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"Grasp revolution, promote production" : struggles over socialist construction in China, 1973-1976 Howard, Roger William 1981

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"GRASP REVOLUTION, PROMOTE PRODUCTION": STRUGGLES OVER SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN CHINA, 1973 - 1976 by ROGER WILLIAM HOWARD B.A., Upsala College, 1964 M.A., Michigan State University, 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Sociology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA November 1981 (c) Roger William Howard, 1981 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department o r by h i s o r her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of S a c i o U . The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date ^UXL^ 1^1 DE-6 (2/79) "To understand a revolution and i t s actors, i t i s necessary to observe from very close and judge from very f a r : extremes which are hard to bring together. Simon Bolivar THESIS ABSTRACT The study i s an examination of struggles over s o c i a l i s t construction i n China between the Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party i n 1973 and the arrests of the so-called "gang of four" i n 1976. It analyzes the content of debates, the context i n which they occurred and p o l i c i e s implemented during the period. The study i s based upon materials c o l l e c t e d while l i v i n g i n China, observations during p a r t i c i p a -t i o n i n various p o l i t i c a l movements of the period, and on materials from the Chinese p r i n t and broadcast media. The d i s s e r t a t i o n analyzes struggles over i n d u s t r i a l development and organization, science and technology p o l i c y , r u r a l development, and the r o l e of the education system i n s o c i a l i s t society. Issues debated i n -cluded worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n management, cadre p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labor, labor remuneration p o l i c i e s , the r o l e of s c i e n t i s t s and technicians i n the production process, the importation of advanced technology, the r e -l a t i o n s h i p between s c i e n t i f i c theory and Marxism-Leninism, s t r u c t u r a l and i d e o l o g i c a l changes i n the modernization of a g r i c u l t u r e , access to higher education and the r o l e of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n s o c i a l i s t society. These debates are analyzed from the perspective of Marxian theory. From t h i s analysis the study concludes that i n s p i t e of the formal appear-ance of a debate, genuine and open discussion of p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s and concrete r e s u l t s did not i n f a c t occur. There were a number of conceptions, widely held i n China during the mid-seventies, which i t i s argued were a cen t r a l factor i n thwarting the emergence of r e a l debate. These include i i i the concept of the r o l e of the Communist Party as the "core of leader-ship" i n a l l spheres of s o c i a l l i f e , the notion of the "continuation of class struggle" i n s o c i a l i s t society, misinterpretation of the r e l a t i o n -ship between the forces and r e l a t i o n s of production i n the process of development, misunderstanding of the means by which the d i v i s i o n of labor can be transcended and misunderstanding of the nature of Chinese society. The study challenges these conceptions from the point of view of Marxian theory and traces the r o l e they played i n the d i s t o r t i o n of the debates and the suppression of a l t e r n a t i v e viewpoints. i v TABLE"OF CONTENTS Page THESIS ABSTRACT i i NOTES . v i i i LIST OF TABLES i x NOTE ON THE TRANSLITERATION OF CHINESE TERMS x GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS x i INDEX OF ABBREVIATED NAMES OF TRANSLATION SERVICES x i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x i v CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 1 Why This Period? 4 Importance of the Media as a Source of Documentation 6 General Si g n i f i c a n c e of This Period as a Case Study 7 The Party as the "Core of Leadership" . . 10 The Continuation of Class Struggle i n S o c i a l i s t Society 12 Misunderstanding of the Relationship Between the Forces and Relations of Production 14 Misconception of the Process of Trans-cending the D i v i s i o n of Labor 17 Misconception of the Nature of Chinese Society 18 V CHAPTER TWO: The Main Protagonists 27 Mao Zedong 30 Zhou E n l a i 33 Deng Xiaoping 35 Hua Guofeng 38 Jiang Qing 40 Zhang Chunqiao 42 Yao Wenyuan 43 Wang Hongwen 45 A "Gang of Five?" 46 CHAPTER THREE: Meetings and Mass Movements '59 The Tenth Party Congress 60 " C r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confucius" . . . 64 The Fourth National People's Congress. . 67 "Study the Theory of the Dictatorship of the P r o l e t a r i a t " 71 " C r i t i c i z e Deng Xiaoping" 77 CHAPTER FOUR: Industry 89 Factory Organization i n the Mid-Seventies: B e i j i n g No. 2 Machine Tool Plant 90 Worker P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Management . . . 97 Cadre P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Labor 101 Rules and Regulations 105 v i M a t e rial Incentives I l l Worker Theorists 121 The Theoretical Framework and the Limits on Debate 127 Factio n a l Disruption 132 CHAPTER FIVE: Science and Technology 146 Transcending the D i v i s i o n of Labor: Mass P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Technical Innovation and S c i e n t i f i c Experiment. 149 Transcending the C a p i t a l i s t D i v i s i o n of Labor 160 Shipbuilding and Self-Reliance 164 The Outline Report on Science and Technology. , 170 CHAPTER SIX: A g r i c u l t u r e 193 Changes i n the Relations of Production i n Chinese A g r i c u l t u r e 193 The Dazhai Model 204 The National Conference on Learning from Dazhai i n Ag r i c u l t u r e 211 Opposition to the Movement to Learn from Dazhai 218 Xiaojinzhuang and He'ertao 222 Class Struggle i n the Countryside . . . 227 "Equalitarian, Crude Communism" . . . . 233 v i i CHAPTER SEVEN: Education 246 Development of the Education Infrastructure 247 The Two Assessments 253 Areas of Struggle: 1973-1976 258 Zhang Tiesheng's Blank Exam Paper . . . 259 From the Commune, To the Commune: The Movement to Learn from Chaoyang A g r i c u l t u r a l College . . . . 274 The Role of I n t e l l e c t u a l s : The Case of Huang Shuai 288 The Issues Come to a Head: The Farrago on the Education Front and the Campaign to C r i t i c i z e Deng Xiaoping . 292 CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion 308 The Party as the "Core of Leadership" 310 The Continuation of Class Struggle i n S o c i a l i s t Society 313 Misunderstanding of the Relationships Between the Forces and Relations of Production 316 Misconception of the Process of Transcending the D i v i s i o n of Labor 319 Misconception of the Nature of Chinese Society 322 An A l t e r n a t i v e A n a l y t i c a l Framework . 324 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 334 Materials from the Chinese Media. . . . 334 Secondary Sources . 349 v i i i NOTES Chapter Page One: Introduction 22 Two: The Main Protagonists 53 Three: Meetings and Mass Movements 83 Four: Industry 137 Five: Science and Technology 187 Six: A g r i c u l t u r e 240 Seven: Education 300 Eight: Conclusion 332 i x LIST OF TABLES Page 1. Total Number of Postsecondary I n s t i t u t i o n s i n China, 1940-1963 249 2. Enrollment i n the Chinese Education System, 1949-1987 250 3. Percentage of Students from Worker or Peasant Background i n Chinese Postsecondary I n s t i t u t i o n s , 1952-1965 252 X NOTE ON THE TRANSLITERATION OF CHINESE TERMS In the text a l l Chinese names and terms are transcribed i n the standard (pin yin) romanization used i n the People's Republic of China and increasingly i n western works. I f , however, an English language source i s quoted or the name of a f a m i l i a r h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e appears, the o r i g i n a l or f a m i l i a r t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n i s retained. In the Notes and Bibliography the o r i g i n a l t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n s of names and terms are retained. x i GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS ba dayuan chej ian dou, p i , g ai gongchang gongduan gong-nong-bing j i e f a n g qian - qian, j i e f a n g hou - cheng, wenge hou - quan l i l u n duiwu sange z i l i u she l a i , she qu wei shenchanli lun y i da, er gong A fi x. r 'it & £ %%Js ft. eight o f f i c i a l s . workshop struggle, c r i t i c i s m , transformation factory work section worker-peasant-soldier before L i b e r a t i o n - money, afte r L i b e r a t i o n -grades, a f t e r the Cu l t u r a l Revolution -influence. t h e o r e t i c a l contingents three spontaneities. from the commune, to the commune. theory of the primacy of the productive forces. big and public. youtiao f r i e d bread twist. X X X zhengzhi guashuai jt^L I'xZ <£?L '-H^ p o l i t i c s i n command, zhiye d i y i P/< putting vocation f i r s t . x i i i •INDEX TO ABBREVIATED NAMES .OF TRANSLATION SERVICES FBIS Daily Report, People's Republic of China, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, S p r i n g f i e l d , Va. SPRCM or SCMM Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, S p r i n g f i e l d , Va. SPRCP or SCMP Survey of People's Republic of China Press, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, S p r i n g f i e l d , Va. x i v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e to acknowledge with thanks the help and encouragement given me by P a t r i c i a Marchak and Tissa Fernando of my Supervisory Committee. I would e s p e c i a l l y l i k e to thank my Research Supervisor, Graham Johnson, for his u n t i r i n g e f f o r t s i n guiding me through the process of researching and wr i t i n g t h i s t h e s i s . His in s i g h t s and suggestions played a major r o l e i n the development of my understanding of the problems involved i n research of th i s sort. Any errors or misconceptions are,of course,my own. The Canadian Association of U n i v e r s i t i e s and Colleges kindly provided the funds that allowed me to study i n China from 1973 t i l l 1975 and the S o c i a l Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada granted me a Doctoral Fellowship during the time I was preparing and writing t h i s t h e s i s . Without t h i s f i n a n c i a l help t h i s thesis would not have been possible. I would also l i k e to take t h i s opportunity to thank my many teachers, students and friends i n China who took i t upon themselves to help me gain a deeper understanding of the Chinese revolution. F i n a l l y , my deepest thanks go to my f r i e n d and companion, Pat Howard, without whose support and understanding t h i s project of many years could not have born f r u i t . 1 Chapter One: Introduction During the night of October 6, 1976 members of the People's L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA) guard unit 8341 who were responsible for the security of high ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and state o f f i c i a l s arrested four leading Party members: Jiang Qing, widow of the recently deceased Party Chairman, Mao Zedong; and three P o l i t i c a l Bureau members, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan.1 As news of t h e i r a r r e s t s began to leak out i n the following days and e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the o f f i c i a l announcement on October 21, the s t r e e t s of China were witness to the greatest outpouring of spontaneous, open expressions of r e l i e f and exultation since the 1949 L i b e r a t i o n . In the months that followed the Party i n i t i a t e d a media campaign against the arrested leaders, dubbed the "gang of four". The now infamous four were held responsible for many serious and persistent problems of the previous decade. In November 1980 they were put on t r i a l , charged with a s e r i e s of criminal a c t i v i t i e s dating from the s t a r t of the C u l t u r a l Revolution i n 1966. 2 The leadership that emerged af t e r the arrests of the "gang of four" i n s t i t u t e d a set of p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s within a general program of "four modernizations" i n industry, a g r i c u l t u r e , national defense, and science and technology. This has led to the abandonment or a l t e r a t i o n of many p o l i c i e s that were developed during the C u l t u r a l Revolution decade of 1966-76. In industry, important experiments have been i n i t i a t e d i n g i v i n g i n d i v i d u a l enterprises more i n i t i a t i v e i n working out production plans, making them responsible for t h e i r own p r o f i t s and losses, and secret 2 b a l l o t elections of workers' congresses and management personnel. 3 Trade unions have more autonomous powers and are supposed to exercise a supervisory r o l e i n r e l a t i o n to management.^ Material incentives are being reemphasized with various forms of bonus systems operating i n the f a c t o r i e s . 5 The a c q u i s i t i o n of advanced foreign technology has been greatly accelerated. Imports include both hardware and software i n c l u d -ing complete sets of equipment and some turnkey operations. Certain forms of j o i n t operations and d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t foreign investments are being encouraged i n order to more r a p i d l y absorb world standard technology. 6 In a g r i c u l t u r e the emphasis has switched from c e n t r a l i z i n g d e c ision-making and accounting at higher l e v e l s of the People's Communes to protecting and expanding the ownership and management r i g h t s of teams and brigades. In some poorer areas small groups and even i n d i v i d u a l house-holds are contracting to perform c e r t a i n types of a g r i c u l t u r a l production for the c o l l e c t i v e . 7 In education, the length of schooling has been increased and exam-inations, including entrance exams, have been reintroduced. Middle school graduates are no longer required to work i n industry or a g r i c u l t u r e for a number of years before being e l i g i b l e to apply to go on for post-secondary education.^ Class struggle i s no longer an all-encompassing theme i n the media. Many former landlords, national c a p i t a l i s t s and "bad class elements" have had t h e i r c i v i l r i g h t s restored. Thousands arrested during the C u l t u r a l Revolution decade have been released from j a i l s and labor camps and many have r i s e n to positions of prominence. 9 3 These are but some of the p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s which represent a deci s i v e r e o r i e n t a t i o n of p o l i c i e s c arried out i n the years immediately preceding the arrests of Jiang Qing and her supporters i n the P o l i t i c a l Bureau. This r e o r i e n t a t i o n has received considerable attention from the Western press, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l business community and academics. Among China scholars there i s considerable disagreement over the s i g n i -ficance of the post '76 p o l i c i e s . On one hand there are those l i k e Mark Selden who see a basic continuity with preceding p o l i c i e s : As the People's Republic enters i t s fourth decade, we can observe a c e r t a i n continuity between i t s current p r i o r i t i e s — the search for unity i n the service of modernization, e f f e c t i v e modes of cooperation, and expanded democratic r i g h t s — and those of e a r l i e r periods of revolutionary change. Perhaps the most persistent element of a l l has been the drive to defeat the legacy of poverty, to achieve a common prosperity that w i l l lay the material foundations for an advanced s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y . 1 0 At the opposite extreme are those l i k e the French scholar, Charles Bettelheim, who consider the current p o l i c i e s a "great leap backward". Bettelheim wrote i n 1978 that "an examination of texts published i n China during the l a s t few months, as well as what i t i s possible to e s t a b l i s h as to actual p r a c t i c e , has led me to believe that a r e v i s i o n i s t l i n e i s presently triumphing". 1 1 This study i s an attempt to throw l i g h t on the controversy over current p o l i c i e s by providing a detai l e d account and analysis of c e r t a i n struggles over aspects of development p o l i c y that immediately preceded the triumph of the "four modernizations" program. It i s my argument that the issues struggled over, the form i n which the debate was c a r r i e d out and the consequences of the implementation of p o l i c i e s advocated during 4 the mid-seventies provides an indispensable background for understanding present p o l i c i e s . Why t h i s period? The period I have chosen for analysis extends from the Tenth Nation-a l Party Congress i n August 1973 u n t i l the arrests of the "gang of four" i n October 1976. The Tenth Congress marks the end of the p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s that occurred when L i n Biao, the then defense minister who had been designated Mao Zedong's successor during the C u l t u r a l Revolution, attempted to gain complete control of the Party and state for h i s f a c -t i o n . 1 2 It was also during congress that members of the f a c t i o n around Jiang Qing were l a t e r reported to have s o l i d i f i e d control over the ' Chinese media. This control was to be an important factor i n the p o l i c y struggles that were to follow. The congress also marked the beginning of a period during which large numbers of leading cadres set aside during the C u l t u r a l Revolution were to return to positions of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . For these reasons the period from l a t e 1973 to l a t e 1976 can be seen as a d i s c r e t e period i n the s e r i e s of p o l i c y struggles that have marked the h i s t o r y of the CCP. I have also chosen t h i s period because i t corresponds with the time during which I had some d i r e c t experience of events i n China. My wife and I were among the f i r s t group of Canadian students to go to China as part of the Canada-China student exchange program. We arr i v e d i n B e i j i n g i n November 1973 and spent the f i r s t academic year studying Chinese at the B e i j i n g Language I n s t i t u t e . During the 1974-75 academic year I was 5 enrolled In the Philosophy department at B e i j i n g U niversity. The one-year program consisted mainly i n study of works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao as interpreted at that time i n China. An e s s e n t i a l part of the program involved what was then c a l l e d "open door education" (kaimen  banxue). Along with our Chinese roommates who were also studying p h i -losophy, the Canadian, French and German students i n my class l i v e d , worked and c a r r i e d out " s o c i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n " at the Red Star Peoples' Commune j u s t outside B e i j i n g and at the B e i j i n g No. 2 Machine Tools Plant within the c i t y i t s e l f . The Chinese and foreign students formed i n v e s t i g a t i o n teams and developed research plans i n d i f f e r e n t areas according to our i n t e r e s t s . To f u l f i l l course requirements, we wrote reports i n Chinese on these investigations when we returned to the u n i v e r s i t y . Materials gathered during the process of open door educa-t i o n i n B e i j i n g are included i n the thesis chapters on industry, science and technology and a g r i c u l t u r e . After completing our year at B e i j i n g University, my wife and I applied to remain i n China as teachers of English. From the f a l l of 1975 u n t i l the summer of 1977 we taught at the Guangdong Foreign Lan-guages I n s t i t u t e . While there we p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a l l a c t i v i t i e s i n the school except for those e x c l u s i v e l y for Party members. We were able to attend school-wide and departmental meetings and regular weekly p o l i t i c a l study sessions for teachers. We joined a group of our students i n t h e i r weekly p o l i t i c a l theory discussions. Observation and r e f l e c t i o n on such meetings and study sessions as w e l l as conversations with friends i n both Guangzhou and B e i j i n g form an important background to the analysis pre-sented here. We were able to p a r t i c i p a t e i n s o c i a l i nvestigations i n 6 communes and f a c t o r i e s i n Guangdong when, as teachers, we helped to organize and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n open door education for our students. In the four years of our stay i n China we made s i x one-week to three-week t r i p s to other parts of China including the northwest, northeast, c e n t r a l , south and east China. On these t r i p s we had opportunties to compare the s i t u a t i o n i n f a c t o r i e s , communes, schools and other units with those i n Guangzhou and B e i j i n g . Importance of the Media as a Source of Documentation Along with materials gathered while l i v i n g i n China, I have attempted to base my descriptions of p o l i c i e s and practices on sources from the Chinese press and radio that are a v a i l a b l e to scholars i n the West. A c e n t r a l function of the Chinese media i s the transmission of p o l i c y d e c i -sions made by the Party leadership to the population. Struggles over development p o l i c y were usually made public as part of a mass p o l i t i c a l campaign. At the beginning of such campaigns, the issues at stake were a r t i c u l a t e d i n speeches, e d i t o r i a l s and documents emanating from the c e n t r a l leadership. These statements of p o l i c y were usually published and broadcast i n the media and were the subject of p o l i t i c a l study at a l l l e v e l s . As part of the campaigns, a r t i c l e s appeared c l a r i f y i n g s p e c i f i c aspects of the p o l i c i e s under discussion and analyzing the relevance of the issues to l o c a l conditions. Units that were models of the proper implementation of p o l i c y would be given wide p u b l i c i t y i n the media. Thus the media are a source of both t h e o r e t i c a l discussions and descriptions of attempts at p o l i c y implementation at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s and d i f f e r e n t places i n Chinese s o c i e t y . 1 3 7 General Significance of t h i s Period as a Case Study As Stephen Andors points out, the p o l i c i e s under debate have also been of i n t e r e s t to people i n Western society who have become c r i t i c a l of t h e i r own s o c i a l system. In the l a t e nineteenth century, the turmoil i n Western society indicated a c e r t a i n kind of growth and development; i n China, turmoil was a sign that the old order was dying. Now, many Western i n t e l -l e c t u a l s have begun to t a l k about the decline of Western c i v i l i z a t i o n , and to write about the possible or probable a l t e r n a t i v e s to "modern" society. There i s not much optimism to be found here, and no wonder. To mention only some of the obvious problems which v a r i o u s l y a f f l i c t the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d world i s to describe a c r i s i s of no small proportions. Waste, p o l l u t i o n , and mindless growth gobble up l i m i t e d natural resources. A l i e n a t i o n and anxiety r e s u l t from gigantic organizations, complexity, and a dehumanizing d i v i s i o n of labor. Technological developments and economic growth c e n t r a l i z e power, create new e l i t e s , break down communities, and lead to r u r a l squalor, suburban sprawl, and urban c r i s i s . Manipulation, l y i n g and b r u t a l i t y are hidden behind the facade of raison d'etat, and are j u s t i f i e d by those with power and accepted c y n i c a l l y by those without. Persistent i n e q u a l i t i e s of wealth and a l l the other blessings of "modern c i v i l i z a t i o n " lead to seemingly random, sometimes organized outbreaks of domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l violence. The threat of uncontrollable disaster haunts the popular imagination, as i t preoccupies the concerns and plans of r u l i n g groups. 1 1 + For many c r i t i c s of Western society, China was seen, during the early and mid-seventies, as developing p o l i c i e s aimed at overcoming a l i e n a t i o n and increasing the p o s s i b i l i t y for ordinary people to have some input into the process of making decisions that a f f e c t t h e i r l i v e s . In the process of development the Chinese were seen to apply t h e i r ver-sion of Marxist theory to the creation of new work re l a t i o n s h i p s and methods of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The Chinese leadership was seen to 8 be consciously s t r i v i n g to b u i l d an i n d u s t r i a l society r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those i n either the Western c a p i t a l i s t countries or i n the U.S.S.R. An appreciation of these e f f o r t s i n China could aid i n the development of a c r i t i c a l understanding of problems i n western i n -d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . 1 5 Among China scholars the innovations i n Marxist theory that formed the basis of the reforms begun i n the C u l t u r a l Revolution have :led to a r e v i v a l of i n t e r e s t i n the r o l e of Marxist theory i n understanding p o l i c y formation i n C h i n a . 1 6 A p a r t i c u l a r version of Marxism, defined as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought by the media, was ce n t r a l to the p o l i c y debates. This version of Marxism w i l l be c r i t i c a l l y analyzed within the framework of Marxist theory through the a p p l i c a t i o n of con-cepts that were ignored or suppressed i n the debates. As the debates over s o c i a l i s t construction were conducted i n the form of mass movements publ i c i z e d i n the media, an impression was created of a wide-ranging, deep and popular debate. Many Western accounts of China described an example of a society i n which there was a great deal of democratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n debate and decision-making. 1 7 At the lowest l e v e l s i n terms of l o c a l decisions, my experience was that such views were generally correct. China would therefore seem to provide an i d e a l context f o r a debate over party and government p o l i c i e s a f f e c t i n g the course of development. In s p i t e of appearances, i t i s my contention that no r e a l debate i n fa c t occurred. The struggles over s o c i a l i s t con-s t r u c t i o n that occurred between 1973 and 1976 are not an example of mass democracy but of i t s opposite. 9 In the campaign to c r i t i c i z e the "gang of four" that followed t h e i r a r r e s t s , many problems were a t t r i b u t e d to r e s u l t s of t h e i r f a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . In my descriptions of the struggles, these f a c t i o n a l a c t i -v i t i e s also play an important r o l e . While i t might be tempting simply to lay the blame for the f a i l u r e of the debate at t h e i r feet, i t would be a great mistake. While there i s plenty of evidence that f a c t i o n a l manipulations created a context of confusion and fear that obstructed the development of a l i v e l y discussion, nevertheless there i s far more to be learned from t h i s experience than simply the necessity of eliminating the immediate conditions that allowed f o r the a r b i t r a r y use of power by the "gang of four". From my reading of the press and experience of d i s -cussions that went on at the base l e v e l , I w i l l argue that there are a number of factors that are much more c e n t r a l to understanding why a r e a l debate f a i l e d to emerge. I w i l l begin with a b r i e f account of these fac t o r s . I w i l l then proceed to a discussion of the context of the p o l i c y debates of the 1973-76 period by introducing the leading p a r t i -cipants and presenting a b r i e f chronological overview of events. This w i l l be followed by a d e s c r i p t i o n of the debates that occurred i n the main areas of contention: Industry, science and technology, a g r i c u l t u r e and education. In the concluding chapter I w i l l return to an analysis of the factors presented here i n l i g h t of examples drawn from the descrip-t i o n of the debates. The factors that prevented the emergence of r e a l debate p r i m a r i l y involve conceptualizations that were dominant i n China during the period 10 that the debate was supposed to take place. Although these conceptual-i z a t i o n s appear to be caricatures of aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory, they were unfortunately widely-held b e l i e f s . The Party as the "Core of Leadership" The generally held conception of the r o l e of the Communist Party was that i t should play the leading r o l e i n a l l aspects of s o c i a l l i f e . Marx conceived of a communist party as an organization of people who, because they had a clearer conception of the road ahead, could provide t h e o r e t i c a l leadership to a working class that was i n the process of l i b e r a t i n g i t s e l f . 1 8 Lenin added to t h i s notion of t h e o r e t i c a l leader-ship the concept of the party as an organization of professional revolu-t i o n a r i e s . . Since he considered the working class as incapable of recog-n i z i n g the necessity for s o c i a l i s t revolution simply on the basis of i t s experience of struggle within c a p i t a l i s t society, socialism had to be brought to the working class from without by a minority of i n t e l l e c t u a l s i d e n t i f i e d as advanced elements or the "vanguard of the p r o l e t a r i a t " . 1 9 In f a c t , the leadership provided by t h i s highly c e n t r a l i z e d and d i s c i p -l i n e d organization was a c e n t r a l factor i n the successful overthrow of the c z a r i s t autocracy and the establishment of Soviet power. But the d i v i s i o n of labor between Party and class continued a f t e r the October Revolution. The form of " d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t " that emerged out of the c r i s i s of the c i v i l war was a one-party state. Working class r u l e was equated with the leading r o l e of the Party i n the state and society. Marx and Engels looked forward to the period of the " d i c t a t o r -ship of the p r o l e t a r i a t " as a r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f one. Aft e r the working 11 c l a s s had exercised i t s d i c t a t o r s h i p over the bourgeoisie by expropri-ating i t s property and turning i t over to the associated producers, p o l i t i c a l authority as a sphere of separate and alienated decision-making would begin to d i s a p p e a r . 2 0 Stalin,however, argued that this was im-possible under the conditions that prevailed i n the Soviet Union. What he f e l t was necessary was rather the strengthening of the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t . 