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Reason, virtue and politics, David Hume and the classical republican tradition Neville, Robert Charles 1984

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REASON, VIRTUE AND POLITICS: DAVID HUME AND THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION By ROBERT CHARLES NEVILLE B.A. (Hons) Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y , 1979 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of H i s t o r y We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1984 © R o b e r t C h a r l e s N e v i l l e , 19 84 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head o f my department o r by h i s o r her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f H i s t o r y  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 7 DE-6 (3/81) ABSTRACT The r e l a t i o n between David Hume's p o l i t i c a l ideas and the formal p h i l o s o p h i c a l s t r u c t u r e s of Book I of h i s T r e a t i s e i s an area of long-standing d i f f i c u l t y i n the world of Hume s t u d i e s . S i m i l a r l y , the r e l a t i o n between Hume's work as a whole and the general t r a d i t i o n of 18th century p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g has proven d i f f i c u l t to c h a r a c t e r i s e . In p a r t i c u l a r , i t has not been easy to f i n d systematic connections between Hume's p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g and those of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n s , the t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e to which Hume's p o l i t i c a l works d i s p l a y the most obvious connections. In an e f f o r t t o sol v e t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , and i n the absence of such connections, James Moore has argued that we ought to co n s i d e r Hume as ou t s i d e of the r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n , p r i n c i p a l l y because he abandoned the c e n t r a l r e p u b l i c a n n o t i o n of v i r t u e i n h i s p o l i t i c s . T h i s t h e s i s argues that Moore i s mistaken i n t h i s , and f o r two reasons. F i r s t , that he, with o t h e r s , has misunderstood the nature of r e p u b l i c a n v i r t u e . T h i s v i r t u e was not i d e n t i c a l with p o l i t i c a l independence, as i s widely supposed, but a c t u a l l y c o n s i s t e d of an a b i l i t y to e x e r c i s e d i s i n t e r e s t e d reason i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Second, that Hume's philosophy, c o n t r a r y to an almost u n i v e r s a l o p i n i o n , made c e n t r a l the o p e r a t i o n and p r o t e c t i o n of d i s i n t e r e s t e d reason i n the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . The d i s c o v e r y of the c e n t r a l i t y of a s i m i l a r form of reason i n both Hume and i n the c l a s s i a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n allows the connections between the i i two to be seen with much great c l a r i t y . I t w i l l be shown, then, that the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n was marked by a s t r u c t u r e which made the e x e r c i s e of reason the s i n e qua non of a s t a b l e r e p u b l i c . And i t w i l l be shown that a widely h e l d view of Hume's philosophy i s i n c o r r e c t : Hume d i d b e l i e v e that reason c o u l d i n f l u e n c e both b e l i e f and the pa s s i o n s . In the T r e a t i s e Hume d e s c r i b e d how a very p a r t i c u l a r and important kind of reason, the n a t u r a l consequence of h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s , c o u l d overcome human passi o n and i n t e r e s t . Hume's d e s c r i b e d the formation and maintenance of c i v i l s o c i e t y as the d i r e c t consequence of c e r -t a i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t s . He saw the s t r u c t u r e s of government as e x t e r n a l p a r t s of a s o c i a l reasoning p r o c e s s . They served to prevent i n e v i t a b l e f a i l u r e s i n i n d i v i d u a l v i r t u e from r u i n i n g c i v i l s o c i e t y and to provide f o r the e x i s t e n c e i n s o c i e t y of i n d i v i d u a l s who co u l d administer laws i n freedom from s e l f i n t e r e s t . Hume's psychology and epistemology can thus be seen to penetrate to the core of h i s p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s . The kind of reason supported by Hume's philosophy shows deep a f f i n i t i e s with that r e q u i r e d by the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n . A r e c o g n i t i o n of the importance of reason i n Hume's p o l i t i c a l thought al l o w s us to see more c l e a r l y the nature of h i s r e a c t i o n to an an c i e n t t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i I. INTRODUCTION 1 1 . APOLOGY 1 2. POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE 18TH CENTURY 1 3. THE DIFFICULT RELATION BETWEEN HUME'S POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS 2 4. THE OBJECT OF THIS THESIS 3 5. SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT IS TO BE DONE . . 4 I I . THE TROUBLE WITH HUME: THE RELATION OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS IN THE LITERATURE 7 1. GIVING UP ON HUME: POCOCK AND FORBES 10 2. NOT GIVING UP ON HUME: HIRSCHMAN, JONES AND MILLER 15 3. MORE HUME IN CONTEXT: JAMES MOORE AND CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM 23 4. SUMMARY 26 I I I . THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION: ITS HISTORY, IMPORTANCE AND LOGICAL STRUCTURE 27 1. WHAT IS THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION? WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO HUME? 27 2. THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLASSICAL REPUBLIC 29 3. SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITISH REPUBLICANISM 44 IV. A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: DAVID HUME'S EPISTEMOLOGY FOR POLITICS 55 1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATISE 55 2. HUME'S PROJECT IN THE TREATISE; AN OUTLINE OF THE TREATISE 57 V. CONCLUSION: DAVID HUME IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 1 01 1. DAVID HUME AND THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION 101 2. SUMMARY OF WHAT HAS BEEN SHOWN 109 3. DAVID HUME'S PLACE IN 18TH CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT 111 V I . BIBLIOGRAPHY 113 1 . BACKGROUND MATERIAL 113 2. DAVID HUME 115 3. THE CLASSIAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION 117 4. DAVID HUME'S WORKS 118 v T h i s t h e s i s i s d e d i c a t e d with love and thanks to I n g r i d v i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A number of people were of great a s s i s t a n c e t o me i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s and I want t o thank them warmly. Ed Hundert, my a d v i s o r , was a model of pa t i e n c e and encouragement: h i s p e n e t r a t i n g q u e s t i o n s , from the beginning to the end of the p r o j e c t , opened up much of what became i n t e r e s t i n g f o r me i n i t . Douglas Wilson, f o r h i s s i n s , found himself deeply i n v o l v e d i n the l a s t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n : what coherence t h i s work possesses i s owing almost e n t i r e l y t o h i s e d i t i n g s k i l l s . He a l s o d i d a great deal of onerous work i n the computer fo r m a t t i n g and p r i n t o u t of the f i n a l v e r s i o n . My wife, I n g r i d Hennig, i n a d d i t i o n t o demonstrating a wholly unreasonable amount of t o l e r a n c e f o r such a long endeavor, provided ongoing support and encouragement. Without her help I c o u l d never have f i n i s h e d i t . She a l s o p r o o f r e a d with great p a t i e n c e , f i n d i n g numerous e r r o r s of s t y l e , sense and s p e l l i n g . I a l s o want t o thank my f a t h e r , C h a r l e s N e v i l l e , f o r h i s c a r e f u l c o r r e c t i o n of the f i n a l p r o o f s . F i n a l l y , I want t o thank John Hutchinson, who was not i n v o l v e d d i r e c t l y i n t h i s p r o j e c t , but whose seminars at Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y f i r s t i n s p i r e d my i n t e r e s t i n the h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l thought. v i i I . INTRODUCTION U_ APOLOGY Co n s i d e r i n g the s i z e of the Hume b i b l i o g r a p h y some apology f o r yet another study must s u r e l y be made. And so I make i t ; and those who have had enough of Hume may stay away. There i s , however, a great deal l e f t to understand. Our i n c r e a s i n g knowledge of the i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y of the 18th century opens ever new doors to the understanding of i t s w r i t e r s . T h i s study w i l l look a b i t f u r t h e r , and I hope a b i t b e t t e r , i n t o some doors that have r e c e n t l y been opened. 2^ POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE 18TH CENTURY The e a r l y years of the 18th century were marked, i n B r i t a i n p a r t i c u l a r l y , by heated p o l i t i c a l debate. T h i s was not merely debate on p o l i c y but r a t h e r debate on the fundamental p h i l o s o p h i c a l bases of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . I t i s now c l e a r that c e r t a i n r e c e i v e d p r i n c i p l e s of p o l i t i c s , many of which d e r i v e d from the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n , were coming i n t o ques-t i o n . P o l i t i c s was i n some kind of c r i s i s ; and a number of attempts were made by important p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r s to r e s o l v e i t : Montesquieu's De 1 ' E s p r i t des L o i s (1748) i s perhaps the most famous of the attempts to r e c o n c i l e the o l d and new ide a s . 1 But r e c o n c i l i a t i o n was not the path t h i n g s were to take. By the l a s t decades of the century most t r a c e s of the an c i e n t vocabulary of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n s had disappeared from the mainstream of p o l i t i c a l debate. The w r i t i n g s of Adam Smith and the school of p o l i t i c a l economy o f f e r e d a r e c o g n i z a b l y new vocabulary f o r the a n a l y s i s of l i f e i n s o c i e t y . David Hume i s g e n e r a l l y acknowledged to be one of the important p o l i t i c a l w r i t e r s of h i s time, and yet i t remains d i f f i c u l t to come to an assessment of h i s pl a c e i n the s t o r y we have sketched. He has been seen v a r i o u s l y as a r e c r e a t o r of o l d e r models of p o l i t i c s and a pr e c u r s o r of 19th century t h e o r i e s . Some more recent s t u d i e s have t r i e d to place him i n the context of the conceptual c r i s i s of c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i d e a s . 3. THE DIFFICULT RELATION BETWEEN HUME'S POLITICAL AND  PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS Hume began h i s work as a w r i t e r with a massive T r e a t i s e which announced the r e s u l t s of the a p p l i c a t i o n of experimental reasoning to moral s u b j e c t s . T h i s T r e a t i s e begins with a comprehensive a n a l y s i s of human psychology, f o l l o w s i t with a r e l a t e d theory of pass i o n s and the w i l l , and concludes with a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of moral and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The r e l a t i o n of these p a r t s has been a t r a d i t i o n a l problem i n Hume s t u d i e s . The c e n t r a l problem, i n my view, has been that the understanding of the r o l e of reason i n human a f f a i r s which u s u a l l y comes out of the f i r s t p art of the T r e a t i s e , seems to f i t very p o o r l y with 2 the kind of reason Hume uses i n the a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c s . In a d d i t i o n i t has not been easy to see systematic r e l a t i o n s be-tween the T r e a t i s e and the l a t e r p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s of Hume. 4^ THE OBJECT OF THIS THESIS (a) A NEW ANGLE ON THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION. The work that f o l l o w s w i l l attempt to shed some l i g h t on these problems. I w i l l present an a n a l y s i s of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n theory of government which w i l l s t r e s s two elements not much s t r e s s e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e : the pl a c e of reason i n the t r a d i t i o n and the s o c i a l nature of the support r e q u i r e d f o r that reason. C l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n theory i d e n t i f i e d the c i v i c v i r t u e necessary f o r p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y with d i s i n t e r e s t e d reason. T h i s reason depended on the independence of c i t i z e n s . In the view of many 18th century p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s the r i s e of commerce threatened the a v a i l a b i l i t y of such reason and thus the foundations of r e p u b l i c a n i s m . (b) A NEW ANGLE ON THE RELATION OF HUME'S PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS. Contrary to a w i d e l y - h e l d b e l i e f about Hume's philosophy, he d i d not hold that reason c o u l d have no i n f l u e n c e on human pa s s i o n s . The T r e a t i s e , i n f a c t , o f f e r s an e l a b o r a t e a n a l y s i s of how reason c o u l d a f f e c t b e l i e f and i t s e l f s t i m u l a t e p a s s i o n s . Because d i s t a n c e i n time d i m i n i s h e s passions but not reason, i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r reason to c r e a t e , through f o r e s i g h t , s o c i a l and 3 p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to p r o t e c t the i n d i v i d u a l from the consequences of immediate p a s s i o n . F o r e s i g h t e d c i t i z e n s c o u l d c r e a t e and s u s t a i n i n s t i t u t i o n s to support d i s i n t e r e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s as a r e s e r v o i r of p u b l i c v i r t u e . With t h i s understanding of the r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n and of Hume's p h i l o s o p h i c a l system i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e to demonstrate the a f f i n i t i e s between the two. I t w i l l be argued that the s i m i l a r i t i e s are such that i t i s s e n s i b l e to view the goal of Hume's T r e a t i s e as the p r o v i s i o n of 18th century p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundations f o r a r e c o g n i z a b l y c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n p o l i t i c a l theory. Such a view w i l l , i n t u r n , allow us to make some improved s p e c u l a t i o n s as to Hume's p l a c e i n the p o l i t i c a l thought of the 18th century. 5^ SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT IS TO BE DONE One of the premises of the work which f o l l o w s i s that the search f o r i n t e r n a l meaning and c o n s i s t e n c y i n Hume has s u f f e r e d from lac k of s u i t a b l e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t . T h i s t h e s i s thus treads i n the f o o t s t e p s of some recent s t u d i e s , to be d i s c u s s e d , which t r y to f i n d usable c o n t e x t . In doing so, as we s h a l l see, these s t u d i e s do not shy away from the assessment of Hume's philosophy on a t e c h n i c a l l e v e l , but ra t h e r attempt to add t e c h n i c a l understanding to h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t . The argument that f o l l o w s uses our r e l a t i v e l y new under-standing of one of the p o l i t i c a l v o c a b u l a r i e s i n h e r i t e d by. Hume's generat i o n to throw some l i g h t on the meaning of h i s work 4 and i n p a r t i c u l a r to i l l u m i n a t e the r e l a t i o n between h i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , p s y c h o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g s . The burden of t h i s t h e s i s , then, l i e s not i n the d i s c o v e r y of new th i n g s i n Hume or new i n f l u e n c e s on him, but rat h e r i n a r e - t h i n k i n g of the r e l a t i o n s between p a r t s of h i s work i n the l i g h t of a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n . There i s no c l a i m i m p l i c i t i n t h i s that the r e l a t i o n s r e v e a l e d provide a unique road to the understanding of Hume. The nature of recent work of Hume suggests that some f u t u r e d e f i n i t i v e study of Hume w i l l succeed by t r a c i n g the paths of many v o c a b u l a r i e s and t r a d i t i o n s though h i s work. It w i l l be argued that Hume's work l a i d new p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundations f o r o l d p o l i t i c a l wisdom. Although Hume's attempt to do t h i s was q u i t e o r i g i n a l , the idea of doing i t was very much i n the a i r . The n o t o r i o u s Dr. Man d e v i l l e had, i n the preceding g e n e r a t i o n , d e r i v e d much about p o l i t i c s from a much l e s s formal i n v e s t i g a t i o n of human psychology. Hume's g r e a t e s t contemporary, Montesquieu, delved deep i n t o the foundations of p o l i t i c s i n the i n d i v i d u a l psychology of human m o t i v a t i o n . Many other examples c o u l d be r a i s e d . E i g hteenth-century century p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s f e l t much disposed to seek new, more s c i e n t i f i c , foundations f o r p o l i t i c a l theory, and Hume was with them. T h i s t h e s i s has as i t s goal a b e t t e r understanding of the foundations Hume l a i d and with i t a b e t t e r understanding of h i s o v e r a l l system of thought. 5 To understand 18th century p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s we must be prepared, as they q u i t e n a t u r a l l y were, to t h i n k of psychology, economics, epistemology, p o l i t i c s and more, as part of a seamless f a b r i c . To begin with a d i s s e c t i o n of the psychology of b e l i e f , and conclude with an assessment of the r i g h t s of men to oppose a u t h o r i t y , seems a longer journey to us than i t d i d to them. The u n w i l l i n g n e s s to f o l l o w such journeys has l e a d to the s p l i n t e r i n g of our h i s t o r i c a l p i c t u r e of David Hume. The work that f o l l o w s w i l l attempt to look at h i s psychology and h i s p o l i t i c a l w r i t i n g as pa r t of a u n i f i e d argument. I t w i l l a l s o t r y to assess the c o n c l u s i o n of that argument i n the l i g h t of the conceptual problems Hume and other 18th century p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s had to f a c e . In so doing, i t i s hoped that some idea of Hume's r e a l purpose w i l l emerge, and with i t , some b e t t e r sense of the meaning of h i s work i n the context of 18th century p o l i t i c s . 6 I I . THE TROUBLE WITH HUME: THE RELATION OF HUME'S PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS IN THE LITERATURE. David Hume continues to be one of the most widely s t u d i e d f i g u r e s of the 18th century. Members of many d i s c i p l i n e s f i n d him i n t e r e s t i n g ; books and papers on him appear at a b e w i l d e r i n g r a t e . But for a l l the a t t e n t i o n - or perhaps because of i t - he remains something of an enigma. We seem to f i n d a d i f f e r e n t Hume i n each d i s c i p l i n e , and even i n each gene r a t i o n of s c h o l a r s h i p . Hume has become - l i k e P l a t o , Marx, M a c h i a v e l l i , and other g i a n t f i g u r e s of the western i n t e l l e c t u a l h e r i t a g e -more of a token than a f i g u r e of h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y , and a token changing i n value from hand to hand. There i s nothing wrong with t h i s i n i t s e l f . The many i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Hume's l i f e and work give credence to h i s s t a t u s as one of the important t h i n k e r s of our t r a d i t i o n . In Hume's case, however, the r e s u l t has been an unu s u a l l y d i s i n t e g r a t e d p i c t u r e . Part of the blame for t h i s must r e s t on h i s own shoul d e r s : Hume favoured an i r o n i c and i n d i r e c t s t y l e which can be made to support widely incompatible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . But perhaps more blame should l i e with a l e s s - t h a n - r i g o r o u s t r a d i t i o n of Hume s t u d i e s . Beginning i n Hume's own time, c r i t i c s have seemed more-than-usually w i l l i n g to base g l o b a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Hume on mere fragments of h i s 7 work. 1 Sometimes t h i s has gone very f a r indeed: as we s h a l l see, the r e c e i v e d view of a c e n t r a l n o t i o n i n Hume's work r e s t s on paragraphs of the T r e a t i s e which are very e x p l i c i t l y m o d ified w i t h i n the very page or s e c t i o n ! More o f t e n however, the s e l e c t i o n process has i n v o l v e d l o o k i n g at one l a r g e part of Hume's work without much ref e r e n c e to ot h e r s . E p i s t e m o l o g i s t s , q u i t e n a t u r a l l y , r a r e l y look beyond Book I of the T r e a t i s e ; while p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , i f they look at the T r e a t i s e at a l l , u s u a l l y r e f e r only t o p a r t s of Book I I I . What f o l l o w s i s an attempt at the r e - i n t e g r a t i o n of a par t of Hume's s c a t t e r e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l persona. There i s no imp l i e d suggestion that such i n t e g r a t i o n i s easy: the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n reading and understanding Hume are r e a l . 2 But the attempt i s important, and p a r t i c u l a r l y so f o r h i s t o r i a n s : the general l a c k of agreement on the nature of Hume's p r o j e c t has meant t h a t , while h i s importance i s almost u n i v e r s a l l y acknowledged, the p r e c i s e nature of h i s r o l e i n the h i s t o r y of 18th century thought continues to appear profoundly ambiguous. T h i s t h e s i s w i l l make, of course, no attempt to present a f u l l y u n i f i e d p i c t u r e of Hume's work i n the complete context of 'See, f o r example, the account of Reid's a t t a c k on Hume given by F r e d e r i c k Copleston i n A H i s t o r y of Philosophy, Garden C i t y , New York, Image Books, 1964. V o l . 5. 2 F o r a recent account of the extent to which Hume s c h o l a r s d i s a g r e e see Yalden-Thomson's "Recent Work on Hume", American  P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 20, No. 1, January, 1983. p. 1. The s i z e of the Hume l i t e r a t u r e i s almost i n c r e d i b l e and the extent of disagreement about the v a l i d i t y and meaning of h i s work p r o v i d e s ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r new s y n t h e t i c s t u d i e s . 8 18th century l i t e r a t u r e . Such a p r o j e c t - the all-encompassing "Mind of David Hume" e n v i s i o n e d by Ernest Mossner - i s s t i l l not p o s s i b l e and would i n any case l i e w e l l beyond the range of any Master's t h e s i s . 3 And yet c e r t a i n recent s t u d i e s of Hume begin to suggest how i t might one day be p o s s i b l e . The common fea t u r e of these s t u d i e s i s that they do not conc e n t r a t e e x c l u s i v e l y on the i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s of Hume's works or on h i s p l a c e i n the t r a d i t i o n a l t r i n i t y of B r i t i s h empiricism - Locke, Berkeley and Hume as has been the tendency of p h i l o s o p h e r s , such as Ayer, Copleston, Bennett or Passmore. Ne i t h e r do they r e s t r i c t t h e i r focus to connections ( l i g h t l y rooted i n a systematic understand-ing of Hume's philosophy) between Hume and other w r i t e r s and t r a d i t i o n s - the n a t u r a l tendency of i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r i a n s such as Gay, Hirschman, Pocock or Mossner h i m s e l f . What they do i s to c a r r y h i s t o r i c a l context - C i c e r o n i a n humanism, the t r a d i t i o n of n a t u r a l law, c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m , or the l i k e -i n t o the i n t e r n a l a n a l y s i s of Hume's work, using i t as a t o o l f o r the assessment of Hume's i n t e n t i o n s . T h i s i s not such a s t a r t l i n g idea i n i t s e l f ; and many works on Hume, e s p e c i a l l y from p h i l o s o p h e r s , have do u b t l e s s been w r i t -ten i n the b e l i e f that t h i s i s what was being done. But the a r t i f i c i a l boundaries of academia have, on the whole, allowed p h i l o s o p h e r s to assess Hume's work without r e f e r e n c e to an i n c r e a s i n g l y r i c h h i s t o r i c a l understanding of the 18th century 3 F o r Mossner's dream, see Ernest Campbell Mossner, The L i f e of  David Hume, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1980, p . v i i . 9 i n t e l l e c t u a l world. T h i s has allowed an e x c e s s i v e surety i n the understanding of Hume's general areas of concern. But even w i t h i n the boundaries of t h i s reduced context p h i l o s o p h e r s have not g e n e r a l l y been able to reach any r e c e i v e d agreement on the meaning of Hume's work. John Wright, f o r example, begins h i s recent study of Hume's p h i l o s o p h i c a l system with these words: "A b r i e f look at the competing present-day i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Hume's philosophy w i l l leave the u n i n i t i a t e d reader completely b a f f l e d ... the main competing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of h i s philosophy appear to be e n t i r e l y incompatible."" In s p i t e of much v a l u a b l e work the p h i l o s o p h i c a l community has thus no great reason to r e j o i c e i n the f r u i t s of t h e i r Humean l a b o u r s . I t seems n a t u r a l to suggest that an escape from t h i s impasse might w e l l l i e i n the expansion of the h i s t o r i c a l context i n which i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s conducted. T h i s i s indeed Wright's s o l u t i o n and, as suggested, i t i s the s o l u t i o n of a s i g n i f i c a n t number of recent Hume s c h o l a r s . K_ GIVING UP ON HUME: POCOCK AND FORBES Turning to i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r i a n s f o r b e t t e r h i s t o r i c a l context i s not without i t s own d i f f i c u l t i e s , however. In f a c t , i t sometimes seems that the r i c h e r and more s o p h i s t i c a t e d the h i s t o r i c a l context, the more fragmented and obscure the Hume we f i n d . Two h i g h l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d readers of 18th century l i t e r a t u r e , J.G.A. Pocock and Duncan Forbes, allow t h e i r 'John P. Wright, The S c e p t i c a l Realism of David Hume, Minne a p o l i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota Press, 1983. p.1. 10 e r u d i t i o n to d i c t a t e obscure and i n d i r e c t assessments of Hume's i n t e n t i o n s . In "Hume and the American R e v o l u t i o n : The Dying Thoughts of a North B r i t o n " Pocock agrees with Forbes i n f i n d i n g Hume to be "... t e r r i b l e campaign country. There i s no statement that does not c o n t a i n i t s own ambiguity or i s not o f f s e t by another statement somewhere." 5 The keyword i n Pocock's account of Hume i s "ambivalence". We are t o l d that Hume e l e c t e d to express the pers o n a l t e n s i o n of being a Scot i n a new Great B r i t a i n , a man of l e t t e r s i n a world of commerce, and a b e l i e v e r i n p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e i n a world which c o u l d no longer support any, i n a work which "converted h i s awareness of the ambivalent f o r c e s at work i n h i s t o r y and p e r s o n a l i t y i n t o p o l i t e l e t t e r s , s c e p t i c a l p h ilosophy, and m a g i s t e r i a l h i s t o r y . " 6 Pocock's idea i s that Hume "... chose to express the h i s t o r i c i s t c o n t r a d i c t i o n of h i s age i n terms not of the dramatic j u x t a p o s i t i o n of oppo s i t e s (but in) ... i n e x h a u s t i b l y s u b t l e ambivalence it 7 • • • Pocock thus f i n d s i n Hume an indeterminacy of philosophy i l l u s t r a t i v e of the acute conceptual t e n s i o n s of the time. Just as the 1 8 t h century found "no f i n a l harmony" between these t e n s i o n s , so we might expect to f i n d no f i n a l harmony w i t h i n Hume's work i t s e l f . In t a k i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n , Pocock gi v e s Hume 5J.G.A. Pocock, "Hume and the American R e v o l u t i o n : The Dying Thoughts of a North B r i t o n , " M c G i l l Hume S t u d i e s , San Diego, A u s t i n H i l l Press, 1976, p.334. 6Pocock, "Hume and the American R e v o l u t i o n " , p. 95. 7 I b i d . , p . 334. 