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The concept of nature (tzu jan) in Kuo Hsiang and its antecedents Van Houten, Richard 1981

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THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (TZU JAN) IN KUO HSIANG AND ITS ANTECEDENTS by R i c h a r d Lee van Houten B.S. C a l v i n C o l l e g e , 1968 M.A. U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago, 1974 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department o f A s i a n Studies) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard. THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January, 1981 (c) R i c h a r d L. van Houten, 1981 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f an advanced deg ree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t ha the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Depar tment o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Depar tment The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1WS i i ABSTRACT THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (TZU JAN) IN KUO HSIANG AND ITS ANTECEDENTS SUPERVISOR: P r o f e s s o r D a n i e l L. Overmyer Kuo Hsiang (d. A/D'. 312) stands a t the t h r e s h o l d o f a major change i n Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y . He i s one of the l a s t g r e a t f i g u r e s i n the mainstream o f Chinese thought b e f o r e the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f Buddhist i d e a s . He a l s o stands at the end o f a h a l f - c e n t u r y o f l i v e l y i n t e l l e c t u a l ferment, and might be seen as the capstone of t h i s mini-epoch. He i s u s u a l l y regarded as one who t r i e d to s y n t h e s i z e the p o l a r i t i e s o f n a t u r a l i s m and conformism i n the l a t e t h i r d c e ntury. He a c h i e v e d t h i s s y n t h e s i s i n p a r t by u s i n g the term t z u j an, c o n c e i v i n g i t as the most fundamental r e a l i t y knowable to man. Thus he borrowed a term r i c h i n meaning f o r the n a t u r a l i s t s and b u i l t an ontology which must have p l e a s e d the c o n f o r m i s t s i n i t s a p p r o v a l of s o c i e t a l s t r u c t u r e s . The n a t u r a l i s t s o f the t h i r d c e n t u r y p o p u l a r i z e d the e x p r e s s i o n t z u j a n through a r e v i v a l o f the study of the Lao  t z u and the Chuang t z u . Yet i n t h i s pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e t z u  j an i s not a major concept, and i t i s c e r t a i n l y not merely on the b a s i s o f renewed i n t e r e s t i n these t e x t s t h a t t h i s e x p r e s s i o n became paramount i n the t h i r d century. Rather the n a t u r a l i s t s are h e i r s to developments i n the Han dynasty, p r i m a r i l y the thought o f the s k e p t i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t Wang Ch'ung and t h a t o f the Huai nan t z u , a c o l l e c t i o n of T a o i s t w r i t i n g s from the l a t e second century B.C. ° T h i s i s how the t h e s i s i s org a n i z e d . In Chapter I the problem i s d e f i n e d . There i s a b r i e f a n a l y s i s o f the term t z u j a n , showing some of i t s p o t e n t i a l uses. I t i s then compared w i t h a Western concept o f nature i n which nature i s seen as v i r t u a l l y e q u i v a l e n t to law. A l l the occurrences o f t z u j a n i n pre-Han p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e a re analyzed and two fundamental uses are d i s c o v e r e d . F i r s t , s i n c e t z u j a n l i t e r a l l y means " s o - b y - s e l f " , i t may be used to i n d i c a t e -to independence. When a p p l i e d ^ t h i n g s c o s m i c a l l y u n i v e r s a l , such as the Tao, t z u j a n i s a mark of a r e l i g i o u s a b s o l u t e . Secondly, when a p p l i e d to c r e a t u r e s , t z u j a n i n d i c a t e s the n a t u r a l s t a t e of t h i n g s , t h a t i s , c r e a t u r e s as they e x i s t without i n t e r f e r e n c e from o t h e r c r e a t u r e s . Chapter I I deals w i t h the l i t e r a t u r e o f the Han dynasty. In the Huai nan t z u , there i s a j o i n i n g t o g e t h e r of these two themes of pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e . The n a t u r a l s t a t e o f c r e a t u r e s i s g i v e n the a t t r i b u t e s of independence and r e l i a b i l i t y . Tzu  ja n became the i n d i c a t o r or guarantee of the more ge n e r a l T a o i s t understanding t h a t the n a t u r a l s t a t e of c r e a t u r e s i s the means of g a i n i n g knowledge of the Tao. Wang Ch'ung added the i d e a that t z u j an a l s o i m p l i e d s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n . Wang made t z u j a n an a t t r i b u t e of ch' i , the fundamental substance o f the u n i v e r s e . i v Chapter I I I d e a l s w i t h the t r a n s i t i o n from the Han dynasty to the Wei-Chin p e r i o d . The T a o i s t t e x t s o f the Hsiang-erh commentary on the Lao t z u and the T ' a i - p ' i n g ching take the step o f making t z u j a n an a t t r i b u t e of the Tao i t s e l f , on a par w i t h terms l i k e v o i d o r o r i g i n . In the Wei-Chin p e r i o d , Wang P i used t z u j a n to i n d i c a t e the most fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o r h i g h e s t p o i n t o f the realm o f being. I t i s t h at i n the realm of b e i n g which r e f e r s beyond i t s e l f to the realm o f non-being, or the Tao. Juan C h i v i r t u a l l y s u b s t i t u t e s the concept o f t z u j an f o r Tao, making i t the l i m i t l e s s , n a t u r a l b a s i s f o r a l l r e a l i t y . Hsiang H s i u a l s o t r i e d to make t z u j an an u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e , but f a i l e d to r e c o n c i l e the n o t i o n o f s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n i m p l i e d by t z u j a n w i t h the concept o f Tao as o r i g i n . Chapter IV d e a l s w i t h the thought o f Kuo Hsiang. Kuo r e j e c t e d the realm o f non-being as the o r i g i n o f r e a l i t y . Being was seen as an e n t i r e l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , s e l f - e x i s t i n g realm. Although v i r t u a l l y r e j e c t i n g the concept o f Tao, Kuo Hsiang r e t a i n e d the T a o i s t sense o f n a t u r a l a c t i o n as more fundamental than c o n t r i v e d a c t i o n , viewing t z u j an as a v i r t u a l e q u i v a l e n t o f cosmic law, the p r i n c i p l e under which a l l r e a l i t y o p erates. Chapter V concludes the t h e s i s , summarizing Kuo 1s dependence on the Han dynasty and p r o p o s i n g three t h e o r e t i c a l p a t t e r n s to understand Kuo. He i s analyzed as both a s k e p t i c and a myst i c , and a g e n e r a l comparison i s made between h i s type of t h i n k i n g and the European theme of the a p r i o r i . V. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. Pre-Han concepts of tzu jan A. Introduction 1. The Issue 1. 2. The Western concept of nature 6. 3. Other Chinese expressions for "nature" 9. 4. An i n i t i a l exploration of tzu jan 11. B. The Lao-tzu 14. C. The Chuang tzu 28. D. Other pre-Han texts: The Hslin tzu, the LU Shih ch'un ch'iu7~EKe Mohist Canon, and the Kuan tzu 40. E. Summary 51. Chapter I I . The Han dynasty A. Introduction 54. B. the Huai nan tzu 59. C. Tung Chung-shu 79. D. The t r a n s i t i o n to Wang Ch'ung: Yang Hsiung and Huan T'an 82. E. Wang Ch'ung 88. 1. the concept of c h ' i 91. 2. Ch'i and the concept of heaven 100. 3. Ch'i and the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u a l i t y 104. 4. Fate 111. 5. The concept of nature 114. 6. Nature and h i s t o r y 7. T h e r o l e o f t z u j a n Chapter I I I . From Wang Ch'ung to Kuo Hsiang A. I n t r o d u c t i o n B. Wang Ch'ung and the p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c s Wang Fu, Chung-ch-ang T'ung, T s ' u i Shin C. Wang Ch'ung and the T a o i s t s : Kao Yu the Ho shang kung commentary, the Hsiang-erh commentary D. The d i s c o v e r y of the Lun Heng and the Ch'ing-chou s c h o o l E. Wang P i , Juan C h i , and Hsiang H s i u Chapter IV. Kuo Hsiang A. Biography and Method B. A l l o t m e n t (fen) and u l t i m a t e ( c h i ) ( ^  ) C. Ming "g? , the sage, and the t r a c e s ( c h i ) ( ^ ) D. Being (wu/yu) and p r i n c i p l e s ( l i ) ( % ^ , I f ) E. Tzu j a n F. The concept o f nature Chapter V. C o n c l u s i o n A. Kuo Hsiang's i n f l u e n c e B. Kuo Hsiang's dependence on the Han dynasty C. B a s i c p a t t e r n s i n Kuo Hsiang 1. S k e p t i c i s m 2. M y s t i c i s m 3. The a p r i o r i v i i . 4. Summary Remarks 247. B i b l i o g r a p h y 249. Appendix I The Kuo Hsiang t e x t s 271. Appendix I I The Luri Hehg t e x t s 293. 1. CHAPTER I THE CONCEPT OF NATURE (TZU JAN) IN PRE-HAN LITERATURE THE ISSUE The o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s was to study the concept of nature i n the movement, Mystery L e a r n i n g , hsUan  hsueh ^ , of the t h i r d and f o u r t h c e n t u r i e s A.D. i n China. I t was c a l l e d Mystery L e a r n i n g because the s c h o l a r s i n the movement s t u d i e d the th r e e books o f mystery, the Lao t z u % Ir o r Tao te ching ^ '\% , the Chuang t z u tji $-and the I ching 4t& • The term came to r e f e r to anyone whose language and concepts r e l a t e d to the Mystery. As a movement i t c r o s s e d t r a d i t i o n a l s c h o o l l i n e s and i n c l u d e d both c o n s e r v a t i v e m o r a l i s t s and r a d i c a l n a t u r a l i s t s . I t was my i n t e n t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r to demonstrate Mystery Lear n i n g ' s dependence on the developments i n the Han dynasty. Many s c h o l a r s view Mystery L e a r n i n g as be i n g r e l a t e d i n some way to the O l d Text s c h o o l o f Confucianism i n the L a t t e r Han dynasty. Fung Yu-lan suggests t h a t the Old Text school was n a t u r a l i s t i c , although why i t w i t h i t s p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i s m should be more n a t u r a l i s t i c t h a t the New Text school w i t h i t s c o s m o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s on Y i n yang, the f i v e phases, and I ching hexagrams i s r a t h e r p u z z l i n g . For Fung n a t u r a l i s m a p p a r e n t l y means t h a t nature i s impersonal•and not t h a t n a t u r a l t h i n g s p l a y a dominant r o l e i n determining c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . Thus the New Text s c h o o l i s not n a t u r a l i s t i c 2. because i t s view of nature i s magical and non-empirical i n Fung's opinion. He also c a l l s Mystery Learning Neo-Taoism, which he says i s a term of convenience to di s t i n g u i s h i t from o r i g i n a l Taoism. But whether i t i s a v a r i a t i o n of Taoism or Confucianism i s s t i l l a matter of debate. Over the l a s t few decades a number of eminent scholars, T'ang Yung-t'ung, Eri k ZUrcher, and Mou Jun-sun among others have been working to e s t a b l i s h the l i n k between the thought of the Han dynasty and the subsequent Wei-Chin period. ZUrcher suggests that the v i c t o r y of the Old Text school over the New Text school at the end of the Han meant the downfall of Confucian metaphysics, that i s , of cosmological yin-yang and f i v e phases speculation. Because the Old Text school r e s t r i c t e d i t s e l f to p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l questions, a vacuum was l e f t i n Confucianism. This was f i l l e d by material from outside the Confucian t r a d i t i o n , whose main ro l e was to f i l l i n gaps i n 2 Confucianism. Thus ZUrcher conceives Mystery Learning as e s s e n t i a l l y an attempt to modify Old Text Confucianism by adding Taoist concepts. Donald Holzman's studies of Juan Chi and Hsi K'ang also confirm the thesis that these so-called n a t u r a l i s t s and students of Mystery Learning were e s s e n t i a l l y Confucians. He argues that they were l o y a l i s t s to the imperial 3 house, alienated by a m i l i t a r y dictatorship. The thesis of Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, II (Leiden: E. J. B r i l l , 1953) p. 168. 2 E r i k ZUrcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, (Leiden: E. J. B r i l l , 1959) P. 46. of these s c h o l a r s i s b u i l t on two k i n d s o f a n a l y s i s . F i r s t , t here are s t u d i e s , such as Holzman's, o f the s c h o l a r s o f Mystery L e a r n i n g which show t h e i r b a s i c Confucian o r i e n t a t i o n . Second, there are s t u d i e s , such as those o f T'ang and Mou, which demonstrate p e r s o n a l , h i s t o r i c a l connections between Mystery L e a r n i n g and the Old Text s c h o o l . However, the p h i l o s o p h i c a l connections between Mystery L e a r n i n g and Han dynasty thought has o n l y been l i g h t l y e x p l o r e d . There has been l i t t l e demonstration t h a t s p e c i f i c concepts of the t h i r d century A.D. depend on conceptual development of the f i r s t and second c e n t u r i e s . T h e r e f o r e , I set out to demonstrate t h a t the development of the concept o f nature i n the t h i r d century depended on developments i n the Han dynasty and c o u l d not be i n t e r p r e t e d as a mere recombination o f pre-Han i d e a s . I began my work with two persons, Kuo Hsiang (d. A.D. 312) and Wang Ch'ung (ca. A.D. 27-ca. 97). Kuo Hsiang i s u s u a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d as a f i g u r e who s y n t h e s i z e d the two wings of Mystery L e a r n i n g and who produced the most c l e a r and s y s t e m a t i c e x p o s i t i o n of the thought of the movement. Because he stands a t the end of the era, h i s w r i t i n g seems almost weary w i t h the sense t h a t t h i s has a l l been s a i d before.^ 1" Yet h i s thought i s independent Holzman, Donald, La V i e e t l a Pensee de H s i K'ang (223-262 Ap. J.C.) (Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1957) and P o e t r y  and P o l i t i c s : the L i f e and Works o f Juan C h i , A.D. 210-263, (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976) ^ R i c h a r d Mather, A New Account of T a l e s of the World, 4. from h i s contemporaries and worthy of a n a l y s i s . Wang Ch'ung was the renegade Confucian o f the Han dynasty. Although he was not an expert i n the c l a s s i c s , he i s i d e n t i f i e d g e n e r a l l y w i t h the O l d Text s c h o o l of c l a s s i c a l e x e g e s i s . In t h a t he was somewhat f a m i l i a r w i t h a l l of the c l a s s i c s , he was p a r t of a group o f men whose broader l e a r n i n g was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the O ld Text s c h o o l . Wang, however, was a l s o a s k e p t i c and a r a t i o n a l i s t who h e l d no gre a t reverence f o r the a n c i e n t s and borrowed f r e e l y from non-Confucian sources as he saw f i t . In s p i t e o f h i s b r i l l i a n c e , he remained on the f r i n g e s o f s c h o l a r l y s o c i e t y i n h i s l i f e t i m e and was v i r t u a l l y unknown f o r a ce n t u r y a f t e r h i s death. In p a r t i c u l a r I began to study the concept o f t z u j an § fuV , which i s prominent i n both of these men. In modern Chinese the term t z u j a n , or i t s expansion, t a t z u j a n means the n a t u r a l world, the complex of animal, p l a n t and p h y s i c a l t h i n g s ( i n c l u d i n g , o f course, the sky and e a r t h as p h y s i c a l t h i n g s ) . I t i s g e n e r a l l y understood t h a t t h i s sense d e r i v e s from i t s standard c l a s s i c a l sense o f " n a t u r a l " or "spontaneous". But i n view o f the f a c t t h a t these l a t t e r meanings are s t i l l d e r i v a t i v e and not y e t the most l i t e r a l , one o f the q u e s t i o n s w i t h which I approached the l i t e r a t u r e (Minneapolis, 1976) suggests t h a t i n the e a r l y f o u r t h century, Mystery L e a r n i n g was "jaded w i t h c l i c h e s " . I n t r o d u c t i o n , p. xxv. I t i s a l s o the main t h e s i s o f E. Ztircher's "The Buddhist  Conquest o f China t h a t Buddhism o n l y made inroads i n t o the Chinese l i t e r a t i w i t h the advent of the f o u r t h century. 5. i s to ask a t what p o i n t t h i s d e r i v e d meaning became common-p l a c e . Since i t was a t e c h n i c a l , p h i l o s o p h i c a l term i n both Kuo Hsiang and Wang Ch'ung, I d i d not wish to b e g i n the study-by assuming t h a t I understood i t s meaning. T h i s q u e s t i o n l e f t me no a l t e r n a t i v e but to go f a r t h e r a f i e l d to search f o r the o r i g i n a l development o f t h i s term. As I s h a l l show i n p a r t s of these f i r s t two chapters, t z u j an was not always a f i x e d e x p r e s s i o n . When i t developed i n t o an e x p r e s s i o n , i t s meaning was s t i l l some d i s t a n c e from "the n a t u r a l world", and perhaps c o u l d not even be thought of as " n a t u r a l " . Very l i t e r a l l y the e x p r e s s i o n means " s e l f -so". Tzu | L means " s e l f " i n c l a s s i c a l Chinese. I t may be used b e f o r e a verb, such as j a n ffi , e i t h e r as a r e f l e x i v e pronominal adverb or as a r e f l e x i v e pronominal o b j e c t . In the f i r s t case i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t the s u b j e c t i s d e f i n i t e l y i n v o l v e d i n the a c t i o n of the verb. In E n g l i s h grammar we sometimes c a l l t h i s the emphatic sense, as i n , f o r example, "I myself do such-and-so...." The second case i s making o n e s e l f the o b j e c t as w e l l as s u b j e c t of the verb, as i n " I h i t myself." The word j a n 3 £ means " t o be so" or " t o be i n a c e r t a i n way". I t i s f r e q u e n t l y used as an a f f i r m a t i v e r e p l y - - " T h a t ' s r i g h t . " or "That's the way i t i s . " I t r e f e r s then to the mode of being r a t h e r than the f a c t of being. The occurrence of t z u j a n as two words can mean e i t h e r the s u b j e c t i s of h i m s e l f t h a t way, or the s u b j e c t regards h i m s e l f as r i g h t . When nomin a l i z e d , the e x p r e s s i o n i n d i c a t e s an a c t i o n whose mode of being i s due 6 . to the s u b j e c t . In p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms, t z u j an can be conce i v e d as a p r i n c i p l e o f i d e n t i t y . I t i s t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a t h i n g which p r e s e r v e s i t s i d e n t i t y over time. I t s "so-ness", the "how" of i t s being, i s guaranteed by an i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e . Tzu j an can then a l s o be understood as s e l f - i d e n t i t y . THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF NATURE How do we get from an a b s t r a c t i o n o f "mode o f being due to the s u b j e c t " to " n a t u r a l " ? In a c e r t a i n way the answer i s obvious. I f the nature o f a t h i n g i s something i n the t h i n g which makes i t the way i t i s , to the extent t h a t i t i s so of i t s e l f , i t i s e x p r e s s i n g i t s nature and i s t h e r e f o r e " n a t u r a l " , as opposed to something f o r c e d by e x t e r n a l circumstances. But when we say "nature", what do we mean? The term "nature" i n both i t s Greek and L a t i n usages i s one of the most fundamental and s e m a n t i c a l l y r i c h e s t words i n our European h e r i t a g e . A r t h u r 0. Lovejoy t r a c e s the development of the word "nature" i n e a r l y Greek thought as f o l l o w s . The o r i g i n a l sense o f p h y s i s , "nature", was probably " b i r t h " , o r " o r i g i n " , but t h i s sense was q u i c k l y l o s t and i s o n l y h i n t e d at i n extant l i t e r a t u r e . In the e a r l i e s t l i t e r a t u r e p h y s i s a l r e a d y meant " q u a l i t y " , the what of a t h i n g , a meaning perhaps d e r i v i n g from a sense o f i n n a t e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . From t h i s sense o f i n n a t e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , which c o u l d be i n d i v i d u a l and temporary, there developed the i d e a t h a t p h y s i s r e p r e s e n t e d r e a l or permanent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The r e a l n ature was thought 7. to be more fundamental than the occasional wayward deed or appearance. Among the physiologists, those who speculated on "nature", physis became the inherent element i n things, the underlying substance which might not be apparent. Every-thing was thought to be reducible to something more fundamental, the l a t t e r being the thing's nature. Hence physis came to ref e r to the fundamental, objective r e a l i t y of the external world. In c u l t u r a l a f f a i r s , i t came to be contrasted with homos, the subjective rules and laws of custom. Whereas these nomoi varied from man to man and culture to culture, physis came to designate the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s common to a l l men, a description of the permanent, universal conditions of human l i f e . I t came to be used for e t h i c a l as well as physiological universals, so that by the end of the f i f t h century B.C., physis was being used with the sense "the cosmic system as a whole", or at least, the laws thereof. "Nature" was roughly equated with the gods and became quasi divine. ~* Thus there i s nearly an i d e n t i t y between nature and law. Thereafter Greeks used "nature" frequently because i t tended to invest t h e i r ideas with a self-evident authority. That which was according to nature was true and good. Thus, as R. G. Collingwood also points out, "nature" o r i g i n a l l y meant the nature of things and only l a t e r the aggregate of natural things. ^Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Primitivism and Related Ideas i n  Antiquity, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935) pp. 103-109. 8. Collingwood suggests that we i n the West have had three p r i n c i p a l views of Nature (in the sense of the Natural World). From Greek times u n t i l the Renaissance, we have viewed nature as an organism. From the l a t e Renaissance, beginning with Copernicus and Gali l e o , nature was seen as a machine. F i n a l l y , under the influence of Darwin, Bergson, and Whitehead, nature was seen as an evolutionary process, a h i s t o r i c a l progression. A l l of these models have i n turn been applied to Chinese thinking i n an attempt to generalize Chinese views of nature.^ In each of these models, nature as a whole i s conceived as an analogy of something of which man has more s p e c i f i c , empirical knowledge. While some of the analogies might be v a l i d for Chinese thought, there i s a danger i n supposing that the Chinese understand the analogy i n the same way. The clearest example of what I mean may be the 'machine' model. In the West t h i s i s a post-Christian development which requires a law-giver outside the cosmos, a maker of the machine. The world as machine i s "an arrangement of bodily parts designed and put together and set going for a d e f i n i t e purpose by an i n t e l l i g e n t mind outside i t s e l f . " I f one suggests that a certain thinker i n the hi s t o r y of Chinese thought i s mechanistic, perhaps because he has conceived the cosmos as running according to a bR.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945) p. 44. ^Certainly a comparison with Whitehead's process philosophy i s increasingly popular. A glance through the issues of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy or Philosophy East and West w i l l show many explorations of this comparison. o Collingwood, Idea of Nature, p. 5. 9. regular rule without personal interference on the part of a creator, w i l l not a Westerner think of "the i n t e l l i g e n t mind" outside of the machine? One can place a l l kinds of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s on the model, but i t seems to me that as many problems are caused as are solved. In my opinion, comparisons between cultures are best made when they are made of more s p e c i f i c , less abstract problems. I have i n mind such problems as the problem of unity and d i v e r s i t y or subject and object. Here at least entire conceptions are not involved, and we are comparing how a part functions i n a whole rather than a whole to a whole. I f we are to be empirical, we only hinder ourselves by seeking analogues on too large a scale, and prevent the discovery of new models for nature which have never developed i n the West. OTHER CHINESE EXPRESSIONS FOR 'NATURE' Whether one thinks of nature as the p r i n c i p l e i n a thing or as the natural world, the cosmos, pre-han Chinese thought already had several words besides tzu j an to express these ideas. The term used to express the inner p r i n c i p l e of a s p e c i f i c thing i s hsing ^EL . A.C. Graham defines i t as a thing's "proper 9 course of development during i t s process of sheng ( l i f e ) " . I t i s the course of ongoing development, not a s t a t i c , innate p r i n c i p l e received at b i r t h . For "the way one i s at b i r t h " 'A. C. Graham, "The Mencian theory of human nature," • hua hsUeh pao j f U M M , VI (1967) p. 218. . 1 0 . the Chinese have a second term ku , the o r i g i n a l . ^ The concept o f h s i n g was the s u b j e c t o f hot debate f o r s e v e r a l c e n t u r i e s o f Chinese philosophy. A l l debaters accept t h a t i t i s man's nature to feed h i m s e l f and keep h i m s e l f from harm; h i s b o d i l y p l e a s u r e and comforts belong to h i s h s i n g . The debate c e n t e r s on the f a c t t h a t s i n c e heaven p r o v i d e s one's h s i n g , i s o r i s not m o r a l i t y i n c l u d e d i n i t ? For " nature" i n the sense of the n a t u r a l w o r l d there are s e v e r a l terms. T ' i e n , heaven, i s perhaps most w i d e l y used. O r i g i n a l l y an anthropomorphic d e i t y , i t came to be used as the source o f order o u t s i d e o f man. When s k e p t i c i s m d e p r i v e d i t o f i t s p e r s o n a l i t y , as i n Hsiln t z u f o r example, i t comes to mean the n a t u r a l order. However, i t never seems to i n c l u d e the e a r t h as the world o f n a t u r a l t h i n g s below, f o r which the e x p r e s s i o n wan wu % , the ten-thousand t h i n g s , was common. Wan wu, as a c o l l e c t i v e term f o r a l l t h i n g s , sometimes i n c l u d e d man and sometimes not, a c c o r d i n g to con c e p t i o n of the w r i t e r . In the Lao t z u , the Tao \ ^ f u n c t i o n s as the source o f n a t u r a l order. Tao can a l s o mean a way of conduct i n oth e r w r i t i n g s , but e v e n t u a l l y i t was taken over by the T a o i s t s as t h e i r word f o r the u n i v e r s a l one which l i e s a t the fo u n d a t i o n o f the world. The term used to c h a r a c t e r i z e the " s t u f f " o f the u n i v e r s e i s ch' i . Coming out of Warring S t a t e s n a t u r a l i s m o r F i v e I b i d . p. 218 11. Elements t h i n k i n g , c h ' i o r i g i n a l l y meant " a i r " or "breath", but i t was e a r l y g i v e n cosmic p r o p o r t i o n s . I t became the b a s i c s t u f f o f the u n i v e r s e which d i v i d e d i n t o y i n and yang c h ' i through the process o f condensation and r a r e f a c t i o n . AN INITIAL EXPLORATION OF TZU JAN J u s t how t z u j an r e l a t e s to these other terms w i l l become c l e a r e r o n l y i n the course o f t h i s study. But begin n i n g w i t h the p a r s i n g o f the grammatical s t r u c t u r e which I d i d above, we can a l r e a d y draw c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s about the b a s i c meaning. We may e l i m i n a t e one p o s s i b i l i t y from c o n s i d e r a t i o n immediately. When t z u j a n means " t o re g a r d o n e s e l f as r i g h t " , i t has no r e l a t i o n to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l development of the term. I t does not bear the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to nature t h a t we have a l r e a d y mentioned, and i n f a c t occurs o n l y once i n the l i t e r a t u r e I have examined. When t z u j a n means "being so of o n e s e l f " , there i s an immediate semantic r e l a t i o n to nature. That which h s i n g t-fe- expresses, namely, the in n e r p r i n c i p l e by which a t h i n g develops i n the course of i t s l i f e , i m p l i e s t h a t to the extent a t h i n g i s the e x p r e s s i o n o f t h a t i n n e r p r i n c i p l e , i t i s an e x p r e s s i o n o f i t s e l f . We assume, of course, t h a t one's nature, i f not e q u i v a l e n t to one's deepest s e l f , i s at l e a s t thought o f as p a r t of the s e l f . S e m a n t i c a l l y , t h e r e f o r e , one co u l d d i s c u s s one's nature, h s i n g , i n terms of self-development and hence " s e l f - s o - n e s s " . T h i s i s not to say t h a t something l i k e "the s e l f - s o " or " s e l f - s o - n e s s " i s the i n n e r p r i n c i p l e , 12. but o n l y t h a t t z u j a n i s a s u i t a b l e a d j e c t i v e to be used as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f n a t u r e . A second meaning, however, may be more important than the f i r s t . Tzu j an takes p a r t of i t s meaning through c o n t r a s t w i t h i t s o p p o s i t e , s h i h j a n 'fjr* ^ , to cause to be so. What we s h a l l f i n d i s t h a t t z u j a n comes to mean independence as opposed to dependence. When t h i s i s extended to a cosmic s c a l e , t z u j a n i n t h i s sense of independence s i g n a l s an a b s o l u t e . I t r e f e r s to a f i x e d p o i n t , an arche. which i s u t t e r l y r e l i a b l e , because i t r e l i e s on n o t h i n g o t h e r than i t s e l f . Now we can see t h a t i f a t h i n k e r does i n f a c t a p p r o p r i a t e t h i s sense of t z u j a n , he may not wish to apply i t a l s o to h s i n g , the n a t u r e of s p e c i f i c t h i n g s , f o r hsirig would l i k e l y be subordinate to a h i g h e r p r i n c i p l e such as heaven or Tao. Although t h i s t h e s i s w i l l concern i t s e l f p r i m a r i l y w i t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems, t h i s sense o f t z u j a n shows us t h a t we cannot t h i n k of p h i l o s o p h y i n an i n t e l l e c t u a l vacuum. In a l l p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e i s t h a t which p o i n t s to a deeper l e v e l , namely, r e l i g i o n . By t h i s I mean th a t a man must f i n d something to r e l y on. His d e c i s i o n , expressed or i m p l i e d , about what i s u l t i m a t e l y r e l i a b l e , i s a r e l i g i o u s d e c i s i o n , r e g a r d l e s s of what k i n d of reasons he f i n d s f o r t h a t d e c i s i o n or what process he goes through to get to i t . I t i s o n l y n a t u r a l t h a t t h i s d e c i s i o n i s r e f l e c t e d i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y when he begins to t h i n k about the o r i g i n and n ature of the cosmos and man. He w i l l 13. have to g i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p r e s s i o n to h i s own r e l i g i o u s l y determined s t a r t i n g p o i n t . When p h i l o s o p h i c a l concepts come c l o s e to t h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t , these concepts become more important through t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p . They p o i n t o u t s i d e the p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n to the r o o t s of the person's b e l i e f . An example from Greek p h i l o s o p h y may i l l u m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t i e s here. The word a p e i r o s has two d i f f e r e n t d e r i v a t i o n s , one meaning "without e x p e r i e n c e " or "unaquainted with", and the second meaning "unbounded" or " u n l i m i t e d " . T h i s l a t t e r sense i s the one t h a t becomes a p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem. In p r e - p h i l o s o p h i c a l uses, as i n Homer, t h i s word i s an a d j e c t i v e d e s c r i b i n g the sea and the e a r t h ; there i t i n d i -c a t e d t h a t there was no boundary to be seen on the o t h e r s i d e . In p h i l o s o p h i c a l usage, although t h i s term c o u l d be and was a p p l i e d to subjects, f o r example, Empedocles 1 d e n i a l that the e a r t h was deep without limit,"'""'" when i t was a p p l i e d to o b j e c t s , i t became a powerful concept. For Anaximandros, to a p e i r o n , the l i m i t l e s s , the boundless, became the indeterminate, u n i t a r y o r i g i n of determinate d i v e r s i t y . The i n d e t e r m i n a t e was an i n d e t e r m i n a t e o b j e c t which i n divergence became determinate o b j e c t s . The f a c t t h a t o b j e c t s came from the l i m i t l e s s gave them an ascendance over s u b j e c t s ; o b j e c t s were i n c a p a b l e of being o n t o l o g i c a l l y exhausted. Even the gods as s u b j e c t s -""""Kathleen Freeman, A n c i l l a to the Pre-So era t i c  P h i l o s o p h e r s , (Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1948) Empedocles, no. 38, p. 57. 14. 12 were l i m i t e d by i t . The term t z u j an has the p o t e n t i a l to be an i n d i c a t o r of an a b s o l u t e , s i n c e i t expresses the r e l a t i o n o f independence. I s h a l l devote the r e s t of t h i s chapter to examining i n what way t z u j a n developed i n the c l a s s i c a l p e r i o d of Chinese philosophy,by examining a l l the occurrences of t z u j a n i n pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e , t h a t i s , l i t e r a t u r e o f the t h i r d century B.C. or e a r l i e r . THE LAO TZU The Lao t z u i s a t e x t which a c c o r d i n g to most c r i t i c a l s c h o l a r s h i p dates to about the f o u r t h century B.C., although i t may r e f l e c t some e a r l i e r trends o f thought. We cannot say whether i t i s e a r l i e r or l a t e r than the Chuang t z u , a l s o from the m i d - f o u r t h century, but we can observe t h a t s i n c e the term t z u j a n does not appear b e f o r e these two t e x t s , i t appears i n Chinese l i t e r a t u r e a t a: comparatively l a t e date f o r such a fundamental term. The concept of nature i n the Lao t z u i s a much broader s u b j e c t t h a t I can d e a l w i t h i n t h i s paper. To d i s c u s s nature i n the Lao t z u i s i n f a c t to d i s c u s s the e n t i r e ontology of the work. Nature i s dominant throughout; c u l t u r e i s at b e s t a d e r i v a t i o n , at worst a c o r r u p t i o n , o f nature. The many concepts a s s o c i a t e d w i t h nature, such as harmony, change, T h i s summary i s based on D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, (Franeker, The Netherlands, 1950), pp. 230-232, 238-240. 15. permanence, g e n e s i s , are t r e a t e d to some degree i n every study of Taoism, but I w i l l r e f e r to these broader concepts o n l y as they might r e l a t e to a p a r t i c u l a r passage under d i s c u s s i o n . I s h a l l r e s t r i c t my d i s c u s s i o n to the f i v e occurrences o f tz u j an i n the Lao t z u and, i n order to i l l u m i n a t e the meaning of t z u j an, to an a n a l y s i s o f t z u 4 , s e l f , as a r e f l e x i v e pronominal adverb. In t h i s a n a l y s i s I s h a l l t r y to d i s c o v e r from the context f i r s t , whether t z u j an. i s one word or two, and second, i f i t i s one word, does i t a l r e a d y mean " n a t u r a l " or "spon-taneous" . Since the Lao t z u and the Chuang t z u jf£ 3- , are the e a r l i e s t sources i n which the two c h a r a c t e r s t z u and j a n occur together, i t i s l e g i t i m a t e to ask whether t h a t l a t e r meaning o f the term t z u j an i s a l r e a d y p r e s e n t i n i t s e a r l i e s t uses. The most d i f f i c u l t i n s t a n c e o f t z u j a n i n the Tao t e ching i s i n Chapter 25. The passage concerned reads as f o l l o w s Man models h i m s e l f on e a r t h , e a r t h models i t s e l f on heaven, heaven models i t s e l f on the Tao, but the Tao onl y repeats the way i t i s o f i t s e l f . 1 3 A S£N *V , ±<n K M $,1% >K & • 13 I have used s e v e r a l e d i t i o n s o f the Lao t z u . My b a s i c t e x t was the Ssu pu p e i yao e d i t i o n w i t h Wang P i ' s commentary. I used the c r i t i c a l e d i t i o n o f the Ho shang kung t e x t by Cheng Ch'eng-hai i% , Lao t z u Ho shang kung chu chiao l i £ \ }S[ -t ;i |$-*f(Taipei: Chung-hua Book Co. , 1971). I c o n s u l t e d the c o l l e c t i o n of stone i n s c r i p t i o n s by Chu C h ' i e n - c h i h j ^ |J| ^_ , Lao t z u chiao s h i h £ ^ ^ | f . 16. We must not be m i s l e d by the p a r a l l e l grammatical s t r u c t u r e of t h i s passage. Since we know more or l e s s what man, e a r t h , heaven, and Tao mean,can we add the term t z u j a n to t h i s l i s t and presume i t makes a f i f t h element? A r e c e n t d i s s e r t a t i o n by Wang H s i e n - c h i h i n f a c t makes t h i s c l a i m . Wang argues t h a t t z u j an i s an independent r e a l i t y which transcends even the Tao. * He supposes t h a t s i n c e we can a t t a c h some k i n d o f h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r to the f i r s t f o u r elements, the p a r a l l e l i s m should l e a d us to p o s t u l a t e the f i f t h element 14 as the h i g h e s t i n the s e r i e s . Wang i s not the f i r s t to suppose t h i s . L i YUeh ( f 1 . ca. A.D. 1231), i n h i s new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s passage, says t h a t everyone e l s e i n h i s day was r e a d i n g t h i s sentence as i n d i c a t i n g f i v e elements. Kao Heng f i r s t drew my a t t e n t i o n IS 16 to t h i s . He r e f e r s to L i YUeh's Tao te chen chin g h s i n chu. as the source of an a l t e r n a t e p u n c t u a t i o n of the sentence as f o l l o w s : Man models h i m s e l f on e a r t h , on heaven, on the Tao, and thus on n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s . F i n a l l y , I compared these w i t h the s i l k manuscripts found at Ma wang t u i a, as p r i n t e d i n Yen L i n g - f e n g ^ , Ma wang t u i po shu Lao t z u s h i h t ' an J | , £ ^ %f> %% ( T a i p e i : Ho-luo t ' u shu Publ. Co. 1976) ' ' "Sjang H s i e n - c h i h 5- ;^ , Tao te c h i n g c h i h t z u j a n  kuan c h i c h ' i shen-hsUeh y i - y i ^ j l ? %t (Tainan, Taiwan: Southeast A s i a T h e o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n . 1978) See pp. 67 f f . 17. L i devotes most of h i s p r e f a c e to an e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s passage. He says t h a t i n i m i t a t i n g e a r t h , heaven, and Tao, man i m i t a t e s t h e i r n a t u r a l , s u b t l e p r i n c i p l e s , t z u j a n miao l i & if£v &')r 3-%. t and thus orders the world. As f o r the r e p e t i t i o n of the words e a r t h , heaven, and Tao, he compares i t to oth e r r e p e t i t i o n s i n the language such as chUn chUn ch'en ch'en ^ ^ . T h i s he says, i s the o n l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which avoids making ' f i v e g r e a t s ' i n the p l a c e the f o u r , Tao, heaven, e a r t h , and k i n g , mentioned i n the main t e x t j u s t p r e v i o u s to t h i s sentence. L i r e p o r t s t h a t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n making ' f i v e g r e a t s ' was p r e s e n t i n a l l twelve schools of h i s day. I f L i i s c o r r e c t i n h i s remarks about h i s contemporaries, Wang Hsi e n - c h i h ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s an o l d , e s t a b l i s h e d one. However, i t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e whether t h i s sentence has any c o n n e c t i o n w i t h what precedes o r f o l l o w s i t . King, wang 3~ , i s l i s t e d as one of the f o u r g r e a t s , whereas man, j en , i s l i s t e d i n the s e r i e s we are c o n s i d e r i n g . L i e x p l a i n s the d i s p a r i t y between " k i n g " and "man" by say i n g t h a t i t means tha t o n l y a man who models h i m s e l f on these three n a t u r a l 17 p r i n c i p l e s can become k i n g . Kao Heng emends j en to wang c l a i m i n g t h a t the i n s e r t i o n o f j e n stems to the Wang P i Kao Heng « \ , Lao-tzu cheng ku % % IE , Peking, 1956 pp. 61-62. 1 6 L i YUeh £ | 0 , Tao te chen ching h s i n chu ^  i% $^ %W %k - i . , (A new commentary on the True C l a s s i c of Tao and Te) , Tao tsang ^ ^ , neng shang _t. , 375 t s ' e JJj-18. t e x t (ca. A.D. 240). However, the newly d i s c o v e r e d Ma wang  t u i t e x t s , v e r s i o n s of the Lao t z u which date to the e a r l y second century B.C., l e a d us to r e j e c t t h i s emendation. Both of the Ma wang t u i t e x t s g i v e j en and not wang. The Ho L i ' s argument t h a t i t i s p a r a l l e l to o t h e r r e p e t i t i o n s i n the language doesn't bear up. Kao r e c o g n i z e d t h i s and emended the t e x t a g a i n by dropping one of the two terms i n each case. However, s i n c e the Ma wang t u i t e x t s support the p r e s e n t t e x t here, the emendations seem u n j u s t i f i e d . Rather, i t i s Kao's t h e o r e t i c a l model which i s a t f a u l t . L i YUeh was probably c o r r e c t i n t h a t he d i d not want to c o n s i d e r t z u j an as a s p e c i a l e n t i t y p a r a l l e l to the o t h e r f o u r t h i n g s mentioned. But h i s main argument f o r t h i s depends on the semantic c o n n e c t i o n to the p r e c e d i n g sentences i n the t e x t . Such a c o n n e c t i o n i s tenuous a t best; a t c e r t a i n o t h e r p o i n t s i n the Lao t z u s i m i l a r l y proximate sentences have p r a c t i c a l l y no connection. L i d i d not wish to make t z u j an a t h i n g above the Tao, but seemed to have no qualms about u s i n g i t as a synonym f o r the Tao. But s i n c e L i produced no c o r r o b o r a t i o n from the Lao t z u i t s e l f , I am not prepared to accept t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n . The Ho shang kung commentary, the e a r l i e s t complete commentary, e x p l a i n s the l a s t phrase of the sentence s a y i n g , "The nature o f the Tao i s t h a t way o f i t s e l f ; t h ere i s n o t h i n g shang kung t e x t a l s o reads j e n . 18 As f o r the p u n c t u a t i o n , 17 19. which i t imitates." ( \J. t ^ , #1 ; i A. ) i f "there i s nothing which i t Imitates," then we cannot conceive of tzu j an as a substantial e n t i t y which i s i n some way imitated. I f we were to read the Ho shang kung's use of tzu  jan as "nature", we would be a step away from the meaning. The sentence already has one word for nature, hsing , the proper course of development for a thing. Tzu j an would have to mean nature i n another sense which cannot be determined from th i s passage. Nor can we, from any concept of nature whatsoever, make the l o g i c a l jump to "there i s nothing which i t imitates". Hence we must read tzu j an as I have translated i t . Therefore, the sentences i n both the Ho shang kung commentary and the Lao tzu r e f l e c t the fact that Tao i s the ultimate r e a l i t y and that i t i s the way i t i s on i t s own authority. E l l e n Marie Chen, i n her d i s s e r t a t i o n Tao, Nature, Man, 19 devotes a great deal of attention to this chapter. However, she does not seek the development of the meaning of tzu j an as a composite term. She analyzes the two words separately, and then combines the two etymologies to get "so-by - s e l f " 20 or "so-changing-by-self". She assumes that from the f i r s t appearance of the two terms together, i t already expresses c h i a o l i . 19 Chen, E l l e n Marie. Tao, Nature, Man: a Study of the Key  Ideas i n the Tao te ching. Fordham University, Ph.D. 1966. See esp. pp. 64-85 for a discussion of Chapter 25. 2 0 I b i d . p. 66. 20 some cosmic p r i n c i p l e : "Tao... i s pure spontaneity." 2 1 Having i d e n t i f i e d tzu jan with nature, she further equates i t with heaven and earth, as a c o l l e c t i v e term f o r nature. Thus she reads t h i s passage--"Nature follows Tao, Tao follows nature By not examining the p o s s i b i l i t y that tzu jan might be two word she i s forced to engage i n some mental gymnastics: Tao i s the p r i n c i p l e i n nature, meaning the natural world. But since nature i s s e l f -becoming i t s e l f , i t i s again the p r i n c i p l e of Tao.23 It i s recognized already by the Han F e i tzu, dating to the late t h i r d century B.C., that the permanent Tao of Chapter 1 of the Lao tzu i s one that i s "not subject to change and has no permanent q u a l i t i e s ; having no permanent q u a l i t i e s and no s p a t i a l i t y , i t cannot be t o l d of." I t would be inconsistent with t h i s concept of Tao to hypostatize tzu jan as a permanent qu a l i t y of the tao. At best tzu jan could be a description of the non-dependent character of the Tao as perceived by beings which are dependent. When Chen c a l l s tzu  jan an i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e of the Tao, t h i s i s some measure i n c o n f l i c t with the i n e f f a b i l i t y of the Tao. I f the Tao cannot be named, can we r e a l l y conceive of i t s i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e ? Not-naming surely means not-conceiving. Man cannot extend ^• xIbid. p. 67. 2 2 I b i d . p. 65. 2 3 I b i d . pp. 67-68. 2 4Han f e i tzu ^  * % , Ch. 20, "Chieh Lao" £ 6.9a. The t r a n s l a t i o n i s that of Max Kaltenmark (and of him, Roger Greaves), Lao tzu and Taoism, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969) p. 31. 21. h i s a n a l y t i c a l a c t i v i t y to the Tao which produced i t . At bes t he can t h i n k o f and name the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f Tao to man, or the v i s i b l e a c t i v i t y o f the Tao. When used to name t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p , the term t z u j a n expresses the n e g a t i v e o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s which dependent c r e a t u r e s experience a l l the time i n the world. They are dependent; the Tao i s not. Although the form o f the e x p r e s s i o n s e l f - s o , t z u j a n , i s p o s i t i v e , the o n l y content we can g i v e i t i s ne g a t i v e , t h a t i t i s not i n f l u e n c e d by anything o u t s i d e o f i t s e l f . Even the language we use i f we t r y to d e s c r i b e the Tao i t s e l f i s a n a l o g i c a l language. I f the Tao cannot be named, how can we speak o f the s e l f o f the Tao? In the end the meaning o f t h i s sentence i n Chapter 25 i s u n c l e a r . We can, f o r example, o n l y guess a t the content o f the phrase, "Man models h i m s e l f on the e a r t h . " Presumably i t i s e q u i v a l e n t to the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f man to the e a r t h i n other passages o f the Lao t z u , but nowhere e l s e i s t h i s verb f a , to model, used. There i s some form o f h i e r a r c h y here, but the Tao must be the end of the order. There i s no room i n the Lao t z u f o r a r e a l i t y which transcends Tao. The Tao i s a law unto i t s e l f ; i t i m i t a t e s o n l y i t s e l f and hence c o n t i n u a l l y r e p e a t s i t s e l f . The i d e a o f the Tao r e p e a t i n g i t s e l f echoes what occurs e a r l i e r i n Chapter 25, namely, t h a t the Tao " r e v o l v e s c y c l i c a l l y without being remiss. 25 ). The Tao 25 The Chung wen t a t z ' u t i e n ( T a i p e i : 22. rotates about i t s e l f , or reverses on i t s e l f . The next occurrence of tzu jan which I w i l l discuss comes at the end of Chapter 17. There we read: Hesitating, do I not value my words, accomplish my task and things get done? And the people a l l say that I am this way of myself. -tt * 11 & f * y JSM MJL te'.. 26 The subject of this paragraph i s obscure. Although I have trans-lated i t as a f i r s t person narrative, i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been interpreted as a t h i r d person narrative, whose understood subject i s the sage-king. In this paragraph the wordwei "to say that", "to c a l l ( i t ) " i s a d i f f i c u l t word. In c l a s s i c a l Chinese of this period, i t does not introduce d i r e c t quotations. A l l interpreters that I have seen understand the term wo , " I , (we)" to have the people, pai hsing as i t s antecedent. However, this would imply the presence of a d i r e c t quotation and i s therefore gram-matically impossible. However, the logic of the sentence suggests that wo can only have an antecedent i f the entire sentence i s a di r e c t quotation. Such a s i t u a t i o n occurs, for example i n Mehcius 1.1.7, i n which King Hsllan of Ch'i says, " I t i s natural that the Bureau for Study of Chinese Culture, 1968) quotes the Lao tzu  shih wen ^ 3^- (unavailable to me) as glossing t a i "^ "o as t a i , meaning lazy, remiss, or negligent. E. M. Chen, Tao, Nature, Man, pp. 73 f f . has a s i m i l a r interpretation. 2^The Wang P i text reads yu h s i ^ w "anxious", i n place of y_ujj|3} . Another variant of y_u j^B[ i s y_u , which commentators gloss as having the same meaning. I follow the Ma  wang t u i texts, both of which read yu^jSj , along with numerous versions c i t e d i n Chu Ch'ien-chih, Lao tzu chiao shih. 23. people say t h a t I am s t i n g y . " ( 4 ^ I) d_ % % • ^ -i^U0 ) There i s no i n d i c a t i o n , however, here i n the Lao  t z u t h a t t h i s sentence i s p a r t of a d i r e c t q u o t a t i o n . Although the c o ntext may have n o t h i n g to do w i t h t h i s sentence, the r e s t of the chapter i s w r i t t e n w i t h a t h i r d person s u b j e c t , and thus g i v e s no support f o r an argument t h a t t h i s i s a d i r e c t q u o t a t i o n . However, one may argue that i n the Lao t z u , there i s an a l t e r n a t i o n of s u b j e c t throughout. Some passages appear to be a f i r s t person n a r r a t i v e , the s u b j e c t of which i s a wise man, although not a k i n g . Other passages are t h i r d person n a r r a t i v e w i t h e i t h e r a sage-king or the people as s u b j e c t . In some cases, such as Chapter 49, these p o i n t s of view w i l l a l t e r n a t e w i t h i n the same chapter. I b e l i e v e t h i s i s a l s o the case i n t h i s chapter. The sentence under c o n s i d e r -a t i o n must be t r e a t e d as an i s o l a t e d epigram i n f i r s t person n a r r a t i v e . T h i s i s the o n l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which does not a r b i t r a r i l y emend the t e x t . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t z u j an a l s o poses a problem. Since he p l a c e s the word i n the mouth of the people, we do not know whether he a f f i r m s the sentence h i m s e l f , or whether he i s r e f e r r i n g t o a common popular ( m i s ) c o n c e p t i o n . In e i t h e r case, i t i s i m p l i e d t h a t the wise man's v a l u i n g o f words and accomplish-i n g o f h i s t a s k i s t h a t which he does o f h i s own accord. Thus r i g h t a c t i o n or p r e s c r i b e d conduct i s governed by the s u b j e c t ' s n a t u r a l s t a t e , the way he i s i n h i m s e l f . There i s no s u g g e s t i o n 24. of a cosmic independence, a r e l i g i o u s e l e v a t i o n of a n a t u r a l s t a t e o f being, but o n l y the o r d i n a r y a s s e r t i o n t h a t the wise 27 man i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the conduct o f h i s own a f f a i r s . In Chapter 51 there i s a c l e a r and l e n g t h y context f o r the use of t z u j a n : Tao g i v e s them l i f e , Te r e a r s them, matter g i v e s them shape, and circumstances complete them. T h e r e f o r e the c r e a t u r e s a l l honor Tao and v a l u e Te. As f o r the honoring o f Tao and the v a l u i n g o f Te, no one gave t h i s p o s i t i o n to them, but they have always been th a t way o f themselves. % W t * f i t T5i | t t . & *. %, i t . i . |, * % *. % , % ^ i t * . 28 At t h i s p o i n t , t z u j a n e s s e n t i a l l y means " n a t u r a l l y " or "spontaneously". To t r a n s l a t e the l a s t phrase "they have always been t h a t way n a t u r a l l y " does not seem to a l t e r the meaning. I t h i n k t h i s i s because the e x p l a n a t o r y phrase "no one gave t h i s p o s i t i o n to them" makes the meaning p e r f e c t l y c l e a r . The p o i n t i s t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g g r e a t e r or deeper Z 7D. C. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (Penguin, 1969), a l s o i n t e r p r e t s t z u j a n as n a t u r e . I note i n p a s s i n g t h a t T'ang ChUn-i, "Lun Lao t z u yen ' f a Tao' c h i h ssu ts'eng-mien" -"^ ^ |-a PM lS_J W (£ (Four l e v e l s o f " i m i t a t i o n o f the Tao" i n the Lao t z u ) , The J o u r n a l of the I n s t i t u t e of  Chinese Studies ( 4» (g -fc -ft. m % 1% ^ ), The Chinese U n i v e r s i t y o f Hong Kong, 1 (Sep., 1968) 171-207, has an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i m i l a r to mine. See e s p e c i a l l y pp. 175-176. The problem w i t h the verb wei was f i r s t drawn to my a t t e n t i o n by E. G. P u l l e y b l a n k . 25. than the Tao. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of Tao and Te to the myriad c r e a t u r e s of the world does not depend on a t h i r d agent. I a l s o note t h a t i n t h i s case t z u j an i s not an a b s t r a c t p r o p e r t y of Tao and Te but a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Tao-Te and the c r e a t u r e s o f the world. The f o u r t h use of t z u j an occurs at the opening o f Chapter 23 and i s extremely c r y p t i c . I t reads: I t i s spare o f words and s e l f - s o . Wang P i r e l a t e s t h i s to Chapter 14. " L i s t e n e d t o , i t cannot be heard. I t i s c a l l e d 'soundless' ( h s i ^  ) . " 2 9 Thus Wang takes i t as a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the Tao. Paul L i n t r a n s l a t e s 30 the phrase, "To spare words i s to be n a t u r a l " . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a l s o suggested by the Ho shang kung commentary and i s c e r t a i n l y p o s s i b l y . S t r i c t l y speaking, we have no way o f knowing who or what i s s p a r i n g o f words. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine any connec t i o n between t h i s s h o r t sentence and e i t h e r what f o l l o w s i t or, as Kao Heng suggests, what precedes i t i n Chapter 22. We might connect the i d e a of sp a r i n g o f words to the Sage-king's v a l u i n g o f words which we saw i n Chapter 17. I f i t i s the Sage-king who i s s p a r i n g of I r e a d chlieh ^ i n p l a c e o f mihg . Ming o c c u r s i n the Wang P i t e x t ; both Ma wang t u i v e r s i o n s and numerous others read chUeh. Wang h i m s e l f notes t h a t other t e x t s read chlieh. 29 Here I f o l l o w P aul L i n , A T r a n s l a t i o n o f Lao tzu ' s Tao  Te Ching and Wang P i ' s Commentary, (Ann Arbor: U n i v e r s i t y o f Mich i g a n Center f o r Chinese S t u d i e s , 1977), p. 42. 3 0 I b i d . 