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Great power war, 1815-1945 : an examination of some power politics arguments Moul, William B. 1980

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GREAT POWER WAR, 1815-1945: AN EXAMINATION OF SOME POWER POLITICS ARGUMENTS by William B. Moul B.A., The University of Bri t i s h Columbia, 1968 M.A., The University of British Columbia, 1970 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA i n A p r i l , 1980 William B. Moul, 1980 In presenting th is thes is in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements fo r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e fo r reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission fo r extensive copying of t h i s thes is f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representa t ives . It i s understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thes is f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my wri t ten permission. Department nf \ C K \ - n c c v i - D i \ £ N e : T g The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 • E-6 B P 75-5 I 1 E Table of Contents Chapter I : I n t r o d u c t i o n Great Powers and Bar 1 Overview 7 Chapter I I : Great Power Bar, 1815-1945 20 Chapter I I I : The Balance of Power 37 P r e l i m i n a r i e s 37 The Most Probable Theory 44 Less Probable P r o p o s i t i o n s 52 A l l i a n c e Commitments and war 52 Economic Growth and War 59 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and Mar 66 Bank and War Between Great Powers 70 Chapter IV: A Review of the E x i s t i n g E m p i r i c a l S t u d i e s 85 E c o l o g i c a l F a l l a c i e s and Methodological I n v o l u t i o n 85 A l l i a n c e Commitiments and War 98 Bar and Rates o f I n d u s t r i a l Growth 110 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and Bar 117 Pa i r w i s e D i f f e r e n c e s or Ra t i o s 117 Rank 132 Percentage Shares 135 D e v i a t i o n from Average Share 137 Conclusion , 141 Chapter V: Methods and Theory 143 I n t r o d u c t i o n 143 Rate of I n d u s t r i a l Growth 148 Long Baves 156 A l l i a n c e commitments 160 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n 163 Power C a p a b i l i t i e s 176 Chapter VI: A l l i a n c e s , I n d u s t r i a l Growth, and Great Power Bar 192 I n t r o d u c t i o n 192 A l l i a n c e s and Bar 194 1815 t o 1885 194 1885 to 1939 202 Pacta de Contrahendo 208 Rates of Economic Growth and Bar 216 1815 to 1875 220 Summary 227 1875 t o 1945 228 Summary: 1815-1945 238 R i p p l e s , Waves and Ententes 241 Baves 241 Great Power Ententes 245 Conclusion 249 i Chapter V I I : R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n , Bank and Bar 254 I n t r o d u c t i o n 254 Preponderance and War 257 Changes i n R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War 260 1816 to 1899 264 Summary 1815-1875 277 1900 t o 1939 280 Rank and War 294 1815 t o 1875 298 1860 t o 1899 306 1900 t o 1939 314 Summary 326 Chapter V I I I : C o n c l u s i o n 329 Catalogue and Coda 329 B i b l i o g r a p h y 348 i i TABLES Chapter I : I n t r o d u c t i o n 1:1 State P a r t i c i p a t i o n In War, 1815-1945 1 Chapter I I : Great Power War, 1815-1945 11:1 Types of 'Balance of Power War', 1815-1945 23 11:2 Number of Each Type of I n t e r s t a t e War: Great Powers 24 11:3 I n i t i a t o r s In Great Power I n t e r s t a t e War, 1816-1945 32 11:4 Great Power I n t e r s t a t e War, 1816-1945: D u r a t i o n , S e v e r i t y and Type of P a r t i c i p a t i o n 34 Chapter I I I : The Balance Of Power 111:1 War Performance o f A l l i e d Great Powers by A l l i a n c e C l a s s During L i f e of A l l i a n c e , 1815-1945 58 111:2 P r o p o s i t i o n s Concerning The Incidence of Great I n t e r s t a t e War To Be Tested 82 Chapter IV: A Review Of The E x i s t i n g E m p i r i c a l S t u d i e s IV:1 Some R e s u l t s Concerning A l l i a n c e s And I n t e r s t a t e War 103 IV:2 Power C a p a b i l i t i e s D i s p a r i t y R a t i o s Above And Below The 1.45 L e v e l : War Events, 1850-1965 128 Chapter VI: A l l i a n c e s , I n d u s t r i a l Growth And Great Power War VI:1 Economic Growth Rates and Great Power War, 1815-1875 227 VI:2 Economic Growth Rates and Great Power War, 1815-1945 238 Chapter V I I : R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n , Rank And War VII:1 I n c r e a s e i n RPP and Great Power War, 1815-1875 278 VII:2 I n c r e a s e i n RPP and Great Power War, 1875-1939 292 VII:3 I n c r e a s e i n RPP and Great Power War, 1815-1939 293 Chapter V I I I : C o n c l u s i o n VIII:1 A Summary o f P r o p o s i t i o n s and F i n d i n g s 345 i i i FIGURES Chapter I: I n t r o d u c t i o n 1:1 T h e o r e t i c a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s In The Power P o l i t i c s L i t e r a t u r e 9 1:2 Power P o l i t i c s R e l a t i o n s h i p s Examined In E m p i r i c a l S t u d i e s 14 Chapter IV: A Review Of The E x i s t i n g E m p i r i c a l S t u d i e s IV:1 S c a t t e r p l o t of R e l a t i o n s h i p Between I n d u s t r i a l Development and F o r e i g n C o n f l i c t : H y p o t h e t i c a l Data on Twelve S t a t e s 112 C h a p t e r V: Methods And Theory V:1 A Comparison of 2 Estimates o f Iron P r o d u c t i o n : Prussia/Germany, 1815-1885 153 V:2 The Use of Log T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s I 155 V:3 The Use of Log Transformations I I 155 Chapter VI: A l l i a n c e s , I n d u s t r i a l Growth, And Great Power War VI: 1 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar United Kingdom, 1815-1885 Involvement: 194 VI: 2 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar France, 1815-1885 Involvement: 195 VI: 3 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar R u s s i a , 1815-1885 Involvement: 195 VI: 4 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar A u s t r i a , 1815-1885 Involvement: 196 VI: 5 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar P r u s s i a , 1815-1885 Involvement: 197 VI: 6 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments A u s t r i a , 1815-1885 and Bar: 198 VI: 7 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments P r u s s i a , 1815-1885 and Bar: 198 VI: 8 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments R u s s i a , 1815-1885 and Bar: 199 VI: 9 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments Fra n c e , 1815-1885 and Bar: 200 VI: 10 Defense A l l i a n a e Commitments and Bar: United Kingdom, 1815-1885 201 i v fl VI: 11 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Ear Involvement: I t a l y , 1860-1945 202 VI: 12 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar Involvement: Eussia/OSSE, 1885-1945 203 VI: 13 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar Involvement: France, 1885-1945 205 VI: 14 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar Involvement: Onit e d Kingdom, 1885-1945 205 VI: 15 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar Involvement: Austria-Hungary, 1885-1914 205 VI: 16 A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar Involvement: Germany, 1885-1945 205 VI: 17 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar: Onite d Kingdom, 1885-1945 20 6 VI: 18 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar: France, 1885-1945 206 VI: 19 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar: Eussia/OSSE, 1885-1945 206 VI: 20 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar: Germany, 1885-1945 207 VI: 21 Defense A l l i a n c e Commitments and Bar: Austria-Hungary, 1885-1914 207 VI: 22 Great Pover Ententes and A c t i v i s t Bar A g a i n s t A Non-Great Power, 1815-1885 211 VI: 23 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: France, 1815-1875 219 VI: 24 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: P r u s s i a , 1815-1875 222 VI: 25 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: A u s t r i a , 1815-1875 222 VI: 26 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: R u s s i a , 1815-1875 223 VI: 27 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: On i t e d Kingdom, 1815-1875 225 VI: 28 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: France, 1875-1939 22 8 VI: 29 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: Germany, 1875-1B39 230 VI: 30 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: Austria-Hungary, 1875-1914 231 VI: 31 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: Russia/USSR 231 VI: 32 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: Onited Kingdom, 1875-1939 233 VI: 33 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: I t a l y , 1860-1940 234 VI: 34 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: Japan, 1895-1939 237 VI: 35 Economic Growth Rates and Bar: On i t e d S t a t e s , 1895-194Q 238 VI: 36 Great Power Bars On K o n d r a t i e f f Baves, 1815-1945 241 VI: 37 Economic Growth, Ententes, and A c t i v i s t Bar A g a i n s t a Non-Great Power: Russia, 1815-1885 246 VI: 38 Economic Growth, Ententes, and A c t i v i s t Bar Against a Non-Great Power: P r u s s i a , 1815-1885 246 VI: 39 Economic Growth, Ententes, and A c t i v i s t Bar Ag a i n s t a Non-Great Power: France, 1815-1885 247 VI: 40 Economic Growth, Ententes, and A c t i v i s t Bar Against a Non-Great Power: A u s t r i a , 1815-1885 247 VI: 41 Economic Growth, Ententes, and A c t i v i s t Bar A g a i n s t a Non-Great Power: 0. K. 1815-1885 247 V Chapter 711: R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n , Bank And Bar VII:1 B e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n (No A l l i a n c e s ) and Bar Involvement: Great Powers, 1815-1945 257 VII: :2 B e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n ( A l l A l l i a n c e s ) and Bar Involvement: Great Powers, 1815-1945 259 VII: 3 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and Bar: P r u s s i a , 1815-1860 264 VI I : 4 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and Bar: P r u s s i a , 1860-1900 265 VII: 5 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and Bar: France, 1815-1860 267 VII: 6 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and Bar: France, 1860-1900 269 VII: 7 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: A u s t r i a , 1815-1860 270 VII: 8 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and Bar: A u s t r i a , 1860-1900 272 VII: 9 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: R u s s i a , 1815-1860 273 VII: 10 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: R u s s i a , 1860-1900 273 VII: 11 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: Onited Kingdom, 1815-1860 276 VII: 12 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: Austria-Hungary, 1900-1914 28 0 VII: 13 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: Germany, 1900-1939 280 VII: 14 R e l a t i v e Power Position, and War: France, 1900-1939 281 VII: 15 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: On i t e d Kingdom, 1900-1939 281 VII: 16 R e l a t i v e Power Position, and War: Russia/OSSR, 1900-1939 282 VII:17 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: Japan, 1915-1940 285 VII:18 R e l a t i v e Power P o s i t i o n and War: I t a l y , 1900-1940 287 VII:19 Power C a p a b i l i t i e s : European Great Powers, 1815-1875 298 VII:20 Power C a p a b i l i t i e s : European Great Powers, 1860-1900 307 VII:21 Power C a p a b i l i t i e s : European Great Powers, 1900-1940 314 v i Acknowledgements I am g r a t e f u l to many people f o r time, prodding, a d v i c e , t a l e n t s , c r i t i c i s m s , and data- David J . E l k i n s s u p e r v i s e d my work and ran v a r i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e hurdles f o r me. Kal J . H o l s t i and Michael D» Wallace were the members of my d i s s e r t a t i o n committee. Over the y e a r s I have l e a r n e d much about s o c i a l s c i e n c e and world p o l i t i c s from them and from Ole R- H o l s t i (now a t Duke D n i v e r s i t y ) . Thank you. T h i s t h e s i s would not e x i s t without the work of members of the C o r r e l a t e s of Bar p r o j e c t under the d i r e c t i o n of J, David Singer a t the U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan. I thank them f o r the use of t h e i r data s e t s and hope t h a t they f i n d some merit i n what I have done with them. Tun-Jen Cheng, Md. Abdul Hakim, and Enzo Barra a s s i s t e d me i n t h e d r e a r y t a s k s of c a l c u l a t i n g index numbers, and checking and r e - c h e c k i n g q u o t a t i o n s , b i b l i o g r a p h y , and f o o t n o t e s . Grace Logan showed me how to reduce the labour a t h o u s a n d - f o l d . I thank her and many other members of Computing S e r v i c e s a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f Waterloo who p a t i e n t l y suggested s o l u t i o n s t o the problems brought to them by a n o v i c e user of machines. The Department of P o l i t i c a l Science a t the U n i v e r s i t y of Waterloo p r o v i d e d me with funds f o r computer work. Esther Macdonald, Joan Boyer, and L i z Smith typed d r a f t s of the e a r l y Chapters. Trudy Moul and G a i l van V a r s e v e l d e d i t e d the f i n a l d r a f t , and i n doing so, helped me to c l a r i f y my thoughts. The a m b i g u i t i e s which remain are, more o f t e n than not, p l a c e s where I s t u b b o r n l y r e f u s e d t h e i r expert a d v i c e . G a i l van Varseveld a l s o put most of the t e x t i n t o machine r e a d a b l e form. Ivan Avakumovic (History) saved me from a number o f h i s t o r i c a l b l u n d e r s . Bruce Bueno de Mesguita ( U n i v e r s i t y of R o c h e s t e r ) , Randolph M. S i v e r s o n ( U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , D a v i s ) , Peter A. Busch, and D. G. Patterson (Economics) made very u s e f u l c r i t i c i s m s . Trudy d i d without a husband and F r a n c i s and Suzanne di d without a f a t h e r during too many summers. I hope t h a t they w i l l f o r g i v e me. v i i ABSTRACT GREAT POWER WAR, 1815-1945: AN EXAMINATION OF SOME POWER POLITICS ARGUMENTS The concept 'the balance of power1 covers a welter of c o n f l i c t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s , a l l of which fo l low from the bas ic assumption that s tates maximize power. The purpose of th is thes is is to examine e m p i r i c a l l y some of the c o n f l i c t i n g power p o l i t i c s arguments concerning the causes of each great powers' wars from 1815 to 1945. As such , I may appear to be mustering yet another party to explore very f a m i l i a r grounds f o r the power p o l i t i c s arguments have a t t rac ted many quant i ta t i ve s t u d i e s . However, few, i f any, of these s t a t i s t i c a l analyses are re levant to the arguments which they purport to t e s t . There fore , th is thes is i s a tes t of commonplace arguments and a demonstration of the inappropr ia te -ness of the commonplace methodology. Sixteen proposi t ions r e l a t i n g a l l i a n c e commitments, i n d u s t r i a l growth, and r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n to great power p a r t i c i p a t i o n in i n t e r s t a t e war are drawn from the power p o l i t i c s 'paradigm. ' Each is examined using data sets from the Corre la tes of War P r o j e c t , augmented with other time s e r i e s . My methods are less elegant than the s t a t i s t i c a l analyses but the r e s u l t s a r e , thereby, s t u r d i e r s t u f f . While there is a r e l a t i o n s h i p between non-defense commitments between great powers and a c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n by some of them against a smal ler s t a t e , there are no assoc ia t ions between the number of various types of a l l i e s and involvement in war. vi i i The four proposi t ions l i n k i n g economic prosper i ty and war involvement receive modest support . They are modest p r o p o s i t i o n s . For example, a c t i v i s t wars occurred in times of high economic growth but high growth rates cannot p red ic t to war. There are many prosperous years and few wars. Four of the r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n propos i t ions have the same l i m i t a t i o n . Wars occur a f te r an increase in r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n but most increases do not lead to war. Par i ty of g e o p o l i t i c a l l y non-separated great powers increases the l i k e l i h o o d o f war between them. Preponderance and g e o p o l i t i c a l b a r r i e r s preserve peace. ix, Chapter I INTRODUCTION 1.1 GREAT POWERS AND WAR While the t h r e a t of war pervades the s t a t e system, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war i s qot randomly d i s t r i b u t e d a c r o s s the p o p u l a t i o n of s t a t e s . S t a t e s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l and l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n , can and do engage i n wa r f a r e ; but members of a d i s t i n c t c l a s s o f s t a t e s , the g r e a t powers, are f a r more war-prone than o t h e r s - Warfare, l i k e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n numerous o t h e r i n t e r s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s , t e nds t o be rank . dependent. 1 The h i g h e r the rank or the more powerful the s t a t e , the more wars i t f i g h t s and the more f a t a l i t i e s i t i n f l i c t s , j u s t as i t t r a d e s more goods, e x p o r t s more c a p i t a l and j o i n s more i n t e r n a t i o n a l c l u b s than those l e s s powerful. The most a c t i v e combatants i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l war duri n g the 1815-1945 p e r i o d are l i s t e d i n Tab l e 1 :1 . Table 1:1 1 The phrase i s Johan Galtung's. See, f o r example, the essays i n h i s Peace And World S t r u c t u r e : Essays In Peace  Research, v o l . I V (Copenhagen: C h r i s t i a n E j l e r s , 1980) . 1 a T a b l e 1 : 1 State P a r t i c i p a t i o n In. War, 1.815-1945 State Interstate Extra Systemic Total Battle Deaths (Great Power) Wars Wars Wars Suffered France (1815-1940) 10 4 14 1 813 540 I t a l y (1860-1945) 10 1 11 759 600 Turkey 10 6 16 756 400 Bussia/OSSB (1815-1917, 1921- ) 8 5 13 9 605 560 Japan (1895-1945) 7 0 7 1 365 300 Austria (1815-1918) 6 2 8 1 287 200 Prussia/Germany (1815-1918, 1925-1945) 6 0 6 5 353 500 Greece 6 0 6 53 270 Onited Kingdom (1815- ) 5 11 16 1 293 590 Spain 5 4 9 188 900 China 5 0 5 2 170 000 Onited States (1898- ) 4 1 5 554 800 Bumania 4 0 4 639 500 Bulgaria 4 0 4 74 000 Source: J.David Singer and Melvin S m a l l , The Wa^es Of War: A S t a t i s t i c a l Handbook (New York: John Wiley, 1972), Table 4:2. Although some s m a l l e r s t a t e s were i n v o l v e d i n as many, or more, wars than some g r e a t powers, the p a t t e r n i s c l e a r . The o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the g r e a t powers would be f a r more s t r i k i n g i f T a b l e 1:1 c o u l d be expanded to i n c l u d e the remaining one hundred and twenty s t a t e s which were members of the i n t e r s t a t e system between t h e end of t h e Napoleonic wars and the end o f World War I I - The great powers o f those 130 years — namely the U n i t e d Kingdom, F r a n c e , Prussia/Germany, Austria/-Hungary, Russia/USSR, I t a l y , Japan, and the United S t a t e s — fought on more o c c a s i o n s , and s u f f e r e d and caused o t h e r s t o s u f f e r more c a s u a l i t 4 . e s than the non-great powers. Always a d i s t i n c t m i n o r i t y among s t a t e s , the g r e a t powers had at l e a s t one of t h e i r number engaged i n 6535 of the 80 i n t e r n a t i o n a l wars S i n g e r and Small catalogued i n The Wages Of War f o r t h i s p e r i o d . 2 I f we d i s c o u n t the i m p e r i a l or c o l o n i a l wars and c o n c e n t r a t e upon the more r e s t r i c t i v e i n t e r s t a t e category, t h i s percentage drops minutely. S i m i l a r percentages can be o b t a i n e d from Wright's c o m p i l a t i o n of modern wars and from Ri c h a r d s o n ' s 2 J . D a v i d S i n g e r and H e l v i n S m a l l , The Wages o f War, 1816-1965: A' S t a t i s t i c a l Handbook (New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1 9 7 2 ) , T a b l e s 4:2 a n d 4: 4. 3 Q u i n c y W r i g h t , A S t u d y Of War, 2nd e d . , r e v . ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1964); L e w i s R i c h a r d s o n , S t a t i s t i c s o f D e a d l y Q u a r r e l s , ( P i t t s b u r g : Boxwood P r e s s , 1960) . S i n g e r and S m a l l compare t h e i r c o m p i l a t i o n o f wars and c a s u a l i t i e s w i t h t h o s e o f W r i g h t and R i c h a r d s o n i n T a b l e 5:2 o f Wages Of War. George M o d e l s k i p e r f o r m s s i m i l a r c o m p u t a t i o n s i n "War and t h e G r e a t P o w e r s , " Peace R e s e a r c h S o c i e t y ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) l i s t of deadly q u a r r e l s . 3 Puthermore, i f we, f o l l o w i n g Singer and S m a l l , determine the i n i t a t o r o f each war by n o t i n g which party f i r s t a t t a c k e d i n f o r c e , we f i n d t h a t , o f the 52 i n t e r n a t i o n a l wars i n which a t l e a s t one g r e a t power p a r t i c i p a t e d , nearly a l l were i n i t i a t e d by a g r e a t power. Th i s f a c t accounts f o r the abnormal war-proneness o f t h e few non-great powers found l i s t e d i n Table 1:1- Turkey and China , more o f t e n than n ot, were the o b j e c t s of a t t a c k by a great power. A l l o f China's wars were i n i t i a t e d by a gr e a t power and most of her c a s u a l t i e s were the r e s u l t o f a a e r i e s o f wars with Japan.* The str o n g a s s o c i a t i o n between war and g r e a t power s t a t e s i s not unexpected- A d e f i n i n g q u a l i t y of a g r e a t power has been, and co n t i n u e s to be, the c a p a c i t y t o wage war e f f e c t i v e l y . The i n t e r e s t s of gr e a t powers a r e commensurate with t h e i r more e x t e n s i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i n t e r - s t a t e system. However, i n Wight's judgement, " power i s more important than i n t e r e s t s " and " t h i s means t h a t t h e g r e a t powers can a f f o r d t o i n c u r a war." "We might s i m p l i f y the whole matter," c o n t i n u e s Wight, "by saying t h a t a Great £ a p j g £ S / 18(1972), 45-59. He shows that while the b a t t l e f i e l d s have s h i f t e d from the t e r r i t o r i e s of the ce n t e r s t a t e s towards the t e r r i t o r i e s of the p e r i p h e r y s i n c e World War I I , the involvement of the g r e a t powers i n war remains high. See a l s o I s t v a n Kende, "Twenty-five Years of L o c a l Wars," J o u r n a l Of Peace Research, 8 (1.971) , 5-22 and "Wars of Ten Years (1967-1976)", J o u r n a l Of Peace Research, 15 (1978), 227-241. * The m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t o r s of i n t e r s t a t e wars are i d e n t i f i e d i n Wages Of War, pp.366-370. Power i s one t h a t can a f f o r d t o t a k e on any o t h e r power whatever i n s i n g l e combat." Although p o i n t i n g c o r r e c t l y t o the i n t i m a t e c o n n e c t i o n s between s t a t e power and war, t h i s c r i t e r i o n , as Bight i s aware, o v e r s i m p l i f i e s the matter. Some s t a t e s which were accepted as great powers c o u l d not " a f f o r d to take on any power whatever i n s i n g l e combat." I t a l y c e r t a i n l y c o u l d not do so. A f t e r her wars o f n a t i o n a l u n i f i c a t i o n , I t a l y j o i n e d t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, Fra n c e , P r u s s i a , R u s s i a and A u s t r i a i n the g r e a t power s e t , and t h e r e a f t e r occupied with them a p o s i t i o n f a r more than a notch above t h a t o f o r d i n a r y s t a t e s . Her p e e r s a c h i e v e d and maintained t h e i r predominant p o s i t i o n by i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l and m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s with which t o f i g h t , and demonstrating, when necessary, the a b i l i t y t o f i g h t . I t a l y , on the other hand, r a r e l y fought s u c c e s s f u l l y i n European wars, was humbled d u r i n g her m i l i t a r y v e n t u r e s i n A f r i c a i n the 19th c e n t u r y , yet maintained g r e a t power s t a t u s "by c o u r t e s y " of o t h e r s and the a b i l i t y t o a t t a c h h e r s e l f to the winners i n g r e a t power wars. 5 P r u s s i a , I t a l y ' s a l l y i n the Seven Weeks war, f o l l o w e d the textbook p a t t e r n . Already a g r e a t power a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the 19th c e n t u r y , P r u s s i a enhanced her p o s i t i o n i n t h e Bund and i n the great power h i e r a r c h y with a s e r i e s of wars a g a i n s t her 5 H a r t i n Wight, Power P o l i t i c s (London: Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1946),p.19.. A r e v i s e d and much expanded v e r s i o n of Power P o l i t i c s has been p u b l i s h e d under the e d i t o r i a l s u p e r v i s i o n of Hedley B u l l and Carsten Holbrand. See Power P o l i t i c s ( L e i c e s t e r U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s : L e i c e s t e r , 1978). 5 neighbours: Denmark, Austria and France. S i m i l a r l y , i n 1895, Japan joined the European great powers a f t e r defeating China. The Onited States soon followed i n 1898 a f t e r defeating Spain. Just as states become great powers by means of war, so also do they become mere states once again. After surrendering i n 1919, Germany l o s t great power status temporarily, while her a l l y , Austria-Hungary, was dismembered and permanently excluded from the great power ranks. Russia, defeated by Germany i n 1917 and rent by revolution and c i v i l war, withdrew from world a f f a i r s u n t i l 1922. The v i c t o r s of World War I I once more removed Germany and her a l l i e s , I t a l y and Japan, from the great power set. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between great power status and war appears to be self-perpetuating and c i r c u l a r : great powers •cause 1 wars and wars 'cause' great powers. Often the s i z e of these states i s thought to be the most important element i n t h i s feedback process- War, i n Kohr's assessment, i s the consequence not of e v i l schemes or e v i l d i s p o s i t i o n but of the power that i s generated by excessive s o c i a l s i z e . For whenever a nation becomes large enough to accumulate the c r i t i c a l mass of power, i t w i l l i n the end accumulate i t . And when i t has acquired i t , i t w i l l become an aggressor, i t s previous record and intentions to the contrary notwithstanding. The mystery of t h e i r war-mindedness was always t h e i r sudden a c q u i s i t i o n of power, as the mystery of t h e i r conversion to the abandoned ways of peace was always t h e i r sudden l o s s of power. Nothing else ever counted. 6 6 Leopold Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations (1957; r p t . 6 Others disagree and stress the nature of the i n t e r -r e l a t i o n s h i p among the great powers i n order to explain t h e i r war-proneness. Bather than size £er se, argues Wright, the more important reason f o r the excessive belligerency of great powers... l i e s i n the structure of the balance of power, which p r a c t i c a l l y assures that a l l great powers w i l l enter wars which threaten the balance i n order to preserve i t , a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which the smaller . states do not have- 7 S t i l l others argue that peace among the smaller states i s maintained by c o l l u s i o n of the great powers and that t i e competition between them i s regulated by the balance of power. Bather than assuring war, the balance of power prevents great power war and keeps the l e s s powerful i n check. The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s to examine e m p i r i c a l l y these c o n f l i c t i n g views of the balance of power and other prominent "power p o l i t i c s " theories concerning the causes of each great power's wars from 1815, when the term "great power" entered the diplomatic vocabulary, u n t i l 1945, when the d i s t i n c t i o n between the "great" and the "super" powers became necessary. These theories are often and p e j o r a t i v e l y l a b e l l e d " t r a d i t i o n a l , " i n contrast to " s c i e n t i f i c " . To j o i n i n a fray fought un,der the banners of "Wisdom" and "Science" would be f u t i l e and f o o l i s h . The caricatures of Llandybie, Carmarthenshire: Christopher Davis, 197ft), pp.35, 38-39. 7 Wright, A Study Of War . p.849. the " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s " as "incompleat t h e o r i s t s " and o f t h e i r works as " i n s i g h t without e v i d e n c e " are f a r l e s s inflammatory and more to the p o i n t . 8 1.2 OVERVIEW Hoffmann contends t h a t the "balance of power" remains " i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o the understanding of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s " , " d e s p i t e the very d i f f e r e n t meanings and uses o f the n o t i o n and the e q u a l l y d i v e r g e n t assessments o f the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s t o which i t r e f e r s . " 9 One source o f ambiguity i n many c o n c e p t i o n s of the balance o f power i s t h e chameleon-like nature of the explanandum: i n one p l a c e war i s to be e x p l a i n e d ; i n another, peace; and i n s t i l l another, the s t a t u s quo ante bellum. I am concerned with the i n c i d e n c e o f the wars o f the g r e a t powers. Great power war may be d e f i n e d p r e c i s e l y , but "war" i s a bl a n k e t term- There a r e good r e a s o n s f o r d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between types o f war and, more i m p o r t a n t l y , between types of involvement i n war- In Chapter I I I d i s c u s s the c a t e g o r i e s o f war and o f involvement i n war, then d e s c r i b e the war ex p e r i e n c e of each of t h e g r e a t powers 8 J. David S i n g e r , "The Incompleat T h e o r i s t : I n s i g h t Without Evidence," i n Contending Approaches To I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , ed. Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press 1969), pp.62-86-9 Stanley Hoffmann, "Balance of Power," I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n c y c l o p a e d ia of the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s (New York: Macmillan and Free P r e s s , 1968). Cf. Sidney Fay, "Balance o f Power," Encylcopaedia of the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s (New York: Macmillan, 1930)-. 8 i n t h e 1815-1945 p e r i o d . T h a n k s t o R i c h a r d s o n ' s S t a t i s t i c s  of D e a d l y Q u a r r e l s , W r i g h t ' s A S t u d y Of War a n d , p a r t i c u l a r l y . S i n g e r ' s a n d S m a l l ' s T h e Wages o f W a r , t h i s o n c e f o r m i d a b l e t a s k i s now a r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d o n e . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p r o b l e m o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r e x p l a n a t i o n o f g r e a t p o w e r war i s n o t a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d o n e . T h e a m b i g u i t i e s o f t h e p h r a s e " b a l a n c e o f p o w e r " , s u c h a s t h e c h a n g i n g e x p l a n a n d u m , s e r v e t o p r o t e c t t h e t h e o r y r a t h e r t h a n t o p l a c e i t i n j e o p a r d y , a n d i f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s c a n n o t b e p l a c e d i n j e o p a r d y , t h e y d o n o t r e m a i n s c i e n t i f i c - T h e m e a n i n g o f " b a l a n c e o f p o w e r " v a r i e s b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s a n d w i t h i n t h e w o r k s o f i n d i v i d u a l t h e o r i s t s . M o r e o v e r , w h e r e t h e k e y c o n c e p t s a r e c o n f i n e d t o s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n s , t h e e m p i r i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a p a r t i c u l a r b a l a n c e o f p o w e r t h e o r y a r e o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y . T h e r e i s n o s i n g l e t h e o r y . A t b e a t t h e r e e x i s t s a s e t o f p u t a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s o f i n t e r s t a t e w a r , some o f w h i c h a r e c o n f l i c t i n g , a n d a l l o f w h i c h w o b b l e a b o u t an a s s u m p t i o n o f p o w e r m a x i m i z a t i o n . F i g u r e 1:1 s u m m a r i z e s t h e n o m o l o g i c a l n e t w o v e n b y b a l a n c e o f p o w e r t h e o r i s t s - Some o f t h e s t r a n d s a r e n o t f o u n d i n p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e b a l a n c e o f p o w e r , a n d o t h e r s c o u l d b e s u g g e s t e d , b u t t h e t h i c k n e s s o f e a c h s t r a n d d o e s d e s c r i b e i t s v i s i b i l i t y a n d i m p o r t a n c e i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e a s a w h o l e - T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s r e l a t i n g g r e a t 9 p o w e r w a r t o a l l i a n c e a c t i v i t y , i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d r e l a t i v e p o w e r p o s i t i o n a r e d i s c u s s e d a n d e l a b o r a t e d u p o n i n C h a p t e r I I I -F i g u r e 1 : 1 T h e p r o m i s e o f t h i s t h e s i s i s n e i t h e r a f u l l - f l e d g e d t h e o r y o f g r e a t p o w e r w a r n o r a d e c i s i v e , a l b e i t e x p o s t f a c t o , e x p e r i m e n t w h i c h w o u l d e l i m i n a t e a l l s a v e o n e o f t w o o r m o r e c o m p e t i n g t h e o r i e s . A r t i c u l a t e r i v a l t h e o r i e s d o n o t e x i s t . I h a v e n o t r e a c h e d i n t o t h e b a l a n c e o f p o w e r m e s s , r e p l a c e d t h e p o w e r m a x i m i z a t i o n a s s u m p t i o n w i t h a l e s s p e r m i s s i v e o n e , a n d p r o c e e d e d t o d e d u c e t i d y c o n s e g u e n o e s . " A t h e o r y i s a c l u s t e r o f c o n c l u s i o n s i n s e a r c h o f a p r e m i s s . " 1 0 T h e p r o m i s e o f t h i s w o r k i s t o e x a m i n e e m p i r i c a l l y t h e p l a u s i b l e , c o m m o n p l a c e a n d , a t t i m e s , c o n f l i c t i n g c o n c l u s i o n s f o u n d i n t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l " o r " R e a l i s t " l i t e r a t u r e . I m a y a p p e a r t o b e m u s t e r i n g y e t a n o t h e r p a r t y t o e x p l o r e v e r y f a m i l i a r g r o u n d . M o s t o f t h e a r g u m e n t s w h i c h I p r o p o s e t o e x a m i n e h a v e a t t r a c t e d e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s . I n d e e d M o d e l s k i , r e v i e w i n g t h e r e c e n t h i s t o r y o f t h e s t u d y o f w o r l d p o l i t i c s , d e c l a r e s t h a t " t h e t e c h n i c a l a d v a n c e s ( o f t h e b e h a v i o r a l r e v o l u t i o n ) . - , d i d l i t t l e m o r e t h a n g i v e s o m e 1 0 N o r w o o d R u s s e l l H a n s o n , P a t t e r n s p_f D i s c o v e r y ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 ) , p - 9 0 . F i g u r e 1:1 T h e o r e t i c a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s I n The Power P o l i t i c s l i t e r a t u r e q u a n t i t a t i v e dimensions t o f a m i l i a r R e a l i s t t h e o r i e s - " " There i s more than a l i t t l e t r u t h i n t h i s p o s i t i o n . However, I t h i n k t h a t i t i s more s i g n i f i c a n t t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t few, i f any, o f the s t a t i s t i c a l s t u d i e s to which he r e f e r s s e r i o u s l y c o n f r o n t the f a m i l i a r R e a l i s t arguments. Many of the " r e l e v a n t " s t u d i e s not o n l y do n o t , they cannot, c o n f r o n t the p r o p o s i t i o n ^ which are d i s c u s s e d below i n Chapter I I I . More o f t e n than not the t e c h n i c a l advances prevent them frcm doing so. The argument of Chapter I V i s not Morgenthau's argument t h a t a b a r r i e r must e x i s t between h i s R e a l i s t balance of power the o r y and q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s ; the argument i s t h a t one does e x i s t . 1 2 To examine the balance of power arguments p r o p e r l y , the b a r r i e r must be overcome. 1 1 George Modelski, P r i n c i p l e s of World P o l i t i c s (New York: The Free P r e s s , 1972), p.7- T h i s i s a l s o the c o n c l u s i o n of J . Handelman, J . Vasque.2, M. O'Leary and W- G o p l i n i n t h e i r paper "Color I t Morgenthau: A Data-based Assessment o f Q u a n t i t a t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , " presented at the Annual Meeting o f the I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n , New York, March 1973. ( C i t e d i n John Vasguaz, " S t a t i s t i c a l F i n d i n g s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies Q u a r t e r l y , 20 (June 1976), 210. 1 2 C i t a t i o n p a t t e r n s r e v e a l the b a r r i e r and i t s semi-permeable nature. Favourable r e f e r e n c e s t o Hans J -Morgenthau's c l a s s i c P o l i t i c s Among Na t i o n s flow p e a c e f u l l y to the bottom of pages i n " I n d i c a t o r s o f C r o s s - N a t i o n a l and I n t e r n a t i o n a l P a t t e r n s " , f o r example. There they share the space with notes such as " t h i s a n a l y s i s comprised the o b l i q u e ( b i q u a r t i i a i n ) r o t a t i o n o f the i n i t i a l f i f t e e n f a c t o r s o l u t i o n . " Rummel* the authour o f t h i s paper, does use a water s i m i l e : As the course o f a r i v e r i s determined by the f e r t i l e v a l l e y s through which i t f l o w s , so i s q u a n t i t a t i v e r e s e a r c h c h a n n e l l e d by t r a d i t i o n a l 1 1 I f the balance of power t h e o r i e s are deemed t o be the work of the "incompleat t h e o r i s t " , many of t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e s t u d i e s which they have a t t r a c t e d suggest the presence o f h i s o p p o s i t e number, the "compleat e m p i r i c i s t " . The compleat e m p i r i c i s t i s not the naive i n d u c t i o n i s t , not the apocryphal i n d i v i d u a l who b u s i e d h i m s e l f c o l l e c t i n g trunks of m i s c e l l a n i a which he proudly w i l l e d t o the R o y a l S o c i e t y so t h a t the F e l l o w s might put together e x p l a n a t i o n s . The f a c t s of the compleat e m p i r i c i s t are g e n e r a l l y r e l e v a n t to the problem at hand, but they then are rendered i r r e l e v a n t by h i s method. The one f a c t which the compleat e m p i r i c i s t i s not as wary of as he should be i s t h a t t h e o r y and method cannot a v o i d one another- P a r t i c u l a r types of problems demand p a r t i c u l a r methods and h i s methods are i n a p p r o p r i a t e . i n s i g h t and knowledge. Together the l a n d and r i v e r produce an abundant h a r v e s t and t o g e t h e r the . p r e c i s i o n and r e l i a b i l i t y o f q u a n t i t a t i v e s c h o l a r s h i p combined with the r i c h comprehensiveness of t r a d i t i o n a l s c h o l a r s h i p bear new f r u i t . ( American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 63 (March 1969) , 128-129. To c o n t i n u e the s i m i l e , Morgenthau's c i t a t i o n s suggest t h a t t h i n g s simply have gone d o w n h i l l - There i s a s t r o n g c o n t i n u i t y i n the r e f e r e n c e s i n P o l i t i c s Among Nations from the f i r s t e d i t i o n i n 1948 onwards- There are no r e f e r e n c e s to any s t a t i s t i c a l s t u d i e s i n the l a t e s t e d i t i o n . For an example of the good use to which c i t a t i o n p a t t e r n s can be put l o c a t i n g v a r i o u s s c h o o l s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s s c h o l a r s , see Bruce M. Russett, " M e t h o d o l o g i c a l and T h e o r e t i c a l S c h o o l s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations,", i n A Design f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and Relevance, Monograph No. 10, American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l S c i e n c e , ed- Norman D. Palmer ( P h i l a d e l p h i a , October 1970), pp.87-105. In t h i s area of r e s e a r c h John Morton's "on Recursive Reference," C o g n i t i o n , 4 (1976), 309 i s a d e f i n i t i v e treatment. To s o l v e a problem, or more a c c u r a t e l y t o t r y t o e l i m i n a t e s o l u t i o n s t o a problem, an a p p r e c i a t i o n of the s t r u c t u r e of the problem i s e s s e n t i a l . Method and measurement are t o conform t o the shape o r form of t h e problem r a t h e r than the other way around. Heaver d e s c r i b e s t h r e e types of s c i e n t i f i c problems — of s i m p l i c i t y , of d i s o r g a n i z e d c o m p l e x i t y and o f o r g a n i z e d c o m p l e x i t y — and the methods a p p r o p r i a t e t o each of them. When making these d i s t i n c t i o n s Heaver uses a b i l l i a r d b a l l analogy, a very apt analogy when d i s c u s s i n g R e a l i s t t h e o r i e s , and one I now w i l l e l a b o r a t e . Imagine one b a l l on the b i l l i a r d t a b l e : we know i t s speed and d i r e c t i o n and wish t o c a l c u l a t e i t s c o u r s e and p o s i t i o n a t v a r i o u s t i m e s . T h i s i s a simple problem and remains so even i f we c o m p l i c a t e i t with the a d d i t i o n of another b a l l , the d i r e c t i o n o f and speed o f which we know a l s o . Now we wish t o determine i f and where they w i l l c o l l i d e - Problems o f t h i s s o r t , i n v o l v i n g one or two o b j e c t s and few v a r i a b l e s , o c c u p i e d students of c l a s s i c a l dynamics. But with the a d d i t i o n o f another b a l l , then another and another, the. problems r a p i d l y became insurmountable with the a v a i l a b l e t e c h n i q u e s . Weaver w r i t e s t h a t now we should imagine a l a r g e b i l l i a r d t a b l e with m i l l i o n s o f b a l l s r o l l i n g over i t s s u r f a c e , c o l l i d i n g with one another and with the s i d e r a i l s . The g r e a t s u r p r i s e i s t h a t the problem now becomes e a s i e r , f o r the methods of s t a t i s t i c a l mechanics a r e a p p l i c a b l e . To be sure the d e t a i l e d h i s t o r y of one s p e c i a l b a l l cannot be t r a c e d , but c e r t a i n 13 important questions can be answered with u s e f u l p r e c i s i o n , such a s : on the average how many b a l l s - . ? (T)he methods of s t a t i s t i c a l mechanics are v a l i d only when the b a l l s are d i s t r i b u t e d , i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s and t h e i r motions, i n a h e l t e r s k e l t e r , that i s t o say a d i s o r g a n i z e d w a y . 1 3 Now imagine f a r l e s s than m i l l i o n s of b i l l i a r d b a l l s upon the t a b l e : they are d i f f e r e n t s i z e s and move at v a r i o u s speeds, often congregating at opposite ends of the t a b l e and t r a v e l l i n g i n tandem; c o l l i s i o n s are r a r e , but not e q u i -probable, and the majority of c o l l i s i o n s i n v o l v e the few very l a r g e b a l l s . In s h o r t , movement and c o l l i s i o n are not h e l t e r - s k e l t e r or random: they have an order to them. To c h a r t the paths of the b a l l s and t o account f o r t h e i r p e r i o d i c c o l l i s i o n s i s not a problem of s i m p l i c i t y nor i s i t one of" d i s o r g a n i z e d complexity. The problem i n v o l v e s "a s i z a b l e number of f a c t o r s which are i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t o an org anic whole," or organized c o m p l e x i t y . 1 4 Whereas F i g u r e 1 : 1 , which summarizes the balance o f power p r o p o s i t i o n s , describes a problem of organized complexity . F i g u r e 1:2, which summarizes the q u a n t i t a t i v e work which they have a t t r a c t e d , d e s c r i b e s a set of problems of s i m p l i c i t y . The nomological net becomes, under quantita±ive 1 3 W. Weaver, " S c i e n c e and C o m p l e x i t y , " A m e r i c a n S c i e n t i s t , 36 (1948) , 537-538. 1 4 I b i d . , 539. A l s o s e e H e r b e r t Simon's e s s a y "The A r c h i t e c t u r e o f C o m p l e x i t y " i n h i s book The S c i e n c e s o f t h e A r t i f i c i a l ( C a m b r i d g e : The M-I.T- P r e s s , 1 9 6 9 ) and J e a n P i a g e t , S t r u c t u r a l i s m (1970; r p t . New Y o r k : H a r p e r 8 Row, 1971). 14. s c r u t i n y , a knot: each o f the key f a c t o r s -- a l l i a n c e s , r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s — i s t i e d d i r e c t l y and autonomously t o i n t e r s t a t e war. F i g u r e 1:2 Of course we must break a p a r t the c o m p l e x i t i e s o f the s o c i a l world i n order t o understand i t , but some ways do not enab l e us to r e t u r n the p i e c e s t o a coherent whole. The whole i s d i f f e r e n t from the sum of the p a r t s . F o r example, the r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n o f a great power depends upon t h a t s t a t e ' s a l l i a n c e a c t i v i t y and i n d u s t r i a l development and upon the a l l i a n c e a c t i v i t y and the i n d u s t r i a l development of each o f the oth e r g r e a t powers. When the s t r a n d s c o n n e c t i n g these f a c t o r s are broken, the p r o s p e c t s f o r p r i m i t i v e accumulation o f the e x i s t i n g e m p i r i c a l r i c h e s by a t h e o r i s t are diminished-The e m p i r i c a l r i c h e s themselves a r e d i m i n i s h e d a l s o . The or g a n i z e d and complex p r o p o s i t i o n s a re tu r n e d i n t o simple ones and t u r n e d over t o methods s u i t a b l e to d i s o r g a n i z e d c o m p l e x i t y . The common techniques of a n a l y s i s r e s t upon assumptions which, I argue, must be met and which o f t e n are in c o m p a t i b l e with problems o f o r g a n i z e d c o m p l e x i t y . For example, many o f the c o n c l u s i o n s about the s t r e n g t h o f s i n g l e s t r a n d s l e a d i n g t o i n t e r s t a t e war are products of c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l s t a t i s t i c a l manipulations. T h i s c r o s s -14 a INDUSTRY RELATIVE POWER POSITION Figure 1:2 wer P o l i t i c s R e l a t i o n s h i p s Examined In E m p i r i c a l S t u d i e 15 s e c t i o n a l mode o f a n a l y s i s p r e c l u d e s any meanin g f u l c a u s a l a n a l y s i s and, more o f t e n than not, any meaningful i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s r e q u i r i n g such a n a l y s i s . Moreover, attempts t o remedy the f r e q u e n t l y - n o t e d s t a t i c c h a r a c t e r o f c r o s s -s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s e s by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of time " l a g s " or " l e a d s " exacerbate these d i f f i c u l t i e s . So a l s o do attempts t o recover t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s which have been l o s t b y a n a l y s i s of dyads. I f chaos i s t o precede, not t o proceed from, o r d e r , the problems of measurement and method demand f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n . T h i s they r e c e i v e i n Chapter V. Consider once more the n o t i o n of r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n . Four d i f f e r e n t types o f i n d i c e s of r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n are found i n t h e e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s reviewed i n Chapter IV. They are: (1) the a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s i n war p o t e n t i a l between p a i r s of g r e a t powers or the r a t i o s ; (2) the rank p o s i t i o n ; (3) the percentage share o f the t o t a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of a group of s t a t e s ; and (4) t h e percentage d e v i a t i o n from the mean share of the t o t a l war p o t e n t i a l . Each o f these i n d i c e s has s i g n i f i c a n t l i m i t a t i o n s , the common denominator of which i s t h e i n a b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t f u l l y the e x i s t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n on the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s between the g r e a t powers. Aside from wasting i n f o r m a t i o n about the p o s i t i o n o f a grea t power v i s - a - v i s i t s c o m p e t i t o r s i n terms o f i n d i v i d u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , a l l of the i n d i c e s d i s r e g a r d the p r i n c i p a l means of r e d r e s s i n g the balance — a l l i a n c e s . 16 To measure r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n without t a k i n g i n t o account the a l l i a n c e commitments s t a t e s make to one another i s t o i n s u l a t e the e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s from the b a s i c balance of power argument. Whether the balance o f power i s thought t o generate war, t o c o n t i n u e peace, or t o m a i n t a i n the more nebulous " s t a b i l i t y " , t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t i t i s a th e o r y of a l l i a n c e and c o u n t e r - a l l i a n c e - I f the balance of power r e f e r s to a s e t of s c a l e s i n e q u i l i b r i u m , a l l i a n c e s maintain i t i n e q u i l i b r i u m ; i f the balance of power r e f e r s t o a bank bal a n c e , a l l i a n c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n adds t o some accounts and s u b t r a c t s from o t h e r s ; i f the balance of power r e f e r s t o the c o n f i q u r a t i o n o f power, balanced or not, a l l i a n c e s a l t e r i t . In Chapter V I demonstrate the t e c h n i c a l and s u b s t a n t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s of the a v a i l a b l e i n d i c e s and d e s c r i b e and defend a more s u i t a b l e index o f r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n which I have c o n s t r u c t e d -The a l l i a n c e data and the i n d i c a t o r s of war p o t e n t i a l , l i k e the i n f o r m a t i o n on g r e a t power war, are p r o d u c t s o f t h e C o r r e l a t e s o f War P r o j e c t . 1 5 The power c a p a b i l i t i e s d ata c o n s i s t of annual o b s e r v a t i o n s on i r o n p r o d u c t i o n , s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n , number of m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l , m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s , and energy consumption f o r each g r e a t power-While some weighted combinations of these and o t h e r s e r i e s 1 5 They are d e s c r i b e d b r i e f l y i n J . David S i n g e r , "The • C o r r e l a t e s of Pfar' P r o j e c t : I n t e r i m Report and R a t i o n a l e , " World P o l i t i c s , 24 (January 1972) , 243-270. My debt t o t h i s r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t and to J . David S i n g e r , the p r o j e c t ' s d i r e c t o r , i s immense. 17 are to be found in the literature, I have not found them satisfactory. Some are very complicated, and in questions o f measurement and technique, I value simplicity. With concepts such as "foreign trade", "national income" and "unemployment" which do Jiave adequate theoretical substrata, "the technical problems of index number construction are heroic."16 When the theoretical substratum is far more rudimentary, as it is with "power capability" or "war potential", the problems are monstrous. There is no requirement that the technical difficulties be made more monstrous with the use of complicated techniques. Factor analysis, for example, adds to the problems rather than reduces them. My amalgam of power capabilities is sijnple and the results are reasonable. Chapter V continues with a discussion of the difficulties of measuring industrial growth and alliance activity and of finding the appropriate techniques of analysis. Throughout the injunction is: Do not waste information when we have so little! Proper procedures of data analysis, like proper measurements, conserve information-The formal statistical techniques such as correlation, regression and various forms of tabular analysis common in empirical studies of international relations compress rather than conserve information and are ill-suited to an Eugene J . Webb e t a l , U n o b t r u s i v e M e a s u r e s : N o n - R e a c t i v e R e s e a r c h i n t h e S o c i a l S c i e n c e s ( C h i c a g o : Rand M c N a l l y , 1966), p. 8 . 18 examination of the balance of power t h e o r i e s . The balance o f power p r o p o s i t i o n s , l i k e most p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t h e f i e l d , a r e crude, and the p r e c i s i o n formal s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s p r o v i d e s i s o f t e n s u p e r f l u o u s , h i n d e r i n g r a t h e r than expanding o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o f u r t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l development-T e s t i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n s i s the f i r s t s t e p i n data a n a l y s i s . The second step — one our rudimentary t h e o r y and p a u c i t y of evidence r e q u i r e s us to take, and t o take s e r i o u s l y — i s t o expose the data. As Tukey and H i l k argue: Exposure, the e f f e c t i v e l a y i n g open of t h e d a t a to d i s p l a y t h e u n a n t i c i p a t e d , i s to us a major p o r t i o n of data a n a l y s i s - Formal s t a t i s t i c s has given almost no guidance t o exposure; indeed i t i s not c l e a r how the i n f o r m a l i t y and f l e x i b i l i t y a p p r o p r i a t e t o the e x p l o r a t o r y c h a r a c t e r o f exposure can be f i t t e d i n t o any o f the s t r u c t u r e s of f o r m a l s t a t i s t i c s so f a r p r o p o s e d . 1 7 G r a p h i c a l d i s p l a y s are s i m p l e , powerful and f l e x i b l e t echniques o f data a n a l y s i s , and I use them e x t e n s i v e l y . A s i d e from t h e i r q u i r k s and the o p p p r t u n t i e s p r o v i d e d f o r s e l f - d e c e p t i o n , g r a p h i c a l d i s p l a y s have the d i s a d v a n t a g e o f demanding f a r more space on a page than s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s e s . Perhaps b u l k i n e s s acccounts f o r the near complete absence of g r a p h i c s of any s o r t i n the p u b l i s h e d s t u d i e s r e l e v a n t t o the balance o f power p r o p o s i t i o n s . 1 7 J - H. Tukey and M. B. H i l k , "Data A n a l y s i s and S t a t i s t i c s : Techniques and Approaches," i n The Q u a n t i t a t i v e A n a l y s i s of S o c i a l Problems, ed. Edward R. T u f t e (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970), p.371. . . . 1.9 The next t h r e e c h a p t e r s c o n t a i n t h e data a n a l y s e s , the c o n c l u s i o n s they permit, and the c o n j e c t u r e s they suggest-In Chapter VI I examine the p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g a l l i a n c e commitments and economic growth r a t e s and t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between growth r a t e s and a l l i a n c e s and g r e a t power war. R e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n and gre a t power war i s t h e s u b j e c t matter of Chapter V I I . Chapter V I I I , the c o n c l u s i o n , i s both a c a t a l o g u e and a coda- There I summarize my d i v e r s e f i n d i n g s and i l l u s t r a t e how some of them can be used t o e x p l a i n some o f the d i v e r s e r e s u l t s of s t u d i e s of the balance o f power system d u r i n g the 1815-1945 p e r i o d . 1 8 1 8 In p a r t i c u l a r , the r e s u l t s of two major s t u d i e s from the C o r r e l a t e s of War P r o j e c t — J . David S i n g e r and Melvin Small, " A l l i a n c e Aggregation and the Onset o f War, 1815-1945," i n Q u a n t i t a t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : I n s i g h t s and Evidence, ed- J . David S i n g e r (New York: Free P r e s s , 1968), pp.247-286; and J.David S i n g e r , S t u a r t Bremer, and John Stuckey, " C a p a b i l i t y D i s t r i b u t i o n , U n c e r t a i n t y , and Hajor-Power War, 1820-1965," i n Peace, War, Numbers, ed. Bruce M. E u s s e t t , (Beverly H i l l s : Sage, 1972) , pp. 19-48. Chapter II GREAT POWER iAR, 1815-1945 The balance of power i s supposed to p r e s e r v e s t a b i l i t y ; but " s t a b i l i t y " i s nebulous. " S t a b i l i t y " may r e f e r t o peace, or to t h e absence of major war, or the r e t u r n t o the s t a t u s quo ante bellum. I n the f i r s t two i n s t a n c e s war s i g n i f i e s t h a t the balance o f power has " f a i l e d " , and i n the l a s t i n s t a n c e war i s a means t o maintain t h e s t a t e system and to prevent empire. The purpose o f t h i s study i s to examine e x p l a n a t i o n s of the i n c i d e n c e , not the consequences, of war. 1 A war i s an o r g a n i z e d v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t between two o r more p o l i t i c a l communities- However, not a l l o r g a n i z e d v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t s are wars, and not a l l wars concern the balance of power t h e o r i s t s . The task a t hand i s t o d e s c r i b e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l wars each great power fought d u r i n g the one hundred and t h i r t y y e a r s between 1815-1945 and which are i n the purview of the balance of power t h e o r i s t s . To do s o , we must c l a s s i f y the types of great power war, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between wars and other v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t s , and determine the k i n d s of involvement i n war. 1 Of course the consequences of a war, l i k e the conseguences f o r the c h i c k e n of c r o s s i n g the road, may be p a r t of the e x p l a n a t i o n of the i n c i d e n c e of war and must be a l a r g e p a r t of the e x p l a n a t i o n i n a theory which presumes r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , as does the balance of power theory. - 20 -21 "Bar", l i k e " c ancer", i s a blanket term and as cancer c o v e r s a v a r i e t y of t y p e s — l e u k e m i a , lymphoma, sarcoma, c a r c i n o m a — s o too does "war." The balance o f power theory p u r p o r t s to e x p l a i n warfare between members of t h e s t a t e system; t h e r e f o r e , the c i v i l wars which o c c a s i o n a l l y rend s t a t e s and t h e many i m p e r i a l o r c o l o n i a l wars which occupied the great powers a t t h e p e r i p h e r y a r e i r r e l e v a n t here (even though they may have consequences f o r the balance o f power). Wright i n h i s monumental A Study of War i d e n t i f i e s " b alance of power wars" with wars between recognized s t a t e s , but t h i s i s too crude f o r my p u r p o s e s . 2 Whether a p p l i e d t o a group o f wars, or t o a group o f t h e o r i e s about the causes o f war, the l a b e l "balance of power" obscures what may be s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s . As Morgenthau w r i t e s , the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t a l l s t a t e s are i n v o l v e d i n the balance of power i s to be avoid e d . We have spoken thus f a r o f the imbalance of power as i f i t were one s i n g l e system comprehending a l l n a t i o n s a c t i v e l y engaged i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . C l o s e r o b s e r v a t i o n , however, r e v e a l s t h a t such a system i s f r e q u e n t l y composed o f a number of subsystems t h a t are i n t e r r e l a t e d with each o t h e r , but t h a t maintain w i t h i n themselves a balance of power of t h e i r own. The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the d i f f e r e n t systems i s g e n e r a l l y one of s u b o r d i n a t i o n , i n t h e sense t h a t one dominates because of the r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t weight accumulated i n i t s s c a l e s , w h ile o t h e r s are, as i t were, a t t a c h e d to the s c a l e s of t h a t dominant system. 3 2 Wright, A Study o f War, Appendix 20, esp. p.638-3 Hans J . Horgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among Nations, (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1967), 4th ed.-, p.191. ; 22 O b v i o u s l y , the European g r e a t p o w e r s — F r a n c e , the United Kingdom, P r u s s i a , A u s t r i a and R u s s i a — c o n s t i t u t e the "dominant system" at the beginning o f the n i n e t e e n t h century, and some s t a t e s adhere t o i t , and o t h e r s are drawn i n as the years pass. The problem i s t o l o c a t e t h e s e o t h e r , mainly non-European, s t a t e s i n r e l a t i o n to t h e g r e a t power c o m p e t i t i o n . A s e r i e s of sociograms d e s c r i b i n g the networks of g r e a t power a c t i v i t i e s s i n c e the Congress of Vienna and e n a b l i n g one t o s e p a r a t e the i n v o l v e d and i n f l u e n t i a l from the uninvolved and n o n - i n f l u e n t i a l would be a boon. Such r i g o r o u s g uides do not e x i s t . Indeed, i t would be remarkable, and perhaps a s i g n t h a t something i s amiss, i f maps of p o l i t i c a l space were as s t a r k as maps of p h y s i c a l space. The few attempts t o map p o l i t i c a l l y e f f e c t i v e d i s t a n c e s demonstrate t h a t a r b i t r a r i n e s s can be reduced, but i t cannot be a v o i d e d - 4 However, t o be a r b i t r a r y does not mean to be c a p r i c i o u s . 4 On the concept o f " e f f e c t i v e d i s t a n c e " , see K a r l W. Deutsch and Walter I s a r d , "A Note on a G e n e r a l i z e d Concept o f E f f e c t i v e D i s t a n c e , " B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n c e , 6 (October 1961), 308-311. Although many e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s of the world were done d u r i n g the 1950's and 1960's, t h e two .most r e l e v a n t t o the pe r i o d s t u d i e d here are M i c h a e l D-Wallace, " C l u s t e r s of Nations i n the G l o b a l System, 1865-1964;Some P r e l i m i n a r y Evidence," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , 19 (March 1975), 67-110; and S t u a r t Bremer, "A So c i o m e t r i c A n a l y s i s o f D i p l o m a t i c Bonds, 1817-1940," unpublished paper, A p r i l 1971. F o r the p e r i o d 1815 to 1919, Singer and Small d i v i d e the members of the s t a t e system i n t o a c e n t r a l group, which i s predominantly European with the g r e a t powers a t the c o r e , and a p e r i p h e r a l group which i s composed of minor European s t a t e s p l u s almost a l l of the non-European s t a t e s . A f t e r World War I , they merge the two groups and simply d i s t i n g u i s h between the g r e a t powers and o r d i n a r y s t a t e s - 5 T h i s does not r e s o l v e the problem of l o c a t i n g b a l a n c e s , but with the d i s t i n c t i o n s between types o f s t a t e s , s i x s t r a i n s o f Wright's "balance o f power war" can be i d e n t i f i e d . See Table 11 : 1 . Table II:1 about here The numbers i n the c e l l s are the f r e q u e n c i e s of i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t s i n v o l v i n g at l e a s t 1000 b a t t l e f a t a l i t i e s d u r i n g the 1815-1945 p e r i o d - The c a u s a l paths t o each type may vary as do those to v a r i o u s b i o l o g i c a l c a n c e r s . Table 11:2 about here Table 11:2 summarizes the i n c i d e n c e s of war f o r each of the great powers. A s t a t e does not p a r t i c i p a t e i n war i y a d e c l a r a t i o n t o do so: p a r t i c i p a t i o n r e q u i r e s having "a minimum o f 1000 armed p e r s o n n e l engaged i n a c t i v e combat s Singer and S m a l l , The Wages of jjar, pp. 22-23. Table 11:1 Types of 'Balance cf Power War1, 1815-1945 Combatants Great Central Peripheral Combatants Power State State Great Power 8 Central State 13 6 Peripheral State 4 6 Total 25 12 7 Source: Singer and Small, The Wages Of War, Table 23 b Table 11:2 flumber of Each Type of Interstate War: Great Powers, 1816-1945 Opponent Great Power Great Power Other Peripheral Total Central State State Onited Kingdom 3 1 1 5 France 5 2 3 1 0 Prussia/Germany 4 2 0 6 Eussia/OSSE 5 5 0 1 0 Austria/A-H 3 2 1 6 I t a l y 4 2 0 6 Onited States 2 0 0 2 Japan 4 2 0 6 Source: Singer and S a a l l , The Wages o f Bar, Table 4:2. 