1 1 c r e d i t f o r an immense s e n s i b i l i t y but does not suggest that h i s system was up to the (admittedly) d i f f i c u l t task of r e s o l v i n g the problems he p e r c e i v e d . The view i s of Hume as a p o s i t i v e but extremely s u b t l e c o n t r i b u t o r to the debate, whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s , because they t o l d i n so many d i r e c t i o n s , can only r e a l l y be understood as attempts to d e s c r i b e the s i t u a t i o n , r a t h e r than as e f f o r t s to p r e s c r i b e r e a l s o l u t i o n s . Now Hume was an a l o o f w r i t e r , who l i k e d to remain above the rough-and-tumble of 18th century l e t t e r s , but h i s w r i t i n g does not g e n e r a l l y suggest conscious and mani p u l a t i v e ambivalence. Although he was fond of iro n y and dry wit, much of h i s w r i t i n g c l a i m s r a t h e r p l a i n g l o b a l o b j e c t i v e s . The T r e a t i s e makes i t s o v e r a l l i n t e n t i o n s reasonably c l e a r even i f the r e s u l t s remain hard to a s s e s s . Most of the ambiguity i n the T r e a t i s e a r i s e s d i r e c t l y from the y o u t h f u l Hume's almost e x c e s s i v e i n t e l l e c t u a l honesty and exuberance: he never h e s i t a t e d to p o i n t to weakness in h i s own r e s u l t s ; he tended to mount three s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t arguments where one would do. Hume's l a t e r work, as might be expected, i s marked by gre a t e r c o n t r o l and s o b r i e t y . The Essays f o r the most pa r t o f f e r p r a c t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n s on s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l matters. The H i s t o r y i s n o t o r i o u s l y bland i n tone: part of Hume's avowed i n t e n t i n i t was the adoption of a calm, non-partisan stance. Hume's fondness f o r iro n y e v i d e n t l y convinces Pocock that the g l o b a l o b j e c t i v e of h i s l i f e ' s work was the c r e a t i o n of an i r o n i c and ambiguous s t r u c t u r e . But the tone of Hume's 12 pronouncements of o b j e c t i v e - as i n the opening of the T r e a t i s e are f a r from i r o n i c a l . And Pocock i s thus not r e a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n suggesting that Hume i s disingenuous when he makes p r a c t i c a l economic and p o l i t i c a l p r o p o s a l s , concerning the n a t i o n a l debt or the r o l e of p a r t i e s i n the B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n . I t seems improper to place our understanding of Hume on such a plane unless we have f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of more d i r e c t and hence more e a s i l y comprehended i n t e n t i o n s . T h i s i s not to suggest that Pocock i s wrong: the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n he advances i s not of the s o r t which c o u l d r e a d i l y be f a l s i f i e d . But i t does seem that a more s a t i s f y i n g reading might be sought f o r those who would l i k e to be able to read Hume and understand what he says and not merely as an embodiment of l a t e 18th-century conceptual c o n f u s i o n . I f Pocock has sought such a reading he has not made h i s search p u b l i c . Duncan Forbes' major study, Hume's P h i l o s o p h i c a l P o l i t i c s , c o n t a i n s much u s e f u l i n s i g h t but a l s o bogs down at the end i n s u b t l e t y and paradox. Of p a r t i c u l a r value i s Forbes' c a r e f u l l y drawn d i s t i n c t i o n between the s c i e n t i f i c or s c e p t i c a l form of Whiggism and a wholly unsystematic body of popular b e l i e f s and p r e j u d i c e s c a l l e d 'vulgar' Whiggism. Forbes shows that Hume took a more e l e v a t e d and a b s t r a c t view of Whiggish concepts l i k e ' l i b e r t y ' and ' f r e e government', thus i n a sense using o l d vocabulary to do modern s c i e n t i f i c work. As a r e s u l t Hume was 13 f r e q u e n t l y accused of Toryism by vulg a r Whigs. 8 Forbes' notion that Hume be regarded as part of a new breed of s c i e n t i f i c Whig helps to reduce the co n f u s i o n encountered when he i s pl a c e d too n e a t l y i n the "Whig-Tory spectrum". 9 At r o o t , however, i t appears that Forbes too f i n d s Hume's philosophy and i t s connections with v a r i o u s t r a d i t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l thought incomprehensible i n any systematic sense. He s u c c e s s f u l l y demonstrates any number of i n t e r e s t i n g connections between Hume's work and a v a r i e t y of t r a d i t i o n s , but i n the end the only u n i f y i n g f o r c e he can f i n d i n i t i s a bland and unsystematic p r e d e l i c t i o n f o r moderation. Forbes' recent a r t i c l e on "Natural Law and the S c o t t i s h Enlightenment" c l a r i f i e s h i s views on Hume to a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent, making Hume's p r o j e c t i n t o p a r t of a general S c o t t i s h Enlightenment re-working of the foundations of n a t u r a l law. But he i s able to o f f e r no prospect of a b e t t e r assessment of Hume's p h i l o s o p h i c a l work i n the l i g h t of n a t u r a l law, except i n the extremely general suggestion that psychology was one of the roads that the new n a t u r a l law would take. 1 0 8 See Duncan Forbes, Hume's P h i l o s o p h i c a l P o l i t i c s , Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975, Chapter 5 passim. 9See Donald Winch, Adam Smith's P o l i t i c s . , C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978, p.39. 1 0 S e e Duncan Forbes, "Natural Law and the S c o t t i s h Enlightenment", The O r i g i n s and Nature of the S c o t t i s h  Enlightenment, eds., Campbell and Skinner, John Donald P u b l i s h e r s L t d . , Edinburgh, 1982. 14 Forbes and Pocock, from d i f f e r e n t angles, thus c l a s s i f y Hume as an awkward t r a n s i t i o n a l f i g u r e . But such a c l a s s i f i c a -t i o n , of whatever i n g e n u i t y , must i n the end be regarded as a f a i l u r e to understand. A l l p o l i t i c a l thought, of whatever p e r i o d , i s t r a n s i t i o n a l ; and to f i n d Hume poi s e d between two p o l i t i c a l paradigms, or caught between many, i s u l t i m a t e l y j u s t to f i n d him misunderstood between two t h i n g s we do understand. T h i s i s not to c r i t i c i s e a body of p e n e t r a t i n g work so much as to express a lack of f u l f i l l m e n t i n i t s r e s u l t s : we f i n d o u r s e l v e s with a Hume of such s u b t l e complexity that he cannot r e a l l y be understood at a l l . There i s , of course, an element of s u b j e c t i v i t y and perhaps a c e r t a i n n a i v e t y i n the d e s i r e f o r more a more concrete s o l u t i o n . At any ra t e such a d e s i r e l i e s at the root of the p r o j e c t before us. But i t should be noted that two of the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n t e r p r e t e r s of Hume's p l a c e i n the 18th century f i n d t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n i n ob l i q u e n e s s . T h i s t h e s i s has been undertaken i n s p i t e of t h i s c a u t i o n a r y s i g n . li. NOI GIVING UP ON HUME: HIRSCHMAN, JONES AND MILLER (a) A l b e r t 0. Hirschman's The Passions and the I n t e r e s t s (1977) i s as c l o s e to an opposite of Pocock and Forbes' work as one cou l d imagine. A thorny conceptual area i s d e a l t with i n a tour  de f o r c e of c l a r i t y and p r e c i s i o n ; a coherent view of the foundations of David Hume's p o l i t i c a l p hilosophy l i e s near the 15 center of i t , g i v i n g us a f i n e example of the use to which Hume's work can be put i n i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y . Hirschman r e t u r n s to Hume again and again whenever i n need of a mid-century p o s i t i o n to precede Adam Smith's f i n a l e . Hume i s c i t e d as an exponent of the d o c t r i n e of the " c o u n t e r v a i l i n g p a s s i o n s , " and as a b e l i e v e r i n " l e doux commerce." H i s d i s -t i n c t i o n between the calm and v i o l e n t passions forms part of Hirschman's support f o r the c l a i m that 18th century p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s c o n s t r u c t e d conceptual equipment a l l o w i n g the love of f i n a n c i a l gain to be seen as s o c i a l l y innocuous: "... an a c t i v i t y such as the r a t i o n a l l y conducted a c q u i s i t i o n of wealth c o u l d thus be c a t e g o r i z e d and i m p l i c i t l y endorsed as a calm pas s i o n that would at the same time be strong and abl e to triumph over a v a r i e t y of t u r b u l e n t (yet weak) p a s s i o n s . " 1 1 At one p o i n t , however, Hirschman f i n d s h i s p i c t u r e of Hume to be l e s s than s a t i s f a c t o r y . Hirschman notes that Hume claims a v a r i c e can be made to c o n t r o l i t s e l f ; and he c i t e s t h i s passage as i l l u s t r a t i o n : "There i s no pa s s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , capable of c o n t r o l l i n g the i n t e r e s t e d a f f e c t i o n , but the very a f f e c t i o n i t s e l f , by an a l t e r a t i o n of i t s d i r e c t i o n . Now t h i s a l t e r a t i o n must n e c e s s a r i l y take p l a c e upon the l e a s t r e f l e c t i o n ; s i n c e ' t i s ev i d e n t , that the passion i s much b e t t e r s a t i s f y ' d by i t s r e s t r a i n t , than by i t s l i b e r t y , and that i n p r e s e r v i n g s o c i e t y , we make much grea t e r advances i n the a c q u i r i n g of po s s e s s i o n s , than i n the s o l i t a r y and f o r e l o r n c o n d i t i o n , . . " 1 2 1 1 A l b e r t 0. Hirschman,The Passions and the I n t e r e s t s -P o l i t i c a l Arguments f o r C a p i t a l i s m Before I t s Triumph, P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977, p.66. 1 2 A s quoted by Hirschman, P o l i t i c a l Arguments f o r C a p i t a l i s m , p.25. 16 Hirschman comments that "One might of course q u i b b l e that to avow the need f o r some reason or r e f l e c t i o n , however " l e a s t " , means to i n -troduce an a l i e n element (which, moreover, i s supposed to the the "s l a v e of the passions") i n t o an arena i n which only p a s s i o n i s supposed to f i g h t with p a s s i o n . The p o i n t here, however, i s not to note flaws i n Hume's thought but ..." 1 3 Hirschman's mandate i s not Hume, of course, so he may be excused f o r not f o l l o w i n g t h i s , p o i n t f u r t h e r . But we s h a l l see in what f o l l o w s that Hirschman's i n t u i t i o n i s good: something important i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the passage. U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r Hirschman, and f o r h i s use of Hume as a road to Adam Smith, we w i l l f i n d that a form of reason i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of Hume's account of how pass i o n s counterbalance one another. Perhaps Hirschman has been m i s l e d , as have many ot h e r s , by reading i n i s o l a t i o n Hume's famous epigram on reason as the "s l a v e of the p a s s i o n s . " 1 * A t i n y crack i n Hirschman's p i c t u r e of Hume thus opens to r e v e a l a vast misunderstanding. Somewhat i r o n i c a l l y , i n an essay devoted to the c o r r e c t i o n of Whiggish h i s t o r i e s of c a p i t a l i s m , Hirschman has allowed a Whiggish view of Hume, c o l o u r e d by the backward-reaching I n v i s i b l e Hand of Smith, to prevent him from as k i n g why Hume should have made the apparently simple e r r o r of l o g i c i m p l i e d by Hirschman's c r i t i c i s m . No c r i t i c i s m of Hirschman's o v e r a l l t h e s i s i s intended here; but Hume's r o l e i n i t w i l l have to be understood rather 1 3 I b i d . , p.25. 1 < tSee Part IV below. 17 d i f f e r e n t l y . Hume's work w i l l have to be co n s i d e r e d not simply as an impartially-worked-out v e r s i o n of something which Smith got r i g h t , but as a more complex answer, best regarded i n i t s own l i g h t , somehow g i v i n g more play to reason than does Smith. Hirschman's book p r o v i d e s us with a good example of how thi n g s go wrong from the p o i n t of view of those concerned to un-derstand Hume. The use of i s o l a t e d q u o t a t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous i n the study of Hume. From Hirschman's p e r s p e c t i v e a l l i s w e l l - h i s t h e s i s i s w e l l supported by the b i t s of Hume he uses. But the c a r e f u l reader of Hume i s l e f t wonder how to f i t the Hume he knows i n t o the h i s t o r i c a l s t r u c t u r e c o n s t r u c t e d by Hirschman. (b) S e v e r a l recent s t u d i e s have t r i e d to to assess Hume's work without v i o l a t i n g i t s i n t e g r i t y or h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t . Three of these w i l l be reviewed at t h i s p o i n t . Our obj e c t w i l l be p r i m a r i l y to c o n s i d e r t h e i r methodological approaches, which are g e n e r a l l y more s u c c e s s f u l i n terms of l o c a t i n g Hume i n h i s t o r i c a l context than those we have looked at thus f a r . Peter Jones' book, Hume's Sentiments - T h e i r C i c e r o n i a n and  French Context, (1982) uses h i s t o r i c a l context to assess the meaning of Hume's arguments, without assuming that one complete-l y determines the other. "The p o i n t of t h i s study ( w r i t e s Jones) has been to e s t a b l i s h sources of Hume's views as a means to determining h i s ends, and the reasons f o r h i s route to them." 1 5 1 5 P e t e r Jones, Hume's Sentiments - T h e i r C i c e r o n i a n and French  Context, Edinburgh, The U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982, p.149. 18 Jones's study succeeds i n a way d e f y i n g simple summary: i t s st r e n g t h l i e s i n a d e t a i l e d account of s e v e r a l i n f l u e n c e s , most importantly those of C i c e r o , Malebranche and Newton, and a h i g h l y t e x t u r e d and persua s i v e account of Hume's connections to them. Jones' success gives new hope to the Hume s c h o l a r : imponderable t a n g l e s i n Hume can be made s t r a i g h t i f s u i t a b l e context be found. Jones' a n a l y s i s does not s a c r i f i c e s u b t l e t y or d e t a i l , and one gains a strong impression that he i s on the r i g h t t r a c k . 1 6 For our c u r r e n t purposes, Jones' most s i g n i f i c a n t comment i s that one of Hume's "... major tasks was to provide t h e o r e t i c a l support f o r pre-determined c o n c l u s i o n s , . ." 1 7 I f Jones i s c o r r e c t i n t h i s , one might c e r t a i n l y expect the assessment of Hume's p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments to depend on the determ i n a t i o n of proper h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t . (c) David M i l l e r ' s Philosophy and Ideology i n Hume's P o l i t i c a l  Thought (1981) a l s o d i s p l a y s a v i s i b l e confidence that Hume's work i s i n t e l l i g i b l e . M i l l e r takes the opposite tack to Jones, l o o k i n g f i r s t to the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of Hume's e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s i n the T r e a t i s e and then to i t s a n a l y s i s i n the l i g h t of "18th century i d e o l o g y " . But one of h i s c e n t r a l ideas i s q u i t e s i m i l a r to Jones'. M i l l e r w r i t e s 1 6 I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to r e f l e c t that i n many ways Forbes' approach i s not so very d i s i m i l a r . Does h i s murky r e s u l t show that h i s c h o i c e of context was wrong, or i s i t simply a r e f l e c -t i o n of Forbes' own complex p r o f e s s i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t y ? 1 7 Jones, Hume's Sentiments, p.149 19 that "... the f a s c i n a t i o n of Hume's p o l i t i c a l thought l i e s i n seeing how a r e v o l u t i o n a r y philosophy i s married to an establishment ideology . . . " 1 B The suggestion, again, i s that Hume was t r y i n g to provide new underpinnings f o r p o s i t i o n s o u t s i d e of h i s s t r u c t u r e proper, and tha t the former cannot p r o p e r l y be understood without the l a t t e r . Hence the d i f f i c u l t y when e i t h e r c o n t e x t u a l or i n t e r n a l analyses are made dominant. M i l l e r ' s r e s u l t s are a good argument f o r t a k i n g such a stance. The book r e s t s on a well-supported a n a l y s i s of the r e l a t i o n of reason to the passions i n Hume's T r e a t i s e and an account of how the Essays and H i s t o r y may be understood i n the l i g h t of that r e l a t i o n . M i l l e r argues that Hume's goal was to undermine t h e o r i e s of government r e s t i n g on n a t u r a l law (such as Locke's) by an a n a l y s i s of i n d i v i d u a l human psychology. In the T r e a t i s e Hume showed that human b e l i e f and judgement have p s y c h o l o g i c a l r a t h e r than s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l foundations. P e r c e p t i o n , r a t h e r than o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , thus became the dominant f a c t o r i n the e x p l a n a t i o n of human a c t i o n . Such p e r c e p t i o n was, of course, not i n the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the p e r c e i v e r . Furthermore, a c t i o n i n Hume's a n a l y s i s c o u l d be shown to r e s t s o l e l y on the passions aroused by s u b j e c t i v e impressions. Hume does give a pl a c e to reason, which i s not simply "the sl a v e of the pa s s i o n s " ; but i t s r o l e i s s e v e r e l y 1 8 David M i l l e r , Philosophy and Ideology i n Hume's P o l i t i c a l  Thought, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, p.187. 20 attenuated and i s e s s e n t i a l l y c o r r e c t i v e i n nature. The r e s u l t , i n M i l l e r ' s view, i s a p o l i t i c a l theory which makes Hume a kind of "... c o n s e r v a t i v e before h i s time ,.." 1 9 Since the i n c l i n a t i o n to a l l e g i a n c e and to support r u l e s of j u s t i c e depends u l t i m a t e l y on shared p e r c e p t i o n s , the foundations of such s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s must be the h i s t o r i c a l l y c r e a t e d environments i n which men are r a i s e d . These work simply because they e x i s t and because a community e x i s t s which has grown up sha r i n g them. The root of these a r t i f i c i a l v i r t u e s l i e i n the i n d i v i d u a l , who i s n a t u r a l l y and i n e v i t a b l y caused to b e l i e v e i n that which i s f r e q u e n t l y presented to him: "Both i n the case of j u s t i c e and i n the case of a l l e g i a n c e to government, t h e r e f o r e , the imagination enables l a r g e numbers of men to c o - o r d i n a t e t h e i r behav-i o r without e x p l i c i t agreement by prompting them to adopt the same conventions concerning p r o p e r t y and a u t h o r i t y " . 2 0 Hume's s c i e n t i f i c foundations f o r e x i s t i n g s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s were, however, of an r a t h e r p e c u l i a r and obliqu e k i n d : they supported e x i s t i n g systems l a r g e l y j u s t because they e x i s t e d . Dr. Johnson i s s a i d to have c a l l e d Hume a "Tory by chance" and from M i l l e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e the remark appears to be extremely p e r c e p t i v e . "... p o l i t i c a l theory ... must accept human judgement at face value, as n o n - r a t i o n a l and c o r r i g i b l e only to a small degree. A p o s i t i o n of t h i s kind must i n a d i f f u s e sense be c o n s e r v a t i v e , not because i t i s yet committed to any p a r t i c u l a r set of i n s t i t u t i o n s or s o c i a l arrangements, but because i t must remain c l o s e l y t i e d to 1 9 M i l l e r , Philosophy and Ideology, p.187. 2 0 M i l l e r , Philosophy and Ideology, p.188. 21 c o n v e n t i o n a l l y - a c c e p t e d judgements." 2 1 Hume d i d indeed support p o s i t i o n s that Johnson and others might have seen as Tory; but the foundations of h i s b e l i e f might i n d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s have allowed him to support v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s was conservatism of a deeper nature than many i n the 18th century c o u l d a p p r e c i a t e , a Toryism, i f such i t was, which was not l i k e l y to appeal to men of v u l g a r p a r t y p r i n c i p l e Although M i l l e r ' s book i s marred by a g r a t u i t o u s c o n c l u s i o n f o c u s i n g on Hume's r e l a t i o n to 19th century l i b e r a l i s m and conservatism, i t i s very c o n v i n c i n g i n i t s demonstration that Hume's e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l work can be t i e d to h i s p o l i t i c a l theory through the r e l a t i o n of reason to the passions and that the whole s t r u c t u r e can best be made sense of i n the context of c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s which are l o g i c a l l y e x t e r n a l to Hume's system - i n t h i s case, the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l s t r u c -t u r e s of 18th century B r i t a i n . The works of Jones and M i l l e r share c e r t a i n methodological assumptions which are not made e x p l i c i t . One assumption i s that of b a s i c coherence and c o n s i s t e n c y i n Hume's work: the premise i s t h a t Hume's thought was more, not l e s s , p r e c i s e that h i s ex-p r e s s i o n of i t . Given t h i s , the job of a reader becomes one of winnowing wheat from c h a f f . The second assumption which helps the winnowing process i s t h a t the l o g i c of Hume's work informs but does not wholly determine the f i n a l c h a r a c t e r of i t . In 2 1 M i l l e r , Philosophy and Ideology, p.191 22 other words, that p o l i t i c a l events and languages o u t s i d e of the s t r i c t l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of h i s work pr o v i d e a great deal of i t s meaning. 2 2 H i s t o r i c a l context might give c l u e s to which f e a t u r e s i n Hume's work ought to be co n s i d e r e d part of a coherent i n t e r -n a l s t r u c t u r e . Put simply, what t h i s suggests i s that h i s t o r i c a l context might allow us to decide j u s t what p o s i t i o n s Hume i s arguing f o r . The r e s u l t i n g c l a r i t y c o u l d allow us to b e t t e r d i s t i n g u i s h the important premises of arguments from extraneous or merely elegant comments. Perhaps we might thus b e t t e r understand the meaning of the arguments, both i n the general 18th century context and i n terms of Hume's own i n t e n t i o n s . These assumptions, of course, cannot be j u s t i f i e d i n advance; but they c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d by success: the c r e a t i o n of a b e t t e r and more i n t e g r e t e d view of Hume's work. 3^ MORE HUME IN CONTEXT: JAMES MOORE AND CLASSICAL  REPUBLICANISM James Moore's paper, "Hume's P o l i t i c a l Science and the C l a s s i c a l Republican T r a d i t i o n " (1977), does not completely share these methodological assumptions, but i t demonstrates a l s o that much of d i f f i c u l t y i n Hume can be made c l e a r i f h i s t o r i c a l context i s p r o p e r l y e s t a b l i s h e d . Moore too i s unhappy with the ex c e s s i v e number of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Hume: " c l e a r l y there are d i f f i c u l t i e s i n f i x i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n s with 2 2 T h i s idea was suggested by M i l l e r , Philosophy and Ideology, p. 13. 23 p r e c i s i o n . " 2 3 Moore b e l i e v e s that the context of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n o f f e r s advantages f o r the understanding of Hume's p o l i t i c a l i d eas: "... Hume's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e can best be understood as an e l a b o r a t e response to the p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n s ... and ... that f o r experimental s c i e n t i s t s , at l e a s t , the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n comes to an end with the p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e of Hume. 2 4 As one can see, Moore's idea i s that Hume's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e i n some sense re p r e s e n t s the end of c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m i n European p o l i t i c a l thought. But Moore's phrasing i s perhaps c a r e f u l l y ambiguous - does Hume represent the l a s t c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n , one whose work p l a c e s him i n s i d e the t r a d i t i o n as Moore understands i t ? Or does Moore understand Hume to be a user of the t r a d i t i o n , i t s vocabulary and ideas, while having l e f t i t i n a deeper sense, through having abandoned some p a r t which Moore f i n d s to be c e n t r a l ? The answer seems to be the l a t t e r ; and Moore's support f o r the placement of Hume ou t s i d e the t r a d i t i o n does r e s t on c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n s as to the c e n t r a l i t y of concepts i n c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m . In s p i t e of the ambiguity of h i s t h e s i s , i t seems c l e a r that f o r Moore, Hume's c r i t i q u e of the r e p u b l i c a n concept of v i r t u e d i d pl a c e him ou t s i d e of the t r a d i t i o n : "The assumption that the study of p o l i t i c s must be conducive to p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e was, i n Hume's view, the great misconception of Bolingbroke's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e . 2 3James Moore, "Hume's P o l i t i c a l Science and the C l a s s i c a l Republican T r a d i t i o n , " P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , V o l . XXIV, 1976, p.810. 2*Moore, "Hume's P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , " P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , p.810. 24 From an experimental or e m p i r i c a l standpoint that assumption c o u l d not be allowed to stand unchallenged." 2 5 But not only d i d Hume abandon the an c i e n t n o t i o n that p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e ought to have f o r i t s goal the i n c u l c a t i o n of v i r t u e , he a l s o , a c c o r d i n g to Moore, l e f t behind the idea that c i t i z e n s need to be v i r t u o u s : "The b e l i e f that c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government might be based on the assumption that p o l i t i c i a n s are capable of v i r t u e seemed to Hume the most fundamental kind of e r r o r . In c o n t r i v i n g and ma i n t a i n i n g the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements of a government one should assume i n s t e a d t h a t , i n p o l i t i c s , a l l men are v i c i o u s or c o r r u p t . Hume took over the maxim that i n ' f i x i n g the s e v e r a l checks and c o n t r o l s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end i n a l l h i s a c t i o n s than p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t . ' " 2 6 In t a k i n g these two r e l a t e d p o s i t i o n s , on the goals of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e and on the r o l e of v i r t u e i n a p o l i t y , Moore argues, Hume e f f e c t i v e l y abandoned a c e n t r a l p r i n c i p l e of rep u b l i c a n i s m . Hume wanted, notes Moore, to f i n d a fi r m e r b a s i s f o r s t a b i l i t y and moderation i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e and i n t h i s , too, he de t e c t s a s i g n i f i c a n t d e v i a t i o n from the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n model. Moore w r i t e s t h a t : "Where M a c h i a v e l l i had thought i t necessary to respond to the u n p r e d i c t a b l e and changing phenomena of p o l i t i c a l l i f e by a c t i o n that was i t s e l f u n p r e d i c t a b l e and impetuous, Hume b e l i e v e d that a s c i e n c e of p o l i t i c s should be able to o f f e r more uniform and more re g u l a r d i r e c t i v e s f o r p o l i t i c a l conduct. I m p l i c i t i n h i s Hume's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e was a response to the ch a l l e n g e s of fortun a as M a c h i a v e l l i and the c l a s s i c a l 2 5Moore, "Hume's P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , " P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , p.814. 2 6Moore, "Hume's P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , " P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , p.820. 25 r e p u b l i c a n s had v a r i o u s l y conceived i t . " 2 7 jk SUMMARY The success of Jones' and M i l l e r ' s work c e r t a i n l y suggests that r e a l improvements i n our understanding of David Hume can come with the establishment of s u i t a b l e h i s t o r i c a l c o ntext. The c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n , to judge from the many t r a c e s of i t i n Hume demonstrated by Moore, c e r t a i n l y seems to be a promising f i e l d f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Moore has argued, i n e f f e c t , that while Hume l e f t the t r a d i t i o n , i t s t i l l p r o v i d e s the best context f o r the understanding of h i s p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . In what f o l l o w s i t w i l l be shown that Moore i s mistaken i n h i s assessment of Hume's r e l a t i o n to the t r a d i t i o n . I t w i l l be argued that Hume might b e t t e r be regarded as belonging to the t r a d i t i o n of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n s and i t w i l l be shown that there i s a bonus att a c h e d to so doing: an understanding of Hume's r e l a t i o n to the t r a d i t i o n pays o f f i n a deeper systematic understanding of the r e l a t i o n between Hume's p o l i t i c a l theory and h i s epistemology and and psychology. Moore's f a i l u r e to pursue the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of Hume's theory of reason and the p a s s i o n s , together with some mistakes of emphasis i n h i s un-der s t a n d i n g of the s t r u c t u r e of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n argument, has kept him from seeing t h i s deep systematic c o n n e c t i o n . 2 7"Hume's P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , " P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , p.818. 2 6 I I I . THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION: ITS HISTORY, IMPORTANCE AND LOGICAL STRUCTURE K_ WHAT IS THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION? WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO HUME? Since 1945, when Zera S. F i n k ' s The C l a s s i c a l Republicans:  An Essay i n the Recovery of a P a t t e r n of Thought i n Seventeenth  Century England was p u b l i s h e d , i t has been understood that European p o l i t i c a l ideas from the Renaissance through the e a r l y modern p e r i o d underwent changes analogous to those of a r c h i t e c t u r e , l i t e r a t u r e , p a i n t i n g and many other f i e l d s . I t was F i n k ' s c o n t e n t i o n that i n the world of p o l i t i c a l thought these changes took the form of the adoption of a complex but r e c o g n i z a b l e vocabulary d e r i v e d from the c l a s s i c a l authors. Fink c a l l e d t h i s t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m . Fink j u s t i f i e d the l a b e l l i n g of musings separated by more than three c e n t u r i e s by p o i n t i n g to a c o n t i n u i t y of vocabulary and concern. He d i d not c l a i m that the vocabulary or the concerns remained unchanged, of course: the needs of a l l these M a c h i a v e l l i a n s were very d i f f e r e n t . The f a s c i n a t i n g and p r o v o c a t i v e f e a t u r e of F i n k ' s work was that i t showed how w e l l a vocabulary c o n s t r u c t e d to meet the very p a r t i c u l a r needs of c e r t a i n I t a l i a n Renaissance p o l i t i c i a n s was able to serve o t h e r s . 