26. words, then i t i s he who i s d e s c r i b e d as t z u j a n . But nowhere e l s e i s the Sage-king d e s c r i b e d as t z u j a n , and we can only-guess at the meaning. I l e a n towards the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Wang P i and r e g a r d the s u b j e c t of the sentence as the Tao. In the end t h i s example p r o v i d e s no evidence i n any d i r e c t i o n f o r the q u e s t i o n I am posing. F i n a l l y , i n Chapter 64, a f t e r a d e s c r i p t i v e l i s t o f the Sage-king's a c t i o n s , the Lao t z u concludes t h a t the Sage, ...thereby a s s i s t s the n a t u r a l s t a t e o f a l l t h i n g s and does not presume to i n t e r f e r e . T h i s i s the o n l y passage i n the Lao t z u i n which t z u j an c l e a r l y r e f e r s to something other than the Tao or Te. I t i s a l s o the o n l y case i n which t z u j an i s c l e a r l y n o m i n a l i z e d . The n a t u r a l s t a t e of the c r e a t u r e s o f the w o r l d has been cor r u p t e d , presumably through m i s d i r e c t e d government, and r e q u i r e s the a s s i s t a n c e o f the Sage-king. However, t h i s a s s i s t a n c e excludes i n t e r f e r e n c e . The Sage accomplishes h i s task by d e s i r i n g o n l y not to d e s i r e and l e a r n i n g not to be l e a r n e d , thereby l e a v i n g the people f r e e to pursue t h e i r own course. The t z u j a n which the c r e a t u r e s then g a i n i s not a cosmic p r i n c i p l e , but i s a t y p i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h i n g s i n an i d e a l i z e d , p r i m i t i v e s o c i a l order. T h i s concept i s 3 1 T h e Ma wang t u i t e x t s both read neng ^ f o r i 4K but t h i s change does not s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r the meaning. c l e a r l y c o r r o b o r a t e d i n Chapter:57. Although t z u j a n i t s e l f does not occur there, s e v e r a l synonyms such as t z u hua ^ f b and t z u cheng %. jE- are a s c r i b e d to the people as a r e s u l t of the ki n g ' s n o n - a c t i o n , wu Wei ^ ) ^ , and l o v e o f s t i l l n e s s , hao ching £ \ From the h i n d s i g h t of h i s t o r y , we see t h a t i n those t h i n k e r s i n which t z u j a n i s an important concept, t h e r e i s an accompanying i n c r e a s e i n the use of t z u |\ as a r e f l e x i v e pronominal adverb. There i s an emphasis on the f a c t t h a t v a r i o u s k i n d s o f a c t i o n are done by o n e s e l f . In the Tao t e ching there are n i n e occurences i n f o u r d i f f e r e n t chapters 32 which f i t t h i s p a t t e r n . A l l o f these cases are a c t i o n s of persons o r t h i n g s i n i d e a l i z e d s o c i e t y , c l o s e to the sense of our study o f Chapter 64. I n s o f a r as t h i s p r i m i t i v e community i s i d e a l i z e d , i t a c t s as a model f o r human l i f e and, by e x t e n s i o n , a r u l e f o r human conduct. T h i s p a t t e r n a p p l i e s to the f o l l o w e r s o f the k i n g . The people's sense o f doing t h i n g s themselves i s to some extent an i l l u s i o n . They are happy i f they suppose they are doing the work themselves and do not r e c o g n i z e the work o f the Sage. In summary, th e r e a re two b a s i c uses o f t z u j a n i n the Lao t z u . The f i r s t i s t h a t o f Chapters 25 and 51 i n which t z u  j a n i n d i c a t e s the u l t i m a t e independence o f the Tao. The second one i s t h a t o f Chapters 17 and 64 i n which t h i n g s are so o f J See Chapter 32 (2 ti m e s ) , Chapter 37 (2 ti m e s ) , Chapter 57 (4 ti m e s ) , and Chapter 73 (1 time). 28. themselves i n an i d e a l s o c i e t y because the Sage-king does not i n t e r f e r e . THE CHUANG TZU The Chuang t z u i s a t e x t of which p a r t s are as o l d , o r even o l d e r , than the Lao t z u . By t r a d i t i o n i t was w r i t t e n by Chuang Chou, who p r o b a b l y f l u o r i s h e d sometime i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the f o u r t h century B.C.. I f he wrote any of the t e x t t h a t now s u r v i v e s , i t i s l i k e l y to have been the f i r s t seven chapters. Most s c h o l a r s agree t h a t the 'inner c h a p t e r s ' , the f i r s t seven, are the o l d e s t o f the work, although s e c t i o n s of the 'outer' and 'miscellaneous' chapters may be e q u a l l y o l d . However, h a r d l y anyone can d i s t i n g u i s h w i t h any c e r t a i n t y which these o l d e r s e c t i o n s might be. T h e r e f o r e , I s h a l l r e g a r d the 'inner chapters' as r e l i a b l e sources from the f o u r t h century B.C., and assume t h a t the remaining chapters, where they do not c l e a r l y agree w i t h the 'inner chapters', 33 belong to l a t e r p e r i o d s . The f i r s t o ccurrence of t z u j an i s i n Chapter 5, Te ch'ung f u ^ . T h i s passage has been c a r e f u l l y a nalyzed by A. C. Graham, i n order to demonstrate t h a t i n pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e ch' i n g •{£ always means "genuine" and n does not have the l a t e r meaning, " p a s s i o n s " . I t must be read "^Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968) i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n , pp. 13-16, has the b e s t E n g l i s h d i s c u s s i o n o f the composition of the book. A l s o see pp. 1-3 f o r i n f o r m a t i o n on the person Chuang t z u . 29. i n the l i g h t of Chuang tz u ' s r e j e c t i o n o f the f a l s e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f r i g h t and wrong, s h i h f e i 4 • Twice i n the context of t h i s passage he i d e n t i f i e s t h i s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as t h a t which i s gen u i n e l y man (jen c h i h ch* i n g ^ *f j^ ) and as t h a t which t h e r e f o r e separates him from other c r e a t u r e s i n the world. Chuang t z u says t h a t the sage has the form of a man but does not have t h a t which i s genuinely man. Because he has the form o f man, he a s s o c i a t e s w i t h men; because he i s without what i s gen u i n e l y man, r i g h t and wrong w i l l not be found i n him. At t h i s p o i n t the s o p h i s t Hui Shih o b j e c t s : how c o u l d he be a man and be without t h a t which i s gen u i n e l y man? A f t e r an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y answer and then a repeat o f the question, Chuang t z u r e p l i e s : Judging r i g h t and wrong i s what I mean by "genuine". When I say "being without t h a t which i s gen u i n e l y man", I mean t h a t a person does not take l i k e s and d i s l i k e s to inwardly wound h i m s e l f . He always accords w i t h the way he i s of h i m s e l f and does not add to h i s l i f e . & n% ft si •# *.. i tt if it. ^ u t 3 A-I have paraphrased the t e x t up to t h i s p o i n t based on the t r a n s l a t i o n o f A. C. Graham, "The Mencian Theory of Human Nature," Ch'ing hua hstieh pao ^ ^ j|3 ^ VI(196?), p. 261. I have a l t e r e d i t s l i g h t l y s i n c e Graham d i d not i n t e r p r e t the s u b j e c t of the whole d i s c u s s i o n as being the sage, but he understood i t as man i n g e n e r a l . Since the sage i s a model f o r human conduct, the p o i n t of the passage i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y changed. 35 A + Chuang t z u yi. t> , 2:23a-b. Compare the t r a n s l a t i o n of Watson, Chuang t z u , pp. 75-76. 30. Here t o f o l l o w o r accor d w i t h t z u j an seems to be the major c o n c l u s i o n of the argument. Chuang t z u c l e a r l y s e t s up two a l t e r n a t i v e ways; man may accept the g u i s e g i v e n by the Tao wi t h the form granted by heaven or f o l l o w the path o f c o n t r i v e d r i g h t and wrong, l i k i n g s and d i s l i k i n g s . Tzu j a n i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the former category. Tzu j an i s here a s u b s t a n t i v e , a n o m i n a l i z e d v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n . We may t h e r e f o r e ask who o r what i s the s u b j e c t o f t h i s e x p r e s s i o n . The f i r s t p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t the sage must f o l l o w the Tao, r e l y i n g on the s e l f - s o c h a r a c t e r o f the Tao. However, I b e l i e v e t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would c o n f l i c t w i t h the context. The sage i s the s u b j e c t o f the whole d i s c u s s i o n . I t i s he who has made the c h o i c e not to c o n t r i v e d i s t i n c t i o n s o f r i g h t and wrong. The focus i s thus on the l i f e of the sage and not on the r o l e o f the Tao. We must a l s o assume t h a t the meaning of the second c l a u s e of the l a s t sentence i s a t l e a s t complementary to the f i r s t . I f the sage adds n o t h i n g t o h i s own l i f e , he accords w i t h what i s giv e n to him. He adds n o t h i n g to i t s n a t u r a l course but goes along w i t h the way he i s of h i m s e l f . Hence, I b e l i e v e t h a t the s u b j e c t of t z u j a n i n t h i s passage must be construed as the sage. Tzu j an i s h e l d up as an i d e a l or model f o r a l l human conduct, or a t l e a s t an aspect of a model conduct. Of course, i n the Chuang t z u , model conduct i s the a b i l i t y to respond to change r a t h e r than a g i v e n s e t of moral i m p e r a t i v e s . 31. The other occurrence i n the 'inner chapters' i s i n Chapter 7, Ying t l wang Jfffi Iji iE. • o c c u r s g i v e n as an answer by the Nameless Man to T ' i e n Ken's q u e s t i o n on how to r u l e the world. L e t your mind wander i n s i m p l i c i t y , b l e n d your s p i r i t w i t h the vastness, f o l l o w along w i t h t h i n g s the way they are, and make no room f o r p e r s o n a l views--then the world w i l l be governed.36 6 !6j JL t jfa 3 - f i ^ r & &a Here the term t z u j a n a p p l i e s to c r e a t u r e s o u t s i d e o n e s e l f . I t i s not as i f t z u j a n i s a p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f Tao or man. I t i s r a t h e r o n l y one way among s e v e r a l o f e x p r e s s i n g the i n j u n c t i o n to i d e n t i f y w i t h the u n i v e r s e and flow w i t h change. Kuo Hsiang c a l l s our a t t e n t i o n to the passage from Te ch'ung f u ^ £f analyzed above, when he says t h a t " p e r s o n a l views" are the same as the d e s i r e to enhance one's l i f e , y_i sheng Jjt Q_ . C l e a r l y , t z u j a n expresses the way the wo r l d i s without human i n t e r f e r e n c e . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to make any great g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s about these examples. Tzu j an i s t i e d c l o s e l y to Chuang tzu's r e j e c t i o n of human d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , although i t i s not a concept which he uses to b r i n g h i s thought i n t o sharp focus. In c o n t r a s t to i t s use i n the Lao tzu, i t i s not connected to a conception of an i d e a l s o c i a l order, nor i s i t a cosmic I b i d . 3:16b. Compare Watson, Chuang t z u , p. 94. 32. p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e d to the Tao. Rather i t i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the manifested w o r l d when i n harmony w i t h the Tao. Of the remaining s i x cases, one i s i n a passage whose v a l i d i t y i s questioned. Commentators suggest i t was a Kuo 37 Hsiang comment which c r e p t i n t o the main t e x t . A second case occurs i n a passage whose date must be r a t h e r l a t e , perhaps from the former Han dynasty, as Burton Watson suggests. I t s mixing of Confucian and T a o i s t ideas i s f o r e i g n to most 38 of the Chuang t z u . A t h i r d case occurs i n the "Autumn F l o o d s " chapter. T h i s chapter i s v e r y c l o s e to the thought of the 'inner chapters', although i t seems more syst e m a t i c and r e p r e s e n t s e i t h e r the work of a d i s c i p l e or perhaps a l a t e r phase of Chuang tzu's own w r i t i n g s . In t h i s case t z u a c t s as a pronoun o b j e c t , and j a n f u n c t i o n s as a verb, " t o r e g a r d as r i g h t " . I t i s presented as a f a u l t o f Yao and Shun, and i s i n no way r e l a t e d to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l development of the 39 e x p r e s s i o n t z u j a n . In Chapter 16, Shan h s i n g j^jp *fi - » we are reminded of the Lao t z u . D e s c r i b i n g a world b e f o r e even the e a r l i e s t legendary emperors, a time when e v e r y t h i n g was i n harmony and a l l l i v e d without a r u l e r i n p e r f e c t u n i t y , t h e Chuang t z u concludes: " ^ I b i d . 5:20b. In Chuang t z u pu cheng, j/£ IE (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1947), 5 h s i a : 5b, L i u Wen-tien notes t h a t i t was suspected a l r e a d y i n the Sung dynasty. See a l s o Watson, Chuang t z u p. 56, no. 7, and Wang Hs i e n - c h ' i e n X % %% , Chuang t z u c h i - c h i e h ffi 2. jji , 1908 ( T a i p e i r e p r i n t : S h i h - c h i e h Book Co., 1965) p. 89. 38 I b i d . 10:5b. For suggested d a t i n g see Burton Watson, Chuang t z u , p. 15. 33. No one made i t t h i s way; i t was always t h i s way of i t s e l f . 4 0 t * * L % $ & . The p h r a s i n g i s v e r y c l o s e to that of the Tao te ching, Chapter 51, and the s o c i e t y d e s c r i b e d reminds us a l s o of Chapter 64, both d i s c u s s e d above. Although i t doesn't seem to be an o u t r i g h t c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h the cases o f 'inner chapters', the a s s o c i a t e d image o f a golden age i n a p r i m i t i v e p a s t i s f o r e i g n to the 'inner c h a p t e r s ' . In Chapter 14, T ' i e n ylin 5^ ^ , we f i n d something we have not yet encountered. In a long and somewhat obscure passage on music, there seem to be dimensions o r l e v e l s o f being suggested. Ch'eng of the North Gate r e p o r t s t h r e e r e a c t i o n s to the music of the Yellow Emperor; he i s f i r s t a f r a i d , then weary, and f i n a l l y confused. The Yellow Emperor r e p l i e s t h a t h i s music was tuned to d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . In the f i r s t stage i t responded to man, heaven, r i t u a l , p r i n c i p l e , and the g r e a t p u r i t y . T h i s produced f e a r . At the second stage, i t responded to Y i n and Yang, and the r e s u l t was weariness. In the t h i r d stage, the Yellow Emperor, The music p l a y e d then r e f l e c t e d chaos and o b s c u r i t y . I t "moved i n the d i r e c t i o n l e s s and r e s i d e d i n deep darkness. ...played i t w i t h the sound which i s without i d l e n e s s and harmonized i t by the decree which i s s e l f - s o . 4 1 I b i d . 6:9b. . See also?Watson, Chuang t z u , p. 180 Ibid.. 6:4a. Watson, Chuang tzu, p. 172. 34. Some c a l l i t death; some c a l l i t l i f e . ' I t i s c l e a r t h a t i t i s the Tao t h a t i s being t a l k e d about. The use o f wu t a i 7C, may a l s o be a v e i l e d r e f e r e n c e to Chapter 25 of the A O Lao t z u . But i t c o u l d a l s o be s a i d o f the f i r s t two stages t h a t they r e f l e c t the Tao; the language i s r e m i n i s c e n t o f othe r s e c t i o n s o f the Chuang t z u . Perhaps there are not three l e v e l s , but o n l y t h r e e k i n d s o f m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f Tao being t a l k e d about here. In t h i s i n s t a n c e t z u j an i s nomin a l i z e d , but i t s meaning i s not c l e a r , p r i m a r i l y because we do not know what i s meant by here by ming ^ , meaning command, decree, f a t e , d e s t i n y . Burton Watson t r a n s l a t e s t z u j a n c h i h ming 4 X.. ^ as "the command of sp o n t a n e i t y " . T h i s p l a c e s the semantic weight of the phrase on t z u j an. I t assumes t h a t t z u j an has come to mean the a b s t r a c t q u a l i t y o f spo n t a n e i t y . The f i r s t h a l f of t h i s sentence w i t h p a r a l l e l s t r u c t u r e , wu  t a i c h i h sheng v^, P^ / ^ , Watson t r a n s l a t e s as "unwearying notes". J u s t as sheng i s the primary o b j e c t o f concern i n t h i s phrase, so ming should be the p r i n c i p l e o b j e c t i n the second phrase, and t z u j a n o n l y a m o d i f i e r . Ch'eng HsUan-ying (T'ang Dynasty A.D. 618-906) suggests t h a t ming here means hsing-ming > one's f a t e d l i f e - s p a n . 4 4 T h i s does not seem c o r r e c t s i n c e the context nowhere r e f e r s t o i n d i v i d u a l s to whom t h i s d e s t i n y a p p l i e s . But i t seems analogous to the 4 1 I b i d . 5:21b. Watson, Chuang t z u , p. 157. 4 2 I b i d . 4 3 S e e the d i s c u s s i o n o f t a i and t a i i n f o o t n o t e 25 Decree of Heaven, t'ten mlng ^ ^ , translated into the V language of the Lao tzu. Ming, conceived as the decree of the Tao, does not r e l a t e here to the establishment of earthly-governments, but probably i n some way r e f l e c t s the necessity i n the working of the Tao. It implies that the actions of the Tao are beyond human control. Such a mlng i s the way i t i s of i t s e l f . We cannot read then, as Watson implies, that tzu j an i s a r e a l i t y which has i t s own mlng, i t s own power to command. What I suggest i s that tzu jan i s here, as i n other cases, a r e l i g i o u s l y loaded term which indicates the power inherent i n the Tao and the power available to the man who harmonizes with the Tao. Clearly the Yellow Emperor overwhelms Ch'eng with the power of his music. That power comes from a t r u l y independent Tao, whose necessary workings, mlng, are subject to no higher or outside influence. The l a s t occurrence i n the Chuang tzu i s i n Chapter 21, T'ien tzu fang gi \ ^ . In a response to a question of Confucius implying that even the perfect man had to have transmitted teachings about the Way i n order to c u l t i v a t e his mind, Lao Tan (one of the persons reputed to be the o r i g i n a l Lao tzu) r e p l i e s : Not so! Water's s e t t l i n g i n deep and clear pools45 i s not contrived and i t s a b i l i t y i s so of i t s e l f . As for the perfect man's r e l a t i o n with Te, he does not c u l t i v a t e i t , yet things cannot depart from him. It i s l i k e heaven's being high of i t s e l f , earth's being vast of i t s e l f , 44 , v See the su\X\j , explanation, on this passage i n Chuang tzu pu cheng, 6 shang: 9a. ^The meaning of shuo (or cho) i s quite obscure. The and the sun and moon be i n g of themselves b r i g h t . What does one c u l t i v a t e i n them?^° In the whole c o n v e r s a t i o n of which t h i s paragraph i s the c o n c l u s i o n , Lao Tan d e s c r i b e s the p e r f e c t man as one who o b t a i n s beauty and happiness by wandering i n the p r i m o r d i a l f l u x produced i n the harmonizing of y i n and yang. He i s the one who embraces the oneness of a l l c r e a t u r e s and knows what i s w i t h i n h i m s e l f . From t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n we might expect him to be a mountain hermit who r i d e s about i n the c l o u d s , but we are t o l d i n t h i s l a s t paragraph t h a t t h i n g s do not depart from him. T h i s i s r e m i n i s c e n t of the p o l i t i c a l theory of Mencius, who t e l l s us t h a t a k i n g need not expand h i s borders by war, but i f he i s benevolent, the people wi 11 a l l f l o c k to h i m . 4 7 In t h i s T a o i s t passage, the "people" become " a l l c r e a t u r e s " , and the l e a d e r -s h i p o f the p e r f e c t man i s not expressed as an o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n . Indeed h i s l e a d e r s h i p seems to be on a m y s t i c a l , cosmic s c a l e r a t h e r than a n a t i o n a l , p o l i t i c a l one. We are t o l d the p e r f e c t man does not c u l t i v a t e h i m s e l f and a l l c r e a t u r e s Chuang t z u s h i h wen (quoted i n Chuang t z u pu cheng) g l o s s e s i t as ch'U , to take. Watson t r a n s l a t e s i t as "murmuring", which i s s i m i l a r to G i l e s ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f i t as the sound o f water b u b b l i n g up, A C h i n e s e - E n g l i s h d i c t i o n a r y , (Shanghai, 1912). Ch'eng HsUan-ying says t h a t t h i s means water t h a t i s c l e a r and deep, cheng chan ^ ^ (quoted i n Chuang t z u pu  cheng). That I f o l l o w Ch'eng i s a somewhat a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e . f o l l o w him. By analogy w i t h the water, we may a l s o conclude t h a t the p e r f e c t man does not act, and the c r e a t u r e s of the world may then be s e l f - s o . T h i s complementary d i v i s i o n which a s s i g n s wu-wei to the l e a d e r s and t z u j a n to the f o l l o w e r s i s s i m i l a r to uses found i n the Lao t z u . However, th e r e seems to be an i n t e n t i o n a l ambiguity i n the meaning of wu wei here. Wu wei i s a t e c h n i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l term e v e n t u a l l y used by many w r i t e r s of pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e . I t can mean a g e n e r a l l a c k of p u r p o s i v e or i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n , and by e x t e n s i o n , a r e l u c t a n c e to engage i n any c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y . Or i t can mean the n o n - a c t i o n of a r u l e r as a technique f o r 48 r u l i n g . But both senses are p r e s e n t here. When d e s c r i b i n g water, the former sense i s the o n l y one t h a t can apply. But when by analogy wu wei i s a l s o a p p l i e d to the p e r f e c t man, the second meaning seems to apply. However, the p e r f e c t man needn't be a r u l e r , and the r e f e r e n c e to h i s r u l e i s i n t h i s case o n l y a v e i l e d one. Perhaps the author i s t r y i n g to say t h a t wu wei as a technique f o r r u l i n g i s n o t h i n g other than the non-contrivance o f n a t u r a l t h i n g s . We might a t t h i s p o i n t ask whether there i s a l o g i c a l c o nnection between wu wei and t z u Jan. I r a i s e the q u e s t i o n ^"Chuang t z u 7:18b. See Watson, p. 226. 4 7 M e n c i u s , IV.1.9 and 1,1,7.18. See The Four Books, Legge, James, t r . (New York; Paragon Book R e p r i n t Co,, 1966) pp. 704-706 and 462. 38. because some l a t e r Chinese t h i n k e r s , such as Wang Ch'ung (A.D. 27-97), commonly l i n k the two terms as a p a i r . But would a pre-Han t h i n k e r make such a connection? In t h i s case there i s a c l o s e j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f wu wei and t z u j a n , but I suggest t h a t there i s no necessary l o g i c a l l i n k . That water's behavior i s not c o n t r i v e d has n o t h i n g to do w i t h i t s b e i n g so of i t s e l f . The f i r s t term r e l a t e s whether or not t h e r e i s purpose i n the a c t i o n ; the second term i n d i c a t e s whether the a c t i o n i s caused from w i t h i n or without the s u b j e c t . Both p u r p o s i v e and non-purposive a c t i o n might be t z u j a n . I t i s o n l y when wu wei and t z u j an are d i s t i n c t i v e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r u l e r and s u b j e c t r e s p e c t i v e l y t h a t there i s some l o g i c a l c o nnection. There, i n the broken or f a l l e n s o c i e t y , the t z u j a n of the f o l l o w e r s can o n l y r e s u l t when the l e a d e r p r a c t i c e s . 4 9 wu wei. One could, as Watson does, t r a n s l a t e t h i s paragraph's use of t z u and t z u j a n as " n a t u r a l l y " . We must of course understand that there i s no expressed substance o r essence w i t h i n these t h i n g s whose nature i s here b e i n g g i v e n e x p r e s s i o n . Rather i t o n l y denies o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e . But i t i s n a t u r a l i n t h a t i t i s the way of being of a l l c r e a t u r e s w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of man. For t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , see H.G. C r e e l , "On the o r i g i n o f wu wei ^ v ^ ," What i s Taoism?, Chicago, 1970, p. 74. 49 Kao Heng a l s o remarks on t h i s . See h i s comments on the passage d i s c u s s e d above from Chapter 64, Lao t z u cheng ku 39. The denying of o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e i m p l i e d i n the e x p r e s s i o n t z u j a n can a l s o be connected t o Chuang tz u ' s understanding of names. Much of the excitement and i n t e r e s t o f the Chuang  t z u comes from h i s b e l i e f i n the a r b i t r a r i n e s s of naming. And the c o r o l l a r y o f t h a t b e l i e f i s t h a t s p e c i e s and genuses do not e x i s t , except i n man's im a g i n a t i o n . For Chuang t z u , th a t which makes a horse a horse i s merely the human a c t i v i t y of naming. There i s n o t h i n g i n the horse i t s e l f which c a l l s f o r t h man's naming a c t i v i t y . By naming, man u n j u s t l y i s o l a t e s a p o r t i o n o f a continuum o f space and time; the boundaries he s e l e c t s are e n t i r e l y a r t i f i c i a l . I f the boundaries had some r e a l i t y , t h e r e would r e a l l y be something o b j e c t i v e which makes the horse the horse, and thus e s t a b l i s h e s the s p e c i e s horse. I m p l i c i t l y , t h e r e would be something which transcends the i n d i v i d u a l animal and r e s t r i c t s h i s being the way he i s o f h i m s e l f . In sh o r t , he would not be t z u j a n . As a r e s u l t man's t r u e course of l i f e l i e s i n going along w i t h changes. There i s n o t h i n g t h a t prevents the Tao from t u r n i n g one c r e a t u r e i n t o another, or from changing the shape of one of i t s c r e a t u r e s . Indeed one must e x u l t and enjoy the workings o f change; i t i s r e s i s t a n c e to change which causes misery and a c c o r d i n g w i t h change which b r i n g s happiness. T h i s l i n e o f l o g i c i s 5 U T h i s i s shown c l e a r l y i n Chapter 6 w i t h the s t o r i e s o f Master Yil and Master L a i . See Watson, Chuang t z u pp. 84-85. These changes are c l e a r l y i l l n e s s e s , but Chuang t z u u n f o r t u -n a t e l y doesn't t r y to e x p l a i n why i l l n e s s should cause p a i n and assumes t h a t one i s happy through a c q u i e s c i n g to change. 40. not pursued i n the Chuang t z u , but i t does seem to be i m p l i c i t , w a i t i n g to be p i c k e d up by l a t e r t h i n k e r s . OTHER PRE-HAN CASES The combination t z u j an occurs i n only f o u r other p i e c e s of pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e , the Hsiin t z u ^ , the LU s h i h  ch'un ch' i u ^ ^ 4^ the l a t e r M o hists' w r i t i n g s , and the Kuan t z u J£ , a l l works probably w r i t t e n i n the t h i r d century B.C. In HsUn t z u , t h e r e are two i n s t a n c e s of t z u j a n . The f i r s t i s i n Chapter 22, Cheng ming jE. . HsUn t z u i s i n the process o f d e f i n i n g human nature, h s i n g 4:L > a n c * he SI g i v e s i t two d i f f e r e n t senses. In the second d e f i n i t i o n HsUn t z u w r i t e s : One ( a l s o ) c a l l s n a ture l i f e ' s harmonizing w i t h t h a t which produces i t , i t s sensory c o n t a c t s and response to s t i m u l i , and being s e l f - s o without working a t i t . 4* iL ** ft H. & & * I ffi 6 % L ft. 52 In t h i s second d e f i n i t i o n of nature, HsUn t z u i s d e s c r i b i n g the a c t u a l process o f l i v i n g as one's nature, i n p a r t . T h i s appears to be an e l a b o r a t i o n o f h i s f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n i n which nature i s the p r i n c i p l e or guide of l i f e . He adds that i n so f a r "'"'"A.C. Graham, "The Mencian theory of human na t u r e , " p. 222. HsUn t z u , 16:la-b. See a l s o the t r a n s l a t i o n by Burton Watson, HsUn t z u (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963), p. 139. 41. as one's l i f e process i s harmonious w i t h t h a t g i v e n at b i r t h (perhaps ku fy>{ ) and w i t h one's sensory c o n t a c t w i t h o b j e c t s and response to t h e i r s t i m u l a t i o n , t h i s , too, i s one's nature. He concludes t h a t nature i s being s e l f - s o without c o n t r i v e d e f f o r t . Nature, then, i s the a p p e t i t e s of the body and emotions not yet checked by the a r t i f i c i a l a c t i v i t y of c u l t u r e , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , r i t u a l . The second case i n the HsUn t z u occurs i n Chapter 23, Hsing o '/£ 3£v In a d d i t i o n to l i n k i n g t z u j a n to sensory p e r c e p t i o n , HsUn t z u a l s o l i n k s i t to ch' i n g 'f^- , the 53 genuine, as opposed to t h a t which i s assumed. The l i k i n g s , hao , of eye, ear, mouth, and mind a l l ...move ( i n s t i n c t i v e l y ) and are so of themselves; they are things which do not w a i t f o r an e f f o r t and o n l y then come i n t o being. $ ST 6 . * * , n % «L*MLi * uu». 54 The grammatical f u n c t i o n of t z u j an i s e x a c t l y the same as i n the p r e v i o u s case. L i k e w i s e , the terms kan Tok , to move, to f e e l and pu. . . s h i h % > c a a ^ not being worked f o r , a g a i n appear i n the same sentence w i t h t z u Jan. C l e a r l y what he i s d e s c r i b i n g i s a spontaneous process, one not y e t a f f e c t e d by 53 See Graham, "The Mencian Theory of Human Nature," pp. 264-265 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s concept i n HsUn t z u . 54 HsUn t z u , 17:3a. See a l s o Watson, HsUn t z u , pp. 160-161. 42. the r a t i o n a l , c u l t u r e - f o r m i n g a c t i v i t y of man. When we say spontaneous i n t h i s case, we must not take i t i n the sense of b e i n g i r r e g u l a r or being without p r i n c i p l e or law, but r a t h e r as being without p r e - m e d i t a t i o n , without the r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y of man. I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t t z u j a n i s n o t connected to the concept of the n a t u r a l world, Hsiln t z u has the r e p u t a t i o n of being the most ' n a t u r a l i s t i c ' of the p r e -Han Confucians. I t i s he among the Confucians who f i r s t removes w i l l and e t h i c a l impulses from the concept o f heaven. But i n doing so he emphasizes the well-orderedness and constancy of heaven's ways. The presence of w i l l would imply the a b i l i t y o f heaven to a l t e r i t s a c t i o n s , but t h i s i s i m p o s s i b l e , a c c o r d i n g to Hsiln t z u . Heaven i s s t i l l the c r e a t o r of man i n the sense t h a t i t p r o v i d e s man w i t h a l l the r e g u l a r f u n c t i o n s of h i s l i f e , but i t i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y of man, and hence s o c i a l order and d i s o r d e r . Man's task i s to harmonize w i t h the h e a v e n - e s t a b l i s h e d order. P a r t of man, as we have seen, i s p a r t of the r e g u l a r order, which, being s e l f - s o , i s not s u b j e c t to man's c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y . Nor should man seek to know more o f heaven than those t h i n g s which a f f e c t him d i r e c t l y . To enquire about the p r i n c i p l e behind heaven's r e g u l a r i t y i s f o r HsUn t z u beyond 55 the range of human knowledge. " HsUn t z u , Chapter 17, T ' i e n l u n ^ = ^ , l l : 9 a - l l a and passim. 43. The LU shih ch'un ch' i u ^ ^ £ ] \ contains three instances of tzu j an. This work i s a c o l l e c t i o n compiled around 240 B.C. LU Pu-wei, a r e l a t i v e of the royal house of the state of Ch'in, commissioned a number of scholars to write and gave Cf. them freedom to write what they wished. Although i t cannot be said to be the work of any one school, i t may t e l l us how tzu jan i s used as an expression at the end of the Warring States period. The f i r s t occurrence i s i n Chi ch'un chi ^ ^ =g, , the t h i r d of the twelve chapters named afte r the months, i n section 4, Luri j en ^ , "Discussion of others". It reads as follows: The way of the r u l e r i s limited. That which the Lord guards i s near. The highest one turns back to himself. The lower ones seek i t i n others...What does i t mean to say "turns back to himself"? He reproves his ears and eyes, restrai n s l u s t and desire, releases knowledge and cunning, gets r i d of cleverness and reasonings; he l e t s his ideas wander i n the inexhaustible places and applies his mind to the path which i s so of i t s e l f . In thi s way he takes nothing which w i l l harm his heavenly nature. This section i s linked with the previous one e n t i t l e d "Putting oneself f i r s t " , hsien chi ^ ^ > i n which the r u l e r i s advised Cf. Richard Wilhelm, FrUhling und Herb'st des LU Buwe, Jena, 1928. Introduction, p. II I . 57 n Lu shih ch'un ch' i u g ^ , Ssu pu pei yao ed. 3: 7b. 44. t h a t making h i m s e l f p e r s o n a l l y complete and i n order w i l l a l s o cause the worl d to be i n order. Completing o n e s e l f i n t h i s case means moral u p r i g h t n e s s , f r u g a l l i v i n g , and b e i n g a proper Confucian example. Although the a l l e g e d c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h Confucius i n t h i s s e c t i o n are not recorded i n the pr e s e n t A n a l e c t s o f Confucius, there are s i m i l a r concepts i n the A n a l e c t s . In A n a l e c t s 15:20 we f i n d , The s u p e r i o r seeks i t i n h i m s e l f ; the p e t t y man seeks i t i n o t h e r s . ***** e,AA5|t « x. 5 8 Yet the LU s h i h ch'un ch.' i u i s by no means e x p r e s s i n g a p u r e l y Confucian sentiment. Confucius probably meant t h a t the g e n t l e -man d i d not take h i s standard o f proper conduct from the approval of o t h e r s , but kept to h i s own standard. He d i d not imply t h a t the r u l e r should r e j e c t knowledge and d e s i r e as the LU s h i h ch'un  c h ' i u suggests. In t h i s r e s p e c t the passage reminds us a l s o of the Lao t z u , although the Lao t z u does not r e j e c t knowledge and d e s i r e as such, but onl y the c o n t r i v e d and a r t i f i c i a l 59 d i v i s i o n s of knowledge and sense p e r c e p t i o n s . Perhaps the author a l s o i n t e n d s t h a t here. He goes on to r e l a t e t h a t as a consequence of the r u l e r ' s a c t i o n s , he a t t a i n s u n i t y and a l l ~^Lun yU = ^ g& 15:21. See Legge, James, The f o u r books, (New York: Paragon Books, 1964), p. 228. T h i s passage was brought to my a t t e n t i o n by a note of P i YUan^t i%j w r i t t e n about 1779, i n the LU s h i h ch'un c h ' i u , Er-shih-wu t z u hui-han ^ + i ^  I i • . i 8 9 3-59 See f o r example Lao t z u , Chapters 2, 12, and 19. c r e a t u r e s are thereby completed. The r u l e r responds to the changes o f t h i n g s , The sentence c o n t a i n i n g t z u j a n occurs j u s t where the author i s b e g i n n i n g to wax eloquent about the powers of such a r u l e r . Tzu j a n i s p a r a l l e l to wu ch' lung , the i n e x h a u s t i b l e . The sentence suggests t h a t somewhere i n h i s s e l f , the k i n g w i l l f i n d a c e r t a i n r e a l i t y which i s independent, a source of t r u e knowledge. Then good government w i l l r e s u l t . The appearance of t h i s term wu ch'lung i s i n t e r e s t i n g because of the s i m i l a r i t y to the Greek n o t i o n of t o a p e l r o n , which I d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r . Wu. ch'lung seems to have f i r s t come i n t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l use i n the Chuang t z u . At some p o i n t s i n the Chuang t z u i t seems to have a n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l f u n c t i o n as an a d j e c t i v e meaning "without end". But i n other p l a c e s he i d e n t i f i e s the boundless w i t h the process of change. Change i s always dominant over s t r u c t u r e and t h i n g s i n Chuang t z u . S t r u c t u r e s change and are t h e r e f o r e f i n i t e , w h i l e change continues i n d e f i n i t e l y . The sense of " i n f i n i t e " i s a l s o used v e r y p r e g n a n t l y when i t i s a p p l i e d to the i n f i n i t e reaches of the cosmos i n order to b e l i t t l e the e f f o r t s o f man. The case we are d i s c u s s i n g here i s e s p e c i a l l y r e m i n i s c e n t of the end of Chapter 7, "embody completely the boundless and wander i n the t r a c k l e s s . " ( $ f I te % fij l# fe ) 6 0 I f t h i s i s what the author of the LU s h i h ch'un c h ' i u passage had i n mind, then t z u j a n i s probably a l s o b e i n g See Chuang t z u , 3:19a, and Watson Chuang t z u , p. 97. 46. i d e n t i f i e d w i t h change. Tzu j a n i s at l e a s t a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the path to be f o l l o w e d , the path which leads to a r i g h t i n g o f a l l wrongs i n the o r d e r o f c r e a t i o n . Here I suspect t z u j a n i s being used as I e a r l i e r suggested was p o s s i b l e , namely to s i g n i f y the a b s o l u t e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h a t which one takes as h i s arche, the t r u e path o f human conduct. There i s another case i n the LJJ. s h i h ch'un ch' i u v e r y L ff/; s i m i l a r to the f i r s t . In book 17, Sheri f e n l a n % If , s e c t i o n 1, the author d i s c u s s e s v a r i o u s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the sage r u l e r . In t h i s paragraph r e c t i f i c a t i o n o f names i s d e s c r i b e d as the source o f good government and the source of a l i f e f r e e from worry and t o i l . The r u l e r does not "manage t h i n g s " , c h i h wu , h i s s p i r i t p e n e t r a t e s i n a l l s i x d i r e c t i o n s , and h i s v i r t u e shines beyond the seas. The r u l e r t r u l y o b t a i n s the people and knowledge, a f t e r having gone through the process of f o r g e t t i n g them. That which he knows i s the i n f i n i t e s i m a l , the s u b t l e s t u f f o f t h i n g s , miao £y , and thereby h i s form and nature r e c e i v e r e s t i n the p l a c e which i s s e l f - s o ( m *H f | S f )• Though he completes a l l c r e a t u r e s , he i s no r u l e r (p_u t s a i ^ ^ ). H i s measure covers the world y e t none knows where i t comes from. As i n the f i r s t case, there i s an assortment of i d e a s here. The concept o f r e c t i f i c a t i o n o f names was a Confucian one, although i t probably f i r s t came from the t h e o r i s t of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Shen Pu-hai. But h i s a t t i t u d e toward knowledge and the f a c t t h a t he r u l e s without h i s subj e c t s ' Lli s h i h ch'un c h ' i u , 17:3b. 47. knowledge i s d e r i v e d from the i d e a of the hidden sage of the T a o i s t s . In p a r t i c u l a r , as i n Chuang t z u Chapter 21, d i s c u s s e d above, h i s r u l e extends over the whole cosmos. The p l a c e which i s so of i t s e l f may be s i m i l a r to what we found i n the p r e v i o u s case, a realm of indeterminateness, which i s the source of the determinate. By knowing t h a t which cannot be named, he i s somehow ab l e to r e c t i f y names. T h i s i s d i f f e r e n t from the i d e a l s o c i a l o r d e r of the Lao t z u , i n which t h i n g s were a l l s e l f so. That harmony was the r e s u l t o f the sage's a c t i o n to remove a l i e n a t i o n from the Way, but i n t h i s case the s e l f - s o p l a c e i s the source o f the harmony. That the king's nature can " r e s t " here confirms t h a t t h i s i s a p l a c e o f u l t i m a t e s i g n i f i c a n c e . There i s n o t h i n g h i g h e r or deeper to which he must move b e f o r e he can f i n d r e s t . The l a s t occurrence i n the LU s h i h ch'un c h ' i u seems to be a n o n - t e c h n i c a l use. I t shows c l e a r l y t h a t one c o u l d at l e a s t c h a l l e n g e i t s c o n n e c t i o n to nature. At the opening of Hsiao h s i n g l a n ^ , Chapter 14, sec. 4, I shang , " J u s t i c e and rewards", we read: When s p r i n g a i r comes grass and t r e e s f l o u r i s h . When Autumn a i r comes grass and t r e e s d e c l i n e . Something causes f l o u r i s h i n g and d e c l i n i n g : I t i s not t h a t they are- so o f r themselves . jiM l i $ H 62 I b i d . 14:10a. 48. Tzu jan i s nominalized here and i s seen as opposite to being caused. The point of the passage i s to show that a l l things, even something so apparently independent as grass and trees are caused by outside forces. Thus the r u l e r could use rewards and punishments to lead the people, causing t h e i r actions to go i n one d i r e c t i o n or another. We get the f e e l i n g that the author i s going against common opinion i n the opening sentence. By s t a r t l i n g his readers with h i s cleverness i n the f i r s t case, he probably hoped to carry them along to his conclusion. Tzu j an i s not given any p a r t i c u l a r philosophical content; i t i s merely used for contrast. In the writings of the l a t e r Mohists, we f i n d a single occurrence of tzu j an. These were written around 300 B.C. and thus are e a r l i e r than both the LU shih ch'un ch T i u and 63 the HsUn tzu. Tzu j an occurs i n the section c a l l e d "Expla-nations of the Canons", Ching shuo . These extremely d i f f i c u l t works have been the subject of several years of study and a series of a r t i c l e s by A.C. Graham. I consider i t my good fortune that he has already published something about the sentence i n question. I t occurs i n a discussion of matching and assent. Matching, wu 3L. (read i% ) , i s the agreement of the idea of something and the thing i t s e l f . In a debate you must check whether or not your opponent's ideas match 6 JA.C. Graham, "The Concepts of Necessity and the "a p r i o r i " i n Later Mohist Disputation,"-Asia Major XIX (1975) p. 166. 6 4 I b i d . p. 179, n. 8. Graham says t h i s substitution occurs elsewhere as well. 49. r e a l i t y , and i f they do, you give your assent, no l| ^ • Graham quotes and translate the passage as follows: Matching and assent enter the consciousness together. When an explanation i s offered and you assent to more than that they match (for example, to a c i r c l e being nowhere s t r a i g h t ) , or when no explanation i s offered but you assent on the basis of the matching, i t has become as though i t were so of i t s e l f . 31 ^ i<§ \ M \>Li@ 3. ( 3 £ X fcl), & w. «* w * ft *: ft.65 The text argues that a person's l o g i c a l f a c u l t i e s w i l l go beyond accepting only another's explanations and w i l l make i t s own deductions, or w i l l make deductions without any explanation at a l l . These jumps made i n the mind are not caused by any outside force of argument but are as i f they are so of themselves In so far as tzu j an i s used to place inner development over against outside cause, there i s formal s i m i l a r i t y to other cases. But what i s important here i s that tzu jan i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of something which the Mohists took as that which transcended the v i c i s s i t u d e s of change. Graham remarks on t h i s : An awareness of changing times, of past knowledge becoming obsolete, of the example of the sages losing i t s relevance, pervades a l l the philosophical schools of the t h i r d century B.C. Taoists welcome i t , Confucians dread i t , the Mohists (who alone among the schools have committed themselves wholly to logic) respond to the challenge by seeking b D I b i d . pp. 180-181. Graham has quoted from the Ssu p_u ts'ung k'an <2D ty % ^\ ed. , HB/2,3. I have followed his emendations i n my quote and refer the reader to Graham's text for explanations of these emendations. : 66 a k i n d of knowledge i n v u l n e r a b l e to time. That l o g i c a l processes are so of themselves i s the same as s a y i n g they are independent; hence t z u j an i s here a s i g n of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s c e r t i t u d e , t h e i r c o n f i d e n c e t h a t l o g i c a l p rocesses w i l l p r o v i d e a sure guide i n l i f e . The l a s t case I have found i n pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e i s i n the Kuan t z u . I t occurs i n the Ching yen ftW •= , " C a n o n i c a l statements", s e c t i o n 2, which W. A. R i c k e t t suggests i s probably the o l d e s t s e c t i o n o f the t e x t . T h i s chapter was c i t e d i n the Shih c h i ^ = 'tL o f S'su-ma Ch'ien (c. 145-C.86 B.C.), and i t i s l i k e l y to be pre-Han m a t e r i a l , although of u n c e r t a i n d a t e . ^ 7 There we read t h a t i f one d e s i r e s to be k i n g of the world but l o s e s the way of heaven, he cannot a t t a i n the world. But i f he o b t a i n s the way of heaven, h i s a f f a i r s w i l l be as i f they ran themselves ( %^ ^ 7a & ^ ) • ^ And i f heaven's way i s obtained, no one w i l l know th a t he r u l e s . T h i s unknown r u l e r we have met b e f o r e i n the Lao t z u and the Lti s h i h ch 'un ch' i u . But the Kuan t z u f u r t h e r argues t h a t the r u l e r h i m s e l f , i f he f o l l o w s heaven, w i l l have to make no e f f o r t ; h i s a c t s w i l l be as though they proceeded of themselves. Tzu j a n occupies a p l a c e s i m i l a r to t h a t which we found i n the Lao t z u , as a d e s c r i p t i o n of the harmonious wor l d 6 6 I b i d . p. 167. 6 7 S e e the i n t r o d u c t i o n by W. A l l y n R i c k e t t i n Kuan t z u  y i n - t e ^ \ ^| <f| Wallace Johnson, compiler, T a i p e i : Chinese m a t e r i a l s and r e s e a r c h a i d s s e r v i c e center, 1970. pp, vi-vxi. 6 8 K u a n t z u ^ J- , 1:6b, when i t was r i g h t w i t h the Tao. I t d e s c r i b e s the r e s u l t and not the cause of the k i n g ' s a c t i o n s . Tzu j a n i s here not a s i g n then of an arche. Yet i t d i f f e r s from the Lao t z u i n t h a t the r u l e r a l s o r e c e i v e s the b e n e f i t s o f h i s a c t i o n s . R u l i n g i s a l s o p a r t of the harmonious, i d e a l s o c i e t y , as much as the e a t i n g , working, and s l e e p i n g of the r u l e d . He i s thus i n a more l e g i t i m a t e p o s i t i o n t h a t he was i n the Lao t z u . In the Lao t z u , the r u l e r c o r r e c t e d and guarded a g a i n s t the tendency of man to a l i e n a t e h i m s e l f from the Tao. I f there were no a l i e n a t i o n , there would be no r u l e r . I t seems s i m i l a r to the C h r i s t i a n problem o f whether or not the s t a t e , t h a t i s , government, i s a r e s u l t of s i n . Many would argue t h a t i f man had not sinned, there would be no s t a t e . Others would agree w i t h the Kuan t z u t h a t even i n a p e r f e c t world there would be a p l a c e f o r a r u l e r . SUMMARY I suggest t h a t the m a t e r i a l I have d i s c u s s e d so f a r can be arranged i n two c a t e g o r i e s . The f i r s t i s a l l those cases i n which t z u j a n i s used i n a n o n - t e c h n i c a l , p r e - p h i l o s o p h i c a l sense as two words. I t r e f e r s i n these cases to s p e c i f i c , u s u a l l y concrete, t h i n g s or events common i n everyday experience. To t h i s group belong the occurrences i n Chapters 17 and 64 of the Tao te c h i n g w i t h t h e i r r e f e r e n c e s to an i d e a l s o c i a l order, a l l cases i n the Chuang t z u except the mysterious r e f e r e n c e of Chapter 21 to the s e l f - s o decree, both cases i n the Hstln t z u , the occurrence i n the Kuan t z u , and t h a t i n Chapter 14 (the 52. d e n i a l t h a t p l a n t s are s e l f - s o ) of the Ltt s h i h c h 1 un ch' i u . In a l l of these the events or t h i n g s d e s c r i b e d are c o n t r a s t e d to normal c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y . Where they are i n c l u d e d i n an i d e a l c u l t u r e , t h a t c u l t u r e i s minimal. A l l these works r e c o g n i z e the d e l i b e r a t e , r a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f c u l t u r e . As a planned product of man's a c t i v i t y , c u l t u r a l s t r u c t u r e s c o u l d h a r d l y be thought to be t h i n g s which were so o f themselves. T h i s agreement causes t z u j an to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s . I t i s never thought of as nature i t s e l f , e i t h e r as the n a t u r a l w o r l d or as the p r i n c i p l e o f t h i n g s , but i s always a d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which means " n a t u r a l " , i n the sense of " s o - b y - s e l f " . The second category i s those cases i n which t z u j a n c o n t a i n s the r e l i g i o u s l y pregnant i d e a o f independence. Included i n t h i s category are the occurrences i n Chapters 25 and 51 of the Tao te c h i n g (Chapter 23 i s too ambiguous to c l a s s i f y ) , Chapter 21 of the Chuang t z u , Chapters 3 and 17 of the Lti s h i h ch' un ch' i u , and the case i n the L a t e r Mohist w r i t i n g s . In t h i s category the p r e - p h i l o s o p h i c a l sense of the words i s a l s o v e r y important. As I d i s c u s s e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , the sense of s e l f - s o g i v e s added s t r e n g t h to what one takes as r e l i a b l e , as t r u t h . As i n the f i r s t category, i n these cases as w e l l , the term t z u j a n never became the d e s i g n a t i o n o f a t h i n g ; i t was never thought o f as an a b s t r a c t e n t i t y but was o n l y a d e s c r i p t i v e e p i t h e t . In t h i s l a t t e r category i t i s m i s l e a d i n g to t h i n k of t z u j a n as meaning " n a t u r a l " . There i s , o f course, an i m p l i e d analogy i n some of these cases. One 53. may suppose t h a t the o p e r a t i o n of the Tao was conceived as an analogy to n a t u r a l o p e r a t i o n s , but I b e l i e v e t h i s remains i m p l i c i t . In the cases o f t h i s second category, the i d e a of independence c l e a r l y dominates over any a n a l o g i e s to a n a t u r a l p r o c e s s . In p a y i n g a g r e a t d e a l o f a t t e n t i o n to the grammatical development of t z u j a n i n Chapter I of t h i s t h e s i s , I have not asked whether t z u j a n i s used o n l y i n c e r t a i n types o f t h i n k i n g o r i n p e c u l i a r s e t s o f problems. I t s ve r y i n f r e q u e n c y makes a v e r y s p e c i f i c p h i l o s o p h i c sense d i f f i c u l t to decipher. In the f o l l o w i n g chapter I w i l l examine w r i t i n g s from the Han dynasty, and I w i l l s h i f t my emphasis from an a n a l y s i s of grammatical s t r u c t u r e to more syste m a t i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l concepts. As the frequency of use i n c r e a s e s and as i t becomes more i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a system, we may a l s o expect that t z u  j a n may become both more s p e c i f i c and more complex. 54. CHAPTER II..: THE HAN DYNASTY. With the advent of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.), the r i v a l r y of the schools of p h i l o s o p h y became s e n s i t i v e to the f a v o r s of the i m p e r i a l c o u r t . I t i s not t h a t they weren't s e n s i t i v e to the o p i n i o n s o f r u l e r s i n pre-Han times, but under u n i f i e d r u l e , the o p i n i o n of the r u l e r c a r r i e d g r e a t e r weight. The Han c o u r t a p p a r e n t l y t o l e r a t e d d i v e r s i t y among s c h o l a r s f o r the f i r s t h a l f century, as i t c o n s o l i d a t e d i t s g r i p on the country. Somewhat a n t i - C o n f u c i a n a t f i r s t -- the f i r s t emporer Kao-tsu had a legendary d i s l i k e o f p e d a n t i c s c h o l a r s ' - - , the Han dynasty came to embrace Confucianism outwardly w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g an e s s e n t i a l l y L e g a l i s t s t r u c t u r e of law and bureaucracy. T h i s bureaucracy was i n f a c t modelled on t h a t of the Ch'in dynasty (221-201 B.C.), but s i n c e the Han r u l e r s had overthrown the Ch'in, they c o u l d not p u b l i c l y admit t h a t the Ch'in p h i l o s o p h y of government was c o r r e c t , and thus they e v e n t u a l l y adopted a p u b l i c stance which endorsed Confucian forms and l i t e r a t u r e . Thus i n 141 B.C. Emporer Wu jf^ ( r- 14-1-86 B.C.) d e c l a r e d t h a t l e g a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t h e o r i s t s , f o l l o w e r s o f Shen Pu-hai, Shang Yang, Han F e i , Su Ch'in, and Cheng I, were to be d i s m i s s e d from o f f i c e . 1 In 136 B.C. s c h o l a r s s p e c i a l i z i n g i n each o f Homer H. Dubs, H i s t o r y o f the Former Han dynasty, V o l . I. (1937), I n t r o d u c t i o n , p. 21. A l s o see L. J . B i l s k y , The S t a t e R e l i g i o n i n A n c i e n t China, ( T a i p e i : O r i e n t C u l t u r a l S e r v i c e , 1975) pp. 259-330 f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of events and r e l i g i o n i n the e a r l y Han dynasty. 55. the f i v e c l a s s i c s , which were then regarded as Confucian t e x t s , were gi v e n c o u r t appointments. In 135 the Empress Dowager Tou -^ jfip d i e d , and w i t h her death the c o u r t l o s t i t s l a s t ardent supporter of Taoism. In the same year the i m p e r i a l academy was e s t a b l i s h e d to p r o v i d e s c h o l a r s f o r the realm. Thus Confucianism became the umbrella under which c o u r t i d e o l o g y was developed. N a t u r a l l y enough a wide v a r i e t y of thought had to be i n c l u d e d under t h i s r u b r i c . We would be s a f e i n assuming t h a t Confucius 2 would h a r d l y have r e c o g n i z e d much of t h i s Confucianism. At the same time we must remember t h a t having Confucianism as an o f f i c i a l c o u r t i d e o l o g y d i d not prevent Emperor Wu from p e r s o n a l l y surrounding h i m s e l f w i t h a g r e a t number of s p i r i t -u a l i s t s and necromancers and spending a good d e a l of h i s energy 3 on the search f o r i m m o r t a l i t y . T h i s e c l e c t i c i s m was a hallmark of other schools i n the Han dynasty as w e l l . The Tao c h i a , the school of the Tao, i s d e s c r i b e d by Ssu-ma T'an 5| S j %% about 100 B.C. as r e l y i n g on the main o u t l i n e s of y i n and yang, t a k i n g the b e s t p o i n t s of Confucianism and Mohism, s e l e c t i n g the e s s e n t i a l s of l e g a l i s m and l o g i c i s m , and responding to the times. T h i s i s to some degree suggested by P i n g - t i Ho, " S a l i e n t aspects of China's h e r i t a g e " , China i n c r i s i s , v o l . I, book 1 (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1968) pp. 10-13. See a l s o Ssu-ma Ch'ien at & > S h i h c h i H £2 ( H i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d s ) "T'ai-shih-kung t z u hstt" &% f% , ch. 130. 3Ytt Y i n g - s h i h , " L i f e and i m m o r t a l i t y i n Han China", Harvard J o u r n a l of A s i a n S t u d i e s 25 (1974-75) esp. pp. 96-108. 56. F o l l o w i n g the a n a l y s i s of L i u Hsiang and L i u H s i n $\;^ *J J^, Pan Ku (£\ a century and a h a l f l a t e r d e s c r i b e d the t s a  c h i a j^Pff. ^ , the e c l e c t i c s c h o o l , i n almost i d e n t i c a l terms. What Pan Ku c a l l e d the tao c h i a was p r i m a r i l y p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i e s of the r u l e r who uses wu wei as a r u l i n g technique. Both the tao c h i a and the t s a c h i a took the d o c t r i n e s o f Lao t z u as t h e i r b a s i s , but the l a t t e r combined i t w i t h o t h e r works as they saw f i t . As f o r the Chuang t z u , Ssu-ma T'an d i d not even i n c l u d e i t i n h i s c a t e g o r i e s , although h i s son, bsu-ma Ch'ien *\ , i n c l u d e d the 'outer c h a p t e r s ' of the Chuang t z u as an expansion of the thought o f the Lao  t z u . Pan Ku f o l l o w e d Ssu-ma Ch'ien's l e a d i n t h i s r e s p e c t . 4 The o n l y major work of the Former Han p e r i o d from the t s a c h i a (or t a o - c h i a of Ssu-ma T'an) i s the Huai-nan t z u i f i . ffj 3~ • T h i s i s a work by s e v e r a l authors under the sponsorship of L i u An ^ i j (d. 122 B.C.), the P r i n c e of Huai-nan."' L i u An's grandmother was a consort o f the f i r s t Han emperor, Kao t s u . When her b r o t h e r r e b e l l e d , she would have been k i l l e d , but was spared s i n c e she was pregnant. However, she committed s u i c i d e s h o r t l y a f t e r g i v i n g b i r t h . ^ T h i s summary i s based on the account of Tanaka Masami, > "E n a n s h i no ' j i z e n ' n i t s u i t e : Zenkan doka  s h i s o no i c h i n e n " tfl $ % f) r% Wj t* n W : %\ ^ <T) — (.On t z u j a n i n the Huai nan t z u : one aspect of T a o i s t thought i n the Former Han dynasty), Shukan Toyogaku 11 =f'l %M 36(Nov. 1976) p. 69-71. ^See Wallacker, Huai nan t z u , p. 5. Huai-nan i s a p p a r e n t l y at or near the modern-day Huai-nan on the Huai R i v e r i n Anhwei. The t e r r i t o r y h e l d by An and h i s b r o t h e r s may have extended down to the Yangtze R i v e r . The i n f a n t , L i u Ch'ang^'j %^ , was then r a i s e d by the Empress Lil § and i n 196 B.C. g i v e n the t i t l e o f P r i n c e of Huai-nan. In a d i s p u t e w i t h Emperor Wen ^ ( r . 