24 w i t h i n the war t h e a t e r " or s u f f e r i n g at l e a s t 100 b a t t l e d e a t h s . 6 While the number of deaths p r o v i d e s a t h r e s h o l d t o d i s t i n g u i s h wars from l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t , though s t i l l d eadly, q u a r r e l s between s t a t e s , i n c i d e n c e and s e v e r i t y — t h e l a t t e r measured by t h e t o t a l number k i l l e d 7 — a r e d i s t i n c t v a r i a b l e s * They a r e not merely a l t e r n a t i v e i n d i c a t o r s of the amount of war a g r e a t power e x p e r i e n c e s ; one i s dichotomous and, hence, c r u d e r than the o t h e r . W i t h i n the R e a l i s t paradigm, war i s , to quote von C l a u s e w i t z , " n o t h i n g but a c o n t i n u a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l i n t e r c o u r s e with an admixture of other means," 8 but i t i s not a c o n t i n u o u s v a r i a b l e - I t i s extremely d i s c r e t e : i t o c c u r s and has a d e f i n i t e end p o i n t , or i t does not occur. The t a s k o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r v a r i a t i o n i n s e v e r i t y a r i s e s once a great 6 I b i d . , pp.36, 35. Note t h a t 1000 b a t t l e f a t a l i t i e s i s a c r t i t e r i o n f o r war and not p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a war. 7 The t o t a l numbers o f m i l i t a r y dead are r e c o r d e d by modern s t a t e s as a matter of b u r e a u c r a t i c n e c e s s i t y , but b u r e a u c r a t i c n e c e s s i t y does not guarantee accuracy and bureaus o f t e n d i f f e r . S i n g e r and Small d i s c u s s t h e accuracy and r e l i a b i l i t y of these numbers on pp. 347-370 of t h e i r compendium of misery The Wages Of War. Note t h a t c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s o f t e n outnumber m i l i t a r y c a s u a l t i e s , but the numbers are u n r e l i a b l e - Some very r e a s o n a b l e e s t i m a t e s can be found i n G i l E l l i o t ' s p o r t r a i t of "the n a t i o n of the d e a d " — t h e r e s u l t s o f the mass p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e of our century- His book. The Twentieth Century Book of the Dead (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), i s a f i n e work of necrology. Necrology, as E l l i o t d e f i n e s i t , "simply means the naming o r l i s t i n g of the dead." 8 K a r l von C l a u s e w i t z , On War, ed, A n a t o l R a p o p o r t r (Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1968), p. 119. • . ' 25 power engages i n war and the c o r r e l a t e s of one need not be the c o r r e l a t e s of the o t h e r . To account f o r i n c i d e n c e , the u n i t of a n a l y s i s i s the s t a t e , and to account f o r s e v e r i t y , war becomes the u n i t . He e a s i l y can imagine a s i t u a t i o n i n which a s t a t e would be u n l i k e l y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n war and, i f a war were to o c c u r , i t would be extremely bloody- For example, Deutsch and S i n g e r argue t h a t i n a b i p o l a r world one would expect few but severe wars and i n a m u l t i p o l a r world one would expect many l e s s s e v e r e wars. 9 I n t h i s sense, frequency o f war may vary i n v e r s e l y with i n t e n s i t y : j u s t as the a c c i d e n t - p r o n e person s u f f e r s more b r u i s e s than broken bones, a c c i d e n t -prone s t a t e s s u f f e r more wars with "minor" f a t a l i t i e s than major f a t a l i t i e s . 1 0 To r e p e a t , e x p l a i n i n g i n c i d e n c e and s e v e r i t y poses two problems, not simply v a r i a t i o n s on the s i n g l e theme of the amount o f war. An examination of a r e c e n t study of " C a p a b i l i t y D i s t r i b u t i o n , U n c e r t a i n t y , and Major Power War, 1820-1965" i l l u s t r a t e s the p o s s i b l e p i t f a l l s of lumping a l l g r e a t power wars together and of f a i l i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h between the i n c i d e n c e of war and the. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f wars once they 9 K a r l W. Deutsch and J . David Singer, " M u l t i p o l a r Power Systems and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t a b i l i t y , " World P o l i t i c s , 16 ( A p r i l 1964), 390-406. 1 0 Evidence t h a t t h i s i s the case f o r deadly q u a r r e l s i n g e n e r a l , and i n t e r n a t i o n a l wars i n p a r t i c u l a r , can be found i n Bichardson, S t a t i s t i c s o f Deadly Q u a r r e l s , p-153, and i n Singer and S m a l l , " A l l i a n c e A g g r e g a t i o n and the Onset o f War," pp.256-257. : • 2 6 do o c c u r . S i n g e r , Bremer and Stuckey i n v e s t i g a t e d two i n c o m p a t i b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s concerning the consequences o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n of m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s and o f changes i n t h a t d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h i n the g r e a t power group o f s t a t e s - 1 1 The f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n was t h a t an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of power and movements towards g r e a t e r i n e q u a l i t y made war l e s s l i k e l y . The second contended t h a t approximate p a r i t y and movements towards f u r t h e r e q u a l i t y decreased the chances of war. The r e a s o n i n g u n d e r l y i n g both p r o p o s i t i o n s was t h a t p a r i t y would i n c r e a s e " d e c i s i o n a l u n c e r t a i n t y " ( d e f i n e d as "the d i f f i c u l t y which f o r e i g n p o l i c y e l i t e s e x p e r i e n c e i n d i s c e r n i n g the s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s and c l u s t e r s i n the system and p r e d i c t i n g t h e b e haviour of o t h e r members o f t h a t system"). The q u e s t i o n to be s e t t l e d was whether d e c i s i o n a l u n c e r t a i n t y i n h i b i t e d i n i t i a t i o n of war or p e r m i t t e d stumbling i n t o one. Note t h a t both p r o p o s i t i o n s p u r p o r t to account f o r t h e i n c i d e n c e o f war-I n the s e c t i o n o f t h e i r paper s u b t i t l e d "The I n c i d e n c e o f War," S i n g e r , Bremer an,d Stuckey e m p i r i c a l l y d e f i n e the dependent v a r i a b l e . "The p a r t i c u l a r index used," they w r i t e , " i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the magnitude of war underway, as measured i n nation-months of...major i n t e r s t a t e war" I The s u b s t i t u t i o n o f a measure o f the magnitude o f war f o r the i n c i d e n c e of war i s not, and cannot, be j u s t i f i e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y . Furthermore, the i n c l u s i o n o f a l l i n t e r s t a t e 1 1 S i n g e r , Bremer and Stuckey, " C a p a b i l i t y D i s t r i b u t i o n U n c e r t a i n t y , and Major Power War," pp.19-48-wars " i n which at l e a s t one major power was an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t " i s n o t , and cannot be j u s t i f i e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y , i s can be gleaned from the f i g u r e s i n Tables 11:1 and 11:2, most of the i n t e r s t a t e wars s i n c e 1815 p i t t e d a g r e a t power (or great powers) a g a i n s t minor powers. I f t h e g r e a t powers are t r e a t e d as an e n t i t y , as they are by S i n g e r , Bremer and Stuckey, the t h e o r e t i c a l r a t i o n a l e o f f e r e d p r o v i d e s l i t t l e h e l p i n e x p l a i n i n g why a c o a l i t i o n , of g r e a t powers destroyed the T u r k i s h f l e e t a t Navarino Bay, o r Napoleon I I I began h i s i l l - f a t e d i m p e r i a l adventures i n Mexico. The t h e o r e t i c a l statements are l i m i t e d t o competing e x p l a n a t i o n s of wars between g r e a t powers, and t o remain f a i t h f u l t o them, the e i g h t such wars which o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the 1815-1965 p e r i o d should not be i n t e r m i n g l e d with the twenty-one ot h e r 1 2 S i n g e r , Bremer and Stuckey are aware of some problems o f t h e i r c r i t e r i o n f o r i n c l u d i n g g r e a t power wars. They wr i t e i n a f o o t n o t e (p.41) : P a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , f o r those who suspect t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n of war used here may be too broad i n t h a t i t embraces a l l i n t e r - s t a t e war i n v o l v i n g major powers, we mention a r e l e v a n t f i n d i n g . That i s , i f we look o n l y at those e i g h t wars i n which th e r e i s a major power on each s i d e , we f i n d t h a t there was a d e c l i n e i n CON ( c o n c e n t r a t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s ) d u r i n g the h a l f decade p r e c e d i n g a l l but one of those wars. Since these are almost e q u a l l y d i v i d e d between the c e n t u r i e s , they l e n d some support to the peace through preponderance d o c t r i n e . I f i n d t h i s f o o t n o t e extremely p u z z l i n g . For one t h i n g , i t i m p l i e s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n with the f i n d i n g s r e p o r t e d i n the body of t h e i r paper. Moreover, they conclude t h a t the " p a r i t y and f l u i d i t y " model f i t s the 19th c e n t u r y and the "preponderance and s t a b i l i t y " model f i t s the 20th century, but the more r e l e v a n t a n a l y s i s noted " p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y " 28 i n t e r s t a t e wars i n which a g r e a t power p a r t i c i p a t e d - 1 2 E i g h t wars between g r e a t powers i s too few a number f o r e l a b o r a t e s t a t i s t i c a l manipulations- I s u s p e c t t h a t the purpose of s u b s t i t u t i n g d u r a t i o n f o r i n c i d e n c e was t c c r e a t e the s t a t i s t i c a l v a r i a t i o n r e g u i r e d by the m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n t e c h n i q u e s the authors employed- As the s t a t i s t i c a l v a r i a t i o n i n c r e a s e d , the f a u l t l i n e between the t h e o r e t i c a l arguments and the e m p i r i c a l t e s t s widened. T h e r e f o r e , t h e study p r o v i d e s an example of t e c h n i q u e s d o m i n a t i o n * * 3 The problem of 'too few wars' f o r s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s i s a s u b s t a n t i v e problem, n ot a t e c h n i c a l one and one t h a t i s more important where the u n i t o f a n a l y s i s i s the s t a t e r a t h e r than a group of s t a t e s -f a v o u r s the l a t t e r f o r the whole time p e r i o d . For another t h i n g , the f o o t n o t e d f i n d i n g i s mistaken. When the b i v a r i a t e c o r r e l a t i o n s (the po i n t b i s e r i a l i s the a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t i s t i c ) are computed f o r CON, the o t h e r independent v a r i a b l e s and t h e i n c i d e n c e of war among the g r e a t powers, the o r i g i n a l f i n d i n g s are r e a f f i r m e d without  mangling the theory-. 1 3 The word "domination" i s used with care- "Tyranny of techn i q u e " i s a l l i t e r a t i v e and more common, but the phrase obscures the problem. Tyranny i s o b v i o u s , and every r e a s o n a b l e person i s a g a i n s t tyranny; whereas, "domination, compared to a l l o t h e r modes o f o p p r e s s i o n , i s unique i n t h a t the dominated remain o b l i v i o u s o f t h e i r d omination." The world of the dominated i s a f a l s i f i e d r e a l i t y t h a t has been granted the semblance of t h e n a t u r a l which i n t u r n g r a nts i t an aura of r a t i o n a l i t y and legitimacy;. ( A l k i s Kontos, "Domination: Metaphor and P o l i t i c a l R e a l i t y " i n Domination ed. A l k i s Kontos (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto P r e s s , 1975) , pp.218-219. See Chapter 4, below, f o r 29 I f the g r e a t power group i s the u n i t of a n a l y s i s , war becomes an a t t r i b u t e of the group and not a r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e s : t h e r e f o r e , i t i s not n e c e s s a r y t o pry i n t o t h e anonymity the group p r o v i d e s . I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, the i n d i v i d u a l g r e a t power i s the u n i t with which we are concerned, as i n t h i s study, f a i l u r e t o i d e n t i f y the i n i t i a t o r or " a g g r e s s o r " poses a p l a u s i b l e t h r e a t t o the v a l i d i t y of the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d . I t would imply t h a t war i s a symmetrical r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e s — both combatants are e q u a l l y " a g g r e s s o r s " or " d e f e n d e r s . " T h i s assumption of symmetry i s o f t e n t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e and e m p i r i c a l l y i n a c c u r a t e - However, we must be c a r e f u l not t o r e p l a c e the assumption of symmetry by embracing i t s o p p o s i t e , the assumption of asymmetry. "Remember t h a t between p o s i t and o p p o s i t e the game need not be z e r o sum." Hany e x p l a n a t i o n s of i n t e r s t a t e war, i n c l u d i n g some of those i n the b a l a n c e of power s c h o o l , are e x p l a n a t i o n s of the b e l l i c o s i t y of s t a t e s , not mere involvement i n war- For example, i t i s argued t h a t the dominant s t a t e A, u n l e s s checked by a c o a l i t i o n o f i t s weaker neighbours, w i l l i n i t i a t e war i n o r d e r t o f u r t h e r i t s dominance. Whether A ( i n f a c t ) does a t t a c k B, a weaker s t a t e , i s something to be an expansion o f t h i s argument and numerous i l l u s t r a t i o n s . ** Jean Laponce, "Of Gods, D e v i l s , Monsters, and One-Eyed V a r i a b l e s , " Canadian J o u r n a l of B o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , 7 (June 1974) , 203. 30 examined. I f A does s o , the war i s d e c i d e d l y asymmetrical and the e x p l a n a t i o n of B's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s q u i t e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d - - i t i s defending i t s e l f - The elementary, i f not always heeded, p o i n t i s t h a t B's warfare i s not n e c e s s a r i l y evidence a g a i n s t the argument and s h o u l d nxat always be taken as such- " T r e a t i n g asymmetric c o n f l i c t s as i f they were symmetric can be d i s a s t r o u s l y m i s l e a d i n g - He a l l a p p r e c i a t e the f r a u d t h a t can be p e r p e t r a t e d by a p p r o p r i a t e d e f i n i t i o n s o f e q u a l i t y - There i s t h e case of the butcher accused o f a d u l t e r a t i n q r a b b i t meat. Hhen asked how much horse meat he added, he r e p l i e d , 'No more than 50%:, one horse, one r a b b i t ' - " 1 3 S e p a r a t i n g r a b b i t from horse meat i s t r i v i a l when compared to r e l i a b l y and v a l i d l y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of involvement i n war- The e q u i v a l e n t s of the butcher cannot be q u e s t i o n e d , and even i f they c o u l d be, the answers they might give would not prove h e l p f u l . Goldmann, a f t e r c l a s s i f y i n g t h e s t a t e s which had engaged i n war s i n c e 1945 a c c o r d i n g to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s which n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s o f f e r e d , p o i n t s out the most p l a u s i b l e t h r e a t t o the v a l i d i t y o f such a procedure. A f t e r a l l , j u s t i f i c a t i o n s are determined by the d e s i r e t o make an a c t i o n appear compatible with e x i s t i n g norms; they may t e l l us l i t t l e about other t y p e s of motives and they are o b v i o u s l y u n r e l i a b l e as s ources o f i n f o r m a t i o n about the s i t u a t i o n . 1 6 1 5 A n a t o l Rapoport, " V a r i o u s Conceptions of Peace Research," Peace Research S o c i e t y ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) Papers, 19 (1972) , 96-31 Goldmann 1s concern i s mi s l e a d i n g t e s t s o f the rank d i s e q u i l i b r i u m h y p o t h e s i s i n Galtung's s t r u c t u r a l theory of a g g r e s s i o n - 1 7 He i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t the use of the i n a p p r o p r i a t e symmetric data i n f l a t e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between rank d i s e q u i l i b r i u m , or s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y , and war- A s s e s s i n g h i s "experiment i n asymmetry", Goldmann w r i t e s : none of the f o u r ways of c r e a t i n g asymmetry t h a t have been experimented with here i s s a t i s f a c t o r y . The p o i n t i s , however, t h a t the symmetric approach i s not very s a t i s f a c t o r y e i t h e r - Indeed, whereas the v a l i d i t y o f the f o u r asymmetric approaches can be argued f o r and a g a i n s t , the symmetric approach i s o b v i o u s l y i n v a l i d to most hypotheses c o n s i d e r e d h e r e . 1 8 Goldman ends h i s p r o j e c t d e j e c t e d l y . I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d i s t i n g u i s h between " a g g r e s s i o n " and "defense" i n a way t h a t i s both v a l i d and r e l i a b l e - T h e r e f o r e , asymmetric t h e o r i e s about warfare---cannot be t e s t e d q u a n t i t a t i v e l y - Much can be s a i d i n f a v o u r of t h a t d e f e a t i s t c o n c l u s i o n . 1 9 And t h a t i s t r u l y a d e f e a t i s t c o n c l u s i o n because, i f i t were accepted, a l l i n q u i r y , q u a n t i t a t i v e o r not, i n t o asymmetric t h e o r i e s would have to cease- R e l i a b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y l i e upon a continuum where they p u l l a g a i n s t one a n o t h e r . 1 6 K j e l l Goldmann, "Some C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f S t a t e s and I n t e r s t a t e HarfarerAn Experiment i n Asymmetry," i n h i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l Norms and Kar Between S t a t e s : Three S t u d i e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s (Stockholm: L a r o m e d e l s f o r e l a g e n , 1971) , p,.277. 1 7 Johan G a l t u n g , "A S t r u c t u r a l Theory o f A g g r e s s i o n , " J o u r n a l of Peace Research, No.2, (1964), 95-119. 1 8 Goldmann, "An Experiment i n Asymmetry," pp. 277-278. 1 9 I b i d . , p.278. I n s t e a d ; o i V t r y i n g t o maximize both, i t would be p r e f e r a b l e to f o rego the l i t e r a l l y U t o p i a n s e a r c h f o r a s i n g l e c r i t e r i o n or an a l l - d u t y c h e c k l i s t which would be both v a l i d and r e l i a b l e f o r i d e n t i f y i n g v a r i o u s types o f involvement i n war- Perhaps the f i r s t t h i n g to do i s to d i s p e n s e with the t e r n " a g g r e s s o r " and, f o l l o w i n g Goldmann, t o t a l k o f " a c t i v e c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r - " Our task i s not the v u l g a r and s u p e r f i c i a l one of naming the cause of each war- " A l l we can say. i s t h a t one n a t i o n i n i t i a t e d o r s t a r t e d o r opened the war, but t h a t i s a d e s c r i p t i o n , not e x p l a n a t i o n of the beginning o f a war-" 2 0 S i n g e r and Sm a l l , i n t h e i r compendium The Wages of War, i d e n t i f y the i n i t i a t o r s — t h o s e s t a t e s "whose b a t t a l i o n s made the f i r s t a t t a c k i n s t r e n g t h on t h e i r opponents' armies or t e r r i t o r i e s " 2 1 — o f a l l but one of the g r e a t power wars-Table 11:3 As t h e f i g u r e s i n Table 11:3 i n d i c a t e , the asymmetry o f g r e a t power war r e f l e c t s the asymmetry i n c a p a b i l i t i e s between the combatants- Only two mice appear t o have r o a r e d : S a r d i n i a i n her f i r s t war with A u s t r i a i n 1849 and Turkey i n the Crimean War, one of her many wars w i t h Russia. S i n g e r and Small c a r e f u l l y s t a t e t h a t t h e i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 2<> G e o f f r e y B l a i n e y , The Causes of War, (New York: P r e s s , 1973), pp.173-174. 2 * S i n g e r and Sm a l l , The Wages of War, Table 14:7, 368-370. The Free pp.366, Table 11:3 32 a I n i t i a t o r s In Great Foyer I n t e r s t a t e j a r , 1816-1945. Great Power France I t a l y Eussia/DSSE Japan A u s t r i a P r u s s i a Onited Kingdom Number o f Wars Against Hen-Great Power 4 4 5 2 2 2 2 Dumber of Times Great Power I n i t i a t e d 4 4 4 2 1 2 • 2 The numbers i n c l u d e Navarino Bay (1827). Source: Singer and Small , The Wages Of War, Tables 4:2 and 14:7. 33 i s "as crude as i t i s t e n t a t i v e " and they are not t r y i n g to reach a f i r m data-based c o n c l u s i o n as to which p a r t i c i p a n t "caused" the war whether by a c t i o n , t h r e a t o r other p r o v o c a t i o n . 2 2 The " p a r t i c u l a r l y ambiguous c a s e s " of g r e a t power war which they l i s t — N a v a r i n o Bay (1827), the Crimean (1853-1856), I t a l i a n Independence (1859), and the S i n o - I n d i a n War (1962)—suggest t h a t the m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t o r need not be the more " a c t i v e " p a r t y . Navarino Bay was l e f t out o f S i n g e r ' s and Small's i n i t i a t i o n / v i c t o r y or d e f e a t t a b u l a t i o n s because Turkey, which attempted to break a blockade o f her f l e e t imposed by France, the Onited Kingdom and R u s s i a , m i s l e a d i n g l y would be named the i n i t i a t o r a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n . S i n g e r and Small p o i n t out t h a t a c t i o n s by R u s s i a may have provoked Turkey i n t o what became t h e Crimean War, and t h a t the same s c r t of argument c o u l d be made i n the o t h e r two c a s e s . A u s t r i a can be seen as r e s p o n d i n g with l a r g e s c a l e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s t o the S a r d i n i a n p r o v o c a t i o n s , and China can be seen as responding t o I n d i a n a c t i v i t i e s i n the d i s p u t e d border area between the two s t a t e s . 2 3 Ray, i n h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n on s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y and g r e a t power war, examines each great power war, i n t e r s t a t e and i m p e r i a l , and seeks t o i d e n t i f y the " a c t i v i s t involvement." He d e f i n e s a c t i v i s t war involvement as engagement by a s t a t e " i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l war which a r i s e s 2 2 I b i d . , p.366. 2 3 Singer and S m a l l , The Wages of War, pp. 366-367. 33 a Table 1 1 : 3 I n i t i a t o r s In Great Power Interstate War, 1816-1945. Great Power number of Wars Against Non-Great Power Number of Times Great Power I n i t i a t e d France I t a l y Bussia/DSSB Japan Austria Prussia United Kingdom 4 4 5 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 1 2 2 The numbers include Navarino Bay (1827). Source: Singer and Small, The Wages Of War, Tables 4:2 and 14:7. 34 out of a c o n f l i c t i n which t h a t s t a t e advocated a change i n e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c a l arrangements," E s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c a l arrangements a r e those i n e x i s t e n c e f o r more than a y e a r - 2 4 The asymmetries made are c e r t a i n l y debatable but t h e debate, rescued from the a b s t r a c t and u n i v e r s a l , can now be awarded-The m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t o r s and the more b r o a d l y d e f i n e d a c t i v i s t s a r e , f a r more o f t e n than not, the same-Table I I : 4 d e s c r i b e s the i n c i d e n c e and s e v e r i t y o f great power wars and the types of involvement of each g r e a t power-Table 11:4 0 From an humanitarian p e r s p e c t i v e , the l i s t i n T a b l e 11:4 i s f a r too long but, from the p e r s p e c t i v e o f a dat a a n a l y s t , i t i s much too s h o r t . Peace i s f a r more common than war- Some n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e c o n f r o n t e d with an analogous problem. Earthquakes, f o r example, are d i f f i c u l t to p r e d i c t because they are i n f r e q u e n t : the c a u s a l paths are not understood c l e a r l y and the p a u c i t y of such n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r s r e s t r i c t s the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r c l a r i f y i n q the c a u s a l paths. C o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g comments on c u r r e n t earthquake r e s e a r c h . They apply with e q u a l f o r c e to the study o f man-made d i s a s t e r s . I r o n i c a l l y , i t i s the l a c k of even moderately-s i z e d earthquakes i n C a l i f o r n i a t h a t i s p r o v i n g most f r u s t r a t i n g t o American r e s e a r c h e r s . Without a l o n g p e r i o d of o b s e r v a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a number of moderate or l a r g e earthquakes, i t would be im p o s s i b l e t o s o r t out the v a r i o u s g e o p h y s i c a l 2 * James Lee Ray, " S t a t u s I n c o n s i s t e n c y and War Involvement Among European S t a t e s , 1816-1970," D i s s . U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan 1974, pp.48, 44-49-0 34 a Table 11:4 great Power Interstate War, .18 16-1945: Duration. Severity and Type of P a r t i c i p a t i o n Har Franco-Spanish 1823 Navarino Eay 1827 Duration (Months) Battle Deaths 7.3 . 1 1 000 3 180 Parti c i p a n t s (ACTIVIST) France Spain ONITED KINGDOM FRANCE BOSSIA Russo-Turkish 16.7 1828 tustror-Sardinian 4.7 1848 Schleswig-Holstein 8.1 1848 Boman Republic 1849 Crimean 1853,1854 Anglo-Persian* 1856 1.8 28.3 4.6 I t a l i a n Unification 2.5 1859 130 000 9 000 6 000 2 200 264 200 2 000 22 500 Turkey RUSSIA Turkey Austria Sardinia PRUSSIA Denmark France Austria Two S i c i l i e s Papal States United Kingdom France Sardinia Turkey RUSSIA United Kingdom IRAN SARDINIA FRANCE Austria 34 b Franco-Mexican 1862 Schleswig-Holstein 1864 Seven Weeks 1866 57.7 3.6 1.4 20 000 4 500 36 100 FRANCE Mexico PRUSSIA Denmark PROSSIA ITALY Franco-Prussian 1870 Busso-Turkish 1877 Sino-French 1884 Russo-Japanese 1904 Italo-Turkish 1911 7.3 8.8 11.8 19.3 12.7 187 500 285 000 12 100 130 000 20 000 Austria Hanover Bavaria Baden Saxony Wuertemberg Hesse-Electoral Hesse-Grand Ducal Mecklenburg-Schuerin France PEOSSIA Bavaria Baden Weurtemberg BOSSIA Turkey FRANCE China JAPAN Russia ITALY Turkey 34 c World War I 51.5 9 000 000 Onited Kingdom 1914 France Belgium Bussia Portugal United States I t a l y Serbia Greece Rumania JAPAN GERMANY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY BULGARIA TURKEY Hanchurian 16.6 1931 Italo-Ethiopian 7.2 1935 Sino-Japanese 53. 1 1937 Busso-Japanese 1.2 1939 World War II 71.5 60 000 20 000 1 000 000 19 000 15 000 000 JAPAN China ITALY Ethiopia JAPAN China USSR/Bussia Japan GERMANY HUNGABY ITALY Bulgaria Rumania Finland JAPAN U n i t e d Kingdom France Russia Poland Belgium Canada United States B r a z i l Holland Yugoslavia Greece Bulgaria I t a l y 34 d Norway Ethiopia South A f r i c a China Mongolia New Zealand A u s t r a l i a Busso-Finnish 1939 3.4 90 000 OSSB Finland Sources: Singer and Small, The Hases of J a r , Table 4:2 and James Lee Bay, "Status Inconsistency And War Involvement Among European States, 1816-1970," Diss. Michigan, 1S74, Appendix A. 35 phenomena that may f o r e t e l l a damaging earthquake from those that are unrelated-But as long as underlying earthquake mechanisms remain poorly understood, the only a l t e r n a t i v e appears to be to observe as many l i k e l y precursory phenomena as possible and try to deduce those that can be used to predict the time, l o c a t i o n , and siz e of major earthquakes. 2 5 Peace and war earthquakes and the absence of earthquakes — are to be e x p l a i n e d . 2 6 Having described the dependent variable, the next tasks are: 1) to draw out putative explanations and precursors of great power war; 2) to formulate them i n t o t e s t a b l e propositions; and 3) to examine the the e x i s t i n g evidence. Once those tasks are completed, I can turn to ways and means to examine the propositions properly. 2 5 Richard A. Kerr, "Earthquakes: Predictions Proving Elusive," Science, Vol.200, No-4340 (28 A p r i l 1978), 419. 2 6 As Geoffrey Blainey r i g h t l y stresses, i t i s "peace that passeth understanding" i n many would be explanations of war* "The Peace That Passeth Understanding" i s the t i t l e of the f i r s t chapter of h i s sometimes i r r i t a t i n g , b/ut never d u l l , book The Causes Of War. LEAF 36 OMITTED Chapter I I I THE BALANCE OF POWER 3.1 PRELIMINARIES The •balance of power' i s the most prominent o f the • R e a l i s t ' or 'power p o l i t i e s ' e x p l a n a t i o n s o f war and peace. The i d e n t i f y i n g marks of these e x p l a n a t i o n s i n c l u d e the f o l l o w i n g assumptions and d e f i n i t i o n s . 1. The s t a t e i s the s o v e r e i g n e n t i t y . 2. The s t a t e i s a u n i t a r y a c t o r . 3. R a t i o n a l decision-making p r e v a i l s . 4. The g o a l i s to maximize power. 5. C o n f l i c t s between s t a t e s , each bent upon maximizing power, are unavoidable. 6.. War i s a r a t i o n a l instrument o f p o l i c y . Rather than a d i s e a s e or a d i s a s t e r , war i s "a c o n t i n u a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l commerce, a c a r r y i n g out of the same by other means" 1 7. P e a c e f u l i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , t o r e v e r s e von C l a u s e w i t z ' s d e f i n i t i o n , are a c o n t i n u a t i o n of v i o l e n t commerce, a c a r r y i n g out of the same with other means. 2 1 von C l a u s e w i t z , On War, p.119. 2 T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n i s from Anatol Rapoport's i n t r o d u c t i o n to the Penguin e d i t i o n of On War, p.22- Rapoport compares the Clausewitzean philosophy of war, the L e n i n i s t view, the philosophy of modern peace r e s e a r c h , and the t h i n k i n g of contemporary n u c l e a r s t r a t e g i s t s who c l a i m t o be the P r u s s i a n ' s progeny. See a l s o W.B. G a l l i e , P h i l o s o p h e r s of Peace and War (Cambridge: At the U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978), chp-3,. - 37 -38 Before d e s c r i b i n g and e v a l u a t i n g the balance of power theory, I w i l l comment b r i e f l y upon some v e r s i o n s which are i n c o m p a t i b l e with these assumptions and d e f i n i t i o n s and upon a c r i t e r i o n of e v a l u a t i o n which i s both common and i n c o r r e c t . For most ' R e a l i s t s ' , the c o r n e r s t o n e of the approach i s the assumption t h a t man i s i n n a t e l y aggressive and s e l f i s h . That assumption need not be accepted i n order t o examine, and perhaps embrace, t h e i r 'power p o l i t i e s ' e x p l a n a t i o n s of i n t e r s t a t e war. I t c o n t r i b u t e s n o t h i n g t o them, although i t does p r o v i d e some normative glue to bind ' R e a l i s t s ' a g a i n s t ' I d e a l i s t s ' - those who advocate p o l i c i e s which work a g a i n s t r a t h e r than "with the f o r c e s i n h e r e n t i n human n a t u r e . " 3 The R e a l i s t goal i s a p o l i t i c a l "theory which t r i e s to understand i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s as i t a c t u a l l y i s , and as i t ought to be, i n view of i t s i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e " . 