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China and the law of the sea Otto, Lee Ann 1981

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CHINA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA by LEE ANN OTTO B.A., cum laude, Lawrence University, 1972 M.A., Northern I l l i n o i s University, 1974 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN THE REQUIREMENTS DOCTOR OF PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF FOR THE DEGREE OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1981 (c) Lee Ann Otto, 1981 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e h e a d o f my d e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s o r h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f P o l i t i c a l Science The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , ' C a n a d a V6T 1W5 D a t e September 8, 1981 DF-fi 12/19) ABSTRACT Through an e x a m i n a t i o n o f the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China's p o l i c i e s on the law o f the sea (LOS), t h i s t h e s i s proposes t o show the e x t e n t t o which t h e s e p o l i c i e s r e f l e c t e d C hina's g e n e r a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s and i t s s p e c i f i c m a r i t i m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In p a r t I, t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f China's LOS p o l i c i e s were examined. From a s u r v e y o f China's f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s from 1949 t h r o u g h 1977, e i g h t o b j e c t i v e s were i d e n t i f i e d as b e i n g c e n t r a l t o China's f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . S e v e r a l f a c e t s o f China's m a r i t i m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and i t s r e g i o n a l m a r i t i m e d i s p u t e s were a l s o c o n s i d e r e d i n o r d e r t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h o s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which most l i k e l y had an impact on China's LOS p o l i c i e s . In g e n e r a l , China's LOS p o l i c i e s emerged as a r e s u l t o f i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Seabed Committee (1972-1973) and t h e f i r s t s i x s e s s i o n s o f the T h i r d U n i t e d N a t i o n s C o n f e r e n c e on the Law o f the Sea (1973-1977). T h e r e f o r e , p a r t II o f the t h e s i s i n c l u d e d a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s f o c u s i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y on an i n - d e p t h d e s c r i p t i o n o f C h i n a ' s p o l i c i e s and how they r e l a t e d t o the p o l i c i e s o f o t h e r s t a t e s . From t h e a n a l y s i s o f China's LOS p o l i c i e s , i t was found t h a t t h e C h i n e s e i n i t i a l l y p r e s e n t e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s on most LOS i s s u e s e a r l y i n the seabed Committee meetings. S e c o n d l y , the m a j o r i t y o f C h i n a ' s LOS statements, e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g t h e e a r l y s e s s i o n s , r e f l e c t e d b r o a d p o l i c y o u t l i n e s and g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r than s p e c i f i c r e g u l a t i o n s . T h i r d l y , i t was shown t h a t China's f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s o f m a x i m i z i n g s t a t e c o n t r o l o v e r areas under i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , c u r t a i l i n g superpower hegemony, e s p e c i a l l y t h a t o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , enhancing China's p r e s t i g e among T h i r d World s t a t e s , promoting t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e g a l o r d e r , and expanding i t s c o n t a c t s w i t h d e v e l o p e d as w e l l as d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s a l l had an impact on China's LOS p o l i c i e s . In a d d i t i o n , C h i n a ' s p o l i c i e s were i n f l u e n c e d by i t s geography, o f f s h o r e r e s o u r c e s , and maritime e x p e r t i s e . I t was c o n c l u d e d t h a t C h i n a ' s LOS p o l i c i e s are b e s t e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e t o China's p a r t i c u l a r m a r i t i m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and t h e manner i n which t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n f l u e n c e d how C h i n a p u r s u e d i t s .general f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s i n the LOS i s s u e - a r e a . iv TABLE OF. CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i i LIST OF TABLES v i . LIST OF MAPS ' v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v i i i LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ix CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 Historical Background 10 PART I. DETERMINANTS OF CHINA'S LOS POLICIES CHAPTER 2. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES 18 1949-1953 19 1954-1957 23 1958-1963 .' . 28 1964-1968 32 1969-1972 36 1973-1977 39 CHAPTER 3. MARITIME CHARACTERISTICS AND REGIONAL MARITIME DISPUTES 52 Maritime Characteristics 52 Regional Maritime Disputes 86 PART II. CHINA' LOS POLICIES: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS CHAPTER 4. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND THE DEEP SEABED 115 Rules of Procedure 117 Committee I The Seabed Beyond National Jurisdiction 124 V Page CHAPTER 5. COASTAL RESOURCE JURISDICTION AND NAVIGATION 160 Committee I I . 161 Committee I I I 192 CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 245 C h i n a P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n UNCLOS I I I . . . . 245 Trends i n C h i n a ' s LOS P o l i c i e s 251 S i g n i f i c a n c e o f UNCLOS I I I f o r C h i n a 260 C h i n a ' s F u t u r e R o l e i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 262 NOTES 264 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 317 v i TABLES Page I. S t r a i t s B o r d e r i n g on C h i n a With a Width o f Less Than Twenty-Four N a u t i c a l M i l e s 55 I I . I n v e n t o r y o f Merchant S h i p s S e l e c t e d Y e a r s , 1952-1976 58 I I I . Amount o f Goods Loaded and Unloaded i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Seaborne S h i p p i n g 61 IV. Amount o f Crude P e t r o l e u m Loaded and Unloaded i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Seaborne S h i p p i n g 68 V. P r o j e c t e d Domestic Consumption and Trade P o t e n t i a l i n Crude O i l , 1974-1985 69 VI. Imports o f M e t a l s f o r S e l e c t e d Y e a r s , 1957-1974 . 71 V I I . E x p o r t s o f M e t a l s f o r S e l e c t e d Y e a r s , 1957-1974 71 V I I I . Departmental A f f i l i a t i o n o f PRC D e l e g a t e s t o the SBC and UNCLOS I I I 77 IX. PRC D e l e g a t e t o t h e SBC and UNCLOS I I I 81 X. Frequency o f C h i n e s e Statements on S e l e c t e d I s s u e s at UNCLOS I I I 247 v i i MAPS Page 1. M a j o r Sea Lanes i n S o u t h - E a s t and E a s t A s i a 88 2. S o u t h C h i n a Sea 90 3. Senkaku ( T i a o Yu T a i ) I s l a n d s 97 4. U n i l a t e r a l C l a i m s t o J u r i s d i c t i o n 102 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Throughout my research I have been aided by several individuals. I am especially indebted to my research supervisor, Professor Mark W. Zacher, for his insightful comments and guidance through the maze known as the law of the sea negotiations. I would also like to thank the other members of my thesis committee, Professor Heath B. Chamberlain, Professor Frank C. Langdon, and Professor D.M. McRae for their constructive advice on the various drafts of my thesis. Institutionally, I wish to express my appreciation to the University of British Columbia for financial support in the form of assistantships and graduate fellowships during my graduate study at UBC. I also wish to express my thanks to Ms. Grace Cross for the grueling task of typing my thesis and to Allen B i l l y for his moral support through what were frequently trying times. Finally, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my parents who taught me the value of carrying a project to i t s conclusion and without whose constant support and encouragement I never would have reached this point. ix ABBREVIATIONS CCP Chinese Communist Party CCDP Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas DWT Deadweight Ton GDS Geographically Disadvantaged States ICNT Informal Composite Negotiating Text IMCO Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization ISA International Seabed Authority ISNT Informal Single Negotiating Text LL Landlocked States LOS Law of the Sea n.m. Nautical Miles PRC People's Republic of China ROC Republic of China ROK Republic of Korea RSNT Revised Single Negotiating Text RVN Republic of Vietnam SBC UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (Seabed Committee) UNCLOS I 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS II Second UN Conference on the Law the Sea UNCLOS III Third UN Conference on the Law c the Sea 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION * From 1966 to 1969 the People's Republic of China (PRC) experienced a massive upheaval under the guise of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The period of the Cultural Revolution had a staggering effect not only on China's domestic policies, but on China's foreign policies as well. During this period, the Chinese recalled a l l of their foreign ambassadors with the exception of Huang Hua in the United Arab Republic and, for the most part, sealed off their country from the rest of the world. By 1970, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution had subsided. Domestic policies reverted back to the earlier pattern of 1961-1965.^ China's foreign policies after 1969 also reflected a change from the isolationism of the preceding years. This change, however, was not a re-version to previous policies but the beginning of a new era in Chinese foreign relations. In the early 1970s the Chinese began to play a more active role in international affairs. They reassigned their ambassadors, increased contacts with foreign states through cultural exchanges, trade, and diplo-matic missions, and became actively involved in international negotiations. In the following discussion, the People's Republic of China w i l l be referred to as the PRC or China. The Republic of China located on Taiwan wi l l be referred to as either the ROC or Taiwan. This latter activity was especially pronounced following the October 15, 1971 vote by the members of the United Nations General Assembly to recog-nize the Peking regime as the o f f i c i a l representative of China. This vote marked the entrance of the PRC as a f u l l participating member of the international community. While the Chinese had been active in regional (Asian) affairs and, to a lesser extent, in relations with other communist and nonaligned states prior to their admission to the UN, they had played only a minor role in multilateral discussions on global issues. Beginning in 1971, the Chinese started to participate more actively in international negotiations on issues about which they had previously said l i t t l e (e.g., environmental pollution and the law of the sea). Thus, the 1970s marked a turning point in China's foreign relations away from i t s earlier isolationist policies. It is important, therefore, to learn more about China's foreign policies during this period in order to develop a better understanding of the current and possibly future direction of China's international relations. There are several possible approaches which could be adopted to study China's foreign relations in the 1970s. Robert North, for example, adopted a survey approach in which he not only described general trends in China's foreign policy over a long period of time, but also discussed historical 2 and ideological factors which influenced these policies. (Michael Yahuda, King Chen, and Robert Sutter have each adopted approaches similar to 3 North's. ) Secondly, studies of China's foreign policy have concentrated more narrowly on China's relations with groups of states situated in specific geographical regions such as East Asia, Africa, Latin America, 4 and Western Europe. A third approach adopted by many authors is to discuss a l l aspects (e.g., diplomatic, cultural, and economic) of China's 3 relations with a single state. Some of the authors using this approach to analyze China's policies during the 1970s have studied China's relations with the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Japan, Great Britain, and Tanzania.*' Fourthly, studies have focused specifically on the impact of individual Chinese leaders, most notably Mao Tse-tung, on China's foreign policy. Finally, there are studies which focus neither on China's state-to-state relations nor on the influence of individuals on foreign policy but on China's policies vis-a-vis one or more specific issue-areas. One of the most recent and comprehensive studies following this approach is Samuel Kim's 7 study of China's "participation in the United Nations system." In addition to China's UN policies, an issue which has been the subject of some study is China's strategic policy. While these five general approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy are not exhaustive, they do give an indi-cation of the type of work being conducted in this area. Of the five approaches presented above, the f i f t h type has been adopted for use in this study. There appears, in fact, to be a gap in the current literature on Chinese foreign policy dealing with single international issue-areas. Therefore, a study following this approach would provide detailed information regarding a previously unexplored area of China's foreign relations. In addition, by focusing in-depth on the development of China's policies regarding one broad issue-area, the factors which led the Chinese to adopt these policies might also become more evident. Whether or not this approach successfully yields important insights into China's foreign policy or i t s strategies toward specific questions depends largely on the issue to be analyzed. For the reasons discussed in detail below, the general issue-area chosen for analysis in this study is China's policies on the various aspects of the law of the sea (LOS). 4 As mentioned earlier, the PRC's admittance to the UN in 1971 paved the way for China to expand i t s role in international affairs. This expan-sion occurred not only as a result of China's activities within the UN its e l f , but also through China's participation in the specialized agencies of the UN and attendance at UN sponsored international conferences. How-ever, the Chinese did not take an immediately active role in a l l of these organizations. In fact, "the PRC . . . adopted a low-profile and apprentice-9 like posture in i t s diplomatic behavior and style in the United Nations." During i t s f i r s t session in the UN (the twenty-sixth session in 1971), the PRC sent representatives to only four of the six main committees of the General Assembly and did not f i l l the quota for Chinese staff on the Secretariat. The Chinese were also reluctant, at f i r s t , to take part in some UN associated activities. They declined an invitation to attend the May 1972 session of the Trusteeship Council and they did not present any nominees for election to the International Law Commission in November 1971 or for the election of new judges to the International Court of Justice in October 1972.1 0 One of the PRC's f i r s t major involvements in a UN sponsored inter-national conference was in 1973 when i t sent a delegation to the f i r s t session of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). 1 1 Earlier, from 1972-1973, China had participated in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (the Seabed Committee or SBC) which established the framework for UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III developed into one of the largest UN sponsored conferences ever held, with approximately 5,000 delegates attending the f i r s t substan-12 tive session in 1974. The conference was also massive in terms of the 5 breadth of issues to be negotiated. According to one author, the conference "represent/ed_7 the most ambitious, extensive, and complex international 13 negotiation in history." Thus, the conference was significant for the Chinese in that i t gave them an opportunity to participate in large-scale international negotiations and to negotiate with other states to attain their policy goals. Through these a c t i v i t i e s , the Chinese gained added experience and recognition in international affairs. In addition to providing international negotiating experience, the conference was also significant not only to the Chinese, but to a l l developing states in that i t was "a key transitional conference in the process of moving from established international standards to a new international 14 order." During the 1960s many of the newly independent and developing states had begun to question the basic tenets of traditional international law on the basis that they had been established by a few dominant Western states to serve their own interests. Many of the new and developing states viewed these tenets as essentially a product of the colonial era and, hence, not appropriate for contemporary international relations. More specifically, "many developing nations view/ed/ the law of the sea as the classic area in which the rules /had/ been formulated by the Western maritime nations."^ They viewed UNCLOS III as the forum for restructuring the oceans regime and contributing to the creation of a new international order. The Chinese shared the opinion that the Conference had a simple choice between the outdated legal regime of the sea based on hegemony and 'a f a i r and reasonable new law of the sea' as an important part of the establishment of a new international economic order.16 Finally, the SBC and the subsequent Law of the Sea Conference were important for the Chinese in that i t was not un t i l i t s participation in 6 17 these sessions "that China's position on LOS issues began to take shape." In 1950, the Chinese established regional fishing and security zones; however, these policies were not formulated into a global position on fishing 18 rights until November 1970. The PRC also made it s f i r s t o f f i c i a l declaration of i t s claim to a twelve nautical mile (n.m.) t e r r i t o r i a l sea on September 4, 1958. However, the Chinese did not elaborate further on their law of the sea policies at that time. Throughout the 1960's, the PRCls activities on the question of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea continued to be . . . limited primarily to giving 'serious warnings' to 'American imperialism' for violating the PRC's ' t e r r i -t o r i a l sea.* 19 Thus, beginning in 1972 with their participation in the SBC, the Chinese started to formulate a comprehensive policy on the oceans. The issue of the law of the sea therefore provides a good vantage point from which to study Chinese foreign policy in the 1970s since i t allows one to examine a comprehensive set of policies designed to deal with an issue-area on which few statements had previously been made. In summary, China's participation in the SBC and UNCLOS III was important for the Chinese in that i t : (1) broadened their general role in international affairs; (2) established their position on the restructuring of the international system; and (3) led to the formulation of their own policies on the oceans. It was the significance of these factors which led me to choose the law of the sea as an appropriate issue-area for analysis. A f i n a l factor which affected the choice of China's policies on the law of the sea as an appropriate area for study was the fact that it- had not been studied previously in any depth. A few articles had been published describing China's position on specific LOS issues such as t e r r i t o r i a l sea or continental shelf limits; however, these articles did not attempt to 7 analyze China's overall LOS position. At the time that this thesis was nearing completion, a book length study by Jeanette Greenfield entitled 20 China and the Law of the Sea, Air, and Environment was published. Greenfield's study i s similar to this one in that she also describes, to some extent, the same policies discussed here. However, in terms of focus the two studies differ substantially. Greenfield's emphasis is on China's LOS policies as they relate to current international law while this study focuses on an analysis of China's LOS policies in terms of China's foreign policy objectives and maritime characteristics. More specifically, this study is designed to achieve two fundamental objectives. The f i r s t objective i s to provide a detailed description of China's LOS policies. In f u l f i l l i n g this goal, the study w i l l also provide information regarding the international bargaining involved in the UNCLOS III negotiations and the strategies adopted by the Chinese during these multilateral discussions. Secondly, this study attempts to explain why the Chinese pursued certain LOS policies. Specifically, i t w i l l focus on how China's general foreign policy objectives as well as i t s maritime characteristics and regional maritime disputes have influenced the development of the country's LOS policies. Through this detailed discussion and analysis a comprehensive picture of China's LOS policies should emerge which wi l l add to our understanding of general trends in Chinese foreign policy including the impact which domestic (in this case, maritime) characteristics have on its content. Before describing the general framework of this study, i t is f i r s t necessary to specify the period to be analyzed. As mentioned earlier, China's participation in the law of the sea discussions began in 1972 with i t s appointment to the SBC. The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea 8 began in 1973 with an organizational session in New York. The conference has continued through a series of jt.en sessions with the most recent meeting being held in March 1981. This study, however, w i l l focus only on the negotiations at the f i r s t six sessions of UNCLOS III: (1) December 3-15, 1973 in New York; (2) June 20-August 29, 1974 in Caracas; (3) March 26-May 10, 1975 in Geneva; (4) March 15-May 7, 1976 in New York; (5) August 2-September 17, 1976 in New York; and (6) May 23-July 15, 1977 in New York. It is limited to these six sessions for a number of reasons. First, during the preparation of this study, delays in the publication of UNCLOS III documents and secondary analyses of the conference proceedings made 1977 a practical cutting off point. Secondly, and more importantly, with the exception of provisions on a few issues such as seabed mining and the definition of the continental shelf, agreement on most aspects of a compre-hensive LOS text had been reached by the conclusion of the sixth UNCLOS III session in 1977. Thirdly, i t was during the f i r s t six sessions of UNCLOS III that the PRC presented i t s proposals and expressed i t s opinions on the major LOS issues. Therefore, a study of negotiations at these six sessions provides a comprehensive picture of China's LOS policies. In fact, the Chinese have not altered their position on any of the LOS issues since 1977. The following discussion and analysis of China's LOS policies is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1, along with serving as a general intro-duction to the study, w i l l also include a brief discussion of early attempts to reach an international agreement on the law of the sea. This historical discussion should help to establish the context in which UNCLOS III was convened. In part I (chapters 2 and 3), the factors influencing China's LOS policies w i l l be discussed. These factors are divided into two categories: (1) China's foreign policy objectives; and (2) China's maritime 9 characteristics and regional maritime disputes. The discussion in chapter 2 w i l l concentrate on the f i r s t category of variables while chapter 3 w i l l include the second. Part II (chapters 4, 5, and 6) w i l l include a description of China's LOS policies as well as an analysis of the rationale behind them. While there were a large number of issues discussed at UNCLOS III, they tended to f a l l into two general categories: those relating to the seabed beyond national jurisdiction which were dealt with in Committee I and those relating to coastal resource jurisdiction and navigation covered in Committees II and III. Corresponding to this division, chapter 4 w i l l include a discussion of the issues considered in Committee I as well as the negotiations concerning the organizational structure of the conference which were conducted at the f i r s t UNCLOS III session. Chapter 5 w i l l deal with the issues negotiated in Committees II and III. The analysis in part II w i l l not only describe China's position on each issue in detail, but also place i t s policies within the context of the overall LOS negotia-tions. In order to achieve this, i t is necessary to consider the general progression of the negotiations including the positions of other states or groups of states on the main issues. At times, this w i l l mean the discussion of these issues during sessions in which the Chinese, while present, did not verbally participate in the negotiations. (In the discus-sion of the six UNCLOS III sessions, a l l of the interventions by the PRC delegates on the major issues w i l l be presented.) Finally, China's policies on the respective LOS issues w i l l be analyzed in terms of the influence which each of the two sets of variables introduced in part I had on these policies. General conclusions drawn from the findings of this study wi l l be 10 presented in chapter 6. These w i l l include conclusions regarding China's LOS policies, the factors which influenced these policies, and China's participation in UNCLOS III negotiations. Finally, the significance of the findings w i l l be discussed in terms of what they might t e l l us about Chinese foreign policy in general. Historical Background In order to understand the context in which UNCLOS III negotiations began, i t is useful to have some background knowledge regarding the develop-ment of international negotiations on the law of the sea prior to the most recent conference. The f i r s t attempt to codify international law on any aspect of the oceans occurred at the f i r s t Conference on the Progressive Codification of International Law held at The Hague in 1930. The objective of this conference was to attempt to codify international law on three 21 subjects, the most important being the regime of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea. Due to disagreements regarding (1) the breadth of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea; (2) the right of a state to take measures outside this breadth in an adjacent and con-tiguous area; and (3) the definition of the nature of the rights which states are entitled to exercise over the t e r r i t o r i a l sea,22 the forty-two delegates attending the conference were unable to agree on a t e r r i t o r i a l sea treaty. However, the conference did result in the prepara-tion of a draft conventi on on "The Legal Status of the Terr i t o r i a l Sea" and a resolution that discussions on the issue of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea 23 should continue. The f i r s t international conference convened exclusively "'to examine the law of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but also of the technical, economic, and biological aspects of the problem'" was the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). The conference was authorized by the UN General Assembly on February 21, 1957 (Resolution 1105 (XI)) on the basis of a 1956 recommendation by the International Law 25 Commission (ILC). The ILC also submitted draft articles for considera-tion at the conference and i t was these articles which formed the basis for 2 6 the four conventions eventually adopted. These conventions included: * (1) the Convention on the Terr i t o r i a l Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1964) ; (2) the Convention on the High Seas (1962); (3) the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (1966) ; and 27 (4) the Convention on the Continental Shelf (1964). The Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was con-vened in 1960 to deal with two issues that had not been satisfactorily resolved in 1958: the breadth of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea and fisheries 28 jurisdiction. Once again, the eighty-eight state delegations at the 29 conference failed to reach a substantive agreement on these issues. Following the close of UNCLOS II in 1960, activities concerning ocean use and development shifted significantly from the arena of international negotiations to the national level.' Many countries made new and/or expanded claims to ocean jurisdiction while others stepped up their efforts in developing advanced marine technology for the exploration and exploita-tion of ocean resources. Within the context of the UN, the discussion of ocean issues moved from international conferences to specialized agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Intergovernmental The dates i  parentheses are the years in which the conventions became effective by being r a t i f i e d by twenty-two states. 12 Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). In addition to these actions, other developments were occurring which would eventually bring ocean issues once again into the forefront of inter-national debate. After 1960, both the number of independent states in the world and membership in the UN increased significantly. For the most part, these countries had had l i t t l e or no say in the early formulation of ocean law and, as a result, fe l t i t did not represent their interests and aspirations. Therefore, they called for the creation of a new and more equitable ocean regime: one which would move away from the traditional system primarily benefiting developed maritime states to one more beneficial to the developing states. Secondly, both old and new states began to extend unilaterally their seaward boundaries. Some states, primarily Latin American, claimed a te r r i t o r i a l sea limit of 100 nautical miles. Other states extended their jurisdiction for specific purposes, e.g., they established fishing zones beyond their t e r r i t o r i a l sea within which foreign fishing vessels were prohibited. Canada enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Act of 1970 which established a pollution zone in which i t would set and enforce regulations 30 to curtail vessel source pollution. These states wanted new LOS conventions to legitimize their claims internationally, and other states called for new laws of the sea in order to make maritime regulations more uniform. Finally, a third development which led to the ca l l for a new LOS conference was the phenomenal advances being made in the f i e l d of marine 31 technology. Through these developments, areas of the ocean which had previously been inaccessible, in particular the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, were opened up for exploration and exploitation. Other developments also brought increased use of the oceans for fishing and shipping which, in turn, led to new problems of conservation and pollution. Therefore, in order to deal adequately with these changes, i t was f e l t that 32 new LOS regulations were needed. In summary, following the 19S8 and 1960 conferences, many states had 33 become dissatisfied with the existing legal regime for the oceans. Some countries f e l t that the traditional ocean regime reflected in the 1958 conventions did not serve their needs and interests while others f e l t they did not establish the rules necessary to deal with rapidly expanding ocean problems such as pollution. In an attempt to cope with these problems and to focus international attention on the need for a new ocean regime, Arvid Pardo, Malta's repre-sentative to the United Nations, proposed on August 17, 1967 that the General Assembly add a new item to i t s agenda entitled Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the limits of present national j u r i s -diction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind.34 In this proposal, Pardo asked the General Assembly to declare the seabed beyond national jurisdiction part of the "common heritage of mankind." In order to realize this concept, Pardo suggested a treaty encompassing several principles including nonappropriation by states, use of seabed revenues primarily to promote the development of poor countries, reservation of the area for peaceful purposes only, and creation of an inter-national agency to assume jurisdiction and to 'regulate', supervise and control a l l activities therein.'35 Pardo's proposal proved to be the major catalyst in the movement towards a new LOS conference. On December 18, 1967, the General Assembly voted to establish an Ad Hoc Committee chaired by Hamilton Shirley Amera-14 singhe of Sri Lanka (Ceylon at the time) to study the issues raised by Pardo. The Ad Hoc Committee met from March through August 1968 and focused on two aspects of Pardo's proposal: i t s legal and economic implications as well as i t s technical components. By August 30, 1968 the Ad Hoc Committee had adopted a report which was presented to the General Assembly on December 21. Among the four resolutions coming out of this report and later adopted by the General Assembly was one which changed the status of the Seabed 36 Committee from an ad hoc to a permanent committee of the General Assembly. The other three resolutions were: the Resolution on Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution (2467B)j the Resolution on Study on an Appropriate International Machinery (2467C); and the Resolution on the International 37 Decade of Ocean Exploration (2467D). Throughout 1969 and 1970, the members of the Seabed Committee used the same format as the earlier Ad Hoc Committee in "acquiring information, negotiating a declaration of principles, and defining areas of disagreement.' The major accomplishment of these meetings was to point out the d i f f i c u l t y inherent in considering the various aspects of ocean policy in isolation from one another. For example, i t was d i f f i c u l t to discuss exploitation of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction when the limits of coastal state jurisdiction over the seabed and water column had not yet been established. The growing awareness of the interdependence of ocean issues and the desire of many countries to alter existing norms f i n a l l y led to the General Assembly's adoption on December 17, 1970 of Resolution 2750C (XXV) which called for a new LOS Conference to be convened in 1973. This conference was to "deal with the establishment of an equitable international regime—including an international machinery--for the area 15 and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a precise definition of the area, and a broad range of related issues including those concerning the regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the t e r r i t o r i a l sea (including the question of its breadth and the question of international straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas (including the question of the preferential rights of coastal States), the preservation of the marine environment (including, inter a l i a , the prevention of of pollution) and sci e n t i f i c research."39 In addition, the resolution enlarged the Seabed Committee from forty-two to eighty-six members and expanded i t s mandate, transforming i t into the 40 preparatory committee for the new LOS Conference. In f u l f i l l i n g this function, the committee's primary task was to delineate a l l of the issues relevant to the conference and to prepare draft articles on them. In order to distribute i t s work load, the Seabed Committee set up three sub-committees dealing with: (1) an international regime and organization for the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (2) most of the issues traditionally associated with the ocean, e.g., the t e r r i t o r i a l sea, straits,high seas, and fisheries; and (3) pollution, s c i e n t i f i c research, and the transfer of technology. These subcommittees later became the three major committees of UNCLOS III. In conclusion, the start of UNCLOS III marked the beginning of a new era in the international law of the sea. It opened the way for a l l countries, developing as well as developed, to have a say in the creation of new regulations for the use of the oceans. For the Chinese, the timing of UNCLOS III also corresponded to a period when China was beginning to expand it s contacts with other states. In addition, the issues to be negotiated at the conference presented the Chinese with the necessity to formulate their own comprehensive set of policies on the broad issue-area of the law of the sea. Thus, an examination of China's subsequent LOS policies should provide useful information regarding the influence which various factors had on the formulation of China's policies vis-a-vis a specific issue-area. Before such an analysis can proceed, however, i t is f i r s t necessa: to examine several of the variables which may have influenced China's LOS policies. The elaboration of these factors w i l l be the objective of part I. PART I DETERMINANTS OF CHINA'S LOS POLICIES 18 CHAPTER 2 FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES B e f o r e an a n a l y s i s o f China's p o l i c i e s on the law o f the sea can be undertaken, i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h t h e c o n t e x t i n which these p o l i c i e s were f o r m u l a t e d . As w i t h a l l government p o l i c i e s , b o t h domestic and f o r e i g n , C hina's law o f t h e sea p o l i c i e s were not f o r m u l a t e d by a group o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n i s o l a t i o n from o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s . These i n f l u e n c e s s e r v e d as e i t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s on o r impetuses t o China's c h o i c e o f p o l i c i e s and thus formed t h e c o n t e x t i n which t h e y s h o u l d be a n a l y s e d . In t h i s s tudy, t h e s e c o n t e x t u a l v a r i a b l e s have been c a t e g o r i z e d i n t o two g e n e r a l groups: (1) China's f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s and (2) China's m a r i t i m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and r e g i o n a l m a r i t i m e p o l i c i e s and d i s p u t e s . The f i r s t c a t e g o r y w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r w h i l e t h e second w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n c h a p t e r 3. P r i o r t o d i s c u s s i n g t h e s p e c i f i c f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s which the Chine s e were p u r s u i n g d u r i n g UNCLOS I I I (1973-1977), i t i s f i r s t u s e f u l t o c o n s i d e r b r i e f l y the development o f Ch i n a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y from 1949 thro u g h 1972 s i n c e t h e s e p o l i c i e s and t h e o b j e c t i v e s t h e y s e r v e d e s t a b l i s h e d t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t f o r China's subsequent LOS p o l i c i e s . The d i s c u s s i o n o f China's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s d i v i d e d i n t o s i x s e c t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o r e l a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t phases i n i t s e v o l u t i o n from 1949 thr o u g h 1977. The p r i m a r y f o c u s w i l l be on the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f China's major f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s d u r i n g each o f t h e s i x time p e r i o d s . In d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s , r e f e r e n c e s w i l l be made t o developments i n China's f o r e i g n 19 relations and domestic affairs which had an impact on China's foreign policy-goals and strategies. Once China's major foreign policy objectives have been identified, i t w i l l be possible, in chapters 4 and 5, to analyze China's LOS policies in terms of the extent to which they were the products of these objectives. 1949-1953 At the time of the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, China's p o l i t i c a l and economic systems were in chaos. P o l i t i c a l organization had been fragmented by the years of turmoil and the economy was suffering under severe inflation. Due to these and other problems, the new Chinese regime required foreign aid in order to begin reconstructing the country. On June 30, 1949, Mao Tse-tung "announced that the Chinese should 'lean to one side' - to the Soviet side.""'" He subse-quently traveled to Moscow to negotiate for reconstruction aid. This trip resulted in the signing of a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance which, among other provisions, called for a Soviet economic credit to China and a thirty year military alliance between the two 2 countries. This and other agreements between China and the Soviet Union on minerals, c i v i l ayiation, petroleum, and shipbuilding exemplified the close ties which developed between the two countries during the PRC's early years. This close relationship with the Soviet Union did not prevent the Chinese from establishing diplomatic relations with other states. By June 1950, the PRC government had been recognized by six Asian, seven Western 3 European, and a l l of the Eastern European socialist states. The trend towards increased international recognition halted rather suddenly with the 20 outbreak of the Korean War and the February 1, 1951 resolution of the UN General Assembly condemning China as an aggressor and recommending an 4 embargo against i t . The PRC's involvement in the Korean War began in mid-October 1950 when i t sent "volunteers" to aid the faltering North Korean forces. China's participation continued until March 1953 when a truce was f i n a l l y signed.