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Strange anarchy : the philosophical anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff Baugh, Graham James 1984

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STRANGE ANARCHY: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM OF ROBERT PAUL WOLFF by GRAHAM JAMES BAUGH A . , The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1982 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS THE FACULTY OF (Depar tment i n GRADUATE STUDIES o f P h i l o s o p h y ) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g to_ the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1984 © G r a h a m James Baugh , 1984 In present ing t h i s thes is in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements fo r an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ib rary s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thes is for scho la r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her representat ives . I t i s understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of t h i s thes is for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permission. Department of The Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 DE-6 (3/81) A b s t r a c t T h i s t h e s i s p r e s e n t s a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and c r i t i q u e of Rober t Pau l W o l f f ' s d e f e n c e of a n a r c h i s m . In P a r t One, the u n d e r l y i n g moral t h e o r y upon which t h i s d e f e n c e i s based i s a n a l y z e d . The d e f e n c e o f a n a r c h i s m i s then r e c o n s t r u c t e d on the b a s i s of t h i s moral t h e o r y . I t i s a rgued t h a t a l l c l a i m s to l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y are a p p a r e n t l y i l l e g i t i m a t e because such c l a i m s c o n f l i c t w i t h an o v e r r i d i n g o b l i g a t i o n of r a t i o n a l a g e n t s to be autonomous . U t i l i t a r i a n and s o c i a l c o n t r a c t s o l u t i o n s to t h i s c o n f l i c t a re d i s c u s s e d i n r e l a t i o n to the same moral t h e o r y . I t i s argued t h a t some forms o f a u t h o r i t y a re c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy but t h a t the s t a t e , due to i t s i n h e r e n t l y c o e r c i v e n a t u r e , i s n o t . W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s t a l t e r n a t i v e to the s t a t e i s then d i s c u s s e d as the form of s o c i e t y i n which p e o p l e e n j o y the f u l l e s t autonomy. In P a r t Two of t h i s t h e s i s W o l f f ' s arguments f o r a n a r c h i s m , h i s u n d e r l y i n g moral t h e o r y and h i s i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew o f r e a s o n are c r i t i c i z e d . I t i s a rgued t h a t W o l f f ' s argument f a i l s as a d e f e n c e o f a n a r c h i s m and the a n a r c h i s t s t a t u s of W o l f f ' s argument i s i t s e l f put i n t o q u e s t i o n . W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n i s h e l d to be a form of moral and p o l i t i c a l s c e p t i c i s m d i s t i n c t f rom the p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y of a n a r c h i s m . W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y i s c r i t i c i z e d f o r f a i l i n g to p r o v i d e any b a s i s f o r m e a n i n g f u l moral d i s c o u r s e or f o r the r a t i o n a l r e s o l u t i o n o f moral c o n f l i c t . W o l f f ' s c o n c e p t s of autonomy, o b l i g a t i o n and moral - i i -c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m are h e l d to be c o n c e p t u a l l y i n c o h e r e n t . W o l f f ' s c l a i m t h a t r e a s o n f u n c t i o n s m e r e l y as an i n s t r u m e n t f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t of n o n r a t i o n a l g o a l s i s r e j e c t e d . I t i s a rgued t h a t W o l f f ' s i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew of r e a s o n i t s e l f e x p r e s s e s c e r t a i n moral v a l u e s t y p i c a l of modern s o c i e t y . The t h e s i s c o n c l u d e s w i t h a s h o r t s e c t i o n o u t l i n i n g some a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h e s to a n a r c h i s m which seem more p l a u s i b l e and c o h e r e n t than the approach t a k e n by W o l f f . STRANGE ANARCHY: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM OP ROBERT PAUL WOLFF A b s t r a c t i i Aknowledgement v i I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 P a r t One 5 C h a p t e r I: Autonomous E t h i c s 5 I n t r o d u c t i o n 5 Autonomy and R a t i o n a l Agency 6 H y p o t h e t i c a l and C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e s 9 O b l i g a t i o n , R a t i o n a l i t y and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y 14 Mora l C o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m 21 C h a p t e r I I : From Autonomy to A n a r c h i s m 30 I n t r o d u c t i o n 30 De F a c t o and De J u r e A u t h o r i t y 30 The A p p a r e n t C o n f l i c t Between A u t h o r i t y and Autonomy 38 P o s s i b l e S o l u t i o n s to the C o n f l i c t 44 The S t a t e o f Natu re as a V i a b l e A l t e r n a t i v e 59 - i v -P a r t Two 67 C h a p t e r I I I : S t r a n g e A n a r c h y . 67 I n t r o d u c t i o n 67 W o l f f ' s " A n a r c h i s t " I d e a l 70 W o l f f ' s C r i t i q u e of E x i s t i n g S o c i e t y 80 W o l f f ' s View of Human Natu re 84 W o l f f and P o l i t i c a l A n a r c h i s m 89 C h a p t e r IV: Autonomous E t h i c s and I n s t r u m e n t a l Reason 92 I n t r o d u c t i o n 92 Autonomous " O b l i g a t i o n " and Mora l C o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m 95 C r i t i q u e of I n s t r u m e n t a l Reason 102 C o n c l u s i o n : W h i t h e r A n a r c h i s m ? 110 Notes 121 B i b l i o g r a p h y 135 - v -Ac knowledgement I would l i k e to acknowledge the h e l p f u l comments and c r i t i c i s m s r e g a r d i n g t h i s t h e s i s which I have r e c e i v e d f rom E a r l W i n k l e r , my t h e s i s a d v i s e r , and Rober t Rowan, the second r e a d e r . S p e c i a l t h a n k s to P e l a r Dav idson f o r p r e p a r i n g the t h e s i s i n m a n u s c r i p t f o r m . G . J . B . - v i -I n t r o d u c t i on Rober t Pau l W o l f f has p r e s e n t e d an o r i g i n a l argument f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a r c h i s m based on the p u r p o r t e d i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. W o l f f h o l d s t h a t because a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s have an o v e r r i d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to be autonomous , a l l c l a i m s to l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y must be r e j e c t e d . The p l a u s i b i l i t y o f W o l f f ' s argument u l t i m a t e l y depends on the v a l i d i t y of a s e p a r a t e g e n e r a l moral t h e o r y which i s meant to e s t a b l i s h the f u n d a m e n t a l o b l i g a t i o n o f a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s to be autonomous . C o n s e q u e n t l y , any r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of W o l f f ' s d e f e n c e o f a n a r c h i s m must f i r s t c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e the mora l t h e o r y upon which t h a t d e f e n c e i s b a s e d . Through a f o r m a l a n a l y s i s of r a t i o n a l agency t i e d to an i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew of r e a s o n W o l f f seeks to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t i n s o f a r as a g e n t s are r a t i o n a l and t h e y a re to a c t , t h e y must be autonomous. By autonomy W o l f f means a c t i n g o n l y on o n e ' s s e l f - c h o s e n p o l i c i e s r a t i o n a l l y c o n n e c t e d to o n e ' s s e l f - c h o s e n e n d s . T h u s , autonomy r e q u i r e s r a t i o n a l c h o i c e and d e l i b e r a t i o n and r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . , By r a t i o n a l a c t i o n W o l f f means a c t i o n based on r a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s which are not s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , or s e l f - d e f e a t i n g , and which a re c o n s i s t e n t , t a k e n as a w h o l e , w i t h each o t h e r . Two i m p o r t a n t consequences f o l l o w f rom W o l f f ' s a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . The f i r s t i s t h a t u l t i m a t e l y the 1 o n l y o b l i g a t i o n r a t i o n a l a g e n t s h a v e , i n s o f a r as t h e y a re r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , i s to be autonomous. The second i s t h a t , because of W o l f f ' s commitment to an i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew of r e a s o n , a l l c h o i c e of ends or g o a l s i s u l t i m a t e l y d e t e r m i n e d by n e i t h e r r e a s o n nor d e s i r e , but i s both n o n r a t i o n a l and u n c a u s e d . W o l f f d e s c r i b e s h i s p o s i t i o n as a form of moral c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m b u t , i t i s a r g u e d , t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s somewhat m i s l e a d i n g . W o l f f a rgues t h a t a l l c l a i m s to l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y a re i l l e g i t i m a t e f o r such c l a i m s seek to e s t a b l i s h a r i g h t of a u t h o r i t y to command r a t i o n a l a g e n t s to a c t c o n t r a r y to t h e i r own s e l f - c h o s e n p o l i c i e s . For r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , o b e d i e n c e to such commands c o n s t i t u t e s a heteronomous p o l i c y . Because a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s have an o v e r r i d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to a c t a u t o n o m o u s l y , t h e y must r e j e c t a l l c l a i m s to l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . Because a l l s t a t e s n e c e s s a r i l y c l a i m such a u t h o r i t y , r a t i o n a l a g e n t s must r e j e c t the s t a t e and become a n a r c h i s t s . W o l f f d i s c u s s e s some p u r p o r t e d s o l u t i o n s to the c o n f l i c t between a u t h o r i t y and autonomy but a rgues t h a t t h e y are f a i l u r e s . He then pu ts f o r w a r d some p r o p o s a l s d e s i g n e d to add some p l a u s i b i l i t y to a n a r c h i s t c l a i m s t h a t r a t i o n a l a g e n t s can and must l i v e w i t h o u t the s t a t e . However , both the s u c c e s s of W o l f f ' s argument and i t s a n a r c h i s t s t a t u s must be q u e s t i o n e d . I t i s a rgued t h a t W o l f f f a i l s to e s t a b l i s h t h a t a n a r c h y i s the o n l y fo rm o f s o c i e t y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. I t i s f u r t h e r a rgued t h a t g i v e n the t r u t h o f W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y , the s o r t o f r a t i o n a l , 2 a n a r c h i s t community he e n v i s a g e s i s i m p o s s i b l e to a c h i e v e . I n s t e a d , W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y can p r o v i d e a r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r some a g e n t s t o i n f r i n g e the autonomy o f o t h e r a g e n t s , and t h e r e f o r e h i s mora l t h e o r y p r o v i d e s a p o s s i b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the s t a t e c o n c e i v e d as a group o f p e r s o n s w i e l d i n g p o l i t i c a l power o v e r o t h e r s . W o l f f ' s v iew of human n a t u r e i s h e l d to be i m p l a u s i b l e , p r o v i d i n g no r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r hope o f p r o g r e s s toward the a n a r c h i s t i d e a l . W o l f f e n d o r s e s a M a r x i s t p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y c o n t r a r y to a n a r c h i s t i d e a l s and i n o p p o s i t i o n to the m a i n s t r e a m of a n a r c h i s t t h o u g h t . For t h e s e r e a s o n s , i t i s argued t h a t i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to d e s c r i b e W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n as an a n a r c h i s t o n e . W o l f f ' s g e n e r a l moral t h e o r y , a n a l y z e d i n i t s own r i g h t r a t h e r than as a form o f a n a r c h i s m , i s h e l d to be d e f i c i e n t f o r a number of r e a s o n s . I t i s a rgued t h a t an u n i n t e n d e d consequence of W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y i s t h a t a g e n t s w i l l be u n a b l e to engage i n any m e a n i n g f u l mora l d i s c o u r s e . T h e r e f o r e , any moral c o n f l i c t cannot be r e s o l v e d t h r o u g h r a t i o n a l means. W o l f f ' s c o n c e p t s of autonomy, o b l i g a t i o n , and. moral c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m i n g e n e r a l a re h e l d to be c o n c e p t u a l l y i n c o h e r e n t . W o l f f i a n a g e n t s must t r e a t each o t h e r as mere means to t h e i r n o n r a t i o n a l e n d s , thus p r e c l u d i n g the p r o s p e c t o f any r a t i o n a l communi ty . W o l f f ' s i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew of r e a s o n i s c r i t i c i z e d on a number of g r o u n d s . I t i s a rgued t h a t the c l a i m t h a t r e a s o n n e i t h e r r u l e s i n nor r u l e s out any c h o i c e o f ends i s a b s u r d and 3 f a l s e . A v a r i e t y of examples and arguments a re p r e s e n t e d to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h i s p o i n t . The c l a i m t h a t i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n i s i t s e l f v a l u e - f r e e and o b j e c t i v e i s r e j e c t e d on the grounds t h a t any c o n c e p t o f reason i s i t s e l f based on c e r t a i n v a l u e s . T h u s , W o l f f ' s a t t e m p t to reduce moral reason to i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n f a i l s . W o l f f ' s c o n c e p t o f i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n i s i t s e l f h e l d t o e x p r e s s c e r t a i n v a l u e s and a c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t moral o u t l o o k . T h i s moral o u t l o o k i s t y p i c a l o f modern t e c h n o - b u r e a u c r a t i c s o c i e t y , and e x c e e d i n g l y nar row and i m p o v e r i s h e d . In the c o n c l u s i o n some a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h e s to a n a r c h i s m are s k e t c h e d o u t . I t i s a rgued t h a t t h e s e a p p r o a c h e s a re more p r o m i s i n g and p l a u s i b l e than the a p p r o a c h t a k e n by W o l f f . I t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t the u l t i m a t e a n a r c h i s t i d e a l i s not a b s o l u t e l i b e r t y or i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, but a more complex v a l u e , communal i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 4 PART ONE C h a p t e r I: Autonomous E t h i c s I. I n t r o d u c t i o n S i n c e i t s o r i g i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n , Rober t . Pau l W o l f f ' s , J j i Defense of A n a r c h i s m has g e n e r a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e debate i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l c i r c l e s . 1 Y e t , as W o l f f h i m s e l f a d m i t s , i n f o r m u l a t i n g h i s argument f o r a n a r c h i s m he has " s i m p l y t a k e n f o r 2 g r a n t e d an e n t i r e e t h i c a l t h e o r y . " I t i s o n l y i n h i s l a t e r w o r k , The Autonomy of R e a s o n : A Commentary on K a n t ' s "Groundwork o f the M e t a p h y s i c s of M o r a l s " , t h a t W o l f f p r o v i d e s a s k e t c h o f the u n d e r l y i n g moral t h e o r y upon which the arguments of In Defense of A n a r c h i s m u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d . However , to f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e m a t t e r s , i n t h i s l a t e r work W o l f f i n d i c a t e s t h a t "I have a l t e r e d my v iews i n ways wh ich r e q u i r e . . . some s i g n i f i c a n t r e v i s i o n of the argument o f In Defense of 3 A n a r c h i s m . " To r e c o n s t r u c t W o l f f ' s d e f e n c e of a n a r c h i s m by d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g i t to the moral t h e o r y he expounds i n The  Autonomy of R e a s o n , as I p ropose to do i n the f i r s t p a r t o f t h i s t h e s i s , t h e r e f o r e p r e s e n t s some d i f f i c u l t i e s . In t h i s c h a p t e r I w i l l s k e t c h out W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y i n the g r e a t e s t d e t a i l p o s s i b l e , so t h a t i n the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r the r e l a t i o n between t h i s moral t h e o r y and W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s m can be c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d . I t i s the purpose o f t h i s c h a p t e r to p r e s e n t 5 W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y i n as c l e a r and as c o n v i n c i n g a manner as i s p o s s i b l e . S u b s t a n t i v e c r i t i c i s m s of W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y w i l l be r e s e r v e d u n t i l P a r t Two of t h i s t h e s i s . I I . Autonomy and R a t i o n a l Agency The key c o n c e p t i n both W o l f f ' s d e f e n c e o f a n a r c h i s m and h i s s u p p o r t i n g moral t h e o r y i s the c o n c e p t of autonomy. W o l f f d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i s c o n c e p t o f autonomy f rom K a n t ' s more c e l e b r a t e d c o n c e p t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to W o l f f , by "autonomy" Kant means the d i s i n t e r e s t e d w i l l i n g of a r a t i o n a l agent ( a b s t r a c t i n g f rom a l l s e l f - i n t e r e s t and sensuous m o t i v e s ) of l a w s , maxims and p o l i c i e s f o r human c o n d u c t . These l a w s , or " c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s , " are u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y and u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d and b i n d i n g f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s . For i n s o f a r as t h e y a re r a t i o n a l and they a b s t r a c t f rom a l l p a r t i c u l a r , c o n t i n g e n t m o t i v e s and i n t e r e s t s , a l l a g e n t s w i l l w i l l e x a c t l y the same laws i n s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . That t h e y must w i l l t h e s e laws f o r t h e m s e l v e s i n o r d e r to be autonomous i s n e c e s s a r y f rom K a n t ' s p o i n t of v iew because o n l y t h o s e a c t i o n s done f o r the sake o f d u t y , i . e . s i m p l y because t h e y a re r i g h t , have mora l w o r t h . Agents who confo rm to the moral law f o r any o t h e r reason - - s e l f - i n t e r e s t f o r example - - a re h e t e r o n o m o u s . For Kant t h e n , w r i t e s W o l f f , " t o be a u t o n o m o u s . . . i s to be ' s u b j e c t o n l y to laws which are made by ( o n e s e l f ) and y e t a re u n i v e r s a l . ' " ^ W o l f f downplays the r e q u i r e m e n t of u n i v e r s a l i t y i n h i s 6 a c c o u n t of autonomy, e m p h a s i z i n g i n s t e a d t h a t " e v e r y s i n g l e 5 r a t i o n a l a g e n t . . . d e c i d e f o r h i m s e l f what i s r i g h t . " For W o l f f t h e n , the e s s e n c e of autonomy i s " s e l f - 1 e g i s l a t i o n , " and by t h a t he means " a c t i n g o n l y on laws t h a t one has g i v e n t o o n e s e l f and b e i n g bound by them o n l y because one has so g i v e n t h e m . " ^ The term " l a w " s h o u l d not be i n t e r p r e t e d l i t e r a l l y . By " l a w " W o l f f means g e n e r a l p o l i c i e s , max ims , i m p e r a t i v e s and o t h e r r u l e s o f conduc t which a g e n t s may a d o p t ; he c l e a r l y does not mean " l a w " i n the c o n v e n t i o n a l , l e g a l i s t i c sense of the word . W o l f f h o l d s t h a t not o n l y a re " s e l f - l e g i s l a t e d " p o l i c i e s b i n d i n g on the agent who l e g i s l a t e s t h e m , but a l s o t h a t any r a t i o n a l agent - - t h a t i s , anyone who "has the c a p a c i t y t o reason about h i s c h o i c e s " - - i s "under a c o n t i n u i n g o b l i g a t i o n " to a c t a u t o n o m o u s l y , o r more c o n c r e t e l y , t o t a k e " f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " f o r h i s or her a c t i o n s by "mak ing the f i n a l d e c i s i o n s about what one s h o u l d d o . " ^ Both the o b l i g a t i o n t o be autonomous and the b i n d i n g n a t u r e of a u t o n o m o u s l y w i l l e d p o l i c i e s f o l l o w , W o l f f a r g u e s , f rom an a n a l y s i s of r a t i o n a l agency i t s e l f . To be a r a t i o n a l agent i s " t o be c a p a b l e o f b e i n g moved by r e a s o n , " and " t o be moved by r e a s o n " means " t o be moved by o n e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f a r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between an end t h a t one has p o s i t e d f o r o n e s e l f and a b i t o f b e h a v i o r wh ich e i t h e r i s an Q i n s t a n c e o f or e l s e w i l l a c c o m p l i s h t h a t e n d . " T h u s , " r a t i o n a l a c t i o n i s p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n , " or " w i 1 l e d 7 g b e h a v i o r . " I t f o l l o w s f rom t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l agency t h a t , as Kant a r g u e s , "who w i l l s the e n d , w i l l s (so f a r as r e a s o n has d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on h i s a c t i o n s ) a l s o the means which a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l y n e c e s s a r y and i n h i s power . To deny the p o s s i b i l i t y o f r a t i o n a l agency i n a c o g n i t i v e l y s i g n i f i c a n t and m e a n i n g f u l way i s s e l f - r e f u t i n g , f o r , as W o l f f a r g u e s : the a s s e r t i o n o f a p r o p o s i t i o n i s an a c t , an e x e r c i s e o f t h e c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . To c o n s t r u e a s s e r t i o n o t h e r w i s e i s t o r e d u c e i t t o t h e m e r e e x h i b i t i o n o f v e r b a l or o t h e r p h y s i c a l b e h a v i o r , wh ich can c e r t a i n l y be e x p l a i n e d w i t h o u t t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f r a t i o n a l agency but which a l s o i s d e v o i d o f the c o g n i t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t i s t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e a s s e r t i o n o f p r o p o s i t i o n s . 11 So to the moral s c e p t i c who d e n i e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f p e o p l e " b e i n g moved by r e a s o n , " W o l f f and Kant r e p l y , " e i t h e r s t e p f o r w a r d and s t a t e your v i e w s , i n which case you p e r f o r m a l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n and eo i p s o r e f u t e y o u r s e l f " by so a c t i n g i n t e n t i o n a l l y and i n t e l l i g i b l y , "o r e l s e r e t i r e f rom the f i e l d 12 i n s i l e n c e , i n which case [we] c l a i m v i c t o r y . " But r a t i o n a l agency r e q u i r e s more than j u s t b e i n g moved by r e a s o n , or " w i l l e d " b e h a v i o u r . J u s t as t h e o r e t i c a l r e a s o n r e q u i r e s r a t i o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y , p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n r e q u i r e s t h a t one a c t c o n s i s t e n t l y . Now, a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f , "whenever any r a t i o n a l agent a c t s . . . he a c t s on the b a s i s of a p o l i c y wh ich he 13 has adopted c o v e r i n g a c l a s s of r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r c a s e s . " T h e r e f o r e , t o a c t c o n s i s t e n t l y i s to a c t a c c o r d i n g to p o l i c i e s 8 which are i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t ( i . e . not s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y ) and c o n s i s t e n t w i t h (o r not c o n t r a r y t o ) each o t h e r . But f o r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n to be t r u l y r a t i o n a l , t h e r e must a l s o be a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r the a d o p t i o n o f o n e ' s p o l i c i e s , and t h e s e p o l i c i e s , once a d o p t e d , must be c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e d . W o l f f does not mean to i m p l y t h a t a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s a c t a c c o r d i n g to c o n s c i o u s l y f o r m u l a t e d p o l i c i e s ( a l t h o u g h , W o l f f n o t e s , t h e r e i s "some h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e t h a t Kant " a c t u a l l y d i d s o ) . 1 ^ A l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r W o l f f ' s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t any r a t i o n a l a c t i o n "can be a n a l y z e d , or r a t i o n a l l y 15 r e c o n s t r u c t e d as h a v i n g t h a t s t r u c t u r e . " Hav ing a c e r t a i n end p r o v i d e s an agent w i t h a r e a s o n f o r a d o p t i n g some a p p r o p r i a t e means f o r a c h i e v i n g i t . T h i s means, or form of a c t i o n , can be i n t e r p r e t e d as a g e n e r a l p o l i c y , f o r i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s where the agent has a c e r t a i n g o a l and he or she can a c h i e v e t h a t goa l t h r o u g h a p a r t i c u l a r form of a c t i o n , the agent w i l l adopt t h a t form o f a c t i o n i n s o f a r as he or she i s r a t i o n a l . I t i s i n t h i s sense then t h a t we can say the agent has adopted a g e n e r a l p o l i c y f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t of some end ( f o r e x a m p l e , we can say t h a t a person h a v i n g the goa l o f q u e n c h i n g h i s o r her t h i r s t who t y p i c a l l y does t h i s by d r i n k i n g wate r has adopted a g e n e r a l p o l i c y of d r i n k i n g water to quench h i s o r her t h i r s t ) . I I I . H y p o t h e t i c a l and C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e s Formal p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n p r o v i d e the c r i t e r i a , 9 or r u l e s , " f o r the a d o p t i o n o f p o l i c i e s , " s t a t i n g " the c o n d i t i o n s under which the a d o p t i o n o f a p o l i c y i s 16 r a t i o n a l . " F o l l o w i n g K a n t , W o l f f d i v i d e s t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s , h y p o t h e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n and c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . Because " a l l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n appear to or are e x p e r i e n c e d by i m p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s [ e . g . human b e i n g s ] as c o m m a n d s . . . t h e y a re e x p r e s s e d i n f o r m u l a e whose g r a m m a t i c a l form i s the i m p e r a t i v e , " or more s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n the form o f h y p o t h e t i c a l and c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s . ^ G e n e r a l l y , someone has a good r e a s o n f o r a d o p t i n g a p o l i c y i f " t h e a d o p t i o n of the p o l i c y w i l l f u r t h e r a purpose wh ich he h a s , " and t h i s reason " i s an e q u a l l y good r e a s o n f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s s i m i l a r l y c o n s t i t u t e d and p o s s e s s e d of the same 18 p u r p o s e . " H y p o t h e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n a s s e r t t h a t " t h e a d o p t i o n of a p o l i c y i s r a t i o n a l under c o n d i t i o n s which a re not n e c e s s a r i l y or u n i v e r s a l l y met by a l l 19 r a t i o n a l a g e n t s as s u c h . " That i s , h y p o t h e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n s t a t e t h a t the a d o p t i o n o f a p o l i c y i s r a t i o n a l p r o v i d e d t h a t the agent has adopted the goa l a t which the p o l i c y a i m s . C a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n a s s e r t t h a t " t h e a d o p t i o n of a p o l i c y i s r a t i o n a l under c o n d i t i o n s which a re n e c e s s a r i l y and u n i v e r s a l l y met by a l l 20 r a t i o n a l a g e n t s as s u c h . " That i s , "a c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e of p r a c t i c a l reason a s s e r t s the a d o p t i o n o f a p o l i c y i s 10 r a t i o n a l , s i m p ! i c i t e r . " S i m p l y by v i r t u e of b e i n g a r a t i o n a l a g e n t , i t i s r a t i o n a l f o r the agent t o adopt the p o l i c y . H y p o t h e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n are then i n s t r u m e n t a l i n n a t u r e , c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s are n o t . H y p o t h e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s s t a t e t h a t , g i v e n the a d o p t i o n o f some e n d , or group of e n d s , such and such a p o l i c y or means o f a c t i o n w i l l a c c o m p l i s h t h a t e n d . What a c t i o n s w i l l a c c o m p l i s h what ends i s a m a t t e r of f a c t wh ich can b e , a t l e a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y , e m p i r i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , " a l t h o u g h the c o n n e c t i o n between the p o l i c y and the end i s d e d u c t i v e " - - because "who w i l l s the end w i l l s the means" - - " t h e e m p i r i c a l knowledge on which the p o l i c y r e s t s i s n o t , and so the f a m i l i a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the s u b j e c t i v e l y r i g h t or r a t i o n a l and the o b j e c t i v e l y 22 r i g h t or r a t i o n a l i s p r e s e r v e d . " The " r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n " between an end and an a c t i o n o r g e n e r a l p o l i c y i s o f two t y p e s . In the f i r s t c a s e , the a c t i o n " s t a n d s i n a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n " to the e n d , such t h a t i t i s "an 2 3 e f f i c i e n t means" f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t of the e n d . For e x a m p l e , d r i n k i n g wate r i s ( u s u a l l y ) an e f f i c i e n t means f o r q u e n c h i n g someone's t h i r s t , and t h i s i s an e m p i r i c a l f a c t . In the second c a s e , the a c t i o n s i m p l y i s an i n s t a n c e of the e n d . For e x a m p l e , making mus ic may be an end i n i t s e l f , so by making music one has a c c o m p l i s h e d o n e ' s e n d . The e x a c t n a t u r e o f a p o l i c y w i l l depend on and be d e t e r m i n e d by not o n l y the a g e n t ' s goa l and the s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s and laws o f n a t u r e w i t h i n which 11 the agent must a c t , but a l s o by the o t h e r g o a l s and c o n c o m i t a n t p o l i c i e s which the agent has a d o p t e d . That i s , a p o l i c y must not o n l y be an e f f e c t i v e means t o the a g e n t ' s e n d , i t must a l s o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the a g e n t ' s o t h e r p o l i c i e s . T h i s i s where the c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n come i n . As we may r e c a l l , a c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n a s s e r t s t h a t " t h e r e are r e a s o n s " f o r the a d o p t i o n o f a p o l i c y "wh ich a re good r e a s o n s f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s as 24 s u c h . " That i s , i n s o f a r as an agent i s r a t i o n a l and he or she i s to a c t , he or she w i l l a c t a c c o r d i n g to the c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . Now, we may a l s o r e c a l l , an agent has a good reason f o r a d o p t i n g a p o l i c y i f t h a t p o l i c y i s an e f f i c i e n t means toward h i s or her e n d . B u t , W o l f f a r g u e s , " t h e r e a re no ends which a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s as such have good r e a s o n s to c h o o s e , " so t h e r e a re no ends which a re b i n d i n g on 25 a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s . T h u s , " t h e o n l y c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n " b i n d i n g on a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s are " n e g a t i v e o r p u r e l y f o r m a l p r i n c i p l e s wh ich r u l e out the a d o p t i o n o f c e r t a i n p o l i c i e s as i r r a t i o n a l . " E s s e n t i a l l y , the r e a s o n why t h e r e a r e no ends wh ich a l l a g e n t s have good r e a s o n s to adopt i s s i m p l y because " t h e r e are 27 no r e a s o n s f o r the c h o i c e o f e n d s . " T h i s i s because " t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between" an a g e n t ' s w a n t s , d e s i r e s and i n c l i n a t i o n s and a c e r t a i n " b i t o f b e h a v i o r , " or p h y s i c a l e v e n t , " j u s t as t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between f i r e and heat or between the mot ion o f the cue b a l l and the subsequent m o t i o n 12 of an o b j e c t b a l l . " . There may be a c o n t i n g e n t c o r r e l a t i o n or a c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n ( d e p e n d i n g on o n e ' s v iew of c a u s a l i t y ) , but t h e r e i s no n e c e s s a r y r e a s o n f o r the agent to adopt as h i s or her end someth ing which he or she may d e s i r e . " I n d e e d , " w r i t e s W o l f f , " t h e w i l l i n g n e s s to f o r g o ends t h a t one d e s i r e s i s n o r m a l l y t a k e n as a p r e r e q u i s i t e both of p rudence and 29 m o r a l i t y . " T h u s , W o l f f a r g u e s , " t h e a d o p t i o n , or p o s i t i n g of ends i s a n o n r a t i o n a l p r o c e s s d e t e r m i n e d n e i t h e r by r e a s o n nor by d e s i r e . There a r e , i n p r i n c i p l e , no ends t h a t r e a s o n 30 r e q u i r e s and no ends t h a t i t r u l e s o u t . " Because the h y p o t h e t i c a l and c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n do not s t i p u l a t e which ends would be r a t i o n a l to a d o p t , but o n l y which p o l i c i e s would be r a t i o n a l to adopt g i v e n the p r e v i o u s a d o p t i o n of v a r i o u s e n d s , and because t h e r e are no s u b s t a n t i v e ends u n i v e r s a l l y b i n d i n g on a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , the c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s e r v e s o n l y as "a p e r f e c t l y u n i v e r s a l n e g a t i v e c r i t e r i o n of the r a t i o n a l i t y o f 31 p o l i c i e s . " What t h i s means i s t h a t the c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e " r u l e s out c o n t r a d i c t o r y w i l l i n g , " t h a t i s , " t h e a d o p t i o n of p o l i c i e s or s e t s o f p o l i c i e s wh ich are i n t e r n a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t a n d , h e n c e , i m p o s s i b l e to c a r r y out as 32 s p e c i f i e d . " I t i s i n c o n s i s t e n t , and hence i r r a t i o n a l , to f a i l " t o t r e a t a l i k e t h o s e c a s e s which o n e ' s p o l i c y d e f i n e s as r e l e v a n t l y a l i k e , " or to adopt " s e v e r a l p o l i c i e s w h i c h , t a k e n 33 c o n j o i n t l y , c o n s t i t u t e an i n c o n s i s t e n t p o l i c y . " We can see then t h a t f o r the a d o p t i o n of a p o l i c y to be r a t i o n a l , not o n l y 13 must i t be an e f f i c i e n t means to an a g e n t ' s s e l f - p o s i t e d end ( i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the h y p o t h e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ) , but i t a l s o must be i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the a g e n t ' s o t h e r p o l i c i e s ( i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ) . IV. O b l i g a t i o n , R a t i o n a l i t y and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y From t h i s a n a l y s i s of r a t i o n a l a g e n c y , W o l f f a r g u e s , f o l l o w the o b l i g a t i o n t o be autonomous and the b i n d i n g n a t u r e o f a u t o n o m o u s l y w i l l e d p o l i c i e s . To be a r a t i o n a l a g e n t , f o r W o l f f , i s to a c t a c c o r d i n g to p o l i c i e s adopted by the agent f o r the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of h i s or her s e l f - c h o s e n e n d s . But i f t h e s e p o l i c i e s a re i n t e r p r e t e d as laws of some s o r t (not l e g a l r u l e s , o f c o u r s e , but g e n e r a l r u l e s of c o n d u c t ) , then r a t i o n a l agency c o u l d be s a i d to c o n s i s t o f " a c t i n g o n l y on laws t h a t one has g i v e n to o n e s e l f , " wh ich i s e x a c t l y how W o l f f d e f i n e s 34 autonomy. In a sense t h e n , to say t h a t r a t i o n a l a g e n t s have an " o b l i g a t i o n " to be autonomous i s m i s l e a d i n g , f o r r a t i o n a l agency and autonomy a r e , u l t i m a t e l y , one and the same t h i n g . T h i s i s s o m e t h i n g we s h a l l come back t o s h o r t l y . I t i s a l s o m i s l e a d i n g f o r W o l f f t o say t h a t " t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t some s i t u a t i o n s i n which i t i s r e a s o n a b l e to g i v e up o n e ' s a u t o n o m y , " f o r i f i t i s " r e a s o n a b l e , " i . e . r a t i o n a l , t o do so 3 5 then one i s not r e a l l y g i v i n g up o n e ' s autonomy. F o r , a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s a n a l y s i s , r a t i o n a l , and hence a u t o n o m o u s , 14 a c t i o n i s a c t i o n caused by r e a s o n . The o n l y r e a l i n s t a n c e s o f heteronomous a c t i o n s a re i n s t a n c e s o f n o n r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r , b e h a v i o u r caused by s o m e t h i n g o t h e r than r e a s o n , be i t p a s s i o n , c o e r c i o n , h a b i t or w h a t e v e r . To ask f o r a d v i c e f rom a t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t , such as a d o c t o r , to use W o l f f ' s own e x a m p l e , i n an a r e a where t h a t e x p e r t has some s p e c i a l competence which the agent l a c k s , i s f a r f rom b e i n g an i r r a t i o n a l c o u r s e o f a c t i o n , or p o l i c y . I n d e e d , i t i s r a t i o n a l i n such c i r c u m s t a n c e s to adopt a p o l i c y of f o l l o w i n g the e x p e r t ' s a d v i c e f o r t h i s i s a much more e f f i c i e n t means to the a g e n t ' s end than r e l y i n g on h i s or her own l i m i t e d k n o w l e d g e , or g u e s s w o r k , or i n t u i t i o n ( the l a t t e r two b e i n g q u i t e c l e a r l y i r r a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s ) . A l s o , the agent can s t i l l d e c i d e whether to f o l l o w the e x p e r t ' s a d v i c e ( a f t e r a l l , the d o c t o r c o u l d p r e s c r i b e c y a n i d e ) , and t h a t a d v i c e remains a f r e e l y s o l i c i t e d (on the p a r t o f the a g e n t ) means to the a g e n t ' s s e l f - c h o s e n e n d s . The g r a i n o f t r u t h i n W o l f f ' s remark i s t h a t i n s o f a r as the agent must depend on t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s (o r anyone e l s e ) f o r p o l i c y a d v i c e f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t o f h i s or her e n d s , the a g e n t ' s r a t i o n a l agency and autonomy i s d i m i n i s h e d because he or she w i l l not f u l l y comprehend the r a t i o n a l e , or r e a s o n s , f o r f o l l o w i n g the p o l i c i e s recommended to him or her by o t h e r s . The agent then l e a v e s him o r h e r s e l f open to m a n i p u l a t i o n by e x p e r t s and h i s or her a c t i o n s w i l l not be c o m p l e t e l y d e t e r m i n e d by reason but p a r t l y by t r u s t i n the e x p e r t ' s a d v i c e (but t h i s t r u s t can i t s e l f be r a t i o n a l l y b a s e d , so s h o r t o f r e q u i r i n g 15 o m n i s c i e n c e on the p a r t o f r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , any d i m i n u t i o n of r a t i o n a l agency appears to be m i n i m a l ) . In t h i s r e g a r d , W o l f f i s c o r r e c t to say t h a t autonomy not o n l y " i n v o l v e s a t t e m p t i n g to d e t e r m i n e what one ought to do" but t h a t i t a l s o " l a y s upon one the a d d i t i o n a l burdens of g a i n i n g k n o w l e d g e , r e f l e c t i n g on m o t i v e s , p r e d i c t i n g o u t c o m e s , c r i t i c i z i n g p r i n c i p l e s , and so f o r t h , " and t h i s may i n t u r n r e q u i r e " t h e g a t h e r i n g o f s p e c i a l , even t e c h n i c a l , i n f o r m a t i o n . " W o l f f c o n c l u d e s t h a t d e s p i t e the t e c h n i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n s t r a i n t s imped ing the a c h i e v e m e n t o f f u l l autonomy, "so l o n g as we r e c o g n i z e our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r our a c t i o n s , and acknowledge the power of r e a s o n w i t h i n u s , we must acknowledge as w e l l the c o n t i n u i n g o b l i g a t i o n to make o u r s e l v e s the a u t h o r s 37 of such commands as we may o b e y . " In o t h e r w o r d s , as r a t i o n a l a g e n t s moved by r e a s o n , we must a c t o n l y a c c o r d i n g t o p o l i c i e s wh ich we have a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r a d o p t i n g ( a c c o r d i n g to the h y p o t h e t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ) and wh ich a re i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and c o n s i s t e n t w i t h each o t h e r ( a c c o r d i n g to the c a t e g o r i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ) , and because we are i m p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n are e x p e r i e n c e d by us as commands. So i n s o f a r as we a r e to a c t , we must a c t a u t o n o m o u s l y , a c c o r d i n g t o s e l f - w i l l e d p o l i c i e s f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t of s e l f - c h o s e n g o a l s . A d m i t t e d l y , t h e r e i s a s l i g h t l y p a r a d o x i c a l a i r t o t h i s a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l i t y and autonomy, f o r one can i m a g i n e 16 s i t u a t i o n s where an a g e n t ' s g o a l s make the a d o p t i o n o f a p o l i c y o f f o l l o w i n g the commands o f a n o t h e r r a t i o n a l . For e x a m p l e , I c o u l d adopt as a goa l l i v i n g i n an a u t o c r a t i c r e l i g i o u s community where eve ryone must f o l l o w the d i r e c t i v e s o f a r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r . In such a c a s e , i t would be r a t i o n a l f o r me to adopt a p o l i c y o f f o l l o w i n g the r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r ' s commands, f o r such o b e d i e n c e i s c o n s t i t u i t i v e of the a u t o c r a t i c community membership i n which i s my g o a l . B u t , W o l f f might r e s p o n d , I am s t i l l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a d o p t i n g such a g o a l and c o n c o m i t a n t p o l i c y a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , I am s t i l l f o l l o w i n g my own command ( i . e . to obey the commands of the r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r , f o r t h i s i s a means t o my end of l i v i n g i n an a u t o c r a t i c r e l i g i o u s c o m m u n i t y ) . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , W o l f f c o u l d a rgue t h a t the a d o p t i o n of some g o a l s i s i r r a t i o n a l because t h e y r e q u i r e the a d o p t i o n o f i r r a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s , and the p o l i c y of f o l l o w i n g the commands of a n o t h e r i s a l w a y s i r r a t i o n a l . Whether W o l f f can e x t r i c a t e h i m s e l f f rom t h i s p r o b l e m i s s o m e t h i n g we s h a l l come back to i n C h a p t e r I I I . That s e l f - 1 e g i s i a t e d p o l i c i e s a r e b i n d i n g on r a t i o n a l a g e n t s a l s o f o l l o w s f rom the r e q u i r e m e n t s of r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . C o n s i s t e n c y r e q u i r e s t h a t , g i v e n r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , r a t i o n a l a g e n t s must a c t a c c o r d i n g to the p o l i c i e s t h e y have adopted a p p r o p r i a t e to the c i r c u m s t a n c e s and to t h e i r g o a l s . However , t h e s e g e n e r a l p o l i c i e s remain b i n d i n g o n l y as l o n g as the agent remains commit ted to the ends t h e y a re meant to a c h i e v e . For e x a m p l e , an agent i s o n l y bound to adhere 17 to a p o l i c y o f p romise k e e p i n g p r o v i d e d t h a t he or she r e m a i n s commit ted t o the s o c i a l p r a c t i c e o f p r o m i s i n g . We see then t h a t to a c t r a t i o n a l l y means " a c t i n g o n l y on laws [o r p o l i c i e s ] t h a t one has g i v e n to o n e s e l f and b e i n g bound by them o n l y because one has so g i v e n t h e m , " and t h i s i s e q u i v a l e n t to s a y i n g t h a t to 38 a c t r a t i o n a l l y i s to a c t a u t o n o m o u s l y . Autonomy and r a t i o n a l agency a r e , i n d e e d , one and the same t h i n g f rom W o l f f ' s p e r s p e c t i v e . A c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l agency and autonomy the f a i l u r e to a c t r a t i o n a l l y , and hence a u t o n o m o u s l y , i s a l w a y s due to i m p e r f e c t r a t i o n a l i t y , not some s o r t o f w i c k e d n e s s . W o l f f sees " r i g h t a c t i o n as a c t i o n d e t e r m i n e d by r e a s o n a l o n e , " so he d e n i e s t h a t an agent " m i g h t have r e a s o n s 39 f o r d i s r e g a r d i n g r e a s o n ' s d i c t a t e s . " One s i m p l y cannot r a t i o n a l l y choose to a c t i r r a t i o n a l l y o r , what amounts t o the same t h i n g , h e t e r o n o m o u s l y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , W o l f f a r g u e s , "whenever a man f a i l s to do as r e a s o n a d v i s e s , d e s i r e has been 40 too s t r o n g f o r h i m . " I f r e a s o n had been " c a p a b l e of o v e r c o m i n g d e s i r e . . . t h e r e [wou ld ] be no p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f why i t f a i l e d to do s o " because " i n the absence o f d i r e c t a c c e s s t o the f a c u l t i e s o f d e s i r e and r e a s o n , our o n l y measure of t h e i r r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s i s the outcome of a s t r u g g l e between 41 t h e m . " On t h i s b a s i s " i t would be s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y to say both t h a t we have good grounds f o r s u p p o s i n g t h a t r e a s o n i s s t r o n g e r than d e s i r e and t h a t r e a s o n f a i l e d t o overcome 42 d e s i r e . And i f an agent s a c t i o n s a r e caused by d e s i r e 18 r a t h e r than r e a s o n , " t h a t r e l i e v e s him of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s wrong a c t i o n . ( S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , i t shows t h a t he d i d n ' t a c t a t a l l , s i n c e a c t i o n i s b e h a v i o r caused by r e a s o n . ) " ^ But t h i s p r e s e n t s us w i t h some p a r a d o x e s . How can one have an o b l i g a t i o n to be autonomous when one cannot*be blamed f o r f a i l i n g to a c t a u t o n o m o u s l y ? F u r t h e r m o r e , i f r a t i o n a l agency and autonomy are u l t i m a t e l y one and the same t h i n g , what sense does i t make t o say t h a t r a t i o n a l a g e n t s have an o b l i g a t i o n to be autonomous , or i n o t h e r w o r d s , to be r a t i o n a l a g e n t s ? H e r e , we must d i s t i n g u i s h between the v a r i o u s ways one can " f a i l " to a c t a u t o n o m o u s l y . When o n e ' s a c t i o n s a re not caused by r e a s o n but by d e s i r e o r i m p u l s e o n e ' s a c t i o n s are not r a t i o n a l and t h e r e f o r e , W o l f f a r g u e s , one c a n n o t be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r o n e ' s n o n r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r . B u t , as w i t h the person whose goa l i s to l i v e i n an a u t o c r a t i c r e l i g i o u s community ment ioned e a r l i e r , one can r a t i o n a l l y choose to f o r f e i t o n e ' s autonomy i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e a s p e c i f i c g o a l . In t h a t case the a g e n t ' s c h o i c e and r e s u l t i n g a c t i o n a r e caused by r e a s o n and t h e r e f o r e he or she can be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t c h o i c e and a c t i o n . W o l f f a l s o h o l d s t h a t p e o p l e can " f o r f e i t t h e i r autonomy at w i l l , " r e f u s e to a c c e p t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s and " d e c i d e to obey the commands o f a n o t h e r w i t h o u t any a t t e m p t to d e t e r m i n e . . . whether what i s commanded i s 44 good or w i s e . " Wh i le t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n may f i t the example of someone r a t i o n a l l y c h o o s i n g a heteronomous p o l i c y i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e a g o a l , the emphas is here i s more on wi11 r a t h e r than 19 r a t i o n a l c h o i c e . In t h i s case i t i s not c l e a r what W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n would be . One would assume t h a t as l o n g as the a g e n t ' s a c t i o n s a re not s t r i c t l y d e t e r m i n e d (by d e s i r e , i m p u l s e , and so on) then the agent can be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s or her a c t i o n s . How a s e e m i n g l y a r b i t r a r y a c t of w i l l can p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r r a t i o n a l autonomy or moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s s o m e t h i n g we w i l l come back to i n C h a p t e r I I I . I t s h o u l d be noted t h a t i n In Defense of A n a r c h i s m W o l f f sometimes f o r m u l a t e s h i s p o s i t i o n somewhat c a r e l e s s l y . In such c a s e s I w i l l d e f e r to the more c a r e f u l pronouncements of the Autonomy of R e a s o n . W o l f f ' s n o t i o n o f o b l i g a t i o n i s v e r y l i m i t e d and r a t h e r p e c u l i a r . In e f f e c t , the o n l y s t a n d i n g " o b l i g a t i o n " a g e n t s have i s to a c t r a t i o n a l l y . On the s u r f a c e , the c l a i m t h a t a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s have a s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to be r a t i o n a l a g e n t s makes as much sense as the c l a i m t h a t a l l b a c h e l o r s have a s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to be u n m a r r i e d m a l e s . But j u s t as the l a t t e r c l a i m makes some sense p r o v i d e d t h a t b a c h e l o r s a re somehow commit ted to not m a r r y i n g but a r e s t i l l f r e e to renege on t h a t commitment , the f o r m e r c l a i m makes some sense p r o v i d e d t h a t a g e n t s a re commit ted to a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y , as t h e y must be i f t h e y are t o a c t a t a l l ( a c t i o n j u s t b e i n g b e h a v i o u r caused by r e a s o n s ) , but a re f r e e to r a t i o n a l l y choose to f o r f e i t t h e i r autonomy ( c o m p l e t e l y or p a r t i a l l y , t e m p o r a r i l y or p e r m a n e n t l y ) i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e some g o a l , o r to renounce r e a s o n i t s e l f - -45 a s , f o r e x a m p l e , d i d D o s t o y e v s k y s Underground Man. I t i s o n l y because the c h o i c e i s t h e r e t h a t i t makes any sense to 20 speak of " o b l i g a t i o n . " V. Mora l C o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m R a t i o n a l a g e n t s , i n s o f a r as t h e y a re t o a c t , are bound by the f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f r a t i o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . T h i s b e i n g s o , i t i s c l e a r t h a t r e a s o n can never be an end i n i t s e l f , f o r an i n f i n i t e v a r i e t y o f c o n s i s t e n t p o l i c i e s and g o a l s can be adopted and c o n s i s t e n t l y a c t e d upon . W o l f f d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e a r e any s u b s t a n t i v e ends b i n d i n g on a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s as s u c h , f o r r e a s o n s we have p r e v i o u s l y d e s c r i b e d . P r i m a r i l y , W o l f f a r g u e s t h a t because the C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e i s the o n l y i m p e r a t i v e u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d and b i n d i n g f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s and because " d e d u c i n g s u b s t a n t i v e ends f r o m " the C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e , wh ich f u n c t i o n s as a p u r e l y n e g a t i v e . c r i t e r i o n f o r the r a t i o n a l i t y o f p o l i c i e s , i s "as i m p o s s i b l e as d e d u c i n g s u b s t a n t i v e e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s f rom the law of C o n t r a d i c t i o n , " t h e r e s i m p l y " a r e not and c o u l d not be any o b l i g a t o r y e n d s " f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s as s u c h . ^ W o l f f acknowledges R a w l s 1 A Theory o f J u s t i c e as an a t t e m p t to s o l v e t h i s p r o b l e m by showing t h a t " t h e p u r e l y f o r m a l c o n s t r a i n t s of c o l l e c t i v e , u n a n i m o u s , c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t , when added to the c o n s t r a i n t of bare c o n s i s t e n c y , s u f f i c e to 47 r u l e out a l l but one s e t o f s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s . " However , i n a l a t e r w o r k , U n d e r s t a n d i n g R a w l s , W o l f f a r g u e s t h a t R a w l s 1 a t t e m p t i s a f a i l u r e . W o l f f ' s main o b j e c t i o n i s 21 t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e moral p r i n c i p l e s cannot be d e t e r m i n e d i n an a^  p r i o r i way t h r o u g h the d e v i c e of a b a r g a i n i n g game because the p a r t i e s to such a game, as w i t h K a n t ' s mora l a g e n t s , " a r e d e p r i v e d o f any knowledge o f t h e m s e l v e s as p a r t i c u l a r a g e n t s , " 48 and c o n s e q u e n t l y , o f any " b a s i s f o r r a t i o n a l d e l i b e r a t i o n . " Because Rawls l a t e r s t i p u l a t e s t h a t the p l a y e r s i n the game are r a t i o n a l l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , even i f t h e y c o u l d r a t i o n a l l y and u n a n i m o u s l y agree to a s u b s t a n t i v e s e t of mora l p r i n c i p l e s t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s would not be u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d and b i n d i n g on a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , f o r t h e r e i s no r e a s o n why a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s s h o u l d commit t h e m s e l v e s to p u r s u i n g t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . W o l f f h i m s e l f a rgues t h a t because t h e r e are no s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s or ends b i n d i n g on a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s " s u b s t a n t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s can a r i s e o n l y form f r e e a c t s o f commitment by wh ich groups o f r a t i o n a l a g e n t s c o l l e c t i v e l y b i n d one a n o t h e r to a s e t 49 of p r i n c i p l e s of a c t i o n . " W o l f f d i s t i n g u i s h e s between " p r i n c i p l e s of p r u d e n c e , " wh ich a re meant t o f a c i l i t a t e the a c h i e v e m e n t of " t h o s e ends which one p o s i t s by o n e s e l f , t r e a t i n g o t h e r s as e x t e r n a l to the p r o c e s s of c h o i c e , " and "mora l p r i n c i p l e s , " which a r e meant to " f a c i 1 i t a t e the a c h i e v e m e n t of " t h o s e ends which one p o s i t s c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h o t h e r r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , t h r o u g h a p r o c e s s of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e c u l m i n a t i n g i n 50 unanimous a g r e e m e n t . " Because a l l s u b s t a n t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s " a r e grounded i n the c o l l e c t i v e commitments of a s o c i e t y o f r a t i o n a l a g e n t s " t h e r e i s "no d i f f e r e n c e between moral and 51 p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . " C o l l e c t i v e commitment i s the b a s i s 22 of b o t h . W o l f f e m p h a s i z e s t h a t f rom t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e T h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y no s u b s t a n t i v e l i m i t a t i o n to the c h a r a c t e r o f t h e e n d s t o w h i c h a s o c i e t y o f r a t i o n a l a g e n t s may choose c o l l e c t i v e l y t o c o m m i t i t s e l f . They may c h o o s e a s y s t e m o f t h o r o u g h - g o i n g , a l i e n a t i n g m u t u a l h o s t i l i t y , s u c h a s l a i s s e z - f a i r e c a p i t a l i s m , o r a s y s t e m o f r e c i p r o c a l c o o p e r a t i o n and communal i n t i m a c y or i n d e e d , a sys tem of r e g u l a t e d r e c i p r o c a l m u r d e r , s u c h as the i n s t i t u t i o n o f d u e l l i n g e s s e n t i a l l y was. So l o n g as the agreement i s e x p l i c i t , c o n s i s t e n t , unanimous and c o n f i n e d o n l y t o t h o s e who a c t u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e c h o i c e o f t h e s y s t e m , t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l , wh ich i s t o s a y , no m o r a l g r o u n d f o r s e l e c t i n g o n e s y s t e m r a t h e r t h a n a n o t h e r . 52 W o l f f adds t h a t not a l l mora l (and h e n c e , p o l i t i c a l ) o b l i g a t i o n s need be the r e s u l t o f e x p l i c i t c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t s . In t h o s e c a s e s where " p e r s o n s f i n d t h e m s e l v e s a s s o c i a t e d i n o n g o i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y o r g a n i z e d p a t t e r n s o f i n t e r a c t i o n which n e i t h e r i n f a c t nor i n p l a u s i b l e f i c t i o n can be t r a c e d to an o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t u a l a g r e e m e n t . . . l i m i t e d or p a r t i a l o b l i g a t i o n s e x i s t , the scope and f o r c e of wh ich c o r r e s p o n d to the degree to wh ich the q u a s i - c o n t r a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n a p p r o x i m a t e s to the pure case o f 53 e x p l i c i t c o l l e c t i v e c o m m i t m e n t . " I t i s t o the degree t h a t t h e s e " o n g o i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y o r g a n i z e d p a t t e r n s of i n t e r a c t i o n " a r e v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t e d and s u s t a i n e d t h a t r a t i o n a l a g e n t s can be s a i d to have any mora l o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s i n g f rom p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n them, f o r " m u t u a l l y v o l u n t a r y " p a t t e r n s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n " a r e the b e h a v i o r a l e q u i v a l e n t s of e x p l i c i t c o l l e c t i v e agreements on the r u l e s o f s o c i a l 23 r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " Because genu ine mora l o b l i g a t i o n s a r e the r e s u l t o f v o l u n t a r y commitments e n t e r e d i n t o " e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or i n some t a c i t b e h a v i o r a l m a n n e r , " t h e y "can a r i s e o n l y a f t e r t r a d i t i o n a l and i n v o l u n t a r y c o n s t r a i n t s have been r e p l a c e d by 5 5 new, f r e e l y chosen p a t t e r n s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . " I t i s not c l e a r why W o l f f r e q u i r e s unanimous c o l l e c t i v e agreement to c r e a t e s u b s t a n t i v e moral o b l i g a t i o n s . The o n l y f o r m a l c o n s t r a i n t on r a t i o n a l agency i s the r e q u i r e m e n t o f r a t i o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . A l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s a r e under a s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n , as i t w e r e , to a c t c o n s i s t e n t l y on a c o n s i s t e n t s e t o f p o l i c i e s i n s o f a r as t h e y a r e to a c t . No m a t t e r what ends t h e y c h o o s e , i t i s t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l p o s i t i n g o f ends wh ich makes i t r a t i o n a l f o r them to adopt and a c t on v a r i o u s , i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s i t e n t p o l i c i e s and s e t s o f p o l i c i e s . Whether t h e i r g o a l s a re i n d i v i d u a l or c o l l e c t i v e , any p o l i c y or p r i n c i p l e which t h e y adopt f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e i r ends w i l l have some s u b s t a n t i v e c o n t e n t ove r and above the f o r m a l demands of r a t i o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . R a t i o n a l a g e n t s a re bound to a c t on t h e s e p o l i c i e s s i m p l y because i t would be i r r a t i o n a l f o r them not to do s o . Whether o t h e r a g e n t s commit t h e m s e l v e s t o a p o l i c y which an i n d i v i d u a l agent has adopted i s o n l y r e l e v a n t i f the a d o p t i o n o f the p o l i c y by t h a t agent i s somehow p r e d i c a t e d on i t s a d o p t i o n by o t h e r a g e n t s , wh ich i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the c a s e . Even g r a n t i n g t h i s , i f the agent i s t o remain t r u l y autonomous , he or she must be a b l e to a l t e r h i s or her ends and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g p o l i c i e s a t w i l l , so p e o p l e are o n l y 24 c o l 1 e c t i v e l y bound to a p r i n c i p l e or p o l i c y as l o n g as t h e y remain i n d i v i d u a l l y c o m m i t t e d to the end wh ich makes the a d o p t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e or p o l i c y r a t i o n a l (o r " o b l i g a t o r y , " i n W o l f f ' s p e c u l i a r sense o f the w o r d ) . So not o n l y i s u n a n i m o u s , c o l l e c t i v e agreement not n e c e s s a r y f o r the c r e a t i o n o f s u b s t a n t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s , such commitments have a p o t e n t i a l f o r c o n f l i c t w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy i t s e l f . In the case of any such c o n f l i c t , autonomy must t a k e p r e c e d e n c e ( f o r , as W o l f f h i m s e l f c o n t i n u a l l y i n s i s t s , an a g e n t ' s a c t i o n s a re r a t i o n a l o n l y i n s o f a r as they a re a u t o n o m o u s ) . C l e a r l y , agents may adopt g o a l s t h a t do r e q u i r e some s o r t o f c o l l e c t i v e commitment . An agent may want to e s t a b l i s h or p a r t i c i p a t e i n a s o c i a l p r a c t i c e , such as p r o m i s i n g , wh ich r e q u i r e s the o n g o i n g c o o p e r a t i o n o f o t h e r s and mutual commitment to the r u l e s c o n s t i t u t i n g the p r a c t i c e . Or an agent may adopt as a goa l some s o r t o f p u b l i c good which a l s o cannot be a c h i e v e d w i t h o u t the c o o p e r a t i o n and commitment o f o t h e r a g e n t s . Unanimous c o l l e c t i v e agreement can a l s o f u l f i l l the i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n of p r o v i d i n g a forum f o r a g e n t s to v o l u n t a r i l y o r d e r t h e i r mutual i n t e r a c t i o n a c c o r d i n g to v o l u n t a r i l y ag reed upon p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s . These p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s , once agreed u p o n , p r o v i d e a s t a b l e and p r e d i c t a b l e f ramework w i t h i n which a g e n t s can a c t , making r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g f o r the f u t u r e p o s s i b l e , and so o n . Because a l l o b l i g a t i o n s are the r e s u l t o f e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l or c o l l e c t i v e commitment , w i t h o u t them the a g e n t ' s a c t i o n s would be c o m p l e t e l y u n c o n s t r a i n e d by any 25 s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s . So i n s o f a r as an agent wants t o engage i n r u l e - g o v e r n e d a c t i v i t y w i t h o t h e r s , he or she w i l l need to s o l i c i t the v o l u n t a r y agreement o f o t h e r s to t h e s e r u l e s , because o n l y v o l u n t a r y agreement can c r e a t e s u b s t a n t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s on the p a r t o f a g e n t s t o f o l l o w t h e s e r u l e s , p r i n c i p l e s or p o l i c i e s . A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e agreement between a g e n t s i s to ensure t h a t i n d i v i d u a l ' autonomy i s not v i o l a t e d . An a g e n t , o r a group o f a g e n t s , may adopt g o a l s and p o l i c i e s which c o n f l i c t w i t h the autonomy of o t h e r s - - the most ex t reme case b e i n g m u r d e r . Now, "what makes murder w r o n g , " W o l f f a r g u e s , " i s not t h a t i t i s an i n s t a n c e o f k i l l i n g , but t h a t i t i s an i n s t a n c e of k i l l i n g someone who has not a c c e p t e d a 56 p r a c t i c e of mutual h o s t i l i t y . " In c o n t r a s t , death by d u e l l i n g i s not w r o n g f u l murder because the p a r t i c i p a n t s have v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t e d and engaged i n a p r a c t i c e o f r e c i p r o c a l k i l l i n g . T h u s , not o n l y do a g e n t s have no o b l i g a t i o n to a b i d e by r u l e s , p o l i c i e s and p r i n c i p l e s which t h e y have not v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t e d , i n s o f a r as t h e y a re t r e a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o such p o l i c i e s t h e y are p r e v e n t e d f rom e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r f u l l autonomy, f rom a c t i n g o n l y a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own s e l f - 1 e g i s 1 a t e d p o l i c i e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the i d e a t h a t a g e n t s s h o u l d not v i o l a t e the autonomy o f o t h e r s does not seem to f o l l o w f rom the b a r e , f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t o f r a t i o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . There i s c e r t a i n l y n o t h i n g l o g i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t about a d o p t i n g a g e n e r a l p o l i c y of not 26 r e s p e c t i n g the autonomy o f o t h e r s . W o l f f r e c o g n i z e s t h i s p r o b l e m , a d m i t t i n g t h a t : I t i s one t h i n g t o s a y t h a t I am o b l i g a t e d to a b i d e by t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s to wh ich I have f r e e l y c o m m i t t e d m y s e l f or even to say t h a t I am o n l y o b l i g a t e d i n s o f a r as I have f r e e l y commit ted m y s e l f . But i t i s q u i t e s o m e t h i n g e l s e t o c l a i m t h a t I h a v e a s t a n d i n g p r o c e d u r a l o b l i g a t i o n , a s i t w e r e , t o b r o a d e n t h e s c o p e o f my c o m m i t m e n t s by t r a n s f o r m i n g my i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h o t h e r p e r s o n s i n t o e l e m e n t s o f r a t i o n a l community grounded i n c o l l e c t i v e commitment . 57 Because t h i s p r i n c i p l e of unanimous c o l l e c t i v e commitment to p o l i c i e s r e g a r d i n g mutual i n t e r a c t i o n "seems to go beyond m e r e l y a r t i c u l a t i n g the n a t u r e o f f o r m a l r a t i o n a l i t y , " W o l f f i s " u n c l e a r about whether a p r o o f f o r i t s h o u l d be c o d i s c o v e r a b l e . " A l t h o u g h a s t r i c t l y f o r m a l p r o o f o f t h i s p r i n c i p l e may be i m p o s s i b l e , I would l i k e to argue t h a t , g i v e n the r e a l w o r l d w i t h i n which a g e n t s must a c t , i t may be r a t i o n a l f o r them to adopt t h i s p r i n c i p l e . A l l a g e n t s have an i n t e r e s t i n m a x i m i z i n g t h e i r own a g e n c y , even i f t h e i r u l t i m a t e g o a l i s the a n n i h i l a t i o n of t h a t agency ( t h r o u g h s u i c i d e , f o r e x a m p l e ) . No m a t t e r what goa l an agent may a d o p t , the agent r e q u i r e s the f reedom to adopt and a c t on p o l i c i e s f o r the a t t a i n m e n t o f t h a t goa l i f the agent i s to have any p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c h i e v i n g i t t h r o u g h r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , and as W o l f f a r g u e s , a l l a g e n t s , i n s o f a r as t h e y a r e a g e n t s , have a s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to a c t r a t i o n a l l y . Autonomy t h e n , a l t h o u g h not n e c e s s a r i l y an end i n i t s e l f , i s a n e c e s s a r y p o l i c y f o r a l l a g e n t s i n s o f a r as t h e y a re 27 to a c t r a t i o n a l l y a c c o r d i n g to s e l f - p o s i t e d p o l i c i e s wh ich can r e a s o n a b l y be e x p e c t e d to a c h i e v e t h e i r ends ( t h r o u g h the " r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n " between the p o l i c i e s and the e n d s ) . Agents may e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y adopt a p o l i c y o f not r e s p e c t i n g the autonomy of o t h e r s , o r they may a c t i n such a way t h a t we can say t h a t t h e y have i m p l i c i t l y adopted such a p o l i c y (by f a i l i n g to o b t a i n the c o n s e n t o f o t h e r s to the p o l i c i e s of mutual i n t e r a c t i o n t h e y have i n d i v i d u a l l y a d o p t e d ) . In a l l c o n s i s t e n c y , a g e n t s who adopt a g e n e r a l p o l i c y of t r e a t i n g o t h e r s as mere means t o t h e i r ends c a n n o t oppose o t h e r a g e n t s a d o p t i n g s i m i l a r p o l i c i e s toward them ( u n l e s s they c o u l d show such t r e a t m e n t was i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the o t h e r a g e n t ' s ends and p o l i c i e s , wh ich i s n ' t n e c e s s a r i l y s o ) . A l t h o u g h i t i s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t h a t a g e n t s t r e a t e d as mere means to o t h e r s ' ends w i l l not respond i n k i n d , i t i s v e r y easy t o i m a g i n e t h a t t h e y w i l l do s o , a n d , i n f a c t , i t i s even e a s i e r to i m a g i n e t h a t i t w i l l 59 be r a t i o n a l f o r them to do s o . There may be no f o r m a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n a d o p t i n g a p o l i c y o f autonomy f o r o n e s e l f but heteronomy f o r o t h e r s , but i n the r e a l w o r l d i n which a g e n t s must a c t the a d o p t i o n o f such a p o l i c y w i l l i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y l e a d t o a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n p r a c t i c e - - n a m e l y , the a d o p t i o n of a p o l i c y o f heteronomy f o r o t h e r s w i l l i n t u r n l e a d to t h o s e o t h e r s a d o p t i n g a s i m i l a r p o l i c y , so the a g e n t ' s g e n e r a l p o l i c y of autonomy f o r him or h e r s e l f w i l l be f r u s t r a t e d . In t h a t c a s e , i t would be i r r a t i o n a l f o r the agent to adopt a p o l i c y of t r e a t i n g o t h e r s as mere means to h i s or her e n d s , f o r the a c t u a l 2 8 e f f e c t of such a p o l i c y would be to i n h i b i t the a g e n t ' s own autonomy. But the agent may f i n d him or h e r s e l f i n a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e , d e s p i t e h i s or her adherence to a p o l i c y of r e s p e c t f o r o t h e r s ' autonomy, a s u f f i c i e n t number o f o t h e r a g e n t s have adopted a p o l i c y o f t r e a t i n g o t h e r s as a means to t h e i r ends so as to d i m i n i s h the a g e n t ' s autonomy. In such a case i t may be r a t i o n a l f o r the agent to adopt a s i m i l a r p o l i c y , s i n c e he o r she w i l l have a l r e a d y s u f f e r e d a d i m i n u t i o n o f autonomy and w i l l have n o t h i n g l e f t to l o s e , and perhaps s o m e t h i n g to g a i n , by f o l l o w i n g such a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n a l s o . What t h i s shows i s t h a t i t w i l l be r a t i o n a l f o r an agent to r e s p e c t the autonomy o f o t h e r s o n l y i f t h e y do so as w e l l . T h u s , a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s have an i n t e r e s t i n d e v i s i n g ways and means f o r p r o t e c t i n g and e n l a r g i n g t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, and t h i s w i l l p r o b a b l y i n c l u d e e n c o u r a g i n g each o t h e r to adopt p o l i c i e s wh ich do not i n f r i n g e on i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. Unanimous c o l l e c t i v e agreement p r o v i d e s the v e r y p r o c e s s by which t h i s can be done . I n s t e a d of p u r s u i n g p o l i c i e s which c o n f l i c t w i t h each o t h e r ' s autonomy a g e n t s can c o l l e c t i v e l y agree to o r d e r t h e i r a f f a i r s a c c o r d i n g to m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e p o l i c i e s and p r i n c i p l e s , thus s a f e g u a r d i n g t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. 29 C h a p t e r I I : From Autonomy to A n a r c h i s m I. I n t r o d u c t i o n W o l f f b e l i e v e s t h a t the " a n a l y s i s of r a t i o n a l a g e n c y , autonomy, and moral p r i n c i p l e s " which he pu ts f o r w a r d i n the Autonomy o f Reason " e n t a i l s the d o c t r i n e wh ich i n p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i s known as a n a r c h i s m . " * * 0 Now t h a t t h i s a n a l y s i s has been s k e t c h e d o u t , we can d e a l w i t h W o l f f ' s argument f o r the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a r c h i s m wh ich he c l a i m s f o l l o w s f rom h i s mora l t h e o r y . The purpose of t h i s c h a p t e r i s to r e c o n s t r u c t W o l f f ' s d e f e n c e o f a n a r c h i s m i n r e l a t i o n to t h a t u n d e r l y i n g mora l t h e o r y . S u b s t a n t i v e c r i t i c i s m s of W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s m , as w e l l as h i s moral t h e o r y , w i l l be r e s e r v e d u n t i l P a r t Two o f t h i s t h e s i s . I t would be u s e f u l t o make some p r e l i m i n a r y remarks about a n a r c h i s m , a n a r c h y and the s t a t e . W o l f f g e n e r a l l y d e f i n e s a n a r c h i s m as the d o c t r i n e which c a t e g o r i c a l l y d e n i e s "any c l a i m to l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y by one man o v e r a n o t h e r . " * ' * T h u s , a n a r c h y i s a c o n d i t i o n o f s o c i e t y " i n which no one c l a i m s l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y or would b e l i e v e such a c l a i m i f i t were m a d e . " R e g a r d i n g the s t a t e , W o l f f c i t e s Weber 's d e f i n i t i o n , d e f i n i n g the s t a t e as "a group of p e r s o n s who have supreme a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n a g i v e n t e r r i t o r y or o v e r a c e r t a i n  p o p u l a t i o n " and who c l a i m " a monopoly o f l e g i t i m a t e or j u s t i f i e d e n f o r c e m e n t " o f t h e i r commands. 30 I I . De F a c t o and De J u r e A u t h o r i t y An i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t W o l f f makes i n h i s argument i s t h a t between de j u r e and de f a c t o a u t h o r i t y . W o l f f d e f i n e s de j u r e , o r l e g i t i m a t e , a u t h o r i t y as " t h e r i g h t t o command, and c o r r e l a t i v e l y , the r i g h t to be o b e y e d . " 6 4 He d e f i n e s de f a c t o , or p u t a t i v e , a u t h o r i t y as an a u t h o r i t y wh ich c l a i m s the r i g h t to be obeyed and "whose s u b j e c t s b e l i e v e i t to be l e g i t i m a t e , " but wh ich does not n e c e s s a r i l y e n j o y such a 65 r i g h t . De f a c t o a u t h o r i t y i s then a d e s c r i p t i v e c o n c e p t w h i l e de j u r e a u t h o r i t y i s a n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t . To e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e r e i s such a t h i n g as de f a c t o a u t h o r i t y one m e r e l y needs to p o i n t to an a c t u a l i n s t a n c e o f i t . But to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t a c l a i m to a u t h o r i t y i s j u s t i f i e d one must employ n o n - e m p i r i c a l , n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s and a r g u m e n t s . T h i s i s one o f the t a s k s o f p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . For W o l f f , the q u e s t i o n i s not whether p e o p l e " a c c e d e to c l a i m s of supreme a u t h o r i t y , " wh ich can be e m p i r i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d , but whether t h e y "ought to a c c e d e " to such c l a i m s . 