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The structure of cabinet government in Canada, 1968-72 : an assessment Zitko, Carley F. 1981

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THE STRUCTURE OF CABINET GOVERNMENT IN CANADA, 1968-72: An Assessment by CARLEY F. ZITKO B.A. , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1969 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ;""ART'S • i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1981 Carley F. Zi.tko In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Li b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I further agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives. It i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The Uni v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date: January 23, 1981 Abstract During the 1968-1972 period attempts were made to introduce ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' into the structures and processes of the Canadian Cabinet. I t has usually been argued that these attempts by Prime Minister Trudeau provide an innovative and r a d i c a l l y d i s t i n c t depar-ture from the ' d i v e r s i f i e d incrementalism' or 'crises management' decision-making under Prime Minis t e r Pearson. Is the usual argument correct? This question i s dealt with by examining i n turn the r o l e of the Cabinet and the Prime Min i s t e r , the development of the committee system (with emphasis upon the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and Planning), the place of the Treausury Board and e s p e c i a l l y of the Treasury Board Se c r e t a r i a t , the r o l e of the Cabinet Secr e t a r i a t , and the r o l e of the Prime Minister's O f f i c e . The c r u c i a l difference between o f f i c i a l actions and p o l i t i c a l actions i s underscored i n t h i s examination. While the 1968-72 changes did e s t a b l i s h , a more r a t i o n a l basis for decision-making, and may thus be seen as innovative, the changes did not amount to any r a d i c a l departure — and, indeed, they were them-selves the product of an incremental approach to change. While Prime Minister Trudeau presented the changes i n terms of a philosophy of r a t i o n a l i t y , the actual changes must be seen as incremental extensions of changes which Prime Minister Pearson began. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION 1 Notes 7 CHAPTER I THE PRINCIPLES OF CABINET GOVERNMENT 9 Notes 21 CHAPTER I I THE CABINET COMMITTEE SYSTEM 25 I n t r o d u c t i o n 25 A. The System 1. 1940-1968 26 2. 1968-1972 31 B. The C a b i n e t Committees 35 1. The C a b i n e t Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g 38 2. The C a b i n e t Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n and House P l a n n i n g 45 3. The C a b i n e t Committee on F e d e r a l -P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s 47 4. The C a b i n e t Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board 48 Summary 53 O r g a n i z a t i o n C h a r t 55 Notes 56 i i i CHAPTER I I I THE CABINET SECRETARIAT 61 I n t r o d u c t i o n 61 A. H i s t o r i c a l Development 61 B. The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e : 1968-72 1. O r g a n i z a t i o n 66 2. Cabi n e t Documents 70 3. Procedures f o r Cabi n e t D e c i s i o n -Making 75 Summary 84 O r g a n i z a t i o n Chart 87 Notes 88 CHAPTER IV THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE 92 I n t r o d u c t i o n 92 Summary 104 O r g a n i z a t i o n Chart 107 Notes 108 CHAPTER V THE TREASURY BOARD SECRETARIAT 111 I n t r o d u c t i o n 111 T r a d i t i o n a l Role of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t 111 The P l a n n i n g Branch 119 Summary 128 Notes 130 CONCLUSION 132 Notes 139 BIBLIOGRAPHY i v LIST OF FIGURES Page 1 Organization Chart: Standing Committees 55 of Committee and Supporting I n s t i t u -tions 2 Organization Chart: Privy O f f i c e , 1971 87 3 The Prime Minister's O f f i c e Organization 107 Chart, July 1971 v PREFACE The f i n a l assessment o f P i e r r e E l l i o t Trudeau's i n f l u e n c e on the n a t u r e of the Canadian C a b i n e t system remains u n d e c i d e d f o r i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o j u d g e , or e v a l u a t e , something w h i c h i s not y e t com p l e t e . F u r t h e r , t h a t f i n a l assessment w i l l r e q u i r e a l o n g e r term h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e r e i s , t o - d a y , a c o n s i d e r a b l e body of l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g w i t h the "Trudeau Y e a r s . " And t h e r e a re two major q u e s t i o n s emanating from t h i s l i t e r a t u r e . F i r s t , t o what e x t e n t has Trudeau succeeded i n b r i n g i n g the co n c e r n s of r a t i o n a l i t y t o the s t r u c t u r e of C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ? And s e c o n d l y , has Trudeau a l t e r e d the n a t u r e of Prime M i n i s t e r i a l power and e x e c u t i v e g o v e r n -ment i n Canada? I n the c o n t e x t of these two q u e s t i o n s , t h i s t h e s i s examines the changes i n C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w h i c h o c c u r r e d i n the p e r i o d 1968-72. The f i r s t Trudeau regime o f f e r s us a s p e c i f i c p e r i o d t o examine. I t was a p e r i o d when t h e r e appeared t o be a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t to implement the concept of r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g at the e x e c u t i v e l e v e l . The f i r s t Trudeau regime i s almost a decade o l d and t h i s time frame p e r m i t s us a c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . As w e l l , many of the people who were a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the f i r s t Trudeau regime have now w r i t t e n about t h i s p e r i o d . These f a c t o r s t o g e t h e r g i v e us the b a s i s f o r a r e a s o n a b l e judgement and assessment of the p e r i o d . The second b a s i s f o r t h i s work i s t h a t f o r the p a s t seven y e a r s v i I have worked i n government and have had a f i r s t hand l o o k a t the o p e r a t i o n s of government. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , f o r the p a s t t h r e e y e a r s I have had a d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the l e g i s l a t i v e s i d e of g o v e r n -ment as the P a r l i a m e n t a r y L i a i s o n O f f i c e r f o r the Department of the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e . I n t h i s p o s i t i o n I have d e a l t w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , M i n i s t e r s ' O f f i c e s , and the House of Commons. T h i s e x p e r i e n c e has enabled me t o c o n s i d e r the changes t h a t s u p p o s e d l y o c c u r r e d i n t h i s e a r l i e r p e r i o d and wh i c h some pe o p l e c o n s i d e r r a d i c a l . G i v e n my p o s i t i o n and e x p e r i e n c e i n government I have been a b l e to draw upon an academic l i t e r a t u r e , government documents and f i r s t hand o b s e r v a t i o n as w e l l as i n t e r v i e w s as a b a s i s f o r t h i s work. Some of the m a t e r i a l c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s t h e s i s d e s c r i b e s a s p e c t s o r p r o c e s s e s of government o p e r a t i o n s i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l and cannot be found i n any of the a v a i l a b l e academic l i t e r a t u r e . T h i s l a t t e r m a t e r i a l i s based upon my p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e and o b s e r v a t i o n s . v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS W h i l e the s h o r t c o m i n g s of t h i s t h e s i s b e l o n g t o the a u t h o r a l o n e , t h e r e a r e many people w i t h o u t whose encouragement t h i s t h e s i s would not have been c o m p l e t e d . My g r a t i t u d e t o the Department of the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r g r a n t i n g me l e a v e of absence t o w r i t e t h i s t h e s i s . And my h e a r t -f e l t thank you t o P r o f e s s o r Howard A s t e r , who p r o v i d e d the o r i g i n a l impetus t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s p r o j e c t and the c o n t i n u o u s encouragement to f i n i s h i t . My g r a t i t u d e must a l s o be extended t o Dr. P a u l Tennant f o r h i s s u p e r v i s i o n o f the t h e s i s from a f a r and t o the Department of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e f o r p e r m i t t i n g my extended e n r o l m e n t . I must a l s o e x t e n d my g r a t i t u d e t o the many pe o p l e who gave me t h e i r time f o r i n t e r v i e w s and the b e n e f i t of t h e i r i n s i g h t s and e x p e r i e n c e . And, t o thos e s p e c i a l p e o p l e who s t o o d by me w i t h t h e i r i n t e r e s t and c o n s t a n t encouragement, go my unspoken but g r a t e f u l thank you. v i i i INTRODUCTION The b a s i c f u n c t i o n of any p o l i t i c a l system i s the r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . ^ I n Canada, the C a b i n e t i s the i n s t r u m e n t by w h i c h c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s a r e r e s o l v e d . The C a b i n e t i s the p o l i t i c a l e x e c u t i v e . I t i s where the p o l i t i c a l , p o r t f o l i o and p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s of M i n i s t e r s i n t e r a c t . The C a b i n e t i s the c r u c i a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g forum of our p o l i t i c a l system. By the e a r l y 1960's, the p o l i t i c a l e x e c u t i v e , o r g a n i z e d as the C a b i n e t , f a c e d i n c r e a s i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s and was unable to h a n d l e not o n l y the r e c u r r i n g c r i s e s of modern s o c i e t y but a l s o the a d m i n i s -t r a t i o n of the complex o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t i s the f e d e r a l government. Moreover, the " e r a of the i n d i v i d u a l " ^ i n the p o l i c y p r o c e s s , w h i c h had endured t h r o u g h o u t the h i s t o r y of Canada, had v a n i s h e d . A f t e r the second World War, government i n Canada had changed d r a m a t i c a l l y . I n response t o the r e v o l u t i o n of r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s , the scope of government a c t i v i t y had expanded r a p i d l y . Government was now a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n the w i d e r range of s o c i a l , economic and c u l t u r a l a f f a i r s r a t h e r than a c t i n g as a p a s s i v e r e g u l a t o r y body as i t had i n the p a s t . W h i l e t h i s growth i n government was d r a m a t i c , i t was a l s o ad hoc, l a c k i n g coherence i n p o l i c i e s and programs. The subsequent r e s u l t s were f r e q u e n t l y w a s t e f u l and c o u n t e r - p r o d u c t i v e . As w e l l , t h e r e was l e s s and l e s s p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n , even p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l , from the C a b i n e t over the massive and complex mechanism of government. F i n a l l y , b i g and complex government had l e d t o a mud d l i n g 1 2 of o b j e c t i v e s and the C a b i n e t was f a c e d w i t h r e c u r r i n g f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s w hich made i t apparent t h a t a system of p r i o r i t i e s was r e q u i r e d f o r l o n g - t e r m planning.-^ However, s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h the e x p a n s i o n of the r o l e and c o m p l e x i t y of government and the p r e s s u r e on the C a b i n e t t o f o r m a l i z e i t s p r i o r i t i e s and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p o l i c i e s came a r e v o l u t i o n i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s ^ — c o n c e p t s of c y b e r n e t i c s , m o d e l l i n g , systems a n a l y s i s , t e c h n o l o g i c a l f o r e c a s t i n g and f u t u r o l o g y . P o l i t i c i a n s , s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s and b u r e a u c r a t s were o p t i m i s t i c t h a t the know-ledge emerging from t h e s e forms of a n a l y s i s would be e f f e c t i v e i n the s o l u t i o n of p u b l i c problems. R a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of p o l i c y now became a p o s s i b i l i t y . The e l e c t i o n of P i e r r e E l l i o t Trudeau i n 1968 s y m b o l i z e d Canada's hope f o r r a t i o n a l i t y i n government p o l i c y - m a k i n g . But what i s " r a t i o n a l i t y " i n the c o n t e x t of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g or po 1 i c y - m a k i n g ? D i d the. new vogue of " r a t i o n a l i t y " i m p l y t h a t d e c i s i o n s u n t i l t h i s time had been a r r i v e d a t i n an i r r a t i o n a l f a s h i o n ? The s t r a t e g y of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g most commonly f o l l o w e d by p u b l i c d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s u n t i l t h i s time was c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " d i s j o i n t e d i n c r e m e t a l i s m . " 6 T h i s s t r a t e g y encompasses a s e r i e s of a c t i o n s i n which those who were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a r r i v i n g a t d e c i s i o n s "muddled t h r o u g h " a l i m i t e d number of c l o s e l y - r e l a t e d a l t e r n a t i v e s ( t h a t i s , i n c r e m e n t a l l y r a t h e r than q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t ) w i t h o u t e v a l u a t i n g a l l the p o s s i b l e r a m i f i c a t i o n s and consequences of each a l t e r n a t i v e . P o l i c i e s : or programs t h a t i n t e r r e l a t e d e i t h e r t h r o u g h s i m i l a r o b j e c t i v e s , i m p l e m e n t a t i o n s , or consequences were not examined. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , p o l i c i e s were d e v e l o p e d i n a d i s j o i n t e d manner. I n t h i s 3 c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of p o l i c y - m a k i n g , d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s assumed t h a t the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of p o l i c i e s and t h e i r outcomes c o u l d not be e x p l o r e d or p r e d i c t e d f u l l y — nor d i d they p l a c e a h i g h p r i o r i t y on o v e r -coming such l i m i t a t i o n s . The new emphasis on r a t i o n a l i t y i n the c o n t e x t of p o l i c y -making was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a s c i e n t i f i c approach t o p o l i c y - m a k i n g . I n f o r m a t i o n c o u l d now be g a t h e r e d to p e r m i t the s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s of c h o i c e s and consequences. Most s o c i e t a l d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s most of the time have o n l y a p a r t of the i n f o r m a t i o n they would need i n o r d e r t o examine a l l of the r e l e v a n t consequences of the v a r i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s . As a r u l e , they do not even know what i n f o r m a t i o n they h o l d o r i t s v a l i d i t y . Nor do they have the a s s e t s o r time t o c o l l e c t more than an a d d i t i o n a l f r a c t i o n of the needed i n f o r m a t i o n . 7 T h i s l a c k , o r d e p r i v a t i o n , of i n f o r m a t i o n , or knowledge, c o u l d now h o p e f u l l y be remedied by new t e c h n o l o g y and i n f o r m a t i o n systems. The s c i e n t i f i c approach c o n s t i t u t e d "a main e f f o r t t o r e a s s e r t the r o l e of i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m and r a t i o n a l i s m i n g u i d i n g human d e s t i n y . " 8 P i e r r e Trudeau was c o n s i d e r e d t o be a man of i n t e l l e c t u a l s t r e n g t h and an adv o c a t e of r e a s o n and r a t i o n a l i t y . 9 He lamented the f a c t t h a t governments o n l y p e r c e i v e d problems as they a r o s e , "never f i n d i n g time t o l o o k a t non-urgent but e x t r a - o r d i n a r i l y i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s w hich would become u r g e n t i n t h r e e of f i v e y e a r ' s time and wh i c h perhaps would be p r e t t y w e l l beyond s o l u t i o n . " - ^ As e a r l y as 1964, he had i n d i c a t e d h i s p r e d i s p o s i t i o n to r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g when he s t a t e d t h a t ...the s t a t e . . . w i l l need p o l i t i c a l i n s t r u m e n t s w h i c h a re s h a r p e r , s t r o n g e r , and more f i n e l y 4 c o n t r o l l e d . . . s u c h t o o l s w i l l be made up of an advanced t e c h n o l o g y and s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . . . i f not a pure p r o d u c t of r e a s o n , the p o l i t i c a l t o o l s of the f u t u r e w i l l be d e s i g n e d and a p p r a i s e d by more r a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s t h a n a n y t h i n g we are c u r r e n t l y u s i n g i n Canada t o d a y . ^ I n 1 9 6 8 , when P i e r r e Trudeau became Prime M i n i s t e r , t h e r e were grounds to b e l i e v e t h a t government d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c o u l d become r a t i o n a l . The new Prime M i n i s t e r endorsed the t e c h n i q u e s o f c y b e r n e t i c s and he s t a t e d t h a t w i t h the r e f i n e m e n t of our t e c h n i q u e s f o r f o r e -c a s t i n g and p l a n n i n g we are coming t o r e a l i z e t h a t the image we h o l d of our f u t u r e i s i t s e l f an i m p o r t a n t element of t h a t f u t u r e . ^ I t was no s u r p r i s e t h e r e f o r e , t h a t d u r i n g the p e r i o d of the f i r s t Trudeau a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1 9 6 8 - 7 2 , t h e r e were many changes w i t h i n the machinery of government i n an attempt t o make r a t i o n a l i t y the b a s i s of government p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . There was a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t t o b r i n g "top-down" p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s and t o c o o r d i n a t e the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e f o r p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s . These e f f o r t s were r e f l e c t e d i n a s e r i e s of changes i n government s t r u c t u r e s : the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of M i n i s t r i e s of S t a t e to improve p o l i c y c o o r d i n a t i o n ; the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new more r a t i o n a l M i n i s t r i e s such as R e g i o n a l Economic E x p a n s i o n , Energy Mines and R e s o u r c e s , and Environment; the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new independent s o u r c e s of p o l i c y such as the I n s t i t u t e f o r Res e a r c h on P u b l i c P o l i c y ; and, the m y r i a d o f p o l i c y r e v i e w s t o examine the r a t i o n a l i t y of e x i s t i n g p o l i c y and programs. But most i m p o r t a n t , an attempt was made to r a t i o n a l i z e the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t e c h n i q u e s of C a b i n e t g o v e r n -ment i t s e l f . I n f a c t , some commentators c o n s i d e r t h a t one of Prime 5 M i n i s t e r Trudeau's most d i s t i n c t i v e p e r s o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o Canadian government has been the f o r m a l i z a t i o n of a system of C a b i n e t Committees and the concommittant changes i n the s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s 13 of the C a b i n e t . These changes, p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e l a t i n g t o the C a b i n e t Committee system and the s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s of the C a b i n e t and the Prime M i n i s t e r , d i d , i n d e e d , a f f e c t the C a b i n e t and, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , t h a t f o r t h e s e same changes Trudeau has been accused of removing power from the c o l l e c t i v e C a b i n e t and c o n c e n t r a -t i n g i t i n the hands of the Prime M i n i s t e r and h i s a d v i s o r s . T h i s t h e s i s examines the s t r u c t u r a l and p r o c e d u r a l changes of C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1968-72. These changes are i m p o r t a n t f o r they c o n s t i t u t e what has been termed " m e t a p o l i c i e s " i n the w o r l d of p o l i c y s c i e n c e s ^ , t h a t i s , p o l i c i e s on p o l i c y - m a k i n g or p o l i c i e s d e a l i n g w i t h the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system. T h i s type of p o l i c y has a l s o been termed " p o s i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s " 1 6 whereby, as opposed t o a l l o c a t i v e p o l i c i e s , the o u t p u t s a f f e c t the s t r u c t u r e of i n f l u e n c e i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system. E s s e n t i a l l y , p o l i c y s c i e n t i s t s c o n s i d e r the r e d e s i g n i n g of the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system n e c e s s a r y because i n n o v a t i v e p o l i c y recommendations ... have l i t t l e chance of b e i n g c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d , adopted, implemented and r e v i s e d u n l e s s the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system d e v e l o p s new c a p a c i t i e s f o r c r e a t i v i t y , c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and feedback.^ 7 The p e r i o d 1968-72 was i m p o r t a n t because i t was the p e r i o d of the f i r s t Trudeau a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a p e r i o d when, q u i t e u n d e r s t a n d a b l y , the new l e a d e r made changes to the system t h a t were most c o m p a t i b l e to h i s p e r s o n a l s t y l e of management. 6 However, i n recommending changes i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system, p o l i c y s c i e n t i s t s a re adamant t h a t t h e s e changes must be r a d i c a l . A l s o r e q u i r e d are s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a x a t i o n of p r e s e n t c o n s t r a i n t s on p o l i c i e s , i n c l u d i n g , i n p a r t i c u l a r , p o l i t i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . New p a t t e r n s of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g are needed, wh i c h i n t u r n r e q u i r e changes i n most of the elements of the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system; i n c l u d i n g p e r s o n n e l , s t r u c t u r e , " r u l e s of the games," equipment and, perhaps most i m p o r t a n t of a l l , " p o l i c y - m a k i n g c u l t u r e . " 18 Trudeau was d e a l i n g w i t h not o n l y the " p o l i c y - m a k i n g c u l t u r e " but e s s e n t i a l l y the Canadian system of government. To what e x t e n t d i d the changes t h a t he implemented i n c o r p o r a t e new c a p a c i t i e s f o r the i n t e g r a t i o n and c r e a t i v e use of i n f o r m a t i o n ? To what e x t e n t d i d Trudeau change the " p o l i c y - m a k i n g c u l t u r e " and d i d t h e s e changes b r i n g r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t o the C a b i n e t ? I n a t t e m p t i n g t o a s s e s s the p e r i o d 1968-72, t h i s t h e s i s w i l l f i r s t o u t l i n e the p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t government i n Canada. I t w i l l then go on t o d i s c u s s the changes i n C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and t o a s s e s s the impact of t h o s e changes. A l s o examined i s the development of the C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e and t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n , as s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . And f i n a l l y , the t h e s i s i n c l u d e s an e x a m i n a t i o n of the developments t h a t o c c u r r e d i n t h i s p e r i o d i n the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t - an agency t h a t had a key r o l e i n the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . 7 NOTES: INTRODUCTION 1 T h i s statement i s fundamental to c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n t h e o r y . For a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n see A n a t o l Rappoport, F i g h t s , Games and Debates (Ann A r b o r , U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n P r e s s , 1967) and Lewis Coser, The F u n c t i o n of S o c i a l C o n f l i c t (Glencoe, 111., Free P r e s s , 1956). 2 For a d i s c u s s i o n of the " e r a of the i n d i v i d u a l " i n government p o l i c y - m a k i n g see M. K i r b y , H. Kroeker, and W. Teschke, "The Impact of P u b l i c P o l i c y - M a k i n g S t r u c t u r e s and P r o c e s s e s i n Canada" Canadian  P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 21 (1978), p. 407. 3 T h i s p e r c e p t i o n of government a c t i v i t y i n t h i s p e r i o d i s shared by many commentators. The d e f i n i t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n i s found i n M i c h a e l P i t f i e l d , "The Shape of Government i n the 1980's" Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 19 (1976), p. 10. 4 D a n i e l L e r n e r and H a r o l d D. L a s s w e l l , eds., The P o l i c y  S c i e n c e s : Recent Developments i n Scope and Methods ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1951). See a l s o H a r o l d L a s s w e l l , A P r e - view of P o l i c y S c i e n c e s (New York: American E l s e v i e r P u b l i s h i n g , 1971). 5 " P o l i c y - m a k i n g i s a form of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n which whole s e t s of d e c i s i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d and the c o n t e x t s f o r d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g b i t s are reviewed. I t i s not t h a t c o n t e x t s are never c o n s i d e r e d when a s i n g l e , e s p e c i a l l y important d e c i s i o n i s made, but t h e i r c r i t i c a l e xamination i s l i k e l y to be more e x t e n s i v e i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p o l i c y . P o l i c y - m a k i n g i s , hence, b e s t viewed as more g e n e r a l i z e d and, i n t h i s sense, more a b s t r a c t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . In the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g r e f e r s to both d e c i s i o n -and p o l i c y - m a k i n g . " A m i t a i E t z i o n i , The A c t i v e S o c i e t y (New York: The Free P r e s s , 1968), p. 252. 6 The term " i n c r e m e n t a l i s m " has been w i d e l y u t i l i z e d to c h a r a c t e r i z e a p a r t i c u l a r approach to d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and p o l i c y -making. " I n c r e m e n t a l i s m " i s b e s t e x p l a i n e d i n C. Lindblom and D. Braybooke, A S t r a t e g y of D e c i s i o n (London: Free P r e s s , 1963), Chapter 5. The term i s used e x t e n s i v e l y i n G. Bruce Doern and P. A u c o i n , eds., The S t r u c t u r e s of P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n Canada (To r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n of Canada, 1971), Chapter 1. I t s h o u l d be noted t h a t Lindblom, i n p a r t i c u l a r , uses i n c r e m e n t a l i s m as a p r e s c r i p t i v e method of d e c i s i o n -making. However, the use of the term i n t h i s t h e s i s i s d e s c r i p t i v e and does not i n c l u d e a v a l u e judgement. E t z i o n i , op. c i t . , p. 265. 8 I b i d . pp. 252-266. 9 See f o r example Trudeau's essays i n F e d e r a l i s m and the French Canadians ( T o r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n of Canada, 1968). These essays were w r i t t e n over a l e n g t h y p e r i o d of time but they a l l b e t r a y Trudeau's p r e d i s p o s i t i o n towards " r a t i o n a l i t y " . 1° I n t e r v i e w w i t h G e r a l d C l a r k , M o n t r e a l S t a r , Dec. 1, 1969, c i t e d i n George Radwanski, Trudeau ( T o r o n t o : New American L i b r a r y , 1978), p. 145. H P i e r r e Trudeau, The C o n s t i t u t i o n and the People of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , 1969), p. 2. 12 Canada, Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , Notes f o r Remarks by the Prime M i n i s t e r at the H a r r i s o n L i b e r a l Conference, November 21, 1969. 13 R i c h a r d F r e n c h , How Ottawa Decides ( T o r o n t o : James L o r i m e r , 1980), p. 3. See a l s o George Radwanski, op. c i t . , Chapter 8. 14 For the most v i t r i o l i c account see Walter Stewart, Shrug, Trudeau i n Power ( T o r o n t o : New P r e s s , 1971). For a more academic p e r s p e c t i v e see Denis Smith, " P r e s i d e n t and P a r l i a m e n t : The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n of P a r l i a m e n t a r y Government i n Canada" and Joseph Wearing, " P r e s i d e n t or Prime M i n i s t e r " both i n Thomas Hockin, ed., Apex of Power 2nd e d i t i o n (Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1977). 15-See Yeh e z k e l Dror, Design f o r P o l i c y S c i e n c e s (New York: American E l s e v i e r , 1971) Chapter 11. See a l s o Y. Dror, P u b l i c P o l i c y m a k i n g Reexamined (San F r a n c i s c o : Chandler P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1968), p. 172. l ^ G. Bruce Doern and P. A u c o i n , op. c i t . , p. 25. 17 Dror, Design f o r P o l i c y S c i e n c e s , op. c i t . , p. 74. 1 8 I b i d . CHAPTER I : PRINCIPLES OF CABINET GOVERNMENT I n o r d e r to f u l l y a s s e s s the changes which o c c u r r e d w i t h i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e of C a b i n e t from 1968-72, an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the b a s i s of what i s the C a b i n e t and how i t a r r i v e s a t i t s a u t h o r i t y i s n e c e s s a r y . The l e g a l a u t h o r i t y of the C a b i n e t i s d e r i v e d from our B r i t i s h h e r i t a g e but the Canadian C a b i n e t i s a l s o a r e f l e c t i o n of the d i v e r s i t i e s and d i f f i c u l t i e s of the c o u n t r y i t s e l f . The C a b i n e t f u n c t i o n s as the p o l i t i c a l e x e c u t i v e and l i k e o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s of our p a r l i a m e n t a r y t r a d i t i o n , the Canadian C a b i n e t has e v o l v e d t o en-compass g r e a t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s than the l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n the B r i t i s h N o r t h A m e r i c a A c t . But what i s the l e g a l b a s i s f o r C a b i n e t a u t h o r i t y ? I n Great B r i t a i n , the C a b i n e t , per s e , has no l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n . - ' - I t i s not 2 mentioned a t a l l i n the B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n . A l t h o u g h the B r i t i s h N o r t h American A c t does not mention the C a b i n e t , s p e c i f i c p r e r o g a t i v e s 3 have d e v o l v e d t o the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l and the G o v e r n o r - i n - C o u n c i l . F u r t h e r , the C a b i n e t as a body i s alm o s t c o m p l e t e l y i g n o r e d by 4 Canadian s t a t u t e s . I t i s S e c t i o n s I I I , a r t i c l e s n i n e , e l e v e n and t h i r t e e n of the B r i t i s h N o r t h A m erica A c t which provide, the b a s i s f o r the a u t h o r i t y of C a b i n e t government i n Canada. I t i s s t a t e d t h a t e x e c u t i v e power s h a l l c o n t i n u e t o be v e s t e d i n the Queen i n the p e r s o n of the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l ^ and t h e r e s h a l l be. a c o u n c i l " t o a i d and advise." and " t o be s t y l e d the Queen's P r i v y C o u n c i l f o r Canada." The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y of the C a b i n e t i s 9 10 therefore derived from the f a c t that the Cabinet i s a Committee of the Queen's P r i v y Council for Canada and, as such, tenders advice to Her Majesty's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , the Governor-General.^ Today, of course, the Cabinet does not simply tender advice to the Governor-General; i t makes d e c i s i o n s . The achievement of responsible government has t r a n s f e r r e d e f f e c t i v e a u t h o r i t y from the Governor-General to the Cabinet.^ While the B r i t i s h North America Act maintains the Governor-General and the Queen as the Head of State, "the most s t r i k i n g feature of the Canadian form of government i s un-doubtedly the s u p e r f i c i a l a bsurdity of the dual nature of executive power." Yet i t i s t h i s d i v i s i o n that Walter Bagehot c a l l e d the "myth and r e a l i t y " , the d i f f e r e n c e between the " d i g n i f i e d p a r t s " and the " e f f i c i e n t p a r t " of government — "those by which i t i n f a c t , 9 works and r u l e s . " I t i s evident that the " e f f i c i e n t " part of the Canadian government today i s the Prime M i n i s t e r and h i s Cabinet"^ — they occupy the apex of power. Although i t lacks any l e g a l s t a t u s , the Cabinet simply dons i t s cloak as the P r i v y Council when i t wishes to assume formal powers. The foregoing has been an explanation of the l e g a l a u t h o r i t y of Cabinet. But what i s the Cabinet? How does i t maintains the confidence of the e l e c t o r a t e ? And how does i t f u n c t i o n as a c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n -making body? The p o s i t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r i n Canada i s pre-eminent i n the Cabinet system and i t i s often c i t e d as "primus i n t e r pares". The Prime M i n i s t e r i s the l i n k between the " e f f i c i e n t " p a r t , the 11 C a b i n e t , and the " d i g n i f i e d " p a r t , the Gove r n o r - G e n e r a l . The Prime M i n i s t e r i s s e l e c t e d by the Governor-General to form a C a b i n e t on the b a s i s of h i s a b i l i t y to m a i n t a i n the c o n f i d e n c e o f , or a m a j o r i t y i n , the House of Commons. The Prime M i n i s t e r , w i t h o u t doubt, has always been the s i n g l e dominant f i g u r e i n Canadian p o l i t i c s . While the Prime M i n i s t e r l a c k s a f o r m a l , l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n of h i s 12 a u t h o r i t y , t h e r e are s e v e r a l f a c t o r s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s power base. The Prime M i n i s t e r d e r i v e s h i s power from a v a r i e t y of elements i n the p o l i t i c a l system. These elements are h i s p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , h i s C a b i n e t c o l l e a g u e s , the House of Commons, the machinery of government th a t i s the bureaucracy, and the p u b l i c , through the media. To the e x t e n t t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r d e r i v e s h i s power from these elements, he i s a l s o dependent upon them f o r c o n t i n u i n g to p r o v i d e t h e i r s u p p o r t . The q u e s t i o n i s how does he m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l of these elements? U s u a l l y , the Prime M i n i s t e r i s the master of h i s p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . He was e l e c t e d the l e a d e r of the p a r t y by vote at a n a t i o n a l conven-t i o n . As Prime M i n i s t e r , he has won the l a s t e l e c t i o n and h i s p a r t y has won more se a t s i n the House of Commons than t h e i r opponents. As the e s s e n t i a l purpose of any p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i s to be i n power, the p a r t y i s dependent upon the Prime M i n i s t e r and h i s Cabi n e t to develop p o l i c i e s which w i l l ensure t h a t p u b l i c p e r c e p t i o n s w i l l guarantee r e -e l e c t i o n . As the Prime M i n i s t e r i s the most v i s i b l e p o l i t i c i a n to the p u b l i c , h i s importance i s m a g n i f i e d . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i f p e r c e p t i o n s are that the Prime M i n i s t e r w i l l be unable to m a i n t a i n the p a r t y ' s s u c c e s s , he w i l l be r e p l a c e d at another c o n v e n t i o n . The Prime 12 M i n i s t e r a l s o c o n t r o l s h i s p a r t y through appointments to Boards and Commissions t h a t are the b a s i s of p o l i t i c a l patronage. The Prime M i n i s t e r d e r i v e s some power from h i s C a b i n e t . The Cabinet i n Canada i s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of r e g i o n a l , 13 r e l i g i o u s , economic, o c c u p a t i o n a l , and c u l t u r a l group i n t e r e s t s . In t h i s way i t i s one of- the forums of the adjustment p r o c e s s i n the f e d e r a l system and p r o v i d e s support to the Prime M i n i s t e r as the head of t h a t f e d e r a t i o n . The Prime M i n i s t e r cannot c o n s i s t e n t l y o v e r r i d e h i s C a b i n e t e i t h e r as a body, or h i s M i n i s t e r s i n d i v i d u a l l y when they are a c t i n g out t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r o l e s i n the adjustment p r o c e s s . The Prime M i n i s t e r c o n t r o l s h i s Cab i n e t by the f a c t t h a t he has a p p o i n t e d i t s members and, g i v e n cause, can d i s m i s s them from the C a b i n e t . Or he can t h r e a t e n to r e s i g n h i m s e l f and t h e r e f o r e d i s m i s s the e n t i r e C a b i n e t . P a r l i a m e n t i t s e l f i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r c e f u l i n c o n t r o l l i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r . But the Government Caucus forms the base of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s power by p r o v i d i n g him w i t h the base of the m a j o r i t y 14 of v o t e s i n the House of Commons. Through t h i s m a j o r i t y the Prime M i n i s t e r i s a b l e to c o n t r o l the House. He i s not i n a p o s i t i o n to ig n o r e the views of the Caucus i n d e v e l o p i n g government p o l i c i e s or the members of the Caucus can remove t h e i r support from the Prime M i n i s t e r . The Prime M i n i s t e r i s a b l e to c o n t r o l the Caucus by a number of appointments such as those of p a r l i a m e n t a r y s e c r e t a r i e s , d e l e g a t i o n s , j u d g e s h i p s , c h a irmanships of the Stan d i n g Committees of the House, commissions and the Senate. There i s a l s o the hope of a Cabi n e t p o s i t i o n . 