*' As a result of the war, the Chinese accomplished several objectives: (1) they preserved their own security by keeping US forces away from the Manchurian border and by helping to"secure the existence of North Korea as a friendly communist buffer state; (2) they helped to unify the Chinese people by focusing on a common enemy; (3) they "established China's right to have a voice in the settlement of Asian problems through participation in the peace negotiations;" and (4) they exhibited China's "determination and ab i l i t y (for the f i r s t time in a century) to play a leading role in opposing 7 Western 'imperialism' in Asia." However, China also suffered severe losses as a result of the Korean War. Domestically not only were many lives lost but the war also caused a delay in economic reconstruction. Inter-nationally the Chinese lost any chance they may have had of becoming a member of the UN in the immediate future. They also lost the opportunity to "liberate" Taiwan since both during and after the war i t was protected Q by the US Seventh Fleet. The focus of China's relations with underdeveloped states changed during the 1949-1953 period. Prior to i t s entry into the Korean War (i.e., from 1949 to 1951), the Chinese had adopted a militant attitude towards underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This attitude led to a foreign policy which reflected China's "h o s t i l i t y to neutralist Asian and African states who were trying to pursue a 'third road' between capitalism and communism" through support for armed communist uprisings in g such areas as Burma, Malaya, Indochina and the Philippines. The Chinese began to temper their relatively aggressive policy in 1951 with the realization that good relations with neutral Asian states "could be a valuable p o l i t i c a l asset and a restraint on possible American military designs against C h i n a . C h i n a ' s declining emphasis on armed struggle in the newly independent Asian and African states may also have been precipitated by China's losses in Korea, the failure of communist uprisings in these states, the reluctance of the Soviets to continue to support Maoist uprisings, the increase in the number of US sponsored collective security agreements in these areas, and China's need to concentrate i t s efforts on domestic economic issues.^ The i n i t i a l indications of a change in the tone of China's foreign policy came in 1951 with a Sino-Indian trade agree-12 ment and in 1952 when a trade agreement with Ceylon was concluded. China's policy of peaceful coexistence, however, was not f u l l y evident until 1953 with the Korean armistice and, more significantly, China's acceptance of a settlement in Indochina which f e l l short of the demands put forward by 13 the Viet Minh. 1953 also marked the inauguration of changes in China's domestic economic policies. By the end of 1952, domestic economic reconstruction had been largely completed. Using the Soviet economic model as a guide, the Chinese instituted their f i r s t Five-Year Plan in 1953 emphasizing the develop-ment of heavy industry at the expense of light industry and agriculture. The Chinese were aided in implementing this plan by Soviet loans which were used to buy complete Soviet industrial plants. These plants later "became 14 the core of China's heavy industrial base." While the Chinese never ex p l i c i t l y stated their foreign policy 22 objectives during this period, their goals can be inferred from foreign policy statements and actions.^ Throughout the 1949-1953 period, China's major foreign policy objectives were centered around China's attempt to maintain i t s national security. In order to achieve this broad goal, the Chinese pursued a series of more specific objectives. First, the Chinese sought military aid from the Soviet Union in order to build up their armed forces. Secondly, they discouraged the presence of unfriendly states near China's borders. The actions instituted to achieve this goal included China's participation in the Korean War and the establishment in 1950 of coastal security zones within which foreign ships were prohibited. (The establishment of these zones will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.) Thirdly, the Chinese focused on reunifying Taiwan province with the rest of the country. In early 1950, i t had appeared that the Chinese were preparing for an amphibious assault on Taiwan. This plan was abandoned in June, however, when the US announced that i t s fleet would defend the Nationalists rp - 16 on Taiwan. In addition to objectives associated with maintaining their national security, the Chinese pursued three other foreign policy goals during the PRC's early years. First, one of China's objectives was to promote Maoist style revolutions in newly independent states. The Chinese hoped that such revolutions would result in the establishment of socialist governments in these states. By late 1951, the Chinese appeared to have abandoned this objective in favor of improving their image among neutralist states. By appearing to be more moderate through decreased support for revolutionary movements within foreign states, the Chinese hoped to increase their influence and prestige among the existing governments of newly independent states. Thus, a second Chinese foreign policy objective was to establish 23 a sphere of influence within the international system by improving relations with Third World countries. Finally, the Chinese sought Soviet economic aid as part of their policy of economic recovery and development. 1954-1957 The second phase in Chinese foreign relations lasted from 1954 through 1957 and was primarily characterized by China's goal of enhancing i t s inter-national prestige, especially among the newly independent Third World states. Correspondingly, the Chinese moved away from their earlier objective of working towards the instigation of communist revolutions in these states. Internationally, China's status was greatly enhanced early in 1954 when its representatives at the Geneva Conference "played a major role in negotiating the truce formula that led to the division of Vietnam and the incorporation 17 of North Vietnam into the Communist bloc." With regard to enhancing i t s position vis-a-vis Third World states, "China started to identify i t s interests with those of Afro-Asian countries, using common experiences with 18 imperialism as a common denominator." The f i r s t tangible expression of China's Third World policy during this period was the Sino-Indian agreement signed on April 29, 1954 in which 19 India recognized China's claim to Tibet. After a second Sino-Indian meeting in June 1954, Prime Ministers Nehru and Chou En-lai issued a statement out-lining their Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: (1) mutual respect for each other's t e r r i t o r i a l integrity and sovereignty, (2) nonaggression, (3) noninterference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.20 These principles, which were also incorporated into a 1954 agreement between China and Burma, "became a landmark of the era of peaceful coexistence and 21 had a far-reaching impact on Chinese foreign policy." 24 Another major step for the Chinese in their attempt to improve their image vis-a-vis Third World states came in 1955 at the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia. The Chinese used this conference to gain support from Asian and African states by "disavow/*ing7 any Chinese intentions 'whatsoever to subvert the governments of i t s neighboring countries, 1 or to use overseas Chinese 'to carry out subversive a c t i v i t i e s . ' " Through his careful mediation efforts, Chou En-lai "convinced many of the delegates 23 that he was a reasonable man of goodwill, pursuing a peaceful policy." The Bandung Conference was also instrumental for the Chinese in that i t gave them an opportunity to establish contacts with African leaders. Specifically, Chou held meetings with Egyptian President Nassar which led to Egypt's recognition of China in 1956 and to China's active participation at the First Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference held in Cairo in 1957. Thus, the Bandung Conference "can be taken as marking the beginning of the CPR's transition from the status of an almost purely Asian power to that of 24 an Afro-Asian power." Aside from participating in conferences and state-to-state meetings, the Chinese also used economic measures to increase their prestige among developing states. In 1956, the Chinese began a program of economic aid to several noncommunist developing states including Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, 25 Nepal, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. During 1954-1957, as in the previous period, concerns for national security were reflected in China's foreign policy. F i r s t , China continued to rely on Soviet assistance in the areas of economic, technical, and military development. (For example, in 1957 the Soviets agreed to aid China 2 6 in the development of i t s nuclear weapons program. ) Part of the rationale behind continued ties with the Soviet Union was China's belief that the 25 Soviet Union was far superior to the US in technology (i.e., "the East Wind 27 prevail/Jed7 over the West Wind" ) . The Chinese saw this superiority as being reflected in the 1957 test of a Soviet inter-continental b a l l i s t i c missile and the Soviet launching of the f i r s t space s a t e l l i t e . While the Chinese continued to pursue a policy aimed at Sino-Soviet cooperation, there were indications during this period that the Chinese were beginning to have doubts regarding the suitability of the Soviet Union as a reliable ally. For example, in conjunction with their technological advances, the Chinese f e l t that the Soviet Union ought to act accordingly by putting politico-military pressures, which were not expected to eventuate in general war, on the United States, on behalf of China as well as of other segments of the revolutionary camp.28 However, subsequent Soviet actions did not conform to Chinese expectations. Secondly, Sino-Soviet relations were strained when, during a c r i s i s in the Taiwan Straits, the Chinese f e l t that the Soviets did not go far enough in 29 supporting them against the Nationalists. Finally, Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 added to Sino-Soviet tensions. In this report, Khrushchev's reluctance to provoke the United States and his determination to play an active role in the third world while discouraging Communist insurgency wherever there was a chance for local Parties to come to power by electoral means-^ O ran counter to the views held by the Chinese. In addition, Khrushchev's 31 attack on Stalin alarmed Chinese leaders and especially Mao. A second national security objective which was of major concern to the Chinese was the protection of China's borders against American threats. China's perception of an impending threat to it s territory was heightened in 1953 when the US expanded i t s defensive perimeter in Southeast Asia to include Taiwan, withdrew i t s prohibition on Chinese Nationalist offensive acts against mainland China, and in early 1954, increased i t s military aid 32 to the Nationalists. The Chinese were reluctant to take any military action to counter this threat while the Indochina War continued. However, as soon as the Geneva Agreement had been signed, the Chinese stepped up their actions against Taiwan both as a means to undermine US influence along China's border and to attempt to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. Hence for the Chinese, the reassertion of . . . sovereignty over the island was not . . . only a question of assuaging national pride, but rather a necessary step to diminish the American threat from a potentially explosive quarter.33 Therefore, on September 3, 1954 the Chinese began shelling islands offshore of Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait which, in turn, led to increased US aid to the Nationalists. (This shelling began only three days prior to the con-vening of the Manila Conference to set up the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-zation whose primary aim was to protect Southeast Asia from Chinese and 34 North Vietnamese subversion or influence. ) The c r i s i s in the Taiwan Strait persisted until April 1955 when the Chinese decreased their pressure on the islands because of some retaliatory threats by ft).S.J Secretary Dulles, Soviet non-support, and a desire to appear in the best possible .. light at the forthcoming Asian-African Conference /"in Bandung?.35 At approximately this same time, the Chinese began "a propaganda campaign aimed at the 'peaceful liberation' of Taiwan by means of an agreement with the Nationalists." While signs of tension were beginning to appear in Sino-Soviet relations in the mid-1950s, Sino-American relations appeared to be moving slowly towards less outright h o s t i l i t y . For example, at the Bandung Conference Chou En-lai publicly proposed that the US and ,China begin negotiations aimed at decreasing tensions in Asia, especially in the area of Taiwan. As a result, low level negotiations between the US and China began on August 1, 1955 and continued, with interruptions, un t i l higher level contacts were established in 1971. While neither side was willing to modify i t s position on Taiwan or other fundamental issues during the early sessions, the talks did indicate 37 a slight amelioration in S.i'n.Q'American relations. Finally, during the 1953-1957 time period the Chinese economy was beginning to expand under the First Five-Year Plan. During the plan years, considerable progress was made in heavy industrial development; however, light industry and especially the agricultural sector did not develop as 3 8 quickly. The institution of these policies, which were essentially based on the Soviet developmental model, had an impact on China's foreign policy in that i t necessitated the continuation of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. As summarized by Ishwer C. Ojha, "the friendliness of the years 1954-1957 did not represent any real change in Chinese foreign policy as far as 39 China's national interests were concerned." China's main objective continued to be to preserve i t s security by allying i t s e l f with the Soviet Union and by eliminating the US presence in Asia. An additional aim of the Chinese was to increase their prestige among Third World states through a policy of peaceful coexistence. Thus, they departed from their earlier objective of promoting communist revolutions within these states. Finally, in order to promote domestic economic modernization, the Chinese maintained their objective of relying on Soviet economic aid. 28 ' 1958-1963 During the 1958-1963 period, China's foreign policy objectives were shaped, to a large extent, by i t s relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, "growing h o s t i l i t y to Khrushchev and to Soviet 'revisionism' was the main 40 single hallmark of Chinese foreign policy during the early 1960's." In general, China's criticisms of the Soviet Union arose out of "the alleged Soviet tendency to appease American 'imperialism' and not to give active support to anti-'imperialist'revolutionary movements and 'oppressed' 41 countries." As examples of the Soviet Union's appeasement of the US, the Chinese pointed to Khrushchev's actions during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and his signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. In the Cuban situa-tion, the Chinese accused Khrushchev of "trying to 'play the Munich scheme against the Cuban people'" while the Soviets "charg/ed7 that the /Chinese? 42 had been trying to incite a world war over Cuba." Similarly, the Chinese considered the Test Ban Treaty as evidence that the Soviet Union "prefer/*red_7 4 accommodation with the United States to preserving the alliance with China." Specifically, the Sino-Soviet s p l i t had an impact on China's objectives relating to i t s economic and military development and i t s relations with Third World states. In the f a l l of 1958, the Chinese instituted a new program designed to increase dramatically agricultural and industrial pro-duction. This program referred to as the Great Leap Forward marked a "shift from the Soviet-style FFYP / F i r s t Five-Year PlanJ to a developmental approach 44 more consonant with Chinese experience and conditions." A major blow to China's industrialization plans came in Ju l y 1960 when, due to the deteriora-tion in Sino-Soviet relations, Khrushchev ordered the withdrawal of the 1,390 Soviet technicians in China and the termination of the associated Soviet aid program. As a result of this withdrawal, the Chinese lost access to Soviet technology and construction on many projects within China was 45 halted only half-completed. In addition, the Chinese were forced to abandon their reliance on Soviet aid for future development projects. Secondly, the sp l i t between the Chinese and Soviets affected the develop-ment of China's military capabilities. Whereas earlier the Chinese had looked to the Soviets for military protection, in May 1958 the Chinese 46 announced that they would begin to develop their own nuclear weapons. Earlier in 1958, the Chinese had requested the transfer of nuclear weapons and an appropriate delivery system to China from the Soviet Union. This request, which probably came as a result of the US decision to place tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, was based on an earlier Soviet agreement to assist China in i t s nuclear development. However, "Khrushchev responded by pressing what had become a favorite project of his, the placing of most 47 i f not a l l of China's armed forces under 'joint' (really Soviet) control." This arrangement was totally unacceptable to China and resulted in its decision to go i t alone. Limited Soviet nuclear assistance to China did 48 continue, however, until mid-1959. Finally, Sino-Soviet relations had an impact on China's foreign policy objectives relating to the Third World. During the 1954-1957 period, the Chinese had attempted to enhance their prestige among Third World states and, as a result, establish their own sphere of influence in this region. In late 1959 and early 1960, the Chinese saw increased Soviet activity in South and Southeast Asia as an encroachment on their sphere of-influence and, therefore, a threat to this objective. In'essence, the USSR sought control over communist movements - and also increased influence over nationalist parties and governments -at what was viewed in Peking as the expense of Chinese Communist interests.49 An explicit example of this conflict was the Soviet attempt to enhance i t s influence in India at the same time that Chinese relations with India were deteriorating. In an apparent contradiction to their objective of increasing China's influence in the Third World, in the late 1950's the Chinese indicated a return to their earlier foreign policy goal of promoting revolution within foreign states. For example, in 1958 the Chinese gave p o l i t i c a l and military aid to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), the main organization actually engaged in an anti-imperialist movement at the time.*^ (Algeria later became China's center of influence in Africa once the FLN took over the government in 1 9 6 2 . T h i s renewed interest in revolutionary move-ments was an early indication of China's intention to challenge Soviet influence in Third World areas outside of Asia. Secondly, according to David Mozingo, these 'revolutionary' forces, whether led by Communists like Ho Chi Minh or nationalists like Sukarno, began to acquire major strategic importance to Peking once i t became clear that a policy based on alignment with Russia and cooperation with the Afro-Asian neutrals could not be manipulated, effectively, to weaken or deter the United States.52 Thus, the Chinese also relied on these groups to help prevent the spread of American influence in the Third World. Finally, throughout the 1958-1963 period the Chinese continued to see the security of China's borders as being threatened. This fear led the Chinese to take a series of steps to deal with the perceived threats. As a result of increased US aid to the Nationalists on Taiwan and of disrup-tions within China caused by the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese f e l t that the Nationalists were planning to take advantage of the situation within 53 China to attack the mainland. In order to counteract this threat and 31 possibly reunify Taiwan with the mainland, the Chinese launched a propaganda offensive against Taiwan in July and began shelling the Nationalist held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu a month later. The Chinese eased their pressure on the islands in October when they realized they could not take control over them and that a possibility'existed that the Nationalists might stage a retaliatory attack on the mainland. In addition, the US and Nationalists "issued a joint statement strongly implying that the Nationalists would not try to invade the mainland unless the Communist regime collapsed 54 from internal weakness" which placated the Chinese to some extent. It was during this c r i s i s that the Chinese made their f i r s t o f f i c i a l declaration of a twelve nautical mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea. (This declaration w i l l be discussed in detail in chapter 5.) Tension in the Taiwan Strait was again heightened in 1962 when threats were exchanged between Taiwan and the mainland. At this time, the conflict was limited to sporadic aerial fighting and a r t i l l e r y exchanges u n t i l , after approximately six months, "the conflict subsided into another prolonged „55 impasse." The second perceived threat to China's security occurred along i t s border with India. The warm reception given to Tibetan refugees in India following the 1959 Tibetan uprising, the aid supplied to Tibetan guerrillas, and the fact that a demarcation of the Sino-Indian border had never been agreed to, set the stage for a border conflict. This dispute did not evolve beyond the stage of border clashes nor was i t conclusively settled; i t merely died down in late 1959.^^ The border areas between China and India did not remain quiet for long, however. The dispute flared up once again in 1962 when the Chinese "considered both the security of western Sinkiang and western Tibet and i t s 32 prestige" to be threatened following a movement of Indian troops into an' 57 area claimed by the Chinese. Therefore, once the Chinese had reinforced their troops in Fukien to deal with the Nationalists, they sent forces into the Indian border areas. After two successful attacks, the Chinese withdrew to their previous border position. While not annexing any new territory, the Chinese maintained control over a disputed area in northeast Kashmir through which they had constructed a military highway in 1956-1957. Thus, they accomplished their goals of enhancing China's prestige at the expense of the Indians and protecting their military highway and thus their border.^ In summary, from 1958 through 1963 China's foreign policy goals were influenced, to a large extent, by i t s deepening sp l i t with the Soviet Union. Due to this s p l i t , the Chinese were forced to become more self-reliant in terms of their military and economic policies. In addition, the Chinese continued to focus on their earlier objectives of protecting China's borders, reunifying Taiwan with the mainland, and establishing their own sphere of influence within the Third World. Finally, during this period the Chinese began to focus, once again, on supplying aid to national liberation movements abroad, an objective which they appeared to have abandoned or at least substantially toned down during the 1954-1957 period. 1964-1968 During the period from 1964 through 1968, domestic events within China had a significant impact on China's foreign policy. Beginning in 1964, Mao became increasingly concerned not only with the degree to which his policies were being carried out within the Communist Party, but also by the extent to which they were being accepted by individual Chinese. 33 In order to rectify this situation, a series of mass campaigns, primarily aimed at maintaining an "uninterrupted revolution" in China, were 59 initiated. By approximately 1965, this series of campaigns developed into what was labelled the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which was characterized by the public criticism of leading Chinese Communist Party (CCP) o f f i c i a l s and intellectuals and mass demonstrations by young people "to denounce and terrorize those said to be /Mao's_7 opponents, and to destroy various symbols of 'bourgeois' or 'reactionary'culture. The campaigns associated with the Cultural Revolution had a major impact on China's foreign policy from 1966 to 1969. During these years, the Chinese adopted a foreign policy strategy based on the idea "that foreigners, like Chinese, should accept the 'thought of Mao Tse-tung' and support the Cultural Revolution."^''' This strategy was manifested in several areas. For example, a l l of China's ambassadors abroad, with the exception of Huang Hua in Cairo, were recalled for p o l i t i c a l reeducation. 6 2 (These posts were not r e f i l l e d u n t i l 1969. ) In addition, from the summer of 1966 to the summer of 1967, the Red Guards demonstrated against foreign embassies in China, harassed the crews of foreign ships, created a series of border incidents primarily with the Soviet Union, and con-ducted violent demonstrations in several foreign countries, most notably 63 Macao, Hong Kong, and Burma. By September 1967, China was involved 64 in disputes with thirty-two countries. As indicated above, China's policies in 1966 aimed at promoting revolutionary movements within foreign states led to serious problems in China's relations with these states. However earlier, in 1964, the Chinese were s t i l l actively pursuing their objective of improving relations with Third World states. From December 1963 to February 1964, Chou En-lai visited ten African and three Asian states in order to: (1) counteract the influence of Great Britain, the US,and the USSR in these areas; (2) decrease support for India in the Sino-Indian dispute; (3) increase China's access to African and Asian markets and resources; and (4) s o l i c i t support for the convening of a second Asian-African Conference rather than a second conference for non-aligned countries (the f i r s t was held in Belgrade in 1961). In addition, Chou's tr i p led to further discussions between China and Third World states regarding Afro-Asian economic problems.^ In spite of apparent early successes in i t s Third World policies, China's goal of enhancing i t s prestige vis-a-vis these countries suffered a series of setbacks in 1965 and 1966 in addition to those associated with the Cultural Revolution. These setbacks included the cancellation of the second Afro-Asian Conference which the Chinese had intended to use "to assert Chinese leadership over a united bloc of African and Asian nations opposed to both American and Soviet 'imperialism.'"^ In addition, Indonesia "became extremely hostile towards China" following an abortive coup which deposed President Sukarno, a PRC supporter, and led to the annihilation of 67 the Indonesian Communist Party. Finally in late 1965 and early 1966, a series of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa (including Ghana which had had especially friendly relations with China) weakened China's position in 68 that area. In September 1967, the Chinese began to decrease their emphasis on promoting Maoism and revolutionary movements abroad and attempted to soothe their damaged relations with several Asian states (e.g., Cambodia and Nepal) by settling diplomatic disputes and granting economic aid. China also improved i t s relations with two African states, Tanzania and Zambia, as a 35 69 result of an agreement to aid them in the construction of a major railroad. In addition to their contradictory objectives of attempting to enhance their international prestige and promoting communist uprisings, the dispute with the Soviet Union also continued to be of major concern to the Chinese from 1964 through 1968. In 1964, the Chinese expl i c i t l y attacked the policies of the Soviet Union at a meeting of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council. China's delegate "accused the Soviet Union of 'great-power chauvinism and national egoism' in giving aid . . . /and/ of ignoring the struggle against 70 imperialism." The Chinese and Soviets also clashed over the extent of China's involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. The Chinese position was to restrict their participation to supplying aid, while the Soviets called for an expanded and united Soviet-Chinese action. Finally, the Sino-Soviet dispute resulted in numerous protests by the Chinese in 1964 and 1968 that the Soviets were attempting to annex Chinese territory along their common border and that the Soviets were st i r r i n g up anti-Chinese feelings among minorities in Sinkiang. China's attempt to counteract what i t perceived as a Soviet threat led i t to continue i t s earlier policy aimed at alleviating tensions with the US. Chou En-lai "presumably judged that improved relations with the United States would serve to offset the Soviet pressure on China" in 1968 when he proposed 72 the resumption of Sino-American talks in Warsaw. Secondly, the Chinese also attempted to improve their relations with other communist states, most notably Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia, to counterbalance Soviet influence 73 in Eastern Europe. Thirdly, in conjunction with i t s other policies aimed at maintaining i t s security vis-a-vis a l l "enemies" including the Soviet Union, between 1966 and 1968 the Chinese accelerated their nuclear weapons 74 program. Finally, the Sino-Soviet dispute led China to expand i t s trade 36 w i t h Japan, Canada, A u s t r a l i a , and o t h e r Western s t a t e s i n o r d e r t o c o n t i n u e 75 t o p u r sue i t s economic development o b j e c t i v e s . In summary, i n i t i a l l y d u r i n g t h e 1964-1968 p e r i o d the C h i n e s e p u r s u e d a f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e o f a t t e m p t i n g t o enhance China's i n f l u e n c e among T h i r d World s t a t e s . However, due t o a s e r i e s o f s e t b a c k s i n 1965 and 1966, t h e C h i n e s e had l i t t l e s u c c e s s i n a c h i e v i n g t h i s g o a l . In a d d i t i o n , i n 1966 the C h i n e s e renewed emphasis on t h e i r e a r l i e r o b j e c t i v e o f p r omoting M a o i s t u p r i s i n g s w i t h i n f o r e i g n s t a t e s which r e s u l t e d i n c o n f l i c t s between C h i n a and t h e s e s t a t e s . By 1967, C h i n a ' s p o l i c i e s had changed d i r e c t i o n t o f o c u s , once more, on the o b j e c t i v e o f i m p r o v i n g China's i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e p u t a t i o n e s p e c i a l l y among d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s . D u r i n g the 1964-1968 p e r i o d , t h e C h i n e s e c o n s i s t e n t l y f o c u s e d on two o t h e r f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s : o p p o s i n g a l l a c t i o n s by t h e S o v i e t Union and, c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , d e c r e a s i n g h o s t i l i t y towards the U n i t e d S t a t e s . F i n a l l y , i n o r d e r t o promote C h i n a ' s economic development, the C h i n e s e p u r s u e d a f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e o f expanding t r a d e w i t h Western i n d u s t r i a l i z e d s t a t e s . 1969-1972 U n l i k e t h e p r e v i o u s p e r i o d when domest i c p o l i c i e s were the major f o c a l p o i n t o f t h e PRC government, the y e a r s from 1969 t o 1972 were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by major new i n i t i a t i v e s i n C h i n a ' s f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . In A p r i l 1969, the C h i n e s e "began t o implement a new f o r e i g n p o l i c y , a p o l i c y o f c o e x i s t e n c e and n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h a l l but a few c a r e f u l l y i d e n t i f i e d and n a r r o w l y d e f i n e d 76 'enemies.'" By t h i s t i m e , the S o v i e t U n i o n had r e p l a c e d t h e US as C h i n a ' s 77 major enemy. In March 1969, t h e S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t e r u p t e d i n t o an armed c o n f r o n t a t i o n r e g a r d i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a d i s p u t e d i s l a n d i n the U s s u r i R i v e r on the S i n o - S o v i e t b o r d e r . T h i s c l a s h e v e n t u a l l y s p r e a d t o o t h e r areas along the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan border u n t i l October when n e g o t i a t i o n s were begun to e s t a b l i s h a p r e c i s e boundary l i n e . In s p i t e of any decrease i n Sino-Soviet tensions which may have r e s u l t e d from the b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s and some increase i n trade between the two c o u n t r i e s , the Chinese were c a r e f u l "to make i t as p o l i t i c a l l y disadvantageous as p o s s i b l e f o r the Soviet Union to resume pressures or launch an a c t u a l 78 attack on China." Therefore, China's nuclear deterrent f o r c e was st r e n g t h -ened,, i t s conventional f o r c e s modernized, and the Chinese people were 79 readied f o r a "people's war." In a d d i t i o n , the Chinese launched a s e r i e s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y a c t i o n s designed to p r o t e c t China from the S o v i e t s . Most n o t i c e a b l y , the Chinese continued to pursue t h e i r o b j e c t i v e of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r own sphere of i n f l u e n c e among T h i r d World s t a t e s by emphasizing t h e i r c l o s e t i e s w i t h these c o u n t r i e s . For example, "Chinese w r i t e r s claimed that these c o u n t r i e s , amongst whom China was i n c l u d e d , were bound together by c e r t a i n common h i s t o r i c a l 80 experiences and by common current o b j e c t i v e s . " In a d d i t i o n , the Chinese 81 granted economic a i d t o s e v e r a l A s i a n , A f r i c a n , and L a t i n American s t a t e s . In the Middle East, where the Chinese feared that the Soviet Union was attempting to o u t f l a n k China from the south, the Chinese exchanged d i p l o m a t i c 82 r e l a t i o n s with s e v e r a l s t a t e s and e s t a b l i s h e d economic t i e s w i t h others. In t h e i r p o l i c i e s v i s - a - v i s a l l of the T h i r d World areas, the Chinese no longer pursued t h e i r o b j e c t i v e of promoting communist r e v o l u t i o n s . Instead, they focused on improving t h e i r s t a t e - t o - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s w i t h these c o u n t r i e s . F i n a l l y , China's dispute w i t h the Soviet Union probably had a large i n f l u e n c e on China's concurrent move towards e s t a b l i s h i n g b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the US. Beginning i n 1969, r e s t r i c t i o n s on trade and t r a v e l between 38 83 China and the US were gradually relaxed. This period of decreasing tension between the US and China eventually led to US President Richard Nixon's v i s i t to China i n February 1972. The r e s u l t s of Nixon's ta l k s with Chou E n - l a i and Mao Tse-tung were presented i n the "Shanghai Communique" which stated that both countries wished 'to reduce the danger of i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t ; ' that 'neither should seek hegemony i n the A s i a - P a c i f i c region' and that each was 'opposed to e f f o r t s by any other country or group of countries to e s t a b l i s h such hegemony;' and that neither was 'prepared to negotiate on the behalf of any t h i r d party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other d i r e c t e d at other states.'84 The v i s i t did not mark the end of a l l c o n f l i c t between the US and China; however, i t did represent a major change i n Chinese foreign r e l a t i o n s . In addition to i t s objectives of e s t a b l i s h i n g a counterbalance to per-ceived Soviet threats and correspondingly enhancing i t s p o s i t i o n with Third World states and improving r e l a t i o n s with the US, from 1969 through 1972 the Chinese also focused on protecting t h e i r border with India and improving t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with Western European states. In order to strengthen t h e i r p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s India, the Chinese signed a boundary agreement with Nepal i n 1969 and strongly supported the Pakistani government during the Pakistani c i v i l 85 war. In the l a t t e r instance, the Chinese f e l t that the growth of Indian influence into East Pakistan and the emergence of Bengla Desh could also be interpreted as a further extension of Soviet influence along China's southern flank. /"Therefore/, . . . Huang Hua, Chinese delegate to the Security Council, accused the Soviet Union of a monstrous plan to e n c i r c l e China.86 F i n a l l y , even though tension between the US and China was decreasing a f t e r 1969, the Chinese continued to advocate p o l i c i e s aimed at c u r t a i l i n g 87 the spread of both Soviet and American influence in the world. The Chinese were e s p e c i a l l y vocal regarding t h i s objective following t h e i r admittance to the United Nations on October 25, 1971. In order to accomplish 39 t h i s goal and to aid t h e i r own economic development program (the Third and Fourth Five-Year plans for 1966-1975 had been proposed), the Chinese began to take action to improve t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with noncommunist i n d u s t r i a l i z e d states. By 1972, the Chinese had established diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with eleven 88 Western i n d u s t r i a l i z e d states, increased t h e i r trade with European states, and openly supported European cooperation through the Common Market i n economic, p o l i t i c a l , and foreign a f f a i r s . In general, "Peking /was playing7 up the development of Western European nations into a more c l o s e l y u n i f i e d 89 force capable of challenging Soviet and American dominance i n Europe." In summary, the 1969-1972 period i n China's foreign r e l a t i o n s saw the continuation of foreign p o l i c y objectives aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y at c r i t i c i z i n g the Soviet Union and correspondingly being le s s c r i t i c a l of the US. In addition, the Chinese adopted a t h i r d foreign p o l i c y objective of c u r t a i l i n g the hegemony of both superpowers. Fourthly, the Chinese focused on expanding r e l a t i o n s with Third World and Western European states to achieve t h e i r goal of enhancing China's i n t e r n a t i o n a l stature and e s t a b l i s h i n g a counterbalance to American and e s p e c i a l l y Soviet influence i n these areas. In the case of r e l a t i o n s with the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d states, the Chinese also focused on increasing trade with these states i n order to promote Chinese economic development. 