179-157 B.C.) L i u Ch'ang was d e p r i v e d of h i s f i e f and e x i l e d to Shu ^ (Szechwan), and he d i e d enroute i n 174 B.C. Emperor Wen r e g r e t t e d h i s a c t i o n s and e n f e o f f e d L i u Ch'ang's f o u r sons f i r s t as Marquises and l a t e r as P r i n c e s . Thus, i n 164 B.C. L i u An became the P r i n c e of Huai-nan. Ssu-ma Ch'ien r e p o r t s t h a t he was good to h i s s u b j e c t s and was h i g h l y p r a i s e d among them, but t h a t he d i d not 6 f o r g e t h i s f a t h e r ' s death and watched f o r a chance to r e b e l . Thus th e r e was c e r t a i n l y enough reason i n L i u An's p e r s o n a l h i s t o r y f o r him to harbor p l a n s o f r e b e l l i o n . I t may be t h a t h i s support of a l a r g e number of s c h o l a r s was p a r t of those p l a n s . At any r a t e , the Huai nan n e i p' i e n >fe % ^\J^was pre -sented to Emperor Wu i n 139 B.C. d u r i n g L i u An's f i r s t v i s i t to the c a p i t a l a f t e r Wu's s u c c e s s i o n . 7 From t h i s he probably gained a r e p u t a t i o n as a supporter of T a o i s t s , and a f t e r , the events o f 136 and 135 d e s c r i b e d above, i t seems t h a t many no n - C o n f u c i a n i s t s f l e d to Huai nan. The Han shu ^ ^ r e p o r t s that he a t t r a c t e d several, thousand r e t a i n e r s v e r s e d i n magical techniques, fang_ shu #f . T h e i r works were c o l l e c t e d i n three p a r t s , o f which the above mentioned n e i p ' i e n was one. Q These t o t a l l e d more than 200,000 words. The n e i p' i e n i s the work t h a t we s t i l l have today known as the Huai, nan .tzu. L i u An's antagonism to the c o u r t a p p a r e n t l y i n c r e a s e d l a t e r , u n t i l 6See Kao Yu % \% , "HsU mu" @ , Huai nan t z u ifl -f , HsU mu: l a - b . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s a l s o found 58. he was f i n a l l y ordered to be prosecuted i n 122 B.C. Before the order c o u l d be d e l i v e r e d , he committed s u i c i d e . There were a p p a r e n t l y many other w r i t i n g s completed under the sponsorship of L i u An. Yii Ta-ch'eng *f has l o c a t e d i n d y n a s t i c h i s t o r i e s and b i b l i o g r a p h i e s eighteen d i f f e r e n t t i t l e s which have some connec t i o n w i t h Huai nan. Some of these are merely c o l l e c t e d m a t e r i a l s from t h a t r e g i o n , and some are 9 d i f f e r e n t t i t l e s f o r the same work. S t i l l the impression remains that there was a t h r i v i n g c e n t e r of s c h o l a r s h i p at Huai nan. As mentioned above, the Huai nan t z u i s a c o l l e c t e d work. The L a t t e r Han commentator Kao Yu % \ % ( f l . A.D. 205-212) l i s t s e i g h t men by name who together w i t h L i u An and the Confucians of the Great Mountain and Small Mountain d i s c u s s e d i n Shih c h i & \ " L , (Peking: Chung-hua Book Co., 1959), ch. 138, "Huai-nan Heng-shan l i e h chuan" iii $ f | f ii, JA f | pp. 3075-3094. For t h i s l a s t r e p o r t see p. 3082. 7 Benjamin Wallacker, The Huai-nan-tzu: Behavior, C u l t u r e , and Cosmos, (New Haven: American O r i e n t a l S o c i e t y , 1962), pp. 1-2. ^Han shu ~% ^ , ch. 44, "Huai-nan Heng-shan C h i p e i wang chuan" j f l ^ l t^Ll *k ^ it f f > a s quoted i n Kuo Ch'an-p'o XP i & ' Chung-kuo chung-ku ssu-hsiang s h i h ^ TS! ^ ife %~ ^-l- ^ (Hongkong: Lung-men Book Co., 1976) p. 49. 9 Y i i Ta-ch'eng f 7\ $c , "Huai nan wang shu k'ao" M l Hf) JL ^ (An examination o f The w r i t i n g s o f the P r i n c e of Huai nan) , Huai nan l u n wen san chung *fl $\ %% \ S~ jfcf, (Three essays on the Huai nan t z u ) , ( T a i p e i : Wen-shih-che Publ. Co., 1975) p. 1. 59. the Tao and Te, gathered and united benevolence and propriety, jen i "fr- ^  , and then wrote the n e i p' ien. ^  How these authors are d i s t r i b u t e d over the various chapters and what rol e L i u An himself played i s unknown, but we are f a i r l y ; safe i n assuming that several authors were involved i n i t s composition, and that i n spite o f discussions among them, there may s t i l l be a considerable difference of opinion from one chapter to the next. We can expect that most of the work w i l l be somehow in the t r a d i t i o n of the Lao tzu as Kao Yu suggests,''""'' but even t h i s may be only nominal. As i n my discussion of the -Lii. shih  ch 1un ch'iu, I. s h a l l attempt not to assume that material, from one chapter supplements that of another. THE HUAI NAN TZU In the opening chapter of. the Huai nan tzu, "Basic meaning of the Tao" yttan tao hsun fay %A , there i s the most complete conception of tzu jan i n the work. Before analyzing tzu jan, I would l i k e to discuss a central concept of t h i s chapter, the d i s t i n c t i o n between heaven and man, or between heavenly and human. The writer defines the former as "that which "^Huai nan tzu, Hstt mu: l b - 2 a . The Confucians of the Great Mountain and small mountain were l i t e r a r y men who s p e c i a l i z e d i n fu and tz 'u ^  poetry forms, respectively. This d i v i s i o n was apparently modelled on classes i n the Shih ching %^ (Poetry C l a s s i c ) , c a l l e d Ta y_a 7\ and hsiao ya /N See Morohashi T e t s u j i i n his Dai Kan Wa j i t e n A l\ ?£Q jjjj'^ under the entry 7k <lv til w h 0 quotes Wang I j£. ^  , Ch'u  tz'u chang chu ^ (Explanations of the Ch' u tz'u) fo r this information. 60. i s pure and simple, u p r i g h t and s t a i n l e s s , not y e t mixed with. t h i n g s " ( i t j f e *g jjl | £ * 5 # W T h e h u m a n element i s but " d i r e c t p e r c e p t i o n and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y knowledge, crooked s k i l l s and a r t i f i c i a l a c t i o n , and i s t h a t by which, w i t h an eye on the o p i n i o n of men, one gets entangled i n The i n d i v i d u a l human i s a c t u a l l y made up of both something heavenly and something human. There i s some i n n e r s t i l l p o i n t which i s h i s heavenly nature, and t h i s i n n e r s t i l l p o i n t should not respond to t h i n g s . When d i s c r i m i n a t o r y knowledge i s a p p l i e d to t h i n g s , l i k e s and d i s l i k e s a r i s e . T h e r e f o r e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y knowledge has no p l a c e i n the heavenly nature. The p e r f e c t man moves w i t h t h i n g s on the o u t s i d e , but on the i n s i d e does not l o s e what i s genuine. He accepts the way t h i n g s are without p r e f e r r i n g one over the other, but does not l o s e t r a c k of h i m s e l f . He does not use what i s human to a l t e r what i s heavenly. T h i s p e r f e c t man i s a l s o a r u l e r ; the world i s drawn to him and e v i l persons f e a r h i m . 1 3 Tzu j an i s used s e v e r a l times i n t h i s chapter as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the world which the sage governs. Both the n a t u r a l world and c e r t a i n forms o f c u l t u r a l development are i n c l u d e d i n h i s realm. T h i s arrangement appears s i m i l a r to the common a f f a i r s . " ( M t * K fa n t % cc . ) 12 11 See Wallacker, p. 5. Huai nan t z u . 12. Huai nan t z u , ch. 1, II Yuan tao h'sttn' II 1:6b. 13 I b i d . 1:4a. r u l e r - r u l e d r e l a t i o n s h i p we found i n the Lao tzu, but there i s a s i g n i f i c a n t difference. In the Lao tzu, that the ruled were so of themselves depended on the wisdom of the r u l e r . It was only possible to be sel f - s o under a sage r u l e r . But here we are t o l d that the perfect man must r e l y on the fact that heaven, earth and a l l the creatures are so of themselves. The r u l e r must seek the truth i n that state of a f f a i r s . ^ 4 Tzu j an i s here a condition of perfection rather than a r e s u l t . I t i s not only that a r u l e r should not t r y to manage or control things, wei ^ , but that he cannot. The events, things, and situations which are self-so have more power and greater necessity than any work of man. As examples of situations which are so of themselves ( H %g JL^$- ), the author c i t e s the fact that two sticks rubbed together w i l l burn, gold put i n f i r e w i l l melt, round things turn, and c y l i n d r i c a l things f l o a t , a l l examples from what we c a l l the world of nature, that i s , the realms of animals, plants, and minerals. Such things, he says, surely follow tzu jan, & k & , so what could the sage do?"^ Tanaka Masami suggests that this sense of r e l y i n g on and following tzu jan i s a new development i n the Huai nan tzu, being a combination of d i f f e r e n t sources. He suggests that the notion of following tzu jan was also found i n Chuang tzu, chapter 7, Ying t i wang jfa. % i , . 1 6 There we f i n d the phrase, "Follow 1 4 I b i d . 1:3b, 5b, 6a. 1 5 I b i d . 1:6a. 1 6Tanaka Masami, "E nan s h i no 1 j i z e n ' n i t s u i t e , " pp. 65-66 62. along w i t h t h i n g s as they are i n themselves." O l [ j | %ty fy^ % 'f& ) . As I noted i n chapter one of t h i s t h e s i s , t h i s i s one o f s e v e r a l i n j u n c t i o n s to flow w i t h the u n i v e r s e . 1 7 I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i n the Chuang t z u the way t h i n g s are i n themselves i s a b e t t e r s t a t e than anything c o n t r i v e d by man. N e v e r t h e l e s s , I t h i n k t h a t i n the Huai nan t z u one's a t t e n t i o n i s brought more s h a r p l y to the f a c t t h a t these things are s e l f -so. I base t h i s c o n j e c t u r e on the f o l l o w i n g evidence: (1) the f a c t t h a t i n phrases l i k e "the being s e l f - s o of heaven and e a r t h " 7 ^ ^ Z_ I , or "the being s e l f - s o o f a l l t h i n g s " gj, Tfi "3 t tzu j a n i s the primary o b j e c t , r a t h e r than a m o d i f i e r of the primary o b j e c t as i n the Chuang t z u r e f e r e n c e ; (2) the presence o f the adverb ku l£l , " s u r e l y " , i n the case a l r e a d y quoted above; and (3) the powerlessness o f the sage over a g a i n s t s i t u a t i o n s which were so of themselves. T h i s l a s t reason, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s something t h a t would have been incomprehensible to Chuang t z u . I doubt t h a t he c o u l d even suppose a c o n f l i c t between a sage and a proper s t a t e of a f f a i r s . That the author o f t h i s chapter makes such a c o n t r a s t shows t h a t he wants to impress upon h i s readers t h a t no man, not even a sage, i s a b l e to w i t h s t a n d the power of t h a t which i s so of i t s e l f . That man l e a r n s the t r u t h about r e a l i t y through the world of nature i s , of course, expressed i n other ways i n the Chuang t z u . That man must f l o w w i t h the changes of t h i n g s means t h a t See Chapter one, p. 31. 63. he must acquiesce i n the workings of the natural world around him as well as whatever changes go on within himself. The Chuang tzu says the Tao i s i n a l l the processes of the world, 18 even down to the lowliest ant or p i l e of dung. But i n the Huai nan tzu there i s a new emphasis i n what i t means to follow nature, namely, to r e l y on the way nature i s of i t s e l f . The f a c t that tzu jan now refers to things which cannot be otherwise indicates a tendency to exalt the apparently necessary functioning of natural things and processes. Whereas Chuang tzu took the changes of nature as the fundamental, i n t h i s chapter of the Huai nan tzu, the fact that things are self-determined and unalterable i s primary. I do not here point out a fundamental difference i n outlook so much as a s h i f t i n emphasis. In f a c t the notion of change i s pushed into the background. I t may be that because things are now thought of as r e l i a b l e , they are also supposed to have more regular functioning. The concept of Tao i s also one that does not receive a l o t of treatment i n the text. Since the self-so character of things i s now to be followed, does man also follow the Tao? At one point the author says that he who follows the heavenly ( i n himself) i s the one who wanders i n the Tao. Although there i s no e x p l i c i t l i n k i n g of the heavenly nature of man with a f f a i r s which are self-so, i n other chapters man i s enjoined to follow the self-so nature, hsing ijfj^  , of things (presumably including Chuang t z u , ch. 22, Chih p e i yu fta , 7.26a. 64. man's own n a t u r e ) , and i t may not be wrong to assume t h a t the heavenly nature o f man i n t h i s chapter i s a l s o s e l f - s o . The t e x t a l s o uses the phrase " c u l t i v a t e the a r t s of the Tao" i^ jsf ^ 5$ i n p a r a l l e l c o n s t r u c t i o n to " r e l y on heaven and e a r t h ' s b e i n g s e l f - s o " @ 9 < & $S , 1 9 What he does not do i s use t z u j an to d e s c r i b e the Tao. As a t h e o r e t i c a l model, we might imagine t h a t the Tao expresses or m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n the world through the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of n a t u r a l t h i n g s and events. T h i s m a n i f e s t a t i o n i s the o n t i c b a s i s which p r o v i d e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r u e knowledge on the p a r t o f man. As a m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f the Tao, t h i n g s are not s e l f - s o i n an a b s o l u t e sense. An i n d i v i d u a l horse, f o r example, i s not thought o f as being undetermined by any other r e a l i t y , s i n c e he i s a product o f the Tao. Tanaka Masami a l s o draws our a t t e n t i o n to another important aspect o f t z u j a n , namely, i t s co n n e c t i o n w i t h wu wei. Through the v e r y d e v i c e o f " r e l y i n g on", y i n Q , the two concepts are made interdependent, so t h a t wu wei i s almost an e q u i v a l e n t of y i n t z u j a n . Whereas f o r m e r l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p was one o f complementary cause and r e s u l t i n an i d e a l i z e d s o c i a l order, here i t has become a t i g h t e r l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Wu c h i h ^ , " n o n - r u l i n g " , which i s the r u l e r ' s e x p r e s s i o n o f wu wei, i s d e f i n e d by the w r i t e r as "not a l t e r i n g the way t h i n g s are of themselves" ^ % ft •ttU . The complement o f t h a t i y H u a i nan t z u , 1:5b, 6b. For the phrase " f o l l o w the s e l f - s o n a t u r e " S % %l 1. 41 > see 8:5a and 9:5b. 65. phrase , wu pu c h i h ^ j& , " t h e r e i s n o t h i n g not r u l e d " , i s e x p l a i n e d as " r e l y i n g on the interdependence of t h i n g s " @ ifl Z_ H . 2 0 The l i n k i n g concept o f r e l i a n c e i s here connected not w i t h wu wei and t z u j a n , but w i t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e complements. But t h i s r e f e r e n c e s t i l l demonstrates the r e l i a n c e of man i n h i s governing on a n a t u r a l o r d e r . The term h s i a n g j an ^ % , "mutually so1,1 i s not an o p p o s i t e o f t z u j a n but a complement. I t i m p l i e s t h a t although a t h i n g i s so of i t s e l f , i t s t i l l has e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . A horse may be s e l f - s o , but as such he i s s t i l l r e l a t e d to a cow, f o r example. The horse and cow do not d e f i n e each other; they are each s e l f - s o . But when each t h i n g i s s e l f - s o , then the w o r l d i s w e l l - o r d e r e d . T h i s assumption of u n d e r l y i n g harmony r e v e a l s the l i m i t e d c h a r a c t e r of the concept of s e l f -so. The development of i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s i s s u b j e c t to the requirement of harmony. We might be f a i r l y s a f e i n assuming t h a t the substance or source o f t h i s harmony would be expressed by a concept of Tao, perhaps e l a b o r a t e d by a theory of yin-yang 2 and the f i v e phases which i s found elsewhere i n the Huai nan t z u , although the nature of the substance of the harmony does not r e a l l y a f f e c t the f a c t t h a t t z u j a n i s l i m i t e d . We can f i n d a c e r t a i n analogy to t h i s k i n d of r e a s o n i n g i n the thought o f Thomas Hobbes (1558-1679). Hobbes conceived of man i n h i s n a t u r a l s t a t e as a mass of i n d i v i d u a l s , each I b i d . 1:8a See e s p e c i a l l y Huai nan t z u , chapter 5, Shih t s e fllf $'| . 66. p u r s u i n g h i s own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Such a s t a t e was one o f c o n t i n u a l war of each a g a i n s t each, and l i f e was " s o l i t a r y , 22 poor, nasty, b r u t i s h , and s h o r t . " The r e s u l t o f t h i s s t a t e i s t h a t i t i s f u r t h e r i n man's s e l f - i n t e r e s t to r e l i n q u i s h a p a r t o f h i s n a t u r a l l i b e r t y over to the s t a t e and the r u l e of law. Hence i t i s i n h i s s e l f - i n t e r e s t to v o l u n t a r i l y l i m i t some o f h i s s e l f - i n t e r e s t s . In Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the founder o f E n g l i s h U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , the e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e of a c t i n g f o r "the g r e a t e s t happiness f o r the g r e a t e s t number" a l s o i n c l u d e d the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a t r u e s e l f - i n t e r e s t would p l a c e benevolence above s e l f - s e e k i n g and t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n and c o n t r o l would be needed to harmonize s e l f - i n t e r e s t and p u b l i c 23 i n t e r e s t . While Bentham wished t h a t p e r s o n a l p l e a s u r e and p a i n be the b a s i s f o r human a c t i o n , he r e c o g n i z e d t h a t p l e a s u r e c o u l d not r e s u l t from the f r e e p u r s u i t of i n d i v i d u a l d e s i r e s , t h a t i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s must viewed as r e l a t i v e to the a c t i o n s of the group. Of course, i n the Huai nan t z u , and i n a l l other cases I have d i s c u s s e d so f a r , the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p e r s o n a l freedom found i n Bentham and Hobbes i s not p r e s e n t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , these examples i l l u s t r a t e t h a t i f a t h i n g i s s e l f - s o , and i f there i s to be harmony between i t and other s e l f - s o t h i n g s , t h e i r b e i ng s e l f - s o must be l i m i t e d . A t h i n g cannot be s e l f - s o Thomas Hobbes, Concerning Body 1.1.7. As quoted i n F r e d e r i c k Copleston, A h i s t o r y o f philosophy, v o l . V, p a r t I, (Garden C i t y , NY: Doubleday, 1962) p. 42. 67. i n a manner which would prevent other things from being s e l f -so. In o t h e r chapters o f the Huai nan tzu, an i n t e r e s t i n g theme i s developed, namely the use of th i n g s which are s e l f - s o f o r c u l t u r a l development. The c u l t u r e o f p r i m i t i v e democracy which was p i c t u r e d i n the Lao t z u was a spontaneous, g r a s s -r o o t s c u l t u r e o f a p r i m a r i l y a g r a r i a n c h a r a c t e r . I t d i d not r e q u i r e any p o s i t i v e c u l t u r a l l y f o r m a t i v e a c t i v i t y on the p a r t o f the l e a d e r s i n order to develop except i n s o f a r as the in v e n t o r s of t h i n g s were to be c a l l e d l e a d e r s . The sage's f u n c t i o n was to remove h i s t o r i c a l l y developed hindrances to the f r e e o p e r a t i o n o f s o c i e t y . But i n the Huai nan t z u , there i s a concept i n which the sage may engage i n the d i r e c t use o f thi n g s i f he does so i n accordance w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l ( t z u jan) s t a t e . C onsider the f o l l o w i n g passage: ...when the sage engages i n a c t i v i t y , how c o u l d he, r e s i s t i n g the technique o f the Tao and i t s p r i n c i p l e s and opposing the s e l f -so nature o f t h i n g s , take the crooked as s t r a i g h t and the c o n t r a c t e d as extended? He never f a i l s to use them a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n . S A S U J k 4 & t %, ii 6 fi t * i , ^ & h & , ^ A it i<?.-& * * t * % n $ -t. 2 4 In Chapter 19 an opponent suggests t h a t wu wei means s i t t i n g q u i e t l y doing n o t h i n g . The w r i t e r r e p l i e s t h a t a l l the g r e a t 2 3 S e e E t t i e n e G i l s o n , e t . a l . , Recent p h i l o s o p h y : Hegel to the pr e s e n t (New York: Random House, 1962) pp. 415-418. 2 4 H u a i nan t z u , 9.8b. 68. sages of h i s t o r y would then not be sages. Did not Shen Nung teach the people c u l t i v a t i o n of the land and did not YU control the floods? These sages were c e r t a i n l y active. He then gives his own d e f i n i t i o n of wu wei: What I c a l l wu wei i s not having private concerns enter public l i f e and not allowing desires to harm proper techniques. Rely on p r i n c i p l e s to conduct a f f a i r s . E s t a b l i s h things according to t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n . Bend things by weighing t h e i r natural circumstances .. . I f one t r i e s to dry a we'll with f i r e or use the Huai River to i r r i g a t e a mountain, th i s i s using oneself and turning one's back on the s e l f - s o . Therefore I c a l l these actions contrivance. % H %% % % i/ iu + t ? A $ v i , °* ^ *t I W *- %K ^ & « . %4 A ^ A *I ^ ;1i The writer of the f i r s t passage q u a l i f i e s nature, .rising , as that which i s se l f - s o . One may use things i f he accords with t h e i r nature. The other important term i n both of these passages i s tzu , which I have translated " d i s p o s i t i o n " , but also means "natural endowment". The uses of things which accord with t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n are uses which complement t h e i r natural condition, the way they are of themselves. Presumably the r e s u l t or product of t h i s use i s something which would never have come from the natural development of the thing. Using water for i r r i g a t i o n and domesticating plant l i f e are acceptable Ibid. 19.3b. 69. c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s way o f man r e l a t i n g to nature may be compared w i t h the Confucian t r a d i t i o n . Although the vocabulary i s d i f f e r e n t , the broad concept i s s i m i l a r to t h a t of HsUn t z u . For HsUn t z u man's c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y was a r t i f i c i a l , but complementary to the n a t u r a l world. Man's a c t i v i t y i s i n accordance w i t h h i s heavenly f u n c t i o n s , t h a t i s , h i s given, n a t u r a l f u n c t i o n s . He forms a t r i a d w i t h heaven and e a r t h , and completes the t r i a d 26 when he harmonizes w i t h the ot h e r two members. Of course, HsUn tzu's view of what t h a t complementary c u l t u r e would be d i f f e r s c o n s i d e r a b l y from the Huai nan tzu's view. HsUn t z u c o n s i d e r s a g r e a t e r s o p h i s t i c a t i o n o f c u l t u r e to be s t i l l complementary to na t u r e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h nature might a l s o be compared w i t h the A r i s t o t e l i a n concept of p o t e n t i a l i t y . In A r i s t o t l e matter i s c o n s i d e r e d to have a p o t e n t i a l ; i t i s p r e - d i s p o s e d to change. I t has an i n h e r e n t c a p a c i t y to be a c t e d on and to become a new t h i n g . A r i s t o t l e a l s o argues t h a t the a c t u a l i t y which the p o t e n t i a l i t y becomes i s both temporally and l o g i c a l l y p r i o r . Grass, f o r example, has the p o t e n t i a l o f becoming the f l e s h o f a cow, but o n l y when cows a c t u a l l y e x i s t which g i v e b i r t h to l i t t l e c a l v e s . And i f there were no cows, the p o t e n t i a l o f grass to become a cow would v a n i s h . T h i s concept o f p o t e n t i a l i t y gave r i s e to a h i e r a r c h y o f being, s i n c e l e s s complex t h i n g s , which 2 bHsUn t z u , " T ' i e n l u n " ^ | § , l l : 9 b - 1 0 b . See Watson, HsUn t z u , pp. 80-81. 7 0 . were a c t u a l i t y c o n s i d e r e d i n themselves, were p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r 27 more complex beings, which i n t u r n were p o t e n t i a l f o r o t h e r s . The n o t i o n o f d i s p o s i t i o n i n the Huai nan t z u i s o n l y a problem concerned w i t h man's t e c h n i c a l use of n a t u r a l o b j e c t s . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between two n a t u r a l o b j e c t s (the cow and the grass) i s not d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s connection. Thus the A r i s t o t e l i a n d i s t i n c t i o n o f matter and i t s p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r form i s a more ge n e r a l concept. Secondly, p o t e n t i a l i t y i s r e a l l y a way of e x p l a i n i n g the n a t u r e o f change, and the Huai nan t z u i s a d d r e s s i n g i t s e l f to use. In r e a l i t y , t h i s need not be as f a r apart as the words make i t seem. A stone which i s hewn and used to b u i l d a house i s s t i l l a stone. T h i s would be a use a c c o r d i n g to i t s d i s p o s i t i o n . Yet i t would a l s o a c t u a l i z e a p o t e n t i a l o f the stone, to become p a r t o f a w a l l . What i s fundamental to both concepts i s t h a t they are ways o f d e a l i n g w i t h the l i m i t s which the s t r u c t u r e o f v a r i o u s n a t u r a l t h i n g s p l a c e s on the t e c h n i c a l use which man can make o f them. I opened t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i t h the remark that the Huai-nan t z u c o n t a i n e d a theme about the r e l a t i o n s h i p of s e l f - s o t h i n g s and c u l t u r a l development. We can now see t h a t t e c h n i c a l development o f a c e r t a i n k i n d i s p r o b a b l y meant. Joseph Needham has p o i n t e d out t h a t i n the Huai nan t z u and o t h e r T a o i s t w r i t i n g s "knack-passages" are a r e c u r r i n g theme. These passages are an F r e d e r i c k Copleston, A H i s t o r y of Philosophy, v o l . I, p a r t I I , pp. 49-54. A l s o see A r i s t o t l e , Metaphysics, book 6, pp. 5-11. (In A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics, H.G. A p o s t l e , t r . (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966) pp. 150-159. 71. approval o f craftsmen and a r t i s a n s , an approval o f i n t u i t i v e s k i l l i n m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e i r m a t e r i a l , which was not backed by a fund o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. The p r a c t i c a l products o f everyday l i f e are approved, but the h i g h e r technology backed by s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and used to ensure the continuance o f an 28 o p p r e s s i v e s t a t e i s r e j e c t e d . However, the r u l e r i n the passages we are d i s c u s s i n g encourages t e c h n i c a l development, r a t h e r than merely a c t i n g to remove hindrances to the f r e e o p e r a t i o n o f i n t u i t i v e c r a f t . T h i s may be a s i g n t h a t there i s a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t even i n technique which accords w i t h the nature of t h i n g s , there i s room f o r the support o f g e n e r a l s c i e n t i f i c theory. But f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n of t h i s t o p i c would demand a c l o s e r examination o f the Huai nan t z u than I have been a b l e to make. In chapter 20 o f the Huai nan tzu, t z u j an has a new f u n c t i o n which we have not elsewhere encountered. T h i s w r i t e r conceives heaven to be the b a s i s o f the u n i v e r s e , but i t s o p e r a t i o n s are i m p e r c e p t i b l e . No one sees how i t b r i n g s t h i n g s to l i f e and death. Yet there i s some k i n d o f sympathy i n the world. When heaven i s about to send wind, although the t r e e s have not y e t begun to move, the b i r d s b e g i n to f l u t t e r . Hot and c o l d vapors move each other, and an echo reproduces the sound. S i m i l a r l y the sage embraces heaven's mind and sounds, and he i s thus a b l e 29 to t r a n s f o r m the world. 2 8 J o s e p h Needham, Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n i n China, v o l . I I (Cambridge:Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1969) pp. 121-127. 2 9 H u a i nan t z u , 20:la-b. 72. At t h i s p o i n t , the w r i t e r i s e x p r e s s i n g a sentiment r a t h e r common i n the Han dynasty. The n o t i o n that there was some k i n d of sympathetic resonance i n the c r e a t i o n was widespread. Tung Chung-shu i^r 1$ ^ (179 ? - 104 ? B.C.) i s the b e s t r e p r e s e n t a -t i v e of such a p o s i t i o n . His w r i t i n g s and ideas would c e r t a i n l y have been i n c i r c u l a t i o n about the time t h a t the Huai nan t z u was w r i t t e n . The author f u r t h e r d i s c u s s e s s p i r i t s and notes that by d i v i n a t i o n and prayers one can decide one's a f f a i r s , o b t a i n good f o r t u n e , or request r a i n . Then he quotes the Shih ching The s p i r i t s ' a r r i v a l Cannot be c a l c u l a t e d . Who can i g n o r e them? if i . n A Immediately t h e r e a f t e r , he comments as f o l l o w s : Heaven b r i n g s i t s h e i g h t (up): e a r t h b r i n g s i t s breadth ( o u t ) . The moon shines on i t s n i g h t ; the sun shines on i t s day. The y i n and yang transform; the s t a r s shine. I t i s not (through) t h e i r way, but things are so of themselves. T h e r e f o r e y i n and yang and the f o u r seasons do not e x i s t i n order to produce a l l the c r e a t u r e s . The seasonal f a l l of r a i n and dew does not e x i s t i n order to n u r t u r e p l a n t s and t r e e s . The s p i r i t s j o i n , the y i n and yang harmonize, and the myriad c r e a t u r e s are born. T h e r e f o r e h i g h mountains and deep f o r e s t s do not e x i s t f o r the sake of t i g e r s and l e a p o r d s . Large t r e e s and f l u o r i s h i n g branches do not e x i s t f o r f l y i n g b i r d s . 3 0 S h i h ching jjjj- , Ta yja, f a n g , i ^ Jff^  j | , <#(! , verse 7. T h i s appears i n the Harvard-Yenching S i n o l o g i c a l index s e r i e s , Mao s h i h y i n - t e ^ | ^ t)| ff a s number 256/7, p. 68. 73. A * # ^ 4 7 * 4 J i H u a i nan tzu,20:2b. T h i s passage has a few v a r i a n t r e a d i n g s . The phrase f e i c h ' i tao ^ "^L |j§ i s g i v e n i n the Cheng t'ung tao t s ' ang A ' 863-867 ts'e flfl. , 20: 3a(Taiwan: I-wen P r i n t i n g Co. 1962) as f e i yu tao -=)^  ^ • T h i s r e a d i n g a l s o appears i n the Ssu pu ts'ung k' an TSD ^ =fi| ed. (Shanghai: Commercial P r e s s , 1936) v o l . 96. p. 151, top. A second v a r i a n t i s g i v e n i n Huai nan hung l i e h  c h i e h ;|? g | , 1590,^ Wang I-l u a n — ^ > e d -which reads cheng yu tao T f ^ • ^he f i r s t v a r i a n t , f e i yu  tao, "they are not the p o s s e s s i n g of the way," does not d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y from f e i c h ' i tao, s i n c e i t a f f i r m s that the way of those heavenly bodies and n a t u r a l phenomena i s not b a s i s f o r the natures of the c r e a t u r e s , which are s e l f - s o . The v a r i a n t cheng yu tao, " s e t r i g h t ( t h e i r ) p o s s e s s i n g o f the way," i m p l i e s that n a t u r a l things each f o l l o w t h e i r own course, "and things are s e l f - s o . " That c o n c l u s i o n has a s l i g h t l y l e s s a d v e r s a t i v e nuance than i n the case o f f e i c h ' i tao. However i t s t i l l i n d i c a t e s t h at i t i s not i n the nature of one t h i n g to produce a t h i n g o f a d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e . The Ssu pu ts'ung k'an e d i t i o n has another v a r i a t i o n , r e a d i n g l i e h h s i n g ch' i "^M^  JP f o r the 74. This discussion arises i n order that author may comment on the passage from the Shih ching. While not actually denying "The s p i r i t s ' a r r i v a l " , he i n s i s t s that they have no causal power i n the order that exists among the creatures. The author's only reference to the s p i r i t s , "The s p i r i t s j o i n " , places them i n a context with other independent but harmoniously co-operating elements i n the universe. He i s arguing against any causal operation of these elements which would i n t e r f e r e i n the natural, self-so functioning of the creatures of the world. Secondly, the passage i s i n part directed against a certain l i e h hsing lang " ^ i ] f[ flft which appears i n the Ssu pu pei yao and other editions. Lieh hsing ch'i means "The stars have the i r periods," and this i s merely another way of in d i c a t i n g a natural function. F i n a l l y Cheng Lang-shu^|jj$ ^  ^'f suggests that y i n yang hua p|? p|> -f(L. should read y i n yang ho {3j| to conform with the occurrence of y in yang ho i n several places i n the context. See Huai nan tzu chiao l i ffl \ (Taipei: National Taiwan University, Dept. of Chinese L i t e r a t u r e , 1969) p. 304. This i s a minor v a r i a t i o n which does not change the point of the passage. 75. understanding o f t h e o r i e s o f the o r i g i n o f the cosmos common to tha t time. In such t h e o r i e s some k i n d o f grand o r i g i n or u n i t y produces heaven and e a r t h , or y i n and yang, and these i n t u r n produce the f o u r seasons and gi v e r i s e to the myriad c r e a t u r e s 32 between heaven and e a r t h . The passage does not deny the f a c t o f t h i s o r d e r o f p r o d u c t i o n , but does deny that the c r e a t i v e or p r o d u c t i v e f u n c t i o n i s an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f t h e i r b e i n g . Thus the author says t h a t y i n and yang do not e x i s t i n order to produce the myriad c r e a t u r e s . I t might be t h a t there i s some p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p between them, but i t i s c e r t a i n l y not e s s e n t i a l to the nature o f y i n and yang. Y i n , yang, and each o f the c r e a t u r e s have t h e i r independent, s e l f - s o mode of e x i s t e n c e . I t i s suggested at the opening o f t h i s chapter that Heaven e s t a b l i s h e s , she , the sun, moon, and s t a r s , and r e g u l a t e s or harmonizes, \ 33 t' i a o -=1^  , the y i n and the yang. Thus Heaven as cosmic o r i g i n J Z T h e openings of chapters 3 and 7 of the Huai nan t z u proposed such t h e o r i e s . The r e l e v a n t s e c t i o n o f chapter 3 i s t r a n s l a t e d i n W. T. DeBary, e t . a l . , Sources o f Chinese t r a d i t i o n , v o l . I (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969) p. 192. 33 Huai nan t z u , 20:1a. 76. does seem to have some kind of creative or regulative function i n i t s very nature. The author, indeed, goes on to state c l e a r l y that some things do produce other things. The large produces, sheng ^ , the small, the many produce the few, and this i s the way of 34 Heaven. Lice are produced i n the sweat of horses and cows. By implication, horses and cows would also be produced i n some way by something larger i n th e i r environment. However, the manner of t h e i r being, t h e i r nature i s e n t i r e l y t h e i r own. The i n t r i n s i c nature of cows i s that they produce cows. It i s only accidental that l i c e are produced by t h e i r sweat. That i s the central idea of tzu jan i n this passage. Each thing i s s e l f - s o ; t h e i r i n t r i n s i c nature i s not dependent on another thing, although the fact of t h e i r existence may be so dependent. I would l i k e to discuss here a problem which has been i m p l i c i t i n a l l the sources we have looked at so far, but which seems to come more to the forefront i n the Huai nan tzu because of i t s close association of tzu j an with the natural world. That problem i s the relat i o n s h i p of man and nature. In general man i s seen as r e l y i n g on the world of nature i n the Huai nan tzu. Huai nan tzu, 20:2b. 77. Even i n Chapter 20 which I have just discussed, although the sage embraces Heaven (something p r i o r to natural objects), his governing of the world "does not e x i s t i n order to a l t e r the nature of the people". \ J^, 'Ht-tiLo ^ His contact with Heaven does not give him license to do as he pleases on earth. This i s to some degree i n harmony with the injunctions i n other chapters to r e l y on the nature of things, which we assume means man's nature as well. Certainly i n Chapter 1 where the author conceived of the "heavenly" as a part of man, there i s some kind of common ground between man and the rest of the creatures, who also have heavenly natures. More importantly, that common ground i s always i n some way more r e l i a b l e for the conduct of l i f e . This suggests that the authors of the Huai nan tzu did not conceive of man as standing absolutely over against nature. Through his f a l s e discriminatory knowledge and his contrived actions he was i n fact alienated from nature, but the sage could show the way back by using things according to t h e i r dispositions, th e i r natural endowments. Ideally then, man follows the lead of the nature of things. We may contrast t h i s , for example, to a C h r i s t i a n under-standing of nature. Since man and natural objects are a l l i n one creation, they c l e a r l y have that creatureliness i n common. But the source of the order i n that creatureliness i s outside of the world. Man respects.the order of the world because i t Huai nan tzu, 20:3a. 78. i s a c r e a t u r e o f God. T h i s p o i n t i s somewhat s i m i l a r to the p o s i t i o n o f Chapter 20 of the Huai nan t z u i n that there too man r e s p e c t s the Heavenly order. But i n C h r i s t i a n i t y , man i s a l s o c a l l e d to dominion (see The B i b l e , Gen. 1:28). Dominion, however, i s understood as an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n on God's b e h a l f , as s e r v i c e or stewardship (See I I Cor. 9:6-13). T h i s has been d i s t o r t e d i n the h i s t o r y o f C h r i s t i a n i t y to a n o t i o n t h a t man may use nature f o r h i s own ends. T h i s concept i s now seen by many as the source o f Western man's concept o f man-against-nature, the h i s t o r i c a l r o o t o f our e c o l o g i c a l c r i s i s , as Lynn 36 White so e l o q u e n t l y puts i t . But o r i g i n a l l y C h r i s t i a n i t y v a l u e d nature, although not as a s u p e r i o r k i n d o f e x i s t e n c e . F i n a l l y , comparing the use of t z u j an i n the Huai nan t z u with the two main ways o f u s i n g i t i n pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e , i t seems t h a t i t f a l l s l a r g e l y i n t o the f i r s t category, namely, a n o n - t e c h n i c a l word used as an a t t r i b u t e o f n a t u r a l t h i n g s and p r o c e s s e s . But i n f a c t i t a l s o borrows a sense from the second category, t z u j a n used as "independent", s i g n a l l i n g a r e l i g i o u s a b s o l u t e . I t i s not the case t h a t n a t u r a l processes are a r e l i g i o u s a b s o l u t e i n the Huai nan t z u , a t l e a s t i n the p l a c e s we have analyzed, but nature has become something r e l i a b l e f o r man. I t s r e l i a b i l i t y i s not d e r i v e d from being a b s o l u t e l y s e l f - s o , f o r n a t u r a l t h i n g s s t i l l r e c e i v e t h e i r natures from Heaven or Tao. Things are s e l f - s o o n l y w i t h i n the boundaries See the now famous a r t i c l e by Lynn White, "The H i s t o r i c a l Roots of our E c o l o g i c a l C r i s i s , " Science 155, no. 3767 (10 Mar 1967) 1203-1207). 79. set f or them by Heaven or Tao. They receive importance by the fact that t h e i r natures create the p o s s i b i l i t y of true knowledge for man. TUNG CHUNG-SHU (CA. 179 - CA. 104 B.C.) Tung Chung-shu -ft w a s a contemporary of the writers of the Huai nan tzu. The basic concepts of his thought 37 are well known i n both Chinese and Western l i t e r a t u r e . He i s known as one who integrates the concept of heaven with natural functioning to such a degree that the extra-ordinary functions of the natural environment may be taken as signs of heaven's pleasure or displeasure. According to Tung, the natural portents can occur because the universe i s a system ordered i n the patterns of yin-yang and the f i v e phases. Because heaven and earth are the o r i g i n of a l l things, a l l things must conform to the pattern of heaven and earth to fi n d t h e i r r i g h t f u l place. In forming culture, man must consciously emulate the patterns of heaven. The natural functions of y i n and yang and the f i v e phases permeate man's cu l t u r a l l i f e , but, i n the t r a d i t i o n of Hsiin tzu, Tung attributes that permeation to the conscious a c t i v i t y of man. Man directs or a l t e r s his a c t i v i t i e s according to how they harmonize or c o n f l i c t with the heavenly pattern. "^Discussions of Tung Chung-shu i n Western l i t e r a t u r e may be found i n Joseph Needham, Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n i n China, II, pp 279 f f . , i n Kung-chuan Hsiao, Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought, pp. 484-503, and others. Translated excerpts from the Ch'un ch'iu fan l u may be found i n Wing-tsit Chan, A 80. Although one might c a l l Tung's t h i n k i n g n a t u r a l i s t i c , i t d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the n a t u r a l i s m o f the T a o i s t s p r i o r to him. Tung does not conceive nature to be an u n s t r u c t u r e d , ever-changing flow of forms. T h e r e f o r e , the concept o f t z u j an has no s i g n i f i c a n t p l a c e i n h i s thought. At one p o i n t he c l e a r l y focuses on the p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t z u j an, arguing d e c i d e d l y t h a t t h i n g s cannot be s e l f - s o , because t h i n g s f i n d t h e i r manner of being ( t h e i r jan) i n a cosmic resonance w i t h o t h e r t h i n g s . In h i s d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter 57 of h i s s u r v i v i n g w r i t i n g s , the Ch 'un ch' i u f a n l u tyC 38 -* M (Luxuriant Dew o f the S p r i n g and Autumn Annals) , Tung d i s c u s s e s the i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h i n g s o f the same genus. Such i n t e r a c t i o n takes p l a c e , he argues, i n the same manner as m u s i c a l resonance. When one l u t e s t r i n g i s s t r u c k , and nearby s t r i n g s v i b r a t e on the same p i t c h , . . . t h i s i s a case of t h i n g s being a c t i v a t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r c l a s s . They are moved by a sound, which has no v i s i b l e form. Men do not see a form by which i t moves, so they say i t sounds o f i t s e l f . Furthermore, when there i s any mutual a c t i o n without form, they say i t i s so of i t s e l f ( t z u j an). In f a c t , i t i s not s e l f - s o , but there i s something which causes i t to be so. » . o > t ft £ * A % % . M H "fifl ^ ^ o Source Book i n Chinese Philosophy, ( P r i n c e t o n , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963) pp. 271-291, and i n E. R. Hughes, Chinese P h i l o s o p h y i n C l a s s i c a l Times (London, J . M. Dent & Sons, L t d . , 1942), pp. 293-308. 81. Tung a l s o uses t z u j an as an e x p r e s s i o n to i n d i c a t e a n a t u r a l s t a t e o f t h i n g s without the a c t i v i t y of man. For example, i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of human nature, he says t h a t human nature i s the " n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l " ( i ^ £ ) r e c e i v e d at b i r t h . ^ But t h a t n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l i s an u n f i n i s h e d one which must be completed by the a c t i v i t i e s of man. The s t u f f of human nature i s n o t h i n g more than raw p o t e n t i a l i t y . I t can become e i t h e r good or e v i l , f o r i t c o n t a i n s i n i t s endowment of l i f e - b r e a t h ( c h ' i S ) the breaths or f o r c e s of both y i n and yang. I t i s l i k e l y t h a t Tung conceived the y i n and yang f o r c e s to operate a c c o r d i n g to s e l f - s o p r i n c i p l e s , but each operates w i t h i n boundaries, and heaven r e s t r i c t s the one w i t h the other. S i m i l a r l y man may r e s t r i c t the p o t e n t i a l f o r e v i l w i t h i n h i m s e l f and develop the p o t e n t i a l f o r good. Thus Tung uses the concept of t z u j an to d e s c r i b e the workings of the heavenly p a t t e r n , but such " n a t u r a l " o p e r a t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d by a m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e heaven. The Ch'un c h ' i u f a n l u i s not r e a l l y a work of the Ch'un  ch' i u type. The p r e s e n t work has 82 chapters i n 17 chuan. I t i s p r obably a remnant of the o r i g i n a l 123 chapters i n h i s c o l l e c t e d works mentioned i n the Han shu. The S u i shu r e c o r d s o n l y a 17 chiian Ch'un ch' i u f a n l u . Since o n l y f o u r t e e n or f i f t e e n chapters are o f the Ch'un c h ' i u type, i t i s l i k e l y t h a t i t s t i t l e was a t i t l e o f p a r t o f the works o f Tung Chung-shu, now taken as a t i t l e of the whole work. There are no s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e s to the a u t h e n t i c i t y of the t e x t . 3 9 T u n g Chung-shu J ^ f% Ch'un c h ' i u f a n l u ^ ^ ^ Chap. 57, 13:4a. T h i s passage i s a l s o t r a n s l a t e d i n E. R. Hughes, Chinese Philosophy, p. 282, and i n W. T. Chan, Source-book, p. 285. 82. Elsewhere Tung repeats the theme of the dominance of human a c t i v i t y . I f the t r i a d o f heaven, e a r t h , and man were not present, he argues, s o c i a l chaos would r e s u l t . F a t h e r s c o u l d not command sons, nor r u l e r s s e r v a n t s . None would r e s p e c t the r u l e r ; they would r e s p e c t o n l y themselves. T h i s , he concludes, i s a " n a t u r a l punishment" ( !i "Z. ) - 4 1 On the other hand, i f the t r i a d o f heaven, e a r t h , and man i s maintained, then there w i l l be s o c i a l harmony, and t h i s harmony w i l l be a " n a t u r a l reward" ( 4 i ~ 'Jjj7 ) . 4 2 In t h i s passage the term t z u j a n expresses the f a c t t h a t w i t h i n the l a w f u l p a t t e r n of the u n i v e r s e , a c t i o n s have consequences, which a r r i v e p r e d i c t a b l y and o f t h e i r own accord. For Tung t h i s use of t z u j an i s a p o s i t i v e one, although o f o n l y minor s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t i s c l e a r l y not used as any standard f o r a c t i o n , human or non-human. I t by no means conveys any sympathy f o r f r e e , n a t u r a l , unhindered a c t i o n , or f o r conduct whose p r i n c i p l e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n i s w i t h i n o n e s e l f . THE TRANSITION TO WANG CH'UNG The next important t e x t i n the h i s t o r y o f the development of t z u j a n i s D i s c u s s i o n s weighed i n the balance, the Lun heng osj ik\ o f W a n § c h ' u n g 2. < A- D- 27-97?). T h i s t e x t i s 4 0 I b i d . Chap. 35, 10:3a T r a n s l a t e d i n Hughes Chinese  Philosophy, p. 300, and Chan Sourcebook, p. 273. 4 1 I b i d . Ch. 19, 6:6a. 4 2 I b i d . 6:6b 83. probably w r i t t e n about two c e n t u r i e s l a t e r than the Huai nan  t z u . Without a doubt Wang Ch'ung was f a m i l i a r w i t h the Huai  nan t z u , and many of h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n s are drawn from i t . Wang Ch'ung r e c o g n i z e d t h i s and f r e e l y announced h i m s e l f indebted to the s c h o o l of the Tao. Wang may be regarded as a some-what renegade Confucian b e l o n g i n g to a m i n o r i t y p a r t y , the Old Text s c h o o l of c l a s s i c a l s c h o l a r s h i p . Opposing the Old Text School was the New Text School. Each had t h e i r own v e r s i o n s or e d i t i o n s of the c l a s s i c s , and the names of the schools are d e r i v e d from the Old Text School's c l a i m t h a t t h e i r v e r s i o n s i n a r c h a i c s c r i p t were more a n c i e n t that those of the New Text School, even though the " o l d t e x t s " were d i s c o v e r e d l a t e r . The d i f f e r e n c e s extended beyond t e x t u a l c r i t i c i s m . The Old Text was more r a t i o n a l i s t i c and pragmatic, whereas the New Text School tended more towards c o s m o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n . In Wang's time the Old Text School was a beleagured m i n o r i t y , but i t gained ascendancy over the New Text School by the end of the Han dynasty. Wang's sympathy f o r T a o i s t ideas may have s e t him a b i t apart i n the s c h o o l , he was i n the t r a d i t i o n o f L i u Hsiang and L i u H s i n as w e l l as h i s C o n f u c i a n i s t mentors, Yang Hsiung and Huan T ' a n . 4 4 Huang Hui ^| 9$ , Lun heng chiao s h i h « ^ jf$r~ £^ ( E x p l a n a t i o n s of the Lun heng), ( T a i p e i : Commercial p r e s s , 1965 ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d 1932) Chapter 85, p. 1190. I c i t e t h i s e d i t i o n of the Lun heng because of i t s s u p e r i o r notes and emendations. In the f o l l o w i n g t e x t I w i l l c i t e t h i s e d i t i o n p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y as f o l l o w s : (LH 85, p. 1190). Where I i n f a c t f o l l o w a suggested emendation of Huang Hui, I w i l l b r a c k e t t h a t emendation, and f o o t n o t e i t when necessary. See a l s o LH 18, pp. 775,780 f o r Wang Ch'ung's remarks on Taoism. 84. . Yang Hsiung ^ t%- (53 B.C.-A.D. 18) i s the o l d e r contemporary of Huan T'an and the more famous of the two. He produced three r a t h e r d i s t i n c t k i n d s o f l i t e r a t u r e which r e p r e s e n t three phases i n h i s development. In h i s e a r l y p e r i o d he was famous as a composer o f the rhapsody, f u . Around 20 B.C. (age 33) he was brought to the c a p i t a l and g i v e n a patronage post f o r poets. S e v e r a l times i n h i s career he was asked to compose f u d e s c r i b i n g i m p e r i a l a c t i v i t i e s . He attempted to e x e r c i s e i n f l u e n c e through i n d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m i n these f u , but f i n a l l y abandoned t h i s p r a c t i c e as u s e l e s s . About the age of 41, he embarked on a new phase, c r e a t i n g a q u a s i - p h i l o s o p h i c a l system d e s c r i b i n g the u n i v e r s e , based vaguely on an analogy to the system of trigrams and hexagrams w i t h commentaries found i n the C l a s s i c of Change, the I ching J | j j j ^ t • The r e s u l t , the C l a s s i c of Great My s t e r y , T' a i hsilan c h i n g ^ , was produced somewhat l a t e r , perhaps around 2 B.C. when Yang was 51 or 52 years o l d . His l a s t phase i s r e p r e s e n t e d by the Model Sayings, Fa yen s| , a work p a t t e r n e d a f t e r the A n a l e c t s of Confucius and the S p r i n g and Autumn Annals. In t h i s work he a f f i r m e d what were then Confucian v a l u e s , such as the moral value of e d u c a t i o n and the a u t h o r i t y of the C l a s s i c s , but a l s o spoke out a g a i n s t i m m o r t a l i t y c u l t s and the p r a c t i t i o n e r s Wang's r e f e r e n c e s to these men are frequent. See LH 39, pp. 606, 608-609 i n p a r t i c u l a r . See a l s o Timotheus Pokora, H s i n l u n (New t r e a t i s e ) and other w r i t i n g s by Huan T'an (43 B.. -28 A.D.), (Ann Arbor: U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Center f o r Chinese s t u d i e s , 1975) p. x i i i . 85. of m a g i c al a r t s , who had a t t a i n e d f a v o r at the end of the Former 45 Han dynasty and d u r i n g the Wang Mang interregnum. To my knowledge, Yang Hsiung uses the term t z u j a n at o n l y one p o i n t . In a paragraph i n the T ' a l hsuan ching on the a r t of w r i t i n g , he says t h a t a good w r i t e r must always pay a t t e n t i o n to the substance o f h i s s u b j e c t and not co n c e n t r a t e on s t y l e and language. S t y l e and language are o n l y the servants o f the substance. He says, "What i s esteemed i n a w r i t e r i s h i s conf o r m i t y to and embodiment o f the way t h i n g s a r e i n them-s e l v e s . " ( -\ i*i % t A 1* ft] $4 % & t ^ . ) 4 6 J u s t as we do not improve our bodies by e i t h e r adding to them or c u t t i n g from them, so the w r i t e r must be c a r e f u l o f the sub-stance and n e i t h e r e m b e l l i s h i t nor abridge i t . " T h e r e f o r e the substance l i e s i n the way th i n g s are of themselves; adorn-ment l i e s i n human a f f a i r s . How c o u l d (the l a t t e r ) add or 4"^Thls d i v i s i o n i s made f o l l o w i n g HsU Fu-kuan f|£ • "Yang Hsiung l u n c h i u " iM. \% *yi (An essay on Yang Hsiung), Chung-kuo che-hsueh ssu-hsiang l u n c h i %^ & ljf. |§ % , Mou Tsung-san ^  ^ , ed. ( T a i p e i : Mu-t'ung P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1976) p. 93. See a l s o David R. Knechtges, The Han rhapsody: a study of the f u o f Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.- A.D. 18), (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976), pp. 3-9. 4 6 Y a n g Hsiung t j # i »' T ' a i hsUan ching ^ (The C l a s s i c o f g r e a t mystery), 7.10a. A t r a n s l a t i o n o f the f i r s t p a r t o f the paragraph which t h i s sentence begins i s found i n Fung Yu-lan, H i s t o r y , I I , p. 139, and a t r a n s l a t i o n o f the second p a r t i s found i n David Knechtges, The Han Rhapsody, p. 93. 86. s u b t r a c t from i t ? " C*X $8. $ T£ 4 f A I <b. A * *f JJ? . )47 The context does not g i v e us much he l p i n e v a l u a t i n g t h i s occurrence o f t z u j a n . I have t r a n s l a t e d i t as "the way t h i n g s are o f themselves", but i n f a c t t here i s no word f o r " t h i n g s " and o n l y the term " s e l f - s o " i s i n the t e x t . Because t z u j a n stands alone, we might be tempted to t h i n k o f i t as an a b s t r a c t q u a l i t y . T h i s however would be a departure from the cases we have seen so f a r . I f t h i s case were such a departure, we would expect Yang Hsiung to make some p o i n t . i n u s i n g i t . Instead i t occurs o n l y i n t h i s paragraph without any e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e i t i s l i k e l y to be conceived i n the framework o f the Huai nan t z u as a g i v e n order o f nature, which i s c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the a r t i f i c e o f human a c t i o n s . As i n the Huai nan t z u t h i s n a t u r a l , s e l f - s o s t a t e i s s u p e r i o r to and more fundamental than human a f f a i r s . Huan T ' a n ^ . | | (43 B.C.