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Islamic resurgence and the stability of Malay non-elite support Robinson, Geoffrey 1982

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ISLAMIC RESURGENCE AND THE STABILITY OF MALAY NON-ELITE SUPPORT by GEOFFREY B. ROBINSON B.A. M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1978 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1982 Geoffrey B. Robinson In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date AUGUST 26, 1982. Abstract This study analyzes the p o l i t i c a l implications of the Islamic resurgence i n Malaysia. Based on a t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between non-elite support and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , i t examines the impact of Islam on the government's a b i l i t y to maintain the support of the Malay population. Contrary to much of the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on the subject, i t argues that the Islamic resurgence, at present, does not pose a serious threat to the s t a b i l i t y of Malay non-e l i t e support f o r the p o l i t i c a l leadership. It further argues that the maintenance of Malay support has, so f a r , been achieved without jeopardizing the s t a b i l i t y and legitimacy of the p o l i t i c a l system as a whole. The absence of p o l i t i c a l d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n under the influence of the Islamic resurgence i s explained, i n t h i s study, by reference to two r e l a t e d sets of f a c t o r s : (1) So c i e t a l Conditions; and (2) State P o l i c y . It i s suggested that the Islamic resurgence expresses s o c i a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l , and r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s , both between Malays and non-Malays, and within the Malay community. At present, the i n t r a -Malay cleavages form a multipolar rather than a b i p o l a r pattern, and i t i s argued that t h i s configuration tends to l i m i t the chances f o r the emergence of a strong, coherent Islamic opposition movement. Under the conditions of an external threat to Islam, the pattern could i i be expected to become l e s s fragmented and more p o l a r i z e d , thereby a f f o r d i n g a greater opportunity f o r the growth of such a movement. State p o l i c i e s have been e f f e c t i v e at undercutting the appeal of anti-government Is l a m i c groups and p a r t i e s - e s p e c i a l l y where these p o l i c i e s have r e i n f o r c e d the s o c i e t a l l i m i t a t i o n s on the emergence of an I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n . i i i Acknowledgements My foremost debt of g r a t i t u d e i s t o my t h e s i s committee, and e s p e c i a l l y to Diane Mauzy and Stephen M i l n e , f o r p r o v i d i n g the i n s p i r a -t i o n , c o n s t r u c t i v e advice and meticulous c r i t i c i s m without which t h i s study could never have been completed. I a l s o owe a s p e c i a l debt t o Pr o f e s s o r s M i l t o n B a m e t t ( C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y ) and C o l i n Abraham ( U n i v e r s i t i Sains M a l a y s i a ) , who f i r s t i n s p i r e d me to study M a l a y s i a , and to P r o f e s s o r Alexander Woodside., who changed my understanding o f Southeast A s i a , and of h i s t o r y , f o r the b e t t e r . I am indebted t o the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, the F a c u l t y o f Graduate S t u d i e s , and the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science, f o r p r o v i d i n g me w i t h the funds necessary to s u r v i v e while doing my r e s e a r c h . I would a l s o l i k e to acknowledge my g r a t i t u d e t o colleagues and pr o f e s s o r s i n the Department, f o r o f f e r i n g v a l u a b l e c r i t i c i s m s of e a r l i e r d r a f t s of t h i s t h e s i s , and f o r p r o v i d i n g the r i g o r o u s academic environment which made i t both a more c h a l l e n g i n g , and a more s a t i s f y i n g t h e s i s t o w r i t e . To Nancy Wong and P e t u l a M u l l e r I extend my s i n c e r e thanks and a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r e x e r c i s i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y on my b e h a l f , f o r p r o v i d i n g i n v a l u a b l e s t y l i s t i c a d v i c e , t y p i n g i n d e c i p h e r a b l e f o o t -notes, and not l e a s t f o r accommodating my o c c a s i o n a l e c c e n t r i c i t i e s . My thanks a l s o go to Mrs. Grace Cross f o r t y p i n g t h i s t h e s i s under the pressure o f an almost impossible d e a d l i n e . F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to express my deepest g r a t i t u d e t o my f a m i l y and t o my f r i e n d s i n M a l a y s i a and at home, who a l r e a d y know why they matter. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I I n t r o d u c t i o n CHAPTER I I Is l a m i c Resurgence i n Malaysia - Theory CHAPTER I I I Intra-Malay and I n t r a - I s l a m i c Cleavages CHAPTER IV Islam and State P o l i c y .. CHAPTER V Summary and Conclusions.. TABLES AND APPENDIX SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY v LIST OF TABLES Page TABLE 1: Breakdown of Seats Held by P a r t i e s i n Parliament a f t e r the E l e c t i o n s of 1974, 1978 and 1982. 131 TABLE 2: Percentage of V a l i d Vote and Seats Won, and Number of Seats Contested by Major P a r t i e s i n Parliamentary E l e c t i o n s of 1978 and 1982: Peninsular M alaysia. 132 TABLE 3: Parliamentary Seats Contested and Won by Major P a r t i e s i n 1978 and 1982 E l e c t i o n s : P e n i n s u l a r M a l a y s i a , Sabah and Sarawak. 133 TABLE 4: Comparison o f Seats Won by Major P a r t i e s i n the State E l e c t i o n s i n Pe n i n s u l a r M a l a y s i a , 1978 and 1982 -- by State. 134 TABLE 5: Comparison o f Parliamentary Seats Won i n Penin-s u l a r M a l aysia E l e c t i o n s , 1978 and 1982 --by S t a t e . 135 TABLE 6: Percentage of V a l i d Vote Won by PAS i n 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Contests. 136 TABLE 7: The Percentage of the Popular Vote P o l l e d by PAS i n Kedah Parliamentary and State E l e c t i o n s i n 1978 and 1982. 136 TABLE 8: The Seats Won and Contested, and the Percentage o f Parliamentary Popular Vote P o l l e d by PAS i n the Four Northern S t a t e s , (Compared to the Party's Performance N a t i o n a l l y ) . 137 v i LIST OF TABLES (Cont'd) Page TABLE 9: Breakdown by State of PAS' Percentage of the T o t a l V a l i d Parliamentary Vote f o r the 1982 E l e c t i o n s i n Pe n i n s u l a r Malaysia. 138 TABLE 10: Percentage of V a l i d Vote P o l l e d by Major P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and Independent Candidates, on a State B a s i s , i n the 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary E l e c t i o n s -- Pe n i n s u l a r Malaysia. 139 v i i CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION One consequence of the I r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n has been the sudden p r o l i f e r a t i o n of s c h o l a r l y s t u d i e s on the subject of 'Islamic Resur-gence'. * Much of t h i s work has focussed on the negative p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the resurgence, and i n p a r t i c u l a r on i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r weakening the l e g i t i m a c y and d i s r u p t i n g the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y of modernizing 'secular' regimes. M a l a y s i a , a s e c u l a r s t a t e w i t h a large 2 non-Muslim p o p u l a t i o n , and notable f o r i t s impressive rates o f economic growth, and i t s record of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , has not been spared 3 p e s s i m i s t i c p r e d i c t i o n s by some p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s t s . While students o f Malaysian p o l i t i c s have s c r u p u l o u s l y avoided f a c i l e comparisons with the I r a n i a n case, most have concluded that the Is l a m i c resurgence poses a strong p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t to the l e g i t i m a c y and s t a b i l i t y o f the system. This study seeks to challenge these co n c l u s i o n s , and to argue i n s t e a d t h a t , i n s p i t e of - and perhaps because of - the resurgence, Malaysian I s l a m i c movements, o r g a n i z a t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s do not c o n s t i t u t e a v i a b l e and coherent p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n to the present system, or to i t s leaders. I t f u r t h e r argues that government s t r a t e g i e s f o r coping w i t h the Is l a m i c challenge are e f f e c t i v e both at undermining the development o f such an Isla m i c o p p o s i t i o n , and at l i m i t i n g the d e s t a b i -l i z i n g e f f e c t s of the a c t i v i t i e s and demands of the more 'extremist^ Muslim groups. In reaching t h e i r more p e s s i m i s t i c c o n c l u s i o n s , scholars have 2 ge n e r a l l y followed one of two r e l a t e d l i n e s o f argument.'' Some have s t r e s s e d the danger o f heightened e t h n i c antagonism which could r e s u l t from the r e v i t a l i z a t i o n of what i s e f f e c t i v e l y the r e l i g i o n of the Malays. Others have emphasized the issues of intra-Malay cleavages and I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n , and the d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t which these might have on the government's a b i l i t y to maintain " s t a b l e n o n - e l i t e support" among Malays. While i t i s accepted that the Is l a m i c resurgence i n Malaysia i s a ma n i f e s t a t i o n of both i n t e r - e t h n i c (Malay vs. non-Malay) and i n t r a - e t h n i c (intra-Malay) d i v i s i o n s , i t i s , nonetheless, argued here t h a t , when viewed w i t h i n the broader context of Islam i n Malaysian p o l i t i c s , i t i s the d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the Malay-Muslim community which appear most s a l i e n t . Moreover, on the i s s u e of Islam, the acti o n s of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , i n recent years, s t r o n g l y suggest that i t i s not so much the problem o f eth n i c antagonism, but r a t h e r of a strong Malay-Muslim o p p o s i t i o n which i s o f most immediate concern to the government. Despite these f a c t s , there i s , to date, very l i t t l e evidence to suggest that the Malaysian p o l i t i c a l system, or i t s l e a d e r s , are i n serious jeopardy due to a d e c l i n e i n n o n - e l i t e support. Quite the contrary, recent f e d e r a l and s t a t e e l e c t i o n s ( A p r i l 22, 1982) returned the r u l i n g N a t i o n a l Front (NF) to power with an over-whelming m a j o r i t y i n seats and popular vote (see Table #1). Moreover the NF l i m i t e d the major I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n party (PAS) to 16.25% of the t o t a l v a l i d vote i n Parliamentary c o n t e s t s , and eroded i t s o v e r - a l l support i n the predominantly Malay northern s t a t e s of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and P e r l i s (see Table #8 and Table #9). These r e s u l t s were achieved 3 d e s p i t e "an economically u n s a t i s f a c t o r y c l i m a t e " , and i n the wake of a crackdown on the c i v i l s e r v i c e , and se v e r a l s t a t e s u b s i d i z e d e n t e r p r i s e s ; p o l i c i e s not c a l c u l a t e d to win the favour of Malay v o t e r s . In l i g h t o f these r e s u l t s , a major o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s study i s to e x p l a i n the absence of a serious weakening o f Malay n o n - e l i t e support f o r the N a t i o n a l Front, under the i n f l u e n c e of the ongoing I s l a m i c resurgence. In order to answer t h i s immediate que s t i o n , i t i s necessary to examine i n greater 7 d e t a i l one aspect of Mauzy's ' c o n s o c i a t i o n a l model' of Malaysian p o l i t i c s ; the i s s u e of " s t a b l e n o n - e l i t e support". Mauzy w r i t e s that while "over-arching e l i t e cooperation i s necessary i n order to form a c o n s o c i a t i o n a l - t y p e system, s t a b l e n o n - e l i t e support i s necessary f o r the s u c c e s s f u l f u n c t i o n i n g of that system'. These two components are not only of roughly equal importance, they are al s o c l o s e l y r e l a t e d i n t h e i r e f f e c t on the f u n c t i o n i n g of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m . The p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s must have s e c u r i t y , which the s t a b l e support of t h e i r f o l l o w e r s ensures, i n order to make compromises. At a minimum, the n o n - e l i t e s must ^ not work against the agreements reached by the e l i t e s . Thus, although UMNO leaders f r e q u e n t l y phrase t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s to the Is l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n i n terms o f the need f o r Malay u n i t y , i t i s c l e a r t h a t the party i s p r i m a r i l y concerned with preventing any s i z e a b l e l o s s of Malay support which would thereby weaken i t s c l a i m to primacy i n the Na t i o n a l Front c o a l i t i o n and which would make more d i f f i c u l t the p o l i t i c s of e l i t e cooperation. I t i s the steady dwindling of n o n - e l i t e support which i s f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d as a major reason f o r the breakdown of p o l i t i c a l order i n May, 1969;"^ S i m i l a r l y , many p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s t s see the w h i t t l i n g away of Malay support through I s l a m i c outbidding as the c h i e f 4 danger to the present system. Mauzy, f o r i n s t a n c e , argues that outbidding from the Malay s i d e i s "Umno's more important concern, because although the p a r t y wants e t h n i c accommodation, i t w i l l probably not s a c r i f i c e i t s dominance, which depends on a s o l i d Malay base, f o r the sake o f compromise with the non-Malays"."'"''' The f a c t o r s which may a f f e c t the s t a b i l i t y of n o n - e l i t e support may u s e f u l l y be grouped under two headings: (1) S o c i e t a l c o n d i t i o n s ; (2) State p o l i c y . The f a c t o r s i n both categories can be e i t h e r conducive of detr i m e n t a l to the maintenance of n o n - e l i t e support. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , however there i s a tendency i n the l i t e r a t u r e on the Is l a m i c resurgence i n Malaysia to s t r e s s the detri m e n t a l s o c i e t a l c o n d i t i o n s . The n a t u r a l c o r o l l a r y to such an emphasis i s the argument, al s o f r e q u e n t l y made, that the only r e s i s t a n c e to the t i d e of Isla m i c o p p o s i t i o n i s coming through the actions of the s t a t e . Those authors who are more p e s s i m i s t i c (Lyon and K e s s l e r f o r example), contend that i t i s not only s o c i e t a l c o n d i t i o n s which encourage Isl a m i c o p p o s i t i o n i n Mala y s i a , but that government p o l i c y i t s e l f i s exacerbating those condtions and th e r e f o r e hastening the c r i s i s o f l e g i t i m a c y . Few, i f any, authors have argued that s o c i e t a l c o n d i t i o n s serve to l i m i t the thr e a t of Isla m i c o p p o s i t i o n , while s t a t e p o l i c y p l a y s an e s s e n t i a l l y complementary r o l e . Part of the purpose of t h i s study i s to redress t h i s imbalance, by drawing a t t e n t i o n to those s o c i e t a l c o n d i t i o n s which, on the i s s u e of Islam, are conducive to s t a b l e Malay n o n - e l i t e support f o r the government, and by demonstrating the extent to which the success of government p o l i c y 5 i s d i r e c t l y dependent upon these c o n d i t i o n s . A general conclusion t o be reached i s that the r o l e of s t a t e p o l i c y i n preventing the growth of a strong I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n has been somewhat over-emphasized, and the s o c i e t a l l i m i t a t i o n s on such a development e q u a l l y under-emphasized. This i s not to argue that s t a t e p o l i c y i s , i n an absolute sense, l e s s important than s o c i e t a l f a c t o r s , but r a t h e r that because the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the former i s , i n many ways, dependent upon the l a t t e r , the r e l a t i v e importance of s t a t e p o l i c y and s o c i e t a l f a c t o r s f o r s t a b l e n o n - e l i t e support i s more roughly equal than most of the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e i m p l i e s . S o c i e t a l Conditions Mauzy, f o l l o w i n g L i j p h a r t , l i s t s s i x s o c i e t a l c o n d i t i o n s which 12 are h e l d to be favorable to c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m . Of these s i x , only three (small country s i z e , segmental i s o l a t i o n , and p r i o r t r a d i t i o n s of e l i t e accommodation) appear to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y operative i n the Malaysian context. Of these three only one (segmental i s o l a t i o n ) has any immediate relevance to the question of n o n - e l i t e support. According to Milne and Mauzy, segmental i s o l a t i o n has, under the i n f l u e n c e of the New Economic 13 P o l i c y (NEP), become l e s s pronounced. The weakening of segmental i s o l a -t i o n , because i t allows the e l i t e s of each ethnic group d i m i n i s h i n g degrees of autonomy, i s g e n e r a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d as being unfavorable to consocia-14 t i o n a l i s m . I t i s a l s o f r e q u e n t l y argued that i n c r e a s i n g contact between races ( i . e . d e c l i n i n g segmental i s o l a t i o n ) encourages the e r e c t i o n of 6 boundaries of ethnic group s o l i d a r i t y , which, although they may!have a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on the maintenance of n o n - e l i t e support i n the short run, u l t i m a t e l y lead to r a c i a l l y competitive s i t u a t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e to d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the c o n s o c i a t i o n a l s t y l e of p o l i t i c s , i n the longer term. Of more immediate relevance to t h i s study, however, are those s o c i e t a l c o n d i t i o n s which may j e o p a r d i z e s t a b l e n o n - e l i t e support among Malays, and i n that way d i s r u p t the c o n s o c i a t i o n a l system. These f a c t o r s i n c l u d e : (1) a d e c l i n e i n deference and/or unquestioning l o y a l t y to persons i n a u t h o r i t y , under the impact of outbidding and modernization;"*"^ ( i i ) the r e a c t i o n among i n t e l l e c t u a l s , students and the urban m i d d l e - c l a s s , to the a l l e g e d c o r r u p t i o n , immorality and inappropriateness of western-de r i v e d development goals and methods of government, and t h e i r p o s s i b l e f r u s t r a t i o n due to lack of access to e l i t e p o s i t i o n s commensurate with t h e i r t r a i n i n g ; " ^ ( i i i ) the widening of the gap between e l i t e s and non-e l i t e s w i t h i n Malay s o c i e t y , i n c l u d i n g the gap between r i c h and poor and 17 between urban and r u r a l d w e l l e r s . I t i s commonly argued that Islam has the p o t e n t i a l to i n t e n s i f y the s a l i e n c e of a l l of these issues and to m o b i l i z e Malays p o l i t i c a l l y i n 18 support of them. And indeed there are examples of Islam p r o v i d i n g the symbolic and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l base f o r the expression of these kinds of 19 p o l i t i c a l d i s a f f e c t i o n . Yet perhaps more s t r i k i n g has been the weakness and i s o l a t i o n of such challenges. Thus f a r Islam has not succeeded i n m o b i l i z i n g or b r i n g i n g p o l i t i c a l coherence to those s o c i e t a l f a c t o r s which are a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t to the government's base of n o n - e l i t e support. A p a r t i a l explanation of t h i s i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s can be found i n the abundant 7 l i t e r a t u r e on the p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of e t h n i c cleavages i n Malaysian s o c i e t y . Nagata has challenged some w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d perceptions of the 20 r o l e of e t h n i c i t y i n p o l i t i c s . The a t t r i b u t e s of e t h n i c i t y ( f o r example; race, language, r e l i g i o n ) , she argues, are not p r i m o r d i a l 'givens'. Rather, e t h n i c boundaries are f l e x i b l e and ever-changing; the s h i f t i n g e t h n i c d e f i n i t i o n and s e l e c t i v e use of a t t r i b u t e s f o r s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n o c c u r r i n g i n response to e x t e r n a l s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l pressures. The components of e t h n i c i t y which are o f t e n assumed to be 'givens', then, are b e t t e r understood as c h a r t e r s or symbols of ethnic i d e n t i t y , more or l e s s c o n s c i o u s l y s e l e c t e d by members of a s o c i a l group to 'shore-up' the boundaries of that group. Moreover, she argues, i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n a s o c i e t y w i l l " i d e n t i f y d i f f e r e n t l y according to the exigencies of the 22 s i t u a t i o n " . Thus, whereas i n the l a r g e r context of Malaysian s o c i e t y i n the 1960's, Malays may have d i s t i n g u i s h e d themselves through t h e i r language (Malay) or custom (ada t ) , w i t h i n a community where a l l were Malay speakers or adat f o l l o w e r s , other d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t r a i t s would be employed 23 to demarcate s o c i a l boundaries. In M a l a y s i a , such c h a r t e r s are more l i k e l y to be framed i n the idiom of e t h n i c i t y than the idiom of c l a s s , even where ' o b j e c t i v e l y ' c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n s do e x i s t . Syed Husin A l i , and J.T. P u r c a l among others concur with Nagata's dictum that "most Malays show l i t t l e awareness of 24 c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n s i n the western sense of the term". I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i n s i t u a t i o n s where the p o p u l a t i o n i s almost t o t a l l y Malay, and where the v i s i b i l i t y of i n t r a - e t h n i c i n e q u a l i t y or e x p l o i t a t i o n i s most pronounced, 8 Malays of d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l (sometimes c l a s s ) groups w i l l use sub-ethnic e p i t h e t s to "minimize the d i v i s i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s of i n t r a - e t h n i c e x p l o i t a -25 t i o n " . In Kelantan, where the near absence of non-Malays makes i t impossible to express class-based sentiments i n e t h n i c terms ( i . e . Malays vs. non-Malays), K e s s l e r argues that intra-Malay cleavages have t r a d i -26 t i o n a l l y been expressed i n the idiom of r e l i g i o n . The argument i n t h i s study i s that Islam has become a marker of i n t r a - M a l a y d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , which expresses perceived s o c i a l boundaries, but which does not jeopardize the u n i t y and i d e n t i t y of the l a r g e r Malay community v i s a v i s Malaysian s o c i e t y as a whole. Nagata r e f e r s to t h i s t e n s i o n between Malay u n i t y and Intra-Malay d i v i s i o n s i n terms of the need: to express status d i s t i n c t i o n s i n the form of e t h n i c (here r e l i g i o u s ) d i f f e r e n c e s , thus avoiding the knotty question of i n t r a - e t h n i c s u b o r d i n a t i o n and i n e q u a l i t y . Thus the u n i t y of the ethnic group, and i t s status-honour system i s preserved.27 For Malays, both kinds of d i s t i n c t i o n s are r e l e v a n t , but the t r e n d , since 2 8 1971, toward Malay hegemony and p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y , has made somewhat l e s s urgent the need to defend the boundaries of 'Malayness' except perhaps at e l e c t i o n time. M. Banton w r i t e s of the luxury of an e t h n i c group's i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n as f o l l o w s : . . . d i f f e r e n t e t h n i c groups can a f f o r d to d i v i d e i n t e r n a l l y because the o v e r - r i d i n g o p p o s i t i o n between groups w i l l b r i n g members back i n t o s o l i d a r i t y i n any c o n f l i c t touching t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s . 2 9 Under a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o Malay r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s or p o l i t i c a l power, i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s w i l l most l i k e l y be minimized and the emotive power 9 of Islam w i l l p l a y an important r o l e i n f o r g i n g t h i s u n i t y . Yet even during such times of c r i s i s , d i f f e r e n c e s can be expressed, and f o r the l a r g e r e t h n i c group, most s a f e l y expressed through the idiom of Islam or some other a t t r i b u t e which i s unique t o the Malay community. The present I s l a m i c resurgence r e f l e c t s and f u r t h e r c o n t r i b u t e s t o d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the Malay-Muslim community, but these d i f f e r e n c e s describe a m u l t i p o l a r or fragmented c o n f i g u r a t i o n , r a t h e r than a b i p o l a r one of government versus o p p o s i t i o n . The reasons f o r , and the p r e c i s e character of t h i s m u l t i p o l a r i t y w i l l be discussed i n d e t a i l i n Chapter I I I , but f o r now i t i s worth n o t i n g that i t i s t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n , perhaps more than any other s i n g l e f a c t o r , which i n h i b i t s the formation of a coherent and v i a b l e Islamic-based o p p o s i t i o n . In a d d i t i o n to these s o c i o l o g i c a l explanations f o r the f a i l u r e of I s l a m i c groups to m o b i l i z e a strong challenge to the Malay e l i t e , there are two more e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l i ssues which bear on the subject. R. K. V a s i l , i n P o l i t i c s i n a P l u r a l S o c i e t y , has examined the problems 30 i n v o l v e d i n forming an o p p o s i t i o n f r o n t based on a non-communal ideology. Some of the problems i n v o l v e d i n forming an o p p o s i t i o n comprised of Malays and non-Malays are d i f f e r e n t from those l i k e l y to be encountered by an Islamic-based o p p o s i t i o n . Most no t a b l y , a Malay I s l a m i c movement can tap the more powerful and p o l i t i c a l l y s a l i e n t emotive bases of race and r e l i g i o n . The ideas of c l a s s and non-communalism, employed by the p a r t i e s s t u d i e d by V a s i l simply do not have the same p o l i t i c a l appeal i n the Malaysian context. Nonetheless, V a s i l ' s f i n d i n g s do shed an informative l i g h t on the problems inherent i n forming any o p p o s i t i o n f r o n t i n the 10 Malaysian p o l i t i c a l system. In p a r t i c u l a r , V a s i l noted the tendency f o r these movements to fragment over one or a l l of the f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : d i f f e r e n c e s i n the background and p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t leaders i n v o l v e d ; d i f f e r e n c e s i n bases of support, and i n the p o l i c y options appropriate to winning each base; d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n each of the component groups; matters of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l / i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n and use of resources. With regard to the p o t e n t i a l f o r an Isla m i c o p p o s i t i o n , then, i t would be u s e f u l to ask the f o l l o w i n g questions. F i r s t , how compatible, p o l i t i c a l l y , are the v a r i o u s I s l a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the country - t h e i r s o c i a l o r i g i n s , s o c i a l bases, t h e i r g o a l s , s t y l e s and p o l i t i c a l - r e l i g i o u s o r i e n t a t i o n s - and how i s t h i s l i k e l y to a f f e c t t h e i r c a p a c i t y f o r coherent and c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n ? Second, how c o n s i s -tent w i t h the various demands, symbols and i n t e r e s t s of the d i f f e r e n t I s l a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s , are the other s a l i e n t issues i n Malay p o l i t i c s ? For i n s t a n c e , i s i t reasonable to expect Isl a m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s to form the b a s i s of p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r land-hungry peasants? With the s o c i o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the f u n c t i o n of Islam i n Malay s o c i e t y as a backdrop, these two questions w i l l be the more immediate focus of t h i s study, and p a r t i c u l a r l y of Chapter I I I . State P o l i c y Mauzy's model of Malaysian p o l i t i c s h i g h l i g h t s four government s t r a t e g i e s f o r r e t a i n i n g and i n c r e a s i n g popular support: (1) the co-optation of o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s i n t o the r u l i n g N a t i o n a l Front c o a l i t i o n : (2) the l i m i t a t i o n of open p o l i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n to minimize the opportunity f o r 11 outbidding by the o p p o s i t i o n ; (3) the r e l i a n c e on government economic " e f f e c t i v e n e s s " to combat the problem of l o s s of l e g i t i m a c y due to #(2); (4) the government's "determined and u n r e l e n t i n g " expounding of i t s message of the need f o r e t h n i c harmony, cooperation and u n i t y , as embodied 31 i n the N a t i o n a l Front c o a l i t i o n . The s t r a t e g i e s p r e s e n t l y employed by the leadership to combat the I s l a m i c 'challenge' f a l l roughly i n t o these fo u r c a t e g o r i e s , which, f o r the sake of s i m p l i c i t y can be l i s t e d as f o l l o w s : (1) c o - o p t a t i v e ; (2) c o e r c i v e ; (3) d i v e r s i v e ; (4) i n f o r m a t i v e -promotional . What i s most notable i n the government's approach to Islam i s i t s i n c r e a s i n g r e l i a n c e on c o - o p t a t i v e , d i v e r s i v e and i n f o r m a t i v e , as opposed to coercive t a c t i c s . This r e f l e c t s the high degree of autonomy and f l e x i b i l i t y , ( v i s a v i s the other e t h n i c groups and t h e i r e l i t e s ) a v a i l a b l e 32 to Malay p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s i n d e a l i n g w i t h the problem. In other r e s p e c t s , the government s t r a t e g y on the i s s u e of I s l a m i c resurgence i s not markedly d i f f e r e n t from the approach o u t l i n e d by Mauzy. Given t h i s consistency i n s t r a t e g y , from is s u e to i s s u e , a question which might w e l l be asked i s , to what extent i s the absence of a serious weakening of Malay n o n - e l i t e support a f u n c t i o n of the conscious p o l i c i e s of the government, as opposed to being a consequence of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s on the coherence and s a l i e n c e of an Islamic-based o p p o s i t i o n movement? St r u c t u r e of the Study The remainder of t h i s study i s d i v i d e d i n t o four chapters. Chapter I I 12 provides a d i s c u s s i o n and a general c r i t i q u e of the e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on the subject of Isla m i c resurgence. In a d d i t i o n to i n t r o d u c i n g the main concepts and arguments r e l e v a n t to the study of Islam and p o l i t i c s i n M a l a y s i a , i t attempts to i d e n t i f y the assumptions which have l e d many authors to p r e d i c t a weakening of Malay support f o r the government. Chapter I I I examines i n some d e t a i l the d i v i s i o n s which e x i s t w i t h i n Malaysian Islam, and suggests t h a t these d i v i s i o n s r e f l e c t deeper s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l cleavages. This chapter a l s o discusses the c o m p a t i b i l i t y of Islam w i t h other s a l i e n t p o l i t i c a l i ssues i n the Malay community, and concludes t h a t , i n the absence of a serious t h r e a t to the Malay community as a whole, the chances f o r the emergence of a u n i t e d I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n f r o n t are very s l i m . The f o u r t h chapter begins with a b r i e f h i s t o r y of Mosque-State r e l a t i o n s i n Ma l a y s i a , then goes on to describe and analyse the s t r a t e g i e s employed by the government to cope with the challenge o f the I s l a m i c resurgence. The conclusion from t h i s chapter i s that s t a t e p o l i c y w i t h regard to Islam i s only e f f e c t i v e when i t complements the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s on the formation of an Is l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n . The f i n a l chapter w i l l b r i e f l y summarize the major f i n d i n g s o f the study, and w i l l suggest t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a i s e d i n t h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter. 13 FOOTNOTES Chapter I 1. The terms I s l a m i c resurgence, Is l a m i c fundamentalism, I s l a m i c r e v i v a l and I s l a m i c r e v i t a l i z a t i o n are used more or l e s s synonymously i n the l i t e r a t u r e . The f i r s t i s used here simply as a matter of preference. I t should be noted that the I s l a m i c resurgence of the l a t e 1970's i s not the f i r s t of i t s k i n d , e i t h e r i n Malaysia or elsewhere. 2. Gordon P. Means, " P u b l i c P o l i c y Toward R e l i g i o n i n M a l a y s i a , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 51(3) ( F a l l 1978), pp. 386-405. Means, p. 402, provides the f o l l o w i n g breakdown of r e l i g i o u s groups i n Malaysia: Muslims 46.9% Buddhist/Confucian/Taoist 32.1% Hindu 8.8% C h r i s t i a n 3.9% Animist 4.5% Other and Unknown 3.8% I t should be noted here that the focus of t h i s study i s P e n i n s u l a r M a l a y s i a . 