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The Farakka Barrage dispute : conflict and cooperation in Bangladesh-India relations Mamun, Kazi Asadul 1984

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THE  FARAKKA BARRAGE DISPUTE: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS by KAZI ASADUL MAMUN M.S.S.,University  Of Dhaka,1980  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in  THE  FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES  D e p a r t m e n t Of P o l i t i c a l  We a c c e p t  this  thesis  as  Science  conforming  to the r e q u i r e d standard  THE  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August  ©  1984  K a z i A s a d u l Mamun, 1984  In  presenting  this  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements for an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y  of  British  Columbia,  I  it  freely  available  for  permission  agree  her  the  Library  shall  reference  and  study.  I  for  purposes may or  that  extensive  It  p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s allowed without my  Department of  written  Political  for  is  August  15,  1984  agree  Department or  understood  financial  permission.  Science  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5  Date:  further  that  copying of t h i s t h e s i s for s c h o l a r l y  be granted by the Head of my  representatives.  make  gain  that  by  his  copying or  shall  not  be  ii  Abstract The as  origins  1951  when  India's River  Pakistan  plans only  of the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e go back as f a r against  the  Government  and  miles  since  from  1971  the  East  Pakistan  Bangladesh,  argued  two  and  the  o v e r a l l ecology  covered  between India and a l l aspects  c o n f l i c t has  agrarian  of the lower d e l t a .  Although  Two  helpful  and  analytical  d i s p u t e s and  Ganges  waters  as of  1984,  approaches  As a  explaining  the  result,  --  to  international  Farakka  states  at  a l l , what  dispute d i f f i c u l t  Barrage  presented  the  river basin.  hydrologic-economic  to r e s o l v e , and  types  why  of p r o p o s a l s  India and  dispute.  The  the more powerful  they have f o r developing  two  a  make t h i s  Bangladesh  have the (the  states reveals  s t a t e , i s a l s o the upper r i p a r i a n .  the lower r i p a r i a n — thesis  is  p o s i t i o n of India which, i n a d d i t i o n to being  the s t r a t e g i e s that Bangladesh —  This  there  A n a l y s i s based on unequal power r e l a t i o n s h i p  superordinate  river are  factors  "asymmetric dyad") which e x i s t s between these the  the  —  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r d i s p u t e l i t e r a t u r e e x p l a i n s why dispute  been  no s o l u t i o n i s imminent.  to power r e l a t i o n s between unequal  in  have  Bangladesh, these agreements have not  of r i v e r i n e development.  continued  Indian  the  i n t e r i m agreements on s h a r i n g of  reached  border.  that  d i v e r s i o n . o f Ganges water would s e r i o u s l y threaten economy  of  to c o n s t r u c t a massive barrage a c r o s s the Ganges  eleven  Pakistan,  protested  Therefore,  as the subordinate  can employ are  state  limited.  o u t l i n e s i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l the  as w e l l as the hydrologic-economic  and  aspects  of  the  political  dispute  and  tries  to demonstrate the c o r r e l a t i o n of o v e r a l l power r e l a t i o n s  between India and employ.  The  Bangladesh with the p o l i t i c a l  main  have acted according costs  and  argument to t h e i r  benefits  ranging what  from c o o p e r a t i v e  it  considers  strategies  an  i s analysed  although  periodically  marginal  concessions  predominant direction  i s that both India and interpretation  involved  Bangladesh, for i t s p a r t , has  equitable i n turn  Ganges waters.  political  resolving  the  dispute.  variety  of  strategies  in an attempt to secure  solution.  Each  of  for i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  Bangladesh  negotiations  Bangladesh  the  pursued a  India,  political-economic of  in  over  they  of  to r e t a l i a t o r y  from  strategies  has  been  the  able  to  these Overall, extract  l a t t e r , because of i t s  position,  has  controlled  the  sharing  and  augmentation of  iv  Table  of C o n t e n t s  Abstract L i s t of F i g u r e s Acknowledgement  i i vi  Chapter I INTRODUCTION  1  A.  4  THE GANGES AND ITS BASIN  B. THE FARAKKA BARRAGE  9  C. CONFLICTING INTERESTS OVER FARAKKA . Chapter II INTERNATIONAL RIVER DISPUTES AND BARGAINING STRATEGIES: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS  21  A.  36  COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES  B. COERCIVE STRATEGIES  10  39  Chapter I I I THE A.  NEGOTIATIONS OVER FARAKKA  50  THE FIRST STAGE: A BARRAGE ACROSS THE GANGES?  B. THE SECOND STAGE: NEGOTIATIONS OR DELAYING TACTICS? C.  INDIAN OBSTINACY OR PAKISTANI WEAKNESS?  51 ...54 65  D. THE THIRD STAGE: SOLUTION ON THE HORIZON?  68  E . THE QUESTION OF AUGMENTATION  81  F. PROCEEDINGS AT THE UNITED NATIONS  85  C h a p t e r IV THE 1977 BREAKTHROUGH AND ITS AFTERMATH A. PRELUDE TO THE GANGES WATERS TREATY  96 97  B. THE GANGES WATERS TREATY: ITS LIMITATIONS IMPLICATIONS  AND 106  C. NEGOTIATION OVER THE QUESTION OF AUGMENTATION  109  D. THE INDIAN PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTATION  110  E . THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTATION  114  F. THE CHRONOLOGY OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER AUGMENTATION  115  G. A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  128  Chapter V ASYMMETRIC DYADS AND UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM CONFLICTS  137  A. THE F I V E STAGES OF THE FARAKKA BARRAGE DISPUTE  140  B. THE FARAKKA BARRAGE: THE ARCHETYPE OF AN UPSTREAMDOWNSTREAM CONFLICT  151  C. STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY PAKISTAN/BANGLADESH  154  BIBLIOGRAPHY  181  •  APPENDIX A - STATUTE OF THE 1972 INDO-BANGLADESH RIVERS COMMISSION APPENDIX B - 1975 FORTY-DAY UNDERSTANDING  JOINT 186 188  APPENDIX C - INDO-BANGLADESH AGREEMENT ON SHARING OF GANGA WATERS AT FARAKKA 189 APPENDIX D - CONSENSUS STATEMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS ..193  v a  List  of  Figures  Figure  1  - Map o f the Ganges River Basins  and  the  Brahmaputra  Figure  2  - Map Its and  Figure  3  - Map Showing the Augmentation of  Indian Ganges  Figure  4  - Map Showing the on A u g m e n t a t i o n  Bangladesh Proposal o f Ganges Flows  Showing the F a r a k k a Barrage and Feeder Canal, Bhagirathi-Hooghly Other Rivers  Proposal Flows  on  Vi  Acknowledgement It w i l l not be p o s s i b l e to thank a l l the people by name who helped me r e s e a r c h and w r i t e t h i s t h e s i s . There have been however, without much  more  whose h e l p w r i t i n g the t h e s i s would have been a  difficult  Professor  John  discussing  so  R.  task. Wood,  volatile  I  want  to  thank  f o r the many and  suggestions about c e r t a i n proved  some,  elusive  hours  a  substantive  my s u p e r v i s o r ,  topic  aspects  he  spent  with of  in  me. H i s  the  thesis  t o be very v a l u a b l e .  I  especially  want  to  thank  my  wife,  Sumaiya,  whose  p a t i e n c e , encouragement and support made i t p o s s i b l e f o r me continue  writing  even  in  the  midst  exhaustion. I f t h i s t h e s i s has achieved excellence,  i t i s due  to  her  r e l e n t l e s s p e r s u a s i o n to c a r r y on. colleague,  M i c h a e l P. Howlett,  of- mental and p h y s i c a l a  certain  constructive I  to  also  want  measure  criticisms to  thank  of and my  who p r a c t i c a l l y taught me how to  use the word p r o c e s s o r and e d i t e d e a r l i e r d r a f t s of the t h e s i s . I am g r a t e f u l to my f a t h e r , K.A. Mamun supplied  with  a  constant  source  Barrage  d i s p u t e from Bangladesh.  fellow  graduate  S r . , who  me  of m a t e r i a l s on the Farakka  I a l s o want  to  thank  a l l my  students at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h  Columbia  who, sometimes u n w i t t i n g l y , helped me i n the completion project.  kept  of  this  1  I. The for its  INTRODUCTION  r e l a t i o n s between India and  the f i r s t  Bangladesh  were  few years a f t e r the former helped  independence from P a k i s t a n  amicable  the l a t t e r  in December, 1971.  Since  gain then,  however, r e l a t i o n s have d e t e r i o r a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l y on a number of issues,  1  the most important  the Farakka Barrage and  i t s consequences f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n  the waters of the Ganges states.  India's  navigability  River  primary  Barrage p r o j e c t was of  of which i s India's c o n s t r u c t i o n of  between  purpose  to prevent  in  the  two  neighbouring  undertaking  the s i l t i n g and  to  the Farakka improve  the port of C a l c u t t a by d i v e r t i n g v i a a  canal a q u a n t i t y of water from  the  Bhagirathi-Hooghly  whose bank the c i t y  River,  Bangladesh maintains  on  that  the  western Bangladesh i s having  Ganges  diversion  to  of  of  flush  the  feeder  out  the  i s located.  water  a d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t on  away  from  i t s agrarian  economy. Although 1975,  2  the  Farakka  was  government t r i e d  still  a  Bangladesh  came  first  of  i n t o being,  squarely on the shoulders  was  important  that  as 3  before  1951  The  India from c o n s t r u c t i n g the in  its  of the new  there  when  Pakistan  attempts.  When  the onus of n e g o t i a t i n g with  the Bangladesh government was  had an  Pakistan.  unsuccessful  l i n e s pursued by P a k i s t a n , which  part  i t s best to prevent  Farakka Barrage but was  While  not commissioned  the o r i g i n s of the d i s p u t e go as f a r back  Bangladesh  fell  Barrage was  government i n  b a s i c a l l y arguing  were  two  important  India  Dhaka." along  changes  e f f e c t on the ongoing n e g o t i a t i o n s .  Pakistan  had  negotiated  with  India  the  from  The a  2  position country  of  equality  whereas  compared with undivided  I n d i a , had  a much more d i f f i c u l t  important  change  India before barrage,  was  had  not  enough  substantive "sharing"  Farakka remedy  issue to  originated  water  with  Barrage the  to accept  from  the  question  construction India, of  it  water  r e s p e c t i v e demands of India and thesis  cooperate  in  of Ganges waters.  The  Ganges  riparian,  the  question  to  efforts  of s h a r i n g and  c e n t r a l question  might  the  dispute of  the  meet  to the  Bangladesh. made  by  riparian,  6  augmentation  this thesis will  to answer i s : what are the s t r a t e g i e s that lower  equitable  commissioning  the  5  there  subsequently c e n t r e d on how  analyses  on the v i t a l  accompli.  of  Pakistan/Bangladesh to i n f l u e n c e I n d i a , as the upper to  the  needs, the  Thus, while  and  with  of  that  respective  of "augmentation."  second  negotiating  both s i d e s acknowledged  shifted  by  was  The  Farakka as a f a i t  their  scarcity  This  Pakistan  meet  the  certainly vis a vis  task to c o n f r o n t .  to  that  and  a much weaker  started actual construction  As n e g o t i a t i o n s went on and was  Pakistan  that while  the l a t t e r had  Bangladesh  Bangladesh, being  Bangladesh,  attempt as  the  employ to e x t r a c t an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n  from i t s preponderant neighbour? Chapter II conflicts there  from  examines a  the  theoretical  problem  of  standpoint.  f o r an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n i n d i s p u t e s  upstream-downstream What p o t e n t i a l i s l i k e Farakka?  If an  e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n seems u n l i k e l y , what options are a v a i l a b l e to the lower r i p a r i a n ? outline  a  number  In of  order  to  answer  these  questions  s t r a t e g i e s that a downstream country  I can  3  employ i n an  effort  to e x t r a c t  powerful upstream country. the  an  equitable solution  These s t r a t e g i e s  works of r i v e r d i s p u t e a n a l y s t s and  theorists. which  T h i s chapter a l s o  certain  they are  strategies  likely  to f a i l .  In short,  r e l a t i o n s h i p between c e r t a i n political  ones--and  likely  the  I attempt to  success  from  relations  conditions  to succeed and  structural  the  derived  international  discusses  are  are  from a more  under  those where  determine  the  conditions—particularly and  failure  of  certain  strategies. In Chapters III and picture  of the  In  these  and  from a few  two  Barrage d i s p u t e are In Chapter V, in  Farakka  conclusions  My  applied  compiled  a  comprehensive  scholarly  works w r i t t e n  India  of  regard that  to i n t e r n a t i o n a l  outlined  and  the  objective to some  on  topic.  the  7  by  Farakka  context.  in Chapter II are actions  in  rethe  success or f a i l u r e of each i s is  to  derive  upstream-downstream of  the  adopted  during  Pakistan/Bangladesh's  and  government  strategies  influence  strategies  ultimate  hope  the  accounts,  examined in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l  dispute  with  general i n the  to  the  light  Barrage  analysed.  have  newspaper  chapters,  Pakistan/Bangladesh  examined  I  e n t i r e Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e between India  Pakistan/Bangladesh publications,  IV,  these  theoretical conflicts  conclusions  r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e s elsewhere.  may  in be  4  A.  THE GANGES AND A  ITS BASIN  b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the Ganges River and i t s basin  enable us to understand the hydrologic-economic aspects dispute.  Although  in  Asia,  9  languages-- i s only the  i t s basin  with the exceptions  China. rises  The r i v e r in  Tibetan  the  itself  into  supports  i s 1,557 miles  southern  Himalayas a  concentration  of 300  (2,506  on  the  southeasterly  sluggish  through  river,  flowing  populated Ganges  divisions—the  km)  long.  Indian  Middle  course  most  of  before  one  t r a c t s of t e r r i t o r y basin  Upper  can  be  Ganges  i t s course  falls  it  is a  i n the world.  divided  into  three  broad  basin which i n c l u d e s the s t a t e of  entirely  within  Bangladesh.  India;  f i v e streams r i s e  of U t t a r Pradesh.  or  Delta  area  In the Upper Ganges  i s f e d by f i v e headstreams--the B h a g i r a t h i , the  Alaknanda, the Mandakini, the Dhauli  Alaknanda  it  Ganges basin which i n c l u d e s the s t a t e s of Bihar and  b a s i n , the r i v e r  These  It  of the most f e r t i l e and  West Bengal i n I n d i a ; and the Lower Ganges Basin which  1 0  s i d e of the  U t t a r Pradesh and p a r t of the s t a t e of Madhya Pradesh i n the  on  the Bay of Bengal, through i t s main d i s t r i b u t a r y , For  The  longest  l a r g e r than that of any country  the Padma i n Bangladesh.  densely  a  fifteenth  of India and the People's Republic of  border and f o l l o w s  empties  the  8  m i l l i o n people, a p o p u l a t i o n earth  of  the Ganges River or Ganga --as i t i s c a l l e d  in most of the Indie river  will  Ganga,  and  the  Pindar.  i n the Uttarkhand d i v i s i o n of the s t a t e  Of these,  the two main  headstreams  are  the  which r i s e s about t h i r t y m i l e s north of the Himalayan  peak of Nanda Devi, and the B h a g i r a t h i , which o r i g i n a t e s  10,000  Figure  1  5  feet above S e a - l e v e l i n an glacier  known  as  i c e cave at the foot of the Himalayan  Gangotri.  The  true  source of the Ganges,  however, i s c o n s i d e r e d to be at Gaumukh, south  of  Gangotri.  After  1 1  the  about  thirteen  Alaknanda and  miles  the B h a g i r a t h i  u n i t e at Devprayag, they form the Ganges' mainstream which through  the  outer  (southern)  mountains at R i s h i k e s h .  The  Himalayas  r i v e r then  to  emerge  flows on to  cuts  from the  Hardwar,  a  sacred p l a c e f o r the Hindus. Although  there  i s seasonal v a r i a t i o n  i t s volume i n c r e a s e s markedly as i t and  enters  a  i n the Ganges' flow,  receives  region of heavier r a i n f a l l .  more  From A p r i l  the m e l t i n g Himalayan snows feed the r i v e r , while season  from  floods.  left-bank  1 3  Gomati, and In  the  in  to June,  the  rainy  J u l y to September, the r a i n - b e a r i n g monsoons cause  In the Upper Ganges b a s i n , the  tributaries  tributaries  are  the  Jumna  principal  (Yamuna) and  t r i b u t a r i e s i n t h i s region  right-bank  the Tons r i v e r s .  are  the  The  Ramganga,  the  the Ghagara. Middle Ganges b a s i n , the main t r i b u t a r i e s from the  Himalayan region to the north are the Gandak, the Burhi the Ghugri, and  the K o s i .  The most important the l a s t  southern  Gandak, tributary  i s the Son.  In West Bengal,  the  flows, the Mahananda j o i n s i t from the n o r t h . *  Ganges  The  to Farakka, westernmost  Indian s t a t e through  to  the  south  and  of  Calcutta.  The  flows  at the apex of the D e l t a . distributary  of  the Ganges i n the D e l t a  area i s the Hooghly, on the east bank of which stands the city  which 1  r i v e r then s k i r t s the Rajmahal H i l l s southeast  1 2  The  Hooghly  itself  is  joined  by  Indian two  6  tributaries  flowing  Rupnarayan.  In Bangladesh, the Ganges i s j o i n e d by  Brahmaputra  (called  Ghat.  in  from  the  the  Damodar and the the  mighty  the Jamuna i n that c o u n t r y ) , near Goalundo  The combined stream, now  Meghna  west,  River above Chandpur.  called  the  Padma,  joins  the  The waters then flow i n t o the Bay  of Bengal through innumerable channels, the l a r g e s t of which  is  known as the Meghna e s t u a r y . Apart  from  distributary Bengal,  the  Hooghly  and  the  Meghna,  streams which form the Ganges d e l t a  the  Jalangi;  Bhairab, the Kobadak,  and  the  are:  other  in  West  i n Bangladesh, the Mathabhanga,  the Gorai  the  (Madhumati), and the A r i a l Khan.  In the D e l t a r e g i o n , the Ganges, as w e l l as i t s t r i b u t a r i e s and d i s t r i b u t a r i e s , course. times.  Such In  changes  1785,  Mymensingh; the G a n g e s .  it 15  i s c o n s t a n t l y v u l n e r a b l e to changes  the now  have  occurred  Brahmaputra  i n comparatively  flowed  past  the  of  joining  There are a l s o i n d i c a t i o n s that the B h a g i r a t h i , or  Nullah")  was  the  most  Ganges i n the seventeenth c e n t u r y . at l e a s t s i n c e clear,  recent  city  flows f o r t y m i l e s west of i t before  one of i t s s e v e r a l branches (Hooghly, S a r a s v a t i , Adi "Tolly's  in i t s  Ganga,  important d i s t r i b u t a r y of the However, i t has been  1770, when the Damodar, which helped to  shifted  i t s mouth  80  or  m i l e s to the s o u t h .  silting keep  it  1 6  The lower  reaches of t h i s l i n e , the Hooghly proper, r e t a i n t h e i r  vitality,  being fed by streams such as the Rupnarayan and the Damodar. The r i v e r s have  i n the West Bengal area are  been d e s c r i b e d as dead or d y i n g .  them to the sea.  very  sluggish  and  L i t t l e water passes down  The r i v e r s i n the Bangladesh d e l t a r e g i o n ,  on  7  the  other hand, are broad and a c t i v e , c a r r y i n g l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s  of water  to the Bay of Bengal.  They are a l s o i n t e r c o n n e c t e d  by  innumerable c r e e k s . The  Ganges  subcontinent water  basin c o n t a i n s the l a r g e s t  (see Map-1).  supply  is  As has been  dependent  river  mentioned  snows  Precipitation  in  in  the  the  earlier,  the  p a r t l y on the r a i n s brought by the  monsoon winds from J u l y to October, as w e l l as Himalayan  system i n the  hot  river  season  basin  on  from  the  April  accompanies  melting  to  the  June.  southwest  monsoon winds, but i s a l s o r e l a t e d to c y c l o n e s that o r i g i n a t e i n the Bay of Bengal between June and October. of  rainfall  Only a small amount  occurs i n December and January.  The average annual  r a i n f a l l v a r i e s from 30 inches at the western end of to  over  90  inches  in  the  eastern  end.  1 7  the  basin  The d e l t a  region  experiences s t r o n g c y c l o n i c storms both before the of  the monsoon season, from March to May,  from September to October. relief  over  and  overemphasized.  mighty  of  is slow.  the  and  variation  in  1 8  numerous  tributaries  the i n h a b i t a n t s of the basin cannot beginning  of  civilization,  be  capital  emperors f l o u r i s h e d on the banks of t h i s  Pataliputra  other  and t h r i v e d as  for  From the  kings  river.  numerous  Today  Since there i s l i t t l e  importance of the Ganges and i t s  distributaries  cities  and at the end of i t ,  the e n t i r e surface of the Gangetic P l a i n , the rate  of flow of the r i v e r The  commencement  (now  Patna),  Delhi,  Allahabad,  and  c i t i e s had sprung up on the banks of the Ganges important  river  not  political  only  and  represents  commercial the  major  centres. source  of  8  livelihood are  f o r the i n h a b i t a n t s of i t s great  a l s o h e l d sacred by the Hindu community.  Hindus that those sins.  for  The r i v e r a l s o provides a constant  the  greater  Bangladesh. deposits  The  I t i s b e l i e v e d by  source  constant  flooding  during  of  all  of f r e s h f i s h ,  forms the primary  m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n  nutrition  i n West Bengal and the  rainy  season  a r i c h a l l u v i u m over the land which makes the Gangetic  p l a i n one of the most f e r t i l e  t r a c t s of t e r r i t o r y  overcrowded and a l l u v i a l Gangetic  its  i t s waters  who bathe i n the Ganges are absolved  a food, which, combined with r i c e ,  The  basin,  life-blood  from  the  river  basin, itself  i n the world.  therefore, and  draws  i t s numerous  t r i b u t a r i e s and d i s t r i b u t a r i e s . Before the  area  1971)  Partition now  1 9  forming  Bangladesh  (East Pakistan  was e n t i t l e d t o draw s u p p l i e s of  (Padma i n Bangladesh). plain  i n 1947, there was never any doubt  had  not  only  Historically,  water  u n t i l December  from  the Ganges  the people of the Gangetic  enjoyed the b e n e f i t s of the r i v e r but had  a l s o , on o c c a s i o n , been subject to i t s tremendous wrath. every  year, c y c l o n e s o r i g i n a t i n g over the Bay  colossal  of  f l o o d s a l l over the Ganges basin and these  the  two  different  created, therefore, traditional  states  i t was  of  expected  Pakistan that  r i v e r would go on as b e f o r e .  cause  floods claim regularity.  and  the  Almost  Bengal  l i v e s and destroy crops and l i v e s t o c k with alarming When  that  I n d i a were  use  of  this  When I n d i a decided to  c o n s t r u c t the Farakka Barrage e x a c t l y at the apex of the d e l t a , it  was  protest.  not  at  a l l surprising  that P a k i s t a n  r a i s e d a c r y of  9  B.  THE FARAKKA BARRAGE The Farakka Barrage i s s i t u a t e d at l a t i t u d e 24 degrees  and  45 minutes North and l o n g i t u d e 87 degrees 50 minutes East .on the Ganges of  River i n the d i s t r i c t  West Bengal.  Calcutta  and  I t i s about about  i s about  back  rail  a  300  18 km.  barrage i t s e l f both  of Murshidabad km.  the  north  of  the  city  of  west of the Bangladesh border.  2455 metres  long  and  l i n k and a motor road.  barrage begins a feeder c a n a l which meet  i n the Indian s t a t e  Bhagirathi-Hooghly  on  Just upstream  runs 42.6  River  supports  km.  The its  of the  southward  to  j u s t downstream of another  barrage (designed to prevent water  that s p i l l s over the  Barrage  from e n t e r i n g the B h a g i r a t h i -  in  the  monsoon  Hooghly) at J a n j i p u r . the  season  There  Bhagirathi-Hooghly  i s also a  just  c o n t r o l the water e n t e r i n g  upstream  cross of  regulator  as  silt  i t d i r e c t l y when the Ganges  excluders,  flow down the Ganges.  across  the feeder c a n a l to  The Farakka Barrage a l s o i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l high v e l o c i t y known  Farakka  floods. sluices,  which are intended to allow s i l t  The barrage was designed  so  that  to  silt-  free water w#uld be d i v e r t e d down the Bhagirathi-Hooghly and the sediment  load  of  the Ganges would be c a r r i e d by the remaining  flow i n that r i v e r on to Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal.  The  canal  has the c a p a c i t y to handle 40,000 cubic feet of water  per  second  (cusecs)  2 0  and c o n t a i n s l o c k s at  both  ends  n a v i g a t i o n from the Ganges through to C a l c u t t a . completed  in  began i t s f i r s t graphic  1970  and  official  understanding  of  the  Farakka  21,  provide  The Barrage  the feeder c a n a l i n 1973. o p e r a t i o n s on A p r i l  to  The  1975.  was  project (For  a  Barrage and the feeder  Figure 2 4  10  c a n a l , c o n s u l t Map-2). C.  CONFLICTING INTERESTS OVER FARAKKA India's  subsequent  construction effect  from other According  the  Farakka  Barrage  and  on the t o t a l volume of water passing  the Padma i n t o East c r i t i c i s m not only  of  Pakistan  through  ( l a t e r Bangladesh) came under heavy  from P a k i s t a n  quarters  its  (and l a t e r Bangladesh) but a l s o  i n the r e g i o n a l and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena.  t o I s h t i a q Hossain:  Of the v a r i o u s i s s u e s responsible for deteriorating Indo-Bangladesh relations, construction and commissioning of a dam at Farakka... has perhaps attracted the most a t t e n t i o n from the r e s t of the world. 2 1  This  was  concerted  in  efforts  construction a  large  chance  part to  due  to  Pakistan's  stop the Indian  to s t a r t n e g o t i a t i o n s  the two governments  the i m p l i c a t i o n s . and  start  construction  The  to save the port of C a l c u t t a Bhagirathi,  of the Ganges u n t i l degenerate a general  had  India, however, managed simultaneously.  India has c o n s i s t e n t l y defended i t s move by c l a i m i n g an e f f o r t  and  government from s t a r t i n g  on the p r o j e c t s i t e before  to d i s c u s s  consistent  from  that  i t was  silting.  which had been the p r i n c i p a l d i s t r i b u t a r y about  two  into a s i l t - l a d e n  hundred  years  ago,  began  r i v e r when the Ganges regime began  eastward s h i f t about that time.  When  this  occurred  the Padma assumed the r o l e of main channel and d i s t r i b u t a r y . a  result  the  Hooghly  s i l t a t i o n problem. river,  the  began  Moreover,  to  to experience an ever since  the  Hooghly  As  increasing  is a  tidal  t i d a l bores began t o a f f e c t the n a v i g a b i l i t y of the  11  r i v e r by d e p o s i t i n g huge amounts of sand. headwater supply between  the  diminished  sea t i d e s and  as the headwater supply  and  this  Over the decades,  overturned  the headwater flow.  the  the  balance  In other words,  reduced, t i d a l waters began to  penetrate  more and more i n l a n d . There are fears  about  1795.  22  i n d i c a t i o n s that future  of  the  Since the c l o s u r e  of  this  decrease  the  the  in  the volume of raw  into  been aware as e a r l y as  of  the  Hooghly  there was  could  1795  be  expressed  port of C a l c u t t a as e a r l y as vital  port  would  mean  a  a g r i c u l t u r a l goods  a committee was  the c o n d i t i o n of the H o o g h l y .  had  rulers  m a t e r i a l s and  t r a n s p o r t e d to the mother country, inquire  British  appointed  Thus, the  23  that unless the  to  British  headwater  flow  i n c r e a s e d through a r t i f i c i a l means,  a danger that C a l c u t t a port  would  have  to  be  shut  down. At  independence i n 1947,  there  i s documented evidence  the Boundary Commission went to the l e n g t h of v i o l a t i n g p r i n c i p l e of d i v i s i o n of t e r r i t o r y between India and majority  religion--in  order  to  Farakka  belonged  Murshidabad, i t was Ganges c o u l d achieve award  the  entire  to  the main  Pakistan—  enable India to take s u i t a b l e  measures f o r the d i v e r s i o n of Ganges waters Although  that  to  the  Hooghly. * 2  the Muslim m a j o r i t y d i s t r i c t  the obvious p l a c e where a barrage a c r o s s this diversion.  The  Murshidabad d i s t r i c t  Commission decided to I n d i a .  According  S i r C y r i l R a d c l i f f e , the chairman: ...to prevent the Hooghly from l a n g u i s h i n g altogether and r u i n i n g the h e a l t h and i n d u s t r y of Bengal, i t i s absolutely necessary that the headwaters of the  of the to to  12  Hooghly state.  should be under the c o n t r o l of the West Bengal  2 5  Pakistan of  received  the Hindu m a j o r i t y d i s t r i c t  of Khulna by way  compensation. The c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Farakka Barrage was  be  the  Indians." the  "only 2 6  technical  solution  to  the  considered problem  I t was p r o j e c t e d that by the j u d i c i o u s o p e r a t i o n  Farakka  Barrage,  fluctuating  the of  i t would be p o s s i b l e not only to prolong  the upland s u p p l i e s i n t o the Hooghly but a l s o to "even sharply  by  to  hydrographs  in  the  river"  out  the thus  2 7  c o u n t e r a c t i n g the d e t e r i o r a t i n g e f f e c t s of the preponderance  of  the t i d a l flow. Pakistan  and  subsequently  d i v e r s i o n of waters at Farakka effects. were  Bangladesh  will  have  have  disastrous  As n e g o t i a t i o n s dragged on, the i l l  presented  in  a  more  detailed  that  economic  e f f e c t s of Farakka  f a s h i o n to impress on the  Indian government the urgency of the s i t u a t i o n . Pakistan/Bangladesh's  argued  c l a i m s are given below.  removal of water from the Ganges/Padma would  A  summary  of  They argued that produce  seriously  d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s on East Bengal's economy by: 1) lowering the water table i n Bangladesh's eastern part and thus reducing the moisture content of the soil immediately a f t e r the monsoons and causing a s e r i o u s d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the summer output of those high y i e l d rice strains whose growth depends on an abundant supply of water; 2) a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g the n a v i g a b i l i t y of the Padma and its spill channels, e s p e c i a l l y the G o r a i Madhumati, both by d r a s t i c a l l y lowering or e l i m i n a t i n g the water l e v e l s of these water courses and by causing the Padma River bed t o r i s e as a r e s u l t of the s i l t i n g caused by such reduced flow. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n about  13  1135 km. of major waterways i n Bangladesh was expected to be n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t e d as a drop i n water levels of up to s i x feet was a n t i c i p a t e d i n the dry season; 3) aggravating the monsoon f l o o d s i n Bangladesh by limiting the amount of flood water which would normally d r a i n o f f i n t o the Bhagirathi-Hooghly and by decreasing through dry season s i l t a t i o n the c a p a c i t y of the Padma r i v e r bed to accommodate the wet season flow; 4) damaging the a g r i c u l t u r e of the c o a s t a l areas of Khulna, B a r i s a l , and P a t u a k h a l i d i s t r i c t s as well as p a r t s of nearby d i s t r i c t s l i k e Jessore and F a r i d p u r by a l l o w i n g s a l i n e water to penetrate deep i n l a n d i n t o an area of more than 20,000 square kilometres. The resulting loss of cultivable land would probably reduce the amount of farm employment, f u r t h e r i n c r e a s i n g the n a t i o n ' s hardship; 5) decimating the forests i n the c o a s t a l areas, causing them to become poorer i n d e n s i t y and to produce lower quality wood. An example are the Sunderban f o r e s t s i n Khulna d i s t r i c t where i n a d d i t i o n to the expected loss in d i s t r i c t revenues and the reduced supply of timber f o r housing and other construction, the changed e c o l o g i c a l balance of the f o r e s t regions would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t forms of animal l i f e presently r e s i d i n g there; 6) reducing in both q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y the water supplied to the urban industrial centres in Bangladesh's lower delta, thereby hurting their growth, c r e a t i n g d i f f i c u l t y i n the d i s p o s a l of their effluents and raising the death rate due to waterborne d i s e a s e s and the d e c l i n e i n s a n i t a t i o n ; 7) d e c r e a s i n g the e x t r a c t i o n of food i n the Bangladesh d e l t a s i n c e f i s h i n g would be e l i m i n a t e d as a source of l i v e l i h o o d for thousands of fishermen and d e a l e r s . An important source of p r o t e i n for many 'Bangladeshis would thus be c u r t a i l e d . The expected change i n the hydrographic c o n d i t i o n s of the Padma's lower reaches would stop the movement of many f r e s h water f i s h v a r i e t i e s up the r i v e r . In a d d i t i o n , a l a r g e p a r t of the water system would go dry i n the months between December and May and many other v a r i e t i e s of f i s h and prawn would become l a n d - l o c k e d and d i e ; 8) r e t a r d i n g the s u c c e s s f u l planning or execution (both present and future) of land and water development p r o j e c t s i n the area by e i t h e r s e v e r e l y reducing or making unpredictable the necessary  14  supplies of Padma water. The most prominent example i s that of the Ganges-Kobadak p r o j e c t , intended to i r r i g a t e almost two m i l l i o n acres in K u s h t i a , Jessore, and Khulna d i s t r i c t s . A l l in a l l , i t has been estimated that e i g h t to nine d i s t r i c t s i n B a n g l a d e s h — containing t h i r t y m i l l i o n people (one-third of the total p o p u l a t i o n of Bangladesh) and about one quarter of the c u l t i v a b l e land-- w i l l be a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by the Farakka p r o j e c t . 2 8  India  has  Bangladesh's data are of  them.  i s given  naturally  claims  inaccurate  gone  to  by m a i n t a i n i n g or by p r o v i d i n g a  A summary of India's  great that the  lengths  to  refute  latter's technical  different  interpretation  responses to Bangladesh's  claims  below:  1) In attempting to refute the basic claim that Bangladesh needs more of the Ganges-Padma water than India i s w i l l i n g to allow, Indian o f f i c i a l s note that whereas the Ganges basin i n India i s r e l a t i v e l y a r i d , the d e l t a area i n Bangladesh i s always green. They note that Bangladesh's r a i n f a l l averages 190 cm. per year as opposed to 63-127 cm. on the Indian s i d e , and the r a i n f a l l of the wet season i s so great that despite a s h o r t , dry season, Bangladesh's s u b s o i l i s not d r i e d out s u f f i c i e n t l y to i n h i b i t the growth of forests. They a l s o contend that monsoon r a i n s are s u f f i c i e n t to s a t u r a t e the soil f o r at least two months a f t e r the rains, u n t i l about the end of December. 2) To Bangladesh's emphasis on an adequate supply of water i n the dry months of March, A p r i l , and May, the Indians counter that during that p e r i o d even with the locks at Farakka being c l o s e d , the waterflow of the Ganges-Padma in Bangladesh i s normally superior to that at Farakka. They a l s o c l a i m that there i s a regeneration of almost 20,000 cusecs and t h e r e f o r e i t is unnecessary f o r India to reduce i t s own meagre allotment. 3) The Indians emphasize that Bangladesh is not l a c k i n g i n water, but r a t h e r overrun with i t , and that i t s a g r i c u l t u r e would a c t u a l l y gain by having the flow of water reduced, e s p e c i a l l y in the summer months when  15  floods inundate countryside.  extensive  areas  of  the Bangladesh  4) To counter Bangladesh's claims r e g a r d i n g l o s s e s to inland navigation, the Indians p o i n t out that there has not been p r e v i o u s l y any organised n a v i g a t i o n along the Padma, and that s p i l l channels l i k e the Gorai are seasonal i n nature and only n a v i g a b l e during the floods. 5) To Bangladesh's c l a i m s about silting due to d i v e r s i o n of the Ganges waters at Farakka, the Indians counter that s i l t i n g i s no problem i n the dry season because the r i v e r i s then r e l a t i v e l y silt-free. The Indians a l s o argue that i n the r a i n y months the i n c r e a s e d percentage of s i l t i n the Bangladesh river system which r e s u l t s from d i v e r s i o n of 40,000 cusecs of s i l t f r e e water at Farakka i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 6) Regarding s a l i n i t y , the Indians c l a i m that since the t o t a l d i s c h a r g e of water by the r i v e r s Meghna and Brahmaputra, even i n the dry months, i s approximately 200,000 cusecs, the problem of seawater i n t r u s i o n should not occur. The Indians have been s i l e n t on the i s s u e of d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t s of s a l t water on fish, f o r e s t s , or urban a r e a s . 7) India a l s o f l a t l y denies that the Farakka Barrage will hurt Bangladesh irrigation projects on the grounds that a) the r e d u c t i o n i n the flow w i l l be so i n s i g n i f i c a n t as not to be missed, b) the requirements of planned and e x i s t i n g p r o j e c t s are so small as to put no burden on present or f u t u r e water s u p p l i e s , and c) the r e g i o n s ' s morphology i n v o l v i n g f l a t ground, annual f l o o d s , and s h i f t i n g r i v e r s i s i m p r a c t i c a l f o r big i r r i g a t i o n schemes. In any event, they suggest an extension of Bangladesh's pumping system should be an a l t e r n a t i v e or s u p e r i o r source of i r r i g a t i o n . 2 9  Thus I n d i a has assembled a v a r i e t y of t e c h n i c a l arguments in  combination attempt to show that no matter how  Ganges-Padma waters may vital  to  India  be to Bangladesh,  they  important the  are  and to p r o j e c t s i t has a l l o t e d them.  when the Farakka Barrage p r o j e c t was  still  which  much  more  In f a c t ,  i n the planning stage  16  it  was  calculated  Bhagirathi-Hooghly  that  and  besides  The  water  the  facilitate  communications, and The  of  the  p r o j e c t would improve C a l c u t t a ' s drainage  of the r e g i o n ,  improve  increase the mileage of i n l a n d n a v i g a t i o n .  principal conflict  dry season  preservation  the port of C a l c u t t a , there would a l s o be  a number of side b e n e f i t s . supply,  the  i n the Ganges d i s p u t e  flow of the Ganges.  The  seasonal  is  over  fluctuation  this  period,  Hooghly and  India's  rising  f o r i r r i g a t i o n are  demand f o r water to maintain  in  the ecology  to promote i n d u s t r y , i r r i g a t i o n , and India  as  and  successor  Bangladesh  has had  influence  them.  The  the power to  f o r i t s needs. have  consequences of Indian d e c i s i o n s but have had to  Bangladesh's  navigation.  the upper r i p a r i a n country,  its  with  the  of the Ganges d e l t a and  implement p r o j e c t s on the Ganges to provide Pakistan  May.  needs for water to f l u s h conflict  the  i n the  flow makes water scarce d u r i n g the p e r i o d January through In  3 0  East  suffered  the  only l i m i t e d power  d i s p u t e over s h a r i n g of the Ganges i s  about attempts by Pakistan and  Bangladesh  to  influence  Indian  policy. Although the government of M o r a r j i Desai treaty  with  Bangladesh  renewed f o r another two the q u e s t i o n  of  November  years a f t e r  1977,  i t expired  t h i s has  i n November  T h i s t h e s i s attempts to d i s c u s s the  sharing  existing  dry  season  a l t e r n a t i v e methods of augmenting t h i s flow perspective  and  been 1982,  of sharing and augmentation of Ganges waters i s f a r  from r e s o l v e d . issues  in  signed a f i v e - y e a r  and  flow from  substantive  and  examining  a  bargaining  explores v a r i o u s s t r a t e g i e s which c o u l d  assist  17  Bangladesh  i n persuading  i t s upstream neighbour  to cooperate.  18  NOTES 1. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the h i s t o r y of Indo-Bangladesh relations since 1971 p r e s e n t s a dismal p i c t u r e . A number of i s s u e s have not o n l y clouded t h e i r relations but have a l s o l e d to the exchange of fire between the two c o u n t r i e s ' border s e c u r i t y f o r c e s over d i s p u t e d t e r r i t o r y . Below i s a l i s t of some of the more c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s between these two c o u n t r i e s : a. D i s p u t e over the maritime b e l t ; b. Indian support f o r pro-Mujib g u e r r i l l a s ; c. the s h a r i n g of Ganges waters; d. d i s p u t e s over Muhurir Char (an i s l e t on the Muhuri R i v e r , the boundary between Bangladesh and the Indian s t a t e of T r i p u r a ) ; e. d i s p u t e over the Purbasha i s l a n d i n the Bay of Bengal; f. smuggling o p e r a t i o n s c a r r i e d on both s i d e s of the border; g. d i s p u t e over i l l e g a l border c r o s s i n g s on both sides of the border; and most r e c e n t l y , h. d i s p u t e over I n d i a ' s plans to c o n s t r u c t a barbed wire fence around the 1700 m i l e s of the Indo-Bangladesh border. 2. The 7000-foot long barrage was completed i n 1970 and the 26.5 m i l e long feeder c a n a l took another four years to complete. The barrage and feeder c a n a l were f i n a l l y commissioned i n 1975 following an interim agreement signed between India and Bangladesh on A p r i l 18 1975. 3. When Indian p l a n s to c o n s t r u c t a dam at Farakka were made p u b l i c through Indian p r e s s r e p o r t s , the P a k i s t a n government sent a note of p r o t e s t to New D e l h i . The o r i g i n s of the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e can be t r a c e d to t h i s date. When P a k i s t a n was dismembered i n 1971 and Bangladesh achieved independence, the new government in Dhaka pursued the case with India along the l i n e s adopted by the P a k i s t a n government from 1961-1971. 4. Dhaka i s the c a p i t a l city of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Before November 1982, i t was s p e l l e d "Dacca" when i t was officially changed by Presidential Order. The new spelling i s closer to the phonetic usage and t h i s v e r s i o n has been used throughout the t h e s i s . 5. The c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Farakka Barrage was completed 1970 before Bangladesh had achieved independence (1971). feeder c a n a l , however, was not completed u n t i l 1973.  in The  6. The word " r i p a r i a n " denotes a country through which a river flows. In the case of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r flowing through two c o u n t r i e s , t h e r e f o r e , the upstream country is called the upper r i p a r i a n , and the downstream country, the lower r i p a r i a n . Both c o u n t r i e s are c o l l e c t i v e l y r e f e r r e d to as c o - r i p a r i a n s . 7. To date, only two major works have been w r i t t e n on the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e . Of these, the only p u b l i s h e d work has  19  been w r i t t e n by B.M. Abbas who was d i r e c t l y involved i n n e g o t i a t i o n s with India over a p e r i o d of ten years. The following i s the b i b l i o g r a p h i c r e f e r e n c e : B.M. Abbas, The Ganges Water Dispute, (Dhaka: U n i v e r s i t y P u b l i c a t i o n s Limited, 1982). The other i s a Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n by Ben Crow i n the U n i v e r s i t y of Edinburgh i n 1980. I t i s e n t i t l e d The P o l i t i c s and Technology of Sharing the Ganges. T h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n has not yet been p u b l i s h e d . 8. The Ganges River i s c a l l e d the "Ganga" i n a l l the Indian languages i n c l u d i n g B e n g a l i . In Bangladesh where the o f f i c i a l language i s Bengali, people r e f e r to the r i v e r as the Ganga although o f f i c i a l l y the a n g l i c i z e d name has been retained. In t h i s t h e s i s , the name Ganges w i l l be used t o a v o i d c o n f u s i o n . 9.  Encyclopaedia  10.  Ibid.  11.  Ibid.  B r i t a n n i c a p.879.  12. In the terminology of f l u v i a l morphology, right-bank t r i b u t a r i e s r e f e r to those which join the mainstream on the right i f one stands with h i s back to the source and looks downstream. By t h i s method, the r i v e r s j o i n i n g the mainstream on the l e f t a r e c a l l e d the l e f t - b a n k t r i b u t a r i e s . 13.  See footnote 12.  14.  Encyclopaedia  B r i t a n n i c a , op.  cit.  p.879.  15. Nafis Ahmed, An Economic Geography of Bangladesh D e l h i : Vikas P u b l i s h i n g House, 1 976) , p. 9. '  ,(New  16. O.H.K. Spate, A.T.A.. Learmonth, and B.H. Farmer, India, Pakistan and Ceylon: The Regions, (London: Methuen and Co. L t d . , 1972), p.574. ~ 17.  N a f i s Ahmed, op.  c i t . , p.18.  18. In the d e l t a region of Bangladesh, g r a d i e n t i s f i v e inches per m i l e .  the  average  seaward  19. The word "Partition" r e f e r s to the c r e a t i o n of two new n a t i o n s - - I n d i a and Pakistan--from the s i n g l e Dominion of India in August 1947. 20. A cusec equals 1 cubic foot per second. In f l u v i a l morphology, a cusec i s a measure of the volume of water i n c u b i c feet f l o w i n g through a p a r t i c u l a r c r o s s s e c t i o n of a r i v e r i n one second. 21. I s h t i a q Hossain, "Bangladesh-India R e l a t i o n s : Issues and Problems," Asian Survey, V o l . XXI, No. 11, November 1981,  20  pp.1115-1128. 22. C.J. Mohan, "Problems of Navigable Approaches to the Port of C a l c u t t a , " C a l c u t t a Port Annual, 1958, p.192. 23. Jayanta Kumar Ray, International Studies, V o l . 24. S.K. Nag, "The Annual, 1970, p.159.  "The Farakka 17, (1978): 239.  Study  of  the  Agreement,"  Hooghly," C a l c u t t a Port  25. A report w r i t t e n by C y r i l R a d c l i f f e on the Bengal. See P a r t i t i o n Proceedings, No. 2, p.49.  partition  26. I n d i a . M i n i s t r y of Information and B r o a d c a s t i n g . Reference Annual, 1969 p.295 27.  in  of  India: A  Ibid.  28. For a d e t a i l e d list of Bangladesh's complaints, see Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute Dhaka, September 1976. 29.  Ibid.  See a l s o Jayanta Kumar Ray,  30.  " I n d i a : A Reference Annual  op.  op. c i t .  cit.  , p.295.  21  II.  INTERNATIONAL RIVER DISPUTES AND  BARGAINING STRATEGIES:  SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS International  r i v e r disputes  contemporary world scene.  The  world's  made  population  commodity.  The  means to make However, vitally  has  are a common phenomenon i n  alarming rate of fresh  more  efficient use  of  use  makes  these  waters  n a t i o n a l water r e s o u r c e s . to  of  overcome than p h y s i c a l ones.  it  of an  valuable  provided  the  resource.  