2 1 As the Party represented the p r o l e t a r i a t , the strengthening of the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t meant strengthening Party authority over a l l spheres of l i f e . In China i n the mid-seventies t h i s was characterized as "carrying out all-round d i c t a t o r s h i p over the bourgeoisie". One sphere i n which the Party exercised t h i s authority to the u l t i -mate was i n the realm of s o c i a l theory. The Party i s the only a u t h o r i t a -t i v e i n t e r p r e t e r of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, S t a l i n and Mao. The fundamental j u s t i f i c a t i o n for i t s leadership i s the notion that i t i s the only organization capable of c o r r e c t l y i n t e r p r e t i n g Marxism-Leninism. And i n f a c t , t h i s authority i s l i m i t e d to top Party theoreticians and even then i n the f i n a l analysis was subject to the powerful veto of the aging Party Chairman. Other than works written under his authority, a l l other t h e o r e t i c a l writings tended to be l i m i t e d to commentaries or extrapolations. Closely associated with t h i s conception of the Party's leading r o l e i n t h e o r e t i c a l work was a prevalent notion of Marxism as a body of established truth. In an introductory l e c t u r e i n our philosophy class at B e i j i n g Uni-v e r s i t y i t was explained that Mao Zedong Thought consisted i n "the a p p l i -cation of the u n i v e r s a l truths of Marxism-Leninism to China". In s p i t e of 12 Mao's own admonition that the source of a l l knowledge was p r a c t i c e and the v a l i d i t y of theory had to be determined i n the course of a p p l i c a t i o n , Marxism was often treated as a set of a p r i o r i truths. Thus the c o r r e c t -ness of any appreciation of r e a l i t y depended on i t s correspondence with the "truths of Marxism-Leninism" as interpreted by the Party center. The acceptance of the a p r i o r i v a l i d i t y of the "universal truths of Marxism-Leninism" and the absolute authority of the Party leadership's i n t e r -p retation of those " t r u t h s " led to the u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of what were in fact misinterpretations or misapplications of analyses, observations, comments and speculations by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao. The Continuation of Class Struggle i n S o c i a l i s t Society One of the o f t e n - c i t e d contributions Mao Zedong was credited with making to Marxist-Leninist theory was the "theory of the continuation of class struggle under the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t " . He maintained that i n s p i t e of the f a c t that the landlord and c a p i t a l i s t classes had been expropriated, classes and class struggle continued to exist i n China 9 9 and the question of who would win out had not yet been s e t t l e d . Both Lenin and S t a l i n held that class struggle continued under socialism but Mao developed i t as the c e n t r a l theme i n h i s understanding of socialism as a t r a n s i t i o n a l stage between cap i t a l i s m and communism. This t r a n s i t i o n could move i n either of two d i r e c t i o n s . The old r u l i n g class s t i l l p h y si-c a l l y remained i n society and i t s i d e o l o g i c a l influence was s t i l l wide-spread. Petty-bourgeois ideas of small ownership were s t i l l prevalent among the peasants,and i n t e l l e c t u a l s trained i n the old society continued 13 to hold and propagate old ideas. Therefore, Mao argued, f a i l u r e on the part of the Party to "take class struggle as the key l i n k " i n a l l i t s work could lead to regression back into capitalism. Interpretations of t h i s theory that were prevalent during the mid-seventies had a serious e f f e c t on the debate over s o c i a l i s t construction. A l l p ositions could be (and were) categorized i n terms of whether or not they were r e f l e c t i o n s of bourgeois or p r o l e t a r i a n ideology. This was often done at the expense of an analysis of the v a l i d i t y or usefulness of a suggestion i n the concrete s i t u a t i o n i n which i t was r a i s e d . In the "debates" of 1973-76 concrete discussion of the problems that a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y p o s i t i o n addressed was repeatedly aborted by l a b e l l i n g the p o s i t i o n or i t s advocate as "bourgeois". This t a c t i c involved more than u n f a i r debating t a c t i c s . Since the continuation of class struggle was being stressed i n the media and ideo-l o g i c a l struggle was an important component of class struggle, l a b e l l i n g was a very serious matter. The Party leadership was not only the a u t h o r i -t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t e r of theory, i t was a party i n power and controlled the organs of " p r o l e t a r i a n " d i c t a t o r s h i p . Advocating a p o s i t i o n l a b e l l e d bourgeois could mean being seen as s i d i n g with the enemy i n the class struggle. Advocating a p o s i t i o n at odds with o f f i c i a l opinion took con-siderable courage i n the face of growing awareness of cases of repression without e f f e c t i v e means of redress. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the theory of the continuation of class struggle under socialism that prevailed during the mid-seventies also affected the a b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l groups to enter p o l i c y debates. Since the p r e v a i l i n g view was that i n t e l l e c t u a l s as a group had not 14 managed to reform t h e i r thinking, they were seen as s t i l l being influenced by bourgeois ideology. Thus, i n t e l l e c t u a l s were p a r t i c u l a r l y susceptible to the charge of supporting the enemy i n the class struggle. The concept that classes continued to exist under socialism was also given a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n during t h i s period. According to Marx-i s t theory, class p o s i t i o n i s determined by r e l a t i o n s h i p to the means of production. In s o c i e t i e s where private property i n the means of produc-t i o n exists t h i s i s expressed i n terms of ownership or non-ownership. In China the property of the former r u l i n g classes had been expropriated and o f f i c i a l l y belonged to the producers, as c o l l e c t i v e or state property. An elaboration of the concept that classes continued to exist under socialism involved the explanation of how a new bourgeoisie could emerge i n s o c i a l i s t society. One aspect of the explanation involved the idea that the ownership of a factory or other unit was determined by the l i n e being c a r r i e d out by the leadership i n that unit. Line i n t h i s case means p o l i c i e s advocated and implemented. It should be noted that t h i s conception of class i s not based on r e l a t i o n s h i p to the means of produc-t i o n . I t i s based on thought and action. Thus, a person i n a p o s i t i o n of leadership who advocated a p o s i t i o n l a b e l l e d bourgeois could be accused not simply of supporting an enemy c l a s s but of being a member of that c l a s s . Misunderstanding of the Relationship between the Forces and  Relations of Production During the debates of the mid-seventies one of the charges l a i d against " c a p i t a l i s t roaders wi t h i n the Party" was that they were advocates 15 of the "theory of the primacy of the productive forces". They were accused of neglecting the r o l e of changes i n the r e l a t i o n s of production i n the process of s o c i a l i s t construction. In Marx the term forces of production r e f e r s not only to the raw materials, machines and tools, f a c t o r i e s and mines, etc., used i n the pro-cess of production, but to also the people engaged i n production including the s k i l l s that they bring to that process. The term r e l a t i o n s of produc-t i o n r e f e r s to the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between people i n the process of production. These re l a t i o n s h i p s include t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s to the means of production and (derived from t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p ) r e l a t i o n s of domination and subordination i n the work process and d i f f e r e n t i a l access to the d i s -t r i b u t i o n of the product. For Marx these fundamental production r e l a t i o n -ships a f f e c t a l l other p o l i t i c a l , l e g a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . According to Marx's m a t e r i a l i s t conception of h i s t o r y , a revolutionary period begins when the development of the forces of production i s blocked by the p r e v a i l i n g r e l a t i o n s of production. Economic, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l c r i s e s lead to a revolutionary change i n the r e l a t i o n s of production which allows for the rapid development of the forces of production. This analysis was derived from Marx and Engels' study of the r i s e of c a p i t a l i s t society and formed the basis for t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of how socialism could replace c a p i t a l i s m . 2 3 But Marx and Engels expected revolutionary change to occur f i r s t i n advanced c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t i e s where the forces of production had already developed to a very high degree. China's revolution occurred, however, when her productive forces were at a very low l e v e l of development. The process of s o c i a l i s t construction i n China involves both changes i n the 16 r e l a t i o n s of production and tremendous development of the forces of pro-duction including that development which Marx expected would be achieved by the bourgeoisie. To carry t h i s through successfully i t i s necessary to have a clear understanding of the concrete r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two factors at any given point. Changes i n the r e l a t i o n s of production can l i b e r a t e new potentials i n the forces of production. But i f changes i n the r e l a t i o n s of production are pushed beyond the p o t e n t i a l inherent i n the forces of production at t h e i r current stage of development, regres-sion can occur. This w i l l be i l l u s t r a t e d i n the discussion of the process of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n described i n the chapter on a g r i c u l t u r e . Determination of the concrete r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two factors i s c r u c i a l for the development of successful p o l i c i e s of s o c i a l i s t con-s t r u c t i o n . This determination necessitates extensive empirical i n v e s t i -gation and wide ranging discussion of opinions as to the present s i t u a t i o n and i t s p o t e n t i a l at each stage of development. In China i n the mid-seventies, these factors were seen as mutually exclusive. An i n d i v i d u a l either supported the "continuation of the rev o l u t i o n under so c i a l i s m " by advocating further changes i n the r e l a t i o n s of production or was a " c a p i t a l i s t - r o a d e r " advocating the "theory of the primacy of the productive forces". The p o s i t i o n that under the present circumstances development of the forces of production had to be emphasized i n order to prepare for further changes i n the r e l a t i o n s of production was l a b e l l e d rather than debated on the basis of i n v e s t i g a t i o n of concrete r e a l i t y . 17 Misconception of the Process of Transcending the D i v i s i o n of Labor According to Engels, the p r i m i t i v e communal s o c i e t i e s i n which human beings l i v e d for most of t h e i r existence as a species began to break up into more complex forms of s o c i a l organization through the d i v i s i o n of labor. The e a r l i e s t form of t h i s d i v i s i o n was that between men and women. When the s o c i a l surplus of the community was great enough to allow for the support of i n d i v i d u a l s who were not engaged i n production, a d i v i s i o n between mental and manual labor emerged. It was t h i s d i v i s i o n which led to the emergence of classes and of p o l i t i c a l power separate from and above the community. Thus emerged the state. 2 L f In the production process, e s p e c i a l l y i n the complex production processes that e x i s t i n modern society, the t e c h n i c a l d i v i s i o n of labor can be conceived i n terms of the increasing separation of conceptualization and e x e c u t i o n . 2 5 This frame-work i s used i n a case study of t e c h n i c a l innovation at a B e i j i n g machine tools plant i n chapter f i v e on science and technology. In China i n the mid-seventies r e l a t i o n s of domination and subjugation that flowed from the d i v i s i o n of labor were stressed. Mencius' famous statement, "Some labor with t h e i r minds and some with t h e i r p h y s i c a l strength. Those who labor with t h e i r minds r u l e others and those who labor with t h e i r p h y s i c a l strength are ruled by others", was often quoted as an example of a reactionary a t t i t u d e toward labor and laboring people. The process of transcending the d i v i s i o n of labor i n Chinese society was seen p r i m a r i l y not i n changing the character of work, but i n remoulding the ideology of mental workers. F a i l u r e to remould could lead to the 18 development of antagonistic r e l a t i o n s between mental and manual workers. Physical labor i n and of i t s e l f was seen as the key to the process of remoulding. The suspicion of a l l mental workers as p o t e n t i a l oppressors and the narrow understanding of the questions involved i n transcending the d i v i -sion of labor seriously d i s t o r t e d both the debates and p o l i c i e s that emerged i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s problem i n both industry and education. The underlying issue i m p l i c i t i n the problem of transcending the d i v i s i o n of labor was l a r g e l y ignored. In China the most important tasks of concep-t u a l i z a t i o n are c a r r i e d out by the Party and the planning bureaus. Tech-n i c a l d e t a i l work and managerial work are at a much lower l e v e l of abstraction and are much more c l o s e l y related to execution. The key issue i n a planned economy i s how the laboring people can gain an increasing capacity f or and p o s s i b i l i t y of exercising control over planning and other decisions that determine what i s produced, how and why. The conceptual framework i n which questions r e l a t e d to the transcendence of the d i v i s i o n of labor were debated prevented r e a l analysis of the concrete s i t u a t i o n by obscuring the c e n t r a l issues. Factory and commune democracy cannot sub-s t i t u t e f o r the s o c i a l i z a t i o n of state authority through d i r e c t democracy i n l o c a l government and responsible representation at higher l e v e l s . Misconception of the Nature of Chinese Society China accepted from Soviet sources the orthodox Marxist d e s c r i p t i o n of "the development of productive forces from ancient times to our day". 19 According to t h i s framework, the development of the forces of production has led to the emergence of f i v e types of r e l a t i o n s of production i n h i s t o r y : p r i m i t i v e communal, slave, feudal, c a p i t a l i s t , and s o c i a l i s t . 2 6 Since p r e l i b e r a t i o n China was c l e a r l y not a c a p i t a l i s t country, the old society was designated by Mao and other Chinese writers as "semi-feudal, s e m i - c o l o n i a l " . 2 7 China i n the century before L i b e r a t i o n was seen as a society i n which decaying feudalism was combined with enclaves of c a p i t a l -ism created as a r e s u l t of i m p e r i a l i s t penetration. According to t h i s account, with the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the p r i m i t i v e commune, a seri e s of class s o c i e t i e s emerged based upon pr i v a t e ownership of the means of production. Through ownership of the means of production the dominant classes, slaveholders, landowners and, f i n a l l y , c a p i t a l i s t s were able to appropriate the s o c i a l surplus through e x p l o i t a t i o n of the laboring people. In s o c i a l i s t society e x p l o i t a t i o n i s ended as the means of production become property of the laborers themselves. In t h i s analysis state ownership i s equated with the s o c i a l i z a t i o n of the means of production. Thus China, with state-owned industry and c o l l e c t i v e l y -owned a g r i c u l t u r e , i s b a s i c a l l y s o c i a l i s t . To complete the process of s o c i a l i z a t i o n , c o l l e c t i v e ownership would have to be " r a i s e d " to the l e v e l of state ownership. But other readings of Marx throw considerable doubt on the v a l i d i t y of the r i g i d , d e terministic formula the Chinese in h e r i t e d from the Soviet Union. Marx described another society, or i n h i s terms "mode of produc-t i o n " , 2 8 that emerged with the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of p r i m i t i v e society. Marx and Engels described t h i s s o c i a l formation as " o r i e n t a l despotism" or the 20 " A s i a t i c mode of pr o d u c t i o n " . 2 9 One form of t h i s mode of production emerged i n areas where natural conditions require the development of i r r i g a t i o n networks to sustain and expand a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n . 3 0 In t h i s mode of production classes and e x p l o i t a t i o n exist without the existence of private property. Production i s ca r r i e d on i n scattered communal v i l l a g e s . The land o f f i c i a l l y belongs to one person, the monarch, usually i n his capacity as the representative or "son" of the deity. The r u l i n g class i s made up of the state bureaucracy who are servants or p r i e s t s of the god-king themselves holding no property i n the means of production. The bureaucracy extracts the s o c i a l surplus from the v i l l a g e s , usually i n the form of labor service, not on the basis of ownership of the means of production, but on the basis of t h e i r r o l e i n the d i v i s i o n of labor. The educated bureaucracy organizes the construc-t i o n and maintenance of the i r r i g a t i o n system and/or other functions necessary to carrying out a g r i c u l t u r a l production. Forms of t h i s mode of production existed i n Egypt, the Middle East, China, c e n t r a l and south-east Asia, and the Inca empire i n South America. 3 1 Descriptions of t h i s mode of production can be found i n Marx and Engels' writings although they never attempted a systematic analysis. Their c e n t r a l concern was i n describing the emergence and demise of the c a p i t a l i s t mode of production, not i n developing a general schema for human hi s t o r y . The concept can also be found i n Lenin's pre-October works when he describes Russia as "semi-asiatic", but i n the early t h i r t i e s under S t a l i n the concept was rejected as an i l l e g i t i m a t e part of the Marxist-Leninist h e r i t a g e . 3 2 21 Legitimate or not, the concept of an A s i a t i c mode of production allows for the p o s s i b i l i t y of developing an analysis of other s o c i e t i e s i n which private property i n the means of production does not e x i s t . Recent analyses of countries that c a l l themselves " s o c i a l i s t " have main-tained that t h i s s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n i s an i l l u s i o n . Socialism, described by Marx as the d i r e c t appropriation of s o c i a l wealth by associated pro-d u c e r s , 3 3 has yet to be achieved. These s o c i e t i e s s t i l l remain within the bounds of class society. This new mode of production has been v a r i -ously described as "bureaucratic c o l l e c t i v i s m " , 3 ^ " p r o t o - s o c i a l i s m " , 3 5 and " s t a t i s m " . 3 6 This i s , however, not a de s c r i p t i o n of a new form of " o r i e n t a l despotism". The A s i a t i c mode was s t a t i c while these s o c i e t i e s are dynamic. They emerged from s o c i a l revolutions and the state bureau-cracy i s f u l f i l l i n g the task of the bourgeoisie i n creating the material conditions for socialism. The c r u c i a l question raised by these analyses i s whether and how these s o c i e t i e s could create changes i n the r e l a t i o n s of production necessary for the t r a n s i t i o n to s o c i a l i s m . 3 7 The Chinese analyze t h e i r own society as one i n which classes and class struggle continue to e x i s t . But there i s a c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e between the Chinese analysis and the one alluded to above. The Chinese believe they have already achieved socialism. The danger of emergence of new forms of e x p l o i t a t i o n i s seen i n terms of s l i p p i n g back into the t h e o r e t i c a l l y p r i o r mode of production according to the Soviet scheme, o o x.e., capitalism. ° I w i l l argue that i t i s t h i s misconception that has seriously d i s t o r t e d the debate over s o c i a l i s t construction i n China i n the mid-seventies. 22 Notes: Chapter One, Introduction 1 For a detail e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the events surrounding the arres t s see: Andres D. Onate, "Hua Kuo-feng and the Arrest of the 'Gang of Four'", China Quarterly, No. 75, Sept. 1978, pp. 540-65. 2 See "Indictment of the Special Procurate Under the Supreme People's Procurate of the People's Republic of China", published as an English supplement to Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, November 1980. 3 See for example Xiang Rong, "A Glimpse of Factory L i f e " , B e i j i n g  Review, No. 11, March 17, 1980, pp. 17-25; "Greater Power for Enterprises", B e i j i n g Review, No. 22, June 2, 1980, p. 4, and "More Enterprises with Greater Self-Management", B e i j i n g Review, No. 33, August 18, 1980, p. 4. For a general analysis of the reforms from China see Liao J i l i , "Reforming Economic Management", China Reconstructs, Vol. XXX, No. 3, March 1981, p. 4-7. For a western analysis of the reforms see V i c t o r C. Falkenheim, "Administrative Reform and Modernization i n Post-Mao China", P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s , V o l . 53, No. 1, Spring 1980, pp. 5-28. ^ See f o r example "Trade Unions Uphold Workers' Interests", Beij ing  Review, No. 50, Dec. 15, 1981, pp. 5-6 and "Tasks of Trade Unions", Be i j i n g  Review, No. 17, A p r i l 27, 1981, p. 5. 5 See for example "Where Does Labour Enthusiasm Come From?", Beij ing  Review, No. 19, May 12, 1980, pp. 16-23. 6 See for example Yang Min, "Importing Technology and Maintaining Independence and Keeping the I n i t i a t i v e i n Our Own Hands", Guangming Daily, Oct. 14, 1978, FBIS, 25 Oct. 78, pp. E5-6; "Study, Use and Manage Imported Technology and Equipment", People's Daily, Oct. 19, 1978, FBIS, 27 Oct. 78, pp. E25-6 and Tsa i Wei-heng, "Several Problems on Compensation Trade", Ta  Kung Pao, Nov. 1, 1978, FBIS, 16 Nov. 78, pp. Nl-8. 7 See for example Jing Hua, "A Glimpse of Rural L i f e " , Beij ing Review, No. 15, A p r i l 14, 1980, pp. 17-26, and Wang Dachang, "System of Responsi-b i l i t y i n A g r i c u l t u r a l Production", Beij ing Review, No. 11, March 16, 1981, pp. 3-4. 8 For a c r i t i c a l analysis of changes i n the education system see: Suzanne Pepper, "Chinese Education A f t e r Mao: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back and Begin Again?", China Quarterly, No. 81, March 1980, pp. 1-65. 9 See for example "On Class and Class Struggle", B e i j i n g Review, No. 20, May 19, 1980, pp. 24-27 and continued i n B e i j i n g Review, No. 25, June 23, 1980, pp. 13-16, and Zhao Cagbi, "On Removing the Designations of Landlords, Rich Peasants, Counterrevolutionaries and Bad Elements", NCNA, Jan. 30, 1979, FBIS, 1 Feb. 79, pp. E17-18. 23 1 0 Mark Seidell, "China's Uninterrupted Revolution", Monthly Review, Vol. 31, No. 5, Oct. 1979, p. 32. Mark Selden i s p a r t i c u l a r l y known for h i s work, The Yenan Way, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) i n which he describes the o r i g i n s of Chinese development p o l i c i e s i n experi-ences i n the l i b e r a t e d areas before 1949. 1 1 Charles Bettelheim, "Letter of Resignation", Monthly Review, Vol. 30 No. 3, July-Aug. 1978, p. 11. See also his "Great Leap Backwards" i n the same issue, pp. 37-116. Charles Bettelheim has written an analysis of the emergence of a new r u l i n g c l a s s i n the Soviet Union: Class Struggles i n  the U.S.S.R.: F i r s t Period, 1917-23 and Second Period, 1923-30 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976 and 1978) and an analysis of i n d u s t r i a l manage-ment i n China: C u l t u r a l Revolution and I n d u s t r i a l Organization i n China (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974). U n t i l 1977 Bettelheim considered China an example of s o c i a l i s t construction which avoided the mistakes made i n the U.S.S.R. 1 2 For a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s c r i s i s see Jaap van Ginneken, The  Rise and F a l l of L i n Piao (N.Y.: Avon, 1977). 1 3 For a d e s c r i p t i o n of the r o l e of the media i n China see: Michel Oksenberg, "Sources and Methodological Problems i n the Study of Contempo-rary China", i n A. Doak Barnett, ed., Chinese Communist P o l i t i c s i n Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 577-606, and James R. Townsend, P o l i t i c s i n China (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1974), pp. 200-210. 1 4 Mark Selden, "China's Uninterrupted Revolution", p. 32. 1 5 See for example John G. Gurley, " C a p i t a l i s t and Maoist Economic Development", i n Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, eds., America's Asia (N.Y.: Vintage, 1971), pp. 324-56. 1 6 See for example Richard M. P f e f f e r , "Mao and Marx i n the Marxist-L e n i n i s t T r a d i t i o n : A C r i t i q u e of 'The China F i e l d ' and a Contribution to a Preliminary Reappraisal", Modern China, Vol. 2, No. 4, Oct. 1976. P f e f f e r ' s contention that China scholars had ignored Marxist analysis i n analyzing China provoked a wide-ranging debate of issues r e l a t i n g to Marxism i n China i n Vol. 3 and 4 of Modern China including Benjamin Schwartz, Andrew Walder, Frederic Wakeman and Stuart Schram. 1 7 See for example Maria Antoinetta Macciocchi, D a i l y L i f e i n Revolu- tionary China (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), and Janet Goldwasser and Stuart Dowty, Huan-Ying: Workers' China (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). 1 8 See for example the d e s c r i p t i o n by Marx and Engels of the r e l a t i o n -ship between Communists and the working class i n the second section of the Manifesto of the Communist Party (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), pp. 47-48. 24 1 9 See for example Lenin's d e s c r i p t i o n of the need for a c e n t r a l i z e d party under the conditions p r e v a i l i n g i n Russia i n the section on "Organization of Workers and Organization of Revolutionaries" i n h i s "What i s to be done", V.I. Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), pp. 322-38. 2 0 See for example the d e s c r i p t i o n of the withering away of the state i n Engels, Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution i n Science (New York: Inter-nati o n a l Publishers, 1936), pp. 308-9. 2 1 See Joseph S t a l i n , Report on the Work of the Central Committee to  the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU (B) (Toronto: New Era, 1939), pp. 45-66. 2 2 See Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", Selected Readings ( B e i j i n g : Foreign Languages Press, 1971), pp. 463-64, for the f i r s t appearance of t h i s concept i n Mao's published works. 2 3 This process i s outlined i n section one of the Manifesto, pp. 3-46. 2 4 Engels analyzes t h i s process i n h i s The O r i g i n of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York: International Publishers, 1942). For analyses of t h i s phenomena by contemporary anthropologists see Morton H. F r i e d , The Evolution of P o l i t i c a l Society (N.Y.: Random House, 1967); Lawrence Krader, Formation of the State (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-H a l l , 1968) and Gehard E. Lenski, Power and P r i v i l e g e (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1966), Chs. 8-9. 2 5 The use of the terms conceptualization and execution to analyze the d i v i s i o n of labor i n modern society i s developed by Rudolf Bahro i n h i s analysis of Soviet s t y l e "proto-socialism" i n The A l t e r n a t i v e i n Eastern  Europe (London: New Left Books, 1978). 2 6 A b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s concept of h i s t o r i c a l development can be found i n the section on d i a l e c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l materialism i n History  of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing, 1948), pp. 126-61. This text and t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the fundamentals of Marxism were basic to the Chinese understanding of Marxist theory. A Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n of the History (Bolshevik) was used as a text i n Party schools and i n the Philosophy department at B e i j i n g Univer-s i t y . The only source of a l t e r n a t i v e versions of Marxism or c r i t i c i s m s of Marxism generally a v a i l a b l e i n China were those included as negative examples i n the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and S t a l i n . Chinese teachers and students at B e i j i n g U n i v e r s i t y were completely unaware of post-war developments i n Marxism i n Eastern and Western Europe and the r e s t of the world. Some post-1956 Soviet material was a v a i l a b l e , however, for purposes of c r i t i c i z i n g revisionism. 25 2 Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", Selected Works, Vol. II (Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 309-14, discusses the nature of Chinese society following the im p e r i a l i s t penetration which began early i n the 19th century. 2 8 Marx's use of the term "mode of production" depends upon the l e v e l of abstraction he i s working with. In The German Ideology (N.Y.: Inter-national Publishers, 1947), pp. 7-8, he re f e r s to the mode of production as a "mode of l i f e " . In A Contribution to the C r i t i q u e of P o l i t i c a l  Economy (Chicago: Kerr, 1904), p. 11, he states that "the mode of pro-duction of material l i f e determines the general character of the s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and s p i r i t u a l processes of l i f e " but i n the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of L844 (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1964), p. 136, he states that " r e l i g i o n , family, state, law, morality, science, ar t , etc., are only p a r t i c u l a r modes of production ..." In general, mode of production seems to be Marx's widest s o c i a l category, including the economic base (forces and r e l a t i o n s of production) and a l l aspects of the superstructure that are derived from the r e l a t i o n s of production: " r e l i -gion, family, state ..." It i s a means of describing a society as a set of r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the productive process at i t s base. The d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s described i n the Soviet History are modes of production. For a des c r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the concept of mode of production and other aspects of Marx's work see Umberto M e l o t t i , Marx and the Third. World (London: Macmillan, 1977), introduction. 