6 6 W o l f f does not deny the e x i s t e n c e o f de f a c t o a u t h o r i t y ; he does deny the v a l i d i t y o f any c l a i m to de j u r e a u t h o r i t y . Both k i n d s o f a u t h o r i t y "must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f rom power , which i s the a b i l i t y to compel c o m p l i a n c e , e i t h e r t h r o u g h the use or the t h r e a t o f f o r c e , " and f rom r a t i o n a l argument and p e r s u a s i o n , whereby c o m p l i a n c e i s o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h r e c o g n i t i o n 31 of " t h e f o r c e o f an argument or the r i g h t n e s s o f a p r e s c r i p t i o n . " * * ^ A u t h o r i t y , whether de j u r e or de f a c t o , i s s u c c e s s f u l l y e x e r c i s e d when o b e d i e n c e i s due to a r e c o g n i t i o n of the r i g h t of the a u t h o r i t y to command and a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e c o g n i t i o n of o n e ' s o b l i g a t i o n to obey . Some of W o l f f ' s c r i t i c s argue t h a t any c r i t i q u e o f a u t h o r i t y must i m p l i c i t l y assume t h a t some c l a i m s to de j u r e a u t h o r i t y a re v a l i d b e c a u s e , as W o l f f f o r m u l a t e s the o b j e c t i o n , i f " a l l such c l a i m s were w r o n g . . . we never would have had the C O c o n c e p t o f l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y a t a l l . " W o l f f r e p l i e s t h a t t h i s t y p e o f o b j e c t i o n " c a n n o t be a p p l i e d t o the c a s e of de f a c t o v e r s u s de j u r e a u t h o r i t y , f o r the key component o f both c o n c e p t s , namely ' r i g h t , ' i s i m p o r t e d i n t o the d i s c u s s i o n f rom 69 the r e a l m o f moral p h i l o s o p h y g e n e r a l l y . " The c o n c e p t o f de j u r e a u t h o r i t y , c o n c e i v e d as " t h e r i g h t to command and the r i g h t to be o b e y e d , " i s m e a n i n g f u l i r r e s p e c t i v e o f any a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g a u t h o r i t y h a v i n g such a r i g h t because the terms wh ich c o m p r i s e t h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y , namely " r i g h t , " "command" and " o b e d i e n c e , " a r e t h e m s e l v e s m e a n i n g f u l r e g a r d l e s s o f the v a l i d i t y o f any c l a i m s to de j u r e a u t h o r i t y . S i m i l a r l y , the c o n c e p t o f de j u r e a u t h o r i t y can be c r i t i c i z e d a c c o r d i n g to o t h e r m e a n i n g f u l moral c o n c e p t s i n d e p e n d e n t o f the c o n c e p t o f de j u r e a u t h o r i t y , such as " a u t o n o m y , " " o b l i g a t i o n , " and so f o r t h , w i t h o u t t h e r e b y i m p l y i n g t h a t any c l a i m to de j u r e a u t h o r i t y i s i n f a c t j u s t i f i e d . P e o p l e may v e r y w e l l b e l i e v e i n the e x i s t e n c e of de j u r e a u t h o r i t y but such b e l i e f s i n no way 32 prove t h a t any such a u t h o r i t y has e v e r e x i s t e d or c o u l d e x i s t , no more than b e l i e f i n God p roves H i s e x i s t e n c e . And j u s t as the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a t h e i s t can a t t a c k the c o n c e p t o f God as c o n t r a r y to human m o r a l i t y , as l o g i c a l l y c o n f u s e d and so f o r t h , the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a r c h i s t can c r i t i c i z e the c o n c e p t o f de  j u r e a u t h o r i t y as i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, w i t h o u t e i t h e r one t h e r e b y i m p l y i n g the e x i s t e n c e o f the c o n c e p t s t h e y a re c r i t i c i z i n g . The i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n i s whether anyone has i n d e e d p o s s e s s e d and defended the c o n c e p t o f de j u r e a u t h o r i t y wh ich i s the o b j e c t of W o l f f ' s a t t a c k . W o l f f ' s c r i t i c , J e f f r e y R e i m a n , c l a i m s t h a t W o l f f ' s c o n c e p t o f de j u r e a u t h o r i t y i s c o n f u s e d , "a c o n t r a d i c t i o i n a d j e c t o , " and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h a t no a d v o c a t e of l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y need be commit ted to d e f e n d i n g i t . ^ I s h a l l argue t h a t W o l f f ' s c o n c e p t o f de  j u r e a u t h o r i t y i s t a k e n f rom c l a s s i c a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y Hobbes , Locke and R o u s s e a u , so t h a t i f the c o n c e p t i s c o n f u s e d - - as W o l f f might w e l l a d m i t - - t h i s i s a p r o b l e m f o r c o n t r a c t t h e o r i s t s , not f o r W o l f f . F u r t h e r m o r e , as W o l f f p o i n t s o u t , v i r t u a l l y e v e r y government c l a i m s a r i g h t to command and to be o b e y e d . I s h a l l argue t h a t no government c o u l d e x i s t w i t h o u t d o i n g s o , t h a t the c o n c e p t o f a u t h o r i t y W o l f f a t t a c k s i s c e n t r a l to the c o n c e p t of government and the s t a t e . We may b e g i n w i t h a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n o f c l a s s i c a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r y . In L e v i a t h a n , Hobbes e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s t h a t the s o v e r e i g n power has " t h e r i g h t to command," and c o r r e l a t i v e l y , 33 t h a t i t s s u b j e c t s have an o b l i g a t i o n t o o b e y , "because w h a t s o e v e r i s commanded by the s o v e r e i g n power i s as to the s u b j e c t . . . j u s t i f i e d by the command, f o r o f such command e v e r y s u b j e c t i s the a u t h o r . " 7 1 L o c k e , d e s p i t e h i s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h Hobbes on o t h e r p o i n t s , h o l d s a s i m i l a r c o n c e p t o f l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y . In The Second T r e a t i s e of Government , Locke a rgues t h a t " e v e r y o n e o f the s o c i e t y ought to obey" d u l y c o n s t i t u t e d , l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y , " f o r i f any man may do what he t h i n k s f i t , and t h e r e be no a p p e a l on e a r t h f o r r e d r e s s or s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t any harm he s h a l l d o , I ask whether he be not p e r f e c t l y s t i l l i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e , and so can be no p a r t or member of t h a t c i v i l 7 2 s o c i e t y . " T h u s , l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y has " t h e r i g h t . . . to make laws f o r a l l the p a r t s and f o r e v e r y member of the s o c i e t y , p r e s c r i b i n g r u l e s to t h e i r a c t i o n s , and g i v i n g power of e x e c u t i o n whence t h e y a re t r a n s g r e s s e d , " and t h i s f u r t h e r r e q u i r e s t h a t the l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y have " t h e supreme p o w e r , " w i t h " a l l o t h e r powers i n any members or p a r t s o f the 7 3 s o c i e t y d e r i v e d f rom and s u b o r d i n a t e to i t . " A l t h o u g h Locke d e f e n d s the r i g h t o f p e o p l e to r e b e l a g a i n s t t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t , t h i s i s o n l y when t h e i r government no l o n g e r has nor e x e r c i s e s l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y . But as l o n g as the government s a t i s f i e s L o c k e ' s c r i t e r i o n f o r l e g i t i m a c y , i t r e t a i n s i t s r i g h t to be o b e y e d , and t h o s e s u b j e c t to i t a r e o b l i g a t e d to obey i t . (The grounds o f t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n , as w i t h Hobbes and R o u s s e a u , r e s t upon t h e i r c o n s e n t . The t h e o r e t i c a l 34 s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s i s s o m e t h i n g I w i l l come back t o , but a t t h i s p o i n t I am m e r e l y t r y i n g to e x p l i c a t e the c l a s s i c a l c o n t r a c t c o n c e p t i o n of l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , not to p r o v i d e an e x p l a n a t i o n or j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t ) . Locke makes c l e a r t h a t the agreement to c r e a t e a supreme p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y r e q u i r e s an a t l e a s t p a r t i a l f o r f e i t u r e o f i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, n a m e l y : the g i v i n g up of the " p o w e r . . . o f d o i n g w h a t s o e v e r " a pe rson t h i n k s f i t " f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f h i m s e l f and the r e s t of m a n k i n d , " and the g i v i n g up of " t h e power to p u n i s h the 7 4 c r i m e s commit ted a g a i n s t " the law of n a t u r e . The i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t , upon a g r e e i n g to e s t a b l i s h a common, l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y to escape the s t a t e o f n a t u r e , must agree " t o p a r t a l s o w i t h as much o f h i s n a t u r a l l i b e r t y . . . as the g o o d , 7 5 p r o s p e r i t y , and s a f e t y of the s o c i e t y s h a l l r e q u i r e . " Anyone who does not f o r f e i t h i s or her r i g h t t o be " j u d g e f o r h i m s e l f and e x e c u t i o n e r " i s " s t i l l i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e . " 7 6 We f i n d Rousseau p u t t i n g f o r w a r d a s i m i l a r c o n c e p t of l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i n The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , a l t h o u g h , o f c o u r s e , h i s c r i t e r i o n of l e g i t i m a c y i s d i f f e r e n t f rom both L o c k e ' s and H o b b e s ' . The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , Rousseau a r g u e s , r e q u i r e s " t h e t o t a l a l i e n a t i o n o f each a s s o c i a t e , t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l h i s r i g h t s , to the whole c o m m u n i t y . . . f o r , i f the i n d i v i d u a l r e t a i n e d c e r t a i n r i g h t s , as t h e r e would be no common s u p e r i o r to d e c i d e between them and the p u b l i c , e a c h , b e i n g on one p o i n t h i s own j u d g e , would ask to be so on a l l ; the s t a t e o f n a t u r e would t h u s c o n t i n u e , and the a s s o c i a t i o n would 35 n e c e s s a r i l y become i n o p e r a t i v e or t y r a n n i c a l . " C o n s e q u e n t l y , " i n o r d e r . . . t h a t the s o c i a l compact may not be an empty f o r m u l a , i t t a c i t l y i n c l u d e s the u n d e r t a k i n g , wh ich a l o n e can g i v e f o r c e to the r e s t , t h a t whoever r e f u s e s to obey the g e n e r a l w i l l [ o f the community ] s h a l l be c o m p e l l e d to do so by 78 the whole b o d y . " Rousseau f u r t h e r a rgues t h a t " i t must a l s o be g r a n t e d t h a t the s o v e r e i g n i s s o l e judge of what i s 7 9 i m p o r t a n t . " The s o v e r e i g n , or supreme a u t h o r i t y , then has " a b s o l u t e power ove r a l l i t s members , " and i t s commands a r e 80 b i n d i n g on a l l c i t i z e n s . Reiman d i s p u t e s t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , a c c e p t e d by W o l f f , o f l e g i t i m a t e or de j u r e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y as the r i g h t t o command and to be o b e y e d , and he f u r t h e r r e j e c t s " t h e m o n o p o l i s t i c c l a i m s o f the t r a d i t i o n a l t h e o r y " t h a t t h o s e s u b j e c t to l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y a re a l w a y s o b l i g a t e d to 81 obey . A c c o r d i n g to R e i m a n , l e g i t i m a t e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y s h o u l d be c o n c e i v e d i n terms of " t h e r i g h t to make commands and 8 2 use c o e r c i o n to d i s c o u r a g e n o n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e m . " Reiman a l s o h o l d s t h a t p e o p l e have o n l y a p r ima f a c i e o b l i g a t i o n to obey l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y . I would l i k e to a rgue t h a t the r i g h t to make and e n f o r c e commands c a r r i e s w i t h i t the r i g h t to be o b e y e d . By what r i g h t does a l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y e n f o r c e i t s commands? Hobbes , Locke and Rousseau argue i t has a r i g h t to e n f o r c e i t s commands because t h o s e s u b j e c t t o i t have agreed t o o b e y , and hence are o b l i g a t e d to do s o , and t h e y have a l s o a u t h o r i z e d such e n f o r c e -36 ment a g a i n s t t h o s e who d i s o b e y , i n c l u d i n g t h e m s e l v e s . By e n f o r c i n g i t s commands when n e c e s s a r y , a l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y i s m e r e l y f o r c i n g p e o p l e to f u l f i l l t h e i r r i g h t f u l o b l i g a t i o n s (o r so the argument g o e s ) . I t would be a b s u r d and i n j u s t t o f o r c e p e o p l e to obey commands wh ich t h e y had no o b l i g a t i o n to obey . As Hobbes , Rousseau and even Locke ( w i t h i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ) a l s o a r g u e , whether d i s o b e d i e n c e t o 1eg i t i mate a u t h o r i t y i s e v e r j u s t i f i e d i s s o m e t h i n g wh ich o n l y the supreme a u t h o r i t y , the s t a t e or s o v e r e i g n , can d e t e r m i n e , f o r i f i t were l e f t up to i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e p e o p l e would soon f i n d t h e m s e l v e s back i n the s t a t e of n a t u r e , i n d i v i d u a l l y e v a l u a t i n g each command on i t s own m e r i t s i n s t e a d o f a c c e p t i n g the a u t h o r i t y o f the s t a t e . But a u t h o r i t i e s do not i s s u e commands and then l e a v e i t up to each i n d i v i d u a l to o b e y . I t goes w i t h the c o n c e p t of a command t h a t t h e y a re meant to be o b e y e d , not j u s t t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n as i n t e r e s t i n g s u g g e s t i o n s wh ich can be f r e e l y a c c e p t e d or r e j e c t e d . No s o v e r e i g n o r s t a t e w i l l t o l e r a t e d i s o b e d i e n c e to i t s a u t h o r i t y ( n e e d l e s s to s a y , t h i s p r e s e n t s some s e r i o u s p r o b l e m s f o r a d v o c a t e s o f c i v i l d i s o b e d i e n c e who a l s o s u p p o r t the e x i s t e n c e o f l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y ) . I f t h e r e i s to be any r u l e of l a w , the s t a t e or s o v e r e i g n must be the supreme a u t h o r i t y . And i f t h i s a u t h o r i t y i s to be more than a c o e r c i v e i m p o s i t i o n , t h e r e must be some sense i n wh ich t h o s e s u b j e c t to i t have an o b l i g a t i o n t o o b e y , and hence can be j u s t i f i a b l y f o r c e d to a b i d e by t h e i r commi t m e n t s . 37 Reiman downplays the o b l i g a t o r y n a t u r e of a u t h o r i t a t i v e commands because he a c c e p t s a u t i l i t a r i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , p e o p l e s h o u l d obey an a u t h o r i t y not because t h e y have agreed t o , and hence have a s p e c i a l o b l i g a t i o n to honour t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t s , but because o b e d i e n c e w i l l c r e a t e g r e a t e r u t i l i t y . C i v i l d i s o b e d i e n c e i s then j u s t i f i e d i f i t i s o f g r e a t e r u t i l i t y than o b e d i e n c e . In e f f e c t , the o n l y r e a l o b l i g a t i o n p e o p l e have i s to max imize u t i l i t y , and t h i s may r e q u i r e e i t h e r o b e d i e n c e or d i s o b e d i e n c e to the s t a t e , depend ing on the c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The e n f o r c e m e n t of a u t h o r i t a t i v e commands i s i n t u r n j u s t i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o the u t i l i t y o f such e n f o r c e m e n t . The s t a t e has the r i g h t to make and e n f o r c e commands o n l y i n s o f a r as g r e a t e r u t i l i t y i s c r e a t e d by such a c t i v i t y . But i f u t i l i t y i s the measure o f a l l t h i n g s , the o n l y commands t h a t a re j u s t i f i a b l y e n f o r c e a b l e a re commands which w i l l y i e l d g r e a t e r u t i l i t y i f o b e y e d . And i f a l l a g e n t s have a d u t y , or o n g o i n g o b l i g a t i o n , to max imize u t i l i t y , then they w i l l have a du ty or o b l i g a t i o n to obey o p t i m i f i c commands. T h u s , even f rom a u t i l i t a r i a n s t a n d p o i n t , any j u s t i f i a b l y e n f o r c e a b l e command w i l l a l s o be a command wh ich a g e n t s have an o b l i g a t i o n to obey . I I I . The A p p a r e n t C o n f l i c t Between A u t h o r i t y and Autonomy W o l f f a rgues t h a t t h e r e i s an a p p a r e n t c o n f l i c t between autonomy, the " s u b m i s s i o n [ o n l y ] to laws wh ich one has made f o r 38 o n e s e l f " and a u t h o r i t y , de f a c t o or de j u r e , c o n c e i v e d e i t h e r i n terms of a " r i g h t to be obeyed" or i n terms of a 8 3 " r i g h t to make and e n f o r c e commands." A l t h o u g h I have argued t h a t t h e s e two c o n c e p t s of de j u r e a u t h o r i t y are i n f a c t i n s e p a r a b l e , I w i l l f o l l o w W o l f f ' s example and t r e a t them s e p a r a t e l y . The advantage o f t h i s a p p r o a c h i s t h a t i t w i l l show t h a t even i f we a c c e p t R e i m a n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y , such a u t h o r i t y s t i l l i n v o l v e s the i n f r i n g e m e n t o f p e r s o n a l autonomy, and i s t h e r e f o r e - - a t l e a s t a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f - -i 1 1 e g i t i m a t e . L e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y , e i t h e r c o n c e i v e d as a r i g h t t o command and to be obeyed or as a r i g h t to make and e n f o r c e commands, can be a b s o l u t e or l i m i t e d . But the d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l fo rms of a u t h o r i t y , wh ich d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t f rom o t h e r forms of s o c i a l c o n t r o l , i s the r e a s o n s f o r o b e d i e n c e . P e o p l e obey the commands of a l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y because t h a t a u t h o r i t y has i s s u e d the commands and i s p e r c e i v e d as h a v i n g a r i g h t to do s o . The commands are not i n d i v i d u a l l y o e v a l u a t e d on i n d e p e n d e n t g r o u n d s , a t l e a s t i n parad igm c a s e s . For e x a m p l e , p e o p l e u s u a l l y obey the commands of t h e i r government w i t h o u t e v a l u a t i n g the commands on t h e i r own m e r i t s , because t h e y f e e l the government has the l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y to command, and t h a t they have an o b l i g a t i o n to obey . Of c o u r s e , p e o p l e (and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s ) w i l l have d i f f e r i n g c r i t e r i a f o r both the l e g i t i m a c y o f a u t h o r i t y and the l e g i t i m a c y o f the commands i s s u e d by a l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y . In the f i r s t c a s e , 39 p e o p l e a re under no o b l i g a t i o n to obey an a u t h o r i t y wh ich has no r i g h t to command. In the second c a s e , p e o p l e may not be o b l i g a t e d to obey a command because i t v i o l a t e s a b a s i c p r i n c i p l e c o n s t i t u t i v e o f l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y ( e . g . i t i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ) , or because i t i s c o n t r a r y to the purpose f o r wh ich t h a t a u t h o r i t y has been c o n s t i t u t e d ( e . g . the p u r s u i t o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ) , o r because the command has not been made t h r o u g h the p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e s ( e . g . i t i s u l t r a v i r e s ) . But i n t h o s e c a s e s where the command s a t i s f i e s the b a s i c c r i t e r i a of l e g i t i m a c y ( f o r e x a m p l e , the a u t h o r i t y i s s u i n g the command has the r i g h t to do so and the command i t s e l f i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ) , p e o p l e have an o b l i g a t i o n to obey and a r e not e n t i t l e d t o i n d i v i d u a l l y e v a l u a t e the command on i t s own m e r i t s and then d e c i d e whether i t s h o u l d be o b e y e d . I f a u t h o r i t a t i v e commands c o u l d be i n d i v i d u a l l y and i n d e p e n d e n t l y e v a l u a t e d on t h e i r own m e r i t s ( r a t h e r than by v a r i o u s c r i t e r i a o f l e g i t i m a c y ) , t h o s e commands would no l o n g e r have the f o r c e o f l a w , nor would t h e r e be any r u l e o f law ( a l t h o u g h t h e r e c o u l d v e r y w e l l be the r u l e of f o r c e or p o w e r ) . When p e o p l e "obey" a command on i n d e p e n d e n t grounds ( t h e y may have d e c i d e d t h a t , i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t was the b e s t t h i n g to do a n y w a y ) , t h e y a re n o t , " s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , o b e y i n g a command, but r a t h e r a c k n o w l e d g i n g the f o r c e of an argument o r the r i g h t n e s s of a p r e s c r i p t i o n , " or pe rhaps 8 4 the f o r c e a t the d i s p o s a l of the i s s u e r o f the command. An autonomous a g e n t , to be t r u l y au tonomous , must i n d i v i d u a l l y e v a l u a t e a l l c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s 4 0 or her s e l f - c h o s e n e n d s , and can a c t o n l y on t h o s e p o l i c i e s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h o s e ends and c o n s i s t e n t , t a k e n c o l l e c t i v e l y , w i t h each o t h e r . " F o r the autonomous" p e r s o n , W o l f f a r g u e s , t h e r e can be "no such t h i n g , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , as a 8 5 command." The o n l y "commands" an autonomous agent can obey and remain autonomous are t h o s e h y p o t h e t i c a l and c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s wh ich impose r a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s on the a g e n t ' s b e h a v i o u r . In a s e n s e , the o n l y a u t h o r i t y an autonomous agent r e c o g n i z e s i s the a u t h o r i t y of h i s or her own r e a s o n . How i s i t p o s s i b l e , t h e n , f o r an autonomous agent to obey the commands o f a n o t h e r and y e t remain autonomous? W o l f f a rgues t h a t t h e r e i s a f a t a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n between autonomy and a u t h o r i t y , and because a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s have an o v e r r i d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to be autonomous , t h e y must n e c e s s a r i l y choose autonomy ove r a u t h o r i t y . The p rob lem w i t h de j u r e a u t h o r i t y i s not t h a t i t i s a vacuous c o n c e p t , as W o l f f a t one p o i n t m i s l e a d i n g l y c l a i m s , but t h a t i t seems to r e q u i r e a g e n t s to adopt a g e n e r a l p o l i c y o f heteronomous o b e d i e n c e , wh ich i s i r r a t i o n a l a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . De j u r e a u t h o r i t y has a r i g h t to command a g e n t s to a c t i n c e r t a i n ways . Even i f t h i s r i g h t i s not a b s o l u t e , even i f t h e r e a re some a c t i o n s wh ich no a u t h o r i t y can l e g i t i m a t e l y command, t h e r e w i l l be a t l e a s t some c a s e s when agents w i l l be commanded to a c t i n c e r t a i n ways w i t h o u t the agents b e i n g e n t i t l e d to d e c i d e f o r t h e m s e l v e s whether i t i s r a t i o n a l f o r them to adopt such p o l i c i e s . No agent i s f r e e to 4 1 d e c i d e i n a l l c a s e s , on the b a s i s of h i s or her own f r e e l y chosen g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , whether or not t o obey the commands o f a u t h o r i t y . I f they were f r e e to do s o , t h e r e would be no p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y i n the normal sense o f the word . I f a g e n t s have an o b l i g a t i o n to obey the commands o f an a u t h o r i t y s i m p l y because both the commands and the a u t h o r i t y s a t i s f y c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a o f l e g i t i m a c y , and not because o f the s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t o f a p a r t i c u l a r command, then t h e y w i l l have t o adopt a g e n e r a l p o l i c y of o b e d i e n c e to a u t h o r i t y wh ich may r e q u i r e them t o a c t c o n t r a r y to t h e i r own r e a s o n , g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , and t h i s would be a heteronomous p o l i c y . Even a u t h o r i t y c o n c e i v e d as e i t h e r the a b s o l u t e o r p r i m a  f a c i e r i g h t to make and e n f o r c e commands, w i t h o u t the c o n c o m i t a n t r i g h t to be o b e y e d , p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. A l t h o u g h i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t h a t a de j u r e a u t h o r i t y might not e v e r e x e r c i s e i t s r i g h t t o make and e n f o r c e commands ( p e r h a p s because e v e r y o n e v o l u n t a r i l y obeys them, but i n t h a t case a u t h o r i t y would seem u n n e c e s s a r y ) , the r i g h t i t s e l f e n t i t l e s the a u t h o r i t y to f o r c e p e o p l e to a c t c o n t r a r y to t h e i r own g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , and t h i s would s u r e l y be an i n f r i n g e m e n t o f t h e i r autonomy, i f e v e r e x e r c i s e d . Reiman d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t between a u t h o r i t y so c o n c e i v e d ( i . e . as the r i g h t to make and e n f o r c e commands) and autonomy because he d e f i n e s autonomy as "mak ing the f i n a l Q C d e c i s i o n s about what one s h o u l d d o . " Autonomy then " i s a p u r e l y i n t e r n a l r e f u s a l to accept , any c l a i m to moral a u t h o r i t y , " 4 2 a s u b j e c t i v e a c t o f judgement which r e q u i r e s no p h y s i c a l a c t i o n : 8 7 "bound and g a g g e d , one can s t i l l make t h i s r e f u s a l . " But as we have s e e n , f o r W o l f f autonomy means not o n l y d e c i d i n g f o r o n e s e l f what one ought to d o , but a l s o a c t i n g on t h o s e d e c i s i o n s . The b a s i s o f R e i m a n ' s c o n f u s i o n l i e s i n W o l f f ' s own ambiguous use of the te rm "autonomy" i n h i s In Defense of A n a r c h i sm. I n d e e d , a t one p o i n t W o l f f h i m s e l f d e f i n e s autonomy 8 8 as "mak ing the f i n a l d e c i s i o n s about what one s h o u l d d o . " I t i s o n l y i n h i s l a t e r w o r k , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , t h a t W o l f f makes c l e a r t h a t by "autonomy" he means both "mak ing the f i n a l d e c i s i o n s about what one s h o u l d d o , " wh ich Reiman c a l l s moral autonomy, and a c t i n g on t h o s e d e c i s i o n s , wh ich Reiman c a l l s p o l i t i c a l autonomy. Reiman a d m i t s t h a t "a d e f e n s e o f p o l i t i c a l autonomy can be an argument a g a i n s t c o e r c i o n , a g a i n s t the a u t h o r i t y o f the s t a t e ; " he j u s t d i d not t h i n k t h a t W o l f f was commit ted t o d e f e n d i n g t h i s s t r o n g e r form o f 8 9 autonomy. What f u r t h e r m i s l e d him was W o l f f ' s own not i n f r e q u e n t a d m i s s i o n s t h a t autonomous i n d i v i d u a l s can d e c i d e to comply w i t h the commands o f a n o t h e r and y e t remain autonomous . With h i s i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew o f r e a s o n , W o l f f o f t e n a d o p t s a form o f c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , a r g u i n g t h a t : men s h o u l d c o n f o r m t h e i r b e h a v i o r to the law when t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f c o n f o r m i t y a r e b e t t e r than t h o s e of d i s o b e d i e n c e ; o t h e r w i s e t h e y s h o u l d i g n o r e t h e l a w o r a c t i v e l y d i s o b e y i t . The law i t s e l f , i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f o b e d i e n c e o r d i s o b e d i e n c e , has no m a j e s t y , no m y s t e r y , no 43 a u t h o r i t y w h i c h can l e g i t i m a t e l y c l a i m our a l l e g i a n c e . 9 0 What makes c o m p l i a n c e w i t h a command c o m p a t i b l e w i t h autonomy and d i f f e r e n t f rom o b e d i e n c e to a command are the r e a s o n s the agent has f o r f o l l o w i n g the command. In the c a s e o f c o m p l i a n c e , the agent f o l l o w s the command not because i t conforms to v a r i o u s c r i t e r i a o f a u t h o r i t a t i v e l e g i t i m a c y ( e . g . not because i t was i s s u e d by an a u t h o r i t y wh ich the agent r e c o g n i z e s as l e g i t i m a t e ) , but because he or she has d e c i d e d on i n d e p e n d e n t grounds t h a t f o l l o w i n g t h i s s p e c i f i c command would be the b e s t p o l i c y i n r e l a t i o n to h i s o r her own g o a l s and p o l i c i e s . When c o m p l y i n g w i t h a command the agent does not r e c o g n i z e the i s s u e r o f the command, or the p r o c e s s by wh ich the command was i s s u e d , as h a v i n g any s p e c i a l l e g i t i m a c y o r a u t h o r i t y . The agent r e m a i n s autonomous because he or she i s v o l u n t a r i l y f o l l o w i n g a command a d h e r e n c e to which i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s or her g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , and p r e c i s e l y f o r t h a t r e a s o n . IV. P o s s i b l e S o l u t i o n s to the C o n f l i c t W o l f f a rgues t h a t " t h e r e i s o n l y one form of p o l i t i c a l community which o f f e r s any hope of r e s o l v i n g the c o n f l i c t 91 between a u t h o r i t y and autonomy, and t h a t i s d e m o c r a c y . " But t h e r e a r e p r i m a r i l y two d i f f e r e n t ways f o r j u s t i f y i n g d e m o c r a c y . One i s t h r o u g h c l a s s i c a l d e m o c r a t i c s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r y , the o t h e r i s t h r o u g h u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . W o l f f a r g u e s t h a t the 44 u t i l i t a r i a n approach i s c o m p l e t e l y i n a d e q u a t e as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r democracy (as opposed to some o t h e r form o f g o v e r n m e n t ) , and t h e r e f o r e , i f t h e r e i s to be any s o l u t i o n a t a l l to the c o n f l i c t between autonomy and a u t h o r i t y , i t w i l l have t o come f rom s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r y . The p r i m a r y i n a d e q u a c y o f u t i l i t a r i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y i n g e n e r a l i s t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to e s t a b l i s h any s o r t o f s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between an a u t h o r i t y and t h o s e s u b j e c t to i t . U t i l i t a r i a n i s m f a i l s t o show t h a t p e o p l e s u b j e c t to a u t h o r i t y have any s p e c i a l o b l i g a t i o n t o obey ove r and above the o b l i g a t i o n s o f any moral a g e n t . F rom,a u t i l i t a r i a n p e r s p e c t i v e , p e o p l e a r e o b l i g a t e d to obey commands because o b e d i e n c e t o t h e m , e i t h e r t a k e n i n d i v i d u a l l y or as a sys tem of r u l e s , w i l l c r e a t e g r e a t e r u t i l i t y . Whether p e o p l e have agreed o r c o n s e n t e d to obey the commands of an a u t h o r i t y i s not s t r i c t l y r e l e v a n t . One might argue t h a t such c o n s e n t w i l l i n c r e a s e f e e l i n g s o f l e g i t i m a c y among p e o p l e so t h a t t h e y w i l l be "more t r a c t a b l e . . . but t h a t i s m e r e l y an argument f o r s o c i a l e n g i n e e r i n g , not f o r 92 d e m o c r a c y . " A c c o r d i n g to u t i l i t a r i a n mora l t h e o r y , a l l moral a g e n t s , not j u s t t h o s e who have c o m m i t t e d t h e m s e l v e s i n some way to the a u t h o r i t y i s s u i n g commands, have an o b l i g a t i o n to obey commands and r u l e s when such o b e d i e n c e i s o f the g r e a t e s t u t i l i t y . The f o r e i g n e r , j u s t as much as the c i t i z e n , i s o b l i g a t e d to obey the commands o f a u t i l i t a r i a n s t a t e ; t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s to t h a t s t a t e a re v i r t u a l l y the same. Because i t i s by v i r t u e o f t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s , and not by v i r t u e 45 of who i s s u e s t h e m , t h a t commands s h o u l d be o b e y e d , who i s s u e s the commands i s i r r e l e v a n t - - i t c o u l d be a d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t , an o c c u p y i n g army or an e n l i g h t e n e d d e s p o t . In a d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e a u t i l i t a r i a n " w i l l c a r r y out the same mora l c a l c u l a t i o n t h a t he would p e r f o r m i n a s t a t e o f n a t u r e ( o r , what i s p r e s u m a b l y the same t h i n g , i n an i l l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e ) . No new m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i l l be i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the c a l c u l a t i o n i n the l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e . Which means, o f c o u r s e , t h a t i n any o r d i n a r y sense o f the w o r d , the s t a t e i s not ' l e g i t i m a t e . ' " 9 3 A more fundamenta l o b j e c t i o n to u t i l i t a r i a n j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of a u t h o r i t y i s t h a t , because u t i l i t a r i a n i s m does not r e c o g n i z e the o v e r r i d i n g v a l u e and i m p o r t a n c e of autonomy, i t can a l s o p r o v i d e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r the s e v e r e c u r t a i l m e n t o f i n d i v i d u a l 94 autonomy i n the i n t e r e s t o f u t i l i t y . A l s o , f rom W o l f f ' s p e r s p e c t i v e u t i l i t a r i a n t h e o r i e s and arguments a r e o n l y v a l i d and b i n d i n g f o r t h o s e who have adopted the m a x i m i z a t i o n o f u t i l i t y as t h e i r p r i m a r y g o a l . A c c o r d i n g to W o l f f , i t i s i l l e g i t i m a t e t o f o r c e p e o p l e who have not adopted u t i l i t y as t h e i r g o a l t o conform to p o l i c i e s , commands or r u l e s d e s i g n e d to max imize u t i l i t y , because t h i s i n f r i n g e s on t h e i r autonomy. But what of t h o s e p e o p l e who have adopted the m a x i m i z a t i o n o f u t i l i t y as t h e i r g o a l ? Here i t must be a d m i t t e d t h a t , g i v e n W o l f f ' s l a t e r moral t h e o r y , a major r e v i s i o n to h i s o r i g i n a l a n a r c h i s t argument w i l l be n e c e s s a r y . A l t h o u g h i t c o u l d be argued t h a t a l l fo rms o f a u t h o r i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y 46 government and the s t a t e , a r e of g r e a t d i s u t i l i t y , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t one s h o u l d be an a n a r c h i s t on u t i l i t a r i a n g r o u n d s , i f one c o u l d show t h a t i n f a c t the a u t h o r i t y of government and the s t a t e can be j u s t i f i e d on u t i l i t a r i a n g r o u n d s , then anyone commit ted to the end of u t i l i t y would be o b l i g a t e d , i n a l l c o n s i s t e n c y , to s u p p o r t and obey such u t i l i t a r i a n forms o f 95 a u t h o r i t y . In p r i n c i p l e , t h e n , i t i s p o s s i b l e to r e c o n c i l e the p u r p o r t e d c o n f l i c t between autonomy and a u t h o r i t y , a t l e a s t i n some c a s e s . In r e a l i t y t h o u g h , i t i s e x t r e m e l y u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e r e w i l l e v e r be an a u t h o r i t y which m a x i m i z e s u t i l i t y and which a l s o o n l y e x e r c i s e s i t s a u t h o r i t y o v e r commit ted u t i l i t a r i a n s , so t h i s i s h a r d l y a c r u s h i n g o b j e c t i o n to W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s t p o s i t i o n . A u t i l i t a r i a n a u t h o r i t y , f rom W o l f f ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , would o n l y have a u t h o r i t y o v e r commit ted u t i l i t a r i a n s as l o n g as t h e i r commitment l a s t e d . I t would have no a u t h o r i t y over anyone e l s e , nor c o u l d i t be s a i d to have any s p e c i a l a u t h o r i t y ove r any g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a . I f such an a u t h o r i t y d i d t r y to c l a i m s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r an a r e a , the n o n - u t i l i t a r i a n s l i v i n g t h e r e would have no o b l i g a t i o n to obey and e v e r y r i g h t to r e s i s t i t s c o e r c i v e i m p o s i t i o n s . T h i s s o r t o f a u t h o r i t y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h autonomy would be v e r y u n s t a b l e because i t would depend on the ongo ing commitment o f i t s members to an end which t h e y would have no s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n , or even r e a s o n , to adopt (because c h o i c e o f ends i s s u p p o s e d l y a n o n r a t i o n a l p r o c e s s ) . One g e t s the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h i s a u t h o r i t y would be c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y 47 s m a l l and weak. A l t h o u g h i t would have a r i g h t to command and to be obeyed (by u t i l i t a r i a n s ) , and i t s u t i l i t a r i a n s u b j e c t s would have an o b l i g a t i o n to obey i t s commands, i t would have no r i g h t to e n f o r c e i t s commands. T h i s i s because a l l a g e n t s have a s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to be autonomous , to have t h e i r a c t i o n s caused by r e a s o n . To f o r c e p e o p l e to a c t i n c e r t a i n w a y s , even to h e l p them to a c h i e v e t h e i r g o a l s , i s then i l l e g i t i m a t e because the cause of t h e i r a c t i o n s i s no l o n g e r t h e i r own r e a s o n , but the t h r e a t or use o f f o r c e , and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r a c t i o n s a r e no l o n g e r autonomous . To f o r c e p e o p l e to be autonomous i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t e r m s . So a l t h o u g h i t i s p o s s i b l e i n e x t r a o r d i n a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s to r e c o n c i l e the demands of autonomy w i t h the demands of de j u r e a u t h o r i t y , c o n c e i v e d as the r i g h t to command and to be o b e y e d , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to r e c o n c i l e autonomy w i t h de j u r e a u t h o r i t y c o n c e i v e d as the r i g h t to e n f o r c e commands. W o l f f b e l i e v e s t h a t s o c i a l c o n t r a c t t h e o r y p r o v i d e s a more h o p e f u l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f democracy and a u t h o r i t y because i t p u r p o r t e d l y shows t h a t p e o p l e can be o b l i g a t e d to obey de j u r e a u t h o r i t y and y e t remain autonomous and f r e e to c o l l e c t i v e l y adopt and pursue any number o f e n d s , not n e c e s s a r i l y u t i l i t y . On ly a d e m o c r a t i c form of government r e s t i n g on " t h e c o n s e n t o f the g o v e r n e d " can p o s s i b l y r e c o n c i l e the o b l i g a t i o n 96 to obey w i t h the o b l i g a t i o n to be autonomous . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s a r g u m e n t , p e o p l e a re o b l i g a t e d t o obey the commands o f a d e m o c r a t i c government because not o n l y have t h e y i n some sense 48 c o n t r a c t e d , or a g r e e d , to a b i d e by i t s a u t h o r i t y , but t h e y a l s o l e g i s l a t e the laws which t h e y obey . B e i n g " b o t h l a w - g i v e r s and 1 a w - o b e y e r s , " p e o p l e i n a democracy remain f r e e and autonomous because t h e y a re the t r u e a u t h o r s of any commands t h e y may 97 obey . ' W o l f f e m p h a s i z e s t h a t c o n s e n t i s not enough to l e g i t i m i z e d e m o c r a c y , " f o r the c o n t r a c t i n g c i t i z e n s c o u l d as w e l l have p r o m i s e d to a b i d e by m i n o r i t y r u l e , or random c h o i c e , or the r u l e o f a m o n a r c h , or r u l e by the b e s t e d u c a t e d , or r u l e by the l e a s t e d u c a t e d , or even r u l e by a d a i l y d i c t a t o r chosen by 98 l o t . " Any p romise to obey which e n t a i l s a f o r f e i t u r e o f autonomy i s i l l e g i t i m a t e . " I n s o f a r as democracy o r i g i n a t e s " i n a p romise by c i t i z e n s " t o obey laws wh ich t h e y do not w i l l , and i n d e e d even laws which t h e y v i g o r o u s l y r e j e c t . . . i t i s no more 99 than v o l u n t a r y s l a v e r y . " In the o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n o f In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , W o l f f a rgued t h a t the o n l y form of government wh ich r e c o n c i l e s a u t h o r i t y w i t h autonomy i s u n a n i m o u s , d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y . T h i s i s because under unanimous d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y , e v e r y mem-ber o f t h e s o c i e t y w i l l s f r e e l y e v e r y law w h i c h i s a c t u a l l y p a s s e d . Hence , he i s o n l y c o n f r o n t e d as a c i t i z e n w i t h l a w s t o w h i c h he h a s c o n s e n t e d . S i n c e a man who i s c o n s t r a i n e d o n l y by the d i c t a t e s o f h i s own w i l l i s a u t o n o m o u s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t under t h e d i r e c t i o n s . o f u n a n i m o u s d i r e c t d e m o -c r a c y , men can h a r m o n i z e the d u t y of a u t o -nomy w i t h the commands of a u t h o r i t y . 