3. See, f o r example, Gordon P. Means, " P u b l i c P o l i c y Toward R e l i g i o n i n Malaysia"; J u d i t h A. Nagata, " R e l i g i o u s Ideology and S o c i a l Change: The I s l a m i c R e v i v a l i n M a l a y s i a , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 53(3) ( F a l l 1980) pp. 405-439; N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", Chapter 9 i n The P o l i t i c s of  I s l a m i c R e a s s e r t i o n , Mohammed Ayoob (ed.) (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 165-189; Fred R. von der Mehden, "The I s l a m i c Resurgence i n M a l a y s i a , " i n Islam and Development, J . L. E s p o s i t o (ed.) (Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980), pp. 163-180; Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement i n M a l a y s i a , " Review of Indonesian and Malayan A f f a i r s 12(2) (December 1979), pp. 34-45; C l i v e S. K e s s l e r , "Malaysia: I s l a m i c R e v i v a l and P o l i t i c a l D i s a f f e c t i o n i n a Divided S o c i e t y , " Southeast  A s i a C h r o n i c l e , no. 75 (October 1980), pp. 3-10; D e n z i l P e i r i s , "The Green R e v o l u t i o n , " Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979, pp. 26-27. The focus on the p o l i t i c a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t s of Islam, found i n these works has probably come as a r e s u l t of e x t r a -p o l a t i o n from the case of I r a n . Von der Mehden, ("The I s l a m i c Resurgence i n Malaysia") provides a b r i e f a n a l y s i s of the d i f f e r e n c e s between the Malaysian and the I r a n i a n cases, but the t h e o r e t i c a l focus remains i n most works on the i s s u e of I s l a m i c resurgence. Another reason f o r the emphasis on the p o l i t i c a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t s of Islam l i e s i n the character of the r e l i g i o n i t s e l f . G. H. Jansen, M i l i t a n t Islam, (New York: Harper § Row, 1979), w r i t e s t h a t : "Islam i s not a r e l i g i o n i n the common, d i s t o r t e d meaning of the word, c o n f i n i n g i t s e l f to the p r i v a t e l i f e of man. I t i s a complete way of l i f e , c a t e r i n g f o r a l l the f i e l d s of human e x i s t e n c e " , p. 17. The 14 p o l i t i c a l concern of Islam i s q u i t e e x p l i c i t , and i n i t s most overt expression t h i s concern takes the form of j i h a d : "the duty of b e l i e v e r s to s t r u g g l e to b r i n g i n t o being, and maintain a p e r f e c t community, a j u s t s o c i e t y , by armed i n s u r r e c t i o n , j ihad of the sword...or by the j ihad of the h e a r t , tongue and hand", Thomas Hodgkin, "The Revolutionary T r a d i t i o n i n Islam," Race and Class XXI (3) (1979)'p. 234. Jansen, M i l i t a n t Islam, .p.142), w r i t e s t h a t : " I t wouldbe p o s i t i v e l y un-Islamic f o r the p r o f e s s i o n a l men of r e l i g i o n i n Islam not to take an i n t e r e s t and an a c t i v e part i n p o l i t i c s , f o r that would mean that they are i n d i f f e r e n t to the f a t e of the umma..." For Malaysia's economic performance, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 A p r i l 1981, pp. 70-75. 4. There are numerous d e f i n i t i o n s o f l e g i t i m a c y which vary only s l i g h t l y . Mauzy's d e f i n i t i o n i s one of the most s u c c i n c t ; "...the acknowledge-ment of the r i g h t of a government to govern, or of a p o l i t i c a l system to e x i s t . " Diane K. Mauzy, Co n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m and C o a l i t i o n P o l i t i c s  i n M a l a y s i a , (Ph.D. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1978), p. 15. 5. Those who emphasize i n t e r - e t h n i c r e l a t i o n s i n c l u d e Gordon P. Means, " P u b l i c P o l i c y Toward R e l i g i o n i n M a l a y s i a " ; J u d i t h A. Nagata, " R e l i g i o u s Ideology and S o c i a l Change..."; N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", Chapter 9 i n M. Ayoob (ed.), The P o l i t i c s of I s l a m i c Reassertion; F. von der Mehden, "The I s l a m i c Resurgence i n Malaysia". Those s t r e s s i n g intra-Malay d i v i s o n s i n c l u d e C l i v e S. K e s s l e r . "Malaysia; I s l a m i c R e v i v a l and P o l i t i c a l D i s a f f e c t i o n . . . " ; Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement i n M a l a y s i a ; D e n z i l P e i r i s , "The Green Revolution". Both schools of thought are discussed more thoroughly i n Chapter I I . 6. Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 March 1982, p. 10. 7. Mauzy's c o n s o c i a t i o n a l 'model' which i s an adaptation of L i p h a r t ' s t h e o r i e s of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i s thoroughly developed and discussed i n Diane K. Mauzy, Co n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , e s p e c i a l l y Chapters 1 and 6. 8. Diane K. Mauzy, Co n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , p. 374. 9. I b i d . , p. 376. 10. Goh Cheng Teik, The May T h i r t e e n t h Incident and Democracy i n M a l a y s i a , (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), pp. 9-18. For a good summary and a n a l y s i s of the 1969 c r i s i s see Diane K. Mauzy, Con s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , pp. 138-44, 378, 303. Also see The May 13th  Tragedy,Report by the N a t i o n a l Operations C o u n c i l , Kuala Lumpur, October 9, 1969. 11. Diane K. Mauzy, C o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , p. 417. 15 12. I b i d . , p. 26. 13. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n M a l a y s i a , (Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1980), p. 348. 14. Diane K. Mauzy, Co n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , pp. 305-06. 15. I b i d . , p. 407. A l s o , on t h i s subject Musa i s quoted as saying "The development p o l i c i e s and programs e s p e c i a l l y i n the education f i e l d have l i b e r a t e d the masses from the chains of unquestioned loyalty.", i b i d . , p. 415, f n . For other analyses of the question of deference and l o y a l t y i n Malay c u l t u r e see Syed Hussein A l a t a s , "Fedualism i n Malay S o c i e t y : A study i n H i s t o r i c a l C o n t i n u i t y " , C i v i l i s a t i o n s XVIII (4) pp. 579-91; Chandra Muzaffar, P r o t e c t o r ? An A n a l y s i s  of the Concept and P r a c t i c e of L o y a l t y i n Leader-Led R e l a t i o n s h i p s  Within Malay S o c i e t y (Pulau Pinang: A l i r a n Press, 1979); and Syed Husin A l i , Malay Peasant S o c i e t y and Leadership (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975). 16. This f r u s t r a t i o n and anti-westernism i s not due only to Islam. I t i s a l s o based on an i n t e l l e c t u a l r e j e c t i o n o f western methods which have e i t h e r proven wanting, or which are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h an unpopular p o l i t i c a l regime. A s i m i l a r r e a c t i o n has occurred i n Indonesia. 17. Numerous studies deal w i t h the issue of ' c l a s s ' d i s t i n c t i o n s . I t i s g e n e r a l l y argued that while ' o b j e c t i v e ' c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n s do e x i s t w i t h i n Malay s o c i e t y , no ' s u b j e c t i v e ' c l a s s consciousness has emerged. There are v a r y i n g opinions on whether t h i s p a t t e r n makes cl a s s an important i s s u e to study. See J u d i t h A. Nagata, P l u r a l i s m  i n M a l a y s i a : Myth and R e a l i t y , V o l . 7, C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o Asian Studies (Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1975), esp. c o n t r i b u t i o n s by J . A. Nagata, pp. 113-36, and J . T. P u r c a l , pp. 65-78. 18. Chandra Muzaffar, ( P r o t e c t o r ? , p. 140.), w r i t e s : "The educated unemployed,the o c c u p a t i o n a l l y stagnant and others who, f o r a v a r i e t y of reasons, are d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the present order of things could w e l l j o i n forces w i t h e x i s t i n g I s l a m i c Youth Groups and coalesce i n t o a powerful movement under an I s l a m i c banner." In the t h e o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e on I s l a m i c resurgence, a s i m i l a r argument i s f r e q u e n t l y made; see Chapters 2 and 3. 19. Kelantan i s the obvious example, but i t i s not e a s i l y g e n e r a l i z a b l e to apply to Malaysia as a whole. For a f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of the importance of Islam i n the v i c t o r y of PAS i n 1959 i n Kelantan, see C l i v e S. K e s s l e r , Islam and P o l i t i c s i n a Malay State: Kelantan 1838-1969 (Ithaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978). Also see f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapters 3 and 4, below. 20. J u d i t h A. Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic: Perspectives From a P o l y e t h n i c  S o c i e t y (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1979), passim. Nagata i s c r i t i c a l of 16 that school of thought which she c a l l s the ' p r i m o r d i a l i s t s ' , p. 189. 21. J u d i t h A. Nagata, P l u r a l i s m i n M a l a y s i a , I n t r o d u c t i o n , p. 3, and Malaysian Mosaic, p. 201, 22. I b i d . , p. 3. I n t e r e s t i n g l y , Nagata notes elsewhere that r e l i g i o n i s one of the l e a s t o b v i o u s l y ' p r i m o r d i a l ' of a l l the s o - c a l l e d p r i m o r d i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , Malaysian Mosaic, p. 194. 23. Nagata notes that Malaysia's orang a s l i , tend to employ s o c i a l markers which are relevant to i n t e r n a l competition, r a t h e r than t o the zero-sum competition w i t h i n the Malaysian s t a t e context, P l u r a l i s m i n  M a l a y s i a , I n t r o d u c t i o n , p. 4. 24. J u d i t h A. Nagata, "Perceptions of S o c i a l I n e q u a l i t y i n M a l a y s i a " , i n P l u r a l i s m i n M a l a y s i a , p. 126. 25. I b i d . , p. 127. 26. G l i v e S. K e s s l e r , R e l i g i o n and P o l i t i c s i n a Malay S t a t e , Chapter 12. For more t h e o r e c t i c a l i n s i g h t s i n t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c l a s s and e t h n i c i t y , see Malcolm Cross, "On C o n f l i c t , Race Re l a t i o n s and the Theory of the P l u r a l S o c i e t y , " Race XII (4) ( A p r i l 1971) pp. 477-92. A Sivanandam, "Race, Class and Power: An O u t l i n e f o r Study," Race XIV (4) ( A p r i l 1973) pp. 384-92. On e t h n i c i t y and c l a s s i n M a l a y s i a , see Michael Stenson, "Class and Race i n West M a l a y s i a , " B u l l e t i n o f Concerned Asian Scholars 8 (2) (1976), pp. 45-54. 27. J u d i t h A. Nagata, "Perceptions of S o c i a l I n e q u a l i t y " , p. 129. 28. R. S. M i l n e , P o l i t i c s o f E t h n i c a l l y B i p o l a r S t a t e s : Guyana, Mal a y s i a , F i j i (Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1981), pp. 207-08. 29. Michael Banton, Race Re l a t i o n s (London:Travistock P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1 1967), p. 288, c i t e d by Diane K. Mauzy, C o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , p. 11, f n . 25. 30. R. K. V a s i l , P o l i t i c s i n a P l u r a l S o c i e t y : A Study of Non-Communal  P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s i n West Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971), esp. pp. 183-221. 31. Diane K, Mauzy, Co n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m , pp. 16, 417-18, and passim. 32. The autonomy of Malay p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s i n t h i s regard does not imply that non-Malays and non Malay e l i t e s are unconcerned about .the process, of ' I s l a m i z a t i o n ' of the country, but r a t h e r that they are unable and u n w i l l i n g to express t h e i r f e a r s openly and s u c c i n c t l y . I t i s not c l e a r that non-Malay r e t i c e n c e w i l l continue as the UMNO e l i t e s move i n the d i r e c t i o n of an I s l a m i c s t a t e and/or non-zero sum I s l a m i c p o l i c i e s , but i t i s s t i l l too e a r l y to a n t i c i p a t e the long term move-ments of Malay or non-Malay p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s . 17 CHAPTER I I : ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN MALAYSIA - THEORY Although the small e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on the Is l a m i c resurgence i n M a l aysia does not deal e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the question of i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the p o l i t i c a l system, most authors do engage i n some ' p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s ' . T h e i r arguments can f r u i t f u l l y be grouped i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s . F i r s t , there are those arguments which s t r e s s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Isl a m i c resurgence and i n t e r - e t h n i c relations.''' The s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l o r i g i n s of the movement are viewed p r i m a r i l y i n terms of on-going tensions between Malays and non-Malays, and i t i s the p o t e n t i a l f o r causing an increase i n e t h n i c antagonism and p o l i t i c a l d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n , which i s seen as the most s a l i e n t p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n of the I s l a m i c resurgence. The second category comprises those arguments which focus on d i v i s i o n s 2 w i t h i n the Malay community. The p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the Is l a m i c resurgence, f o r these authors, l i e s i n i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r undermining the l e g i t i m a c y of the s e c u l a r Malay e l i t e s , (UMNO) and thereby t h r e a t e n i n g the s t a b i l i t y of the system. Before proceeding with the c r i t i c i s m of these two schools of thought, one po i n t should be made a b s o l u t e l y c l e a r . The l i n e between the two types of cleavage ( i n t r a - e t h n i c and i n t e r - e t h n i c ) must not be too h a r s h l y drawn. I t i s e n t i r e l y p o s s i b l e that d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the Malay community, f o r example, have a r i s e n as a consequence of a challenge from without, which has t r i g g e r e d a debate over the best way to achieve Malay u n i t y or development. Indeed, many r e l i g i o u s schisms have re s o l v e d around p r e c i s e l y these issues of how best to p r o t e c t , u n i f y and promote the f a i t h . Moreover, 18 a l a r g e number of such schisms, e s p e c i a l l y i n the I s l a m i c world, have 3 come about under a challenge from without. The great Middle-Eastern reformers, A l - A f g h a n i , Abduh and Rida, f o r example, were p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about the v i a b i l i t y of I s l a m i c t h i n k i n g and s o c i e t y , i n the face of western p o s i t i v e science and t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y . In Indonesia, Reform Islam came as a response, i n p a r t , to the d i r e c t challenge posed by C h r i s t i a n missionary a c t i v i t y . In both cases, the e x t e r n a l challenge l e d to i n n o v a t i o n , but i t a l s o l e d to d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the I s l a m i c community. In the d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s , then, i t i s important to bear i n mind that the d i s t i n c t i o n between i n t r a - and i n t e r - e t h n i c ( r e l i g i o u s ) cleavages i s made to i n d i c a t e d i f f e r e n c e s i n emphasis i n the two schools of thought, not to suggest t h a t they are t r e a t e d by these schools as mutually e x c l u s i v e . Nonetheless, t h i s chapter suggests t h a t both approaches have important weaknesses; the f i r s t - which s t r e s s e s i n t e r - e t h n i c cleavages -because i t over-emphasizes the homogeneity of Malay s o c i e t y and the u n i t y of Malaysian Islam, and the second - which stresses i n t r a - e t h n i c cleavages -because i t c h a r a c t e r i z e s Malay s o c i e t y and Malaysian Islam as p o l i t i c a l l y p o l a r i z e d (government versus o p p o s i t i o n ) . The arguments i n both c a t e g o r i e s , although f o l l o w i n g d i f f e r e n t l i n e s of reasoning, tend to support the same co n c l u s i o n ; that the I s l a m i c resurgence i n Malaysia poses a strong p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t to the l e g i t i m a c y and s t a b i l i t y of the c o n s o c i a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l system. In a d d i t i o n to the evidence from the recent e l e c t i o n s , i n d i c a t o r s from the n o n - e l e c t o r a l sphere suggest that t h i s c onclusion i s somewhat o f f the mark. Malays continue to show a strong l a t e n t respect f o r e l i t e s , and according to Nagata, assign 19 a part icularly high status to Malays who have achieved success in the 4 f ie lds of education and business. This is a promising sign for the new, more technocratic, Mahathir-Musa UMNO leadership. Incidents such as land-grabbing, r iot ing or s tr iking do not yet appear to be rooted in a general sense of class antagonism."' They seem, rather, to be examples of isolated responses to local or personal injustices . Even within the UMNO leadership, norms of deference and loyalty have not been seriously challenged. The elections for vice- and deputy-presidents of the party, at the 1981 annual assembly, once again provided evidence of the need to play by these rules, in order to get ahead. Datuk Musa Hitam managed to defeat Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah in the contest for the deputy presidency, and he was no doubt aided in this by having been subtly endorsed by president-designate Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad Iskandar, and by having gained the reputation as a man who would not "jump the queue" on his way to the top.^ In short, support for UMNO among Malays, and the autonomy of Malay eli tes within the National Front, seems to be as great now as at any time since Merdeka. The c r i t i c ism which follows then, seeks to locate the deficiencies in those arguments which predict de-legitimation, ethnic antagonism and destabilization as a consequence of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. The argument to be made is that the more pessimistic conclusions derive from a less than complete understanding of either or both of the following: (1) the character and complexity of intra-Malay and intra-Islamic cleavages; (2) the f l e x i b i l i t y of the state in coping with the p o l i t i c a l challenge from diverse Islamic groups and organizations, 20 without s e r i o u s l y a l i e n a t i n g s e c u l a r Malay and non-Malay support. I s l a m i c Resurgence and Communal Tensions The l i t e r a t u r e which emphasizes the i n t e r - e t h n i c s i g n i f i c a n c e of the I s l a m i c resurgence appears to be s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by e a r l i e r s tudies concerning the r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l i g i o n and p o l i t i c s i n Malaysia. In keeping with the t r a d i t i o n a l emphasis on the p o l i t i c a l s a l i e n c e of e t h n i c cleavages i n M a l a y s i a , both s t r e s s the overlap of Muslim and Malay i d e n t i t y , and the i m p l i c a t i o n s which t h i s has f o r ethnic r e l a t i o n s . Means, f o r i n s t a n c e , w r i t e s t h a t r e l i g i o u s issues are "a byproduct of t h i s more 7 b a s i c (ethnic) p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t " . Moreover, he argues that Islam has encouraged p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n and modernization among Malays, and has thereby begun to break down the p a r o c h i a l l o y a l t i e s w i t h i n Malay s o c i e t y . The c h i e f danger, according to Means, l i e s i n the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the g government's p r o - I s l a m i c p o l i c i e s w i l l a l i e n a t e the non-Muslim community. A s i m i l a r emphasis on the s a l i e n c e of Islam as a c h a r t e r of Malay ethnic s o l i d a r i t y i s found i n more recent works on I s l a m i c resurgence. Funston (1981), f o r i n s t a n c e , draws a t t e n t i o n to the strong h i s t o r i c a l tendency i n Malaysia toward the use of I s l a m i c symbols i n e f f o r t s to e s t a b l i s h Malay hegemony and u n i t y . The most important cause of the present resurgence, f o r Funston, was the May 13th tragedy, because that event boosted Malay communalism and encouraged a more a c t i v i s t government r o l e i n I s l a m i c a f f a i r s , as part of the l a r g e r e f f o r t to shore up Malay u n i t y 9 and hegemony. Ac c o r d i n g l y the most important p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n of the resurgence, i n Funston's view, i s the "heightening of communalism among 21 Malaysia's r a c i a l l y d i v i d e d p o p u l a t i o n " . Nagata (1980), a l s o emphasizes the s a l i e n c e of Islam as a c h a r t e r of e t h n i c i d e n t i t y , but she sees t h i s as a f a i r l y recent phenomenon: Whereas the e a r l i e r issues focussed on the Malay language and Malay r i g h t s , m o b i l i z a t i o n i s now achieved through r e l i g i o n . The slogan bahasa j i w a bangsa (language i s the s o u l of the peop l e ) , has become bangsa dan agama ( r e l i g i o n and r a c e ) . H The s h i f t to r e l i g i o n as c h a r t e r , she argues, i s the r e s u l t of the e r o s i o n , w i t h modernization and the c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n of p o l i t i c s since 1971, of the e a r l i e r elements of Malayness - language and adat - thus l e a v i n g Islam 12 as the "one e f f e c t i v e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e " . Modernization, or more p a r t i c u l a r l y the NEP, has had the e f f e c t of "reducing the economic and occupational gap between Malays and non-Malays (and) has al s o d i s p l a c e d 13 some of the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s o f the o l d s o c i a l boundaries..." . Moreover, government language and education p o l i c i e s have encouraged the widespread use o f the Malay language by non-Malays, thereby eroding i t s d i s t i n c t i v e -ness as a symbol o f Malay i d e n t i t y . In b r i e f , Nagata claims t h a t the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the Isla m i c resurgence l i e s i n the f a c t that the d i s t i n c -t i o n between Muslim and non-Muslim i s e s s e n t i a l l y a new "code" to describe the Malay - non-Malay s o c i a l boundary. The p o l i t i c a l consequence of the r e l i g i o u s resurgence, she concludes, i s that " e t h n i c / r e l i g i o u s p o l a r i z a t i o n 14 appears to be sharpening", as intr a - M a l a y s o l i d a r i t y i s promoted. Von der Mehden, l i k e Funston and Nagata, s t r e s s e s the c l o s e r e l a t i o n -15 ship between r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y , but he i s more f i r m i n the b e l i e f that the I s l a m i c resurgence i s e s s e n t i a l l y an " a c c e l e r a t i o n of an o l d trend " ; s p e c i f i c a l l y , the use of r e l i g i o u s symbols, and " I s l a m i c r h e t o r i c " 22 as v e h i c l e s f o r Malay s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l demands. Although he l i s t s three d i f f e r e n t types o f Malaysian dakwah groups and b r i e f l y mentions f a c t i o n a l s p l i t s over I s l a m i c issues i n UMNO and PAS, i t seems c l e a r from h i s d i s c u s s i o n g e n e r a l l y that he does not regard i n t r a - I s l a m i c (or intra-Malay) d i f f e r e n c e to be of primary s i g n i f i c a n c e . For i n s t a n c e , he w r i t e s , r a t h e r u n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g l y of: a r i t u a l i s t i c and somewhat t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e toward Islam which i s to be found i n the Malay community, which when combined with the i n t e g r a t e d s o c i a l concept of the Malay Muslim has helped to develop a somewhat ^ homogenous r e l i g i o u s p a t t e r n among the Malay Muslims. Thus, despite h i s awareness o f d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n Malaysian Islam, von der Mehden sees the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the Is l a m i c resurgence p r i m a r i l y i n e t h n i c terms. On the iss u e o f khalwat, and the movement to make the r u l i n g a p p l i c a b l e to non-Muslims, he w r i t e s t h a t , " t h i s e f f o r t i s looked upon by many non-Muslims as a s i g n o f increased I s l a m i c chauvinism and 18 a danger to the previous p o l i t i c s of accommodation". While i t may come as no s u r p r i s e that non-Muslims should react i n t h i s way, von der Mehden provides no evidence whatsoever that t h i s i s i n f a c t the case. Nor does he s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e s t a b l i s h that the khalwat i s s u e , or the des e c r a t i o n of Hindu s h r i n e s , c o n s t i t u t e the most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of the phenomenon of I s l a m i c resurgence i n Malaysia. But i t i s on these issues that he concentrates i n drawing the co n c l u s i o n that the p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of 19 the resurgence i s that the " p o l i t i c s of accommodation may be s o r e l y t r i e d " . The a c t i o n s and demands of extremists groups, to be sure, do cause some problems f o r the government i n t h i s regard, but these groups c o n s t i t u t e only a small fragment of the l a r g e r movement known as the Is l a m i c resurgence. 23 Thus, while as far as this fragment is concerned, inter-ethnic considera-tions are highly salient, i t is misleading to characterize 'the Islamic resurgence', as a whole, as a movement which is l i k e l y to disrupt the p o l i t i c s of accommodation between ethnic groups. More generally, the most serious cr i t ic ism which can be made of Funston (1981), Nagata (1980) and von der Mehden is that they f a i l to provide convincing evidence that the Islamic resurgence w i l l indeed result in heightened ethnic polarization, or that i t has made more d i f f i c u l t the p o l i t i c s of accommodation. It is true of course that their analyses have a ring of c r e d i b i l i t y , and that is probably because they are founded on some well established assumptions about the nature of Malaysian p o l i t i c s and r e l i g i o n . One of the most persistent of these has entailed the portrayal of Islam and 'Malayness' as overlapping or reinforcing ethnic attributes. Although, in theory, this need not imply that Islam can play no other role , i t has, in fact, meant that the function of Islam in expressing intra-Malay (ideological , class, sub-ethnic etc.) distinctions has been relat ively underplayed. The three authors discussed above appear to have accepted, for the most part, this important assumption about the p o l i t i c a l significance of Islam in Malaysia. While i t is not suggested here that this assumption is necessarily wrong, evidence presented in later chapters should indicate that i t may have encouraged these authors to place rather too much emphasis on the salience of Islam as a charter of ethnic sol idar i ty , and not enough on i ts function as a marker of intra-ethnic cleavages. The need for a more balanced perspective becomes part icularly obvious when i t is recognized that the Islamic resurgence is 24 by no means a u n i t a r y phenomenon; d i f f e r e n t components of the movement both express d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l , and even r e l i g i o u s v a l u e s , and have d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . A second assumption which underpins the arguments of these authors i s that I s l a m i c outbidding i s i n h e r e n t l y more d i f f i c u l t to accommodate -without a l i e n a t i n g non-Muslims - than are other kinds of r a c i a l appeals. I t i s t h i s assumption, i t seems, which leads them to p r e d i c t that i n t e r -e t h n i c b a r g a i n i n g and accommodation w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t , as I s l a m i c demands incr e a s e . In f a c t , however, to the extent that non-Muslims are concerned about the resurgence, they appear to be responding by showing greater support f o r the p a r t i e s of moderation i n the N a t i o n a l Front. In the recent e l e c t i o n , the MCA made s u b s t a n t i a l gains, i n c r e a s i n g i t s t o t a l o f Parliamentary seats by seven over i t s previous seventeen. At the same time, the DAP had i t s t o t a l reduced from s i x t e e n to nine 20 Parliamentary seats. Of course, i t i s e n t i r e l y p o s s i b l e (indeed probable) that t h i s breakthrough f o r the NF non-Malay p a r t i e s i s sympto-matic of Chinese communal f e a r s , e s p e c i a l l y i n view of the f a c t that i t was the need f o r Chinese u n i t y and the p r o t e c t i o n of the Chinese p o s i t i o n which formed the b a s i s of the 1982 MCA/Gerakan campaign. Yet even i f t h i s i s the case, and the Chinese community i s genuinely worried by the I s l a m i c resurgence, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that t h e i r p o l i t i c a l response i m p l i e s the movement of non-Malay n o n - e l i t e support to the NF, thereby enhancing r a t h e r than weakening the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r i n t e r - e t h n i c e l i t e accommodation, at l e a s t i n the short run. The s i t u a t i o n would c l e a r l y be very d i f f e r e n t i f the Malay party i n 25 the mult i - racial alliance were perceived to be extremist on the issue of Islamic resurgence. In that scenario, non-Malay communal fears would l i k e l y be focussed in support of an opposition party, such as DAP, thereby making more d i f f i c u l t the p o l i t i c s of ethnic accommodation. One of the main objectives of the government, therefore, has been to draw a strong line of dist inction between the moderation of the NF (and UMNO), and the extremism of most other Malay Muslim groups (e.g. PAS). Yet, while in 1982 a vote for the NF was apparently s t i l l a vote for "moderation, 21 s t a b i l i t y and ethnic accommodation", non-Malay perceptions of the NF may well be changing in response to an apparently growing commitment to a more Islamic government, among UMNO e l i t e s . Whereas u n t i l very recently, government strategies for coping with Islamic outbidding concentrated on granting concessions to Muslims which did not seriously infringe on the rights or interests of non-Muslims, the trend now appears to be somewhat more in the direction of zero-sum p o l i t i c a l choices. The use of government tax revenue to pay for increasingly extravagant Islamic public works projects (e.g. mosques), the creation of an Islamic Bank which is expected to provide interest-free loans to Muslims, and the recruitment of leaders who favour the idea of an Islamic ••(e.g. former ABIM president Anwar Ibrahim) are a l l policies in this vein, which have begun to raise non-Muslim fears. The important p o l i t i c a l question is whether this trend toward zero-sum p o l i t i c a l choices, and non-Malay alienation can be controlled under pressure from Islamic outbidders. In this regard, the government's task is made more d i f f i c u l t by the strong emotional appeal of Islamic symbols to the Malay peasantry, and by the legitimacy (religious and p o l i t i c a l ) which is attributed to p o l i t i c a l 26 appeals phrased i n an I s l a m i c idiom. Nonetheless, the argument and evidence of Chapter IV suggest that the government has, so f a r , been success-f u l i n c o n t r o l l i n g the t r e n d toward I s l a m i c extremism, and that while the new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n appears to be more s t r o n g l y p r o - I s l a m i c , i t i s premature to p r e d i c t a serious breakdown of i n t e r - e t h n i c accommodation as a p o l i t i c a l consequence of t h i s change. Is l a m i c Resurgence and I n t r a - E t h n i c Cleavages C l o s e r to the mainstream of general l i t e r a t u r e on the p o l i t i c a l 23 s i g n i f i c a n c e of I s l a m i c resurgence, are those authors who s t r e s s the u t i l i t y of I s l a m i c ideology, symbols and o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o r waging b a t t l e against the incumbent Malay p o l i t i c a l e l i t e and the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s quo. These authors draw a t t e n t i o n to the way i n which the I s l a m i c resurgence i n Malaysia i s both symptomatic of e x i s t i n g intra-Malay cleavages, and i s c o n t r i b u t i n g to the formation and hardening of new d i v i s i o n s . A decade ago" Baker suggested that r e l i g i o u s values i n Malaysia had begun to emerge as a r e a c t i o n and an a l t e r n a t i v e to i n c r e a s i n g 24 b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n and the values of the then e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . More r e c e n t l y , Kassim has w r i t t e n t h a t : The long term i m p l i c a t i o n s of the dakwah movement are grave f o r the UMNO l e a d e r s h i p , as renewed f a i t h i n the r e l i g i o n i n e v i t a b l y leads i t s adherents t o question the b a s i c fundamentals of the s t a t e structure.25 Lyon, K e s s l e r (1980), and P e i r i s are c l o s e r to the p o s i t i o n of Esposito and Hudson, i n t h e i r emphasis on the r o l e of Islam as an instrument of p o l i t i c a l c o u n t e r - e l i t e s . Hudson w r i t e s : 27 Opposition movements, w i t h l i t t l e hope of ac h i e v i n g power, without m o b i l i z i n g popular pressure against the regime, look t h e r e f o r e to I s l a m i c ideology as an instrument r a t h e r than as an end i n i t s e l f f o r s e t t l i n g . . . b a s i c p o l i t i c a l problems.26 P e i r i s echoes