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Canada’s Foreign Enlistment Act : Mackenzie King’s expedient response to the Spanish Civil War Frohn-Nielsen, Thor Erik 1982

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CANADA'S FOREIGN ENLISTMENT ACT: MACKENZIE KING'S EXPEDIENT RESPONSE TO THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR by THOR ERIK FROHN-NIELSEN B.A. (Hon.), The Universi ty of V i c t o r i a , 1979 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of H is tory , Universi ty of B r i t i s h Columbia We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Apr i l 1982 ©Thor Er ik Frohn-Nielsen, 1982 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. I t i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of UlSToijy The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date ABSTRACT Twelve-hundred Canadians volunteered for the republican cause during the Spanish C i v i l War. Along with the large number of rec ru i t s , committees were formed, fund ra is ing begun, r a l l i e s organized, and parliament pet i t ioned. Interest was widespread in Canada, and tended to become emotional as the con f l i c t became a ba t t l e f i e l d of i dea ls . Whether communist labourers, s o c i a l i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s , or simply champions of democracy, Engl ish speaking Canadians were inc l ined to support the beleaguered Republic in i t s bat t le against Franco and his f asc i s t a l l i e s . Though Engl ish speaking Canada tended to be sympathetic toward the Republic, Mackenzie King's Liberal government passed the Foreign Enlistment Act nine months into the war, which forbad any Canadian from volunteering for e i ther side in the con f l i c t . Why did the Prime Min is te r , usually so careful in his dealings with publ ic opinion, pass l eg i s la t i on that seemed to go against the wishes of the electorate? This thesis w i l l attempt to prove that King was, in f ac t , paying scrupulous attention to popular sentiments, and passed the Act af ter a thorough analysis of his government's s i tua t ion . I t w i l l be shown that opinion in Quebec, a federal Liberal stronghold, had become increasingly react ionary, and by 1936 was indeed sympathetic - iv -to Franco. King bel ieved, quite r i gh t l y , that the vehement an t i -republicanism in Quebec was simply much stronger than the pro voice from the rest of Canada. The Foreign Enlistment Act was shrewdly designed to placate Quebec voters without a l ienat ing too many English speaking Canadians. To f a c i l i t a t e th is study i t w i l l f i r s t be necessary to examine public opinion, and the role of the media in English Canada. An analysis of the Quebec s i tuat ion w i l l then be made. F i n a l l y , a chapter w i l l be devoted to Mackenzie King and how he dealt with the r i f t in publ ic opinion .exacerbated by the Spanish C i v i l War. This chapter w i l l show the Prime Minister as a p o l i t i c a l animal par  excel lence, who in this case, put p o l i t i c a l survival before moral p r inc ip les . A Note on the Vocabulary One of the most confusing aspects of the Spanish C i v i l War i s the antagonist 's myriad of names and t i t l e s . For the purposes of th is thes is , those Spaniards who supported the elected Spanish Republic w i l l be referred to as republicans or l o y a l i s t s , while those who fought for General Franco are rebels or na t iona l i s ts . Franco was, s t r i c t l y speaking, not a f a s c i s t , but has been label led as such since July 1936, and w i l l be so in th is thes is . I t is hoped that this small semantic indulgence w i l l , in fac t , help to keep the themes c learer . V TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. - 1 Notes to the. Int roduct ion. 1 1 CHAPTER I The C i v i l War Thrrough Engl ish Canadian Eyes . . . . 12 Notes to Chapter I 37 CHAPTER II The P ivo ta l Role of Quebec 40 Notes to Chapter II 60 CHAPTER III Mackenzie King and the C i v i l War 62 Notes to Chapter III 88 CONCLUSION. 91 APPENDIX I The Foreign Enl istment Act of 1937 . . 94 APPENDIX II Order in Council to the Foreign Enl istment Act . . .100 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • - 1 0 1 \ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i ke to thank my supervisor, Professor C. Humphries, for his time and encourage-ment, and for helping me keep the subject within i t s proper perspective in the grand scheme of things. Thanks also to Wayne Westergard-Thorpe, for reading the thesis and of fer ing much constructive c r i t i c i s m . A special thanks to you Debbie. Had i t not been for you, your enthusiasm, gentle encouragement, and long hours at the typewriter, the project would s t i l l be a dream. I humbly offer th is thesis to a l l those fr iends who have shared the dreams and idea ls . May you remain romantic and op t im is t i c , sometimes ind ig-nant, but always able to laugh. INTRODUCTION Few twentieth century c o n f l i c t s have s t i r r e d the emotions of western man qui te l i k e the c i v i l war that raged in Spain from 1936 to 1939. The eyes of the world were on the Iberian Peninsula from the morning of Ju ly 18 1936 when na t i ona l i s t a r t i l l e r y f i r s t rumbled, un t i l Franco's ult imate v ic to ry three bloody years l a t e r . Why were the hearts of so many ordinary c i t i z e n s moved by a v ic ious c i v i l war that did not concern them d i r e c t l y , and which was being fought thousands of miles away? What could make someone forsake the comparative t r a n q u i l l i t y of Canada and t rave l to a fore ign land to face death in a shallow republ ican trench? Hugh Thomas, who has wr i t ten the d e f i n i t i v e study of the c o n f l i c t , postu la tes: Spain became the central point of l i f e , work, and a r t i s t i c i n s p i r a t i o n . Stephen Spender wrote that Spain "of fered the twentieth century an 1848." P h i l i p Toynbee sa id of Spain "the gloves are of f in the struggle against fascism" Spain gave i n t e l l e c t u a l s a sense of freedom, the thought of rubbing shoulders with the dispossessed in a ha l f -developed country, above a l l , the i l l u s i o n that t he i r "ac t i on " would be e f f e c t i v e . Jason Gurney, a former Engl ish volunteer to the Inter-nat ional Br igades, re i te ra ted th i s in his memoirs: The Spanish C i v i l War seemed to o f fe r the ind iv idua l the chance to take pos i t i ve and e f fec t i ve act ion against fasc ism. One could stand on an issue which seemed absolute ly c lear By f igh t ing against fascism in Spain, we would be f igh t ing against i t in our own - 2 -country and every o the r c . . . . I t may have lacked rea l i sm, but i t was heady s tu f f to a young man who was by nature a romantic. A s t rugg l i ng , but f ree ly e lected republ ican government was, a f te r a l l , being b ru ta l l y attacked by the country 's rebe l l i ous m i l i t a r y machine. A c t i v e l y supported by Germany and I t a l y , Franco's Spanish and Moorish troops were sweeping over Spain , loo t ing and p i l l a g i n g as they t ightened the i r noose around the neck of Largo Caba l le ro 's Popular Front government. Most nat ional leaders looked away when Madrid appealed for in te rnat iona l afd to combat th is l a t e s t f a s c i s t menace, but t he i r c i v i l i a n populations sat up and watched the debacle with mounting c u r i o s i t y . I t was not long before volunteers went to the a id of the beleaguered Republ ic , where they fought and often died side by side with armed Spanish workers and peasants. Eventual ly some 40,000 i n te rna t i ona l s , inc luding 1,200 4 Canadians, answered the republ ican c a l l to arms. What i s not a l i t t l e astonishing i s that according to V i c to r Hoar, author of The Mackenzie-Papineau B a t t a l i o n , "no other country provided so great a number of 5 volunteer so ld ie rs in proport ion to i t s population as did Canada." Though ind iv idua l Canadian c i t i zens did go to Spain, and many more helped supply the l o y a l i s t s with badly needed mate r ia l s , sympathy for the Republic was fa r from universal in Canada. Nor d id the L ibera l government under Pr"ime Min is te r Mackenzie King r a l l y to the banner of a fellow- democracy In her dour of need. As Kugfi MacLennan has pointed out in The Watch that Ends the Night , no matter whom Canadians supported, - 3 -the c r i s i s in Spain captured the i r imaginat ions. The c i v i l war, in f a c t , r e k i n d l e d the s t ra in in nat ional unity as Quebec tended to support General Franco, while the sympathies of many Engl ish speaking Canadians were with the republ icans. I t was th is s p l i t which eventual ly forced the Canadian government to take a re luc tant but de f i n i t e foreign po l i cy stance with regard to the Spanish C i v i l War. K ing 's ult imate aim was to maintain Canadian in ternat iona l i n t e g r i t y and independence, while ca re fu l l y steer ing a course away from issues that could div ide the country. Passing the Foreign Enl istment Act was an expedient method of achieving th is as i t l e g a l l y prevented Canadians from volun-teer ing for the Spanish crusade. Canadian foreign po l i cy has rare ly been considered e i ther s t r iden t or aggressive. On the contrary, s ince the day i t began conducting i t s own external a f f a i r s , the country has often been accused of s i t t i n g on the fence, watching from a safe distance as b a t t l e f i e l d s pe r i od i ca l l y f i l l e d with the c l a t t e r of innumerable armies. This i n te rp re ta t i on , hardly new, was promoted by h is to r ians l i k e C P . Stacey and James Eayrs. They were the scholars who, during the Pearson e ra , examined the King years , compared the two, and found the l a t t e r 6 wanting. Both Canada and the Age of Cohf1 ic t , volume two, and In  Defence of Canada, volume two, show the authors to be less than enthus ias t ic wi th the L ibera l government's in ternat iona l stance during the 1930s as they suggest that Canada had a s im i l a r foreign po l i cy to that of the western nations who appeased the d i c t a to r s . I t could be argued that t h i s in te rpre ta t ion was a product of i t s t ime. Canada - 4 -d i d , a f te r a l l , play a more aggressive ro le in in ternat iona l p o l i t i c s during the 1950s, and i t i s poss ib le that h is to r ians l i k e Eayrs and Stacey, wr i t ing during that t ime, found the diplomacy of the la te 1930s weak by comparison. This thesis tends to fo l low the i r bas ic i n t e r -p re ta t ion , not because Canadian foreign po l i cy i s necessar i ly more dynamic in 1982 than i t was in 1936, but because the documents ava i l ab le support t h i s argument. The various Canadian Prime Min is ters have, a f te r a l l , repeatedly stepped aside to al low more daring heads of s tate to f i nd a safe passage through the miasmatic swamp of in ternat iona l a f f a i r s . Only then have they ventured to fo l low sa fe ly behind, ra re ly t i p - toe ing from the secur i ty of the tested path. At no time was th is mouse-l ike mental i ty more f i rm ly entrenched in government po l i cy than during the Mackenzie King e ra , and then in pa r t i cu la r during the l a t t e r ha l f of the 1930s. There were a few except ions. To do him j u s t i c e , Walter R i d d e l l , one of the Canadian delegates to the League of Nations in the mid-1930s, did once attempt to r e c t i f y th is unimpressive pos i t ion by taking the i n i t i a t i v e for Canada. He ca l l ed for an o i l embargo against I t a l y a f te r Musso l i n i ' s armour had rumbled across the Ethiopian f r on t i e r i n 1935. Everyone lauded the moral courage of Riddel l with the exception of the I t a l i ans and his own government. When Mackenzie King came to power in the autumn of 1935, and learned to his horrdr that Canada was suddenly and unexpectedly the standard-bearer of the League Covenant, re t r i bu t ion was swi f t and ru th less . R idde l l was immediately reca l l ed for consu l ta t ion , and the government made i t c lear that the i r representat ive had been speaking so le l y fo r - 5 -himsel f . "I am ce r ta in l y going to give him a good spanking," was the Prime M in i s t e r ' s immediate response.^ The "R idde l l i nc iden t , " as i t became known, b r i e f l y propel led Canada to the fo re f ront of world diplomacy, but the subsequent nervousness in Ottawa was so acute that the new pos i t ion was ignominiously ended. The inc ident was not only the f i r s t Canadian foray into the l ime l igh t of foreign a f f a i r s during the 1930s, i t came to exemplify the ul t imate Canadian diplomatic faux- pas, and served as an embarrassing lesson for the timorous Department of External A f f a i r s . Internat ional i n i t i a t i v e s could be o f f i c i a l l y cheered, and even supported, but were not to emanate from the govern-ment of Canada. Staying c lear of in ternat iona l c o n f l i c t s became one of the government's most important foreign a f f a i r s programmes, and the re -su l t i ng noncommitment po l icy reached i t s zeni th during the f i r s t months of the Spanish C i v i l War. The Canadian government zealously t r i e d to remain uninvolved from the morning when rebe l l i ous so ld ie rs f i r s t took up arms, un t i l Franco's v i c to ry in 1939. What many Canadians objected to was that the L ibera ls were in Ottawa, apparently doing no-thing to stop the pitched bat t les on the Iberian Peninsula which increas-ing ly threatened to s p i l l over the Pyrenees and to engulf the world in yet another in ferno. When asked why he chose his pa r t i cu la r stance, the Prime Min is ter tended to ignore his quest ioners, and spoke of preserving nat ional un i ty . King did not hop from the fence un t i l March 1937, nine months a f te r the c o n f l i c t had begun, and then only be-cause he was f i na l l y - forced to do so by a d iv ided Canadian pub l i c . - 6 -The question therefore i s : why did the Canadian government fo l low i t s pa r t i cu la r path during the Spanish C i v i l War? Was King in fac t sh i rk ing his r e s p o n s i b i l i t y toward in ternat iona l peace and demo-cracy? Was, as the Prime Min is te r argued, the Canadian stance only l og i ca l consider ing the.country 's in terna l d isun i ty? Was the govern-ment's handling of the c i v i l war simply an example of a weak foreign po l i cy permitted to meander along by an apathet ic Canadian publ ic? Or was King c h i e f l y concerned with his L ibera l major i ty? These questions can best be answered through an examination of the period from the beginning of the Spanish C i v i l War to the passing of the Canadian Foreign Enl istment Act on March 19 1937. This was the formative period when Canadian c i t i z e n s and the govern-ment a l i k e , taken aback by Franco's sudden r e b e l l i o n , had to decide which s ide , i f any, they would support. The government, fear ing controversy and a l i ena t ion from an increas ing ly div ided pub l i c , bel ieved caution to be the l og i ca l answer. . The Enl istment Ac t , once passed, estab l ished o f f i c i a l po l i cy toward Spain for the remainder of the c i v i l war. For th is reason, i t i s unnecessary to fo l low Canada's conduct during the course of the c o n f l i c t beyond March 1937. What is important i s to examine why o f f i c i a l po l i cy evolved as i t d i d , what pressures inf luenced i t , and whether i t acted as an e f fec t i ve pou l t ice on the wound to nat ional unity aggravated by the c r i s i s . To f a c i l i t a t e th is study, i t w i l l be necessary to examine and evaluate Engl ish speaking Canadian pub l ic opinion and the c i v i l - 7 -war. This w i l l be done through an ana lys is of media coverage, e d i t o r i a l comment, and the l e t t e r s to the ed i tors of not only mass c i r c u l a t i o n Canadian d a i l i e s and magazines, but a lso in some of the more eso te r i c pub l icat ions of the time. I t w i l l be weighed fur ther by measuring the debates in the House of Commons, and by delving into the many l e t t e r s received by Prime Min is te r Mackenzie King and Jus t i ce Min is te r Ernest Lapointe. Though no surveys are known to have been taken on Spain and Canada, and though pub l ic opinion i s by nature i n tang ib le , a carefu l scru t iny of the aforementioned sources, augmented by secondary ma te r i a l , should y i e l d a reasonably accurate p icture of Engl ish speaking Canadians and the i r sympathies in the Spanish C i v i l War. The f i r s t chapter w i l l hopeful ly show why many Engl ish speaking Canadians qu ick ly became sympathetic toward the republ ican cause. I t w i l l suggest the v i t a l ro le played by the media, how th is led to changes of perceptions and to the in t roduct ion of the v i t a l ideo log ica l element. I t w i l l a lso be i l l u s t r a t e d that pro-republ ican pub l ic opinion seemed to gather i t s own momentum once i t was accepted that the war was a great deal more than a protracted palace coup. F i n a l l y i t w i l l be shown that support fo r the Spanish Republ ic, though st rong, was not universal in Engl ish speaking Canada. Those who shied away from the l o y a l i s t s were not necessar i ly a t t racted by the r i gh t , but were members of that body of Canadians who did not want the i r country involved in any European powder keg. Condit ions in Quebec must be examined next. In th is chapter i t w i l l be shown that the L ibera l government had to pay c lose at tent ion - 8 -to French Canadian sentiments i f i t were to remain in power. Much of Mackenzie K ing 's support came from Quebec, and French Canada, in a conservative mood by 1936, had to be treated accord ing ly . Problems were compounded by economic cond i t ions , as the t rad i t i on of animosity between Engl ish and French speaking Canada was exacerbated by the soc ia l tensions of the depression e ra . French Canadian leaders were making a concerted e f f o r t to a l t e r the course of Quebec's h is tory as they were ser ious ly a f r a i d that the i r cu l tu ra l s o l i d a r i t y was being eroded by foreign forces Beyond the i r con t ro l . Men l i k e Premier Duplessis and Cardinal V i l leneuve saw l i be ra l i sm and communism as the enemy that threatened Quebec, and encouraged a general turn to the r igh t as the best means of defence. I t w i l l be shown that the Spanish C i v i l War aggravated Quebec's sense of i nsecur i t y and the r i f t between i t and the res t of the country. Unl ike Engl ish Canada which, tended to r a l l y behind the republ ican banner, most of Quebec saw Franco as a conservative na t i ona l i s t who was t ry ing to purge his country of communism. Quebec did not per-ceive the rebe l l i on as an a f f ron t to democracy, but ra ther , viewed i t as an heroic at tack against imported ideologies that were destroying Spain. To many French Canadians, supporting republ ican Spain was tanta-mount to a id ing a l l those inf luences that were threatening Quebec her-s e l f . Thus i t i s no wonder that French Canadians wanted nothing to do with the Spanish! Republ ic , and found i t inexcusable that l o y a l i s t sym-pathizers, were allowed to rec ru i t volunteers from the i r province. - 9 -The f i n a l chapter w i l l deal with Mackenzie King and his government's a t t i tude toward the Spanish C i v i l War. The Prime Min is te r was already faced with pub l ic opinion that was div ided between Engl ish and French speaking Canadians, and the c i v i l war widened the r i f t . He therefore had to create a po l i cy that would s a t i s f y as many as pos-s i b l e , hopeful ly ease the animosity between the two, and maintain his seat in power. I t was not a simple matter of mending the in terna l s p l i t , however, as King a lso had to weigh Canada's pos i t ion on the in ternat iona l scene. He had to consider whether the country would toe the B r i t i sh , l i n e , s t r i ke out f o r c e f u l l y on i t s own, or bu i l d a foreign p o l i c y based on Canada's geographic i s o l a t i o n . B r i t a i n d i d , a f te r a l l , pass i t s own Foreign Enl istment Ac t , and did pressure Canada to fo l low s u i t . I t could be argued that Canada's own Act was passed as a resu l t of th is pressure, but the evidence does not support t h i s . I t w i l l be shown that the Prime Min is te r i n i t i a l l y attempted to calm Canadian emotions by keeping the country as uninvolved as poss ib le , but that th is po l i c y became untenable by ear ly 1937. I t w i l l then be suggested that the Foreign Enlistment Act was ca re fu l l y and shrewdly conceived as the most expedient so lu t ion to the d i v i s i v e problems aggravated by the c i v i l war in Spain . I t was an Act created, not in haste, but a f te r a thorough ana lys is of a l l the factors involved. As such, i t stood as an ear ly example of K ing 's po l i cy formulation method fo r the duration of his years in o f f i c e . Indeed the roots of h is successful t ac t i c s over conscr ip t ion during the Second World War may be found in minor p o l i c y pos i t ions l i k e the Foreign Enl istment Act . The - 10 -conclusions w i l l be strengthened by an examination of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s personal a l leg iances and the government's perceptions of the war. A number of conclusions may be drawn at th is po in t . I t should be poss ib le to suggest why sympathy for the Republic came almost exc lus i ve l y from Engl ish speaking Canada, and whether th is was because suscept ib le i d e a l i s t s had been duped by a s e n s a t i o n a l i s t i c media. Conclusions may be drawn concerning Quebec, why the province was in a react ionary mood by 1936, and how French Canadian a f f i n i t i e s for General Franco were encouraged. F i n a l l y i t may be suggested that the Foreign Enl istment Act was K ing 's way of paying carefu l homage to the province that t r a d i t i o n a l l y gave him much of his support. The Act was not introduced out of any concern for the Spanish people, nor fo r Canada's in ternat iona l s i t u a t i o n . This in terpre ta t ion d i f f e r s from the one reached by V i c to r Hoar in The Mackerizie-Papineau B a t t a l i o n . He seems sympathetic to the Prime Min is te r who ca l l ed i t an Act which would "prevent Canada from being drawn into foreign con f l i c t s by the act ions of manufacturers of munitions or of organizers of r e c r u i t i n g . " 7 Hoar accepts th i s quote at i t s face va lue, though the evidence suggests that the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s stated in tent ions were d i f fe ren t from his p r i va te l y held asp i ra t i ons . King hoped the Act would be gentle enough not to a l ienate h is government from too many Eng l i sh speaking Canadians whi le being severe enough, for the ant i - republ icanism of Quebec. I t stands as an exce l len t example of shrewd l e g i s l a t i o n introduced by a p o l i t i c a l animal par exce l lence. K ing , in essence, attempted to l e g i s l a t e a thorny problem out of existence. - 11 -NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION *Hugh Thomas, The Spanish C i v i l War, t h i rd e d i t i o n , (Bucks: Hazel l Watson & Viney L t d . , 1977), p. 347. 2 Jason Gurney, Crusade in Spain, (London: Faber & Faber L t d . , 1974), p. 36. 