100 But as W o l f f ' s c r i t i c s have p o i n t e d out ( n o t a b l y R e i m a n ) , under 49 such a unanimous d i r e c t democracy t h e r e i s n e i t h e r any r e a l p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , a t l e a s t as W o l f f d e f i n e s i t , nor do a g e n t s n e c e s s a r i l y remain a u t o n o m o u s . 1 0 1 There i s no p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , i n W o l f f ' s sense o f the t e r m , i n a unanimous d i r e c t democracy because t h e r e a r e no p e r s o n s or groups which have a r i g h t t o be obeyed s i m p l y "by v i r t u e o f who t h e y are and not by v i r t u e o f what t h e y 102 command." In a unanimous d i r e c t democracy p e o p l e a r e o b l i g a t e d to obey the law because i t i s what t h e y h a v e , as  i n d i v i d u a l s , a u t o n o m o u s l y w i l l e d , not because some a u t h o r i t a t i v e body has i s s u e d the commands. T h e i r " o b e d i e n c e " to the d e c i s i o n s o r laws made by a unanimous d i r e c t democracy i s o f the same q u a l i t y as the c o m p l i a n c e o f an autonomous agent to the laws o f an i l l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y . P r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , t h e y a r e not o b e y i n g anyone e x c e p t t h e m s e l v e s , and t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n to "obey" t h e i r own s e l f - p o s i t e d p o l i c i e s f o l l o w s f rom the r e q u i r e m e n t s of r a t i o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y , not f rom the f a c t t h a t o t h e r a g e n t s have a l s o u n a n i m o u s l y adopted the same p o l i c i e s ( a l t h o u g h an a g e n t ' s r e a s o n f o r a d o p t i n g a p o l i c y may be based on the e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t o t h e r s w i l l do so as w e l l ) . A l t h o u g h autonomous i n d i v i d u a l s may s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and u n a n i m o u s l y commit t h e m s e l v e s to the same p o l i c i e s , t h i s does not c r e a t e a s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l a u t h o r i t y w i t h a r i g h t to be o b e y e d . I f unanimous c o l l e c t i v e commitment d i d c r e a t e a s u p r a -i n d i v i d u a l a u t h o r i t y , as W o l f f seems to a r g u e , i n d i v i d u a l autonomy would be t h r e a t e n e d . I n d i v i d u a l s would be bound by 50 t h i s a u t h o r i t y to obey laws which t h e y u n a n i m o u s l y c o n s e n t e d t o even i f t h e y l a t e r changed t h e i r minds and d e c i d e d t h a t o b e d i e n c e to any such laws was not the b e s t p o l i c y . They would not be e n t i t l e d to i n d i v i d u a l l y e v a l u a t e laws a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r c u r r e n t i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , so t h e y would have t o obey laws or p o l i c i e s e i t h e r a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l o r w i t h o u t r a t i o n a l l y e v a l u a t i n g them w i t h r e g a r d to t h e i r c u r r e n t g o a l s and p o l i c i e s . In e i t h e r c a s e , they would no l o n g e r be autonomous . Unanimous d i r e c t democracy i s then e i t h e r s u p e r f l u o u s , i n the sense t h a t i t does not add to the o b l i g a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g f rom i n d i v i d u a l c o m m i t m e n t s , or i t i s i l l e g i t i m a t e , as i t r e q u i r e s autonomous i n d i v i d u a l s t o a c t c o n t r a r y to t h e i r own r e a s o n (even i f i t does r e q u i r e them to a c t a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own p a s t , and p r e s u m a b l y d e f i c i e n t , r e a s o n ) . In h i s "A R e p l y to R e i m a n , " W o l f f h i m s e l f a d m i t s the v a l i d i t y o f R e i m a n ' s c r i t i c i s m s , g r a n t i n g t h a t a l t h o u g h " i t may be t h a t men a r e bound by the c o l l e c t i v e commitments t h e y m a k e . . . such commitments do not c r e a t e the s o r t o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y I 103 was a t t e m p t i n g to a n a l y z e . " One p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n to t h i s p r o b l e m would be to a rgue t h a t the d e c i s i o n s a r r i v e d at c o l l e c t i v e l y i n a p u b l i c fo rum or a s s e m b l y , by e i t h e r a unanimous or m a j o r i t y v o t e , e x p r e s s the t r u e w i l l o f the i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d . They a r e then d o u b l y bound to obey the d e c i s i o n s o f the a s s e m b l y because t h e y have c o n s e n t e d to a b i d e by i t s d e c i s i o n s and because t h o s e d e c i s i o n s e x p r e s s t h e i r r e a l w i l l . To d i s o b e y would then be i r r a t i o n a l , 51 f o r i t would be to c o n t r a d i c t o n e ' s own w i l l . So not o n l y does t h i s scheme s u p p o s e d l y p r e s e r v e i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, i t shows t h a t d i s o b e d i e n c e i s i r r a t i o n a l , and h e n c e , h e t e r o n o m o u s . T h i s , i n f a c t , i s one way to i n t e r p r e t the argument Rousseau p u t s f o r w a r d i n The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t . A l t h o u g h W o l f f i s w i l l i n g to g r a n t at l e a s t the t h e o r e t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , and t h e r e f o r e of a g e n e r a l w i l l common to a l l i n d i v i d u a l s p u r s u i n g t h a t i n t e r e s t , he does not a c c e p t t h i s R o u s s e a u i a n a rgument . Because t h e r e a re no s u b s t a n t i v e ends b i n d i n g on a l l a g e n t s , i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s have no o n g o i n g o b l i g a t i o n to adopt or remain c o m m i t t e d to any e n d , even the g e n e r a l good . To remain au tonomous , i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s must be f r e e to a l t e r t h e i r g o a l s and c o r r e s p o n d i n g p o l i c i e s . T h u s , o n l y as l o n g as each i n d i v i d u a l r e m a i n s commit ted to the p u r s u i t o f some g e n e r a l good can p o l i c i e s f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t of t h a t good be b i n d i n g on him or h e r . F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f a l l members of a s o c i e t y adopt and remain c o m m i t t e d to the common p u r s u i t o f some g e n e r a l g o o d , i t r e m a i n s u n c l e a r how one i s t o d e t e r m i n e whether any g i v e n law or p o l i c y i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t g o a l , and t h e r e b y e x p r e s s e s the " t r u e " w i l l o f each i n d i v i d u a l . Rousseau c l a i m s , a l b e i t w i t h i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , t h a t any law approved by a m a j o r i t y vo te i n a p u b l i c a s s e m b l y of a l l c i t i z e n s i s i n f a c t a t r u e e x p r e s s i o n of the g e n e r a l w i l l a i m i n g a t the g e n e r a l g o o d . These laws a r e b i n d i n g on a l l the members of s o c i e t y , f o r t h e y e x p r e s s the t r u e w i l l o f the c i t i z e n s , who a l s o aim a t the g e n e r a l g o o d . The 52 p r o b l e m h e r e , as W o l f f p o i n t s o u t , " i s the a p p a r e n t l y g r o u n d l e s s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t the m a j o r i t y are a lways r i g h t i n t h e i r o p i n i o n 104 c o n c e r n i n g the g e n e r a l g o o d . " But even i f i t c o u l d be shown t h a t the m a j o r i t y i s a l w a y s r i g h t (o r t h a t some o t h e r group - - a m i n o r i t y , o r even a u n a n i m i t y i s a l w a y s r i g h t ) , o r t h a t some o t h e r k i n d o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e d u r e a l w a y s y i e l d s c o r r e c t a n s w e r s , t h i s does not s o l v e the p r o b l e m . I f the m a j o r i t y , as the c a s e may b e , e n f o r c e d i t s d e c i s i o n s a g a i n s t a r e c a l c i t r a n t m i n o r i t y t h i s would s t i l l e n t a i l an i n f r i n g e m e n t o f the l a t t e r ' s autonomy, f o r the m i n o r i t y would be f o r c e d to a c t c o n t r a r y to i t s own ( a l b e i t m i s t a k e n ) r e a s o n , and would t h e r e f o r e no l o n g e r be autonomous . And i f the m i n o r i t y v o l u n t a r i l y obeyed the m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g the r e a s o n s f o r d o i n g s o , i t would no l o n g e r be autonomous e i t h e r . Any group o r pe rson which e i t h e r does not a c c e p t or does not u n d e r s t a n d a d e c i s i o n which r e a l l y does e x p r e s s the g e n e r a l w i l l (and hence the " t r u e " w i l l o f each member o f s o c i e t y ) c a n n o t obey such a d e c i s i o n and remain autonomous . ( S u p r i s i n g l y , W o l f f d e f e n d s R o u s s e a u ' s n o t i o n o f " f o r c i n g to be f r e e , " i f t h a t i s i n t e r p r e t e d as f o r c i n g p e o p l e to do what t h e y want a g a i n s t t h e i r own ( m i s t a k e n ) w i l l . ^ 6 But the pos i t i ve c o n c e p t i o n o f f reedom wh ich u n d e r l i e s t h i s argument i s not synonymous w i t h autonomy, so a l t h o u g h i t may be p o s s i b l e to f o r c e p e o p l e to be f r e e ( i f f reedom i s s u i t a b l y d e f i n e d ) , t h e y c a n n o t , I have a r g u e d , be f o r c e d to be autonomous . ) 53 D e s p i t e t h i s , and d e s p i t e W o l f f ' s g e n e r a l a n a r c h i s t a r g u m e n t s , I would l i k e to argue t h a t a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s own p r e m i s e s i t i s a t l e a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e to r e c o n c i l e l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y and autonomy, but o n l y i n a v e r y tenuous way wh ich would be e x t r e m e l y u n l i k e l y to be a c h i e v e d i n p r a c t i c e . A group o f autonomous a g e n t s p u r s u i n g a common good c o u l d r e c o g n i z e the commands o f an a u t h o r i t y as l e g i t i m a t e and a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n the sense t h a t t h e y a r e the most r a t i o n a l and e f f i c i e n t means f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n o f the common good . D i s -r e g a r d i n g the grounds upon wh ich t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n i s based ( t h e a u t h o r i t y c o u l d have g r e a t e r a c c e s s to i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n each i n d i v i d u a l l a c k e d , i t c o u l d be b e t t e r a b l e to u t i l i z e t h i s k n o w l e d g e , i t c o u l d have r e p e a t e d l y d e m o n s t r a t e d i t s s u p e r i o r competence i n p r a c t i c e , and so o n ) , so l o n g as each agent has a r a t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g as to why the a u t h o r i t y ' s commands a r e the most r a t i o n a l and e f f i c i e n t means to the common g o o d , and so l o n g as t h e s e commands a r e i n d e e d the most r a t i o n a l and e f f i c i e n t means, each agent p u r s u i n g the common good but who r a t i o n a l l y u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t he or she l a c k s t h i s s p e c i a l competence (due to u n a v o i d a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s , l a c k o f k n o w l e d g e , e t c . ) would be o b l i g a t e d , a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s a n a l y s i s , t o obey the commands o f t h i s a u t h o r i t y . R a t h e r than c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h autonomy or r a t i o n a l a g e n c y , such r e c o g n i t i o n and o b e d i e n c e would be an e x p r e s s i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, the most r a t i o n a l and e f f i c i e n t means f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t o f each a g e n t ' s e n d , the common g o o d . In t h i s c a s e , d i s o b e d i e n c e would be i r r a t i o n a l . 54 I t s h o u l d be emphas i zed t h a t i n t h i s c a s e the agent does not i n d e p e n d e n t l y e v a l u a t e each command, f o r the a g e n t ' s o b e d i e n c e to the command i s based i n p a r t on h i s or her own r a t i o n a l l y based acknowledgement t h a t he o r she l a c k s the same competence as the a u t h o r i t y wh ich i s s u e d the command. Due to i t s s p e c i a l competence i t c o u l d be s a i d t h a t t h i s a u t h o r i t y has a r i g h t to command and t h a t i t s s u b j e c t s have a c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to obey . But as w i t h the u t i l i t a r i a n a u t h o r i t y d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , t h i s a u t h o r i t y would o n l y have a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h o s e a g e n t s commit ted to the g e n e r a l good (and o n l y as l o n g as t h e y remained so c o m m i t t e d ) . I t would have no a u t h o r i t y o v e r anyone e l s e a n d , i n f a c t , i f r e s i s t a n c e and d i s o b e d i e n c e to the commands o f t h i s a u t h o r i t y were a r a t i o n a l and e f f i c i e n t means f o r r e a l i z i n g t h e s e o t h e r a g e n t s ' e n d s , t h e y would have an o b l i g a t i o n t o r e s i s t and d i s o b e y such a u t h o r i t y , f o r a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y u l t i m a t e l y a g e n t s a r e o n l y o b l i g a t e d to do what i s most r a t i o n a l f o r them as i n d i v i d u a l s . F i n a l l y , t h i s a u t h o r i t y would have no r i g h t to e n f o r c e i t s commands, because such a r i g h t o f e n f o r c e m e n t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy c o n c e i v e d i n W o l f f i a n terms as r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . T h i s l a s t p o i n t r e q u i r e s e m p h a s i s . For W o l f f , an a g e n t ' s a c t i o n s a re r a t i o n a l and autonomous o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e y a re caused by the a g e n t ' s own r e a s o n . When someone's a c t i o n s a r e caused by s o m e t h i n g e l s e , such as the t h r e a t or a p p l i c a t i o n o f c o e r c i o n , then t h a t pe rson i s no l o n g e r a r a t i o n a l , autonomous agent ( a t 55 l e a s t i n t h i s s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e ) . And because W o l f f h o l d s t h a t a l l a g e n t s have an o v e r r i d i n g o b l i g a t i o n , i n s o f a r as t h e y a r e autonomous , r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , to a c t r a t i o n a l l y , any i n f r i n g e m e n t o f t h e i r r a t i o n a l autonomy i s i l l e g i t i m a t e , even i f the a g e n t s t h e m s e l v e s have agreed to such i n f r i n g e m e n t . A l t h o u g h i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e to r e c o n c i l e some forms o f a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, i t i s v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e to r e c o n c i l e autononmy w i t h government or the s t a t e . A l l s t a t e s and a l l governments c l a i m supreme a u t h o r i t y o v e r a l l the i n h a b i t a n t s o f a s p e c i f i c g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a , whether or not a l l ( o r any) o f t h o s e i n h a b i t a n t s a c t u a l l y c o n s e n t to b e i n g r u l e d by such an a u t h o r i t y . No s t a t e o r government p e r m i t s i n d i v i d u a l s to opt out o f i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n and y e t remain i n the a r e a i t c l a i m s s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r . A l l who choose to remain a r e s u b j e c t to the p u t a t i v e a u t h o r i t y o f the s t a t e or g o v e r n m e n t , whether t h e y c o n s e n t or n o t . No s t a t e or government w i l l t o l e r a t e d i s o b e d i e n c e to i t s l a w s , even i f t h o s e laws c o n f l i c t w i t h the g o a l s and p o l i c i e s of autonomous a g e n t s . A l l s t a t e s c l a i m a monopoly o f the l e g i t i m a t e use o f v i o l e n c e i n t h e i r d o m a i n s , and t h e y use t h i s v i o l e n c e to compel o b e d i e n c e to t h e i r l a w s . None o f t h e s e p r a c t i c e s a re c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, y e t a s t a t e or government wh ich f a i l e d to engage i n them i s s c a r c e l y i m a g i n a b l e . W o l f f may not have p r o v i d e d an a^  p r i o r i j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a n a r c h i s m , but g i v e n the r e a l w o r l d i n which a g e n t s must a c t , and the c l a i m s r e a l s t a t e s and governments make, any r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l autonomy 5 6 and s t a t e or government a u t h o r i t y a p p e a r s i m p o s s i b l e . U l t i m a t e l y , a l l government or s t a t e a u t h o r i t y depends on c o e r c i o n , and c o e r c i o n i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h autonomy. F o r c i n g someone to a c t i n any way, even i n a way t h a t pe rson had p r e v i o u s l y agreed t o , i s a v i o l a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. A l l forms o f government wh ich r e l y on e n f o r c e d o b e d i e n c e , whether a unanimous d i r e c t d e m o c r a c y , a m a j o r i t a r i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d e m o c r a c y , o r a d i c t a t o r s h i p , a r e e q u a l l y i l l e g i t i m a t e ( a l t h o u g h t h i s i l l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y can be used f o r more o r l e s s e v i l p u r p o s e s ) . Autonomy, the i n d i v i d u a l ' s o b l i g a t i o n to a c t o n l y a c c o r d i n g to f r e e l y chosen p o l i c i e s f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t o f f r e e l y chosen e n d s , and s t a t e a u t h o r i t y , c o n c e i v e d as the r i g h t to command, to be o b e y e d , and to e n f o r c e commands, a r e s i m p l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e f rom a W o l f f i a n p e r s p e c t i v e . Autonomy, W o l f f a r g u e s , i s a n e c e s s a r y p o l i c y f o r a l l a g e n t s i n s o f a r as they a r e r a t i o n a l and t h e y a r e to a c t . To f o r f e i t o n e ' s autonomy i s to f o r f e i t o n e ' s r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . The p o l i c y o f autonomy then t a k e s p r e c e d e n c e . o v e r a l l o t h e r p o l i c i e s ( a l t h o u g h i t does not t a k e p r e c e d e n c e o v e r a l l o t h e r g o a l s ; an agent may v e r y w e l l adopt as a goa l the f o r f e i t u r e or even a n n i h i l a t i o n of h i s or her a u t o n o m y . ^ 6 Even s t i l l , autonomy remains the n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r the r a t i o n a l a c h i e v e m e n t of t h i s g o a l ) . Because autonomy i s the n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , a n y t h i n g wh ich i n h i b i t s or c o n f l i c t s w i t h autonomy i s i l l e g i t i m a t e , or put a n o t h e r way, c o n t r a r y to r e a s o n . The s t a t e , c o n c e i v e d as h a v i n g a r i g h t to make and 57 e n f o r c e commands, and to be o b e y e d , i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h autonomy and t h e r e f o r e i l l e g i t i m a t e . On ly a s o c i e t y w i t h o u t a s t a t e ( o r a " s t a t e of n a t u r e , " as W o l f f d e s c r i b e s i t ) p r o v i d e s the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r c o m p l e t e autonomy. Because autonomy i s the n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , the s t a t e o f n a t u r e i s a r a t i o n a l , t h a t i s to say a m o r a l , n e c e s s i t y . C r i t i c s of W o l f f and a n a r c h i s m i n g e n e r a l w i l l u n d o u b t e d l y respond t h a t i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e autonomy w i l l i n p r a c t i c e s u f f e r even g r e a t e r i n f r i n g e m e n t s than i n a s o c i e t y w i t h a s t a t e . T h i s , however , i s an e m p i r i c a l p r e d i c t i o n , s u b j e c t to p o s s i b l e r e f u t a t i o n , not a t h e o r e t i c a l t r u t h . I t i s t h e o r e t i c -a l l y t r u e t h a t i n a s o c i e t y w i t h a s t a t e , a t l e a s t as we c o n c e i v e i t , p e o p l e w i l l not e n j o y c o m p l e t e autonomy. I t remains to be seen whether f u l l autonomy i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e , a l t h o u g h t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e , i s i n f a c t a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , W o l f f does not devo te a g r e a t d e a l o f a t t e n t i o n to t h i s q u e s t i o n . Hobbes , the most f o r m i d a b l e c r i t i c o f the s t a t e o f n a t u r e , i s not d i r e c t l y a n s w e r e d . 1 0 7 But answered he must b e , f o r i f the moral c o n d i t i o n o f f u l l autonomy which W o l f f sees as the o n l y m o r a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e form o f s o c i e t y i s i n f a c t i m p o s s i b l e t o a c h i e v e , then one would t h i n k t h e r e i s s o m e t h i n g d r e a d f u l l y wrong w i t h the mora l t h e o r y W o l f f e s p o u s e s which g i v e s r i s e to such an i m p o s s i b l e i d e a l . Be t h i s as i t may, W o l f f does o f f e r some comments wh ich he hopes "may s e r v e to make the i d e a l a b i t l e s s l i k e a mere f a n t a s y o f U t o p i a n 58 p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . " V. The S t a t e o f N a t u r e as a V i a b l e A l t e r n a t i v e What p r i m a r i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s the s t a t e o f n a t u r e f rom a s o c i e t y w i t h a s t a t e i s t h a t the f o r m e r i s m o r a l ! y s y m m e t r i c a l ; " t h e r e i s no r u l e , no p a r t y p o s s e s s i n g r i g h t s of 109 d e c i s i o n and e n f o r c e m e n t wh ich a re not p o s s e s s e d by a l l . " Each pe rson has the r i g h t and the d u t y t o be c o m p l e t e l y autonomous. In h i s "A R e p l y to R e i m a n , " W o l f f adds t h a t e v e r y o n e i n the s t a t e of n a t u r e a l s o "has the r i g h t to use f o r c e to compel c o m p l i a n c e w i t h what he j u d g e s to be h i s m o r a l l y j u s t i f i e d commands," but g i v e n the moral t h e o r y he s k e t c h e s out i n The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , t h i s c l a i m i s too s t r o n g , even f a l s e . 1 1 * * ( W o l f f n o t e s i n the " R e p l y " t h a t he does not now agree w i t h h i s e a r l i e r v i e w , which he h e l d when w r i t i n g In  Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , t h a t p e o p l e i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e have s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n s and r i g h t s , i n c l u d i n g " t h e o b l i g a t i o n to r e s p e c t the l e g i t i m a t e p u r s u i t s o f o t h e r s and the r i g h t o f s e l f - d e f e n s e , " but he has " a d o p t e d the s i m p ! i f y i n g . d e v i c e o f s p e a k i n g f rom my e a r l i e r p o i n t o f v i e w . " ) 1 1 1 In the s t a t e of n a t u r e the o n l y o b l i g a t i o n a l l a g e n t s have i s the o b l i g a t i o n to be autonomous . I t would seem a t most t h a t a g e n t s i n a s t a t e of n a t u r e would have a r i g h t to r e s i s t any a t t a c k s on t h e i r autonomy, but t h e y would c e r t a i n l y have no r i g h t to f o r c e c o m p l i a n c e t o t h e i r commands ( e x c e p t , p e r h a p s , t h o s e commands 59 d i r e c t i n g a v i o l a t o r o f o n e ' s autonomy to cease and d e s i s t ) . What would a s t a t e l e s s s o c i e t y o f autonomous a g e n t s be l i k e ? Hobbes p r o v i d e s an e x t r e m e l y n e g a t i v e p i c t u r e of such a s o c i e t y i n L e v i a t h a n . But perhaps t h e r e a r e r e a s o n s f o r b e i n g l e s s p e s s i m i s t i c . W o l f f e n v i s a g e s a s o c i e t y o f autonomous a g e n t s v o l u n t a r i l y r e g u l a t i n g t h e i r mutual a c t i v i t i e s by f r e e , c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t s . A l t h o u g h , as was d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , t h e r e i s no f o r m a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n a d o p t i n g p o l i c i e s w i t h o u t r e s p e c t f o r the autonomy o f o t h e r s , i f a s u f f i c i e n t number of a g e n t s do so t h e y w i l l f r u s t r a t e one a n o t h e r ' s autonomy. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t some p e o p l e would e n j o y enough power t h a t t h e y c o u l d i n f r i n g e o t h e r p e o p l e ' s autonomy w i t h o u t t h o s e o t h e r s b e i n g a b l e to respond i n k i n d , but as a n a r c h i s t s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y a r g u e d , such a c c u m u l a t i o n s o f power a r e r e a l l y o n l y p o s s i b l e i n s t a t i s t s o c i e t i e s , as t h e y a r e c r e a t e d , p r o t e c t e d and m a i n t a i n e d t o a l a r g e e x t e n t by the a c t i v i t i e s o f 112 the s t a t e i t s e l f . I t i s i n the i n t e r e s t s o f p e o p l e w i t h r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l power to a r r a n g e t h e i r a f f a i r s so as to p r o t e c t and max imize t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, and t h i s can be done t h r o u g h unanimous c o l l e c t i v e commitment to p o l i c i e s d e a l i n g w i t h t h e i r mutual i n t e r a c t i o n . By e n g a g i n g i n c o n s t r u c t i v e d i a l o g u e w i t h one a n o t h e r , autonomous a g e n t s can d e t e r m i n e each o t h e r ' s s e l f - c h o s e n g o a l s and p o l i c i e s and a r r i v e a t c o l l e c t i v e agreements f o r the r e g u l a t i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i r mutua l a c t i v i t i e s which w i l l r e s p e c t each a g e n t ' s autonomy. Because t h e r e a r e no ends b i n d i n g on a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s and c h o i c e o f 60 ends i s a n o n r a t i o n a l p r o c e s s , what g o a l s , p r a c t i c e s and p o l i c i e s p e o p l e may c o l l e c t i v e l y choose t o commit t h e m s e l v e s t o r e m a i n s o p e n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , W o l f f o f f e r s some s u g g e s t i o n s which he hopes " w i l l commend t h e m s e l v e s to the r e a d e r as an a p p e a l i n g a l t e r n a t i v e , " even though he can o f f e r no " s y s t e m a t i c p r o o f of 113 [ t h e i r ] o b j e c t i v e g o o d n e s s . " In o r d e r to " a c h i e v e an adequate l e v e l o f s o c i a l c o o r d i n a t i o n " i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e , W o l f f b e l i e v e s t h a t "much c o u l d be done t h r o u g h the l o c a l , c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d deve lopment of a c o n s e n s u a l or g e n e r a l w i l l w i t h r e g a r d to m a t t e r s o f 114 c o l l e c t i v e r a t h e r than p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . " T h i s c o n s e n s u a l w i l l can be d e v e l o p e d on the b a s i s o f s h a r e d " s o c i a l v a l u e s o f c o m m u n i t y , " c o n s i s t i n g of t h r e e major t y p e s : A f f e c t i v e 115 Community , P r o d u c t i v e Community and R a t i o n a l Community . W o l f f d e f i n e s community i n g e n e r a l as "a group o f p e r s o n s who t o g e t h e r e x p e r i e n c e a r e c i p r o c i t y of a w a r e n e s s . " 1 1 6 Each p a r t i c u l a r form of community he a n a l y z e s d e a l s w i t h d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f t h i s " r e c i p r o c a l a w a r e n e s s . " What i s n o t e w o r t h y about r e c i p r o c a l awareness i n any form i s t h a t i n s o f a r as i t i s v a l u e d f o r i t s own s a k e , i t i s an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e wh ich can o n l y be r e a l i z e d i n a s p e c i f i c s o c i a l c o n t e x t . One form o f community wh ich i s "an e l e m e n t of a p o s s i b l e g e n e r a l good" upon which a c o n s e n s u a l , g e n e r a l w i l l can be d e v e l o p e d , i s " A f f e c t i v e C o m m u n i t y . . . the r e c i p r o c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a s h a r e d c u l t u r e . " 1 1 7 Autonomous a g e n t s "can d e l i b e r a t e l y choose to c h e r i s h t h e i r c u l t u r e , and t h r o u g h t h a t 61 c h e r i s h i n g to b i n d t h e m s e l v e s to one a n o t h e r . " T h i s commitment to a s h a r e d c u l t u r e p r o v i d e s autonomous i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h a common i n t e r e s t wh ich can form the b a s i s f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n r e g a r d i n g how t h e y s h o u l d v o l u n t a r i l y a r r a n g e t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a f f a i r s . A n o t h e r form o f community which i s "an e lement o f a p o s s i b l e g e n e r a l good" i s " P r o d u c t i v e C o m m u n i t y , " the " s a t i s f a c t i o n i n coming to know one a n o t h e r t h r o u g h 119 c o o p e r a t i o n i n c o l l e c t i v e p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y . " A g e n t s who v a l u e P r o d u c t i v e Community w i l l share a common i n t e r e s t " i n the c r e a t i o n and en joyment of a r e c i p r o c a l awareness i n the work p r o c e s s , " and they can a u t o n o m o u s l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y choose " t o o r g a n i z e the p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y o f the community i n such a way t h a t t h i s r e c i p r o c a l awareness i s i n c r e a s e d and s t r e n g t h e n e d . " R a t i o n a l Community i s the t r u e f o u n d a t i o n of a s t a t e l e s s s o c i e t y of autonomous a g e n t s , f o r i t c o n s i s t s of " t h a t r e c i p r o c i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s which i s a c h i e v e d and s u s t a i n e d by e q u a l s who d i s c o u r s e t o g e t h e r p u b l i c l y f o r the s p e c i f i c purpose 121 of s o c i a l d e c i s i o n and a c t i o n . " A g e n t s who v a l u e R a t i o n a l Community share a common i n t e r e s t " i n the p o s i t i n g of c o l l e c t i v e 122 g o a l s and i n the p e r f o r m a n c e o f common a c t i o n s . " I t i s o n l y t h r o u g h such R a t i o n a l Community t h a t a g e n t s are a b l e to a u t o n o m o u s l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y choose o t h e r s o c i a l g o o d s , such as A f f e c t i v e and P r o d u c t i v e Community . But R a t i o n a l Community i s not m e r e l y a means to v a r i o u s e n d s ; i t can be v a l u e d f o r i t s e l f . 62 F u r t h e r m o r e , W o l f f a r g u e s , t h o s e a g e n t s commit ted to such an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e s h o u l d s u p p o r t " a b s o l u t e l i b e r t y o f speech and c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " f o r a t r u l y r a t i o n a l community r e q u i r e s t h a t "each m e m b e r . . . r e c o g n i z e h i s f e l l o w c i t i z e n s as r a t i o n a l mora l a g e n t s and must f r e e l y acknowledge t h e i r r i g h t (and h i s ) to 123 r e c i p r o c a l e q u a l i t y i n the d i a l o g u e of p o l i t i c s . " Through t h e s e t h r e e forms o f c o m m u n i t y , and " v o l u n t a r y c o m p l i a n c e , " W o l f f a r g u e s , " s u f f i c i e n t s o c i a l c o o r d i n a t i o n " can be g e n e r a t e d " t o p e r m i t c o l l e c t i v e p u r s u i t o f d o m e s t i c g o a l s , " p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e r e i s a l s o "ex t reme economic 124 d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . " Such d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , based on "a c h e a p , l o c a l s o u r c e o f power and an advanced t e c h n o l o g y o f s m a l l - s c a l e p r o d u c t i o n , " would " p e r m i t the s o r t o f v o l u n t a r y economic c o o r d i n a t i o n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the i d e a l s o f a n a r c h i s m and a f f l u e n c e , " a l t h o u g h t h e r e would be "a h i g h l e v e l o f 125 economic w a s t e . " W o l f f might have added t h a t what would be l o s t i n s o - c a l l e d economic e f f i c i e n c y would be w e l l made up f o r i n the e c o l o g i c a l b e n e f i t s o f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and i n the en joyment o f the r e c i p r o c a l awareness o f P r o d u c t i v e 126 Communi t y . W o l f f a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t the autonomous a g e n t s l i v i n g i n such a s o c i e t y "would be p e r f e c t l y c a p a b l e o f c h o o s i n g f r e e l y whether to de fend the n a t i o n [o r communi t y ] and c a r r y i t s 127 purpose beyond n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s . " P e o p l e w i t h a s h a r e d commitment to a common c u l t u r e , c o l l e c t i v e p r o d u c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e s , and n o n c o e r c i v e forms o f r a t i o n a l , c o n s e n s u a l 63 d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and c o o p e r a t i v e a c t i o n , would c e r t a i n l y have much t o l o s e i n the e v e n t o f a f o r e i g n i n v a s i o n . W o l f f p o i n t s to " Y u g o s l a v p a r t i s a n s and I s r a e l i s o l d i e r s " to s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m t h a t p e o p l e who r e a l l y v a l u e t h e i r way o f l i f e w i l l v o l u n t a r i l y choose to d e f e n d i t a g a i n s t a g g r e s s o r s . He a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t " t h e army i t s e l f c o u l d be run on the b a s i s o f 128 v o l u n t a r y commitments and s u b m i s s i o n to o r d e r s . " In t h i s r e g a r d he c o u l d have c i t e d the a n a r c h i s t p e a s a n t army l e d by N e s t o r Makhno i n the U k r a i n e d u r i n g the R u s s i a n C i v i l War, wh ich was o r g a n i z e d a l o n g t h e s e l i n e s and a l s o o p e r a t e d f a i r l y s u c c e s s f u l l y ( u n t i l d o u b l e c r o s s e d by i t s e r s t w h i l e a l l i e s , the B o l s h e v i k s ) . 