13 The machinery of government embodied i n s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s a c c o r d s another power base to the Prime M i n i s t e r . I t i s the f e d e r a l bureau-c r a c y t h a t develops p o l i c i e s and programs a c c o r d i n g to the d i r e c t i o n s from the e x e c u t i v e . I t i s a l s o the bureaucracy t h a t a d m i n i s t e r s e x i s t i n g programs. The Prime M i n i s t e r c o n t r o l s the s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a c y through a wide range of appointments i n the Gover n o r - i n - C o u n c i 1 c a t e g o r y which i n c l u d e the appointments of deputy m i n i s t e r s and ot h e r s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s . F i n a l l y , the Prime M i n i s t e r must be a b l e to persuade the p u b l i c to accept h i s p o l i c i e s and h i s l e a d e r s h i p . P u b l i c support i s an important r e s o u r c e when a t t e m p t i n g to g a i n advantages over a g g r e s s i v e opponents be i t p r o v i n c i a l p r e m i e r s , the Leader of the O p p o s i t i o n , or even a C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r . The important q u e s t i o n i s what do the opponents p e r c e i v e as p u b l i c o p i n i o n ? In many i n s t a n c e s , p u b l i c o p i n i o n i s c o n s i d e r e d to be e q u i v a l e n t to the views of the media and co n s e q u e n t l y the media becomes an element i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s power base."'""' In t u r n , the Prime M i n i s t e r i s a b l e to manage the news, i n f l u e n c e the agenda of p u b l i c p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n and prepare the c i t i z e n r y f o r new p o l i c i e s . The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the media i s both complex and important. There e x i s t s a n a t u r a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t between the p r e s s and the Prime M i n i s t e r . The Prime M i n i s t e r has a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n . J o u r n a l i s t s would l i k e to have easy a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n w h i l e the Prime M i n i s t e r w i l l want to dispens e i n f o r m a t i o n s e l e c t i v e l y f o r maximum p e r s u a s i v e e f f e c t . The Prime M i n i s t e r can c o n t r o l the media through the c u l t i v a t i o n of 14 s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h those r e p o r t e r s who are sympathetic to the government and to h i m s e l f . He can r e f u s e to g i v e i n t e r v i e w s or answer q u e s t i o n s to those r e p o r t e r s who are unsympathetic. T h i s n a t u r a l c o n f l i c t between the media and the Prime M i n i s t e r can l e a d the media to f e e l t h a t they are the u n o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n . In t h i s case the r o l e of the media becomes l i m i t e d — they can no lon g e r be used as e f f e c t i v e p e r s u a d e r s and are c o n s e q u e n t l y cut o f f from i n f o r m a t i o n . The most important f u n c t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r i s h i s r o l e as c o - o r d i n a t o r or chairman of the C a b i n e t . R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s and r e g i o n s w i t h i n the Cab i n e t i s one of the means of 16 f a c i l i t a t i n g c o n s o c i a t i o n a l m o d a l i t i e s w i t h i n Canadian s o c i e t y . A lthough accommodation of d i v e r s i t i e s w i t h i n the Cab i n e t cannot be c o n s i d e r e d a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , g i v e n the nature of the f e d e r a l system, i t i s a p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y . " ^ As the chairman of the C a b i n e t , the Prime M i n i s t e r must a c t as the n a t i o n a l spokesman of h i s Government; he i s the f i n a l a r b i t e r of e x e c u t i v e d e c i s i o n s . Indeed, i t i s the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s r o l e as f a c i l i t a t o r and m a n i p u l a t o r of these d i v e r s e i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the Cabinet t h a t f i n a l l y g i v e s him h i s s t r e n g t h . The Prime M i n i s t e r a l s o has the power to c o n t r o l the Cab i n e t Agenda. T h i s power enables him to man i p u l a t e s u b j e c t s f o r d i s c u s s i o n u n t i l such time as when the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i s f a v o u r a b l e to h i s p o s i t i o n on.the s u b j e c t . He can be the major i n f l u e n c e i n r e a c h i n g a C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n . He i s , i n f a c t , the c o - o r d i n a t o r of e x e c u t i v e d e c i s i o n s . O f t e n p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a t h e r than p e r s o n a l t a l e n t determine who i s a p p o i n t e d to the C a b i n e t . A Prime M i n i s t e r may be 15 hampered i n p i c k i n g the most d e s i r a b l e C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s s i m p l y because a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n or i n t e r e s t group i s a l r e a d y o v e r -r e p r e s e n t e d i n the C a b i n e t . A n o t h e r a s p e c t of the p r a c t i c e of accommodation i s the s i z e of the C a b i n e t . The C a b i n e t has grown from 18 t h i r t e e n members i n Macdonald's day t o t w e n t y - n i n e under Trudeau. O f t e n new p o r t f o l i o s a re c r e a t e d , not f o r f u n c t i o n a l r e a s o n s , but t o accommodate an a d d i t i o n a l C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r . A t h i r d f e a t u r e of C a b i n e t b u i l d i n g i s the problem of m a t c h i n g r e g i o n a l or group r e -p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o p o r t f o l i o s t h a t r e f l e c t and i n t e r e s t those r e p r e -s e n t a t i o n s . But the C a b i n e t i s not o n l y a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e body. I t must a l s o a c t as a c o h e s i v e body. T h i s i s the b a s i s of the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e C a b i n e t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T h i s p r i n c i p l e i s based i n the a c t i o n of the C a b i n e t as a u n i t t o adopt O r d e r s - i n - C o u n c i l or t o a d v i s e the Prime M i n i s t e r . The d e l i b e r a t i o n s of C a b i n e t a r e p r i v a t e , or " p r i v y " , f o r the s i m p l e r e a s o n t h a t f u l l d i s c u s s i o n and mutual c o n f i d e n c e can o n l y be a c h i e v e d i n an atmosphere of s e c u r i t y . A C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n i s a d e c i s i o n of the group and i n d i v i d u a l o p i n i o n s of M i n i s t e r s are not p u b l i c l y v o i c e d o u t s i d e of the C a b i n e t Room. M i n i s t e r s speak and a c t i n the name of the e n t i r e C a b i n e t . A f u r t h e r example of the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e g i a l i t y i s the f a c t t h a t the C a b i n e t makes d e c i s i o n s w i t h o u t ever t a k i n g a v o t e . Agreements are r e a c h e d by c o n s e n s u s . T h i s modus o p e r a n d i p u t s g r e a t emphasis on the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s c a p a c i t y as a f a c i l i t a t o r . I f a M i n i s t e r i s u n a b l e t o a c c e p t the g e n e r a l consensus, he must t e n d e r h i s r e s i g n a t i o n . 16 The f a c t t h a t the C a b i n e t o p e r a t e s through consensus and t h a t a l l M i n i s t e r s a c c e p t t h e s e c o n s e n s u a l d e c i s i o n s e s t a b l i s h e s the b a s i s f o r the c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the C a b i n e t . I t i s the custom t h a t the C a b i n e t i n t u r n w i l l n o r m a l l y a c c e p t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the a c t s of i t s members. There e x i s t s a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y b o t h to the Prime M i n i s t e r and t o each o t h e r . A n o t h e r a s p e c t the C a b i n e t system of government i s the p r i n c i p l e of m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , t h a t i s , t h a t a M i n i s t e r i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s done w i t h i n h i s own department. Only a C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r may c a r r y f o r w a r d d e p a r t m e n t a l r e q u e s t s to the C a b i n e t or 20 defend d e p a r t m e n t a l p o l i c i e s and programs i n the House of Commons. Such a r e l a t i o n s h i p between a M i n i s t e r and h i s department p r o t e c t s d e p a r t m e n t a l o f f i c i a l s from a t t a c k and c o n c e n t r a t e s a p p r o v a l or d i s -a p p r o v a l on the " r e s p o n s i b l e " p o l i t i c a l head of the department. The p r i n c i p l e of m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y reasons t h a t i f the " p o l i t i -c a l head" i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r j u s t i f y i n g d e p a r t m e n t a l a c t i o n s t o the C a b i n e t or t o the House, he must t h e r e f o r e have the f i n a l word i n any i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n . J u s t how, and t o what degree, the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s r e c o n c i l e d t o i n d i v i d u a l m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s dependent upon the Prime M i n i s t e r and the amount of c o - o r d i n a t i o n t h a t he can g e n e r a t e . The f o r e g o i n g has been a d e s c r i p t i o n of the bases of a u t h o r i t y of C a b i n e t government i n Canada. T h i s a u t h o r i t y r e s t s upon a combina-t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government and.the p r a c t i c e s , or p r e c e d e n t s , of the B r i t i s h p a r l i a m e n t a r y system. But can the elements of the C a b i n e t system, w h i c h i n c l u d e M i n i s t e r s as i n d i v i d u a l s 17 as w e l l as the p r i n c i p l e s of c o l l e c t i v i t y , accommodate r a t i o n a l dec i s ion-making? P r i o r to 1968, th e r e was a g e n e r a l f e e l i n g t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r s i n Canada both honoured the p r i n c i p l e s and a c c e p t e d the p r e c e d e n t s of Cabi n e t government. However, w i t h the emergence of P i e r r e E l l i o t Trudeau as Prime M i n i s t e r , t h e r e was a g e n e r a l sentiment t h a t C a b i n e t govern-ment was go i n g to undergo s i g n i f i c a n t changes and t h a t past p r i n c i p l e s would be s u p p l a n t e d by concerns of r a t i o n a l i t y and t h a t p r e v i o u s p r a c t i c e s would be r e v i s e d to s u i t these concerns f o r r a t i o n a l i t y . There are s e v e r a l important p r i n c i p l e s of Canadian C a b i n e t government t h a t we have d i s c u s s e d t h a t do have some b e a r i n g on the implementation of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g models. F i r s t , one of the c r i t e r i a f o r the r a t i o n a l model i s the requirement f o r an agreed-upon s e t of v a l u e s . These v a l u e s form the b a s i s of g o a l s e l e c t i o n s as w e l l as the s c a l e a g a i n s t which the consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n can be judged. I t i s not i n the nature of the Canadian Cab i n e t to have members w i t h agreed-upon v a l u e s except at the most g e n e r a l l e v e l . These g e n e r a l v a l u e s are i m p l i c i t w i t h i n the Canadian p a r t y system. However, one of the s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Canadian Ca b i n e t i s t h a t i t i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n a l , r e l i g i o u s , economic, o c c u p a t i o n a l and c u l t u r a l groups w i t h i n Canada, a l l e x p r e s s i n g d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s . Consequently, u n l e s s Cabinet d e c i s i o n s are to be so g e n e r a l as to be i r r e l e v a n t , or the p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n are to be m o d i f i e d , r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w i l l be ve r y d i f f i c u l t to a c h i e v e without d e s t r o y i n g the accommodation p r i n c i p l e . The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s i n f l u e n c e i n t h i s 18 area i s extremely important f o r as i t i s h i s r o l e to a c t as f a c i l i t a t o r and c o o r d i n a t o r , h i s c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l be a major f a c t o r i n o v e r -coming v a l u e d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the C a b i n e t . Other important c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r the implementation of r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g models are the s i z e of the C a b i n e t and the average l e v e l of i n t e l l i g e n c e , e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g of C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s . Because r a t i o n a l i t y i s based on l e v e l s of i n f o r m a t i o n , or knowledge, the l a r g e d i s c r e p a n c y between e d u c a t i o n l e v e l s w i t h i n the C a b i n e t , as w e l l as the c a p a c i t i e s to absorb g r e a t e r i n f o r m a t i o n , w i l l hamper 21 e f f o r t s to impose r a t i o n a l i t y on the C a b i n e t . T h i s statement i s not meant to imply t h a t Members of P a r l i a m e n t are e n t i r e l y uneducated but, as we have p o i n t e d out, the Prime M i n i s t e r i s not always f r e e to choose who he d e s i r e s f o r h i s C a b i n e t . He i s r e s t r i c t e d by the p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . F u r t h e r , r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i s most e f f e c t i v e l y a c h i e v e d by a s i n g l e person or a s m a l l group. A d e c i s i o n f o r which t h i r t y p eople are g o i n g to be u l t i m a t e l y r e s p o n s i b l e w i l l of n e c e s s i t y be more g e n e r a l , t h a t i s l e s s s p e c i f i c and l e s s b i n d i n g , and generate more d i s c u s s i o n . The p r a c t i c e of c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i t s e l f tends to make the C a b i n e t an i n e f f i c i e n t body. "Because many d e c i s i o n s must be taken c o l l e c t i v e l y by a l a r g e cumbersome group, and because d e c i s i o n s must be based on p o l i t i c a l p r i o r i t i e s , the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s at the f e d e r a l l e v e l i s o f t e n i n e f f i c i e n t , slow and 22 f r u s t r a t i n g . " However, the u l t i m a t e impediment to r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g models w i t h i n the C a b i n e t system i s p r o b a b l y the f a c t t h a t C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s a r e f i r s t and, f o r e m o s t , p o l i t i c i a n s . No m a t t e r how much p a t r i o t i c s p i r i t a p o l i t i c i a n may have when he o r i g i n a l l y seeks t o ser v e h i s c o u n t r y t h r o u g h e l e c t e d o f f i c e , the most prominent g o a l a p o l i t i c i a n w i l l have i s t o get r e - e l e c t e d . W i t h i n the C a b i n e t t h i s g o a l i s f u r t h e r emphasized because of the C a b i n e t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e the government w i t h p o l i c i e s and d e c i s i o n s t h a t w i l l ensure i t s s t a y i n power. T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n can o f t e n make r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , o r p l a n n i n g , u n a c c e p t a b l e t o the p o l i t i c i a n , and, per h a p s , u n d e s i r a b l e i n the s h o r t r u n to s p e c i f i c groups i n the e l e c t o r a t e . R a t i o n a l i t y i m p l i e s a c e r t a i n detachment towards c h o i c e s between a l t e r n a t i v e s . I n the case of p o l i t i c i a n s , the detachment i s seldom p r e s e n t . But the u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the P a r t y i n power b e l o n g s t o the Prime M i n i s t e r . And i t can be seen t h a t w i t h i n our C a b i n e t system the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s power can be t r u l y enormous. But h i s g r e a t i n f l u e n c e "stems from an a b i l i t y to command the maximum p o s s i b l e amount of i n f o r m a t i o n about the p o l i t i c a l environment and to use t h i s r e s o u r c e i n p e r s u a d i n g p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s t o f o l l o w h i s 23 p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . " T h i s a b i l i t y i s a p a r t of the p e r s o n a l s t y l e of each Prime M i n i s t e r and i t i s r e f l e c t e d i n the t e c h n i q u e s of h i s management of the government. I t i s true, t o say t h a t under Trudeau t h e r e were changes i n the s t r u c t u r e s and p r o c e d u r e s of C a b i n e t government t h a t r e f l e c t h i s p e r s o n a l s t y l e . But b e f o r e we can a s s e s s f a i r l y whether or not these changes a f f e c t e d p r e v i o u s p r a c t i c e s , o r even the. p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t government, we must examine t h e s e changes. What were they? Did these changes r e f l e c t Trudeau's d i s i t i o n to r a t i o n a l i t y and impose t h a t p r e d i l e c t i o n on the Ca b i n e t system? How d i d these changes a f f e c t the p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t government ? NOTES: CHAPTER I A l t h o u g h the C a b i n e t as an i n s t i t u t i o n i s not mentioned i n B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l documents, the p r a c t i c e s and p r i n c i p l e s of Cabinet government i n B r i t a i n are w e l l documented i n Walter Bagehot, The E n g l i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n , Fontana E d i t i o n (Glasgow: Fontana/Co11 i n s , 1963). See a l s o S i r I v o r J e n n i n g s , C a b i n e t Government (Cambridge, U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965). 2 A s i n g l e document t i t l e d the B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n does not e x i s t . The concept i s used here i n the same sense as used by W. Bagehot, i b i d . 3 S e c t i o n I I I , a r t i c l e 12, B r i t i s h North America A c t . 4 See f o r example M i n i s t e r s of the Crown A c t . ^ See S e c t i o n I I I , a r t i c l e s n i n e and then. By the B r i t i s h North America A c t , e x e c u t i v e power c o n t i n u e s to r e s i d e i n the Queen. The Governor-General performs h i s d u t i e s i n the name of the Queen. Some powers are g r a n t e d s o l e l y to the Governor-General such as appointments to the Queen's P r i v y C o u n c i l f o r Canada. See S e c t i o n I I I , a r t i c l e e l e v e n , B r i t i s h North America A c t . The G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , r e p r e s e n t i n g the Crown, does have s i g n i f i c a n t powers, r e a l and c o n d i t i o n a l . See Eugene F o r s e y , "The Crown and the C o n s t i t u t i o n " i n F o r s e y , Freedom and Order ( T o r o n t o : M c L e l l a n d and Steward, 1974). R.M. Dawson, r e v i s e d by Norman Ward, The Government of Canada (T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967), p. 180. 9 Bagehot, op. c i t . , p. 61. ^ The C a b i n e t as used i n t h i s paper i s synonymous w i t h the M i n i s t r y . As noted by Margaret Banks i n " P r i v y C o u n c i l , C a b i n e t and M i n i s t r y i n B r i t a i n and Canada: A S t o r y of C o n f u s i o n " i n Canadian  J o u r n a l of Economics and P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e 31 (1965), p. 193-205, the Canadian p r a c t i c e d i f f e r s from the B r i t i s h p r a c t i c e . In Canada, i t i s now almost always customary t h a t M i n i s t e r s of the Crown are a l s o members of the C a b i n e t and t h e r e f o r e sworn i n as members of the P r i v y C o u n c i l . A lthough t h i s p r a c t i c e leads to a l a r g e and unwieldy C a b i n e t , a cha-r a c t e r i s t i c which l e d the f o r m e r l y predominant P r i v y C o u n c i l to accede i t s p o s i t i o n to a s m a l l e r C a b i n e t , the f e d e r a l nature of Canada n e c e s s i t a t e s t h a t the C a b i n e t i n c l u d e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n from a l l important s o c i a l groups. Although r e s o r t i n g to a d i f f e r e n c e between the M i n i s t r y 21 22 and the C a b i n e t would s o l v e one a s p e c t of a l a r g e C a b i n e t , i t would c r e a t e f u r t h e r problems by l e a v i n g i m p o r t a n t s o c i a l groups un-r e p r e s e n t e d i n the h i g h e s t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g body. ^ F o r m a l l y t i t l e d the G o v e r n o r - i n - C o u n c i 1 . The C a b i n e t has a l s o been d e s c r i b e d as a committee of the House of Commons, chosen by the House from the House to be the e x e c u t i v e . I t i s i n t h i s r o l e t h a t Bagehot's famous metaphors of the C a b i n e t as the "hyphen", the " b u c k l e " t o d e s c r i b e the c o n n e c t i n g l i n k between the l e g i s l a t i v e body and the e x e c u t i v e were used. " . . . i n i t s o r i g i n i t b e l o n g s i n one, i n i t s f u n c t i o n , i t b e l o n g s t o the o t h e r . " (Bagehot, op. c i t . , p. 6 8 ) . I t has been s t a t e d by some Canadian s c h o l a r s t h a t " t h e c o n s t i -t u t i o n p r o v i d e s f o r the f u s i o n of e x e c u t i v e and l e g i s l a t i v e powers by r e q u i r i n g o v e r l a p p i n g membership i n the C a b i n e t and P a r l i a m e n t . " (R. J a c k s o n and M. A t k i n s o n , The Canadian L e g i s l a t i v e System ( T o r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1974), p. 5 1 ) . However, t h e r e i s i n f a c t no p r e c i s e r u l i n g t h a t C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s must be Members of P a r l i a m e n t . S e n a t o r s a r e now o f t e n a p p o i n t e d t o the C a b i n e t i n o r d e r t o f u l f i l l the r e p r e -s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n of the C a b i n e t . The C a b i n e t and the Prime M i n i s t e r do however have a c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o the House of Commons. The House can r e f u s e t o su p p o r t the Government i f i t does not l i k e the p o l i c i e s of the C a b i n e t . But i t cannot o r d e r the G o v e r n o r - i n - C o u n c i 1 , i . e . the C a b i n e t , what t o do. The C a b i n e t i s t h e r e f o r e a b l e t o dominate the House by the n a t u r e of the p a r t y system i n Canada — the l e a d e r t h a t can o b t a i n the c o n f i d e n c e of the House, t h a t i s m a i n t a i n a m a j o r i t y , i s chosen as the Prime M i n i s t e r and i t i s from h i s p a r t y t h a t members of the C a b i n e t a r e chosen. The C a b i n e t has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o d i r e c t P a r l i a m e n t as t o l e g i s l a t i o n i t wants passed but the r e s p o n s i b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the House and the C a b i n e t i s v e r y much one of e x e c u t i v e and l e g i s l a t u r e . E x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y has passed t h r o u g h the Queen t o the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l t o the P r i v y C o u n c i l and t o the C a b i n e t . T h e r e f o r e , the r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e t h e s e powers has not been d e r i v e d from P a r l i a m e n t but from the c o n s t i t u t i o n . A p o p u l a r argument t h a t the d e c l i n e of P a r l i a m e n t has r e s u l t e d i n an i n c r e a s e i n e x e c u t i v e c o n t r o l does not r e s t on l e g a l i t y w i t h the p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n of p a s s i n g r e g u l a t i o n s by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l . W h i l e i t i s customary t h a t the i n t e n t of l e g i s l a t i o n i s made e x p l i c i t a t the time t h a t a B i l l i s p a s s e d , t h e r e i s u s u a l l y a c a p a c i t y f o r the G o v e r n o r - i n - C o u n c i 1 t o make r e g u l a t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n and the r e g u l a t i o n of the l e g i s l a t i o n . Some o b s e r v e r s have commented t h a t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , P a r l i a m e n t has l o s t c o n t r o l of some of i t s l e g i s l a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . (See W.A. Matheson, The Prime M i n i s t e r and  the C a b i n e t ( T o r o n t o : Methuen, 1976), p. 14-15). P a r l i a m e n t does impose some r e s t r a i n t s on the C a b i n e t , t h r o u g h custom or c o n v e n t i o n . The i n i t i a l p r e s e n t a t i o n of major p o l i c i e s must f i r s t , be p r e s e n t e d i n the House i f i t i s i n s e s s i o n , and the C a b i n e t i s r e s p o n s i b l e t o P a r l i a m e n t , b o t h c o l l e c t i v e l y and as i n d i v i d u a l M i n i s t e r s f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of government departments. 23 12 There are a number of s t a t u t e s however t h a t r e c o g n i z e the e x i s t e n c e of the Prime M i n i s t e r such as the S a l a r i e s Act and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Residence A c t . There i s a l s o a C a b i n e t Minute (P.C. 3374, October 25, 1935) which l i s t s some of the d u t i e s of the Prime M i n i s t e r . However, t h i s l i s t i s not e x h a u s t i v e and perhaps shoul d be regarded as a r e i n f o r c e m e n t of c o n v e n t i o n a l powers. 13 For an h i s t o r i c a l d i s c u s s i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s s u e s i n the f o r m a t i o n of Canadian C a b i n e t s see R.M. Punnett, The. Prime M i n i s t e r i n Canadian Government (T o r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1970), pp. 56-72. 14 The Government P a r t y may not c o n s t i t u t e a m a j o r i t y i n the House of Commons. However, a Prime M i n i s t e r must be a b l e to command a m a j o r i t y v o te i n the House or he w i l l be unable to m a i n t a i n power or he w i l l not be a b l e to pass any l e g i s l a t i o n . See F r e d e r i c k F l e t c h e r , "The Prime M i n i s t e r as P u b l i c P e r s u a d e r " i n Thomas Hockin, ed., Apex of Power, 2nd e d i t i o n , (Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1977), p. 87. ^ See W.A. Matheson, The Prime M i n i s t e r and the C a b i n e t ( T o r o n t o : Methuen, 1976) pp. i x - x f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l democracy and the Canadian C a b i n e t . For a d i s c u s s i o n of conso-c i a t i o n a l democracy theory see Arend L i j p h a r t , " T y p o l o g i e s of Democratic Systems," i n Comparative P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , V o l . 1, A p r i l 1968. ^ See Judy LaMarsh, Memoirs of a B i r d i n a G i l d e d Cage (T o r o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1968) f o r an account of L e s t e r Pearson's i n -a b i l i t y to accommodate the d i v e r s i f i e d i n t e r e s t s i n h i s Cabinet and the r e s u l t i n g weakness and f r a g m e n t a t i o n of the C a b i n e t . 18 W.A. Matheson, op. c i t . , p. 32. 19 One can argue t h a t t h i s r e s u l t would depend on the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the i s s u e , whether the q u e s t i o n b e f o r e the C a b i n e t i s of s i g n i f i c a n t importance to warrant a r e s i g n a t i o n . U l t i m a t e l y i t i s the M i n i s t e r h i m s e l f who w i l l make t h a t d e c i s i o n . I f he f e e l s t h a t the i s s u e i s important he would i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y h o l d f i r m to h i s o p i n i o n and not accept C a b i n e t ' s d e c i s i o n . He would then be expected to hand i n h i s r e s i g n a t i o n . However, i f the i s s u e i s not of g r e a t importance, he w i l l f o r ego h i s o p i n i o n and a c c e p t C a b i n e t ' s d e c i s i o n . 20 An e x c e p t i o n to t h i s i s the P a r l i a m e n t a r y S e c r e t a r y to a • M i n i s t e r . The P a r l i a m e n t a r y S e c r e t a r y a c t s as the M i n i s t e r ' s a s s i s t a n t i n the House of Commons i n d e a l i n g w i t h r o u t i n e m a t t e r s . He i s not a member of the M i n i s t r y or the P r i v y C o u n c i l . 24 21 See Yehezkel Dror, Ventures i n P o l i c y S c i e n c e s (New York: American E l s e v i e r , 1971) p. 20 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n on the need to develop the i n t e l l e c t u a l c a p a c i t i e s and t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s of p o l i t i c i a n s . 22 Matheson, op. c i t . , p. 33. 23 R. J a c k s o n and M. A t k i n s o n , op. c i t . , p. 53. CHAPTER I I : THE CABINET COMMITTEE SYSTEM I n t r o d u c t i o n One of the major changes i n the Ca b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n the p e r i o d 1968-72 was the f o r m a l i z a t i o n of a system of s t a n d i n g C a b i n e t Committees. Cabinet Committees had e x i s t e d p r e v i o u s l y , but the f o r m a l i z a t i o n of the system was i n t e n d e d to e s t a b l i s h s y s t e m a t i c r a t i o n a l i t y i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l examine the h i s t o r i c a l development of Ca b i n e t Committees, i n c l u d i n g the developments t h a t o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the Pearson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . For i t was these developments t h a t formed the b a s i s of the Trudeau system. We w i l l then examine the e x t e n t of the changes t h a t were implemented by Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau from 1968-72. These changes w i l l be e v a l u a t e d f o r t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w i t h i n the C a b i n e t system of government. Questions to ask, of c o u r s e , are to what ex t e n t d i d the new system of Cabinet Committees a f f e c t the p r i n c i p l e s of the Cabinet system of government and to what ex t e n t d i d these changes f a c i l i t a t e the more c r e a t i v e and e f f i c i e n t use of knowledge or i n f o r m a t i o n as r e q u i r e d by a r a t i o n a l system of d e c i s i o n -making? The second p a r t of the c h a p t e r w i l l examine the Committees them-s e l v e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the c o o r d i n a t i n g Committees. How :did- the Committees each c o n t r i b u t e to the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s ? Emphasis w i l l be p l a c e d on the c o - o r d i n a t i n g Committees as opposed to the o p e r a t i o n a l Committees because the nature of t h e i r s u b j e c t matter i s 25 26 of g r e a t e r importance to the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system. A. The System: 1940-1968 U n t i l 1939, the c e n t r a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g body i n Canada, the C a b i n e t , f u n c t i o n e d s o l e l y as a s m a l l group of men meeting p r i v a t e l y under the chairmanship of the Prime M i n i s t e r . ' " The C a b i n e t n o r m a l l y met i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l Chamber, s e a t i n g themselves around a c i r c u l a r t a b l e w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r s e ated i n the high-backed c h a i r o r i g i n a l l y d e s i g n a t e d f o r the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l . I t was the p r a c t i c e of Mackenzie K i n g simply to t u r n to the M i n i s t e r at h i s r i g h t and to ask i f he had a n y t h i n g to d i s c u s s and to c o n t i n u e so around the t a b l e . The Prime M i n i s t e r , of c o u r s e , had the power to i n t e r r u p t at w i l l . In t h a t s i t u a t i o n , M i n i s t e r s were seldom aware o f , or p r e p a r e d f o r , i s s u e s t h a t t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s brought up, as t h e r e was n e i t h e r an agenda, nor b r i e f i n g m a t e r i a l s . T h i s s i t u a t i o n was l a t e r d e s c r i b e d by a S e c r e t a r y of the C a b i n e t as "a s i n g u l a r l y i n e f f i c i e n t and un-f a i r way f o r a c o l l e c t i v e e x e c u t i v e to r e a c h a d e c i s i o n f o r which a l l 2 would share r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " Given the t r a d i t i o n s of C a b i n e t s o l i d -a r i t y , s e c r e c y and consensus d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , as w e l l as t h i s l a c k of shared b r i e f i n g m a t e r i a l s , the Prime M i n i s t e r , as chairman of the C a b i n e t , managed h i s C a b i n e t w i t h t o t a l c o n t r o l . However, the war e f f o r t c r e a t e d c o n d i t i o n s of government which r e q u i r e d e f f i c i e n c y i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system and i n c r e a s e d c o o r d i n a t i o n i n urgent m a t t e r s . The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a temporary C a b i n e t Committee system was an attempt to d e a l w i t h these new r e q u i r e m e n t s . 3 Committees of C a b i n e t have e x i s t e d s i n c e C o n f e d e r a t i o n , u s u a l l y of a s p e c i a l or an ad hoc n a t u r e , to d e a l w i t h s p e c i f i c problems or p r i o r i t i e s . There was a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of Committees d u r i n g both World Wars, e s p e c i a l l y World War I I . By the end of 1939, the r e were ten Cabi n e t committees f u n c t i o n i n g . The War Committee, w h i l e s t i l l n o m i n a l l y r e p o r t i n g to the f u l l C a b i n e t , v i r t u a l l y d i s p l a c e d i t as the executor of a u t h o r i t y . A f t e r World War I I , the use of Committees c o n t i n u e d . There was, however, no attempt made to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e the id e a of the Committees. T h e i r i n f o r m a l i t y was found u s e f u l i n the r e s o l u t i o n of ad hoc and s p e c i a l problems. I t s h o u l d be noted t h a t C a b i n e t Committees were not based i n Canadian law. The T r e a s u r y Board, the Committee on S c i e n t i f i c and I n d u s t r i a l Research and a S p e c i a l Committee of the C o u n c i l o f f e r e d some e x c e p t i o n to t h i s g e n e r a l r u l e as they were s t a t u t o r y Committees of the P r i v y C o u n c i l . But the s t a n d i n g Committees were e s t a b l i s h e d and r e - o r g a n i z e d at the p r e r o g a t i v e of the Prime M i n i s t e r . The Prime M i n i s t e r a l s o a s s i g n e d the chairmanship and the membership of each 4 Committee, which were kept c o n f i d e n t i a l i n ord e r to keep the p r i n c i p l of c a b i n e t c o l l e c t i v i t y i n t a c t . Government p o l i c i e s were the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Cabi n e t as a whole; they were not to be seen as the c r e a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r Committee or group of M i n i s t e r s . As Mackenzie K i n g s t a t e d i n the House of Commons, Because of the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t has always been r e c o g n i z e d t h a t matters r e l a t i n g to the pr o c e e d i n g s and o r g a n i z a t i o n of the C a b i n e t . . . are n e c e s s a r i l y s e c r e t . . . T h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the C a b i n e t , however, remains a c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t o committees i s merely a matter of p r o c e d u r a l convenience._ 28 On another o c c a s i o n , when the Opposition.was q u e r y i n g the use of C a b i n e t Committees, the Speaker of the House, Mr. Michener, r u l e d t h a t "...the d e c i s i o n of the government i s one and i n d i v i s i b l e . I n q u i r y i n t o how i t i s a r r i v e d at and p a r t i c u l a r l y e n q u i r y i n t o the C a b i n e t p r o c e s s i s not p e r m i t t e d i n the House. On January 24, 1964, L e s t e r Pearson announced a new development i n C a b i n e t government w i t h the f o r m a t i o n of nine s t a n d i n g Committees of C a b i n e t . T h e i r purpose, was " t o o b t a i n under the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s l e a d e r s h i p , thorough c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p o l i c i e s , c o - o r d i n a t i o n of government a c t i o n , and t i m e l y d e c i s i o n s , i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h m i n i s t e r i a l and c a b i n e t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " ^ The n i n e Committees named were: E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s and Defense; L e g i s l a t i o n and S e s s i o n a l ; F i n a n c e and Economic P o l i c y ; Communications and Works; S o c i a l S e c u r i t y and Labour; A g r i c u l t u r e ; F o r e s t r y and F i s h e r i e s ; C u l t u r e and R e l a t e d M a t t e r s ; and F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s . Given the i n c r e a s i n g c o m p l e x i t y of government and the mushrooming areas f o r p o l i c y - m a k i n g , Pearson had e l e c t e d to e s t a b l i s h a "system" of Committees. T h i s was the f i r s t time i n the h i s t o r y of Cabinet t h a t s t a n d i n g Committees were e s t a b l i s h e d to d e a l w i t h "main a s p e c t s 9 of government b u s i n e s s . " The key p o i n t i n t h i s new system was t h a t the M i n i s t e r who wished to b r i n g items b e f o r e Cabinet had f i r s t to b r i n g f o r t h the item to the a p p r o p r i a t e Cabinet Committee. But these Committees had no power to make d e c i s i o n s . The i n t e n t was not to remove the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c a p a b i l i t y from f u l l C a b i n e t but r a t h e r to s h o r t e n the debate w i t h i n t h a t p l e n a r y body. 29 The use of standing Cabinet Committees had several important advantages. The Cabinet had grown in size from an average of f i f t e e n members in the nineteenth century to twenty-six under Pearson. The increase was p a r t l y a consequence of new m i n i s t e r i a l posts created as the work of government expanded. But i t was also a re s u l t of a need to accommodate a greater number of regional and special i n t e r e s t s . With a smaller membership than f u l l Cabinet, Committees were able to investigate questions in greater d e t a i l . Cabinet Committees could promote coordination through the involvement of Ministers whose departments had a s p e c i f i c interest in a policy matter. This system could spread the workload more evenly among a l l Ministers and, as well, d i f f i c u l t problems could be side-tracked. The Sy Stem could also broaden Ministers' horizons by involving them in policy areas beyond th e i r own immediate departmental or regional i n t e r e s t s . Ministers were required to present written proposals to the standing Committees but without a r i g i d format. Consequently, Ministers were required to react i n a "yes" or "no" manner as often no alternatives were provided. Ministers were not required to share background material. "Mr. Pearson did not require Ministers to document the i r proposals f u l l y and did not, generally speaking, require detailed scrutiny by other Ministers."''"^ Ministers were able to maintain t h e i r fiefdoms, reinforced by the doctrine of m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and strong i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c Ministers were able to continue to function within the system.^ This method of decision-making concentrated a great deal of power within the bureaucracy. O f f i c i a l s were in a position to choose 30 what p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s would be p r e s e n t e d to C a b i n e t , sometimes p r o v i d i n g o n l y one. The Cabinet was t h e r e f o r e o n l y i n v o l v e d i n the d i s c u s s i o n of the end r e s u l t of p o l i c y development r a t h e r than i n the a c t u a l p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n p r o c e s s . C a b i n e t c o o r d i n a t i o n of govern-12 ment a c t i v i t i e s was c o n s e q u e n t l y v e r y d i f f i c u l t . Pearson's f o r m u l a t i o n of the Committee system i n 1964 kept w i t h i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s grasp the " g e n e r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the o p e r a t i o n of the C a b i n e t Committee system as a means of co -13 o r d i n a t i n g programs." The c o o r d i n a t i o n a s p e c t , however, was l e s s than s u c c e s s f u l . For i n a d d i t i o n to the e l e v e n s t a n d i n g Committees, and two s t a t u t o r y Committees, t h e r e were e l e v e n ad hoc Committees. A M i n i s t e r sat on an average of seven Committees and the Prime 14 M i n i s t e r , h i m s e l f , was chairman of s i x . And because a l l m atters s t i l l had to be d i s c u s s e d i n f u l l C a b i n e t as w e l l as Committees, attendance at Committee meetings was not good. In 1968, L e s t e r Pearson added another s t a n d i n g Committee of C a b i n e t — the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g , which was i n t e n d e d to d e a l w i t h the growing problem of c o o r d i n a t i n g the govern-ment's many p r i o r i t i e s . The government had found i t s e l f i n r e c u r r i n g f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s and c r i s e s . I t became apparent t h a t t h e r e was a d e f i n i t e need f o r s y s t e m a t i c assessment of o v e r a l l p r i o r i t i e s of e x p e n d i t u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the area of long-term p l a n n i n g . P r i o r i t i e s were s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e d f o r the implementation of the Program, P l a n n i n g and Budgeting System (PPBS) recommended by the G l a s s c o Commission i n 1962. I t was t r u e t h a t program p r i o r i t i e s were set i m p l i c i t l y i n the annual e s t i m a t e s but t h i s was done by the T r e a s u r y 31 Board i n the absence of any broad d i r e c t i o n from C a b i n e t as to o v e r -a l l p r i o r i t i e s or o b j e c t i v e s . By 1967, however, L e s t e r Pearson had become a lame-duck Prime M i n i s t e r f o r he had announced h i s i n t e n t i o n to r e s i g n . The C a b i n e t Committee System, which r e q u i r e d some attendance on the p a r t of M i n i s t e r s , c o n s e q u e n t l y d i s i n t e g r a t e d as most of the Cabinet was out c o l l e c t i n g l e a d e r s h i p v o t e s , i f not f o r themselves, then as s u p p o r t e r s f o r o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s . 