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Migration, population change and socio-economic development in the Cook Islands Hayes, Geoffrey Robert 1982

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MIGRATION, POPULATION CHANGE, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE COOK ISLANDS by GEOFFREY ROBERT HAYES M.A., The University of Toronto, 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA JUNE 1982 (^Geoffrey Robert Hayes DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n In presenting th is thes is in p a r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree ly ava i l ab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis for scho la r ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives . It is understood that copying or pub l ica t ion of th is thes is for f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wri t ten permission. Department of A N T H R O P O L O G Y AND S O C I O L O G Y The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 S E P T E M B E R 6 , 1 9 8 2 Date 1 1 ABSTRACT This study examines the inter r e l a t i o n s h i p s between migration patterns, population change, and socio-economic development in the Cook Islands of the south P a c i f i c during the period 1966-80. Socio-economic "development" is defined as: (1) economic growth; (2) increasing s o c i a l complexity; (3) an improvement in the physical quality of l i f e . Two models of the relationship between migration and socio-economic development were extracted from the theoreti c a l l i t e r a t u r e : one suggests that migration brings a range of socio-economic benefits to the "sending" society; the other claims that migration i s costly to the sending society and i s l i k e l y to promote i t s "underdevelopment". The e f f e c t s of migration on population growth, age structure and sex balance, geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n , labor force size and qu a l i t y , during the post self-government period 1966-80, are examined in d e t a i l . The ef f e c t s of these changes on the three dimensions of socio-economic development are explored and some of the monetary "costs" and "benefits" of migration are estimated. The net crude rate of emigration for the period was 27.3/1000 for the population as a whole, and 32.2/1000 for the Maori component taken separately. This rate of out-flow has reduced the average annual growth rate from a potential 3.2% to an actual rate of -0.6% over the 1966-76 intercensal period. The population has declined o v e r a l l by 5.9% over the same period and some islands have dropped by as much as 55%. While most migrants are under 40 years of age, high f e r t i l i t y in the past means that the majority of the population i s also under this age. Disproportionate migration occurs p r i n c i p a l l y in the age range 15-24. The "working age" population of the Cook Islands as a whole declined by 2.6%; some islands did maintain a s t a t i c labor force, however, while in others the labor force declined. No evidence was found to indicate that emigration improves the dependency burden or the sex r a t i o . Where the dependency r a t i o has improved, t h i s can be attributed to declining f e r t i l i t y . A higher proportion of the population i s concentrated on the main island of Rarotonga, but "urbanization" has actually decreased as a result of d i f f e r e n t i a l emigration by d i s t r i c t . While i t i s clear that the demographic and socio-economic impact of migration varies from region to region, and island to island, the ov e r a l l e f f e c t on the "development" of the Cook Islands has been negative. The period of large-scale emigration was accompanied by f a l l i n g real GDP per capita and in t o t a l , d e c lining production for export, and the loss of both s o c i a l c a p i t a l and occupational s k i l l s . The physical q u a l i t y of l i f e has improved over the period, but the rate of improvement has f a l l e n -off as emigration increased in the mid 1970s. Remittance income from migrants abroad has increased as a proportion of t o t a l per capita income, leading to greater "dependency" on an external economy. Structural complexity has increased to a degree on Rarotonga, but some of the outer islands show signs of str u c t u r a l "devolution" and economic decline. It i s argued that the declining population of the Cook Islands w i l l tend to exacerbate the already severe problems of iv small scale and geographical dispersion in the micro-economy of the Cook Islands and w i l l add considerable uncertainty to the processes of development planning. In the short-term dependency w i l l probably increase as more foreign aid w i l l be required to operate the p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system. V TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents . .• v L i s t of Tables v i i i L i s t of Figures x i i i Acknowledgements xiv PART I INTRODUCTORY 1 CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM AND THE SETTING 2 The problem 2 The Cook Islands Setting 8 The Organization of the Study 18 General Methods and Field-work 21 CHAPTER TWO, THEORETICAL ISSUES 23 The General Nature of the Problem 23 Development and Underdevelopment conceptual issues 31 Economic Growth 34 Social Structure and Organization 35 Social Welfare 37 The Research Problem C l a r i f i e d 38 Population E f f e c t s 39 Welfare E f f e c t s 43 Socio-economic Organization and Structure 45 Income, Consumption and Balance of Payments 50 Production and "dependency" e f f e c t s 53 Labor Force and Human Resources 62 Capital Formation and Investment 64 Two Models of Migration and Development 65 The Problem of Values 69 CHAPTER THREE, DETERMINANTS AND CONDITIONS OF MIGRATION 73 Introduction 70 Pre-contact migration patterns 75 The Missionary Era 77 The Colonial Period 81 The Makatea Indenture Scheme 83 Chain Migration to New Zealand 85 Population Growth 87 Social and P o l i t i c a l Factors 95 Uneven Development and Economic Incentives 98 Migrant Motivations in the 1960s and 1970s 103 Education and Occupational Aspirations 106 Summary and Discussion 114 PART I I : MIGRATION PATTERNS AND POPULATION CHANGE 1966-80 ... 118 CHAPTER FOUR, MIGRATION PATTERNS 1966-80 119 v i Introduction 1 1.9 Cook Island Migration Streams 120 The Conceptualization of Migration 122 The Volume of External Migration 1966-80 123 Total Migration in Self-Government Period 128 Ethnic Differences in Migration 131 Pe r i o d i c i t y and Duration of Maori Migration 134 Return Migration 139 Regional Differences in Migration 141 Migration by Island 146 S e l e c t i v i t y by Age Group 149 S e l e c t i v i t y by Sex 157 Age-Sex S e l e c t i v i t y : Cohort Analysis 161 Summary and Conclusions 169 CHAPTER FIVE, EMIGRATION, POPULATION GROWTH AND RESOURCES ... 175 Introduction 175 Emigration and Population Growth 183 Population Structure 194 Population Growth, Density and Resources 196 Population D i s t r i b u t i o n 203 Summary and Discussion 210 CHAPTER SIX, THE EFFECTS OF EMIGRATION ON THE LABOR FORCE ... 215 Introduction 215 The Labor Force 221 The "working-Age" Population 217 Geographical D i s t r i b u t i o n 224 The dependency burden 226 The "Economically Active Population 228 Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n 232 Unemployment and Underemployment 232 Emigration and the Quality of the Labor Force 240 Emigration and the Net Loss of S k i l l s 253 The Changing Occupational Structure 262 Emigration and the Supply of Labor 266 The Labor Situation in Rarotonga 274 Labor in Agriculture 271 The Labor situation in the Outer Islands 279 Summary and Discussion 285 PART I I I : MIGRATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 291 CHAPTER SEVEN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1966-76 292 Introduction 292 The Physical Quality of L i f e 293 Economic Growth 298 Production and Productivity in Commercial Agriculture 306 Sectoral Changes in Production and Productivity 315 The Changing Economic Structure 321 Summary and Discussion 333 CHAPTER EIGHT, SOME COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EMIGRATION AND THE QUESTION OF DEPENDENCY 340 v i i Introduction 340 The Production Effects of Emigration 342 Balance of Payments 353 The Transfer of Social Capital 356 Transportation Costs 362 Emigrant Remittances 363 Remittances and "Dependency" 372 Social Costs and Benefits of Emigration 374 Unequal Exchange and the Exploitation of the Periphery 375 Summary and Discussion 379 CHAPTER NINE, CONCLUDING REMARKS 384 POSTSCRIPT 394 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES CITED 399 APPENDICES 425 APPENDIX A, COMMENTS ON FIELD-WORK 426 APPENDIX B, MIGRATION AND POPULATION ANALYSIS: METHODS AND MATERIALS 431 APPENDIX C, MIGRATION STATISTICS 457 APPENDIX D, FERTILITY AND POPULATION GROWTH DATA 482 APPENDIX E, COOK ISLANDS LIFE TABLES 495 v i i i LIST OF TABLES 2.1 A Model of "Equilibrium" and "Dependency" 56 3.1 Average Annual Population Growth Rates in Quinquenial Periods 1902-1976 89 3.2 Crude Rates of Bir t h , Death and Natural Increase 1945-76 92 3.3 General F e r t i l i t y rate by Year and Region 92 3.4 Projected Numbers Attaining Age 17 by Year 1966-81 Assuming no Emigration 93 3.5 Projected Growth in the Working-Age Population of the Cook Islands 1966-81 94 3.6 Comparison of some Weekly Wages in the Cook Islands and New Zealand 102 3.7 Comparison of Average Hourly Wages in the Cook Islands and New Zealand, 1975 102 3.8 Motivations of Two Migrant Samples 1965-66 104 3.9 Reasons Given by Persons Departing Pukapuka for New Zealand, 1978-79 104 3.10 Educational Aspirations and Residential Expectations of a Sample of Rarotonga High School Students 109 3.11 Chi-square Analysis of Relationship Between Educational Aspirations and Expected Residence 111 3.12 Chi-square Analysis of Relationship Between Occupational Aspirations and Expected Residence 111 4.1 Net Migration of Cook Islands Maori: Five-year Averages 1926-79 121 4.2 Crude Migration Rates 1966-80 124 4.3 Net Migration 1966-80 Residual Method 129 4.4 Intercensal Migration 1966-1976: Residual Method 129 4.5 Estimated Intercensal Migration 1966-1976 V i t a l S t a t i s t i c s Method 130 4.6 Net Intercensal Migration of Maori and Non-Maori Population 132 4.7 Net Migration of Cook Islanders to New Zealand and Elsewhere 132 ix 4.8 Cook Islands-Born Population of New Zealand 135 4.9 Migration Intentions of Cook Islands-Born A r r i v a l s in New Zealand 1966-76 135 4.10 Return Migration 1966-76 1-40 4.11 Net Intercensal Migration by Region 1966-76 143 4.12 Intercensal Migration Rates by Region and Sex 144 4.13 Internal Migration Between Outer Islands and Rarotonga 1966-76 143 4.14 Annual Average Crude Emigration Rates Adjusted for Ethnicity/Island of Origin 147 4.15 Emigration Rates Rank-order by Residence and Ethnic o r i g i n 148 4.16 Estimated Net Intercensal Maori Migration by Region, Island and Sex 1966-76 151 4.17 Net Maori Migration by Age-Groups 1967-70 and 1971-78 ..152 4.18 Net Maori Migration by Age-Group and Sex 158 4.19 Net Maori Migration (both sexes) by Age-Group 1972-77 159 4.20 Net Maori Migration by 5-year Age-Groups and Sex 1972-77 160 4.21 10-Year Male Migration Rates of 1966 Age Cohorts by Island and Region 162 4.22 10-Year Female Migration Rates of 1966 Age Cohorts by Island and Region 163 5.1 Population Changes by Region and Island 1966-76 182 5.2 Average Annual Rates of Population Change 1966-76 185 5.3 Actual and Expected Population Growth compared 185 5.4 Rank Order of Islands by Rates of Emigration and Population Change: Average Annual Change 1966-76 189 5.5 Intercensal Changes in Total F e r t i l i t y Rates 1966-76 ... 189 5.6 Changes in Age-Specific F e r t i l i t y Rates, Rarotonga 1966-76 192 5.7 Emigration Loss and F e r t i l i t y Decline by Region 1966-76 192 X 5.8 Changing Proportion of Females Aged 15-44 Never Married 1966-76 195 5.9 Changing Proportion of Female Population Aged 15-44 Economically Active 1966-76 195 5.10 Actual and Expected Population Compared on the Basis of the Proportion of Population in Three Age Groups 197 5.11 Comparison Between the Age Structure of the Enumerated Population in 1966 and 1976, by Region 197 5.12 Expected Increase in Females Aged 15-44 with no Emigration 200 5.13 Expected Population in 1976 with Zero Emigration From 1966, by Island and Region 200 5.14 Person/Land Ratios of Expected Population in 1 976, By Region 198 5.15 Population Density of Selected Island States, 1977 204 5.16 Changes in Cook Islands Land/Person Ratios 1966-76 204 5.17 Cook Islands Population D i s t r i b u t i o n by Region 206 5.18 Birthplaces of Rarotonga Residents, 1966-76 206 5.19 Population D i s t r i b u t i o n in Rarotonga 1966-76 207 5.20 Proportion of Ethnic Cook Islanders Residing in the Cook Islands and New Zealand 1936-76 207 6.1 Changes in the Size of the "Working-Age" Population of the Cook Islands 1961-76, by Region 222 6.2 Changes in the Geographical D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Working Age Population 1966-76 225 6.3 Changes in Dependency Ratios by Island and Region 225 6.4 Economically Active Population of the Cook Islands 1961-76 by Region 229 6.5 Changes in the Regional D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Economically Active Population 1966-76 231 6.6 P a r t i c i p a t i o n Rates of Emigrant Sample Compared with 1971 Cook Islands Population 231 6.7 Unemployment by Region and Sex 1966 and 1976 234 6.8 Changes in Occupational status 1966-76 234 6.9 Occupational Categories of Emigrant Sample Compared xi With Cook Islands Labor Force 243 6.10 Occupational Categories of Male Emigrant Sample Compared With Cook Islands Labor Force 244 6.11 Top Ten Occupations in Male Emigration Sample 248 6.12 Occupational Categories of Female Emigrant Sample Compared with Female Labor Force 1971, 1976 249 6.13 Top Ten Occupations in Female Emigration Sample 248 6.14 Comparison of Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n Rates of Sample Emigrants and Immigrants and 1971 Population .... 