4 The 3 The R e a l i s t s tend to assume t h a t men are s t a t e s w r i t s m a l l while they pretend to leap the d i s t a n c e from the nature of man to the nature of the s t a t e system. I d e a l i s t s , and o t h e r s , are c o r r e c t to r e j e c t such c l a i m s . R e a l i s t s are c o r r e c t t o r e j e c t the c l a i m of I d e a l i s t s t h a t man i s by nature c o - o p e r a t i v e and, t h e r e f o r e , war i s u n n a t u r a l . Both s i d e s are c o r r e c t f o r the wrong reasons. Assuming man to be a s e l f i s h , a g g r e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l h e lps l i t t l e when t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n warfare and other forms o f o r g a n i z e d d e s t r u c t i o n . The o p p o s i t e assumption i s f a r more c o m p e l l i n g . See S t a n l e y Milgram, Obedience To A u t h o r i t y : An Experimental View (New York: Harper & Row, 1 9 7 4 ) . For a c o n c i s e e x p o s i t i o n of the l o g i c of i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s , see Kenneth Waltz, Han, The S t a t e , And War (Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press:New York, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp.1 5 9 - 1 8 6 . 4 Morgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among Nations, p^14 } 39 d i s t i n c t i o n between a p o s i t i v e theory and a normative one, a d i s t i n c t i o n o f t e n hard to make i n p r a c t i c e and an anathema to R e a l i s t s , i s worth m a i n t a i n i n g . Organski, an ardent c r i t i c of the balance of power theory, w r i t e s t h a t "the balancer i s the keystone of the e n t i r e t h e o r y " and the b a l a n c e r i s supposed to be a s t a t e " r e s e r v e d , s e l f - r e s t r a i n e d , humane, moderate, and wise". 5 Or, i n other words, one s t a t e i s supposed to a c t c o n t r a r y to the r e s t f o r the good of a l l ; moreover, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t i t do so. For Organski t h i s i s yet another c o n t r a d i c t i o n among a p i l e of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . However, n e i t h e r of the two balance of power t h e o r i s t s from whom he documents the theory, namely Morgenthau and A.J.P. T a y l o r , p o s i t so aberrant a s t a t e i n t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n s . 6 I t h i n k they would applaud Cobden, the B r i t i s h pamphleteer Organski c i t e s , who a t t a c k e d those of h i s c o u n t r y ' s l e a d e r s who p r o f e s s e d to r e s t r a i n themselves f o r the good of Europe, u n l i k e the l e s s wise and l e s s moderate c o n t i n e n t a l statesmen. Cobden wrote i n 1836 t h a t England has, f o r n e a r l y a c e n t u r y , h e l d the European s c a l e s - not with the b l i n d n e s s of the goddess of j u s t i c e h e r s e l f , or with a view to the e g u i l i b r i u m of opposite i n t e r e s t s , but with a cyclopean eye to her own aggrandizement. 7 5 A. F. K. Organski, World P o l i t i c s (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1968), pp.279-287-6 Morgenthau's d i s c u s s i o n of the " b a l a n c e r " i s on pp. 187-190 of P o l i t i c s Among Nations and T a y l o r ' s balance of power theory can be found i n h i s The S t r u g g l e For Mastery; In Europe. 1848-1918 (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1954) . no The balance o f power theory does not r e q u i r e a b a l a n c e r i n order to e x p l a i n the r e l a t i o n s among a group of s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s , each of which pursues i t s own advantage. " P r i v a t e v i c e s , p u b l i c k b e n e f i t s " (to borrow a s u b t i t l e from a work of another, f a r more nettlesome, B r i t i s h pamphleteer) are what i s promised. 8 L i k e many other c r i t i c s , Organski attempts t o t o p p l e the balance of power by d i g g i n g away the r e a l i t y or accuracy of the r e a l i s t assumptions upon which i t s i t s . Quite a c c u r a t e l y he w r i t e s t h a t "not a l l n a t i o n s are bent p r i m a r i l y upon maximizing t h e i r own power" 9 and from h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s "the b a s i c e r r o r s of the balance of power theory become apparent" to him-To begin with, i t i s based upon two erroneous assumptions: 1) t h a t n a t i o n s are fundamentally s t a t i c u n i t s whose power i s not changed from w i t h i n and 2) t h a t n a t i o n s have no permanent t i e s to each other but move about f r e e l y , motivated p r i m a r i l y by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of power. But we have seen t h a t these assumptions are not c o r r e c t , and s i n c e the assumptions of the t h e o r y are wrong, the 7 R i c h a r d Cobden, The P o l i t i c a l W r i t i n g of Richard Cobden, 4th ed. (1903; r p t . New York! Kraus7~1969)7 p.. 201. Organski c l o s e s h i s c r i t i q u e with the f o l l o w i n g v i t r o l i c passage from Cobden's work: the balance of power i s a chimera! I t i s not a f a l l a c y , a mistake, an imposture, i t i s an undecided, i n d e s c r i b a b l e , incomprehensible n o t h i n g ; mere words, conveying to the mind not i d e a s , but sounds.-.(197-198) . This need not be so, 8 Bernard M a n d e v i l l e , The Table o f t h e Bees, ed. P h i l l i p Harth (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970). 9 Organski, World P o l i t i c s , p.298. 41 c o n c l u s i o n s are a l s o i n e r r o r . 1 0 As with the assumption of the b a l a n c e r , the f i r s t o f these two assumptions i s not a p a r t of the balance of power theory, or a t l e a s t not a part of the t h e o r i e s of Morgenthau and T a y l o r which Organski draws u p o n . 1 1 There i s no reguirement t h a t a s t a t e ' s power be generated e x t e r n a l l y and not i n t e r n a l l y , (say) by means of i n d u s t r i a l growth or i n c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y spending. In h i s c r i t i q u e , Organski i s l a y i n g the groundwork f o r h i s theory of "power t r a n s i t i o n " which s t r e s s e s the i n f l u e n c e of r a p i d and d i f f e r e n t i a l r a t e s of i n d u s t r i a l development. I w i l l d i s c u s s t h a t theory below because i t does f i t w i t h i n the assumptions and d e f i n i t i o n s o u t l i n e d above. The important p o i n t here i s t h a t the assumptions are t h e o r e t i c a l 1 0 IJ2i£« / pp. 288,292,. Compare with the f o l l o w i n g c r i t i c i s m of "the balance of power theory made by Georg Schwarzenberger i n h i s Power Polj.ti.cs: A Study, of World S o c i e t y (New York: Praeger, 1964). The balance of power i s a p h y s i c a l and mechanical i d e a . I t i s based on the q u e s t i o n a b l e assumption t h a t the friend-enemy r e l a t i o n s between Stat e s are immutable, and t h a t other S t a t e s do not change over from one s i d e t o the other (174).. 1 1 There i s some ambiguity i n the case of A. J$P. T a y l o r . T a y l o r p r e f a c e s h i s The S t r u g g l e For Master£ i n Europe with a g u a n t i t a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n of the i n d u s t r i a l , m i l i t a r y and demographic might that d e f i n e d the p r o t a g o n i s t s and w r i t e s i n the b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l essay at the end of the book t h a t " p o l i c y s p r i n g s from deep s o c i a l and economic sources; i t i s not c r u d e l y manufactured i n f o r e i g n o f f i c e s " (215). However, i n the t e x t i n between, the reader i s plunged i n t o the e l a b o r a t e d i p l o m a t i c s h u f f l e . E.B. S e g a l , r e f e r r i n g to T a y l o r ' s once c o n t r o v e r s i a l book on the o r i g i n s of World War I I , sums up the d i f f i c u l t y . . E.B. Segal, "A.J.P. T a y l o r and H i s t o r y " , i n Tjie O r i g i n s of the Second World War: A, J.P. 42 assumptions and, as such, are not open to d i r e c t e m p i r i c a l a t t a c k . They are i n a c c u r a t e . How c o u l d they be otherwise? T h e i r i n a c c u r a c y p r o v i d e s no b a s i s f o r r e j e c t i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are d e r i v e d from them. T r u l y important and s i g n i f i c a n t hypotheses w i l l be found t o have "assumptions" t h a t are w i l d l y i n a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of r e a l i t y and i n g e n e r a l , the more s i g n i f i c a n t the t h e o r y , the more u n r e a l i s t i c the assumptions (in t h i s s e n s e ) . The reason i s simple. A hypothesis i s important i f i t " e x p l a i n s " much by l i t t l e , t h a t i s i f i t a b s t r a c t s the common and c r u c i a l elements from the mass o f complex and d e t a i l e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s surrounding the phenomena to be e x p l a i n e d and permits v a l i d p r e d i c t i o n s on the  b a s i s of them alone,. To be important, t h e r e f o r e , a hypotheiss must be d e s c r i p t i v e l y f a l s e i n i t s assumptions; i t takes account of and accounts f o r none of the many other a t t e n d a n t circumstances, s i n c e i t s very success shows them to be i r r e l e v a n t f o r the phenomena t o be e x p l a i n e d . 1 2 The underscored phrase, "and permits v a l i d p r e d i c t i o n s on the b a s i s of them a l o n e " , b r i n g s me to the crux o f t h i s chapter and of the c r i t i c s * c o mplaint: the assumptions are f a r too p e r m i s s i v e . They are able t o support a l l s o r t s of c o n t r a d i c t o r y p r e d i c t i o n s w i t h i n the balance of power l i t e r a t u r e , as a whole, and w i t h i n the works of p a r t i c u l a r balance of power t h e o r i s t s (plus the p r e d i c t i o n s o f t h e i r most severe c r i t i c s ) . C a r r y i n g so much i s a s i g n of T a y l o r and His C r i t i c s , ed. W.R. Louis (New York: John Wiley S Sons, 1972) , p, 16. 2 M i l t o n Friedman, "The Methodology of P o s i t i v e Economics" i n Essays In P o s i t i v e Economics (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1953), pp.14-15. Kenneth Waltz makes the same p o i n t and a l s o f i n g e r s Organski i n h i s c r i t i c a l essay on "Theory of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , Vol.8 Handbook of P o l i t i c a l S c ience (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp.1-86i weakness, not s t r e n g t h - To have a p o s i t i v e theory of the i n c i d e n c e of i n t e r s t a t e war something must be t i g h t e n e d , added, thrown away or r e p l a c e d . For those t h e o r i s t s , such as R i k e r , who are i n c l i n e d towards the d e d u c t i v e approach to t h e o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , the immediate task i s to r e p a i r the f o u n d a t i o n s . 1 3 I do not agree with them. The " b u i l d i n g " metaphors, which we use so o f t e n t h a t we no l o n g e r r e c o g n i z e t h e i r metaphorical nature, mislead us t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s — l i k e the o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s we admire, work i n , and e v e n t u a l l y leave behind — must a l s o be c r e a t e d from the bottom up. Our task i s more a k i n to the a r c h i t e c t ' s than i t i s to the c a r p e n t e r ' s . The l a t t e r must have secure foundations i n order to do h i s work, while the former does h i s work and then secures i t to the ground. I f t h e o r i e s must be " c o n s t r u c t e d " , I p r e f e r t o s t a r t from near the top and to use sky-hooks-. He can a f f o r d to i g n o r e g r a v i t y f o r a l i t t l e 1 3 W i l l i a m H. R i k e r , The Theory Of P o l i t i c a l C o a l i t i o n s (New Haven: Ya l e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962)7 ~pp.T-3"T. Riker s u b s t i t u t e s "winning" f o r "power" maximization and proceeds t o e r e c t a " s i z e p r i n c i p l e " upon the f o u n d a t i o n s of the mathematical theory of games. To w i t : "In s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o n-person, z e r o sum games with s i d e -payments, p a r t i c i p a n t s c r e a t e c o a l i t i o n s j u s t as l a r g e as they b e l i e v e w i l l ensure winning and no l a r g e r " (32-33).. 1 4 For those who t h i n k t h a t t h i s y i e l d s t o the temptation of i n d u c t i v i s m or "mere f a c t g a t h e r i n g " , Robert Merton p r o v i d e s a homily. The hackneyed phrase o f t e n expresses an unexamined and i m p a t i e n t philosophy of i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I t r e f l e c t s the c o m p e l l i n g urge t o a r r i v e d i r e c t l y at an explanatory i d e a . Yet p r a c t i c e d i n v e s t i g a t o r s 44 while u n t i l we see i f there i s something to s u p p o r t . 1 * I can now rehearse the a m b i g u i t i e s of the balance of power theory and present the bundle of arguments that I e m p i r i c a l l y examine below. 3.2 THE HOST PROBABLE THEORY According to the balance of power theory, A l l the v a r i o u s b o d i e s , the g r e a t e r and the l e s s e r powers, were po i s e d a g a i n s t one another, each e x e r c i s i n g a k i n d of g r a v i t a t i o n a l p u l l on a l l the r e s t — and the p u l l of each would be p r o p o r t i o n a t e to i t s mass, though i t s e f f e c t would be g r e a t l y reduced as i t a c t e d a t a g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e . When one of these great bodies i n c r e a s e d i t s mass, t h e r e f o r e - when f o r some reason, France, f o r example, had an undue a c c e s s i o n of s t r e n g t h - the r e s t c o u l d r e c o v e r an e q u i l i b r i u m only by regrouping themselves, l i k e s e t s of b a l l e t dancers, making a necessary r e c t i f i c a t i o n i n the d i s t a n c e s , and producing new combinations. Otherwise, the overgrown power would swallow up the l i t t l e ones near a t hand, und become gr e a t e r s t i l l — j u s t as the moon would f a l l i n t o the e a r t h i f t h e r e were no c o u n t e r a c t i n g f o r c e s to o f f s e t the e f f e c t of g r a v i t y . 1 5 t e l l us t h a t o f t e n a f r u i t f u l idea can be adequately formulated only a f t e r reasonably sound data have brought i t to mind. In s o c i o l o g y as i n other d i s c i p l i n e s , psuedo-facts have a way o f i n d u c i n g pseudoproblems, which cannot be s o l v e d because matters are not as they purport to be. I t i s only when t e d i o u s r e c i t a t i o n s of u n r e l a t e d f a c t are s u b s t i t u t e d f o r the absent i d e a that i n q u i r y d e c l i n e s i n t o "mere" f a c t - f i n d i n g . "Notes on Problem-Finding i n S o c i o l o g y , " i n S o c i o l o g y Today ed. Robert K. Herton, Leonard Broom and Leonard S. C o t t r e l l , J r . {New York:Basic Books, 1959), pp. xiv-xv. See Chapter IV below f o r many examples of what I c o n s i d e r to be p a r t i a l l y processed p s u e d o - f a c t s . 1 5 Herbert B u t t e r f i e l d , "The Balance of Power" i n Diplomatic I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , ed. Herbert B u t t e r f i e l d and Martin Wight (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966), p.132. H5 The t h e o r y , with r o o t s extending f a r t h e r and f u r t h e r a f i e l d than t h i s Newtonian d e s c r i p t i o n of the s o - c a l l e d c l a s s i c European balance suggests, i s among the o l d e s t i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e . From the contemporary post-Newtonian world, where i t remains c e n t r a l to many e x p l a n a t i o n s o f war and peace, the r o o t s of the balance of power no t i o n can be f o l l o w e d i n P o l y b i u s ' h i s t o r i e s of a n c i e n t Greece and Rome, and i n K a u t i l y a ' s a d v i c e t o p r i n c e s o f a n c i e n t I n d i a . 1 6 For Morgenthau, the most i n f l u e n t i a l exponent of p o l i t i c a l Realism and the balance of power, the l a t t e r " i s only a p a r t i c u l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f a ge n e r a l s o c i a l p r i n c i p l e " analogous to the law of g r a v i t y i n p h y s i c s . the balance of power and p o l i c i e s aiming at i t s p r e s e r v a t i o n are not only i n e v i t a b l e but are an e s s e n t i a l s t a b i l i z i n g f a c t o r i n a s o c i e t y o f s o v e r e i g n nations..... the i n s t a b i l i t y of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l balance of power i s due not to the f a u l t i n e s s of the p r i n c i p l e , but to the p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s under which the p r i n c i p l e must operate i n a s o c i e t y of s o v e r e i g n n a t i o n s . . 1 7 To those who value p h y s i c a l laws such as the law of g r a v i t y f o r t h e i r accuracy, an accuracy bestowed by mathematical form, and who, t h e r e f o r e , pooh-pooh s o c i a l s c i e n c e , Morgenthau's statement i s dubious. However, s c i e n t i f i c laws need not be, and of t e n are not, g u a n t i t a t i v e , and i n a c c u r a c y i s a very r e s p e c t a b l e t r a i t i n s c i e n t i f i c laws. S c r i v e n argues t h a t i n a c c u r a c y i s "the key » 6 For the i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y of the n o t i o n i n 17th and 18th century European thought and p r a c t i c e , see Edward Vose G u l i c k , E u r o p e 1 s C l a s s i c a l Balance Of Power (New York: H. W. Norton, 1967)." 1 7 P o l i t i c s Among Nations, p.161. 46 pr o p e r t y of p h y s i c a l laws." A p h y s i c a l law, he w r i t e s , expresses a r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r o p e r t i e s "which i s the s i m p l e s t u s e f u l approximation t o the t r u e p h y s i c a l behavior and which appears to be t h e o r e t i c a l l y t r a c t a b l e . 1 8 The balance o f power i s c e r t a i n l y a simple approximation; however, i t i s n e i t h e r u s e f u l nor t h e o r e t i c a l l y t r a c t a b l e . We should not ask a candidate f o r law s t a t u s i f i t i s d e s c r i p t i v e l y honest. We must ask what great t r u t h i t r e p r e s e n t s . Here the balance of power i s very ambiguous. Ambiguity s a t u r a t e s the n o t i o n of the balance of power, and the l o n g e v i t y i t has enjoyed i s a simple f u n c t i o n of that ambiguity. For each person who e x t o l s the v i r t u e s or d e c r i e s the excesses of the balance of power, another appears and p o i n t s out once more the c o n f u s i o n the term begets. With tongue f i r m l y i n cheek, P o l l a r d demonstrates t h a t , i f t h i s i s to be continued, i t w i l l c o n t i n u e f o r some time y e t . Aided by the Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , he c a l c u l a t e d t h a t the number of permutations p e r m i t t e d by the v a r i o u s uses of the t h r e e words "balance", " o f " and "power" approaches 21,000.* 9 L i k e H e i n l e i n ' s e x t r a t e r r e s t i a l hero. P o l l a r d "had d i s c o v e r e d t h a t long human words r a r e l y changed t h e i r meanings but short words were s l i p p e r y , changing » 8 Michael S c r i v e n "The Key Property of P h y s i c a l Laws Inaccuracy", i n C u r r e n t Issues In The Philosophy Of Sc i e n c e , ed. H. F i e g l and G. Maxwell (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1961) , pp.100-101. (Emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l . ) 1 9 A.F. P o l l a r d , "The Balance of Power," J o u r n a l of the B r i t i s h I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 2 (March 1923)",~51-64. 47 without p a t t e r n . Short human words were l i k e t r y i n g to l i f t water with a k n i f e . " * 0 Haas and Wight, i n more e m p i r i c a l surveys, l o c a t e d e i g h t and nine d i s t i n c t usages r e s p e c t i v e l y . Zinnes, who excluded the p r e s c r i p t i v e ones they had i n c l u d e d , found s i x . 2 1 As Zinnes p o i n t s out i n her survey, the many d i s t r i b u t i o n s of s t a t e s which have been l a b e l l e d "balanced" do share a common f e a t u r e : no s t a t e or e x i s t i n g c o a l i t i o n i s i n a p o s i t i o n of dominance. The v i r t u e of the balance of power i s t h a t i t i n h i b i t s empire and preserves independence. The q u e s t i o n remains: why and when do s t a t e s choose war as the instrument of p o l i c y r a t h e r than (say) a l l i a n c e , and attempt to swallow t h e i r neighbours? One p l a u s i b l e answer i s provided i n the Newtonian d e s c r i p t i o n of the balance of power at the beginning of t h i s s e c t i o n , and other p l a u s i b l e ones e x i s t . That t h e o r i e s from d i f f e r e n t s c h ools d i f f e r i s not remarkable, and perhaps i t i s t o be expected t h a t those w i t h i n the same s c h o o l d i f f e r among themselves, but i t i s d i s c o n c e r t i n g when they d i f f e r , as they do, w i t h i n themselves. Once we e x t r a c t the ambiguity c o n c e r n i n g the meaning of the term "balance of 2 0 Robert H e i n l e i n , Stranger In A Strange Land as c i t e d i n W. J.M. Mackenzie, Power, V i o l e n c e , D e c i s i o n (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 35. 2 1 E r n s t B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: P r e s c r i p t i o n , Concept or Propaganda?," World P o l i t i c s , 5 (July 1953), 442-477; Martin Wight, Power P o l i t i c s , (1946 and 1978; Dina Zinnes, "An A n a l y t i c a l Study o f the Balance of Power T h e o r i e s , " J o u r n a l of Peace Research 3 (1967), 270-288 and " C o a l i t i o n T h e o r i e s and the Balance of Power," i n The Study of C o a l i t i o n Behavior, ed. Sven Groennings, E;W. . K e l l y and Michael L e i s e r s o n (New York: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 351-368. 48 power", the t h e o r e t i c a l ambiguity p e r s i s t s . L e t me i l l u s t r a t e t h i s with an example. In a f o o t n o t e beneath the passage from P o l i t i c s Among Nations e x h i b i t e d above, Morgenthau informs h i s readers t h a t i n h i s book the term has f o u r meanings. Often i t i s not c l e a r from the context which o f the f o u r i s o p e r a t i v e , and h i s c r i t i c s have suggested t h a t f o u r i s onl y the lower l i m i t t o the number of meanings t o be found i n h i s w r i t i n g . 2 2 R e c a l l Morgenthau's b a s i c p r i n c i p l e : " i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , l i k e a l l p o l i t i c s , i s a s t r u g g l e f o r power". The f o u r d e f i n i t i o n s he does give are: (1) a c t u a l r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n ; (2) an i n c r e a s e i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n ; (3) the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power;and (4) an approximately egual d i s t r i b u t i o n of power. 2 3 The analogy i n the f i r s t two usages i s to a bank balance: each s t a t e c o n s t a n t l y a s s e s s e s i t s account and seeks a f a v o u r a b l e balance by i n c r e a s i n g m i l i t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , j o i n i n g a l l i a n c e s and f i g h t i n g wars with l e s s s o l v e n t s t a t e s . The l i n e d i v i d i n g n a t i o n a l c r e d i t s from d e b i t s f l o a t s i n r e l a t i o n to the accounts o f other s t a t e s . Each s t a t e ' s account i s i n balance so long as a l l the s t a t e s are at approximate p a r i t y . When speaking o f eguibalance o r p a r i t y and of the a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of power, the analogy i s t o a p h y s i c a l balance. 2 2 For example, I n i s Claude, J r . , Power and I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , (New York: Random House, "1962)". 2 3 Morgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among Nations, p.1 6 1 , f n . 1. 49 Now, what i s t o be gained by d e c l a r i n g t h a t the balance of power i s "not only i n e v i t a b l e " but a l s o "an e s s e n t i a l s t a b i l i z i n g f a c t o r i n a s o c i e t y of sovereign n a t i o n s " ? The t h i r d d e f i n i t i o n i s u n i n f o r m a t i v e : a balance of power i s i n e v i t a b l e because, given a number of s t a t e s , power w i l l be d i s t r i b u t e d . The p r o b a b i l i t y of the t r u t h of t h a t statement, l i k e the p r o b a b i l i t y of other t a u t o l o g i e s , i s 1 . 0 0 . The same can be s a i d when the f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n i s s u b s t i t u t e d and the second one simply r e s t a t e s the power maximization assumption- The statement t h a t an egu i b a l a n c e between s t a t e s or c o a l i t i o n s i s i n e v i t a b l e i s f a r more i n f o r m a t i v e , l e s s probable, and has t h e o r e t i c a l p o t e n t i a l . B i c h e r s t i l l i s the statement t h a t eguibalance preserves peace and prevents war. The major problem with Morgenthau•s d i s c u s s i o n of the balance of power (defined as eguibalance) i s not t h a t i t l a c k s t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n , and others e q u a l l y r i c h , but t h a t i t a l s o c o n t a i n s the converse. E q u i b a l a n c e , a c c o r d i n g t o Morgenthau, c r e a t e s u n c e r t a i n t y of advantage, and t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y of success, i f war were to occur, makes the d e c i s i o n of any s t a t e t o i n i t i a t e war l e s s l i k e l y . On the other hand, c a l c u l a t i o n s of n a t i o n a l power are i n h e r e n t l y u n c e r t a i n — t h e r e i s no currency of power — and the u n c e r t a i n t y c r e a t e d by approximate p a r i t y may l e a d to war as w e l l as prevent i t . S i n c e i n a balance-of-power system a l l n a t i o n s l i v e i n constant f e a r l e s t t h e i r r i v a l s d e p r i v e them, at the f i r s t opportune moment, of t h e i r power p o s i t i o n , a l l n a t i o n s have a v i t a l i n t e r e s t i n a n t i c i p a t i n g such a development and doing unto o t h e r s what they do not want ot h e r s t o do unto them. 2* 50 While "peace can be maintained o n l y by two d e v i c e s " — the balance of power and normative l i m i t a t i o n s on c o n f l i c t — " i t i s not hard to see t h a t most of the wars t h a t have been fought s i n c e the beginning of the modern s t a t e system have t h e i r o r i g i n i n the balance of power." 2 5 T h i s balance o f power theory l a c k s , t h e r e f o r e , one key p r o p e r t y any e x p l a n a t o r y theory need possess -the a b i l i t y t o be wrong, 2 6 I f we accept Popper's d i s t i n c t i o n between the p r o b a b i l i t y of a theory and the degree of c o r r o b o r a t i o n , and i f we d e s i r e the most probable t h e o r y , then the balance o f power theory i s i t . The p r o b a b i l i t y of a statement or s e t of statements being " t r u e " i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Popper, i n i n v e r s e p r o p o r t i o n to the i n f o r m a t i o n content of the statement or s e t of statements and i n f o r m a t i o n content i s i n d i r e c t p r o p o r t i o n to explanatory power. 2 7 Empty of e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t , the balance of power theory i s the most probable, e x p l a i n i n g anything, and, t h e r e f o r e , e x p l a i n i n g n o t h i n g . The l a c k of content p r e c l u d e s f a l s i f i a b i l i t y or 2 4 Morgenthau, P o l i t i c s Ajnong Nat i o n s , p. 202. 2 5 I b i d . , pp.22, 204. 2 6 T h i s i s not a s i n committed e x c l u s i v e l y by the " t r a d i t i o n a l " balance of power t h e o r i s t s . For example, Morton A. Kaplan i n h i s i n n o v a t i v e "systems a n a l y s i s " p o i n t s t o many t e s t a b l e e m p i r i c a l conseguences of h i s "balance of power model" which i n f a c t serve to d e f i n e t h a t model. See the Preface and pp.22-36 of System And Process In I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s {New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957). 2 7 K a r l Popper, The L o g i c of S c i e n t i f i c Discovery, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper S Bow, 1968), pp.112-146 and C o n j e c t u r e s And R e f u t a t i o n s : The Growth of S c i e n t i f i c Knowledge,, (New York: Harper S Row, 1968), pp.33-65-t 51 t e s t a b i l i t y , t he b a s i c c r i t e r i o n of a s c i e n t i f i c theory. In p a r t , t h e d i f f i c u l t y i s the ambiguity and m a l l e a b i l i t y o f the terms. Even where the meaning of the "balance of power" i s pinned down t o e g u i b a l a n c e , the theory c o n t a i n s c o n f l i c t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s . To re p e a t , the c o n j e c t u r e that eguibalance d e t e r s war, and i t s converse, t h a t eguibalance s t i m u l a t e s war, are both i n f o r m a t i v e , improbable and f a l s i f i a b l e . When they devolve from a s i n g l e theory and are combined w i t h i n i t , these very d e s i r a b l e g u a l i t i e s v a n i s h . Then the theory i s rendered i r r e f u t a b l e and u s e l e s s ; the e x p l a n a t o r y power of the argument t h a t eguibalance l e a d s t o peace or war i s n i l . Rather than c o n f r o n t i n g e m p i r i c a l evidence, the balance of power theory envelops i t and i n t h i s manner the balance o f power i s c h i m e r i c a l over and above the a m b i g u i t i e s i n the core concept. In g r a p h i c a l terms, the l o g i c i s not along s t r a i g h t l i n e s . The l o g i c i s f u l l of r e v e r s a l s , and, where t i g h t t a u t o l o g i c a l c i r c l e s are avoided, the p r o p o s i t i o n s seem t o be arranged as i f they were on a moebius s t r i p . As you f o l l o w i t , up becomes down; i n s i d e , o u t s i d e ; and p l u s , minus. To t e l l one from the o t h e r , e m p i r i c a l evidence i s needed. In s h o r t , the balance of power t h e o r i e s , as found i n the power p o l i t i c s l i t e r a t u r e , a re s c i e n t i f i c a l l y u n i n t e r e s t i n g , and the power p o l i t i c s l i t e r a t u r e does c o n t a i n numerous i n t e r e s t i n g and t e s t a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s . Moreover, the b a s i c elements of the arguments - a l l i a n c e commitments, r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s - do seem e s s e n t i a l to any e x p l a n a t i o n of great power war. 52 3a3 LESS PROBABLE PROPOSITIONS An examination of the complete processes d e s c r i b e d by the balance of power t h e o r i s t s would e n t a i l i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the f o r m a t i o n , maintenance and breakdown of c o a l i t i o n s o f s t a t e s , f o r whatever e l s e i t may be, the balance of power i s a theory of a l l i a n c e s and c o u n t e r - a l l i a n c e s . 2 8 My aim here i s l e s s ambitious and I c o n f i n e myself to the p u t a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s of g r e a t power war. Although the i n f l u e n c e s of a l l i a n c e s between great powers upon t h e i r r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n s w i l l be taken i n t o account, a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n and t e r m i n a t i o n are not "dependent v a r i a b l e s " i n t h i s work. 3«,3= 1 A l l i a n c e Commitments and War Because a l l i a n c e s between great powers can s h i f t the s c a l e s up and down v i g o r o u s l y , they r e c e i v e f a r more a t t e n t i o n i n the balance of power l i t e r a t u r e than do commitments exchanged between great powers and non-great powers. T h i s does not mean t h a t the l a t t e r , and " l a t e n t war 2 8 And many of the e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s which draw t h e o r e t i c a l sustenance from the balance of power l i t e r a t u r e examine a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . See, f o r examples, Ole R. H o l s t i , P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. S u l l i v a n , U n i t y and D i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e s : Comparative S t u d i e s (New York: John Wiley S Sons, 1973) and; P a t r i c k J . McGowan and Robert M. Rood, " A l l i a n c e Behavior i n Balance of Power Systems: Ap p l y i n g a Poisson Model to Nineteenth Century Europe," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 69 (September 1975), 859-870-2 9 x h e phrase i s from Robert E. Osgood, A l l i a n c e s and American F o r e i g n P o l i c y (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), pp.18-19. 