1968-1972 On A p r i l 30th, 1968, Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau s a i d t h a t t h e r e was a "need to make some changes i n the s t r u c t u r e of the o p e r a t i o n s of the e x e c u t i v e arm of the g o v e r n m e n t . " ^ He announced t h a t t h e r e would be a r e s t r u c t u r i n g which would r e s u l t i n " i n c r e a s e d e f f i c i e n c y i n d e a l i n g w i t h p a r t i c u l a r items of b u s i n e s s but at the same time s h o u l d permit more time and a t t e n t i o n to be c o n c e n t r a t e d on the task of p l a n n i n g and p o l i c y d e v e l o p m e n t . " ^ The Cabinet Committee System, as r e f i n e d and f o r m a l i z e d by Trudeau, was c o n c e i v e d to o p t i m i z e the use of m i n i s t e r i a l time, acknowledged to be a s c a r c e r e s o u r c e . ^ In c o n t r a s t to Pearson's day, M i n i s t e r s now s a t , on the average, on two Committees. The s c a r c i t y of M i n i s t e r s ' time and the r e s u l t i n g i n a b i l i t y to devote s u f f i c i e n t time to the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of government p o l i c i e s had developed i n t o a s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n . The v o i d was b e i n g f i l l e d by o f f i c i a l s . The new Committee system was to ensure t h a t i t was Cabinet M i n i s t e r s , and not o f f i c i a l s , who would undertake the most s i g n i f i c a n t d e c i s i o n s i n 18 l i n e w i t h the t h e o r y of C a b i n e t government. Trudeau's r a t i o n a l e 32 f o r the use of Committees was t h a t i s s u e s c o u l d be d i s c u s s e d i n g r e a t e r depth and w i t h g r e a t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a Committee of f o u r to twelve r a t h e r than i n f u l l C a b i n e t , now w i t h almost t h i r t y members. G r e a t e r d i s c u s s i o n would generate knowledge and even, perhaps, e x p e r t i s e w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r group of M i n i s t e r s . T h i s e x p e r t i s e would take d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g one more step away from the e s t a b l i s h e d e x p e r t i s e of the s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s . In Canada, u n l i k e B r i t a i n , s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s are p e r m i t t e d to a t t e n d C a b i n e t Committee meetings and to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the d i s c u s s i o n . T h i s p r o v i d e d a f u r t h e r advantage from the use of Committees. In t h i s way, a group of M i n i s t e r s , r a t h e r than one, would be a b l e to q u e s t i o n o f f i c i a l s r e g a r d i n g p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s and d i r e c t i o n s . " M i n i s t e r s would have more i n f l u e n c e on p o l i c y as a whole, and on i t s development, and o f f i c i a l s would have p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y l e s s than 19 they used t o . " Trudeau a l s o hoped to reduce the l a c k of c o o r d i n a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from what he had f e l t to be the e x c e s s i v e autonomy of i n d i v i d u a l M i n i s t e r s i n the Pearson e r a . " T h i s p e r s o n a l i z e d s t y l e of government . . . d i d u n d e r l i n e the f a c t t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s of govern-ment c o u l d be s u c c e s s f u l l y managed by i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y and i n i t i a t i v e 20 alone r a t h e r than by a l l - e m b r a c i n g t h e o r i e s of management." The s h a r i n g of the bureaucracy's p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s was t h e r e f o r e implemented as w e l l f o r the f u r t h e r a n c e of c o l l e g i a l i t y . The e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between Trudeau's system and t h a t of Pearson was t h a t the Committees were now empowered to make d e c i s i o n s . However, the r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s of M i n i s t e r s not members of a p a r t i c u l a r Committee were p r o t e c t e d . S u b j e c t s f o r C a b i n e t d i s c u s s i o n 33 were f i r s t s ubmitted to the a p p r o p r i a t e Committee and a d e c i s i o n was taken. In or d e r to m a i n t a i n c o l l e c t i v e Cabinet r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , a l l M i n i s t e r s r e c e i v e d c o p i e s of a l l Committee Agendas, s u p p o r t i n g 21 documentation and Committee d e c i s i o n s . Even i f not a member, a M i n i s t e r c o u l d a t t e n d a Committee i f a p a r t i c u l a r item was of i n t e r e s t 22 to him. Once a d e c i s i o n was reached i n Committee, i t was l i s t e d i n an Annex to the Agenda of C a b i n e t . Unless a M i n i s t e r informed the Prime M i n i s t e r , u s u a l l y through the Deputy S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t , th a t he wished to b r i n g the item to d i s c u s s i o n , a l l Annexes to the Agenda were a u t o m a t i c a l l y passed by the C a b i n e t . O r i g i n a l l y the Committees were to meet on a r e g u l a r weekly b a s i s , a schedule w i t h both advantages and d i s a d v a n t a g e s . The schedule p r o v i d e d a s y s t e m a t i c and o r d e r l y c o n s i d e r a t i o n of problems f o r subm i s s i o n to the C a b i n e t . The r e g u l a r time a l s o a l l o w e d f o r the s c h e d u l i n g of r e g u l a r time s l o t s i n a M i n i s t e r ' s busy agenda which was o f t e n planned s e v e r a l months i n advance. Without a p p r o p r i a t e n o t i c e , a M i n i s t e r ' s attendance at meetings c o u l d be n o t h i n g but i r r e g u l a r and i n t e r m i t t e n t . The dis a d v a n t a g e to the weekly meetings was the paper burden of i n c r e a s e d Committee meetings. Agendas, sub-m i s s i o n s and d e c i s i o n s i n c r e a s e d and M i n i s t e r s were unable to keep up w i t h them. The consequence was t h a t the Trudeau Committee system d i d not f a r e much b e t t e r than the Pearson system i n the b e g i n n i n g . M i n i s t e r s d i d not have s u f f i c i e n t time to prepare f o r Committee meetings and, t h e r e f o r e , p r e s e n t e d no comments i n Committee meetings and used the c o u r t of l a s t r e s o r t , the C a b i n e t , to r a i s e t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s . The 34 Committee meetings were then s c h e d u l e d to meet every second week. M i n i s t e r s were a b l e to b e t t e r prepare themselves and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , fewer d e c i s i o n s were, reviewed i n f u l l C a b i n e t . The r e s u l t was an i n c r e a s e i n C a b i n e t committee meetings and fewer C a b i n e t meetings. From J u l y 1, 1970, to June 31, 1971, the C a b i n e t met s e v e n t y - f i v e times as opposed to the same p e r i o d i n 1966 when i t had 139 meetings. C o n v e r s e l y , i n the same p e r i o d , t h e r e were 120 C a b i n e t Committee 23 meetings i n 1966 as opposed to 311 i n 1971. The major changes i n the s t r u c t u r e of the C a b i n e t Committee system i n the p e r i o d 1968-72 have been o u t l i n e d . What were the e f f e c t s of these changes on the p r i n c i p l e s of the C a b i n e t system of government? Were these changes r a d i c a l to the p o i n t t h a t they c o u l d i n s t i l l g r e a t e r c r e a t i v i t y and a n a l y s i s i n t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system? The C a b i n e t Committee system d i d not compromise the p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t government. Indeed, the Committee system enhanced the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y through the s h a r i n g of i n f o r m -a t i o n . I t was the s h a r i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t was a r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e from past e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s g r e a t e r a c c e s s to i n f o r m a t i o n was important f o r two r e a s o n s . F i r s t , M i n i s t e r s were now a b l e to develop a l e v e l of e x p e r t i s e w i t h i n c e r t a i n areas and g r e a t e r c o m p a t a b i 1 i t y c o u l d be. a c h i e v e d between programs and p o l i c i e s . Secondly, because M i n i s t e r s were now r e q u i r e d to share background i n f o r m a t i o n , submissions to the C a b i n e t were r e q u i r e d to be f u l l y documented and a b l e to w i t h s t a n d d e t a i l e d s c r u t i n y from o t h e r M i n i s t e r s . Consequently, the i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d to the C a b i n e t by o f f i c i a l s was g r e a t e r . The a b i l i t y of the Committees to make d e c i s i o n s f a c i l i t a t e d r a t i o n a l i t y i n t h a t 35 M i n i s t e r s w i t h some l e v e l of expertise, w i t h i n the s u b j e c t area were now a b l e to have g r e a t e r i n p u t i n t o the d e c i s i o n . There was a l s o a s e r i o u s drawback to the concept of C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e s t h e paperburden. I n c r e a s e d i n f o r m a t i o n r e s u l t e d i n s t a c k s of d i s c u s s i o n s papers w i t h which M i n i s t e r s found i t i m p o s s i b l e to cope. Because Cab i n e t M i n i s t e r s are not e x p e r t s , nor t e c h n i c i a n s , the i n c r e a s e d i n f o r m a t i o n was not n e c e s s a r i l y w e l l u t i l i z e d , perhaps not even absorbed. T h e r e f o r e , a l t h o u g h i n keeping w i t h the s c i e n t i f i c approach and p r o v i d i n g g r e a t e r i n f o r m a t i o n on which to base d e c i s i o n s , n e i t h e r e f f i c i e n c y nor r a t i o n a l i t y were a c h i e v e d w i t h the Committee system. But I have a l s o shown t h a t the changes implemented by Trudeau were, i n f a c t , not r a d i c a l at a l l . The development of the C a b i n e t Committee system was merely an e x t e n s i o n of a c t i v i t i e s t h a t had taken p l a c e not o n l y i n the. Pearson era by extend back to Mackenzie K i n g . What Trudeau accomplished was the s t r u c t u r e d and o r d e r l y s y s t e m i z a t i o n of C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g — an a c t i o n which f o r m a l i z e d the C a b i n e t Committee system as a p r a c t i c e of the Canadian C a b i n e t . B. C a b i n e t Committees 1968-1972 The Cabinet Committees t h a t Trudeau i n t r o d u c e d i n 1968 were reduced i n number from those of the Pearson e r a . They c o n s i s t e d of f o u r s t a n d i n g Committees of an o p e r a t i o n a l or s u b j e c t nature and f o u r s t a n d i n g Committees of a c o o r d i n a t i n g n a t u r e . Memberships i n the s u b j e c t Committees were determined m o s t l y by the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s u b j e c t matter.and the p a r t i c u l a r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of each M i n i s t e r 36 but "they were c a r e f u l l y s t r u c t u r e d , care b e i n g taken to a c h i e v e 24 g e o g r a p h i c a l as w e l l as departmental balance i n the membership." The f o u r Committees of an o p e r a t i o n a l nature d e a l t w i t h s u b j e c t areas and were r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : E x t e r n a l P o l i c y and Defense; Economic P o l i c y and Programs; Communications, Works and 25 Urban A f f a i r s ; and, S o c i a l P o l i c y ( i n c l u d i n g Manpower and L a b o u r ) . These Committees r e p r e s e n t e d an attempt to d i v i d e the major p o l i c y spheres of the government i n t o coherent s e c t o r s and c o n s e q u e n t l y they were s u b j e c t to change w i t h any major s h i f t i n p o l i c y emphasis. The e x i s t e n c e of these s t a n d i n g Committees d i d not p r e c l u d e the use of o t h e r S p e c i a l Committees on o t h e r s u b j e c t areas such as s c i e n c e and c u l t u r a l q u e s t i o n s . T h i s arrangement d i d not r e p r e s e n t any major d e p a r t u r e from those Committees e s t a b l i s h e d by Pearson except t h a t t h e r e was a r e d u c t i o n i n the number of s u b j e c t i s s u e s . The f o u r main c o o r d i n a t i n g Committees announced were: P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g ; L e g i s l a t i v e and House P l a n n i n g ; T r e a s u r y Board; and, F e d e r a l P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s . As mentioned e a r l i e r , t h e r e a l s o e x i s t e d the S p e c i a l Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l but i t was of a formal n a t u r e and, a l t h o u g h i n t e g r a l to the f u n c t i o n i n g of the machinery of government, i t was not i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the d e c i s i o n -making s t r u c t u r e . Another Committee was t h a t on S e c u r i t y , I n t e l l i g e n c e and Emergency P l a n n i n g . T h i s Committee was c h a i r e d by the Prime M i n i s t e r and was h i g h l y s e c r e t i v e , o n l y Committee members b e i n g aware of s u b j e c t s under d i s c u s s i o n . Normally i t was not p e r t i n e n t to the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s except i n times of emergency. Perhaps the most important d e v i a t i o n from Pearson's system, and 37 an i n d i c a t i o n of Trudeau's s e r i o u s i n t e n t to i n t r o d u c e r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o the system, was the use of the t i t l e " c o o r d i n a t i n g " Committees. The c o o r d i n a t i n g Committees were concerned w i t h c o o r d i n a t i n g a l l f e d e r a l government a c t i v i t y w i t h a t o t a l government overview. I t was t h e i r r o l e to e n f o r c e some o r d e r , or p r i o r i t y on the v a r i e d view-p o i n t s of i n d i v i d u a l departments. As w e l l , t h e i r r o l e was to co-o r d i n a t e i s s u e s , as they emerged, w i t h the government's p r i o r i t i e s . As one p o l i t i c a l commentator has w r i t t e n , the g r e a t s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l d i s c o v e r y of our time i s t h a t e v e r y t h i n g c o n n e c t s , and t h a t g a i n i n one s e c t o r i s accomplished o n l y at the c o s t of l o s s i n another; t h e r e are no s o l u t i o n s i n government these days; o n l y t r a d e - o f f s between competing interests.„, 26 The c o o r d i n a t i n g Committees were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r managing the t r a d e -o f f s between the competing i n t e r e s t s . The use of the t i t l e c o o r d i n a t i n g emphasized t h e i r r o l e and p l a c e d the emphasis on r a t i o n a l c h o i c e of what the t r a d e - o f f s would be. I t s h o u l d a l s o be noted t h a t i n Trudeau's system of C a b i n e t Committees the T r e a s u r y Board was acknowledged as a C a b i n e t Committee. The T r e a s u r y Board p l a y e d a c r u c i a l r o l e i n the e x p e n d i t u r e p r o c e s s (to be d i s c u s s e d more f u l l y l a t e r ) and the i n c l u s i o n of the Board as a c o o r d i n a t i n g Committee i n d i c a t e d the attempt to a c h i e v e a l o g i c a l , r a t i o n a l o r d e r i n g of the C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system. We s h a l l now examine the c o o r d i n a t i n g Committees to a s s e s s t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to p l a n n i n g and r a t i o n a l i t y i n the system. 38 1. The Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g In the area of c o o r d i n a t i n g f u n c t i o n s , the new Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g (P and P) was the most important of a l l C a b i n e t Committees. I t was u n l i k e any o t h e r . M i n i s t e r s who were not members were not p e r m i t t e d to a t t e n d u n l e s s i n v i t e d by the Prime M i n i s t e r who was the Chairman. I t was c a l l e d an " i n n e r C a b i n e t " by 27 some and al t h o u g h i t s b e i n g one was denied by o t h e r s , i t has been suggested t h a t the P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g Committee was composed of . M i n i s t e r s whom Trudeau most t r u s t e d and w i t h whom he f e l t most 2 8 c o m f o r t a b l e . In tha t c o n t e x t , i t f u n c t i o n e d as an i n f o r m a l , or 29 f u n c t i o n a l , i n n e r C a b i n e t , a l t h o u g h i t r e p o r t e d to the Cabi n e t as d i d any ot h e r Committee. E s s e n t i a l l y , the P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g Committee was the 30 c o r n e r s t o n e of what came to be known as the Cabinet p l a n n i n g system. I t was w i t h i n the terms of r e f e r e n c e of t h i s Committee t h a t concepts of r a t i o n a l p o l i c y - m a k i n g were int e n d e d to come i n t o p l a y , p r o v i d i n g the p l a n n i n g c a p a c i t y t h a t Trudeau f e l t was l a c k i n g . The o r i g i n a l impetus f o r p r i o r i t i e s stemmed from the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Program, P l a n n i n g and Budgeting (PPBS) i n the mld-60s on the recommendation of the G l a s s c o Commission. The i n c r e a s i n g s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of the ex p e n d i t u r e budget proce s s put p r e s s u r e on the Cabinet to express 31 p r i o r i t i e s . Added to t h i s requirement f o r Cab i n e t p r i o r i t i e s , t h e r e were " r e c u r r i n g f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s and c r i s e s , making i t apparent that t h e r e was r e q u i r e d a s y s t e m a t i c assessment of o v e r a l l p r i o r i t i e s 32 of e x p e n d i t u r e w i t h a view to b e t t e r long-term p l a n n i n g . " For t h i s reason, L e s t e r Pearson had made s e v e r a l attempts to e s t a b l i s h p r i o r i t i e s i n the summer of 1966 and the s p r i n g of 1967. He a l s o had e s t a b l i s h e d the P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g Committee i n 1968, j u s t p r i o r to h i s r e t i r e m e n t . L i k e h i s o t h e r Committees, i t had not p l a y e d an e f f e c t i v e r o l e . P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g became s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y when P i e r r e Trudeau became Prime M i n i s t e r . The m a i n ' f u n c t i o n s of P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g were f o r m a l l y d e s c r i b e d as: a) to c o n s i d e r the main areas of concern to m i n i s t e r s and develop the government's o b j e c t i v e s , b) to e s t a b l i s h the government's p r i o r i t i e s by s e l e c t i n g the major o b j e c t i v e s and p o l i c y t h r u s t s , c) to ensure t h a t m i n i s t e r s ' main concerns and p r i o r -i t i e s are communicated w i t h i n the government and o u t s i d e , d) to ensure t h a t p l a n n i n g i s s u e s are c o n s i d e r e d i n the c o n t e x t of the c u r r e n t r e l e v a n t p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s , e) to develop the framework and o b j e c t i v e of each of the p o l i c y t h r u s t s , f ) to guide the a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s , i . e . money, p e r s o n n e l , and time ( m i n i s t e r i a l , l e g i s l a t i v e , o f f i c i a l , p o l i c y a n a l y s i s ) , i n accordance w i t h i t s p r i o r i t i e s , g) to ensure t h a t C a b i n e t work i s p r o c e e d i n g i n a c c o r d -ance w i t h the p r i o r i t i e s , by m o n i t o r i n g the work programs of C a b i n e t committees, and h) to a s s e s s the degree to which the government's o b j e c t i v e s and p o l i c y t h r u s t s are b e i n g met. 3 4 As i l l u s t r a t e d by the f u n c t i o n s , P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g was concerned w i t h not o n l y c o o r d i n a t i n g government p o l i c y , but as w e l l , p l a n n i n g f u n c t i o n s . E s s e n t i a l l y the f u n c t i o n s of P and P were the key f u n c t i o n s of the C a b i n e t as a whole, brought down to a manageable s i z e w i t h i n a Committee. 40 P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g f u n c t i o n e d as a t h i n k - t a n k or a k i n d of f r e e - w h e e l i n g seminar, d e a l i n g w i t h such a b s t r a c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s as govern-ment's r o l e i n s o c i e t y , the s t a t u s and importance of the work e t h i c , and the balance to be drawn between economic growth and the q u a l i t y of l i f e . ^ ^ A l t hough no c l e a r f a c t s are p u b l i c l y e v i d e n t , the Committee, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , used a network, or system, of i n t e r r e l a t e d concepts and c a t e g o r i e s to compensate f o r the u n t i d y r e a l i t i e s of c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g by C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s who were u n t r a i n e d i n the f i n e r 3 6 a r t s of the p o l i c y - s c i e n t i s t s . The importance of P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g i s t h a t i t e x i s t e d at a l l , a t t e m p t i n g to s t r u c t u r e M i n i s t e r s ' views at a governmental, r a t h e r than a d e p a r t m e n t a l , l e v e l on a l o n g -term b a s i s as w e l l as on the s h o r t - t e r m . The r i n g i n g q u e s t i o n was, "What k i n d of Canada do we want i n the year 2000?" In the s c a l e of the many elements i n the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s — from the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the community's v a l u e s through to the s e l e c t i o n of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e modes f o r implementing the government's p o l i c i e s — the P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g Committee works from the top down. I t i s the committee which r e l a t e s the the community's v a l u e s and i t s emerging problems to the government's p o l i c i e s and programs, and v i c e v e r s a , and out of t h i s develops f o r c a b i n e t c o n s i d e r a t i o n the broad p o l i c i e s which are seen to a c h i e v e the n a t i o n ' s and the government's o b j e c t i v e s M i c h a e l P i t f i e l d , Deputy S e c r e t a r y of the P l a n s S e c r e t a r i a t , 1968-72, s i m p l i f i e d the f u n c t i o n s of P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g when, at a l a t e r date, a f t e r he had become S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t , he s t a t e d t h a t d e f i n i n g p r i o r i t i e s o n l y meant s e t t i n g o b j e c t i v e s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n -s h i p to one another and t h a t p l a n n i n g was simply a p r o c e s s of M i n i s t e r s t a l k i n g to one another, t r y i n g to d e f i n e what they were t r y i n g to a c c o m p l i s h as a government. A q u e s t i o n to pose i s whether or not P i t f i e l d was b e i n g o v e r l y s i m p l i s t i c and downplaying the r o l e of P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g , and as w e l l h i s own r o l e i n i t s development, or whether he was r e f l e c t i n g on the r e a l i t y of c o p i n g w i t h c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g by e l e c t e d p o l i t i c i a n s which i s a p r i n c i p l e of C a b i n e t 39 government. The i n i t i a l phase of development of the p r i o r i t y - s e t t i n g e x e r c i s e i n 1968-69 was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a s h o r t l i s t of g e n e r a l but d i f f i c u l t -t o — a c h i e v e p r i o r i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g p o l i c i e s such as b i l i n g u a l i s m and the removal of r e g i o n a l d i s p a r i t i e s . The p r i o r i t i e s themselves r e f l e c t e d the i n i t i a l p e r i o d of " r a t i o n a l i t y " i n the p o l i c y p r o c e s s as w e l l as the newness and the excitement of the government a f t e r the l a n d s l i d e e l e c t i o n . The 1969 b a t t l e a g a i n s t i n f l a t i o n , which i n c l u d e d an e f f o r t to c u r t a i l the growth of government e x p e n d i t u r e , a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d to the b r e v i t y and d i f f i c u l t y of the p r i o r i t y l i s t . The 1968-69 e f f o r t a l s o i n c l u d e d the development of an X-budget w i t h i t s f u n c t i o n to r e - a l l o c a t e r e s o u r c e s and to a s s e s s e x i s t i n g programs i n l i g h t of p r i o r i t i e s . But the r e a l t e s t of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g came s e v e r a l y e a r s l a t e r . By 1970, however, both the g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n -ment and the p r e s s u r e of m i n i s t e r s and b u r e a u c r a t i c departments made the p r i o r i t y e x e r c i s e l e s s f o r m a l l y " r a t i o n a l " i n the a b s t r a c t sense of t h a t word, but q u i t e p o l i t i c a l l y r a t i o n a l . Thus the October C r i s e s of 1970 c o n v e r t e d the p r i o r i t y - s e t t i n g e x e r c i s e i n t o a vague s e a r c h f o r programs t h a t would a i d " n a t i o n a l u n i t y " . In a d d i t i o n , the p r e s s u r e from m i n i s t e r s and departments t h a t had been ranked low f o r two or t h r e e y e a r s i n a row i n c r e a s e d g r e a t l y . They i n c r e a s i n g l y demanded f a i r e r treatment and e q u i t y i n t h i s budgetary and p r i o r i t y - s e t t i n g p r o c e s s . These i n t e r n a l arguments 42 and the need to m a i n t a i n b u r e a u c r a t i c and m i n i s t e r i a l peace and t r a n q u i l i t y were a i d e d by, and r e f l e c t e d i n , the d e c l i n i n g p o l i t i c a l s t r e n g t h of the Trudeau government i n 1971 and 1972 and by growing un-employment. By the 1972 e l e c t i o n , the p r i o r i t y -s e t t i n g p r o c e s s generated a v e r i t a b l e " w i s h - l i s t " of p r i o r i t i e s . ^ The d e c i s i o n to i n t r o d u c e r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system through a p r i o r i t y - s e t t i n g e x e r c i s e was u n s u c c e s s f u l and, even d y s f u n c t i o n a l , f o r a number of reasons. There was a b a s i c problem between the i s s u e of s e t t i n g p r i o r i t i e s and e x t e n d i n g those p r i o r i t i e s to the e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n . The government was not f a c i n g " r e a l " s e r i o u s f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s but r a t h e r what c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d "imagined" d i f f i c u l t i e s . These "imagined" d i f f i c u l t i e s were c r e a t e d by the Depart-ment of F i n a n c e by setting«the outward l i m i t s of the f i s c a l framework c o n s e r v a t i v e l y . Although c o n t i n u i n g to deny government e x p e n d i t u r e , F i n a n c e Department o f f i c i a l s c o n t i n u a l l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the amount of funds a v a i l a b l e f o r government e x p e n d i t u r e , o n l y to be o v e r t u r n e d at a l a t e r date when the a v a i l a b i l i t y of funds was more r e a d i l y r e c o g n i z e d . In t h i s i n s t a n c e , t h e r e appeared to be no i n c e n t i v e f o r C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s to d e p r i v e e i t h e r t h e i r departments, or t h e i r e l e c t o r a t e , of the d e s i r e d new programs, even i f these programs were not w h o l l y compatible w i t h the planned f u t u r e . I f the p e r i o d 1968-72 was regarded as a p e r i o d of " p o s i t i o n a l p o l i c y " development, or "metapolicy-making", t h a t i s , r e d e s i g n i n g the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system, i n c l u d i n g i t s s t r u c t u r e s and p r o c e s s p a t t e r n s , then c e r t a i n e f f e c t s were to be expected. U n t i l 1968, i n d i v i d u a l departments f u n c t i o n e d as r e l a t i v e l y autonomous u n i t s w i t h i n the 4 3 o r g a n i z a t i o n of the f e d e r a l government. However, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of p r i o r i t y or g o a l - s e t t i n g from the top-down by the Committee on P r i o r -i t i e s and P l a n n i n g served to c e n t r a l i z e power i n the P l a n s D i v i s i o n of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e which was the s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n to the Committee. The P l a n s D i v i s i o n was a s s i s t e d by a number of o u t s i d e 4 1 a d v i s o r s — systems a n a l y s t s , p o l i c y s c i e n t i s t s and f u t u r o l o g i s t s . 4 2 The predominance of a c e n t r a l agency , such as the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , over the s p e c i a l i z e d e x p e r t i s e of l i n e departments c r e a t e d r e s e n t -ment, f e a r and a subsequent d i s i n t e r e s t i n p r i o r i t i e s and r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s d i s i n t e r e s t was o f t e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d as u n c o o p e r a t i v e n e s s . The r e a c t i o n was a p r e d i c t a b l e response g i v e n t h a t the consequence of a p r i o r i t i e s e x e r c i s e c o u l d be t h a t the e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e of i n f l u e n c e 4 3 i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system would be changed. The Departments responded by p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r own p r i o r i t i e s and t h e i r e x i s t i n g programs. The prominence of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , as the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Department, w i t h i t s o u t s i d e group of a d v i s o r s , c r y s t a l l i z e d the c r i t i c i s m a g a i n s t the Prime M i n i s t e r . I t was c l a i m e d t h a t he had developed a system th a t was designed to b r i n g about the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power i n the hands of the Prime M i n i s t e r and h i s p e r s o n a l o f f i c e . The i n t r o d u c t i o n of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g i n t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system a l s o c r e a t e d a p l e t h o r a of p o l i c y reviews — to examine how proposed a c t i o n i n any one area might a f f e c t the programs or p o l i c i e s of o t h e r areas of government. R a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t e v e r y t h i n g was r e l a t e d to e v e r y t h i n g e l s e . The r e s u l t of the approach was " a n a l y s i s p a r a l y s i s " — n o t h i n g c o u l d be s o l v e d u n t i l 44 e v e r y t h i n g was s o l v e d . Problems t h a t might have been r e s o l v e d i n a l e s s planned and more ad hoc system were s u b j e c t e d to f u r t h e r study. T h i s " a n a l y s i s p a r a l y s i s " c r e a t e d the image t h a t the government had a c complished l i t t l e and t h a t i t was l a c k i n g d i r e c t i o n . T h i s image f u r t h e r e d the resentment of the b u r e a u c r a c y a g a i n s t the concept of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g as w e l l as e x a c e r b a t i n g c r i t i c i s m a g a i n s t the Prime M i n i s t e r . R a t i o n a l i t y caused a f u r t h e r d y s f u n c t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l system — one t h a t was most important to the C a b i n e t . R a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g r e q u i r e d t h a t the p r o c e s s be d e - p o l i t i c i z e d , or t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s become detached from the c h o i c e s . R a t i o n a l i t y must p r e c l u d e emotions and r e a c t i o n s to i s s u e s t h a t are s e n s i t i v e to r e p r e s e n t a t i v e groups w i t h i n the system. Brokerage p o l i t i c s , symptomatic of the c o n s o c i a t i o n a 1 s t r u c t u r e of the f e d e r a l system, would no l o n g e r be a s a t i s f a c t o r y , nor l e g i t i m a t e , method of making d e c i s i o n s and m a i n t a i n i n g the e q u i l i b r i u m between c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s i n the f e d e r a t i o n . The onus was now on p l a n n i n g f o r the f u t u r e on the b a s i s of a s s e s s e d v a l u e s , g o a l s and d i r e c t i o n s . Caught up i n the attempt to a c h i e v e a planned f u t u r e , the Prime M i n i s t e r and the Cabinet f a i l e d to r e c o g n i z e and acknowledge the needs and problems of s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t i o n s of Canada, such as the economic needs of Western Canada and the e x p e c t -a t i o n s of urban O n t a r i o . I n s t e a d , w i t h the s l o g a n "The Land i s S t r o n g " , Trudeau and h i s C a b i n e t went to the c o u n t r y to conduct a " d i a l o g u e " w i t h Canadians o n l y to be f a c e d w i t h the e l e c t o r a t e ' s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and the r e t u r n of a m i n o r i t y government i n 1972. The r e s u l t s of t h i s e l e c t i o n have to some ex t e n t been blamed on the manner or s t y l e i n 45 which the government had approached p u b l i c problems. 45 2. The Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n and House P l a n n i n g The Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n and House P l a n n i n g was a c o - o r d i n a t i n g Committee w i t h two main f u n c t i o n s : to s c r u t i n i z e d r a f t B i l l s , c l a u s e by c l a u s e , i n ord e r to ensure t h e i r c o h e s i o n to Government p o l i c y as i t was o r i g i n a l l y e x pressed i n the Cabi n e t D e c i s i o n ( s ) t h a t a u t h o r i z e d the d r a f t i n g of the B i l l ; and to develop p o l i c i e s f o r the management of the Government program i n the House of Commons and the Senate. T h i s Committee was c h a i r e d by the P r e s i d e n t of the P r i v y C o u n c i l , as a r e s u l t of h i s now customary r o l e as Government House Leader. Because the work of the Committee was to study d r a f t l e g i s l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e , l e g a l wording, f a i r n e s s and a c c e p t -a b i l i t y as a working measure, i t was dominated to some extent by o f f i c i a l s from the J u s t i c e Department. The Committee tended to be p r e - o c c u p i e d w i t h the l e g a l e x p r e s s i o n of government p o l i c y . However, L e g i s l a t i o n and House P l a n n i n g was important as a c o -o r d i n a t i n g committee f o r s e v e r a l r e asons. I t was i n a p o s i t i o n to f u r t h e r the ambitions of M i n i s t e r s as f a r as promoting the l e g i s l a t i o n f o r which they were r e s p o n s i b l e and wished to see passed i n the House. A M i n i s t e r was u l t i m a t e l y judged by what he accomplished. H i s r e p u t a t i o n as a f i g h t e r f o r h i s department and f o r h i s own i d e a s , and the degree to which he was informed and prepa r e d i n d e f e n d i n g h i s p r o p o s a l s through C a b i n e t to the House of Commons u l t i m a t e l y determined h i s s t a n d i n g w i t h i n the C a b i n e t . These ambitions had to be co-o r d i n a t e d w i t h the c o l l e c t i v e view of the Cabi n e t r e g a r d i n g the Government's p r i o r i t i e s i n l e g i s l a t i o n . 46 The Committee, p e r s o n i f i e d as the Government House Leader, was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the important task of management of the House of Commons. Although i t was taken f o r gr a n t e d t h a t the Government c o u l d c o n t r o l the House, a l l Governments need to pass l e g i s l a t i o n both f o r the r e c o r d and as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the p u b l i c c o n f i d e n c e t h a t has been p l a c e d i n them. The House of Commons c o u l d be an i n s t i t u t i o n of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , t o t a l l y l a c k i n g i n c o - o p e r a t i o n . I t was the r o l e of the Government House Leader and the Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n and House P l a n n i n g to program the Government Agenda f o r L e g i s l a t i o n through the House. The Agenda f o r L e g i s l a t i o n , of c o u r s e , r e q u i r e d the c o - o r d i n a t i o n of the government's p r i o r i t i e s . The r o l e of the Committee was to ensure t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n r e f l e c t i n g the government's p r i o r i t i e s was a v a i l a b l e f o r passage i n the House. The Committee was a l s o i n v o l v e d i n n e g o t i a t i n g t r a d e - o f f s i n l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h a c o n t r a r y O p p o s i t i o n , i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e the maximum c o n s i d e r a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i o n r e l a t i n g to government p r i o r i t i e s . In p e r i o d s of m i n o r i t y government,>such as 1972-74, the Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n and House P l a n n i n g became extremely important i n f u l -f i l l i n g t h i s f u n c t i o n of n e g o t i a t o r between the O p p o s i t i o n and the Government — c o - o r d i n a t i n g the d i v e r g e n t views of the O p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s to a c h i e v e some of the Government's p r i o r i t y p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . L e g i s l a t i o n and House P l a n n i n g was o f t e n a s s i g n e d s p e c i f i c p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s t h a t d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d the House of Commons, such as Freedom of I n f o r m a t i o n and p a r l i a m e n t a r y reform. 47 3. The Committee on F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s P r i o r to the development of the Committee on F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s , and the subsequent growth of the S e c r e t a r i a t i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , most f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l matters were c o n f i n e d to the F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s D i v i s i o n i n the Department of F i n a n c e . There the f ocus of concern had been the f i n a n c i a l a s p ect of f e d e r a l -p r o v i n c i a l r e l a t i o n s such as e q u a l i z a t i o n , t a x - s h a r i n g , s h a r e d - c o s t , o p t i n g - o u t arrangements and f i s c a l c o o r d i n a t i o n . The Committee was e s t a b l i s h e d as the forum f o r s t u d y i n g q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g to n a t i o n a l u n i t y as w e l l as f o r improving c o o r d i n a t i o n of programs and a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t i n g g e n e r a l l y to f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c y . I t met to c o n s i d e r most new p o l i c i e s , or amendments to e x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s , t h a t had f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . A number of i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l committees, concerned w i t h the p o l i c y development as i t r e l a t e d to the p r o v i n c e s , supported the Committee on F e d e r a l -P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s . The Committee was the p o l i t i c a l body t h a t was concerned w i t h p r o v i n c i a l governments. I t p r o v i d e d a f ormal channel:' f o r p r o v i n c i a l / r e g i o n a l g r i e v a n c e s , as opposed to the t r a d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a l channels such as the C a b i n e t , the r e g i o n a l l y p o werful M i n i s t e r s , or the P a r t y Caucus. O r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d by Pearson, the Committee p r o v i d e d a new k i n d of i n t e r a c t i o n between Ottawa and the p r o v i n c e s , i n t e r a c t i o n s not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c i e s and programs. By removing the f u n c t i o n from the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a department and e l e v a t i n g the r o l e to a C a b i n e t Committee as an appendage of the C a b i n e t , f e d e r a l -p r o v i n c i a l r e l a t i o n s were e l e v a t e d to the c r u c i a l l e v e l of C a b i n e t 48 d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The Committee p r o v i d e d the p r o t o t y p e f o r the p r o v i n c i a l governments who had not yet developed f o r m a l i z e d government s t r u c t u r e s f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the f e d e r a l govern-ment . The F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s Committee became much more a c t i v e under Trudeau i n response to the p r o c e s s of c o o r d i n a t i n g s t r a t e g i e s 46 and p l a n n i n g . In the p e r i o d 1968-72, t h i s area was l a r g e l y o c c u p i e d w i t h d i s c u s s i o n s of the c o n s t i t u t i o n as w e l l as the q u e s t i o n of n a t i o n a l u n i t y emphasized by the c r i s i s i n October 1970. T h i s Committee was v e r y important to the p r i o r i t i e s of P i e r r e Trudeau. T h i s importance was i l l u s t r a t e d by the c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h i s Committee to the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g , w i t h a shared membership and a shared meeting room. The Prime M i n i s t e r was the Chairman and o n l y M i n i s t e r s t h a t had been i n v i t e d c o u l d a t t e n d . The t i t l e of the Committee was assumed a c c o r d i n g to the s u b j e c t s on the Agenda. 