1  states  exploitable  boundaries  are is  basin  to than  present  real  often more d i f f i c u l t not  at  all  to  surprising,  there should be a problem of sharing  Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e  p r i m a r i l y a r i v e r dispute analyse  the d i s p u t e  as  states.  I aim  It w i l l  i s any  the  waters  solution  depend  the c o - r i p a r i a n s ,  in any  river  In  on  the  order  to  theoretical disputes  as  dispute  u n i t s as opposed to two  a The  which  which occurs between  sovereign s t a t e - - t h e  which are hydrologic-economic. between  Bangladesh i s  with r e l a t i o n s between unequal  r i v e r dispute  or more sovereign p o l i t i c a l one  neighbours.  international river  soon be c l e a r that  autonomous u n i t s w i t h i n  and  i n t h i s chapter to e l i c i t  from l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g  is i n t e r n a t i o n a l — t h a t  equitable  between India  between two  f o r m u l a t i o n s from work done on  two  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r between r i p a r i a n s t a t e s . The  well  very  vital  readily  Political and  that  this  getting  less  use  therefore,  efficient  of  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r e s h waters i s a l s o  important, the d i f f i c u l t y  obstacles  a  r a p i d advancement of technology has  although the  cooperate  water  growth  the  chances  number of f a c t o r s not o v e r a l l state  stakes involved  of  or more of  an  a l l of  relations  f o r each of them,  22  their  general  techniques  they  bargaining the f i n a l  foreign  policy  chose  to  objectives,  employ  c h i p s each holds, may outcome.  According  and,  a l s o be  the  bargaining  more importantly, important  to David G.  the  factors  in  LeMarquand:  The complex i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y i n a basin is often unrelated to a n a t u r a l system. Demands on the shared resources d i f f e r between basin countries due to many f a c t o r s i n c l u d i n g p o p u l a t i o n growth, economic development, c u l t u r a l practices, foreign policy objectives, and the availability and a c c e s s i b i l i t y of other domestic water r e s o u r c e s . 2  It i s not  s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , that s o l u t i o n s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l  river disputes  encompass  much  more  than  purely  hydrologic-  economic i s s u e s . Although disputes my  the  literature  i s vast and  contention,  planning open and and  long  and  d e t a i l e d , most of  however,  r i v e r d i s p u t e s are  the  that  The  i t is legalistic.  of  years  disputes  f i n a l outcome i s more a  of the most comprehensive works on has  been  w r i t t e n by David G.  is  self-interested bargaining, result  of  both short  river  is  disputes  that,  while  hydrologic-economic i s s u e s , he  considerations. international  LeMarquand.  from other authors d e a l i n g  the  It  term p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the d i s p u t i n g  LeMarquand apart  solution  of  strenuous p o l i t i c a l  r i p a r i a n s than i t i s of hydrologic-economic One  international river  most s o l u t i o n s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l  results  lobbying, and  secret.  d e a l i n g with  with  r e c o g n i s i n g the  importance,  What sets  international importance of  s t r e s s e s the point that the  i s the r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  latter's  3  river  he  divides  To  relationships  final  clarify among  23  international a) p u b l i c  co-riparians  i n t o the f o l l o w i n g  resources;  c)  integrated  d)  upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t . "  development o p p o r t u n i t i e s ;  first  cooperation  two  among  relationships  basin s t a t e s .  e x i s t s when a l l s t a t e s  to  the  other  on  relationship, share  A "public  resource may  users'  an  i s able  detriment.  approximation  international  i s involved.  to  relationship access to the  to  exploit  the  States' navigation of  a  public  river.  The  when  goods second  two  action  In t h i s i n s t a n c e , use of  by one country may d i m i n i s h the b e n e f i t s eventually  a l l riparian  river, a l l will  water.  the  goods"  "common pool r e s o u r c e s , " occurs  also  example, the  conducive  states  a r i v e r or lake as a boundary, but no upstream-downstream  relationship  but  most  have equal and u n r e s t r i c t e d  r i g h t s represent the c l o s e s t relationship  and  are  resource, and when none of the s t a t e s resource  categories:  goods;  b) common pool  The  four  On  the  harm  i t s own  basin s t a t e s  suffer  other  from  hand,  conflict  relationships, l e s s as one  the  resource  reduced  without  an  quality  a l l w i l l benefit In t h i s category  I f , for  of the  from concerted of  disputes,  high because the  through c o o p e r a t i o n . arise  in  the  the chances of r e a c h i n g e a r l y  country  to the others  interests.  to reach agreement w i l l be q u i t e  w i l l benefit  Should  common  c o u n t r i e s dispose of t h e i r e f f l u e n t s i n  to reduce the e f f l u e n t s .  incentives  the  i s able  to  agreement.  third  and  settlement are much  receive  benefits  In  third  the  fourth  from  category  the of  24  " i n t e g r a t e d development o p p o r t u n i t i e s , " two are  in  an  upstream  upstream-downstream  country  providing  may  benefits  decide to  to  build  itself, forms.  example  benefit.  The  latter  benefits  for  riparians actions.  the  a river.  dam  which,  brings  is  undertakes  An  while  benefit  country received  The main problem here l i e s  by  to a  a  good  the p r o j e c t and  which  from  the  the upper  i n c a l c u l a t i n g an  " e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of c o s t s and b e n e f i t s " between which  countries  upstream country w i l l want to  downstream  pay  on  Flood c o n t r o l  reach an agreement with the will  a  also  in c e r t a i n  such  more  relationship  downstream country of  or  the  country  the country which p r o f i t s as a  result. The are i n  f i n a l category can a l s o be found where the basin s t a t e s an  upstream-downstream  relationship.  however, the upstream country uses a r i v e r Its  utilisation  for i t s sole  makes consumptive use  interests  i f , for  water  satisfied. agreement  such  that  own  the  In such cases, the economic i n c e n t i v e s to are extremely  users'  may  example,  flow  of  reach  be an  low because the upstream s t a t e r e c e i v e s  demands.  The  in accordance  dispute  between  Bangladesh over s h a r i n g of the Ganges waters f a l l s category of hydrologic-economic LeMarquand's  profit.  the downstream country's needs cannot  maximum b e n e f i t by e x p l o i t i n g the r i v e r its  case,  (such as f o r i r r i g a t i o n ) of the water,  d i v e r t s i t , p o l l u t e s i t e x c e s s i v e l y , or r e g u l a t e s the  this  does not b e n e f i t the downstream country and  well be d e t r i m e n t a l to the l a t t e r ' s it  In  typology  with India  in t h i s  only and last  relationships.  is helpful  i n s o f a r as i t s p e l l s out  25  which d i s p u t e s can be solved e a s i l y and degree  of d i f f i c u l t y .  examination of case reveals  that  studies  of  upstream-downstream  to cooperate.  set of i n t e r n a l and the  which  upstream  may  have  These types  other  persuade  the  down  to  agreed to d e s a l t  Mexico  in  f o r these  the  Colorado  agreements, LeMarquand o f f e r s a  e x t e r n a l v a r i a b l e s which the countries  have  to take  generally  important  to to  international  policy a  specifically,  to  riparian(s),  formulation. foreign  its  policy  willingness  areas  of  mutual  to  LeMarquand  7  in  certain  depending  on  the  contends  non-executive refer  objectives  and,  concern about i t s  link  principles  the with  the value  that  this  situation,  riparian the  brings  co-  i t places  cluster  v a r i a t i o n s for d i f f e r e n t  specific  dispute.  factors  concern  i t s d e s i r e f o r r e c i p r o c i t y , and  acts  While  and  such f a c t o r s as a country's  other  sovereignty.  s o l u t i o n or  on a r i v e r  External  6  policy-making  image, i t s w i l l i n g n e s s to adhere to the  with  variables  domestic  repercussions  country's  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, dispute  of  decision-makers  into consideration.  include bureaucratic, executive,  approaches  and,  conflicts  As an example he c i t e s the case  I n t e r n a l f a c t o r s r e f e r to the types  on  greater  5  As an e x p l a n a t i o n  of  ones which may  S t a t e s and Mexico where the U.S.  part of the water i t passes River.  a  agreements have been reached, there must be  country  of the United  with  He a l s o s t a t e s that s i n c e even a cursory  f a c t o r s besides hydrologic-economic upstream  which  of  conflicts about  a  non-solution. there  can  be  no  doubt  about the c o n t r i b u t i o n of  26  LeMarquand's typology potential  I  i n t e r n a t i o n a l river disputes  and  their  f o r r e s o l u t i o n , h i s a n a l y t i c framework i s by no means  all-encompassing. but  of  want  To be  f a i r , LeMarquand admits t h i s  to point out  some of the terms and  himself;  8  concepts he  has  s t a t e s that  in  used which, I b e l i e v e , need some e l a b o r a t i o n . LeMarquand makes a keen o b s e r v a t i o n an  upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t ,  f o r cooperation  there  when he  i s no economic  when an upstream country uses  an  international  river  to the detriment of the downstream country and  has  r e c i p r o c a l power over the  no  former.  ambiguous i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and been  able to give  power i n the  9  The  the  to t h i s day One  s t a t e s that  nobody  has  definition  of  i t i s the  c a p a c i t y of a s t a t e to c o n t r o l the behaviour of o t h e r s . has  certain  attributes:  resources,  industrial  population  usually  capacity,  not  always  that  intangible  defines  as  supports the war"  are  form the core of "power a t t r i b u t e s . "  Most  concepts degree  another  however, give the  The  such of  as  perceive  b a s i s of our  one  tangible  its of  1 1  attributes  Morgenthau, f u r t h e r , argues national  determination  element  impression  a r e l a t i o n a l context, that we  however, that such  f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of  yet  natural and  c o n s t i t u t e power.  "the  Power  1 0  advantage,  military  general  capability,  authors a l s o recognise, may  geographical  latter  term power i s very  i t a s a t i s f a c t o r y meaning.  i n t e r n a t i o n a l context  incentive  morale  with which a  government power.  which  12  in  he  nation  peace  and  These a t t r i b u t e s ,  that power i s a s t a t i c concept.  In  power assumes a p s y c h o l o g i c a l dimension in country to be more powerful than  perception,  another.  however, i s based on a comparative  27  assessment  of  countries.  S u l l i v a n makes an  "one  should  liabilities  the  attributes  focus  on  of  certain  attributes,  r e l a t i n g to the power  r e l a t i v e and  contest  between  "powerful"  will  two  of  countries,"  assessment.  countries,  automatically  the  be  contention  (unless  that  country  former) becomes ambiguous. the downstream country to relative  the  term:  all  has  on  is  more  Seen i n t h i s country  negotiate  a  in upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t  1  between  unequal  elsewhere:  is  15  relations  apply  to  a  countries  b a r g a i n i n g power  Asymmetric  Other  unequal  neighbours.  Canadian-American conclusions  two  the  have equal  upstream  scholars  group from C a r l e t o n U n i v e r s i t y have conducted  between two  not  It  relationships  in the works of i n t e g r a t i o n s c h o l a r s such  Keohane and Joseph Nye. "  relations  power over  do  of unequal  of "asymmetric dyads."  prominently  downstream  situations.  r e l a t e d to the concept  i s the concept  a  settlement.  respective  Closely  of  "Power" must i n c l u d e the c a p a c i t y of  b a r g a i n i n g power v i s - a - v i s t h e i r  their  not  upstream  reciprocal  countries  on  that  the "winner."  downstream  on  and  that i n a s p e c i f i c  country  about  why  no economic i n c e n t i v e to n e g o t i a t e where t h i s country i s  country  Robert  these  Power, t h e r e f o r e ,  13  using an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r to the detriment  figure  by  c e r t a i n a s s e t s or  i t i s by no means guaranteed  context, LeMarquand's having  possessed  i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t when he asks  others when making a comparative is  power  such  the  extensive research  c o u n t r i e s , and  specifically,  Although  t h e i r work  between  the  asymmetric  as  as  years dyadic  is  based  1963-1972, relations  28  ....(the theory) provides a context f o r the a n a l y s i s of s h i f t s i n i n t e g r a t i o n and the quest f o r enhanced autonomy i n Canadian-American relationships. (In a broader sense), the h i s t o r y of this particular relationship serves as a r i c h i l l u s t r a t i o n of dyadic r e l a t i o n s where the subordinate country continues to be attracted to the s u p e r o r d i n a t e one as a r e s u l t of expected economic gains, while p e r i o d i c a l l y t r y i n g to reassert an arm's l e n g t h r e l a t i o n s h i p with the l a t t e r in order to a v o i d the p e r c e i v e d p o l i t i c a l c o s t s of increased i n t e g r a t i o n . 1 6  What  emerged  most  discrepancy  between  integration  and  policy. how  clearly  from  growing  t h e i r a n a l y s i s was  Canada-United  continuing  Based  disintegration  i s s u e s are  aim  on  Lemarquand's  category  in  this  section  upstream-downstream  country. to  conflict  Before proceeding,  of  psychological to  art  and  afford  p o l i c i e s i n peace or w a r . "  words,  implementation  out  is  leaves  strategy  upstream-dowstream  of asymmetric  with a  dyads,  17  of  the  The  have  term " s t r a t e g y " i s  employing  military  to  superordinate/upstream  the  political,  f o r c e s of a n a t i o n or a  maximum  support  to  adopted  S t r a t e g y i s a l s o d e f i n e d as the a r t  of d e v i s i n g or employing plans or stratagems other  of  there are c e r t a i n terms which  d e f i n e d as "the science and  group of n a t i o n s  realm  adopt i n seeking a s o l u t i o n  be d e f i n e d to c l a r i f y t h e i r meaning.  economic,  the  to o u t l i n e a set of s t r a t e g i e s that a  subordinate/downstream s t a t e may an  in  economic  settled.  c o n f l i c t s and the C a r l e t o n group's concept I  States  S u r p r i s i n g l y , however, what t h e i r study  specific  a notable  involves  both  toward a g o a l . the  planning  of a s t a t e ' s course of a c t i o n s i n i t s e f f o r t s  achieve a s o l u t i o n to a d i s p u t e i t has with another  state.  1 8  In and to  29  S t r a t e g i e s may  be  implemented through p e a c e f u l means (e.g.  n e g o t i a t i o n ) or through the conduct of war. of  power  relations  between  o f t e n the weaker s t a t e in strategies limited.  it  different  is  that  relations.  threatens  By  finds  against  the  consideration categories  riparian  means.  T h i s i s not  fought  over  the  For  intended  of  theory  number  dispute  and  the s o v e r e i g n t y reasoning,  usual f o r a  unless the  international  rights.'  9  to  achieve.  river  little  category  implying  wars  Usually, to  have  that two  to s e t t l e an  that  the  not  been  however, s t r a t e g i e s the  objectives  they  fall  who into  of f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s of a states rarely,  i f ever, wage war  international river  i s a l s o the more powerful likelihood  disputes  T h i s i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d by H o l s t i  In a s u p e r o r d i n a t e - s u b o r d i n a t e riparian  latter  of the former in a t a n g i b l e  to say, however, that  riparian  a g a i n s t each other  of  s t a t e s are not u s u a l l y s e t t l e d through v i o l e n t  "middle-range"  s t a t e thereby  evoke  practice  contends that i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r d i s p u t e s o r d i n a r i l y the  of  discussing  i n s t a n c e , i t i s not  adopted by c o u n t r i e s are p r o p o r t i o n a t e are  the  when  a g a i n s t another country  same  between  that  i t s preponderant neighbour i s  different  to launch war  directly  dyad  important  realities  unequal s t a t e s , however, very  r e a c t i o n s by s t a t e s in  international  way.  use  Another  strategies  country  can  a  two  Given the  dispute.  2 0  r e l a t i o n s h i p where the upper of the two  downstream  states,  there  is  s t a t e would achieve  a  r e s o l u t i o n of the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e by employing s t r a t e g i e s which c o u l d l e a d to war. powerful  country  Pursuing  a violent  would not only f a i l  strategy against to achieve  a  more  i t s objective,  30  the subordinate country may in  areas  Another  which  it  important  discussing  considers v i t a l  factor  strategies  configuration  which is  open to  be  tends  survival.  remembered  while  country, how  pressures  to i t s n a t i o n a l  must  that  generally  superordinate/upstream specific  a l s o leave i t s e l f  the  to  while  overall  power  favour  the  t h i s a f f e c t s the outcome of  " m i d - l e v e l " d i s p u t e s v i s - a - v i s a weaker country  no means c e r t a i n .  According to Keohane and  is  by  Nye:  The t r a n s l a t i o n from c a p a b i l i t i e s to outcomes depends on the political process. Skill in political bargaining affects the translation. States with intense p r e f e r e n c e s and coherent positions will bargain more e f f e c t i v e l y than s t a t e s c o n s t r a i n e d by domestic and t r a n s n a t i o n a l a c t o r s . 2 1  T h e r e f o r e , i f the subordinate/downstream country can prepare i t s strategies  carefully  preponderant an  and  with  its  achieve  optimal s o l u t i o n to the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e d e s p i t e the  overall  In country  in their  an  relations.  upstream-downstream  conflict  upstream  country.  the  upstream  convince  suits  the  interest  the  the  subordinate/downstream  of  the  the downstream country  country  upstream country that as a r e s u l t of the  u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n taken by the l a t t e r on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s being a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d .  f i r s t phase of the d i s p u t e . persuade  of the  The o b j e c t i v e of the downstream country i s ,  therefore, twofold: f i r s t , to  where  i s using an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r to the detriment  downstream country, the s t a t u s quo  has  effectively  i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e that i t can  inequality  neighbour,  bargain  The  T h i s i s the  o b j e c t i v e i n t h i s phase  the superordinate/upstream  river,  is  to  country to acknowledge that  31  a problem indeed e x i s t s . superordinate/upstream  The  second  country  phase  begins  acknowledges  problem and agrees to n e g o t i a t e with the  that  once  the  there  is a  subordinate/downstream  country. The  subordinate  downstream  country  s t r a t e g i e s i t can employ to i n f l u e n c e the country to cooperate.  In order to  has  a  variety  of  superordinate/upstream  make  the  upstream  acknowledge that a problem indeed e x i s t s , the lower  country  riparian  may  do the f o l l o w i n g t h i n g s : 1) It may with  lodge a formal complaint  regard  to  the  with the upper r i p a r i a n  latter's  unilateral  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r emphasising  that  harm  state.  to  the  lower  riparian  such  irrigation  action  This  Pakistan which p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t I n d i a ' s  action  on  would  was  cause  the case of  (in P a k i s t a n ) .  2 2  Lodging  West  with  developing  respond  diplomatic  c o n s t i t u t e s an  courtesy.  It  Punjab  and  a formal complaint with the upper  r i p a r i a n compels that country to also  in  the  interest  important  solution  to  however, i s to s i g n a l  the  dispute.  i t s concern  The  to the  primary  upstream  of  first  step i n the downstream country's o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y to achieve optimal  an  systems on the Indus River l a r g e l y to meet the needs  of East Punjab ( i n India) to the e x c l u s i o n of Sind  action  state  an  objective, country  and  persuade i t to n e g o t i a t e . 2)  The  subordinate/downstream  notes emphasising objective  country may  the l e g a l r i g h t s  of  exchange d i p l o m a t i c  lower  riparians.  2 3  The  of t h i s s t r a t e g y i s to keep channels of communication  with the upstream country open.  The  upstream  country  usually  32  responds supports The  by  citing  an  exchange  The  of  diplomatic  notes  also  second  phase  d i p l o m a t i c technique  of  country  subordinate/downstream  2  signifies  that  the  begins  when  the  negotiate  with  the  the  dispute  agrees  to  country.  Negotiation  advancement  through  i s d e f i n e d as a  f o r the p e a c e f u l settlement of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s .  n e g o t i a t i o n are accomplished by compromises reached  dispute. *  i s w i l l i n g to n e g o t i a t e .  superordinate/upstream  the  norm or precedent which  i t s own p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the s p e c i f i c  upstream country  and  international  direct  personal  of  differences  The o b j e c t i v e s of and  contact.  accommodations  Reaching agreement  through n e g o t i a t i o n i m p l i e s a w i l l i n g n e s s on both s i d e s t o mutually  acceptable  concessions  ( q u i d pro quo ).  make  Ultimatums,  t h r e a t e n i n g speeches, boycotts and walkouts are o f t e n r e l a t e d to n e g o t i a t i o n and may a f f e c t  its  ultimate  success  or  failure.  S k i l l f u l n e g o t i a t i o n i n v o l v e s agreement at the l e a s t cost leaving  the  relations. The  other  side  relatively  (while  s a t i s f i e d ) to good f u t u r e  2 5  w i l l i n g n e s s of the  superordinate/upstream  country  to  n e g o t i a t e , however, should not be a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d as a sincere In  fact,  desire  to achieve  i t may  procrastination.  agree The  a s o l u t i o n to the r i p a r i a n to  negotiate  upstream  i n f l u e n c e d by a few important  In  between  and  the  United  government entered  States  country's  factors.  be concerned about i t s image.  with  the  the  intent  decision  First,  will  t h i s country  Colorado  Mexico,  dispute.  the  River United  of be will  dispute States  i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n with Mexico d e s p i t e the f a c t  33  that  i t had no economic i n c e n t i v e to do so.  felt  that  by  pursuing  its  own  The  interest,  United  States  i t would damage i t s  r e l a t i o n s with Mexico and  i t would p r o j e c t to the r e s t of  America  world  and  the  third  country that pursues consequences a neighbour  i t s own  the  image of a s t r o n g powerful  national  i n t e r e s t heedless  to i t s poorer n e i g h b o u r s . on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r  concessions on other b i l a t e r a l arrangements  or  support  may  2 7  According  scheme may  for  a  multilateral  to H o l s t i ,  In  countries  trade of  isolation"  the  i s more common.  In the second begins,  United  the  where  States  issue  of  relations  and  Canada,  good f a i t h  s t r a t e g i e s may  to  area  phase of the d i s p u t e , when a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n  achieve  cooperative those  achieve  an  state  can  employ c e r t a i n  solution  coercive. are  i t s objective. to  to  the  into  two  Cooperative  employed  i n a gesture of  a l s o i n c l u d e responses  superordinate/upstream  optimal  and  which  subordinate/downstream country in  more  "issue  These s t r a t e g i e s can be c l a s s i f i e d  are  is  communication,  riparian  strategies  areas  are  to  categories:  areas  conflict  s t r a t e g i e s i n order  broad  policy.  28  subordinate/downstream  dispute.  trade  l i n k a g e between p o l i c y  r o u t i n i z e d and where there i s a t r a d i t i o n of easy such as between  the  be used to gain  i s s u e s , such as f a v o u r a b l e  be t y p i c a l of c o u n t r i e s where a high l e v e l  characteristic.  of  Second, agreement with  26  LeMarquand c a l l s t h i s connection i n b a r g a i n i n g "linkage."  Latin  by  cooperation  Coercive  and  As such c o o p e r a t i v e  queries  made  by  country p e r t a i n i n g to t e c h n i c a l or  aspects of the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e .  the  strategies,  on  the legal the  34  other  hand,  are  those  subordinate/downstream  which  state  are  to  state  Coercive  strategies  be i m p l e m e n t e d  negative  inducements.  in  the nature  of a quid  country  may  exchange  fora  inducements and  may  dispute  offer  include  the  those  The  following  conflict  riparian  which  involve  lists  country  with  adopt  a preponderant  1.formal  Stage  into  country.  strategies an  a  upstream-  CONFLICTS  Strategies  of diplomatic  3.talks  between  4. j o i n t  survey  notes  leaders  5. e x c h a n g e  of t e c h n i c a l  data  6. p e r s u a d e  the upstream  state  solution  the  protest  2.exchange Negotiation  in  measures  neighbour.  Cooperative  Stage  party  probable  may  Negative  retaliatory third  are  i t wants i n  dispute.  by a s t r o n g e r  table  which  or  t h e downstream  to  UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM  Pre-negotiation  are those  of the subordinate/downstream  subordinate/downstream downstream  the dispute.  country something  which  the  by t h e u s e o f p o s i t i v e  I n o t h e r words,  the  the  on  upstream  intervention  at the behest  to resolve  inducements  p r o quo.  solution  are  i n order  Positive  by  put pressure  superordinate/upstream may  employed  i s beneficial  that  f o r longer  term  35  Coercive  Intra-issue  7.pressure i s o l a t ion)  (issue-area  Strategies  t o upgrade  8.retaliation upstream  Pressure  talks  (project  harmful  country  9.internationalization organisation, 10. m u s t e r  support  (regional, 11. m o b i l i z e public  to  (regional  U.N.,  ICJ,  etc.)  from  other  powers  international)  domestic  and  international  opinion  Extra-issue (i ssue-area  linkage)  12.Positive  and n e g a t i v e  economic  sanctions  analysing  Before to  remember  that  these  while a l l  subordinate/downstream individually of  their  relations  between  a  of  climate  strategies solution  the  including  strategies Since  have  mutual  a better  lodging  objective  formal  When,  f o r some  of  on  For instance,  tradeoffs  and  worthwhile  or  dispute failure state  of  when  there  is  achieve  reason,  the  the  relations, may  by  of the  the success  depends  suspicion chance  be  c a n be u s e d  the course  bilateral  economic  to the dispute. by  during  combinations,  in  i t would  strategies  the c o - r i p a r i a n s .  confidence  characterised  these  country  or i n c e r t a i n  achieving  strategies,  cooperative an  optimal  relations  hostiltity,  are  coercive  succeeding.  complaints  and exchange  of  diplomatic  36  notes  have a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d , we w i l l s t a r t  with the t h i r d  s t r a t e g y on our l i s t . A.  COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES  3) I t i s always always f r u i t f u l hold  formal  issues. were  or  informal  I f the leader to  hold  treated  as  one  of  two  the  talks  subordinate/downstream  with  country,  his the  of many "problems."  will  river  have  the  strategy.  Mexico) s t a t e v i s i t deadlock  2 9  In  authority  1972,  dispute  It must be remembered,  to  when  the  whom  Farakka  the  cooperate,  make  the  compromises flexible  Echeverra's  (of  however,  3 0  that  a  breakthrough project  t o the superordinate/upstream  in  i s of low  state.  Barrage  dispute  to by  speed  For  up  negotiations  promoting  t a l k s t o the  Indian engineers and West  project  had  Bengal  politicians  a high p r i o r i t y prevented d i s c o u r s e  between m i n i s t e r s from both c o u n t r i e s f o r ten y e a r s .  3 1  4) The subordinate/downstream  country may suggest  of  i n order to ensure e f f i c i e n t  the  be  P r e s i d e n t Ayub (of P a k i s t a n ) and Prime M i n i s t e r  ministers' level, to  President  issue.  Jawaharlal Nehru (of India) decided over  could  to develop a  i s p o s s i b l e only when the r i v e r  or m i d - l e v e l p r i o r i t y instance,  the  t o Washington and t a l k s with Nixon broke the  on the Colorado s a l i n i t y  negotiations  in  Besides, where there i s a  necessary to reach agreement, or at l e a s t bargaining  to  country  counterpart  strong commitment by the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p to negotiators  states  t a l k s over a wide range of b i l a t e r a l  of  superordinate/upstream  for leaders  international  river  management of the r e g i o n ' s water  resources.  This  joint  survey joint  constitutes  37  the o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y body  to  ensure  rivers.  of the downstream  equitable  d i s t r i b u t i o n of b e n e f i t s from common  In the Canadian-American case, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Commission  was  set  up  Boundary Waters T r e a t y .  the  border  I t s f u n c t i o n s are to approve or r e j e c t  3 2  governments, solutions  and,  to  to  at  the  conduct  water  Joint  in 1909 under the Canada-United S t a t e s  p r o j e c t s that w i l l a f f e c t the n a t u r a l at  country to c r e a t e a j o i n t  l e v e l of  request  of  investigations  resource  and  the  that  other  will  recommend  boundary  problems.  ensure smooth n e g o t i a t i o n  or even proper t e c h n i c a l e v a l u a t i o n  even i f such a either  side  does  national  a  data.  body  two  waters  However, the c r e a t i o n of  available  joint  boundary  not  necessarily  In a h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n , i t i s more l i k e l y joint  would  body  were  reflect  the  created, opinion  representatives of  their  The c r e a t i o n of a j o i n t body, however, i s  inasmuch  it  riparian  lends  data  i t may  country  may  do on i t s own  initiative  state's  or  request.  t e c h n i c a l data c o n s t i t u t e s the downstream continue  offer  negotiations  on  in  response  Most  to  the  state's  strategy  to  the one hand, and a l s o to dispose of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l river disputes  years and even decades of n e g o t i a t i o n . by  exchange  An o f f e r to exchange  t e c h n i c a l problems i n an e f f o r t to seek a p o l i t i c a l other.  to  p e r t a i n i n g to the p a r t i c u l a r r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e .  superordinate/upstream  caused  helpful  dispute.  technical  the  of  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l outlook to r e s o l v i n g a  5) The subordinate/downstream  This  that  respective  governments. as  of  3 3  solution  on  are s e t t l e d a f t e r  The delay  is  primarily  the massive amount of t e c h n i c a l data that have to be  38  c o l l e c t e d , produced, s c r u t i n i z e d and evaluated before a s o l u t i o n can be reached. The  exchange of t e c h n i c a l data, however, can be turned  a double-edged weapon by the superordinate/upstream so  chooses.  Sometimes  conflicting  s i d e s can c r e a t e a deadlock  data  state  produced  in negotiations.  If  into  if it  by the two  the  upstream  country decides to p r o c r a s t i n a t e , there i s a good chance that i t will  demand  more  and more " r e l e v a n t " data from the downstream  state. 6)  The subordinate/downstream country may appeal to the upstream  country saying that r e s o l v i n g the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e w i l l be  in  the  country. the  long-range  interest  fact  of the superordinate/upstream  In many asymmetric dyadic r e l a t i o n s around the  world,  p o p u l a t i o n i n the subordinate/downstream s t a t e i s i n a l e s s  favourable  economic  situation  superordinate/upstream neighbours, States,  compared  country.  as i s the case with,  then  people  If  with  that  these  say, Mexico  of  country  country  of  and  i n t h e subordinate counry  greater  ordinarily  population  the  living  cope  does  not  with  want  illegal  opportunity. to  take  United  near the move  to  The upstream in  additional  immigration.  The i n f l u x of  people c o u l d c r e a t e economic as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l  problems f o r  the  or  economic  the  c o u n t r i e s are  border of the superordinate country, may be tempted to the  in  s u p e r o r d i n a t e country.  The n e g o t i a t o r s from the downstream  country may convince the government of the upstream country that i t s u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n on worsen  the  economic  the  international  situation  in  the  river  downstream  could  only  country.  39  Therefore, would long B.  an e q u i t a b l e  also  be  and  immediate s o l u t i o n  3  COERCIVE STRATEGIES category  outside  the  tradition  of  strategies state  issue area. of  may  be  within  the  In the case of two  strained extra-issue  often.  3  applied  or  issue-area  by  the  issue area i t s e l f  or  s t a t e s which have  a  easy communication, quid pro quo  area i s more common whereas between two  states linkage  within  the  issue  where  relations  i s p r a c t i s e d more  5  Intra-issue The  linkage  subordinate/downstream  state  may  put  pressure on  superordinate/upstream s t a t e to upgrade t a l k s from the bureaucrats to the  leaders  of  some p o i n t s instance,  the  if  they  are  with the  negotiating  l e s s than the amount i t had  upstream  quantities  the  be  state.  For  of flow of  an  have to accept a  originally  i n t e r e s t of a quick s o l u t i o n which can  political  In order  even have to concede  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r , the downstream country may quantity  of  arrange a t a l k between  c o - r i p a r i a n s t a t e s or may  in i t s n e g o t i a t i o n s  the  level  l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l decision-makers.  to do t h i s the downstream country may  the  problem  to the advantage of the upstream country in the  subordinate/downstream  7)  the  term. "  This  are  to  demanded.  found only at  In the  l e v e l , however, t h i s c o n c e s s i o n i s very minor.  8)  The  a  p r o j e c t of  subordinate/downstream s t a t e may i t s own  with the  sometimes go ahead  i n t e n t of p u t t i n g pressure on  upstream s t a t e .  T h i s of course depends on  the  of  topography  their  terrain.  For  the two  countries  instance,  if  with the and the  40  downstream  country  were  s t o r e the waters of the release  it  in  such  i n a p o s i t i o n to b u i l d a r e s e r v o i r to international  a  manner  as  river to  in  question  cause harm to crops by  f l o o d i n g areas upstream, the upstream country might be to s e t t l e the o r i g i n a l d i s p u t e . country  will  project  and  depend its  on  The  the  perception  reaction  technical of  the  downstream country to see the p r o j e c t 9)  The  Although  arbitration,  the  upstream  determination  of  country  may  t h r e a t e n the upstream  be  p r o g r e s s i n b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s once the r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of a r b i t r a t i o n . and  hostility  the  through.  both p a r t i e s have to agree  upstream  suspicion  the  i t s i n t e n t i o n to s e t t l e the d i s p u t e  arbitration.  mutual  of  persuaded  f e a s i b i l i t y of such a  subordinate/downstream country may  country by d e c l a r i n g  and  to  through  submit  to  persuaded  to make  downstream  country  In a dyadic s i t u a t i o n where  r e i g n supreme, a r b i t r a t i o n  p r o v i d e a f r u i t f u l method of r e s o l v i n g a r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e . was  how  I960. 10)  India and P a k i s t a n signed the  Indus  Waters  may This  Treaty  in  36  The  downstream  domestically government  and of  country  create the  may  politicize  unfavourable  upstream  the r i v e r d i s p u t e  opinion  country.  of  m a i n t a i n i n g c o r d i a l b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s and a l s o to preserve  the  persuaded project  upstream  to s e t t l e the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e .  country  may  However, i f the  be river  i s of top p r i o r i t y to the upstream country t h i s s t r a t e g y  is l i k e l y  to  11)  downstream  The  the  the  the  interest  image of a " f r i e n d l y " neighbour,  In  against  fail. country  may  create  unfavourable o p i n i o n  41  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y against  the upstream country by  latter's  unilateral  action  unethical,  i l l e g a l and  a v i o l a t i o n of human r i g h t s .  done by  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g the  s a i d than done. General long  The  and  tedious  against  stages of  the  The  of the  final  issue  comes  a  vote.  remain uncommitted. superordinate.  for  s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e that  country  a  bilateral  easier  through  can  issue.  number  Because  Assembly  of  of  sure of the  states  this, wording  even  may  if  the  i t i s quite decide  to  not want to antagonize  the  a number of reasons. international issue and  several  expect to come up  Once i t comes to a vote,  an  be  of the upstream s t a t e at  General  through b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n . the  lobbying  These s t a t e s may  state  T h i s can  as  issue of t h i s type i n the  never be e n t i r e l y  r e s o l u t i o n in the to  river  T h i s , however, i s  from r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  p o s s i b l e that a s i g n i f i c a n t  essentially  of  downstream  s t a t e can  the  Nations, f o r example, i n v o l v e s a  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g the  downstream  international  b r i n g i n g up of an  process  opposition  the  issue.  Assembly of the United  subcommittees.  all  on  portraying  should  First,  riparian  they  may  dispute  is  t h e r e f o r e be  Second, by v o t i n g  in  resolved  favour  of  downstream country they might antagonize the upstream s t a t e  with which they may Third,  some  of  have economic and/or  these c o u n t r i e s may  political  relations.  have s i m i l a r problems with  t h e i r neighbours where t h e i r own  p o s i t i o n s are e q u i v a l e n t  superordinate/upstream c o u n t r y .  These s t a t e s do  taking  sides  in  the  dispute,  to  create  an  precedent which might l a t e r c o n f l i c t with t h e i r finally,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  not  to  the  want,  by  international  interests.  any  And  international  42  o r g a n i s a t i o n operates not on the b a s i s of e q u a l i t y b a s i s of the power wielded by member s t a t e s . may  combine  in  There  internationalization. gets  resolutions  a  obligatory.  A l l these  factors  vote,  nature  Therefore, itself  negotiations  additional  problem  with  In the u n l i k e l y event that the downstream  this  country may f i n d resume  is  favourable  of  on the  favour of the upstream s t a t e when the issue i s  internationalized.  country  3 7  but  are  most U.N.  General  recommendatory  Assembly  rather  than  i t i s very l i k e l y that the downstream i n the unenviable p o s i t i o n of having  with  the  upstream  state  after  to  spending  months of hard work and money i n i t s e f f o r t s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e the  issue. Internationalization, therefore,  downstream  state  employs  in  t a n g i b l e progress i n b i l a t e r a l state be  takes the  desperation. negotiations  strategy When and  which  a  there i s no the  upstream  a non-compromising stand, i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n may way  to  internationalization,  the  only  break riparian  and may cause some embarrassment to country.  is a  For  fear  superordinate/upstream  of t a r n i s h i n g  the  deadlock.  Through  d i s p u t e becomes p u b l i c i z e d the  superordinate/upstream  i t s international  country may decide to agree  image, the  to an optimal  s o l u t i o n to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r d i s p u t e . 12) The subordinate/downstream s t a t e may a l s o the of  government the l a t t e r  very  put  pressure  of the upstream s t a t e by approaching  s t a t e through  the superpowers.  on  the leader  Although  there  is  l i t t l e p r o b a b i l i t y of the superpowers doing anything on an  official  level,  they may i n f o r m a l l y request the  leader  of the  43  superordinate/downstream equitably. pressure  The on  country t o s e t t l e the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e  subordinate/downstream  the  state  superordinate/upstream  other co-basin s t a t e s i n the r e g i o n .  may  state  The  also  put  by approaching  superordinate/upstream  s t a t e may f e e l threatened i f a l l the s t a t e s i n the region align  themselves  Bangladesh's Cooperation South  in a  proposal  could  formal or even i n f o r m a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . to  create  the  South  Asian  Regional  (SARC), a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n of a l l the s t a t e s of  Asia,  for instance,  predominance by  India  was  although  viewed  as  a  i t was  to  be  threat an  to i t s  important  member.  38  The  above-mentioned s t r a t e g i e s may be used  in combination to  achieve  with others by the  an  at l e a s t o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n to the  I t must  be  remembered,  in  superordinate/upstream precludes  be pursued  different times  and  downstream  Although  however,  relations the  between  a  particular  the  country  from pursuing many  the aforementioned  strategies  may  to  the  there  are  s t r a t e g y i s the only course of a c t i o n  For i n s t a n c e , when there i s no progress i n  b i l a t e r a l negotiation, open  the  subordinate/downstream  stages of an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t ,  when  that  by the subordinate/downstream country during the  which i t can pursue.  course  the  country  the  courses of a c t i o n . all  state  or  inequality  country  subordinate/downstream  equitable  riparian dispute. overall  i n d i v i d u a l l y or  internationalization  may  be  the  only  subordinate country d e s p i t e the f a c t that  t h i s s t r a t e g y does not b r i n g about an immediate s o l u t i o n .  Also,  r e l a t i o n s between c o - r i p a r i a n s may vary during the course of the  44  dispute for d i f f e r e n t useful  during  reasons  particular  and  some  periods  and  strategies  state  for  superordinate/upstream  options  open  application  country  in  prove  f u t i l e at other times.  T h e r e f o r e , although these s t r a t e g i e s are downstream  may  an  to  against  the a  upstream-downstream  c o n f l i c t , the success or f a i l u r e of each alone or i n combination with  others depends on the r e l a t i o n s between the two  the p r i o r i t y river  the superordinate/upstream  project.  The  superordinate/upstream negative  higher  the  country,  the  inducements  subordinate/downstream  it  has  country  and  country  places  on  the  priority  placed  by  the  more  to in  states  positive  be  and/or  offered  order  to  by  agree  the to  a  settlement. The  foregoing  superordinate/upstream disputes  will  now  approach versus be  in  a  useful  asymmetrical  example  of  relationship.  trying  two  The  countries  been thwarted  signed  i n 1977  there was  in  a  1971)  However,  when  an  have  time  T h i s was  and  India to reach  interim  between the governments of I n d i a and  resolved.  dyad  structural  treaty  was  Bangladesh,  s p e c u l a t i o n from n e u t r a l q u a r t e r s that the problem  been f i n a l l y  the  Barrage  India-Bangladesh  i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to persuade  an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n .  analyse  N e g o t i a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g Bangladesh  (and t h e i r P a k i s t a n i predecessors before again  to  riparian  i n i t i a t e d over the Farakka  d i s p u t e between I n d i a and Bangladesh. is  understanding  subordinate/downstream  applied  n e g o t i a t i n g process which was  to  had  u n f o r t u n a t e l y not to be because  as soon as the t r e a t y e x p i r e d i n November, 1982,  a Memorandum of  45  Understanding  extended  the p r e v i o u s t r e a t y f o r another  in the absence of a comprehensive s e t t l e m e n t . explain  both  the achievement and  solution.  We  and  speculate  task  is  to  a  permanent  and  w i l l a l s o analyse the a c t i o n s taken  Bangladesh i n the context of the framework chapter  years  tenuousness of t h i s agreement  and analyse the f a c t o r s which are o b s t r u c t i n g equitable  Our  3 9  two  on  the  laid  down  in  p o s s i b i l i t y of a permanent  e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n with India over s h a r i n g of the Ganges  by  this and  waters.  46  NOTES 1. David G. LeMarquand, I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s : The P o l i t i c s of Cooperation, (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1 977) , p. 1 . 2.  Ibid.  3. Ibid. LeMarquand presents an a n a l y t i c framework and d i s c u s s e s four case s t u d i e s using h i s framework to e x p l a i n each case. The four case s t u d i e s are : a. The Colorado s a l i n a t i o n problem between the United S t a t e s and Mexico. b. The Columbia River T r e a t y signed between the U n i t e d States and Canada. c. The Skagit V a l l e y and Ross Dam issue between the United States and Canada. d. The Rhine River p o l l u t i o n problem between S w i t z e r l a n d , West Germany, and the Netherlands. 4.  Ibid  • i  p.8.  5.  Ibid  • t  p. 1 0.  6.  Ibid  • /  pp.15-20.  7.  Ibid  •  i  pp.12-15.  8.  Ibid  •  i  p. 1 9.  9.  Ibid  • /  p. 1 0.  10. K.J . Holsti , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : A Framework f o r 3d. ed., (Englewood C l i f f s , New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e Analysi s H a l l , Inc., 1977), p.165. 