1 For m i d - l 8 t h century students of p o l i t i c s I t a l i a n Renaissance w r i t i n g s v i e d f o r i n f l u e n c e with more recent work. But the more recent work was i t s e l f l a r g e l y the product of r e -f l e c t i o n on that of the I t a l i a n masters and the a n c i e n t s . The c e n t r a l n o t i o n s of r e p u b l i c a n i s m , together with i t s conceptual c o m p l e x i t i e s , thus came i n t o modern p o l i t i c a l theory as many streams i s s u i n g from a s i n g l e source. In Hume's case, as i n many o t h e r s , i t i s a c c o r d i n g l y d i f f i c u l t or impossible to i d e n t i f y with c e r t a i n t y the source of p a r t i c u l a r elements. But Hume was a v o r a c i o u s reader. Books, he once wrote to a f r i e n d , were more necessary i n l i f e than a wife, "and I have more than I can use." 2 I t i s c e r t a i n from h i s own r e f e r e n c e s that he read P l a t o , C i c e r o , M a c h i a v e l l i and G u i c c i a r d i n i ; h i s reading of most other c l a s s i c s of the l i t e r a t u r e may s a f e l y be assumed. Now i t i s d i f f i c u l t to over-estimate the importance of c l a s s i c a l i n f l u e n c e , d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t , on p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s of Hume's time. Educated men of Hume's day r e c e i v e d c l a s s i c a l ideas second and t h i r d hand, through the c h a i n of r e p u b l i c a n l i t e r a t u r e d e s c r i b e d by Robbins, Pocock and Raab, and a l s o f i r s t hand, through reading of c l a s s i c a l authors i n the o r i g i n a l . They were thus f a m i l i a r with C i c e r o , P o l y b i u s , P l a t o and ^ e r a S. F i n k , The C l a s s i c a l Republicans - An Essay i n the  Recovery of a P a t t e r n of Thought i n Seventeenth Century England, Evanston, Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y , 1945. 2J.Y.T. G r i e g , ed., The L e t t e r s of David Hume, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1932, Vol.2, p.611. 28 A r i s t o t l e , and t h e i r Renaissance i n t e r p r e t e r s , M a c h i a v e l l i , Bodin, More, C o n t a r i n i and many o t h e r s . When they came to read modern c o n t r i b u t o r s to the d i a l o g u e , H a r r i n g t o n , Montesquieu and Bolingbroke or Rousseau and Hume, they d i d so i n the context of a very n a t u r a l and deep engagement with the t r a d i t i o n and vocabulary. 2_;_ THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLASSICAL REPUBLIC To f a c i l i t a t e an understanding of David Hume's r e p u b l i c a n environment our f i r s t step must be a review of the b a s i c elements of c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m . T h i s w i l l be undertaken with two o b j e c t i v e s . F i r s t , to give the reader s u f f i c i e n t sense of the nature and d e t a i l s of c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m to a p p r e c i a t e Hume's deep attachment to i t . Second, to p o i n t out c e r t a i n l o g i c a l f e a t u r e s of c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m which w i l l be important i n our assessment of Hume's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e . These f e a t u r e s w i l l suggest an account of r e p u b l i c a n i s m which w i l l make more of the s o c i a l nature of r e p u b l i c a n c i t i z e n s h i p than i s u s u a l l y done i n the l i t e r a t u r e . (a) The An c i e n t s and M a c h i a v e l l i : Some H i s t o r i c a l Background. Mixed government was not a new idea even when A r i s t o t l e wrote about i t . I t r e s t s on the no t i o n that there are three pure or i d e a l forms of government: monarchy, a r i s t o c r a c y and democracy. 3 Ancient w r i t e r s , i n c l u d i n g P l a t o , A r i s t o t l e , and Thucydides, found that these forms tended to be unstable and to 3 F i n k , The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, p . 2 f f . 29 degenerate i n t o tyranny, o l i g a r c h y and anarchy r e s p e c t i v e l y . These l a t t e r were themselves seen as u n s t a b l e , and p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of t h i s type d e s c r i b e d the dynamics by which the s i x paradigmatic forms turned i n t o one another i n complex c y c l e s . U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , the object of t h i s kind of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e was s t a b i l i t y ; and A r i s t o t l e experimented i n the P o l i t i c s with ways of combining the pure forms of government i n t o s t a b l e mixtures. T h i s kind of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e i s o f t e n c o n s i d e r e d to have come to i t s a n c i e n t m a t u r i t y i n the work of the Greek h i s t o r i a n P o l y b i u s . " W r i t i n g j u s t before the chaos of the l a s t century of the Roman r e p u b l i c , P o l y b i u s found i n Sparta and Rome working examples of mixed government. The idea was "that the degenerative tendency which l e d every pure form of government to d e s t r u c t i o n had l i t t l e room to op-e r a t e , and a s t a b i l i t y which f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes approached permanence was a t t a i n e d . " 5 I t was a t t a i n e d through a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l balance c r e a t e d by a supremely wise l e g i s l a t o r . C i c e r o , the Roman i n h e r i t o r of P o l y b i u s ' t h e o r i e s , wrote that Lycurgus, the L e g i s l a t o r of Sparta, understood the i n s t a b i l i t y of unmixed c o n s t i t u t i o n s to be a law of nature and "... combined together a l l the e x c e l l e n c e s and d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s of the best c o n s t i t u t i o n s , that no one p a r t should become predominant, and be p e r v e r t e d i n t o i t s kindred v i c e ; and t h a t , each power being checked by the o t h e r s , no one part should turn the s c a l e or d e c i s i v e l y out-balance the o t h e r s ; but t h a t , by being a c c u r a t e l y a d j u s t e d and i n exact e q u i l i b r i u m , the whole might remain long steady l i k e a s h i p s a i l i n g c l o s e to "Fink, The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, Chap.1, passim. 5 F i n k , The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, p. 4 . 30 the wind." 6 The o r i g i n a l i t y of C i c e r o ' s Republic, a c e n t r a l t e x t f o r 17th and 18th century r e p u b l i c a n s , l a y i n an e x p l a n a t i o n of how Rome b u i l t a n e a r - p e r f e c t r e p u b l i c on l e s s - t h a n - p e r f e c t f o u n d a t i o n s . 7 C i c e r o b e l i e v e d that the Romans had done t h i s p a r t l y through the d i s c o v e r y of a fundamental p r i n c i p l e of p o l i t i c a l power: that i t ought to be based not upon r o y a l h e r e d i t y but on i n d i v i d u a l q u a l i t i e s or v i r t u e s a p p r o p r i a t e to o f f i c e . In accordance with t h i s the Romans made the throne an e l e c t e d o f f i c e . C i c e r o gave a d e t a i l e d account of t h i s and other c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f e a t u r e s which balanced the Roman Republic so that n e i t h e r the elements of monarchy, o l i g a r c h y or democracy c o u l d dominate and d e s t a b i l i z e the s t a t e . The g r e a t e s t p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t of the I t a l i a n Renaissance, N i c c o l o M a c h i a v e l l i , absorbed the elements of t h i s p o l i t i c a l theory i n t o a body of work which more than any other shaped the vocabulary of modern r e p u b l i c a n i s m . In our day M a c h i a v e l l i ' s best known work i s The P r i n c e , but p r i o r to the 19th century h i s D i s c o u r s e s were at l e a s t as widely r e a d . 8 The two works were ac-t u a l l y composed at about the same time and should probably be understood as complementary p a r t s of a l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y . 9  The P r i n c e e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n f o r r u l e r s of 6 Quoted by Fink, The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, p.4. 7 F i n k , The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, p.5. 8 F i n k , The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, I n t r o . , passim. 9 B e r n a r d C r i c k , ed., The D i s c o u r s e s of M a c h i a v e l l i , Harmondrworth, Penguin Books, 1970, I n t r o . , passim. 31 p r i n c i p a l i t i e s ; the Discourses set f o r t h o p e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e s f o r r e p u b l i c s . M a c h i a v e l l i ' s goal i n the D i s c o u r s e s was to d i s c o v e r the reasons f o r the success and l o n g e v i t y of the Roman r e p u b l i c and a l s o the reasons f o r i t s u l t i m a t e f a i l u r e . He found that the key to the success of Rome was the l i b e r t y of her c i t i z e n s and by l i b e r t y he meant freedom from i n t e r n a l tyranny and i m p e r i a l domination. L i b e r t y was thus f i r s t and foremost self-government. C e n t r a l q u e s t i o n s f o r M a c h i a v e l l i thus became how l i b e r t y should be obtained and, once gotten, how i t should be preserved. The s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem l a y p a r t l y i n C i c e r o ' s notion of p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e s . As we have noted, l i b e r t y , or self-government, r e s t e d on c e r t a i n s t r e n g t h s or q u a l i t i e s . I t i s c e n t r a l to the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n that at l e a s t two kinds of such v i r t u e are i d e n t i f i e d : the v i r t u e of L e g i s l a t o r s and that of c i t i z e n s . The p l a c e of L e g i s l a t o r - a g o d l i k e o f f i c e that b a r e l y preserved the s e c u l a r c h a r a c t e r of r e p u b l i c a n i s m - was passed by the Renaissance p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s to modern r e p u b l i c a n s from the a n c i e n t s . I t i s axiomatic i n c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m before the 18th century that a mixed p o l i t y cannot be c r e a t e d by the e f f o r t s of o r d i n a r y men. The c r e a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s a man above a l l o t h e r s , one who combines l e a d e r s h i p , p o l i t i c a l wisdom and an i n t i m a t e understanding of the c h a r a c t e r of h i s people. Only such a man c o u l d cause a people to begin l i f e together under the 32 laws of a p r o p e r l y balanced r e p u b l i c . And only such a r e p u b l i c c o u l d hope to stand s t a b l e a g a i n s t the p e r i l s of time and chance. Thus Lycurgus understood h i s people so w e l l , and formed laws so a r t f u l l y i n that understanding, that Sparta was able to l a s t more than e i g h t hundred y e a r s . One might w e l l ask j u s t what c o u l d cause a Republic so cunningly c r a f t e d ever to f a i l ? The answer i s of great impor-tance to the understanding of the r e p u b l i c a n p r o j e c t . The enduring p o r t i o n i n the l i f e of Republics comes, of course, a f t e r the time of formation when they can no longer depend f o r everyday maintenance and s t a b i l i t y on a L e g i s l a t o r . Here r e s t s a c e n t r a l and ongoing problem f o r M a c h i a v e l l i and r e p u b l i c a n s i n g e n e r a l : i t appears that the work of a L e g i s l a t o r , however e s s e n t i a l and however f i n e , i s not i n i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t . C i t i z e n s too must be possessed of p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e . For a r e p u b l i c to l a s t , i t s c i t i z e n s must be possessed of a w i l l i n g n e s s to submerge i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s i n those of the r e p u b l i c . And t h i s , M a c h i a v e l l i t e l l s us, i s . a s k i n g a great d e a l . Men tend to be swayed by t h e i r immediate i n t e r e s t s ; they are always more i n c l i n e d to e v i l than good; and they w i l l always be i n r i s k of l o s i n g that sense of absolute l o y a l t y to the r e p u b l i c p rovided by the i n s p i r a t i o n of the L e g i s l a t o r . T h i s degenerative process i s c a l l e d c o r r u p t i o n by M a c h i a v e l l i and many of h i s f o l l o w e r s . (b) L o g i c a l Problems with the C l a s s i c a l R e p u b l i c . 33 I t i s at t h i s p o i n t that the l o g i c of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c as d e s c r i b e d by M a c h i a v e l l i becomes clouded and d i f f i c u l t . I t cannot but appear that M a c h i a v e l l i wanted to h o l d two somewhat c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o s i t i o n s . A r e p u b l i c i s d e s c r i b e d with f e a t u r e s t h a t , viewed from a l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , ought to promise permanent s t a b i l i t y . And t h i s indeed was the s e r i o u s i n t e n t of the a n c i e n t c r e a t o r s of the s t r u c t u r e . But M a c h i a v e l l i and h i s contemporaries were s t i l l possessed of a view of the world and of man's work in i t that owed much to the middle ages. A l l works of men, with a l l c r e a t u r e s of the e a r t h , were seen as f r a g i l e and temporary. And so, at the same time as M a c h i a v e l l i d e s c r i b e s l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e s of government which the a n c i e n t s c r e a t e d i n optimism, he undermines the s t r u c t u r e with an account of i t s i n e v i t a b l e f a i l u r e . I t i s t h i s t e n s i o n which c r e a t e d the e x t r a o r d i n a r y conceptual complexity d e s c r i b e d by Pocock i n The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment. Pocock shows us that t h i s t e n s i o n continued to p l a y a p a r t i n r e p u b l i c a n thought i n t o the 18th c e n t u r y . 1 0 Now as we have noted, a u t h e n t i c v e r s i o n s of t h i s s t r u c t u r e , from M a c h i a v e l l i ' s time on, are made more complex by v i s i b l e doubts of i t s adequacy. These doubts s p r i n g from the p e s s i m i s t i c world-view mentioned above, a world-view which i n some ways accords i l l with the p o s i t i v e s t r u c t u r e of the r e p u b l i c i n h e r i t e d from the a n c i e n t world. M a c h i a v e l l i doubted 1 0J.G.A Pocock, The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment - F l o r e n t i n e P o l i t i c a l  Thought and the A t l a n t i c Republican T r a d i t i o n , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975. 34 that even such a w e l l - c o n t r i v e d i n s t i t u t i o n as he d e s c r i b e s i n the e a r l y p a r t s of the Dis c o u r s e s c o u l d stand f o r e v e r i n the face of human p a s s i o n s : "... s i n c e no sure remedy can be p r e s c r i b e d a g a i n s t such d i s o r d e r s the l o s s of c i v i c v i r t u e through passion ... i t f o l l o w s that i t i s impossible to c o n s t i t u t e a r e p u b l i c that s h a l l l a s t f o r ever, s i n c e there are a thousand u n p r e d i c t a b l e ways i n which i t s downfall may be brought a b o u t . " 1 1 In the face of such doubt i n the a b i l i t y of even a success-f u l r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n to provide enough of the feedback of v i r t u e d e s c r i b e d above, and t h i s i s what M a c h i a v e l l i ' s comment amounts t o , he looked to a f r a g i l e mechanism which r e a l l y stood o u t s i d e of the l o g i c of the s t r u c t u r e we have e x t r a c t e d from the e a r l y s e c t i o n s of the D i s c o u r s e s . He looked to mutual support i n v i r t u e by the body of c i t i z e n s themselves, support not d i -r e c t l y i n c u l c a t e d by the c o n s t i t u t i o n or even by the advantages of l i f e i n the r e p u b l i c : simply the support of one c i t i z e n ' s v i r t u e by that of h i s neighbour. M a c h i a v e l l i ' s r e p u b l i c , w r i t e s Pocock, "... was a s t r u c t u r e i n which every c i t i z e n ' s a b i l i t y to place the common good before h i s own was the p r e c o n d i t i o n of every o t h e r ' s , so that every man's v i r t u e saved every other's from that c o r r u p t i o n , . . " 1 2 When seen i n t h i s l i g h t M a c h i a v e l l i a n v i r t u e c o n t a i n s a strong s o c i a l and mutually s u p p o r t i v e element i n s p i t e of the m a r t i a l independence which supports i t . V i r t u e must be a j o i n t p o s s e s s i o n of a l l c i t i z e n s . We thus f i n d , at the very beginning ' ' C r i c k , ed., M a c h i a v e l l i ' s D i s c o u r s e s , p.455. ' 2Pocock,The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment, p.184. 35 of the modern r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n , a sense of interdependence among the c i t i z e n s of a r e p u b l i c : because the r e p u b l i c i s so f r a g i l e i n the face of time and c o r r u p t i o n , i t appears almost as a c h a i n which must have no weak l i n k s . Each c i t i z e n ' s v i r t u e i s supported by the v i r t u e of h i s f e l l o w s . The goal of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s must be to support t h i s chain of v i r t u e . Now while M a c h i a v e l l i c l e a r l y leaned toward g l o r y on the Roman model, f o r a body of c i t i z e n s whose v i r t u e r e s t e d on a w i l l i n g n e s s to bear arms, h i s contemporary G u i c c i a r d i n i ' s model of v i r t u e p o i n t s more d i r e c t l y to the s t r u c t u r a l importance of reason: he p r e f e r r e d the Venetian model, i n which prudence and i n t e l l i g e n c e are the prime q u a l i t i e s of c i t i z e n s . For G u i c c i a r d i n i l i b e r t y i t s e l f was: "... the freedom to perform ... a c t i o n s which are, and are seen to be, e x c e l l e n t because they are to the p u b l i c g o o d . " 1 3 While M a c h i a v e l l i emphasized an h e r o i c independence, s u s t a i n e d by m i l i t a r y v i r t u e s , G u i c c i a r d i n i drew out the l o g i c a l requirements of the r e p u b l i c a n model, making e x p l i c i t that independence r e s t e d on i n t e l l i g e n c e s u s t a i n e d by s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . Thus, f o r example, G u i c c i a r d i n i opted for a senate e l e c t e d f o r l i f e because i t s members w i l l thus "never f e a r , nor f e e l indebted to any other i n d i v i d u a l . " 1 4 Much of the d i f f i c u l t y of understanding c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m (and of understanding Pocock, f o r that matter) 1 3 Q u o t e d by Pocock, The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment, p 229. 1 < tPocock, The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment, p.257. 36 thus s p r i n g s from the f a c t that i t s modern advocates appear most o f t e n to be d e s c r i b i n g both a l o g i c a l l y p e r f e c t system and, per  impo s s i b l e , i t s inadequacies s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T h i s i s not to say tha t there i s anything erroneous i n the ideas of M a c h i a v e l l i or h i s f o l l o w e r s : the l o g i c a l system of r e p u b l i c a n i s m i n a sense r e f l e c t e d t h e i r hopes while the no t i o n of i n e v i t a b l e decay r e f l e c t e d t h e i r f e a r s . The conceptual c o m p l e x i t i e s of c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m m i r r o r e d the human concerns of people who d i d not i n h a b i t l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e s . But i n t r y i n g to understand r e p u b l i c a n i s m i n a l e s s r i c h l y t e x t u r e d way than Pocock does we are faced with the n e c e s s i t y of i s o l a t i n g hopes from f e a r s , of removing from l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e f e a t u r e s which undermine i t . The a n a l y s i s of the c l a s s i c r e p u b l i c which f o l l o w s i s thus undertaken i n the understanding that i t v i o l a t e s to some extent the i n t u i t i o n s of the M a c h i a v e l l i a n s who proposed i t . For them, the n o t i o n of the i n e v i t a b l e e r o s i o n of v i r t u e - the heart of t h e i r concern - was of a pa r t with t h e i r a n a l y s i s of how i t co u l d be overcome. The a n a l y s i s f o l l o w i n g might thus be co n s i d e r e d as d e s c r i b i n g an i d e a l type, based not on any p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l model but on the w r i t e r ' s sense of how the r e p u b l i c might be supposed to work. I t i s an attempt to demonstrate the p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g a l l the v a r i e d r e p u b l i c s proposed by the M a c h i a v e l l i a n s . The obj e c t w i l l be to present the r e p u b l i c i n a l o g i c a l l y pure form. That i s to say, i t w i l l be presented with the p e s s i m i s t i c s i d e of the M a c h i a v e l l i a n v i s i o n l a r g e l y removed; as i f i t worked, i n other words. I t 37 w i l l then be possible to use the logical structure so outlined as a means of discussing the problems which Machiavellians tended to find in i t and, ultimately, to describe the relation of David Hume's p o l i t i c a l theory to the t radit ion, (c) The Logical Structure of the Classical Republic. As we have seen, the traditional hope of the c lassical republicans was that a constitution could be so devised as keep the state going forever in s t a b i l i t y . Two factors were always involved: the body of laws or constitution i t se l f and the body of c i t izens . The body of citizens was always considered to be somewhat suspect in the matter of virtue, for one can see that an assembly of perfectly virtuous citizens would be in no need of a constitution or laws at a l l . Now of the three c lass ical forms of government a republic most resembles a democracy. The weakness of democracy l ies in the mult ipl ic i ty of interests of c i t izens . It is the innate tendency of men to pursue their own interest, while the general good of the state would be furthered by other actions. This is the reason that democracy tends to degenerate into anarchy. The object of the c lassical republic is to remedy this deficiency by incorporating into democracy features of the other types of pol i ty , monarchy and aristocracy. The goal of a mixed polity is thus to provide some kind of support for the individual against his own failures of virtue, support that w i l l allow him to reap the benefits of l i f e in society. What w i l l make the mixed polity work in the face of 38 f a i l u r e s of i n d i v i d u a l v i r t u e i s a system of balanced governmental s t r u c t u r e s . The idea i s to give c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g powers to the d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the p o l i t y which w i l l resemble those of monarchy, a r i s t o c r a c y and democracy. If these i n s t i t u t i o n s p r o p e r l y represent the n a t u r a l d i v i s i o n s of i n t e r e s t i n the people ( h e r e i n l i e s the a r t of the L e g i s l a t o r ) then the i l l e f f e c t s of i n t e r e s t - the lack of c i t i z e n s ' v i r t u e - w i l l be d e f l e c t e d by the opposing i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s . Now given the dubious v i r t u e of c i t i z e n s i t i s har d l y s u r p r i s i n g that r e p u b l i c a n s do not look to c i t i z e n s f o r the genesis of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . As we have seen, a L e g i s l a t o r must appear. The L e g i s l a t o r must provide a set of a p p r o p r i a t e laws, the c o n s t i t u t i o n ; he must a l s o p r o v i d e i n s p i r a t i o n f o r h i s people: they must be w i l l i n g to f o l l o w the laws even on the occasions when t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t might l e a d to do other-wise. T h i s i s the ab s o l u t e minimum of v i r t u e r e q u i r e d - while s t a t e s can impose s a n c t i o n s on o c c a s i o n a l d i sobedience, no c o n s t i t u t i o n c o u l d stand a g a i n s t widespread u n w i l l i n g n e s s to submit to law. But c i t i z e n s of a c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c do not only l i v e under the laws of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , they are a l s o the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s of i t . In t h e i r v a r i o u s assemblies and o f f i c e s they must i n t e r p r e t the c o n s t i t u t i o n , decide when i t has been v i o l a t e d , and even make the a l t e r a t i o n s to i t which might be r e q u i r e d by changing circumstances. A d e c l a r a t i o n of war, f c r example, may 39 be c r u c i a l to the f u t u r e of a s t a t e ; and c i t i z e n s , not the c o n s t i t u t i o n , must decide upon i t . The L e g i s l a t o r , then, must a l s o i n s p i r e i n h i s people s u f f i c i e n t v i r t u e - as we have s a i d , the a b i l i t y to reason i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t - to allow them to make p r o p e r l y these kinds of d e c i s i o n s . Without such v i r t u e the r e p u b l i c might be expected to f a i l not long a f t e r the death of the L e g i s l a t o r ; and i t was a prime goal of the r e p u b l i c to escape from the dependence on and r e s t r i c t i o n of the s i n g l e human l i f e t i m e . If a l l these t h i n g s are provided by the L e g i s l a t o r the r e p u b l i c may be c o n s i d e r e d to be w e l l begun. We might expect i t to l a s t as long as the v i r t u e of the c i t i z e n s p e r s i s t s and as long as the laws of the L e g i s l a t o r continue to be a p p r o p r i a t e to the c o n d i t i o n s of the world and the temperament of the people. And the laws, as we have suggested, w i l l l a s t l ongest i f the c i t i z e n s e n t r u s t e d with t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and adjustment are v i r t u o u s . A l l these c o n d i t i o n s being met, the b e n e f i t s of l i f e i n s o c i e t y w i l l f o l l o w . The s t a b i l i t y of s o c i e t y and government w i l l p r ovide advantages to s t a t e and c i t i z e n a l i k e . These advantages vary from s t a t e to s t a t e i n accordance with the p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t i t u t i o n and c h a r a c t e r of the people: i n Sparta, m i l i t a r y might; i n Venice, p r o s p e r i t y ; i n Rome, empire. Such advantages are not without t h e i r dangers, but they play an important r o l e i n the sustenance of the r e p u b l i c . T h e i r importance l i e s i n the independence they grant to c i t i z e n s . T h i s independence a r i s e s d i f f e r e n t l y i n d i f f e r e n t kinds of 40 r e p u b l i c s . In Sparta m i l i t a r y success engenders p r i d e i n the s o l d i e r / c i t i z e n . H i s w i l l i n g n e s s to s a c r i f i c e h i m s e l f i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s i n c r e a s e d . In h i s r o l e as a d m i n i s t r a t o r of the c o n s t i t u t i o n h i s reason w i l l be unclouded i n i t s p u r s u i t of the p u b l i c good because, i n h i s p r i d e , he f e e l s the i n f l u e n c e of no one. On the Venetian model the s t a b i l i t y of the s u c c e s s f u l r e p u b l i c makes f o r a prosperous c i t i z e n r y . Such c i t i z e n s , secure i n t h e i r economic independence, are safe from b r i b e r y by f o r e i g n e r s or by i n t e r n a l i n t e r e s t groups. They too can f r e e l y e x e r c i s e d i s i n t e r e s t e d reason i n t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r o l e . One might ob j e c t that such v i r t u e has al r e a d y been i n s t i l l e d i n t o the c i t i z e n s at the time of the r e p u b l i c ' s c r e a t i o n . Why i s refreshment of t h i s v i r t u e required? The po i n t i s that a r e p u b l i c i s formed to overcome the acknowledged weaknesses of i n d i v i d u a l s : f o r one t h i n g the i n s p i r a t i o n of the L e g i s l a t o r can ha r d l y be expected to o u t l a s t h i s l i f e t i m e by much. For another there i s an ongoing danger inherent i n human nature that leads i n d i v i d u a l s to f a l l out of v i r t u e : the danger of s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s always pres e n t . The working r e p u b l i c thus r e q u i r e s the c o n t i n u a l refreshment of v i r t u e . I t does so by r e i n f o r c i n g the independence of c i t i z e n s . In t h i s drawing-out of the elements of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c we thus r e v e a l a c l o s e d l o g i c a l system. The anc i e n t w r i t e r s b e l i e v e d that the r e p u b l i c o f f e r e d a genuine s o l u t i o n to the weakness of human nature: the system of balanced government 41 would prevent day-to-day f a i l u r e i n v i r t u e from undermining the p o l i t y ; and the s u c c e s s f u l r e p u b l i c c o u l d , through the independence of i t s c i t i z e n s , feed back enough v i r t u e i n t o the c i t i z e n s to overcome the tendency to c o r r u p t i o n inherent i n human nature. The r e p u b l i c thus c o n s t i t u t e d might be expected to continue f o r e v e r . (d) Independence and Reason i n the C l a s s i c a l Republican T r a d i t i o n . For the purposes of the assessment of Hume which f o l l o w s i t i s necessary to draw two r e l a t e d p o i n t s out of t h i s review of c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m . They concern the p l a c e of independence i n the r e p u b l i c a n s t r u c t u r e and the r o l e of reason. On the matter of independence i t i s easy to s l i p i n t o misunderstanding. I n t e r p r e t e r s l i k e Raab, Pocock or Fink pay a great deal of a t t e n t i o n to the p l a c e of independence; one tends to come away with the impression that v i r t u e s p r i n g s d i r e c t l y from the independence granted a man of m i l i t a r y a b i l i t y or a man of economic independence. But t h i s i s to make an important e r r o r . The p o i n t of independence i n the system we have d e s c r i b e d can only be that i t f r e e s the reasoning process i n the c i t i z e n and allows him to reason i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . M a c h i a v e l l i ' s i n t e n s e concern with c o r r u p t i o n i s proof of t h i s . Why i s dependence a s s o c i a t e d with c o r r u p t i o n ? Because the i n t e r e s t s e n t a i l e d by dependence impair the reasoning process and l e t a c i t i z e n b e l i e v e that the i n t e r e s t of the s t a t e i s not h i s own. I t i s from unimpaired reason that v i r t u e comes, 4 2 because i t is only from such reason that that a sense of the public interest can flow. The argument i s v a l i d i f one supposes, as republicans c l e a r l y did, that disinterested reason w i l l always place public over private interest. Let us rei t e r a t e t h i s point, because i t w i l l be important to arguments which follow: in the republican system virtue i s the a b i l i t y to see public over private interest; i t springs from the disinterested exercise of reason; independence i s thus only an indirect source of virtue in c i t i z e n s ; i t i s important as the support of reason but i s not in i t s e l f the immediate source of virtue; the immediate source of virtue in the republican system is reason. It i s easy to come away from a reading of the l i t e r a t u r e on c l a s s i c a l republicanism impressed with the importance of independence. Much of the excitement generated by Pocock's story, for example, comes through seeing the extraordinary transformation of that independence from a quality rooted in mi l i t a r y ideals to one resting on economic foundations. This story i s so s t r i k i n g - and so r i c h in p o s s i b i l i t y - that attention i s drawn away from the fact that independence i s only one feature of the t r a d i t i o n . But reason, unfettered by s e l f - i n t e r e s t , i s the true engine of c l a s s i c a l republicanism. The central question of the t r a d i t i o n i s how, given the inherent weakness of men in the face of s e l f - i n t e r e s t , can they be supported in such a way as to exercise their capacity for disinterested reason. Independence i s important, but not for 43 i t s e l f , r a t h e r because of the kind of reason i t supports. 3. SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITISH REPUBLICANISM (a) H a r r i n g t o n . Much of David Hume's acquaintance with c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m came through the work of James Ha r r i n g t o n and from the f e r t i l e Augustan p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e forming the immediate background to the debates of Hume's own day. While Harrington and the Augustans a l t e r e d r e p u b l i c a n i s m s i g n i f i c a n t l y the c e n t r a l l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e we have i d e n t i f i e d remained e s s e n t i a l -l y unchanged. S i g n i f i c a n t accomodations to changing economic and i n t e l l e c t u a l c l i m a t e s i n v o l v e d a t t i t u d e s towards commerce and the t a k i n g of modern p s y c h o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s . The l a t t e r had important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the place of reason i n p o l i t i c s which we have d e s c r i b e d ; the r e l a t i o n of reason to the passions tended to become a p o l i t i c a l and a p s y c h o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n . In Hume's view the foremost B r i t i s h c o n t r i b u t o r to r e p u b l i c a n l i t e r a t u r e was James H a r r i n g t o n , who provided "the only v a l u a b l e model of a commonwealth that has yet been o f f e r e d to the p u b l i c . " 1 5 H a r r i n g t o n ' s v e r s i o n of the i d e a l r e p u b l i c r e s t e d on a v i r t u o u s n o b i l i t y : " N o b i l i t y , not possessed of h e r e d i t a r y p r i v i l e g e s or powers beyond the i n h e r i t a n c e of property ... were 1 5 D a v i d Hume, "Idea of a P e r f e c t Commonwealth,"Essays Moral,  P o l i t i c a l and L i t e r a r y , (1741-42 and 1752) Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963, p.501. 44 the ' l i f e and s o u l ' of a s u c c e s s f u l mixed s t a t e . " 1 6 True nobles were "... such as l i v e upon t h e i r own revenues i n p l e n t y , without engagement e i t h e r unto the t i l l i n g of t h e i r lands, or other work f o r t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d . The f i r s t b a s i s of n o b i l i t y , then, was 'ancient r i c h e s . ' Men whose minds and energies were not occupied with t h e i r own a f f a i r s had l e i s u r e to r e f l e c t on the good of the whole s t a t e . When to r e f l e c t i o n they added the performance of s e r v i c e s f o r the commonwealth, they a c q u i r e d the second b a s i s of n o b i l i t y - v i r t u e . When c e r t a i n f a m i l i e s became d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o r such s e r v i c e s , 'ancient v i r t u e ' became the accompaniment of 'ancient r i c h e s ' and n o b i l i t y i n the f u l l e s t was a c q u i r e d . " 1 7 H a r r i n g t o n ' s i d e a l c i t i z e n thus r e s t e d h i s v i r t u e on economic and s o c i a l independence. Those l a c k i n g such independence co u l d never escape t h e i r own need to the extent r e -q u i r e d by p o l i t i c a l l i f e : "Your mechanicks t i l l they have f i r s t f e a t h e r ' d t h e i r n e s t s , l i k e the Fowles of the Ayr, whose whole imployment i s to seek t h e i r food, are so busied i n t h e i r p r i v a t e concernments, that they have n e i t h e r l e i s u r e to study the p u b l i c k , nor are s a f e l y to be t r u s t e d with i t . " 1 8 Pocock's a n a l y s i s of Ha r r i n g t o n s t r e s s e s the importance of r e a l property i n the support of the v i r t u e of c i t i z e n s . "Harrington's acquaintance with E n g l i s h l e g a l a n t i q u a r i a n i s m p ermitted him ... to add a f u r t h e r dimension ... which M a c h i a v e l l i had missed: the bearing of arms, once i t was seen as a f u n c t i o n of feu d a l tenure, proved to be based upon the pos s e s s i o n of pr o p e r t y . The c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n was that between vassalage and f r e e h o l d : i t determined whether a man's sword was h i s l o r d ' s or h i s own and the commonwealth's; and the f u n c t i o n of f r e e p r o p r i e t o r s h i p became the l i b e r a t i o n of arms, and consequently of the p e r s o n a l i t y , 1 6 F i n k , The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, p.59. 1 7 F i n k , The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, p.59. 1 8 H a r r i n g t o n , quoted by Fink, The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, p.58. 45 f o r f r e e p u b l i c a c t i o n and c i v i c v i r t u e . " 1 9 On t h i s foundation, H a r r i n g t o n was able to move to a re-assessment of the r e p u b l i c a n concept of c o r r u p t i o n . In terms of the a n a l y s i s of r e p u b l i c a n i s m we have presented he moved f u r t h e r i n the d i r e c t i o n of the s o c i a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l support of v i r t u e , moving away from the i d e a l of i n d i v i d u a l m i l i t a r y v i r t u e s . C o r r u p t i o n , a c c o r d i n g l y , became an almost proto-Marxian n o t i o n of m i s - f i t between p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s and t h e i r foundations i n the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of land h o l d i n g s . 2 0 And p o l i t i e s became c o r r u p t , l e s s because of the innate tendency of i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s to pursue s e l f - i n t e r e s t , than because "... the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y was no longer p r o p e r l y r e l a t e d to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y that should determine i t . " 2 1 H a r r i n g t o n ' s r e p u b l i c a n i s m thus continues to f i t the conceptual p a t t e r n we have r e v e a l e d . He d i d s t r e s s the impor-tance of i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l q u a l i t i e s ; but i t i s even c l e a r e r in H a r r i n g t o n than i n the Renaissance p o l i t i c i a n s that the e s s e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l q u a l i t i e s cannot s u r v i v e without the support of economic and s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r those which support a c l a s s of independent c i t i z e n s . H a r r i n g t o n ' s Oceana thus r e s t e d on a f i r m b e l i e f i n n a t u r a l a r i s t o c r a c y , kept v i r t u o u s by a balance of people and e x e c u t i v e . The path of 1 9Pocock, The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment, p.386. 2 0 P o c o c k , The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment, p.387. 2 1 P o c o c k , The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment, p.387. 46 v i r t u e was n e i t h e r from s o c i e t y t o i n d i v i d u a l nor v i c e v e r s a : t h e two were m u t u a l l y s u s t a i n i n g . I n d i v i d u a l s needed c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s t o s u s t a i n t h e i r e x i s t e n c e a s i m p a r t i a l r e a s o n e r s f o r t h e s t a t e . The p o l i t y needed s u c h v i r t u e b o t h i n i t s f o r m a t i o n and i n d a y - t o - d a y p o l i t i c s , t o p r e v e n t t h e breakdowns a r i s i n g f rom e x c e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t . So a l t h o u g h H a r r i n g t o n moved t h e s u p p o r t o f v i r t u e i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e V e n e t i a n model, from s o m e t h i n g f u n d a m e n t a l l y m a r t i a l t o s o m e t h i n g f u n d a m e n t a l l y e c o n o m i c , t h e v i r t u e r e m a i n e d e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same: c i t i z e n s must be p o s s e s s e d o f t h e a b i l i t y t o r e a s o n i n t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . I n t h e l i g h t o f t h i s , and i n t h e l i g h t o f H i r s c h m a n ' s comments on t h e r e l a t i o n o f i n t e r e s t t o t h e p a s s i o n s i n e a r l y modern p o l i t i c s , H a r r i n g t o n ' s c o n n e c t i o n o f c o r r u p t i o n t o t h e p a s s i o n s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g . In M a c h i a v e l l i t h e l o s s of c i v i c v i r t u e , t h e a b i l i t y t o see t h e common good, i s r e l a t e d t o p a s s i o n a t e d e s i r e f o r s o l e l y p e r s o n a l g a i n o r g l o r y . But H a r r i n g t o n went f u r t h e r , e x p l i c i t l y t y i n g p a s s i o n s t o t h e c l a s s i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e p u r e forms o f g o v ernment. D e g e n e r a t i o n t h u s o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e : "... t h e unmixed forms o f government c o n t a i n no c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e t o t h e n a t u r a l t e n d e n c y i n man f o r p a s s i o n t o u s u r p t h e r u l e o f r e a s o n . I n d e e d , he ( H a r r i n g t o n ) goes so f a r a s t o say t h a t when t h e one, t h e few, o r t h e many r u l e by r e a s o n , we have t h e t h r e e s i m p l e forms o f government, and t h a t when p a s s i o n c r e e p s i n we have t h e i r c o r r u p t i o n s . From t h i s p o s i t i o n , i t f o l l o w e d t h a t t h e whole a r t o f government was so t o c o n t r i v e t h e s t a t e t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s o f government w o u l d compensate f o r and overcome t h e n a t u r a l e v i l i n man. H a r r i n g t o n t h o u g h t t h a t t h i s c o u l d be done by 47 mixed government." 2 2 H a r r i n g t o n thus demonstrated a shrewd f o r e s i g h t : 18th century p o l i t i c a l debate was to be dominated by j u s t such concern f o r the passionate nature of men and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r p o l i t i c s . But once again a c e r t a i n ambivalence appears i n the t r a d i t i o n . C o r r u p t i o n i s d e s c r i b e d both as a pr o p e r t y of the economic and p o l i t i c a l f a b r i c s - a mismatch between the two and as a predominance of passion over reason - t h i s l a t t e r c l e a r l y o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l . The t e n s i o n between these two notions i s appa r e n t l y never r e s o l v e d i n H a r r i n g t o n ; he remained a 17th century f i g u r e i n that i t never a p p a r e n t l y o c c u r r e d to him, as i t would to many 18th century w r i t e r s , that passions themselves might serve as a b a s i s f o r a p o l i t i c a l p e r s o n a l i t y . H a r rington's confidence i n the s t r e n g t h of the land-based p o l i t i c a l p e r s o n a l i t y allowed him to overlook such a p o s s i b i l i t y i n s p i t e of h i s evident worry over the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the p a s s i o n s . But i t was an e r o s i o n of confidence i n land-based v i r t u e which helped b r i n g t h i s ambivalence to the sur f a c e i n the burgeoning f i n a n c i a l environment of l a t e 17th and e a r l y 18th century B r i t a i n . The p a r t of Harrington's v i s i o n r e s t i n g on pro p e r t y and the p r o p e r t i e d was not long formulated when i t began to be threatened by the growth i n importance of kinds of pro p e r t y and s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s seen by r e p u b l i c a n t h i n k e r s as c o r r u p t . In England, from about the 1670's, the growth of p r o f e s s i o n a l 2 2Fink,The C l a s s i c a l Republicans, pp.60-61. 48 armies, of organized patronage in Parliament, and the e x i s t e n c e of i n t e r e s t groups dependent on such i n s t i t u t i o n s , began to alarm those of c o n s e r v a t i v e bent. The F i n a n c i a l R e v o l u t i o n of the 1690's brought government debt, j o i n t stock companies and stock jobbing, paper f i n a n c i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s , and stock market c r i s e s to the worried a t t e n t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l l y minded. Such i n s t i t u t i o n s , which in t h e i r nature r e s t e d on a h i g h l y i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e and hence v o l a t i l e model of economic l i f e , t hreatened to d i s p l a c e the H a r r i n g t o n i a n land-based i d e a l . As Pocock puts i t : "Forms of property were seen to a r i s e which conveyed the n o t i o n of inherent dependence: s a l a r i e d o f f i c e , r e l i a n c e on p r i v a t e or p o l i t i c a l patronage, on p u b l i c c r e d i t . For these the a p p r o p r i a t e term i n the r e p u b l i c a n l e x i c o n was c o r r u p t i o n - the s u b s t i t u t i o n of p r i v a t e dependencies f o r p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y - and the t h r e a t to i n d i v i d u a l i n t e g r i t y and self-knowledge which c o r r u p t i o n had always i m p l i e d was r e i n f o r c e d by the r i s e of forms of property seeming to r e s t on fantasy and f a l s e c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Once pro p e r t y was seen to have a symbolic value, expressed i n c o i n or i n c r e d i t , the foundations of p e r s o n a l i t y themselves appeared imaginary or at best consensual: the i n d i v i d u a l c o u l d e x i s t , even i n h i s own s i g h t , only at the f l u c t u a t i n g value imposed upon him by h i s f e l l o w s , and these e v a l u a t i o n s , though constant and p u b l i c , were too i r r a t i o n a l l y performed to be seen as a c t s of p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n or v i r t u e . " 2 3 (b) M a n d e v i l l e and the Augustans. Much of p o l i t i c a l debate i n the new B r i t a i n of the 18th century can thus be understood as an encounter between the vocabulary of the r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n and these t h r e a t e n i n g new r e a l i t i e s . Our r e l a t i v e l y new understanding of these matters has a l r e a d y allowed b e t t e r comprehension of a great d e a l of 18th 2 3 P o c o c k , The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment, p.464. 49 century p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . An example i s the work of Bernard M a n d e v i l l e , who made f o r himself a Hobbesian r e p u t a t i o n exposing the inadequacies of the language of v i r t u e and c o r r u p t i o n i n the face of s o c i a l and economic r e a l i t i e s . 2 " M a n d e v i l l e ' s w r i t i n g s , which c o u l d have remained i n t e r e s t i n g o d d i t i e s i n l i t e r a r y h i s t o r y , were made important by the s t r e n g t h of the r e a c t i o n they engendered. He struck a c o l l e c t i v e nerve, making readers angry with h i s 'proofs' that they were governed s o l e l y by t h e i r p a s s i o n s , that v i r t u e a c t u a l -l y p layed no part i n the l i f e of the s o c i a l h i v e . Pocock f i n d s a thread of e x i s t e n t i a l f e a r i n the ap p a r e n t l y e x c e s s i v e r e a c t i o n to M a n d e v i l l e ' s word-games. The h e r i t a g e of 18th century European c i t i z e n s was a b e l i e f that p o l i t i c a l e x i s t e n c e r e s t e d on a b i l i t y to judge r a t i o n a l l y and o b j e c t i v e l y f o r the community and that these f a c e t s were rooted i n a c e r t a i n economic s t r u c t u r e and t h e i r part i n that s t r u c t u r e . M a n d e v i l l e ' s j i b e s caused great d i s c o m f o r t : i t l a y i n the r e a l i z a t i o n that economic l i f e seemed to have turned f o r e v e r from v i r t u o u s paths which s t i l l , f o r many, provided a s e n s i b l e s e c u l a r account of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . T h i s i s , of course, a complex s t o r y ; i t has been w e l l t o l d elsewhere and needs no e l a b o r a t i o n here. For our present purposes we need only draw a t t e n t i o n to the r e l a t i o n between reason and the passions which emerges from the debate i n i t s 2 " B e r n a r d M a n d e v i l l e , The Fable of the Bees, (1724) ed. P h i l l i p Harth, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970. 50 e a r l y 18th century form. We have noted that the e x e r c i s e of d i s i n t e r e s t e d reason l i e s near the heart of the l o g i c a l s t r u c -t ure of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n . Our deduction i s supported by the a n a l y s i s of Pocock, fo r i t seems that fear of i r r a t i o n a l i t y , and a l o s s of the conceptual requirements of c i t i z e n s h i p , were widespread among t h o u g h t f u l 18th century people. Only such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i t seems, can make sense of the tumultuous r e a c t i o n to M a n d e v i l l e ' s work. As d e s c r i b e d i n Pocock, and, from q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t angle, by Hirschman, 18th century p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s faced a complex d i f f i c u l t y . Passions were widely regarded as the a n t i t h e s i s of reason. They were a s s o c i a t e d with s e l f - i n t e r e s t and dependence. Finance and commerce had always been regarded, from the r e p u b l i c a n p e r s p e c t i v e , as r e l a t i v e l y minor and necessary e v i l s . But they now began to occupy prominent p o s i t i o n s i n the l i v e s of c i t i e s and governments. As they d i d , those of the r e p u b l i c a n mold began to suspect that i r r a t i o n a l i t y was c r e e p i n g i n t o the center of p u b l i c l i f e , i n t o the p l a c e formerly occupied by the c i v i c v i r t u e we have analysed at l e n g t h . T h i s extreme conceptual t e n s i o n produced an astounding a r r a y of responses. Some w r i t e r s simply berated the new order: Bolingbroke a s s a u l t e d Walpole's new s t y l e of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n with n o s t a l g i c i n v e c t i v e taken from the pages of M a c h i a v e l l i , H a r r i n g t o n and the A u g u s t a n s . 2 5 Much of Rousseau's work can be 2 5 I s a a c Kramnick, Bolingbroke and h i s C i r c l e : The P o l i t i c s of  N o s t a l g i a i n the Age of Walpole, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968, passim. 51 w e l l understood as a l o s t attempt somehow to i n c o r p o r a t e r e p u b l i c a n i d e a l s i n t o a v i s i o n of mass democracy. Other w r i t e r s , however, attempted to face the problem more d i r e c t l y . There can be no doubt that one of the most important responses was that which e s s e n t i a l l y disposed of the n o t i o n of v i r t u e a l t o g e t h e r . Montesquieu's a n a l y s i s of the workings of 18th century monarchy - which he d e s c r i b e d as founded on pa s s i o n went some way i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . The c u l m i n a t i o n of the approach - and the t r a d i t i o n a l watershed - i s found i n Adam Smith. Although Smith never wholly escaped the i d e a l s of the r e p u b l i c he c l e a r l y l e f t behind the c e n t r a l elements of the r e p u b l i c a n framework. The n e c e s s i t y f o r the r e p u b l i c a n v i r t u e of a c i t i z e n - the a b i l i t y to reason i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t - i s removed. Smith most c e r t a i n l y advocated reason, but the atmosphere surrounding that reason i s changed g r e a t l y i n h i s p i c t u r e of s o c i e t y . I f i n d i v i d u a l s look to t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , the i n v i s i b l e hand w i l l see to the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Edmund Burke recognized t h i s , i n complaining about the reduced scope of reason i n modern s o c i e t y : "We are a f r a i d to put men to l i v e and trade each on h i s own p r i v a t e stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock i n each man i s small ,.." 2 6 Smith h i m s e l f p r o v i d e d a p e r f e c t b r i e f e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n of the change i n reason from a u n i v e r s a l p o s s e s s i o n of c i t i z e n s to a commodity l i k e any other: 2 6 T h e p o i n t and the q u o t a t i o n are from Raymond W i l l i a m s , C u l t u r e  and S o c i e t y 1790-1950, Harmondsworth, P e l i c a n Books, 1961, p.28. 52 "In opulent and commercial s o c i e t i e s to thin k or to reason comes to be, l i k e every other employment, a p a r t i c u l a r business, which i s c a r r i e d on by a very few people, who f u r n i s h the p u b l i c with a l l the thought and reason possessed by the vast m u l t i t u d e s that l a b o u r . " 2 7 The v i s i o n here i s c l e a r l y one of reason being bought and s o l d ; the c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n i s that the e x i s t e n c e of any reason unclouded by a s e l l e r ' s i n t e r e s t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y i n the s o c i e t y Smith i s d e s c r i b i n g . From the p o i n t of view of our a n a l y s i s of the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c the i m p l i c a t i o n s of such a remark are l a r g e : while Smith may have continued to h o l d c e r t a i n v e s t i g a l or n o s t a l g i c elements of the r e p u b l i c a n credo, t h i s remark alone would make i t c l e a r that he l e f t behind the c e n t r a l i d e a l s of the r e p u b l i c . Now while t h i s too i s perhaps a simple view of a complex matter, i t i s c o r r e c t enough to guide our thoughts a l i t t l e way. The d e s c r i p t i o n of Hume which f o l l o w s w i l l enable us to place Hume on the other s i d e of the watershed from Smith. T h i s , as we have seen, i s i n o p p o s i t i o n to the p o s i t i o n s of Hirschman and Moore, which p l a c e Hume with those who t r i e d to wr i t e v i r t u e out of the s t r u c t u r e of p o l i t i c a l thought. Hirschman and Moore do t h i s p r i n c i p a l l y because they b e l i e v e , with most of the i n t e l l e c t u a l world, that Hume's philosophy o f f e r e d no place f o r the i n f l u e n c e of reason over the p a s s i o n s . B e l i e v i n g t h i s , i t i s r i g h t l y impossible f o r them to come to any o v e r a l l assessment of Hume's work which shows any deep concordance with the 2 7 F r o m a D r a f t of the Wealth of Nations, i n Adam Smith as  Student and P r o f e s s o r , W.R. S c o t t , New York , A.M. Kerry, 1965, p.344. 53 t h e o r i e s of c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m . Our next t a s k , t h e n , w i l l be t o argue a g a i n s t t h i s w i d e l y h e l d b e l i e f : Hume's p h i l o s o p h y does indeed p r o v i d e f o r an imp o r t a n t element of c o n t r o l of the p a s s i o n s by r e a s o n . An un-d e r s t a n d i n g of t h i s p a r t of Hume's p h i l o s o p h y w i l l a l l o w t o t o see w i t h g r e a t e r c l a r i t y i t s r e l a t i o n s t o the r e p u b l i c a n s t r u c -t u r e s we have j u s t a n a l y s e d . 5 4 I V . A T R E A T I S E OF HUMAN N A T U R E : D A V I D H U M E ' S E P I S T E M O L O G Y F O R P O L I T I C S U_ T H E I M P O R T A N C E OF T H E T R E A T I S E T h e T r e a t i s e w a s t h e f i r s t s u b s t a n t i a l w o r k o f a v e r y y o u n g m a n ; Hume w r o t e i t d u r i n g a s o j o u r n o f s e v e r a l y e a r s i n F r a n c e . I t w a s p u b l i s h e d i n s e v e r a l s t a g e s d u r i n g t h e y e a r s 1 7 3 9 a n d 1 7 4 0 . Hume w a s n o t y e t t w e n t y - o n e a n d t h e w o r k h a d a l l t h e f a u l t s a n d m e r i t s o f a n e a r l y w o r k b y a t a l e n t e d a u t h o r . T h e m e r i t l a y i n a v a s t s y s t e m a t i c v i s i o n o f t h e h u m a n a n d n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . T h e f a u l t s l a y p r i n c i p a l l y i n t h e m e t h o d o f c o m p o s i t i o n a n d p u b l i c a t i o n b y v o l u m e - w h i c h d i d n o t a l l o w Hume t o e d i t t h e w o r k a s a w h o l e - a n d i n a s o m e t i m e s e x c e s s i v e i n t e l l e c t u a l n i c e t y - w h i c h o f t e n c a u s e d Hume t o u n d e r m i n e a n d c o n f u s e h i s o w n a r g u m e n t s w i t h d o u b t s a n d c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s . T h e s e f e a t u r e s h a v e m a d e t h e T r e a t i s e a f e r t i l e s o u r c e o f 1 8 t h c e n t u r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a s . T h e d i f f i c u l t T r e a t i s e w a s n o g r e a t s u c c e s s o n f i r s t p u b l i c a t i o n . Hume f a m o u s l y m o a n e d t h a t i t " f e l l d e a d - b o r n f r o m t h e p r e s s " . B u t w h i l e e x p r e s s i n g p u b l i c d i s t a s t e f o r h i s f a i l u r e - w h i c h h e h a d c a u t i o u s l y p u b l i s h e d a n o n y m o u s l y - Hume p r o c e e d e d t o m i n e i t f o r m u c h o f t h e r e s t o f h i s l i f e . L a r g e s e c t i o n s o f t h e E s s a y s M o r a l a n d P o l i t i c a l ( 1 7 4 1 - 4 2 ) a r e p a t e n t r e w o r k i n g s o f s e c t i o n s o f t h e T r e a t i s e . T h e s a m e c a n b e s a i d o f 55 the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), the Enquiry  Concerning the P r i n c i p l e s of Morals (1751) and the P o l i t i c a l  D i s c o u r s e s (1752). The t h r i f t y Hume, i n f a c t , s c a r c e l y allowed a s e c t i o n of the T r e a t i s e to escape r e - w r i t i n g and r e - p u b l i c a t i o n . 1 Hume's work thus p r e s e n t s something of a quandary. Almost every re-working of m a t e r i a l from the T r e a t i s e which Hume subsequently p u b l i s h e d i s i n a c l e a r e r , more mature and more e a s i l y understandable form. Hume had le a r n e d to make h i s musings p a l a t a b l e to the p u b l i c . And yet never again do a l l these p a r t s stand together i n a systematic whole. Some s c h o l a r s b e l i e v e that Hume made s u b s t a n t i a l changes to h i s system of thought i n the course of h i s r e - w r i t i n g s . 2 For the purposes of t h i s t h e s i s the opposite p o s i t i o n w i l l be maintained. While there may be some j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the E n q u i r i e s from the T r e a t i s e on c e r t a i n complex e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i s s u e s , f o r example, such i s s u e s do not seem to bear upon the qu e s t i o n of the r e l a t i o n of that epistemology to Hume's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , which i s the axe we have to g r i n d . 1See M i l l e r , Philosophy and Ideology, pp.7-8. 2 F o r some well-known examples see Norman Kemp Smith, The  Philosophy of David Hume, New York, S t . Martin's Press, 1966, chap. 24;- John B. Stewart, The Moral and P o l i t i c a l Philosophy of  David Hume, New York, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1963, Appendix; James Noxon, Hume's P h i l o s o p h i c a l Development, Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1973; L.A. Selby-Bigge's i n t r o d u c t i o n to the E n q u i r i e s Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. 56 Since Hume's v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l essays themselves conceal t h e i r systematic o r i g i n s i n the T r e a t i s e , p r e s e n t i n g r e s u l t s r a t h e r than p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundations, our only hope of under-standing Hume's p o l i t i c s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n to h i s psychology l i e s i n the admittedly d i f f i c u l t T r e a t i s e . T h i s i s not to say that the Essays do not show t h e i r connections to the T r e a t i s e , f o r they do, but only to express the b e l i e f that understanding w i l l come p r i m a r i l y through the T r e a t i s e . In accordance with these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s of Hume's T r e a t i s e w i l l make f r e e with q u o t a t i o n s from and r e f e r e n c e s to h i s E n q u i r i e s and Essays. The goal of t h i s t h e s i s i s a b e t t e r understanding of the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n of Hume's p s y c h o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l thought. T h i s p r o j e c t i s undertaken in the b e l i e f that t h i s s t r u c t u r e d i d not a l t e r s i g -n i f i c a n t l y d u r i n g Hume's c a r e e r . As M i l l e r puts i t , the T r e a t i s e i s "Hume's g r e a t e s t work, and i t i s a l s o the key to e v e r y t h i n g e l s e that he wrote." 3 2_j_ HUME' S PROJECT IN THE TREATISE; AN OUTLINE OF THE TREATISE In the l i g h t of the e f f o r t s of Montesquieu and o t h e r s , i t i s evident that the r e l a t i o n of reason to the passions was a c e n t r a l i s s u e f o r many 18th century p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s . Seen i n t h i s l i g h t the T r e a t i s e , f o r a l l i t s o r i g i n a l i t y , i s a r e l a t i v e l y u n s u r p r i s i n g p r o j e c t . Montesquieu himself made s i m i l a r e f f o r t s : h i s Essay on Causes A f f e c t i n g Minds and  3 M i l l e r . Philosophy and Ideology, p.9. 