-AD. 28), l i k e Yang Hsiung, makes no s p e c i a l use of the concept o f t z u j an. He too i s c i t e d v e r y r e s p e c t f u l l y by Wang Ch'ung and i s an important f i g u r e i n the development of s k e p t i c a l , c r i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n i n the Han dynasty. He was one of the f i r s t s c h o l a r s to c h a l l e n g e the b e l i e f commonly accepted from the end of the Former Han dynasty that c a l a m i t i e s and unusual n a t u r a l occurrences were a s i g n o f good or bad human l e a d e r s h i p . He p u b l i c l y opposed the use o f p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n t e x t s w i t h h i s work H s i n l u n i$f\ k^fr (New t r e a t i s e ) which he 4 7 T ' a i hsuan ching, 7.10a. I read kan ^  f o r kuan ^ i n accordance w i t h the Ssu pu t s 'ung k'an u* ^ e d i t i o n o f the T ' a i hsUan ching, 7.17a. 87. presented to the emperor, Kuang Wu ( r . A.D. 25-57), as a handbook of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e . When he dared to repe a t t h i s o p p o s i t i o n to the Emperor's face, he was sentenced to execu t i o n . The e x e c u t i o n was commuted to e x i l e , but the aged s c h o l a r d i e d ^ 4 8 enroute. As was Yang Hsiung, Huan T'an was a severe opponent o f those who sought i m m o r t a l i t y . He i n s i s t e d t h a t one must accept death. L i f e i s l i k e a candle flame. I t uses up a c e r t a i n amount of g i v e n m a t e r i a l . By c a r e f u l tending, one might make sure t h a t n o t h i n g i s wasted and thus extend one's l i f e to a r i p e o l d age, but once the wick i s burnt and the o i l used up, 49 death w i l l i n e v i t a b l y come. As I w i l l show below, t h i s i d e a of a g i v e n q u a n t i t y o f m a t e r i a l which supports l i f e i s p i c k e d up by Wang Ch'ung and made an important p a r t o f h i s thought. Huan a l s o f o l l o w e d Yang i n h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the T a o i s t t r a d i t i o n , although I suspect he was l e s s e n t h u s i a s t i c i n t h i s than e i t h e r Yang Hsiung o r Wang Ch'ung. In p r a i s i n g 4 8 T i m o t h e u s Pokora, H s i n l u n , p. x i i . Huang Hui, Lun  heng chiao s h i h , a l s o c i t e s Cheng H s i n g ^ ^ and Y i n Min as o t h e r s c h o l a r s who denied the r e l a t i o n s h i p between heavenly p o r t e n t s and r o y a l deeds and a t t a c k e d the p r o g n o s t i -c a t i o n t e x t s . But they d i d not s y s t e m a t i c a l l y a t t a c k the p r i n c i p l e o f sympathetic i n t e r a c t i o n between heaven and man as Wang Ch'ung d i d . As was Huan T'an, these two men were a c t i v e d u r i n g the Wang Mang p e r i o d and i n the e a r l y phases o f the L a t t e r Han dynasty. See L.H. t z u hsil, p. 1. For examples of Huan T'an's a t t i t u d e see Pokora, H s i n Lun paragraphs 51, 33, 210. 4 ^ P o k o r a , H s i n Lun Paragraph 84A, See a l s o 146A, 147. 88. Yang's C l a s s i c o f g r e a t mystery, he i d e n t i f i e d the mystery w i t h the "way" of Lao t z u and the " o r i g i n " o f Confucius. He shared w i t h Yang a l o v e o f astronomy. One i n c i d e n t suggests 51 that he surpassed Yang i n t h i s f i e l d . T h i s i n t e r e s t a l s o e x e m p l i f i e s a c r i t i c a l s p i r i t towards heaven and i t s phenomena, which was continued and extended by Wang Ch'ung. WANG CH'UNG I would now l i k e to t u r n to one of the most important f i g u r e s i n the development o f the concept t z u j a n i n the Han dynasty, namely, Wang Ch'ung. Wang Ch'ung was born i n Chekiang. His f a t h e r h e l d a minor post r e c e i v e d as payment f o r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . Wang w r i t e s t h a t h i s f a t h e r had f a l l e n and had to d e a l i n the buying and s e l l i n g o f goods. Although he i s o f t e n c r i t i c i z e d i n Chinese l i t e r a t u r e f o r t h i s " u n f i l i a l " a t t i t u d e , there i s reason to suspect t h i s was a t r u t h f u l account, Wang's f a m i l y may have been descendants from a l i n e o f p r i n c e s of the s t a t e o f C h ' i ^ and p o s s i b l y had at one p o i n t an 52 a f f i l i a t i o n by marriage w i t h the Han r o y a l house. Thus the minor posts t h a t he and h i s f a t h e r h e l d were probably a s i g n of d e c l i n e . His f a t h e r d i e d w h i l e he was s t i l l young, but Wang Ch'ung was a p r e c o c i o u s c h i l d , showing a g r e a t a p t i t u d e 5 0 I b i d . Paragraphs 163A to 164G. 5 1 I b i d . Paragraphs 114-115, 134. ~*2Chu Wen-chUan^ , Wang Ch'ung Lun-heng yen-c h i u %% f|ft (A study o f Wang Ch'ung's Lun heng) ( T a i p e i : Chung-yang t'u-shu Publ. Co., 1974) pp. 5-6. 89. f o r study. He may have even spent some time a t the I m p e r i a l Academy. The Hou Han shu r e c o r d s that h i s teacher was Pan r i a o , the f a t h e r o f the h i s t o r i a n Pan Ku, but i n f a c t t h i s i s u n l i k e l y . Wang never mentions Pan Piao as h i s teacher, nor was Pan Piao r e s i d e n t a t the Academy duri n g the time Wang 53 was supposed to have stayed there. ' When he completed h i s s t u d i e s he r e t u r n e d home to work as a teacher, and e v e n t u a l l y was g i v e n a s e r i e s o f minor p o s t s . I t i s l i k e l y t h a t h i s c r i t i c a l s p i r i t and s a t i r i c a l bent kept him from e n j o y i n g a p l e a s a n t r a p p o r t w i t h h i s s u p e r i o r s . Perhaps t h i s h i n d e r e d h i s o f f i c i a l c a r e e r , which a t any r a t e was unimpressive. Near the end of h i s l i f e he h e l d a post .as a s u b - p r e f e c t i n Anhwei f o r about two years (A.D.86-88), but then r e t i r e d f o r reasons of h e a l t h . The Hou Han shu a l s o records a recommendation o f Wang (to the throne) by a c e r t a i n Hsieh I-wu l ^ 1 ^ ^ and the subsequent summons by Emperor Chang ( r . A.D. 76-88), which Wang had to r e f u s e f o r reasons o f h e a l t h . T h i s s t o r y i s a l s o l i k e l y to be apocryphal."* 4 We have a s u b s t a n t i a l work o f Wang Ch'ung as a source o f i n f o r m a t i o n , namely, the Lun heng. The t e x t which s u r v i v e s i s one of 85 chapters i n 30 chlian, although o f one chapter o n l y the t i t l e remains. Wang Ch'ung w r i t e s t h a t h i s own works t o t a l l e d more than one hundred chapters, but from the time o f 5 3 H s u Fu-kuan f | X%i% > L i a n g Han ssu-hsiang s h i h j5a ; ^ J^. 7Js%. ^ ( I n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y of the two Han d y n a s t i e s ) , ( T a i p e i : Student Book Store, 1976) P. 567. 90. Ko Hung l& (A,D. 283-363) o n l y an 85 chapter v e r s i o n 55 remained i n c i r c u l a t i o n , Besides the Lun heng, Wang Ch'ung mentions the t i t l e s o f f i v e o t h e r works which he wrote. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , a l l o f these have been assumed l o s t . But Timotheus Pokora, who over the past two decades has done a grea t d e a l of work on the Lun heng, argues t h a t the t e x t which we now have i n f a c t c o n t a i n s a l l s i x works w i t h i n i t . The f i f t e e n or more l o s t chapters cannot account f o r f i v e works m i s s i n g . Given the r e l a t i v e l y good p r e s e r v a t i o n of the Lun heng, i s i t not strange t h a t a l l the other works v a n i s h without a t r a c e , even i n quotations? Pokora suggests that the o r i g i n a l "Lun heng" i s o n l y a p a r t o f the presen t t e x t . I t i s l i k e l y to have been the l a r g e s t o f the s i x works and was used t h e r e -f o r e as the t i t l e f o r the c o l l e c t i o n . T h e importance o f t h i s theory i s , as Pokora p o i n t s out, t h a t we can now be reasonably sure t h a t the pr e s e n t t e x t i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a l l o f Wang Ch'ung's thought. Although at some time i n the f u t u r e i t may "* 4 I b i d . p. 569. F o r f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n see Forke's i n t r o d u c t i o n to h i s t r a n s l a t i o n o f the Lun heng (New York: Paragon Book R e p r i n t Co. 1962) and Chapter 85 i n the Lun heng i t s e l f . 55 Timotheus Pokora, "The Works o f Wang Ch'ung," A r c h i v  O r i e n t a l n i 36 (1968), p. 130. See a l s o Huang Hui, Lun heng  chiao s h i h , p. 1236. 5 6 P o k o r a , l o c . c i t . See a l s o Chu C h ' i e n - c h i h ^ ^ "Wang Ch'ung chu-tso k'ao" S- T\ % \*f ^ (An i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the works of Wang Ch'ung), Wen s h i h ^ 1(1962) 241-254. Pokora and Chu both make guesses about the assignment of chapters to the v a r i o u s works. 91. be p o s s i b l e to d i v i d e Wang Ch'ung's thought by a s s i g n i n g the chapters to d i f f e r e n t works, t h i s theory i s s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y young and undeveloped, and I s h a l l t r e a t the work as though i t re p r e s e n t s the mature thought o f Wang Ch'ung. THE CONCEPT OF CH'I The p i v o t around which Wang Ch'ung's sy s t e m a t i c thought r e v o l v e s i s the concept o f ch' i SJ^ , v a r i o u s l y t r a n s l a t e d as l i f e f o r c e , v i t a l f l u i d , a i r , b r e a t h , or ether, but which I s h a l l u s u a l l y l e a v e u n t r a n s l a t e d . A c c o r d i n g to Wang, c h ' i i s the fundamental s t u f f o f which the u n i v e r s e i s made and on which e v e r y t h i n g i n i t depends. When the genesis of the cosmos i s di s c u s s e d , Wang Ch'ung r e f e r s to yuan ch' i ^ J|j_ , " p r i m a l ether", to p o i n t out the fundamental c h a r a c t e r o f c h ' i and to i n d i c a t e t h a t i t stands at the o r i g i n o f the cosmos. The term yuan i t s e l f was a p p a r e n t l y becoming common i n Han times. Pokora has p o i n t e d out t h a t i t f i r s t appears i n the Ch'un ch' i u the Spr i n g and Autumn Annals, which was t r a d i t i o n a l l y supposed to be authored by C o n f u c i u s . ^ 7 T h i s was n o t i c e d by 58 Huan T'an, who compared i t to Yang Hsiung's "mystery". Tung Chung-shu j r f4» ^ (179? - 104? B.C.) a s s o c i a t e d yuan w i t h the u n i t y at the beg i n n i n g of a l l t h i n g s , saying t h a t i t r e f e r r e d 59 to the greatness o f t h a t u n i t y . F i n a l l y Wang Ch'ung h i m s e l f Pokora, H s i n l u n , pp. 177-178, n. 9. " ^ I b i d . paragraph 163A. 5 9 H a n shu j | . , "Tung Chung-shu chuan" ^ ff i f f f quoted by Huang Hui, Lun heng chiao s h i h , p. 1174. 92. quotes an unknown I ching scholar or scholars to the e f f e c t that before d i v i s i o n , the ytiari ch' i was an i n d i s t i n c t , muddled 60 unity (LH 31, p. 476). I t i s clear that f o r Wang, yttan  ch ' i i s nothing other than the hun tun j 1 ^ , the undi f f e r -entiated, primordial unity. The world comes into being through the s p l i t t i n g of this primordial unity. I t d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t s e l f into the clear and the muddy, the f i r s t becoming heaven, the second, earth. Joseph Needham labels t h i s " c e n t r i f u g a l cosmogony", with the heavier s t u f f staying at the center, earth, and the l i g h t e r , more r a r i f i e d s t u f f moving out to heaven. He also notes that, unless chapter one of the Lieh tzu i s genuinely pre-Han, the e a r l i e s t development of t h i s theory i s i n the Huai nan tzu, chapter 3 . 6 1 This theory of cosmic o r i g i n by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n or divergence i s si m i l a r to a theory i n the Lao tzu, Chap 42, where we read: "Tao produced one, one produced two, two produced three, and three produced a l l creatures." The common understanding of this i n the Han dynasty was that the Tao i t s e l f i s the one, y i n and yang are the two, yin and yang plus th e i r union are the three, and that union produced the creatures of the world. Yang i s i d e n t i f i e d primarily with heaven and yin with earth, and one can say then that heaven and earth produced Huang Hui offers a tentative i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s quote, but i t i s not exact. See p. 476. Joseph Needham, Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n , II, pp. 371-372. 93. 62 the c r e a t u r e s . S t r i c t l y speaking t h i s i s not a theory o f divergence, but of p r o d u c t i o n . In divergence the o r i g i n a l u n i t y disappears because i t s p l i t s , whereas i n p r o d u c t i o n the o r i g i n a l u n i t y remains. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the two t h e o r i e s are s i m i l a r enough t h a t they c o u l d be e a s i l y confused. A case i n p o i n t i s Huai nan t z u chapter 3 i n which both t h e o r i e s appear. In common w i t h t h i s theory o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Lao  tzu, Wang Ch'ung says t h a t the c h ' i o f heaven and e a r t h combine to form a l l o f the c r e a t u r e s , In chapter 31, which I quoted above, he does not r e f e r to the c h ' i o f heaven and e a r t h as y i n and yang c h ' i , although i n other p a r t s o f h i s work, he does seem to r e l y on the yin-yang theory. N e v e r t h e l e s s , o f a l l of h i s r e f e r e n c e s to c h ' i , the ones t h a t are s p e c i f i c a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h y i n and yang are a smal l m i n o r i t y . Most Western s c h o l a r s who touch on t h i s i s s u e seem to assume t h a t Wang understood c h ' i as being made up of y i n and yang wherever he mentions i t . A l f r e d Forke, f o r example, w h i l e arguing t h a t Wang was a monist, assumes t h a t y i n and yang are the d i v e r g e n t products o f the ylian ch' i . Derk Bodde i n h i s t r a n s l a t i o n o f passages o f Wang Ch'ung s u p p l i e s the a d j e c t i v e s y i n and yang f o r c h ' i , even where they are not i n the o r i g i n a l . See Max Kaltenmark, Lao t z u and Taoism ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968) pp. 38-39. The yin-yang i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f these l i n e s i n the Tao te ching i s a l s o g i v e n i n Huai nan t z u , 3.11b. 6 3 A l f r e d Forke, Lun heng, I, p. 13. 6 4 F u n g Yu-lan, H i s t o r y , I I , p. 152. 94. Joseph Needham s t a t e s b l u n t l y t h a t Wang " f u l l y accepted the fundamental Yin-Yang dualism...." On the other hand, Hsu Fu-kuan argues that Wang, w h i l e adopting the c h ' i monism common i n the Han dynasty, d i f f e r e d from h i s contemporaries i n s e v e r a l r e s p e c t s . One of these was t h a t Wang was c a r e f u l to a v o i d the popular view t h a t yang c h ' i was good and y i n c h ' i was e v i l , but i n s i s t e d t h a t an excess of yang would i t s e l f be d e t r i m e n t a l . A c c o r d i n g to HsU, Wang s u b s t i t u t e s the concept of yUan c h ' i f o r the concept of y i n and yang c h ' i . T h i s i s not to say t h a t he r e j e c t e d the theory, but th a t he avoided i t . Wang r e j e c t s o u t r i g h t the t h e o r i e s o f the f i v e phases, wu h s i n g ^ j f j , and holds h i m s e l f a p a r t from the yin-yang t h i n k i n g t h a t was u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h f i v e phases theory. I f we understand the use o f y i n and yang by Forke, Bodde, and Needham i n the c r i t i c a l sense t h a t Wang Ch'ung used i t , these two p o s i t i o n s need not be opposed to one another. Only i n Needham i s Wang's adherence to yin-yang t h e o r i e s o v e r s t a t e d . As an i l l u s t r a t i o n of Wang's approach, I would l i k e to co n s i d e r a s e c t i o n o f Chapter 13, " O r i g i n a l nature", i n which Wang debates w i t h Tung Chung-shu. Tung d i s t i n g u i s h e d two s i d e s to the nature, one of which he c a l l e d human nat u r e and the other p a s s i o n s . The nature was produced by yang c h ' i and was good; Joseph Needham, Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n , I I , p. 368 'Hsu Fu-kuan, L i a n g Han ssu-hsiang s h i h , p. 610. 95. the p a s s i o n s were produced by y i n eh' i and were e v i l . He s a i d t h a t those who saw nature as e v i l were seeing o n l y y i n f o r c e s , whereas those who saw nature as good saw o n l y yang f o r c e s . Wang r e p l i e d t h a t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n was inadequate: The p a s s i o n s and nature are both produced by y i n and yang. As f o r t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n by yin-yang, some are t h i c k and some are t h i n . . . S i nce nature and p a s s i o n s are both produced by y i n and yang, how c o u l d one be p u r e l y good? Wang i n s i s t s t h a t y i n and yang a c t together; they are compli-mentary aspects of one c h ' i . Secondly he i m p l i e s by h i s r e f e r e n c e to the d e n s i t y of y i n and yang t h a t good and e v i l f i n a l l y depend on t h i s t h i c k n e s s and t h i n n e s s . The c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c o f d e n s i t y cannot be a s s i g n e d to e i t h e r y i n or yang, but i t i s a q u a n t i t a t i v e measure of the combination. Joseph Needham c o l l e c t e d a number of c i t a t i o n s from the Lun heng to demonstrate Wang's acceptance o f y i n and yang. He f i r s t notes a number of cases i n which y i n and yang f u n c t i o n i n nature as the source of seasonal change and n a t u r a l c a l a m i t i e s . T h i s r e s t r i c t e d sense of y i n and yang as the movement of hot and c o l d a i r may be accepted without b e l i e v i n g t h a t yin-yang dualism i s the b a s i c d i v i s i o n i n the u n i v e r s e . Needham h i m s e l f c i t e s Hsiln t z u to show t h a t i t may be an e x p l a n a t i o n o f n a t u r a l (LH 13, p. 132) 96. events without i n t r i n s i c c o n n e c t i o n to the sphere o f human a c t i v i t y . ^ He goes on to c i t e the r o l e o f y i n and yang i n the c r e a t i o n of man as found i n Lun heng, Chapter 65. In t h i s chapter Wang i s concerned to d i s p e l the f e a r of the a c t i v i t i e s o f ghosts. To do t h i s he uses the concepts o f y i n and yang to e x p l a i n s o r c e r o r s , dragons, ghosts and a p p a r i t i o n s . They are a l l c r e a t e d through an imbalance o f y i n and yang. When out of balance, both y i n and yang are poisonous to man. Wang concludes t h i s chapter w i t h t h i s yin-yang account of man's s t r u c t u r e : T h e r e f o r e , a l l the s o - c a l l e d good and e v i l omens, ghosts, and s p i r i t s i n the world are made by the c h ' i o f the gre a t yang. The c h ' i of the g r e a t yang i s the c h ' i o f heaven. Heaven i s a b l e to produce man's body, t h e r e f o r e i t can make an image resembling h i s shape. Now t h a t by which man i s born are the two c h ' i o f y i n and yang. The y i n c h ' i c o n t r o l s the making of the bones and f l e s h ; the yang c h ' i c o n t r o l s the making of the s p i r i t . At the b i r t h of man, y i n and yang c h ' i come together. T h e r e f o r e h i s bones and f l e s h are f i r m and h i s v i t a l f o r c e ( e s s e n t i a l c h ' i ) f l u o r i s h e s . S ince h i s v i t a l f o r c e c r e a t e s h i s i n t e l l e c t and h i s bones and f l e s h make him strong, t h e r e f o r e h i s s p i r i t produces speech and h i s body i s f i r m l y maintained. The body and s p i r i t are i n t e r t w i n e d and i n t e r -dependent, t h e r e f o r e one can always p e r c e i v e i t and not de s t r o y i t . (LH 65, p. 945) % F I -e tt %\ M g- * U t * *. h f tf), pl J M fa *| it ft ftJUk, % f Joseph Needham, Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n , I I , p. 368 97. Although t h i s paragraph r e l i e s h e a v i l y on yin-yang theory, there i s s t i l l an element which seems not to agree w i t h the u s u a l f o r m u l a t i o n s . Wang says t h a t heaven produces man's body, but a l s o t h a t man's body i s a product o f y i n c h ' i . The e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s l i e s i n Wang's f o r m u l a t i o n elsewhere, i n which h i s main t h e s i s i s t h a t heaven's c h ' i i s t h a t which g i v e s form to the c r e a t u r e s . I t does not supply the substance from which a t h i n g i s formed, but i t s c h ' i f i l l s up the substance s u p p l i e d by e a r t h . Wang uses the analogy o f the r i c e bag, which i s l o o s e and shapeless u n t i l r i c e f i l l s i t up. Then i t i s f i r m and s o l i d , W/ith a shape which does not change w i t h every push on i t (LH 7, p. 60). The terminology Wang norm a l l y uses to d i s c u s s t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s the words ch' i and h s i n g ft*', , form or shape. The ch' i of e a r t h , the s t u f f to which form i s given, does not enter h i s d i s c u s s i o n s . I t seems t h a t e a r t h ' s c h ' i i s a m a t e r i a l w i t h so few c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s t h a t i t p l a y s no s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the de t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i n g s . I f ear t h ' s c h ' i i s b a s i c a l l y y i n c h ' i , then i t should e x h i b i t d e f i n i t e p r o p e r t i e s , but Wang never takes up the q u e s t i o n i n t h i s way. He ap p a r e n t l y i d e n t i f i e s the muddy, heavy c h ' i o f e a r t h w i t h y i n f o r c e s , as we have seen, but does not a l l o w the yin-yang theory to p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a t h i n g . 98. The t h i r d k i n d of case presented by Needham i s the comparison o f heaven and e a r t h to man and w i f e . In these comparisons, Wang i s not o f t e n making a p o i n t r e l a t e d to y i n and yang. Of the three cases c i t e d by Needham, none r e f e r t o 68 yin-yang. In one o f them the analogy o f heaven and e a r t h to man and w i f e i s made by an opponent (LH 32, p. 492). In another the p o i n t i s to demonstrate t h a t the union has no i n t e n t i o n i n i t of producing o f f s p r i n g (LH 16, p. 136). Only i n the t h i r d case i s the analogy made to show that heaven i s the source t h a t i s s u e s c h ' i i n the union between heaven and e a r t h , j u s t as a male does i n human sexual union (LH 15, p. 153). In g e n e r a l such comparisons are common to yin-yang theory, and the t h i r d case c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s a yin-yang theme. N e v e r t h e l e s s , I b e l i e v e Wang's avoidance o f the terms y i n and yang i n d i c a t e s t h a t he wished to a v o i d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the p r e v a l e n t yin-yang theory. By c o n t r a s t Wang's p o s i t i o n on the theory o f the f i v e phases i s much c l e a r e r . He s h a r p l y opposed the f i v e phases t h e o r e t i c i a n s , p r i m a r i l y because t h a t theory was the i n t e l l e c t u a l b a s i s f o r a gre a t d e a l o f what Wang saw as s u p e r s t i t i o n . I t a l s o formed the b a s i s f o r apocryphal l i t e r a t u r e which 69 f l u o r i s h e d i n the f i r s t c entury A.D. The f i v e phases D O I b i d . n."d". 69 For a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s l i t e r a t u r e and the important r o l e t h a t the f i v e phases theory p l a y e d i n i t , see the un-p u b l i s h e d d i s s e r t a t i o n by Jack D u l l , "A h i s t o r i c a l i n t r o d u c t i o n 99. t h e o r e t i c i a n s conceived o f a cosmic changing o f the f i v e phases, expressed i n wonders and omens, as the b a s i s o f d y n a s t i c change. In Wang's eyes such p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g was e n t i r e l y s p u r i o u s . G e n e r a l l y speaking, yin-yang and f i v e phases t h i n k i n g are l i n k e d t ogether i n Han times although o r i g i n a l l y they appear to have been two d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s . 7 ^ The f i v e phases theory has a g r e a t e r range o f a s s o c i a t i o n s than the theory o f y i n and yang, making i t a more s u i t a b l e v e h i c l e f o r s p e c u l a t i o n . Wang takes pains to r e j e c t the f i v e phases as a g e n e r a l theory. He argues t h a t Heaven produces the c r e a t u r e s u s i n g o n l y one phase, 1 h s i n g — <\j , namely ch' i . Because there i s o n l y one phase or element, there i s mutual l o v e between the c r e a t u r e s , and not mutual s t r i f e (LH 14, pp. 137-138). How c o u l d heaven be the source o f s t r i f e ? Both Needham and Hsil Fu-kuan suggest t h a t Wang Ch'ung does not deny the e x i s t e n c e o f the f i v e p h a s e s . 7 1 They imply r a t h e r t h a t Wang l i m i t e d i t s o p e r a t i o n s to the human body. Wang d i d accept the p h y s i o l o g y of h i s contemporaries t h a t t h e r e were f i v e major organs i n the human body, and t h i s p h y s i o l o g y i s undoubtedly r e l a t e d to the f i v e phases theory. But, Wang asks r h e t o r i c a l l y , i f the f i v e organs are r e a l l y d e r i v a t i v e from to the apocryphal (ch'an wei) t e x t s of the Han dynasty." U n i v e r s i t y o f Washington, 1966. 7 0 J o s e p h Needham, Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n , I I , p.p. 232, 273 f f . 7 1 I b i d . p. 368. Hsil Fu-kuan, L i a n g Han ss u - h s i a n g s h i h , p. 615. 100. the f i v e phases, why do they not mut u a l l y harm each other? (LH 32, p. 139) Furthermore, the i d e a t h a t Wang r e s t r i c t e d or l i m i t e d the f i v e phases theory to man i s i t s e l f a d e n i a l o f the f i v e phases theory's c l a i m to u n i v e r s a l i t y as a cosmic p r i n c i p l e . CH'I AND THE CONCEPT OF HEAVEN Since the ytlan ch' i i s seen by Wang Ch'ung as the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e and p r i m a l s t u f f of the u n i v e r s e , he does not view heaven as the source o f cosmic order. In g e n e r a l , he regards heaven as the sky and i t s attendant f u n c t i o n s , such as weather, movement o f p l a n e t s and s t a r s , and any oth e r atmospheric phenomenon. His p r i n c i p a l concern w i t h r e s p e c t to heaven i s to deny t h a t i t i s an i n t e l l i g e n t b e i n g w i t h c o n t r o l over men's l i v e s . Heaven, f o r a l l i t s g r e a t s i z e , i s a c r e a t u r e . I t i s even a body, a m a t e r i a l b e i n g ( t ' i ). Although i t i s produced by c h ' i , i t i s not i t s e l f c h ' i , t h a t i s , a i r y clouds or m i s t , but i s c h ' i transformed, c h ' i congealed. I t i s s u e s f o r t h i t s own c h ' i , but does not thereby decompose i t s e l f . Heaven's c h ' i has i t s own p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r . I t i s a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d form o f c h ' i . In p a r t , i t r e c e i v e s t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n through the way i n the s t a r s move about i n heaven. Because c h ' i i s a l i f e - f o r c e , heaven i s i n some sense a l i v e ; i t i s a g r e a t organism which moves and grows (LH 31, p. 476). But even though i t i s an organism, i t has no thought or f e e l i n g s , nor does the r e l a t i o n s h i p between heaven, e a r t h , and man depend i n any way on development o r growth on the p a r t 101. of heaven. The overwhelming impression Wang gives his readers i s that he attempts to understand heavenly phenomenon as regular, natural patterns. Heaven i s an agent i n the process of the production of the world's creatures. I t issues f o r t h i t s c h ' i , and by the con-densing or congealing of the c h ' i , things come Into being. This i s a continual process. Heaven not only has no intention of creating things, i t also has no capacity even to be aware of the existence of things. When heaven's ch ' i produces men, the essences, ching > of stars are somehow ca r r i e d along with the ch'i of heaven and a s s i s t i n the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of man. Wang's theory that heaven i s a material body i s pri m a r i l y a polemical p o s i t i o n . Heaven i s the product of r a r i f i e d c h ' i (LH 31, p. 476), and i t issues f o r t h c h ' i , but i s not i t s e l f c h ' i . For Wang's opponents, the idea that heaven was ch' i and that man was c h ' i provided the th e o r e t i c a l basis for t h e i r notion of a sympathetic response between heaven and man. Wang rejected the notion of a sympathetic response between heaven and man, but he accepted the notion to a ce r t a i n degree that c h ' i i n d i f f e r e n t places could have some mutual influence (LH 11, p. 106). Therefore, he had to deny that heaven was ch' i i n order to prevent any p o s s i b i l i t y of heaven responding to man's deeds. Therefore, Wang argues, The scholars say, "Heaven i s c h ' i . Therefore i t i s never f a r from man. When man affirms something as r i g h t or wrong, 102. or secretly acts v i r t u o u s l y or malevolently, heaven always knows t h i s and always responds to i t . This i s proof that heaven i s near man." I f we discuss this t r u t h f u l l y , heaven i s a material body and not ch' i . Man i s born of heaven, so why suspect that heaven i s without ch'i? I t i s only that i t has a body above, f a r from man ... That heaven has a body i s not baseless. I f one investigates l i k e t h i s , then that i t lacks the diffuse and vague i s clear. (LH 31, pp. 485-487) 72 ft..i A . «g. A .t.a +*. 4* 9# & 0 / zCompare A l f r e d Forke, Lun heng, I, p. 257. I follow Huang Hui's punctuation here, and the emendation of yu.^ j§ to tuj$||j . L i u Pan-sui Mfr VJ^_ i n his Lun-heng chi-chieh *Jk (Collected commentary on the Lun Heng) , (Shanghai: Chung-hua Book Co. 1957) p. 221, suggests that the sentence ffijJijfc 7 ^ fe* jg^ i s mistaken, since i t implies that heaven i s without c h ' i . Huang Hui suggests that hsien should be read te 'fjf . In his detailed argument on p. 159 that t h i s i s the case throughout the Lun heng, he interprets te_ as " ( a f f a i r s ) coming to t h i s " . Although his derivation that hsien sometimes means chien ^ which i n turn sometime means te i s tenuous, I have no better solution. I believe the point of th i s sentence must be that Wang i s denying that heaven is_ ch' i , and i s not denying that heaven has c h ' i . 103. Wang's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t heaven i s a l i v e i s a l s o used p o l e m i c a l l y , although i t i s a fundamental concept f o r him. He uses i t to p r o t e s t c e r t a i n forms of d i v i n a t i o n . I f a dead man asks something of a l i v e man, he says, there can be no answer. Heaven and e a r t h move, hence they are a l i v e . One cannot then use m i l f o i l and t o r t o i s e s h e l l to d i v i n e the i n t e n t i o n s o f heaven, s i n c e these t h i n g s are dead (LH 71, p. 997). I t seems strange t h a t Wang uses motion as a c r i t e r i o n f o r l i f e . A l l inanimate t h i n g s move, a f t e r a l l , so motion per  se i s no c r i t e r i o n f o r l i f e . But I t h i n k we may guess t h a t Wang does not mean t h a t mere p h y s i c a l movement means something i s a l i v e . Rather heaven and e a r t h move of themselves. I f heaven c o u l d not move of i t s e l f , Wang would have to f i n d another agent to cause i t s movements. T h i s however would c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s i d e a o f heaven's cosmic independence and the r e l a t e d o f i d e a of heaven's cosmic i n d i f f e r e n c e . That cosmic i n d i f f e r e n c e i s compromised i f heaven has a need or d e s i r e to respond to man's a c t i o n s o r any other agent. I suggested i n my summary a t the be g i n n i n g o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t heaven i s o n l y an agent f o r the t r a n s f e r of c h ' i . Whether i t a c t s alone or i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the e a r t h as i t i s s u e s i t s c h ' i , i t i s s t i l l o n l y an i n t e r m e d i a r y . I t r e l a y s the c r e a t i v e f o r c e i n h e r e n t i n yuan c h ' i . At times, the in t e r m e d i a r y o f heaven i s omitted a l t o g e t h e r : Man i s a c r e a t u r e ; he i s the one among the c r e a t u r e s who has i n t e l l i g e n c e . He Is no d i f f e r e n t from the c r e a t u r e s i n t h a t he 104. receives his l i f e span from heaven and his c h ' i from the primal source (LH 72, 1007^T00~8) 5| n % JL Thus i n spite of the p a r t i c u l a r i z a t i o n of c h ' i as heavenly ch'i, heaven's c h ' i i s not fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from the yuan c h ' i . F i n a l l y , the c h ' i of heaven i s completed by the addition of the essence of the stars (LH 6, p. 45). The positions of the stars determine the nature of the essence which i s released along with heaven's c h ' i . As the c h ' i and essence give form to man, the essence i s that which det ermines the wealth and honor which that i n d i v i d u a l w i l l have. Thus wealth and honor are from heaven and not the r e s u l t of human a c t i v i t y . With thi s concept Wang provides a t h e o r e t i c a l basis for astrology. Needham notes that "this....paradoxically...may well be the f i r s t statement i n Chinese l i t e r a t u r e of i n d i v i d u a l astrology. The paradox l i e s i n the p r o b a b i l i t y that i t was pr e c i s e l y Wang Ch'ung's s c i e n t i f i c materialism which pushed him into t h i s theory, as a means of escaping from the a r b i t r a r y endowments 73 of l o c a l gods and s p i r i t s and other 'supernatural' agencies." CH'I AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY The problem of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s a central one encountered in any monism. I f a l l things are e s s e n t i a l l y one or derive from Joseph Needham, Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n , II, p. 384. See also his remarks on p. 356. 105. one t h i n g , how does one account f o r d i v e r s i t y ? A p r i n c i p l e must be b u i l t i n t o the fundamental substance which allows i t to appear i n d i f f e r e n t forms. The p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i f f i c u l t y i s t h a t some-t h i n g t r u l y one cannot have a p r i n c i p l e o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , f o r the p r i n c i p l e must i n e v i t a b l y d i f f e r from the nature o f the o r i g i n a l substance, and i t must have an ' e t e r n a l ' o n t i c s t a t u s . In the Han dynasty, as I have s t a t e d , the t h e o r i e s o f y i n and yang and the f i v e phases were the common ways o f understanding the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of c h ' i . Although Wang adopted the yin-yang theory to a c e r t a i n extent, at those p o i n t s where he p a i d p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the problem o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , the main t h r u s t o f h i s thought went i n another d i r e c t i o n . Wang conceived o f the a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n o f c h ' i i n the coming i n t o being o f a l l the c r e a t u r e s as a process o f c o n g e l a t i o n and t h e i r c e a s i n g to be as d i s p e r s a l . He uses the metaphor of water t u r n i n g to i c e : Water congeals and becomes i c e : c h ' i accumulates and makes man. Ice l a s t s a t most one wi n t e r and d i s s i p a t e s ; man completes one-hundred years and he d i e s . (LH 24, p. 333) 74 The analogy o f water and i c e i l l u s t r a t e s the impermanence of i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n c e , but i s not ab l e to e x p l a i n the d i v e r s i t y o f forms. I t would s u f f i c e o n l y i f th e r e were q u a l i t i e s i n the water i t s e l f which would determine d i f f e r e n t i c e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . Wang has to examine the process o f condensation and r a r e f a c t i o n more c l o s e l y . Wang's main concern i n t h i s i s to d i s t i n g u i s h f i r s t of a l l A s i m i l a r passage can be found i n LH 62, p. 870. 106. why man i s d i f f e r e n t from other beings, and second (and more important) to d i s t i n g u i s h why one man d i f f e r s from another. D i s t i n c t i o n s between the k i n d s of c r e a t u r e s , such as p l a n t s and animals, do not a r i s e as a separate q u e s t i o n , but o n l y as an argument f o r or a g a i n s t some p o s i t i o n r e l a t e d to man. Man i s f i r s t of a l l a c r e a t u r e , a t h i n g . At times t h i s commonality i s the b a s i s f o r an argument (the argument a g a i n s t ghosts, f o r example LH 62, p. 869), but u s u a l l y Wang a l s o takes p a i n s to d i s t i n g u i s h man from the animals. At the l e v e l of man's concret e form, h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e i s h i s p r i n c i p l e d i f f e r e n c e from animals. (LH 72, pp. 1007-1008) 7 5 Although there i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n k i n d , Wang i n s i s t s t h a t there i s no d i f f e r e n c e i n source between man and o t h e r c r e a t u r e s . However, the c h ' i which he r e c e i v e s from the source seems to have a d i f f e r e n t nature: When the nature of c h ' i (endowed by heaven) i s not equal, then c r e a t u r e s are d i f f e r e n t i n body. The ox l i v e s h a l f as long as a horse, and a horse l i v e s h a l f as long as a man. So the form of the ox and horse are d i f f e r e n t from man. I f you r e c e i v e the form o f an ox o r horse, you w i l l n a t u r a l l y l i v e o n l y as long as an ox or a horse. (LH 7, p. 60) ML * ft)** 9/L * i a l . *t% ¥ &r Jb % Y A , 1 « #1 T * ^ A S What does Wang mean by "the nature of c h ' i " ? T h i s paragraph i s p a r t of a long argument a g a i n s t the seekers of p h y s i c a l immor-t a l i t y . Wang assumed t h a t to g a i n such i m m o r t a l i t y , man would T h i s passage i s quoted above, p p . 103-104. 107. have to metamorphose i n t o a new k i n d of c r e a t u r e . Examples from the animal world of such metamorphoses took p l a c e , he i n s i s t e d , o n l y when the changes were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r endowed c h ' i : Now the changes o f t h i n g s f o l l o w t h e i r c h ' i . There i s t h a t done by the c o n s t e l l a t i o n s o f s t a r s which seems as i f i t responds to government.76 But i t i s not because i t i s d e s i r e d by heaven to lengthen l i f e t h a t t h i n g s change t h e i r shape, nor does one t r a n s f o r m ( h i m s e l f ) by being a b l e to eat d i v i n e herbs and p r e c i o u s p l a n t s . I f a man p e r s e r v e r e s i n swallowing medicine, he may be a b l e to strengthen h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n and thereby i n c r e a s e h i s b a s i c n a t u r a l s t r e n g t h and lengthen h i s l i f e . But to suddenly t r a n s -form i s not l i k e the proper c h ' i of heaven or the t r u e nature r e c e i v e d by man. Heaven and e a r t h do not change; the sun and the moon do not a l t e r ; the s t a r s and c o n s t e l l a t i o n s do not d i s a p p e a r - - t h i s i s proper. Man r e c e i v e s t h i s proper c h ' i , t h e r e f o r e h i s body does not change. (LH 7, p. 57) 77 a n P i A ' # M % ft & % *f »o * -ft & £ t t % UL. >1B* 1c n * J£Mi, KH % ±. $ X ^ i t * * * y a ^ ^ | ; 76 >» I read h s i a n g as c o n s t e l l a t i o n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h LH 6, p. 44, where i t c l e a r l y means the arrangement of the s t a r s and f u n c t i o n s i n governing t h i n g s through i t s i n c l u s i o n i n heaven's c h ' i . Huang Hui suggests t h i s i s i n o p p o s i t i o n to the common Han theory o f sympathetic response between heaven and man, s i n c e the c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of heaven are i n t h i s case p r i o r to the a c t i o n s of man. 7 7 A l f r e d Forke misconstrues t h i s passage by r e a d i n g s u i 108. In some way man, i n contrast to animals who change, receives a d i f f e r e n t kind of c h ' i from heaven. It i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y better than the ch' i given to animals. But nowhere that I know of does Wang further analyze i n what way th i s c h ' i i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t . In the end the "nature of c h ' i " i s a given whose secret we do not know. Within each species determined by the nature of c h ' i , Wang uses a quantitative c r i t e r i o n . The germ of th i s idea was present i n Huan T'an, but whereas i n Huan T'an i t was a vague quantity of l i f e , Wang Ch'ung defines i t more s p e c i f i c a l l y as the quantitative density of endowed c h ' i . This i s i l l u s t r a t e d most c l e a r l y i n the case of man. The problem arises i n the discussion of how and to what extent man's in d i v i d u a l length of l i f e i s determined. The fated l i f e - s p a n of man, ming ^ , i s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of his given c h ' i . I note that the fated l i f e - s p a n may or may not be the actual l i f e - s p a n . But for the moment, I am concerned only with the r e l a t i o n between c h ' i and ming. "The endowed destiny c h ' i as an a d j e c t i v e - n o u n combination, "concomitant f l u i d " (Forke, Lun heng, I, p. 326) r a t h e r than as a verb-noun as I have done. H i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s based on an analogy w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n o f three k i n d s o f d e s t i n y i n which the two terms s u i and cheng j£ , "proper", occur. However, the i d e a of "concomitant f l u i d " occurs nowhere e l s e i n the Lun heng. My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s supported by a sentence a l i t t l e f a r t h e r i n the same s e c t i o n where Wang w r i t e s , "The form moves i n accordance w i t h the c h ^ i ^ ffi (LH 7, p. 57). 109. of long or s h o r t l i f e " , Wang says, "takes the q u a n t i t y o f c h ' i as i t s r u l i n g n a t u r e . " (LH 4, p. 28) By q u a n t i t y Wang means d e n s i t y , t h i c k n e s s or t h i n n e s s . He continues, The c h i l d o f a woman who i s remiss i n n o u r i s h i n g i t may l i v e , and the c h i l d o f one who g i v e s ample m i l k may d i e . ..Why i s t h i s ? I f one i s remiss, but the ch*-i i s t h i c k , the c h i l d w i l l be st r o n g . I f one i s generous, but the c h ' i i s t h i n , the c h i l d w i l l be weak. (LH~4~, p. 28) d^KJtH * ^ Jftc %t I • ft m .Jk ft Mi ft, i £ 51- JF* « .. The c h ' i here i s by nature human c h ' i , but i t s v a r y i n g d e n s i t y determines d i f f e r e n t types o f men. F u r t h e r i n the same s e c t i o n , Wang argues: ...Those who l i v e l o n g and those who d i e young have the same s i n g l e c h ' i . The l e n g t h o f t h e i r l i v e s g r e a t l y d i f f e r . How can we know t h a t one who d i e d young b e f o r e he com-p l e t e d 100 years had a f a t e d l i f e - s p a n o f 100 years? By p u t t i n g h i s body, a c c o r d i n g to s i z e and l e n g t h , together w i t h those o f the same c l a s s . For a body of a man who l i v e s 100 years does not d i f f e r from t h a t of one who d i e d a t 50 ye a r s . I f the bodies do not d i f f e r , then the l i f e - f o r c e s , b l o o d and c h ' i , a l s o do not d i f f e r . But b i r d s and beasts have a d i f f e r e n t form, thus t h e i r l e n g t h of l i f e d i f f e r s g r e a t l y from t h a t o f man. (LH 4, p. 29) h t * s M *A Am ft I < * o If! * t * * j fc ft js% , * ft * $ * A * Jfc o Huang Hui suggests t h a t t z u T he read as ytln , to n o u r i s h or n u r t u r e . 110. Wang's main p o i n t here i s t h a t form i s determined by the nature o f c h ' i . Hence d i v i s i o n o f s p e c i e s i s determined by t h i s n ature. W i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r form r e l a t i v e s i z e and s t r e n g t h i s determined by the amount of c h ' i r e c e i v e d a t b i r t h . (LH 4, p. 26) A person w i t h a s m a l l amount has o n l y a s m a l l amount o f " l i f e - s t u f f " , and he cannot hope to l i v e to f u l l human p o t e n t i a l . Although the concept o f c h ' i ' s d e n s i t y occurs most o f t e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the i d e a o f l i f e - s p a n , i t a l s o produces o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e s among men. A s l i g h t l y p e c u l i a r e x t e n s i o n of t h i s concept i s the i d e a t h a t k i n g s and sages are f a t e d to be so from b i r t h . Since they are s u p e r i o r men, they must have s u p e r i o r c h ' i . Since t h i s c h ' i must m a n i f e s t i t s e l f i n form, sage-kings and others o f h i g h s t a n d i n g show unusual body c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Almost a l l of the "Osseus c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " chapter (LH 11, pp. 100-114) i s devoted to c i t i n g cases o f g r e a t men and t h e i r unusual p h y s i c a l marks. Because g r e a t men presumably have h i g h e r e t h i c a l standards, Wang a l s o adds m o r a l i t y to the e f f e c t s o f one's c h ' i . "Are the p e t t y man and the gentleman endowed w i t h natures of a d i f f e r e n t k i n d ? " he asks. On the c o n t r a r y "...the good and bad i n man are the s i n g l e p r i m a l c h ' i . The c h ' i comes i n l a r g e and s m a l l q u a n t i t i e s , and t h e r e f o r e the natures are worthy or mean." (LH 8, p. 75) 7 9 F o l l o w i n g Huang Hui's emendation of k o ^ to t'ung /sl , a c c o r d i n g to a Yuan dynasty e d i t i o n . 111. P o l i t i c a l wisdom, on the model of wu-wei, i s a l s o an e f f e c t o f the d e n s i t y o f c h ' i . In response to a q u e s t i o n as to why man's nature, which he r e c e i v e d from heaven, i s c o n t r i v e d a c t i o n whereas heaven's b a s i c p r i n c i p l e i s wu-wei, Wang r e p l i e s t h a t he who r e c e i v e s a g r e a t e r amount of c h ' i i s a b l e to p a t t e r n h i m s e l f on heaven's s e l f - s o n on-action, but he who r e c e i v e s t h i n c h ' i cannot i m i t a t e the ways of heaven and e a r t h . (LH 54, p. 781) He thus puts the sage and common man on one spectrum. Wisdom and moral a c t i o n stem from a d i f f e r e n c e i n degree o f one's endowed c h ' i . F i n a l l y Wang i n s i s t s t h a t wealth and honor are a l s o determined by one's c h ' i , although i n t h i s case by a non-q u a n t i t a t i v e q u a l i t y o f ch'1. Although a person may work hard and l e a d an u p r i g h t l i f e , Wang t h i n k s wealth and honor can have l i t t l e r e l a t i o n to h i s deeds. Wealth and honor can no more be c o n t r o l l e d than the r i s i n g and s e t t i n g o f the sun. (LH 3, pp. 19, 24, and passim). The c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f the s t a r s a t one's b i r t h i s th a t which determines wealth and honor. Wang c o u l d not r e l y on c h ' i ' s d e n s i t y f o r t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , s i n c e d e n s i t y determines moral u p r i g h t n e s s , and he wished to keep m o r a l i t y separate from wealth and honor. FATE Wang Ch'ung's i d e a o f f a t e or d e s t i n y , ming ^ , has r e c e i v e d more a t t e n t i o n i n the secondary l i t e r a t u r e than any other s i n g l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept of the Lun heng. T'ang Chiln-i 112. has set i t i n a h i s t o r i c a l l i n e from the c u l t s o f heaven and 80 Shang-ti to the end o f t r a d i t i o n a l times. Joseph Needham 81 and A l f r e d Forke a l s o g i v e summaries. I s h a l l not do more here than p r e s e n t a b r i e f o u t l i n e . 82 A man's f a t e i s r e c e i v e d a t b i r t h as a product or aspect of h i s ch' i . I t governs two t h i n g s i n h i s l i f e , h i s n a t u r a l l i f e - e x p e c t a n c y and the wealth and honor to be g i v e n him i n l i f e . A man who r e c e i v e s the t h i c k e s t c h ' i should l i v e , b a r r i n g a c c i d e n t , f o r one-hundred years. S i m i l a r l y , a t h i n n e r endowment o f c h ' i reduces h i s l i f e - e x p e c t a n c y . A c c i d e n t a l death may shorten one's n a t u r a l l i f e - e x p e c t a n c y . One category o f a c c i d e n t a l death occurs when one l o s e s h i s l i f e i n war as the s t a t e i s l o s t . T h i s i s death through n a t i o n a l d e s t i n y , kuo ming ^ ^ , which o v e r r u l e s a p e r s o n a l d e s t i n y . Other a c c i d e n t a l deaths which are not a r e s u l t o f the n a t u r a l weakening o f the body are admitted i n the form i n c i d e n t a l d e s t i n y , t s ' ao ming yjgi . He t o t a l l y r e j e c t s the n o t i o n common i n h i s time t h a t there was a concomitant d e s t i n y , s u i  ming "Sp . Advocates of t h i s d e s t i n y proposed t h a t a man 8 0 T ' a n g Chun-i % , "Ch'in Han i-hou T ' i e n -ming ssu-hsiang c h i h f a - c h a n , " ^ 4<A ?| * v ® ^ (The development of the i d e a o f the decree of heaven from the c h ' i n and Han d y n a s t i e s ) H s i n Ya hslieh pao J£f[ ^ £ £|3 ^ 6(1964) no. 2, 1-61. 81 Joseph Needham, Sc i e n c e and C i v i l i z a t i o n , I I , pp. 382 f f . A l f r e d Forke, Lun heng, pp. 25-26. 82 T'ang ChUn-i, Ch'in Han i-hou T ' i e n ming, p.13 notes t h a t Tung Chung-shu was the f i r s t not to l i m i t ming to the r u l e r . 113. extended or shortened h i s l i f e e i t h e r through the moral q u a l i t y of h i s l i f e or any other p r a c t i c e . T h i s p o s i t i o n was the foun d a t i o n f o r the seekers o f i m m o r t a l i t y , and Wang takes care to r u l e out th a t p o s s i b i l i t y i n h i s concept of f a t e . As I noted p r e v i o u s l y , wealth and honor are a l r e a d y f i x e d i n the s t a r s . Wang d e f i n e s d e s t i n e d wealth and honor as one's c o n d i t i o n at the end of h i s d e s t i n e d l i f e - s p a n . A person d e s t i n e d to be poor might be r i c h most of h i s l i f e , becoming poor o n l y a t the end of h i s l i f e . I f such a person were to di e a c c i d e n t a l l y w h i l e he was s t i l l r i c h , he would have never been poor, although he was d e s t i n e d to be so. Thus we can see th a t f o r Wang Ch'ung f a t e i s c l o s e r to an i d e a of n a t u r a l p o t e n t i a l r a t h e r than an i n e r a d i c a b l e p e r s o n a l p r e s c r i p t i o n . Fate s e t s l i m i t s w i t h i n a n a t u r a l world e s t a b l i s h e d through the workings of heaven and the s t a r s , but the l i m i t s are s u b j e c t to the i n t e r v e n t i o n o f circumstances. Wang sought to keep d e s t i n y and human nature s t r i c t l y 83 separate. (LH 6, pp. 47-49). Since Wang b e l i e v e d wealth and honor to be unconnected to one's e t h i c a l conduct, a good nature (and hence good conduct) c o u l d bear no c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p to one's d e s t i n y . Although wealth and honor have a d i s t i n c t c r i t e r i o n i n the essence of the s t a r s , both long l i f e and a good nature are dependent on a t h i c k c h ' i . I f there i s a proper correspondence, then persons who l i v e long should be m o r a l l y b e t t e r than those who d i e young. Wang does not p e r c e i v e t h i s I b i d . p. 23. 114. as a problem. The p r i n c i p a l counter-example should have been Yen Hui, the d i s c i p l e of Confucius who d i e d young, but Wang on l y notes t h a t h i s f a t e was short.. (LH 28, pp. 408ff, 419ff.) THE CONCEPT OF NATURE Wang's concept o f nature i s no easy t h i n g to d e l i m i t . To do i t j u s t i c e , we should r e l a t e i t to two broad streams i n Chinese r e l i g i o n and thought d e r i v i n g from the c u l t u r e r e l i g i o n of Shang T i _ t *^ and of heaven on the one hand, and on the other hand a massive nature r e l i g i o n expressed i n f e r t i l i t y c u l t s and nature gods. The former became s y s t e m a t i z e d i n v a r i o u s ways as the p r i n c i p l e s o f s o c i a l order, w h i l e the l a t t e r produced the s p e c u l a t i v e systems centered on the Tao or the p r i m o r d i a l u n i t y , as w e l l as the beginnings o f s p e c u l a t i o n on n a t u r a l c y c l e s and causes. Wang Ch'ung, f o l l o w i n g a t r a d i t i o n c e r t a i n l y p r e s e n t s i n c e Hsiln-tzu, c r e a t e d a s y n t h e s i s between these two fundamental d i r e c t i o n s . In h i s s y n t h e s i s he g i v e s primacy to the n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s o f l i f e . As we. have seen, the endowment of ch' i determines a gre a t d e a l o f man's e t h i c a l and s o c i a l development. But Wang a l s o a l l o w s room f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the n a t u r a l course of events. Indeed i n most cases human a c t i v i t y can improve one's n a t u r a l l o t . In Chapter 8, "Leading your nature", Wang argues t h a t as human e f f o r t s can improve poor s o i l , so e d u c a t i o n can improve a bad nature. (LH 8, p. 68) Then he p o i n t s out that a man can make money through h i s c l e v e r n e s s even i f he were not d e s t i n e d to do so. F i n a l l y he makes a g e n e r a l statement from 115. these p a r t i c u l a r cases: The way of heaven can be r e a l or a r t f u l . 8 4 The r e a l i s t h a t which of i t s e l f responds to heaven. The a r t f u l i s t h a t added by the knowledge and s k i l l o f men, but i t i s not d i f f e r e n t from the r e a l . How s h a l l we prove t h i s ? The " T r i b u t e o f YU" speaks of the gems R l-c h ' i u , l i n , lang and kan ( j | ST ) . Now c h ' i u i s a gem, l i n i s a p e a r l , the lang and kan are v a r i e t i e s of p e a r l s . These are tr u e gems and p e a r l s produced by the e a r t h . But T a o i s t s have melted the f i v e stones and made gems of f i v e c o l o r s . When compared w i t h r e a l gems, t h e i r b r i l l i a n c e i s not v e r y d i f f e r e n t . The p e a r l s o f o y s t e r s and the gems i n the " T r i b u t e of YU" are a l l r e a l gems and p e a r l s . But the Marquis of S u i made p e a r l s from chemicals which were as b r i l l i a n t as the r e a l ones. The p e r f e c t i o n of the teachings of the T a o i s t p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n t h i s added i d e a of knowledge and s k i l l . (LH 8, p. 70-71) % & * i\ f & . k % ® a« * *fl M > 1% t % I e r i | J# ?^ *fj $ £ &. jfc &. ?£. «i "1 A V* X*^  3t ft A ± * . jtfc i . & * £ £ 3 * c gj P4 1^ ^ f¥ si, idtl 8 4 A r t f u l , wei . Since Wang seems to approve of the s k i l l o f the T a o i s t s , i t cannot be " f a l s e " here. Compare HsUn-tzu , Chapters 19, 21-23. 8 5 S h u ching % £5. » P a r t 1 1 1 > book I. See James Legge, The Chinese C l a s s i c s , v o l . 3, p. 127. Legge reads c h ' i u f o r c h ' i u £ p 8 6 F o l l o w i n g Huang Hui, i f o e . ^ . has been added Several other examples follow t h i s one. Within the general boundaries set by natural processes, Wang allows the products of culture |p imitate nature, even to the extent of making a bad man become a good one through the influence of sagely education. In contrast to a c u l t u r a l i s t l i k e Hslin-tzu f o r whom the a r t f u l i s the crown of nature,the completion of and complement of natural structures, Wang Ch'ung makes room f o r va r i a t i o n i n the consequences of one's natural pre-disposition, but does not admit an e s s e n t i a l l y new r e a l i t y . Man's a r t i f i c e i s a r e p e t i t i o n and imitation of nature; not a creation. NATURE AND HISTORY A second way i n which culture i s seen as subordinate to nature i s found i n Wang Ch'ung's view of history. Apparently weary of those who found good only i n a distant past, he uses his ontology to es t a b l i s h the equality of the ages. He argues thus: People of the former ages are the same as people of today, for they a l l receive the same primal c h ' i . The primal c h ' i i s pure and harmonious; i n the past and present i t i s not different...One heaven and one earth , together produce the myriad creatures. When the myriad creatures are born, they a l l receive one c h ' i . The thickness and thinness of c h ' i i s the same i n a l l generations. (LH"36T p. 804) *o * * * X o o . - * - ML • £ * % #, % ty*. & fl fl * ft XL Sf ^ • *f - c to the text from the T'ai-p'ing yU lan ^  *F fftp ^ , and the character che ^ has been dropped. 