53 communities" i n g e n e r a l , 2 9 may not i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of war or t h a t the p u t a t i v e path between a l l i a n c e s and war can be an i n d i r e c t one mediated by r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n only. (See F i g u r e 1:1 above.) A l l i a n c e commitments, p a r t i c u l a r l y those with non-great powers, may re p r e s e n t an expansion of involvement i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , and "whether • c o n t r a c t e d f o r de f e n s i v e or o f f e n s i v e purposes, a l l i a n c e s are concluded with war or the b l u f f o f war i n view." As Schwarzenberger c o n t i n u e s : " a l l i a n c e s tend to i n c r e a s e the f i e l d of f r i c t i o n and i n case of c o n f l i c t the area of war," and they "may give a d d i t i o n a l momentum to the a n a r c h i c f o r c e s i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y ^ "3<> Two p r o p o s i t i o n s t o be examined then a re: P r o p o s i t i o n 1: The more a l l i e s , the more l i k e l y t h a t a g r e a t power w i l l become i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r -s t a t e war-P r o p o s i t i o n 2: The more non-great power a l l i e s , the more l i k e l y t h a t a g r e a t power w i l l become i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r - s t a t e war. While, as Schwarzenberger among ot h e r s argues, a l l i a n c e s may add t o the chaos and expand war once war o c c u r s , he, along with most balance o f power t h e o r i s t s , r e c o g n i z e s that a l l i a n c e s , l i k e Janus, have another f a c e . They can reduce chaos. A l l i a n c e s , i t i s argued, may prevent war and len d some s t a b i l i t y and c e r t a i n t y t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Morgenthau d e c l a r e s t h a t "an a l l i a n c e adds p r e c i s i o n , 30 Schwarzenberger, Power P o l i t i c s , pp.166-167. See a l s o R i c h a r d Rosecrance, I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s : Peace Or War (New York: McGraw-Hill Book~Company, 1973)7 pp.~T29, 298,. 54 e s p e c i a l l y i n the form of l i m i t a t i o n , to an e x i s t i n g community of i n t e r e s t s and to the g eneral p o l i c i e s and c o n c r e t e measures s e r v i n g them." 3* Here the numbers of commitments are l e s s important than the type of commitments and the p a t t e r n which they form. a l l i a n c e s a l t e r the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power (f o r s t a t e s j o i n o t h e r s t a t e s to i n c r e a s e t h e i r p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e to s t i l l o t her s t a t e s ) , and they s i m p l i f y the r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s . The s t a b i l i t y of a s o c i a l system, l i k e the s t a b i l i t y of an ecosystem, depends upon complexity. Formal a l l i a n c e s reduce the number o f c h o i c e s open; d e f i n e and c r e a t e f r i e n d s , f o e s , and bystanders i n the event of c o n f l i c t ; and, t h ereby, focus p e r c e p t i o n s of t h r e a t . In t h i s sense, a l l i a n c e s reduce the number of u n i t s and s i m p l i f y the r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s . The r e s i l i e n c y of e c o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l systems i s reduced as the number of components i s reduced;. 3 2 As the balance or d i s t r i b u t i o n of power tends t o p o l a r i z e about the two most powerful s t a t e s or c o a l i t i o n s , the mechanical metaphor becomes more apt: i n t e r s t a t e c o m p e t i t i o n comes to resemble a zero sum game. S i m i l a r l y "the balance of nature" i s more s u i t a b l e when d e s c r i b i n g a r i c e paddy r a t h e r than a meadow. B i p o l a r 3 1 P o l i t i c s Among Nations, p.176. 3 2 On " r e s i l i e n c y " see Crawford S. H o l l i n g , " S t a b i l i t y i n E c o l o g i c a l and S o c i a l Systems," i n D i v e r s i t y And S t a b i l i t y J_n E c o l o g i c a l Systems: Report o f Symposium b^eld May 26-28, 1969 "(Upton, N.Y.: Brookhaven N a t i o n a l L a boratory, 1969), pp-128-141. 55 c o n f i g u r a t i o n s and s i n g l e s p e c i e s gardens are l e s s r e s i l i e n t to s m a l l changes and, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e f a r more a t t e n t i o n than l e s s o r d e r l y arrangements of s t a t e s and p l a n t s . Because the conseguences of even s l i g h t i n a t t e n t i o n are so ominous, each i s c a r e f u l l y managed. 3 3 Great power a l l i a n c e s with "pawns" may not be so much ex t e n s i o n s of i n t e r e s t as formal p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n s to p r o t e c t a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g i n t e r e s t s . Snyder, b u i l d i n g upon the b i p o l a r i t y / m u l t i p o l a r i t y / s t a b i l i t y debate, puts the case s u c c i n c t l y : when alignments are c l e a r and f i r m , the s t r e n g t h of the i n t e r e s t i n preventing the defeat of an a l l y or an opponent's i n c r e a s e of power w i l l encourage r e s i s t a n c e and f a v o r deterrence of a g g r e s s i o n . The most dangerous c o n d i t i o n i s t h a t i n which a l l i a n c e commitments seem qu e s t i o n a b l e to o u t s i d e r s but are i n r e a l i t y q u i t e f i r m . 3 4 As Morgenthau argues, an accurate e v a l u a t i o n of the balance of power " i s an i d e a l task and hence i n c a p a b l e of achievement": The crowning u n c e r t a i n t y . . . l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t one cannot always be sure who a r e one's own a l l i e s and who are the opponent's. Alignments by v i r t u e of a l l i a n c e t r e a t i e s are not always i d e n t i c a l with the a l l i a n c e s that oppose each other i n the a c t u a l war,. 3 5 3 3 See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The S t a b i l i t y of a B i p o l a r World," Qaedalus, 93 (Summer 1964), 881-909- and Glenn H. Snyder, " C o n f l i c t and C r i s i s i n the I n t e r n a t o n a l System," i n H2£i<l P o l i t i c s , ed. James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp.682-720. 3 4 Snyder, " C o n f l i c t and C r i s i s , " p..691. Also see Bruce M. Russett, "The C a l c u l u s of Deterrence," J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n . 7 (June 1963) , 97-1097 56 Morgenthau's f i r s t sentence should not be taken as an unconscious d e n i a l of h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t a l l i a n c e s lend some p r e c i s i o n to c a l c u l a t i o n s of advantage or disadvantage. His argument i s sharper than t h a t : Janus does have two f a c e s . Regarding the l a s t sentence j u s t guoted, we should be c a r e f u l here t o separate the i n c i d e n c e of war from the course of war once i t occurs. C e r t a i n l y the i n c i d e n c e of war i s r e l a t e d to the e x p e c t a t i o n s about i t s course, but we take c are a g a i n s t ad hoc ergo p r o p t e r hoc and a g a i n s t the l o g i c which proceeds from the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t some a l l i a n c e s were t r e a t e d as "mere s c r a p s of paper" to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a l l a l l i a n c e s are "mere scraps of paper". While f o r some Bethmann's d e s c r i p t i o n of the t r e a t y which guaranteed the n e u t r a l i t y of Belgium i s a maxim of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , i t i s worth remembering t h a t the German C h a n c e l l o r was c u r s i n g the United Kingdom because the B r i t i s h were to s t i c k t o "a word - ' n e u t r a l i t y ' -.-..a scrap of p a p e r , " 3 6 Are ihe e x p e c t a t i o n s embodied i n f o r m a l a l l i a n c e commitments to be r e l i e d upon? I f not, f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them and the i n c i d e n c e of war would be a waste of space. Schroeder suggests i t would be a waste of space. "Nothing", he concludes, "can s u b s t i t u t e f o r the p a i n f u l l y e m p i r i c a l task of f u n c t i o n a l 3 5 Morgenthau, P o l i t i c s Among Nati o n s , pp.147, 199. 3 6 As c i t e d i n Barbara Tuchman, The Guns Of Aucjust (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 153, } 57 a n a l y s i s of p a r t i c u l a r a l l i a n c e s . " a n a l y z i n g and c a t e g o r i z i n g a l l i a n c e s a c c ording to t h e i r t y p e s or p r o v i s i o n s (defensive or o f f e n s i v e , l i m i t e d or u n l i m i t e d , c o n s u l t a t i v e or automatic, with or without m i l i t a r y c o n v e n t i o n s , b i l a t e r a l or m u l t i l a t e r a l ) are not l i k e l y t o be very f r u i t f u l i n d e s c r i b i n g what a l l i a n c e s r e a l l y d o . . . 3 7 To see i f f o r m a l a l l i a n c e s do b i n d , Singer and Small performed a modest, ele m e n t a l , a l b e i t ex p_ost f a c t o experiment. I f a l l i a n c e commitments r e f l e c t both a congruence of i n t e r e s t s among the s i g n a t o r i e s and a c o n s t r a i n t on t h e i r f u t u r e freedom of a c t i o n , i t would seem reaso n a b l e t o expect that when an a l l i a n c e member gets i n t o war, the behavior of i t s p a r t n e r s would be something other than random. That i s , a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s would be expected to f i g h t a l o n g s i d e one another more o f t e n than non-partners, and a g a i n s t one another l e s s o f t e n than o t h e r s . 3 8 C l a s s i f y i n g a l l i a n c e s a c c ording t o the types of formal o b l i g a t i o n s they imposed (defense p a c t s , n e u t r a l i t y pacts and non-aggression t r e a t i e s and e n t e n t e s ) , Singer and Small found that t h i s was the case. Some of t h e i r c a l c u l a t i o n s are reproduced i n Table 111:1. 3 7 Schroeder notes t h a t he " r e f e r s e s p e c i a l l y " to the s t u d i e s by J . David Singer and Melvin Small, the makers of the data which I am using here. He w r i t e s t h a t nor are attempts t o e s t a b l i s h s t a t i s t i c a l c o r r e l a t i o n s between the numbers and types o f a l l i a n c e s e x i s t i n g a t v a r i o u s times and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g l e v e l s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t and t e n s i o n l i k e l y t o be very f r u i t f u l . Paul W. Schroeder, " A l l i a n c e s , 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and T o o l s of Management", i n H i s t o r i c a l Dimensions of N a t i o n a l S e c u r t i y Problems ed. Klaus Knorr (Lawrence, Kansas: U n i v e r s i t y Press of Kansas, 1976), p.225. 3 8 J . D. S i n g e r and Melvin Small, "Formal A l l i a n c e s , 1815-1939: A Q u a n t i t a t i v e D e s c r i p t i o n , " J o u r n a l of Peace Research. 3 (1966), 16-17. Table 111:1 about here 58 The types of commitment, contrary to Schroeder's suggestion, do seem to matter. Defense a l l i a n c e s impose the most severe demands and, unlike ententes which reguire only consultation i n the event of war, they are formally unequivocal. Defense commitments reduce, rather than foster ambiguity i n the relations between states. Pawns are l i k e l y to be c l o s e l y watched and potential predators forewarned. Recalling the l o g i c of the * b i p o l a r i t y - l e s s uncertainty-peace' chain, a proposition to be examined i s : Proposition 3: Defense commitments deter. Non-defense • commitments are more l i k e l y than defense commitments to lead to non-activist war. By implication from Proposition 2 : Proposition 4: Non-defense commitments to non-great powers are more l i k e l y than defense commitments to lead to non-activist war. No doubt, with a l i t t l e more imagination, I could unpack more propositions concerning types of a l l i a n c e s , the patterns they form, and the types of involvement i n war they might lead to, To do so i n the abstract would be both tedious and unproductive. The permutations are too numerous and the balance of power theo r i s t s wisely avoid such detailed speculations. I follow their example now and heed the advice of Tukey and Wilk "to begin by obtaining and try i n g to explain s p e c i f i c findings, rather than attempting to catalogue a l l possible findings and 3« Tukey and B i l k , "Data Analysis and S t a t i s t i c s , " p.373. 59 e x p l a n a t i o n s . " 3 9 Moreover, I w i l l t r y to heed these words more c l o s e l y i n the d i s c u s s i o n of economic growth r a t e s and war t h a t f o l l o w s . 3 . 3 . 2 Economic Growth Bates and War War begets Poverty, Poverty Peace Then People w i l l t r a f f i c and Biches i n c r e a s e Biches produceth P r i d e , P r i d e i s War's ground. War begets Poverty. So we go r o u n d . 4 0 Very d i f f e r e n t c h a i n s of argument l i n k economic growth r a t e s t o war and peace. One type f i t s the power p o l i t i c s p e r s p e c t i v e and the ot h e r does not. The former arguments u s u a l l y proceed from economic downturns, r e c e s s i o n s or de p r e s s i o n s through " s o c i e t a l breakdown", " s t r a i n " , " s t r e s s " , " f r u s t r a t i o n " , " t e n s i o n " or " i n s t a b i l i t y " to r e l e a s e or d i v e r s i o n i n war. They o f t e n take c o n f l i c t to be " n o n r e a l i s t i c " . That i s c o n f l i c t s not occasioned by the r i v a l ends of the a n t a g o n i s t s , but by the need f o r t e n s i o n r e l e a s e of a t l e a s t one of them. In t h i s case, the c h o i c e of a n t a g o n i s t s depends on determinants not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o a c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e and i s not o r i e n t e d toward the attainment of s p e c i f i c 4 0 As c i t e d i n George C l a r k , War and S o c i e t y i n the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: At The U n i v e r s i t y ~ P r e s s , 1 9 5 8 ) , p.1 3 4 . A l s o see B l a i n e y , The Causes Of War, pp.9 1 - 9 6 , 2 5 6 - 2 5 7 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of C l a r k ' s essay. 60 r e s u l t s . . ' . s a t i s f a c t i o n i s d e r i v e d from the a g g r e s s i v e a c t i t s e l f . * * I agree with Coser's comments. Knowledge gained from the study of n o n r e a l i s t i c c o n f l i c t i s being a p p l i e d to the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , o v e r l o o k i n g the f a c t t h a t c o n f l i c t s i n t h i s f i e l d are p r i m a r i l y r e a l i s t i c c o n f l i c t s of power, i n t e r e s t s or values and t h a t n o n r e a l i s t i c elements which may be i n t e r m i n g l e d i n the s t r u g g l e are c o n t i n g e n t and p l a y , at best, a r e i n f o r c i n g r o l e . 4 2 Boulding's concept of " s t r a i n " i s not p s y c h o l o g i c a l , nor does h i s argument s t r e s s n o n - r e a l i s t i c c o n f l i c t , but he too r e l a t e s "the sudden worsening i n general economic c o n d i t i o n s , as i n the depression phase of a business c y c l e , " 4 3 t o war. His example i s the depression of the 1930s. V i n e r , another economist who has knocked down and run over the w a l l s between academic f i e l d s , argues the c o n t r a r y . "I can f i n d , " he w r i t e s , no d i s t i n c t h i s t o r i c a l p a t t e r n of impact of mass unemployment or of the b u s i n e s s c y c l e on the problem of war except t h a t c o u n t r i e s were more co n s c i o u s of t h e i r s t r e n g t h , were l e s s pre-occupied by i n t e r n a l t r o u b l e s , and were i n b e t t e r f i n a n c i a l shape f o r war, i n the p r o s p e r i t y than i n the d e p r e s s i o n phases of t h e i r c y c l e s , and t h a t t h i s seems to have been r e f l e c t e d i n the temper of t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s . 4 4 4 1 Lewis Coser, The F u n c t i o n s of S o c i a l C o n f l i c t (New York: The Free P r e s s , 1956) , p.49,55. 4 2 I b i d - , p.49. 4 3 Kenneth B o u l d i n g , S t a b l e Peace A u s t i n : The U n i v e r s i t y of Texas Press, 1978, p.. 73. 61 The l i n k s i n t h i s power p o l i t i c s argument are c r i s p but few and r the argument i s , thereby, l i m i t e d . Great power A would be l e s s able and l e s s i n c l i n e d to seek c o s t l y engagements, such as war, a g a i n s t B i f the economy were f a l t e r i n g . High r a t e s o f economic growth, c e t e r i s p a r i b u s , r e s u l t i n a more advantageous power p o s i t i o n ; thence, t o war, t o make i t a more advantageous one. The. g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n to be examined i s : P r o p o s i t i o n 5: A gr e a t power i s more l i k e l y t o become i n v o l v e d i n war when i t s r a t e of economic growth i s high r a t h e r than low. The d i s t i n c t i o n s between types of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war and types of p a r t i c i p a n t s suggest more s p e c i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n s . Wars have a c t i v i s t and n o n - a c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a n t s , and, f o l l o w i n g the balance of power assumption t h a t the powerful are to be f e a r e d , the p r o p o s i t i o n i s : P r o p o s i t i o n 6: A c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r s t a t e war i s more l i k e l y than n o n - a c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n when a great power's r a t e of economic growth i s high. Futhermore, because one type of opponent i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , more powerful than the other, the c o n d i t i o n of the economy would be more s i g n i f i c a n t i n wars between great powers than i n wars between g r e a t powers and non-great powers. P r o p o s i t i o n 7 : The a s s o c i a t i o n between a c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r s t a t e war and high growth r a t e s i s s t r o n g e r when the opponent i s another gre a t power and weaker when a great power a t t a c k s a non-great power. Jacob V i n e r , "Peace As An Economic Problem," i n h i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economics:Studies (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), pp.262-263. 6 2 Where t h e a c t i v i s t p a r t y i s n o t a g r e a t p o w e r , t h e r e a s o n i n g f r o m t h i s c r u d e p o w e r p o l i t i c s c a l c u l u s o f r e l a t i v e a d v a n t a g e d o e s n o t s u g g e s t a n y r e a s o n why t h e r a t e o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h s h o u l d m a t t e r a t a l l . T h e r e f o r e : P r o p o s i t i o n 8: T h e r e i s no a s s o c i a t i o n b e t w e e n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h i n a g r e a t p o w e r a n d n o n - a c t i v i s t i n v o l v e m e n t i n war w i t h a n o n - g r e a t p o w e r . The s e t o f p r o p o s i t i o n s h a s an a d v a n t a g e o v e r a n y o n e o f them b e c a u s e i t s u g g e s t s a p a t t e r n t o t h e " e r r o r s " w h i c h , i f e m p i r i c a l l y a c c u r a t e , w o u l d l e n d m o r e s u p p o r t t o t h e p o w e r p o l i t i c s t h i n k i n g t h a n e a c h c o u l d i n d i v i d u a l l y . I f t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f i n s t a n c e s o f a c t i v i s t war a g a i n s t a n o t h e r g r e a t p o w e r war p r e c e d e d b y h i g h e c o n o m i c g r o w t h r a t e s i s t h e same a s t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f n o n - a c t i v i s t i n v o l v e m e n t s i n w a r s w i t h n o n - g r e a t p o w e r s , t h e p o w e r p o l i t i c s c a l c u l u s w o u l d r e c e i v e n o s u p p o r t , M e r e c o i n c i d e n c e w o u l d be t h e p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e r e s u l t s . E a c h o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e s e t o f a l l o f t h e m r e m a i n s w e a k , h o w e v e r . T h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e p l a i n : t h e y do n o t , a n d c a n n o t , p r e d i c t f r o m t h e s t a t e o f t h e e c o n o m y t o i n c i d e n c e s o f w a r . Wars may be p r e c e d e d b y h i g h r a t e s o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , b u t we know i n a d v a n c e t h a t s o a l s o a r e many y e a r s o f p e a c e . T h e r e a r e t o o many f l u c t u a t i o n s a n d t o o few w a r s . T h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , i s t o d e n y , n o t t o a f f i r m , t h e p o w e r p o l i t i c s c a l c u l u s w h i c h p r o m p t e d t h e m . The most c o n c l u s i v e f i n d i n g w o u l d b e no i n s t a n c e s o f g r e a t p o w e r war o c c u r r e d i n p r o s p e r o u s t i m e s , 63 To be made st r o n g e r these p r o p o s i t i o n s have to be turned around, and the way to turn them around i s to search f o r i n t e r a c t i o n s with t h i r d v a r i a b l e s . Two i n t e r a c t i o n s suggest themselves. The f i r s t comes from the vagueness of the words "de p r e s s i o n 1 1 , " r e c e s s i o n " , and " p r o s p e r i t y " . The second comes from the a l l i a n c e commitment p r o p o s i t i o n s . V i n e r , Boulding and the anonomyous author of the g u a t r a i n a t the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s s u b s e c t i o n r e f e r t o " c y c l e s " , but they l e a v e the guestion -of p e r i o d i c i t y open. Students of b usiness c y c l e s have i n d e n t i f i e d many d i f f e r e n t c y c l e s : aside from s e a s o n a l v a r i a t i o n , we have K i t c h i n s of 40 months, J u g l a r s of 9/10 years, Kuznets of 15 to 20 years and K o n d r a t i e f f s of 50 t o 60 y e a r s . * 5 T h i s p r o f u s i o n o f f e r s a l l s o r t s of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , one of which I w i l l pursue here. Schumpeter interweaves the K i t c h i n , J u g l a r and K o n d r a t i e f f i n an e l e g a n t model of c a p i t a l i s t development. He f i n d s i t p o s s i b l e , " b a r r i n g very few cases i n which d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e , " * s Joseph Schumpeter, Business C y c l e s : A T h e o r e t i c a l , H i s t o r i c a l , and S t a t i s t i c a l A n a l y s i s o f the C a p i t a l i s t Process v o l . 1 (New York: HcGraw-Hill, 1939)7 PP- 173-174; Er n e s t Mandel, Late C a p i t a l i s m (London: New L e f t , 1975); Moses Abramovitz7 "The Nature and S i g n i f i c a n c e of Kuznets C y c l e s , " i n Readings In Business C y c l e s ed. Robert Aaron Gordon and Lawrence R. K l e i n (Homewood: Richard D. I r w i n , 1965), ppi579-645; N.D,. K o n d r a t i e f f , "The Long Waves i n Economic L i f e . " An abridged t r a n s l a t i o n f i r s t appeared i n Review of Economic S t a t i s t i c s 17, (November 1935), 105-115 and a complete E n g l i s h v e r s i o n appears i n the s p e c i a l i s s u e of Review, devoted to Cycles and Trends (vol.2 (Spring 1979)7~519-562. 64 to count o f f , h i s t o r i c a l l y as w e l l as s t a t i s t i c a l l y , s i x J u g l a r s to a K o n d r a t i e f f and t h r e e K i t c h i n s to a J u g l a r ... However, to f o l l o w the courses of the K i t c h i n s and J u g l a r s with p r e c i s i o n over the h i s t o r y of each great power would be a huge r e s e a r c h t a s k , one, i f the evidence were a v a i l a b l e , f a r beyond the a b i l i t i e s of t h i s neophyte. For the economist, the ' d i r t y ' time s e r i e s and h i s t o r i c a l records make the task d i f f i c u l t . . The t u r n i n g p o i n t s , amplitudes and d u r a t i o n s are a f f e c t e d by ' e x t e r n a l ' events such as the weather or p o l i t i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e s . The d i f f i c u l t i e s are l e s s severe with the K o n d r a t i e f f wave which, i n Schumpeter's scheme, the s h o r t e r c y c l e s are thought to generate. The K o n d r a t i e f f wave, so to speak, absorbs these problems by i t s very nature; the wave l u r c h e s over two generations and over a l l the great powers.. Moreover, f o r K o n d r a t i e f f p o l i t i c a l events are l e s s " e x t e r n a l " and more i n t r e g a l to h i s argument. 4 6 Wars and r e v o l u t i o n s , K o n d r a t i e f f concluded, occur on the l o n g upswing of economic a c t i v i t y , the phase of h i s wave c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a prevelance o f p r o s p e r i t y . T h e r e f o r e , P r o p o s i t i o n 9: R e l a t i o n s h i p s between high r a t e s of economic growth and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war vary with the long term phases of economic expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n . 4 6 George Garvy, " K o n d r a t i e f f ' s Theory Of Long C y c l e s , " The Review Of Economic S t a t i s t i c s , 25, (November 1943), 203-220 p r o v i d e s a good d i s c u s s i o n of the c o n t r o v e r s y i n the S o v i e t Onion surrounding Kondratieff»s work. See a l s o Richard B* Day, "The Theory of the Long C y c l e : Kondratiev, T r o t s k y , Mandel," New L e f t Review, No. 99 (September-October 1976), 67-82. 65 Turning to alliance commitments, I find it incongruous that a sluggish attribute such as "number of alliance commitments" could have a temporally specific effect such as the outbreak of war. Perhaps the conjunction of alliance commitments and rate of economic change will enable us to predict properly from the independent variable to the dependent variables, rather than the other way around. Proposition 10: Great power participation in interstate war depends upon a combination of alliance commitments and high rates of economic growth* The open-endedness of this proposition is quite deliberate. To add the number of alliance partners, the types of commitments exchanged to the rates of economic growth and the phases of the Kondratieff wave upon which they ride increases immensely the possible permutations seeking association with the incidence and types of involvement in great power war. Once again there is little to guide one in sifting the logically for the theoretically reasonable. I have no specific arguments. Proposition 10 is an invitation to be made more specific or to be withdrawn depending upon the performance of the previous propositions. Whether or not a more specific Proposition 10 supports the crude power politics calculus remains to be seen. 66 3-3.3 Relat ive Power P o s i t i o n and Bar According t o the balance of power t h e o r i e s , s t a t e s enhance t h e i r power r e l a t i v e t o one another i n t e r n a l l y by i n c r e a s i n g n a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s and e x t e r n a l l y by s e c u r i n g the c a p a b i l i t i e s of some other s t a t e s to themselves with defense a l l i a n c e s or by denying advantages t o p o t e n t i a l enemies with non-aggression pacts. Eguibalance, whether b i p o l a r or m u l t i p o l a r , i s the expected and n a t u r a l r e s u l t of the i n t e r p l a y between power-maximizing, s e c u r i t y c o n s c i o u s , s o v e r e i g n e n t i t i e s . I f not, i n s t a b i l i t y o r war i s to be expected. S t a b i l i t y w i l l i n c r e a s e as the p a r i t y i n power of s t a t e s i n c r e a s e s . I f t h e r e were only two s t a t e s , t h e r e would be g r e a t i n s t a b i l i t y unless they were very n e a r l y egual i n power. The same would be t r u e i f a l l the s t a t e s had become p o l a r i z e d i n two r i v a l a l l i a n c e s . And, i f t h e r e were not any g r e a t power a l l i a n c e s , with a l a r g e number of s t a t e s a c t i n g i ndependently, comparative e g u a l i t y of power would tend to augment the c a p a c i t y o f each to defend i t s e l f and so t o i n c r e a s e s t a b i l i t y . * 7 * 7 B r i g h t , A Study Of War, pp.755.. In 1934 i n Geneva Wright gave an i l l u s t r a t i o n , l a t e r p u b l i s h e d i n P u b l i c a t i o n s of the Graduate I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , Geneva, No.14. (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1935). Germany wants e g u a l i t y , and by t h a t she means, e v e n t u a l l y , not only an e g u a l i t y between her armaments and those of France, but an e g u a l i t y between her and her a l l i e s on the one hand and France and her a l l i e s on the o t h e r . I f t h e r e i s such e g u a l i t y t h a t each s i d e t h i n k s the p r o s p e c t s of r a p i d v i c t o r y s l i g h t , i t i s probable, other t h i n g s b e ing e g u a l , t h a t the prospects o f war would be reduced. I t w i l l , o f course, be s a i d t h a t with such e g u a l i t y , while the prospects of German v i c t o r y would be g r e a t e r than the 67 The debate over which s p e c i f i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n i s more s t a b l e i s f a r l e s s f u r i o u s i n the balance of power l i t e r a t u r e than i t i s e l s e w h e r e . 4 8 B i p o l a r or not, s t a b i l i t y depends upon parity-. The rough consensus among balance of power t h e o r i s t s i s t h a t the dominant great power, unless checked or balanced by the o t h e r s , w i l l press i t s advantage and wage war, Furthermore, war i s a means to keep order and to preserve a s t a t u s quo f a v o u r a b l e t o the most powerful. P r o p o s i t i o n 11: The predominant power i s more l i k e l y t o f i g h t than are the l e s s powerful. Increases i n power, 'undue a c c e s s i o n s of s t r e n g t h ' , are dangerous, The presumption i s t h a t i n c r e a s e s i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n are p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r war and decreases i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n make one more v u l n e r a b l e . The general p r o p o s i t i o n i s : P r o p o s i t i o n 12: I n c r e a s e s r a t h e r than decreases i n a great power's r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n are more l i k e l y to l e a d i t s involvement i n war. V e r s a i l l e s disarmament p r o v i s i o n s ; that Germany, anxious f o r a war of revenge w i l l take the f i e l d even though the prospects of v i c t o r y are no more than even. But t h a t denies the whole t h e s i s t h a t peace can be promoted by a s t a b l e m i l i t a r y e q u i l i b r i u m (57-58). 4 8 The two p r i n c i p a l opposing statements are Kenneth Waltz, "The S t a b i l i t y o f a B i p o l a r World," Daedalus, 93 (Summer 1964), 881-909 and Deutsch and Singer, " M u l t i p o l a r Power Systems and I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t a b i l i t y , " World P o l i t i c s , 16 (1964), 390-406, Richard Rosecrance, " B i p o l a r i t y , M u l t i p o l a r i t y aad the Future," J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 10 (1966), 314-327, c r i t i z e s both and seek the~middle ground with a model of " b i - m u l t i p o l a r i t y " . 