3 I b i d . , p. 49. 4 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish C i v i l War, p. 982. 5 V i c to r Hoar, The Mackenzie-Papineau B a t t a l i o n , (Toronto: Copp C1 ark , 1969), p. 1. C P . Stacey, Canada and the Age of C o n f l i c t , (Toronto: Un ivers i ty of Toronto Press , 1981), I I . 7James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, (Toronto: Un ivers i ty of Toronto Press , 1965), I I , p. 26. V ic to r Hoar, The Mackenzie-Papineau Ba t t a l i on , p. 105. - 12 -CHAPTER I THE CIVIL WAR THROUGH ENGLISH CANADIAN EYES [The Spanish] people are making [ a ] desperate and heroic e f f o r t to defend the i r homes against the savage onslaughts of Foreign Mohamedan Barbarians and other Foreign mercenaries, the lowest human or perhaps inhuman, scum of a l l . Lapointe Papers, v o l . 22, f i l e #70, P .A .C. From the f i r s t vo l l ey of gun f i r e on Ju ly 18 1936, the f a s c i s t r ebe l l i on in Spain of fered table d'hote to those looking for excitment and drama. Canadian newspapers i n i t i a l l y focused on the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t i c aspects of the war, o f fer ing the i r readers graphic descr ipt ions of severed heads ly ing in pools of blood in the narrow st reets of Madrid; churches being v i c i ous l y sacked and burned; f a s c i s t s raping innocent Spanish women and ch i l d ren ; and republ ican workers bearing arms. Canadian feminists could see women stand fas t behind cobblestone barr icades, looking l i k e so many copies of De lacro ix ' s "L ibe r t y Leading the People" . Even the popular Sh i r l ey Temple found the g raph ica l l y ghoul ish news f lashes from Spain hard competi t ion. The c h i l d s tar lasted for one b r ie f day on the f ront page of the Vancouver Sun before being dispatched to the middle sect ions by the f lood of news bu l l e t i ns from the Iberian peninsula. As i t d id elsewhere, Spain captured the imaginations of the Canadian people. - 13 -Was the c o n f l i c t viewed by Canadian e d i t o r i a l wr i ters as a b i t t e r ba t t l e of idea ls? Was there a leg i t imate emotional connec-t ion between the bloody struggles in Spain and the besl ippered f i r e -s ide reader i n Edmonton? Did the portrayal of the c i v i l war make Torontonian gents clench the i r f i s t s in anger or did i t make them doze of f complacently? How was the Spanish s i tua t ion i n i t i a l l y portrayed to Canadians, and what was the i r react ion? Though the perspectives a l te red as in terpreta t ions changed, the impl ica t ions of the Spanish C i v i l War qu ick ly h i t a l l Canadian news-papers and magazines. Within a week of Ju ly 18, papers across the country were re f l ec t i ng Canadian opinion and c u r i o s i t y . Was Franco's rebe l l i ous outburst merely another coup that would replace a bankrupt government with a more i n s i d i o u s l y e f f i c i e n t f a s c i s t version? Would there indeed be a winner, or was Spain to o f fe r the wor ld , in graphic d e t a i l , another example of the horrors of protracted warfare? Edi tors of Canada's major d a i l i e s were i n i t i a l l y unanimous on one c r i t i c a l po int : that there could be no real v ic to ry in the c i v i l war since a repressive and highly v o l a t i l e d ic ta torsh ip would l i k e l y be i n s t a l l e d no matter which s ide won. The Toronto Globe and Mail provides a good example of th is general b e l i e f . The paper e d i t o r i a l i z e d on July 29 1936: "Most cer ta in however i s the fac t that whichever side emerges v ic to r ious nothing w i l l be so lved. "^ From the West Coast, the Vancouver  Sun ed i tor wrote on Ju ly 22, that "whichever side wins now—and the winner i s anybody's guess—Spain w i l l be j u s t as far from peace and 2 order as she was in the beginning." The l uc id ed i to r of the Winnipeg - 14 -Free Press J.W. Dafoe, passed ear ly sentence on the s i tua t ion on Ju ly 24. A f te r a lengthy and accurate analys is of the f i r s t few days of the c i v i l war, the a r t i c l e ended on a d i s t i n c t l y pess imis t i c note, suggesting that "a v i r t ua l d ic ta to rsh ip—ei ther s o c i a l i s t or 3 fascist—sems the l i k e l y outcome." The Canadian l e f t , which l a te r championed the republ ican cause, was i n i t i a l l y very doubtful of the outcome. Wri t ing in October, the ed i tor of the s o c i a l i s t Canadian  Forum hypothesized that "whichever side wins w i l l i nhe r i t a Spain im-poverished and_embittered, with some of i t s best and f i nes t men and 4 women s l a i n . " Had the Spanish s i tua t ion been without s i g n i f i c a n t in te res t to Canada and Canadians, the press would not have been as vehement in i t s unanimous condemnation of the war. The Spanish C i v i l War c r y s t a l -l i z e d Canada's perceived ro le in world a f f a i r s . The average Canadian tended to be caut iously smug in his geographical i s o l a t i o n , wanting l i t t l e to do with a c o n f l i c t in which nei ther side was l i k e l y to i n t r o -duce a government embodying Canadian democratic i d e a l s . I t can a lso be argued that most Canadians f e l t a d i s t i n c t aversion to both communism and fasc ism, seeing them both as v io len t extremes, more d is rupt ive than const ruc t ive . The Spanish C i v i l War was i n i t i a l l y viewed as a prime example of a l l that Canada was against . Later seen as a war between democracy and d i c ta to rsh ip , the war in Spain was f i r s t perceived as a f i gh t between communism and fasc ism, and thus e v i l against e v i l . To the i s o l a t i o n i s t , Canada fol lowed i t s pa r t i cu la r fore ign po l i cy p rec ise ly to avoid embroilment in a nonsensical s i tua t ion l i k e that in Spain. For - 15 -the f i r s t months of the war, Canadians took heed, watched with c u r i o s i t y , and were glad not to be involved. To the Canadian newspaper industry the Spanish C i v i l War c l ea r l y exempl i f ied the ongoing d is in tegra t ion of Europe. Given the wishful th inking of the l e f t and the po l i cy of i s o l a t i o n advocated by the r i g h t , the l a t t e r was approved as the most pragmatic for Canada. With that i n mind, ed i tors of most Canadian d a i l i e s stressed the purely loca l nature of the c i v i l war, adamantly character iz ing i t as a Spanish c o n f l i c t between two i l l o g i c a l e v i l s , and delved deeply into Spanish h is to ry to substant iate the i r c la ims. The Toronto Globe and M a i l , fo r example, suggested in la te Ju ly 1936, that the war resul ted from a lack i 5 of democratic t r ad i t i on in Spain. The Vancouver Sun in a pon t i f i ca t i ng a r t i c l e , suggested that the c o n f l i c t was due to the b io log i ca l make-up of the Spaniards: We bel ieve that the r a c i a l fac tor which con-t r ibuted more than any other to the eventual co l lapse of Spain, was the nat ional miscegena-t ion forced upon that unhappy country when she was over run by f iMoors and Arabs for almost four centur ies . By a t t r i bu t ing i t s o r ig ins to d is tan t and abstract factors inherent in the Spanish her i tage, the ed i tors had minimized the relevance and import of the more immediate ideo log ica l dimensions of the c o n f l i c t . The war was simply inev i tab le anarchy once again appearing over the Iberian Peninsula. This analys is helped mo l l i f y the fears of those few Canadians who were watching the general European s i tua t ion with mounting - 16 -apprehension and who had l inked the c i v i l war to the seemingly inexorable r i se of f a s c i s t d i c ta to rsh ips . I f Canadian ed i tors saw the Spanish con-f l i c t as an i nev i t ab le , purely in ternal c o n f l i c t , and not as an example of world fascism versus democracy, Canada need not fee l any ob l igat ion to get invo lved. Indeed, were th is thesis cor rec t , the c i v i l war could never bo i l over the Spanish cauldron nor could i t create a major European or world c o n f l i c t . Thus Great B r i t a i n and the Dominions would thankfu l ly remain uninvolved. There were those, however, who were not placated by the rather forced i s o l a t i o n i s t e d i t o r i a l s . Canadian le f t -w ing i n t e l l e c t u a l s , saw beyond th i s e d i t o r i a l ana l ys i s , and soon supported the ideo log ica l s p i r i t of republ ican Spain. This group, so v i v i d l y portrayed in Hugh MacLennan's novel The Watch that End the Night , was more than a c o l -l ec t i on of l i b e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s championing that year ' s fad . Deeply concerned wi th the spread of fasc ism, they soon interpreted the p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l s ign i f i cance of the Spanish C i v i l War, and made an impassioned plea for democracy to Canadians. The ed i tors of New Fron t ie rs , one of the bet ter Canadian i n t e l l e c t u a l magazines, wrote in October 1936: Labour and progressive groups in Canada cannot ignore th is lead. The events in Spain have merc i less ly exposed the i s o l a t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s advocated by many Canadian l i b e r a l s and s o c i a l i s t s . . . .The immediate task for those who desire to keep Canada out of another war i s the most act ive support of the Spanish government. Though these people made the i r a l leg iances patent ly , and in l e f t i s t fash ion , pedant ica l ly obvious, f i l l i n g the i r pages with s o c i a l -- 17 -i s t jargon and dogmatic r he to r i c , the i r ana lys is of the Spanish s i tua t ion tended to be extremely l uc id and t r a g i c a l l y prophet ic : " I f fascism is v ic to r ious in Spain, then the fantas ies of the Canadian p a c i f i s t s and i s o l a t i o n i s t w i l l be smashed to pieces by the r e a l i t y of g another World War." The Canadian Forum, more perceptive than i t had i n i t i a l l y been, noted in an ed i to r ia l , that "The present c i v i l war in Spain has turned in to a dress rehearsal fo r the bigger European war which everybody over there now e x p e c t s . " ^ Canadian i n t e l l e c t u a l s though highly voca l , comprised a de f i n i t e minor i ty of the populat ion. Small groups of Canadians had become p o l i t i c a l l y po lar ized by the depression, and by the emergence of fascism and communism as potent ia l a l te rna t ives to democracy and cap i ta l i sm. This schism was la rge ly between f r inge groups, however, leaving the bulk of the population as s t o l i d upholders of middle c lass ideals and e t h i c s . As mentioned, the react ion to the outbreak of the Spanish C i v i l War i l l u s t r a t e d that most Canadians f e l t an aversion for extremist European ideo log ies , few heeding the h i s t r i o n i c c a l l to arms from the fa r l e f t or r i gh t . The Vancouver Sun echoed th is sentiment in an e d i t o r i a l of August 11 1936: "We f a i l to see why anybody should worry about whether Fascism or Communism w i l l control Europe because not only is the one as bad as the other but to a l l in tents and purposes they are one and the same t h i n g . T o the eyes of the middle c lass in Canada, the Spanish C i v i l War was i n i t i a l l y seen, i f nothing e l s e , as un-Canadian. - 18 -Iso lat ion ism was one of the most dominant trends in pub l ic opinion in Canada during the 1930's. There were the many immigrants who, having turned the i r backs on the i r ancestral lands, had ar r ived to s ta r t a new l i f e in Canada; there were those who f e l t that Canada had everything to lose and nothing to gain from jo in ing another European war; many j u s t i f i a b l y f e l t that anything but s t r i c t i s o l a t i o n could d iv ide the country into e thn ic , and p a r t i c u l a r l y Engl ish versus French camps of a l l eg iance . F i n a l l y , there was also a strong fee l ing among many Canadians that Europe, long past i t s zen i th , was in i t s waning years , that the warring nations and ideologies should conclude the i r own quarrels without dragging in the res t of the world. The horrendous memories of Canadian pa r t i c i pa t i on in the European trenches of the Great War were made p a r t i c u l a r l y poignant in the summer of 1936 with the unvei l ing of the Canadian memorial at Vimy Ridge. "Never Again" fee l ings were strong throughout the country. Newspapers were ce r ta i n l y against any Canadian involvement on the Iberian Peninsula. The ed i tors took a rather patroniz ing stance when ana lys ing the da i l y f ront page reports of horrors and a t r o c i t i e s committed by republicans and rebels a l i k e . . The Vancouver Sun had spoken 12 of the waste of time worrying over Europe, while the Winnipeg Free  Press s ta ted: "Any leaving [ s i c ] away from neu t ra l i t y might mean the spread of war over Europe between those adhering to Fascism and those 13 whose ideal i s Communism." Their a l l us ion to "Splendid I so la t i on " would not be an exaggeration. - 19 -When i t became c l e a r , in the f i r s t weeks of August 1936, that the Spanish c o n f l i c t had mushroomed into a f u l l scale c i v i l war, the e d i t o r i a l denunciations in-Canadian newspapers increased appreciably. The f ront pages s t i l l featured photographs of r i f l e - c a r r y i n g women giv ing the republ ican clenched f i s t sa lu te , accompanied by racy action-packed s t o r i e s , but the p o l i t i c a l ana lys is became increas ing ly sombre and pess im is t i c . On Ju ly 31, the Toronto Globe and Mail f i r s t mentioned the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Spanish s i tua t ion could escalate into a f u l l 14 f ledged European war. Reports had been c i r cu l a t i ng that the I t a l i a n s , and perhaps the Germans, were about to give the rebels mater ial support. Leon Blum, the French s o c i a l i s t Premier, watched apprehensively. He was very aware of the dangers of Franco's f l ag f l y i n g over Spain—his country would be a l l but hemmed i n , surrounded on three f ronts by f a s c i s t d i c -ta to rs . A republ ican sympathizer by conv ic t ion , he did not hesi tate to o f fer support to the l o y a l i s t s (support which was o f f i c i a l l y withdrawn in short order ) , and sent stern warnings to the Axis powers to stay c lea r of Spain. In the autumn of 1936, Europe was a ve r i tab le powder keg, and each power seemed to be s t r i k i n g matches with abandon. The Winnipeg Free Press headline of August 5 i l l u s t r a t e d Canadian fea rs : "Anxiety Over C i v i l War in Spain Grows. D iv is ion of Europe into two 15 camps i s i nd i ca ted . " One spark that very nearly set the charge occurred on August 7, when four German c i t i zens were shot by Spanish republ icans, incensed, the Third Reich issued stern warnings and shunted part of the German navy into the Bay of B iscay; France responded to the move by verba l ly lashing out at the Germans, ordering H i t l e r to keep c lear of the war; the republicans marched through the s t r ee t s ; and England - 20 -t r i ed to soothe the raw tempers by supporting the new French demand for general non-intervent ion in the war. The Winnipeg Free Press again epitomized Canadian newspaper headl ines: "Events in Spanish Revolt Near Cl imax". The a r t i c l e declared Europe to be on the brink of war 1 fi over the Spanish s i t u a t i o n . The Canadian Forum held s im i l a r views, but went fu r the r , admonishing England for her inact ion in the war: Spain i s fa r away, but we doubt whether many of our readers w i l l be able to view her troubles with the complete detachment of the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i ce . They reveal very c l ea r l y how the c lass struggle converts domestic into i n t e r -nat ional p o l i t i c s . Every count ry 7 in Europe i s swayed by the Spanish C i v i l War. Europe was indeed on the verge of war over Spain. By mid-August i t had become patent ly obvious that i n i t i a l media analys is had been rather s i m p l i s t i c i f not na'ive--blame for the c r i s i s could no longer be pinned on the i n f e r i o r genetic composition of the average Spaniard. An already div ided Europe had been fur ther s p l i t over the c o n f l i c t , making i t increas ing ly d i f f i c u l t to ignore the ideo log ica l d i f ferences between the two warring fact ions on the Iberian Peninsula. This r e a l i z a t i o n was re i te ra ted o f f i c i a l l y in Canada when Malcolm MacDonald, the Secretary for the Dominions in London, sent a telegram to the Department of External A f f a i r s on August 5. In i t he remarked that "the struggle between m i l i t a r y and government is becoming a f i gh t 18 between fascism and communism." This was an analys is which car r ied world-wide soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l imp l i ca t i ons , and led to yet another s h i f t in media coverage. - 21 -No Canadian newspaper had i t s own correspondent in Spain when f igh t ing broke out in J u l y , but that changed as the war became one of the century 's major media events. The f l u i d nature of the Spanish bat t les provided a perfect tes t ing ground for some of the. newly perfected high speed communications techniques of journal ism. For the f i r s t time sensat ional and often s t i r r i n g photos and s to r ies could be f lashed from Spanish trenches to Canadian par lors in a. scant few hours. Thus i t was not long before a l l the major papers had syndicated j ou rna l i s t s combing Spain, r i sk ing l i f e and limb for ex-c lus ives and "human-drama" a r t i c l e s . One of the f i r s t Canadian war correspondents to leave for Spain was Henning S0rensen, a young Danish emigre who went on behalf of the Canadian Forum and New Commonwealth. He l e f t in ear ly September, but changed his vocation a f te r he was of-fered an opportunity to work with Dr. Bethune's new mobile blood t rans-- . , . . 19 fusion c l i n i c s . Eng l ish d a i l i e s l i k e the Winnipeg Free Press , Vancouver Sun and Toronto Globe and Mail had i n i t i a l l y r e l i ed on Associated Press news serv ice for the i r b u l l e t i n s , which meant that Anglo-Canadian newspapers drew from the same stock of material and therefore tended 20 to have s im i l a r i n te rp re ta t ions . French-Canadian papers, on the other hand, received most of the i r information from S.P.A . news se rv i ce . With Canadian Press supplying very l i t t l e informat ion, i t was therefore easy for Quebec papers to reach the i r own, rather d i f f e ren t , i n te r -pretat ion of events in Spain. - 22 -The ro le of Associated Press was soon usurped by Canadian Press se rv i ce , which by October 1936 cont ro l led most of the Canadian information emanating from Spain. I t would seem that Canadian Press managed to re ta in that monopoly for the duration of the war. With most of the Spanish news being funnel led through one major news serv ice , before enter ing Canada, i t can be conjectured that biases of s ing le Canadian Press reporters could f i l t e r t he i r way into most major Canadian d a i l i e s , thereby helping sway pub l ic op in ion. Perhaps the most i n -f l u e n t i a l sub ject ive in terpre ta t ion transmitted to Canada was that Spain was becoming the tur f fo r an ideo log ica l joust ing match between fascism and democracy. The in ternat iona l and emotive character of the war tended to have a negative e f fec t on object ive journal ism. Ernest 22 Hemingway's reports were, a f te r a l l , not appealing to cold i n t e l l e c t . Even the London Times was not f ree from b ias . The paragon of object ive journal ism had the i r man, Kim Phi 1 by, report ing on the n a t i o n l i s t s i d e , 23 unaware that the i r reporter was in fac t a Russian agent. Once the notion was accepted that Spain had become the ba t t l e -ground for two of Europe's most cont rovers ia l ideo log ies , Canadians began to look at the c o n f l i c t from a new perspect ive. Iso lat ion ism was no longer enough as i t did not provide an answer for the e t h i c a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , and prac t i ca l questions inherent in the Spanish C i v i l War. The Canadian Forum not only supported the l e g a l i t y of the Spanish Republ ic, but also questioned the moral aspects of the c r i s i s . The appeal in the October issue exempl i f ied what was to become standard - 23 -fare fo r the magazine throughout the war: "Every s o c i a l i s t , every l i b e r a l , we would almost say every man of any decent f e e l i n g , can only 24 hope that the [Spanish] government w i l l p r e v a i l . " People responded, began to take s ides , and, much to the dismay of staunch i s o l a t i o n i s t s who re jected any assistance to fore ign combatants, the newly aroused consciousness soon led to d i rec t a i d . When i t was learned that the New York loca l of the Internat ional Ladies Garments Workers Union had donated $5,000 to the republ icans, the conservative Toronto Globe and  M a i l , i n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Meddling in Spa in 's Revo l t " , stated that "governments [should] put a ban on the m a t e r i a l i s t i c sympathies of t he i r na t i ona l s . " The ed i t o r , no i s o l a t i o n i s t , advocated a strong new foreign po l i cy that would bring Canada into c loser a l l i a n c e with Great B r i t a i n . He f e l t that "any foreign po l i cy devised by the Dominion that f a i l e d to dovetai l with that of B r i t a i n would be of no serious -importance in world a f f a i r s and might as wel l be forgotten before i t i s s t a r t e d . " 2 6 Given Moroccan imports of Canadian i ndus t r i a l goods, however, Mackenzie King 's government could not simply ban the " m a t e r i a l i s t i c sympathies" of Canadians without appearing to approve of the rebe ls . Franco's rebe l l i on had, a f ter a l l , been born in Spanish Morocco, and the country was f i rm ly under na t i ona l i s t con t ro l . To his consternat ion, the Canadian Prime M in i s te r , wanting to keep the country uninvolved in the c i v i l war, found pr ivate c i t i zens sending goods to the republicans while Canadian business circumvented the Non-intervent ion Treaty by pumping mater ia ls into "neu t ra l " Morocco. The f i r s t to question the - 24 -moral i ty of th is ambiguous s i tua t ion was the Canadian Forum. The magazine i ns i s ted that there was no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for sending goods to a "neu t ra l " which was, in f a c t , t o t a l l y under the control of General Franco and the rebe ls : The "Mail and Empire's^' Ottawa_correspondent assures us that "the [Canadian] au thor i t ies have no delusions about where the shipments are going to u l t imate ly—to General Franco, but they don't fee l ca l l ed upon to take any ac t i on . Af ter a l l , we get our money. The government's export p o l i c i e s were a lso attacked in the House of Commons i t s e l f . Vancouver C .C .F . opposit ion M.P. Charles G. MacNeil openly c r i t i c i z e d K ing, saying that "unquestionably large p ro f i t s are being made on mater ial exported to Morocco for the assistance of the f a s c i s t insurgents in Spa in . " The asser t i ons , both from the media and from the oppos i t ion , gained tremendous credence when Canadian war material export f igures for Morocco were re leased. 