Hudson when he argues that Malaysia's I s l a m i c r e v i v a l i s not an attempt to r e s t o r e the f a i t h , but r a t h e r i s a " p o l i t i c a l t o o l w i t h which new s o c i a l c l a s s e s want to expand t h e i r own o p p o r t u n i t i e s to acquire 27 more of man's w o r l d l y goods". P e i r i s i s undoubtedly p a r t i a l l y c o r r e c t ; there c e r t a i n l y are c o u n t e r - e l i t e s who 'use' r e l i g i o n f o r other l e s s r e l i g i o u s ends. That alone, however, i s not a s a t i s f a c t o r y c h a r a c t e r i z a -t i o n of the d i v e r s e movement of I s l a m i c resurgence. Lyon, on the other hand, acknowledges that the dakwah phenomenon i n 2 8 Malaysia i s part of "an i n c r e a s i n g concern with r e l i g i o n " . However, she contends t h a t i t i s , more i m p o r t a n t l y , an expression of a " s t r u g g l e 29 t a k i n g place w i t h i n the Malay community". I t i s c l e a r that t h i s s t r u g g l e i s a p o l i t i c a l one, between government and anti-government f o r c e s , over the " b a s i c questions of j u s t where c o n t r o l of r e l i g i o n l i e s , and j u s t what 30 the boundaries of that r e l i g i o n are v i s a* v i s the s t a t e " . This i n t r a -Malay c o n f r o n t a t i o n , Lyon argues, i s the r e s u l t of a number of "b a s i c c o n t r a d i c t i o n s " i n Malaysian " s t a t e s t r u c t u r e " and s o c i e t y , which have 31 a r i s e n since 1969. I t i s no doubt tr u e that tensions e x i s t w i t h i n Malaysian and Malay s o c i e t y , but i t i s perhaps an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n to c h a r a c t e r i z e them i n terms of a government versus non-government p o l a r i -z a t i o n . Symptomatic of Lyon's tendency to make large claims on small evidence i s her d i s c u s s i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Islam and c l a s s 28 differences. "Islamic pr inciples" , she writes "are being used to art icu-late economic grievances but in such a way as to cut across racial l i n e s " . ' This kind of oversimplification is evidenced again in her prediction of the p o l i t i c a l consequences of Islamic resurgence: . . . should such groups become the basis of p o l i t i c a l mobilization and therefore broaden the base of p o l i t i -cal opposition to the National Front, the ruling group could easily f a i l to get the Parliamentary majority they need in any election.33 Kessler's treatment of intra-Malay cleavages and their relationship to Islam is somewhat more subtle. In i ts simplest form, his argument is that Malaysia's Islamic resurgence is the religious expression of Malay p o l i t i c a l and social disaffection. On the one hand a genuinely religious movement, (dakwah) also constitutes, on the other, a critique of the bureau-cratic state, i ts economic policies and i t s deracinating cultural effects.34 Whereas once this disaffection formed the basis of PAS support, he argues, the reorganization of public p o l i t i c a l l i f e after 1969, and the co-optaion of PAS into the National Front, forced dissat isf ied Malays to seek new "para -pol i t i ca l " outlets for their grievances. Many former PAS supporters have, according to Kessler, "opted out of p o l i t i c s , preferring involvement in the many sects and associations and the broad intel lectual stream of religious revivalism". In addition to the limitations place on open p o l i t i c a l ac t iv i ty , Kessler isolates the post-1969 modernization strategy of the government as a source of Malay disaffection. Malays in various sectors of the economy and society, he argues, have been adversely affected by these 29 p o l i c i e s . In rural areas, for instance, development programs have often served to undermine traditional Malay local leaders (penghulu and ketua kampong for example), and Malay culture, or have widened the gap between r ich and poor Malays. The processes of urbanization, westernization and the experience of education abroad, have proven traumatic for many young Malays, but at the same time have given them improved access to the ideas and the organizations of Islam. Moreover, given the limits placed on student p o l i t i c a l ac t iv i ty , Islamic groups have provided, in Kessler's view a 'necessary' outlet for the expression of discontent, much as organizations such as the Malay Language Society did in the 1960's. F inal ly , Kessler argues that the development, under the NEP, of a class of state-subsidized Malay entrepreneurs, has cut into the terri tory 36 of the small independent Malay businessman. Though i t is based'on evidence from Kelantan only, Kessler' s reasoning seems quite-sound, part icularly with regard to the motivations of the educated, urban and professional sectors, from whose ranks are drawn the vast majority of urban dakwah activists and followers. Kessler's study, then, lends some support to the idea that the Islamic resurgence reflects cleavages within the Malay community. On the other hand, there does not appear to be much recent evidence to support the argument that dakwah, or for that matter PAS, represents the interests of the Malay urban and rural poor. In fact, dakwah organizations associated with workers and peasants have been notably absent, and PAS, outside of Kelantan, has not demonstrated any great interest i n , nor gained much support through 37 appeals to the economic grievances of the Malay peasantry. Kessler is 30 perhaps too anxious to generalize from the Kelantan experience, which he has studied so thoroughly, and as a result portrays the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia as a potential popular united front of opposition 38 to the government. In this sense, l ike Lyon, he minimizes the l i k e l y differences within such an Islamic front, and consequently over-estimates the extent of government versus anti-government polarization, and the potential threat to the status quo posed by the lat ter . Lyon and Kessler both, are essentially in agreement with the argument of Hudson, which i s based on the analysis of Islamic resurgence in several modernizing states; With i t s potentially intense and pervasive ideolo-gical power... and given the fact that Islamic  opposition is generally compatible with other kinds  of opposition, i t is possible that i t could serve as the catalyst for serious challenges to these regimes. (Emphasis added)39 It is outside the scope of this study to assess the general v a l i d i t y of Hudson's argument, but i t is possible to demonstrate that, for the Malaysian case, i t has serious weaknesses. Simply stated these are: f i r s t , that although Islam is 'pervasive' in the Malay community, i t is by no means uniform or homogenous, either in the intensity with which i t is believed, 40 or in i t s organizational and ideological manifestations. The differences between the sub-communities of Malaysian Islam, which w i l l be examined in the next chapter, impose serious barriers to anything l ike an Islamic united front. Secondly, there is very l i t t l e evidence indeed to suggest that, in Malaysia, an Islamic opposition is compatible with most other kinds of opposition. While this is most obviously true in the case of non-Malay parties , l ike DAP, i t is also true of different Malay-Muslim groups and organizations. The p o l i t i c a l demands of these groups are as 31 often made in competition with other Malay groups as they are in direct confrontation with the government. The result of this competition is a "struggle between established leaders and opposition groups, and among various opposition groups, to represent the purest, truest, and often the 41 most extreme form of Islam". It is misleading, then, to speak of an "Islamic opposition" as a singular, homogenous entity, 'compatible' with other forms of opposition. Under present circumstances, in Malaysia, compatibility does not exist within the Islamic community, let alone between i t and other kinds of opposition. To the extent that an Islamic challenge does exist , the literature which stresses intra-Malay cleavages does not provide any systematic treatment of the government's attempts to cope with i t . Only Lyon provides a check-list of government strategies, both coercive and co-optative, but even these are not analysed within the framework of the Malaysian consociational style of governance. Consequently, i t is d i f f i c u l t to judge the potential for success or fai lure of these strategies. By viewing them in semi-isolation Lyon unintentionally obscures the strong s imilar i t ies between the strategies presently used to cope with the Islamic challenge, and the well-established and highly successful practices used by the National Front in other issue-areas. Instead, she stresses the discontinuity in government pol icy , and the presumed deleterious effect which i t w i l l have on Malay p o l i t i c a l support for incumbent e l i t e s . Lyon writes, for example that: the dilemma for the government would seem to be how to respond to the demands for a greater role for Islam in 32 the state without undermining the structure of the state and therefore i ts basis of support.42 Her estimation of the government':s a b i l i t y to respond successfully is quite low, as evidenced by her prediction that i t is only necessary for Islamic groups to become ' p o l i t i c a l l y mobilized' before the ruling e l i te w i l l lose 43 i t s stable non-elite support. Kessler is somewhat more cautious in his predictions of the dwindling of Malay support, but l ike Lyon (and Funston), he implies that i t i s the government's own policies which are the chief cause of Malay-Muslim disaffection, and which are l i k e l y to encourage the growth of a strong Islamic opposition. In Kessler's view then, a continuation of National Front p o l i t i c s and strategies for coping with the Islamic challenge ( i . e . those used up u n t i l 1980), i s l i k e l y to exacerbate the problem. Chapter IV of this study w i l l suggest that Kessler, Lyon and Funston seriously underestimate the f l e x i b i l i t y and v i a b i l i t y of government strategies in this regard, both as they pertain to the maintenance of stable Malay non-elite support, and to the avoidance of non-Malay alienation from the National Front. Summary The arguments and criticisms presented in this chapter can be summarized in the following four points. (1) The arguments which emphasize the relationship between the Islamic resurgence and inter-ethnic cleavages obscure important intra-Malay and intra-Islamic cleavages, by focussing somewhat too heavily on the overlap betwen ethnic (Malay) and religious (Muslim) ident i t ies . (2) Some elements within the larger movement represent and express chauvinistic Malay sentiments, but i t is misleading to characterize the whole movement primarily in terms of inter-ethnic 33 divisions . (3) The religious diversity which exists within the Malay Muslim community probably reflects p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l , as well as s t r i c t l y religious divisions among Malays, but the configuration of these divisions is considerably more complex, and less polarized than most authors suggest. (4) Both schools of thought examined here underestimate the effectiveness of government strategies for coping with the Islamic resurgence. Those authors who emphasize the dangers of ethnic p o l a r i -zation appear to assume that religiously-based outbidding is necessarily more d i f f i c u l t to accommodate. Those who portray the danger to the p o l i t i c a l system primarily as a matter of an Islamic challenge to the incumbent Malay e l i t e s , while they agree that Islamic outbidding is d i f f i c u l t to accommodate, imply that government strategy may in fact be exacerbating p o l i t i c a l and religious disaffect ion. Neither school of thought carefully analyses the relationship between the strategies of the government and the complexity and character of intra-Islamic cleavages. 34 FOOTNOTES Chapter I I 1. Gordon P. Means. " P u b l i c P o l i c y Toward R e l i g i o n i n Ma l a y s i a " , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 51(3) ( F a l l , 1978), pp. 386-405; J u d i t h A. Nagata, " R e l i g i o u s Ideology and S o c i a l Change: The I s l a m i c R e v i v a l i n Mal a y s i a , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s 53(3) F a l l , 1980) pp. 405-39; N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", Chapter 9 i n The P o l i t i c s of Is l a m i c R e a s s e r t i o n , Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 165-89; F. von der Mehden, "The I s l a m i c Resurgence i n M a l a y s i a " i n J . L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development, (Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980), pp. 163-80. 2. Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement i n M a l a y s i a " Review of  Indonesian and Malayan A f f a i r s 12(2) (December 1979), pp. 34-45; C l i v e S. K e s s l e r , "Malaysia: I s l a m i c R e v i v a l and P o l i t i c a l D i s a f f e c -t i o n i n a Divided S o c i e t y " Southeast A s i a C h r o n i c l e , no. 75 (October 1980) pp. 3-10; D e n z i l P e i r i s , "The Green R e v o l u t i o n " Far Eastern  Economic Review, 9 February 1979, pp. 26-27. 3. Constantine Zurayk, "Tensions i n Isla m i c C i v i l i z a t i o n , " Washington, Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y , 1978. See a l s o C l i f f o r d Geertz, Islam  Observed: R e l i g i o u s Development i n Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1971), and idem, The R e l i g i o n of Java ( I l l i n o i s : Glencoe, 1960). 4. J u d i t h A. Nagata, "Perceptions of S o c i a l I n e q u a l i t y i n Mala y s i a " , pp. 122-27. 5. J u d i t h A. Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic, p. 176. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to make a case f o r the c l a s s consciousness of the peasantry on the b a s i s o f , say, the 1980 A l o r Setar r i o t . Moreover, i t should be noted o c c a s i o n a l v i o l e n t o u t b u r s t s , i n c i d e n t s of landgrabbing, and the emergence of c u l t movements, are a l l more t r a d i t i o n a l responses to s o c i a l and economic d i f f i c u l t i e s •-- they do not r e f l e c t a new awareness of c l a s s i n t e r e s t s . 6. Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 J u l y 1981, pp. 14-16. 7. Gordon P. Means, " P u b l i c P o l i c y Toward R e l i g i o n i n M a l a y s i a , " p. 402. 8. Gordon P. Means, "The Role of Islam i n the P o l i t i c a l Development of Mal a y s i a " , Comparative P o l i t i c s , 1 (2) (January 1969), pp. 282-83. 9. N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", i n The P o l i t i c s of Is l a m i c Reassertion, M. Ayoob (ed.), pp. 171-72. 35 10. I b i d . , 184. 11. J u d i t h A. Nagata, " R e l i g i o u s Ideology and S o c i a l Change: The I s l a m i c R e v i v a l i n M a l a y s i a , " p. 409. In Malaysian Mosaic,p.48, Nagata r e f e r s to the I s l a m i c resurgence as "an a f f i r m a t i o n of Malay p o l i t i c a l and ethnic i d e n t i t y " . 12. I b i d . , p. 409. 13. I b i d . , p. 412. A l s o see W. A. Halim b i n Othman, "Ethnogenesis: A Case Study of the Malays of P e n i n s u l a r M a l a y s i a " , (Ph.D. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i s t o l , 1979). Othman argues t h a t Malays are par-t i c u l a r l y s e n s i t i v e to e x t e r n a l s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l s t i m u l i , which are very o f t e n perceived as 'threats' to the Malay i d e n t i t y . 14. J u d i t h A. Nagata, " R e l i g i o u s Ideology...", pp. 435-36. 15. Fred R. von der Mehden, "The I s l a m i c Resurgence i n M a l a y s i a , " i n J . L . Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development, p. 164. von der Mehden w r i t e s : "Within Malay s o c i e t y there i s an i n t e g r a t e d perception of r e l i g i o n , t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s , and v i l l a g e and f a m i l y l i f e . I t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r the Malay to disentangle Islam from t h i s whole." 16. I b i d . , p. 170. 17. I b i d . , p. 164. 18. I b i d . , p. 171. 19. I b i d . , p. 180. 20. See Table 3. 21. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, P o l i t i c s and Government i n M a l a y s i a , p. 401. 22. See chapter IV f o r a f u l l e r treatment of s t a t e s t r a t e g i e s toward Islam. See p. 83, Chapter IV. f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the l e g i t i m a c y of I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n . 23. Within the growing body of works on the subject o f I s l a m i c resurgence and p o l i t i c s , the f o l l o w i n g represent,more or l e s s , the main t h e o r e t i c a l t h r u s t : Mohammed Ayoob, (ed.), The P o l i t i c s of I s l a m i c  Reassertion, esp. I n t r o d u c t i o n , "The Myth of the M o n o l i t h " ; Conclusion "The Discernable P a t t e r n s " , (London: Croom Helm, 1981). John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development (Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980), esp. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and P o l i t i c a l Development", pp. 1-25; and J . T. Cummings, et. a l . , "Islam and Modern Economic Change", pp. 25-48. 36 24. David J . Baker, Local Muslim Organizations and N a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s  i n Malaysia (Ph.D. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1973). 25. I s m a i l Kassim, Race, P o l i t i c s and Moderation: A Study of the  Malaysian E l e c t o r a l Process (Singapore: Times Books I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1979), p. 119. 26. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and P o l i t i c a l Development", p. 18. 27. D e n z i l P e i r i s , "The Green Re v o l u t i o n " , Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979, p. 27. 28. Margo L. Lyon, "Dakwah Movement i n M a l a y s i a , " p. 35.. 29. I b i d . , p. 35. 30. I b i d . , p. 35. 31. I b i d . , pp. 39-42. These " c o n t r a d i c t i o n s " i n c l u d e (1) Islam vs. the s e c u l a r s t a t e ; (2) Federal vs_. s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n over Islam; (3) r a c i a l - r e l i g i o u s t e n s i o n s ; (4) c l a s s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the Malay community. For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between f e d e r a l and s t a t e governments i n r e l i g i o u s matters, and on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n of the Rulers v i s st v i s Islam, see Chapters I I I & IV, esp. 55-56, 79-80, ;82, 89, .92. 32. I b i d . , p. 42-43. 33. I b i d . , p. 44. 34. C l i v e S. K e s s l e r , "Malaysia: I s l a m i c Revivalism and P o l i t i c a l D i s a c c e c t i o n . . . " Southeast A s i a Chronicle no. 75 (October 1980), p. 3. 35. I b i d . , p. 8. 36. I b i d . , passim. K e s s l e r does not note that the NEP had a l s o 'created' many small businessmen. 37. The s o c i a l bases of the various I s l a m i c p a r t i e s and groups are discussed i n more d e t a i l i n Chapter I I I . 38. In h i s R e l i g i o n and P o l i t i c s i n a Malay S t a t e , p. 35, K e s s l e r argues f o r instance that PAS "...expressed c l a s s antagonisms between Malays r a t h e r than e t h n i c antagonism between Malays and Chinese." The s i t u a t i o n i n Kelantan was unique i n a number of ways. Perhaps most i m p o r t a n t l y , there e x i s t e d a strong p o l a r i -z a t i o n w i t h i n the Malay community, which K e s s l e r says r e f l e c t e d 37 class antagonisms. Others have identif ied the s p l i t as one between an e l i te and a counter-elite. Either way, i t was the polarization which was so significant and so unique. 39. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and P o l i t i c a l Development", p. 22. 40. Judith A. Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic, passim; Also Afifuddin bin Haji Omar, Peasants Institutions and Development in Malaysia:  The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Development in the Muda Region (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1978). Also see discussion of social heterogeneity in Kedah, chapter III. 41. Michael C. Hudson, "Islam and P o l i t i c a l Development", pp. 15-16. 42. Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia", p. 45. 43. See p. 28, f n . 33. 38 CHAPTER I I I : INTRA-MALAY AND INTRA-ISLAMIC CLEAVAGES Religious schisms usually involve strong and open differences on matters of doctrine. It i s rare, however, for such differences to be the sole, or even the primary cause of a schism. At the heart of i n t e r n a l r e l i g i o u s c o n f l i c t there i s often a debate over the approach which w i l l best promote the unity and v i t a l i t y of the f a i t h . These debates are inherently p o l i t i c a l , because they r e f l e c t the competing opinions of in d i v i d u a l s or s o c i a l groups who, by v i r t u e of t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l structures, have d i f f e r e n t statuses, goals, i n t e r e s t s , values and degrees of access to p o l i t i c a l power, and, moreover, because t h e i r outcome a f f e c t s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of values and p o l i t i c a l power i n the society. Religious schisms frequently r e f l e c t even more e x p l i c i t p o l i t i c a l d i fferences. Geertz, w r i t i n g about Javenese Islam, has argued that d i v i s i o n s between s a n t r i (both moderen and k o l o t ) , abangan, and the p r i y a y i , f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t l i n e s of competition f o r p o l i t i c a l power.^ Nagata, i n a recent paper on Islam i n r u r a l Malaysia, writes: In Malay communities maintenance of legitimacy i s often a consideration i n the adoption and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of d o c t r i n a l issues, and as such, another aspect of power and authority i n l o c a l l e v e l r e l i g i o u s l i f e . ^ Religious schisms, then, are r a r e l y r e l i g i o u s only, i n the western sense of the term. Alignment with one or another t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n may r e f l e c t "exogenous" factors such as " p o l i t i c a l tendencies, s o c i a l pressures, f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , age and attitude of the bearer of the 3 message". The present Islamic resurgence has contributed to d i v i s i o n s 39 within Malaysian Islam, but i t w i l l be argued in this chapter that these divisions are not s t r i c t l y theological in origin (although they are partly that) , but rather are the expression of other social and p o l i t i c a l divisions within the Malay community. It is for this reason that i t is misleading to speak of Malaysian Islam today primarily as a charter of ethnic unity. Moreover, the configuration of intra-Islamic cleavages which is described below belies the argument that there exists a p o l a r i -zation between government and anti-government forces within the Islamic community in Malaysia. Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua The s p l i t , in the 1920's and 1930's, between the Kaum Muda (Young Faction) and the Kaum Tua (Old Faction), was not simply a division between competing views of Islamic orthodoxy. It reflected and gave expression to important p o l i t i c a l and social differences within Malay society. Due to their different soc io -pol i t i ca l positions (and the varied religious and intellectual exposure which accompanied these), members of the two 'factions'saw the future of Malay Islam and Malay society in quite d i f -ferent terms. The distinction between Tua and Muda was symptomatic of an important heterogeneity of values in Malay society. On the one hand, those who had an essentially conservative (status quo) orientation would tend to support the Tua side, while, on the other, those who sought to challenge the p o l i t i c a l and religious status quo, on the grounds that i t 4 had weakened Malay society, would be supporters of the Kaum Muda. 40 More e x p l i c i t l y , the division paralleled the dist inction between members of the r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l e l i t e (and their followers), and members of a Malay counter-elite, a group with different social origins, intel lectual attitudes, and access to p o l i t i c a l power. Roff writes that the schism was the result of the Kaum Muda challenge to the "very basis of customary authority", which consisted of a "powerful and pervasive" alliance between the traditional p o l i t i c a l e l i te and orthodox Islam.^ The leaders of Kaum Muda were from a different socio-economic group than the majority of Malays - primarily urban intellectual and professionals -and most were not Malays from Peninsular Malaya. At the loca l , rural level , Nagata notes, these foreign-born and urban-educated men "raised questions as to the legitimacy of the local religious eli tes and attacked the orthodoxy of many of their teachings".^ In sum, Roff writes that: It was the innovatory and potentially disruptive character of this teaching that brought the reformists, known pejora-t i v e l y as the Kuam Muda into conflict with other groups in Malay society - the o f f i c i a l religious hierarchy, the t radi -tional Malay e l i t e , and the rural ulama, col lect ively the Old Faction or Kaum Tua .7 The Kaum Muda - Kaum Tua conflict percolated to the kampong (village) level where i t became entangled with other socio-economic issues. In the kampong to be Kaum Muda was "to espouse modernism in any form and go against t radi t ion; to be Kaum Tua was to be in favour of a l l that was g familiar , unchanging and secure". Means argues that the emergence of such division's at the local level came as a consequence of the increasing divergence in religious knowledge between some religious leaders and the majority of followers, and also as a result of a growing awareness of the 41 contradictions between Malay adat and "true" Islam which came with the influence of Middle-Eastern Islamic reformism. The Kaum Muda - Kaum Tua conf l ic t , he writes, was the beginning of tensions between "the folk 9 rel igion of the Malay kampong and the demands of orthodox Islam". Today, Malay folk rel igion is once again under attack, and Nagata notes that i ts status "seems to be less dependent on an inherent ideolo-gical or theological tension between Islamic and non-Islamic traditions, than on conditions in the wider social environment".'''^ The nature of this tension between folk rel igion and "orthodox" Islam emanating from the urban centres is one of the important themes of this chapter. It would be a mistake, however, to l imit the discussion of Malaysian Islam to this one axis of divis ion , because the present configuration of the rel igion today is not so clearly bipolar as the earl ier Kaum Muda - Kaum  Tua s p l i t seems to have been. It is no longer appropriate ( i f i t ever was) to draw a line between the tradit ional p o l i t i c a l - r e l i g i o u s e l i te and their followers on the one hand, and the modern, urban challengers, on the other. The present pattern is considerably more complex. For instance, in rural areas, Islamic leaders may be.either modern or t radi -tional but s t i l l be distinguishable from leaders whose appeal and 11 philosophy is more adat-oriented. In other words, religious orthodoxy may come in modern and tradit ional forms. In urban areas, differences in social origins, theological orientation and p o l i t i c a l goals exist between groups which are col lect ively called 'fundamentalist'. In the contact between urban and rural Islam there are wide variations in the 42 degree of receptivity and compatibility between groups. F i n a l l y , groups representing almost a l l degrees of orthodoxy, modernity and t radi t ion , may be divided according to their attitudes and p o l i t i c a l position relative to state and federal governments. For example, at least since the 1950's, many local religious leaders have resented and resisted the incursions of the government in areas of their traditional p o l i t i c a l and doctrinal jur isdic t ion . Thus state (secular) and religious eli tes 12 no longer comprise a coherent ruling e l i t e . This , in rather simplified form, is the basis of the present "multipolar" configuration of Malaysian Islam. And i t is this multipolarity which has so far made, and w i l l continue to make extremely unlikely , a united, coherent Islamic opposition to the government and the p o l i t i c a l status quo. In order to more f u l l y grasp the divisions which exist within Malaysian Islam, i t is necessary to examine in detail (i) the soc io -pol i t i ca l bases and origins, and ( i i ) the ideology and goals of the most prominent Islamic organizations and movements. Special attention w i l l be paid to PAS: the three most inf luent ia l urban dakwah organizations (ABIM, Jema'at Tabligh, and Par 'ul Arqam); and the group of smaller groups known col lect ively as 'extremists' and 'deviat ionis ts ' . 13 PAS - Socio-pol i t ica l Origins Malay p o l i t i c a l opposition, bu the time of Merdeka, drew i t s support and leadership from three major groups: (1) Radical nationalists , with social and even secularist leanings; (2) Islamic reformers, l ike Dr. Burhanuddin, especially from the urban middle-class religious 43 i n t e l l i g e n t s i a ; (3) Conservative Muslim teachers and scholars, members of the state Islamic bureaucracies, disaffected UMNO sub-elites , and 14 their respective followers. The three streams of Malay p o l i t i c a l opposition found an inst i tut ional base in PAS, which having been created by UMNO as the Pan Malayan Union of the Religiously Learned, in 1951, was, in 1955, registered as an independent p o l i t i c a l party. Of the three components of PAS i t was the third group (the rural ulama etc.) which took the longest to join the opposition. By 1947, the left-wing Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) had a l l i e d with the Pan Malayan Supreme Islamic Council (MATA), which represented Islamic reformism and which, one year later formed the reformist Hizbul Muslimin, (Islamic P a r t y ) . ^ Together, the left-wing and Islamic reformist elements were, in the late 1940's, a force powerful enough for the Br i t ish to consider i t expedient to ban most associated organizat ions .^ At the same time, the colonial government was endeavoring to cement i ts t ies with the traditional leaders of Islam - the Rulers and the rural ulama - who were under serious attack from reformist groups. The Bri t ish preferred to negotiate independence with the representatives of a more conservative and ' a p o l i t i c a l ' interpretation of Islam - that is a Kaum Tua interpre-tation - and UMNO f i l l e d the b i l l . S ignif icant ly , together with the 1 Sultans, UMNO was also the preferred choice of the majority of ordinary Malays. While the chief foci of early Malay p o l i t i c a l opposition were Islamic reformism and radical Malay nationalism, by the late 1950's the 44 more conservative Islamic community had joined the anti-UMNO camp, appalled by the collaborationist (pro-kafir) stance of UMNO in the independence negotiations. "The dis l ike of Islamic reformism amongst Islamic conservatives was certainly exceeded by their d is l ike of the k a f i r non-Malays, whom UMNO then appeared to be most earnestly s o l i c i t i n g . ' PAS - Social Base Despite the diversity which characterized the early PAS leadership, i t s primary constituency in the post Merdeka period has been the more tradit ional rural religious leaders (ulama, imam, b i l a l , haj i , tok guru), and their Malay peasant followers. Kessler has found that PAS leaders tend to be of humble bir th ( i . e . not ar is tocrat ic ) , and are more l i k e l y to have received a religious or Malay vernacular education than their 18 counterparts in UMNO. PAS' p o l i t i c a l strength has been t radit ional ly concentrated in those areas with large rural Malay majorities (the four northern states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and P e r l i s ) , and for obvious reasons, i t has had least success in ethnically mixed and pre-19 dominantly non-Malay constituencies. In spite of reports that social mobilization and modernization have begun to disrupt traditional social patterns of deference and loyalty in rural areas, the a b i l i t y of rural PAS leaders to mobilize large followings does not, at f i r s t glance, appear to have been weakened. In the 1978 and 1982 elections the small number of federal seats won each time by PAS (5) masked a f a i r l y impressive achievement in terms of 45 the percentage of va l id vote polled (see Table #2). Even more impressive has been PAS' performance in the four northern states, where in 1978 i t polled 40.29%, and in 1982 38.21%, of the popular vote in Parliamentary contests (see Table #8). In state elections, in 1982, PAS staged some-thing of a comeback, winning 10 of 36 seats in Kelantan (having won only 2 of 36 in 1978), and 5 of 28 seats in Trengganu (having won none in 1978) (see Table #4). In both states PAS increased i ts share of the popular vote in Parliamentary elections by about 3% (see Table #11), indicating that in the most heavily rural and Malay constituencies, PAS has not lost i t s appeal. A l l of the electoral evidence is not so promising for PAS. For instance in Kedah, where PAS has h i s t o r i c a l l y threatened UMNO hegemony, the 1982 results showed a serious decline both in popular vote polled, 20 and seats won by PAS. In 1978, in Kedah, PAS polled 39.7% of the federal vote and won 2 of 13 Parliamentary and 7 of 26 state seats. In 1982 the equivalent s tat is t ics were 30.98%, 1 of 13, and 2 of 26. In terms of national averages PAS fared somewhat worse in 1982 than in 1978, pol l ing only 16.25% of the total va l id vote, with 82 candidates, as compared with 17.48% in 1978 with 87 candidates. In more than half of the states PAS gained a smaller percentage of the popular vote than i t had in the previous election (see Table #10). Although the most serious setback occurred in Kedah, PAS suffered heavily in the ethnically mixed and urban areas of Penang (10.8% with 6 candidates in 1978 - 2.5% with 2 candidates in 1982), the Federal Territory (6.5% with 2 candidates in 46 1978 - 2.8% with 2 candidates in 1982), and Selangor (9.9% with 8 candidates in 1978 - 5.4% with 8 candidates in 1982). The weakening of PAS support in these areas suggests that PAS is not benefiting from the urban dakwah phenomenon, but may be staying aloft due to the intensif icat ion of Islamic bel ief in some rural areas, (although not in Kedah). F i n a l l y , i t should be noted that the good showing of PAS in Trengganu and Kelantan is real ly a return to normal after the serious weakening of PAS c r e d i b i l i t y in 1978. Signif icantly , in 1978, a number of former PAS seats were actually won by Berjasa rather than UMNO, and 21 many PAS losses were by very small margins. PAS strength in the North-east, then, should not be too readily attributed to the Islamic resurgence. In short, despite evidence that PAS is holding i t s own in some states, the Islamic resurgence does not yet appear to have been a tremendous boon to the electoral success of the party. The reasons for this remain somewhat obscure, but some studies have suggested that i t is under the pressure of the Islamic resurgence, and the new Islamic leaders which i t has generated, that the legitimacy of tradit ional religious leaders associated with PAS, has begun to be 22 challenged. The challenge has come from a number of quarters; from government appointed ulama and missionaries, from representatives of the urban dakwah organizations, and from the more 'extremist' or semi-Islamic religious leaders. On this score Nagata writes that religious leaders in rural areas "may be apprehensive of undesirable competition and confrontation in religious matters - more kafir mengafir - which could 47 show the rural PAS leaders up to disadvantage".