1 2 9 D e s p i t e a l l t h i s , W o l f f i s g e n e r a l l y p e s s i m i s t i c about the p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n a r c h i s m . He o f f e r s no r e a l s t r a t e g y o r p r a c t i c a l p r o p o s a l s f o r e i t h e r a b o l i s h i n g the s t a t e or f o r a c t u a l l y c r e a t i n g an a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y . A t one p o i n t , he even e q u a t e s an a s s o c i a t i o n o f autonomous a g e n t s who " d e t e r m i n e to s e t p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t a s i d e and pursue the g e n e r a l good" w i t h the s t a t e , a l b e i t a s t a t e " w h i c h a c c o m p l i s h e s t h a t end w i t h o u t 130 d e p r i v i n g some o f them of t h e i r moral a u t o n o m y . " A l t h o u g h I have argued t h a t such a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and autonomy i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e , the s t a t e c o n c e i v e d i n such terms c l e a r l y does not r e s e m b l e any a c t u a l l y or p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g s t a t e . F u r t h e r m o r e , one must q u e s t i o n the wisdom of so l o o s e l y d e f i n i n g the s t a t e as m e r e l y "a fo rm o f a s s o c i a t i o n " composed o f autonomous a g e n t s c o l l e c t i v e l y p u r s u i n g 64 the " g e n e r a l g o o d . " A c c o r d i n g to the Weber ian d e f i n i t i o n o f the s t a t e , wh ich W o l f f h i m s e l f a p p r o v i n g l y c i t e s , the s t a t e i s not m e r e l y a form o f a s s o c i a t i o n p u r s u i n g the g e n e r a l good but a p a r t i c u l a r form o f a s s o c i a t i o n which c l a i m s a monopoly o f the l e g i t i m a t e use o f v i o l e n c e , and the r i g h t t o command and to be o b e y e d , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s ' own g o a l s , p o l i c i e s and w i s h e s . As s u c h , i t i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s own a n a l y s i s . Thus i t i s m i s l e a d i n g and somewhat c o n f u s i n g f o r W o l f f to b e g i n s p e a k i n g of the s t a t e as b e i n g c o m p a t i b l e w i t h autonomy w i t h o u t any f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n . W o l f f ' s a l t e r n a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of the s t a t e as a form o f a s s o c i a t i o n o f autonomous a g e n t s u n i t e d i n p u r s u i t o f a common good a l s o seems to e n t a i l such a b s u r d c l a i m s as t h a t most v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s i n p u r s u i t o f a common g o o d , f rom c r e a t i v e w r i t i n g c l u b s to worker c o o p e r a t i v e s , a r e s t a t e s , and t h a t most a n a r c h i s t s , f rom Proudhon to P a u l Goodman, a re r e a l l y s t a t i s t s , f o r they a d v o c a t e the c r e a t i o n o f such v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s . I f W o l f f s e r i o u s l y b e l i e v e s t h a t a c o n s i s t e n t a n a r c h i s t must oppose such v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s as w e l l as the s t a t e c o n c e i v e d i n Weber ian t e r m s , no wonder he i s p e s s i m i s t i c about the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n a r c h i s m . But t h e r e i s a n o t h e r r e a s o n f o r W o l f f ' s p e s s i m i s m . He i s not s u r e whether "a s o c i a l o r d e r [ can ] s u r v i v e the autonomy of i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e when t h a t c o n s c i e n c e i s not c o n f i n e d t o a 131 r a r e few or r e s t r i c t e d to one or two g r e a t mora l i s s u e s . " W o l f f s p e c u l a t e s t h a t " t h e h e a l t h y f u n c t i o n i n g o f s o c i e t y - -65 any s o c i e t y - - [may] r e q u i r e t h a t the g r e a t p r e p o n d e r a n c e of men b e l i e v e i n the l e g i t i m a c y of some s o c i a l a u t h o r i t y , even 132 though such b e l i e f s [may] be a lways w r o n g . " He adds t h a t " t h e r o m a n t i c o p t i m i s m o f most a n a r c h i s t s c o n c e r n i n g human n a t u r e b e a r s no r e l a t i o n to any ot the f a c t s o f human b e h a v i o r 133 w i t h wh ich I am a c q u a i n t e d . " But pe rhaps t h e r e i s a n o t h e r r e a s o n f o r W o l f f ' s p e s s i m i s m , r e l a t e d to h i s own b e l i e f t h a t c h o i c e o f ends i s a n o n r a t i o n a l p r o c e s s . I f t h i s i s i n d e e d the c a s e , then which ends r a t i o n a l a g e n t s choose to adopt r e m a i n s e n t i r e l y o p e n ; t h e r e i s no r e a s o n f o r them to c o l l e c t i v e l y adopt as g o a l s the p u r s u i t o f a common good or the c r e a t i o n of the v a r i o u s forms o f community which W o l f f a d v o c a t e s and sees as n e c e s s a r y f o r the m a i n t e n a n c e of " s o c i a l c o o r d i n a t i o n " i n an a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y . P e r h a p s i t i s because o f doubts such as t h e s e t h a t W o l f f c o n c l u d e s by s a y i n g , " s i n c e i t i s beneath the d i g n i t y o f a t r u l y f r e e man to obey a law he has not made, we can o n l y hope t h a t as men b e g i n to make t h e i r own laws t h e y w i l l 134 make good l a w s . " In subsequent c h a p t e r s we s h a l l see i f t h e r e i s any b a s i s f o r such hope. 66 PART TWO C h a p t e r I I I : S t r a n g e A n a r c h y I. I n t r o d u c t i o n In t h i s c h a p t e r I p ropose to c r i t i c a l l y e v a l u a t e W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n c o n s i d e r e d as a d e f e n c e of a n a r c h i s m . I w i l l b e g i n by d i s c u s s i n g some p r e l i m i n a r y o b j e c t i o n s t o the a n a r c h i s t s t a t u s o f W o l f f ' s a rgument . I a rgue t h a t t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s do not h o l d , a t l e a s t as i n i t i a l l y f o r m u l a t e d . I w i l l then more c a r e f u l l y examine W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n a c c o r d i n g to a f o u r p o i n t d e f i n i t i o n of a n a r c h i s m d e v e l o p e d by John P. C l a r k . J e f f r e y Reiman c l a i m s t h a t W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s m " i s a p e r s o n a l , i n n e r moral a t t i t u d e - - and not the p o l i t i c a l 13 5 d o c t r i n e o f a n a r c h i s m a t a l l ! " The a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t John P. C l a r k a g r e e s w i t h Reiman t h a t " W o l f f ' s argument t h a t autonomy and moral a u t h o r i t y a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e c o n s t i t u t e s n e i t h e r a d e f e n s e o f a n a r c h i s m as a p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y nor a p r o o f 13 6 of the u n j u s t i f i a b l e n a t u r e of the s t a t e and g o v e r n m e n t . " Reiman a r g u e s t h a t a p o l i t i c a l a n a r c h i s t , as opposed to a W o l f f i a n mora 1 a n a r c h i s t , " d e c r i e s the s t a t e i n the name o f . . . f reedom f rom c o e r c i o n , not i n the name o f any i n n e r f reedom or 137 moral a u t o n o m y . " A l a n R i t t e r , i n h i s book , A n a r c h i s m : A T h e o r e t i c a l A n a l y s i s , backs up t h i s c l a i m by p o i n t i n g out t h a t none o f the f o u r major c l a s s i c a l a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s , G o d w i n , 67 P r o u d h o n , B a k u n i n or K r o p o t k i n , "use K a n t i a n autonomy as the 1 38 n o r m a t i v e b a s i s f o r t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to s t a t e c o e r c i o n . " These a t t e m p t s to deny the a n a r c h i s t s t a t u s of W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n f a i l , however , f o r p r i m a r i l y two r e a s o n s . F i r s t , as was a rgued i n P a r t One of t h i s t h e s i s , by autonomy W o l f f means both d e c i d i n g f o r o n e s e l f what one ought t o do and a c t i n g on t h e s e d e c i s i o n s . Autonomy so c o n c e i v e d i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h any form o f c o e r c i o n , so W o l f f ' s argument f o r autonomy i s e q u a l l y an argument a g a i n s t the c o e r c i o n of the s t a t e . S e c o n d , the c l a s s i c a l a n a r c h i s t t h i n k e r s v a l u e autonomy v e r y h i g h l y , i n the sense o f both moral autonomy and r a t i o n a l a g e n c y , even i f t h e y do not a s s i g n e i t h e r k i n d o f autonomy supreme n o r m a t i v e v a l u e i n t h e i r t h e o r i e s and a r g u m e n t s . As John P. C l a r k h i m s e l f has a r g u e d , the c o n c e p t o f p e r s o n a l autonomy, the " a b i l i t y on the p a r t o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o make m e a n i n g f u l , c r i t i c a l , u n p r e j u d i c e d d e c i s i o n s , " i s c e n t r a l to the c l a s s i c a l a n a r c h i s t 139 c o n c e p t i o n o f f reedom i t s e l f . V i r t u a l l y a l l o f the major a n a r c h i s t t h i n k e r s emphas i ze the need f o r i n d i v i d u a l s to a c t a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own r e a s o n r a t h e r than the d i c t a t e s o f a u t h o r i t y . The supposed d i s t i n c t i o n between W o l f f ' s " m o r a l " a n a r c h i s m and " p o l i t i c a l " a n a r c h i s m i s then not as c l e a r c u t as W o l f f ' s c r i t i c s c l a i m . N e v e r t h e l e s s , W o l f f ' s " a n a r c h i s m " i s d i s t i n c t f rom c l a s s i c a l a n a r c h i s m , and f a r l e s s c o h e r e n t or c o n v i n c i n g . The b e s t way to show t h i s i s by e v a l u a t i n g W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s m a c c o r d i n g to a f o u r p o i n t d e f i n i t i o n o f a n a r c h i s m d e v e l o p e d by , 68 John P. C l a r k . C l a r k a r g u e s t h a t " f o r one to be d e s c r i b e d as an a n a r c h i s t i n a f u l l s e n s e , a l l f o u r c r i t e r i a s h o u l d be m e t , " as t h e y a r e by " t h e f o u n d e r s o f a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y ( G o d w i n , P r o u d h o n , B a k u n i n , and K r o p o t k i n ) . " W e s h a l l see t h a t t h e r e a r e s e r i o u s r e a s o n s f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s m f a i l s to s a t i s f y any of C l a r k ' s f o u r c r i t e r i a , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t h i s t h e o r y i s not r e a l l y an a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y , p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d . A c c o r d i n g to C l a r k , " f o r a p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y to be c a l l e d ' a n a r c h i s m ' i n a c o m p l e t e s e n s e , i t must c o n t a i n : " 1) a v iew of an i d e a l , n o n c o e r c i v e , n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n s o c i e t y ; 2) a c r i t i c i s m o f e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , based on t h i s a n t i a u t h o r i -t a r i a n i d e a l ; 3) a v iew of human n a t u r e t h a t j u s t i f i e s the hope f o r s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s toward the i d e a l ; and 4) a s t r a t e g y f o r c h a n g e , i n v o l v i n g imme-d i a t e i n s t i t u t i o n o f n o n c o e r c i v e , n o n -a u t h o r i t a r i a n , and d e c e n t r a l i s t a l t e r n a -t i v e s . 141 The v i r t u e o f t h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f a n a r c h i s m i s t h a t i t i s b road enough to i n c l u d e a l l o f the major a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s and the h i s t o r i c a l a n a r c h i s t movements , w h i l e i t i s s p e c i f i c enough to e x c l u d e o t h e r t h e o r i s t s and movements who s h a r e somewhat s i m i l a r i d e a l s and g o a l s but who are n o r m a l l y not c o n s i d e r e d " a n a r c h i s t " - - Marx and h i s f o l l o w e r s , f o r e x a m p l e , and some l i b e r a l s who would r e g a r d a n a r c h y as m o r a l l y i d e a l but p r a c t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . 69 I I . W o l f f ' s " A n a r c h i s t " I d e a l I t would appear t h a t W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s m s a t i s f i e s C l a r k ' s f i r s t c r i t e r i o n of p r o v i d i n g "a v iew o f an i d e a l , n o n c o e r c i v e , n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n s o c i e t y . " However , a l t h o u g h W o l f f does a d v o c a t e as an i d e a l the c r e a t i o n of a n o n c o e r c i v e and n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n s o c i e t y o f autonomous a g e n t s , such an i d e a l i n no way f o l l o w s f rom h i s mora l t h e o r y , nor has W o l f f shown t h a t a u t h o r i t y and autonomy a r e n e c e s s a r i l y i n c o m p a t i b l e , and due to h i s c l a i m t h a t c h o i c e o f ends i s n o n r a t i o n a l he can p r o v i d e no r a t i o n a l argument f o r a d o p t i n g a n a r c h y as a g o a l . I w i l l f u r t h e r argue t h a t autonomous a g e n t s do not have to choose a n a r c h y even as an o n g o i n g p o l i c y f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e i r autonomy, and t h a t g i v e n W o l f f ' s a n a l y s i s o f autonomy and human r e a s o n , the s o r t o f r a t i o n a l community o f autonomous a g e n t s W o l f f e n v i s a g e s i s i m p o s s i b l e to a c h i e v e . In In Defense of A n a r c h i s m , W o l f f s e t out to d e m o n s t r a t e " t h a t a n a r c h i s m i s the o n l y p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 142 the v i r t u e o f a u t o n o m y . " I would now l i k e t o argue t h a t he has f a i l e d to do t h i s . I n d e e d , as we saw i n C h a p t e r I I , W o l f f was u n a b l e to show t h a t t h e r e i s an i r r e c o n c i l a b l e c o n f l i c t between autonomy and de j u r e a u t h o r i t y . I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t an a u t h o r i t y c o u l d p r o m u l g a t e laws i n such a c c o r d a n c e w i t h an i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t ' s g o a l s and p o l i c i e s t h a t i t would be r a t i o n a l f o r t h a t agent t o obey the commands o f 70 such an a u t h o r i t y w i t h o u t i n d i v i d u a l l y - e v a l u a t i n g each law or command. And i f o b e d i e n c e to such law i s the most e f f i c i e n t and r a t i o n a l means to the a g e n t ' s e n d s , and such o b e d i e n c e i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s o r her o t h e r g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , then the a g e n t , i n s o f a r as she or he i s to be autonomous and r a t i o n a l , must obey such l a w s . To r e p e a t an example f rom C h a p t e r I I , a commit ted u t i l i t a r i a n , who due to u n a v o i d a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s i n knowledge (one pe rson can o n l y know so much) l a c k s the same competence as a s t a t e ( p e r h a p s w i t h an e x t e n s i v e b u r e a u c r a c y , e x p e r t s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s and so f o r t h ) f o r d e t e r m i n i n g wh ich p o l i c i e s would c r e a t e the g r e a t e s t u t i l i t y , would be o b l i g a t e d to obey the u t i l i t a r i a n commands of t h a t s t a t e even though he or she i s u n a b l e to i n d e p e n d e n t l y e v a l u a t e each command. In t h i s case the o b l i g a t i o n to obey does not c o n f l i c t w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy but i n f a c t f o l l o w s f rom the a g e n t ' s own autonomous c h o i c e o f e n d s . W o l f f a l s o f a i l s t o show t h a t autonomous a g e n t s s h o u l d adopt a n a r c h y as e i t h e r a goa l or an o n g o i n g p o l i c y . A c c o r d i n g to W o l f f , c h o i c e o f ends i s n o n r a t i o n a l . W o l f f can t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e no r a t i o n a l arguments f o r the a d o p t i o n o f any g o a l , i n c l u d i n g the goa l o f a n a r c h y , a s t a t e l e s s n o n c o e r c i v e , n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n s o c i e t y of autonomous a g e n t s who r e g u l a t e t h e i r a f f a i r s t h r o u g h f r e e , c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t . One might want to argue t h a t such a s o c i e t y i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a g o a l , but r a t h e r a n e c e s s a r y i n f r a s t r u c t u r e or means f o r the f u l l en joyment o f i n d i v i d u a l autonomy. However , t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the c a s e . 71 For e x a m p l e , one c o u l d adopt as a goa l the e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the w o r k i n g - c l a s s , and the b e s t way to a c h i e v e t h i s goa l c o u l d be t h r o u g h a c o e r c i v e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s wh ich p r e s e r v e s o n e ' s own autonomy a t the expense of o t h e r s . T h i s i l l u s t r a t e s a n o t h e r f a u l t i n W o l f f ' s a rgument : he i s u n a b l e to show t h a t autonomous a g e n t s m u s t , i n s o f a r as t h e y a re autonomous , r e s p e c t the autonomy o f o t h e r s . Whether i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s s h o u l d r e s p e c t the autonomy o f o t h e r s w i l l depend on t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , and i n some c a s e s such g o a l s and p o l i c i e s may a c t u a l l y r e q u i re the i n f r i n g e m e n t o f o t h e r a g e n t s ' autonomy. T h u s , W o l f f has f a i l e d to show t h a t a n a r c h y , c o n c e i v e d e i t h e r as an i d e a l g o a l or as a p o l i c y f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n of autonomy, s h o u l d be r a t i o n a l l y s u p p o r t e d or adopted by autonomous a g e n t s . In f a c t , g i v e n t h a t c h o i c e of ends i s n o n r a t i o n a l , W o l f f cannot even p r o v i d e a r a t i o n a l argument f o r a d o p t i n g autonomy i t s e l f as a g o a l . A l l h i s arguments show i s t h a t autonomy i s a n e c e s s a r y p o l i c y f o r the r a t i o n a l a c h i e v e m e n t of o n e ' s g o a l s . T h u s , not o n l y can W o l f f p r o v i d e no arguments f o r a l w a y s r e s p e c t i n g the autonomy of o t h e r s , he can p r o v i d e no arguments a g a i n s t a d o p t i n g g o a l s i n j u r i o u s to o n e ' s own autonomy, 144 i n c l u d i n g s u i c i d e . I f f o l l o w s t h a t W o l f f cannot p r o v i d e any r a t i o n a l arguments a g a i n s t a d o p t i n g as a goa l the c r e a t i o n of a s t a t e wh ich i n f r i n g e s even o n e ' s own autonomy. As l o n g as reason i s c o n c e i v e d i n p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l t e r m s , as a mere means to any c o n c e i v a b l e e n d , as i t i s by W o l f f , one c a n n o t show t h a t some ends a re more r a t i o n a l t h a n , and hence s u p e r i o r t o , 72 o t h e r s . Only a n o n i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew o f r e a s o n i s c a p a b l e of p r o v i d i n g r a t i o n a l arguments f o r the a d o p t i o n or r e j e c t i o n o f v a r i o u s e n d s , i n c l u d i n g a n a r c h y and autonomy. I w i l l c r i t i c i z e W o l f f ' s i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew o f r e a s o n more f u l l y i n the n e x t c h a p t e r . One c a n , o f c o u r s e , g i v e p r u d e n t i a l a rguments f o r s a f e g u a r d i n g o n e ' s own or o t h e r ' s autonomy, as I d i d i n C h a p t e r I, but t h e r e i s n o t h i n g f o r m a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t about a d o p t i n g g o a l s and c o r r e s p o n d i n g p o l i c i e s damaging t o o n e ' s own o r o t h e r ' s autonomy, and f o r W o l f f f o r m a l i n c o n s i s t e n c y i s the o n l y a s p e c t of such a d o p t i o n t h a t can be r a t i o n a l l y c r i t i c i z e d . To be m o r a l , f o r W o l f f , i s to be c o n s i s t e n t , and n o t h i n g e l s e . A g a i n , I w i l l be c r i t i c i z i n g the v a c u i t y o f W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y i n the next c h a p t e r . I t s h o u l d h a r d l y go w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t , b e i n g u n a b l e t o p r o v i d e n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r a g e n t s to adopt a n a r c h y as a goa l or p o l i c y , W o l f f c a n n o t p r o v i d e any r a t i o n a l agruments a g a i n s t a d o p t i n g g o a l s and p o l i c i e s p o s i t i v e l y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a n a r c h i s t i d e a l s . As w i t h the c a p i t a l i s t m e n t i o n e d e a r l i e r , autonomous a g e n t s may r a t i o n a l l y d e c i d e t h a t the c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f s t a t e power i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h and even u s e f u l to t h e i r own g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , w i t h o u t n e c e s s a r i l y r e c o g n i z i n g the s t a t e as h a v i n g de j u r e a u t h o r i t y o v e r them. Autonomous a g e n t s do not have to be c o n s i s t e n t a n a r c h i s t s . W o l f f h i m s e l f a d m i t s t h a t autonomous a g e n t s can comply w i t h the l a w , " b e c a u s e of p r u d e n t i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t and because o f the 73 o b v i o u s mora l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the v a l u e o f o r d e r , the g e n e r a l good consequences o f p r e s e r v i n g a sys tem of p r o p e r t y , 145 and so f o r t h , " and y e t remain autonomous . That may be s o , but t h e y c e r t a i n l y have not remained a n a r c h i s t s . D e s p i t e h a v i n g f a i l e d to show t h a t " a n a r c h i s m i s the o n l y p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the v i r t u e o f a u t o n o m y , " perhaps W o l f f can p r o v i d e a w e a k e r , more p r u d e n t i a l argument f o r 146 a n a r c h i s m . Because W o l f f cannot show t h a t autonomous a g e n t s , i n s o f a r as t h e y a r e to remain autonomous , must r e s p e c t the autonomy o f o t h e r s , t h e r e i s a p o t e n t i a l f o r g r e a t c o n f l i c t between autonomous a g e n t s , f o r t h e y may choose g o a l s and a c t on p o l i c i e s t h a t c o n f l i c t w i t h the g o a l s and p o l i c i e s of o t h e r a g e n t s , and which may even d i r e c t l y r e q u i r e the i n f r i n g e m e n t of o t h e r a g e n t s ' autonomy. The s i n g l e m i n d e d p u r s u i t o f o n e ' s own g o a l s w i t h o u t r e s p e c t f o r o t h e r p e o p l e ' s autonomy, i f p r a c t i c e d w i d e l y , c o u l d v e r y w e l l l e a d to the d i m i n u t i o n o f e v e r y o n e ' s autonomy t h r o u g h w i d e - s p r e a d s o c i a l c o n f l i c t . Because no agent can be c e r t a i n t h a t o t h e r a g e n t s w o n ' t adopt g o a l s and p o l i c i e s t h a t c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s or her autonomy, i t may be i n h i s o r her i n t e r e s t s t o c r e a t e a s o c i e t y i n which e v e r y o n e e n j o y s f u l l autonomy, i n which any p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t between a g e n t s can be a v o i d e d . A n d , i n f a c t , W o l f f a rgues t h a t any p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t between autonomous a g e n t s can be a v o i d e d t h r o u g h the d e v i c e o f unanimous, c o l 1 e c t i v e commitment , r a t h e r than t h r o u g h the s t a t e , so t h a t a n a r c h i s m , a l t h o u g h not s t r i c t l y the o n l y p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e t h e o r e t i c a l l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h autonomy, i s the 74 p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e most c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the f u l l and equa l autonomy o f e v e r y o n e . In a s t a t i s t s o c i e t y , t h e r e i s no g u a r a n t e e t h a t the s t a t e w i l l adopt p o l i c i e s and g o a l s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h each a g e n t ' s autonomy, nor i s t h e r e any g u a r a n t e e t h a t the s t a t e w i l l not adopt g o a l s and p o l i c i e s i ncompat i b l e w i t h each p e r s o n ' s autonomy. I f o n l y i n an a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y would each p e r s o n ' s autonomy be g u a r a n t e e d then " p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a r c h i s m would seem t o be the o n l y r e a s o n a b l e p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f f o r an e n l i g h t e n e d man" c o m m i t t e d to 147 the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f h i s autonomy. Through the d e v i c e o f unanimous c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t , W o l f f would a r g u e , a g e n t s can v o l u n t a r i l y a r r a n g e t h e i r a f f a i r s t o a v o i d c o n f l i c t and mutual i n f r i n g e m e n t o f each o t h e r ' s autonomy. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , g i v e n W o l f f ' s v iew t h a t c h o i c e o f ends i s n o n r a t i o n a l , t h e r e i s no way autonomous a g e n t s c o u l d r a t i o n a l 1 y agree t o the p u r s u i t o f any g o a l s . Any agreement would be m e r e l y a c o i n c i d e n c e o f n o n r a t i o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s . In a W o l f f i a n s t a t e o f n a t u r e t h e r e c o u l d be no m e a n i n g f u l d e b a t e or d i s c u s s i o n of c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e o f e n d s . There would be l i m i t e d r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s i o n of p o l i c i e s but o n l y i n an i n s t r u m e n t a l s e n s e : " g i v e n t h a t x i s y o u r g o a l , adopt p o l i c y y . " Because p o l i c i e s a r e r a t i o n a l (and hence b i n d i n g f o r autonomous a g e n t s ) o n l y i n r e l a t i o n to g o a l s , i f one agent opposed the p o l i c y o f a n o t h e r , o r h i s or her autonomy was t h r e a t e n e d by t h a t p o l i c y , the o n l y way he or she c o u l d c o n v i n c e t h a t p e r s o n to r e f r a i n f rom a c t i n g on t h a t p o l i c y would be to c o n v i n c e him o r her t o 75 abandon the goa l wh ich made a d o p t i o n o f the p o l i c y r a t i o n a l l y b i n d i n g ( o r " o b l i g a t o r y , " i n W o l f f ' s sense o f the w o r d ) . But because c h o i c e of ends i s n o n r a t i o n a l , t h i s cannot be done i n a r a t i o n a l manner . The o n l y way to get someone t o change h i s or her g o a l s and c o r r e s p o n d i n g p o l i c i e s would be t h r o u g h t h r e a t s , b r i b e s , m a n i p u l a t i o n or some form o f n o n r a t i o n a l p e r s u a s i o n , but never t h r o u g h r a t i o n a l a rgument . We see then t h a t g i v e n W o l f f ' s i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew o f r e a s o n , h i s a n a r c h i s t i d e a l o f a r a t i o n a l community o f f u l l y and e q u a l l y autonomous a g e n t s i s i m p o s s i b l e to a c h i e v e i n p r a c t i c e . The members o f such a community would be u n a b l e to m e a n i n g f u l l y debate or d i s c u s s the c o l l e c t i v e a d o p t i o n o f any g o a l s , and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e y would be u n a b l e to r a t i o n a l l y i n f l u e n c e each o t h e r ' s c o r r e s p o n d i n g c h o i c e o f p o l i c i e s , e x c e p t i n a p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l s e n s e . Each would s t e p f o r w a r d to e x p r e s s h i s or her own n o n r a t i o n a l p r e f e r e n c e , and t h r o u g h t h i s p r o c e s s some c o i n c i d e n c e of p r e f e r e n c e s might o b t a i n , but no r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t . So even i f agreement among a g e n t s c o u l d be o b t a i n e d , one o f the p r i m a r y g o a l s o f W o l f f ' s r a t i o n a l communi ty , " t h a t r e c i p r o c i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s which i s a c h i e v e d and s u s t a i n e d by e q u a l s who d i s c o u r s e , t o g e t h e r p u b l i c l y f o r the s p e c i f i c pu rpose of s o c i a l d e c i s i o n and a c t i o n , " would b e , i n e s s e n c e , 148 d e f e a t e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , each agent would be " o b l i g a t e d " to comply w i t h p o l i c i e s f o r the a c h i e v e m e n t o f v a r i o u s ends o n l y as l o n g as he o r she remained commit ted to t h o s e e n d s . The c o l l e c t i v e agreements t h a t would m i r a c u l o u s l y o b t a i n would then 76 have no r e a l b i n d i n g f o r c e each agent c o u l d change h i s o r her g o a l s a t w i l l , and thus n u l l i f y any " o b l i g a t i o n " to adhere t o the c o l l e c t i v e l y agreed upon p o l i c i e s f o r t h e i r a c h i e v e m e n t . W o l f f ' s community would be a n a r c h i c t h e n , but o n l y i n the p e j o r a t i v e sense o f the w o r d . Any agent whose c h o i c e of ends i s d e t e r m i n e d by m a n i p u l a t i o n o r some form of n o n r a t i o n a l p e r s u a s i o n i s not au tonomous , a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s a n a l y s i s , because the a g e n t ' s a c t i o n (o f c h o o s i n g ) i s not caused by h i s or her own r e a s o n . But t o have any r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t f o r o b t a i n i n g o t h e r a g e n t s ' agreement to the p u r s u i t o f some g o a l , r a t h e r than m e r e l y h o p i n g t h a t e v e r y o n e w i l l m i r a c u l o u s l y s h a r e the same p r e f e r e n c e s , an agent w i l l have to d e v i s e ways o f m a n i p u l a t i n g and o t h e r w i s e i n f l u e n c i n g o t h e r a g e n t s ' n o n r a t i o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s . O ther a g e n t s w i l l then agree to the p u r s u i t o f some g o a l , not because t h e y were r a t i o n a l l y c o n v i n c e d , but because t h e y were s u c c e s s f u l l y m a n i p u l a t e d . T h u s , the d e v i c e o f unanimous c o l l e c t i v e agreement w i l l f a i l to p r e s e r v e each a g e n t ' s autonomy, because to get i t to f u n c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y ( r a t h e r than m i r a c u l o u s l y ) each agent w i l l have to t r e a t a l l o t h e r members o f the community as heteronomous a g e n t s i n c a p a b l e o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e or r a t i o n a l d e l i b e r a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e i r n o n r a t i o n a l g o a l s . I n s t e a d o f a r a t i o n a l community o f autonomous a g e n t s , t h e r e w i l l be a group of heteronomous a g e n t s m u t u a l l y m a n i p u l a t i n g one a n o t h e r . A l t h o u g h W o l f f i a n autonomous a g e n t s c a n n o t r a t i o n a l l y agree among t h e m s e l v e s to the p u r s u i t o f v a r i o u s e n d s , pe rhaps t h e y 77 can r a t i o n a l l y agree to adopt a r a t i o n a l method f o r the r e s o l u t i o n o f c o n f l i c t between t h e i r n o n r a t i o n a l ends and c o r r e s p o n d i n g p o l i c i e s wh ich w i l l e i t h e r p r e s e r v e or max imize t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l autonomy - - a R a w l s i a n p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e f o r ^ e x a m p l e . However , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to d e r i v e f rom W o l f f ' s p u r e l y f o r m a l a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l agency any n o t i o n o f j u s t i c e or f a i r n e s s which would l i m i t the autonomy o f each agent to a d e f i n i t e sphere o f l e g i t i m a t e a c t i o n , so t h a t each agent would e n j o y the maximum amount of autonomy c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the autonomy o f o t h e r s . ( S i g n i f i c a n t l y , W o l f f r e g a r d s R a w l s ' a t t e m p t to d e v i s e a n o t i o n o f j u s t i c e b i n d i n g on a l l r a t i o n a l 149 a g e n t s as a f a i l u r e a l s o . ) Any agent who a c t s a c c o r d i n g t o s e l f - c h o s e n p o l i c i e s , wh ich a r e i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and r a t i o n a l l y c o n n e c t e d to h i s or her g o a l s , i s autonomous i n a W o l f f i a n s e n s e . I t i s the f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n , and not the a c t u a l c o n t e n t o f the a g e n t ' s g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , wh ich makes each a g e n t ' s a c t i o n s r a t i o n a l , and hence autonomous a n d , f o r W o l f f , m o r a l . That the agent may have adopted g o a l s and p o l i c i e s which t h r e a t e n the autonomy o f o t h e r s i s not s t r i c t l y r e l e v a n t . Autonomous a g e n t s a re not bound to r e s p e c t the autonomy o f o t h e r s . Even i f a g e n t s d i d ag ree to a p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l r e s p e c t , perhaps f o r the p r u d e n t i a l r e a s o n s o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how such a p r i n c i p l e c o u l d be a p p l i e d . V i r t u a l l y any goa l or p o l i c y may c o n f l i c t , e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , w i t h o t h e r g o a l s and p o l i c i e s . Upon what b a s i s can 78 such c o n f l i c t be r e s o l v e d ? A l t h o u g h i t may be p o s s i b l e f o r i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s to rank t h e i r g o a l s on some s o r t o f r a t i o n a l b a s i s , W o l f f cannot d e r i v e an i n t e r p e r s o n a l , o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d or r a n k i n g o f g o a l s f rom h i s i n s t r u m e n t a l a n a l y s i s o f mora l r e a s o n . For W o l f f , a l l ends a re e q u a l l y n o n r a t i o n a l , so to adopt one common s t a n d a r d o r r a n k i n g o f g o a l s f o r the r e s o l u t i o n o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n f l i c t e i t h e r would a r b i t r a r i l y f a v o u r some a g e n t s ove r o t h e r s , o r i t would i m p l i c i t l y assume t h a t wh ich W o l f f e x p l i c i t l y d e n i e s - - t h a t some ends a re r a t i o n a l l y o r m o r a l l y s u p e r i o r to o t h e r s . Pe rhaps W o l f f would e n d o r s e some s o r t o f p r e f e r e n c e u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , but the m a x i m i z a t i o n o f the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f e v e r y o n e ' s p r e f e r e n c e s , or autonomy, i s a s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e which does not s t r i c t l y f o l l o w f rom W o l f f ' s f o r m a l a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . M o r e o v e r , such a p r i n c i p l e can j u s t i f y the i n f r i n g e m e n t of some p e o p l e ' s autonomy, or the f r u s t r a t i o n o f some p e o p l e ' s p r e f e r e n c e s , i n o r d e r to m a x i m i z e the autonomy o r s a t i s f a c t i o n of o t h e r s . As K e i t h Graham a r g u e s , i t can a l s o p r o v i d e a p o s s i b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r e i t h e r unanimous o r m a j o r i t a r i a n d i r e c t democracy r a t h e r than a n a r c h i s m , because i n both unanimous and m a j o r i t a r i a n d i r e c t democracy any c o n f l i c t between g o a l s and p r e f e r e n c e s can be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o u r o f the 150 g r e a t e s t number. We seen then t h a t W o l f f has f a i l e d t o show t h a t " a n a r c h i s m i s the o n l y p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the v i r t u e o f a u t o n o m y . " Autonomous a g e n t s can remain autonomous w i t h o u t 79 r e s p e c t i n g the autonomy o f o t h e r s or a d o p t i n g a n a r c h y as a g o a l or p o l i c y . Some forms o f government a re c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, and o t h e r forms of g o v e r n m e n t , namely unanimous and m a j o r i t a r i a n d e m o c r a c y , a r e a t l e a s t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the v i r t u e o f m a x i m i z i n g autonomy ( b u t not n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h f u l l and e q u a l autonomy f o r a l l p e r s o n s ) . W o l f f can p r o v i d e no r a t i o n a l method f o r r e s o l v i n g c o n f l i c t between a g e n t s ' g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , and g i v e n the u n d e r l y i n g mora l t h e o r y upon which h i s d e f e n c e of a n a r c h i s m i s p u r p o r t e d l y b a s e d , the s o r t o f r a t i o n a l , a n a r c h i s t community he e n v i s a g e s as an i d e a l s o c i e t y i s f o r m a l l y i m p o s s i b l e ( i t may be both f o r m a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e g i v e n a d i f f e r e n t mora l t h e o r y o r 1 C 1 t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e ) . In t h i s s e n s e , i t c o u l d be argued t h a t W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s m f a i l s to s a t i s f y C l a r k ' s f i r s t r e q u i r e m e n t f o r any a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y , t h a t i t p r o v i d e "a v i e w o f an i d e a l , n o n c o e r c i v e , n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n s o c i e t y " t h a t i s , i f we assume t h a t any p r o p e r l y a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y s h o u l d be based on a c o h e r e n t i d e a l and a p l a u s i b l e , r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t . 1 5 2 I I I . W o l f f ' s C r i t i q u e o f E x i s t i n g S o c i e t y G i ven t h a t W o l f f ' s a n a r c h i s t i d e a l n e i t h e r f o l l o w s f rom nor i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the mora l t h e o r y upon w h i c h i t was supposed to be b a s e d , i t would seem t h a t W o l f f ' s " a n a r c h i s m " a l s o f a i l s to s a t i s f y C l a r k ' s second c r i t e r i o n o f p r o v i d i n g "a c r i t i c i s m of 8 0 e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , based on t h i s a n t i a u t h o r i t a r i a n i d e a l . " One can h a r d l y base a c o h e r e n t c r i t i q u e of s o c i e t y on an i n c o h e r e n t i d e a l . Be t h a t as i t may, W o l f f does p r o v i d e a c r i t i q u e o f e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . We can f u r t h e r c l a r i f y the s t a t u s o f W o l f f ' s argument by s e e i n g how e f f e c t i v e t h i s c r i t i q u e r e a l l y i s i n v iew of the p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n . Due t o the v e r y n a t u r e of W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y he c a n n o t p r o v i d e any s u b s t a n t i v e , p o s i t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e to e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y . Any a l t e r n a t i v e must be the c r e a t i o n of autonomous a g e n t s , and t h e y w i l l be the ones to p r o v i d e the s u b s t a n t i v e c o n t e n t o f the a l t e r n a t i v e . But W o l f f can p r o v i d e a c r i t i q u e o f e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y based on h i s moral t h e o r y , a l b e i t not based on the a n a r c h i s t o r a n t i a u t h o r i t a r i a n i d e a l wh ich C l a r k ' s d e f i n i t i o n of a n a r c h i s m c a l l s f o r . From a W o l f f i a n p e r s p e c t i v e , a l l o b l i g a t i o n s and d u t i e s must be v o l u n t a r i l y s e l f - a s s u m e d , and t h e y a r e o n l y b i n d i n g f o r a r a t i o n a l agent i n s o f a r as t h e y r a t i o n a l l y f o l l o w f rom the a g e n t ' s own g o a l s and p o l i c i e s . On t h i s b a s i s , any l a w , o b l i g a t i o n , d u t y , i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t or a u t h o r i t y wh ich c o n f l i c t s w i t h , i m p e d e s , t h r e a t e n s or v i o l a t e s i n d i v i d u a l autonomy can be j u s t i f i a b l y c r i t i c i z e d , opposed and r e s i s t e d , a t l e a s t by the agent c o n c e r n e d . No agent has a s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n to obey the commands o f a u t h o r i t y , and e v e r y agent has the r i g h t to r e s i s t t h e i r c o e r c i v e i m p o s i t i o n . No a g e n t , t h r o u g h h i s or her a c t i o n s , can c r e a t e o b l i g a t i o n s f o r any o t h e r 81 a g e n t , but o n l y f o r him or h e r s e l f . W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y p r o v i d e s the b a s i s f o r a c r i t i q u e o f i n v o l u n t a r y s o c i a l a r r a n g e m e n t s , such as the s t a t e (and c a p i t a l i s m , j u d g i n g f rom W o l f f ' s own r e m a r k s ) , any form o f s o c i a l c o n t r o l wh ich impedes r a t i o n a l i t y and t h r e a t e n s autonomy, and v i r t u a l l y any k i n d o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e or i n s t i t u t i o n which i s not v o l u n t a r i l y c r e a t e d 153 and s u s t a i n e d by autonomous a g e n t s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the v a l i d i t y of t h e s e c r i t i q u e s may o f t e n be l i m i t e d to the i n d i v i d u a l s whose autonomy i s a c t u a l l y i n f r i n g e d or t h r e a t e n e d . As we have s e e n , W o l f f can p r o v i d e no arguments a g a i n s t i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s or groups o f a g e n t s (and i t i s i m p o r t a n t to remember t h a t W o l f f d e f i n e s the s t a t e i t s e l f as "a group of p e r s o n s " ) v i o l a t i n g the autonomy o f o t h e r s i f such v i o l a t i o n s a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the v i o l a t o r ' s g o a l s and p o l i c i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , i f v i o l a t i n g a n o t h e r a g e n t ' s autonomy i s the most r a t i o n a l means f o r a c h i e v i n g an a g e n t ' s g o a l s , then t h a t agent i s p o s i t i v e l y o b i i g a t e d to v i o l a t e the o t h e r a g e n t ' s autonomy. T h i s l e a d s to one o f the c e n t r a l p a r a d o x e s o f W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y . W h i l e h i s t h e o r y can p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r an i n d i v i d u a l agent to j u s t i f i a b l y c r i t i c i z e and r e s i s t any i n f r i n g e m e n t o f h i s o r her autonomy, i t can a t the same t i m e not o n l y j u s t i f y (o r " r a t i o n a l i z e , " i f you w i l l ) such i n f r i n g e m e n t , f rom the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the agent o r a g e n t s d o i n g the i n f r i n g i n g , i t can a l s o show t h a t such i n f r i n g e m e n t i s o b l i g a t o r y on the p a r t o f t h o s e a g e n t s . From W o l f f ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to r e s o l v e t h i s c o n f l i c t between 82 the i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t ' s " o b l i g a t i o n " to a c t a u t o n o m o u s l y and the o b l i g a t i o n o t h e r a g e n t s may h a v e , g i v e n t h e i r a d o p t i o n o f c e r t a i n g o a l s and p o l i c i e s , to i n f r i n g e a n o t h e r a g e n t ' s autonomy, due to W o l f f ' s v iew t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s a r e a s t r i c t f u n c t i o n o f what i s i n s t r u m e n t a l l y r a t i o n a l f o r each a g e n t . A l t h o u g h the s t a t e , c o n c e i v e d as a "g roup o f p e r s o n s , " may not have a r i g h t to command and to be obeyed a c c o r d i n g t o W o l f f ' s a r g u m e n t , i t i s a l s o the c a s e , a c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s own a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l i t y , m o r a l i t y and o b l i g a t i o n , t h a t f rom the p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h i s "g roup o f p e r s o n s " i t may v e r y w e l l be r a t i ona 1 and hence o b i i g a t o r y to command and to compel o b e d i e n c e to t h e i r commands. T h u s , as C a r o l e Pateman r e m a r k s , "no p o l i t i c a l r u l e r need quake a t the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f W o l f f ' s 154 a n a r c h i sm. " We see then t h a t W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y i s i n c a p a b l e o f p r o v i d i n g a v a l i d , c o h e r e n t and g e n e r a l (as opposed to a g e n t - s p e c i f i c ) c r i t i q u e o f e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y or the s t a t e . I n d e e d , h i s t h e o r y p r o v i d e s a p o s i t i v e r a t i o n a l e , or j u s t i f i c a t i o n , f o r t h o s e p e r s o n s w i e l d i n g power and a u t h o r i t y t o t h r e a t e n and v i o l a t e o t h e r a g e n t s ' autonomy as l o n g as such a c t i o n i s r a t i o n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s and p o l i c i e s . F o r , f rom W o l f f ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , i f s o m e t h i n g i s i n s t r u m e n t a l l y r a t i o n a l