1935 Sept. $ 1,929 1936 Sept. $ 296,752 Oct. $16,461 Oct. $ 291,135 Nov. $ 4,392 Nov. $ 678,101 Dec. $ 4,836 Dec. $ 505,809 29 Canadian War Mater ia l Export to Morocco. Much l a te r the Prime M in i s t e r , with the p o l i t i c a l success of the Foreign Enlistment Act. by then behind him, had an Order in Council passed in Ju l y 1937 proh ib i t ing the export o f any war material to e i ther side in 29 the c o n f l i c t . Though his e th ics might perhaps be questioned, there i s no doubt that K ing, a p o l i t i c a l animal par excel lence , e f f ec t i ve l y - 25 -el iminated a potent ia l thorn in his side by l e g i s l a t i n g i t out of ex is tence. Meanwhile, the debate on the moral issues continued un-abated. The Winnipeg Free Press , an advocate of a more independent Canada, and much more l i b e r a l than the Globe and M a i l , sided with the republ icans on August 8 when the e d i t o r i a l read: {the rebe l l ion ] i s a revo l t against a properly const i tu ted government with a major i ty in a popular ly e lected assembly and has no more status from a legal point of view, than a mob t ry ing to take the law into i t s own hands or a gangster r e s i s t i n g the p o l i c e . . . . T e c h -n i c a l l y then, other European powers would be r i gh t i n permitt ing the shipment of arms to the government of Spain , wrong i n al lowing t h e i r nat ionals to give any a id to the f as -c i s t cause. According to J.W. Dafoe, i n f l u e n t i a l ed i to r to the Winnipeg Free  Press , the Spanish C i v i l War had c r y s t a l l i z e d pub l ic opinion on Canadian fore ign po l i cy v is a v i s general currents in Europe. At a conference on Canadian-American a f f a i r s in ear ly 1937, he noted that the c o n f l i c t had po lar ized publ ic opinion into f i ve camps: 1) the s t r i c t i s o l a t i o n i s t s . These were mostly p a c i f i s t s who f e l t that Canada should not involve herse l f in any external c o n f l i c t or t rea ty . I f the country came under a t tack, the i s o l a t i o n i s t contended that Canada should re l y on the United States and Great B r i t a i n for any m i l i t a r y ass is tance. 2) The i s o l a t i o n i s t s who f e l t that Canada should remain neutral at a l l cos ts , but should be able to defend her borders - 26 -as needed. 3) People advocating a foreign po l i cy re jec t ing any advance commitments, but al lowing Canada to go to war i f i t were deemed necessary. 4) The c o l l e c t i v i s t s , who were glad to see Canada's modest re-armaments programme because i t meant more power to the League of Nations and the idea of c o l l e c t i v e secur i t y . 5) The i m p e r i a l i s t s , who ca l l ed for a 31 melding of Canadian foreign po l i cy with that of Great B r i t a i n . Dafoe f e l t that preparations fo r defence with no commitment of any kind ( i . e . number 3) "const i tu ted a po l i cy which su i ted a very de f i n i t e majori ty 32 of the people in Canada." There were those who f e l t a great deal stronger about the Spanish c o n f l i c t . A week a f ter the war broke out , l e t t e rs began to t r i c k l e in to the edi tors of the various Canadian d a i l i e s . Most echoed the fo l lowing theme: "Can anyone be in doubt as to which side i s the r igh t when wives and sweethearts are marching side by side with the i r 33 loved ones to defend the 'Peop le 's F r o n t ' . " And on Ju ly 25, a more rhe to r ica l l e t t e r t yp ica l of the Canadian Communist Par ty : " A l l honour to the Spanish people, who defend with the i r l i ves the i r hard won demo-cracy; a noble people marching proudly and de f ian t l y on the road to 34 emancipation." The Anarchists may have been p i l l a g i n g Cathol ic churches, but as Canadian nove l i s t Morley Callaghan noted, the rebe ls , despite what Quebec clergymen s a i d , were hardly upholders of Chr is t ian e th ics e i t he r : The spectacle of the devout Foreign Legion thugs and pious i n f i d e l Moors, the ancient enemy of the Chr is t ian Spanish people marching to the tune of Onward Chr is t ian Sold iers leaves me very cold indeed. - 27 -An anonymous poem submitted to the Canadian Forum in October 1936 fol lowed the same l i n e s : Bat t le Hymn for the Spanish Rebels. The Church's one foundation Is now the Muslim sword, In meek co l labora t ion With flame and axe and cord; Deep-winged with holy love The bat t le-p lanes of Wotan , 3 g The bombing-planes of Jove. There were a few English-Canadians who thought championing the l o y a l i s t cause foolhardy, unworthy, or downright meddlesome. Some l i k e the author of the fo l lowing Tet ter , could not understand what the fuss was a l l about: that under the sacred stand of humanitarianism, would meddle with the in ternal a f f a i r s of a nation 4000 miles away from Canada, and towards which na t ion , the B r i t i s h government i s endeavouring to ensure the neu t ra l i t y of other nations by me^ns of a concentration of i t s f l e e t o f f i t s shores. Excluding Quebec, however, an t i - repub l ican sentiments were very l im i t ed . Prime Min is te r Mackenzie King and Jus t i ce Min is te r Ernest Lapointe received several hundred l e t t e r s and pet i t ions from Engl ish Canada during the f i r s t nine months of the c o n f l i c t , of which but two were a n t i - l o y a l i s t , and one of them can be el iminated as i t came from the town of Fa lher , A lbe r ta , which was ninety-nine percent French-Canadian 38 Ca tho l i c . The author of the other, who also sent Mr. Lapointe a - 28 -sampling of Germany's propaganda min is ter Dr. J . Goebbels's i n t e r -pretat ions of the Spanish C i v i l War, could not have been taken too ser ious ly considering his concluding ana lys i s : "Oh for an ' A n t i -Communist League' England, America and even here i s seething with 39 Bolshevism." * * * Canadian pub l ic opinion is notor iously f i c k l e and d i f f i c u l t to judge. Unl ike the c i t i zens of so many other count r ies , even wrath-fu l Canadians ra re l y bu i ld bar r icades, take to the s t reets in vast numbers, or storm the i r l e g i s l a t i v e bu i ld ings . Whether i t i s the Anglo-Saxon heri tage of the s t i f f upper l i p , or the newly ar r ived immigrant's fears of deportat ion, the fac t remains that Canadians tend to assert the i r fee l ings in unobtrusive, innocuous ways that are consequently d i f f i c u l t to assess. Let ters to the ed i to r are indeed one i nd i ca to r , but one that must be used with caution as there are always those contr ibutors who w i l l wr i te anything to see the i r names in p r in t . Edi tors a lso ca re fu l l y s i f t through the incoming ma i l . There-fore i t i s v i r t u a l l y impossible to know whether, in f a c t , the l e t te rs pr in ted are an honest r e f l ec t i on of those received. Perhaps a safer clue to pub l ic opinion is an examination of the l e t t e r s wr i t ten by groups or ind iv idua ls d i r e c t l y to the government. There i s very l i t t l e ego involved in a message to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e ; i t w i l l not be publ ished; w i l l be rout ine ly answered, often by an unsympathetic secretary ; and w i l l then be relegated to an obscure she l f in the pub l ic arch ives. Let ters to the government therefore tend to be wr i t ten from convict ion - 29 -rather than van i ty , often with the co-operat ive hope that enough s im i l a r messages w i l l bring the desired changes. Though i t is a t iny percentage of the population which ac tua l l y wri tes Ottawa, the l e t t e r s , analyzed in conjunction with previously mentioned sources, can j u s t i -f i a b l y be used as reasonable ind icators of Canadian pub l ic op in ion. The emotive character of the Spanish C i v i l War led to innumerable appeals and pe t i t ions pouring in to the o f f i ces of the Prime Min is te r and Jus t i ce Min is te r Ernest Lapointe for the duration of the c o n f l i c t . For the purposes of th is paper, however, only those l e t te rs w i l l be examined that had been received by the time of the Foreign Enlistment debates in March 1937. Furthermore, for the sake of c l a r i t y , French-Canadian l e t te rs w i l l be deal t with in a separate chapter. The l i t e r a l l y hundreds of messages and resolut ions sent during the f i r s t nine month period may be broken into f i ve d i s t i n c t categor ies , each deal ing with a s p e c i f i c aspect of the Spanish C i v i l War: 1) popular responses to the government's threatened ban on exports to Spain; 2] the uproar, in September 1936, when l o y a l i s t Spain 's membership in the League of Nations was not renewed; 3) the disappear-ance, in February 1937, of General Emile Kleber , f i r s t leader of what was to become the Internat ional Br igades, and reputedly a Canadian c i t i z e n ; 4) general views on Canada and the Spanish C i v i l War, and f i n a l l y ; 5) the e th ica l and moral questions involved in the proposed Foreign Enlistment Act . - 30 -As has been mentioned, le f t -wing Canadian magazines l i k e the Canadian Forum and New Front iers demanded that the Spanish Republic be permitted to buy any material i t needed from Canada. This sentiment also found expression in l e t te rs to King and Lapointe. Typical of these was a pe t i t i on sent by the "Canadian League Against War and Fascism for Peace and Democracy": Be i t resolved that th is Mass Meeting of one thousand Canadian c i t i zens urge upon the Dominion government that i t permit the transport of suppl ies to the f r i end l y government of Spain in accordance with Internat ional law and that i t w i l l not a t -tempt to place r e s t r i c t i o n s upon Canadian c i t i zens who may wish to a id the Spanish people in the i r * defence of the p r i nc i p l e of cons t i tu t iona l and democratic government. As with the above reso lu t i on , few authors r es t r i c t ed themselves so le l y to the question of supp l ies , but rather dealt with both material and human a i d . Many of the l e t t e r s r e f l e c t the highly charged emotional nature of the Spanish C i v i l War through the i r strong ind ignat ion: In conclusion I beg to ask i f i t i s proposed in t h i s b i l l , to p roh ib i t the sending of fur ther cash and material a id to such a worthy and admirable c i t i z e n of th i s country as Dr. Norman Bethune who i s carry ing on such a noble work in l i t e r a l l y snatching from the jaws of death, hundreds i f not thousands who other-wise, would be numbered among the hundreds of thousands who have been s a c r i f i c e d to the God of Finance Capi ta l fn Spain , through her t rusted l ieutenants , the-,Fascist and Nazi butchers of I ta l y and Germany. . . . Spain 's membership in the League of Nations came up for re-newal in September 1936. To the consternation and surpr ise of many, the - 31 -League ousted Spain by re jec t ing the Republ ic 's app l i ca t ion on September 20th. That alone could have resul ted in general indignat ion from the democratic wor ld, but when i t was learned through the Canadian press ' tha t Senator Dandurand, Canada's representat ive to the League, had voted against Spain 's re-admission, l e t t e r s p o s i t i v e l y f looded the Prime M in i s t e r ' s o f f i c e . The government of A lbe r ta , having l i t t l e sympathy for the federal 42 L i b e r a l s , went so fa r as to pass a reso lu t ion condemning the ac t i on . H.R.L. Henry, the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s pr ivate secre tary , answered a l l the pro tes ta t ions , ca re fu l l y point ing out that since the vote had been by secret b a l l o t , Canada's pos i t ion could not have been known to the press. 43 Though Dandurand did in fac t vote for Spain 's r e - e l e c t i o n , the publ ic outcry, p a r t i c u l a r l y from the West, went a long way to prove that Engl ish Canada did not want Spain i so la ted from the wor ld, and was indeed sym-pathet ic toward the l e g a l l y e lected republ ican government. * The disappearance of Emile Kleber in February 1937 caused a minor pub l ic uproar in Engl ish speaking Canada. Kleber , a professional revolut ionary and veteran of the Russian revo lu t ion , reached the stature of a f o l k hero in the f a l l of 1936 a f te r s k i l l f u l l y commanding a motley 44 crew of in te rna t iona ls in the defence of Madrid. To many Canadians Kleber not only stood for l i b e r t y , j u s t i c e and idea l i sm, but as a natura l ized Canadian of Austr ian o r i g i n , was almost a nat ive son. Thus in te res t in Spain was fur ther heightened by the fac t that one of the f i r s t leaders of 45 the Internat ional Brigades was Canadian. Mackenzie King received dozens of l e t t e r s and telegrams from the time Kleber was f i r s t reported captured by Franco's Moorish troops un t i l his eventual re-emergence several weeks - 32 -l a t e r . Every one of them c a l l e d , with varying degrees of c i v i l i t y , fo r the Canadian government to go to K leber 's a i d , or at leas t to ensure his safe ty . The pe t i t ions were not only from le f t -wing groups, but were also from ind iv idua l concerned c i t i zens .throughout Canada ( inc luding AC Quebec). Recurring inc idents such as th is were embell ished by papers l i k e the communist Dai ly C l a r i o n , and became v i t a l to the construct ion of the mystique surrounding the Spanish C i v i l War. The smal lest category of l e t t e r s sent to the government during the f i r s t nine months of the war concerned general impressions of the c r i s i s . These notes were not wr i t ten as a resu l t of any pa r t i cu la r inc iden t , and were therefore more expressions of general concern rather than s p e c i f i c angry complaints. A typ ica l example was the fo l lowing note from the "Lutheran Workers L i te ra ry Assoc ia t ion" of Toronto: "Tramp [the f a s c i s t ] down and end a l l the butchery which they have caused wi th -47 out any r i gh t or reason." There were also seventy-two copies of a pro-republ ican an t i - rebe l pe t i t i on a l leged ly representing a to ta l of 4,331 people. A l l stemming from B r i t i s h Columbia, most from the Vancouver area, they were sent in mid-October 1936, and tended to emanate from C.C .F . clubs with a smal ler assortment of women's groups, German, I t a l i an and church organizat ions a lso represented. This category of l e t t e r s was again overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Spanish Republic and tended to see the war as an ideo log ica l s t rugg le . The government's proposed Foreign, Enlistment Act drew by fa r the greatest response from the e lec tora te throughout the f i r s t nine - 33 -months of the Spanish war. Let ters from across Canada flooded in to the o f f i ces of both the Prime Min is te r and Ernest Lapointe from la te January 1937 un t i l the Act was passed in March. As with the other ca tegor ies , they seem to have been weighted evenly between those sent by ind iv idua ls and those dispatched under the auspices of pa r t i cu la r groups or clubs ( in the l a t t e r case, labour groups tended to dominate). Though the l e t t e r s d i f fe red in the i r approach the emphasis, less than f i ve percent ac tua l l y supported the proposed Act while most condemned i t ou t r igh t . Vehement re jec t ion of the Act revolved around two central and p o l i t i c a l i ssues: the democratic r igh t of Canadians to come and go as they pleased^and the increasing f a s c i s t threat to democracy and l e g a l l y e lected democratic governments. The fo l lowing reso lu t ion adopted at a C .P .C . chaired "mass meeting" in Winnipeg furnished a good example of the former case: As f ree Canadians we demand the r igh t to go to the assistance of any in jured person, group of persons, or a nation who i s suf fer ing under these or s im i l a r circumstances, e i ther as combattants, or as non-combattants. Even elements from wi th in Mackenzie K ing 's own L ibera l Party rebel led against the perceived ant i-democrat ic nature of the Act . The L ibera l Club of S t . Jacques, Montreal , sent the Prime Min is te r a po l i t e note informing 49 him ,that i t bel ieved the proposed Act to be "contrary to democracy". The emotional ly indignant character of the l e t te rs also took a personal form, with attacks on the i n t eg r i t y of King himsel f : "I had always thought that you were in favour of democracy, but today I perceive the 50 contrary. I' hope that your a t t i tude w i l l change in the next few days." - 34 -And th is rather v ic ious and scornful statement: " I t appears to me that you have been overwhelmed by [ B r i t a i n ' s Prime Min is te r ] , Mr. Baldwin 51 and company and the entertainment in the i r ca re . " Many Canadians saw the Act as t a c i t government approval fo r the rebel cause. Though the Enlistment Act was to prevent Canadians from volunteering f o r e i ther side in the Spanish war, the number who wished to j o i n Franco's Foreign Legions was so miniscule that the B i l l was l o g i c a l l y perceived as an attack so le l y upon the l o y a l i s t s . A C .C .F . candidate from West York f e l t that the Act would be "tantamount to countenancing rebe l l i on against a cons t i t u t i ona l l y chosen government 52 of a f r i e n d l y power." McGi l l Un i ve rs i t y ' s "Soc ia l Problems C lub" , ac t i ve l y fo l lowing events in Spain, wrote to the Jus t i ce M in i s te r : I t has been unmistakeably shown that [passing the Act} would amount in prac t ice to in tervent ion on the side of the rebe ls . . . .Cer ta in !v 3 t he Canadian people are not pa r t i a l to the rebe ls . Many p ro tes ts , though less academic, were never- the- less obvious in t he i r in ten t : What dark and s i n i s t e r object is behind the b i l l ? Surely an opponent of democracy in Spain , would, be an opponent in Canada. An advocate of govern-ment by the Thug, l i k e his f r iend Franco, the Fasc is t Baby-butcher. I f th is damnable outrage i s permitted to becowe law, I sha l l never again cast a L ibera l vote. - 35 -Protestant re l i g ious groups a lso jo ined in at tacking the government over the foreign enl istment i ssue . Their l e t t e r s , exem-p l i f i e d by the fo l l ow ing , tended to dwell on the moral aspects of the Act : As a c i t i z e n of Canada and a clergyman of the United Church, I wish to add my voice to those which are protest ing against the government's an-nounced in tent ions to introduce a b i l l p roh ib i t -ing Canadians from f igh t ing for democracy in Spain. Such l e g i s l a t i o n would, in my judgement, be a t o t a l l y unwarranted infringement on c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , a gross i nsu l t to a f r i end l y govern-ment, a shameful encouragement to world-wide fasc ism, and a c lear breach of in ternat iona l law. I fe rvent ly hope that the professedly L ibera l government of Canada w i l l not disgrace i t s e l f by introducing th is abominable b i l l . Perhaps the best example of a l l the l e t te rs deal ing with the Foreign Enlistment Act i s the fo l lowing succinct note to the Prime Min is te r . Torontonian Le i th McMurray qu ick ly i l luminated the central issues that seemed to d is turb so many Engl ish Canadians about Canada and the Spanish C i v i l War: I consider i t a cry ing shame that only when a c l ique of react ionary generals conspire with fore ign c a p i t a l i s t s to overthrow a government, democrat ical ly chosen by a people, do you con-s ider i t necessary to forbid g Canadians to j o i n that people's armed fo rces . One c ruc ia l inference may be gathered from the many le t te rs sent to the government during the ear ly stages of the Spanish C i v i l War. As has been mentioned, of a l l the inc idents and issues revolv ing - 36 -around Canada and Spain for the f i r s t nine months of the c o n f l i c t , none aroused as much at tent ion from Engl ish Canada as the Foreign Enlistment Act . The p laus ib le explanation for th is i s that Engl ish Canada, though pro- republ ican, did not want to become phys ica l l y i n -volved in Spain 's c i v i l war. Pr ivate co l l ec t i on agencies l i k e "the Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy" and volunteer recruitment e f fo r ts gave Engl ish Canada a sense of s o l i d a r i t y with the l o y a l i s t s without ac tua l l y dragging the country in to the muck of the i r war. Forcedly stopping the sale of mater ia ls and the t r i c k l e of rec ru i t s to Spain would mean blocking Engl ish Canada's sole ideo log ica l and legal vent. That, whether conscious or not, was the crux of the matter. Of more v i t a l import to th is paper was the obvious Engl ish Canadian support for the Spanish republ ican cause. Why did the Prime M in i s t e r , wel l aware of th is sentiment from Engl ish Canada, encourage the Foreign Enlistment Act and the ban on m i l i t a r y sales to e i ther of the Spanish antagonists? The answer to that question l i e s nei ther in Engl ish Canada, nor with the personal sympathies of Mackenzie King and his co l leagues, but rather in the province of Quebec. NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 Toronto Globe and M a i l , 29 July 1936, p. 4. 2 Vancouver Sun, 22 July 1936, p. 6. 3 Winnipeg Free Press, 24 July 1936, p. 11. 4 The Canadian Forum, e d i t o r i a l , October 1936, p. 4-5. 5Globe and M a i l , 20 July 1936, p. 4. ^Vancouver Sun, 25 July 1936, p. 4. 7New Front iers , e d i t o r i a l , vo l . 1, #6, October 1936. o I b i d . , v o l . 1, #5, September 1936, p. 3. New Front iers says of the fasc is ts and the i r attempted overthrow of the Spanish government: "The insurgents continue to ffgftt l i ke the cornered rats they are." 9 I b i d . , v o l . 1, #11, March 1937, p. 3. 1 0 The Canadian Forum, e d i t o r i a l , February 1937, p. 5. ^Vancouver Sun, 11 August 1936, p. 4. 1 2 I b i d . 13 Winnipeg Free Press, 6 August 1936, e d i t o r i a l . 1 4 Globe and M a i l , 31 July 1936, p. 1. 15 Winnipeg Free Press, 5 August 1936, p. 1. 1 6 I b i d . , 8 August 1936, p. 1. l 7 The Canadian Forum, e d i t o r i a l , September 1936, p. 4-5. 18 John A. Munro, e d . , Documents on Canadian External Relat ions, (Ottawa: Queen's Pr in te r , 1972), V I , p. 754. 19 Vic tor Hoar, The Mackenzie-Papineau Ba t ta l i on , (Toronto: Copp Clark Publishing Co. , 1969), p. 10. 20 The.Winnipeg Free Press i n i t i a l l y used Associated Press Serv ice, ~ then combined i t with Canadian Press, the la t te r dominating the paper by January 1937. The Vancouver Sun seems" to have used both press services for the f i r s t nine months of the c o n f l i c t , while papers l i k e the Toronto Star had i t s own correspondent, M.H. Halton, in place by October 1936. 21 Montreal's Le Devoir used S.P.A. news service exclus ively for the f i r s t two months of the con f l i c t a f ter which time they supplemented i t with a few dispatches from the Canadian Press Service. 22 At least one member of the International Brigades, Jason Gurney, was not impressed by Hemingway's macjnsmo_: "The most controversial of (the dist inguished v i s i t o r s to the repub-l i can trenches^J, was Ernest Hemingway, f u l l of hearty and bogus bon-homie. He sat himself down behind the bu l le t -proof shie ld of a machine-gun and loosed off a whole bel t of ammunition in the general d i rect ion of the enemy. This provoked a mortar bombardment for which he did not s tay." Jason Gurney, Crusade in Spain, (London: Faber & Faber L t d . , 1974), p. 67. 