11. Michael P. S u l l i v a n , I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s : T h e o r i e s and Evidence , ( E n g l e w o o d - C l i f f s , New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc., 1976), p.159. 12. Hans J . Morgenthau, for Power and Peace , 3d. p.131 . 13.  S u l l i v a n , op.  P o l i t i c s Among Nations: The S t r u g g l e ed., (New York: A l f r e d Knopf, 1965),  c i t ., p.163.  14. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Interdependence: World P o l i t i c s i n T r a n s i t i o n Brown and Company, 1977).  Nye, Power and , (Boston: L i t t l e  15. Michael B. Dolan, B r i a n W. Tomlin, and Harald von Reikhogff, " I n t e g r a t i o n and Autonomy i n Canada-United S t a t e s R e l a t i o n s , 1963-1972," i n Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Science, June 1982, XV:2, pp.331-363.  47  16.  Ibid  ., pp.332-333.  17. Webster's T h i r d New I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y Language, Unabridged e d i t i o n , p.2256. 18.  of the  English  Ibid.  19. The best example of an armed c o n f l i c t over an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r was the 1967 Middle East war between I s r a e l and Jordan. Although, the war ostensibly occurred over the waters of the River Jordan, i t i s c l e a r that there were other b a s i c political and r e l i g i o u s reasons. T h i s e s t a b l i s h e s the c o r r e l a t i o n between the level of hostility between two s t a t e s and the chances of armed c o n f l i c t . Hence, as a rule war does not take place between two s t a t e s over r i p a r i a n r i g h t s . 20. H o l s t i , op. c i t . , pp. 148-151. H o l s t i s t a t e s that these objectives are generally concerned with s a t i s f y i n g domestic, s o c i a l , and economic demands through i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements or by m a i n t a i n i n g amicable r e l a t i o n s with neighbouring c o u n t r i e s . 21.  Keohane and  Nye,  op.  c i t . , p.  53.  22. J.D. Chapman (ed.), The I n t e r n a t i o n a l River Basin, (Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia P u b l i c a t i o n s Centre, 1963), pp. 35-36. The Indus Waters Treaty was signed between India and Pakistan in September 1960. The t r e a t y c o u l d be negotiated only because both sides agreed to World Bank mediation and i n t e r v e n t i o n . 23. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law A s s o c i a t i o n . H e l s i n k i Rules on the Uses of the Waters of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s , (London: The International Law A s s o c i a t i o n , 1966), pp. 8-11. The H e l s i n k i Rules authored by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Association (I LA) in 1966, provide the most important and widely accepted l e g a l g u i d e l i n e s f o r use in s e t t l i n g international river disputes. While the H e l s i n k i Rules do not have the force of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, they have been both a p p l i e d and c i t e d in i n t e r n a t i o n a l and interstate river disputes The c e n t r a l u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e i s that each basin s t a t e i s e n t i t l e d w i t h i n its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share i n the b e n e f i c i a l uses of the waters of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l drainage basin. The downstream country usually f i n d s the " e q u i t a b l e and reasonable" c l a u s e of the H e l s i n k i Rules favouring i t s stand on an international river. 24. F.J. Berber, R i v e r s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, (New York: Oceania P u b l i c a t i o n s Inc., 1 959) , pp. 14-19. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that amongst the innumerable volumes on norms and precedents on international river disputes, there i s almost always a norm or precedent which supports a p a r t i c u l a r state's position in a specific dispute. For instance, in d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n to the Helsinki Rules' "equitable and reasonable apportionment" stands the p r i n c i p l e of "absolute s o v e r e i g n t y " or  48  "first principle." This principle was first espoused by American Attorney-General Harmon in 1895 in connection with the dispute with Mexico over the u t i l i s a t i o n of the Rio Grande. Harmon r u l e d that the U.S. c o u l d do whatever i t wanted with the waters of the Rio Grande w i t h i n U.S. territory regardless of any p o s s i b l e i l l - e f f e c t s the U.S. a c t i o n might have on Mexico. The Harmon D o c t r i n e , t h e r e f o r e , supports the upstream country's p o s i t i o n in an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t although in recent times, t h i s r u l e i s h a r d l y c i t e d by any r i p a r i a n n a t i o n because of i t s i m p e r i a l i s t i c c o n n o t a t i o n . 25. Jack C. D i e t ionary, p.218.  Piano and Roy Olton, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s (New York: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, Inc . , 1969),  26.  LeMarquand, op.  27.  I b i d . , p.  c i t . , p.  12.  13.  28. K.J. H o l s t i and T.A. Levy, "Bilateral I n s t i t u t i o n s and Transgovernmental Relations between Canada and the United S t a t e s , " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , 28:4 (1974): 875-901. 29.  LeMarquand, op.  30.  Ibid.  31.  See  32.  LeMarquand, op.  c i t . , p.  17.  Chapter III of t h i s t h e s i s . c i t . , p.  56.  33. The Columbia River Treaty signed between the United States and Canada in 1961 was preceded by more than twenty years of n e g o t i a t i o n . The f i v e - year Ganges Waters Treaty signed between India and Bangladesh in November 1977 was preceded by twentyf i v e years of n e g o t i a t i o n and b a r g a i n i n g . 34. K.J. H o l s t i , "Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , " i n Steven L. S p i e g e l and Kenneth N. Waltz ( e d s . ) , C o n f l i c t in World P o l i t i c s , (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop P u b l i s h e r s Inc., 1971), pT 384. Taking the Canadian-American s i t u a t i o n , H o l s t i maintains that Canadian n e g o t i a t o r s f r e q u e n t l y emphasise the nature of the Americans' own long-range interests. They appeal to the o p p o s i t i o n s ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t , but from a time p e r s p e c t i v e that may be d i f f e r e n t from that of American n e g o t i a t o r s . In an upstreamdownstream c o n f l i c t , n e g o t i a t o r s from the subordinate/downstream country may t r y a s i m i l a r b a r g a i n i n g p l o y . 35.  H o l s t i and  36.  See  Levy, op.  footnote  no.  c i t . , pp.  875-901.  24.  37. Mark W. Zacher, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t s and C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y , 1946-1977 , (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979).  49  Zacher makes the point that the United Nations i s an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the world's power brokers and not a g l o b a l p o l i c e s t a t i o n as i s commonly supposed. In t h i s sense, t h e r e f o r e , powerful c o u n t r i e s hold more sway even in the General Assembly. 38. The concept of South Asian Regional Cooperation was first proposed i n May 1980 by P r e s i d e n t Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the idea was f l o a t e d when Mrs. Gandhi's government threatened to scrap the November 1977 Ganges Waters T r e a t y . See, Rajendra Sareen, "South Asian Regional Cooperation," i n Indian and Foreign Review, 20:20 (August 1-14) pp. 12-15. 39. The Memorandum of Understanding was drawn up c o l l e c t i v e l y by the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s of Bangladesh and India during Gen. Ershad's v i s i t to new D e l h i at the beginning of October, 1982. Although t h i s Memorandum has been c a l l e d a two year extension of the 1977 T r e a t y , a few important m o d i f i c a t i o n s have been made in some of the p r o v i s i o n s and the r e v i s e d v e r s i o n tends to favour India. This would i n d i c a t e that the problem of water s h a r i n g , far from being r e s o l v e d , i s s t i l l very much a d i s p u t e d i s s u e .  50  III.  THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER FARAKKA  The Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e has a t h i r t y - t h r e e year h i s t o r y h i g h l i g h t e d by over t h i r t y  official  1960.  Farakka  Negotiations  distinct  stages.  to  Indian  the  over  The f i r s t  bilateral can  be  meetings  divided  into  stage began with P a k i s t a n ' s  government  about  the  in  the a l l e g e d c o n s t r u c t i o n of a  f i r s t meeting  of t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s from both c o u n t r i e s .  continued u n t i l the independence third  stage  spanned  c r e a t i o n of Bangladesh and interim  treaty  Bangladesh  in  "equitable  June  The  1960 and  i n December 1971.  s i x years beginning with the  lasted  The  in  of Bangladesh  about  November,  governments.  negotiators  until  1977 fourth  the  between  signing the  stage  of the  Indian  started  and when  from both s i d e s sat down to r e d e f i n e the concept of apportionment"  considerable  criticism  since  the  1977  treaty  aroused  from c e r t a i n q u a r t e r s both i n Bangladesh  and I n d i a .  Current n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka  be included  i n the  first,  Indian  1951, and ended i n 1960 when the path was c l e a r e d f o r  second stage began with the e x p e r t s ' meeting  The  four  protest  massive dam a c r o s s the Ganges, which was r e p o r t e d i n the press  since  fourth  stage  f o r two  issue can a l s o  important  reasons:  the 1977 t r e a t y over Farakka was renewed f o r a p e r i o d of  two years i n November 1982, without any important changes having been made; and revolves  second,  around  the  the  substance  Division  negotiations  problem of e q u i t a b l e s h a r i n g .  stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s a l s o d e a l s with augmentation  of  the  larger  still  The f o u r t h question  of  of the dry season flow of the Ganges. of  the  Farakka  negotiations  i s not merely an  51  attempt at during  maintaining  each  of  chronological  these  stages  A.  THE  with those  is  debatable  shows  that  p r i o r i t i e s which were o f t e n  of the other  in  side.  FIRST STAGE: A BARRAGE ACROSS THE  It  It  n e g o t i a t o r s on e i t h e r s i d e had a  d i f f e r e n t order of p r i o r i t i e s — sharp c o n f l i c t  order.  GANGES?  whether or not the exchange of d i p l o m a t i c  notes and  l e t t e r s between the governments of India and  regarding  India's plans to c o n s t r u c t a barrage across the Ganges  qualify  as  negotiations.  which suggest that the  There are c e r t a i n  1951-60 p e r i o d was  n e g o t i a t i o n s between P a k i s t a n and issue.  First,  "meaningful" succeeding two  the  negotiations  stages.  between  Second, i t was recognised  the  two  stage  there was  T h i r d , i t was  d u r i n g the  c a l l e d the primary stage  that  Farakka  the to be  project  1951-60 p e r i o d that  P a k i s t a n government suggested a r b i t r a t i o n by a reach a s o l u t i o n .  in the  a d i s p u t e which had  could  begin.  of  f o r more  countries  during t h i s period  the a c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the  lower  first  however,  these d i p l o m a t i c exchanges paved the way  governments  to  reasons,  India over the Farakka Barrage  r e s o l v e d before  order  Pakistan  In f a c t , the  third  party  1951-60 p e r i o d can  of the d i s p u t e as P a k i s t a n ,  being  r i p a r i a n , managed to persuade India that there was  the in be the  indeed  a problem. In 1951  the f i r s t  news of  India's  plans  to  construct  a  barrage on the Ganges at Farakka, eleven m i l e s upstream from i t s point  of  entry  through Indian Pakistan  into  press  expressed  East P a k i s t a n , came to Pakistan's  reports. concern  In a note dated October and  notice  19,  p o i n t e d out that i t should  1951 be  52  c o n s u l t e d before any  schemes  interests  into  were  r e p l i e d on May project  put 8,  was  1952  only  a  May  were  1953.  cooperation  adding  that  T h i s was  Farakka  water  a request  t h e r e f o r e the  no  similar  proposed  information  would  have  on  Farakka  cooperative  Barrage.  steps  toward  upstream.  Brahmaputra b a s i n s . up  this  reaches advised  In May  suggestion  by  of these two Pakistan  In  model of those In 1957, delaying  set  India  1954,  tactics,  proposed  in  the P a k i s t a n a joint  the  project  in  Ganges  A  United  Nations  and took  of the upper  February,  up a f l o o d c o n t r o l commission on  1956 the  2  government,  frustrated  arbitration  of  by  India's  the d i s p u t e .  s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s of the P a k i s t a n government were: 1)  the  suggested  government  survey  and  Pakistan  from India on merely  India's reply  set up by I n d i a . the Pakistan  India  control  proposing  rivers.  to  Instead  1955,  to be  Pakistan's  from  forthcoming  flood  of  which, c o u l d not i n f l u e n c e downstream  was  note to  a p r o j e c t which would s u f f e r  1  but  changes  The  the d e s i r a b i l i t y  f u r n i s h e d India with some d e t a i l s of the Ganges-Kobadak but  Barrage  not r e p l i e d to u n t i l  for information  diversion  causing  and  "cooperation  c o n d i t i o n s i n India because i t was of  Ganges  hypothetical."  t h i s was  Ganges-Kobadak i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t ,  incapable  stage  vital  government  P a k i s t a n wrote another  but  the  its  Indian the  In t h i s r e p l y India repeated  reciprocal."  from  that  "purely  cooperation.  Indian government in 1952 22,  out  prejudice The  preliminary  P a k i s t a n government's f e a r s  the  to  operation.  pointing  at  note a l s o suggested  likely  technical  program  should  be  The  53  requested to a s s i s t r i v e r system;  i n the development  2) t h e p r o j e c t s i n b o t h jointly by experts i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ; and  i n the eastern  c o u n t r i e s should be examined from both countries before  3) t h e U.N. S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l s h o u l d be r e q u e s t e d to appoint an engineer to p a r t i c i p a t e i n experts' meetings. 3  The United  Pakistan Nations  negotiations. put  forward  agreed  a  The  was l i m i t e d  for  with  stage  While  urgency,  Indian  finally  agreed  the  to  the Indian  Nations  technical river  proposals reluctantly  information  thereby  officially  notified  to hold b i l a t e r a l  In the  meetings of  Pakistan." of n e g o t i a t i o n s over  notes  a  Farakka,  and  even  limited  reflected  reluctant.  amount  two some India  of  technical  the P a k i s t a n  government  of i t s plans  to a s s i s t  therefore,  between t h e  by P a k i s t a n  only a f t e r  government programme  sent  slow  occurred  system.  of a c t u a l  specific  government  technical  government  exchange  but t h i s  onset  the  a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the f u t u r e .  r e a c t i o n was  informed  eastern  exchange o f  involving  the  the  Indian  of  t o the exchange of d i p l o m a t i c notes  countries.  information  the  of i t s i n t e n t i o n  nature  first  hastened  India rejected  t h e Nehru  parliament  suggestion  matter  Pakistan,  stage  this,  technical  the  Although by  the  with  Indian  in  to a limited  setting line  government's  to request  a  i n the development  United of the  54  B.  THE  SECOND STAGE: NEGOTIATIONS OR  The took  DELAYING TACTICS?  f i r s t meeting of t e c h n i c a l experts  place  from  June 28 to J u l y 3,  t h i s meeting India d i d not supply  1960  any  of  both  at New  countries  Delhi.  i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e d to the  Farakka p r o j e c t ; i t s u p p l i e d only a note on the Teesta a  barrage  to  During  be b u i l t across the Teesta  River  project,  in the north of  West Bengal. The  second meeting of t e c h n i c a l experts  between October "project was  report  provided  experts flows  1 and  3,  for  perusal  The  exchange of The Dhaka  and  of  the  Pakistan  1960  and  data.  between  point were  1963  r e p l y was  December in  that  the  27, both  had  Indians  considered  the Pakistan  1961  and  sides  also  confined  agreeing  to  January  expressed  demanded  8,  the  more data but  irrelevant  by  s i d e requested  forthcoming,  1965  meeting,  by  a r e c o r d of the Ganges' the  to  an  1962 view  a  fourth  6  At  s i n c e most of the  considerably  smooth hindered.  a f i n a l meeting but when no  a reminder was 1965.  Pakistan,  was that  been made i n the exchange of d a t a .  the Indian government in May, August  a  5  o p e r a t i o n of meetings between experts was By  government  a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on  t h i r d meeting of experts was  c o n s i d e r a b l e progress  these  at t h i s meeting that  f o u r t h meeting of t e c h n i c a l experts which took p l a c e at  "successful"  this  i t was  India also provided  between. 1948  Teesta.  and  the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the port of C a l c u t t a "  f o r the  from I n d i a .  1963  took p l a c e at Dhaka  sent by d i p l o m a t i c note to India e v e n t u a l l y r e p l i e d in  meeting  of  experts.  however, c o u l d not take p l a c e before May,  1968  This because  55  war  had  and  broken out between I n d i a and  i t took three years  these c o u n t r i e s to be The  fifth  technical The  two  1965  f o r normal d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between  as  it  turned  out,  final)  meeting  from both c o u n t r i e s took p l a c e i n May,  s i d e s c o u l d not  demanding more  i n September  restored.  (and  experts  Pakistan  reach any  technical  accusing  the Indians  Helmut  Kulz  and  the  the  atmosphere  side  Pakistan  of u n n e c e s s a r i l y d e l a y i n g the  describes  1968.  agreement with the Indian  information  which  of  side  proceedings. pervaded  this  meeting: . . . i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , a f t e r a l l these d e l a y s , that the last meeting showed wide divergence of views between the two d e l e g a t i o n s on almost a l l issues. While the Indian delegation insisted on further meetings to exchange data, the Pakistan delegation maintained that enough data had been exchanged and that the problem r e q u i r e d immediate tackling at the political level to achieve a s o l u t i o n of the problem a c c e p t a b l e to both c o u n t r i e s i f necessary through the mediation of a t h i r d p a r t y . 7  The  five  meetings  of  technical  experts  "upgrading" of the t a l k s over the Farakka issue government. issue  and  reason  "promote"  and  talks as  to the p o l i t i c a l they  could.  the  level  to  8  level,  Most  Indian  the  Indian  observers--both  from P a k i s t a n - - have suggested that the  India's r e l u c t a n c e to d i s c u s s  procrastination. negotiation  long  those  behind  political  by  an  Though the P a k i s t a n governments wanted to f o r c e the  side r e s i s t e d as neutral  represented  was  the  The  Indian  occur  only  direct  result  government after  the  the  issue  of wanted  Farakka  a  at  policy  real the of  meaningful Barrage  was  56  completed and  operational.  T h i s stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s conscious  effort  by  the  Pakistan  Farakka issue at the p o l i t i c a l President Nehru  was  India  were  in  characterized  government  and  Prime  London  for  M i n i s t e r s ' conference in March 1961.  They  discussion  parliament. two  He  some  months  later  s a i d that he had  c o u n t r i e s should  in  the  Jawaharlal  Commonwealth Prime met  to  number of t o p i c s i n c l u d i n g the Farakka p r o j e c t . the  discuss  Nehru  the  a speech to the  Farakka  a  described Indian  suggested to Ayub Khan that  cooperate over  a  government.  Minister  the  by  to d i s c u s s  l e v e l with the Indian  Ayub Khan of Pakistan  of  also  the  project.  He  a l s o t o l d Ayub Khan: Let us do i t i n such a way as to b e n e f i t each and l e t us decide t h i s at m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l .  other...  9  He  f u r t h e r recounted how  they had  meeting of m i n i s t e r s but  that t h i s c o u l d only be  necessary t e c h n i c a l data had to  agreed that there  first  should  fruitful  been gathered.  be a  i f the  Nehru went on  say: I hope that a f t e r the next meeting, which i s going to take p l a c e fairly soon, both p a r t i e s would be in possession of these f a c t s . Then the time w i l l come, if i t i s considered necessary, f o r m i n i s t e r s on both s i d e s to meet and discuss, that i s not to allow matters to be dealt with by o f f i c i a l s who cannot decide t h i n g s . 1 0  Nehru's political  promise  l e v e l was  to  discuss  the  Farakka  taken up by Ayub Khan.  Nehru (dated March 27,  1961)  attaching  a  He  issue  at  sent a l e t t e r  tentative  list  the to of  57  points  for  discussion  h i s t o r y of the case. his  desire  that  at the m i n i s t e r i a l meeting, and  In t h i s l e t t e r , Ayub Khan  "such  Nehru's r e p l y was  a meeting should  somewhat  expressed  the  Pakistan's  s i d e - - would be completed  "enable East that  the  hope  that  tentative the  i n c r e a s i n g the  as  soon  has  been  scope of  a  the  project,  as  without  the  for  this  demands  consideration  by I n d i a . that the  jeopardized  project 1 2  could  made  He  and  that  not  be  taken  (dated May  into  19,  1961)  Pakistan  would  Teesta  rivers  were  a l s o s t a t e d that a m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l Nehru's l e t t e r dated J u l y 6,  expressed doubts as to whether the necessary would be completed by the  was  the  thereby implying  l i v e s of the people of East  way.  To  to  the  i f waters from the Ganges and any  it from  possible  giving  1 1  us  Ayub Khan's r e p l y  meeting would be a p p r o p r i a t e .  a l s o made the  that  proceeding with i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n  without c o n s u l t i n g us,"  in  sense  reservation  and  disturbed  the  f u l l exchange of d a t a - - a l s o  information,  be  be arranged e a r l y . "  in  Ganges-Kobadak p r o j e c t ,  "Pakistan  out  expressed  m i n i s t e r s ' l e v e l meeting to be h e l d soon."  Pakistan  pointed  also  a brief  exchange  f o u r t h meeting of e x p e r t s .  f o l l o w i n g general  of The  1961 data  letter  remarks:  One more matter to which I must a l s o r e f e r , i s the d i s t i n c t i o n you s t i l l seem to make between the rights of the upper and lower r i p a r i a n i n paragraph 7 of your letter, which implies that the lower r i p a r i a n can proceed u n i l a t e r a l l y with p r o j e c t s , while the upper riparian should not be f r e e to do so. I f t h i s was to be so, i t would enable the lower r i p a r i a n to create, unilaterally, h i s t o r i c r i g h t s in i t s favour and go on i n f l a t i n g them at i t s d i s c r e t i o n thereby completely blocking a l l development and uses of the upper riparian. We cannot, o b v i o u s l y accept t h i s point of view, e s p e c i a l l y when t h r e e - f o u r t h s of the length of the Ganges l i e s in Indian t e r r i t o r y , which g i v e s India  58  the p r i o r i t y of i n t e r e s t  It  river.  i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that India  construction  on  were exchanged. Indian  in this  the  Farakka Barrage countries.  against  without  The  had  already  started  Farakka Barrage at the time these  P a k i s t a n had lodged  government  1 3  beginning  previous  protest  a formal p r o t e s t the  letters  with  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n of the  agreement  between  the  was r e j e c t e d by I n d i a i n two  two  separate  notes dated June 20 and 29, 1961. " Understandably, there was no 1  f u r t h e r d i r e c t correspondence between the two l e a d e r s . The Nehru-Ayub meeting of March because  it  concerning dispute 1971. few  was  the  1961  was  very  important  only agreement between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n  the Farakka Barrage, and i t set the p a t t e r n  throughout  the  1960s  until  for  Bangladesh was formed i n  However, s i n c e there was no w r i t t e n agreement,, months  of  disagreement  the  over  understanding its  the  being  reached,  interpretation.  This  within there  is  a was  clearly  i l l u s t r a t e d by the correspondence between the two l e a d e r s . In  an  effort  to  t e c h n i c a l exchanges with government  decided  reach a s o l u t i o n and r e a l i s i n g that the India were going  nowhere, the  to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e the i s s u e .  of a c t i o n was f i r s t made p u b l i c by Pakistan's before  the  press  in  minister  14, 1967 a f t e r he had  Barrage.  The f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s t a t e d that "the Farakka Barrage the  threatened  foreign  course  touring  threatens  region  on December  This  completed 1 5  the  Dhaka  Pakistan  by  the  Farakka  e n t i r e e c o l o g i c a l p a t t e r n of the d e l t a region of  East P a k i s t a n " and that f o r P a k i s t a n ,  "the q u e s t i o n  assumes  an  59  importance  which  transcends  P a k i s t a n would approach "the  purely  economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; "  international  agencies  concerned,  i f her e f f o r t s to solve the problem through n e g o t i a t i o n s d i d not y i e l d any As  r e s u l t s w i t h i n a reasonable part  superpowers  support  1 6  of t h e i r campaign to b r i n g up the Farakka Barrage  i s s u e in the U n i t e d Nations, the  time."  of  the  the  Pakistan  dispute  from the S o v i e t Union.  government  and a p p a r e n t l y  Mr.  Kosygin  became prime m i n i s t e r i n  solution  lines  also publicly  the  played  in  Treaty.  1 8  Hussein,  conciliatory  the  raised  the  leading  foreign  up  question  on the one  India's  the  to  one  it  had  the Indus Waters  of  States  to  Pakistan,  attend  hand, and  the Bank  19  Nothing  i n t e r v i e w with Ben  f e e l i n g that had Ayub not c o u l d probably  and  f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , on the o t h e r .  by the World B a n k . an  India  1 7  Arshad  with the World Bank's p r e s i d e n t  t o l d the Bank that India would be w i l l i n g  In  a  the  U.N.  A number of c o n v e r s a t i o n s were h e l d between the Bank  and Hussein, then  to  minister  while he was. v i s i t i n g the United meetings.  urging  from the World Bank that i t p l a y  role similar  negotiations  However, the  1966,  of the Indus Waters T r e a t y .  r e j e c t e d an o f f e r  a mediatory and  obtained some  despatched a l e t t e r  to I n d i r a Gandhi, who along  informed  f u r t h e r was  Crow, Hussein fallen  Desai,  Desai  apparently  to c o n s i d e r  mediation  heard  of the p r o p o s a l .  a p p a r e n t l y expressed  i n 1969,  have been p u r s u e d .  Morarji  the  Bank's  the  proposal  2 0  India's a c t i o n s during t h i s stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s c e r t a i n l y reflect  typical  upstream  country  economic i n c e n t i v e to cooperate  behaviour  where there i s no  with the downstream country  and  60  the  downstream  country  upstream c o u n t r y . Pakistan time.  holds  To  2 1  redress  f e a s i b l e at the time. impression  Pakistan's construct  a  Barrage.  on  off-take  the  of  on  the  season use.  reports  nor  financially  never  been The  The  reservoir  discussed  proposed  would  in the west  barrage was  started  in s e v e r a l  barrage,  known  have been b u i l t  i n the  Understandably,  India  reacted  strong p r o t e s t .  K.L.  these  Rao,  and  have  southwest  of  East  to s t o r e water f o r dry extended  certain  into  India,  areas  in  of  to make to the Lok  India.  irrigation  and  Sabha about  the  project: If (the p r o j e c t i s ) executed ( i t ) w i l l cause harm to l a r g e t r a c t s of t e r r i t o r y belonging to I n d i a by way of submersion and e r o s i o n , e t c . The Government of India have lodged a strong p r o t e s t with the Government of P a k i s t a n and have urged that no c o n s t r u c t i o n should be undertaken on (the) Padma which may i n j u r e the upstream area of I n d i a . 2 3  This  to t h i s p r o j e c t proposal with a  Indian m i n i s t e r  comments  the  I t s o s t e n s i b l e purpose  a l s o intended would  at  as f a r upstream as the Farakka Barrage.  could  to  although  in East P a k i s t a n , probably  flooded  had  22  Barrage,  have  •power,  was  had  governments.  Ganges  certainly  reservoir  the  s t r a t e g y for a short  planned  the Gorai-Madhumati R i v e r .  The  however,  Ganges downstream of the Farakka  project  to i r r i g a t e huge areas  Pakistan.  the  However, the mere mention of i t seemed to  this  consultants'  as  neither well  v i c i n i t y of Hardinge Bridge,  almost  imbalance,  over  t h r e a t to r e t a l i a t e came in the form of plans  meetings of the two  was  the  power  on Indian p o l i c y makers.  barrage  Work  several  simply  reciprocal  government followed a r e t a l i a t o r y  T h i s s t r a t e g y was  make an  no  61  There was The  height  a s u b t l e irony embedded in Pakistan's  of the Ganges Barrage would depend on how  India agreed to r e l e a s e at Farakka. very  little,  water, and Since  proposal.  then  If India agreed to  release  the Ganges Barrage would have to s t o r e more  t h i s might pose a t h r e a t to West Bengal  no work was  much water  in  India.  done on the p r o j e c t , the whole t h i n g may  been planned by the Pakistan  a u t h o r i t i e s merely as a  2 4  have  bargaining  tool. The  1968-71  p e r i o d during  t h i s stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s  the Farakka Barrage a l s o witnessed an of  talks.  attended  The  last  f i v e meetings h e l d during  by s e c r e t a r i e s ( s e n i o r c i v i l  ministries  servants)  the  In the talks  first  on  the  of the  three meetings Pakistan  relevant  Pakistan the two the  for  countries for  such a framework f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n  governments at the p o l i t i c a l that  the  also  to  s e c u r i n g an adequate q u a n t i t y of water.  wanted to evolve  plea  for  regarding  which purpose adequate data were a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e , and machinery  experts  pressed  framework f o r a settlement  e q u i t a b l e s h a r i n g of Ganges waters between the two  devise  level  t h i s p e r i o d were  from both c o u n t r i e s rather than by t e c h n i c a l  or engineers. substantive  "upgrading" of  over  data  level.  available  2 5  India disagreed  were s t i l l  incomplete  by on and  inadequate. In the  f o u r t h meeting of s e c r e t a r i e s h e l d at Islamabad from  February 24 to March 2, the  1970  the  Pakistan  f i n a l p o s i t i o n taken regarding  pointed  out  the  futility  except  in  the  context  delegation  recorded  a l l the t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s  of f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of  these  and  issues  of agreed a l l o c a t i o n of water from  the  62  Ganges to East The July  Pakistan.  f i f t h and  16  and  21,  last 1970  2 6  s e c r e t a r i e s ' meeting in  New  recommendations on t h i s occasion  Delhi.  was  held  between  Pakistan's  specific  were:  1) that the p o i n t of d e l i v e r y of supply to Pakistan of such quantum of water as may be agreed upon w i l l be at Farakka; 2) that c o n s t i t u t i o n of a body of one representative from each of the two c o u n t r i e s f o r ensuring d e l i v e r y of agreed s u p p l i e s at Farbakka i s acceptable in p r i n c i p l e ; and 3) that a meeting be h e l d in three to s i x months' time at a l e v e l to be agreed upon by the two governments to consider the . q u a n t i t y of water to be s u p p l i e d to Pakistan at Farakka and other unresolved issues r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o and to eastern r i v e r s which have been the subject matter of d i s c u s s i o n in these s e r i e s of talks. 2 7  Agreement on the technical  "point  of  delivery"  argument surrounding  ended,  regeneration;  presumably, agreement that  next meeting should d i s c u s s water s h a r i n g s i g n i f i e d the technical  exchanges.  This  to  There was  almost  that  agreement i n January  titled  over  the  issue,  1971, The  which  I n d i a ' s Farakka Barrage and  East P a k i s t a n ,  and  what  Nehru  a decade p r e v i o u s l y was  another meeting should be h e l d . position  the ensuing  i n the t a l k s .  2 8  Ayub  becoming a  new was  r i g i d i t y of published  of  had  reality. that  Pakistan's  in a pamphlet  i t s Adverse Consequences on  s t r u g g l e for independence by on which the  Pakistan governments took d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposite impasse  and  at India's suggestion,  m a j o r i t y of Bengalees in East Pakistan  an  the  can be c a l l e d the t u r n i n g p o i n t in  the n e g o t i a t i o n s in the sense agreed  end  the  Indian  stands,  the and  created  With the independence of Bangladesh  63  in December 1971, nascent  the  Bangladesh government.  Any over  the onus of n e g o t i a t i n g with India f e l l on  d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t e d to t h i s stage  Farakka would be incomplete  of  the  negotiations  i f no mention were made of  the  attempted i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Pugwash movement i n t o the d i s p u t e . During in  the Addis Abbaba conference  January  1966,  the  members  development problems in India and resolved  that  some  P a k i s t a n , should which  they  Pakistan.  The  outside  of  to  the  University,  that  Center  offered  to  for  there  was  a  need  rivers.  Revelle  was  group  India  and  nations  on  P r o f e s s o r Roger  the  Studies  It  Pakistan.  3 0  of  the  Ganges  of  particularly  well  qualified  The  Pugwash  initiative  for  the  task  I n d i a expressed  of  the  Pugwash  team.  Pakistan  enthusiasm, but met  No  and  with a refused  Indira stumbling to  explanation for t h i s r e f u s a l  o f f e r e d by the Indian government.  in  seemed to make some  block when the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e with  and  2 9  headway i n i t i a l l y when both Ayub Khan Gandhi  was  to look i n some d e t a i l at the  because he had d i r e c t e d a l a r g e s c a l e d e s a l i n a t i o n programme West  at  s e r v i c e s of h i s  f o r such a study.  n a t u r a l resource development of the basins Brahmaputra  both  Population  provide  to w r i t e a prospectus  Pugwash  both  might work on a c o o p e r a t i v e b a s i s .  research s t a f f agreed  among other t h i n g s ,  organisation,  of  held  discussed  i d e n t i f y problems common  Revelle, director Harvard  of the Pugwash movement  However, the  team  did  meet was meet  with Ayub Khan. Since p r e l i m i n a r y s t u d i e s of c o o p e r a t i v e development of  the  64  Ganges  basin  had  already  been completed, the group continued  with a study of the Pakistan p o r t i o n of the b a s i n , with from the World Bank and other study  emerged  a concept  p r o p o s a l to use a water  storage  the  groundwater recharge heavy  pumping  system  Ganges  as a  would  for  basin  and  solution.  lower  increasing  the  During  the  measures would increase the rate  of  percolation  flood  to  recharge  reservoirs. that  could  be  used  By t h i s means, the  nearly  thirty  Harvard  c e r t a i n people  some m e r i t . government  3 2  was  almost  government  the  reasons  l y i n g behind  probable  reason  completed was  the  water  that  the  underground estimated  for  both  dispute.  was  and,  at  conceived.  forwarded  of  by  massive  the  late  foreign  stage,  Indian  the dubious  the f a c t that the Farakka this  There  b e l i e v e d that i t had  f o r i t s r e j e c t i o n was  offers  not i n t e r e s t e d  been so c a r e f u l l y  Barrage  i n I n d i a , however, who of  so  various  r e j e c t e d by the Indian government.  as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  motives i t saw Another  One  season,  provide  Such a p r o p o s a l , t h e r e f o r e , undermined  the b a s i s of the e n t i r e Farakka  were  season,  general flow of the  Ganges R i v e r c o u l d be s t o r e d , p r o v i d i n g enough  T h i s proposal was  dry  researchers  per cent of the annual  India and East P a k i s t a n .  induced  groundwater t a b l e and In the wet  31  underground  suggesting  water f o r i r r i g a t i o n and other uses.  waters  From t h i s  known as the "Ganges water machine,"  massive  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l agencies.  funding  the  aid. Barrage Indian  i n abandoning a p r o j e c t which had  65  C.  INDIAN OBSTINACY OR  PAKISTANI WEAKNESS?  Twenty years of n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka issue no  real  progress  diplomatic experts' 1971  saw  During  notes level  toward  and and  ten  a  solution.  meetings  five  (five  at  its  way  an  "Indian"  Therefore,  India's terms. no  any  "talks."  Even  inclination  to  to press  Minister  negotiate  with  said  this  stage  on the t o p i c .  have f e l t reached,  was  not  interpretation,  but  to  Nehru,  next  j u b i l a t i o n the  was  few  on  Pakistan  who  requests  had  shown  government,  the  1961  as some was  parts  Nehru-Ayub  the only d i s c u s s i o n by p o l i t i c a l  the  be  Its basin includes  negotiations,  Indian  years  Pakistan  Soon a f t e r t h i s  there  formal agreement with the P a k i s t a n the  these  Pakistan  leaders  government understanding  disagreement  as  government  also  c o n s t r u c t i o n on the Farakka Barrage without  During  must  time that "what India does with  short-lived. only  was  Bangladesh.  of  However, any  stand  Ganges  Pakistan  refer  3  agreement in London was  was  the  33  f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s on the Farakka  i s India's b u s i n e s s . " "  of I n d i a , Nepal, T i b e t , and During  with  the  at one  year  as opposed to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  documents  Prime  have  India's r i v e r s  might  the  completion.  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that although  opportunity  to  river  "discussion"  i s s u e , Indian o f f i c i a l  reported  technical  p e r i o d , Indian n e g o t i a t o r s took an o b s t i n a t e  essentially  missed  the  to  that l a r g e l y d e r i v e d from t h e i r a s s e r t i o n that  one.  innumerable  at the s e c r e t a r i e s ' l e v e l ) ,  the Farakka Barrage w e l l on this  After  showed  having  to  its  started  reached  any  government. no  negotiations  took p l a c e  66  between the two  s i d e s as  over many t e r r i t o r i a l between  India  and  restored.  issues.  elapsed  but  them  deteriorated  In September 1965,  and,  before  at f u l l  government brought the  the United Nations. members  between  broke  out  although i t l a s t e d only a  few  normal  war  diplomatic  relations  During t h i s i n t e r v a l , c o n s t r u c t i o n work on  Farakka Barrage continued Pakistan  3 5  Pakistan  days, s e v e r a l years were  relations  no  Pakistan's  pressure  swing.  In September  the  1968,  the  issue to the General Assembly of p o s i t i o n was  was  put  on  supported  India.  by  As a  3 6  most  result,  Pakistan went back to the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e ; only t h i s time, s e c r e t a r i e s of both c o u n t r i e s were  present.  T h i s part of the n e g o t i a t i o n s talks  by one  actual  secretaries respective  in  from  negotiations,  either  political  predecessors.  side  leaders  Despite  only because  agreed  of  some  Pakistan  was  Farakka  would  the general  ecology  the  the  employed  unfortunately, F i r s t , Pakistan  opinions their  no the  of  the  technical  Indian  demands.  Pakistan  Whereas u n t i l  damaging to the economy of East Pakistan  and  from  1968  1960-1971  bargaining  could tried  elicit to  that  a  1962, at  of the area,  India  from  barrage  the  several  had  because  negotiators  n e g o t i a t i n g percentages of t o t a l Ganges' Throughout  the  of  There was  however,  as  t r y i n g to impress upon be  "upgrading"  ladder.  reflected much  an  these c o n s t r a i n t s , some t e c h n i c a l p o i n t s  were r e s o l v e d but to  represents  more notch i n the d i p l o m a t i c  progress  the  onwards  they  flow.  p e r i o d , the P a k i s t a n techniques,  any  elicit  were  none  major concessions cooperation  government of  which,  from I n d i a .  from  India  by  67  emphasising country  the  legal  rights  of  co-riparians  undertook a p r o j e c t l i k e l y  interests Pakistan Soviet  of  the other.  tried and  to  be  prejudicial  one  to  the  Second, when t h i s t a c t i c got nowhere,  to put p o l i t i c a l pressure  American  whenever  leaders.  on India by t a l k i n g  Third,  3 7  keeping the option of  b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s open, the P a k i s t a n government brought the  issue  in  the  General  Assembly  Fourth, hoping to put d i r e c t pressure the  question  irrigating  of  building  large  Pakistan,  parts  would  also  a  of  western  have  of  the United  Barrage and  raised  which,  besides  southwestern  underground  up  Nations.  on I n d i a , P a k i s t a n  Ganges  to  East  r e s e r v o i r s that c o u l d  f l o o d p a r t s of West Bengal i n I n d i a . Why their  c o u l d Pakistan not way  on  explanations. its  the One  eastern  prevent  Farakka  issue?  and  The  completing  the Farakka p r o j e c t , was  their  There  other p o s s i b i l i t y  manifesto,  to become a f a i t a c c o m p l i . Barrage had  having  two  care  logical  enough  about  seems to be that I n d i a , bent on only s t a l l i n g  they  claimed  neglect of e a r l i e r governments has allowed 3  9  f o r time.  that the  cause.  "the Farakka  become a f a i t accompli,  i t i s very  The In  criminal Barrage  While i t i s c e r t a i n l y true that  that the P a k i s t a n government had allowed nothing  are  tended to give credence to the f i r s t  election  Farakka  from  t h e r e f o r e d i d not advocate i t s p o s i t i o n  strongly.  38  Indians  i s that P a k i s t a n d i d not  wing  Awami L e a g u e  the-  the  doubtful  t h i s to happen by  doing  about i t .  The deliberate  second policy  possible of  explanation,  procrastination  that  there  was  a  pursued by I n d i a , seems  68  c l o s e r to the t r u t h . Indian Indian  answers  The  to  constant  Pakistan's  statements and  procedure  had  establish a  without  openly  the evasive nature  the beginning  f a i t accompli  repudiating  dispute  a  technically  in  of a l l replies  the view that India's a t t i t u d e  the  been c a l c u l a t e d to gain  with  its  Farakka  p r i n c i p l e of  India's r e f u s a l to meet with the team devised  i n c r e a s i n g delay  the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n some of i t s  -from  time and  ever  notes,  to P a k i s t a n , a l l s t r o n g l y support and  and  sound way  from  project  "cooperation.""  Harvard  which  had  to undermine the b a s i s of  i s a l s o i l l u s t r a t i v e of the Indian  government's  0  the  actual  intentions. D.  THE  THIRD STAGE: SOLUTION ON  This months of ended  stage 1972,  with  of  negotiations  signing  Ganges waters, d i f f e r e d First,  were p e a c e f u l and chasacterised as a d i r e c t  HORIZON? which  started  soon a f t e r the independence of  the  respects.  THE  of  a  Bangladesh,  earlier  the c o n d i t i o n s surrounding no sense of  the  stages these  of  India's  and  in  several  which  India.  Bangladesh's  the  negotiations  strain  n e g o t i a t i o n s between P a k i s t a n and  result  and  t r e a t y over the sharing of  from the two  there was  in the e a r l y  had  Second,  newly  found  f r i e n d s h i p , n e g o t i a t o r s on both s i d e s were more t o l e r a n t of each other's views and presented needs  of  which was formula  were w i l l i n g  by the other the  other  side.  to at l e a s t examine the  proposals  T h i r d , each, r e c o g n i s i n g the water  s i d e , was  w i l l i n g to c r e a t e a j o i n t  charged with the task of c h a l k i n g out  an  body"  1  appropriate  f o r s h a r i n g Ganges waters between the c o - r i p a r i a n s .  Despite  a  mutual  recognition  of  each  other's  needs,  69  however, i t took India and on  a  water s h a r i n g  Bangladesh almost s i x years  formula.  The  No  42  sooner  had  Treaty  embodying  the t r e a t y been signed  the  launched  editorial  aimed at the s i g n a t o r y governments.  h i s t o r y of the events l e a d i n g up to Treaty the  between Bangladesh and  different  forces  contend with before any Discussions the  Farakka  continued meet  returned January and  1972  power.  On  in  A brief the  B.M.  43  went  early  1972  February,  issued at the end  and  and to  Bangladesh m i n i s t e r s to  New  Indian m i n i s t e r of  Abbas t o l d the press  there.  to  including  M i n i s t e r s came from I n d i a  Abbas Rao,  issues  from  in Bangladesh and  that  Delhi  in  irrigation suspicions and  4 4  prime m i n i s t e r s of the two  January,  1977  reached.  p r e v i o u s l y hampered the n e g o t i a t i o n s between India longer  and  on both s i d e s had  bilateral  started  years.  January 24,  Pakistan were no The  negotiators  project  to t a l k to K.L.  critics  verbal  of  sort of agreement c o u l d be  counterparts  their v i s i t s .  which had  which  f o r the next two  their  signing  a  I n d i a w i l l enable us to understand  about outstanding  Barrage  the  scathing  end  such  than  from both s i d e s of attacks  border  agree  d i s p u t e , however, d i d not  with the s i g n i n g of the November 1977 formula.  to  now  March of  friendly 1972.  of the February meeting  The  countries joint  met  statement  said:  The two Prime M i n i s t e r s emphasized that the geography of the region provided a natural basis of cooperation...They discussed the problem of flood c o n t r o l , Farakka Barrage and other p r o b l e m s . 45  At  the  c o n c l u s i o n of the prime m i n i s t e r s ' meeting i n March the  t r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p , Co-operation  and  Peace was  signed.  