4. The Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board The T r e a s u r y Board was the o l d e s t C a b i n e t Committee. I t was o r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d by s t a t u t e i n 1867 to a s s i s t the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e i n the management of the e x p e n d i t u r e p r o c e s s w i t h i n the government and i t had enjoyed c o n t i n u o u s e x i s t e n c e s i n c e them, un-l i k e o t h e r C a b i n e t Committees. The M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e was the Chairman of the Committee. In 1966, as a r e s u l t of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Government O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1962 ( G l a s s c o Commission), the Committee was g i v e n a s e p a r a t e M i n i s t e r , the P r e s i d e n t 4 9 of the T r e a s u r y Board. The Board c o n s i s t e d of the P r e s i d e n t , the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e , 47 and f o u r o t h e r C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s . I t f u n c t i o n e d somewhat d i f f e r e n t -l y than the o t h e r C a b i n e t Committees i n t h a t , i n p r a c t i c e , i t had the f i n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g powers over a l a r g e number of management i s s u e s under i t s c o n t r o l . The F i n a n c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Act p r o v i d e d the powers f o r the Board to a c t on b e h a l f of the P r i v y C o u n c i l i n a) g e n e r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o l i c y i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e , b) the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the p u b l i c s e r v i c e and the d e t e r m i n a t i o n and c o n t r o l of the e s t a b l i s h m e n t s , c) f i n a n c i a l management i n c l u d i n g e s t i m a t e s , e x p e n d i t u r e s , f i n a n c i a l commitments, acco u n t s , e t c . , d) the review of annual and long term e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n s and programs of the v a r i o u s departments of government, and the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r i o r i t i e s w i t h r e s p e c t t h e r e t o , e) p e r s o n n e l management i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e , i n c l u d i n g the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of terms and c o n d i t i o n s of persons employed t h e r e i n , f ) such o t h e r matters as may be r e f e r r e d to i t by the Governor-in-Counci1.._ 48 The F i n a n c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Act c o n f e r r e d e x t e n s i v e powers on the Board through i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as w e l l as the power to make r e g u l a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the o p e r a t i o n s of government departments and a g e n c i e s . By the same token, the G o v e r n o r - i n - C o u n c i l c o u l d revoke any of the powers. Hence, the T r e a s u r y Board a c t e d w i t h f u l l l e g a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers o n l y at the s u f f e r a n c e of f u l l C a b i n e t . I f a M i n i s t e r r e f u s e d to accept a d e c i s i o n of the Board, he c o u l d r e q u e s t t h a t the matter be reviewed by f u l l C a b i n e t as would be the d e c i s i o n of any o t h e r C a b i n e t Committee. E s s e n t i a l l y , the f u n c t i o n s of the Board c o u l d be d i v i d e d i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s . In i t s r o l e as the Committee of the E x p e n d i t u r e Budget, the T r e a s u r y Board a l l o c a t e d funds between competing programs, 50 t a k i n g i n t o account the p r i o r i t i e s of government, the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the programs i n a c h i e v i n g the government's o b j e c t i v e s , and the e f f i c i e n c y w i t h which the programs were a d m i n i s t e r e d . The Board's o t h e r r o l e as the Committee on Management was concerned w i t h p o l i c i e s and r e g u l a t i o n s to guide departments i n the use of p u b l i c funds. As the Committee on Management, the Board was concerned w i t h " i n p u t s " which were bought to a d m i n i s t e r the government's programs — p e r s o n n e l , o f f i c e accommodation, m a t e r i a l and equipment, e t c . T h i s r o l e of the Board had e v o l v e d c o n s i d e r a b l y s i n c e the r e l e a s e of the G l a s s c o Commission Report i n 1962 w i t h the e x h o r t a t i o n "Let the Managers manage!" As a consequence of the Report, the Board had developed g u i d e l i n e s i n s t e a d of r e g u l a t i o n s and the departments had to c o n s u l t the Board o n l y when they saw a need to exceed the g u i d e l i n e s . I t was the Board's r o l e as the Committee on the E x p e n d i t u r e Budget t h a t was p e r t i n e n t to the 'development of r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n -making. The purpose and o b j e c t i v e of t h i s r o l e was the annual e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n which combined the p r i o r i t i e s and p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n s of the C a b i n e t w i t h program p r o p o s a l s from the departments and then, a l l o c a t e d funds, i n d i m i n i s h i n g o r d e r " t o those programs which are most i n a c c o r d w i t h the government's p r i o r i t i e s and most e f f e c t i v e i n 49 a c h i e v i n g the g o a l s i n h e r e n t i n those, p r i o r i t i e s . " In t h i s p r o c e s s , t h e r e were two v e r y important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g — the c l a r i t y of the government's p r i o r i t i e s and the e v a l u a t i o n of e f f i c i e n c y of programs i n a c h i e v i n g o b j e c t i v e s . The. Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g had taken over the r o l e of r e v i e w i n g annual and long-term e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n s and programs and 51 the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r i o r i t i e s l a r g e l y because the Board had never f u l f i l l e d these f u n c t i o n s . " I t i s p a i n f u l l y c l e a r t h a t d u r i n g the Pearson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n no organ of government set the p r i o r i t i e s ; n e i t h e r the T r e a s u r y Board nor Cabi n e t i t s e l f produced a y e a r l y master p l a n f o r the e x p e n d i t u r e b u d g e t . I t was now the r o l e of P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g to produce the master p l a n i n the form of "the g u i d e l i n e s . " Once approved by C a b i n e t , these g u i d e l i n e s were t r a n s m i t t e d to the T r e a s u r y Board where they were t r a n s l a t e d i n t o an e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n by superimposing "upon t h i s map of s o c i a l u t i l i t y (P & P g u i d e l i n e s ) ... the d e t a i l e d s o c i a l u t i l i t y map which emerge(d) i n r e s p e c t of i n d i v i d u a l programs and p r o j e c t s . T h e Board was i n v o l v e d i n p r o v i d i n g the a c t u a l d o l l a r a l l o c a t i o n s to s p e c i f i c government programs and p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n s . Once the e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n was f i n i s h e d , i t was t r a n s m i t t e d back to P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . A former S e c r e t a r y to the T r e a s u r y Board wrote t h a t the T r e a s u r y Board was d i f f e r e n t from o t h e r Cabinet Committees because i t s d e c i s i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d hard c h o i c e s which f i n a l l y had to be made when a r r i v i n g at the e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the hard d e c i s i o n s by the Board d i d not always stand up to p r e s s u r e s from M i n i s t e r s to change t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . New p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s u s u a l l y r e c e i v e d C a b i n e t a p p r o v a l " i n p r i n c i p l e " p r i o r to any involvement of the Board. When these new i n i t i a t i v e s r e q u i r e d e x p e n d i t u r e , a sub m i s s i o n was made to the Board f o r the r e l e a s e of funds. Given C a b i n e t a p p r o v a l " i n p r i n c i p l e " i t was expected t h a t the Board would indeed r e l e a s e the funds. However, w i t h the i n s t i t u t i o n of an e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n , the Board t r i e d to a s s e r t g r e a t e r c o n t r o l and would r e t u r n submissions on the 52 b a s i s t h a t no funds were a v a i l a b l e . T h i s a c t i o n was p e r c e i v e d by M i n i s t e r s and the b u r e a u c r a c y a l i k e as an u s u r p a t i o n of C a b i n e t a u t h o r i t y even though the new i n i t i a t i v e might have r e c e i v e d a p p r o v a l o n l y " i n p r i n c i p l e . " What had more s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the T r e a s u r y Board was the l a c k of support from the e n t i r e C a b i n e t f o r the e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n , which was based on the f i s c a l framework of the Department of F i n a n c e . T h i s f i s c a l framework, however, was at odds w i t h the a c t u a l a v a i l a b i l i t y of funds. T r e a s u r y Board d i d not have the power to r e s t r i c t government spending a c c o r d i n g to a " p l a n " when i t was known t h a t funds were a v a i l a b l e . On a d a i l y b a s i s , the T r e a s u r y Board was l a r g e l y p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the t e d i o u s d e t a i l s r e s u l t i n g from the o p e r a t i o n a l n e c e s s i t i e s of the enormous burea u c r a c y of government. M i n i s t e r s had v e r y l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e t a i l s which were at the h e a r t of the o p e r a t i o n s of the T r e a s u r y Board. M i n i s t e r s found i t even l e s s a p p e a l i n g to r e j e c t a c o l l e a g u e ' s i n i t i a t i v e s on the b a s i s of " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n s i s t e n c y " or " f i s c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " T h e r e f o r e , the Board was n o r m a l l y composed of j u n i o r M i n i s t e r s e x c e p t i n g the P r e s i d e n t of the T r e a s u r y Board and the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e . U s u a l l y the M i n i s t e r of Supply and S e r v i c e s or the M i n i s t e r of P u b l i c Works was a member, as both had v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s i n the r e g u l a t o r y a s p e c t s of the Board. Subsequent M i n i s t e r s of F i n a n c e had become u n i n t e r e s t e d i n the Board and c o n s e q u e n t l y d i d not a t t e n d meetings. T h i s l e f t the P r e s i d e n t of the Board as the o n l y member w i t h an i n c e n t i v e to c o n t r o l e x p e n d i t u r e s but even to him t h e r e appeared to be l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l 52 p a y o f f to deny a new program to a c o l l e a g u e . The i n a b i l i t y of the Board to c o n t r i b u t e to the c o n t r o l of government e x p e n d i t u r e s was d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the l a c k of importance and, subsequent weakness, of the Board. As a Committee of the C a b i n e t , T r e a s u r y Board d i d not have a powerful p o s i t i o n . 53 The t r a d i t i o n a l weakness of the T r e a s u r y Board was one of the reasons f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . However, P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g had not concerned i t s e l f w i t h the f i n a n c i a l a s p e c t s of government p r i o r i t i e s . A lthough r a t i o n a l i t y , i n i t s e l f , was a p r i o r i t y of P i e r r e Trudeau, he d i d not extend the p r i o r i t y to the management of the e x p e n d i t u r e budget. The r e s u l t was t h a t the Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board, a l t h o u g h now f o r m a l l y acknowledged as a Cab i n e t Committee, c o n t i n u e d to l a c k s u f f i c i e n t i n f l u e n c e i n the p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s to f u l f i l l i t s mandate to c o n t r o l government e x p e n d i t u r e s . Summary The concept of r a t i o n a l i t y i n government d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n v o l v e s two important f a c t o r s — the o r d e r i n g of p r i o r i t i e s to d e a l w i t h p u b l i c problems and, j u s t as important, the management of the ex-p e n d i t u r e of p u b l i c funds. While Trudeau d i d indeed e s t a b l i s h a Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g to s t r u c t u r e the government's o b j e c t i v e s , he d i d not g i v e emphasis to the management of the ex-p e n d i t u r e budget, e i t h e r through T r e a s u r y Board or the Department of F i n a n c e . T h i s l a c k of emphasis was i l l u s t r a t e d by the c o n t i n u i n g weak p o s i t i o n of the Cab i n e t Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board, the a b i l i t y of the. C a b i n e t to c o n s i s t e n t l y o v e r r u l e the d e c i s i o n s of the 54 Board,^ and^the i n a b i l i t y of Fin a n c e to a r r i v e at a r e a l i s t i c f i s c a l framework. To the ex t e n t t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to a c h i e v e " r a t i o n a l " d e c i s i o n s w i t h o u t the complete c o o r d i n a t i o n of the e x p e n d i t u r e budget to the government's o b j e c t i v e , the attempt to a c h i e v e r a t i o n a l i t y i n the p e r i o d 1968-72 must be judged u n s u c c e s s f u l . Perhaps the f a i l u r e was not so much a r e s u l t of inadequate emphasis on f i s c a l p o l i c y but r a t h e r t h a t too much was p l a c e d on the p r i o r i t i e s e x e r c i s e . M i n i s t e r s were r e q u i r e d to " i n t e l l e c t u a l i z e " t h e i r f e e l i n g s , t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e s and t h e i r hopes f o r the c o u n t r y . P o l i t i c i a n s are not u s u a l l y i n t e l l e c t u a l l y p r e p a r e d f o r such d i s c i p l i n e , nor i s t h a t the reason f o r which they are e l e c t e d . In any case, the pr o c e s s took up a g r e a t d e a l of v a l u a b l e m i n i s t e r i a l time and w h i l e i t was enjoyed by some i n t e l l e c t u a l M i n i s t e r s , i t d i d not produce . n . 54 b e t t e r l e g i s l a t i o n . However, the formal C a b i n e t Committee system i t s e l f i n s t i l l e d a g r e a t e r degree of r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g through s t r u c t u r a l p r a c t i c e s . How were these d e c i s i o n s reached? Was i t through a s c i e n t i f i c method? What were the procedures? The Cabinet Committee system r e q u i r e d e x t e n s i v e support from the burea u c r a c y i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . What r o l e d i d t h i s s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n p l a y i n Cab i n e t d e c i s i o n s ? We w i l l now examine the r o l e of the Cabi n e t S e c r e t a r i a t i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . FIGURE 1 STANDING COMMITTEES OF CABINET and SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS 1968 Federal-Provincial Relations Treasury Board Cabinet Secretariat (PCO) Priorities and Planning Legislative and House Planning Prime Minister Cabinet Treasury Board Secretariat Prime Minister's Office Economic Policy and Programs (Communications, Works and Urban Affairs External Policy and Defense Social Policy Cn Ln NOTES: CHAPTER I I ^ A.D.P. Heeney, "Mackenzie K i n g and the Ca b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 10 (1967): 366-75. 2 Gordon Robertson, "The Changing Role of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 14 (1971), p. 489. 3 The T r e a s u r y Board was e s t a b l i s h e d by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i 1 on J u l y 2, 1867 and by s t a t u t e two y e a r s l a t e r . 4 The Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board was an e x c e p t i o n to t h i s r u l e . However, i n June, 1980, the Prime M i n i s t e r announced the membership of a l l Cabinet Committees e x c e p t i n g P r i o r i t i e s and Planning T h i s announcement was an element of the government's attempt at freedom of i n f o r m a t i o n . ^ Canada, House of Commons Debates ( u n r e v i s e d , Feb. 10, 1947), pp. 251-2 c i t e d i n J.R. M a l l o r y , The S t r u c t u r e of Canadian Govern-ment (Tor o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1971), p. 106. ^ I b i d . , November 6, 1957, p. 813, c i t e d i n M a l l o r y , i b i d . Canada, The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , P r e s s R e l e a s e , January 24, 1964. Q Pearson d i d not i n c l u d e the T r e a s u r y Board as a Committee of the C a b i n e t . Although i t had been e s t a b l i s h e d by s t a t u t e , the T r e a s u r y Board was regarded as a committee to a i d the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e and was s c a r c e l y r e c o g n i z e d as a Committee of C a b i n e t . 9 The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , op. c i t . ^ I n t e r v i e w w i t h the Honourable M i t c h e l l Sharp c i t e d i n George Radwanski, Trudeau (Scarborough: The New American L i b r a r y , 1978), p. 143. ^ See M. K i r b y , H. Kroeker, and W. Teschke, "The Impact of P u b l i c P o l icy-Making S t r u c t u r e s and P r o c e s s e s i n Canada," Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 21 (1978): 407-417 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of i n d i v i d u a l M i n i s t e r s ' c o n t r i b u t i o n s to p u b l i c p o l i c y . 56 57 12 See Judy LaMarsh, Memoirs of a B i r d In a G i l d e d Cage (Tor o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1968) f o r some examples of l a c k of co-o r d i n a t i o n i n programs and p o l i c i e s i n the Pearson e r a . 13 The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , op. c i t . * 4 W.A. Matheson, The Prime M i n i s t e r and the Cabinet ( T o r o n t o : Methuen P u b l i s h i n g , 1976), p. 86. ^ Canada, Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , P r e s s R e l e a s e , A p r i l 30, 1968. 1 6 I b i d . * 7 Gordon Robertson, op. c i t . , p. 491. 18 G. Radwanski, op. c i t . , p. 142. see p. 141 f o r an example of how some government p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s had been d e c i d e d i n the p a s t . 19 G. Robertson, op. c i t . , p. 499. 20 M. K i r b y and H. Kroeker, "The P o l i t i c s of C r i s e s Management i n Government: Does P l a n n i n g Make Any D i f f e r e n c e ? " S t u d i e s i n C r i s e s Management, ed. by C. Smart and W. Stanbury ( T o r o n t o : I n s t i t u t e f o r Research on P u b l i c P o l i c y , 1978), p. 182. 21 The e x c e p t i o n to t h i s r u l e i s a l l documentation f o r the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . 22 P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g i s a g a i n an e x c e p t i o n to t h i s r u l e . 23 G. Robertson, op. c i t . , p. 492. 24 M i t c h e l l Sharp, " D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n the F e d e r a l C a b i n e t , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 19 (1976), p. 5. 25 The Committee on Communications, Works and Urban A f f a i r s became S c i e n c e , C u l t u r e and Communications i n 1969 and another Committee c a l l e d Government O p e r a t i o n s was e s t a b l i s h e d to d e a l w i t h o t h e r s u b j e c t a r e a s . 2 6 G. Radwanski, op. c i t . , p. 140. 27 '<• G. Robertson, op. c i t . , p. 495. 58 2 8 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , May 15, 1980. 29 G. Bruce Doern, "The Development of P o l i c y O r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the E x e c u t i v e Arena," i n Doern and A u c o i n , eds., The S t r u c t u r e of P o l i c y Making i n Canada (To r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1971), p. 74. 30 R i c h a r d F r e n c h , How Ottawa Decides ( T o r o n t o : James Lor i m e r , 1980), pp. 41. 31 See Chapter IV on the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . 32 G. Robertson, op. c i t . , p. 491. 33 34 35 36 R. F r e n c h , op. c i t . , p. 41. I b i d . G. Radwanski; op. c i t . , p. 145. The p r i n c i p l e s of Cabinet-making i n Canada do not a l l o w f o r the most ab l e people to be chosen as C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s . See Chapter I . The t r a i n e d p o l i c y s c i e n t i s t s were l o c a t e d i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e to guide M i n i s t e r s i n t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n s . 37 A.W. Johnson, "The T r e a s u r y Board of Canada and the Machinery of Government i n the 1970's" Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e 4 (1971), p. 351. 3 8 M i c h a e l P i t f i e l d , "The Shape of Government i n the 1980's" Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 19 (1976), p. 11. 39 M i c h a e l P i t f i e l d was the Deputy S e c r e t a r y of the P l a n s D i v i s i o n , P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . T h i s was the s u p p o r t i n g s e c r e t a r i a t to the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . P i t f i e l d ' s i n f l u e n c e on the p r i o r i t y s e t t i n g e x e r c i s e can be i n f e r r e d from the f a c t t h a t a f t e r the set-back of the p r i o r i t y s e t t i n g p r o c e s s i n 1972, l i k e a l l o t h e r v i s i b l e f i g u r e s i n the p r o c e s s , he. was removed from the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e and became Deputy M i n i s t e r , Consumer and C o r p o r a t e A f f a i r s . In 1975 he r e t u r n e d to the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e as S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t . G. Bruce Doern, op. c i t . 59 41 Some examples of p o l i c y a d v i s e r s on c o n t r a c t to the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e were Yehezkel Dror, P u b l i c Po1 i c y -Making Reexamined (San F r a n c i s c o , Chandler P u b l i s h i n g , 1968); E r i c h J a n t s c h , "From F o r e c a s t i n g and P l a n n i n g to P o l i c y S c i e n t i s t s " i n P o l i c y S c i e n c e s I, 1970 and M a r s h a l l McLuhan. 42 For a d i s c u s s i o n of c e n t r a l a g e n c i e s v e r s u s o p e r a t i n g d e p a r t -ments see C o l i n Campbell and George S z a b l o w s k i , The S u p e r b u r e a u c r a t s ,  S t r u c t u r e and Behaviour i n C e n t r a l A gencies (To r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1979), p. 2-8. 43 See Y. Dror, P u b l i c P o l i c y m a k i n g Reexamined (San F r a n c i s c o : Chandler P u b l i s h i n g , 1968), p. 172 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the p r o c e s s of " s u b o p t i m i z a t i o n " to g a i n the b e n e f i t s of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and the i n h e r e n t r i s k of l a c k of i n t e g r a t i o n or s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n . 44 M. K i r b y and H. Kroeker, op. c i t . , p. 187. 45 See John M e i s e l , Working Papers on Canadian P o l i t i c s , second e n l a r g e d e d i t i o n ( M o n t r e a l : McGi11-Queen 1s U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1975), -Chapter 5. Me.isel a s s e r t s t h a t the L i b e r a l p a r t y s u f f e r e d from t h e i r own arrogance which perhaps i s t r u e but i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to argue t h a t as w e l l as t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l arrogance the L i b e r a l s were hampered by the b e l i e f t h a t they were a government th a t was p l a n n i n g f o r the f u t u r e , hence, The Land i s S t r o n g motto. 46 T h i s Committee has been i n c r e a s i n g l y more a c t i v e . In 1975 l e g i s l a t i o n was passed c r e a t i n g the p o s i t i o n of S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t f o r F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a s e p a r a t e o f f i c e from the C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t . There has a l s o been the appointment of a M i n i s t e r of S t a t e f o r F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s to a s s i s t the Prime M i n i s t e r . However, the Prime M i n i s t e r remains the M i n i s t e r to d e a l w i t h p r o v i n c i a l P r e m i e r s . 47 Because the Committee i s s t a t u t o r y , the members of the T r e a s u r y Board are a p p o i n t e d by O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l . T h e r e f o r e , as was not the case w i t h o t h e r C a b i n e t Committees, the membership has always been p u b l i c . 48 The F i n a n c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A c t , R.S., c. 116, s. 5. 49 A.W. Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 352. M i c h a e l H i c k s , "The T r e a s u r y Board of Canada and I t s C l i e n t s , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 16 (1973), p. 188. 60 ^ A. Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 353, 52 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , December, 1980. 53 M i c h a e l H i c k s , op. c i t . , p. 190. 54 R i c h a r d Gwyn, The N o r t h e r n Magus (T o r o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1980), p. 98. CHAPTER I I I : THE CABINET SECRETARIAT I n t r o d u c t i o n The Ca b i n e t Committee system had been designed and implemented to promote r a t i o n a l i t y i n Ca b i n e t d e c i s i o n s . Through the s h a r i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n and the a b i l i t y of s m a l l e r groups to have i n - d e p t h d i s c u s s i o n s , t h a t concern of r a t i o n a l i t y f o r g r e a t e r i n f o r m a t i o n was to some ex t e n t s a t i s f i e d . M i n i s t e r s , however, are supported i n t h e i r C a b i n e t d e l i b e r a t i o n s by a l a r g e s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n — the Cab i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t — and th a t support system should r e f l e c t the concern f o r r a t i o n a l i t y . Does t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n r e f l e c t r a t i o n a l i t y ? Has i t h i s t o r i c a l l y ? What i s the r o l e of c i v i l s e r v a n t s i n the Cab i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s ? In the course of d e t e r m i n i n g r a t i o n a l i t y w i t h i n the Ca b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t , we w i l l examine the procedures of Ca b i n e t d e c i s i o n -making and the r o l e of the. S e c r e t a r i a t i n s u p p o r t i n g the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . A. H i s t o r i c a l Development Although the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e has e x i s t e d s i n c e C o n f e d e r a -t i o n ^ , i t s f u n c t i o n s have e v o l v e d c o n s i d e r a b l y . I t s o r i g i n a l f u n c t i o n s were to a s s i s t the P r e s i d e n t of the Queen's P r i v y C o u n c i l f o r Canada i n the t r a n s a c t i o n of the C o u n c i l ' s b u s i n e s s , which c o n s i s t e d main-l y of r e f e r r i n g the recommendations of the Ca b i n e t to the Governor-G e n e r a l . The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e never p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the 61 d e l i b e r a t i o n s of the C a b i n e t , nor d i d i t have any r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h a t body. Mackenzie K i n g , however, d e c i d e d t h a t he needed a s s i s t a n c e i n c a r r y i n g out h i s d u t i e s r e l a t e d to C a b i n e t m a t t e r s . H i s good f r i e n d , S t a n l e y Baldwin c o n f i r m e d h i s b e l i e f s . Baldwin had r e l i e d on Maurice Hankey to e s t a b l i s h the B r i t i s h C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t . Mackenzie. K i n g determined t h a t he r e q u i r e d h i s own Canadian v e r s i o n of Hankey. Ki n g d e c i d e d t h a t he r e q u i r e d a S e c r e t a r y , someone to provide. l i a i s o n w i t h C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r s and to c a r r y out c e r t a i n prime m i n i s t e r i a l d u t i e s . But what Mackenzie K i n g was r e a l l y e n v i s i o n i n g was a p e r s o n a l a s s i s t a n t — "a k i n d of deputy to the Prime M i n i s t e r " and " h i s primary, i f unacknowledged, o b j e c t i v e was to enhance h i s a u t h o r i t y as Prime M i n i s t e r by s t r e n g t h e n i n g the means of i t s 2 e x i s t e n c e . " For t h i s r e a s o n , he a p p o i n t e d A r n o l d Heeney as the f i r s t S e c r e t a r y to a Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r i n 1939. At t h a t time, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Cabinet and the P r i v y 3 C o u n c i l was i n d i s t i n c t and the o n l y o f f i c i a l s e r v i n g the Cabinet i n any way was the C l e r k of the P r i v y C o u n c i l , a s s i s t e d by a j u n i o r c l e r k and a s m a l l s t a f f . The p r i n c i p a l d u t i e s of the C l e r k c o n t i n u e d to be the same as when the O f f i c e had been o r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1867 — drawing up formal p r o c e e d i n g s of the P r i v y C o u n c i l (Orders and Minutes) from the submissions of M i n i s t e r s , the swearing i n of M i n i s t e r s and c i v i l s e r v a n t s , and the k e e p i n g of formal r e c o r d s . The C l e r k d i d not a t t e n d meetings of C a b i n e t and was o n l y concerned w i t h the " C o u n c i l " a s p e c t s of C a b i n e t meetings. He was, however, the 4 h i g h e s t r a n k i n g c i v i l s e r v a n t i n the l a n d . Because of the p o s i t i o n ' s h i g h rank, when Mackenzie K i n g f i n a l l y agreed t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y to have a S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t , r a t h e r than a S e c r e t a r y to the Prime M i n i s t e r , i t was agreed t h a t the new s e c r e t a r y ' s p o s i t i o n would f u n c t i o n i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the d u t i e s of the C l e r k of the P r i v y C o u n c i l which would p r o v i d e the new S e c r e t a r y w i t h the s e n i o r s t a t u s r e q u i r e d i n h i s d e a l i n g s w i t h M i n i s t e r s and s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s . As w e l l , t h i s a c t i o n a l l o w e d the appointment to be made witho u t the troublesome procedure of going to P a r l i a m e n t f o r l e g i s l a t i o n to c r e a t e the O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i 1 p o s i t i o n . " ' The p o s i t i o n of the C l e r k a l r e a d y e x i s t e d and the d u t i e s of the S e c r e t a r y were simply tacked on. I t was f o r t h i s reason t h a t the t i t l e s C l e r k of the P r i v y C o u n c i l and S e c r e t a r y to the Cabi n e t have always f u n c t i o n e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the t i t l e C l e r k of the P r i v y C o u n c i l t a k i n g p r e -cedence . The d u t i e s of the S e c r e t a r y to the Cabi n e t were s e t out i n the O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l t h a t a p p o i n t e d Heeney as the f i r s t S e c r e t a r y and they have not been changed s i n c e . ^ Heeney, h i m s e l f , simply d e s c r i b e d the S e c r e t a r y ' s concerns as "the f o r m u l a t i o n , r e c o r d i n g , and communi-c a t i o n of d e c i s i o n s by those who compose the Cabi n e t of the day." In r e a l i t y , the p o s i t i o n of S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t , i f s i m p l i s t i c i n f u n c t i o n s , i s extremely i n f l u e n t i a l . As P r o f e s s o r M a l l o r y wrote i n d e s c r i b i n g the S e c r e t a r y , u n l i k e most c i v i l s e r v a n t s , the s e c r e t a r y to the Cab i n e t i s not c o n s t r i c t e d by the i m p e r a t i v e s of a s i n g l e department's r o l e and p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s . He r e p r e s e n t s the i n t e r e s t s of governments as a t o t a l i t y , and thus u n i q u e l y embodies the end u r i n g i n t e r e s t s of the s t a t e i r r e s p e c t i v e of changes of men and i s s u e s of government. In t h i s sense, he i s perhaps the most n o n - p o l i t i c a l member of the 64 h i g h e s t ranks of the c i v i l s e r v i c e , as w e l l as the most p r e s t i g i o u s . o Because the o r i g i n a l i d e a f o r a C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t developed from the B r i t i s h example, i t was not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n those f i r s t y e a r s the procedures f o r the new S e c r e t a r i a t r e l i e d h e a v i l y upon B r i t i s h p r a c t i c e . And, as the new C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t f i r s t f u n c t i o n e d d u r i n g the War y e a r s , i t s procedures were developed f o r the C a b i n e t War Committees. W i t h i n these procedures were the form and manner of i n t r o d u c i n g items f o r the Agenda, p r o v i s i o n f o r adequate n o t i c e of p r o p o s a l s c a l l i n g f o r d e c i s i o n s , the p r e p a r a t i o n and c i r c u l a t i o n of papers, the maintenance of r e c o r d s of d i s c u s s i o n and the f o r m u l a t i o n of agreed d e c i s i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s , as w e l l as arrangements f o r the f o l l o w - u p to ensure t h a t d e c i s i o n s were c a r r i e d out by the r e s p o n s i b l e 9 M i n i s t e r and h i s department. The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of e f f i c i e n t p rocedures w i t h i n the War Committee, and l a t e r f o r f u l l C a b i n e t , was a slow p r o c e s s due m a i n l y to King's r e l u c t a n c e to f o r m a l i z e the p r o c e e d i n g s of the C a b i n e t — f o r K i n g f e a r e d t h a t f o r m a l i t y would j e o p a r d i z e the genius of the C a b i n e t system which l a y i n i t s f l e x i b i l i t y and i t s i n f o r m a l i t y . But at the same time, Mackenzie K i n g a l s o r e c o g n i z e d the need f o r more e f f e c t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w i t h i n the C a b i n e t , both d u r i n g the War and d u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d . R e l u c t a n t l y , he a c c e p t e d the new p r o c e d u r e s . In 1957, an important step i n the h i s t o r y of the C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t o c c u r r e d w i t h the t r a n s f e r of power from L o u i s S t . Laurent to John D i e f e n b a k e r . I t was agreed t h a t the S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t would be the C u s t o d i a n of C a b i n e t Papers and the S e c r e t a r i a t 65 would d i s p o s e of C a b i n e t r e c o r d s . With t h i s development, the C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t became a permanent i n s t i t u t i o n of Canadian government. The r o l e of the C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t w i t h i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e c o n t i n u e d u n t i l the Pearson era i n much the same f a s h i o n as when i t was c r e a t e d by H e e n e y . ^ Under Pearson, a more c l e a r l y s t r u c t u r e d S e c r e t a r i a t was developed to support the d e v e l o p i n g . C a b i n e t Committee system. T h i s new s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t e d of f o u r A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y p o s i t i o n s r e l a t i n g to s p e c i f i c p o l i c y areas — economic p o l i c y and r e s o u r c e i s s u e s ; l e g i s l a t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n and f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l r e l a t i o n s ; s e c u r i t y and i n t e l l i g e n c e ; and, s o c i a l p o l i c y and l a b o u r . The c r e a t i o n of the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y p o s i t i o n s began the p r o c e s s of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n the S e c r e t a r i a t a l t h o u g h the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s d i d not become d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d w i t h p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s . The p o s i t i o n s were c r e a t e d to r e l i e v e the S e c r e t a r y of the co-o r d i n a t i o n and c l e r i c a l f u n c t i o n s r e l a t e d to the. new Committees. But Pearson's Committee system was i t s e l f not p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e . As most matters s t i l l went to f u l l C a b i n e t , the S e c r e t a r y was s t i l l c o n f i n e d to C a b i n e t r e l a t e d i s s u e s and a c t i v i t i e s . The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e tended to r e s t r i c t i t s e l f to t h i s p a s s i v e r o l e i n the co-o r d i n a t i o n of C a b i n e t a c t i v i t i e s u n t i l the. r e s t r u c t u r i n g which o c c u r r e d under P i e r r e Trudeau. One i n d i c a t i o n of the tremendous change t h a t o c c u r r e d was i n the growth of the O f f i c e . Under Pearson, the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e had numbered 141 w h i l e a t the end of 1971, i t numbered 2 3 9 . ^ However, o n l y f i f t y - f i v e , were o f f i c e r s f u n c t i o n i n g w i t h i n the. S e c r e t a r i a t and a f u r t h e r t h i r t e e n concerned themselves w i t h f i n a n c i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a tters as w e l l as c o n t r o l of C a b i n e t documents 12 and P r i v y C o u n c i l d u t i e s . But the S e c r e t a r i a t had come a long way 13 from the ten o f f i c e r s t h a t Heeney had had i n 1945 — but then so had the r e s t of government. B. The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e : 1968-72 1. O r g a n i z a t i o n The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e was r e c o g n i z e d from the b e g i n n i n g as a government department w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r as the r e s p o n s i b l e 14 M i n i s t e r . The O f f i c e was s e p a r a t e from the P r e s i d e n t of the P r i v y C o u n c i l , f o r a l t h o u g h the Prime M i n i s t e r had o f t e n h e l d t h i s p o r t -f o l i o , ^ i t was now the p o s i t i o n of the Leader of the Government i n the H o u s e . ^ The p o r t f o l i o P r e s i d e n t of the P r i v y C o u n c i l was e s s e n t i a l l y a s t a t u s " m i n i s t e r w i t h o u t p o r t f o l i o " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; i t s t i t l e was d e r i v e d from the formal d u t i e s of the P r i v y C o u n c i l which seldom met. The p o r t f o l i o was now used to p r o v i d e a seat i n the Cabinet f o r the Government House Leader. The P r e s i d e n t had a s m a l l s t a f f which was a t t a c h e d to the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , but e s s e n t i a l l y they had d u t i e s t h a t r e l a t e d to h i s p o s i t i o n as House Leader, d u t i e s such as o r g a n i z i n g debates f o r p r i v a t e members' hour and c o o r d i n a t i n g responses to p a r l i a m e n t a r y q u e s t i o n s on the Order Paper. The r e m a i n i n s t a f f of the P r i v y C o u n c i l r e p o r t e d to the S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t who was d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to the Prime M i n i s t e r . The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e (PCO), by 1968, was t o t a l l y encompassed by the Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t . I t was o r g a n i z e d p a r a l l e l to the C a b i n e t 67 Committee s t r u c t u r e i n t o t h r e e d i v i s i o n s , c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the o p e r a t i n g Committees, the c o o r d i n a t i n g Committees and the F e d e r a l -P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s Committee. Each d i v i s i o n was headed by a Deputy S e c r e t a r y r e p o r t i n g to the S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t . The p o s i t i o n of Deputy S e c r e t a r y was c r e a t e d i n 1968 as a p a r t of the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the S e c r e t a r i a t . The Deputy S e c r e t a r y was an i n t e r m e d i a r y p o s i t i o n between the two former l e v e l s of o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e — the S e c r e t a r y and the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s . T h i s was an important development f o r two r e a s o n s . F i r s t , i t b u r e a u c r a t i z e d and f o r m a l i z e d the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e by c r e a t i n g a h i e r a r c h i c a l s t r u c t u r e . P r i o r to t h i s development, PCO had been a r e l a t i v e l y f l a t o r g a n i z a t i o n , l a c k i n g i n s t r o n g d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n r o l e f u n c t i o n s . Secondly, because the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s , now i n c r e a s e d i n numbers, c o n t i n u e d i n t h e i r s e c r e t a r i a l d u t i e s to the Committees, the Deputy S e c r e t a r i e s were a b l e to take i n i t i a t i v e s i n p o l i c y development. The e x c e p t i o n to t h i s was the Deputy S e c r e t a r y , P l a n s , who, as w e l l as i n i t i a t i n g p o l i c y development, c o n t i n u e d i n h i s s e c r e t a r i a l d u t i e s to the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . " ^ T h i s new p o l i c y development c a p a c i t y w i t h i n the Cab i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t was of s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e because i t changed the n a t u r e of the S e c r e t a r i a t from a p a s s i v e r e g u l a t o r y body to an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n government p o l i c y - m a k i n g . 