57 C h a r a c t e r s (1736-43) attempts to provide a b a s i s f o r p o l i t i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n i n the psychology of ideas." But while Montesquieu was i n many ways the deeper student of human m o t i v a t i o n he lack e d Hume's g i f t f o r f i n e - g r a i n e d a n a l y s i s ; h i s psychology remained at root i n t u i t i v e r a t her than s y s t e m a t i c . In t h i s context the f u l l t i t l e of Hume's great work, A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning i n t o MORAL SUBJECTS, (the c a p i t a l s are Hume's own) takes on a d e c i d e d l y p o l i t i c a l resonance. In h i s opening comments Hume claimed that a l l branches of human knowledge r e s t on the same foundation: " ' T i s e v i d e n t , that a l l the s c i e n c e s have a r e l a t i o n , g r e a t e r or l e s s , to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from i t , they s t i l l r e t u r n back by one passage or another. Even Mathematics, N a t u r a l Philosophy and N a t u r a l R e l i g i o n , are i n some measure dependent on the s c i e n c e of MAN: si n c e they l i e under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by t h e i r powers and f a c u l t i e s . " 5 The road, then, to understanding i n any f i e l d l a y f i r s t with an understanding of the nature of man. The s t r u c t u r e of Hume's T r e a t i s e r e f l e c t s t h i s b e l i e f i n the context of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of the 17th and 18th c e n t u r i e s . Book I analyses the ideas and b e l i e f s of men - how they reason, when they reason and when they do not. Book II analyses t h e i r "See C h a r l e s L o u i s Montesquieu, An Essay on Causes A f f e c t i n g  Minds and C h a r a c t e r s , i n the same volume as The S p i r i t of Laws, ed., David Wallace C a r r i t h e r s , Berkeley, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1977, pp.417 f f . 5 D a v i d Hume, A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature, ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, At the U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1888, p.xv. 58 passions and mo t i v a t i o n s , and assesses the r e l a t i o n of the rea-soning process to w i l l and a c t i o n . Book III takes the human i n d i v i d u a l thus analysed and p l a c e s him i n s o c i e t y - m o r a l i t y and p o l i t i c s are d e s c r i b e d i n the l i g h t of human psychology. Two chapters of the T r e a t i s e , "Of the O r i g i n of Government" and "Of the Source of A l l e g i a n c e " , thus appear almost as the kernel of the T r e a t i s e . 6 In them Hume p u l l s together the threads of the long argument, showing how h i s a n a l y s i s of knowledge, b e l i e f and the p a s s i o n s pays o f f i n an understanding of p o l i t i c a l l i f e , (a) Knowledge and B e l i e f i n the T r e a t i s e . Hume's system begins with a d i v i s i o n of a l l the contents of the mind i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s , impressions and i d e a s . The former amount to a c t u a l input from the senses, what we might c a l l sense data. A c e n t r a l argument of Book I of the T r e a t i s e i s designed to convince us that the mind has nothing to work upon except these impressions. There a r e , of course, i n t e r n a l as w e l l as e x t e r n a l senses, and so impressions a r i s e from o p e r a t i o n s of the mind as w e l l as from the world o u t s i d e . Now the mind i s supposed by Hume to possess c e r t a i n mechanical p r o p e r t i e s e n a b l i n g i t to process the raw impressions i t r e c e i v e s . I t has for example a memory, to hold impressions and present them again in somewhat weaker form. These weaker v e r s i o n s of impressions, which the mind can produce and manipulate i n v a r i o u s ways, comprise the other c l a s s of mental o b j e c t s i n Hume's a n a l y s i s , 6Hume, T r e a t i s e , Book I I I , Part I I , S e c t i o n s VII and V I I I , p p . 5 3 4 f f . 59 the i d e a s . In a d d i t i o n Hume supposes the mind to have f a c u l t i e s e n a b l i n g i t to manipulate i d e a s : combining simple ideas, p e r c e i v i n g r e l a t i o n s of q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y , producing a b s t r a c t ideas from r e l a t e d groups of simple ideas, and so on. For our present purposes the importance of t h i s system i s the epistemology c o n s t r u c t e d upon i t . Knowledge i s seen to be of two b a s i c kinds: of the r e l a t i o n s of ideas and of matters of f a c t . The former i s best represented by mathematics: the mind can d i s c o v e r by r e f l e c t i o n alone r e l a t i o n s of i d e n t i t y between ideas, and mathematics r e s t s on t h i s a b i l i t y . A l l other kinds of knowledge f a l l i n t o the second category, that of matters of f a c t . These, Hume t e l l s us, o f f e r l i t t l e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t y i n s o f a r as they r e l a t e to o b j e c t s a v a i l a b l e to the "present testimony of the sen s e s . " 7 T h i s i s to say that we can c e r t a i n l y c l a i m to know our c u r r e n t impressions. But s i n c e most of what people know reaches beyond the present testimony of the senses, Hume needs to j u s t i f y t h i s most important c l a s s of knowledge c l a i m s . The whole of t h i s l a r g e c l a s s of knowledge c l a i m s , argues Hume, f a l l s i n t o the category of cl a i m s concerning the r e l a t i o n of cause and e f f e c t . A l l q u e s t i o n s about t h i s kind of knowledge can be seen to be questions about how we can come to know that some o b j e c t , c u r r e n t l y c o n t a i n e d i n the mind, has any necessary r e l a t i o n to another o b j e c t not immediately p r e s e n t . 7 D a v i d Hume, E n q u i r i e s Concerning Human Understanding and  Concerning the P r i n c i p l e s of Morals (1777), eds., Selby-Bigge and N i d d i t c h , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p.26. 60 A cornerstone of Hume's empiricism f o l l o w s from t h i s : "that causes and e f f e c t s are d i s c o v e r a b l e , not by reason but by experience." 8 To use one of Hume's own examples, there i s noth-ing i n the idea of a moving b i l l i a r d b a l l that c o u l d i n any way giv e us a p r i o r i the idea that i t would make a second b a l l move on c o n t a c t . We c o u l d imagine that one might make the other move, i f we wished. But we c o u l d j u s t as soon imagine that the c o l l i s i o n might spontaneously give r i s e to a herd of goats. There would be no a p r i o r i reason f o r p r e f e r r i n g one fantasy to the other. Now t h i s being the case, how i s i t that we come to know anything at a l l o u t s i d e of immediate impressions or mathematical t r u t h s ? Hume's answer r e s t s on b u i l t - i n tendencies or s t r u c -t u r e s of the mind: to say that two mental o b j e c t s are r e l a t e d c a u s a l l y , the two must e x h i b i t some degree of c o n t i g u i t y i n time and space and there must be a constant c o n j u n c t i o n of the two o b j e c t s i n a l l experience of them. Is there then any absolute c e r t a i n t y u n d e r l y i n g our judgement that the one b a l l causes the other to move? There i s not. The s a t i s f a c t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s of c o n t i g u i t y and constant c o n j u n c t i o n i s as f a r as e m p i r i c a l matters can ever go. To ask f o r more would be to ask the i m p o s s i b l e : that the only way i n which we can l e a r n about the world be d i f f e r e n t . T h i s p o s i t i o n , sometimes seen as profoundly s c e p t i c a l , was 8 H u m e , E n q u i r i e s , p.28. 61 not so intended by Hume.9 He d i d indeed see i t as c a u t i o n a r y , f o r i t i m p l i e d a humbleness i n the making of knowledge c l a i m s . But the c l a s s i c work of Kemp Smith, r e i t e r a t e d r e c e n t l y by R.W. Connon, has shown that the p o i n t of Hume's a n a l y s i s of c a u s a l i t y was not what Popkin c a l l s P y r r o n n i c s c e p t i c i s m 1 0 but rather de-s c r i p t i v e p s y c h o l o g y . 1 1 Hume's account of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundations of knowledge was intended p o s i t i v e l y : he b e l i e v e d that a proper assessment of knowledge c l a i m s might a ct as a n t i d o t e to the enthusiasm (rooted i n p r i d e of knowledge) pla g u i n g p u b l i c and r e l i g i o u s debates of h i s t i m e . 1 2 T h i s view of the s t a t u s of knowledge c l a i m s has i m p l i c a t i o n s beyond the realm of pure p h i l o s o p h y : Hume's a n a l y s i s supports no e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the moral and n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . P h y sics thus r e s t s on no stronger l o g i c a l foundation than p o l i t i c s . I t appears more f i r m l y founded, but that i s simply a matter of experience: great r e g u l a r i t i e s p e r s i s t i n the mechanical world. These r e g u l a r i t i e s are so con-stant that we come to suppose that r e l a t i o n s , as between two 9Thomas Reid, for example, thought that Hume had undertaken a r e d u c t i o ad adsurdum on the Lockean p r o j e c t . See Copleston, op. ci t . , C h a p . 18. 1 0 R i c h a r d H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, San Diego, A u s t i n H i l l Press, 1980, e s p e c i a l l y pp.11 f f . 1 1Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume; R.W. Connon, "The Nat u r a l i s m of Hume R e v i s i t e d , " M c G i l l Hume S t u d i e s , eds., Norton, C a p a l d i and Robison, A u s t i n H i l l P ress, San Diego, 1979, p.121 . 1 2 S e e , f o r example, Hume, "Of S u p e r s t i t i o n and Enthusiasm", Essays, p.75. 62 b i l l i a r d b a l l s , are l o g i c a l in nature when they are in fact only contigent. But i t i s only because we know d i r e c t l y the inner relations of the ideas in our minds, while we know about the actions of b i l l i a r d b a l l s only by acquaintance, that we are able mistakenly to imagine that the connections between ideas of one type are better founded than those of the o t h e r . 1 3 The implications are s t a r t l i n g : there is no l o g i c a l reason that findings in morals cannot be regarded in the same epistemological l i g h t as those of physics to the extent that the re g u l a r i t i e s of experience warrant. Now what ground does Hume's theory give us for believing that one b i l l i a r d b a l l causes another to move? The question i s awkward for Hume: beli e f does not appear to be an impression from the external world; nor could Hume allow i t to be present in advance of impressions without spo i l i n g the empirical thrust of his analysis. Hume's solution i s to make beli e f a special kind of idea, "a l i v e l y idea related to, or associated with a present impression." 1 * It i s an idea with no q u a l i t i e s of i t s own but the property of giving to other ideas a diff e r e n t f e e l i n g : 1 5 "An idea assented to feels d i f f e r e n t from a f i c t i t i o u s idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: and thi s d i f f e r e n t f e e l i n g I endeavour to explain by c a l l i n g i t a superior force or v i v a c i t y , or s o l i d i t y or firmness or 13Hume, Enquiries p.92. 1"Hume, Treatise, p.96. 15Some of thi s based on Copleston, op. c i t . , pp. 93-96. 63 s t e a d i n e s s " 1 6 The important t h i n g about t h i s f e e l i n g of b e l i e f i s that reason cannot simply engender i t : "Reason can never s a t i s f y us that the e x i s t e n c e of any one o b j e c t does ever imply that of another; so that when we pass from the impression of one to the idea or b e l i e f of another, we are not determined by reason, but by custom . . . " 1 7 The word 'custom' i s intended without s o c i a l or h i s t o r i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n . Hume simply means that the r e g u l a r or customary c o n j u n c t i o n of mental o b j e c t s accounts not only f o r knowledge, but a l s o i n c e r t a i n cases f o r the s p e c i a l a d d i t i o n a l f e e l i n g of b e l i e f . B e l i e f i s thus p r o v i d e d by another mechanical p r o p e r t y of the mind, and one might very w e l l suppose that reason has nothing to do with i t . T h i s impression i s , however, s e r i o u s l y m i s l e a d i n g ; i t can l e a d to a deep misunderstanding of Hume's g l o b a l aims. Hume's use of the word 'reason' i s a major hurdle i n the understanding of h i s o v e r a l l p r o j e c t . M i l l e r p o i n t s out that Hume's d e s i r e to r e f u t e r a t i o n a l i s t t h e o r i e s l e d him to f u l m i n a t i o n s a g a i n s t reason which sometimes square i l l with h i s o v e r a l l g o als and with the language he uses to d i s c u s s e t h i c s and p o l i t i c s . 1 8 In the f i r s t book of the T r e a t i s e and i n the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume takes a very hard l i n e on reason, reducing i t to mathematics or l o g i c : a 1 6Hume, E n q u i r i e s , appendix, p.629. 1 7Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.97. 1 8 M i l l e r , op. c i t . , I n t r o . 64 proposition cannot be said to be proven unless i t can be seen that i t s negation i s self-contradictory. On thi s standard Hume rests the claim that relations of causes and effect are discoverable "not by reason but by experience". 1 9 Now i t cannot be denied that in the Treatise Hume allowed himself to be carried quite far by the implications of this standard of reason: he even allowed himself to f a l l into an uncharacteristic frenzy of scepticism: "The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject a l l bel i e f and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or l i k e l y than another ..." 2 0 On expressions l i k e t h i s , which occur only in the Treatise, rest a common view of Hume as Pyrrhonic sceptic - and not wholly without j u s t i f i c a t i o n . But note that the passage d i r e c t l y f o l -lowing retreats at once: "... Most fortunately i t happens, that since reason i s incapable of d i s p e l l i n g these clouds, nature herself s u f f i c e s to that purpose, and cures me of thi s philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and l i v e l y impression of my senses, which ob l i t e r a t e a l l these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hours' amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and rid i c u l o u s , that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any f a r t h e r . " 2 1 19Hume, Enquiries, p.28. 20Hume, Treatise, p.268. 21Hume, Treatise, p.268-9. 65 From the ou t s e t , then, Hume found i t unnatural to c a r r y t h i s s trong form of reason from the world of mathematics and l o g i c i n t o the world of everyday l i f e . Pure reason was a t e c h n i c a l o d d i t y which need not concern common f o l k at a l l , and which should serve not to p a r a l y s e p r a c t i c a l t h i n k e r s but rather to humble metaphysicians. As we s h a l l see, there i s good evidence that Hume pl a c e d the world of p o l i t i c s i n the category of everyday a f f a i r s , o u t s i d e of the view of pure reason. In what f o l l o w s we s h a l l see that t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l l o g i c a l standards i s of the gr e a t e s t importance to understanding Hume. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Hume d i d not support the d i s t i n c t i o n adequately with t e c h n i c a l vocabulary. For being warned not to expect the same kind of reason i n Hume's p r a c t i c a l study as we f i n d i n the f i r s t book of the T r e a t i s e , what do we i n f a c t f i n d ? The unfortunate answer i s that we once again f i n d reason. Hume's d e c i s i o n to continue to use the word 'reason' i n the second and t h i r d books of the T r e a t i s e and i n the E n q u i r i e s has now caused d i f f i c u l t y f o r more than 200 years. Part of the blame f o r t h i s must r e s t on Hume h i m s e l f : some other word or phrase might w e l l have served b e t t e r . But readers are not blameless: the T r e a t i s e i s a l a r g e and i n t i m i d a t i n g work; a n a t u r a l approach to i t i s to read with some care the p h i l o s o p h i c a l drama of Book I and then, i n the assumption that the p r o j e c t i s understood i n broad terms, to poke around the r e s t of i t together with the E n q u i r i e s and the Essays. For many w r i t e r s such reading techniques serve w e l l ; but nothing proves 66 more unfortunate f o r the understanding of Hume. His r e p u t a t i o n f o r d e s t r u c t i v e s c e p t i c i s m and the ensuing c o n f u s i o n surrounding h i s e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e s r e s t to a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent on t h i s reading technique. But f o r a l l t h a t , the primary problem a r i s e s from Hume's remarkable d e c i s i o n to use the word 'reason' i n much of the T r e a t i s e , f o r e x a c t l y those mental o p e r a t i o n s e x p l i c i t l y c o n t r a s t e d with reason i n Book I. T h i s d e c i s i o n obscures a l i n e of thought which i s f a r from i n t r i n s i c a l l y obscure. The problem i s even worse than t h i s , f o r Hume at v a r i o u s times a l s o used the word 'imagination' to r e f e r to j u s t about every mental o p e r a t i o n a l s o f a l l i n g i n t o the category of reason. The only s o l u t i o n to t h i s d i f f i c u l t y i s found i n g l o b a l and sympathetic r e a d i n g . Such reading shows that Hume's primary use of the word 'reason' i s to r e f e r to what M i l l e r c a l l s the "rule-governed i m a g i n a t i o n . " 2 2 Hume g e n e r a l l y used 'reason' to r e f e r to a p s y c h o l o g i c a l process causing b e l i e f based on the c o n t i g u i t y and constant c o n j u n c t i o n of impressions. Reason i s thus not j u s t an a p r i o r i process i n v o l v i n g the l o g i c a l comparison of ideas, though that i s one of i t s f a c e t s , but, roughly, the whole set of mental a c t i v i t i e s g i v i n g knowledge of the world. I t i s t h i s broad concept of reason, s u i t e d to the world of a f f a i r s , which informed Hume's e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s . Now f o r Hume, as f o r most p h i l o s o p h e r s , human a c t i o n i s based not p r i m a r i l y on knowledge but on b e l i e f . To understand 2 2 M i l l e r , op. c i t . , Chapter I, passim. 6 7 what people do we have to look to what they b e l i e v e to be t r u e . For 20th century e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s - many of whom d e f i n e knowledge as j u s t i f i e d true b e l i e f - t h i s o f f e r s few d i f f i c u l t i e s . But for Hume knowledge i s c l o s e r to what we might want to c a l l acquaintance: as we have seen, i t s paradigms are c u r r e n t sensory impressions. B e l i e f , on the other hand, i s st r o n g e r . We are caused to b e l i e v e i n the m o t i o n - t r a n s m i t t i n g property of b i l l i a r d b a l l s because i t i s i n v a r i a b l y demonstrated whenever the occasion a r i s e s . There i s nothing by way of c o g i t a t i o n we can do that would a f f e c t t h i s b e l i e f - the only t h i n g that c o u l d change i t would be s u f f i c i e n t l y well-demonstrated counterexamples. Hume p o i n t s out i n Of M i r a c l e s that such counterexamples would have to be more s t r o n g l y evidenced than a l l the p r e v i o u s l y accumulated experience: "... no testimony i s s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h a m i r a c l e , unless the testimony be of such a kind, that i t s f a l s e h o o d would be more miraculous than the f a c t which i t endeavors to e s t a b l i s h ... When any one t e l l s me that he saw a dead man r e s t o r e d to l i f e , I immediately c o n s i d e r with myself whether i t be more probable that t h i s person would e i t h e r deceive or be deceived, or that the f a c t which he r e l a t e s should r e a l l y have happened ... I weigh the one m i r a c l e a g a i n s t the other ... and always r e j e c t the gr e a t e r m i r a c l e . " 2 3 A l l of t h i s suggests that conscious thought p l a y s no par t in the determination of b e l i e f . And indeed, the p o s i t i o n that b e l i e f s (with passions) are not subject to reason i s a r e c e i v e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume. 2 4 2 3Hume, "Of M i r a c l e s , " Essays, p.526. 2 4 F o r a more-or-less standard account of Hume as a de s t r o y e r of 18th century f a i t h i n reason see Ger a l d R. Cragg, Reason and  A u t h o r i t y i n the Ei g h t e e n t h Century, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 68 Peter Gay, f o r example, views Hume as an a n t i - r a t i o n a l i s t , a pre c u r s o r of romanticism, who abandoned the s e c u r i t y of reason to seek understanding i n r a t i o n a l l y unfathomable emotions. While Hume d i d de-emphasize reason compared, say, with De s c a r t e s , Gay's view r e s t s on too narrow a p e r s p e c t i v e . For one t h i n g , i t makes p a r a d o x i c a l the passage quoted above (from an essay Gay a d m i r e s ) . 2 5 In f a c t , i t makes p a r a d o x i c a l much of Hume's work. Hume's very e x i s t e n c e as a c a r e f u l reasoner, a master of p h i l o s o p h i c a l prose, suggests that he b e l i e v e d i n reason to a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree. Now the a n a l y s i s of Hume's philosophy of b e l i e f presented thus f a r i s c o r r e c t only to a p o i n t . I t i s true that f o r Hume b e l i e f i s simply and i r r a t i o n a l l y caused when a p p r o p r i a t e c o n d i t i o n s of c o n t i n u i t y and constant c o n j u n c t i o n h o l d . The b i l l i a r d b a l l s , and every other case i n v o l v i n g c l a s s i c a l mechanics, are paradigmatic. No counterexamples e x i s t ; p o t e n t i a l ones are met with profound s c e p t i c i s m and cannot touch the f i r m b e l i e f s we h o l d i n such o p e r a t i o n s of nature. But what of the many cases where there are i n s u f f i c i e n t o b s e r v a t i o n s to engender b e l i e f n a t u r a l l y ? A d e c i s i v e passage i n Book I of the T r e a t i s e , almost l o s t i n Phyrron i c Sturm und drang, p o i n t s to Hume's r e a l i n t e n t i o n s . Hume i s r e f l e c t i n g on the strong 2 f l ( c o n t ' d ) 1964. S i m i l a r views may be found i n Peter Gay, The  Enlightenment: An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , V o l . I., The Rise of Modern  Paganism, New York, Knopf, 1966; A l s o i n Copleston, op. c i t . 2 5Hume appears as a kind of a n t i - r a t i o n a l i s t hero of the f i r s t volume of Gay's The Enlightenment, op. c i t . 69 r a t i o n a l i s m of much of Book I, showing that i t s wages are the i n t e l l e c t u a l excitement of Pyrrhonism. While overheated b r a i n s can be t h r i l l i n g , when the heat i s past the world remains, and there are th i n g s to do i n i t . Since pure reason has been shown to be a s e l f - d e s t r u c t i v e t o o l , we must turn to other t o o l s which, i f perhaps not q u i t e so sharp to the eye, might prove more e f f e c t i v e i n the cut and t h r u s t of o r d i n a r y l i f e . The t o o l proposed by Hume i s yet another v e r s i o n of reason. "In order to j u s t i f y myself, I must d i s t i n g u i s h i n the imagination betwixt the p r i n c i p l e s which are permanent, i r r e s i s t i b l e , a n d u n i v e r s a l ; such as the customary t r a n s i t i o n from causes to e f f e c t s , and from e f f e c t s to causes: And the p r i n c i p l e s which are changeable, weak, and i r r e g u l a r : such as those I have j u s t now taken n o t i c e o f . The former are the foundation of a l l our thoughts and a c t i o n s : so that upon t h e i r removal human nature must immediately p e r i s h and go to r u i n . The l a t t e r are n e i t h e r unavoidable to mankind, nor necessar-y, or so much as u s e f u l i n the conduct of l i f e ; but on the c o n t r a r y are observ'd only to take p l a c e i n weak minds, and being opposite to the other p r i n c i p l e s of custom and reasoning, may e a s i l y be subverted by a due c o n t r a s t and o p p o s i t i o n . For t h i s reason the former are r e c e i v e d by philosophy, and the l a t t e r r e j e c t e d . " 2 6 Hume thus p o i n t e d a way out of the impasse of pure reason so g r a p h i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e d . Reasoning people, not those of "weak minds", can judge the q u a l i t y of r e l a t i o n s of cause and e f f e c t i n circumstances where there i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence to put matters beyond doubt. Bouncing b a l l s and the l i k e , e x p l i c a b l e by the r e l a t i o n s of c l a s s i c a l mechanics, are part of permanent conceptual s t r u c t u r e s . The wise, however, can d i s t i n g u i s h between these and other r e l a t i o n s l e s s f i r m l y 2 6Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.225. 70 e s t a b l i s h e d . Reason p l a y s no part i n determining whether we b e l i e v e that teacups w i l l f a l l , but i t does p l a y the c r u c i a l r o l e i n other kinds of l e s s w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d r e l a t i o n s : "due c o n t r a s t and o p p o s i t i o n " , i n other words, the a p p l i c a t i o n s of reasoning p r i n c i p l e s , can show us that some r e l a t i o n s are simply f a l s e or, i f s e v e r a l c o n f l i c t i n g r e l a t i o n s might ho l d , which are most probable. There i s no sense that a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y c o u l d be achieved. For Hume such c e r t a i n l y i s not i n the nature of such r e l a t i o n s . But reasoning i s of the utmost importance i n a vast range of cases, encompassing, i n f a c t , the whole of the human s c i e n c e s , which do not allow of the o b s e r v a t i o n a l p r e c i -s i o n of p h y s i c s . With t h i s i n mind, we can understand Hume's s h i f t of c r i t e r i a from Book I of the T r e a t i s e and i n the f i r s t Enquiry to the subsequent books and u l t i m a t e l y to the Essays and H i s t o r y : seen i n t h i s l i g h t Book I appears as a negative assessment of pure reason i n the human s c i e n c e s . The p r a c t i c a l concerns of Books Two, Three and subsequent work r e q u i r e a d i f f e r e n t stand-ard of reason, but i t i s reason nonetheless. I t i s i n t h i s sphere of p r a c t i c a l i t y that moral and p o l i t i c a l l i v e s are l i v e d . And i n t h i s sphere c o n t r a d i c t o r y and ambiguous impressions are r e c e i v e d , making some kind of reason a n e c e s s i t y . Hume thus formed a h i e r a r c h y of reason: d i f f e r e n t kinds and standards are a p p l i c a b l e to d i f f e r e n t spheres. Leaving a s i d e the s t r o n g l o g i c a l reason of Book I, as Hume himself recommends, and moving i n t o the realm of p r a c t i c a l i t y , h i s a n a l y s i s of 71 p r a c t i c a l reason o f f e r s three main v a r i e t i e s . F i r s t , when impressions are u n i v e r s a l l y c a s u a l l y l i n k e d i n experience they simply cause b e l i e f . Although conscious d e l i b e r a t i o n p l a y s no pa r t i n t h i s Hume sometimes r e f e r s to the process as reasoning! "We i n f e r a cause immediately from i t s e f f e c t ; and t h i s i n f e r e n c e i s not only a true s p e c i e s of reasoning, but the s t r o n g e s t of a l l o t h e r s , . . " 2 7 Second, when impressions are u s u a l l y l i n k e d i n experience they tend to cause b e l i e f . T h i s i s the n a t u r a l bent of the mind: custom i s a dominant f a c t o r . Because most b e l i e f s , o u t s i d e of those concerned with p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , f a l l i n t o t h i s category i t i s the most important and p o l i t i c s i s a n a t u r a l member of i t . These two kinds of b e l i e f are c a l l e d n a t u r a l by Hume. 2 8 T h i r d , b e l i e f can be caused not only by d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n of causes and e f f e c t s but a l s o by prolonged exposure to complex ideas. Custom p l a y s a r o l e here a l s o ; but i t i s no longer simply the idea of habitude or r e p e t i t i o n : the sense i s broadened to i n -clude the customs and customary knowledge which surround an i n d i v i d u a l i n s o c i e t y . Thus education can cause b e l i e f too: the frequent r e p e t i t i o n of complex ideas can cause someone to b e l i e v e i n t h i n g s which may or may not be based i n the experience of the r e l a t i o n s of cause and e f f e c t . To take a modern example, f o r those of us who are n e i t h e r mathematicians nor a s t r o p h y s i c i s t s the b e l i e f that the e a r t h moves around the 2 7Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.97n. 2 8Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.117. 72 sun i s not the r e s u l t of deduction from d i r e c t experience but r a t h e r the product of r e p e t i t i o n of s o c i a l l y accepted complex i d e a s . Hume b e l i e v e d that such b e l i e f was powerful, and p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous: " I f we c o n s i d e r t h i s argument from education i n a proper l i g h t , ' t w i l l appear very c o n v i n c i n g ; and the more so, that ' t i s founded on one of the most common phenomena, that i s any where to be met with. I am persuaded, that upon examination we s h a l l f i n d more than h a l f of those o p i n i o n s , that p r e v a i l among mankind, to be owing to education, and that the p r i n c i p l e s which are thus i m p l i c i t e l y embrac'd, over-balance those, which are owing e i t h e r to a b s t r a c t reasoning or experience. As l i a r s , by the frequent r e p e t i t i o n of t h e i r l i e s , come at l a s t to remember them; so the judgement, or r a t h e r the imagination, by the l i k e means, may have ideas so s t r o n g l y imprinted on i t , and conceive them i n so f u l l a l i g h t , that they may operate upon the mind i n the same manner, with those, which the senses, memory or reason present to u s . " 2 9 Education may thus overpower even d i r e c t experience: " A l l these o p i n i o n s and n o t i o n s of t h i n g s , to which we have been accustomed from our infancy,take such deep ro o t , that i t i s impossible f o r us, by a l l the powers of reason and experience, to e r a d i c a t e them; and t h i s h a b i t not only approaches in i t s i n f l u e n c e , but even on many occasions p r e v a i l s over that which a r i s e s from the con-stant and i n s e p a r a b l e union of causes and e f f e c t s . " 3 0 Hume's a n a l y s i s of b e l i e f thus supports a c l a s s i c Enlightenment s c e n a r i o : a powerful body of r e c e i v e d o p i n i o n , which can produce b e l i e f of almost any kind by the r e p e t i t i o n of complex ideas (education) i s c o n t r a s t e d with b e l i e f formed i n the d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n of r e g u l a r i t i e s i n nature (reason). To make t h i s 2 9Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.117. Note Hume's v a c i l l a t i o n between judgment and imagination. T h i s i s a good example of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of terminology found i n the T r e a t i s e . 