This  70  treaty  was  to be v a l i d  for t w e n t y - f i v e  years,  and  specifically  i n c l u d e d agreement t o : make j o i n t s t u d i e s and take j o i n t a c t i o n i n the f i e l d s of f l o o d c o n t r o l , r i v e r basin development, and the development of h y d r o e l e c t r i c power and i r r i g a t i o n . " 6  In  the  discussion  simultaneously was  among  officials  which  took  with the prime m i n i s t e r s ' meetings, the  taken to e s t a b l i s h a J o i n t R i v e r s Commission."  months of the  7  place decision  Within  four  independence of Bangladesh, the c o - r i p a r i a n s t a t e s  agreed to e s t a b l i s h a j o i n t  body:  so that the water resources of the region can be utilised on an e q u i t a b l e b a s i s f o r the mutual b e n e f i t of the peoples of the two c o u n t r i e s . * 8  The  Statute  1972,  of the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission  i n c l u d e d the Article  signed  in  November  following provisions:  4  (i) The Commission s h a l l have the in p a r t i c u l a r :  following  functions  a) to maintain liaison between the p a r t i c i p a t i n g countries in order to ensure the most e f f e c t i v e j o i n t e f f o r t s in maximizing the b e n e f i t s from common river systems to both c o u n t r i e s . . . b) to study f l o o d c o n t r o l and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s so that the water resources of the region can be u t i l i s e d on an e q u i t a b l e b a s i s f o r the mutual b e n e f i t of the peoples of the two c o u n t r i e s . (iii) The Commission shall a l s o perform such other f u n c t i o n s as the governments may, by mutual agreement, d i r e c t i t to do." 9  The  J o i n t R i v e r s Commission was  coopertion  intended  to act as a  i n a l l areas of r i v e r development.  The  forum  for  Statute  laid  71  down that each government should appoint Commission  a  engineers)  and  staff.  to  the  The  provide  adequate  chairmanship  Statute  ruled  Commission's  of  secretarial  the  and  out  public  scrutiny  dispute  i s not  quoted  7 of  the J o i n t  Rivers  but  the  unless  the  mentioned  paragraphs  i n the from  the  above gave the governments freedom to r e f e r the  to the Commission i f they so chose. The  in  meetings  specifically  Commission's terms of reference  topic  of  Article  proceedings:  Farakka  Statute  supporting  Commission was to a l t e r n a t e  A l l meetings shall be c l o s e d Commission d e s i r e s otherwise. The  Rivers  chairman and three members (two of whom should be  between the two governments i n s u c c e s s i v e years. the  Joint  first  meeting of the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission  June 1972, before the S t a t u t e had been s i g n e d .  this  was  indicative  of  the  importance  was  held  I f anything,  attached  to  river  development by both  India and Bangladesh and of t h e i r d e s i r e f o r  mutual c o o p e r a t i o n .  A press note i s s u e d at the end of the f i r s t  meeting s a i d : The Commission considered r i v e r development works i n the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna System i n general and w i l l take i t up i n d e t a i l i n i t s next m e e t i n g . 5 0  It as  i s important  i f the  Indian  Farakka  statements  officials  to note that while on the s u r f a c e i t seemed dispute issued  was on i t s way to being r e s o l v e d ,  after  meetings  with  Bangladesh  avoided any mention of Farakka and r e f e r r e d g e n e r a l l y  72  to  "river  government will  development" wanted  become  in  the  region.  and  that  c o n t r o l , and  tactic  thesis.  power,  after  h i s Bangladesh  mentioned  Indian  c l e a r e r when we a n a l y s e Indo-Bangladesh a c t i o n s i n  In a statement issued by K.L.  Ahmed,  the  to achieve through the adoption of t h i s  Chapter V of t h i s  irrigation  What  Rao,  he  was  in April  complete  i t was  on power, f l o o d  On h i s r e t u r n  Khandakar would  gave  more  Moshtaque Ahmed.  added  1972,  misconceptions about Farakka had been c l e a r e d up. Rao  also  Moshtaque  Bangladesh's  Dhaka,  Rao  agreement  for  that  from  irrigation.  minister  met with Khandakar  counterpart,  there  Indian  details  about  the  He s a i d that sharing  meeting with  of  the  water  be s e t t l e d at the meeting of the two prime m i n i s t e r s , but  that Farakka was no longer a problem. going  The p r o p o r t i o n  of  water  t o each country was yet t o be s e t t l e d , but the doubts and  m i s g i v i n g s of Bangladesh had been It  was  misgivings  not were,  came down t o  made or  public  removed. what  51  Bangladesh's  how they were " c l e a r e d up."  actually  devising  a  formula,  India's p o s i t i o n were d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed.  doubts  and  F o r , when i t  Bangladesh's  and  I f Rao's statement  i s to be accepted at face value, one probable e x p l a n a t i o n can be given  f o r Bangladesh's  willingness  to  d i s c u s s broader r i v e r  problems r a t h e r than Farakka: Bangladesh was hoping t o convince India  of i t s good f a i t h i n s e t t l i n g the Farakka i s s u e and other  outstanding b i l a t e r a l issues  between  these  issues. two  As i t turned out, countries  however,  most  were s e t t l e d when I n d i r a  Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman met i n 1974, but not the  issue  73  of the Farakka In  Barrage.  the meantime, events  Bangladesh and i n other bearing on political  the  i n t e r e s t e d q u a r t e r s which were to have a  outcome  leaders  were t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n India and  of  i n West  this  dispute.  Bengal  began  In  In  the  Rajya  Sabha  (upper  1972,  lobbying the Indian  c e n t r a l government f o r what they saw as t h e i r waters.  August  share  of  Ganges  of  the  Indian  house  p a r l i a m e n t ) , Rao, the m i n i s t e r f o r i r r i g a t i o n and power, made  a  statement c o n f i r m i n g that the l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of Bangladesh would  be kept  i n view, and that no arrangement of the o p e r a t i o n  of the Barrage would a f f e c t that The what  country.  c h i e f m i n i s t e r of West Bengal returned from D e l h i  the  press  with  r e p o r t e d as an "agreement" on the o p e r a t i o n of  the Farakka Barrage.  According  to t h i s  -the feeder c a n a l of the barrage December, 1973;  "agreement":  would be completed by  . - f o r f i v e years a f t e r . that 40,000 cusecs c o u l d be diverted down the Hooghly and, f o r the f o l l o w i n g two years, the d i v e r s i o n s would be v a r i e d e x p e r i m e n t a l l y ; -at the end of seven years there would be a During  1972, the World Bank was m a i n t a i n i n g  r i v e r development schemes i n Bangladesh. a well-known c o n s u l t a n t t o , among other  a  review.  close  52  watch  on  The Bank a l s o employed things:  •evaluate the water supply picture (of the GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna basins) and to examine the possibility of m a i n t a i n i n g or even augmenting the low flows of the r i v e r s . . . (and) t o examine the need and possibilities for international c o o p e r a t i o n between the c o u n t r i e s s i t u a t e d i n the r i v e r b a s i n s . 5 3  74  The  c o n s u l t a n t recommended that c o n s i d e r a t i o n be  establishment  under  United  Nations  Brahmaputra-Meghna  Coordinating  countries—India,  Bangladesh,  auspices,  Committee, Nepal,  Sikkim,  Whatever r o l e the World Bank may have played, intervention again  in  the  dispute.  i n December, 1972.  The  with  given  to the  of  Ganges-  a  five and  member  Bhutan. " 5  i t made no  public  The J o i n t R i v e r s Commission met press  were  informed  that  the  Commission had: decided to c o n s i d e r a framework f o r p r e p a r a t i o n of long term plans f o r the development of major basins common to I n d i a and Bangladesh. The Commission a l s o recommended a programme f o r j o i n t survey of the River Ganges from Farakka up to the Gorai off-take to enable the p l a n n i n g of development works of mutual interest... Two groups have been s e t up f o r the study of c e r t a i n r i v e r s i n Bangladesh and I n d i a , on p o s s i b i l i t i e s of augmenting water d i s c h a r g e s i n these r i v e r s . The Commission a l s o received b a s i c data on works executed or under execution i n the Ganges-Meghna-Brahmaputra r i v e r basin and decided that this should be supplemented further. 5 5  This and  r e l e a s e i n d i c a t e s that the q u e s t i o n of the Farakka its  effects  Commission.  were  However,  56  matter was given a high In  1973,  several  being  discussed  i t i s not  in  clear  the  Joint  Barrage divers  whether or not t h i s  priority. more  meetings  of  the J o i n t  Rivers  Commission were h e l d but l i t t l e was p u b l i s h e d about the s u b j e c t s they  discussed.  In J u l y of the same year, Khandakar Moshtaque  Ahmed l e d a Bangladesh d e l e g a t i o n to New D e l h i . Indian  team  l e d by  external a f f a i r s .  Sardar  Swaran  I t met with  an  Singh, Indian m i n i s t e r of  The Indian team a l s o c o n s i s t e d of  two  other  75  ministers: minister  D.P.  Dhar,  minister  f o r i r r i g a t i o n and  for planning;  power.  of t a l k s over the Farakka Barrage pleasant  realising  friendly bilateral  r e l a t i o n s , the  K.L.  Rao,  T h i s unannounced "upgrading" issue  by  India  s u r p r i s e to the Bangladesh government.  s i d e s were slowly  and  that  even  in  an  57  came  as  a  However, both atmosphere  issue c o u l d prove d i f f i c u l t  of to  resolve. The  meeting r e a f f i r m e d  that a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on  Ganges waters would be taken when the two The  press  release  issued a f t e r  e f f e c t s the Ganges d i v e r s i o n s  sharing  prime m i n i s t e r s  the t a l k s belaboured the might  have  on  of  met.  58  possible  flooding  inside  Bangladesh: The d i s c u s s i o n s d e a l t mainly with the commissioning of the Farakka Feeder Canal and i t s impact on Bangladesh... the Farakka p r o j e c t might increase the flood intensity in Bangladesh by reducing n a t u r a l s p i l l discharges in the B h a g i r a t h i . This point was discussed and the Indian s i d e assured the Bangladesh side that the feeder c a n a l and the Jangipur Barrage will be so operated that the B h a g i r a t h i w i l l continue to r e c e i v e during the monsoon p e r i o d as much water as before, or more i f p o s s i b l e . It was accepted by the government of India that the Farakka Barrage Project will not increase the f l o o d i n t e n s i t y of the Padma i n Bangladesh. There was d i s c u s s i o n about the Farakka Barrage Project and i t s impact on both c o u n t r i e s . It was agreed that the two sides would meet again and continue the d i s c u s s i o n s with a view to a r r i v i n g at a s o l u t i o n to the problem. The two s i d e s f u r t h e r agreed that a mutually acceptable s o l u t i o n w i l l be a r r i v e d at before o p e r a t i n g the b a r r a g e . 5 9  This l a s t  sentence, though i t provided  was  first  the  government that  definite  and  i t would not a c t  public  no b a s i s f o r a  solution,  commitment by the  unilaterally.  Indian  76  The  e a r l y months of  pressing  issues  a l s o r e l a t i n g to the  was  Bangladesh's and  also  subcontinent.  attempt  to  acceptance  Republic of China was against  were  taken  up  by  get  at  The  most prominent  recognition  the  Islamic  entry  i n the United  in  Summit.  successfully wielding  Bangladesh's  the  the The  threat  Nations.  alliance  with  which  t r i a l s of  195  prisoners  to  of the  Indian February  prevent 1971  war  Indo-Pakistan W a r .  foreign minister  1974  at  the  Swaran  invitation  m i n i s t e r , Dr.  Kamal Hossein.  at the end  their  of  crime  There was  meeting.  Farakka Barrage i s given  The  United People's of  veto  Pakistan high-level  60  Singh of  issue  Presumably,  mainland China's p o s i t i o n r e f l e c t e d an wanted  other  mainly concerning the government of Bangladesh  but  Nations  1974  came  the  to  Dhaka  in  Bangladesh f o r e i g n  a long  portion  joint  communique  relevant  to  the  below:  Both sides a v a i l e d of the o p p o r t u n i t y to d i s c u s s the use of the water resources of the two countries for the common b e n e f i t of the peoples of Bangladesh and India. They agreed that to meet this objective the Joint Rivers Commission should c o n t i n u e , as a matter of p r i o r i t y , i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the development of the water resources of the r e g i o n . The two Foreign Ministers also discussed the question of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the waters of the Ganges between India and Bangladesh and the need f o r an e a r l y d e c i s i o n on the matter. They were c o n f i d e n t that t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s s u b j e c t had advanced t h e i r common approach f o r an e a r l y s o l u t i o n to t h i s issue. Both the Foreign Ministers agreed that a mutually a c c e p t a b l e s o l u t i o n will be a r r i v e d at before operating the Farakka Barrage P r o j e c t . 6 1  Whether doubtful.  this The  could  be  called  progress  agreement that a "mutually  toward a s o l u t i o n i s acceptable"  solution  77  must  precede  operation  of  the Barrage had  almost i d e n t i c a l wording, in Swaran Singh's with  Khandakar  meeting of the progress.  Moshtaque Ahmed. two  There  foreign was  an  first earlier  That i t was  ministers  can  indication,  hardly  however,  Rivers  Farakka  in i t s d i s c u s s i o n s .  priority  discussion  r e i t e r a t e d at  communique, that the J o i n t question  emerged with  Commission  be  called  in t h i s  was  that a formula  Farakka Barrage was In  March  guesses  1974,  and  f o r t h i s t r a n s f e r and we  as to the probable  Flood  ones.  acreage,  create  a  Americans and  A below average  make  educated  rice  harvest  of  on  its  was  known  to  be  t r a n s f e r was  favoured  by  both  Commerce and F o r e i g n Trade to a t t r a c t  feet.  in  The  thus put  other probable  The  new  the  to head outside country  e x p l a n a t i o n f o r Ahmed's  more s i n i s t e r and had a d i r e c t  toward the Farakka Barrage.  the  to  Khandakar  the Arabs, would be the a p p r o p r i a t e person  Ministry  was  entire  r a t e a l l helped  in f o r e i g n exchange r e s e r v e s .  c a p i t a l to redress t h i s imbalance and back  only  an unprecedented i n c r e a s e i n the r a t e of  huge d e f i c i t  Moshtaque Ahmed, who  the  economy of Bangladesh  p o p u l a t i o n growth and a s t a g g e r i n g i n f l a t i o n  the  to  There are a number of  can  The  Control  1973-74 season as a r e s u l t of massive f l o o d i n g of the  rice-growing  the  Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed was t r a n s f e r r e d  t a k i n g a t u r n f o r the worse. the  a  operational.  of Foreign Trade in Bangladesh.  explanations  was  would be worked out before  from the M i n i s t r y of Water, Power, Ministry  the  t h i s point  in the d i s p u t e , the only p o s i t i v e s i g n toward a s o l u t i o n mutual reassurance  joint  giving  Till  the  b e a r i n g on h i s views  correspondent  of  the  Hindu  78  could the  not  resist  irrigation  ministries  simultaneously. deep, in a  l i n k i n g K.L.  K.L.  stance  Moshtaque had question."  of  Rao,  based  India  on  old  also  noted  giving  Dhaka  to  adopted. proved  62  a As  to  new  approach  be  too  to be  transfer  of  important  ministers  to  And  Khandakar  that rise  the to  transfer  of  speculation  in  the Farakka question  to  the  other  vital  might  Farakka  tough p r o p o s i t i o n at prime  sharing  be  issue  i n t e r e s t s of both  portfolios.  a r e a l i s a t i o n by n e g o t i a t o r s  both s i d e s that agreement on  two  himself  r e s o l v e d by mere "upgrading" of t a l k s or by  s u r e l y , there was  The  known to d i g  l a t e r events were to i n d i c a t e , the  countries  very  almost  a h a r d - l i n e r on the Farakka  Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed was that  Bangladesh  arguments."  of being  reporter  Ahmed's removal from  and  he wrote, "was  a "reputation The  Rao's and  Gradually and  the but  leaders  on  of Ganges waters would be a  best.  ministers  finally  met  in May  1974  i n the  immediate wake of the Simla T r i p a r t i t e Conference between I n d i a , Pakistan,  and  Bangladesh.  A l o t of outstanding  were s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s o l v e d . was 16,  6 3  The  the Farakka Barrage i s s u e . 1974  exception In the  to  bilateral these  issues  successes  j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n of  they agreed that there would not  be  enough  water  meet the needs of both c o u n t r i e s : The two Prime M i n i s t e r s took note of the f a c t that the Farakka Barrage P r o j e c t would be commissioned before the end of 1974. They recognised that during the period of minimum flow, there might not be enough water to meet the needs of C a l c u t t a Port and the full requirements of Bangladesh and, t h e r e f o r e , the f a i r weather flow of the Ganga i n the lean months would have to be augmented to meet the requirements of both countries. I t was agreed that the problem should be  May to  79  approached with understanding so that the i n t e r e s t s of both c o u n t r i e s are r e c o n c i l e d and the d i f f i c u l t i e s removed i n a s p i r i t of f r i e n d s h i p and c o o p e r a t i o n . I t was a c c o r d i n g l y decided that the best means of such augmentation through optimum u t i l i s a t i o n of the water resources of the region a v a i l a b l e to the two c o u n t r i e s should be s t u d i e d by the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission. The Commission should make s u i t a b l e recommendations to meet the requirements of both the c o u n t r i e s . It was recognised that i t would take some years to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission as accepted by the two Governments. In the meantime, the two s i d e s expressed t h e i r determination that before the Farakka P r o j e c t i s commissioned they would a r r i v e at a mutually a c c e p t a b l e a l l o c a t i o n of the water a v a i l a b l e during the p e r i o d of minimum flow in the Ganga. * 6  The  importance of the prime m i n i s t e r s ' meeting l i e s  f a c t that i t gave the  Joint  discuss  of the flow of the Ganges.  no  augmentation  Rivers  Commission  forum or method of n e g o t i a t i o n was  of  the  more  urgent  l a i d down  q u e s t i o n of how  a  mandate  for  settlement  to share the e x i s t i n g  N e g o t i a t i o n s on t h i s s h a r i n g  took  1975  Serneabat,  in  February  Bangladesh prime  brother-in-law  and  the  Power, and J a g j i v a n Ram, Agriculture  and  They met  again  w i t h i n two  reached.  Under  66  Mujibur  dry  finally  D e l h i , between Abdur Sheikh  Rab  Rahman's  Bangladesh M i n i s t e r f o r Water and  I n d i a ' s newly  appointed  Minister  However, they made l i t t l e  for  progress  6 5  in A p r i l  s i d e s . and,  minister  new  Irrigation.  in t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s .  i n New  to  Unfortunately  season flow of the r i v e r . place  i n the  this  1975.  days, an  There was  optimism  i n t e r i m "understanding"  agreement,  India  could  on  had been  divert  q u a n t i t i e s of water f o r f o r t y days beginning the 20th of  both  small April.  80  India  would  receive  a f r a c t i o n of the water i t had o r i g i n a l l y  demanded but the agreement c o n s t i t u t e d  an  important  precedent  inasmuch as Bangladesh conceded that India c o u l d begin of  the  Barrage.  agreement.  However, too much should  not be made of t h i s  The understanding s e t t l e d n e i t h e r of the outstanding  p r i n c i p a l questions and  operation  augmentation  of the c o n f l i c t : d i s c u s s i o n s on both were  to  continue.  The  sharing  government-owned  Bangladesh Observer noted: The agreement will not d i s t u r b the d i s c u s s i o n s regarding the a l l o c a t i o n of f a i r weather flows of the Ganges during the lean months as envisaged i n the Prime M i n i s t e r s ' d e c l a r a t i o n of May 1 974. 67  The  agreement was only  operation  of  an  interim  one  the Farakka Barrage.  allowing  J o i n t teams were to observe  the e f f e c t s of the d i v e r s i o n s a t Farakka, on the and  experimental  Hooghly  River  i n s i d e Bangladesh. Though t h i s understanding c o n s t i t u t e d a step forward,  were  criticisms  on  both  s i d e s of the border.  The absence of  Serneabat, the Bangladesh m i n i s t e r , from the o f f i c i a l the  Farakka  Barrage  Bangladesh's quoted  as  misgivings. describing  "driblets...in Nevertheless, canal  was  interpreted  as  an  there  opening of  expression  of  Moreover, a West Bengal m i n i s t e r was India's  quantities  that  share do  not  of serve  the  water  our p u r p o s e . "  water s t a r t e d f l o w i n g down the newly b u i l t  i n t o the B h a g i r a t h i and j o i n t o b s e r v a t i o n  observe the e f f e c t s of these d i v e r s i o n s .  as 68  feeder  teams s e t out to  81  E.  THE  QUESTION OF AUGMENTATION  While  the  two  ministers  a l l o c a t i o n of the e x i s t i n g discussing  methods  Commission met standstill  of  were  negotiating  increasing  that  December.  The  flow.  on the  two  teams  "the  Joint  agreed  conclusions  6 9  should be augmented by the c o n s t r u c t i o n of storage  water  becomes  concept, a r g u i n g Brahmaputra  Chapter  7 0  year  the  The  two  15,  1975,  Ganges  o«f  Mujib  was  diverting  Farakka and  1976.  are  Mujib was  a  opposed  more  discussed  killed  this  "realistic" in  detail  in a coup d ' e t a t .  i n Bangladesh.  I t was  i n Bangladesh to take over the r e i n s eliminated.  Amidst  i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of the the new  reasons  team  in  The  Mujib's r u l e had a l i e n a t e d the Awami League from  for the m i l i t a r y  on  was  proposals  the m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n  once  Indian  year  IV.  On August last  The  in the  that a c a n a l to t r a n s f e r s u r p l u s water from the  into  alternative.  scarce.  Ganges  r e s e r v o i r s on  r i v e r ' s Himalayan t r i b u t a r i e s f o r r e l e a s e l a t e r  when  two  Rivers  Bangladesh proposed that the dry season flow of the  the  the  were advocating  c o u l d not, t h e r e f o r e , come to any  subject."  Although  was  i t s d i s c u s s i o n s came to a  d i f f e r e n t methods of augmenting the flow and Commission  interim  flow, the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission  monthly from June 1974,  by  an  Ganges  continued  undetermined,  water  all  this  born country,  at  the  rate  did  of  chaos  power i n the  the Indians  went  of 40,000 cusecs at  to do so f o r the remainder of Bangladesh  q u i t e easy  1975.  71  For  not p r o t e s t u n t i l e a r l y  82  Just before the outbreak of  renewed,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the two s i d e s met  vociferous  i n New  issue.  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Bangladesh's new  Gandhi,  the  officials  Indian  but  at  foreign the  end  u n i n f o r m a t i v e statement was Bangladesh  protest  note  secretary of  the  released. started  7 2  a  D e l h i to d i s c u s s the p r e s i d e n t met  and  visit  other  Mrs.  relevant  only a s t r a i n e d  On January year  dispute,  15,  of p u b l i c  1976  of  73  "surprised  The Indian government responded saying that and pained" at such propaganda,  i t had been agreed at the p r e v i o u s s i d e s would  refrain  from " h o s t i l e  month's  it  particularly meeting  that  7  February and March, the Bangladesh government p r o t e s t e d  withdrawals  the maximum  mark  Indian  to the new  allowed  border. regime  Ganges'  flow  During  imminent,  of Ganges waters were c o n t i n u i n g at or near by  Simultaneously Bangladesh was the  both  propaganda." "  t h i s time, with the low dry season  Indian  was  because  f r e q u e n t l y , i n s e v e r a l forums and by a v a r i e t y of media. all  the  the forty-day understanding c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of the  agreement.  In  a  dispute.  Bangladesh a l l e g e d that Indian withdrawals at Farakka a f t e r end  and  the  Farakka  suffering  Barrage  Project.  from armed a t t a c k s along  Awami Leaguers and other- elements,  opposed  in Bangladesh, were making i n t e r m i t t e n t  i n t o the c o u n t r y .  raids  7 5  Before n e g o t i a t i o n on the Farakka i s s u e c o u l d resume, there were  some  p r e c o n d i t i o n s set by both India and Bangladesh  had to be met. could  start  Bangladesh's only  position  was  that  which  negotiations  when the Indian withdrawals s t o p p e d .  76  India  wanted to meet only i f the t a l k s were c o n f i n e d to the s h a r i n g of  83  water during made  some  dispute.  the p e r i o d March 15 to May 1 5 . positive  suggestions,  Bangladesh  commissions  proposed  even  the  Both  7 7  at  the  creation  for  height  of  talks,  India  announced  a  also of the  international  f o r the Ganges and Brahmaputra r i v e r s  the end of March, a f t e r Bangladesh had r e l a x e d  sides  and, toward  7 8  its  precondition  concession.  Mrs.  Gandhi  r e p o r t e d l y t o l d the Bangladesh High Commissioner i n New D e l h i : India i s t a k i n g steps to keep up the downstream at the March 15th l e v e l during the r e s t of the season to the extent p o s s i b l e on the b a s i s of availability of waters. I t i s now Bangladesh's to chose i t s response i n a h e l p f u l manner t o pave way f o r r e s t o r a t i o n of mutual c o n f i d e n c e .  flow lean the turn the  7 9  At  the  same  time  I n d i a had made — effects  of  Mrs.  Gandhi t o l d Bangladesh that the o f f e r  f o r the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission to  withdrawals  on  Bangladesh  Bangladesh accepted  the o f f e r and t a l k s  month  These  in  topic.  Dhaka.  They  were  were  --  study  remained  resumed  the  the  open.  following  t e c h n i c a l t a l k s on a r e s t r i c t e d  reminiscent  of  the  1960-1971  period  of  n e g o t i a t i o n s between India and P a k i s t a n .  India again  its  any agreement c o u l d be  former  negotiated, The  p o s i t i o n , saying that before  t e c h n i c a l problems had t o be s o r t e d  t a l k s occurred  subcontinental the t a l k s shooting rounds  were  of  Bangladesh, Neither  announced, on  discussions, up  i n a p e r i o d when r e l a t i o n s  neighbours were at a low ebb.  incidents  the  out.  India  had  the b o r d e r . and  Hooghly  side issued d e t a i l s  8 1  protested  between  the  before  against  two  The o f f i c i a l s met f o r two through  River  the  what  8 0  A few days  travelled  of  reasserted  to  they  southwestern  Farakka Barrage.  had  achieved,  but  84  within  a  few  days of the r e t u r n of the Bangladesh team, B.M.  Abbas was quoted as saying that Indian f i g u r e s  f o r withdrawals  from the Ganges d i d not t a l l y with Bangladesh's  measurements.  In  April  1976,  the  first  Indian withdrawals at Farakka was Bangladesh. of  to  against  emerge  within  political  importance  leader  c a l l e d upon the g e n e r a l  i n Bangladesh to o r g a n i s e a p r o t e s t march to condemn  Indian  action  Farakka. the  beginning  protest  Maulana Abdul Hameed Khan Bhasani, a peasant  considerable  public  consolidated  unilateral  withdrawal  of  talks.  Ganges waters at  Estimates  of  the  size  of  the march range  of thousands to h a l f a m i l l i o n p e o p l e .  peaceful  with  Maulana  Bhasani  at  the  head.  8 4  unpleasant  Farakka  incidents.  The  8 5  importance  of  now  rallied  this  were march  country  made  it a  was  with the Bangladesh government.  Indian f e e l i n g c o u l d be aroused i n Bangladesh that  no  of the  T h i s i n c i d e n t a l s o i n d i c a t e d to the Indian government that  in  was  The p r o c e s s i o n  People i n Bangladesh who had only been aware Barrage  from  The march  stopped s i x m i l e s short of the Indian border and there  symbolic.  the  The t h r e a t was c a r r i e d out ten days a f t e r the end of  8 3  hundreds  of  82  point  to  i f the  publicize  anti-  government the  issue  domestically. Soon a f t e r t h i s i n c i d e n t , I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n s e c r e t a r y , Mehta,  led a  p u b l i c clamour months.  86  At  announced that Nations.  "goodwill" over the  the  m i s s i o n to Dhaka i n mid-June and the dispute  beginning  of  died August,  i t had decided to take i t s  One f i n a l  Jagat  down  f o r almost  however, case  to  two  Bangladesh the U n i t e d  round of t a l k s was h e l d before the i s s u e was  85  raised  in  the  United  Nations.  Rear  Admiral  Bangladesh l e d a d e l e g a t i o n to New D e l h i but reached. on  no  four  different  points:  within  the  Bangladesh  Ganges  difference  of  was  Basin;  Bangladesh's r i g h t to veto upstream  t a l k s regarding  India  favour  of  d i d not accept  withdrawals;  there  was  a  augmentation.  include  Nepal  87  PROCEEDINGS AT THE UNITED NATIONS  the  first  half  position  Nations, two.  had  advocated by Dhaka.  d i s p u t e of t h i s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l support during  of 1976 had not been p a r t i c u l a r l y  only B e i j i n g and Islamabad  nature  wholehearetedly  The f i r s t  could  be  brought  was to i n c l u d e the World  over  successful--  supported  augmentation.  up  in  the  United  i t s o p t i o n s down to  Bank  in  any  further  T h i s o p t i o n was suggested to  Bangladesh government by one of i t s diplomats on the United N a t i o n s .  the  Among the v a r i o u s ways i n which a  the Bangladesh government narrowed  negotiations  to  was  opinion as to the l e n g t h of the dry season; and,  Bangladesh's attempt t o muster  the  agreement  in  India r e j e c t e d o u t r i g h t any proposal which would  F.  Khan of  The disagreement between India and Bangladesh c e n t r e d  augmentation  in  M.H.  secondment  He proposed t h a t :  at an a p p r o p r i a t e stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s (Bangladesh) may agree to d i s c u s s the Indian p r o p o s a l for a link canal between the Brahmaputra and the Ganges provided that India agrees to a World Bank r o l e i n the realisation of a p r o j e c t i n v o l v i n g Ganges-Brahmaputra basin development. 8 8  The second o p t i o n was to b r i n g the whole i s s u e up i n the Nations  General  Assembly.  United  The Bangladesh government chose the  86  l a t t e r course.  In p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h i s ,  first  Bangladesh  then I n d i a p u b l i s h e d pamphlets s e t t i n g out t h e i r In  order to r a i s e t h e i r grievance  diplomats  had  proceedings in the  to n e g o t i a t e of the General  agenda  maneuvered finally,  a  of  into  the a  Assembly;  committee  resolution  through  to  for  the  with be  the  8 9  s u c c e s s f u l l y , Bangladesh the  Assembly: an item had  that committee had  favourable  course  cases.  and  item  preparatory  to be  then  included  had  to  a p p r o p r i a t e concerns; persuaded  to  consideration  be and,  recommend  of  the  a  General  Assembly. In the f i r s t of  the  dispute  India pressed Committee was  procedural  Committee,  India  but the item was  accepted.  than by the P o l i t i c a l  the  in  item was  line  referred  with  to  only  preparatory  representatives  were  able  to  case  which had  India  Political  The  first  skirmishes.  two  India's  their  losses  Rear  Admiral  M.H.  Khan  to the S p e c i a l P o l i t i c a l  p u b l i c proceedings delay  ceased while  intermediaries,  resolution  Again  recoup  f o r e i g n s e c r e t a r y , Jagat Mehta, r e p l i e d .  through  Economic  Special 9 0  stage,  in  the  put  the  which f o l l o w e d .  A f t e r a postponement,  embarrassing  At the next  Bangladesh's w i s h e s .  were  Bangladesh  consideration  Committee. the  stages, however,  backstage war  opposed  f o r the q u e s t i o n to be c o n s i d e r e d by the  rather  defeated;  stage  was been  and  At  that  behind  with  India's  stage,  the  there followed what amounted to an  both p a r t i e s l o b b i e d and  withdrawn and evolved  Committee and  the  scenes.  The  negotiated, Bangladesh  r e p l a c e d by a consensus statement the  assistance  of  an  ad  hoc  87  mediation aligned Syria.  committee, countries: There  9 1  c o n s i s t i n g of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of f i v e nonAlgeria,  i s no doubt  Egypt,  Guyana,  S r i Lanka,  that the consensus  and  r e s o l u t i o n was a  way of saving f a c e . Most of the membership of the General Assembly to express t h e i r concerns f o r Bangladesh's was  quite  another  concern i n t o v o t e s . that  India,  as  matter  when  plight.  i t came  In the backstage war,  were w i l l i n g However, i t  to t r a n s l a t i n g Bangladesh  countries  a l l expressed  their  u n w i l l i n g to take s i d e s i n the Assembly.  One f a c t o r  the major powers were themselves, at home, upper India.  While  sympathies,  the course taken by Bangladesh was i t s assessment  like  realised  one of the champions of the non-aligned cause,  had a l o t of support from a l l over the t h i r d world. aligned  this  non-  they were  influencing  that  many  riparian  of  states  9 2  As an attempt, to m o b i l i z e support, or t o o b t a i n t h i r d p a r t y intervention, successful.  Bangladesh's  action  in  the  Bangladesh d i d achieve p u b l i c i t y  the consensus  U.N.  f o r i t s case,  r e s o l u t i o n which the General Assembly  c o n t a i n one c o n c e s s i o n to Bangladesh's  was not very and  endorsed d i d  objective:  It i s open to e i t h e r p a r t y to report to the General Assembly at i t s t h i r t y - s e c o n d s e s s i o n on the progress achieved i n the settlement of the p r o b l e m . 93  The  next  chapter w i l l analyse the n e g o t i a t i o n s l e a d i n g up  to the f i v e - y e a r agreement reached between India and  Bangladesh  for s h a r i n g the dry season flow of the Ganges i n November 1977.  88  NOTES 1. The Ganges Kobadak P r o j e c t i s a c a n a l i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t drawing water from the Ganges at Bheramara, in Kushtia d i s t r i c t . The p r o j e c t was s t a r t e d under the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme in 1951, and the P a k i s t a n government gave i t s approval i n 1954. The p r o j e c t has been bogged down both by technical difficulties and by the inappropriateness for agriculture. Irrigation only s t a r t e d i n the late 1960s. However, u n l i k e some other p r o j e c t s which seemed to have been h u r r i e d through in order to e s t a b l i s h Pakistan's right to historic usage of the water, the Ganges-Kobadak p r o j e c t was sanctioned p r i o r to the approval of the Farakka Barrage. Its construction was started f i r s t and i t s t a r t e d consuming the Ganges waters before the Farakka d i v e r s i o n . 2. Ben Crow, The P o l i t i c s and Technology of Sharing the Ganges. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Edinburgh U n i v e r s i t y , 1980, p.94; Helmut R. Kulz, "Further Water Disputes between India and Pakistan," in The I n t e r n a t i o n a l and Comparative Law Q u a r t e r l y , Vol. 18, (July 1969): 718-739. 3. Government of Bangladesh. Dispute, September 1976, p.12.  White Paper on the Ganges Water  4. The Indian m i n i s t e r of irrigation and power made the f o l l o w i n g statement to the Indian Lok Sabha: "...Government of India have agreed to a meeting of experts of India and Pakistan for a limited purpose of d i s c u s s i n g p r o c e d u r a l . d e t a i l s and arrangement f o r exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n . " Lok Sabha Debates, August 25 1959, "Indo-Pakistan Gangetic B a s i n , " S2, 3_3, C o l . 4324. 5.  The  Hindu, August 6 1960,  6.  Helmut Kulz, op.  7.  Ibid.  talks  on  the  "Talks on E a s t e r n R i v e r s . "  c i t . , p.722.  8. For neutral perspectives see Ben Crow, op. c i t . ; also Helmut K u l z , op. c i t . For Indian views see Jayanta Kumar Ray, "The Farakka Agreement," in I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , V o l . 17, 1978, pp. 235-246; f o r Pakistan/Bangladesh views see, for example, S.M. Burke, P a k i s t a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y : A H i s t o r i c a l A n a l y s i s (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 197 3), pp.381 -383. With the exception of most of the Indian w r i t e r s , both n e u t r a l observers and w r i t e r s from Pakistan/Bangladesh are of the opinion that while the barrage was being c o n s t r u c t e d , India d e l i b e r a t e l y put o f f meaningful n e g o t i a t i o n s . 9. Lok Sabha Debates, S i t u a t i o n , " 32, 56, C o l s .  August 16 2405-2560.  1961,  "International  89  10.  Ibid.  See a l s o Kulz, op.  c i t . , p.723.  11.  Ibid.  12.  I b i d . , pp.723-724.  13.  I b i d . , p.724.  14.  Dawn, K a r a c h i , December 15 1967.  15.  Ibid.  16.  K u l z , op.  c i t . , p.724.  17. Dawn, K a r a c h i , July suggestions on Farakka."  16  1968,  "India r e j e c t s Kosygin's  18. Only on a very few occasions has India accepted any course other than bilateral n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the settlement of disputes. The U.N. mediated i n the Kashmir d i s p u t e i n 1949 but reached an impasse. The World Bank provided c o n c i l i a t i o n and mediation f o r the Indus d i s p u t e , and some broader d i s p u t e s were s e t t l e d by an a r b i t r a l t r i b u n a l i n 1948. 19. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that the 1977 Treaty with signed a f t e r M o r a r j i Desai became prime m i n i s t e r leader of the Janata c o a l i t i o n which defeated Congress Party at the p o l l s e a r l i e r i n the same 20.  Ben Crow, op.  Bangladesh was of India as the I n d i r a Gandhi's year.  c i t . , p.117.  21. David G. LeMarquand, I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s : The P o l i t i c s of Cooperation, (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1977). p.10. 22. The t e c h n i c a l s t u d i e s were c a r r i e d out by T i b b e t t , Abbot, McCarthy, Scratton of the United States and Associated C o n s u l t a n t s and Engineers of K a r a c h i , P a k i s t a n . 23. Lok Sabha Debates, March 31 1969, " C o n s t r u c t i o n of a barrage a c r o s s River Padma by P a k i s t a n , " S4, 2_6, C o l . 46. 24. Dawn, K a r a c h i , June 11, 15, and 21, 1969, "The t r u t h Ganges waters." 25. Government p. 1 3. 26.  Ibid.  27.  I b i d . , p.14.  of  Bangladesh.  "White Paper..."  about  op. c i t . ,  28. Water I n v e s t i g a t i o n s D i r e c t o r a t e , EPWAPDA, Dhaka. See a l s o Dawn, June 2 1971, "East wing's water needs f o r eastern rivers  90  established," published.  in  which  an  aide-memoire  sent  to  India  is  29. Harvard U n i v e r s i t y . Center for Population Studies, Bangladesh: Land, Water and Power S t u d i e s , F i n a l Report, June 1972, p.1. 30. Revelle had been a s s o c i a t e d with President Kennedy's technological approach to the s o l u t i o n of a l l manner of problems. See E.B. Skolnikoff, Science, Technology, and American F o r e i g n P o l i c y , (Cambridge: Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e of Technology Press, 1967), pp.156-157. 31. Roger R e v e l l e and V. Lakshminarayana, Machine," i n Science, May 9 1975, pp.611-616. 32.  Ben Crow, op.  "The  c i t . , p.121.  33. The Barrage i t s e l f was complete but the 26.4 mile c a n a l was not f i n i s h e d u n t i l December 1973. 34.  Kulz, op.  Ganges  feeder  c i t . , p.724.  35. There were outstanding d i s p u t e s between India and P a k i s t a n in areas of Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch, bordering the Rajasthan Desert. 36. See Appendix D. of the United Nations  f o r Consensus Statement put on the General Assembly.  agenda  37. Dawn, K a r a c h i , July 16 1968, "India r e j e c t s Kosygin's suggestions on Farakka." Pakistan's foreign minister at the time Arshad Hussein had s e v e r a l t a l k s with Roger R e v e l l e and a l s o the p r e s i d e n t of the World Bank regarding a multilateral approach t o Farakka. 38. The Awami League, under the l e a d e r s h i p of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman won 167 out of 169 seats i n the N a t i o n a l Assembly i n Pakistan from East P a k i s t a n i n December 1970. Since the Awami League wanted t o c a p i t a l i z e on the Farakka i s s u e , i t i s u n l i k e l y that t h e i r views would have r e f l e c t e d the a c t u a l s t a t e of affairs. As i t turned out, t h e i r own a t t i t u d e toward I n d i a regarding the Farakka Barrage was as strong as the P a k i s t a n government's had been a f t e r Bangladesh was c r e a t e d . 39. I n d i a . M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Bangladesh Documents, "Awami League M a n i f e s t o , " p.81, undated, New D e l h i . 40.  Kulz, op.  c i t . , pp.734-735.  41. As e a r l y as February 1972, the prime m i n i s t e r s of Bangladesh and India met and decided to c r e a t e the IndoBangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission to look i n t o the problem of sharing the water resources of the r e g i o n . See Appendix A for  91  the Statute of the J o i n t Rivers Commission for a detailed d e s c r i p t i o n of i t s f u n c t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 42. Jayanta Kumar Ray, "The Farakka Agreement," in International Studies, V o l . 17, 1978, pp.235-246. In t h i s a r t i c l e P r o f e s s o r Ray launches a s c a t h i n g a t t a c k on the Janata Government's policy of t r y i n g to b e f r i e n d Bangladesh by s a c r i f i c i n g the needs of C a l c u t t a and West Bengal. Indira Gandhi had always been a g a i n s t the 1977 Agreement. 43. B.M. Abbas was the a l t e r n a t e leader i n the f i r s t f i v e e x p e r t s ' meetings h e l d between India and Pakistan. After the independence of Bangladesh, Abbas became Advisor to the Prime M i n i s t e r on f l o o d c o n t r o l , i r r i g a t i o n , and power, and, i n that capacity was Bangladesh's c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r on the Farakka i s s u e with I n d i a . He was also the f i r s t chairman of the IndoBangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission. 44. The Hindu, January 23 1972, " J o i n t Indo-Bangla steps f o r f l o o d c o n t r o l mooted." Subsequent a r t i c l e s i n January 24 and 29 i ssues. 45. S a t i s h Kumar (ed.) Documents on India's F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1972 , ( D e l h i : Macmillan, 1975). Joint Statement on the talks between the prime m i n i s t e r s on February 8, 1972. 46. Treaty of F r i e n d s h i p , C o - o p e r a t i o n and Peace between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of I n d i a , of March 19 1972, A r t i c l e 6. 47.  S a t i s h Kumar, op. c i t .  48.  Appendix  A.  49.  Appendix  A.  50.  S a t i s h Kumar, op.  c i t . Press note of June 26  1972.  51. Hindustan Times, May 5 1972, "Eastern H o r i z o n s ; " a l s o , Keesinqs Contemporary A r c h i v e s , A p r i l 9-15 1972, p.25822, "IndoBangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission." 52. The Times of I n d i a , August 2 and 15, 1972, not h i t Bangla's i n t e r e s t s : Dr. Rao," and M i n i s t e r happy."  "Farakka will "Bengal Chief  53. M. Maasland, Water Development P o t e n t i a l s of the GangesBrahmaputra- Meghna River B a s i n s , World Bank S p e c i a l Project Department, Washington, August 30 1972, (with r e v i s i o n s February 12 1973), p.1. 54.  Ibid.,  p.20.  55.  S a t i s h Kumar, op.  c i t . Press r e l e a s e of December 13  1972.  92  56. Taking the i s s u e s in order: "Major r i v e r b a s i n s " could apply to the Brahmaputra, to the Ganges, or, s t r e t c h i n g the "major" somewhat, to the Teesta. The scarcity of dry season water i s much l e s s on the Brahmaputra. The l i k e l i h o o d i s that the press r e l e a s e i s p r i m a r i l y referring to the River Ganges. "Development works of mutual i n t e r e s t " in the s t r e t c h of the Ganges r e f e r r e d to could be (1) the Farakka Barrage, (2) the Ganges-Kobadak P r o j e c t , or (3) the proposed Ganges Barrage. 57.  The  58. to  The PMs."  Times of I n d i a , J u l y 13 and Times of I n d i a ,  J u l y 19  14,  1973.  1973. "Farakka d e c i s i o n l e f t  59. S a t i s h Kumar (ed.) Documents of India's Foreign P o l i c y , ( D e l h i : Macmillan, 1 9 7 6 7 ^ Press r e l e a s e of J u l y 18 1973.  1973  60. During the independence s t r u g g l e i n Bangladesh from March 25 to December 16, 1971 the Chinese government had always supported the p o s i t i o n of the c e n t r a l government i n Islamabad. To some people i n Bangladesh t h i s was a cop-rout and others were perplexed because Mao's philosophy is full of revolutionary struggles. In the matter of P a k i s t a n versus Bangladesh, the government in B e i j i n g was always c l e a r . In fact the Chinese recognition of Bangladesh came only after Mujib had been assassinated. A l s o the h o s t i l i t y between China and India i s well known. As long as a s u i t a b l y a n t i - I n d i a n government p r e v a i l s i n Dhaka, token Chinese support can be counted on. 61. F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, February 1974, Vol. XX, "Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t Communique," of February 15 1974. 62. The Hindu, March 23 1974, "Indo-Bangla stand on (by R. Krishna Moorty from Dhaka).  p.34,  Farakka."  63. The May meeting i n 1974 between Mrs. Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman i s reported to have been very s u c c e s s f u l . A number of b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s were r e s o l v e d and new areas of cooperation agreed upon. The f o l l o w i n g i s a complete l i s t of t h i n g s d i s c u s s e d and t h e i r r e s u l t : i ) many small boundary d i s p u t e s were s e t t l e d ; i i ) c l o s e r trade cooperation was agreed upon; i i i ) both c o u n t r i e s pledged to i n c r e a s e exports to meet balanced trade t a r g e t s set at e a r l i e r t a l k s ; iv) establishment of four j o i n t i n d u s t r i e s , t a k i n g raw m a t e r i a l s from one country to labour and machinery in the other, was agreed upon; v) i t was agreed that a j o i n t survey would be c a r r i e d out f o r a r a i l l i n k to connect C a l c u t t a with A g a r t a l a (a d i s t r i c t of India l y i n g to the east of Bangladesh); and v i ) p r o t o c o l s were signed making new Indian c r e d i t s a v a i l a b l e to Bangladesh.  93  64. Foreign A f f a i r s Record, May 1974, "Indo-Bangladesh Joint D e c l a r a t i o n " of May 16 1974, p.55; a l s o , The Hindu, May 17 1974, " I n d i a , Bangladesh sign p o l i t i c a l , economic, p a c t s . " 65. 61 .  Lok  Sabha  Debates, March 24 1975, S5, V o l .  