1973-1977 The f i n a l period discussed i n t h i s study covers the years 1973 through 1977. It was p r i m a r i l y during t h i s period that the Chinese formulated t h e i r p o l i c i e s on ocean issues and p u b l i c l y presented them at UNCLOS I I I . China's s p e c i f i c LOS p o l i c i e s w i l l be discussed i n d e t a i l i n chapters 4 and 5. At t h i s point, developments i n other areas of China's foreign r e l a t i o n s w i l l be considered since they r e f l e c t China's general foreign p o l i c y objectives and may have had a direct impact on the concurrent development of China's LOS policies. Domestic p o l i t i c s in China from 1973 through 1977 were focused on changes in leadership following the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung in 1976 and attempts by various groups to enhance their own p o l i t i c a l authority at the expense of competing groups. In general, this maneuvering for power within China had l i t t l e impact on China's foreign policy and the goals i t was formu-90 lated to achieve. One could possibly argue that for a short time in 1976 "the gang of four" (i.e., Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-Ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yuan) attempted to change the direction of China's foreign policy. However, since their period of control was shortlived, their objective of changing the focus of China's foreign policy was not translated into any sig-nificant policy changes. In the area of foreign policy, the Chinese s t i l l seemed to be concerned primarily with their dispute with the Soviet Union and attempts to enhance their own strength vis-a-vis that of the Soviets. China's criticisms of the Soviet Union were summarized in 1977 by Hua Kuo-feng, then Chairman of the CCP, when he accused the "Soviet leading clique" of "'restoring capitalism and enforcing fascist dictatorship at home and pushing hegemonism and perpet-91 uatihg aggression and expansion abroad. '•" Among the specific actions which aggravated Sino-Soviet tensions in 1974 were the failure of the Soviets to support China in i t s dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly islands, the expulsion on charges of espionage of five members of the Soviet embassy staff in Peking, and the capture by the Chinese of what they labelled 92 "an armed /SovietJ reconnaissance helicopter." Throughout the entire 1973-1977 period, disputes over the delimitation of the Sino-Soviet border also continued. Following Mao's death in 1976, the Soviets appeared to make an attempt to improve their relations with China. In response, the Chinese accused the Soviets "of creating 'false impressions' of relaxation in Sino-Soviet relations in order to 'confuse' world opinion /and of engaging7 in 93 'wishful thinking and day dreaming1 about Sino-Soviet reconciliation." Continuing the trend in China's foreign policy objectives which appeared in the late 1960s, the Chinese looked to improved relations with the US as. a means of counteracting the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. For example, in 1976 during talks with former US President Nixon, Hua Kuo-feng, acting premier of China, stressed that Sino-American cooperation 94 was needed to cope with the Soviet expansionist threat. Relations between China and the US improved substantially following the January 1973 with-drawal of US forces from Vietnam which "removed one of the major irritants 95 in Sino-U.S. relations." On the other hand, Sino-American relations failed to improve further in 1974 and 1975 due to the Paracel and Spratly islands 96 dispute and continued US support for the Nationalists on Taiwan. In addition, the Chinese were c r i t i c a l of the US for i t s continued policy of detente with the Soviet Union and i t s failure, according to the Chinese, to 97 deal effectively with the spread of Soviet influence. The fact that Sino-American relations were improving did not mean that the Chinese no longer opposed the US in it s position as a superpower. The Chinese continued to pursue their objective of struggling against the 98 "'hegemonism of the two superpowers.'" However, as alluded to earlier, the Chinese identified the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to peace since '"the United States wants to protect i t s interests in the world and the 99 Soviet Union wants to expand.'" During the 1973-1977 period, the Chinese also continued to pursue the objective of improving their relations with Third World states and establishing 42 a sphere of influence among these states in order to enhance their position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. As a means to accomplish this goal, the Chinese began to speak out on issues of importance to Third World states. For example, following the "energy c r i s i s " in 1973, China announced i t s general policy guideline of '"Third World control of Third World resources.' Since this policy announcement, "Peking has campaigned for the Third World's economic independence /and7 . . . has endorsed every move relating to Third World control over Third World resources."1^''" The Chinese specifically focused on strengthening their ties with Asian states. They attempted to enhance their position with the Japanese at the expense of the Soviets by siding with Japan in i t s dispute with the Soviet Union over ownership of islands off the north coast of Japan and by signing an agreement to s e l l o i l to Japan. Through direct negotiations in 1975, the Chinese managed to improve relations with several Southeast Asian states including Cambodia, Burma, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. (The Chinese also encouraged the 102 US to continue i t s vigilance against Soviet incursions into Asia. ) In South Asia, China's relations with India "followed a rather consistent policy of making l i f e d i f f i c u l t for the Indian government, which Peking regarded as 103 a willing victim of Soviet social-imperialism." On the other hand, China maintained i t s good relations with Pakistan through cooperative 104 development projects involving Chinese loans and grants. China's relations with the countries of Western Europe not only reflec-ted i t s objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but also i t s goal of speeding up i t s own economic modernization program. With regard to the Soviet threat, in 1973 the Chinese expressed "a concern with encouraging a continued American presence in Europe as a counterweight to the Soviets."^^^ T ] 1 addition, they stressed the need for Western European unity to combat Soviet "hegemonism. 43 In relation to China's economic development, Chou outlined a policy in 1975 which called for an '"all-out modernisation of agriculture, industry, 107 national defense, as well as science and technology.'" I n i t i a l l y advo-cates of this policy urged the Chinese to "'rely mainly on /their7 own efforts 108 while making external assistance subsidiary.'" However, by 1977 China's policies turned towards imports of foreign technology as a basis from which to develop. Thus, foreign trade particularly with the US and Western Europe was to "be allowed to develop so as to 'help' in the modernization of China. 109 Self-reliance would not be defined as self-exclusion." In addition to the foreign policy objectives which, for the most part, were the continuation of earlier goals, the Chinese also began to support policies aimed at a new objective, "the formulation of new norms of interna-tional law."^^ The Chinese were especially eager to see the establishment of new international regulations which would ensure that a l l states were dealt with equally under international law regardless of national characteris-tics such as level of economic development. China's policies aimed at achieving this goal were also closely related to China's other objective of improving i t s relations with Third World states since many of these states similarly called for changes in international law. In essence, the Chinese were particularly concerned about the 'progressive' development of international law: changes to increase the representation of the small and medium-sized states in international organizations, to encourage the 'progressive' forces of nationalism to establish their independence and equality, and to incorporate 'socialist' principles of 'mutual aid.'HI Finally before concluding the discussion of China's foreign policy goals from 1949 through 1977, i t is necessary to consider the Chinese conception of sovereignty since i t exerted a major influence on China's foreign policies 44 and objectives throughout the period. It was particularly central to China's objective of protecting i t s borders. However, the concept of sovereignty means more to the Chinese than just military security. It also represents the protection of a l l of China's rights as an independent state including, for example, the right to establish i t s own regulations for a l l areas under it s jurisdication including coastal waters and the right to accept or reject, on i t s own terms, international regulations which might impinge on China's sovereign authority. The concept of sovereignty currently held by the PRC was greatly influenced by China's early contacts with the West. Traditionally, the Chinese had viewed China as the "'central kingdom' superior to a l l other coun-112 t r i e s . " However, following China's defeat at the hands of Great Britain in the Opium War (1842), the Chinese signed the f i r s t in a series of what they later referred to as "unequal treaties." These treaties, which established extraterritorial rights within China for Western states, had an entirely different meaning for the Chinese than for foreign states. The Western states were operating under their conception of international law which established the idea that a ' c i v i l i z e d ' nation had a right to colonize t e r r i -tories which were 'uncivilized' and incapable of understanding their responsibilities under international law. . . . /Therefore/, /r/espect for sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l integrity was not an issue because China, lacking the rights of a c i v i l i z e d state under inter-national law, was not considered a sovereign entity.113 The Chinese, on the other hand, saw fixed t a r i f f s and consular jurisdiction as conveniences rather than a mark of inequality. In addition, the creation of foreign enclaves tended to isolate Westerners from Chinese: a situation which suited the Chinese rulers. Thus, the Chinese signed treaties agreeing to Western extraterritoriality 45 "not with any sense of loss of dignity or power, but in the condescending belief that the less c i v i l i z e d aliens could not understand the highly complex Chinese rule and must therefore be given a chance to learn the c i v i l i z e d way of l i f e through gradual observation and slow assimilation." 114 The Chinese attitude towards treaties with the West began to change in the late 1800s when the Chinese became familar with Western international law and i t s concept of sovereignty. They then began "to suffer from 'a sense of inferi o r i t y and even shame at the unusual position of China,' which combined with the activating force of nationalism, engendered a positive, active 'determination to end that inequality.'""^^ Even after the f a l l of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911 and the establishment of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912, China was s t i l l not treated as a sovereign and equal state by the Western powers. These states continued to exercise extraterritorial rights in China until 1943.^^ In essence, China's early involvement with Western international law left i t with a sense of bitterness over the impo-sition of "unequal treaties" and the affront to i t s sovereignty. This experience " i n s t i l l e d in a proud and once powerful people the determination to have China - no longer 'the central realm' but now a nation-state - achieve 117 recognition as the sovereign equal of other states." The view of sovereignty currently held by the Chinese stipulates that '"to deny the sovereignty of any state under any pretext, be i t the state's 118 "level of c i v i l i z a t i o n , " or social system,is i l l e g a l . ' " This conception of sovereignty includes three major elements: (1) China w i l l not tolerate any infringements on i t s sovereignty by other states; (2) China is equally committed to respecting the sovereignty of other states; and (3) China w i l l never give up i t s sovereign interests or "sell-out" those of other states to 119 the "imperialists." As an extension of the third element, the Chinese pledged not only to defend their own sovereignty but also to be "the defender of the sovereignty of a l l other states unable to do so on their own. 46 .120 The Chinese see the major problem facing states today as being "how to 121 maintain, not to relinquish or diminish, sovereignty." Maintaining the sovereignty of one's state, however, can lead to problems in cases where the sovereignty of two states come into conflict, i.e., where "an exercise of absolute sovereignty by one nation {isj bound to undermine the sovereignty of 122 another nation." In order to resolve this dilemma, the Chinese "advocat/e7 the principle of mutual respect for national sovereignty as the only correct 123 interpretation of the sovereignty issue in modern international law." China's objective of emphasizing the primacy of state sovereignty and protecting a state's sovereign rights appearsit-o contradict the fact that, in the past xChina has frequently supported national independence movements against state governments. The Chinese have attempted to resolve this contra-diction between two of i t s objectives by arguing that '.'even nations which are not independent should nevertheless have the rights of independent states under law as soon as the movements representing these nations indicate that they 124 want to be independent." In distinguishing between which groups or nations f i t this criterion and which do not, Suzanne Ogden has noted that the Chinese have had to make "a qualitative judgement . . . usually contingent on the 125 'support of the people.'" Secondly, China's relations with communist parties in other states also appear to conflict with i t s concept of sovereignty. For example, a situation could arise in which the Chinese publicly express support for a communist party advocating the overthrow of i t s government while at the same time maintaining diplomatic relations with that government. In fact, situations such as this 126 arose in China's relations with Indonesia and Burma in 1967. This inconsistency in China's foreign policy objectives has not been adequately 47 reconciled by the Chinese. However, by the late 1970s, the Chinese had attempted to decrease the significance of this discrepancy by suggesting that China's relations with communist parties in other states would be limited to 127 ideological and moral support rather than material aid. In conclusion, from a consideration of the development of China's foreign policy from 1949 through 1977 i t has become apparent that, with a few exceptions, the Chinese have consistently pursued a limited number of objectives. Primary among these objectives has been the maintenance of China's national security. In order to accomplish this very broad goal which is common to a l l states, the Chinese have pursued a number of secondary objectives more specific to China. For example, the Chinese have generally cooperated with one superpower to counteract any potential threat from the other. During its early years (i.e., from approximately 1949 to 1957), the Chinese collab-orated with the Soviet Union against a perceived threat from the US. However, by 1958 serious conflicts arose between China and the Soviet Union such that the Chinese no longer f e l t they could rely on the Soviet Union for military protection. Hence, from approximately 1958 to 1968 the Chinese adopted a more self-reliant foreign policy strategy. The objective of this strategy was for the Chinese to develop their own military capability so that they could defend themselves in the future. From 1969 through 1977, the Chinese also moved towards a closer alignment with the US and focused less on self-reliance as a means to counteract what was seen as a threat to China from the Soviet Union. Thus, by the start of UNCLOS III, two of China's major foreign policy objectives were to improve i t s relations with the US and to oppose the Soviet Union. China's objective of improving i t s relations with the US, however, did not mean a lessening of i t s commitment to a third foreign policy objective, 48 the curtailment of superpower (i.e., American and Soviet) hegemony. While the Chinese had consistently voiced their opposition to what they saw as attempts by both superpowers to dominate international affairs, they became even more vocal on this subject after joining the UN in 1971. By the start of UNCLOS III in 1973, the curtailment of superpower hegemony appeared to be one of China's major foreign policy objectives. Related to China's other objectives aimed at preserving its national security, was i t s objective of enhancing i t s international prestige and creating i t s own sphere of influence within the Third World. This objective was especially important to the Chinese during the UNCLOS III years (1973-1977) as well as during several of the previous time periods (i.e., 1949-1951, 1954-1965, and 1967-1972). Corresponding to the years in which the Chinese were not pursuing a policy principally aimed at improving their relations with the Third World (i.e., 1951-1953 and 1965-1966), the Chinese were focusing on an objective of promoting revolutions within these states. That i s , the Chinese were more concerned with promoting the spread of Chinese style communist movements with-in these states than attempting to improve relations on a state-to-state level. This objective of promoting revolutionary movements within foreign states was not stressed by the Chinese during the time of the UNCLOS III negotiations. This, however, does not mean that they have abandoned this objective for a l l i time. As seen in the mid-1960s, Chinese actions are, at times, d i f f i c u l t to predict. An additional objective which related to China's security was i t s focus on protecting China's border areas. This objective was prevalent throughout a l l six of the periods studied. It was reflected in China's relations with Asian states and the Soviet Union along i t s land borders and in i t s policies 49 relating to coastal waters (e.g., the 1950 security zones and the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly islands). China's concern with preserving i t s sovereignty and the rights associated with a sovereign state (e.g., respect from other states) was also a major foreign policy objective of the Chinese throughout the 1949-1977 period. As mentioned earlier, China's objectives of protecting i t s borders and preserving i t s sovereignty are interrelated in that they both reflect China's fundamental concern with attaining maximum control over areas under i t s jurisdiction. In their policies aimed at protecting China's borders, the Chinese were essentially focusing on preserving their military control within this area. On the other hand, China's objective regarding state sovereignty referred to ensuring that no foreign state would be able to dictate to China how i t should conduct affairs within areas under i t s national jurisdiction. (The Chinese had previously suffered under this type of control during the period of "unequal treaties" (1842-1943).) Therefore, since both of these objectives are subsumed under that of maximizing control over areas under national jurisdiction, China's LOS policies w i l l be analyzed in terms of this objective rather than the two objectives of protecting China's borders and preserving state sovereignty. With regard to coastal areas, the Chinese were concerned with reuni-fying Taiwan province with the rest of the country. This goal, which the Chinese would consider a purely domestic issue, also affected China's relations with the US as well as other countries and added to China's concern over the security of i t s coastal areas. This concern was reflected in the disputes over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. China's domestic policy of economic development also influenced i t s foreign policy objectives. In order to f u l f i l l their economic goals, the 50 Chinese have, at times, looked to outside economic aid f i r s t from the Soviet Union (1949-1960) and later from the US and other Western industrialized states (1969-1977). Thus, in recent years the Chinese have attempted to expand not only diplomatic relations with Western industrialized states but also trade linkages. Finally, beginning in the early 1970s, the Chinese proposed policies aimed at promoting, what was for them, a new foreign policy objective, the creation of a new international legal order. Given their early experience with Western international law, the Chinese were eager to see new norms developed which would ensure that a l l states would be treated equally under international law. In this chapter, the development of China's foreign policy and the objectives i t was designed to serve have been examined for the 1949-1977 time period. From the discussion of China's foreign policy objectives, i t has become apparent that, with a few exceptions, the Chinese tended to focus consistently on a limited number of objectives. By the start of UNCLOS III, the Chinese appeared to be focusing on eight objectives in their foreign relations. These were: (1) the improvement of relations with the US; (2) opposition to the Soviet Union; (3) the curtailment of superpower hegem-ony; (4) the enhancement of their international prestige and the establish-ment of their own sphere of influence within the Third World; (5) the maximi-zation of control over areas under national jurisdiction; (6) the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland; (7) the expansion of contacts with Western industrialized states; and (8) the creation of a new international legal order. It w i l l now be possible, in chapters 4 and 5,to determine the extent to which these objectives influenced China's LOS policies. However before a thorough analysis of China's LOS policies can be undertaken, i t is necessary, in chapter 3, to examine the second set of variables which establish the context for this analysis, i.e., China's maritime charac-te r i s t i c s and regional maritime policies and disputes. 52 CHAPTER 3 MARITIME CHARACTERISTICS AND REGIONAL MARITIME DISPUTES China's foreign policy objectives undoubtedly had a major impact on the formulation of China's LOS policies. However, this set of variables in isolation from other potentially influential factors is an insufficient basis for an analysis of China's policies. It is also necessary to examine an additional set of variables: China's maritime characteristics and regional maritime disputes. In this chapter, the various components of this second set of variables w i l l be examined in order to identify factors which may have influenced China's policies at UNCLOS III. Maritime Characteristics Since the number of variables associated with China's maritime characteristics which could have potentially influenced China's LOS policies is immense, i t has been necessary to limit this discussion to those vari-ables which appeared most lik e l y to have had a major impact on China's policies. These variables w i l l be discussed in terms of four general categories: (1) geographic characteristics; (2) economic characteristics; (3) maritime expertise; and (4) naval characteristics. As w i l l become evident, these categories are by no means mutually exclusive. They are used here merely as an organizational tool. 53 Geographic Characteristics The most constant factors affecting China's orientation towards the ocean are those resulting from i t s geographic location and physical attrib-utes. In addition to merely describing China's geographic characteristics, i t is also useful to consider how China compares with other states with respect to these factors. The two most significant physical features of China's geography are the length of i t s coastline and the size of i t s continental shelf. China's coast is very long, covering approximately 3,492 miles. When compared with 142 other states, China has the tenth longest coastline.^ China's shores face five maritime areas: Pohai Bay; the Yellow Sea; the East China Sea; the Gulf of Tonkin; and the South China Sea, and are marked by numerous 2 indentations. These factors were likely to have had an impact on China's claims regarding the limits of coastal state jurisdiction over waters off i t s coast. China's large continental shelf would also indicate a position favoring extensive coastal state jurisdiction. Using the 200 meter isobar as the maximum outward limit of the continental shelf, China's shelf would include an area of 230,000 square nautical miles. This gives China the seventh largest continental shelf area in the world following Canada, 4 Indonesia, Australia, the US, the USSR, and Argentine. China is among the thirty-one states which can be characterized as having a f a i r l y wide shelf (i.e., a shelf greater than f i f t y nautical miles in width) while sixty-one states have narrow shelves, twenty-six are shelf-locked and thirty are landlocked.^ A second important characteristic is China's geographic location. At UNCLOS III i t became evident that geographic proximity to straits used for international navigation had an influence on the LOS policies of several 54 states. This was due, in part, to the probable adoption by the conference delegates of a twelve nautical mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea limit which would place approximately 106 straits under the jurisdiction of the adjacent coastal states. China borders on four straits which would be included in this group: the Pohai Strait; P'enghu Shuitao (Pescadores Channel); Lema Channel; and the Hainan Strait. A l l of these areas are surrounded on both sides by Chinese territory with the exception of the Lema Channel which is located 7 between areas under Chinese and British jurisdiction. (The specific geographic location and width of the straits and channels bordering on China are given in table I.) Bordering on four straits whose status would be altered as a result of a twelve nautical mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea limit places China in the middle of a scale of states affected by the changed limit. According to information compiled by Douglas Campbell III, eight states border on more affected straits or channels than China while twenty-one g border on less and three border on the same number. In addition to the straits along their own border which would be affected by a twelve nautical mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea limit, the Chinese were also concerned about future sea t r a f f i c through the straits of i t s neigh-bors. They were especially concerned about the regulation of vessel t r a f f i c through the Malacca and Singapore straits which connect the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean since the regulation of transit through these straits would have a major impact on both China's coastal security and i t s seaborne trade. While the proximity to international straits had an impact on states' LOS policies, so did their location vis-a-vis landlocked and/or shelf-locked states. In this instance, closeness to these states might obligate the coastal state to share i t s coastal resources with the disadvantaged states. 55 TABLE I STRAITS BORDERING ON CHINA WITH A WIDTH OF LESS THAN TWENTY-FOUR NAUTICAL MILES Least Width Sovereignty Geographical (In Nautical Passage (On Either Side) Situation Miles) Pohai Strait China entrance to Pohai 22 Bay P'enghu Shuitao China between Taiwan and 17 , P1enghu Lema Channel China/U.K. between Hong Kong 6 and Lema Islands Hainan Strait China between Hainan Island 10 and Mainland China SOURCE: S. Houston Lay, Robin Churchill, and Myron Nordquist, eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea: Documents-Volume II (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1973), pp. 888-889. China has a lengthy land border which covers approximately 9,000 miles and 9 borders on eleven states. Of these, five are landlocked (Laos, Bhutan, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Mongolia); one has a narrow continental shelf in that a l l or most of the shelf is less than f i f t y nautical miles in breadth (North Korea); four have wide continental shelves (Burma, India, Pakistan, and the USSR); and one (Vietnam) is partially shelf-locked in that the continental shelf off the northern part of the country abuts on the con-tinental shelf of China while the southern portion has a wide margin. 1 0 As mentioned above, China's geographic proximity to several landlocked, as well as two narrow or shelf-locked states, may have influenced i t s position on the right of landlocked states to transit neighboring states to gain access to the sea and on the right of landlocked and disadvantaged states to share in the resources of their neighboring states' economic zones. Economic Characteristics The sectors of China's economy which relate most directly to the oceans can be grouped into two categories: commercial shipping and natural resources (both living and non-living). The state of China's commercial shipping industry can be assessed in terms of four factors: (1) the size of China's merchant fleet; (2) the number and handling capacity of China's ports; (3) the amount of goods China trades by sea; and (4) China's regu-lation of foreign shipping and i t s participation in bilateral and/or multilateral treaties dealing with navigation and commerce. At the time of the inauguration of the PRC in 1949, China's ship-building industry was virt u a l l y nonexistent. It was essentially limited to a small number of shipyards concentrating on r e p a i r s . 1 1 At that time, China's merchant shipping fleet was confined to approximately fourteen 57 state-owned vessels, primarily US war surplus, which were only suitable for 12 coastal and inland shipping. During the years before i t s shipbuilding f a c i l i t i e s could be expanded, China relied on the purchase of new and secondhand foreign ships as well as on the chartering of foreign vessels. Many of the secondhand vessels were of dubious quality since they had been "sold as scrap to the Chinese-who simply repaired them and put them back into service with l i t t l e regard for 13 the safety factor." China's shipbuilding capacity began to grow after 1957. It was reported that in 1959 China launched i t s f i r s t self-designed ship in the 5,000 deadweight ton (DWT) class and i t s f i r s t 10,000 DWT class ship in 14 1960. A second source reported that China built two 10,000 DWT class ships in 1958. Regardless of the exact date of China's f i r s t major ship production, during the 1960s this production expanded rapidly. By 1974, ship production was six times that of 1965.^ In spite of i t s expanded domestic production, China continued to rely on the purchase of foreign built vessels in order to expand i t s merchant fleet and to meet i t s shipping needs. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, China purchased several Yugoslavian ships and in 1972 ordered eight additional Yugoslavian freighters in the 13,000 ton class. China also pur-chased sixty-three Japanese vessels immediately following i t s resumption of diplomatic relations with Japan. From 1971 to 1974 China purchased approximately 200 secondhand vessels, a l l less that ten years old, from 17 foreign sources. With the combination of foreign purchases and domestic production, by 1975 Chinese flag vessels made up the nineteenth largest 18 merchant fleet in the world. In 1978, Lloyd's Register of Shipping reported that the Chinese had a total of 713 steamships and motor ships with a total gross registered tonnage of 5,168,898 tons. This figure 58 19 represented 1.3 percent of the world's gross registered tonnage of ships. (Lloyd's also reported, however, that i t s figures for China were incomplete 20 and could only be taken as an approximation. See table II for a more detailed picture of the growth of China's merchant fleet.) In order to handle their growing imports (primarily of wheat and sugar), the Chinese 21 continued to charter foreign vessels. TABLE II INVENTORY OF MERCHANT SHIPS SELECTED YEARS, 1952-1976 Year Units Thousand DWT. 1952 101 270 1957 93 302 1965 174 933 1970 269 1,944 1971 305 2,290 1972 329 2,657 1973 368 3,291 1974 430 4,592 1975 495 6,082 1976 556 7,081 SOURCE: U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, China: Economic Indicators (Washington, D.C: Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, ER 77-10508, October 1977), p. 35, table 19. Throughout the 1960s, most of the ships produced in China were for domestic use. However, at the Fal l Canton Trade Fair in 1975 the Chinese indicated they would be willing to export their 3,000 ton tankers to foreign 22 markets. According to one observer, "the announcement that China /was_/ now in a position to export vessels signal/ed7 the emergence of the PRC 23 as a growing maritime nation and shipbuilder." In conjunction with the expansion of their merchant fleet, the Chinese also sought to expand and improve their port f a c i l i t i e s . This development was especially crucial during the years when China needed ports to accommo-date foreign shipping. This rebuilding resulted in seven major seaports capable of handling at least 10,000 ton vessels being put into operation 24 25 by 1959. By the 1970s, China had seventeen major ports. In 1973, a three year port construction and improvement program was initiated "which involved a doubling of investment in the expansion of nine 26 major ports." By the middle of 1976, this program had resulted in the construction of forty deep water berths in the nine ports including: deep water bulk load berths for coal, ore, and mixed cargoes; berths for 10,000 27 ton tankers; and container berths. This program not only increased the number of small and medium sized ports (those accommodating 5,000 ton vessels) along China's coast, but also expanded China's previously limited capacity 28 to handle large ships of 10,000 tons or more. However even with these improvements, China's ports s t i l l suffered from inadequate and insufficient 29 storage f a c i l i t i e s . A third major indicator of the importance of commercial shipping for China's economy is the amount of goods which China trades by sea. As suggested by John Gamble, Jr., the total seaborne trade that a state engages in indicates the degree to which navigational uses of the sea are important to that state. The greater a state's interest in navigation, the more likely i t is to be concerned about maintaining freedom of the seas, innocent passage through straits, etc.30 31 In 1969, China's sea trade amounted to 10,600,000 metric tons of cargo. When compared with 146 other states, China ranked thirty-eighth in terms 32 of the amount of cargo traded by sea. The development of China's sea-borne trade from 1959 to 1975 as well as the differences between amounts imported (unloaded) and exported (loaded) are shown in table III. The f i n a l category concerning commercial shipping includes China's regulations governing foreign vessels and i t s participation in bilateral and multilateral navigational and commercial treaties. The regulations adopted by the Chinese governing access of foreign ships to Chinese ports are f a i r l y restrictive. For example, under "The 1957 Foreign Vessels Measures" foreign ships were only allowed to enter ports specifically designated by the Ministry of Communication for the use of foreign vessels. Also the captain of a foreign ship was required to complete a l l entry procedures one week before entering a Chinese port and had to report his exact time of arrival twenty-four hours before 33 arrival. There are also special regulations regarding the use of ports located on rivers which form the boundary between China and a neighboring state. In general, there is a lack of concrete information on China's practices concerning jurisdiction over foreign vessels in i t s ports. From available information, i t appears that the Chinese tend to accept the generally recognized principle of international law that "in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary, private vessels entering foreign 35 ports are subject to local jurisdiction." However, in some cases where actions on board a ship do not affect local interests, the port state may 61 TABLE I I I AMOUNT OF GOODS LOADED AND UNLOADED IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE SHIPPING (Thousand M e t r i c Tons) Y e a r Loaded Un l o a d e d T o t a l 1959 3,200 3,000 6,200 1965 6,250 11,700 17,950 1966 10,050 12,000 22,050 1967 8,850 12,600 21,450 1968 7,450 14,000 21,450 1969 7,200 13,400 20,600 1970 7,500 15,500 ' 23,000 1971 7,710 14,000 • 21,710 1972 8,050 14,500 22,550 1973 10,100 15,000 25,100 1974 14,150 16,000 30,150 1975 18,200 17,000 35,200 SOURCES: U.N., Department o f Economic and S o c i a l A f f a i r s , S t a t i s t i c a l  Y e a r b o o k s , 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977. (New York S t a t i s t i c a l O f f i c e o f th e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ) , pp. 434-435 t a b l e 155, 414-415 t a b l e 150, 424-425 t a b l e 150, 430-431 t a b l e 149, 514-515 t a b l e 160, and 552-553 t a b l e 161 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 62 decide to leave i t up to the flag state to deal with the situation. In general though, " i t is the port state, not the flag state, which has the fin a l authority to decide whether a particular case in fact f a l l s into the category of exemption.""^ In order to deal with the issue of state jurisdiction over collisions at sea and other maritime incidents, the Chinese Ministry of Communication set forth "the 1959 Regulations Concerning the Investigation and Settlement of Incidents Involving Maritime Losses." This document superseded a l l 37 earlier Chinese regulations on the subject. In general, these regulations claimed Chinese jurisdiction over a foreign vessel involved in a maritime incident: '(1) which caused damages to properties belonging to Chinese nationals, or, (2) which took place in Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l sea, or (3) i f /sic_7 which an investigation and settlement has been requested by the consular officer of the flag state.'38 Another important set of regulations promulgated by the Chinese in 1964 was the "Regulations Governing Foreign NonMilitary Vessels Passing 39 Through the Chiungchow Strait." With the adoption by the Chinese of the straight baseline method for drawing t e r r i t o r i a l sea boundaries, Chiungchow Strait became part of China's internal waters. However, since the strait had previously been used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas, the Chinese adopted the 1964 regulations to set forth explicit rules which would permit the continued use of the strait by non-military vessels. (If the strait had been treated by the Chinese as s t r i c t l y internal waters, a l l passage by foreign vessels would have been restricted.) In general these regulations were more restrictive than is the normal practice in the Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l sea, and even that is far short of what was held by the International Court of Justice to be required in the Corfu Channel Case (1949) and stipulated by the Geneva Con-vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.40 63 Finally, according to Tao Cheng, possibly the most significance [s\cj indication of the PRC's new outlook in maritime affairs has been her effort to build a network of full-fledged standard treaties of commerce and navigation as well as consular treaties.41 In order to protect the rights of her ships and nationals in foreign ports, between 1958 and 1962 China signed treaties of commerce and navigation with 42 the Soviet Union, East Germany,North Korea, North Vietnam, and Albania. The second major sector of China's economy which relates to the oceans is the resource sector. The oceanic resources most important to China, and other states, are fi s h , o i l , and minerals. As w i l l be brought out in the second half of this chapter, the competition between China and some of i t s neighboring states over areas containing fish and o i l have led to several serious disputes. For centuries, the Chinese have relied on both fresh and salt water fish as a food source. During the c i v i l war, China's fishing fleet was so severely damaged that by 1949 only approximately 200 trawlers and s a i l -boats and less than 50,000 old-fashioned wooden vessels remained. Most of these were suitable only for shallow water fishing. In addition, according to Chinese sources, China's fishery production had decreased from a high in 4^ 1936 of 1,500,000 tons to a low of 45 tons in 1949. Once the new government was installed in Peking, a concerted effort was made to develop and modernize China's fishing industry. In the 1949 Common Program which served as the fundamental law in China prior to the adoption of the 1954 Constitution, there was a c a l l for the "'protection of coastal fishing grounds (and) [thej development of aquatic products 44 industry.'" In addition, conferences were called for the discussion of production goals and possible means to improve output. Among the direc-tives which came out of these conferences in March and April 1959 were the suggestions that 'the deputy governors of the (coastal) provinces and the deputy mayor of the Municipality (of Shanghai) /were/to assume personal command over the catching, buying, and transporting work during the brisk season,' and that 'fishing boats and fishermen who fhadj made changes of employment must immediately return to the fishing business.'45 Finally, the Chinese government also attempted to increase fishery produc-tion by organizing the fishermen into cooperatives and later communes, by granting loans to fishermen with which to purchase equipment, by estab-lishing large fish markets and improving the transportation of fish products, and by instituting long-term plans for modernizing the fishing 46 fleet, the fish processing industry, and fishery research. Even though statistics on the size of China's offshore fish catches are sketchy, i t is evident that they have increased substantially since the forty-five tons the Chinese reported in 1949. The Chinese government reported to.the FAO in 1978 that China's catch of marine fish amounted to 3,400,000 metric tons in 1977. Based on this o f f i c i a l l y reported figure, the FAO estimated that China's marine fish catches from 1973 to 1976 were 47 3,100,000, 3,200,000, 3,200,000 and 3,300,000 metric tons respectively. Based on these figures, when compared with other states China ranks third behind Japan and the Soviet Union in terms of the amount of marine fish 48 caught. While the catch data may not be totally accurate, considered in conjunction with developments in other areas of China's fishing industry (e.g., the modernization of China's fishing f l e e t ) , i t gives an indication of the growth of China's maritime fishing industry in size and importance. Unlike other countries with a major interest in offshore fishing who fish not only in waters close to their own shores but also in distant waters (e.g., Japan and the Soviet Union), China's fishing is confined to 65 i t s own coastal waters. China's waters cover a vast area and have an abun-dance of fish species. According to Choon-Ho Park, the total area of coastal and offshore fishing grounds to the depth of 200 meters along the coasts of China i s approximately 1% million sq. km. which comprises as much as 23.7 percent of the world total. . . . The number of species in this vast area of sea exceeds 1,500.49 However, the Chinese concentrate primarily on f i f t y of these species and four of them (the small croaker, the large croaker, the girdle fish, and the white-scale herring) represent a larger proportion of the total Chinese catch than a l l the others combined.50 Of the non-living resources associated with the exploration and exploi-tation of the seas,oil has been the most important for China as well as other states. The potential for o i l in the offshore areas near the Chinese coast was f i r s t brought to light as a result of a 1968 geophysical survey of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. The survey, conducted by a UN agency, the Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCDP), "concluded that the 'Continental Shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most p r o l i f i c o i l and gas reservoirs in the world.'" 