252 6.15 Migration Losses and Gains by Occupational Category .... 252 6.16 Female Migration Losses and Gains by Occupational Category 256 6.17 Male Migration by Occupational Category and S k i l l Level 256 6.18 Male Permanent and Long-Term Migration by S k i l l Level .. 260 6.19 Female Permanent and Long-term Migration by S k i l l Level 260 6.20 Cook Islands Labor Force by Occupational Categories 1966 and 1 976 263 6.21 Gaining and Losing Occupations in Rarotonga Labor Force 1966-76 265 7.1 Changing Values of Physical Quality of L i f e Index 295 7.2 Cook Islands Gross Domestic Product by Sector 1964-77 .. 301 7.3 Cook Islands Gross Domestic Product by Sector 1964-77 in Constant Prices 302 7.4 Cook Islands A g r i c u l t u r a l Production for Export in T r i e n n i a l Moving Averages 308 7.5 Changes in Productivity of Full-time A g r i c u l t u r a l Labor force 308 7.6 Mangaia Commercial A g r i c u l t u r a l Production 1966-76 in T r i e n n i a l Moving Averages 311 7.7 Atiu Commercial A g r i c u l t u r a l Production 1966-76 in T r i e n n i a l Moving Averages 311 7.8 Mauke Commercial A g r i c u l t u r a l Production 1966-76 in T r i e n n i a l Moving Averages 313 7.9 Copra and Pearl Production for Export, Northern Group 1966-76 313 7.10 Production and Income in the Northern Group in T r i e n n i a l Moving Averages 1966-76 316 7.11 Total and Per capita Value of a l l Cook Islands Exports in Constant Prices 1963-1980 317 7.12 Changes in GDP per Economically Active Population by Sector 1964-76 318 7.13 The Cook Islands Labor Force by Sector 1966-76 322 7.14 Southern Outer Islands Labor Force by Sector 1966-76 ... 322 7.15 Northern Group Labor Force by Sector 1966-76 332 7.16 Rarotonga Labor Force by sector 332 8.1 Comparison of Per-Capita GDP of the Expected and Actual Population 1966-76 345 8.2 Total GDP with Expected Population and Observed Per-Capita Product 1966-76 345 8.3 Additional Expected Labor Force Without Emigration 348 8.4 Losses Attributable to Emigration Under Three Assumptions 348 8.5 Cook Islands Balance of Trade 1967-80 355 8.6 New Zealand Aid to the Cook Islands 355 8.7 The Value of Social Capital Exported from the Cook Islands 1966-76 358 8.8 Differences Between Social Investment Costs of Cook Islands Maori Migrants and New Zealanders 361 8.9 Transportation Costs of Emigration 1966-76 361 8.10 Postal Money Orders Received in the Cook Islands From New Zealand 1966-80 364 8.11 Estimates of Remittances to the Cook Islands 1967-76 ... 369 8.12 Comparison of Product "Losses" and Remittance "Gains" .. 364 8.13 A Summary of Costs and Benefits to Emigration 370 8.14 Remittances as a Proportion of Per-capita GNP 370 8.15 Remittances and A g r i c u l t u r a l Income Compared 373 8.16 Wages Earned by Cook Islands Maori Immigrants in New Zealand 373 8.17 Gross Domestic Product Generated by Cook Islands Maori Migrants i n New Zealand Compared with Grants and Loans to the Cook Islands .... 376 xi i i LIST OF FIGURES 1.1 The Cook Islands in the South P a c i f i c 9 1.2 The Southern Group 10 1.3 The Northern Group l i 2.1 Migration and "Welfare" 56 3.1 Population Change by Region 1821-1976 88 3.2 Estimated rates of Bi r t h , Death and Natural Increase 1942-1979 91 4.1 Cook Island Migration Streams 121 4.2 Net Migration of Cook Islands Maori 1946-1978 126 4.3 Net Maori Migration by Sex and Quarter 1967-79 138 4.4 Net Migration in Five Age Groups 153 4.5 Net Migration Age Groups 1 and 2 154 4.6 Net Migration Age Groups 3, 4 and 5 155 4.7 Proportion of Net Migration in Six Age Groups 156 4.8 Emigration by Age Cohorts and Region 1966-76 165 4.9 Southern Group Emigration by Age Cohorts 1966-76 166 4.10 Northern Group Emigration by Age Cohorts 1966-76 167 5.1 Crude Rates of Natural Growth, Actual Growth and Emigration 1941-79 187 5.2 Intercensal Growth Rates: Selected Islands 1906-1976 ... 188 5.3 Population of Cook Islanders in New Zealand and the Cook Islands 208 5.4 Cook Islands Maori in New Zealand by Birthplace 209 xiv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis has benefited from the assistance of a great many people. I would l i k e to thank the Government of the Cook Islands for permitting the research and a s s i s t i n g in i t s completion. Thanks are due also to those Maori and Papaa, too numerous to mention, who provided me with information and perspectives on Cook Islands migration and society. I am p a r t i c u l a r l y grateful to those business managers and department heads in Government who provided me with s t a t i s t i c a l information. I would also l i k e to acknowledge the help of teachers and pr i n c i p a l s at a l l three Rarotonga high schools who gave me access to t h e i r classes to conduct an occupational survey. The Vocational Guidance Centre and the Planning Bureau also assisted with s t e n c i l i n g f a c i l i t i e s , as did Tereora High School. Some individuals should be mentioned by name. I am immensely grateful to Joe Tibbie (formerly of Ngati Porou in New Zealand, now of West Vancouver, B.C.) who generously gave his time to teach me the rudiments of the New Zealand Maori language. Without t h i s background I would not have made the progress I eventually did in the related Rarotongan language. I am also grateful to Mana Strickland whose patience and good humor, as well as his excellent teaching s k i l l s , made learning from him a rewarding experience. Rangi Moekaa helped me with ideas and suggestions. I p a r t i c u l a r l y appreciate his assistance in trans l a t i n g into Maori the migration questionnaire I developed, but have yet to use. Andrew Turua and Don Hunter at the Cook XV Islands S t a t i s t i c s O ffice helped generously in providing me with published and unpublished s t a t i s t i c s as well as encouragement. I am es p e c i a l l y grateful to Don Hunter, then Chief S t a t i s t i c s O f f i c e r , for his enthusiastic cooperation in locating unpublished s t a t i s t i c s and in many other ways f a c i l i t a t i n g my research. My supervisory committee—particularly the Chairman, Professor C S . Belshaw--has steered me away from serious errors in theory and method and has tolerated in good s p i r i t the s h i f t s of focus that the thesis took over the years. Dr. Murray Chapman at the University of Hawaii, and Professor Ron Crocombe at the University of the South P a c i f i c , generously offered ideas and references to l i t e r a t u r e . Drs. Nancy and Ted Graves graciously gave me the benefit of their f i e l d experience in the Cook Islands. Dr. Braxton Alfred's help with computer programmes was much appreciated. I am also indebted to Rob Borofsky who kindly consented to keep notes for me on the movement of people to and from Pukapuka during the period of his field-work there. Dr. Margaret MacKenzie assisted me well beyond the c a l l of duty, and her introductions to friends in Rarotonga made my field-work that much easier and s a t i s f y i n g . My h e a r t f e l t thanks go out to A k a i t i and Tupai Ama, and their family, for their acceptance of me into their household and the innumerable assistances that they gave me during my two t r i p s to the Cook Islands. I am deeply g r a t e f u l , too, for the friendship and help given me by T a i t i Marekino and family. To these families, to John and Teta Trego in Mangaia, to Tunui Tangaroa in Rarotonga and Teau Tangaroa and family in A i t u t a k i , and the many other Maori who received me generously, I offer my kia orana and kia manuia. xvi This thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of Esther Birney who not only looked after my interests in Vancouver during my field-work, and a f t e r , but also provided a receptive audience and a most perceptive c r i t i c of my work. The field-work for t h i s study was supported by a Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship (No. 452-773453), and the writing-up of the results was supported by a University of B r i t i s h Columbia MacMillan Family Fellowship. Kuniko Miyanaga has contributed to th i s thesis in ways too numerous to mention. Her commitment to knowledge, humanity, and personal growth has been no less than i n s p i r i n g . 1 PART I INTRODUCTORY 2 CHAPTER ONE THE PROBLEM AND THE SETTING The Problem This i s a study of the relat i o n s h i p between migration and socio-economic "development"1 in the Cook Islands of the South P a c i f i c . The study focuses s p e c i f i c a l l y on the period beginning with the re-establishment of self-government in 1965 up to the late 1970s. The relationship between various forms of population mobility and the socio-economic "development" of "sending s o c i e t i e s " in d i f f e r e n t parts of the world has received increasing attention from s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s in various d i s c i p l i n e s during recent years. But the issue, in broad outline, has a long history. The ef f e c t s of labor migration on small scale v i l l a g e and t r i b a l s o c i e t i e s have been of concern to scholars, administrators and s o c i a l c r i t i c s with an interest in c o l o n i a l areas since at least the mid-l9th century. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y true in Oceania, where attention was drawn to the topic in part 1 I w i l l use the term "development" in the meantime without defining i t . An e x p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n w i l l be given in Chapter 2. 3 because of the form recruitment took (variously referred to as kidnapping, "blackbirding", slavery, e t c . ) . 2 Nevertheless, voluntary and l e g a l l y regulated labor migration remained a powerful factor stimulating s o c i a l , economic and c u l t u r a l change well into the 20th century. In the 1920s, the topic became linked with the controversial issue of depopulation; 3 but by the 1930s, the broad impact of migration on communities of o r i g i n began to receive systematic anthropological treatment (e.g., Hogbin [1939]), and during the 1940s a number of detailed studies were conducted by anthropologists and rural s o c i o l o g i s t s in various parts of the world [Read 1942; Shapera 1947; Tannous 1942]. Although these early studies contained a quite e x p l i c i t concern for the welfare of individual migrants and their v i l l a g e s o c i e t i e s , recent studies have focused on the more abstract concepts of "development" and "underdevelopment".* While a large number of studies, p a r t i c u l a r l y those conducted by anthropologists, continue to focus on the v i l l a g e l e v e l of analysis (see the review in Connell, et al_. [ 1974]), an increasing number of studies are concerned with the effects of migration on larger s o c i a l units up to and including the nation-state [Paine 1974; Philpott 1970; Friedlander 1965; Tidrick 2 Labor r e c r u i t i n g began as soon as whalers and sandalwood traders entered the P a c i f i c in the early 19th century. Mass re c r u i t i n g dates from the 1840s [Parnaby 1972] and o f f i c i a l reports on i t s conditions and effects began to appear shortly thereafter. See Belshaw [1954] for a review of Melanesian experience. For an unrepentant account by a labor r e c r u i t e r , see Wawn [1893]. 3 See, for example, the essays in Rivers [1922], es p e c i a l l y Speiser. • For example: Amin [1974], Friedlander [1965], Gregory [1979], Leys [1979], Oberai and Singh [1980], Shankman [1976], Tapinos [1970], Birks and S i n c l a i r [1980]. 4 1973]. Another trend i s the growing attention to the trans-national, regional character of migration flows. The large-scale movement of workers from southern Europe to the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d contries of Germany, France, Switzerland and Sweden, has attracted the attention of anthropologists, s o c i o l o g i s t s , and increasingly, economists. 5 Studies which attempt to assess the impact of migration on the "development" of whole regions of countries have now been conducted in the Middle East [Birks and S i n c l a i r 1980] and in the Southeast A s i a - P a c i f i c area [Jones and Richter 1981]. One important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of many recent, regional studies, i s their sponsorship or association with international agencies charged with the formulation of s o c i a l and economic po l i c y . In Europe the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has sponsored a number of studies [Kayser 1971,1972; Bourguignon et a_l. 1977], while elsewhere in the world the p r i n c i p a l impetus has come from the International Labor Organization (ILO) of the United Nations through i t s World Employment Programme (WEP).6 A recent example of ILO sponsored research i s that of Birks and S i n c l a i r in the Middle East, and a similar ILO-assisted study, with an e x p l i c i t p o l i cy orientation, i s presently underway in the South P a c i f i c region (this study was i n i t i a t e d by the South P a c i f i c Commission at the request of a 5 The number of studies on south-north population movement i s extremely large. A comprehensive, regional study with a s o c i o l o g i c a l focus i s Castles and Kosack [1973]. General studies, t h e o r e t i c a l and empirical, may be found in Kayser [1971,1972], Bohning [1979], G r i f f i n [1976], Ward [1975]. For representative studies dealing with s p e c i f i c countries or regions see: de Sousa [1974], Rhoads [1978, 1978a], Tomasi [1979], King and Strachan [1980], Beuchler and Beuchler [1975]. 