23 > see Andrew Boyle, The Fourth Man, (New York: Bantam Books, 1980). 24 The Canadian Forum, e d i t o r i a l , October 1936, p. 5. 2 5G16be and M a i l , 5 August 1936, p. 4. 2 6 I b i d . 27 The Canadian Forum, ed f to r fa l , November 1936, p. 4. 28 Canada, Parl iament, House of Commons, Debates, (Ottawa: Queen's P r in te r , 15 February 1937], p. 885. Hereafter c i ted as House of Commons, Debates. 29 J .A . Munro, Documents, p. 977. 30 Winnipeg Free Press, 8 August 1936, p. 7. 31 J.W. Dafoe, "Canadian Foreign Po l i c y , " Conference on Canadian . American A f f a i r s , (Boston: Ginn & Co. , 1937), p. 224-231. 32 ^ Ib id . 3 3Vancouvef Sun, 25 Ju ly 1936, p. 5. 34 ^ I b i d . 3 5New Front iers , v o l . 1, #8, December 1936, p. 14. 3 6 The Canadian Forum, October 1936, p. 23. Globe and M a i l , 19 January 1937, p. 1. 38 Ernest Lapointe Papers, vo l . 22, f i l e #70, Publ ic Archives of Canada. Letter dated 12 February 1937, from Mr. L.P. Labbe ( in French). A l l subsequent references are to materials in the Publ ic Archives, and w i l l be referred to as Lapointe Papers. 39 I b i d . , l e t te r dated 21 February 1937, from Al f red Mansfield E s q . , V i c t o r i a , B.C. 40 I b i d . , le t te r dated 8 February 1937. 41 I b i d . , l e t te r dated 1 February, from J.W. Gorman, Montreal. 42 for examples see King Papers, v o l . 342, f i l e S-500, Publ ic Archives of Canada. A l l subsequent King Papers references are to materials in the public archives. 43 King Papers, J4 se r ies , vo l . 212. Volume 167 of the King Papers contains a memorandum to the Prime Minister which says that Senator Dandurand did in fact vote for Spain's membership renewal. The word "conf ident ia l " is scr ibbled in the margin. 44 Victor Hoar, The Mac-Paps, p. 17. 45 memoranda in the King Papers suggest that the Department of Immigration ran a check on Mr. Kleber. The conclusion was that he was indeed not a Canadian c i t i zen nor a landed immigrant. 46 King Papers, J4 ser ies , v o l . 212. 4 7 I b i d . , vo l . 342, f i l e S-500, l e t te r dated 20 December 1936. 48 Lapointe Papers, vo l . 22, f i l e #70, l e t te r dated 7 February 1937. 49 I b i d . , l e t te r dated 31 January 1937, from Monsieur L. Rousseau, Secreta i re , Club L ibe ra l , St . Jaques, Montreal ( in French). 50 I b i d . , l e t te r dated 30 January 1937. 5 1 K i n g Papers, vo l . 342, f i l e S-500, l e t te r dated 31 January 1937. 5 2 Lapointe Papers, vo l . 22, f i l e #70, l e t te r dated 3 February 1937. 53 I b i d . , l e t te r dated 31 January 1937, from the s ix ty members of the "Social Problems Club." 54 • Ib id . , l e t t e r dated 2 February 1937, from Mr. B. Seanlon, Montreal. 55 I b i d . , l e t te r dated 5 February 1937, from Rev. J . C . Mortimer, Northport, N.S. 56 King Papers, vo l . 342, f i l e S-500, l e t te r dated August 1937. - 40 -CHAPTER II THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF QUEBEC Mackenzie King wouldn't know a p r i nc i p l e i f he t r ipped over i t . A l l he was in terested in was votes. Interview with Senator Eugene Forsey, February 1982 Af ter that fa te fu l day when the Bolsheviks f i r s t began to board up or convert churches into workers' clubs in the new Soviet Republ ic , communism had become the avowed nemesis of organized r e l i g i o n . Of a l l c l e r i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , the Catho l ic church reacted most vehemently against the new foe, condemning communism from the p u l p i t , and supporting any group that promised to challenge and destroy the growing red menace. Undoubtedly th is was because the Catho l ic church, through centur ies of e f f ec t i ve socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l con t ro l , bore the brunt of the l e f t i s t a t tacks , and stood to lose the most. Thus one of the many reasons for the na t i ona l i s t rebe l l i on against the Spanish Republic in Ju ly 1936, was the r e a l i z a t i o n by the m i l i t a r y that the new l e f t i s t tendencies of Madrid posed a deadly threat to the t r ad i t i ona l pos i t ion of the Spanish church. Not only were s o c i a l i s t s c a l l i n g for reforms wi th in the Cathol ic h ierarchy, communists and anarchists were reaching sacr i leg ious heights by c a l l i n g for the complete erad icat ion of a l l papal inf luence in Spain. The Spanish a r i s toc racy , inc luding i t s m i l i t a r y leaders , rebe l led against increasing - 41 -secu la r i za t ion of the state and the threat to the former semi-feudal state of church, gentry and m i l i t a r y , a bastion which had kept a l l three in pos i t ions of wealth and power for centur ies . Many Cathol ics also feared a moral col lapse i f the inf luence of the church were to be destroyed. They f e l t that the o ld bonds of law, order, and the fami ly would be severed i f the v i g i l a n t eye of the church were c losed. Playing on th is sentiment, the r i gh t pointed to the apparent decl ine of the Spanish moral f i b re s ince the creat ion of the Second Republic in December 1931, repeat-edly warning Spain of the dangers of l i b e r a l i s m . There were a lso less a l t r u i s t i c reasons for fear ing l e f t i s t a n t i - c l e r i c a l i s m . The Catho l ic church stood to lose a great deal more than several m i l l i o n Spanish souls were the republicans to i n s t i t u t e a l l t he i r promised programmes. The church, through i t s vast holdings and the centur ies old system of t i thes was an immensely r i ch and powerful o rgan izat ion , which j u s t i -f i a b l y feared that the l e f t was about to a l t e r th is t rad i t i ona l pos i t ion by expropr iat ing holdings and red i s t r i bu t i ng them among the Spanish c i t i z e n s . By the time war broke out in Spain, the forces of soc ia l i sm and communism on the one hand, and Cathol ic ism on the other, had ca l l ed up t he i r respect ive reserves for the impending bat t le for the souls and a l leg iances of western man. Musso l i n i , the I t a l i an d i c ta to r , had scored a major diplomatic coup for fasc ism, nat iona l ism, and a n t i -communism by s igning the Lateran t rea t ies with the Vatican in 1929. Through them, Pope Pius XI came to terms with the I t a l i an government and pub l i c l y endorsed the f a s c i s t in the i r f i gh t against communism. Ar r i v ing - 42 -at a legal and p o l i t i c a l agreement with the r igh t meant that the papacy o f f i c i a l l y sh i f ted i t s world-wide f lock fur ther toward conservatism, u l t ra -na t iona l i sm, and a n t i - l i b e r a l i s m . I t a l i an fasc ism, though never completely championed by the Vat ican , was general ly encouraged from the' pu lp i t as i t promised to ra ise the strongest , and perhaps only e f fec t i ve bulwark against encroaching communism. This rapprochement between the Vatican and I t a l i a n fascism led to immediate and dynamic soc ia l repercussions throughout the Cathol ic world. In the case of French Canada, i t added an a i r of legi t imacy to a conservative swing that had been waxing for many years . This acted as a d i rec t threat to the federal system in genera l , and to Mackenzie K ing 's L ibera l government in p a r t i c u l a r , because i t sur-r e p t i t i o u s l y helped widen the o ld gul f between Engl ish and French Canada. * * * French Canadians t r a d i t i o n a l l y f e l t themselves to be members of a proud and unique minor i ty whose cu l tu ra l surv iva l was perennia l ly menaced by outside fo rces . The sense of insecur i t y engendered by th is s i tua t ion was fur ther exacerbated by demographic sh i f t s ,and by the depression of 1929. The major i ty of French Canadians l i v e d , by 1936, in an urban environment, general ly around the few indus t r ia l centres of Quebec. The rural exodus was recent however, and the o ld p rov inc ia l values had yet to make allowances fo r the i r new m i l i e u . - 43 -The t rag ic resu l t of th is ambiguous s i tua t ion was the creat ion of French Canadian p ro le ta r i a t which did not have a cul ture to r e f l e c t i t s new urban cond i t ion . B l a i r Neatby describes the s i tua t ion as fo l lows: There was no place for the urban worker in th is i dea l i zed version of French-Canadian soc ie ty ; no i n f l u e n t i a l French-Canadians had become spokesmen for the working c lass and there was l i t t l e aware-ness of the problem of an urban p r o l e t a r i a t . The ideas of soc ia l i sm, trade unionism or even mi ld l y l e f t -wing l i be ra l i sm were therefore treated as a l i en or rad ica l ideo log ies . Viewed as urban threats l i k e l y to leave French Canada even more v u l -nerable to destruct ive external fo rces , these rad ica l a l i en ideas were highly suspect. Most of Quebec's Catho l ic leaders saw any form of pro-gressive soc ia l change as a d i rec t attack on French Canadian cu l ture and race. I t i s hardly su rp r i s ing , the re fo re , that the apparent re l i g ious into lerance of l e f t i s t s and Spanish republicans a l i ke garnered l i t t l e sympathy from Quebec. Unlike the Spanish Popular Front, which was crying for in ternat iona l a i d , French Canada was being swept by powerful i l l i b e r a l c l e r i c a l nat ional ism, and to many was indeed r ipe for the dynamic r ight-wing extreme of fascism. The soc ia l swing to the r igh t was also re f lec ted in the p o l i t i c a l cl imate of Quebec. Though Prime Min is te r Mackenzie King had been less than fond of the former Taschereau admin is t ra t ion , there i s no doubt that he favoured i t over the new Union Nationale administ ra-- 44 -t ion which Maurice Duplessis had led to a major v ic to ry in the Quebec prov inc ia l e lec t ions of 1936. I t can be sa fe ly assumed that King was t ry ing to make the best of a bad s i t ua t i on when he noted- in h is d ia ry : I am not sorry to have a conservative government in power in Quebec. I t i s eas ier to govern at Ottawa with the provinces cont ra . Also i t w i l l help us in dealing with the other provinces, and in meet-ing const i tu t iona l questions e tc . Supported by Cardinal V i l l eneuve , Duplessis had ridden to power as the champion of anti-communism. His government's p o l i c i e s and the react ionary mood wi th in French Canada were la rge ly instrumental in shaping Canadian . fore ign po l i cy v is a v i s Spain and the Spanish C i v i l War. * * * The well documented examples of church desecrations in republ ican Spain, French Canadian fears of communism, and the recent accord between Cathol ic ism and I t a l i a n fascism were instrumental i n swinging Quebec pub l ic opinion away from the l ega l l y e lected Spanish Popular Front government. Even without these v i t a l fo rces , however, strong French Canadian i so la t ion ism would never have permitted Quebec to endorse any o f f i c i a l Canadian support fo r the Spanish Republ ic. I so la t i on -i s t sentiments had always been dominant wi th in Quebec, but were sw i f t l y gaining momentum by 1936. The debacles in the trenches of the F i r s t World War, the depression, and the dark clouds that again hung over Europe, made French Canada a l l the more vociferous in i t s e f fo r ts to keep - 45 -the country from being embroiled in the European c o n f l i c t that so many saw coming. Most French Canadians perceived i so la t ion ism and react ionary conservatism as the most e f fec t i ve weapons in the i r bid fo r se l f - p ro tec t i on . Ins t inc ts for preservat ion in Quebec ran very deeply indeed. I t might have been natural fo r Quebec to fee l at l eas t nominal l oya l t y to the "o ld country" since the province had l i t t l e love for England and could trace i t s ancestry s t ra igh t back to France. The re-occupa-t ion of the Rhineland by Germany in March 1936, proved that th is was, in f a c t , not the case at a l l . Professor James Eayrs has wr i t ten about Quebec's react ion to French appeals for in ternat iona l a id against her o ld foe: Perhaps the balance of informed opinion came down on the side of Henri Bourassa who, no Angloph i le , wrote to Mackenzie King from Europe: "On the Rhine i s s u e , w i l l I shock you in saying that I side with the B r i t i s h against the French? Whether H i t l e r ' s peace proposals be sincere or not, they ought to be_taken at t he i r face value and H i t l e r gousie fs ic ] au pied du mur to de l i ve r the goods." Though an Engl ish language paper, the Montreal Gazette exempl i f ied French Canada's stance by arguing that "Nothing can ever be gained by pe rs i s ten t l y t reat ing Germany as though she were national enemy No. 1 4 in perpetu i ty . " I f the i s o l a t i o n i s t sentiments ran so deeply that French Canadians would not run to the a id of France, there was ab-so lu te ly no reason to suppose that Quebec would ever r a l l y to the - 46 -ta t tered banner of republ ican Spain. L.M. Gouin, a prominent business-man, and Mackenzie King 's former Quebec l ieu tenant , wrote of the deter io ra t ing Spanish s i t ua t i on : "French Canadians are in favour of i s o l a t i o n in one form or another, from th is i t fo l lows that we do not 5 intend to have Canada become one of the policemen of the wor ld . " In his l uc id ana l ys i s , wr i t ten f i ve years a f te r Franco's r e b e l l i o n , professor F.H. Soward noted: The sense of aloofness from Europe was perhaps even stronger in Quebec than was the w i l l ingness to give Franco mater ial support. That may explain why French-Canada was more in terested in blocking assistance to the Spanish Republic than in f a c i l -i t a t i ng d i rec t a id to General Franco. A fur ther example of the staunch i s o l a t i o n i s t stance in Quebec was that prov ince 's react ion to the modest rearmament proposal put fo r th by the federal government in 1935. According to professor James Eayrs, to defend i t s sovereignty, Canada in the m id - th i r t i es could shuf f le and wheeze for th wi th : . . .a sea-going, Navy [consist ing] of two se rv i ce -able dest royers, and two destroyers and a mine-sweeper something, less than serv iceab le . On shore, barracks were decrep i t , and wi re less inadequate, the naval magazine at Esquimalt (having been con-demned as long ago as 1905) a menace to the sur-rounding community. . . .Not a s ing le a n t i - a i r c r a f t gun was to be found in the ent i re Dominion. Am-munition was scarce and, on account of i t s great age, a gamble to f i r e . Mechanzied transport was a r a r i t y . The A i r Force could muster twenty-three a i r c r a f t , but not one of them was judged su i tab le fo r act ive se rv i ce . - 4Z -Though the exact f igures can be d isputed, the country was, to a l l in tents and purposes, lacking in adequate defences. I t i s therefore small wonder that Defence Min is te r Ian Mackenzie pushed so strenuously for a large increase to the meagre defence budget. Though Canada's borders were poorly defended, however, i so la t ion ism appeared so strong in Quebec that the Prime Min is te r received warnings from C.G. Power, the i n f l u e n t i a l L ibera l from Quebec East , that "Any extensive defence 8 programme would cost the government the support of the ent i re prov ince." Since a large percentage of federal L ibera l support came from Quebec, Power's threat had to be taken se r i ous l y . Canada's response to the Ethiopian c r i s i s in 1935 i l l u s t r a t e d j us t how ser ious ly Mackenzie King took the i s o l a t i o n i s t sentiments from wi th in Quebec. Jean Bruches i 's a r t i c l e , "A French-Canadian view of Canadian Foreign p o l i c y " , typef ied the Quebec response to Hai le S e l a s s i e ' s plea for a id against the I t a l i an invaders. In i t he stressed that "the League of Nations as i t now ex i s t s i s not h ighly pr ized in the province of Quebec", and that there was very l i t t l e enthusiasm for a war fought 9 on behalf "of a cer ta in t r i be of negroes." Even when the vague idea of an in te rven t ion is t war had died i t s inev i tab le death and sanctions against I t a l y were proposed, Quebec newspapers of a l l p o l i t i c a l per-suasions came out f o r c e f u l l y against t h e m . ^ K ing 's co l league, Ernest Lapointe, re i te ra ted th is when he declared: No in te res t in E th iop ia , of any nature whatsoever, i s worth the l i f e of a s ing le Canadian c i t i z e n . No considerat ion could j u s t i f y Canada's p a r t i c i -pation-i in such a war, and I am unal terably opposed to i t . 1 1 - 48 -According to professor Eayrs, Lapointe spoke for French Canada, "and 12 on th is i ssue , French Canada was to speak for Canada." The members of the League, inc lud ing Canada, turned away while the I ta l ians marched unimpeded in to Addis Ababa a f te r a gross and ruth less v i o l a t i on of sovereign t e r r i t o r y . * * * Prime Min is te r K ing, always a f ra id of d i v i s i v e elements wi th in Canada, was l e f t in a quandry over the react ionary and i s o l a t i o n i s t mood of Quebec. The L i b e r a l s , taking 55 of 65 possib le seats , had won a resounding v ic to ry in Quebec in the federal e lec t ions of 1935, but could not a f ford to g l o a t . I t was rea l i zed that the federal L ibera l party regained i t s t r a d i t i o n a l l y large major i ty , not through i t s own popu lar i ty , but la rge ly because of d i s -i l lus ionment with Bennett 's former Conservative government. There i s no doubt that th is worried the Prime Min is te r as i t was, a f te r a l l , la rge ly Quebec which had endorsed him as Lau r i e r ' s successor to the head of the L ibera l party. King knew how v i t a l Quebec was to his power base; the problem was how to in te rp re t the prov ince 's increasing con-servat ism, and what act ions to fo l low i f react ionary French Canada were to be p lacated. As was his wont when deal ing with sens i t i ve problems in Quebec, King wise ly sent his widely respected French Canadian Jus t i ce M in i s te r , Ernest Lapointe, in to the f ray . However, an o ld man by the 1930's, - 49 -Lapointe seemed incapable of deal ing with the dynamic Quebec s i t u a t i o n . He was, in f a c t , so disturbed by events in his home province that i t 14 af fected his heal th . An entry in the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s diary shows that King eould not understand these de fea t i s t fee l ings in the usual ly op t im is t i c and buoyant Lapointe: Lapointe 's fear of the Cardinal and Duplessis amounts to absolute te r ro r . No one can convince me that i f he, h imsel f , and a few others would begin to expound the doctr ines of L ibera l ism to the younger generation of Quebec, i t would not take long to-,free them from c l e r i c a l or p o l i t i c a l in to lerance. An otherwise t r i v i a l event that occurred in la te 1936 ex-empl i f ied King 's incomprehension of the trends within Quebec. In an e f f o r t to garner in ternat iona l a id and support fo r the Spanish repub-l i c a n cause, four l o y a l i s t s requested permission to embark upon a cross-Canada speaking tour . An ardent proponent of free speech, the Prime Min is te r was a l l in favour, while Lapointe, equal ly dedicated to the s p i r i t s of l i b e r a l i s m , bel ieved that the tour must be stopped as a l o y a l i s t v i s i t to Quebec might prove calamitous. Previous incidents between v i s i t i n g republicans and French Canadians had, a f te r a l l , led to bloodshed, and the general sentiment in Quebec was against a l lowing republ ican propaganda into the province. In a long l e t t e r to the Jus t i ce M in i s t e r , the Assoc ia t ion Catholique des Voyageurs de Commerce du Canada re i te ra ted French Canada's fears of subversive propaganda: We have been advised that Dr. Be'thume [ s i c^ i s continuing his propaganda in favour of red Spain. - 50 -Leaving Vancouver he i s coming east indoct r ina t ing the pub l ic in favour of Spanish communists. . . . I t has been proposed and unanimously resolved to ask you to have t ^ is propaganda stopped in the i n te res t of a l 1 . The fo l lowing l e t t e r from a law f i rm in Montreal to the Min is te r of Jus t i ce i s a lso t yp i ca l of French Canada's fee l ings towards v i s i t i n g republ ican speakers. A l l ez -vous , en votre qua l i te de min is t re de l a j u s t i c e et de premier min is t re in te r ima i re , l a i s s e r entcer au pays un element inevitablement subvers i f? When one such delegation was scheduled to speak in Montreal in October 1936, the resu l t i ng v io len t student protest forced the mayor to cancel the meeting permit. In the aftermath, "the vociferous students were . pub l i c l y praised by Premier Duplessis for hindering 'communists' from 18 speaking." The inc ident would have been less s i n i s t e r had the r i o t been a spontaneous ac t , but that was not the case. Deeply disturbed and f r ightened by the event, Eugene•Forsey, than a young lec turer at M c G i l l , wrote to Ernest Lapointe on November 3 1936: The p la i n fac t i s that the c i t y au thor i t ies ab-dicated in the face of th reats . Law and order were set at naught. Peaceable decent c i t i zens were deprived of the i r r igh ts at the bidding of lawless and turbulent adolescents. . . .This af-f a i r was ca re fu l l y organized; former students of mine have in the i r possession one of the notes sent round ordering the youths to meet at the headquarters of the Jeunesse Ouvriere Catholique and "br ing the i r canes". I t i s ob-vious a lso that i t has approval in high quarters. There i s , in f a c t , q a formidable Fasc i s t movement in th is province. - 51 -Contrary to Premier Dup less is 's accusat ions, Senator Forsey proved conc lus ive ly that there were, i n f a c t , no "communist elements" at the meeting. With passions in Quebec as inflamed as they were, Lapointe bel ieved that entry v isas to the second group of republ ican speakers should not be granted. The Jus t i ce Min is te r feared, qui te r i g h t l y , that permit t ing them to speak would be interpreted in Quebec as t a c i t federal support for the l e f t i s t ideas of the l o y a l i s t s . "He seemed to th ink " , noted King in his d ia ry , " that i f they were allowed to come into Canada at a l l , i t might only lead to the secession of the 20 province of Quebec from the rest of Canada." Through a compromise, the l o y a l i s t s were f i n a l l y permitted to tour and speak, but only in Engl ish Canada. The Spaniards were thoroughly checked by the Canadian legat ion in Washington before enter ing Canada, and were obl iged to sign a document promising to stay wel l c lear of Quebec. On December 24 1936, the Under Secretary of State for External A f f a i r s , Dr. O.D. Ske l ton , who had taken personal charge of the i nves t i ga t i on , wrote a memorandum to the Prime Min is te r in which he s a i d : "Sa t i s fac to ry assurances were received that i f the v i s i t o r s entered Canada they would not v i s i t the 21 province of Quebec." The republicans entered the country and had a successful tour , wel l aware that " i f they came near Quebec and caused 22 disturbances they would be immediately deported." I f th is ru