5 1 This report led to further studies of the area by several bordering states including China. The numerous disputes arising out of conflicting claims by the surrounding states to this offshore area w i l l be discussed in detail later. However, at this point i t is useful to consider China's potential in terms of offshore o i l production as well as the effect this new production will have on China's economy. Since the Chinese do not publish statistics regarding o i l production or estimates of o i l reserves i t is necessary to rely on the estimates of others. Jan-Olaf Willums, a Norwegian oceanographer who studied China's offshore o i l reserves estimated that the total recoverable o i l potential in 66 the area off China's coast ranged anywhere from a pessimistic 8.7 b i l l i o n barrels to an optimistic 283.6 b i l l i o n barrels with the middle range estimate 52 being 29 b i l l i o n barrels. Thus, China's offshore o i l potential is considerable. In mid-1968, China began i t s f i r s t offshore test d r i l l i n g in the Po Hai Gulf. By the f a l l of 1968, the Chinese had made their f i r s t o i l strike 53 in the Gulf. Basing his statements on foreign sources, primarily Japanese and Norwegian, and on the amount of Chinese purchases of foreign equipment associated with o i l d r i l l i n g and production, Selig Harrison concluded that the Chinese continued their d r i l l i n g in the Gulf and as of 1977 were probably approaching major o i l production in the area. However, 54 no definite statements on this topic have been made by the Chinese. In 1974, the Chinese began to expand their offshore o i l exploration beyond the Po Hai Gulf with seismic surveys and test d r i l l i n g s in the East China Sea.^ Between 1974 and 1977, the Chinese also sent out seismic survey vessels to explore the area around the Nansha (Spratly) Archipelago in the South China Sea, and in 1975 an exploratory well was d r i l l e d in the 56 southern half of the Yellow Sea. In spite of this extensive exploration, according to Harrison, with the exception of the Po Hai Gulf and possibly the Yellow Sea, there [\sj no firm evidence as of 1977 that China [isj moving into production in the other places where offshore opera-tions /are_7 known to be underway, notably the area between Tsingtao and Shanghai in the East China Sea, the Tonkin Gulf, and the areas near Hainan and the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. 5 7 In most of their exploratory and d r i l l i n g operations, the Chinese have attempted to rely on their own equipment. In some instances, however, Chinese equipment has been supplemented by foreign purchases to f i l l the technological gaps. As of 1977, the Chinese had not gone the step further 67 to enter into service contracts or other joint arrangements with any of .-i * • i . 5 8 the manor o i l companies. Finally, i t is important to consider the impact which offshore o i l production may have on China's economy. While precise data on China's imports and exports of crude o i l are impossible to obtain, the general trends in this data can be seen in the limited information that is available. According to UN estimates, the Chinese had been f a i r l y consistent importers of crude o i l u n t i l 1972. By 1973, China had, in fact, become an o i l exporter (see table IV). Chu-yuan Cheng predicted that China's rate of o i l export would continue to increase into the 1980s. As delineated in table V, Cheng estimated that China's total o i l production would continue to outpace domestic consumption, thus resulting in an increasing surplus, a large 59 part of which could be exported... Therefore, for the Chinese the poten-t i a l increase in o i l production resulting from offshore o i l reserves and the subsequent increase in the amount of o i l available for export could be seen as a source of needed foreign exchange. According to one author, eventually " o i l exports may finance Peking's imports of machinery and plants „60 from the West upon which i t s current economic development plans are based. Hence an increasing surplus of o i l for export is of considerable importance to the Chinese. The third major group of resources relevant to a discussion of ocean development is metals. Unlike fi s h and o i l , the concern with regard to metals, primarily in the form of manganese nodules, is not so much their exploitation in coastal or economic zone waters, but their exploitation on the seabed of the high seas. The major impact of deep sea mining of man-ganese nodules would be f e l t by landbased importers and exporters of manganese, copper, cobalt, and nickel, the principle metals found in the 68 TABLE IV AMOUNT OF CRUDE PETROLEUM LOADED AND UNLOADED IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE SHIPPING (Thousand Metric Tons) Year Loaded Unloaded 1959 0 21 1965 0 165 1966 0 165 1967 0 165 1968 0 0 1969 0 159 1970 0 400 1971 0 50 1972 0 0 1973 1000 0 1974 4000 0 1975 8000 0 SOURCES: U.N., Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statis- t i c a l Yearbooks, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977 (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations), pp. 434-435 table 155, 414-415 table 150, 424-425 table 150, 430-431 table 149, 514-515 table 160, and 552-553 table 161 respectively. 69 TABLE V PROJECTED DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION AND TRADE POTENTIAL IN CRUDE OIL, 1974-1985 (Million Metric Tons) Year Total Domestic Demand for Crude Oil Estimated Crude Oil Output Surplus in Crude Oil 1974 50.3 63.0 12.7 1975 57.0 76.0 19.0 1976 64.6 91.0 26.4 1977 74.7 109.0 34.3 1978 84.8 128.0 43.2 1979 96.2 150.0 53.8 1980 109.7 176.0 56.3 1981 126.4 202.0 75.6 1982 143.5 232.0 88.5 1983 163.1 267.0 103.9 1984 185.2 299.0 113.8 1985 210.5 335 .0 124.5 SOURCE: Chu-yuan Cheng, China's Petroleum Industry: Output Growth  and Export Potential (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 187, table 8.8. 70 nodules.^ 1 Therefore, China's imports and exports of these resources need to be discussed in order to assess the impact which deep sea mining might have on China's economy. Secondly, the issue of seabed mining would have an additional importance for China i f i t s own industries possessed the technological capabilities to participate directly in the mining. Therefore, the state of China's technology in this area will also be considered. As in the case of o i l production and fish catches, i t is d i f f i c u l t to get accurate figures on the amount of metals China imports and exports, let alone i t s total production and/or reserves. K.P. Wang, an o f f i c i a l of the US Bureau of Mines, reported in 1975 that, in general, China i s self-sufficient in most minerals with large surplus reserves of some and deficiencies 62 in only a few. However, in spite of this resource base, China's trade 63 figures show a deficit in terms of overall trade in minerals and metals. This general trend also holds true for the major metals found in seabed nodules with the exception of manganese (see tables VI and VII). In order to get a clearer picture of China's position vis-a-vis these metals, each w i l l be discussed br i e f l y . In 1974, China's domestic copper production accounted for approxi-64 mately one to two percent of the total world output of copper. However, this amount was only enough to satisfy thirty to f i f t y percent of China's domestic requirements, thus leaving i t severely deficient in terms of supplying i t s own copper needs.^5 China's estimated reserves of copper are only of modest size and even this is of relatively poor q u a l i t y . ^ (Chinese sources have reported that China's copper deposits are sizeable. However, none of these supposedly large deposits have been developed, prob-67 ably due to a lack of capital and technology. ) Added to this deficiency 68 in copper production is the continually growing demand for copper in China. 71 TABLE VI IMPORTS OF METALS FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1957-1974 (Thousand Metric Tons) Metal 1957 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 copper 3 30 80 90 100 170 140 nickel 2 8 8 11 15 29 29 cobalt (metal content) .05 .5 .25 .1 .9 .9 1.. SOURCE: U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, China's Minerals and Metals  Position in the World Market (Washington, D.C: Library of Congress Photo-duplication Service, ER 76-10150, March 1976), p. 15, table B-l. TABLE VII EXPORTS OF METALS FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1957-1974 (Thousand Metric Tons) Metal 1957 1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 copper manganese 0.2 5 0.8 38 0.2 43 3.4 52 0.8 50 1.8 51 0.4 65 SOURCE: U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, China's Minerals and Metals  Position in the World Market (Washington, D.C: Library of Congress Photo-duplication Service, ER 76-10150, March, 1976), p. 16, table B-2. 72 Hence, China's imports of copper, which in 1974 accounted for approximately three-fifths of i t s total imports of nonferrous metals, are likely to 69 increase in the coming years. Most of these imports are from Chile, Peru, 70 and Zambia with smaller amounts coming from Japan, the UK, and West Germany. As seen in table VII, China does export small amounts of copper as part of 71 i t s general aid program to some states. As with copper, China's domestic reserves of nickel are also small, 72 leaving i t severely deficient in meeting i t s domestic needs. Therefore, as seen in table VI, China's imports of nickel have been steadily increasing since 1957. These imports accounted for approximately one-fifth of China's 73 total nonferrous metal imports in 1974. In 1973 and 1974 most of these imports were from Canada (78 percent in 1973 and 69 percent in 1974). China also imported smaller amounts from Western Europe, Albania, Cuba, 74 and possibly the Soviet Union. Unlike the other nodule metals, China's landbased reserves of man-ganese are large and of good quality. China produced approximately five 75 percent of the world's output of manganese ore in 1974. This production was great enough to serve China's domestic needs and to allow i t a small surplus for export (see table VII). These exports go almost exclusively . j 76 to Japan. Finally, China is estimated to have only a small deposit of cobalt 77 whose overall quality is unknown. Aside from the import figures pre-sented in table VI which show that China's cobalt imports are relatively small but steadily increasing since 1971, l i t t l e information is available regarding China's cobalt supplies or production. In summary, in terms of i t s own trade picture, China imports a large amount of some of the metals found in seabed nodules. Imports of copper, nickel, and cobalt cost the Chinese a total of 188.5, 405.6, and 404.5 million 73 78 US dollars in 1972, 1973, and 1974 respectively. Thus, these purchases constituted a drain on China's foreign exchange reserves. However in terms of world trade, the amount of minerals imported by China is not significant For example, in 1973 China's imports of copper accounted for only approxi-79 mately five percent of the total world exports of copper. Thus, China is not one of the world's major importers of these metals. As is readily apparent from table VII, China also is not a major exporter of any of these metals. In fact, China's "'export metals' only earn moderate amounts of 80 foreign exchange, without greatly affecting the /ChineseJ7 economy." In 1974, for example, China's exports of manganese earned only 1.9 million US 81 dollars in foreign exchange. Finally with regard to seabed mining i t s e l f , China does not have the technological potential, at this time, to become directly involved in any 82 deep sea exploitation of nodules. It also has not expressed any immediate interest in developing this capacity. Maritime Expertise There are two facets of China's maritime expertise which need to be examined as background for an analysis of China's UNCLOS III policies. F i r s t , China's capabilities in the f i e l d of marine scie n t i f i c research need to be examined in order to assess the level of China's development in this area and i t s future research interests. Secondly, i t is necessary to consider the level of maritime expertise among China's delegates at the SBC and UNCLOS III sessions. Therefore, the background of China's delegates w i l l be examined with regard to their experience vis-a-vis maritime issues, including international law, and international negotiations in general. Within China a great deal of effort in the area of marine sc i e n t i f i c research has been focused on developing China's offshore seismic capability 74 for use in o i l related projects. In this area, "Peking has sought to minimize foreign dependence . . . by combining carefully modulated foreign imports with the parallel development of Chinese operational and manufac-83 turing expertise." According to Selig Harrison, since 1967 the Chinese 84 have had at least three ships with a marine geological capability. These were foreign built ships purchased by the Chinese. By 1973, the 85 Chinese had deployed the f i r s t Chinese built seismic survey boats. The Chinese, however, continued to purchase offshore seismic survey equipment from foreign markets to make up for the deficiency in their own production. For example, in the summer of 1974 they purchased a seismic survey boat from France and two multi-purpose oceanographic vessels from a Japanese trading combine. These vessels were then outfitted with a combination of 86 Chinese and imported sc i e n t i f i c equipment. In general, with regard to i t s offshore seismic research capabilities most seismologists who have visited China believe that Peking w i l l have relatively l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y in catching up with the West in the geophysical instrumentation needed for o i l exploi-tation and wi l l not have to rely much on imported equipment.^ China's increasing interest in the general area of marine sci e n t i f i c research has also been exemplified in i t s attendance at international oceanographic conferences. Between 1971 and 1975, the Chinese sent dele-gations to four such conferences. These were: (1) the International Colloquium and Exhibition on the Exploration of the Ocean in France (March 1971); (2) the Second International Ocean Development Conference in Japan (October 1972); (3) the Third International Ocean Development Conference in Japan (August 1975); and (4) the Third International Conference on Q Q Oceanographic Technology in Britain (April 1975). Since the late 1960s, the Chinese have also shown the increased importance attached to oceanographic research through the expansion of 75 t h e i r research vessel f l e e t . According to a Chinese source, the f i r s t oceanographic research ship designed and b u i l t by the Chinese was launched 89 i n November 1959. While complete information regarding the current si z e of China's research f l e e t i s unavailable, Harrison reported that, according to his information, the Chinese had approximately t h i r t y - f i v e oceanographic 90 research vessels of various kinds i n 1977. Information provided by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in 1976 stated that "since the Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l Revolution 10 years ago the number of 91 R/V's /"in ChinaJ has increased 8.5 times." Not only has the size of China's research f l e e t been increasing, so has the scope of i t s oceanographic c r u i s e s . In Ju l y 1976, two Chinese research vessels completed China's f i r s t oceanographic study covering a wide area of the P a c i f i c Ocean including both hemispheres and south of the 92 equator. This study covered a number of subjects including marine hydrography, meteorology, chemistry, gravity and geology, seabed geomorphol-ogy, ship-to-ship telecommunications, and navigation.93 In summary, comprehensive data regarding China's e f f o r t s i n the area of marine s c i e n t i f i c research are not available (e.g., information regarding expenditures, number of personnel, e t c . ) . From the av a i l a b l e information, i t i s apparent that the Chinese have become inc r e a s i n g l y involved i n marine research during the past ten years. For the most part, China's i n t e r e s t s have focused on the waters immediately o f f i t s coasts and have been linked with i t s economic i n t e r e s t s i n these waters. However i n recent years, the Chinese have also developed t h e i r oceanographic c a p a b i l i t i e s i n the area of research on the high seas. So f a r , the Chinese have not shown an in t e r e s t i n conducting research within the waters of other states. F i n a l l y , members of an oceanography delegation who v i s i t e d several Chinese oceano-76 graphic institutes in 1978 reported that within China there were adequate personnel and f a c i l i t i e s but that research lagged 10 to 15 years behind the West. . . . However, the uniformly high level of enthusiasm among scientists and adminis-trators, coupled with the policy of investment in modern instrumentation, convinced /them/ that the lag between Chinese and Western oceanography would rapidly diminish.94 A second major facet of China's maritime expertise relates directly to i t s participation in the UNCLOS III negotiations. In this context, i t is useful to examine the background of China's SBC and UNCLOS III delegates in terms of their experience vis-a-vis the law of the sea and related matters. As seen in table VIII, with the exception of the f i r s t organizational session of UNCLOS III in 1973, the Chinese have sent a relatively large (in comparison with other states) delegation to both the SBC and UNCLOS III sessions. Details regarding the background of each of China's delegates are not available; however, i t is unlikely that many of the delegates had any legal training. In fact, legal study within China virtually dis-appeared after the Cultural Revolution. In mid-1966 the publication of China's leading journals on international law and poli t i c s was halted and 95 as of 1977 had not been reinstituted. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which had ultimate responsibility for LOS issues within the Chinese government did not have a branch department devoted exclusively to legal affairs. These were dealt with by a more inclusive department entitled "Department of International Organizations, Conferences, Treaties and Laws" which was also referred to as the "Department of International 96 Organizations, Law and Treaty." Given the f a c i l i t i e s for legal training within China, especially in the .area of international law, i t is not surprising that the Chinese did 97 not have a legal expert in their Permanent Mission to the UN in New York 77 TABLE VIII DEPARTMENTAL AFFILIATION OF PRC DELEGATES ,TO THE SBC AND UNCLOS III Session Number of Delegates SBC 1972 1973 10 17 UNCLOS III Session 1 (1973) Session 2 (1974) 14. Session 3 (1975) 22 Session 4 (1976) 15 Departmental A f f i l i a t i o n not available UN Mission Dept. of International Organizations § Law § Treaty National Bureau of Oceanology Geological Bureau UN Mission Dept. of International Organizations § Law £ Treaty Dept. of International Organizations § Law § Treaty National Bureau of Oceanology Foreign Trade Bureau of Port Supervision Bureau of Aquatic Products UN Mission Dept. of International Organizations § Law § Treaty National Bureau of Oceanology Geological Bureau Bureau of Port Supervision Geneva Mission UN Mission Dept. of International Organizations $ Law £ Treaty National Bureau of Oceanology Geological Bureau Ministry of Communications Ministry of Foreign Affairs 78 TABLE VHI-Continued Session Number of Delegates Departmental A f f i l i a t i o n Session 5 (1976) 20 UN M i s s i o n Dept. of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organizations § Law § Treaty N a t i o n a l Bureau of Oceanology Ge o l o g i c a l Bureau M i n i s t r y of Communications M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e § For e s t r y Venezuelan Ambassador Session 6 (1977) 20 UN M i s s i o n Dept. of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organizations § Law § Treaty N a t i o n a l Bureau of Oceanology G e o l o g i c a l Bureau M i n i s t r y of Communications M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e § Fo r e s t r y M i n i s t r y of Petroleum t} Chemical Industry Legal Expert SOURCES: U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/INF.6 (28 February 1972), p. 2; U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/INF.8 (2 March 1973), p. 3; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.1 (10 December 1973), p. 6; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.3/Rev.2 (16 January 1975), p. 12; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.4/Rev.1 (17 September 1975), p. 12; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.5 (12 A p r i l 1976), p. 12; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.6 (31 August 1976), p. 13; and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.7 (21 June 1977), p. 13. 79 or that only one member of China's SBC or UNCLOS III delegations, Ni Cheng-yu, was identified as a legal expert. (Ni Cheng-yu was present at the February 1972 meeting of the SBC and the second [197<\], third fl97Sj, 98 and sixth £1977] UNCLOS III sessions. ) In addition to a lack of legal expertise, the Chinese delegates, to a large extent, also lacked experience in international negotiations. This was largely due to their exclusion from the UN and i t s related organi-zations until 1971. Of the numerous Chinese representatives to the SBC and UNCLOS III sessions, only two,Pi Chi-lung and Ho Li-liang, had had prior experience in international negotiations. Pi Chi-lung served as the chairman of China's delegation to the third UNCLOS III session (1975). In March 1972, Pi along with two other Chinese took part in discussions in Peking with D.A. Davies, secretary-general of the World Meteorology 99 Organization (WMO) to discuss China's participation in that organization. Pi also served as a Chinese representative at the twenty-seventh session of the UN General Assembly in 1972. (He was also a representative at the thirtieth session in 1975 after his participation at the LOS Conference.) Finally, while serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1973, Pi led China's delegation to the Working Group on the Draft Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States established by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).101 Ho Li-liang served as an advisor and as an alternate representative at the 1972 and 1973 SBC sessions respectively. She was also an alternate representative at the f i r s t UNCLOS III session in 1973 and a representative at the two sessions in 1976. While l i t t l e i s known about her specific background in international a f f a i r s , i t can probably be assumed that she had had f a i r l y extensive experience in the area of international negotia-tions prior to 1972. This assumption is based on the fact that her husband, 80 Huang Hua, "was one of the most experienced and cosmopolitan diplomats in 102 the PRC's foreign service establishment and that she was serving as a counsellor with China's permanent mission to the UN from 1972-1976 when she participated in the LOS discussions. Both of these factors would indicate that she had had at least some international negotiating experience prior to the 1972 SBC meeting. Finally, while Huang Hua was not listed as an o f f i c i a l member of China's delegation to any of the SBC or UNCLOS III sessions, he was present at several of the sessions held in New York. Huang served as China's ambassador to the UN from 1971 until 1976 when he returned to China to serve as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As mentioned earlier, Huang Hua was very skilled in international diplomacy and he, along with his wife, played an active role in informal negotiations, especially with African 103 delegates, at UNCLOS III. Even though the majority of China's SBC and UNCLOS III delegates had l i t t l e experience in multilateral negotiations prior to these sessions, they undoubtedly gained this experience as a result of their participation. In fact, with the start of UNCLOS III in 1973, individual Chinese represen-tatives and advisors participated f a i r l y consistently in consecutive conference sessions (see table IX). This pattern of participation lent some consistency to China's representation and gave these individuals the opportunity to gain experience. The fact that several new advisors were added at each session also indicates that the Chinese probably used the conference as a training ground for future negotiators. As the Chinese built up their expertise in the areas of marine science and the law of the sea, the Chinese delegations at UNCLOS III began to include advisors from a variety of departments within the Chinese bureaucracy 81 TABLE IX P-RC DELEGATES TO THE SBC AND UNCLOS I I I D e l e g a t e SBC 1972 1973 S e s s i o n 1973 1974 UNCLOS 1975 I I I 1976 1976 1977 An C h i h - y u a n R Shen W e i - l i a n g AR R R Hu C h i n - l i n AR Ho L i - l i a n g A AR AR R R N i Cheng-yu A A A A Wang Yu-wen A Chuang Yen R H s i a Pu R Chao L i n AR Chang P i n g - h s i A R Tang Hs i n g - p o A A Huang C h i a - h u a A Yeh Shou-cheng A Shen C h i h - c h e n g A AR AR AR AR AR Lo M e i - l u n g A A A L i n g C h i n g R R R L i S h e ng-chiao A A A A A Wu T s i e n - m i n A A A C h a i Shu-fan R Lo Y u - j u R R R R R Ke T a i - s h u o R R R R Ouyang T s u - p i n g AR AR AR AR AR L i u Han-hui AR AR AR Chen Teh-kung A A A A P i C h i - l u n g R Wang C h u n g - l i R T i e n C h i n AR N i n g C h i a - t s a i AR TABLE IX-Continued 82 Delegate Session SBC UNCLOS III 1972 1973 1973 1974 1975 1976 1976 1977 Lin Chia-sen AR Chen Tsien A A A Lai Ya-li R Chung Cheng-wei AR AR AR Wang Nung-sheng A Wang Kuang-ya A A A Cheng Yeh-kuei A Yu Yuan-cheng A A A Kuo Yuan-li A Wang Wei-yang A A Lo Ai-mei A Yang Hsiu-chu A Ching Ming-yuan A Ho Liang-tsai A A Chang Wen-chin R Wu Hsiao-ta R Hsu Kuang-tsien A Chang Chin-chuan A Li Jen-pei A Chen Lo-nan A Hsu Ya-nan A Ku Tzu-ping A SOURCES: U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/INF.6 (28 February 1972), p. 2; U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/INF..8 (2 March 1973), p. 3; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62.INF.1 (10 December 1973), p. 6; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.3/Rev.2 (16 January 1975), p. 12; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.4/Rev.l (17 September 1975), p. 12; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/ INF.5 (12 April 1976), p. 12; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.6 (31 August 1976), p. 13; and U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/INF.7 (21 June 1977), p. 13. KEY: R representative AR alternate representative A advisor 83 with interests in the oceans. It is useful to examine the departmental af f i l i a t i o n s of the Chinese delegates as a reflection of which organiza-tions the Chinese saw as affected by the LOS discussions and, hence, which ones were most likely to have had an input into China's LOS policies. In addition, an examination of the bureaucratic a f f i l i a t i o n s of China's delegates may also give an indication as to which maritime issues held the highest priority for the Chinese. During the SBC meetings and the f i r s t UNCLOS III session in 1973, the Chinese delegation was composed of representatives from China's mission to the UN, the Department of International Organizations, Law and Treaty of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Bureau of Oceanology, and the Geological Bureau (see table VIII). These departments continued to send representatives as part of the Chinese delegation to a l l subsequent UNCLOS III sessions. However, as the conference progressed, representatives from more specialized departments within the Chinese bureaucracy also began to be included, primarily as advisors, in China's delegation (see table VIII). The other organizations represented were the Ministry of Foreign Trade (second session), the Bureau of Port Supervision of the Ministry of 104 Communications (second through sixth sessions), the Bureau of Aquatic Products of the Ministry of Agriculture and For e s t r y 1 0 5 (second and f i f t h sessions), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (several advisors at the fourth, f i f t h , and sixth sessions), the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemical Industry (sixth session), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (sixth session). From this l i s t i n g i t would appear that the Chinese were most concerned about the impact of the LOS negotiations on China's foreign relations. In addition, as reflected in the attendance of members of the relevant bureaucracies, the Chinese also appeared to be concerned with navigation and resources (both living and non-living). In summary, a consideration of the Chinese delegations to the SBC and UNCLOS III sessions has shown that i n i t i a l l y most of the members of these delegations lacked legal and maritime expertise as well as multi-lateral negotiating experience. However, through a f a i r l y consistent participation pattern, several delegates gained this experience. As the sessions progressed, the Chinese delegation also expanded with regard to the areas of expertise of i t s members to more specialized areas relating to LOS issues. Finally, as pointed out during the discussion of China's capabilities in the area of marine s c i e n t i f i c research, i t is clear that China's SBC and UNCLOS III delegates did not have the background informa-tion regarding the technical aspects of marine issues possessed by many other delegations, especially those of developed states. Naval Characteristics The fourth and fi n a l category of maritime variables which could potentially influence China's position on the law of the sea issues is i t s naval characteristics, including the size of China's fleet and i t s deployment. As brought out earlier, China has a long shoreline which leaves i t especially vulnerable to seaborne attack. In addition, a large percentage of China's population and many of i t s industrial centers are located near the coasts. Since the opening of China to the West in the mid-1800s, the Chinese have been sensitive to the repeated invasions of their country from the sea. This sense of vulnerability was heightened during the 1950s and 1960s with the presence of the US Seventh Fleet in waters off China and the potential threat of Soviet ships in the area. It is not surprising, therefore that "Chinese publications make i t clear 85 that the navy's primary mission is the defense of China against seaborne a t t a c k . I n support of this, Commander Bruce Swanson of the US Navy reported that other than the Paracels incident, no Chinese warships have been noted operating at any distance from the mainland. /In addition/, . . . public statements of the PRC Navy's mission have consistently referred to defending the t e r r i t o r i a l seas through interception of enemy i n f i l t r a t i o n and providing escorts for coastal shipping and fishing fleets.107 In order to achieve their goal of coastal defense, the Chinese have been slowly but steadily increasing both the size and capability of their navy to a point where i t is the third largest in the world with approxi-mately 150,000 officers and men and more than 100 vessels in active 108 service. China's inventory of surface combatant ships is primarily composed of small vessels such as missile-attack torpedo and gun boats and submarine chasers. China also has a number of conventional submarines and 109 a b a l l i s t i c missile submarine under construction. The Chinese navy is organized into three fleets: the North Sea Fleet (over 300 ships including two submarine squadrons) covering the area from the Sino-Korean border to the Shantung-Kiangsu provincial border; the East China Fleet (over 600 vessels with one submarine squadron) from the Shantung-Kiangsu boundary to Kwangtung Province; and the South Sea Fleet (approximately 285 vessels) from Kwantung to the Vietnamese border."'""'"^  Thus, Chinese naval forces and their support f a c i l i t i e s "are configured primarily for coastal defense"^ '"'""' and make up "probably the world's most 112 formidable coastal fleet." China has the potential to become a global naval power. However, according to Lt. David Muller, this would require "extensive preparations 113 in both naval and p o l i t i c a l spheres." Large expenditures of funds would be required to expand the capabilities and size of China's navy to enable i t to carry out long oceanic cruises. P o l i t i c a l l y , as long as China maintains only a coastal force of i t s own, i t can use the naval issue as a propaganda device to c r i t i c i z e the Soviet Union and the US for "rank gunboat diplomacy," i.e., maintaining their fleets in foreign 114 waters. In addition, with just a coastal fleet to defend, China can strengthen i t s position as a member of the Third World by supporting the extension of coastal state jurisdiction and restrictions on the passage of warships through international str a i t s . Muller concludes that "Peking could well find i t s navy's freedom of movement severely limited, largely by i t s own propaganda and diplomatic efforts.""'' 1 5 However, as he also points out, the PRC is no doubt making a virtue of necessity. It does not have a blue-water navy and therefore feels no qualms about ^ attempting to limit the usefulness of those i t s rivals possess. Regional Maritime Disputes A fi n a l set of variables which needs to be examined in order to get a better idea of China's major maritime interests is that of China's regional maritime disputes. The region in the v i c i n i t y of the PRC encom-passes the Yellow, East China, and South China seas. A l l of these areas are rich in both living and non-living resources. As a result of this abundance (the extent of o i l resources being unclear at this time), several controversies have arisen between China and neighboring states regarding jurisdiction over various sectors of this region. For the most part, these disputes have centered around the question of which state has sovereignty over specific islands in the area. However, controversies have also arisen over the delimitation of fishing zones and the continental shelf. 87 The major island groupings over which sovereignty disputes have arisen are the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea and the 117 Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. For the most part, the rush of claims and counterclaims to jurisdiction over these islands arose as a result of the geophysical survey of the area in 1968. As mentioned pre-viously, this survey concluded that significant deposits of o i l and natural gas could possibly be found in the seabed areas off these islands. Thus, a claim to sovereignty over the islands would give the claimant jur i s -diction over the adjacent seabed and the o i l . In addition to o i l , however, sovereignty over these islands i s also important in terms of access to rich fishery resources in, and control over shipping through, the area. The abundance of o i l and fishery resources in the South and East China seas has already been discussed; however, the significance of the sea lanes in the South China Sea s t i l l needs to be examined. Hungdah Chiu recognized the importance of this area in stating that the South China Sea emerges as one of the few, i f not the only, enclosed areas of the sea to which none of the four major powers, China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States, can afford to remain indifferent. H8 The South China Sea connects with the Indian Ocean by way of the Malacca-Singapore Straits and with the East China Sea and eventually with the Sea of Japan in the northeast (see map 1). The navies of both the US and the USSR rely on the sea routes through the South China Sea. It is especially important for the Soviets' naval access to their base in Vladivostock. China, and to an even greater extent, Japan rely on these 119 routes for a large part of their commercial maritime trade. Thus, i t is important for China that these lanes remain open for commercial navi-gation, but that military t r a f f i c is s t r i c t l y regulated. As mentioned above, the Spratly and Paracel Islands are situated MAP 1 MAJOR SEA LANES IN SOUTH-EAST AND EAST ASIA SOURCE: Hungdah Chiu, "South China Sea Islands: Implications for Delimiting the Seabed and Future Shipping Routes," The China Quarterly, no. 72 (December 1977), p. 755, map 1. 89 in the South China Sea with the Spratlies approximately 200 nautical miles south of the nearest island of the Paracel grouping (see map 2). More specifically, the Spratlies are located approximately 250 miles east of southern Vietnam, 200 miles west of the Philippines, 1,100 miles southwest of Taiwan, and 800 miles southwest of Hainan Island of the PRC. The Paracels are approximately 225 miles east of Da Nang in Vietnam and 165 120 miles southeast of Hainan. Both of these island groupings are archi-pelagoes comprised of a series of small islands, reefs, and shoals (approximately f i f t y in the case of the Paracels and 100 in the Spratlies) 121 which, in most instances, are uninhabited. Geologically, the northern part of the South China Sea in which the Paracels and Spratlies are located is essentially a deep sea basin with a large abyssal plain the depth of which is greater than 1000 meters (see 122 map 2). The Paracels are located in an area which constitutes the slope and rise of the continental shelf off the coasts of China and Vietnam. Greenfield concludes that on the basis of natural appurtenance, i t is d i f f i c u l t to see how the Paracels, tiny islands on what might be regarded as the slope of the shelf extending from South China and Vietnam, . . . could be the effective basis of any extensive shelf claims.123 The Spratlies l i e in an area of the South China Sea which is the slope or rise of the continental shelf appertaining to South Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines, but not of China. Hence, China's claims in this area rest on jurisdiction over the islands rather than the 124 delimitation of the continental shelf. During the period covered by this study, the jurisdictional disputes over the Paracel and Spratly islands have primarily involved the PRC and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Prior to the reunification of Vietnam in 11975, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam did not specifically state its MAP 2 SOUTH CHINA SEA 110 Vietnam ~~2g*J"^<\J\l 20° / 115° People's Republic of China n>J Macao *?? . 1 *w „ ' > ° Republic of China fl lg Kong ' , / ' BashiC / Pratasl. / aiwan) 4 hannel \s 20° / Gulf of Tonkin ff" C S Hainan 15° S \ \ o r 200-metre contour line /* Island / y.-'Paracel Is.'"-.. / ; • o, / » . « M a \ u 0 5 ,••••-/'"«»" y.....,"' +<»»^ ... - / > » . . p ^ • ; 1,000-metre line 4,000-metre line \ ) cclesfield Bank The Phi / / f • NanyenRock i 'f ippincs .uzon I. 1 15° — v ; \ \ "s ^ I \ 10° " f*^" '^ ' \ x — 1 1 ^ » 1 / > r ' /'• /"'V / :'--.../ \ / \_ (Chung-yeh) ^i-Ie' Thi-tu I. ^ * j Spratly Is. y Itu-abal. (Huang-yen I. in PRCs map) v. y / /< • — / / ran) Reed Bank 1 ' a ,'i ... IM ; '' Palawan I. 1 A y io° J / / / I Prince Consort Bank, i < Vanguard Bank -•, \ / / i / i 5° V Northern I ' o'o « o o jstorm-*. * 0 '(p (Spratly) I. i / ndship Shoals^ S / -uccnia Shoal \ ^—*" // i v Malaysia ^ * " ) \ \ "~\ i ••-J K \ » » 110° jth Luconia "~ 1 Shoals ~* % r , 0 V* James Shoals y ' / U 5 ° j Indonesia / (1 kilometre = 0-62137 mile ,/ Scale 1 :8,000,000 i I I l I 0 80 160 240 320 (Kilometre) 120 ) ° SOURCE: Hungdah Chiu, "South China Sea Islands: Implications for Delimiting the Seabed and Future Shipping Routes," The China Quarterly, no. 72 (December 1977), p. 758, map 2. 91 claim to the islands and essentially evaded the issue by stating that i t 125 should be settled through negotiations among the relevant states. In order to understand the current state of the jurisdictional dispute, i t is useful to examine the basis upon which the Chinese and Vietnamese make their claims. The Vietnamese claim that '"from time immemorial, /the Paracels/ 126 have been frequented by Vietnamese fishermen.'" However, they did not ful l y assert their claim to the islands until 1802 when the Vietnamese Emperor, Gia-long, established a company to exploit the natural resources of the Paracels. The islands were annexed to Vietnam in 1816 and f i r s t 127 appeared on Vietnamese maps in 1838. In the early 1930s, the French 128 occupied the Paracels "'in the name of the Vietnamese Royal Kingdom.'" Vietnam's historical claim to- the Spratly Islands is not clearly documented. The Vietnamese do state, however, that emperors of the Nguyen Dynasty (1802-1884), one of the tributary states of the Chinese Ch'ing 129 Dynasty, claimed jurisdiction over the Spratlies. This claim was not 130 c l a r i f i e d until the French took possession of the islands in 1933. China's claims to the Paracel and Spratly islands are also based on historical records and the right of prior discovery. In 1975 a Chinese writer, Shih Ti-tsu, presented a detailed description of China's claims to 131 the South China Sea islands. He pointed out that the Chinese had been using the South China Sea as a navigation route since the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) and that the islands f i r s t appeared on 132 Chinese maps in the early thirteenth century. Also, from 1405 to 1433, the noted Chinese navigator Cheng Ho and his fleet sailed to the Western Seas on seven occasions, calling at the South China Sea Islands time and again and leaving many articles on them, and the places they visited were recorded in special books.133 92 Shih Ti-tsu not only discussed the early discovery of these islands by the Chinese, but also pointed out that the Chinese have inhabited the Paracels and Spratlies for centuries. He stated that archeologists have discoverd a variety of artifacts which "show that the Chinese people have lived on many of the /Paracel/ Islands since ancient times, and without interruption since the Tang /626-900 A.D.J and Sung /960-1126 A.D./ 134 Dynasties." In addition, since the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, Chinese fishermen from Hainan Island not only used several of the Spratly Islands as fishing bases but also built houses and temples 135 there and engaged in farming. Thirdly, to establish his point regarding China's jurisdiction over the islands, Shih pointed out that not only were the South China Sea Islands . . . discovered and developed /by the Chinese/, the successive Chinese governments of various dynasties exercised jurisdiction and sovereignty over them.136 In substantiating this point, the author cited historical records of inspection tours of the islands during the Eastern Han Dynasty /"25-220 A.D./ and naval patrols to the area during the Northern Sung Dynasty /960-1126 A.D./. Also, since the 1830s, the area around the Paracels has been clearly 137 delineated as within the sea defense area of China. Finally, other authors have pointed out that China's claims to the Paracels and Spratlies were not seriously challenged until the 1930s when the French claimed them. Also, prior to this time, China's claim to the islands was, "in fact, confirmed by several international and Chinese domes-t i c acts." The actual dispute over the Paracels and Spratlies began in 1931 when France, acting on behalf of Vietnam, claimed the islands. The Chinese immediately protested, stating that the islands were, in fact, under Chinese 93 jurisdiction. After several exchanges of diplomatic notes and the passage of several years, the French f i n a l l y withdrew their claim in 1934. However in 1938.when the Chinese were preoccupied with the Japanese invasion of China, the French occupied the Paracels. The French only retained control until 1939 when the Japanese took over the Paracel and Spratly islands. 