66. The Hindu, A p r i l waters problem."  17 1975,  "Short-term  67. Bangladesh Observer, A p r i l 44,000 cusecs i n lean p e r i o d . "  19 1975,  L, 25, C o l .  solution  to  Ganga  "Bangladesh w i l l get  68. Marcus Franda, "Indo-Bangladesh R e l a t i o n s , " i n American U n i v e r s i t i e s F i e l d s t a f f Reports, South A s i a S e r i e s , V o l . XIX, 16, September 1975, p.10. 69. Government of p. 1 6. 70.  Bangladesh.  "White  Paper..."  op. c i t . ,  I b i d . , pp.14-16.  71. In a statement printed i n The Hindu, February "Ganga waters: India r e f u t e s Bangla c l a i m , " an Indian of external a f f a i r s spokesman wrote: " I t i s no s e c r e t one that the Farakka Barrage has been operating at optimum c a p a c i t y 40,000 cusecs s i n c e June 1975."  19 1976, ministry from any near or  72. The Statement only i n d i c a t e d that the Indian government was alarmed about Bangladesh's treatment of Hindus i n Bangladesh and that Bangladesh had complained of g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s from w i t h i n India. Foreign A f f a i r s Record, December 1975, "Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t Statement" of December 8 1975, pp.319-333. 73. Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , "Bangladesh: the Farakka Dispute."  October  15  1976,  74. Foreign A f f a i r s Record, January 1976, "Official Statement on a n t i - I n d i a n propaganda i n the Bangladesh p r e s s , " January 10 1976, p.1. 75. Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh's c h i e f m a r t i a l law administrator t o l d a Swedish newspaper t h a t : "The Indians have sent s e v e r a l thousand men a c r o s s the border i n the north. They are Bangladesh c i t i z e n s but are equipped and supported by the Indian army." See Crow, op.  c i t . , p.402.  76. Bangladesh Observer, March 15 1976, "Talks meaningless unless India stops withdrawal of Ganges water u n i l a t e r a l l y . " 77. Xinhua News Agency, March 16 1976, t a l k s on Ganges waters r e j e c t e d . "  "Indian  precondition for  94  78. The Hindu, March 19 1976, for t a l k s on Farakka." 79. The Hindu, March 30 1976, with the envoy."  "Bangla r a i s e s extraneous "PM  stresses  issues  Indo-Bangla  amity  80. F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, A p r i l 1976, " O f f i c i a l statement of Indo-Bangladesh t a l k s on Ganga waters." of A p r i l 26 1976. 81.  Ibid.  82. Bangladesh Observer, May 12 1976, t a l l y with a c t u a l o b s e r v a t i o n s . "  "Indian  figures  do  not  83. Bangladesh Observer, A p r i l 19 1976, "Bhasani p l a n s s i l e n t March to Farakka;" see, a l s o , Dawn, A p r i l 20 1976, Bhasani plans p e a c e f u l march on Farakka." 84. Dawn, May 17 1976, border;" see, a l s o , New  " F i v e l a k h people s t a r t trek York Times, May 17 1976.  to  Indian  85. F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, May 1976, " O f f i c i a l Statement of a n t i - I n d i a n propaganda over Farakka;" see, a l s o , Far E a s t e r n Economic Reiview, May 28 1976, "Bhasani's march f o r s u r v i v a l . " 86. Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , "Bangladesh: the Farakka d i s p u t e . "  October  15  1976,  87. F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, September 1976, "Official Statements on a n t i - I n d i a n propaganda on Farakka," of September 4 an 10; see, a l s o Bangladesh Observer, September 12 1976, "Absurd Indian ideas thwart Farakka i s s u e . " 88. Syed Anwarul Karim, I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Ganges Water Issue with S p e c i a l Reference to the U n i t e d Nations on a paper submitted i n June 1976, p.39. 89. Government of -«India. M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , The Farakka Barrage, s e v e r a l e d i t i o n s , undated, New D e l h i (probably first published in late September 1976); Government of Bangladesh. Ministry of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , White Paper on the Ganges Water D i s p u t e , September 1976. 90. U n i t e d Nations Document (Summary Record) A/BUR/31/SR.1, pp.7-10 and 13-14, records t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . 91. F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, November 1976, statement on Farakka i s s u e , " pp. 321-328.  "Foreign S e c r e t a r y ' s  92. T h i s account i s based on i n t e r v i e w s conducted by Ben Crow with Bangladesh diplomats i n New York and with a d e l e g a t e to the Special Political Committee who was present when the item was raised. See Crow op. c i t . , p. 407.  95  93.  See  consensus  statement  i n Appendix  D.  96  IV. The of  the  THE 1977 BREAKTHROUGH AND ITS AFTERMATH  d i s c u s s i o n of the Farakka i s s u e i n the General Assembly United  negotiation  Nations  between  India  formula f o r a quick Bangladesh  who  neither and  that  Although  their  there  of  progress was a c h i e v e d .  of the issue had been this  was achieved  the  process  First,  1  were  government's  c a l l e d , almost e i g h t years a f t e r the f a c t sort  the  Bangladesh  i n some measure.  Second,  issue i n the U.N. of  India  the  fact  i t seems  just  that  government's  More s t a t e s became aware of taken by  the  express  between  India  not be made of Bangladesh's U.N.  the same p e r i o d ,  underwent  several  the  important  Indian  Bangladesh  e f f e c t on the outcome of the Farakka  indicates  However,  strategy  domestic  changes  wishes  T h i r d , the  and  that the Bangladesh move had p a i d some d i v i d e n d s .  during  the  that Bangladesh brought up the  must have embarrassed the l a t t e r c o u n t r y .  should  some  intention,  one year a f t e r the issue was r a i s e d i n the U.N.  much  in  i f internationalization  General Assembly a g a i n s t  f a c t that the t r e a t y was signed  many  b l u f f had been  the Farakka Barrage issue and the r e s p e c t i v e stand disputants.  of  Bangladesh nor o f f e r e d any new  solution.  felt  hastened  too  because  political  scene  which undoubtedly had an  question.  At the end of 1976, Emergency Rule i n India came to an end. In the general  e l e c t i o n s of March 1977,  head  Janata  of  the  coalition  overwhelming m a j o r i t y . political  change should  While the  was  Morarji  voted  into  importance  not be o v e r r a t e d ,  note that w i t h i n nine months of the  2  Janata  Desai  of  at the  power the  by an  domestic  i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to Party's  coming  to  97  power  in  New  Ganges was  Delhi,  a  t r e a t y over s h a r i n g . t h e waters of the  signed between I n d i a and  Bangladesh.  T h i s chapter examines the process by which the 1977 emerged,  discusses  some  Treaty  of the l i m i t a t i o n s of the t r e a t y ,  and  records the progress of d i s c u s s i o n s about i n c r e a s i n g the Ganges' dry  season  flow.  government's i t was  It  "softer"  played  argued  that  stand on Farakka  by no means the  Bangladesh  is  only  or  the  a very c r u c i a l  while  time  on  most  willing  certain  that  to reach agreement was  important  reason.  r o l e i n a r r i v i n g at the terms  the Indian government.  used once i t became  Janata  helped reach agreement,  of the t r e a t y by p u t t i n g the r i g h t amount right  the  the  of  pressure  at  the  The approach Bangladesh Janata  government  that of "maximizing  was  b e n e f i t s and  minimizing c o s t s . " In the 1977 principle Farakka the  dry  The  last  that  Treaty both there  Barrage  was  and  agreed  in  not enough water f l o w i n g through  the  i n the dry season.  season  Both p a r t i e s concluded  of  chapter  the dry season  deals  PRELUDE TO THE  with  but  no  progress  was  headed by V i c e Admiral M.H. and,  problem  of  analyses  GANGES WATERS TREATY  made.  d i f f e r e n c e from previous meetings,  Bangladesh  that  I n d i a on t h i s q u e s t i o n .  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of I n d i a and Bangladesh 1976  the  flow of the Ganges and  the stands taken by Bangladesh and A.  Bangladesh  flow of the Ganges would have to be augmented.  s e c t i o n of t h i s  augmentation  India  on  the  There  however.  Khan who  was  met was  in  December,  one  important  This  meeting  was  then the navy c h i e f of  Indian s i d e J a g j i v a n Ram,  India's  new  98  agriculture minister substantive  issues  important p o l i t i c a l of  many  in  again off  not  these  and  says  two  on the  that  diversion  the  leaders  Reports important  India  of  was i n New  more  meeting ended, the  than Indian  15,000  however, e l a b o r a t e d  the  hopes  This  the  was  meeting  being  broken  discussion  sharing.  One  was  report  "more than h a l f " the  willing cusecs.  3  to  accept  that  dry  India's  A f t e r the New  government announced  ended without agreement.  the  in s i g h t .  before  that  Bangladesh not  raised  because  Delhi  i s s u e of water  Bangladesh was  the  adjourned, resumed, adjourned  indicate  offered  Although  same, the meeting between  for some time yet  then resumed again  season flow but  had  still  delegation.  leaders of both c o u n t r i e s  to be  altogether.  focussed  were  their  Bangladesh that a s o l u t i o n was  unfortunately between  headed  Delhi  the  talks  A Bangladesh government spokesman,  on the deadlock in the  f o l l o w i n g words:  The negotiations were not successful because the Indian s i d e f a i l e d to recognise the urgency of the situation and the serious adverse effects on Bangladesh of the continuous withdrawals of Ganges water at Farakka, e s p e c i a l l y with the onset of the dry season s i n c e November." The  details  Eastern was  of  the  t a l k s , described  a month l a t e r  Economic Review, r e v e a l that the  snubbed  for  Indian  domestic  Bangladesh  political  i n the  delegation  reasons.  scheduled meetings were unceremoniously c a n c e l l e d to the of M.H.  Khan who  was  l e a d i n g the Bangladesh d e l e g a t i o n .  the Bangladesh team l e f t head of I n d i a ' s called  on  policy  Admiral  f o r home, however, J a g j i v a n Ram planning  Khan  to t e l l  division, him  G.  Far  Two  chagrin Before and  the  Parthasarathy,  " o f f the r e c o r d " that  the  99  Indian and  government c o u l d not i n i t i a t e any new move  could  not  consider  any  proposal  presented  on  i t s own,  by Bangladesh  because, "such a move would have s e r i o u s adverse e f f e c t s on the Congress  Party's e l e c t i o n chances, e s p e c i a l l y i n West B e n g a l . "  Cancellation  of  scheduled  meetings  with  the  5  Bangladesh  d e l e g a t i o n may a l s o have been I n d i a ' s way of showing d i s p l e a s u r e with  Bangladesh's move i n the United  if  India  was  telling  internationalization  its  would  Nations.  I t was almost as  subordinate  neighbour  that  not h e l p Banglasdesh's cause i n any  way. Although n e g o t i a t i o n s were broken o f f and of  an immediate settlement  breakdown  of  negotiations  the  possibility  seemed remote, n e i t h e r side used the to  generate  propaganda.  The  Bangladesh government knew f u l l w e l l that to blame the breakdown of  talks  on  the  Indians  l i m i t a t i o n s of the U.N. part,  were  content  would draw domestic a t t e n t i o n to the  resolution.  6  The  Indians  for  their  to keep a low p r o f i l e s i n c e the s t a t u s quo  s u i t e d t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . During the e a r l y months of 1977, P r e s i d e n t Bangladesh and  Iran.  to  gain  paid  support of  M.H.  s t a t e v i s i t s to the People's Republic  During these v i s i t s , international  Farakka i s s u e .  support  from Chinese l e a d e r s Khan's  the  the Bangladesh  president  f o r h i s country's  visit  two  i n January  1977.  7  tried  stand on the  nations  would  commitment, be  able  of  A f t e r the f a i l u r e  to New D e l h i , Z i a v i s i t e d  making any  of  of China  He was s u c c e s s f u l i n e x t r a c t i n g d e c l a r a t i o n s  Shah t a c t f u l l y avoided hoped  Ziaur Rahman  Iran but the  saying to  that  settle  he  their  100  differences.  8  Bangladesh c o u l d  international months of  support  1977.  for  therefore  its  stand  In the words of Ben  muster  only  limited  on Farakka in the e a r l y  Crow:  Bangladesh c o u l d muster the support of only a few friendly nations. Amongst the more powerful, only China was willing to make p u b l i c declarations of support and, since China and I n d i a and not r e s o l v e d the d i f f e r e n c e s which had caused the 1962 war, that support could not be r e a d i l y converted i n t o pressure on the Government of I n d i a . 9  Bangladesh's p o s i t i o n in the n e g o t i a t i o n s propitious  turn  at  this point.  In March 1977,  f a c t i o n of the Congress Party was  defeated  Janata c o a l i t i o n headed by M o r a r j i D e s a i . New  Delhi  was  pledged to a p o l i c y of  a s i m i l a r p o l i c y , any  manifestation  noticeably  in  India's  Mrs.  new  1975.  sought  tangible  11  neighbourliness" were made  on  The  of good-neighbourliness relations  right  both  Ram,  a  dramatic  following  report  Indian  there  from  its  and,  was  occasion  actual negotiations,  its  with  policy  inception.  within  10  weeks  was  Bangladesh Rahman  in  hand,  had  of  "good-  Some concessions of  the  Indian  were resumed once more.  who  m i n i s t e r , headed the was  from  sides  election, negotiations Jagjivan  from  the  a l s o been committed to  Janata government, on the other  results  by  government in  e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Sheikh Mujibur August,  Gandhi's  at the p o l l s The  a  "good-neighbourliness."  Although I n d i r a ' s Congress government had  absent  seemed to take  now  the Janata government's defence  delegation  to Dhaka  in  April.  It  by most accounts but when i t came to was  more drama than  the Far Eastern  agreement.  Economic Review  The  records  101  the events immediately a f t e r the meeting of A p r i l  15,  1977:  In a rare i f not unprecendented outburst of rage India's Babuji J a g j i v a n Ram shouted at pressmen, w a i t i n g at the s t a t e guest house here ( i n Dhaka), "Take i t from me, nothing has been s e t t l e d . . . " And h a l f an hour l a t e r at the a i r p o r t , while Khan and Ram remained behind c l o s e d doors i n the VIP lounge, Jagat Mehta ( I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n s e c r e t a r y ) read out a onesentence statement to newsmen: "An understanding has been reached the d e t a i l s of which are to be worked out at a meeting of the o f f i c i a l s of the two governments to be h e l d i n D e l h i as soon as p o s s i b l e . " 1 2  When Mehta was should  asked to e l a b o r a t e , however, he r e p l i e d that they  not ask him any more q u e s t i o n s i n the " i n t e r e s t of  Bangladesh  friendship."  Indo-  1 3  It seems that some sort of agreement was  reached,  however,  and that India had made a c o n c e s s i o n on the q u a n t i t y of water be  given  Bangladesh  to  in the d r i e s t ten-day p e r i o d of the y e a r .  Although the d e t a i l s of t h i s  "understanding"  authoritatively  they  published,  can  be  have  never  tentatively  been pieced  together from what d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s t o l d the newspapers at  the  t ime. In concede might  January,  the  Indian  had  been w i l l i n g to  in  the  driest  be reduced to 25,000-27,000 cusecs.  One  that the withdrawals at Farakka  c o v e r i n g the A p r i l  round  figure  cusecs,  of  20,500  d r i e s t p e r i o d , was the  delegation  quantity  of  discussions  suggested  1  in  is  the  case,  then  report  that  the  to be withdrawn by India d u r i n g the  the  treaty  signed  November, i t seems probable that t h i s report that  newspaper  agreed upon by both s i d e s . "  specified  periods  the  Indian  was  Since the  this  following  correct.  d e l e g a t i o n had  is  If  conceded  1 02  between 4,500 to 7,000 cusecs, w h i l s t Bangladesh had only  500  to 3,500 c u s e c s .  The  other  Earlier,  made by India India had  May,  Treaty, was  a  five-month  dry  In  p e r i o d of s h a r i n g ,  i s s u e s , however, remained  c a l l e d understanding of A p r i l . was  the  division  The  the  wanted  November  from January to  problem  unresolved  in  most important  five-month  the  so-  issue i n t h i s  of water between the two  throughout the remainder of the term  season.  the  agreed upon.  Certain  category  the  by them as  from mid-March to mid-May, whereas Bangladesh had  a seven-month, November to May, 1977  involves  i n s i s t e d on a lean  season, the p e r i o d of lowest Ganges flow d e f i n e d period  away  1 5  important concession  l e n g t h of the dry p e r i o d .  given  period.  countries The  long-  of augmentation of the Ganges' flow a l s o remained  unresolved. The meetings  question  of  between  India  i n New  help  to  B.M.  Delhi.  plan  the  but  of  the  in  i n t o a deadlock.  was  Ganges.  reached  16  Jagat Mehta of  third-party  The  It  is  at  a later meeting.  meeting between because  Jagat  agreement  Mehta would  technical  quite  to i n c r e a s i n g  deadlock  was  finally  17  One and  have  dry  would  be  B.M.  Abbas  the  season by  s t a t e s that the  prejudiced  views  broken  report  was  The  possible  because of c o n t r a d i c t o r y  agreement i n p r i n c i p l e that both c o u n t r i e s ' p r o p o s a l s studied  subsequent  India r e j e c t e d t h i s p r o p o s a l .  presented by both p a r t i e s with regard flow  raised  Bangladesh proposed  ran  impasse  was  Abbas of Bangladesh and  projects  meeting t h e r e f o r e that  augmentation  first  postponed forthcoming  103  legislative  assembly e l e c t i o n s i n West B e n g a l .  There are r e p o r t s that Bangladesh was promise  from  the  negotiations  Bangladesh  with  government  attacks.  In  June  India had  1977,  from bases i n  over  the  Farakka  in  the  issue  tied  to  meet  in  London  the  across  the  Zia  and  informally.  agreed to "see that no s h e l t e r was from  extract  guerrilla  India.  issue, of  Prime  to  Minister  criminal  elements  period  was  promised  released  acceptable  to  territory.  be  prevent  India had now  and,  second,  the  further g u e r r i l l a  two  the q u a n t i t y  Indian  government  a t t a c k s i n t o Bangladesh  its  own  Farakka,  i n any f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n the  Jagat Mehta and B.M. meeting  decided  to  put  p r o p o s a l regarding the long-term augmentation  Republic of China and Nepal should a l s o be  the  however,  Abbas met  differences  a c c o r d i n g to the o f f i c i a l accounts,  made  Bangladesh, viewing India's c o n c e s s i o n s as a sign of  q u e s t i o n , s u g g e s t i n g that  this  restored  to Bangladesh during the five-month  w i l l i n g n e s s to reach a s o l u t i o n over forward  under  20  c o n c e s s i o n s from Bangladesh's p o i n t of view: f i r s t , to  the  At t h i s meeting Desai  given  in n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka i s s u e .  water  In  guerrilla  From t h i s p o i n t onward, a degree of c o n f i d e n c e was  of  1 9  border, whatever might have taken p l a c e  previous regime."  a  the Commonwealth Conference once again  p r o v i d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r P r e s i d e n t Desai  t r y i n g to  Indian government not to encourage  o p e r a t i o n s i n t o Bangladesh t e r r i t o r y its  1 8  were  less  2 1  i n Dhaka i n August.  between  statement,  included.  People's  the  "narrowed sanguine.  two  During  sides  down."  22  Bangladesh  were, Other was  1 04  apparently  sticking  programmes  were  to  its  not  a  that  f a c t that consensus  had  been reached on a l l aspects of the Farakka i s s u e , there  were  that  the  settlement.  J a g j i v a n Ram  Despite  2 3  Indian  during  the  the  bilateral,  government  visited  Merchant Chamber of Commerce that Bangladesh  for  development for  indications  matter  long-term  but  quadrilateral discussion. not  case  West  was  preparing  Bengal  " i t would not  monsoons and  leave  and  for a  told  the  be  f a i r to f l o o d  i t dry  in the summer  months when i t too needs water." " West Bengal l e a d e r s were  not  convinced  the  2  and  lobbied  the  Central  maximum d i v e r s i o n at Farakka, but was was  government, demanding  to no  apparent  effect.  It  2 5  c l e a r from J a g j i v a n Ram's statement that Desai's government ready to  put  its  policy  of  "good-neighbourliness"  into  operation. Talks when B.M. was  between  India  and  Bangladesh resumed i n September  Abbas l e d a Bangladesh d e l e g a t i o n  to New  It  at , t h i s stage that the Bangladesh government, e n v i s a g i n g  treaty from  i n the India.  f u t u r e , decided  to  extract  that  agreement  rebutted  the  had  been reached.  t h i s statement,  understanding.  26  By  saying  and  that  it  B.M.  was  Abbas,  only  a  said  sharply verbal  mid-month the t a l k s reached a snag because on  f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n s over the  long-term q u e s t i o n  of  benefit  Bangladesh, however,  of Bangladesh's i n s i s t e n c e  India,  maximum  a  E a r l y in September, Prime M i n i s t e r Desai r e f e r r i n g  to the A p r i l meeting between J a g j i v a n Ram  The  Delhi.  including  course would have nothing  reasons behind India's  r e f u s a l are  China  and  Nepal  in  of augmentation.  to do with t h i s  proposal.  l u c i d l y explained  in t h i s  1 05  e d i t o r i a l by G.K.  Reddy i n The  Hindu :  India cannot a f f o r d to l e t Nepal line up with Bangladesh and to look to China f o r i n s p i r a t i o n . . . A n d whatever King B i r e n d r a ' s (of Nepal) f i x a t i o n , India has to d i s p l a y a l l p o s s i b l e p a t i e n c e and imagination in making him r e a l i s e in h i s own way where Nepal's own interests lie in the geopolitics of the subcont i n e n t . 2 7  Toward the end meeting  between  of the month, there were h i n t s that a summit Zia  and  agreement c o u l d be  reached.  had  but  been achieved  of each other's the  summit  basic  was  the  Upon  Indian  forwards  their met,  that the set  B.M.  2 8  As  and  and  remained was  how  during  remaining  however,  for a while visiting  in  would  to  May,  dry  be  already  In the A p r i l  reached  on how  ten-day  understanding,  period;  b)  and  therefore  question two  periods had  of  that  countries the only  30,  t h i s p e r i o d being  the d r i e s t  five been  much water each country would r e c e i v e during to A p r i l  a  c) the p r i n c i p l e  studied  agreement  to  been reached on  the only unresolved  fourteen  final  acceptable  ten-day  season; and be  and  receiving  29  not  backwards  to d i v i d e the water between the  months.  21  agreement  out.,  Z i a was  Dhaka,  f o r the leanest  f o r the time being,  period A p r i l  before  a l i n g e r i n g suspicion  i t turned  v e r b a l agreement had  January  the  an  T a l k s were h e l d up  long-term development should  aside  was  of  Abbas s h u t t l e d  Delhi  would  a) s e t t i n g the d i v i s i o n five-month,  necessary  main d e t a i l s  south of India and  and  New  i n s t r u c t i o n s on what Since  be  r e t u r n , the P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s Committee of  between  Bangladesh.  would  r e a l hurdle  required.  in the  cabinet  The  intentions.  not  because Desai was Egypt.  the  Desai  the  spell.  106  The  five-month dry  period  p e r i o d s and  agreement had  India  Bangladesh  and  ten-day  was  divided  into  fifteen  not yet been reached on how  would  linear  r e c e i v e i n the remaining  distribution  eighths  of the flow or an asymmetric d i v i s i o n .  of  the  Ganges'  presumably flow  given  Bangladesh  f o r the whole of the  p e r i o d of s h a r i n g .  An asymmetric d i v i s i o n , on the  would  an  give  India  India would r e c e i v e an 30  accepted  was  increasing  acceptable  September 30,  period 1977,  Treaty  A  3 0  five-month hand,  flow.  From  an asymmetric d i v i s i o n which meant that  t h i s only when Desai  extended  Waters  an  a  five-  other  i n c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of the  Bangladesh's standpoint,  M.H.  fourteen  f i n a l problem seems to have been on a c h o i c e between  l i n e a r d i v i s i o n would have  an  much water  periods.  The  April  ten-day  of  proportion  alternative. had  sharing.  3 1  In  Surjit  after  the  Bangladesh  early  initialled.  ( t e x t in Appendix B) was and  water  However, Bangladesh  agreed to meet  the agreement was  Khan of Bangladesh  of  signed Singh  on  morning of The  Ganges  on November 5, Barnala,  the  by new  Indian M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e . B.  THE  GANGES WATERS TREATY: ITS LIMITATIONS AND  The  Ganges  Waters  fifteen articles. describes  in  The  detail  for  increasing  part c o n t a i n i n g  the  consists  of  f i r s t part c o n s i s t i n g of  three seven  parts  and  articles  arrangements f o r the s h a r i n g of waters of  the Ganges at Farakka. a r t i c l e s addresses the  Treaty  IMPLICATIONS  The  second  important dry  part  consisting  of  four  i s s u e of long-term arrangements  season flow of the Ganges.  four a r t i c l e s d e a l s with  clarification  The of  final the  107  terms  of  the t r e a t y and a l s o s e t s down a time l i m i t  f o r future  discussions. While the t r e a t y i t s e l f government,  there  i m p l i e d success f o r the  Bangladesh  were some a r t i c l e s w i t h i n the document which  e s p e c i a l l y protected i t s i n t e r e s t s . treaty, for instance,  Article  II  (ii)  of the  states:  ...Provided further that i f d u r i n g a p a r t i c u l a r t e n day p e r i o d , the Ganga flows at Farakka come down t o such a l e v e l that the share of Bangladesh i s lower than 80 per cent of the (agreed s h a r e ) , the r e l e a s e of waters to Bangladesh d u r i n g that ten-day p e r i o d shall not f a l l below 80 per cent of the (agreed s h a r e ) . 3 2  This  was  government  the  "safeguard"  clause  requested by the Bangladesh  (and assured by the Janata government) to ensure that  continued upstream withdrawals would not d i p i n t o whatever of the waters government  was  was  allocated  to  Bangladesh.  The  share  Bangladesh  w e l l aware that the waters reaching the Farakka  Barrage ( i n West Bengal) where d i v i s i o n of the waters would take place would dwindle as i r r i g a t i o n was extended i n clause  India.  This  would guarantee Bangladesh's share d u r i n g the d r i e s t ten  days at the end of A p r i l at 27,-600 cusecs, 80 per cent, that i s , of 34,500 c u s e c s . The empowered  3 3  Indo-Bangladesh  Joint  Rivers  Commission  under A r t i c l e IX of the t r e a t y to produce schemes f o r  augmentation and propose a s o l u t i o n which would and  feasible."  The t r e a t y  first  be  to  both  governments  three years of the t r e a t y ' s d u r a t i o n .  had any doubts  about  "economical  f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d that the JRC would  have t o submit i t s recommendations the  (JRC) was  India's  sincerity,  Article  within  I f Bangladesh XII,  which  108  stated  that  the  "quantum  of  water  Bangladesh at Farakka... s h a l l not  agreed to be  be  reduced,"  released  provided  to  some  measure of assurance. At  first  glance,  the  h i s t o r i c dispute  over the  and  On  Bangladesh.  that  this  1977  t r e a t y seems to have r e s o l v e d  sharing  of Ganges waters between India  c l o s e r s c r u t i n y , however, i t  treaty  only  the e x i s t i n g flow.  solved  the  To r e s o l v e the  becomes  immediate problem of more  complicated  augmentation, the t r e a t y only e s t a b l i s h e d n e g o t i a t i n g and  a deadline  which  the  for d i s c u s s i o n s .  treaty  The  no  way  the most e f f i c i e n t  signalled  By  mutual  population  that  as before  to conclude a l a t e r  for  a  treaty,  during  a  and  Bangladesh while  solution  would  long-range  agreement.  therefore,  In the words of a an  agreement  34  cannot be  i n t e r p r e t e d as an  international river.  ideal It  product of i t s h i s t o r i c a l circumstances, the d i s p u t e s  f o r c e d the two  c o u n t r i e s to  circumstances  d i c t a t e d that n e g o t i a t i o n  on one the dry  aspect  enter  into  of the development of the  season flow.  of  solution,  a pactum de contrabendo or  final  in  because of the r i s i n g needs of  agreement f o r the development of an the  India  on both s i d e s of the border.  lawyer, the t r e a t y was  The  of  procedures  to both s i d e s , i t was  both  desire  recognising  r e q u i r e hard b a r g a i n i n g the  issue  to manage the water resources  s i g n i n g the t r e a t y  their  simultaneously  sharing  would be e f f e c t i v e a l s o i n d i c a t e s that while acceptable  the Ganges.  clear  f i v e - y e a r time l i m i t  t h i s temporary s o l u t i o n was way  an  an  agreement.  should river,  Future t r e a t i e s may  which These  concentrate augmentation  be r e q u i r e d to  is  only of  resolve  109  disputes a r i s i n g C.  from other  NEGOTIATION OVER THE  aspects  of r i v e r i n e  QUESTION OF  development.  AUGMENTATION  Although n e g o t i a t i o n s s t a r t e d immediately a f t e r the of  the  Ganges  Waters  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y and 1979, and  most  Treaty,  little  the  progress  meetings  was  made.  signing  continued During  only  1978  and  of the d i s c u s s i o n s between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of  Bangladesh centred  on  35  procedural  issues.  There  India  were  no  meaningful examinations of the a l t e r n a t i v e augmentation schemes. In  several  Commission  meetings  (JRC)  of  during  the  the  Indo-Bangladesh  1978-1979  period,  Joint  no  Rivers  achievements  were announced. In India.  late  1977,  President  Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh v i s i t e d  During h i s v i s i t i t was  upgraded  to  government.  include By  36  transformed  virtue  of  relevant this  The  political  intertwined. influence  and  decision,  upgrading  of  the  JRC  aspects  of  whatsoever  on  the  the  this JRC's  no  be  from  each  JRC  was  recommending  with  "greater"  by mutual agreement i s an  increasing  I t i s only i r o n i c that  would  the  t e c h n i c a l commission  m i n i s t e r i a l - l e v e l commission made predecessor.  JRC  ministers  i n d i c a t i o n that both governments recognised and  the  from a p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l body with only  powers, to a p o l i t i c a l powers.  the  decided.that  more  that  the  Ganges  technical flow  "upgrading"  were  had  no  efficiency—the  new  progress  than  its  110  D.  THE INDIAN PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTATION In  March  exchanged  what  augmentation important because  can  of  the be  the  governments  called  dry  of the two  of I n d i a and Bangladesh  formal  season  to be f a m i l i a r with the they  schemes  1978,  proposals  flow  of  details  for  the Ganges.  of  these  It i s  proposals  represent not only the r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l  governments  but  the  technical  the  aspects  views  of  these  have remained the cornerstone of each s i d e ' s b a r g a i n i n g  strategy.  The  Indian  proposal  is  entitled  Proposal f o r  Augmentation of the dry season flow of the Ganga.  Henceforth,  t h i s document w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as  the  Indian  Proposal  for  convenience. The  Indian Proposal c o n t a i n s a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of how  the augmentation of the  Ganges'  Indian  involves  plan  basically  flow  can  be  effected.  The  the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a barrage  a c r o s s the Brahmaputra and a c a n a l to take water from that r i v e r to the Ganges at Farakka. construct the  three  Himalayas  Brahmaputra.  At a l a t e r  stage  India  intends  storage r e s e r v o i r s i n the e a s t e r n f o o t h i l l s of to The  supplement whole  the project  dry  season  flow  of  includes  five  separate  s t r u c t u r e s and the estimated cost at 1978 p r i c e s would be six  billion  to  U.S.  dollars.  3 7  f o l l o w i n g arguments to j u s t i f y  The  Proposal  also  the  about  o f f e r s the  the Indian plan f o r augmentation:  1) Shortage i n the Ganges Basin cannot be overcome schemes w i t h i n that b a s i n ;  by  2) a l l f e a s i b l e reservoir sites w i t h i n the Ganges cannot s t o r e enough water f o r the combined needs of India and Bangladesh;  Figure 3  111  3) the needs of Indian drought areas o u t s i d e the Ganges b a s i n must be c o n s i d e r e d , and s i n c e the Ganges i s the nearest source of the water any plan to augment the Ganges flow should a l s o be able to meet the needs of these areas; 4) there i s unused water a v a i l a b l e i n the Brahmaputra and the Meghna r i v e r b a s i n s at times of the year when shortages i n the Ganges are most acute.  The  f o l l o w i n g i s a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the Indian Proposal  and  the f u n c t i o n of each component:  The  Brahmaputra The  Barrage  Indians propose to c o n s t r u c t a barrage  Brahmaputra at Jogighapa,  a c r o s s the River  i n Assam, about 70 m i l e s downstream of  the s t a t e ' s c a p i t a l , Gauhati.  The  be approximately  the s t r u c t u r e would be s i m i l a r to  the  1.5 miles and  one at Farakka.  The purpose of the barrage  r i v e r l e v e l so that water w i l l The  l e n g t h of t h i s barrage  flow by g r a v i t y  would  i s to r a i s e  the  into a canal.  Canal Indian planners p r o j e c t a 200 m i l e - l o n g  transport  the  the Farakka  water  Barrage.  Ganges-Brahmaputra  would  be  estimates, the c a n a l  which  will  to the Ganges at a p o i n t j u s t upstream of The  Indian  canal  Proposal  should  cusecs, and a depth of 30 f e e t . waterway  canal  nearly would  3 8  900  have  a  suggests  that  this  capacity  of 100,000  In t h i s case the width of feet.  occupy  3 9  According  20,000  acres  to of  the  Indian land  in  Bangladesh and about 44,950 a c r e s i n I n d i a . The Dams at Dihang, S u b a n s i r i , and The  River  south from China  Brahmaputra to I n d i a .  is  Tipaimukh called  the Dihang as i t turns  I t f a l l s through  a d i s t a n c e of 7,500  11 2  feet  i n 200 m i l e s .  considerable." fill  The h y d r o e l e c t r i c p o t e n t i a l  The Indian government  0  proposes to b u i l d a rock-  dam at a s i t e 25 miles north of the Assam p l a i n .  will  be  basalt this  foundations. dam  power  The estimated  gross  storage  w i l l be about 26.5 m i l l i o n acre feet  generator  load  factor).  reservoir  However,  alone  the  in the midst  Indian  could  government  store  enough  capacity  (MAF).  The  estimates  north of the Assam dam this  town  120,000  cusecs.  that the second dam  would  by  to be b u i l t  North  be  tributary  T h i s dam  would  at a gorge 40 miles The  reservoir  would be a b l e to s t o r e an estimated  7.5 MAF of  could  of  augment  about  the  25,000  e l e c t r i c i t y would be generated however,  this  of which l i e s the Indian town of Along.  be a 700 f e e t high r o c k - f i l l dam  Brahmaputra  (at 60%  water t o augment the dry  j o i n the Brahmaputra on the p l a i n s of Assam.  water and  live  that  on the River S u b a n s i r i , which i s the f i r s t major  the  of  r e s e r v o i r would f l o o d an area of 137 square miles  The Indian Proposal suggests  behind  jointed  b u i l t at the dam would provide 7,500 MW The  dam  and a h y d r o e l e c t r i c  season flow of the Brahmaputra from 60,000 to  built  The  80 feet high, 1.5 m i l e s long, r e s t i n g on hard,  storage of the r e s e r v o i r would be 17.2 MAF,  to  i s , therefore,  Lakhimpur.  dry  season  flow  cusecs.  About  1,800  by t h i s dam.  When  of MW  the of  operational,  the dam would f l o o d 41 square m i l e s of t e r r i t o r y and a  large v i l l a g e c a l l e d D a p a r i j o i n I n d i a would be f l o o d e d . According to the Indian P r o p o s a l , the t h i r d constructed  at  a  place  dam  would  be  c a l l e d Tipaimukh on the R i v e r Barak.  T h i s would be a much smaller one compared with the other two and  113  would  provide  a  live  storage  of  6  MAF  and  600  MW  of  h y d r o e l e c t r i c power. The  Indian  Proposal  also  Bangladesh d i s t r i c t s of Dhaka and India  could  s i t e s are  be  also  provided.  prevented." mentioned  states  that  Sylhet  along  A  1  but  projected  north-south crosses  district  no  detailed  Ganges-Brahmaputra  flow  in  descriptions  are  link  the River  on  this  in.the  canal and  crosses  could  a  disrupt  of n a t u r a l drainage.  In p a r t i c u l a r , the  Teesta  northwest  at  a  of Rangpur i n Bangladesh.  Bangladesh position  Kochar  number of p o t e n t i a l r e s e r v o i r  s e r i e s of r i v e r s i n northwestern Bangladesh  canal  with  i n the  Level-Crossings  The  the  flooding  point,  following  the  point  of  the  Anticipating objections  from  Indian  Proposal j u s t i f i e s i t s  way:  For major r i v e r s i t would be more convenient to level crossings which would permit n a v i g a t i o n along the r i v e r s being n e g o t i a t e d . "  have also  2  A four-way r i v e r canal envisaged  j u n c t i o n , s i m i l a r to a road j u n c t i o n ,  f o r the Teesta c r o s s i n g and  T h i s would be a major engineering in  the  world.  crossing could one  regulator  Indian  also possibly  elsewhere.  p r o j e c t , p o s s i b l y the  engineers  be operated with one at the o u t f a l l of the  believe  that  barrage across canal."  3  is  largest  such a the  level-  river  and  1 14  E.  THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTATION The Bangladesh government's  called  proposal  P r o p o s a l f o r the Augmentation  the Ganges. henceforth  It  will  be  called  f o r convenience.  f o r augmentation  is  of the Dry Season Flow of  the  Bangladesh  Proposal  The main t h r u s t of the Bangladesh  argument r e s t s on the premise that there i s enough water i n the Ganges basin t o meet the needs of the three c o u n t r i e s Nepal).  The  reservoir  s i t e s of  remaining  Bangladesh which  31 i n Nepal.  Proposal 52  are  identifies located  a  in  total  India  details  of  the  design  o p e r a t i n g procedures, or the Bangladesh  Proposal,  of 83  and the  T h i s document i s c o n s i d e r a b l y weaker i n  t e c h n i c a l d e t a i l compared with the Indian P r o p o s a l . no  (including  of  the proposed r e s e r v o i r s ,  cost  however,  There  of  these  presents  are their  reservoirs.  an  estimate  The  of the  a d d i t i o n a l dry season flow which c o u l d be generated i f a l l these r e s e r v o i r s are b u i l t . major  Bangladesh planners c o n c e n t r a t e on twelve  r e s e r v o i r s i n Nepal  on  the  three  main  trans-Himalayan  systems: the K a r n a l i , the Gandaki, and the Kosi r i v e r The included  Bangladesh in  any  augmentation.  proposal  future  The  implies  discussions  that on  Nepal the  systems. should  question  Proposal a l s o i m p l i e s that the water  be of  stored  in the p r o j e c t e d r e s e r v o i r s i n Nepal should be a l l o c a t e d f o r the needs of C a l c u t t a port is  interesting  to  i n India and of western  note  that  u n t i l now, development  r e s e r v o i r s i n Nepal was a subject of and  Nepal.  Indian  Bangladesh.  discussion  It  of these  between  India  had o f f e r e d to f i n a n c e the c o n s t r u c t i o n of  some of these r e s e r v o i r s and buy h y d r o e l e c t r i c power from Nepal.  '  j  V j  >  S j  V  7fc^>;y H M ^ A ^ 7 V  w  .iv  yy  ii • ,1 •  f \  . . . • >s / i s  /  i /  /  •~,J  N  L K J L.  A / M  A  0 /  H  T  .<v. ,-  /  ^'-^  /^ C\\'7\Vv y.-V  c t L  ,  \^y'x i  / A  MAP SHOWING THE BANGLADESH ,^0^^-'*" PROPOSAL ON AUGMENTATION OF GANGES FLOWS^ «\ U  Figure  4  0  U  1  M  S  0 1  s  - . y 'S / ' V  j  0  0)  115  The of  Bangladesh proposal f u r t h e r estimates the t o t a l  flow  generated  from  a d d i t i o n a l 310,000 cusecs. the  dry  Indian  amount  and Nepalese r e s e r v o i r s at an  T h i s c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e  during  season to meet the needs of the three c o u n t r i e s .  This  estimate c o n s t i t u t e s the crux of the Bangladesh p r o p o s a l . F.  THE CHRONOLOGY OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER AUGMENTATION Despite the exchange of d e t a i l e d p r o p o s a l s f o r a l t e r n a t i v e  projects proceed that  to  augment  the  Ganges'  flow,  beyond t h i s p r e p a r a t o r y stage.  the important  or more, are Ganges.  n e g o t i a t i o n s d i d not  The reason  for this  was  q u e s t i o n of whether two c o u n t r i e s , or t h r e e ,  vitally  concerned  in  the  augmentation  of the  U n t i l t h i s v i t a l p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n c o u l d be r e s o l v e d ,  the chances of reaching a consensus on the t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n of augmentation were v i r t u a l l y consistently  argued  that  nil. the  Ganges i s a b i l a t e r a l concern, India.  The  Indian  government  q u e s t i o n of augmentation of the  t o be d i s c u s s e d by Bangladesh and  The view i s embodied i n the 1977 Treaty which  provision  f o r the  involvement  of  other  Bangladesh government, however, has a c t u a l l y interests  of Nepal cannot be ignored.  makes  governments. insisted  Nepal i s s i t u a t e d  the Ganges  and  Bangladesh's  Ganges would be c a r r i e d out mostly For  these  reasons,  proposal within  Bangladesh argues,  no The  that  Ganges b a s i n , i t s r i v e r s c o n t r i b u t e most of the dry season of  has  the  i n the flow  f o r augmenting the  Nepalese  territory.  Nepal must be a p a r t y t o  the n e g o t i a t i o n of augmentation. In May 1979, the t h i r d meeting of the Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t  11 6  R i v e r s Commission the  Indian  (JRC) a f t e r the 1977 Treaty had  ministerial  T h i s s l i g h t concession intervention.  M i n i s t e r M o r a r j i Desai Nepal be approached. the  signed,  s i d e conceded that the Nepalese government would be  "approached."  on  been  was made because of  prime  J u s t p r i o r to the JRC meeting Prime  had v i s i t e d Bangladesh and suggested that However, the concession  understanding  that  i t d i d not  was made by  India  p r e j u d i c e the "basic  b i l a t e r a l c h a r a c t e r of the n e g o t i a t i o n s of the augmentation the  flow."  The  4 4  might have i n the Judging the  from  Indian  status  negotiations  which the Nepalese government was  not  This  never  ambiguous  envisaged concession  to the Bangladesh government.  therefore,  publicly  clarified.  I n d i a ' s a c t i o n s even today, i t becomes c l e a r that government  commission. acceptable  exact  of  that  there  a  formal  from  trilateral  India  was not  It i s quite  natural,  was no agreement to commence surveys of  the a l t e r n a t i v e schemes f o r augmenting the dry  season  flow  of  the Ganges. India's  i n s i s t e n c e on b i l a t e r a l i s m on the i s s u e i s c l e a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o the response given to a t h i r d i n t e r v e n t i o n which was made i n January Indian p a r l i a m e n t , assistance days l a t e r  1978.  In a speech to the  P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r of the United  f o r the  development  States o f f e r e d  of the region's r i v e r s .  the Prime M i n i s t e r of B r i t a i n , James Callaghan,  a similar offer  in Bangladesh.  46  party  4 5  Two made  The i n t e r v e n t i o n s were welcomed  in Dhaka but r e b u f f e d i n New D e l h i .  Nothing more has been heard  of them s i n c e . With  the  return  of  Mrs.  Gandhi  as  prime m i n i s t e r i n  117  January  1980,  the Indian a t t i t u d e  compromising. notice  During Mrs.  that  the  Indian  fence-mending  concern  to the short-term  agreements  address  a  become  non-  made by the  Janata  the  focus  moved from the q u e s t i o n of augmentation back  s h a r i n g of the e x i s t i n g dry season  U.N.  conference.  o p p o r t u n i t y to meet Mrs. augmentation.  have  In subsequent months,  7  P r e s i d e n t Ziaur Rahman v i s i t e d New to  to  Gandhi's e l e c t i o n campaign, she gave  government should be undone." of  seems  The  Gandhi  D e l h i in  During to  flow.  February  this v i s i t  discuss  the  1980  he took the question  of  f o l l o w i n g r e p o r t quoted from the Hindu i s a  good i n d i c a t i o n of the change in Indian  attitude:  The new government's policy toward neighboring c o u n t r i e s i s to continue to s t r i v e for a c o n s o l i d a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s with them i n mutual i n t e r e s t . (But) the Indian view i s that one-sided concessions do not lead to lasting f r i e n d s h i p , but only end up by d i s t o r t i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p and doing more harm in the long run in the long run. So i t i s necessary to a s p i r e to a c e r t a i n . d e g r e e of r e c i p r o c i t y to give both sides an abiding stake in the p r e s e r v a t i o n of equally beneficial relations." 8  The  new  p o s i t i o n can be  i n t e r p r e t e d in two  q u i t e p o s s i b l e that the new the  short-term  predecessor. existing  dry  sharing  season  the  proposal  augmentation.  to  Bangladesh In my  to  accept  is  to accept  negotiated question  it  by  of  its  sharing have been  the  o p i n i o n the l a t t e r  Indian seems to  case.  In the March meeting of the JRC, minister,  not w i l l i n g  flow the  First,  flow, the Indian government may  pressure  have been the  of  Second, by b r i n g i n g up  t r y i n g to put for  government was  ways.  Kedar  Pandey (who  the new  Indian  had p r e v i o u s l y been the  irrigation irrigation  1 18  m i n i s t e r f o r the s t a t e of West Bengal) warned that invoke her r i g h t were  made  in  i n v e s t i g a t i n g augmentation p r o p o s a l s . " i n the Lok Sabha,  say that s i n c e i t was a b i l a t e r a l agreement, That  5 0  would  to review the Treaty i n November i f no p r o g r e s s  when he was q u e s t i o n e d l a t e r  it.  India  the  Indian  threat  However,  9  the m i n i s t e r  they would stand by  to scrap the t r e a t y was a ploy  aimed at g e t t i n g Bangladesh's acquiescence on the matter of Inedian  proposal  for  i l l u s t r a t e d by G.K.  dry  did  season  augmentation  is  Reddy's report on the m i n i s t e r ' s  the  further  statement  in The Hindu : The M i n i s t e r . . . i s m i s s i n g no o p p o r t u n i t y to do some p l a i n speaking to Bangladesh on the Ganga waters problem. He has been sounding a note of warning, presumably with the p r i o r lknowledge of h i s s e n i o r Cabinet colleagues, that the 1977 Farakka agreement, in i t s present form, w i l l have to be scrapped i f Bangladesh continued to drag i t s feet over the question of augmentation of the flow d u r i n g the dry season." 