t h e r e i s "no mora l g r o u n d " f o r o p p o s i n g 155 i t . T h i s c o n f l a t i o n of i n s t r u m e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y w i t h m o r a l i t y i s the v e r y e s s e n c e o f W o l f f ' s t h e o r y . I t c o u l d be s a i d then t h a t W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y f a i l s t o s a t i s f y C l a r k ' s 83 second a n a r c h i s t c r i t e r i o n of p r o v i d i n g "a c r i t i c i s m o f e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , " based on e i t h e r an a n a r c h i s t i d e a l or W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y i t s e l f . IV. W o l f f ' s View o f Human Nature We now come to C l a r k ' s t h i r d c r i t e r i o n f o r an a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y , t h a t i t p r o v i d e "a v iew o f human n a t u r e t h a t j u s t i f i e s the hope f o r s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s toward the [ a n a r c h i s t ] i d e a l . " One c o u l d argue t h a t W o l f f s i m p l y has no v iew o f human n a t u r e , or t h a t i t i s i r r e l e v a n t to h i s mora l t h e o r y , because a l t h o u g h h i s moral t h e o r y d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y f rom K a n t ' s i n most r e s p e c t s , he does f o l l o w Kant i n a t t e m p t i n g to d e v e l o p a r a t i o n a l t h e o r y o f e t h i c s v a l i d f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , the v a l i d i t y o f wh ich does not depend on any e m p i r i c a l l y c o n t i n g e n t f a c t s r e g a r d i n g human b i o l o g y and p s y c h o l o g y . But t h i s would be a m i s t a k e . C l e a r l y , f o r W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n to be a t a l l r e l e v a n t or p l a u s i b l e , he must h o l d a t l e a s t one t e n e t r e g a r d i n g human n a t u r e , namely t h a t human b e i n g s a re c a p a b l e o f r a t i o n a l a g e n c y , o f b e i n g moved by r e a s o n . G iven t h i s v iew o f human n a t u r e as r a t i o n a l a g e n c y , i t i s l e g i t i m a t e to ask whether i t p r o v i d e s any b a s i s f o r hope o f a t t a i n i n g W o l f f ' s m o r a l l y i d e a l s o c i e t y . W o l f f ' s c o n c e p t o f human n a t u r e as i n s t r u m e n t a l l y r a t i o n a l agency p r o v i d e s no r e a l hope f o r p r o g r e s s toward an a n a r c h i s t i d e a l . As has been a r g u e d , W o l f f ' s m o r a l l y i d e a l a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y n e i t h e r f o l l o w s f rom nor i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h i s g e n e r a l 84 moral t h e o r y , based on h i s f o r m a l a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . Beyond t h i s , i t i s wor th e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y can p r o v i d e no c o h e r e n t a c c o u n t o f autonomous i n d i v i d u a l mora l d e v e l o p m e n t , e x c e p t i n the sense of a g e n t s d e v e l o p i n g more e f f i c i e n t means f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e i r own n o n r a t i o n a l e n d s . A c c o r d i n g to W o l f f , c h o i c e o f ends i s d e t e r m i n e d by n e i t h e r r e a s o n nor d e s i r e . A l t h o u g h v a r i o u s r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may i n f l u e n c e o n e ' s c h o i c e o f ends ( e . g . the p r a c t i c a l a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the e n d ) , i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s o n e ' s c h o i c e i s d e t e r m i n e d by n e i t h e r r e a s o n nor d e s i r e but r a t h e r , one can o n l y assume, by an a l m o s t N i e t z s c h e a n a c t o f w i l l . Because c h o i c e o f ends i s u l t i m a t e l y n o n r a t i o n a l , a g e n t s c a n n o t r a t i o n a l l y p r o g r e s s f rom one end or s e t o f ends to a n o t h e r end or s e t of e n d s . Any movement to new ends or s e t s o f e n d s , i n c l u d i n g the a n a r c h i s t i d e a l , w i l l be j u s t as a r b i t r a r y as the o r i g i n a l n o n r a t i o n a l c h o i c e o f ends u l t i m a t e l y was. T h u s , a g e n t s can have no r a t i o n a l n a r r a t i v e h i s t o r y o f mora l deve lopment - - " m o r a l " c o n f l i c t w i l l c o n s i s t o f n o t h i n g more than c o n f l i c t between e q u a l l y n o n r a t i o n a l and u l t i m a t e l y a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e s . Because u l t i m a t e l y t h e r e i s no r e a s o n why autonomous a g e n t s s h o u l d embrace a n a r c h i s m as an i d e a l , t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r h o p i n g t h a t t h e y w i l l p u r p o s e f u l l y p r o g r e s s towards a n a r c h y . Any such " p r o g r e s s " w i l l be e i t h e r c o m p l e t e l y f o r t u i t o u s or the r e s u l t o f f o r c e s beyond each 156 a g e n t ' s r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . One must q u e s t i o n i n what p o s s i b l e sense a g e n t s whose 85 a c t i o n s a re u l t i m a t e l y d e t e r m i n e d by n o n r a t i o n a l c h o i c e can be s a i d to be f r e e or r e s p o n s i b l e . To be a u t o n o m o u s , f o r W o l f f , i s to be "moved by r e a s o n , " r a t h e r than by d e s i r e , i m p u l s e and so o n . But i t i s to be moved by reason o n l y i n the sense of a c t i n g a c c o r d i n g to p o l i c i e s r a t i o n a l l y c o n n e c t e d to o n e ' s n o n r a t i o n a l g o a l s . These n o n r a t i o n a l g o a l s , wh ich make the a d o p t i o n o f p o l i c i e s , and a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l , r a t i o n a l , can be s a i d to be the motor of a g e n c y , f o r t h e y p r o v i d e the n e c e s s a r y i m p e t u s and r a t i o n a l e f o r a c t i o n . For the autonomous a g e n t , c h o i c e o f ends and a c t i o n a re i n e x t r i c a b l y i n t e r t w i n e d . I t can be s a i d t h a t to choose i s to a c t , a t l e a s t m e n t a l l y . The a c t o f c h o o s i n g ends t h e n , wh ich i s uncaused by r e a s o n , i s not an autonomous a c t b u t , i n W o l f f ' s t e r m i n o l o g y , a " b i t o f b e h a v i o r . " B u t , W o l f f a l s o h o l d s , a g e n t s cannot be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r n o n r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r , as opposed to t h e i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s . In t h a t c a s e , a g e n t s c a n n o t be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r " c h o o s i n g " the ends t h e y do c h o o s e , f o r such c h o i c e i s not r a t i o n a l , o r i n the t r u e sense of the w o r d , autonomous . And i f they c a n n o t be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the ends they c h o o s e , how can they p o s s i b l y be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a d o p t i n g the p o l i c i e s wh ich r a t i o n a l l y f o l l o w f rom them? To be "autonomous" they must f o l l o w t h e s e p o l i c i e s , but by d o i n g so t h e y make t h e m s e l v e s s l a v e s to t h e i r own n o n r a t i o n a l c h o i c e s . U l t i m a t e l y , W o l f f ' s c o n c e p t o f autonomy i s i n c o h e r e n t . W o l f f ' s c r i t i c i s m s o f Rober t N o z i c k can be a p p l i e d to h i m s e l f , f o r h i s c o n c e p t of n o n r a t i o n a l c h o i c e o f ends a l s o 86 e x c l u d e s any " u s a b l e n o t i o n s of f a l s e c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o f 157 s e l f - d e c e p t i o n , [ o r ] o f a l i e n a t i o n . " Ends must be t r e a t e d s i m p l y as g i v e n . Because of W o l f f ' s a b s t r a c t , q u a s i - K a n t i a n a p p r o a c h , he cannot c r i t i c i z e some ends as i n a p p r o p r i a t e to human n a t u r e , or " s p e c i e s - b e i n g , " to use a M a r x i a n t e r m . A l s o , W o l f f can o f f e r no n o n p r u d e n t i a l a rguments a g a i n s t a d o p t i n g g o a l s and p o l i c i e s damaging to o n e ' s own o r to o t h e r ' s autonomy, nor can he e x p l a i n e x a c t l y what i s wrong w i t h c h o o s i n g such t h i n g s . I n d e e d , i t i s o b s c u r e how W o l f f can even d i s t i n g u i s h between the a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e s o f an autonomous agent and the c o m p u l s i v e c h o i c e of an i r r a t i o n a l p e r s o n . For W o l f f , an i r r a t i o n a l pe rson would be one who f a i l e d to adopt p o l i c i e s r a t i o n a l l y c o n n e c t e d to h i s or her e n d s . But the ends t h e m s e l v e s a r e a l l e q u a l l y n o n r a t i o n a l , f rom the end o f b e i n g w o r l d - d i c t a t o r to t h a t o f b e i n g a good c o o k . As l o n g as the a g e n t ' s p o l i c i e s a r e r a t i o n a l l y c o n n e c t e d to h i s or her g o a l s , t h a t agent i s p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l , no m a t t e r how s t r a n g e o r h o r r i b l e h i s or her g o a l s may be . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , not o n l y c o u l d one argue t h a t v a r i o u s d i c t a t o r s a r e autonomous a g e n t s , one would not be a b l e to r a t i o n a l l y c r i t i c i z e t h e i r g o a l s but o n l y t h e i r methods f o r a t t a i n i n g them. I t i s hard to see i n what sense any agent can be s a i d t o be f r e e and r a t i o n a l , when a l l o f h i s or her a c t i o n s (as opposed to " b e h a v i o u r " ) a re u l t i m a t e l y based on c h o i c e s o v e r wh ich the agent has a b s o l u t e l y no r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . E i t h e r the a g e n t ' s a c t i o n s a re u l t i m a t e l y d e t e r m i n e d by a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e or t h e y 87 are d e t e r m i n e d by s o m e t h i n g e l s e (perhaps the a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e of a n o t h e r p e r s o n ) , but i n n e i t h e r case a r e t h e y d e t e r m i n e d by r e a s o n . In the f i r s t case the agent i s a s l a v e to h i s or her n o n r a t i o n a l c h o i c e , i n the second case he or she i s a s l a v e to some s o r t o f i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l c o m p u l s i o n . Y e t , W o l f f h i m s e l f a d m i t s t h a t to be f r e e and r e s p o n s i b l e one must be r a t i o n a l . To some e x t e n t W o l f f r e c o g n i z e s the i n a d e q u a c y of h i s v iew of human n a t u r e as c e n t r a l l y dependent on and l a r g e l y c o n f i n e d to r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . In both the c o n c l u d i n g s e c t i o n o f the Autonomy o f Reason and i n a s e p a r a t e a r t i c l e , " T h e r e ' s Nobody Here But Us P e r s o n s , " he d i s c u s s e s the l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h i s 159 p o s i t i o n . As W o l f f h i m s e l f a d m i t s , i n the a c c o u n t of r a t i o n a l agency which he has adapted f rom K a n t , "man i s p o r t r a y e d as not e s s e n t i a l l y l o c a t e d i n a t i m e , a p l a c e , a c u l t u r e , or a h i s t o r y . The l i m i t a t i o n s o f h i s w i l l and the c o n s t r a i n t s o f h i s body a re seen as a c c i d e n t a l to h i s n a t u r e as a moral and p o l i t i c a l b e i n g . " 1 * 1 0 W o l f f a l s o a d m i t s t h a t , f rom t h i s s o r t o f p e r s p e c t i v e , r a t i o n a l a g e n t s " a r e c o n c e i v e d as e s s e n t i a l l y u n c h a n g i n g , " as " t i m e l e s s l y r a t i o n a l , " and t h e i r " p u b l i c or p o l i t i c a l w o r l d as a t i m e l e s s s t a t i c community o f 161 a d u l t s . " C o n s e q u e n t l y , the s o r t o f a p p r o a c h W o l f f t a k e s (wh ich he s h a r e s w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l t h e o r y ) " s i m p l y does not t a k e s e r i o u s l y the dominant f a c t s of human l i f e , namely b i r t h , c h i l d h o o d , a g i n g and d e a t h , " a n d , he might have a d d e d , 162 gender . 88 Given the g e n e r a l i n a d e q u a c y and i m p l a u s i b i 1 i t y o f W o l f f ' s v iew of human n a t u r e , and the f a c t t h a t i t p r o v i d e s no r e a l hope f o r p r o g r e s s toward an a n a r c h i s t i d e a l , i t can be s a i d t h a t W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y f a i l s to s a t i s f y C l a r k ' s t h i r d c r i t e r i o n f o r an a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y , t h a t i t p r o v i d e "a v iew o f human n a t u r e t h a t j u s t i f i e s the hope f o r s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r e s s toward t h e [ a n a r c h i s t ] i d e a l . " As C l a r k a r g u e s , F o r a n a r c h i s m t o be a c o h e r e n t t h e o r y , i t must have a c o n c e p t i o n of human n a t u r e wh ich fo rms t h e b a s i s f o r s p e c u l a t i o n a b o u t t h e i d e a l s o c i e t y and w h i c h g i v e s a f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h o s e p r a c t i c a l p r o p o s a l s t h a t a r e n e c e s s a r y i f the i d e a l i s to have p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l r e l e v a n c e . 163 As we have s e e n , W o l f f ' s t h e o r y f a i l s on both c o u n t s . V. W o l f f and P o l i t i c a l A n a r c h i s m C l a r k ' s f o u r t h and f i n a l c r i t e r i o n f o r any a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y i s t h a t i t p r o v i d e "a s t r a t e g y f o r c h a n g e , i n v o l v i n g i m m e d i a t e i n s t i t u t i o n of n o n c o e r c i v e , n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n , and d e c e n t r a l i s t a l t e r n a t i v e s . " I t i s t h i s c r i t e r i o n wh ich most c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s a n a r c h i s m f rom o t h e r moral or p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e s wh ich may p o s t u l a t e some form of a n a r c h y as the u l t i m a t e i d e a l , such as M a r x ' s s t a t e l e s s , communist s o c i e t y , or K a n t ' s Kingdom of E n d s , but which do not a d v o c a t e c o n s i s t e n t l y a n a r c h i s t methods of c h a n g e . R a t h e r , as C l a r k n o t e s , " t h e M a r x i s t , the n o n - M a r x i a n s o c i a l i s t , the w e l f a r e s t a t i s t and the modern l i b e r a l have q u i t e o b v i o u s l y come to r e l y i n c r e a s i n g l y on the 89 s t a t e , c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , and h i e r a r c h i c a l 164 b u r e a u c r a c y as a means toward s o c i a l c h a n g e . " I t s h o u l d come as no s u r p r i s e t h a t W o l f f ' s t h e o r y f a i l s to s a t i s f y t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t as w e l l . W o l f f can p r e s e n t no r a t i o n a l method f o r even c o n v i n c i n g autonomous a g e n t s to adopt the a n a r c h i s t i d e a l , l e t a l o n e p r o v i d e them w i t h a s t r a t e g y f o r a t t a i n i n g i t . What i s even more a s t o n i s h i n g i s t h a t W o l f f , as C l a r k summarizes h i s p o s i t i o n , " s e e s no p r a c t i c a l p r o p o s a l s t h a t 16 5 f o l l o w f rom h i s t h e o r e t i c a l a c c e p t a n c e o f a n a r c h i s m . " A c c o r d i n g to C l a r k , " n e v e r b e f o r e . . . has any t h e o r i s t c l a i m i n g to be an a n a r c h i s t p r e s e n t e d no p r o p o s a l s f o r a c t i o n a t a l l . " 1 6 6 In f a c t , i n the same r a d i o i n t e r v i e w i n w h i c h he makes t h i s a d m i s s i o n , W o l f f e x p l i c i t l y i n d i c a t e s h i s e s s e n t i a l agreement w i t h M a r x ' s v iew t h a t i n o r d e r t o b r i n g about a n a r c h y one must f i r s t s t r e n g t h e n , not l e s s e n , the power o f the 1 6 7 s t a t e . Only a v e r y p o w e r f u l and c e n t r a l i z e d s t a t e , i t i s a r g u e d , i s c a p a b l e o f the m a s s i v e r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f the economy and the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e a l t h which p r o v i d e the n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r the c r e a t i o n o f a d e c e n t r a l i z e d , a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y . Genuine a n a r c h i s t s have a lways s t r o n g l y opposed t h i s i d e a " t h a t a n a r c h y or f reedom i s the a i m , but the S t a t e or d i c t a t o r s h i p i s the means. T h e r e f o r e i n o r d e r to e m a n c i p a t e the 1 6 ft masses t h e y must be e n s l a v e d . " F u r t h e r m o r e , a n a r c h i s t s have i n c r e a s i n g l y come to r e j e c t the whole b a s e / s u p e r s t r u c t u r e model and economic r e d u c t i o n i s m upon wh ich the M a r x i s t p o s i t i o n 169 i s b a s e d . P o l i t i c a l power , a n a r c h i s t s a r g u e , i s not m e r e l y 90 the " e x c r e s c e n c e " o f the "economic b a s e , " nor w i l l i t n e c e s s a r i l y d i s a p p e a r w i t h the a b o l i t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s m . I t would be s t r a n g e i n d e e d to d e s c r i b e W o l f f , who s u p p o r t s the M a r x i s t c a l l f o r a p o w e r f u l " t r a n s i t i o n a l " s t a t e t o u s h e r i n the a n a r c h i s t U t o p i a , as an " a n a r c h i s t " i n the a p p r o p r i a t e sense o f the word . We see then t h a t W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y f a i l s to r e a l l y s a t i s f y any of C l a r k ' s f o u r c r i t e r i a f o r an a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y . I t would be a m i s t a k e t o d e s c r i b e e i t h e r W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y or W o l f f h i m s e l f as b e i n g " a n a r c h i s t , " p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d . W o l f f ' s c r i t i c , J e f f r e y R e i m a n , i s r i g h t then to say t h a t W o l f f ' s "mora l a n a r c h i s m b e a r s o n l y the most s u p e r f i c i a l and l a r g e l y 170 m i s l e a d i n g r e s e m b l e n c e to p o l i t i c a l a n a r c h i s m . " As C a r o l e Pateman a r g u e s , W o l f f ' s moral and p o l i t i c a l s c e p t i c i s m r e g a r d i n g the l e g i t i m a c y o f a u t h o r i t y and the o b j e c t i v i t y o f s u b s t a n t i v e moral ends i s a form o f " s c e p t i c i s m wh ich i s i n h e r e n t i n a b s t r a c t l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t l i b e r a l i s m , " but wh ich " fo rms no p a r t o f a p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y o f a n a r c h i s m . " 1 7 1 In the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r I s h a l l s u b j e c t W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y i t s e l f to a more t h o r o u g h g o i n g c r i t i q u e , r e g a r d l e s s o f i t s s t a t u s as an " a n a r c h i s t " t h e o r y . We s h a l l see how w e l l h i s p a r t i c u l a r brand of s c e p t i c i s m h o l d s up as a t h e o r y i n i t s own r i g h t . 91 C h a p t e r IV: Autonomous E t h i c s and I n s t r u m e n t a l Reason I. I n t r o d u c t i o n In t h i s c h a p t e r I p ropose t o c r i t i c i z e both W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y and h i s r e l a t e d i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew o f r e a s o n . I w i l l b e g i n by making some p r e l i m i n a r y remarks r e g a r d i n g W o l f f ' s c o n c e p t o f autonomy. What many o f h i s c r i t i c s found s t a r t l i n g and d i s t i n c t i v e about W o l f f ' s d e f e n c e of a n a r c h i s m was h i s c e n t r a l c l a i m t h a t moral autonomy and p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y a r e c o m p l e t e l y i n c o m p a t i b l e . W o l f f was t a k e n to have d e v e l o p e d an a p r i o r i argument f o r a n a r c h i s m . But even i f t h i s argument were s u c c e s s f u l , and I have argued t h a t i t i s n o t , i t o n l y s u c c e e d s by c o n f u s i n g two d i s t i n c t n o t i o n s : the n o t i o n o f mora 1 autonomy, d e c i d i n g f o r o n e s e l f what one ought to d o , and the n o t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l autonomy, a c t i n g on t h o s e d e c i s i o n s . As many of W o l f f ' s c r i t i c s , n o t a b l y R e i m a n , have a r g u e d , mora l autonomy and the s t a t e a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c o m p a t i b l e . As l o n g as one s u b j e c t i v e l y d e n i e s the " b i n d i n g mora l f o r c e " o f s t a t e l a w s , to use W o l f f ' s own w o r d s , one r e m a i n s m o r a l l y autonomous , no m a t t e r how r i g o r o u s l y one c o m p l i e s w i t h t h o s e 17 2 l a w s . And i t s h o u l d h a r d l y be s u r p r i s i n g t h a t p o l i t i c a l autonomy, the f reedom to a c t as one p l e a s e s , s h o u l d c o n f l i c t w i t h the a u t h o r i t y o f the s t a t e to make and e n f o r c e laws wh ich are d e s i g n e d p r e c i s e l y t o l i m i t such f reedom of a c t i o n . 92 P r o p o n e n t s o f mora l autonomy, i n c l u d i n g the c l a s s i c a l a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s , need not embrace W o l f f ' s p o l i t i c a l autonomy as w e l l . Reiman i s m i s t a k e n t h a t a l l a n a r c h i s t s h o l d t h a t " e v e r y o n e s h o u l d be a l l o w e d [o r i s e n t i t l e d ] to do what he d e t e r m i n e s as h i s mora l d u t y . " T h i s i s c l o s e r to a d e s c r i p t i o n of W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n r a t h e r than the p o s i t i o n o f " p o l i t i c a l " a n a r c h i s t s . To my k n o w l e d g e , none of the m a j o r a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s ( G o d w i n , P r o u d h o n , B a k u n i n , K r o p o t k i n , e t a l ) has e v e r a d v o c a t e d t h a t s t a t e o f f i c i a l s , f o r e x a m p l e , s h o u l d be a l l o w e d or a r e e n t i t l e d to do what t h e y may d e t e r m i n e as t h e i r moral d u t y , namely e n f o r c e the laws o f the s t a t e . R e g a r d i n g W o l f f h i m s e l f , a more a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f h i s p o s i t i o n would be t h a t " e v e r y o n e i s e n t i t l e d to do what i s most i n s t r u m e n t a l l y e f f i c a c i o u s i n r e a l i z i n g h i s or her e n d s . " T h i s s o r t o f p o s i t i o n may l e a d to v e r y u n d e s i r a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s , due t o the p o t e n t i a l f o r c o n f l i c t between a g e n t s who have adopted m u t u a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e g o a l s and p o l i c i e s . Because W o l f f can p r o v i d e no r a t i o n a l method or c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e f o r r e s o l v i n g such c o n f l i c t , one g e t s the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t c o n f l i c t between autonomous a g e n t s i n a W o l f f i a n s t a t e o f n a t u r e can o n l y be r e s o l v e d on the b a s i s of power or f o r c e . As we have s e e n , such c o n f l i c t c a n n o t be r e s o l v e d by means o f r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t . The e x t e n t o f an a g e n t ' s autonomy w i l l then depend on the amount o f power he or she p o s s e s s e s . In t h a t e v e n t , each agent w i l l pose a permanent t h r e a t to each o t h e r a g e n t ' s autonomy. T h i s i s n o t h i n g o t h e r than Hobbes ' s t a t e of p e r p e t u a l war . O ther 93 a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s would do w e l l to a v o i d the s o r t o f mora l 17 3 t h e o r y which y i e l d s such u n p a l a t a b l e c o n c l u s i o n s . W o l f f i a n a g e n t s w i l l l a c k even a m e a n i n g f u l mora l d i s c o u r s e by wh ich to m u t u a l l y r e s o l v e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s . In a W o l f f i a n s t a t e of n a t u r e the meaning of moral c o n c e p t s w i l l be s t r i c t l y r e l a t i v e to each a g e n t ' s s u b j e c t i v e c h o i c e s . 1 7 ^ From a W o l f f i a n p e r s p e c t i v e , what i s m o r a l l y r i g h t , j u s t i f i e d and o b l i g a t o r y f o r an i n d i v i d u a l autonomous a g e n t i s w h a t e v e r i s the most r a t i o n a l and e f f i c i e n t means to h i s o r her e n d s . And t h e s e e n d s , or the " g o o d " f o r each a g e n t , a r e s u b j e c t i v e , n o n r a t i o n a l , and r e l a t i v e to the a g e n t . For W o l f f , i f t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l ground f o r o p p o s i n g s o m e t h i n g , t h e r e i s "no mora l g r o u n d " f o r 17 5 o p p o s i n g i t e i t h e r . Because ends a re a l l e q u a l l y n o n r a t i o n a l , t h e r e can be no r a t i o n a l , and hence no m o r a l , ground f o r o p p o s i n g them. M o r e o v e r , because what i s r a t i o n a l f o r one agent ( i n r e l a t i o n to h i s or her g o a l s ) i s not r a t i o n a l f o r a n o t h e r a g e n t , what i s m o r a l l y " g o o d " and " o b l i g a t o r y " f o r one a g e n t , i n s o f a r as he or she i s to be a u t o n o m o u s , w i l l not be m o r a l l y " g o o d " and " o b l i g a t o r y " f o r a n o t h e r . I n d e e d , i f the o t h e r agent has g o a l s and p o l i c i e s t h a t a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the f o r m e r a g e n t ' s , then what i s m o r a l l y " g o o d , " " r i g h t " and " o b l i g a t o r y " f o r t h a t agent w i l l be m o r a l l y "wrong" and " o b l i g a t o r y " to r e s i s t ( i n o r d e r to p r e s e r v e autonomy) f o r the l a t t e r a g e n t . T h u s , any mora l d i s c o u r s e between autonomous a g e n t s w i l l c o n s i s t o f c o m p e t i n g but i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e and m u t u a l l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e moral c l a i m s . 94 I I . Autonomous " O b l i g a t i o n " and Mora l C o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m I t would be u s e f u l now to t u r n t o an e x a m i n a t i o n o f W o l f f ' s p e c u l i a r n o t i o n o f o b l i g a t i o n and then to e v a l u a t e h i s " m o r a l c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m " i n g e n e r a l . For W o l f f , w h a t e v e r i s the most r a t i o n a l and e f f i c i e n t means f o r a t t a i n i n g an a g e n t ' s n o n r a t i o n a l g o a l s i s o b l i g a t o r y f o r any a g e n t c o m m i t t e d t o r a t i o n a l autonomy. T h u s , W o l f f i a n o b l i g a t i o n s a re p u r e l y i n t e r n a l and s u b j e c t i v e ; they are "owed" o n l y to o n e s e l f . They are a l s o i n v o l u n t a r y , f o r they a re r a t i o n a l l y n e c e s s a r y , f o l l o w i n g f rom the a g e n t ' s s u b j e c t i v e e n d s , r e g a r d l e s s o f whether the agent a c t u a l l y chooses to a c c e p t them. Any agent who r e f u s e s to a c c e p t such " o b l i g a t i o n s " i s not f u l l y r a t i o n a l , and hence f o r f e i t s h i s o r her autonomy. I f the agent c h o o s e s ends which r e q u i r e c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i c i e s , then the agent w i l l have c o n f l i c t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s . B u t , f o r W o l f f , to adopt and a c t on c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i c i e s i s i r r a t i o n a l ; any g e n u i n e mora l c o n f l i c t or c o n f l i c t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s a r e then i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h r a t i o n a l a g e n c y , and h e n c e , autonomy. The autonomous agent must t h e r e f o r e h i e r a r c h i c a l l y o r d e r h i s o r her n o n r a t i o n a l g o a l s , even i f a r b i t r a r i l y , to a v o i d any such c o n f l i c t . T h i s h e l p s e x p l a i n why W o l f f i n v a r i a b l y adopts some form o f c o n s e q u e n t ! ' a l i sm i n h i s own moral d e l i b e r a t i o n s . W o l f f ' s d e n i a l o f the r e a l i t y of mora l c o n f l i c t ( o f c o u r s e , he can s t i l l h o l d t h a t p e o p l e e x p e r i e n c e f e e l i n g s o f mora l 95 c o n f l i c t but such f e e l i n g s a re " i r r a t i o n a l " ) f o l l o w s f rom h i s f a i l u r e to a d e q u a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h h y p o t h e t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s , moral oughts and s e l f - a s s u m e d o b l i g a t i o n s ( s u c h as p r o m i s e s ) . For W o l f f , f rom the h y p o t h e t i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , " g i v e n x as y o u r g o a l , do y , " i t f o l l o w s both t h a t you ought to do y and t h a t you have an o b l i g a t i o n to do y , p r o v i d e d t h a t you are a c o m m i t t e d r a t i o n a l a g e n t . T h u s , i n W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y both " o u g h t " and " o b l i g a t i o n " f u n c t i o n i n the same p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l s e n s e . N e i t h e r can h i s t h e o r y c o n c e i v e of moral d u t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f each a g e n t ' s n o n r a t i o n a l c h o i c e o f e n d s . But t h i s c r e a t e s some s e r i o u s c o n c e p t u a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . By c o n f l a t i n g " o u g h t " and " o b l i g a t i o n , " and by making them both a s h o r t h a n d way o f s a y i n g " g i v e n t h a t you a r e r a t i o n a l and x i s your g o a l , do y , " W o l f f cannot e n v i s a g e a s i t u a t i o n where you c o u l d have an o b l i g a t i o n to do one t h i n g ( b e c a u s e one p r o m i s e d , f o r example ) but t h a t , a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , you ought to do s o m e t h i n g e l s e . I f , a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , you i n s t r u m e n t a l 1 y ought to do one t h i n g , then a c c o r d i n g t o W o l f f ' s moral t h e o r y you s i m p l y d i d not have an o b l i g a t i o n ( o r any o t h e r moral d u t y ) to do the o t h e r . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e t h e n , someone who p r o m i s e s to do someth ing has no o b l i g a t i o n to do so i f some o t h e r c o u r s e o f a c t i o n p roves a more e f f i c i e n t means to the a g e n t ' s e n d s . Thus W o l f f , and o t h e r p r o p o n e n t s o f t h i s v i e w , a re f o r c e d to deny " s u c h o b v i o u s c o n c e p t u a l t r u t h s as t h a t p r o m i s e s c r e a t e o b l i g a t i o n s . " 1 7 6 I t i s s i m p l y p a r t o f the c o n c e p t o f 96 p r o m i s i n g as a s o c i a l p r a c t i c e t h a t p r o m i s e s o b l i g e , a l t h o u g h i n ways t h a t can be o v e r r i d d e n ( i f they d i d not o b l i g e even when they were o v e r r i d d e n t h e y would not r e a l l y be o v e r r i d d e n but v o i d ) . As C a r o l e Pateman puts i t , the "mean ing o f 'I p r o m i s e ' i s not p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e and i n d i v i d u a l but i s s o c i a l and i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e . " 1 7 7 The i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c o n c e p t s and i m p e r s o n a l r u l e s which c o n s t i t u t e the s o c i a l p r a c t i c e o f p r o m i s i n g s t i p u l a t e t h a t someone who makes a p r o m i s e a t the same t ime assumes an o b l i g a t i o n to f u l f i l l t h a t p r o m i s e . Such o b l i g a t i o n s may c o n f l i c t w i t h and be o v e r r i d d e n by o t h e r o b l i g a t o n s , d u t i e s or mora l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and even s e l f - i n t e r e s t ( t o p r o t e c t l i f e and l i m b , f o r e x a m p l e ) , but t h e y remain o b l i g a t i o n s n o n e t h e l e s s . O t h e r w i s e , not o n l y would t h e r e be no b a s i s f o r the mora l c o n f l i c t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p r o m i s e - b r e a k i n g , p r o m i s i n g as i t i s commonly u n d e r s t o o d and p r a c t i c e d would not e x i s t . Peop le c o u l d s t i l l say "I p r o m i s e , " but the meaning would be c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t , s o m e t h i n g l i k e "I w i l l do s o m e t h i n g p r o v i d e d t h a t i t i s the most r a t i o n a l and e f f i c i e n t means t o my e n d s , " r a t h e r than "I p l e d g e m y s e l f t o t h i s c o u r s e o f a c t i o n and w i l l f u l f i l l t h i s p l e d g e w i t h i n g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d mora l l i m i t s . " I f o n e ' s o b l i g a t i o n s a r e a lways s u b o r d i n a t e to what i s most r a t i o n a l f o r o n e s e l f , as d e t e r m i n e d by s e l f - i n t e r e s t ( w h i c h , W o l f f a d m i t s , may be e g o i s t i c or a l t r u i s t i c ) , then o b l i g a t i o n s w i l l s i m p l y have no r e a l , i n t e r p e r s o n a l , b i n d i n g f o r c e . T h i s i n d e e d i s the case w i t h W o l f f i a n " o b l i g a t i o n , " which i s r e a l l y no o b l i g a t i o n a t 97 a l l . The o n l y " o b l i g a t i o n " W o l f f i a n a g e n t s have i s to be r a t i o n a l , d e f i n e d i n an i n s t r u m e n t a l s e n s e , r e g a r d l e s s o f any p r o m i s e s or commitments t h e y may make. T h e i r r a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t o v e r r i d e s a l l e l s e . W o l f f c a n n o t p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t a c c o u n t of o b l i g a t i o n , f o r o b l i g a t i o n a r i s e s f rom v a r i o u s s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , such as p r o m i s i n g , and W o l f f ' s p u r e l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c and a b s t r a c t a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l agency s i m p l y cannot p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t a c c o u n t of any s o c i a l p r a c t i c e , f o r s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s a re c o n s t i t u t e d by i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e meanings and i m p e r s o n a l r u l e s wh ich t r a n s c e n d p u r e , s u b j e c t i v e r a t i o n a l agency and a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e . W o l f f i a n a g e n t s l a c k a common moral v o c a b u l a r y by which to c o n s t i t u t e and s u s t a i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . A l l mora l c o n c e p t s and v a l u e s w i l l be r e l a t i v e t o each a g e n t ' s s u b j e c t i v e , n o n r a t i o n a l g o a l s and c o r r e s p o n d i n g p o l i c i e s . S i m i l a r l y , the " r u l e s " c o n s t i t u t i n g a s o c i a l p r a c t i c e w i l l be d i f f e r e n t f o r each a g e n t , b e i n g the most e f f i c i e n t and r a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s or her g o a l s and o t h e r p o l i c i e s , r a t h e r than i m p e r s o n a l s t a n d a r d s . Even i f a g e n t s c o u l d agree to a b i d e by the same r u l e s , d e s p i t e t h e i r l a c k o f a common mora l v o c a b u l a r y , t h e s e r u l e s w i l l a l w a y s be s u b o r d i n a t e to each a g e n t ' s e n d s . Whenever i t i s r a t i o n a l to b reak the r u l e s , the agent w i l l be " o b l i g a t e d " to do s o . The r u l e s c o n s t i t u t i n g a s o c i a l p r a c t i c e w i l l then have no b i n d i n g f o r c e - - they r e a l l y w o n ' t be r u l e s at a l l . I f the r u l e s a r e b i n d i n g and i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e , t h e y w i l l t h r e a t e n i n d i v i d u a l autonomy j u s t 98 as much as any p o s i t i v e l a w , f o r the agent w i l l be r e q u i r e d to a c t i n ways not a l w a y s r a t i o n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a s p e c i f i c p e r s o n a l g o a l . W o l f f i a n a g e n t s must a l w a y s be s u p e r i o r t o any o b l i g a t i o n s or commitments owed to o t h e r s , whether an i n d i v i d u a l to whom one has made a p r o m i s e o r a p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y to whom one has p r o m i s e d o b e d i e n c e . T h i s e x p l a i n s why when W o l f f a d o p t s a fo rm o f c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , i t i s a fo rm o f a c t - c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m . The n a t u r e o f o b l i g a t i o n s which form a p a r t o f the s o c i a l p r a c t i c e of p r o m i s i n g d i f f e r s m a r k e d l y f rom the n a t u r e o f W o l f f i a n " o b l i g a t i o n . " The o b l i g a t i o n c r e a t e d by a p r o m i s e i s c r e a t e d by a c o n s c i o u s a c t of the a g e n t , r a t h e r than b e i n g an i n v o l u n t a r y s i d e - e f f e c t o f the a g e n t ' s n o n r a t i o n a l c h o i c e o f e n d s . The o b l i g a t i o n i s owed to t h o s e whom one p r o m i s e d , not to o n e s e l f as an autonomous a g e n t . The agent can d e c l i n e to make a p r o m i s e , and thus r e f u s e an o b l i g a t i o n , w i t h o u t t h e r e b y b e i n g i r r a t i o n a l and f o r f e i t i n g h i s or her autonomy. The agent can j u s t i f i a b l y b reak a p r o m i s e i f , a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , he o r she ought to do s o m e t h i n g e l s e . By d i s t i n g u i s h i n g s e l f - a s s u m e d o b l i g a t i o n f rom what an agent ought to d o , a l l t h i n g s 178 c o n s i d e r e d , the r e a l i t y o f moral c o n f l i c t i s p r e s e r v e d . That a g e n t s can f r e e l y assume t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s and break them when n e c e s s a r y , w i t h o u t t h e r e b y b e i n g i r r a t i o n a l , a l s o p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f o r a s c r i b i n g mora l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and c u l p a b i l i t y t o a g e n t s , wh ich W o l f f ' s t h e o r y i s i n c a p a b l e o f d o i n g . W o l f f ' s moral c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m , h i s i d e a t h a t the moral 9 9 p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g a g e n t s ' i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t e r a c t i o n must (and can) be based on unanimous a g r e e m e n t , and t h a t " a l l o b l i g a t i o n s a re grounded i n the c o l l e c t i v e commitments o f a s o c i e t y o f r a t i o n a l a g e n t s , " i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h i s a n a l y s i s of r a t i o n a l agency and h i s c o r r e s p o n d i n g n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l 17 9 " o b l i g a t i o n . " A c c o r d i n g to W o l f f ' s own a n a l y s i s , the a c t of p u b l i c l y c o m m i t t i n g o n e s e l f to a p o l i c y o r a p r a c t i c e , o f v o l u n t a r i l y assuming an o b l i g a t i o n , adds n o t h i n g to the b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r o f the p o l i c y or p r a c t i c e f o r the i n d i v i d u a l agent because any o b l i g a t i o n to a b i d e by a p o l i c y o r p r a c t i c e u l t i m a t e l y depends on the i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t ' s s u b j e c t i v e commitment to the ends wh ich make a d o p t i o n o f the p o l i c y o r p r a c t i c e r a t i o n a l , and hence " o b l i g a t o r y " i n s o f a r as the agent i s to be autonomous . Any " o b l i g a t i o n " to adhere to a p o l i c y or p r a c t i c e i s based on t h e i r e f f i c a c y i n r e a l i z i n g the a g e n t ' s e n d s , not on any p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t . P u b l i c l y and v o l u n t a r i l y assumed o b l i g a t i o n s a r e s u p e r f l o u s to W o l f f ' s a b s t r a c t a n a l y s i s of r a t i o n a l a g e n c y . As W o l f f h i m s e l f a d m i t s , " f i d e l i t y to p r i n c i p l e i s n o t . . . d e d u c i b l e f rom bare f o r m a l 180 r a t i o n a l i t y . " P u b l i c agreements h a v i n g b i n d i n g f o r c e can a l s o t h r e a t e n i n d i v i d u a l autonomy by r e q u i r i n g a g e n t s t o a b i d e by agreements even when i t t u r n s out not t o be r a t i o n a l l y a d v a n t a g e o u s f o r each agent to do s o . W i t h o u t any m e a n i n g f u l i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e mora l n o t i o n s and v a l u e s , w i t h o u t even a c o n c e p t of r a t i o n a l i t y wh ich t r a n s c e n d s i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s and s i t u a t i o n s , i n e f f e c t , w i t h o u t the v e r y 100 n o t i o n s wh ich form the b a s i s of s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , W o l f f i a n a g e n t s s i m p l y w i l l have no m e a n i n g f u l n o t i o n s of what a p r o m i s e , a c o n t r a c t , an agreement or the c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n s a r e . So not o n l y w i l l t h e y be u n a b l e to c o l l e c t i v e l y and r a t i o n a l l y agree to the p u r s u i t o f c e r t a i n g o a l s , t h e y w i l l l a c k the v e r y c o n c e p t u a l a p p a r a t u s by which to make any b i n d i n g agreements w h a t s o e v e r . B a k u n i n c a p t u r e d the e s s e n t i a l a b s u r d i t y of t h i s s o r t o f p o s i t i o n l o n g a g o : How r i d i c u l o u s t h e n a r e t h e i d e a s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s t s of the Jean J a c q u e s R o u s s e a u s c h o o l and o f the P r o u d h o n i a n m u t u a l i s t s who c o n c e i v e s o c i e t y as t h e r e s u l t o f the f r e e c o n t r a c t o f i n d i v i d u a l s a b s o l u t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t o f one a n o t h e r and e n t e r i n g m u t u a l r e l a t i o n s o n l y b e c a u s e o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n drawn up among them. As i f t h e s e men had d r o p p e d f r o m t h e s k i e s , b r i n g i n g w i t h them s p e e c h , w i l l , o r i g i n a l t h o u g h t , and as i f t h e y were a l i e n to a n y t h i n g o f the e a r t h , t h a t i s , a n y t h i n g h a v i n g s o c i a l o r i g i n . H a d s o c i e t y c o n s i s t e d o f s u c h a b s o l u t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e r e w o u l d h a v e b e e n no n e e d , n o r e v e n t h e s l i g h t e s t p o s s i b i l i t y o f them e n t e r i n g i n t o an a s s o c i a t i o n ; s o c i e t y i t s e l f w o u l d be n o n - e x i s t e n t , and t h o s e free_2J!di^vj_dua]_s , not b e i n g a b l e to l i v e and f u n c t i o n upon the e a r t h , w o u l d have to wing t h e i r way back to the h e a v e n l y a b o d e . 