139 The Japanese held this control until 1945. From 1946 until 1950, the islands were under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China (ROC). Throughout this period, "neither Vietnam nor any other country protested to China regarding their takeover of the islands from Japan . . . or their inclusion within the t e r r i t o r i a l scope of 140 China." In May 1950, the troops of the ROC withdrew from the islands and were replaced by forces from the PRC. With the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, Japan formally renounced i t s claim to both the Spratly and Paracel island groups; however, the treaty did not specify who would have jurisdiction 141 over the islands. At the conference, the RVN issued a statement in which i t reasserted i t s claim to both of these island groups. This claim went unchallenged by the conference participants; however, neither the PRC nor the ROC were in attendance. Prior to the conference, on August 16, 1951, the PRC Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, stated that: "whether or not the U.S.-British Draft Treaty contains provi-sions on this subject and no matter how these provisions are worded, the inviolable sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over Nanwei Island (the Spratly Islands) and Sisha Island (the Paracel Islands) w i l l not be in any way affected."142 The ROC also maintained i t s claim over the islands by virtue of a bilateral peace treaty with Japan in 1952. According to the ROC, the provisions in tliis treaty stipulated that Japan had renounced i t s claim to the 94 143 islands in favor of the ROC. These claims remained relatively stable until the summer of 1956 when a Filipino, Tomas Clomas, laid claim to the Spratly Islands. The PRC, ROC, 144 and RVN protested this action to the Philippine government. The ROC sent a naval contingent to the Spratly Islands, which found that the Filipinos had already l e f t . Later in 1956, while maintaining i t s claim to a l l of the islands, the ROC stationed forces on the largest of the Spratly Islands, Itu Aba (T'ai-ping). At approximately the same time, the Viet-namese occupied Spratly Island (Nanwei), and in 1957 the PRC announced 145 that the Vietnamese had also occupied several of the Paracel Islands. The PRC reasserted i t s claim to both the Paracels and Spratlies in 1958. In upholding this claim from 1960 through 1971, the PRC issued at least a hundred warnings to the US regarding violations of China's t e r r i t o r i a l sea 146 and/or airspace around the Paracel Islands. In general, the situation of overlapping claims to the Paracels and Spratlies remained f a i r l y constant un t i l 1974 when an armed clash occurred between the PRC and RVN. The Vietnamese had taken two actions in 1973 which precipitated this clash. In July the Vietnamese government opened thirty of the forty offshore tracts along i t s coast for o i l exploration bids. Eight of these tracts were awarded to Western o i l companies for o i l and gas exploitation. Later, in September, the Vietnamese took the additional step of incorporating eleven of the Spratly islets into Phuoc Tuy Province in an attempt to preempt the continental shelf between the Spratlies and 147 Vietnamese mainland. On January 11, 1974 the PRC responded to these actions with a strong statement protesting this infringement of Chinese territory. The RVN refuted the Chinese claim to sovereignty and took the further step of intercepting several Chinese fishermen off the coast of 95 the P a r a c e l s . The c o n f r o n t a t i o n h e a t e d up between the t w e l f t h and s i x t e e n t h o f J a n u a r y when t h e C h i n e s e p l a n t e d t h e i r f l a g on s e v e r a l o f t h e P a r a c e l i s l e t s t o r e a s s e r t t h e i r c l a i m . On the s i x t e e n t h , the Vietnamese condemned C h i n a f o r suddenly' c l a i m i n g t h e P a r a c e l s and S p r a t l i e s " and i n f o r m e d 148 the UN S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l o f China's " ' u n r e a s o n a b l e c l a i m . ' " They a l s o i n v a d e d Money and Robert I s l a n d s o f the P a r a c e l group on the s e v e n t e e n t h and took down the Chinese f l a g s . These a c t i o n s d i d not r e s u l t i n an armed c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the C h i n e s e s i n c e i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t any Chinese were on the i s l e t s at the t i m e . On J a n u a r y n i n e t e e n t h , t h e Vietnamese attempted t o occupy another o f t h e P a r a c e l s ; however, t h e y were met by a C h i n e s e f o r c e which was a l r e a d y s t a t i o n e d t h e r e . The next day, t h e C h i n e s e f o r c e s drove the Vietnamese from the e n t i r e P a r a c e l i s l a n d group. The Vietnamese th e n moved t h e i r f o r c e s southward and o c c u p i e d s e v e r a l u n i n h a b i t e d i s l e t s o f t h e S p r a t l y group. The PRC a l s o p r o t e s t e d t h i s move; however, i t d i d not t a k e any m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . The ROC a l s o s t r o n g l y p r o t e s t e d the V i e t -namese t a k e o v e r o f t h e S p r a t l y i s l e t s . I t r e a f f i r m e d Chinese s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r the S p r a t l i e s and began r e i n f o r c i n g i t s base on I t u Aba, However, 149 no armed c o n f l i c t s a r o s e between the ROC and RVN. As mentioned e a r l i e r , t h e government i n N o r t h Vietnam s a i d l i t t l e b e f o r e 1975 r e g a r d i n g the South C h i n a Sea i s l a n d d i s p u t e s . However, s i n c e i t s t a k e o v e r o f the government o f the RVN i n A p r i l 1975, the new govern-ment has r e a s s e r t e d the Vietnamese c l a i m t o t h e i s l a n d s and has p u b l i s h e d , maps i n c l u d i n g t h e S p r a t l i e s and P a r a c e l s as Vietnamese t e r r i t o r y , In summary, as o f 1977 t h e PRC o c c u p i e d t h e P a r a c e l I s l a n d s and c l a i m e d t h e S p r a t l i e s as Chinese t e r r i t o r y . Vietnam a l s o c l a i m e d t h e P a r a c e l s and o c c u p i e d S p r a t l e y I s l a n d and a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w e l v e o t h e r i s l e t s of the Spratly island group. The ROC occupied Itu Aba, the largest 152 i s l e t in the Spratly group, and like the others claimed the Paracels. The Republic of the Philippines occupied three small islets of the 153 Spratly group. The Philippines also claimed a l l of the Spratlies, primarily basing i t s claim on geographic proximity. (Several of the islets are only forty to f i f t y miles west of Palawan Island of the Philippines.)"'" In general, the jurisdictional disputes over the Paracel and Spratly islands hinge on historical claims of discovery and use and, as a result, w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to resolve. China's jurisdictional dispute with the Japanese over the Senkaku Islands (Tiao Yu Tai in Chinese) in the East China Sea is interrelated with the broader question of the delimitation of the seaward boundaries between the two states. Both of these issues are of importance primarily due to the high probability of seabed o i l in the Yellow and East China seas. In order to make the relationship between the issues clearer, the dispute over the Senkakus will be considered f i r s t since the settlement of this dispute in favor of either the Chinese or Japanese w i l l influence the resolution of the delimitation issue. The Senkaku Islands are located approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles west of Okinawa, and 100 nautical miles north of the nearest city of the southwest end of the Ryukyu Islands (see map 3). This places the islands on the eastern edge of the East China Sea continental shelf near the Okinawa Trench which lies off the coast of Japan. The island grouping consists of "five uninhabited i s l e t s and three rocks without vegetation. " ^ 5 The largest island of the group is only about two miles long and a l i t t l e less than one mile wide. The controversy over these islands did not come to light until the 97 MAP 3 SENKAKU (TIAU YU TAI) ISLANDS SOURCE: Jeanette Greenfield, China and the Law of the Sea, Air, and Environment (Germantown, Maryland: Sijthoff § Noordhoff, 1979), p. 135, map 8. 98 middle of 1970. On J u l y 12, the ROC signed a contract with a Japanese s u b s i d i a r y of the Gulf O i l Company f o r the e x p l o r a t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n of seabed o i l i n the East China Sea northeast of Taiwan, an area encompassing 156 a l l of the Senkaku I s l a n d s . The Japanese government responded on J u l y 18 w i t h a statement that the Senkaku Islands belonged to the Ryukyus and, t h e r e f o r e , Japan had sovereignty over them. According to the Japanese, Taiwan d i d not have the a u t h o r i t y to enter i n t o e x p l o r a t i o n c o n t r a c t s covering t h i s area. On October 23, 1970, the a c t i n g Foreign M i n i s t e r of the ROC informed the Japanese ambassador i n T a i p e i that the i s l a n d s were part of Taiwan. He a l s o asked that the US, which had j u r i s d i c t i o n over the Ryukyus at the time, prevent Ryukyu p a t r o l boats from i n t e r f e r i n g with 157 Chinese fishermen i n the area of the Senkakus. This dispute d i d not lead to any armed clashes i n the area nor d i d i t r e s u l t i n any formal n e g o t i a t i o n s to s e t t l e the sovereignty question. However, informal d i s c u s s i o n s between Japan and the ROC regarding the e x p l o i t a t i o n of seabed resources on the c o n t i n e n t a l s h e l f d i d occur. In a d d i t i o n , the Japanese suggested "that Japan, the ROC, and South Korea cooperate i n developing the undersea resources of the East China Sea with-158 out p r e j u d i c e to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l e g a l c l a i m s . " These s t a t e s met on 159 November 12 to d i s c u s s the j o i n t venture. The suggestion of a j o i n t e f f o r t to e x p l o i t the resources of the area l e d to the f i r s t u n o f f i c i a l statement by the PRC on the i s s u e . On December 11, 1970 an a r t i c l e was published i n the Peking Review i n which the PRC expressed i t s d i s a p p r o v a l of the scheme and c a l l e d i t '"a new crime by Japanese m i l i t a r i s m i n p l o t t i n g aggression against China and Korea with U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t support. On December 30, 1971 the PRC M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s i s s u e d i t s f i r s t o f f i c i a l statement on the i s l a n d s . This 99 followed the signing of a treaty by the US and Japan on June 17, 1971 which would restore Okinawa, the Ryukyus, and the Senkakus, since they were considered to be part of the Ryukyus, to Japan in 1972. (The US had adminis-tered these islands since the end of World War I I . I n i t s statement, the PRC stressed that " i t is utterly i l l e g a l for the U.S. and Japanese governments to include China's Tiaoyu /Senkaku/ and other islands in the so-called 'area of reversion' in the Okinawa 'reversion' agreement. Their act cannot in the least alter the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over her territory of the Tiaoyu and other is lands."162 Thus, the Senkaku Islands are claimed by the PRC, ROC, and Japan. Once the jurisdictional dispute arose, each of the countries went back into i t s historical records in order to "prove" the validity of it s claim. The bases of the PRC and ROC claims are essentially the same. In the December 30, 1971 statement by the PRC, the Chinese stated that "the tiaoyu [sjxj and other islands /had/ always been China's territory from time imme-163 morial." More specifically, as early as 1556 the islands were con-164 sidered "within the scope of China's coastal defence." Other historical writings also established China's sovereignty over the islands. According to the Chinese, the Japanese did not discover the islands until 1884 and did not "seize" them until "the defeat of the government of the ching /"sic/ dynasty in the sino-j apanese war [sic] had become inevitable" 166 in 1895. Finally, in substantiating their claim, the Chinese also pointed out that the islands are situated on the continental shelf which is 167 part of the extension of the Chinese land mass. On March 8, 1972, the Japanese reasserted the basis of their claim to the islands. They stated that a survey of the Senkakus made in 1885 by the Japanese 100 "ascertained c a r e f u l l y that the islands were not only uninhab-i t e d but without any trace of control by China (Ching dynasty). . . . /Therefore/, the Japanese government . . . set up posts on the Senkaku Islands to manifest Japan's t e r r i t o r i a l sover-eignty' and thereby formally incorporated these islands into the t e r r i t o r y of Japan."168 They also claimed that these islands were not among the Chinese islands which were ceded to Japan as a r e s u l t of the 1895 treaty since they were already Japanese t e r r i t o r y . F i n a l l y , the Japanese stated that "none of the alleged h i s t o r i c a l , geographical, and geological arguments set f o r t h by the governments of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are-acceptable as v a l i d under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to substantiate China's t e r r i t o r i a l claim over the Senkaku I s l a n d s . " ! 6 9 As mentioned e a r l i e r , the establishment of sovereignty over the Senkakus w i l l have a large impact on the d e l i m i t a t i o n of state boundaries i n the East China Sea. However, the d e l i m i t a t i o n i t s e l f , apart from i s l a n d j u r i s d i c t i o n , has also become a major point of contention among Japan, the PRC, the ROC, and South Korea. The area i n dispute includes the Yellow and East China seas which are both adjacent and semienclosed by Korea (North and South), China (including Taiwan), and Japan. Nowhere i s the distance between any of these land areas greater than 400 n a u t i c a l miles. In addition, both of these areas are f a i r l y shallow. The average depth of the Yellow Sea i s f i f t y - f i v e meters and at i t s deepest i s less than 125 metres. The East China Sea, with the exception of the Okinawa Trough o f f the coast of Japan which has a depth of 1270 fathoms at i t s deepest, i s also 170 less than 200 meters deep. This area i s r e l a t i v e l y free of islands except for the Senkakus discussed above. Thus, under the 200-meter depth c r i t e r i o n /"for the l i m i t of the con-t i n e n t a l s h e l f j 7 alone, the natural resources of these seas would f a l l mainly under the exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n of the coastal states, and . . . under the hypothesis of a 200-mile economic zone, t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n would be completely exclusive i n r e l a t i o n to non-coastal state interests.171 Hence, the r i c h resources i n the area d e f i n i t e l y come under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of one of the four states; however, the de l i m i t a t i o n of the boundaries remains problematical. Before discussing the l e g a l foundations upon which the countries base t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l claims, i t i s useful to point out the events which p r e c i p i t a t e d these claims. The primary action which led to i n t e r e s t i n the area was the 1968 geophysical survey of the area discussed e a r l i e r . Similar to the reactions of Vietnam and China i n the case of the Paracels and S p r a t l i e s , the "immediate reaction of the adjacent coastal states to the reports was to claim sovereignty over as much of the supposedly o i l - r i c h 172 continental s h e l f as reasonably d e f e n s i b l e . " Due to t h e i r pressing domestic demands f o r o i l and to the uncertainty regarding the c r i t e r i a f o r d e l i m i t a t i o n under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, the states i n the area did not seek to negotiate a boundary settlement. Instead, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan u n i l a t e r a l l y established t h e i r boundaries v i s - a - v i s opposite states. Between 1969 and 1970, these coastal areas were subdivided into seventeen sectors f o r the purpose of o i l exploration. In the Japanese case, i t was the o i l companies which s p e c i f i e d t h e i r claims while the South Korean and ROC governments s p e c i f i e d the blocks i n t h e i r areas and then contracted out to foreign o i l companies f or exploration 173 r i g h t s i n these blocks. As seen i n map 4, the areas claimed by these states overlap to such an extent that only four remained uncontested. The fourth state bordering on the area, the PRC, did not make any formal claims 174 regarding i t s continental s h e l f l i m i t s u n t i l December 1970. One of the possible means of dealing with the problem of overlapping claims would be for the concerned states to negotiate boundary settlements. In 1970, several Japanese o i l companies convinced the Japanese government 102 MAP 4 UNILATERAL CLAIMS TO JURISDICTION SOURCE: Choon-Ho Park, Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow  Sea and the East China Sea, Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper, no. 15 (n.p. University of Rhode Island, September 1972), p. 69, map 5. 103 of the need for such talks. The Japanese held separate meetings with the ROC and South Korea in October and November of 1970 respectively with each side merely repeating i t s previous position. In fact, "the attitudes of /"South/ Korea and Taiwan were so firm on their respective 175 positions that they even voiced skepticism on the need for talks." The Chinese expressed their views regarding boundary negotiations in December 1970 when they made their f i r s t public statement claiming sovereignty over the continental shelf of the Yellow and East China seas. In this statement, the Chinese recognized that they could not claim a l l of the shelf area; however, they stipulated that the boundaries delimiting Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean waters could only be 176 * decided on the basis of mutual agreement. In the working paper presented by Shen Wei-liang to Subcommittee II of UNCLOS III on July 16, 1973, the Chinese also emphasized that states "shall, on the basis of safeguarding and respecting the sovereignty of each other, conduct necessary consultations to work out reasonable solutions for the exploitation, regulation and other matters relating to the natural resources in their contiguous parts of the continental shelves."177 Finally, at a UN sponsored Conference in April 1974, the Chinese reiterated the need for "consultations on an equal footing" between the states , 178 concerned. A second means whereby each side could benefit from seabed o i l exploitation without a fin a l settlement of boundary limits would be through mutual cooperation in terms of joint development of the resource. The f i r s t agreement between representatives from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan regarding joint ventures was reached at a conference of nongovern-mental, interstate organizations in November 1970. Underlying the agreement to form an ocean development corporation was 104 the basic idea . . . to 'freeze' the problems of jurisdiction and boundary delimitation, leaving those to the governments concerned, while the o i l groups proceeded with their develop-ment plans under a non-governmental arrangement.179 The problems associated with isolating the exploitation of seabed o i l from the state jurisdictional disputes and strong protests by the PRC regarding 180 this joint venture led to i t s failure. (The protest by the PRC in December 1970 was discussed earlier with regard to the jurisdictional dis-pute over the Senkakus.) A second agreement concerning joint exploitation was signed by Japan and South Korea in January 1972. Once again, this agreement provided for the suspension of the boundary issue pending future negotiations while allowing for o i l exploitation to proceed in certain areas of overlapping 181 claims. However, the Japanese became reluctant to ratify this agreement 182 following a protest by the Chinese on February 4, 1974. On April 24 while the agreement was before the Japanese Diet for ra t i f i c a t i o n , the Chinese lodged a formal protest with the Japanese stating that the area 183 proposed for joint development, in fact, belonged to China. The Diet went on to rat i f y the agreement in June at which time the Chinese again stated their claim to the area and asserted that the continental shelf could only be developed after consultations between the Chinese and the other states concerned. Finally, the Chinese warned that states violating China's 184 sovereignty over the area must bear the consequences. In substantiating their claims to the area of the continental shelf, the bordering states referred to two principles of international law. One of these was set forth in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. In the convention, the continental shelf is defined as 105 the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the . . . areas. According to this definition, a l l of the areas claimed by the coastal states in the Yellow and East China seas qualify as continental shelf areas, thus necessitating the application of c r i t e r i a regarding delimitation of conti-nental shelf claims. In Article 6 of the convention, the provisions regarding delimitation between adjacent coastal states stipulate that the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is ju s t i f i e d by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the t e r r i -t o r i a l sea of each State is measured. i 8° Even though Japan did not sign the Convention on the Continental Shelf, i t s t i l l adhered to the equidistant principle as the legal basis upon which i t established i t s continental shelf claim. Taiwan, on the other hand, signed the 1958 Convention on October 14, 1970 with two major reservations. Specifically, i t "reserved the right to rely on the theory of natural prolon-18' gation of land territory and to disregard isolated small islands and rocks." Thus, i t le f t the way open for acceptance of the natural prolongation concept which is the second legal principle. A legal precedent cited by both Taiwan and the PRC as the basis for their continental shelf claims (which are essentially identical) was the ruling by the International Court of Justice in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. In this ruling, i t was decided that "delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of a l l the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party a l l those parts of the continental shelf that consti-106 tute a natural prolongation of i t s land territory into and under  the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other. '. '. . "188 In applying the natural prolongation of land territory principle, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and PRC argue that the Okinawa Trough marks the outer limit of their continental land mass, effectively cutting off Japan's claims to the continental shelf beyond the Trough. On the other hand, the equidistant principle would allow for Japan's extended claim to the conti-nental shelf west of the Trough. . The final party to the continental shelf dispute, South Korea, takes a 189 position "which is a hybrid of both the Chinese and the Japanese approach." In their dispute with China, the South Koreans rely on the equidistant principle since, given the seabed topography of the Yellow Sea, application of the natural prolongation principle would be to the advantage of the 190 Chinese. However, in its dispute with Japan, South Korea adheres to some aspects of the natural prolongation of land territory principle i n s i s t -ing, "that the presence of the /Okinawa./ Trough constitutes 'special circum-191 stances' under which the median-line principle cannot be applied." As discussed above, various legal principles for the delimitation of the continental shelf have been referred to by the coastal states bordering the Yellow and East China seas to justify their claims. It is extremely d i f f i -cult to judge which of these claims is the most valid since the legal principles regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf have been open to interpretation based on a combination of geography and an equitable , . 192 solution. In summary, the disputes over island jurisdiction and continental shelf delimitation in the East and South China seas are interrelated. China's interests in these areas have been based on i t s desire for access to seabed 107 o i l and other resources and on the s t r a t e g i c importance of the area f o r navigation and shipping. The basis of China's claims to j u r i s d i c t i o n i n the East China Sea has been twofold F i r s t , China claims the Senkaku Islands and t h e i r surrounding t e r r i t o r i a l sea and economic zone. (This claim i s strongly contested by the Japanese as i s China's claim in the South China Sea by Vietnam.) Secondly, China has also attempted to extend i t s j u r i s -d i c t i o n in the East China Sea through a claim to the continental s h e l f . According to the Chinese, the s h e l f i n t h i s area i s a natural prolongation of the Chinese continental land mass while the continental s h e l f o f f Japan ends at the Okinawa Trough. In order to extend i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n the South China Sea, China has claimed sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly i s l a n d groups based on h i s t o r i c a l discovery and use. This claim could p o s s i b l y give China access to a t e r r i t o r i a l sea and an economic zone around the i s l a n d s . Due to the depth of the South China Sea, China cannot r e l y on a continental s h e l f claim as a basis f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n over resources i n t h i s area. Therefore, whereas the i n t e r n a t i o n a l acceptance of China's claim to the Senkakus i s important, without the islands China s t i l l has a claim, although weaker, to areas of the East China Sea. However, in the South China Sea, China's p o s i t i o n rests e n t i r e l y on i t s claim to j u r i s d i c -t i o n over the i s l a n d s . F i n a l l y , i n the area of the Yellow Sea, the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l dispute rests e n t i r e l y on the d e l i m i t a t i o n of the continental s h e l f . The f i n a l issue over which China has come into c o n f l i c t with i t s neighbors i s j u r i s d i c t i o n over f i s h e r y stocks. Unlike the controversies discussed above, t h i s c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s was dealt with through a series of f i s h e r i e s agreements. While most of these negotiations and agreements have been with Japan, China also signed a f i s h e r y agreement with North Vietnam 108 in 1957 and one with North Korea in 1959. L i t t l e is known about the details 193 of these latter two agreements since the texts were not made public. The PRC's involvement in fishery regulations and disputes began soon after the communists came to power in 1949. For both security and conser-vation reasons, in December 1950, the Chinese established a zone stretching from the Sino-Korean border in the north to Chekiang Province in the south 194 "in which fishing by trawlers, Chinese or foreign, /wasj7 prohibited." In breadth, this zone extended beyond the twelve nautical miles which China 195 later (1958) declared to be the seaward limit of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l sea. Also in December, the Chinese seized five Japanese fishing boats in the East China Sea for fishing within the area China considered to be i t s fishing 196 zone. The seizures of Japanese fishing vessels off the coast of China continued for several years. Since the Japanese government did not have formal diplomatic ties with the PRC at the time, i t could only respond with informal protests. In order to deal with the situation, a group of Japanese fishermen's organizations began to band together in September 1952. By November 1954, they had gained enough support to form the "Japan-China Fishery Association of Japan, a private endeavor devoted to the promotion of 197 peaceful fishery relations with China." Negotiations between the Japan-China Fishery Association and the China Fishery Association took place in Peking in January 1955. By April 15, the two groups had reached an agreement on fishing in the Yellow and East China 198 seas. Under this nongovernmental agreement, the Japanese agreed to restrict their fishing in the area with regard to season, fishing gear, and the size of their fleet. They also stated that their fishing boats would comply with the regulations /set forth by China in 1950/ so long as they were aplicable /"sic/ to a l l boats 109 regardless of nationalisty /"sicj and not confined to Japanese fishing boats.199 In exchange, the Chinese agreed not to seize Japanese fishing boats in the area. This agreement was extended twice until June 1958 when the Chinese refused to extend i t further. The Chinese refusal resulted from a general deterioration of relations between China and Japan and what China considered 201 to be repeated Japanese violations of the treaty. After 1958, the Chinese again began to seize Japanese vessels violating the zone established in the 1950 declaration and the 1955 agreement. A second agreement was f i n a l l y concluded between the two nongovernmental fisheries organizations in November 1963. In this agreement the Chinese designated one zone in which fishing would only be allowed with Chinese permission, two zones as military areas which Japanese fishing vessels were forbidden to enter, and a fourth conservation zone in which a l l motorboat 202 trawler fishing (Chinese and Japanese) would be prohibited. The Japanese fishery association, in turn, agreed to respect the zones and regulations 203 formulated by the Chinese. Further restrictions on Japanese fishing in Chinese coastal waters were incorporated in a third fisheries agreement in 204 1965. A further revision of the agreement in 1970 restricted Japanese seining in the western half of the East China and Yellow seas and added 205 certain restrictions on the vessels of both states. The 1970 version of the agreement was later extended seven times until December 1975 when a 206 formal bilateral fishery agreement came into force. The negotiations leading up to the formal agreement began soon after relations between China and Japan were normalized in 1972. Throughout these discussions, the Japanese voiced their opposition to several of the restrictions found in the earlier nongovernmental agreements such as Japanese 110 recognition of China's military and conservation zones and certain horsepower restrictions on Japanese trawlers. However, when major differences had f i n a l l y been accommodated in the form of a compromise, the new agreement turned out to be simply another version of the old, slightly modified in form but generally more restrictive of Japanese interests.207 At the f i r s t meeting of the Japan-People's Republic of China Fisheries Committee in June 1976, the Chinese pointed out that over ten violations of the 1975 treaty had occurred during the six months between the signing and implementa-tion of the treaty and that a Japanese fishing vessel had again violated 208 China's t e r r i t o r i a l waters after the treaty had taken effect. Thus, even though agreements regulating fishing in the area have been signed and most of the problems worked out, there are s t i l l some disagreements over fisheries jurisdiction. From the discussion of China's maritime characteristics and regional maritime disputes a general image of China's orientation towards ocean-issues can be formulated. First, China is a coastal state with a long shoreline. It possesses a wide continental shelf, the waters and seabed of which are rich in living and non-living resources. These resources are of great importance to the Chinese as evidenced by their increasing efforts in the development of coastal fishing fleets, the enhancement of fish catches, the emphasis being placed on offshore o i l exploration, and the disputes which have arisen over fishing and o i l rights. Based on these characteristics,one would expect China to be interested in the creation of large coastal zones over which the coastal state would have exclusive jurisdiction and in the international acceptance of a definition of a state's continental shelf which would secure China's claim to shelf resources. Secondly, while China is not yet a major maritime shipping state, the Chinese are concerned with increasing their sea trading capacity. This is shown in the increase in the size of China's merchant fleet, in i t s port development programs, and in the increasing amount of Chinese seaborne trade Thus, the Chinese would appear to have a stake in the maintenance of an international ocean regime which would uphold unimpeded transit of merchant vessels. From the discussion of the coastal nature of China's navy and in light of China's foreign policy objective of protecting i t s coastal borders, i t is also apparent that the Chinese would not favor the same unimpeded transit for military vessels. In essence, China's concern with the freedom of navigation currently focuses on i t s commercial rather than military implications. Thirdly, China is not among the group of states which is advanced either in terms of the technical knowledge necessary for deep seabed exploi-tation or in terms of general maritime expertise. While there does not appear to be much effort under way within China to develop the specific s k i l l needed for deep seabed exploitation, the Chinese are attempting to expand, as fast as possible, their general knowledge of oceanography. Hence they could benefit greatly from any international exchanges of technological and/ or sc i e n t i f i c information or equipment. Finally, the examination of China's regional maritime disputes brought out several points regarding China's maritime interests. The persistent and at times violent disputes over virtually barren islands in the South China Sea point out the immediate importance of the area to China and other states with regard to navigation. The Chinese are particularly concerned with the strategic significance of the South China Sea area for protecting i t s coast from the Soviet and American navies. In addition, states in the region of the South and East China seas, including China, are interested in the long range prospects of gaining control over seabed o i l . Thus, the numerous disputes demonstrate the importance the Chinese attach to gaining control 112 over navigation and offshore resources. From statements regarding these disputes, i t is also clear that the Chinese support the idea that relatively small islands should be entitled to their own t e r r i t o r i a l seas and economic zones. Finally, as a result of the dispute over resources in the East China Sea, the Chinese enunciated their definition of the continental shelf as the natural prolongation of the continental land mass. In summary, the examination of China's maritime characteristics and i t s regional maritime disputes has led to a general impression of China as a state which is keenly interested in maritime issues. China is slowly but steadily developing i t s own maritime capabilities in the areas of coastal fishing, commercial shipping, and s c i e n t i f i c research. It also appears that the Chinese are interested in the expansion of coastal state jurisdiction relating to both coastal waters and the continental shelf. In this and the previous chapter, two sets of variables have been considered which establish the general context in which China's LOS policies wi l l be analyzed. Before proceeding to a discussion of UNCLOS III and the analysis of China's policies, i t is useful to look back on the variables already discussed to see how they combine to form the basis of the analysis. First, the policies of any state on any foreign policy issue reflect, to some extent, the broad foreign policy goals of that state. Through an examination of China's foreign policies from 1949 through 1977, eight general foreign policy goals were identified. These eight general objectives formed the broadest set of variables which the Chinese were likely to take into consideration in the formulation of their LOS policies. Secondly, China's orientation towards a specific foreign policy issue-area is influenced not only by i t s general orientation towards a l l foreign policy issues (i.e., i t s goals), but also by factors specific to that issue. Therefore, four categories of variables relating specifically to China's maritime characteristics were discussed. These established a more issue specific context which is also necessary for an analysis of China's LOS policies. Finally, China's regional maritime disputes were discussed in order to point out how China's regional maritime concerns may have had an influence on i t s general LOS policies. In conclusion, part I has focused on an elaboration of two sets of variables, China's foreign policy objectives and i t s maritime characteris-tics and regional maritime disputes, which can be used to analyze China's LOS policies. This analysis, preceded by a detailed discussion of China's LOS policies as well as those of other states, w i l l be the focus of part I PART I I CHINA'S LOS POLICIES: DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 115 CHAPTER 4 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND THE DEEP SEABED Since i t s f i r s t substantive session in 1974, numerous issues relating to the use of the oceans have been discussed at UNCLOS III. These discussions have centered around the proposals of various states on the issues and have resulted in the preparation of a series of LOS texts. In part II, the state proposals on the main LOS issues w i l l be presented in order to show the direction in which the negotiations have proceeded. In addition, China's policies on the various issues w i l l be discussed specifically with regard to how they related to the proposals of other states and to the main positions of the various negotiating blocs. Finally, China's LOS policies w i l l be analyzed in terms of the degree to which they reflected the impact of China's maritime characteristics and foreign policy objectives. Due to the large number of issues discussed at UNCLOS III, part II is divided into two chapters. Chapter 4 w i l l focus on a discussion of the UNCLOS III negotiations which related to conference procedures and to the seabed beyond national jurisdiction which was the subject of Committee I delibera-tions. In chapter 5, the issues discussed in Committees II and III relating primarily to coastal resource jurisdiction and navigation w i l l be considered. As mentioned above, groups of states organized into more or less cohesive negotiating blocs played an important role in the UNCLOS III negotia-tions. Therefore, before beginning the substantive discussion of these negotiations, the composition of these groups w i l l be examined. In general, 116 while the delegates at UNCLOS III expressed their opinions as representatives of individual states, they often also reflected the general policy goals of a larger coalition of states. The majority of these blocs were organized on the basis of geographic (regional) location, shared special interests, or a common economic background. The allocation of o f f i c i a l committee posts at UNCLOS III as well as representation on conference committees (e.g., the Credentials and Drafting committees) were on the basis of regional state groupings. These groupings included the Latin American Group (28 countries), the African Group (47 countries), The Asian Group (41 countries), the Eastern European Group (11 countries), and the Western European and Others Group (27 countries including the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). 