^ Elsewhere she notes that "government dakwah representatives are equally unacceptable to PAS 24 sympathisers". Regardless of the issue, the mission, or the source of the challenge, t radit ional local el i tes are not keen on being dis -placed by new leaders. The consequence, in rural areas, has been the emergence, or perhaps more accurately the intensif icat ion, of religious tension within the kampong religious community. As Jansen writes, "the tussle is not so much over the place of Islam in a Muslim society but more over what sort of Islam i t should be, and who should be the 25 mediators and interpreters of Islam to the rest of society" (emphasis added). Unlike earl ier divisions , however, the threat to the legitimacy and autonomy of the t radit ional local leaders comes today, not just from the Islamic reformists (Kaum Muda), but from government appointed ulama, 2 6 and from various 'extremist' charismatic leaders. The threat, then, i s not only greater, i t is also more diverse than i t once was. It is this diversity in the challenge which makes more d i f f i c u l t , for t radi -tional religious leaders, the task of maintaining their religious and p o l i t i c a l legitimacy. It is this diversi ty , moreover, which limits the likelihood of a religiously-based,, government versus non-government polarization in the countryside which would be of benefit to the electoral prospects of PAS. The present PAS versus UMNO p o l i t i c a l / electoral polarization is not deepened or intensified by a corresponding r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l polarization. 48 Extremists and Deviationists - Socio-pol i t ica l Origins and Base Under attack from both the government and the new urban dakwah organizations, have been the so-called 'extremist' or 'deviant' rural Islamic movements. Nagata writes; Through his tor ica l connexions with a long Sufi tradition. . .some of the more charismatic ulama have generated their own idiosyncratic cults and religious movements, or tar ikat , usually of only local importance, with intensely personal followings in just one or two villages.27 She f a i l s to mention, however, that the leaders of the most active and the most extreme of these movements are very frequently of foreign b i r t h , (from Pakistan, Southern Thailand, Kampuchea and Indonesia for example). This pattern suggests, f i r s t , the importance of social dislocation and change as a factor in generating support for these movements, and second, the reverence which is generally shown, in rural Malay society, for men with a claim of close connections (through bir th or education) to descendents of the Prophet, and for men with exceptional magical or r-spi r i tua l powers. It is in both of these respects that i t is appropriate to refer to these religious movements as "the rural and traditional 2 8 variant of the modern dakwah teachings of the urban educated sector". The recently active Organization of Warriors for Allah (P.A.S. not PAS), for instance, is believed to have links with the Red Sash invulnerablity 29 cul t , which represents an old Malay tradition of resistance to outside authority, and which is generally mobilized in times of social and p o l i t i c a l upheaval and uncertainty. Stockwell writes that; 49 Cult movements were essentially vi l lage phenomena which erupted at particular times of p o l i t i c a l and social unrest, when the wider framework of the state -i t s social hierarchy and administrative system - fa i led to safeguard kampong l i fe .30 Such times have included, most notably, the immediate post-war period, the Malayan Union period and the 1969 c r i s i s . In addition to being a sociological manifestation of unrest, cult movements in Malaysia have h i s t o r i c a l l y proven to be useful , and often necessary, in the mobilization of p o l i t i c a l support, most often in opposition to established authority. Signif icant ly , i t has often been the men of Javanese and other foreign origins, who have most successfully 31 mobilized such opposition. In the immediate post-war period (1945-48), for example, the predominantly foreign-born Islamic reformist leaders, made use of un-reformed Islam, with i t s animist additions of magic and invulnerabil i ty , for the purpose of undermining the loyalty of the kampong to those Malay leaders who had become identif ied with the administration of Br i t i sh Malaya.32 The s imilar i t ies between the present rural religious cults and those of the 1940's are indeed s t r iking . In addition to their resistance to established authority, both are notable for their heavy reliance on myths of invulnerabil i ty , the spir i tual powers of their leaders, and the use of violence to achieve their ends. The followers of a religious group known as Crypto, for example, apparently believe that membership 33 in the group ensures immortality. The Army of Allah (Tentera Sabilluhlah) was thought to be responsible for the series of Hindu shrine desecrations 34 in 1978-79. The wounding of several men and women in the violent attack on the police station at Batu Pahat, in November 1980, was conducted by the followers of a Cham Muslim refugee who claimed to be the imam mahdi 50 (future Prophet). Observers of the slaughter reported that the members of the group appeared to be in an entranced state, and to be unconcerned 35 for their own safety. In general, however, i t is the use of violence in achieving their ends which j u s t i f i e s the use of the term extremist to describe most of these groups. Numerous other religious movements of this kind have surfaced in recent years. In some cases they have clearly been influenced by the broader stream of Islamic resurgence, as in the case of the cult leader who called himself the Ayatollah of Malaysia. The tradition of the rejection of established authority found in Mahdism (a millenarian t radi -tion within Islam based upon the expected coming of a new Prophet), has also gained a measure of popularity and c redibi l i ty as a result of the 36 resurgence of Islam. But despite the encouraging effect of the resurgence on the growth of these cults they, l ike the earl ier movements, have only local followings and a largely local significance. They can, however, pose a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the more orthodox 37 religious leaders at the local leve l . In this sense, the emergence of an extremist rural variant of dakwah may be weakening the social -religious base of PAS support. Early in 1982, the New Straits Times reported that citizens of Jelutong had formed a Village Action Committee to combat the disintegrative effects of "deviationist teachings". One vi l lager is quoted as saying: We are very concerned about the serious implications of these teachings. They have caused children to go against their fathers. Families seem to have split .38 51 Extremist groups, then, may be encouraging the disintegration of tradit ional patterns of loyalty in religious communities. Further evidence to this effect can be found in the dwindling numbers of t radi -tional pondoks, long recognized as the social and organizational base of PAS support, part icularly in the four northern states. Afifuddin estimates that, in the north of Kedah where once there were about 80 39 pondoks, there now remain no more than.40. Nagata reports that pondoks are now infrequently taken over by the sons of gurus,and that "on the admission of the gurus themselves" "the total inst i tut ion of the old 40 pondok is dying". There are no doubt many other factors influencing this decline, including the growing demand for (and supply of) secular and academic education, for example. However, the presence of charis-matic religious leaders, claiming legitimacy on the basis of spir i tual and magical powers, and through more appealing variations of Islamic teachings, must be of concern to the more orthodox rural ulama. What-ever the sociological and p o l i t i c a l origins of these alternate philosophies and movements, i t is clear that they can result in increased competition between local leaders for the local following. Nagata describes the significance of the competition for a following in these terms: While purely doctrinal questions are important, these sometimes take a subordinate position to the maintenance of the leader-follower relationship as such, and in this sense the guru as broker is the voice of his con-stituents as well as the authoritarian bearer or interpreter of a tradition or orthodoxy.41 Thus, in the rural areas, the Islamic resurgence and the rural 52 variant of dakwah, is more l i k e l y to increase r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l competi-t ion than to encourage the unif icat ion of the Malay Muslim community behind an organization l ike PAS. Under these conditions a coherent Islamic opposition to the government is unlikely to develop. Moreover, as the number of different groups competing for the rural constituency grows, the chances for unity diminish. Islam in Malaysia may best be portrayed as a series of small communities and movements, each with i t s own established (but potentially confl ict ing and competing) patterns of guru-disciple legitimacy.42 As noted at the outset, however, divisions within the Malay-Muslim community are l i k e l y to be minimized at a time of c r i s i s . For example, i f Islam or the Malay community as a whole were represented as being in serious danger (as in 1969), one would not expect intra-Islamic or 43 personal differences to stand in the way of p o l i t i c a l unity. Urban Dakwah - Socio-pol i t ica l Origins and Bases In the Malaysian context Islamic resurgence is most commonly referred to as the "dakwah movement". Although dakwah is an Arabic word which describes the task of propagating the fa i th ( l i t e r a l l y ' i n v i t a t i o n ' or ' c a l l ' ) , in Malaysia i t is broadly used to connote the inte l lec tual -cultural phenomenon of a s t r i c ter , more self-conscious adherence to Islamic principles among Malays, and is also more narrowly used in reference to the organizations involved in carrying out missionary work among believers and non-believers a l i k e . ^ In both senses, dakwah i n Malaysia is primarily an urban middle-class phenomenon. 53 Like earl ier movements to reform Islam, the present r e v i t a l i z a -tion has occurred in response to external soc ia l , p o l i t i c a l and economic pressures and from "a sense of social and cultural c r i s i s , in which • patterns of authority sanctioned by religious practice no longer seem 45 valid'. ' . More spec i f i ca l ly in the post-Merdeka period the perceived challenge has come in the form of a western derived pattern of moderni-zation. Members of the young, educated urban middle class have been c r i t i c a l of this strategy and have, in recent years, r a l l i e d around Islam as the major symbolic and organizational focus of their discontent over the alleged "materialism, corruption and cultural westernization 46 of the ruling e l i t e s " . The urban dakwah movements,of the 1970's and 1980's have their 47 roots in the student p o l i t i c a l organizations of the 1960's. In part icular , they have developed out of the Malay Language Society (of which Anwar Ibrahim was once the president) and The National Association of Muslim Students. Both of these organizations provided a forum for young intellectuals who f e l t that the government was not dealing satis-fac tor i ly with the problem of Malay backwardness, and was not paying sufficient attention to Malaysia's role in world (Islamic) a f f a i r s . Acutely concerned that their English-medium colonial education made them i l l - f i t t e d to help forge a new ppst-colonial Malaysia, the students developed an esprit de corps based on Islam, a commitment to upholding the Malay character of the country, and a conviction that Malay economic problems were the major economic problems facing the n a t i o n . ^ ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia - Malaysian Islamic Youth' 54 Movement) was formed by a group of University of Malaya student leaders in 1971, for three stated reasons. F i r s t , to provide a forum for graduating students to continue their dakwah act ivi tes . Second, to f i l l the organizational gap for Islamic youth throughout Malaysia. Third, "to generate an Islamic movement as the path to Islamic revival 49 in Malaysia". A number of social mechanisms have combined to increase the strength of this move toward Islamic revival among Malaysia's urban youth. Perhaps the most obvious has been the renewed confidence in Islam which has come with the world-wide resurgence in recent years. Other international influences have been the plight of Muslim minorities in southern Thailand and the Philippines; and the links with Indonesia, whence came the model of dakwah organizations as para-pol i t ical channels. 5 Related to the international resurgence of Islam is the experience of young Malays t ravell ing abroad to obtain their tert iary education. For many, this provides their f i r s t exposure to a concerned, active and intel lectual Islamic community. Fellow students at foreign universi t ies , especially those from Libya, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, actively propagate a more completely Islamic l i f e s t y l e amongst their peers, and encourage a sense of Islamic community through such organizations as the Federation of Students of Islamic Studies (FOSIS) in Great B r i t a i n . 5 1 As a result : . . . ser ious doubts have been raised in many minds about the west and i ts teachings, and these misgivings have undoubtedly been reinforced by . . . the ascendance of the Muslim world in general.^2 The acceptance of a more rigorously religious l i f e s t y l e by Malay students may come, in part, as a consequence of unpleasant or traumatic cultural 55 experiences while studying or t ravell ing abroad. At the very least, there may be, in such a setting, strong pressures encouraging a young Malay to consolidate an "identity as 'Muslim', a status with more impact 53 and universal is t ic significance than that of Malay alone". With the large number of Malays who have returned from abroad to teach or to form various religious associations, even Malays who choose to remain at home for their education are receiving a religious exposure strongly influenced by the fundamentalist-rationalist Islam from abroad. Moreover, under government programs, the Malay percentage of enrolment in tert iary institutes of education has increased from 40% in 1970 to about 67% in 1980. There has also been an absolute increase in the total number of Malay students, a good number of which have enrolled in the 54 faculty of Islamic Studies at Universi t i Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) This expansion of tertiary education for Malays has, according to Funston, "created a much larger pool for organizations l ike PKPIM" (National Association of Muslim Students) and A B I M . ^ Like the Malay youth who travel abroad those who, under the auspices of the NEP, are moving from the kampong to the urban centres, often find the change in l i f e s t y l e t raumatic .^ Over the last decade the percentage of Malays in urban areas has increased from 14% to 21% of the Malay population, so that Malays now constitute one third of a l l urban dwellers, 57 and about 50% of a l l professional and technical workers. Many of these apparently find solace in the s implic i ty , and especially the community of Islam. One of the more'important aspects of the culture shock suffered by recently transplanted Malays i s , the increasing 56 consciousness of ethnicity. Chandra Muzaffar writes; In a society where ethnic consciousness is pervasive, Malays who have just become part of a largely non-Malay milieu, are bound to develop an awareness of their ethnic background, which may not have been there when they were amongst their own ethnic kind in the rural areas. . . Islam provides a useful channel for the expression of this awareness.^ Thus there seems to be some truth to the contention that Islam is employed as a "charter" by which polarization between Malays and non-Malays is expressed. However, the salience of this connection varies from one dakwah group to the next, and with the issue at hand. The ideas and goals expressed by some important urban dakwah groups (like ABIM), for instance, indicate that i t is as much the secularist-materialist elements in Malay society i t s e l f as i t is the Chinese which are the chief concern. These seemingly divergent trends may, i n fact , be part of the same phenomenon - the debate over the question of how best to achieve ethnic/religious sol idar i ty . It is s ignif icant , however, that this debate entails the expression of both intra-Islamic and inter-ethnic differences. Although primarily urban-based, the major dakwah organizations have begun to extend their evangelistic ac t ivi t ies to rural areas. This has effectively compounded the challenge to traditional religious e l i tes . Their resentment has been reflected in their coolness, and sometimes their overt antipathy toward the urban missionaries. Despite i ts reputed association with PAS, for example, ABIM is "often unpopular in rural areas 59 and has not made "a lasting impression on kampong religious culture". The use, by the urban groups of Arab-style dress is considered to be 57 presumptuous by the older religious men, and i t is resented because i t "detracts from the status and dist inction of those who have earned the qual i f ica t ion , and from the la t ter ' s authority in the vi l lage h i e r a r c h y " M o r e o v e r , the young evangelists are generally regarded, by rural standards "as insuff ic ient ly trained in Islam, too inexperienced to lead the prayer or deliver the sermon, and too lacking in wisdom to dispense advice' . ' .^ Ironical ly , they are also considered to be 'too western'. It ought to be noted of course that the relationship between traditional religious elites and urban missionaries is not always an antagonistic one. Despite the basic problem of age, the educational and occupational status of the urban representatives entitles them to respect within the vi l lage system of values. Moreover, groups l ike ABIM with substantial f inancial resources and autonomy, are often seen as valuable a l l i e s by rural religious leaders whose own resources are limited, or subject to stringent p o l i t i c a l controls. Some rural religious teachers for instance have entered into partnership with urban groups, in estab-l ishing joint religious schools as ah alternative to the educational pro-grams offered by the Ministry of Education. Furthermore ABIM members, at least since 1978, have been actively involved in campaigning on behalf of PAS. In the 1978 elections "at least three ABIM members ran as PAS candidates, although they took the precaution of resigning from ABIM 6 2 f i r s t " ; resignation was legally necessary because, o f f i c i a l l y , ABIM is designated as a non-poli t ical body, and i ts members are therefore forbidden to take part in p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Again in 1982, former 58 ABIM leaders l ike Ustaz Fadzil Noor, and Ustaz Nakhaire Ahmad, ran on a PAS t icket , and ABIM lent i t s taci t support to the party during the campaign. F i n a l l y , the recent trend toward cooperation between fundamen-t a l i s t youth and the rural t radi t ional is t Nahdatul Ulama (NU), provides some reason to believe that a similar reconciliation is possible in 63 the Malaysian context. Such a reconcil iat ion, however, would depend, as i t seems to have done in Indonesia, on the emergence of Islam as the primary focus of , and channel for anti-government sentiment. So far , Islam has not assumed that role in Malaysia. Strong differences in the respective p o l i t i c a l , social and economic goals of these groups (to be discussed shortly) „ would, in any event, make such a rapprochement an extremely precarious arrangement. In the meantime, differences in the social origins and social bases of the two groups limit the opportunities for genuine cooperation as opposed to short-term and p o l i t i c a l l y opportunistic arrangements. Although i t has some ' grassroots support, ABIM prefers to gain followers through PAS channels, before possibly assuming an independent p o l i t i c a l role . For i t s part, PAS seems content to take advantage of the f inancial resources of the urban dakwah groups, and of the urban Malay vote which they hope to win with the aid of ABIM campaigners. In the short term, then, differences exist but are not emphasized. In the longer term, i f ABIM as an organization assumes a more e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l role , competition between PAS and ABIM w i l l probably intensify, rather than diminish, as ABIM tries to establish a following in t radi t ional ly PAS areas, and as fundamental differences 59 in goals, interests and style become more apparent. The pattern of this competition, however, w i l l depend signif icantly on the outcome of the Old Guard versus Young Turk leadership struggle within PAS, and the extent to which ABIM members actually begin to assume leadership positions within the party. These questions are discussed in greater detail in the following section. PAS - Goals and Ideology The o f f i c i a l ideology of PAS, since 1955, has been consistently 64 theocratic. One of the party's major themes has been that Islam should guide, not just morality and worship, but also the p o l i t i c a l and economic affairs of the s t a t e . ^ In practical terms, however, the goals and orientation of the party have often tended more toward Malay nationalism, as reflected in the slogan 'Bangsa, Ugama, Tanah Ayer' (Race, Religion, 6 6 Native Land). Particularly after the election of Datuk Mohd. Asri bin Haji Muda as party president in 1964, PAS began to appeal more heavily to Malay chauvinism. With UMNO 'concessions' to non-Malays through the 1960's, PAS gained c r e d i b i l i t y and support as a defender of Malay rights and culture. Interestingly, then, under conditions which are viewed as threatening to Malay rel igion and ethnicity, an Islamic party l ike PAS could conceivably be a focus for r e l i g i o u s / p o l i t i c a l discontent. The ambivalence over the party's ideology has been, in part, a matter of p o l i t i c a l opportunism, but i t has also reflected an on-going tension within the party leadership. During the recent election campaign, UMNO Minister, Sanusi Junid expressed the problem as follows: 60 There is a leadership c r i s i s in PAS; the t radi t ional is ts versus the intel lec tuals . As a result there are no co-ordinated efforts . Statements made by leaders contradict each other.68 From i ts inception PAS has comprised elements of Islamic reformism, traditionalism, and Malay chauvinism, and these various components have emerged, from time to time, generally in the form of factional leader-ship struggles. For instance, the decision by PAS to join the National Front, in 1973, triggered a struggle between older collaborationist nationalist leaders, who were aligned behind party president Datuk Mohd. Asri bin Haji Muda, on the one hand, and the younger more intel lectual 69 and vaguely social is t Young Turks, who later aligned behind Ustaz Fadzil Noor and Ustaz Khaidir Khatib, on the other. More recently the s p l i t within the party has become more pro-nounced. In late 1977 the attempt by Asri loyalists (the Group of Twenty) to topple the Kelantan Mentri Besar, and the ensuing c r i s i s sparked recriminations from the Young Turks, who threatened to form a new party, and many of whom joined Berjasa. This group was further angered by A s r i ' s appointment of an old fr iend, Ustaz Abu Bakar Onn, to the position 70 of PAS Secretary General. In the years following the disastrous 1978 elections, Fadzil Noor and his faction were vocal in expressing their 71 opinion that Asri was responsible for PAS' poor showing. In the period preceding the 1982 elections, the s p l i t resurfaced once again, but this time disguised, somewhat, in the idiom of Islam. The young faction publicly espouse a rat ionalist and non-communal vision of a Malaysian Darul Islam, a gradualist approach te i t s attainment and 72 an Islamic-socialist economic system. In this way they distinguish themselves from the old guard, who, after their three-year f l i n g with 61 the National Front, and the exposure of PAS corruption and economic mis-management in Kelantan, are no longer regarded as 'exemplary Islamic men', but as rather opportunistic Malay chauvinists. The younger group makes especially good mileage on their c r i t ic ism of Asri for intimating that PAS would cooperate with v i r t u a l l y any party for reasons of p o l i t i c a l 73 expediency. Some observers have predicted that PAS support in urban areas, part icularly among the young professionals and inte l l igents ia , would grow signif icantly under the influence of the new, more credible, group of Islamic leaders. As previously noted, however,the appeal of PAS in urban areas appears to be weakening. To a large extent, this may be the result of the disenchantment of the younger group with the s t i f f resistance to a turnover in leadership which is being mounted by the old guard. In the period prior to the recent elections numerous PAS branches disbanded, hundreds of PAS members publicly switched their allegiance to UMNO, and many more branches and members threatened to 74 do the same. Their immediate grievance was the last minute change in the Kelantan PAS nomination l i s t , by Asri and his a l l i e s , Nik Aziz and Wan Ismail. The earl ier l i s t , engineered by PAS Deputy Commissioner Encik Mustapha A l i , had included a very high percentage of 'new faces' 75 and reportedly none of the original Group of Twenty. Not only did Asri and his a l l i e s remove a large number of the new faces from the l i s t , they managed to place a promising Young Turk sympathiser, Yusof^ Rawa, in the Kedah constituency of Kubang Pasu, where no PAS candidate 62 could be expected to win, in view of the fact that the UMNO candidate 76 was Prime Minister Mahathir. The manner in which this on-going factional struggle is ultimately resolved w i l l , to a great extent, determine the p o l i t i c a l future of PAS. If the Young Turks prevai l , PAS may capture the urban dakwah constituency, 77 and even a good part of the t radit ional rural base. If , on the other hand the old guard remain in control, the new wave of Islamic resurgence in urban, and possibly rural areas, may outpace PAS and become the sol id base of a more e x p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l ABIM. The more l i k e l y outcome, however, i s the continuation of internal PAS divisions and the persistence of the intra-Islamic competition for Malay urban and rural constituencies. It must always be borne in mind, however, that the l ikelihood of a unified Islamic opposition depends heavily, and perhaps ultimately, on the attitude of the various religious leaders toward such a unif ica t ion . In the case of rural religious eli tes for example, their opinion on this score would depend on the extent to which such cooperation would permit 78 the maintenance of existing patterns of authority and on their percep-tion of their own social and p o l i t i c a l best interests. H i s t o r i c a l l y , the strength and p o l i t i c a l orientation of the rural ulama has depended, in part, on their relationship with the state and central governments, especially in matters pertaining to the administra-79 tion of Islam. In Kelantan, for instance, the intrusion of the central government and i t s agents into the countryside, had the effect of weakening the imam as a local leader. In addition, the centralization of religious administration under the Majlis Ugama (State Religious Council) , 63 deprived the imam of their a b i l i t y to collect zakat and f i t r a h , thereby lessening their prestige and wealth. Control of the Majlis by the Kelantanese aristocracy, and i t s p o l i t i c a l ins t i tu t ion , UMNO, especially resented by local religious leaders. Their resentment provided an impor-tant base for mobilizing PAS support in the highly successful election of 1959. Generally speaking, rural Islamic el i tes have shared this resentment at the steady intrusion of bureaucracy into their traditional realm of authority, and have sought to resist this intrusion through PAS, and sometimes through the Rulers. Pondok teachers are threatened by the Ministry of Education efforts , since 1977, to centralize a l l religious education and to "control traditional religious private teachers through 80 a system of licensing (tauliah). Imam suffer a loss of independence and wealth as a result of the system of centralized zakat and f i t rah col lect ion. A l l local religious el i tes suffer a loss of autonomy through the interference, by the National Council of Religious A f f a i r s , in the jur isdic t ion of the State Religious Councils, and in the centralized issuing of fatwah. For the majority of rural PAS ulama, a shift in the control of Islamic administration to UMNO e l i t e s , or even attempts by the Ruler and the federal government to bring them under tighter control, w i l l always be viewed as a serious and unwarranted threat to their own positions. Where this is taking place, the rural ulama are l i k e l y to become more active and intense c r i t i c s of the government. But for this to be transformed into a populist challenge to government e l i t e s , the goals and strategies of this group must be compatible with those of 64 other important p o l i t i c a l and social groups, as they apparently were in Kelantan in 1959. Kessler argues that the success of PAS in that year was a function of: the a b i l i t y of Islamic teachers and radical nationalists , working upon the dist inctive tensions within Kelantanese society, to reach the peasantry through tradit ional rural leaders threatened by the new p o l i t i c a l regime and i ts dominant party.81 This study suggests that these conditions do not at present prevail in most of the Malay rural areas, and that cooperation, on a national level between different Islamic-based social and p o l i t i c a l groups may be more d i f f i c u l t than i t was in Kelantan in the 1950's and 1960's. In part, this is because divisions between the different states, and loyalty to state Rulers, encourage a kind of p o l i t i c a l parochialism, even within a national party, such as PAS. Perhaps of equal importance in l imiting the chances of national-level cooperation between different Islamic groups is the fact that other Islamic groups and leaders are generally regarded by the rural PAS e l i te as threats on a par with the challenge of government intervention. A further reason is related to the conflict ing real economic interests of different groups such as the peasantry, on the one hand and the landowning PAS e l i te on the other. These confl ic ts , which may stand in the way of an effective strategy of rural p o l i t i c a l mobilization, w i l l be more thoroughly discussed in the second half of this chapter. Extremists - Ideology and Goals Apart from their potential for weakening the p o l i t i c a l and 65 religious legitimacy of the more conservative rural ulama, the main p o l i t i c a l significance of the 'extremist' groups l ies in their potential for exacerbating ethnic tensions at the local l e v e l . Although these fanatical groups comprise only a very small fraction of the Malay popu-lat ion, their intensely chauvinistic orientation, the extraordinary dedication of their members, and their propensity to operate outside of the ins t i tut ional ly proscribed limits of p o l i t i c a l competition, make them a threat to rac ial harmony. The P . A . S . , for example, aims at the violent overthrow of the government and the establishment of Darul  Islam, with no rights for non-Muslims. Glearly, non-Muslims cannot help but feel threatened by the existence of such groups. Somewhat surprisingly, in spite of incidents l ike Batu Pahat, Kerling and others, there does not appear to be a strong overt general reaction to the Islamic resurgence phenomenon amongst non-Malays. Although this does not indicate that non-Malays are unconcerned by Islamic extremism, i t does serve to minimize the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for this extremism to escalate into open, violent ethnic confrontations. The staunchest c r i t i c s , in fact, appear to be Malays themselves, from within and without the government. ABIM and government spokesmen alike refer to the teachings of these groups as dakwah songsang (false dakwah), and 82 c r i t i c i s e their emphasis on 'un-Islamic' practices and b e l i e f s . Older leaders cannot always afford to be so c r i t i c a l of the syncretic Islam of these movements, because their own brand of Islam is often infused with Malay adat as opposed to 'orthodox' Islamic tradit ions, and indeed there is some evidence of links between P.A.S. and PAS. Nonetheless, the 66 strategies and objectives of PAS are necessarily very different from those of the extremists. PAS is committed to working within the p o l i t i c a l system, to the accommodation of other ethnic groups within a framework of Malay dominance, and to essentially moderate economic and social p o l i c i e s . The greater danger to rac ial harmony is the p o s s i b i l i t y that PAS leaders, faced with the choice of adapting or losing support may choose to adapt in the direction of Islamic extremism. There is already some speculation that PAS has benefitted electorally from i ts alleged association with the P.A.S. in Kedah. The other side of that p o l i t i c a l coin is that by dissociating i t s e l f from such groups, PAS may lose much needed support. For many rural Malays there may seem to be nothing wrong with an organization which seeks to establish an Islamic state, as does the P.A.S. Indeed i t is central to Islamic doctrine that Muslims should strive to create such a state. Moreover, Islam harbours a d is t inc t ly democratic t radi t ion , in the sense that, in pr inciple , a l l members of the umma are morally equal before God - and this is a tradition which, in pr inciple , sanctions the overthrow by the community 83 of an unjust government or ruler . For these reasons PAS eli tes may find i t hard not to support the extremist groups in the future, and this shif t would bear with i t the danger that extreme r a c i a l i s t appeals would once again find a foothold in the p o l i t i c a l system, and thereby jeopar-dize the ethnic balance. 