2 9 For a preliminary d e s c r i p t i o n of " o r i e n t a l despotism" see Karl Marx, Grundrisse (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 473. For a d e s c r i p t i o n of the a s i a t i c mode of production derived from various references i n Marx's works, see M e l o t t i , pp. 54-72 and Bahro, pp. 68-73. The concept i s also d i s -cussed i n Ka r l Wittfogel, O r i e n t a l Despotism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), Ch. 9 and Barry Hindness and Paul Q. H i r s t , P r e - C a p i t a l i s t  Modes of Production (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), Ch. 4. 3 0 This however was not the only form the a s i a t i c mode could take. See M e l o t t i , Chs. 11-12 for the range of forms possible with or without su b s t a n t i a l hydraulic features. John Taylor i n his From Modernization to  Modes of Production (London: Macmillan, 1979), Ch. 9, maintains that con-t r o l of i r r i g a t i o n i s not a s u f f i c i e n t explanation of the r o l e of the state i n the a s i a t i c mode. Other functions he notes are: r e g u l a r l y r e d i s t r i -buting communal lands to meet changing demographic requirements, maintain-ing storage f a c i l i t i e s , organizing crop r o t a t i o n and the production and d i s t r i b u t i o n of tools for a g r i c u l t u r a l production. 3 1 For a d e s c r i p t i o n of the Inca variant see Bahro, pp. 73-75. For the Chinese variant see M e l o t t i , Ch. 17. 3 2 See Ka r l Wittfogel, "The Marxist View of China (Part I ) " , China  Quarterly, No. 11, July-Sept., 1962, pp. 1-20 and (Part I I ) , No. 12, Oct.-Dec. 1962, pp. 155-69. 26 3 3 In The C i v i l War i n France (Moscow: Foreign Languages Press, 1948), Marx describes how i n the Paris Commune the producers began the process of s o c i a l appropriation leading to a s i t u a t i o n i n which "united co-operative s o c i e t i e s are to regulate national production upon a common plan". These measures included the destruction of the e x i s t i n g state machine and i t s replacement by the Commune, the e l e c t i o n of representatives to the Commune through univ e r s a l suffrage with provisions for instant r e c a l l and the s t i p u l a t i o n that "public service had to be done at workmen's wages", the provision of u n i v e r s a l education without interference from church or state and the beginning of s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n including the turning of workshops and f a c t o r i e s over to "associations of workmen". See pp. 73-91. 3 4 See M e l o t t i , Chs. 21-22, for a d e s c r i p t i o n of the emergence of "bureaucratic c o l l e c t i v i s m " i n the U.S.S.R. 3 5 See Bahro, Ch. 3, "From A g r i c u l t u r a l to I n d u s t r i a l Despotism". 3 6 The concept of "statism" i s developed by Marxist theoreticians i n Yugoslavia as an extension of t h e i r c r i t i q u e of Stalinism. See Svetozar Stojanovic, Between Ideals and R e a l i t y (New York: Oxford Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1973), Part I I , and Mihailo Markovic, From Affluence to Praxis (Ann Arbor: Un i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press, 1974), Chs. 2-4. 3 7 See i n p a r t i c u l a r Bahro's discussion of "The Strategy of a Communist A l t e r n a t i v e " , pp. 251-405. 3 8 This i s the basis of the analysis of the U.S.S.R. presented by Bettelheim i n h i s Class Struggles i n the U.S.S.R. Bettelheim's thesis i s that socialism i s a t r a n s i t i o n a l society which can move i n either d i r e c -t i o n : forward toward communism or backward toward capitalism. In h i s debate with Paul Sweezy i n On the T r a n s i t i o n to Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), he argued that t r a n s i t i o n towards capitalism could not be defined as movement away from state planning toward the i n -creasing r o l e of the market. This was simply a surface manifestation of the change i n power r e l a t i o n s i n society. The c r u c i a l question i s who holds power, the p r o l e t a r i a t or the representatives of the new bourgeoisie. This can be determined by analyzing the l i n e followed by the r u l i n g Party. Thus his p o s i t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as the one prevalent i n China i n the mid-seventies. 27 Chapter Two: The Main Protagonists Chapters two and three describe the context which shaped the form and manner i n which p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s were presented and which u l t i -mately determined the choices that were made. The succeeding chapters deal with s p e c i f i c issues i n the areas of industry, science and technol-ogy, a g r i c u l t u r e , and education. These issues were the focus of debates over s o c i a l i s t construction i n the mid-seventies. I w i l l attempt to c l a r i f y what was at stake, t h e o r e t i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y i n each of these areas. In r e a l i t y , f o r most of the period only one side of the debate was p u b l i c l y a i r e d . The views that eventually prevailed appeared i n the media i n fragmentary form as objects of c r i t i c i s m quoted out of context. It was only a f t e r the downfall of the "gang of four" that materials became a v a i l a b l e which allow the a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y options to be sketched out. In the one-sided "debate" that did occur p u b l i c l y these issues were presented i n the context of movements to prevent "the r e s t o r a t i o n of capitalism i n China" through the coming to power of persons who would lead China down "the c a p i t a l i s t road". It i s th i s context that w i l l be outlined i n these chapters i n terms of the i n d i v i d u a l protagonists who stood at the center of p o l i t i c a l power, the p o l i t i c a l movements that were the public manifestations of the struggle and the problem of fa c t i o n a l i s m that lay beneath the tensions of the period. In any s o c i a l system, questions of p o l i c y are at the same time questions of power. The form that the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t has taken i n China i s that of a s i n g l e party s t a t e . 1 The state structure 28 has as i t s center the State Council with i t s subordinate m i n i s t r i e s i n Be i j i n g . The State Council i s elected at periodic National Peoples' Congresses. Below the cen t r a l government the state structure consists of p r o v i n c i a l governments and c e n t r a l l y administered m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and then the county governments and larger m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . The lowest l e v e l of state structure includes the r u r a l peoples' communes, small c i t i e s and muncipal d i s t r i c t s i n larger c i t i e s . During the mid-seventies, governments below the national l e v e l were headed by revolutionary committees. The Party structure p a r a l l e l s the state structure but extends down to base l e v e l organizations such as the brigades or teams within the communes and f a c t o r i e s i n the urban areas. 2 The Communist Party plays the leading r o l e i n the p o l i t i c a l system. Major p o l i c y decisions are made by the Party while the state's r o l e i s simply to implement those decisions. Party and state structures are c l o s e l y linked. To ensure the Party's r o l e as the "core of leadership" i t has t r a d i -t i o n a l l y been the p r a c t i c e to have the p r i n c i p a l leader at any l e v e l con-currently hold the leading Party and administrative p o s i t i o n s . 3 The Chinese consider t h e i r system democratic i n the sense that c i t i z e n s are encouraged to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s under the leadership of the Party. Popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the decision-making process occurs within the framework of what i s c a l l e d i n China the "mass l i n e " . This was described by Mao Zedong i n the following terms: 29 In a l l the p r a c t i c a l work of our Party, a l l correct leadership i s necessarily 'from the masses, to the masses'. This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systema-t i c ideas), then go back to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas, u n t i l the masses embrace them as t h e i r own, hold f a s t to them and t r a n s l a t e them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas i n such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses, so that the ideas are persevered i n and c a r r i e d through. And so on over and over again i n an endless s p i r a l , with the ideas becoming more correct, more v i t a l and r i c h e r each time. Such i s the Marxist theory of knowledge.^ When, on the basis of information flowing up to the appropriate l e v e l , decisions are made, the r o l e of Party members i s to explain these decisions to people and to persuade them to carry them out. These processes often occur as part of "mass movements" which have ranged i n scope from the land reform of the early f i f t i e s which destroyed the economic basis of the old society i n the countryside to the weekly p a t r i o t i c health campaign i n which we and our neighbors at the languages i n s t i t u t e were organized to spend an hour or so every Wednesday morning sweeping the streets or s e t t i n g o f f DDT smoke bombs to k i l l mosquitoes. When the aims of these movements corres-pond with the needs and i n t e r e s t s of a large s e c t i o n of the people, they can be powerful v e h i c l e s f or s o c i a l change. But when they do not, as we i n c r e a s i n g l y found the case to be i n our experience i n the mid-seventies, p a r t i c i p a t i o n becomes the empty r e p e t i t i o n of slogans i n response to pressure from above. Although p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s widespread, decision-making on issues of general natio n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s highly c e n t r a l i z e d . Within the Communist Party i t s e l f , members have the r i g h t to f r e e l y discuss issues and hold 30 views d i f f e r e n t from those of the leadership, but f i n a l decisions rest with the Central Committee and "... the lower l e v e l i s subordinate to the higher l e v e l , and the e n t i r e Party i s subordinate to the Central Commit-tee". 5 When the Central Committee i s not i n session a smaller body, the Politburo, makes decisions i n i t s name. A yet smaller group, the Stand-ing Committee, c a r r i e s out day to day decision-making. 6 Since the d e l i -berations of these bodies are secret, China scholars and the Chinese population can only speculate on the i n t e r n a l dynamics of these groups and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n d i v i d u a l s i n these groups to broader p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l groupings. 7 Fortunately, i n the movement to c r i t i c i z e the "gang of four" that followed t h e i r a r r e s t s , materials were made public which indicated the i d e n t i t y of the major protagonists i n the struggles at the center of p o l i t i c a l power i n China during the mid-seventies. As t h e i r names w i l l recur i n the exposition of the p o l i c y debates that follows, background information on each of these i n d i v i d u a l s can help to c l a r i f y the s i g n i -ficance of t h e i r involvement. Mao Zedong Mao Zedong was born on December 26, 1893 i n the v i l l a g e of Shaoshan i n Hunan province. His p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s began i n the May Fourth movement of 1919. He was one of the founding members of the CCP i n July 1921. He continued to play leading r o l e s i n the Party and became i t s p r i n c i p a l leader i n 1935 at a meeting of the P o l i t i c a l Bureau of the Party i n the v i l l a g e of Zunyi (Tsunyi) at the beginning of the Long March af t e r the Party and i t s armies had been forced to abandon i t s bases i n 31 c e n t r a l China. I t was under h i s leadership that the Party consolidated i t s power i n the northwest, p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the united front to r e s i s t the Japanese invasion, and fought i t s way to national power i n 1949. Because the s o c i a l programs c a r r i e d out under his leadership as part of these struggles met the pressing needs of the vast majority of the Chinese people, he achieved tremendous personal p r e s t i g e . 8 As head of state and chairman of the Party, Mao used h i s personal prestige to push forward the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of industry and the c o l l e c -t i v i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e . This culminated i n the formation of the people's communes during the Great Leap Forward movement of the l a t e f i f t i e s . Excesses i n the implementation of these programs led to opposition within the Party centering around Peng Dehuai, the then minister of national defense. This opposition was defeated at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee i n August 1959 but i t was c l e a r that many i n the Party considered many of the c r i t i c i s m s j u s t i f i e d . 9 It was during t h i s period that Mao decided to give up h i s p o s i t i o n as head of state and withdraw from day to day decision-making. The Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee deemed t h i s a p o s i t i v e d e c i s i o n s t a t i n g , "Comrade Mao Zedong w i l l be enabled a l l the better to concentrate h i s energies on dealing with questions of the d i r e c t i o n , p o l i c y and l i n e of the Party and the state; he may also be enabled to set aside more time for Marxist-Leninist t h e o r e t i c a l works ..." 1 0 During t h i s period Mao's attention was centered on what he saw as the growing danger of revisionism i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement. He supervised the p u b l i c a t i o n of a s e r i e s of l e t t e r s and a r t i c l e s that opened 32 up the Sino-Soviet debate. One of the l e t t e r s explained that: Classes and class struggle continue to e x i s t i n t h i s society, and the struggle s t i l l goes on between the road of socialism and the road of capitalism. The s o c i a l i s t road on the economic front ( i n the ownership of the means of production) i s i n s u f f i c i e n t by i t s e l f and cannot be consolidated. There must be a thorough s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n on the p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l fronts. Here a very long period of time i s needed to decide "who w i l l win" i n the struggle between socialism and capitalism ... Anyone who f a i l s to see t h i s or to appreciate i t f u l l y w i l l make tremendous mistakes. 1 1 This danger of r e s t o r a t i o n of capitalism was c e n t r a l to Mao's think-ing for the rest of his l i f e . Concluding that the p o l i c i e s of the early s i x t i e s which were att r i b u t e d to L i u Shaoqi, the new head of state, were leading i n the d i r e c t i o n of capitalism, Mao launched the S o c i a l i s t Educa-t i o n Movement i n 1963 and then the Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l Revolution i n 1966. 1 2 It was during the C u l t u r a l Revolution that e f f o r t s to enhance Mao's prestige took on the proportions of a personality c u l t . The person most responsible for the development of the c u l t , L i n Biao (Lin Piao), was declared to be "Comrade Mao Zedong's close comrade-in-arms and successor" at the Ninth Party Congress i n 1969. 1 3 When an attempt at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee i n August-September 1970 on the part of Mao's "close comrade-in-arms" to accrue even more power to himself f a i l e d , a c r i s i s occurred which led to an abortive attempt on Mao's l i f e and L i n Biao's death i n September 1971 when his plane crashed en route to the Soviet Union. 1 L f Following t h i s c r i s i s the attempt to r e b u i l d the Communist Party, which had been shattered i n the C u l t u r a l Revolution, began i n earnest. By the Tenth Party Congress i n 1973, Mao was almost 80 years old. In the 33 beginning of 1974 Mao's health began d e t e r i o r a t i n g . 1 5 Although no o f f i c i a l announcement as to the nature of his i l l n e s s was ever released, we were informed by friends i n China that he was s u f f e r i n g from a form of Parkinson's disease i n which periods of l u c i d i t y alternate with periods i n which the patient i s not aware of h i s surroundings. Although he continued to be p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e , h i s public appearances became less frequent. He did not attend the Fourth National People's Congress i n January 1975. It has been reported that by July 1976 Mao was gravely i l l . 1 6 His death on September 9, 1976 triggered the c r i s i s that led to the arrests of the "gang of four". Zhou E n l a i Zhou E n l a i was another senior statesman of the Chinese revolution. Born i n 1898, h i s p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s began when he was a high school student i n T i a n j i n (Tientsin) i n 1914. During the May Fourth movement he and his future wife, Deng Yingzhao, were among the organizers of the Awakening Society, an important student group of the p e r i o d . 1 7 While a student i n Paris i n the early twenties, Zhou helped organize a Party group among the Chinese students and workers l i v i n g i n Europe. 1 8 In the struggles that led up to the l i b e r a t i o n of China i n 1949, Zhou played a number of key r o l e s . He helped organize the workers' up-r i s i n g i n Shanghai at the end of the Northern Expedition of 1927. When Jiang J i e s h i (Chiang Kai-shek) betrayed the united front of the Nation-a l i s t s and the Communists and suppressed the workers' movement, Zhou moved on to Nanchang where he helped organize the m i l i t a r y u p r i s i n g that 34 i s celebrated today as the b i r t h of the Chinese People's L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA). 1 9 His support of Mao at the Zunyi meeting was c r u c i a l to est a b l i s h i n g of Mao's leadership i n the Party. In the p r e - l i b e r a t i o n period Zhou emerged as the chief negotiator for the Party. During the Xian (Sian) incident of 1936 Zhou negotiated the release of Chiang Kai-shek on the promise that the N a t i o n a l i s t s would enter into a united front with the Communists to r e s i s t the Japa-n e s e . 2 0 During t h i s second united front period Zhou was the Party's representative i n negotiations with the N a t i o n a l i s t s and i t s main contact with the outside w o r l d . 2 1 After l i b e r a t i o n Zhou would continue i n th i s r o l e i n for e i g n a f f a i r s (as Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s u n t i l 1958) and i n party to party r e l a t i o n s within the i n t e r n a t i o n a l communist movement. 2 2 Int e r n a t i o n a l l y , he became the most well known of the leaders of the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n . As Premier of the State Council a f t e r l i b e r a t i o n , Zhou Enlai's primary r o l e was to organize the concrete implementation of Party p o l i -c i e s . As r e a l i t y often imposes compromises on p o l i c y i n the process of implementation, Zhou i s often viewed as a "moderate" i n r e l a t i o n to Mao's r o l e as a " r a d i c a l " i n i t i a t o r of p o l i c i e s . This can be misleading. There was a story that c i r c u l a t e d among the people we knew i n China that Mao often referred to Zhou as "my housekeeper" implying that at times i t was necessary for Zhou to clean up the messes he had made. Although per-haps apocryphal, I suspect the story i s a truer i n d i c a t i o n of the dynamics of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two men. 35 During the C u l t u r a l Revolution Zhou played a key r o l e i n attempt-ing to resolve f a c t i o n a l disputes and h a l t the s u f f e r i n g and destruction that were t h e i r outcome. He also attempted to protect i n d i v i d u a l s who were being wrongfully accused and persecuted. 2 3 It was these a c t i v i t i e s that were stressed again and again by people giving t h e i r personal evaluations of h i s l i f e during memorial meetings, p o l i t i c a l study sessions and personal discussions we experienced i n Guangzhou following hi s death. Zhou was found to have cancer i n 1972. He was p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e u n t i l the l a s t days of h i s l i f e , a l t h o u g h a p a r t i c u l a r l y short report on the work of the government had to be prepared for the Fourth National People's Congress to allow him to d e l i v e r i t without a break. 2 1 + He died on January 8, 1976 at the age of 78. Deng Xiaoping At the center of the storms of struggle i n the mid-seventies stood the diminutive f i g u r e of Deng Xiaoping. He, among the f i r s t generation of Chinese communist leaders, has the d i s t i n c t i o n of having been removed from h i s posts and returned to power three times i n his p o l i t i c a l career Deng was born into a landlord's family i n Szechuan i n 1904. In 1921 he t r a v e l l e d to France on a work-study program. He became involved i n the student movement and joined the French branch of the Chinese Communist Youth League organized by Zhou E n l a i . In 1925 he joined the Communist Party and a f t e r studying i n Sun Yat-sen U n i v e r s i t y i n Moscow for a year, he returned to China and did party work i n Shanxi and Shanghai. 2 5 In 1929 Deng was sent to Guangxi province to organize an u p r i s i n g among the l o c a l troops. In December the u p r i s i n g succeeded and led to the 36 establishment of a Soviet area i n Guangxi. Deng became the p o l i t i c a l commissar of the Red Flag Army (l a t e r the Seventh Red Army) formed during the u p r i s i n g . The Soviet area was crushed i n 1930 but g u e r r i l l a a c t i -v i t i e s continued i n the area u n t i l l i b e r a t i o n i n 1949. 2 7 After a b r i e f stay i n Shanghai, Deng joined Mao i n the J i a n g x i (Kiangsi) Soviet where he held various government posts u n t i l being purged for support of Mao's p o l i c i e s i n 1933. From the Long March i n 1934 t i l l l i b e r a t i o n i n 1949, Deng's main work was providing p o l i t i c a l leadership i n the Eighth Route Army during the anti-Japanese war and i n the f i e l d armies which fought the c i v i l war against the N a t i o n a l i s t s . At the end of the c i v i l war Deng was assigned the leading Party, government and m i l i t a r y posts i n the southwest region. In the early 1950's he was awarded a number of posts i n the c e n t r a l government as well and i n 1954 became the Secretary-General of the Central Committee (i n charge of the administrative o f f i c e s of the Committee), the V i c e -Chairman of the National Defense Council and Vice-Premier of the State Council. In 1956 he also became a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Party. When Zhou E n l a i was out of the country i t was Deng who served as acting Premier. In 1962 he supported L i u Shaoqi's p o l i c i e s of retrenchment i n the economy following the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of the Soviet experts. It was then, i n r e l a t i o n to a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y , that he uttered the words that were to haunt him l a t e r i n h i s p o l i t i c a l career: "As long as i t catches mice, i t doesn't matter whether the cat i s black or white". It was also during t h i s period that Mao became c r i t i c a l of Deng. During the C u l t u r a l Revolution 37 Mao i s reported to have stated i n a meeting of the Politburo: "Deng Xiaoping has never come to me since 1959. In 1962 a l l the four v i c e -premiers came to see me i n Nanjing, but Deng Xiaoping refused to come with them ... During the past s i x years he has never reported h i s work to me ... Deng Xiaoping i s a l i e n a t i n g me".28 In the C u l t u r a l Revolution Deng became second only to L i u Shaoqi as a target of the campaign to overthrow the " c a p i t a l i s t roaders" i n the Party. September 1966 was h i s l a s t public appearance u n t i l 1973. On Mao's recommendation that Deng's case be viewed d i f f e r e n t l y from L i u Shaoqi's, Deng was not expelled from the Party. He spent the next years i n a "May Seventh" cadre school and as a cadre i n a factory. In A p r i l 1973 he emerged as a Vice-Premier of the State Council. Zhou Enlai's health s e r i o u s l y deteriorated toward the end of 1974 and Deng began taking over more and more of h i s workload. In January of 1975 Deng became a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and F i r s t Vice-Premier of the State Council and Chief of Staff of the Army. This was the year of Deng X i a o p i n g . 2 9 Toward the end of 1975 barely v e i l e d c r i t i c i s m s of Deng began to surface. In January 1976 he gave the memorial speech at Zhou Enlai's funeral. It was h i s l a s t public appearance u n t i l h i s re-emergence again i n 1977. In A p r i l 1976 Deng was held responsible (though not d i r e c t l y ) for the "counter-revolutionary p o l i t i c a l incident at Tian An Men square" and was dismissed from a l l h i s posts "both inside and outside the Party". 38 Hua Guofeng On the same day, another r e s o l u t i o n was published appointing Hua Guofeng F i r s t Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and Premier of the State C o u n c i l . 3 1 Hua i s from the generation of Chinese leaders who joined the r e v o l u t i o n during the anti-Japanese war. Although l i t t l e information about hi s early l i f e i s a v a i l a b l e , i t has been reported that he was born i n Chiaocheng country, Shanxi province i n 1921. 3 2 He began revolutionary work i n h i s home county probably i n 1937. He became chairman of the county's Anti-Japanese Agression and National Salvation Federation, d i r e c t o r of the propaganda department of the county Party committee and l a t e r secretary of the county Party committee. As p o l i -t i c a l commissar of the county m i l i t i a he was involved i n g u e r r i l l a war-fare i n the a r e a . 3 3 In 1949 he was sent south as part of the process of having Party and government work teams accompany the PLA during the c i v i l war. He and h i s group arri v e d i n Xiangyin county, Hunan province i n August 1949. He was to serve for twenty years i n the province of Hunan before moving on to posts i n the c e n t r a l government. He organized the land reform i n Xiangyin county while working as f i r s t secretary of the county Party committee. During the movement to organize mutual aid groups and a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperatives, he was secretary of the Xiangtan p r e f e c t u r a l Party committee. In 1955, of the 12,000 a g r i c u l t u r a l co-ops organized i n Hunan, f o r t y percent were i n Xiangtan prefecture. Materials c o l l e c t e d by Hua while leading finance and supply work during the Great Leap Forward may have been used by Mao i n countering the c r i t i c i s m s of the Great Leap and the speed of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n raised by Peng Dehuai 39 at the Lushan meeting i n 1959. On Mao's recommendation, Hua was appointed secretary to the Hunan p r o v i n c i a l Party committee. During the "three hard years" of d i s l o c a t i o n s due to natural d i s a s t e r s , the p u l l -out of Soviet experts and the mismanagement of the Great Leap Forward, Hua was involved i n work teams of cadres sent down to lower l e v e l s to solve serious l o c a l problems. During an inspection tour Mao made at the time i n Hunan, Hua twice reported to Mao on h i s work i n Maotian d i s t r i c t . During the C u l t u r a l Revolution, although he was marched through the streets of Changsha i n a dunce cap, Hua Guofeng was not "overthrown" i n the f a c t i o n a l f i g h t i n g i n Hunan. On Zhou Enlai's recommendation, he p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the work of s e t t i n g up a revolutionary committee to head the p r o v i n c i a l government i n 1967. He became a vice-chairman of that body i n 1968. When a new p r o v i n c i a l Party committee was set up i n 1970, Hua became f i r s t s e c r e t a r y . 3 4 Hua was transferred to B e i j i n g i n 1971 to work under Zhou E n l a i i n the State Council. He returned to Hunan i n 1972 to work on problems related to the L i n Biao a f f a i r . At the Tenth Party Congress i n 1973 he became a member of the P o l i t i c a l Bureau. At the Fourth National People's Congress i n January 1975 he was made a vice-premier and put i n charge of public security work. In 1976 he was named acting premier when Zhou E n l a i died, became premier following the Tian An Men incident and c h a i r -man of the Party i n October. 3 5 Hua's r i s e to c e n t r a l leadership positions a f t e r 1970 was quite rapid and was probably r e l a t e d to h i s prominence i n the r u r a l c o l l e c t i -v i z a t i o n movement and the Great Leap Forward i n the areas where Mao grew 40 up. Mao was aware of h i s work by at least 1959. Hua's work i n Hunan gave him experience i n a g r i c u l t u r e , finance and trade, united front work, m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s and water conservancy. By the time he a r r i v e d i n B e i j i n g , Hua was a quite well-rounded administrator and a leader of proven a b i l i t y . Mao, Zhou and Deng were among the elders of the Chinese rev o l u t i o n who, by the mid-seventies, had held key positions of power for a genera-t i o n . Although Hua Guofeng's r i s e to power was more rapid than most, i t was a step by step process through which he acquired considerable experi-ence and p o l i t i c a l contacts. By contrast, the group of leaders that came to be known as the "Shanghai f a c t i o n " and l a t e r as the "gang of four" owed t h e i r positions to the sudden realignments that occurred during the C u l t u r a l Revolution. From p o l i t i c a l obscurity or lower l e v e l posts they emerged onto the center stage during the l a t e 1960's. This phenomenon was described by Deng and others i n China as a "helicopter r i d e " . In any event, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l positions depended on a continuing a f f i r m a t i o n of the p o l i c i e s and practices of the C u l t u r a l Revolution as they interpreted them. Jiang Qing Jiang Qing, as Mao's wife, was perhaps the most i n f l u e n t i a l of the leaders who emerged during the C u l t u r a l Revolution. She was born i n 1914 i n Shandong province. In 1931 she entered u n i v e r s i t y i n Qingdao (Tsingtao) while working part-time as an actress. During t h i s period she joined the League of Left-Wing Writers. According to her own account she joined the Party i n Qingdao i n 1933. 