18 The O p e r a t i o n s D i v i s i o n was composed of f o u r S e c r e t a r i a t s , each r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a s e c t i o n of government a c t i v i t y . They moved forward to and through the Cab i n e t p r o p o s a l s t h a t had to be d e c i d e d i n r e l a t i o n to the " o p e r a t i o n s " of government w i t h i n each s p e c i f i c s e c t o r . The O p e r a t i o n s D i v i s i o n was a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s p e c i a l and ad hoc committees, as w e l l as h a v i n g the primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of p r o v i d i n g s e r v i c e s to the c a b i n e t i t s e l f . These s e r v i c e s i n c l u d e d the C o o r d i n a t i n g and S c h e d u l i n g S e c t i o n s as w e l l as the C a b i n e t Documents S e c t i o n . The P l a n s D i v i s i o n , under the Deputy S e c r e t a r y to C a b i n e t P l a n s , was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r two of the c o o r d i n a t i n g Committees of the C a b i n e t the Committees on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g and L e g i s l a t i o n : and House Planning.. As w e l l as the u s u a l S e c r e t a r i e s to each of the two Committees, l o c a t e d i n the P l a n s D i v i s i o n was a P l a n n i n g P r o j e c t s S e c r e t a r i a t which was concerned w i t h a n t i c i p a t i n g problems t h a t were l i k e l y to warrant government a t t e n t i o n . Here were l o c a t e d the s k i l l s i n p l a n n i n g t e c h n i q u e s which were p r o f e r r e d to any major study under 19 review as w e l l as a n a l y t i c , s y n e c t i c and g r a p h i c s e r v i c e s . A l s o under the P l a n s D i v i s i o n was the Machinery of Government S e c r e t a r i a t composed of the Government O r g a n i z a t i o n and S e n i o r P e r s o n n e l D i r e c t o r a t e s . T h i s S e c r e t a r i a t d i f f e r e d from the o t h e r i n t h a t i t was not concerned w i t h s e r v i n g the C a b i n e t and C a b i n e t Committees. I t was p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d to s e r v i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r i n the e x e r c i s e of h i s p r e r o g a t i v e s w i t h r e s p e c t to the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the Government of Canada. The d i r e c t o r a t e was concerned w i t h both the substance and s t r a t e g y of long or s h o r t - t e r m p l a n s of government o r g a n i z a t i o n and produced s p e c i a l s t u d i e s r e l a t e d to o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i s s u e s . T h i s d i r e c t o r a t e f u n c t i o n e d i n some s e c r e c y , f o r w i t h o u t c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y , v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the b u r e a u c r a c y might have m o b i l i z e d to f r u s t r a t e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n p r o p o s a l s . A l s o , from here 69 came a d v i c e and support to the Prime M i n i s t e r i n matters r e l a t e d to the Canadian monarchy and l i a i s o n w i t h Government House. The S e n i o r P e r s o n n e l D i r e c t o r a t e a d v i s e d and ot h e r w i s e supported the Prime M i n i s t e r i n the e x e r c i s e of key p e r s o n n e l appointments such as Deputy M i n i s t e r s ( G o v e r n o r - i n - C o u n c i l or GC c a t e g o r y ) . As w e l l , under the Pl a n s D i v i s i o n was l o c a t e d the A s s i s t a n t C l e r k of the P r i v y C o u n c i l who c o n t i n u e d h i s d u t i e s of r e f e r r i n g Cabinet d e c i s i o n s to the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l . 20 The F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s D i v i s i o n was o r i e n t e d to the Prime M i n i s t e r i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of m a t e r i a l s on f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l r e l a t i o n s and served i n the c o o r d i n a t i o n and support a c t i v i t i e s f o r the Committee of the same name. I t monitored p r o v i n c i a l views on f e d e r a l p o l i c i e s as w e l l as the e v o l u t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s as they would a f f e c t the f e d e r a l government. T h i s D i v i s i o n a l s o p r o v i d e d a s s i s t a n c e to M i n i s t e r s , departments, and a g e n c i e s i n the conduct of t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h p r o v i n c i a l governments and, of c o u r s e , c o o r d i n a t e d f e d e r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n at F i r s t M i n i s t e r s ' C o n f e r e n c e s . The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e a l s o had a D i r e c t o r a t e of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n and i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t t h i s o f f i c e p r o v i d e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e support to the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e as w e l l as to the O f f i c e s of the P r e s i d e n t of the P r i v y C o u n c i l and the Leader of the Government i n the Senate. I t a l s o a d m i n i s t e r e d Royal Commissions and Conferences and the. Prime M i n i s t e r ' s R esidence. The new o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h i n the Cab i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t c r e a t e d a ve r y p o w erful o r g a n i z a t i o n by the ver y n a t u r e of the i n f o r m a t i o n and m a t e r i a l t h a t i t c o o r d i n a t e d . But w i t h i n the framework of r a t i o n a l i t y , 70 i t was the Deputy Secretary, Plans D i v i s i o n s , who became a key player w i t h i n the decision-making process. As w e l l as being responsible f o r P r i o r i t i e s and Planning, the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Committee, and the Committee on L e g i s l a t i o n and House Planning - he was also responsible for the planning techniques and approaches to be used w i t h i n the government. He was a l s o responsible f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the government. His power was emphasized by the f a c t that t h i s man a l s o had unprecedented d i r e c t access to the Prime M i n i s t e r without 21 going through the Secretary to the Cabinet. The man was Michael P i t f i e l d . To what extent h i s i n f l u e n c e was determined by h i s personal r e l a t i o n s h i p to the Prime M i n i s t e r or a r e s u l t of h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l acumen and senior p o s i t i o n i s not r e l e v a n t . What was important, i n terms of metapolicy, was the powerful o r g a n i z a t i o n he had b u i l t w i t h i n the P r i v y Council O f f i c e . 22 2. Cabinet Documents The Cabinet Committee system was dependent upon the system of Cabinet Documents which were required f o r the b r i e f i n g , o r g a n i z a t i o n and c o n t r o l of the decision-making process. Cabinet Documents were comprised of Memoranda, d r a f t B i l l s , Agendas f o r Cabinet and Cabinet Committee meetings, Committee Reports and Records of Decision (RDs) and minutes of the proceedings of the Cabinet. They were a l l "a confidence of the Queen's P r i v y C o u n c i l " and were therefore c o n f i d e n t i a l to the Cabinet. The root of Cabinet secrecy was based not only i n the O f f i c i a l Secrets Act and the P r i v y C o u n c i l l o r ' s Oath but also on the grounds that Cabinet business was advice to the Sovereign whose 71 consent was n e c e s s a r y f o r i t s p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s consent c o u l d o n l y be o b t a i n e d through the Prime M i n i s t e r and i t a p p l i e d o n l y to the p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n and the. p a r t i c u l a r d i s c l o s u r e f o r which the s a n c t i o n was g i v e n . T h e r e f o r e , Cabinet Documents were numbered, t h e i r c i r c u l a t i o n was s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d , they c o u l d be t r a n s f e r r e d o n l y on signature, and they had to be r e t u r n e d to the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . The r u l e of C a b i n e t s e c r e c y was a l s o l i n k e d to the c o n v e n t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Cabinet s o l i d a r i t y would have been j e o p a r d i z e d i f i t was known p u b l i c l y what o p i n i o n s were ex p r e s s e d i n C a b i n e t . C a b i n e t s o l i d a r i t y was the reason f o r the p r a c t i c e of 23 not k e e p i n g r e c o r d s of C a b i n e t p r o c e e d i n g s , o n l y Records of D e c i s i o n (RDs). These were seldom a v a i l a b l e o u t s i d e the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . The most important document was the Memorandum to C a b i n e t f o r i t formed the b a s i s of d i s c u s s i o n i n C a b i n e t . Only a C a b i n e t M i n i s t e r c o u l d sponsor a submission to Cabinet and i t had to be i n the form of a Memorandum.. As was not the case i n Pearson's time, under Trudeau, Ca b i n e t Memoranda were r e q u i r e d to be d e t a i l e d and e x h a u s t i v e i n t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n . The b a s i c a n a l y t i c a l structure, c o n t a i n e d e l e v e n components. The f i r s t component, " O b j e c t " , gave an e x p l a n a t i o n of the purpose of the document i n c l u d i n g the. development of what d e c i s i o n was r e q u i r e d . The next heading was "Background", under which was l i s t e d a b r i e f h i s t o r y of the problem i n c l u d i n g any p r e v i o u s govern-ment p o l i c y on the i s s u e s and any p r e v i o u s C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n was c l e a r l y summarized. F o l l o w i n g t h a t , was a s e c t i o n on " F a c t o r s " which was an attempt to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e s c r i b e and a s s e s s the f a c t o r s 72 p e r t i n e n t t o the problem. Such f a c t o r s c o u l d c o n s i s t of many t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g f i n a n c i a l or l e g a l c o n s t r a i n t s , p u b l i c a t t i t u d e s , economic and/or s o c i a l changes. I n c l u d e d was how t h e s e f a c t o r s i n t e r r e l a t e d and a f f e c t e d the i s s u e . " A l t e r n a t i v e s " was the n e x t h e a d i n g , l i s t i n g the d i f f e r e n t ways i n w hich i t was p o s s i b l e t o approach the i s s u e . I t was an i t e m -i z a t i o n of what p o l i c i e s or programs c o u l d be d e v e l o p e d or m o d i f i e d to meet the needs p r e v i o u s l y e l a b o r a t e d upon. The p r o s and cons of a l l were examined and the i n t e n t was t o have a complete l i s t of a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e w h i c h appeared t o be o v e r l y s i m p l i s t i c i n the r e a s o n s f o r t h e i r n o n - v i a b i l i t y . The next component was " F i n a n c i a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s " w h i c h summarized the impact of the. a l t e r n a t i v e s on government e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r the f i r s t y e a r and the f o l l o w i n g f i v e y e a r s . T h i s , of c o u r s e , was an e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t a r e a i n which to p r o j e c t , g i v e n the un-p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of c e r t a i n f a c t o r s such as economic c o n d i t i o n s and p u b l i c demand. And, of c o u r s e , any proponent of the p o l i c y , such as the s p o n s o r i n g M i n i s t e r , was l i k e l y to downplay the c o s t s i n the hope of g a i n i n g a p p r o v a l . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h i s s e c t i o n was r e g a r d e d c l o s e l y by the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e and t h e ' P r e s i d e n t of the T r e a s u r y Board. The " F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s " component was not p e r t i n e n t i n those documents p e r t a i n i n g to a f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l s u b j e c t because the m a t t e r would have been d e a l t w i t h i n " F a c t o r s " and " A l t e r n a t i v e s " . F o r o t h e r Committees, the p a r a g r a p h summarized the e f f e c t of the p r oposed i n i t i a t i v e on p r o v i n c i a l governments, n o t i n g c o n s u l t a t i o n s t h a t had o c c u r r e d , i n t e r e s t s , and j u r i s d i c t i o n s . A l s o of concern was who sh o u l d be a d v i s e d p r i o r to announcements of new i n i t i a t i v e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " I n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s " d e s c r i b e d the i n t e r e s t s o t h e r f e d e r a l departments and agen c i e s might have had i n the i s s u e , summarizing c o n s u l t a t i o n s which had been c a r r i e d out e i t h e r through formal i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l meetings or i n f o r m a l meetings. Any support f o r p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s on the p a r t of another department would be c l e a r l y p o i n t e d out and the l a c k of c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h any c o n c e i v a b l y i n t e r e s t e d p a r t y would be conspicuous by i t s absence. " P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n C o n s i d e r a t i o n s " were concerned w i t h the p u b l i c announcement of new p o l i c y . A lthough many Cabi n e t d e c i s i o n s would be of no i n t e r e s t whatsoever, some new p o l i c i e s or programs r e q u i r e d s p e c i f i c campaigns to i n f o r m those a f f e c t e d . A d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the t i m i n g of m i n i s t e r i a l announcements and the media i n v o l v e d and the s i z e and nature of the p o p u l a t i o n concerned was s u p p l i e d . T h i s component was c o o r d i n a t e d through a sub-committee of P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . Other p o s s i b l e components t h a t might have appeared on a Cabinet Memorandum were: "Other C o n s i d e r a t i o n s " which was open-ended as to purpose; " P a r l i a m e n t a r y C o n s i d e r a t i o n s " which r e f e r r e d to t a c t i c s i n the House of Commons r e q u i r e d f o r p a r l i a m e n t a r y support f o r the p o l i c y and; " P o l i t i c a l Considerations 1', p o s s i b l y r e f l e c t i n g the e x t r a -p a r l i a m e n t a r y p a r t y c o n f e r e n c e r e s o l u t i o n s . T h i s component would a l s o have i n c l u d e d c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h the Caucus and the g e n e r a l support t h a t t h i s i s s u e would r e c e i v e . The " C o n c l u s i o n " d e s c r i b e d the s p o n s o r i n g M i n i s t e r ' s o p i n i o n of what needed to be done and the most v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e f o r a c h i e v i n g t h i s g o a l . The "Recommendations" s e c t i o n was the most important of a l l the s e c t i o n s . I t gave a d e t a i l e d and p r e c i s e l i s t of recommend-a t i o n s f o r the implementation of the p r e f e r r e d a l t e r n a t i v e s p e c i f i e d i n the C o n c l u s i o n . Every e f f o r t was made to express the f u l l scope of the i n i t i a t i v e i n the exact words t h a t the M i n i s t e r would want to see i n the f i n a l "Record of D e c i s i o n " , once the d e c i s i o n had been reached. As s t a t e d e a r l i e r , the C a b i n e t Memorandum formed the b a s i s f o r the C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n . They were now e x t e n s i v e i n d e t a i l and were an e x h a u s t i v e e xamination of the i s s u e s under d i s c u s s i o n . The new format has f o r c e d M i n i s t e r s to share t h e i r background i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s . I t a l s o f o r c e d the o f f i c i a l s who p r e p a r e d the Memoranda to e x p l o r e f u l l y a l l i m p l i c a t i o n s and a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s In the c o n t e x t of the attempt to i n t r o d u c e r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system, the r e v i s e d procedures f o r the p r e p a r a t i o n of C a b i n e t Memoranda were a p o s i t i v e s t e p . However, the i n c r e a s e d number of C a b i n e t Documents submitted to 24 C a b i n e t each year and the d e t a i l r e q u i r e d i n C a b i n e t Documents 25 c r e a t e d the paper burden argument. M i n i s t e r s seldom had the time to read Memoranda ot h e r than those which concerned them d i r e c t l y . 2 ^ For t h i s reason, the r e v i s i o n of the format f o r C a b i n e t documents l o s t some of i t s e f f e c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . 75 3. P r o c e d u r e s f o r C a b i n e t D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g The d e c i s i o n t o go t o C a b i n e t f o r a p o l i c y or program d e c i s i o n , t h a t i s , t o a c o l l e c t i v e d e c i s i o n r a t h e r than one based on m i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , was the s o l e d e c i s i o n of the M i n i s t e r . The need f o r a d e c i s i o n c o u l d have been p r e c i p i t a t e d by a number of f a c t o r s . A M i n i s t e r had t o go t o C a b i n e t i f he wanted t o pass l e g i s l a t i o n to make a law. He may have w i s h e d t o implement a p o l i c y w hich r e q u i r e d C a b i n e t a p p r o v a l . He may have w i s h e d t o make a r e q u e s t f o r new monies f o r an e x i s t i n g program or t o r e - a l l o c a t e funds w i t h i n h i s e x i s t i n g b u d g e t a r y framework. These f a c t o r s were u s u a l l y the r e s u l t of a d v i c e from o f f i c i a l s or a r e s u l t of the M i n i s t e r ' s own p e r s o n a l a m b i t i o n s . C a b i n e t a d v i c e o r d i r e c t i o n may have been r e q u e s t e d as w e l l i n response to a p o l i t i c a l problem a r i s i n g from the O p p o s i t i o n i n the House, d i s c u s s i o n i n the media, p r e s s u r e from i n t e r e s t g r o u p s , or perhaps the e x t r a p a r 1 i a m e n t a r y p a r t y . A l t e r n a t i v e l y a M i n i s t e r c o u l d have been d i r e c t e d by the C a b i n e t t o p r e s e n t new p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s , u s u a l l y as a r e s u l t of p r i o r i t i e s drawn up i n the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . L e g i s l a t i v e and House P l a n n i n g may a l s o have r e q u i r e d l e g i s l a t i o n f o r the Government L e g i s l a t i v e Program and r e q u e s t e d a M i n i s t e r t o p r e p a r e l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h i n h i s a r e a . However, t h e r e were a number of re a s o n s why a M i n i s t e r c o u l d have chosen not t o go t o C a b i n e t . H i s r e q u e s t c o u l d have been d e n i e d . I t c o u l d p o s s i b l y have been d e t a i n e d i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e and been v i r t u a l l y l o s t . A M i n i s t e r might a l s o have f e a r e d t h a t the C a b i n e t would choose an a l t e r n a t i v e o t h e r than h i s recommended one. The C a b i n e t c o u l d deny him r e q u e s t e d funds and f r u s t r a t e h i s 76 policy i n i t i a t i v e . And f i n a l l y a Minister could lose c r e d i b i l i t y in Cabinet i f he was i l l - p r e p a r e d for the discussion or i f his policy i n i t i a t i v e was found to be lacking d i r e c t i o n or compatability with the government's objectives. The choice to go to Cabinet would be influenced by the degree of controversy that a decision could engender, the Minister's need for c o l l e c t i v e support, or, i f a policy already existed, the terms and conditions of the po l i c y as stated in the Record of Decision. Consultation with Cabinet colleagues could play an important role at this stage as would the consultations that deputy ministers would undertake with their counterparts in other departments. The Privy Council O f f i c e could also play an important r o l e , using i t s influence and knowledge as a central agency to persuade or dissuade a Minister from Cabinet action. The Privy Council's action would depend on the p o l i c y implications, the resources required, the mood and the time schedule of Cabinet. It was the role of the Privy Council Office to keep departments informed of m i n i s t e r i a l decisions and attitudes either in Cabinet or Cabinet Committees and also to inform them of the position of the Prime Minister i f he had a s p e c i f i c viewpoint. And, in turn, the Secretariat was usually advised of new and ongoing concerns 2 g within the organization of the government. Privy Council Office could, therefore, p a r t i c i p a t e i n the development of a Cabinet Memorandum pri o r to i t o f f i c i a l l y leaving the department. Considerations that PCO would have are: the'issuer's relationship to established govern-ment p r i o r i t i e s , government a l l o c a t i o n of time and l e g i s l a t i v e 77 p r i o r i t i e s , i t s r e l a t e d n e s s t o o t h e r departments' i n i t i a t i v e s , the c o n c i s e n e s s and the coherence of the document, the completeness and the a c c u r a c y , the c l e a r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s , and f i n a l l y , the f e a s i b i l i t y of the recommendation. I n the c o u r s e of t h i s a n a l y s i s PCO was not a t t e m p t i n g t o by-pass d e p a r t m e n t a l e x p e r t i s e b u t , r a t h e r , to a p p l y t h e i r knowledge of the o v e r a l l p r i o r i t i e s of government and t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e w i t h C a b i n e t and i t s Committees t o t h a t s u b s t a n t i v e e x p e r t i s e of d e p a r t m e n t a l o f f i c i a l s . T h i s a r e a , however, was p a r t i c u l a r l y s e n s i t i v e . D e p a r t -m e n t a l o f f i c i a l s c o u l d be e a s i l y f r u s t r a t e d i f they p e r c e i v e d t h a t i t was o f f i c i a l s i n PCO, r a t h e r than M i n i s t e r s i n C a b i n e t , who were d e l a y i n g t h e i r i n i t i a t i v e s . PCO had s e v e r a l r e a s o n s f o r t h i s c a r e f u l assessment of a proposed d e p a r t m e n t a l p o l i c y . P r i m a r i l y , t h i s assessment would be used t o make recommendations t o the M i n i s t e r f o r h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of the f i n a l Memorandum. More i m p o r t a n t l y , i t would form the b a s i s of v a r i o u s b r i e f i n g s t o s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s i n the PCO, the Chairman of the Committee concerned and, f i n a l l y , the Prime M i n i s t e r h i m s e l f . The Prime M i n i s t e r was kep t i n f o r m e d of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Committees e i t h e r t h r o u g h b r i e f i n g s by the Deputy S e c r e t a r y , P l a n s c o n c e r n i n g h i s r o l e as Chairman of the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and 29 P l a n n i n g and the Committee on F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s o r he was kept i n f o r m e d a t h i s d a i l y meetings w i t h the S e c r e t a r y t o the C a b i n e t and h i s P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y . The d a i l y meetings t h a t the 78 Prime M i n i s t e r had w i t h the S e c r e t a r y to the Cabi n e t were a co-o r d i n a t i n g f a c t o r i n the f u n c t i o n i n g of the government. The Prime M i n i s t e r was b r i e f e d on a l l developments a c r o s s the government. Given the e a r l i e r comment on the paper burden t h a t M i n i s t e r s are under, the Prime M i n i s t e r had a d i s t i n c t advantage i n b e i n g a b l e to c o n t r o l h i s Ca b i n e t and the government through b r i e f i n g by h i s own o f f i c i a l s . The presence of the P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y added the p o l i t i c a l dimension to h i s b r i e f i n g s e n s u r i n g t h a t b u r e a u c r a t i c r e a s o n i n g was s u i t a b l y b a l a n c e d w i t h p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The Prime M i n i s t e r would a l s o i n f o r m the S e c r e t a r y to the Cabi n e t i f he 30 had any views on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e d u r i n g these meetings. Once the f i n a l document had been s i g n e d by the s p o n s o r i n g M i n i s t e r , i t would be submitted to the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , Documents and S c h e d u l i n g D i v i s i o n . There, i t was a s s i g n e d a number, p r i n t e d and d i s t r i b u t e d . I t was at t h i s p o i n t t h a t i t became a c o n f i d e n c e of the Queen's P r i v y C o u n c i l and i t was g i v e n a s e c r e c y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . I t was then p l a c e d on an Agenda f o r a Committee. I t was the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p r e r o g a t i v e to a s s i g n a Cab i n e t Memorandum to a p a r t i c u l a r Committee and i t was the p r e r o g a t i v e of the Prime M i n i s t e r and the Chairman of the Committee to a s s i g n a time f o r d i s c u s s i o n . In a c t u a l f a c t , t h i s p r e r o g a t i v e was seldom used. The r o u t i n g of Memorandum through Committees and the assignment of Committee Reports to the Main Agenda or the Annex of Cabinet were monitored by a group of P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c i a l s at the weekly Agenda Meeting. The meeting was c h a i r e d by the Deputy S e c r e t a r y , O p e r a t i o n s and each S e c r e t a r i a t was r e p r e s e n t e d . In p r e p a r i n g the Cabi n e t Memorandum f o r Committee, a b r i e f i n g was p r e p a r e d f o r the Committee Chairman. T h i s b r i e f i n g would i n c l u d e : a summary of the substance of the document; an a n a l y s i s of the flaws i n the document and recommendations on how to d e a l w i t h them; a d e s c r i p t i v e summary of the a t t i t u d e s of the members of the Committee towards the i s s u e and recommendations on how to respond to expected a c t i o n s ; and f i n a l l y , a d e s c r i p t i o n of the n a t u r e of the d e c i s i o n r e q u i r e d . The purpose of t h i s b r i e f i n g was to a s s i s t the C h a i r p e r s o n i n c o n d u c t i n g the meeting and to minimize waste of time i f the Committee shou l d become p r e - o c c u p i e d w i t h p e r i p h e r a l i s s u e s or from p r o l o n g e d c o n f r o n t a t i o n between M i n i s t e r s . The use of such a b r i e f i n g was always at the d i s c r e t i o n of the C h a i r p e r s o n as was a l l o t h e r a d v i c e from an o f f i c i a l to a M i n i s t e r . However, the n a t u r e of the b r i e f i n g g i v e s some i n d i c a t i o n of the depth of involvement of o f f i c i a l s from the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e i n r e l a t i o n to the Committee p r o c e s s . D u r i n g the Committee meeting, the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y to the Committee would s i t behind the C h a i r p e r s o n to p r o v i d e an o r a l b r i e f i n g i f n e c e s s a r y . There would a l s o be at l e a s t one o t h e r member 31 of the C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t p r e s e n t to take minutes of the meeting. These minutes would i n c l u d e the o p i n i o n s of v a r i o u s M i n i s t e r s p r e s e n t and a l s o the p o i n t s of views of v a r i o u s o f f i c i a l s p r e s e n t , e i t h e r r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r M i n i s t e r s or a d v i s i n g him. They s t a t e d p r e c i s e l y what d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n s were expressed on a s p e c i f i c s u b j e c t . Because these minutes were, t e c h n i c a l l y , c o n t r a r y to the c o n v e n t i o n s of C a b i n e t s e c r e c y , they were d i s t r i b u t e d to v a r i o u s o f f i c i a l s i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e on a need to know b a s i s o n l y . Others i n attendance v a r i e d a c c o r d i n g to the Committee. U s u a l l y an o f f i c i a l from the T r e a s u r y Board was p r e s e n t and p o s s i b l y an o f f i c i a l from the F i n a n c e Department. Departmental o f f i c i a l s — deputy m i n i s t e r s , a s s i s t a n t deputy m i n i s t e r s or p o l i c y p e r s o n n e l — would be p r e s e n t to support a M i n i s t e r or to r e p r e s e n t the views of an absent M i n i s t e r . Although the presence of o f f i c i a l s might have been n e c e s s a r y f o r informed d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , i t was p a r t of the r o l e of the A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y to minimize the number of o f f i c i a l s p r e s e n t as w e l l as to ensure t h a t the presence of o f f i c i a l s and t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the d i s c u s s i o n d i d not c o n s t r a i n the f r a n k n e s s and freedom w i t h which M i n i s t e r s must be a b l e to express t h e i r views. I t was a b l e n d i n g of r o l e s t h a t r e q u i r e d mutual c o n f i d e n c e and an awareness of t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s . . . The exposure of s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s to the t h i n k i n g and p o l i c y concerns of m i n i s t e r s h e l p e d them to e x p l a i n to t h e i r departments the l o g i c of d e c i s i o n s t h a t might o t h e r w i s e seem wrong, i n -comprehensible or p e t t y p o l i t i c s . ^ Of c o u r s e , the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of o f f i c i a l s would v a r y , from the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g , w i t h l i t t l e p a r t i c i p a t i o n on on the p a r t of o f f i c i a l s , to L e g i s l a t i o n and House P l a n n i n g , dominated i n a l a r g e p a r t by o f f i c i a l s from the J u s t i c e Department, p a r t i c u l a r -l y when a d r a f t b i l l was b e i n g d i s c u s s e d . Once a Committee had reached a d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g the Memorandum, the Committee Report was d r a f t e d by the S e c r e t a r i a t . The Committee Report was the e x p r e s s i o n of the Committee's recommendation to C a b i n e t . Of c o u r s e , the s p o n s o r i n g M i n i s t e r would l i k e to have seen the. Committee Report d r a f t e d i n i d e n t i c a l words to h i s "Recommendation But i n r e a l i t y the d r a f t i n g of t h i s document was one of the most 81 important r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . Because Ca b i n e t d e c i s i o n s were a r r i v e d at by consensus, and no formal vote was even taken, t h e r e was no formal s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the r e s o l u t i o n of the i s s u e . Consequently, the formal d r a f t i n g of Committee Reports c o u l d be v e r y c o m p l i c a t e d and r e q u i r e much c o n s u l t -a t i o n on the p a r t of P r i v y C o u n c i l o f f i c i a l s . I t was f o r t h i s reason t h a t C a b i n e t s e c r e c y r u l e s were bent and r e c o r d e d p r o c e e d i n g s of the meeting were k e p t . In or d e r to ensure t h a t c o n s i s t e n c y was m a i n t a i n e d w i t h what a c t u a l l y had o c c u r r e d , d r a f t i n g of Committee Reports was overseen by the Chairman of the Committee. The next stage was dependent upon the d e c i s i o n reached w i t h i n the Committee. An u n s u c c e s s f u l Memorandum may have been r e t u r n e d to the department or have been withdrawn by the M i n i s t e r . Or i t may have been r e t u r n e d to the department w i t h a request f o r r e v i s i o n s . To have been r e f e r r e d to another Committee was a f u r t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y . Or i t may have been r e f e r r e d to Cab i n e t f o r a p p r o v a l to be l i s t e d e i t h e r on the Main Agenda or the Annex to the Agenda. The d e c i s i o n to l i s t a Committee Report on the Main Agenda was dependent on the nat u r e of the i s s u e and was u l t i m a t e l y d e c i d e d by the Prime M i n i s t e r . E i t h e r j u s t b e f o r e , or immediately a f t e r , the Memorandum had been d i s c u s s e d i n Committee, the i s s u e of the Memorandum was p r e s e n t e d to the Caucus. The a c c e s s of Caucus to Cab i n e t i s s u e s was one of the major reforms t h a t o c c u r r e d i n 1968. The M i n i s t e r r e s p o n s i b l e c o u l d d i s c u s s the i s s u e at a s p e c i a l Caucus meeting known as a S u b j e c t Caucus or he c o u l d choose to c o n s u l t the Caucus on the i s s u e at a r e g u l a r Wednesday morning meeting. The Caucus r e q u e s t e d these reforms 8 2 a f t e r a c o n f e r e n c e on the r o l e of the backbencher i n the government 33 p o l i c y - m a k i n g system. Access to M i n i s t e r s and to the government's p r i o r i t i e s by members of the Government Caucus were t h e i r main c o n c e r n s . The c o n s u l t a t i o n p r o c e s s was i n s t i t u t e d as a r e s u l t of these c o n c e r n s . The c o n f e r e n c e a l s o c o n s i d e r e d the r o l e of the Caucus to suggest p o l i c y to the C a b i n e t . However, the process./and r e s u l t of c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Caucus was v e r y much dependent upon the M i n i s t e r concerned. In some i n s t a n c e s the c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Caucus members had o c c u r r e d long b e f o r e t h i s stage i n the development of C a b i n e t p o l i c y - m a k i n g and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s had been noted i n the Cabinet Memorandum. The Caucus c o u l d p r o v i d e support to a M i n i s t e r i n h a n d l i n g h i s l e g i s l a t i o n through the House of Commons, p u b l i c l y s u p p o r t i n g h i s p o l i c i e s a c r o s s the c o u n t r y , or s u p p o r t i n g them i n the R e g i o n a l Caucus. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , some M i n i s t e r s f e l t t h a t the Caucus would c o n t r i b u t e l i t t l e to p o l i c y - m a k i n g and d i d not use i t as a source of power and i n f l u e n c e . In any case, Caucus was now almost always informed of new government p o l i c y p r i o r to p u b l i c announcement. Ca b i n e t meetings were more formal than Committee meetings. In p a r t t h e i r b e i n g so was n e c e s s i t a t e d by the s i z e of the meeting w i t h so many more members. In p a r t , the f o r m a l i t y was a r e s u l t of the Prime M i n i s t e r s e r v i n g as Chairman. No o f f i c i a l s were p r e s e n t e x c e p t i n g the S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t , the Deputy S e c r e t a r y , P l a n s and an A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y , a g a i n to take a r e c o r d of the p r o c e e d i n g s . The P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y to the Prime M i n i s t e r was a l s o a l l o w e d to a t t e n d w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p e r m i s s i o n . The Prime M i n i s t e r was b r i e f e d by the S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t and the Deputy S e c r e t a r y , P l a n s . Because of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s d a i l y b r i e f i n g s w i t h the S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t and h i s P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y , as w e l l as h i s b r i e f i n g s w i t h the Deputy S e c r e t a r y , P l a n s , f o r those Committees which he c h a i r e d and Cabinet Agenda b r i e f i n g s , i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t any item of b u s i n e s s would have reached the stage of C a b i n e t d i s c u s s i o n without h i s knowledge and a p p r o v a l . I f the Committee Report was l i s t e d i n the Annex to the Agenda, the p r o c e s s of i t s going to C a b i n e t was u s u a l l y u n e v e n t f u l and i t was a u t o m a t i c a l l y passed. The Committee Report would become the Record of D e c i s i o n (RD) w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i v e change. I f the Committee Report was l i s t e d on the Main Agenda, or i f a M i n i s t e r wished to speak to an i s s u e l i s t e d i n the Annex then there was a d i s c u s s i o n i n C a b i n e t and the Record of D e c i s i o n would d i f f e r from the Committee Report. Every Thursday a f t e r n o o n , a f t e r C a b i n e t , t h e r e was a meeting i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e under the chairmanship of the Deputy S e c r e t a r y , O p e r a t i o n s . The meeting was c a l l e d "Round-Up". R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the PCO S e c r e t a r i a t s a t t e n d e d , as d i d o f f i c i a l s from T r e a s u r y Board. The purpose of t h i s meeting was to d i s c u s s the i s s u e s t h a t were r e s o l v e d i n C a b i n e t and the r e s u l t i n g Records of D e c i s i o n . The Record of D e c i s i o n stood as government p o l i c y on the i s s u e i n q u e s t i o n . I t c o n s t i t u t e d d i r e c t i o n s to M i n i s t e r s and departmental o f f i c i a l s to f o l l o w i n t h e i r implementation of government p o l i c y . The Record of D e c i s i o n was never more than a page i n l e n g t h and c o u l d 84 be as s h o r t as f i v e s e n t e n c e s . I t was a p r e c i s e d i r e c t i v e . The premium i n w r i t i n g a Record of D e c i s i o n was a c c u r a c y and b r e v i t y . Because of the tremendous amount of paper t h a t was g enerated by the Committee system, i t was not unusual f o r M i n i s t e r s to read o n l y Records of D e c i s i o n to f i n d out what government p o l i c y had been d e c i d e d . The r u l e s of consensus d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a p p l i e d e q u a l l y to C a b i n e t as they d i d to Committees. The r e s o l u t i o n of the i s s u e may have been u n c l e a r . I t was f o r t h i s reason t h a t the s e c r e c y r u l e of C a b i n e t was bent and r e c o r d s of C a b i n e t p r o c e e d i n g s were taken. T h i s e n a b l e d the o f f i c i a l s of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e to f u l f i l l t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i t h care and a t t e n t i o n . I t a l s o p r o t e c t e d the o f f i c i a l s from undue c r i t i c i s m f o r t h e i r p o t e n t i a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n i n t e r p r e t i n g d e c i s i o n s . The Prime M i n i s t e r was the f i n a l a r b i t e r of Records of D e c i s i o n . Summary We have examined the p r o c e s s e s and procedures by which Cabinet makes i t s d e c i s i o n s as w e l l as the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e which i s the s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n to C a b i n e t . The procedures encompass a l l t h a t a commentator would expect a d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s to i n c l u d e . And, i n the c o n t e x t of h i s t o r i c a l development, i t was under Trudeau t h a t a r a t i o n a l s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n of the p r o c e -dures was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Cabinet d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , as the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s department, has always h e l d a prominent p o s i t i o n i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n of govern-ment. However, i n the p e r i o d 1968-72, a time of m e t a - p o l i c y development, 85 the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e i n c r e a s e d i n power i f f o r no ot h e r reason than i t c o n t r o l l e d the procedures f o r Cabi n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . But the PCO enhanced and m a i n t a i n e d i t s powerful p o s i t i o n i n o t h e r ways as w e l l — f i r s t , through i t s r o l e i n the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s and, second, through i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r b r i e f i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r . A l t h o u g h the Cabi n e t remained the f i n a l a r b i t e r of government p r i o r i t i e s and o b j e c t i v e s , the P l a n s D i v i s i o n of the PCO p l a y e d an important r o l e i n t r a n s l a t i n g M i n i s t e r s ' views to long-term o b j e c t i v e s and p r i o r i t i e s . Proposed p r i o r i t i e s were p r e s e n t e d on an annual b a s i s i n a s i n g l e Memorandum to Cabi n e t w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r as the s p o n s o r i n g M i n i s t e r . The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , u s u a l l y the Deputy S e c r e t a r y , P l a n s , was the agent t h a t wrote the Memorandum. The sources f o r t h i s document i n c l u d e d : i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r v i e w s w i t h a l l M i n i s t e r s f o r t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s of i s s u e s and t h e i r concerns as w e l l as proposed d i r e c t i o n s f o r the government; concerns expressed i n Cabin e t and Committees; concerns expressed by the s t a f f of the PMO and o t h e r M i n i s t e r s ' O f f i c e s ; P a r t y promises; and, l e f t - o v e r or urgent l e g i s l a t i v e items. C a b i n e t was a l s o i n v o l v e d i n day-long p l a n n i n g s e s s i o n s where t h e r e was n e i t h e r agenda nor b r i e f i n g n o t e s . The key r o l e of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e i n t h i s p r o c e s s was one of i n t e r v i e w e r , s y n t h e s i z e r , s c h e d u l e r and packager. The PCO p l a y e d a s i m i l a r r o l e i n the w r i t i n g of Committee Reports and Records of D e c i s i o n . PCO was a l s o the c e n t r a l agency which i n t e r p r e t e d these documents to o p e r a t i n g departments. T h e r e f o r e , the r o l e of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , w h i l e not 3 4 n e c e s s a r i l y d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d , was v e r y i n f l u e n t i a l . 