3 0 As quoted by Copleston, op. c i t . , p.94. 73 dichotomy concrete i n 18th century terms one need think only of how the r i t u a l s of C a t h o l i c i s m were regarded by the part y of humanity. But i t would be s u r p r i s i n g i f Hume, a noted i f detached p a r t i s a n of the Enlightenment, had f a i l e d to provide any mechanism to overcome b e l i e f s a r i s i n g from ed u c a t i o n . Yet the common view of Hume's philosophy (the i n e r t n e s s of reason) would leave him i n j u s t such a s i t u a t i o n . In f a c t Hume d i d b e l i e v e that reason c o u l d i n f l u e n c e b e l i e f : c l aims to that e f f e c t are in c l u d e d i n Book I, Chapter XV of the T r e a t i s e under the t i t l e , "Rules by which to judge of causes and e f f e c t s " . Hume c o u l d not have w r i t t e n t h i s chapter had he not h e l d that b e l i e f and judgement c o u l d be improved by some process of r e f l e c t i o n . The r u l e s given i n Chapter XV amount to a r e i t e r a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s of the a c q u i s i t i o n of b e l i e f : causes and e f f e c t s must be contiguous; causes must precede e f f e c t s ; there must be a constant c o n j u n c t i o n between causes and e f f e c t s . These r e f l e c t Hume's b e l i e f that the process by which the vulg a r or u n r e f l e c t i v e come to b e l i e v e i s fundamentally sound except i n the case of custom or ed u c a t i o n . Hume's suggestion i s that by a b s t r a c t i n g r u l e s from the o r d i n a r y process by which knowledge i s a c q u i r e d i n unproblematical cases, we can produce t o o l s to serve i n hard cases. Using these t o o l s , judgements about wheth-er to b e l i e v e may be made, and t h e i r p r o b a b i l i t y assessed. In the p r a c t i c a l sphere reason thus takes the form of the a p p l i c a t i o n of general r u l e s d e r i v e d from s u c c e s s f u l i n s t a n c e s 74 of knowledge a c q u i s i t i o n . Hume himself notes that such a process must be supposed to operate i n h i s system or there would e x i s t no method of c o r r e c t i n g f a u l t y b e l i e f . 3 1 T h i s amounts to a system wherein s t r o n g l y - b a s e d h i g h e r - o r d e r b e l i e f s - b e l i e f s about how b e l i e f i s gotten i n the best cases - are used to balance and c o r r e c t l o w e r - l e v e l b e l i e f s - b e l i e f s about o r d i n a r y matters. Far from h o l d i n g that reason has no i n f l u e n c e on b e l i e f , Hume thus c l a i m s that i t has the remarkable c a p a c i t y to i d e n t i f y the most s u c c e s s f u l kinds of knowledge a c q u i s i t i o n , a b s t r a c t from them t h e i r fundamental p r i n c i p l e s , and use the r e s u l t i n g p r i n c i p l e s to judge the q u a l i t y of d o u b t f u l r e l a t i o n s . Can t h i s reasoning process a c t u a l l y c r e a t e b e l i e f ? Hume i s a l i t t l e vague on t h i s p o i n t ; but i t does not matter a great d e a l . The poi n t i s t h a t , even i f the reasoner r e t a i n s a he a l t h y s c e p t i c i s m regarding the r e l a t i o n , and even i f he continues to regard i t as unproved i n the strong sense, he w i l l be able to act i n a more reasonable manner than i f he merely f o l l o w e d the u n c r i t i c a l path of the v u l g a r . I t seems, i n f a c t , that reason i s only impotent a g a i n s t those s t r o n g b e l i e f s a r i s i n g from very e a r l y and powerful education, and those which occur a u t o m a t i c a l l y as a r e -s u l t of the i n v a r i a b l e c o n j u n c t i o n of impressions. T h i s a f a r c r y from the p o s i t i o n that would have Hume's reason wholly i n e f f e c t i v e i n the formation of b e l i e f . I t pr o v i d e s , moreover, a model of the reasoning process which can 3 1 See Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.149. 7 5 serve i n the a n a l y s i s of h i s t o r y , e t h i c s , or p o l i t i c s . On such a model, we might w e l l expect to f i n d Hume to be concerned with custom, to b e l i e v e that the fundamental conceptual s t r u c t u r e s of people are l i t t l e s u s c e p t i b l e of change, but a l s o to hold that reason has an important p l a c e i n m a i n t a i n i n g s e n s i b l e and moderate b e l i e f . The r o l e of reason i s moderating and rule-governed; i t helps prevent w i l d and unfounded b e l i e f by viewing i t i n the l i g h t of a vast m a j o r i t y of s u c c e s s f u l b e l i e f s . There i s c e r t a i n l y no sense i n which the e s s e n t i a l l y n o n - r a t i o n a l process of b e l i e v i n g d i s s a p p e a r s from Hume's sys-tem: a vast body of unconsidered b e l i e f continues to form the bedrock of the p e r s o n a l i t y d e s c r i b e d by Hume. But above that bedrock, i n the realm where people c r e a t e p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s and make moral judgements, l i e s a l a r g e area i n which the r e g u l a r i t i e s of experience are not so great as to form conceptual foundations: here reason comes i n t o p l a y . "The mind ... d i s c o v e r s the laws of i t s own o p e r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g the laws d e s c r i b i n g the process by which i t a r r i v e s at b e l i e f s , s u c c e s s f u l and u n s u c c e s s f u l . Using these, and monitoring i t s own a c t i v i t i e s , i t can r e g u l a t e i t s e l f by t h i s feedback process so as more e f f i c i e n t l y to a t t a i n the t r u t h as f a r as i t i s a b l e . T h i s element of feedback and s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e i s c r u c i a l to understanding why Hume's " r u l e s by which to judge of causes" are those that reasonably render a l a w - b e l i e f s u b j e c t i v e l y j u s t i f i e d . " 3 2 (b) REASON AND PASSION IN HUME'S TREATISE. T h i s understanding of the place of reason i n Hume's epistemology has important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the r e l a t i o n of 3 2 F r e d Wilson, "Hume's Theory of Mental A c t i v i t y , " M c G i l l Hume  St u d i e s , o p . c i t . , p.101. See a l s o M i l l e r , op. c i t . , p.35. 76 reason to the pa s s i o n s . As we have seen, Hume d i v i d e d impressions of the mind i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s : o r d i n a r y impressions from the senses, and impressions of r e f l e c t i o n . The l a t t e r are as v i v i d as o r d i n a r y sensory impressions and a r i s e at the prompting of e a r l i e r ideas or impressions. They i n c l u d e the pas s i o n s - p r i d e , f e a r , l o v e , shame, l u s t , a dmiration, the d e s i r e f o r wealth or the l i k e . These passions form f o r Hume the so l e l i n k between the contents of the mind and r e l a t e d a c t i o n s : Hume notes on s e v e r a l occasions that passions are the only mental o b j e c t s to i n f l u e n c e the w i l l . From such comments the erroneous impression has a r i s e n that Hume h e l d that reason c o u l d not i n f l u e n c e human a c t i o n . Now some pass i o n s a r i s e d i r e c t l y from p l e a s u r e or p a i n : i f , f o r example, a mental o b j e c t produces p l e a s u r e i t w i l l a l s o produce - subj e c t to c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s - a passion such as d e s i r e f o r the ob j e c t or admiration of i t . T h i s kind of pa s s i o n , an automatic response to a p a r t i c u l a r impressions, Hume c l a s s i f i e s as a ' d i r e c t p a s s i o n ' . I n d i r e c t p a s s i o n s , on the other hand, r e q u i r e f o r t h e i r g enesis not only a v e r s i o n or d i s a v e r s i o n , but a l s o other ideas, not j u s t impressions, r e l a t i n g to t h e i r o b j e c t s . Hume spends much time i n Book II of the T r e a t i s e on these r e l a t i o n s . His f a v o u r i t e example i s p r i d e . P r i d e i s engendered when some ob j e c t g i v e s p l e a s u r e and i s a l s o a s s o c i a t e d with the s e l f . U n l i k e d i r e c t p a s s i o n s , then, i n which imagination p l a y s l i t t l e p a r t , i n d i r e c t p assions are i n t e g r a l l y t i e d to the understanding 77 - the pa r t of the imagination which d i s c o v e r s the r e l a t i o n s be-tween i d e a s . The exact nature of the connection of the understanding to the i n d i r e c t passions i s the p r i n c i p a l i s s u e i n what f o l l o w s . Book I I , S e c t i o n I I I of the T r e a t i s e , supports a common under-standing of Hume, that passions alone determine a c t i o n : "Nothing i s more usual i n philosophy, and even i n common l i f e , than to t a l k of the combat of pass i o n and reason, to g ive the preference to reason, and to a s s e r t that men are only so f a r v i r t u o u s as they conform themselves to i t s d i c t a t e s ... I s h a l l endeavour to prove f i r s t , that reason alone can never be a motive to any a c t i o n of the w i l l ; and secondly, that i t can never oppose pa s s i o n i n the d i r e c t i o n of the w i l l . " 3 3 The opening of S e c t i o n III leads to one of Hume's best-known e p i t h e t s : "Reason i s , and ought only to be the sla v e of the pas s i o n s , and can never pretend to any other o f f i c e than to serve and obey them." 3" Unequivocal as these statements may seem i n i s o l a t i o n , they are i n f a c t s e r i o u s l y m i s l e a d i n g . To understand them i t i s nec-essary to attend c l o s e l y to Hume's o v e r a l l argument and to every word used i n and around them. The key l i e s i n the a n a l y s i s of b e l i e f presented above. F i r s t , c o n s i d e r that b e l i e f resembles a p a s s i o n : i t i s s i m i l a r to an impression of r e f l e c t i o n . In many cases b e l i e f - an inc r e a s e d v i v i d n e s s surrounding an idea simply a r r i v e s i n the mind as l u s t might, i n more-or-less auto-matic response to c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s ; i n l e s s c l e a r - c u t cases, 3 3Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.413. 3"Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.415. 78 as we have seen, the understanding p l a y s an important p a r t . A s i m i l a r l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e appears i n Hume's a n a l y s i s of the pa s s i o n s . Reason p l a y s no r o l e i n the op e r a t i o n of d i r e c t p a s s i o n s (being excluded from them by d e f i n i t i o n ) ; but i t does pl a y a pa r t in the op e r a t i o n of the i n d i r e c t passions analogous to that i n the case of b e l i e f . Hume's choice of words should be noted. In the above q u o t a t i o n he w r i t e s only that reason cannot alone motivate any a c t i o n of the w i l l . T h i s does not suggests that reason p l a y s no part i n the m o t i v a t i o n of a c t i o n s , but that we should look f o r reason a c t i n g i n consort with something e l s e . And the word 'alone' i s not used c a s u a l l y or a c c i d e n t a l l y , f o r Hume repeats the same ex p r e s s i o n almost immediately: "Since reason alone can never produce any a c t i o n , or give r i s e to v o l i t i o n , I i n f e r that the same f a c u l t y i s as incapable of pr e v e n t i n g v o l i t i o n , or of d i s p u t i n g the pref e r e n c e with any pa s s i o n or emotion. T h i s consequence i s necessary. ' T i s impossible reason cou'd have the l a t t e r e f f e c t of pr e v e n t i n g v o l i t i o n , . but by g i v i n g an impulse i n a c o n t r a r y d i r e c t i o n to our pa s s i o n ; and that impulse, had i t operated alone, wou'd have been able to produce v o l i t i o n , . . " 3 5 Now the b r e v i t y of Hume's argument ( f o r what might appear i n some systems as a hard-won c o n c l u s i o n ) suggests that that Hume d i d not regard that t h i s p o s i t i o n was i n need f o r much sup-p o r t . The Hume of the T r e a t i s e was young Turk who d i d shy from argument. I t was, i n f a c t , a p o s i t i o n not demanding of argument, rather a consequence of d e f i n i t i o n s and the way the 3 5Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.414-415. 79 mind and i t s q u a l i t i e s are d i v i d e d up. 3 6 Since Hume's system a l l o t s to reason only two modes of o p e r a t i o n , the d i s c o v e r y of the a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s of ideas and the d i s c o v e r y of causes and e f f e c t s , the la c k of any d i r e c t r e l a t i o n between a c t i o n and the passi o n s can be seen as a t a u t o l o g i c a l . The passions are de-f i n e d analogously as mental f e a t u r e s which, because of t h e i r r e l a t i o n to a v e r s i o n and d i s a v e r s i o n , motivate a c t i o n s . The opening pages of Book I I , S e c t i o n I I I , thus amount to a restatement of these d e f i n i t i o n s and t h e i r consequences, rather than an exhaustive argument f o r them. A c l o s e look at t h i s sec-t i o n shows that Hume does not inten d to allow these d e f i n i t i o n s to prevent him from g i v i n g reason a r o l e i n the mo t i v a t i o n of a c t i o n . What i s easy to overlook i s the s t r u c t u r e c r e a t e d i n Se c t i o n I I I . Reason cannot d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n c e the w i l l , but i t can p l a y a p a r t , o f t e n the most important p a r t , i n the genera-t i o n of pass i o n s which i n turn can motivate a c t i o n . I t i s t h i s t h r e e - p a r t s t r u c t u r e that Hume intends us to see: and h i s i n s i s t e n c e that passions are the s o l e motivators of a c t i o n r e a l l y amounts to an i n s i s t e n c e on t h i s s t r u c t u r e . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n makes sense of passages incomprehensible from the more t r a d i t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e . Consider the f o l l o w i n g , and whether i t c o u l d be r e c o n c i l e d with the view that reason wholly r u l e s the p a s s i o n s . "... ' t i s i m p o s s i b l e , that reason and passion can ever 3 6 T r e a t i s e pp.413f f 80 oppose each other, or d i s p u t e f o r the government of the w i l l and a c t i o n s . The moment we p e r c e i v e the fal s e h o o d  of any s u p p o s i t i o n , or the i n s u f f i c i e n c y of any means  our passions y i e l d to our reason without any o p p o s i t i o n . I may d e s i r e any f r u i t as of an e x c e l l e n t r e l i s h : but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my lo n g i n g c e a s e s . " 3 7 S h o r t l y afterwards, Hume c l a r i f i e s t h i s p r o c e s s : ' " T i s obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or ple a s u r e from any o b j e c t , we f e e l a consequent emotion of a v e r s i o n or p r o p e n s i t y , and are c a r r y ' d to a v o i d or embrace what w i l l give us t h i s uneasiness or s a t i s f a c -t i o n . ' T i s a l s o obvious, that t h i s emotion r e s t s not here, but making us c a s t our view on every s i d e , comprehends whatever o b j e c t s are connected with i t s o r i g i n a l one by the r e l a t i o n of cause and e f f e c t . Here then reasoning takes p l a c e to d i s c o v e r t h i s r e l a t i o n : and a c c o r d i n g as our reasoning v a r i e s , our a c t i o n s r e c e i v e a subsequent v a r i a t i o n . But ' t i s evident i n t h i s case, that the impulse a r i s e s not from reason, but i s only d i r e c t e d by i t . " 3 8 Hume's p o s i t i o n , then, i s that reason can never d i r e c t l y oppose the p a s s i o n s , i t has no immediate power over them. But because of reason's p a r t i n the s t r u c t u r e of reason, p a s s i o n and a c t i o n i t can exert d e c i s i v e i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e . When reasoning convinces there can be no o p p o s i t i o n from the pa s s i o n s , because the passions simply dissappear, and m o t i v a t i o n f o r a c t i o n goes with them. Reason does indeed serve as sla v e to the p a s s i o n s , because m o t i v a t i o n , even f o r reasoning i t s e l f , must come from them. But once begun, the reasoning process i s capable of overpowering even the d e s i r e s which may have prompted i t s own ge n e s i s . 3 7Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.416-417. I t a l i c s added. 3 8Hume,Treatise, p.414. 81 One ought not to take from t h i s an impression that Hume was some kind of c l o s e t r a t i o n a l i s t . On the c o n t r a r y , h i s w r i t i n g i s permeated with a wry sense of reason's l i m i t a t i o n s . F i n d i n g the proper l i m i t s and r o l e of reason was perhaps the most important goal of h i s work, and having s e t t l e d on a complex sys-tem g i v i n g an i r r e d u c i b l e r o l e both to reason and the passion s , Hume had to provide an account of t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n . Book II of the T r e a t i s e i s l a r g e l y an attempt to meet t h i s requirement. How, then, do reason and pass i o n a c t u a l l y i n t e r a c t ? The answer can best be approached by ask i n g how such a t h i n g as mental c o n f l i c t comes i n t o being at a l l . While there can be no c o n f l i c t between reason and the pas s i o n s , there can be between d i f f e r e n t p a s s i o n s ; and some of these passions may be those r a i s e d by the the reasoning f a c u l t y . Hume never makes i t e n t i r e l y c l e a r whether more than one passi o n can r e i g n i n the mind at the same time; but i t appears, more from the s t r u c t u r e of h i s argument than from anything s a i d e x p l i c i t l y , that only one passion can produce m o t i v a t i o n at any moment. I n d e c i s i o n , f o r example, would be analysed as a mental f l i c k e r i n g between two d i f f e r e n t m o t i v a t i o n s rather than as the simultaneous presence of c o n t r a d i c t o r y m o t i v a t i o n s . 3 9 3 9 S e e Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp.440-41 for the best example of Hume on t h i s p o i n t . T h i s d i s c u s s i o n suggests that the q u a l i t i e s of passi o n s mix, but the f o l l o w i n g paragraph suggests that passions r a p i d l y succeed one another i n the mind. Hume does not appear to dea l d i r e c t l y with the q u e s t i o n whether two pas s i o n s , once t h e i r q u a l i t i e s are determined, can both motivate an act at the same time. The metaphor of the s t r i n g instrument suggests that p a s s i o n s resonate slowly i n the mind. I take i t that Hume meant to say that passions mix i n q u a l i t y and sometimes sum i n s t r e n g t h : that he emphasised summing i n s t r e n g t h suggests to me 82 When c o n d i t i o n s are such that s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t passions are e x c i t e d , that of the g r e a t e s t i n t e n s i t y wins and so p r o v i d e s c u r r e n t m o t i v a t i o n . Hume thus developed a d i s t i n c t i o n between strong and weak p a s s i o n s . Each kind of p a s s i o n can vary i n i n t e n s i t y ; but some kinds are by t h e i r nature g e n e r a l l y more intense than o t h e r s . Why then do powerful passions not c o n t i n u a l l y r u l e the mind? For one t h i n g e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s may not be such as to s u s t a i n them. But more importantly, Hume b e l i e v e d that strong impressions of any kind tend to f a t i g u e the mind. When the i n t e n s i t y of a passion f a l l s , m o t i v a t i o n changes as new passions come to the f o r e f r o n t . T h i s o s c i l l a t i o n of m o t i v a t i o n seemed normal to Hume; i n f a c t , the c o n d i t i o n of prolonged domination of some pa s s i o n , on the other hand, he saw as a kind of derangment. 4 0 For Hume, then, a n a t u r a l mental balance tends to be maintained simply by the tendency of the mind to s a t i a t e with the r e p e t i t i o n of impressions. We should r e c a l l Hume's a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l comments in Book I of the T r e a t i s e on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of s u s t a i n i n g the p h i l o s o p h i c a l passion of extreme s c e p t i c i s m . In s p i t e of t h i s s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g tendency, however, the mind i s always in danger of succumbing to v i o l e n t passions such 3 9 ( c o n t ' d ) that he b e l i e v e d that the s t r o n g e s t at any moment pr o v i d e s that moment's m o t i v a t i o n . T h i s view seem to make the most sense of Hume's general p o s i t i o n . 4 0 S e e Hume,"Of S u p e r s t i t i o n and Enthusiasm"; a l s o many other p l a c e s throughout the Essays. 83 as l u s t or vengefulness. These can storm the mind, overcome other m o t i v a t i o n , and produce s e l f - d e t r i m e n t a l a c t i o n . Hume never claimed that strong p a s s i o n s can permanently be defeated, but h i s system does (as indeed i t must) provide a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree of p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t them. T h i s p r o t e c t i o n comes from the f a c u l t y of reason o p e r a t i n g on the i n d i r e c t passions i n a manner analogous to i t s o p e r a t i o n s i n the case of b e l i e f . We are agreed, then, that reason can produce passions and in doing so i n f l u e n c e a c t i o n . Such passions may be v i o l e n t , as when reason d i s c o v e r s the e x i s t e n c e of a t h r e a t e n i n g o b j e c t ; but most passions aroused by reasoning are m i l d . The process of reasoning i t s e l f produces no mental s e n s a t i o n s ; we thus become conscious only of i t s r e s u l t s , which are u s u a l l y i n the form of mi l d p a s s i o n s : "Reason ... ex e r t s i t s e l f without producing any s e n s i b l e emotion; ... and scarce ever conveys any pl e a s u r e or uneasiness. Hence i t proceeds, that every a c t i o n of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and t r a n q u i l l i t y , i s confounded with reason by a l l those, who judge of t h i n g s from the f i r s t view and appearance." 4 1 The o p e r a t i o n s of reason and those of the m i l d passions thus tend to give much the same impression. Because reason u s u a l l y produces g e n t l e p a s s i o n s i t i s e a s i l y overcome. How then can reason operate with any e f f e c t i v e n e s s a g a i n s t strong passions? " I t has been observ'd, i n t r e a t i n g of the pa s s i o n s , " w r i t e s Hume i n Book III of the T r e a t i s e , "... that men are m i g h t i l y govern'd by the imagination, "'Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.417. 84 and p r o p o r t i o n t h e i r a f f e c t i o n s more to the l i g h t , under which any obj e c t appears to them, than to i t s r e a l and i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . What s t r i k e s upon them with a strong and l i v e l y idea commonly p r e v a i l s above what l i e s i n a more obscure l i g h t ... Now as every t h i n g , that i s contiguous to us, e i t h e r i n space or time, s t r i k e s upon us with such an idea, i t has a p r o p o r t i o n a l e f f e c t on the w i l l and pa s s i o n s , and commonly operates with more f o r c e than any o b j e c t , that l i e s i n a more d i s t a n t and obscure l i g h t . Tho' we may be f u l l y convinc'd that the l a t t e r o b j e c t e x c e l s the former, we are not able to re g u l a t e our a c t i o n s by t h i s judgement; but y i e l d to the s o l l i c i t a t i o n s of our p a s s i o n s , which always p l e a d i n favour of whatever i s near and c o n t i g u o u s . " 4 2 T h i s might seem merely to r e i t e r a t e t h at m i l d p a s s i o n s , the usual product of the reasoning process, cannot defeat the v i o l e n t p a s s i o n s . But i t a l s o opens the door to another p o s s i b i l i t y : m i l d passions c o u l d defeat v i o l e n t passions if_ the  l a t t e r were s u f f i c i e n t l y removed from the former i n time. And he r e i n l i e s the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r overcoming human weakness i n the face of the p a s s i o n s . Without any p o s s i b i l i t y of ba l a n c i n g c u r -rent m i l d passions a g a i n s t f u t u r e strong ones, w r i t e s Hume, prospects f o r s o c i a l l i f e would look grim: "This q u a l i t y ( a l l o w i n g strong passions to defeat the weak) ... of human nature, not only i s very dangerous to s o c i e t y , but a l s o seems, on a cu r s o r y view, to be incapable of any remedy ... i f men be incapable of them-s e l v e s to p r e f e r remote to contiguous, they w i l l never consent to any t h i n g , which wou'd o b l i g e them to such a ch o i c e , and c o n t r a d i c t , i n so s e n s i b l e a manner, t h e i r n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s and p r o p e n s i t i e s . " 4 3 People very o f t e n f a l l i n t o t h i s danger, w r i t e s Hume: "... men so o f t e n a ct i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n to t h e i r own i n t e r e s t , and ... p r e f e r any t r i v i a l advantage, that i s 4 2Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp.534-35. 4 3Hume,Treatise,pp.535-536. 85 present, to the maintenance of order i n s o c i e t y . ..'",ft because they cannot b r i n g themselves to p r e f e r a d i s t a n t g r e a t e r advantage to one l e s s e r but c l o s e r . But there are ways of overcoming the "curs o r y " view that near triumphs always over d i s t a n t . The tyranny of the present, while always powerful, need not always p r e v a i l . Strong passions must always defeat the unaided i n d i v i d u a l , but those who take s t r e n g t h i n s o c i e t y can sometimes defeat s t r o n g p a s s i o n s : "In r e f l e c t i n g on any a c t i o n , which I am to perform a twelve-month hence, I always r e s o l v e to p r e f e r the gre a t e r good, whether at that time i t w i l l be more contiguous or remote; nor does any d i f f e r e n c e i n that p a r t i c u l a r make a d i f f e r e n c e i n my present i n t e n t i o n s and r e s o l u t i o n s ... but on my nearer approach, those circumstances, which I at f i r s t over-look'd, begin to appear, and have an i n f l u e n c e on my conduct and a f f e c t i o n s . A new i n c l i n a t i o n to the present good s p r i n g s up, and makes i t d i f f i c u l t f o r me to adhere i n f l e x i b l y to my f i r s t purpose and r e s o l u t i o n ... I may have recourse to study and r e f l e x i o n w i t h i n myself; to the a d v i c e of f r i e n d s ; to frequent m e d i t a t i o n , and r e -peated r e s o l u t i o n : And having experienc'd how i n e f f e c t u a l a l l these a r e , I may embrace with p l e a s u r e any other expedient, by which I may impose a r e s t r a i n t upon myself, and guard a g a i n s t t h i s weakness."" 5 The answer to i n d i v i d u a l impotence i n the face of the passions thus l i e s i n what e x t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e s can be c r e a t e d while the mind i s contemplating the long view of t h i n g s . We s h a l l see i n what f o l l o w s that Hume's p o l i t i c s came to center on t h i s q u e s t i o n of long and short-term i n t e r e s t . In the essay "Of P u b l i c C r e d i t " , f o r example, he c r i e d : "What then i s to become of us?", when flftHume, T r e a t i s e , p.535. fl5Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp. 536-37. 86 "... men are commonly more governed by what they have seen, than by what they f o r e s e e , with whatever c e r t a i n t y ; yet promises, p r o t e s t a t i o n s , f a i r appearances, with the allurements of present i n t e r e s t , have such powerful i n f l u e n c e as few are a b l e to r e s i s t . " « 6 We begin, then, to see the p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the s t r u c t u r e we have examined. Hume's a n a l y s i s of reason and p a s s i o n s , which r e s t s on the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of Book I, p r o v i d e s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l opening f o r the support of i n d i v i d u a l s a g a i n s t the i l l e f f e c t s of t h e i r p a s s i o n s . We may now turn to Hume's s p e c i f i c t h e o r i e s of government to see how t h i s opening i s u t i l i z e d . (c) PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS: THE ORIGIN AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE TREATISE. In a chapter of the T r e a t i s e , Book Three, c a l l e d , "Of the O r i g i n of Government" Hume began to p u l l together the threads of h i s long argument, showing how h i s a n a l y s i s of knowledge, b e l i e f and the passions pays o f f i n an understanding of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . He began with an e v a l u a t i o n of the r o l e of i n t e r e s t i n i n the o r i g i n of governments: "Nothing i s more c e r t a i n , than that men are, i n a great measure, govern'd by i n t e r e s t , and that even when they extend t h e i r concern beyond themselves, ' t i s not to any great d i s t a n c e ... " * 7 Hume's a n a l y s i s of government thus r e s t s on i n t e r e s t . But t h i s should not l e a d us to th i n k that he proposed a " l i b e r a l " theory of p o l i t i c s , i n which par t y s t r u c t u r e m i r r o r s and "6Hume, Essays, p.372. *7Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.534. 