6 For background on the WEP see Bohning [1979]. 5 number of P a c i f i c Islands governments concerned with the negative e f f e c t s of the "brain drain" and related i s s u e s ) . 7 Even studies which have not been sponsored by an international agency (e.g., Jones and Richter [1981]) have an ultimate concern with the policy issues faced by governments. The fact that population mobility research i s increasingly focused on "development", rather than broader issues of s o c i a l change, and that interest in the linkages between these two phenomena i s located largely in policy-oriented organizations, has greatly increased the complexity of the issues involved and the methodology used to explore them. Naturally, too, the question of migration and other forms of population mobility has intersected the widespread debate over the "New International Economic Order" (NIEO)—the so-called "North-South dialogue". International migration has been charged with contributing to the "widening gap between r i c h and poor countries" [Bohning 1979:410]. This perception, legitimized by o f f i c i a l United Nations support, has led to a c a l l for an "International Labor Compensatory F a c i l i t y " which would compensate sending countries for the losses they have experienced on account of emigration. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has already moved in t h i s d i r e c t i o n by including the fluctuations of remittances in the category of export earnings covered by i t s "Compensatory Financing F a c i l i t y " [Independent Commission 1980:111]. Thus, the view has been o f f i c i a l l y sanctioned by some of 7 The ILO has, of course, long been involved in international migration issues, p a r t i c u l a r l y where the l e g a l , p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l rights of immigrant workers are concerned. The focus on countries of o r i g i n as whole units rather than on individual migrants i s a more recent trend. 6 the world's most prestigious international organizations, that emigration (and other forms of population mobility) i s harmful to the "development" e f f o r t s of the less-developed nations. From a s o c i a l science point of view, t h i s conclusion immediately arouses suspicion. F i r s t , the concept of "development" i s inherently vague as applied to s o c i e t i e s . The number of d e f i n i t i o n s extant has reached the hundreds, consequently the a n a l y t i c a l u t i l i t y of the development concept i s seriously reduced [Seers 1977], At a minimum i t must be recognised that there are several dimensions to s o c i e t a l development, and there i s no a - p r i o r i reason to assume that each of them responds to population mobility in the same d i r e c t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , "sending s o c i e t i e s " vary greatly in their s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l and economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; and i t i s highly unlikely that the e f f e c t s of migration are completely independent of the s p e c i f i c socio-economic conditions in which i t occurs. Third, population mobility i s a highly complex phenomenon which varies greatly in i t s tempo, intensity, duration and motivation. Is i t r e a l i s t i c to imply that a l l forms of mobility are negatively related to "development" e f f o r t s ? F i n a l l y , there i s a body of t h e o r e t i c a l argument that suggests a quite contrary relationship between migration and "development". Galbraith has recently argued that emigration i s an e f f e c t i v e solution to Third World poverty: Migration ... i s the oldest action against poverty. It selects those who most want help. It i s good for the country to which they go; i t helps to break the equilibrium of poverty in the country from which they come. What i s the perversity in the human soul that causes people to r e s i s t so obvious good? [1979:136]. Similar arguments have been put forward by G r i f f i n [1976:353] who raises the p o s s i b i l i t y that p o l i t i c a l , rather than economic, motivations are behind the discouragement of migration. Belshaw has suggested that "migration from poorer to richer countries i s possibly the most e f f e c t i v e way of increasing world economic growth, since in p r i n c i p l e i t brings people to a climate of enterprise and expansion" [1976:136]. Since the benefits of population r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n within the nation state are acknowledged and well-known [Spengler and Myers 1977; Davis 1977], 8 one is prompted to wonder what i s so d i f f e r e n t about international migration that allegedly produces such contrary r e s u l t s . Should the view become widespread that international migration i s a "bad thing", the potential for r e s t r i c t i v e migration p o l i c i e s accompanied by xenophobia and r a c i a l discrimination is surely great [ G r i f f i n 1976; Teilhet-Waldorf 1979]. The emerging climate of opinion in such bodies as the ILO appears to be a reversal of the pre v a i l i n g views in the 1950s (see United Nations [1953]) which were considerably more l i b e r a l in nature. In t h i s study I intend to explore the rel a t i o n s h i p between migration and socio-economic "development" through an examination of the Cook Islands case. To anticipate, b r i e f l y , the argument of Chapter 2, the question cannot be put in the s i m p l i s t i c form "does migration promote development or underdevelopment?". Rather, the minimally acceptable form of the question i s : "under what conditions do certain patterns of migration produce various kinds of developmental e f f e c t s and in combination with what other 8 Although there i s some doubt about hyper-urbanization. 8 variables?". This formulation better r e f l e c t s the complexity of the issues involved both in the area of "development" and migration. The present study i s intended to add a small amount to the growing body of knowledge of migration processes in r e l a t i o n to socio-economic change in the hope that s i m p l i s t i c formulations do not become the basis for policy or public opinion. Before turning to a more detailed examination of the conceptual and theoretical issues involved here, some background on the Cook Islands i s necessary. The Cook Islands Sett ing The 15 islands and a t o l l s of the Cook group are located in the south P a c i f i c Ocean approximately mid-way between the Samoa islands and the Society Islands (Figure 1.1). The islands divide more or less naturally into two geographic groups, known l o c a l l y as the "southern group" (Figure 1.2) and the "northern group" (Figure 1.3). Aside from the small sand cays of Manuae and Takutea (which are not normally inhabited), a l l the islands of the southern group are of volcanic formation, part of an undersea mountain chain which originates in the Austral Islands to the southeast and disappears in the v i c i n i t y of Palmerston island. The islands of the northern group are of a t o l l formation and, with the exception of Palmerston, are located on a raised oceanic shelf known as the "Manihiki Plateau". Rarotonga, with a t o t a l land area 9 of 67.1 km2 i s the largest, most populous island and the centre of government. The 9 These and subsequent figures on land area and q u a l i t y are from Fox and Grange [1953] (converted to metric). pontic* turiidiatoit. Source: Hawaii Geographic Society (Reproduced by permission). FIGURE 1.2 The Southern Group Showing Rarotonga N v i l l a g e Main road _ _ _ _ _ Ancient road (ara metua) D i s t r i c t boundaries ............. Streams — 0 1 2 3 l L__l I km THE SOUTHERN GROUP A i t u t a k i ft o Manuae Takutea . . * 0 M i t i a r o „ Mauke 20°S A t i u o Rarotonga Q Mangaia 160°W 0 100 200 300 I I I I km Source: Based on Survey Department maps, Rarotonga, Cook Islands. FIGURE 1.3 The Northern Group Showing Pukapuka 160°W 155°W Tongareva Pukapuka Rakahanga 10°S o Manihiki Nassau Suwarrow THE NORTHERN GROUP 1 5 ° S Palmerston 100 200 300 _ J l i km N Toka (sand bank) PUKAPUKA Yato v i l l a g e Pukapuka (Wale) Roto v i l l a g e Boat passages--} y Ngake v i l l a g e Motu Ko 0 1 2 3 I I I 1 km Source: Based on Survey Department maps, Rarotonga, Cook Islands. 12 physical configuration of Rarotonga i s t y p i c a l of "high" volcanic islands in the P a c i f i c : a mountainous central core with a series of sharp ridges radiating toward the periphery, between which are a number of f e r t i l e valleys up to 3 km deep (Figure 1.2); a f e r t i l e , though in places swampy area between the base of the mountains and the l e s s - f e r t i l e coastal p l a i n ; and a lagoon of up to 1 km wide, surrounded by a fringing reef. Of Rarotonga's 6720 hectares (ha), 1500 (22%) are highly f e r t i l e and capable of supporting cash crops or the common root crops consumed domestically. The remaining land i s either too mountainous, i n f e r t i l e or rock-strewn to have s i g n i f i c a n t a g r i c u l t u r a l value. The southern group islands of Mangaia, Atiu, Mauke and Mitiaro are a l l similar in their geologic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and contrast markedly with Rarotonga. These islands consist of a sunken volcanic core of swampy and f e r t i l e land encircled by a raised plateau of coral (known l o c a l l y as makatea), which mainly supports coconut, ferns and scrub. Below the makatea, which in Mangaia reaches a height of 30 meters, i s an area of i n f e r t i l e land which slopes gradually toward a narrow fringing reef. A i t u t a k i , the remaining southern island, combines features common to both volcanic "high" islands and "low" coral a t o l l s and for this reason i s the richest in resources of a l l the Cook Islands and the most li v e a b l e . In t o t a l the southern group contains 20,460 ha of land, about 20% of which i s s u f f i c i e n t l y f e r t i l e to support both subsistence and cash crops. The northern group islands are of a t o l l formation and therefore contain only small quantities of f e r t i l e s o i l . The to t a l area of the northern a t o l l s i s 24.5 km2, most of which i s 13 coral rubble supporting mainly the coconut palm, pandanus tree, and a dry-land variety of taro know as puraka. But each a t o l l has a small amount of organic s o i l , some of which was man-made through the constant mulching of coconut leaves and other material, in which small quantities of swamp taro are grown. While the northern a t o l l s are small in land area, r e l a t i v e to the southern group they have much greater marine resources due to their large lagoons. Tongareva's lagoon i s 64 km in circumference and r i c h l y stocked with f i s h and pearl s h e l l . Manihiki's lagoon i s smaller, but s t i l l of s u f f i c i e n t size to permit commercial pearl f i s h i n g . The s t y l e of l i f e followed in the Cook Islands varies between regions and islands, although there are common patterns and themes. Only Rarotonga and Ait u t a k i have a s u f f i c i e n t degree of economic d i v e r s i t y to permit agriculture to become a secondary occupation. On these two islands, the majority of the labor force i s engaged in wage or sa l a r i e d employment, most of i t in administration or community services. On the other islands, however, agriculture remains the p r i n c i p a l productive a c t i v i t y , although teachers, medical personnel and other Government employees are able to withdraw from cash-cropping. The cash crops produced on Rarotonga for export include c i t r u s f r u i t and juice, pawpaw (papaya), mango, beans, tomatoes, green peppers and other vegetables. Most of thi s production takes place on household plots of land which rarely exceed 2.5 ha. Only a small number of households are exclusively engaged in cash-cropping, and aside from employees in the Department of Agriculture, there is l i t t l e permanent, full-time wage labor in agriculture. Other exports 14 include carved a r t i f a c t s , clothing and shoes, stamps and c o i n s . 