117. Although the p r i m a l c h ' i i n p r e - h i s t o r y gave form to heaven and e a r t h and then the d i v e r s e c r e a t u r e s between them, the c h ' i which i s imbedded i n heaven, e a r t h , and a l l c r e a t u r e s i s s t i l l a t bottom the p r i m a l ch ' i . P r i m a l c h ' i i s the source o f the genesis o f the cosmos, but i s a l s o at the base of a t i m e l e s s s t r u c t u r e . T h i s p o s i t i o n supports Wang's c l a i m t h a t there are l a t t e r -day sages and pr o v i d e s the t h e o r e t i c a l base f o r Chapter 57, " P r a i s e o f the Han" (LH 57, pp. 817 f f r ) , and i t s sequel, Chapter 58, "The r e s t o r a t i o n " . (LH 58, pp. 826 f f . ) THE ROLE OF TZU JAN In Wang Ch'ung the concept o f t z u j a n has a r a t h e r w e l l -d e f i n e d and f a i r l y c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n . T h i s i s the f i r s t time t h a t there i s e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f t z u j a n as a d i s t i n c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept. Fo r Wang t z u j a n i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the f u n c t i o n i n g of heaven and forms the b a s i s on which Wang a s s e r t s the non-i n t e l l i g e n c e o f heaven and the u n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f a l l i t s a c t i o n s . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s I w i l l analyze a few passages from the chapter on t z u j an. The assumption w i t h which Wang begins t h i s chapter i s th a t when heaven and e a r t h j o i n t h e i r c h ' i , the c r e a t u r e s are produced o f themselves. The consequence o f t h i s i s t h a t they bear no p u r p o s e f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p one to another. Men, f o r example, ...see t h a t the f i v e g r a i n s can be eaten, so they take and eat them. They see th a t s i l k 118. and hemp can be worn, so they take and wear them. Some suppose t h a t heaven produced the f i v e g r a i n s to f e e d man and produced s i l k and hemp to c l o t h e man. T h i s means heaven makes men become a farmer or a silkworm g i r l . I t i s not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t z u Jan. (LH 54, p. 775) * M ^ * A . jtfc W * A A One may conclude from t h i s t h a t n a t u r a l phenomena are not sent f o r or a g a i n s t man. J u s t as the g r a i n s are not sent as a f a v o r to man, so omens are not sent to reprimand him. Thus man need not f e a r them: I f heaven's omens were i n t e n t i o n a l , then where i s i t s t z u jan? And where i s i t s wu wei? How do we know th a t heaven i s t z u j an? By the f a c t t h a t i s has no mouth or eyes. (LH 54, p. 775-776) 3* X * * % * K , i & % & f 1*7% o i% ^ M R X & K * A % . & P. fl i a . Wang goes on to remark t h a t mouth and eyes stand f o r d e s i r e s , and the l a t t e r are the source of human i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the world, yu. wei ^ fa In these few remarks, i t i s a l r e a d y c l e a r t h a t t z u j a n i s a p r o p e r t y o f heaven, and t h a t i t somehow f u n c t i o n s i n the proof o f heaven's n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . Although we c o u l d not c o n s t r u c t a v e r y p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n from t h i s context, Wang n i c e l y s u p p l i e s at t h i s p o i n t a d e f i n i t i o n of t z u j a n and wu wei: 119. Some say, " A l l t h i n g s which move a r e b a s i c a l l y a c t i v e . They d e s i r e , t h e r e f o r e they move. When they move, they a c t . Now heaven moves and resembles man. How c o u l d i t be n o n - a c t i v e ? " I say t h a t the movement o f heaven i s to i s s u e f o r t h c h ' i . I t s body moves, the c h ' i comes out, and t h i n g s are born. I t i s l i k e when a man moves h i s c h ' i . H i s body moves, h i s c h ' i (semen) comes out, and a c h i l d i s born. Now when a man i s s u e s h i s c h ' i , i t i s not th a t he d e s i r e s to produce a son. TEe c h ' i i s i s s u e d and the son i s born of h i m s e l f . When heaven moves, i t does not d e s i r e to produce t h i n g s , but t h i n g s are born o f themselves. T h i s i s t z u j a n . When i s s u i n g c h ' i , heaven does not d e s i r e to make th i n g s , but t h i n g s make themselves. T h i s i s wu wei. (LH 54, p. 776) A h. * * th n 51 A « ikk, * f| g fed L »t ! Afe Jt«. f t *»>B*JU M) l f « f ^ ?5i H i t 7 \ f ^ Now we may q u a r r e l w i t h Wang's analogy. A man may d e s i r e to produce c h i l d r e n through sexual i n t e r c o u r s e , but i t i s s t i l l t r u e t h a t there i s something q u i t e independent i n the a c t i o n of the sperm seeking out the egg. Once i s s u e d , there i s no c o n t r o l over the sperm. A l l t h a t heaven does i s c r e a t e an environment by i t s i s s u i n g o f c h ' i . That some of the c h ' i a c c i d e n t a l l y converges and forms t h i n g s i s an e n t i r e l y separate process. Tzu j a n i s used to d e s c r i b e that process o f the convergence of c h ' i , which i s n o t h i n g o t h e r than the s e l f -p r o d u c t i o n of a l l the c r e a t u r e s . How can i t be ' s e l f p roduction? 120. The s e l f i s i n the end nothing but c h ' i . Hence the self-production of things i s nothing but the natural process of the temporally 87 and s p a t i a l l y l o c a l accumulation of c h ' i . Wu wei i s almost i d e n t i c a l to tzu jan. The two defining sentences have only two points of difference. The phrase "When heaven moves" i n the d e f i n i t i o n of tzu jan i s replaced by "When issuing c h ' i " i n the d e f i n i t i o n of wu wei. However, he begins his argument by saying that these two actions, moving and issuing c h ' i , are i d e n t i c a l . Hence, this difference i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t . The other difference i n the de f i n i t i o n s i s that between "produce themselves" or "born of themselves", tzu sheng • 4- , i n the f i r s t case and "make themselves", tzu wei ^ ^ , i n the second case. One i s hard put to f i n d a substantial conceptual difference between them. L o g i c a l l y , i t seems that wu wei i s predicated of heaven. Since things are s e l f -made, heaven has "no-making". Tzu jan i s predicated of the process of self-making. A l l creatures are self-produced. Tzu  jan i s not therefore a property exclusively of heaven, but of the more general process of coming into being. Heaven i t s e l f i s probably tzu jan only with respect to i t s own o r i g i n . In the remainder of the chapter, Wang seems to confirm this d i v i s i o n between wu wei and tzu j an. He continues h i s narrative by c i t i n g several cases of Chinese p o l i t i c a l leaders 87 Although I haven't studied this problem, I suspect that the framework of time and space, yii chou , i s a given f o r Wang Ch'ung and operates as a background for the movements of c h ' i . 121. who were said to govern by the p r i n c i p l e of wu wei. Could heaven be less than these, he implies? (LH 54, p. 778) He accepts the appearance of the River Chart and the Lo Writings, two prognostication charts allegedly found i n r i v e r s and thought to be sent by heaven or gods to man, but he argues that they are e n t i r e l y s e l f - s o . "Heaven's way," he s a y s , " i s s e l f - s o . There-fore the chart and the writings were completed of themselves." (LH 54, p. 778) I think that i t i s not accidental that the references are to heaven's way, to the action of heaven, rather than the essence or substance of heaven conceived as a separate entity. Wang opened th i s chapter saying that he r e l i e s on the tao  chia, the school of the Tao, for his discussion of thi s problem. (LH 54, p. 775) He also remarks that the tao chia f a i l e d to demonstrate the v a l i d i t y of tzu j an on the basis of experience. Therefore the theory of tzu jan was not i n general believed. (LH 54, p. 781) Who i s Wang thinking of when he says tao chia? Because of his connections with the Old Text school, i t could be that he meant what L i u Hsin meant, namely the Lao tzu, or Tao te ching, with the explanations of the Chuang tzu. However, on the basis of my previous analysis, I suggest that the tao  chia was seen primarily as the thought of the Huai nan tzu. We know that he was very f a m i l i a r with the Huai nan tzu, and we can see that his concept of tzu j an has some elements i n common with that of the Huai nan tzu. In that Wang i d e n t i f i e s tzu jan 122. with the manner of being of a l l creatures, he keeps i t s a p p l i -cation i n the same realm as the Huai nan tzu, i n which i t was primarily an attribute of natural, creaturely existence. But i n contrast to the Huai nan tzu Wang related tzu jan s p e c i f i c a l l y to the o r i g i n of things, rather than the general functioning of things. Wang asked how a horse came to be a horse, but not whether b i t s and b r i d l e s were i n accordance with the self-so nature of the horse. Only i n the case i n Chapter 20 of the Huai nan tzu i s the problem of the r e l a t i o n of creating and tzu j an approached. Although the author there expressed a theory of sympathy between heaven and man which Wang vigorously denied, the Huai nan tzu does suggest that the rel a t i o n s h i p of one thing to another i s the provision of an environment, but that i n essence things- are 88 mutually independent. However, i n Wang Ch'ung there i s a new step i n the l o g i c of tzu j an's r e l a t i o n s h i p to production. I r e f e r to the problem of how s e l f - s o , as the manner of being, relates to self-production, the fact of being. In other words, tzu j an answers the question how a thing i s the way i t i s , whereas tzu sheng ^ Q_ answers the question how a thing comes to be. Since Wang applies tzu j an to the process of coming into being and tzu sheng to the things which come into being, the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l f - production i s See Above, Chapter 2, pp. 71-76. 123. guaranteed by the s e l f - s o nature o f that p r o d u c t i o n . Tzu j an f u n c t i o n s then to keep a l l i n t e n t i o n a l o p e r a t i o n s o f heaven out o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f the c r e a t u r e s . Wang a l s o d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from Chapter 20 i n the Huai  nan t z u i n another r e s p e c t . The l a t t e r conceived Heaven as the cosmic r e g u l a t o r o f the u n i v e r s e . How Heaven accomplished t h i s task i s not s p e l l e d out. Wang r e p l a c e s the concept o f heaven as the o r i g i n w i t h h i s concept o f c h ' i . The l i n k between the cosmic o r i g i n and the presen t r e a l i t y i s not a mysterious one but a w e l l - d e f i n e d and w e l l understood one of the s e l f - d i v e r g e n c e and condensation o f that o r i g i n . Thus t z u j a n not onl y f u n c t i o n s to deny the o t h e r - p r o d u c t i o n of things (of which heaven i s now one), but a l s o to c l a r i f y the r e l a t i o n between the cosmos and i t s o r i g i n . In some r e s p e c t s the d i s t i n c t i o n s I have made are too f i n e f o r Wang Ch'ung h i m s e l f . I have supposed a c e r t a i n l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n o f p r i o r i t y between s e l f - s o and s e l f - p r o d u c e d . But i n t h i s same chapter Wang v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i f i e s the two concepts: In s p r i n g , one sees the b i r t h o f a l l c r e a t u r e s , and i n the autumn one sees t h e i r completion. Did heaven and e a r t h make them? Things are s e l f - s o . I f we say heaven and e a r t h make them, they must use hands to make them. Where w i l l heaven and e a r t h get the m i l l i o n s o f hands which w i l l together make the m i l l i o n s o f cr e a t u r e s ? (LH 54, p. 780) i 1* %% * . £ .Jfl * „ 124. Man may through h i s c o n t r i v e d a c t i o n s a s s i s t the s e l f - s o p r o c e s s e s . He may c u l t i v a t e l a n d and p l a n t seed, but he cannot a c t u a l l y f o r c e the seed to grow. Hence he cannot a c t u a l l y r e p l a c e the s e l f - s o . (LH 54, p. 782) Man's primary r e l a t i o n s h i p to the s e l f - s o i s to p a t t e r n h i m s e l f on i t . Wang i s f o l l o w i n g the l e a d of the Huai nan t z u a l s o i n t h i s i d e a , but as i n the former cases, he has h i s own p e c u l i a r understanding o f the m o d e l l i n g and r e l i a n c e : Someone asked, "Man i s born of heaven and e a r t h . Heaven and e a r t h do not a c t , Man r e c e i v e s a heavenly nature; he ought a l s o not to a c t , but he s t i l l c o n t r i v e s a c t i o n s . Why i s t h i s ? " I r e p l y t h a t a man of p e r f e c t v i r t u e , pure and t h i c k , r e c e i v e s a l o t of heaven's c h ' i , so he i s a b l e to p a t t e r n h i m s e l f on heaven's t z u j a n and wu wei. But i f h i s endowed c h ' i i s t h i n and s l i g h t , he does not r e s p e c t the Tao and Te and does not resemble heaven and e a r t h . . . I f he does not resemble heaven and e a r t h , he i s not of the same c l a s s as sages and worthies, and t h e r e f o r e c o n t r i v e s to a c t . (LH 54, pp. 781-782) .ft & fe, is * &.n i-i.j s $ fjfc &L xH 1 A | x J J L # 0 ^ ft #1 * 6 las Since one's c a p a c i t y to model h i m s e l f on t z u j an and wu wei i s l i m i t e d by h i s endowment o f c h ' i , Wang concludes t h a t sages and worthies are the o n l y ones who have even the p o t e n t i a l to emulate t h i s way of heaven. The m o d e l l i n g on heaven, Wang i s c a r e f u l to p o i n t out, does not mean t h a t one f o l l o w s the s p e c i a l commands of heaven. 125. Rather he f o l l o w s h i s own nature which i s i t s e l f s e l f - s o . Wang r e f e r s to the Han emperor Kao tsu' s k i l l i n g o f a white snake (an ac t which i s s a i d to have p r e - f i g u r e d h i s becoming an emperor). I t was not heaven which caused him to k i l l i t , but h i s own brave ardour b u r s t f o r t h . His nature was t h a t way o f i t s e l f . (LH 12, p. 120) S i m i l a r l y King Wen, a founding k i n g o f the Chou dynasty, d i d not take over the empire on a d i r e c t command of heaven: The k i n g models h i m s e l f on heaven. He does not oppose i t but obeys heaven's p r i n c i p l e s . He extends h i s s e l f - s o n ature and thus j o i n s w i t h heaven. T h i s i s what i s c a l l e d "The Great Mandate o f King Wen". King Wen h i m s e l f conceived i t and h i m s e l f c a r r i e d i t out. I t was not th a t heaven sent a v e r m i l l i o n swallow to i n f o r m him t h a t he ought to become kin& and o n l y then d i d he dare a r i s e . (LH 12, p. 122) i f fc^o * f i & X Heaven's i s s u e o f c h ' i , i n c o r p o r a t e d by man once and f o r a l l a t b i r t h , i s the o n l y r e l a t i o n s h i p between man's s p e c i f i c conduct and heaven. T h e r e f o r e , o n l y those who by a c c i d e n t o f b i r t h r e c e i v e a l a r g e q u a n t i t y o f c h ' i have the p o t e n t i a l to become a sage-king. Wang moderates t h i s p o s i t i o n somewhat, suggesting 8 % o l l o w i n g Huang Hui's suggestion, I t r a n s l a t e by tr a n s p o s i n g t z u ^  immediately b e f o r e y_i to agree w i t h the f o l l o w i n g sentence. 126. t h a t w i t h e d u c a t i o n even a mean nature can become good, but such a nature as a product o f i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i v i t y does not have the same r e l i a b i l i t y as a n a t u r a l l y good nature. (LH 8, p. 68) For Wang, human nature, b e i n g d e f i n e d by c h ' i , i s so of i t s e l f , and i t i s t h a t on which we r e l y . We have encountered the n o t i o n of r e l i a n c e i n the Huai nan t z u i n a d i f f e r e n t sense. There i t was i m p l i e d t h a t anyone, by w i l f u l l y bending h i m s e l f to accord w i t h t h i n g s i n t h e i r s e l f - s o s t a t e , c o u l d become a sage. Man i s e n j o i n e d to r e l y on n a t u r a l s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s , which i n c l u d e d o n e s e l f as a p a r t o f the n a t u r a l world. For Wang Ch'ung, the r e l i a n c e i s on one's own n a t u r a l development. There i s no n o t i o n of a g e n e r a l r e l i a n c e on n a t u r a l ( t z u j an) s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s . T h i s does not negate my e a r l i e r statement that f o r Wang nature tends to dominate c u l t u r e . He i s saying t h a t there i s a n a t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n f o r c u l t u r a l development, but i s not d e n i g r a t i n g any aspect of c u l t u r e as such. With r e s p e c t to t h i s p a r t o f h i s theory, Wang's s y n t h e s i s seems to l e a n more toward the Confucian s i d e than to the T a o i s t s i d e . Wang's a f f i r m a t i o n o f the p o t e n t i a l f o r edu c a t i o n a l s o p l a c e s him i n a Confucian t r a d i t i o n . He was not i n any sense a n t i - c u l t u r a l but sought to base c u l t u r e on the workings o f c h ' i . Although he says he based h i s n o t i o n o f c h ' i and i t s s e l f - s o o p e r a t i o n on the tao c h i a , the men he had i n mind would probably have been shocked had they known of h i s wholehearted appr o v a l of the Han b u r e a u c r a t i c s t a t e . Moreover, h i s b e l i e f t h a t wealth and honor i n s o c i e t y were decreed by heaven i s rank heresy f o r 127. the T a o i s t s . S o c i e t a l wealth and honor were the worst of human f a i l u r e s f o r the l a t t e r . F o r Wang r e l y i n g on one's s e l f - s o n ature may mean th a t one has to govern a s t a t e . But he does not say t h a t i n governing a s t a t e , the r u l e r must a l l o w a l l t h i n g s to develop i n t h e i r own way. For men whose c h ' i i s t h i n , n a t u r a l development i s n ' t r e a l l y s u f f i c i e n t . T h e r e f o r e the r u l e r must have both s c h o o l s and j a i l s f o r 'teaching'. (LH 8, p. 73) So Wang Ch'ung stands i n t h i s r e s p e c t i n sharp c o n t r a s t to the use of t z u j a n i n the Lao t z u , f o r example, i n those cases i n which the r u l e r i s the one who removes the h i s t o r i c a l l y developed hindrances of s o c i e t a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and allows the people to be so o f themselves. On the o t h e r hand, Wang continues to use t z u j a n as a s i g n a l f o r a r e l i g i o u s a b s o l u t e . I t i s used to show t h a t the metamorphoses of c h ' i have no law or determining f o r c e o u t s i d e of the c h ' i i t s e l f . Although i n the process of divergence, i m p e r f e c t i o n a l s o a r i s e s , the f i n a l standard and source of the b e s t human l i f e i s d e r i v e d from t h a t p r o c e s s . 128. CHAPTER I I I FROM WANG CH'UNG TO KUO HSIANG INTRODUCTION We do not know of any students o f Wang Ch'ung. His w r i t i n g must have been known i n h i s home p r o v i n c e o f K ' u a i - c h l ^ but become g e n e r a l l y known onl y a f t e r T s ' a i Yung ^ , I s E L d i s c o v e r e d i t l a t e i n the second century A.D. He passed i t on to h i s s u p e r i o r , Wang Lang i (d. A.D.228) who brought i t back to the c a p i t a l r e g i o n s where i t c i r c u l a t e d among the s c h o l a r l y community. However, there are a few thi n g s which suggest t h a t Wang Ch'ung may have had some i n f l u e n c e p r i o r to the g e n e r a l awareness o f h i s w r i t i n g s . T h e r e f o r e we w i l l b r i e f l y examine a few of Wang's contemporaries and t h i n k e r s of the second century A.D. who have been a s s o c i a t e d i n some way w i t h Wang. At the same time t h a t we look at some of h i s contempo-r a r i e s , we should be a l e r t to the p o s s i b i l i t y o f developments i n the i d e a o f t z u j a n t a k i n g p l a c e q u i t e independently of Wang Ch'ung's thought. WANG CH'UNG AND THE POLITICAL CRITICS The Hou Han shu groups Wang Ch'ung's biography together w i t h those o f Wang Fu j£ <^ T (A.D. 90-165) and Chung-ch'ang T'ung f«{» (A.D. 179-219). However, the reason f o r t h i s i s not e x p l i c i t l y g i v e n . In what r e s p e c t they were found to be s i m i l a r may on l y be guessed at by l o o k i n g at the b i o g r a p h i e s themselves. Wang Fu was a s c h o l a r who f a i l e d to achieve g r e a t o f f i c e . He was born i n the f a r west o f China, i n present-day 129. Kansu, and thus i t i s extremely u n l i k e l y that he would have had any d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h Wang Ch'ung or h i s d i s c i p l e s at the o p p o s i t e end of the empire. He was known i n the h i g h e s t s c h o l a r l y c i r c l e s , b eing a f r i e n d of both the g r e a t c l a s s i c a l commentator Ma Jung (A.D. 79-166) and the mathematician Chang Heng (A.D. 78-139). Wang Fu h i m s e l f l i v e d much o f h i s l i f e i n r e t i r e m e n t and wrote a t r e a t i s e c r i t i c i z i n g the shortcomings of h i s age. Since he d i d not wish to be known (he s a y s ) , he c a l l e d i t the " C r i t i c i s m s of a hidden man", Ch'len f u l u n ^ "j^jn . T h i s work was s h a r p l y c r i t i c a l o f h i s s o c i a l m i l i e u , f o c u s s i n g on b u r e a u c r a t i c inadequacies, the m i s c a r r i a g e of j u s t i c e , and e x c e s s i v e wealth and extravagance.''" Wang Fu was not a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k e r ; h i s r e f e r e n c e s to the b a s i c s t r u c t u r e o f t h i n g s seem to f a l l .in the t r a d i t i o n of Tung Chung-shu. He emphasizes the p e r v a s i v e presence of ch' i Jjjl i n a l l r e a l i t y and adopts the term yttan ch' i =^ to r e f e r to the beginning of t h i n g s . A c c o r d i n g to both Tung and Wang Fu,. t h i s ch' i i s the b a s i s f o r the i n t e r a c t i o n of heaven and man. In c o n t r a s t to Tung, Wang had more sympathy ''"This b i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s found i n the Hou Han  shu, 79:1b. A summary of Wang Fu's biography and thought..is.also found i n E t i e n n e Balazs, " P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y and S o c i a l C r i s i s at the End of the Han Dynasty," Chinese C i v i l i z a t i o n and  Bureaucracy, pp. 198-205. A l s o see Kung-chuan Hsiao, A H i s t o r y  of Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought, ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1979), pp. 537-540. 2Wang Fu j£ , C h ' i e n - f u l u n ^- ^ (Discourses o f a Hidden Man), ( T a i p e i : World Book Co., 1975), Chap. 16, 130. f o r T a o i s t thought, seeing .-the Tao as the fundamental r e a l i t y . He c a l l s Tao the r o o t , pen 7^ , of c h ' i , and c h ' i the instrument of the Tao. The concept o f t z u j a n i s completely absent from Wang Fu;. thus he makes no c o n t r i b u t i o n to the theme which i s the t o p i c of t h i s t h e s i s . Chung-ch'ang T'ung i n h i s youth was a v e r y f o r t h r i g h t and outspoken young man. By h i s candor and w i t he a c q u i r e d the e p i t h e t o f "madman". The Hou Han shu c i t e s the encounter w i t h Kao Kan, the governor of Ch'ing chou, who was a famous supporter of young i n t e l l e c t u a l s . In an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Kao Kan, Chung-ch'ang T'ung s a i d , " S i r , you have h i g h ambitions, but are l a c k i n g i n t a l e n t . You l i k e s c h o l a r s , but you do not know how to s e l e c t men f o r o f f i c e . I must t h e r e f o r e g i v e you s e r i o u s warning: take c a r e ! " 4 T h i s i n t e r v i e w e s t a b l i s h e d h i s r e p u t a t i o n both f o r frankness and i n s i g h t , s i n c e Kao Kan l o s t h i s l i f e s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r i n a r e b e l l i o n . Chung-ch'ang T'ung was w e l l acquainted w i t h T a o i s t l i t e r a t u r e . As Balazs notes., h i s essay " D e s i r e f o r Happiness" abounds i n t e c h n i c a l terms from the Lao t z u and the I ching. ~* The same may be s a i d of the two poems which appear i n h i s biography. About the year 210 he was taken i n t o employment i n Ts'ao Ts'ao's p. 77. A l s o see Chap. 9, p. 36 and Chap. 32, pp. 154 f f . 3 I b i d . Chap. 32, p. 154 4Hou Han shu, 79:11a. The speech i s the t r a n s l a t i o n of E. Balazs, " P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y and S o c i a l C r i s i s , " p. 214. ^Ba l a z s , " P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y and S o c i a l C r i s i s " , p. 216. 131. a d v i s o r y group o f s c h o l a r s where he remained u n t i l h i s death i n 219. I t i s l i k e l y t h a t h i s main work, Ch'ang yen *| 4 Frank words , i s from t h i s p e r i o d . Of t h i s work o n l y three chapters quoted i n h i s biography and s c a t t e r e d fragments s u r v i v e . He s u b t l y p r a i s e s Ts'ao Ts'ao f o r having brought order, but i n s i s t e d t h a t d i s o r d e r would s u r e l y a r i s e again as the power of the r o y a l f a m i l y decayed. He a t t a c k e d the landed a r i s t o c r a c y , c a l l i n g f o r l a n d r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n and a thorough r e v i s i o n , i n a more a u t h o r i t a r i a n d i r e c t i o n , o f a d m i n i s t r a t i o n procedures. One can see t h a t the concern w i t h s o c i a l decay and c o r r u p t i o n which exasperated Wang Fu l e d to a deep-seated pessimism i n Chung-ch'ang T'ung. His a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m r e f l e c t s a concern to f i n d pragmatic means of e s t a b l i s h i n g order, but w i t h a p e s s i m i s t i c b e l i e f i n the u l t i m a t e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f permanent or d e r . ^ In n e i t h e r the biography nor c o l l e c t e d fragments o f Chung-ch'ang T'ung i s there anything suggesting a sy s t e m a t i c a p p r a i s a l of T a o i s t thought. The term t z u j a n occurs nowhere i n t h i s l i t e r a t u r e . As w i t h Wang Fu, there seems to be no s o l i d h i s t o r i c a l c o n n e c t i o n to Wang Ch'ung, although Wang Ch'ung's works would have been i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n the l i f e t i m e of Chung-ch'ang T'ung. We can r e l a t e Wang Ch'ung and Wang Fu °See the summary of Chung-ch'ang T'ung i n Balaz s , " P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y and S o c i a l C r i s e s , " pp. 213-225. A Few paragraphs o f h i s work are a l s o t r a n s l a t e d i n Hsiao, Chinese  P o l i t i c a l Thought, pp. 545-547. Both o f these sources are based on the accounts o f the Hou Han shu, 79:10b f f . 132. b i o g r a p h l c a l l y ; both were d i s a p p o i n t e d i n t h e i r s earch f o r o f f i c e and wrote t h e i r works i n s e c l u s i o n , but t h i s i s not t r u e of Chung-ch'ang T'ung. One might say t h a t a l l three were ' c r i t i c a l ' , but whereas Wang Ch'ung d i r e c t e d h i s c r i t i c i s m a t custom and s u p e r s t i t i o n w h i l e p r a i s i n g the Han government, both Wang Fu and Chung-ch'ang T'ung d i r e c t e d t h e i r i r e at governments. Timoteus Pokora suggests t h a t T s ' u i Shih "j£* (ca. A.D. 103 - ca. 170) belonged to t h i s group as w e l l . As Ba l a z s ' s study r e v e a l s , T s ' u i Shih ranks as a p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c along w i t h Wang Fu and Chung-ch'ang T'ung, but Pokora giv e s no reason why Wang Ch'ung should be grouped w i t h them on th a t b a s i s . Pokora a l s o notes t h a t Hsu Kan ift (A.D. 170-217) was added to t h i s l i s t by the l a t e Ming s c h o l a r , Ho Liang-chUn Kung-chuan Hsiao f u r t h e r expands t h i s l i s t by i n c l u d i n g Huan T'an and HsUn YUeh % ' f ^ (A.D. 148-209), but l e a v i n g out Wang Ch'ung. 8 I t may be th a t of a l l of these men, Wang Ch'ung was the f a r t h e s t from p o l i t i c a l power, and he t h e r e f o r e i d e a l i z e d i t . Although Wang Ch'ung i s l e g i t i m a t e l y connected to Huan T'an, he s e t s o f f i n a d i r e c t i o n q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t found i n t h i s l i n e o f p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c s . One p o s s i b l e p o i n t o f comparison among these men may be the genre o f w r i t i n g employed. With the ex c e p t i o n o f Chung-ch'ang T'ung a l l o f these men wrote t r e a t i s e s , l u n . But Wang 7Timotheus Pokora, "The N e c e s s i t y o f a More Thorough Study of the P h i l o s o p h e r Wang Ch'ung and h i s Predecessors", A r c h l y  O r i e n t a l n i 30(1962), p. 252. Hsiao, Chinese P o l i t i c a l Thought, p. 547. 133. Ch'ung's w r i t i n g , although i t s t i t l e c o n t a i n s the word l u n , i s not a t r e a t i s e , but a c r i t i c i s m of t r e a t i s e s . Lun heng may best be t r a n s l a t e d as " T r e a t i s e s weighed i n the bala n c e . " In the end, I t h i n k we must conclude t h a t the a s s o c i a t i o n of Wang Ch'ung w i t h these p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c s i s a h i s t o r i c a l anomaly and r e f l e c t s no h i s t o r i c a l sequence i n the h i s t o r y o f idea s . WANG CH'UNG AND THE TAOISTS Another d i r e c t i o n i n which Wang Ch'ung may have had i n f l u e n c e i s w i t h i n the Tao c h i a . The h i s t o r y of the sch o o l o f the Tao i n the L a t t e r Han d y n a s t y , i s murky at best. We do know of some a t t e n t i o n to T a o i s t t e x t s and ideas among c e r t a i n l i t e r a t i a lthough t h e s e . l i t e r a t i cannot f o r the most p a r t be c a l l e d T a o i s t s The Huai nan t z u , which Wang used so e x t e n s i v e l y , was fi r s t . . . commented on by a contemporary of Wang, Hsil Shen % ^ (A.D. 30-124). HsU Shen was the author o f China's f i r s t d i c t i o n a r y , , the author of China's f i r s t d i c t i o n a r y , the Shuo wen c h i e h t z ' u */t» £ %\ » a n c * l i k e Wang Ch'ung c o u l d not h i m s e l f be c a l l e d a T a o i s t . Ma Jung i s a l s o c r e d i t e d w i t h a commentary on the Huai  nan t z u . Two of. h i s students, Yen Tu and Lu Chih j j | (d. A.D. 192) are l i k e l y to have w r i t t e n some, commentary. Kao Yu %\ \ ^ whose name i s att a c h e d to the presen t commentary, 9 probably d e r i v e d most of h i s m a t e r i a l from Lu Chih. Benjamin E. Wallacker, The Huai nan t z u , Book Eleven: Behavior, C u l t u r e , and the Cosmos, pp. 2-3, p. 9, n. 25. 134. Even a sh o r t study o f Kao Yu's commentary r e v e a l s t h a t he p a i d v e r y l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to e i t h e r ' T a o i s t thought i n ge n e r a l or to the i d e a o f t z u j a n i n p a r t i c u l a r . He seems to analyze t h i n g s p r i m a r i l y i n terms of the common Han dynasty concepts of Y i n and Yang, but o c c a s i o n a l l y uses terms r e f e r r i n g to dark-ness and mystery to e x p l a i n things."*"^ He a l s o quotes the 11 Chuang t z u to i l l u s t r a t e a p o i n t . These are sign s t h a t he had some f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the d i s c u s s i o n of the Lao t z u and the Chuang t z u be g i n n i n g i n h i s time, but the r e f e r e n c e s are too i n f r e q u e n t to conclude t h a t he h i m s e l f was ve r y f a m i l i a r w i t h the t e x t s . I have found on l y one p l a c e where Kao Yu h i m s e l f i n t r o d u c e s the term t z u j an i n t o the commentary without quoting an occurrence i n the main.text. In commenting on the t e x t , "Therefore, the sage on the throne embraces the Tao and does not speak, " ( X, ^ As f o r t z u j a n and wu-wei, there i s no way of d i s c o v e r i n g whether Kao Yu had any p e c u l i a r understanding o f these terms. The o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e i s t h a t the two occur together, a combination which became commonplace o n l y w i t h Wang Ch'ung. Kao Yu w r i t e s : The sage t r a v e l s the Way, which i s t z u j a n and wu-wei. 10 See, f o r example, Huai nan t z u 2.lb, 8.1b. 11 I b i d . 2.2a 12 I b i d . 6.2b 135. The Huai nan t z u p r o v i d e d a t h e o r e t i c a l b a s i s f o r t h i s combination but. i t was Wang Ch'ung who turned i t i n t o a s i n g l e e x p r e s s i o n . T h i s i s some evidence then, although..hardly c o n c l u s i v e , t h a t Wang's ideas o f t z u j an were known i n s c h o l a r l y c i r c l e s . A more p r o p e r l y " T a o i s t " case, and a more d i f f i c u l t one, i s the Ho_ Shang Kung *,QT ^ commentary to the Lao t z u . I t s g r e a t e r d i f f i c u l t y l i e s i n the problem o f d a t i n g i t . The commentary p u r p o r t s to be w r i t t e n i n the time of the Han emperor Wen ( r . 179-157 B.C.) and to have been presented at c o u r t . However, the Shih c h i makes no mention of i t , nor i s i t l i s t e d , i n the Han shu b i b l i o g r a p h y . The Shih c h i does mention an. otherwise unknown ha shang chang j en J L jt. J\ as a teacher, s p e c i a l i z i n g i n s t u d i e s of Huang-lao (that i s , s t u d i e s of the Yellow emperor and of the Lao t z u , a combi-n a t i o n which u s u a l l y i m p l i e d t h a t they sought techniques to assure immortality).''' 4 T h i s may be the source o f the name, but i t i s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t the commentary i t s e l f was w r i t t e n by him. The Han shu mentions t h r e e commentaries on the Lao t z u but n e g l e c t s to mention t h i s one. Although these three commen-t a r i e s are l o s t , the Ho shang kung commentary has been c o n s i d e r e d v a l u a b l e enough to be r e - c o p i e d through a l l these c e n t u r i e s . I t seems u n l i k e l y t h e r e f o r e t h a t i f L i u H s i n and Pan Ku knew of i t , t h a t they would i n t e n t i o n a l l y exclude i t . Th i s argument from s i l e n c e , a d m i t t e d l y not the b e s t argument, suggests t h a t See above, Chapter 2, pp. 64-65. Shih c h i , chuan 80, p. 2436. 136. the commentary was composed a f t e r the end of the former Han dynasty. The Ssu-k'u t ' i yao $3 fij^ jf-^ a l s o p o i n t s out t h a t Ma Jung (A.D. 79-166) was the f i r s t commentator to w r i t e i n t e r l i n e a r commentaries on the c l a s s i c s , t h a t i s , producing the t e x t and comments on the same page, but the Ho shang kung commentary was a l s o w r i t t e n t h a t way. I t i s not i m p o s s i b l e t h a t i t was w r i t t e n that way i n the second century B.C., but 15 i t seems u n l i k e l y . One o f the e a r l i e r mentions o f the Ho shang kung commentary was by Ko Hung (277-357). He assumed i t was c u r r e n t at the time of Wang P i (240), whose commentary he regarded as 16 s u p e r i o r to the Ho shang kung. Anna S e i d e l had c i t e d a r e f e r e n c e to i t by Hs.tieh Tsung j $ (d. 243). Hsileh comments on the "Fu on the E a s t e r n C a p i t a l " , Tung ching f u j^t. Al& by Chang Heng, to the e f f e c t t h a t p a r t o f the f u i s a quote of the Ho shang kung commentary to Lao t z u , chap. 46. ^ This, dates the commentary as being p r i o r to 243. Hsileh h i m s e l f must have b e l i e v e d i t to be much e a r l i e r , s i n c e he assumed Chang Heng (A.D. 78-139) quoted from i t and not v i c e -v e r s a . In d a t i n g the commentary to the l a t t e r h a l f o f the ^ S s u k'u t ' i yao tfl f^ T &> quoted i n Chang Hsin-cheng ^^c shu t'ung k'ao |? i ^ ^ (Examination of dubious books), (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939) pp. 744-745. 1 6 I b i d . p. 744. ^ 7Anna S e i d e l , La D i v i n i s a t i o n de Lao t s e u dans l e Taoisme des han, ( P a r i s : E c o l e F r a n c a i s e d'Extreme-Orient, 1969) p. 32. 1 3 7 . Latter Han dynasty, Seldel follows the t r a d i t i o n of Jao Tsung-i S j | whose study of the Hsiang- erh M % commentary included an essay comparing i t with the Ho shang kung commentary. He concludes that, although the Hsiang erh d i f f e r s s u b s t a n t i a l l y from the Ho shang kung, i t appears to have certa i n elements borrowed from the l a t t e r . Jao i s of the opinion that Chang Lu % ' t ^ i e third Taoist Heavenly Master and probable author of the Hsiang-erh commentary, had a copy of the Hb shang kung 1 8 when he composed the Hsiang erh. Obuchi N i n j i A Jl $9 and Yoshioka Yoshitoyo ^ [$} ^ ^ have both concurred i n 1 9 Jao's opinion and added further evidence of th e i r own. In recent times only Kusuyama Haruki Jfcfyi til ^  has offered a serious alternative.. He argues that although there may have been an older version of the Ho shang kung, the extant e d i t i o n i s a revised e d i t i o n which dates only to the s i x t h century A.D. He also points out that the Hsileh Tsung commentary on Chang Heng contains several interpolations and therefore i t may not be a r e l i a b l e source. "*"8Jao Tsung-i , Lao tzu Hsiang erh chu chiao chien £ J » J J ; |j[ jf%{ (The Lao tzu with the Hsiang erh commentary, edited),(Hongkong: Tong Nam, 1 9 5 6 ) pp. 8 7 - 9 2 . 1 9Yoshioka Yoshitoyo £ g] J | % > "Roshi Ka jo ko hon to Dokyo £ 3 - >T Jz. " A ^ £ ^ (The Ho shang kung commentary to the Lao tzu and Taoism), Dokyo Sogoteki kenkyu " 4 $ %] ffifi (Tokyo: National Book Publ. Co., 1 9 7 7 ) pp. 3 2 1 , 3 2 5 . 2 0Kusuyama Haruki dl ^  , "Roshi Ka jo ko 138. Although I have not s t u d i e d the Ho shang kung commentary c a r e f u l l y enough to f u l l y e v a l u a t e Kusuyama's arguments, I s h a l l t e n t a t i v e l y f o l l o w the l a r g e r number of s c h o l a r s who p l a c e i t i n the L a t t e r Han dynasty. The few concepts which I d i s c u s s below seem to be t y p i c a l l y Han dynasty concepts. Through t h a t d i s c u s s i o n , I demonstrate t h a t the claims of the p r e f a c e t h a t the work i s from the second century B.C. are u n l i k e l y , but those claims are not s e r i o u s l y accepted by any modern s c h o l a r s t h a t I am aware o f . One f a i r l y c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the commentary i s l a t e r than Tung Chung-shu i s i t s r e f e r e n c e to yuan ch' i Tung Chung-shu i s g e n e r a l l y supposed to have been the f i r s t to 21 use t h i s term. Tung makes a p o i n t of arguing why the term yuan was a good one to use. T h i s suggests t h a t he was aware t h a t he was s e t t i n g a precedent. By c o n t r a s t the Ho shang kung commentary seems to invoke i t as a g e n e r a l l y known term, i d e n t i f y i n g i t w i t h the Tao. To the phrase "(The Tao) produces but does not possess ( 15] 7^ ), the commentary notes, The yuan c h ' i produces the c r e a t u r e s but does not possess them. 22 The commentary a l s o d e s c r i b e s c h ' i i n terms which I have seen nowhere e l s e but i n the Lun heng. To the phrase "Mystery chu no s e i r i t s u " ^ % ;?T JL <Ck i£ f) M ic , Waseda Daigaku  bungaku kenkyuka k i v o ^ * © 7^ ^ A L ^ £ J | ^ (Dec. 1972). See e s p e c i a l l y p. 25. 21 See above, Chap. 2, p. 59. 139. o f m y s t e r i e s " ( £ ^ -k ), the commentary adds, .the endowed ch' i has t h i c k n e s s and t h i n n e s s . No d e f i n i t e c o n c l u s i o n s may be drawn from t h i s , but i f the commentary were as o l d as i t c l a i m s , then t h i s p e c u l i a r e x p r e s s i o n would occur i n o n l y two works which are two hundred years a p a r t . I f , however, the works are r e l a t i v e l y c l o s e i n time, the e x p r e s s i o n c o u l d r e f l e c t a common p a r l a n c e o f the p e r i o d . A second c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the thought o f Wang Ch'ung i s the commentary's emphasis on the s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n o f the c r e a t u r e s . The commentary remarks, Between heaven and e a r t h i s a v o i d , and the blended c h ' i flow about. Therefore, the myriad c r e a t u r e s are s e l f - p r o d u c e d . The Tao i s pure and s i l e n t ; i t does not speak. When i t d a r k l y moves i t s essences (ching ch' i ) , the c r e a t u r e s are completed o f themselves. * lo Pt ir #f |L $ to 6 2 5 Both the i d e a o f the c r e a t u r e s s e l f - p r o d u c i n g i n the environment o f the mingled c h ' i and the i d e a t h a t when the c h ' i i s moved, 2 2 C h e n g Ch'eng-hai^P A , Lao t z u Ho shang kung chu chiao l i %_ 3 j.«T -t ?y SJL 2% , P- 15-16 (Lao t z u , chap. 2). See a l s o p. 272 (Lao t z u , chap. 42). 23 I b i d . p. 10 (Lao t z u , chap. 1). o / I b i d . p. 36 (Lao t z u , chap. 5). 2 5 I b i d . p. 171 (Lao t z u , chap. 25) 140. the c r e a t u r e s are s e l f - c o m p l e t e d are s i m i l a r to concepts found i n Wang Ch'ung. Wang, however, uses "heaven" i n p l a c e of the commentary's "Tao". These two s i m i l a r i t i e s between the Lun heng and the Ho shang  kung commentary do not t e l l us which was p r i o r . However, Wang Ch'ung was not s e c r e t i v e about h i s sources and f r e e l y admits i n t e l l e c t u a l indebtedness. I f he, i n f a c t , had access to t h i s commentary, i t i s strange t h a t he n e g l e c t e d to mention i t . The Ho shang kung commentary on the o t h e r hand i s c r y p t i c and mentions no p r e v i o u s sources, as f a r as I know. For the commentary not to acknowledge indebtedness i s not unusual. Hence i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t the commentary's ideas are taken from the Lun heng, d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , than v i c e - v e r s a . A d m i t t e d l y t h i s i s another argument from s i l e n c e and has the weaknesses o f a l l such arguments. The commentary d i f f e r s from the Wang Ch'ung a t a c r u c i a l p o i n t , namely t h a t i t a f f i r m s a sympathetic response o f heaven 26 to man's a c t i o n s , a d o c t r i n e t h a t was anathema to Wang. As w i t h the concept of yuan c h 1 i t h i s theory r e c e i v e d i t s f o r m u l a t i o n by Tung Chung-shu and had become a commonplace n o t i o n by the time o f the L a t t e r Han dynasty. The cumulative e f f e c t o f these concepts makes i t r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n t h a t the commentary was not w r i t t e n i n the time of Emperor Wen. T h i s , combined w i t h the l a c k o f any r e f e r e n c e to i t p r i o r to the v e r y end o f the second century, makes i t l i k e l y I b i d . p. 292 (Lao t z u , chap. 47). 141. to have been w r i t t e n i n the second century A.D., when the e x p r e s s i o n which the commentator uses i n common w i t h Wang Ch'ung may have been c u r r e n t . The Ho shang kung commentary uses the term t z u j a n r a t h e r o f t e n . The m a j o r i t y o f cases f a l l i n t o the category o f a sense found i n the Lao t z u i t s e l f , namely the way th i n g s are o f them-s e l v e s as opposed to the way they are when manipulated by r u l e r s or men. The commentator o n l y once borrows the i d e a o f r e l y i n g 27 on t z u j a n found i n the Huai nan t z u . At o n l y one p o i n t does he a s s o c i a t e i t d i r e c t l y w i t h the Tao. He remarks t h a t the Tao r e f e r r e d to i n the main t e x t i s the way o f t z u j a n , t z u j a n c h i h tao ^ ^ ;<L 28 ^ o n e f 0 u _ o w s t h i s way, h i s d e s i r e s and h i s c u l t u r a l adornments w i l l d a i l y l e s s e n . F o l l o w i n g t h i s way means t h a t he w i l l e x e r t no e f f o r t . Presumably one l e t s t h i n g s go t h e i r own way ( t z u jan) without i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h them. Tzu j a n must mean " n a t u r a l " here, j u s t as i t does i n the other occurrences i n the commentary. Although t h i s occurrence might be i n t e r p r e t e d as a r e f e r e n c e to an abs o l u t e , " s e l f - s o " Tao, such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would i s o l a t e t h i s occurrence from the o t h e r s i n the commentary. A l l i n a l l , I must conclude t h a t there i s nothi n g v e r y remarkable i n the Ho shang kung commentary: On the q u e s t i o n of t z u j a n , i t o n l y r e p e a t s p a t t e r n s o f thought found e a r l i e r . I b i d . p. 239 (Lao t z u , chap. 38). I b i d . p. 295 (Lao t z u , chap. 48). 142. I f i t s dates were c e r t a i n , i t might show t h a t c e r t a i n o f Wang Ch'ung's idea s were known b e f o r e h i s w r i t i n g s became g e n e r a l l y c i r c u l a t e d , but i f i t s date i s as l a t e as A.D. 200, Wang Ch'ung's w r i t i n g s would have been i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n any case. The Hsiang-erh |{| commentary, which was probably w r i t t e n by Chang Lu 2£ & , the t h i r d T a o i s t Heavenly Master o f the F i v e Pecks o f R i c e s e c t , may a l s o be worth c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t dates t o sometime around the end of the second century. Although the t e x t i n subsequent c e n t u r i e s r e c e i v e d a t t e n t i o n p r i m a r i l y w i t h i n the ranks o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d Taoism, t h e r e i s no reason to suppose i t was always i s o l a t e d from the view o f Confu c i a n l i t e r a t i . A f t e r a l l , i t s probable author Chang Lu, was not a t o t a l s t r a n g e r to the bureaucracy. He d i d h o l d o f f i c e under Ts'ao Ts'ao, a l b e i t on account o f h i s m i l i t a r y prowess and not on account o f s c h o l a r s h i p , and thus had a c e r t a i n degree o f r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . The commentary i s i n t e r e s t i n g because a t p o i n t s i t t r e a t s tzxi j a n as e q u i v a l e n t to the Tao. Chang Lu comments that the occurrence o f t z u j a n i n Lao t z u , Chapter 23 ( % & t£ ) i s a r e f e r e n c e to the Tao, and he adds t h a t i f one j o i n s w i t h 29 t z u j a n , he can lengthen h i s days. A s i m i l a r case occurs i n the comments on Chapter 10, i n which Lao t z u i s i d e n t i f i e d as a d i v i n i t y who i s the i n c a r n a t i o n o f the p r i m a l u n i t y o f r e a l i t y . T h i s u n i t y i s the Tao and i s beyond heaven and e a r t h . Then Jao Tsung-i, L a o - t z u Hsiang-erh chu chiao c h i e n , p. 32. 143. he makes the following peculiar note: Whether we c a l l i t the void, or tzu jan, or the nameless, these are a l l the same as th i s unity. # I A . «, t i t fe*, £ /il - * o 3 0 And f i n a l l y i n a remarkable comment on Chapter 25 ( ^  li^ fa ), Chang Lu writes, Tzu jan i s named together with the Tao, but i t has a d i f f e r e n t essence. It causes mutual imitation and a l l together imitate the Tao. Heaven and earth are vast and great. They constantly imitate the Tao i n order to l i v e . How could man not respect the Tao? J « * * i B 8* I ft. ? i *a C-e-. % « j%_ -K,% & 4. ^  t . •?„ k .T * $ i | f.31 Therefore, tzu jan i s not an absolute equivalent to Tao. It i s a term which can be used by i t s e l f to indicate the Tao, but we may not suppose i t to be the same as Tao. It refers to Tao i n the same manner that the terms void and nameless do. They suggest some aspect or viewpoint of the Tao but do not capture the essence of the Tao. From.the occurrence i n Chapter 23, i t seems that as an aspect of Tao tzu jan contains power, for one may lengthen his l i f e by j o i n i n g with i t . Chang may be saying only that following the natural course of things leads to long l i f e . One should not wear out his s p i r i t through ambition, nor get himself k i l l e d prematurely through entanglements i n p o l i t i c s . But more l i k e l y he i s thinking of Tao as the 30 31 Ibid. p. 13 Ibid. p. 35 144. p r i m o r d i a l u n i t y b e f o r e heaven and e a r t h . Thus j o i n i n g w i t h t z u j a n may imply some more m y s t i c a l process of a t t a i n i n g to the p r i m o r d i a l u n i t y . The same community which produced the Hsiang erh commentary a p p a r e n t l y a l s o v a l u e d h i g h l y a work now known as the T ' a i p ' i n g c h i n g "ft f ( T h e C l a s s i c of Great Peace). U n f o r t u n a t e l y the h i s t o r y of t h i s t e x t b e f o r e the s i x t h century A.D. i s obscure. We know of two works from the Han d y n a s t i e s w i t h T ' a i p ' i n g i n t h e i r t i t l e s . The two may have been r e l a t e d , the l a t e r b e i n g a development of the e a r l i e r . The l a t e r of these two was a t e x t e n t i t l e d T ' a i - p ' i n g ch' i n g - l i n g shu *f ^ ]|-i n 170 chapters (chuan sjs ) , which was presented a t the c o u r t d u r i n g the r e i g n of Emperor L i n g ( r . A.D. 136-144). There i s a l s o a t h i r d work, a T' a i - p ' i n g t u n g - c h i shu "fa ^ ^ § 8 . ^ , and a f o u r t h , a Cheng-i meng-wei chin g j£. — Jffi ffi, » both of which are l o s t . The former claimed to be r e v e a l e d to a c e l e s t i a l master and the l a t t e r a work p u r p o r t e d l y r e v e a l e d to Chang T a o - l i n g , the founder of the F i v e Pecks of R i c e s e c t and the f i r s t h i s t o r i c a l C e l e s t i a l Master. The extant t e x t of the T ' a i - p ' i n g c h i n g i s a work of 57 chapters which dates to the s i x t h century A.D. Max Kaltenmark suggests t h a t i t i s almost i m p o s s i b l e to e s t a b l i s h the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of the extant T ' a i - p ' i n g c h i n g to these three l a t t e r t e x t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he argues t h a t some fragments o f the T ' a i - p ' i n g  c h i n g c l e a r l y predate the T a o i s t S e c t a r i a n movement, i . e . b e f o r e ca. A.D. 180, and t h a t the i d e o l o g y i n g e n e r a l i s a r e f l e c t i o n - of p r e - s e c t a r i a n a t t i t u d e s c l o s e r to c l a s s i c a l 145. 32 ideas than to l a t e r Taoism, The Han dynasty 170 chapter version was divided into ten books of seventeen chapters each. There i s a ninth century document which appears to be an abridgement of this work, c a l l e d T ' a i p'ing ching ch'ao ^ ^ & ?£ ^ . This abridgement has ten chapters, whose t i t l e s purport to correspond to the ten books of the Han work. Although Wang Ming suggests that the f i r s t chapter of t h i s abridgement i s a fab r i c a t i o n , the remaining chapters he feels are based on a version of the T'ai p'ing ching more complete than the 57 chapter version of the six t h century. Since entire books of the Han work are missing from the 57 chapter version, this abridged version 33 supplies important information. Although both extant editions are r e l a t i v e l y l a t e and are perhaps only marginally r e l i a b l e , they o f f e r some intere s t i n g material which tends to agree with the concepts found i n the Hsiang erh commentary. The second chapter of the abridged e d i t i o n contains a very e x p l i c i t conception of tzu jan as a separate e n t i t y . J*Max Kaltenmark, "The Ideology of the T'ai-p'ing Ching," Facets of Taoism; Essays i n Chinese Religion, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pp. 19-21, 44-45. I am also indebted to Kaltenmark f o r the b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l information contained i n this paragraph. The a r t i c l e appears i n a Japanese t r a n s l a t i o n as "Tai hei k e i no r i r o n " ?V f J&f. (T) 2 $ %^ t Dokyo Sogoteki kenkyu ^ %\ fc% £ ^ (Tokyo: National Book Pub. Co., 1977). 3 3Wang Ming .£ a$ , T'ai p'ing ching ho chiao £ f %?{ ^ (The Cl a s s i c of Great Peace, c o l l a t e d and edited), (Peking: Chung-hua Book Co., 1960), pp. 1-3, 11-14. 146. A c c o r d i n g to t h i s c o n c e p t i o n a t r i a d i s formed by yuan c h ' i ( p r i m o r d i a l b r e a t h ) , t z u j a n , and heaven. A l l three r e c e i v e the Tao and thereby perform t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e t a s k s . When t z u j a n i s a c t i v a t e d by the Tao, a l l c r e a t u r e s r e c e i v e t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p l a c e s . Tzu j a n thus r e t a i n s i t s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the manner of being o f t h i n g s , but i s a b s t r a c t l y c o n c e i v e d as a separate power i n the u n i v e r s e . In the same chapter i t i s a l s o r e c o r d e d t h a t the yuan ch' i and t z u j a n together form 35 the nature o f heaven and ea r t h , t h a t i s , the world. Kaltenmark observes t h a t i n the T'ai-p'.ing ching, yuan ch' 1 i s a p r i m o r d i a l b r e a t h i n man which had to be r e - d i s c o v e r e d i n order f o r man 36 to r e t u r n to the Tao and thereby a t t a i n the Great Peace. We have seen t h a t yuan ch' 1 was a fundamental concept f o r many Han t h i n k e r s . For the T ' a i - p ' i n g c h i n g to p l a c e t z u j a n on a l e v e l w i t h yuan c h ' i i s an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t z u j a n had a fundamental r o l e i n i t s ontology. I t f u n c t i o n s as a p r i n c i p l e of d i f f e r e n -t i a t i o n at a p o i n t equal i n importance to t h a t o f y i n and yang or the f i v e phases i n other .Han dynasty thought. I t i s f a i r to ask how t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t z u j a n as one of the p r i m o r d i a l f o r c e s r e l a t e s to what we have found to be a t y p i c a l l y Han a s s o c i a t i o n ; o f t z u j a n w i t h n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s . I b i d . p. 21. A c c o r d i n g to Wang Ming's mar g i n a l notes, t h i s i s found i n the T ' a l p ' i n g c h i n g ch'ao, sec. I Z. , pp. 9-10. 3 5 I b i d . p. 17. A l s o i n T ' a i p ' i n g ching ch'ao, sec. I TL , p. 6. 3 6Max Kaltenmark, "The Ideology o f the T'ai- p ' l n g  Ching," p. 23. 147. Might th i s conception be a kind of absolutization of natural processes, i n which nature i s elevated to a primordial p r i n c i -ple? There are many occurrences of tzu jan i n the T'ai p'ing  ching i n phrases such as "natural technique", tzu jan chih shu | 2_ # J , or "natural laws", tzu jan chih f a & f»V . These seem to ref e r to only natural processes and natural laws, but not to an operation of a primordial p r i n c i p l e . In these cases tzu jan probably indicates that the techniques and laws referred to are independent of outside influences, i n p a r t i c u l a r , the influence of human a c t i v i t y . This concept of tzu jan i s rela t e d to the concept of tzu jan as a primordial power i n that the primordial power i s related to the manner of being of a l l the creatures of the world. In so fa r as creatures are an expression of the primordial workings of tzu jan, t h e i r fundamental natures have a r e l a t i v e independence which may be c a l l e d a natural process of develop-ment . A t h i r d use of tzu jan occurs i n the context of a search for immortality. According to this concept, those who preserve or swallow the c h ' i of tzu jan neither hunger nor t h i r s t . They 38 f i n d t h e i r l i f e and do not depart from th e i r roots. This kind of use of tzu jan t e s t i f i e s to the power which tzu jan was thought to have. It t e l l s us l i t t l e about the place and nature of tzu jan, but only conveys that i t was important and J / S e e for examples Ibid. pp. 34, 112, 150, 151, 174. 3 8 I b i d . pp. 43, 47. Also i n T'ai p'ing ching, 36.1b-2a and 36.4a. . 