87 r a t i o n a l i z e s i n t e r e s t s , which are made the u l t i m a t e motor of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . For Hume i n t e r e s t was something to be overcome for a p o l i t y to prosper and s u r v i v e , r a t h e r than a p o s i t i v e f a c -to r i n the formation and o p e r a t i o n of c i v i l s o c i e t y . T h i s i s not to say that Hume found no p o s i t i v e f e a t u r e s i n i n t e r e s t . But, as we s h a l l see, he had to f i n d them i n a roundabout manner. He was faced with much the same problem as Montesquieu, Smith, M i l l a r and other contemporary s o c i a l and economic t h i n k e r s : how was the burgeoning commercial and f i n a n c i a l world to be regarded, i n the l i g h t of p o l i t i c a l paradigms which found i t fundamentally negative? As suggested above, Hume found i n i n t e r e s t not the s o l u t i o n to p o l i t i c s , but the problem of p o l i t i c s . There are i n d i c a t i o n s that he b e l i e v e d i t to be the s o l e s i g n i f i c a n t problem f o r complex s o c i e t i e s . Hume thought that the d e s i r e f o r p o s s e s s i o n s , when such p o s s e s s i o n s are ev i d e n t , i s " i n s a t i a b l e , p e r p e t u a l , u n i v e r s a l , and d i r e c t l y d e s t r u c t i v e of s o c i e t y . " And we know, from the a n a l y s i s of Hume's philosophy of the pas s i o n s , that such a passion i s a f o r c e of great power. Hume consequently asks two q u e s t i o n s : how i s i t that men come to e s t a b l i s h general r u l e s of j u s t i c e , which must c o n f l i c t with t h i s powerful p a s s i o n ; and how, having done so, do they c o n t r i v e to support and maintain these r u l e s ? " J u s t i c e ( w r i t e s Hume) takes i t s r i s e from human conven-t i o n s ... these are intended as a remedy to some inconveniences, which proceed from the concurrence of c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s of the human mind with the s i t u a t i o n of e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . The q u a l i t i e s of the mind are s e l f i s h n e s s and l i m i t e d g e n e r o s i t y : And the s i t u a t i o n of 88 e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s i s t h e i r easy change, j o i n ' d to t h e i r s c a r c i t y i n comparison of the wants and d e s i r e s of men." 4 8 I t i s only from these q u a l i t i e s of the mind and of the world that j u s t i c e and u l t i m a t e l y government s p r i n g , products of the e f f o r t s of men to overcome the inconvenience of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . Such e f f o r t s cannot be based on a p r i o r i reason, wrote Hume: "... we may conclude ... that the sense of j u s t i c e i s not founded on reason, or on the d i s c o v e r y of c e r t a i n connexions and r e l a t i o n s of ideas, which are e t e r n a l , immutable, and u n i v e r s a l l y o b l i g a t o r y . ' " 1 9 Rules of j u s t i c e , then, are r e q u i r e d i n a l l l a r g e or com-plex s o c i e t i e s , but the p a r t i c u l a r nature of the r u l e s might be expected to vary g r e a t l y i n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s . Such r u l e s , w r i t e s Hume, " a r i s e from a r t i f i c e and human c o n v e n t i o n s . " 5 0 The sense of ju s t n e s s thus a r i s e s , not a p r i o r i , but from the pe r c e p t i o n of the way i n which p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t i e s d e a l with the problems of p r o p e r t y : "These r u l e s ... are a r t i f i c i a l , and seek t h e i r end i n an o b l i q u e and i n d i r e c t manner; nor i s the i n t e r e s t , which gi v e s r i s e to them, of a kind that cou'd be pursu'd by the n a t u r a l and i n a r t i f i c i a l p assions of men. " 5 1 Hume p o i n t s to a d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e of r u l e u t i l i t a r i a n i s m : r u l e s of j u s t i c e may be c o n t r a r y to the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n many cases: "8Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.494. fl9Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.496. 5 0Hume, T r e a t i s e . p.496. 5 1Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp.496-7. 89 "When a man of merit, of a be n e f i c e n t d i s p o s i t i o n , r e s t o r e s a great fortune to a miser, or a s e d i t i o u s b i g o t , he has acted j u s t l y and lauda b l y , but the p u b l i c i s a r e a l s u f f e r e r . . . ' t i s e a s i l y c o n c e i v ' d how a man may impoverish himself by a s i g n a l instance of i n t e g r i t y , and have reason to wish, that with regard to that s i n g l e a c t , the laws of j u s t i c e were f o r a moment suspended i n the u n i v e r s e . " 5 2 But r u l e s of j u s t i c e come i n t o being n e v e r t h e l e s s , s i n c e : "... ' t i s c e r t a i n , that the whole plan or scheme i s h i g h l y conducive, or indeed a b s o l u t e l y r e q u i s i t e , both to the support of s o c i e t y , and the w e l l - b e i n g of every i n d i v i d u a l ...'Tho i n one instance the p u b l i c be a s u f f e r e r , t h i s momentary i l l i s amply compensated by the steady p r o s e c u t i o n of the r u l e , and by the peace and order, which i t e s t a b l i s h e s i n s o c i e t y ... every i n d i v i d u a l person must f i n d h i m s e l f a ga i n e r , on b a l l a n c i n g the account; s i n c e , without j u s t i c e , s o c i e t y must immediately d i s s o l v e , and every one must f a l l i n t o the savage c o n d i t i o n , which i s i n f i n i t e l y worse than the worst s i t u a t i o n that can p o s s i b l y be suppos'd i n s o c i e t y . " 5 3 By experience, then, and not by a p r i o r i reason, men di s c o v e r r u l e s of j u s t i c e . At l e n g t h , i t becomes c l e a r to them that i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t can best be served by the mutual ob s e r v a t i o n of r u l e s : " A f t e r men have found by experience, that t h e i r s e l f i s h n e s s and c o n f i n ' d g e n e r o s i t y , a c t i n g at t h e i r l i b e r t y , t o t a l l y i n c a p a c i t a t e them f o r s o c i e t y ; and at the same time have observ'd, that s o c i e t y i s necessary to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of those very p a s s i o n s , they are n a t u r a l l y indue'd to l a y themselves under the r e s t r a i n t of such r u l e s , as may render t h e i r commerce more safe and commodious." 5 4 In complex s o c i e t y , then, where men have come to see through experience that t h e i r strong d e s i r e f o r possessions can 5 2Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.497. 5 3Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp.497-8. 5 4Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp.498-9. 90 best be served through the p u b l i c r e s t r a i n t of passionate impulses, s o c i a l l y d e s t r u c t i v e a v a r i c e i s made by Hume i n t o a foundation of j u s t i c e . I t might thus appear that we. ought to agree with Hirschman i n f i n d i n g the d e s i r e f o r m a t e r i a l wealth an innocuous and c o n t r o l l a b l e f o r c e . Hume i s p l a i n l y c l a i m i n g t h a t , i n some manner, t h i s strong passion can be made to turn i n upon i t s e l f . But the reader w i l l a p p r e c i a t e the problems surrounding t h i s suggestion i n the context of Hume's system. In the r e s o l u t i o n of these d i f f i c u l t i e s the genuinely d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s of Hume's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e emerge. In s o c i e t i e s s u f f i c i e n t l y small and simple, i t may be so c l e a r to an i n d i v i d u a l that s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s t i e d to the ob s e r v a t i o n of r u l e s that no i n c l i n a t i o n to over t u r n them i s l i k e l y to a r i s e . But i n more complex s o c i e t i e s "... we f r e q u e n t l y l o s e s i g h t of that i n t e r e s t , which we have i n ma i n t a i n i n g order, and may f o l l o w a l e s s e r and more present i n t e r e s t , . . " 5 5 Even given that men c o u l d thus e s t a b l i s h r u l e s of j u s t i c e , r e c o g n i z i n g that s e l f - i n t e r e s t would be advanced, how do they c o n t r i v e to support such r u l e s , i n the l i g h t of Hume's under-standing of the r e l a t i o n of reason to the passions? One t h i n g i s c l e a r : the common understanding of Hume we have o v e r r u l e d i n Part I I I , g i v i n g reason no power over the pa s s i o n s , c o u l d pro-vide no answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n a c c e p t a b l e to Hume. He would be fo r c e d to say that men do not support r u l e s of j u s t i c e (except in o t i o s e cases where immediate s e l f - i n t e r e s t and r u l e s 5 5Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.499. 91 c o i n c i d e ) because they cannot: the p a s s i o n of present i n t e r e s t i s incomparably gre a t e r than that generated by d i s t a n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of long-term advantage. T h i s i s a genuine problem f o r Hume, l y i n g at the very heart of h i s p r o j e c t i n the T r e a t i s e . I t i s easy to come away with the impression that he was undecided or s e v e r e l y muddled on the i s s u e . On the one hand we f i n d t h a t the love of g a i n , a p a s s i o n , i s more powerful than any mere idea of r e f l e c t i o n . On the other, that r e f l e c t i o n on t h i s p a s s i o n i t s e l f can convince that i t s ends are b e t t e r served by j u s t i c e than by agrandizement. In other words that r e f l e c t i o n , r e v e a l i n g yet b e t t e r s a t i s f a c t i o n , can have s u f f i c i e n t power to overcome present impulses born of a v a r i c e : "There i s no p a s s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , capable of c o n t r o l l i n g the i n t e r e s t e d a f f e c t i o n , but the very a f f e c t i o n i t s e l f , by an a l t e r a t i o n of i t s d i r e c t i o n . Now t h i s a l t e r a t i o n must n e c e s s a r i l y take p l a c e upon the l e a s t r e f l e c t i o n ; s i n c e ' t i s e v i d e n t , that the passion i s much b e t t e r s a t i s f y ' d by i t s r e s t r a i n t , than by i t s l i b e r t y , and that i n p r e s e r v i n g s o c i e t y , we make much gr e a t e r advances in the a c q u i r i n g of p o s s e s s i o n s , than i n the s o l i t a r y and f o r l o r n c o n d i t i o n , which must f o l l o w upon v i o l e n c e and an u n i v e r s a l l i c e n c e . " 5 6 T h i s makes i t a l l seem r a t h e r easy, because Hume has chosen f o r an example the e a s i e s t p o s s i b l e case. Our d i s c u s s i o n of Part III makes i t c l e a r t h a t , when r e f l e c t i o n convinces that the dreams of a v a r i c e w i l l be b e t t e r gained i n d i r e c t l y , that path l e a d i n g to g r e a t e r gain w i l l of course be f o l l o w e d . But the r e a l t e s t of Hume's system i s found i n the hard cases; and with 5 6Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.492. 92 the honesty c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the T r e a t i s e , he makes no bones about i t : "Men being n a t u r a l l y s e l f i s h , or endow'd only with a c o n f i n ' d g e n e r o s i t y , they are not e a s i l y induc'd to perform any a c t i o n f o r the i n t e r e s t of s t r a n g e r s . . . " 5 7 Consider a l s o t h i s : " ' T i s c e r t a i n , that no a f f e c t i o n of the human mind has both a s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e , and a proper d i r e c t i o n to counter-balance the love of g a i n , and render men f i t members of s o c i e t y , by making them a b s t a i n from the posse s s i o n s of o t h e r . " 5 8 Let us summarize what we have determined thus f a r : the r u l e s of j u s t i c e are e s t a b l i s h e d by men, l i v i n g i n s o c i e t i e s of some degree of r i c h e s , who c o n s i d e r that t h e i r own chance of amassing goods would b e t t e r be served by f o l l o w i n g some r u l e s of pro p e r t y than by the u n r e s t r i c t e d war of each a g a i n s t a l l . But i t i s i n the very nature of such r u l e s that they do not serve the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n each case; and they most d e f i n i t e l y do not serve the i n t e r e s t of every i n d i v i d u a l i n every case. I n d i v i d u a l s w i l l , of course, support the r u l e s when they see t h e i r our advantage i n them. They w i l l even support them as d i s i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s , judging the a c t i o n s of ot h e r s , because they p e r c e i v e the general value of r u l e s , to themselves and the p u b l i c . But i n the hard cases when j u s t i c e does not support s e l f - i n t e r e s t , Hume's psychology makes i t c e r t a i n that the value of j u s t i c e w i l l crumble i n the mind of a s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d p a r t y . T h i s i s a consequence of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of Book I I , 5 7Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.519. 5 8Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.492. 93 s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e i t e r a t e d at the beginning of S e c t i o n V I I , "Of the O r i g i n of Government." Hume's comments at the opening of t h i s s e c t i o n are important and need to quoted at some l e n g t h . " I t has been observ'd by Hume i n Book I I , i n t r e a t i n g of the p a s s i o n s , that men are m i g h t i l y govern'd by the imagination, and p r o p o r t i o n t h e i r a f f e c t i o n s more to the l i g h t , under which any o b j e c t appears to them, than to i t s r e a l and i n t r i n s i c value ... "... every t h i n g , that i s contiguous to us, e i t h e r i n space or time, ... has a p r o p o r t i o n a l e f f e c t on the w i l l and the p a s s i o n s , and commonly operates with more f o r c e than any o b j e c t , that l i e s i n a more d i s t a n t and obscure l i g h t ... "This i s the reason why men so o f t e n act i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n to t h e i r known i n t e r e s t ; and i n p a r t i c u l a r why they p r e f e r any t r i v i a l advantage, that i s present, to the maintenance of order i n s o c i e t y ... the consequences of every breach of e q u i t y seem to l i e very remote, and are not able to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e any immedi-ate advantage, that may be reap'd from i t . They are, however, never the l e s s r e a l f o r being remote; ... as a l l men are, i n some degree, s u b j e c t to the same weakness, i t n e c e s s a r i l y happens, that v i o l a t i o n s of e q u i t y must become very frequent i n s o c i e t y . "This q u a l i t y , t h e r e f o r e , of human nature, not only i s very dangerous of s o c i e t y , but a l s o seems, on a c u r s o r y view, to be incapable of any remedy. The remedy can only come from the consent of men; and i f men be incapable of themselves to p r e f e r remote to contiguous, they w i l l consent to any t h i n g , which wou'd o b l i g e them to such a choice ..." 5 9 On a "cursory view" Hume's a n a l y s i s thus p r o v i d e s no s o l u t i o n to a paradox: while men can come by experience to see that j u s t i c e serves t h e i r long-term i n t e r e s t , an innate f r a i l t y i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l make-up makes i t u n l i k e l y t h at they w i l l f o l l o w the r u l e s i n j u s t those cases where r u l e s are most necessary. 5 9Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp.534-536, passim. 94 J u s t i c e thus f i n d s no secure foundation i n psychology. And yet i t must e x i s t i n some form f o r men to accrue the advantages of l a r g e , complex and c u l t u r e d s o c i e t i e s . As was suggested b r i e f l y above, the s o l u t i o n proposed by Hume was the i n s t i t u t i o n of government, which e x i s t s to he l p men overcome t h i s innate p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e f i c i e n c y . S e c t i o n VII r e i t e r a t e s the c l a i m from Book II that the power of present i n t e r e s t , " t h i s i n f i r m i t y of human nature", can "become a remedy to i t s e l f " 6 0 But how might t h i s be expected to occur, s i n c e d i s t a n t advantage can never outweigh present? What, argued Hume, might happen i f two d i f f e r e n t kinds of advantage are co n s i d e r e d as e q u a l l y d i s t a n t : "When we con s i d e r any o b j e c t s at a d i s t a n c e , a l l t h e i r minute d i s t i n c t i o n s v a n i s h , and we always give the pref e r e n c e to whatever i s i n i t s e l f p r e f e r a b l e , without c o n s i d e r i n g i t s s i t u a t i o n and circumstances ... In r e f l e c t i n g on any a c t i o n , which I am to perform a twelve-month hence, I always r e s o l v e to p r e f e r the gre a t e r good, whether at that time i t w i l l be more contiguous or remote ... My d i s t a n c e from the f i n a l d e t ermination makes a l l those minute d i f f e r e n c e s v a n i s h ... but the general and more d i s c e r n a b l e q u a l i t i e s of good and e v i l . " 6 1 One can thus make accurate judgements about a c t i o n s s u f f i c i e n t l y removed even though present advantage cannot be e a s i l y p r e f e r r e d to f u t u r e . I f wise, one might t h e r e f o r e make r e s o l u t i o n s concerning f u t u r e a c t i o n s , based on c o o l and d i s t a n t r e f l e c t i o n s . The rub, of course, comes when the time of a c t i o n draws near, and r e s o l v e weakens i n the face of present i n t e r e s t : "... on my nearer approach ... A new i n c l i n a t i o n as to 6 0Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.536. 6 1Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.536. 95 the present good s p r i n g s up, and makes i t d i f f i c u l t f o r me to adhere i n f l e x i b l y to my f i r s t purpose and r e s o l u t i o n . T h i s n a t u r a l i n f i r m i t y I may very much r e g r e t , and I may endeavour, by a l l p o s s i b l e means, to f r e e my s e l f from i t . I may have recourse to study and r e f l e x i o n w i t h i n myself; to the advice of f r i e n d s ; to frequent m e d i t a t i o n , and repeated r e s o l u t i o n ..." But, laments Hume, "... having experienc'd how i n e f f e c t u a l a l l these are, I may embrace with p l e a s u r e any other expedient, by which I may impose a r e s t r a i n t upon myself, and guard a g a i n s t t h i s weakness." 6 2 What i s the remedy f o r t h i s weakness? I t i s government i t s e l f , seen as a c o n t r i v e d change of circumstance, designed s o l e l y f o r t h i s purpose. I t would be i d e a l , argued Hume, i f we co u l d c o n t r i v e changes of c o n d i t i o n s i n our world to make the obs e r v a t i o n s of the r u l e s of j u s t i c e "our nearest i n t e r e s t " : "But t h i s being i m p r a c t i c a b l e with respect to a l l mankind, i t can only take p l a c e with r e s p e c t to a few, whom we thus immediately i n t e r e s t i n the execution of j u s t i c e . These are the persons, whom we c a l l c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e s , kings and t h e i r m i n i s t e r s and r u l e r s , who  being i n d i f f e r e n t persons to the g r e a t e s t part of the  s t a t e , have no i n t e r e s t , or but a remote one, i n any act  of i n j u s t i c e ; and being s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r present  c o n d i t i o n , and with t h e i r part i n s o c i e t y , have an imme- d i a t e i n t e r e s t i n every execution of j u s t i c e , which i s  so necessary to the upholding of soc i e t y . Here then i s the o r i g i n of c i v i l government and s o c i e t y . Men are not able r a d i c a l l y to cure, e i t h e r i n themselves or oth e r s , the narrowness of s o u l , which makes them p r e f e r the present to the remote. These persons, then, are not only indue'd to observe those r u l e s i n t h e i r own conduct, but a l s o to c o n s t r a i n others to a l i k e r e g u l a r i t y , and i n f o r c e the d i c t a t e s of e q u i t y t h r o ' the whole s o c i e t y . And i f i t be necessary, they may a l s o i n t e r e s t o t h ers more immediately i n the execution of j u s t i c e , and c r e a t e a number of o f f i c e r s , c i v i l and m i l i t a r y , to a s s i s t them i n t h e i r government." 6 3 6 2Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp.536-7. 6 3Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.537. I t a l i c s added. 96 On t h i s most general l e v e l , then, Hume f i n d s h i s r a t i o n a l e f o r government i n the weakness of i n d i v i d u a l s . Although men are unable to c o n t r o l the pass i o n s r a i s e d by present i n t e r e s t s i n d i v i d u a l l y , they can use the f a c u l t i e s of the understanding to cr e a t e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s to r e s t r a i n themselves. T h i s i s what Hume meant when he s a i d t h at both j u s t i c e and government are " a r t i f i c i a l " ; that i s , they are a r t i f a c t s , c o n s t r u c t e d by men out of the understanding, r a t h e r than innate and necessary f e a -t u r e s of i n d i v i d u a l human psychology. The s t r u c t u r e s of government are, as i s were, o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n s i n the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of the long-term i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s . As Hume puts i t : "... nature p r o v i d e s a remedy i n the judgement and un-der s t a n d i n g , f o r what i s i r r e g u l a r and incommodious i n the a f f e c t i o n s . " 6 4 Hume's s o l u t i o n to the unavoidable presence of s e l f - i n t e r e s t i n complex modern s o c i e t y has thus two a s p e c t s . F i r s t , the a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s to make d i s i n t e r e s t e d d e c i s i o n s i s used, not when i t cannot operate i n the heat of d a i l y a f f a i r s , but i n the c o o l r e f l e c t i v e s t a t e generated by the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of long-term o b j e c t i v e s . Second, the r e s u l t of t h i s process i s the fo r m u l a t i o n of r u l e s of j u s t i c e and the c r e a t i o n of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s to keep i n d i v i d u a l s from breaking r u l e s i n the heat of a f f a i r s . T h i s i n v o l v e s the establishment and support of a s p e c i a l c l a s s of c i t i z e n , judges, together with sup p o r t i n g components of the l e g a l apparatus, who must 6 4Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.489. 97 "... have no i n t e r e s t , or but a remote one, i n any act of i n j u s t i c e ; and being s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r present c o n d i t i o n , and with t h e i r p a r t i n s o c i e t y , have an imme-d i a t e i n t e r e s t i n every execution of j u s t i c e , . ." 6 5 P o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y , says Hume, e x i s t s f o r the promulgation of j u s t i c e which i s , roughly speaking, the p r o t e c t i o n of p r o p e r t y . 6 6 And j u s t i c e e x i s t s because i t must. The "... a v i d i t y alone, of a c q u i r i n g goods and possessions f o r o u r s e l v e s and our nearest f r i e n d s i s i n s a t i a b l e , p e r p e t u a l , u n i v e r s a l , and d i r e c t l y d e s t r u c t i v e of s o c i e t y . " 6 7 Hume's dangerous knack f o r making p e r f e c t l y c o r r e c t statements i n the context of h i s argument, which n e v e r t h e l e s s succeed i n g i v i n g the impression of absolute pronouncements, i s in evidence here. He does not mean that a l l mankind i s , or must be, possessed of t h i s kind of a v a r i c e , but r a t h e r that we a l l have the c a p a c i t y to become enamoured of the possessions of ot h e r s . In the above he i s r e f e r r i n g to complex s o c i e t i e s of 18th Century Europe; t h i s i s made c l e a r i n S e c t i o n V I I I , where he c o n s i d e r s the nature of ruder s o c i e t i e s . "An Indian i s but l i t t l e tempted to d i s p o s s e s s another of h i s hut, or to s t e a l h i s bow, as being a l r e a d y p r o v i -ded of the same advantages; and as to any s u p e r i o r f o r t u n e , which may atte n d one above another i n hunting and f i s h i n g , ' t i s only c a s u a l and temporary, and w i l l have but a small tendency to d i s t u r b s o c i e t y . " 6 8 Government, argues Hume, i s thus not a b s o l u t e l y necessary to men l i v i n g i n s o c i e t y ; i t s n e c e s s i t y i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to 6 5Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.537. 6 6Hume, T r e a t i s e , Book I I I , Part I I , passim., pp.477ff. 6 7Hume, T r e a t i s e , pp.491-2. 6 8Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.539. 98 the amount of r i c h e s i n s o c i e t y . "The s t a t e of s o c i e t y without government i s one of the most n a t u r a l s t a t e s of men, and must s u b s i s t with the co n j u n c t i o n of many f a m i l i e s , and long a f t e r the f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n . Nothing but an encrease of r i c h e s and posses s i o n s cou'd o b l i g e men to q u i t i t ; and so barbarous and u n i n s t r u c t e d are a l l s o c i e t i e s on t h e i r f i r s t formation, that many years must elapse before these can encrease to such a degree, as to d i s t u r b men in the enjoyment of peace and c o n c o r d . " 6 9 A c e r t a i n ambivalence surrounds t h i s p o s i t i o n . Hume viewed p o s i t i v e l y , i n a rat h e r t e c h n i c a l sense, that "most n a t u r a l s t a t e " of mankind - without government. But h i s p r e f e r e n c e i s c l e a r : such s o c i e t i e s , while p o l i t i c a l l y pure, are "barbarous and u n i n s t r u c t e d " . T h i s i s a good ins t a n c e of t e n s i o n between the demands of the r e p u b l i c a n model of c i v i l s o c i e t y and Hume's very S c o t t i s h sense of the value of c i v i l i z a t i o n and high c u l t u r e . We do not f i n d i n Hume any of Rousseau's q u a s i - r e p u b l i c a n n o s t a l g i a f o r a world devoid of m a t e r i a l progress and f i n e manners. Eigh t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Scots were too cognizant of the r e a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of barbarism to e n t e r t a i n such thoughts. It i s not, then, that men must l i v e i n a p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t y ; but i t i s c l e a r that the p r i c e of c i v i l i z a t i o n i s government. The p o i n t of government i s thus the p r o t e c t i o n of pro p e r t y , otherwise known as j u s t i c e , something that becomes the more nec-essary as c i v i l i z a t i o n advances. I t e x i s t s because of the r o l e i t p l a y s i n a p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y based s t r u c t u r e : men can by reason c r e a t e s t r u c t u r e s i n s o c i e t y e x t e r n a l to themselves which h e l p 6 9Hume, T r e a t i s e , p.541. 99 them to protect their long-term interests from their own passions. Hume's system of pol i t i cs in the Treatise thus starts from psychological principles remote from the foundations of c lassical republican p o l i t i c a l theory, but concludes in a posi-tion with discernable relations to them. 1 0 0 V. CONCLUSION: DAVID HUME IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT U DAVID HUME AND THE CLASSICAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION In the w r i t e r ' s view, nothing i n the l i t e r a t u r e , not even Moore's paper, g i v e s a s u f f i c i e n t l y strong impression of the c l a s s i c r e p u b l i c a n i n f l u e n c e to be seen i n Hume's work. While, as we have seen, t h i s i n f l u e n c e appears i n a s t r u c t u r a l form in the T r e a t i s e , i t i s most v i s i b l e i n the v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l Essays, which show both t h e i r connection with the system of the T r e a t i s e and a very d e t a i l e d and knowledgeable use of r e p u b l i c a n vocabulary. I t i s to be r e g r e t t e d that space does not allow a comprehensive review of Hume's Essays at t h i s p o i n t . I t must s u f f i c e to give a few examples of how the p s y c h o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e we have developed can a i d i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Again and again, i n one essay a f t e r another, Hume uses the concepts of r e p u b l i c a n i s m to assess c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s or to d e s c r i b e i d e a l s o l u t i o n s . T h i s i s not to say he i n v a r i a b l y f o l l o w e d the p a r t y l i n e , but there can be no doubt that much of Hume's p o l i t i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n was c a s t i n the r e p u b l i c a n mold. But i f Hume was r e p u b l i c a n , he was a c r i t i c a l one. While he accepted, f o r example, the t r a d i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of the p l a c e of commerce and l u x u r y : "The r e p u b l i c of Sparta was c e r t a i n l y more powerful than 101 any s t a t e now i n the world ... and t h i s was owing e n t i r e l y to the want of commerce and l u x u r y . " 1 He a l s o argued that a modern s t a t e might w e l l be more powerful i f v i r t u e were somehow pursued i n concord with commerce. A more n a t u r a l , because l e s s c o e r c i v e , method would be to allow commerce and luxury - t h i s would make the s t a t e w e a l t h i e r , through some degree of t a x a t i o n , and provide a stock of a v a i l a -b l e labour f o r occasions of n a t i o n a l need. 2 On the other hand, Hume's v i o l e n t l y expressed antagonism to the i n s t i t u t i o n of the p u b l i c debt was c l e a r l y p a r t of h i s r e p u b l i c a n i n h e r i t a n c e . Consider t h i s v i v i d p o r t r a y a l of the consequences of the l o s s of c i v i c v i r t u e : "Suppose the p u b l i c once f a i r l y brought to that c o n d i t i o n , to which i t i s hastening with such amazing r a p i d i t y ; suppose the l a n d to be taxed eighteen or nineteen s h i l l i n g s i n the pound ... In t h i s unnatural s t a t e of s o c i e t y , the only person, who possess any revenue beyond the immediate e f f e c t s of t h e i r i n d u s t r y , are the s t o c k - h o l d e r s , who draw almost a l l the rent of the land and houses, besides the produce of a l l the customs and e x c i s e s . These are men, who have no connexions with the s t a t e , who can enjoy t h e i r revenue i n any p a r t of the globe i n which they chuse to r e s i d e , who w i l l n a t u r a l l y bury themselves i n the c a p i t a l or i n great c i t i e s , and who w i l l sink i n t o the l e t h a r g y of a s t u p i d and pampered luxury, without s p i r i t , ambition, or enjoyment. Adieu to a l l ideas of n o b i l i t y , gentry, and f a m i l y . The stocks can be t r a n s f e r r e d i n an i n s t a n t , and being i n such a f l u c t u a t i n g s t a t e , w i l l seldom be t r a n s m i t t e d d u r i n g three generations from f a t h e r to son ... by t h i s means, the s e v e r a l ranks of men, which form a kind of independent magistracy i n a s t a t e , i n s t i t u t e d by the hand of nature, are e n t i r e l y l o s t ; and every man i n a u t h o r i t y d e r i v e s h i s i n f l u e n c e from the commission alone of the s o v e r e i g n . No expedient remains f o r p r e v e n t i n g or suppressing i n s u r r e c t i o n s , but mercenary armies: No expedient at a l l remains f o r r e s i s t i n g ^ume, Essays, p.290. 