1 0 The southern outer islands produce mainly c i t r u s , banana, pineapple and copra for export. A small quantity of coffee i s grown on Atiu and sold to hotels in Rarotonga. In the northern group, copra and pearl s h e l l are the p r i n c i p a l sources of locally-earned cash income. The majority of households throughout the Cook Islands, including those whose main source of income i s wage employment, produce food for household consumption. The staple food crop in the southern group i s taro, with kumara (sweet potato) and kuru (breadfruit) of secondary importance. In the northern group, coconut and f i s h are the staples although small quantities of taro are grown, and r i c e i s imported in growing amounts. Most households in the southern group raise pigs which are consumed mainly on ceremonial occasions. The population of the Cook Islands, which t o t a l l e d 18,112 people in 1976, i s over 95% Polynesian in ethnic o r i g i n . The people themselves, and those things indigenous to them and to the islands, are described l o c a l l y as Maori. While there are l i n g u i s t i c and c u l t u r a l - h i s t o r i c a l l i n k s to the New Zealand Maori population, the two groups should not be confused. 1 1 The Cook Islands were somewhat remote from the p r i n c i p a l 1 0 The la s t two items are not phy s i c a l l y exported but are sold to c o l l e c t o r s through an American agent. 1 1 Unless otherwise stated, the term Maori i s used in th i s study to refer to the native population of the Cook Islands, or to things considered indigenous to the islands. The term "Cook Islanders" i s used interchangeably to mean Cook Islanders of Polynesian e t h n i c i t y . In 1976 about 5% of the population were of European or other extraction. I w i l l refer to them as "non-Maori" (the term "resident", which i s used in o f f i c i a l documents to refer to t h i s group, i s confusing in the context of a migration study and w i l l not be used here). 15 trade routes of the South P a c i f i c , and because land and other natural resources were scarce by comparison with other P a c i f i c island groups to the east and west, the islands did not feature prominently in the 19th century expansion into the P a c i f i c by European states, s e t t l e r s and traders. Polynesian missionaries, trained by the London Missionary Society in T a h i t i , arrived in 1821 and were followed a few years later by a small group of English missionaries who maintained an uneasy a l l i a n c e with the l o c a l chiefs u n t i l the 1880s. 1 2 After a brief period as a B r i t i s h Protectorate, the Cook Islands were annexed to New Zealand in 1901 and administed, somewhat a u t o c r a t i c a l l y , by a Resident Agent, or similar o f f i c i a l , u n t i l 1965 when a new constitution permitting self-government in "free association" with New Zealand was proclaimed. Since the early post-contact period, migration has been an important element of socio-economic change in the Cook I s l a n d s . 1 3 Following World War II, the pace of internal movement from the outer islands to Rarotonga, and external movement from a l l the islands to New Zealand, increased s t e a d i l y . During the f i r s t six years of self-government, the annual rate of emigration slowed down; but the period 1972 to 1975 saw a rapid increase in the number of emigrants leaving the country temporarily or permanently. By the end of 1976, the net emigration loss for the previous decade had climbed to over 7000. 1 2 The best reviews of post-contact history are Gilson [1952,1980]; Beaglehole [1957]. Pre-contact society in some islands i s described most f u l l y in Te Rangi Hiroa [1932, 1932a, 1934, 1938, 1944]; Beaglehole and Beaglehole [1938] 1 3 For previous studies of Cook Islands migration see: Brimble [1976] Crocombe [1971]; Curson [1970,1973]; Douglas [1965]; Hooper [1961,1961a]; Ward [1961]; McArthur [1964]. 16 In proportion to the size of the resident population this i s migration on a massive s c a l e — e q u i v a l e n t to one t h i r d of the t o t a l population in 1971. By 1976, the population of Cook Islands Maori reported to be residents of New Zealand exceeded the number enumerated within the boundaries of the Cook Islands, and this population has continued to grow rapidly during the subsequent five years. 1" Consequently, the ethnic community of Cook Islanders no longer coincides with the geographical boundaries of the Cook Islands. Maori society as a soci o - c u l t u r a l entity now transcends the l e g a l - p o l i t i c a l borders of both the Cook Islands and New Zealand: i t has become bi-national in character. That t h i s population r e d i s t r i b u t i o n has occurred within a decade or so of the Cook Islands achieving p o l i t i c a l s e l f -determination i s paradoxical. On the one hand, the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s , with some degree of internal support, are a c t i v e l y constructing the range of i n s t i t u t i o n s t y p i c a l of nation-states accompanied by an increasingly n a t i o n a l i s t ideology. On the other hand, a large proportion of the native population has transcended the p o l i t i c a l and geographical boundaries of the Cook Islands and s e t t l e d outside the range of such i n s t i t u t i o n s . The more l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are transformed into "national" ones, or completely new i n s t i t u t i o n s are formed to match neighbouring states, the smaller the population becomes which i s served by them and which 1 u In 1976, 18,610 f u l l and part Maori were reported as "usually resident" in New Zealand (New Zealand Department of S t a t i s t i c s , 1976 Census of Population, p.9). The Cook Islands Census for 1976 indicates 17,322 f u l l and part Maori (Cook Islands S t a t i s t i c s O f f i c e , 1976 Census of Population and Housing, p. 106). In so far as the New Zealand census i s de jure while the Cook Islands census i s a de facto type, there may be some overlap between these figures. 17 is required to pay their c o s t s . 1 5 The growing assertion of de-facto sovereignty i s closely linked to the vigorous e f f o r t s of the government to obtain foreign aid from any possible source. As the population shrinks, and with i t the productive capacity and tax base of the economy, increasing amounts of foreign a i d are required to maintain "national" i n s t i t u t i o n s — i n c l u d i n g the p o l i t i c a l system i t s e l f . Since more aid i s available for independent, but underdeveloped "nations" than for self-governing t e r r i t o r i e s which remain linked to a metropolitan power, the tendencies of increasing foreign aid inflow and assertive nationalism are s e l f - r e i n f o r e i n g . The immediate j u s t i f i c a t i o n for seeking increased levels of foreign aid, however, is the "economic development" of the Cook Islands. The o f f i c i a l view i s that the islands are "underdeveloped" 1 6 and that foreign aid is essential to their "development". I do not intend to challenge t h i s view except to note that i t i s questionable [see Bauer 1976; Khor 1979]. What I do wish to explore i s the role of migration ( p a r t i c u l a r l y emigration) in r e l a t i o n to the "development" which the government is seeking to promote through foreign aid and the programmes purchased with i t . While the strategy of government revolves around aid and formal programmes, for large numbers of 1 5 Nationalism i s evident in some recent changes: the "Premier" is now "Prime Minister" and the " l e g i s l a t u r e " now "Parliament". The Minister of Justice has been renamed the " S o l i c i t o r General" so as not to be in an " i n f e r i o r status" at international conferences. Some government o f f i c i a l s have spoken of the "national culture" of the Cook Islands and such i n s t i t u t i o n s as "national anthem" and "national arts theatre" have been established. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , taxation emerged as a major item of p o l i t i c a l controversy in 1980. 1 6 This characterization was made by the present Prime Minister during a radio speech in July, 1978. 18 individuals and families emigration i s the most e f f e c t i v e means to overcome low income and thwarted expectations. The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i n k with New Zealand which permits Cook Islanders to migrate free l y to that country contrasts sharply with the situation of other P a c i f i c Islanders in F i j i , Samoa, Tonga, etc., who do not have th i s option open to them (at least not on a permanent basis). The existence of this "option" obviously has important implications for "development" strategies and planning, since there i s no guarantee that the population w i l l stay put and suffer through whatever short-term hardships may be implied in various programmes. This returns us to the question posed at the outset: does migration (under Cook Islands conditions) contribute to the developmental goals which government i s seeking to achieve by other means? Put another way, are the private actions of individuals and families who have sought to change their style of l i f e and l e v e l of l i v i n g through emigration compatible with the public programmes formulated by the government? Or, on the other hand, are the two tendencies incompatible and contradictory? The present study i s an attempt to throw some l i g h t on th i s complex question. The Organization of the Study The study i s organized in three parts. Part I i s introductory. Part II describes migration patterns in the Cook Islands during the post-self government period and examines the ef f e c t s of these patterns on population growth and structure. Part III describes the changes in selected indicators of "socio-19 economic development" over the same period and explores the possible relationship between these changes and the migration patterns described in Part I I . The following i s a more detailed overview of the study. Chapter 2 examines the t h e o r e t i c a l and conceptual issues involved in studying the relationship between migration and socio-economic development in general and in the Cook Islands in p a r t i c u l a r . An attempt i s made to c l a r i f y the meaning of "development" and i t s counter-concept "underdevelopment". In broad terms i t i s argued that "development" subsumes three dimensions of socio-economic change which can be studied by macroscopic methods: (1) economic growth; (2) the physical qu a l i t y of l i f e ; (3) organizational complexity. Chapter 3 provides some background material on Cook Islands migration. The effects of migration on a s o c i a l system are not determined by the nature of migration alone but also depend on the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the sending society. This chapter provides a description of the s o c i a l economic context in which large scale emigration has developed. In Chapter 4 a descriptive overview of migration patterns in the Cook Islands since 1966 i s given. The p r i n c i p a l issues here are: the magnitude of migration; the d i r e c t i o n and regional v a r i a t i o n in migration streams; age, sex and ethnic s e l e c t i v i t y ; the p e r i o d i c i t y , duration and tempo of migration. The emphasis here i s primarily on the demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the migration streams; such aspects as occupations and s k i l l s are discussed in Chapter 6. The e f f e c t s of migration on population growth, structure, and geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n are examined in Chapter 5. The 20 issue of "overpopulation" and the pressure of population on "natural resources" are also discussed here. Chapter 6 examines the e f f e c t s of migration on the si z e , quality and regional d i s t r i b u t i o n of the Cook Islands labor force. As w i l l be argued in Chapter 2, these are c r u c i a l variables in the growth of output and productivity. The question of whether migration results in a net loss of s k i l l s and "human resources" w i l l be considered here. The ultimate "dependent variables" in t h i s study are examined in Chapter 7. As already mentioned, I have selected three indicators of "development": economic growth, the physical qua l i t y of l i f e , and s t r u c t u r a l complexity. This chapter w i l l explore the possible linkages between migration population change and these "development" dimensions. F i n a l l y , Chapter 8 looks at migration from a "cost-benefit" perspective. The general aim i s to assess the argument that the country of emigration incurs more costs than benefits through the free-flow of migrants. Related to t h i s is the hypothesis that migration from poorer to richer countries i s a form of exploitation of the former by the l a t t e r , or at least a symptom of "unequal exchange" between the two systems. Also examined in th i s chapter i s the question of whether emigration has increased the degree of "dependency" between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. This overview has foreshadowed some of the elements of the theoret i c a l framework I intend to pursue. The next chapter examines the l o g i c a l and conceptual issues involved in the selection of such a framework. 21 General Methods and Field-Work The general approach of the study i s macro-sociological and macro-economic. This implies the use of descriptive s t a t i s t i c s at a high l e v e l of aggregation. Since most of these s t a t i s t i c s were derived from o f f i c i a l sources, t h i s study constitutes secondary analysis. It should be noted, however, that the meaning and interpretation of various s t a t i s t i c s has been supported by direct f i e l d observation. 1 7 Between October 1977 and July 1978 I l i v e d with a Maori family in the " v i l l a g e " of Ngatangi'ia on the island of Rarotonga. 