148. dependable, a key to the u n i v e r s e and of the r e s t o r a t i o n o f human l i f e to i t s o r i g i n a l good s t a t e . I t i s somewhat d i f f i c u l t to assess t h i s source. In a d d i t i o n to the problem o f d a t i n g these m a t e r i a l s , i t i s a l s o d i f f i c u l t to gauge the e f f e c t t h a t the w r i t i n g s o f t h i s community might have on the e l i t e mainstream o f Chinese thought. N e v e r t h e l e s s i t appears to be a most remarkable p o i n t i n the development o f the concept o f t z u j a n . When we co n s i d e r t h a t t h i s community was a l s o the source o f other s i g n i f i c a n t developments i n the h i s t o r y o f Chinese r e l i g i o n s , we need not r e j e c t the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s development o c c u r r e d i n the Han dynasty. I t s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the development o f Chinese p h i l o s o p h y remains to be seen. THE DISCOVERY OF THE LUN HENG AND THE CHING-CHOUtf*\ -)f \ SCHOOL The d i s c o v e r y o f the Lun heng i s documented by Ko Hung i n h i s Pao p'u t z u iY % . There, two d i f f e r e n t but not c o n f l i c t i n g accounts, t e l l how T s ' a i Yung ^ (A.D. 133-191) and Wang Lang 1 &fi (d. A.D,; 228) d i s c o v e r e d the te x t and brought i t i n t o g e n e r a l c i r c u l a t i o n : T s ' a i Yung entered Wu ( i n modern Chekiang p r o v i n c e ) and f i r s t o b t a i n e d (the Lun  heng). He s e c r e t l y toyed w i t h i t as an a i d i n c o n v e r s a t i o n . L a t e r Wang Lang o b t a i n e d i t , and everyone thought h i s t a l e n t s i n c r e a s e d . Someone s a i d , We are not seeing a d i f f e r e n t person; he must have o b t a i n e d a d i f f e r e n t book". They asked him about i t , and as a r e s u l t the Lun heng f l u o r i s h e d . When the Lun heng of Wang Ch'ung had not yet been o b t a i n e d i n the n o r t h e r n r e g i o n s 149. (the c a p i t a l a r e a ) , T s ' a i Po-chieh ( T s ' a i Yung) went to the area east o f the r i v e r and o b t a i n e d i t . He sighed a t i t s f i n e w r i t i n g ; i t sur-passed a l l the p h i l o s o p h e r s . Upon h i s r e t u r n i n g to the c e n t r a l kingdom, the l i t e r a t i became aware t h a t h i s d i s c o u r s e s had become even h i g h e r , and they suspected t h a t he had ob t a i n e d a new book. Someone sought i t out i n a hidden p l a c e and o b t a i n e d the Lun heng. He took s e v e r a l r o l l s o f i t along w i t h him, but T s ' a i Yung s a i d to him, "Le t ' s keep t h i s between you and me and not spread i t abroad."39 A t h i r d account i n the Hou Han shu mentions t h a t Wang Lang was governor o f K ' u a i - c h i when he ob t a i n e d the Lun h e n g . ^ He appears to have been awarded t h i s post f o r h i s p a r t i n keeping o r d e r d u r i n g the Yellow Turban r e b e l l i o n o f 184, 41 and he h e l d the post f o r about f o u r years. Thus we can say t h a t the Lun heng was brought to the c a p i t a l sometime between 184 and 188. Both T s ' a i Yung and Wang Lang have d i r e c t connections w i t h Wang P i % i \ (A.D. 226-249), the f i r s t g r e a t f i g u r e of the movement c a l l e d Mystery L e a r n i n g , hsilan hsileh \ . T s ' a i Yung's l i b r a r y , which the San Kuo c h i h 1^1 ^ re c o r d s as be i n g more than 10,000 volumes, was 39 Both quotes were assembled by Huang Hui, Lun heng ch iao s h i h , Appendix I I I , pp. 1236-1237. The f i r s t was found i n the e n c y c l o p e d i a Ku-chin shih-wen l e i chtl, p i e h c h i e r h $ § >C 5? , ft — • 1 h a v e not seen the o r i g i n a l r e f e r e n c e . The second can be found i n the T ' a i p' i n g yii l a n A ^ f£p ^ , 602. T h i s source g i v e s no chapter r e f e r e n c e f o r the Pao-p'u t z u . 4^See the commentary to Wang Ch'ung's biography i n the Hou Han shu 79. T h i s i s t r a n s l a t e d by A l f r e d Forke, Lun  heng, I, p. 5. 150. g i v e n i n p a r t to Wang Ts'an X ^ (A.D. 177-217), who was a g r e a t - u n c l e o f Wang P i . Wang Ts'an's sons were executed because o f a r e b e l l i o n , and the p r o p e r t y o f Wang Ts'an passed on to Wang Yeh £. ^  , the f a t h e r o f Wang P i . 4 2 Thus Wang P i had access to a good number of books o f T s ' a i Yung's l i b r a r y . Through Wang Ts'an, who must have been a good f r i e n d o f T s ' a i Yung, Wang P i had the o p p o r t u n i t y to l e a r n o f the s c h o l a r s h i p o f the Ching-chou group. Wang Ts'an was p r o b a b l y the b e s t s c h o l a r o f h i s f a m i l y b e f o r e Wang P i . Although h i s works do not s u r v i v e , we know t h a t he v a l u e d the H s i - t z ' u lt^? ^ commentary to the I ching, which i s the commentary taken as the b a s i s f o r m e t a p h y s i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n s on the I c h i n g . He a l s o had h i g h r e g a r d f o r both the Lao t z u and the Chuang t z u . He had a r e p u t a t i o n f o r being a good debater. O r i g i n a l l y he had ten chuan of w r i t i n g s , and 43 i t i s probable t h a t Wang P i had access to them. 4 1 C h ' e n Shou PJL ' jb , San Kuo c h i h (gl * , Wei c h i h (Records o f the Three Kingdoms: the Records of Wei), 13.12a-b. 4 2 I b i d . 28.30a-31a. The biography o f Wang P i , w r i t t e n by Ho Shao, i n which t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n appears, i s appended as commentary to the few sentences about Wang P i i n the main t e x t of the biography o f h i s f r i e n d , Chung Hui ^ ^ . I t i s t r a n s l a t e d i n Pa u l J . L i n , A T r a n s l a t i o n of Lao tzu ' s Tao  te ching and Wang P i ' s Commentary, pp. 151-153. See Mou Jun-sun f$ if^ ?Jl , Lun Wei Chin i - l a i c h i h  ch'ung-shang t'an-p'ien c h i c h ' i y i n g - h s i a n g | ^ ^| 4A & 151. T'ang Yimg-t'ung Ifi $0 was the f i r s t to analyze i n d e t a i l Wang P i ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the l a t t e r Han dynasty, and i n p a r t i c u l a r to the s c h o l a r s at Ching-chou. In an a r t i c l e w r i t t e n i n 1943, T'ang.argues t h a t Wang P i r e c e i v e d the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the I ching from Wang S u i || , who s t u d i e d the T' a i hsUan  ching w i t h Sung Chung ^  ^ , one o f the s c h o l a r s a t Ching_ c h o u . 4 4 Wang Su was the son of Wang Lang, who had brought Wang Ch'ung's w r i t i n g s to the c a p i t a l , and he was a l r e a d y a s c h o l a r i n h i s own r i g h t b e f o r e meeting Sung Chung. At Ching chou the governor, L i u Piao , p r o v i d e d a refuge f o r s c h o l a r s i n the hope t h a t he might be a b l e to sponsor d e f i n i t i v e commentaries on the c l a s s i c s . Ching chou was one of the few p l a c e s which were not ravaged by war a t the end o f the Han dynasty, and more than 300 s c h o l a r s gathered under L i u Piao's sponsorship. They d i d i n f a c t p u b l i s h commentaries on the 1 $ fi| t£ W A A lb * J * <" 0 n t h e indulgence i n 'disco u r s e and polemics' by s c h o l a r s o f the Wei-Chin times and i t s i n f l u e n c e i n subsequent ages"), (Hongkong: The Chinese U n i v e r s i t y o f Hongkong, 1966). 4 4 T ' a n g Yung-t'ung 3|j #1 H > "Wang P i c h i h Chou-1 Lun-yU h s i n - i " X ^ i Jfl | | g ft jfefr ^  (Wang P i ' s new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the I-ching and the Lun-yU). T h i s a r t i c l e f i r s t appeared i n T'u shu c h i k'an fj§) % ^ ft] new s e r i e s 4, no. 1T2(1943) 28-40. I t i s co n t a i n e d i n T'ang Yung-t'ung, Wei-Chin hsUan-hsUeh l u n kao 0^ ^ % ^ (Peking: Jen-min Publ. Co., 1957). T h i s book i s p u b l i s h e d under the pseudonym T'ang Hsi-yU ,>| j. ( T a i p e i : Lu-shan Publ. Co., 1972). F i n a l l y the a r t i c l e was the s u b j e c t o f a f r e e t r a n s l a t i o n by Walter L i e b e n t h a l i n Harvard J o u r n a l o f A s i a n S t u d i e s 10(1947), 124-161. 152. f i v e c l a s s i c s , although these do not survive. Sung Chung was one of those i n charge of that project. He was also an expert i n Yang Hsiung's T'a i hsuan ching. Interest i n t h i s work was probably a by-product of in t e r e s t i n the I ching near the end of the Han dynasty. Interest i n the l a t t e r continued, while T'ai hsuan studies declined after the Han f e l l . For the connection between Wang Su and Wang P i , T'ang refers to Chang Hui-yen % % (d. 1802) an expert i n I ching studies, who said that Wang P i handed down the teachings 45 of Wang Su on the I ching. Apart from Chang Hui-yen's comment however, no other close connection between Wang P i and Wang Su has been found. T'ang further assumes that since Wang Su studied the T'ai hsuan ching with Sung Chung, Wang Su's approach to the I ching was probably influenced by Sung Chung as well. Of scholars who have discussed this problem since T'ang Yung-t'ung's a r t i c l e , only Mou Jun-sun ^ )f^\ ^ has offered serious objections to his thesis. 4*' ^""T'ang Yung-t'ung, "Wang Pi's new interpretation of the I-ching and the Lun y i l , " Walter Liebenthal, t r . , p. 133. 4^See Wang Shao-sheng I | 2 J, , "Ching-chou hsueh-p'ai t u i ytt San-kuo hstieh-shu chih kuan-hsi," -l-H ^ >/k f t % ^ WT 1k- ( T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of the Ching-chou school to the scholarship of the Three Kingdoms) Ch'ung-chi hsueh pao ^ % i \ 4, no. 1 (Nov. 1964) 36-41. Also see Yu Ying shih ^ ^ B4 » "Han Chin chih chi shih chih hsin tzu-chileh yU h s i n ssu-ch'ao" 1% | x -± L iff I | £ U & >^ (The New Self-consciousness of the L i t e r a t i and New Trends of Thought 153. He takes note o f the f a c t t h a t the l i n k between Sung Chung and Wang P i i s tenuous, whereas the l i n k to Wang Ts'an i s c l e a r . He c i t e s s e v e r a l fragments o f Wang Ts'an showing t h a t he was i n t e r -e s t e d i n the thought o f the Lao t z u and the Chuang t z u , and t h a t he had an i d e a o f hidden p r i n c i p l e s i n the I c h i n g . 4 7 Thus i t i s l i k e l y t h a t Wang P i continued a t r a d i t i o n w i t h i n h i s own f a m i l y and not one going to Sung Chung. Wang P i and h i s contemporaries r e j e c t e d commentaries o f the chang chid jj[ type common i n the Han. Why would they r e s p e c t the f i n a l 48 r e d a c t i o n o f these by Sung Chung? Mou Jun-sun does not, however, e x p l a i n how Wang P i a r r i v e d a t h i s method o f a r r a n g i n g the comments on the I ching, a method which T'ang Yung-t'ung claimed d e r i v e d from Wang Su. S t i l l , Wang P i ' s g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of r e l y i n g on the ' ' t r a d i t i o n " , the ten wings o r commentaries, was a w i d e l y h e l d p o s i t i o n o f the Old T e x t - s c h o o l , d a t i n g back to the I ch i n g e d i t i o n o f P i C h i h ^ i n the Former Han dynasty. P i Chih's approach to the I ching was g i v e n wide c i r c u l a t i o n by both Ma Jung and Cheng HsUan. Both Wang Su and 49 Wang P i r e l i e d on i t . The weakness o f T'ang's argument l i e s not so much w i t h the Wang Pi-Wang Su co n n e c t i o n as w i t h t h a t Between the Han and Chin D y n a s t i e s ) , H s i n Ya hstieh pao j $ g£ Jj? ^ , 4, no. 1 (1959). And see Mou Tsung-san $ ^ Wei Chin hsUan-hsileh \ £|? (Mystery L e a r n i n g i n the Wei-Chin p e r i o d ) , (Taichung: Tunghai U n i v e r s i t y , 1962). 47 Mou Jun-sun, Lun Wei Chin i - l a i c h i h ch'ung-shang t'an-p ' i e n c h i ch:'i y i n g - h s i a n g , pp. 11-12. 4 8 I b i d . pp. 18-19. 154. between Wang Su and Sung Chung. Wang Su's p o s i t i o n on the I c h i n g might a l s o be t r a c e d back to Cheng HsUan. Although Wang Su c o n s i d e r e d h i m s e l f an opponent o f Cheng HsUan, they both worked w i t h the O l d Text v e r s i o n s o f the c l a s s i c s , and 50 both t r a c e t h e i r l i n e s back to Ma Jung. Although I s h a l l not go i n t o f u r t h e r d e t a i l s o f the t r a n s m i s s i o n o f ide a s , i t i s r e a s o n a b l y c l e a r t h a t Wang P i owed a gre a t d e a l to the Ching chou group. Along w i t h the t r a n s m i s s i o n o f c e r t a i n views o f the c l a s s i c s and a new a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the Lao t z u and Chuang t z u , the a r t of s k i l l e d c o n v e r s a t i o n i s a l s o r e c o g n i z e d as be g i n n i n g i n t h i s l a t e Han group of s c h o l a r s . T h i s a r t , known as "pure t a l k " , c h ' i n g t'an ^ , and p r a c t i c e d throughout the Wei and Chin d y n a s t i e s , stems from the r i s e o f the consciousness o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n the L a t t e r Han dynasty's waning years. YU Y i n g - s h i h ^ xj£- suggests t h a t i n such a sphere i n which the sharp tongue and qui c k w i t were h i g h l y valued, the w r i t i n g s o f Wang Ch'ung must have been h e l d i n esteem. His l o g i c and sk e p t i c i s m , h i s ingenious t u r n i n g o f commonplace n o t i o n s on t h e i r head, h i s r e a d i n e s s to f o l l o w what h i s mind d i c t a t e d over a g a i n s t r i t u a l and t r a d i t i o n , should have found a sympa-t h e t i c h e a r i n g among the l a t e Han s c h o l a r s . D i d not T s ' a i Yung H*YU Y i n g - s h i h , "Han Chin c h i h c h i s h i h c h i h h s i n tzu-chUeh yU h s i n ssu-ch'ao", p. 91. 5 0 I b i d . pp. 91-92. 155. and Wang Lang both attempt to conceal the book and use i t s e c r e t l y ? 5 1 The w r i t i n g s o f Wang Ch'ung continued to be c i r c u l a t e d e a r l y p a r t o f the century s t i l l had a long v e r s i o n o f the Lun heng i n more than 100 chapters. We a l s o know th a t Ko Hung at the end o f the century had an 85 chapter v e r s i o n which he s t u d i e d c a r e f u l l y . However, the Lun heng i t s e l f r e c e i v e s no d i r e c t n o t i c e from the s c h o l a r s whom I w i l l d i s c u s s i n the remainder o f the t h e s i s . Any i n f l u e n c e t h a t Wang Ch'ung had on t h e i r t h i n k i n g was i n d i r e c t . The f a c t t h a t h i s w r i t i n g s were admired and d i s c u s s e d i n s c h o l a r l y c i r c l e s a few gener-a t i o n s b e f o r e Wang P i p r o v i d e s the b a s i s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h a t i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e . I t remains to be proved t h a t the concepts o f those t h i n k e r s bear some r e l a t i o n s h i p to Wang Ch'ung . WANG PI, JUAN CHI, AND HSIANG HSIU To c l o s e t h i s chapter and to l e a d us up to the end p o i n t of the t h e s i s , namely the thought o f Kuo Hsiang, I would l i k e to d i s c u s s b r i e f l y s e v e r a l t h i n k e r s o f the Wei and E a s t e r n Chin d y n a s t i e s who used the i d e a o f t z u j a n . I w i l l not attempt to analyze thoroughly the thought o f any of them, but I w i l l r e s t r i c t myself to examining the use they make o f t z u j an. Of Wang P i ' s w r i t i n g s , o n l y i n the commentary on the Lao t z u i s the term t z u j a n an important one. I t appears nowhere i n the t h i r d century. We know 51 I b i d . pp. 59-60. 156. i n h i s essay on t h e I chin g , the Chou I lueh l i | 1fi\ and I know o f o n l y two r e f e r e n c e s i n h i s commentary on the I ching. But i n the commentary on the Lao t z u i t appears q u i t e o f t e n and w i t h a f a i r l y c o n s i s t e n t meaning.. At t h i s p o i n t i n , h i s t o r y t z u j a n i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d as an e x p r e s s i o n meaning " n a t u r a l " , but Wang P i remained v e r y c o nscious o f i t s o r i g i n a l meaning, s o - b y - s e l f , and d i d not use t z u j an l i g h t l y as a synonym f o r n a t u r e . In the m a j o r i t y of occurrences i t r e f e r s to the f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h i n g s and conduct o f man as they are i n themselves without o u t s i d e i n t e r f e r e n c e . Wang P i a l s o i m p l i e s t h a t the way t h i n g s f u n c t i o n 52 of themselves i s the most r e l i a b l e . In t h i s , o f course, he depends on the p o s i t i o n developed i n the Huai nan t z u . The c o r r e l a t i o n between wu wei and t z u j a n which t h i s p o s i t i o n i m p l i e s i s a l s o found. I f t h i n g s are best when they are l e f t to themselves, no i n t e r f e r e n c e from e i t h e r heaven or the sage w i l l be a l l o w e d . 5 3 Yet Wang P i ' s i d e a o f t z u j a n extends beyond the co n c e p t i o n o f the Huai nan t z u . F o l l o w i n g the l e a d o f the t e x t o f the Lao t z u i t s e l f , he connects t z u j a n w i t h the Tao. His most lengthy d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i s h i s comment on the d i f f i c u l t passage i n Chapter 25 which I have an a l y z e d i n d e t a i l a l r e a d y . 5 4 On the d i f f i c u l t phrase, "The Tao models i t s e l f on J ^ E o r examples see Lao t z u 5, 20, 27, 28, 29, 37, 42, 45. See e s p e c i a l l y Chapters 27, 29, 37, and 45. 5 3 L a o t z u 5, 29, 37. 54 See above, Chapter one, pp.15-21. 157. t z u j a n , " Wang P i comments i n p a r t : The Tao does not go a g a i n s t t z u j a n and thus o b t a i n s i t s n a t u r e . "To i m i t a t e t z u j a n " means t h a t i n squares ( i t ) i m i t a t e s the square and i n c i r c l e s ( i t ) i m i t a t e s the c i r c l e . There i s no t h i n g i n the s e l f - s o which (the Tao) opposes. Tzu j a n i s a word which does not name and i s an e x p r e s s i o n which exhausts the u l t i m a t e (of r e a l i t y ) . « * %, & © fii & ( J . ^ 6 ftfx ^ 55 Wang P i here understands t z u j a n to be a p r o p e r t y o f t h i n g s . For square t h i n g s the Tao i m i t a t e s t h e i r squareness, t h a t i s , the n a t u r a l c o n d i t i o n o f the t h i n g s . Throughout t h i s paragraph t z u j a n can o n l y mean "the way t h i n g s are o f themselves." He o b v i o u s l y does not read t z u j a n as a p p l y i n g to the Tao i t s e l f , but understands t h a t i t i s the nature o f the Tao to ac c o r d w i t h the way t h i n g s are o f themselves. Thus Wang a l t e r s what I understand to be the o r i g i n a l meaning o f the t e x t by r e a d i n g i t w i t h what i s e s s e n t i a l l y a Han dynasty p e r s p e c t i v e . Ch'ien Mu agrees t h a t the o r i g i n a l meaning o f Chapter 25 was t h a t there i s n o t h i n g h i g h e r than Tao, but he a l s o says t h a t Wang P i ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s o l a t e s t z u j a n as a separate e n t i t y . He suggests t h a t f o r Wang P i there i s a sphere o r way o f t z u j a n , ( t z u j a n c h i h tao a which i s g r e a t e r than and encompasses the way o f heaven, e a r t h , Lao t z u , 25. 158. 56 and man. Chien Mu a l s o a s s e r t s t h a t Wang P i uses t z u j a n as a new term f o r the v o i d , wu as*- but t h i s a s s e r t i o n must be more c l o s e l y examined. We might suppose t h a t "the way t h i n g s are of themselves" i s even s u p e r i o r to the Tao, f o r the Tao must acquiesce i n the squareness and roundness o f t h i n g s . However, th e r e i s another p o s s i b l e way of c o n c e i v i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p , which i s suggested i n the c o n c l u d i n g sentence o f the paragraph quoted above. There Wang P i as s i g n s a s p e c i a l v a l u e to t z u j a n , namely i n e f f a b i l i t y . He i s suggesting t h a t the word t z u j a n p o i n t s to something which i s too g r e a t t o be grasped by human knowledge. Since i n the t e x t of the Lao t z u i t s e l f i t i s the Tao which i s i n e f f a b l e , we might conclude t h a t Tao and t z u j a n mean the same t h i n g f o r Wang P i , but i t would be p r e f e r a b l e to f i n d some conception o f t z u j a n which c o u l d a l s o i n c l u d e the other occurrences o f t z u j a n i n the commentary. I suggest t h a t one way of doing t h i s i s to conceive o f t z u j a n as the p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the manifested Tao, t h a t i s , t h i s r e a l i t y , yu. ^  , w i t h i t s c o n c r e t e o b j e c t s . So conceived, Tzu j a n i s the evidence i n r e a l i t y o f the workings o f the hidden Tao. The i n d i v i d u a l , c o n c r e t e uniqueness o f each t h i n g i n the cosmos e x i s t i n g the way i t does by v i r t u e of i t s own s e l f i s t h a t uniqueness which cannot be grasped by "^Ch'ien Mu , "Kuo Hsiang Chuang t z u chu chung c h i h t z u - j a n i " 5t + $ - % (The Idea o f t z u - j a n i n the Kuo Hsiang commentary on the Chuang t z u ) , Chuang-Lao t'ung p ' i e n ^ ^ \j\ , ( T a i p e i : San-min Book Store, 1971), p. 389. 159. thought o r word. The f a c t t h a t we use t z u j a n as a c o l l e c t i v e term to r e f e r s y m b o l i c a l l y to t h a t m u l t i p l i c i t y of unique m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of Tao means i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s t h a t the word has no s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n t . U n i t y Is found i n Tao, whereas t z u j a n i s a s i n g l e term f o r a m u l t i p l i c i t y . One might say t h a t i t has no r e a l content, because i t has no power to p r e d i c t how a c e r t a i n t h i n g w i l l f u n c t i o n but r e f e r s to the f a c t t h a t i n whatever way a t h i n g f u n c t i o n s , i n s o f a r as i t i s the n a t u r a l e x p r e s s i o n o f the Tao, i t w i l l f u n c t i o n t h a t way o f i t s e l f . T h e r e f o r e , t z u j a n i s a "word which does not name", y e t i s "an e x p r e s s i o n which exhausts the u l t i m a t e (of r e a l i t y ) " . A problem w i t h t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n s t i l l remains, however. How does Wang P i use the word " u l t i m a t e " , c h i TJ^I, ? I t i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h wu , the unchanging base or r o o t of r e a l i t y , or does i t belong .to .yu 7 ^ , the m a n i f e s t e d r e a l i t y ? I suggest t h a t he r e s e r v e s " u l t i m a t e " f o r the most important p o i n t i n r e a l i t y , and c a l l s non-being, wu, the s u p e r - u l t i m a t e or supreme u l t i m a t e . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g passage. At a c e r t a i n p o i n t i n d i s c u s s i n g the numbers of heaven and e a r t h , he notes t h a t although 50 i s the number of heaven and e a r t h , o n l y 49 numbers are used. One i s the b a s i s o f the other numbers. Then he makes the f o l l o w i n g d i s t i n c t i o n : Thus t h i s (oneness) c o n s t i t u t e s the super-u l t i m a t e o f the process of change; 49 c o n s t i t u t e s the u l t i m a t e of numbers. Non-being cannot be m a n i f e s t through non-being; t h i s must be done by means o f being. T h e r e f o r e , i t i s always through the u l t i m a t e of e x i s t i n g t h i n g s t h a t the o r i g i n from which these t h i n g s come ( i . e . oneness or non-being) must be made ma n i f e s t . 160. & f 1 * * & « L . * i " * £ , |k 1 * S L *L>. A * -1 ^ A ^  afl , > g) >^ ^ . 4< $ 7^ ^ ^ 1 *X HJi 0 * ^ t, H M * - * «L. 57 Th i s makes i t v e r y c l e a r t h a t one should not i d e n t i f y non-being w i t h the u l t i m a t e , which may a l s o be thought o f as the l i m i t , but o n l y w i t h the su p e r - u l t i m a t e , t a c h i -fo pj^ jk , or supreme u l t i m a t e , t ' a i c h i -fa o f the I-ching i t s e l f . Hence i t i s v e r y c o n s i s t e n t to a s c r i b e t z u j a n to the m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f the Tao and not i d e n t i f y i t e i t h e r w i t h wu o r the Tao i t s e l f . On the other hand, Wang P i i s not as c o n s i s t e n t as I would l i k e him to be. He a l s o i d e n t i f i e s wu w i t h the u l t i m a t e , c h i /fjjj . However, I tend to r e l y on the language o f the passage above i n which Wang's a t t e n t i o n i s fo c u s s e d on the c o n t r a s t between c h i and t a c h i r a t h e r than on passages i n which c h i i s mentioned i n pa s s i n g . Of course, the phrase i n which t z u j a n i s d e s c r i b e d as an " e x p r e s s i o n which exhausts the u l t i m a t e " i s j u s t such a pa s s i n g mention. N e v e r t h e l e s s , I r e l a t e t h i s sense o f " u l t i m a t e " to the above quote because i t enables us to a r r i v e a t a g e n e r a l concept of t z u j an which i n c l u d e s most o f i t s occurrences. 5 7 C h o u i Wang Han chu g | 3, > £ (Wang P i and Han Po's commentary on the I c h i n g ) , (Ssu-pu p e i yao ed.) 7.6b. The t r a n s l a t i o n here i s t h a t o f Derk Bodde, m o d i f i e d , i n Fung Yu-lan, H i s t o r y , I I , p. 182. CO See Lao t z u , 6. However, another example i n which c h i ^r B^t and t z u j a n are l o o s e l y connected i n the world o f e x i s t i n g t h i n g s appears i n Wang P i ' s commentary on the I-ching, 1.6a. 161. Wang's discussion of the ultimate also illuminates very c l e a r l y the importance of tzu jan as a means of knowledge of the Tao, for i t i s through the ultimate of e x i s t i n g things that the Tao can be made known. Tzu jan as the epistemological intermediary between man and the Tao was already present i n the Huai nan tzu, but only i n the general sense that i t could be r e l i e d on for knowledge. Here a very s p e c i f i c p o sition i n the hierarchy of being i s assigned to tzu jan, which gives p a r t i c u l a r philosophical expression to what began as a r e l i g i o u s affirmation of r e l i a b i l i t y . The stage for t h i s p a r t i c u l a r philosophical expression was set, I believe, by Wang Ch'ung. Since c h ' i was the basic s t u f f of r e a l i t y for Wang Ch'ung, tzu j an was a key element i n under-standing the processes of r e a l i t y . For Wang P i , there i s a basis beyond this world of existing things, but within this world of exis t i n g things, tzu jan i s that which points beyond to the super-ultimate. Although Wang P i does not seem to be s p e c i f i c a l l y aware of Wang Ch'ung's pos i t i o n , h i s thought r e f l e c t s the place given to tzu jan. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n also throws l i g h t on other passages i n which tzu jan seems to be applied d i r e c t l y to the Tao. In Chapter 23 Wang writes that the words which describe the Tao have no flavor and cannot be seen or heard. He concludes that, .. . f l a v o r l e s s words, not worth l i s t e n i n g to, are the perfect words, so of themselves. $ °A * L l i i l / > i i * ; i l U , 5 9 Lao tzu, 23. 162. I f we read t z u j a n as Wang uses i t i n Chapter 25, above, there i s no d i f f i c u l t y o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , even though, read i n i s o l a t i o n , t h i s sentence v i r t u a l l y equates t z u j a n w i t h the Tao. I f t z u  j a n i s the key to understanding the Tao, the " p e r f e c t words" are words which stand a t the boundary o f r e a l i t y and p o i n t to the Tao. The words r e f e r r i n g to the Tao are not themselves the Tao, but by v i r t u e o f being t z u j a n are a b l e to r e f e r to the Tao and thus p r o v i d e t h a t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l i n k between e x i s t e n t r e a l i t y and the Tao. There are three cases i n which the phrase t z u j an c h i h tao '^ L o c c u r s . ^ In a l l three o f these cases i t i s best to understand t z u j a n as a c o l l e c t i v e term f o r n a t u r a l o b j e c t s / i n c l u d i n g man, and read the phrase as "the way o f n a t u r a l t h i n g s " o r "the way of nature". In none o f these cases can the term tao be read as the e t e r n a l , unchanging Tao. Ch'ien Mu a l s o draws our a t t e n t i o n to the r e l a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e , l i , and t z u j a n i n Wang P i ' s w r i t i n g s . He suggests 61 t h a t Wang P i c o n s i d e r s the p e r f e c t p r i n c i p l e to be t z u j a n . The o n l y c l o s e l i n k i n g o f these two concepts occurs i n Lao t z u , Chapter 42. There Wang P i says: I (the sage) do not f o r c e people to f o l l o w something, but I use the way something i s o f i t s e l f i n order to p o i n t out i t s t r u e p r i n c i p l e . F o l l o w i n g i t w i l l s u r e l y b r i n g f o r t u n e and going a g a i n s t i t w i l l s u r e l y b r i n g m i s f o r t u n e . #*' n % 1*. A tn JL e., *n Ifl * i « ^ % 6 0 L a o t z u , 15, 17 and 22, 163. C l e a r l y , t z u j a n i s not e q u i v a l e n t to the p e r f e c t p r i n c i p l e but i s something used to p o i n t out the p r i n c i p l e . I t i s a means o f g a i n i n g knowledge about t r u e p r i n c i p l e but not n e c e s s a r i l y the tr u e p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f . Tzu j a n may not be conceived too a b s t r a c t l y here. I t stands somewhat i n o p p o s i t i o n to f o r c i n g the s i t u a t i o n , s h i h , although not e x a c t l y i n p a r a l l e l c o n s t r u c t i o n . The sage i s not t a k i n g advantage o f some realm of a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e but o f the n a t u r a l course o f events i n 63 order to uncover the t r u e p r i n c i p l e o f the s i t u a t i o n . A contemporary o f Wang P i , Hsia-hou HsUan |^ f i ^ i j (A.D. 209-253) may have gone f u r t h e r than Wang P i i n the process o f making t z u j a n a separate realm o r e n t i t y . A fragment o f h i s w r i t i n g i s p r e s e r v e d i n Chang Chan's 31*. >% commentary on the L i e h t z u ~f\\' Heaven and e a r t h r o t a t e a c c o r d i n g to t z u j a n . The sage f u n c t i o n s a c c o r d i n g to t z u j a n . Tzu  j a n i s the Tao. 64 ^ C h ' i e n Mu, "Kuo Hsiang Chuang t z u chu chung c h i h t z u - j a n i " , p. 390. 6 2 L a o t z u , 42. 6 3 For a d i s c u s s i o n o f the concept o f l i , a l s o see Ch'ien Mu, "Wang P i Kuo Hsiang chu I Lao Chuang yung l i t z u tiao-lu"£. & A ^ > Chuang Lao t'ung p ' i e n , 141-178, and W i n g - t s i t Ch'an, "The E v o l u t i o n o f the Neo-Confucian Concept l i as P r i n c i p l e , "Ch'ing hua hsUeh pao j i 3jp y (Tsing-hua J o u r n a l o f Chinese S t u d i e s ) n.s. 4, no. 2 (1964) 123-149. 164. Because of the fragmentary nature of th i s quote, we cannot discern p r e c i s e l y what Hsia-hou HsUan understood by the word tzu jan. The obvious interpretation i s to assume that he thinks tzu jan i s an abstract p r i n c i p l e equivalent to the Tao. Heaven, earth, and the sage have some kind of access to t h i s p r i n c i p l e , and they function i n accordance with i t . I t i s i n fact, then, nothing but another name f o r the Tao. However, such an interpretation represents a sharp break with the t r a d i t i o n a l use of tzu j an. The only precedent seems to be that of the Hsiang erh commentary. Not even Wang Pi's under-standing that tzu jan i s the ultimate point of being r e f e r r i n g to the Tao can be grafted onto th i s bald statement that the Tao and tzu jan are i n some sense the same. However, Hsia-hou HsUan's concept i s found i n an elaborated form i n the thought of his contemporary, Juan Chi (A.D. 210-263). Juan Chi uses tzu jan i n a way that suggests i t i s an abstract power. In a short essay t i t l e d "On understanding Chuang t z u " ^ 5 he raises tzu jan to the place of cosmic o r i g i n : Lieh tzu chu \ ^ (The Lieh tzu with commentary) 4.5a-b. 6 5 J u a n Chi Pfu jjj , TVa Chuang lun ^  . The text may be found i n Yen K'o-chUnj|^ , Ch' Uan San-kuo wen ^ ^ > chUan 45. I t i s also reproduced i n Mou Tsung-san, Ts'ai hsing yU hsUan l i 4£- 1^ % 3% (T'aichung, Taiwan: Tunghai University, 1962), pp. 297-302. A complete tra n s l a t i o n and analysis of the text i s given by Donald Holzman, Poetry and P o l i t i c s : the L i f e and Works of Juan Chi, A.D. 210-263, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 99-109. 165. Heaven and e a r t h were produced by t z u j a n ; the t e n thousand t h i n g s were produced by heaven and e a r t h . Tzu j a n has n o t h i n g o u t s i d e i t and t h e r e f o r e heaven and e a r t h took t h e i r names from i t . Heaven and e a r t h have something w i t h i n them; t h e r e f o r e the ten thousand beings can be produced there. F a c i n g the T i m l t i e s s n e s s o f the one ( t h a t i s , t z u j a n ) , who c o u l d say there were d i f f e r e n c e s i n i t ? F a c i n g the content o f the o t h e r ( t h a t i s , heaven and e a r t h ) , who c o u l d say there were d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s i n i t ? % *t iik.t% * 1 o % \ % 1*1 tft \\ n t. 66 I t i s q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e to read t z u j a n i n t h i s paragraph as b e i n g anything o t h e r than a seperate e n t i t y . I t i s c l e a r l y a power beyond heaven and e a r t h which produces them. Juan C h i charac-t e r i z e s i t by an i d e a s i m i l a r to t h a t found i n the Chuang t z u , the i d e a o f being without l i m i t . In t h i s case Juan C h i uses the e x p r e s s i o n wu-wai p\. , having n o t h i n g o u t s i d e i t . ^ 7 The same con n e c t i o n r e - o c c u r s a l i t t l e l a t e r i n the essay, when he compares the ideas o f Chuang t z u and the s i x c l a s s i c s . The former d i s c u s s e s the h i g h e s t i d e a s , w h i l e the l a t t e r have o n l y t e a c h i n g about a l l o t t e d s o c i a l p o s i t i o n s . R e f e r r i n g to the ideas of Chuang t z u , he says, Juan C h i , T'a chuang l u n , i n Mou Tsung-san, T s ' a i h s i n g  yii hsiian l i , p. 298. The t r a n s l a t i o n here i s t h a t o f Holzman, Po e t r y and P o l i t i c s , p. 104, s l i g h t l y m o d i f i e d . Holzman notes t h a t the e x p r e s s i o n wu wai £r p\. i s t h a t of Hui Shih ,tL » as recorded i n the Chuang t z u , Chapter 33. ^ 7See above, Chapter 1, pp. 13, 4 5 . 166. When one approaches something g r e a t , then he may go as f a r as p o s s i b l e and f i n d n o t h i n g beyond i t . . . H e who f o l l o w s t z u j a n and a s s i m i l a t e s h i s nature to t h a t o f heaven and e a r t h t a l k s about the d i s t a n t and v a s t . S t i l l Juan C h i r e t a i n s most of the h i s t o r i c a l sense o f the ex p r e s s i o n t z u j a n . T h e way o f t z u j a n and the p r i n c i p l e o f t z u j a n are c o n t r a s t e d to man's self-adornment, h i s a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n o f r i g h t and wrong, h i s f e a r o f death and l o v e o f l i f e . Tzu j a n i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the calm mountain and the depths o f the v a l l e y s , the sun and moon i n t h e i r courses, and even the mutual r e l a t i o n s o f f a t h e r and son, r u l e r and s u b j e c t . Juan C h i thus r e t a i n s the common meaning of t z u j an, namely, the course o r p a t t e r n s o f things l e f t to themselves without i n t e r f e r e n c e by man, and he r e t a i n s the ideas o f f o l l o w i n g and r e l y i n g on t z u j a n . Juan C h i i s the f i r s t to d e s c r i b e t z u j a n as l i m i t l e s s . But i t may be b e s t to say t h a t n e i t h e r he nor Hsia-hou HsUan t r u l y i d e n t i f i e d t z u j a n w i t h the Tao as such. Although i t may r e p l a c e the Tao i n t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n as the r e l i a b l e b a s i s o f r e a l i t y , i t i s not, as Donald Holzman has a l r e a d y p o i n t e d out, 69 simply a new term f o r Tao. I t i s not a term f o r the a b s o l u t e Juan C h i , T'a Chuang l u n i n Mou Tsung-san, T s ' a i h s i n g  yU hsUan l i , p. 299. See Holzman, Po e t r y and P o l i t i c s , p. 105. Along w i t h Holzman, I f o l l o w the v a r i a n t r e a d i n g o f h s i n g tfit, f o r chu ^ ^ D o n a l d Holzman, Po e t r y and P o l i t i c s , p. 100. u n i t y a t the f o u n d a t i o n o f the r e l a t i v e m u l t i p l i c i t y of t h i s world. The p r e v i o u s development o f the term i m p l i e d an a f f i r m a t i o n o f the m u l t i p l i c i t y of the world as having some v a l u e i n i t s e l f . Thus, to e x a l t t z u j a n i s some way or other always meant an acceptance o f the " n a t u r a l " s i d e of f a c t u a l r e a l i t y . T h e r e f o r e a f t e r the opening d e f i n i t i o n of t z u j a n , quoted above, Juan Chi continues by d e s c r i b i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n o f v a r i o u s p a r t s of the cosmos, w i t h a u n i t y running through them a l l . He does not reduce them to a u n i t y , but says they are " o f themselves one body" ( — #f ) • The whole process i s "the r i s e and f a l l o f a s i n g l e v i t a l b r eath, transformed but not harmed" ( ~~% & i , 1'^  ^ ^ 11 ) - 7 ° T h e u n i t Y i s n o t something i n which d i f f e r e n c e s are d i s s o l v e d , but i s a p e r v a s i v e t h r e a d through r e a l i t y i n which m u l t i p l i c i t y i s p r e s e r v e d . Holzman suggests t h i s i s e x p l i c i t i n the phrase "one body".7"*" Whether Juan C h i was i n any way i n f l u e n c e d by the t h i n k i n g o f the p o p u l a r T a o i s t movements i s d i f f i c u l t to say. For Chang Lu, the author of the Hsiang erh commentary, t z u j a n was i n some way an a l t e r n a t e name f o r the Tao, but one which suggested o n l y a f a c e t o f the Tao. I f Juan Chi i s to be thought of as c o n t i n u i n g t h a t t r a d i t i o n , then he i s a s k e p t i c , f o r he seems to doubt that there i s anything beyond the f a c e t i t s e l f . For Chang Lu knowing t z u j a n i s a way to know the Tao, but f o r Juan 7 0 J u a n C h i , Tj_a Chuang. l u n i n Mou Tsung-san, T s ' a i h s i n g ZM hsUan l i , p. 298. Holzman, Poetry and P o l i t i c s , p 104-105 Holzman, Poetry and P o l i t i c s , p. 101. 168. C h i knowing t z u j a n i s an end i n i t s e l f . Juan Chi a l s o extends the theme of the r e l i a b i l i t y o f t z u  j a n one step f u r t h e r by making i t u l t i m a t e l y r e l i a b l e . As we saw, Wang P i came q u i t e c l o s e to t h i s concept, and a t t h a t p o i n t i n h i s t o r y i t was not a g r e a t leap of thought to take. The concept o f t z u j a n i n the Han dynasty had been s u f f i c i e n t l y e l e v a t e d so t h a t i t c o u l d f u n c t i o n as a b a s i c p r i n c i p l e i n systematic thought. For these post-Han t h i n k e r s , the search f o r a new source o f order e a s i l y moved i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . As a f i n a l p r i n c i p l e o f n a t u r a l processes, t z u j a n became a key to the order o f u n i v e r s e and the conduct of men's l i v e s . F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to s i n g l e out Hsiang H s i u (tp ^ (ca. 225-ca. 30.0)a younger contemporary o f Juan C h i . Hsiang H s i u i s famous as one o f the seven worthies o f the bamboo grove, and i s known p a r t i c u l a r l y as a f r i e n d o f H s i K'ang (223-262). Hsiang wrote a commentary on the Chuang t z u , one which Kuo Hsiang i s accused of h e a v i l y p l a g i a r i z i n g . The a c c u s a t i o n of p l a g i a r i s m was f i r s t made i n the• Shih shuo h s i n y_U & %*rL %f[ k i ' 7 2 a n d repeated i n the Chin shu *| |L I t i s s a i d t h a t Kuo Hsiang saw Hsiang Hsiu's commentary and i n c o r p o r a t e d most o f i t i n the commentary under h i s own name. L a t e r a copy i n the p o s s e s s i o n of Hsiang Hsiu's son came to l i g h t and was p u b l i s h e d , thus supposedly p r o v i n g the p l a g i a r i s m 7 2 L i u I - c h ' i n g % \ |> ^ ,, Shih shuo h s i n yii -tti \ % £ff % % , wen-hsUeh p ' i e n £ j g r shang c h i h h s i a . 1 0 a - l l b . 169. of Kuo Hsiang. These reports were not seriously challenged u n t i l modern times, although there was always enough doubt about i t that Kuo Hsiang 1s name remained attached to the commentary. Only fragments of the Hsiang Hsiu commentary survive, found quoted i n the commentary of Chang Chan on the Lieh tzu, written sometime i n the mid-fourth century and i n Lu Te-ming's ^ a$ Ching t i e n shih wen & f ^ * f ± written i n 583. Several c o l l a t i o n s of the Hsiang Hsiu fragments have been made and compared with si m i l a r or i d e n t i c a l passages i n Kuo Hsiang 1s Commentary. Most modern scholars are agreed that although Kuo Hsiang had access to some notes and possibly a rough commentary of Hsiang Hsiu, Kuo s t i l l exhibited a great deal of his own thought. The differences between the two are generally thought to be too great to c a l l Kuo's use of Hsiang Hsiu an 73 outright plagiarism. Ch'ien Mu asserts that the fragments of Hsiang Hsiu's commentary show that his idea of tzu jan was markedly d i f f e r e n t / J F o r a summary of the s c h o l a r s h i p on t h i s q u e s t i o n see Huang Chin-hung ^ ^ , "Kuan-ytt Chuang t z u Hsiang H s i u chu yu Kuo Hsiang chu,"f|f[ } f i $ * ft % ^ %} % & ®n the Chuang t z u commentaries of Hsiang H s i u and Kuo Hsiang), Tan-chiang hsUeh-pao } v£ JJ. $sfr 9 (Nov. 1970) 17-32. Huang h i m s e l f argues t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l assessment was c o r r e c t and t h a t Kuo Hsiang c o n t r i b u t e d n o t h i n g new. A second summary w i t h g r e a t e r emphasis on Japanese s c h o l a r s h i p may be found i n Shin Un Choi, Kuo Hsiang ^ , a R a t i o n a l T a o i s t (Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota, 1976). 170. from t h a t o f Kuo Hsiang. He groups Hsiang H s i u together w i t h Wang P i , Ho Yen, and Hsia-hou HsUan i n t h a t he b e l i e v e s a l l understood t z u j an as a realm i n i t s e l f which produces a l l the c r e a t u r e s o f r e a l i t y . We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t i n Wang P i ' s case t h i s a s s e r t i o n i s unfounded. For Hsia-hou HsUan, Ch'ien Mu based h i s a s s e r t i o n on the fragment o f t e x t I quoted above. We have a l s o found a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n however i n Juan Ch i , whom Ch'ien Mu does not mention. Shin Un Choi i n a r e c e n t d i s s e r t a t i o n d e a l i n g w i t h the thought o f Kuo Hsiang f o l l o w s Ch'ien Mu's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 7 4 T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e s t s e s s e n t i a l l y on two passages, both o f which are fragments quoted i n Chang Chan's commentary. The more important one occurs i n the T' i e r i tuan jr^ chapter o f the L i e h t z u . The main t e x t says t h a t t h a t which g i v e s l i f e to t h i n g s and changes t h i n g s i s n e i t h e r l i v i n g nor changing. T h i s p o s i t i o n i s b a s i c a l l y t h a t o f Wang P i and Ho Yen i n which Being, yu. ^  , i s thought to be produced by Non-being, wu . In the c o n c l u s i o n of the argument, the L i e h  t z u says, T h e r e f o r e t h a t which g i v e s b i r t h to th i n g s i s not a l i v e and t h a t which changes t h i n g s does not change. 75 7 4 C h ' i e n Mu, "Kuo Hsiang Chuang t z u chu chung c h i h t z u j a n i " , p. 393. Shin Un Choi, Kuo Hsiang pp. 16-17. 7 5 L i e h t z u , 1.2b. 171. Chang Chan remarks f i r s t t h a t t h i s sentence a l s o appears i n the Chuang t z u . I t i s not i n the extant t e x t , which i s Kuo Hsiang's 7 fi e d i t i o n , but a p p a r e n t l y i t was i n Hsiang Hsiu's t e x t . Chang Chan then quotes the comment of Hsiang H s i u a t t h a t p o i n t as f o l l o w s : I f my l i f e i s not produced by something, then l i f e merely produces i t s e l f . How c o u l d t h a t which produces l i f e be a thing? (There i s no such thing) and t h e r e f o r e i t i s not a l i v e . I f my changing i s not changed by something then the changing merely changes i t s e l f . How c o u l d t h a t which causes the changing be a thing? There i s no such t h i n g , and t h e r e f o r e i t does not change. I f that which g i v e s l i f e to t h i n g s i s a l s o a l i v e , and t h a t which changes t h i n g s a l s o changes, then i t must change r i g h t along w i t h t h i n g s . Then how i s i t d i f f e r e n t from thi n g s ? T h i s makes i t c l e a r t h a t o n l y something n e i t h e r a l i v e nor changeable i s a b l e to be the r o o t of l i f e and change. % ifLnL, H % m i # 4 , * J l j i « , I % n *s i eg* sto % x% \ M L at, A% w k Hit, «•! fcfi f t * . fcft$,.£ & *K x ft.3 • # H± « 4 * * t l » £ frit, 77 I t i s s i m i l a r to Chuang t z u , Chap. 6, 3.7b. "That which ends l i f e i s not dead; t h a t which produces l i f e i s not a l i v e . " 7' 7L'ieh t z u , 1.2b. There appear to be a few t e x t u a l problems i n t h i s paragraph. Wang Shu-min J , ^ J>£ i n h i s L i e h t z u pu  cheng JE (The L i e h t z u , a m p l i f i e d and c o r r e c t e d ) , (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1948) suggests t h a t the th r e e c h a r a c t e r s wu wu yeh *Jr^  be added b e f o r e the phrase 1 7 2 . As I try to follow the l o g i c of Hsiang Hsiu's comment, I think the f i r s t problem arises with the phrase, "then l i f e merely produces i t s e l f " ( ). On the face of things, this seems to c o n f l i c t with his references to "that which produces things" ( ). I f things are produced of themselves, i s there s t i l l some producer or not? Hsiang Hsiu seems to imply there i s , for he sets down necessary conditions for such a producer. It cannot be a thing, nor can i t be a l i v e or change. The question then seems to be--does he i n fact assert that there i s such a producer or does he lay down conditions for such a producer which make i t impossible for i t to exist? The main text of the Lieh tzu asserts the existence of such a producer, and Hsiang's comment does not e x p l i c i t l y contradict i t . Although Hsiang was commenting on a ku pu sheng yeh ^. (fcL i n order to be p a r a l l e l with the sentence below, namely fe^ ^ (fc>, 7$. it, . Since these characters answer a r h e t o r i c a l question, t h e i r addition merely smooths out the reading. Also on the grounds of p a r a l l e l i s m , I suggest that the phrase f e i wu chih so sheng 4t % ^ ftf 4-be read as f e i wu chih so sheng %ty ^ffitL. • I n addition to the fact that this substitute i s p a r a l l e l to the phrase f e i  wu chih so hua ^| r*/f "fK-> > t n e l o g i c of the argument is better s a t i s f i e d with this substitution, since the conclusion i s that there i s no thing which produces l i f e . Further references to "my_ producing my own l i f e " do not occur. Unfortunately, I have found no previous commentator who supports me on th i s point. Shin Un Choi misread the l a s t sentence, substituting the character t' i e n ^ for the character fu , and thereby draws the erroneous conclusion that Hsiang Hsiu regards Nature or 173. d i f f e r e n t t e x t at a p o i n t where we do not know the context, i t s t i l l seems i m p o s s i b l e to escape the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Hsiang H s i u a l s o a f f i r m e d the e x i s t e n c e of the producer o f l i f e . Indeed i t would be q u i t e r a d i c a l i f he were to deny i t . Besides the theory o f h i s contemporaries about wu producing yu, the Chuang t z u i t s e l f speaks o f the c r e a t o r , tsao wu che ^ 78 But when Hsiang i n t r o d u c e s the i d e a of s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n , 79 he i n t r o d u c e s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I suggest t h a t the c o n f l i c t between s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n and the Great Producer must be allowed to stand, to be r e s o l v e d o n l y i n the thought o f Kuo Hsiang. As I w i l l show i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, Kuo Hsiang r e l a t e s the problem o f s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n to t z u j an, w h i l e denying the e x i s t e n c e of a producer. In the extant Hsiang H s i u fragments there i s o n l y t h i s i n c hoate e x p r e s s i o n of an idea which becomes a major theme i n Kuo Hsiang. The a f f i r m a t i o n of a n o n - l i v i n g , non-changing a b s o l u t e at the base o f r e a l i t y i s coupled by Ch'ien Mu w i t h a second passage. There Hsiang H s i u i s r e c o r d e d as saying, Things merely having form and shape l i k e t h i s are not good enough to be taken as p r i o r b e i n g s . Only t z u j a n may be taken as t h a t which i s p r i o r . ft jk ^ * , * A. *K *® * . fc-*@ % % 'ftl 6 % .e. 80 Heaven as t h a t n o n - l i v i n g and unchanging e n t i t y which i s the r o o t ' o f l i f e and change. See Shin, Kuo Hsiang p. 17 and Chap. I n . 32. 78 Chuang t z u , Chap. 6, 3.8b, e t . a l . 174. Both Ch'ien Mu and Shin Un Choi take t h i s as evidence t h a t t z u j a n c o n s t i t u t e d some realm o f being p r i o r to the worl d of t h i n g s , and t h a t i t probably produced them, as was a s s e r t e d , f o r example, by Juan C h i . Kuo Hsiang has a comment i d e n t i c a l w i t h the f i r s t sentence, but s i g n i f i c a n t l y omits the second sentence. We w i l l see t h a t i n Kuo Hsiang t h i s i d e a t h a t no t h i n g can precede another t h i n g i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to h i s i d e a of s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n . I t i s l i k e l y t h a t p r o d u c t i o n and temporal p r i o r i t y are a l s o connected i n Hsiang Hsiu's thought. Ch'ien Mu's c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Hsiang H s i u i s here making t z u j an the c r e a t o r o f t h i n g s may be c o r r e c t . However, I t h i n k t h i s i s an undeveloped concept i n Hsiang Hsiu, perhaps u n c r i t i c a l l y borrowed from Juan C h i or others dependent on Juan C h i . T h i s use o f t z u j an i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s use o f t z u j a n e l s e -where . In h i s o n l y s u r v i v i n g essay, " O b j e c t i o n s to (H s i K'ang's) "Nur t u r i n g L i f e " Nan yang sheng l u n 1 ^ , Hsiang H s i u uses t z u j a n f i v e times. Donald Holzman i n t e r p r e t s 81 a l l of these cases as " n a t u r a l " . I b e l i e v e he i s c o r r e c t , but i t must be emphasized t h a t " n a t u r a l " i s a powerful i d e a . /ySee my e a r l i e r remarks on t h i s problem i n Chapter 2, pp. 121-123. 8 Q L i e h t z u , 2.5b. QI O J-Donald Holzman, La V i e et l a Pensee de H i K'ang (223-262  Ap. J.C.), (Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1957) pp. 92-96. The Chinese t e x t o f the essay may be found on pp. 162-164. 175. In each of these f i v e occurrences i t i s the end of the argument. If something i s natural, who can argue with i t ? Hsiang Hsiu describes human feelings, the good effects of eating grain, and eating when hungry as tzu jan, and even refers to the natural order of heaven, t' ieri 11 tzu jan ^ j | L % This l a s t case i n p a r t i c u l a r shows that tzu j an i s connected to a p r i n c i p l e of order i n r e a l i t y ; i t i s above human a c t i v i t y . Hsiang notes that even the three great kings could not change i t . But although t h i s concept of tzu jan i s a l o f t y one, there i s no reason to assume that tzu j an constitutes an independent entity. I t i s the p r i n c i p l e s of heaven which are unchangeable; tzu j an characterizes these and provides the assurance that the p r i n c i p l e s are r e l i a b l e . The remnants of Hsiang Hsiu's writing a l l show a high value placed on the concept of tzu j an, but also contained contradictory elements. I t i s l i k e l y that his thought stimu-lated the thought of Kuo Hsiang but also presented him with d i f f i c u l t i e s which had to be resolved. How successful Kuo was w i l l be discussed i n the following chapter. 176. CHAPTER IV., KUO HSIANG BIOGRAPHY AND METHOD We are t o l d i n h i s biography t h a t Kuo Hsiang d i s p l a y e d t a l e n t a l r e a d y as a youth, and he was fond of Lao-Chuang s t u d i e s . He was known i n h i g h s o c i a l c i r c l e s , although he d i d not take a h i g h post, p r e f e r r i n g to spend h i s time w i t h l i t e r a t u r e . He d i d , however, serve as a p a l a c e attendant and as a Grand Tutor to P r i n c e YUeh of Tung-hai, t h a t i s , Ssu-ma YUeh 51 Sij (d. 3 1 1 ) . 1 Kuo d i e d i n A.D. 312. 2 The biography of Hsiang H s i u t e l l s us t h a t Kuo Hsiang's r e v i s i o n and expansion of Hsiang Hsiu's commentary took p l a c e i n the r e i g n of Emperor Hui % , 290-306. 3 I have s e v e r a l times i n the course of t h i s t h e s i s made the assumption t h a t one can i s o l a t e the thought of a commentary from t h a t of the t e x t on which i t comments. I do not t h i n k t h i s assumption needs to be v i g o r o u s l y defended. N a t u r a l l y , one must be a l e r t f o r cases i n which the commentator merely re-phrases the p r i n c i p a l t e x t without a c t u a l l y a r t i c u l a t i n g concepts of h i s own. Much of Kuo Hsiang's commentary does p r e c i s e l y t h a t . He saw h i m s e l f , a f t e r a l l , as an e x p l a i n e r o f Chuang t z u . H i s i s the e a r l i e s t extant commentary on the Chuang t z u and i s s t i l l v a l u a b l e f o r i t s a s s i s t a n c e i n under-standing the Chuang t z u . But the commentary a l s o has been ''"Ssu-ma YUeh e v e n t u a l l y became the power behind the throne i n 303 and i n 306 emerged v i c t o r i o u s i n the war of the e i g h t p r i n c e s . See h i s b i o g r a p h i c a l sketch i n A New Account of T a l e s of the World, R i c h a r d Mather, t r . , (Minneapolis: U n i v e r s i t y of r e c o g n i z e d as a system of thought i n i t s e l f . I t c o n t a i n s long d i s c u s s i o n s r e l e v a n t o n l y to i t s own i n t e r n a l system. He even proceeds somewhat from t o p i c to t o p i c as he works through the Chuang t z u , so t h a t r e f e r e n c e s to a c e r t a i n concept tend to be grouped together i n a few chapters. Kuo Hsiang has r e c e i v e d a f a i r amount of s c h o l a r l y a t t e n t i o n although a d e f i n i t i v e study has not y e t been w r i t t e n . The a r t i c l by Ch'ien Mu and the d i s s e r t a t i o n by S h i n Un Choi, to which I have a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d , focus on the thought o f Kuo Hsiang and cover to some degree the problem of t z u j a n . Feng Yu-lan t r a n s -l a t e d a few fragments o f the Kuo Hsiang commentary i n h i s t r a n s -l a t i o n of the Chuang t z u and then devoted an e n t i r e chapter to 4 the commentary i n A H i s t o r y of Chinese Philosophy. Hou Wai-lu, a f t e r r e - a s s e r t i n g the a u t h o r s h i p of Hsiang Hsiu, devotes c o n s i d e r a b l e space i n h i s h i s t o r y to "Hsiang Hsiu's commentary".^ T'ang Yung-t'ung, Jung Chao-tsu, and Mou Tsung-san have a l s o i n c l u d e d i t i n t h e i r s t u d i e s . Gn the Japanese s i d e , Nakajima Ryuzo has more r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a g e n e r a l study, w h i l e a v e r y good study was done e a r l i e r by S e k i Masao. 7 Fragments o f Minnesota Press, 1976) p. 571. J C h l r i shu, 49.9a-b. 4 Fung Yu-lan, Chuang t z u : New S e l e c t e d T r a n s l a t i o n w i t h an E x p o s i t i o n of the P h i l o s o p h y o f Kuo Hsiang (Shanghai, 1933 and New York: Paragon Book R e p r i n t Co., 1964) and H i s t o r y , I I , pp. 205-236. 50.5a. Hou Wai-lu " f ^ et . a l . Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang 178. the commentary are translated i n the two sources by Fung Yu-lan o and i n Wing-tsit Gh'an's A Sourcebook of 'Chine'se' Philosophy. A complete tra n s l a t i o n and grammatical study of Chapter One was 9 made by Birthe Arendrup. Kuo Hsiang has several concepts which I have not discussed previously, and he has his own peculiar understanding of some well-known ideas. I s h a l l t r y to assemble the key passages for each of several major concepts. Since several of these passages are relevant to more than one topic, I w i l l number them according to the order i n which I c i t e them, so that I may refe r back to 10 my t r a n s l a t i o n of a passage by that number. t'ung shih ^ 5*- L§ ^  (A Comprehensive History of Chinese Thought) (Peking: Jen min Publ. Co., 1957), v o l . I l l , Chap. 6, pp. 197-262. T'ang Yung-t'ung, Wei Chin hsUan-hsueh lun kao. Jung Cttao-tsu^ £JS. Wei Chin te tzu jan chu-i ?§ &t] fa f £i (Wei-Chin Naturalism), Taipei: Commercial Press, 1966 (postfaee dated 1934). Mou Tsung-san, T s ' a l hsing yU hsuan l i . 7Nakajima Ryuzo 4 H M , "Ko So no shiso n i t s u i t e " -jfjS ^  (H £U l R "> v (On the Thought of Kuo Hsiang) Shukan Toyogaku ife ^ '1 24(1970), 43-60. Seki Masao jE ^ [5 , "Ko So no Sh5shi shu n i mirareru j i z e n sono ta.". ^jb | , <f) pl 5- [~ K y -H ? $ f£ I <T) f t (Tzu jan and other concepts i n Kuo Hsiang's commentary on the Chuang tzu), Niigaku  Daigaka j imbun kagaku kenkyu. %ft ; g ^ ^ A ± H ^ ^ % 28(1965) 31-71. o Wing-tsit Chan, Sourcebook, pp. 326-335. 