51  During  most  became p o l a r i z e d . in  any  of March and A p r i l of 1980, the Farakka i s s u e Bangladesh i n s i s t e d on Nepal's  discussion  threatened to  over the q u e s t i o n of augmentation and  scrap  government r e l e n t e d . is  a  reflection  Bangladesh's  participation  of  policy  the  1977  Treaty  unless  The f o l l o w i n g report the to  Nepal  Bangladesh  in the Times of India  Indian government's include  the  India  in  d i s p l e a s u r e over discussions  augmentation: ..Instead of c o o p e r a t i n g with t h i s country (India) i n making the agreement work i n r i g h t earnest, Bangladesh has p e r s i s t e d i n a negative and dilatory attitude which amounts, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, to a  of  1 19  r e f u s a l to implement some c r u c i a l clauses of the agreement. For i n s t a n c e , a commitment to formulate a long-term plan to augment the flow of the Ganga i s as much a part of the agreement as the p r o v i s i o n f o r a guaranteed minimum supply of the Ganga waters to Bangladesh d u r i n g the lean months f o r a p e r i o d of f i v e years..For i f no progress c o u l d be made i n the longterm plan w i t h i n the s p e c i f i e d time-frame, India w i l l have no o p t i o n but to ask f o r the scrapping of the f i v e - y e a r formula f o r water sharing during next year's review of the 1977 agreement which has a l s o been s p e c i f i c a l l y provided f o r i n the accord i t s e l f . " 5 2  A f t e r the 17th meeting of the JRC i n New D e l h i which took between  February  27-29,  an  official  of  the Indian  place  external  a f f a i r s m i n i s t r y i s s u e d the f o l l o w i n g statement: Whether i t i s the i s s u e of the augmentation of the flow of the Ganga or the sharing of the Teesta waters or indeed the q u e s t i o n of the waters of any of the common r i v e r s , the true meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e of the i n t e r i m Farakka accord must not be d i s t o r t e d or else the future of this agreement might be jeopardized. 5 3  The  Indian  government was attempting  to show that Bangladesh had  reneged from i t s p o s i t i o n as s i g n a t o r y to the therefore  there  was  observe the Treaty  no  reason  anymore.  1977  f o r the Indian  The Indian  Treaty  and  government to  p o s i t i o n of not agreeing  to i n c l u d e Nepal i n d i s c u s s i o n s was defended on the grounds that India d i d not l i k e  "a  multilateral  approach  to  a  bilateral  issue." " 5  Relations  between  India  and Bangladesh d e t e r i o r a t e d once  again d u r i n g most of 1980 and 1981. The f e e l i n g of had  been  restored  mutual s u s p i c i o n . that  Bangladesh  by  Desai's  trust  that  government was now r e p l a c e d by  Under these circumstances,  i t i s not  unusual  adopted an ambiguous n e g o t i a t i n g s t r a t e g y -- a  1 20  s t r a t e g y which i n v o l v e d d i s p l a y i n g a keen i n t e r e s t long-term  solution  trilateral  and  in finding  a  yet not budging from i t s i n s i s t e n c e on  involvement.  Bangladesh's  strategy  is  described  a c c u r a t e l y by Inder Malhotra i n the Times of I n d i a : In a l l fairness i t must be recognised that not only does the Farakka i s s u e a f f e c t the l i v e s of m i l l i o n s of people i n Bangladesh, i t i s a l s o a highly emotive q u e s t i o n i n that c o u n t r y . Moreover, a l l the complexes arising from the c l o s e p r o x i m i t y between India and Bangladesh and the d i s p a r i t y i n t h e i r s i z e s come into play whenever Dhaka takes up the Ganga water problem with D e l h i . A curiously ambivalent negotiating strategy i s the r e s u l t . On the one hand, Bangladesh pleads f o r magnanimity and g e n e r o s i t y from i t s bigger neighbour: on the other i t attempts o v e r t l y and covertly to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e the p u r e l y bilateral issue. 5 5  The stalling  Indian government was c l e a r l y unimpressed with Dhaka's tactics.  releases,  New  Through  Delhi  made  official  i t c l e a r that  agree to the Indian p r o p o s a l of might  have  altogether. attitude  to  consider  Sensing  the  the  statements  long-term option  central  of  and  press  i f Bangladesh d i d not augmentation,  India  s c r a p p i n g the Treaty  government's  uncompromising  toward Bangladesh, the government of the s t a t e of West  Bengal wasted no time i n i t s attempts to pledge i t s support f o r the  Indian  position.  The  West  Bengal  assembly  unanimously  adopted two r e s o l u t i o n s r e q u e s t i n g the Union government to modify the Indo-Bangladesh Ganga waters agreement minimum  of 4 0 , 0 0 0  cusecs of water  part of the year and to take  i n the Hooghly  necessary  maintain and improve n a v i g a b i l i t y of that The  18th meeting of the JRC was h e l d  to ensure a  i n the l e a n e s t  conservation river.  to t r y  steps  to  5 6  i n New D e l h i  in April.  121  Although  Jamaluddin  Ahmed, Bangladesh's Deputy  Prime M i n i s t e r ) and leader of i t s d e l e g a t i o n to  Premier the  (Deputy  New  Delhi  t a l k s , s a i d that the t a l k s were " f r i e n d l y , " no s o l u t i o n had actually conflict  reached. that  In f a c t , the two p o s i t i o n s were i n such sharp  the two s i d e s had not been able to agree even on  the minutes of Indian  been  the  meeting.  Inder  57  Malhotra  reflected  the  attitude:  Only those out of touch with r e a l i t y c o u l d have been s u r p r i s e d by the f a i l u r e of the l a t e s t round of Farakka talks between t h i s country (India) and Bangladesh. The divergence between the approaches of the two s i d e s has been so great that to look f o r a meeting ground between them is like expecting two p a r a l l e l l i n e s to meet. For once the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission appointed under the Farakka a c c o r d , signed by the Janata government i n November 1977 has even dispensed with the f o r m a l i t y of r e c o r d i n g the two s i d e s ' agreement to d i s a g r e e . And although another meeting of the JRC i n Dhaka has been mooted, i t i s c l e a r that the deadlock cannot be broken at the t e c h n i c a l level at which the Commission functions. A way out of the impasse can only be f o r c e d at the highest p o l i t i c a l l e v e l . 5 8  Malhotra's main point the  i s s i g n i f i c a n t : the  JRC made i t a l l the more d i f f i c u l t  is essentially  the  time  of  of  augmentation  by  former signing  Indian the  to  referring  include  seems Mr.  arrangements  which  Ram  Nepal  I t was  revealed  later  defence m i n s t e r , J a g j i v a n Ram,  treaty  had  also  had a f f i r m e d that  in  to M o r a r j i Desai's  exchanged  Bangladesh c o u n t e r p a r t a " c o n f i d e n t i a l " l e t t e r . it  of  political.  w i l l i n g n e s s to "approach" Nepal i n 1979. that  nature  to f i n d a s o l u t i o n  The Bangladesh government had t r i e d discussions  technical  at the  with  In t h i s  his  letter,  i n d i s c u s s i n g the long-term  to augment the Ganges' flow, the two c o u n t r i e s need  122  not  exclude N e p a l .  trying  to  treat  understanding. The  According  5 9  this  to  letter  one as an  report,  Bangladesh  was  i n t e g r a l part of the  1977  60  19th JRC  meeting was  held  during  July  8-11,  While  t h i s meeting a l s o f a i l e d to b r i n g about any  Indian  and  the  end  Bangladesh p o s i t i o n s , the stated  that  "it  d i s c u s s i o n s at the JRC, also."  The  6 1  the JRC  a l s o decided  ministers,  by  It was  the  20th  meeting  that  at  a  followed  meeting and  Mrs.  Narashima Rao met  in  issues.  and  Dhaka The  continue  the  other  levels  It  was  by a meeting of the  two  Rao  of August.  and  during  Gandhi  Shamsul Hague of  the be  be  foreign taken  and  worked  ministers  during  Ziaur  the  Rahman  , however, the 20th meeting of the JRC foreign ministers'  s i d e s had  in  level.  The  meeting.  the b a s i c  Indian  issues  16-17  were  external a f f a i r s  the Bangladesh f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r  on August  was This  presumably r e a l i s e d that such a sorted minister  Shamsul  to d i s c u s s a number of  Haque  bilateral  issue of long-term augmentation of the Ganges'  f i g u r e d prominently i n t h e i r t a l k s . at the end  at  at  6 2  a f t e r the  both  higher  to  issued  that the 20th meeting of  D e l h i at the end  meeting would be p o i n t l e s s unless out  agreed  f i n a l decision could  out  h e l d on August 30,  statement  necessary,  Narashima  change in the  hoped that a l l the d e t a i l s c o u l d  Delhi.  i t turned  indicates  P.V.  between  September in New As  i n New  JRC  meeting so that the summit,  where  that t h i s would be  Bangladesh. out  been  Dhaka meeting a l s o decided  would be h e l d  foreign  and  had  joint  1980.  of t h e i r t a l k s s t a t e d :  The  joint  statement  flow  issued  1 23  India and Bangladesh should c o n t i n u e t h e i r e f f o r t s t o maintain a c l i m a t e of mutual t r u s t and understanding and further consolidate and strengthen the f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between them. 63  Regarding Farakka, the j o i n t inevitable  statement  contained  the  by  now  line:  Efforts should be i n t e n s i f i e d to f i n d a mutually acceptable s o l u t i o n at an e a r l y date t o the problem of the long-term augmentation of the dry season flow of the Ganga at F a r a k k a . " 6  In  other  words,  r e s o l v e d as ever. great  the Farakka i s s u e was s t i l l  as f a r from being  I t was c l e a r that both s i d e s were  exercising  r e s t r a i n t and both s i d e s were aware that n e g o t i a t i o n s had  to continue i f a s o l u t i o n was t o be reached. The  20th  Commission  session  (JRC) was  of  the  held  in  s u r p r i s e , i t d i d not make any issued  at  the  end  of  a  view  to  make  New  Delhi  progress.  of  the  agreement."  Ganges  but, to  The  joint  Rivers no one's  statement  a  within  i t was  of the JRC i n Dhaka very  renewed  attempt  recommendations concerning the augmentation flow  Joint  the New D e l h i t a l k s s t a t e d that  decided to h o l d the next meeting "with  Indo-Bangladesh  the  time  of  limit  to the  early  submit i t s dry  specified  season i n the  65  The date of the review was due i n two months on November 5, 1980.  I t was extremely u n l i k e l y that  augmentation previous  the  agreement  over  the  q u e s t i o n could be reached i n two months where every  meeting of the JRC had f a i l e d to produce any r e s u l t s .  Meanwhile, the domestic p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s i n both  Bangladesh  1 24  and  India  had  preoccupied Rahman  taken  with the  was  more  from members  a  t u r n f o r the worse.  volatile  concerned  of  the  Awami  situation  Mrs. Assam  was  and  Ziaur  about the o p p o s i t i o n he was  facing  League  in  Gandhi  because  the  economy " had  deteriorated. The  next  round  of  talks  over the augmentation q u e s t i o n  c o u l d not be h e l d before November 5 i n Dhaka. the nature Indian that  delegation  was  as p r o v i d e d  f o r by the  headed by Mr.  to  12,000  longer.  formula  cusecs and  sharing  Treaty.  Kedar Pandey who  had  received  agreed  e x i s t i n g dry season flow  to  The  reported  t h i s s i t u a t i o n c o u l d not  He a l s o s a i d that India  for  t a l k s were i n  1977  in the l a s t dry season the port of C a l c u t t a  10,000 any  of a review  The  only  continue the  1977  i n the hope that  Bangladesh would agree to the Indian proposal of  a  through  the Ganges and  Bangladesh  Brahmaputra Minister  Rivers. for  territory 6 6  Kazi  Power,  had  Anwarul  Water  responded to the Indian Bangladesh  thereby  joining Huque,  Resources,  minister's  the  and  by  has  never  below  44,000 c u s e c s .  T r e a t y , t h e r e f o r e , achieved  nothing  augmentation  was  problem  impact, implementation, The to  Control,  saying  to be s a t i s f i e d with only 34,000 cusecs  three years during the lean season whereas  but  6 7  in  Bangladesh government was  for the  historic  usage  review  of the  1977  terms  of  solving  the  "considering  the  to  of the  trying  that  The  confined  and progress  canal  Bangladesh  Flood  statement  last  been  link  1977  its  agreement."  best,  68  meanwhile,  i n t e r e s t Nepal in t a k i n g a more v o c a l r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of  the region i n general and  e s p e c i a l l y , regarding j o i n t management  125  of the eastern  rivers.  President  visited  Nepal in an e f f o r t  stand  river  on  apparently formal  in  issues. getting  stance in the d i s p u t e ,  international  river  and  augmentation of i t s dry  as  with  suspicion.  April  13 which s t a t e d that o f f i c i a l s by  Dhaka  consistently bilateral  government nothing  as  The  was  Ganges  question was  still  should  at t h i s  in  with  between  New  Delhi  its  inclined  to  also view  "unfriendly  should  stated the  act."  that  1981  Muchkund  Bangladesh,  announced  Dubey, in  Indian Calcutta  Bangladesh meeting to d i s c u s s i s s u e s would be h e l d s h o r t l y . The  these  the  policy all  be  solved  the  Indian  season flow of  the  as  the  including  broad  High  entire  both trying  by  that  on  and  Bangladesh was  i s s u e s of mutual concern to both c o u n t r i e s .  Mr.  on  saw  By May.1981, both Bangladesh  i f the deadlock were to be broken.  of  courtship  7 1  to broaden the scope of the d i s c u s s i o n s range  co-  Bangladesh campaign  of augmentation of the dry not decided.  the  neighbours—that  neighbours  report  the  in the Times of India  conscious attempt to subvert  by India  an  over  include a l l  India r e a l i s e d that concessions would have to be. made sides  formal  government  discussions  a report  same  short of an  The  was  a  problems 7 0  Nepalese  government of India looked  followed  bilaterally.  The  such  season flow  There  Bangladesh  but agreed that the Ganges was  states.  moves  The  of  a t a c t i c a l postponement of a  basin  6 3  Rahman  to secure i t s commitment to a  development  succeeded  Ziaur  a  On May  Commissioner a  high-level  range  of  3, to  Indo-  bilateral  7 2  meeting, however, c o u l d not  take place  f o r a long  time.  1 26  During the month of May, low  over  the  Indo-Bangladesh r e l a t i o n s reached a new  question  of ownership of a new  i s l a n d which had  sprung up at the mouth of the Hariabhanga River i n Bengal.  The  Talpatty  in  carried  down  island,  known  Bangladesh  was  by  as  formed  flag.  Because  the  ownership.  The  Indian government. (India's  Upper  Narashima Rao  by  deposits  of  sediment  As soon as the i s l a n d  island  was  Answering  suggested a  questions  Indian  the  so c l o s e to the Indian joint  idea was c a t e g o r i c a l l y  House),  of  sent a naval s h i p and r a i s e d  border, the Bangladesh government verify  Bay  Moore i n I n d i a and South  the River Hariabhanga.  emerged, the Indian government Indian  New  the  in  survey  to  r e j e c t e d by the  the  Rajya  Sabha  external a f f a i r s minister  Mr.  said:  India's t i t l e to New Moore island is clear. The question of j o i n t survey requested by Bangladesh i s premature and not r e l e v a n t at p r e s e n t . 7 3  The t a l k s on augmentation were once again i n t e r r u p t e d by an unexpected event. May  31,  1981  President  while  Ziaur Rahman  he was v i s i t i n g  7  was d e c l a r e d the new  ensuing general Nationalist  Party  voted to power. however,  elections  because  (BNP)  Sattar on  of  March  had  been  November Justice only 25,  rule  1981,  the  country.  7 5  Although  on  ViceIn the  Bangladesh  S a t t a r was once again for  a  few  months,  1982 Lieutenant General  Ershad, Bangladesh's army c h i e f d e c l a r e d m a r t i a l law the  Zia's  p r e s i d e n t of Bangladesh.  under could  assassinated  the c i t y of Chittagong i n  Bangladesh. " J u s t i c e Abdus S a t t a r , who President  was  H.M.  throughout  Ershad made some important changes i n  1 27  the domestic office  sphere,  issued  a  the  Chief  directive  to  Martial the  Law  effect  Administrator's that  Bangladesh's  f o r e i g n p o l i c y would remain unchanged. Indo-Bangladesh leadership. the  After  Indian  improved  Mujib had been a s s a s s i n a t e d  Zia's  growing  ties  subcontinent Obaidullah  d i d not  find  favour  Khan, Ershad's a d v i s o r  to an Indian  i n August 1975,  round  27-31, 1982. The  countries  in India.  Besides,  Khan  Bangladesh who  Mr.  Kedar  press  release  Pandey,  India.  of t a l k s were h e l d  A.Z.M.  indicated  delegation  7 6  i n Dhaka during was  l e d by  August A.Z.M.  Union  The Indian Minister  delegation  was  for Irrigation.  l e d by  The j o i n t  i s s u e d at the end of the t a l k s s t a t e d that the two  s i d e s "achieved  a  greater  measure  of  elements to be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n 7 7  had  i n the  had by now become M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e  f o r the m i l i t a r y government.  solution."  with  j o u r n a l i s t that the m i l i t a r y r u l e r s were anxious to  next  Obaidullah  smaller  on a g r i c u l t u r e  s o l v e the Farakka Barrage issue with  release,  Ershad's  with the Muslim world and h i s  wooing of Nepal and the other  The  under  government had viewed the Bangladesh l e a d e r s h i p  suspicion. constant  relations  understanding  on the  f o r f i n d i n g an e q u i t a b l e  While not a great d e a l can be read  from t h i s  i t was c l e a r that the two s i d e s had decided  in t h e i r e f f o r t s t o f i n d a mutually acceptable  press  to continue  s o l u t i o n and a l s o  agreed to meet as o f t e n as necessary at a p p r o p r i a t e  levels.  128  G.  A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  Further  negotiations  Bangladesh  between  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of  Ershad  paid  his first  visit,  Mr.  P.V.  M i n i s t e r . and Minister,  1 977.  as  a  During  official  A.R.  up  a  two-year  October  October  visit  Rao,  1982, Gen.  to I n d i a .  Indian  Shams-ud-Doha,  During h i s  External  Affairs  Bangladesh  Foreign  Memorandum of Understanding  however",  the  In e a r l y  Narashima  Mr.  drew  This,  78  and  had c l e a r e d the way f o r a formal understanding t o be  drawn up on a number of i s s u e s .  reported  India  which  was  e x t e n s i o n of the Farakka agreement of  i s essentially visit,  Mrs.  d i s c u s s e d the 1977 agreement on  a misrepresentation.  Gandhi  Farakka  and  and  Gen.  agreed  Ershad  that  the  agreement had not proved s u i t a b l e f o r f i n d i n g a s a t i s f a c t o r y and durable s o l u t i o n . to be extended the  7 9  On that b a s i s , the 1977 agreement was agreed  f o r another two years with the understanding that  Indo-Bangladesh  Joint  undertake and complete 18  months  Rivers  Commission  t e c h n i c a l and f e a s i b i l i t y  two c o u n t r i e s .  within  sharing  between  What the j o i n t press r e l e a s e d i d not say i s  that the new understanding omits the 80 per guaranteed  studies  of the s i g n i n g of the Memorandum of Understanding to  augment the flow of water and ensure e q u i t a b l e the  (JRC) would  Bangladesh's  cent  share d u r i n g the d r i e s t  end of A p r i l a t 27,600 c u s e c s .  8 0  clause  ten days at the  The Gandhi-Ershad  Memorandum of  Understanding has a c l a u s e which d i r e c t s the JRC " t o ensure a f u l l and f i n a l agreement i s a r r i v e d The Memorandum of Understanding favours  the  interests  of  India  at." i s an  over  which  that  8 1  understanding  those  which  of Bangladesh.  129  Without  the 80 per cent "safeguard" c l a u s e , any arrangements  divide  the  Ganges  perspective, irrigation  waters  at Farakka a r e , from the Bangladesh  increasingly expansion  irrelevant.  next  decade  f u n c t i o n of the 1977 Treaty — --. . w i l l  remain  unchanged  d i f f e r e n c e : whereas the steady  supply  of  current  but  1977  water,  or  rates  there  Treaty  so.  8 2  will  Thus  be  guaranteed  the Gandhi-Ershad  the  first  Bangladesh  not  agreement  over  augmentation  d i s c u s s i o n s have proved  by  matter  s e r i o u s l y below  that  time.  i n t r a c t a b l e we can  assume  a  promises only  average  d u r i n g the next two dry seasons and the two c o u n t r i e s can an  flow  one important  Memorandum  This w i l l  the flow i n the Ganges does not f a l l  of  not be enough water  that of s h a r i n g the e x i s t i n g  only a share of a dwindling supply. if  At  i n I n d i a , there might  in Farakka d u r i n g the  to  reach  Since that  past future  d i s c u s s i o n s w i l l prove to be every b i t as d i f f i c u l t . The  second  function  of  the 1977 T r e a t y was to e s t a b l i s h  procedures f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s of augmentation. of  Understanding  significantly  which  the  negotiations  study  alternative  recommendations  will  modifies  to  the  take p l a c e .  augmentation  The new Memorandum circumstances  The JRC was asked t o  proposals  and  make  the  result  that  no  Memorandum of Understanding, ensure  that  its  the two governments w i t h i n three y e a r s .  was unfortunate that n e i t h e r s i d e accepted the other's with  JRC  has  been  It  position  surveys c o u l d be conducted. the  in  In the  directed  a f u l l and f i n a l agreement i s a r r i v e d a t . "  8 3  "to Nepal  w i l l not be i n v o l v e d i n d i s c u s s i o n s and the nature of the c l a u s e i n d i c a t e s that  the  economic  and  technical  aspects  will  be  130  discussed,  eschewing  the p o l i t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s . " On both the 8  o b s t a c l e s which prevented progress i n the past,  Bangladesh  has  been o v e r r u l e d : the l i n k c a n a l i s to be c o n s i d e r e d , i g n o r i n g i t s political  implications;  the  but without the involvement The  Bangladesh  of Nepal.  Memorandum of Understanding,  continuation  of  the  1977  Treaty  h e a v i l y favours the Indian s i d e . understanding  avoid  out, the  chance of success.  as  political  continuing p o l i t i c a l sorted  therefore,  but  a  is  not  a  new agreement which  In terms of content,  the  new  i s as much concerned with the hydrologic-economic  a s p e c t s of r i v e r development religiously  scheme w i l l be s t u d i e d  issues  the  solutions.  involved  understanding  previous  over  are  one, As  not  and  long  as the  recognised  augmentation  both  and  has l i t t l e  o  131  NOTES 1. T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y true when one c o n s i d e r s that for almost twenty-six years the two s i d e s had been n e g o t i a t i n g without any results. Bangladesh's b r i n g i n g the issue up i n the U.N. in September 1976, and Desai's assuming the r e i n s of power in New D e l h i in March 1977, occurred w i t h i n the space of a few months, therefore c o m p l i c a t i n g the c o r r e l a t i o n of the two events to the a c t u a l s i g n i n g of the t r e a t y in November, 1977. It is clear, however, that b r i n g i n g up the i s s u e in the United Nations helped the Bangladesh government regain i t s confidence and play i t s cards c a r e f u l l y i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s . 2. Foreign p o l i c y i s s a i d to be a rational continuum evolved over decades by various governments and also through the i n t e r a c t i o n of different government departments. Therefore, although the thrust of p o l i c y might change with a change i n government, the a c t u a l process of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n remains the the same. I t i s q u i t e u n l i k e l y f o r governments to make a 180 degree turn from an e x i s t i n g pattern, e s p e c i a l l y on a substantive issue. 3. The Hindu, January 24 leaves." 4.  Holiday,  January 30  5. Far Eastern watery grave."  1977,  1977,  "No  accord  " A f t e r t a l k s what?"  Economic Review, March 4  6. A s i m i l a r argument is "What prospect f o r , t a l k s . " 7. Dawn, January March 19 1977, sovereignty."  on Ganga: Bangla team  1977,  made i n H o l i d a y ,  "Talks  meet  January 23  10 1977, "China-Bangladesh relations," "Bangladesh fully prepared to uphold  8. Dawn, March 12, 1977, "Bangladesh issue to Shahanshah of I r a n . "  chief  explains  a  1977, and its  Farakka  9. Ben Crow, The P o l i t i c s and Technology of Sharing the Ganges, unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of Edinburgh, 1980, pp.169-170. 10. The Janata Party manifesto, Both Bread and L i b e r t y , says: "The Party w i l l s t r i v e to r e s o l v e such outstanding issues as remain with some of i t s neighbours and w i l l c o n s c i o u s l y promote a good neighbour p o l i c y . " (p.25). 11. Ever s i n c e Mujibur Rahman was a s s a s s i n a t e d on August 15, 1975 the Indian government became unsure of how the new m i l i t a r y government i n Dhaka would react to Indian p a t e r n a l i s m . One of the b e t t e r known freedom fighters, a c e r t a i n Kader "Tiger"  1 32  Siddiky along with h i s f o l l o w e r s refused to accept the new government and i n a b i d to put up v i o l e n t o p p o s i t i o n to the new regime i n Dhaka c r o s s e d over to Indian t e r r i t o r y . Here h i s band of men were given s h e l t e r and p r o t e c t i o n . O c c a s i o n a l l y , Kader S i d d i k y and h i s troops would enter Bangladesh and r a i d and plunder the border areas. The government of Bangladesh requested the Congress government t o put a stop to S i d d i k y ' s activities and hand him over t o Banhgladesh. The Indian government d i d not comply. 12. Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, May 6 1977, "As the Ganges T a l k s . " 13.  you  were  at  Ibid.  14. The n e g o t i a t i o n s concentrated on the flow d u r i n g the p e r i o d April 21-30, the ten days of lowest flow, and there was agreement that the t o t a l flow i n t h i s p e r i o d should be taken as 55,000 cusecs, the 75% a v a i l a b i l i t y v a l u e . The d e t a i l s of t h i s p e r i o d come from: 1) F i n a n c i a l Times, A p r i l 27 1977, "Ganges water agreement near." 2) The Hindu, A p r i l 15 1977, " J a g j i v a n to decide other issues besides Farakka." 3) The Hindu, A p r i l 20 1977, "Concessions to Bangla over Ganga waters." 4) The Hindu, A p r i l 26 1977, "Bengal M i n i s t e r c r i t i c i s e s Farakka accord." 15.  Ibid.  16. Bangladesh. Dhaka, September 1976.  White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute,  17. The Hindu, May 11 1977, "Farakka economic a s p e c t s , " by G.K. Reddy. 18.  t a l k s hinge on techno-  Dawn May 12 1977, "Indo-Bd t a l k s on Ganges waters  fail."  19. The Hindu, A p r i l 15 1977, " J a g j i v a n to d i s c u s s other issues besides Farakka;" see, a l s o , footnote #11. 20.  The Hindu, June 11 1977, " Z i a happy over  21. The Hindu, J u l y 16 1977, "Farakka: long term s o l u t i o n . " 22.  India's  thinking  on  a  F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, August 6 1977, "Talks on Farakka."  23. The Hindu, August 9 headway," by G.K. Reddy. 24.  talks."  1977,  "Farakka  talks  made  little  The Hindu, August 30 1977, " I n d i a may s e t t l e f o r l e s s water  1 33  with Dhaka." 25. The Hindu, September plea to c e n t r e . "  15 1977,  26. The Hindu, September 5 1977, Farakka, says Bangladesh." 27. The Hindu, apart?" by G.K.  September Reddy.  16  "Farakka water: Bengal team's "Only  1977,  28. The Hindu, September 25 1977, by G.K. Reddy.  a  limited  "India,  accord  on  Bangla d r i f t i n g  "Summit on Farakka P o s s i b l e ? "  29. On the morning of September 28, a f u l l meeting of Zia's Council of A d v i s o r s was d i s c u s s i n g the f i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s to be given t o B.M. Abbas before he returned to D e l h i . They were interrupted by the news that a h i j a c k e d Japan A i r L i n e s plane was asking p e r m i s s i o n to land in Dhaka. See, Sunday, Delhi, October 1977, "The coup coupland." In the subsequent chaos caused by the h i j a c k , two rebellions were attempted, one in Dhaka and the other i n Bogra. Neither succeeded and though a few people were k i l l e d i n the attempts, s e v e r a l hundred people were executed later. D e s p i t e a l l t h i s , the i n s t r u c t i o n s were given to B.M. Abbas and he got back to New Delhi i n time to i n i t i a l the t r e a t y on September 30, 1977. 30. The Hindu, September 28 1977, "Farakka: Dhaka summons Abbas for f r e s h b r i e f i n g , " a n d The Hindu, September 30 1977, "Agreement of Farakka," by G.K. Reddy. 31.  Ibid.  32. Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on Sharing of Ganga Waters at Farakka , A r t i c l e l I ( i i ) , See Appendix B. 33. Ben Crow, " A p p r o p r i a t i n g the Brahmaputra," P o l i t i c a l Weekly, December 25 1982, p.2097. 34. Hassan, 717. 35. 36. P.M."  i n Harvard I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law  Ben Crow, op. The Hindu,  c i t . , The P o l i t i c s . . . December  20  1977,  in <•  Journal,  Economic 19:2,  and  (1978):  , p.177.  "Zia's f r u i t f u l  t a l k s with  37. I n d i a . M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e and I r r i g a t i o n , Department of I r r i g a t i o n , Proposal f o r augmentation of the dry season flow of the Ganga, New D e l h i , March 1978, p.83. 1 billion equals 1,000,000,000 i n the American t r a d i t i o n . 38.  Ibid.  , p.68.  134  39. The depth and d i s c h a r g e a r e given, the slope appears to be s i m i l a r to that of the Farakka Barrage feeder c a n a l . The c r o s s s e c t i o n a l area and width can t h e r e f o r e be c a l c u l a t e d . 40. Maasland has c a l c u l a t e d that the power p o t e n t i a l of the unregulated minimum flow i n t h i s region i s 30 GW at 60% load f a c t o r . Water development p o t e n t i a l s of the Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna b a s i n s , World Bank, Washington, 1973, p.20. 41.  Indian P r o p o s a l , op.  c i t . , p.8.  42.  Ibid.  43.  Ben Crow, op.  44.  The Hindu, May 13 1979, "India's gesture to Bangla."  , p.67.  45. USIA, D e l h i , speeches," D e l h i ,  c i t . , The P o l i t i c s . . .  , p.304.  "Toward our common g o a l s : t e x t s of remarks and 1978, p.18.  46.  The Hindu, January 7 1978, "Callaghan gets warm welcome."  47.  The Economist, December 8 1979, "Back to I n d i r a R a j . "  48. The Hindu I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n , President C o r d i a l talks in D e l h i . "  February 2 1980, "Bangla  49. The Hindu I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n , t a c t i c s won't do Bangla t o l d . "  March  8  1980,  50. The Hindu I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n , March 29 1980, Waters a c c o r d : m i n i s t e r blames Janata government." 51. The Hindu I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n , March 29 India warns Bangladesh." 52. Times of I n d i a , adjourned."  March  53. Times of I n d i a , March i n c o r r e c t and u n f a i r . " 54.  4  1980,  1980,  "Ganga  "Farakka:  "Delhi-Dhaka  "Bangla  talks  statement  Times of I n d i a , A p r i l  15  1981, "Farakka and i t s F a l l -  8 1980, "Review of Farakka urged."  57. Times of I n d i a , May 1 1980, "Farakka and i t s F a l l - o u t , " Inder M a l h o t r a . 58.  is  Ibid.  55. Times of I n d i a , January out," by Inder Malhotra. 56.  1  1980,  "Delay  Ibid.  by  1 35  59.  Ibid.  60.  Ibid.  61. Times of summit." 62.  India,  12  1980,  "Ganga waters issue goes to  Ibid.  63. Times of I n d i a , i l l e g a l entry." 64.  July  August  19  1980,  "Delhi-Dhaka  stop  Ibid.  65. Times of I n d i a , r i v e r waters i s s u e . "  September 2 1980,  "Bangladesh obdurate on  66. Times of I n d i a , November 7 1980, "Dhaka India suggests long-term pact on Ganga." 67.  to  talks  extended:  Ibid.  68. Times of I n d i a , November 9 1980, D e l h i next week."  "Talks on Ganga waters in  69. Bangladesh Times, May 16 1981, "India takes stubborn on Ganges: B i t t e r campaign launched a g a i n s t Bangladesh." 70.  Ibid.  71 .  Ibid.  72. Bangladesh Times, May shortly."  4 1981,  73. Bangladesh Times, May 9 1981, proposal on South T a l p a t t y . "  stand  " H i g h - l e v e l Indo-Bangla meet "India r e j e c t s  joint  survey  74. Ziaur Rahman was a s s a s s i n a t e d in a p l o t to overthrow him led by Maj.-Gen. Abul Manzur. The coup attempt was unsuccessful. A l l those involved were executed and Zia's President J u s t i c e Abdus S a t t a r took over as President of Bangladesh. 75. Lieutenant General H.M. Ershad was the army c h i e f at the time Zia was a s s a s s i n a t e d . He was the one responsible for sending army detachments to Chittagong to subdue the mutineers and punish the o f f i c e r s r e s p o n s i b l e . When S a t t a r was elected President i n the general e l e c t i o n s of November 1982, the armed f o r c e s under the l e a d e r s h i p of Ershad demanded that they should have a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n in the r u l i n g of Bangladesh. J u s t i c e S a t t a r refused and the armed f o r c e s took over power on March 25, 1982 in a b l o o d l e s s coup o s t e n s i b l y to f i g h t the c o r r u p t i o n p r a c t i s e d by the p o l i t i c i a n s who had been in power  1 36  and which, a c c o r d i n g to the army, had eroded the very f a b r i c of s o c i e t y i n Bangladesh. 76. Times of I n d i a , A p r i l 18 1982, "Coup to a v o i d bloodbath," by Anthony Mascarenhas, s t a f f correspondent of the Sunday Times, London, i n a s p e c i a l to the Sunday Review to the Times of I n d i a . 77. Times of I n d i a , h o p e f u l note."  September  78. Times of I n d i a , October scrapped." 79.  Ibid.  80.  Ben Crow, op.  81.  Ibid.  , p.2098.  82.  Ibid.  , p.2097.  83.  Ibid.  , p.2098.  84.  Ibid.  8  1  1982, "Farakka t a l k s end on  1982,  "Farakka  accord  c i t . , " A p p r o p r i a t i n g the...," p.2097.  to  be  1 37  V.  ASYMMETRIC DYADS AND UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM CONFLICTS  The  Farakka  Barrage  dispute  between  India  and  Pakistan/Bangladesh p r o v i d e s s c h o l a r s with a u s e f u l study of an upstream-downstream  c o n f l i c t over an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r .  the t h i r t y odd years that the d i s p u t e has  been  c o n f l i c t has evolved through many s t a g e s .  T h i s chapter analyses  the  strategies  adopted  by  r i p a r i a n s t a t e i n i t s attempt an  equitable  and  Pakistan/Bangladesh  that  an  long-range  equitable  reached so f a r because  as  t o i n f l u e n c e India i n s o l u t i o n throughout  stages i n the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e . been  going  Over  and  on, the  the lower  negotiating  the d i f f e r e n t  My c e n t r a l argument  has  long-range s o l u t i o n has not been  of the i n h e r e n t i n e q u a l i t y  i n the o v e r a l l  r e l a t i o n s between India and Bangladesh. In bound  any r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e between two neighbours, t o be hydrologic-economic  i s s u e s which have t o be s e t t l e d  before an agreement can be reached. case  studies  dealing  with  there are  However,  international  an  analysis  riparian  of  disputes  r e v e a l s that the f i n a l outcome depends on other f a c t o r s as w e l l . The o v e r a l l s t a t e of r e l a t i o n s stakes  involved  between  the c o - r i p a r i a n s ,  f o r each of them, t h e i r general f o r e i g n  the  policy  o b j e c t i v e s , the b a r g a i n i n g techniques they choose  t o employ and,  more i m p o r t a n t l y , the b a r g a i n i n g r e s o u r c e s  commands,  each  a l s o be important f a c t o r s i n the f i n a l outcome. the  final  political  solution  i s more  a  considerations affecting  first  factor  which  In other words,  r e s u l t of short and long term the d i s p u t i n g  than i t i s of p u r e l y hydrologic-economic The  may  co-riparians  considerations.  i s important  i n determining the  138  r e l a t i v e ease or d i f f i c u l t y with which an  international  d i s p u t e can be s e t t l e d between two c o u n t r i e s i s position  vis-a-vis  an  international  be  divided  difficult  into  its  sole  According  co-riparians  profit.  Its  r e g u l a t e s the  flow  needs  does not b e n e f i t  w e l l be d e t r i m e n t a l to  the  of  the  cannot  be  Farakka  Barrage  with  latter's  i t , p o l l u t e s i t e x c e s s i v e l y or  water  such  that  satisfied.  In  the upstream s t a t e r e c e i v e s maximum b e n e f i t accordance  the  (such as f o r  the  downstream  such  cases,  economic i n c e n t i v e s to reach agreement are extremely  in  can  "upstream-downstream  utilisation  i r r i g a t i o n ) of the water, d i v e r t s  river  to  Of these, the d i s p u t e s most  i f , f o r example, i t makes consumptive use  country's  relative  In t h i s category, the upstream country uses a r i v e r  downstream country and may interest  1  to r e s o l v e are the ones he c a l l s  conflicts." for  four c a t e g o r i e s .  their  river.  LeMarquand, r e l a t i o n s h i p s among i n t e r n a t i o n a l  riparian  only  its  by  own  d i s p u t e between I n d i a and  low  the  because  exploiting  the  user's demands.  The  Bangladesh  falls  in  t h i s l a s t category of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r d i s p u t e s . In  an  the lower power  upstream-downstream  r i p a r i a n can do unless  over  the  upper  whether or not the lower influence  conflict,  the  this  riparian. riparian  By  2  there i s very  country  upper r i p a r i a n to cooperate. and  the The  from  asymmetric-dyadic  Carleton  University.  relationship  3  (their  capacity  to  superordinate-  Bangladesh  f r u i t f u l l y a n a l y s e d using the conceptual apparatus scholars  reciprocal  r e c i p r o c a l power I mean  possesses  subordinate r e l a t i o n s h i p between I n d i a  has  little  can  be  of a group of  According to them, i n an terminology  for  two  1 39  countries  in  an unequal  r e l a t i o n s h i p ) , the s u b o r d i n a t e country  although economically dependent  on  tries  length  to  maintain  an  arm's  the  superordinate relationship  s u p e r o r d i n a t e p a r t n e r i n order to a v o i d the p e r c e i v e d costs  of  increased  s i t u a t i o n where the upper r i p a r i a n  the  state,  vulnerable  position.  agreements  have  the  even  reached.  in-  The  5  such  How  a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t r a t e g i e s o u t l i n e d countries  superordinate/upstream  countries  superordinate/upstream  country  e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n but i t . i s my negotiations,  the  chances  superordinate/upstream it  is  hand.  the  may to  country  successful  and  i n Chapter  able  to  II,  persuade  Getting  the  to cooperate does not assure an contention  winning country.  be  the  However, with  cooperate.  subordinate/downstream of  also  situations  c o u n t r y . w i l l be depends on the s p e c i f i c c o n f l i c t  subordinate/downstream  its  is  to engage the superordinate/upstream  the nature of r e l a t i o n s between two c o - r i p a r i a n s . a prudent  political  subordinate/downstream  in n e g o t i a t i o n s over the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e . downstream  its  downstream country i s i n a very  However,  been  country can attempt  with  i n t e g r a t i o n . " T r a n s l a t e d i n t o an upstream-  downstream c o n f l i c t superordinate  country  that  by  initiating  country can maximize  concessions  from  the  In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , however,  superordinate/upstream  country which has the upper  1 40  A.  THE FIVE STAGES OF THE FARAKKA BARRAGE DISPUTE The Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e has not  the  thirty  odd  years that  remained  static  i t has been going on.  over  Based on the  nature of the o v e r a l l p a t t e r n of power r e l a t i o n s between the cor i p a r i a n s , the d i s p u t e has evolved through stage had  i t s own  influenced  the  five  stages.  p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r which, to a l a r g e extent, b a r g a i n i n g s t y l e adopted by each r i p a r i a n .  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the d i s p u t e i n t o stages helps the  actions  context.  and  It  committing  reactions  also  saves  us  to  of the d i s p u t a n t s i n an us,  as  political  The  analyse  historical  analysts,  from  o u r s e l v e s to a s i m p l i s t i c a n a l y s i s of the s t r a t e g i e s  used by Pakistan/Bangladesh as the lower r i p a r i a n the  Each  strategies  employed  by  state.  Pakistan/Bangladesh  While  were  very  instrumental i n persuading India to cooperate, t h e i r success failure  at  particular  periods  depended to a great extent on relations  between  subordinate/downstream powevr  relationship  Pakistan/Bangladesh Barrage  dispute  d i s p u t e and a l s o enable certain  strategies  The  which  will  a  the  clarify us  changing  pattern  of  superordinate/upstream  state.  during  of the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e  the  the  to  or  following  existed five the  and  analysis  between stages  structural  appreciate  the  subordinate/downstream  of  power the  of  India the  the and  Farakka  context of the importance s t a t e may  of  use to  achieve a s o l u t i o n to an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t . a. the  The Exchange of D i p l o m a t i c Notes: The  Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e spanned  first  stage  of  a p e r i o d of nine y e a r s .  As  141  mentioned e a r l i e r ,  i t began on October  19,  complaint  by  the  lodged  Pakistan  with  1951  with  a  government  r e g a r d i n g the l a t t e r ' s plans to c o n s t r u c t  the  formal of I n d i a  Farakka  Barrage  a c r o s s the Ganges a few m i l e s from the East P a k i s t a n border. ended  in  June i960 with the f i r s t meeting of t e c h n i c a l  It  experts  from both c o u n t r i e s . R e l a t i o n s between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n c o r r e c t " which i s another way  were  "diplomatically  of saying that although d i p l o m a t i c  channels were open, r e l a t i o n s were l e s s than f r i e n d l y . of  power,  Pakistan  and  India  were  In terms  roughly equal with I n d i a  having a s l i g h t edge owing to i t s l a r g e r p o p u l a t i o n and land  area.  As c o - r i p a r i a n s on a number of major  r i v e r s , such as the Indus, India  was  in  an  the  Ganges,  and  countries  newly independent  wary  of  s c a l e war  and  other  especially  dispute,  t h e r e f o r e mostly  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and development.  each  Brahmaputra,  advantageous p o s i t i o n by v i r t u e of being  During t h i s stage of the Farakka  with domestic  international  the  upper r i p a r i a n . were  greater  They  s i n c e they had  over the d i s p u t e d Kashmir area i n 1948.  the both  occupied  were  very  fought a small 6  During t h i s p r e p a r a t o r y stage P a k i s t a n simply wanted to get India to acknowledge that a problem e x i s t e d , and,  i n order to do  t h i s , P a k i s t a n f o r m a l l y p r o t e s t e d about the a l l e g e d c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Farakka sense  that  when  sent r e m i n d e r s . because  Barrage.  7  P a k i s t a n was  no r e p l y was The  Pakistan  quite  forthcoming government's  persistent  the  from I n d i a , P a k i s t a n efforts  a f t e r a while the Indian government agreed  with P a k i s t a n on a r e c i p r o c a l b a s i s .  in  paid  off  t o cooperate  However, although P a k i s t a n  1 42  s u p p l i e d the Indians project,  information  the Indians withheld any  Farakka p r o j e c t . of  with  on  the  Ganges-Kobadak  information p e r t a i n i n g to the  India d i d agree to exchange a  limited  amount  t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n with P a k i s t a n but t h i s concession came  only a f t e r plans f o r the Farakka p r o j e c t were f i n a l i z e d and Indian parliament b.  had approved i t .  Wallowing in T e c h n i c a l Data:  The  second stage of  Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e began with the f i r s t June 1960  and  Relations  lasted  between  until India  decade to such an extent first  in  May  1965,  December 1971.  8  the  the  e x p e r t s ' meeting in  Indo-Pakistan  war  of  1971.  and P a k i s t a n d e t e r i o r a t e d d u r i n g that they engaged i n war  then  in  September  1965,  three and  this  times:  f i n a l l y in  T h i s l a s t c o n f r o n t a t i o n dismembered P a k i s t a n  what used to be East Pakistan became the  the  independent  state  and of  Bangladesh. A comparative power assessment of India and this  period  would  u n t i l Pakistan was international Egypt  and  alignment.  recognise split  system  On  India gained of  the  concept  the other  The  South two  economy border exposed  its  the  o r i g i n a t i n g , along  with  and  practice  of  (CENTO and  proved  that  c o u l d s u s t a i n a long, drawn-out c o n f r o n t a t i o n . conflict  with the People's  India's  Republic  vulnerability.  1 1  non-  integrated into  became a member of the  Pakistan  two  in  East Asian Treaty O r g a n i s a t i o n s  wars between India and  during  between the  some s t a t u r e  s i d e , P a k i s t a n was  American system of a l l i a n c e s and and  rough balance  because  Yugoslavia, 9  up.  a  Pakistan  of  However,  China the  the  Central SEATO).  10  neither's India's in  1962 border  143  c o n f r o n t a t i o n s with China only i n c r e a s e d to  India's  strengthen and modernize i t s armed f o r c e s .  to  do with S o v i e t and American h e l p .  1 2  determination  T h i s i t proceeded  Despite attempts  by  both  India and P a k i s t a n to achieve s u p e r i o r i t y , both s i d e s were about equal i n m i l i t a r y  capabilities.  N e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka from both c o u n t r i e s .  The  i s s u e s t a r t e d between experts  substantive technical  i s s u e s that were  d i s c u s s e d i n c l u d e d an assessment of the needs of and East P a k i s t a n . available  In order to f i n d out how  during  different  months  d i s c h a r g e measurements had to be points  of  the  Ganges.  ended on January exchange  8,  of d a t a .  1962  By  of  port  much water would be  the  carried  Calcutta  year,  out  surveys of  along  different  the f o u r t h experts' meeting which  c o n s i d e r a b l e progress was  made  in  the  However, f u r t h e r progress c o u l d not be made  1 3  because of I n d i a ' s demand f o r more and more data. During t h i s stage, there was of  the  dispute.  