1 8 I was able to achieve a modest understanding of and a b i l i t y in the Rarotongan language with the assistance of my host family and others, and was able to observe many of the s o c i a l and economic patterns re f l e c t e d in primary s t a t i s t i c s . A return t r i p from March to June 1980 enabled me to check the v i t a l s t a t i s t i c s used to estimate emigration rates by island, and to obtain additional economic m a t e r i a l . 1 9 As I indicate in Appendix A, much of the s t a t i s t i c a l material presented here was o r i g i n a l l y intended to provide the background to a v i l l a g e - l e v e l study; when this became impossible these s t a t i s t i c a l materials, with a l l their l i m i t a t i o n s , became the basis of the entire study. While much of the s t a t i s t i c a l material was taken from published sources, some had to be processed from primary data not previously compiled or tabulated. For example, the wage and salary data to be discussed in Chapter 3 was taken from a previously unpublished employment survey conducted by the Cook 1 7 For another example of t h i s type of approach, see P i r i e [1976]. 1 8 The f i e l d s ituation i s described more f u l l in Appendix A. 1 9 The results of these checks are reported in Hayes [1980]. 22 Islands S t a t i s t i c s Office in 1975. The o r i g i n a l questionnaires were re-coded by me and processed by computer. Simi l a r l y , migration data by age had to be re-processed by computer in order to obtain a net emigration figure for the f u l l range of age groups. Some use has also been made of 1976 census data which was re-processed by computer to obtain labor force information not previously p u b l i s h e d . 2 0 Some primary data were gathered during my field-work period in Rarotonga. P a r t i a l results from an occupational prestige survey taken in three Rarotonga high schools are reported in Chapter 3. I also conducted a survey of 18 public and private enterprises in order to obtain information on wages and sa l a r i e s , labor demand and supply, labor turnover and recruitment. Some of these results are reported in Chapters 6 and 7. Much of this material has not been used because better s t a t i s t i c s became available in the interim: the 1975 employment survey came to li g h t a few days before my departure from Rarotonga; the New Zealand Department of S t a t i s t i c s made available unpublished information on the occupations of migrants. The supply of economic s t a t i s t i c s on the Cook Islands has expanded since 1971. A study focused on the 1971-81 decade would produce better results than one covering the 1966-76 decade because of the shortage of data during the f i r s t f i v e years of the new self-governing Administration. 2 0 The assistance of the Cook Islands S t a t i s t i c s Office i s gr a t e f u l l y acknowledged. 23 CHAPTER TWO THEORETICAL ISSUES: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM The General Nature of the Problem Before going into the conceptual ambiguities of the concepts "development" and "underdevelopment", i t might be useful to present some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h e o r e t i c a l statements and research conclusions in order to obtain a general idea of the kinds of claims which have been made about migration in re l a t i o n to "development".1 The modern l i b e r a l view of migration, for example, i s reflected in the following: The reallocation of r e l a t i v e l y unskilled labor which mass emigration represents contributes to greater e f f i c i e n c y in resource u t i l i z a t i o n and a r i s e in world output. [ G r i f f i n 1976:358] The o r i g i n of thi s general position can be traced to J.S. M i l l : The exportation of laborers and c a p i t a l from the old to the new countries, from a place where their productive power i s less, to a place where i t is greater, increases by so much the aggregate produce of the labor and c a p i t a l of the world. It adds to the joint wealth of the old and the new country, what amounts in a short period to many times the mere cost of eff e c t i n g the transport. 1 Note that there are many empirical studies which deal with socio-economic aspects of migration patterns without necessarily r e l a t i n g them to "development" as such (see the review by Connell et a l . [1974]). 24 [ M i l l 1965:963] The c l a s s i c a l economists' argument on migration was formed in opposition to the pr e v a i l i n g Mercantalist view which regarded migration as harmful u n l e s s — a s in the case of English emigration to the c o l o n i e s - - i t could be shown that employment at home was increased as a result [Thomas 1973:1; Schultz 1977:379]. C l a s s i c a l theorists, imbued with the idea of diminishing returns, supported government-sponsored emigration on the grounds that the tendency of the rate of p r o f i t to f a l l would be subverted and wages would r i s e on account of there being fewer workers. 2 Consequently, migration was exempted from the p r i n c i p l e of l a i s s e z - f a i r e ; i t s benefits flowed so long as c a p i t a l i s t s and laborers remained separate classes and only government control over the d i s t r i b u t i o n of land could ensure that the class structure of the mother country was reproduced in the colonies [Thomas 1973:6-7], In contrast, modern l i b e r a l theory treats the freedom of labor to relocate according to i t s own "s e l f interest" as a d i r e c t expression of l a i s s e z - f a i r e and any interference with th i s right implies a regression to neo-Mercantalism. 3 2 Marx viewed emigration from B r i t a i n as symptomatic of capitalism's tendency to create " r e l a t i v e surplus population" or an " i n d u s t r i a l reserve army" [Marx 1906:706-707]. This conception i s at the root of most Marxisant approaches to labor migration (See Ward [1975, 1975a], Castles and Kosack [1973]), but, following Keynes, the idea of "disequilibrium" between c a p i t a l accumulation and the demand for labor has been incorporated into l i b e r a l theory. 3 For a strong statement of t h i s view see Schultz [1977]. In t h i s version of l i b e r a l theory i t i s l o g i c a l l y impossible for migration to have negative economic consequences. Only "voluntary" behaviour i s amenable to "economic" analysis; thus, i f migration i s "involuntary" i t i s economically i r r e l e v a n t . Migration in response to famine i s "voluntary" in so far as i t serves the " s e l f - i n t e r e s t of s u r v i v a l " [Schultz 1977:378], 25 Two features of the " l i b e r a l " approach to migration deserve mention: (1) the focus i s on the growth of world output (see also Belshaw [1976:136]); (2) i t contains an i m p l i c i t p o l i t i c a l philosophy which emphasizes the right of individuals to improve their life-chances through migration (see also Schultz [1977]). The c l a s s i c a l view of migration emerged from a debate of the economic benefits of colonies; migration from "old" countries f a c i l i t a t e d the creation of "new" ones, presumably out of underpopulated, but p o t e n t i a l l y f e r t i l e , wilderness. The type of migration I am concerned with here i s c l e a r l y of a d i f f e r e n t order. The movement of "guest workers" from European hinterlands to the i n d u s t r i a l centres of the EEC, the movement of "peasants" from the v i l l a g e communities of A f r i c a , Asia or the P a c i f i c to l o c a l or overseas urban areas, or from the minifundia of rural Latin America to the barrios of large metropolitan centres, a l l these types of migration imply rather d i f f e r e n t socio-economic conditions than those the c l a s s i c a l economists had in mind. In the African case, concern over the p o t e n t i a l l y harmful ef f e c t s of temporary labor migration on v i l l a g e s o c i e t i e s was expressed at an early stage by c o l o n i a l authorities and in some areas led to the setting of quotas l i m i t i n g the numbers who could be absent at any one time [Colson 1966:109; Berg 1965:170]. A somewhat di f f e r e n t kind of concern has been expressed during the present post-colonial era: Emigration impoverishes the region, i t also prevents the socio-economic structure from undergoing r a d i c a l , progressive change; also, to defend themselves, to survive, these s o c i e t i e s react by reinforcing those aspects of their t r a d i t i o n a l structure, which enables them to survive t h i s impoverishment. But at the same time, th i s impoverishment reinforces the push-effect on certai n elements of the population, reproducing the 26 conditions of emigration. The form that t h i s takes i s that of a degenerated, agrarian capitalism, corrupted and poor. [Amin 1974:104] Similar views have been stated recently in reference to migration from the Upper Volta to the West A f r i c a coast: Vol t a i c underdevelopment has produced a highly unbalanced s p a t i a l pattern of economic opportunity resulting in out-migration from rural areas. In turn, th i s out-migration may be reducing the potential of Upper Volta to generate adequate and s a t i s f y i n g employment within the rural sector. [Gregory 1979:83] The most closely-argued counter-position on the West A f r i c a case has been stated by E l l i o t Berg: On the l e v e l of the v i l l a g e economy as a whole, labor migration i s the most e f f i c i e n t way to meet money-income needs. It allows v i l l a g e society to maintain i t s e l f within the t r a d i t i o n a l framework. For the individual v i l l a g e r , migration permits the maximizing of the income of his household as a consuming unit. [1965:173] According to t h i s view, migration not only benefits the sending v i l l a g e s , i t promotes the economic development of the region as a whole: ...the migrant labor system represents an " e f f i c i e n t " adaptation to the economic environment in West A f r i c a . H i s t o r i c a l l y , i t permitted West A f r i c a to enjoy more rapid growth than would otherwise have been possible. It continues to benefit both the labor-exporting v i l l a g e s and recipient areas. Because migrant labor permits a better a l l o c a t i o n of resources than would be possible under any other form of labor u t i l i z a t i o n , i t is not l i k e l y to disappear u n t i l fundamental changes occur in West African economies. [Berg 1965:161] The view that labor migration i s an appropriate adaptation to the p o l i t i c a l and economic conditions of A f r i c a , also receives support in the work of Byerlee [1974:557], Skinner [1965:83-84], Mit c h e l l [1969:171] and Van Velson [1966:161]. Since World War II, and in some regions well before, migrants from the rural areas of Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain and Italy have moved, temporarily or permanently, to the 27 i n d u s t r i a l centres of West Germany, France and Switzerland. By the early 1970s, the number of foreign migrant workers in north-western Europe reached 6 m i l l i o n plus an equivalent number of dependents [Bohning 1979:401].4 The overwhelmingly negative view of the impact of emigration on European exporting regions is supported by a number of empirical studies. One of these concluded: Unless migrants are attached to the region from which they originate, emigration i s in the long run, nothing but a factor of empoverishment. At the outset i t relieves congestion but l i t t l e by l i t t l e i t becomes erosive. As there can be no q u a l i t a t i v e control over departing emigrants, the cream i s bound to be skimmed o f f . In t h i s way a community loses i t s structure while i t s economic system disintegrates. [Kayser 1971:151] After reviewing empirical research on t h i s issue in I t a l y , Tomasi concluded that "...emigration s t i f l e s development because i t r e sults in no changes in the system of a g r i c u l t u r a l ownership and in r u r a l structures" [1979:335], Tapinos suggests that while emigration may relieve unemployment problems for a time t h i s may be a " f a c i l e solution which only postpones problems" [1970:13], Several authors [Ward 1975, 1975a; Rhoads 1978, 1978a; Castles and Kosack 1973] have characterized labor migration as a system of d i r e c t exploitation of r u r a l areas by the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries: * It i s partly the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of these migration streams to business cycles which has led to the debate over the benefits and costs of migration to sending regions [Kayser 1971, 1972; Bohning 1979], This issue was raised at the 1976 World Employment Conference and subsequent conventions and commissions sponsored by the ILO and other bodies have led to recommendations that sending areas be compensated for their loss of human resources. Resolutions to this e f f e c t have been passed by the UN General Assembly. 28 Today migration i s highly p r o f i t a b l e for Western European capitalism. At the same time i t does nothing to a l l e v i a t e the backwardness of the regions from which migrants come; indeed i t i s often a hindrence to development. Labor migration i s a form of development aid given by poor countries to r i c h countries. [Castles and Kosack 1973:8] G r i f f i n has argued on th e o r e t i c a l grounds, supported by some data from Turkey, that the negative consequences of emigration have been exaggerated. 