c i t . , 130. Pateman a r g u e s t h a t n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n c a n n o t be a s i g n o f s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h government b e c a u s e i n t h i s c a s e n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s w o u l d be d i s t r i b u t e d e v e n l y among the s e c t i o n s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . The f a c t t h a t t h e y come l a r g e l y f r o m l o w e r s o c i o - e c n o m i c s t r a t a makes h e r s u s p e c t t h a t n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n may be a s i g n o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h s o c i e t a l g o a l s . C a r o l e Pateman, The P r o b l e m o f P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n (New Y o r k , 1979), 86-7. 12 P a r e n t i , "Power and P l u r a l i s m , " op. c i t . , 130. 13 B a c h r a c h , " E l i t e C o n s e n s u s , " op. c i t . , 443. 14 Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Z e i g l e r , The I r o n y  o f Democracy ( B e l m o n t , C a l i f . , 1 9 6 7 ) , 4 - 5 . 15 O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , t h i r d ed. (London, 1 9 3 3 ) . The s e c o n d s e n s e o f c o n s p i r a c y , w h i c h does n o t • s p e c i f y t h a t t h e common p u r p o s e i s e v i l , i s n o t meant h e r e . I n h i s P o l i t i c a l E l i t e s ( L o n d o n , 1969), G e r a i n t P a r r y u s e s t h e s e c r i t e r i a o f e l i t i s m t h r o u g h o u t . See, f o r example, p. 151: " J . S . M i l l i s n o t an e l i t i s t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t he e x p e c t s h i s e l i t e t o f o r m a c o n s c i o u s , c o h e s i v e , and c o n s p i r a t o r i a l g r o u p . " 17 M c C l o s k y , " C o n s e n s u s and I d e o l o g y , " op. c i t . , 374. See a l s o D a h l , Who G o v e r n s ? , op. c i t . , 320.; J o s e p h Femia, 37 " E l i t e s , P a r t i c i p a t i o n , and t h e D e m o c r a t i c C r e e d , " P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s 27 ( M a r c h 1979), 18n. L i p s e t , P o l i - t i c a l Man, op. c i t . , 90, and W i l l i a m K o r n h a u s e r , The  P o l i t i c s o f Mass S o c i e t y (New York, 1959), e.g., 223, s t r e s s t h e c o r o l l a r y : a p a t h y i s r e l a t e d c l o s e l y t o a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . Of c o u r s e , e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h does n o t e s t a b l i s h a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . 18 Femia, " D e m o c r a t i c C r e e d , " op. c i t . 18. 19 Samuel S t o u f f e r , Communism, C o n f o r m i t y and C i v i l  L i b e r t i e s , s e c o n d e d . ( G l o u c e s t e r , Mass., 1963) d i f f e r s f r o m Truman, " A m e r i c a n S y s t e m , " op. c i t . , 493, and Key "Decay o f Democracy," op. c i t . , 492-3, i n t h a t he f i n d s one a s p e c t o f a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m -- anti-communisrn — t o be w i d e s p r e a d and d e e p l y h e l d . He h o l d s t h a t a c o n s e n s u s among p o l i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l e l i t e s i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h e d e f e n c e o f d e m o c r a t i c l i b e r t i e s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . K o r n h a u s e r , "Mass S o c i e t y , " op. c i t . , 181, i s c l o s e r t o Truman and Key i n s e e i n g M c C a r t h y i s m ' a s an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e t h a t c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a d e m o c r a t i c g o o d . 20 L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l Man, op. c i t . , 219. 21 Femia, " D e m o c r a t i c C r e e d , " op. c i t . , 18. 22 S t o u f f e r , C i v i l L i b e r t i e s , op. c i t . , 223. I n s u p p o r t o f t h e argument h e r e we s h o u l d n o t e t h a t S t o u f f e r , M c C l o s k y , and P r o t h r o and G r i g g c h o o s e e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s as i n d i c a t o r s o f democracy i n t h e i r r e s e a r c h . S t o u f f e r ' s - p r i n c i p l e s c o n c e r n o n l y the r i g h t s o f communists on W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s ; M c C l o s k y , P r o t h r o and G r i g g a l s o f o c u s on t h e r i g h t s o f p o l i t i c a l e x t r e m i s t s , and t h e y i n c l u d e p r i n c i p l e s o f m a j o r i t y r u l e , due p r o c e s s , and s o c i o - e c o n o m i c e q u a l i t y . I n S t o u f f e r ' s c a s e , i t i s u n c l e a r t h a t a nti-communism a t t h e t i m e o f the C o l d War i s t h e c l e a r e s t p o s s i b l e s i g n o f an a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c w o r l d - v i e w . 23 The t e x t s c i t e d , B e r e l s o n , V o t i n g , op. c i t . , 322; L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l Man, op. c i t . , 116; and P r o t h r o and G r i g g , " F u n d a m e n t a l P r i n c i p l e s , " op. c i t . , 288, d a t e f r o m b e f o r e t h e mid-1960s. As M a r g o l i s n o t e s , e m p i r i c a l p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s r a r e l y , t o o k t h i s p o i n t o f v i e w i n t h e n e x t d e c a d e . M i c h a e l M a r g o l i s , "The New A m e r i c a n T e x t b o o k s , " A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s 17 (May 1 9 7 3 ) , 461. 38 P a u l F. L a z a r s f e l d , B e r n a r d R. B e r e l s o n , and H a z e l G a u d i t , The P e o p l e ' s C h o i c e , t h i r d , e d . (New Y o r k , 1944), e.g. 28-30, 1 2 1 f f . , 145-148; Angus C a m p b e l l , G e r a l d G u r i n , and Warren E. M i l l e r , The V o t e r D e c i d e s ( E v a n s t o n , 111., 1954), 4, 182. T h e s e s t u d i e s d e a l b o t h w i t h t h e g e n e s i s o f a t t i t u d e s , p e r c e p t i o n s and g r o u p s l o y a l t i e s , and w i t h t h e i r e f f e c t s on p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n . L a z a r s f e l d ' s s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i s t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e mass m e d i a on o p i n i o n ; C a m p b e l l i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and " r e i n f o r c e m e n t e f f e c t s " between b e l i e f s . 25 F o r example, W a l k e r , "The E l i t i s t T h e o r y , " op. c i t . , 290. 2 (3 I n o r d e r t o t e s t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and b e h a v i o u r i t was n e c e s s a r y t o have a l a r g e " c r o s s - o v e r " sample; t h a t i s , a l a r g e number o f r e s p o n d e n t s who c h a n g e d t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e d u r i n g the c o u r s e o f t h e s t u d y . The few who d i d so d i s n o t l e a d L a z a r s f e l d and C a m p b e l l to. s i g n i f i c a n t ' c o n c l u s i o n s : most were p o l i t i c a l l y a p a t h e t i c , and t h e i r m o t i v e s f o r c h a n g i n g seemed i r r a t i o n a l o r a r b i t r a r y . As C a m p b e l l r e m a r k s i n a l a t e r work, he d i d n o t f i n d c o h e r e n t p a t t e r n s o f b e l i e f among t h i s g r o u p . See Angus C a m p b e l l , P.E. C o n v e r s e , W.E. M i l l e r , and D.E. S t o k e s , The A m e r i c a n V o t e r (New Y o r k , 1960), 543. 27 L a z a r s f e l d e t . a l . , The P e o p l e ' s C h o i c e , op. c i t . , 43-51; C a m p b e l l e t . a l . , The V o t e r D e c i d e s , op. c i t . , 70-73. L a z a r f e l d s t a t e s t h a t "a p e r s o n t h i n k s , p o l i t i c a l l y , as he i s , s o c i a l l y . " He c i t e s s o c i o - e c o n o m i c s t a t u s , p l a c e o f r e s i d e n c e and r e l i g i o n as t h e socia-1 f a c t o r s w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t p r e d i c t i v e v a l u e . See pp. 25-7. 2 8 S i d n e y V e r b a , Norman H. N i e , and J a e - o n Kim, P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n A m e r i c a : P o l i t i c a l Democracy and  S o c i a l E q u a l i t y (New Y o r k , 1972); G a b r i e l Almond and S i d n e y V e r b a , The C i v i c C u l t u r e ( B o s t o n , 1965), e.g., 134-5. * 29 As C a r o l e Pateman n o t e s a p p r o v i n g l y i n "To Them T h a t H a t h S h a l l Be G i v e n , " P o l i t i c s 9 (May 1 9 4 7 ) , 143. 30 S i d n e y V e r b a , Norman H. N i e , and J a e - o n Kim, P a r t i c i p a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l E q u a l i t y ( C a m b r i d g e , 1978), 307. 39 Eugene B u r d i c k , " P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y and t h e V o t i n g S t u d i e s , " i n A m e r i c a n V o t i n g B e h a v i o u r , e d . Eugene B u r d i c k and A r t h u r J . B r o d b e c k ( G l e n c o e , 111., 1959), 139. See a l s o B e r e l s o n e t a l . , V o t i n g , op. c i t . , 310. 32 I n t h e i r s e a r c h f o r c o r r e l a t e s o f l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e s t u d i e s a d o p t t h e c i t i z e n ' s s e n s e o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . F o r example, see M i l b r a t h , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i - c i p a t i o n , op. c i t . , 56; V e r b a and N i e , P a r t i c i p a t i o n  and P o l i t i c a l E q u a l i t y , op. p i t . , 160-2; Almond and V e r b a , The C i v i c C u l t u r e , op. c i t . , 137, 164, 188, and 204-9. 33 C a m p b e l l , The V o t e r D e c i d e s , op. c i t . , 1 8 7 f f . 34 I b i d . See a l s o L a z a r s f e l d , The P e o p l e ' s C h o i c e , op. c i t . , 32-4. H i s c o n c e p t o f p o l i t i c a l e x t r o v e r s i o n i s s i m i l a r t o C a m p b e l l ' s s e n s e o f e f f i c a c y . I n n e i t h e r work i s t h e c o n c e p t c e n t r a l t o t h e argument. 35 See n o t e 32 above. ^ P a t e m a n , P a r t i c i p a t i o n and D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y op. c i t . , 46. See a l s o G e r a i n t P a r r y , P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n P o l i t i c s ( M a n c h e s t e r , 1972): The d e v e l o p m e n t a l a p p r o a c h c a n be r e g a r d e d as t h e n o r m a t i v e s i d e o f the c o i n t o t h e d a t a i n t h e behav-i o u r a l l i t e r a t u r e w h i c h s u g g e s t s t h a t p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t , k n o w l e d g e , and a s e n s e o f e f f i c a c y go h a n d - i n -hand w i t h p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . D o n a l d Keim, " P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n C o n t e m p o r a r y D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r i e s , " i n P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , e d s . J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (New Y o r k , 1975), 11, p o i n t s o u t t h a t p a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i e s s h o u l d s t i p u l a t e t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a democracy s h o u l d have h i g h o b j e c t i v e e f f i c a c y . D e n n i s Thompson, The D e m o c r a t i c C i t i z e n ( C a m b r i d g e , 1 9 7 0 ) , 70. The p o i n t t h a t t h e e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s on t h e s e n s e o f e f f i c a c y l e n d w e i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i e s i s made a l s o by L e w i s L i p s i t z , "On P o l i t i c a l B e l i e f s , " op . c i t . , 155. V e r b a and N i e , P a r t i c i p a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l E q u a l i t y , 40 op. c i t . , 295; S i d n e y V e r b a , Norman II. N i e , and J a e -on Kim, P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n A m e r i c a : P o l i t i c a l Democracy  and S o c i a l E q u a l i t y (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 2 ) , 339. 39 M i l b r a t h , P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , op. c i t . , 142. 40 These d i f f e r e n c e s w o u l d c o n c e r n b o t h t h e added j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n t h a t i t d e v e l o p s c h a r a c t e r , and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a r t i c i p a t i o n and o t h e r d e m o c r a t i c r e q u i r e m e n t s , s u c h as s t a b i l i t y . 41 G i o v a n n i S a r t o r i , " A n t i - E l i t i s r n R e v i s i t e d , " Government and O p p o s i t i o n 13 ( W i n t e r 1978), 64-5. 42 - I b i d . 43 "Once t h e two s i d e s i n the d e b a t e a g r e e t h a t p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g i e s a r e a f u n c t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l r e s o u r c e s t h e r e i s no f u r t h e r n e e d t o a d d r e s s t h i s p r o b l e m . - • 44 Pateman, "To Them t h a t H a t h , " op,, c i t . , 141. See a l s o P e t e r B a c h r a c h , The T h e o r y o f D e m o c r a t i c  E l i t i s m ( B o s t o n , 1967), 4; Keim " C o n t e m p o r a r y D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r i e s , " op. c i t . , 25-6; Wal k e r , "The E l i t i s t T h e o r y , " op. c i t . , 289; Duncan and L u k e s , "The New D e m o c r a c y , " op. c i t . , 175; Thompson, Demo- c r a t i c C i t i z e n , op. c i t . , 70; A r n o l d S. Kaufman, "Human' N a t u r e and P a r t i c i p a t o r y D e mocracy," i n The B i a s of. P l u r a l i s m , e d . W i l l i a m E . C o n n o l l y (New Y o r k , 1969) , 192. 45 Almond and Verba,' C i v i c C u l t u r e , op. c i t . , 138. 46 V e r b a and N i e , P a r t i c i p a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l  E q u a l i t y , op. c i t . , 45, 46, 47. 47 Pateman, D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y , op. c i t . , 24-5, 29,. 45-6. See a l s o W i l l i a m H. N e l s o n , On J u s t i f y i n g Democracy, (Lond o n , 1 9 8 0 ) , 49. 48 M a r t i n Oppenheimer, "The L i m i t a t i o n s o f S o c i a l i s m , " i n The Case f o r P a r t i c i p a t o r y Democracy, e d s . C. George B e n e l l o and D. R o u s s o p o u l o s (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 1 ) , 279. 49 R o b e r t P r a n g e r , The E c l i p s e o f C i t i z e n s h i p (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 8 ) , 10-13, 69, 91-2, 115, 262. J u l e s 41 S t e i n b e r g , L o c k e , R o u s s e a u , and t h e I d e a o f C o n s e n t W e s t p o r t , Conn., 1 9 7 8 ) , 128, a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e s between p a r t i c i p a t i o n as t h e e x e r c i s e o f power, and p a r t i c i p a t i o n as s u b m i s s i o n t o p o w e r - h o l d e r s . 50 J o h n H. H a l l o w e l l , "Compromise as a P o l i t i c a l I d e a l , " E t h i c s 54 ( A p r i l 1 9 44), 652. 51 Lawrence S c a f f , "Two C o n c e p t s o f P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " W e s t e r n P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y 28 ( S e p t e m b e r 1975), 449. 52 J.R.. Pennock, L i b e r a l Democracy (New Y o r k , 1 9 5 0 ) , 105, 238-9, 231. P e n n o c k ' s n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t d e v e l o p s i n t h e c i t i z e n s e n t i m e n t s o f l o y a l t y and t h e r e a l i z a t i o n n o t o n l y o f t h e n e c e s s i t y o f compromise, b u t a l s o o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s l o n g - r u n i n t e r e s t i n t h e d i s c o v e r y o f s o l u t i o n s t o p r o b l e m s t h a t a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e m a j o r i t y . 53 J.R. P e n n o c k , D e m o c r a t i c P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y ( P r i n c e t o n , N . J . , 1 9 7 9 ) , 462. 54 C l a r k e E. Cochran', " A u t h o r i t y and Freedom," I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 6 (May 1977), 111. See a l s o W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z , A s p e c t s o f P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y (London, 1976), 142. 55 H e n r y K a r i e l , " P o s s i b i l i t i e s , " i n The P o s t - B e h a v i o r a l E r a , e d s . George J . Graham J r . , and George W. C a r e y (New Y o r k , 1972), 138. 56 C o c h r a n , " A u t h o r i t y and Freedom,", op. c i t . , 111. C o c h r a n ' s a r t i c l e i n c l u d e s a summary o f t h e p o s i t i o n o f Y v e s Simon. 5 7 C i t e d by J o h n H. H a l l o w e l l , The D e c l i n e o f  L i b e r a l i s m as an I d e o l o g y (New Y o r k , 1971), 55. 58 N e l s o n a r g u e s s i m i l a r l y i n On J u s t i f y i n g Democracy, op. c i t . , 49. 59 " C o c h r a n , " A u t h o r i t y and Freedom," op. c i t . , 109. 60 Pateman, D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y , op. c i t . , 34. 42 R.A. D a h l , P l u r a l i s t Democracy i n t h e U n i t e d  S t a t e s ( C h i c a g o , 1 9 6 7 ) , 24. C i t e d by J o h n H. S c h a a r , " L e g i t i m a c y i n t h e Modern S t a t e , " i n Power and  Community, e d s . P h i l i p G r e e n and S a n f o r d L e v i n s o n (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 9 ) , 325, f o o r n o t e 45. 6 2 I n t r o d u c t i o n , f o o t n o t e 11, above; C h a p t e r F o u r , f o o t n o t e 1, b e l o w . Two f i n d i n g s o f the v o t i n g s t u d i e s a r e r e l e v a n t h e r e . F i r s t , f i n d i n g s a b o u t i r r a t i o n a l i t y i n p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r s u g g e s t t h a t t h e mandate t h e o r y r e s t s on a f a l s e a s s u m p t i o n a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f n o r m a t i v e b e h a v i o u r . See Duncan and L u k e s , "The New Democracy," op. c i t . , 172. Se c o n d , t h e f i n d i n g s a b o u t the r e l a t i o n s h i p b etween t h e w i l l t o power and l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i m p l y t h a t c i t i z e n s w i l l n o t be s a t i s f i e d where t h e r e a r e i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between t h e m s e l v e s and go v e r n m e n t . .'. 6 4The p h r a s e i s G r i f f i t h s ' . A. P h i l l i p s G r i f f i t h s , "How.-.Can One P e r s o n R e p r e s e n t A n o t h e r ? " I n P r o c e e d i n g s  o f t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n - S o c i e t y , s u p p l e m e n t a r y v o l . 