In  the f i r s t  a definite shift  i n the  focus  stage P a k i t s t a n ' s e f f o r t s were  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y d i r e c t e d toward stopping India from b u i l d i n g Farakka  Barrage  without  c o n s t r u c t i o n on the Farakka  being  consulted  p r o j e c t was  first.  underway, the  the Once  focus  of  the d i s p u t e (from P a k i s t a n ' s standpoint) s h i f t e d to an e q u i t a b l e allocation  of  the  Ganges'  spurred t e c h n i c a l exchanges.  flow.  The q u e s t i o n of a l l o c a t i o n  Despite  with these s o - c a l l e d t e c h n i c a l meetings, follow I n d i a ' s l e a d . East  Pakistan's  The presence  western  border  Pakistan's  i t had no c h o i c e but to  of the Farakka had  frustrations  changed  d i s c u s s i o n s from an argument over a " p r i n c i p l e " to  Barrage the an  across  focus  of  argument  144  over  "sharing." Had  India  stage and probable  not  allowed  insisted  on more and  that r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from India and  management  India's  of  intention.  Ganges It  not  Barrage was  complete and o p e r a t i o n a l .  Barrage  to decide  Embrace; The  assassination Negotiations  However, that was that  anything  third  the  the  of  Sheikh  Mujibur  circumstances  established  Bangladesh, now negotiating  initially  Rahman  over the Farakka assumed a new  changed  Indian  an  with  conditions  and  in  Farakka  in  light  subcontinent.  The  that  country,  subcontinent.  The  stronger these no  sense  more  confident  negotiations of  the  India.  were  peaceful  and  strain  that  had  Pakistan.  of Bangladesh's independence, the  to c r e a t e a j o i n t  body in  order  that  water  resources  of the region c o u l d be u t i l i s e d on an  basis  for  mutual  the  countries." " 1  This  it  a  months  governments decided  1975.  was  was  four  the  in  the  c h a r a c t e r i z e d n e g o t i a t i o n s between India and Within  with  the  independent but p o l i t i c a l l y weak country,  surrounding there  predominance  with  August  dimension  weakened  Indian  the  ending in  the  never  u n t i l the Farakka  stage of  1971  dismemberment of Pakistan not only also  efficient  d i s p u t e spanned more than four years beginning  c r e a t i o n of Bangladesh i n December  of  ensured  surprising  was  Paternalistic  Pakistan c o u l d have  have  waters.  is  unwilling  would  government  c.  this  p o l i t i c a l exchanges to take p l a c e , i t i s q u i t e  hammered out an agreement which joint  more data d u r i n g  benefit  joint  body  of  the  peoples  was  called  the  of  two "the  equitable the  two  Indo-Bangladesh  145  J o i n t R i v e r s Commission  (JRC).  issue went ahead at f u l l JRC,  the  Indian  proposing India's  speed.  government  ministerial part  Negotiations  had  a  level  j It  Bangladesh  meetings.  l o t to  15  This  was i n I n d i a ' s Indians  The explained  The Barrage had been completed i n late  1973.  16  i n t e r e s t to r e s o l v e the i s s u e at t h i s p o i n t .  wanted to push a s o l u t i o n through d u r i n g the I n d i r a As i t turned  Barrage.  out,  lack  of  by  the  1 7  progress fact  over  that  the  during  Farakka the  issue  first  Bangladesh's e x i s t e n c e , Bangladesh's l e a d e r s f e l t Mrs.  the c i v i l  war.  Bangladesh  to  differ  leaders  with  There c e r t a i n l y were d i f f e r e n c e s countries,  but  felt  of  very  had with  grateful during  i t would  between  be  issues. the two  Bangladesh's l e a d e r s thought i t more prudent to  India.  actually  I n d i a ' s views as to  needed  during  the d i f f e r e n c e s  how  much  the dry s e a s o n .  statement issued a f t e r the  1974 c o n t a i n e d  on  There were a l s o r e p o r t s that Sheikh Mujib  was naive enough to accept  since the j o i n t  that  opinion  be  few years of  India on most b i l a t e r a l  emphasize good r e l a t i o n s rather than focus  Bangladesh  can  Gandhi's government f o r l e n d i n g a c t i v e support  inappropriate  of  on  i s s u e s were s e t t l e d during the summit but not the issue of  the Farakka  they  l e a d e r s by  do with the s t a t e of the Farakka  Mujib summit h e l d i n New D e l h i i n May 1974. many  Farakka  generosity  but the feeder canal would not be ready u n t i l  The  to  the  r e g u l a r s e s s i o n s of the  surprised  Barrage and the feeder c a n a l . 1970  Besides  over  1 8  Indira-Mujib  water  However, summit  only a statement of p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r than an  a c t u a l agreement, Mujib o b v i o u s l y had h i s own d o u b t s .  1 9  1 46  While Bangladesh was f o l l o w i n g a p o l i c y of c o o p e r a t i o n I n d i a , India r e c i p r o c a t e d i n a  way  paternalism.  believed  Indian  leaders  which  sometimes  with d e l e g a t i o n s  because  from P a k i s t a n .  Bangladesh's  chief  T h i s stage signed  than  Pakistan  of the d i s p u t e a l s o  B.M.  Abbas, had a l s o  delegations.  saw  an  2 0  interim  agreement  between India and Bangladesh so that India c o u l d  the now completed Farakka Barrage and the experimental misgivings chose  basis.  It  2 1  to  feeder  canal  operate on  an  i s c l e a r that Bangladesh had c e r t a i n  about t h i s agreement, but  not  they  T h i s proved to be d i f f i c u l t  negotiator,  been a key member of p r e v i o u s  resembled  that they would have a  much e a s i e r time d e a l i n g with Bangladesh n e g o t i a t o r s had  with  f o r reasons  yet  unclear  make too much of i t . On the augmentation i s s u e ,  however, Bangladesh took a tougher  stand.  was t o t a l l y opposed to the Indian p r o p o s a l  Because  Bangladesh  f o r augmentation, JRC  d e l i b e r a t i o n s came to a s t a n d s t i l l by December 1974. The  a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Mujibur Rahman i n August  an end to t h i s Barrage  stage  of  the  Farakka  dispute.  the q u e s t i o n d. and  From H o s t i l i t y  to Compromise;  Bangladesh d e t e r i o r a t e d during t h i s  in  dispute.  Farakka  The foeus of of s h a r i n g  to  of augmentation.  Barrage d i s p u t e . were  The  was o p e r a t i n g under an i n t e r i m agreement.  the d i s c u s s i o n s had now s h i f t e d from the question  1975 brought  some  R e l a t i o n s between India stage  of  the  Farakka  India's i n i t i a t i v e s and Bangladesh's responses ways  reminiscent  The events of August  of  the  1975 (Mujib's  second  stage  of the  assassination  and  1 47  its  aftermath)  were  i n t e r p r e t e d by India as m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of  a n t i - I n d i a n sentiments, and attempts by Bangladesh diplomatic  relations  a n t i - I n d i a n moves. Indian  High  to  establish  with P a k i s t a n , China, and Saudi A r a b i a as  There was  Commissioner  an attempt  on  in Dhaka to kidnap  November 26,  1975.  These  the  events  brought the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two c o u n t r i e s to an a l l time  low.  Not  willing  to accept the s i t u a t i o n  I n d i a began to mount a massive propaganda new  i n Bangladesh,  campaign  against  the  r u l e r s i n Bangladesh and there were a l s o r e p o r t s of a t t a c k s  on outposts  along  Indian  2 2  side.  During  the  Mymensingh-Meghalaya  a l l this  time,  India  continued  withdrawal of Ganges waters at Farakka. Bangladesh  protest  note  started  border  a  its  On January year  from  unilateral  15,  of p u b l i c  the  1976  a  dispute.  Bangladesh a l l e g e d that Indian withdrawals at Farakka at the end of the f o r t y - d a y agreement c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of the understanding.  23  Meanwhile,  w i t h i n Bangladesh, p u b l i c outcry a g a i n s t Indian  a t t a c k s and u n i l a t e r a l withdrawal of crescendo. protest  Hundreds of thousands march  organised  Ganges  waters  reached  of Bangladeshis took part  by  Maulana  nonagenarian  nationalist  leader. " It  that  Bangladesh  authorities  while  existing  is  2  took  Bhasani,  a  interesting  not  permit  government's way country  was  a of  united  confrontation. demonstrating  2 5  to  in a  famous to  note  no steps to stop the  p r o t e s t march, they assured India that Bangladesh border would  a  T h i s was India  a g a i n s t India i n the f i g h t  the  that  forces  Bangladesh the  for their  whole water  148  rights.  I t i s reported  that  the  protest  border s e c u r i t y f o r c e s on the a l e r t . Meanwhile, for the f i r s t  they  bargaining  s t r a t e g y of r e q u e s t i n g  delaying  were  tactics  resumed,  on  the  compromising a t t i t u d e on prompted  Bangladesh  As d i s c u s s e d  for negotiations  India  went  issue  to  matters  its  of  bilateral  to take the matter to the United  concern Nations.  i n Chapter I I I , however, the Bangladesh s t r a t e g y of dividends.  impasse i n t a l k s was not broken u n t i l M o r a r j i Desai was  government  in  considerably. relations,  power  Indo-Bangladesh  With a c e r t a i n  degree  relations  of  harmony  improved  restored  i n the ensuing months.  in  Undeterred by the lukewarm  r e c e p t i o n i t r e c e i v e d i n the General Assembly, Bangladesh proceeded  to  political  support.  During negotiations  approach  this  international  agencies  stage  adroitly.  of Once  issues i n negotiations  the  dispute,  Bangladesh  i t chose  f o r maximum b e n e f i t .  Bangladesh at l e a s t with 2 8  f o r moral and  tackled  the Bangladesh government sensed  the November 1977 agreement between  the Ganges' f l o w .  still  27  India's w i l l i n g n e s s t o s e t t l e the d i s p u t e ,  favoured  Janata  b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka d i s p u t e made  some progress  out,  old  India's  e l e c t e d Prime M i n i s t e r of India i n March 1977. With the  other  and,  and i t s general non-  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n d i d not pay immediate The  back  an exchange of data.  Farakka  other  Indian  withdrawals c o u l d be f e l t  Bangladesh pressed  although  kept  2 6  the e f f e c t s of Indian  time.  march  regard  India  to  include  As i t turned  and  Bangladesh  to dry season share of  In June 1977, Ziaur Rahman was able to get a  1 49  promise from M o r a r j i Desai  i n London  to  the  effect  that  the  Indian government would not g i v e s h e l t e r to g u e r r i l l a s i n Indian territory. On  2 9  the  question  of  augmentation,  both  c o n s i d e r each other's p r o p o s a l s w i t h i n the next charged the JRC with the t a s k .  s i d e s agreed to three years  and  From 1977 to e a r l y 1980, the JRC  d e l i b e r a t i o n s proved f u t i l e because n e i t h e r India nor Bangladesh would  budge  from  their  positions  on  the  question  of  T h i s stage of the d i s p u t e r e v e a l s an i n t e r e s t i n g aspect  of  augmentat i o n .  upstream-downstream country  and  domestic  a  conflict  between  a  subordinate/downstream  political  changes  within  the  improve the chances of the downstream settlement.  However,  too  because the upstream country that  might  these can downstream  be do  superordinate/upstream  much  country.  Sometimes  upstream  country can  country  should  not  i s not l i k e l y  country  "windows  i s prudent,  of  negotiate  be  made of t h i s  to agree to  d e t r i m e n t a l to i t s i n t e r e s t s . i s create  to  a  anything  A l l changes l i k e  opportunity."  I f the  i t can take advantage of the  o p p o r t u n i t i e s , j u s t as Bangladesh d i d . e. stage  Stalemate or Indian V i c t o r y ? of  the d i s p u t e began i n January  r e - e l e c t i o n as Indian prime m i n i s t e r . stage  of  The  the  dispute,  the  focus  fifth  and  1980 with Mrs. Throughout  has  this  current Gandhi's current  p r i m a r i l y been on the  augmentat ion of the dry season flow of the Ganges.  Although the  q u e s t i o n of augmentation was r e p e a t e d l y d i s c u s s e d by the JRC i n i t s meetings d u r i n g  1977, 1978, and 1979, there was no p r o g r e s s .  1 50  It  was  only a f t e r January  a blatantly p o l i t i c a l been  argued  that  colour.  the  l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of India  and  underplay always  that the Farakka d i s p u t e assumed Throughout  non-solution the  Both  the p o l i t i c a l  nature  In  this  of  differing  Bangladesh.  successful.  political  1980  the  the  the  o b j e c t i v e s are more prominent  has been  objectives  diligently dispute  current  it  d i s p u t e has  political  countries of  thesis  of  tried  but  to  were  not  stage  of  the  dispute,  than  in  the  previous  stages. The an  f i f t h and c u r r e n t stage of the d i s p u t e  important  reminder to r i v e r d i s p u t e a n a l y s t s and  asymmetric dyads that the f a t e s are i n favour country  i s in many ways  in  the  dyad.  With  India's a t t i t u d e became  Mrs.  totally  students  of  of the predominant  Gandhi's r e t u r n to power,  non-compromising.  India  not  only expressed  i t s r e g r e t s over the stalemate  on the question  augmentation,  it  of n e g o t i a t i n g the  s h a r i n g aspect  which, a c c o r d i n g  Bangladesh.  India  30  also  raised  to  be  enough water received  drier for  its  c l a u s e , there was  than  share  and  of  very l i t t l e  and  Lt.  General  India.  water  leader) in November 1982, of  the  eighty  per  Because  f o r use  (Bangladesh's  clause.  Therefore,  1980 not  Bangladesh cent  i n West Bengal.  signed  India r e f u s e d to allow  cent  of  under the e i g h t y per  water l e f t  Ershad  progress  As a r e s u l t , there was  When the Memorandum of Understanding was Gandhi  favoured  To be f a i r , the winter  usual.  Bangladesh  fair  to I n d i a , have h e a v i l y  blames Bangladesh f o r the lack of  over the augmentation q u e s t i o n . proved  the q u e s t i o n  of  new the  by  Mrs.  military inclusion  although  the  151  Memorandum of Understanding  has been h a i l e d as an  the  1977 Agreement f o r another  year  formula  guarantees  other a g r i c u l t u r a l  activities  are extended  Memorandum of Understanding  Nepal  from  consultations.  Ganges'  flow  with  no  T h i s means that as i r r i g a t i o n and  Bangladesh w i l l be l e f t with a dwindling The  of  two y e a r s , i t i s a c t u a l l y a two-  f o r sharing the dry season f o r Bangladesh.  extension  also  This  i n West  Bengal,  share of Ganges specifically  means  that  waters.  leaves out Bangladesh's  p r o p o s a l s f o r augmentation w i l l be very hard t o r e a l i z e . Bangladesh  has  not  augmentation q u e s t i o n  .  budged  from  i t s position  The Memorandum of Understanding  to e x p i r e i n a few months.  i s due  I t i s only a q u e s t i o n of time  India can r e a s s e r t i t s predominance i n t h i s B.  over the  before  regard.  THE FARAKKA BARRAGE; THE ARCHETYPE OF AN UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM  CONFLICT The  Farakka  barrage  dispute  d i s p u t e between two neighbours. be  traced  as  f a r back  i s essentially  The o r i g i n s of the d i s p u t e  as 1951 when P a k i s t a n , quoting  press r e p o r t s , lodged a formal p r o t e s t with India  regarding  and  this  11 miles from the East Pakistan  s t a r t e d a d i s p u t e between  continued  until  the Farakka  Barrage  Bangladesh, and although an  Indian  India  of  across  border.  and  3 1  Pakistan  1971 when East Pakistan seceded  Pakistan and became the independent s t a t e of Bangladesh. 1971,  can  the government  the l a t t e r ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n of a barrage  the Ganges River about The p r o t e s t note  a riparian  from Since  d i s p u t e continued between I n d i a and interim  agreement  was  signed  in  1 52  November  1977,  the  dispute  resurfaced  agreement had  f a i l e d to r e s o l v e a l l the  the  Barrage.  Farakka  India  and  Bangladesh  (starting formula  from for  countries. the terms  To  3 2  of  comprehensive  the  which  of  However,  era)  years  Farakka  which have to be settlement the  provides  waters  is  on  both  reached  Barrage d i s p u t e satisfactorily  can be reached.  Ganges'  agreement  between  negotiations  the only  between  sides  guiding  these  and,  flow  resolved  progress  in  The  during  i n v o l v e s two  first the  t h i s i s s u e but  discussions  countries during of Understanding  dry  to extend the  second  issue  1982.  between  1977  involves  the  agreement f o r the q u e s t i o n  proposed violently  Bangladesh alternative  and  India.  schemes  1977. issues  comprehensive  countries.  sharing  The  1977  f o r the d u r a t i o n of  the  In the absence  any  of  both  two  of  from  in force, a  both  Memorandum  countries  more  years.  increasing  augmentation  was The  of augmentation of the  Both I n d i a and  opposed to the other's  be  season when the flow i s  to meet the  for  a  likely  different  representatives  leaders  season flow of the Ganges i n order both  only  with  will  i s s u e i n v o l v e s the  the time the t r e a t y was between  two  unless  country  r e s o l v e d before a  t r e a t y which ended on November 5,  of  1977  soon, i t i s q u i t e  lowest and cannot meet the needs of both  signed  with  even the share of Ganges waters i t r e c e i v e d as of  The  of  associated  of  that Bangladesh as the subordinate/downstream denied  this  i s increasing dissatisfaction  agreement  settlement  because  the agreement of  Ganges  there  issues  embodies  Pakistan  sharing  this  date,  again  dry  needs  Bangladesh have but  scheme f o r p o l i t i c a l  each  is  reasons.  153  Bangladesh proposed the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 81 23  would  be  in  Nepal  reservoirs  on the Ganges b a s i n .  dry  season.  Because some of these  Nepal, that country, included  in  according  future  at  important least  should  on augmentation.  other  solution  to  during  also  In f a c t ,  the  an e q u i t a b l e  River  Brahmaputra  Bangladesh border. of  this  barrage  on  an  its  or  Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e .  I n d i a , meanwhile, has proposed c o n s t r u c t i o n of a barrage the  be  interested states constitutes  s t r a t e g y f o r Bangladesh to achieve  optimal  later  r e s e r v o i r s would be i n  Bangladesh,  discussions  attempt to i n c l u d e Nepal and an  to  which  These r e s e r v o i r s  would s t o r e water during the monsoons f o r r e l e a s e the  of  territory  just  A canal would be c o n s t r u c t e d  across  outside just  the  upstream  to l i n k the Brahmaputra R i v e r with the Ganges  j u s t upstream of the Farakka Barrage.  Part of  the  would have to pass through Bangladesh t e r r i t o r y .  link  canal  The a d d i t i o n a l  flow of the Brahmaputra would e f f e c t i v e l y augment the dry  season  flow of the Ganges f o r both c o u n t r i e s . Today,  after  of sharing and seems  that  the e x p i r y of the  augmentat ion  India,  being  winning the b a t t l e .  But  without  The  a  fight.  Bangladesh withstand  more  economic  southwestern  region.  both  agreement, the  being  issues  re-examined.  It  the upstream/superordinate country  Bangladesh i s important  not  about  question  India's p r e s s u r e ,  that the more time i t takes the  are  1977  is  to how  give  up  long  can  keeping i n mind the  to reach a comprehensive  a d v e r s i t i e s Bangladesh has  is  fact  settlement,  to s u f f e r i n i t s  1 54  C.  STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY  PAKISTAN/BANGLADESH  In an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t , has  very  few  r i p a r i a n to although  In  legalistic  Chapter  approach  resolving a r i p a r i a n dispute, precedents  which  support  p a r t i c u l a r dispute the  upper  citing  the  India's a t t e n t i o n . the  bargaining  In  downstream  the  riparian's for  help  stand  and in  discussions  reasonable  can  adopt  in  norms  a  with  c i t e d the H e l s i n k i Rules'  country  well  apportionment"  a  agrees  to  number  of  to reach an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n to  case  of  the  adopted  Formal p r o t e s t and  Farakka  the  to f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the  following  T e c h n i c a l exchange; to upgrade t a l k s ;  Attempts to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s ; t h r e a t of  retaliation.  Internationalization; Issue-area  linkage;  strategies  exchange of d i p l o m a t i c  Cooperat i o n ;  Pressure  Barrage  dispute:  T a l k s between l e a d e r s ;  The  usually  that  dispute.  Pakistan/Bangladesh effort  shown  Once the upstream country  s t r a t e g i e s in order  the r i p a r i a n  have  international  lower  Pakistan  3 3  I not  u s u a l l y forms a b a s i s  riparian.  negotiate,  II,  does  p u b l i c i z e d p r i n c i p l e of " e q u i t a b l e and to get  country  options a v a i l a b l e with which to induce the upper  cooperate. a  the downstream  notes;  dispute, in  an  1 55  10) M o b i l i z e opinion.  domestic  and  international  public  34  Although  these  strategies  were given  necessarily  in  the  discernible  in  Pakistan/Bangladesh's  conceded to h o l d  order  not  employed at one time nor  above,  once  clearly I n d i a had  talks.  the p e r i o d preceding  Pakistan's  were  actions  Formal p r o t e s t and exchange of d i p l o m a t i c During  they  objective  was  to  notes  a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n with make  India  India,  acknowledge  that a  barrage at Farakka would be d e t r i m e n t a l  to the i n t e r e s t s of East  Pakistan.  a  the  To t h i s end, P a k i s t a n  lodged  Indian government e x p r e s s i n g  barrage at Farakka. consulted vital  before  Pakistan  Pakistan pointed  out  p r e l i m i n a r y stage,  that  any p r o j e c t or scheme l i k e l y  saying  that  the l a t t e r  protest  the  While project  kept on sending  i t should  India was  tried only  notes  followed  on  at  a  government  i t s d i p l o m a t i c notes with reminders every  sending  to  requesting  To keep the matter moving, the P a k i s t a n  India delayed  be  to p r e j u d i c e i t s  cooperation. up  with  concern about India's proposed  i n t e r e s t s was put i n t o o p e r a t i o n .  reassure  formal  time  i t s replies.  The s t r a t e g y of l o d g i n g a formal p r o t e s t and  following i t  up with d i p l o m a t i c notes was p a r t l y s u c c e s s f u l inasmuch as India was persuaded t o maintain  a steady  However,  to  nature were  when  i t came  correspondence with  actual  i n f o r m a t i o n of a t e c h n i c a l  p e r t a i n i n g to the Farakka Barrage silent.  Pakistan  c o u l d press the Indians  was  also  Pakistan.  project,  the  Indians  in a peculiar position. It  only so much s i n c e c o n s t r u c t i o n work had  156  not  s t a r t e d on the p r o j e c t s i t e at  matter  forward,  Pakistan  negotiation.  point.  To  suggested a r b i t r a t i o n  move by P a k i s t a n prompted the direct  that  Indian  move  i n 1957.  government  to  the This  35  agree  India agreed t o exchange a l i m i t e d amount  of t e c h n i c a l data with P a k i s t a n .  Pakistan's  o b j e c t i v e to  enter  i n t o d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n with I n d i a , t h e r e f o r e , was achieved combination  of  arbitration.  There were c e r t a i n reasons why these compelling  strategies  succeeded  India to agree t o d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n .  F i r s t , at  that p o i n t of the d i s p u t e , I n d i a was intervention  might  result  worried  that  Second, by  n e g o t i a t e , I n d i a was a c t u a l l y conceding  nothing  contrary,  the  I n d i a ' s favour projects  in  third-party  i n an i n j u n c t i o n which c o u l d  c o n s t r u c t i o n work at the barrage s i t e .  the  by a  l o d g i n g a formal p r o t e s t , exchanging d i p l o m a t i c  notes and suggesting  in  to  exchange  of  technical  prevent  agreeing  to  to P a k i s t a n .  On  data c o u l d work i n  since i t c o u l d get i n f o r m a t i o n regarding East  Pakistan.  certain  T h i r d , and most i m p o r t a n t l y , the  exchange of t e c h n i c a l data would g i v e India the time to go ahead with the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Farakka Barrage without of the work being In  January  after  1976,  the Bangladesh government a l s o lodged a  the  end  of  the  "forty-day  c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of the a g r e e m e n t . although a  danger  stopped.  formal p r o t e s t with I n d i a , a l l e g i n g that Indian Farakka  any  36  withdrawals  at  understanding"  Unfortunately,  however,  Bangladesh p r o t e s t e d f r e q u e n t l y i n s e v e r a l f o r a and by  variety  of media, Indian withdrawals at Farakka continued at  or near the maximum mark allowed  by the p r o j e c t .  In t h i s  case,  157  the  lodging  of a formal p r o t e s t was  more an act of  desperation  on the part of Bangladesh rather than a well-planned It  i s not  s u r p r i s i n g that India d i d not  Relations low.  between India and  Both s i d e s were complaining  their  common  border.  because. Bangladesh unacceptable the  flow  India was  had  to I n d i a .  at  set  of shooting  some  would  preconditions  be c o n s i d e r a b l y  a l r e a d y withdrawing water the s t a t u s  interest.  Fourth,  the  assassination  came as a shock to Mrs. displeasure  to  the  Gandhi  new  incidents  across  n e g o t i a t i o n s c o u l d not  T h i r d , with the onset  Farakka  favourably.  Bangladesh were at an a l l - t i m e  Second,  3 7  respond  strategy.  and  resume  which  were  of the dry-season, reduced and quo  since  suited  its  of Sheikh in Bangladesh  she  wanted  to  show  her  regime i n Bangladesh by t a k i n g a tough  stand on the Farakka i s s u e . T a l k s between l e a d e r s During  various  Pakistan/Bangladesh  points  in  arranged  r i p a r i a n s t a t e s i n an e f f o r t to  clear  up  heads  of s t a t e conference.  Farakka Barrage.  I t was  Farakka  Barrage  dispute,  between l e a d e r s of the  co-  to e i t h e r speed up n e g o t i a t i o n s  or  i n London i n  point. 1961  These two  d i s c u s s a number of b i l a t e r a l  and  talks  some c o n t e n t i o u s  M i n i s t e r Nehru met  the  P r e s i d e n t Ayub and during  Prime  the  Commonwealth  l e a d e r s met  i n f o r m a l l y to  i s s u e s i n c l u d i n g the  agreed by the two  issue of  l e a d e r s that  the  Pakistan  India would cooperate on the Farakka Barrage p r o j e c t and  decision  to  a l l o c a t e shares  at the m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l . clarified  the  Indian  3 8  the  of the Ganges' flow would be taken  Unfortunately,  however, Nehru  later  p o s i t i o n by saying that m i n i s t e r s ' l e v e l  158  meetings c o u l d take place only a f t e r the t e c h n i c a l s o r t e d out. not  Although the Nehru-Ayub "understanding" of  reap immediate b e n e f i t s f o r P a k i s t a n ,  for  future  negotiation  between  the  co-riparians:  d i d not in  progress  see eye  these  but  India  broken by d i r e c t  intervention  suggested  Nepal c o u l d be  direct  disagreed.  from  Prime  This  India  included  impasse  was  Desai  who  Minister  point for  so that n e g o t i a t i o n s  Zia  was  conference.  in  New  her.  time,  however,  personal  clear  contact  the l a s t  had  Treaty  during  impossible  severely her  for  anything  on  up.  39  to address a  The  problem  between  failure  of  with  the  two  direct  l e a d e r s of the c o - r i p a r i a n s t a t e s in  be e x p l a i n e d  in the f o l l o w i n g way.  criticised  office  for the  that Z i a ' s suggestion attack  smoothly.  1980  this  tete-a-tete  the  five-year  campaign.  to change her  the  reason  the  election  her  e l e c t e d to  important  Gandhi to d i s c u s s  between  instance can  Gandhi  proceed  Since d i s c u s s i o n s of augmentation were making Mrs.'  l e a d e r s d i d not  could  D e l h i i n February  he met  This  "approached."  the  i n t e r v e n t i o n by a leader r e s o l v e d a c o n t e n t i o u s  no progress,  direct  of  instance,  President  being  flow  In t h i s  the time being  U.N.  political  Bangladesh wanted Nepal to be  discussions  that  formula  c o u l d be made because Bangladesh and  to eye.  did  experts.  In d i s c u s s i o n s of augmentation of dry season no  were  1961  i t d i d set the  d i s c u s s i o n would follow t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n by  Ganges,  issues  of  It  Prime  Ganges Waters  was  tune j u s t a few  Mrs.  well  nigh  months a f t e r  Minister.  The  other  f a i l u r e of the Zia-Gandhi meeting  to i n c l u d e  the Indian  Nepal  in  discussions  p o l i c y of b i l a t e r a l i s m  was  was a  in dealing  159  with  i t s neighbours."  only  achieve  Therefore,  0  p a r t i a l success.  meetings between  leaders  On matters of n a t i o n a l p r i o r i t y ,  d i r e c t p e r s o n a l contact between l e a d e r s of d i f f e r e n t not  likely In  to r e s o l v e  late  states  1977,  President  Zia  during  a  to upgrade the J o i n t  visit  Rivers  (JRC)  to i n c l u d e m i n i s t e r s from both governments."  this  decision,  the JRC  was  transformed  1  to I n d i a Commission  By v i r t u e of  from a p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l  body with only recommending powers to a p o l i t i c a l and with  "greater"  powers.  meeting between Z i a and Desai was  now  represented  Bangladesh  had  by  In  this  political  informal  of the JRC.  decision-makers,  wanted f o r many years.  commitment  technical  i n s t a n c e , an  changed the nature  can always h e l p c l e a r up l i t t l e strong  n e g o t i a t o r s w i l l have the  Meetings between l e a d e r s  problems..  to  reach  bargaining  strategy."  authority  agreement,  It  something  Where  there  is  by the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p to cooperate,  necessary  is  anything.  persuaded M o r a r j i Desai  body  can  to  make  the  a the  compromises  or at l e a s t develop a  flexible  2  Cooperation At v a r i o u s times d u r i n g the Farakka Barrage Pakistan  and  dispute,  Bangladesh f o l l o w e d a s t r a t e g y of c o o p e r a t i o n  India with mixed r e s u l t s .  A cooperative  strategy  was  their  sincerity.  countries  f o r i n s t a n c e , suggested  should  India  They proposed that the c o - r i p a r i a n s work  j o i n t l y to manage t h e i r common water resources Pakistan,  with  adopted  because Pakistan/Bangladesh hoped that t h i s would convince of  both  consider  in  constructing  1961  efficiently. that  the  two  a j o i n t barrage.  The  160  southwestern r e g i o n of gravity  channels  East  f e d from  p o t e n t i a l s i t e e x i s t e d at barrage  Pakistan a  could  barrage  Lalgola  across  which  would  e q u a l l y i n India and East P a k i s t a n .  satisfactory  from  an e n g i n e e r i n g  be  irrigated the Ganges. have  been  The expensive unnecessary  I f the barrage  Pakistan  could  c o n t r i b u t i o n to the c o s t of the barrage was  totally  unsuccessful  because  c o n s t r u c t i o n on the Farakka s i t e . not  taken  seriously  considered  this  to  by be  the  were  standpoint, the p r o j e c t would  Bhagirathi-Hooghly  and  A  put the  have s u b s t a n t i a l economic advantages f o r both East Pakistan India.  by  and  feeder c a n a l would have have made a s u b s t a n t i a l itself.  India  4 3  had  This  strategy  already  begun  Besides, P a k i s t a n ' s o f f e r was  Indians  who,  perhaps  rightly,  a ploy on P a k i s t a n ' s p a r t t o delay the  c o n s t r u c t i o n of the barrage  a t Farakka.  In e a r l y 1972, Bangladesh suggested  the c r e a t i o n of a j o i n t  body which would a c t as a t e c h n i c a l and a d v i s o r y body to the two governments rivers.  4 4  f o r developing India  agreed  the  India  45  agreed  o b j e c t i o n s to c r e a t i n g  resources  at once to the suggestion  Bangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission 1972.  water  with a  (JRC) was  Bangladesh  joint  body  of  and the Indo-  formed  because  which  common  i n March i t had no  would  have  only  recommendatory powers and would be manned p r i m a r i l y by t e c h n i c a l experts  from both c o u n t r i e s .  the c r e a t i o n of such a body. is  there  any  mention  of  India a l s o had another  In the S t a t u t e of the JRC, nowhere the Farakka Barrage.  c r e a t e d to " c a r r y out a comprehensive survey shared  by the two c o u n t r i e s . "  interest in  I t was a body  of the r i v e r  T h i s meant that w i t h i n the  system scope  161  of  the  JRC's  a c t i v i t i e s would be i n c l u d e d the Brahmaputra and  Meghna b a s i n s , along with the shared  rivers.  which was f i r s t  Ganges,  the  Teesta,  and  other  Judging from I n d i a ' s p r o p o s a l f o r augmentation, mentioned  i n 1974, (the Ganges-Brahmaputra  link  c a n a l ) , Bangladesh's  p r o p o s a l to c r e a t e a j o i n t body was a l s o i n  India's  Bangladesh,  interest.  p r o p o s a l i n good f a i t h the  on  the  other  hand, made the  i n order t o e f f e c t a prompt  Farakka Barrage i s s u e .  Moreover,  a time when Indo-Bangladesh  solution  the suggestion was made at  r e l a t i o n s were at t h e i r best and the  Awami League government i n Dhaka had not yet gotten over grateful  to New D e l h i  to  f o r the support i t had given  l i b e r a t i o n d u r i n g the c i v i l  feeling  Bangladesh's  war l e s s than a year p r e v i o u s l y .  T e c h n i c a l Exchange Throughout  the n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka Barrage  there were times when t a l k s were completely broken India the  and Pakistan/Bangladesh.  exchange of t e c h n i c a l  other  projects  s t a r t i n g point  in  both  issue,  o f f between  When n e g o t i a t i o n s were resumed,  information countries  about  were  the  always  barrage  and  an important  f o r both s i d e s .  N e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka i s s u e broke  down  completely  j u s t before the 1965 war between P a k i s t a n and India and were not resumed 1968,  until  1968.  the  two s i d e s met i n New D e l h i i n  they exchanged t e c h n i c a l d a t a . "  August  quantities early  6  After  Mujib's  death  1975, n e g o t i a t i o n s broke down f o r almost a year.  t h i s period, India  in  When  of water  unilaterally  continued  from the Ganges.  to  withdraw  in  During large  When n e g o t i a t i o n s resumed  1976, t e c h n i c a l t a l k s formed the b a s i s  of  discussions  1 62  between  the  Indian  and Bangladesh d e l e g a t i o n s .  exchange c o n s t i t u t e d an important s t r a t e g y country to r e s t a r t n e g o t i a t i o n s Technical order  exchange  Thus t e c h n i c a l  f o r the  downstream  a f t e r a p e r i o d of stalemate.  also  had i t s s u b s t a n t i v e  aspects.  t o determine how much water would be r e q u i r e d  for Calcutta  port and how much f o r p r o j e c t s i n Bangladesh, two t h i n g s had be  calculated  first:  1)  basic  discharge  Ganges, and 2) p r o j e c t d e s c r i p t i o n s to projects  downstream of Farakka.  that although these d i s c u s s i o n s were interpretation  of  considerations." role  at  7  technical  data  water  needs  of  i n t e r e s t i n g to note  "technical,"  each  side's  was i n f l u e n c e d by p o l i t i c a l  Thus t e c h n i c a l exchange assumed  the s t a r t or resumption of n e g o t i a t i o n s  a l l e g e d " o b j e c t i v e " nature.  to  measurements of the  assess  I t i s very  In  Technical  India t o put o f f meaningful p o l i t i c a l  an  important  because of i t s  exchange, however, helped negotiation  as  long  as  possible. Pressure to Upgrade Throughout  Talks  the  negotiations  I n d i a , Pakistan/Bangladesh put talks  from  the  decision-makers' attempting  to  the p o l i t i c a l First, of  technical level.  convince  over the Farakka d i s p u t e  pressure  experts' The  lower  on  level  India to  riparian's  the  political  political  strategy  of  l e v e l was the d i r e c t r e s u l t of two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  Pakistan/Bangladesh f e l t that India was using  technical  upgrade  the upper r i p a r i a n to upgrade t a l k s to  the  exchange to put o f f s e r i o u s n e g o t i a t i o n .  even when the t e c h n i c a l problems were sorted out, the  to  with  decision-makers  from  both  excuse Second,  i t was  countries  only  who were  1 63  capable  of  pressure  making  on  the  India  to  Bangladesh) wanted to Farakka  substantive upgrade  bring  decisions.  talks,  about  a  By  Pakistan quick  putting  (and  solution  later, to the  dispute.  The  Nehru-Ayub  "agreement"  of  1961  d i d l a y down  foundations of m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l meetings between riparians." claiming  However,  8  India  that Nehru had agreed  later to  the  clarified  ministerial  level  a f t e r a l l the t e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s of the d i s p u t e  out.  For i n s t a n c e ,  pressed  two co-  i t s position,  only  Pakistan  the  meetings  were s o r t e d  f o r m i n i s t e r i a l meetings i n  November 1962 and May 1963 to move the matter forward, but India refused  to comply.  Pakistan  India  civil  servants')  because  was  only  after  r a i s e d the issue i n the U n i t e d  that  The  It  September  1968  Nations General Assembly  agreed to upgrade t a l k s to the s e c r e t a r i e s ' ( s e n i o r level.  strategy to India  was  upgrade  talks  not i n t i m i d a t e d .  was  largely  unsuccessful  India agreed to r a i s e the  l e v e l of t a l k s only when i t s u i t e d i t s i n t e r e s t s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  India r a i s e d the l e v e l of the t a l k s to the m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l 1972  without being  was  that  requested to do so by Bangladesh.  the Farakka Barrage was nearing  in India's  i n t e r e s t s to reach a s o l u t i o n  could go i n t o o p e r a t i o n Attempts to Involve In  an  both Pakistan on  several  when  in  The reason  completion and i t was so  that  the  barrage  as soon as c o n s t r u c t i o n was completed.  Third Parties  attempt to hasten a s o l u t i o n to the Farakka  crisis,  and Bangladesh attempted to i n v o l v e t h i r d  parties  occasions.  The  rationale  behind t h i s p o l i c y was  1 64  simple:  a  non-partisan  international approach  to  third  organisation) the Farakka  party  (be  it a  one.  The  dispute.  only  task  India to agree to t h i r d party easier  said  than  done.  Farakka Barrage dispute  or an  would presumably b r i n g an o b j e c t i v e A  mediated  t h e r e f o r e , would be i n f i n i t e l y more e q u i t a b l e negotiated  state  settlement,  than a b i l a t e r a l l y  that remained was to persuade  involvement.  India  This  repeatedly  proved  to be  i n s i s t e d that the  was e s s e n t i a l l y a b i l a t e r a l problem and,  t h e r e f o r e , a s o l u t i o n c o u l d only be the r e s u l t of b i l a t e r a l , not multilateral,  discussion.  As e a r l y as 1957, Pakistan dispute.  India  proposals  categorically  but agreed  technical  suggested  that  information  on  rejected  the  two  arbitration Pakistan's  countries  common r i v e r s .  secondary  motive.  The  to  sometimes  resulted  i n progress  negotiations  with  India.  Pakistan's  promoted b i l a t e r a l c o n s u l t a t i o n diplomatic  notes  information  with that  One question  of  involve made  bilateral  of a r b i t r a t i o n  indirect  exchange  of  country.  augmentation  Bangladesh's  position  on the  has been to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s i n  Bangladesh's proposal  f o r augmentation  includes  r e s e r v o i r s i n India and Nepal which can, t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  s t o r e enough water to maintain the Ganges' flow during season.  had a  third parties in  suggestion an  also  India to a d i r e c t exchange of t e c h n i c a l  of the c o r n e r s t o n e s of  discussions. storage  with  from  exchange  The lower r i p a r i a n ' s  the d i s p u t e  being  specific  could  s t r a t e g y to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s i n suggestion  i n the  By  attempting  to  include  Nepal  in  the dry  discussions,  165  Bangladesh wants to increase is  the  that  lower  riparian  country  on  concessions.  a  India  i t s bargaining  power.  Since  v i s - a - v i s Nepal, i t wants to deal basis  knows  in a t r i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n , i t  that  to  extract  same advantage that  from Nepal as the  state.  also  objectives. believes in the "divide  region and  Nepal  in  from broader and power  in  maximum  i t receives  discussions  more basic South  political India  gain maximum b e n e f i t from the other  states  in i t s d e a l i n g s with them by adopting a p o l i c y  act  in  If  the smaller  concert,  enjoys.  in d i s c u s s i o n s has  not  because  India  s t a t e s i n the might  lose  Bangladesh has  some  of  succeeded so f a r and it  goes  against  one  i s l i k e l y to f a i l  While  to  put  Bangladesh  pressure was  on  the  this  to  intimidate  Considering  apparently  enough  the s t a t e of Sino-Indian  decades, t h i s i s hardly appropriately  in the  surprising.  basis.  India  able to get  on  not  in  of India's c a r d i n a l  d e c l a r a t i o n s of support over i t s stand was  the  Bangladesh's s t r a t e g y to include Nepal  also t r i e d  China.  of  region were  p o l i c i e s - - t h a t of d e a l i n g with neighbours on a b i l a t e r a l  approaching  of  Asia,  rule."  future  include  predominant  i t can  advantage i t now  the  to  stems  As the  that  allowed to  lower r i p a r i a n  refusal  augmentation  with  bilateral  w i l l have to give Bangladesh the  India's  India  Farakka  Chinese issue, India."  r e l a t i o n s over the past Crow sums up the  by  9  two  situation  f o l l o w i n g words:  Bangladesh c o u l d muster the support of only a few f r i e n d l y nations. Amongst the more powerful, only China was willing to make p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n s of support and, since China and India had not resolved the d i f f e r e n c e s which had caused the 1962 war, that  166  support c o u l d not be r e a d i l y converted on the Government of I n d i a .  into  pressure  5 0  Pakistan/Bangladesh through the  also  superpowers.  In  tried  to  1968,  the  put  Pakistan  requested the S o v i e t Union to b r i n g pressure settle  the  Farakka  dispute  equitably  Kosygin, the then Soviet premier, sent urging  a s o l u t i o n on the  1978,  President  Carter,  offered assistance A few  offer  "requests." far  Bangladesh.  53  New  Bangladesh's s t r a t e g y  with  its  Indian  In  5 1  parliament,  region's  rivers.  5 2  made  a  Britain  ignored  these has  C l e a r l y , India views i t s  neighbours  It i s not  country  i n t i m i d a t e d by other  not be  Alexei  to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s  important p r i n c i p l e . will  of  to  to I n d i r a Gandhi  D e l h i simply  produced no p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s .  p o l i c y of b i l a t e r a l i s m  India  Indus Waters T r e a t y .  i n a speech to the  India  government  quickly.  a letter  for the development of the  in  on  to bear on  and  days l a t e r , Prime M i n i s t e r Callaghan  similar  so  l i n e s of the  pressure  as  based  on  s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , that major powers, be  an this they  r e g i o n a l or i n t e r n a t i o n a l . Pakistan/Bangladesh's s t r a t e g y the  dispute  was  at best a " c a l c u l a t e d r i s k . "  the d e s i r e d r e s u l t of India agreeing On On  occasion, other  from  i t accelerated  occasions,  India  to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s  to the extent  mediation.  the b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i n g  that the  o f f the b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i n g  I t never produced  to t h i r d party  this strategy triggered a Indian  process. " 5  in  hostile  process. reaction  government almost cut  1 67  Threat  of R e t a l i a t i o n  According  to LeMarquand, i n an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t  the upstream country has no economic i n c e n t i v e to cooperate the downstream country over  the  former.  clarified country  signalling project  The  55  i n Chapter can  elicit  its  own  else,  One  India  t h r e a t was  could  the  which  the  Pakistan  going  have adverse government,  been  downstream  ahead  i s by  with  effects having  a  i n the tried  on the Farakka Barrage i s s u e .  i s s u e d i n the form of p a s s i n g  on  plans  to which P a k i s t a n would c o n s t r u c t a barrage  the Ganges in East P a k i s t a n t e r r i t o r y . as  power  followed a r e t a l i a t o r y s t r a t e g y f o r a while in  according  simply  reciprocal  from the upstream country  an e f f o r t to make India cooperate The  in  i t s i n t e n t i o n of  which The  has  of r e c i p r o c a l power has  way  cooperation  country.  everything  concept  II.  to the l a t t e r  of  upstream  unless the l a t t e r  with  "Ganges  Barrage."  T h i s barrage This  was  barrage,  on  known  a s i d e from  i r r i g a t i n g huge areas  i n East P a k i s t a n would  for  Because of the l o c a t i o n of t h i s  dry season use.  also  to  store  water  reservoir,  i t would be p o s s i b l e to f l o o d huge areas  i n West Bengal ( I n d i a ) .  The  considerable  New  very mention of t h i s p r o j e c t caused Delhi.  K.L.  power, expressed parliament)  Rao,  alarm  in  the Indian m i n i s t e r of i r r i g a t i o n  and  h i s apprehensions  about the p r o j e c t .  implemented,  it  would  The  Ganges  of  Lok  Sabha  East  (Indian  s a i d that i f the p r o j e c t were  eroding these  a s u b t l e irony embedded  Barrage  the  cause harm to l a r g e t r a c t s of  w i t h i n India by submerging and There was  He  in  in  areas.  territory  5 6  Pakistan's  scheme.  P a k i s t a n c o u l d act as a l e v e r on  1 68  India.  If India were u n w i l l i n g to r e l e a s e to  sufficient opt  would  10 feet  force  The  proposed barrage  a  would have to be  (from 45 to 55 f e e t above s e a - l e v e l ) and  India  to put high marginal  banks of Indian p a r t s of the G a n g e s . India  Pakistan  supply of Ganges waters, East Pakistan would have to  f o r a higher barrage.  r a i s e d by  East  this  embankments along implicit  to  in East P a k i s t a n ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Ganges Barrage  was  clear.  