5 There i s no evidence that emigration reduces a country's rate of growth, and in p r i n c i p l e i t could raise i t . Thus, those who are concerned with achieving s o c i a l j u s t i c e for the working people of underdeveloped countries should condemn the r e s t r i c t i v e immigration p o l i c i e s of r i c h countries... [ G r i f f i n 1976:359]. The negative conclusions regarding European and African migration which we have quoted above, refer p r i n c i p a l l y to systems of supposedly temporary migration wherein migrants receive fewer s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l rights than other classes of c i t i z e n s or workers, and where their chances of s o c i a l mobility within the "host" country are severely limited. Furthermore, the negative e f f e c t s are believed to accrue to the rural v i l l a g e or region of o r i g i n rather than to the national unit of which each is a part. The question arises whether the same consequences are to be expected when migration i s more permanent and where the unit of analysis i s the nation-state as a whole, or, paradoxically, the majority of in d i v i d u a l s . Two studies from the Caribbean may be taken as i l l u s t r a t i v e of research focused at the nation-state l e v e l . T i d r i c k ' s analysis of the economic effects of Jamaican emigration to Great B r i t a i n 5 For a d i f f e r e n t view of the Turkish case see [Paine 1974]. 29 during the period 1953-62 led him to the conclusion that "on balance, emigration appears to have aided rather than impeded economic development" [Tidrick 1973:218], Similar conclusions were reached by Friedlander in a study of emigration from Puerto Rico to the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. In b r i e f , "emigration was a c r u c i a l variable in the success story of economic growth and prosperity of Puerto Rico" [Friedlander 1965:166].6 The volume and tempo of migration in the South P a c i f i c region has increased steadily since the close of World War I I . Western and American Samoa, Niue, Tonga, F i j i and the Cook Islands have a l l become, to varying degrees, "migration oriented" s o c i e t i e s . 7 In these cases migration streams lead p r i n c i p a l l y to New Zealand, Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States, with smaller t r i b u t o r i e s to A u s t r a l i a and further a f i e l d . While a small amount of migration from the Solomons, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and French Polynesia i s international in scope, the most s i g n i f i c a n t streams here are from ru r a l 'areas or islands to l o c a l urban centres (often characterized by complex patterns of c i r c u l a t i o n ) . 8 A minor debate has emerged around the question of Samoan emigration to New Zealand. Following a case study of a v i l l a g e on Upolu, Shankman concluded: 6 The posi t i v e e f f e c t s in Puerto Rico may have been sho r t - l i v e d . Piore reported that a severe labor shortage developed in the mid-s i x t i e s leading to suggestions from business groups that labor be imported from Colombia [Piore 1979:132]. 7 This term i s from Philpott [1970:13]. 8 On Solomon Islands mobility see Chapman [1974, 1976]. On Papua New Guinea see May [1977] and Conroy [1976] and on Vanuatu (New Hebrides) see Bedford [1973]. For other examples of population mobility in Oceania see Lieber [1977], 30 The data for Western Samoa indicate that migration and remittances offer a p a r t i a l solution to the problem of underdevelopment for families and individuals. Dependence on migration and remittances, however, i s also symptomatic of continuing underdevelopment. Furthermore, as migration and remittances become more important at both national and l o c a l l e v e l s , they may perpetuate underdevelopment. That i s , by more clos e l y integrating Islanders into a wider p o l i t i c a l economy, the e f f e c t s of migration and remittances may prevent economic development. [Shankman 1976:85] Similar views were expressed e a r l i e r by P i r i e based on a comparative study of several Samoan v i l l a g e s : Emigration is being used as a substitute for the vigorous investment needed to expand employment and urban f a c i l i t i e s . . . To permit the already advanced nations, such as New Zealand, to benefit from Samoan c a p i t a l and s k i l l s , p a i n f u l l y accumulated, at the expense of development at home is to reduce Western Samoa to a hinterland community. [ P i r i e 1972:212] On the other hand, P i t t has argued that emigration has no adverse a f f e c t on Samoan v i l l a g e s o c i e t i e s ; to the contrary, migration helps to maintain the system of i n s t i t u t i o n s c o l l e c t i v e l y referred to as fa'asamoa (the Samoan way) [ P i t t 1970:185-88], However, the negative effects of labor migration from Tonga have been stressed by de Bres and Campbell: Tonga, with a rapidly increasing population, rapidly changing consumer habits, and a stagnant and increasingly dependent economy, has developed that unhappy congruence of push and p u l l factors t y p i c a l of other countries of o r i g i n for migrant labour. Possibly nowhere in the world has economic dependence been taken further than in t h i s microcosm of underdevelopment, [de Bres and Campbell 1975:451] But these views are not necessarily shared by Tongans themselves. One author has commended the New Zealand Government for permitting Tongans to migrate there even i f only for the 3-month period that was, u n t i l recently, the maximum allowed. Migration is considered l o c a l l y to be a form of development aid rather than 31 a system of exploitation: At t h i s point in time we are able to see concrete evidence of good s o c i a l e f f e c t s of migration. We are ' unable to see the intangible bad e f f e c t s , i f any. The phenomenon of migration i s new, exciting and infectious. It has brought about a rapid transformation in housing, a sense of security, a new outlook and a feeling of well-being to some. Our best exports are our manpower and labour overseas. [Edwards 1975:79] It w i l l be clear from the foregoing that the claims made about migration cover an extremely broad range of phenomena: from " e f f i c i e n t resource a l l o c a t i o n " to "exploitation", from wealth to impoverishment, from economic growth to community s u r v i v a l , from support of " t r a d i t i o n " to the "disintegration" of s o c i e t i e s . Some of the statements are contrary only in so far as d i f f e r e n t value judgements are implied. Thus, Amin charges emigration with reinforcing " t r a d i t i o n a l structure" (undesirable), while P i t t sees emigration as supporting t r a d i t i o n (desirable). S i m i l a r l y , what appears as " e f f i c i e n c y " from one theoreti c a l perspective i s "exploitation" from another, and so on. In the following section I attempt to bring some order to th i s confusion by c l a r i f y i n g , for the purposes of thi s study, the concepts of development and underdevelopment. Development and Underdevelopment: Conceptual Issues We can begin by distinguishing between three separate, but often overlapping, sets of questions: (1) the concern of formal economics with a theory of economic "growth" where growth i s defined as a real increase in the t o t a l or per capita output or consumption of goods and services; (2) the interest of h i s t o r i c a l sociology and the evolutionary school of anthropology in the 32 theory and process of organizational and st r u c t u r a l change in s o c i a l systems; (2) a less formalized set of issues which implicate such f i e l d s as welfare economics, epidemiology, medicine, psychology, s o c i a l work and anthropology. Here I refer to the relationship between economic growth, structural and organizational change, and the "welfare" of individuals and f a m i l i e s . 9 If we take the meaning of "development" as given in the Oxford English D i c t i o n a r y , 1 0 there is no reason why the term should not be applied with equal v a l i d i t y to each of these problem areas; but the f a i l u r e to distinguish between them, or the unexamined assumption that "development" in one sphere implies "development" in one or both of the others, has produced a great deal of confusion [Belshaw 1974; Brookfield 1975; Flamang 1979; Seers 1972]. It i s also possible to breakdown the concept of "underdevelopment" into similar dimensions. To describe a region or country as "underdeveloped" i s to imply either a negative rate of economic growth, or a slower growth rate than i s p o s s i b l e , 1 1 the presence of an archaic or regressive form of s o c i a l organization or structure, or a l e v e l of welfare received by individuals or groups that i s less than i s possible and/or desirable. 9 More or less similar d i s t i n c t i o n s as these have been made by a number of authors. See Baster [1972], Belshaw [1974, 1976], Dalton [1971], Flamang [1979]. 1 0 [Compact Edition, 1971:77]. 1 1 Higgins defines an underdeveloped country as one in which there has been no discernable r i s e in t o t a l and per capita income in two centuries [1968:147], It i s not clear what makes thi s the relevant time-scale. 33 In other words, when the indicators of any one of these components changes in a negative direction we can speak of underdevelopment; when the change i s in a positive d i r e c t i o n we can speak of development. In a comprehensive sense, development "theory" concerns the hypothetical and real interconnections between these three elements: productive capacity, s o c i a l structure/organization, and so c i a l w e l f a r e . 1 2 These interconnections are e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t in most theories of "development". The "modernization" paradigm, for example, assumed that the le v e l s of "welfare" achieved by the Western i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nations could only be attained elsewhere by means of the same l e v e l and kind of economic growth and productive i n s t i t u t i o n s . 1 3 This particular model has been discred i t e d by i t s empirical results and ideological content; but the nature of the interconnections between the three elements outlined above remains the central issue in "development" theory. 1* While the range of organizational types capable of providing a high l e v e l of welfare i s much wider than the "modernization" paradigm allowed, increasing le v e l s of welfare do 1 2 The d e f i n i t i o n of "development" which comes closest to what I have in mind here i s the "...enhancement of the capacity of a society to function for the well being of i t s members over the long run". This i s what McGranahan [1972:97] describes as the "Capacity Performance" model of development. This d e f i n i t i o n could be improved by the addition of "independent" capacity... Defined in thi s way "development" i s not only a problem of the so-called "developing" s o c i e t i e s [Seers 1977]. 1 3 Few neo-classical economists would argue that "growth" i s s e l f - j u s t i f y i n g or that the s o c i a l inequality believed to be necessary for c a p i t a l accumulation i s a "good thing" in i t s e l f . Rather, growth and inequality were seen as necessary mechanisms which, in the fullness of time, would produce higher levels of welfare (the " t r i c k l e down" eff e c t ) than would otherwise occur. 1 * Development in the sense used here is not simply a shopping l i s t of randomly associated desiderata. See McGranahan [1972:95-96]. 34 not appear out of nothing: they are a product of the organized application of resources to human problems. The degree to which higher levels of welfare require "growth" in the t o t a l "production of goods and services i s obviously variable. Clearly "growth" and "welfare" need not be opposites or necessarily in c o n f l i c t . In certain situations t o t a l product may be adequate while d i s t r i b u t i o n i s not. The same may be said for structure and organization: the former may be adequate while the l a t t e r requires modification (as when a kin group re-organizes around new objectives). And what constitutes the "Good L i f e " i s obviously a philosophical question related to s p e c i f i c , as well as universal c u l t u r a l values. These elementary d i s t i n c t i o n s are, however, merely points of departure. Any par t i c u l a r theory of development must specify the content of these forms, suggest indicators of each dimension as well as hypothetical interconnections between them. Economic Growth The concept of "growth" has been at the core of "development" thinking for three decades. 1 5 It implies changes in the volume of goods and services produced or consumed within a so c i a l unit. The emphasis here i s on a measurable quantity represented by money or some other indicator of value or purchasing power. The standard measures of growth in development studies are Gross National Product (GNP), Net National Product (NNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP), necessarily applying to the nation as a geographic unit or a c o l l e c t i v i t y of c i t i z e n s . 1 5 For a brief history of growth theory see Brookfield [1975]. 