1 After the election of conference o f f i c i a l s , a l l of these groups, with the exception of the Western 2 European and Others Group, continued to function as loose negotiating units. Membership in blocs based on special interests and economic background was not exclusive and tended to overlap. Blocs based on shared special interests included: (1) strait states with a common interest in navigation through straits; (2) coastal states concerned with preserving and expanding their offshore jurisdiction; (3) long-distance fishing states who wanted to preserve their existing rights in waters off the shores of other countries; (4) landlocked (LL) and geographically disadvantaged states (GDS) concerned with preserving their access to the sea and receiving an equitable share of the benefits from offshore resources; (5) archipelagic states concerned with maximizing their jurisdiction over waters between their islands; (6) mari-time states, industrially developed states with extensive interests in maritime shipping; and (7) developed states with an interest in the exploitation of seabed resources. •117 F i n a l l y , one o f the major n e g o t i a t i n g b l o c s throughout the c o n f e r e n c e was the "Group o f 77" d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s . T h i s " c o a l i t i o n /was_7based on an 3 assumed commonality o f i n t e r e s t s o f a l l 'have-nots' a g a i n s t a l l 'haves.'" I t s membership, which a c t u a l l y t o t a l l e d 103 s t a t e s at the 1974 Car a c a s s e s s i o n , was comprised o f s t a t e s from the L a t i n American, A f r i c a n , and A s i a n r e g i o n a l groups. I t a l s o i n c l u d e d s t a t e s r e p r e s e n t i n g a l l o f the s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t b l o c s w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l l y d e v e l o p e d m a r i t i m e s t a t e s . Rules o f Pro c e d u r e The f i r s t s e s s i o n o f UNCLOS I I I was convened i n New York from December 3 t o December 15, 1973. D u r i n g t h i s s e s s i o n , t h e e l e c t i o n o f o f f i c i a l s as w e l l as the a d o p t i o n o f t h e r u l e s o f p r o c e d u r e f o r t h e c o n f e r e n c e were t o be completed. However, t h e d i s c u s s i o n s became drawn out due t o l e n g t h y debates on b o t h t h e e l e c t o r a l and p r o c e d u r a l i s s u e s r e s u l t i n g i n t h e s e d e l i b e r a t i o n s b e i n g c a r r i e d o v e r i n t o the second s e s s i o n . The major i s s u e s which l e d t o the p r o t r a c t e d d i s c u s s i o n s were t h e number o f o f f i c i a l p o s t s which each s t a t e would be a l l o w e d t o h o l d and t h e system o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g f o r the c o n f e r e n c e , i n c l u d i n g whether d e c i s i o n s s h o u l d be made on the b a s i s o f a consensus o r by v o t i n g and, i f v o t i n g were used, what ty p e o f m a j o r i t y would be needed t o adopt p r o p o s a l s . D u r i n g the f i r s t f o u r days o f t h e f i r s t s e s s i o n , H a m i l t o n S h i r l e y Amerasinghe, P r e s i d e n t o f the C o n f e r e n c e , conducted a s e r i e s o f c o n s u l t a -t i o n s w i t h the chairmen o f t h e f i v e r e g i o n a l groups and the US r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . These c o n s u l t a t i o n s c o v e r e d the s t r u c t u r e and o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e as w e l l as t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f i t s major committees. From these d i s c u s s i o n s , i t was 118 tentatively agreed that the General Committee would consist of 48 members: 12 each from the African and Asian groups, 9 from the Latin American countries, 9 from the Western European and others group and 6 from the Eastern European group . . . It /was also/ tentatively agreed that the Drafting Committee would consist of 23 members comprising 6 each from the African group and Asian groups, 4 from the Latin American group, 5 from the Western European and others group, and 2 from the Eastern European group.4 The General Committee was to be responsible for coordinating conference proceedings and reviewing the progress of the conference. 5 The function of the Drafting Committee was to give advice on and to "co-ordinate and refine the drafting of a l l texts referred to i t , without altering their substance."^ A third conference committee, the Credentials Committee, which was to have nine members was also established during the f i r s t session. Its duties were to examine the credentials of a l l delegates and to report to the conference 7 on their acceptability. Detailed provisions regarding the o f f i c i a l s of the three main commit-tees of the conference were also firmly agreed upon at these early meetings. The Chairmen of Committees I, II, and III would be elected from the African, Latin American, and Eastern European groups respectively. In addition, each of the three committees would have three vice-chairmen and a rapporteur, thus ensuring that each regional group would have one representative among the leadership of each main committee. Finally, in order that a representative of each regional group would hold one important conference office, the chair-manship of the Drafting Committee was delegated to the Western European and 8 Others group while the president of the conference was from the Asian group. (The positions of chairmen of the main committees were considered of equal stature with the latter two positions.) The major point of contention regarding the election of individuals to f i l l the various conference posts was whether or not "one country would occupy 9 more than one of the seats or posts allocated to the group." The Chairman of the Latin American group was the f i r s t delegate to bring up this issue in stating that her group had adopted the position that no individual country should hold more than one post. 1 0 This position was supported by many of the delegates within the African and Asian groups. The Chinese delegate, Ling Ching, was especially adamant in his support for this view. He formally proposed that a decision should be made by the conference in plenary sessions on the principle of one State, one seat, . . . a position which his delegation endorsed in view of i t s long-standing conviction that a l l countries, large or small, should have equal rights and ^ that no country, however powerful, should enjoy a privileged position. 12 China's proposal was strongly supported by the Albanian delegation. Among the states taking a different view from the one expressed above were those of the Western European and Others group including the US and members of the Eastern European group. Unlike China, most of these states f e l t that the issue should be settled within the regional groups and not in plenary sessions. That i s , since the issue centered specifically on the number of candidates and whom the regional groups nominated to f i l l the seats allocated to them on the Drafting and General Committees, these states f e l t that the problems regarding the nominations should be handled within the 13 groups. If one group decided to nominate more candidates than i t s allow-able number of seats on the committees then a l l members of the conference should be free to vote on the candidates. A third side to this issue was expressed by the Australian delegate when he said he welcomed the decision by the Latin American group that no country should hold more than one office. . . . But there was a need for realism: the great Powers expected to have seats in both the General Committee and the Drafting Committee.14 The US elaborated on this by pointing out that " i t was v i t a l to ensure that the views which had to be accommodated in the negotiating process were adequately represented /and to7 that end there must be some deviation from 1 2 0 the principle of one seat for each State." ^ After consultations with several delegates, the President of the Conference suggested a formula to settle this impasse. This formula, which was later accepted by the conference without a vote, stated that "'no State shall as_ a. right be represented on more than one main organ of the 16 Conference.'" Later, on the same day, the election of conference officers took place. In these elections, representatives of the US and USSR were elected to serve both as Vice-Presidents of the • Conference as well as 17 members of the Drafting Committee. In response to the election of the USSR to i t s second post, China stated i t s reservations regarding the election as well as i t s reservation to "similar actions in respect of the other 18 Committees." During the elections, China was selected as one of the thirty-one Vice-Presidents of the Conference (one of the eight allocated to the 19 Asian group) and was appointed a member of the Credentials Committee. Following the elections, the discussions focused on the adoption of rules of procedure for the conference. The discussions on voting procedures led to the f i r s t major controversy of the conference. According to Edward Miles, the general significance of this confrontation is explained by the fact that the players without significant marine-related capabilities have a potentially overwhelming coalition, consequently the players with significant marine capabilities precipitated a fight over the method of decision making to be employed by the conference.20 Due to the importance of this issue for a l l states, these discussions were not concluded during the f i r s t session. As a result, informal negotiations continued throughout the interim between the f i r s t and second sessions. The issue was f i n a l l y settled in informal negotiations during the f i r s t week of the second session (June 20-August 29, 1974) . The specific issues regarding decision-making under contention were the method of decision-making (i.e., by consensus or by majority vote) and 121 the type of majority needed i f a vote were taken. During the 1973 session, the Soviet delegate stated that "there was a great danger of the imposition of majority views on the Conference and that i t was impossible to solve 21 international problems in this way." Therefore, he proposed that a l l decisions be made on the basis of a consensus. In addition, i f a vote were necessary (i.e., a consensus simply could not be reached), the voting majorities should come as close as possible to consensus. The US proposal late in the session focused on decision-making by voting with the required majority for issues of substance being two-thirds of a l l states participating in the conference (not only of those present and voting). On a l l the other issues, the US proposed that voting be by a simple majority. The Group of 77 adamantly opposed both the US and the USSR proposals stating that a l l voting 22 should be by simple majority. Under this type of system, the developing states would constitute a majority bloc of votes. The Chinese were highly c r i t i c a l of the Soviet proposal favoring a consensus system and stated that i t was merely "an attempt to maintain the 23 veto power of soviet /~sic7 social-imperialists." The Chinese supported the Group of 77 in calling for the conference voting rules to be based on a 24 simple'majority vote with no special privileges being given to any state. At the conclusion of the f i r s t session, the Chinese blamed "the unreasonable conduct of the superpowers" for the delay in adopting the conference rules of procedure.^ A compromise was f i n a l l y reached on an outline for voting procedures during the f i r s t week of the second session. This compromise, based on a paper prepared by the President of the Conference, provided for a "cooling-off" period before a vote on an issue of substance, given the existence of certain specified conditions. If, after this period, a consensus s t i l l had not been reached, a vote would be taken. The document, however, s t i l l left 122 2 6 open the question of the size of the majority needed to pass a vote. On the issue of majorities, the proposals either favored a majority calculated on the basis of those present and voting or, as mentioned above in the US proposal, on the basis of the total number of conference participants. The compromise on this issue was based on a proposal suggested by Australia and supported by Canada. In general, votes on substantive issues would be on the basis of a majority of two-thirds of those present and voting as long 21 as this included a simple majority of a l l conference participants. However, the question of the majority needed for the adoption of a final treaty, was s t i l l undecided. This issue was f i n a l l y settled on June 27, 1974, the day on which a vote would have been taken i f no agreement on the rules of procedure had been reached. It was decided that the same two-thirds majority rule used for issues of substance would be applied to a vote on the final convention. On the other hand, the ten day deferment or "cooling-off" period for issues of substance would not apply to the adoption of a fi n a l treaty. However, at least four working days would have to lapse after the 2 8 adoption of the last Article before a final vote could be taken. In general, the rules of procedure adopted for use at UNCLOS III called for a complex and time-consuming method of decision-making. According to Miles, these rules were 'convention breaking' because they constituted a repudiation of the normal General Assembly Rules of Procedure by most of the permanent members of the Security Council. As such, the rules of /UNCLOS I I l 7 have become precedents for any future international conference in which similar incompatibilities between substantive capabilities and coalition size obtain.29 China's policies on the contentious procedural issues appeared to be influenced by both i t s maritime characteristics and i t s foreign policy objectives. When considered in conjunction with the large number of states represented at UNCLOS III, China's position as a developing state in terms 123 of many of i t s maritime and economic characteristics probably had the most significant impact on i t s position regarding procedural issues. As a con-sequence of i t s status as a developing state, China's interests were similar to those of many of the members of the largest negotiating bloc at UNCLOS III. Since the bloc of developing states constituted more than half of the conference delegates, i t is clear that the members of this bloc and states associated with i t including China, would support a voting system based on a simple majority. Under this scheme, this group could wield more power than under a consensus system in which their large number would not be sufficient to pass a motion. In essence, China was not a major maritime power and, as a result, would not benefit from any procedural system which would be advantageous to the developed maritime states. Therefore, i t supported the system most beneficial to the developing group and i t s own interests. Secondly, several of China's foreign policy objectives also appeared to influence i t s policies at the 1973 session. By speaking out forcefully on the procedural issues, the Chinese appeared to be attempting to enhance their standing among Third World states. This was evident in China's state-ments on both the voting issue and the election of o f f i c i a l s in which the Chinese supported the Third World position. For example, in the latter instance, Ling Ching adamantly supported the position proposed by the chairman of the Latin American group and supported by delegates from both the Asian and African groups. China's position on the election of o f f i c i a l s reflected i t s concern that a l l states be treated as sovereign equals at the conference and correspondingly that the influence of the superpowers be curtailed. Given their adherence to the idea that a l l sovereign states are equal, the Chinese condemned the election of an individual state to more than one major committee 124 post since this would imply that some states were "more deserving" of conference posts than others. The Chinese supported a system under which each state had an equal opportunity to be elected to a post and no state would be allowed to hold more than one major post. Thus, China's early statements on the rules of procedure reflected i t s intention to actively participate in the establishment of a new international legal order. In this instance, China's focus was on the establishment of rules of procedure under which a l l states would be considered as equal with no additional powers being given to states with greater capabilities in the area or those with the most to lose or gain. Committee I  The Seabed Beyond National Jurisdiction Prior to the f i r s t session of UNCLOS III in 1973, each of the three subcommittees of the Seabed Committee was instructed to draw up a text summarizing the major issues and positions relevant to i t s area of concern. The document submitted by the working group of Subcommittee I consisted of 115 pages of alternative texts covering the "areas of agreement and disagree-ment on the status, scope, and basic provisions of the international regime, and the status and scope, functions, and powers of the international 30 machinery." From this report, which formed the basis of the early seabed discussions at UNCLOS III, three issues emerged as problematic, yet whose successful resolution was crucial to a f i n a l Law of the Sea agreement. These issues were the nature of the resource exploration and exploitation system, the functions and powers of the international organization, referred to in the working group texts as the Authority, and the nature of the decision-making process.31 The positions taken by various states on the question of the nature of the system of exploration and exploitation directly related to their .125 e a r l i e r positions on whether or not the seabed beyond national j u r i s d i c t i o n should be considered the common heritage of mankind as proposed by Pardo i n 1967. In general, those states which favored Pardo's proposal l a t e r supported a strong International Authority which would regulate seabed ex-p l o i t a t i o n f or the benefit of a l l states. Between 1968 and 1970, the discussions i n the ad hoc SBC on the common heritage p r i n c i p l e tended to r e f l e c t the general p o l a r i z a t i o n between the developed and developing states. Opposition to the p r i n c i p l e was strongly expressed by the Soviet Union while 32 Kenya, Malta, and Tanzania expressed the greatest support. A f t e r prolonged discussions, several o f the developed states began to soften t h e i r opposition to the p r i n c i p l e . Thus the Soviet Union and i t s a l l i e s , along with I t a l y , Belgium, and Malaysia /continued to oppose^ i t s i n c l u s i o n as a p r i n c i p l e , but not n e c e s s a r i l y as a guideline. The United States did not accept the common heritage as a p r i n c i p l e , but did not oppose i t e i t h e r , and other key developed states l i k e B r i t a i n and Canada also came around to a non-opposition stance. . . . f l j t was obvious by the end of the 1970 sessions that t h i s issue was nearly s e t t l e d , and that the major d i f f i c u l t i e s lay in the more de t a i l e d disputes over how the common heritage should be put into operation.33 China did not j o i n the SBC u n t i l December of 1971 and, as a r e s u l t , did not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the early discussions on the p r i n c i p l e of common heritage. However, China's representative, An Chih-yuan, expressed China's strong support f o r t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n h i s f i r s t speech before the committee i n March 1972. He stated that China "maintain/ed7 that the seas and oceans as well as t h e i r submarine resources beyond the l i m i t s of t e r r i t o r i a l seas and national j u r i s d i c t i o n are i n p r i n c i p l e commonly owned by a l l the peoples of 34 the world." This p o s i t i o n was also emphasized by another Chinese repre-sentative to the SBC, Hsia Pu, i n Ju l y 1972 and March 1973, and i n the "Working Paper on General P r i n c i p l e s f o r the International Sea Area" 35 sumbitted by China on August 2, 1973. .126 Based on i t s support for the principle that the seabed beyond national jurisdiction i s the common heritage of mankind, China supported the concept of a strong international authority during the negotiations on the nature of the system of exploration and exploitation. Specifically, Hsia Pu stated that the machinery should be empowered to manage sci e n t i f i c research, exploration and exploitation of international sea-bed resources . . . fandj should be empowered to engage in direct exploitation of resources. . . . Its functions should not be limited to handling matters of registration, license-issuing and co-ordina-tion of matters pertaining to the seabed.36 China's position on the system of exploration and exploitation was similar to that formally proposed by Tanzania on July 20, 1971. Tanzania had proposed a system in which the Seabed Authority would have the authority both to license states who wished to mine the seabed and to carry out exploitation of the seabed on i t s own. In addition, Tanzania also advocated that the Authority have control over the pricing and marketing of seabed 37 minerals. (This latter position was also supported by China and wi l l be discussed in more detail later.) In terms of the general debate on the system of exploration and exploitation, the Tanzanian proposal as well as China's position tended to f a l l near the middle of the spectrum of proposals which ranged from a registry system to a system where exploitation would be the sole prerogative of the Authority. The registry system proposed by France called for an international authority with only minimal power whose "main function . . . would be to allocate blocks of seabed to states /thus maintaining/ . . . 38 maximum freedom for states." Similarly, the proposal by Poland called for a system where "the machinery would . . . start with simple registry and coordinating functions and work i t s way up to some form of weak super-visory and licensing agency."^ The proposals by Britain, the US, and Japan called for "a weak 40 licensing type of international regime and machinery." This type of system was similar to that proposed by Poland for the later stages in the Authority's development. The Soviet Union's proposal while vague also im-plied the creation of "a relatively weak international regime and machinery 41 that would leave considerable i n i t i a t i v e in the hands of states." A third system was suggested in the proposals of Malta, Canada, and a group of seven landlocked and shelf-locked states. In general, these proposals suggested a mixed system with the International Authority acting 42 as both a licensing agency and at some stage as an operating agency. The Tanzanian proposal as well as China's stated position f i t into this category. Finally, on the other extreme of the spectrum from the pure registry system of France was the system proposed by thirteen Latin American states on August 10, 1971. These states argued that a l l exploitation and explora-tion as well as a l l activities regarding production, processing, and marketing of seabed minerals and sci e n t i f i c research on the seabed should be regulated by the International Authority. Thus, they rejected the idea of licensing as incompatible with the common heritage, and wished to restrict the role of states in exploitation to that of service contractor to, or joint venture partner with, the authority.43 The debate in Subcommittee I continued to center around these proposals throughout 1972 and 1973 without any significant progress being made towards a compromise solution. As noted by Barry Buzan, the dominant question here was a licensing versus an operating authority, and the respective underlying viewpoints were desire for secure access to seabed minerals versus fear of looting of the common heritage to the benefit of the developed states.44 128 In order to inject new momentum into the negotiations, a group of developed states suggested that the delegates consider the conditions of exploitation which could be operable under any form of operating system be i t a licensing or a totally Authority controlled system. Throughout 1973, the discussion of conditions such as the rights and duties of operators and the Authority regarding fees, work requirements and operating standards, increased in the SBC meetings. However, "'conditions of exploitation' . . . did not fu l l y replace 'licensing versus operating' as the core of the debate on the nature of the operating system until the Caracas session . . . in 45 the summer of 1974." A second major issue at the SBC meetings was the question of the scope of the functions and powers of the International Authority. A specific issue of concern was whether the Authority should have the power to regulate the production and prices of seabed minerals to protect land-based producers of these minerals. As mentioned above, Tanzania advocated that the Authority have control over the pricing and marketing of seabed minerals. In addition, the proposals by the group of thirteen Latin American states, Malta, the seven landlocked and shelf-locked states, and those of two developed states, Canada and Japan, also called for the Authority to exercise varying degrees of production and pricing controls to minimize 46 possible adverse economic effects on developing countries. In general, the basic conflict here was between the fears of the developed states that such controls would render nodule mining econom-ic a l l y , unattractive and the fears of the developing countries that without such controls exploitation of the common heritage could turn into a curse rather than a blessing by undercutting the metal exports of some of their number.^ Due partially to the fact that l i t t l e precise'.information existed regarding the probable effects of nodule mining on world supplies and prices and to 129 the strong positions of both the developed and developing countries, l i t t l e progress was made on this issue. As with other crucial questions, a l l sides were more concerned with protecting their own interests and presenting their positions than in attempting to reach compromises. The third major seabed issue, the process of decision-making,was closely-related to the problem of the distribution of power within the Authority. In terms of the structure of the Authority, a l l sides agreed that there should be an Assembly made up of a l l parties to the LOS Convention as well as a Council of a limited size. Debate arose, however, over which of the two bodies should exercise the power of in i t i a t i v e and thus be the dominant branch. This debate was the result of the attempt of the developed states to protect themselves as a minority by giving power to the council in their proposals, and out of the parallel attempt of the developing countries to pro-tect themselves from the technological advantage of the developed states by giving power to the assembly, which they could control through their votes.48 In addition, the developing states wanted a l l decisions of the Authority to be made on the basis of either a simple or a two-thirds majority in the Assembly. The developed states, on the other hand, saw this provision as a 49 threat to their own interests. On the issue of the structure of the Authority, as on those discussed above, China sided with the developing states in i t s support for an Inter-national Seabed Authority (ISA) in which "a greater proportion of seats should be given to the developing countries in order to reflect those countries' positive role in international a f f a i r s . " ^ The Chinese represen-tative also stressed that care should be taken in the distribution of seats on the Council as well as in i t s mode of operation to ensure that " i t could not be dictated to by either super-Power."^ 130 In addition to the three major issues discussed above, two other issues of importance were raised in Subcommittee I. These were the extent of seabed resource exploitation which would be allowed in the interim before a treaty was signed and the military use of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. In December 1969, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution which called for a moratorium on seabed claims and exploitation. Specifi-cally the resolution declared that, pending the establishment of the international regime, (a) States and persons, physical or j u r i d i c a l , are bound to refrain from a l l activities of exploi-tation of the resources of the area of the seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (b) No claim to any part of that area or i t s resources shall be recognized.^2 The main impetus behind this resolution was an attempt by several developing states to restrict seabed mineral exploitation by a few of the developed states. In essence, " i t was a way of buying time in which to negotiate before the whole negotiating process was overtaken by a f a i t 53 accompli." This was reflected in the vote on the resolution where a l l but two (Sweden and Finland) of the sixty-two votes in favor of the resolution were cast by developing states, where a l l but one (Ghana) of the twenty-eight opposed were developed states, and where twenty-four of the twenty-eight abstentions were cast by developing states who opposed the more radical position of the Latin American states and some of the other 54 developing states. Between 1969 and 1971, US companies had made a great deal of progress in the development of the technology needed for deep seabed exploitation. As a result, in November 1971 Senator Lee Metcalf introduced the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources B i l l which would have paved the way for the 131 e x p l o i t a t i o n of the deep seabed by American c o m p a n i e s . E v e n though the US executive did not take a s p e c i f i c stand on the proposed b i l l , i t s presence before the US Congress led to mounting concern among the developing states at the SBC meetings. In response, t h i r t e e n developing countries including China presented a draft r e s o l u t i o n to the SBC i n March 1972. This proposal which was supported by many of the countries i n the Group of 77 invoked the moratorium r e s o l u t i o n and the declaration of p r i n c i p l e s . . . /and reaffirmed/ that 'prior to the estab-lishment of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime, no claims on any part of the area or i t s resources, based on past, present or future a c t i v i t i e s , w i l l be recognized.'56 This statement along with the proposed US b i l l gave r i s e to lengthy discussions within the SBC. However, i n order to prevent i t s leading to a major disruption of the conference, neither side pressed the issue i n the 1972 sessions of the 57 General Assembly or the 1973 SBC meetings. In the 1973 SBC session, however, China's representative, Hsia Pu, r e i t e r a t e d China's p o s i t i o n on t h i s matter. He stated that "his delegation f e l t that pending the establishment of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l machinery, commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n of resources i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l sea-bed area should 5 8 cease." The Chinese continued to voice t h e i r support f o r a ha l t to seabed 59 e x p l o i t a t i o n throughout the Caracas and Geneva sessions of UNCLOS I I I . The issue of the m i l i t a r y use of the seabed was introduced by Pardo i n h i s 1967 statement to the UN General Assembly i n which he proposed that the seabed "be used 'exclusively f o r peaceful purposes' beyond the l i m i t s of national j u r i s d i c t i o n . " ^ During 1968, debate on t h i s issue i n the SBC tended to center on whether or not the SBC was even the proper forum f o r t h i s discussion or whether another UN committee should handle the issue of seabed arms c o n t r o l . Both the US and USSR wanted the issue r e f e r r e d to the Geneva 132 E i g h t e e n - N a t i o n Disarmament Committee (ENDC). T h i s move was s u p p o r t e d by t h e s uperpowers' t r a d i t i o n a l a l l i e s w h i l e t h e n o n a l i g n e d n a t i o n s s p l i t o v e r t h e i s s u e w i t h some s t a t e s p r e f e r r i n g t h e SBC as t h e forum f o r d i s c u s s i o n s . ^ 1 The i s s u e was f i n a l l y s e t t l e d i n June 1968 when th e US and S o v i e t U n i o n s p e c i f i c a l l y a s k ed t h e ENDC t o d e a l w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n t h e r e b y l a r g e l y 6 2 r emoving i t from t h e SBC's mandate. Between 1968 and 1971, p r o p o s a l s and c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s were made by t h e US and S o v i e t U n i o n on t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f seabed arms a t t h e ENDC m e e t i n g s . These d i s c u s s i o n s f i n a l l y r e s u l t e d i n t h e 1971 Sea-Bed T r e a t y w h i c h s p e c i f i c a l l y c a l l e d f o r t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f " n u c l e a r weapons and o t h e r weapons o f mass d e s t r u c t i o n /on t h e seabed/ beyond 12 / n a u t i c a l m i l e s j 7 o f f t h e c o a s t s . ' T h i s t r e a t y , however, d i d n o t p r o h i b i t t h e s e weapons i n t h e w a t e r s above t h e seabed. The r e s p o n s e t o t h i s t r e a t y w i t h i n t h e SBC i n c l u d i n g t h a t o f t h e C h i n e s e d e l e g a t i o n , was g e n e r a l l y p o s i t i v e . However, a t a SBC m e e t i n g i n March 1973, H s i a Pu went even f u r t h e r t h a n t h e t r e a t y p r o v i s i o n s i n s t a t i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l sea-bed a r e a s h o u l d be u s e d f o r p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s /and/ as a f i r s t s t e p towards t h a t end, t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f a l l n u c l e a r submarines and emplacement o f n u c l e a r and a l l o t h e r weapons i n t h e a r e a s h o u l d be p r o h i b i t e d . 6 4 C h i n e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c o n s i s t e n t l y v o i c e d t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o t h i s t y p e o f m i l i t a r y use o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l seabed a r e a a t f o l l o w i n g UNCLOS I I I 65 s e s s i o n s . On t h e r e l a t e d i s s u e o f t h e seabed t e s t i n g o f n u c l e a r weapons, th e C h i n e s e took a p o s i t i o n c o n t r a r y t o t h a t o f most d e v e l o p e d as w e l l as d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s . ^ Whereas t h e s e s t a t e s s u p p o r t e d t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f seabed t e s t i n g , t h e C h i n e s e s t a t e d t h a t t o a d v o c a t e t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o f n u c l e a r t e s t s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l sea-bed a r e a meant i n f a c t t o a l l o w t h e two super-Powers t o 133 maintain their monopoly of nuclear weapons, to control other countries, and completely to deprive the peace-loving countries of any freedom of action. /Therefore./, China could not accept that situation.°7 Even though delegates expressed a great deal of disagreement on the details of provisions for an international seabed regime during the SBC sessions, there was agreement on several basic principles. For example, i t was agreed that: (1) an area of the seabed exists over which no individual state should claim jurisdiction or special rights; (2) an international agency of some type should be established with at least some power over the seabed beyond national jurisdiction; and (3) a proportion of the revenue from seabed resource exploitation should be devoted to the needs of 68 developing countries. Hence at the f i r s t substantive session of UNCLOS III in 1974, Committee I was faced with a series of texts reflecting agreement on these few broad principles and disagreement on most of the major issues. By the start of the Caracas session of UNCLOS III in June of 1974, Committee I had most of the issues before i t delineated in a series of alternative texts. Therefore, after one week of general discussion under the chairmanship of Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon, the members of the committee decided to focus their attention on a few of the major issues of disagreement rather than specifically on the structure of the international machinery. To some extent, these issues reflected new areas of disagreement which had arisen out of the SBC debates. They included: (1) the exploitation system; (2) the conditions of exploitation (rules and regulations); and (3) 69 the economic implications of seabed development. During the negotiations regarding who should be allowed to explore and exploit the international seabed area, several approaches emerged which 13:4 followed along the same lines as the licensing versus operating regime debate during the SBC meetings. The approaches varied along a continuum advocating that a l l activities be carried out by a Contracting Party or (Parties) subject to Authority regulation on one extreme, to f u l l control by the 70 Authority over a l l exploration and exploitation on the other. A proposal by the Group of 77 conceded that the Authority would have to enter into legal arrangements with other groups to conduct activities in the area since the Authority lacked the technology necessary to exploit the resources on its own. These joint ventures, however, would only be allowed under the condition that the Authority maintain " 'direct and effective control at a l l times 71 over such ac t i v i t i e s . ' " The proposals of several developed states continued to favor exploration and exploitation by outside parties under the broad supervision of the Authority. Chai Shu-fan speaking for China set forth China's continuing support for the Group of 77's proposals regarding the nature of the exploitation system. He stated that an effective international re'gime should be worked out and appropriate international machinery established to manage and exploit /seabed/* resources. He firmly opposed any form of super-Power manipulation or monopoly and the exclusive control of arbitrary exploitation of international deep-sea resources by one or two super-Powers on the strength of their advanced technology.72 In a later meeting of Committee I, Ke Tsai-shuo reiterated the position that "the international machinery should be endowed with real powers, including the power of engaging directly in the exploration and exploitation of the 73 resources in the international sea-bed area." Debate at Caracas continued to s t a l l around the issue of who should be allowed to exploit the seabed u n t i l the f i r s t week of August when the US delegate, in a strongly worded speech, demanded that the committee 1.35" discuss the specific conditions of exploitation and that the Group of 77 74 stop avoiding the discussion of details. Even though this speech provoked time-consuming ideological debate between developed and developing countries, i t also shifted the focus of discussion to a possibly more productive area, the conditions of exploitation. The US, the Group of 77, Japan, and eight of the European Economic 7 Community members submitted drafts on the issue of conditions of exploitation. The Group of 77's draft text directly followed from their position on the issue of who may exploit. They stipulated that the Authority should have virtually complete discretion regarding resource exploitation, thereby remaining in direct control of a l l operations. This draft also emphasized the need to protect developing states who are landbased producers of minerals 76 found on the seabed. As on the issue of who may exploit, China supported 77 the Group of 77's proposal. The US proposal, as well as that of eight EEC members and Japan, contained detailed regulations for exploitation aimed at maximizing state access to seabed resources. In general, their approach was to define conditions, the fulfillment of which would automatically result in the allocation of speci-fied rights and duties to entities desiring to engage in exploitation. Such a system would place nearly a l l powers of i n i t i a t i v e in the hands of the exploiting entities (the advanced technology states and their companies) and leave the seabed authority a largely passive supervisory body.78 Specifically, the US proposal covered such topics as the size of mine sites, the duration of exploration and exploitation rights, and certification of financial and technical responsibility. The EEC members' proposal intro-duced the concept of national area quotas whereby an individual state could 79 only exploit a set proportion of the seabed area. Thus, at Caracas debate shifted from a consideration of the general form of the exploitation system to a more specific concern with the conditions or rules and regulations 136 under which the system would operate. The fi n a l major area of debate at Caracas in 1974 concerned the economic implications of seabed mining. As at the SBC meetings, the landbased producers of minerals which would be affected by seabed mining, who were supported by many developing countries, expressed the need for the Authority to have the power to i n i t i a t e price supports and production controls. On the other side, the US and other developed countries opposed such controls on the basis that i t was in the interest of a l l consuming nations to encourage seabed mining, that the probable adverse effects on landbased producers were questionable, and that any system of controls would i t s e l f 80 give rise to more problems. Some developing countries also supported 81 the need to protect consumers from a r t i f i c a l l y high prices. Due primarily to a lack of reliable data on the probable effects of seabed mining on land-based producers, neither side was able to gain the upper hand in these 82 discussions. Therefore, this debate continued throughout the session without any mutually acceptable solutions being reached. Committee I, in 1974, did not deal specifically with the draft articles concerning the structure, powers, and functions of the Seabed Authority; however, as has become evident above, many facets of these issues were indirectly considered in the discussions. As in the SBC draft texts, dele-gates continued to agree on the rudimentary structure of the Authority, including an Assembly, Council, and subsidiary organs. The creation of a separate structure to deal with the settlement of disputes was also generally * supported. Regarding the structure of the ISA, China's representative Ke Tsai-shuo "said that the principles of equality among big and small nations and of rational geographical representation should be observed. /In addition?, the developing countries . . . ought to have a greater weight in the inter-national machinery." With regard to decision-making procedures, i t was generally accepted that regulatory decisions would require approval by a substantial majority of parties, probably two-thirds. A major contentious issue continued to be the composition and voting procedure to be followed in the Council, primarily because the Council, as i t was conceived at the time, would serve as the executive body. In summary, the proposals made in Committee I during the Caracas session tended to f a l l into a limited number of competing positions. With regard to the system of exploitation, the alternatives tended to favor either a single (the Authority) or a multiple (the Authority in coordination with contracting parties) system approach. The proposals on conditions of exploration and exploitation favored either the detailed elaboration of rules and regulations in the Convention i t s e l f or the inclusion of general norms providing a framework within which the Authority would set regulations. Relatedly, the Authority's control could be limited to the mere administra-tion of legal arrangements or expanded to include direct control over a l l stages of seabed operations.