34, ,188. ..Verba.-and N i e , P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n A m e r i c a , op. c i t . , 131-; P a r t i c i p a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l E q u a l i t y , op, c i t . , 291. T h i s i s so b e c a u s e , a s G r i f f i t h s s t a t e s i n "How Can One P e r s o n R e p r e s e n t A n o t h e r ? " op, c i t . , " d i r e c t demo-c r a c y i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r us so we c a n n o t c h o o s e i t . " 6 7 I b i d . , 196, 209. 4 3 CHAPTER TWO NORMATIVE AND PROCEDURAL CONSENSUS IN DEMOCRACY Part One: The Empirical Theory The empirical theory of consensus arises from the research of the voting studies on commitment to democratic p r i n c i p l e s among United States c i t i z e n s . The studies f i n d that there i s widespread disagreement about such p r i n c i p l e s as equal representation and the right to free speech. The Empirical theorists claim that t h e i r findings d i s c r e d i t the c l a s s i c a l theory of consensus. The main c l a s s i c a l thesis i s stated by Prothro and Grigg as follows: a necessary condition f o r the existence of a democratic government i s widespread consensus (approaching 100%)...on at least the basic questions about how p o l i t i c a l power i s won.1 In i t s weaker form the empirical theory holds that demo-cracy i s compatible with normative dissension. For instance, McClosky concludes that "consensus i s not required. . . i t s absence in an otherwise stable society 2 need not be f a t a l or even p a r t i c u l a r l y damaging'" A stronger thesis states that, in the words of T.V. Smith, "democracy does not require, or permit, agreement 3 on fundamentals." The stronger empirical thesis i s supported by those who equate the democratic philosophy with that of r e l a t i v i s m . Hans K e l s e n c l a i m s : t h e r e e x i s t s . . . n o t o n l y an e x t e r n a l p a r a l l e l i s m b u t an i n n e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e a n t a g o n i s m o f a u t o c r a c y and d e m o c r a c y , on t h e one hand, and p h i l o -s o p h i c a l a b s o l u t i s m and r e l a t i v i s m , on t h e o t h e r . . . 4 S i m i l a r l y , C . J . F r i e d r i c h and J o h n Dewey d e s c r i b e t h e i d e o l o g i e s o f t h e d e m o c r a t and t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n as 5 r e l a t i v i s t and a b s o l u t i s t r e s p e c t i v e l y . F o r t h e s e t h e o r i s t s t h e t e r m " r e l a t i v i s m " r e f e r s t o t h a t p o s i t i o n f o r w h i c h t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f one n o r m a t i v e s y s t e m o v e r a n o t h e r c a n be n e i t h e r d e m o n s t r a t e d n o r known. I f t h e i d e a l d e m o c r a t i c c i t i z e n i s a r e l a t i v i s t , i n t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g m o r a l l y u n c o n v i n c e d , t h e r e c a n be no s h a r e d n o r m a t i v e c o n v i c t i o n i n t h e i d e a l d e m o cracy. I f d emocracy p r e s u p p o s e s r e l a t i v i s m as a w o r l d - v i e w , i t must a l s o r e q u i r e n o r m a t i v e d i s a g r e e m e n t o r d i s s e n s i o n . The t h e s i s t h a t r e l a t i v i s m i s t h e d e m o c r a t i c p h i l o s o p h y f o l l o w s f r o m t h e t h e s i s t h a t commitment t o 7 an a b s o l u t i s t i d e o l o g y d e f i n e s t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . F r i e d r i c h and Dewey a r g u e t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l commitment i n a d emocracy i m p l i e s e l i t i s m o r a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . F o r F r i e d r i c h " a l l i n s i s t e n c e upon agreement on f u n d a m e n t a l s i s b a s i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e i d e a . . . t h a t some p e r s o n s know what i s r i g h t . " T h i s i d e a , he c o n t i n u e s , " i s h i s t o r i -8 c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a b e l i e f i n an e l i t e . " Dewey a r g u e s t h a t i f one b e l i e v e s i n a s i n g l e r i g h t c o u r s e o f a c t i o n , one i s l i k e l y a l s o t o s u p p o r t th e c l a i m o f a 45 g r o u p o r i n s t i t u t i o n t o i n t e r p r e t and t o a p p l y t h i s c o u r s e o f a c t i o n . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s d e f i n e t h e i d e a l d e m o c r a t by h i s a p p r o a c h t o v a l u e s and norms. F o r Almond and P o w e l l t h e t o t a l i t a r i a n • h a s an " i d e o l o g i c a l s t y l e o f p o l i t i c s " i n t h e s e n s e t h a t he " f a i l s t o d e v e l o p th e open, b a r g a i n i n g 10 a t t i t u d e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h f u l l s e c u l a r i z a t i o n . " By c o n t r a s t , t h e d e m o c r a t i s m u l t i - v a l u e d , e x p e r i m e n t a l , 11 f l e x i b l e , and s e c u l a r . The l o g i c s u p p o r t i n g t h i s v i e w i s t h a t t o r e j e c t i d e o l o g i e s and n o r m a t i v e commitment i s t o embrace t o l e r a n c e , compromise, and e g a l i t a r i a n p l u r a l i s m . I t i s u n l i k e l y , t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s assume, t h a t t h e a r d o u r o f t h e r e l a t i v i s t ' s b e l i e f s w i l l l e a d him t o s u b v e r t t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e . K e l s e n s t a t e s : he who h o l d s t h a t a b s o l u t e t r u t h and a b s o l u t e v a l u e s a r e b eyond human u n d e r -s t a n d i n g i s f o r c e d t o l o o k upon a r i v a l a l i e n o p i n i o n as p o s s i b l e a t t h e v e r y l e a s t . R e l a t i v i s m i s t h e r e f o r e t h e p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n -c e p t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s . I 2 The e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y h o l d s t h a t t h e r e l a t i v i s t t e n d s t o t o l e r a t e d i v e r s e v i e w s . The t h e o r y does n o t s t a t e , however, what i t i s t h a t l e a d s him t o a c c e p t t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e o v e r c o m p e t i n g c l a i m s t o t r u t h . I f t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y i s t o e x p l a i n t h e b a s i s o f p e a c e f u l a g r e e m e n t i n p l u r a l i s m , i t must i d e n t i f y t h e l i m i t s o f r e l a t i v i s m ; t h e t h e o r y must show t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c c i t i z e n i s n o t m u l t i - v a l u e d and f l e x i b l e a b o u t t h e outcome o f d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s 46 a r g u e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t democracy does p r e s u p p o s e a c o n s e n s u s on t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e . As P r o t h r o and G r i g g n o t e , " t h e g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n i s t h a t c o n s e n s u s i s r e q u i r e d o n l y on t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r w i n n i n g p o l i t i c a l 13 power." F o r Almond and V e r b a d e m o c r a t i c c o n s e n s u s c o n s i s t s o f "an a d h e r e n c e t o a b r o a d compromise on p o l i t i c a l 14 p r o c e d u r e s . " M c C l o s k y d i s t i n g u i s h e s between p r o c e d u r a l and s u b s t a n t i v e d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s , and he f i n d s t h a t t h e r e i s a h i g h l e v e l o f s o c i e t a l c o n s e n s u s on p r o c e d u r a l , 1 5 p r i n c i p l e s o n l y . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s t a k e t h e t h e s i s o f p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s t o be e x h a u s t i v e o f t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y o f c o n s e n s u s . T h i s v i e w i s m i s l e a d i n g , however, b e c a u s e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e t h e s i s c a n be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e t h e s i s o f n o r m a t i v e d i s s e n s i o n . P r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s and n o r m a t i v e d i s s e n s i o n a r e comp-l e m e n t a r y d e m o c r a t i c c o n d i t i o n s b e c a u s e t h e outcome o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c a n n o t be t h e h i g h e s t p o l i t i c a l good where t h e r e i s a f i r m commitment t o norms. I f t h e r e i s a s o c i e t a l c o n s e n s u s on j u s t i c e and r a t i o n a l i t y , t h e r e i s no a s s u r a n c e t h a t a l l w i l l r e s p e c t t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e p r o c e d u r e u n l e s s t h e y p e r c e i v e t h a t t h e r e s u l t s a r e j u s t and r a t i o n a l , i n w h i c h c a s e p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s i s an u n n e c e s s a r y s t i p u l a t i o n . The t h e s i s o f n o r m a t i v e d i s s e n s i o n r e q u i r e s t h e t h e s i s o f p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s i n o r d e r t o e x p l a i n why t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f o p p o n e n t s i s n o t common-p l a c e i n d e m o c r a c i e s ; t o e x p l a i n , i n s h o r t , how p l u r a l i s m 47 e n d u r e s . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s c o n s i d e r t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y t o be e l i t i s t b e c a u s e i t i s c o n c e r n e d more w i t h t h e s t a b i l i t y o f e x i s t i n g p r o c e d u r e s t h a n w i t h r a d i c a l c h a n g e . However, t h e r e i s - no n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n between a s t a b l e p r o c e d u r e and an e l i t i s t one. I n f a c t , t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y i m p l i e s t h a t we must d e f i n e d e m ocracy as an e g a l i t a r i a n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e . From t h e t h e s i s o f n o r m a t i v e d i s s e n s i o n i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r e a r e no i n t e r e s t s common to s o c i e t y , b u t o n l y i n t e r e s t s p u r s u e d by i n d i v i d u a l s and by g r o u p s . 1 5 The t h e s i s t h a t r e l a t i v i s m i s t h e d e m o c r a t i c p h i l o s o p h y i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s no h i e r a r c h y o f i n t e r e s t s and v a l u e s i n d e m o c r a c y . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e a l l i n t e r e s t s a r e e q u a l l y l e g i t i m a t e . The one c r i t e r i o n o f e v a l u a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t s a l l o w e d by t h e empi-r i c a l t h e o r y i s t h e p r o c e d u r a l one o f p o p u l a r a c c l a i m . F a r f r o m l e g i t i m i z i n g e l i t e r u l e , t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s i m p l i c i t l y a c c e p t T.D. Weldon's r e l a t i v i s t i c d e f i n i t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y as a " f o r c e e x e r c i s e d o r c a p a b l e o f b e i n g 17 e x e r c i s e d w i t h t h e g e n e r a l a p p r o v a l o f t h o s e c o n c e r n e d . " The e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y i s b e s t d e s c r i b e d n o t as a • t h e o r y o f c o n s e n s u s , b u t as one o f c o n s e n t . C o n s e n s u s d e n o t e s a g r e e m e n t o r a c c o r d on m a t t e r s o f o p i n i o n o r b e l i e f ; c o n s e n t , as a t y p e o f a c t i o n , may o c c u r i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any g i v e n b e l i e f on t h e p a r t o f t h e c i t i z e n . F o r F r i e d r i c h what b i n d s a f r e e p e o p l e t o g e t h e r i s n o t 48 an a g r e e m e n t on f u n d a m e n t a l s , b u t a common way o f a c t i n g i n s p i t e o f a d i s a g r e e m e n t on f u n d a m e n t a l s . 1 8 The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s s u b s t i t u t e a t h e o r y o f c o n s e n t f o r one o f c o n s e n s u s when t h e y a d o p t a p r o c e d u r a l d e f i -n i t i o n o f d e m o c r a c y . The n e x t s e c t i o n shows t h a t t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s a l s o p r o c e e d f r o m a r e j e c t i o n o f c o n s e n s u s as a d e m o c r a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t o a p r o -c e d u r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f democracy as g o v e r n m e n t by c o n s e n t . The f i n a l s e c t i o n e x a m i n e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n s w h i c h a r e common t o t h e two p o s i t i o n s . P a r t Two: The P a r t i c i p a t o r y C r i t i q u e B a c h r a c h and Keim c l a i m t h a t t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s s u p e r c e d e t h e p r o c e d u r a l t h e o r y o f democracy; f o r B a c h r a c h p a r t i c i p a t o r y d emocracy i s " b o t h p o l i t i c a l 1 9 method and e t h i c a l e n d . " These t h e o r i s t s a p p e a r t o t a k e a n o r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n i n t h a t t h e y a p p e a l t o t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t v a l u e o f d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s t o c o u n t e r t h e d e s c r i p t i v i s m o f t h e e m p i r i c a l method. However, the p r i n c i p l e s c i t e d i n t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y c r i t i q u e o f t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y a r e d e r i v e d f r o m p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y ; t h e y a r e t h u s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l v i e w o f de m o c r a c y . The o n l y n o r m a t i v e c o n s e n s u s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y i s one on compromise and t o l e r a n c e . A n o r m a t i v e c r i t i q u e o f t h e t h e o r y m i g h t s t i p u l a t e t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c compromise i s j u s t , r a t i o n a l , and i n t h e p u b l i c 49 i n t e r e s t . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s do n o t i d e n t i f y t h e l i m i t s o f t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s as a g u i d e t o r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n -m a k i n g . I n s t e a d t h e y a r g u e t h a t t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n o f comp-r o m i s e and p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s i s an e g a l i t a r i a n , u n b i a s e d f o r m o f p l u r a l i s m . R.P. W o l f f and H. Marcuse a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e " c o v e r t i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s " o f t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e s i s o f p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s . F o r them t h e t h e s i s l e g i -t i m i z e s the " a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d m a c h i n e r y o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " 2 0 w h i c h h i n d e r s " g r o u p s i n t h e p r o c e s s o f f o r m a t i o n . " M a r cuse s t a t e s t h a t t h e " b a s i c r e q u i r e m e n t f o r d e c i s i o n -m a k ing" i n a d e m o c r a c y i s " i m p a r t i a l i t y t o t h e u t m o s t " and 2 1 " e q u a l t r e a t m e n t o f c o m p e t i n g ... i s s u e s . " He c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n and v a l u e o f p r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e s 2 2 d e p e n d on t h e e q u a l i t y p r e v a l e n t i n t h e s o c i e t y . The main i m p l i c a t i o n o f A C r i t i q u e o f P u r e T o l e r a n c e i s t h a t d e mocracy r e q u i r e s a c o n s i s t e n t l y r e l a t i v i s t o r p l u r a l i s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y and t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f i n t e r e s t s and g r o u p s . I n t h e a c c o u n t o f t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s t h e b i a s o f W e s t e r n p l u r a l i s m a r i s e s f r o m a p r i o r e l i t e c o n s e n s u s on c e r t a i n e s t a b l i s h e d i n t e r e s t s . A c o n s e n s u s among n o n -e l i t e s on e x i s t i n g p r o c e d u r e s i s u n d e m o c r a t i c , t h e s e t h e o r i s t s c l a i m , i n t h a t i t u n d e r m i n e s change t o w a r d s g r e a t e r e q u a l i t y . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s oppose t h e p a r t i a l s o c i e t a l c o n s e n s u s r e q u i r e d by t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y , b u t t h e y a r e s i l e n t on t h e t h e s i s o f n o r m a t i v e d i s s e n s i o n . From t h e i r s t a n d p o i n t t h e weakness o f t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y 50 l i e s i n an i n d i s c r i m i n a t e a c c e p t a n c e o f c o n s e n s u s as a d e m o c r a t i c i d e a l r a t h e r t h a n i n an i r r e s p o n s i b l e a p p r o v a l o f d i s s e n s i o n . The symposium A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s s t a t e s t h e p a r t i -c i p a t o r y c r i t i q u e o f t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y . The c o n t r i -b u t o r s t o t h i s work d e s c r i b e t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y as c o n s e r v a t i v e , i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f Edmund B u r k e ' s c o n s e r v -23 a t i s m . The t h e o r y f o l l o w s B u r k e , t h e y e x p l a i n , i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t c o n s e n s u s and s t a b i l i t y a r e e s s e n t i a l t o d e m o c racy e v e n where t h e y a r e b a s e d on s u c c e s s f u l s o c i a -l i z a t i o n , b e h a v i o u r a l i n e r t i a , and a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . C o n s e n s u s t h e o r y i s c o n s e r v a t i v e t o t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s b e c a u s e c o n s e n s u s i s t h e main j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t r u s t e e r e l a t i o n s h i p , and h ence o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d e m o c racy. Where t h e r e i s a measure o f s o c i e t a l c o n s e n s u s the f a i t h f u l t r a n s m i s s i o n o f i n t e r e s t s i s a t l e a s t f e a s i b l e ; i f • a s o c i e t y i s marked i n s t e a d by w i d e s p r e a d d i s s e n s i o n , a d e m o c r a t i c r e s u l t i s more l i k e l y t o r e q u i r e 24 t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f c o n t e n d i n g i n t e r e s t s . Thus, D a r r y l B a s k i n r e j e c t s c o n s e n s u s t h e o r y b e c a u s e i t r e s t s on t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t s where o n l y p a r t i -c u l a r i n t e r e s t s e x i s t . I n a c l a s s s o c i e t y , B a s k i n a r g u e s , i n t e r e s t s a r e n o t o n l y h e t e r o g e n e o u s , b u t a l s o a n t a g o n i s t i c . C i t i z e n s s u b s c r i b e t o " o p p o s i n g i d e o l o g i c a l v i s i o n s , ' ! some 25 o f w h i c h q u e s t i o n t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f p l u r a l i s t p o l i t i c s . A l t h o u g h t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s d i r e c t t h e i r c r i t i q u e o f t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y a t t h e t h e s i s o f p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s , t h e i r p o s i t i o n on t h a t t h e s i s i s a m b i v a l e n t . They i m p l y t h a t p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s i s t o o s t r o n g as a d e s c r i p t i v e o r e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y b e c a u s e i t o v e r e s t i m a t e s t h e l e v e l o f agr e e m e n t between l e a d e r s and l e d i n W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s . They a l s o i m p l y t h a t p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s i s t o o weak as a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y b e c a u s e i t does n o t s t i p u l a t e an e g a l i t a r i a n p r o c e d u r e as a c o m p l e m e n t a r y d e m o c r a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . W o l f f c o m b i n e s t h e s e p o s i t i o n s as f o l l o w s : u nanimous d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y . . . i s p e r f e c t l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h . . . s h a r p , e v e n v i o l e n t , o p p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e community, p e r h a p s o f an ' e c o n o m i c k i n d . The o n l y n e c e s s i t y i s t h a t , when t h e c i t i z e n s come t o g e t h e r t o d e l i b e r a t e on t h e means f o r r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t s , t h e y a g r e e u n a n i m o u s l y on t h e laws t o be a d o p t e d . 2 6 I t i s c l e a r t h a t u n a n i m i t y and v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t s may be combined i n - a t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e , s i n c e the regime c a n compel i t s c r i t i c s t o c o n s e n t , b u t how i s t h i s c o m b i n a t i o n p o s s i b l e i n a dem o c r a c y ? W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n i s c o h e r e n t o n l y i f one a c c e p t s a l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e norms and the p r o c e d u r e s o f democracy. W o l f f ' s unanimous c o n s e n t c o r r e s p o n d s t o F r i e d r i c h ' s common p a t t e r n s o f b e h a v i o u r i n t h a t b o t h a r i s e f r o m t h e p r o c e d u r a l v i e w o f democracy. F u r t h e r , b o t h r e s t on t h e r e l a t i v i s t p r e m i s e t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e r e i s no good r e a s o n t o i n s i s t on any g i v e n s e t o f norms, compromise i s t h e h i g h e s t p o l i t i c a l g o od. The E m p i r i c a l and t h e 52 P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s a r e u n i t e d i n the a t t e m p t t o s u b s t i t u t e c o n s e n t f o r c o n s e n s u s i n t h e c a t a l o g u e o f d e m o c r a t i c r e q u i r e m e n t s . The main p o i n t o f d i s p u t e between them i s t h e e m p i r i c a l one o f w h e t h e r th e p r i n c i p l e s o f p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s and g o v e r n m e n t by c o n s e n t a r e s a t i s f i e d i n W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s . P a r t r i d g e n o t e s t h a t " t o a s k what government by c o n s e n t means h a s become synonymous w i t h a s k i n g what 27 d e m ocracy means." Most c o n t e m p o r a r y t h e o r i s t s a r e c o n c e r n e d more w i t h d i s c o v e r i n g how d e m ocracy can meet t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f g o v e r n m e n t by c o n s e n t t h a n w i t h showing 28 why c o n s e n t i s a d e m o c r a t i c p r i o r i t y . The most u s u a l p o s i t i o n among t h e s e t h e o r i s t s i s s t a t e d by B a s k i n : any l e g i t i m a t e e f f o r t t o c o n t r o l t h e c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t s c a n p r o c e e d o n l y w i t h t h e c o n s e n t o f t h e i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s , and i n a manner t h a t does n o t ^ d i s p u t e t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e i r p u r p o s e s . C h a p t e r t h r e e e x a m i n e s i n d e t a i l t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e p r o c e d u r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f democracy as g o v e r n m e n t by t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n s e n t o f t h e g o v e r n e d . By a way o f a p r e l i m -i n a r y t a s k , t h e n e x t s e c t i o n i d e n t i f i e s t h e main assump-t i o n s upon w h i c h t h e d e f i n i t i o n r e s t s . P a r t T h r e e : R e l a t i v i s m i n t h e D e b a t e The e s s e n t i a l p r e m i s e o f t h e p r o c e d u r a l d e f i n i t i o n , o f d emocracy i s t h a t t h e r e a r e no s t a n d a r d s by w h i c h t o c a l l some a u t h o r i t y i n t r i n s i c a l l y l e g i t i m a t e . The r e j e c t i o n o f s u c h c o n c e p t s as t h e common good p r e s u p p o s e s 53 i n t u r n t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c c i t i z e n i s a r e l a t i v i s t . J o h n H. S c h a a r s t a t e s : H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e n o t i o n o f t h e common good h a s o f t e n p l a y e d a b o u t t h e same r o l e i n d o m e s t i c p o l i t i c s as ' r e a s o n s o f s t a t e . ' o r ' n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t ' : i t r e l e a s e s o f f i c i a l s f r o m t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s i m p o s e d by t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e o f p o p u l a r s o v e r e i g n t y . B u t i f o f f i c i a l s c a n c l a i m a u t h o r i t y , u s u a l l y on g r o u n d s o f s u p e r i o r knowledge, t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p u b l i c good, t h e n d e m o c r a c y . . . i s n o t h i n g ^ more t h a n a method f o r s e l e c t i n g r u l e r s . S c h a a r i m p l i e s t h a t we must d e f i n e d e m o cracy e i t h e r as a method f o r s e l e c t i n g r u l e r s o r as a method f o r m e a s u r i n g p o p u l a r s u p p o r t f o r a u t h o r i t y . The t h i r d p o s s i b l e p o s i t i o n — t h a t democracy i s p r i m a r i l y a s e t o f norms — i s p r e c l u d e d by S c h a a r ' s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t b o t h l e a d e r s and c i t i z e n s a r e r e l a t i v i s t s . S c h a a r ' s c l a i m t h a t n o t i o n s o f t h e common g o o d r e f l e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f " o f f i c i a l s " f o l l o w s f r o m h i s p r e m i s e t h a t l e a d e r s i n v o k e t h e i r a u t h o r i t y o n l y i n o r d e r t o evade a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s . H i s i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t " t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s i m p o s e d by p o p u l a r s o v e r e i g n t y " must i n c l u d e r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e f r e e d o m o f l e a d e r s t o i n t e r -p r e t and t o p u r s u e t h e common good assumes t h a t c i t i z e n s w i l l c o n s e n t t o n o t i o n s o f t h e common g o o d o n l y where t h e i r p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s p r e v a i l . The E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s h o l d t h a t , s i n c e p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s n o t g o v e r n e d by norms w h i c h a r e h e l d by t h e c i t i z e n t o be a b s o l u t e , i t must be g o v e r n e d by r e l a t i v i s m and s e l f - i n t e r e s t . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s f i n d t h a t p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c i t i z e n ' s p r o f e s s e d n o r m a t i v e b e l i e f s , and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s show t h a t t h e r e i s l e s s t h a n a b s o l u t e commitment, e s p e c i a l l y among t h e p o o r t o t h e d o m i n a n t s o c i e t a l c o n s e n s u s i n W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s . The two s c h o o l s p o r t r a y a c h o i c e between a b s o l u t e com-mitment t o a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f norms on t h e one hand, and a f l e x i b l e , c o m p r o m i s i n g r e l a t i v i s m on t h e o t h e r . They show e m p i r i c a l l y t h a t t h e f o r m e r a l t e r n a t i v e d o e s n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o r e a l i t y , and t h e y a c c e p t t h e l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e as a p r e m i s e f o r t h e i r t h e o r i e s . However, t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l r e a s o n s t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e tween r e l a t i v i s m and a b s o l u t i s m i s i n v a l i d . F i r s t , r e l a t i v i s m i s i t s e l f an a b s o l u t i s t i d e o l o g y . S e c o n d , a f l e x i b l e and t o l e r a n t d e m o c r a t i c o u t l o o k p r e s u p p o s e s c o n v i c t i o n a b o u t c e r t a i n norms. F i n a l l y , n e i t h e r r e l a -t i v i s m n o r a b s o l u t i s m a r e o f h e l p i n e x p l a i n i n g a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r . • We c a n c o n s i d e r t h e s e t h r e e p o i n t s i n t u r n . I n t h e i r d e f e n c e o f r e l a t i v i s m as a d e m o c r a t i c p h i l o s o p h y , K e l s e n and F r i e d r i c h s t a t e t h a t a b e l i e f i n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t v a l u e o f norms e n t a i l s dogmatism and i n t o l e r a n c e . However, t h e r e i s no g o od r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h o s e who a r e f i r m l y c o m m i t t e d t o n o r m a t i v e b e l i e f s , w i l l oppose a d e m o c r a t i c compromise. They m i g h t , f o r i n s t a n c e , be c o n v i n c e d o f t h e v a l u e o f r a t i o n a l i t y , y e t f e e l t h a t i r r a t i o n a l i t y i n o t h e r s i s n o t so o f f e n s i v e t h a t 31 t h e y c a n n e i t h e r t o l e r a t e i t n o r compromise w i t h i t . E v e n i f t h e y do s e t o u t t o c o n v i n c e a n o t h e r o f h i s e r r o r , t h e y may do so i n a t o l e r a n t and r e s p e c t f u l manner. As J o h n M o r l e y n o t e s , the c e r t a i n t y o f t h e t r u t h o f y o u r own o p i n i o n s i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f any s p e c i a l i d e a as t o t h e means by w h i c h o t h e r s 3 2 m i g h t b e s t be b r o u g h t t o s h a r e them. The d e c i s i o n t o compromise w i t h o t h e r s i s more l i k e l y t o a r i s e f r o m a commitment t o s u c h p r i n c i p l e s as s e l f -d e t e r m i n a t i o n and r e s p e c t f o r o p p o s i n g v i e w p o i n t s t h a n f r o m t h e v i e w t h a t a l l n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s a r e o f e q u a l l e g i t i m a c y . J.R. L u c a s a r g u e s t h a t t o l e r a n c e r e q u i r e s compromise " i n s p i t e o f c o n v i c t i o n , " o r p e r h a p s b e c a u s e o f t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i n t o l e r a n c e w o u l d show i n s u f f i c i e n t 33 r e s p e c t f o r r i v a l p o i n t s o f v i e w . D e m o c r a t i c t o l e r a n c e d o e s r e q u i r e d o u b t , as B e r n a r d C r i c k a r g u e s , b u t t h e s e d o u b t s a r e c o n f i n e d t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f how f a r o u r b e l i e f s 34 j u s t i f y i n t o l e r a n c e . To r e t u r n t o t h e terms o f t h e d e b a t e , p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s o r c o n s e n s u s on compromise i s n o t a s a t i s f a c t o r y a l t e r n a t i v e t o n o r m a t i v e c o n s e n s u s b e c a u s e p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s p r e s u p p o s e s c o n v i c t i o n a b o u t t h e w o r t h and d i g n i t y o f o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e p r o c e d u r e , and a b o u t t h e v a l u e o f r a t i o n a l p e r s u a s i o n . P a r t r i d g e i s c o r r e c t t o a r g u e t h a t p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s "needs t o be u n d e r p i n n e d by o t h e r t y p e s o f C o n s e n s u s , " and t h a t " i t 35 i s l i k e l y t o c r u m b l e i f t h e s e a r e removed." I t i s t r u e t h a t d emocracy i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h an a b s o l u t i s t p h i l o s o p h y , s i n c e t h e l a t t e r p r e c l u d e s d i s -a g reement, v a r i e t y - , and change. I t i s a l s o t r u e t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c a t t i t u d e , b e i n g " c o m p e l l e d t o q u e s t i o n , a n a l y z e and ' r e - o r d e r ' t h e i r norms," r e q u i r e s a c e r t a i n s k e p t i c i s m . F o r , as P r e s t o n K i n g p u t s i t , a s e t o f b e l i e f s i s v a l i d o n l y i f i t w i t h s t a n d s a l l t e s t s , and t e s t s a r e i n p r i n c i p l e 37 i n f i n i t e i n number. However, t h e s k e p t i c d i f f e r s f r o m t h e r e l a t i v i s t . i n t h a t , w h i l e t h e f o r m e r d o u b t s c l a i m s t o t r u t h and r e a s o n , t h e l a t t e r e q u a t e s t r u t h and r e a s o n w i t h s u b j e c t i v e o p i n i o n s and demands. As H a r r i s o n n o t e s , F o r t h e r e l a t i v i s t ' s p u r p o s e s , a l l m o r a l s y s t e m s c a n be t r e a t e d as i f t h e y were m o r a l l y e q u a l . T h i s does n o t mean t h a t - • t h e y have a l l been t e s t e d a g a i n s t some m o r a l s t a n d a r d and come o u t w i t h e q u a l ^g s c o r e s , b u t t h a t no s u c h t e s t i s r e l e v a n t . The t h e s i s t h a t democracy p r e s u p p o s e s r e l a t i v i s m r e j e c t s c r i t e r i a by w h i c h t o r a n k demands a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y and r a t i o n a l i t y . The t h e s i s i s t h e r e f o r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t a l l i n t e r e s t s and v a l u e s a r e e q u a l l y l e g i t i m a t e , and w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t t h e y a r e e q u a l l y i l l e g i t i m a t e and u n w o r t h y o f t o l e r a t i o n . I n f a c t t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t two r e a s o n s why t h e r e l a t i v i s t . i s more l i k e l y t o be d o g m a t i c t h a n f l e x i b l e . F i r s t , t h e r e l a t i v i s t ' s d o u b t s a r e l i m i t e d , as S t a n k i e w i c z p u t s i t , t o " t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r a t i o n a l l y a n a l y s i n g norms and d e f e n d i n g them." F o r t h e r e l a t i v i s t t h e r e i s no p o i n t i n c h a n g i n g , d e b a t i n g , o r c o m p r o m i s i n g h i s immediate 39 d e s i r e s ; h i s d e s i r e s become h i s norms. Second, t h e r e l a t i v i s t c a n n o t a b i d e a d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e 57 w h i c h i s d e s i g n e d t o embody r e a s o n ; he w i l l n o t be t o l e r a n t and f l e x i b l e a b o u t a s u b s t a n t i v e o r n o n - p r o c e d u r a l d e f i -n i t i o n o f d e m o c r a c y . The d e b a t e between t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s r e s t s on t h e e m p i r i c a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t c i t i z e n s i n a d emocracy w i l l a c t c o n s i s t e n t l y as r e l a t i v i s t s . B u t t h e f a c t t h a t d e m o c r a c i e s e n d u r e s u g g e s t s t h a t c i t i z e n s c o n s e n t t o g o v e r n m e n t n o t o n l y where t h e i r s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s p r e v a i l , b u t a l s o where t h e y p e r c e i v e t h a t 41 p o l i c i e s a r e j u s t . P o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s n e i t h e r r e l a t i v i s t n o r a b s o l u t i s t , b u t r a t h e r n o r m a t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r . N o r m a t i v e b e l i e f s r e s e m b l e d e s i r e s i n b e i n g , as t h e r e l a t i v i s t s u p p o s e s , s u b j e c t i v e and e v a l u a t i v e . However, most do d i s t i n g u i s h between norms and d e s i r e s : norms have a c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l i t y ; t h e y a r e c o n n e c t e d t o t h e i d e a o f a s t a n d a r d i n a way i n w h i c h d e s i r e s a r e n o t . N o r m a t i v e b e h a v i o u r may be d e f i n e d as t h e o r d e r i n g o f e nds i n t h e l i g h t o f a n o t i o n o f t h e common go o d . The m ain p r o b l e m w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f democracy i s t h a t i t r e d u c e s a l l n o r m a t i v e e n d s t o t h e p u r s u i t o f ' 1 .4.