3 6 In the summer of 1933 she moved to Shanghai 41 where she worked with the Shanghai Work Study Troupe and taught i n a workers' night school. During t h i s time she was unable to make contact with the under-ground Party organization i n Shanghai. Af t e r being imprisoned by the N a t i o n a l i s t s for a short period, she continued her acting career including roles i n left-wing f i l m s . It was the r e l a t i o n -ships she developed i n these years that were the basis for l a t e r charges that her forays into c u l t u r a l spheres during the C u l t u r a l Revolution were motivated by personal revenge and an attempt to cover up her a c t i -v i t i e s i n Shanghai during the 1930's. 3 7 In 1937 Jiang Qing l e f t Shanghai f o r the communist base area at Yan'an (Yenan). She continued working as an actress and taught i n the Lu Xun Academy. She began l i v i n g with Mao Zedong i n 1938. Mao had divorced a previous wife and he and Jiang decided to marry. According to one version of events, the P o l i t i c a l Bureau was opposed to the marriage and only consented with the proviso that Jiang Qing could not assume any p o s i t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l power. 3 8 Another p l a u s i b l e explana-t i o n may simply be that chronic i l l n e s s kept her i n a c t i v e u n t i l the early 1960's. At any rate Jiang spent the period of time from her marriage to Mao t i l l 1949 working mainly as h i s p r i v a t e secretary. During the 1950's she alternated periods of recuperation from medical treatment i n the Soviet Union with work i n the cinema department of the Party's propaganda department and i n the General O f f i c e of the Party's Central Committee. In her autobiographical account to Roxanne Witke, she claims that during t h i s period she collaborated with Mao i n a s e r i e s of attempts to r i d the c u l t u r a l sphere of bourgeois i n f l u e n c e . 3 9 42 Her f i r s t public appearance was a speech at a B e i j i n g opera f e s t i v a l i n 1964. In 1965 she was involved i n the preparation work for Yao Wenyuan's c r i t i q u e of the play "Hal Rui Dismissed from Office", which became the opening shot of the C u l t u r a l Revolution.^ 0 In 1966 L i n Biao (Lin Piao) appointed her to the p o s i t i o n of c u l t u r a l advisor to the People's L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA). She also became one of the leaders of the C u l t u r a l Revolution,serving as deputy head of the C u l t u r a l Revolution Group of the Central Committee and secretary to the Standing Committee of the P o l i t i c a l Bureau. Through these positions she was able to exercise extensive control over the c u l t u r a l l i f e of China. 1 + 1 She was to remain one of the most p o l i t i c a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l people i n China for the next ten years. At the time of her arrest i n 1976 she held the post of member of the P o l i t b u r o . 1 + 2 Zhang Chunqiao Less i s known about the man considered to be the chief t h e o r e t i c i a n of the "gang of four". Zhang Chunqiao was born i n Shandong province i n 1917. 1 + 3 It i s known that he was involved i n l i t e r a r y work i n the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei base area i n the 1940's.1*1* He entered Shanghai with the PLA i n 1949 and became deputy d i r e c t o r of the Information and Pu b l i c a t i o n Bureau of the East China M i l i t a r y and Administrative Council and the deputy d i r e c t o r of the East China o f f i c e of the New China News Agency (Xinhua). In 1954 he became publisher of L i b e r a t i o n D a i l y (Jiefang  Ribao), the main newspaper i n Shanghai. He l a t e r became deputy secretary of the municipal Party committee and deputy minister of propaganda for 43 that committee. 1 + 5 In the period j u s t before the C u l t u r a l Revolution he worked c l o s e l y with Jiang Qing and provided the access to the media that Mao lacked i n B e i j i n g . When the C u l t u r a l Revolution Group was reorgan-ized i n May 1966, Zhang became one of the leading members. He played a centr a l r o l e i n f a c t i o n a l struggles i n Shanghai and became head of the Shanghai Commune (l a t e r the Shanghai municipal revolutionary committee) when "the L e f t seized power" i n February 1967. That year he also became the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l commissar of the Nanjing M i l i t a r y Region and the Shanghai Garrison Command. At the Ninth Party Congress he was elected to the Politburo i n B e i j i n g . At the time of his arrest he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, Vice-Premier of the State Council, d i r e c t o r of the General P o l i t i c a l Department of the PLA and f i r s t secretary of the Shanghai municipal Party committee as we l l as ret a i n i n g h i s post i n the c i t y government.^ 6 Yao Wenyuan Yao Wenyuan, a young l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i n Shanghai, earned hi s " h e l i -copter r i d e " to the centers of power i n B e i j i n g by preparing and wr i t i n g the a r t i c l e which sparked the Cu l t u r a l Revolution. Born i n Zhejiang province i n 1931, he was the son of Yao Pengzi, a left-wing writer of the 1930's, who broke with the CCP i n 1934. In the 1950's he was active i n youth organizations becoming a member of the national committee of the All- C h i n a Youth Federation i n 1958. He was also a writer, working as a reporter for Wenyi Bao, a c u l t u r a l magazine i n Shanghai. In 1956 he 44 became editor of L i t e r a t u r e Monthly. In the early s i x t i e s he became a council member of the Shanghai Writers' Association and e d i t o r - i n - c h i e f of L i b e r a t i o n D a i l y . ^ 7 In 1965 Mao decided to open the struggle against those he saw as res t o r i n g capitalism i n C h i n a , f i r s t on the c u l t u r a l front. In 1959 Peng Dehuai had been dismissed from h i s posts i n the Party and the PLA for " r i g h t opportunism" i n his opposition to the Great Leap Forward. In 1961 Wu Han, deputy mayor of B e i j i n g , wrote and produced a play, "Hai Rui Dismissed from O f f i c e " , about an h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l who loses h i s post for protecting the ordinary people from the p o l i c i e s of the emperor. Yao Wenyuan's r o l e i n 1965 was to write an a r t i c l e exposing the a l l e g o r i c a l intent of the play i n attacking Mao's r o l e i n the d i s -missal of Peng Dehuai. Because of opposition from the B e i j i n g Party committee, Yao's "On the New H i s t o r i c a l Drama Hai Rui Dismissed from O f f i c e " , was f i r s t published not i n B e i j i n g , but i n Shanghai on Novem-ber 10, 1965. 4 8 The ensuing struggle led to the f a l l from power of members of the B e i j i n g Party committee and then wider and wider c i r c l e s of people i n both Party and government. Yao was rewarded with a p o s i -t i o n i n the C u l t u r a l Revolution Group. Yao was also involved i n the struggles around the formation of the Shanghai Commune. By the time of his arrest i n 1976, he was a member of the Politburo of the Party, second secretary of the Shanghai municipal Party committee and v i c e -chairman of the Shanghai municipal revolutionary committee. 45 Wang Hongwen It was through the power and influence of Jiang, Zhang and Yao that the "gang of four" were able to control the media as part of the c u l t u r a l apparatus i n China. The fourth member of the "gang", Wang Hongwen, had made his mark not i n the areas of culture and the press, but i n the f a c t i o n a l struggles that made up such an important part of the C u l t u r a l Revolution. Born i n 1935 i n the c i t y of Changchun i n J i l i n province, Wang joined the PLA sometime during the Korean War. He was demobilized i n 1962 and sent to work as a security o f f i c e r at the Shanghai Number 17 Spinning and Weaving M i l l . 4 9 It has also been reported that he served as secretary of a party branch within the f a c t o r y . 5 0 During the C u l t u r a l Revolution t h i s factory was one of the f i r s t places where the workers became organized. In October 1966, when the main a c t i v i t y was s t i l l that of the student Red Guards, Wang's organization, the "Forever Loyal to Chairman Mao Thought Fighting Group", sent him as part of a secret delegation to the C u l t u r a l Revolution Group i n B e i j i n g . There they met with "leading comrades" 5 1 and returned to the factory having been given a "sixteen character presentation": "Stick to p r i n c i p l e s , dare to struggle, pay attention to strategy, unite the majority". Armed with these i n s t r u c t i o n s , Wang and h i s followers organ-ized a Rebel Workers Group i n his factory which sent people out to organize groups i n other f a c t o r i e s . Wang became the head of the c i t y -wide Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters. Zhang Chunqiao, i n h i s capacity of representative of the C u l t u r a l Revolution Group, gave his blessings to the new organization. During the "January Storm" of 46 1967, this group led the forces that overthrew the municipal Party and government i n Shanghai. 5 2 The events i n Shanghai served as a model for power takeovers i n other c i t i e s . When the Shanghai municipal revolutionary committee was organized i n March 1967, Wang became a deputy d i r e c t o r . In 1969 he became a member of the c e n t r a l committee and i n 1971 secretary of the Shanghai municipal Party committee. By the time of h i s arrest he was a member of the standing committee of the Politburo and vice-chairman of the CC as well as r e t a i n i n g his posts i n Shanghai. 5 3 A "Gang of Five"? During the mid-seventies Zhou E n l a i and Deng Xiaoping c l e a r l y r e -presented d i f f e r e n t p o l i c y options than those of the group now c a l l e d the "gang of four". As Hua Guofeng was promoted to positions of greater power, he became subject to the same kinds of attack through the media co n t r o l l e d by Zhang and Yao as had Zhou and Deng. Hua was also one of those who authorized t h e i r a r r e s t s . These r e l a t i o n s h i p s c l e a r l y were or became antagonistic. But what of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the "gang of four" and Mao Zedong? As can be seen from t h e i r backgrounds, Mao's wife and the three leaders from Shanghai cooperated very c l o s e l y with Mao i n the i n i t i a l stages of the C u l t u r a l Revolution. They were c e n t r a l figures i n t h i s movement which was declared to be "under the personal d i r e c t i o n of 47 Chairman Mao". It would therefore be l o g i c a l to conclude that the "gang of four" was a c t u a l l y a "gang of f i v e " with Mao Zedong as a f i f t h member.54 This also appears to be the basis of Jiang Qing's defence at her t r i a l . 5 5 However, i n cen t r a l Party documents and press reports that were published a f t e r the arrests of the four, the Chinese maintain that Mao Zedong had, i n f a c t , opposed them while he s t i l l l i v e d . 5 5 This conten-t i o n i s based upon a series of statements made by Mao between early 1974 and May 1975. These include references to Jiang Qing, c r i t i c i s m s of factionalism and statements about Marxist philosophy. It has been reported that Mao and Jiang Qing personally separated sometime i n 1973. 5 7 In March 1974 he i s reported to have t o l d her: "It's better i f we don't see each other. You haven't done many of the things I talked to you about over the years. What's the use of seeing each other more often? The works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and S t a l i n are there, my works are there, but you simply refuse to s t u d y " . 5 8 During the maneuverings that occurred as part of the process of nominating a new set of state leaders before the Fourth National People's Congress, Mao i s reported to have exclaimed: "Jiang Qing has wild ambitions. She wants Wang Hongwen to be Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and h e r s e l f to be Chairman of the Party Central Committee". 5 9 In 1975 he i s reported to have remarked: "After I die, she w i l l make t r o u b l e " . 6 0 Mao also seems to have been distressed by t h e i r f a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s , at l e a st at the center. In July of 1974 he i s reported to have said: "You'd better be c a r e f u l ; don't l e t yourselves become a small f a c t i o n of four". Almost a year l a t e r he was s t i l l c r i t i c i z i n g them for factionalism. 48 It i s t h i s quote that i s the source of the l a b e l "gang of four": "Don't function as a gang of four. Don't do i t any more. Why do you keep doing i t ? Why don't you unite with the more than two hundred members of the Party Central Committee? It i s no good to keep a small c i r c l e of a few. It has always been no good doing s o " . 6 1 The closest thing to a c r i t i c i s m of the general p o s i t i o n held by the "gang of four" occurred when Mao reacted to a campaign being conducted against "empiricism". The campaign was being used to attack veteran cadres with long experience. Mao pointed out: " I t seems the formulation should be: Oppose revisionism which includes empiricism and dogmatism. Both r e v i s e Marxism-Leninism. Don't mention j u s t one while omitting the other". "In my opinion, those who are c r i t i c i z i n g empiricism are them-selves e m p i r i c i s t s . " 6 2 On May 3, 1975 Mao i s reported to have suggested that some act i o n be taken against h i s wife and her supporters: "If t h i s i s not s e t t l e d i n the f i r s t half of t h i s year, i t should be s e t t l e d i n the second h a l f ; i f not t h i s year, then next year; i f not next year, then the year a f t e r " . 6 3 We must assume that a l l a v a i l a b l e evidence of Mao's opposition to the "gang of four" would have been marshalled as part of the campaign against them a f t e r t h e i r a r r e s t s . But what do the quotes indicate? He was personally estranged from h i s wife and considered her ambitious. He was aware of and condemned t h e i r f a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s within the CC and he had a basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e with them over the nature of the danger of revisionism. His remarks concerning " s e t t l i n g " the a f f a i r of the "gang of four" can as e a s i l y be taken as a plea for p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n 49 as one for prompt action. He appears to have opposed the f a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s he was aware of without i n d i c a t i n g any thoroughgoing opposi-t i o n to the p o l i c y positions they were taking i n the debates of the mid-seventies . However, his p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the decisions placing Hua Guofeng i n the key positions of power af t e r the death of Zhou E n l a i and the purge of Deng Xiaoping indicated he did not t r u s t the four s u f f i c i e n t l y to acquiesce to t h e i r obtaining overwhelming power. 6 4 In h i s analysis of the "gang of four", Lowell Dittmer uses the con-cept of the " f a v o r i t e " developed by h i s t o r i a n s of European court p o l i t i c s . He notes: The f a v o r i t e may become i n f l u e n t i a l i n any organi-zation with a strong monocratic executive who chooses to i s o l a t e himself from his o f f i c i a l advisors and to r e l y on personal advisors whose l o y a l t y to him i s un-questioning. The executive may so choose for any number of reasons: a f a l l i n g out with o f f i c i a l s t a f f , a s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to f l a t t e r y , are two of the more obvious. It i s i n the i n t e r e s t of the f a v o r i t e to f a c i l i t a t e his patron's i s o l a t i o n i n order to make h i s own r o l e as go-between i n d i s p e n s a b l e . 6 5 Although there are p a r a l l e l s between t h i s concept and the r e l a t i o n -ships that seem to have developed between Mao and the "gang of four", I believe i t would be misleading to carry the analogy too f a r . By r a i s i n g the question of the danger of r e s t o r a t i o n of capitalism i n China i n the mid-sixties, Mao did place himself i n opposition to many of h i s senior colleagues who did not see this as the c e n t r a l question at that time. By broadening the scope of the debate through the m o b i l i z a t i o n of people out-side the Party and i t s leadership, Mao attempted not only to democratize the discussion but also to overcome h i s own i s o l a t i o n . Because the Party 50 propaganda apparatus was c o n t r o l l e d by people with whom he disagreed, Mao r e l i e d on his wife and her a l l i e s i n Shanghai to make the debate public. The C u l t u r a l Revolution Group was to serve as the organiza-t i o n a l center for making contact with the mass organizations that joined the debate. What Mao had i n mind was an "open door" r e c t i f i c a t i o n of the Party s i m i l a r to that which occurred i n Yan'an i n the early f o r t i e s . Mass organizations would be i n v i t e d to c r i t i c i z e Party p o l i c y and p a r t i -cipate i n a process whereby a very small minority of leading cadres who persisted i n "following the c a p i t a l i s t road" would be removed from power. This was the s p i r i t of the famous "Sixteen Points" which were issued by the CC on August 8, 1966. 6 6 But what i n fa c t occurred was a breakdown of the s i t u a t i o n into f a c t i o n a l i s m during which the Party organization v i r t u a l l y everywhere except i n the PLA disintegrated. Within the center of power in d i v i d u a l s and groups used the s i t u a t i o n to t h e i r own advantage. When the f i r s t attempt to develop a new i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure based upon the Shanghai example ran into trouble, the PLA had to be c a l l e d i n to restore order. Because they played a key r o l e i n bringing the contending factions together, representatives of the PLA played a much more s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the new revolutionary committees than they had i n c i v i l i a n government i n the past. The prestige of the PLA was also greatly enhanced. L i n Biao used t h i s s i t u a t i o n to attempt to "put Mao on the s h e l f " and take personal power. After the exit of L i n Biao i t became possible to return to the p o l i c y toward cadres enunciated i n the "Sixteen Points". Mao had long maintained that the overwhelming majority of cadres 51 were b a s i c a l l y good. In the early seventies many of the senior cadres who had f a l l e n during the C u l t u r a l Revolution were " l i b e r a t e d " and went back to work. The return of Deng Xiaoping was the outstanding example of t h i s p o l i c y . This new d i r e c t i o n was, however, very threatening to Mao's wife and her a l l i e s who had worked t h e i r way to the top p r e c i s e l y through the elimination of the people who were being restored to positions of author-i t y . This set the stage for the struggles of the mid-seventies. Un-fortunately, i t was during t h i s period that b i o l o g i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s began to catch up with Mao Zedong. Increasing age and i l l n e s s severely limited his awareness of what was occurring and increased h i s i s o l a t i o n . It was i n the i n t e r e s t s of the "gang of four" to foster h i s and the public's suspicion of senior cadres. Mao saw through some of these attempts. This probably was one of the factors that led to his personal break with Jiang Qing i n 1973. Nevertheless, they attempted to maintain p r i v i l e g e d access to him through Wang Hongwen and through Mao's nephew, Mao Yuanxin. 6 They were attempting to f a c i l i t a t e Mao's i s o l a t i o n . It i s now charged that they used these channels to provide Mao with d i s t o r t e d information and to i n t e r p r e t h i s opinions on current p o l i t i c a l problems. A l l t h i s , however, does not add up to a conclusion that Mao supported the "gang of four". What seems to me to emerge i s a t r a g i c s i t u a t i o n i n which an increasingly i l l and i s o l a t e d aging Mao was being manipulated by a group that depended on the appearance of h i s support to maintain and expand t h e i r power. Jiang Qing and her group claimed the support of Mao for t h e i r p o l i c i e s and actions. It would be i d l e to speculate what would 52 have happened had Mao's s i t u a t i o n been d i f f e r e n t . But i t seems to me that he was not i n a p o s i t i o n to make a meaningful contribution to the debates of t h i s period. In t h i s sense the "gang of four's" claim to Mao's support had very l i t t l e substance. The r e a l question that needs i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s not whether Mao supported or opposed the "gang of four". The r e a l question i s how was i t that i n a society which c a l l s i t s e l f " s o c i a l i s t " , the support or non-support of a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l for a set of p o l i c i e s could carry such overwhelming weight. How had a t r a d i t i o n of concentrating power into the hands of a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l developed? It was t h i s concentration of power that developed into such a dangerous s i t u a t i o n at a time when basic questions concerning the d i r e c t i o n of s o c i a l i s t construction were being debated. 6 8 53 Notes: Chapter Two, The Main Protagonists There s t i l l e x i s t i n China eight party organizations known as the " p a t r i o t i c democratic p a r t i e s " which were part of the united front with the Communist Party. They s t i l l play an advisory r o l e i n the Chinese People's P o l i t i c a l Consultative Conference but have no d i r e c t p o l i c y making power. See: China, A General Survey (B e i j i n g : Foreign Languages Press, 1979), pp. 68-80, for a d e s c r i p t i o n of these p a r t i e s and an o f f i c i a l view of t h e i r r o l e . 2 For a d e t a i l e d discussion of the Chinese governmental process and the c e n t r a l r o l e of the CPC see James R. Townsend, P o l i t i c s i n China (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1974), Chs. 3 and 7. This has recently come under c r i t i c i s m . One of the proposed r e -forms of the post "gang of four" era has been the separation of Party and state power. See: Hongqi Special Commentator, "Power Should Not be Concentrated i n the Hands of Individuals", Beij ing Review, No. 44, No. 3, 1980, pp. 15-17. 4 Mao Zedong, Selected Works, I I I , "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership", ( B e i j i n g : Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 119. 5 "Constitution of the Communist Party of China", The Tenth National  Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Be i j i n g : Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp. 67-8. This c o n s t i t u t i o n was i n e f f e c t during the period under discussion. A new c o n s t i t u t i o n was adopted at the Eleventh National Party Congress i n August 1977. 6 The Tenth Central Committee, 1973-77 had 319 members and alternates, the Politburo 26 members and alternates and the Standing Committee was a group of nine. Ibid., p. 89-93 and 97-98. 7 John Bryan Starr outlines the various approaches to t h i s problem that China scholars have taken and t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s i n h i s a r t i c l e "From the 10th Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua Kuo-feng: the S i g n i -ficance of the Colour of the Cat", China Quarterly, No. 67, Sept. 1976, pp. 479-87. 8 A biography of Mao based upon Chinese sources and interviews with p a r t i c i p a n t s can be found i n Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge (Toronto: L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1972). See also Jerome Chen, Mao and the Chinese  Revolution (Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965) and Stuart S. Schram, Mao Tse-tung (N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1969). Jacques Guillermaz, The Chinese Communist Party i n Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), pp. 240-246. 54 1 0 Quoted by Guillermaz, i b i d . , p. 248. During the C u l t u r a l Revolu-t i o n Mao was to comment that t h i s decision had been a mistake. 1 1 "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its H i s t o r i c a l Lessons f o r the World", The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement (Be i j i n g : Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 471-72. 1 2 For a d e t a i l e d account of one aspect of t h i s period see Richard Baum, Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party and the Peasant Question, 1962-66 (N.Y.: Columbia Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1966). Baum presents a much more complex p i c t u r e of the differences between Mao Zedong, L i u Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping during the S o c i a l i s t education campaign than was pre-sented i n the descriptions of the "two l i n e struggle" i n the media i n the mid-seventies. 1 3 "Constitution of the Communist Party of China", The Ninth National  Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Be i j i n g : Foreign Languages Press) 1969, p. 113. 1 1 + See Jaap van Ginneken, The Rise and F a l l of L i n Biao (New York: Discus, 1977). 1 5 Chi Hsin, The Case of the Gang of Four (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1977), p. 22. 1 - 6 "Singing the Old Counterrevolutionary Tune Again", L i b e r a t i o n Army  Daily, Jan. 22, 1977. Cited i n China News Analysis (CNA), Hong Kong, No. 1078, May 6, 1977, p. 3. 1 7 T i e n t s i n Museum of History and T i e n t s i n D a i l y correspondent, "Com-rade Chou E n - l a i i n T i e n t s i n During His Youth", We W i l l Always Remember  Premier Chou E n - l a i ( B e i j i n g : Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 58-67. 1 8 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 46-9. 1 9 Party Branch of the Memorial H a l l of the Nanchang "August 1st" Uprising, "Reminiscences of Comrade Chou E n - l a i i n the Nanchang Uprising", We W i l l Always Remember ..., op. c i t . pp. 68-71. 2 0 Memorial H a l l of the Eighth Route Army O f f i c e i n Sian, "Premier Chou's Achievements i n S e t t l i n g the Sian Incident W i l l Go Down i n History Forever", i b i d . , pp. 72-81. 2 1 See: Chien Chih-kuang, " M i l i t a n t Years i n Chungking" and Nanking Museum and Nanking C u l t u r a l R e l i c s Bureau, "Premier Chou at Meiyuan New V i l l a g e " , i b i d . , pp. 82-107. 2 2 Theoretical Study Group of the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , "Premier Chou Creatively Carried Out Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line i n Foreign A f f a i r s " , i b i d . , pp. 36-51. Also i n Peking Review, Vol. 20, No. 5, Jan. 28, 1977. 55 2 3 Correspondents of Hsinhua News Agency and Peking Daily, "In the Storm and Stress of the Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l Revolution", i b i d . , pp. 108-119. Also i n Peking Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, Jan. 21, 1977. 2 1 + Theoretical Group of the General O f f i c e of the State Council, "In Commemoration of the F i r s t Anniversary of Premier Chou En-l a i ' s Death", i b i d . , pp. 1-22. Also i n Peking Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, Jan. 14, 1977. 2 5 Report of remarks by Deng at the Third Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee appeared i n Ming Bao, Hong Kong, Aug. 16, 1977. Translated i n FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), Aug. 17, 1977, p. E l . Deng pointed out he had been dismissed once i n Ji a n g x i Soviet period i n the early t h i r t i e s , once i n the C u l t u r a l Revolution and f i n a l l y during the "gang of four" period. 2 6 Chi Hsin, Teng Hsiao-ping - A P o l i t i c a l Biography (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1978), pp. 3-17. 2 7 Interview with Meng J i a l i n g of the United Front M i n i s t r y , Guangxi province, July 26, 1977. 2 8 "The Sudden Return of Teng Hsiao-ping", Issues and Studies, T a i p e i , Vol. IX, No. 9, June 1973, pp. 82-86. 2 9 Chi Hsin, The Case of the Gang of Four, op. c i t . , pp. 146-49. 3 0 "Resolution of C.P.C. Central Committee on Dismissing Teng Hsiao-ping from a l l Posts Both Inside and Outside the Party", Peking Review, No. 15, A p r i l 19, 1976, p. 3. 3 1 Text of r e s o l u t i o n , i b i d . , p. 3. 3 2 Chang Chen-pang, "Mao Tse-tung and the Gang of Four", Issues and  Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 9, Sept. 1977, p. 30. See also Michel Oksenberg and Sai-Cheng Yuen, "Hua Kuo-feng's Pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan Years, 1949-66: The Making of a P o l i t i c a l Generalist", China Quarterly, No. 69, March 1977, pp. 3-53, for an account of Hua's experience up to 1966. 3 3 Party Committee of Chiaocheng County, "Comrade Hua Kuo-feng i n the Years of War", Peking Review, No. 15, A p r i l 8, 1977, pp. 9-12. 3t* Jen Hua, "Comrade Hua Kuo-feng i n Hunan", Peking Review, No. 9, Feb. 25, 1977, pp. 5-11, covers the period 1949-1970. Michael Oksenberg and Sai-cheung Yeung i n t h e i r : "Hua Kuo-feng's Pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan Years, 1949-66: The Making of a P o l i t i c a l Generalist", China  Quarterly, No. 69, March 1977, pp. 3-53, give a d e t a i l e d account of Hua's p o l i t i c a l and administrative experience based upon a c a r e f u l reading of the p r o v i n c i a l newspaper New Hunan Daily. 56 3 5 "Hua Kuo-feng", Issues and Studies, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1976, pp. 80-88. A s i m i l a r summary can be found i n Oksenberg and Yeung, op. c i t . , pp. 51-53. 3 6 Roxanne Witke, Comrade Chiang Ching (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1977) , p. 63-68. 3 7 "Indictment of the Special Procurate Under the Supreme People's Procurate of the People's Republic of China", published as an English supplement to Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, November 1980, p. 23. 3 8 Raymond Lotta, ed., And Mao Makes Five (Chicago: Banner Press, 1978) , p. 399. While we were i n China there was a widespread b e l i e f that Zhou E n l a i has opposed the marriage and that t h i s was one of the reasons Jiang Qing bore a vengeful hatred for the Premier. We were also t o l d that Kang Sheng, who would become advisor to the C u l t u r a l Revolution Group i n 1966, sponsored Jiang Qing's Party a p p l i c a t i o n and arranged the compromise that allowed her to marry Mao Zedong. 