35 For certain limited purposes i t i s appropriate to give "development" an operational d e f i n i t i o n such as a s p e c i f i c l e v e l , rate of growth, or pattern of d i s t r i b u t i o n in GNP. A quite d i f f e r e n t set of issues arises when GNP is used as an indicator of something else, whether that be "growth" or "progress". In this case important t h e o r e t i c a l and conceptual questions are implicated concerning the relationship between the indicator and the underlying phenomena to which i t r e f e r s . 1 6 The shortcomings of GNP as a measure of economic growth and lev e l s of welfare in "developing" countries are well known.17 We note here simply that the v a l i d i t y of GNP as a measure of growth depends on what kinds of economic transactions have been included and excluded from the c a l c u l a t i o n and on the purpose of the analysis. Soc i a l Structure and Organization The patterns of s t r u c t u r a l and organizational change that are defined as, or emerge with, "development" i s the primary subject matter of macro-sociology. Social structure refers to patterned sets of s o c i a l relationships which endure through time and are defined normatively such that there i s a generally accepted set of expectations about the behaviour of various s o c i a l members. Social organization, on the other hand, refers to the a c t i v i t i e s required to "get things done"; i t implies the making of decisions and choices as well as the a l l o c a t i o n of 1 6 As McGranahan points out, a s t a t i s t i c i s not in i t s e l f an indicator but can only become one when i t i s defined as such by a theory [McGranahan 1972:94]. 1 7 See McGranahan [1972], Morris [1979], Seers [1972]. 36 resources to various ends. 1 8 Development implies changing patterns of organization and so c i a l structure. Structural change i s reflected at the personal l e v e l by a s h i f t in the basis of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and evaluation from a kinship role to an occupational one. At the s o c i e t a l l e v e l s t r u c t u r a l change is re f l e c t e d in the growth of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and the increasing d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of productive a c t i v i t i e s ( d i v i s i o n of labor). Empirically, increasing complexity in the d i v i s i o n of labor i s the key structural c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of "development"; but i t i s rarely a goal for i t s own sake. Complexity follows from decisions made in the interest of e f f i c i e n c y , but the rel a t i o n s h i p i s not l i n e a r : there may be situations in which e f f i c i e n c y requires less complexity. The p r i n c i p a l indicator of structural change for "development" purposes i s the pattern of occupational roles which indicate broad changes in the nature of productive systems. Changes in s o c i a l organization are reflected in the way in which decisions are made, the kinds of resources "that are mobilized, and the p r i n c i p l e s according to which resources are a p p l i e d . 1 9 1 8 This d i s t i n c t i o n between structure and organization i s made by F i r t h [1963:35-36]. 1 9 The "modernization" paradigm stresses the role of science or " r a t i o n a l i t y " in general, contrasting " t r a d i t i o n a l " s o c i e t i e s with "modern" ones on thi s basis. But the rati o n a l properties of " t r a d i t i o n a l " action can only be uncovered by an investigation of the s o c i o - c u l t u r a l context. 37 Social Welfare The concept of human welfare i s i m p l i c i t in a great many development studies, including some previously quoted. For some, underdevelopment implies absolute, or r e l a t i v e , poverty [Galbraith 1965; Myrdal 1970], rather than a condition of s o c i a l organization (although the l a t t e r may be considered a cause of the former). Recent attempts to make the welfare component of development more e x p l i c i t in programmes are re f l e c t e d in the growing emphasis on a "basic needs" approach. The primary emphasis here is on such material conditions of l i f e as health and n u t r i t i o n , housing, education and, employment; but the concept also extends to "self reliance", " p o l i t i c a l freedom", " c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y " , and other non-material aspects of l i f e [Streeten 1977; Seers 1977]. There i s a danger that i f the term welfare i s extended to cover psychological and other non-material needs i t w i l l become conceptually overloaded and therefore vague. It then begins to look l i k e a residual category for a l l the non-physical aspects of l i f e which r e s i s t q u a n t i f i c a t i o n . In t h i s context I prefer to r e s t r i c t the concept of welfare primarily to i t s physical and quantifiable aspects. Those non-material aspects of development which have to do with c u l t u r a l l y - s p e c i f i c goals (a more suitable term than "needs") are best dealt with in a 38 s p e c i f i c category. 2 0 In so far as a society is conceived as a system through which "welfare" is both defined and delivered, individual and community welfare are clos e l y connected. For a society to meet the needs of i t s members i t must also meet the conditions of i t s own s u r v i v a l . The measurement of "welfare" i s complex and as yet there i s no single set of indicators in general use. Morbidity and mortality s t a t i s t i c s r e f l e c t general health conditions. Caloric and protein intake are measurable aspects of n u t r i t i o n . Housing and water quality are factors in themselves and can be expected to be refl e c t e d in morbidity data. The Research Problem C l a r i f i e d If we re-examine the empirical studies and theoretical arguments in the l i g h t of the d i s t i n c t i o n s drawn above, i t w i l l be apparent that the arguments for and against migration as a "development-fostering process" 2 1 are based to some extent on di f f e r e n t conceptions of what development i s , what the s o c i a l unit i s which "develops", how i t can be measured or operationalized, and what kinds of processes bring i t about. 2 0 One of the few serious t h e o r e t i c a l attempts in t h i s d i r e c t i o n i s Belshaw [1970], where the concept of " s o c i a l performance" i s suggested. I see thi s as a fourth dimension of development in addition to the three already mentioned, even though there i s potential overlap. More accurately, the " s o c i a l performance" p r o f i l e of a society p o t e n t i a l l y contains elements of growth, str u c t u r a l change and s o c i a l welfare, but the desirable l e v e l of achievement in these areas i s given by the c u l t u r a l system of the society i t s e l f . This concept of " s o c i a l performance" is i m p l i c i t in certain parts of t h i s study, but a proper treatment requires d i f f e r e n t methods than have been employed here. 2 1 This phrase i s from Spengler and Myers [1979]. 39 However, there is a great deal of variation in the extent to which these conceptions are made e x p l i c i t and the degree to which each link in the chain of deductions--from conception to outcome--is f u l l y spelled out. The "development" implications of migration are t y p i c a l l y discussed in terms of seven distinguishable, but overlapping, e f f e c t s : (1) population e f f e c t s ; (2) welfare and q u a l i t y of l i f e e f f e c t s ; (3) s o c i a l organization and/or structural e f f e c t s ; (4) income, consumption and balance of payments e f f e c t s ; (5) production e f f e c t s ; (6) work force and human resources e f f e c t s ; (7) c a p i t a l formation e f f e c t s . Not a l l of these categories are on the same l e v e l of abstraction: some refer to properties of a n a l y t i c a l frameworks while others are more "substantive"; but each can be linked t h e o r e t i c a l l y to the three components of "development" outlined above. I w i l l discuss each of these links in turn. Population Effects The extent to which migration a f f e c t s development-related aspects of population w i l l depend on i t s d i r e c t i o n , content and magnitude. In this respect migration does not act alone but in combination with trends in f e r t i l i t y and mortality. The same rate of net migration may be associated with population growth when natural increase i s high and with population decline when natural increase i s low [Davis 1977:153], However, migration and natural increase are also i n t e r r e l a t e d : population growth i s reduced not only by the migrants who leave but also by the births that migrants would have had i f they had not emigrated. But the 40 process of migration may not be neutral to the b i r t h rate: non-migrants may substitute for the "missing" births and the overa l l growth rate maintained. 2 2 Several v i l l a g e studies have shown that emigration tends to lower the b i r t h rate due to delayed marriage and more widely-spaced births [Connell et a l . 1974; Gonzalez 1961; Tapinos 1970], but in general terms migration must reach high lev e l s before long-term growth w i l l be affected by the actions of migration alone [Keyfitz 1971]. However, migration w i l l have an indirect impact on f e r t i l i t y i f i t i s associated with "modernizing" influences such as improved educational or employment opportunities for women. Other "modern" practices, on the other hand, may a c t u a l l y increase f e r t i l i t y [Nag 1980]. As Davis has noted [1977:153], the e f f e c t s of migration on population growth are d i f f i c u l t to measure pr e c i s e l y . If emigration reaches such a magnitude that o v e r a l l population size decreases s i g n i f i c a n t l y , a number of important socio-economic consequences w i l l follow. A rural population with already high population densities w i l l benefit from an improved person/land r a t i o [ G r i f f i n 1976:355; Spengler 1974:155]. 2 3 At the aggregate l e v e l population density tends to be an elusive variable because of variations in the quality of land, the extent of external trade and the nature of productive techniques. Under some circumstances population "pressure" may stimulate innovation in techniques leading to higher productivity [Boserup 1965; Clark 2 2 Bizien suggests that some classes of the population in sending v i l l a g e s in southern I t a l y increased their f e r t i l i t y in response to out-migration [Bizien 1979:138-39]. 2 3 For an empirical demonstration of t h i s see Tannous [1942]. 41 1967]. 2 * The significance of an increase or decrease in population w i l l also depend on whether there are any economies of scale to be achieved. The generally negative view of population growth in development c i r c l e s follows in part from the assumption that large countries such as India or the P h i l l i p i n e s , which already contain a l l the advantages of scale which could be expected (as well as the disadvantages), are somehow t y p i c a l of "developing" countries. At the sub-national l e v e l , or in the case of small countries, the situation may be very d i f f e r e n t . The a b i l i t y to supply services w i l l depend on whether there i s s u f f i c i e n t population to support them. The per capita costs associated with infrastructure and administration w i l l increase s i g n i f i c a n t l y i f population drops below some threshold l e v e l [Byerlee 1974]. The productive system as a whole w i l l be affected by population size since below certain levels s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of productive a c t i v i t i e s may not be possible [Brookfield 1976]. Migration i s generally selective by age and sex and therefore has the potential to a l t e r the age structure and sex balance of a population. The resu l t i n g age d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l have implications for socio-economic development. Most theories of economic growth treat age d i s t r i b u t i o n as a major determinant of savings and c a p i t a l accumulation. 2 5 At the very least the age structure w i l l have implications for the per capita supply of education and health resources as well as employment [Keyfitz 1971b; Kayser 1971, 1972]. 2 4 This consequence has been observed in Tonga by Maude [1973]. 2 5 See Coale and Hoover [1958]. 