67 ABIM - Ideology and Goals By far the largest and most inf luent ia l urban dakwah organiza-tion is the Angkatan Belia Islam (Islamic Youth Movement) or ABIM. Philosophically ABIM projects a somewhat rat ionalist and intel lectual approach to Islam, which reflects the English-educated and urban back-ground of i t s founding leaders. ABIM also emphasizes the importance of understanding Islamic principles as a guide to a " s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t way of 84 l i f e that holds the key to a l l of man's problems" - a l - d i n . As such ABIM spokesmen are equally c r i t i c a l of the excessive ritualism of 'syncretic Islam' and the secularism and decadence of urban Malay society. Both of these phenomena, i t is argued, stem from the stagnation of Malay society and Islam which took place under the oppressive influence of Bri t ish colonialism, and of the collaborating aristocracy. S i g n i f i -cantly, in view of these opinions, though not surprisingly, ABIM has not spoken out strongly against the Rulers, nor advocated republicanism. It seems clear that this reticence is enforced by considerations of ' r e a l p o l i t i k ' ; the Rulers continue to be highly respected symbols and leaders in the Islamic community, and in some states actually act as an effective barrier to excessive federal and state government intrusion into Islamic a f f a i r s . Although i t is the most p o l i t i c a l of a l l the urban dakwah groups, ABIM has avoided such overt p o l i t i c a l involvement, concentrating instead on education and social development programs. Through i ts various publications (Risalah and Perspectives for example), seminar series, lecture tours, group discussions and even training camps for Islamic 68 leadership, ABIM spreads i t s message which is oriented more toward the encouragement of Islamic thinking than toward the legal or practical 85 details of Islamic behavior. Nevertheless, i t is clear that the ultimate aim of ABIM's ac t ivi t ies i s to foster a receptive environment for the emergence of an Islamic State. It is in the ABIM conception of Darul Islam Malaysia that i t is possible to find evidence of a critique of the present p o l i t i c a l e l i te and p o l i t i c a l system, which is similar to the views of the younger sub-elite within PAS. ABIM's o f f i c i a l line on the Islamic state is that i t must be social-reformist and non-communal. Anwar Ibrahim, former ABIM president, expressed the commitment to justice (keadilan) and ethnic harmony in the following terms': Islamic leadership w i l l be based on moral and humani-tarian leadership, and one that implements Islamic Laws, a just and equitable economy which w i l l be planned care-f u l l y . Islamic leadership is not chauvinistic.86 We think that Islam should be used as a means to solving the evils in society - corruption, exploitation of the poor and so o n . . . To be fundamentalist doesn't mean to be antagonistic. We integrate well and present Islam in a rational manner. We are co-existing. . . . O u r theme is the relevance of Islam in a mult i - racial society in Malaysia. We do not have double standards.87 There are some who would question: Anwar's last claim, because although ABIM presents an image of enlightened liberalism to sophistica-ted urban audiences, i t s less public discussions have been known to become quite chauvinistic. It is not clear which is the ' r e a l ' ABIM orientation. In fact , there is no reason to believe that i t must be either one or the other; the approach changes depending on what is 69 p o l i t i c a l l y appropriate. In i t s balance between a rat ionalist Islamic critique of the present p o l i t i c a l system, and an underlying current of Malay chauvinism, ABIM comes close to the philosophy and approach of the PAS 'Young Turk' sub-eli te . There would appear to be some basis here for cooperation between the two groups, and indeed there is substantial evidence that such cooperation already exists . Those ABIM members who have campaigned for or have become PAS candidates have been sympathetic to and have collaborated almost exclusively with members of the Young Turk faction. The co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim into the ruling National Front coalit ion suggests that at least some ABIM leaders have p o l i t i c a l ambitions, andperhaps more importantly, that these ambitions might be sat isf ied within the existing p o l i t i c a l system, and even within the ruling party, UMNO (NF). The p o l i t i c a l ambition of ABIM leaders together with the p o l i t i c a l frustration of PAS sub-elites, although i t may create a coherent p o l i t i c a l alliance cannot, therefore, guarantee an effective Islamic opposition. In the case of the sub-elites in PAS, a government strategy of co-optation would be consistent with the ambitions of this group, and would l i k e l y remove this group as a threat to government hegemony. The danger in such a strategy l ies in the very real p o s s i b i l i t y that extensive co-optation would exacerbate strains and divisions over the issue of Islam, within UMNO and the National Front. Jemaat Tabligh - Ideology and Goals Although or iginal ly an organization of Indian Muslims, a large 70 proportion of Jemaat Tabligh's membership is drawn from the ranks of 88 the "young middle class and highly educated professional Malays". Unlike ABIM, Tabligh has no coherent set of economic or p o l i t i c a l goals. Its main aim is to cultivate the inner spir i tual development of i t s members, but i t is at the same time the most aggressively evangelistic 89 of the urban dakwah groups. This aggressiveness extends to rural areas, where Tabligh is the most warmly received of a l l the urban . . . + . 90 missionary organizations. There are a number of reasons for this acceptance, including the widely held bel ief that Tabligh's methods are closest to those of the Prophet. Perhaps more important is Tabligh's lack of explici t p o l i t i c a l ambition and economic idelolgy, and i t s deliberately low emphasis on leaders within the movement. A l l of these factors reduce the potential threat to the legitimacy and authority of the local ulama,and thus mini-mize the tension between the latter and the new missionaries. Darul Arqam - Ideology and Goals Like Jemaat Tabligh and ABIM, Darul Arqam is primarily a movement of the young urban middle class, but i t is much less l i k e l y to become involved in a p o l i t i c a l Islamic movement than ABIM, and at the same time expresses a more explici t economic ideology than Tabligh. Darul Arqam is said to be "essentially n o n - p o l i t i c a l " , and is pre-occupied with " l i t e r a l and rather r i g i d interpretations of codes of dress, food and 91 other items of personal behavior". The most dist inctive aspect of Arqam' s approach is i t s attempt to develop an .["autonomous economic system 71 based on petty manufacturing enterprises, agricultural products and a 92 network of small Malay traders". The main objective is to establish a purely Islamic community, free from the appurtenances of western materialism (T.V. chairs, tables), and from dependence upon the secular government and non-Malays. Relations between Darul Arqam and the rural communities in which they have attempted to establish Islamic micro-communities, are often quite strained,. In addition to the usual problem of communication between urban educated youth and older traditional v i l lagers , i t is the methods and the s t r ic t limitations on personal behavior which many vi l lagers f ind odious, and inappropriate to rural l i v i n g . In the case of Darul Arqam then, i t appears to be largely the preferences of vi l lagers which limits i ts success in rural areas. Local religious leaders, interested in maintaining their own c r e d i b i l i t y are unlikely to seek cooperation with Darul Arqam i f i t s practices are offensive 93 to the community. Even in urban areas " i t s emphasis on a l l things "Arab", in eating and dress styles and matters of daily hygiene...makes Darul Arqam seem rather intimidating to many outs iders . . . and an obstacle to Muslims who feel personally insecure through limitations in 94 their own knowledge of the f a i t h " . In sum, though they draw their respective members and leaders from substantially the same social group, the three most prominent urban dakwah organizations adhere to different ideologies, and pursue unique and often incompatible goals. Despite the tendency to view 72 these groups as a unit or a type, there^ does not appear to be a firm basis for their cooperation as a unified p o l i t i c a l entity. Moreover, with the possible exception of Jemaat Tabligh, the urban-based groups have had limited success in propagating their message in rural areas, largely because of the incompatibility of their goals and strategies, with the values and p o l i t i c a l interests of the rural population, or because their presence poses a threat to the authority of the local 95 ulama. More generally, this outline of the most prominent Islamic organizations, movements and parties , suggests that i t is a mistake at this point to characterize the p o l i t i c a l significance of Islamic resur-gence in Malaysia exclusively in terms of a government versus non-government polarization within the Malay community, or in terms of Malay versus non-Malay ethnic antagonism. Certainly these divisions are part of the total phenomenon of the Islamic resurgence, but they are only a part. If the Islamic resurgence is examined in terms of i ts various i n s t i t u -tional and ideological manifestations - their origins and their relat ion-ships to other groups, including pre-resurgence ones - what emerges is a picture of Malaysian Islam best characterized as multi-polar. Different organizations, movements, parties and even factions have, at this stage, l i t t l e inclination to form a coherent Islamic opposition. Moreover, the pattern of possible future alliances is hard to predict , because they w i l l most certainly vary with p o l i t i c a l circumstances. The fragmented or multipolar configuration of Islam in Malaysia is to a great extent a reflection of important social and p o l i t i c a l 73 differences within the Malay community (urban versus r u r a l , syncretism versus orthodoxy for example), but i t is also a consequence of the variable r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l responses to social change which have emerged 96 from distinguishable social groups (the urban middle-class for example). However, as noted ear l ier , i t is frequently argued that Islam has the symbolic and organizational capacity to transcend such differences and to merge with most other kinds of opposition, to challenge the status 97 quo. It remains, therefore, to discuss whether Islam in Malaysia is l i k e l y to play this role . As a focus for this discussion i t would be best to examine a p o l i t i c a l issue which is regarded as having serious implications for the disruption of Malay non-elite support for the p o l i -t i c a l e l i t e . Some of these issues, l ike the reaction among intellectuals and the urban middle-class, to the alleged corruption and immorality of the present government, have been touched upon in the foregoing discussion. But one of the most important p o l i t i c a l problems for the p o l i t i c a l e l i te is the gap between r ich and poor Malays, and the effect that a strong consciousness of this gap may have on the Malay tradition of unquestioning loyalty and deference to the ruling group. The next section focusses, therefore, on the salience of Islam for the issue of economic grievances of poor Malays in a predominantly rural Malay area -Kedah. Islam and Inequality in Kedah In pr inc iple , Islam harbours a tradition of economic egalitarianism and social just ice . In the economic f i e l d , Jansen writes that Islamic ideology differes from capitalism in three important respects; "(1) i t 74 fights against the accumulation of wealth and the retaining of i t in the hands of a minority. (2) Islamic legislat ion conserves the funds 98 of nations and individuals. (3) charity is a part of worship".' The institutions of zakat and f i t r a h , i t is said, were or ig inal ly intended to ensure the social and economic security of a l l members of the umma, and in particular the "rendering of zakat to poor Muslims is 99 a divinely revealed requirement", one of the five p i l l a r s of Islam. Quranic injunctions are frequently cited in support of these principles . On the subject of charity, the following verse is especially popularr Hast thou not seen him who cries l ies to the doom? That is he who repulses the orphan, and urges not the feeding of the needy. So woe to those that pray and are heedless of their prayers, to those that make display and refuse charity. The restr ic t ion on the charging of interest (riba) was or iginal ly intended to l imit the p o s s i b i l i t y of exploitation through usury, and on that subject the Quran is also eloquent: Those who devour usury shall not rise again, except as he rises who Satan of the touch prostrates; that is because they say ' t raf f i cking is l ike usury' . God has permitted t raff icking and forbidden usury, but freewill offerings He augments with interest. F inal ly , as earl ier noted, conditions of injustice and inequality, in theory, jus t i fy rebellion against the established (and responsible) authority. Islam, then, even in i ts Sunni variant, contains the philosophi-cal or idological basis for a p o l i t i c a l movement aimed at rel ieving a situation of socio-economic inequality or injustice . Indeed, i t has 75 certainly been used to those ends in the not too distant past, even within Malaysia. In Kelantan during the 1950's, Kessler argues, Islam served as the ra l ly ing symbol of a broadly-based popular movement; Rather than being a manifestation of religious fanaticism, Malay racialism and peasant traditionalism, the PMIP (PAS) served as a rel igiously informed move-ment for the defense of peasant interests.102 .It is interesting to consider the likelihood of i ts playing this role again, and outside of Kelantan with i ts unique p o l i t i c a l - r e l i g i o u s v • . 103 history. The four northern states of Malaysia represent a v i t a l p o l i t i c a l constituency for the Malay p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . An important part of the government's strategy in securing non-elite support from this region has been the promotion of rural development and land settlement schemes. The Muda Irrigation Scheme was a program in this vein. In 1970, the Muda Agricultural Development Authority (MADA) stated that the true meaning of this development lay in "the higher incomes and better 104 standards of l i v i n g for the on-farm population". Yet, while the expected increases in agricultural productivity and yield were achieved, Lim Teck Gee (1981) has estimated the incidence of poverty among the Muda padi-farming peasantry to be close to 85%. 1 0 5 Further s t a t i s t i c s , concerning real incomes, production costs, tenancy patterns, levels of landlessness and underemployment, credit a v a i l a b i l i t y , and farm size, point to a similar trend of increasing poverty in the Muda region^ What is relevant here is simply the fact of widespread and growing poverty in the area, and the indications that peasants increa-76 singly regard the central government, rather than landlords or middle-men, as responsible for the economic (and even the climactic!) hard-ships which they suffer. Under these conditions i t would seem reasonable to predict that p o l i t i c a l opposition to the government, on the basis of economic grievances, would be phrased in an Islamic idiom, and led by the major opposition party in the region, PAS. On these grounds, moreover, one might expect to find an increase in PAS support in the region as peasants became more conscious of their relative deprivation, 107 through the process of social mobilization. In fact, electoral data (see Tables #4, #5, #7, #10) indicate that support for PAS has weakened over the last decade, and especially in the last election, which reduced PAS' percentage of the total val id vote in Kedah Parliamentary contests, from 39.6% in 1978 to 30.98% in 1982. There are a number of common explanations for the fai lure of PAS to make a strong showing in Kedah. the government claims that i t is the result of the effectiveness and fairness of development programs and agricultural subsidies. To a certain extent this is true. The government has effectively become the new patron, so that although peasants may regard the government as chiefly responsible for their hardships, they are also aware that i t is through government channels that the most 108 effective redress is l i k e l y to be had. There are reports, for example, of pro-PAS villages becoming frustrated with their lack of access to government aid and loans, and seeking to rec t i fy the situation by changing p o l i t i c a l allegiance to UMNO. Other explanations include the role of of the Sultan (only recently) in l imiting the autonomy and finances of 77 PAS leaders, divisions within the PAS leadership, and the important psychological advantage which attaches to those candidates already in positions of authority and prestige (Dr. Mahathir for example). Less frequently noted have been the deeper social structural factors which may limit PAS success and anti-UMNO outbreaks. One such 109 factor is the internal heterogeneity of Malay society in the region. The simplificat ion of ethnic categories for administrative and p o l i t i c a l purposes has encouraged scholars and pol i t ic ians alike to speak of the essential homogeneity of the society, but a brief glimpse at Kedah's social history indicates that this is a misleading characterization. At least since the late 19th century Kedah has received immigrants in large numbers from Aceh, Java, Bugis, Kelantan and Pattani, to name only the most prominent sources . 1 1 ^ Among these, the Acehnese, Pattani and Kelantanese Muslims are most noteworthy for having migrated to Kedah as families and religious communities following a religious leader, rather than as individuals seeking their fortune. It was primarily these 'Malays' who established rice-farming communities around a pondok, headed by a religious leader/teacher. 1 1"'' The close association of the pondok with rice-growing settlements is best explained by the s u i t a b i l i t y of this kind of agriculture to the subsistence needs of a closely-knit and inward-looking religious community. It is these communities, labelled 'clustered kampongs' by A f i f f u d i n , which have t radit ional ly 112 formed the social base of PAS support in Kedah. In addition to these clustered kampongs, Af i f fudin has ident i -f ied ' l inear ' and 'scattered' types, both of which are more recently 78 settled. Most importantly, the residents of these more recent settlements display soc ia l , religious and p o l i t i c a l characteristics quite dist inct from those l i v i n g in the clustered kampongs. For instance, they tend to belong to different Malay sub-ethnic groups than the earl ier sett lers ; to be more individual is t ic than those in the clustered kampongs; to display a more puritan work ethic, and concern for progress and advancement; to have a religious orientation which is reformist; to have had greater access to secular and English education; and to show somewhat less concern for age and kinship ties in judgements of status 44 and leadership a b i l i t y . The residents of the linear and scattered kampongs, in short, appear to share characteristics with the 'modernist' farmers and businessmen of Java, who also turned to a more rationalist ' this-worldly ' interpretation of Islam, in their attempt to come to terms with social change, and participation in a highly commercialized 115 economy. Briefly then, i t is possible to detect at least two dist inct sub-communities within the larger Kedah Malay society. What i s s igni -ficant here is the possible connection between these social divisions and p o l i t i c a l party a f f i l i a t i o n . Afifuddin reports that " i n the entire mid-section of the Muda scheme, most of the kampongs take the linear form". It is interesting, therefore, that a l l of PAS' presently held state seats (Langgar Limbong and Bukit Raya), and Parliamentary seats (Kota Setar), l i e within the central section of the Muda area. Although any suggestion that i t i s the residents of linear kampongs who are now the major PAS base must be largely speculative, i t does seem clear that the traditional pondok bases of support are dwindling. If 79 PAS has not already begun to appeal to the Muslims of the linear settlements, i t must make that effort now, or be relegated to the 117 p o l i t i c a l wilderness in Kedah. To sum up, the heterogeneity of Kedah's Malay population, and the changing balance of i t s component units , has t radi t ional ly limited the appeal of PAS, and promises, in the near future to remove i t as a p o l i t i c a l contender, unless i t makes more serious overtures to the 'reformist' Muslims of the linear and scattered kampongs. Another factor which inevitably bears on the success of PAS, is i ts p o l i t i c a l strategy at election time. In this regard, Milne and Mauzy noted of the 1978 PAS campaign, that, despite the p o l i t i c a l opportunity offered by certain Malay grievances against the implementation of the NEP, the party shunned economic issues, dismissing them . as less important than purifying Islamic practices and preparing Muslims for the a f t e r - l i f e . The underplaying of issues of economics and poverty does not appear to have been an effective p o l i t i c a l strategy, to a large extent because Kedah's farmers s t i l l "hanker after the goods of urban l i f e , in an 119 inevitable bid to catch up". There are, however, some strong reasons for this de-emphasis. Mansor Haji Othman has found that of a sample of one hundred Kedah farmers, owning more than 30 relongs (21.3 acres), 120 46% were PAS members. In other words, the Kedah rural landed e l i te is comprised almost equally of UMNO and PAS members. What makes this information of particular interest is the fact that, in Kedah, i t was the pondok teachers who, through the collect ion of zakat and the use of the labour of pondok students, became a landed gentry of sorts with close ties to the Sultan. Thus, i t i s l i k e l y that i t i s the most 80 important PAS leaders, and not simply PAS members, who belong to the rural landed e l i t e . If the introduction of land reform measures by UMNO is a p o l i t i c a l impossibili ty, because of the importance of the landed e l i te in the party's strategy of rural mobilization and electoral support, then the proposal of such measures by PAS is equally an impossibili ty . In fact , 100% of Othman's sample were opposed to land reform of any kind. It should be added, however, on the issue of land reform, that while inaction by both parties may be a function of s t i f f resistance from a landed e l i t e , i t is clear that on other issues, the objective class status of local leaders is of immediate relevance. In short the class status of PAS or UMNO leaders does not necessarily interfere with their a b i l i t y to gain followers (indeed i t may enhance i t ) , but i t may well l imit the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the meshing of the Islamic appeal with the economic grievances of the peasantry, and, there-fore, for the emergence of a strong Islamic popular movement against the government. Moreover, the internal heterogeneity of Kedah's (and perhaps Malaysia's) Malay community makes unlikely , in any event, the development of a mass peasant consciousness of relative deprivation. 81 FOOTNOTES Chapter III 1. Clifford Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 213. 2. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy Among Rural Religious El i tes in Malaysia," Man 17 (1) (March 1982), p. 45. 3. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival (Dakwah) on the Rural Religious Culture of Malaysia". Paper presented at the CCSEAS-ISEAS Joint International Conference on "Vil lage Level Modernization. . . " Singapore, June 21-24, 1982, p. 19. 4. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 78-79. 5. I b i d . , p. 77. Roff writes of the "concentration of doctrinal and administrative religious authority in the hands of a hierarchy of o f f i c i a l s direct ly dependent upon the Sultans for their position and power." For more on the history of mosque-state relations, see Chapter 4, this paper. 6. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic Revival (Dakwah) on the Rural Religious Culture of Malaysia," p. 43. 7. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, p. 67. 8. I b i d . , p. 87. 9. Gordon P. Means, "The Role of Islam in the P o l i t i c a l Development of Malaysia," pp. 270-72. 10. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic R e v i v a l . . . " , p. 1. 11. I b i d . , p. 6. Also see, C l i f f o r d Geertz, Religion of Java, for a good discussion of the modern (moderen) and traditional (kolot) variations of Islamic orthodoxy, and their dist inction from the abangan religious philosophy or a l i ran . 12. See pp. 62-63 below for examples of government intrusion into the jurisdictions of tradit ional religious e l i t e s . It is not implied here that there is no overlap between secular and religious eli tes within the ruling group, but rather that a good proportion of religious e l i t e s , (notably those associated with PAS) can no longer be considered to be part of a single and coherent ruling e l i te to the same extent that this may have been possible prior to the Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua s p l i t . See below Chapter 4, Mosque-State Relations: History. 82 13. For more detailed accounts of PAS history see: Y. Mansoor Marican, "Malay Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaya," Islamic  Studies, No. 16 (1977), pp. 291-301; N. J . Funston, "The Origin of Parti Islam Se Malaysia," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7 (1) (March 1976), pp. 58-73; K. J . Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967), passim. 14. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revivalism and P o l i t i c a l D i s a f f e c t i o n . . . . " p. 6; and Marican, "Malay Nat ional ism. . . " , p. 299. 15. N. J . Funston, "The Origin of Parti Islam Se Malaysia", p. 66. 16. The Br i t i sh banned the MNP Youth wing, API, and in August 1948, arrested without t r i a l 7 Hizbul Muslimin leaders, thus effectively putting an end to the H.M. and MATA. See N. J . Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Pol i t i cs of Islamic Reassertion, p. 168. 17. N. J . Funston, "The Origins of Parti Islam Se Malaysia: , p. 69. 18. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revivalism and P o l i t i c a l D i s a f f e c t i o n . . . " , p. 6. 19. For an idea of PAS' weakness in these areas, see I. Kassim, Race, Pol i t ics and Moderation, p. 95. He indicates that in 1978, PAS contested 30 state and 18 Parliamentary seats in mixed (no absolute Malay or Chinese majority) and Chinese majority areas, and won none of them. Also see Diane K. Mauzy, "A Vote for Continuity: The 1978 General Elections in Malaysia", Asian Survey XIX (3)(March 1979), pp. 281-96. 20. See Tables 7, 9, and 10 for the s ta t is t ics on PAS in Kedah which appear here. Kedah may be a special case because of the serious leadership divisions within PAS, between the Old guard and the Young Turks. See pp. 55-57 on internal PAS divisions. 21. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Pol i t i cs and Government in Malaysia, pp. 389-90. The breakdown for the Kelantan state elections was as follows: Berjasa 11, NF 23, PAS 2. 22. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legi t imacy . . . " , passim. 23. Idem, "The Impact of the Religious R e v i v a l . . . " , p. 17. 24. I b i d . , p. 13. 25. G. H. Jansen, Mili tant Islam (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 166. 83 26. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy. . . pp. 52-53. 27. I b i d . , p . 48. 28. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change " , p. 417 29. This has been suggested by a number of Malay p o l i t i c a l leaders, and also in the New Straits Times, 19 March 1980. 30. A. J . Stockwell, B r i t i s h Policy and Malay P o l i t i c s during the  Malayan Union Experiment; 1945-48. The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asia t ic Society, Monograph No. 8 (Kuala Lumpur: 1979), p . 156 Also see Syed Husin A l i , Malay Peasant Society and Leadership, p. 114; and N. J . Funston, "Malaysia" i n M. Ayoob (ed.), The  P o l i t i c s of Islamic Reassertion, p . 172. . . 31.. A. J . Stockwell, pp. 146-62. 32. I b i d . , p. 158. 33. Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 A p r i l 1982, p . 24. 34. Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979. These comprised about two dozen attacks and several deaths. Von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", attributes them to Pakistani and Indian fanatics, pp. 171-72. • 35. Asiaweek, 7 November 1980, reports that 8 of the attackers were k i l l e d and 23 victims wounded at Batu Pahat. The Qadianis of . Johore also claim their leader to be Mahdi, Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change. . . " , p. 417. Other cul t -l i k e movements include Mufaradiyah which has a strong Sufi influence: Matahari, which teaches that i t i s possible to dispense with normal Islamic r i tuals l ike praying. 36. On the idea of the Imam Mahdi, and other aspects of Islam's revolutionary and millenarian t radi t ions , see Thomas Hodgkin, "The Revolutionary Tradition in Islam", Race and Class XXI (3) (Summer 1979), pp.' 221-38. 37. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic R e v i v a l . . . " , pp. 1-6, discusses the kinds of roles and practices which are often expected of religious leaders, by their followers. 38. New Straits Times, 13 January 1982. 39. Afifuddin bin Haji Omar; Diane K. Mauzy interview, May 1980. 84 40. 43 44 45. 47. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legit imacy. . . " , p. 52. 41. I b i d . , p. 56. 42. I b i d . , p. 56. See pp. 7-9 above.. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revivalism and P o l i t i c a l Disaffection . . . " , p. 3; von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", p. 170, stresses the s t r ic ter adherence to Islamic law and to the goal of Darul Islam. Ruth T. McVey, "Islam Explained", Review a r t i c l e , Pacific  Affairs 54 (2) (Summer 1981), p. 278. 46. I b i d . , p. 283, This discussion i s based primarily on Funston's treatment of the roots of the urban dakwah movement. N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Pol i t i cs of Islamic'Reassertion, pp. 157-.70. ~ ~ 48. I b i d . , p. 170. 49. I b i d . , p. 157. Some of the f i r s t student leaders had close connections with the Malay Language Society. 50. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revivalism and P o l i t i c a l D i s a f f e c t i o n . . . " , p. 4. 51. Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", pp. 168-69 52. J . A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change. . ." , p. 411. 53. Idem, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legit imacy. . . " , p. 49. 54. Far Eastern Economic Review,10 A p r i l 1981. 55. N. J . Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob, (ed.), The Pol i t ics  of Islamic Reassertion, p. 171. 56. V. S. Naipaul, Among the Believers (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981). The chapter on Malaysia, which consists largely of conversations with urban dakwah followers, gives a good sense of t h i s . 57. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 A p r i l 1981, p. 75. 85 58. Chandra Muzaffar, The Universalism of Islam (Penang: A l i r a n , 1979), cited in Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", pp. 168-69. 59. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Religious R e v i v a l . . . " , pp. 14-15. 60. Idem, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legit imacy. . . " , p. 53. 61. I b i d . , p. 53. 62. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change. . ." , p. 427. 63. Ruth T. McVey,"Islam Explained", p. 285. For a f u l l e r discus-sion of the link between the N.U. and the youth, see M. K. Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to New Order Modernization (Jakarta: Dewan Bahasa, 1980). 64. That i s , committed to the formation of an Islamic State-Darul Islam. 65. N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Pol i t ics of  Islamic Reassertion, p. 169. 66. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, p. 223. 67. I b i d . , pp. 138-40. 68. New Straits Times, 7 A p r i l 1982. 69. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 262-64. 70. I b i d . , 6 A p r i l 1982. 