86 Another source of i n f l u e n c e of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e was r o o t e d i n t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to b r i e f the Prime M i n i s t e r on a l l m a t ters r e l a t e d to the f e d e r a l government. In t h i s p o s i t i o n , the o f f i c i a l s of PCO had to be c o n s t a n t l y aware of a l l o p e r a t i o n s a c r o s s the government spectrum. The o f f i c i a l s of PCO were a b l e to m a i n t a i n t h e i r sources of i n f o r m a t i o n because they a c t e d as c o o r d i n a t o r s of Cabinet o p e r a t i o n s . A M i n i s t e r r e c e i v e d , and was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r , o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t a f f e c t e d h i s department or r e g i o n a l r e s p o n s i -b i l i t i e s . The Prime M i n i s t e r was d i f f e r e n t because he was responsible, f o r the o p e r a t i o n s of the e n t i r e government and h i s concern was the e n t i r e c o u n t r y . The development of m e t a p o l i c i e s i n the p e r i o d 1968-72 not o n l y appeared to make PCO s t r o n g e r , they, i n f a c t , d i d . Through i t s growth i n s i z e , i t was now a b l e to c o n t r o l and c o o r d i n a t e to a f a r g r e a t e r e x t e n t than p r e v i o u s l y . However, c o n s i d e r a t i o n must a l s o be g i v e n to the f a c t t h a t PCO i s the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Department, and the g r e a t e s t i n c r e a s e of power i n t h i s p e r i o d was i n the hands of the Prime M i n i s t e r . The Prime M i n i s t e r was a b l e to m a i n t a i n h i s c o n t r o l of the government, and the C a b i n e t , on the b a s i s of the i n f o r m a t i o n he r e c e i v e d from the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . There was another o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t was a l s o d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to the. Prime M i n i s t e r . I t i s an o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t has been c r e d i t e d w i t h a g r e a t d e a l of i n f l u e n c e i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . That o r g a n i z a t i o n i s the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e . ' . We w i l l now examine the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e to f i n d out what r o l e d i d the PMO p l a y i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . Did i t p l a y a p a r t i n the attempt to r a t i o n a l i z e d e cision-making? FIGURE 2 ORGANIZATION CHART: PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, 1971 The Prim© Minister President nf the Privy Council Prime Mlnistii Clerk of t h - Privy Council and Secretary tn l!»c Canine t Constitutional Confcrri'.v Secretariat Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations ) Coordination and scheduling Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Pbns) Government Operations Sorrrtflriat Planning Section Econorrrio Tollcy Secretariat External Policy »nd Defence Secretariat Priorities and Planning Sccrelaiint Legislative & House. Planning Secretariat Sricnce Culture and Information Secretariat Social Policy Secretariat Asst. Clerk of Privy Council (crder* in con net t) Legal policy L-j Legal adviser Deputy Secretary to tl»e Cabinet (Fcd.-Prov. Affairs) Machinery of govt, section , Federal- Pmvi ndal P.elations Communications Government org av t rj\ tion Senior personnel Assistant Secretary to the Oahlnct (Security) Dire ctor Admini tra (ton' ti Personnel Dlrcctnt constitutional review Supervisor o i cabinet documents Research and policy development UJ Cabinet docamenb Parliamentary Personnel I-* Briefing te;i:n P C O officer personnel Royal coram! trlom and conf i Government oonference centre Management Information centre Financial services Source: Organization of the P r i n t e r , 1970), 217 Government of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's 00 NOTES: CHAPTER I I I S e c t i o n 130 of the B r i t i s h North America Act r e q u i r e d than a l l o f f i c e r s of the p r o v i n c i a l governments charged w i t h d u t i e s r e l a t i n g to matters a s s i g n e d by the Act to the P a r l i a m e n t of Canada were r e q u i r e d to c o n t i n u e to d i s c h a r g e t h e i r d u t i e s u n t i l o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by P a r l i a m e n t . The c l e r k of the E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l of the P r o v i n c e of Canada was sworn i n as C l e r k of the P r i v y C o u n c i l , J u l y 1, 1967. 2 A.D.P. Heeney, "Mackenzie K i n g and the Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 10 (1967), p. 367. 3 See Margaret Banks, " P r i v y C o u n c i l , C a b i n e t and M i n i s t r y i n B r i t a i n and Canada," Canadian J o u r n a l of Economics and P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e 31 (1965), p. 193-205. 4 Heeney, op. c i t . , p. 370. ~* L e g i s l a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the p o s i t i o n of S e c r e t a r y of the C a b i n e t was passed i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the p o s i t i o n of S e c r e t a r y to the Cabinet f o r F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s . See J.R. M a l l o r y , "The Two C l e r k s : P a r l i a m e n t a r y D i s c u s s i o n of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , " Canadian J o u r n a l of Economics and P o l i t i c a l  S c i e n c e 10 (1977): p. 14"] f. O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l , P.C. 1121, March 25, 1940. Heeney, op. c i t . , p. 373. 8 J.R. M a l l o r y , The S t r u c t u r e of Canadian Government (Tor o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1971), p. 255. 9 Heeney, op. c i t . , p. 371. ^ G. Bruce Doern, "The Development of P o l i c y O r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the E x e c u t i v e Arena" i n Doern and A u c o i n , eds., The S t r u c t u r e of P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n Canada (Tor o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1971), p. 42. ^ W.A. Matheson, The Prime M i n i s t e r and the Cabi n e t ( T o r o n t o : Methuen, 1976), p. 93. 88 Gordon Robertson, "The Changing Role of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 14 (1971), p. 493. I b i d . 14 T r e a s u r y Board of Canada, O r g a n i z a t i o n of the Government of  Canada (Ottawa: Q u e e n ' s P r i n t e r , 1979), p. 402. At one time i t was c o n s i d e r e d a requirement f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r to h o l d a p o r t f o l i o p o s i t i o n i n or d e r to have a seat i n Cabi n e t as he was not mentioned i n s t a t u t e s or the B r i t i s h North America A c t . 1 6 S i n c e 1968. ^ The o f f i c i a l i n t h i s p o s i t i o n was M i c h a e l P i t f i e l d who, i n 1967, had been an A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y and became S e c r e t a r y to the Cabi n e t i n 1975. 18 There are now f i v e S e c r e t a r i e s w i t h i n the O p e r a t i o n s D i v i s i o n w i t h the a d d i t i o n of the Cab i n e t Committee on Government O p e r a t i o n s . 19 The P r i v y C o u n c i l had on c o n t r a c t such p o l i c y s c i e n t i s t s as E r i c h J a n t s c h and Yehezekel Dror. 20 On January 15, 1975, t h i s D i v i s i o n became the F e d e r a l -P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s O f f i c e (FPRO), d e s i g n a t e d a department of government w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r as the a p p r o p r i a t e M i n i s t e r . I t i s now headed by a S e c r e t a r y to the Cab i n e t f o r F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s and c o n t i n u e s to f u n c t i o n w i t h i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . R e f e r to the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r on the Committee on F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s . 21 R i c h a r d Gwyn, The N o r t h e r n Magus (Tor o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1980), p. 82. 22 The i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s d e r i v e d from my r e s e a r c h conducted on c a b i n e t documents. Much of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s governed by s e c r e c y r u l e s . 23 The r u l e of Cab i n e t s e c r e c y i s , i n f a c t , somewhat bent and re c o r d e d p r o c e e d i n g s of Cab i n e t d i s c u s s i o n s are taken to a s s i s t P r i v y C o u n c i l o f f i c i a l s i n p r e p a r i n g Committee Reports and Records of D e c i s i o n . 90 24 The annual average between 1969-71 was 818. G. Robertson, op. c i t . , p. 492-493. 25 See Anthony W e s t e l l , Paradox (Tor o n t o : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1971), pp. 111-113 and Judy LaMarsh, Memoirs of a B i r d i n a G i l d e d Cage (Toro n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1968), p. 259-60. 2 6 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , June 12, 1980. 27 In 1977, the C a b i n e t Document system was m o d i f i e d to a l l e v i a t e the i n c r e a s i n g paper burden on M i n i s t e r s . A b i n a r y system was i n t r o d u c e d whereby a C a b i n e t Memorandum was accompanied by a C a b i n e t D i s c u s s i o n paper. I n c l u d e d i n the d i s c u s s i o n paper was the complex and t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n t h a t was r e q u i r e d to s a t i s f y t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s or the o f f i c i a l l e v e l of departments and a g e n c i e s . A f u r t h e r reason for m o d i f i c a t i o n was the concern t h a t C a b i n e t Documents were b e i n g w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d at the o f f i c i a l l e v e l . G iven t h a t the Government wished to c l a i m c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y on the b a s i s of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , i t was deemed n e c e s s a r y to demonstrate t h a t steps had been taken to c o n t r o l the c i r c u l a t i o n of C a b i n e t Documents. D i s c u s s i o n papers are c l a s s i f i e d as C a b i n e t Papers, not Documents. They are not a c o n f i d e n c e of the Queen's P r i v y C o u n c i l . They are g i v e n a s e c u r i t y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r s u b s t a n t i v e c o n t e n t . 28 Some commentators have addressed themselves to d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i e s of M i n i s t e r s use to a v o i d P r i v y C o u n c i l i n t e r f e r e n c e i n g o i n g to C a b i n e t . See R i c h a r d French, i b i d , f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of the " b l u f f s t r a t e g y " and Bruce Doern, op. c i t . f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of the "end-run". Douglas H a r t l e , The D r a f t Memorandum to C a b i n e t (To r o n t o : The I n s t i t u t e of P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1976) o f f e r s an i n t e r e s t i n g and amusing account of the "end run", a l t h o u g h H. L a f r a m b o i s e , "Moving a P r o p o s a l to a P o s i t i v e D e c i s i o n , " Optimum 4:3 (1973), 31-42 o f f e r s a more r e a l i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n . 29 S i n c e 1975 the Prime M i n i s t e r i s b r i e f e d by the S e c r e t a r y to the Cabinet f o r F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s i n matters r e g a r d i n g the C a b i n e t Committee of the same name. 30 I t has been suggested t h a t the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e w i l l ask the Prime M i n i s t e r f o r a v i e w p o i n t on an i s s u e i f they wish to s t a l l an item. P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , Aug. 12, 1980. 31 The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e a c t u a l l y r e c o r d s the p r o c e e d i n g s of the meeting on a tape r e c o r d e r . P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , Aug. 12, 1980. G. Robertson, op. c i t . , p. 500. L i b e r a l P a r t y Caucus E x e c u t i v e , The Role of the Backbencher ( u n p u b l i s h e d paper, 1969). PCO i s c o n s i d e r e d to be the most powerful of c e n t r a l a g e n c i e s . " I f a department wants something done, i t w i l l have to go through PCO because they c o n t r o l the C a b i n e t . The PMO has l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e compared to PCO from the v i e w p o i n t of government o p e r a t i o n s . " P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , June 6, 1980. For a comparative study of the c e n t r a l a g e n c i e s , see C. Campbell and G. S z a b l o w s k i , The Super-b u r e a u c r a t s , ( T o r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1979). CHAPTER IV: THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE I n t r o d u c t i o n U n t i l 1968, v e r y l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n was p a i d to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e (PMO). The a t t e n t i o n f o c u s e d on the O f f i c e s i n c e then has been the r e s u l t of g r e a t e r v i s i b i l i t y and the i n c r e a s e d s t a f f of the O f f i c e . As i n the case of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , t h i s i n c r e a s e was a r e f l e c t i o n of the changing r o l e of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e . The PMO had e v o l v e d from a h a n d f u l of a s s i s t a n t s i n f o r m a l l y o r g a n i z e d to s e v e r a l dozen a s s i s t a n t s i n a combined s e r v i c e / a d v i s o r y r o l e w i t h a l i m i t e d p o l i c y c a p a b i l i t y and a formal c h a i n of command."'" T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l examine these developments i n the PMO i n the c o n t e x t of m e t a - p o l i c i e s or p o s i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s . The PMO i s f o c u s e d on i n t h i s t h e s i s because a g r e a t d e a l of c r i t i c i s m was d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the O f f i c e . T h i s c r i t i c i s m c e n t e r e d on the i d e a t h a t the PMO was a new c e n t e r of i n f l u e n c e and power i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e . The q u e s t i o n i s d i d i t t r u l y e x e r t a powerful i n f l u e n c e ? What r o l e d i d the PMO p l a y i n the attempt to r a t i o n a l i z e the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s ? The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e had e x i s t e d s i n c e C o n f e d e r a t i o n . I t s r a i s o n d ' e t r e was " t o serve the Prime M i n i s t e r i n the e x e r c i s e of h i s powers, i n the p u r s u i t of h i s d u t i e s , i n the d i s c h a r g e of h i s 2 r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . " A Prime M i n i s t e r , l i k e any s e n i o r e x e c u t i v e , r e q u i r e s s e c r e t a r i a l support as w e l l as a d v i s o r s i n whom he can t r u s t . 92 93 R.B. Bennett managed w i t h a s t a f f of twelve,"^ but under Mackenzie K i n g , the O f f i c e expanded to t h i r t y , i n c l u d i n g the p o s i t i o n of P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y to the Prime M i n i s t e r which was f i l l e d by A r n o l d Heeney p r i o r to h i s appointment as S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t . The O f f i c e was m a i n t a i n e d at the same l e v e l d u r i n g the S t . Laurent and D i e f e n b a k e r y e a r s . But under L e s t e r Pearson the O f f i c e expanded to f o r t y . Pearson had f u r t h e r i n s i s t e d on h i s own r e s e a r c h s t a f f , independent of the L i b e r a l P a r t y , w h i l e s t i l l i n O p p o s i t i o n and he 4 c o n t i n u e d t h i s p r a c t i c e once he became Prime M i n i s t e r . Trudeau i n c r e a s e d the PMO to n i n e t y - o n e , ~* an i n c r e a s e of 40%, i n h i s f i r s t y e a r o f o f f i c e . T h i s r a p i d i n c r e a s e of s t a f f must be p l a c e d i n c o n t e x t . F i r s t , i t had been q u i t e common, almost customary u n t i l the 1960's f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r to occupy a Cab i n e t p o r t f o l i o p o s i t i o n , u s u a l l y those of S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s or P r e s i d e n t of the P r i v y C o u n c i l . The Prime M i n i s t e r was a b l e to l o c a t e h i s a d v i s o r s w i t h i n the m i n i s t e r i a l o f f i c e s of hiw own department and to draw on the departmental machinery f o r su p p o r t . ^ A second f a c t o r was t h a t , p r i o r to 1968, the m a j o r i t y of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s a d v i s o r s were a p p o i n t e d from the P u b l i c S e r v i c e , seconded to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , t h e i r s a l a r i e s and expenses absorbed by t h e i r departments. T h e r e f o r e , t r a d i t i o n a l l y the Prime M i n i s t e r has always been surrounded by a d v i s o r s . ^ P u b l i c s e r v a n t s i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e however, p r o v i d e d a s e r v i c e f u n c t i o n w i t h no o v e r t p o l i t i c a l r o l e . The e n l a r g e d Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e was d i s t i n c t l y p o l i t i c a l . However, l i k e the changes i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , the new 94 d i r e c t i o n s f o r the PMO were a l r e a d y v i s i b l e p r i o r to the a r r i v a l of P i e r r e Trudeau. In 1966, L e s t e r Pearson had announced the a p p o i n t -ment of a new P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y " a c c o r d i n g to the p r a c t i c e f o r m e r l y adhered to i n Canada and c o n s i s t e n t l y f o l l o w e d i n the U n i t e d Kingdom, of h a v i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e headed by a s e n i o r o f f i c e r of the P u b l i c S e r v i c e . " Yet i n 1968, Pearson a p p o i n t e d the f i r s t p o l i t i c a l P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y . I t was deemed t h a t the O f f i c e was 9 " l a c k i n g a degree of c l a r i t y of purpose." I t was p o l i t i c a l d i r e c t i o n and not a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i r e c t i o n t h a t was r e q u i r e d . The f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n t h a t Trudeau e n v i s a g e d a new r o l e f o r the PMO came o n l y one month a f t e r h i s e l e c t i o n as Prime M i n i s t e r . A p r e s s r e l e a s e announced t h a t The Prime M i n i s t e r r e c a l l e d t h a t d u r i n g the r e c e n t e l e c t i o n campaign he had r e p e a t e d l y s t r e s s e d the importance of i n c r e a s e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the p u b l i c i n the a c t u a l p r o c e s s of government. He mentioned t h a t the changes b e i n g i n s t i t u t e d are i n t e n d e d to p r o v i d e a g r e a t e r s e n s i t i v i t y by government to the w i l l of the people to f a c i l i t a t e s p e e d i e r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and more e f f e c t i v e s e r v i c e . The b a s i c concept of the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s t h a t i n a d d i t i o n to the u s u a l P e r s o n a l A s s i s t a n t s n e c e s s a r y to the d i s c h a r g e of h i s d a i l y r o u t i n e , the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e s h o u l d i n c l u d e u n i t s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p o l i c y a d v i c e , f o r m a i n t a i n i n g c l o s e c o n t a c t s w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s and groups i n a l l r e g i o n s of the c o u n t r y , f o r i n i t i a t i o n of p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s and f o r i n f o r m a t i o n . , _ Trudeau f e l t t h a t by e n l a r g i n g and r e - o r g a n i z i n g h i s O f f i c e , he would be a b l e to s t r e n g t h e n h i s a b i l i t y to d i r e c t and c o n t r o l the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and p o l i t i c a l machinery of government which the Prime M i n i s t e r l e a d s . As w e l l , Trudeau r e c o g n i z e d t h a t "modern government, p a r t i c u l a r l y democratic government, cannot f u n c t i o n w i t h o u t e f f e c t i v e methods f o r o b t a i n i n g h i g h l y s k i l l e d a d v i c e and i n f o r m a t i o n . " To a l a r g e e x t e n t , Trudeau's p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the PMO was a f u r t h e r response to the growing " b i g n e s s of government". The demands of n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , P a r l i a m e n t and Cab i n e t Committees, c o n s t i t u e n c y , p a r t y and p u b l i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l r e l a t i o n s , f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and c e r e m o n i a l d u t i e s had become overwhelming. To s o l v e t h i s problem he r e q u e s t e d h i s P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y to e s t a b l i s h a d e t a i l e d o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h a s s i g n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and l i n e s of u • 12 a u t h o r i t y . The P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y i s at the head of the PMO o r g a n i z a t i o n . Trudeau c o n t i n u e d the p r a c t i c e e s t a b l i s h e d by Pearson of a p p o i n t i n g a p o l i t i c a l nominee as P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y . Indeed, Trudeau r e -a p p o i n t e d the same person, Marc Lalonde. The P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y i s 13 the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s " c h i e f of s t a f f and main p o l i t i c a l a d v i s o r . " What was unprecedented was the c o n s i d e r a b l e magnitude of the p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t h a t Trudeau f o r m a l l y i n v e s t e d i n the p o s i t i o n . The terms of r e f e r e n c e i n c l u d e d u n i n h i b i t e d a c c e s s to the Prime M i n i s t e r , s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s and members of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s s t a f f ; attendance at weekly meetings of the P r i v y C o u n c i l ' s s e n i o r s t a f f ; maintenance of c l o s e l i a i s o n between the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e ; d i r e c t i n g the a f f a i r s of the " p o l i t i c a l c a b i n e t " ; o v e r s e e i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p e r s o n a l s t a f f ; "from time to time" o f f e r i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r a d v i c e on p o l i c y i s s u e s ; and, f i n a l l y , w i t h the a p p r o v a l of the Prime M i n i s t e r , attendance at some Cabinet meetings. Tom Kent had c a r r i e d out many of these f u n c t i o n s f o r Pearson, i n c l u d i n g some as s e n s i t i v e as d e a l i n g w i t h f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l a g r e e m e n t s . ^ While the concept of P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y o r i g i n a t e d w i t h Mackenzie K i n g as someone to a c t as an a s s i s t a n t to the Prime M i n i s t e r , " ^ i t was Trudeau who f o r m a l l y put the p o s i t i o n on an o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a r t w i t h s p e c i f i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and c r e a t e d a p o w erful p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the c e n t r a l machinery of government r e s p o n s i b l e to no one but the Prime M i n i s t e r . "The o p p o r t u n i t y i s t h e r e , o n l y the p e r s o n a l i t y and s t y l e of o p e r a t i o n of the appointee w i l l a f f e c t how f o r c e f u l l y , and u l t i m a t e l y , how s u c c e s s f u l l y , he e x e r c i s e s h i s power. Another Trudeau i n n o v a t i o n was the f o r m a l i z a t i o n of a p l a n n i n g u n i t w i t h i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e . L e s t e r Pearson had had h i s r e s e a r c h s t a f f , and Tom Kent, as w e l l , had o f t e n p l a y e d the r o l e of p o l i c y a d v i s o r . But the p l a n n i n g f u n c t i o n had never been f o r m a l i z e d In 1968, Trudeau a p p o i n t e d a Program S e c r e t a r y whose c h i e f r e s p o n s i b l i t y was to ensure " t h a t the Government and the. e x t r a p a r 1 iamentary 18 p a r t y had, and m a i n t a i n e d , a comprehensive and coherent program." I t was i n t h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t r e g u l a r assessments of the Government's o v e r a l l performance, were measured a g a i n s t p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . P o l i c y matters took shape through the development of p o l i c y c h o i c e s and p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y . The f o r m a l i z a t i o n of a p o l i c y u n i t w i t h i n the PMO d i d cause some concern i n p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t r e s . The Program S e c r e t a r y was a systems a n a l y s t , Jim Davey, who f u n c t i o n e d as an 19 "in-house p h i l o s o p h e r and a one-man t h i n k - t a n k " and was fond of 20 drawing up t i m e - f l o w c h a r t s and m u l t i - c o l o u r e d graphs. The r e a l c o n c e r n c e n t e r e d on the use of norms and v a l u e - o r i e n t e d p o l i t i c s to r e p l a c e the customary brokerage p o l i t i c s , thus removing p o l i c y i n f l u e n c e from the P a r t y , the l o c a l M.P.s and the r e g i o n a l M i n i s t e r s and p l a c i n g i t i n the hands of t e c h n o c r a t s and academics. Another concern was t h a t program and p o l i c y a n a l y s i s belonged to the p u b l i c s e r v i c e . PMO argued t h a t p u b l i c s e r v a n t s , f o r a l l t h e i r e x p e r t i s e , i n t e g r i t y and s k i l l s , l a c k e d f l e x i b i l i t y , b r e a d t h of u n d e r s t a n d i n g 21 and p o l i t i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y . A p o l i c y c a p a b i l i t y i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e would supply the s t r o n g p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e e s s e n t i a l to a w e l l - b a l a n c e d , a d v i s o r y c a p a b i l i t y f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r . A f u r t h e r i n n o v a t i o n d u r i n g t h i s Trudeau p e r i o d was the e s t a b l i s h ment of the R e g i o n a l Desks. The Desks c o n s i s t e d of f o u r Desk O f f i c e r s a s s i g n e d to the West, Quebec, the M a r i t i m e s and O n t a r i o . They were to p r o v i d e the Prime M i n i s t e r w i t h "an independent view of 22 the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l developments i n each r e g i o n . " They kept the Prime M i n i s t e r i n touch w i t h v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s and encouraged the f r e e flow of id e a s and o p i n i o n s from i n d i v i d u a l s and s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t groups d i r e c t l y to the Prime M i n i s t e r . They a l s o p l a y e d a major r o l e i n the. p l a n n i n g and c o o r d i n a t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s many t r a v e l s through the r e g i o n s of Canada i n t h i s p e r i o d . The R e g i o n a l Desks caused a g r e a t d e a l of concern among some t r a d i t i o n a l s ources of r e g i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n such as Members of P a r l i a m e n t , some Cabi n e t M i n i s t e r s and h i g h - r a n k i n g members of the L i b e r a l P a r t y . T h i s c e n t r a l l y - p l a c e d , h i g h l y mobile and independent i n t e l l i g e n c e u n i t was p e r c e i v e d as an o r g a n i z a t i o n to undermine the 98 t r a d i t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r o l e of the P a r t y , the C a b i n e t and the Caucus- The c r i t i c s of these Desks got t h e i r revenge w i t h the r e s u l t s of the 1972 e l e c t i o n . The Desks had p l a y e d a major r o l e i n the e l e c t i o n s t r a t e g y . However, the r e s u l t s had proved t h e i r i n -e f f e c t i v e n e s s . The Desks were s u b s e q u e n t l y o f f i c i a l l y disbanded, a l t h o u g h the f u n c t i o n c o n t i n u e d to e x i s t w i t h a reduced p r o f i l e . In a s s e s s i n g the R e g i o n a l Desks i t must be remembered t h a t Trudeau was a newcomer to p o l i t i c s and he l a c k e d a l t e r n a t i v e p r i v a t e sources of i n f o r m a t i o n . Such s o u r c e s , w i t h i n the P a r t y and through-out the c o u n t r y , would n o r m a l l y have been developed by someone who had been i n v o l v e d i n the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s over a p e r i o d of time. These sources would have p r o v i d e d the balance to judge the i d e a s and o p i n i o n s of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r e g i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Consequently, the R e g i o n a l Desks s t r e n g t h e n e d the hand of the Prime M i n i s t e r by o f f e r i n g him a wider c h o i c e of p o l i t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s . I t was not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e r e was a s t r o n g p r e s s u r e to have them disbanded. A f u r t h e r development i n c r e a t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g c o n t r o l of the machinery of government was the c r e a t i o n of the Nominations D i v i s i o n w i t h i n the. PMO, to oversee the p a r t - t i m e O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i 1 a p p o i n t -ments to the boards and commissions t h a t make up patronage. Although the a c t u a l s e l e c t i o n of p e r s o n n e l remained the p r e r o g a t i v e of i n d i v i d u a l M i n i s t e r s , the Nominations D i v i s i o n was designed to ensure t h a t the appointments were of a h i g h - q u a l i t y and t h a t adequate i n f o r m a t i o n was a v a i l a b l e . The D i v i s i o n a l s o ensured t h a t t h e r e was f u l l c o n s u l t a t i o n between a l l i n t e r e s t e d M i n i s t e r s p r i o r to a 9 9 A • •  2 3 d e c i s i o n . The Nominations D i v i s i o n had a v e r y l i m i t e d involvement i n f u l l -time O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l appointments such as Deputy M i n i s t e r s and Heads of Agencies and Crown C o r p o r a t i o n s . The r o l e was r e s t r i c t e d to i d e n t i f y i n g and a s s e s s i n g s u i t a b l e c a n d i d a t e s from o u t s i d e of the government. Because these appointments i n v o l v e d the P u b l i c S e r v i c e , the S e n i o r P e r s o n n e l D i v i s i o n of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e p r o v i d e d the s u p p o r t i n g memorandum f o r r e g u l a r meetings between the Prime M i n i s t e r , the P r i n c i p a l S e c r e t a r y and the S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t . The Nominations D i v i s i o n was rep u t e d to be v e r y p r o f e s s i o n a l i n i t s approach and a l t h o u g h not p o l i t i c a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d , i t s i n t e n t i o n s were to seek out the best c a n d i d a t e s from a c r o s s Canada f o r the p o s i t i o n s a v a i l a b l e and to a v o i d i n d i s c r i m i n a t e patronage appointments. Another new area of growth i n the PMO was i n the area of e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s . Prime M i n i s t e r s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been c l o s e to the E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s p o r t f o l i o , o f t e n r e t a i n i n g i t f o r themselves. Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau, however, s h i f t e d away from r e l i a n c e on p u b l i c s e r v i c e a d v i c e i n t h i s area and developed a s p e c i a l a d v i s o r y c a p a b i l i t y i n t h i s a r e a , assigned to a s p e c i a l a s s i s t a n t ( r e s e a r c h ) . T h i s member of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p e r s o n a l s t a f f c a r r i e d out a number of f o r e i g n m i s s i o n s d i r e c t l y f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r as h i s p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and had s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e on key f o r e i g h p o l i c y i s s u e s . T h i s s i t u a t i o n caused a g e n e r a l f e e l i n g of d i s c o n t e n t w i t h i n 24 the Department of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . The s e r v i c e f u n c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s 100 O f f i c e have always e x i s t e d , a l b e i t on a s m a l l e r s c a l e . Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t was the Correspondence D i v i s i o n . I t doubled i n s i z e between 1968-70. T h i s i n c r e a s e was d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the i n c r e a s e i n correspondence r e c e i v e d by the Prime M i n i s t e r , caused i n p a r t by a g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t on the p a r t of the Canadian p u b l i c , encouraged by the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s e x h o r t a t i o n to p a r t i c i p a t e . On the p r i n c i p l e t h a t correspondence p r o v i d e s an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r communication between the people of Canada and the Prime M i n i s t e r , t h i s s e c t i o n developed a c a p a c i t y to g i v e s u b s t a n t i v e r e p l i e s to a l l correspondence f o r which i t was r e s p o n s i b l e . The i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s purpose was g a t h e r e d and r e d e s i g n e d to s u i t the purposes of the D i v i s i o n and then kept up to date by a r e s e a r c h / r e f e r e n c e u n i t . By the same te c h n i q u e , the Correspondence D i v i s i o n was supposed to monitor p u b l i c s entiments v i s - a - v i s the government and i t s p o l i c i e s . The a n a l y s i s from t h i s m o n i t o r i n g was r e g u l a r l y forwarded to the Prime M i n i s t e r , h i s s t a f f , and the concerned M i n i s t e r s ' O f f i c e s . The o t h e r s e r v i c e p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Office-i n c l u d e d an E x e c u t i v e A s s i s t a n t whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i t was to a l l o c a t e the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s time — both ad hoc and long-term p l a n n i n g ( a l t h o u g h long-term p l a n n i n g was a c t u a l l y undertaken at a weekly s t a f f meeting where a d v i c e was g i v e n and recommendations made on the c h o i c e of engagements and time a l l o c a t i o n ) . The E x e c u t i v e A s s i s t a n t was a s s i s t e d by an Appointments S e c r e t a r y who had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to p r o c e s s the over two thousand i n v i t a t i o n s t h a t the. Prime M i n i s t e r r e c e i v e d y e a r l y . The. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e A s s i s t a n t p r o v i d e d the same s e r v i c e to the 101 Prime M i n i s t e r i n r e l a t i o n to documents. For c o n t r o l purposes and c o o r d i n a t i o n , a l l documentation from C a b i n e t , o f f i c i a l memoranda, correspondence, b r i e f i n g n o t e s , e t c . , passed through the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e A s s i s t a n t who submitted them to the Prime M i n i s t e r . T h i s o f f i c e r was a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r l i a i s o n w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s House of Commons c o n s t i t u e n c y as w e l l as m a tters t h a t had to be d e a l t w i t h i n h i s c a p a c i t y as a Member of P a r l i a m e n t . The Press O f f i c e ^ was comprised of the P r e s s S e c r e t a r y , two A s s i s t a n t P r e s s S e c r e t a r i e s and one p r e s s a s s i s t a n t . I t was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the P r e s s O f f i c e to answer q u e s t i o n s from the p r e s s g a l l e r y and the p u b l i c , i n c l u d i n g i n q u i r i n g s t u d e n t s of govern-ment; to i s s u e p r e s s r e l e a s e s c o n t a i n i n g announcements and statements by the Prime M i n i s t e r and to arrange a l l p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e s and i n t e r -views i n v o l v i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r . The P r e s s S e c r e t a r y f u n c t i o n e d as the p r i n c i p a l a d v i s o r to the Prime. M i n i s t e r w i t h r e g a r d to a l l matters r e l a t e d to the t r a n s m i s s i o n of government i n f o r m a t i o n to the media. He was one of the few to a t t e n d the d a i l y s t a f f meetings, f o r h i s own i n f o r m a t i o n as w e l l as to i n f o r m the Prime M i n i s t e r of p u b l i c o p i n i o n as e xpressed i n and by the media. The Press O f f i c e a l s o had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to b r i e f the Prime M i n i s t e r i n d e t a i l i n advance of any important p r e s s i n t e r v i e w s . Another source of p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n and b r i e f i n g was the L e g i s -l a t i v e A s s i s t a n t , a s s i g n e d to f o l l o w House matters on a permanent b a s i s and who was concerned s o l e l y w i t h the a c t i v i t i e s of the Prime M i n i s t e r as a p a r l e m e n t a r i a n . T h i s o f f i c e r ensured t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r was up-to-date and p r o p e r l y b r i e f e d i n advance of the. d a i l y 102 Q u e s t i o n P e r i o d i n the House, ensured c l o s e l i a i s o n w i t h the O f f i c e of the Government House Leader, a d v i s e d the Prime M i n i s t e r on a d a i l y b a s i s of any important development i n . the House program and p r o v i d e d 27 him w i t h any statement he shoul d make i n the House. There was much c r i t i c i s m of Trudeau f o r what was c o n s i d e r e d to 2 8 be h i s "abuse" of power. The c e n t r a l focus of t h i s c r i t i c i s m was c a l l e d the "Supergroupy" which was e s s e n t i a l l y a group of a d v i s o r s o u t s i d e of the. t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y sources such as the e x t r a -p a r l i a m e n t a r y p a r t y , r e g i o n a l M i n i s t e r s , and the Cab i n e t i t s e l f . The development of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e was even d e s c r i b e d as "a new q u a s i p u b l i c s e r v i c e " and i t caused a p p r e h e n s i o n f o r the 29 O f f i c e appeared to c o n s t i t u t e a new c e n t r e of power. The i n n o v a t i o n s t h a t Trudeau i n t r o d u c e d to the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , 1968-72, d i d a f f e c t the s t r u c t u r i n g of i n f l u e n c e i n the p o l i c y -making system. The c l o s e r an i n d i v i d u a l i s to power the g r e a t e r the i n f l u e n c e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l w i l l have i f on l y because he i s ab l e to c o n t r o l a c c e s s and i n f o r m a t i o n to the source of power. T h e r e f o r e , the i n n o v a t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t Trudeau c r e a t e d d i d e x e r t some i n f l u e n c e . However, "the power t h a t a Prime M i n i s t e r ' s a s s i s t a n t may w i e l d i s no more and no l e s s than th a t which the Prime M i n i s t e r and h i s o f f i c i a l s w i l l t o l e r a t e i n t h e i r hands."3'"' The o f f i c e r s i n Trudeau's O f f i c e were not empowered to make, d e c i s i o n s and they were d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to the Prime M i n i s t e r f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s . The ver y f a c t t h a t many of the s e n i o r o f f i c e r s i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1968-72 ran f o r e l e c t i o n as Members of P a r l i a m e n t i n 1972 was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the o f f i c i a l s i n 103 the PMO were not i n a powerful p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the d e c i s i o n -making p r o c e s s . Rather than re m a i n i n g i n s u p p o r t i n g p o s i t i o n s to the Prime M i n i s t e r , these i n d i v i d u a l s chose to forego t h e i r i n f l u e n c e by a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the Prime M i n i s t e r to p a r t i c i p a t e d i r e c t l y i n the democratic p r o c e s s . Some of these i n d i v i d u a l s were Marc Lalonde, F r a n c i s Fox, Romeo Leblanc and P i e r r e De Bane. The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e had g i v e n these i n d i v i d u a l s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how the government worked from the vantage p o i n t at the apex. T h e i r c h o i c e to run f o r e l e c t i o n and e v e n t u a l l y become Cab i n e t M i n i s t e r s under-l i n e d the f a c t t h a t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t i l l r e s t e d w i t h the Cabi n e t 31 and p o l i t i c i a n s r a t h e r than i n the hallowed h a l l s of the East B l o c k . The new formal o r g a n i z a t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e s e r v e d to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e the O f f i c e inf the machinery of government. I t i s now an acknowledged and e s t a b l i s h e d o r g a n i z a t i o n . P o l i t i c a l a s s i s t a n t s no lon g e r e x i s t i n "a never-never land between p o l i t i c i a n s 32 and proper b u r e a u c r a t s . " T h e i r w o r l d i s r e c o g n i z e d . However, the f o r m a l i z a t i o n of the O f f i c e a l s o served to p r o v i d e boundaries and l i m i t s f o r the e x e r c i s e of i n f l u e n c e f o r those o f f i c e r s i n the PMO. T h i s f o r m a l i z a t i o n was i n e v i t a b l e i n the growth of any o r g a n i z a t i o n over a p e r i o d of time. And, i n the case of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , the development was an i n c r e m e n t a l step from the o l d i n f o r m a l and c h a o t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t had p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t e d . The f o r m a l i z a t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e a l s o acknowledged another aspect of government — the r e a l i t y of p o l i t i c s . The nature of the t r a d i t i o n a l b u r e a u c r a c y p r e v e n t s the c i v i l s e r v i c e from b e i n g a b l e to respond a d e q u a t e l y to the changes of modern 104 s o c i e t y so t h e r e "has been the r a p i d growth of a new k i n d of p u b l i c 33 s e r v i c e " — the p o l i t i c a l a s s i s t a n t to M i n i s t e r s who was n e i t h e r a c i v i l s e r v a n t nor a p o l i t i c i a n . T h i s expanded p o l i t i c a l s t a f f was a r e s u l t of the enormous i n c r e a s e of the workload i n M i n i s t e r s ' O f f i c e s . The expanded s t a f f was t h e r e to h e l p and a d v i s e and i t added an important element of f l e x i b i l i t y and s e n s i t i v i t y to p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . M i n i s t e r s , i n c l u d i n g the Prime M i n i s t e r , i n a d d i t i o n to t h e i r departmental r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , have an important r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r o l e to p l a y i n r e l a t i o n to matters connected to t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and r e g i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as w e l l as to the e x t r a -p a r l i a m e n t a r y P a r t y . T h i s f a c t means t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r and h i s M i n i s t e r s must seek a d v i c e o u t s i d e the c o n f i n e s of p u b l i c s e r v a n t s . The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s c o n s t i t u e n c y , i n a sense, encompasses the e n t i r e c o u n t r y . H i s p e r s o n a l o f f i c e must respond to t h i s r e a l i t y . Summary The formal o r g a n i z a t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e acknow-ledged t h a t the p o l i t i c a l a s p e ct of government c o n t i n u e s a f t e r e l e c t i o n s and a l t h o u g h p o l i t i c a l s t a f f are not o f f i c i a l l y a p a r t of the p u b l i c s e r v i c e , they do perform a s i g n i f i c a n t f u n c t i o n w i t h i n the machinery of government. In t h i s c o n t e x t , the developments i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e r e f l e c t e d an attempt at r a t i o n a l i s m by i n t e g r a t i n g an a s p e c t of the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s i n t o the machinery of government. To a degree the developments had been i n c r e m e n t a l . As Marc Lalonde s t a t e d , "the need f o r i t (PMO) to be enhanced became p a r t i c u l a r l y 105 c l e a r d u r i n g the m i n o r i t y y e a r s p r i o r to 1968;...Mr. Pearson responded to t h i s s i t u a t i o n by d e l i b e r a t e l y i n c r e a s i n g the s i z e of h i s p o l i t i c a l a d v i s o r y s t a f f . When e l e c t e d i n 1968, the p r e s e n t Prime M i n i s t e r 34 c o n t i n u e d the b u i l d i n g p r o c e s s . . . " But an important c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r r a t i o n a l i t y must be noted. That c o n s i d e r a t i o n c e n t e r s on r a t i o n a l i t y ' s requirement f o r i n c r e a s e d i n f o r m a t i o n and assessment of t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n . The new Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e d i d a c h i e v e t h i s o b j e c t i v e and i n doing so s t r e n g t h e n e d the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p e r s o n a l a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l the o p e r a t i o n s of govern-ment through the i n f o r m a t i o n which was p r o v i d e d to him through h i s p e r s o n a l O f f i c e . But the by-product was t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s new s t r e n g t h a f f e c t e d h i s t r a d i t i o n a l sources of power and i n f l u e n c e as w e l l as p o l i c y s o u r c e s . These t r a d i t i o n a l s o u r c e s , such as the C a b i n e t , the Caucus, the e x t r a p a r 1 i a m e n t a r y P a r t y and the p u b l i c were a f f e c t e d because the PMO had surrounded the Prime M i n i s t e r and removed him from the i n f l u e n c e of the former power-brokers. T h i s r e s u l t was not compatible w i t h the p o l i t i c a l system and the low-key approach taken by the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e a f t e r the 1972 e l e c t i o n i l l u s t r a t e d the r e s o l v e to r e t u r n to former checks and b a l a n c e s of t r a d i t i o n a l power s o u r c e s . We have examined the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s and the C a b i n e t ' s p o s i t i o n s i n the c e n t r a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s and have looked at t h e i r s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s . However, there i s one C a b i n e t Committee S e c r e t a r i a t t h a t we have not examined, t h a t i s , the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . The T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t i s of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t f o r two r e a sons. F i r s t , the TBS d e r i v e s i t s importance f o r i t s 106 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the area of f i n a n c i a l management w i t h i n the govern-ment. I t would be i n t h i s area t h a t " r a t i o n a l i t y " would have the g r e a t e s t e f f e c t . Secondly, the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t s i t s o f f on i t s own, o u t s i d e the golden c i r c l e around the Prime M i n i s t e r . What r o l e d i d the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t p l a y i n the p e r i o d of m e t a - p o l i c i e s , 1968-72? FIGURE 3 0 P r i m e m i n i s t e r P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y A d m i n i s t r a t i v e A s s i s t a n t S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t E x e c u t i v e A s s i s t a n t A p p o i n t m e n t s s e c r e t a r y L e g i s l a t i v e ass is tant C o r r e s p o n d e n c e d i v i s i o n Press d i v i s i o n P r o g r a m s e c r e t a r y R e g i o n a l d e s k s P u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s d i v i s i o n O - i n - C n p p o i n t m e n t s T H E M I M E MINISTER'S OFFICE ORGANIZATION CHART, JULY 1971. Source: Marc Lalonde, "The Changing Role of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e 1  Canadian Public Administration 14 (1971), 514. ' 108 NOTES: CHAPTER IV ^ Thomas d'Aquino, "The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e : C a t a l y s t or Cabal/'Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 17 (1974), p. 164. 2 Marc Lal o n d e , "The Changing Role of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 14 (1971), p. 519. 3 D'Aquino, op. c i t . , p. 157. 4 W.A. Matheson, The Prime M i n i s t e r and the Cab i n e t (To r o n t o : Methuen, 1976), p. 168~ 5 D'Aquino, op. c i t . R.M. Punnett, The Prime M i n i s t e r i n Canadian Government and P o l i t i c s ( T o r o n t o : M a c m i l l a n , 1977), p. 75. Some commentators view these a d v i s o r s as o u t s i d e of c o n s t i t u -t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y as they are not a p a r t of C a b i n e t , e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t -a t i v e s or p u b l i c s e r v a n t s . see J.R. M a l l o r y , "The M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e S t a f f : An unreformed P a r t of the P u b l i c S e r v i c e , " Canadian P u b l i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 16 (1973), p. 25. Canada, Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , P r e s s R e l e a s e , J u l y 31, 1968. 9 Lalon d e , op. c i t . , p. 521. ^ Canada, Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , P r e s s R e l e a s e , J u l y 31, 1968. ^ John Deutsch, "Governments and T h e i r A d v i s o r s , " Canadian P u b l i c  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 16 (1973), p. 26. 12 D'Aquino, op. c i t . , p. 157. 13 D'Aquino, op. c i t . , p. 161. 1 4 I b i d . 109 See Judy LaMarsh, Memoirs of a B i r d i n a G i l d e d Cage (To r o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1968) f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the r o l e t h a t Tom Kent p l a y e d i n c e r t a i n p o l i c y i s s u e s ( m e d i c a r e ) . 16 17 18 19 20 See Chapter I I , p a r t A, s e c t i o n 1. D'Aquino, op. c i t . Lalonde, op. c i t . , p. 523. D'Aquino, op. c i t . W a l t e r Stewart, Shrug: Trudeau i n Power (Tor o n t o : New P r e s s , 1971), p. 177. 21 See J . Deutsch, op. c i t . , p. 27 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n , a l s o D'Aquino, op. c i t . , p. 165. 22 L a l o n d e , op. c i t . , p. 526. 23 R e g i o n a l M i n i s t e r s p l a y an important r o l e i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of patronage. They are the chairmen of the r e g i o n a l caucuses which meet once a week to d i s c u s s p o l i t i c a l m a t t e r s . They are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the p a r t y s t r u c t u r e w i t h i n t h e i r r e g i o n s . They have veto power over n o m i n a t i o n s . see J . LaMarsh, op. c i t . , p. 139 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the Nominations system i n the Pearson e r a . 24 A l t h o u g h the Prime M i n i s t e r has c o n t i n u e d to have an i n t e r e s t i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , h i s requirement f o r independent a d v i c e appears to have d i s a p p e a r e d w i t h the incumbent. 25 L a l o n d e , op. c i t . , p. 524. 2 6 The f i r s t prime m i n i s t e r i a l p r e s s s e c r e t a r y was a p p o i n t e d i n 1957 by John D i e f e n b a k e r . However, the f i r s t e f f e c t i v e prime m i n i s t e r i a l p r e s s o f f i c e was e s t a b l i s h e d by L e s t e r Pearson i n 1963. 27 I t has been suggested by a c r i t i c of the PMO t h a t t h i s p o s i t i o n s h o u l d be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of an a c t i v e MP f o r who b e t t e r than an M.P. can know about the a c t i v i t i e s of the House. (Norman Ward, "The Changing Role of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e : A Commentary" Canadian P u b l i c 14 (1971). I t i s p o l i t i c a l l y n a i v e to assume t h a t a M.P. has e i t h e r the time or the o b j e c t i v i t y to b r i e f the Prime M i n i s t e r f o r Q u e s t i o n P e r i o d which must be c o n s i d e r e d as n o t h i n g l e s s than a f u l l time j o b . 2 8 See W. Stewart, op. c i t . , a l s o Denis Smith, " P r e s i d e n t and P a r l i a m e n t : The T r a n s f o r m a t i o n of P a r l i a m e n t a r y Government i n Canada," and Joseph Wearing, " P r e s i d e n t or Prime M i n i s t e r , " both i n T. Hockin, ed., Apex of Power 2nd e d i t i o n (Scarborough: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1977). 29 J . Deutsch, op. c i t . , p. 32. 30 J.R. M a l l o r y , "The M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e S t a f f : An Unreformed P a r t of the P u b l i c S e r v i c e " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 16 (1973) p. 33. 31 In the p e r i o d 1968-72 the E a s t B l o c k was the l o c a t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e . I t i s now l o c a t e d i n the L a n g e v i n B l o c k . 32 J.S. P i c k e r s g i l l , " B u r e a u c r a t s and P o l i t i c i a n s " Canadian  P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 15 (1972), p. 420. 3 3 J . Deutsch, op. c i t . , p. 32. L a l o n d e , op. c i t . , p. 521. CHAPTER V: THE TREASURY BOARD SECRETARIAT I n t r o d u c t i o n While a p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r has examined the Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t i n g e n e r a l , there i s one s p e c i f i c s e c r e t a r i a t f u n c t i o n , performed i n r e l a t i o n to the C a b i n e t Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board, t h a t i s s e p a r a t e from the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e and must be looked a t more c a r e f u l l y — the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , the T r e a s u r y Board as a Committee of C a b i n e t had a major r o l e to p l a y i n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of government p r i o r i t i e s and i n the area of f i n a n c i a l management of government e x p e n d i t u r e s . And the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t , as the s u p p o r t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n , a s s i s t e d the T r e a s u r y Board to a c h i e v e these o b j e c t i v e s . I f r a t i o n a l i t y of ex-p e n d i t u r e was the o b j e c t i v e of T r e a s u r y Board's a c t i v i t i e s , **\. then one would expect the same concerns to be expressed through the o p e r a t i o n s of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . Did t h i s , i n f a c t , happen? 1. T r a d i t i o n a l Role of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t The T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t (TBS) was e s t a b l i s h e d as a separate e n t i t y i n 1966 — a r e s u l t of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Government O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1962 ( G l a s s c o Commission). P r i o r to t h i s development, the S e c r e t a r i a t had e x i s t e d as a Branch of the Department of F i n a n c e . S i n c e the Committee of the P r i v y C o u n c i l c a l l e d the T r e a s u r y Board was o r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1867 as a committee to a s s i s t the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e , i t was l o g i c a l 111 112 t h a t the T r e a s u r y Board would be o r g a n i z e d w i t h i n the Department of F i n a n c e . But w i t h the development of the Cabinet Committee system and the C a b i n e t Committee S e c r e t a r i a t , the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t was the o n l y C a b i n e t Committee S e c r e t a r i a t t h a t was not a p a r t of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . I t o p e r a t e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y and o u t s i d e the 2 j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s department. The G l a s s c o Commission, concerned w i t h f i n a n c i a l management w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n of government, had been e s t a b l i s h e d by the Pearson government to come to g r i p s w i t h the i n c r e a s i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g modern government. The r a p i d expansion of government s i n c e the second World War had been ad hoc and p o l i c i e s and programs l a c k e d coherence. As w e l l , the government was f a c i n g i n c r e a s i n g f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h i t s new massive s o c i a l programs. Because of the T r e a s u r y Board's mandate to oversee the e x p e n d i t u r e of government funds, a c e n t r a l focus of the G l a s s c o Commission had been the T r e a s u r y Board and i t s S e c r e t a r i a t . The subsequent recommendations had g r e a t impact on the S e c r e t a r i a t at the time, i f f o r no o t h e r reason than, 3 p o l i t i c a l l y , i t was " i n vogue" to be concerned w i t h a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . The t r a d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n of the TBS was to a s s i s t the C a b i n e t Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board i n combining the government's p r i o r i t i e s w i t h departmental p r o p o s a l s to f i n d a balance between the two i n the annual e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n . The e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n , as r e p r e s e n t e d i n the annual Main E s t i m a t e s , or Blue Book, was the f i n a l statement of the government's p l a n s i n d o l l a r s and c e n t s . However, the i n a b i l i t y of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t to f u l f i l l t h i s f u n c t i o n was one of the c h i e f c r i t i c i s m s of the G l a s s o Report. N e i t h e r the TB Committee nor the TB S e c r e t a r i a t , were ab l e to f i n d 113 t h i s b a l a n c e because government p r i o r i t i e s d i d not e x i s t . As w e l l , l a r g e s c a l e r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n belonged to the Department of F i n a n c e . The T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t t h e r e f o r e f u n c t i o n e d mainly as a l a r g e - s c a l e a c c o u n t i n g o p e r a t i o n , always a t t e m p t i n g to cut back on e x p e n d i t u r e s to remain w i t h i n the Department of F i n a n c e ' s c o n s e r v a t i v e f i s c a l framework. Because, of i t s mandate to manage the government's i n t e r n a l budget, the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t has always been viewed by o p e r a t i n g government departments w i t h some h o s t i l i t y . O p e r a t i n g departments f e l t t h a t TBS i n t e r f e r e d w i t h t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s — namely, managing i n p u t s to a c h i e v e o u t p u t s , to s a t i s f y the govern-ment's o b j e c t i v e s . I t was the mandate of the T r e a s u r y Board to c o n t r o l o p e r a t i n g expenses w i t h i n the government. The a u t h o r i t i e s of the 4 T r e a s u r y Board, as l i s t e d i n the F i n a n c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Act , were d e l e g a t e d to the o f f i c i a l s of the S e c r e t a r i a t . T h i s d e l e g a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y c o n f e r r e d e x t e n s i v e powers of c o n t r o l over o p e r a t i n g government departments. The Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board was i t s e l f not s t r o n g l y m o t i v a t e d , nor i n t e r e s t e d , i n i t s mandate to c o n t r o l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the government.^ I t was l e f t to o f f i c i a l s to f u l f i l l those r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . And those o f f i c i a l s f u l f i l l e d those r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s by " a t t a c k i n g " weak programs t h a t d i d not have powerful b u r e a u c r a t s or M i n i s t e r s , e i t h e r s u p p o r t i n g or managing them. The r o l e of the S e c r e t a r i a t was o n l y to a d j u s t the e x p e n d i t u r e budget, not to e v a l u a t e the b e n e f i t s of any g i v e n p o l i c y or program. Consequently, government programs c o u l d be s a c r i f i c e d on the b a s i s of p o l i t i c s and power as opposed to c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r b e n e f i t s to a s p e c i f i c group or even a c o s t / b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s . 114 T h i s potent p o s i t i o n of the S e c r e t a r i a t v i s - a - v i s o p e r a t i n g departments was enhanced by e x t e n s i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y which was d e l e g a t e d to o f f i c i a l s i n a d d i t i o n to t h e i r r e g u l a t o r y powers. De c i s i o n - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y was d e l e g a t e d because of the unmanageable-workload of the Board. Each time a department wished to exceed the l i m i t s of a T r e a s u r y Board r e g u l a t i o n , f o r reason of a c h i e v i n g program o b j e c t i v e s , p e r m i s s i o n of the Board had to be sought v i a a T r e a s u r y Board s u b m i s s i o n . The number of T r e a s u r y Board r e g u l a t i o n s was v e r y l a r g e . "By 1966, matters which r e q u i r e d T r e a s u r y Board a p p r o v a l — l a r g e l y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r a n s a c t i o n s — had come to number s i x t e e n thousand."^ Of c o u r s e , M i n i s t e r s of the Board c o u l d not p o s s i b l y r u l e on each of the r e q u e s t s submitted and, t h e r e -f o r e , d e c i s i o n s were o f t e n taken by o f f i c i a l s i n the name of the T r e a s u r y Board Committee. While on paper i t was c l e a r t h a t t h i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y belonged to the Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board, i n p r a c t i c e , the a u t h o r i t i e s of the S e c r e t a r i a t and the C a b i n e t Committee c a l l e d the . T r e a s u r y Board o v e r l a p p e d and were i n d i s t i n c t from each o t h e r . In f a c t , to an o f f i c i a l of an o p e r a t i n g department the t i t l e T r e a s u r y Board u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d to the S e c r e t a r i a t and to those o f f i c i a l s w i t h i n t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n r a t h e r than to the Cabinet Committee. In 1966, i n keeping w i t h the suggested reforms of the G l a s s c o Commission to l e t the managers manage, government departments were g i v e n g r e a t e r a u t h o r i t y . The i n t e n t i o n was to e s t a b l i s h g u i d e l i n e s , r a t h e r than r e g u l a t i o n s , which would enable departmental managers to c o n t r o l more e f f e c t i v e l y t h e i r own i n p u t s i n t o t h e i r programs. Along w i t h 115 g r e a t e r freedom to manage w i t h i n e s t a b l i s h e d g u i d e l i n e s , t h e r e was a concommittant requirement now to e v a l u a t e the departmental programs to judge t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s as w e l l as t h e i r e f f i c i e n c y . T h i s major task would be accomplished by such newly developed t e c h n i q u e s as Q PPBS, OPMS, and MBO. Great e x p e c t a t i o n s e x i s t e d f o r these new t e c h n i q u e s to a s s i s t the government i n the r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n p r o c e s s . The government's i n t e n t i o n s were i l l u s t r a t e d by the advocates of PPBS — systems a n a l y s t s , a c c o u n t a n t s , o p e r a t i o n s r e s e a r c h e x p e r t s — who were brought i n t o the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t from the b u s i n e s s community to implement the PPB System. The implementation of PPBS was no s m a l l task! The new s p e c i a l i s t s r e q u i r e d a complete r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the budgetary system as w e l l as e s t a b l i s h e d c r i t e r i a f o r e v a l u a t i n g the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the d e p a r t -mental programs. T h i s c r i t e r i a was to be the p u b l i c s e r v i c e a p p r o x i m a t i o n of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e ' s "bottom l i n e v " The d e p a r t -ments, i n t u r n , were r e q u i r e d to develop program o b j e c t i v e s , i n p u t data and output data w i t h i n a framework which would permit a n a l y s i s . The p r e v i o u s system had tended to be "bottom-up" and a g g r e g a t i v e i n n a t u r e , t r e a t i n g the p r e v i o u s y e a r ' s budget as the base. As a consequence, the annual budget was t o t a l l y i n c r e m e n t a l . The new PPB System would be "top-down" and d i s a g g r e g a t i v e , making increment-a l i s m a s m a l l e r p a r t of the p o l i c y - p r o c e s s . I t was not int e n d e d t h a t t h i s new system would be implemented o v e r n i g h t , but s e r i o u s advances would occur i n the d i r e c t i o n of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . 116 From the p r e d o m i n a n t l y i n c r e m e n t a l b u d g e t i n g i n terms of e x p e n d i t u r e c a t e g o r i e s ( s a l a r i e s , t r a v e l , postage, r e n t , r e p a i r s ) , which p r e v a i l e d p r i o r to 1965, t h e r e has been a s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t i n emphasis to p l a n n i n g and b u d g e t i n g i n the c o n t e x t of d e f i n e d (or r e -d e f i n e d ) departmental o b j e c t i v e s , and of programs and a c t i v i t i e s d e signed to meet these o b j e c t i v e s s t r u c t u r e d i n a manner to f a c i l i t a t e p l a n n i n g and subsequent e v a l u a t i o n of achievement.^ The implementation of the new g u i d e l i n e s and a c c o u n t i n g procedures was a heavy burden on a l l departmental r e s o u r c e s . I t appeared to o p e r a t i n g departments, and even to M i n i s t e r s i n t h e i r r o l e of ad-m i n i s t e r i n g departments, t h a t the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t had, i n f a c t , merely changed the r u l e s and was as powerful and as i n t e r f e r i n g i n l i n e f u n c t i o n s as e v e r . The S e c r e t a r i a t had simply changed i t s f a c e because i t was p o l i t i c a l l y " i n vogue" to do so, but the i n t e n t remained the same. Although the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t was c o n s i d e r e d by l i n e departments to be v e r y p o w e r f u l , was the S e c r e t a r i a t , indeed, power-f u l i n r e l a t i o n to e x e c u t i v e power? When A l Johnson was S e c r e t a r y to the T r e a s u r y Board he wrote t h a t the S e c r e t a r i a t c o u l d be l i k e n e d to Kafka's C a s t l e : the apparent i f unknown source of a u t h o r i t y which governs the v i l l a g e (the P u b l i c S e r v i c e ) — remote, m y s t e r i o u s , a l l p o w e r f u l beyond comprehension i n terms of both reason and judgement, and above a l l beyond the r e a c h , l e t alone i n f l u e n c e , of the o r d i n a r y m o r t a l s governed by i t - ^ Q The S e c r e t a r i a t c o u l d c e r t a i n l y be l i k e n e d to the C a s t l e f o r reasons of m y s t e r i o u s n e s s and remoteness. But Kafka's C a s t l e was at the top of the H i l l : where d i d the S e c r e t a r i a t f i t i n t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n of government, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n to the Cabinet and the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e ? 117 The G l a s s c o Commission had recommended t h a t the TBS be moved from the Department of F i n a n c e i n t o the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e but Prime M i n i s t e r L e s t e r Pearson had not a c c e p t e d t h a t recommendation. I n s t e a d , he had d e c i d e d t h a t the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t would stand on i t s own — halfway between Fin a n c e and the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to s p e c u l a t e what would have happened i f the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t had been l o c a t e d w i t h i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . I t i s p o s s i b l e to assume t h a t problems would have a r i s e n w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n of government because an extremely p o w e r f u l c e n t r a l agency would have been c r e a t e d i n r e l a t i o n to o p e r a t i n g departments. The power and i n f l u e n c e o f t h i s new o r g a n i -z a t i o n would have been ve r y v i s i b l e simply because of i t s s i z e and i t s wide area of concerns — namely, both p o l i c y and e x p e n d i t u r e s . T h i s s i t u a t i o n would p r o b a b l y have c r e a t e d even g r e a t e r h o s t i l i t y on the p a r t of o p e r a t i n g l i n e departments to agency c o n t r o l s as r e p r e s e n t e d by the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . But Prime M i n i s t e r Pearson d i d not choose to c r e a t e such an o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n s t e a d , the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t , a l t h o u g h enhanced as a c e n t r a l agency s e p a r a t e from the Department of F i n a n c e , was l e f t s e p a r a t e • from the C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t . The o r g a n i z a t i o n of TBS o u t s i d e the P r i v y C o u n c i l o f f i c e i n s t e a d r e i n f o r c e d the i d e a t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r and the C a b i n e t were not i n c l i n e d to be r e s t r i c t e d by f i n a n c i a l r e a l i t i e s which they would have been c o n s t a n t l y reminded of i f the TBS was o r g a n i z e d w i t h i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e . More i m p o r t a n t l y , the Prime M i n i s t e r would have been more d i r e c t l y i m p l i c a t e d by the f a i l u r e of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t 118 to c o n t r o l e x p e n d i t u r e s . So i t was d e c i d e d t h a t the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t would m a i n t a i n a s t r o n g l i n k w i t h the Department of F i n a n c e as both departments had o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t s i n t h e i r concerns w i t h budget e x p e n d i t u r e s . The reasons f o r our s p e c u l a t i o n are the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r r a t i o n -a l i t y i n the f u n c t i o n of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . The annual e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n was r a t i o n a l i t y i n p r a c t i c e . However, i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e an e f f e c t i v e b a lance w i t h i n the e x p e n d i t u r e p l a n , between government p r i o r i t i e s and departmental p r o p o s a l s , two important requirements had to be met. The f i r s t important requirement was c l a r i t y of e x p r e s s i o n i n the government's o b j e c t i v e s . The second requirement was to have a v a i l a b l e e v a l u a t i o n s of government programs. These requirements were n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r to be a b l e to judge the e f f i c i e n c y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of departments i n t h e i r endeavours to a t t a i n government o b j e c t i v e s . In 1968 government p r i o r i t i e s became the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . But e v a l u a t i o n of government programs was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . The consequence of t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the p r o c e s s of r a t i o n a l i z i n g government d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p l a c e d the TBS i n a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the o r g a n i z a t i o n of government. In a p e r i o d of m e t a p o l i c y development such as 1968-72, the TBS had much to g a i n . When A l Johnson made h i s r e f e r e n c e to Kafka's C a s t l e i n 1971, he was then the S e c r e t a r y to the Board. I t would seem th a t at l e a s t p r i o r to 1968 the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t was d e f i n i t e l y not the C a s t l e at the top of the H i l l . However, the statement c o u l d perhaps be 119 i n t e r p r e t e d as an i n d i c a t i o n of the a s p i r a t i o n s of the TBS. The T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t c o u l d p l a y an important r o l e i n Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau's attempt to r a t i o n a l i z e C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The q u e s t i o n i s was the S e c r e t a r i a t s u c c e s s f u l i n t h i s r o l e ? 2. The P l a n n i n g Branch In 1968, the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t was d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e main s e c t o r s : the Program Branch, the P e r s o n n e l P o l i c y Branch and the Management Improvement Branch. The P e r s o n n e l P o l i c y Branch d e a l t w i t h those p o l i c i e s r e q u i r e d of the Board as the employer of the P u b l i c S e r v i c e . The Program Branch d e a l t w i t h the e x p e n d i t u r e budget p r o c e s s — the a l l o c a t i o n of funds to c a r r y out departmental o b j e c t i v e s . The Management Improvement Branch was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e v a l u a t i o n of both the e f f e c t i v e n e s s and the e f f i c i e n c y of departmental programs i n meeting o b j e c t i v e s . T h i s branch concerned i t s e l f w i t h such endeavours as paper management systems and how much the government had expended on photocopy machines. I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, the attempt to i n t r o d u c e r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o the government expenditure, p r o c e s s c e n t e r e d on the Management Improvement Branch. In 1969, an i n t e r e s t i n g p l a n was d e v i s e d between Simon Reisman, then S e c r e t a r y of the Board, and a p o l i t i c a l economy p r o f e s s o r by the name of Douglas H a r t l e . H a r t l e had e s t a b l i s h e d a number of s t r o n g p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h powerful mandarins from the time t h a t he had been the Research D i r e c t o r f o r the C a r t e r Commission''"''" and was without much to do at the time. So i t was d e c i d e d t h a t H a r t l e c o u l d take over the Management Improvement Branch and experiment w i t h i t w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of e v a l u a t i o n of e f f i c i e n c y and e f f e c t i v e -120 ness of government programs. The Management Improvement Branch was re-named the P l a n n i n g Branch. I t was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the P l a n n i n g Branch to develop e v a l u a t i o n s of programs and to e v e n t u a l l y t r a i n and a s s i s t d e p a r t -ments to undertake them themselves. The combination of the ex-p e n d i t u r e budget p r o c e s s , now r e - i n f o r c e d by the a c t i v i t i e s of the P l a n n i n g and P r i o r i t i e s Committee, and an a n a l y t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n system, to be s u p p l i e d by the P l a n n i n g Branch would form the b a s i s of a more s y s t e m a t i c , and s c i e n t i f i c approach to government d e c i s i o n -making. Indeed, the. v e r y b a s i s of PPBS was r a t i o n a l i t y ! The system r e l i e d on a c e n t r a l l y determined s e t of p r i o r i t i e s which were to be communicated through the ranks from the. top-down, th a t i s , from the Ca b i n e t through to the program o f f i c e r s . The b a s i c approach of the T r e a s u r y Board P l a n n i n g Branch was to a n a l y z e the budgetary data produced by PPBS u s i n g advanced m i c r o -economic t e c h n i q u e s . The o f f i c i a l s of t h i s Branch were v e r y know-le d g e a b l e and s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n t h e i r methods of a n a l y s i s and eager i n t h e i r attempts to prove t h a t " p l a n n i n g " c o u l d succeed w i t h i n government o r g a n i z a t i o n . They s e t out to i l l u s t r a t e the i n t e r -r e l a t e d n e s s of e v a l u a t i o n and p l a n n i n g by c o n d u c t i n g major reviews of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of e x i s t i n g s o c i a l programs such as manpower t r a i n i n g , d i r e c t job c r e a t i o n , youth unemployment and economic d e v e l o p -ment programs. But p o l i c y and program e v a l u a t i o n i n e v i t a b l y l e d to p l a n n i n g and p r i o r i t y c h o i c e . As Douglas H a r t l e , the Deputy S e c r e t a r y of the P l a n n i n g Branch wrote, 121 E v a l u a t i o n i s , i n t u r n , one of the f i v e elements of what we w i l l c a l l s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g . These elements a r e : (1) f o r e c a s t s of the changes i n the i n d i c a t o r s of g o a l achievement t h a t would occur i n the p o l i c y i n s t r u m e n t s ; (2) the assignment by m i n i s t e r s of p r i o r i t i e s to the p r e s e n t or emerging problems i d e n t i f i e d on the b a s i s of t h i s i n f o r m a -t i o n ; (3) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the k i n d s of p o l i c y instrument changes t h a t might be used to meet these h i g h - p r i o r i t y problems; ( 4 ) assessment of t h e i r r e l a t i v e effectiveness, taking into account any p o s i t i v e or negative e f f e c t s on other goals (Prospective evaluation); (5 ) s e l e c t i o n by ministers of the changes i n the p o l i c y instruments that would most e f f e c t i v e l y resolve the highest p r i o r i t y problems of the Government.^ H e r e i n l a y the dilemma. M i n i s t e r s would be f o r c e d to be s p e c i f i c as to what t h e i r p r i o r i t i e s a c t u a l l y were. They would then have to judge the e f f i c i e n c y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r own e x i s t i n g programs i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r new p r i o r i t i e s . The u l t i m a t e d i f f i c u l t y would be to r e - a s s i g n r e s o u r c e s , t h a t i s , d o l l a r s , to new programs to a c h i e v e the f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e i r new p r i o r i t i e s . Because the Depart-ment of F i n a n c e c o n t i n u e d to f o r e c a s t c o n s e r v a t i v e f i s c a l frameworks, M i n i s t e r s would be a b l e to develop new programs o n l y at the c o s t of e x i s t i n g programs. U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r the P l a n n i n g Branch and Douglas H a r t l e , M i n i s t e r s were u n w i l l i n g to p r o v i d e the f a r more s y s t e m a t i c and s p e c i f i c framework of g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s t h a t the P l a n n i n g Branch r e q u i r e d to f u l f i l l what i t p e r c e i v e d as i t s mandate. Nor was the C a b i n e t p r e p a r e d to make the d i f f i c u l t c h o i c e s between e x i s t i n g programs and i t s new p r i o r i t i e s . F u r t h e r , i n a t t e m p t i n g to r e -s t r u c t u r e the system of e v a l u a t i o n w i t h i n the government o r g a n i z a t i o n , the P l a n n i n g Branch had encroached on the v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s of the 122 e n t i r e government o r g a n i z a t i o n . The v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s r e a l i z e d t h a t i n terms of m e t a p o l i c i e s , i f e v a l u a t i o n of e f f i c i e n c y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s was to be used as c r i t e r i a f o r the c o n t i n u e d f u n d i n g of s p e c i f i c programs, then the P l a n n i n g Branch of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t would become an extremely i n f l u e n t i a l p l a y e r i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . There were many v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s . Of co u r s e , t h e r e were the o p e r a t i n g government departments. The P l a n n i n g Branch had made assumptions about the f l e x i b i l i t y and a d a p t a b i l i t y of i n t e r d e p a r t -mental and i n t e r - a g e n c y r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the f e d e r a l b u r e a u c r a c y . The departments had been the main focus of i d e n t i t y and s o c i a l i z a t i o n , and the main u n i t of budgetary p r o c e s s e s , and these b e h a v i o u r 13 p a t t e r n s c o u l d not be overcome e a s i l y . With the PPB System, the departments were r e q u i r e d to d i s a g g r e g a t e t h e i r departmental o b j e c t i v e s to program o b j e c t i v e s and then to government p r i o r i t i e s . But departmental l o y a l t i e s were d i f f i c u l t to overcome. Nor were departmental managers w i l l i n g to have t h e i r programs e v a l u a t e d by o f f i c i a l s from the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . These e v a l u a t i o n s were c o n s i d e r e d to be a f u r t h e r i n t r u s i o n of the Board i n t o d e p a r t -mental a f f a i r s as w e l l as i n t r u s i o n s i n t o the power bases of s e n i o r mandarins. The l i n e departments were not the o n l y sources of h o s t i l i t y towards the P l a n n i n g Branch. Some of the c e n t r a l a g e n c i e s were a l s o concerned w i t h the developments t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n the TBS. The Department of F i n a n c e became concerned when suddenly the TBS was i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h i n i t s area of j u r i s d i c t i o n , a d v i s i n g the Cab i n e t 123 on the broad economic i m p l i c a t i o n s of major p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , the Department of F i n a n c e had o n l y been concerned w i t h how to meet e x p e n d i t u r e budgets and was not p a r t i c u l a r l y 14 concerned w i t h the f i s c a l framework. F i n a n c e s t r o n g l y r e s e n t e d the P l a n n i n g Branch's attempt to i n t r o d u c e s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g i n t o the C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . Of c o u r s e , the P l a n n i n g Branch f e l t t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y to s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g to a s s i s t M i n i s t e r s i n a s s e s s i n g the r e l a t i v e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of new p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s . Next t h e r e was the Program Branch of the S e c r e t a r i a t i t s e l f . The Program Branch was concerned o n l y w i t h the a l l o c a t i o n of the e x p e n d i t u r e budget and i t r e s e n t e d the i n t r u s i o n of the P l a n n i n g Branch i n i n d i c a t i n g the funds c o u l d be spent more r a t i o n a l l y i n o t h e r ways. The P l a n n i n g Branch, on the o t h e r hand, f e l t t h a t i t was w i t h i n i t s mandate to i n d i c a t e where i t f e l t t h a t r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d be a l l o c a t e d on the b a s i s of i t s own e v a l u a t i o n s of departments' programs. And then t h e r e was the P r i v y C o u n c i l o f f i c e . PCO p e r c e i v e d the P l a n n i n g Branch to be an i n t r u s i o n i n t o PCO's mandate as the c o o r d i n a t o r of government p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s and c h i e f a d v i s o r s to the C a b i n e t . The main c o n f l i c t c e n t e r e d on the f a c t t h a t the P l a n n i n g Branch's e v a l u a t i o n system demanded a f a r more s y s t e m a t i c and s c i e n t i f i c framework of g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s than the P l a n s D i v i s i o n , PCO, was p r e p a r e d to p r o v i d e . Nor was PCO p r e p a r e d to a l l o w the P l a n n i n g Branch to usurp t h e i r r o l e i n a s s i s t i n g Cabinet o M i n i s t e r s i n p l a n n i n g t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . 124 The P l a n n i n g Branch of TBS attempted at one p o i n t to d e l i v e r such a s y s t e m a t i c and r i g o r o u s framework f o r C a b i n e t a p p r o v a l , but the attempt was beaten back by PCO o f f i c i a l s , j e a l o u s of t h e i r own and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s f r a n c h i s e on the C a b i n e t P l a n n i n g System as the u l t i m a t e mechanism f o r the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of government g o a l s and o b j e c t -i v e s . ^ A b a s i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t e d between PCO and the P l a n n i n g Branch. PCO c o n s i d e r e d e v a l u a t i o n to be o n l y a t o o l w i t h i n the t o t a l framework of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g and t h a t the P l a n n i n g Branch d i d not c o n s i d e r the t o t a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s of p l a n n i n g . The P l a n s D i v i s i o n , PCO, determined i t s own p l a n n i n g agenda a p a r t from any c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r a c t i v i t i e s t a k i n g p l a c e i n the P l a n n i n g Branch. Perhaps more p e r t i n e n t was the c o n f l i c t t h a t e x i s t e d between H a r t l e , Deputy S e c r e t a r y of the P l a n n i n g Branch, TBS, and M i c h a e l P i t f i e l d , Deputy S e c r e t a r y , P l a n s D i v i s i o n , PCO. Douglas H a r t l e was an academic economist who was a t t e m p t i n g to b u i l d f o r h i m s e l f a power base by d e v e l o p i n g an e x p e r i m e n t a l a p p l i c a t i o n of microeconomic t e c h n i q u e s to government programs. He was c o n s i d e r e d a " g r e a t man" by some^, a c h a r i s m a t i c l e a d e r but he was d e t e s t e d by o t h e r s . H a r t l e was not a f r a i d to make enemies and he " l o v e d a fight."''" M i c h a e l P i t f i e l d was r e p u t e d to be a c o l d , b r i l l i a n t , p a r a n o i d c i v i l s e r v a n t , 18 a man who was determined to have power f o r h i m s e l f . And, indeed, at the time, P i t f i e l d d i d have power i n h i s c a p a c i t y as a p e r s o n a l 19 f r i e n d of as w e l l as a s e n i o r a d v i s o r to the Prime M i n i s t e r . In t h i s p o s i t i o n , P i t f i e l d was a b l e to d e f e a t H a r t l e by b l o c k i n g almost 20 a l l work ever done by the P l a n n i n g Branch. The r o l e of the S e c r e t a r y to the Board must a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d . 125 A l t h o u g h Simon Reisman had been the S e c r e t a r y of the T r e a s u r y Board at the time t h a t the P l a n n i n g Branch was c r e a t e d , A l Johnson became S e c r e t a r y the f o l l o w i n g y e a r . In the b e g i n n i n g i t appeared t h a t he a l s o supported the aims of the P l a n n i n g Branch. Johnson saw the e x p e n d i t u r e budget p r o c e s s and the T r e a s u r y P l a n n i n g System as the twin f o u n d a t i o n s f o r a more s y s t e m a t i c approach to government d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . The System's comprehension of the r e l e v a n t t e c h n i q u e s would imply a r o l e f o r the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t which would en-compass not merely management but a major p a r t of b a s i c p o l i c y - m a k i n g as w e l l . ^ T h i s v i s i o n was apparent when Johnson compared the TBS to Kafka's C a s t l e . However, as a mandarin s e e k i n g power i n h i s own r i g h t , he e v e n t u a l l y turned a g a i n s t the P l a n n i n g Branch. He r e f u s e d to support the P l a n n i n g Branch i n f a c e of the Program Branch's r e c a l c i t r a n c e to a c c e p t e v a l u a t i o n s as c r i t e r i a f o r funds. L a s t but not l e a s t was the r e a c t i o n of the C a b i n e t . Even w i t h the hard-core a n a l y t i c a l data produced by the P l a n n i n g Branch to i l l u s t r a t e the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of c e r t a i n programs i n terms of e f f e c t i v e n e s s and e f f i c i e n c y , M i n i s t e r s r e f u s e d to " b i t e the b u l l e t " as f a r as the P l a n n i n g Branch was concerned. What the P l a n n i n g Branch d i d not take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n was the p o l i t i c a l reward of a l l government programs. P o p u l a r government programs win v o t e s and v o t e r s u p port. C l e a r l y t h i s p o l i t i c a l concern was an important p a r t of the government's o b j e c t i v e s , a l t h o u g h never s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d w i t h i n the p r i o r i t i e s of the Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . In matching government p r i o r i t i e s to the e v a l u a t i o n s of e x i s t i n g programs the P l a n n i n g Branch f a i l e d to c o n s i d e r the most 126 obvious p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y of government d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . R a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g d i d not a l l o w f o r the system of " p o l i t i c a l i n c e n t i v e s " which were a major f a c t o r i n C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n s . There was, as w e l l , a more b a s i c c o n f l i c t between the C a b i n e t and the P l a n n i n g Branch. In the p r o c e s s of j u d g i n g e f f i c i e n c y , the P l a n n i n g Branch began to judge the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the government's o b j e c t i v e s themselves. In doing so, the P l a n n i n g Branch p l a c e d i t s e l f above the e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who were the r e a l d e c i s i o n -makers. The P l a n n i n g Branch, u s i n g s c i e n t i f i c methods of a n a l y s i s , 22 was s u g g e s t i n g t h a t o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s would be more, r a t i o n a l . The P l a n n i n g Branch d i s i n t e g r a t e d i n 1973. W i t h i n a six-month p e r i o d every D i r e c t o r w i t h i n the Branch had l e f t . H a r t l e h i m s e l f concluded t h a t p l a n n i n g c o u l d not win the b a t t l e a g a i n s t p o l i t i c s . He l o s t h i s enthusiasm and, u n w i l l i n g to f i g h t on, he l e f t the govern-ment to r e t u r n to academia. An i n t e r e s t i n g l e g a c y , however, was the number of a n a l y s t s r e c r u i t e d by H a r t l e who now occupy s e n i o r p o s i t i o n s i n government. Men such as Ian Stewart, now Deputy M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e , Mark D a n i e l s , S e n i o r A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t f o r Economic P o l i c y and B a r r y C a r i n , A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r , M i n i s t r y of S t a t e f o r S o c i a l Development a l l shared H a r t l e ' s enthusiasm f o r the i n t e l l e c t u a l p r e c e p t s of p l a n n i n g . In t u r n they educated o t h e r young o f f i c e r s who were to leave the P l a n n i n g Branch to work i n o t h e r important areas of government. In 1977 the P l a n n i n g Branch d i s a p p e a r e d a l t o g e t h e r and became a D i v i s i o n w i t h i n the Programs Branch, TBS. The s t o r y of the P l a n n i n g Branch i s i n t e r e s t i n g f o r a number of r e a s o n s . The T r e a s u r y B o a r d • S e c r e t a r i a t was the l o g i c a l o r g a n i -z a t i o n to implement systems f o r r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g because i t was w i t h i n the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t t h a t a v a i l a b l e funds were matched to the C a b i n e t ' s p r i o r i t i e s . The P l a n n i n g Branch of the S e c r e t a r i a t was to have p r o v i d e d the e v a l u a t i o n s of departmental programs, j u d g i n g to what e x t e n t these programs a c t u a l l y d i d f u l f i l l government o b j e c t i v e s . The t e c h n i c a l a n a l y s i s of programs which was r e q u i r e d f o r the implementation of the r a t i o n a l model was a v a i l a b l through the a c t i v i t i e s and knowledge of the P l a n n i n g Branch. But the id e a f o r the r a t i o n a l e v a l u a t i o n of e x i s t i n g government programs, one of the c e n t r a l c r i t e r i a of a s c i e n t i f i c approach to d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and the mandate of the P l a n n i n g Branch, came from o u t s i d e Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau's attempt to implement r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o the Cab i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . The P l a n n i n g Branch was c r e a t e d by sources o u t s i d e the government and i n s t i t u t e d w i t h i n the bure a u c r a c y , removed from the C a b i n e t . Although i t was a t t r i b u t e d as a n a t u r a l outcome of the G l a s s c o Report, H a r t l e had no sympathy f o r the G l a s s c o Report and was simply concerned w i t h the e x p e r i m e n t a l 23 a p p l i c a t i o n of new methods of s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s . The P l a n n i n g Branch c o u l d have been the l i n c h p i n i n the implement a t i o n of a r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g model i n the Cab i n e t d e c i s i o n -making system. But the implementation of such a model gave too much i n f l u e n c e and power to a group of o f f i c i a l s . I t was the o f f i c i a l s who had the t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e and not the members of the C a b i n e t . R a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g demanded a c e r t a i n l e v e l of knowledge and an o b j e c t i v i t y i n r e a l i z i n g d e c i s i o n s . N e i t h e r of these requirements 128 were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of p o l i t i c i a n s . Yet i t i s one of the p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t government th a t i t s members be e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the people and t h e r e f o r e , p o l i t i c i a n s . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the P l a n n i n g Branch and i t s a c t i v i t i e s r e c e i v e d l i t t l e support from the p o l i t i c a l e x e c u t i v e , i n c l u d i n g Prime M i n i s t e r Trudeau. In p a r t , t h i s c o u l d be viewed as a r e f u s a l to j e o p a r d i z e the C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n -making system by s u p p o r t i n g the growth i n power of an a l t e r n a t i v e body of u n e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . Summary F i n a n c i a l management w i t h i n the government had never been s t r o n g l y supported by the p o l i t i c a l s e c t o r . The Pearson y e a r s had seen a d e c l i n e i n the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the work of the T r e a s u r y Board 23 i n i t s r o l e as the T r e a s u r y watch-dog. M i n i s t e r s of F i n a n c e had not been a b l e to check the " p e r m i s s i v e n e s s " of the Pearson a d m i n i s -t r a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d to budgetary expansion. Nor had i t r e a l l y been n e c e s s a r y . And Pearson had not f o l l o w e d the G l a s s c o recommendation to put the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the Prime M i n i s t e r . E v a l u a t i o n i s i n t r i n s i c to the s c i e n t i f i c approach to d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t was the l o g i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n to have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of e v a l u a t i n g government programs. Had the government f o l l o w e d through on the id e a of e v a l u a t i o n , the TBS might have been ab l e to c o n t r o l and manage the government e x p e n d i t u r e p r o c e s s . I f i t had been a l l o w e d to f u l f i l l t h i s r o l e , perhaps many of the f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the "70's" c o u l d have been a v o i d e d . 129 The e x p e r i e n c e of the P l a n n i n g Branch of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t would i n d i c a t e t h a t the f i r s t Trudeau government was a l s o u n w i l l i n g to support the concept of f i n a n c i a l management. T h i s l a c k of support was f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e d by the c o n t i n u i n g p r a c t i c e of the M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e to a v o i d attendance at Board meetings and thus not p r o v i d e support to the P r e s i d e n t of the T r e a s u r y Board. The 25 Board c o n t i n u e d to be weak as a Cab i n e t Committee a l t h o u g h Trudeau d i d a c c o r d i t some importance by naming i t as a c o o r d i n a t i n g Committee of the C a b i n e t . The f a t e of the P l a n n i n g Branch a l s o i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t the o p t i m a l r a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s model of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g n e c e s s i t a t e d the making of some d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s which Ca b i n e t M i n i s t e r s , as p o l i t i c i a n s , d i d not f e e l were a c c e p t a b l e . The Cab i n e t c o u l d accept r a t i o n a l i t y to the p o i n t of r h e t o r i c and t h i n k - t a n k s — i t was not prepar e d to d i g below the s u r f a c e and wipe out e x i s t i n g programs which i n t u r n might have l e d us to a " p r e f e r r e d f u t u r e . " CHAPTER V: NOTES ^ See Chapter I I , p a r t B, s e c t i o n 4 on the Committee of the T r e a s u r y Board. 2 The P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e i s c o n s i d e r e d to be the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Department. T r e a s u r y Board, O r g a n i z a t i o n of Government (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , 1970). 3 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , December 11, 1980. 4 See Chapter I I , p. 49. See Chapter I I , p a r t B, s e c t i o n 4. P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w s , December 11, 1980, and December 29, 1980. 7 A.W. Johnson, "The T r e a s u r y Board of Canada and the Machinery of Government i n the 1970's," Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e 4 (1971), p. 349. g Program, P l a n n i n g and Budgeting System; O p e r a t i o n a l Performance Measurement System and; Management by O b j e c t i v e s . 9 Henning F r e d e r i c k s o n , " O p e r a t i o n a l Performance Measurement Systems," i n K. Kernachen, ed., P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Canada (T o r o n t o : Methuen, 1977), p. 178~! ^ A.W. Johnson, op. c i t . , p. 346. ^ Royal Commission on T a x a t i o n . 12 Douglas H a r t l e , "A Proposed System of P o l i c y and Program E v a l u a t i o n , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 16 (1973), p. 245 (emphasis mine). 13 G. Bruce Doern, "Recent Changes i n the P h i l o s o p h y of P o l i c y -Making i n Canada," Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e 4 (1971), p. 260. 14 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w s , December 11, 1980, and December 29, 1980. 130 ^ R i c h a r d F r e n c h , How Ottawa Decides (To r o n t o : James Lorimer and Co., 1980), p. 35. 16 1 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , December 11, 1980. ^ P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , December 29, 1980. 18 R i c h a r d Gwyn, The N o r t h e r n Magus (Toro n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1980), pp. 74-79. I b i d . 20 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , December 29, 1980. 21 R i c h a r d F r e n c h , op. c i t . , p. 34. 22 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , June 12, 1980. 23 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , December 29, 1980. 24 See M i c h a e l H i c k s , "The T r e a s u r y Board of Canada and i t s C l i e n t s " , Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 16 (1973), p. 190. 25 See Chapter I I , p a r t B, s e c t i o n 4. CONCLUSION T h i s t h e s i s has examined the s t r u c t u r a l and p r o c e d u r a l changes i n the C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s which were implemented d u r i n g P i e r r e T r u d e a u 1 s f i r s t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1968-72. These changes have been examined i n the c o n t e x t of Trudeau's p h i l o s o p h i c a l a l l e g i a n c e to the i d e a l s of r a t i o n a l i t y . In the w o r l d of p o l i c y s c i e n c e s , government p o l i c y - m a k i n g o f t e n equates w i t h " c r i s e s management" which can be d e f i n e d as a) d e a l i n g w i t h problems as they a r i s e , and b) i g n o r i n g the l o n g e r term e f f e c t s of a p o l i c y o u t s i d e the immediate problem a r e a . Any a n t i c i p a t i o n of the f u t u r e i s on the b a s i s of p r e s e n t t r e n d s and no thought i s g i v e n to a p r e f e r r e d future.''" Trudeau i n i t i a t e d h i s changes i n an attempt to overcome the i n c r e a s i n g problems w i t h i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s as c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n the theory of " c r i s e s management." These problems would be overcome by a more s c i e n t i f i c approach to d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , i n c o r p o r a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e through new t e c h n o l o g y and i n f o r m -a t i o n systems. T h i s new i n f o r m a t i o n would l e a d to r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n -making. To what ex t e n t d i d the new d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s r e f l e c t the concerns of r a t i o n a l i t y ? To what extent d i d Trudeau's concern f o r r a t i o n a l i t y a f f e e t the p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t government? The main changes t h a t Trudeau made were the f o r m a l i z a t i o n of the C a b i n e t Committee system and the s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , both i n s t i t u t i o n s which were r e s p o n s i b l e to the Prime M i n i s t e r . W i t h i n the Cabinet Committee 132 133 system the concerns f o r r a t i o n a l i t y were e v i d e n t i n the g r e a t e r c r o s s -r e f e r e n c e and s h a r i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n among the C a b i n e t and the i n -c r e a s e d c o l l e c t i v i t y of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g w i t h i n government. Procedures were changed to ease the burden on M i n i s t e r s ' time but the paper burden argument s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced any g a i n s made i n t h i s a r e a . The Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g was an attempt to develop the c a p a c i t y f o r i m a g i n a t i v e and c r e a t i v e p l a n n i n g w i t h i n the C a b i n e t . The concept of " c o o r d i n a t i n g " Committees emphasized the government's i n t e n t i o n to a c h i e v e c o h e s i v e p o l i c y development and implementation. W i t h i n the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , the C a b i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t was e n l a r g e d and i t became a c t i v e i n p o l i c y development. A p l a n n i n g c a p a c i t y was added to support the C a b i n e t Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g . G r e a t e r amounts of i n f o r m a t i o n now r e q u i r e d i n C a b i n e t documents produced a need f o r g r e a t e r c o o r d i n a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . The expansion of PCO c r e a t e d a super-b u r e a u c r a c y d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to the Prime M i n i s t e r . The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e a l s o grew i n s i z e and the p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n s of the g o v e r n i n g p a r t y were f o r m a l i z e d . The PMO a l s o had a p l a n n i n g c a p a c i t y and i t became an a l t e r n a t e source of i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the Prime M i n i s t e r , s e p a r a t e from t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l sources and s e p a r a t e from the bureaucracy as w e l l . These changes caused a g r e a t d e a l of concern to many — bureau-c r a t s , academics, j o u r n a l i s t s and, the p u b l i c — a l l who f e l t t h a t Trudeau was r a d i c a l l y changing the system of Canadian government. And Trudeau, w i t h h i s p h i l o s o p h y of r a t i o n a l i t y and h i s e x p e r i e n c e s as P a r l i a m e n t a r y S e c r e t a r y to L e s t e r Pearson, d i d i n t e n d to a l t e r 134 the manner i n which d e c i s i o n s were made. However, i n d e s i g n i n g a p o l i c y - m a k i n g system, the q u e s t i o n i s whether to change the system r a d i c a l l y or i n c r e m e n t a l l y ? "In p r i n c i p l e one c o u l d answer t h i s q u e s t i o n by s e e i n g whether the c o n d i t i o n s under which the i n c r e m e n t a l change model i s v a l i d 2 are met by the system." The i n c r e m e n t a l change model r e f e r r e d to i s v a l i d i n c o n d i t i o n s whereby a) r e s u l t s of past p o l i c i e s are not c o n s i d e r e d u n s a t i s f a c t o r y to such a degree as to r e q u i r e r a d i c a l change; b) the problem i s not new, i t has a past and now d e c i s i o n s can be i n c r e m e n t a l ; c) new knowledge w i l l not make the past p o l i c y 3 outmoded and i n e f f i c i e n t i f i n c r e m e n t a l change i s c o n t i n u e d . To v e r i f y the v a l i d i t y of the i n c r e m e n t a l change model f o r the Canadian s i t u a t i o n , the p r i n c i p l e s of Cab i n e t government must be c o n s i d e r e d . The p r i n c i p l e s of Cab i n e t government d i d indeed s a t i s f y the requirements of the f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e because i t was a b l e to accommo-date the r e g i o n a l , r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s of s p e c i f i c group i n t e r e s t s . And, the p r i n c i p l e s of Cabinet government d i d indeed have a p a s t . The t r a d i t i o n s of Cab i n e t government have p r o v i d e d the b i n d i n g i n g r e d i e n t of the f e d e r a t i o n to some e x t e n t . However, the f i n a l c o n d i t i o n of the model d i d q u e s t i o n the v a l i d i t y of i n c r e m e n t a l change. New knowledge and i n f o r m a t i o n , a v a i l a b l e through such t e c h n i q u e s as c y b e r n e t i c s , m o d e l l i n g , systems a n a l y s i s and f u t u r o l o g y p r o f e r r e d the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the Cabi n e t system was outmoded and i n e f f i c i e n t . The o p t i m a l model i s r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , based on know-ledge and i n f o r m a t i o n . The model cannot accommodate p r e j u d i c e and 135 r e q u i r e s shared v a l u e s of a s p e c i f i c nature and e x p e r t i s e . Given the nature of Canada w i t h i t s c o n s o c i a t i o n a l m o d a l i t i e s and t r a d i t i o n o f a C a b i n e t of e l e c t e d members, the o p t i m a l model of r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n -making cannot i t s e l f be accommodated. The outcome of the 1968-72 p e r i o d of m e t a p o l i c i e s was not r a t i o n a l i t y but the i n s t i t u t i o n of r a t i o n a l p r o c e s s e s . None of Trudeau's changes were r a d i c a l to the e x t e n t t h a t they r e l a x e d p o l i t i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s on the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system. The " p o l i c y m a k i n g c u l t u r e " remained the same and p r i n c i p l e s of Cabinet government were not a f f e c t e d . R a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g was not imposed on the C a b i n e t through r a d i c a l changes i n the s t r u c t u r e of the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system. Trudeau's changes were, i n themselves, i n c r e m e n t a l and made w i t h i n the sub-compartments of the t o t a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system. Most of them had been i n i t i a t e d d u r i n g the Pearson e r a , i f not b e f o r e . Trudeau simply f o r m a l i z e d them. But perhaps many s m a l l changes can have a major impact on the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system. ...because we are speaking about changes i n the p o l i c y m a k i n g system, t h e r e may be a good chance t h a t a s e t of r e l a t i v e l y minor and q u i t e i n c r e m e n t a l changes i n the p o l i c y m a k i n g system w i l l permit — through m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t s — f a r - r a n g i n g i n n o v a t i o n s i n the s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s made by t h a t system. T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s of much p r a c t i c a l importance, because of the much g r e a t e r f e a s i b i l i t y of i n c r e m e n t a l change than of r a d i c a l change...^ The Trudeau changes d i d p r o v i d e the p o s s i b i l i t y of r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g . The Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g , as w e l l as the p l a n n i n g u n i t s i n PCO and PMO, c o u l d have l e d to widespread changes w i t h i n the v e r y concept of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . But the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of e l e c t i o n s , v o t e r s a t i s f a c t i o n , and the e x p e r t i s e of 136 p o l i t i c i a n s were i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the r a t i o n a l model of d e c i s i o n -making.^ What r e s u l t e d was improved c o o r d i n a t i o n of government p o l i c y through r a t i o n a l procedures of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . There was a l s o the q u e s t i o n of to what ex t e n t Trudeau was p r e p a r e d to go to accommodate r a t i o n a l i t y i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process? The answer i s to be found i n the s t o r y of the P l a n n i n g Branch of the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t . The P l a n n i n g Branch was a b l e to p r o v i d e the knowledge and i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d f o r r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s . But the P l a n n i n g Branch c o u l d not accept the p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s which s e p a r a t e the p o l i t i c i a n s from the e x p e r t b u r e a u c r a t . The P l a n n i n g Branch attempted to p l a c e e x p e r t i s e above the mandate of the C a b i n e t i n q u e s t i o n i n g government o b j e c t i v e s . I t was the P l a n n i n g Branch which was a t t e m p t i n g to a l t e r the p r i n c i p l e s of C a b i n e t government and i t s l a c k of success r e i n f o r c e d the C a b i n e t as the e x e c u t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r . The f a t e of the P l a n n i n g Branch has p o i n t e d out another d e v e l o p -ment i n the p e r i o d under ex a m i n a t i o n . In the d e s i g n i n g of meta-p o l i c i e s a concommittant r e s u l t w i l l be p o s i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s , p o l i c i e s which a f f e c t the s t r u c t u r e of i n f l u e n c e i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g system. Did the s t r u c t u r e of i n f l u e n c e change as a r e s u l t of Trudeau's p r o c e d u r a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l changes? I t i s e v i d e n t from the s t o r y of the P l a n n i n g Branch t h a t the T r e a s u r y Board S e c r e t a r i a t d i d not have a g r e a t d e a l of i n f l u e n c e i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . I t was too f a r removed from the Prime M i n i s t e r and the C a b i n e t . Nor d i d i t g a i n i n f l u e n c e from the attempt to i n t r o d u c e r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system. 137 What d i d g a i n i n f l u e n c e was the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y the P l a n s D i v i s i o n , and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e . Both of these i n s t i t u t i o n s were c l o s e to the Prime M i n i s t e r , i n f a c t , r e s p o n s i b l e to him. I t was these two i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t had a v a i l a b l e the g r e a t e s t amount of i n f o r m a t i o n and i t was a r e s u l t of t h i s i n f o r m -a t i o n t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p o s i t i o n , i t s e l f , became s t r o n g e r . The Trudeau C a b i n e t Committee system r e i n f o r c e d the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v i t y . I t enabled g r e a t e r and more knowledgeable p a r t i c i -p a t i o n on the p a r t of a l l M i n i s t e r s as a c o l l e c t i v i t y r a t h e r than one M i n i s t e r i n d i v i d u a l l y w i t h i n h i s own area of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . T h i s g r e a t e r c o l l e c t i v i t y and Trudeau's i n s i s t e n c e on consensus w i t h i n the C a b i n e t have been c i t e d as the cause of the withdrawal and l o s s of i n d i v i d u a l i t y by some good Ca b i n e t M i n i s t e r s and even the cause of t h e i r r e s i g n a t i o n s . T h i s c o l l e g i a l i t y has a l s o s t r e n g t h e n e d the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p o s i t i o n as "primus i n t e r p a r e s " through h i s r o l e as c o o r d i n a t o r of C a b i n e t d e c i s i o n s . The p e r s o n a l i t y of the Prime M i n i s t e r i s an important f a c t o r i n how h i s C a b i n e t f u n c t i o n s . T h i s i s not to debate whether or not the Prime M i n i s t e r of Canada i s more powerful than the P r e s i d e n t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s — i t i s , r a t h e r , simply to r e s t a t e t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r i s "primus i n t e r p a r e s " and t h a t the management t e c h n i q u e , or s t y l e , of every Prime M i n i s t e r i s p e r s o n a l to t h a t man a l o n e . In the case of P i e r r e Trudeau, c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the man r e q u i r e d ' c e r t a i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l changes. These changes were d i r e c t e d by the man's requirement f o r g r e a t e r amounts of i n f o r m a t i o n f o r r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and not by a w i l l i n g n e s s to change Canadian C a b i n e t government. The importance of Trudeau as Prime M i n i s t e r i n t h i s p e r i o d was h i s p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s p h i l o s o p h y a c t e d as an independent v a r i a b l e i n the development of the t r e n d s . In the mid 60s.,. s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s i n the burea u c r a c y had become concerned w i t h c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s and w i t h f i n a n c i a l management w i t h i n government.^ The G l a s s c o Commission, the i n t r o -d u c t i o n of PPBS and even Pearson's C a b i n e t Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g were a r e s u l t of these c o n c e r n s . Trudeau's p h i l o s o p h y gave i n t e l l e c t u a l support and r e i n f o r c e m e n t to the i d e a t h a t r a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n s c o u l d be found f o r the d y s f u n c t i o n s i n the system. But i n those y e a r s of optimism, Trudeau i g n o r e d r a t i o n a l i s m ' s e s s e n t i a l f l a w . To be s y s t e m a t i c i s to be s e n s i b l e . To be s y s t e m a t i c w i t h o u t common sense, w i t h o u t humour, i s to t r e a t systems as more important than p e o p l e . And p o l i t i c s i s o n l y p e o p l e . ^ But throughout h i s t o r y , t r a d i t i o n s and p e r s o n a l i t i e s have c o n s i s t e n t l y brought changes i n the Cabi n e t system. I t i s p o s s i b l e to understand a l l t h a t o c c u r r e d i n the p e r i o d 1968-72 i n the c o n t e x t of h i s t o r i c a l development. The r a t i o n a l model may add another dimension to the a n a l y s i s and, because P i e r r e Trudeau was p h i l o s o p h i -c a l l y i n c l i n e d to s t r i v e f o r r a t i o n a l i t y , the p e r i o d 1968-72 cannot be t o t a l l y removed from t h a t p e r s p e c t i v e . But c o n f u s i o n may r e s u l t when a p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s t looks to models of p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s to judge the f o r c e s of h i s t o r i c a l development. In subsequent y e a r s to the p e r i o d 1968-72, Trudeau has made oth e r changes w i t h i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g system. The envelope '8 system, developed i n the Trudeau y e a r s but i n i t i a l l y implemented by Joe C l a r k and c o n t i n u e d by Trudeau a f t e r the 1980 e l e c t i o n , has major i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the e x p e n d i t u r e system and the T r e a s u r y Board. The Ca b i n e t Committee system w i l l be s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by the emphasis on the Committee on Economic Development and the Cab i n e t Committee on S o c i a l Development. The Committee on P r i o r i t i e s and 9 P l a n n i n g has a much reduced p r o f i l e and has l o s t p r e s t i g e . Other developments have been the c r e a t i o n of the s u p e r m i n i s t r i e s of S o c i a l Development and Economic Development; the c r e a t i o n of " m i r r o r " committees, committees of Deputy M i n i s t e r s m i r r o r i n g the c o m p o s i t i o n of the Cab i n e t Committees f o r S o c i a l Development and Economic Develop-ment. These developments are a p a r t of the ongoing p r o c e s s of meta-p o l i c y making w i t h i n the government of Canada. They are areas f o r f u r t h e r study, as w i l l be the changes of the f u t u r e . The changes i n the Cab i n e t system of government have been developed "under the p r e s s u r e of events and i n response to a c t u a l need . " ^ I t i s not of major importance whether or not those events and needs are the r e s u l t of n a t i o n a l c r i s i s or the r e s u l t of a Prime M i n i s t e r ' s p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r r a t i o n a l i t y ; i t i s the genius of our Cabi n e t system t h a t i t i s f l e x i b l e and w i l l adapt to the requirements p l a c e d upon i t o u t s i d e the bounds of e x i s t i n g p r a c t i c e . The laws p r o v i d e o n l y the framework; those who put the laws i n t o o p e r a t i o n g i v e the framework a meaning and f i l l i n the i n t e r s t i c e s . Those who take d e c i s i o n s c r e a t e p r e c e d e n t s which o t h e r s tend to f o l l o w , and when they have been f o l l o w e d long enough they a c q u i r e the s a n c t i t y and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of age... NOTES: CONCLUSION Malcom Rowan, "A Conc e p t u a l Framework f o r Government P o l i c y -Maing," Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 13 (1970), p. 282. 2 Yehezkel Dror, P u b l i c P o l i c y m a k i n g Reexamined (San F r a n c i s c o : Chandler P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1968), p. 172. 3 I b i d . , p. 145-6. 4 Yehe z k e l Dror, Design f o r P o l i c y S c i e n c e s (New York: American E l s e v i e r P u b l i s h i n g , 1981), p. 76. ^ The removal of key o f f i c i a l s s u r r o u n d i n g Trudeau immediately a f t e r the 1972 e l e c t i o n , such as M i c h a e l P i t f i e l d , Deputy S e c r e t a r y , P l a n s , PCO, and Jim Davey, Head of the P l a n n i n g D i v i s i o n , PMO, and the d i s b a n d i n g of the R e g i o n a l Desks o f f e r f u r t h e r p r o o f t h a t the concept of p l a n n i n g and r a t i o n a l i t y was c o n s i d e r e d to have c o n t r i b u t e d to the d i s a s t r o u s e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . 6 Gordon Robertson, "Canadian P o l i t i c s and Cab i n e t i n the Face of Modern Demands," Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 11 (1968), p. 273. R i c h a r d Gwyn, The N o r t h e r n Magus (Tor o n t o : M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1980), p. 107. g See R i c h a r d F r e n c h , How Ottawa Decides ( T o r o n t o : James Lorimer and Co., 1980) f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of the envelope system. 9 P r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w , January 16, 1981. The Prime M i n i s t e r o f t e n does not a t t e n d meetings of the P r i o r i t i e s and P l a n n i n g Committee. ^ A r n o l d Heeney, "Mackenzie K i n g and the Cab i n e t S e c r e t a r i a t , " Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 10 (1967), p. 370. ^ S i r I v o r J e n n i n g s , C a b i n e t Government (Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965), p. 2. 140 'BIBLIOGRAPHY Au c o i n , P e t e r and French, R i c h a r d . Knowledge, Power and P u b l i c P o l i c y . Ottawa: S c i e n c e C o u n c i l of Canada, I n f o r m a t i o n Canada, 1974. Bagehot, W a l t e r . 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" • Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 19 (1976): 1-7. Stewart, W a l t e r . Shrug, Trudeau i n Power. To r o n t o : New P r e s s , 1971. T r e a s u r y Board. O r g a n i z a t i o n of the Government of Canada. Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r , 1970. V e u i l l e u x , G e r a r d . " F e d e r a l - P r o v i n c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e l a t i o n s i n Canada." i n Bureaucracy i n Canadian Government e d i t e d by W.D.K. Kernaghan. T o r o n t o : Methuen, 1973. Ward, Norman. "The Changing Role of the P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e and the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e : A Commentary." Canadian P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 15 (1972): 375-377. W e s t e l l , Anthony. Paradox, Trudeau as Prime M i n i s t e r . Scarborough: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1972. 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