l ing ap-peared in to le ran t and ant i -democrat ic , i t was because Lapointe sensed that in the case of Quebec, the safest po l i cy was to acquiesce to the w i l l of the major i ty . - 52 -Cardinal V i l l eneuve , Dupless is , and many other French Canadian leaders would have Quebec and the res t of the country bel ieve that "La Be l le Province" was in gravest p e r i l of being overrun by red. hord£. To them, nothing was as pernic ious or got bet ter p o l i t i c a l mileage than communism. Though the powerful i ndus t r i a l e l i t e of Quebec was large ly Engl ish speaking, protestant , and unsympathetic to Dup less is 's French Canadian nat iona l ism, i t ra ised no object ion to his tough stance on Spain. A f te r a l l , the more v i r u l en t l y anti-communist the province became, the bet ter the i ndus t r i a l leaders l i ked i t . A p ious, and obedient working c lass would be a tremendous asset to Engl ish manu-fac turers in Quebec. The s i ze of th is communist f i f t h column must therefore be examined. Unl ike the rest of Canada, where the depression served as the best rec ru i t i ng agent the Communist Party of Canjda could have hoped f o r , economic d i f f i c u l t i e s turned Quebecers away from the l e f t , toward the r i gh t and extreme nat ional ism. This i s borne out by an examination of e lec t ion re turns, which show that the Quebec wing of the communist party never garnered more than a few thousand votes, these 23 coming almost exc lus ive ly from the i ndus t r i a l areas of Montreal . I t i s safe to say then, that communism, in r e a l i t y , never posed any form of threat to Quebec at a l l . I f , as suggested, communism never r e a l l y posed a threat to Quebec, why was the fear of anything l e f t - o f - cen t re so rampant through-out the province? One potent ia l explanation i s that French Canadians, who tended to be a church-going people, were not only bombarded with anti-communist rhe tor ic from the i r government, and the French Canadian - 53 -media, but also from the pu lp i t and those soc ia l i n s t i t u t i ons run by the Catho l ic c le rgy . Thus, when a l l e f fec t i ve media of communication issued steady streams of a n t i - l e f t i s t propaganda, i t i s small wonder that the already concerned French Canadian population became more f i rm ly entrenched in i t s conservative outlook. The Spanish C i v i l War merely i n t e n s i f i e d those f ee l i ngs . I t was d i f f i c u l t to see Spanish republ ican-ism in an ob jec t i ve , l e t alone pos i t i ve l i g h t , when Monsignor A n t o n i u t t i , the powerful papal delegate to Canada and Newfoundland, introduced General Franco and the rebels as "An army of heroes, j u s t l y ca l l ed ' C h r i s t ' s m i l i t i a ' . " 2 4 The various ethnic groups of Quebec also tended to help sway opinion away from anything remotely l e f t -w ing . As mentioned, Cathol ic ism was t r a d i t i o n a l l y a v i t a l anti-communist, pro-conservat ive fo rce , and many of the non-French ethnic groups in Quebec were staunchly c a t h o l i c . Chief among these was the large I t a l i an populat ion. Badly impoverished by the depression, these poeple, who tended to be factory workers in and around the i ndus t r i a l areas of the province, natura l ly took courage and heart from the reports of Musso l i n i ' s new I t a l y . The I ta l ian-Canadian ca tho l i c church buttressed th is sentiment fur ther by urging i t s f lock to support Mussol in i in word and deed. Veneration of II Puce reached the point where a; giant f resco of the I t a l i an d ic ta tor appeared on 25 the wal ls of the Madonna de l l a Difesa church in Montreal . Charles Bayley, who wrote a Master 's thesis on the I t a l i an community of Montreal in 1935, estimated that f u l l y ninety percent of the loca l I ta l i ans 26 supported I t a l i a n fasc ism. Together, the various Catho l ic groups in - 54 -Quebec manifested so much overt support fo r the Spanish rebels that Hugh Thomas, author of the d e f i n i t i v e study of the Spanish C i v i l War, observed that Quebec and B raz i l of fered more moral support to Franco 71 than any other non- fasc is t province or country in the world. Support fo r the r igh t and v i ru len t condemnation of republ ican Spain was, however, not universal in Quebec. There were small enclaves, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the urban areas, of men and women who not only supported the l o y a l i s t s , but who were equal ly deeply disturbed by the threat of fascism wi th in t he i r own province. As could be expected, the most vocal a n t i - f a s c i s t of these groups seems to have been the Anglo-Quebec i n t e l l e c t u a l c l a s s . A small Quebec chapter of the Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy ex i s ted , and an equal ly small but vocal group sup-ported republ ican Spain because i t was the l e g a l l y and democrat ical ly e lected government. The fo l lowing two l e t t e r s are typ ica l of the many Ernest Lapointe received from the l a t t e r group of Engl ish Quebecers a f te r the Canadian government refused to s e l l goods to the l o y a l i s t s : . . . .Whatever our opinions might be [the Spanish government} was elected in a democratic manneg and should receive our f u l l support as L i b e r a l s . The government knows that , had the Rebels not been sided by H i t l e r and Musso l i n i , and the whole p lo t engineered in Germany, the legal government of Spain would have overthrown i t s enemies in a month's t ime. . . .And since the government knows that , and who can help knowing, i f a id i s refused to the elected government of Spain, then we are d i r e c t l y ass i s t i ng the enemies of a cons t i t u t i on -a l l y e lected government, and we sha l l be, our-se lves , the enemies of,democracy. - 55 -Though no records have been kept, i t i s l i k e l y that th is Engl ish group also provided many of the Quebec contingent of the Mac-Paps. This i s borne out by V ic to r Hoar's The Mackenzie-Papineau B a t t a l i o n , which mentions "at leas t three dozen" French Canadians of the to ta l twelve hundred man f o r c e . 3 ^ Since there were over s i x t y volunteers from 31 Quebec, most of the remaining must have been Eng l i sh . Very few French Canadians supported the l o y a l i s t s , and those who did seem to have done so for less i d e a l i s t i c reasons. The motives of the fo l lowing scathing attack on Franco are rather suspect as the union which wrote the l e t t e r represented Quebec workers in the armaments industry: We fee l that the leg i t imate ly estab l ished Spanish government has the r i gh t to buy what they want to protect against the vandals who k i l l women and ch i l d ren . We ask you to s e l l arms to the Spanish government who render serv ice to ca tho l i c people by putt ing an end to the t e r r i b l e bat t le caused by C o l . [s ic ] Franco and his bandits who commit the most barbaric acts in a l l h i s to ry . The suspic ions of more l i b e r a l l y minded Quebecers were heightened fur ther by the int roduct ion in 1937 of Dup less is 's Padlock Act . By i t , the Attorney General (Duplessis h imse l f ) , could padlock a l l premises a l -legedly used "to propagate communism or bolshevism by any means what-32 soever." The Eng l i sh and l i b e r a l French community in Quebec was outraged and attacked the Act through the C i v i l L i be r t i es Union. They fought a los ing b a t t l e , however, s ince most Quebecers, p a r t i c u l a r l y French Canadians, approved the measure. Adelard Godbout was barely heard, and less l i s tened to , when he to ld a Quebec C i ty audience "That - 56 -the dangerous menace in the province was not communism—the people 33 could never be taken in by tha t—i t was fasc ism. " Since the vast major i ty of Quebecers showed l i t t l e sympathy for soc ia l ism or communism, and indeed tended to support those i ns t i t u t i ons and groups which a t -tacked s o c i a l i s t s , the minor i ty of Quebecers who feared the r i g h t i s t trend wi th in the i r province and the world in general had l i t t l e impact e i ther on the i r own province or on Canada as a whole. * * * Though the u l ta-conservat ive trends in Quebec were d is tu rb -ing in t h e i r own r i gh t , i t i s un l i ke l y that they would have had much impact on Canadian fore ign po l i cy i f the Spanish C i v i l War had not broken out. I t was la rge ly the creat ion of the Internat ional Brigades on the Iberian Peninsula, and the subsequent world-wide l e f t i s t re -cruitment dr ives that forced Mackenzie K ing 's L ibera l government away from i t s po l i cy of non-commitment, towards a pos i t i ve foreign po l icy statement, and u l t imate ly to pass the Foreign Enlistment Act . The question posed by the Spanish c ruc ib le was whether the Canadian govern-ment would al low i t s c i t i zens to volunteer fo r the ranks of the Inter-nat ional Brigades. On the one hand, Engl ish Canada tended to remain i nd i f f e ren t , or sympathetic towards the l o y a l i s t cause. While on the other , Quebec tending to see things in black and white (or i n th is case red and b lue) , na tu ra l l y viewed recruitment for the Spanish trenches as another example of an in ternat iona l communist f i f t h column that had to be ru th less l y nipped at the bud. For example, when asked by - 57 -a Montreal Star reporter whether he thought that "anybody who j^contendedj that the present Spanish l o y a l i s t s [were] not communists could be classed as a communist on that account," act ing Montreal mayor Leo McKenna an-34 swered emphatical ly in the a f f i rmat i ve . Duplessis too, as we have seen, used the idea of communist i n f i l t r a t o r s to great e f f ec t . Though unwarranted, th is fear was none-t h e l e s s very r e a l , and caused many Quebecers a great deal of concern, p a r t i c u l a r l y when the i r Premier ca tegor i ca l l y declared: that in our province communistic rec ru i t i ng has been going on, that our young men have been enro l led to f i gh t for the communists in Spain. . . not fo r one or two young men, but for seve ra l , which shows that an organizat ion e x i s t s , and ind icates that there i s something lacking somewhere. I t was the idea of an organizat ion that disturbed French Canada so much. If volunteering for Spain was a purely ind iv idua l and spontaneous ac t , i t could perhaps be overlooked i f not condoned, but a communist r e c r u i t -ing network could not be to le ra ted . This problem went beyond Quebec and entered the ha l l s of the House of Commons. When asked by the opposi t ion whether there had been s u f f i c i e n t enlistment in Canada to warrant federal ac t i on , the government's rep ly made i t obvious that there was concern: I t i s known that a small number of Canadians have en l i s ted on one side or the other of the c o n f l i c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y on the s ide of the government. The number i s very small but organized e f fo r t Isabelng made to increase i t to a substant ia l sca le . - 58 -There was an obvious cloak-and-dagger aura about the whole business as exempl i f ied by the fo l lowing l e t t e r to the Under Secretary of State for External A f f a i r s , Dr. O.D. Skel ton: I beg to advise that paymaster-l ieutenant Commander Del age, Quebec D i v i s i o n , Royal Canadian Naval V o l -unteers Reserve, reported by telephone l as t night that a doubtful character with headquarters in a Chinese laundry in Quebec C i t y was en l i s t i ng young men for the Spanish army and providing each one with a passport. The v i t a l issue was that Engl ish Canada did not seem over ly concerned that small groups.of Canadians went overseas to f i gh t for Spanish democracy, while Quebec, fo l lowing along the conservative path already d iscussed, ca tegor i ca l l y refused to al low her c i t i zens to r a l l y behind any red banner. Some, l i k e L ibera l Maxime Raymond, did not mind that the volunteers l e f t , say ing: " [ t he i r l eav ing ] , I admit, does not give me any sorrow; i t w i l l r i d us of these undesirable people, 38 provided that they not return here," but men l i k e him were a de f i n i t e -minor i ty . Nor could Quebec's vehement stand toward Spain be interpreted only as an i s o l a t i o n i s t prov ince 's desire to remain aloof from the rap id ly deter iora t ing European arena. Condemnation of the Spanish Republic was almost exc lus ive ly motivated by p o l i t i c s since Quebec en-couraged her young men to f i gh t for Finland when that country came under f i r e from the Soviet Union, in the winter of 1 9 3 9 . 3 9 - 59 -The ba t t le l i nes were drawn up by the beginning of 1937. I f the Prime Min is te r did not a l t e r h is own l i b e r a l p r i nc ip les and pay heed to the anger in Quebec, he would l i k e l y come face to face with one of h is greatest f ea rs : a deepening r i f t in the uni ty of Canada, and a headlong tumble for his Party. The safest and most p o l i t i c a l l y expedient so lu t ion proved to be the Foreign Enlistment Ac t , passed in March 1937. - 60 -NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 1 B l a i r Neatby, Will iam Lyon Mackenzie King, (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 234'. 2 King Diary, 28 October 1937. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 11, p. 51. 4 I b i d . 5 L . M . Gouin, "The French-Canadians, Their Past and Their Asp i ra t ions, " World Currents and Canada's Course, ed . , V.A. Anderson, (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1937), p. 122-125. 6 F . H. Soward and others, Canada in World A f f a i r s , (London: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1941), p. 63. 7 Eayrs , Ih Defence of Canada, 11, p. 134. 8 I b i d . , p. 140. 9 Jean Bruchesi, "A French-Canadian View of Canadian Foreign P o l i c y , " Canada the Empire and the League, (Toronto, 1936), p. 146. 1 0 L i ta -Rose Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf, (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1975), p. 84. 1 Ottawa C i t i z e n , 9 September 1935. 12 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 11, p. 4. 13 J . Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal E lec t ions , (Scarborough, 1968), p. 206-222. 14 B l a i r Neatby, Mackenzie King, p. 232. 1 5 K ing Diary, 18 December 1936. 1 6 Lapointe Papers, v o l . 22, f i l e #70, l e t te r dated 23 October 1937. 1 7 I b i d . , le t te r dated 22 October 1936, from Vanier & Vanier, Avocats. 18 L.R. Betcherman, The Swastika, p. 87. 1 9 I b i d . , p. 88. B l a i r Neatby, Mackenzie King, p. 233. 21 King Papers, J4 se r ies , v o l . 212, memorandum to the Prime Minister from O.D. Skelton dated 24 December 1936. 2 2 B l a i r Neatby, Mackenzie King, p. 233. 2 3 S , "Embryo of Fascism in Quebec," Foreign A f f a i r s , ( A p r i l , 1938), p. 455. V ic tor Hoar, The Mac-Paps, p. 35. 2 5 L . R . Betcherman, The Swastika, p. 8. 2 6 I b i d . , p. 7. 2 7Hugh Thomas, The Spanish C i v i l War, th i rd ed i t i on , (Bucks: Hazell Watson & Viney L t d . , 19 / / ) , p. 362. 2 8 Lapoin te Papers, vo l . 22, f i l e #70, l e t te r dated 1 February 1937. 2 9 I b i d . , l e t te r dated 31 January 1937. 3 0 V i c t o r Hoar, The Mac-Paps, p. 35. 3 1 Lapointe Papers, vo l . . 22 , f i l e #70, le t te r dated 8 February 1937, in French. 3 2 B l a i r Neatby, Mackenzie King, p. 235. 3 3 L . R . Betcherman, The Swastika, p. 98. 3 4 The Canadian Forum, e d i t o r i a l , December 1936, p. 23. 3 5 Montreal Le Devoir, 26 January 1937. 3 6 Lapoin te Papers, vo l . 49, f i l e #31. 3 7 Canada, Department of External A f f a i r s , f i l e #265557, January-December 1937. 3 8House of Commons, Debates, 29 January 1937. 3 9 C P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Con f l i c t , (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1981), 11, p. 279. - 62 -CHAPTER III MACKENZIE KING AND THE CIVIL WAR If I am r igh t and publ ic sentiment does favour the Loya l i s ts a ren ' t you p o l i t i c a l l y making a mistake in not disavowing the act ions of the Foreign Of f ice? Let ter to King from his f r iend J . L . Counsel 1, Apr i l 1937 Franco's r e b e l l i o n , due to i t s c landest ine p lanning, took the world by su rp r i se . Spain had been in a state of p o l i t i c a l turmoil fo r several years , but no one expected the General 's legionnaires to burst from the Spanish skies in t he i r borrowed Junkers on Ju ly 18th. I t has a l -ready been discussed how the media i n i t i a l l y perceived the bloody f r a t -r i c i d e as another curious example of Lat in temper, a l og i ca l next scene in the "Death of Europe" tragedy. It has a lso been shown how th is i n te r -pretat ion changed as the skirmishes became f u l l - s c a l e b a t t l e s , as other nations seemed inexorably drawn into the vor tex, and as ideology became v i t a l to the c o n f l i c t . The Canadian Department of External A f f a i r s a lso attempted to analyze the s i t u a t i o n , and to formulate an o f f i c i a l Canadian stance. Unl ike the media, however, the government was in ho hurry to pass judgement on the antagonists, but trod g inger ly , never stepping in to the mire without f i r s t fee l ing for f i rm ground. This became King 's method throughout the c i v i l war, and the Foreign Enlistment Act i s a good example of that policy—move only when absolutely necessary, to a minimal degree, and only a f te r exhaustive analys is of a l l elements involved. - 63 -Was the Foreign Enlistment Act indeed passed purely because i t was the safest way out of a L ibera l p o l i t i c a l dilemma, or was that only part of the reason? Could i t not be that the Prime Min is te r en-couraged i t because i t was in keeping with his personal sympathies? Due to the i r potent ia l impact on the decis ion making process, K ing 's own a l leg iances must be estab l ished before drawing concrete conclusions con-cerning the Canadian government and the Spanish C i v i l War. The enigmatic Prime Min is te r produced one of the wor ld 's most comprehensive and voluminous d i a r i e s , but one that often presents more questions than answers. The references to K ing 's personal a l leg iances are few, usual ly c r y p t i c , and often rather s t i l t e d . Though consistent with the sentiments of a man who zealously separated h is pr ivate and publ ic l i v e s , th i s never- the- less leaves the reader d i s s a t i s f i e d , s k e p t i c a l , and suspicious that the da i l y ent r ies were wr i t ten with an eye toward possib le future publ ic consumption. Certa in de f i n i t e subject ive trends do emerge, however, and when these are augmented by statements from the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s personal correspondence and memoranda, i t i s poss ib le to paint a reasonably accurate po r t ra i t of Mackenzie K ing 's own sympathies in the Spanish c o n f l i c t . The diary repeatedly shows that King found a l l war abhorrent. Nor can there be any question that the Prime Min is te r bel ieved strongly in democratic and federal systems. Indeed, one need only read b r i e f passages from his Industry and Humanity to see the author 's almost c h i l d l i k e reverence for l i be ra l i sm and his undying f a i t h in the inherent - 64 -pos i t i ve potent ia l of mankind. He had a l s o , as Min is te r of Labour in the Laur ier admin is t ra t ion , seen himself as the champion of Canadian workers and of "those in humble circumstances." Though communism was anathema to K ing , he remained true to the s p i r i t of l i b e r a l i s m , and to lerated red ag i ta tors because he f e l t sure that they would dig t he i r own graves. F i n a l l y , though impressed by the trappings of Empire, the Prime M in i s t e r , a staunch Canadian n a t i o n a l i s t , placed greater em-phasis on sovereignty, independence, and national uni ty . Conversely, Mackenzie King could also be pos i t i ve l y impressed by less than l i b e r a l or democratic people. He v i s i t e d H i t l e r and the Third Reich i n June 1937, and returned impressed, his anx ie t ies m o l l i f i e d by the "great calmness and moderation" of the Fuh re rJ In the memorandum on his meeting with the German Chancel lor , he wrote: I confess that the impression gained by th is interv iew was a very favourable one. As I to ld Herr H i t l e r in the course of the in terv iew, what he sa id was a r e l i e f to my mind because of the very pos i t i ve manner in which he spoke of the determination of himself and 2 his colleagues not to permit any resort to war. This was not l i k e l y a statement of pure naivety since i t was common knowledge by June 1937 that the Third Reich had thousands of men and tons of war mater ial engaged in Spain on behalf of General Franco. The memorandum's concluding remark—"[Hi t ler 's ] in te res t in Spain a r ises unquestionably out of h is fee l ings and fears concerning the 3 spread of communism" —suggests that King could acquiesce when i t came - 65 -to war on communism, as long as the bat t les were fought well beyond Canada's hor izon. As shown in chapter one, many Canadians viewed the i r Prime Min is te r in p rec ise ly th is way, but i t was an in terpre ta t ion that may now be proven f a l s e . The Prime Min is te r could be and was accused of being an unpr inc ip led and ruth less p o l i t i c i a n , but he cannot be branded as a f a s c i s t sympathizer. Furthermore, K ing 's conscience would never have allowed him to support a group of react ionary generals attempting, through c i v i l war, to usurp the power of a l e g a l l y const i tuted and democrat ical ly e lected government. This i s v e r i f i e d conc lus ive ly by an examination of the personal correspondence between the Prime Min is te r and his c lose f r iend J . L . Counse l l . Dismayed and obviously hurt by the personal d ia t r ibes against his Spanish p o l i c y , King wrote to his f r iend in Ap r i l 1937: I am at a loss to understand how you or anyone e lse could be of the opinion that my sympathies in the Spanish C i v i l War have been with Franco and the rebe ls . As a matter of f a c t , as the t rag i c event has continued month a f te r month, I have become increas ing ly of the opinion which I have held from the outset , that only the gravest sense of oppression on the part of the rura l and urban elements of the population a l i ke could account fo r the determination and endurance they have shown throughout the ent i re s t rugg le . One of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s few close confidants to judge by the l e t t e r ' s sa lu ta t ion and the warm rep ly , Counsell answered in a manner that sug-gests an int imate knowledge of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s sentiments: - 66 -My dear Rex: Don't l e t us get mixed up in th is Spanish si tuat ion—Our personal opinions have nothing to do with i t . A l l that I have been t ry ing to do i s to ompress you with the fac t that the people in Canada and the U.S. are a lso behind the Loya l i s t s in Spain to a far greater extent than we are perhaps aware of . Since K ing 's pr ivate a l leg iance was with the l o y a l i s t s , i t may be concluded that the Foreign Enlistment Act was not encouraged because of any Prime M i n i s t e r i a l p red i lec t ion for the rebe ls . This also holds true for the sympathies of Dr. O.D. Ske l ton , the Under Secretary of State fo r External A f f a i r s . I f anything, Skelton was a confirmed i s o l a t i o n i s t who bel ieved that Canada's sovereign in teres ts could be damaged by " i r respons ib le foreign adventur ing." Referr ing to the Sudeten C r i s i s , he wrote: "we are the safest country in the world as long as we mind our own b u s i n e s s . " 7 Though a confirmed i s o l a t i o n i s t , however, his personal views on Spain were very s im i l a r to those of the Prime M in i s te r . He made th is patent ly c lear in a l e t t e r to Mackenzie K ing, wr i t ten l a t e in the Spanish C i v i l War: Whatever mistakes were made by the a n t i - f a s c i s t forces in Spain in the i r f i r s t angry r e p r i s a l s , they have shown a surpr is ing growth in moderation, courage, un i ty , and e f fec t i veness . I have fol lowed the record of the Spanish government with surpr ise and increasing admirat ion. When the i r record i s compared with that of most of the recent govern-ments in France and England, with the i r endless muddling and lack of fo res igh t , the i r cold-blooded concentration on the i r own immediate i n t e res t s , there i s a l o t to be said for the conclusion that i f the people of Canada r e a l l y wanted to get in to somebody's European war, they might choose Negr in 's instead of N e v i l l e ' s . - 67 -The Foreign Enlistment Ac t , which stood in opposit ion to these s e n t i -ments, was therefore introduced because of outside pressures. Quebec's ro le thus becomes increas ing ly obvious. * * * Ear ly news f i l t e r i n g into the Department of External A f f a i r s made the Canadian government aware of the grav i ty of the s i t ua t i on . Already by Ju ly 22, a scant four days a f ter the rebe l l i on broke out, the Prime Min is te r cabled the Canadian High Commissioner to London, Vincent g Massey, fo r information on the safety of Canadians in Spain. Canada did not have an o f f i c i a l representat ive in Madrid, so Massey had the d i f f i c u l t , but reasonably success fu l , task of seeking his answer through the B r i t i s h embassy. Few Canadians were in Spain at the t ime, but there were the inev i tab le t o u r i s t s , and some vested in teres ts run by Canadian businessmen. A Canadian company had, for example, organized the d i s t r i -but ion of e l e c t r i c i t y in Cata lon ia , and much of i t s personnel was s t i l l t h e r e K i n g thought these people might need the protect ive wing of B r i t ann ia . Once assured that Canadian c i t i zens were in no immediate danger, the government could concentrate on analyzing the potent ia l repercussions of the war i t s e l f . Unfortunately for K ing , i t took a mere two weeks for the B r i t i s h Foreign Of f ice to r ea l i ze that i t s immediate assumptions about the war had been unfounded. The c o n f l i c t was unfor-tunately much more than an extended palace coup. The telegram sent to King - 68 -on August 5 by the Secretary for the Dominions suggested ominous p o l i t i c a l and ideo log ica l ram i f i ca t i ons , and was to help s h i f t the Canadian government's or ienta t ion toward the war: The struggle between m i l i t a r y and government i s becoming a f i gh t between Fascism and Communism and there are signs that even i f the struggle were to resu l t in v i c to ry for Moderate Lef t Par t ies composing the government, these would be submerged by Anarcho-syndica l is ts and Com-munists to whom.,they would have la rge ly owed the i r v i c t o r y . The L ibe ra l government was apparently s l i g h t l y ahead of the media in i t s change of i n te rp re ta t i on . Af ter a l l , the Canadian press clung to the "nat ional miscegenation" idea un t i l mid-August (page \f). Thus the Prime Min is te r knew from ear ly August 1936 that the Spanish C i v i l War was an ideo log ica l s t rugg le . This was an unpleasant r e a l i z a t i o n for a man who feared both the de ter io ra t ing s i tua t ion in Europe, and the dynamism of ideas. True to K ing 's cautious fore ign p o l i c y , the f i r s t act ion taken by the Department of External A f f a i r s was to determine what Canada's c loses t a l l i e s were going to do about Spain. O.D. Skelton sent Massey a telegram on August 18, ins t ruc t ing the High Commissioner to discover B r i t a i n ' s pos i t ion on: 1) arms and ammunition shipments; 2) enl istment of volunteers; 3) .transmission of funds; and 4) propaganda This telegram, sent so ear ly in the war, suggests the Canadian government' f u l l awareness that Spain could become a p o l i t i c a l crusade for foreign nations and ind iv idua ls a l i k e , and that contingency plans fo r such an - 69 -eventual i ty had to be made. Whi teha l l ' s answer doubt lessly f rus t ra ted King. When f i n a l l y sent on September 11, the message offered few guidel ines for Canada to consider: arms exports would be p roh ib i ted , but the ru les on enl istment were unclear in cases of c i v i l war; and no act ion was contemplated regarding propaganda. Mention was not made 13 concerning the transmission of funds. A day a f ter dispatching the telegram to B r i t a i n , the govern-r 1 14 ment also decided " in formal ly ^toj consult Washington as to i t s v iews." The Canadian government was s t i l l t ry ing to decide whether to consider 15 the Spanish C i v i l War a purely in terna l or a general European a f f a i r . Obviously Ottawa hoped that the former was the case, but i t must be assumed by August 19 that there were nagging fears that the l a t t e r was, in f a c t , a more accurate ana lys is of the s i t u a t i o n . I t i s not known, however, whether Ottawa ac tua l l y consulted Washington at th is ear ly date. * * * Personal ly sympathetic towards the republicans by mid-August, Mackenzie King knew that the Spanish C i v i l War was not merely an a t -tempted coup d'e ' tat , but was qu ick ly becoming an ideo log ica l battleground between r igh t and l e f t , fascism and democracy. I t must now be e s t a b l i s h -ed whether the Prime Min is te r and his advisors feared that the war posed a real threat to the peace and secur i ty of Canada in p a r t i c u l a r , and Europe in genera l . I f indeed they d i d , i t w i l l i l l u s t r a t e the ser ious-ness of the government's dilemma, and why i t f i n a l l y forced King into construct ing a fore ign po l i cy that would deal with the i ssues . - 70 -Using h i nds igh t , i t could l o g i c a l l y be argued that the Spanish C i v i l War was never a preview of the second world war, but rather a purely in ternal a f f a i r which Goering used to test the mettle of h is f l edg l i ng Luftwaffe; which Mussol in i used as a bombastic imperial adventure; S t a l i n promoted as a general European ag i t a to r ; and which i d e a l i s t i c ind iv idua ls used as the i r personal crusade. Indeed there i s a degree of t ru th to th is supposi t ion, but i t does not go fa r enough. The fac t remains that in the ear ly months in p a r t i c u l a r , the c o n f l i c t seemed to bu i l d i t s own momentum, and to very nearly set the rest of Europe and i t s a l l i e s ablaze. Many i n f l u e n t i a l and informed sources on both sides of the A t l a n t i c ce r ta in l y voiced th is fear . King held high leve l d iscussions on Spain with Church i l l by mid-October, t ry ing to discover what f i rm act ion England intended 1 6 to take in the c o n f l i c t . B r i t a i n ' s pos i t ion was, a f te r a l l , of v i t a l concern to Canada. Though wishing to asser t her new-found independence Canada was s t i l l the senior Dominion, fee l ings of l oya l t y toward B r i t a i n S t i l l e x i s t ed , and there were de f i n i t e moral ob l igat ions to consider. The Prime Min is te r ser ious ly worried l e s t Canada be obl iged to back Great B r i t a i n i f England were to go to war over Spain. Nor was th is a preposterous idea. By the ear ly f a l l of 1936 Germany and I t a l y were pumping massive amounts of m i l i t a r y a id to Franco's rebel fo rces , the Soviet Union supported the l o y a l i s t s , and B r i t i s h property in G ib ra l ta r had been inadver tent ly damaged more than once by over ly enthus ias t ic 17 rebel a r t i l l e r y m e n . - I f nothing e l s e , the complete European a l l i ance network was becoming Involved, which as had been shown in 1914 could havedisasterous consequences. - 71 -King learned that England hoped f o r a stalemate i n the c o n f l i c t . The B r i t i s h government b e l i e v e d t h a t i f n e i t h e r s i d e could gain the upper hand, reason would p r e v a i l and a truce be the natural r e s u l t . Prime M i n i s t e r Baldwin, however, r e a l i z e d t h a t the only r e a l i s -t i c way to achieve t h i s was by c l o s i n g the French-Spanish border. The stream of v o l u n t e e r s f o r the Republic, steady by September 1936, had to be dammed i f there were to be any hope of keeping the I t a l i a n s out of Franco's t r e n c h e s J 8 Leon Blum, the French Prime M i n i s t e r , concurred. He was i n an unenviable p o s i t i o n , a r e p u b l i c a n sympathizer who f o r p o l i t i c a l and economic reason, b e l i e v e d that he could not a f f o r d t o o f f e r d i r e c t a i d to the l o y a l i s t s . He too was deeply concerned about the s i t u a t i o n , as was obvious from Mackenzie King's a n a l y s i s o f t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s : "Spain, t h e r e f o r e , i s l i k e l y to remain a dangerous spot 19 i n Europe f o r some time to come." U l t i m a t e l y i t was Blum, v a c i l l a t i n g and with the most to l o s e , who pushed hardest f o r the n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n 20 meetings that were convened i n September. The Spanish s i t u a t i o n was indeed grave, and threatened to get worse. Two of the top Canadian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Europe, Walter Riddel 1 with the League i n Geneva, and High Commissioner Vincent Massey in London, both sent t h e i r Prime M i n i s t e r p e s s i m i s t i c i f not f r i g h t e n i n g analyses of the war. The former, conscious of the "good spanking" he had r e c e i v e d as a r e s u l t of h i s o v e r l y e n t h u s i a s t i c p a r t i n the A b y s s i n i a n c r i s i s , took great care with his l a t e r r e p o r t s to the govern-ment. T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y i l l u s t r a t e d by the accuracy and meticulous r e -search i n the f o l l o w i n g memorandum sent on December 19th: - 72. -The appeal of Spain to the Council under A r t i c l e XI of the Covenant has re-emphasized the danger of the Spanish C i v i l War developing in to an in ternat iona l war. From the reports before the Non-intervention Committee in London, the s t a t e -ments of the United Kingdom Members of Parl iament who v i s i t e d Spain, as well as from other sources, i t i s evident that the C i v i l struggle in Spain i s rap id l y becoming an in ternat iona l war of ideo-log ies on Spanish s o i l . . . .1 have i t on the best author i ty that the Government of I t a l y are js ic ] carry ing on an act ive programme of r e c r u i t -ment. . .The I t a l i an Government undertakes to supply a l l such rec ru i t s for th is serv ice with unmarked uniforms, a cash g ra tu i t y of 3,000 l i r a and t ransportat ion v ia Spesia to the Spanish f ron t . This campaign of recruitment i s meeting with very considerable success. While my inform-ant could not give de f i n i t e f igures he considered that some thousands had already l e f t fo r Spain. I t i s qui te possib le that s im i l a r methods are being used in Germany in rec ru i t i ng the large numbers of Germans which are f ind ing the i r way into Franco's armies. Nor was R idde l ! being melodramatic. I t can be assumed that the author had become rather sens i t i ve to committing or impl ica t ing him-s e l f p o l i t i c a l l y , and that he therefore avoided exaggerating the seriousness of the c o n f l i c t . From London Vincent Massey a lso warned King of the world-wide dangers brewing wi th in Spain , and ampl i f ied h is concern by sending the message of gloom on Christmas day 1936: I t i s , of course, possib le to exaggerate the g rav i ty of the Spanish s i t u a t i o n , but i t would be a f a r greater error to under-estimate i t s ser iousness. . . i t would be f o l l y not to r e c -ognise that the Spanish s i t u a t i o n , f a r from improving, has become more dangerous during the past few weeks, so far as the p o s s i b i l i t y of in ternat iona l repercussions are concerned. . . . Germany and I t a l y have now made c lear that they w i l l not permit the establishment of what they c a l l a Soviet state in Spain and Russia has made i t - 73 -equal ly c lear that she w i l l do what she can to bring about such an establ ishment. As the pos i -t ion of both sides hardens, the l i nes of re t reat by the three nations who have taken pos i t ions are beginning to c lose . I t i s th is development • which, in my op in ion, const i tu tes the gravest threat to European^oeace a r i s i ng out of the Spanish C i v i l W a r . " I t may be concluded that the L ibera l government saw the Spanish C i v i l War as a d i rec t threat to world peace and s t a b i l i t y . * * * \ I t i s now necessary to examine Mackenzie K ing 's foreign p o l i c y , to look at the in ternat iona l condi t ions that r es t r i c t ed i t s form, and more important ly, to determine why the Prime Min is te r per-ceived his fore ign po l i cy as an extension of the in ternal Canadian s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . This w i l l hopeful ly i l l u s t r a t e the v i t a l ro le played by Quebec, and show that King 's Foreign Enlistment Ac t , though i t might have appeared p o l i t i c a l l y su i c ida l and moral ly bankrupt, in fac t showed shrewd judgement, expedient ly so lv ing a po ten t ia l l y dest ruct ive s i t u a t i o n . As in so many other aspects of h is foreign p o l i c y , Mackenzie King i n i t i a l l y succeed in keeping the government out of controversies over the Spanish quest ion. Though Canadian newspapers headlined events in Spain every day for the f i r s t three months of the war, they barely mentioned Canadian o f f i c i a l reac t ion . By not committing his govern-ment to any pa r t i cu la r foreign p o l i c y , King ca re fu l l y deferred to the fee l ings of the major i ty of Canadians, who did not want Canada ac t i ve l y - 74 -involved in a potent ia l powder keg in southern Europe. No doubt the L ibera ls had learned some embarassing lessons in the Riddel l a f f a i r , and were extremely carefu l not to declare themselves before absolutely necessary. Harold Nicol son, author of Curzon: The Last Phase, described the philosophy of a safe foreign po l i cy as fo l lows: The essence of good foreign po l icy i s cer t i tude [and though] an uncertain po l i cy i s always bad, on the other hand, parl iamentary press and op-pos i t ion i s less l i k e l y to concentrate against an e l a s t i c fore incupol icy than against one which Is p rec ise . This d e f i n i t i o n apt ly describes Mackenzie K ing 's careful course once he returned to power in the autumn of 1935. As the Prime Min is te r noted in h is d ia ry : I would well a t t r i bu te my being Prime Min is te r of Canada, a f te r 17 years of leadership of the par ty , to the fac t that I had made as few speeches as poss ib le . . . .1 had never suffered from anything I had not s a i d ; most pub l ic men got in to d i f f i c u l t i e s over what they s a i d . The Prime Min is te r maintained th is dodging pos i t ion whenever poss ib le , and natura l l y earned the wrath of the Opposit ion for i t . J . S . Woodsworth, leader of the C . C . F . , repeatedly threw up h is hands in f rus t ra t i on and once remarked wi th exasperat ion: "Af ter l i s t en i ng ca re fu l l y to what the Prime Min is ter s a i d , I confess I am s t i l l at a loss to know jus t what our - 75 -foreign po l i cy i s . " " The L ibera ls in Ottawa argued that Canadian foreign po l i cy need only be precise when the pressure of events demanded i t . Otherwise the Department of External A f f a i r s would seek Of. refuge in "complacent, unctuous and empty rec t i t ude . " E l a s t i c i t y was the watchword of the day. King rea l i zed that Canada, due to i t s geographical pos i t i on , was not obl iged to take any foreign po l i cy stance with regard to Europe: Canada i s not exposed to d i rec t and imminent danger of attack and conquest by any country. We are fortunate both in our neighbours and in our lack of neighbours. . .one has only to be in any European country a day to r e a l i z e how r e l a t i v e l y fortunate a p o s i t i o n ? i t i s , and what f o l l y i t would be to throw i t away. Thus i t could be suggested that Canada's natural choice would have been a dec larat ion of n e u t r a l i t y , but the Prime Min is te r rea l i zed that such a po l i cy would only garner complete support in Quebec, and would l i k e l y a l iena te his government from the imper ia l i s t s and the many Canadians who f e l t at l eas t token a l leg iance to Great B r i t a i n . A po l i cy of non-commitment, on the other hand, of fered Canada and the King government the i r best chance for s u r v i v a l . The Prime Min is te r described his foreign po l icy as fo l lows : There are no commitments at the present t ime, so far as Canada i s concerned, for Canada to p a r t i -c ipate in any war, nor are there any commitments to remain neut ra l . But the pos i t ion of th is government i s that with respect to neu t ra l i t y or p a r t i c i p a t i o n , Parliament w i l l decide. - 76 -Deeply aware of the f i c k l e nature of the Canadian e lec to ra te , Mackenzie King knew that he would have to pay homage to i t s wishes i f he were to remain in power and keep the country un i ted. The conser-vat ive Montreal Gazette exempl i f ied h is fears when i t warned the govern-ment that "nei ther King nor anybody e lse in his pos i t ion w i l l decide 29 th i s country 's course in any c r i s i s . Pub l ic opinion does that . " Pub l ic opinion had to be one of K ing 's paramount po l i cy considerat ions. By ear l y autumn 1936 the major i ty of Canadians were f rank ly nervous about the European s i t u a t i o n , and ce r ta i n l y did not wish to become embroiled in another war. So when, on September 26 1936, two weeks a f te r the outbreak, of the Spanish C i v i l War, King spoke to the League of Nations in Geneva, he c a r e f u l l y stated that : Canada does not propose to be dragged in to a war which she has no i n t e r e s t , and over the o r ig in of whcih she has no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or control through any automatic ob l i ga t i on . This i s simple doctr ine and sens ib le . This po l i cy paid dividends in the form of e d i t o r i a l s l i k e the one that appeared in the independent conservat ive Ottawa Journal : "Mr. King spoke, we th ink , for the vast major i ty of Canadians when he said emphasis on the League's p o l i c i e s should be placed upon c o n c i l i a t i o n 31 rather than coerc ion . " I t would have been p o l i t i c a l su ic ide had King div ided pub l ic opinion even far ther by committing Canada to a prec ise foreign p o l i c y that might involve the country in a European war. The Prime Min is te r paid heed to his own ana lys is that " there was in Canada a great dread l e s t the country should be committed at the JJ937J Imperial - 77 -Conference to some ob l iga t ion a r i s i ng out of the European s i t u a t i o n . " ^ K ing 's guiding p r i nc i p l e In the formulation of Canadian foreign po l i cy was therefore the maintenance of h i s power and Canadian un i ty . The Prime Min is te r achieved th i s by remaining unlnvolved, and by not commit-t ing Canada to any cont rovers ia l and apparently useless foreign po l i cy ventures. As a former colony and as the. senior Dominion, Canada had a specia l re la t ionsh ip wi th Great B r i t a i n . The country was given i t s independence by the Statute of Westminster in 1931, but many of the o ld ob l iga t ions and fee l ings of f ea l t y remained. This was the crux of the problem, fo r though Canada could not f a i l to acknowledge Great B r i t a i n ' s leadersh ip , the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s fee l ings of independence repeatedly led him in an opposite d i r e c t i o n . B r i t a i n ' s determined non-in tervent ion stance in the Spanish C i v i l War became one of the f i r s t tests of the new re la t ionsh ip between the two, a baptism by f i r e , as i t were, fo r the Infant Department of External A f f a i r s . Mackenzie King a lso h.ad personal fee l ings of ambivalence toward Canada's former motherland. On the one hand, Great B r i t a i n , with her advanced cu l tu re and t r ad i t i on of democracy, represented a l l those q u a l i t i e s King found worth, emulating, whi le on the other, the country . a lso stood fo r s t i f l i n g imperial ism and attachments. Furthermore, the Prime Min is ter , was f rank ly suspic ious of Westminster's in ten t ions . Canada in 1936 acted l i k e a rebe l l i ous adolescent who fiad to a f f i rm i t s independence but f e l t unsure of the proper d i r e c t i o n . Big brother to - 78 -the south, was consulted and sought out , hut as a voice of support rather than as a mate. The Spanish C i v i l War merely exacerbated th is oedipal dilemma. As the war progressed, tfie hands-off p o l i c y of Westminster allowed King to fo l low the B r i t i s h l i n e without making an o f f i c i a l commitment to that e f f ec t . Thus he garnered the support of Quebec, the Canadian i m p e r i a l i s t s , and maintained that of the more independently minded Canadians. An advocate of peace and negot ia t ion , King lauded the government of Great B r i t a i n for i t s p o l i c y toward Spain. When in January 1937 Westminster outlawed rec ru i t i ng of her nat ionals for the Spanish, crusade, King applauded the a c t i o n , . suggesting that i t was l a rge l y because of B r i t a i n ' s stand tfiat the war had not spread across 33 the Pyrenees and into the rest of Europe. This carefu l statement made the Prime Min is te r appear as a man of peace, and kept Canada as a nation uninvolved. The Toronto Globe and Mai 1 v indicated King 's stance in a January 12 e d i t o r i a l which, expressed the sentiments of many Canadians: S t i l l more f l a t t e r i n g , another e d i t o r i a l ended: " | U i s impossible to imagine what would have happened] had t t not been for Great B r i t a i n ' s 35 backstage leadersh ip . " There ts no doubt that Mackenzie King genuinely advocated peace, but i t was for tu i tous that in the ea r l y months of the war, h is fore ign p o l i c y asp i ra t i ons , and those of tfie major i ty of the Great B r i t a i n ' s dec is ive act ion to prevent her nat ionals f i gh t ing in Spain i s but fur ther evidence of her ceaseless e f f o r t s to i s o l a t e the revolut ion and^prevent the d isas ter of in ternat iona l war. - 79 -e lec to ra te , were upheld by uno f f i c i a l support of Great B r i t a i n ' s stance toward Spain. The new Department