3 9 Witke, op. c i t . , pp. 223-253. 1 + 0 See Ch. 2 of C l i v e Ansley's The Heresy of Wu Han (Toronto: Univer-s i t y of Toronto Press, 1971). 4 1 Ibid., pp. 315-355. 1 + 2 "Indictment op. c i t . , p. 35. 4 3 Ibid., p. 35. Lotta gives h i s b i r t h p l a c e as Anhui province. 1 + 4 "Chang Chun-chiao: An 'Old Cadre' Who Rose to Power During the C u l t u r a l Revolution", Issues and Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 7, A p r i l 1972, p. 75. 4 5 Ibid., p. 75. See also Lotta, op. c i t . , pp. 401-2. 4 6 "Indictment op. c i t . , p. 35. 1 + 7 "Yao Wen-yuan - New Blood i n the Mao Regime", Issues and Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 6, March 1972, pp. 80-82. 4 8 C l i v e Ansley, The Heresy of Wu Han (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 89-95. 4 9 Lotta, op. c i t . , pp. 406-7. Also personal interview with Xu Yueqi, v i c e - d i r e c t o r of Shanghai No. 17 Spinning and Weaving M i l l , July 1976. 5 0 "Wang Hung-wen - A New Department Director of the CCP Central Committee", Issues and Studies, Vol. IX, No. 5, Feb. 1973, p. 88. 57 5 1 Interview with Xu Yueqi, op. c i t . The report i n Issues and Studies indicates that Zhang Chunqiao arranged for Wang Hongwen to meet Mad and L i n Biao. 5 2 "Wang Hung-wen - A New Department Director ...", op. c i t . , p. 89. 5 3 Indictment op. c i t . , p. 36. 5 4 This i s Raymond Lotta's conclusion. The s u b t i t l e of the book he edits i s : "Mao Tsetung's l a s t great b a t t l e " . See Lotta, op. c i t . , pp. 1-52. 5 5 Graham Earnshaw, "Mao's Name Tarnished by Gang T r i a l " , Vancouver  Sun, December 3, 1980, p. A20. 5 6 The series of quotes upon which t h i s argument i s based f i r s t appeared i n a c e n t r a l document: Zhongfa (1976) No. 24 published within the CC on Dec. 10, 1976. The English t r a n s l a t i o n of t h i s document appears i n Vol. XIII, No. 9, 10 and 11 (Sept., Oct., Nov.) of Issues and Studies. The quotes appear i n No. 10, pp. 82-90. The a r t i c l e : "Crushing the 'Gang of Four' Was a Wise Decision by Chairman Mao", Peking Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, Jan. 14, 1977, pp. 27-30, contains a l i s t of the most important quotes. 5 7 Chi Hsin, The Case of the Gang of Four, op. c i t . , p. 19. 5 8 "Crushing the Gang of Four p. 28. 5 9 Ibid., p. 29. 6 0 Ibid. 6 1 Ibid. 6 2 Ibid., p. 28. 6 3 Ibid., p. 29. 6 I + E d i t o r i a l Department of L i b e r a t i o n Army Daily, "Comrade Hua Kuo-feng as Leader of our Party i s Chairman Mao's Wise Decision", Peking Review, No. 47, Nov. 19, 1976, pp. 7-8. 6 5 Lowell Dittmer, "Backgrounds of the Gang of Four", Steve Chin, ed., The Gang of Four (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs, No. 23, 1977), p. 7. 6 6 Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l Revolution, Peking Review, Aug. 12, 1966. 58 6 7 Tadashi Ito (KYODO) Tokyo, Aug. 15, 1977, " P o l i t i c s and People", FBIS, Aug. 19, 1977, p. E l , describes some of the background to Mao Yuanxin's r e l a t i o n s h i p with the "gang of four" and with Mao and h i s r o l e i n B e i j i n g toward the end of Mao's l i f e . 6 8 The lessons of th i s s i t u a t i o n and the events that led up to i t were outlined i n an a r t i c l e that appeared i n Red Flag (Hongqi), No. 17, i n 1980. It was pointed out that inner-Party democracy i s destroyed, factionalism appears and opportunists are rewarded. C o l l e c t i v e leader-ship i s advocated as a countermeasure. See: Hongqi Special Commentator, "Power Should not be Concentrated i n the Hands of Individuals", B e i j i n g  Review, Nov. 3, 1980. 59 Chapter Three: Meetings and Mass Movements Between July 1921 and August 1973 the Communist Party of China held ten national Party congresses. Although according to the various Party co n s t i t u t i o n s , national meetings are to be held every f i v e years, the pattern which has emerged i n p r a c t i c e has been d i f f e r e n t . Meetings appear to have occurred when a consensus had been reached among the upper l e v e l s of leadership over the general p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n s to be taken and the apportionment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s within the c e n t r a l organs of the Party. The Ninth Party Congress held i n A p r i l 1969 sought to end the more ac t i v e stage of the C u l t u r a l Revolution and sum up the lessons of that struggle. But a new struggle within the Central Committee against L i n Biao and Chen Boda began immediately afterward. At the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee held at Lushan i n 1970 L i n Biao's f a c t i o n attempted to gain control over positions of authority i n the Party. When th i s attempt f a i l e d , L i n Biao's group engineered a m i l i t a r y coup d'etat. When the coup attempt was aborted, L i n commandeered a m i l i t a r y plane i n which to f l e e to the Soviet Union. The plane crashed i n the People's Republic of Mongolia, k i l l i n g a l l on board. 1 After Lin's death i n 1971, there was a low-keyed campaign which was f i r s t c a l l e d the movement to " c r i t i c i z e revisionism and r e c t i f y our s t y l e of work" and l a t e r the movement to " c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and r e c t i f y our s t y l e of work". 2 We were t o l d by friends i n China that t h i s movement had a very p o s i t i v e impact at the base. In many units problems of l o c a l 60 f a c t i o n a l i s m were openly discussed and solved and some of the u l t r a - l e f t excesses of the C u l t u r a l Revolution such as the c u l t of Mao were c r i t i -c i zed. It was generally f e l t that the tension that characterized the C u l t u r a l Revolution and the L i n Biao a f f a i r was coming to an end. The Tenth Party Congress By August 1971 p r o v i n c i a l Party committees had been formed through-out China. During the following two years leading to the convening of the Tenth Congress i n August 1973 the much more d i f f i c u l t task of over-coming l o c a l f actionalism and r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g base l e v e l Party units was slowly proceeding. 3 By the time the congress was announced, the Party was able to report that the 1,249 delegates had been chosen through a democratic process working from the base l e v e l units on up and including consultation with the masses outside the Party. In an attempt to insure a u n i f i e d public stance, delegates debated p o l i c y questions before the formal convening of the congress. Although there was speculation that a congress was to be held, the congress was not o f f i c i a l l y announced u n t i l a f t e r i t had ended. The delegates met over an unusually short period ( f i v e days) with only two plenary sessions: an opening session on August 24 and the main session at which two reports were read and a new Central Committee elected on the 28th. 4 There i s no record of any other meetings being held during the congress. The purpose of the congress was to p u b l i c i z e decisions already taken. Zhou E n l a i gave the p o l i t i c a l report on behalf of the CC. In i t he reaffirmed the basic p o l i c i e s that had been proclaimed as part of the c r i t i c i s m of L i u Shaoqi's " r e v i s i o n i s t l i n e " during the C u l t u r a l Revolution. 61 S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the report accused L i n Biao ( i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n with Chen Boda) of preparing a p o l i t i c a l report for the Ninth Congress which i n essence repeated the p o s i t i o n a t t r i b u t e d to Liu Shaoqi that i n the Chinese s o c i a l system the major contradiction was now that "between the advanced s o c i a l i s t system and the backward productive forces of s o c i e t y " . 5 Zhou said that Lin's report had been rejected and he had been forced to read the one that was made public at that time. The Premier also outlined the tasks that faced the Party i n the years ahead. The work of c r i t i c i z i n g L i n Biao and r e c t i f y i n g the Party's s t y l e of work was to go ahead i n order to develop among the population a deeper understanding of the nature of class and l i n e struggle. Party members i n p a r t i c u l a r were c a l l e d upon to study basic Marxist theory. Class struggle i n the superstructure was to continue. The r e v o l u t i o n i n the arts and l i t e r a t u r e , the revolution i n education, the p o l i c i e s of sending educated young people to the r u r a l areas and cadres to May 7th cadre schools for r e -education were a l l to be maintained. 6 The f a l l of L i n Biao did not involve any public expression of changes i n C u l t u r a l Revolution p o l i c i e s . The report on changes made i n the Party c o n s t i t u t i o n was read by Wang Hongwen. This indicated that he was now playing an important r o l e i n the center. During the congress he was elected to the Standing Committee of the P o l i t i c a l Bureau and became a vice-chairman of the CC. There has been speculation that he was appointed a department d i r e c t o r of the CC but there has been no o f f i c i a l confirmation. 7 Although Zhou had quoted Mao to the e f f e c t that i t was necessary to "unite to win s t i l l greater v i c -t o r i e s " , Wang's report added a proviso to t h i s c a l l f o r order. His report included another quote from the Chairman: 62 Great disorder across the land leads to great order. And so once again every seven or eight years. Monsters and demons w i l l jump out themselves. Determined by t h e i r own class nature, they are bound to jump out. 8 This was a warning that the laws of class struggle insured that the f a l l of L i n Biao did not mean that major struggles among the leadership had ended. Both reports contained contradictory messages as to how struggle was to be c a r r i e d out. On the one hand, Mao's "three do's and three don'ts" warned against factionalism: "Practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't s p l i t ; be open and aboveboard, and don't i n t r i g u e and conspire". At the same time i t was pointed out that Mao had stated that: "Going against the t i d e i s a Marxist-Leninist p r i n c i p l e " . This would be l a t e r used as a f a c t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r actions against " c a p i t a l i s t roaders". The Tenth Party Congress elected a new Central Committee. Since a l l of the most important leaders are included among the members and a l t e r -nates of the CC, i t i s a good i n d i c a t o r of the types of people who hold p o l i t i c a l power i n China. A biographical study i n 1974 of the membership of the tenth CC indicated that there had been important changes since the Ninth Congress. 9 The purge of the followers of L i n Biao caused the per-centage of m i l i t a r y cadres to drop by 12.8 percent to 31.3 percent of the t o t a l membership. This also r e f l e c t e d the general withdrawal of the PLA from the c i v i l i a n sphere i n conjunction with the r e b u i l d i n g of the Party. The percentage of veteran cadres showed a s l i g h t increase to 28.5 percent. This was due to the beginning of a p o l i c y of bringing back leaders who had been overthrown during the C u l t u r a l Revolution but who nevertheless 63 were considered to be b a s i c a l l y good. If the cadres whose backgrounds were unknown are included i n the group that came to power during the C u l t u r a l Revolution, then t h e i r proportion increased by a dramatic 12.9 percent to 41.2 percent of the t o t a l . Although a person's back-ground may not i n d i c a t e the p o l i t i c a l positions he or she w i l l take, the figures do give some rough idea of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l forces. With the f a l l of L i n Biao, the p r i n c i p l e that "the Party con-t r o l s the gun" had been reasserted. the PLA was to play a less c e n t r a l r o l e i n decision-making. The main tension was to be between those whose p o l i t i c a l careers were based on t h e i r actions during the C u l t u r a l Revolu-t i o n and the returning veteran cadres who had been overthrown during that period. It has been reported since the f a l l of the "gang of four" that i t was during the Tenth Congress that they gained c o n t r o l of the mass media. 1 0 Although exactly how t h i s c o n t r o l was achieved has not been made public, press reports issued i n 1977 outlined the methods that were used to generate public opinion favorable to the f a c t i o n around Jiang Q i n g . 1 1 In Shanghai and B e i j i n g they had t h e i r own w riting c o l l e c t i v e s , which pro-duced a r t i c l e s under pen names l i k e "Liang Xiao" and "Luo Siding". Their a r t i c l e s were published i n major nation a l newspapers l i k e People's D a i l y and Guangming Dai l y and the Party's t h e o r e t i c a l j o u r n a l , Red Flag. They not only c o n t r o l l e d Party organs but also academic journals such as Study  and C r i t i c i s m published by Fudan University i n Shanghai and B e i j i n g Uni- v e r s i t y Journal. Since the a r t i c l e s i n the l a t t e r were often more e x p l i c i t , 64 they were very popular among those who were tr y i n g to f i g u r e out what was happening at the Party center. When copies of Study and C r i t i c i s m were shipped up from Shanghai, the B e i j i n g bookstores sold out immedi-atel y . In China the press i s used to mobilize people. Major a r t i c l e s from national papers and magazines are often reprinted i n the l o c a l press and serve as models for further a r t i c l e s and radio and t e l e v i s i o n commentaries. P o l i t i c a l movements are given guidance by t h i s mechanism. When, i n the mid-seventies, hundreds of a r t i c l e s were published by the Be i j i n g and Shanghai writing groups, they caused a great deal of confusion and tension; These were c l e a r l y the key a r t i c l e s i n the p o l i t i c a l move-ments. Someone at the center was c l e a r l y approving them. But i n the past, general d i r e c t i o n was given to movements by materials designated as coming from the Central Committee. This precedent was taken as an i n d i -cation that there was no consensus at the center. Who then was leading these movements and to what end? " C r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confucius" The f i r s t movement to develop a f t e r the Tenth Congress was the move-ment to " c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confucius". Confucian philosophy had been c r i t i c i z e d i n the May 4th Movement 1 3 and the topic had been raised again during the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n . 1 4 The connection with L i n Biao was made when the i n v e s t i g a t i o n into h i s case revealed that he had been an avid reader of the Confucian c l a s s i c s . 1 5 Although the question of Confucius had been raised i n previous months, 1 6 an o f f i c i a l movement was not launched u n t i l February 1974. 1 7 65 Because the movement attacked a feudal ideology that had prevailed i n China for thousands of years, i t had p o s i t i v e aspects. People were encouraged to question h i e r a r c h i c a l concepts that had been taken more or less f or granted. While we as students were carrying out s o c i a l investigations at the Red Star commune outside B e i j i n g i n the winter of 1974, the women i n the v i l l a g e where we were l i v i n g with peasant f a m i l i e s were using the movement to expose the feudal roots of male chauvinism and to improve t h e i r economic and s o c i a l p o s i t i o n . 1 8 It was reported i n the Chinese press at the time that analysis of Confucianism and i t s concrete manifestations was going on at t h i s time i n v i l l a g e s , f a c t o r i e s and PLA units throughout C h i n a . 1 9 But the movement also had another aspect. During the e a r l i e r move-ment to " c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and r e c t i f y our s t y l e of work", Lin's u l t r a -l e f t t a c t i c s had come under f i r e . This threatened not only the memory of L i n Biao, but also others who had been a c t i v e during the C u l t u r a l Revolution. At the Tenth Congress i t had been argued that L i n was a r e v i s i o n i s t i n the mould of L i u Shaoqi. In 1974 i t was maintained that those who emphasized Lin's u l t r a - l e f t aspects were mistaken. It was claimed that L i n was fundamentally a r i g h t i s t whose actions had been aimed at the r e s t o r a t i o n of capitalism i n China. His behavior was " l e f t i n form but r i g h t i n essence". 2 0 The theme of r e s t o r a t i o n also became ce n t r a l to the analysis of Confucius i n the press. The period i n which Confucius l i v e d was described as one of t r a n s i t i o n between slave and feudal society. Confucius was castigated as the ideological representative of the slaveholders who were attempting to return to the old o r d e r . 2 1 This theme was to be repeated 66 and elaborated on i n numerous subsequent a r t i c l e s . 2 2 People were admonished to study the l i n e struggle i n Chinese philosophy between the Confucianists and t h e i r opponents, the L e g a l i s t s , i n order to draw lessons for the l i n e struggle of the 1970's. 2 3 The movement seemed to be degenerating into a rather abstruse academic debate, but i n fact there was an immediate p o l i t i c a l purpose behind t h i s s h i f t i n emphasis. Since t h e i r f a l l the "gang of four" have been accused of using h i s t o r i c a l analogy to attack veteran cadres and e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r patron, Zhou E n l a i , whom the "gang" held responsible for the p o l i c y of bringing back into leading positions veteran cadres de-nounced i n the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n . 2 4 Deng Xiaoping had re-emerged i n 1973 and was by t h i s time doing important work i n the government. In A p r i l 1974 he was chosen to represent China at the United Nations General Assembly. Deng had been i d e n t i f i e d as the number two c a p i t a l i s t roader a f t e r L i u Shaoqi i n the C u l t u r a l Revolution. His r e s t o r a t i o n to a p o s i t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y stood (as i t was no doubt intended to stand) as a symbol of the p o s s i b i l i t y for any and a l l c r i t i c i z e d cadres to trans-form t h e i r outlook and return to work. This p o s s i b i l i t y , l i k e the c r i t i -cisms of u l t r a - l e f t i s m i n 1972, can be seen as a threat to the power of the four. The charge that h i s t o r i c a l analogy was used to meet t h i s threat i s corroborated by an a r t i c l e that appeared while the "gang of four" s t i l l c o n t rolled the media. In March 1976 Red Flag published an a r t i c l e that summed up the movement to " c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and C o n f u c i u s " . 2 5 Since t h i s was a l a t e r stage of the struggle, the author was much more e x p l i c i t than e a r l i e r a r t i c l e s . F i r s t he lauded the movement because i t "... gave a f o r c e f u l r e b u t t a l to the reactionary trend of thought of t r y i n g to restore capitalism that appeared i n 1972". He claimed that the " c a p i t a l i s t roaders within the Party" opposed the movement because they agreed with Confucius'slogan " c a l l to o f f i c e those who have f a l l e n into obscurity". Deng, here s t i l l r e f erred to as "that unrepentant c a p i t a l i s t roader", i s shown as following Confucius' admonition to " r e s t r a i n oneself and restore the r i t e s " . It was claimed that Deng had "restrained himself" by promising not to attempt to reverse the v e r d i c t s of the C u l t u r a l Re-v o l u t i o n i n order to regain power. Now he was being charged with using his power to attempt to restore capitalism. In the a r t i c l e the focus of the attack was broadened to veteran cadres i n general. Labelled " c a p i t a l -i s t roaders", they were accused of defending the p o l i c i e s of the 1950's when they asserted that "some of the previous practices are not neces-s a r i l y a l l wrong". The s h i f t i n d i r e c t i o n i n the movement to " c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confucius" marked the beginning of a growing discrepancy between p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s on the part of Party and state leaders responsible for the economy and an in c r e a s i n g l y s t r i d e n t denunciation of " c a p i t a l i s t roaders" i n the press. The Fourth National People's Congress P o l i t i c a l maneuverings apparently began some months before the Fourth National People's Congress was convened i n January 1975. It i s now charged that the "gang" plotted to influence Mao's opinions on 68 personnel selections by slandering Zhou E n l a i . According to Wang Hongwen's testimony at t h e i r t r i a l , Mao t o l d him that he intended to recommend Deng Xiaoping for the post of f i r s t v i c e - p r e m i e r . 2 6 This was an unprecedented move as there had not previously been a post of f i r s t vice-premier. This was an important move because Zhou E n l a i was already h o s p i t a l i z e d with cancer and Mao's recommendation would mean the choice of Zhou's successor would be made before and not a f t e r his death. It also insured that Mao would have a hand i n the decision. Wang has admitted that, a f t e r conferring with the others, he was sent to see Mao i n October 1975. In h i s discussion with Mao he insinuated that Zhou E n l a i was using h i s stay i n h o s p i t a l to plot a power seizure with Deng and other veteran cadres. He was rebuffed by Mao but returned again i n December to t r y to persuade Mao to change his mind. In the same month Jiang Qing forwarded her opinions on personnel arrangements through two of Mao's i n t e r p r e t e r s . 2 7 Mao was not impressed. His comments on h i s wife's ambition were reported i n the l a s t chapter. The NPC was prepared i n a manner which insured that unity would be achieved before the formal sessions began. Questions of personnel s e l e c t i o n were s e t t l e d by the end of December. 2 8 The 2,864 deputies met fo r preliminary discussions from January 5-11. 2 9 The Party's Central Committee met from January 8-10 to put the f i n a l touches on the congress documents and name l i s t s . 3 0 The Fourth NPC met for only f i v e days, from January 13-17, with plenary sessions on the f i r s t and l a s t days. The items on the agenda were the r e v i s i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , the report on the work of the government and the e l e c t i o n of leading state personnel. 3 69 Zhang Chunqiao gave the report on the"revision of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . Although t h i s indicated his importance i n the leadership, i n the l i s t of vice-premiers h i s name was second to Deng Xiaoping's,who was taking over the bulk of Premier Zhou's work. In the section of his report that dealt with s o c i a l i s t construction there was a passage that presaged the struggles to come: It should be pointed out that i n our country we s t i l l have harmony as well as contradiction between the r e l a t i o n s of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base. Like the morning sun, our s o c i a l i s t system i s s t i l l very young. It was born i n struggle and can only grow i n struggle. Take the state sector of the economy for example. In some enterprises, the form i s that of s o c i a l i s t ownership, but the r e a l i t y i s that t h e i r leadership i s not i n the hands of Marxists and the masses of workers. The bourgeoisie w i l l seize hold of many fronts i f the p r o l e t a r i a t does not occupy them. Confucius died more than two thousand years ago, yet such rubbish as h i s never vanishes of i t s e l f where the broom of the p r o l e t a r i a t does not reach. The d r a f t lays down that "state organizations and state personnel must earnestly study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought", that "the p r o l e t a r i a t must exer-c i s e all-round d i c t a t o r s h i p over the bourgeoisie i n the superstructure, including a l l spheres of c u l t u r e " and the state organizations and state personnel must maintain close t i e s with the masses and overcome unhealthy tendencies. It i s p r e c i s e l y the purpose of these provisions to c a l l on us to pay keen attention to grasping s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n the realm of the superstructure and to pay attention to solving problems concerning the r e l a t i o n s of production. We must broaden, deepen and persevere i n the current movement to c r i t i c i z e L i n Piao and Confucius and occupy a l l fronts with Marxism. 3 2 Although Premier Zhou's report on the work of the government also noted that: "While t a c k l i n g economic tasks, our leading conrades at a l l l e v e l s must pay close attention to the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n the realm of the superstructure and keep a firm grasp on class struggle and the 70 struggle between the two l i n e s " , the centerpiece of h i s discussion of s o c i a l i s t construction was the proposal that would come to be known as the "four modernizations",which would involve the buil d i n g of "an independent and r e l a t i v e l y comprehensive i n d u s t r i a l and economic system" before 1980, and the modernization of a g r i c u l t u r e , industry, defense, and science and technology by the end of the c e n t u r y . 3 3 Zhou c a l l e d upon grass-roots l e v e l units across China to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the drawing up and implementation of long and short-range plans under the d i r e c t i o n of the State Council. China was to begin a twenty-five year period of rapid modernization. By the end of the century she was to have a f u l l y developed i n d u s t r i a l base technologically up to world standards and a mechanized a g r i c u l t u r e . The reports given at the congress did not simply express the views of the persons who delivered them. They had been approved by the CC as a whole. But they contained two very d i f f e r e n t views of the p r i n c i p l e task facing the Chinese people i n the years ahead. On the one hand, emphasis was l a i d on the primacy of further r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g the r e l a t i o n s of production. On the other hand, the forces of production were to be developed to world standards at a very rapid pace. T h e o r e t i c a l l y there need be no fundamental contradiction between the two goals. But i n the concrete conditions of China the differences i n emphasis would grow into antagonistic contradictions. 71 "Study the Theory of the Dictatorship of the P r o l e t a r i a t " A new campaign was launched shortly a f t e r the close of the congress. In December 1974 at the same time that he approved Zhou Enlai's sugges-tions for arrangements for the Fourth NPC, Mao made a set of statements that were made public i n an e d i t o r i a l i n People's Daily on February 9, 1975. 3 4 Apparently concerned that i n the drive for rapid modernization basic p r i n c i p l e s of Marxism-Leninism might be s l i g h t e d , Mao emphasized that i t was important to understand why i n a s o c i a l i s t society the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t was necessary. He pointed out that although the system of ownership had changed, aspects of the r e l a t i o n s of production and superstructure were s i m i l a r to those of the old society. The commodity, money and wage systems remained and d i s t r i b u t i o n was accord-ing to work (rather than need as i t would be a f t e r the t r a n s i t i o n to communist s o c i e t y ) . Therefore " i t would be quite easy for people l i k e L i n Biao to push the c a p i t a l i s t system i f they come to power". Mao was also quoted as saying: "Lenin said, 'Small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, d a i l y , hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale'". Lenin was r e f e r r i n g to the continued existence of small-holding peasants i n the early Soviet period. Mao, however, goes on to say, "This also occurs among a section of the workers and a section of the Party members. Both within the ranks of the p r o l e t a r i a t and among the personnel of state organs there are people who follow the bourgeois s t y l e of l i f e " . In so doing he confused economic phenomena occurring i n the base with what was e s s e n t i a l l y an i d e o l o g i c a l problem among some people. Mao does not elaborate, at l e a s t i n the part of h i s t a l k that was 72 made publ i c , what the economic basis for a bourgeois l i f e s t y l e i s ; This allowed for the confusion of l e v e l s of analysis i n the materials commenting on these quotes. The source and context of these quotes from Mao Zedong were not explained i n the media, but they were used as a s t a r t i n g point f o r a new movement to "study the theory of the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t " . 3 5 At the beginning of t h i s movement p o l i t i c a l study groups were issued pamphlets containing a s e r i e s of t h i r t y - t h r e e excerpts from the Marxist c l a s s i c s s i m i l a r i n format to the " l i t t l e red book" of the C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n . 