71. I b i d . , 7 A p r i l 1982. 72. N. J . Funston, Malay Pol i t ics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO  and PAS, (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann, 1980), pp. 149-52. 73. A s r i , in fact, had referred, in 1982 to the p o s s i b i l i t y of collaborating electorally with DAP. New Straits Times, 1 A p r i l 1982. 74. New Straits Times, 9 A p r i l 1982. 75. I b i d . , 2, 6,.7, Apri l 1982. 86 76. I b i d . , 7 A p r i l 1982. 77. There is the p o s s i b i l i t y that a new 'non-traditional ' Islamic sector w i l l emerge to become the PAS base under a more reformist leadership. See discussion of the heterogeneity of Kedah Malay society, later in this chapter. At present the struggle between the -'Ol'd Guard1 and the 'Young Turks' is unresolved in Perlis and Kedah. However, the 'Young Turks' are dominant in Trengganu, and the 'Old Guard' remains dominant in Kelantan, Diane K. Mauzy, personal communication. 78. For a f u l l e r discussion of rural authority structures and the question of leader-follower relationships, see Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy Among Rural Religious El i tes in Malaysia", pp. 43-47; and Syed Husin A l i , Malay Peasant Society and Leadership (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), passim. 79. This discussion is based primarily on Kessler's account in Islam and P o l i t i c s ' i n a Malay State. 80. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change. . ." , p. 430. 81. Clive S. Kessler, Islam and Pol i t i cs in a Malay State, p. 126. 82. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legit imacy. . . " , p. 51. 83. Chandra Muzaffar, Protector? p. 73, p. 136. 84. N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Pol i t i cs of  Islamic Reassertion, p. 175. 85. Anonymous, "Islamic Revivalism and the P o l i t i c a l Process in Malaysia" - - unpublished paper in D. K. Mauzy col lect ion, p. 425. 86. Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia," p. 74. 87. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1980, p. 36. 88. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy", p. 51. 89. Anonymous, "Islamic R e v i v a l i s m . . . " . 90. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legi t i -macy. . . " , p. 55. 87 Idem, "The Impact of the Islamic R e v i v a l . . . " , p. 8. Idem, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legit imacy. . . " , p. 50. Idem, "The Impact of the Islamic R e v i v a l . . . " , p. 12. I b i d . , p. 9. The problem of incompatibility of goals is perhaps even more obvious in relations between the Islamic groups and parties on the one hand, and the PSRM (Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia) on the other. For a brief outline of the origins and ideas of the Malay-dominated PSRM, see R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Pol i t i cs and Government in Malaysia, p. 146. For a discussion of i ts predecessor, the Partai Rakyat (P.R.) , see K . J . Ratnam and R. S. Milne The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967), passim. For an interesting discussion of variations in cultural and religious responses to change, part icularly as i t relates to the question of a l i ran , see C l i f f o r d Geertz, The Religion of Java, Chapter 13; and Islam Observed, passim. This capacity to mobilize is most in evidence under conditions of a threat to Islam. See Chapter 1, f n . 2. G. H. Jansen, Mili tant Islam, p. 180. J . T. Cummings, et a l . , "Islam and Modern Economic Change", pp. 26-27. I b i d . , p. 38. I b i d . , p. 32 . Clive S. Kessler, Islam and P o l i t i c s in a Malay State, p. 35. Kelantan in the 1950's was unique in the sense that there.was a strong polarization within the Malay community, which enhanced the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for cooperation between different social groups. This kind of polarization does not obtain in Kedah, least of a l l the polarization between the peasantry and the ruling class. For Kelantan, see Kessler, Islam and P o l i t i c s , pp. 63-70 and 94-127. S. Jegarthesen, "Land Tenure in Muda: Income Distribution and Reform" MADA Monograph No. 29, 1976. 88 Lim Teck Ghee, "Muda: The Green Revolution Reassessed", Seminar at Cornell University, (December, 1980) . There is a large body of literature dealing both with the Muda area and West Malaysian agriculture generally. This is a small sample of this l i terature . A f i f f u d i n bin Haji Omar, Peasants, Institutions and Development in Malaysia.; Rsdolphe deKoninck, "Integration of the Peasantry; Examples from Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific Affairs 52 (3) ( F a l l , 1979), pp. 265-91; T. B. Wilson, The Economics of  Padi Production in Northern Malaya^ Part I, Department of Agriculture, Bulletin No. 103, K.L . 1959; Ingrid Palmer, The New Rice in Asia , U . N . R . I . S . D . No. 76.6, 1976; D. S. Gibbons, et a l . , Agricultural Modernization, Poverty and  Inequality, (West Mead: Saxon House, 1980) . Most of this l i terature supports the conclusions made here regarding increasing rural poverty. For a synthesis of these arguments and findings, see Geoffrey B. Robinson, "Islamic Resurgence and P o l i t i c a l Change in Malaysia" Unpublished Paper, University of Br i t ish Columbia, 1982. pp. 25-30. See James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), for an introduction to the Moral Economy School of peasant rebell ion. See Karl W. Deutsch, J r . , "Social Mobilization and P o l i t i c a l Development" in Claude E. Welch, J r . , P o l i t i c a l Modernization (second edn») (Belmont.^California: Duxbury Press, 1971), pp. 153-76, for formative theoretical statements on the concept of "social mobilization". For a discussion of patron-client p o l i t i c s , and their changing patterns, see James C. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Southeast Asia", Journal of Asian  Studies XXXII, (1) (November, 1972). Judith A. Nagata, Malaysia Mosaic, passim. Ibid. Afifuddin bin Haji Omar, Peasants, Institutions and Develop-in Malaysia. Idem, "A Study on Leadership Patterns, Act ivi t ies and Behaviour Among Leaders of F . A . ' s within the Muda Scheme," MADA Monograph, No. 17, July, 1972. I b i d . , p. 5. 89 114. I b i d . , passim 115. James L. Peacock, Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in  Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 175-86. Peacock finds a similar 'reformist' ethic in Kedah's Muslim population. Geertz, Religion of Java, refers to "the economic advantages of a religious ethic emphasizing t h r i f t , hard work, and individual e f f o r t . . . " , p. 134. 116. Afifuddin bin Haji- Omar, "A Study on Leadership Pat terns . . . " , p. 32. 117. Even in PAS 'strongholds' such as Bukit Raya, PAS does not have a clear majority of Malay support. In fact, PAS apparently won Bukit Raya in 1982 (after losing narrowly to NF in a recent by-election) because of strong Chinese support, and in spite of a nearly even s p l i t in the Malay vote between UMNO and PAS. Diane K. Mauzy, personal communication, August 1982. 118. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Pol i t ics and Government in  Malaysia. A similar reticence on economic issues was evident in the 1982 elections, and in the intervening years. 119. Judith A. Nagata, "The Impact of the Islamic R e v i v a l . . . " , p. 15. Nagata is here relating the views of former ABIM president Anwar Ibrahim. 120. Mansur Haji Othman, "Ownership of Padi Land and Pol i t ics in Kedah" (in Malay) (M.S.S. Thesis, Universi t i Sains Malaysia, November 1978). 90 CHAPTER IV: ISLAM AND STATE POLICY The strategies employed by the Malaysian government to limit the erosion of Malay non-elite support under the influence of the Islamic resurgence can be subsumed under four categories: (1) Co-optative; (2) Coercive; (3) Diversive; (4) Informative-promotional. The main arguments in this chapter are, f i r s t , that the constellation of state strategies demonstrates a considerable f l e x i b i l i t y on the part of the National Front, in the sense that i t is able to employ an essentially inclusionary/co-optative approach, rather than one more heavily balanced toward exclusion/coercion. Secondly, contrary to the assumption that the' •.: outbidding of Islamic groups is inherently more d i f f i c u l t to accommodate, the government has so far been able to make important concessions to the demands of these groups, without seriously alienating non-Malays. With a few important exceptions, such as the National Islamic Bank, the government has 5 u n t i l very recently, avoided zero-sum p o l i t i c a l choices. Thirdly , state policies toward Islam have been especially effective at undercutting the Islamic challenge where they have been consistent with, and have therefore reinforced the social structural limitations on the growth of a united Islamic-based p o l i t i c a l opposition. F inal ly , the danger in the government's inclusionary approach is that i t may exacerbate divisions over the question of Islam, within the National Front and especially within UMNO. Before proceeding with the analysis of present government strategies, i t w i l l be instruc-91 tive to look b r i e f l y at the history of relations between Islam and the state in Malay(si)a. Islam and the State; History Prior to the arr ival of the B r i t i s h , the p o l i t i c a l significance of Islam in the Malay Peninsula lay mainly in i ts value for legitimating 'royal authority' , and providing a symbol of unity for citizens of Malay states.''" However, as in the realm of p o l i t i c a l organization, so also in that of religious bel ief and practice "the pre-colonial Malay s ta te . . . lacked the resources necessary for centralization of authority". Furthermore, no recognizeable class of ulama, or religious legal o f f i c i a l s existed except at the local leve l . The expansion, in the late 19th century, of Bri t ish p o l i t i c a l authority into the area, s ig -ni f i cant ly altered the relationship between Islam and the state. Although the Pangkor Engagement of 1874 established the principle of Br i t ish non-interference in matters of Malay custom and r e l i g i o n , Roff and Yegar both agree that the observance of this principle was limited to those areas which least affected colonial administration; 3 generally matters of ceremony and r i t u a l . Thus, not only was the authority of the Rulers limited to subjects of re l igion and custom, i t was further circumscribed to the degree that outside of these spheres the Rulers retained l i t t l e more than a symbolic significance. Nonetheless, i t was a symbolism which was taken seriously by most Malays, and i t encouraged the development of a closer connection between the Malay identity, the Sultan, and the re l igion of Islam; an association 92 which persists for many Malays to this day. A second, and-'equally significant consequence of-Bri t ish, colonialism was the growth, in most states, of centralized systems of religious administration, and religious legal enforcement. In part, this was done by the Rulers to establish their authority in the one realm s t i l l open to them, and in part i t was done to compete with the western bureaucratic and legal systems which were progressively establishing control over Malay society.^ Kessler writes that in Kelantan, . . . the Islamic administration, expanded by leading religious o f f i c i a l s connected to the aristocracy, was becoming a counterweight to a secular state apparatus increasingly alien in content, personnel and 'ideology' .6 Although i t was Islam which was expanded, i t was western systems and methods which provided the model to emulate, and western sources of p o l i t i c a l power which permitted the Rulers to establish the new religious bureaucracies. Referring to the policy of preservation of the Malay eli tes and the non-interference in re l ig ion , Roff writes: . . . the preservation and reinforcement of the t radi -tional bases of authority and social organization implici t in this policy , together with greatly improved means of communication and backed by the effective sanctions now open to British-supported Sultans, com-bined to produce an authoritarian form of religious administration much beyond anything known in the penin-sula before.^ By the 1920's most states had a central religious authority l ike Kelantan's Majlis Agama Islam dan Isti 'adat Melayu (Council of Religion and Malay Custom), or at least a Religious Committee on the State Council. In both cases i t was generally the Ruler who controlled appointments, 93 and delegated authority to the hierarchy of religous o f f i c i a l s . Under this system, Sharia law was, for the f i r s t time, systematically organized and enforced by Islamic courts presided over by appointed kathis. And the alliance which these represented, between the "forces of the traditional e l i te and 'orthodox' Islam was powerful and pervasive, g not least in the eyes of the Malay peasant". In short, under the B r i t i s h , Islam acted as a conservative and s tabi l iz ing force which, generally speaking, had the effect of keeping rural Malay society static and hierarchical , insulated from the modernist influences from the Middle-East, and the social strains which might have'inspired . 9 nationalist passions. The emergence of the Kaum Muda in the 1920's and 1930's did not result in a break in the allegiance of the majority of Malays to the traditional e l i t e , and to the Sultans in particular . Malay p o l i t i c s remained e l i t i s t and essentially conservative u n t i l the interlude of Japanese rule and u n t i l the resented Malayan Union Scheme (a Br i t ish proposal) ignited mass-based Malay nationalism. Even then, however, i t was the party of the traditional Malay aristocracy which mobilized the Malays, and their appeals were primarily traditional chauvinistic appeals to protect the Malay race and community. Nonetheless, after the war, the Br i t i sh began to show more concern about the p o l i t i c a l potential of Islam, and responded by taking a more direct role in Islamic administration. In 1948, the government estab-lished State Departments of Religious A f f a i r s , which were ostensibly intended to permit greater communication between the government and 94 prominent I s l a m i c l e a d e r s , p o l i t i c i a n s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s . More to the p o i n t , B r i t i s h p o l i c y by t h i s time r e f l e c t e d UMNO Malay i n t e r e s t s , and i t i s c l e a r that these i n c l u d e d a d e s i r e to draw the p o t e n t i a l l y d i s -r u p t i v e I s l a m i c o p p o s i t i o n groups more c l o s e l y under government c o n t r o l . The leader of UMNO at that time, Dato Onn b i n Jaafar, f o r example, was r e f e r r i n g to the I s l a m i c r e f o r m i s t s (the H i z b u l Muslimin) i n h i s famous warning; "Hubaya - hub aya! B ah aya turun d a r i gunong", which t r a n s l a t e s roughly as "Watch out! the danger descends from the mountain", where the H i z b u l Muslimin had t h e i r headquarters. "^ Through the 1950's both UMNO and the p a r t i e s o f the o p p o s i t i o n r e s o r t e d i n c r e a s i n g l y to r e l i g i o u s appeals i n t h e i r attempts to gain the mass Malay constituency. Although the government f o r the most part remained outside of r e l i g i o u s issues u n t i l Merdeka (1957), s t a t e governments were a c t i v e l y d e f i n i n g , e n f o r c i n g and promoting Isl a m i c p r i n c i p l e s and laws through the 1950 ' s . ^ With Merdeka, the c e n t r a l government immediately became inv o l v e d i n I s l a m i c a f f a i r s , because of the singular'importance of winning r u r a l Malay support f o r maintaining p o l i t i c a l power and l e g i t i m a c y , and because of the strong t h r e a t posed to t h a t support by the r u r a l ulama' of PAS, and t h e i r f o l l o w e r s . In 1959, f o r i n s t a n c e , PAS won 41 of 53 s t a t e seats and 13 of 16 P a r l i a -12 mentary seats i n the s t a t e s of Kelantan and Trengganu. The government response to the challenge c o n s i s t e d p r i m a r i l y of e f f o r t s to l i m i t and c o n t r o l r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n and behavior, and to pose as the patron of the f a i t h : by funding the c o n s t r u c t i o n of mosques, sponsoring n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l I s l a m i c conferences, and Quran-reading contests, and, 13 i n general, by devoting about 10% of the n a t i o n a l budget to Islam. The c o n s t i t u t i o n , promulgated at the time of Merdeka, provides 95 that Islam shall be the ' o f f i c i a l r e l i g i o n ' of the Federation, but s ignif icant ly not the 'state r e l i g i o n ' . Non-Muslims are prohibited from proselytizing among Muslims, but Muslims are free to engage in missionary act ivi ty among members of a l l rel igions . Islam is o f f i -c i a l l y included in the definit ion of a Malay, so that being a Muslim is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for receiving the 14 special privileges accorded to Malays. F inal ly , the constitution places limits on the questioning of Islamic orthodoxy, either in a public forum, or through religious instruction. While these provisions were intended to protect and promote Islam, Means has argued that the real effect was to place the rel igion in a r i g i d legal mould, and under the control of traditional conservative e l i t e s , thereby sapping o f f i c i a l Islam of i ts v i t a l i t y and adaptability. The consequence was that modernists and more ortho-dox leaders alike were able to challenge the Islamic dedication of the government. Together with the competition for the Malay vote, this resulted in a situation of persistent outbidding by opposition parties l ike PAS, which, in turn, forced UMNO to make concessions in the hope of placating or co-opting c r i t i c s of the government. This essentially 'reactive' strategy created serious d i f f i c u l t i e s for the All iance , because i t allowed outbidding to intensify to the point where i t began to weaken non-elite support and to heighten ethnic antagonism. The c r i s i s of 1969 convinced the Alliance el i tes that a more positive and aggressive strategy was needed; a strategy which would remove the causes of ethnic antagonism, and which, in the meantime, would place limits on 96 the p o l i t i c s of outbidding. As earl ier noted, however, consiti tutional and legal amendments made since 1971, although they have effectively put an end to extreme ethnic outbidding, have at the same time deflected Malay opposition challenges into the idiom of I s l a m . ^ Moreover, as Chandra Muzaffar notes, the introduction of Islam into the p o l i t i c a l realm has provided a greater degree of legitimacy to Malay opposition cr i t i c ism. This is especially so since Islam, as a social phi lo-sophy, legitimizes such a challenge, part icularly when a leadership has deviated from j u s t i c e . . . It is Islam in p o l i t i c s then that has transformed the environment and atmosphere in which unquestioning loyalty is being preserved and perpetuated.17 After 1969, the change in government policy toward a more concertedly pro-Malay position, further encouraged the growth of 18 Islam as a focus and idiom of p o l i t i c a l competition. For instance, the government took steps to expand the religious bureaucracy under the Prime Minister 's Department; i t entered into a coali t ion with PAS, thereby indicating in part, a stronger government commitment to Islam; and i t expanded Malay opportunities for tert iary education, especially for rural Malays, thereby creating a larger base for urban dakwah movements. Today the government continues with this essentially inclusionary/co-optative strategy, in i ts bid to undercut the appeal of the Islamic opposition. (1) Co-optative Strategies The strategy of co-opting opposition parties into the ruling 97 coalit ion is a major part of the consociational style of the National Front. It has proven to be an effective method of gaining larger-than-minimal all iances, and of securing large electoral majorities, both of which are essential to the maintenance of government legitimacy and to the v i a b i l i t y of the consociational system i t s e l f . The co-optation of the major Islamic opposition party, PAS, has been an option intermittently entertained by the Alliance/National Front el i tes for at least two decades. It was only under the rather exceptional circumstance of the early 1970's 19 that both UMNO and PAS leaders f i n a l l y agreed to such an al l iance. From the point of view of both parties, but expecially PAS, the coalit ion was not an unmitigated success. PAS is only now beginning to recover from a serious loss of c r e d i b i l i t y suffered during the years of participation in the National Front. In recent months the UMNO leadership has once again begun to extend to PAS the offer of coal i t ion . There seems l i t t l e chance that the PAS leadership w i l l accept, part icularly in view of the party's moderate come-back, in Kelantan and Trengganu, in the 1982 elections. A s r i ' s cautious replies to the Prime Minister 's overtures in the pre-election period should probably be interpreted as efforts to project an image of PAS' reasonable-20 ness and i ts genuine concern for Malay-Muslim unity. Moreover he must tread l ight ly on the issue of coali t ion because i t is one which is sharply debated within his own party. Asri was c r i t i c i z e d by PAS 21 branches in Kubang Pasu for not accepting the NF offer , for example. At the same time, acceptance of the offer would have brought a storm 98 of condemnation from those intent on removing Asri from the leadership. On the government side, Dr. Mahathir's offers appeared to be a tactic aimed primarily at exposing PAS' adversarial attitudes, and i ts alleged efforts to show disunity in the Malay community. Although Dr. Mahathir, personally, puts a high premium on Malay unity, i t is unlikely that UMNO, in fact, wants to see the PAS old guard once again within the National Front. The more genuine efforts at co-optation have taken place amongst the younger more intel lectual elements within PAS. Indeed, in the pre-election period UMNO leaders seemed genuinely concerned that the urban Islamic resurgence might provide a boost to PAS prospects in urban areas. During the campaign, UMNO appealed both to PAS leaders and members not to let the young 22 intellectuals run for office on a PAS t icket . The most noticeable and significant UMNO acquisition is the charismatic former president of ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar publicly announced that he had chosen to join UMNO because he was convinced that the new administration was genuinely committed to Islam and to 23 bringing development and security to Malaysian society. It is not yet clear whether this was the real reason for Anwar's move. What is certain is that UMNO has increased i ts Islamic c r e d i b i l i t y enormously. On the day following the move, about 400 PAS members in Pasir Mas, Kelantan reportedly switched allegiance to the National 24 " Front Islamic party, Berjasa. Anwar's own electoral victory over 25 PAS incumbent Zabidi bin Haji A l i , was overwhelming. Moreover, the inclusion of Anwar in the government line-up is consistent with the 99 new UMNO emphasis on the development of a young, educated, techno-cratic p o l i t i c a l e l i t e , the nomination l i s t s for the 1982 elections showed the highest turnover of candidates within the National Front 26 in the history of Malaysia. F inal ly , the government is hoping that the co-optation of Anwar w i l l create something of a precedent, by which i t can hope to discourage young intellectual Islamic leaders from joining the opposition. During the recent campaign, for example, Datuk Sanusi Junid argued that PAS candidates Ustaz Nahkaie Ahmad and Ustaz Fadzil Noor (former ABIM vice-president), should not run because i t would hurt Islamic unity, and because, "as close associates of former ABIM leader, Encik Anwar Ibrahim, b o t h . . . should give their 27 support to UMNO". The government's co-optative strategy also involves the effort to gain the direct support of present and potential PAS followers, and a l l of those caught up in the Islamic resurgence. This strategy implies the 'co-optation' or undercutting of opposition demands and proposals, through the aggressive expansion of the government's Islamic programs. Former Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn explained the logic be hind this strategy as follows: You may wonder why we spend so much money on Islam. You may think i t is a waste of money. If we don't, Parti Islam (PAS) w i l l get at us. The party w i l l and . does claim that we are not rel igious , and (that) the people wi 11 lose faith.28 The programs include: increased government spending on mosque-building, which UMNO representatives frequently compare to the paltry sums spent by PAS in Kelantan; an increase in Islamic radio and 100 television programming, and greater restrictions on broadcasts which may give offence to Muslims; public declarations of support for principles of Islamic morality, such as khalwat, while at the same time stressing that these ought not to be binding on non-Muslims; legislat ion which prohibits the serving of alcohol at government functions, and a general crackdown on the corrupting elements of western culture, such as alcohol, drugs, pornography, rock music and beauty contests; regular Quran-reading-contests and, beginning in December 1978, annual 'Dakwah Months' designed in the then Prime Minister 's words, "to give the (dakwah) movement some order and good 29 sense"; investment laws sensitive to Islamic restrictions on interest, and the recent decision to establish an Islamic Bank in 30 1983; an increase in the number of students sent abroad to study, and the sponsorship (by Perak) of a student's hostel in Cairo; plans to build a M$ 12 mil l ion Islamic complex in Ipoh; an expansion and intensif icat ion of trade, investment and friendship t ies , with Muslim states, including for example the Prime Minister 's recent tours to Oman, united Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and the granting of diplomatic status to the PLO in Kuala Lumpur; the standardization of legislat ion on various aspects of Islamic practice, including most recently, Muslim Marriage and Family laws; the construction of a complex in K.L . to house the new headquarters of the Pilgrim Manage-ment and Fund Board (Luth), which aids Malaysian Muslims in making the haj ; the decision to set up an Islamic University with instruction 101 in Arabic and English, shortly after a government decision to reject 31 the proposed Chinese-language Merdeka University; the administration of fines to shopkeepers serving Malays during Puasa; and the suspension of meals at national primary schools during Puasa, despite the presence 32 of non-Malays. With the exception of the last three mentioned, and possibly the Islamic Bank decision, government programs do not seriously challenge the r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l status quo, in the direction of Darul Islam, nor are they seriously offensive to non-Muslims. Their value to the government l ies in providing concrete and symbolic evidence of the government's pro-Islamic character. This evidence is useful both in refuting the accusations of Islamic c r i t i c s , and in convincing ordinary Muslims that the government is genuinely devoted to the f a i t h . None-theless, more recent policy decisions indicate that the government may now be more committed to altering the Islamic status quo, than i t once was. Although i t is too early to predict the f u l l consequences of this trend, i t can be speculated that i t w i l l enhance the government's Islamic legitimacy, but at the same time alienate many non-Malay government supporters. Yet another component of the co-optative strategy is the effort to control Islam by increasing the direct involvement of the central government in (i) the propagation, and ( i i ) the administration of r e l i g i o n . The expansion of a national Islamic inst i tut ional infrastruc-ture, accordingly, has been in two directions; (i) dakwah and education, and ( i i ) administration and legal a f f a i r s . The federal government's \ 102 a b i l i t y to deal with religious opposition has always been complicated by the fact that, constitutionally, rel igion is under state j u r i s d i c -t ion . In response to this problem, the government established, in 1968, the Malaysian National Islamic Council, as an advisory body attached to the Prime Minister 's Department. Through the 1970's, the role of the Council was expanded to include Islamic instruction, the publication . of Islamic materials, control over an Islamic Research Centre, and the direction of the Islamic Missionary Fund. Renamed the Malaysian Council for Islamic A f f a i r s , in 1974, this body's major function today is to coordinate the ac t ivi t ies of, and l i a i s e with State Religious Councils, and Departments of Religious A f f a i r s , and i t is generally regarded as an instrument to l imit the autonomy of 33 state religious o f f i c i a l s . A separate body, the Islamic Council of the Federal Territory, is empowered to issue fatwa (Islamic legal judgements), which State Re-ligious Councils are urged to follow, and Mentris Besar ( legally, not permitted to meddle with the religious prerogatives of the Rulers), 34 have begun to meet, to discuss and coordinate religious policy . Yet despite these efforts to establish central inst i tut ional control of Islam, State Religious Councils and Rulers continue to exercise a good measure of autonomy in matters of Islamic law and administration. Within the state religious bureaucracies, for instance, the Council of Ulama controls the collection and distribution of zakat and f i t r a h , and can therefore affect the strength of pondoks, and can control what is taught in religious schools. Moreover, because i t is the 103 Ruler who appoints this Council, i t is he who has effective control over a large part of Islamic administration at the state leve l . The Sultans of Kedah and Pahang, for instance, are known to take their religious prerogatives very seriously, and frequently refuse to co-operate with federal and state governments on matters pertaining to Islam. More recently, however, the Sultan of Kedah has begun to work more closely with both governments, apparently in recognition of the need to combat Islamic extremism and the use of Islam for p o l i t i c a l l y disruptive purposes (e.g. Alor Setar r i o t s , 1980). The cooperation of the Rulers and the government on the issue of Islam, where and when i t occurs, does serve to limit the ac t ivi t ies of the Islamic opposition. Similarly , on the question of dakwah, state governments and the Rulers have begun to cooperate more f u l l y with the federal govern-ment in l imiting the appeal and autonomy of the propagators of dakwah  songsang. The main inst i tut ional efforts at undercutting dakwah extremism however have originated at the national leve l . For instance, nearly every government department has a dakwah section, which is designed to observe and direct the dakwah act ivi t ies within i ts 35 jur isdic t ion . The federal government is also involved, both direct ly and indirect ly in a large number of dakwah organizations. The oldest, Pertubohari Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim), founded by the Tunku in 1960, concentrates on the conversion of non-Muslims. By 1977 Perkim claimed to have converted about 30,000, although i t did admit 36 that the incidence of recidivism could be as high as 60%. The greater part of the government's dakwah effort is directed toward Malay Muslims. Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah (YDIM) and the Dakwah 104 Training Institute (sponsored by the P.M.'s Department), are the most important of the government's inst i tut ional developments in this 37 regard. Although the stated aim of the government's organizations and programs is to combat 'false dakwah' and to raise the level of correct Islamic teachings, most observers recognize that i t is some-thing more than that. One author writes that government missionaries: seldom showed a c r i t i c a l attitude toward government pol ic ies . Rather they generally raised aspects of Islam that supported the position of the government, or touched on Islam in a general manner, such as emphasizing that i t endorses progress , . . . A few govern-ment missionaries were considered unsuitable or too radical , and were eventually shifted to other positions or forbidden to teach.38 That government dakwah programs have a p o l i t i c a l flavour should, of course, come as no surprise, but i t is worth noting that the labels 'un-Islamic' and 'false dakwah' can be as much code words for 'ant i -government' or 'anti-status quo', as they are objective assessments of degrees of Islamic orthodoxy. To sum up, the government, in i ts effort to undercut the appeal of an Islamic opposition, employs a co-optative strategy which has three components: (1) the co-optation of key Islamic leaders in the hope of gaining the support of their followers, and also of establishing c redibi l i ty as a government committed to Islam; (2) the sponsorship of highly v i s i b l e pro-Islamic programs to undercut the cr i t ic ism and the appeal of other Islamic groups, in a way which is appealing to the large majority of Malays; (3) the development of an inst i tut ional infrastructure designed both to direct and control the administration of Islam and to l imit the autonomy of non-government Islamic 105 organizations. These three components of the co-optative strategy have been effect ively and astutely implemented. However, the success of the strategy is to a large extent a function of the character of Malay Islam and Malaysian p o l i t i c s . The strategy of e l i te co-optation, for instance, is effective only as long as the key leaders' of the Islamic 'opposition' are wi l l ing to be co-opted. If their principles are genuinely Islamic and their p o l i t i c a l orientation is sincerely anti -status quo, the policy of co-optation is less l i k e l y to be effective. In this regard, the co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim should not be under-stood simply as a preview of the path to be followed by a l l young Muslim intel lec tuals , because not a l l of these are necessarily as p o l i t i c a l l y ambitious as Anwar. Ustaz Nahkaie Ahmad and Ustaz Fadzil Noor, for example, have resisted the temptation to change sides, despite the frustration that their faction suffers under the older PAS leader-ship. Nonetheless, the co-optation of younger sub- and counter-elites w i l l be an effective strategy for removing the challenge of those individuals who are more immediately concerned with gaining access to the benefits of p o l i t i c a l office - and a good number of the urban educated Islamic act ivists certainly f a l l within this category. The danger in this strategy is that, once within the government coal i t ion, these individuals w i l l be hard to control. This is a concern which has been expressed about Anwar Ibrahim, who already has a sizeable personal following, a position as Deputy Minister in charge of Islamic affairs in the Prime Minister 's department, and who is expected to make 39 a strong bid for the presidency of UMNO Youth in September. The tac-t i c of programmatic co-optation is effective because, for the large 106 majority of Malay Muslims, the observable aci tvi t ies of the government may seem more genuinely Islamic than the pronouncements of the so-called Islamic parties. Moreover, the experience of the Jemaat Tabligh in rural areas, and the nature of requests and complaints emanating from the countryside, indicate that rural Malays are not so intent as urban middle class Malays,on foresaking material progress and comfort for the sake of Islamic purity . UMNO (and the National Front) more or less guarantees material progress or at least security, and at the same time is v i s i b l y active in promoting Islam. That is a balance which has an obvious appeal for the vast majority of Malays. F inal ly , the development of institutions to establish government control over Islam is effective for two reasons. F i r s t , as State Religious Councils come increasingly under the control of state secular e l i t e s , the p o l i t i c a l content of local religious education is more carefully monitored, and correct p o l i t i c a l and religious opinions 40 become a condition of government approval to operate. Control of finances also implies p o l i t i c a l control: Ulama who also run religious schools (pondok or madrasah) are becoming increasingly dependent for financial support on the (Federal) Ministry of Education and/or State Religious Councils, which simultaneously increases their economic dependence and vulnerabil i ty . It also reduces their willingness to welcome members of dakwah organizations which the government regards as poten-t i a l l y subversive.41 Similar constraints operate to enhance the effectiveness and appeal of government dakwah organizations. Joining a non-government dakwah group bears an explic i t p o l i t i c a l meaning, which potential recruits 107 may want to avoid, and operating a non-government group implies certain economic costs which may outweigh the benefits of independence. The second reason for the effectiveness of the government's inst i tutional efforts at co-optation and control, is that the state governments and the Rulers have an equal stake with the federal govern-ment in s t a b i l i t y and the maintenance of the r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l status  quo. The legitimacy of both governments and the Rulers could be challenged by proponents of an extreme version of Darul Islam, which advocated the removal of the vestiges of traditional and/or secular authority. Even i f PAS were to once again establish control of Kelantan or Trengganu, the compatibility of state and federal objectives vis a vis Islam would dissolve, as would the effectiveness of the central government's more moderate and co-optative approach to l imiting Islamic opposition. Generally speaking, the effectiveness of the present inst i tut ional strategy is almost guaranteed by the absence of any coherent Islamic opposition or unified anti-government dakwah movement. Attacks on false dakwah can be tolerated and even welcomed by non-government groups, which also feel that dakwah needs greater coherence and control. The creation of national dakwah organizations, therefore, has not been an affront to a l l existing dakwah organizations, nor has i t led to a polarization between government and non-government dakwah forces. (2) Coercive Strategies In addition to the government's concern that independent dakwah 108 groups and PAS may interfere with UMNO's legitimacy and the achievement of development goals, there is a strong concern that the more 'extremist' groups could pose a threat to national security. It is generally accepted in government circles that, in order to prevent these groups from someday becoming a real threat, coercive tactics are a necessity. Sanusi Junid, for instance has said: To secure Islamic growth from being desecrated by unscrupulous elements, various preventive and punitive measures have to be taken. . . Those who have committed a breach of the f a i t h , w i l l have to be deprived of the privileges accorded to them as Muslims.42 Toward the end of 1980, and shortly after the Batu Pahat incident, the then Minister of Home A f f a i r s , Tan Sr i Ghazali^" Shafie confirmed that "mu Police Special Branch (S.B.) effort once devoted to insurgent act ivi ty 43 has been shifted to Islamic extremists". In the aftermath of the Alor Setar r i o t , in January 1980, Ghazali was sharply c r i t i c a l of opportunistic p o l i t i c a l groups (a reference to PAS and P.A.S.) and charged that "the staging of demonstrations is not a democratic prac-44 t i c e . " The chief instruments of censorship and coercion available to the government are; the Internal Security Act, which allows the arrest and detention without t r i a l of persons suspected of engaging in ac t ivi t ies threatening to national security; the Universities Act which prohibits p o l i t i c a l ac t ivi ty by students and faculty; the Societies Act (administered by the Registrar of Societies in the Home Affairs ministry), which allows the government to grant or rescind licenses with l i t t l e explanation, although i t does make clear the limitations 109 imposed by the license involved. Mauzy argues that these kinds of restrictions "have helped provide some autonomy for the accommodating 45 e l i t e s , by shedding the democratic excesses of the old system". Yet, i f i t has provided some autonomy for el i tes i t may have contributed to other problems within their respective ethnic consti-tuencies. Kessler has argued that the circumscription of open p o l i t i c a l debate has not put an end to Malay p o l i t i c a l disaffection, but rather, has displaced i t from formal to para-pol i t ical channels of ar t iculat ion. Cr i t i cs of the government, he writes, "have opted out of p o l i t i c s , preferring association in the many sects and associations and the broad 46 intel lectual stream of Islamic revivalism". While Kessler has perhaps overstated the extent to which cr i t ic ism is outside of formal p o l i t i c a l channels, i t is true that under the present restr ic t ions , Islam has become an important channel for the articulation of Malay disaffection. Coercive techniques, then, have provided some autonomy for p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s , but they have not succeeded in silencing Malay c r i t i c s . In general, however, the government has used coercive methods only sparingly against the religious opposition, and when i t has done so, i t has frequently been at the insistence of the public or of local pol i t ic ians that something be done to curb the ac t ivi t ies of the more dangerous groups. In fact , i n response to pressure of this kind in Parliament, the Deputy Home Affairs Minister sounded a note of moderation, saying that the government must make a careful survey of the groups 47 which threaten national security, before taking any drastic action. n o Even when action is taken, i t is in circumstances where few can question the need for coercive techniques. When the government arrests without t r i a l the members of a cult which vows to k i l l non-Muslims, which desecrates Hindu shrines, or which murders innocent c i t izens, i t can usually count on the acquiescence of the majority of the population. Used under such circumstances, where the action of the government is more or less in harmonty with the opinion of other p o l i t i c a l leaders and the public , i t is an effective strategy, and moreover may encourage a realignment of some Islamic groups behind the government, in the name of Islamic discipline and moderation. (3) Diversive Strategies Although UMNO recognizes the p o l i t i c a l salience of Islam, and has had some success in using i t to advantage, a more effective and long-standing strategy for maintaining Malay support has been heavy government sponsorship of rural development programs: One of UMNO's instincts is to seek solutions to ideological problems in development projects and to woo votes by the very material lures that dakwah protagonists re jec t . . . . 48 While i t is beyond the scope of this study to examine Malaysian rural development policy in d e t a i l , i t can be stated unequivocally that one of the main aims of that policy has been to raise the standards ;of l iv ing of the rural Malay populace, in order to ensure their stable support for the UMNO p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . The strategy has not been a complete success - PAS s t i l l wins a substantial number of Malay votes - but the I l l general trend appears to be toward the s o l i d i f i c a t i o n of UMNO support. As noted ear l ier , one plausible explanation for this trend is that UMNO/NF has effectively displaced the local el i tes in the role of patron. Rural Malays, although they may frequently be unhappy with the new patron, are at the same time dependent on 'him' . The new patron, moreover, spares no effort in emphasising this dependence, and the importance of patron-client bonds of loyalty and deference. Under the Third Malaysia Plan the government spent about M$ 24.9 b i l l i o n on development of which M$ 7.4 b i l l i o n was speci f ica l ly a l l o -cated to agriculture and land development. Under the Fourth Malaysia Plan, the equivalent allocations are M$ 42.8 b i l l i o n and M$ 12.0 49 b i l l i o n . Regular expenditures on i r r iga t ion , resettlement and extension programs encourage Malays to view the government as patron. But perhaps of even greater importance are those expenditures which come in the form of special projects, subsidies and grants, which are distributed in times of serious hardship, or at election time. During the 1978 election campaign, in Kedah, the National Front referred quite openly to the material benefits which would accrue to those' voting for the governing coal i t ion . Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn announced a M$ 400 mil l ion investment in the Muda area, and added that much more aid would come provided the NF were elected; half a mil l ion chickens were sent to families in Baling where serious food shortages were reported; Dr. Mahathir promised to raise the price of padi for producers while keeping the cost for consumers constant; and the Mentri Besar, Datuk Syed Nahar stated that only a strong NF-run state 112 government would be able to administer effectively the M$1.2 b i l l i o n Third Malaysia Plan allocation to the state. In the recent (1980) by-election in Bukit Raya (Kedah), the NF promised the constituency M$ 30 mil l ion in aid and development projects (about M$ 30,000/voter) i f the NF candidate were e l e c t e d . 5 1 Datuk Michael Chen was brought in to campaign for the NF and i t is thought that he managed to swing the Chinese vote away from the PAS incumbent by stressing the prospects for business under the new government development schemes. In Trengganu, shortly before the 1982 election day (April 22), an UMNO Division Head, and also a Deputy Minister in the P.M.'s Department, Datuk Abdullah Abdul Rahman, publicly announced 52 (threatened) that people would face hardship i f they voted for PAS. In addition to promises, the government occasionally has an opportunity to demonstrate i t s magnanimity, just before election time. The four-month drought in the rice-bowl areas of the north-east and 53 the north-west provided such an opportunity early in 1982. The government recognized that the loss of the main-season crop would cause farmers considerable hardship, and that farmers in the major i r r igat ion scheme areas (Muda and Kemubu), would hold the government responsible for the absence of i r r igat ion water, and for the suffering which would ensue. With the election approaching, the decision was taken to release the available water from the reservoirs, to allow planting to continue, as scheduled. As a result , the main-season crop was expected to be only s l ight ly smaller than average, but i t "may have been rescued at 54 the expense of the off-season y i e l d " . Nonetheless, by the time the 113 election took place, the memory of the government's power to deal with the c r i s i s , was probably more v i v i d l y in the minds of most padi farmers than.the c r i s i s i t s e l f . Once again, the effectiveness of the government strategy is greatly enhanced by i ts consistency with the structural p o l i t i c a l factors discussed ear l ier . UMNO's emphasis on issues of material progress and development is a good strategy only where the opposition is unwilling or unable to confront the government on these issues. PAS seems neither w i l l i n g nor able to challenge the government on i ts economic performance, despite the fact that real grievances do exist and serious cr i t ic ism can be made. Moreover, the government has begun to phrase the need for material progress and development in Islamic terms, thereby further weakening the PAS posit ion. (4) Informative-Promotional Strategies As part of i t s strategy for l imiting outbidding and securing stable non-elite support, the government has been "determined and un-55 relenting in expounding i ts message to the people". On the issue of Islam, the government has been no less determined, though the message has been somewhat different from the one outlined by Mauzy in 1978. While the ruling coalit ion continues to stress ethnic harmony, tolerance, and economic development as the way to achieve greater equality between ethnic groups, the message has more recently begun to emphasize three themes: (i) UMNO's genuine dedication to the promotion and preservation of Islam, and the dubiousness of similar claims made by opposition groups; 114 ( i i ) the importance of Islamic/Malay unity and UMNO's commitment to that cause; ( i i i ) the compatibility of the government's economic development strategy with the prime tenets of Islam. The material patronage of Islam, discussed ear l ier , has, not surprisingly, been complemented by a concerted government propagative effort to convince Malays of the NF's Islamic character, and to i n s t i l 'correct ' Islamic values in the population. Recently Datuk Sanusi Junid, for example, referred to UMNO as the world's third-largest Islamic party, and to PAS as "a splinter p a r t y " . ^ UMNO, he continued 57 "upholds and protects Islam from being profaned by certain quarters". To strengthen the Islamic credentials of the party and the government, Ministers and Muslim propagandists are sent throughout Malaysia and abroad to address audiences on sub j ects pertaining to Islam. State and central governments took advantage of the Prophet's birthday to stage enormous r a l l i e s , processions and celebrations during which government representatives spread the message of the close 5 8 relationship between the state and Islam. On a more didactic note, the King used the occasion to c r i t i c i z e Malays for their backward and unethical attitudes. The theme of the celebrations "Disciplined Living Ensures the Greatness of a People", was touched upon by the King, who said that Malay Muslims "are indisciplined and no longer obey the 59 commands of Al lah , their parents, teachers, society and the nation". The Prime Minister spoke in a similar vein, saying that Malay Muslims must change their attitudes of dependence and indifference, and should not be afraid to strive for achievement.^ 115 Government spokesmen are even more outspoken on the subject of the non-Islamic character of Islamic opposition groups. Tun Hussein Onn, after the Batu Pahat incident, lamented that "Islam had been mis-interpreted and exploited by i l l - informed, misguided and unscrupulous 61 people". More recently, Dr. Mahathir challenged the Islamic character of PAS: . . .PAS does very l i t t l e that is Islamic apart from shouting slogans, even when they go and pray, they pray because of p o l i t i c a l effect . I know PAS members who go from mosque to mosque every Friday to pray but before he was a member of Parliament and State Assembly he never did t h a t . . . Is he praying to God or is he praying for the vote? . . . If you question UMNO as being i r r e l i g i o u s , I can question PAS as being even worse.62 Another frequent claim of government leaders is that UMNO is the only party with a genuine concern for Islamic unity. PAS, with i ts " p o l i t i c s of negativism", and i ts penchant for forming "unholy alliances" with the DAP at election time, is said to be disrupting that unity for i t s own opportunistic ends. In a recent press conference, Dr. Mahathir referred to these divisive tendencies, as follows: I know...that they are doing things l ike organizing boycotts which are not Islamic - l ike not wanting to be buried in the Muslim cemetery where UMNO members are buried. That is not Islamic. Preaching divisiveness in Islam - that is not Islamic.63 Shortly before election day (1982), Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Musa made a speech, parts of which appeared in the New Straits Times under the banner, "Ever Onwards for Islamic Unity : . In this speech, Datuk Musa expressed the party's pride at being the leadership of an Islamic nation, and went on to say that "Islamic Unity is the main factor for us 116 to move forward to attain success in a l l levels of development". Naturally, PAS claims that UMNO is responsible for Islamic disunity. It is true that UMNO spends some time in separating PAS leaders from followers, i n drawing attention to factional stuggles in PAS' leadership, and has used vote s p l i t t i n g tactics to draw the vote away from PAS on at least one occasion.^ 5 But divisions within Islam, as we have seen, have deeper causes than these, and the character is such that the theme of Islamic unity has worked primarily to the advan-tage of the government rather than PAS, or any other organization which differentiates i t s e l f from the party of religious moderation. Groups which emphasize their own uniqueness or exclusivity cannot make a credible appeal on the basis of Islamic unity. UMNO, on the other hand, with a reputation for moderation and coal i t ion, can make such an appeal, and can thereby gain the cooperation or support of a wide variety of Islamic groups. Apart from i t s concern over unity, one of the major objectives of the UMNO leadership is to provide evidence of the compatibility of Islam with the programs of modernization and development which are at the heart of their strategy for maintaining non-elite support. Part i -cularly in the post-1971 era, with i ts emphasis on the economic modernization of the Malays, the government has expressed concern that 'deviat ionist ' teachings w i l l convince Malays to forsake the benefits of this world, for those of the next. The government has, therefore, sought to channel the emotive power of re l igion for "pragmatic social and p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s " . ^ MADA, for instance, uses mosque lectures 117 and UMNO imams to promote prompt loan repayment among Muda area farmers, and some 400 mosques are used as distribution centres for literature 6 7 on agricultural extension. In a campaign speech, Datuk Musa argued that: The factor that dominates our successes is that Islam is a rel igion that is suited to the modern world and a rel igion that caters for the needs of man in the complete sense - spi r i tual and material well-being.68 The issue of spi r i tua l and material needs is a common subject of debate within Malaysia's Islamic community. Anwar Ibrahim cited UMNO's commitment to a balance between the two as a major reason for his decision to join the party. Although such statements were or iginal ly received with considerable skepticism, recent statements by the Prime Minister indicate that Anwar's principles have a reasonably firm base of support within UMNO, and that his commitment to the party may in fact be gunuine. When asked i f he fe l t capable of containing Anwar's eagerness for an Islamic state, the Prime Minister repl ied: I don't see any need to worry. If he sticks to proper Islamic interpretation, then there is no need to worry about what he wishes to do. In fact, i t is because we are doing what he would l ike to do that he has joined UMNO... Of course, a lot of people equate Islam with some ex-tremist demands. That is not Islam. . . As far as I can make out, he has not demanded something impossible of :the government. He thinks there should be an Islamic Bank and there is no difference of opinion between him and me. I don't think there is need to worry about r iding a t i g e r . . . . 6 9 Thus, although there is a trend within. UMNO in the direction of pragmatism, efficiency and technocracy, i t is complemented by an increasing emphasis on the spi r i tual prerequisites of national development and progress; and Islam is seen as providing that spi r i tual base. According to 118 Dr Mahathir: Islam should be a very strong s tabi l i s ing factor. It w i l l anchor us sol idly to the ground. If we follow the teachings of Islam properly, i t w i l l make us a very disciplined and a very learned nation. It w i l l make us p o w e r f u l . . . . 70 Despite this renewed commitment, however, the government's propagandative techniques w i l l only be successful to the extent that they are complemented by material evidence of the government's patronage of Islam. Further-more, for those whose interpretation of Islam is more extreme (less l iberal) than that of the ruling e l i t e s , or for those groups which are more sincerely c r i t i c a l of the government per se, neither material nor symbolic expressions of government commitment to Islam w i l l deter their c r i t i c ism. Yet i t is precisely the absence of any stable and coherent Islamic opposition group of this kind, which makes the present government strategies so effect ive . If the basic social and p o l i t i c a l conditions which have limited the growth of such an opposition were to change, then the effectiveness of the strategies of the ruling eli tes would weaken appreciably. To sum up, the government has employed a variety of strategies to limit the erosion of support among Malays, under the influence of the Islamic resurgence. The constellation of strategies - co-optative, coercive, diversive, and informative-promotional - reflects :an essen-t i a l l y inclusionary and accommodative approach to the problem. This has been a feasible and effective strategy primarily because i t has been consistent with and has reinforced social and p o l i t i c a l disctinctions within Malaysian Islam and society. For instance, the strategy of counter-elite and sub-elite co-optation has been effective because i t is 119 consistent with the real p o l i t i c a l goal of some Islamic leaders, who therefore accept the offer of coal i t ion. The government's pro-Islamic programs work because the vast majority of Malays are more easily convinced by the material evidence of the government's commitment to Islam than they are by the slogans of other groups. Institutional con-trols impose economic and p o l i t i c a l costs on those engaged in anti-government religious ac t ivi ty , and weaken the chances of cooperation among non-government groups. Diversive and informative strategies work in complementary fashion to satisfy both the material and spir i tual demands of a l l but the most extreme religious and p o l i t i c a l groups, and the latter are effectively controlled by limited recourse to coer-cive techniques. In short, government strategies for coping with the threat of Islamic opposition have been effective to the extent that they have taken account of, and have reinforced the socio-religious limitations on the emergence of such an opposition. F inal ly , despite Dr. Mahathir's optimism that 'there is no need to worry about riding a t i g e r ' , the most serious threat to p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y in Malaysia probably exists in the potential for the exacerbation of internal UMNO (and NF) divis ions , which may result from the government's inclusionary or co-optative approach to the Islamic challenge. This danger has arisen as a result of very recent changes in the government's approach to Islam, rather than as a consequence of government policies over the last decade. The suggestion of danger made here, then, does not lend support to the arguments of Kessler and Lyon, but rather demarcates the limits on on the effectiveness of state strategies toward Islam. 120 FOOTNOTES er IV Gordon P. Means, "The Role of I s l a m . . . " , p. 268. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, p. 67. I b i d . , p. 70. Also Moshe Yegar, Islam and Islamic Institutions  in Br i t ish Malaya: 1874-1941, (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1979). Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", Pacif ic Affairs 51(3) (Fall 1978), p. 386. Also N. J . Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob, (ed.), The Pol i t ics of Islamic  Reassertion, p. 168. William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, p. 73. Religious legal and administrative centralization was also encouraged by the B r i t i s h . Clive S. Kessler, Islam and P o l i t i c s , p. 53. ' William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, p. 72. Also see Kessler, Islam and P o l i t i c s , pp. 53-55. I b i d . , p. 74. Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", p. 386. Y. Mansoor Marican, "Malay Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaysia", p. 295. Gordon P. Means, "The Role of I s l a m . . . " , p. 279. I b i d . , p. 279. Fred R. von der Mehden, "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", pp. 174-76. The state was o f f i c i a l l y declared a secular state with freedom of re l ig ion , despite Islam's ' o f f i c i a l ' status. See Hashim M. Suffian, "The Relationship Between Islam and the State in Malaya" Intisari 1(1), pp. 7-22. A Malay is defined as "one who professes the Muslim r e l i g i o n , habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay customs". Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", p. 396. For a f u l l discussion of the constitutional amendments, see R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Pol i t ics and Government in Malaysia, pp. 93-95. 121 17. Chandra Muzaffar, Protector?, pp. 137-38. 18. N. J . Funston, "Malaysia" in M. Ayoob, (ed.), The Pol i t i cs of  Islamic Reassertion, p. 172. 19. See Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 221-35, for a f u l l discussion of the background and conditions of coal i t ion. 20. Asri replied that PAS would gladly support or join the government i f the latter brought i t s policies in line with Islam. New  Straits Times, 1 A p r i l 1982. Asri may also want to keep the door open to guard against a challenge to his leadership, as in 1973. 21. New Straits Times, 1 A p r i l 1982. Kubang Pasu was, perhaps, a special case because the UMNO candidate was Dr. Mahathir. 22. I b i d . , 1 A p r i l 1982. 23. I b i d . , A p r i l , 5, 9, 1982. 24. I n i d . , 5 A p r i l 1982. 25. The breakdown of the vote in the parliamentary constituency of Permatang Pauh was: 1982 1978 Total Valid Vote 25,171 21,388 NF . . . . . . (Anwar) 18,849 ( A r i f f i n bin Haj Daud) 10,264 PAS (Zabidi) 4,497 (Zabidi) 11,124 DAP (Tan) 1,825 New Straits Times, 24 A p r i l 1982. 26. The NF line-up included more than 45% new faces, New Straits Times, 5 A p r i l 1982. 27. I b i d . , 1 A p r i l 1982. 28. Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 February 1979, p. 23. 29. I b i d . , p. 23. 30. The government has recently announced some plans for an Islamic banking system, complete with interest-free loans. There is s t i l l considerable confusion about the details of the Islamic Bank, i t s mandate and i ts sphere of operation. For more details see Asiaweek, 30 July 1982, pp. 41-42; and New Straits Times, 6 July 1982. 122 31. Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1982. 32. New Straits Times, 24 & 30 June 1982. 33. N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Pol i t i cs of  Islamic Reassertion, p. 180. 34. Diane K. Mauzy; Personal communication, August 1982. 35. Margo L. Lyon, "The Dakwah Movement...", p. 38. Lyon notes that those dakwah sections in the Ministries of education and defence are the most active. 36. I b i d . , p. 35. 37. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change.. ." p. 430. 38. N. J . Funston, "Malaysia", in M. Ayoob (ed.), The Pol i t ics of  Islamic Reassertion, p. 181. fn . 20. 39. Asiaweek, 30 July 1982, p. 14. 40. Judith A. Nagata, "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legit imacy. . . " , p. 32. 41. Idem,"The Impact of the Islamic R e v i v a l . . . " , p. 17. 42. New Straits Times, 4 January 1982, p. 4. 43. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1981. 44. Asiaweek, 15 February 1980, p. 25. 45. Diane K, Mauzy, Consociationalism, pp. 398-399. It should be noted that the government has indicated that i t is prepared to rescind most of the conditions of the recent (1981) Amendment to the Societies Act, which was aimed at ABIM and A l i r a n . ABIM is no longer considered to be a dangerous organi-zation; the co-optative approach, therefore is considered to be appropriate. Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne, personal communication, August 1982. Also see Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1982, pp. 14-15. 46. Clive S. Kessler, "Islamic Revival and P o l i t i c a l D i s a f f e c t i o n . . . " , p. 8. 47. New Straits Times, 4 January 1982. 123 48. Judith A. Nagata, "Religious Ideology and Social Change. . . " , p. 429. 49. Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 A p r i l 1981, pp. 70-75. Allocations do not necessarily match actual expenditures - the latter often amount to as l i t t l e as hai'f of the former. 50. Ismail Kassim, Race, Pol i t i cs and Moderation, pp. 61-62. 51. New Straits Times, 7 A p r i l 1980. 52. I b i d . , 5 A p r i l 1982. 53. For detai ls , see Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 March 1982. 54. I b i d . , p. 78. In fact, i t has turned out that the off-season crop w i l l not be seriously affected; such a happy ending could not have been easily predicted at the time the decision was made. 55. Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism, p. 417. 56. New Straits Times, 4 January 1982. 57. I b i d . , 4 January 1982. 58. I b i d . , January 8, 9, 10, 1982. 59. I b i d . , 9 January 1982. 60. I b i d . , 15 January 1982. 61. Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 November 1980. 62. New Straits Times, 17 July 1982. p. 2. From a press conference given by the Prime Minister on the anniversary of the new administration. 63. I b i d . , 17 July 1982. 64. I b i d . , 7 A p r i l 1982. p. 7. 65. The most notable example of this strategy was the UMNO-Berjasa electoral alliance in the 1978 Kelantan State Assembly elections; Berjasa, an Islamic party, drew a substantial proportion of the vote away from PAS. see Ismail Kassim, Race, Pol i t i cs and Moderation, pp. 24-27; and Diane K. Mauzy, Consociationalism , pp. 367-73. 66. Gordon P. Means, "Public Policy Toward Religion in Malaysia", p. 397. 124 67. Afifuddin bin Haji Omar, Institutions, Peasants and Development  in Malaysia, p. 251. 68. New Straits Times, 7 A p r i l 1982. 69. I b i d . , 17 July 1982. 70. I b i d . , 17 July 1982, p. 2. 125 CHAPTER V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS This study has attempted to assess the implications for the Malaysian p o l i t i c a l system of the on-going Islamic resurgence. Contrary to prevailing opinion on the subject, i t has been argued that the Islamic resurgence does not pose a serious threat to the s t a b i l i t y and legitimacy of the p o l i t i c a l system, or to i ts leaders. The major elements of this argument can be highlighted by summarizing and discussing the findings of each chapter. In the f i r s t chapter, the issue of stable non-elite support, an in t r ins ic part of Mauzy's consociational model of Malaysian p o l i t i c s , was introduced as a theoretical focus. The importance of non-elite support was discussed, and the factors which may affect i ts s t a b i l i t y (in the Malay community) were examined and c lassif ied as either (i) Societal Conditions, or ( i i ) State Policy. It was noted that, despite the resurgence, Islam has not, so far succeeded in mobilizing or bringing p o l i t i c a l coherence to those factors which are viewed as a potential threat to the government's stable non-elite support. The reason for t h i s , i t was argued, l ies in the internal heterogeneity of Malaysian Islam, which in i t s e l f reflects important soc ia l , economic and p o l i t i c a l divisions within Malay society. Moreover, i t was stressed that the pattern of intra-Islamic and intra-Malay cleavages is not bipolar - between government and opposition - but rather is fragmented or multipolar, which tends to limit the mobilization of a 126 p o l i t i c a l opposition. F inal ly , on the basis of insights from the l i terature on the p o l i t i c s and sociology of ethnicity in Malaysia, i t was suggested that Islam has become a charter of intra-Malay, as well as inter-ethnic differentiat ion, through which Malays can express internal social and p o l i t i c a l dist inct ions, without jeopar-dizing the security or hegemony of the larger (Malay) ethnic group. In Chapter II, the two major schools of thought on Malaysia's Islamic resurgence were outlined and c r i t i c i z e d . It was suggested that those authors who emphasize the significance of Islam as a charter of ethnic identity , tend to understate the importance of intra-Malay and intra-Islamic divis ions . Those who stress the rela-tionship between Islamic resurgence and intra-Malay cleavages, tend to over-state the extent of polarization within the Malay community. It was argued that, when the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence is viewed in i ts relationship to the pre-existing, and often 'non-resurgent', elements within Malaysian Islam, what emerges is a picture of immense diversity and complexity. Islam appears in many forms and with many roles; as a symbol of Malay ethnicity, but also as a charter of intra-Malay differentiat ion. Both schools of thought manage, in different ways, to obscure this complexity, and in both cases the result is an over-estimation of the potential danger to the p o l i t i c a l system. Secondly, neither school carefully analyzes the influence of intra-Malay and intra-Islamic diversity in determining the effective-ness of state policy toward Islam. 