of External A f f a i r s therefore passed i t s f i r s t tests almost by de fau l t , any uncertainty na tu ra l l y resolv ing i t s e l f in to the non-commitment po l i c y . King had avoided aggravating the schism between Engl ish Canada and Quebec, was as popular as ever, Canadian independence remained i n t a c t , and the country s t i l l un i ted. As has been d iscussed, however, sentiments changed, and by ear ly 1937 th is maneouvering room had been i r revocably eroded by the po la r i za -t ion of Canadian publ ic opinion over the Spanish C i v i l War. Had the c o n f l i c t not become an emotional crusade for so many Canadians, King and the Ottawa L ibera ls could have continued to avoid a Canadian commitment of any k ind. Luck a lso came to play on the government's s ide . Ear ly in August, j u s t when i t appeared that the inc ident of the murdered Germans would create a major c r i s i s i n Spain (page 18), and that B r i t a i n would have to declare her a l l eg iance , tempers cooled. H i t l e r ca l l ed of f the German navy a f te r receiv ing his desired apology from republ ican au thor i -t i e s ; IT_Duce, wi th the a l a c r i t y of a consumate ac to r , promised not to i n te r fe re in Spain; Blum, the French Premier, bel ieved Musso l i n i , and decided to push fo r a general non-intervent ion pact; and B r i t i s h Prime Min is te r Stanley Baldwin could breathe a sigh of r e l i e f . The C i v i l War was again o f f i c i a l l y blockaded behind the she l ter of the Pyrenees which so so wel l confined the dust and tragedy of the c o n f l i c t . - 80 -The temporary re laxat ion of tensions between the European nations allowed Mackenzie King to spend the autumn of 1936 weighing Canadian pub l ic opinion and the c r i s i s in Spain. This l u l l f i n a l l y broke down in January 1937 as more and more Canadians involved them-selves in the war. As d iscussed, Eng l ish Canada tended to o f fe r the republ icans mater ia l and manpower ass is tance , whi le Quebec's sym-pathies were wi th the rebe ls . King rea l i zed that his career and Canadian un i ty depended on his a b i l i t y to mediate between these d iame t r i ca l l y opposed a l l eg iances . The government's fore ign p o l i c i e s therefore came under sc ru t iny , with eventual a l te ra t ion to accom-modate the Foreign Enl istment Act . Spain not only played a much greater part in Canadian in ternal p o l i t i c s than the Prime Min is te r would have des i red , but pushed the government from i t s perch on the fence of in ternat iona l r e l a t i o n s . As shown prev ious ly , emotions about Spain, whether pro or an t i - repub l i can , became very strong by January 1937. Newspaper readers a v i d l y fol lowed the deeds of the renowned Canadian surgeon Dr. Norman Bethune, as he raced from bat t le to bloody b a t t l e , f i gh t ing 36 to keep wounded republ ican so ld ie rs a l i v e ; trade unions championed the cause of the Spanish l e f t ; a id was co l l ec ted ; and Canadian men went to the Iberian Peninsula to f i gh t side by side with Spanish workers against what they saw as the tyranny of fasc ism. The govern-ment could not remain b l i t h e l y uncommitted when, on the one h a n d , < ? ^ ^ / Quebec had a f r e s c o ^ of Mussol in i on one of i t s church w a l l s , while on the other, the Trade and Labour Congress of Canada passed resolut ions l i k e the fo l l ow ing : - 81 -This congress wishes to express to the workers of Spain our appreciat ion of the i r splendid f i gh t in defence of t he i r l i b e r t i e s . . .[and] places i t s e l f fur ther on record in the in te res t of national s o l i d a r i t y as expressing to the Spanish workers our s incere in te res t in the i r struggle and extends to them our whole hearted support i n the f i gh t for j u s t i c e , freedom and peace and our hopes for an ear ly and v ic to r ious f i n i s h / 7 The "Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy" had been founded, and a c t i v e l y s o l i c i t e d assistance fo r the republicans through mail dr ives and advertisements in Canadian magazines. Whether pos i t i ve l y or negat ive ly , the Spanish C i v i l War had f i n a l l y become and in ternat ional crusade. Nor was i t d i f f i c u l t to be swept up by the enthusiasm. The usual ly conservative Toronto Globe and Mai 1, in a fu l l -page headline s to ry , spoke of "Volunteers pouring through France [to] rush to the a id of the L o y a l i s t s . •. .and entra in ing for Barcelona to don the Loya l i s t 39 uniform." In another headline a r t i c l e en t i t l ed "50,000 Foreigners on Spanish Front , " the Globe wrote that "from a c o n f l i c t over purely domestic i ssues , the f i gh t has turned in to a general war, fought on Spanish t e r r i t o r y , over the fundamental issues of fascism versus 40 * communism." For the f i r s t time the paper a lso mentioned Canadian Volunteers: No longer i s the fac t hidden or denied that. . . even Canadians are engaged in a war which os tens ib ly concerns none but Spaniards. . . .One's f i r s t thought i s that they are inexperienced youths grown up since the catastrophe of 1914-1918 who s t i l l have delusions concerning the glamour and splendor of war. - 82 -I t would have been expedient for Canada to step o f f i c i a l l y aside from Spain i f the population were in to ta l agreement, but with one h ighly vocal group openly s id ing with the republ icans, and another c a l l i n g fo r i s o l a t i o n and f r iendship with Franco, the resu l t i ng div ided opinions were bound to reach Parliament H i l l . Luck i l y fo r K ing, the i n i t i a l questions on the recruitment of volunteers were s u f f i c i e n t l y muted to al low the Prime Min is te r to answer that his government would make no decis ion e i ther way, but that "the question would continue to be given cons ide ra t i on . " ' As passions increas-ing l y f l a red up, however, the temperature in the House rose correspond-ing l y . While some M . P . ' s simply wanted to know why the government allowed Canadians- to f i gh t in a war on another cont inent , o thers , mainly from Quebec, made the serious accusation that Canadians were lured to Spain by communist ag i ta tors su r rep t i t i ous l y working wi th in Canada. Nor, as the Prime Min is te r was aware, was the accusation i d l e . The R.C.M.P. had furnished King with a secret report proving conc lus ive ly that the Communist Party of Canada had recru i ted at leas t twenty volunteers from Port Ar thur , twenty from the west, and "seven 43 or e ight " from Quebec. Whether one supported or opposed the vo lunteers, the fac t remained that questions had reached parl iament, which in turn forced the King government to take a stand. Thus on January 29, when again asked for i t s pos i t ion regarding recrui tment, the government hopped - 83 -off the fence, declar ing that " l e g i s l a t i o n banning recruitment is 44 coming in the near fu tu re . " Mackenzie King had avoided commitment as long as poss ib le , but by la te January had simply run out of t ime. Nor d id the powerful Quebec voice alone clamour fo r a ban on recrui tment. The Foreign Of f ice in London, having imposed i t s own updated version of the Foreign Enlistment Ac t , press\^ed Ottawa to fo l l ow s u i t . England was almost in s ight of the Spanish c o n f l i c t and, as discussed prev ious ly , was very nervous about i t s potent ia l consequences. Though there i s no evidence to show that i t helped sway K ing, Malcolm MacDonald's Boxing Day telegram to the Prime Min is te r was no doubt an attempt by the Secretary of State for Dominion A f f a i r s to ca jo le Canada into toeing the imperial l i n e : I t i s therefore v i t a l i f serious in ternat iona l complications are to be avoided, that steps should be taken without fur ther delay to put a stop to the increasing flow of foreign nat ionals in Spain. Though rather negat ive, MacDonald's request was reasonable. Having nat ionals from a l l over the world f i gh t ing on e i ther side in the Spanish C i v i l War was an exceedingly dangerous s i t u a t i o n . Considering t he i r geographical l o c a t i o n , i t was small wonder that the democratic European nations did almost anything to ease the danger, even i f the moral i ty of the i r act ions could be questioned. B r i t a i n l o g i c a l l y saw the so lu t ion as a cordon san i ta i re around the Iberian Peninsula. Many bel ieved that i f foreign men and equipment could not - 84 -enter Spain, the c i v i l war would not only lose i t s in ternat iona l f l avour , but would peter out from a lack of supp l ies . Those nations who s t i l l bel ieved that the German and I t a l i an leaders could be trusted therefore pract iced considerable r e s t r a i n t , and encouraged dialogue un t i l Spain could be e f f e c t i v e l y quarantined. Their na'ivety was r e a l l y quite astounding. The Non-intervention Committee decided that the B r i t i s h and French navies would patrol A t l a n t i c Spain while the Germans and I t a l i ans would seal o f f the Mediterranean area. Baldwin and Blum, both weak men and extremely nervous about the general European s i t u a t i o n , made every e f f o r t to implement the i r ha l f of the bargain, even with the increasing h o s t i l i t y between B r i t a i n and the rebe ls . The d i c t a t o r s , rather than turning back a l l ships approaching Spain, methodical ly ignored those supplying Franco's l i nes with men and equipment, while accost ing a l l others. Were i t not fo r the secret compl ic i ty and sympathy of the French border guards, new l o y a l i s t volunteers would have been hard pressed to reach the republ ican l i n e s . Up un t i l recently, most h is to r ians suggested that appeasement reached i t s blackest point over the Sudetenland c r i s i s , but i t has since been proven that Chamberlain had few choices by 1938. B r i t a i n ' s appease-ment in the Spanish C i v i l War, of which i t s own Foreign Enlistment Act was an in tegra l par t , i s less easy to excuse. The free world had manoeuvering room in ea r l y 1937, and could have challenged the German and I t a l i an adventures. Denying republ ican Spain while aware that the f a s c i s t s a c t i v e l y aided Franco, was indeed a very shor ts ighted, and u l t imate ly • c o s t l y , b i t of appeasement. - 85 -Canada's o f f i c i a l Spanish p o l i c i e s are even more d i f f i c u l t to excuse. Mackenzie.King was asked to j o i n the twenty-seven member Non-intervent ion Committee, but, true to his po l i cy of non-commitment, 47 had decl ined the i n v i t a t i o n . The Canadian version of the Foreign Enlistment Act was passed, not to ensure the surv iva l of the country, but ra ther , as an added guarantee for the continued l i f e of the L ibera l government. Banning recruitment was the best way of keeping Canadians out of the l ime l igh t of in ternat iona l trouble spots , of making the Prime Min is te r appear as a man of peace, and most important ly , of re ta in ing the French Canadian vote. Ant i - republ icanism from wi th in French Canada was simply louder, more voc i ferous, and car r ied fa r more"po l i t i ca l c lout" than the p r o - l o y a l i s t voice from the rest of the country. Had the Act not passed, King could have l os t some of the f i f t y - f i v e L ibera l seats from Quebec plus the a l leg iance of the p r o - B r i t i s h , the i s o l a t i o n -i s t s , and p a c i f i s t s . The successful passage of the B i l l demonstrated how conscious the Prime Min is te r was of the importance of publ ic op in ion, and i s a good example of his expedit ious handling of a potent ia l i n -ternal r i f t . * * * Any Canadian wishing to f i gh t in Spain had f i r s t to secure a v a l i d Canadian passport. Though i t took t ime, money, and a voucher's s ignature, get t ing the document ac tua l l y posed few problems fo r the potent ia l volunteer. The Foreiw _ErrH^ jtme4vfe-Aet-only authorized a stamp in each new passport i nva l i da t ing i t for t ravel to Spain or the Ba lear ic Is lands. The simple beauty of t h i s , from Ottawa's point of - 86 -view, was that the Act obviously only had relevance i f one were ac tua l l y standing at the Spanish f r o n t i e r , fa r removed from any Canadian j u r i s -d i c t i o n . A volunteer knew he would have to enter Spain i l l e g a l l y , and 49 could therefore not turn to his government i f he got in to t rouble. App l ica t ions for passports could only be refused with d i f f i c u l t y s ince rec ru i t s merely had to say that they wished to v i s i t 50 England, France, or any other nation save Spain. Forty suspicious passport app l ica t ions from western Canada were under scrut iny in January 1937, but Laurent Beaudry, Ass is tan t Under Secretary of State for External A f f a i r s , eventual ly had to grant them as there was no way of proving that the men were in fac t on the i r way to the republ ican 51 trenches. The Act was therefore very shrewd indeed. I t allowed an easy route for those i d e a l i s t s who i ns i s t ed on going to Spain, while at the same time sa t i s f y i ng that part of the Canadian e lectorate which wanted Ottawa to clamp down on "communistic r e c r u i t i n g . " The fac t that seven-hundred men, wel l over ha l f of the twelve-hundred man contingent, entered Spain a f te r the Act was passed and the i r passports had been stamped with the new t ravel r e s t r i c t i o n s , shows how easy i t was for Canadian volunteers to spring to the a id of the l o y a l i s t s . Passing the Foreign Enlistment Act was not simply a matter of draf t ing a B i l l and having i t enacted through parl iament. Canada already had an Enl istment Act—the United Kingdom Foreign Enlistment 53 Act of 1870. Not only was th i s l e g i s l a t i o n badly outdated, i t did not t reat c i v i l wars, and, being B r i t i s h , a lso flew in the face of - 87 -Canadian sovereignty. By g iv ing Canada i t s own Ac t , King would in essence be cut t ing into what remained of the umbi l ica l cord l i nk ing Canada to Great B r i t a i n . In keeping with h is suspic ions of England and his des i re for an autonomous foreign p o l i c y , however, the Prime Min is ter thought independence the bet ter course, and had h is Jus t i ce M in i s t e r , Ernest Lapointe, introduce the Canadian version of the Act . I t passed 54 f i r s t reading on February 18 1937, and a f te r a three hour debate, passed 55 th i rd and f i n a l reading the fo l lowing day. Though there had been l i t t l e parl iamentary opposi t ion to i t , the C .C .F . urged a prov is ion making the Act apply to insurgent forces in a f r i end l y s ta te , thus making that par ty ' s 55 aversion to Franco's rebel forces rather obvious. The new Act not only prohib i ted m i l i t a r y assistance to the enemies of a f r i e n d l y s t a t e , but authorized the government by Order in Council to apply i t "with necessary modi f icat ions to any case in which there i s a state of armed c o n f l i c t c i v i l or otherwise, e i ther 57 wi th in a fore ign country or between foreign coun t r ies . " One small allowance was made for moral and a l t r u i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s . Passports would be issued to people going to Spain on humanitarian grounds under the contro l of the Red Cross "or other recognized Canadian humanitarian C O s o c i e t y . " NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1 •Ibid. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, p. 231. 2, 3 I b i d . 4 King Papers, J2 se r ies , vo l . 342, S-500. 5 I b i d . c J . L . Granatstein, and R. Bothwell, "A sel f -Evident National Duty," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, v o l . 3-4, 1974-76, p. 213. : 7 External A f fa i rs Records, vo l . 2, f i l e 66-2, "Central European S i tua t ion . " q King Papers, J4 ser ies , vo l . 212. 9 I b i d . , vo l . 223, document #192041. ^Huyh Thomas, The Spanish C i v i l War, p. 335. ^ K i n g Papers, J l se r ies , v o l . 227. 12 J .A . Munro, e d . , Documents, p. 970. 13 King Papers, v o l . 230, document #197053. 14 J .A . Munro, Documents, p. 971. 1 5 I b i d . 1 6 K ing Diary, 21 October 1936. l 7G1obe and M a i l , 5 January 1937, p. 1. . 18 J .A . Munro, Documents, p. 983. 1 9 K ing Diary, 13 October 1936. 20 Vic tor Hoar, The Mac-Paps, p. 13. 2 1 K i n g Papers, v o l . 225, document #193880. 2 2 I b i d . , v o l . 224, document #192304. 23 Harold Nicol son, Curzon: The Last Phase, (Toronto: Macmillan • Co . , L t d . , 1934), p. 394-5. " King Diary, 1 December 1936. 2 5House of Commons, Debates, 24 May 1938. 2 6 H . Nicol son, Curzon, p. 394-5 27 House of Commons, Debates, 18 June 1936. 2 8 Globe and M a i l , 26 January 1937. oq Montreal Gazette, 30 September 1936. 3 0 0ttawa Journal , 30 September 1936. 3 1 I b i d . 3 2 C . Barnett, The Collapse of B r i t i sh Power, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1970), p. 218-227. 33 J .A . Munro, Documentsj p. 973. 3ZL Globe and M a i l , 12 January 1937, p. 6. 3 5 I b i d . , 11 January 1937, p. 6. 3 6 s e e New Front iers autumn 1936 edi t ions for information on Dr. Bethune's exp lo i t s . 3 7New Front iers , vo l . 1, #8, December 1936, p. 13. 3 8 I b i d . , p. 4. 3Q Globe and M a i l , 7 January 1937, p. 1. 4 0 I b i d . , 8 January 1937, p. 1. 4 1 I b i d . AO House of Commons, Debates, 19 January 1937. 43 King Papers, J4 ser ies , v o l . 212. The le t te r contained the fol lowing statement: "The Mounted Pol ice have jus t furnished us with a report on recru i t ing by the Communist Party of volunteers for service in Spain." Penci l led in the margin was: "The Mounted Pol ice never report on the actions of the other s ide . " 4 4House of Commons, Debates, 29 January 1937. AC King Papers, J4 ser ies , v o l . 212. - 90 -46 Globe and M a i l , 5 January 1937, p. 1. 47 Victor Hoar, The Mac-Paps, p. 13. 48 interview with former Mackenzie-Papineau Bat ta l ion member, John Johnston, Vancouver, November 1981. According to Mr. Johnston, the volunteers l e f t procurement of a l l documentation in the hands of the recrui ters who seem to have had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y obtaining passports. This is substantiated by other rec ru i t s . 49 Those Canadian volunteers who were s t i l l in Spain when Franco's v ic tory was assured sent repeated le t te rs for help to the Department of External A f fa i rs in Ottawa. The Department answered that nothing would be done except in the case of minors. This response, though per fect ly j u s t i f i a b l e , seems rather harsh when i t i s considered that the safety of the foreign nationals who had fought for the Republic was far from assured. Incidents of b ru ta l i t y were common in nat ion-a l i s t j a i l s , and a Canadian passport would not exempt a volunteer from torture or death. 50 a popular excuse for t rave l l i ng to Europe was to see the world exhib i t ion in Pa r i s . 51 J .A . Munro, Documents, p. 974. 5 2 V i c t o r Hoar, The Mac-Paps, p. 14. 53 J .A . Munro, Documents, p. 973. 54 House of Commons, Debates, 18 February 1937. 5 5 I b i d . , 19 March 1937. Winnipeg Free Press, 20 March 1937, p. 5. 5 7 Canada, Statutes, 1937, Geo VI , c . 32, p. 163. C O J .A . Munro, Documents, p. 980. As Dr. Bethune was sent to Spain by the "Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy," and not by a recognized "humanitarian soc ie ty , " i t i s un l ike ly that he would have qua l i f i ed under the new Act. - 91 -CONCLUSION Most p o l i t i c a l leaders , whatever the i r i n s p i r a t i o n , s t r i ve for power, which once a t ta ined , they do the utmost to consol idate. Mackenzie K ing , who was Prime Min is te r longer than any other in the h is to ry of the B r i t i s h Empire, was no except ion. As a resu l t of h is impressive record, the p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l l i v e s of the enigmatic King are sc ru t in i zed to th i s day by h is to r ians t ry ing to discover the key to his success. I t i s popular ly held that his amazing p o l i t i c a l longevi ty was par t l y the resu l t of a re len t less need to please cer ta in ancestors or deceased men who had made a l as t i ng impression on him, or that the Prime Min is te r tended to be j us t p la in lucky, that s i tua t ions often resolved themselves before they could ser ious ly hurt him. Though these in terpre ta t ions have some mer i t , the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1937 shows them to be highly inadequate. Sp i r i t ua l i sm and luck did play a part in King 's long career, but they were secondary or i n c i d e n t a l . The Prime Min is te r owed most of h is success to h is owr, shrewd, and often ruth less judgement. An astute p o l i t i c i a n , he never reacted more than necessary, and therefore rare ly had the unenviable task of re t rac t ing a po l i cy or statement. Above a l l , he was highly atuned to pub l ic op in ion, and knew that he courted d isas ter were he to go against the wishes of the e lec to ra te . The Spanish C i v i l War had exacerbated the t rad i t i ona l d i f f e r i n g a l leg iances of Engl ish and French Canada, but K ing, concerned with the deepening d i v i s i o n s , - 92 -successfu l ly eased them by introducing l e g i s l a t i o n that s a t i s f i e d as many as poss ib le while keeping his government in power. Suggesting that the po lar ized Canadian a l leg iances in the Spanish C i v i l War would have toppled the government had King not acted would be an exaggerat ion. The Prime Min is te r r e a l i z e d , however, that the c o n f l i c t in Spain did have tremendous emotional appeal , and that i t would in tens i f y the d isun i t y in Canada i f steps were not taken to d/fuse the s i t u a t i o n . More important ly , he rea l i zed that his govern-ment could be caught in the middle i f i t did not take some form of concrete stand. The dilemma was how to sa t i s f y French Canada without fur ther antagonizing the rest of the country, and v ice versa. King 's answer, the Foreign Enl istment Ac t , shows him to have been an astute and shrewd p o l i t i c i a n . He waited un t i l the s i tua t ion was thoroughly analyzed, moved only when circumstances d i c ta ted , and then passed l e g i s l a t i o n strong enough to placate his a l l i e s yet s u f f i c i e n t l y weak to reduce his a l iena t ion from the res t . The Quebec e lec tora te simply had to receive specia l at tent ion as i t was the more vocal and provided the federal L ibera ls with th i r ty- two percent of t he i r seats (Beck, page 220-221). King rea l i zed that the Act would lose him few votes, whereas no act ion or l e g i s l a t i o n in favour of the Spanish Republic would be very dangerous consider ing the react ionary mood in Quebec. I t could perhaps be suggested that the Foreign Enlistment Act was passed because King genuinely wanted to contr ibute to world - 93 -peace. There i s , on the one hand, no doubt that he was a peace-loving man, but there i s no evidence, on the other, to suggest that the Act was introduced out of a l t ru ism or moral p r i n c i p l e s . The Prime Min is te r was, a f te r a l l , sympathetic to the l o y a l i s t s , found fascism abhorrent, and ce r ta in l y did not approve of naked aggression against a l e g a l l y const i tu ted democracy. Furthermore, the Act was not enforced to any strong degree, as the Canadian government could (and subsequently did) d isc la im any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the i l l e g a l adventuring of i d e a l -i s t i c c i t i z e n s . F i n a l l y , and perhaps most simply, no document has been found in which King defends the Act as an instrument of peace. Thus i t was passed, not out of any moral conv ic t ion , but as a p o l i t i c a l l y expedient so lu t ion to a small but nagging dilemma. - 94 -APPENDIX I 1 G E O R G E V I . C H A P . 