181 U l t i m a t e l y , W o l f f ' s "autonomous" a g e n t s a r e l e f t s t r a n d e d i n a n i h i l i s t i c d e s e r t , u n a b l e to engage i n any m e a n i n g f u l mora l d i s c o u r s e or s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s , reduced to t r e a t i n g each o t h e r as m o r a l l y "mute" means to one a n o t h e r ' s a r b i t r a r y e n d s . I t i s a f a r c r y f rom the " r a t i o n a l community" W o l f f o r i g i n a l l y e n v i s a g e d . Not even the C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e can h e l p us h e r e . 101 One l a s t remark needs to be made. Even i f p o s s i b l e , the r e d u c t i o n of a l l human r e l a t i o n s h i p s to c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s u n d e s i r e a b l e and inhuman. There can be no r e a l t r u s t , f r i e n d s h i p , f i d e l i t y , l o v e or r e s p e c t - - i n o t h e r w o r d s , no r e a l community among p e o p l e who must t r e a t each o t h e r as means t o t h e i r ends r a t h e r than as ends i n t h e m s e l v e s . A g a i n , W o l f f ' s c r i t i c i s m s o f N o z i c k can be a p p l i e d t o h i m s e l f . Both " e n c o u r a g e us to t r e a t as a l r e a d y r a t i o n a l i z e d t h o s e s p h e r e s of human e x p e r i e n c e t h a t have not y e t been s u b o r d i n a t e d to the d e h u m a n i z a t i o n of q u a s i - e c o n o m i c r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , and t h a t ought 18 2 to be p r o t e c t e d a t a l l c o s t f rom such s u b o r d i n a t i o n . " I I I . C r i t i q u e o f I n s t r u m e n t a l Reason One o f W o l f f ' s c e n t r a l c l a i m s i s t h a t r e a s o n n e i t h e r r u l e s i n nor r u l e s out any c h o i c e o f e n d s . Now, i f one d e f i n e s r e a s o n i n s t r u m e n t a l l y , as b e i n g s o l e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h d e t e r m i n i n g the most e f f i c i e n t means f o r a t t a i n i n g e n d s , t h e n o f c o u r s e i t f o l l o w s t h a t c h o i c e o f ends must be n o n r a t i o n a l . But u n l e s s one can p r e s e n t an argument f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n , t o d e f i n e r e a s o n i n t h i s way, t h e r e b y showing t h a t c h o i c e o f ends i s n o n r a t i o n a l , i s i n e f f e c t to beg the q u e s t i o n . On the f a c e o f i t , the c l a i m t h a t r e a s o n does not r u l e  out any c h o i c e of ends i s a b s u r d . There a r e many ends wh ich are e i t h e r i m p o s s i b l e to a c h i e v e , u n l i k e l y t o be a c h i e v e d , or s i m p l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e to a s i t u a t i o n . In the case o f i m p o s s i b l e 1 0 2 e n d s , even f rom the p e r s p e c t i v e o f i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n , to choose an end f o r wh ich t h e r e i s no p o s s i b l e means o f a c h i e v e m e n t i s i r r a t i o n a l . I t i s no a c c i d e n t t h a t p e o p l e who choose to be God a r e c o n s i d e r e d not o n l y i r r a t i o n a l , but p o s i t i v e l y i n s a n e . No m a t t e r what p o l i c i e s t h e y a d o p t , t h e y can never a c h i e v e t h e i r g o a l . That they even t h i n k t h e y can a c h i e v e such a goa l (o r i n d e e d , have a l r e a d y a c h i e v e d i t ) shows t h a t they a r e i r r a t i o n a l . One can t h i n k o f l e s s ex t reme examples where an end i s u n a t t a i n a b l e . I t would be i r r a t i o n a l to choose to become a R u s s i a n a r i s t o c r a t , f o r the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t made such a r o l e p o s s i b l e (even i n t e l l i g i b l e ) no l o n g e r e x i s t s . One c o u l d p r e t e n d to be a R u s s i a n a r i t o c r a t , o r an a r i s t o c r a t i n e x i l e , but the a c t u a l r o l e of a l a n d - o w n i n g , s e r f - o w n i n g 18th c e n t u r y R u s s i a n a r i s t o c r a t i s no l o n g e r a v a i l a b l e , and to choose such a r o l e shows t h a t one has not u n d e r s t o o d c e r t a i n f a c t s about the r e a l w o r l d . T h i s i n a b i l i t y to u n d e r s t a n d t h e s e f a c t s , and t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s , i s a s i g n of c o g n i t i v e f a i l u r e , not some s o r t o f poor " v a l u e - j u d g e m e n t . " I t would a l s o be i r r a t i o n a l to adopt g o a l s which one l a c k s the a b i l i t i e s t o a t t a i n . T ry as I m i g h t , I w i l l never be a b l e to w r i t e l i k e T o l s t o y . R e a l i z i n g o n e ' s l i m i t a t i o n s i s as much a s i g n of r a t i o n a l i t y , o f b e i n g a b l e to a p p r e c i a t e c e r t a i n f a c t s about o n e s e l f and about the w o r l d , as i t i s a s i g n of m a t u r i t y . There are some g o a l s w h i c h , a l t h o u g h not s t r i c t l y i m p o s s i b l e , a re so u n l i k e l y to be a c h i e v e d t h a t to adopt them would show such poor judgement t h a t one c o u l d argue t h a t t h e i r 103 a d o p t i o n i s i n f a c t i r r a t i o n a l . For e x a m p l e , g i v e n t h a t I am not a c i t i z e n o f the U . S . A . and t h a t because I am not a n a t i v e born A m e r i c a n I am c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b a r r e d f rom b e i n g P r e s i d e n t , a l t h o u g h i t i s not s t r i c t l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r me to become P r e s i d e n t o f the U . S . A . (I c o u l d be g r a n t e d c i t i z e n s h i p , the C o n s t i t u t i o n c o u l d be c h a n g e d ) , i t i s e x t r e m e l y u n l i k e l y . G i ven t h e s e f a c t s and p r o b a b i l i t i e s , i t would be i r r a t i o n a l f o r me to adopt such a g o a l , f o r the a b i l i t y to make even m o d e r a t e l y s u c c e s s f u l p r e d i c t i o n s about the f u t u r e , and to p l a n a c c o r d i n g l y , i s as much a s i g n of r a t i o n a l i t y as b e i n g a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d c u r r e n t f a c t s and s i t u a t i o n s ( a g a i n , even f rom the v i e w p o i n t o f i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n ) . B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s and H i l a r y Putnam argue t h a t some ends a re g e n e r a l i n n a t u r e ( e . g . " h a v i n g a good t i m e t h i s w e e k e n d " ) , so i t then becomes a q u e s t i o n of d e t e r m i n i n g , i n P u t n a m ' s w o r d s , which " o v e r a l l p a t t e r n o f a c t i v i t y . . . w i l l c o n s t i t u t e an a c c e p t a b l e s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the goa l ( e . g . ' g o i n g to a m o v i e . . . ' ) ; " i n o t h e r w o r d s , which s p e c i f i c g o a l i s a p p r o p r i a t e 183 to the s i t u a t i o n . In t h i s case r e a s o n both r u l e s i n c e r t a i n g o a l s and r u l e s out o t h e r s . W i l l i a m s l i s t s some o t h e r ways g o a l s can be c r i t i c i z e d . The c o s t or e f f o r t i n v o l v e d i n a c h i e v i n g a g o a l may o u t w e i g h the a c t u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a c h i e v i n g i t , o r i t may be so d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y v a l u e d r e l a t i v e to o t h e r v a l u e s t h a t i t s s i n g l e m i n d e d p u r s u i t i s i n d i c a t i v e o f a c e r t a i n k i n d o f i r r a t i o n a l f a n a t i c i s m . P e o p l e may o v e r l o o k o t h e r g o a l s wh ich 104 t h e y c o u l d pursue and f i n d more f u l f i l l i n g . In t h e s e c a s e s , the agent p u r s u e s i n a p p r o p r i a t e g o a l s because o f i g n o r a n c e o f the c o s t s i n v o l v e d , and o f o t h e r , more p r e f e r a b l e ends a v a i l a b l e ; and because o f a f a i l u r e o f i m a g i n a t i o n . The agent f a i l s t o i m a g i n e a l l o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to him o r h e r , o r the agent f a i l s to p r o p e r l y imag ine the degree o f s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t w i l l be o b t a i n e d upon a c h i e v i n g a g o a l . T h u s , as Putnam n o t e s , " t h e a b i l i t y to r a t i o n a l l y c r i t i c i z e o n e ' s own g o a l s (and t h o s e of o t h e r s ) may depend j u s t as much on o n e ' s i m a g i n a t i o n as on o n e ' s a b i l i t y to a c c e p t t r u e s t a t e m e n t s and d i s b e l i e v e f a l s e o n e s . " 1 8 4 There i s one l a s t sense i n which g o a l s can be s a i d t o be i r r a t i o n a l . Putnam argues t h a t g o a l s a r e i r r a t i o n a l i f the a c c e p t a n c e and p u r s u i t o f them l e a d s a g e n t s e i t h e r " t o o f f e r c r a z y and f a l s e arguments f o r them ( i f one a c c e p t s the t a s k o f j u s t i f y i n g them w i t h i n our normal c o n c e p t u a l s c h e m e ) , or e l s e . . . to adopt an a l t e r n a t i v e scheme f o r r e p r e s e n t i n g o r d i n a r y m o r a l - d e s c r i p t i v e f a c t s ( e . g . t h a t someone i s c o m p a s s i o n a t e ) 185 which i s i r r a t i o n a l . " For e x a m p l e , a N a z i who t r i e s t o argue t h a t h i s or her " g o a l s are m o r a l l y r i g h t and g o o d . . . w i l l a s s e r t a l l k i n d s of f a l s e ' f a c t u a l ' p r o p o s i t i o n s , e . g . t h a t the d e m o c r a c i e s a r e run by a ' J e w i s h c o n s p i r a c y ' ; and he w i l l advance mora l p r o p o s i t i o n s ( e . g . t h a t , i f one i s an ' A r y a n , ' one has a d u t y t o s u b j u g a t e n o n - A r y a n r a c e s to the ' m a s t e r r a c e ' ) IOC f o r wh ich he has no good a r g u m e n t . " The N a z i can renounce our normal c o n c e p t u a l scheme, but by d o i n g so w i l l have to adopt 105 an a l t e r n a t i v e scheme wh ich i s i r r a t i o n a l , i n the sense t h a t i t w i l l be an " i n a d e q u a t e , u n p e r s p i c o u s , r e p u l s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 187 of i n t e r p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l f a c t s . " Putnam a d m i t s t h a t " ' i n a d e q u a t e , u n p e r s p i c o u s , r e p u l s i v e ' r e f l e c t v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s , " but he a rgues t h a t " t h e c h o i c e o f a c o n c e p t u a l scheme n e c e s s a r i l y r e f l e c t s v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s , and the c h o i c e of a c o n c e p t u a l scheme i s what c o g n i t i ve r a t i o n a l i t y i s a l l 188 a b o u t . " T h i s i s because w i t h o u t a " c o n c e p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y one o b j e c t i v e l y ought to h a v e . . . the n o t i o n o f a ' f a c t ' i s e m p t y , " f o r our n o t i o n of a ' f a c t ' i s based on " t h e c o g n i t i v e v a l u e s o f c o h e r e n c e , s i m p l i c i t y , and i n s t r u m e n t a l e f f i c a c y , " and " t h e s e c o g n i t i v e v a l u e s a r e a r b i t r a r y c o n s i d e r e d as a n y t h i n g but a p a r t o f a h o l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f human 189 f l o u r i s h i n g . " T h u s , " t h e o r y of t r u t h p r e s u p p o s e s t h e o r y of r a t i o n a l i t y wh ich i n t u r n p r e s u p p o s e s our t h e o r y o f the g o o d , " which " i s i t s e l f dependent upon a s s u m p t i o n s about human n a t u r e , about s o c i e t y , about the u n i v e r s e , " and w h i c h i s r e v i s a b l e as 190 t h o s e a s s u m p t i o n s change and our knowledge i n c r e a s e s . In the case o f the N a z i , h i s or her v a l u e s l e a d to a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f what we r e g a r d as the f a c t s . A N a z i w i l l use d e s c r i p t i v e terms l i k e " c o m p a s s i o n a t e , " " c o n s i d e r a t e , " " d i s h o n e s t " and so on c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t l y than we d o , so t h a t i n " a l m o s t a l l i n t e r p e r s o n a l s i t u a t i o n s , the d e s c r i p t i o n we g i v e of the f a c t s w i l l be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f rom the d e s c r i p t i o n [ N a z i s ] g i v e of the f a c t s . Even i f none o f the s t a t e m e n t s they make about the s i t u a t i o n are f a l s e , t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n 106 w i l l not be one t h a t we w i l l count as a d e q u a t e or 191 p e r s p i c u o u s . " D i s r e g a r d i n g any d i s a g r e e m e n t we may have w i t h the N a z i s o v e r v a l u e s , "we c o u l d not r e g a r d t h e i r t o t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the human w o r l d as f u l l y r a t i o n a l l y 192 a c c e p t a b l e . " Those who c l a i m t h a t r e a s o n i t s e l f i s r e l a t i v e must remain s i l e n t , f o r to make any r a t i o n a l and i n t e l l i g i b l e s t a t e m e n t the s p e a k e r must adopt an i d i o m w h i c h p r e s u p p o s e s a c e r t a i n c o n c e p t of r e a s o n , w h i c h i m p l i c i t l y makes c e r t a i n c l a i m s about f a c t s , t r u t h , and so o n . W o l f f ' s a t t e m p t to reduce moral r e a s o n t o i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n f a i l s , f o r the l a t t e r embodies w i t h i n i t c e r t a i n v a l u e s . Reason and m o r a l i t y a r e i n e x t r i c a b l e , but not r e d u c i b l e to one a n o t h e r . And to adopt a c e r t a i n mode o f r e a s o n o r c o n c e p t u a l scheme i s to adopt a c e r t a i n g e n e r a l mora l o u t l o o k . In t h e case of i n s t r u m e n t a l i s m , i t i s to adopt some s o r t o f c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m , as W o l f f r e p e a t e d l y but u n w i t t i n g l y shows . For W o l f f , i n s t r u m e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y and m o r a l i t y a r e u l t i m a t e l y one and the same t h i n g . Whatever i s r a t i o n a l f o r an autonomous agent i s mora l and o b l i g a t o r y f o r t h a t a g e n t , i n s o f a r as he o r she i s autonomous . And what i s r a t i o n a l f o r an agent i s what i s the most e f f i c i e n t means to the a g e n t ' s n o n r a t i o n a l e n d s . For W o l f f t h e n , " e f f i c i e n c y " i s both a d e s c r i p t i v e and an e v a l u a t i v e term which can be used to j u s t i f y a c t i o n . By e l e v a t i n g the c o n c e p t o f " e f f i c i e n c y " to such a h i g h p l a c e i n h i s mora l t h e o r y , W o l f f i m p l i c i t l y downgrades o t h e r c o n c e p t s , a s s e r t i n g the i m p o r t a n c e and v a l u e o f e f f i c i e n c y o v e r them. 107 But i s what i s most e f f i c i e n t n e c e s s a r i l y what i s most r a t i o n a l ? Only i f one has a l r e a d y adopted a c r u d e form o f c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s m . W o l f f a l s o i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s an o b j e c t i v e , r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n between an end and the means f o r a c h i e v i n g i t . T h u s , once one has chosen o n e ' s e n d , a l l t h a t r e m a i n s i s to d e t e r m i n e the most e f f i c i e n t means f o r a c h i e v i n g i t , and t h i s can be done i n a p r e c i s e and even s c i e n t i f i c manner . But j u s t as our c o n c e p t of r e a s o n i m p l i c i t l y assumes v a r i o u s v a l u e s , so our c h o i c e of means w i l l depend on and e x p r e s s our v a l u e s . E a t i n g human meat may be a v e r y e f f i c i e n t means f o r s a t i s f y i n g o n e ' s h u n g e r , but we would r e g a r d such a c t i o n as e x p r e s s i n g a s t r a n g e s e n s i b i l i t y and a warped mora l o u t l o o k . In any s i t u a t i o n t h e r e w i l l be a m u l t i t u d e o f ways by which p e o p l e can a t t a i n t h e i r g o a l s , but the s p e c i f i c c o u r s e s of a c t i o n t h e y do adopt w i l l be d e t e r m i n e d by a whole s e t o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , based on t h e i r g e n e r a l mora l o u t l o o k , v a l u e s and c o n c e p t u a l a b i l i t i e s . There i s no s i n g l e , o b j e c t i v e " r a t i o n a l c o n n e c t i o n " between ends and means j u s t w a i t i n g to be d i scove red . The s o r t o f mora l o u t l o o k which e m p h a s i z e s e f f i c i e n c y i n i t s a c c o u n t o f r a t i o n a l (and m o r a l ) a g e n c y , and wh ich t r e a t s ends as n o n r a t i o n a l , p r e c l u d i n g any i n t e l l i g e n t d e b a t e o v e r a n y t h i n g o f moral i m p o r t a n c e , i s t y p i c a l o f modern b u r e a u c r a t i c , 193 t e c h n o c r a t i c s o c i e t y , s o c i a l i s t or c a p i t a l i s t . I t i s not so much the mode of p r o d u c t i o n i n modern s o c i e t y , but i t s i n s t r u m e n t a l mode o f r e a s o n which d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t f rom o t h e r 108 forms of s o c i e t y . And i t i s t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y modern mode of reason wh ich W o l f f a r t i c u l a t e s . Why s h o u l d we adopt such a n a r r o w , and i r o n i c a l l y , f a i r l y u s e l e s s , c o n c e p t o f r e a s o n ? As Putnam puts i t , " t o be s u r e i t i s o f v a l u e t o have an i n s t r u m e n t t h a t h e l p s us s e l e c t e f f i c i e n t means f o r the a t t a i n m e n t o f our v a r i o u s e n d s ; but i t i s a l s o v a l u a b l e to know what ends we 194 s h o u l d c h o o s e . " 109 C o n c l u s i o n : W h i t h e r A n a r c h i s m ? U l t i m a t e l y , R o b e r t Pau l W o l f f ' s d e f e n c e o f a n a r c h i s m must be j u d g e d an a m b i t i o u s f a i l u r e . The o r i g i n a l i t y o f h i s argument l a y i n h i s a t t e m p t to d e m o n s t r a t e the i l l e g i t i m a c y o f the s t a t e t h r o u g h a p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l , a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s of autonomy and p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y and the a l l e g e d i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between them. But f rom the f a i l u r e o f W o l f f ' s p a r t i c u l a r argument n e i t h e r the l e g i t i m a c y of the s t a t e nor the f a l s i t y of a n a r c h i s m i n g e n e r a l f o l l o w . The s t a t e r e q u i r e s an i n d e p e n d e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n (whether such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n has been s u c c e s s f u l l y p r o v i d e d by any p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r i s a q u e s t i o n t h a t c a n n o t be answered h e r e ) . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , t h e r e a r e a l t e r n a t i v e d e f e n c e s of a n a r c h i s m which may d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y enough f rom W o l f f ' s a p p r o a c h to l e a v e open the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , because t h e y do not s u f f e r f rom the same d e f e c t s as h i s t h e o r y d o e s , t h e y may be more s u c c e s s f u l . In t h i s c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r I would l i k e to s k e t c h out some of the l e s s o n s to be l e a r n e d f rom the f a i l u r e o f W o l f f ' s argument f o r t h o s e i n t e r e s t e d i n d e f e n d i n g an a n a r c h i s t p o s i t i o n and to i n d i c a t e , somewhat c u r s o r i l y , some a l t e r n a t i v e approaches to a n a r c h i s m which may be b e t t e r a b l e to d e a l w i t h the prob lems upon wh ich W o l f f ' s argument f o u n d e r e d . What must be i m m e d i a t e l y b rought i n t o q u e s t i o n i s the 110 p l a u s i b i l i t y and v i a b i l i t y o f any d e f e n c e o f a n a r c h i s m based on an i n s i s t e n c e on the a b s o l u t e i n v i o l a b i l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, c o n c e i v e d i n W o l f f i a n terms as a b s o l u t e i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y of t h o u g h t and of a c t i o n . T h i s i s a c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o i n t , f o r i t i s commonly assumed t h a t a l l a n a r c h i s t s , not j u s t W o l f f , a d v o c a t e a b s o l u t e i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y c o n c e i v e d i n s i m i l a r t e r m s , and t h a t t h e i r c r i t i q u e of government and the s t a t e i s based on a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y uncompromis ing o p p o s i t i o n to any l i m i t a t i o n imposed on t h i s a b s o l u t e l i b e r t y . Yet such an ext reme form of 1 i b e r t a r i a n i s m seems m a n i f e s t l y i m p l a u s i b l e , f o r i t appears t o assume t h a t a b s o l u t e l y f r e e i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l not s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n or i n f r i n g e one a n o t h e r ' s l i b e r t y , and t h i s a s s u m p t i o n i n t u r n a p p e a r s to r e s t on e q u a l l y i m p l a u s i b l e v iews of human n a t u r e , o v e r l y o p t i m i s t i c e v a l u a t i o n s o f human r a t i o n a l i t y and c o o p e r a t i v e t e n d e n c i e s , an u n r e a l i s t i c f a i t h i n s p o n t a n e i t y , a s s u m p t i o n s o f a n a t u r a l harmony o f i n t e r e s t s once the s t a t e (and perhaps c a p i t a l i s m ) i s a b o l i s h e d , and o t h e r q u e s t i o n a b l e v i e w s . A n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s have a t t e m p t e d t o answer t h e s e s o r t s of o b j e c t i o n s i n a v a r i e t y o f ways. Some a n a r c h i s t s have d e n i e d t h a t t h e r e i s any such t h i n g as a f i x e d , immutab le "human n a t u r e , " a r g u i n g i n s t e a d t h a t how p e o p l e t h i n k and a c t i s l a r g e l y d e t e r m i n e d by t h e i r e n v i r o m e n t . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e the " p r o b l e m f o r a n a r c h i s t s i s to c r e a t e the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s under wh ich the l i b e r t a r i a n r a t h e r than the a u t h o r i t a r i a n ( o r , i n some c a s e s , the c o o p e r a t i v e r a t h e r than the c o m p e t i t i v e ) 111 c a p a c i t i e s o f p e o p l e a re r e a l i z e d . " O t h e r a n a r c h i s t s , most n o t a b l y K r o p o t k i n , have not d e n i e d t h a t t h e r e i s such a t h i n g as human n a t u r e but r a t h e r have argued t h a t human b e i n g s have a n a t u r a l p r o p e n s i t y f o r g r e g a r i o u s and c o o p e r a t i v e b e h a v i o u r which w e l l s u i t s them f o r l i f e i n an a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y but which 1 9 6 a l s o tends t o a t r o p h y i n s t a t i s t , b u r e a u c r a t i c s o c i e t i e s . More r e c e n t l y Noam Chomsky, d r a w i n g on h i s work i n l i n g u i s t i c s , has c r i t i c i z e d the v iews o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l d e t e r m i n i s t s and de fended a v iew o f human n a t u r e which e m p h a s i z e s i n t r i n s i c human c a p a c i t i e s and p o t e n t i a l f o r the f r e e , c r e a t i v e , r a t i o n a l and c o o p e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y upon which a v i a b l e a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y w i l l 1 9 7 to a l a r g e e x t e n t d e p e n d . On a more c o n c e p t u a l l e v e l , M i c h a e l T a y l o r has argued i n a game t h e o r e t i c a n a l y s i s o f r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o Hobbes , i n the absence of government v o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n may be a r a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y , and some e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h c o n d u c t e d by R o b e r t 1 9 8 A x e l r o d t e n d s to s u p p o r t T a y l o r ' s h y p o t h e s i s . The v i a b i l i t y o f any o f t h e s e a p p r o a c h e s r e m a i n s open t o c o n s i d e r a b l e debate b u t , even assuming t h a t some o f them a r e s u c c e s s f u l , f o r a n a r c h i s t s then to deny the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t a l t o g e t h e r i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y would not be v e r y c o n v i n c i n g , and i n f a c t none of the above m e n t i o n e d w r i t e r s , i n c l u d i n g K r o p o t k i n , c a t e g o r i c a l l y deny the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y . But once a n a r c h i s t s do a d m i t such a p o s s i b i l i t y s e r i o u s prob lems a r i s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f a n a r c h i s t s a r e the u n c o m p r o m i s i n g l i b e r t a r i a n s t h e y a r e o f t e n 1 1 2 p o r t r a y e d as b e i n g . To remain c o n s i s t e n t l y l i b e r t a r i a n a n a r c h i s t s must put f o r w a r d p l a u s i b l e p r o p o s a l s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h c o n f l i c t i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y which w i l l e i t h e r somehow p r e s e r v e a b s o l u t e i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y o r , b a r r i n g t h a t , m a i n t a i n the maximum amount of i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y p o s s i b l e w i t h the minimum amount o f c o e r c i o n n e c e s s a r y . W o l f f , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , argued t h a t c o n f l i c t c o u l d be a v o i d e d t h r o u g h the d e v i c e o f unanimous c o l l e c t i v e agreement b u t , due to h i s s c e p t i c a l moral t h e o r y and h i s u n c o m p r o m i s i n g commitment to i n d i v i d u a l autonomy, he was u n a b l e to p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t a c c o u n t of such a s o c i a l p r a c t i c e and the e n s u i n g o b l i g a t i o n s . Shou ld c o n f l i c t a c t u a l l y a r i s e , no c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e or r a t i o n a l method can be d e r i v e d f rom W o l f f ' s mora l t h e o r y to d e a l w i t h i t o t h e r than on the b a s i s o f each i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t ' s s e l f - i n t e r e s t . On t h a t b a s i s i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t s can e a s i l y j u s t i f y the i n f r i n g e m e n t o f o t h e r a g e n t ' s autonomy, t h e r e b y e x a c e r b a t i n g c o n f l i c t r a t h e r than f a i r l y r e s o l v i n g i t . O ther a n a r c h i s t s have a l s o a d v o c a t e d v a r i o u s forms o f v o l u n t a r y c o n t r a c t or f r e e agreement f o r the v o l u n t a r y , n o n - c o e r c i v e c o o r d i n a t i o n and o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s o c i a l a c t i v i t y and communal l i f e i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y . Assuming t h a t such l i b e r t a r i a n means o f s o c i a l c o o r d i n a t i o n , i f s u c c e s s f u l , w i l l l e s s e n the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t a r i s i n g i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y , a n a r c h i s t s must s t i l l be a b l e to p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t a c c o u n t o f these k i n d s o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . T h i s w i l l r e q u i r e a more 113 s u b s t a n t i v e and i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e a c c o u n t o f mora l r e a s o n than t h a t o f f e r e d by W o l f f . I t w i l l a l s o r e q u i r e l e s s emphas is on a b s o l u t e i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y and a l e s s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , a b s t r a c t a n a l y s i s , f o r f rom an a b s t r a c t , i n d i v i d u a l i s t p e r s p e c t i v e any s o r t of o b l i g a t i o n may appear as an u n j u s t i f i e d r e s t r a i n t on a b s o l u t e i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y or autonomy. For e x a m p l e , W i l l i a m G o d w i n , whose a n a r c h i s m , as C a r o l e Pateman has p o i n t e d o u t , s h a r e s many a f f i n i t i e s w i t h W o l f f ' s , a r g u e s on t h i s b a s i s t h a t " e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s u s u a l l y u n d e r s t o o d by the term c o - o p e r a t i o n i s , i n some d e g r e e , an e v i l , " and t h a t " p r o m i s e s a r e , a b s o l u t e l y c o n s i d e r e d , an e v i l , " f o r t h e y " s t a n d i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the 199 genu ine and wholesome e x e r c i s e of an i n t e l l e c t u a l n a t u r e . " L a t e r a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s , such as P r o u d h o n , B a k u n i n , K r o p o t k i n and B o o k c h i n , have taken a l e s s i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a p p r o a c h , a r g u i n g t h a t i t i s o n l y t h r o u g h v a r i o u s forms of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n a community t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s d e v e l o p both s e l f - a w a r e n e s s and mora l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Some forms o f c o o p e r a t i o n and o b l i g a t i o n , they a r g u e , a r e a n e c e s s a r y p a r t o f s o c i a l l i f e . 2 0 0 More p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y a c u t e work has been done r e c e n t l y on t h e s e themes by C a r o l e P a t e m a n , who f o c u s e s d i r e c t l y on the p r o b l e m of p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n and s e l f - a s s u m e d 2 0 1 o b l i g a t i o n , e x e m p l i f i e d by p r o m i s i n g , i n g e n e r a l . She a rgues t h a t , c o n t r a r y to Godwin and W o l f f , a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p r o m i s i n g as a s o c i a l p r a c t i c e not o n l y r e v e a l s t h a t p r o m i s e s o b l i g e , but t h a t p r o m i s i n g p r e s u p p o s e s " i n d i v i d u a l 2 0 2 autonomy, or f r e e , c r i t i c a l judgement and c h o i c e . " These 114 " c r e a t i v e moral and s o c i a l c a p a c i t i e s " i n t u r n " p r e s u p p o s e , and i n p r a c t i c e , can o n l y be e x e r c i s e d and d e v e l o p e d as a p a r t o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n c l u d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f o b l i g a t i o n . " 2 0 3 Pateman f u r t h e r a rgues t h a t the p o l i t i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t o f p r o m i s i n g i s " d i r e c t or p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a t i c v o t i n g . , | 2 0 4 Pateman makes two f u r t h e r c l a i m s o f p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r a n a r c h i s t s . She a rgues t h a t p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n so c o n c e i v e d " c a n n o t be g i v e n e x p r e s s i o n w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f l i b e r a l d e m o c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s " of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government and the s t a t e , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t to " t a k e s e l f - a s s u m e d o b l i g a t i o n s e r i o u s l y as a p o l i t i c a l i d e a l i s to deny t h a t the a u t h o r i t y of the l i b e r a l d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e and the ( h y p o t h e s i z e d ) 20 5 p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n of i t s c i t i z e n s can be j u s t i f i e d . " Pateman a r g u e s t h a t t h i s " v i e w of ' p o l i t i c a l ' o b l i g a t i o n as a h o r i z o n t a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between c i t i z e n s " not o n l y " c a n n o t be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h a l i b e r a l c o n c e p t i o n o f the ' p o l i t i c a l ' . . . i t p r e s u p p o s e s a n o n - s t a t i s t p o l i t i c a l community as a p o l i t i c a l 206 a s s o c i a t i o n o f a m u l t i p l i c i t y of p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s . " T h i s , a r g u a b l y , i s a form of a n a r c h y - - t h a t i s i f we r e c o g n i z e , as C a r o l e Pateman d o e s , t h a t " a n a r c h i s m i s not a t h e o r y o f the chaos w i t h which ' a n a r c h y ' i s p o p u l a r l y e q u a t e d , but a t h e o r y of a s p e c i f i c form o f s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t i s , as i t 207 must b e , o r d e r e d and r u l e - g o v e r n e d . " These are c l e a r l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l c l a i m s . However , a l t h o u g h a c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of Pa teman 's a rguments cannot be e n t e r e d 115 i n t o h e r e , i f s u c c e s s f u l they p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n , d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n which a n a r c h i s t s can u t i l i z e t o p r o v i d e an a c c o u n t of the s e l f - a s s u m e d o b l i g a t i o n , f r e e agreement and v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n which w i l l o r d e r s o c i a l l i f e i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y . Her arguments a l s o p r o v i d e a n a r c h i s t s w i t h an a l t e r n a t i v e c r i t i q u e of the l i b e r a l d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e w h i c h does not s h a r e W o l f f ' s a b s t r a c t , i n d i v i d u a l i s t a s s u m p t i o n s , and the c o n s e q u e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p r a c t i c a l p rob lems wh ich f o l l o w f rom them ( P a t e m a n ' s a r g u m e n t s , o f c o u r s e , may s u f f e r f rom o t h e r d e f i c i e n c e s ) . But a g a i n , even i f we were to assume t h a t P a t e m a n ' s arguments a r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o r r e c t , the p r o b l e m of how a n a r c h i s t s p ropose to d e a l w i t h s o c i a l c o n f l i c t s h o u l d i t a r i s e r e m a i n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f , as Pateman a r g u e s , " t h e p r a c t i c e o f s e l f - a s s u m e d o b l i g a t i o n i s m e a n i n g l e s s w i t h o u t the p r a c t i c a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f the r i g h t o f m i n o r i t i e s to r e f u s e or w i t h d r a w 208 c o n s e n t , o r where n e c e s s a r y , to d i s o b e y . " Pateman a r g u e s t h a t t h r o u g h the deve lopment of a common p o l i t i c a l m o r a l i t y or c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e much c o n f l i c t can be r e s o l v e d i n a m u t u a l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e f a s h i o n . What remains e s s e n t i a l l y a n a r c h i s t i n P a t e m a n ' s a p p r o a c h i s t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l , s h a r i n g a common moral v o c a b u l a r y , s o c i a l e d u c a t i o n and v a l u e s w i t h o t h e r members of the communi t y , i s deemed competent to j udge when d i s o b e d i e n c e i s n e c e s s a r y and j u s t i f i e d . A n a r c h i s t s t h e m s e l v e s have more s t r o n g l y a d v o c a t e d the use of d i r e c t a c t i o n as w e l l as c i v i l 116 d i s o b e d i e n c e . Both a p p r o a c h e s w i l l p r o v o k e c h a r g e s of a r b i t r a r i n e s s , v i g i l a n t i s m , m o b - r u l e and so o n . D i s r e g a r d i n g t h e s e i m p o r t a n t o b j e c t i o n s , which cannot be d e a l t w i t h i n t h i s s h o r t c o n c l u s i o n , i t would be u s e f u l to f o c u s on how a n a r c h i s t s p ropose to d e a l w i t h p e r s o n s who engage i n b e h a v i o r i n j u r i o u s to the community and c o n t r a r y to a n a r c h i s t i d e a l s . A c a r e f u l r e a d i n g o f a n a r c h i s t w r i t i n g s w i l l r e v e a l t h a t a n a r c h i s t s a d v o c a t e the use of c o e r c i v e s o c i a l c o n t r o l s - -n a m e l y , p u b l i c c e n s u r e and the t h r e a t of w i t h d r a w a l of c o o p e r a t i o n - - to m a i n t a i n s o c i a l o r d e r i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y . Some a n a r c h i s t s s u p p o r t the use of v i o l e n c e but o n l y as a means of s e l f - d e f e n c e . M i c h a e l T a y l o r has a rgued t h a t the s o r t s o f s o c i a l c o n t r o l s a d v o c a t e d by a n a r c h i s t s a r e , j u d g i n g f rom the a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e , n e c e s s a r y f o r the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f s o c i a l o r d e r i n a n a r c h i c c o m m u n i t i e s , and t h a t such s o c i a l c o n t r o l s can o n l y f u n c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of a r o u g h l y e g a l i t a r i a n community where r e l a t i o n s between p e o p l e are 210 " d i r e c t and