3 6 They were soon supplemented by two pamphlets that summed up the t h e o r e t i c a l basis of the "gang of four's" p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s . In h i s "On the S o c i a l Basis of the L i n Biao Anti-Party C l i q u e " 3 7 Yao Wenyuan explained the connection between the c r i t i c i s m of L i n Biao and the new movement. Besides representing the i n t e r e s t s of the old r u l i n g classes, Lin's f a c t i o n was c i t e d as an example of how new bourgeois elements could emerge i n the Party and attempt to gain control of the state. Yao explained that because differences remained between the s t a t e -owned and the collectively-owned economy, the commodity system had to be maintained i n order to f a c i l i t a t e exchange between the two sectors. The existence of the commodity system meant that goods had to be exchanged for equal value, money continued to be used as the medium of exchange and bourgeois r i g h t , exemplified by the slogan, "to each according to h i s work", prevailed i n the r e l a t i o n s of production. Yao considered bourgeois r i g h t to be the economic basis for the emergence of what he c a l l e d bour-geois elements. Yao pointed out that i f bourgeois r i g h t were expanded 73 rather than r e s t r i c t e d , p o l a r i z a t i o n would occur i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l incomes. He also saw p o l a r i z a t i o n occurring through the i l l e g a l accumulation of money through graft and corruption. He further maintained that i t was possible for state and c o l l e c t i v e ownership to be transformed into private ownership by an emerging bourgeois c l a s s . Yao argued that i n those enterprises where the l i n e of the leadership was incorrect, ownership was i n the hands of a new bourgeoisie. If not struggled against, t h i s new bourgeoisie would seize power i n the Party and state as they had i n the Soviet Union. If t h i s were to occur, c o l l e c t i v e and state property would become the c o l l e c t i v e private pro-perty of a new r u l i n g class and the s o c i a l i s t system would be destroyed. From the perspective of Marxist theory, there are a number of things that Yao Wenyuan f a i l e d to point out i n h i s analysis. The material basis for the continued existence of commodity exchange lay p r i m a r i l y i n the low p r o d u c t i v i t y of a g r i c u l t u r e . Given the l i m i t e d development of the productive forces i n the r u r a l areas, the state could not afford to n a t i o n a l i z e a g r i c u l t u r a l production and pay the peasants state wages. This i s the economic basis for the continuation of commodity exchange between the state and the communes. Bourgeois r i g h t could not, as Yao claimed, be an economic foundation for the emergence of c a p i t a l i s t r e l a -tions of production. Bourgeois r i g h t i s a notion of formal equality which ignores underlying i n e q u a l i t i e s . Thus equal pay for equivalent work and equal access to education, for example, ignore differences i n i n d i v i d u a l needs and c a p a c i t i e s . Bourgeois r i g h t i s a concept, a superstructural phenomenon, not a part of the economic base. The economic basis of the 74 commodity system i s i n fac t the low l e v e l of development of the produc-t i v e forces. Yao ignores t h i s fundamental point i n h i s analysis. Can p o l a r i z a t i o n of income lead to the development of c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production as Yao implies? Yao muddies t h i s issue by r a i s i n g the question of accumulation of money through g r a f t and corrup-t i o n , a phenomenon which does not depend on bourgeois r i g h t f o r i t s existence. Not a l l money i s c a p i t a l . In order f o r c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production to emerge,the new bourgeois elements Yao describes would have to be able to invest t h e i r money i n the e x p l o i t a t i o n of labor. This i s impossible under the present system i n China. Yao neatly sidesteps t h i s problem by equating the correctness or incorrectness of l i n e with ownership. Thus i n Yao's analysis ownership i s no longer an a t t r i b u t e of r e l a t i o n s to the means of production but can be determined by the p o l i c i e s advocated and pursued by the leadership of an enterprise. For Yao,in the l e v e l s of leadership above the enterprises, class p o s i t i o n i s also determined by l i n e . Yao, by describing bourgeois r i g h t as the economic basis f o r the emergence of c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production and by defining class status as a subjective category, i s s e r i o u s l y d i s -t o r t i n g Marxist theory. What t h i s allows him to do i s to ignore the importance of developing the forces of production. P o l a r i z a t i o n i n i n d i v i d u a l incomes i s most l i k e l y to occur i n the gap between urban and r u r a l incomes because of the low l e v e l of peasant pr o d u c t i v i t y . The ultimate s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem l i e s i n simultaneous mechanization of a g r i c u l t u r e and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the countryside. This w i l l increase the produ c t i v i t y of the decreasing 75 number of people working i n a g r i c u l t u r e while increasing the o v e r a l l value of t o t a l r u r a l production. But so long as the forces of produc-t i o n have not developed to the stage where "to each according to h i s needs" can be practiced, bourgeois r i g h t must not only be r e s t r i c t e d but preserved. By ignoring the problem of developing the forces of production, Yao i s able to argue for pushing reforms i n the r e l a t i o n s of production without taking into consideration the material basis for those changes. Zhang Chunqiao, i n h i s contribution to the study materials for the new movement, draws out the p o l i t i c a l implications for the analysis i n t r o -duced by Yao. He u t i l i z e s a quote from Mao r e f e r r i n g to the s i t u a t i o n i n some f a c t o r i e s p r i o r to 1969 to imply that numerous enterprises i n China at that time were i n the hands of the b o u r g e o i s i e . 3 8 He repeats the notion of the danger of power being seized i n the Party and state and l a t e r pin-points the main suspects. There are undeniably some comrades among us who have joined the Communist Party o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y but not i d e o l o g i c a l l y . In t h e i r world outlook they have not yet stepped out of the confines of small production and of the bourgeoisie. They do approve of the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t at c e r t a i n stages and i n c e r t a i n spheres and are pleased with c e r t a i n v i c t o r i e s of the p r o l e t a r i a t , because these w i l l bring them some gains;'once they have secured t h e i r gains, they f e e l i t ' s time to s e t t l e down and feather t h e i r cozy nests. As for exercising a l l -round d i c t a t o r s h i p over the bourgeoisie, as for following up the f i r s t step on the 10,000-li long march, sorry, l e t others do the job; here i s my stop and I must get off the bus. We would l i k e to o f f e r a piece of advice to these comrades: It's dangerous to stop half-way! The bour-geoisie i s beckoning to you. Catch up with the ranks and continue the advance! 3 9 76 What began as a movement to encourage t h e o r e t i c a l study as a part of the drive for modernization was being turned into something else. In the process of developing the forces of production i n a s o c i a l i s t society, a discussion of the means used must be framed i n terms of the o v e r a l l goals of s o c i a l development. This means that the r e l a t i o n s of production which are part of the e f f o r t must be the subject of discussion and debate. But i f changes i n the r e l a t i o n s of production are debated i n the absence of an understanding of the material n e c e s s i t i e s of the present stage of development then there are no objective . c r i t e r i a to judge various proposals. Everything i s judged by the i d e a l i z e d c r i t e r i a of a communist society. By s e t t i n g the discussion i n the framework of clas s struggle, Yao and Zhang were, i n fa c t , c losing o f f meaningful debate. I t was no longer a question of differences among the people but struggle against class enemies. If one did not accept the necessity to r e s t r i c t bourgeois r i g h t and "exercise an all-round d i c t a t o r s h i p over the bourgeoisie", one had "gotten o ff the bus" and a l l i e d oneself with the bourgeoisie. What had started as a study movement was being pushed i n the d i r e c t i o n of an attack against cadres i n leadership i n the economic sphere from the factory f l o o r and the r u r a l production team on up. These two a r t i c l e s set the theme for the movement conducted i n the mass media. A r t i c l e s elaborating the framework set down by Yao and Zhang continued to appear through the spring and summer of 1975. 4 0 77 " C r i t i c i z e Deng Xiaoping" During the summer of 1975 Deng Xiaoping took over the leadership of the State Council from Premier Zhou. During t h i s period he supervised the drawing up of a series of documents to be used as d i r e c t i v e s to guide the modernization d r i v e . 4 1 The p o l i c y proposals i n the three documents w i l l be analyzed i h l a t e r chapters. It was Deng and h i s supporters' analysis of the p o l i t i c a l problems of the period that led them into d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with the "gang of four". One of these documents, "The General Program f o r a l l Work of the Party and the Country", returned to the theme of the u l t r a - l e f t nature of Li n Biao's t a c t i c s . It then maintained that there were s t i l l people around using the same t a c t i c s . ... They always take over our revolutionary slogans, d i s t o r t and mutilate them, and ins e r t t h e i r prejudices i n them, so that they can turn black into white and reverse righ t and wrong ... They wave the banner of opposing revisionism i n order to promote revisionism and engage i n re s t o r a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s under the s i g n -board of preventing a bourgeois comeback. They throw good Party cadres and outstanding advanced figures out of o f f i c e and usurp the leadership of c e r t a i n l o c a l i t i e s and units so that they can impose a bourgeois d i c t a t o r -ship there ... Without s t r i k i n g down these class enemies and wresting back the leadership they have usurped, i n no way w i l l we f u l f i l l the task of achieving p r o l e t a r i a n d i c t a t o r s h i p at the grass-roots l e v e l . And there the all-round d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t over the bour-geoisie w i l l j u s t remain an empty ph r a s e . 4 2 It i s not l i k e l y that anyone i n the upper l e v e l s of leadership would not know who "they" were. The report also deals with the problem of factionalism: 78 ... They f e e l no pain when s o c i a l i s t production and construction s u f f e r damage and are i n d i f f e r e n t to breaches of s o c i a l i s t systems. Indulging themselves i n b u i l d i n g mountain strongholds and f i g h t i n g f a c -t i o n a l wars, they have been embroiled for a long time i n the struggle between t h i s and that f a c t i o n , a s s e r t -ing that i t i s a struggle between rebels and conserva-t i v e s , between new cadres and the old, between "Confu-cians" and " l e g a l i s t s " . 1 + 3 The "General Report" and the other documents were never made f u l l y public before the f a l l of the "gang of four". Copies of the reports were f i r s t leaked to supporters of the "gang" and used as a basis for a cam-paign to d i s c r e d i t Deng.^ It began with a g i t a t i o n i n December 1975 on the campuses of B e i j i n g and Qinghua u n i v e r s i t i e s over alleged attacks on the r e v o l u t i o n i n education. But i n the New Years Day e d i t o r i a l i n People's Daily, Red Flag and L i b e r a t i o n Army Daily the issue was given wider s i g n i f i c a n c e : "The recent farrago on the educational front, r e -presenting a Right d e v i a t i o n i s t wind to reverse previous v e r d i c t s , i s a conspicuous manifestation of the r e v i s i o n i s t l i n e that stands against the p r o l e t a r i a t on behalf of the bourgeoisie". 1 + 5 We experienced the change i n atmosphere at the time through our p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the "movement to learn from Dazhai". In the middle of September a nati o n a l conference on learning from Dazhai (Tachai) was con-vened near the l o c a t i o n of the famous model production brigade.^ 6 The meeting sparked a movement to increase p r o d u c t i v i t y i n a g r i c u l t u r e . In Guangzhou ten thousand urban dwellers went to Dongguan county to help l e v e l the land i n preparation for the introduction of t r a c t o r c u l t i v a t i o n . Along with fellow teachers, students and cadres of our language i n s t i t u t e we went with the f i r s t group and worked i n the country for much of the 79 month of December. The second group, scheduled to go i n January,never l e f t school. Cadres i n the countryside were being accused of being " c a p i t a l i s t roaders" because they were supposedly too concerned with production to the exclusion of revolution. When the leadership began to f a l t e r , the movement i n our area collapsed. Deng Xiaoping made his l a s t public appearance of 1976 when he de-l i v e r e d the memorial speech at Zhou Enlai's funeral i n January. In the beginning of the campaign Deng was not attacked by name. But a s e r i e s of quotes from "that unrepentant c a p i t a l i s t roader i n power i n the Party" i n the press soon c l a r i f i e d who the s p e c i f i c and general targets of the movement were. He was quoted as saying, "In r e s t r i c t i n g bourgeois r i g h t , i t i s also necessary to have a material basis. Without i t , how can we r e s t r i c t ? " In r e b u t t a l i t was argued that i n the years of revolutionary war a system of m i l i t a r y communism was applied i n s p i t e of harsh conditions. Now i t was argued "... our material conditions are far better than i n the years of revolutionary war".1*7 The question of the cadres was raised again: "Hasn't the unrepent-ant c a p i t a l i s t roader said that a l l cadres, regardless of what mistakes they have committed, should be employed?"1*8 Deng was also quoted as saying: The s i t u a t i o n i n the Party i s abnormal. Many comrades are a f r a i d of t h i s and that, but they are not a f r a i d that the b u i l d i n g up of the country w i l l not go ahead ... It cannot be said that, i n general, the old cadres are r e v i s i o n i s t . I do not believe they a r e . 4 9 80 The "gang of four's" writing groups at Qinghua, Beida, and Fudan u n i v e r s i t i e s , however, evoked suspicion of the veteran cadres: If t h e i r thinking remains i n the old stage and i f they view and assess the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n from the stand and world outlook of the bourgeois demo-crats, then they w i l l represent the bourgeoisie and become c a p i t a l i s t roaders and hence targets of the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n . 5 0 From A p r i l 3-5 during the Qing Ming F e s t i v a l when Chinese t r a d i -t i o n a l l y honor t h e i r dead, hundreds of thousands of people gathered i n Beijing's Tian An Men square to pay respects to Zhou. When attempts were made to remove memorial wreaths placed around the monument to the people's heroes i n the center of the square, people put up resistance. At the time the incident was denounced as counterrevolutionary. 5 1 Although i t was admitted that there was no evidence to l i n k Deng Xiaoping with the a f f a i r , nevertheless, the Politburo decided that "the nature of the Deng Xiaoping problem has turned into one of antagonistic contradiction. On the pro-posal of our great leader, Chairman Mao, the P o l i t i c a l Bureau unanimously agrees to dismiss Deng Ziaoping from a l l posts both i n s i d e and outside the Party while allowing him to keep his Party membership so as to see how he w i l l behave i n the f u t u r e " . 5 2 This rather ambiguous announcement meant that Deng could be attacked by name i n the press. But i t caused a great deal of confusion. Much to the consternation of non-members who had to take up the slack, Party members at our school were given ten days off work to discuss the r e s o l u t i o n i n closed study sessions. They were unable to achieve a consensus as to whether or not the contradiction with Deng was one among the people or one with the enemy. It was clear to a l l that serious differences remained among the national leadership. 81 It was c l e a r that the movement to " c r i t i c i z e Deng" was becoming increasingly unpopular. A mass r a l l y and parade was held i n Guangzhou a few days a f t e r the announcement of Deng's dismissal. Each unit i n the c i t y was required to send a contingent of marchers. It was the most un-enthusiastic v i c t o r y celebration we had ever witnessed. In our school the students c r i t i c i z e d the leadership,demanding to know why the movement had "gone cold". The leadership responded by organizing mass meetings at which attendance was compulsory. At the meetings the audience read, knitted or slept while the speakers repeated statements and slogans from the press. In p o l i t i c a l study we were issued mimeographed l i s t s of quotations out of context from the so-called "three poisonous weeds" written under Deng's supervision i n the summer and f a l l of 1975. When the teachers i n our group complained that i t was impossible to c r i t i c i z e documents which could not be read i n f u l l , the Party secretary admitted that though he had read the texts i n f u l l , he had not been able to detect anything wrong with them. Tension continued to mount. Even a f t e r the disastrous earthquake that destroyed the c i t y of Tangshan on July 2 8 5 3 there was no l e t up and there were rumours c i r c u l a t i n g that Hua Guofeng had been c r i t i c i z e d for neglecting the movement "to beat back the r i g h t d e v i a t i o n i s t wind" while concentrating on organization of r e l i e f f o r the earthquake victims. Mao Zedong died September 9, 1976. The outpouring of g r i e f was matched by a widespread anxiety about the future of China. A p o l i t i c a l struggle at the center began almost immediately. A r t i c l e s i n the press created the impression that Mao had l e f t some form of testament. The 82 f a c t i o n around Jiang Qing apparently hoped to d i s c r e d i t Hua Guofeng and other leaders through t h i s d e v i c e . 5 4 Hua ordered t h e i r a r r e s t s on October 6 and the following day he was appointed Chairman of the Party's Central Committee. This was j u s t i f i e d by pu b l i c a t i o n of the text of a note to Hua from Mao st a t i n g "With you i n charge, I am at e a s e " . 5 5 On October 8 followers of the "gang of four" i n Shanghai t r i e d to organize armed resistance but the attempt f e l l through. 5 6 At our school we and our students heard reports of the arrests on the Voice of America a few days a f t e r the event, but o f f i c i a l word did not f i l t e r down for a week. Nevertheless, many teachers and cadres began to celebrate with t h e i r friends immediately. When i t was o f f i c i a l , a r a l l y was held at our school that was attended by peasants from the surrounding commune. At that r a l l y and at celebrations that were held i n the following days we witnessed spontaneous expressions of mass, public, overt joy the l i k e s of which we had never seen i n China before. People c a l l e d i t "our second l i b e r a t i o n " . 83 Notes: Chapter Three, "Meetings and Mass Movements" 1 See Jaap van Ginneken, The Rise and F a l l of L i n Piao (N.Y.: Discus, 1977), Part Eight: The Second Plenum, and Part Eleven: The Background to the Plot. 2 "The Men of Teng Hsiao-ping", China News Analysis (CNA), No. 1059, Nov. 5, 1976, p. 3. Jaques Guillermaz, The Chinese Communist Party i n Power (Boulder, Westview Press, 1976), pp. 458-462. 4 Chung Hua-min, "A Preliminary Evaluation of the Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party", Chinese Law and Government, Vol. VII, No. 1-2, 1974, pp. 6-12. For the o f f i c i a l reportage on the con-gress see: "Press Communique of the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China" i n : The Tenth National Congress of the Commu- n i s t Party of China (Documents) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp. 75-85. 5 Chou E n - l a i , "Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", The Tenth National ..., p. 5. As Zhou mentions i n t h i s report, t h i s i s a quote from the p o l i t i c a l report to the Eighth Party Congress i n 1956. Today i n China the p o s i t i o n quoted i s affirmed as correct. 6 Ibid., pp. 31-33. May 7th cadre schools were farms run by adminis-t r a t i v e units or schools on which a portion of t h e i r cadres worked i n a g r i c u l t u r e and engaged i n p o l i t i c a l study. Cadres went i n turn and had to apply to go. S o c i a l pressure assured that j u s t about everyone who was f i t applied. When they were f i r s t established i n the l a t e '60s they served the purpose of cooling down f a c t i o n a l tensions. When the term of study was only a few months many people looked forward to going. It was a break from the d a i l y grind at the o f f i c e . When we taught at the Guang-dong Foreign Languages I n s t i t u t e , the demand for places i n c i t y - r u n cadre schools was so great that our school had to set up i t s own on land near our campus. However, i n some units the schools were used as labor camps where people spent long years at hard labor. 7 "Wang Hung-wen - A New Department Director of the CCP Central Committee", Issues and Studies, Vol. IX, No. 5, Feb. 1973, p. 88. Wang Hung-wen, "Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution", The Tenth National Congress ...,op. c i t . , p. 45. 84 9 Fang Chun-kuei, "An Analysis of the Tenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", Chinese Law and Government, Vol. V88, No. 1-2, 1974, pp. 44-105. As Fang himself states, the percentages are tentative. Since many cadres wear more than one hat i t i s sometimes d i f f i c u l t to place a person i n either the m i l i t a r y or c i v i l i a n spheres. In t h i s study i n d i v i d u a l s whose backgrounds were not known were put i n the category of those who had come to power during the C u l t u r a l Revolution. This may have led to an overestimation of that group. Fang does not define h i s "veteran", " C u l t u r a l Revolutionary" and " m i l i t a r y " cadre categories. They are somewhat problematic because they combine background factors with des-c r i p t i o n s of present p o s i t i o n s . The usefulness of his analysis l i e s i n i t s p r o j e c t i o n of a general p i c t u r e of groups represented i n the upper l e v e l s of the Party. See also: Kenneth L i e b e r t h a l , "The Foreign P o l i c y Debate i n Peking as Seen Through A l l e g o r i c a l A r t i c l e s " , China Quarterly, No. 71, Sept. 1977, pp. 528-54 f o r further examples of the use of h i s t o r i c a l a l legory. 1 0 Chou Wen, " D i s t o r t i n g Ancient History to Serve Present Needs", Peking  Review, No. 44, Oct. 28, 1977, p. 19. 1 1 Shen Tao-sheng, "On Lo Ssu-ting", People's Daily, Aug. 15, 1977. English t r a n s l a t i o n i n FBIS, Aug. 18, 1977; Theoretical Group of the Peking Municipal Motor Industry Company, "Why did Liang Hsiao Write so many A r t i c l e s C r i t i c i z i n g History", FBIS, Aug. 24, 1977; "Who was Liang Hsiao?", Peking Review, No. 43, Oct. 21, 1977, p. 24; "Such was t h i s 'Writing Group"', Peking Review, No. 50, Dec. 9, 1977, p. 16. 1 2 See: Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization i n Communist China (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1968), pp. 58-68, for a des-c r i p t i o n of the r o l e of the mass media i n Chinese p o l i t i c s . 1 3 Tien Kai, "The Laboring People's Anti-Confucius Struggle i n History", Hongqi, No. 1, Jan. 1, 1974. English t r a n s l a t i o n i n Selections from  People's Republic of China Magazines (SPRCM), No. 767-8, pp. 34-42. 1 4 "The Ghost of Confucius' Shop and Actual Class Struggle", Peking  Review, Dec. 12, 1969. 1 5 Chen Yang-feng, "Why did L i n Piao Curse Chin Shih Huang?", Hongqi, No. 12, Dec. 1, 1973, SPRCM, No. 765-66, pp. 54-60. 1 6 Chung Tse and Sung Hsin, "Is Such an Appraisal Consistent with H i s t o r i c a l R e a l i t y " , Hongqi, No. 11, No. 1, 1973, SPRCM, No. 763-64, pp. 84-90. 1 7 "Carry the Struggle to C r i t i c i z e L i n Piao and Confucius through to the End", Peking Review, No. 6, Feb. 8, 1974, pp. 5-6. 85 1 8 Meeting with women cadres Zhang Xiufen, L i u Xiu, Feng Shumai, Lu Suhua at the Shou Bao Zhuang brigade of Red Star People's Commune, Nov. 29, 1974. 1 9 "Workers, Peasants and Soldiers are the Main Force i n C r i t i c i z i n g L i n Piao and Confucius", Peking Review, No. 7, Feb. 15, 1974. 2 0 Yu Fan, "The Bankruptcy of L i n Piao's Counterrevolutionary T a c t i c s " , Hongqi, No. 5, May 1, 1974, SPRCM, No. 775-76, p. 22. 2 1 Yang Jung-kuo, "Struggle between two l i n e s i n the i d e o l o g i c a l sphere during the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period", Peking  Review, No. 8, Feb. 22, 1974, pp. 4-7. 2 2 See e s p e c i a l l y : Lo Ssu-ting, "Struggle between r e s t o r a t i o n and counterrestoration i n the course of the founding of the Chin dynasty", Hongqi, No. 11, Nov. 1974. English t r a n s l a t i o n i n Peking Review, Nos. 17 & 18, A p r i l 26 & May 3, 1974. Liang Hsiao, "Study on s a l t and ir o n " , Hongqi, No. 5, May 1974, FBIS, May 21, 1974, pp. El-9. Hsueh L i , "Debate at the Salt and Iron Conference", Peking Review, No. 29, July 18, 1975, pp. 17-21. 2 3 Liang Hsiao, "Study the H i s t o r i c a l Experience of the Struggle between the Confucianist and L e g a l i s t Schools", Peking Review, No. 2, Jan. 10, 1975, pp. 8-12. See also: '"Gang of Four's' Plots i n the Move-ment to C r i t i c i z e L i n Piao and Confucius", Peking Review, No. 16, A p r i l 15, 1977, pp. 27-29. 2 4 Chou Wen, op. c i t . , and also "Chengchow Radio Denounces 'Gang of Four's' Use of Allegory", Chengchow, Honan P r o v i n c i a l Service i n Mandarin, Nov. 15, 1976, FBIS, No. 16, 1976, p. H5. Hong Kong scholars have done det a i l e d analysis of t h i s use of h i s t o r i c a l analogy. See: L.Y. Chiu, "The Study of Chinese History and Modern Chinese P o l i t i c s " and Chien Chiao, "The Use of History as a P o l i t i c a l Strategy by the Gang of Four" i n ed., Steve S.K. Chin, The Gang of Four (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs, No. 23), 1977. 2 5 Lao Lu, "To Combat Revisionism, It i s Necessary to C r i t i c i z e Con-fu c i u s " , Hongqi, No. 3, March 1, 1976, SPRCM, 76-8, pp. 33-35. 2 5 Graham Earnshaw, B e i j i n g correspondent for the Daily Telegraph of London, wire service report, No. 24, 1980. These charges were also con-tained i n the Party Central Document No. 24 (1976) issued i n Dec. 1976. See: Issues and Studies, V ol. XIII, No. 9, Sept. 1977, pp. 99-100, and the "Indictment of the Special Procuratorate", B e i j i n g Review, No. 48, Dec. 1, 1980, p. 14. Because Earnshaw's report includes testimony at the t r i a l i t includes more d e t a i l concerning Wang Hongwen's f i r s t v i s i t to Mao. 2 7 Issues and Studies, i b i d . , pp. 103-4. 86 2 8 Ibid., p. 103. 2 9 "Press Communique of the F i r s t Session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China", Peking Review, No. 4, January 24, 1975, p. 7. 3 0 "Communique of the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", Ibid., p. 6. 3 1 "Press Communique of the F i r s t Session of the NPC i b i d . , p. 6-7. 3 2 Chang Chun-chiao, "Report on the Revision of the Constitution", i b i d . , p. 20. 3 3 Chou E n l a i , "Report on the Work of the Government, i b i d . , p. 23. 3 4 Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung Thought, the Last Struggle f o r Succession, and the Post-Mao Era", China Quarterly, No. 71, Sept. 1977, p. 499. The People's Daily e d i t o r i a l was reprinted i n English i n Peking Review, No. 7, Feb. 14, 1975, pp. 4-5. 3 5 "Study Well the Theory of the Dictatorship of the P r o l e t a r i a t " , Peking Review, op. c i t . , p. 4. 3 6 An English t r a n s l a t i o n of what were c a l l e d i n China "the t h i r t y -three quotations" can be found i n Peking Review, No. 9, Feb. 28, 1975. 3 7 Yao Wenyuan, "On the So c i a l Basis of the L i n Piao Anti-Party Clique", Peking Review, No. 10, March 7, 1975, pp. 5-10. 3 8 Chang Chun-chiao, "On Exercising Ail-Round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie", Peking Review, No. 14, A p r i l 4, 1975, pp. 5-11. See es p e c i a l l y his elaboration of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the quote on p. 7 and his return to the topic on p. 8. 3 9 Ibid., p. 9. 4 0 Liang Xiao stressed the class nature of the struggle to r e s t r i c t bourgeois r i g h t and the deep and long-term nature of the struggle i n t h e i r "The P r o l e t a r i a t Must Exercise Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie", Peking  Review, No. 12, March 21, 1975, pp. 13-16. Other a r t i c l e s stressed the need for cadres to study theory and p a r t i c i p a t e i n the movement, perhaps i n d i c a t i n g a reluctance to do so. See: People's Daily e d i t o r i a l "Leading Cadres must take the Lead and Study Well", Peking Review, No. 13, March 28, 1975 and Wang Yung-tai, "Cadres Studying Theory: Important Measure to R e s t r i c t Bourgeois Right", Peking Review, No. 24, June 13, 1975. 87 1 + 1 Translations of the three documents: "The General Program for a l l work of the Party and the Country", "Some Problems on the Acceleration of In d u s t r i a l Development" and "Outline Report on the Work of the Academy of Sciences" with an excellent introduction describing the d e t a i l s of the struggle over the documents can be found i n Kenneth L i e b e r t h a l , ed., "The P o l i t i c s of Modernization: Central Committee Documents of the Mid-1970's", Chinese Law and Government, Vol. XII, No. 102, 1979, pp. 3-133. 4 2 Ibid., pp. 38-39. k 3 Ibid., p. 39. 1 + 4 L i e b e r t h a l describes how the leak occurred with the "Outline Report on the Work of the Academy of Sciences" i n his editor's introduction. Ibid., p. 19-27. 1 + 5 "Nothing i s Hard i n t h i s World i f you Dare to Scale the Heights", Peking Review, No. 1, Jan. 2, 1976, p. 9. 1 + 6 "National Conference on Learning from Tachai i n Ag r i c u l t u r e " , Peking  Review, No. 38, Sept. 19, 1975. 4 7 Kuei Chih, "The Right D e v i a t i o n i s t Wind of Reversing Verdicts and Bourgeois Right, Hongqi, No. 3, March 1, 1976, SPRCM 76-8, pp. 17-23. Before l i b e r a t i o n cadres were not paid s a l a r i e s but only provided with rations and pocket money. The a t t i t u d e of the author i s s i m i l a r to those i n the Soviet Union who celebrated "War Communism" as a new s o c i a l system. 1 + 8 Chao Yuan, " I t i s Impermissible to Tamper with the Five C r i t e r i a for Successors to the Revolution", Hongqi, No. 3, March 1, 1976, SPRCM 76-8, p. 27. 4 9 Guangming Daily, March 30, 1976, c i t e d i n CNA No. 1044, p. 2. 5 0 Chih Heng, "From Bourgeois Democrats to C a p i t a l i s t Roaders", Hongqi, No. 3, March 1, 1976, SPRCM 76-8, p. 4. 5 1 "Counter-Revolutionary P o l i t i c a l Incident at Tien An Men Square", Peking Review, No. 15, A p r i l 9, 1976, pp. 4-5. 5 2 "Resolution of CPC Central Committee on Dismissing Teng Hsiao-ping From A l l Posts Both Inside and Outside Party", Peking Review, No. 15, A p r i l 9, 1976, p. 3. 5 3 "People i n A f f l i c t e d Area Fight Quake", Peking Review, Nos. 32-33, Aug. 9, 1976, pp. 6-10. 5 4 E d i t o r i a l Department of People's Daily, "A Desperate Move Before Destruction", Peking Review, No. 52, Dec. 24, 1976. 88 "Comrade Wu Teh's Speech at the Celebration R a l l y i n the C a p i t a l " , Peking Review, No. 44, October 29, 1976, p. 12. "The Indictment Against L i n Biao-Jiang Qing Cliques", op. c i t . , p. 33-34. 89 Chapter Four: Industry Media discussions of i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y questions during the mid-seventies l a r g e l y focused on r e l a t i o n s of production within i n d u s t r i a l enterprises. T y p i c a l topics included worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n management, cadre p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n production, factory regulations, methods of r e -muneration ... These topics are a l l r e l a t e d to a c e n t r a l concern within Marxism for the development of workers' self-management. Marx envisioned that post-revolutionary p o l i c y would produce a r e v e r s a l of the trend i n c a p i t a l i s t society i n which ordinary workers f i n d themselves further and further removed from centers of decision-making, be i t i n p o l i t i c s or production. 