32. An Act respecting Foreign Enlistment. [Assented to 10th April, 1937.} HIS Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:— 1. This Act may be cited as Tlic Foreign. Enlistment Act, short title. 1937. 2. In this Act, and in any regulation or order made nofinitions. hereunder, unless the context otherwise requires:— (a) "Within Canada" includes Canadian waters as ^J'jij, defined for the purposes of the Customs Act; n.sTc%i. (b) "Armed forces" includes military, naval and air "Armed forces or services, combatant or non-combatant, but f o r o c a " ; shall not include surgical, medical, nursing and other services engaged solely in humanitarian work and which are under the control or supervision of the Canadian Red Cross or other recognized Canadian humanitarian society; (c) "Conveyance" includes ships, vessels, aircraft, trains, " C o n v e y -and motor and other vehicles; a n c o "-(d) "Illegally enlisted person" means a person who has ^|^}ly accepted or agreed to accept any commission or en- £en»n". gagement, or who is about to quit Canada with intent to accept any commission or engagement, or who has been induced to go on board a conveyance under a misapprehension or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged with the intention or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement contrary to the provisions of this Act; (e) "Equips" in relation to a ship, includes the furnish- "Equips", ing of anything which is used for the purpose of fitting PART i—11| or - 95 -" F o r e i g n S t a t e " . or adapting the ship for the sea, or for naval service, and all words relating to equipment shall be construed accordingly; (f) "Foreign State" includes any foreign prince, colony, province or part of any province or people, or any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any province or people. o f f e n c e t o 3 . If any person, being a Canadian National, within or a n f o r e i g n t h without Canada, voluntarily accepts or agrees to accept w f t h a t w a r a n y commission or engagement in the armed forces of any f r i e n d l y s t a t e , foreign state at war with any friendly foreign state, or, whether a Canadian National or not, within Canada, induces p e t e r s any other person to accept or agree to accept any commis-m d u c e m e n t . g j o n Q r e ng agement in any such armed forces, such persons shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. O f f e n c e t o q u i t o r i n t e n d t o q u i t C a n a d a t o e n l i s t . O f f e r s i n d u c e m e n t . 4 . If any person, being a Canadian National, quits or goes on board any conveyance with a view of quitting Canada with intent to accept any commission or engage-, ment in the armed forces of any foreign state at war with any friendly foreign state, or, whether a Canadian National or not, within Canada, induces any other person to quit or go on board any conveyance with a view of quitting Canada, with a like intent, such person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. O f f e n c e t o i n d u c e a p e r s o n t o e n l i s t a n d q u i t C a n a d a b y m i s r e p r e -s e n t a t i o n . O w n e r o f c o n v e y a n c e m a y b e g u i l t y o f a n o f f e n c e . D e t a i n i n g c o n v e y a n c e . 5. If any person induces any other - person to quit Canada, or to go on board any conveyance within Canada under a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the armed forces of any foreign state at war with a friendly state, such person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. C. (1) If the person having the control or direction of, or being the owner of any conveyance,! knowingly either takes on board or engages to take on board or has on board such conveyance, within Canada, any illegally en-listed person, the person having such control or direction of, or being the owner of any such conveyance, shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. (2) Such conveyance shall be detained until the trial or conviction of such person or owner and until all fines or penalties imposed on such person or owner have been paid or security approved by the Court having jurisdiction in the matter has been given for the payment thereof. 164 7 . - 96 -1937. Fore![irr Enlistment Act. C h a p . 3 2 . 3 7 . If any person, within Canada, does any of the follow- O f f e n d s , ing acts, that is to say, (a) builds or agrees to build or causes to be built, any B u i l d s s h i p , ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in or by the armed forces of any foreign state at war with any friendly state; or (b) issues or delivers any commission for any ship with C o m m i s s i o n s intent or knowledge or having reasonable cause to 8 h , p ' believe that the same shall or will be employed in or by the armed forces of any foreign state at war with any friendly state; or (c) equips any ship with intent or knowledge or having E q u i p s s h i p , reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in or by the armed forces of any foreign state at war with any friendly state; or (d) despatches or causes or allows to be despatched, any D e s p a t c h e s ship, with intent or knowledge or having reasonable s l l l p 9" cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in or by the armed forces of any foreign state at war with any friendly state; such person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. Provided that a person building, causing to be built, or rwiso. equipping a ship in any of the cases aforesaid, in pursuance of a contract made before the commencement of such war as aforesaid, shall not be deemed to have committed an offence under this Act, if, forthwith, upon a proclamation of neutrality or any other proclamation notifying or bringing into operation the provisions of this Act, he gives notice to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that he is so building, causing to be built, or equipping, such ship, and furnishes such particulars of the contract and of any matters relating to or done, or to be done under the contract, as may be required by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and, if he give such security and takes and permits to be taken such other measures, if any, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs may prescribe for insuring that such ship shall not be despatched, delivered or removed, or otherwise dealt with, without the permission in writing of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, until the ter-mination of such war as aforesaid. S . When any ship is built by order of or on behalf of any ^ , v foreign state, when at war with a friendly state, or is ^rnietHorePs delivered to or to the order of such foreign state, or to any "^ {jj^ 11 d person who to the knowledge of the person building is an t o h a v e b e e n agent of such foreign state, or is paid for by such foreign p " ^ ^ S U l U state or such agent, and is employed in or by the armed forces of such foreign state, such ship shall, until the con-trary is proved, be deemed to have been built with a view 165 to - 97 -A r m i n g o r e q u i p p i n g s h i p s f o r f o r e i g n s t a t e a t w a r . O f f e n c e . to being so employed, and the burden shall lie on the builder of such ship of proving that he did not know that the ship was intended to be so employed in or by the armed forces of such foreign state. 9. If any person within Canada, by any addition to or substitution in the armament or equipment, increases or augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or is knowingly concerned in increasing or augmenting the war-like force of any ship, which at the time of its being within Canada was a ship in or of the armed forces of any foreign state at war with any friendly state, such person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. lO. If any person, within Canada, prepares or fits out O u t f i t t i n g e x p e d i t i o n — — — J X > _ ; V . " , . a g a i n s t any military, naval or air expedition, to proceed against o f f e n c e . B t a t e ' the dominions of any friendly state, such person shall be guilty of an offence against this Act. R e c r u i t i n g . O f f e n c e . P r o v i s o . N o t a p p l i c a b l e t o c o n s u l a r o r d i p l o m a t i c o f f i c e r s . 11. If any person, within Canada, recruits or otherwise induces any person or body of persons to enlist or to accept any commission or engagement in the armed forces of any foreign state or other armed forces operating in such state, such person shall be guilty of an offence under this Act: Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the action of foreign consular or diplomatic officers or agents in enlisting persons who are nationals of the countries which they represent, and who are not Canadian Nationals, in conformity with the regulations of the Governor in Council. P r i » e o f w a r . 12. If any ship, goods, or merchandise, captured as prize of war within Canada in violation of Canadian neutrality, or captured by any ship which may have been built, equipped, commissioned or despatched, or the force of which may have been augmented, contrary to the pro-visions of this Act, are brought within Canada by the captor, or by any agent of the captor, or by any person having come into possession thereof with a knowledge that the same was prize of war so captured as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the original owner of such prize or his agent, or for any person authorized in that behalf by the govern-ment of the Foreign State to which such owner belongs, or in which the ship captured as aforesaid may have been A p p l i c a t i o n duly registered, to make application to the Exchequer for^Jtoration Court of Canada for seizure and detention of such prize, o f p r i a e . and the Court shall, on due proof of the facts, order such prize to be restored. 166 13. - 98 -1937. Foreign EnKdnw.nl Ad. Chap. 3 2 . ' 13. Every order r e f e r r e d to in the preceding section shall be executed and carried into effect in the same manner. ! ' ' " : r t ' ' : ; ' " and subject to the same right of appeal, as in case of any Appeal, order made in the exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of such court; and in the meantime, and until a final order has been made, on such application the court shall have power to make all such provisional and other orders as to the care or custody of such captured ship, goods, or mer-chandise, and (if the same- be of perishable nature, or incurring risk of deterioration) for the sale thereof, and with respect to the deposit or investment of the proceeds of any such sale, as may be made by such court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. 14. Any person, who is guilty of an offence against this P e n a l t i e s . Act shall be deemed to be guilty of an indictable offence, i n d i c t a b l e and shall be punishable by fine not exceeding two thousand o f f e n c e , dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, or by both fine and imprisonment; but such offence may, instead of being prosecuted as an indictable offence, be prosecuted summarily in manner provided by Part X V of the Criminal Code, and R.s. c. 3s. if so prosecuted, such offence shall be punishable by fine Summary not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not c o n v l c t i o n -exceeding twelve months, with or without hard labour, or by both fine and imprisonment. 15. (1 ) Any ship in respect of which an offence under " f T e n d i n a section seven of this Act has been committed and the f n X i t e d u> equipment thereof, shall be forfeited to His Majesty. H i ? M a j e s t y . (2) Any conveyance and the equipment thereof and all C o n v e y a n c e , arms, ammunition and implements of war used in or forming ™™rft0" part of an expedition in respect of which an offence has been e x p e d i t i o n committed under the provisions of section ten of this Act. f" r f" l t < ; d-shall be forfeited to His Majesty. 1 0 . For the purpose of giving jurisdiction in criminal L o c u s n f proceedings under this Act, every offence shall be deemed i u r i s r i l c t , o a -to have been committed, every cause or complaint to have arisen either in the place in which the same was committed or' arose, or in any place in which the offender or person complained against may be. 17. Subject to the provisions of this Act, criminal r r ^ ^ r , j ; : . proceedings arising hereunder shall be subject to and code, governed by the Criminal Code. R.s. c . 38. 1 8 . A l l proceedings for forfeiture of conveyances, goods P r o c e s s f ° r i ! • i i i • • f i i • i L 1 f o r f e i t u r e . or merchandise, under the provisions of this Act, may be taken in the Excheauer Court of Canada, or in anv court '•'••w* of competent jurisdiction. 1G7 1 9 . - 99 -Chap. 3 2 . Foreign Enlistment Act. 1 GEO . V I . O r d e r s i n C o u n c i l . R e g u l a t i o n s . O r d e r s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s t o b e p u b l i s h e d i n G a z e t t e . R e p e a l . 11). (1) The Governor in Council may, from time to time, by order or regulation, provide for any or all of the following matters:— (a) the application of the provisions of this Act, with necessary modifications, to any case in which there is a state of armed conflict, civil or otherwise, either within a foreign country or between foreign countries; (b ) the seizure, detention and disposition of conveyances, goods and merchandise; (c) the requirement of the consent of an authority or authorities to prosecutions, seizures, detentions and forfeiture proceedings; (d) the designation of officers or authorities who may execute any of the provisions of this Act; ( e ) the issue, restriction, cancellation and impounding of passports, whether within Canada or elsewhere, to the extent to which such action is deemed by him to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the general purposes of this Act. (2) Such orders and regulations shall be published in the Canada Gazette, and shall take effect from the date of such publication or from the date specified for such purpose in such order or regulation, and shall have the same force and effect as if enacted herein. 20 . The Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, chapter ninety of the Statutes of 1870 (33 & 34 Victoria) the short title of which is The Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, is hereby repealed in so far as it is part of the law of Canada. OTTAWA: Printed by JOSEPH OSCAR PATBNAOTIB, I.S.O., Law Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty. 168 - 1 0 0 -APPENDIX II Order in Council P.C. 1915 August 6, 1937 WHEREAS under Section 19( 1) (e) of "The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1937", it is provided that the Governor in Council may from time to-time, by order or regulation, provide for the issue, restriction, cancellation and impounding of passports, whether within Canada or elsewhere, to the extent to which such action is deemed by him to be necessary for carrying out the general purposes of the said Act; AND WIII-RUAS the Secretary of State for External Affairs reports that in view of the present armed conflict in Spain, it is not deemed desirable that passports be issued for travel in Spain unless it is clear that the applicants have no intention of enlisting in cither of the armed forces or otherwise taking part in the conflict; Now, THEREFORE, the Deputy of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External AITairs is pleased to order as follows: (1) Passports shall not be issued for travel in Spain, that is to say, the territories of the Peninsula, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, and towns and territories under Spanish sovereignty in Africa, unless applicants fall within the following categories: (a) Persons having urgent business reasons for such travel, and persons returning to resume employment there, together with members of their families. (b) Journalists representing reputable papers. (c) Persons forming part of surgical, medical, nursing or other services engaged solely in humanitarian work and which arc under the control or supervision of the Canadian Red Cross or other recognized Canadian humanitarian society. (2) Applicants for passports for Spain shall be required to subscribe to the following Declaration: In connection with my application for a passport to' travel in Spain I wish to state that I desire to proceed to for the purpose of ; I undertake that nothing will take place in the course of my visit that could be considered as implying any intervention by me on behalf of cither side of the present dispute in Spain. I understand that 1 travel at my own risk and that His Majesty's Government in Canada undertake no responsibility for my protection or for my evacuation in case of need. (3) A passport may be issued and endorsed "Valid for a single journey to (here insert name of the place or district in Spain and purpose of journey)" in the case of applications conforming with the above mentioned requirements. (4) New passports for travel in countries other than Spain and similar passports presented for renewal shall be marked "Not valid for travel in Spain, that is to say, the territories of the Peninsula, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, and towns and territories under Spanish sovereignty in Africa". (5) Passports issued for travel in Spain may be impounded or cancelled upon evidence of fraud or misrepresentation in the passport application or upon evidence that the holder has not faithfully carried out the undertaking set forth in the Declaration. (6) These regulations shall come into force on August 10th, 1937. H. W. LOTHROP - 101 -SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Archival material and interviews Forsey, Senator Eugene. Interviewed in Ottawa, February 1982. Johnston, John. Former member of the Mackenzie-Papineau Batta l ion interviewed in Vancouver, November 1981. Lapointe Papers. Publ ic Archives of Canada. Mackenzie King Diary. Publ ic Archives of Canada. Mackenzie King Papers. Publ ic Archives of Canada. Newspapers and magazines The Canadian Forum. July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. The Daily C lar ion . July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. Montreal Le Devoir. July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. Toronto Globe and Mai 1. July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. Montreal Gazette. July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. New Frontiers magazine. Ju ly 1936 - Apr i l 1937. Ottawa C i t i zen . July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. Ottawa Journal . July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. The Vancouver Sun. July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. Winnipeg Free Press. July 1936 - Apr i l 1937. Government publ icat ions Canada, Parliament, House of Commons. Debates. Ottawa: Queen's Pr in te r , 1936-37. Canada. Statutes. Ottawa: Queen's Pr in te r , 1937. 1 Geo. VI , C. 32. Munro, John A . , ed. Documents on Canadian External Relat ions. Volume 6. Ottawa: Department of External A f f a i r s , 1972. Books and journals Aldgate, Anthony. Cinema and History: B r i t i s h Newsreels and the . Spanish C i v i l War. London: Scolar Press, 1979. Barnett, C. The Collapse of B r i t i sh Power. London: Eyre Methuen, 1970. Beck, J . Murray. Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal E lect ions. Scarborough: Prentice H a l l , 1968. Betcherman, Li ta-Rose. The Swastika and the Mapleleaf. Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1975. Black, Conrad. Duplessis. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977. Boyle, Andrew. The Fourth Man. New York: Bantam Books, 1980. Dafoe,- John W. "Canadian Foreign Po l i c y , " Conference on Canadian  American A f f a i r s . Boston: Gin & Co. , L t d . , 1937. Eayrs, James. In Defence of Canada. Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1965. Volume 2. Engl ish , John, and Stubbs, J . O . , eds. Mackenzie King: Widening the  Debate. Toronto: Macmillan, 1977. Erv in , Randy. "Men of the Mackenzie-Papineau Ba t ta l ion . " Unpublished Master's thes is , Universi ty of Toronto. Glazebrook, G.P. deT. A History of Canadian External Relat ions. Volume 2. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1966. Gouin, L.M. "The French-Canadians, Their Past and Their Asp i ra t ions, " World Currents and Canada's Course, ed. V.A. Anderson. Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1937. Graham, Frank. The Book of the XV Brigade. Newcastle: Frank Graham, 1938. ^103~-Granatstein, J . L . and Bothwell. "A Sel f -Evident National Duty," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History. Vo l . 3-4, 1974-76. Gurney, Jason. Crusade in Spain. London: Faber & Faber L t d . , 1974. Hi l lmer, Norman. "O.D. Skelton: the Scholar Who Set a Future Pat tern," International Perspectives. Sept. Oct. 1973. Hoar, V ic tor . The Mackenzie-Papineau Bat ta l ion . Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969. Johnston, Verle B. Legions of Babel., Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Univers i ty , 1967. Liversedge, Ron, "Memoirs of a Mackenzie-Papineau Battal ion Veteran," unpublished memoirs, Special Co l lec t ions , Universi ty of B r i t i sh Columbia. MacLennan, Hugh. The Watch that Ends the Night. Toronto: MacMillan Co. , 1958. MacKay, R.A. and Rogers, E.B. Canada Looks Abroad. Toronto: McClelland Stewart, 1938. Mansergh, Nicholas. A Survey of B r i t i sh Commonwealth A f f a i r s . Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1952. Monroe, John. "Chr is t ie and Canadian External Relat ions," Journal  of Canadian Studies. May 1972. Neatby, B l a i r . Wil l iam Lyon Mackenzie King. Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1976. Nicolson, Harold. Curzon: the Last Phase. Toronto: MacMillan Co. L t d . , 1934. Pearson, Lester B. Mike. Volume 1. Scarborough: Signet Books, 1973. P ike ; David W. Conjecture, Propaganda, and Deceit and the Spanish  C i v i l War. Stanford: Inst i tu te of International Studies, 1968, Quinn, Herbert. The Union Nationale. Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1963. R idde l ! , Walter A, ed. Documents on Canadian Foreign Po l icy 1917-39. Toronto: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1962. Roberts, L e s l i e . The Chief: A P o l i t i c a l Biography of Maurice  Duplessis. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. L t d . , 1963. - 1 0 4 -Rosenstone, Robert A. Crusade of the Le f t . New York: Pegasus, 1969. Stacey, C P . Canada and the Age of Con f l i c t . Volume 2. Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1980. Thomas, Hugh. The Spanish C i v i l War. Third ed i t i on . Bucks: Hazel 1 Watson & Viney, 1977. Watkins, K. B r i t a in Divided: the Effects of the Spanish C i v i l War on B r i t i sh Publ ic Opinion. New York: Thomas Nelson, 1963. 

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