68 F o l l o w i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n s between types of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and types of p a r t i c i p a n t s , P r o p o s i t i o n 12 may be s p e c i f i e d . The f i r s t s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s : P r o p o s i t i o n 13: A c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war i s more l i k e l y than n o n - a c t i v i s t involvement t o f o l l o w an i n c r e a s e i n a great power's r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n . The 'overgrown power swallows up the l i t t l e ones near at hand' but i f the opponent i s l a r g e , not l i t t l e , i n c r e a s e s i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n are more necessary. F o l l o w i n g the crude power p o l i t i c s c a l c u l u s , the second s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s : P r o p o s i t i o n 14: The a s s o c i a t i o n between a c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war and i n c r e a s e s i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n i s st r o n g e r when a great power a t t a c k s another g r e a t power and weaker when the t a r g e t i s a non-great power. I f a gr e a t power i s the t a r g e t of a non-great power or i f a great power seeks t o preserve the s t a t u s quo c o n t r a r y to the i n t e r e s t of a non-great power, i n c r e a s e s or decreases i n the p o s i t i o n of the gre a t power would be l e s s r e l e v a n t than the gap i n the l e v e l s o f c a p a b i l i t i e s . P r o p o s i t i o n 15: T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s no a s s o c i a t i o n between changes i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n and n o n - a c t i v i s t involvement i n war with a non-great power. Like P r o p o s i t i o n s 5 through 8, the a b i l i t y of these P r o p o s i t i o n s i s t o deny. They cannot p r e d i c t t o war but i f the evidence i s to the c o n t r a r y , the b a s i c power p o l i t i c s argument would be undercut. 69 The a s s u m p t i o n b e h i n d t h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s i s t h a t war i s t h e r e s u l t o f i m b a l a n c e ; p a r i t y p r o v i d e s p e a c e . O r g a n s k i , f o r one, a s s e r t s t h e c o n t r a r y - The r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a r i t y and p e a c e " a p p e a r s t o be e x a c t l y t h e o p p o s i t e o f what has o f t e n been c l a i m e d . " He c o n t i n u e s : I n d e e d , i t i s n o t even l o g i c a l - N a t i o n s a r e r e l u c t a n t t o f i g h t u n l e s s t h e y b e l i e v e t h e y have a good c h a n c e o f w i n n i n g , b u t t h i s i s t r u e f o r b o t h s i d e s o n l y when t h e two a r e f a i r l y e v e n l y matched o r , a t l e a s t , when t h e y b e l i e v e t h e y a r e . Thus, a b a l a n c e o f power i n c r e a s e s t h e c h a n c e s o f war. A p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f power on one s i d e , on t h e o t h e r h and, i n c r e a s e s t h e c h a n c e s o f p e a c e , f o r t h e g r e a t l y s t r o n g e r s i d e need n o t f i g h t a t a l l t o g e t what i t wants, w h i l e t h e weaker s i d e would be p l a i n l y f o o l i s h t o a t t e m p t t o b a t t l e f o r what i t wants. * 9 H i s own l o g i c i s n o t u n a s s a i l a b l e . U n l i k e w i t h a l l i a n c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , e a c h s t a t e need n o t c o n s e n t t o j o i n i n a war and, w h i l e t h e s t r o n g e r need n o t f i g h t t o o b t a i n what i t wants, t h a t i t w i l l s h r i n k f r o m e m p l o y i n g f o r c e i s n o t o b v i o u s . Many weaker s t a t e s may have c a v e d i n , b u t we need o n l y t o c o u n t t h e number o f g r e a t power wars w i t h s m a l l e r s t a t e s and n o t e t h a t t h e g r e a t power was n o t a l w a y s t h e a c t i v i s t p a r t y . R e c a l l t h e c o n t e n t s o f T a b l e s I I : 2 and 11:3. O r g a n s k i ' s argument i s f a r more c o m p e l l i n g when l i m i t e d t o h a n d l i n g wars between g r e a t powers. I w i l l d i s c u s s h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f 'major' g r e a t power wars — t h o s e wars i n v o l v i n g a l l t h e g r e a t powers — and t h e n e l a b o r a t e upon i t and e x t e n d i t t o i n c l u d e a l l wars between g r e a t powers. * 9 W o r l d P o l i t i c s , p.294-70 3»3.4 Rank and War between Great Powers I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , Organski argues, transformed states and, hence, r e l a t i o n s between them. His a l t e r n a t i v e to the balance of power jumble focuses on the d i f f e r e n t s t a r t i n g points and d i f f e r e n t i a l rates of growth. This y i e l d s four categories of s t a t e s : the great power which i n d u s t r i a l i z e d f i r s t and i t s a l l i e s {the "powerful and s a t i s f i e d " ) ; the great powers which followed (the "powerful and d i s s a t i s f i e d " ) ; the "weak and s a t i s f i e d " : and l a s t , "weak and d i s s a t i s f i e d " - . The powerful and d i s s a t i s f i e d , a c c e p t i n g , to use T r o t s k y ' s phrase, the " p r i v i l e g e of h i s t o r i c backwardness", challenges and seeks to replace the dominant status guo power. "One could almost say that the r i s e of such a c h a l l e n g e r guarantees a major war," writes O r g a n s k i . 5 0 Others have made s i m i l a r cases. Lenin, for example and to pick a strange bedfellow for Organski, argued t h i s i n the l a s t pages of h i s t r a c t on Imperial ism. Finance c a p i t a l and the t r u s t s do not diminish but increase the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the rate of growth of the various parts of the world economy. Once the r e l a t i o n of forces i s changed, what other s o l u t i o n of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s can be found under c a p i t a l i s m than that of f o r c e . so world P o l i t i c s , p.361. Elman Service puts the "power t r a n s i t i o n " argument upon a grander s c a l e . See h i s essay "The Law of E v o l u t i o n a r y P o t e n t i a l , " from which I took T r o t s k y ' s phrase, i n E v o l u t i o n and C u l t u r e , ed. Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R- Service (Ann Arbor: The U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press, 1960) , pp.93-122. 71 Any other b a s i s under c a p i t a l i s m f o r the d i v i s i o n of spheres of i n f l u e n c e , of i n t e r e s t s , of c o l o n i e s , e t c ; , than a c a l c u l a t i o n of the s t r e n g t h of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the d i v i s i o n , t h e i r g e n e r a l economic, f i n a n c i a l , m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , e t c . , i s inconceivable-. And the s t r e n g t h o f these p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the d i v i s i o n does not change t o an e q u a l degree, f o r the even development... of c o u n t r i e s i s i m p o s s i b l e under c a p i t a l i s m . 5 1 With two c o a l i t i o n s , the s a t i s f i e d and t h 3 d i s s a t i s f i e d , poised o p p o s i t e each ot h e r , the image of the simple pan balance i s s u i t a b l e and becomes more apt as the two s i d e s approach p a r i t y . Small increments i n c a p a b i l i t i e s or p o t e n t i a l d i p l o m a t i c advantages are magnified i n importance and, as more p r e c i s e c a l c u l a t i o n s of r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n become c r u c i a l , they become l e s s p o s s i b l e . The competition between r e l a t i v e l y equal c o a l i t i o n s becomes d e f i n e d i n zero sum terms, and the tendency to over-compensate, to allow f o r a margin of e r r o r , l e a d s e a s i l y i n t o an arms r a c e . The normal i n c i d e n c e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s g u i c k l y t u r n i n t o c r i s e s and c r i s e s i n c r e a s e i n danger. Major war, t h e r e f o r e , " i s most l i k e l y when the power of the d i s s a t i s f i e d c h a l l e n g e r and i t s a l l i e s begins to approximate the power of those who support the s t a t u s q u o . 1 1 5 2 Lenin and Organski are concerned p r i m a r i l y with major wars, and f o r Organski major wars are wars between two 5 1 V. I . Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of C a p i t a l i s m . (Moscow: F o r e i g n Languages P u b l i s h i n g House, n. d . ) , pp.165, 205. 5 2 Organski, World P o l i t i c s , p.370. 5 3 Compare with George Modelski's argument. He d e c l a r e s that 72 i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r s . 5 3 On top l i e the s a t i s f i e d and under them l i e the d i s s a t s f i e d - Each i s f i x e d i n composition. I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , argues Organski, opened avenues f o r v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y , but s e v e r e l y reduced h o r i z o n t a l m o b i l i t y . Nations are not f r e e t o s h i f t from one i n t e r n a t i o n a l order t o another without s e r i o u s i n t e r n a l changes i n v o l v i n g u s u a l l y a change i n economic systems, a change i n predominant c l a s s , a change i n the p o l i t i c a l and a change i n i d e o l o g y . Great or s m a l l , t h e i r whole way of l i f e i s geared t o the order t o which they b e l o n g . 5 * Perhaps t h i s was the case at the time Organski f i r s t put forward h i s "power t r a n s i t i o n " h y p o t h e s i s (1958), but the d e s c r i p t i o n i s not an a p t one i n the world p r i o r to the Cold War or s i n c e t h a t time. Furthermore, i t hobbles the power t r a n s i t i o n argument with an unnecessary problem. Once we agree t h a t the g r e a t power ranked 1 i s s a t i s f i e d , how do we decide which other s t a t e s are s a t i s f i e d ? To answer t h a t the s a t i s f i e d are those who favour the s t a t u s guo i s , I t h i n k , to beg the g u e s t i o n t o a l a r g e e x t e n t - Take, f o r example, f o u r g r e a t powers E, F, G and H whose i n i t i a l s do not conceal t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s . G by means of war surpasses H and F and approaches E. H a l l i e s with G and F a l l i e s with E. Now why i s F thereby s a t i s f i e d and H d i s s a t i s f i e d ? The answer i s not c l e a r to me. Add I , another great power. "global wars constitute a separate class...a species of c o n f l i c t " and suggests that we compare global wars only with each other, rather than swamp them " i n longer l i s t s of l e s s homogenous events." See his "War and the Great Powers." 5 4 World P o l i t i c s , p.354.. 73 What i f I a l l i e s w i t h G and H and t h e n changes t o t h e s i d e of E and F? I , F and H seek t o advance, and t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e i r c h o i c e o f p a r t n e r s need not be, and more o f t e n t h a n not i s n o t , a consequence of i n d u s t r i a l growth- D e f i n i n g F and I as s a t i s f i e d because they a l l y w i t h t h e dominant g r e a t power g a i n s n o t h i n g f o r t h e t h e o r y and, as I s a i d , a l s o r e s t r i c t s i t s range. Ockam's r a z o r , as I w i l l i l l u s t r a t e , c u t s t h e h o b b l e . Some b a l a n c e o f power t h e o r i s t s a r e not as f a r from O r g a n s k i as O r g a n s k i s u g g e s t s they a r e . Morgenthau does argue from ' e g u i b a l a n c e ' t o ' u n c e r t a i n t y ' t o 'peace', bu t he w r i t e s : a l l n a t i o n s must always be a f r a i d t h a t t h e i r own m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s and the power i n c r e a s e s of o t h e r n a t i o n s might add up t o an i n f e r i o r i t y f o r t h e m s e l v e s which they must at a l l c o s t s a v o i d -Hence a l l n a t i o n s who have g a i n e d an apparent edge o v e r t h e i r c o m p e t i t o r s t e n d t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h a t advantage and use i t f o r c h a n g i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f power permanently i n t h e i r f a v o r . 5 5 The edge one h o l d s over t h e o t h e r may be more apparent than a c t u a l as m a t e r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s become e g u a l and, c o n c o m i t a n t l y , t h e e l u s i v e g u a l i t a t i v e a s p e c t s o f power such as d i p l o m a t i c s k i l l , c i t i z e n m o r a l e , m i l i t a r y e l a n and p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n become prominent i n t h e d e c i s i o n -making c a l c u l u s . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e o f b i p o l a r s i t u a t i o n s where a l l i a n c e s are many and both o f t h e i r f a c e s are v i s i b l e . 5 5 P o l i t i c s Among N a t i o n s , p.202 . A l l i a n c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y d e f e n s e a l l i a n c e s , r e d u c e t h e u n c e r t a i n t y w hich t h e who/whom q u e s t i o n c r e a t e s , a n d , i n d o i n g s o , r a i s e u n c e r t a i n t y i n t h e answers t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h s i d e i s s t r o n g e r . The m a t e r i a l and n o n - m a t e r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f s t a t e s must be a g g r e g a t e d i n t o two lumps. A s i d e f r o m t h e p r o b l e m o f a s s i g n i n g p r o p e r w e i g h t s t o t h e components o f s t a t e power, a d d i n g t h e n a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s t o form t h e sum f o r e a c h c o a l i t i o n p r o v i d e s o n l y a v e r y c r u d e i n d e x . One c a n t e l l whether t h e two c o a l i t i o n s a r e d r a w i n g c l o s e r t o p a r i t y (and t h a t i s a l l t h a t we need t o know) , but a s t h e y draw . c l o s e r , s t a t e s m e n demand f i n e r c a l c u l a t i o n s . T h e r e i s no a l g o r i t h m and a v a r i e t y o f r e a s o n a b l e a n s w e r s a r e p o s s i b l e . " R a t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f s e v e r a l n a t i o n s , which i s t h e v e r y I i f e b l o o d o f t h e b a l a n c e o f power becomes a s e r i e s o f g u e s s e s t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f w h i c h c a n be a s c e r t a i n e d o n l y i n r e t r o s p e c t . " 5 6 T h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n between t h e p r e c i s i o n r e q u i r e d and t h a t w h i c h i s a v a i l a b l e i s , a c c o r d i n g t o M orgenthau, t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e b a l a n c e o f power. Georg Simmel, r i g h t l y dubbed "a master o f s o c i o l o g i c a l p a r a d o x , " p u t s t h e argument more c l e a r l y t h a n t h o s e who a r e p r e o c c u p p i e d w i t h war and i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The most e f f e c t i v e p r e r e g u i s i t e f o r p r e v e n t i n g s t r u g g l e , t h e e x a c t knowledge o f t h e c o m p a r a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f t h e two p a r t i e s , i s v e r y o f t e n a t t a i n a b l e o n l y by t h e a c t u a l f i g h t i n g out o f t h e c o n f l i c t . 5 7 75 J u s t a s t h e g r e a t powers, a s a g r o u p , d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m s e l v e s f r o m o t h e r s t a t e s by t h e c a p a c i t y and a b i l i t y t o wage war s u c c e s s f u l l y , s o t o o a r e t h e g r a d a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e g roup d i s t i n g u i s h e d . Wars between g r e a t powers p r o v i d e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o c h a n g e r a n k o r d e r by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e w i n n e r and d i m i n i s h i n g t h e s t a t u s o f t h e l o s e r . A s i d e from s u c h o p p o r t u n i t i e s , t h e y may be f o u g h t o v e r "no s p e c i f i c o b j e c t " a s T a y l o r c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n War. The F r a n c o - P r u s s i a n War "was a t e s t o f s t r e n g t h " a f t e r which P r u s s i a r e p l a c e d F r a n c e as t h e f o r e m o s t c o n t i n e n t a l p o w e r . 5 8 Who i s s t r o n g e r and who i s weaker? Who w i l l g e t h i s way and who w i l l have t o g i v e i n ? Such q u e s t i o n s . . . l e a d t o r a n k l i s t s — s u c h as t h e r a n k i n g s o f p l a y e r s i n t e n n i s o r c h e s s t o u r n a m e n t s , o f b a s e b a l l c l u b s i n t h e w o r l d s e r i e s , o f c h i c k e n s i n t h e peck o r d e r o f t h e c h i c k e n y a r d , and o f g r e a t powers i n w o r l d p o l i t i c s . The f e w e r t h e r e c e n t a c t u a l e n c o u n t e r s t h a t have o c c u r r e d , . . t h e l a r g e r t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h s u c h r a n k l i s t s must be b u i l t up from h y p o t h e s e s b a s e d upon t h e p a s t p e r f o r m a n c e s and p r e s e n t o r e x p e c t e d r e s o u r c e s o f t h e c o n t e s t a n t s . 5 9 5 7 The c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f Simmel i s L e w i s C o s e r ' s and i s f r o m h i s "The D y s f u n c t i o n s o f M i l i t a r y S e c r e c y , " i n C o n t i n u i t i e s i n t h e S t u d y o f S o c i a l C o n f l i c t ed. L e w i s A. C o s e r , (New Y o r k : The F r e e ~ P r e s s , 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 2 4 7 , The q u o t a t i o n i s c i t e d i n C o s e r ' s The F u n c t i o n s Of S o c i a l C o n f l i c t , p. 1 3 3 . B l a i n e y i n h i s e x c e l l e n t book. The C a u s e s o f War a l s o f o l l o w s Simmel t h r o u g h C o s e r ' s e x p l i c a t i o n s . See i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e C h a p t e r "The Abacus o f Power". se T a y l o r , The S t r u g g l e f o r M a s t e r y i n E u r o p e , p. 2 1 7 . 5 9 K a r l W. D e u t s c h , The A n a l y s i s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s (Englewood C l i f f s ^ P r e n t i c e - H a l l J 1 9 6 8 ) , p . 2 2 . 76 With the "breakout of peace", the rack order i s as c l e a r as i t i s a t other times when d i s p a r i t i e s i n c a p a b i l i t y are l a r g e . As the breakout of peace recedes i n time and as gaps d i m i n i s h , the rank order i s b l u r r e d . O r d i n a l p o s i t i o n i s c o m p e t i t i v e and c o m p e t i t i o n between A and B, a r a p i d l y r i s i n g adjacent g r e a t power, becomes zero sum. T i e s are unacceptable and must be broken, f o r only one can occupy the i i r s t p o s i t i o n , the second p o s i t i o n , and so on down the queue. "War i t s e l f i s a d i s p u t e about measurement; peace on the other hand marks a rough agreement about measurement." 6 1 Note t h a t , here, r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n i s i n d i v i d u a l and excludes the weight which a l l i a n c e p a r t n e r s c o u l d add. War between two great powers i s most probable the c l o s e r they become i n terms of n a t i o n a l power c a p a b i l i t i e s . A ccording to the b a l a n c i n g arguments, on the other hand, war need not occur between any two great powers A and B as the gap narrows, f o r the l a r g e gaps between C, a more powerful s t a t e , and A and B are more worrisome to the l e s s powerful. D e c l i n e s i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n are to be compensated f o r with a l l i a n c e s ; moreover, one would expect A and B to 6<> G,. B l a i n e y , The Causes of War, p. 122. 6 i Compare t h i s with the p r e d i c t i o n s of c o a l i t i o n f ormation i n T. Caplow, Two Against One: C o a l i t i o n s i n T r i a d s (Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1968), pp.21-40, esp. Figure3:1; and Morton Kaplan's r u l e s of conduct i n a "balance of power" system i n h i s System and Process i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s (New York: John Wiley, 1957) , p.23. The f o u r t h r u l e of a balance o f power system i s : 77 a l l y i n order t o check C . 6 1 A l l i a n c e s are a means to augment c a p a b i l i t i e s of a l l the p a r t n e r s by j o i n i n g them, by subsuming the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o the group s h o u l d war occur. Such c o a l i t i o n s may d e t r a c t and c o n s t r a i n the i n d i v i d u a l b a r g a i n i n g power, and which of the two a d j a c e n t l y ranked g r e a t powers i s stronger and which i s weaker i s what the c o n f l i c t between them i s a l l about. A l l great powers seek t o maximize t h e i r power, and t h i s assumption h o l d s whether they are i n a c o a l i t i o n or not. Each t h e r e f o r e p r e f e r s the i m p o s s i b l e ; t h a t i s , t o a l l y i t s e l f with s m a l l e r , l e s s powerful p a r t n e r s . I f g r e a t power B i n rank 5 i s drawing up on A at rank p o s i t i o n 4 , each w i l l seek out a l l i e s from rank 6 downwards i n t o the non-great power stratum. N e i t h e r would have anything t o g a i n from attempts t o commit C, a great power s u p e r i o r to them both, to e n t e r a war between them, and, thereby, to deter one from a t t a c k i n g the o t h e r . C would have l i t t l e t o g a i n by l e t t i n g i t s e l f be committed i n advance. I f C i s the dominant great power, sguabbles i n the lower ranks need not t h r e a t e n i t s p o s i t i o n u n l e s s they a r e i n d e c i s i v e and/or other great powers t h r e a t e n to i n t e r v e n e . Moreover, A and B have a mutual i n t e r e s t i n i s o l a t i n g t h e i r competition from the i n t e r f e r e n c e of the higher-ups and i n guaranteeing a " f a i r f i g h t . " A " f a i r f i g h t " i s one i n which they are the l e a d i n g "Act t o oppose any c o a l i t i o n or s i n g l e a c t o r which tends to assume a p o s i t i o n of preponderance with r e s p e c t to the r e s t of the system." I do not expect i t to be 'obeyed.' 7 8 contenders. I f a l l i a n c e s are made with those great powers higher up, they are commitments t o keep c l e a r u n l e s s the war should prove t o be i n d e c i s i v e . Defense a l l i a n c e s , on the other hand, may be arranged with those s m a l l e r s t a t e s whose c o o p e r a t i o n does not d e t r a c t from n a t i o n a l power and may prove b e n e f i c i a l when war occu r s . Smaller s t a t e s are w i l l i n g a l l i e s because war opens o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r upward m o b i l i t y , i f they are on the v i c t o r i o u s s i d e , and p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s k i d d i n g downwards, i f t h e i r neighbours are on the winning s i d e . T h e i r s i s a prudent, not a r a p a c i o u s , c h o i c e . The f a r t h e r up the great power h i e r a r c h y the co m p e t i t i o n between a d j a c e n t l y ranked p a i r s i s , the l a r g e r the p o t e n t i a l f o r d i s r u p t i o n of the whole pecking o r d e r . The prospect o f war between the f i r s t and second ranked great powers f o r c e s them to seek a l l i e s — they w i l l always be dominant w i t h i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o a l i t i o n s — a n d f o r c e s those below to one s i d e or the other. The narrowing o f the gap between those i n rank p o s i t i o n s 1 and 2 l e a d s t o a l l i a n c e s with other great powers. With those a l l i a n c e s come d i f f i c u l t i e s i n c a l c u l a t i n g advantage, b i p o l a r i t y and the numerous c r i s e s which make the e m p i r i c a l t e s t o f war most probable. The t i m i n g of a major war i s i n f l u e n c e d by the r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n s of the c o a l i t i o n s even though the d i s p u t e over the ranks of the most powerful i s at the r o o t of the matter. More g e n e r a l l y , a d j a c e n t l y ranked great powers f i g h t each other when they approach p a r i t y i n power p o s i t i o n . 79 Thus f a r i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of g r e a t power war I have neglected geography — p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r s and d i s t a n c e s , l a n d , sea and l o c a t i o n . In the Sprouts' words, I have suggested "the i n t e r p l a y of puppets upon a stage as bare and u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d as the p o l i s h e d f l o o r of an empty room." 6 2 For the ad j a c e n t rank argument, the s i d e w a l l s are p u l l e d i n : the room becomes a c o r r i d o r , a t r a c k . As one great power meets another, blows are exchanged; the l o s e r f a l l s behind, and the winner advances t o a rank i n f r o n t of the l o s e r . T h i s n e g l e c t i s no s m a l l matter: o p p o r t u n i t i e s of i n t e r a c t i o n between s t a t e s , f o r good or i l l , a r e s t r u c t u r e d by s o c i a l and g e o g r a p h i c a l p r o x i m i t i e s . 6 3 In the i d e a l space, the pure s o c i a l space where th e r e are no b a r r i e r s or f r i c t i o n , the common balance of power argument and the ad j a c e n t rank argument are c l e a r l y d i s t i n c t . The p r e d i c t i o n s of one are opposite t o those of the o t h e r : a c c o r d i n g t o the former, preponderance l e a d s to war and p a r i t y p r e s e r v e s peace, a c c o r d i n g to the l a t t e r , p a r i t y l e a d s t o war and preponderance to peace. When we co n s i d e r the two arguments on the ground — i n g e o p o l i t i c a l space — some d i f f e r e n c e s become b l u r r e d . 6 2 Harold and Magaret Sprout, An E c o l o g i c a l Paradigm f o r the Study, of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , Research Monograph No.30, Center of I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, March 1968), p.5. 6 3 For examples, see the s t u d i e s of t h e freguency of war and the numbers of neighbours. They i n c l u d e : Richardson, S t a t i s t i c s o f Deadly Q u a r r e l s , pp.290-291 and James Paul Wesley, "Freguency o f Wars and Geographical Opportuniy," J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 6 (1962), 387-389. 80 C o n s i d e r t h e s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e a r e two u n e q u a l s t a t e s w i t h some d i s t a n c e i n between them. Both t h e b a l a n c e o f power argument and t h e a d j a c e n t r a n k argument would p r e d i c t no war. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e b a l a n c e o f power argument " s t a b i l i t y t e n d s t o i n c r e a s e i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e most v u l n e r a b l e government i n t h e s y s t e m t o r e s i s t i t s most p o w e r f u l n e i g h b o r . " S t a b i l i t y i s a f u n c t i o n o f power c a p a b i l i t i e s and g e o g r a p h i c s e p e r a t i o n . The s t r o n g s t a t e i s t o be f e a r e d b u t d i s t a n c e e r o d e s s t r e n g t h . 6 * The g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s t h a t e a c h p a r t y can be s u p p o s e d t o be a t h i s maximum power a t home ( t h i s may be an a r e a r a t h e r t h a n a p o i n t ) b u t t h a t h i s c o m p e t i t i v e power, i n t h e s e n s e o f h i s a b i l i t y t o d o m i n a t e a n o t h e r , d e c l i n e s t h e f a r t h e r f r o m home he o p e r a t e s . T h i s i s t h e g r e a t p r i n c i p l e o f t h e f u r t h e r t h e weaker. The amount by w h i c h t h e c o m p e t i t i v e power o f a p a r t y d i m i n i s h e s p e r m i l e movement away f r o m home i s t h e l o s s o f power g r a d i e n t . 6 5 On t h e o t h e r hand, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e a d j a c e n t r a n k argument, r a n k would n o t be a s o u r c e o f c o n f l i c t and, t h e r e f o r e , war would be u n l i k e l y . Now c o n s i d e r t h e s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e a r e two e g u a l s t a t e s s e p e r a t e d by some d i s t a n c e . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e b a l a n c e o f power argument t h e r e would be p e a c e . Both c o n d i t i o n s — e g u a l i t y and s e p e r a t i o n — a r e s a t i s f i e d . Note however t h a t peace would n o t be t h e r e s u l t o f u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e outcome o f war — t h e d e f e n d e r would win. Any a t t a c k e r ' s 6 * Q u i n c y W r i g h t , A S t u d y Of War, Ap p e n d i x XXIX and pp.952-956. 6 5 K e n n e t h B o u l d i n g , C o n f l i c t and D e f e n s e : A G e n e r a l T h e o r y (New Y o r k : H a r p e r S Row, 1962), pp,.78-79-81 c o m b a t i v e power would d i m i n i s h o v e r d i s t a n c e and t h e knowledge o f t h e outcome, i f war were t o o c c u r , p r e s e r v e s p e a c e . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e a d j a c e n t r a n k argument, r a n k p o s i t i o n i s .a s o u r c e o f c o n f l i c t and u n c e r t a i n t y o f t h e outcome i f war were t o o c c u r l e a d s t o war as t h e measure. W i t h no u n c e r t a i n t y o f t h e outcome o f war, t h e r e would be no war. T h e r e would be a s t a n d o f f . On t h e g r o u n d , r a t h e r t h a n i n t h e n e t h e r w o r l d o f a number l i n e , t h e a d j a c e n t r a n k argument y i e l d s t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n . P r o p o s i t i o n 16: N o n - s e p a r a t e d g r e a t powers f i g h t a s t h e y a p p r o a c h p a r i t y i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s . S e p e r a t i o n i s n o t s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f g e o g r a p h y -D i s t a n c e s , f o r example, keep s t a t e s a p a r t and c a n be gauged v e r y a c c u r a t e l y , b u t p h y s i c a l d i s t a n c e s p e r s e a r e n o t r e l e v a n t . L o s s o f s t r e n g t h g r a d i e n t s v a r y w i t h t h e i n t e r p l a y o f t e c h n o l o g y and g e o g r a p h y and t h a t i n t e r p l a y d o e s n o t have a m e t r i c . Only t h e g e n e r a l t r e n d i s c l e a r . "War c a n be d e f i n e d r o u g h l y as men t h r o w i n g t h i n g s a t e a c h o t h e r w i t h m a l i c i o u s i n t e n t , " 6 6 and d i s t a n c e has become l e s s i m p o r t a n t a s men r e d u c e t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t s o f k i l l i n g w i t h new t e c h n o l o g i e s . 6 7 C o r o l l a r i e s o f t h e o b v i o u s w i l l p r o v e h e l p f u l when e v a l u a t i n g P r o p o s i t i o n 16. S u i t a b l e t h e o r i e s do n o t e x i s t , 6 6 B o u l d i n g , C o n f l i c t And D e f e n s e , p.266, 6 7 A f t e r r e a d i n g M a r t i n Van C r e v e l d ' s f a s c i n a t i n g book, S u p p l y i n g War: L o g i s t i c s f r o m W a l l e n s t e i n t o P a t t o n ( Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 977), t h e g e n e r a l t r e n d i s no l o n g e r c l e a r . 