m a n y - s i d e d . " B u t , even a s s u m i n g the p r a c t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y o f such a scheme, by a d v o c a t i n g v a r i o u s forms of c o e r c i v e s o c i a l c o n t r o l a n a r c h i s t s seem to be i n v o l v e d i n some g l a r i n g i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . Not o n l y would one e x p e c t them t o show why t h e s e forms o f c o e r c i v e s o c i a l c o n t r o l a r e s u p e r i o r to and more a c c e p t a b l e than the forms of c o e r c i v e s o c i a l c o n t r o l u t i l i z e d by the s t a t e , but one would a l s o l i k e to know how the advocacy o f c o e r c i v e s o c i a l c o n t r o l s can be made c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the a n a r c h i s t s ' p u r p o r t e d commitment to a b s o l u t e i n d i v i d u a l 117 11b e r t y . In a v e r y c o n t r o v e r s i a l a r g u m e n t , A l a n R i t t e r has a t t e m p t e d 211 to answer both o f t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . R i t t e r a rgues t h a t the a p p a r e n t c o n f l i c t i n a n a r c h i s t w r i t i n g s between p r a i s e f o r l i b e r t y and s u p p o r t f o r c o e r c i v e s o c i a l c o n t r o l s ( R i t t e r f o c u s e s on p u b l i c c e n s u r e ) can be r e s o l v e d once we see t h a t both p l a y i m p o r t a n t r o l e s i n r e a l i z i n g the a n a r c h i s t s ' t r u e i d e a l , "communal i n d i v i d u a l i t y , " which R i t t e r d e f i n e s as a c o m b i n a t i o n of " t h e g r e a t e s t i n d i v i d u a l deve lopment w i t h the g r e a t e s t 212 communal u n i t y . " R i t t e r f u r t h e r a rgues t h a t due to the e g a l i t a r i a n and d i f f u s e s t r u c t u r e of a n a r c h i s t s o c i a l c o n t r o l s , and because the w e l l - d e v e l o p e d i n d i v i d u a l s i n a n a r c h i s t c o m m u n i t i e s w i l l be "more amenable to r e a s o n e d a r g u m e n t , " the l i t t l e c o e r c i o n t h a t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n s o c i a l o r d e r i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y w i l l be m i l d e r , l e s s c o e r c i v e , and t h e r e f o r e more l i b e r t a r i a n than the forms o f s o c i a l c o n t r o l u t i l i z e d by the s t a t e , p a r t i c u l a r l y l e g a l s a n c t i o n s and 213 i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p u n i s h m e n t . R i t t e r c l a i m s t h a t " l e g a l government i s p r e v e n t e d by the i n e s c a p a b l e g e n e r a l i t y and permanence o f i t s c o n t r o l s f rom t a k i n g as much advantage as a n a r c h y can o f the p o t e n t i a l o f f e r e d by communal i n d i v i d u a l i t y f o r d i m i n i s h i n g c o e r c i o n t h r o u g h the g i v i n g o f s p e c i f i c r e a s o n s " f o r e n g a g i n g or r e f r a i n i n g from a c e r t a i n c o u r s e o f a c t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t " a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y must be deemed more f r e e . " 2 1 4 D i s r e g a r d i n g the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f R i t t e r ' s argument t h a t 118a n a r c h y i s more f r e e than l e g a l government based on the r u l e o f law (wh ich i s q u i t e d i s t i n c t f rom p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy wh ich i s o f t e n c r i t i c i z e d because i t i s not based on the r u l e o f law and i s t h e r e f o r e i n danger of becoming c o m p l e t e l y a r b i t r a r y ) , R i t t e r ' s c e n t r a l t h e s i s r e g a r d i n g communal i n d i v i d u a l i t y c o n t a i n s a c r u c i a l i n s i g h t f o r the p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y as i t was o r i g i n a l l y d e v e l o p e d by such t h i n k e r s as G o d w i n , P r o u d h o n , B a k u n i n and K r o p o t k i n . I f , as R i t t e r a r g u e s , the c e n t r a l c o n c e p t i n n o r m a t i v e a n a r c h i s t t h e o r y and c r i t i c i s m i s communal i n d i v i d u a l i t y r a t h e r than l i b e r t y or autonomy, the e n t i r e t h r u s t , s t r u c t u r e and n a t u r e o f t r a d i t i o n a l a n a r c h i s t argument w i l l d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y f rom W o l f f ' s a b s t r a c t , c o n c e p t u a l a p p r o a c h . I n s t e a d o f c o u c h i n g a n a r c h i s t arguments i n terms o f a c o n c e p t u a l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between i n d i v i d u a l autonomy and p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y , as W o l f f d o e s , the a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d c l a s s i c a l a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s argue i n a more h i s t o r i c a l , c o n c r e t e and s u b s t a n t i v e f a s h i o n t h a t the s t a t e , due to i t s v e r y s t r u c t u r e , i s d e s t r u c t i v e of human community and e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y (by p r o t e c t i n g s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s which t h e m s e l v e s are a l i e n a t i n g , e x p l o i t a t i v e or o p p r e s s i v e ) f r u s t r a t e s the f u l l deve lopment o f human i n d i v i d u a l i t y . T h u s , the a n a r c h i s t v i s i o n o f the i d e a l s o c i e t y and a n a r c h i s t c r i t i c i s m o f e x i s t i n g s o c i e t y a r e based l e s s on an a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t o f autonomy and more on a s u b s t a n t i v e and b r o a d e r c o n c e p t o f human f l o u r i s h i n g , wh ich i n c l u d e s n o t i o n s of r a t i o n a l a g e n c y , autonomy, s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n and 119 n o n - d o m i n a t i n g communi ty . T h i s t r a d i t i o n o f a n a r c h i s t t h o u g h t i s then c o n c e r n e d " p r i m a r i l y about the q u a l i t y o f r e l a t i o n s between p e o p l e , " or i n a more c l a s s i c a l v e i n , about what 215 c o n s t i t u t e s the good l i f e and the good s o c i e t y . I would argue t h a t t h i s i s the most p r o m i s i n g a p p r o a c h to be t a k e n by t h o s e i n t e r e s t e d i n d e f e n d i n g an a n a r c h i s t p o s i t i o n , b e i n g b e t t e r a b l e to d e a l w i t h c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f s o c i a l l i f e and the human c o n d i t i o n than the a b s t r a c t t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s of W o l f f . A s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n c e of a n a r c h i s m on t h i s b a s i s would need to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t communal i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s i t s e l f a c o h e r e n t and r e a l i z a b l e i d e a l , t h a t the s t a t e and v a r i o u s o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s and p r a c t i c e s which a n a r c h i s t s oppose a r e i n i m i c a l to communal i n d i v i d u a l i t y , and t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e forms of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and s o c i a l c o n t r o l a d v o c a t e d by a n a r c h i s t s a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h , or more s t r o n g l y , n e c e s s a r y f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n of communal i n d i v i d u a l i t y . N e e d l e s s to s a y , a d e f e n c e o f a n a r c h i s m c o n c e i v e d i n t h e s e terms r e m a i n s the t a s k o f a n o t h e r t h e s i s . 120 NOTES For a c o m p r e h e n s i v e l i s t of a r t i c l e s and books d e a l i n g w i t h W o l f f ' s argument i n c l u d i n g works not c i t e d i n the p r e s e n t t h e s i s , see Pau l T. M e n z e l , " W o l f f ' s C r i t i c s : C o n f u s i n g the C o n f u s i n g , " The P e r s o n a l i s t , 5 7 , n o . 3 (Summer 1 9 7 6 ) , 320 - 3 2 1 . W o l f f , In Defense of A n a r c h i s m : Wi th a R e p l y to J e f f r e y  H. R e i m a n ' s "In"~Defense of P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y " (New Y o r k : Harper & Row, 197 6 ) , p. v i i i . A l l f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e s a re to t h i s e d i t i o n . The o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n , minus the r e p l y to R e i m a n , was p u b l i s h e d by Harper & Row i n 1970 . W o l f f , The Autonomy o f Reason (New Y o r k : Harper & Row, 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 2 2 3 . W o l f f , U n d e r s t a n d i n g R a w l s : A R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and  C r i t i q u e of "A Theory of J u s t i c e " ( P r i n c e t o n : P~rinceton U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977 ) , p. 113 . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 8 7 . For two c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s o f W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n e m p h a s i z i n g h i s d i f f e r e n c e s f rom K a n t , which i s not the f o c u s o f the p r e s e n t t h e s i s , see P a t r i c k R i l e y , "On the ' K a n t i a n ' F o u n d a t i o n s o f R o b e r t Paul W o l f f ' s A n a r c h i s m , " i n A n a r c h i sm, e d . J . Ro land Pennock and John W. Chapman, Nomos, XIX (New Y o r k : New York U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 244 - 3 1 9 , and Marcus G. S i n g e r , " R e c o n s t r u c t i n g the G r o u n d w o r k , " E t h i c s , 93 ( A p r i l 1 9 8 3 ) , pp . 566 - 5 7 8 . W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , p. 17 8 . W o l f f , In Defense of A n a r c h i s m , pp . 1 2 , 14 - 1 5 . W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , p. 2 1 6 . i b i d , pp . 1 3 1 , 137. Immanuel K a n t , Groundwork o f the M e t a p h y s i c s o f M o r a l s , t r a n s . H . J . Paton (New Y o r k : Harper & Row, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp . 84 -8 5 . W o l f f , The Autonomy of R e a s o n , pp . 192 - 193 . i b i d , p. 1 9 3 . i b i d , p. 6 9 . 121 1 4 i b i d , p. 6 9 . 1 5 i b i d , p. 6 9 . 1 6 i b i d , p. 1 3 2 . 1 7 i b i d , p. 1 3 3 . 1 8 i b i d , p. 1 2 8 . 1 9 i b i d , p. 1 3 2 . 20 i b i d , p• 1 3 2 . 21 i b i d , p p . 132 - 133 22 i b i d , p • 2 2 4 . 23 i b i d , pp . 1 4 4 , 174 . 24 i b i d , p. 127 . 25 i b i d , p. 138 . 26 i b i d , p. 1 3 3 . 27 i b i d , p • 138. 28 i b i d , p. 1 3 7 . 29 i b i d , p • 144. 30 i b i d , p. 2 2 3 . 31 i b i d , p. , 138 . 3 2 i b i d , pp . 1 6 8 , 1 5 9 . 3 3 i b i d , p. 2 1 7 . 3 4 i b i d , p. 178 . 35 W o i f f , i n Defense of A n a r c h i s m , 3 6 i b i d , p p . 1 2 , 1 7 . 3 7 i b i d , p. 17 . 3 8 W o l f f , The Autonomy of R e a s o n , 3 9 i b i d , p. 1 3 5 . 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 i b i d , pp . 135 - 136. i b i d , p. 1 3 5 . i b i d , p. 135 . i b i d , p. 136. W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 14 . As w i l l become c l e a r l a t e r i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , W o l f f uses such mora l and e v a l u a t i v e terms as "good" and " w i s e " i n a p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l s e n s e . See Fyodor D o s t o y e v s k y , Notes From Underground and the  Grand I n q u i s i t o r , e d . and t r a n s . , R a l p h E. Mat law (New Y o r k : D u t t o n , 1 9 6 0 ) . W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , pp . 4 9 , 1 3 2 . i b i d , p. 177. See John R a w l s , A Theory o f J u s t i c e ( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 ) . W o l f f , U n d e r s t a n d i n g R a w l s , p. 114. W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , p. 5 1 . i b i d , p. 224 . i b i d , p. 224 . i b i d , pp . 224 - 2 2 5 . i b i d , p. 224 . W o l f f , " A f t e r w o r d , " i n The Rule o f Law, e d . R o b e r t P a u l W o l f f (New Y o r k : Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1 9 7 1 ) , pp . 249 - 2 5 0 . i b i d , p. 2 5 1 . W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , p. 5 1 . i b i d , pp . 225 - 2 2 6 . i b i d , p. 2 2 6 . See v a r i o u s work on game t h e o r y , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game, such as R .D . Luce and H. R a i f f a , Games and D e c i s i o n s (New Y o r k : John W i l e y & S o n s , 1 9 5 7 ) , Mancur O l s o n , The L o g i c of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n ( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) , A n a t o l Rapopor t and 123 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 A l b e r t C. Chammah, P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma (Ann A r b o r : The U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1965) and R o b e r t A x e l r o d , The E v o l u t i o n o f C o o p e r a t i o n (New Y o r k : B a s i c B o o k s , 1 9 8 4 ) . For an a n a r c h i s t c r i t i q u e o f H o b b e s i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game, see M i c h a e l T a y l o r , A n a r c h y and C o o p e r a t i o n ( L o n d o n : John W i l e y & S o n s , 1 9 7 6 ) . W o l f f , The Autonomy of R e a s o n , p. 1 2 9 . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 7 2 . Compare the a n a r c h i s t S e b a s t i a n F a u r e ' s r e m a r k : "Whoever d e n i e s A u t h o r i t y and f i g h t s a g a i n s t i t i s an A n a r c h i s t , " c i t e d i n The A n a r c h i s t R e a d e r , e d . George Woodcock ( G l a s g o w : F o n t a n a , 1 9 7 7 ) , p. 6 2 . i b i d , p. 7 9 . Compare the a n a r c h i s t E r r i c o M a l a t e s t a ' s r e m a r k : " A n a r c h i s m w i l l not have d e f i n i t i v e l y and u n i v e r s a l l y t r i u m p h e d u n t i l a l l men w i l l not o n l y not want to be commanded but w i l l not what to command," c i t e d i n M a n ! , e d . Marcus Graham (London : C i e n f u i e g o s P r e s s , 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 7 4 . i b i d , pp . 3 , 8 9 . i b i d , p. 4 . i b i d , p. 10 . i b i d , p. 8 . i b i d , pp . 4 , 6 . i b i d , p. 9 . See Rex M a r t i n , " A n a r c h i s m and S k e p t i c i s m , " i n A n a r c h i sm, e d . Pennock and Chapman, pp . 115 - 1 2 9 . i b i d , p. 10 . R e i m a n , In Defense o f P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y : A R e p l y t o  R o b e r t Pau l W o l f f ' s " In Defense of A n a r c h i s m " (New Y o r k : Harper & Row, 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 9 . Thomas Hobbes , L e v i a t h a n : P a r t s I and I I , e d . H e r b e r t W. S c h n e i d e r ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i 1 1 , 1 9 5 8 ) , pp . 1 6 9 , 184. John L o c k e , The Second T r e a t i s e of Gove rnment , e d . Thomas P. Peardon ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : B o b b s - M e r r i 1 1 , 1 9 5 2 ) , p p . 5 0 , 54 . i b i d , p. 8 5 . 124 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 i b i d , p. 7 2 . i b i d , p. 7 2 . i b i d , p. 4 9 . Jean Jacques R o u s s e a u , The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t and  D i s c o u r s e s , t r a n s . G . D . H . Co le ( L o n d o n : D e n t , 1 9 1 6 ) , p. 12 . i b i d , p. 1 5 . i b i d , p. 24 . i b i d , p. 2 4 . W o l f f , "A R e p l y to R e i m a n , " i n In D e f e n s e o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 9 4 . R e i m a n , In Defense o f P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , p. 18 . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , pp . 1 4 , 88 - 1 0 0 . i b i d , p. 6 . i b i d , p. 15 . R e i m a n , In Defense o f P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , p. x x i v . i b i d , p. x x i v . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 1 5 . R e i m a n , In Defense o f P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , p. x x i v . W o l f f , " A f t e r w o r d , " i n The Rule o f Law, p. 2 4 6 . W o l f f , In Defense of A n a r c h i s m , p. 2 1 . i b i d , pp . 87 - 8 8 . i b i d , p. 110. W o l f f s p e c i f i c a l l y makes t h i s argument i n h i s c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f John S t u a r t M i l l ' s a t t e m p t to de fend l i b e r t y on s e e m i n g l y s t r i c t l y u t i l i t a r i a n g r o u n d s . See W o l f f , The  P o v e r t y of L i b e r a l i s m ( B o s t o n : Beacon P r e s s , 1 9 6 8 ) , pp . 3 - 5 0 . For the c l a s s i c u t i l i t a r i a n c r i t i q u e of government and 125 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 d e f e n c e of a n a r c h i s m , see W i l l i a m G o d w i n , Enqui r y  C o n c e r n i n g P o l i t i c a l J u s t i c e , e d . I s a a c K ramnick (Harmondswor th : P e n g u i n , 1 9 7 6 ) , and John P. C l a r k ' s e x c e l l e n t commentary , The P h i l o s o p h i c a l A n a r c h i s m o f  W i l l i a m Godwin ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977 ) . W o l f f , In Defense of A n a r c h i s m , p. 4 2 . i b i d , p. 2 1 . i b i d , p. 4 2 . i b i d , p. 4 2 . R o u s s e a u , of c o u r s e , makes a s i m i l a r argument i n The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t . i b i d , p. 2 3 . R e i m a n , In Defense o f P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , pp . 10 -15 . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 6 . i b i d , p. 8 8 . i b i d , pp . 54 - 5 5 . i b i d , pp. 51 - 5 3 . Rousseau a rgues o t h e r w i s e i n The S o c i a l C o n t r a c t , as do most a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s . However , due to h i s commitment to the v iew t h a t c h o i c e of ends i s e n t i r e l y n o n r a t i o n a l , W o l f f , as I w i l l argue l a t e r , i s p r e v e n t e d f rom p r e s e n t i n g any r a t i o n a l arguments a g a i n s t the c h o i c e o f any e n d s . How a d e q u a t e l y W o l f f has r e a l l y answered Rousseau i s a l s o q u e s t i o n a b l e . See C a r o l e Pa teman , The P r o b l e m of  P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n : A C r i t i c a l A n a l y s i s o f L i b e r a l  Theory ( L o n d o n : John W i l e y & S o n s , 1 9 7 9 ) , pp . 134 - 1 6 2 , f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of W o l f f and R o u s s e a u . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 8 2 . i b i d , p. 9 3 . i b i d , p. 1 0 3 . i b i d , p. 9 0 . See K r o p o t k i n , "The S t a t e : I t s H i s t o r i c R o l e , " i n S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s on A n a r c h i s m and R e v o l u t i o n , e d . M a r t i n 126 M i l l e r ( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : MIT, 1 9 7 0 ) , p p . 211 - 2 6 4 . 1 1 3 W o l f f , The P o v e r t y o f L i b e r a l i s m , p. 1 6 7 . 1 1 4 W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , pp . 7 9 , 8 1 . 1 1 5 W o l f f , The P o v e r t y o f L i b e r a l i s m , p. 1 8 5 . 1 1 6 i b i d , p p . 184 - 1 8 5 . 1 1 7 i b i d , p. 1 8 7 . 1 1 8 i b i d , p. 187 . 1 1 9 i b i d , pp . 1 9 1 , 1 9 0 . 1 2 0 i b i d , p. 1 9 1 . 1 2 1 i b i d , p. 1 9 2 . 1 2 2 i b i d , p. 1 9 2 . 1 2 3 i b i d , p. 1 9 2 . 1 2 4 W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 8 1 . 1 2 5 i b i d , pp . 81 - 8 2 . See Mur ray B o o k c h i n , Toward an E c o l o g i c a l S o c i e t y ( M o n t r e a l : B l a c k Rose B o o k s , 1 9 8 0 ) . 1 2 7 W o l f f , In De fense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 8 0 . How a p p r o p r i a t e i t i s t o speak o f a " n a t i o n " and " n a t i o n a l - b o r d e r s " i n a s o c i e t y wh ich has done away w i t h the n a t i o n - s t a t e i s a q u e s t i o n we s h a l l l e a v e u n a n s w e r e d , but m e r e l y no te t h a t i t has an odd r i n g to i t . 1 2 8 i b i d , p . 8 0 . See P e t e r A r s h i n o v , H i s t o r y o f t h e M a k h n o v i s t Movement  (1918 - 1 9 2 1 ) , t r a n s . L o r r a i n e and F r e d y P e r l m a n ( D e t r o i t : B l a c k & R e d , 1 9 7 4 ) , M i c h a e l M a l e t , N e s t o r Makhno i n the  R u s s i a n C i v i l War ( L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 8 2 ) , and M i c h a e l Pa 1 i j , The A n a r c h i s m of N e s t o r Makhno, 1918 - 1921 ( S e a t t l e : U n i v e r s i t y o f Washington P r e s s , 1 9 7 7 ) . 1 3 0 W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 7 8 . 1 3 1 W o l f f , " A f t e r w o r d , " i n The Ru le o f Law, p. 2 4 7 . 1 3 2 i b i d , p. 2 4 7 . 127 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 i b i d , p. 2 4 7 . The common c l a i m t h a t a n a r c h i s t s h o l d a n a i v e and o p t i m i s t i c v iew of human n a t u r e needs to be more c r i t i c a l l y e x a m i n e d . See A l a n R i t t e r , A n a r c h i s m : A  T h e o r e t i c a l A n a l y s i s ( C a m b r i d g e : Cambr idge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 0 ) , pp . 118 - 1 2 0 , and John P. C l a r k , "What i s A n a r c h i s m ? , " i n A n a r c h i sm, e d . Pennock and Chapman, p p . 16 i b i d 17 252, R e i m a n , In Defense o f P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , p. x x i i . John P. C l a r k , "What i s A n a r c h i s m ? , " p. 8 . R e i m a n , In Defense of P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , p. 4 8 . R i t t e r , A n a r c h i s m , p. 115. John P. C l a r k , Max S t i r n e r ' s Egoism ( L o n d o n : Freedom P r e s s , 1 9 7 6 ) , pp . 6 9 , 6 1 . C l a r k , "What i s A n a r c h i s m ? , " p. 1 3 . i b i d , p. 1 3 . Two p o i n t s i n C l a r k ' s d e f i n i t i o n r e q u i r e f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n . F i r s t , the c l a i m t h a t a n a r c h i s t s a d v o c a t e a c o m p l e t e l y n o n c o e r c i v e s o c i e t y may be d i s p u t e d on the grounds t h a t some a n a r c h i s t s s u p p o r t the use o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n or c e n s u r e i n a n a r c h i s t s o c i e t y to c o n t r o l m i s b e h a v i o u r , and such c e n s u r e can be c o e r c i v e . The answer i s t h a t w h i l e a n a r c h i s t s a d v o c a t e as the u l t i m a t e i d e a l the c r e a t i o n o f a s o c i e t y i n which c o e r c i o n i s e n t i r e l y e l i m i n a t e d and u n n e c e s s a r y , some a d v o c a t e t h a t when c o e r c i o n i s u n a v o i d a b l y n e c e s s a r y the fo rm o f c o e r c i o n most c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a n a r c h i s t i d e a l s i s p u b l i c c e n s u r e . See R i t t e r , A n a r c h i sm, pp . 9 - 39 . S e c o n d , by " i m m e d i a t e i n s t i t u t i o n " of a n a r c h i s t a l t e r n a t i v e s C l a r k makes c l e a r t h a t he means any c o n c r e t e a c t i o n wh ich can p l a u s i b l y be argued to be a s t e p toward a n a r c h y , whether g r a d u a l o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y . T h u s , h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f a n a r c h i s m i s meant to i n c l u d e a n a r c h i s t s who a d v o c a t e a programme of g r a d u a l c h a n g e , such as Godwin and Pau l Goodman, as w e l l as a n a r c h i s t s who a d v o c a t e r e v o l u t i o n , such as B a k u n i n and K r o p o t k i n. W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , 18 One can i n t e r p r e t H e g e l ' s argument i n The P h i l o s o p h y of  R i g h t i n s i m i l a r t e r m s . To be r a t i o n a l , and hence f r e e one must obey the commands of the R a t i o n a l S t a t e . Obed ience t o the law i s f r e e d o m . See H e g e l , The 128 P h i l o s o p h y o f R i g h t , t r a n s . T . M . Knox ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 7 ) . For a t r e n c h a n t c r i t i q u e o f such c l a i m s to r a t i o n a l , b u r e a u c r a t i c a u t h o r i t y , see A l i s d a i r M a c l n t y r e , A f t e r Vi r t u e (Not re Dame: U n i v e r s i t y o f N o t r e Dame P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , pp . 84 - 102. W o l f f r e j e c t s K a n t ' s argument a g a i n s t s u i c i d e , and not b e c a u s e , as some would a r g u e , c h o o s i n g o n e ' s own d e a t h i s the f u l l e s t e x p r e s s i o n of o n e ' s autonomy. R a t h e r , he r e j e c t s K a n t ' s argument p r e c i s e l y because t h e r e i s no n a t u r a l purpose or goa l i n t r i n s i c to human b e i n g s . See The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , pp. 163 - 164 . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 19 . Other a n a r c h i s t s would r e g a r d t h i s s t a t e m e n t as c o m p l e t e l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e . Proudhon argued t h a t " p r o p e r t y i s t h e f t , " and l a t e r a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s , such as B a k u n i n and K r o p o t k i n , were s t a u n c h l y a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t , a d v o c a t i n g some form of s o c i a l i s m or communism. A n a r c h i s t s have a l s o d e n i e d t h a t c o m p l i a n c e to the law p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f o r a j u s t o r d e r . See P r o u d h o n , What i s P r o p e r t y ? , t r a n s . Ben jamin Tucker (New Y o r k : D o v e r , 1970 ) , K r o p o t k i n , The  Conquest o f B r e a d , e d . Paul A v i c h (New Y o r k : New York U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972) and "Law and A u t h o r i t y , " i n K r o p o t k i n ' s R e v o l u t i o n a r y P a m p h l e t s , e d . Roger B a l d w i n (New Y o r k : D o v e r , 1 9 7 0 ) , pp. 196 - 2 1 8 , and L e s t e r J . M a z o r , " D i s r e s p e c t f o r L a w , " i n A n a r c h i sm, e d . Pennock and Chapman, pp . 143 - 159. Here i t would be u s e f u l to ment ion t h a t a n a r c h i s m can be de fended on a more t r a d i t i o n a l K a n t i a n b a s i s , u t i l i z i n g the n o t i o n o f u n i v e r s i 1 i z a b i 1 i t y . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s s o r t o f a r g u m e n t , someone who d e s i r e s f u l l autonomy and l i b e r t y f o r him or h e r s e l f m u s t , i n a l l c o n s i s t e n c y , s u p p o r t the same degree o f autonomy and l i b e r t y f o r a l l r a t i o n a l a g e n t s . The s t a t e i t s e l f can then be c r i t i c i z e d , both f o r d e n y i n g f u l l autonomy and l i b e r t y to a l l a g e n t s , and f o r i s s u i n g laws and p u r s u i n g p o l i c i e s which t h e m s e l v e s c a n n o t be w i l l e d as u n i v e r s a l moral l a w s , wh ich c o n t r a d i c t u n i v e r s a l m o r a l i t y . For an argument somewhat a l o n g t h e s e l i n e s see B a k u n i n , " F e d e r a l i s m , S o c i a l i s m , A n t i - T h e o l o g i s m , " i n B a k u n i n on A n a r c h i s m , e d . Sam D o l g o f f ( M o n t r e a l : B l a c k Rose B o o k s , 1 9 8 0 ) , pp . 115 - 147 . W o l f f i s p r e c l u d e d f rom u t i l i z i n g t h i s s o r t o f argument because o f h i s i n s t r u m e n t a l v iew o f r e a s o n and c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y na r row v iew o f r a t i o n a l c o n s i s t e n c y . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 1 9 . W o l f f , The P o v e r t y o f L i b e r a l i s m , p. 1 9 2 . 129 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 W o l f f , U n d e r s t a n d i n g R a w l s . K e i t h Graham, "Democracy and the Autonomous Mora l A g e n t , " i n Contemporary P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y : R a d i c a l S t u d i e s , e d . K e i t h Graham ( C a m b r i d g e : Cambr idge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , pp . 113 - 137 . For an e x p o s i t i o n o f such an a l t e r n a t i v e a n a r c h i s t p e r s p e c t i v e , see A l a n R i t t e r , A n a r c h i sm. A l a n R i t t e r q u e s t i o n s the a n a r c h i s t s t a t u s o f Max S t i r n e r ' s p u r p o r t e d l y a n a r c h i s t ego ism on s i m i l a r g r o u n d s . See R i t t e r , A n a r c h i sm p. 6 , and John P. C l a r k , Max  S t i r n e r ' s E g o i s m , pp . 87 - 9 4 , f o r a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t v i e w . For W o l f f ' s c r i t i c a l remarks r e g a r d i n g c a p i t a l i s m w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f h i s a n a r c h i s t a r g u m e n t , see In Defense of  A n a r c h i sm, pp . 74 - 7 8 , 8 1 , and " V i o l e n c e and the L a w , " p. 6 8 , and " A f t e r w o r d , " pp . 250 - 2 5 1 , b o t h i n The Ru le o f  Law. With the e x c e p t i o n of some i n d i v i d u a l i s t a n a r c h i s t s , the m a j o r i t y o f a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s (and the h i s t o r i c a l a n a r c h i s t movement) have been a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t as w e l l as a n t i - s t a t i s t . For a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a m p l i n g o f a n a r c h i s t A n a r c h i s t s , e d . Pau l Berman (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r , 1 9 7 2 ) , pp . 78 - 8 6 . C a r o l e P a t e m a n , The Prob lem of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , p. 137. W o l f f , The Autonomy of R e a s o n , p. 2 2 5 . T h u s , i t i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e to h o l d a r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e b e l i e f t h a t s o c i e t y i s e v o l v i n g toward a n a r c h y as the r e s u l t o f c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e s r a t h e r than as the r e s u l t o f c o n s c i o u s r a t i o n a l c h o i c e . M a r x i s t h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m can be i n t e r p r e t e d as a t h e o r y wh ich p u r p o r t e d l y d e m o n s t r a t e s j u s t t h i s , a c c o r d i n g to an a n a l y s i s of h i s t o r i c a l change based on t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n i s m . See G . A . Cohen , K a r l M a r x ' s Theory of  H i s t o r y : A Defence ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) . As we s h a l l s e e , W o l f f seems s y m p a t h e t i c to t h i s v i e w . W o l f f , " N o z i c k ' s D e r i v a t i o n o f the M i n i m a l S t a t e , " i n R e a d i n g N o z i c k : E s s a y s on A n a r c h y , S t a t e and U t o p i a , e d . J e f f r e y Pau l ( T o t o w a , N . J . : Rowman & L i t t l e f i e l d , 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 4 5 . W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , p. 2 2 2 . 130 W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , pp . 226 - 2 2 8 , and " T h e r e ' s Nobody Here But Us P e r s o n s , " i n Women and  Ph i 1 o s o p h y , e d . C a r o l C. Gould and Marx W. W a r t o f s k y (New Y o r k : Pu tnam's S o n s , 1 9 7 6 ) , pp. 128 - 144 . W o l f f , " T h e r e ' s Nobody Here But Us P e r s o n s , " p. 130 . i b i d , pp . 1 3 1 , 1 3 3 . i b i d , p. 1 3 3 . One assumes t h a t W o l f f ' s t h e o r y i s g e n d e r - b l i n d , but h i s c o n t i n u a l use o f male nouns and pronouns would r a i s e the s u s p i c i o n s o f a c o m m i t t e d femi n i s t . C l a r k , "What i s A n a r c h i s m ? , " p. 16 . i b i d , p. 18 . i b i d , p. 8 . i b i d , p. 8 . W o l f f , i n t e r v i e w e d i n The B l a c k F l a g o f A n a r c h i s m , w r i t t e n and p roduced by R e s e a r c h Group One ( B a 1 1 i m o r e : G r e a t A t l a n t i c R a d i o C o n s p i r a c y , 1 9 7 3 ) , tape #43. B a k u n i n , S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s , e d . A r t h u r L e h n i n g (New Y o r k : G r o v e , 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 270 . L e s t t h i s be d i s m i s s e d as a p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l s q u a b b l e , h i s t o r i c a l l y t h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t has l e d to open c o n f l i c t between a n a r c h i s t s and M a r x i s t s and the f o r c i b l e s u p p r e s s i o n of a n a r c h i s t movements and i d e a s by v a r i o u s M a r x i s t g o v e r n m e n t s . See Mur ray B o o k c h i n , The E c o l o g y o f Freedom ( P a l o A l t o : C h e s h i r e , 1 9 8 2 ) , and John P. C l a r k , The A n a r c h i s t Moment ( M o n t r e a l : B l a c k Rose B o o k s , 1 9 8 4 ) , f o r two r e c e n t a n a r c h i s t c r i t i q u e s of M a r x i a n a n a l y s i s . R e i m a n , In Defense of P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y , p. 5 2 . However , as was argued e a r l i e r , Re i man's own r e a s o n s f o r s a y i n g t h i s a r e not e n t i r e l y c o r r e c t . P a t e m a n , The P r o b l e m of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , p. 137 . For a more e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n of W o l f f ' s p o s i t i o n as a form of s c e p t i c i s m , see Rex M a r t i n , " A n a r c h i s m and S k e p t i c i s m , " i n A n a r c h i sm, e d . Pennock and Chapman, pp . 115 - 129 . W o l f f , In Defense o f A n a r c h i s m , p. 1 8 . 131 For an e x t e n s i v e argument t h a t the c l a s s i c a l a n a r c h i s t t h e o r i s t s do not embrace a p o s i t i o n r e s e m b l i n g W o l f f ' s , see A l a n R i t t e r , A n a r c h i sm. In L e v i a t h a n Hobbes makes a s i m i l a r argument r e g a r d i n g the meaning o f mora l terms i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e . How Hobbes ian a g e n t s i n the s t a t e o f n a t u r e c o u l d then r e a c h any m e a n i n g f u l , r a t i o n a l agreements would a l s o seem to be p r o b l e m a t i c a l , p r e s e n t i n g s i m i l a r p r o b l e m s f o r Hobbes 1 c o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m as a re b e i n g d i s c u s s e d here w i t h r e g a r d to W o l f f ' s . For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s t o p i c , see C a r o l e P a t e m a n , The P r o b l e m of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , pp . 37 -6 0 . W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , p. 2 2 5 . John S e a r l e , " P r i m a F a c i e O b l i g a t i o n s , " i n P r a c t i c a l  Reason i n g , e d . Joseph Raz ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 8 6 . P a t e m a n , The P r o b l e m of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , p. 2 7 . Some p h i l o s o p h e r s h o l d t h a t p e o p l e have some mora l o b l i g a t i o n s which a re not v o l u n t a r i l y s e l f - a s s u m e d . For r e a s o n s t h a t c a n n o t be gone i n t o h e r e , I b e l i e v e i t i s c o n c e p t u a l l y c l e a r e r and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y more sound to d i s t i n g u i s h between s e l f - a s s u m e d o b l i g a t i o n , mora l d u t y and what p e o p l e m o r a l l y ought to do . For a d e f e n c e o f t h i s a p p r o a c h , see C a r o l e Pateman, The P r o b l e m of P o l i t i c a l  Obi i g a t i on , pp . 28 - 3 6 . W o l f f ' s m o r a l c o n t r a c t a r i am" sm i s c o n c e p t u a l l y i n c o h e r e n t r e g a r d l e s s o f whether some o b l i g a t i o n s a re not v o l u n t a r i l y a s s u m e d , so t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not c e n t r a l to my a r g u m e n t . W o l f f , The Autonomy o f R e a s o n , p. 2 2 4 . W o l f f , U n d e r s t a n d i n g R a w l s , p. 2 0 . B a k u n i n , The P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y o f B a k u n i n , e d . G . P . M a x i m o f f (New Y o r k : F ree P r e s s , 1 9 5 3 ) , p~! 167. W o l f f , " N o z i c k ' s D e r i v a t i o n of the M i n i m a l S t a t e , " pp . 100 - 1 0 1 . H i l a r y Putnam, R e a s o n , T r u t h and H i s t o r y ( C a m b r i d g e : Cambr idge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 170 and B e r n a r d W i l l i a m s , " I n t e r n a l and E x t e r n a l R e a s o n , " i n Mora l L u c k :  P h i l o s o p h i c a l P a p e r s , 1973 - 1980 ( C a m b r i d g e : Cambr idge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , pp. 101 - 1 1 3 . Putnam, R e a s o n , T r u t h and H i s t o r y , p. 1 7 0 . 132 i b i d , P- 194. i b i d , P- 2 1 2 . i b i d , P- 2 1 2 . i b i d , P- 2 1 2 . i b i d , P- 136. i b i d , P- 2 1 5 . i b i d , P- 1 4 1 . i b i d , P- 1 4 1 . C f . A l i s d a i r Mac I n t y r e , A f t e r V i r t u e . Putnam, p. 178 . John P. C l a r k , "What i s A n a r c h i s m ? , " p. 17 . See K r o p o t k i n , Mutua l A i d : A F a c t o r o f E v o l u t i o n ( B o s t o n : E x t e n d i n g H o r i z o n s , n . d . ) , V i n c e n t C. P u n z o , "The Modern S t a t e and the S e a r c h f o r Community : The A n a r c h i s t C r i t i q u e o f P e t e r K r o p o t k i n , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Q u a r t e r l y , 16 (March 1 9 7 6 ) , 3 - 3 2 , M a r t i n B u b e r , P a t h s  i n U t o p i a , t r a n s . R . F . C . H u l l ( B o s t o n : B e a c o n , 19 5 8 ) , and f o r f u r t h e r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e , H a r o l d B a r c l a y , P e o p l e W i t h o u t Government : An A n t h r o p o l o g y o f A n a r c h i s m ( S a n d a y , O r k n e y : C i e n f u e g o s , 1 9 8 2 ) , P i e r r e C l a s t r e s , S o c i e t y A g a i n s t the S t a t e , t r a n s . R o b e r t H u r l e y ( O x f o r d : B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1977 ) and M i c h a e l T a y l o r , Communi t y ,  A n a r c h y and L i b e r t y ( C a m b r i d g e : Cambr idge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) . Noam Chomsky, R e f l e c t i o n s on Language (New Y o r k : P a n t h e o n , 1 9 7 5 ) , and "Language and F r e e d o m , " i n For  Reasons of S t a t e (New Y o r k : V i k i n g , 1 9 7 3 ) , pp . 387 - 4 0 8 . M i c h a e l T a y l o r , A n a r c h y and C o o p e r a t i o n , and R o b e r t A x e l r o d , The E v o l u t i o n of C o o p e r a t i o n . W i l l i a m G o d w i n , E n q u i r y C o n c e r n i n g P o l i t i c a l J u s t i c e , pp . 7 5 8 , 2 1 8 . C f . C a r o l e Pa teman , The P r o b l e m of  P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n , pp . 134 - 1 4 1 . On c o n t r a c t , see P r o u d h o n , The P r i n c i p l e of F e d e r a t i o n , e d . R i c h a r d Vernon ( T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y o f T o r o n t o , 1 9 7 9 ) , pp . 36 - 4 2 ; on the s o c i a l bases o f m o r a l i t y and 133 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 i n d i v i d u a l i t y , see B a k u n i n , S e l e c t e d W r i t i n g s , pp . 136 -1 5 4 , K r o p o t k i n , E t h i c s : O r i g i n and D e v e l o p m e n t , t r a n s . L . S . F r i e d l a n d and J . R . P r i o s h n i k o f f (New Y o r k : D i a l , 1 9 2 5 ) , and " A n a r c h i s t M o r a l i t y , " i n R e v o ! u t i o n a r y  P a m p h l e t s , pp. 80 - 113 . For a more r e c e n t d i s c u s s i o n of some of t h e s e i s s u e s , see Murray B o o k c h i n , Toward an  E c o l o g i c a l S o c i e t y . Pa teman , The P r o b l e m of P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n . i b i d , p. 137 . i b i d , p. 140 . i b i d , p. 18 . i b i d , pp . 1 , 174 . i b i d , p. 174. i b i d , p. 1 4 1 . See a l s o C o l i n Ward, " A n a r c h y as a Theory o f O r g a n i z a t i o n , " i n P a t t e r n s of A n a r c h y e d . Leonard Kr imerman and Lewis P e r r y (New Y o r k : D o u b l e d a y , 1 9 6 6 ) , pp 386 - 3 9 6 , and h i s l a t e r work , A n a r c h y i n A c t i o n (New Y o r k : Harper & Row, 1 9 7 4 ) . i b i d , p. 162 . C f . A p r i l C a r t e r , D i r e c t A c t i o n and L i b e r a l Democracy (New Y o r k : Harper & Row, 1 9 7 4 ) . M i c h a e l T a y l o r , Community , Anarchy and L i b e r t y , p. 3 2 . A l a n R i t t e r , A n a r c h i sm. i b i d , p. 3 . i b i d , p. 3 5 . i b i d , p. 3 8 . M i c h a e l T a y l o r , Community , Anarchy and L i b e r t y , p. 3 . C f . R i t t e r , A n a r c h i s m . 134 BIBLIOGRAPHY A r s h i n o v , P e t e r . H i s t o r y of the M a k h n o v i s t Movement (1918 -1 9 2 1 ) . T r a n s . L o r r a i n e and F redy P e r l m a n . D e t r o i t : B l a c k & R e d , 1974. 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