- 1 4 2 p o l i t i c a l power. One weakness o f democracy i s t h a t i t l a c k s a s e l f -e v i d e n t j u s t i f y i n g i d e o l o g y . As M a c T v e r p o i n t s o u t , s i n c e d emocracy a d m i t s a l l f a c t i o n s i t i s e a s i l y c o n c e i v e d as b e i n g i t s e l f a p u r e l y n e g a t i v e t h i n g , a f o r m w i t h o u t c o n t e n t , a mere b r a c k e t t o e n c l o s e d i v e r s i t y . . . S i n c e i t does n o t s t a n d f o r t h e f a i t h o f any p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p i t seems t o s t a n d f o r none o f i t s own. 4 The E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s do l i t t l e t o d e v e l o p a d e m o c r a t i c f a i t h . I n f a c t , the E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s t a k e t h e l a c k o f a j u s t i f y i n g i d e o l o g y t o be a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f W e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s r e j e c t e x i s t i n g i d e o l o g i e s as e l i t i s t o r a u t h o r i -t a r i a n . Y e t b o t h s c h o o l s a d o p t an i d e o l o g y o f r e l a t i v i s m w h i c h i s , as t h i s s e c t i o n h a s shown, u n j u s t i f i a b l e . 59 FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER TWO James V/. P r o t h r o , C h a r l e s M. G r i g g , " F u ndamental P r i n c i p l e s o f Democracy: B a s e s o f A g r e e m e n t and D i s a g r e e m e n t , " J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c s 22 (May 1960), 276-7. See a l s o H e r b e r t M c C l o s k y , " C o n s e n s u s and I d e o l o g y i n A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c s , " A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review 58 (June 1 9 6 4 ) , 361-83. I n h i s P u b l i c O p i n i o n and W e s t e r n Democracy (New Y o r k , 1961), 550, V.O. Key s t a t e s t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f c o n s e n s u s as a d e m o c r a t i c p r e c o n d i t i o n h a s s p r u n g f r o m the i n v e n t i v e minds o f t h e o r i s t s u n t a i n t e d by... knowledge o f t h e r e l e v a n t mass a t t i t u d e s . . . T h i s k n owledge does n o t g i v e much c o m f o r t t o t h o s e who suppose t h a t most p e o p l e c a r r y a r o u n d i n t h e i r h e a d s the e l e m e n t s o f d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y i n e v e n i t s most a t t e n u a t e d f o r m . 2 M c C l o s k y , " C o n s e n s u s and I d e o l o g y , " op. c i t . , 377. 3 T.V. S m i t h , D i s c i p l i n e f o r Democracy ( C h a p e l H i l l , N.C., 1942), 124. C i t e d by E.A. P u r c e l l J r . , i n The C r i s i s  o f D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y ( L e x i n g t o n , Ky., 1973), 209. S m i t h ' s p o s i t i o n r e c e i v e s e m p i r i c a l s u p p o r t f r o m P r o t h r o and G r i g g , " P r i n c i p l e s o f D emocracy," op. c i t . , 286. They n o t e t h a t t h o s e s h a r i n g a commitment t o s e l e c t e d p r i n c i p l e s number between 25% and 7 5 % o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e , w h i c h i m p l i e s t h a t , i n t h e i r words, " t h e e l e c t o r a t e i s c l o s e r t o p e r f e c t d i s c o r d t h a n t o p e r f e c t c o n c o r d . " 4 Hans K e l s e n , " F o u n d a t i o n s o f Democracy," i n P o l i t i c a l T h o u g h t ..Since W o r l d War I I , e d . W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 4 ) , 74. 5 C . J . F r i e d r i c h , The New B e l i e f i n t h e Common Man ( B o s t o n , 1942),' 173, 186. A u s e f u l summary o f Dewey's p o s i t i o n i s g i v e n i n P u r c e l l , D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y , op. c i t . , 200-1. P u r c e l l n o t e s t h a t t h e more c l e a r l y t h e c o n c e p t o f t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m emerged, t h e more f i r m l y Dewey i n s i s t e d on i t s a b s o l u t i s t f o u n d a t i o n s . F o r t h e e m p i r i c i s t r e l a t i v i s m i s a l s o t h e p h i l o -s ophy o f t h e t h e o r i s t . The s o c i a l t h e o r i s t must d i s t i n g u i s h b e tween s t a t e m e n t s o f f a c t and s t a t e m e n t s o f v a l u e , and he must d e a l o n l y w i t h t h e f o r m e r . The r e l a t i v i s m o f e m p i r i c a l 60 t h e o r y s t a t e s t h a t v a l u e p r o p o s i t i o n s e x p r e s s s i m p l y t h e e m o t i o n s o f the v a l u i n g s u b j e c t . As c l a i m s t o t r u t h t h e y a r e n e i t h e r v a l i d n o r i n v a l i d , b u t u n d e m o n s t r a b l e . 7 See, f o r example, G a b r i e l Almond and S i d n e y V e r b a , The C i v i c C u l t u r e ( B o s t o n 1965); B e r n a r d B e r e l s o n ; P a u l F. L z a r s f e l d ; and W i l l i a m McPhee, V o t i n g ( C h i c a g o , 1954), 323. Q F r i e d r i c h , The New B e l i e f i n t h e Common Man, op. c i t . , 173, 186. 9 P u r c e l l , D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y , op. c i t . , 200. 10 G a b r i e l Almond and G.B. P o w e l l J r . , C o m p a r a t i v e P o l i t i c s ( B o s t o n , 1 9 6 6 ) , 61. C i t e d by B e r n a r d S u s s e r , "The B e h a v i o u r a l I d e o l o g y : A Review and a R e t r o s p e c t , " P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s 22 (September 1974), 282. 11 F r i e d r i c h a r g u e s i n h i s The New B e l i e f i n t h e Common  Man, op. c i t . , 186 t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c p e r s o n a l i t y i s - o p e n o r u n c o n v i n c e d b e c a u s e s h a r e d a g r e e m e n t on norms c a n n o t be r e a c h e d d e m o c r a t i c a l l y . G i v e n t h e f a c t t h e c i t i z e n s d i s -a g r e e w i d e l y , he c l a i m s , o n l y c o e r c i o n c a n s e c u r e a s o c i e t a l c o n s e n s u s on norms. See a l s o B e r e l s o n e t a l . , V o t i n g , op. c i t , 323. 1 2 Hans K e l s e n , A l l g e m e i n e S t a a t s l e h r e ( B e r l i n , 1 9 2 5 ) , 370. C i t e d by Rene de Visme W i l l i a m s o n , "The C h a l l e n g e o f P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i v i s m , " The J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c s 9 (May 1 9 4 7 ) , 150. 279. 13 P r o t h r o and G r i g g , " F u n d a m e n t a l P r i n c i p l e s , " op. c i t . , 14 Almond and V e r b a , The C i v i c C u l t u r e , op. c i t . , 492; The i m p o r t a n t a s s u m p t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t h e t h e s i s o f p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s i s , o f c o u r s e , t h a t d e m o c r a c y i s a s e t o f p r o c e d u r e s D a v i d Truman, "The A m e r i c a n S y s t e m i n C r i s i s , " P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y 74 (December 1959), 490, s t a t e s : R i s k does n o t l i e i n t h e c o n f l i c t as s u c h . . . b u t i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e means by w h i c h i t i s c a r r i e d on may v i o l a t e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e s y s t e m . F o r o t h e r p r o c e d u r a l d e f i n i t i o n , see P u r c e l l , D e m o c r a t i c  T h e o r y , 215. I n some e m p i r i c a l t e x t s t h e d e f i n i t i o n i s i m p l i c i t . When Eugene B u r d i c k s t a t e s t h a t t h e v e r y low a f f e c t o f most v o t e r s , 61 t h e i r l a c k o f i d e o l o g i c a l commitment... makes p o l i t i c a l c o n c o r d r e l a t i v e l y e asy t o a c h i e v e , he i s c l e a r l y n o t t h i n k i n g o f a n o r m a t i v e c o n c o r d , b u t a p r o c e d u r a l one. " P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y and The V o t i n g S t u d i e s , " i n A m e r i c a n V o t i n g B e h a v i o r , pp. 136-150. E d i t e d by Eugene B u r d i c k , A r t h u r J . B r o d b e c k ( G l e n c o , 111., 1959), 145. B u r d i c k ' s p o s i t i o n i s t a k e n by M c C l o s k y , " C o n s e n s u s and I d e o l o g y , " op. c i t . , 362; Angus C a m p b e l l ; P.E. C o n v e r s e ; W.E. M i l l e r ; and D.E. S t o k e s , The A m e r i c a n V o t e r (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 0 ) , 543; S i d n e y V e r b a and Norman H. N i e , P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n A m e r i c a (New Y o r k , 1972), 339. 15 M c C l o s k y , " C o n s e n s u s and I d e o l o g y , " op. c i t . , 364. . 1 6 T h e p h r a s e i s C o c h r a n ' s . C l a r k e E. C o c h r a n , " P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e and t h e P u b l i c I n t e r e s t , " J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c s 36 (May 197 4 ) , 328. 17 T.D. Weldon, The V o c a b u l a r y o f P o l i t i c s ( London, 1 9 5 3 ) , 56. 18 F r i e d r i c h , The New B e l i e f i n t h e Common Mail, op. c i t . , 181. 19 D o n a l d Keim, " P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n C o n t e m p o r a r y D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r i e s , " i n P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n , e d s . J.R. Pennock, J.W. Chapman (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 5 ) , 29-30; P e t e r B a c h r a c h , The T h e o r y o f D e m o c r a t i c E l i t i s m ( B o s t o n , 1967), 53; J a c k W a l k e r , "A C r i t i q u e o f t h e E l i t i s t T h e o r y o f Democracy," A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review 60 ( J u n e , 1 9 6 6 ) , 286; Graeme Duncan, S t e v e n L u k e s , "The New Demo-c r a c y , " i n A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s , e d s . C h a r l e s A. McCoy, J o h n P l a y f o r d (New Y o r k , 1967), 174. 20 R o b e r t P. W o l f f ; H e r b e r t M a r c u s e ; and B a r r i n g t o n Moore J r . , A C r i t i q u e o f Pur e T o l e r a n c e ( B o s t o n , 1965), 43-4; 84. 2 l I b i d . , 97. 2 2 I b i d . , 97, 109. 23 McCoy and P l a y f o r d , A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , 77, 226, 221. See a l s o B a c h r a c h , D e m o c r a t i c E l i t i s m , op. c i t . , 8 ; L e w i s L i p s i t z , "On P o l i t i c a l B e l i e f s : The G r i e v a n c e s o f t h e P o o r , " i n Power and Community, e d s . P h i l i p G r e e n and S a n f o r d L e v i n s o n (New Y o r k , 1969), 1 4 4 f f . 62 24 A d e m o c r a t i c r e s u l t n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f c o n t e n d i n g i n t e r e s t s o n l y i f one assumes t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s a r e r e l a t i v i s t s . 25 • D a r r y l B a s k i n , " A m e r i c a n P l u r a l i s m : T h e o r y , P r a c t i c e and I d e o l o g y , " J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c s 32 ( F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 0 ) , 81, 82. 2 6 R.P. W o l f f , I n D e f e n c e o f A n a r c h i s m (New Y o r k , 1970) , 24. 27 P.H. P a r t r i d g e , C o n s e n t and C o n s e n s u s (London, 1971) , 59. . ' 2 8 I b i d . , 31. 29 B a s k i n , " A m e r i c a n P l u r a l i s m , " op. c i t . , 91. 30 J o h n H. S c h a a r , " L e g i t i m a c y i n the' Modern S t a t e , " i n Power and Community, e d s . P h i l i p G r e e n , S a n f o r d L e v i n s o n (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 9 ) , 320n. 31 E l i a s B e r g , Democracy and t h e M a j o r i t y P r i n c i p l e ( G o t e b e r g , Sweden, 19 6 5 ) , 33. 32 J o h n M o r l e y , On Compromise ( L o n d o n , 1928), 202. See a l s o ' h i s p. 201: The c r y 'Be my b r o t h e r o r I s l a y t h e e ' was t h e s i g n o f a v e r y weak, t h o u g h t e r r i b l y f i e r y , f a i t h i n t h e s a c r e d w o r t h o f f r a t e r n i t y . 33 J.R. L u c a s , The P r i n c i p l e s o f P o l i t i c s ( O x f o r d , 1 9 6 6 ) , 296. 34 B e r n a r d C r i c k , P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y and P o l i t i c a l P r a c t i c e ( L o n d o n , 1 9 6 4 ) , 93. 35 P a r t r i d g e , C o n s e n t and C o n s e n s u s , op. c i t . , 94. See a l s o J o h n H. H a l l o w e l l , "Compromise as a P o l i t i c a l I d e a l , " E t h i c s 54 ( A p r i l 1 9 44), 172. See a l s o H a l l o w e l l ' s p. 164: i f t h e r e i s no agreement on f u n d a m e n t a l s , t h e r e c a n be no d i s c u s s i o n w o r t h y o f t h e name, no common p o l i c y , no compromise t h a t i s a n y t h i n g b u t t h e e x t r a c t i o n o f c o n c e s s i o n s 63 by f o r c e . . . i n short, nothing that cannot tomorrow t u r n i n t o the most r u t h l e s s . . . tyranny. W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z , Aspects of P o l i t i c a l Theory (London, 1976), 130. 37 P r e s t o n King, Tolerance (London,1976), 136. 38 G e o f f r e y H a r r i s o n , " R e l a t i v i s m and T o l e r a n c e , " E t h i c s 86 (October, 1975), 133. 39 St a n k i e w i c z , Aspects, op. c i t . , 45. - 40 See S t a n k i e w i c z , Approaches to Democracy, op. c i t . , 99-100. 0 41 H a l l o w e l l , "Compromise," op. c i t . , 164. See a l s o h i s p . 161. 42 See S t a n k i e w i c z , Approaches to Democracy, op. c i t . , 205. 4 3 R. Maclver, The Ramparts We Gaurd (New York, 1950), 112. 64 CHAPTER THREE DEMOCRACY AS GOVERNMENT BY CONSENT P a r t One: P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Consent The E m p i r i c a l and the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s agree t h a t the democratic p r i n c i p l e of government by consent r e q u i r e s c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The debate between the two schools concerns the l e v e l and the type of p a r t i c i p a t i o n 1 r e q u i r e d by the p r i n c i p l e . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s argue t h a t the procedures of Western democracies are a p r o c e s s of consent by c i t i z e n s to government. M o r r i s Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick p o r t r a y the United S t a t e s P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s o f 1952 as a s a t i s f a c t o r y form of popular consent. They p o i n t to the f a c t t h a t there were both h i g h l e v e l s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and a meaningful choice o f 2 c a n d i d a t e s . Where there are f r e e e l e c t i o n s , the E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s h o l d , the a c t of v o t i n g may be a s i g n that the c i t i z e n bestows l e g i t i m a c y on government. For . :each c i t i z e n knows, or i s presumed to know, tha t to vote i s to c r e a t e i n another a r i g h t he would not otherwise have...So the v o t e r ^ 'consents' to the e x i s t e n c e of t h i s r i g h t . C a r o l e Pateman takes i s s u e with the E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s by comparing the vote of an u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d c i t i z e n to the promise of a s t a r v i n g man to a wealthy man: n e i t h e r the vote nor the promise i s morally b i n d i n g . 65 For Pateman v o t i n g i s a form of consent only where there i s i s an e q u a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l r e s o u r c e s , and where the c i t i z e n votes d i r e c t l y or through i n s t r u c t e d delegates 4 on every i s s u e o f importance. Pateman p o i n t s to s i m i -l a r i t i e s between the theory of v o t i n g as consent and John Locke's theory of t a c i t consent. According to Locke, the f a c t t h a t a c i t i z e n r e s i d e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e i m p l i e s t h a t he consents t a c i t l y to the a u t h o r i t y of t h a t s t a t e . N e i t h e r Locke nor the E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s s t i p u l a t e f o r democracy a continuous and express form o f consent. F u r t h e r , both allow t h a t consent to i n d i v i d u a l p o l i c i e s can be mediated through r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . "Pateman s t a t e s : c i t i z e n s c o l l e c t i v e l y must c r e a t e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y through p a r t i -c i p a t o r y v o t i n g i n a democratic community; there can be no a l i e n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I f we d e f i n e democracy as government by consent, Pateman i s c o r r e c t to deny t h a t t a c i t consent i s adequate to democracy. In i t s normal usage consent r e f e r s to the a c t of g i v i n g p e r m i s s i o n ; i t i m p l i e s t h a t there i s some e x p r e s s i o n of p e r m i s s i o n . As C a s s i n e l l i p o i n t s out, the term does not denote the i n t e n t i o n or a t t i t u d e behind the a c t of d e f e r r i n g to a u t h o r i t y , but r a t h e r the a c t i t s e l f . C a s s i n e l l i and P a r t r i d g e s p e c i f y f u r t h e r t h a t the act of consent must be v o l u n t a r y ; the c i t i z e n must have the r i g h t and the power to w i t h h o l d consent, but 7 g r a n t i t n o n e t h e l e s s . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s c i t e these arguments i n favour of a strong or l i t e r a l concept of consent as evidence t h a t , i n P a r r y ' s words, i f there i s anything meaningful i n the n o t i o n of consent i t i s b e t t e r t r a n s -l a t e d i n t o the language o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Although v o t i n g i s a form o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , the E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s ' p o s i t i o n i s h a r d l y more acceptable to the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s than i s Locke's simple presumption of consent. As S t e i n b e r g argues, e l e c t o r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not provide a context of p e r s o n a l involvement and i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t i s necessary £o any r e l a t i o n s h i p based on consent. V o t i n g does not meet the c o n d i t i o n s o f the p r i n c i p l e of government by consent. F i r s t , the v o t e r has no choice but to be r e p r e s e n t e d by the s u c c e s s f u l c a n didate. Since candidates may be e l e c t e d by a m i n o r i t y of the e l e c t o r a t e , they do not r e c e i v e the i n d i v i d u a l consent of the governed. Second, the o b l i g a t i o n of the c i t i z e n to the s t a t e i s the same whether or not he v o t e s . Thus, Pateman concludes t h a t v o t i n g cannot be "the p o l i t i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t of the s o c i a l ~ . . ..10 p r a c t i c e o f p r o m i s i n g . " There are three p o s s i b l e types of c i t i z e n consent i n the debate: r e s i d e n c e i n a s t a t e ; the e x e r c i s e of the s u f f r a g e ; and p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. Of these the l e a s t u s e f u l f o r d e f i n i n g democracy i s the f i r s t , s i n c e i f a l l c i t i z e n s consent to t h e i r government there can be no way of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between governments by the c r i t e r i o n of p o p u l a r consent. Every regime must enjoy unanimous consent, and so be counted as democratic. The second 6 7 form of consent, which requires p a r t i c i p a t i o n in elections, i s more discriminating than the f i r s t i n that i t re-s t r i c t s the t i t l e "democratic" to governments elected by universal suffrage. However, the p r i n c i p l e of one man, one vote i s not.a s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i o n by which to rank democracies, since almost a l l governments claim to s a t i s f y the conditions of the p r i n c i p l e . If i t i s to be of p r a c t i c a l value to democratic theory, the concept of government by consent needs stronger or more exacting conditions than those associated with universal suffrage. It might then appear that the t h i r d , p a r t i c i p a t o r y i n t e r e t a t i o n of consent, being the strongest or the most discriminating, i s also the best d i f f e r e n t i a of democracies. It i s true that universal suffrage i s a weak or in c l u s i v e c r i t e r i o n of democracy. For i t implies that those Communist regimes which are supported in elections by approximately 95% of voters are the most democratic "form of government. However, we might also consider universal suffrage to be a strong or exclusive c r i t e r i o n since i t follows from the p r i n c i p l e that a l l Western governments were undemocratic u n t i l the f i n a l extensions 11 of the suffrage in t h i s century. The c r i t e r i o n of one man, one -vote i s both too strong and too weak; i t i s a useless i n d i c a t o r of democracy. The weakness of the empirical theory arises not only from the thesis that voting s i g n i f i e s consent, but a l s o f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e o f w i d e s p r e a d c o n s e n t g u a r a n t e e s d e m ocracy. The E m p i r i c a l and the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s s h a r e t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t any c l e a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f c o n s e n t i s a l s o an u n d i s p u t e d s i g n o f d e m o c r a c y . However, e v e n i f we c a n be .sure t h a t t h e c i t i z e n w i s h e s t o b estow l e g i t i m a c y on h i s g overnment, we c a n n o t say t h a t i t i s t h e r e b y d e m o c r a t i c . T h e r e a r e g o v e r n m e n t s , as W i l l i a m s o n p o i n t s o u t , t h a t no amount o f 12 c o n s e n t c o u l d make d e m o c r a t i c . We c a l l H i t l e r ' s R e i c h u n d e m o c r a t i c , i n s p i t e o f mass r a l l i e s w h i c h i m p l i e d p o p u l a r c o n s e n t , b e c a u s e H i t l e r d i d n o t r e s p e c t t h e u n i v e r s a l r i g h t s o f man and t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . W h a t ever c o n d i t i o n s a r e a t t a c h e d t o t h e f r e e e x p r e s s i o n o f c o n s e n t , t h e y c a n n o t d e f i n e d e m o c r a c y u n l e s s t h e y i n c l u d e s t i p u -l a t i o n s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f g o v e r n m e n t . I t i s o n l y by c o n s i d e r i n g p o l i t i c a l ends t h a t we c a n s peak o f democracy e x i s t i n g a t any t i m e between t h e d i r e c t democracy o f a n c i e n t A t h e n s and t h e r e c e n t a d v e n t o f u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e . The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s r e t a i n t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s ' c o n c e r n w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r e s o f d e m ocracy. A l t h o u g h t h e p a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r y o f c o n s e n t i s e x a c t i n g o r s t r i n g e n t , i t c a n n o t h e l p t o d i s t i n g u i s h and t o r a n k e x i s t i n g f o r m s o f g o v e r n m e n t . F o r example, th e l e v e l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n may' be h i g h e r i n a S o v i e t s t a t e f a r m t h a n i t i s i n any r u r a l a r e a i n t h e W e s t e r n s o c i e t i e s ; i t may have been h i g h e r i n a f e u d a l E u r o p e a n c i t y t h a n i n most c i t i e s t o d a y . We c a n d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e s e and any 69 o t h e r forms of government only by r e f e r e n c e to non-p r o c e d u r a l or s u b s t a n t i v e c r i t e r i a , such as that of the common good. I f democracy i s indeed government by popular consent we must p r e f e r the p a r t i c i p a t o r y theory over the e m p i r i c a l p o s i t i o n . For continuous p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a c l e a r e r s i g n of commitment to government than i n f r e q u e n t v o t i n g can be. However, i f we r e j e c t the premise t h a t government by' consent i s a s u f f i c i e n t democratic p r i n c i p l e the p a r t i -c i p a t o r y case i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the s t r o n g e r . In t h i s case we might accept arguments i n f a v o u r of a l i t e r a l i n t e r e t a t i o n of consent, y e t deny t h a t they have major i m p l i c a t i o n s about the need f o r a p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. We might conclude from the p o s i t i o n of C a s s i n e l l i and P a r t r i d g e t h a t government by consent i s not a democratic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n because no s o c i e t y can f u l f i l l i t s c o n d i t i o n s . The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s t a t e s the case f o r t h i s j c o n c l u s i o n . P a r t Two: A u t h o r i t y and Consent Yves Simon d i s t i n g u i s h e s between three types of l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y , and he shows t h a t two of these do not depend on the consent of the governed. Simon c o n s i d e r s f i r s t l y a type o f a u t h o r i t y d e s c r i b e d by him as " p a t e r n a l " , 13 "pedagogical", o r " s u b s t i t u t i o n a l " . T h i s category c o n s i s t s of cases where the a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p i s temporary, and c o n t i n g e n t on the underdevelopment of the 70 c i t i z e n . P a t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y i s compatible with the view t h a t l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i s s u b j e c t to the consent of the governed. For i t r e s t r i c t s the duty of unquestioning obedience to those, such as c h i l d r e n , the insane, and p r i s o n e r s , who are excluded from most e l e c t o r a t e s . The E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s imply that a l l a u t h o r i t y i s o f the p a t e r n a l type when they deny the 14 p o s s i b i l i t y o f an o b j e c t i v e common good. They view s o c i e t y as a form of p a r t n e r s h i p i n which every sane and r e s p o n s i b l e a d u l t has the r i g h t to govern. By c o n t r a s t , Simon c o n s i d e r s h i s remaining types of a u t h o r i t y to be both e s s e n t i a l to democracy and above the consent of the governed. Simon names h i s second category " e s s e n t i a l " . E s s e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y i s r e q u i r e d , he argues, i n order to u n i f y a c t i o n s where there i s a consensus on the nature of the common good combined wi t h a p l u r a l i t y of means of 15 a c h i e v i n g t h i s good. E s s e n t i a l a u t h o r i t y d i f f e r s from the p a t e r n a l v a r i e t y i n t h a t i t o r i g i n a t e s not i n the d e f e c t s or the immaturity of c i t i z e n s , but i n the nature of s o c i e t y . For example, i t i s i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t t h a t a l l m o t o r i s t s d r i v e on the same s i d e of the road, but there i s no obvious reason why we should choose e i t h e r the r i g h t or the l e f t - h a n d s i d e . Where reason alone cannot produce a compromise, the a u t h o r i t y o f l e a d e r s must. "Faced w i t h a c h o i c e of means," Simon comments, "even 71 angels would have to resort to authority." In the case of t r a f f i c laws, authority i s powerless to save l i v e s i f i t i s subject to individual consent. A l l theories of government must account for e s s e n t i a l authority. Simon asserts not only that h i s second category of authority i s e s s e n t i a l to a l l governments, but also that i t i s required e s p e c i a l l y by democracies. In contrast to paternal authority, he argues, instances of essential authority multiply as men mature, and as s o c i e t i e s grow 16 more complex. For instance, a young family with l i t t l e savings may not require authority when planning i t s f i r s t major vacation. The number of destinations possible- on a small budget is.so low that a family vote might well s e t t l e the issue. But the great choice of vacations facing a wealthy family i s l i k e l y to require a single authoritative voice even where there i s agreement on t h e c r i t e r i a of a desirable holiday. Those who define democracy as government by consent imply that as the l i b e r t y of c i t i z e n s grows the need fo r authority declines. Simon suggests instead that authority i s a complement of l i b e r t y . I t allows for individual d i v e r s i t y while guaranteeing the p o s s i b i l i t y of common action. For Simon es s e n t i a l authority does not r e s t r i c t but i t creates the conditions that make possible a measure of s e l f -determination. Simon's f i n a l category of authority, which he c a l l s " p o l i t i c a l " , i s required i n order to choose among ends 72 where t h e r e i s a c o n s e n s u s on t h e p r o p e r means t o a g i v e n end. Simon d e s c r i b e s two p r o f e s s o r s , e a c h a m a s t e r o f one t y p e o f t e a c h i n g . One c o n d u c t s h i s l e c t u r e s as d i s c u s s i o n g r o u p s i n o r d e r t o promote s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n and i n t e r e s t among s t u d e n t s . The o t h e r l i m i t s s t u d e n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n an a t t e m p t t o p r o d u c e d i s c i p l i n e d l e a r n e d s c h o l a r s . A s s u m i n g t h a t e a c h p r o f e s s o r p r o v i d e s t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e means t o h i s p r e f e r r e d end, a l l members o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y w i l l c h o o s e between t h e ends o f knowledge and i n t e r e s t when a s s e s s i n g t h e p r o f e s s o r s . To i l l u s t r a t e h i s t h i r d c a t e g o r y o f a u t h o r i t y , Simon p o i n t s t o d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e a s s e s s m e n t made by t h e s t u d e n t s and t h a t made by t h e C h a i r m a n o f t h e d e p a r t m e n t . I n s e l e c t i n g h i s c o u r s e s t h e s t u d e n t ' s commitment t o t h e common good i s a f o r m a l one o n l y . E v e n i f he a d m i t s t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y and d e s i r i b i l i t y o f c h o o s i n g on t h e b a s i s o f t h e common good, t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e good w i l l e d by him i s a c t u a l l y h i s p r i v a t e good, d e r i v e d f r o m h i s v i e w s on l i b e r a l i s m i n t e a c h i n g . The C h a i r m a n d i f f e r s i n t h a t , when f o r c e d t o c h o o s e between h i s members o f s t a f f , h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e common good i s a p o l i t i c a l one, f o r w h i c h he b e a r s u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T h e r e f o r e , Simon c o n c l u d e s , he is d e f i n e d by t h e d u t y o f w i l l i n g and i n t e n d i n g t h e common good considered b o t h i n i t s f o r m and i n i t s m a t t e r . S i n c e t h e e x e r c i s e o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y r e q u i r e s t h e 73 renunciation of private interests, the p o l i t i c a l leader must have authority which transcends the consent of the governed. Simon's p o l i t i c a l authority i s necessary where there i s no consensus on the content of the common good; h i s essential authority belongs where there are disputes over the means to a generally accepted good. The thesis that authority must transcend consent may be refuted, therefore, only by hypothesizing a society i n which consensus on both means and ends i s high. The Par t i c i p a t o r y theorists have devoted the bulk of the i r work, not to the p o l i t i c s of the national state, but to what Bachrach c a l l s 18 "sub-systems of the body p o l i t i c . " Pateman, Bachrach, and others attempt to arrive at a theory of government by means of analogies with non-governmental bodies such as the c a p i t a l i s t enterprise, the University, and so f o r t h . The method of these theorists i s to wage a war of a t t r i t i o n against the theory of government: i f a l l s o c i a l organizations can be e g a l i t a r i a n , why not government too? Bachrach's sub-systems d i f f e r from the state i n that they are s p e c i a l i z e d groups which may dispense with a s t r i c t hierarchy. The state i s an unselective community; 19 dissenters cannot r e t i r e or be excluded, as from a club. Stankiewicz states: The same committee members who are capable of making policy decisions through p a r t i c i p a t i o n are l i a b l e to disintegrate into quarreling factions when discussing matters outside 74 t h e i r committee's frame of reference. The reason i s p l a i n : the committee can function as a committee because i t has been selected on the basis of the q u a l i t i e s necessary — common int e r e s t , knowledge, a b i l i t y . The farther we move from that s i t u a t i o n , the smaller i s t h e 2 g o s s i b i l i t y of genuine p a r t i c i p a t i o n . P o l i t i c a l demands d i f f e r from those i n other organizations i n that they are u n l i k e l y to have a self-evident order of p r i o r i t y . C r i t e r i a are needed to rank demands in the state, and this requires i n turn p o l i t i c a l a uthorities to interpret and to apply these c r i t e r i a . ' F i n a l l y , only government 21 can legitimately coerce members of a l l organizations. The e g a l i t a r i a n p o s s i b i l i t i e s of non-governmental bodies have" no serious implications f o r democratic theory. The thesis that the legitimacy of government arises from popular consent i s best described not as a theory of government, but as one of anarchy. A.D. Lindsay c a l l s the thesis the " s i l l y " democratic argument because i t implies that the c i t i z e n i s under an obligation to obey government only where he i s part of the consenting majority. The thesis also suggests that, should one c i t i z e n f a i l to consent, none i s obliged to obey. Lindsay argues that few actually believe that a minority can be j u s t i f i e d in holding a society to ransom. He concludes: Men w i l l not i n practice consent to govern-ment by consent. For government by i n d i v i -dual consent i s . ... anarchy, and men w i l l not consent to anarchy. Since government by i n d i v i d u a l consent i s l o g i c a l l y impossible, the, attempts of the Empirical and the P a r t i -7 5 cipatory theorists to select a suitable form of consent by which to define democracy i s based on a false assumption about the nature of democracy. One possible conclusion to t h i s chapter i s that authority and consensus are preferable to the e g a l i t a r i a n norms of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and consent for the purpose of defining democracy. However, there are dangers i n defining democracy by authority and consensus alone. For instance, the d e f i n i t i o n may be unacceptably broad in the sense that one may succeed in defining not democracy as the term i s generally used, but mixed government or the good society. As Maclver warns, a d e f i n i t i o n of democracy ought not to eschew procedural c r i t e r i a : we must beware of defining democracy as a ' s p i r i t 1 , a creed, a way of l i v i n g . , . . I f we do so we play into the hands of those who claim that t h e i r systems of government express 'true' democracy or ^4 'real' democracy or a 'higher' democracy. A non-procedural or substantive d e f i n i t i o n i s too broad or i n c l u s i v e when i t perceives the right to a choice of-representatives as being unnecessary. Kelsen argues: There is...no better means to obstruct the movement for democracy, to pave the way f o r autocracy... than to make the people believe that t h e i r desire for democracy i s f u l f i l l e d i f the government acts i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t , that they have... democracy i s tt)gy have a government for the people. In the next section we see how the p r i n c i p l e of consent can be retained i n a substantive d e f i n i t i o n of democracy. The f i n a l chapter then shows that we can interpret the 76 e g a l i t a r i a n norms of democracy i n a non-procedural way. Part Three: Two Types of Democratic Consent The Empirical and the Pa r t i c i p a t o r y theorists are united i n the search f o r a stronger or more l i t e r a l concept of consent than that of Locke's t a c i t consent. The two schools imply that the t a c i t consent of c i t i z e n s to govern-ment i s a necessary but i n s u f f i c i e n t condition of democracy. For them Locke errs i n understating the importance of consent in a democracy. The debate creates the impression of a continuum of consent theories ranging from the weakest, which imputes consent to a l l residents in'the state, to