82 Sprout and Sprout provide a sustained c r i t i q u e of Geqpolitik and of those theorists who, perhaps i n reaction to g e o p o l i t i c a l advocates, eschew geographical considerations and use s p a t i a l concepts only metaphorically. Although they do not o f f e r a metric or a theory, the Sprouts do provide the proper perspective. The base of their " ecological paradigm" i s a t r i a d composed of (1) "environment", (2) "environed e n t i t y " , and (3) " e n t i t y -environment i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . " Blunt as i t i s , t h i s t r i a d i s a useful device with which to reconnoiter the propositions l i s t e d i n Table 111:2. Table 111:2 Those propositions which secure themselves to but one or two points of the t r i a d are l e s s reasonable than those attached to a l l three. Reasonableness i s enhanced not by the addition of more variables or s p e c i f i c a t i o n s or elaborations per se. I t i s enhanced by bringing i n the r e l a t i o n s between states. Propositions 5, for example, touches one point i n the e c o l o g i c a l t r i a d . The s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of Proposition 5, Propositions 6 through 8, are based upon a crude calculus of r e l a t i o n s between states but the rate of economic growth remains an a t t r i b u t e of an i n d i v i d u a l great power and a t t r i b u t e s of states do not explain peace.. Indeed, while, i n one sense, the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s make the general argument more precise, they Table 111:2 82 a P r o p o s i t i o n s C o n c e r n i n g The I n c i d e n c e of Great Power I n t e r s t a t e War To Ee T e s t e d . P r o p o s i t i o n 1) The more a l l i e s , the more l i k e l y t h a t a g r e a t power w i l l become i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r - s t a t e war. P r o p o s i t i o n 2) The more n o n - g r e a t power a l l i e s , t h e more l i k e l y t h a t a g r e a t power w i l l become i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r - s t a t e war. P r o p o s i t i o n 3) Defense commitments d e t e r . Non-defense commitments a r e more l i k e l y t h a n d e f e n s e commitments t o l e a d t o n o n - a c t i v i s t war. P r o p o s i t i o n 4) Non-defense c c i i i t m e n t s to n o n - g r e a t powers a r e more l i k e l y t h a n d e f e n s e commitments t o l e a d t o n o n - a c t i v i s t war. P r o p o s i t i o n 5) G r e a t power wars a r e most l i k e l y t o o c c u r when t h e r a t e of economic growth i s h i g h r a t h e r t h a n when i t i s low. P r o p o s i t i o n 6) A c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r s t a t e war i s more l i k e l y t han n o n - a c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n when t h e r a t e o f economic growth i s h i g h . P r o p o s i t i o n 7) The a s s o c i a t i o n between a c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r s t a t e war and h i g h growth r a t e s i s s t r o n g e r when t h e opponent i s a n o t h e r g r e a t power and weaker when a g r e a t power a t t a c k s a n o n - g r e a t power. P r o p o s i t i o n 8) There i s no a s s o c i a t i o n between economic growth i n a g r e a t power and n o n - a c t i v i s t i n v o l v e m e n t i n war w i t h a n o n - g r e a t power. P r o p o s i t i o n 9) E e l a t i o n s h i p s between h i g h r a t e s c f economic growth and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war v a r y w i t h t h e l o n g term phases o f economic e x p a n s i o n and c o n t r a c t i o n . P r o p o s i t i o n 10) G r e a t power p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r s t a t e war depends upon a c o m b i n a t i o n o f a l l i a n c e commitments and h i g h r a t e s o f economic growth. 82 b P r o p o s i t i o n 11) The predominant power i s more l i k e l y t o f i g h t t h a n a re t h e l e s s p o w e r f u l . P r o p o s i t i o n 12) I n c r e a s e s r a t h e r than d e c r e a s e s i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n a r e more l i k e l y t o l e a d t o war. P r o p o s i t i o n 13) A c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war i s more l i k e l y t h a n n o n - a c t i v i s t i n v o l v e m e n t t o f o l l o w an i n c r e a s e i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n . P r o p o s i t i o n 14) The a s s o c i a t i o n between a c t i v i s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war and i n c r e a s e s i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n i s s t r o n g e r when a g r e a t power a t t a c k s a n o t h e r g r e a t power and weaker when t h e t a r g e t i s a n o n - g r e a t power. P r o p o s i t i o n 15) T h e r e f o r e , t h e r e i s no a s s o c i a t i o n between changes i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n and n o n - a c t i v i s t i n v o l v e m e n t i n war w i t h a n o n - g r e a t power. P r o p o s i t i o n 16: N o n - s e p a r a t e d g r e a t powers f i g h t as t h e y approach p a r i t y i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s . 83 l e a v e many more t i m e s o f peace u n a c c o u n t e d f o r b e c a u s e e a c h r e d u c e s t h e a l r e a d y s m a l l number o f wars. P r o p o s i t i o n 16, u n l i k e t h e o t h e r s , t o u c h e s a l l t h r e e and o f f e r s an e x p l a n a t i o n o f p e a c e — p r e d o m i n a n c e i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s and g e o p o l i t i c a l b a r r i e r s — and war. The a d j a c e n t r a n k argument, l i k e t h e c o n t r a r y b a l a n c e o f power argument, i s a b o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and, s t r i p p e d o f a l l s a v e e s s e n t i a l s , t h e e c o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e p o i n t s t o t h e commonplace: i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s and s h o u l d be a b o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s — r e l a t i o n s between s o v e r e i g n t e r r i t o r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The commonplace emerges as n o v e l when t h e e c o l o g i c a l t r i a d i s f i t t e d t o t h e r e l e v a n t e m p i r i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . T h i s i s t h e argument o f C h a p t e r IV-LEAF 84 OMITTED C h a p t e r IV A REVIEW OF THE EXISTING EMPIRICAL STUDIES The a r guments j u s t p r e s e n t e d have been t e s t e d q u a n t i t a t i v e l y b u t few, i f any, o f t h e e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r a c c e p t i n g o r r e j e c t i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s . Some o f t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h i s a r e p e c u l i a r t o i n d i v i d u a l s t u d i e s . O t h e r s a r e n o t - I w i l l d e s c r i b e g e n e r a l p r o b l e m s i n t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e s t u d y o f i n t e r - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s f i r s t and t h e n r e v i e w t h e e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s o f a l l i a n c e s , r a t e s o f e c o n o m i c g r o w t h , and r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n and war. 4.1 ECOLOGICAL FALLACIES AND METHODOLOGICAL INVOLUTION Most o f t h e e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s w h i c h draw t h e o r e t i c a l s u s t e n a n c e f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n a l b a l a n c e o f power l i t e r a t u r e a r e s t u d i e s o f t h e b a l a n c e o f power s y s t e m . A l t h o u g h t h e y r e s t upon a s s u m p t i o n s and p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g s t a t e b e h a v i o u r , t h e s e s t u d i e s a r e u n a b l e t o t e l l us much a t a l l a b o u t t h e b e h a v i o u r o f s t a t e s which compose t h e s y s t e m . The p a r t i c u l a r u n i t mesh r e s t r i c t s t h e p e r m i s s i b l e i n f e r e n c e s . E x p a n d i n g t h e u n i t mesh, by a g g r e g a t i n g t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f s t a t e s i n o r d e r t o examine r e l a t i o n s h i p s a t t h e s y s t e m gauge p r e c l u d e s c a p t u r i n g t h e f i n e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e same v a r i a b l e s a t t h e l e v e l o f t h e s t a t e s . I f t h e c o r r e l a t i o n - 8 5 -86 c o e f f i c i e n t s a r e r e p o r t e d f o r the system of s t a t e s , the c o e f f i c i e n t s have no a b s o l u t e v a l i d i t y independently o f those u n i t s , but are r e l a t i v e t o them- They measure, as i t were, not only v a r i a t i o n s o f the q u a n t i t i e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , but the p r o p e r t i e s of the u n i t mesh which we have imposed,..in order t o measure,-- 1 For example Si n g e r , Bremer, and Stuckey, i n t h e i r study of the balance o f c a p a b i l i t i e s i n the major power group and major power war, p r o p e r l y p o i n t out t h a t no i n f e r e n c e s can be made as to which p a r t i c u l a r nations...become i n v o l v e d i n war r e s u l t i n g from the d i s t r i b u t i o n or r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a p a b i l i t i e s . 2 The balance of power t h e o r i s t s suggest t h a t the predominant great power w i l l i n i t i a t e war u n l e s s those s t a t e s i n l e s s f a v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n s combine i n order to r e d r e s s the balance. Some a l s o suggest, as p o i n t e d out i n Chapter I I I , t h a t a r i s e i n r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n may propel a s t a t e i n t o war. Evidence f o r these p r o p o s i t i o n s must come from a n a l y s e s of s t a t e s , not of the s t a t e system. In t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e , the d i f f i c u l t y i s c a l l e d the " l e v e l o f a n a l y s i s problem" a f t e r S i n g e r ' s o f t - c i t e d paper of t h a t t i t l e , H is paper begins with a choice and attempts t o s p e l l out the consequences of that c h o i c e f o r the unwary, "Whether i n the p h y s i c a l or s o c i a l 1 G. Odny Yule and Haurice G. K e n d a l l , An I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Theory o f S t a t i s t i c s (London: Charles G r i f f i n , 1950), p.312. 2 S i n g e r , Bremer and Stuckey, " C a p a b i l i t y D i s t r i b u t i o n , U n c e r t a i n t y , and Hajor Power War," p- 45. 87 s c i e n c e , " Singer w r i t e s , the observer may choose to focus upon the p a r t s or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system. He may, f o r example, choose between the fl o w e r s or the garden... the t r e e s or the f o r e s t . . . . 3 The problem, i f i t be a "problem" at a l l , * i s an o l d one. Since the p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1950 of Robinson's c l a s s i c paper " E c o l o g i c a l C o r r e l a t i o n s and the Behavior of I n d i v i d u a l s , " an i n f e r e n c e from an aggregate r e l a t i o n s h i p to the i n d i v i d u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p has been dubbed "the e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y " , s While t h i s name i s now p r e v a l e n t , i t i s unfortunate; " e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y " f i t s e a s i l y and more g e n e r a l l y i n t o the Sprouts' c o n c e p t u a l vocabulary. E c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c i e s of the f i r s t t ype, Robinson's type, are i n f r e g u e n t i n g u a n t i t a t i v e s t u d i e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 3 J . David S i n g e r , "The L e v e l of A n a l y s i s Problem i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , " The I n t e r n a t i o n a l System: T h e o r e t i c a l Essays, ed. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961), p.77. 4 To " s o l v e the problem" i s to s t a t e what the u n i t which you are a n a l y z i n g i s and to s t i c k with i t . There are a number o f methods t o as s e s s the accuracy of i n f e r e n c e s from aggregates to i n d i v i d u a l s . In i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , these methods are i r r e l e v a n t . The s t a t e most o f t e n i s the u n i t and we c r e a t e our aggregates r a t h e r than have taem ready made. See W.B.Moul, "The L e v e l o f A n a l y s i s Problem R e v i s i t e d , " Canadian J o u r n a l o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e nce 6(September 1973), 494-513. 5 W.S.Robinson, " E c o l o g i c a l C o r r e l a t i o n s and the Behavior of I n d i v i d u a l s , " American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 15(1950), 351-357. For another typology o f e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c i e s , one which i s f a r more elegant than the one presented h e r e i n , see Hayward A l k e r , J r . , "A Typology o f E c o l o g i c a l F a l l a c i e s " i n Q u a n t i t a t i v e E c o l o g i c a l A n a l y s i s i n the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , ed.. M- Dogan and S. Rokkan (Cambridge: 88 r e l a t i o n s and they are not d i f f i c u l t t o spot. On the other hand, e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c i e s of the second type, the Sprouts' v a r i e t y , i n h e r e i n much of the q u a n t i t a t i v e work and are f a r more p e r n i c i o u s . An e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y o f the second s o r t occurs when the a n a l y s i s denies one or two p o i n t s o f the e c o l o g i c a l t r i a d of environed e n t i t y , environment, and entity-environment i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . The p r o f e r r e d c h o i c e of the t r e e s or the f o r e s t , or the f l o w e r s or the garden, i s too r e s t r i c t i v e . The c h o i c e should be between the t r e e s i n the f o r e s t and the f o r e s t , between the garden and the flowers i n the garden. This i s the essence of the e c o l o g i c a l approach, and the e c o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , i f not the language, i s e s s e n t i a l to a proper study o f the r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s . 6 To repeat the t r u i s m : i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s and should be about i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . An e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y , t o put the matter most p l a i n l y , denies r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s . T h i s i s a preposterous s i t u a t i o n , given the s u b j e c t matter. F o l l o w i n g from the th r e e elements o f the e c o l o g i c a l t r i a d , HIT Press, 1969), pp. 69-86. T h i s essence o f the Sprouts' e c o l o g i c a l approach i s con s p i c u o u s l y absent from the only s t a t i s t i c a l study of the Sprouts' arguments which I can r e c a l l , . U n f o r t u n a t e l y i t i s found i n a F e s t s c h r i f t t o the Sprouts. Dina Zinnes, "Some Evidence Relevant to the Man-Milieu Hypothesis" i n The A n a l y s i s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : Essays i n Honor of Harold and Margaret Sprout, ed. J.N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis, Maurice East (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp.209-251 c o n s i s t s o f evidence i r r e l e v a n t to the man-m i l i e u hypothesis and evidence, r e l e v a n t and i r r e l e v a n t , rendered i r r e l e v a n t by a l l of the e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c i e s mentioned i n t h i s chapter. 89 there are t h r e e ways of denying i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I w i l l d e a l with the f i r s t two b r i e f l y . The remainder of the chapter i s a prolonged d i s c u s s i o n of the t h i r d . The f i r s t , and r e l a t i v e l y r a r e , subtype i s the use of the r e s u l t s of a study of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system to account f o r the e x t e r n a l or systemic i n f l u e n c e s upon s t a t e behaviour. For example. Singer, i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of systems theory and the e c o l o g i c a l approach, suggests t h a t we may t h i n k of the g l o b a l system as a h i e r a r c h y of nested subsystems each embraced by those at the next higher l e v e l of a n a l y s i s and embracing those at a l l lower l e v e l s . I t f o l l o w s from t h i s t h a t any system or s e t of systems at one l e v e l o f a n a l y s i s c o n s t i t u t e s the environment of a l l e n t i t i e s e x i s t i n g at any lower l e v e l . 7 7 J . David S i n g e r , A General Systems Taxonomy For P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , (New York: General Learning Press, 1971), p. 12. I t would f o l l o w t h a t a great power, (say) France, i s environed by the g r e a t power system which i n c l u d e s France and, above t h a t , by the t o t a l i n t e r s t a t e system which again i n c l u d e s France. I f so, a "boundary problem," no l e s s s e r i o u s than those which plague the "systems of a c t i o n " s c h o o l Singer c r i t i c i z e s throughout h i s pamphlet, emerges i n S i n g e r ' s "systems as e n t i t i e s " approach-France i s a member of the g r e a t power system and the t o t a l system; we cannot t r e a t a s t a t e as c o n s t i t u t i n g , i n p a r t , i t s own environment and a v o i d c o n c e p t u a l c o n f u s i o n . S i n g e r ' s argument here undermines h i s argument f o r e c o l o g i c a l or c o n t e x t u a l a n a l y s i s . I f we found the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between two v a r i a b l e s to vary among s t a t e s , we would want to see i f the v a r i a t i o n depends upon each s t a t e ' s c ontext. The i m p l i c a t i o n of the q u o t a t i o n i s t h a t c o n t e x t of each i s the same, and a c o n s t a n t cannot e x p l a i n a v a r i a t i o n . See C y n t h i a Cannizzo, " C a p a b i l i t y D i s t r i b u t i o n and Major-Power War Experience, 1816-1965," O r b i s , 21 (Winter 1978), 947-957 f o r a r e c e n t example of the c o n f u s i o n . The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e v a r i a t i o n i n t h e o n s e t o f war i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m " e x p l a i n e d " by t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e s y s t e m c o u l d be s a f e l y added t o t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e v a r i a t i o n i n t h e i n c i d e n c e o f war f o r any s t a t e " e x p l a i n e d " by t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h a t s t a t e . 8 The d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s a r e n o t t h e same, b e c a u s e i n e a c h c a s e t h e u n i t mesh i s d i f f e r e n t . The s u g g e s t i o n i n v i t e s o p e r a t i o n i s m i n r e v e r s e . "By o p e r a t i o n i s m i n r e v e r s e i s meant endowing t h e m e asures w i t h a l l t h e meanings a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c o n c e p t . " 9 The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t f o r e s t s and t r e e s s h o u l d be added t o g e t h e r - To use a n o t h e r h a c k n e y e d p h r a s e , when y o u add a p p l e s and o r a n g e s , t h e r e s u l t c a n be e x p r e s s e d i n number o f f r u i t s : b u t t h e sum o f t h e numbers o f f o r e s t s and t r e e s i s m e a n i n g l e s s . I n a r e c e n t a n a l y s i s o f t h e C o r r e l a t e s o f War d a t a , H a r f , H o o v l e r and James J r . embrace t h i s v e r s i o n o f e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y , d i s p l a y t h e most c r u d e o p e r a t i o n a l i s m , and d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t a c o mputer c a r e s o n l y f o r n u m e r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , m e a n i n g f u l o r m e a n i n g l e s s . 1 0 I w i l l d i s c u s s t h e i r s t u d y below. 8 T h i s i s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n t o J . D a v i d S i n g e r and M e l v i n S m a l l , " A l l i a n c e A g g r e g a t i o n and t h e O n s e t o f War, 1815-1945," p.286. 9 C l y d e Coombs, " T h e o r y and Methods o f S o c i a l Measurement," i n R e s e a r c h Methods i n t h e B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n c e s , e d . Leon F e s t i n g e r and D a n i e l K a t z (New Y o r k : The Dryden P r e s s , 1953) , p. 476. 1 0 J . H a r f , D. H o o v l e r and T. James J r . , " S y s t e m i c and E x t e r n a l A t t r i b u t e s i n F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a l y s i s , " i n C o m p a r i n g F o r e i g n P o l i c i e s : T h e o r i e s , F i n d i n g s , and Methods, e d . J.N. Rosenau (New Y o r k : John W i l e y and Sons, 1974), pp.235-249, 91 The second subtype of the e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y arose i n asking: are the a t t r i b u t e s of the s t a t e or the a t t r i b u t e s of the environment most potent when e x p l a i n i n g the behaviour of s t a t e s ? The g u e s t i o n leaves out entity-environment i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . Rosenau wri t e s t h a t two extreme answers to t h i s g u e s t i o n provide "one of the most p e r s i s t e n t , i f not always r e c o g n i z e d , c o n t r o v e r s i e s i n the study of world p o l i t i c s . 1 1 1 * T h i s analogue to the n a t u r e / n u r t u r e c o n t r o v e r s y i s j u s t as s t e r i l e i n the a b s t r a c t . Rosenau argues t h a t an e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n which admits the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t both s e t s of i n f l u e n c e s may be e g u a l l y potent i s r e g u i r e d . He and h i s c o l l e a g u e s , Hoggard and Ramsey, attempt such a t e s t . D i v i d i n g p r e d i c t o r s i n t o i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l , or r e l a t i o n a l , c a t e g o r i e s , they f i n d " i n t e r n a l " f a c t o r s to be f a r more potent than r e l a t i o n a l f a c t o r s . 1 2 They "hope...that the a s s a u l t on the f i n d i n g s w i l l come from many g u a r t e r s . " 1 3 I w i l l be g l a d to j o i n i n . A l l of the e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c i e s d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s chapter are found i n these two 1 1 James N. Rosenau and Gary D. Hoggard, "Foreign P o l i c y Behavior i n Dyadic R e l a t i o n s h i p s : T e s t i n g a Pre-T h e o r e t i c a l E x t e n s i o n , " i n Comparing F o r e i g n P o l i c i e s : T h e o r i e s . Methods, and F i n d i n g s , ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: John H i l e y and Sons/Sage P u b l i c a t i o n , 1974), pp. 117-118, 1 2 I b i d , p. 142, and J.N. Rosenau and George H. Ramsey J r . , " E x t e r n a l and I n t e r n a l T y p o l o g i e s of F o r e i g n P o l i c y Behavior: T e s t i n g the S t a b i l i t y of an I n t r i g u i n g Set of F i n d i n g s , " i n Sage I n t e r n a t i o n a l Yearbook of F o r e i g n P o l i c y ' S t u d i e s , Volume I I I , ed. P a t r i c k J . McGowan (Beverly H i l l s : Sage, 1975) pp. 245-262. 1 3 Rosenau and Hoggard, "Foreign P o l i c y Behavior," p.143. 92 s t u d i e s , b u t t h e " i n t e r n a l v s . e x t e r n a l " i s t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n here,. Rosenau and Hoggard p o i n t o u t t h a t o t h e r s have s u g g e s t e d t h a t " t h e s i z e a t t r i b u t e i s as much a r e l a t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e as a n a t i o n a l o ne," and t h e same c o u l d be s a i d o f d e v e l o p e d / u n d e r d e v e l o p e d d i c h o t o m y w h i c h i s t h e s e c o n d " i n t e r n a l " p r e d i c t o r v a r i a b l e . 1 * T u r n i n g t o t h e e x t e r n a l o r r e l a t i o n a l c a t e g o r y , no r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e t o be f o u n d . A l l o f t h e r e l a t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s d e s c r i b e p r o p e r t i e s o f dyads o r p a i r s o f s t a t e s . To make i n f e r e n c e s t o s t a t e s f r o m t h e f i n d i n g s o f d y a d s i n v o l v e s R o b i n s o n ' s e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y . A s i d e f r o m t h a t , none o f the t h r e e r e l a t i o n a l p r e d i c t o r s ( " d i s t a n c e " , " b a l a n c e " and "homogeneity") a r e r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s . L i k e many s t a t e s , we may have d i s t a n t r e l a t i o n s and p h y s i c a l o r s o c i a l d i s t a n c e may l i m i t v i s i t s t o them, but d i s t a n c e p e r s e i s n o t a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x c e p t i n g e o m e t r i c t e r m s . T h e s e two s t u d i e s c a n n o t answer t h e g u e s t i o n t h e y pose and t h e main p o i n t i s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n i s i l l - c o n c e i v e d , . I t i s t h e same t h i n g as a s k i n g : does t h e l e n g t h o r t h e w i d t h c o n t r i b u t e most t o t h e a r e a o f a r e c t a n g l e ? S u r v e y i n g g a r d e n s , we m i g h t n o t e t h a t t h i s one i s l o n g e r o r w i d e r t h a n t h a t one; b u t what we c a l l l e n g t h and w i d t h w i l l v a r y w i t h t h e v a n t a g e p o i n t , and t o t a l k o f a r e a i s t o t a l k o f an i n t e r r e l a t i o n between t h e two. To say i t may be a l i t t l e o f b o t h i s n o t v e r y h e l p f u l . 1 4 I b i d . , p , 1 4 2 . 93 I f a l l of these problems c o u l d be avoided, the t h i r d subtype of e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y remains. T h i s one concerns the way gu e s t i o n s about i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s are answered rather than how they are posed. Along with the c r o s s -s e c t i o n a l s t a t i s t i c a l mode of a n a l y s i s comes, c o v e r t l y , the assumption t h a t the s t a t e i s an i s o l a t e , occupying and g i v i n g behaviours i n t o a vacuum. The assumption i s not recognized; n e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s t h e r e - An extreme example draws i t out. WcGowan and Rood expand upon a remark by Kaplan i n h i s book, System and Process i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s which, perchance, i s found i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f the balance of power. The remark i s on the u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the random bumping together o f i n d i v i d u a l gas molecules and the p r e d i c t i b i l i t y of temperature and changes of pr e s s u r e f o r a volume of a gas. They propose t h a t "when viewed from the p e r s p e c t i v e of the system a l l a l l i a n c e s are eguiprobable and time i n d e p e n d e n t . " 1 5 That i s , i n a balance of power system, a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n and the i n t e r v a l s between the formation o f one a l l i a n c e and the next are randomly d i s t r i b u t e d -McGowan and Rood f i n d t h a t the a l l i a n c e a c t i v i t y i n Europe during 1814-1914 f i t the values expected i f the process were randomly generated. No reasonable person would i n f e r from t h e i r very i n t r i g u i n g r e s u l t s about the European s t a t e 1 5 P a t r i c k McGowan and Robert Rood, " A l l i a n c e Behavior i n Balance o f Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth Century Europe," American P o l i t i c a l Science B§view, 69 (September 1965), 859-870. i1 94 system t h a t the gre a t powers acted r a n d o m l y . 1 6 The aggregate f a l l a c y would be a minor i r r i t a n t compared to the massive a f f r o n t t o common sense. To assume t h a t s t a t e s are indepedent o f each other and of t h e i r immediate past, " a c t i n g " randomly, i s a gr e a t e r a f f r o n t t o common sense than that inference.. However, t h a t i s what must be assumed i f the powers of c l a s s i c a l s t a t i s t i c a l i n f e r e n c e are to be invoked i n c r o s s - n a t i o n a l q u a n t i t a t i v e s t u d i e s . The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of c l a s s i c a l s t a t i s t i c a l i n f e r e n c e with s c i e n c e , and the c r a v i n g f o r s c i e n c e , have l e d t o the c r e a t i o n of a wholly perverse s i t u a t i o n : to study i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s we must assume t h a t they do not e x i s t o r , i f they e x i s t , they e x i s t i n a haphazard manner. 1 7 Moreoever, the c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l mode of a n a l y s i s , the one 1 6 C e r t a i n l y the authors do not. Quite the c o n t r a r y : each a l l i a n c e " i s based s o l e l y upon present s t a t e i n t e r e s t and c u r r e n t t h r e a t s to the balance of power-" I b i d . , 860. 1 7 T h i s i s the s u b s t a n t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n of the apparently t e c h n i c a l d e c i s i o n s . R e c a l l the d i s t i n c t i o n between organized and d i s o r g a n i z e d complexity. For d i s c u s s i o n s of the " i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c " , " a t o m i s t i c " , o r , l e s s commonly and more p e r c e p t i v e l y , the " l i b e r a l " f a l l a c y i n other areas of the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , see James S. Coleman, " R e l a t i o n a l A n a l y s i s : The Study o f S o c i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s with Survey Methods," Human, O r g a n i z a t i o n , 17 (Winter 1958-1959), 28-36; and Johan Gaitung,"Theory and Methods of S o c i a l Research, (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967), pp.148-160, 358-388, To c a s t the argument i n a t r i a d , we have three p o i n t s : (1) theory, (2) technigue, and (3) method. Where the lack of theory i s bemoaned, technigue and more s o p h i s t i c a t e d technigue are p r e s c r i b e d ; methodology, the study of r e l a t i o n s between theory and tec h n i g u e , i s f o r g o t t e n . D i s c u s s i o n s o f , and presumably courses on, "Theory and Method" are misnamed. They o f t e n c o n f i n e themselves t o e i t h e r the f i r s t p o i n t or the second; favoured/ p r e c l u d e s any c a u s a l a n a l y s i s , as I w i l l i l l u s t r a t e below. C r o s s - n a t i o n a l aggregate data s t u d i e s are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s u p r a - e x p o n e n t i a l growth of q u a n t i t a t i v e p u b l i c a t i o n s i n the f i e l d of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . 1 8 In the numerous reviews of the many d i v e r s e r e s u l t s , some f a u l t s a r e noted and minor r e p a i r s are s u g g e s t e d . 1 9 To r e s t o r e r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s dyadic analyses are recommended. To capture the temporal order which i s necessary f o r c a u s a l a n a l y s e s , time l a g s are recommended. Each of the r e p a i r s compounds the e r r o r s and pushes up the growth curve. For t h i s reason, I have c o n f i n e d the review of the e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h t o a separate chapter. To have accepted the p u b l i s h e d r e s u l t s as they are and t o have i n c l u d e d them i n the d i s c u s s i o n of the p r o p o s i t i o n s i n Chapter I I I , would have i n v i t e d a multitude where, on the l e f t , Ockham's r a z o r i s made b l u n t , to the r i g h t , numerical crunchers prance on. 1 8 For an e m p i r i c a l e s t i m a t e of the growth curve, see P a t r i c k McGowan, "The Future of Comparative S t u d i e s : An E v a n g e l i c a l P l e a , " i n I n Search of G l o b a l P a t t e r n s , ed. J.N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pc219-222. My estimate of the numbers of c r o s s - n a t i o n a l aggregate data s t u d i e s i s an educated guess,. 1 9 P. McGowan and H. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of F o r e i g n P o l i c y : A Survey of S c i e n t i f i c F i n d i n g s (Beverly H i l l s : Sage, 1973); S. Petersen, "Research on Research: Events Data S t u d i e s , 1961-1972," i n Sage I n t e r n a t i o n a l Yearbook of F o r e i g n P o l i c y S t u d i e s , 3 (Beverly H i l l s : Sage, 1975), pp7263-310; and J.A. Vasguez, " S t a t i s t i c a l F i n d i n g s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : A Data-Based Assessment," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s Q u a r t e r l y , 2 0 (June 1976), 171-21?, are r e c e n t s t o c k - t a k i n g s . 2 0 Merton, "Notes on Problem-Finding," pp. x i i i - x v i . 96 of tseudo p r o b l e m s . C l e a r l y p o i n t i n g out what t o avoid should improve the data a n a l y s i s i n Chapters VI and VII. Through d e s p a i r over the l a c k of t a k e - o f f i n t o cumulative knowledge, there i s a p a t t e r n i n the development of s t u d i e s r e l e v a n t to the power p o l i t i c s p r o p o s i t i o n s . I t i s i n v o l u t i o n , not the e v o l u t i o n so d e s i r e d , or the r e v o l u t i o n so r e g u i r e d . Any c u l t u r a l p a t t e r n has two opposing as p e c t s : "the n e g a t i v e aspect of p a t t e r n e s t a b l i s h e s a taboo, the p o s i t i v e aspect p o i n t s to a t a s k . " As Goldenweiser d e s c r i b e s one p e c u l i a r i t y of p r i m i t i v e c u l t u r e s : The primary e f f e c t of p a t t e r n i s , of course, to check development, or at l e a s t to l i m i t i t . As soon as the p a t t e r n form i s reached f u r t h e r change i s i n h i b i t e d by the t e n a c i t y o f the p a t t e r n . While c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l t h i n g s c u l t u r a l , e s p e c i a l l y i n p r i m i t i v e n e s s , t h i s aspect of p a t t e r n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y conspicuous i n r i t u a l s and the forms of r e l i g i o u s o b j e c t s , where the t e n a c i t y of p a t t e r n i s enhanced by s o c i a l i n e r t i a or a s a c r e d h a l o . The i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t i s p r o g r e s s i v e c o m p l i c a t i o n , v a r i e t y w i t h i n u n i f o r m i t y , v i r t u o s i t y w i t h i n monotony. T h i s i s i n v o l u t i o n . 