1 Lenin saw t h i s r e v e r s a l as the c e n t r a l purpose for the creation of Soviet power: " I t gives those who were formerly oppressed the chance to straighten t h e i r backs and to an ever increasing degree to take the whole government of the country, the whole administration of the economy, the whole management of production, into t h e i r own hands". 2 In order to explore whether or not the workers of China were "to an ever increasing degree" taking "the whole management of production into t h e i r own hands", I w i l l describe the B e i j i n g No. 2 Machine Tool Plant as an example of the state of progress i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n by the mid-seventies, discuss media treatment of the issues of management p o l i c y and describe how progress i n t h i s area was subverted by f a c t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l considera-tions. 90 Factory Organization i n the Mid-Seventies: B e i j i n g No. 2 Machine  Tool Plant The organization of f a c t o r i e s i n China during the mid-seventies followed a pattern that emerged during the Great Leap Forward and was re-emphasized during the C u l t u r a l Revolution. 3 B e i j i n g No. 2 Machine Tool Plant i s a large, state-owned enterprise. This plant has been chosen as an example because while I was a student at B e i j i n g U niversity together with h a l f a dozen classmates and our Chinese roommates, I had the opportunity to work, l i v e and do s o c i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n there during the spring of 1975. Through informal discussions on the factory f l o o r , i n the s i n g l e workers' dormitory and i n formal discussions with cadres at various l e v e l s , we were able to get a r e l a t i v e l y comprehensive under-standing of how the factory was organized. 4 In v i s i t i n g and working at other f a c t o r i e s I found that they were also organized along very s i m i l a r l i n e s . 5 Examples of innovations i n administration and organization p u b l i c i z e d i n the media, but not present i n the B e i j i n g No. 2 Machine Tool Plant, w i l l be discussed l a t e r i n the chapter. This plant had 4,800 employees at the main factory plus an a d d i t i o n a l workforce of 1,100 at a molding and casting operation outside the c i t y . Two-thirds of the workforce was under t h i r t y - f i v e , s l i g h t l y over f o r t y percent were women and administrators made up about seventeen percent of the t o t a l workforce. As i n most large Chinese f a c t o r i e s , the machine t o o l plant was a s o c i a l unit as well as a workplace. Housing was provided on the factory grounds for more than h a l f the workers. There was a dining h a l l , c l i n i c , daycare center, store, workers' college and a recreation center with a swimming pool on the factory grounds. 91 The factory had four l e v e l s of administration. At the factory l e v e l the decision-making core was the Revolutionary Committee and the factory party committee. The functional d i v i s i o n s at the factory l e v e l included administrative o f f i c e s normally associated with a factory,such as general administration, design, technique, production, personnel, purchasing and accounting. There were also other o f f i c e s that r e f l e c t e d the wider range of a c t i v i t i e s c a r r i e d out within the unit,such as p o l i t i c a l propaganda, health care, food services, daycare, c a p i t a l construction and m i l i t i a organization. Below the factory l e v e l were three further l e v e l s organized according to the d i v i s i o n s i n the productive process. D i f f e r e n t workshops ca r r i e d out the d i f f e r e n t major production processes,such as pattern making, molding and casting, machining, painting and assembly. Below the workshops were work sections again r e f l e c t i n g further d i v i s i o n s of labor according to s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . Below them were work teams consisting of between f i f t e e n and t h i r t y workers. A number of the administrative functions were c a r r i e d out "on the shop f l o o r " i n the sense that the cadres and t h e i r o f f i c e s were located i n the workshops rather than i n a s p e c i a l administrative wing of the factory. These functions included the day to day d i r e c t i o n of production, p o l i t i c a l propaganda, organizing technical innovation, issuing of supplies and tools and supplying meals i n the workshops. Cadres were also present on the workshop f l o o r as workers. The plant had i n s t i t u t e d a system where at any one time one-third of the administra-t i v e cadres would be released from administrative duties to work f u l l - t i m e as ordinary workers. The remaining cadres, who were not taking t h e i r 92 turns at f u l l - t i m e production tasks, spent at least one day a week "at the bench". On average,administrative cadres contributed one hundred days of productive labor a year. This cadre p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labor was considered an important means of narrowing the gap between mental and manual labor, between management and workers. The complementary p o l i c y implemented to close t h i s gap was worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n management. We were t o l d i n our i n i t i a l b r i e f i n g by the factory l e a d e r s h i p 6 that the workers had representatives on the factory Revolutionary Committee and i n the leadership groups at the workshop and work section l e v e l s . These representatives spent most of t h e i r time i n production and did not attend the meetings discussing day-to-day decisions. They were only brought i n when important p o l i c y decisions were being made. This process, which was r e a l l y one of consultation, though stressed by the leadership, was not perceived as very important by the workers with whom we discussed i t . They had heard of the p o l i c y but did not consider i t to have a great deal of p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . What was more immediately s i g n i f i c a n t to them was the organization of leadership on the factory f l o o r at the work team l e v e l . Base l e v e l administrative functions were divided among "eight o f f i c i a l s " ("ba dayuan") elected by the members of the team. These included the team leader who was generally i n charge of production and who led the p r e - s h i f t meetings at which progress on the monthly plan and the day's work assignments were discussed. As well there was a trade union representative, a person i n charge of p o l i t i c s and propaganda who organized weekly p r e - s h i f t p o l i t i c a l study 'sessions and maintained a black-board newspaper, a person i n charge of t h e o r e t i c a l study who prepared the 93 content for the study sessions, a person i n charge of q u a l i t y c o n t r o l , a team accountant, a person i n charge of safety and equipment mainte-nance and a person i n charge of welfare and culture whose duties ranged from organizing sports meets and d i s t r i b u t i n g theatre t i c k e t s to arrang-ing welfare payments to f a m i l i e s of workers i n f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y and doing propaganda for the n a t i o n a l b i r t h control campaign. The workers were able to elect these " o f f i c i a l s " who served as intermediaries between themselves and the management of the factory i n those areas which were of immediate concern to t h e i r l i v e s as workers and as members of the factory community. In our discussion with the factory leadership they stressed that the "eight o f f i c i a l s " system was a founda-t i o n on which the conditions could be prepared for the workers' f u l l control of production. They also explained that the workers p a r t i c i p a t e d i n mass meetings held at the work se c t i o n (gongduan), workshop (chejian) and factory (gongchang) l e v e l s to discuss the yearly and quarterly plans. From discussions with the workers i n our shop i t appeared that these were rather formal a f f a i r s of a consultative nature at best. Decisions as to the content of the plans were not taken at these meetings, which were often l i t t l e more than assemblies to announce targets and r a l l y enthusiasm. The plant also had a trade union organization. A representative of the trade union i n the factory explained i n an interview that the trade unions had been c r i t i c i z e d during the C u l t u r a l Revolution for being con-cerned almost e x c l u s i v e l y with the question of r a i s i n g wages. Its present p r i o r i t i e s were now p o l i t i c a l education, increasing production, and hand-l i n g questions of welfare. The union ran a p o l i t i c a l night school which 94 trained the persons i n charge of t h e o r e t i c a l study at the team l e v e l , was involved i n organizing t e c h n i c a l upgrading courses and coordinated the a c t i v i t i e s of the persons i n charge of culture and welfare a c t i v i t i e s . In discussions on the shop f l o o r we discovered that the workers viewed the trade union as a part of the management system. In a discussion concern-ing the i n c l u s i o n of the r i g h t to s t r i k e i n the national c o n s t i t u t i o n , we asked the workers i n our team over what issues might they s t r i k e and whether or not the trade union would provide leadership i n a s t r i k e . They explained that they would not s t r i k e over wage issues because the wage l e v e l s and s e n i o r i t y were determined at the national l e v e l , so the factory had no control over t h i s area, besides people i n f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y could be helped through the welfare system. The only condition under which they would consider s t r i k i n g would be i f they f e l t that the leader-ship of the factory had become " r e v i s i o n i s t " and was not functioning i n the i n t e r e s t s of the workers or the nation. They assumed that i n such a s i t u a t i o n the leadership of the trade union would undoubtedly be r e v i s i o n -i s t as w e l l and the workers would have to create t h e i r own organization to lead a s t r i k e . Individual workers had an opportunity to p a r t i c i p a t e i n d e c i s i o n -making through the organization of "three-in-one" t e c h n i c a l innovation teams. If a technical innovation was proposed or i f t e c h n i c a l problems emerged i n production, a team consisting of experienced workers, techni-cians and cadres would be organized to deal with making the technical and administrative changes necessary. In discussions plant leadership cadres explained that an important condition for the workers inc r e a s i n g l y being involved i n management was the r a i s i n g of the workers' p o l i t i c a l consciousness. To t h i s end the plant had developed a number of systems of p o l i t i c a l study. Management and s t a f f a l l p a r t i c i p a t e d i n weekly p o l i t i c a l study sessions organized at the team or o f f i c e l e v e l . The Communist Youth League had organized 150 spare-time t h e o r e t i c a l study groups i n which 1,600 young workers p a r t i c i p a t e d . The trade union organized evening study groups and the team leaders and persons i n charge of t h e o r e t i c a l study had t h e i r own study groups. Over a period of four months i n the spring of 1975 the party leadership had organized eighteen mass meetings at which eighty-eight people spoke about th e i r own or t h e i r group's experience and d i f f i -c u l t i e s i n studying. At the apex of the organization of p o l i t i c a l study was the workers college, which gave courses not only on t e c h n i c a l subjects, but i n p o l i t i c a l theory as w e l l . 7 Of f i f t y - s i x worker-students enrolled i n the f u l l - t i m e courses at the workers' college, twelve were taking a one-year course i n p o l i t i c a l theory. Last but not l e a s t , we were to l d that the workers were represented i n the factory leadership through the Communist Party. The party's purpose was to represent the i n t e r e s t of the working c l a s s . Party members, who included ordinary workers, were to maintain close contact with the workers and to r e f l e c t t h e i r concerns and needs i n the party which was i t s e l f supposed to form the "core of leadership" at a l l l e v e l s of administration from top to bottom. 96 As can be seen from the p i c t u r e of r e l a t i o n s of production at the B e i j i n g No. 2 Machine Tool Plant sketched above, the most s i g n i f i c a n t area where aspects of worker self-management were developing was at the base, at the team l e v e l . The workers were able to s e l e c t from among themselves those who would organize t h e i r work, ensure t h e i r safety and deal with important aspects for t h e i r health, welfare and study. From my experience i n working i n Chinese f a c t o r i e s and from what I have been t o l d by workers, t h i s power resulted i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s of cooperation and mutual help among the "eight o f f i c i a l s " and the workers. But r e a l p a r t i -c i p a t i o n ended there. The worker representatives on the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of leadership were not responsible to any organized body of workers. Workers' congresses which existed before the C u l t u r a l Revolution were no longer functioning. Mass meetings to discuss production and p o l i t i c a l study were not decision-making or representative bodies. How well the worker representatives r e f l e c t e d the needs and i n t e r e s t s of the workers depended l a r g e l y on t h e i r own energy and i n c l i n a t i o n s . They had no i n s t i -t u t i o n a l i z e d mechanism for learning or representing the opinions of t h e i r constituencies. The trade union which previously had been concerned with the economic i n t e r e s t s of the workers had taken on p o l i t i c a l education and welfare duties instead. The party whose function i t was to represent the class (and not n e c e s s a r i l y the immediate) i n t e r e s t s of the workers was d i r e c t l y involved i n the management of the plant and thus involved i n an ambiguous r e l a t i o n s h i p with the workers. According to Marx the only thing that separates the party from the class i t leads i s t h e i r l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l consciousness. 8 This i s why p o l i t i c a l study was stressed as a precondition for further advances i n 97 worker self-management. We were t o l d that as the workers studied Marxism-Leninism and applied i t to analysis of the nature of class struggle i n t h e i r factory, they would be more and more able to see beyond t h e i r immediate needs and i n t e r e s t s to those of t h e i r class and of the people as a whole. As t h i s consciousness developed, the party could turn more and more of i t s leadership functions over to the workers and the tutelage of the party over the class could end. Worker P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Management The media treated the question of worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n management as a c e n t r a l issue and as a question of p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e . In the words of one a r t i c l e : "How to treat the masses i s the f o c a l point of the struggle between the Marxist l i n e and the r e v i s i o n i s t l i n e i n enterprise management".9 And yet the question was treated a b s t r a c t l y and i n defen-sive terms. What was feared was a return to a s i t u a t i o n where the manage-ment of Chinese f a c t o r i e s would be i n the hands of "professionals" whose r e l a t i o n s h i p to the workers would be e s s e n t i a l l y the same as that i n a c a p i t a l i s t factory. Quoting Marx i n C a p i t a l , one a r t i c l e points out that "The c a p i t a l i s t s 'assign to s p e c i a l l y employed workers the function of exercising d i r e c t and constant supervision over i n d i v i d u a l workers and groups of workers' so that they may, l i k e ' o f f i c e r s (managers) and non-commissioned o f f i c e r s (foremen) i n industry, guide i n the name of c a p i t a l the process of labor. Supervisory work i s fi x e d as t h e i r s p e c i a l duty'. This has v i v i d l y revealed the class o r i g i n and class essence of profes-s i o n a l management, which i s a t o o l for the e x p l o i t a t i o n and oppression of workers by c a p i t a l i s m " . 1 0 98 Although i t s importance was stressed, the media had l i t t l e to say about concrete experiments to increase the scope of worker self-management. In the summer of 1976, during the movement to c r i t i c i z e Deng Xiaoping, there were references to some innovations. A lead and zinc mine i n Liaoning province developed a formal elaboration of the suggestion box. The leadership provided the workers with a s p e c i a l form on which they could give t h e i r opinions of the mine's management. The form would be sent to the departments concerned and there was a space on the form f o r them to elaborate what changes or improvements had been made. The forms were then returned to the workers who had submitted them to express any f i n a l comments. The a r t i c l e reported that the party committee of the mine monitored the process and often added i t s own views. 1 1 The purpose behind formalizing t h i s whole procedure seems to have been to ensure that management i n fa c t responded to workers' c r i t i c i s m s and that someone assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for acting on the matters r a i s e d . What t h i s pro-cedure c a l l s into question, however, i s the e f f i c a c y of workers' attempts to channel complaints and/or suggestions through t h e i r representatives i n management or party committees. In the spring of 1976 some f a c t o r i e s i n Shanghai were reported to be experimenting with new management methods which applied the methods of e s t a b l i s h i n g t e c h n i c a l innovation teams to other areas of worker p a r t i c i -pation i n management. According to one report, "Workshops or the factory proper set up 'three-in-one' combination production command groups and drew the f i r s t - l i n e workers to take part i n planning, and i n t e c h n i c a l , labor and f i n a n c i a l management. Workers i n v e s t i g a t i o n groups were set up according to needs for i n v e s t i g a t i n g problems a r i s i n g from production and 99 putting f o r t h s o l u t i o n s " . 1 2 This elaboration on the model of the tech-n i c a l innovation teams meant that more workers had the p o s s i b i l i t y to be involved i n more aspects of management. But i t had the same l i m i t a t i o n as the o r i g i n a l model. The i n d i v i d u a l s selected "represented" the workers only inasmuch as they were themselves workers but i t f a i l e d to i n s t i t u -t i o n a l i z e a method whereby the workers, as a group, discuss a l t e r n a t i v e s and p a r t i c i p a t e i n management decisions i n an ongoing manner. The Red Banner Shipyard i n Dalian was c i t e d as a model for estab-l i s h i n g a "mass management network". 1 3 This was an expansion of the eight " o f f i c i a l s " system described e a r l i e r . The workers elected committees at the work section, workshop and shipyard l e v e l s . At each l e v e l there were committees concerned with p o l i t i c a l propaganda, production planning, pro-duct q u a l i t y , accounting, safety, and public health and medical care. In a l l 4,200 workers were involved i n the network. In order to insure that these workers' committees would i n fact be consulted, "The shipyard party committee also s t i p u l a t e d that the relevant departments should not report c e r t a i n major problems related to enterprise management to the party committee without passing through discussion by the 'mass management' net-work". 1 4 This statement i s i n d i c a t i v e of the actual s i t u a t i o n i n Chinese f a c t o r i e s during t h i s period. A l l the important decisions were being made i n the party committee of the factory and the party committee was deeply involved i n day-to-day decision-making. This occurred i n s p i t e of the fa c t that the j u r i d i c a l center of decision-making was the revolutionary committee. The party committee's c e n t r a l r o l e i n decision-making was greatly augmented i n 1956 when the "one-management system" o r i g i n a l l y 100 copied from the Soviet Union was replaced by a system of "d i r e c t o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under the leadership of the p a r t y " . 1 5 In s p i t e of subse-quent changes i n form of management, the locus of decision-making remained the same. When the party organization disintegrated during the C u l t u r a l Revolution, the revolutionary committees temporarily served as d e c i s i o n -making bodies i n those f a c t o r i e s where party leadership had not yet been re-established. But as the party organization was re-established, cadres on the revolutionary committees formed the nucleus of the new party organi-zation, which then assumed co n t r o l . Party leadership of the revolutionary committee and of the mass organizations i n the factory assured that they could a l l be coordinated to carry out party p o l i c y . Therefore, although systems of mass management could broaden worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the con-s u l t a t i v e process that led up to decision-making and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the making of subsidiary decisions involved i n the process of p o l i c y imple-mentation, the workers as a group were not d i r e c t l y involved i n the p o l i c y decisions themselves. Regardless of form, worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i c y -making was l i m i t e d to t h e i r representation by the party. In other words, instead of the party s t r i v i n g on the basis of p r i n c i p l e s to influence workers' decisions (decisions made through i n s t i t u t i o n s of democratic s e l f -management) , the party made the decisions based ( i d e a l l y ) upon consultation with the workers and then would s t r i v e to mobilize the workers to accept and carry out these decisions ( i d e a l l y ) made on t h e i r b e h a l f . 1 6 A f t e r the f a l l of the "gang of four", the press reported that Wang Hongwen had i n i t i a t e d an experiment i n a workshop i n the Shanghai No. 17 Cotton M i l l where he had begun his p o l i t i c a l career. The management section of the workshop was abolished and a system "without regulation, 101 without management, and without leadership" was i n s t i t u t e d under the slogan "everybody takes part i n management". The a r t i c l e did not give any d e t a i l s as to how t h i s experiment a c t u a l l y worked except to report that i t resulted i n chaos and losses i n both output and q u a l i t y . It i s therefore not clear whether t h i s was a serious experiment or the t r y i n g out of a d i s r u p t i o n t a c t i c to be used i n f a c t i o n a l struggles i n other places. When I v i s i t e d the factory i n July 1976 I was given a d e t a i l e d account of Wang Hongwen's a c t i v i t i e s but t h i s experiment i n mass manage-ment was not mentioned. 1 7 Cadre P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Labor On Party Day (July 1) 1976 the lead e d i t o r i a l i n several n a t i o n a l newspapers made public for the f i r s t time excerpts from a d i r e c t i v e issued by Mao Zedong i n 1964. The e d i t o r i a l underlined the importance of cadre. p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labor as a means of narrowing the gap between workers and managers. The excerpt from Mao bore down on the danger involved i n not closing t h i s gap. Management i t s e l f i s a matter of s o c i a l i s t education. If the managerial s t a f f do not j o i n the workers on the shop f l o o r , work, study and l i v e with them and modestly learn one or more s k i l l s from them, then they w i l l f i n d themselves locked i n acute class struggle with the work-ing class a l l t h e i r l i v e s and i n the end are bound to be overthrown as bourgeois by the working c l a s s . If they don't learn any t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s and remain outsiders for a long time, they won't be able to do management well e i t h e r . Those i n the dark are i n no p o s i t i o n to l i g h t the way for o t h e r s . 1 8 The p o l i c y of administrative personnel engaging i n productive labor was a product of the Great Leap Forward period when the process was f i r s t p o p u l a r i z e d . 1 9 In 1968, during the C u l t u r a l Revolution, a d i r e c t i v e on 102 the process of "struggle, c r i t i c i s m , transformation" ("doupigai") was issued from the center c a l l i n g f or streamlining organization by sending o f f i c e personnel to lower l e v e l s . The advantages c i t e d for t h i s innova-t i o n were that i t added to productive capacity, i t forced the development of simpler management procedures, i t transformed the ideology of the cadres and countered the notion that equated downward transfer with a loss of face, and i t opened up more opportunities for younger c a d r e s . 2 0 The system used i n the mid-seventies, as described i n the example of the machine to o l plant, maintained most of the goals of the more d r a s t i c C u l t u r a l Revolution method while insuring the cadres did not permanently lose t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . The one-third of the cadres who were sent down to labor at any one time could return to t h e i r administrative posts with a much clearer conception of the s i t u a t i o n and problems on the factory f l o o r . The main concern i n the press was that the system was being eroded because factory leaderships were allowing cadres to s l i p back into old habits of avoiding labor. It was argued that this could lead to i d e o l o g i -c a l degeneration and create openings for the spread of r e v i s i o n i s t think-21 mg The problem with t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n to cadres' p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labor can perhaps best be seen through a p u b l i c i z e d incident that occurred i n the B e i j i n g Machinery P l a n t . 2 2 During the campaign to c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confucius a group of workers put up a big-character poster e n t i t l e d "Where are the party committee members' hammers?". The story behind the poster i s as follows. In 1971, when the factory's new party committee was formed, the workers presented each member with a hammer with the slogan "Never be divorced from physical labor, never be divorced from the masses" 103 painted on them i n red characters. Despite t h i s attempt by the workers to symbolize the importance of cadre p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labor, however, as time wore on some cadres spent less and less time on the factory f l o o r . In the winter of 1973-74 L i n Biao was accused of opposing cadre p a r t i c i -pation i n labor and c a l l i n g i t "unemployment i n disguised form" i n order to "serve h i s scheme of changing the Party's basic l i n e and r e s t o r i n g c a p i t a l i s m " . 2 3 It was i n the context of t h i s c r i t i c i s m that the poster appeared. In response, the party committee held a meeting with the workers at which the committee c r i t i c i z e d themselves. It was resolved to hold a "hammer meeting" each quarter to check up on each cadre's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labor. The press report included excerpts from the speeches at the s e l f -c r i t i c i s m meeting that reveal why the issue was considered an important one. They also reveal how the issue was understood at the time. One of the party cadres stated "Once one becomes divorced from labor, one gets closer to revisionism and the bourgeoisie and further away from Marxism and the p r o l e t a r i a t . We must never forget t h i s l e s s o n ! " 2 4 Another cadre elaborated on t h i s point. He stated that "bourgeois ideas of every d e s c r i p t i o n are poisoning the a i r and class enemies are using every t r i c k to corrupt our cadres. If we are not v i g i l a n t and get divorced from labor and the masses, we can e a s i l y become corroded by bourgeois ideas and stumble down the b l i n d a l l e y of revisionism ... Only by continuing to take part i n physical labor and mixing our sweat with that of the working people can our hearts beat as one with the workers, and only i n t h i s way can we r e t a i n the f i n e q u a l i t i e s of the working c l a s s " . 2 5 104 One of the workers attending the meeting r e p l i e d that "We ask cadres to take part i n labor not because we lack manpower. What we want i s for you to keep i n close touch with the masses, l i s t e n to t h e i r opinions and demands and get to know what's on t h e i r minds and what they are doing so that y o u ' l l be able to implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary l i n e and p o l i c i e s b e t t e r " . 2 6 The opinions expressed by the cadres and workers at t h i s meeting and selected for p u b l i c a t i o n g r a p h i c a l l y and accurately express the p r e v a i l i n g view of the importance of cadre p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labor. Physical labor i t s e l f was seen as an antidote to the corruption of bourgeois ideology. Physical labor among the workers would produce empathy with the workers so that the cadres could better administrate i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . The closing of the gap between mental and manual labor i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p was to occur i n the mind of the administrator. But i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p the most important aspect of the gap between mental and manual labor i s a knowledge gap. The cadre has an o v e r a l l understanding of the operation of the factory derived from the synthesizing of the general knowledge of the workforce as a whole. Each worker through his/her labor shares only a fragment of t h i s knowledge. In c a p i t a l i s t i n d u s t r i a l organization t h i s s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and fragmentation d i s q u a l i f i e s the workers for s e l f -management. 2 7 Cadres' p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n physical labor could provide cadres with a very useful opportunity for informal dissemination of a great deal of information about the operation of the enterprise and d i s -cussion of management problems and options. Without closing the knowledge gap, transcending the t r a d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of labor with a system of 105 self-management i s necess a r i l y reduced to administration by others on the workers' behalf. But t h i s was not part of the general understanding of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of cadre p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n l a b o r . 