As  it  negotiations  turned after  out, the  there  The  57  was  threat  both  some  progress  in  the  p r e s e n t a t i o n of East P a k i s t a n ' s Ganges  Barrage p r o j e c t to I n d i a . P a k i s t a n was threaten  India  extremely with  a  f o r t u n a t e to be  project  of  i t s own.  pursued t h i s s t r a t e g y with a l i t t l e more quite  likely  Farakka  that  dispute turmoil  prevented  that  attention  to  quite  the  and  India.  problems and take  position  to  If P a k i s t a n  had  determination,  quite  going  possible  through,  concentrating  Barrage  it  dispute.  5 8  that  at  the  this  was  perhaps Pakistan  I t i s unfortunate  The  situation  f u l l advantage of the  "reciprocal  was  the  undivided  that owing to domestic  f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s , Pakistan  the  its  the only time d u r i n g had  is  time  in i t s proposed Ganges Barrage p r o j e c t  Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e that over  is  was  from  Farakka  to P a k i s t a n  unique  It  Pakistan  country  a  would have been f o r c e d to s e t t l e  amicably.  domestic  presented  India  in  is the  power"  political  not  able  to  opportunity.  Internationalization Internationalization  involves  the  taking  of  a disputed  issue to a r e g i o n a l or an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n by  one  or  169  more of the d i s p u t a n t s with an aim to reach a s o l u t i o n . of  "mid-level"  when  disputes,  relations  considerably. subordinate  between  unfavourable  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n normally the  disputants  have  In a s u p e r o r d i n a t e - s u b o r d i n a t e state  may  In case  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e an  international  opinion  against  deteriorated  r e l a t i o n s h i p , the issue  to  create  the superordinate  country  thereby  issue.  With regard to i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e s , however,  the  chances  p u t t i n g i n d i r e c t pressure  occurs  of  r e s o l u t i o n are not good.  have been d i s c u s s e d During  in detail  the course  the  Helsinki  Nations.  Rules'  apportionment." riparian  It  Pakistan  of  Assembly on two separate first  took the issue  to  a strong case based on the  "equitable  and  reasonable  s t a t e s and urged the i n t e r n a t i o n a l body t o put pressure  s o l u t i o n c o u l d be reached. levelled  accusations explained  The reasons f o r t h i s  a l s o emphasised the r i g h t s of lower  on India to cooperate i n order  charges  General  presented  principle 59  the  of the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e , the i s s u e  In September 1968, P a k i s t a n  United  resolve  i n Chapter I I .  was taken to the United Nations occasions.  on i t to  were the  against not  in  that a f a i r l y quick  The Indian i t by the  government claiming  least  and e q u i t a b l e defended  that  justified.  the  Pakistan's India  also  importance of the Farakka Barrage p r o j e c t i n the  r e j u v e n a t i o n of the port of C a l c u t t a . Pakistan's  s t r a t e g y succeeded only  insofar  as  subsequent  b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s were e l e v a t e d from the l e v e l of t e c h n i c a l experts  to  the  level  of  senior  remembered that i n 1968 Indo-Pakistan  civil  servants.  I t must be  r i v a l r y was w e l l known  to  1 70  the  rest  opposite  of  the  world.  stands on almost  General Assembly, the be  one  could  Since  of  all  India and  issues  they  at  each  other.  Moreover,  these damages were h y p o t h e t i c a l  a long way  In any  continued  to  of  forty-day  Pakistan's Pakistan  case,  at  that  s i n c e the Farakka Barrage  issue to the United  Nations  in  withdraw water u n i l a t e r a l l y even a f t e r the "agreement."  internationalization ditch  of  effort  unilaterally.  the  to  India  to prevent the  1976.  stop was  In  60  this  India  from  s u i t a b l y embarrassed and  issue from being  D e l h i on  the  T h i s was  a t a c t i c a l move by India to d i s s i p a t e the  attempts to the  foil  to  the  United  Bangladesh's  item  in  There  water  eve  move,  Nations. the  of  bilateral  the  Farakka.  6 1  force  behind  Despite  India's  latter  managed  the agenda of the General Assembly.  requested both p a r t i e s to hold  a  l o b b i e d hard  s e s s i o n to hold b i l a t e r a l t a l k s on  f i n a l wording of the r e s o l u t i o n , however, was  ministerial  instance,  r a i s e d in the General Assembly.  Assembly  request  expiry  withdrawing  General  Bangladesh's  India  i s s u e by Bangladesh represented  India even i n v i t e d Bangladesh to New  include  states  a year a f t e r the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.  the  the  from completion.  Bangladesh took the  last  in  of the damages that would be caused to East  were b e l i e v e d to have been exaggerated.  T h i s was  on  taken  i n t e r n a t i o n a l community mistook Farakka to  polemics  assessment  was  voted  had  those "excuses" f o c u s s i n g on which these two  hurl  point  Pakistan  very mild and  negotiations  at  to The only the  l e v e l . ( S e e Appendix D f o r text of the r e s o l u t i o n ) . is  no  doubt  that  the  Bangladesh  move  caused  171  considerable interesting signed  embarrassment to  only  note  much should that  India.  It  the  months issue.  after  the  also  being of  a  Bangladesh  Although  the o v e r a l l support  slightly,  the r e s o l u t i o n had only recommending powers.  other  states  in  similar  i n terms votes  Bangladesh  f o r Bangladesh p o l i c y  situations.  favoured  makers  Bangladesh  to  can r e s o r t to i s s u e - a r e a l i n k a g e .  that Bangladesh can o f f e r concessions India has shown i n t e r e s t .  to India  The success  s t r a t e g y w i l l depend on the kind of p r i o r i t y Brahmaputra l i n k c a n a l . linked  could  Linkage  It i s important  where  There can be other  to a Farakka settlement.  in  6 2  remember  T h i s means  other  areas  or f a i l u r e of t h i s India p l a c e s on the  i s s u e s which can be  For example, India has o f f e r e d  to buy n a t u r a l gas from Bangladesh on a number of o c c a s i o n s . one  time, Z i a agreed to s e l l  Bangladesh  government  natural  reversed  f o r c i b l e occupation  of a d i s p u t e d  India  shown  has  also  l i n k from A g a r t a l a West  Bengal  m i l i t a r y access  gas  after  but the India's  in  developing  6 3  railway  India wants to c o n s t r u c t a r a i l  Bangladesh.  of India to C a l c u t t a  For fear of p r o v i d i n g a  i n t o Bangladesh, the Bangladesh  never agreed t o the p r o p o s a l .  India,  At  i s l a n d on the Bay of B e n g a l .  i n the eastern extremity through  to  i t s decision  interest  communications with Bangladesh.  in  to  however,  subordinate/downstream country  sympathy  that  move  It i s clear,  gain the  Issue-area  very  As has been mentioned before, too  not be made of the s t r a t e g y .  Bangladesh  is  that the i n t e r i m Ganges Waters Treaty was  fourteen  internationalize  to  government  has  172  These  are two areas which could be reopened and a t r a d e o f f  might be made with I n d i a .  S e l l i n g n a t u r a l gas to India would i n  f a c t b e n e f i t Bangladesh as w e l l beacause i t has resources  of  districts the  this  commodity,  i n Bangladesh.  distance  from  in Comilla  The proposed railway  Agartala  Bangladesh would a l s o gain network.  mostly  huge  untapped and Sylhet  link  would  to C a l c u t t a by a thousand  an  improved  railway  cut  miles.  communication  I t i s up to the policy-makers i n Dhaka to reopen these  negotiations  and  link  i t to the Farakka i s s u e .  India might be  interested. Since the  Farakka d i v e r s i o n s are causing  much  hardship  to  people of southwestern Bangladesh, they have been forced t o  move elsewhere. search for  so  Some of them have even crossed  of b e t t e r economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  t h i s migration,  i s already  barbed-wire  is  fence  futile  over to India since  around  and  that  nothing  a  entire  1700 miles  Bangladesh accurate. * 6  India's  with Bangladesh.  l i n k canal  of the IndoDelhi  that  i t i s i n the long-range i n t e r e s t of 65  overall  superiority  m i l i t a r y and economic c a p a b i l i t i e s g i v e s  in n e g o t i a t i o n s allow  the  Bangladesh.  In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , to  is  Dhaka c o u l d t r y to convince New  India not to impoverish  regard  1971  reason  attempting to prevent t h i s i n f l u x by b u i l d i n g a  Bangladesh border. this  Whatever, the  the f a c t that at l e a s t a m i l l i o n  n a t i o n a l s have c r o s s e d India  over to India i n  to be b u i l t  But i f Bangladesh  i t the edge refuses  through i t s t e r r i t o r y ,  India can do short of using m i l i t a r y f o r c e .  seems u n l i k e l y that India w i l l do t h i s .  with  to  there i s  So f a r , i t  Meanwhile, the pressure  1 73  on  the  government of Bangladesh to augment the dry season  of the Ganges i s i n t e n s i f y i n g because  as  irrigation  I n d i a i n c r e a s e Bangladesh's share w i l l decrease. solution  to  this  in  both  countries  Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e i n t o a c o n f l i c t Despite  needs  in  With no agreed  s t r u g g l e f o r a scarce resource  d e s p e r a t i o n of m i l l i o n s  flow  i n s i g h t , the  may  escalate  the  of major p r o p o r t i o n s .  r i g o r o u s b a r g a i n i n g by both P a k i s t a n and Bangladesh  with India over  the Farakka Barrage i s s u e , an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n  has  reached  not  been  even  today.  There  were  times  when  n e g o t i a t i o n s between the two c o - r i p a r i a n s showed some p r o g r e s s . T h i s p r o g r e s s , however, was more the r e s u l t of Indian concession  than  i t was of any conscious  Pakistan/Bangladesh  followed at  dyadic  where  situation  superordinate country  the  the  b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y that  time.  upstream  power, i t i s q u i t e u n l i k e l y  In  an  country that  asymmetric  i s also the  upstream  country  room to maneuver.  too h e a v i l y  in  f o r the downstream country  the  downstream  can achieve much i n the way of r e s u l t s i t d e s i r e s .  o v e r a l l power r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t i l t e d the  unilateral  favour  The of  to have much  174  NOTES 1. David G. LeMarquand, I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s : The P o l i t i c s of Cooperation, (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1977), p.8. LeMarquand identifies four f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between coriparians: a) p u b l i c goods; b) common pool resources; c) i n t e g r a t e d development o p p o r t u n i t i e s ; and d) upstream-downstream conflict. For a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the four c a t e g o r i e s , see Chapter 11. 2.  Ibid.  , p. 1 0.  3. Michael Dolan, Brian Tomlin, and H a r a l d von R e i k h o f f , "Integration and Autonomy i n Canada-United R e l a t i o n s , " i n Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Science, June 1982, XV:2, pp.331363. 4.  Ibid.  5. The passes on economic country.  , pp.332-333. United States agreed to d e s a l t p a r t of the water i t to Mexico i n the Colorado River d e s p i t e having no i n c e n t i v e to cooperate as the superordinate/upstream See LeMarquand, op. c i t . , p.10.  6. For a b e t t e r understanding of the Kashmir problem, see S.M. Burke, P a k i s t a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y : An H i s t o r i c a l A n a l y s i s , (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973), pp.21 -46. 7. B.M. Abbas, The Ganges Water Dispute, Press L i m i t e d , 1982), p.19.  (Dhaka: U n i v e r s i t y  8. In May 1965, I n d i a and P a k i s t a n fought a war over the disputed Rann of Kutch t e r r i t o r y on the Indo-Pakistan border. T h i s was f o l l o w e d by a bigger war over Kashmir i n September 1965. The f i n a l war which decided I n d i a ' s predominance beyond q u e s t i o n was fought i n December 1971 over East Pakistan. P a k i s t a n troops s u f f e r e d a resounding defeat at the hands of the Indian armed f o r c e s on December 16, 1971. Bangladesh was created and a new balance of power e s t a b l i s h e d i n the subcontinent. For a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the f i r s t two IndoP a k i s t a n wars, see Burke, op. c i t . , pp.318-357. 9. The concept of non-alignment f i r s t gained currency i n 1961 during the Belgrade conference as the middle-of-the-road p o l i c y in i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . The foundations of the movement were l a i d s i x years e a r l i e r i n the Bandung conference (Indonesia). The origins of the movement i s c r e d i t e d to Jawaharlal Nehru of I n d i a , Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and Josef Broz T i t o of Yugoslavia. .Initially, however, non-alignment was viewed as a v e i l e d form of p r o - S o v i e t i s m . 10. P a k i s t a n j o i n e d the Baghdad pact on September 23, 1955. In August 1959, the name of the o r g a n i s a t i o n was changed to the  175  Central Treaty O r g a n i s a t i o n . Although the U.S. had cancassed for the Baghdad Pact and l a t e r f u l l y p a r t i c i p a t e d in i t s work, it never officially signed the t r e a t y . P a k i s t a n r a t i f i e d the Manila Pact on January 19, 1955. The Manila Pact l a t e r came to be known as the South East Asian Treaty O r g a n i s a t i o n . 11. The f i r s t p u b l i c i z e d border i n c i d e n t took p l a c e at Longju in the North East F r o n t i e r Area (NEFA) on August 26, 1959. On this occasion the Chinese and Indian border f o r c e s exchanged fire. The second border i n c i d e n t , which was actually a brief war, s t a r t e d when the Chinese c r o s s e d Thagla Ridge, which I n d i a claimed as the boundary, and threatened the Indian post of Dhola. The Chinese a c t u a l l y d i d not a t t a c k en masse u n t i l October 20, on both the eastern and western f r o n t s , p u t t i n g the Indian army i n ignominious f l i g h t everywhere. While the Chinese rounded some 4,000 Indians as p r i s o n e r s of war, the Indians c o u l d not capture even one Chinese s o l d i e r . 12. By September 1965, United States economic a i d to India exceeded $6 billion and military a i d to the tune of $84.5 million. India continued to receive large q u a n t i t i e s of military a i d from the S o v i e t Union b a f t e r i t s wars with China. See Burke, op. c i t . , pp.278, 301. 13. Helmut R. Kulz, "Further Water Disputes between India and Pakistan," i n The I n t e r n a t i o n a l and Comparative Law Q u a r t e r l y , Vol. 18, (July 1969): 722. 14.  B.M.  Abbas, op.  15.  Ibid.. , p. 32.  cit. ,  p.30.  16. The c o n s t r u c t i o n of the barrage was completed i n the feeder c a n a l was not ready u n t i l December, 1973.  1970  but  17. The May 1974 meeting between Mrs. Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman i s reported to have been very s u c c e s s f u l . A number of bilateral i s s u e s were s e t t l e d and a number of new d e a l s struck between India and Bangladesh. Although there was no definitive agreement on the Farakka i s s u e , the f o l l o w i n g new d e a l s were struck and i s s u e s r e s o l v e d : 1) many small boundary d i s p u t e s were s e t t l e d ; 2) c l o s e r c o o p e r a t i o n on trade was agreed upon; 3) both c o u n t r i e s pledged to i n c r e a s e t h e i r exports to meet balanced trade t a r g e t s set during e a r l i e r t a l k s ; 4) establishment of four j o i n t i n d u s t r i e s , t a k i n g raw m a t e r i a l from one country to labour and machinery i n the other; 5) i t was agreed that a j o i n t survey would be carried out f o r a r a i l l i n k to connect C a l c u t t a with A g a r t a l a ; and f) p r o t o c o l s were signed making new credits a v a i l a b l e to Bangladesh. 18.  B.M.  Abbas, op.  c i t . , pp.34-35.  19. According to B.M. Abbas when Mujib c o n f e r r e d with Abbas, he r e a l i s e d h i s e r r o r and decided to r e l y on Abbas's judgement.  1 76  20. B.M. Abbas was the a l t e r n a t e leader in the f i r s t five experts' meeting held between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . A f t e r the independence of Bangladesh Abbas became Advisor to the Prime Minister on f l o o d c o n t r o l , i r r i g a t i o n , and power, and, i n that c a p a c i t y was Bangladesh's c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r . He was also the f i r s t chairman of the Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission. 21. India and Bangladesh agreed to run the Farakka Barrage on an experimental b a s i s from A p r i l 21 to May 31, 1975. The accord was announced on A p r i l 18, 1975 i n the form of a p r e s s r e l e a s e . 22.  B.M.  Abbas, op.  c i t . , p.46.  23. Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , "Bangladesh: The Farakka D i s p u t e . "  October  15  24. The Vancouver Sun, May 17 1976, "Bangladesh p r o t e s t e r s end march c l o s e to Indian border." 25.  Ibid.  26.  Ibid.  1976, anti-dam  27. Bangladesh sent a d e l e g a t i o n under the l e a d e r s h i p of B.M. Abbas to the United Nations Water Conference h e l d i n Mar Del P l a t a , A r g e n t i n a from March 14 to 25, 1977. B.M. Abbas was elected chairman of one of the two committees. The major Bangladesh p r o p o s a l with regard to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n in the development of shared water r e s o u r c e s was met with immediate response from most of the lower r i p a r i a n s t a t e s . 28. See Appendix C f o r p r o v i s i o n s of the 1977 Ganges Waters T r e a t y . A r t i c l e II (2) of the Agreement assures Bangladesh 80% of the agreed share. 29. The Janata Party M a n i f e s t o , Both Bread and L i b e r t y , says: The Party w i l l r e s o l v e such o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e s as remain with its neighbours and w i l l c o n s c i o u s l y promote a good-neighbour policy, p.25. 30.  See footnote  #28.  31. The f i r s t l e t t e r of p r o t e s t was w r i t t e n by the government of P a k i s t a n on October 29, 1951. T h i s i s the date which marked the beginning of the d i s p u t e . 32. See Text of the 1977 Agreement between India and Bangladesh in Appendix C. 33. The Helsinki Rules authored by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law Associaton i n 1966, p r o v i d e the most important and widely accepted l e g a l g u i d e l i n e s f o r use in s e t t l i n g international river disputes. See International Law A s s o c i a t i o n , H e l s i n k i Rules on the Uses of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s , (London:  177  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law A s s o c i a t i o n ,  1966).  34. Ben Crow, The P o l i t i c s and Technology of Sharing the Ganges , unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Edinburgh, 1980, p.114. Although Crow i d e n t i f i e s P a k i s t a n ' s s t r a t e g y t o be these f i v e , he l i m i t s h i s d i s c u s s i o n t o the 1960-1970 p e r i o d . I agree with him, but only partially. I argue that these five s t r a t e g i e s were used throughout the d i s p u t e from 1951 up t o now. I also s e r i o u s l y doubt Crow's c o n t e n t i o n that these s t r a t e g i e s were used i n the order given i n an e f f o r t to increase the pressure on India t o cooperate. As I argue throughout the t h e s i s , a subordinate/downstream country has a l i m t e d number of options available. I t uses whichever i t t h i n k s w i l l give i t maximum b e n e f i t a t a p a r t i c u l a r time and a c c o r d i n g t o the dynamics of the s p e c i f i c c o n f l i c t . 35. Government of Bangladesh. White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute, Dhaka, September, 1976, p.13. 36. The Hindu, February 19 1976, "Ganga waters: Bangla c l a i m . "  India  refutes  37. See Crow, op. c i t . , p.402; see a l s o , Foreign A f f a i r s Record, A p r i l 1976, " O f f i c i a l Indo-Bangladesh T a l k s on Ganges Waters of A p r i l 26, 1979." 38. Nehru and Ayub were i n London i n March 1961 t o attend the Commonwealth heads of s t a t e conference. They mmet t o d i s c u s s a nvumber of i s s u e s and the q u e s t i o n of the Farakka issue a l s o came up. Thre was no fpormal understanding but they decided t o cooperate on the Farakka p r o j e c t . Nehru had t e n t a t i v e l y agreed that as soon as the t e c h n i c a l aspects were s o r t e d out, discussions among m i n i s t e r s from both c o u n t r i e s c o u l d take place. T h i s , they hoped would pave the way f o r a comprehensive settlement of the i s s u e . 39. Bangladesh, however, d i d not accept t h i s concession because Nepal's p o s i t i o n i n f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n s was not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d . 40. The Times of I n d i a , January 15 1981, "Farakka and i t s F a l l out," by Inder Malhotra. 41. PM." 42.  The Hindu,  December  LeMarquand, op.  20  1977, " Z i a ' s f r u i t f u l  t a l k s with  c i t . , p. 17.  43. Dawn (Dhaka d a t e l i n e ) , J u l y 12 1961, c o l d shouldered."  "Pakistan's  proposal  44. B.M. Abbas who was a l t e r n a t e leader of the Pakistan d e l e g a t i o n i n n e g o t i a t i o n s with India over the Farakka Barrage issue stayed back i n Bangladesh a f t e r the c r e a t i o n of that country. In Mujib's c a b i n e t he was f i r s t a d v i s o r to the Prime  1  78  Minister on f l o o d control, irrigation, and power. He has w r i t t e n an a u t h o r i t a t i v e account of the n e g o t i a t i o n s from 1960 onward. In t h i s book, The Ganges Water D i s p u t e , he c l a i m s that d u r i n g Mrs. Gandhi's v i s i t to Bangladesh i n March 1972, he proposed a joint rivers commission of the two c o u n t r i e s . Apparently,. Mrs. Gandhi r e a d i l y endorsed the i d e a . The idea was a l s o supported by Sheikh Mujib, Sardar Swaran Singh India's foreign minister, as w e l l as Abdus Samad Azad, Bangladesh foreign minister. See B.M. Acbbas, The Ganges Water D i s p u t e , (Dhaka: U n i v e r s i t y Press L i m i t e d , 1982), pp.31-32. 45. The J o i n t R i v e r s Commission was f i r s t mentioned i n the joint statement issued a t the end of I n d i r a Gandhi's v i s i t to Dhaka i n March 1972. However, the JRC f i r s t met i n June 1972 with B.M. Abbas of Bangladesh as i t s chairman. 46. Government of Bangladesh. White Paper on the Ganges Water D i s p u t e , Dhaka, September, 1976, p.13. 47. A good i l l u s t r a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of technical data i s to be found i n the way each s i d e used measurements of the Ganges' flow to support i t s own position. The Indians used measurements taken a t Farakka and the Pakistanis used measurements taken farther downstream at Hardinge Bridge i n East p a k i s t b a n . The two measurements d i d not tally because at Hardinge B r i d g e , the Ganges' flow i s supplemented by groundwater seepage. Therefore, the measurements taken here asre g r e a t e r than those recorded a t Farakka. The Indians used the flow measurements a t Farakka to prove that since Pakistan received more water a t Hardinge B r i d g e , the Indians should have to r e l e a s e less water to Pakistan. The Indians, of c o u r s e , needed a l l the water they c o u l d get at Farakka f o r the r e j u v e n a t i o n of C a l c u t t a p o r t . 48. Lok Sabha Debates, S i t u a t i o n , " 32, 56, C o l s .  August 16 2405-2560.  1961,  "International  49. Dawn, January 10 1977, "China-Bangladesh r e l a t i o n s , " and March 19 1977, "Bangladesh fully prepared to uphold sovereignty." 50.  Crow, op.  51. Dawn, J u l y Farakka."  c i t . , pp.169-170. 16 1978, "India r e j e c t s Kosygin's suggestion on  52. USIA, D e l h i , Towards our common g o a l s : t e x t s of remarks and speeches," New D e l h i , 1978. 53.  The Hindu, January 7 1978, "Callaghan gets warm welcome."  54. A f t e r Bangladesh r a i s e d the i s s u e i n the U n i t e d Nations i n September 1976, India was o b v i o u s l y angered. Bilateral n e g o t i a t i o n s which followed were a mere f o r m a l i t y . No progress  179  c o u l d be made because the Indian d e l e g a t i o n demanded more data. This deadlock was not broken until I n d i r a Gandhi l o s t the e l e c t i o n to M o r a r j i D e s a i . 55.  LeMarquand, op.  cit•  ,  p.10.  56. Lok Sabha Debates, March 31 1969, "Construction Barrage across the River Padma by P a k i s t a n , " S4, 2_6, C o l . 57.  B.M.  Abbas, op.  cit. ,  of a 46.  p.26.  58. In 1969, Ayub Khan's ten-year long "benevolent" dictatorship came to an end. M a r t i a l Law was declared throughout P a k i s t a n because of the student unrest throughout the country but particularly i n East P a k i s t a n . In East P a k i s t a n , the movement a g a i n s t m i l i t a r y r u l e was a c t u a l l y spearheaded by the Awami League. Amidst a l l t h i s chaos, the communication from Islamabad to i t s n e g o t i a t o r s over the Farakka i s s u e was u n c l e a r . Besides, the Ganges Barrage was such a mammoth p r o j e c t that the P a k i s t a n government might have used i t to put pressure on I n d i a . 59.  See  footnote  #33.  60. Mrs. Gandhi had considered Mujibur Rahman to be her "friend" and protege. It i s s a i d that she had a b s o l u t e l y no i n k l i n g of h i s b r u t a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n . A f t e r t h i s incident, she summoned senior Raw o f f i c e r s (Research and A n a l y s i s Wing), the Indian version of a secret s e r v i c e and reprimanded them severely. The timing a l s o corresponded with her assuming e x t r a o r d i n a r y powers under Emergency regulations. Withdrawing water u n i l a t e r a l l y from Bangladesh at t h i s p o i n t was, t h e r e f o r e , q u i t e normal f o r I n d i a . 61.  Abbas, op.  c i t . , pp.55-56.  62. It i s quite a common p r a c t i c e by s t a t e s to l i n k v a r i o u s issues in a bargaining s i t u a t i o n . The subordinate state in a superordinate-subordiante r e l a t i o n s h i p may sometimes o f f e r the stronger power something that country may want i n exchange f o r something i t wants from the superordinate country. This issuearea linkage works only when what it wants from the superordinate power i s not very important to that country. In that sense, the subordinate country i s always at a disadvantage v i s - a - v i s i t s superordinate p a r t n e r . 63. Bangladesh Times, May 9 1981, proposal of South T a l p a t t y . "  "India r e j e c t s j o i n t  survey  64. Since the p a r t i t i o n of India in 1947, Bengali-speaking people from both West Bengal and what i s now Bangladesh s t a r t e d emigrating to Assam. Very soon, these Bengalees became the e l i t e , educated c l a s s in Assam. The Assamese people have always resented this i n v a s i o n of t h e i r homeland. S t a r t i n g in 1980, there was an o r g a n i s e d movement a g a i n s t I n d i r a Gandhi's policy  180  of l e t t i n g i n Bengalees. The estimated number of Bengalees who went over to Assam i n a p e r i o d of t h i r t y year must be c l o s e to one m i l l i o n . 65. Sometimes subordinate/downstream c o u n t r i e s may t r y to convince the upstream c o u n t r i e s that a long-range and equitable solution i s in their interest. T h i s s t r a t e g y u s u a l l y works when i t i s employed with some other p o s i t i v e s a n c t i o n .  181  BIBLIOGRAPHY I.  O f f i c i a l Documents.  Bangladesh. 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"Problems of Navigable Approaches to the Port of Calcutta." C a l c u t t a Port Annual 1958. Morgenthau, Hans J . P o l i t i c s Among Nations: The Struggle f o r Power and Peace. 3d ed. New York: A l f r e d Knopf, 1965. . . York Times Magazine. Nag, S.K. 1970.  " i s world P u b l i c Opinion 6:23 (March 1962).  "The Study of the Hooghly."  a Myth?"  In  New  In C a l c u t t a Port Annual  Piano, Jack C. and Roy O l t o n . The I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s Dictionary. New York: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969. Rao, K.L. I n d i a ' s Water Wealth: I t s Assessment, Uses and Projections. New D e l h i : O r i e n t Longman Limited,- 1 975. Cusecs Candidate: Memoirs of an E n g i n e e r . M e t r o p o l i t a n Book Co. P v t . L t d . , 1978.  New  Delhi:  185  Ray, J a y a n t a Kumar. Studies. 17 ( 1 9 7 8 ) :  "The F a r a k k a 235-246.  Agreement."  International  R e v e l l e , Roger and T. Herman. "Some P o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra R i v e r Basins." In Water f o r the Human E n v i r o n m e n t , V o l . 1. Congress Papers. P r o c e e d i n g s of t h e F i r s t W o r l d C o n g r e s s on Water R e s o u r c e s h e l d September 24-28, 1973, i n C h i c a g o , I l l i n o i s , pp. 154-163. R u s s e t t , B r u c e M. and Harvey S t a r r . W o r l d P o l i t i c s : The Menu for Choice. San F r a n c i s c o : W.H. Freeman and Company, 1981. S k o l n i k o f f , E.B. S c i e n c e , T e c h n o l o g y , and A m e r i c a n F o r e i g n Policy. C a m b r i d g e : M a s s a c h u s e t t s I n s t i t u t e of T e c h n o l o g y P r e s s , 1967. S p a t e , O.H.K., A.T.A. L e a r m o n t h , and B.H. Farmer. India, P a k i s t a n and C e y l o n : The R e g i o n s . L o n d o n : Methuen and Company Limited, 1972. S u l l i v a n , M i c h a e l P. I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s : T h e o r i e s and Evidence. E n g l e w o o d - C l i f f s , New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l I n c . , 1976. U n i t e d N a t i o n s Document. United goals:  (Summary R e c o r d ) A/BUR/31/SR.1.  S t a t e s I n f o r m a t i o n Agency ( U S I A ) . Toward our t e x t s and s p e e c h e s . " Delhi, 1978.  common  Z a c h e r , Mark W. I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t s and C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y , 1946-1977. New Y o r k : P r a e g e r P u b l i s h e r s , 1979.  186  APPENDIX A - STATUTE OF  THE 1972 INDQ-BANGLADESH JOINT RIVERS COMMISSION  Chapter I The C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s Pursuant to the r e l a t i o n s of f r i e n d s h i p and c o - o p e r a t i o n that e x i s t between India and Bangladesh, D e s i r o u s of working together in h a r n e s s i n g the r i v e r s common to both c o u n t r i e s f o r the b e n e f i t of the peoples of the two countries, D e s i r o u s of s p e c i f y i n g some q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g to these matters, WE  HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:  Chapter II Article 1 There s h a l l be e s t a b l i s h e d an Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the Commission. Article 2 ( i ) The Commission s h a l l be c o n s t i t u t e d by each p a r t i c i p a t i n g government a p p o i n t i n g a chairman and three members; of these two s h a l l be engineers. The Chairman and three members s h a l l o r d i n a r i l y hold o f f i c e for a p e r i o d of three y e a r s . ( i i ) Each p a r t i c i p a t i n g government may a l s o such e x p e r t s and a d v i s o r s as i t d e s i r e s . Article 3 The Chairmanship of the Commission s h a l l be h e l d a n n u a l l y turn by Bangladesh and I n d i a .  in  Article 4 ( i ) The Commission s h a l l have the f o l l o w i n g f u n c t i o n s in particular: a) to maintain l i a i s o n between the p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n t r i e s in order to ensure the most e f f e c t i v e j o i n t e f f o r t s i n maximising the b e n e f i t s from common r i v e r s to both c o u n t r i e s . b) to formulate f l o o d c o n t r o l works and to recommend implementation of j o i n t p r o j e c t s . c) to formulate d e t a i l e d p r o p o s a l s on advance f l o o r warnings, f l o o d f o r e c a s t i n g and cyclone warnings, d) to study f l o o d c o n t r o l and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s so that the water resources of the region can be u t i l i s e d on an e q u i t a b l e b a s i s fpor the mutual b e n e f i t of the peoples of the two c o u n t r i e s , and e) to formulate p r o p o s a l s f o r c a r r y i n g out c o - o r d i n a t e d research on problems of f l o o d c o n t r o l a f f e c t i n g both the c o u n t r i e s . ( i i ) The Commission s h a l l a l s o perform such other f u n c t i o n s as the two governments may, by mutual agreement, d i r e c t i t to do.  187  Chapter III SUPPORTING STAFF AND  SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE  Article 5 Each government w i l l provide a p p r o p r i a t e supporting s t a f f and s e c r e t a r i a l a s s i s t a n c e to i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n the Commission to enable them to d i s c h a r g e t h e i r f u n c t i o n s i n an e f f e c t i v e manner. Chapter IV SESSIONS Article 6 ( i ) Subject to the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s s t a t u t e , the Commission s h a l l adopt i t s own r u l e of procedure. ( i i ) Meetings may g e n e r a l l y take p l a c e a l t e r n a t i v e l y i n the two c o u n t r i e s , subject to the conveniencce of the two c o u n t r i e s . ( i i i ) S p e c i a l meetings of working groups or ad-hoc expert groups duly nominated by the r e s p e c t i v e governments may be arranged, as r e q u i r e d , by mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n of the Members. Chapter V RULES OF PROCEDURE ( i v ) The o r d i n a r y s e s s i o n of the Commission s h a l l be h e l d as o f t e n as necessary, g e n e r a l l y four times a year. In a d d i t i o n s p e c i a l meetings may be convened any time at the request of e i t h e r government. Article 7 A l l meetings s h a l l be c l o s e d meetings d e s i r e s otherwise.  u n l e s s the Commission  Chapter VI GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 8 The Commission s h a l l submit confirmed minutes of a l l meetings the two governments. The Commission s h a l l a l s o submit i t s annual r e p o r t s by the t h i r t y f i r s t of January, next year.  to  Article 9 D e c i s i o n s of the Commission s h a l l be unanimous. If any d i f f e r e n c e s a r i s e i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s S t a t u t e they s h a l l be r e f e r r e d t o the two governments to be d e a l t with on a b i l a t e r a l b a s i s i n a s p i r i t of mutual respect and understanding. Done i n Dhaka on the 24th day of November, Nineteen Hundred and Seventy Two.  188  APPENDIX B - 1975 FORTY-DAY UNDERSTANDING JOINT INDO-BANGLADESH PRESS RELEASE EMBARGO:Not t o be p u b l i s h e d / b r o a d c a s t / t e l e c a s t BST on 18th A p r i l , 1975.  before  1730 hours  Dacca/New D e l h i , A p r i l 18: The d e l e g a t i o n from India l e d by H i s E x c e l l e n c y S h r i J a g j i v a n Ram, M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e and I r r i g a t i o n and the d e l e g a t i o n from Bangladesh l e d by H i s E x c e l l e n c y Mr. Abdur Rab Serneabat, M i n i s t e r f o r F l o o d C o n t r o l , Water Resources, and Power met i n Dhaka from the 16th to 18th A p r i l , 1975. The t a l k s were h e l d i n a c o r d i a l atmosphere and were c h a r a c t e r i s e d by mutual understanding that e x i s t s between the two f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s . The Indian s i d e p o i n t e d out that while d i s c u s s i o n s regarding a l l o c a t i o n of f a i r weather flows of the Ganga d u r i n g lean months in terms of the Prime M i n i s t e r s ' d e c l a r a t i o n of May, 1974 a r e c o n t i n u i n g , i t i s e s s e n t i a l to run the feeder c a n a l of the Farakka Barrage d u r i n g the c u r r e n t lean p e r i o d . I t i s agreed that t h i s o p e r a t i o n may be c a r r i e d out with v a r y i n g d i s c h a r g e s in the ten-day p e r i o d s during the months of A p r i l and May, 1975 as shown below ensuring the continuance of the remaining flow for Bangladesh. Month Ten-day p e r i o d Withdrawal April May  1975 1975  21st to 30th 1st t o 10th 11th to 20th 21st to 31st  11,000 12,000 15,000 16,000  cusecs cusecs cusecs cusecs  J o i n t teams c o n s i s t i n g of experts of two governments s h a l l observe at the a p p r o p r i a t e p l a c e s i n both the c o u n t r i e s the e f f e c t s of the agreed withdrawals at Farakka, i n Bangladesh and on the Hooghly R i v e r f o r the b e n e f i t of C a l c u t t a P o r t . A J o i n t Team w i l l a l s o be s t a t i o n e d at Farakka to record the d i s c h a r g e s i n t o the feeder c a n a l and the remaining flows f o r Bangladesh. The teams w i l l submit t h e i r r e p o r t s to both the governments f o r consideration. April  18, 1975.  189  APPENDIX C - INDO-BANGLADESH AGREEMENT ON SHARING OF GANGA WATERS AT FARAKKA The f o l l o w i n g i s the text of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on s h a r i n g of the Ganga waters at Farakka and on augmenting i t s flows signed i n Dhaka by S h r i S u r j i t Singh Barnala, f o t the Government of the Republic of India and Rear Admiral Musharraf Hussain Khan, f o r the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on November 5, 1977. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH,  THE GOVERNMENT OF  DETERMINED to promote and strengthen t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p and good n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s ,  r e l a t i o n s of  INSPIRED by the common d e s i r e of promoting t h e i r peoples,  the w e l l being of  BEING d e s i r o u s of s h a r i n g by mutual agreement the waters of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r s f l o w j i n g through the t e r r i t o r i e s of the two c o u n t r i e s and of making the optimal u t i l i s a t i o n of the water resources of t h e i r region by j o i n t e f f o r t s , RECOGNISING that the need of making an i n t e r i m arrangement f o r sharing of the Ganga waters at Farakka i n a s p i r i t of mutual accommodation and the need f o r a s o l u t i o n of the long term problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga are i n the mutual i n t e r e s t s of the peoples of the two c o u n t r i e s , BEING d e s i r o u s of f i n d i n g a f a i r s o l u t i o n of the q u e s t i o n before them, without a f f e c t i n g the r i g h t s and e n t i t l e m e n t s of e i t h e r country other than those covered by t h i s Agreement, or e s t a b l i s h i n g any general p r i n c i p l e s of law or precedent, HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS: A. Arrangements f o r s h a r i n g of the waters of the Ganga at Farakka Article I The quantum ogf waters agreed to be r e l e a s e d by India to Bangladesh w i l l be at Farakka A r t i c l e II ( i ) The s h a r i n g between I n d i a and Bangladesh of the Ganga waters at Farakka from the 1st January to the 31st May every year w i l l be with r e f e r e n c e to the quantum shown i n Column 2 of the Schedule annexed hereto which i s based on 75 per cent a v a i l a b i l i t y c a l c u l a t e d from the recorded flows of the Ganga at Farakka from 1948 to 1943.  190  ( i i ) I n d i a s h a l l r e l e a s e to Bangladesh waters by 10-day p e r i o d s in the quantum shown i n Column 4 ogf the Schedule: Provided that the a c t u a l a v a i l a b i l i t y at Farakka o f f the Ganga waters d u r i n g a ten-day p e r i o d i s higher or lower than the quantum shown i n Column 2 of the Schedule i t s h a l l be shared i n the p r o p p o r t i o n a p p l i c a b l e to that p e r i o d ; Provided f u r t h e r that i f d u r i n g a p a r t i c u l a r ten-day p e r i o d , the Ganga flows at Farakka come down to such a l e v e l that the share of Bangladesh i s lower than 80 per cent of the value shown in Column 4, the r e l e a s e of waters to Bangladesh d u r i n g that tenday p e r i o d s h a l l not f a l l below 80 per cent of the value shown in Column 4. A r t i c l e III The waters r e l e a s e d to Bangladesh at Farakka under A r t i c l e I s h a l l not be reduced below Farakka except f o r reasonable uses of waters, not exceeding 200 cusecs, by I n d i a between Farakka and the p o i n t on the Ganga where both i t s banks are i n Bangladesh. A r t i c l e IV A committee of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s nominated by the two Governments ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d the J o i n t Committee) s h a l l be constituted. The J o i n t Committee s h a l l set up s u i t a b l e teams at Farakka and Hardinge Bridge to observe and record at Farakka the d a i l y flows below Farakka Barrage and i n the Feeder Canal, as w e l l as at Hardinge B r i d g e . Article V The J o i n t Committee s h a l l decide i t s own functioning.  procedure and method of  A r t i c l e VI The J o i n t Committee s h a l l submit to the two Governments a l l data a l l data c o l l e c t e d by i t and s h a l l a l s p o submit a y e a r l y report to both the governments. A r t i c l e VII The J o i n t Committee s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r implementing the arrangements c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s part of the Agreement and examining any d i f f i c u l t y a r i s i n g out of the implementation of the above arrangements and of the o p e r a t i o n of the Farakka Barrage. Any d i f f e r e n c e or d i s p u t e a r i s i n g i n t h i s regard, i f not r e s o l v e d by the J o i n t Committee, s h a l l be r e f e r r e d to a panel of equal number of Indian and Bangladeshi e x p e r t s nominated by the two Governments which s h a l l meet u r g e n t l y at the a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l to r e s o l v e i t by mutual d i s c u s s i o n and f a i l i n g that by such other arrangements as they may mutually agree upon.  191  B.  Long-Term Arrangements  A r t i c l e VIII The two governments recognise the need to cooperate with each other i n f i n d i n g a s o l u t i o n to the long-term prpoblem of augmenting the flows, of the Ganga d u r i n g the dry season. A r t i c l e IX The Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission e s t a b l i s h e d by the two Governments i n 1972 s h a l l c a r r y out i n v e s t i g a t i o n and study of schemes r e l a t i n g to the augmentation of the dry season flow of the Ganga proposed or to be be proposed by e i t h e r Government with a view to f i n d i n g a s o l u t i o n which i s economical and feasible. I t s h a l l submit i t s recommendations to the two governments with a p e r i o d of three y e a r s . Article X The two Governments s h a l l c o n s i d e r and agree upon a scheme or schemes, t a k i n g i n t o account the recommendations of the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission and take necessary measures to implement i t or them as s p e e d i l y as p o s s i b l e . A r t i c l e XI Any d i f f i c u l t y , d i f f e r e n c e or d i s p u t e a r i s i n g from or with regard to t h i s part of the Agreement, i f not r e s o l v e d by the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission, s h a l l be r e f e r r e d to the two Governments which s h a l l meet u r g e n t l y at the a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l to r e s o l v e i t by mutual d i s c u s s i o n . C.  Review and D u r a t i o n  A r t i c l e XII The p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Agreement w i l l be implemented by both p a r t i e s i n i n good f a i t h . During the p e r i o d f o r which the Agreement c o n t i n u e s to be i n f o r c e in accordance with A r t i c l e 15 of the Agreement, the quantum of waters agreed to be r e l e a s e d to Bangladesh at Farakka i n accordance with t h i s Agreement s h a l l not be reduced. A r t i c l e XIII The Agreement w i l l be reviewed by the two Governments at the e x p i r y of three years from the date of coming i n t o f o r c e of t h i s Agreement ar as may be agreed upon between the two governments. A r t i c l e XIV The review or reviews r e f e r r e d to i n A r t i c l e 13 s h a l l e n t a i l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the working, impact, implementation and progress of the arrangements c o n t a i n e d i n p a r t s A and B of t h i s Agreement. A r t i c l e XV T h i s Agreement s h a l l enter i n t o f o r c e upon s i g n a t u r e and s h a l l remain i n f o r c e f o r a p e r i o d of f i v e years from the date of i t s coming i n t o f o r c e . I t may be extended f u r t h e r f o r a s p e c i f i e d  1 92  p e r i o d by mutual agreement i n the l i g h t of the reviews r e f e r r e d to i n A r t i c l e 13. IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly a u t h o r i s e d t h e r e t o by the r e s p e c t i v e Governments, have signed t h i s Agreement. DONE i n d u p l i c a t e at Dhaka on November 5, 1977 i n the H i n d i , Bengali and E n g l i s h languages. In the event of any c o n f l i c t between the t e x t s , the E n g l i s h t e x t s h a l l p r e v a i l .  1 93  APPENDIX D  -  CONSENSUS  S T A T E M E N T AT  THE  UNITED  NATIONS  1. T h e p a r t i e s a f f i r m e d t h e i r a d h e r e n c e t o t h e D e c l a r a t i o n on P r i n c i p l e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law concerning Friendly Relations a n d C o - o p e r a t i o n among S t a t e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e C h a r t e r of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and s t r e s s e d , i n t h i s r e g a r d , their u n a l t e r a b l e commitment t o s t r e n g t h e n their bilateral relations by a p p l y i n g t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t of disputes. 2. T h e p a r t i e s r e c o g n i s e d the u r g e n c y of the s i t u a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the onset of a n o t h e r dry season. 3. B o t h p a r t i e s a g r e e d s o l u t i o n and, to that Dacca (Dhaka) a t the m view to a r r i v i n g at a  t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n c a l l e d f o r an urgent end, have d e c i d e d t o meet u r g e n t l y at i n i s t e r i a l level for negotiations with a f a i r and e x p e d i t i o u s settlement.  4. T h e p a r t i e s a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e p r i m e o b j e c t i v e o f s u c h i n t e n s i f i e d c o n t a c t was to promote the w e l l b e i n g s of their p e o p l e s and a g r e e d t o f a c i l i t a t e the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f an atmosphere c o n d u c i v e t o the s u c c e s s f u l outcome of the negotiations. 5. T h e p a r t i e s u n d e r t o o k t o g i v e d u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n appropriate ways o f u t i l i z i n g t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e system. 6.It i s open to e i t h e r p a r t y at i t s t h i r t y - s e c o n d session settlement of the problem.  to on  to the United  r e p o r t to the G e n e r a l the p r o g r e s s achieved  most Nations  Assembly i n the  

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