the strongest, which demands a participatory democracy. In t h i s section we see, however, that there i s a fundamental difference between t a c i t and l i t e r a l concepts of consent. L i t e r a l concepts derive from the p r i n c i p l e of popular sovereignty, while the concept of t a c i t consent i s part of a theory of the unlimited rights of government. I argue that the d e f i n i t i o n of democracy must ..address both the rights and the duties of the c i t i z e n ; that i t must refer to both c l a s s i c a l and e g a l i t a r i a n concepts of government by consent. The p r i n c i p l e of government by consent i s generally discussed eit h e r i n the context of p o l i t i c a l obligation or i n that of popular sovereignty. For instance, the thesis that legitimate government proceeds by the consent of the governed i s one possible answer to the questions, 77 "what obliges c i t i z e n s to obey government?" and "what binds government to the w i l l of the people?" Simmons defines consent as the "personal performance of a voluntary act which i s the deliberate undertaking of an obl i g a t i o n . " He implies by t h i s d e f i n i t i o n that a theory of consent should consider both the right to withhold 2 6 consent and the duty to obey government. However, <? the two branches of consent theory have not always been developed i n tandem. The Empirical and the Participatory-theorists address themselves c h i e f l y to the right of the c i t i z e n to approve authority, and to the duty of government to embody the popular w i l l . By contrast, the theory of t a c i t consent i s an attempt to explain the obligations of the c i t i z e n , following h i s decision to reside in a p a r t i c u l a r state. We can d i s t i n g u i s h between the two types of consent theory by t h e i r relationship to the p r i n c i p l e of p o l i t i c a l equality. The S o c i a l Contract theorists view government as the l i m i t a t i o n of natural equality; t h e i r consent theory j u s t i f i e s the p o l i t i c a l i n e q u a l i t i e s of c i v i l 27 society. These theorists cannot mean that the legitimacy of government arises from the consent of the governed, for t h i s view would d i s c r e d i t the theory's d i s t i n c t i o n between society and the state of nature. Following the• r i s e of the modern democracies, the i d e a l government i s portrayed widely as a manifestation of popular sovereignty; today the p r i n c i p l e of government by consent i s almost 78 i d e n t i c a l to that of p o l i t i c a l equality. For most modern theorists, consent and equality are the c r i t e r i a of d i s t i n c t i o n between despotic and democratic types of government. These theorists cannot conceive that the consenting c i t i z e n i s bound unconditionally to government since t h i s view would invalidate the d i s t i n c t i o n between despotism and democracy. Modern consent theory concerns the retention of the right to govern; c l a s s i c a l theories define consBnt as the renunciation of p o l i t i c a l power. The c i t i z e n waives the right to withhold consent from government when he consents, t a c i t l y or otherwise, to the founding contract of the state. As Crosby puts i t , Locke considers that legitimate authority flows from the consent of the governed, which implies that i t i s no longer situated among the 2 8 governed/ The Empirical and the Part i c i p a t o r y theorists hold that democracy requires the maximization of individual consent to government; they agree further that some form of p a r t i c i p a t i o n must f u l f i l l t h i s requirement. If these theorists mean by consent something s i m i l a r to that which i s meant by the Social Contract t h e o r i s t s , i t follows that the c i t i z e n i s trapped by p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy. The more he p a r t i c i p a t e s the more he i s a part of the system, 29 and h i s dissenting judgements are of no consequence. Even the c i t i z e n who i s skeptical about the existence of a moral o b l i g a t i o n to obey a u t h o r i t y f i n d i n g himself commanded (in e f f e c t ) by himself, w i l l be psychologically 79 trapped by the system. It i s true that the Empirical and the Participatory theorists do not intend to imply that the participant i s under a moral oblig a t i o n to obey government. In a sense these theorists•are at f a u l t only in f a i l i n g to consider the issue of p o l i t i c a l obligation, and not i n depriving the democratic c i t i z e n of the right to protest. However, there are at least two reasons why we must take the c l a s s i c a l and the e g a l i t a r i a n types of consent not as alternatives, but as complementary p r i n c i p l e s . F i r s t , i t i s impossible to develop the one without making untested assumptions about the other. Thus, the egal-i t a r i a n concept suggests that the c i t i z e n has no o b l i -gations towards government, save those which he choo'ses to assume. Locke's t a c i t consent appears to deny the c i t i z e n the r i g h t to protest i n the face of malevolent authority. Second, neither concept s u f f i c e s to distinguish between forms of government. The e g a l i t a r i a n concept confuses democracy with anarchy, and the concept of t a c i t consent cannot help to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between democracy and other forms of legitimate government. An adequate theory of democratic consent must explain simultaneously the rights and the duties of the governed. The debate between the Empirical and the Participatory theorists ignores that which i s t r u l y r a d i c a l about consent theory. Consent to leaders i s common to a l l legitimate governments. Democracy d i f f e r s not i n the extent of 80 popular consent, but i n that the c i t i z e n always r e t a i n s some sovereignty f o r him s e l f . This sovereignty he may use, at s t i p u l a t e d times and p l a c e s , as a weapon against absolute power. As Simon argues, what i s unique about democracy i s . . . the f a c t t h a t not a l l a u t h o r i t y i s t r a n s m i t t e d to the governing personnel. F r i e d r i c h ' s common pa t t e r n s of behaviour and Wolff's unanimous consent resemble Locke's t a c i t consent i n that f o r each d i s s e n t i s deviant. A theory of democratic consent must r e t a i n the r a d i c a l n o t i o n that consent i s never t o t a l , while i d e n t i f y i n g the l i m i t s of the r i g h t to withhold consent. The theory must d i v e r t a t t e n t i o n from the locus of absolute a u t h o r i t y , and consider instead the ends to which a u t h o r i t y i s committed. An example of such a theory i s that of Hannah 32 P i t k i n . P i t k i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s between consent to the i n d i v i d u a l d i r e c t i v e s of government and consent to the o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t of the s t a t e . She f o l l o w s Locke i n arguing that only the l a t t e r type i s e s s e n t i a l to democracy, but she does.not accept h i s i m p l i c a t i o n that a l l c i t i z e n s 33 n e c e s s a r i l y consent to t h e i r government. For the concept of an o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t i s taken metaphorically by P i t k i n to r e f e r to a set of p r i n c i p l e s which are " l o g i c a l l y deduced from the laws of nature," and which 34 are defin e d by the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . According to P i t k i n , the r i g h t to withhold consent and the duty to obey government are both contingent on the adherence of 81 g o v e r n m e n t t o s u c h o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d s as r e s p e c t f o r t h e n a t u r a l r i g h t s o f man. L e g i t i m a t e g o vernment i s d e f i n e d as g o vernment w h i c h p u r s u e s r a t i o n a l e n d s . A t one p o i n t i n The P r o b l e m o f P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n Pateman a r g u e s t h a t t h e a c t o f v o t i n g c a n n o t o b l i g e the c i t i z e n t o obey g o v e r n m e n t . She a s k s w h e t h e r we w o u l d c o n s i d e r t h a t t h o s e who v o t e d a g a i n s t H i t l e r i n 1933 were m o r a l l y o b l i g e d t o obey h i m i n s u b s e q u e n t y e a r s . P i t k i n w o u l d d i f f e r f r o m Pateman i n i n s i s t i n g t h a t n o t even H i t l e r ' s e a r l y s u p p o r t e r s were bound t o obey him once t h e n a t u r e o f h i s r u l e became a p p a r e n t . As Rogowski a r g u e s , e v e n t h e most p a r t i c i p a n t t r a d e u n i o n i s t may have no o b l i g a t i o n t o r e s p e c t a b l a c k l i s t , and e v e n t h e most p a r t i c i p a n t c i t i z e n no 3 5 o b l i g a t i o n t o s u p p o r t an i m p e r i a l i s t war. S i m i l a r i l y , t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o obey a p a r e n t i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f l e v e l s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n f a m i l y l i f e . T h a t i s , one may be o b l i g e d . . u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y t o obey an u p s t a n d i n g p a r e n t , b u t m o r a l l y e x c u s e d f r o m any o b l i g a t i o n t o w a r d s a d r u n k e n , v i o l e n t p a r e n t . The d i s t i n c t i o n between c l a s s i c a l and e g a l i t a r i a n c o n c e p t s o f c o n s e n t may be o f use i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f p a r t i c u l a r ' t h e o r i e s , ..but i t i s an a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n . T h i s c h a p t e r h a s shown t h a t t h e two c o n c e p t s a r e i n c o h e r e n t i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m e a c h o t h e r . The f i r s t s e c t i o n a r g u e d t h a t n e i t h e r c o n c e p t c a n s u f f i c e u n a i d e d t o d i s t i n g u i s h •and t o r a n k e x i s t i n g f o r m s o f g o v e r n m e n t . The s e c o n d s e c t i o n showed t h a t t h e e g a l i t a r i a n c o n c e p t l e a d s t o 82 a 'confusion between democracy and anarchy. I n t h i s s e c t i o n I have.argued t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to a r r i v e a t a t h e o r y o f consent w h i c h can e x p l a i n b o t h the r i g h t s and the the o b l i g a t i o n s o f the d e m o c r a t i c c i t i z e n . However, I have n o t e d o n l y ' t h e form and n o t the c o n t e n t o f such a t h e o r y . That i s , the argument s t a t e d t h a t the t h e o r y must be n o r m a t i v e o r t e l e o l o g i c a l , but i t d i d not i d e n t i f y the t e l o s t h a t a l e g i t i m a t e democracy must p u r s u e . For i t i s s u f f i c i e n t , when d i s c u s s i n g the l i m i t s o f the E m p i r i c a l and the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s , to show the n e c e s s i t y o f a n o n - p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y . 83 FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER THREE i F o r a summary o f t h e d e b a t e see C a r o l e Pateman, The P r o b l e m o f P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n (New Y o r k , 1979), c h a p t e r f i v e . 2 M o r r i s J a n o w i t z and Dwaine M a r v i c k , " C o m p e t e t i v e P r e s s u r e and D e m o c r a t i c C o n s e n t , " i n P o l i t i c a l B e h a v i o r , e d s . H e i n z E u l a u , Samuel J . E l d e r s v e l d , M o r r i s J a n o w i t z ( G l e n c o e , 111., 1 9 5 6 ) , 275-6, 284. 3 Pateman, P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , op. c i t . , 8 9 . 4 I b i d . , 87, 149, 154, 170. 5 I b i d . , 174. 5C.W. C a s s i n e l l i , The P o l i t i c s o f Freedom ( S e a t t l e , 1 9 6 1 ) , 86. 7 I b i d . ; P.H. P a r t r i d g e , C o n s e n t and C o n s e n s u s ( L o n d o n , 1971), 34-6. G e r a i n t P a r r y , P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n P o l i t i c s ( M a n c h e s t e r , 1 9 7 2 ) , 37. 9 J u l e s S t e i n b e r g , L o c k e , R o u s s e a u and t h e I d e a o f C o n s e n t ( W e s t p o r t , Conn., 1978), 117. 10 Pateman, P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , op. c i t . , 17. See a l s o A. P h i l l i p s G r i f f i t h s , "How Can One P e r s o n R e p r e s e n t A n o t h e r ? " I n P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , s u p p l e m e n t a r y v o l . 34 ( L o n d o n , 1960), 202. 11 See W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z , A p p r o a c h e s t o Democracy ( L o n d o n , 1 9 8 0 ) , 120. 12' Rene de V i s m e W i l l i a m s o n , "The C h a l l e n g e o f P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i v i s m , " J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c s , 9 (May 1 9 4 7 ) , 150. 13 Simon's t h e o r y o f a u t h o r i t y i s n o t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y ' p r e s e n t e d i n any one work. U s e f u l summaries may be f o u n d i n C l a r k e E. C o c h r a n ' s a r t i c l e s : " A u t h o r i t y and Community," 84 A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review 71 (June 1977), 546-558; " A u t h o r i t y and Freedom," I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 6 (May 1 9 7 7 ) , 107-124. 14 See C o c h r a n , " A u t h o r i t y and Freedom," op. c i t . , 110. 15 C o c h r a n , • " A u t h o r i t y and Community," op. c i t . , 551. 16 C o c h r a n , " A u t h o r i t y and Freedom," op. c i t . , 109. 17 f v e s Simon, P h i l o s o p h y o f D e m o c r a t i c Government, S e c o n d e d i t i o n ( C h i c a g o , 1961), 41-2. C i t e d by C o c h r a n , " A u t h o r i t y and Community," op. c i t . , 552. 18 I n h i s The T h e o r y o f D e m o c r a t i c E l i t i s m ( B o s t o n , 1 9 6 7 ) , 102, Bachrach e x t e n d s t h e t h e o r y o f d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d i e s : O b v i o u s l y G e n e r a l M o t o r s i s n o t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s g o v e r n m e n t . However, t h e r e i s a b a s i c s i m i l a r i t y between t h e two: t h e y b o t h a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y a l l o c a t e v a l u e s f o r t h e s o c i e t y . S i m i l a r l y , Pateman d e f e n d s p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy by r e f e r r i n g t o t h e a c h i e v e m e n t s o f worker-managed e n t e r p r i s e s i n Y u g o s l a v i a . See h e r P a r t i c i p a t i o n and  D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y (Cambridge 1 9 7 0 ) . 19 J.R. L u c a s , P r i n c i p l e s o f P o l i t i c s ( O x f o r d , 1966), 58. See a l s o h i s p. 289. 20 S t a n k i e w i c z , A p p r o a c h e s t o Democracy, op. c i t . , 13, 21 See R o b e r t M a c l v e r , The Ramparts We G a u r d (New Y o r k , 1950), 37: T h e r e i s one c o n c l u s i v e d i f f e r e n c e b etween p r i v a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and t h e g r e a t s t a t e . The s t a t e a l o n e h a s d i r e c t c o e r c i v e power o v e r men, i n c l u d i n g t h e members o f a l l o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 22 A.D. L i n d s a y , The Modern D e m o c r a t i c S t a t e ( O x f o r d 1 9 4 3 ) , 232-4. See a l s o A. J o h n Simmons, Mora1 P r i n c i p 1 e s and P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n ( P r i n c e t o n , N . J . , 1979), 79: Most o f us have n e v e r been f a c e d w i t h a s i t u a t i o n where e x p r e s s c o n s e n t t o a g o v e r n m e n t ' s a u t h o r i t y was a p p r o p r i a t e , l e t a l o n e a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m e d s u c h an a c t . 8 5 23 Lindsay;, Modern D e m o c r a t i c S t a t e , op. c i t . , 2 3 3 . 2 4 M a c l v e r , The Ramparts We G a u r d , op. c i t . , 4 8 . M a c l v e r ' s e m p h a s i s . 25 Hans K e l s e n , " F o u n d a t i o n s o f Democracy," i n P o l i -t i c a l T hought S i n c e World. War I I , e d . W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z (New Y o r k , 1 9 6 4 ) , 6 8 . See a l s o " G r i f f i t h s , "How Can One P e r s o n R e p r e s e n t A n o t h e r , " op. c i t . , 2 0 5 . ^ S i m m o n s , M o r a l P r i n c i p l e s , op. c i t . , 5 7 . 27 S t e i n b e r g n o t e s i n The I c t e a o f C o n s e n t , op. c i t . , 1 3 4 , t h a t c l a s s i c a l c o n s e n t t h e o r y i s e g a l i t a r i a n i n t h a t i t i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h l i m i t i n g the power o f a monarch, b u t n o t i n t h a t i t p o s i t s an e q u a l r i g h t f o r a l l c i t i z e n s t o w i t h h o l d c o n s e n t f r o m a monarch. As S t e i n b e r g a l s o p o i n t s o u t , t h e e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between c l a s s i c a l and modern c o n s e n t t h e o r i e s i s t h a t t h e l a t t e r p r e s u p p o s e s u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e w h i l e th e f o r m e r does n o t . 28 F o r t h e S o c i a l C o n t r a c t t h e o r i s t s , he s t a t e s , " f a r f r o m b e i n g a " t i t l e t o r u l e , c o n s e n t i s a r e n u n c i a t i o n o f t h e c l a i m t o r u l e . " I n The New E g a l i t a r i a n i s m , ed. D a v i d L. S c h a e f e r ( P o r t W a s h i n g t o n , N.Y., 1 9 7 9 ) , 6 5 - 6 . 29 See W i l l i a m H . . N e l s o n , On J u s t i f y i n g Democracy ( L o n d o n , 1 9 8 0 ) , 4 4 - 5 . S t a n k i e w i c z n o t e s , i n A p p r o a c h e s t o Democracy, op. c i t . , 1 6 5 , t h a t p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy means t h a t a l l c i t i z e n s become members o f the e s t a b l i s h m e n t " i n f a c t and s p i r i t , by a c t i n g as t h e e x i s t i n g members do." 3 0 C o c h r a n , " A u t h o r i t y and Freedom," op. c i t . , 1 1 9 . 3 1 C i t e d by C o c h r a n , i b i d . 3 2 Hannah P i t k i n , " O b l i g a t i o n and C o n s e n t , " A m e r i c a n  P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review 5 4 (December 1 9 6 5 ) , 9 9 0 - 9 9 9 . 33 I b i d . , 9 9 6 . 3 4 I b i d . 