127 The third chapter examined in some d e t a i l , (i) the social origins and bases, and ( i i ) the ideologies and goals, of the most pro-minent Islamic groups and parties - PAS, ABIM, Darul Arqam, Jemaat  Tabligh and various 'extremist' organizations. Following V a s i l , two questions were asked at the outset which this chapter sought to answer. The f i r s t question was; how compatible, p o l i t i c a l l y , are the various Islamic organizations in the country - their social origins, social bases, their goals, s tyles , and p o l i t i c a l - r e l i g i o u s orienta-tions - and how is this l i k e l y to affect their capacity for coherent and collective p o l i t i c a l action? In answer to this question i t was demonstrated that strong differences of this kind do exist between the various groups, and that these differences can, and do, l imit the chance, and indeed the motivation, for a united Islamic opposition movement. It was argued that differences within Malaysian Islam reflect soc ia l , economic and p o l i t i c a l divisions within Malay society, but that these divisions are neither bipolar nor s tat ic . Thus, Islam is not simply representing 'objective' class divisions , but more f l u i d divisions , based on social values, p o l i t i c a l objectives and economic interests. Some of the more important divisions were: (1) differences in the goals and ideologies of the various dakwah groups on the one hand, and those of the majority of t radit ional rural ulama and their followers, on the other; (2) conflicts arising over the competition for a constituency of followers, or the leadership of an organization, i n both urban and rural settings; (3) divisions based on confl ict ing 128 economic interests of two or more social groups within the Malay community - eg. peasants vs. landowners; (4) divisions in social origins and value systems of Malays in different rural commnuities -eg. linear and clustered kampongs; (5) ideological differences within the urban dakwah movement, part icularly between those with an a r t i -culated p o l i t i c a l commitment, and those with a more religious and inwardlooking philosophy; (6) differences between groups primarily c r i t i c a l of the Malay community (its decadence or corruption for example), and those with a more overtly chauvinistic attitude; (7) ambivalence or f l e x i b i l i t y within the ideology and goals of a single movement, depending on the social and p o l i t i c a l environment. These cleavages cross-cut in ways which inhibit the polarization of Islam on a government versus opposition axis, although they do not entirely rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y of a united Islamic opposition under condi-tions of a serious external threat to the rel igion or the Malay community. In answer to the second question - how consistent with the various demands, symbols and interests of the different Islamic organi-zations, are the other salient issues in Malay pol i t ics? - the last half of Chapter III discussed the compatibility of Islam with the economic grievances of the Kedah peasantry. Again, despite the fact that Islam provides the philosophical and ideological j u s t i f i c a t i o n for such an al l iance, i t was discovered that the internal hetero-geneity of Malay society (in Kedah), makes the emergence of a populist-129 type Islamic opposition movement, a highly unlikely p o s s i b i l i t y . The fourth chapter analyzed the state strategies for coping with the Islamic challenge - co-optative, coercive, diversive, and informa-tive promotional. With regard to state policy , the following question was posed at the outset: To what extent is the absence of a serious weakening of Malay non-elite support a function of the conscious policies of the government, as opposed to being a consequence of social structural and (exogenous) p o l i t i c a l limitations on the coherence and salience of an Islamic-based opposition movement? Chapter IV showed that the pol ic ies of the government do have some considerable impact in l imiting the threat of Islamic opposition. It also revealed, however, that the success of government strategies is largely contin-gent upon the extent to which they work in complementary fashion with the social structural limitations on such a threat. In the event of a change in those social conditions, the government strategies w i l l need to change or they w i l l cease to be effective. Indeed, a change in these conditions, either in the direction of a greater polarization within the Malay community, or between Malays and non-Malays, could s ignif icant ly alter the significance of Islam, and the Islamic resurgence, for the Malaysian p o l i t i c a l system. For instance, by moving too aggressively toward something resembling Darul Islam, the government would run the r isk of alienating non-Malays, or perhaps of accentuating spl i ts within the Malay community in the direction of polarization. -Somewhat i r o n i c a l l y , then, i t may be the 130 government's response to the perceived challenge of the Islamic resurgence, which w i l l ultimately provide the most serious test to Malaysia's p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . 131 TABLE 1 Breakdown of Seats Held by Parties in Parliament after Elections; 1974, 1978, 1982; 1974 1978 1982 NF 135 131 132 PAS n . a . a 5 5 DAP 9 16 9 Independent 0 1 8 Pekemas 1 -SNAP 9 n . a . b n .a . SAPO 0 1 -TOTALS: 154 154 154 Sources for Tables: A l l tables compiled on the basis of; Diane. K. Mauzy, "A Vote for Continuity: The 1978 General Elections in Malaysia", Asian Survey,XIX (3) (March 1979);Ismail Kassim, Race, Pol i t i cs and  Moderation, A Study of the Malaysian Electoral Process,(Singapore Times Books International 1979);New Straits Times, 8, 22, 23, 24 A p r i l 1982. Newspaper reports for the 1982 elections were incomplete in some respects. These were, therefore, supplemented by more recent and accurate sources; in particular Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne. a PAS was a member of the National Front at the time of the 1974 election. b SNAP was a member of the National Front at the time of the 1978 and 1982 elections. 132 TABLE 2 Percentage of Valid Vote and Seats Won, and Number of Seats Contested  by Major Parties in Parliamentary Elections in 1978 and 1982: Peninsular Malaysia % total seats 1978 % val id vote a seats contested % total seats 1982 % val id voteb seats Contested NF 82.4 57.2 113 90.3 61.1 114 DAP PAS OTHER 13.2 4.4 0 21.6 17.5 3.7 51 87 33 5.3 4.4 0 21.5 16.3 1.1 63 82 61 TOTALS 100.03 100.0% 284 100.0% 100.0% 340 a The total val id vote in Peninsular Malaysia (1978) was 3,027,603. b According to available sources the total val id vote in Peninsular Malaysia was 3,534,803.. This figure is somewhat smaller than the actual number of votes because complete figures are not available. ( A l l subsequent calculations are based on this figure. 133 TABLE 3 Parliamentary Seats Contested and Won by Major Parties in 1978 and 1982 Elections: Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak 1978 Won NF Total National Front Parties: Peninsular Malaysia UMNO MCA MIC Berj asa Gerakan Dir NF PPP Sabah and Sarawak PBB SNAP SUPP Berj aya USNO NF Ind 131 69 17 3 4 1 0 9 6 8 5 1 Contested 153 1982 Won Contested 74 27 4 6 1 1 9 7 9 6 2 132 70 24 4 •0 5 0 0 6 5 10 0 0 154 73 28 4 2 7 0 0 9 7 11 5 0 Opposition Parties: A l l Malaysia DAP PAS Ind SAPO 16 5 1 1 .52. 87 18 1 63 82 60 1 134 TABLE 4 Comparison of Seats Won by Major Parties in the State Elections in Peninsular Malaysia, 1978 and 1982 - - by State 1978 1982 Total seats NF PAS DAP 'IND NF PAS DAP -IND by sti Perak 32 1 9 0 38 0 4 0 42 Negri Sembilan 21 0 3 0 22 0 2 0 24a Malacca 16 0 4 0 18 0 2 0 20 Selangor 29 0 3 1 31 0 1 1 33b Johore 31 0 1 0 32 0 0 0 32 Pahang 32 0 0 0 31 0 1 0 32 Penang 20 1 5 1 25 0 2 0 27 Trengganu 28 0 0 0 23 5 0 0 28 Perlis 12 0 0 0 11 1 0 0 12 Kedah 19 7 0 0 24 2 0 0 26 Kelantan (34) 2 0 0 26 10 0 0 36c Totals by Party 274b 11 25 2 280a 18 12 1 312 a 1982 elections for the Negri Sembilan state seat of Gemencheh were post-poned because of the death of Datuk Mohd. Talib (NF-UMNO). Source: The Sunday Star, 24 A p r i l 1982. The by-election was held on 22 May 1982, and was won by Waad Haji Mansor (NF-UMNO) Source: New Sunday Times, 23 May 1982. b In 1978, a l l of the candidates in one Selangor constituency were dis -qual i f ied , necessitating a later by-election for that seat which was eventually won by a NF candidate. c State elections in Kelantan were held prior to the national elections in 1978. Figures in parentheses show aggregate seats won by NF and Berjasa, which later joined NF. Berjasa won 10 of NF's 34 seats. 135 TABLE 5 Comparison of Parliamentary Seats Won by Major Parties in Peninsular Malaysia Elections, 1978 and 1982 - - by State -1978 1982 Totals by -NF PAS DAP .IND NF PAS DAP IND State Perak 17 0 4 0 21 0 0 0 21 Negri Sembilan 5 . 0 1 0 6 0 0 0 6 Malacca 3 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 4 Selangor 10 0 1 0 11 0 0 0 11 Johore 15 0 1 0 16 0 0 0 16 Pahang 8 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 8 Penang 4 1 4 0 7 0 2 0 9 Trengganu 7 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 7 Perlis 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 Kedah 11 2 0 0 12 1 0 0 13 Kelantan 10 2 0 0 8 4 0 0 12 Federal Territory 2 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 5 Totals 94 5 15a 0 103 5 6b 0 114 a DAP also to 16. won one seat in Sabah in 1978, bringing i t s national total b DAP also won two seats in Sarawak and one in Sabah in 1982, bringing i ts national total to 9. 136 TABLE 6 Percentage of Valid Vote Won by PAS in 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Contests Total Pop Total PAS PAS Vote as % of No. of Seats Vote Vote Total Pop Vote ^Contested 1978 3,027,603 529,329 17.48% 87 1982a 3,534,803 574,309 16.25% 82 Source: Compiled from New Straits Times, 24 A p r i l 1982. Some adjustments and corrections have been made on the basis of s ta t is t ics provided by Diane K. Mauzy, August 1982. TABLE 7 The Percentage of the Popular Vote Polled by PAS in Kedah Parliamentary and State Elections in 1978 and 1982 Parliament State 1978 39.69% 39.50% 1982 30.98% 32.40%a Statist ics for 1982 popular vote in Kedah are incomplete. Returns for 8 state seats are not available. Figures for Parliamentary popular vote provided by Diane K. Mauzy, August 1982 (Also see Table 9). 137 TABLE 8 The Seats Won and Contested, and the Percentage of Parliamentary Popular  Vote Polled, by PAS in the Four Northern States, (Compared to the Party's Performance Nationally) , in the 1978 and 1982 Elections n i • ^ Percentage of Parliament State .. . , _. , . Valid Parliamen-Won Contested Won Contested tary Vote 1978 4(5) a 33 (87) 9 (11) 95 (203) 40.29% (17.48%) 1982 5(5) 34 (82) 18 (18) 99 (223) 38.21% (16.25%) a Figures in parentheses show the national PAS totals of seats won and contested, and Parliamentary popular vote polled. b Sources: New Straits Times, 8, 22, 24 A p r i l 1982, and Diane K. Mauzy s t a t i s t i c s . 138 TABLE 9 Breakdown by State, of PAS' Percentage of the Total Valid Parliamentary Vote, for the 1982 Elections in Peninsular Malaysia PAS Vote as % PAS Total Vote Total Vote of Total Perak^ 68,511 580,423 11.80 Negri Sembilan 8,751 195,345 4.48 Malacca 20,105 162,970 12.37 Selangor 21,824 401,111 5.44 Johore 18,224 354,962 5.13 Pahang 46,951 233,297 20.12 Penang 8,612 344,346 2.50 Trengganu 76,991 186,147 41.36 Perlis 18,860 58,932 32.0 Kedah 125,872 406,315 30.98 Kelantan 151,629 325,830 46.54 Federal Territory 7,979 285,125 2.80 Totals 574,309 3,534,803 16.25% a indicates that the data for one constituency in the state are not available. b indicates that the data for two constituencies in the state are not available. Although some s tat is t ics are missing, the percentages are derived from the same base of data and so are internally v a l i d . Also the sample is large enough to give reasonably accurate figures (Also see Table #10) TABLE 10 Percentage of Valid Vote Polled by Major P o l i t i c a l Parties and Independent Candidates on a State Basis in the 1978 and 1982 Parliamentary Elections - Peninsular Malaysia NF % PAS % DAP % Independent % OTHERS % State 1978 .1982 1978 1982 1978 1982 1978 1982 1978 1982 Perak 53, .5 61, .2 9 .6 11 .8 36.5 26.5 - -Negri Sembilan 57: ,6 67, .3 7 .9 .4 .5 29.4 27.4 5.1 -Malacca 55, .7 66, ,4 11 .8 12, .4 32.5 21.2 - -Selangor 57, .6 62. ,7 9 .9 5, .4 30.1 27.5 4.4 1.5 Johore 77, .3 74. ,6 7 .6 5, .1 15.1 20.1 - -Pahang 66, .8 60. ,4 18 .5 20, .1 8.8 17.2 2.4 2.3 3.5 Penang 47, ,1 56. ,2 10 .8 2, .5 27.3 36.0 6.6 8.2 4.7 Trengganu 58. ,4 57. ,5 38 .0 41, ,4 - - - 3.6 Perlis 60. ,8 67. ,8 33 .5 32. ,0 - - 5.7 -Kedah 57. ,1 61. 5 39 .7 31, ,0 - 4.7 2.4 -Kelantan 56. ,4 53. ,2 43 .6 46, ,5 - - - -Federal Territory 25. ,0 49. 9 6, .5 2. ,8 55.0 46.8 2.8 10.7 140 Malaysian P o l i t i c a l Parties Appendix ---Peninsular Malaysia - -UMNO United Malays National Organization. Formed at Kampong Bahru, Kuala Lumpur, in 1946 by Malay associations gathered in protest against the proposed Malayan Union. Headed at the outset by Dato Onn bin Ja 'afar , the father of Tun Hussein Onn. The unexpected success of UMNO-MCA cooperation in Kuala Lumpur in 1952 led to the formation of an UMNO-MCA al l iance . UMNO has been the leading vote winner in every national election to date. The principal member of both the Alliance and the National Front, UMNO remains the largest and most significant p o l i t i c a l organization in Malaysia. MCA Malaysian Chinese Association. Founded i n 1949 to do welfare work among rural Chinese uprooted by the Emergency and to preserve the p o l i t i c a l and social rights of the Chinese. Has been associated with UMNO in a p o l i t i c a l alliance since the early 1950's. Originally the party of Baba Chinese businessmen, MCA has for 30 years been identif ied as the representative of economically privileged Chinese. Its links with UMNO have been both a p o l i t i c a l asset and a p o l i t i c a l l i a b i l i t y . MIC Malaysian Indian Congress. Founded in 1946 to represent Indian interests. It was relat ively insignificant as a p o l i t i c a l force u n t i l i t joined the Alliance and became the o f f i c i a l spokesman for Indian interests in government. Its p o l i t i c a l leverage is slight since there are no constituencies in Malaysia where "Indians' form a majority. DAP Democratic Action Party. Formed in 1966 by Malaysian citizens who were previously members of the Singapore-based People's Action Party's Malaya branch. Its approach is non-communal, although i t is regarded primarily .as a party of the Chinese. Its platform is " s o c i a l i s t " with an emphasis on more equitable distribution of income and o f f i c i a l recognition and use of Malay, Chinese, Indian and English. Because of i t s origins in the People's Action Party, i t has been accused of having foreign t ies . Currently led by Lim Kit-Slang. Gerakan Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement). A non-communal but basically Chinese party based in Penang. Formed in 1968, i t did well in the 1969 election by making an election pact with DAP to avoid s p l i t t i n g the support of dissat isf ied Chinese and other voters. Joined the National Front in 1972. 141 PAS Partai Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu (Pan-Malayan Islamic Party - - PMIP). Usually referred to as PAS. Originated as an ulama organization which collaborated with UMNO but withdrew in protest against UMNO compromises with the MCA. Based or iginal ly in Perak and Penang i t later controlled Kelantan from 1959-78 and Trengganu from 1959 to 1964 and made inroads into UMNO terri tory in Perlis and Kedah in 1969. Originally "a re l igiously informed popular movement for the defense of peasant interests" , i t suffered a loss of voter appeal as a result of association with UMNO in the National Front from 1973 to 1977. S t i l l won 17 percent of the vote in West Malaysia in 1978. PPP People's Progressive Party. Began in 1953 as the Perak Progressive Party. Renamed after the 1955 election. Power base in the Kinta Valley of Perak. A member of the National Front since 1972, i t has declined from four seats in Parliament in 1969 to none since 1978. PEKEMAS Social Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Masharakat - - PEKEMAS). A Kuala Lumpur-based splinter faction of Gerakan established in 1972 under the leadership of Syed Hussein Alatas. "Essentially a party of noncommunal intel lec tuals , i t has acted as a moral gadfly, pointing out the debil i tat ing aspects of corruption and other acts of misrule." It won a single parliamentary seat in 1974. Partai Marhaen Best rendered as the "peasants' party", i t was formed in 1972 by dissident Malay intel lec tuals . Vaguely l e f t i s t in orientation, i t enjoyed some minimal support on university campuses. - - Sabah - -Berj aya Bersatu Ra'ayat Jelata Sabah (United Peoples of Sabah). Berjaya also means "victory" in Malay. A splinter of USNO established in July 1975 by Kadazans and others dissat isf ied with the corrupt and dic ta tor ia l rule of Tun Mustapha Sabah's chief Minister. A member-of the National Front since 1975. Berjaya won control of Sabah's state government in elections in A p r i l 1976. It is currently led by Datuk Harris Salleh. USNO United Sabah National Organization. Modelled on UMNO and led by Tun Mustapha from i ts founding in 1963. An ardent defender of Malay p o l i t i c a l enculturation, the party lost the backing of UMNO in 1975 because of Tun Mustapha independence and abuse of power in Sabah. As members of the national Front, USNO and Berjaya are bound to 142 cooperate in national elections. Nevertheless, in 1978 both parties backed "independent" candidates in constituencies reserved for the other, and Berjaya kept control of the state government. - - Sarawak - -PBB Partai Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu. The offspring of a 1973 merger between the Partai Bumiputera (a union of Sarawakian Islamic groups) and PESAKA (an Iban challenger to SNAP). Leader of the Sarawak Alliance government, which is modelled on the original UMNO-MCA al l iance. The party is headed by -F_aji Abdul Rahman Yaakub. SUPP Sarawak United People's Party. A mul t i - rac ia l , but mainly Chinese party formed in 1959. Although or iginal ly l e f t i s t , moderates came to dominate the party in the mid-1960's. Prior to 1963, i t s main platform plank was independence for Sarawak or an independent union of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. In recent years, SUPP has been a regu-lar coali t ion partner in the Sarawak Alliance and a National Front member. SNAP Sarawak National Party. Originally the party of Ibans from the Second Division, SNAP opposed federation with Malaysia u n t i l 1962 when i t changed i ts posit ion. SNAP was ascendant in the Sarawak Alliance u n t i l 1966 when i t s opposition to the introduction of Malay as the national language of Sarawak led the government in Kuala Lumpur to remove SNAP'S leader as chief minister. SNAP then broke away from the All iance . SNAP won p l u r a l i t i e s in state elections in 1970 and 1974 but was unable to establish a governing coal i t ion . It f i n a l l y entered the National Front in 1977. 143 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Adas, Michael. Prophets of Rebellion; Millenarian Protest Movements  against the European Colonial Order. University of Carolina Press. A l i , S. Husin. Malay Peasant Society and Leadership. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975. 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New York: Free Press, 1975. Palmer, Ingrid. The New Race in Asia : Conclusions from Four Country  Studies, U .N.R. I .S .D. 76:6, 1976. Peacock, James L. Muslim Puritans; Reformist Psychology in South- east Asian Islam. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 175-86, 1978. Ratnam, K . J . and R.S. Milne. The Malayan Parliamentary Election of  1964. Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1967. 145 Rodinson, Maxime. Islam and Capitalism. New York: Pantheon Books, 1973. Roff, William R. The Origins of Malay Nationalism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Scott, James C. The Moral Economy of the Peasant. Rebellion and  Subsistence in Southeast Asia . New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976. Stockwell, A . J . Bri t ish Policy and Malay Pol i t i cs During the Malayan  Union Experiment 1945-48. The Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiat ic Society, Monograph #8, Kuala Lumpur, 1979. Up.hoff, N.J . and M.J. Esman, Local Organization for Rural Development. Analysis of the Asian Experience. Rural Development Committee, Cornell University, 1974. V a s i l , R.K. Pol i t i cs in a Plural Society; A Study of Non-communal  P o l i t i c a l Parties in West Malaysia. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971. Wilson, T .B . The Economics of Padi Production in Northern Malaya, Part I. Department of Agriculture Bulletin #103, Kuala Lumpur, 1959. Wolf, Eric R. Peasants. Foundations of Modern Anthropology Series, Marshall D. Sahlins (ed.), Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice-Hall , 1966. Yegar, Moshe. Islam and Islamic Institutions in Bri t ish Malaya 1874-1941; Pol i t i cs and Implementation. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1976. 146 ARTICLES Abdul Ghani Ismail. "Changing Landscape - The History of Islam in Malaya". Southeast Asian Archives, July 1972. Afifuddin bin Haji Omar. "Social Implications of Farm Mechanization in the Muda Scheme" in Barnett and Southworth (eds.). Experience in Farm Mechanization in Southeast Asia . Agricultural Development Council Inc. , 1974. . "A Study on Leadership Patterns, Act iv i t ies and Behaviour Among Leaders of F . A . ' s Within the Muda Scheme". Mada Monograph No,. 17, July 1972. Alatas, Syed Hussein. "Feudalism in Malaysian Society: A Study in Historical Continuity". C i v i l i s a t i o n s , XVIII (4) (1968), pp. 579-91. Ayoob, Mohammed. "The Revolutionary Thrust of Islamic P o l i t i c a l Tradi t ion" , Third World Quarterly. 3(2) (April 1981), pp. 269-76. B e l l , C . L . G . and P.B.R. Hazel1. "Measuring the Effects of an Agricultural Investment Project on i ts Surrounding Region" American Journal of Agricultural Economics (February 1980). Reprint. Cham, B.N. "Class and Communal Conflict in Malaysia". Journal of  Contemporary Asia . 5 (4), pp. 446-61. Cross, Malcolm. "On Confl ic t , Race Relations and the Theory of the Plural Society". Race, XII (4) (April 1971), pp. 477-92. Cummings, J . T . , ert a l . "Islam and Modern Economic Change" in Esposito (ed.). Islam and Development. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980. Deutsch, Karl W. "Social Mobilization and P o l i t i c a l Development" in Claude E. Welch, Jr . (ed.), P o l i t i c a l Modernization. 2nd. ed. Belmont Calif:Duxbury Press, 1971. Frankel, F. et^  al_. "The P o l i t i c a l Challenge of the Green Revolution; Shifting Patterns of P o l i t i c a l Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan". Princeton University Policy Memorandum No. 38, 1972. Funston, N.J . "The Origin of Parti Islam se Malaysia". Journal of  Southeast Asian Studies, 7(1) (March 1976), pp. 58-73. "Malaysia", Chapter 9 in The Pol i t i cs of Islamic Reassertion. Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), London: Croom Helm, 1981, pp. 165-89. 147 Geertz, C l i f f o r d . "The Integrative Revolution; Primordial Sentiments and C i v i l P o l i t i c s in the New States", i n Claude E. Welch Jr . (ed.), P o l i t i c a l Modernization, (2nd ed.) . Belmont Cal i f : - Duxbury Press, 1971. Hashim M. Suffian. "The Relationship between Islam and the State in Malaya" I n t i s a r i , 1(1), pp. 7-22. Hodgkin, Thomas. "The Revolutionary Tradition in Islam". Race and  Class, XXI (3) (Summer, 1979), pp. 221-38. Hudson, Michael C. "Islam and P o l i t i c a l Development" in John L. -Esposito (ed.) Islam and Development. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980. Jegarthesen, S. "The Economics of Rice Double-cropping in the Muda Irrigation Scheme" in Barnett and Southworth (eds.), Experience in Farm Mechanization in Southeast Asia. Agricultural Development Council Inc. , 1974. Kessler, Clive S. "Islam Society and P o l i t i c a l Behaviour: Some Comparative Implications of the Malay Case", Br i t i sh  Journal of Sociology, 23 (1) (1972), pp. 33-50. - . "Malaysia; Islamic Revivalism and P o l i t i c a l Disaffection in a Divided Society". Southeast Asia Chronicle no. 75 (October 1980), pp. 3-11. de Koninck. R. "Integration of the Peasantry; Examples from Malaysia and Indonesia". Pacific Affairs 52 (2) (Fall 1972), pp. 265-91. Lyon, Margo L. "The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia". Review of Indonesian  and Malayan A f f a i r s , 13 (2) (December 1979). pp. 34-45. MADA Publications. "Short Term Credit Scheme for the Muda Project; An Analysis of i ts Operational Problems", Alor Star, (1972). . "The Muda Irrigation Scheme" Project Manager's Off ice , (May 1970). Marican, Y. Mansoor. "Malay Nationalism and the Islamic Party of Malaya", Islamic Studies, 16 (1977), pp. 291-301. Mauzy, Diane K. "A Vote for Continuity: The 1978 General Elections in Malaysia", Asian Survey, XIX (3) (March 1979), pp. 281-296. McVey, Ruth T. "Islam Explained" Review A r t i c l e . Pacific A f f a i r s , 54 (2) (Summer 1981), pp. 260-87. 148 Means, Gordon P. "The Role of Islam in the P o l i t i c a l Development of Malaysia", Comparative P o l i t i c s , 1 (2) (January 1969), •pp. 264-84. . ' "Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development", Comparative P o l i t i c s . 5 (1) (October 1972), pp. 29-62. . "Public Policy toward Religion in Malaysia", Pacific Affa i rs , 51 (3) (Fall 1978), pp. 386-404. Nagata, Judith A. "Perceptions of Social Inequality in Malaysia", Pluralism in Malaysia; Myth and Reality. Judith A. Nagata (ed.), Leiden: E.J. B r i l l , 1975, pp. 113-36. . "Religious Ideology and Social Change; the Islamic Revival in Malaysia". Pacific A f f a i r s , 53 (3) (Fall 1980), pp. 405-39. "Islamic Revival and the Problem of Legitimacy among Rural Religious El i tes in Malaysia" in MAN, 17 (1) (March 1982), pp. 42-57. Purcal, J . T . "Rural (Economic Development and i ts Impact on Economic and Social Integration in West Malaysia", in Judith A. Nagata (ed.), Pluralism in Malaysia: Myth and Reality. Leiden: E . J . B r i l l , 1975, pp. 65-78. Ratnam, K . J . "Religion and P o l i t i c s in Malaya", in Robert 0. Tilman (ed.), Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast  Asia . Praeger: New York, 1969, pp. 351-61. Richards,W. "The Underdevelopment of West Malaysia; A Survey" Review of Indonesian and Malayan A f f a i r s , 7 (1) (January 1973), pp. 19-37. Rogers, M.L. "The Pol i t i c iza t ion of Malay V i l l a g e s " , Comparative  P o l i t i c s , 7 (2) (January 1975), pp. 205-25. Safie bin Ibrahim. "The Islamic Elements in Malay Pol i t i cs in Pre-independent Malaya 1937-48", Islamic Culture, LII (2) (Apri l , 1978), pp. 185-95. Said, Edward W. "Hiding Islam", Harpers, (January 1981), pp. 25-32. Scott, James C. "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Southeast A s i a " , Journal of Asian Studies, XXXII (1) (November 1972), pp. 5-37. 149 Shabbir, Cheema G. "Rural Organizations and Participation in Malaysia". W.C.A.R.R.D. Meeting Papers, Rome, F .A.O. Access #38274, (July 1979). Shari , Ishak. "Some Comments on the Eradication of Poverty Under the Third Malaysia Plan" Southeast Asian A f f a i r s , Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1977, pp. 173-81. Sivanandan, A. "Race, Class and Power: An Outline for Study" RACE, XIV (4) (April 1973), pp. 384-92. Southeast Asia Chronicle. Special Malaysia Issue, No. 72. "What Price Success", 1980. Stenson, Michael. "Class and Race in West Malaysia" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 8 (2) (1976), pp. 45-54. Tan Tin Yean. "Income Inequality and Employment in Peninsular Malaysia". Nanyang Occasional Paper #27, 1978. Von der Mehden, Fred R. "Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia", in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980, pp. 163-80. Wertheim, W.F. Evolution and Revolution: The Rising Waves of  Emancipation. Penguin Press, 1974. Winzeler, Robert L. "The Social Organization of Islam in Kelantan", in William R. Roff, (ed) Kelantan; Religion, Society, and  Pol i t i cs in a Malay State. London: Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 259-71. Zurayk, Constantine K. "Tensions in Islamic C i v i l i z a t i o n " , Papers in Contemporary Arab Studies, no. 3. Washington D . C . : Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1978. 150 THESES, DISSERTATIONS AND ACADEMIC EXERCISES Afifuddin bin Haji Omar. Peasants, Institutions and Development  in Malaysia; the Political-Economy of Development in  the Muda Region. Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell , 1978. Ah-Bang, Leo. E l i t e Cohesion in Malaysia: A Study of Alliance  Leadership. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of P o l i t i c a l Science, University of Singapore, July 1972. Ahmat, Sharom. Transitions and Change in a Malay State; A Study  of the Economic and P o l i t i c a l Development of Kedah  1879-1923. Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1969. Baker, David John. Local Muslim Organizations and National Pol i t i cs in Malaysia. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cal i fornia , Berkeley, 1973. Doering, O.C. Malaysian Rice Policy and the Muda River Project. Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell , 1973. Marican, Y. Mansoor. The P o l i t i c a l Accommodation of Primordial  Parties: DMK (India) and PAS (Malaysia). Ph.D. Thesis, Department of P o l i t i c a l Science, U . B . C . , 1976. Mauzy, Diane K. Consociationalism and Coalition P o l i t i c s in Malaysia. Ph.D. Thesis, Department of P o l i t i c a l Science, U . B . C . , 1978. Othman, Mansur Haj i . "Hakmilik Tanah Padi Dan Pol i t ik Di Kedah". /Ownership of Padi Land and Pol i t i cs in KedahJ. Unpublished M.S.S. Thesis, Universi t i Sains Malaysia, Penang, 1978. Thambipillai , Pushpathavi. P o l i t i c a l Participation in Rural  Malaysia, M.S.S. Thesis, Universi t i Sains Malaysia, Penang, 1975. Wan Abdul Halim bin Othman. "Ethnogenesis; A Case Study of the Malays in Peninsular Malaysia". Ph.D. Thesis, University of B r i s t o l , 1979. Yeoh Chee Koon. "Traditionalism and the Malays of West Malaysia". Academic Exercise, Singapore, 1973. 151 UNPUBLISHED PAPERS Anonymous, (D.K. Mauzy Collection) . "Islamic Revivalism and the P o l i t i c a l Process in Malaysia", Unpublished Paper. King, Dwight Y. '.'Indonesia's New Order ASA Bureaucratic Pol i ty . A Neo-Patrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: What Differences Does i t Make?", Paper for Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, A p r i l 1979. Lim Teck Ghee, et.. a l . "Land Tenure in the Muda Irrigation Area; A Preliminary Report", Universit i Sains Malaysia. Lim Teck Ghee, "Muda; The Green Revolution Reassessed", Seminar at Cornell University, December 1980. Nagata, Judith.' "The Impact of the Islamic Revival (Dakwah) on the Rural Religious Culture of Malaysia", Paper presented at the CCSEAS-ISEAS Joint International Conference on "Village-Level Modernization; L i v e l i -hoods, Resources and Cultural Continuity" Singapore, June 21-24 1982. Robinson, Geoffrey, B. "No Harvest Without a Thorn; the Muda Irrigation Scheme", Unpublished Paper, Cornell University, 1981. "Islamic Resurgence and P o l i t i c a l Change in Malaysia", Unpublished Paper, University of Bri t ish Columbia, 1982. 152 NEWSPAPERS Christian Science Monitor, December 14, 1978. Globe and Mai l , March 20, 1980. New Straits Times. A p r i l 7, 9, 1980; May 5, 1980. January - A p r i l , 1982. New Sunday Times. The Star. March 3, 1980; A p r i l 7, 1980; May 6, 8, 9, 1980. The Sunday Star. Straits Times. March 18, 19, 21, 22, 1980; A p r i l 3, 7, 1980. PERIODICALS Asiaweek. "Islam's Rising Cry" (August 24, 1979). . "Cracks in the Bowl" (September, 1980). . Also February 15; A p r i l 18; October 17; October 31; November 7; November 21; December 12; 1980; and July 30, 1982. Far Eastern Economic Review. "A Loud Yes (with a warning)" July 21, 1978), pp. 10-14. ._ "Pilgrim's Progress, Asian Style" . (November 17, 1978), pp. 32-5. . "The Green Revolution". (February 9, 1979), pp. 27-7. . "Bit ter Harvest in the Rice Bowl". (February 8, 1980) ••. •-'.) p. 20. . "Mending Cracks in a Rice Bowl". (February 22, 1980), pp. 28-30. j . "Of Rice and Anxious Men". (February 22, 1980), pp. 41-4. . "Keeping Islam i n Balance". (November 28, 1980), pp. 34-6. . "Half-way to Maturity". (April 10, 1981), pp. 70-7. . "The Old Guard Changes". (July 3, 1981), pp. 14-16. 153 . "Mahathir Picks his Men". (July 24, 1981), pp. 8-9. . "Malaysia Feels the Pinch". (August 14, 1981). pp. 44-5. . "Malaysia, '81". (August 28, 1981), pp. 37-70. . "The Muslims Move In". (October 9, 1981), pp. 23-9. . "Malaysia's Labour Pains" (October 23, 1981), pp. 83-4. Interview with Dr. Mahathir. (October 30, 1981), pp. 32-5. "Malaysia to Set Up an Islamic University". (March 12, 1982), p. 10. . "A L i t t l e Give a L i t t l e Take". (March 12, 1982), pp. 14-15 . "Pointers to a P o l l " . (March 19, 1982), pp. 12-13. . "Mahathir's Date with a Mandate". (March 26, 1982), pp. 10 . "Mahathir's Prize Catch". (April 2, 1982), pp. 23-4. "Clocking in for a New Era; "The Front w i l l Win but i t is the Margin that Counts"; "The New Malay Dilemma", (April 9, 1982), pp. 15-21. . "Mahathir's Soft Shoe Shuffle" . (May 7, 1982), pp. 10-11. . "An Eastern Awakening". (July 2, 1982), pp. 85-7. "Hoping for a Leap from Feudal to Industrial Age". (July 2, 1982), pp. 88-92. 

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