42 A methodological comment i s appropriate here. I have so far implied that the effects of migration can be separated from the "causes". This position cannot be maintained in practice. The point i s made most f o r c e f u l l y by Amin in the context of a c r i t i q u e of the "factors of production" approach to migration [Amin 1974:84-85]; but there i s also a sound basis in demographic theory for such a view. The p r i n c i p a l demographic consequence of migration i s more migration; thus, once a certain threshold has been reached (and assuming no p o l i t i c a l intervention), migration tends to be self-perpetuating [Peterson 1975:315]. This feature of " c i r c u l a r causation" w i l l necessarily characterize those variables to which migration i s linked. The implications of this have been observed by Kayser who found, contrary to "equilibrium" theory, that migration "does not stop short at certain t h e o r e t i c a l levels of potential productivity. Irrespective of other known factors, example and encouragement play a decisive part" [1971:146]. Where out-migration i s the predominant pattern, t h i s cumulative effect may have implications for the survival of the community. As Selwyn [1975] and Lowenthal and Comitas [1962] have pointed out, a small community experiencing out-migration tends to get smaller and may reach a point where basic services can no longer be supplied i n t e r n a l l y . To summarize, migration may contribute to a lower rate of population growth and help a l l e v i a t e the pressure of population on natural resources. If the rate of emigration i s such as to reduce the scale of s o c i a l organization, however, str u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and complexity may be constrained. The smaller 43 the population, the less l i k e l y that i t w i l l be able to develop a complex d i v i s i o n of labor. High rates of emigration from remote communities carry the potential for depopulation, the d i s i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of economic a c t i v i t i e s and, ultimately, the disintegration of communal l i f e . Whether t h i s constitutes "development" depends on the unit of analysis and the point of view. The "development" of a nation-state implies urbanization; i t i s expected, therefore, that rural depopulation w i l l occur and is "normal". 2 6 But where the sending society i t s e l f aspires to nationhood, and, for c u l t u r a l or p o l i t i c a l reasons, wishes to develop for i t s own sake, depopulation may seriously undermine development e f f o r t s . 2 7 Welfare Effects The "welfare" conception of "development" i s i m p l i c i t in many studies. Some economists (e.g., G r i f f i n [1976]) merely substitute the term " s o c i a l welfare" for economic growth even though i t i s c l e a r l y the l a t t e r which i s being measured. Others use the term " s o c i a l welfare" to refer to the combined monetary and "psychic" costs or benefits which accrue to migrants without e x p l i c i t e l y mentioning what these are (e.g., Byerlee [1974]). Gregory [1979] employed a "basic needs" conception of "development" to evaluate the ef f e c t s of migration from Upper 2 6 Note that in theory urbanization need not imply rural depopulation; i f the rural growth rate i s high urbanization may simply siphon off the "surplus" while the t o t a l r u r a l population remains the same. 2 7 The use of the c o l l e c t i v e term "society" here does not rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y of internal c o n f l i c t over goals. "Development" as an abstract concept i s often the preoccupation of p o l i t i c a l and economic e l i t e s ; individuals may conceive their private goals rather d i f f e r e n t l y . 44 Volta, concluding that they were negative. 2 8 P i t t has argued [1970:266] that Samoa should not be considered "underdeveloped" (cf. Shankman [1976]) on the grounds that Samoans are generally s a t i s f i e d with their l e v e l of consumption and way of l i f e (an aspect of " s o c i a l performance"); but he also notes that emigration to New Zealand provides access to better health services than are available in the v i l l a g e s [1970:188]. Research on " s o c i a l indicators" [McGranahan 1972; Morris 1979] has shown that "expectation of l i f e " correlates highly with other "development" indicators. Morris has consequently produced a composite index (the "Physical Quality of L i f e Index") composed of (a) infant mortality, (b) l i f e expectancy at age 1, (c) percent of the population b a s i c a l l y l i t e r a t e [Morris 1979:30], This i s the measure of "welfare" which w i l l be used in t h i s study. The link between migration and the physical qu a l i t y of l i f e i s rather tenuous t h e o r e t i c a l l y . Clearly i t is important to specify whose welfare is involved: the migrant's or the non-migrant's. 2 9 At the macroscopic l e v e l there i s an indirect link to the issue of population growth. In the neo-Malthusian models of the relationship between population growth and economic development, i t i s assumed that there i s some kind of zero-sum relat i o n s h i p between "unproductive consumption" (education, health, housing) and investment in production [Coale and Hoover 1957:247]. 2 8 For d i f f e r e n t versions of the "basic needs" concept compare Seers [1977] and Streeten [1977], 2 9 If v i l l a g e conditions are unhealthier than towns i t i s possible to argue that unwillingness to migrate reduces individual welfare. 45 If t h i s theory were v a l i d , and the evidence is strongly against i t [Cassen 1976; Hawthorn 1978;.McNicol 1978], migration could improve the level of welfare i f i t contributed to a reduction in the rate of population growth, and thereby reduced the demand on welfare expenditure. But this i s a wholly s t a t i c approach; welfare expenditures are neither a fixed proportion of government expenditure, nor an automatic "investment drain" [Cassen 1976]. 3 0 This question i s c l e a r l y more complex than implied in the macroscopic approach based on simulation models. Even i f migration (emigration in t h i s case) improves the r a t i o of resources per capita, the tr a n s l a t i o n of this improvement into higher welfare standards, or higher economic growth (or some combination of the two) depends on p o l i c y choices. Socio-economic Organization and Structure The extent to which the socio-economic organization of a "sending" society w i l l be affected by migration depends on the temporal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the movement and the socio-economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the migrants. 3 1 Assessments of the s o c i a l impact of migration are usually based on a typological approach [Gonzalez 1961; Graves and Graves 1974]; but what is generally important, aside from the absolute magnitude of migration, i s the way in which duration and 3 0 The role of physical investment, as opposed to investment in human resources, i s overstated by neo-classical growth theory [Bauer 1976; Kuznets 1973]. 3 1 Note the argument that migration may, for better or worse, enable " t r a d i t i o n a l " i n s t i t u t i o n s to survive [ P i t t 1970; Van Velson 1966]. 46 p e r i o d i c i t y of movement affe c t the performance of socio-economic roles. A temporary, regular, brief absence by s o c i a l l y "unimportant" role occupants presents minimal problems of adaptation [Gonzalez 1961]. Sporadic, ir r e g u l a r , variable length absences by strategic position holders present a greater adaptive challenge. Seasonal migration implies regular duration and p e r i o d i c i t y around which s o c i a l and economic a c t i v i t i e s become organized. Here, p r e d i c t a b i l i t y and regularity are probably more important features, as far as the continuity of the sending society i s concerned, than the "temporary" nature of the movement. It i s reasonable to assume that a system is more able to adjust to small losses of population than large ones [Connell e_t a l . 1974:142; Hugo 1978:249]; but the quantitative aspects alone do not set the adaptation problem. An isolated f i s h i n g society may be threatened by the emigration of i t s only outboard motor mechanic, whereas the absence of several school-age children may be of l i t t l e economic si g n i f i c a n c e . The loss of community or group leaders with important co-ordinating functions may have consequences for the operation of the productive system as a whole. At an abstract l e v e l migration can be seen as a process which a f f e c t s the nature and degree of s o c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 3 2 The extent to which migrants p a r t i c i p a t e in their "home" society on a regular basis w i l l depend on the "cognitive model" they hold 3 2 Migration i s not the only s o c i a l process which does so since r e b e l l i o n , retreatism and "alienat i o n " exist to some degree in a l l s o c i e t i e s . P i t t remarks that many migrants from Samoan v i l l a g e s are " m i s f i t s " anyway [1970:186]. This i s the "safety valve" theory of emigration. 47 of their migration [Philpott 1970] as well as the a v a i l a b i l i t y and cost (in time and money) of transportation and communications. But p a r t i c i p a t i o n need not be d i r e c t : the use of "proxy" or surrogate participants i s acceptable in a variety of so c i a l contexts. Migrants, including those whose absence appears "permanent", can compensate for their absence by a variety of means. Cash remittances or goods sent back to the home society are clear examples. Pre-arranging for the performance of important s o c i a l and economic functions by substitute actors i s another. The management of resources may be handed over to r e l a t i v e s or friends. The giving over of legal authority in the form of "power of attorney", where formal courts ex i s t , or the bestowal of the right to speak in community or family meetings on behalf of absentees are further examples. Such arrangements ensure that s o c i a l , economic and ceremonial l i f e can continue with minimal disruption and a s s i s t the migrant to retain a place in his natal community in spite of his physical absence. That adaptation or adjustment i s possible does not mean that i t always occurs or does not have l i m i t s . The disruption to family organization, residence patterns, cooperative labor groups, prestige and authority structures by migratory processes has been widely observed [Hugo 1978; Gonzalez 1961; Read 1941; Shapera 1947; Kayser 1971; Skinner 1969]. Some have argued that migration should produce more disruption to t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l structure than i t actually does on the grounds that "development" would be promoted by the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of land or the break-up of "feudal" s o c i a l structures [Amin 1974; Rhoades 1978; Tomasi 1979]. The major issue here i s whether " t r a d i t i o n a l " s o c i a l 48 structure provides the basis on which "development" could occur. P i t t , for example, argues that t r a d i t i o n a l Samoan i n s t i t u t i o n s are a suitable vehicle for c a p i t a l accumulation, incentives to work, entrepreneuership and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and that migration tends to support these [1970:264]. Those who argue from a "dependency" model of underdevelopment s h i f t the primary focus of attention from the internal s o c i a l organization of the sending society to i t s relations with external systems. Emigration from a peripheral rural community to an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d "core" area is the result of "uneven development", a process which i s s e l f - r e i n f o r c i n g [Castles and Kosack 1973:7-8], Unequal economic opportunity precipitates emigration which in turn reduces economic opportunity in the rural area. To the extent that remittance flows to the periphery compensate for lost l o c a l production, the rural area becomes "dependent" on further migration which reduces both i t s economic potential and i t s p o l i t i c a l independence [Gregory 1979; Rhoads 1978; Amin 1974]. This argument i s usually accompanied by a c r i t i q u e of neo-c l a s s i c a l economics which views migration as a means of creating "equilibrium" between regions and factors of production. 3 3 The sta r t i n g premise of equilibrium theory i s that various factors of 3 3 This t h e o r e t i c a l approach i s expressed well by Spengler and Myers: "Migration consists of a variety of movements that can be defined in the aggregate as an evolutionary and development-fostering process operating in time and space to correct r u r a l -urban, interurban, and interregional imbalances". This perspective also guides Soviet research on migration: "The main economic function of human migration i s to secure quantitative and q u a l i t a t i v e equilibrium between labour supply and labour demand in d i f f e r e n t regions and d i f f e r e n t settlements" [Zaslovskaia and Liashenko 1977:65], 49 production are unequally d i s t r i b u t e d in space. While dependency theory acknowledges t h i s with respect to the quality of land [Amin 1974:85], in so far as non-agricultural sectors are concerned, uneven development i s seen as the result of a d e f i n i t e h i s t o r i c a l "strategy of development", not of r e l a t i v e natural endowment. If we hold to the d e f i n i t i o n of organizational/structural "development" as an increase in d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and internal capacity, then there i s l i t t l e evidence that migration promotes the "development" of sending s o c i e t i e s . Both "equilibrium" and "dependency" theory agree on this point, but they interpret i t d i f f e r e n t l y . Dependency theory begins with the premise that a l l regions have an equal pot e n t i a l to develop ( i . e . , i n d u s t r i a l i z e ) . If "development" does not occur i t can only be on account of the intervention of external systems. There i s evidence from some parts of A f r i c a that the "development" of sending areas was deliberately thwarted by c o l o n i a l authorities in order to maintain the flow of labor to the centres of plantation agriculture and the export-oriented economy. But t h i s was not a universal practice. Labor migration cannot be explained solely in terms of the "underdevelopment" of th