2 8 I witnessed a few instances where i n d i v i d u a l cadres did use the opportunity i n t h i s way but the general emphasis was on cadres humbly learning from the workers with the r e s u l t that the flow of information tended to move i n one d i r e c t i o n only. There were also i n s t i t u t i o n a l b a r r i e r s to the flow of information from cadres to workers. Party members (and most important cadres were party members) were not permitted to discuss the content of p o l i c y debates with non-party members or with members who were at a lower l e v e l of leadership within the party than they were. As well, attitudes toward s e c u r i t y often meant that i n d i v i d u a l cadres did not have access to information outside t h e i r area of competence. 2 9 Given the narrow understanding of the r o l e of cadre p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labor, the dissemina-t i o n of information that the Workers would need for informed and respon-s i b l e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n decision-making was l a r g e l y n e g l e c t e d . 3 0 The a l t e r n a t i v e method for the dissemination of (another kind) of information was worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l study. The s i g n i -ficance of t h i s method w i l l be discussed l a t e r i n the chapter. Rules and Regulations The issue of the r o l e of rules and regulations was one area of factory management presented i n the media i n the form of a "debate". Dur-ing the campaign to c r i t i c i z e Deng Xiaoping i n 1976 he was accused of advo-cating a "dictatorship of rules and regulations" from the center down to 106 the f a c t o r i e s and within the f a c t o r i e s . The case against Deng on t h i s issue was elaborated on two l e v e l s . On one l e v e l he was accused of attempting to reintroduce the methods of " v e r t i c a l r u l e " which were applied during the 1950's. This meant that decision-making would be centered i n the m i n i s t r i e s and bureaus i n B e i j i n g and l o c a l f a c t o r i e s would r e t a i n very l i t t l e i n i t i a t i v e . 3 1 It was argued that this meant that not only would decision-making be further removed from the workers i n the hands of a small e l i t e at the center but that i n d u s t r i a l develop-ment would be hindered. One a r t i c l e compared the progress made on the construction of new port f a c i l i t i e s at Dalien with the lack of progress i n an expansion project at the Benqi Iron and Steel Company (both i n Liaoning province). According to the a r t i c l e , t h e reimposition of a " d i c t a t o r s h i p of rules and regulations" at the Iron and Steel Company held up the progress of c a p i t a l construction by preventing the l o c a l party organization from mobilizing l o c a l l y a v a i l a b l e manpower and r e s o u r c e s . 3 2 These accusations against Deng Xiaoping were based on a document drafted under h i s d i r e c t i o n for discussion i n September 1975. The docu-ment was e n t i t l e d "Some Problems on the Acceleration of I n d u s t r i a l Develop-ment" and was popularly r e f e r r e d to as "the twenty points". The text was not made public i n China at the time. The general public had only excerpts quoted out of context i n the press while at least some party members had the f u l l t e x t . 3 3 A reading of the document reveals that Deng and h i s supporters were by no means advocating a return to the command structures of the early f i f t i e s . The document affirms the system of d e c e n t r a l i z i n g industry but points to problems that arose from d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n without proper 107 preparation by the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . What was advocated as a s o l u t i o n to the problem was the strengthening of l o c a l management, not reversion to c e n t r a l c o n t r o l . What the document objected to was not l o c a l i n i t i a -t i v e but the wholesale disregard of national needs: At present, some l o c a l i t i e s and units disregard the i n t e r e s t s of the whole and the u n i f i e d s t i p u l a t i o n of the center, i n s t i t u t e t h e i r p o l i c i e s at w i l l , v i o l a t e state plans, f r e e l y change the d i r e c t i o n of production of enter-p r i s e s which are sent down, interrupt e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s of cooperation, f a i l to f u l f i l the task of sending products to higher l e v e l s , randomly introduce projects of c a p i t a l construction and expand the scope of construction, f r e e l y draw and use goods and materials and funds, increase the number of s t a f f and workers and enlarge the t o t a l amount of wages at w i l l , and a r b i t r a r i l y change commodity p r i c e s . This cannot be p e r m i t t e d . 3 4 One problem emphasized here and repeated l a t e r i n the document was the random introduction of c a p i t a l construction projects. Under the section on c a p i t a l construction i t was reemphasized that: No regions, departments, or units are allowed a r b i t r a -r i l y to enlarge the scale of construction and r a i s e the standard of construction, or to change at w i l l the speed of progress i n the work of construction. Nobody has the power to di v e r t the materials, equipment, and funds ear-marked for key projects of the state to other construction p r o j e c t s . 3 5 The problem being a r t i c u l a t e d here was that l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s or i n d i v i d u a l units were authorizing c a p i t a l construction projects that r e -quired f a r more resources than were i n fact a v a i l a b l e . This undermined the whole structure of planning. This was a commonplace problem i n China during t h i s period. For example, at the Guangdong Foreign Language I n s t i -tute the leadership wanted to b u i l d a swimming pool for the students and s t a f f . There was a serious shortage of b u i l d i n g materials so nothing could be procured through normal channels. However,the school was 108 fortunate i n that one student's father was a high l e v e l cadre i n the p r o v i n c i a l construction bureau. The necessary materials were thus pro-cured but not without at the same time exacerbating the general problem. I strongly suspect that i t was t h i s sort of problem that lay behind the delays i n c a p i t a l construction imposed by higher l e v e l s i n the comparison of units i n Liaoning province c i t e d above rather than simply a s t u l t i f y i n g " d i c t a t o r s h i p of rules and regulations". On another l e v e l Deng was also accused of extending the " d i c t a t o r s h i p of rules and regulations" into the f a c t o r i e s themselves. According to the accusations, "The various 'rules and regulations' are themselves inde-pendent and can be c a r r i e d through to the basic l e v e l , t o t a l l y barring out the leadership of the Party committees at a l l l e v e l s over economic work". 3 6 It was thought that t h i s would have two negative e f f e c t s . Management would be concerned s o l e l y with the development of production and p o l i t i c a l questions would have no place. Furthermore, management i n the f a c t o r i e s would be i n the hands of s p e c i a l i s t s who would "vigorously c o n t r o l , check and suppress the workers" r e s u l t i n g i n a s i t u a t i o n where "the power of leadership i n the enterprises i s again i n the grasp of the c a p i t a l i s t - r o a d e r s and the bourgeois ' s p e c i a l i s t s ' and ' a u t h o r i t i e s ' who have not been s u c c e s s f u l l y remolded". 3 7 In f a c t , the "twenty points" document stresses the need for workers to take part i n management, for cadres to take part i n c o l l e c t i v e pro-ductive labor and for the r o l e of the three-in-one t e c h n i c a l innovation groups to be enhanced. The section r e f e r r i n g to the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the party committees and factory management reads as follows: 109 A l l enterprises should, under the u n i f i e d leadership of the Party committees, set up a strong, powerful, and independent system for managing and d i r e c t i n g an enterprise's d a i l y production a c t i v i t i e s , handling promptly problems a r i s i n g from production and ensuring the normal operation of production. The Party committees cannot always deal d i r e c t l y with a l l b i g and small matters and be prevented from grasping the major issues. It i s necessary to set up c e r t a i n compact and e f f i c i e n t f u n c t i o n a l organs according to the needs of production and to the p r i n c i p l e of having fewer and better troops and simpler administration. These organs must face the masses, the grass-roots l e v e l , and the front l i n e of production. In close i n t e g r a t i o n with management by the masses, they should do a good job of management planning, tech-n i c a l management, labor management, and f i n a n c i a l management.JO What was being argued i n "Some Problems on the Acceleration of In-d u s t r i a l Development" was that the key problem at the time was quite d i f f e r e n t from what was being stressed i n the media. While the media were pointing to the danger of workers being shunted aside and placed at the mercy of new overlords, the document being c r i t i c i z e d stressed that the present danger to worker management came from f a c t i o n a l d i s r u p t i o n of the r a t i o n a l ordering of production. The basis f o r t h i s a s s e r tion w i l l be dealt with l a t e r i n the chapter. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the issue of the proper r o l e for rules and regulations was that open debate of the r e a l issues under contention was suppressed. On October 30, 1975 the Anhui P r o v i n c i a l Radio broadcasting out of Hefei broadcast an e d i t o r i a l which did appear to r e f l e c t the s p i r i t of "the twenty p o i n t s " . 3 9 The broadcast raised the question of di s r u p t i o n of production i n d i r e c t l y through h i s t o r i c a l reference. 110 Before 1971, under the influence of the r e v i s i o n i s t l i n e pushed by L i n Biao and company, who preached that " p o l i t i c s can oust everything" and " s p i r i t u a l conditions can substitute for material conditions", for a time a l l rules and regulations were abolished i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y at our plant. This adversely affected production. The author of t h i s broadcast was the Chairman of the revolutionary committee and vice-secretary of the party committee at the Hefei Mining Equipment Plant. He went on to o u t l i n e what "the necessary rules and regulations for s o c i a l i s t enterprises must embody". They uphold the s p i r i t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the, Anshan Iron and Steel Company, adhere to the p r i n c i p l e of independence and s e l f r e l i a n c e and making foreign things serve China, and embody the party's mass l i n e . They also c l e a r l y s t i p u l a t e that three-in-one groups composed of workers, cadres and technicians must be set up from the plant down to the workshop l e v e l s , to r e l y on the masses to the enterprises well ... They must be conducive to strengthening the system of per-sonal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The system of personal respon-s i b i l i t y i s the key l i n k i n a l l rules and regulations. In the past, the system of personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was for some time abolished i n designing work. When problems popped up, only drawings, and not people could be found. Now, we have c l e a r l y defined i n our rules and regulations a reasonable system of personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for f u l l -time and part-time designing personnel. We also have strengthened the system of personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the workers, e f f e c t i v e l y improving the q u a l i t y of products They must be conducive to the workers acting as masters and making the decisions and bringing into play the masses enthusiasm. ... We have set up the positions of leaders and f i v e other types of managerial personnel through the plant, namely s h i f t and work team leaders, output recorders, q u a l i t y examiners, time keepers, storekeepers and d a i l y l i f e supervisors, t o t a l l i n g some 650. In addition to taking part i n the management of s h i f t s and work teams, they also work together with cadres responsible for various parts of the plant, guiding each o t h e r . 4 0 I l l This d e s c r i p t i o n of the strengthening of the rules and regulations i n a mining equipment plant concretizes the p o l i c i e s advocated i n the "twenty points". Regulations were not seen as l i m i t s on workers' s e l f -management r i g h t s imposed by bureaucratic a u t h o r i t i e s but as a system of r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s formulated and enforced by the e n t i r e person-nel (production and managerial s t a f f ) of the enterprise. But i n 1976 when th i s d i r e c t i o n was c r i t i c i z e d i t was done i n terms of a personal attack on the motives of Deng Xiaoping rather than a substantive discussion of the issues involved. This i s the way the "debate" was redirected i n People's  Dai l y i n July 1976: If we simply examine what Deng Xiaoping has said, we can get a clear view. Didn't he want to i n v i t e the "hermits" to power? Didn't he want to entrust important r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to those who "have made up t h e i r minds" and "have no fear of being toppled a second time"? Didn't he clamor that " i f we are not good at t e c h n i c a l and vocational work we should l e t others do i t " ? This f u l l y t e s t i f i e s that his reimposing the " d i c t a t o r s h i p of rules and regulations" means i n v i t i n g the handful of c a p i t a l i s t roaders i n the Party and the bourgeois " s p e c i a l i s t s " and " a u t h o r i t i e s " who have not been r e -molded to give d i r e c t orders to the enterprises so that the c a p i t a l i s t roaders may push the r e v i s i o n i s t l i n e from the top to the bottom, pra c t i c e dispersionism, e s t a b l i s h "many centers" against the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s , p r a c t i c e despotism toward the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and the broad masses and exercise d i c t a t o r s h i p over the pro-l e t a r i a t . 4 1 M a t e r i a l Incentives Both L i n Biao and Deng Xiaoping were accused of advocating the use of material incentives such as bonuses and piecework as the primary means for increasing the p r o d u c t i v i t y of l a b o r . 4 2 L i n Biao was accused of using the promise of material reward to a t t r a c t people to his f a c t i o n . It was asserted that t h i s was based on a confusion between the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 112 materialism that was the basis of the Marxist view of r e a l i t y and the vulgar understanding of materialism as a desire for material possessions. The essence of the accusations against L i n was that he was manipulating Marxist terminology i n the pursuit of f a c t i o n a l ends. 4 3 The accusations against Deng involved broader issues. Deng was accused of advocating "putting p r o f i t s i n command" as a means of stimu-l a t i n g economic development and pushing the economy i n a c a p i t a l i s t d i r e c t i o n . The use of material incentives within the f a c t o r i e s was i d e n t i f i e d as one aspect of a more general p o l i c y . The heart of the argument was that using p r o f i t a b i l i t y as the means to evaluate management and a l l o c a t e investment i n industry would put pressure on managers to use material incentives to increase p r o f i t s by getting the workers to work harder: Very obviously, i f we act according to " p r o f i t s i n command" advocated by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, bourgeois r i g h t s w i l l i n e v i t a b l y follow a pattern of malignant i n f l a t i o n . To pursue p r o f i t s , the leading personnel of c e r t a i n enterprises w i l l n a t u r a l l y exploit t h e i r authority to adopt the dual p o l i c y of the carrot (material incentives) and the big s t i c k ( control, check and suppression) i n a desperate bid to e x p l o i t and squeeze the workers. The broad masses of workers w i l l i n e v i t a b l y be again plunged into the miserable p l i g h t of being exploited and e n s l a v e d . 4 4 This accusation against Deng i s based on an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the con-tents of the "twenty points" which i s not corroborated by a reading of the o r i g i n a l document. 4 5 Deng's c r i t i c s admit that opposition to " p r o f i t s i n command" does not mean negating p r o f i t as one goal of s o c i a l i s t production. The same a r t i c l e as quoted above goes on to say: 113 True, In c r i t i c i z i n g the c a p i t a l i s t p r i n c i p l e of doing business by putting " p r o f i t s i n command", we do not mean that we don't want s o c i a l i s t p r o f i t s . The p r o f i t s r e a l i z e d by the s o c i a l i s t state-run enter-prises are an important source of the f i n a n c i a l income of our state and a main source of s o c i a l i s t accumulation. 1 + 6 The claim was that Deng was making p r o f i t the c e n t r a l overriding goal of production. But i n the passage i n the "twenty po i n t s " that r e f e r s to p r o f i t s i t i s mentioned as one of a number of goals to be f u l f i l l e d by an enterprise. A l l enterprises should get a grip on the following p r i n c i p a l economic and t e c h n i c a l targets: (1) the target of output, (2) the target of v a r i e t y , (3) the target of q u a l i t y , (4) the target of the consumption of raw material, other materials, f u e l and power, (5) the target of labour p r o d u c t i v i t y , (6) the target of cost of production, (7) the target of p r o f i t s , (8) the target of the use of c i r c u l a t i n g funds, and so f o r t h . Not f u l f i l l i n g these targets and not f u l f i l l i n g the contracts of supplying goods according to s p e c i f i e d q u a l i t y , quantity, and schedule cannot be considered as f u l l y carrying out the state p l a n . 4 7 In analyses of material incentives descriptions of the influence of material incentives used i n the f a c t o r i e s before the C u l t u r a l Revolution emphasized how bonuses and piecework s p l i t the working cl a s s into competi-tors for an extra piece of the p i e . Even te c h n i c a l innovation was affected because "the introduction of awards for new products made c e r t a i n people block technical data from each o t h e r " . 4 8 Material incentives were seen as the breeding ground of individualism through which people would think only of personal gain and become slaves to money so that the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between people would become mercenary cash r e l a t i o n s . The i n e v i t a b l e r e -s u l t , i t was asserted, would be a reversion to the c a p i t a l i s t system of ownership. 4 9 For t h i s reason i t was claimed that: 114 To develop production, our s o c i a l i s t state does not r e l y on putting p r o f i t s i n command or material incentives but on Chairman Mao's p r o l e t a r i a n revolu-tionary l i n e , on putting p r o l e t a r i a n p o l i t i c s i n command, on taking class struggle as the key l i n k and on powerful p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l work. This i s fundamental i n running the s o c i a l i s t enterprises w e l l . 5 0 In s p i t e of t h i s claim, material incentives were i n operation i n a number of units during t h i s time. These examples c a l l into question the notion that material and i d e o l o g i c a l conditions for the elimination of material incentives existed i n China at that time. The examples a l l i n -volve work si t u a t i o n s that involved a great deal of physical labor. An i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Huangpu harbor near Guangzhou showed that from 1964-66, when piece work was used, the dockers labor productivity averaged 3,089 tons per year. When piece work was eliminated at the end of 1971 labor productivity dropped to 2,423 tons per year, 72.9% of the e a r l i e r average. Based on t h i s experience piece work was restored i n 1974 and labor pro-d u c t i v i t y rose to i t s e a r l i e r l e v e l s . 5 1 The Guangzhou docks experimented with the elimination of piece work i n 1972 with s i m i l a r r e s u l t s . When piece work was r e i n s t i t u t e d i n 1973, labor p r o d u c t i v i t y rose 25.34%. While workers' average wages went up, the cost of handling each k i l o t o n of goods dropped 4.33% and the accident rate dropped 16.84%. 5 2 An example from the construction industry i n T i a n j i n involved bonuses paid for the return of undamaged paper cement bags. The bags cost the unit f i f t y fen each. A bonus of three fen was given each time a worker returned an undamaged bag. This produced a 60-70% return rate of undamaged bags. When the system was abolished v i r t u a l l y a l l the bags were damaged on f i r s t use. When the old system was restored i n 1974 i t became possible for the unit to save 14,000 yuan with an outlay of 900 yuan for bonuses over the period 1974-76. 5 3 115 Under conditions where mechanization was not highly developed and therefore p r o d u c t i v i t y was more d i r e c t l y correlated to labor input, the imposed "egalitarianism" of straight-time wages produced resentment among the workers who viewed i t as un f a i r . Under the e x i s t i n g conditions p o l i t i c a l awareness could not substitute f or material incentives to keep pr o d u c t i v i t y high. And China could no more afford that loss of producti-v i t y than she could afford the loss of a l l those paper cement bags a f t e r one use. What the elimination of material incentives was producing was a gap between o f f i c i a l p o l i c y and propaganda and the r e a l experience and thinking of the workers. There were hints of t h i s i n the media. The following paragraph appeared i n an a r t i c l e i n People's Daily i n July 1975 about the s i t u a t i o n at the T i a n j i n Railway Station. Some time ago, c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l young workers of the Eastern Goods Yard Workshop tended to compare t h e i r wages rather than comparing t h e i r contributions. To counter t h i s problem, the Party branch launched i n the whole yard a c t i -v i t i e s to prepare statements of accounts about the hardship of slaving as draft animals i n the old society and the happiness as the master of the house i n the new society. Everyone was guided to discuss "how to be a proper master of the s o c i a l i s t enterprise". Education was conducted to foster the great ideals of communism. Everyone was made to see c l e a r l y the h i s t o r i c mission shouldered by the work-ing class and r a i s e consciousness i n working with the communist s p i r i t . The workers said, "We must be the master of the goods yard and can i n no way be the slaves of money. We must devote our time to the p r i n c i p l e of "from each to the best of h i s a b i l i t y " and can i n no way move i n c i r c l e s around "to each according to h i s work". They assiduously studied theory, consciously transformed t h e i r world outlook and feared no hardships i n doing labor. They worked as one man, fought i n unity and o v e r f u l f i l l e d the transportation t a s k . 5 4 116 This i n s p i r i n g story hid a less i n s p i r i n g r e a l i t y that I became aware of working i n the B e i j i n g Machine Tool Plant. The focus of p o l i -t i c a l study at that time was the movement to study the theory of the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t . One topic of discussion was the example of bourgeois r i g h t inherent i n the eight-grade wage system. The system operated i d e a l l y as follows. As a worker b u i l t up his or her s e n i o r i t y and s k i l l s , he or she was moved up the scale.getting higher wages. In t h i s factory the scale went from t h i r t y - s i x yuan to one hundred and eight yuan per month. The t h e o r e t i c a l point was that two workers on the same l e v e l earning equal pay according to the formula "to each according to his work" could have unequal needs. Thus the wage system was an example of bourgeois r i g h t because apparent equality hid r e a l i n e q u a l i t y . This holdover from bourgeois society would one day be replaced i n communist society by a system of d i s t r i b u t i o n according to need. This discussion provided an opening for the workers to r a i s e ques-tions about wages and needs. What had happened was that, when material incentives had become a p o l i t i c a l issue during the C u l t u r a l Revolution, disagreement over wages p o l i c y at the center led to a freezing of the system. This meant that remuneration i n each of the l e v e l s did not i n -crease and i n d i v i d u a l s no longer moved up the scale as they accumulated experience or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The center made some improvements i n 1971. Workers who began work before 1958 were moved up one l e v e l but anyone who had entered the factory since 1966 could not get past the second l e v e l . Since the wage rates for the f i r s t two l e v e l s were based on the assumption that the young worker was s t i l l l i v i n g with his or her family, the wages 117 were not s u f f i c i e n t for workers who were older, independent and t r y i n g to r a i s e a f a m i l y . 5 5 This i s what the workers were interested i n d i s -cussing. They were concerned with achieving the "equality" of bourgeois r i g h t f i r s t and then discussing how to move beyond i t . It was explained to them that f i r s t i t was necessary to gain a clear understanding of the theory. S p e c i f i c s could be discussed at some l a t e r stage of the movement. It was Yao Wenyuan with h i s widely promulgated and studied essay "On the S o c i a l Basis of the L i n Biao Clique" who had argued most strongly for the r e s t r i c t i o n of bourgeois r i g h t . Yao argued that "the existence of bourgeois r i g h t provides an important economic foundation for t h e i r [new bourgeois elements R.H.] emergence". 5 5 I r o n i c a l l y , Yao goes on to quote Lenin to prove h i s case: Lenin said, "... i n the f i r s t phase of communist society (usually c a l l e d socialism) 'bourgeois r i g h t ' i s not abolished i n i t s e n t i r e t y , but only i n part, only i n proportion to the economic revol u t i o n so f a r attained, i e . , only i n respect of the means of pro-duction ... However, i t continues to e x i s t as f a r as i t s other part i s concerned: i t continues to exist i n the capacity of regulator (determining factor) i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of products and the allotment of labour among the members of society. The s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e : 'He who does not work, neither s h a l l he eat', i s already r e a l i z e d ; the other s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e : 'An equal amount of products for an equal amount of labour', i s also already r e a l i z e d . But t h i s i s not yet communism, and i t does not yet abolish 'bourgeois r i g h t ' , which gives to unequal i n d i v i d u a l s , i n return for unequal ( a c t u a l l y unequal) amounts of labour, equal amounts of p r o d u c t s " . 5 7 Lenin, however, l i k e the workers at the machine t o o l plant, was a c t u a l l y arguing that the task of socialism was to r e a l i z e , safeguard and guarantee the p r i n c i p l e of bourgeois r i g h t promised but never f u l l y r e a l -ised i n bourgeois s o c i e t i e s . This i s evident i n the text immediately 118 following the paragraphs quoted out of context by Yao Wenyuan. Lenin continues as follows: This i s a "defect", says Marx, but i t i s unavoid-able i n the f i r s t phase of Communism; for i f we are not to indulge i n utopianism, we must not think that having overthrown capitalism people w i l l at once learn to work for society without any standard of r i g h t ; and indeed the a b o l i t i o n of cap i t a l i s m does not immediately  create the economic premises for such a change. And there i s no other standard than that of "bour-geois r i g h t " . To th i s extent, therefore, there s t i l l remains the need for a state, which, while safeguarding the public ownership of the means of production, would safeguard equality i n labour and equality i n the d i s -t r i b u t i o n of products. The state withers away i n so f a r as there are no longer any c a p i t a l i s t s , any classes, and consequently, no class can be suppressed. But the state has not yet completely withered away, since there s t i l l remains the safeguarding of "bour-geois r i g h t " , which s a n c t i f i e s actual i n e q u a l i t y . For the state to wither away completely complete Communism i s necessary. 5 8 Yao Wenyuan repeatedly associates bourgeois r i g h t with "bourgeois influence", " c a p i t a l i s t ideas of making a fortune", "speculation, graft and corruption, theft and bribery". Thus workers were surprised to learn that "to each according to t h e i r labor" was based on "bourgeois r i g h t " . Their confusion was described by one worker at the machine t o o l plant. 119 In studying Marx's C r i t i q u e of the Gotha Program there was a question of how to understand the nature of d i s t r i b u t i o n i n the s o c i a l i s t system. Why did Marx and Engels say that the s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e of "from each according to t h e i r a b i l i t y , to each according,to t h e i r work" was an a p p l i c a t i o n of bourgeois r i g h t which continues to exi s t i n s o c i a l i s t society? Many older workers compared the system of d i s t r i b u t i o n before l i b e r a t i o n with the present. They described how the workers wages could never keep up with the rampant i n f l a t i o n under Chiang Kai-shek. In the end, they sai d , paper money was worth less than t o i l e t paper. They argued how can th i s s i t u a t i o n be compared with the present when wages have been s t e a d i l y r i s i n g and prices have remained stable and even dropped on some commodi-ti e s ? They said that the system of money exchange under capitalism had p r o f i t s as i t s center, under socialism i t had people as i t s center. They were as d i f f e r e n t as night and day. They said the c a p i t a l i s t s ' and landlords' wealth was not p