179 The concepts which I am about to d i s c u s s are r e l a t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g manner. The f i r s t two i d e a s , a l l o t m e n t and l i m i t , r e f e r to Kuo 1s concept of a n a t u r a l p l a c e or p o t e n t i a l f o r each c r e a t u r e i n the world. The order of these n a t u r a l p l a c e s i s guaranteed by the p r i n c i p l e s or p a t t e r n s i n h e r e n t i n each of them. In the d i v e r s i t y o f n a t u r a l p l a c e s , there i s a u n i t y or harmony. Knowledge of t h i s u n i t y i s found through ming , the dark j o i n i n g a c h i e v e d by the sage. The e f f e c t of t h a t achievement by the sage i s a harmonious human community as an e x t e r n a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n or t r a c e of the sage. F i n a l l y Kuo probes f o r the nature o f the b a s i c u n i t y . He examines the concepts of b e i n g and non-being, but f i n a l l y he r e j e c t s both and c o n f i n e s h i m s e l f to a c c e p t i n g the f a c t u a l s e l f - i d e n t i t y o f t h i n g s , t z u j a n , as the h i g h e s t p r i n c i p l e which can be known. ALLOTMENT, FEN ^ , AND ULTIMATE, CHI A c o n c i s e d e s c r i p t i o n of f e n i n the Kuo Hsiang commentary i s g i v e n by E. ZUrcher i n The Buddhist Conquest of C h i n a . 1 1 q B i r t h e Arendrup, "The F i r s t Chapter of Guo Xiang's Commentary to Zhuang Z i : a T r a n s l a t i o n and Grammatical A n a l y s i s " , A c t a O r i e n t a l i a (Copenhagen) 36 (1974) 311-416. ^ I w i l l c i t e the Ssu-pu pei-yao e d i t i o n of the commentary, n o t i n g i f and when I c i t e v a r i a n t s . I w i l l not f o o t n o t e each c i t a t i o n s e p a r a t e l y , but I w i l l i n s e r t the chapter number, and the chUan and page number of the SPPY e d i t i o n i n the main body of my t e x t . Photo r e p r i n t s of the Chinese t e x t s may be found i n Appendix I. n E r i k ZUrcher, Buddhist Conquest, pp. 90-92. 180. Hou Wai-lu has a l s o g i v e n s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n to t h i s concept. Paul D e m i e v i l l e wrote a s h o r t r e p o r t on the concept of f e n i n Chinese p h i l o s o p h y . D e m i e v i l l e noted that i n pre-Han times i t was a Confucian and L e g a l i s t concept connected w i t h s o c i a l , order, r e c t i f i c a t i o n o f names, and law. He suggests t h a t i t s . r e v i v a l i n the t h i r d century A.D. was p a r t of a d e s i r e f o r order i n . ^ 13 s o c i e t y . A c c o r d i n g to Kuo Hsiang, one's a l l o t m e n t or share i n l i f e i s what each person or t h i n g i s g i v e n . T h i s a l l o t m e n t i s the c a p a c i t i e s which are. b u i l t i n t o h i s nature. Thus some men are born to be poor and others r i c h , some i g n o r a n t and some wise, some r u l e r s and some s u b j e c t s . Although Kuo does not say c l e a r l y how one's f e n i s obtained, i t i s c l o s e l y connected to one's nature which i s r e c e i v e d from heaven. (1) In the heavenly nature which one r e c e i v e s , each has h i s b a s i c a l l o t m e n t . None can escape i t , and none can add to i t . & H % ^ * r ) * . * * « T r i o . (Ch. 3, 2.3b) Kuo Hsiang uses .fen to e x p l a i n the Chuang t z u passages on the r e l a t i v i t y o f t h i n g s . Where the Chuang t z u uses the v e r y great i n order to show i n s i g n i f i c a n c e of the s m a l l , Kuo argues that i t i s not s m a l l or great t h a t i s important. There i s no v i r t u e i n being e i t h e r small or great, f o r t h a t i s one's l o t . What one must do i s know h i s p l a c e and h i s l i m i t s and then l e t h i s conduct p e r f e c t l y match those l i m i t s , n e i t h e r f a l l i n g s h o r t nor exceeding them: Hou Wai-lu, Chung kuo ssu-hsiang, I I I , pp. 244-247 181. (2) Although the s m a l l and the l a r g e are d i f f e r e n t , y e t i f they are p l a c e d i n p o s i t i o n s where they can f u l f i l l themselves, then t h i n g s f o l l o w t h e i r n a t u r e s ; t h e i r tasks match t h e i r a b i l i t y and each i s s u i t e d to h i s l o t . In being f r e e and happy they are one. How c o u l d s u p e r i o r i t y and i n f e r i o r i t y be allowed i n t h e i r midst? * * A S t s; fi A *|. i<\ n 1i % (Ch. 1, 1.1a) (3) Now the g r e a t b i r d t r a v e l s a h a l f - y e a r to the c e l e s t i a l l a k e and then r e s t s . The s m a l l b i r d f l i e s h a l f the morning h a s t i l y a l i g h t i n g on elms and sapanwood. In comparing t h e i r a b i l i t i e s t h e r e i s a d i f f e r e n c e , but i n adapting to t h e i r natures they are the same. ~ t ¥$> 2 * i « ^ \ & . - f t f * * i ft % * . >t *t fk ft l-i lip * # i l l ^ -(Ch. 1, l . l b - 2 a ) (4) Now i f one compares forms, then Mt. T ' a i i s g r e a t e r than an autumn h a i r . I f each r e l i e s on t h e i r a l l o t e d n ature and things d a r k l y j o i n t h e i r l i m i t , then a l a r g e t h i n g w i l l have no excess and a s m a l l t h i n g w i l l not be i n s u f f i c i e n t . . . I f one regards the s u f f i c i e n c y of form as g r e a t , then none of the s u f f i c i e n c i e s of the world surpass t h a t of the autumn h a i r . * 4k * i n J6f |.j * di * tt & $. ^ £ * 4& a 4t ^ ^ % I'J * * & ^ ^ m * * & * A,. oo* J£ AA ^ /£ & * jgi ^ T j% ^ v8 4fc (Ch. 2, 1 . 1 8 b ) 1 4 " P a u l D e m i e v i l l e , Choix d'Etude S i n o l o g i q u e s (1921-1970) (Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1973) pp. 89-91. The remarks were f i r s t made i n 1948 i n the Annuaire du C o l l e g e de France. 1 4Comments (2), (3), and (4) are a l l t r a n s l a t e d by B. Arendrup, "Guo Xiang's Commentary", pp. 313, 319 and 327 182. Thus to Chuang tzu's i m a g i n a t i v e attempt to r e l a t i v i z e the human s c a l e of l i f e by r e c o u n t i n g t a l e s o f the s u p e r - l a r g e , Kuo Hsiang seems to ask, "What v i r t u e i s there i n being l a r g e ? The P'eng b i r d cannot l a n d i n your garden. He too i s l i m i t e d by h i s s i z e i n t h a t he needs l a r g e areas f o r h i s h a b i t a t . " Happiness f o r Kuo Hsiang then i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h one's l o t i n l i f e , w i t h one's n a t u r a l p l a c e . T h i s does not mean t h a t one accepts the s t a t u s quo, but r a t h e r t h a t one must f u l f i l h i s c a p a c i t y , do the bes t t h a t h i s n a t u r a l a b i l i t i e s w i l l allow. Kuo i d e n t i f i e d the freedom of man, the " f r e e and easy wandering" of the Chuang t z u , as the matching of one's a c t i o n s to h i s c a p a c i t y to a c t . In a d d i t i o n to the remarks found on t h i s i n comment (1) above, Kuo notes: (5) I f , when l i f t i n g something heavy or c a r r y i n g something l i g h t , one's s p i r i t and b r e a t h are n a t u r a l , t h i s i s w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f h i s s t r e n g t h . But he who esteems fame and lo v e s v i c t o r y i s not s a t i s f i e d though he r e p e a t e d l y breaks h i s back (with the e f f o r t ) . The cause o f t h i s i s t h a t knowledge has no l i m i t . There-f o r e the term 'knowledge' a r i s e s from l o s i n g s i g h t of the s u i t a b l e , and i t i s destroyed i n d a r k l y j o i n i n g w i t h the l i m i t . He who d a r k l y j o i n s h i s l i m i t (or u l t i m a t e ) f u l f i l s h i s p e r f e c t a l l o t m e n t and cannot i n c r e a s e i t by a s i n g l e f r a c t i o n o f an ounce. T h e r e f o r e , though he c a r r i e s s e v e r a l tons, i f i t i s equal to h i s a b i l i t y , he (suddenly) i s unaware of the weight on h i s body. Though r e s p e c t i v e l y . Comment (4) i s a l s o t r a n s l a t e d i n Chan, Source-book, p. 329 no. 15, and i n Fung Yu-lan, H i s t o r y I I , pp. 228-229. I have used c e r t a i n phrases from these t r a n s l a t i o n s but have not quoted them i n t o t o . A passage on f e n s i m i l a r to comment (4) may be found i n Ch. 1, 1.2b. 183. he responds to a l l matters, he w i l l be b l i s s -f u l l y unaware t h a t the a f f a i r s l i e on him. ..This i s "the p r i n c i p l e o f n u r t u r i n g l i f e " . (Chapter t i t l e ) 1 5 « * & ft * * l f | & f 4jj * & *A i f . * / « _ % & # f £n%m A * t a*. * t | * f i (Ch. 3, 2.1a) Thus i n a d d i t i o n to p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , f e n a l s o governs 16 a c t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y human a c t i o n . Kuo here p r o v i d e s a t h e o r e t i c a l base f o r the p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n that was an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f s e l e c t i o n o f o f f i c i a l s as i n s t i t u t e d by Ts'ao Ts'ao, i n which i n d i v i d u a l s were assig n e d to one of n i n e c l a s s e s on the b a s i s of t h e i r a b i l i t i e s . The i d e a o f e v a l u a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t i e s was a l s o p r e v a l e n t among s c h o l a r s , both i n works such as L i u Shao 1 s £ ^ ( f l . ca. 224) Jen wu c h i h A ty & (Record o f P e r s o n a l i t i e s ) and i n "pure t a l k " c i r c l e s generally.'*" 7 C l o s e l y r e l a t e d to f e n i s the term c h i 7J$x . C h i i s a two-edged sword f o r Kuo Hsiang s i n c e i t means both " u l t i m a t e " ^ T h i s i s a l s o t r a n s l a t e d i n Chan, Sourcebook, p. 331, no. 21 and Fung, H i s t o r y , I I , p. 221. A r e l a t e d passage may be found i n Ch. 4, 2.15b, which i s t r a n s l a t e d i n Fung, H i s t o r y , I I , p. 223. 1 6 S e e a l s o Ch. 6, 3.1a. 1 7 S e e E r i k Zlircher, Buddhist Conquest, pp. 44, 93. 184. 18 and " l i m i t " at the same time. The concept may be used as an i n c e n t i v e to a t t a i n a t r u l y h i g h p o i n t , but i t always i m p l i e s that there i s a d e f i n i t e boundary beyond which one cannot go. Thus i n comments (4) and (5), I t r a n s l a t e d the phrase ming  c h i | ^ as " d a r k l y j o i n i n g (one's) l i m i t " , but i t may e q u a l l y w e l l be t r a n s l a t e d as W i n g - t s i t Ch'an does, " s i l e n t l y harmonizing w i t h (one's), u l t i m a t e c a p a c i t y " . Derk Bodde t r a n s -l a t e s i t more f r e e l y as " f u l l y accept one's l i m i t a t i o n s " . In the sense " l i m i t " , Kuo means to say t h a t each must s t a y i n h i s (her, i t s ) p l a c e . I f one t r i e s to go beyond h i s l i m i t , d i s o r d e r w i l l a r i s e . But the sense " u l t i m a t e " i m p l i e s that t h i s l i m i t i s a l s o the p e r f e c t i o n of the c r e a t u r e s of the world. I f each t h i n g reaches i t s i n d i v i d u a l u l t i m a t e , there w i l l be a p e r f e c t and harmonious world. Moreover, there i s power i n r e a c h i n g one's l i m i t . When one achieves t h i s s t a t e , i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r mere t h i n g s to c o n t r o l him. On the phrase i n the Chuang  t z u ". . .how can t h i n g s stop him?", Kuo comments: (6) He who reaches h i s l i m i t i s not something t h i n g s can c o n t r o l . ^ n n (Ch. 19, 7.2a) Both f e n and c h i are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p r i n c i p l e s , l i , as w e l l as w i t h t h i n g s . Although I w i l l d i s c u s s l i i n more d e t a i l l a t e r , I quote here two passages i l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s C h i becomes a more important concept i n Sung Neo-Confucianism. Joseph Needham argues t h a t c h i i s not any l i m i t but a f o c a l p o i n t on a boundary. For the Neo-Confucians, i t i s an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c e n t e r . See Science and C i v i l i z a t i o n , I I t 185. a s s o c i a t i o n . The f i r s t i s found i n the d i s c u s s i o n of the g r e a t and s m a l l which we have a l r e a d y mentioned: (7) ...Therefore, p r i n c i p l e s have t h e i r p e r f e c t d i v i s i o n s and t h i n g s have f i x e d l i m i t s . Each i s s u f f i c i e n t to perform i t s task, and t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n i s one.19 (Ch. 1, 1.2a) The second passage i l l u s t r a t e s Kuo's i d e a of the harmony of a proper i n n e r stance and f r e e outer a c t i o n : (8) Now p r i n c i p l e s have p e r f e c t l i m i t s and outer and i n n e r d a r k l y j o i n . There i s no one who exhausts the l i m i t s of wandering on the o u t s i d e without d a r k l y j o i n i n g t h a t to the i n s i d e . There i s no one a b l e to d a r k l y j o i n (with t h i n g s ) on the i n s i d e who does not wander on the o u t s i d e . Therefore, the sage i s always roaming on the o u t s i d e to broaden the i n s i d e ; he i s without d e l i b e r a t i o n i n order to accord w i t h e x i s t e n c e . T h e r e f o r e , although to the end o f h i s days he moves h i s body, h i s s p i r i t does not change. A l l around him he looks on a l l a f f a i r s and i s i n d i f f e r e n t l y s e l f - s o . 2 0 ft * % ft I * * x 2 A # s& fi\ t>k & t\tn * »>f *. *x #a (Ch. 6, 3.10b) Kuo Hsiang i s not concerned w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g some k i n d o f theory of l i m i t a t i o n s on l i _ , but w i t h f o l l o w i n g the l o g i c a l conse-quences of p r i n c i p l e s to t h e i r utmost. I t i s not t h a t Kuo i s pp. 464-465. 1^See B i r t h e Arendrup, "Guo Ziang's Commentary", p. 322. 2 0 T h i s i s p a r t i a l l y t r a n s l a t e d i n Fung, H i s t o r y , I I , p. 236. 186. saying t h a t there are t h i n g s g r e a t e r than l i , which i s l i m i t e d , but t h a t p r i n c i p l e s have a c e n t r a l focus, a p o l e , a p o i n t about which they are u n i f i e d . To re a c h t h e i r " l i m i t " i s to expose t h i s u n i t y and the nature of the o r g a n i z a t i o n around i t . Thus, p r i n c i p l e i s a word f o r the u n d e r l y i n g order o f r e a l i t y . In t h i s case a p e r f e c t and c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e means that the i n n e r wisdom of the sage i s always balanced by outer a c t i o n i n the world. When a p p l i e d to i n d i v i d u a l c r e a t u r e s , f e n r e f e r s to order and d i v i s i o n , t o the f a c t t h a t r e a l i t y has a s t r u c t u r e d c h a r a c t e r so t h a t p a r t s f u n c t i o n to make a harmonious whole. When a p p l i e d to the concept of p r i n c i p l e , f e n does not have the same s o c i a l sense found e a r l i e r , but s t i l l has the gen e r a l sense of a d e f i n i t e order which must be accepted. MING ^? , THE SAGE, AND TRACES, CHI We have a l r e a d y encountered the i d e a o f ming ^ i n comments (4), (5), and (8) and the i d e a o f the sage i n comment (8). Kuo understood t h a t a l l o t m e n t and l i m i t , although they e x p l a i n the d i v e r s i t y of f u n c t i o n s o f t h i n g s , a l s o d i s p l a y the b a s i c u n i t y and harmony of the world. Now ming i s e s s e n t i a l l y an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l concept i n Kuo's thought, the means by which t h i s b a s i c u n i t y can be known. I group these three concepts together because ming r e p r e s e n t s a c e r t a i n i d e a l a c t i o n which i s r e a l i z e d o n l y by the sage. The b a s i c meaning of ming i s "dark", but i t a l s o means "deep", " d i s t a n t " , or " s i l e n t " . In the sch o o l of Dark L e a r n i n g 187. i t was sometimes used as a synonym f o r heaven, thought of as a dark and mysterious p l a c e . Extending the meaning of "dark", i t can mean "not understanding". But extending i t s meaning of " s i l e n t " , ming can mean " t a c i t understanding". Given such a range o f meaning, Kuo's use of ming w i l l have to be decided by i t s context. Kuo o c c a s i o n a l l y uses ming i n i t s o r d i n a r y sense o f "dark" 21 or " d a r k l y " , f o r example, ming j a n ^ ^itv , but h i s more frequent and more p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y important use i s a v e r b a l form, as i n the i n s t a n c e s a l r e a d y c i t e d . Kuo Hsiang's most ex t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f ming occurs i n the passages i n the context of comment (8). The Chuang t z u r e c o r d s a c o n v e r s a t i o n between Confucius and h i s d i s c i p l e Tzu-kung. Tzu-kung had attended a f u n e r a l a t which the two f r i e n d s o f the dead man were l a u g h i n g and s i n g i n g . Confucius e x p l a i n e d t h i s by saying, Such men as they wander beyond the realm; men l i k e me wander w i t h i n i t ' . 22 (Ch. 6, 3.10b) At t h i s p o i n t Kuo i n s e r t s comment (8), which I t r a n s l a t e d above only i n p a r t , i n which he argues t h a t a t r u e sage u n i t e s both 21 See, f o r example, Ch. 6, 3.8a. "The 'mysterious dark' (of the Chuang t z u t e x t ) i s t h a t by which one names non-being .but i s not i t s e l f non-being. ( ^  % \ pft J,A % % ^ H %k ) • 9 9 T h i s t r a n s l a t i o n of the Chuang t z u t e x t and those below through comment (11) are taken from Burton Watson, Chuang tzu, pp. 86-87. 188. i n n e r and outer, and t h a t the Chuang tzu's e x p l a n a t i o n was that which the w o r l d c o u l d apprehend. But, Kuo i n s i s t s , one c o u l d not deny t h a t Confucius was a t r u e sage. The Chuang t z u continues, Beyond and w i t h i n can never meet...Even now they (the two "mourners") have j o i n e d w i t h the c r e a t o r as men to wander i n the s i n g l e b r e a t h of heaven and e a r t h . ?[ i*I * n A ... Ok ;fc £. K v& % fa (Ch. 6, 3.10b-lla) Kuo comments, (9) They are a l l i n s i l e n t union w i t h i t ; t h e r e -f o r e , they are not two ( b r e a t h s ) . & % ty * o (Ch. 6, 3.11a) I t i s from a phrase l i k e t h i s t h a t one gets the impression t h a t ming i n v o l v e s some k i n d of union. I t i s not c l e a r , how-ever, who i s the s u b j e c t of ming. Kuo might be r e f e r r i n g o n l y to the f a c t t h a t heaven and e a r t h are o f one breath, but i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t he i n c l u d e s the sages along w i t h heaven and e a r t h . These have a u n i t y because they ming. There i s some k i n d of a c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between them. T h i s u n i t y i s beyond the l e v e l of c o n v e n t i o n a l knowledge, f o r Kuo does not c h a l l e n g e the Chuang tzu's remark t h a t "Beyond and w i t h i n do not meet." However ming i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the beyond and the w i t h i n , f o r i n comment (8) we saw that "outer and i n n e r mutually,ming" ( P\• % ). For a t r u e sage, outer and i n n e r c o u l d not e x i s t alone. Ming thus i m p l i e s a r e l a t i o n -189. s h i p between them e s t a b l i s h e d by the sage. At t h i s p o i n t we might t h i n k t h a t the sense of ming as " t a c i t u nderstanding" c o u l d e x p l a i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how outer a c t i o n c o u l d be capable o f "understanding". A b i t f a r t h e r on, the Chuang t z u says, I d l y they roam beyond the dust and d i r t ; they wander f r e e and easy i n the realm of i n a c t i o n . 3*: ft i i & £ . (Ch. 6, 3.11b) Kuo comments, (10) T h i s "realm of i n a c t i o n " i s not f o l d i n g one's hands s i l e n t l y and n o t h i n g e l s e . "Beyond dust and d i r t " does not mean h i d i n g i n the mountains and f o r e s t s . 1 *\ n ist di H „ (Ch. 6, 3.11b) The Chuang t z u continues, Why should they f r e t and f u s s about the ceremonies o f the v u l g a r world and make a d i s p l a y f o r the eyes and ears of the common herd? (Ch. 6, 3.11b) Kuo comments, (11) Those t h i n g s by which they make a d i s p l a y to the common herd are a l l merely t h e i r dust and d i r t , and they are not the dark understanding of t h i n g s , which comes from beyond t h i s realm. -* H «. |jL.* & M ±6 190. it % ^ % W (Ch. 6, 3.11b) Here Kuo t r i e s to p l a c e the sage between the hermit and the r i t u a l i s t . The sage who wanders i n the beyond i s not a hermit, but the r i t u a l s o f the common herd are dust and d i r t f o r him. I t i s Kuo's h o l d i n g i n t e n s i o n i n the sage man's i n n e r freedom and an outer o r d e r l i n e s s . The sage's wandering i n the beyond or the o u t s i d e i s c o n d i t i o n e d by the phrase ming wu ^ - ^ J . Although ming wu might mean " t o understand t h i n g s " , the understanding i s such t h a t i t i s e i t h e r harmonizing w i t h t h i n g s or i n some way j o i n i n g w i t h them. T h i s i s a l s o shown by Kuo's frequent use of the phrase "ming w i t h t h i n g s " yU wu ming ^ , as, f o r example, i n the f o l l o w i n g passage. On a Chuang t z u passage which b e r a t e s the Yellow Emperor f o r u s i n g benevolence and r i g h t e o u s n e s s Kuo comments, (12) The Yellow Emperor d i d not i n t e n d to be benevolent and r i g h t e o u s . When he d i r e c t l y harmonized w i t h t h i n g s , then the t r a c e s of benevolence and r i g h t e o u s n e s s appeared of themselves. When the t r a c e s appeared of themselves, the h e a r t s of l a t e r ages, n e c e s s a r i l y s a c r i f i e d themselves f o r them. T h i s a l s o means th a t the t r a c e s of the Yellow Emperor cause t h i n g s to be d i s t u r b e d . # fa^i i<! i~& £ J L . & ft k,,m#&*Lr .4 m I O (Ch. 14, 4.16b) 23 Hou Wai-lu has a l i s t o f s e v e r a l p l a c e s where the phrase yii wu ming |& K? o c c u r s . See Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang, I I I , p. 233. 191. Benevolence and r i g h t e o u s n e s s are by-products of a d i r e c t harmonizing w i t h t h i n g s ; they are epiphenomena and should not be mistaken f o r t h a t dark experience which l i e s behind them. Ming i s a deep understanding which i s mysterious because i t cannot be seen; o n l y t r a c e s of i t are v i s i b l e . That Kuo uses ming i n the context o f the t r u e r e a l i t y at the f o u n d a t i o n of a l l t h i n g s may be seen i n the chapter t i t l e d "Knowledge Wanders North". The Chuang t z u t e x t remarks t h a t the maker o f t h i n g s i s not l i m i t e d by t h i n g s . Kuo comments, (13) T h i s shows t h a t t h a t which makes th i n g s " t h i n g s " i s no t h i n g , but t h i n g s make them-s e l v e s " t h i n g s " and t h a t i s a l l . Things make themselves " t h i n g s " , t h e r e f o r e they are dark...Things have l i m i t s , t h e r e f o r e none i s a b l e to m y s t e r i o u s l y understand another. Thus they are t r u l y what i s c a l l e d l i m i t e d . n w i u « j m kn *re % w n $, (Ch. 22, 7) J u s t how t h i n g s become t h i n g s cannot be known i n an o r d i n a r y sense. I t i s dark and t h e r e f o r e hidden to o r d i n a r y knowledge. I t i s a v a i l a b l e o n l y to the one who can d a r k l y j o i n w i t h t h a t darkness. A s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n between knowledge and some super-knowledge i s a l s o p r e s e n t i n the Chuang t z u i t s e l f , when the t e x t speaks of o b t a i n i n g the Tao. In such a context, Kuo has a l s o i n t r o d u c e d the concept of ming: 192. (14) A l l o b t a i n i n g of i t (the Tao) not through knowledge i s ming. M l 4 ftt.Xo A f HL. (Ch, 22, 7.23a) Thus Kuo uses ming to i n d i c a t e the mysterious knowing or apprenhension of the Tao. I t i s a g r a s p i n g of the Tao through some means other than c o n v e n t i o n a l knowledge. When Kuo d i s c u s s e s ming, the sage, and the t r a c e s of the sage, the same d i s t i n c t i o n between ming and knowledge appears. In d i s c u s s i n g the legendary emperor Yao, f o r example, Kuo e x p l a i n s why Yao was both a t r u e sage and r u l e r . He suggests t h a t these were two Yaos, the t r u e Yao and the one whose a c t i o n s are p e r c e i v e d by the people: (15) ...Yao i s not the same as Yao. Yao t r u l y d a r k l y apprehended. His t r a c e s are Yao. Looking at the darkness from the t r a c e s , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the outer and i n n e r become d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n s . People of the world see Yao's being Yao. How c o u l d they r e c o g n i z e h i s darkness?24 .... * 4 t $ fc. *1 4 i '4. % % % ? \ P \ % * & * / L ' & « i 0 f *. JL % *- & % . t ite % % % . (Ch. 1, 1.8a) See t r a n s l a t i o n by B i r t h e Arendrup, p. 361. 193. Here ming i s the dark mystery i n which true r e a l i t y i s comprehended. It i s both that by which the sage's actions are made manifest and the place or faculty by which true apprehension, or unconditioned knowledge can be gained. In Chuang tzu ch. 5, Kuo makes his clearest statement on how this true apprehension leads to r i g h t action, but that i t cannot be d i r e c t l y perceived i n the actions. Lao Tan i n the Chuang tzu text remarks that Confucius should be freed of his chains and fe t t e r s and see that l i f e and death are one. Kuo comments by using the concept of ming to j u s t i f y the sage character of Confucius: (16) He (Lao Tan) desires to take immediate p r i n c i p l e s to mysteriously understand i t (the awareness of l i f e and death being one) and he longs for i t s tracklessness... Now Confucius was not unapprending. According to natural p r i n c i p l e s , when one moves, the shadow follows: when one speaks, the echo follows. I f one accords with things, his fame and traces are established. But the according with things i s not for the sake of fame. Since i t i s not for sake of fame, i t is perfect. S t i l l , i n the end he did not avoid fame. Then who i s able to free himself from i t ? Therefore fame i s a shadow and an echo. The shadow and the echo are the chains and f e t t e r s of shapes and sounds. When this p r i n c i p l e i s understood, then fame and traces can be abandoned. When fame and traces are abandoned, then esteem for others can be cut of f . When esteem for others i s cut o f f , then one's nature and destiny can be completed. SU * * % t A * ooo ^ it A n * A * <® * i 4 & #f ± % % n % # fa % «... 194. M Zl £') 3 & -T J 0 l i , £>i (Ch. 5, 2.19b-20a) Reputation i s a n a t u r a l consequence of t r u e understanding. But i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r t h a t r e p u t a t i o n to i n d i c a t e the t r u e understanding because of the c o n d i t i o n of the p e r c e i v e d . He i s bound by h i s p o s i t i o n , indeed h i s f a t e d a l l o t m e n t , to be a b l e to p e r c e i v e o n l y the t r a c e s o f the sage. Ne v e r t h e l e s s , although he cannot see the t r u e understanding, the o r d i n a r y man can at l e a s t r e a l i z e t h a t t r a c e s of the sage are not h i s t r u e nature, and t h a t he need not i d e a l i z e those dead remnants of the sage's work. When one cuts o f f the exaggerated esteem f o r the works of o t h e r s , then one can concentrate on f u l f i l l i n g the p o t e n t i a l of h i s own a l l o t t e d nature, doing the b e s t p o s s i b l e w i t h one's own c a p a c i t i e s and not merely emulating the sages. A great d e a l o f Fung Yu-lan's a n a l y s i s of Kuo Hsiang 25 concerns the sage and h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I w i l l t h e r e f o r e do no more than summarize a few main p o i n t s . The word sage i s used i n two senses i n the commentary, as i t i s i n the Chuang Tzu i t s e l f . There i s the t r u e sage, and t h e r e i s the one who has o n l y the t r a p p i n g s of the sage. T h i s l a t t e r "sage" merely emulates the t r a c e s of the t r u e sage. Moreover, the t r u e sage has a s p l i t p e r s o n a l i t y , h i s t r u e r e a l i t y on the i n s i d e and the t r a c e s o f t h a t r e a l i t y on the o u t s i d e . True Fung Yu-lan, H i s t o r y , I I , pp. 219-236. 195. sagehood i s cloaked i n darkness and mystery. Even when a c e r t a i n person i s remembered as a sage, the memory i s not that of the t r u e sage. Yet these h i s t o r i c a l sages s t i l l possess a oneness of nature: (17) . . . t h e r e f o r e the sage i s one, but there are the d i f f e r e n c e s of Yao, Shun, T'ang, and Wu. That which makes t h i s d i f f e r e n c e c l e a r i s t h a t they are merely the names from d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s . They are not s u f f i c i e n t to name the r e a l i t y o f the sage.26 H * £ .4 AkZi^kit (Ch. 11, 4.16b) Th i s oneness of the sage through time i s not a transcendant oneness or an achievement o f supra-mundane sphere through e c s t a t i c a c t i v i t y . But i t i s a m y s t i c a l u n i t y . The c h a r a c t e r of t r u e sagehood i s not a f f e c t e d by h i s t o r y , because h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of sagehood are always p a r t i a l , and t h e r e f o r e d i s t o r t e d , expressions of r e a l i t y . The sage's fundamental way of r e l a t i n g to the world i s to acc o r d w i t h the nature of t h i n g s , and the nature of t h i n g s i s the same i n a l l times. The sage's p e r c e p t i o n of t h i s n a ture i s i n e f f a b l e , i t i s dark, and i t i s not a c c e s s i b l e from the st a n d p o i n t of d i s c u r s i v e knowledge. By f o l l o w i n g the nature o f t h i n g s , the sage imposes no d i s -t i n c t i o n s o f h i s own, but he allows t h i n g s to take t h e i r A s i m i l a r passage a s s e r t i n g the oneness of the sage may be found i n Ch. 12, 5.10b. 196. n a t u r a l course. He i s , t h e r e f o r e , i n e x h a u s t i b l e , s i n c e he can accommodate every new t h i n g . S t i l l , he moves about i n the world and even r u l e s , but he never "does"".anything, t h a t i s , he never c o n t r i v e s any a c t i o n nor d e l i b e r a t e s any p l a n . By t h i s time the concept of " t r a c e s " i s a l r e a d y f a i r l y c l e a r . S e k i Masao and Hou Wai-lu have both g i v e n c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n to t h i s concept, and Hou c o n s i d e r s i t one of the key p o i n t s i n Kuo H s i a n g ! s (Hsiang Hsiu's) thought. Hou Wai-lu begins h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the concept of the " t r a c e s " w i t h a d i s t i n c t i o n between the t r a c e s and t h a t by which the t r a c e s are made, c h i and so I c h i che f>j{ 'iT^F . As Hou p o i n t s out, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n o r i g i n a l l y 2 7 appeared i n the Chuang t z u i t s e l f (Ch. 14, 5.26b). There Lao t z u b e r a t e s Confucius f o r u s i n g the s i x c l a s s i c s , which are o n l y the o l d paths or t r a c k s of former kings and are not the shoes which made them. Kuo comments, (18) That by which the t r a c k s were made i s the t r u e nature. Now he who f o l l o w s the t r u e nature of t h i n g s , h i s t r a c k s are the s i x classics...How much more, i n the case of men and events of today, c o n s i d e r the way they are i n themselves to be the shoes and the s i x c l a s s i c s to be the t r a c k s . M: M * . * & T t - * f t ^ 1 1 - 'lit- % fc* (Ch. 14, 5.26b) See Burton Watson, Chuang t z u , p. 166. 197. In general Kuo i s i n accord with the point of the Chuang  tzu that the concreteness and i n d i v i d u a l i t y of everyday experience i s p r i o r to r e f l e c t i o n on i t . However, he adds the ontological concept of the true nature as the heart or center of that concrete experience. Another passage which relates the concept of "traces" to human nature occurs i n Chapter 9: (19) The term "the sage" (as used i n the Chuang tzu text) i s merely the traces of the T a c t that people r e a l i z e t h e i r natures (under this r u l e ) . I t i s not that by which the traces were made. When his passage says "Then comes the sage", i t i s saying "then come his traces"... Now since the sage's traces are a manifestation, benevolence and righteousness are not true and r i t e s and music depart from one's nature. With them, one merely obtains an external form and that i s a l l . Wherever there i s a sage, there i s this corruption. What can we do about i t ? Y ki K % ft i i * T, te % iA v* % ML. >t « 1-$ * & Si 4| £ *t '14. tfetf * * « t * . * M « « . (Ch. 14, 4.7b) The key idea i n thi s passage i s the idea of " r e a l i z i n g one's nature", te hsing . For a person to r e a l i z e his nature undoubtedly means attaining the l i m i t of his allotment. Such attainments lead to an orderly, harmonious society. By a t t r i b u t i n g the source of that order to the pa r t i c u l a r techniques of the r u l e r of that time, his r i t e s 198. and music, e t c . , people mistake these f o r sage wisdom. How-ever, s i n c e such a mistaken tendency i s i n the v e r y s t r u c t u r e of human l i f e , Kuo ends i n p e r p l e x i t y over what can be done about i t . A t h i r d term which r e l a t e s to these two i s the concept of being without t r a c e s , wu c h i ^ . We have encountered t h i s term b e f o r e i n comment (16), where i t seemed to r e f e r to an apprehension of the oneness of l i f e and death. However, ac c o r d i n g to Kuo's c o n c l u s i o n i n comment (19), t r a c e s cannot be avoided. Kuo e x p l a i n s t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n by saying t h a t the t r u e sage does not h i m s e l f make the t r a c e s , but the t r a c e s appear o f themselves i n the form o f an ordered human community (see a l s o comment (12)). T h e r e f o r e , i t seems t h a t the t r a c e s o f the sage do not r e a l l y belong to the sage. In another comment on bogus sages, Kuo draws t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n : (20) Now the matter of Mr. Yu-yll and Mr. T ' a i i s e n t i r e l y the t r a c e s o f the world's a f f a i r s , and i s not t h a t by which the t r a c e s are made. That by which the t r a c e s are made has no t r a c e s . Who i n the world can name i t ? Not being even once named, how can there be the v i c t o r y and defeat (of T ' a i over Yu-yii)? Yet he who has no t r a c e s r i d e s the myriad changes and walks i n a l l ages. The world has i t s l e v e l s and h i l l s , and t h e r e f o r e there are p l a c e s paths do not reach. 7%f^ A * A r| <£ f t X t ?ki,k * J L % 45 U m I £ ft c f& % * £ (Ch. 7, 3.15a) 199. Here Kuo's analogy makes p l a i n that the "shoes" go everywhere, but that paths by their nature are li m i t e d and do not go everywhere i n the world. The sage may have walked where the paths are, but undoubtedly he had no intention of making paths. The actions of the sage's walking seems to trigger some kind of response so that the paths ari s e of themselves. In t h i s way the l o g i c a l contradiction that there are no traces of that by which traces are made i s p a r t i a l l y explained. Wu chi, being without traces, i s t r u l y achieved by using the p r i n c i p l e of t zu-j an. The sage accords both with his own natural course and that of other things: (21) The king i s able to follow' his acting of his own accord. Therefore he i s without traces. ±- %% -ri i t i f , % i & (Ch. 12, 5.9b) 2 8 Acting of one's own accord, tzu-hsing ^ ' l s m e r e l y a v a r i a t i o n on tzu-jan. The sage-king must act according to the dictates of his own nature; only then i s he without traces. However, the sage's conduct allows others to operate out of t h e i r selves. On the lament of the Chuang tzu that the times did not recognize former sages, who could have walked about the world restoring unity without leaving The Ssu-pu pei yao edition mistakenly p r i n t s chu •fe. for wang =£, . See the Block p r i n t edition of Chuang  tzu, (Taipei: I-wen Prin t i n g Co., 1968) p. 268. 200. any t r a c e , Kuo comments, (22) (They) would r e t u r n to f o l l o w i n g the n ature o f t h i n g s and t h i n g s of themselves would be u n i f i e d . Hence there would be no t r a c e of them.29 £ ii. <Vk <f£ % W k - , M 'A o (Ch. 16, 6.5a) Being without t r a c e s i s t h e r e f o r e a r e s u l t of the non-c o n t r i v a n c e of the sage. T h i s i s Kuo H s i a n g 1 s e x t e n s i o n of the i d e a i n the Lao t z u i n which the sage k i n g a c t s i n such a way t h a t the people imagine they accomplish e v e r y t h i n g themselves. Of course, the n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n of sages i s a cause f o r concern i n the Chuang t z u passage, but Kuo makes i t a matter of the s t r u c t u r e of t h i n g s . In so doing he a c t u a l l y c o n t r a d i c t s the Chuang t z u t e x t at t h i s p o i n t . Kuo.argues t h a t i t i s not the problem of the age t h a t the sage i s not known. Rather i t i s the very n ature of sagehood t h a t the sage cannot be known. 3^ Hou Wai-lu f u r t h e r suggests t h a t Kuo Hsiang d i s t i n g u i s h e d between " t r a c e s " and " t r a c e s which can be esteemed", k'o  shang c h i h c h i SJ" >a| ^- »3^ L -"^ The f i r s t t r a c e s of the sage are l e g i t i m a t e evidences of h i s a c t i o n i n the world. 2 9 S e e a l s o Ch. 22, 7.24b-25a. 30 The u n k n o w a b i l i t y of t r u e sagehood should not be i d e n t i f i e d e i t h e r w i t h the hidden sage found i n c e r t a i n p a r t s of the Chuang t z u . I t i s o n l y the i n n e r sage and not the outer sage who i s hidden ..according to Kuo Hsiang. 31 Hou Wai-lu, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang. I l l , pp. 235-237. 201. But when the sage matches w i t h the p r i n c i p l e of t h i n g s , then the t r a c e s diappear (Ch. 1, 1.4b). But i f the former t r a c e s are separated from t h e i r source and made something i n themselves, they t r u l y become harmful: (23) From b e f o r e the t h r e e - d y n a s t i e s , t h e r e have t r u l y been t r a c e s o f non - a c t i o n . The t r a c e s of n o n - a c t i o n are a l s o t h a t which c o n t r i v e d a c t i o n r e s t s on esteems. When-one esteems them, he l o s e s t h e i r n a t u r a l s i m p l i c i t y . As.n *A±.,t % fc*.^, * * & * i ft i . t f i . . n } i | ' J ^ 4 K i | 0 (Ch. 9, 4.4a) C o r r u p t i o n o f the n a t u r a l s i m p l i c i t y o f the t r a c e s a r i s e s when they are esteemed, when f o l l o w e r s o f a sage t r y to pre s e r v e him by w r i t i n g h i s words down (see comment (19)). Such d i s c i p l e s or the bogus sages (see comment (20)) le a v e t r a c e s which can be esteemed and t h i s i s the nature of t h e i r f a u l t : (24) T h e i r f a u l t s a l l stem from the f a c t t h a t t h e i r t r a c e s c o u l d be esteemed. (Ch. 9, 4.8b) I t h i n k Kuo must have c o n s i d e r e d these i n d i r e c t t r a c e s a l s o as t r a c e s o f the sage. He s t i l l regarded the s i x c l a s s i c s as t r a c e s , a l t h o u g h they c l e a r l y f a l l i n t o the category o f estimable t r a c e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , such estimable t r a c e s are one step removed from the a c t i o n s o f the sage and are d e r i v a t i v e from the n a t u r a l , l e g i t i m a t e t r a c e , the outer m a n i f e s t a t i o n or ex p r e s s i o n , o f those a c t i o n s . Therefore, the d i s t i n c t i o n of t r a c e s and estimable t r a c e s i l l u s t r a t e s 202. that the t r a c e s themselves are not bad. In f a c t as a n a t u r a l phenomenon, they are good, but they may not be v a l u e d i n themselves. Although t r a c e s are n a t u r a l aspects o f the p a s t which may not be v a l u e d i n the present, they are a l s o not u t t e r l y w o r t h l e s s i n the p r e s e n t . Kuo seems to r e g a r d them as a s t e p p i n g stone to h i g h e r knowledge: (25) He who models h i m s e l f on the sage merely i m i t a t e s the sage's t r a c e s . Traces are t h i n g s which are a l r e a d y past; they are not means of responding to changes. How can they be worth esteeming and h o l d i n g on to? But grasp the completed t r a c e s i n order to r i d e on the D i r e c t i o n l e s s . When the D i r e c t i o n l e s s i s a t t a i n e d , the t r a c e s w i l l be o b s t r u c t e d . M ^ i k . &. % ik U %% fc. *t ut *A top $ % %. % -h * % A JL (Ch. 10, 4.9a) B u i l d i n g on the metaphor of paths through the h i l l s and v a l l e y s , Kuo suggests t h a t the paths at l e a s t a c q u a i n t one w i t h the landscape b e f o r e one begins to wander f r e e l y . I f one reaches the s t a t e such t h a t any d i r e c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e and such t h a t he can respond to the u n l i m i t e d changes of r e a l i t y without being l i m i t e d to set courses o f a c t i o n , then he leaves the paths behind. Although they were once a t o o l f o r him, he abandons them when t h e i r time of u s e f u l n e s s i s over. As a stage of l e a r n i n g , the t r a c e s are a l s o p o s i t i v e l y b e n e f i c i a l . L a t e r Kuo comments t h a t when the sage reaches the stage o f apprehending the l i m i t s of t h i n g s , 203. then, (26) his traces are the traces which benefit things. (Ch. 10, 4.11b) Kuo i s probably making a case here for learning and education as a stage of attaining wisdom. Thus the concept of traces may be seen as analogous to Wang Pi's notion one comes to know the image, the word which brought him to that point i s discarded. Traces are l i k e words. They serve for a time, but may not be is o l a t e d from that service. If one is o l a t e s traces from th e i r function, then that which appears good i n i t s place becomes an e v i l . THE QUESTION OF BEING AND PRINCIPLES, WU/YU % AND LIJ.§[ I have already mentioned that Wang P i , following the Lao tzu and the Chuang tzu, spoke of Tao i n terms of non-being, wu fcj , which was regarded as the source of a l l being, yu. ^  . Wang P i did not think of wu as the absolute non-existence of anything, but as an unchanging root, standing over against the changing r e a l i t y of man's everyday experience. However, he seems to have been aware of the li m i t a t i o n s of the term "non-being", namely that i t implied that l i t e r a l l y nothing was there. of words, images, and ideas. 32 According to Wang, afte r 32 See Fung Yu-lan, History, II, pp. 184-185. 204. On Lao tzu, Chapter 14, he remarks, We may wish to say i t i s non-being, but things are completed by i t . We may wish to say i t i s being, but we see no form. ^ i i U * 3 3 However, i n spite of these objections against the use of either wu or yu. to describe the Tao, most of Wang's writings imply that wu i s the supreme o r i g i n of a l l things. Kuo Hsiang attacks Wang P i and those who agreed with him at exactly t h i s p o i n t — t h a t wu means "nothing", and thus i t cannot be the o r i g i n of exist i n g things. Kuo did i d e n t i f y wu with the Tao, but what he challenges i s the idea that wu i s the o r i g i n of yu. His posi t i o n on this i s clear. Wu cannot be the o r i g i n of things, because i t i s nothing. Things, which c o l l e c t i v e l y constitute existence, have no o r i g i n outside of themselves. It i s not only that non-being does not give r i s e to being, but being also cannot become non-being. "Existence" cannot ever cease to be, and hence the c o l l e c t i v e existence of things has always been. The conclusion would seem to be that Tao and the r e a l i t y of t h i s world would stand as eternal opposites. As for the production of things, not even yu, the abstract c o l l e c t i v e existence of a l l things, produces things, but things are produced Lao tzu, Wang P i chu, Chapter 14. 205. of themselves. There i s no external o r i g i n of things. Although Kuo denies a causal production of the cosmos, he does have a temporal order. There i s a beginning of things i n the realm of being, although j u s t beyond the l i m i t s of r a t i o n a l analysis: (27) The one i s that which i s p e r f e c t l y subtle at the beginning of existence. Because i t i s p e r f e c t l y subtle i t does not yet have the forms of things and p r i n c i p l e s . Now the a r i s i n g of the one i s an a r i s i n g from the perfect unity and i s not an a r i s i n g from non-being. So why i s i t that Chuang tzu repeatedly says that non-being i s at the beginning? The very f i r s t thing i s not born and then i t achieves b i r t h . It achieves t h i s d i f f i c u l t thing of being born, and yet above i t does not r e l y on non-being and below i t does not wait for knowledge, but i t suddenly of i t s e l f obtains this b i r t h . Why should one base b i r t h on that already born, thereby losing i t s self-production? m**%-Lf>ft & Stool* Stiff *t*$L x t t f e* . (Ch. 12, 5.5a) The perfect unity i s the primordial unity, the unity which i s not even "one" and which i s not yet the object of knowledge. It r e l i e s on nothing, neither non-being nor knowledge, but i s a p e r f e c t l y subtle, mysterious, self-created entity. The relevant passages supporting my general description can be found i n Fung, History, II, pp. 208-210. 206. It i s d i f f i c u l t to f i n d further elaboration of the relationship between wu and yu i n the commentary. While Kuo Hsiang never spells out the relationship, he does suggest that there i s some relat i o n s h i p closer than that of eternal opposites. For example, he agrees with Wang P i that there are words which i n d i r e c t l y lead one to a realm of non-being beyond this world. In the Chuang tzu the Lord of the North Sea says that there must be some form before one can speak of coarseness and fineness, the gross and the subtle. Things are what can be spoken of and conceived, and what cannot be spoken of or conceived does not r e l a t e to coarseness or fineness. Kuo comments, (28) It i s merely nothing (wu) and no more. How could i t be a coarse or fin e thing? Now speech and concepts are existent, but that which i s spoken of and conceived are not existent. Therefore one seeks i t i n the outward manifestation of speech and concepts and enters the realm which has no speech or concepts. Thereafter he i s perfect "arrives there (at .non-being.) . , , *« £ % £ . iST * f 7fc « * * I , f c . * Jk*L,%fifi%M t * § • t s . . * % (Ch. 17, 6.8a-b) Words and concepts are guideposts or markers which send one i n a di r e c t i o n . In the end the guidepost must be abandoned i n order for man to reach this realm of non-being . A similar passage i n Chapter 6 has the same basic 207. point. After describing how one finds the way, Woman Crookback (as Burton Watson translates her name) l i s t s a chain of persons through whom thi s knowledge came to her. Kuo understands th i s l i s t as a series of progressive stages on the path to knowledge. He takes the seventh step, the Mysterious Dark, hsuan ming ^ ^ , as the turning from the named to the unnamed, which he c a l l s wu: (29) The Mysterious Dark i s used to name non-being but i s not non-being itself...Now he who r e l i e s on names to arrive at non-being must f i n d non-being through mani-fes t a t i o n of names. Therefore, although the Mysterious Dark i s not yet the ultimate, i t sends one into P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Mystery (the eighth stage). This too i s the "mystery of mysteries"35,..Now he who accumulates and completes se l f - s o p r i n c i p l e s r e l i e s on the near to at t a i n the distant and investigates the coarse to a t t a i n the fi n e . Therefore at the seventh stage one attains to the name of non^being. At the ninth stage, one suspects there i s not this beginning. * f & 4 * £ i M£$. ft 4 4i f «i * 1? JL M J 4 , % 4A 2 #t (Ch. 6, 3.8a) From th i s passage i t i s clear that one can move from knowledge of being to knowledge of non-being. It i s almost the same concept as that of Wang P i i n di f f e r e n t Mystery of mysteries" i s a quote from Lao  tzu, Chapter 1. 208. terminology. For Kuo the Mysterious Dark i s not yet non-being, but i t names non-being. The Mysterious Dark i s a point i n the realm of being which points to non-being. It "pushes and sends", t ' u i chi "^f^  "z!p , one into the realm of non-being, which i s the mystery of mysteries. For Wang P i , however, such a connection was possible because of a r e a l , ontic relationship; wu produced yu. Kuo rigorously denies t h i s . Since Kuo implies a connection, we must return to the question of on what basis this connection i s possible. Kuo seems to be suggesting some-thing i n his obscure description of the ninth stage. In this stage one suspects there i s not this beginning. Does th i s phrase possibly imply a d i a l e c t i c a l movement from being to non-being and then to a point from which the d i v i s i o n can be reconciled? If t h i s ninth stage does represent some kind of transcendant point d i a l e c t i c a l l y achieved, there must be some ontic ground which guarantees the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s transcendant knowledge. In addressing this problem Seki Masao suggests four possible ways i n which the connection between wu and yu. might be imagined. He concludes that Kuo Hsiang does not give enough information to decide between the alternatives. Since two of Seki's alternatives involve the concept of p r i n c i p l e , l i , I s h a l l f i r s t examine the concept of p r i n c i p l e i n Kuo 1s thought before taking up Seki's arguments. 209. For Kuo, p r i n c i p l e s are not things, but a d i f f e r e n t kind of r e a l i t y . They appear i n things, but they also appear i n the realm of the unlimited. It i s not yet clear whether the unlimited i s to be i d e n t i f i e d with Tao and wu, and I have found no di r e c t statement that the realm of non-being i t s e l f has p r i n c i p l e s . However, for the moment, we can see that only the sage can perceive that there are pr i n c i p l e s i n both the realms of the li m i t e d and unlimited, and i t i s part of his wisdom that he does not try to j o i n them. On the sentence of the Chuang tzu which reads, "As for what i s beyond the Universe, the sage admits t h e i r 36 existence but does not discuss i t , " Kuo comments, (30) Now "what i s beyond the Universe" means just that which i s outside of the a l l o t t e d natures of a l l the creatures. Although there may be p r i n c i p l e s beyond the nature of things, i f these do not f a l l within the a l l o t t e d natures, then they never stimulate the sage. Therefore the sage has never discussed them. I f he were to discuss them, he would cause things to try and learn what they cannot. So he does not discuss what i s beyond them and a l l within the eight boundaries (the world) are the same i n their s e l f -r e a l i z a t i o n . I t t A t 5 6n # 44$ t ft, A 31 * w * W £ # ** * tfi Ik * «i ^  ®t rim i ff (Ch. 2, 1.19a) Translation by Burton Watson, Chuang tzu, p. 44, modified. 210. This passage shows further that sage wisdom w i l l not be something which w i l l bring wu and yu together. I f i n fact the sage transcends the d i v i s i o n (and t h i s i s not yet c l e a r ) , he also sees the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of communicating that transcendant knowledge to creatures i n the realm of being. At any rate, the concept of the sage's knowledge only drives us back to the question of the ontic basis of t h i s knowledge. Although p r i n c i -ples exist beyond the creatures, i t i s not yet clear whether they provide some kind of connection between the realms of wu and yu. In things p r i n c i p l e s are seen by Kuo from several view-points. They represent order among the creatures of the world; they are the pattern which penetrates everywhere. P r i n c i p l e s are manifold. Kuo does not see the p r i n c i p l e s of things as the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of one great, primordial p r i n c i p l e . As we have seen i n comments (7) and (8), p r i n c i p l e s are associated with the /natures of i n d i v i d u a l things. As i n d i v i d u a l natures are limited, so also p r i n c i p l e s have a s p e c i f i c character which l i m i t s them. As I have suggested above, Kuo i s not so much concerned with the o r i g i n s and l i m i t s of p r i n c i p l e s as he i s with the consequential, l o g i c a l following and carrying out of the p r i n c i p l e to i t s very end. To carry out the consequences of the p r i n c i p l e of a thing i s nearly the same thing as maximizing one's allotment. In Chapter 17, Kuo remarks, (31) I f one's. travels and deeds go beyond his allotment, and d r i v i n g and walking lose 211. t h e i r i n t e g r i t y , then heaven's p r i n c i p l e s are destroyed. (Ch. 17, 6.11b) Another aspect of fen, i n addition to i t s l i m i t i n g character, was i t s p r e s c r i p t i v e character. Fen i s what one i s supposed to become. Simi l a r l y , p r i n c i p l e s are not merely a pattern, but prescribe a pattern. One must carry out the consequences of p r i n c i p l e i f one wishes to enjoy the f u l l benefits of his nature. Thus Kuo i d e n t i f i e s p r i n c i p l e as a necessity. It i s not an inescapable necessity; i t i s at least possible to v i o l a t e p r i n c i p l e s , but p r i n c i p l e s remain as the compelling "ought" of human conduct. For example, when Confucius advises Yen Hui to make oneness his home and l i v e with what cannot be otherwise ( •— (ft !|£ f ^ & • ) , Kuo remarks, (32) That i t "cannot be otherwise" i s that p r i n c i p l e s are necessarily so. Embody the dwelling of the perfect unity and match the t a l l y of what i s necessary. (Ch. 4, 2.7b) In addition to the idea of necessity, comment (32) also introduces something related to how one knows l i _ . The concept that one somehow "matches", hui ^ , with p r i n c i p l e s i s also introduced through Kuo's comment on the Chuang tzu's marvelous story of Cook Ting cutting up the ox without ever 212. d u l l i n g h i s bl a d e : (33) (He) merely lodges the p r i n c i p l e s o f the Tao i n h i s s k i l l . That which he loves i s not the s k i l l . (When he began c u t t i n g up oxen, he) was not y e t a b l e to see the l i . and the spaces. ( A f t e r t h r e e years, he) merely saw i t s l i and the spaces, (but now he) d a r k l y matches w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s ( l i ) . # %l JL.1SE .«L^fti .ftJL *I .BP <* - I f (Ch. 3, 2.1b-2a) The term l i o r i g i n a l l y meant v e i n s or g r a i n i n wood, l i n e s running through something and t h i s meaning i s s t i l l p resent here. From t h i s meaning developed the i d e a o f a s t r u c t u r e or p a t t e r n w i t h i n the t h i n g . One may be tempted to understand t h i s p a t t e r n as a r a t i o n a l order. For Kuo I do not t h i n k t h i s i s the case. Although t h e r e i s t h a t i n the p a t t e r n or s t r u c t u r e of t h i n g s which can be l o g i c a l l y seen, t r u e knowledge of p r i n c i p l e i s t h i s "dark matching". I take t h i s to be an i n t e g r a l , i n t u i t i v e grasp of p r i n c i p l e s whose harmonious wholeness i s beyond the l i m i t s o f o r d i n a r y knowledge. In g e n e r a l i n Wei-Chin dark l e a r n i n g , p r i n c i p l e s are thought to be the p a t t e r n s o f the Tao or Heaven., One might suppose that i f the p r i n c i p l e s o f the Tao are p r i n c i p l e s i n t h i n g s , then p r i n c i p l e may be the b a s i s on which the wu/yu d i v i s i o n i s transcended. Indeed, S e k i Masao o f f e r s t h i s as two of h i s fou r a l t e r n a t i v e s . But i f the p r i n c i p l e o f the Tao i s presen t i n the realm of being, t h i s presence must be thought of i n terms of a c a u s a l agency of non-being 213. i n the realm o f being. Having a l r e a d y r e j e c t e d wu as the o r i g i n of yu, Kuo probably c o u l d not conceive of c a u s a t i o n i n terms others than " g i v i n g b i r t h t o " . T h e r e f o r e , he i s v e r y c a r e f u l to i n s i s t t h a t p r i n c i p l e s are so of themselves, t h a t i s , they are independent o f an o u t s i d e agency. Kuo remarks t h a t p r i n c i p l e s are p e r f e c t e d when the r u l e r i s n o n - a c t i v e i n r u l i n g , but a c t i v e i n employing m i n i s t e r s . Then, (34) ...the p r i n c i p l e s of heaven are so of themselves and they are not c o n t r i v e d . (Ch. 13, 5.13b) In another chapter on the phrase "none gets (knows) i t s p r i n c i p l e " ( |? ^^ jj^  ), Kuo comments, (35) P r i n c i p l e i s so of i t s e l f ; t h e r e f o r e no one gets i t . *f & i *X % (Ch. 27, 9.7b) L a t e r i n the same chapter, when the Chuang t z u expresses the u n k n o w a b i l i t y of one's f a t e or of the e x i s t e n c e of s p i r i t s , Kuo remarks, (36) P r i n c i p l e s must have responses as i f there were s p i r i t s which cause t h e m . . . P r i n c i p l e s respond m u t u a l l y of themselves. T h i s response does not f o l l o w any cause. T h e r e f o r e , although there i s mutual response, there are no s p i r i t s . > * A # * * t I H zi&00o 6 n M (Ch. 27, 9.9a) 214. Thus although there i s a r e g u l a r i t y and even a compulsion i n the workings of p r i n c i p l e , Kuo does not admit any outside cause which would be deeper than p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f . Now I would l i k e to turn b r i e f l y to Seki Masao's treatment of the problem of the relationship of being and 37 non-being. He suggests four possible ways i n which wu and yu. might be connected. They may be summarized as follows: (1) When Tao and l i _ , conceived as wu, begin their influence i n the formless being, then that being becomes perceivable. (2) Tao and l i , being i n the formless being, become things when they reach the stage of being perceived as conforming to the true substance of that thing. (3) Things are those l i m i t e d beings which perceptual knowledge can grasp, whereas non-being i s that r e a l i t y grasped by conceptual knowledge. (4) The one whose knowledge surpasses a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s has his knowledge joined with the evolution of primordial being, which i s the wu of Tao. But i n the process of evolution, t h i s knowledge i s separated from < Seki Masao, "Ko So no Shoshi", p. 61. 