^ Informal negotiating sessions rather than formal meetings characterized the second substantive session of UNCLOS III held in Geneva from March 26 through May 10, 1975. The overall result of this session was a series of draft texts prepared by the chairmen of each of the three main committees. These texts were combined to form the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT). Even though the ISNT reflected the authors' assessment of the state of negotiations rather than a consensus of delegate opinion, i t was to serve as the basis for future negotiations towards a comprehensive LOS treaty. The text was not presented to the delegates until the end of the Geneva 138 session and, as a r e s u l t , was not i t s e l f the focus of debate. However, i t did r e f l e c t the general trends i n the Geneva discussions. In a s s i s t i n g i n the drawing up of the negotiating text for Committee I, the Chairman of the Working Group, Christopher W..Pinto of S r i Lanka, submitted an i n i t i a l d r a f t to Committee Chairman Paul Engo. The d r a f t , l a t e r r e f e r r e d to as the Engo text, p r i m a r i l y r e f l e c t e d the views of the developing states. A f t e r submitting t h i s i n i t i a l d r a f t , Pinto continued negotiations with various state representatives i n an attempt to a r r i v e at a compromise text which would r e f l e c t a consensus of a l l views ( i . e . , those of the developed as well as the developing countries). A revised d r a f t , the Pinto text, was eventually drawn up--however, not u n t i l a f t e r the deadline f o r submission to the combined conference negotiating text had 86 passed. Hence, the more con t r o v e r s i a l Engo text rather than "a set of a r t i c l e s balanced e i t h e r by the i n c l u s i o n of a r t i c l e s representative of those submitted by a l l i n t e r e s t groups, or by adopting the d r a f t a r t i c l e s 87 facing the least opposition" was submitted to the conference for i n c l u s i o n i n the ISNT. The following discussion w i l l focus on both the Engo and Pinto texts i n order to point out the major areas of contention regarding seabed a c t i v i t i e s . One of the fundamental problems c a r r i e d over from Caracas was the question of the nature of the system f o r exploration and e x p l o i t a t i o n . This problem had been discussed extensively p r i o r to the Geneva session i n 1975 with l i t t l e or no movement towards agreement. Hence, e n t i r e l y new ideas were needed to spur negotiations. In t h i s respect, the US proposed a "banking system" under which "an applicant for a j o i n t venture would submit two mine s i t e s of equal s i z e , one of which the Authority would 88 designate as a reserved area." The Authority could then negotiate with 139 any state or i t s nationals regarding the exploitation of the reserved area. The second area would be developed by the applicant according to arrange-ments with the Authority. These arrangements would be regulated by provisions in the treaty. At approximately the same time as the submission of the US proposal, the Soviet delegate also submitted an alternative strategy for exploration 89 and exploitation. Under the Soviet system, the seabed would be divided "into two separate regime areas, one being exploited by states in conformity with the authority's rules and contracts, and the other being exploited by 90 the authority under whatever system i t wished; or was able to implement." The size of the areas to be exploited would be set according to a fixed 91 ratio which would be established through negotiation. The Soviets also stressed that the Authority would be entering into contracts with states and not multinational corporations, thereby implying greater s t a b i l i t y for 92 the Authority in i t s relations with outside contractors. A third new proposal by the Chairman of the Working Group, CW. Pinto, 93 also focused on a type of parallel or reserved area system. This proposal included provisions similar in some respects to both the Soviet and US proposals. That i s , i t called for the seabed to be divided into two separate regimes, one reserved for state contractors and the other for the 94 Authority. In addition, i t also contained the provision that applicants for contracts would have to submit two proposed mine sites, one of which they would receive rights to and the other of which would revert to the authority to be exploited by i t in any manner i t might determine within the limits of the convention.95 The Group of 77 considered these proposals and rejected the idea of a parallel system which designated certain areas as solely for state 140 e x p l o i t a t i o n . They f e l t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s could only be protected under a 96 system where the Authority d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d a l l seabed e x p l o i t a t i o n . China continued to support the Group of 77 i n i t s proposals f o r an 97 Authority with extensive powers. Tien Chin stated that the Authority should have broad powers, inc l u d i n g the r i g h t to d i r e c t explora-t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n of sea-bed resources, and should regulate a l l a c t i v i t i e s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l area, such as s c i e n t i f i c research, production, processing and marketing. The super-Powers must not be allowed to reduce the machinery to a hollow administrative framework devoid of r e a l power.98 The views of the Group of 77 were r e f l e c t e d i n the ISNT where the underlying p r i n c i p l e regarding seabed a c t i v i t y was that "the Area and i t s 99 resources /are/ the common heritage of mankind." Regarding the system of exploration and e x p l o i t a t i o n , the ISNT s t i p u l a t e d that the International Seabed Authority would d i r e c t l y undertake exploration, e x p l o i t a t i o n , and marketing of seabed resources. In addition, these a c t i v i t i e s could be undertaken by States Parties and/or e n t i t i e s under t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n accord-ing to agreements with the Authority. However, the Authority would r e t a i n d i r e c t and e f f e c t i v e control over a l l operations at a l l t i m e s . 1 0 0 Also included i n the 1975 ISNT was an elaboration of the basic structure of the Authority already mentioned i n both the SBC d r a f t proposals and i n discussions at Caracas. E a r l i e r disagreements regarding the r e l a t i v e powers and functions of the two major organs of the Authority, the Assembly and the Council, continued at Geneva. In the Engo text "the Assembly /was/ the supreme policy-making organ with power to lay down d i r e c t i o n s to be pursued by the Council and other o r g a n s . " 1 0 1 The Chinese p o s i t i o n favored the d i v i s i o n of powers as set f o r t h i n t h i s text. That i s , they supported an Assembly which would be the dominant body within the Authority. According to the Chinese, the Assembly 141 should formulate policy on a l l important matters and give instructions to the council and other subsidiary organs. The council, as an executive organ, should be responsible to the assembly and operate according to the guidelines l a i d down by i t . 1 0 2 Under the Pinto text, the Assembly would have l i t t l e power in determining exploitation rights and the Council would not be required to follow the Assembly's directions. At Geneva, agreement continued regarding an Assembly comprised of a l l parties to the LOS treaty and run on a one-state, one-vote formula. However, the structure and the voting procedures of the Council remained problematic. According to the 1975 ISNT, the Council would be comprised of thirty-six members (a larger number than had been suggested in previous drafts). Twenty-four of the thirty-six would be selected on the basis of region (i.e., Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Western Europe and Others) and twelve would be selected as representatives of special interests (six 104 from technologically advanced states and six from developing states). This arrangement, however, was not acceptable to the GDS who wanted two-fi f t h s of the Council seats^^ and the developed states who wanted nine representatives on the Council. Disagreements also arose over voting procedures in the Council. According to the Engo ISNT, Council decisions would be passed on the basis 107 of a two-thirds plus one majority of members present and voting. China supported this requirement stating that i t was opposed "to the super-Powers 108 introducing a disguised veto system." In the Pinto text, a three-fourths majority would be required only after a general agreement could not be reached. Hence under the Pinto text which called for nine representatives on the Council to be from developed states, only ten votes would be needed to block a decision, whereas under the Engo text requiring only six developed 14-2 109 state representatives, twelve votes would be needed to block. Thus, the negotiations on Council voting procedures directly reflected the intent of the developed and developing states to protect their own interests. Three additional organs of the ISA discussed at Geneva and included in the ISNT were the Tribunal, the Enterprise, and the Secretariat. The Tribunal would serve as a dispute settlement body and would consider questions regarding the interpretation of the Convention as well as problems relating to exploration and exploitation contracts. 1 1 0 The Enterprise, "subject to the general policy directions and supervision of the Council, /would/ undertake the preparation and execution of activities of the Authority in the Area." 1 1 1 The Enterprise could conduct these activities either on i t s own or in joint ventures with states or state-sponsored private companies. Finally, the Secretariat would be the central administrative organ of the Authority. Its staff, including the Secretary-General, i t s chief adminis-trator, would be appointed by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Council. The Authority would also appoint an additional staff of inspectors whose function would be to report any violations of the convention and/or 112 contracts to the Secretary-General. A f i n a l problem area at Geneva, as earlier at Caracas and the SBC meetings, was the question of conditions of exploitation. Basically, the Authority was to set the regulations for exploitation; however, certain safeguards for exploiters were also included in the ISNT. For example, "operators were guaranteed security of tenure and freedom from alterations or suspension of the contract except for 'gross and persistent violations' 113 of rules." In summary, the 1975 Geneva session began in a mood of conciliation. The leaders of the Group of 77 had indicated they would be more flexible on 143 the issues of decision-making and the structure and procedures of the ISA. They also f e l t that they had made a significant concession in 1974 at Caracas in agreeing to include conditions of exploitation in a LOS treaty. On the other hand, the US expressed i t s willingness to consider basic conditions in place of detailed regulatory provisions in the treaty as long as the conference would adopt detailed regulations for the provisional period. In addition, the US was willing to consider joint ventures, with 114 the possibility of profit sharing, as a single method of exploitation. In spite of this expressed f l e x i b i l i t y , the major problem at UNCLOS III continued to be that of reconciling the views of those favoring a system of direct exploitation by the new international Authority to be established with the views of those interested in assuring guaranteed access to, and production of deep seabed minerals by states and their nationals under reasonable conditions with security of tenure.H5 Committee I was also le f t with the problem of reconciling the differences in the Engo and Pinto texts noted earlier. Finally, despite the passage in the UN General Assembly of a new moratorium on deep seabed mining (over the negative votes of the US and other industrialized states), there was the nagging threat of unilateral action to in i t i a t e seabed o p e r a t i o n s . H e n c e , increasing pressure was exerted on a l l sides in the negotiations to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. The discussions at the fourth session of UNCLOS III held in New York from March 15 through May 7, 1976 centered on the revision of the proposals in the ISNT and resulted in the preparation of a Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) by the committee chairmen. On the f i r s t day of the session, China's representative Lai Ya-li expressed China's views on the format for the negotiations. He stressed that the delegates should consider the 1975 ISNT as "a procedural device and . . . therefore simply a working instrument 144 without binding force. Thus, amendments could be made and new proposals 117 discussed together with the texts." He also stressed that the negotiations should not be broken down into numerous working groups since many of the dele-gations, especially those from developing countries, were small and, as a 118 result, would not be able to participate f u l l y in a l l of the working groups. Unlike the 1975 ISNT, which reflected the views of the developing states, the 1976 RSNT, negotiated largely by the US and a small number of 119 developing countries, reflected the positions of the developed countries. For example, under the RSNT the Authority's discretionary power would be 120 somewhat restricted compared to i t s powers under the ISNT. More specifi-cally the system of exploitation set forth in the RSNT was very similar to that proposed by the US at the 1975 Geneva session. As envisaged in the 1976 RSNT, this system, referred to as a parallel or banking system, called for the applicant £ t q j indicate the co-ordinates of an area . . . of which one half /would/ be designated by the Authority as the contract area. Alternately, the applicant //could/ submit two areas of like size and equivalent commercial value, one of which /would!/ be designated by the Authority as the contract area. . . . If a contract /were/ entered into for the area, the area covered by the application but not by the contract /"could/ only be exploited by the Authority directly or in association with the Authority and under i t s control . . . by developing countries or entities spon-sored by them and under their effective control.121 Under the earlier ISNT, the Authority alone had the power to "determine the part or parts of the Area in which the exploration of the Area and the exploitation of i t s resources and other associated activities /could/ be 122 conducted." With regard to the issue of whether or not the conditions of explora-tion and exploitation should be expli c i t l y set forth in the LOS treaty, the 1976 RSNT f e l l in the middle. That i s , various rules regarding mining would be specified in the treaty, while others would be elaborated by the Council of the Seabed Authority on the basis of treaty c r i t e r i a , subject to veto by one-fourth of the Contracting Parties.123 Disputes regarding these regulations would be submitted to the Tribunal of the Seabed Authority. During Committee I negotiations at the fourth session in 1976, the US changed i t s position on the issue of the economic implications of seabed mining. It agreed that the Authority should be able to establish production controls on seabed minerals in order to minimize the adverse effects on land-124 based producers of seabed minerals caused by production increases. The RSNT was much more explicit on this issue than the ISNT had been in that i t enumerated specific measures the Authority could take to protect the export 125 earnings of developing producers of seabed minerals. Specifically, these arrangements included: commodity agreements covering those minerals in which the proposed International Seabed Authority //would/ participate; powers for the authority to limit seabed production for at least 20 years in accordance with a formula tied to the price of and demand for nickel; and compensation for the economic harm caused to affected countries.126 The structure of the Authority outlined in the 1976 RSNT remained basi-cally the same as that in the 1975 ISNT. With regard to the distribution of power within the ISA, the Group of 77 s t i l l pressed for a dominant Assembly while the developed states called for a strong Council. China continued to support the developing countries and c r i t i c i z e d the superpowers 127 for attempting to establish their hegemony over the seabed administration. The Chinese representative also stated that, given the number of developing states compared to developed states in the world and the need for f a i r representation on the Council, the developing states should hold more than 128 two-thirds of the Council seats. Discussions at the f i f t h session of UNCLOS III held in New York from August 2 through September 17, 1976 resulted in detailed reports from each 146 of the three committees; however, no new revisions to the RSNT were formally-proposed. Most of Committee I's time was spent in informal discussions which, according to Committee Chairman Paul Engo, "tended, in spite of a l l efforts by most delegations, to cover old ground and failed to produce any new approaches that /could/* help resolve the problems at the center of /their7 work." 1^ In his report to the conference, Engo "emphasiz/ecl/ that the one central, c r i t i c a l issue which /had to_7 be solved without delay /was7 that of 130 the system of exploitation." He pointed out that since the f i r s t substantive session in 1974 both of the major interest groups had gradually altered their demands. The group of developing countries had shifted from a position where they would approve of seabed exploitation only by the Authority to a position, expressed at the f i f t h session in 1976, where they would accept exploitation by other groups including private companies as long as the Enterprise remained preeminent. On the other hand, the developed countries agreed to accept the Enterprise as equal with other exploiters, where originally they had insisted that mining operations be confined to 131 private commercial entrepreneurs. In spite of these gradual shifts, however, a consensus s t i l l could not be reached on a system acceptable to a l l . Towards the end of the f i f t h session, the US informally circulated a proposal which opened the way for new avenues of discussion. In this proposal, the US indicated "that as part of a parallel system that /included/ assured access for states and their nationals, / i t / would be willing to help the Enterprise get into business simultaneously or virt u a l l y simultaneously 132 with other miners." The US also indicated that i t would agree to pro-visions for the transfer of technology and i t proposed that a review of the 147. system of exploitation be considered after approximately twenty-five years 133 of operation. In spite of these proposals by the US and those by several other delegations, no real progress was made at the f i f t h session in 1976 towards an agreement on a new seabed regime. Due to the seriousness of this apparent deadlock, the Conference President, H.S. Amerasinghe, with the agreement of conference delegates, stated that the f i r s t three weeks of the sixth session in 1977 would be devoted exclusively to the issue of the deep seabed. In addition, the heads of delegations were expected to conduct these negotiations. During the 1976 f i f t h session, Chinese representatives repeatedly expressed China's support for the Group of 77's position as well as for the 135 maritime rights and interests of LL and GDS. Correspondingly, Ling Ching attacked the superpowers in a plenary meeting for "obstinately clinging to their unreasonable positions and . . . [for] saying one thing while doing 136 another." He also went on to state that the basic contradiction of the present work on the law of the sea was that, while the third world countries wanted to safeguard their maritime rights and interests, the one or two super-Powers were not reconciled to the loss of their privileged position of monopolizing the seas. Quite clearly, i t was the hegemonist position of the super-Powers that constituted the basic reason why the Conference failed to make due progress.137 138 These same sentiments had been expressed earlier by Ho Li-liang. With specific reference to the 1976 RSNT, Ling Ching stated that the preamble and final clauses of the text should not be discussed hastily. He suggested that an ad hoc group be established to study the matter and that a l l states be allowed to express their views on the texts before the prepara-139 tion of a draft text. In general, the Chinese f e l t that the RSNT needed 140 revision especially with regard to seabed exploitation. Finally, Ho Li-liang concluded that "the premature consideration of specific or technical questions" at the f i f t h session in 1976 had only served to slow 148 141 down progress. Therefore, she proposed that "at the next session important questions of principle should be allotted more time and considered • •„ v • ,,142 on a priority basis." In the interim between the f i f t h (1976) and sixth (1977) UNCLOS III sessions, Minister Jens Evensen of Norway, Vice-President of the Conference, organized several informal negotiating sessions on seabed issues. These informal meetings, attended by representatives from several countries, continued into the sixth session. The result of these meetings was a series of draft articles (the Evensen text) which, while not totally acceptable to either the developed or developing countries, was for both " 'an acceptable 143 basis for further negotiations.' " In spite of this general agreement, Engo in preparing his submission on behalf of Committee I for inclusion in 144 the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) only partially adopted the ideas presented in the Evensen text. Instead, after considering the discus-sions at the sixth session, Engo focused primarily on the proposals of the developing states in writing his text. As a result, several of the text's articles were s t i l l unacceptable to many delegations. The following discussion of the sixth session held in New York from May 23 to July 15, 1977 wi l l focus not only on the ICNT, but also on the Evensen text and the developed states' proposals not represented in the ICNT in order to give a clearer view of the seabed negotiations. The four basic issues of the system and conditions of exploitation, the structure of the ISA, and the economic implications of seabed mining which were discussed at previous UNCLOS III sessions continued to be of major importance in 1977. The Evensen text followed the same outline as the 1976 RSNT with regard to the system and conditions of seabed mining. Under the parallel system of the Evensen text, the Authority was to have a substan-1.49 t i a l say in the context of mining contracts and could offer financial 145 incentives to encourage joint Enterprise and state or private ventures. The parallel system envisaged under the 1977 ICNT, however, would give the Authority the option of stipulating a joint venture as a condition of access. Thus, contracts for the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the Area may provide for joint arrangements between the Contractor and the Authority through the Enterprise, in the form of joint ventures, production sharing or service contracts, as well as any other form of joint arrangement.146 The ICNT further restricted access by allowing the Authority to make the transfer of technology from contractors to the Enterprise virtually a 147 condition of access. Thus, whereas the 1976 RSNT favored the developed states and their desire to keep access to the seabed as open as possible for private exploiters, the relevant provisions in the 1977 ICNT moved in the opposite direction towards the Group of 77's position that the Authority should have the power to reject some private contractors, to set heavy restrictions on those i t accepted, and to encourage Enterprise participation in a l l seabed mining. The Chinese representatives continued to support an ISA with the exclusive right to exploit seabed minerals and to oppose a parallel system of exploitation. They did agree, however, that " i f the authority deem/ed/ i t necessary, activities of exploitation /could? be conducted, as determined by the authority, under i t s f u l l and effective control, through a form of 148 association with the states parties or their enterprises." According to the Chinese, this system should only be transitional and should end 149 automatically after a fixed time period. The negotiations on the structure of the Authority continued to center on whether i t should 150: be governed exclusively on the basis of the sovereign equality of a l l States whereby every nation would have equivalent polit-i c a l power . . . £br where7 because of their economic and technological advancement and their higher stake in the mining of the seabed . . . /the developed states should havej* a voice in the Authority sufficient to protect their substantial 'minority' interests.150 In the Evensen text, a one-state, one-vote Assembly with substantial legis-lative powers was provided for as was a Council in which voting would be weighted towards the developed s t a t e s . 1 5 1 The 1977 ICNT articles on the structure of the Authority reflected the same basic arrangements as the 1976 RSNT and Evensen text with the exception of the provisions on the selection of members and voting in the Council. The ICNT s t i l l called for a Council of thirty-six members; however, i t designated eighteen rather than twenty-four seats to be distributed on the basis of geographical location, four seats, not six, for states having made contributions to the development of technology for exploration and exploi-tation, six seats for developing countries, and four seats each for major importers and exporters of seabed minerals. It also guaranteed greater 152 representation on the Council for LL and GDS. Engo, in the ICNT, also rejected the Evensen idea of weighted voting in the Council and stipulated 153 that questions of substance be decided by a three-fourths majority. (The 1975 ISNT and 1976 RSNT called for a two-thirds plus one majority.) With regard to the fourth major seabed issue, economic implications of seabed mining, the 1977 ICNT went further than previous texts, including Evensen's, in protecting landbased producers. Whereas the Evensen text called for the Authority to control the production of minerals found in nodules to protect landbased producers, the ICNT allowed for controls on the 154 production of any of the minerals found in the seabed. The controls on the production of minerals in nodules were also stated in more stringent 151 and mandatory terms in the ICNT. 1 5 5 Finally, unlike either the 1975 ISNT or 1976 RSNT, the 1977 ICNT added to the Assembly's functions the duty to establish a system of compensation for developing countries suffering. adverse economic effects as: a result of seabed mining. 1 5^ The interests of consumers of seabed minerals were also considered in the ICNT. It contained new provisions to ensure just, and stable and remunerative prices for raw materials o r i g i -nating in the Area which /were_7 also produced outside the Area /and/ . . . security of supplies to consumers of /these/ raw materials.157 During the general discussion of the economic implications of seabed mining, most groups, with the exception of the Socialist bloc, reiterated their previously stated positions. The US which had softened i t s position at the fourth session in 1976 was faced with increased pressure to allow production controls to protect future as well as current landbased producers. The Group of 77 continued to c a l l for centralized management of seabed mining to protect developing landbased producers and the mandatory transfer of technology to developing states. The Socialist bloc including the Soviet 158 Union altered i t s position and endorsed extensive production controls. Hence in 1977, the ICNT not only reflected the general agreement in favor of controls, but, also leaned towards the developing countries' view regarding 159 the stringency of these controls. Near the closing of the sixth session of UNCLOS III in 1977, Shen Chih-cheng stated China's views f i r s t on the eventual LOS text and then on the ICNT. He stated that the formulation of a new convention on the law of the sea was an important element in the struggle to establish the new inter-national economic order to which the developing countries attached great significance. Accordingly, the composite text must be based on the reasonable proposals of the developing countries and reflect the fundamental interests of the people 152 of a l l countries and i t must firmly reject the proposals of the super-Powers. The text should be drafted democratically and serious consideration should be given to the views of the devel-oping • countries.160 In summary, the negotiations on the seabed beyond national jurisdic-tion during the f i r s t six sessions of UNCLOS III were continually plagued by major disagreements especially between the developed and developing states. Even though agreement was reached during the early SBC meetings : on the basic principles regarding the seabed and i t s uses, the actual means to implement these principles could not be agreed upon. Hence, this issue continued to be a major impediment to concluding a new LOS treaty. In analyzing the policies supported by the Chinese during the Committee I negotiations, i t becomes apparent that these policies were influenced both by China's maritime characteristics and its foreign policy objectives. Within the set of variables associated with China's maritime characteristics, China's lack of the technological capacity to exploit the deep seabed appeared to have had the greatest impact on i t s policies. As discussed in chapter 3, China does not have, nor is i t likely to develop in the near future, the technology needed to carry out seabed mining on i t s own or even in partial conjunction with the ISA's Enterprise. Thus, i t s position in favor of a strong Enterprise with virtually exclusive control over the exploitation of the seabed was totally in keeping with i t s own economic interests. The states opposing strong ISA control over exploitation were primarily those who have the potential to carry out seabed mining on their own and hence have the potential to reap economic gains from this exploitation. The Chinese, on the other hand, have more to gain as a member of a strong ISA whose profits could potentially benefit developing as well as developed states. 153 A second set of maritime characteristics which influenced China's policies on seabed exploitation was the size of i t s copper, nickel, cobalt, and manganese reserves. As was brought out during the Committee I negotia-tions, the group of states which would be most adversely affected by seabed mining were the major landbased producers and exporters of nodule minerals. Of the four minerals most affected by seabed mining, China possesses a surplus only of manganese. Its exports of this metal are relatively small and go almost entirely to Japan. As mentioned in chapter 3, these exports earn only a small amount of foreign exchange for the Chinese. It is unlikely, therefore, that China's economy would suffer-as a result of an increased supply of minerals from seabed mining. This situation accounts, to some extent, for China's position favoring some form of seabed exploitation. In addition, China's position as a net importer of copper, nickel, and cobalt would lead one to believe that the Chinese would actively support expansive mining of these minerals since the increased supply from seabed mining would probably result in a decline in their world price. China's probable interest in decreased prices is also indicated by the fact that the size of China's imports of seabed minerals is steadily increasing. Hence, the Chinese could benefit economically from decreased world prices resulting from seabed mining. In Committee I, however, the Chinese supported a strong International Authority with extensive powers to control a l l facets of seabed mining. In conjunction with i t s position as a mineral importer, one would have expected China to favor an Authority with only limited production controls thereby allowing for greater mineral production. This discrepancy can be partially explained by reference to the fact that even though China 154 imports these minerals, i t s imports are not large enough that a decrease in price due to seabed mining would have a major impact on China's overall economy. In addition, given that the developed countries were strongly-opposed to stringent ISA production controls, the Chinese were relatively confident that these states would block the inclusion of such controls in a f i n a l LOS agreement. Finally, significant production from seabed mining i s s t i l l in the future, thus relegating any assessment regarding the possible impact of increased supplies of minerals to the area of speculation. More importantly, China's support for a strong ISA placed i t squarely with the developing states. Thus, instead of supporting a position which may have produced some unknown and possibly minimal economic gains at an equally unknown future date, the Chinese adopted a position which would provide them more immediate p o l i t i c a l gains in terms of increased identification with the interests of the developing states. (The effect of China's relation-ship with the developing states on i t s seabed policies w i l l be discussed in detail later.) The final maritime characteristic which had an impact on China's participation in the Committee I negotiations was the Chinese delegation's lack of expertise in the area. This characteristic was evident in the fact that the Chinese did not take any real i n i t i a t i v e regarding new seabed pro-posals during these discussions. As noted earlier, the Chinese had had l i t t l e experience in international negotiations prior to the start of UNCLOS III. In addition, the Chinese did not possess as great an expertise in the areas of international law and seabed technology as some of the other state delegations (especially those from developed states). There-fore, rather than proposing any specific provisions of i t s own on seabed mining, China's contribution to the seabed negotiations took the form of 155 r e a c t i o n s t o t h e p r o p o s a l s o f o t h e r s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e impact o f s p e c i f i c m a r i t i m e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , C h i n a ' s seabed p o l i c i e s a l s o r e f l e c t e d C h i n a ' s attempt t o f u l f i l l s e v e r a l o f i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . On most o f t h e i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d i n Committee I , i . e . , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f t h e seabed beyond n a t i o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n as t h e common h e r i t a g e o f mankind, t h e n a t u r e o f t h e system o f e x p l o i t a t i o n , t h e r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e x p l o i t a t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e , powers, and f u n c t i o n s o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n t b o d i e s o f t h e ISA, t h e m o r a t o r i u m on seabed m i n i n g , and t h e economic i m p l i c a t i o n s o f seabed m i n i n g , t h e C h i n e s e s i d e d e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h t h e d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s and t h e Group o f 77. I n t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e i r speeches on seabed i s s u e s , t h e C h i n e s e made a p o i n t o f e x p l i c i t l y s t a t i n g t h a t t h e y s i d e d w i t h t h e s m a l l and medium s i z e d d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s , t h a t t h e b r o a d i n t e r e s t s o f t h e s e s t a t e s must be u p h e l d i n a l l a r e a s , and t h a t t h e superpowers must not be a l l o w e d t o dominate t h e ISA o r t o g a i n any advantage o v e r o t h e r s t a t e s i n e x p l o i t i n g seabed m i n e r a l s . C h i n a ' s a t t e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f as d e d i c a t e d t o p r e s e r v i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s was r e f l e c t e d i n t h e s t r o n g w o r d i n g o f some o f i t s a t t a c k s on t h e p r o p o s a l s o f t h e US, USSR, and o t h e r d e v e l o p e d s t a t e s . I t i s a l s o e v i d e n t i n t h e c a r e t a k e n by t h e C h i n e s e i n a l m o s t a l l o f t h e i r speeches n o t o n l y t o s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f y t h e i r i n t e r e s t s w i t h t h o s e o f t h e d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s , but t o do so i n such a way as t o i m p l y t h a t t h e C h i n e s e were t o t a l l y d e d i c a t e d t o e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s were b e i n g p r o t e c t e d . Thus, t h e C h i n e s e used t h e seabed n e g o t i a t i o n s as a forum b o t h t o s o l i d i f y t h e i r p o s i t i o n as a member o f the group o f d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s ( w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y j o i n i n g t h e Group o f 77 b l o c ) and t o enhance t h e i r i n f u e n c e w i t h t h e s e s t a t e s . 156 Not only China's position on seabed issues, but also i t s statements on the suggested format for Committee I negotiating sessions reflected China's attempt to enhance i t s influence among developing states. During the fourth session in 1976, the Chinese urged that the negotiations not be delegated to several working groups. They pointed out that this action would be to the detriment of the small and primarily developing states who, as a result of the limited size of their delegations, would be unable to have representatives present at a l l of the working groups. While the Chinese delegation i t s e l f was not large, i t would have been able to send representatives to several simultaneous sessions without undue d i f f i c u l t y . Thus, the Chinese were projecting themselves as standing up•for the smaller states on an issue which would not have significantly impaired their own negotiating a b i l i t y . The one area in which China's position did not reflect that of other developing states was the military uses of the seabed. On this issue, the developing states supported the ban on nuclear testing on the seabed beyond twelve nautical miles while the Chinese opposed i t . China's stated reason for adopting i t s position was that the ban would allow the superpowers to retain their monopoly of nuclear weapons and deprive other states of "any freedom of action." 1^ 1 Thus, China's position followed directly from i t s objective of curtailing superpower hegemony. The Chinese saw the proposed ban on seabed testing as a tactic adopted, by the superpowers to maintain their own military superiority. The Chinese, on the other hand, fel t that they, and other states, should be allowed to develop their own nuclear capabilities using any available means. The Chinese saw their own develop-ment of nuclear weapons as one way to curtail the military dominance of the superpowers. 