3 5 R o n a l d R o g o w s k i , "The O b l i g a t i o n s o f L i b e r a l i s m : Pateman on P a r t i c i p a t i n g and P r o m i s i n g , " E t h i c s 9 1 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 8 1 ) , 3 0 1 . 86 CHAPTER FOUR DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL EQUALITY Part One: Equality i n the Debate The dispute between the Empirical and the Participatory theorists concerns the extent to which Western democracies r e a l i z e e g a l i t a r i a n p o l i t i c a l i d e a l s . The- two schools agree that the id e a l democracy i s p l u r a l i s t , i n the sense 1 that the procedure accords a l l i n t e r e s t s equal legitimacy. They agree further that the democratic procedure requires the p a r t i c i p a t i o n and the consent of a l l i n t e r e s t s . However, empirical research on Western p o l i t i c a l procedures cannot succeed f u l l y . i n resolving the debate. A the o r e t i c a l commentary on the debate i s es s e n t i a l insofar as the• two schools d i f f e r i n t h e i r understanding of the e g a l i t a r i a n norms of democracy. Because they disagree about the l e v e l and the type of equality required by pluralism, p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and consent, the means to the resolution of the debate l i e s in the analysis of the p r i n c i p l e of p o l i t i c a l equality. The Empirical t h e o r i s t s consider a system to be p l u r a l i s t when a l l i n t e r e s t s face a roughly equal chance of a r t i c u l a t i o n and s a t i s f a c t i o n ; when, i n Dahl•s phrase, there i s po t e n t i a l i f not actual equal representation of in t e r e s t s . The Participatory t h e o r i s t s reply that the 87 formal r i g h t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n s a t i s f i e s the co n d i t i o n s of p l u r a l i s m only where a l l c i t i z e n s have the power to promote t h e i r i n t e r e s t s s u c c e s s f u l l y . P a r e n t i s t a t e s that "the a b i l i t y to convert p o t e n t i a l i t y i n t o a c t u a l i t y " must be equ a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d . 2 S i m i l a r l y , Bachrach c r i t i c i z e s L a s s w e l l f o r h i s view that access to power i n a democracy must be equal f o r a l l c i t i z e n s ; Bachrach proposes that 3 power i t s e l f must be equal f o r a l l . For these t h e o r i s t s democracy r e q u i r e s both equal p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s and equal p o l i t i c a l power. One way to d i s t i n g u i s h between these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of p l u r a l i s m i s by means of Jack L i v e l y ' s concepts of 4 prospective and r e t r o s p e c t i v e e q u a l i t y . The r i g h t to equal p a r t i c i p a t i o n may appear to be e g a l i t a r i a n when one looks forward at the prospects of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s i n decision-making. However, the r i g h t may seem quite inadequate by the c r i t e r i o n of the r e s u l t s of the procedure. The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s f i n d that some i n t e r e s t s remain c o n s i s t e n t l y unresolved i n Western s o c i e t i e s . The f i n d i n g leads them to broaden the e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e ; to include the s t i p u l a t i o n of equal p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . Without power, they argue, the p r i n c i p l e of equal op-p o r t u n i t y i s a "useless f o r m a l i t y " or a "hollow mockery," 5 l i k e the beggar's freedom to enter the R i t z . The P a r t i -c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s r e j e c t the p r i n c i p l e of prospective equality, on the grounds that i t i s of no value to him who i s unable to compete. 88 The two t y p e s o f e q u a l i t y c o r r e s p o n d t o d i s t i n c t f o r m s o f d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . From the p r i n c i p l e o f p r o s p e c t i v e e q u a l i t y the E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s d e r i v e t h e p r i n c i p l e o f m a j o r i t y r u l e . oThe m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e i s e g a l i t a r i a n i n t h a t r u l e by e i t h e r l e s s o r more t h a n 50% p l u s one o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e may i m p l y an u n e q u a l w e i g h t i n g o f v o t e s . 6 M a j o r i t y r u l e g u a r a n t e e s t o e a c h c i t i z e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o v o t e w i t h t h e r u l i n g m a j o r i t y ; i t d oes n o t , however, e n s u r e t h a t a l l v o t e s w i l l i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n s e q u a l l y . I n o r d e r t o p r e s e n t an e g a l i t a r i a n c r i t i q u e o f t h e m a j o r i t y p r i n c i p l e , t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s must a l t e r t h e e g a l i t a r i a n ' p r i n c i p l e by w h i c h t h e E m p i r i c a l t h e o r i s t s j u s t i f y i t . R e t r o s p e c t i v e e q u a l i t y o r e q u a l i t y o f outcome demands e q u a l s h a r i n g i n t h e r u l e ; t h i s r e q u i r e s i n t u r n t h e d i r e c t and c o n t i n u o u s p a r t i c i p a t i o n and c o n s e n t o f t h e g o v e r n e d . The E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s a g r e e t h a t a p o l i t i c a l p r o c e d u r e i s d e m o c r a t i c i f i t i s e g a l i t a r i a n , F o r them e q u a l i t y i s a s u f f i c i e n t n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e f o r d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . T h i s v i e w h a s two main i m p l i -c a t i o n s : i t i m p l i e s t h a t e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s o v e r r i d e c o m p e t i n g d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s , and i t i m p l i e s t h a t -p l u r a l i s m , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and c o n s e n t a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y j u s t i f i e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a r e e g a l i t a r i a n . An example o f a d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e o v e r r i d d e n by t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i s , as J.R. L u c a s n o t e s , t h e r i g h t t o d i s s e n t : i f e v e r y o n e i s t o p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y i n 89 the p o l i t i c a l process, everyone must be of one mind, and nobody may dissent from the p r e v a i l i n g opinion. I f people are to be free to be out of sympathy with pre-v a i l i n g opinion, they must be able to opt out of the higher l e v e l s of involvement, and s e t t l e for a low minimum of external conformity.^ Examples of alleged j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for the e g a l i -t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s have been seen in e a r l i e r chapters. For instance, the P a r t i c i p a t o r y theorists j u s t i f y p a r t i -c i p a t i o n by the p r i n c i p l e of equal p o l i t i c a l power. For Pateman the experience of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . . . leaves the i n d i v i d u a l better psychologically equipped to undertake further p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the f u t u r e . 8 Lipset j u s t i f i e s the p r i n c i p l e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n by that of government by consent: those who believe that democracy i s best served by a high l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n point to the fact that a democratic state, unlike... oligarchy, must depend on the consent of i t s c i t i z e n r y . The two schools i n the debate j u s t i f y one egalitarian, p r i n c i p l e by r e f e r r i n g to another. The main assumption of t h i s .exercise i s that p o l i t i c a l equality i s a s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n for any democratic p r i n c i p l e . The Empirical theorists d i f f e r from the P a r t i c i p a t o r y theorists in that they subscribe to a weaker p r i n c i p l e of p o l i t i c a l equality. However, John Charvet argues that both prospective and retrospective types of equality are properly regarded as strong. .For p o l i t i c a l prospects are equal only where the conditions that determine the 90 a b i l i t y o f c i t i z e n s t o e x p l o i t t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t i e s a r e 10 e q u a l . When i t i s t a k e n l i t e r a l l y , i n f a c t , the p r i n c i p l e o f p r o s p e c t i v e e q u a l i t y i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h any f o r m o f s o c i e t y . B e c a u s e c i t i z e n s v a r y i n t h e i r i n f l u e n c e o v e r o t h e r s , C h a r v e t p o i n t s o u t , p r o s p e c t i v e 11 e q u a l i t y c a n n o t p e r m i t dependence between c i t i z e n s . The p r i n c i p l e s o f e q u a l i t y i n t h e d e b a t e have i n common the f a c t t h a t t h e y o v e r r i d e o t h e r d e m o c r a t i c norms. F u r t h e r , n e i t h e r i s s e l f - e v i d e n t l y j u s t i f i a b l e as a p r i n c i p l e o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . P a r t Two: P o l i t i c a l E q u a l i t y as a Norm One p r o b l e m o f p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y i s t h a t e g a l i -t a r i a n - means may w e l l l e a d t o a n o n - e g a l i t a r i a n end. The P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s assume t h a t p l u r a l i s m , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and c o n s e n t w i l l s e c u r e i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y , o r c o n t r o l o v e r g o v e r n m e n t . However, t h e r e a r e many i n s t a n c e s where i n d i v i d u a l e f f i c a c y i s h i g h t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e a r e r e s t r i c t i o n s on p a r t i -c i p a t i o n . F o r i n s t a n c e , i n any l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n some s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s n e e d e d t o a c h i e v e c o n t r o l by members 12 o v e r h i g h e r l e v e l s . A.D. L i n d s a y p o i n t s o u t t h a t the e f f i c a c y o f c i t i z e n s i s low where power i s d e v o l v e d f r o m g o vernment t o t h e armed f o r c e s , and where t h e l a t t e r a r e r u n as p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a c i e s ; I t i s c o n t r o l o v e r a r m i e s t h a t i s d e s i r e d by most c i t i z e n s , L i n d s a y a r g u e s , and t o t h i s end one must l i m i t both the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the s o l d i e r in m i l i -13 tary command, and that of armies in government. Lindsay point i s relevent to the most common form of part i c i p a t o r y democratic theory: i t is. control over the unrestricted pursuit of p r o f i t that the Partic i p a t o r y theorists demand in t h e i r c r i t i q u e s of c a p i t a l i s t hierarchies, but i t i s unclear how they expect to secure t h i s control by maxi-mizing the norms of self-government. As Stankiewicz notes the r e a l danger i n the notion of p a r t i -cipatory democracy i s that i t i s an i n -d i r e c t attack on the controls we have 4 evolved to prevent the abuse of power. Clearly,, the Pa r t i c i p a t o r y theorists mean to exempt the sol d i e r , the c a p i t a l i s t , and a l l abusers of power when they c a l l f or equality, p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and consent. There i s thus a confusion i n the i r theories between the demand for a strong, i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t government, and the desire to subject t h i s power to l o c a l i z e d popular control. The tension between the e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s and indi v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y i s well i l l u s t r a t e d by Jane Mansbridge's research on small town democracies i n New England. Mansbridge establishes, f i r s t l y , that many c i t i z e n s of Selby, Vermont choose not to attend t h e i r town assembly. 1 6 As the Par t i c i p a t o r y theorists would predict, Mansbridge's subjects attribute t h e i r p o l i t i c a l .apathy to a -low sense of e f f i c a c y : they do not take part in meetings because they f e e l that they cannot influence them. However, the c i t i z e n s do not, asv:the Participatory 92 t h e o r i s t s m i g h t a l s o p r e d i c t , blame the h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e a s s e m b l y f o r t h e i r low p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y . R a t h e r , t h e y p o i n t t o s u c h p e r s o n a l t r a i t s as p o o r s p e a k i n g a b i l i t y , o r a s i m p l e d i s t a s t e f o r p o l i t i c s . F u r t h e r , t h e n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s o f S e l b y l a c k p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y b e c a u s e t h e y have no c h o i c e b u t t o be r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e more p o l i t i c a l l y e a g e r , and b e c a u s e t h e l a t t e r a r e n o t a c c o u n t a b l e f o r t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . As one c i t i z e n n o t e s , y o u c a n ' t v o t e t h e r a s c a l s o u t i f t h e y d o n ' t h o l d e l e c t i v e o f f i c e ; i n d e e d y o u c a n ' t t a k e any f o r m o f r e p r i s a l i f y o u d o n ' t know who t h e r a s c a l s a r e . A s an o u t s i d e r , i f y o u go t o town m e e t i n g y o u f e e l m a n i p u l a t e d b y ' t h o s e i n t h e know"; i f y o u d o n ' t go y o u seem t o have f o r f e i t e d y o u r r i g h t t o g r i p e . J u s t as t h e y assume t h a t e q u a l i t y i s t h e means t o w i d e s p r e a d p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y , t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t e g a l i t a r i a n measures l e a d t o a c o n s e n s u a l , c o h e s i v e s o c i e t y . However, e q u a l i t y c a n be a c a u s e o f s o c i a l d i v i s i o n . I n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e r e t r o s p e c t i v e e q u a l i t y g o v ernment must f a v o u r t h o s e who p r o v e c o n s i s t e n t l y u n a b l e t o b e n e f i t f r o m p r o s p e c t i v e e q u a l i t y . The p o l i c y known as r e v e r s e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o r a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n may be j u s t and e q u i t a b l e , b u t i t does t e n d t o i s o l a t e and t o a n t a g o n i z e g r o u p s where t h e r e i s no p r i o r s o c i e t a l c o n s e n s u s on t h e p o l i c y . As Benn s t a t e s , e q u a l i t y " c a n be e f f e c t i v e i n p u b l i c p o l i c y - m a k i n g . . . o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t agreement c a n be r e a c h e d on t h e 18 p r o p e r o r d e r o f p r i o r i t y o f human i n t e r e s t s . " W i t h o u t s u c h a c o n s e n s u s the d e m o c r a t i c r u l e o f law i s r e p l a c e d 19 by t h e law o f b a r g a i n i n g , and u l t i m a t e l y by a n a r c h y . E g a l i t a r i a n norms a r e d i v i s i v e i n t h a t t h e y l e a d t h e c i t i z e n t o v i e w c i v i l d i s o b e d i e n c e as an a s s e r t i o n o f h i s own a u t h o r i t y , r a t h e r t h a n as a r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t th e l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y o f o t h e r s . The d e f i n i t i o n o f democracy i n t e r m s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n and c o n s e n t i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r o l e o f t h e c i t i z e n i s t o a c c e p t o r t o r e j e c t g overnment on t h e b a s i s o f w h e t h e r i t p r o m o t e s h i s own, s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . Samuel H u n t i n g d o n f i n d s t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y o f g o v ernment d e c l i n e s as i t s a c t i v i t y i n c r e a s e s . I n t h e * l a t e 1950s t h r e e - q u a r t e r s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s e l e c t o r a t e b e l i e v e d t h a t g o v e r n m e n t was " r u n f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e p e o p l e . " By 1972 t h e p e r c e n t a g e a g r e e i n g w i t h t h i s p r o p o -20 s i t i o n had f a l l e n by a l m o s t h a l f . " F o r H u n t i n g d o n the c r i s i s o f modern democracy a r i s e s f r o m an i d e o l o g y o f . e g a l i t a r i a n i s m . The weakness o f t h e E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s does n o t l i e i n t h e i r i d e a l o f compromise and u n a n i m i t y , b u t r a t h e r i n t h e i r p r o p o s e d e g a l i t a r i a n means t o t h e s e e n d s . I n B e r l i n ' s t erm, the two s c h o o l s have " f o r t r e s s e d " t h e e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e w i t h p r i n c i p l e s , s u c h as i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r o l o v e r g o v e r n m e n t and s o c i a l 21 harmony, w h i c h a r e i n c i d e n t a l t o e q u a l i t y . J.R. L u c a s a r g u e s t h a t the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y i s o f t e n a s s i m i l a t e d t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l r e s p e c t f o r h u m a n i t y , w h i c h 2< c mmands us t o t r e a t a l l men as ends r a t h e r t h a n as means. For B e r l i n and Lucas equality cannot be a s u f f i c i e n t democratic p r i n c i p l e because i t presupposes other norms, such as respect for a l l individuals and s o c i e t a l consensus. S a r t o r i , Benn, and Peters describe equality as a 23 "negative" norm.