2See Hume, Essays, p.290 f f . 102 tyranny: e l e c t i o n s are swayed by b r i b e r y and c o r r u p t i o n a l o n e : And the middle power between king and people being t o t a l l y removed, a grievous despotism must i n f a l l i b l y p r e v a i l . The la n d h o l d e r s , d e s p i s e d f o r t h e i r poverty, and hated f o r t h e i r o ppressions, w i l l be u t t e r l y unable to make any o p p o s i t i o n to i t . " 3 With t h i s q u o t a t i o n before us, not much f u r t h e r argument f o r Hume's deep sympathy with c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m i s c a l l e d f o r . But the que s t i o n at hand i s one of systematic connections be-tween Hume's T r e a t i s e and r e p u b l i c a n i s m . As we have seen, Moore argues f o r strong connections between Hume and the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n s , but e f f e c t i v e l y c l aims that Hume l e f t the t r a d i t i o n in removing c i v i c v i r t u e . Hume, w r i t e s Moore, b e l i e v e d that "... good government c o u l d be achieved q u i t e i r r e s p e c t i v e of the moral q u a l i t i e s and c h a r a c t e r s of the p o l i t i c i a n s who conduct the government."* Moore's support f o r t h i s c l a i m l i e s mainly on the f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n s : "A c o n s t i t u t i o n i s only so f a r good as i t pro v i d e s a remedy a g a i n s t m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ..." 5 "... i n f i x i n g the s e v e r a l checks and c o n t r o l s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end i n a l l h i s a c t i o n s than p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t . " 6 Two p o i n t s need to be made i n response to t h i s . One concerns c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m i t s e l f ; the other, the kind of p o l i t i c s we have d i s c o v e r e d i n Hume. F i r s t , i t appears that Moore has not s u f f i c i e n t l y a p p r e c i a t e d the s t r u c t u r e of the 3Hume, Essays, pp.362-63. "Moore, op. c i t . , p.20. 5Hume, Essays, pp. 25-26. 6Hume, Essays, p. 40. 103 c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c ; i t should be c l e a r that such c l a i m s as to the r o l e of a c o n s t i t u t i o n are e n t i r e l y w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n . The p o i n t of the balanced s t r u c t u r e of the c o n s t i t u t i o n i s to he l p overcome the i n e v i t a b l e f a i l u r e s i n v i r t u e which w i l l appear i n any r e p u b l i c . The best c o n s t i t u t i o n w i l l assume the worst about human nature. M a c h i a v e l l i h i m s e l f made t h i s p o i n t : " A l l w r i t e r s on p o l i t i c s have p o i n t e d out, and throughout h i s t o r y there are p l e n t y of examples which i n d i c a t e , that i n c o n s t i t u t i n g and l e g i s l a t i n g f o r a commonwealth i t must needs be taken f o r granted that a l l men are wicked and that they w i l l always give vent to the m a l i g n i t y that i s i n t h e i r minds when op p o r t u n i t y o f f e r s . " 7 Hume c l a i m amounts to the same t h i n g ; but he adds the i n t e r e s t i n g and s i g n i f i c a n t comment that "... i t appears somewhat strange, that a maxim (every man a knave) should be true i n p o l i t i c s , which i s f a l s e i n f a c t . " 8 Moore i s mistaken, then, i n t h i n k i n g that the s u p p o s i t i o n of c o r r u p t i o n i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p l a n n i n g p l a c e s Hume out of the r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n . The other p o i n t r e l a t e s to Hume d i r e c t l y . We have made c l e a r i n our a n a l y s i s of Hume's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e i n the T r e a t i s e that Hume d i d not depend on c o r r u p t i o n and s e l f - i n t e r e s t to be the motor f o r c i v i l s o c i e t y . Moore and others may be excused f o r t h i n k i n g so, f o r Hume does sometimes give that impression. For example, Hume's a n a l y s i s of the 7See Bernard C r i c k , ed., The Dis c o u r s e s of M a c h i a v e l l i , Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970, pp.111-112. 8Hume, Essays, p.40. 1 04 E n g l i s h government r e s t s i t s op e r a t i o n s on the v i o l e n t l y competing i n t e r e s t s at work i n the government. Moore, Pocock and others have taken t h i s as an i n d i c a t i o n of Hume's pr e f e r e n c e . But Hume e x p l i c i t l y notes that he i s a n a l y s i n g an imperfect l i v i n g government. He i s f a r from o p t i m i s t i c about i t s f u t u r e , f e a r i n g that i t w i l l end i n abs o l u t e monarchy. Hume's s p e c u l a t i o n s concerning the i d e a l r e p u b l i c , on the other hand, are to be found i n Essay XVI, Idea of a P e r f e c t  Commonwealth. T h i s i d e a l r e p u b l i c i s marked by a s t r i k i n g absence of c o r r u p t i o n : i t i s , i n f a c t , a c l a s s i c balanced p o l i t y , with a m i l i t i a of c i t i z e n s and no p u b l i c debt. I t d i d , however, allow f o r commerce and a high degree of c u l t u r e and lux u r y . Hume's work thus shows a high degree of a f f i n i t y f o r the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n model without s t i c k i n g to the t r a d i t i o n i n every d e t a i l . What can the s t r u c t u r e of Hume's p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e i n the T r e a t i s e t e l l us about h i s r e l a t i o n to c l a s s i c a l r epublicanism? Consider the two systems i n t h e i r e s s e n t i a l s . We can see at once that Hume's system o f f e r s no r e a l analogue to the o f f i c e of L e g i s l a t o r . T h i s i n i t s e l f i s u n s u r p r i s i n g . The go d l i k e o f f i c e of L e g i s l a t o r had been de-emphasized i n the t r a d i t i o n s i n c e M a c h i a v e l l i ' s time. M a c h i a v e l l i himself expressed g r e a t e s t i n t e r e s t i n the Roman model - where c i t i z e n s had c o n t r i v e d to b u i l d a r e p u b l i c i n the face of an i n e f f e c t i v e o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . Hume's n o t i o n , then, of an e v o l v i n g h i s t o r i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n was a n a t u r a l 18th century extension of 1 0 5 a tendency i m p l i c i t i n the modern r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n . With the o f f i c e of L e g i s l a t o r removed great s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two s t r u c t u r e s emerge. The c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n s e n v i s i o n e d a p o l i t y i n which two elements allowed them to l i v e together i n the b e n e f i t s of s o c i e t y i n s p i t e of t h e i r n a t u r a l tendencies to pursue of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t . These were a balanced system of government and laws, which prevented minor, ongoing problems of s e l f - i n t e r e s t from damaging the r e p u b l i c ; and a l s o a system of support, from government and from each other, which allowed c i t i z e n s to e x e r c i s e d i s i n t e r e s t e d reason in the f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e i r r o l e s as a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and law-makers. Consider now the foundations of David Hume's p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e . He a l s o advocated mixed government and f o r the same reasons. He too provided a system of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s the obj e c t of which were the p r o t e c t i o n of c i t i z e n s i n the e x e r c i s e of d i s i n t e r e s t e d reason. In both systems the e s s e n t i a l element i s the same - the e x i s t e n c e of c i t i z e n s who can reason i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Hume has abandoned the word v i r t u e , i n i t s c l a s s i c a l sense, but he has not e l i m i n a t e d the concept from h i s system. When we look to the foundations of the v i r t u e i n the two systems, we come near to the heart of Hume's encounter with c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m . In t r a d i t i o n a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m , the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r v i r t u e e x i s t s i n c e r t a i n men, but i t i s ex-tremely f r a g i l e and i n need of c a r e f u l p r o t e c t i o n : a c e r t a i n 106 m i l i t a r y environment, a p a r t i c u l a r kind of economic s t r u c t u r e . As we have seen, 18th century p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s found grave d i f f i c u l t y with the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s kind of v i r t u e i n the context of modern commercial s o c i e t y . As we have noted, many of them abandoned v i r t u e a l t o g e t h e r ; and by the end of the century i t was e f f e c t i v e l y gone from the scene. But Hume, as we can now see, d i d not abandon v i r t u e . He r e t a i n e d the idea of v i r t u e i n a p o l i t i c a l system which made the presence of d i s i n t e r e s t e d reason e s s e n t i a l . He found the sup-port f o r t h i s reason, not i n m i l i t a r y q u a l i t i e s or economic independence, but i n f e a t u r e s of the human psychology which he had systematised i n the T r e a t i s e . For Hume, reason was weak i n the face of present p a s s i o n s ; but i t was stro n g i n the a b i l i t y to i n c o r p o r a t e s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s i n t o the reason-ing process i t s e l f . While Hume never e x p l i c i t l y s a i d that he was p r o v i d i n g p s y c h o l o g i c a l foundations f o r a c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c , there are o c c a s i o n a l comments which suggest that he d i d see i t that way. In h i s review of H a r r i n g t o n , f o r example, he noted that H a r r i n g t o n ' s n o t i o n of the connections between pro p e r t y and p o l i t i c s would have to be a l t e r e d i n the l i g h t of modern psychology: the b e l i e f s of men, c e n t r a l as we have seen to Hume's whole s t r u c t u r e of thought, would have to r e p l a c e notions of necessary m a t e r i a l c o n n e c t i o n s . 9 9 T h i s p o i n t i s from Moore, op. c i t . , p 816. See a l s o Hume, "Of the F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s of Government," Essays, pp.30-31. 107 Because the foundation of reason no longer l a y i n m i l i t a r y or economic s t r u c t u r e s , Hume was able to look upon luxury and commerce with a c o o l e r eye. Rather than being a t h r e a t to the very foundations of p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y , commerce became merely one more f e a t u r e of the world. Hume c o u l d a c c o r d i n g l y accept the i n c r e a s i n g l y popular a n t i - r e p u b l i c a n a n a l y s i s of luxury as b e n e f i c i a l to the s t a t e : i t s i l l e f f e c t s , no longer so c e n t r a l l y p o l i t i c a l , c o u l d be c o n t r o l l e d i n the same manner as any a c t i v i t y . But on the que s t i o n of the N a t i o n a l Debt Hume's p s y c h o l o g i c a l p o l i t i c s p r e d i c t e d d i s a s t e r . Here was a paradigmatic case of short-term i n t e r e s t - the passions of ambitious men - overcoming long-term i n t e r e s t . Here was a case of reason overcome; c o r r u p t i o n , i n other words, and Hume's essay p a i n t s a d i r e p i c t u r e of the consequences. Hume, then, was r e c o g n i s a b l y a r e p u b l i c a n , a c r i t i c a l r e p u b l i c a n , i n some ways p o s s i b l y the l a s t great r e p u b l i c a n , and one l a r g e l y unrecognized as such. I t i s l i k e l y that h i s o r i g i -n a l 18th century audience, h i g h l y attuned to r e p u b l i c a n nuance, c o u l d have recognized the nature of h i s new r e p u b l i c a n foundations with l e s s s t r u g g l e than we have made. But the T r e a t i s e was a d i f f i c u l t document, then as now, and we have seen that an understanding of i t s connections to r e p u b l i c a n i s m do not come e a s i l y . From the la c k of e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e s , i t appears most l i k e l y that Hume himself d i d not r e a l i z e the extent to which he was r e - c r e a t i n g an ol d e r p o l i t i c a l model on modern 108 psychological p r i n c i p l e s . The Treatise, however, makes i t clear that he did want to establish e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l structures on epistemological and psychological foundations. The analysis we have made makes i t just a l i t t l e clearer what kind of p o l i t i c a l structures he had in mind. 2_;_ SUMMARY OF WHAT HAS BEEN SHOWN We have seen that the c l a s s i c a l republican t r a d i t i o n was characterised by a structure which made the exercise of reason the sine qua non of a stable republic. The importance of independence in that structure lay in i t s support of disinterested reason; and virt u e , the a b i l i t y to place public over private interest, came from the exercise of disinterested reason. While the l o g i c a l l y ideal republic we abstracted from the optimistic side of the t r a d i t i o n provided enough independence to c i t i z e n s to keep them virtuous, Machiavelli and his followers sought additional aid for vi r t u e . For some Renaissance republicans t h i s support came from m i l i t a r y independence; in Harrington's version i t came from economic independence. Individual virtue in the c l a s s i c a l republican t r a d i t i o n was thus characterised by i t s support from two dire c t i o n s : from the consti t u t i o n a l structures of government and from the s o c i a l and interdependent support of c i t i z e n s one for another. The fascinating changes in the support for virtue, as provided by the di f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l versions of the c l a s s i c a l republic, have tended to dominate the l i t e r a t u r e . As a result 109 the h i g h degree of s o c i a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l support has tended to go unnoticed. In our examination of the T r e a t i s e we have found that a wi d e l y - h e l d view of Hume's philosophy i s f a l s e . Hume b e l i e v e d that reason c o u l d i n f l u e n c e both b e l i e f and the p a s s i o n s . Hume d e s c r i b e d how a very p a r t i c u l a r kind of reason, the consequence of h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s , c o u l d overcome p a s s i o n s . Hume's p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s i n the T r e a t i s e d e s c r i b e s the formation and maintenance of c i v i l s o c i e t y as a d i r e c t consequence of these p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t s . The s t r u c t u r e s of government are seen as e x t e r n a l p a r t s of the reasoning p r o c e s s : t h e i r r o l e i s twofold: one, to prevent, so f a r as pos-s i b l e , i n e v i t a b l e f a i l u r e s i n i n d i v i d u a l v i r t u e from r u i n i n g c i v i l s o c i e t y ; and two, to pro v i d e f o r the e x i s t e n c e i n s o c i e t y of i n d i v i d u a l s who c o u l d administer laws i n complete freedom from s e l f - i n t e r e s t . The l e g a l system thus embodies mutual long-term i n t e r e s t s and p r o t e c t s i n d i v i d u a l s from the consequences of short-term i n t e r e s t s - t h e i r p a s s i o n s . Hume's psychology and epistemology thus penetrate to the core of h i s p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s . H is Essays r e f l e c t t h e i r s trong connections both with the T r e a t i s e and with c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c a n i s m : Hume's re p u b l i c a n i s m i n the Essays appears more c o n s i s t e n t when viewed from the p e r s p e c t i v e of the T r e a t i s e . 1 1 0 3^ DAVID HUME'S PLACE IN 18TH CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT In the M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment, J.G.A. Pocock proposes a d i v i s i o n by which we can judge the modernity of 18th century p o l i t i c a l thought. T h e o r i s t s who continued to found t h e i r p o l i t i c s on c l a s s i c a l notions were doomed a l l to the same r e -s u l t , suggests Pocock: "... every t r e a t i s e on p o l i t i c s which c o u l d not transcend the l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s s t y l e was l i k e l y to end, not only i n moral e x h o r t a t i o n , but i n the suggestion that v i r t u e as a q u a l i t y of the p e r s o n a l i t y was the only agency l i k e l y to cure c o r r u p t i o n . " 1 0 The problem of 18th century p o l i t i c s at the mid-century was, Pocock t e l l s , that somehow "Men had ... to be b e t t e r than t h e i r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " 1 1 Pocock i s suggesting, with Smith c l e a r l y in mind, that only a p o l i t i c a l system which abandoned v i r t u e c o u l d r e a l l y hope to break out of the conceptual t a n g l e . In the l i g h t of our d i s c u s s i o n we can now see what t h i s means: the c l a s s i c a l r e p u b l i c had o f f e r e d men a chance to be b e t t e r than the chaos of chance or fortune which surrounded them, a chance to u t i l i z e t h e i r reason a g a i n s t t h e i r own weakness. But i t was a f r a g i l e chance, dependent not only on reason but on a very p a r t i c u l a r environment. Most 18th century p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s l o s t some degree of confidence i n the e x i s t -ence of t h i s environment and hence i n the the modern a p p l i c a b i l i t y of r e p u b l i c a n v i r t u e . I t was the great p r o j e c t of 18th century p o l i t i c a l thought to r e p l a c e i t , or somewhat rework 1 0Pocock,The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment,op. c i t . , p.484. 1 1 P o c o c k , o p . c i t . , p.485. 1 1 1 i t . Montesquieu, w r i t e s Winch, "... can be seen as the l a s t major exponent of a c l a s s i c a l - r e n a i s s a n c e t r a d i t i o n a l of concern with the c u l t i v a t i o n of d i s t i n c t i v e p o l i t i c a l q u a l i t i e s or as one of the f i r s t of the 'moderns', i n h i s r e c o g n i t i o n that the changes i n s o c i e t y a s s o c i a t e d with commerce c o u l d f u r n i s h a b a s i s f o r a new plan of l i b e r t y , and a s u b s t i t u t e f o r v i r t u e i n the anc i e n t s e n s e . " 1 2 When we reach Adam Smith, t r a d i t i o n a l l y regarded as the i n h e r i t o r of Montesquieu's i n s i g h t i n t o t h i s conceptual dilemma, we have c l e a r l y l e f t v i r t u e behind and entered a new p o l i t i c a l paradigm: freedom, i n place of v i r t u e , became the motor of c i v i l s o c i e t y . The need f o r c i t i z e n s to reason i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t was l e f t behind; i n i t s p l a c e came a confidence that the p u r s u i t of s e l f - i n t e r e s t would l e a d u l t i m a t e l y to the good of a l l . We can now see that Hume l a y c l e a r l y on the other s i d e of t h i s conceptual w a l l . Hume seems, i n f a c t , to have done what Pocock i m p l i e s c o u l d not be done: keeping the c e n t r a l notion of v i r t u e , he re-formed i t i n t o an idea compatible with, indeed founded on, the environmental, h i s t o r i c a l p e r s o n a l i t y of modern 18th century psychology. In doing so, Hume o f f e r e d to the 18th century a re p u b l i c a n i s m f r e e d of o b s o l e t e , d o c t r i n a i r e a t t i t u d e s toward commerce, luxury and, indeed, to h i s t o r y i t s e l f . 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S c o t t , W i l l i a m Robert. Adam Smith as Student and P r o f e s s o r . New York, A.M. Kerry, 1965. Skinner, Quentin. The Foundations of Modern P o l i t i c a l Thought. Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978. 2 v o l s . Skinner, Andrew S.; Wilson, Thomas., eds. Essays on Adam Smith. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Ed. E.G. West. I n d i a n a p o l i s , L i b e r t y C l a s s i c s , 1976. Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. (1776) Books I - I I I . Ed. Andrew Skinner, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1974. T a y l o r , W.L. F r a n c i s Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors of  Adam Smith. Durham, N.C., Duke U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965. West, E.G. Adam Smith and His Works. I n d i a n a p o l i s , L i b e r t y P ress, 1976. Wi l l i a m s , Raymond. C u l t u r e and S o c i e t y 1780-1 950. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1961. Winch, Donald. Adam Smith's P o l i t i c s . Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1978. 1 14 2. DAVID HUME Aiken, Henry David. "An I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume's Theory of the Place of Reason i n E t h i c s and P o l i t i c s . " E t h i c s . Vol.90, No.l, October, 1979. Ayer, A.J. Hume. Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980. Burke, John J . "Hume's H i s t o r y of England: Waking the E n g l i s h from a Dogmatic Slumber." S t u d i e s i n Eig h t e e n t h Century  C u l t u r e . Vol.7, 1978. C a p a l d i , N i c h o l a s . "Hume as S o c i a l S c i e n t i s t . " The Review of  Metaphysics, V o l . XXXII, No. 1, 1978. p.99. Chamley, P.E. "The C o n f l i c t Between Montesquieu and Hume: A Study of the O r i g i n s of Adam Smith's U n i v e r s a l i s m . " Essays  on Adam Smith. Eds. Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. C o n n i f f , James. "Hume's P o l i t i c a l Methodology: A R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 'That P o l i t i c s May be Reduced to a Science." The Review of P o l i t i c s . Vol.38, 1976. Connon, R.W. "The Nat u r a l i s m of Hume R e v i s i t e d . " M c G i l l Hume  St u d i e s . Eds, Norton, C a p a l d i and Robinson. San Diego, A u s t i n H i l l P ress, 1979. C o t t l e , C h a r l e s E. " J u s t i c e as A r t i f i c i a l V i r t u e i n Hume's T r e a t i s e . " J o u r n a l of the H i s t o r y of Ideas. Vol.XL, 1979. Forbes, Duncan. Hume's P h i l o s o p h i c a l P o l i t i c s . Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975. Forbes, Duncan. "Natural Law and S c o t t i s h Enlightenment." The  O r i g i n s and Nature of the S c o t t i s h Enlightenment. Eds. R.H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner. Edinburgh, John Donald P u b l i s h e r s , 1982. Haakonssen, Knud. The Science of a L e g i s l a t o r - The N a t u r a l  J u r i i s p r u d e n c e of David Hume and Adam Smith. Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981. H a l l , Roland. "The Development of Hume S c h o l a r s h i p . " F i f t y  Years of Hume S c h o l a r s h i p . Edinburgh U n i v e r s i t y , Press, 1978. H a r r i s o n , Jonathan. Hume's Theory of J u s t i c e . Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1981. H a r r i s o n , Jonathan. Hume's Moral Epistemology. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976. 1 15 Hendel, C h a r l e s W. Studies i n the Philosophy of David Hume. I n d i a n p o l i s , B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1963. Home, John. A Sketch of the Character of Mr. Hume and D i a r y of A Journey from Morpeth to Bath 23 A p r i l - j_ May 1776. Ed. David Fate Norton. Edinburgh, the Tragara Press, 1976. Jones, P e t e r . Hume's Sentiments - T h e i r C i c e r o n i a n and French  Context. The U n i v e r s i t y P ress, Edinburgh, 1982. Kemp Smith, Norman. The Philosophy of David Hume. New York, St. Mart i n ' s Press, 1966. L a i r d , John. Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature. London, Methuen and Co., 1932. L i v i n g s t o n , Donald, King, James T. Hume - A Re - E v a l u a t i o n . New York, Fordham U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1976. L i v i n g s t o n , Donald W. "Hume's Conservatism." S t u d i e s i n  Eig h t e e n t h Century C u l t u r e . V o l . 7, 1978. M i l l e r , David. Philosophy and Ideology i n Hume's P o l i t i c a l  Thought. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981. Moore, James. "Hume's Theory of J u s t i c e and Property." P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s . V o l . XXIV, No.2, 1976,pp.103-119. Moore, James. "Hume's P o l i t i c a l Science and the C l a s s i c a l Republican T r a d i t i o n . " Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e. Vol.X:4, 1977, pp.809-839. Mossner, Ernest Campbell. The L i f e of David Hume. Second E d i t i o n . Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1980. Norton, David Fate; C a p a l d i , N i c h o l a s ; Robinson, Wade L; eds. M c G i l l Hume S t u d i e s . San Diego, A u s t i n H i l l Press, 1979. Norton, David Fate; Popkin, R i c h a r d H; eds. David Hume; P h i l o s o p h i c a l H i s t o r i a n . I n d i a n a p o l i s , B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1965. Noxon, James. Hume's P h i l o s o p h i c a l Development. Oxford, At the Clarendon Press, 1973. Passmore, J.A. Hume's I n t e n t i o n s . Cambridge, At the U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1952. P r i c e , John Valdimar. The I r o n i c Hume. A u s t i n , The U n i v e r s i t y of Texas Press, 1965. Sesonske, Alexander; Fleming, Noel; eds. Human Understanding;  S t u d i e s i n the Philosophy of David Hume. Belmont, C a l i f o r n i a , Wadsworth P u b l i s h i n g , 1966. 1 16 Stewart, John B. The Moral and P o l i t i c a l Philosophy of David  Hume. New York, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963. Todd, W i l l i a m B. Hume and the Enlightenment - Essays Presented  to Ernest Campbell Mossner. Edinburgh U n i v e r s i t y Press,1974 Vlachos, Georges. E s s a i Sur La P o l i t i q u e de Hume. P a r i s , Domat-Montchrestien, 1955. Wertz, S.K. "Hume, H i s t o r y and Human Nature." J o u r n a l of the  H i s t o r y of Ideas. V o l . 36, 1975, p.481. Wexler, V i c t o r G. "David Hume and the H i s t o r y of England." Memoirs of the American P h i l o s o p h i c a l S o c i e t y . V o l . 131, 1979. Wilson, Fred. "Hume's Theory of Mental A c t i v i t y , " M c G i l l Hume  S t u d i e s . Eds, Norton, C a p a l d i and Robinson. San Diego, A u s t i n H i l l Press, 1979. Yalden-Thomson, D.C. "Recent Work on Hume." American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 20, No. 1, January 1983, pp.1-22. 3. THE CLASSIAL REPUBLICAN TRADITION B i l t z e r , C h a r l e s . The Immortal Commonwealth. New Haven, Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960. C r i c k , Bernard, ed. The D i s c o u r s e s of M a c h i a v e l l i . Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970. Fink, Zera S. The C l a s s i c a l Republicans - An Essay i n the  Recovery of a Pat t e r n of Thought i n Seventeenth Century  England. Evanston, Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y , 1945. Forbes, Duncan. " S c e p t i c a l Whiggism, Commerce and L i b e r t y . " Essays on Adam Smith. Eds. Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. Kramnick, Isaac. Bolingbroke and His C i r c l e : The P o l i t i c s of  N o s t a l g i a i n the Age of Walpole. Cambridge, Mass, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968. M a c h i a v e l l i , N i c c o l o . The Prince(1514), ed. George B u l l . Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1961. Montesquieu, C h a r l e s L o u i s . The S p i r i t of Laws. (1748) Ed. David Wallace C a r r i t h e r s . Berkeley, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1977. 1 17 Pocock, J.G.A. The Ancient C o n s t i t u t i o n and the Feudal Law. At the U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge, 1957. Pocock, J.G.A. The M a c h i a v e l l i a n Moment - F l o r e n t i n e P o l i t i c a l  Thought and The A t l a n t i c Republican T r a d i t i o n . P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975. Pocock, J.G.A., ed. The P o l i t i c a l Works of James H a r r i n g t o n . Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1977. Raab, F e l i x . The E n g l i s h Face of M a c h i a v e l l i . London and Toronto, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964. Robbins, C a r o l i n e , ed. Two E n g l i s h Republican T r a c t s . ("Plato R e d i v i v u s " by Henry N e v i l l e (1681) and "Upon the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Roman Government" (1699) by Walter Moyle.) Cambridge, At the U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969. Robbins, C a r o l i n e . The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman. New York, Atheneum, 1968. (Copyright 1959 Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press.) Skinner, Quentin. M a c h i a v e l l i . Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981. Toland, John, ed. James H a r r i n g t o n Works - The Oceana and Other  Works. S c i e n t i a V e r l a g Aalen, 1963. (Reprint of London e d i t i o n of 1771 . 4. DAVID HUME'S WORKS Hume, David. A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature (1739—). Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (1888). Oxford, At the U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1888. Hume, David. E n q u i r i e s Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the P r i n c i p l e s of Morals. (From the posthumous e d i t i o n of MllY. Eds., L.A. Selby-Bigg ( 1893) and P.H. N i d d i t c h (1974). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975. Hume, David. The H i s t o r y of England From the Invasion of the J u l i u s Caesar to the R e v o l u t i o n i n 1688. (1754-62). Boston, A l d i n e Book, Undated. Hume, David. A L e t t e r From a Gentleman to H i s F r i e n d i n  Edinburgh. (1745). Eds., Mossner and P r i c e . Edinburgh U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967. 118 Hume, David. Essays - Moral, P o l i t i c a l , and L i t e r a r y . Eds. Green and Grose (1882). S c i e n t i a V e r l a g Aalen, 1964. 2 V o l s . Hume, David. Essays Moral, P o l i t i c a l and L i t e r a r y . (1741-1752) Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963. 119 

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