157 As a counterproposal, to the seabed test ban, the Chinese suggested that a l l nuclear submarines be banned from the waters of the high seas. The adoption of this counterproposal would have had l i t t l e direct impact on the Chinese since they did not possess any nuclear submarines in 1973 when the proposal was made. On the other hand, the ban on nuclear sub-marines would have an immediate impact on the navies of the Soviet Union and the US. In addition, since they knew that their counterproposal would never be accepted by the superpowers, the Chinese did not have to worry about i t s possible implications for the future development of their own navy. Thus, China's proposal appeared to have been designed to draw criticism away from i t s nonacceptance of the seabed test ban and to redirect i t towards the superpowers. The Chinese thereby hoped to regain some of their prestige with the developing states which they had lost by opposing the original seabed test ban proposal. China's stand on the military uses of the seabed also reflected i t s position that no state should be inhibited by another from attaining an equal position in the international system. The Chinese would not support a policy which could possibly inhibit them, or any other state, from developing nuclear weapons while some states already possessed them. China's position reflected i t s basic belief that the equality of a l l states needs to be protected under international law. Finally, China's adherence to the principle that a l l states should be treated equally under international law regardless of their p o l i t i c a l and/or economic capabilities was also reflected in i t s frequent statements supporting the Committee I proposals of the developing states and in i t s policies regarding the ISA. With regard to the structure of the ISA, the 158 Chinese supported the position that the Assembly, whose membership would include a l l states, should be the dominant body whereas the Council, with a more limited membership, should be subordinate. With a dominant Assembly, a few states would not be able to overrule the preferences of the majority. In addition, by supporting the creation of an ISA along the lines proposed by most of the' developing states, China was encouraging the establishment of a new international body which would provide for the equal participation of a l l states in the exploitation of the deep seabed. In order to ensure equal participation, limits had to be placed on the activities of the developed states who already possessed the technology to exploit the deep seabed. The Chinese would probably justify the limitation on state action, in this instance, by pointing out that the developed states had long dominated the developing states and that i t was now necessary to place limits on the former so that the latter could also reap benefits. Thus, the Chinese were consistent in their support for the policies of the developing states. It would be interesting to note, however, i f the consistency between China's adherence to the concept of state equality and i t s seabed policy would have arisen i f the Chinese had themselves possessed the technological capacity to exploit seabed resources. In this case, a policy consistent with that of the developing states stressing the need for equal seabed access for a l l states would have been economically detri-mental for the Chinese while one less consistent with their broad conception of a new international legal order would have been economically beneficial. In summary, China's position on issues relating to the seabed beyond 159 national jurisdiction reflected two general trends in the motives behind China's policies. Firs t , on most issues, China had l i t t l e at stake in terms of i t s own economic interests. As a result, the Chinese could easily support the proposals of the developing states without any potential loss to themselves. They were therefore supporting policies which corresponded to their foreign policy goal of increasing China's influence among Third World states. Secondly, on the one issue which was of immediate relevance to China's own interests, namely i t s nuclear policies, the Chinese adopted a position which put them in disagreement with the developing states, but in line with their foreign policy objective of curtailing superpower hegemony. From this, one could conclude that on issues which do not affect China's other foreign policy goals, in this case curtailing superpower hegemony, the Chinese wi l l support the policies of the developing states. However, in areas where China's own immediate interests and/or foreign policy goals conflict with the expressed interests of the developing states, the Chinese wi l l abandon the long-term goal of enhancing their position vis-a-vis Third World states in favor of a policy more in line with their immediate self-interest. It remains to be seen, however, i f this emphasis on immediate self-interest is a general feature of China's LOS policies or i f i t was unique in the case of China's military interests. 160 CHAPTER 5 COASTAL RESOURCE JURISDICTION AND NAVIGATION Unlike Committee I whose mandate covered a relatively limited issue-area, the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, the Second, and to a lesser extent, Third committees dealt with a large number of diverse issues. Committee II was instructed to prepare draft treaty articles on: the t e r r i -t o r i a l sea; navigation through straits; the seaward limits of archipelagic states; the establishment of a contiguous zone; the creation of an economic zone for living and non-living resources; access to the ocean and its resources for LL and GDS; the limits of the continental shelf; and several more minor issues. While not as extensive as Committee II's mandate, Committee III was le f t with the task of negotiating articles on the three issues of the preservation of the marine environment, marine s c i e n t i f i c research, and the transfer of technology. This chapter w i l l focus on an elaboration of the UNCLOS III negotiations on the issues mentioned above. In this discussion, as in chapter 4, the policy positions of the various negotiating groups and individual states w i l l be considered. Specific attention w i l l be given to China's policies on these issues and their relationship to those of other states. Due to the large number of issues debated in Committees II and III and the fact that agreement on some of these issues was arrived at early in the conference while others were s t i l l sources of controversy in 1977, this chapter w i l l be organized in terms of issue-areas. Each issue w i l l be discussed in i t s entirety (i.e., 161 from the early SBC meetings through the sixth session in 1977) before another is considered. This general discussion of the issues w i l l be followed by an analysis of China's Committee II and III policies in terms of China's foreign policy objectives and maritime characteristics. Committee II Following the expansion of the SBC's mandate in 1970, Subcommittee II was entrusted with the task of compiling "a comprehensive l i s t of subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea which should be revised or developed, and prepar/ing/ . . . draft articles on such subjects and issues." 1 The issues which emerged from these discussions as most in need of change were those relating to the extent and nature of coastal state jurisdiction. Traditionally the rights of a coastal state within i t s t e r r i t o r i a l sea had included: "(1) jurisdiction over foreign vessels (both war and merchant ships); (2) police, revenue, and customs functions; (3) fishery rights; and 2 (4) the establishment of defense and security zones." Ter r i t o r i a l Sea The debate on the t e r r i t o r i a l sea during the SBC meetings centered around the issues of i t s size and how to establish the baselines from which to measure i t s limits. With regard to the size of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea, general agreement was expressed on a maximum limit of twelve nautical * miles (n.m.) . For some states, the acceptance of a twelve-mile limit was conditional on the satisfactory resolution of other issues, most notably transit through international straits (e.g., for the US) and the exploitation of * Throughout the remainder of this paper, when the term miles is used to refer to the limits of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea, contiguous zone, and econom-ic zone, i t should be read as nautical miles. 162 3 coastal resources (e.g., for Iceland in relation to i t s fishing grounds). A few Latin American (e.g., Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Peru) and African (e.g., Sierra Leone and Guinea) states, however, supported a coastal state's right to unilaterally establish i t s own t e r r i t o r i a l sea limits based on i t s 4 unique characteristics. Some of these states wanted to extend their t e r r i -t o r i a l seas to a maximum of 200 n.m. In spite of this opposition, the concept of a twelve-mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea continued to be generally accepted at the Caracas session of UNCLOS III in 1974. Some states s t i l l based their acceptance of this limit on the corresponding creation of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone.5 (The economic zone issue w i l l be discussed later.) In the ISNT which resulted from the Geneva negotiations in 1975, the maximum limit for the t e r r i t o r i a l sea was set at the agreed limit of twelve n.m.^  The major opposition to this limit continued to be from certain Latin American states, including Ecuador and 7 Brazil, who wanted the maximum limit to be-set at 200 miles. However, the twelve-mile limit remained unchanged in both the 1976 RSNT and the 1977 ICNT.8 The f i r s t o f f i c i a l statement on the limits of the PRC's t e r r i t o r i a l sea since i t s creation in 1949 came in September 1958. At that time, China 9 declared a t e r r i t o r i a l sea of twelve n.m. The Chinese reasserted their claim to a twelve-mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea in 1973 during the SBC meetings and maintained this position throughout the f i r s t six sessions of UNCLOS I I I . 1 0 Unlike the US, Soviet Union, and several other countries, China did not advocate that a l l states be restricted to the same twelve-mile limit. In i t s "Working Paper on Sea Area Within the Limits of National Jurisdiction" submitted to Subcommittee II on July 16, 1973, the Chinese stated that 163 a coastal State /was_7 entitled to reasonably define the breadth and limits of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l sea according to it s geographical features and i t s needs of economic development and national security and having due regard to the legitimate interests of it s neighbouring countries and the convenience of international navigation.11 This position was repeated during subsequent SBC meetings and at the 1974 Caracas and 1975 Geneva UNCLOS III sessions by the Chinese delegates Shen Wei-12 Iang, Chai Shu-fan, and Ke Tsai-shuo respectively. The Chinese demonstra-ted their adherence to this position in their frequent and often outspoken support for the 200-mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea claims of several Latin American states and their strong criticism of the superpowers' advocacy of a universal twelve-mile limit. For example, in his statement before the SBC on March 3, 1972, An Chih-yuan stated that the Chinese firmly support the just struggle initiated by Latin American countries in defence of the 200 nautical-miles t e r r i t o r i a l sea rights and their own marine resources, and resolutely oppose the maritime hegemony and power po l i t i c s of the superpowers.13 At Caracas, the Chinese representative further attacked the US and USSR in his statement that in order to secure maritime domination and take possession of the fishery and sea-bed resources of other countries, the superpowers have been trying to maintain maximum 'high seas' by limiting the extent of the t e r r i t o r i a l waters and zones of jurisdiction to 12 nautical miles. /"In addition/, /t/hey arrogantly assert that the extension of that limit by any country is impermissible and would be tantamount to under-mining the 'freedom of the high seas'.14 In spite of these and other statements advocating that each country be allowed to set i t s own t e r r i t o r i a l sea limits, the Chinese did not rule out the possibility that "Coastal States in the same region may through consulta-tions on an equal footing, define a unified breadth or a limit for the t e r r i t o r i a l sea in the region." 1 5 However, they never expanded on this idea to include support for an internationally uniform limit. Finally, with regard 164 to the delimitation of t e r r i t o r i a l sea boundaries between adjacent or opposite coastal states, the Chinese advocated that the states involved should "define the boundaries between their t e r r i t o r i a l seas on the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l integrity, equality and reciprocity." The second facet of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea issue before the conference con-cerned the c r i t e r i a to be used in establishing the baselines from which the t e r r i t o r i a l sea would be measured. Prior to the SBC meetings, the generally accepted means of establishing baselines for states with regular coastlines (i.e., without deep indentations or fringed by islands) had been to take 17 the low-water marks along the shore. States with irregular coasts, on the other hand, could use a straight baseline method whereby a set of points along the shore were chosen in accordance with certain established princi-ples, and then joined to form the baseline. Water on the landward side of this line was considered internal. Special c r i t e r i a had also been established regarding the designation of bays as either internal waters or 18 part of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea. The issue of baselines was not extensively discussed during the SBC meetings and, for the most part, the baseline c r i t e r i a already in use were found acceptable. Agreement on the existing c r i t e r i a for establishing baselines continued throughout UNCLOS III. The only addition to the two accepted methods, i.e., the low-water mark and straight baselines, was suggested at the Geneva session in 1975 and incorporated in the ISNT. According to this method, "depending on the range of geographical poss i b i l i t i e s for a State's coast, a State fhadj the right to employ a method of 'mixed' baselines to f i t each 19 special case." This provision was also included in the 1976 RSNT and 20 the 1977 ICNT. The only major restriction on the establishment of 165 baselines was that they could not be drawn in such a way as to cut another 21 state off from either i t s economic zone or the high seas. In their 1958 declaration, the Chinese stated that they would adopt the straight baseline method for establishing China's t e r r i t o r i a l sea limits. In applying this method, the Chinese selected a number of points on the mainland and the coastal islands . . . as the base-points which /were then/ joined by a number of straight lines drawn from point to point, thus forming a broken line.22 During the SBC and UNCLOS III sessions, the Chinese representatives did not make any specific references to the issue of baselines. Navigation through Straits A second major issue in Committee II, transit through international straits, was closely tied to that of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea. Many maritime states, including the US, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom, wanted an assurance that free transit would be maintained through a l l straits used for international navigation, including those which would become t e r r i -23 t o r i a l waters under a twelve-mile t e r r i t o r i a l sea limit. On the other hand, some states bordering straits and some developing states advocated that "innocent passage" should apply to a l l shipping in the t e r r i t o r i a l sea including straits. Tanzania expressed the rationale behind this opinion in i t s statement "that a strait is an 'integral part of the t e r r i t o r i a l waters 24 of a coastal State whose sovereignty must be f u l l y safeguarded.'" The US opposed the application of the right of innocent passage because: (1) i t had only been vaguely defined and, as a result, various coastal states interpreted i t differently; (2) i t required submarines to navigate on the 25 surface; and (3) i t did not include fl i g h t over the t e r r i t o r i a l sea. Later in the SBC negotiations, the US amended it s position slightly to allow 166 coastal states the right to restrict international navigation to suitable 2 6 specified sealanes as long as free transit was preserved. The Chinese f i r s t presented their position on transit through straits used for international navigation on July 24, 1972 at the SBC meetings. Speaking for China, Shen Wei-liang stated that in the Chinese delegation's opinion, straits within t e r r i t o r i a l waters, whether or not they were often used for international navigation, should be subject to regulation by the coastal States concerned. Foreign commercial vessels might enjoy the right of innocent passage through them, provided that they observed the regulations of the coastal State. Foreign warships, on the other hand, must obtain prior authorization.27 The Chinese restated this position with only minor changes in their "Working 2 8 Paper on Sea Area Within the Limits of National Jurisdiction" in 1973. The changes which appeared in this later proposal were the inclusion of references to coastal state regulation of the airspace above i t s t e r r i t o r i a l sea , and a definition of innocent passage as passage which "is not prej-29 udicial to the peace, security and good order of a coastal State." During the Caracas session in 1974 several proposals were introduced regarding navigation through straits. From among these, the proposals of the United Kingdom, Oman, and F i j i are representative of the major interest 30 groups on this issue. The UK's proposal recognized free passage through straits (including overflight) for vessels of a l l nationality; prohibit/edj the coastal state from promulgating regulations which /JwoulcL7 affect ship design and construction and place/d/ this competence, along with the enactment of measures to control ship-generated pollution, in an appropriate international organization (IMC0).31 While these suggestions reflected the UK's position as both a major maritime state and a strait state, they were also supported, in general, by the US, USSR, France, and Japan. The US and USSR also submitted their own proposals reiterating the need for free passage through straits used for international 32 navigation. 167 Oman's proposal reflected the views of several of the developing states within the Group of 77, including several strait states, who wanted greater coastal state control over their coastal waters. This proposal called for the coastal state to: (1) regulate the installation, u t i l i z a t i o n , and protection of navigational f a c i l i t i e s and aids, thus implying the regulation of ship design and construction; (2) control marine pollution and the passage of "special" ships such as nuclear submarines and supertankers; 33 and (3) allow only innocent passage of vessels through straits. The Chinese delegate, Ling Ching, expressed China's support for Oman's 34 proposal as "set/ting/ forth a number of reasonable objective c r i t e r i a . " In general, the Chinese stressed their support for the position that a l l coastal states should have the right to apply regulations in respect of . . . straits [used for international navigation/ in accordance with their security and other interests, while also taking account of the needs of inter-national navigation and some reasonable international standards.35 They also maintained that a distinction should be made between foreign m i l i -tary and non-military vessels. In the latter case, the right of innocent passage should prevail for transit through straits used for international navigation while in the former, prior authorization from the coastal state should be required before the vessel could pass through the str a i t . Finally, F i j i ' s proposal represented the middle ground between the UK and Oman proposals. According to this proposal, coastal states would be allowed to "regulate passage but these regulations could not be more restrictive than relevant IMCO conventions on the subjects of ship design, 37 construction, manning, or equipment." In addition, unless prior n o t i f i -cation were given to the coastal state, submarines would be required to 38 navigate on the surface. During the discussions on these and other proposals regarding navigation, the need for protecting the security, safety, 168 39 and environment of strait states was also brought out. During the 1975 negotiations, i t was recognized that what was needed on the issue of navigation through straits was a compromise "which would accommodate both the interests in passage and the concerns of strait states 40 regarding such problems as navigational safety and pollution." While favoring the position of the maritime states, the 1975 ISNT reflected an attempt at such a compromise. Under the ISNT, the right of transit passage would apply to a l l ships and aircraft passing through or over a strait used for international navigation which connected one area of the high seas or 41 economic zone with another area of the high seas or economic zone. Tran-s i t passage was defined as "the exercise in accordance with the provisions of this part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the 42 purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the s t r a i t . " A strait 43 state could neither hamper nor suspend transit passage. The ISNT also provided for strait state jurisdiction over the st r a i t . For example, a strait state could designate specific sealanes and separation schemes to promote safe navigation. It could also establish regulations regarding: (1) safety of navigation; (2) prevention of pollution; (3) pre-vention of fishing; and (4) taking on board or putting overboard of anything which contravened i t s customs, f i s c a l , immigration or sanitary regulations.^ The strait state, however, could not use these regulations to discriminate 45 against any ship or to impair i t s right of passage. A nonsuspendable right of innocent passage would apply in a l l straits used for international navigation other than those mentioned above in which transit passage would 46 apply. In spite of these provisions, many strait states continued to oppose unimpeded passage through straits stating that the straits were part of their t e r r i t o r i a l seas and, as a result, should be covered by the regime 169 47 of innocent passage. During the negotiations in 1975, the Chinese sided with these strait states in supporting innocent passage through straits 48 which were part of the strait state's t e r r i t o r i a l sea. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines also called for greater strait state rights 49 over the regulation of strait passage. While the issue of international navigation through straits was discussed during the two UNCLOS III sessions in 1976, no major additions or changes were made to the relevant provisions in the 1975 ISNT. Hence, the 1976 RSNT was essentially the same as the ISNT on these issues. 5^ According to the Chairman of Committee II, Andres Aguilar of Venezuela, the informal discussions on straits at the f i f t h session in the summer of 1976 "showed that chapter II /of the RSNT dealing with straits used for inter-national navigation/ appear/ed_7 to provide an acceptable negotiating basis for the great majority of delegations." 5 1 However, several strait states continued to press for greater control over navigation through straits in order to attain "a better balance between their interests and the interests 52 of users of the s t r a i t s . " The Chinese also expressed their support for greater strait state control over navigation (i.e., a regime of innocent 53 passage) at both the fourth and f i f t h sessions in 1976. By the sixth session of UNCLOS III in 1977, most of the strait states who had earlier argued in favor of a regime of innocent passage in straits used for international navigation had softened their positions and continued to press only for amendments to the transit passage regime. Therefore, the 54 ICNT provisions on transit passage remained the same as those in the RSNT. During the discussions, the strait states also dropped their insistence that submarines be required to navigate on the surface through s t r a i t s . 5 5 170 Throughout the negotiations on strai t s , China's position closely resembled that of many of the developing strait states. In addition, the Chinese were highly c r i t i c a l of the position of both the US and USSR that free transit should be allowed in straits used for international navigation which were located within the t e r r i t o r i a l waters of coastal states. For example, Shen Wei-liang stated that in demanding 'freedom of transit' and 'freedom of overflight' for foreign ships and aircraft, whether c i v i l i a n or military, the super-Powers were seeking to treat t e r r i t o r i a l waters as the high seas, so as to ensure their maritime hegemony.56 One of the most strongly worded of China's attacks occurred during the Caracas session in 1974 when the Chinese representative said that the ideas of ' a l l ships' and 'free passage' as advocated by the super-Powers were designed to enable their warships and nuclear submarines to cross the oceans of the world in implementation of their expansionist policies and their strategy of world hegemony. If that design were carried out, not only would the sovereignty of the straits States be infringed, but the peace and security of the world as a whole would be threatened.^ Archipelagoes Many of the states affected by both the t e r r i t o r i a l sea and straits issues were those forming an archipelago. During the SBC meetings, several archipelagic states including F i j i , Indonesia, and the Philippines claimed that states comprised of island groupings such as theirs should have the right "'to regard the waters between and around their islands as one single 5 8 unit.'" They also claimed that innocent passage should apply to a l l vessels within their t e r r i t o r i a l seas and that this passage could be 59 restricted to specific corridors. The UK's proposal on archipelagoes, like that of F i j i , etc., also applied only to island states; however, i t restricted the delimitation of their t e r r i t o r i a l seas to the areas enclosed by the use of straight baselines. It also allowed for the continuation of 171 6l free passage within these waters i f i t had existed prior to the convention. During the early discussions on archipelagoes, the Chinese adopted a position closely resembling that of archipelagic states such as Indonesia. In i t s 1973 working paper, the Chinese stated that "an archipelago or an island chain consisting of islands close to each other may be taken as an integral whole in defining the limits of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea around i t . " ^ 1 Thus, the Chinese supported the archipelagic states' claims to expanded jurisdiction over surrounding waters, while at the same time, stressing the need for moderation in their claims. As pointed out by Charles Bethill, "this /was7 very typical of the general Chinese approach which /was/ to accord maximum deference to sovereign state action subject only to the tests 6 2 of necessity and reasonableness." This 1973 working paper included China's only direct statement during the f i r s t six sessions of UNCLOS III on the issue of archipelagoes. In 1974 at Caracas, the discussions on archipelagic states continued to center on the two issues of their seaward limits and rights of navigation within and flight over their t e r r i t o r i a l waters. A l l proposals included the archipelagic state's right to use straight baselines to enclose i t s outermost islands. However, some proposals attempted to place limits on which islands could be included. The major concern was that states would unreasonably apply the straight line c r i t e r i a to far-flung small islands. Therefore "among the c r i t e r i a proposed /to avoid this situation werej 63 land-to-water ratios and precise maximum lengths for archipelagic lines." The problems associated with navigation and overflight in archipelagic states were analogous to those discussed above regarding straits. For the most part, archipelagic states, like other strait states, opposed the complete freedom of transit advocated by several maritime states such as the US and USSR. One proposed solution to these problems was to allow free transit through and over archipelagic states as long as this passage • ^ . i • 64 was restricted to specified transit lanes. A precise definition of an archipelago was f i n a l l y proposed at Geneva and included in the 1975 ISNT. According to Article 117 (2) (b) of Part VII, Section 1, an archipelago is a group of islands, including parts of islands inter-connecting waters and other natural features which are so closely inter-related that such islands, waters and other natural features form an in t r i n s i c geographic, economic and p o l i t i c a l entity, or which histor i c a l l y have been regarded as such.65 Archipelagoes which form an integral part of the territory of a continental state, however, were not covered by ISNT provisions Specific c r i t e r i a were also set forth in the 1975 ISNT regarding the 67 drawing of baselines around archipelagic states. The waters enclosed 68 by these baselines would be referred to as "archipelagic waters." In addition, "within i t s archipelagic waters, the archipelagic State may draw 69 closing lines for the delimitation of internal waters." The rights of archipelagic states within their archipelagic waters would basically be the same as those of other states in their t e r r i t o r i a l seas. That i s , they would have jurisdiction over not only the water, but also the airspace 70 above i t and i t s seabed and subsoil. The right of innocent passage would apply to a l l navigation within archipelagic waters. The archipelagic state could also temporarily suspend innocent passage of foreign ships " i f such suspension /were_7 essential for the protection of '/the state's.7 71 security." As in straits used for international navigation, the ISNT stated that archipelagic states could designate specific sealanes for sea 72 t r a f f i c . (Passage through designated sealanes could hot be suspended.) 173 In spite of the progress made at Geneva towards agreement on provisions regarding archipelagoes, they were s t i l l not acceptable to a l l states. For example, the Japanese were s t i l l concerned with preserving their historic fishing rights within newly enclosed archipelagic waters and the Soviet 73 Union continued to disagree with provisions restricting vessel t r a f f i c . As with the negotiations on navigation through straits, the discussions on archipelagoes at the fourth and f i f t h UNCLOS III sessions in 1976 did not result in any new compromises. Hence, the 1976 RSNT reflected the same views as expressed in the earlier ISNT. It was not unti l the 1977 negotia-tions that states most concerned with the question of archipelagoes were able to reach a general agreement on the previously contentious issues. This new agreement was incorporated into Part IV of the ICNT, According to the 1977 ICNT, the creation of sealanes within archipela-gic waters would not affect the status of archipelagic waters or the sovereign rights of archipelagic states over these waters, the airspace above them, 74 or the seabed below. Secondly, provisions in the ICNT revised earlier RSNT articles regarding the rights of states adjacent to archipelagic states. Under the RSNT, i f the drawing of . . . baselines enclose/d_7 a part of the sea which /had7 traditionally been used by an immediately adjacent neighbouring State for direct access and a l l forms of communi-cation, . . . the archipelagic State /must7 continue to recognize /these rights_7.75 The ICNT, however, referred only to cases where "the archipelagic water of an archipelagic State lies between two parts of an immediately adjacent 76 neighbouring State." In these cases, the neighboring state would retain a l l of the rights i t had traditionally exercised in the area as well as any rights which were stipulated in agreements between the states. Finally, in two areas, the drawing of baselines around archipelagic states and the 174 designation of sealanes in archipelagic waters, the basic principles remained the same as in the RSNT with only the details of these calculations 77 being revised in the ICNT. In general, throughout the UNCLOS III negotiations, China's position on archipelagoes referred only to the basic principle that the islands comprising these states should "be taken as an integral whole" in defining the states' 78 t e r r i t o r i a l seas. This provision was included in the 1975 ISNT and was carried over into the 1977 ICNT. Contiguous Zone A fourth major area of discussion in Committee II was the issue of coastal zones of special jurisdiction or, more specifically, the creation of contiguous and economic zones. The concepts of contiguous and economic zones are closely related in that depending upon the scope of coastal state jurisdiction in and the size of it s economic zone,'the concept of a con-tiguous zone could be superfluous. A contiguous zone is that area beyond the t e r r i t o r i a l sea in which a state may claim certain rights such as the establishment of f i s c a l and immigration regulations. Its main function "is to act as a buffer and 'checking' zone to make sure nothing i l l e g a l or detrimental to security interests takes place in the t e r r i t o r i a l sea or on 79 the territory of the /coastal_7 nation-state." The establishment of contiguous zones, which had been considered in 1958 at UNCLOS I, was not specifically discussed during the SBC meetings. During these meetings, the issue tended to be overshadowed by that of the creation of economic zones. As at the SBC negotiations, during the f i r s t six sessions of UNCLOS III, the issue of a contiguous zone became intertwined with that of an economic zone and, as a result, was not discussed extensively on it s own. However, 175 some support for the creation of a contiguous zone separate from an economic zone was s t i l l apparent during the negotiations. In response to this support, i t was stated f i r s t in the 1975 ISNT and later in both the 1976 RSNT and the 1977 ICNT that a coastal state could establish a contiguous zone of up to twenty-four nautical miles from its baselines. Within this zone, the coastal state would have the right to "exercise the control neces-sary to: (a) Prevent infringement of i t s customs, f i s c a l , immigration or sanitary regulations within i t s territory or t e r r i t o r i a l sea; /and/ (b) 80 Punish infringement of the above regulations." The Chinese delegation at UNCLOS III did not make a specific statement on the creation of a contiguous zone. However, i t may be inferred from their support of the Latin American states' claims to 200-mile t e r r i t o r i a l seas that they did not have any strong objections to it s creation. Economic Zone The primary impetus for the creation of an economic zone was the need "to assure the coastal State jurisdiction and rights over the exploration 81 and development of a l l resources within the zone." Negotiations on the economic zone centered around the issues of: (1) i t s size; (2) the resources to be encompassed within the zone and the extent of coastal states' rights over them; and (3) access to zone resources for LL and GDS. With regard to the seaward limit of the economic zone, most states supported the distance of 200 nautical miles measured from a state's baselines. However, in some proposals this limit varied depending upon the resources under consideration. For example, in addition to a fisheries zone of 200 miles most Latin American states and states with broad continental margins wanted jurisdiction over seabed resources to extend beyond 200 miles to the edge of the continental margin. (The specific issue of continental shelf resources 176 w i l l be discussed in detail later.) On the other hand, some African and other coastal states (e.g., Canada, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, and Sri Lanka) called for preferential fishing rights for coastal states beyond 82 200 miles since many species of fis h migrate beyond the 200-mile limit. China presented i t s proposal on the creation of an economic zone on July 16, 1973. In it s working paper, China stated that a coastal State may reasonably define an exclusive economic zone . . . beyond and adjacent to i t s t e r r i t o r i a l sea in accordance with i t s geographical and geological conditions, the state of i t s natural resources and i t s needs of national economic development. The outer limit of the economic zone may not, in maximum, exceed 200 nautical miles measured from the baseline of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea.83 Thus, the Chinese sided with the majority of states who wanted a 200-mile maximum limit on the size of the economic zone. With regard to the extent of a coastal state's jurisdiction within i t s economic zone,during Subcommittee II's meetings, i t was generally agreed that the rights of a coastal state should extend to both living and non-living resources. This jurisdiction would also be exclusive in that "the coastal state would have discretion with respect to access to, and the 84 disposition of those resources." The Chinese agreed with this general position. According to their 1973 working paper, a l l natural resources within the economic zone of a coastal State, including living and non-living resources of the whole water column, sea-bed and it s subsoil, are owned by the coastal State. A coastal State exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its economic zone for the purpose of protecting, using, exploring and exploiting the resources as described /above/. 85 In spite of the general agreement on the scope of coastal state ju r i s -diction within the economic zone, there was a great deal of debate over how this jurisdiction should be exercised and the necessity to safeguard the interests of other states. This problem was especially evident in the discussions concerning coastal fisheries. In these discussions, there was general agreement that a new fisheries regime should promote: (1) fish 177 conservation; (2) the maximum safe u t i l i z a t i o n of fisheries stocks; and 86 (3)the.equitable allocation of the right to fish stocks. However, differences emerged regarding how to incorporate these broad principles into precise regulations. For example, who would be responsible for seeing that-stocks of highly migratory or anadromous species of fish such as tuna and salmon respectively were managed and who would be allowed to fish for them. Also, and perhaps more controversial, were the related issues "of accommo-dating the preference of two or more coastal states to the same stock . . . /and deciding/ who /could/ f i s h for portions of stocks subject to a coastal state preference that are not for the time being f u l l y u t i l i z e d by the 87 coastal state." These issues were brought out in the SBC proposals of several states. In separate but similar proposals, the US and Canada called for: (1) coastal state jurisdiction throughout the migratory ranges of anadromous species originating in the coastal state; (2) coastal state jurisdiction over coastal species; and (3) international and regional organizations to manage 88 highly migratory species such as tuna. The Soviet proposal supported the preservation of existing regulatory agencies for fish stocks and the creation of necessary new ones through agreements between the coastal state and other states fishing in the area. Regarding the allocation of fishery resources, the Soviets supported preferential rights over coastal species only for developing coastal states and for a l l coastal states over anadromous 89 species originating within their waters. The Japanese, who not only engage extensively in coastal fishing but also long distance fishing, supported the preferential rights of developing coastal states over stocks in offshore waters and indicated they might be willing to extend these rights to developed states. However, Japan also wanted highly migratory and 178 90 anadromous s p e c i e s exempted from t h e s e s p e c i a l r i g h t s . Many o f t h e d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e s d i d not submit s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s r e g a r d i n g f i s h e r i e s d u r i n g t h e SBC s e s s i o n s s i n c e t h e y s u p p o r t e d t h e g e n e r a l view t h a t , w i t h i n i t s economic zone, a c o a s t a l s t a t e s h o u l d have e x c l u s i v e f i s h e r y 91 r i g h t s . F i n a l l y , some LL and GDS e x p r e s s e d a p p r e h e n s i o n a t t h e concept o f a 200-mile e x c l u s i v e f i s h e r y zone s i n c e i t would cut o f f t h e i r a c c e s s t o f i s h w i t h i n 200 m i l e s from s h o r e . To a l l e v i a t e t h i s f e a r , some c o a s t a l s t a t e s p r oposed r e g i o n a l f i s h e r i e s or l i m i t e d a c c e s s f o r LL and GDS t o t h e 92 n e a r e s t c o a s t a l f i s h e r i e s . (The i s s u e o f LL and GDS a c c e s s t o t h e sea and i t s r e s o u r c e s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l l a t e r . ) In t h e i r SBC statements on f i s h i n g w i t h i n t h e economic zone, t h e Ch i n e s e , l i k e most o t h e r s t a t e s , s t r e s s e d t h a t c o a s t a l s t a t e s s h o u l d t a k e measures t o co n s e r v e s t o c k s . However, u n l i k e some s t a t e s , C h i n a "was c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e c o a s t a l S t a t e s were f u l l y c a p a b l e o f p r o t e c t i n g and 93 r a t i o n a l l y e x p l o i t i n g t h e f i s h e r y r e s o u r c e s o f t h e i r own economic zones." In a d d i t i o n , t h e C h i n e s e agreed t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n s were needed t o ensure t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f f i s h e r y r e s o u r c e s . L i k e the US, Canada, S o v i e t Union, and o t h e r s t a t e s , C h i n a a l s o suggested t h a t c o a s t a l s t a t e s w i t h i n a s p e c i f