• Although equality i s a v a l i d demo-c r a t i c norms, S a r t o r i argues, i t i s "not designed, as such, 24 to be converted into r e a l i t y . " It i s true of a l l norms that they may become less desirable at high levels of achievement, e i t h e r because of the claims of competing norms, or because of our f a m i l i a r i t y with thern. Negative norms d i f f e r in that* i f they are taken l i t e r a l l y , the outcome does not correspond to the aim. S a r t o r i 1 s example i s " a l l power to the people", which becomes transformed from a weapon against absolute power into i t s a n tithesis, a new absolutist p r i n c i p l e . Further examples have been noted in t h i s chapter: the participatory democracy in Selby leads to a form of e l i t i s m , and govern-ment by i n d i v i d u a l consent undermines s o c i e t a l control over armed forces and c a p i t a l i s t enterprises. A democratic p r i n c i p l e of equality must allow for and require reference to other democratic norms. For one t h e o r i s t democracy requires "the equality of men i n t h e i r 25 natural possession of certain inalienable r i g h t s . " Here equality i s desired only insofar as i t guarantees the universal r i g h t s of man; the p r i n c i p l e presupposes a theory of natural law. A second example states that only relevant differences between c i t i z e n s can j u s t i f y 95 u n e q u a l p o l i t i c a l t r e a t m e n t . 25 T h i s p r i n c i p l e i s i n s u f -f i c i e n t , i n t h e s e n s e meant by F l a t h a m , b e c a u s e i t h a s no p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s w i t h o u t a c a t a l o g u e o f r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s . I t d i f f e r s f r o m the p r i n c i p l e s o f p r o -s p e c t i v e and r e t r o s p e c t i v e e q u a l i t y i n t h a t i t demands c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f c i t i z e n s as i n d i v i d u a l s . I n P e n n o c k ' s p h r a s e , i t i m p l i e s t h a t c i t i z e n s i n a d e m o c r a c y a r e e q u a l "as s u b j e c t s - o f - e n d s , " o r i n t h a t e a c h i s an end 27 i n h i m s e l f . S i m i l a r l y , D o r o t h y Lee s t a t e s t h a t demo-c r a t i c e q u a l i t y r e q u i r e s " t h e r i g h t o f e a c h t o d e v e l o p 28 i n n e r p o t e n t i a l i t y and u n i q u e n e s s . " The l i t e r a l i n t e r e t a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y i m p l i e s t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democracy must make way f o r a s y s t e m o f d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i n d i v i d u a l c o n s e n t . However, i f we e x c l u d e p a r t i c i p a t i o n and c o n s e n t f r o m t h e h i e r a r c h y o f d e m o c r a t i c norms, we have no c r i t e r i a by w h i c h t o d i s t i n g u i s h d emocracy f r o m o t h e r f o r m s o f l e g i t i m a t e g o v e r n m e n t . As W i l l i a m s o n a r g u e s , we must t a k e e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s t o be " s e c o n d a r y and d e r i v a t i v e " among d e m o c r a t i c norms. F o r i f t h e y a r e " p r i m a r y and 29 o r i g i n a l " t h e y w i l l u n d e r m i n e o t h e r norms. The e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s c a n be d e m o c r a t i c o n l y b e c a u s e t h e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n — a e f f e c t , w r i t t e n o r t h a t p r e v e n t s t h e i p r i n c i p l e s . 3 ° r i s an o v e r r i d i n g c o n t r a c t , i n u n w r i t t e n — 1 b e i n g t h e o n l y The E m p i r i c a l and t h e P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s d i f f e r o v e r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y . 96 They a l s o d i f f e r o v e r the e m p i r i c a l - q u e s t i o n o f whether Western d e m o c r a c i e s f u l f i l l the c o n d i t i o n s o f the e g a l i -t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s o f p l u r a l i s m , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and c o n s e n t . However, they agree t h a t a s o c i e t y which does meet these c o n d i t i o n s i s d e m o c r a t i c ; f o r b o t h s c h o o l s p o l i t i c a l e q u a l i t y i s . a s u f f i c i e n t d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e . T h i s c h a p t e r has shown t h a t democracy i s d e f i n e d as a s e t o f norms which i n c l u d e s b o t h e g a l i t a r i a n and s u b s t a n t i v e o r n o n - p r o c e d u r a l norms. 97 o FOOTNOTES — CHAPTER FOUR See G i o v a n n i S a r t o r i , D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y ( D e t r o i t , 1 9 62), 270, f o o t n o t e 13: By ' p l u r a l i s m ' i s g e n e r a l l y meant t h a t t r e n d . o f t h o u g h t w h i c h o p p o s e s t h e t h e o r y o f t h e s o v e r e i g n t y o f t h e s t a t e i n o r d e r t o i n d i c a t e t h e e q u a l r i g h t o f a l l a s s o c i a t i o n s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t h e body p o l i t i c . As J a c q u e s M a r i t a i n and o t h e r s have shown, however, ' p l u r a l i s m ' d o e s n o t have t o be u s e d i n t h i s s e n s e . p M i c h a e l J . P a r e n t i , "Power ana P l u r a l i s m : A View f r o m t h e B o t t o m up," i n An End t o P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , e d s . M a r v i n S u r k i n , A l a n W o l f e (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 0 ) , 132. 3 P e t e r B a c h r a c h , The T h e o r y o f D e m o c r a t i c E l i t i s m ( B o s t o n , 1967), 84. 4 J a c k L i v e l y , Democracy ( O x f o r d , 1975), 16. 5 C o l i n W e l ch, " I n t e l l e c t u a l s Have C o n s e q u e n c e s , " i n The New E g a l i t a r i a n i s m , e d . D a v i d L. S c h a e f e r (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 9 ) , 118. 6 M i n o r i t y r u l e n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s an u n e q u a l w e i g h t i n g o f v o t e s o n l y i f one assumes t h a t p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s a r e r e l a t i v i s t s . J.R. L u c a s , The P r i n c i p l e s o f P o l i t i c s ( O x f o r d , 1966) , 321. Q C a r o l e Pateman, P a r t i c i p a t i o n and D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y ( C a m b r i d g e , 1 9 7 0 ) , 45. See a l s o , however, p. 107, where she a d m i t s t h a t " t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y o f w o r k e r s " m i g h t w e l l c h o o s e n o t t o t a k e p a r t i n a p a r t i c i p a t o r y s y s t e m . 9S.M. L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l Man ( G a r d e n C i t y , N.Y., 1963), 226. J o h n C h a r v e t , " E q u a l i t y as a S u b s t a n t i v e P r i n c i p l e o f S o c i e t y , " P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s 17 ( M a r c h 1969), 3-4. 11 x I b i d . 98 12 As W i l l i a m H. N e l s o n a r g u e s i n On J u s t i f y i n g  D e m o cracy (London, 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 47, i t may be p r e f e r a b l e t o h a v e c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o v e r some l e v e l s i n a h i e r a r c h y t h a n t o have some c o n t r o l o v e r many h i g h e r l e v e l s . 13 A.D. L i n d s a y , The Modern D e m o c r a t i c S t a t e ( O x f o r d , 1 9 4 3 ) , 283-4. 14 / W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z , A p p r o a c h e s t o Democracy (Lon d o n , 1 9 8 0 ) , 14n. 1 5 T . H . L o w i , The P o l i t i c s o f D i s o r d e r (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 1 ) , 67. - 16 Jane M a n s b r i d g e , "Town M e e t i n g Democracy," i n Dilemmas o f Democracy , e d . P e t e r C o l l i e r (New Y o r k , 1976), 157. I n S e l b y o n l y 25% o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e a t t e n d town m e e t i n g s , w h i l e a l m o s t 75% v o t e i n s t a t e e l e c t i o n s . l 7 I b i d . , 160. 18 S t a n l e y I . Benn, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m and t h e E q u a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f I n t e r e s t s , " I n E q u a l i t y , e d s . J.R. Pennock, J.W. Chapman (New Y o r k , 1967), 62. 19 L o w i , P o l i t i c s o f D i s o r d e r , op. c i t . , 78. 20 Samuel J . H u n t i n g d o n , "The U n i t e d S t a t e s , " i n The C r i s i s o f D e m o c r a c y , - e d s . M i c h a e l C r o z i e r ; Samuel P. H u n t i n g d o n ; and J o j i W a t a n u k i (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 5 ) , 78. 21 I s a i a h B e r l i n , " E q u a l i t y , " i n P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e  A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , v o l . 56 (Lond o n , 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 304: Some i n e q u a l i t i e s (say-, t h o s e b a s e d on b i r t h ) a r e condemned as a r b i t r a r y and i r -r a t i o n a l , o t h e r s ( s a y , t h o s e b a s e d on e f -f i c i e n c y ) a r e n o t , w h i c h seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t v a l u e s o t h e r t h a n e q u a l i t y f o r i t s own sake a f f e c t the i d e a l s e v e n o f p a s s i o n a t e e g a l i t a r i a n s . 22 J.R. L u c a s , " A g a i n s t E q u a l i t y , " P h i l o s o p h y 40 ( O c t o b e r , 1 9 6 5 ) , 298. 23 F o r S a r t o r i i n D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y ,op. c i t . , 327, e q u a l i t y i s n e g a t i v e i n t h a t i t i s a ' " p r o t e s t - i d e a l . " S t a n l e y ! . Benn and R.S. P e t e r s , S o c i a l - P r i n c i p l e s and t h e  D e m o c r a t i c S t a t e ( L o n d o n , 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 114, c l a i m t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y i s " a l w a y s n e g a t i v e , d e n y i n g 99 t h e p r o p r i e t y o f c e r t a i n e x i s t i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s . " See a l s o t h e i r p. 126. See a l s o D o r o t h y Lee, " E q u a l i t y o f O p p o r t u n i t y a s a ' C u l t u r a l V a l u e , " i n A s p e c t s o f E q u a l i t y , ed. Lymon B r y s o n (New Y o r k , 1 9 5 6 ) , 256: " E q u a l i t y i s a n e c e s s a r y s t e p i n t h e a b o l i t i o n o f t h e i l l s o f i n e q u a l i t y . . . i t c a n n o t go b e y o n d t h i s . " 24 S a r t o r i , D e m o c r a t i c T h e o r y , op. c i t . , 64. 25 R o b e r t F. S a s s e e n , "'Remedies' f o r I n e q u a l i t y , " i n The New E g a l i t a r i a n i s m , e d . D a v i d L. S c h a e f e r (New Y o r k , 1 9 7 9 ) , 189. 26 Benn, " E g a l i t a r i a n i s m , " op. c i t . , 67, s t a t e s : "Where t h e r e i s a ' r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e " between two c a s e s " t h e r e i s a ' r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d f o r t r e a t i n g them d i f f e r e n t l y . " See a l s o Benn and P e t e r s , S o c i a l P r i n c i p l e s , op. c i t . , I l l : "none s h a l l be h e l d t o have a - c l a i m t o b e t t e r t r e a t m e n t than- a n o t h e r , i n a d v a n c e o f g ood r e a s o n s b e i n g p r o d u c e d . " 2 7 J.R. Pennock, L i b e r a l Democracy (New Y o r k , 1950), 85. 2 8 L e e , " E q u a l i t y o f O p p o r t u n i t y , " op. c i t . , 262. F o r J.R. L u c a s , " A g a i n s t E q u a l i t y , " op. c i t . , 301, "we must r e p l a c e c o n t r o v e r s y a b o u t E q u a l i t y by d e t a i l e d a r guments a b o u t c r i t e r i a o f r e l e v a n c e . " H i s e m p h a s i s . W i t h o u t s u c h c r i t e r i a t h e e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e i s , as B e r l i n p u t s i t i n " E q u a l i t y , " op. c i t . , 303, no more t h a n a t r i v i a l t a u t o l o g y . 29 Rene de V i s m e W i l l i a m s o n , "The C h a l l e n g e o f P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i v i s m , " J o u r n a l o f . • • P o l i t i c s 9 (May 1 9 4 7 ) , 158. 30 W.J. S t a n k i e w i c z , A p p r o a c h e s t o Democracy, op. c i t . , 173. 100 CONCLUSION The Empirical and the Partici p a t o r y theorists both define democracy as a set of decision-making procedures. For both schools the task of the democratic theorist i s to describe behaviour and to make recommendations in terms of procedural norms. Democratic c i t i z e n s pursue a sense of p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y or power, and the theorist c a l l s for pluralism, p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and consent. One implication of procedural theory i s that the normative p r i n c i p l e s of the common good, natural law and p o l i t i c a l sovereignty are of inte r e s t to the h i s t o r i a n of ideas only, and not to the student of modern democracies. A defence of c l a s s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s presupposes a c r i t i q u e of the shared assumptions of the Empirical and the Par t i c i p a t o r y schools. This study has i d e n t i f i e d the main shared assumption as relativism. The Empirical theorists subscribe to a customary re l a t i v i s m . For them what i s , i s r i g h t . Thus, the voting studies take the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of existing democracies to those of the i d e a l democracy. The Par t i c i p a t o r y theorists reject empirical theory for i t s l o g i c a l error in assuming that facts (e.g. c i t i z e n s do not pa r t i c i p a t e widely in democracies) can contradict a normative theory ( c i t i z e n s ought to p a r t i c i p a t e in democracy). However, i t does not follow that the par t i c i p a t o r y theory i s a normative one. Normative theory deals with the relationship between norms; the pa r t i c i p a t o r y theory attempts to maximize the 101 e g a l i t a r i a n norms without considering their compatibility with other norms. Participatory theories do not even demonstrate that t h e i r system i s compatible with a s o c i a l order. The theories belong to the desire school of relativism; they equate the.right with that which i s desired. Theirs 2 i s a "misbegotten and u n r e a l i s t i c normativism." The debate .between the two schools concerns the implications of equality and the w i l l to power as democratic norms. The Empirical theorists i n f e r from these norms that a 'democratic r e s u l t i s possible only -where society i s wholly organized into interest-groups. . The Participatory theorists show that there are i n e q u a l i t i e s between "and within interest-groups, and that certain interests are not represented by exi s t i n g groups. These theorists interpret the norms of equality and the w i l l to power to imply that democracy requires face-to-face decision-making based on the p r i n c i p l e of unanimity. Although t h i s procedure i s very d i f f e r e n t to interest-group pluralism, both follow from the same set of r e l a t i v i s t premises. For both the Empirical and the Participatory theorists government responds only to the active, and c i t i z e n s consent only where t h e i r private interests p r e v a i l . Both schools agree further that democracies are either e l i t i s t or e g a l i t a r i a n , depending on whether power i s r e s t r i c t e d or dispersed. The c r i t i q u e of the debate must i d e n t i f y points of tension between the norms of equality and the w i l l to power. 102 We have seen t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a form o f d e c i s i o n -making i n S e l b y e x c l u d e s both the d i s s e n t e r s and those u n s u i t e d to p o l i t i c s . S i m i l a r l y , we have seen t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s o f p r o c e d u r a l consensus and government by i n d i v i d u a l c o n s e n t b i n d the c i t i z e n to government, p r e c l u d i n g i n d i v i d u a l d i s s e n t . S i n c e e g a l i t a r i a n measures may undermine the i n d i v i d u a l ' s sense o f e f f i c a c y , e q u a l i t y and the p u r s u i t o f p o l i t i c a l e f f i c a c y cannot be a " c o n c e p t u a l framework i n t o w hich a l l the norms 3 w i t h i n the s o c i e t y must f i t . " R e f e r e n c e to n o n - p r o c e d u r a l o r s u b s t a n t i v e norms i s r e q u i r e d f o r the coherence o f the e m p i r i c a l and the p a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i e s . The p r i n c i p l e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p resupposes the s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t o n l y r a t i o n a l and l e g i t i m a t e groups and i n d i v i d u a l s have e q u a l r i g h t s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n . P r o c e d u r a l consensus i s an adequate c o n d i t i o n o f democracy o n l y where t h e r e i s an u n d e r l y i n g n o r m a t i v e consensus, and where the p r o c e d u r e i s j u s t . The p r i n c i p l e s o f p l u r a l i s m and government by c o n s e n t must be supplemented by those o f s o c i a l o r d e r and the p u b l i c good. For w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , the p r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e s i m p l y t h a t democracy i s i d e n t i c a l to a narchy. T h i s study has n o t e d some p o s s i b l e a r e a s o f a debate between r e l a t i v i s t and n o r m a t i v i s t t h e o r i s t s . For example, F r i e d r i c h and K e l s e n argue t h a t the c o n t e n t o f n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s cannot be d e c i d e d d e m o c r a t i c a l l y ; f o r them the 103 common good must be the outcome o f d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n -making. The problem w i t h the n o r m a t i v e approach i s t h a t t h e r e i s a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between democracy and the p r i n c i p l e s o f e q u a l i t y and i n d i v i d u a l i s m , but no such r e l a t i o n s h i p between democracy and the s u b s t a n t i v e c o n c e p t s o f the common good and n a t u r a l law. However, any s e r i o u s attempt to d i s t i n g u i s h , to rank , and to j u s t i f y e x i s t i n g d emocracies must show t h a t t h e r e i s some l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n -between the two. D e s p i t e t h e i r commitment to democracy, n e i t h e r the E m p i r i c a l n o r the P a r t i c i p a t o r y t h e o r i s t s o f f e r a c o n v i n c i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the system. 104 FOOTNOTES — CONCLUSION Many p a r t i c i p a t o r y c r i t i q u e s make t h e p o i n t . 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