215. i t s object which i t thinks of as "other" Then things become known as things. Although Seki i s of the opinion the Kuo Hsiang does not provide s u f f i c i e n t material to decide between these alternatives, some of them are much less plausible than others. The t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e i s easiest to re j e c t , since we have j u s t seen that conceptual knowledge i s lim i t e d knowledge for Kuo Hsiang. We should not i d e n t i f y conceptual knowledge with the i n t u i t i v e , i n t e g r a l knowledge of Kuo's sage. Hence this d i v i s i o n of knowledge into perceptual and conceptual i s inappropriate. As for the f i r s t a lternative, the r e a l problem i s not to know when things are perceivable, but to know what i s the nature of the influence of Tao and 1^ on the formless being. In a sense, Seki i s begging the question. He is assuming that there i s some primordial unity p r i o r to any wu/yu. d i v i s i o n . However, Kuo does not have a simple inclu s i o n of wu i n the primordial being. In comment (27) he denies that the formless perfect unity arises from non-being,, yet i n comment (28) there i s the suggestion that gaining knowledge of the formless led one to non-being. The same problem exists i n the case of Seki's fourth alternative. I think Seki i s correct i n assuming that for Kuo the sage's knowledge transcends a l l d i s t i n c t i o n s and that the evolution of knowledge involved a separation of the sagely subject from the object of his knowledge. But 216. what i s the object of that o r i g i n a l knowledge? Is i t indeed a primordial unity which somehow encompasses both being and non-being? Or i s Seki saying that wu i s a concept which i s nothing more than a by-product of the separation of the subject and object? A careful reading of comment (27) indicates that this i nterpretation may be possible. It says only that non-being i s not the source, but does not say that the source i s therefore being. The wu/yu d i s t i n c t i o n could be conceived as a r i s i n g after the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the one. But Kuo also points out that the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the one does not wait upon knowledge, and therefore wu cannot merely be an epistemo-l o g i c a l construct. Seki's second alternative depends on what i s meant by l i "conforming to the true substance",jisshitsu to shokusuru %. ~^ ^ ^  ' ^ ^ e m e a n s s o m e kind of dire c t i d e n t i t y of l i with the true substance of things, then t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e i s also inadequate. Substance i s a word with many shades of meaning, but a l l seem to imply some kind of material r e a l i t y at the base of things. Seki describes IA as substance when he discusses the lim i t e d aspect of p r i n c i p l e s . However, as I have argued above, l i i s not matter or stuff, but the organization, the patterns of things. On the other hand i f he supposes that this "conformity" i s harmonious agreement with the material basis of things, so that organizing p r i n c i p l e s only agree with the nature of the 217. substance, then his argument may be more plausible. It may be analogous to saying, for example, that clay may be shaped into a pot, but not into a broom. When that j o i n i n g of p r i n c i p l e and substance takes place, then the p r i n c i p l e s become perceivable. However, this analogy: breaks down when examined further. I A represents the order and structure of things. Then there cannot be d i f f e r e n t kinds of material apart f r o m . l i . There i s already a s t r u c t u r a l difference between the materials of clay and straw, for example. Logicall y , one i s driven back to the p o s i t i o n that the substance must.be t o t a l l y formless. A l l form must originate with the action of p r i n c i p l e s . Then what content can be put into the concept of conforming to the true substance? In English,, at least, the very word "conform" implies that some form i s previously present. The puzzle of what conforming may mean might f i n d an answer i n Kuo's concept of tzu jan. As we have seen to some extent already, Kuo thinks that one...must always r e l y on the way things are i n themselves. The idea of conformity might be expressed as allowing natural, that i s , uncaused, processes to develop without interference. In the evolution of the i n e f f a b l e , primordial unity, p r i n c i p l e s , as s e l f -operating e n t i t i e s , never i n t e r f e r e with the self-development or self-production of the o r i g i n a l unity. In his fourth alternative, Seki implied that the wu/yu 218. d i v i s i o n . i s an evolution from the primordial unity. Although I think Kuo rejects the epistemological slant of Seki's argument, i t i s worth investigating whether or not t h i s evolution occurs as part of n a t u r a l l y harmonious whole which unfolds according to i t s own natural essence. Could tzu jan,. the p r i n c i p l e of self-operation, be Kuo's court of l a s t resort, the common element between wu and yu? TZU JAN Kuo Hsiang uses tzu jan more frequently than any thinker we have examined thus f a r . As. synonyms he uses tzu jo and tzu erh § , f| |^ . Another word with nearly the same meaning as tzu jan i s tu huajj|| , "to singly transform" or "self-transformation", which implies that things change without outside causes. I s h a l l divide my discussion of tzu j an and these re l a t e d words into two broad categories, f i r s t , the relationship of man (and other things) to tzu jan, and second, the r e l a t i o n of Heaven, Tao, and related concepts such a s : l i to tzu jan. Each man, according to Kuo, i s endowed with a nature which has a very s p e c i f i c capacity. As we have seen, one attains perfection, or f u l l s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n ( ^. £ f ) through following one's nature, that i s , the way one i s i n himself. Kuo brings these concepts together as he offers a d e f i n i t i o n of tzu j an and describes i t as a standard 219. for things: (37) "Heaven and earth" i s the general name f o r a l l creatures. Heaven and earth take the creatures as t h e i r body, and a l l the creatures take tzu j an as t h e i r standard. Tzu jan means not acting but being n a t u r a l l y so. Therefore the great P'eng bird's a b i l i t y to go high and the quail's a b i l i t y to stay low, the Ch'un tree's a b i l i t y to l i v e long, and the morning mushroom's a b i l i t y to l i v e a short time are a l l natural capacities, and not the capacities of contrived action. That they do not contrive these things but are able to do them of them-selves i s how they become correct. Therefore to "mount the standard of Heaven and earth" means to follow the nature of things. To "ride the regulation of the six breaths" i s to wander on the road of change. T r a v e l l i n g i n this way, where can one go and reach a l i m i t ? f! « tn ?fr ^ f i IS? %3E. * • tit M mi L%l%t*$£> t%% # * tit iM @ a t m Rtt s r & ft $, *t & ± M % &o * & ft b &:rM «A * ° j %\ t«r H *i ^  1? (Ch. 1, 1.5a) n n Kuo continues by saying that a man who follows both the natures of things and a l l changes i s t r u l y independent. But since he follows other creatures, he i s dependent on them. He gains independence through dependence, and thus there i s no r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n between independence and dependence. The dependence of things i s t h e i r allotment, and t h e i r perfection, 38 of course, l i e s i n remaining dependent. O Q A t r a n s l a t i o n of the f u l l paragraph may be found i n 220. Tzu jan i s connected with a number of things i n t h i s paragraph. The basic contrast seems to be that of natural (tzu jan) action to contrived action. Non-action or non-contrivance i s for Kuo not merely a task of the rule r , as i n pre-Han thinkers, nor even an a t t r i b u t e of heaven, as i n the case of Wang Ch'ung. The sage who transcends a l l differences, of course, must act without contrivance, but so must every other creature i n some degree. The Huai nan tzu already advocated, following the self-so nature and conceived of 39 wu-wei as.relying on tzu jan. I t also implied that man i n general had to act without contrivance, although i t s main injunction was directed at r u l e r s . Kuo Hsiang puts r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on each i n d i v i d u a l thing to f u l f i l his capacity through the means of non-contrivance and following of tzu  j an. Only man among the creatures i s able to contrive action, and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y therefore rests on him to take the non-human things as his model. At the same time, no i n d i v i d u a l man can achieve his maximum capacity merely on his own strength, but requires an enlightened r u l e r . (See Ch. 7, 3.17a) "Following nature" i n comment (37) means to accord with the natures of a l l things, but Kuo i s also concerned that each i n d i v i d u a l must accord with his own nature i n p a r t i c u l a r : Birthe Arendrup, "Guo Xiang's Commentary", pp. 339-340. A p a r t i a l t r a n s l a t i o n i s found i n Chan, Sourcebook, p. 326, no. 4. and i n Fung, History, II p. 233. 3 9See Chapter 2, pp. 61-62. . . •_; • " » 221. (38) Now following one's nature and immediately proceeding i s natural. It i s also natural that one might i n his going harm his nature, but having harmed his nature be able to correct himself. £ % 44 A fr% $ & «n f f 4 i ; 4 M | * %l tt i * t « (Ch. 6, 3.14a) Kuo i s here commenting on an exchange between Y i Erh-tzu and Hstl.Yu. Hsil Yu says that Y i Erh-tzu has damaged his nature, so he cannot expect free wandering. Y i Erh-tzu r e p l i e s that HsU Yu cannot know whether the Creator might change him a g a i n . ^ Kuo substitutes t z u J a n f ° r Chuang tzu's "Creator". Kuo does not mean to say that tzu jan i s an ent i t y which creates things, but that i n fact there i s no creator, that things as they are i n themselves i s the deepest l e v e l of existence. Here Kuo i s saying that t h i s deepest l e v e l of existence i s not only present when one pe r f e c t l y follows his nature, but also can operate i n imperfect situations as a corrective. Kuo thus conceives the world as e s s e n t i a l l y good, so. good that i t has b u i l t into i t s structure the p o s s i b i l i t y . o f redemption, i f one only returns to creation's f i r s t p r i n c i p l e . Naturally one who i n fact achieves accord with his nature gets beyond a lim i t e d existence and wanders where there are no traces (Ch. 22, 7.24b). Since Kuo did not believe i n a Creator, the idea of self-production i s an important correlate of the concept of See B. Watson, Chuang tzu, pp. 89-90. 222. tzu j an. We have already seem the question of self-production .  i n comment (27). In denying that either being or non-being gives b i r t h to things, Kuo i n s i s t s that things merely appear. This i s stated most c l e a r l y i n his comments i n Chapter 2 on the piping of Heaven, 4^ where, afte r the denial that yu and wu produce things, Kuo says, (39) ...then what i s that which produces l i v i n g things? Clod-like, they are merely s e l f -produced. They are merely self-produced; i t i s not that an Ego produces them. An Ego does not produce things, and things cannot produce the Ego, therefore I am so of myself. I t i s from myself only that I am so, thus i t i s said (I am) made that way by Heaven. Being that way from Heaven means that things were not i n t e n t i o n a l l y created, therefore (Chuang tzu) uses the word Heaven to speak of them. Using "Heaven" to speak of them i s that by which he makes clear that they are so of themselves. How could he be r e f e r r i n g to the azure sky? ...Therefore a l l things are s e l f -produced and there i s nothing that they came from. This i s the way of heaven.^2 (Ch. 2, 1.11b) Kuo says that the fact that everything acts i n some kind of order makes i t appear that there i s a creator of things or ^ x I b i d . p. 37. Also translated i n Chan, Sourcebook, p. 328, no. 11, and i n Fung, History, I I , p. 209. 223. a true lord. But i n fact there i s no such thing (see Ch. 2, A- 3 A A 1.12b and 1.25a ). Kuo does not deny that things re-produce according to genus and species. Things produce one another according to the i r forms, but these are s t i l l a l l natural processes. Therefore, he says, that things with wombs or eggs cannot a l t e r t h e i r basic type means that some s p i r i t u a l force cannot a l t e r them either (Ch. 22, 7.24b). No matter which point of view one takes, i t i s impossible for man to answer the question why things are as they are; they are that way of themselves and one cannot f i n d a deeper cause (Ch. 1, 1.3a and Ch. 2, 1.25a). Wang Ch'ung was the f i r s t to explore the question of s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n . ^ Wang placed ch'i as his ultimate material from which a l l things evolved under the operating p r i n c i p l e of tzu jan. For Wang the self-production of things was only the manifest side of the se l f - e v o l u t i o n of c h ' i . Kuo refers to ch'i occasionally and i t i s possible that he might consider i t an explanation for differences among the creatures. The only passage I have found which suggests this are Kuo's comments on a reference to a li f e - s p a n i n the Chuang tzu. When the Chuang tzu says that, Also translated i n Chan, Sourcebook,p. 329, no. 12. Also translated i n Fung, History, II, p. 210. 'See Chapter 2, pp. 121-123. 224. ...of those who receive th e i r l i f e - s p a n from earth, the pine and cypress stand alone--Summer and Winter they are green. Kuo remarks, (40) The pine and cypress are s p e c i a l l y endowed with natural, heavy ch' i . Therefore they are able to be extraordinary among a l l the trees. It i s not that they are able to contrive something and thereby obtain i t (long l i f e ) . *- % % Hi '4 (Ch. 5, 2.17a) The Chuang tzu goes on to say that the sage-king Shun stood out among those who receive th e i r l i f e - s p a n from heaven. Kuo comments, (41) This says that he who s p e c i a l l y receives the natural, correct c h ' i i s extremely rare. Below there i s only the cypress and pine; above there i s only the sage. Therefore a l l those who are not correct come to seek the correct. If...men would each correct themselves, then they would not envy the great sage and chase aft e r him. "f o i # £ ± . * £ * i ^ . f l r P f k % P # , -t- i i'J °1M ^ A „ ^ ft * & % £ (Ch. 5, 2.17a-b) Kuo seems to have accepted a theory of c h ' i i n connection with lif e - s p a n , but he also remarks that one must correct ^The Ssu-pu pei-yao e d i t i o n reads che yfe i n place of shou . I follow ".the Sung Blockprint c i t e d above i n note 26, p. 112 and the Chuang tzu pu-cheng, 2c;4b. There i s no difference i n meaning. 225. himself. One can only correct himself by maximizing his allotment, so c l e a r l y allotment or capacity must be something other than endowed c h ' i . What was a fated, natural process for Wang Ch'ung has been reduced to a st a r t i n g point for Kuo Hsiang. Of course, Wang allowed that through education one might a l t e r his situation, but such cases were exceptional. For Kuo the i n i t i a l c h ' i i s complete or correct i n only a few cases, and most men must correct themselves. Moreover, for Wang Ch'ung, heavy and l i g h t c h'i acted as an instrument of individuation. It appears to function somewhat that way for Kuo as well. The pine and cypress are individuated by thei r heavy c h ' i , but i n the case of man, the allotment of ch'i i s only a factor at the s t a r t i n g point, and i s thereafter modified by man's intentional, voluntary a c t i v i t y . Man i s not fated by his endowment of ch'i but by his allotment. Wang Ch'ung never asked where c h ' i came from. The concept of self-production was lim i t e d wholly to describing the evolution of c h ' i . But Kuo says that i f being s e l f - s o means a thing i s self-produced, then the realm of being i t s e l f i s self-produced. Furthermore, the self-production of being i s somehow eternal. Kuo says i n comment (27) that the perfect unity at the beginning of things came suddenly into existence. This i s re-inforced i n the following important passage: (42) What i s there that i s p r i o r to things? I might suppose that y i n and yang are p r i o r , but y i n and yang are just what we c a l l things. What further might there be before 226. y i n and yang? I might suppose that tzu jan i s before i t , but tzu jan i s ju s t the way things are of themselves. I might suppose the perfect Tao to be before i t , but the perfect Tao i s ultimate nothingness, which i s nothing, so how could i t be prior? Then what i s i t that i s prior? Yet there are s t i l l things without end. This makes clear that things are so of themselves. "It i s not that they are caused to be so.47 f l * t$H% tft * f . - g * & % A % X ^ t # k I S %. '3 *A 2. ^ 1S\ £ & #/S £ 1 & <&y &p^Al~ ^ ^ tg e,. k& ^ , *t % i% ts (Ch. 22, 7.29a-b) Kuo i s here not concerned f i r s t of a l l with asking what was the f i r s t thing but with asking what kind of r e a l i t y might there be from which things could a r i s e . He considers yin-yang, the Tao, and.tzu jan, but rejects them a l l . It i s inter e s t i n g that he does not propose the perfect unity to which he referred i n comment (27). I t leads one to think that Kuo regards the primordial unity as a thing. Although th i s i s an argument from silence, i t s omission here casts some doubt on Seki's suggestion that wu and. yu are d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of the primordial unity. Kuo's conclusion, a f t e r eliminating a l l things that might be p r i o r to things, i s that this makes clear that things must be s e l f - s o . What his argument 4 7 A l s o translated i n Fung, History, II, p. 208. 227. actually makes clear i s that things are self-produced, and thus Kuo i d e n t i f i e s the concept of tzu sheng, s e l f -production, with the concept of tzu jan. In the process of asking whether tzu jan i s p r i o r to things, Kuo says that i t i s an at t r i b u t e of things, a l b e i t their most fundamental one. From comment (42) at least, i t appears to stand i n contrast to the perfect Tao. However, in a number of passages Kuo appears to connect or i d e n t i f y tzu j an with Heaven or the Tao. Many of these passages are of the same type as comment (39). They occur when Kuo Hsiang translates the terminology of the. Chuang tzu into his own terminology. Several times, when the Chuang tzu uses heaven to account for the order and nature of things, Kuo remarks that by "heaven", the Chuang tzu r e a l l y means tzu jan (For example, see Ch. 6, 3.1a-b). In a few cases, Kuo seems to r e l y on heaven as a source of order: (43) He.who follows tzu j an and forgets ( d i s t i n c t i o n s of) r i g h t and wrong embodies and uniquely follows the truth of heaven and nothing more. ^ 1ft i« % * ,1 % +-JB f£ (Ch. 2, 1.10a) The "truth of heaven" i s probably a reference to human nature. Although i t i s implied that heaven i s the source of one's nature, i t i s l i k e l y that t h i s i s an i s o l a t e d use of a commonplace notion. The vast majority of Kuo's writing 228. places the source of order i n the concepts of p r i n c i p l e and tzu jan. Thus when the Chuang tzu says that there i s some-thing superior to heaven, Kuo says this i s self-transformation, tu h u a ^ g 1 ^ : (44) By "superior" he i s talking about s e l f -transformation. The achievements of mutual dependence are never as good as the perfection of self-transformation. Therefore that which man r e l i e s on is. heaven. Those things that heaven produces are self-transforming... Self-transformation i s perfected i n the r e a l m ^ f dark mystery. (Ch. 6, 3.4b) For the Chuang tzu the word heaven i s often a synonym for Tao. Kuo makes no such i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . He sees heaven as an important, but not universal, element i n natural processes, whose workings are subordinate to the p r i n c i p l e of tzu jan. Kuo holds the Tao and tzu jan s t r i c t l y apart. Tzu jan is an at t r i b u t e of the functioning of things, and the perfect Tao i s divorced from things. This divorce forces Kuo to disagree with the text at some points and to misinterpret i t at others. For example, when Lao Tan i s explaining the perfect Tao to Confucius, he says the follower of the Way 4 8 I read che ^ for erh ^ following the Sung blockprint e d i t i o n . 229. responds to a l l things. He then says, Heaven cannot help but be high, earth cannot help but be broad,: the sun. and moon cannot help but revolve, and the creatures cannot help but f l u o r i s h . Is thi s not the Way?49 The closing sentence reads tz 'u ch' i tao yil f^cfc. ^  |& . The c h ' i here should be read as a modal interrogative, and the sentence should be a r h e t o r i c a l question requiring a po s i t i v e answer. Therefore the tr a n s l a t i o n should read, "Is t h i s not the Tao?" or "Surely, this i s the Tao." Kuo comments, (45) This says that a l l these (natural processes) must be the way they are, and they are that way of themselves. It i s not that the Tao i s able to cause them to be so. t jfcfc £ * f$ * & «j I ft? * a 4* ± %% fc'tk (Ch. 22, 7.25a) Thus Kuo expands the Chuang tzu text by noting that the Tao does not cause things to be so. Kuo i s correct about the lack of causation i n the intent of the Chuang tzu text, but one wonders whether he does not hold the natural state of things and the Tao separate, rather than i d e n t i f y i n g them as the Chuang tzu does. In another passage dealing with the Tao, Kuo apparently substitutes tzu jan for the Tao. When a man c a l l e d Knowledge and the Yellow Emperor discuss how one gets to know the Way, the Yellow Emperor concludes that they do not come near to the way because they know i t . Kuo remarks, The t r a n s l a t i o n i s that of Burton Watson, Chuang 230. (46) This makes i t clear that tzu jan i s not obtainable by words or knowledge. Therefore i t faces.the darkness i n the land without words. (Ch. 22, 7.23a) Since the question of the paragraph i s how one comes to know the Tao, Kuo's comment implies that one comes to know i t through the knowledge of tzu jan., We cannot conclude that he i d e n t i f i e s the two, but at least i t i s clear that the knowledge one does have of tzu jan does not have the character of discursive knowledge. If one's knowing of tzu jan i s then not discursive knowledge, what sort of knowledge i s i t then? I think we must return to concepts already introduced .in my discussion of Wang Pi.. For Kuo as well as Wang, tzu jan i s a general term for the concrete uniqueness of each i n d i v i d u a l thing. Its uniqueness can be grasped only i n the concrete experience of the thing, and i s not attainable through abstract t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge. When one struggles to r e a l i z e the self-existence of the t o t a l i t y of things, Kuo believes one never finds any further answer beyond the bare fact of th e i r self-existence. As knowledge probes to this boundary, i t faces only darkness; there i s nothing beyond. The sage who has f i n a l l y gone to the edge of darkness turns and sees a l l of r e a l i t y i n harmony Tzu, p. 239. 231. when he r e a l i z e s the bare fact of i t s self-existence. Before concluding t h i s section, I would l i k e to turn once more to Seki Masao. He divides the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of tzu jan into three aspects: (1) the unknowability of the basis of subjective existence, (2) the baseless, uncaused, and accidental nature of being, and (3) an unlimited, necessary causal chain, which f i n a l l y extends back to the i . . . . . 50 ultimate o r i g i n . The f i r s t aspect i s i n fact reducible to the second one. Knowledge of the basis of subjective, factual existence i s impossible because a basis does not exist. Seki i s p e r f e c t l y correct i n asserting that for Kuo the nature of being i s baseless and uncaused. When we consider being as a whole, then we must consider that Kuo says there was no being and then "suddenly" i t was. Seki's t h i r d point i s more d i f f i c u l t to deal with. He i s c l e a r l y r e f e r r i n g to the function of the p r i n c i p l e of tzu j an among in d i v i d u a l creatures of the world. I. agree that the. concept of tzu jan assumes that the creatures of the world are connected with the ultimate o r i g i n . There i s also a certain causality i n that connection, a chain to the ultimate o r i g i n . However, i t s necessity i s not a r i g i d , mechanical necessity. Kuo Hsiang's world i s not the world of Leibnez, i n which every monad has b u i l t into i t a Seki Masao, "Ko So no Shoshi", p. 51. 232. pre-established harmony so that i t s self-motivated action i s i n harmony with the action of a l l other beings. Rather, I believe we must think of Kuo's concept of necessity as an organic one. Certain needs are b u i l t into the body. The body i s strong when they are f u l l y met and becomes weaker as the needs, are met less well. If one wishes a healthy body, then i t i s necessary to meet the needs of the body. Kuo says that i f one wishes the world to be harmonious, a l l creatures must be allowed to follow t h e i r own natures, and to accord with the way things are of themselves. Kuo's'unspoken assumption that harmony between creatures i s a natural state can be found e x p l i c i t i n the Huai nan tzu, which argued that things are both self-so and mutually so."'"'" Four centuries l a t e r , Kuo assumes that when things are s e l f -52 so, there w i l l , be no c o n f l i c t . In the Huai nan tzu thi s assumption was guaranteed by the workings of the Tao. Kuo rejects the workings of the Tao i n the realm of being, and he r e a l l y provides no substitute. P r i n c i p l e s possess a morally.good order, but they too are governed by the p r i n c i p l e of tzu Jan. Although Kuo does not say thi s e x p l i c i t l y , I venture to guess that the harmony between creatures i s guaranteed by the fact of t h e i r evolution from the perfect one. As long as the evolution proceeds without interference, there 5 1See Chapter 2, pp. 62-63. r o For i l l u s t r a t i o n s of thi s concept, see Seki Masao, "Ko So no Shoshi", p. 52 233. can be no disharmony. It was perfect i n the beginning and thus would have no source from which disharmony could r e s u l t . When one compares the realms of non-being and being, then tzu jan i t s e l f i s the guarantee of harmony. Since the natures of the two realms are r a d i c a l l y separate, disharmony between them, could only r e s u l t from some kind of inte r a c t i o n . Since each pursues Its own course, t h i s i s impossible. THE CONCEPT OF NATURE It i s not immediately obvious that Kuo Hsiang's view of tzu jan i s a view of nature as such. Tzu jan surely means "natural" at many points i n his commentary. At the same time tzu jan carries a l l the weight of an ultimate p r i n c i p l e . Kuo has no other point of reference for the concept of tzu jan, except that other, less basic, concepts point to it.. Previously we noted that tzu jan could function as a signal of a r e l i g i o u s absolute i n that i t implied the absence of a l l . outside forces and,thus implied ultimate independence and r e l i a b i l i t y . But i n Kuo tzu j an i t s e l f , conceived, as the fac t of c o l l e c t i v e self-production and self-determination of a l l things, has these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . As Kuo becomes skeptical about conceiving non-being as the o r i g i n of being, tzu jan becomes the most fundamental r e a l i t y known to .man. I do not mean to say that Kuo viewed tzu jan as a thing or basic substance. He has not quite come to the point of replacing the Tao with tzu Jan. He has 234. placed the l i m i t s of human knowledge at the knowledge of tzu jan. . He i s skeptical about knowledge of the Origin of a l l things, and w i l l only say that the s e l f - i d e n t i t y of things and the eternal self-production of things i s a l l one can know. Because he has no concept of a great Origin, we have had d i f f i c u l t y i n finding what i s the guarantee of harmony.for Kuo. S t i l l , the assumption of harmony i s so strong that Kuo never sees i t as a problem. Is nature or the natural a model.or law for human action? Kuo would deny that the world of nature, that i s , animals, plants, and mineral or physical things, i s t r u l y a standard f o r the world of man and his culture. Some of Kuo's examples, of course, are taken from natural objects.which produce a model of unfettered tzu jan, but tzu jan runs equally across a l l strata of r e a l i t y . Each thing, event, or s i t u a t i o n has i t s own natural outcome within i t s own sphere of operation (fen '/j ) . Even c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y has i t s own natural cause, through completing that which by nature seeks completion. The all-pervasiveness of the p r i n c i p l e of tzu jan makes an appeal to the world of nature almost unnecessary. Rather, Kuo's attention i s directed to the natural g i f t s of the sage and to the t o t a l s o c i a l harmony which w i l l r e s u l t when the sage and a l l other beings under his r u l e , subject to h i s s i l e n t , harmonious understanding, f u l f i l t h e i r own natural capacity. In such an i d e a l society, each i n d i v i d u a l obtains the Taoist i d e a l of free and easy wandering through l i f e . 235. CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION KUO HSIANG'S INFLUENCE Kuo Hsiang's commentary became the standard commentary on the Chuang tzu. In general, Kuo has not been recognized as one of the great figures i n the hi s t o r y of Chinese philosophy. The very authorship of his work has been the subject of controversy, and he always seems to suffer by comparison with the youthful prodigy, Wang P i . In many ways his thought was also eclipsed by the entrance of Buddhism into Chinese philosophical thought i n the fourth century. The next s i g n i f i c a n t interpreter of the Chuang tzu a f t e r Kuo was Chih Tun % */J (314-366), whose inte r p r e t a t i o n of the Chuang tzu i n terms of Buddhist concepts moved i n a d i r e c t i o n which was not anticipated by Kuo Hsiang. Nevertheless, Kuo's commentary continues to be read and valued up to the present. I have made no general study of the influence of Kuo's thought. Indeed there i s a cer t a i n h i s t o r i c a l backwardness i n attempting to f i n d such influences, but I would l i k e to o f f e r as an i s o l a t e d example a story found at Tun Huang and translated by Arthur Waley. The story i s e n t i t l e d "The Swallow and the Sparrow" and i s a long poem about a dispute over a house which the sparrow steals from the swallow. The swallow brings the dispute to the court of the Phoenix where i t i s resolved. The sparrow and swallow return home as friends, only to be upbraided by a busy-body heron for disputing over such a t r i f l i n g matter. The swallow and sparrow 236. demand that he explain himself. The heron r e p l i e s , The heron's heart has long been set on things far away, Concerning which the Swallow and Sparrow are quite uninformed. In one morning he can s a i l far above the blue clouds; In three years he f l i e s and sings j u s t at thi s time. This, of course, i s a reference to the story of the great P'eng b i r d i n Chapter 1 of the Chuang tzu. The swallow and the sparrow reply, however, with Kuo Hsiang's interpretation to close the discussion. The great rukh sets out on i t s journey to the south While the l i t t l e wren nests on i t s one bough. Yet each finds contentment i n i t s own haunts; So why question the knowledge of us two creatures. KUO HSIANG'S DEPENDENCE ON THE HAN DYNASTY The two major pre-Han uses of tzu j an do p e r s i s t i n Kuo Hsiang's thought, although what was once two rather separate themes, namely tzu j an as a signal of r e l i g i o u s r e l i a b i l i t y and tzu jan as a description of a natural state of a f f a i r s , were joined together. This l i n k i n g of two themes was accomplished by developments i n the Han dynasty on which Kuo's thought depended. We may divide these developments into three main areas, namely, the r e l i a b i l i t y of tzu j an, the concept of s e l f -pro due tion, and the association of tzu jan with a multiple r e a l i t y , the "ten-thousand things". Arthur Waley, Ballads and Stories from Tun-huang (London: George A l l e n & Unwin, Ltd., 1960) p. 24. 237. I t was i n the Huai nan t z u th a t the two themes o f pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e were f i r s t j o i n e d . The n a t u r a l world was i t s e l f r e l i a b l e , because i t was t z u j an. The f u n c t i o n of t z u j a n as a s i g n a l of a r e l i g i o u s a b s o l u t e was t r a n s f e r r e d to the f u n c t i o n of t z u j an as an i n d i c a t i o n of a n a t u r a l , u n f e t t e r e d s t a t e . The n a t u r a l s t a t e which was fo r m e r l y seen as the r e s u l t of wisdom and as a r e s u l t o f f o l l o w i n g the Tao, was made a pre -c o n d i t i o n f o r wisdom and a v e h i c l e by which to g a i n knowledge of the Tao. T h i s dependence on t z u j an f o r wisdom i s a b a s i c element i n Kuo Hsiang's thought, although he m o d i f i e d the T a o i s t p o i n t of view of the Huai nan t z u by making t z u j an a p r o p e r t y o f c u l t u r a l as w e l l as n a t u r a l development. In extending t z u j an to c u l t u r a l development, Kuo i s a l s o broadening the v e r y concept of nature. The e n t i r e world i s r e g u l a t e d a c c o r d i n g to n a t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s , a l a w f u l order imbedded i n r e a l i t y i t s e l f . Whereas i n the Huai nan t z u , c u l t u r e c o p i e d nature, f o r Kuo Hsiang the ve r y boundary between c u l t u r e and nature i s made subordinate to t h i s more u n i v e r s a l , l a w f u l order. The c o n n e c t i o n o f t z u j an w i t h s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n was f i r s t made by Wang Ch'ung. Wang r e a l i z e d t h a t to produce something o r g i v e l i f e to i t c o u l d not be done without a l s o g i v i n g form to the product. I t i s im p o s s i b l e merely to produce the e x i s t e n c e of a t h i n g without a l s o determining how i t e x i s t s . T h e r e f o r e when Wang a s s e r t e d t h a t a l l c r e a t u r e s o f the world are s e l f - s o , he a l s o took the step o f a s s e r t i n g t h a t the c r e a t u r e s are s e l f - p r o d u c e d . T h i s was important f o r Wang because i t guaranteed t h a t no i n t e n t i o n a l i t y 238. on the p a r t o f heaven was p o s s i b l e , nor cou l d he be accused o f having c h ' i r e p l a c e heaven as the c o n s c i o u s l y r u l i n g f o r c e o f the u n i v e r s e . In a d d i t i o n to the l o g i c o f t z u j a n which compelled Wang to take t h i s step, Wang a l s o l i v e d i n a time i n which there was focus on the i d e a o f the c r e a t i o n o f the world. The Huai nan t z u , on which Wang depended h e a v i l y , was the f i r s t work to d e s c r i b e c r e a t i o n out of chaos, even mentioning the be g i n n i n g o f the Tao 2 i n the s e t t i n g o f the great V a c u i t y . Although Wang Ch'ung does not ask where c h ' i comes from, h i s concern w i t h how things came to be i s probably a response to d i s c u s s i o n s o f h i s time. Kuo Hsiang took t h i s theme of s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n a step f u r t h e r and d e a l t w i t h the problem o f the s e l f - p r o d u c t i o n o f the u n i v e r s e . L i k e Wang Ch'ungjKuo i s compelled to say that i f e x i s t e n t t h i n g s , or the a b s t r a c t i o n t h e r e o f - - " B e i n g " , i s t z u j an, then i t must a l s o be s e l f - p r o d u c e d and cannot be the product o f the Tao or the Void . The t h i r d way i n which Kuo i s indebted to Han dynasty developments i s the l i m i t a t i o n o f the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t z u j an to c r e a t u r e l y r e a l i t y . C e r t a i n l y , t h i s l i m i t a t i o n was presen t i n the Huai nan t z u , i n Wang Ch'ung, and i n the Wei-Chin s c h o l a r s , Wang P i and Juan C h i . On the other hand, some works f o l l o w e d the example of the Lao t z u . In both the Hsiang-erh commentary and the T ' a i For a d i s c u s s i o n o f Chinese c r e a t i o n myths see N. J . G i r a r d o t , "The Problem o f C r e a t i o n Mythology i n the Study o f Chinese R e l i g i o n , " H i s t o r y of R e l i g i o n s 15, no. 4 (May, 1976) 289-318. 239. p'ing ching, the Tao i s represented as having tzu jan as a p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . However th i s opposition can be reconciled to some extent. I believe the conception of the Tao i n pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e was such that the Tao was intimately involved i n the structures of manifested r e a l i t y . By contrast, there i s a more abstract conception of the Tao i n the Wei-Chin period. The d i v i s i o n conceived between being and non-being and the t h e o r e t i c a l struggles to describe the l i n k between them are i n d i c a t i v e of this abstract conception of the Tao, conceived as non-being. I suspect the l y r i c a l passages of the Chuang tzu on the role of the Tao i n the world were somewhat puzzling to Wei-Chin l i t e r a t i . Kuo Hsiang's disagreements with the Chuang tzu text r e f l e c t s this puzzlement. It i s as i f the Tao were removed from the p o s i t i o n of immanence i n the world, which i t held i n pre-Han l i t e r a t u r e , to a p o s i t i o n of transcendance among the Wei-Chin scholars. Once that removal had taken place, i t was thought no longer appropriate to apply the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c tzu j an to the Tao. BASIC PATTERNS IN KUO HSIANG SKEPTICISM At f i r s t glance Kuo Hsiang does not seem to be a l i k e l y candidate for the epithet "skeptic". He i s a champion of s o c i a l order and i s generally viewed a synthesizer of Confucian and Taoist t r a d i t i o n s . He also never announces that he i s a skeptic, never openly drawing the conclusion which I believe must be drawn. I t i s i n the context of the major philosophical problem 240. of the Mystery Learning movement, that of being and non-being, that Kuo i s skep t i c a l . He does not openly doubt the r e a l i t y of non-being, but he can f i n d no content i n the expression "non-being". He doubts f i r s t that man can know anything about non-being, and second that non-being has any influence whatever i n the realm of being. Wang P i , with whom Kuo i s primarily arguing, asserted that tzu jan points beyond i t s e l f into the workings of the Tao, which i s non-being. Although Kuo does not pick up the terminology of ultimate and super-ultimate which Wang P i employed, he does take Wang Pi's p o s i t i o n that tzu jan i s the heart or pinnacle of the realm of being, or r e a l i t y . Then he questions whether tzu j an points beyond i t s e l f to the realm of the Tao. Kuo cannot f i n d i n the concept of tzu jan any compelling reason why i t would re f e r beyond i t s e l f . Kuo does not say that the concept of non-being i s worthless and should be done away with, but only that nothing can be said about i t . There are, as well, a few ambiguous points i n which Kuo's sage seems to have a v i s i o n of the darkness at the edge of r e a l i t y . The sage r e f r a i n s , indeed cannot but r e f r a i n , from speaking of this experience. Kuo hesitates to c a l l this darkness non-being. It i s for this hesitation, the doubt, the reluctance to speak of non-being, and the r e j e c t i o n of every avenue which might connect being and non-being, that I c a l l Kuo a skeptic. Although Kuo did at one point appear to admit that the sage was aware of the name of non-being (see Comment (29)), he has no ontic ground which makes such knowledge possible. In most 241. other respects, that mystical knowledge of the sage i s confined to the apprehension of the self-production and s e l f - i d e n t i t y of creaturely existence. MYSTICISM A second c l a s s i f i c a t i o n which may be applied to Kuo's thought i s that of mysticism. Indeed the whole Mystery Learning movement i s usually thought of as being mystical i n some sense. However, we must distinguish some t y p i c a l patterns i n mysticism before i t can be a useful concept. Mysticism i s a very r i c h concept. There i s i n the l i t e r a t u r e on mysticism a wide variety of description of mystical experiences along with philosophical, psychological, and s o c i o l o g i c a l analyses of those experiences. One can also seek to analyze the mystical experience i n terms of i t s s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n to other forms of r e l i g i o u s experience, as Robert S. Ellwood has done recently i n his work Mysticism and Religion. Kuo Hsiang relates no such experiences to us. We do not know whether he himself had any mystical experiences. What can be discussed however i s whether he lays down ontological conditions such that mystical experience i s not only possible but necessary i n order to know truth. Thus i n applying the term mysticism to Kuo, I am primarily interested i n a philosophical analysis of mysticism. Ellwood points out, with some j u s t i c e , that this kind of analysis i s analysis of the ideology of mysticism 3 and not of the primary mystical experience i t s e l f . However, I Robert S. Ellwood, Mysticism and Religion (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 67. 242. believe that he underestimates the importance of such analysis. A person must be c l a s s i f i e d as a mystical thinker i f he conceives the primary avenue to truth to be through mystical experience. Such an ontological framework predisposes one to seek and f i n d . . -, . 4 mystical experiences. There are two pairs of philosophical concepts i n which mysticism functions. The f i r s t pair i s that of transcendant and non-transcendant realms i n an ontological dualism. In a mystical dualism, the gap between the two realms must be breached i n a mystical way. The other pair of concepts i s that of unity and di v e r s i t y . In a mystical formulation, the unity i s somehow hidden i n the d i v e r s i t y , or separated from the d i v e r s i t y , and must be mystically apprehended. A mystical anthropology can also be formed i n two ways. Man can be conceived to be e n t i r e l y i n the realm of non-transcendence or d i v e r s i t y , and thus l i t e r a l l y j have to step outside of himself (ekstasis) i n order to f i n d truth either i n transcendance or unity. Man may also be conceived to be p a r t i a l l y i n each realm, and thus have to fi n d the p r i n c i p l e of order by an inner mystical experience. As an example of how this framework might be applied, one might argue that i n Wang P i there was a d i s t i n c t i o n of transcendant and non-transcendant realms. Both unity and d i v e r s i t y were present i n the non-transcendant (being).^ The mystical knowledge involved the leap from the ultimate of the realm of being to the super-Although the following discussion of mysticism i s my own, that discussion i s at least informed by R. C. Zaehner, Mysticism: 243. ultimate. Man himself was i n the realm of the non-transcendant, and thus knowledge of non-being was i n some way e c s t a t i c , going beyond oneself. For Kuo Hsiang on the other hand, the true sage the d i s t i n c t i o n s between things are forgotten. I suggest that this i s an example of mystical monism i n which the basic unity i s hidden i n the d i v e r s i t y . Kuo's sage also has a glimpse of non-being, but as we saw i n our struggle with this concept i n Chapter IV, that glimpse i s never spoken of i n the realm of being. For Kuo, mystical knowledge i s necessary for the sage at the pinnacle of his s o c i a l hierarchy. For a l l others acceptance and f u l f i l l m e n t of the i r allotment leads to the free and easy l i f e , Kuo never suggests i n these l a t t e r cases that that f u l f i l l m e n t i s possible only through mystical knowledge of the Tao. Thus i n his general anthropology, Kuo i s decidedly unmystical. Without the sage, however, no one's allotment can be r e a l i z e d f u l l y , and thus Kuo requires at least one mystic i n order to close o f f the hierarchy and complete i t s functioning. THE A PRIORI F i n a l l y , I think Kuo's conception can be f r u i t f u l l y compared with the notion of the a. p r i o r i i n European thought. Kuo's use of tzu j an as the fundamental ordering p r i n c i p l e of r e a l i t y implies that the law which determines the structure of r e a l i t y derives from some point within each creature. In such a position, Sacred and Profane (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). ^See Wing-tsit Chan, "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept l i as P r i n c i p l e , " Ch'ing hua hsiieh-pao \£ x| |£3 jjj has a mystical knowledge of the basic unity of things i n which 4, no. 2 (Feb., 1964) p. 130. 244. the concept of tzu jan leaves something to be desired. There i s something unfinished i n Kuo. He has broken away from seeing the Tao as the source of creaturely existence and i s l e f t with the s e l f - i d e n t i t y of creatures as his highest p r i n c i p l e . But tzu j an i s not a r i c h enough concept of explain the manifold structure of creaturely r e a l i t y . It counsels one to accept one's allotment, but i t provides no reason why one allotment d i f f e r s from another. However, the concept reduces the importance of this uncertainty since happiness can be found i n every allotment. He thereby affirms the fundamentally good nature of the structures of r e a l i t y , but because he has not found another source of order to replace the Tao, he can only describe the workings, the operation of that order. The most general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the theme of the a p r i o r i i n European thought i s that there i s i n man's mind a Reason, the law by which creatures function. Truth i s to be found within man himself. The discovery by man of his r a t i o n a l essence i s also the discovery of the basic p r i n c i p l e s governing r e a l i t y . Since this i s a theme which runs from the early Church Fathers r i g h t up to the twentieth century, I hesitate to try and discuss i t more s p e c i f i c a l l y . I believe even this b r i e f description, however, contrasts s i g n i f i c a n t l y with Kuo's concept of tzu j an. Formally, the concept of tzu jan resembles that of the a p r i o r i i n that the i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e s of things must be allowed to work t h e i r way out, and thereby the world w i l l be well-ordered. Kuo's conception d i f f e r s from the theme of the a p r i o r i i n Europe 245. i n two ways. F i r s t , I think Kuo's conception i s that development i s e s s e n t i a l l y natural and organic rather than r a t i o n a l . Secondly, Kuo's conception i s directed more at solving the question of place and status rather than solving the question of what i s r a t i o n a l truth. The alternatives here are not mutually exclusive, but I suggest that Kuo has c e r t a i n emphases which distinguish his conception. Kuo's conception of the order of the universe i s not r a t i o n a l i s t i c . I do not mean that he i s u i r r a t i o n a l i s t i c , for there i s surely l o g i c i n the patterns of creaturely structures and functions. Kuo's world i s not, however, the necessary working of a universal Reason, nor i s the development of things done on a model of s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l order. The world's order i s achieved by the f u l f i l l m e n t of p o t e n t i a l i t i e s or capacities, whose structures have an i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e of harmony. Kuo never t r i e s to analyze the nature of the harmony. Therefore, i t may be just as speculative to c a l l i t organistic as to c a l l i t r a t i o n a l i s t i c . However, I believe Kuo leans towards an organistic model through the notion of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of place and function. It i s l i k e the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between members of one body; the arm and the leg have t h e i r own job to do, and when each does i t well, the whole functions properly. Kuo i s , of course, not an organistic thinker i n the mold of Oswald Spengler. Kuo's conception does not involve ideas of growth, decline, and reb i r t h of the world. Rather i t i s organistic because in t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s between creatures are 246. perfected when each develops i t s own in t e r n a l capacities, thus contributing to the well-being of the whole body. The non-rationalism of Kuo can also be seen i n aspects of his thought which are d i a l e c t i c a l . According to Kuo, creatures become independent by harmonizing with other creatures, that i s , through a dependence on others. True independence i s achieved only through mutuality. Therefore independence and dependence are not r e a l l y d i f f e r e n t . Since thought i s a process of abstracting and breaking down of r e a l i t y , rationalism leads to a concept of r e a l i t y which i s f i n a l l y a c o l l e c t i o n of separate e n t i t i e s . In n o n - d i a l e c t i c a l rationalism, creatures cannot be both dependent and independent. Therefore, Kuo's recognition of the inter-relatedness of creatures i s an i m p l i c i t denial of rationalism. From the concept of the organic model, i t follows quite r e a d i l y that for Kuo the main problem confronted i n l i f e i s to f i n d one's own place. By contrast, the theme of the a p r i o r i developed i n Europe as an answer to the question, what i s the source of order, or where i s the law through which order comes. For Kuo, however, only the sage has the capacity to know the source of things; the vast majority of creatures cannot know i t . Even for the sage, the capacity to know the course of order i s not guaranteed by the presence of some fragment of the source within him, an a p r i o r i law known to him before any experience of the world. To the question what i s law, Kuo gives the counsel to f i n d the answer i n experience. Following the 247. p r i n c i p l e of tzu jan, l e t each f u l f i l l his in t e r n a l capacity and thus f i n d the true happiness of the free and easy wandering. SUMMARY REMARKS In conclusion, I would l i k e to offer a few generalizations on the topic of this thesis, namely, the concept of nature. As I stated e a r l i e r , the Western concept of nature i s one of our most fundamental concepts. It contains both concepts of o r i g i n and law, and from these i s derived i t s meaning as the cosmic system as a whole. In many ways the Chinese concept of hsing 'fit , (human) nature, seems to be a rough equivalent. It ce r t a i n l y i s etymologically related to " b i r t h " , sheng ft , and serves as a standard for i n d i v i d u a l development. The concept tzu jan begins rather innocuously by comparison with hsing. Although i t had semantic p o t e n t i a l , i t c e r t a i n l y was not a point of high debate i n pre-Han China. I t was only i n the Han dynasty that tzu jan f i r s t took on the character of law. Through the notion of r e l y i n g on natural or spontaneous action, i t became a general standard. Wang Ch'ung linked tzu j an to the concept of ori g i n s , by making i t an aspect of the process of cosmogenesis and of the generic self-production of things. The r i s i n g importance of tzu j an i n the Han dynasty i s also attested by the cosmic significance given to i t i n the Hsiang-erh commentary and the T'ai p'ing ching. In Kuo Hsiang, tzu jan f i n a l l y receives the pos i t i o n of the source of cosmic law and order. It designated the permanent normative conditions under See above, pp. 6-9. 248. which the universe should function both i n natural and c u l t u r a l spheres. The s i m i l a r i t y i n content then between tzu jan and the physis i s s t r i k i n g . A l l that remains i s to discover how ta  tzu jan fo |} became the modern term for "natural world", a development which did not occur i n the period covered by this study. However, i n spite of the s i m i l a r i t i e s with the concept physis, the course of development of the concept tzu jan shows c l e a r l y that we are not merely bringing a Western concept to Chinese philosophy and searching for i t s counterpart, nor i s the i n t e r e s t i n the problem of tzu j an merely that of a Westerner seeking to solve his own problems. The intere s t i n tzu j an i s germaine to the Chinese texts themselves. The s i m i l a r i t i e s one finds give testimony not to a Western myopia but to the universal conditions for a l l human existence. 249. BIBLIOGRAPHY Section I. Primary Texts; In most cases this thesis c i t e s the texts from the c o l l e c t i o n , Ssu-pu p e l yao OD f ^ f ^  (Shanghai: Chung - h u a i Book Co., 1936). When the notes c i t e only a page number for a c l a s s i c a l text, this w i l l be the page number of the Ssu-pu p e l yao. Modern editions and commentaries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whose texts are not c i t e d as a primary source w i l l be l i s t e d as secondary works. In most cases the Ssu-pu p e l yao editions were compared with several other editions. Those which are ci t e d i n the notes with the exception of the well-known Ssu-pu t s ' ung k' an W {^S ^  =fij editions (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936) are c i t e d below. Chuang tzu pu cheng j££ Ty \$ j E (Amplication and correction of the Chuang tzu), L i u Wen-tien ^ , ed. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1947. Chuang tzu jffi £ , with Kuo Hsiang"^ comm. Taipei: I-wen -V P r i n t i n g Co., 1968. Reprint of a Sung dynasty •te ^ . block p r i n t e d i t i o n . Huai nan hung l i e h chieh Hk. , Wang I-luan _£ - , 1590. Jao Tsung-i jgQ . 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