2 1 My i n t e n t i o n i s t o be mischievous, not m a l i c i o u s . I can f i n d no other way to understand the l o g i c of most of the s t u d i e s which sh o u l d be r e l e v a n t to the p r o p o s i t i o n s i n the l a s t c h a p t e r . 2 1 Alexander A. Goldenweiser, "Loose Ends of Theory on the I n d i v i d u a l , P a t t e r n , and I n v o l u t i o n i n P r i m i t i v e S o c i e t y , " i n Essays i n Anthropology: Presented to A.L. Kroeber, ed. Robert Lowie (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1936), pp. 102-103. 97 How e l s e , given good w i l l and d i s c o u n t i n g attempts at black humour, can the l o g i c of the f o l l o w i n g argument on "fundamental problems" i n theory be comprehended? The n o m o t h e t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d i n v e s t i g a t o r i s n a t u r a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n maximizing the number of ca s e s f o r s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s j.n order t h a t e m p i r i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s may be d e r i v e d . I f r e s e a r c h r e t a i n s i t s emphasis on n a t i o n s as i t s u n i t s - o f - a n a l y s i s , the p o p u l a t i o n s i z e r e s u l t i n g does indeed c a s t some doubts on the c a p a c i t y of s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s t o uncover meaningful contingency s t a t e m e n t s . 2 2 The world i s at f a u l t and the authors seek ways "of r e d r e s s i n g the problems" by s t a t i s t i c a l t r u s t - b u s t i n g . One hundred and f o r t y s t a t e s are made to y i e l d 19,460 c a s e s . To what end? Now, they quote another a p p r o v i n g l y : the number i s l a r g e enough to make random sampling a s e n s i b l e approach i n the study of 'dyads'. S t u d i e s t h a t produce e s t i m a t e s about the p o p u l a t i o n of a l l dyads from a n a l y s i s of random samples are s t a t i s t i c a l i n the exact s e n s e . 2 3 2 2 C h a r l e s W. Kegley, Jr.. and R i c h a r d A. Skinner, "The Case-f o r - A n a l y s i s Problem" i n In Search of G l o b a l P a t t e r n s , p.311. 2 3 C-A. M c C l e l l a n d , "Two Conceptual Issues i n the Q u a n t i t a t i v e A n a l y s i s of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Events Data," mimeo, 1970, p.6, as c i t e d i n i b i d . p.312. In a f o o t n o t e on the same page, Kegley and Skinner note that of the 19,469 " d i r e c t e d dyads" (N (N-1) ) , a s m a l l number account f o r most o f the events recorded. Four hundred and f i f t y - t w o (452) d i r e c t e d dyads accounted f o r 81% of the events r e c o r d e d . They then go on, passing the most s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t i n t h e i r paper, t o s t a t e t h a t we should c o n c e n t r a t e on these 452. The 452 dyads are generated from a " p o p u l a t i o n ( s i c ) of only 91 " a c t i v e " s t a t e s . The enormous d i s c r e p a n c y between the two f i g u r e s t e l l s us much of the s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t e system. I f the i n t e r a c t i o n s were random, 91 s t a t e s should g i v e 91 (91-1) dyads where only 452 are found. Perhaps more evidence t h a t the world i s organized along " f e u d a l " l i n e s would be s u p e r f l u o u s , but I f i n d i t amazing that no study has used the massive events data a r c h i v e s to d i s p l a y and d e s c r i b e 98 They c o n t i n u e , b u t , a s Davy C r o c k e t t i s r e p o r t e d t o have r e m a r k e d d u r i n g a s p e e c h by Andrew J a c k s o n : " I t d o n ' t e v e n make good n o n s e n s e . " 2 * The a r g u m e n t s o f t h i s c h a p t e r , l i k e t h o s e i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , a r e n o t , i n t h e m s e l v e s , n o v e l , and t h e theme i s t h a t c l i c h e — t h e o r y and method c a n n o t a v o i d e a c h o t h e r . C l i c h e s a r e what r e m a i n o f once s t a r t l i n g i n s i g h t s : worn smooth and weakened w i t h r e p e t i t i o n , t h e y become s u b s t i t u t e s f o r t h e t h o u g h t s t h e y b o r e . Now t h e y a r e f i t o n l y t o s e r v e t h e l i p s , where o n c e t h e y s e r v e d t h e mind. P r a x i s , n o t f u r t h e r r e p e t i t i o n , r e s t o r e s s t r e n g t h and t h e c r i t i c a l e d g e s . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g t h r e e s e c t i o n s I a s s e s s p a r t i c u l a r s t u d i e s o f (1) t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a l l i a n c e i n v o l v e m e n t and war, (2) t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h and war, and (3) t h e a l l i a n c e / r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n nexus and war. 4 . 2 ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS AND WAR A f t e r t h e y made t h e i r s e m i n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e p o l a r i t y / s t a b i l i t y d e b a t e , S i n g e r and S m a l l t u r n e d t h e i r a t t e n t i o n f r o m " t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e s y s t e m " t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s among i t s components. They c o m p l e t e d t h e o n l y e m p i r i c a l s t u d y which d e a l s e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h n a t i o n a l t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e s t a t e s y s t e m o v e r t i m e . I i n t e n d t o do s o . 2 * As c i t e d i n D a v i d H a c k e t t F i s h e r ' s c o m p r e h e n s i v e and w i t t y c a t a l o g u e , H i s t o r i a n ^ s F a l l a c i e s : Toward a L o g i c o f H i s t o r i c a l T h o u g h t (New Yo r k : H a r p e r and Row, 1970). 99 a l l i a n c e commitments and war-proneness. F i n d i n g t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n s between v a r i o u s measures of a l l i a n c e involvement and war hovered near z e r o during the 1815-1945 c r o s s - s e c t i o n , Singer and Small conclude t h a t behind the minute c o e f f i c i e n t s , l i e l a r g e r ones of egual s i z e and o p p o s i t e s i g n s . That i s : the n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s i n the 19th century c a n c e l out the p o s i t i v e ones i n the t w e n t i e t h . The b a s i s f o r t h i s r e a s o n i n g i s t h a t such was the case i n the e a r l i e r (1968) study o f the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. They s t a t e : what holds f o r the system must a l s o h o l d , i n g e n e r a l , f o r the n a t i o n s s i n c e they generate the behavior from which our s y s t e m a t i c p r o p e r t i e s are i n f e r r e d . 2 5 Wrong- The r e a s o n i n g i s l o g i c a l l y i n c o r r e c t and the i n f e r e n c e i s e m p i r i c a l l y i n a c c u r a c t e - The c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the 1815-1899 c r o s s - s e c t i o n , which are supposed to be negative v i a the " e c o l o g i c a l f a l l a c y " , are moderate i n s i z e but p o s i t i v e i n s i g n . Those f o r the 1900-1945 c r o s s - s e c t i o n , which are supposed to be p o s i t i v e , are o c c a s i o n a l l y n e g a t i v e and s m a l l e r i n s i z e . 2 6 One s t r i k i n g d e f e c t of the Singer and Small a n a l y s i s , and my r e - a n a l y s i s to which I have r e f e r r e d , i s the immense width of each of the c r o s s - s e c t i o n s i n v e s t i g a t e d . I t i s 2 5 J.David Singer and Melvin Small, " N a t i o n a l A l l i a n c e Commitments and War Involvement, 1818-1945," I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , ed. J.N. Rosenau (New York: The Free P r e s s , 1969)", pp. 513,542 2 6 W.B.Moul, "The L e v e l of A n a l y s i s Problem R e v i s i t e d , " 500-501. 100 i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e t e m p o r a l p r i o r i t y , and t o do so i s e s s e n t i a l t o s u p p o r t any c a u s a l s t a t e m e n t . F o r e x a m p l e , a s t a t e c a n have a l l o f i t s a l l i a n c e a c i t i v i t y i n one p o r t i o n o f t h e i n t e r v a l and a l l i t s w a r f a r e i n a n o t h e r . Such a s t a t e would c o n t r i b u t e t o a p o s i t i v e c r o s s - s e c t i o n a s s o c i a t i o n between two v a r i a b l e s when, i n f a c t , t h e y a r e i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d h i s t o r i c a l l y . 2 7 The p r o b l e m w i t h t h e c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s — t h e f a v o u r e d mode o f a n a l y s i s i n t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e — i s o f t e n t h o u g h t t o be o n e o f s o r t i n g o u t c a u s e and e f f e c t , and t h e s o l u t i o n o f f e r e d i s t o b u i l d i n " t i m e l a g s " . 2 8 (More o f t e n t h a n n o t , t h e a n a l y s t s i m p l y n o t e s a d i f f i c u l t y ; f a l l s back upon t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t one f a c t o r i s a c a u s e and t h e o t h e r an e f f e c t , a n d , t h e r e b y , r e n d e r s h i s argument l e s s c o r r i g i b l e e m p i r i c a l l y . ) T h i s s o l u t i o n s e r v e s o n l y t o d i s t r a c t one f rom t h e c o n g e n i t a l p r o b l e m o f c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . The p r o b l e m i s n o t t h a t one p o i n t i n t i m e i s e x a m i n e d . I t i s t h a t v a r i a t i o n a c r o s s s t a t e s i s assumed t o c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e v a r i a t i o n f o r e a c h o f them t h r o u g h t i m e . Somers l a b e l s t h i s t a c i t a s s u m p t i o n " d e v e l o p m e n t a l e q u i v a l e n c e " and warns t h a t i t i s o f t e n u n j u s t i f i e d and t h e s u b s e g u e n t 2 7 The c a s e o f T u r k e y d u r i n g t h e 1900-1945 p e r i o d p r o v i d e s a s t a r k example. I b i d . , 503-508*. 2 8 F o r example, s e e R o b e r t B u r r o w e s , " M u l t i p l e Time S e r i e s A n a l y s i s o f N a t i o n - L e v e l D a t a , " C o m p a r a t i v e P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 2 ( J a n u a r y 1970) , 465-480. ~P 101 a n a l y s i s i s t h e r e f o r e m i s l e a d i n g . 2 9 The tr a p i s t h a t the assumption cannot be j u s t i f i e d u n l e s s we know the r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r each s t a t e , yet the purpose of the a n a l y s i s i n the f i r s t p l a c e i s t o d i s c o v e r those r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I f we know them, why proceed? I f we do not know them and s t i l l proceed, much i s ventured and n o t h i n g can be gained. We would "know" (by assumption) t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p s are e q u i v a l e n t , but the r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r any s t a t e (and, f o l l o w i n g from the i n i t i a l assumption, a l l state s ) would remain a m y s t e r y . 3 0 The t r a p i s a l o g i c a l one. No amount of e m p i r i c a l b a t t e r i n g or s t a t i s t i c a l t e a s i n g of a c r o s s -s e c t i o n a l data base can provide an escape from i t . A l o n g i t u d i n a l a n a l y s i s of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a l l i a n c e commitments and war r e v e a l s the i n a c c u r a c y of the assumption of developmental e q u i v a l e n c e . There are s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a t i o n s i n the s t r e n g t h and d i r e c t i o n among 2 9 Bobert Somers, " A p p l i c a t i o n s of an Extended Survey Research Model t o Comparative I n s t i t u t i o n a l S t u d i e s , " i n Comparative Methods i n S o c i o l o g y , ed. Ivan V a l l i e r (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1971) , pp.301-305. 3 0 W.B.Moul, "On G e t t i n g Nothing f o r Something: A Note on Causal Models o f P o l i t i c a l Development," Comparative P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s , 7 ( J u l y 1974), 142-147. Causal modelling of c r o s s - n a t i o n a l data continues t o be touted. See C h a r l e s Powell, et a l , "Determinants of F o r e i g n P o l i c y Behavior: A Causal M o d e l l i n g Approach" i n Comparing F o r e i g n P o l i c i e s , pp. 151-170 f o r an example. D i f f i c u l t i e s with ^"the a p p l i c a t i o n of c a u s a l models i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e are c h r o n i c l e d with verve and wit i n K.I.Macdonald, " C a u s a l M o d e l l i n g i n P o l i t i c s and S o c i o l o g y , " Quality and Q u a n t i t y , 10 (1976), 189-208. ? * Moul, "The L e v e l of A n a l y s i s Problem R e v i s i t e d , " 500. 102 the most war-prone s t a t e s . 3 1 Since the purpose i n t h a t study was to i l l u s t r a t e the methodological p i t f a l l s , o n l y f o u r s t a t e s were examined, the time span was l i m i t e d to 1900-1945, and some of the p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f t h e o r i g i n a l paper (1968) from which Singer and Small e r r o n e o u s l y argued were repeated,. That i s : u n l i k e o r d i n a r y time lagged c o r r e l a t i o n ( t 1 - t 2 , t 2-t3...) between the number o f a l l i a n c e s and war, I c a l c u l a t e d the c o e f f i c i e n t s between a l l i a n c e s i n one year and the i n c i d e n c e of war w i t h i n the next t h r e e years ( t - 1 — t 2 - t 4 , t 2 — t 3 - t 5 . . . ) . T h i s procedure may have i n f l a t e d improperly the modest c o e f f i c i e n t s I r e p o r t e d . The problem i s not simply the e x i s t e n c e of a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n ( i f indeed temporal c o n t i n u i t y i s , i n g e n e r a l , an o b s t a c l e t o be overcome r a t h e r than a welcome f a c t o f l i f e to be accommodated). The problem i s the d e l i b e r a t e c r e a t i o n of interdependent o b s e r v a t i o n s . In s h o r t , t h i s r e - a n a l y s i s d i s p l a y s the methodological p o i n t s , but the s u b s t a n t i v e r e s u l t s are suspect. So a l s o are the r e s u l t s o f two subseguent r e - a n a l y s e s of the same data. Harf, Hoovler and James J r . r e p o r t modest a s s o c i a t i o n s between a l l i a n c e involvement and i n t e r s t a t e war f o r 31 European and 22 Asian s t a t e s d u r i n g the 1900-1964 p e r i o d . 3 2 Singer and Small f i n d : •'....membership i n a l l i a n c e s seems to have had l i t t l e e f f e c t on the h i s t o r i c a l l i k e l i h o o d of major powers g e t t i n g i n t o war or remaining at peace" and "...those 3 2 Harf, Hoovler and James, J r . , "Systemic and E x t e r n a l A t t r i b u t e s , " pp. 239-241. 103 powers which entered i n t o a l l i a n c e s were somewhat more l i k e l y t o subsequently get i n v o l v e d i n war than those major powers which d i d not. But the a s s o c i a t i o n i s f a r from a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t o n e . " 3 3 The d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n the f i n d i n g s can be a t t r i b u t e d to the d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s and d i f f e r e n t time p e r i o d s which were examined and to the d i f f e r e n c e s between "number of a l l i a n c e s " , " a l l i a n c e membership" and j o i n i n g an a l l i a n c e . 3 4 However, the d i f f e r e n c e s are overshadowed by the i d e n t i c a l methods bf a n a l y s i s , and a l l of the r e s u l t s are unacceptable because o f the methods of a n a l y s i s which generated them. The method i s b a s i c a l l y the same as the one j u s t met i n the d i s c u s s i o n of the other a l l i a n c e / w a r s t u d i e s . The Singer and Small t a b l e s and the r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n s of the Harf, Hoovler and James,Jr. t a b l e are reproduced below. A s i g n t h a t something i s amiss i s the s i z e of the N i n each of them. 3 3 J.D.Singer and M.Small, " F o r e i g n P o l i c y I n d i c a t o r s : P r e d i c t o r s o f Bar i n H i s t o r y and i n the S t a t e of the World Message," P o l i c y S c i e n c e s , 5, (1974) , 293-294. Emphasis added. 3 4 Harf, Hoovler and James, J r . r e s o r t to the most t o r t u r e d numerology i n order t o f a t t e n the v a r i a b l e s f o r m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n . To d e f i n e " a l l i a n c e membership" to t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n they count the numbers of a l l i a n c e s each s t a t e was i n v o l v e d i n during the 13 h a l f d e c a d e s ; add together the memberships of a l l the s t a t e s i n each h a l f -decade and take the mean v a l u e s ; and then c a l c u l a t e the d e v i a t i o n s from the mean f o r each s t a t e i n each of the t h i r t e e n s l i c e s . Expressed i n percentages these d e v i a t i o n s from the t o t a l s become the " a l l i a n c e membership" valu e s f o r each s t a t e . 104 Table IV:1 Singer and Small examine the g r e a t powers, the number of which f l u c t u a t e d between a maximum of 7 and a minimum of 4, and r e p o r t the N to be 887. Harf, Hoovler and James,Jr. examine 31 European and 22 Asian s t a t e s , many of which d i d not e x i s t f c r the t o t a l time span which they examine, and r e p o r t N's of 323 and 129 r e s p e c t i v e l y . The s t a t e / y e a r , not the s t a t e , i s the u n i t of a n a l y s i s , but the necessary assumption of o r d i n a r y c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s remains. I t i s assumed t h a t the v a r i a t i o n a c r o s s s t a t e / y e a r s corresponds to the v a r i a t i o n f o r each s t a t e through the y e a r s . The assumption cannot be j u s t i f i e d . S inger and Small e x p l i c i t l y use the s t a t e / y e a r as the u n i t of a n a l y s i s i n order to r e s o l v e the problem of c a u s a l p r i o r i t y , and, i n doing so, provide an extreme i l l u s t r a t i o n of another l i a b i l i t y of c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l s t u d i e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . To b u i l d the t a b l e , they i s o l a t e (say) "Germany/1912"; note whether Germany was then i n an a l l i a n c e and whether i t entered a war i n 1912 or subsequently i n 1913 or 1914; and repeat t h i s procedure f o r a l l of the years Germany was a great power, and f o r a l l of the other g r e a t powers. Observation In A l l i a n c e ? Enter War? Yes No Yes No Germany/1912 x x Germany/1913 x x 104 a Table IV:1 Some Results Concerning A l l i a n c e s And Interstate gar A: Freguencies with which majors belonged to a l l i a n c e s and then entered into war. In Alli a n c e ? l e s No les 1 16 44 X V= 0.03 Entered Bar? No 532 195 Q = 0.02 648 + 239 = 887 B: Frequencies with which majors joined a l l i a n c e s and then entered i n t o war Joined Alliance? l e s No les 31 129 1^= 2.6 Entered war? No 104 623 Q = 0.18 135 + 752 = 887 All i a n c e and War r R1" B N Europe ( a l l time periods) 0.21 4.4% 0.38, 323 Asia ( a l l time periods) C.30 9.05? 0.41 129 Sources: A and B from J. David Singer and Kelvin.Small, "Foreign Policy Indicators: Predictors of War i n History and the State of the World Message," Policy Sciences, 5 (1974), 293. C from J. Harf, E. Hoovler and T. James, J r . , "Systemic and External Attributes i n Foreign Po l i c y Analysis," i n Comparing Foreign P o l i c i e s , p.240. 105 Germany/1914 O n i t e d Kingdom/1912 O n i t e d Kingdom/1913 O n i t e d Kingdom/1914 The r e s u l t i n g l a r g e r N may be r e g u i r e d f o r r e l i a b l e s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s e s , b u t a r t i f i c i a l l y i n f l a t i n g t h e N does n o t p e m i t v a l i d s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s . The p r o b l e m o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n t o b s e r v a t i o n s n o t e d a b o v e i s now m a g n i f i e d t o an a b s u r d d i m e n s i o n . An e l e m e n t a r y a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e model o f s t a t i s t i c a l i n f e r e n c e employed i s t h a t t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s be i n d e p e n d e n t o f one a n o t h e r . The c h o i c e o f one b a l l from t h e u r n must n o t i n f l u e n c e t h e c h o i c e o f t h e n e x t b a l l ; t h e f i r s t t o s s o f one c o i n must n o t i n f l u e n c e t h e s e c o n d t o s s o r t h e t o s s o f a n o t h e r c o i n - I f one w i s h e s t o a c c e p t t h e r e s u l t s as v a l i d , one must a l s o a c c e p t t h e a s s u m p t i o n s from which t h e y come. S t r i c t l y § p e a k i n g , t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s i n c l u d e : t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t Germany's a l l i a n c e w i t h A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y p r i o r t o World War I was i n d e p e n d e n t o f A u s t r i a H u n g a r y ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany p r i o r t o W o r l d War I ; t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " b o t h " a l l i a n c e s had no i n f l u e n c e upon F r a n c e ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom; t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e U n i t e d Kingdom's a l l i a n c e w i t h F r a n c e was u n r e l a t e d t o F r a n c e ' s a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e U n i t e d Kingdom; t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t one g r e a t power's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war i n 1914 was i n d e p e n d e n t o f a l l t h e o t h e r g r e a t powers' p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n x X X X X X X X 106 war i n 1914; and t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a g r e a t power's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war i n 1914 h a d no i n f l u e n c e upon i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e same war i n t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r . Demands t h a t s t a t e s move about a i m l e s s l y , w i t h no t i e s t o o t h e r s o r t o t h e i r own i m m e d i a t e p a s t , and t h a t t h e y s t r i k e a t no o t h e r i n p a r t i c u l a r a t no p a r t i c u l a r t i m e a r e p r e r e q u i s i t e s f a t a l t o a s t u d y o f i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t . L e t me e m p h a s i z e t h a t t h e p o i n t i s n o t s i m p l y t h a t one s h o u l d compute t e s t s o f s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r a p o p u l a t i o n c o r r e l a t i o n . 3 S A l t h o u g h t h e y do n o t r e p o r t t e s t s o f s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , H a r f , H o o v l e r and J a m e s , J r . p r o d u c e r e s u l t s w h i c h a r e as u n a c c e p t a b l e as a r e t h o s e o f S i n g e r and S m a l l . To be r e p l i c a t e o f a p r o c e s s *, a u n i t must be i n d e p e n d e n t o f o t h e r i n s t a n c e s o f *. I f a u n i t i s n o t i n d e p e n d e n t , no new i n f o r m a t i o n about * i s o b t a i n e d by s t u d y i n g i t t w i c e , and no a d d i t i o n a l c o n f i r m a t i o n o f (a t h e o r y ) T i s o b t a i n e d by c o u n t i n g i t t w i c e . 3 6 3 5 The c o n t r a r y p o s i t i o n , one which I f e e l i s p r o p e r b u t am c o n v i n c e d i s n o t , c a n be f o u n d i n R o b e r t F. Winch and D o n a l d C a m p b e l l , " P r o o f ? No. E v i d e n c e ? Y e s . The S i g n i f i c a n c e o f T e s t s o f S i g n i f i c a n c e , " The A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i s t , 4 (May 19 6 9 ) , 140-143. 3 6 M o r r i s Z e l d i t c h , J r . , " I n t e l l i g i b l e C o m p a r i s o n s , " i n C o m p a r a t i v e Methods i n S o c i o l o g y , pp. 282-283. T h e r e i s a l s o t h e s t o r y o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t who r e p o r t e d t h a t a r a t ' s s p e e d t h r o u g h a maze i m p r o v e d u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a d r u g which h i s c o l l e a g u e s had r e p o r t e d t o be a r e t a r d a n t . He t h e n r e p l i c a t e d h i s r e s u l t s , r e p o r t i n g an N o f 1000 c a s e s , f a r more t h a n i n a l l t h e p r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h , To h i s now a s t o n i s h e d c o l l e a g u e s , he e x t e n d e d an i n v i t a t i o n t o h i s l a b o r a t o r y s o t h a t t h e y m i ght i n s p e c t t h e raw d a t a . When t h e y a r r i v e d he d i r e c t e d them t o w a r d s two f i l e c a s e s and p o i n t e d o u t t h e s t i l l e x h a u s t e d r a t . 107 N e i t h e r i s t h e p r o b l e m o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n t o b s e r v a t i o n s p e c u l i a r t o t h e s t u d i e s j u s t d i s c u s s e d . As we s h a l l s e e , i t u n d e r m i n e s t h e v a l i d i t y o f many s t a t i s t i c a l s t u d i e s r e l e v a n t t o t h e b a l a n c e o f power t h e o r i e s . Nor i s t h i s a new p r o b l e m : i t i s a s o l d a s t h e method. The f i r s t c r o s s - c u l t u r a l s t a t i s t i c a l p a p e r was p r e s e n t e d i n 1888 t o t h e R o y a l A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l I n s t i t u t e o f G r e a t B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d . E - B . T y l o r r e a d h i s p a p e r r e p o r t i n g " a d h e s i o n s " o f v a r i o u s c u s t o m s i n a sample o f h u n d r e d s o f " g r e a t c i v i l i z a t i o n s a nd s a v a g e h o r d e s " t o t h e m e e t i n g . A f t e r w a r d s , F. G a l t o n s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e " a d h e s i o n s , " o r c o r r e l a t i o n s , might be due t o d i f f u s i o n r a t h e r t h a n t o f u n c t i o n a l o r c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s -( F ) u l l i n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d be g i v e n a s t o t h e d e g r e e i n w h i c h t h e c u s t o m s o f t h e t r i b e s and r a c e s w h i c h a r e compared t o g e t h e r a r e i n d e p e n d e n t . I t m i ght be, t h a t some o f t h e t r i b e s had d e r i v e d them from a common s o u r c e , so t h a t t h e y were d u p l i c a t e c o p i e s o f t h e same o r i g i n a l . 3 7 H e n c e f o r t h known a s " G a l t o n ' s p r o b l e m " , i t has w o r r i e d a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s f o r d e c a d e s . N a r o l l has d e v i s e d numerous s o l u t i o n s and, r e p e a t e d l y , h a s c a r r i e d t h e d i f f i c u l t y from t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l j o u r n a l s o n t o t h e t u r f o f o t h e r s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , b u t i t has y e t t o s e r i o u s l y t r o u b l e 3 7 D i s c u s s i o n o n E. T y l o r , "On a Method o f I n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e Development o f I n s t i t u t i o n s : A p p l i e d t o Laws o f M a r r i a g e and D e s c e n t , " l o y a l M t h r o ^ o l o g i c a l I n s t i t u t e o f G r e a t B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d ! J o u r n a l , 18-19(November 1888), 270. 3 8 The same i s t r u e o f f h e o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s . F o r example, D a v i d H a r v e y i n h i s f i n e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c r i t i g u e o f t h e "new g e o g r a p h y " , w h i c h he p i o n e e r e d , w r i t e s : 1 0 8 s t a t i s t i c a l l y - i n c l i n e d students of p o l i t i c s . 3 8 While t h i s problem cannot be i g n o r e d , i t should not be s o l v e d i n the o r d i n a r y sense of t h a t word. S o l u t i o n s to "Galton's problem", or " s p a t i a l a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n " as i t i s known i n geography, e x i s t 3 9 but they are i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . They would have us e l i m i n a t e the subject.. The problem should be d i s s o l v e d , not s o l v e d - One should e l i m i n a t e the c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s s u i t e d t o w e l l - s t i r r e d messes of time, p l a c e s anu events, which, t h e r e f o r e , t u r n s a l l i a n c e s , war and other r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t a t e s i n t o t e c h n i c a l d i s t r a c t i o n s . L o n g i t u d i n a l o r h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s i s an e s s e n t i a l p r e r e g u i s i t e f o r a v a l i d study of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p r ocesses. T h i s problem a r i s e s at almost every poi n t i n work at the i n t e r f a c e . . I t i s c e r t a i n l y unresolved, and o f t e n i t passes unrecognized. I t has always seemed str a n g e to me, f o r example, t h a t m u l t i v a r i a t e methods of r e g i o n a l i z a t i o n r e l y upon c o r r e l a t i o n measures which, i f they are to be judged s i g n i f i c a n t i n d i c a t o r s , r e q u i r e independence i n the data o b s e r v a t i o n s , when the o b j e c t i v e of the whole procedure i s t o group u n i t s i n t o r e g i o n s which have s i m i l a r (and hence s p a t i a l l y a u t o c o r r e l a t e d ) c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The method and the o b j e c t i v e i n t h i s case seem to be l o g i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t o r , at b e s t , to generate a s e t of r e g i o n s which cannot be judged s i g n i f i c a n t i n any meaningful sense. T h i s i s from p.43 of h i s S o c i a l J u s t i c e and the C i t y * (London: Edward A r n o l d , 1973), a remarkable c o l l e c t i o n of essays. Robert N a r o l l ' s s a l l i e s i n c l u d e "Some Thoughts on Comparative Method i n C u l t u r a l Anthropology" i n Methodology i n S o c i a l Research, ed. H.M. and A.S. B l a l o c k (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp.236-277; "Two S o l u t i o n s to Galton's 109 The Choucri and North a n a l y s i s o f the great powers from 1870 to the s t a r t o f the F i r s t World War i s l o n g i t u d i n a l and, t h e r e f o r e , a v o i d s the assumptions which c r i p p l e d the other s t u d i e s . 4 0 They r e p o r t t h a t changes i n the number of each power's a l l i a n c e commitments had very l i t t l e e f f e c t on a n a t i o n ' s e x t e r n a l v i o l e n c e . In the context of the 1870-1914 s i t u a t i o n (a c l a s s i c a l case of the c o n f l i c t s p i r a l ) alignment commitments per se c o n t r i b u t e d only minimally to the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o r . (109) " T h i s f i n d i n g , " they observe, " r e f e r s t o long term trends and not t o c r i s i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n s where a l l i a n c e commitments may be more i n f l u e n t i a l . " (109,fn.69) During the c o n f l i c t s p i r a l s of the 1870-1914 p e r i o d one would expect t h a t the annual changes i n the numbers of a l l i a n c e s ( A l l i a n c e / T — A l l i a n c e / T - 1 ) , the v a r i a b l e Choucri and North enter i n t o t h e i r e g u a t i o n s , would have been f a r l e s s important than the p a r t i c u l a r commitments and the p a t t e r n formed by these t i e s between s t a t e s . A l l i a n c e groupings d e f i n e d a major a x i s of competition and c o n f l i c t ; f o r c e d the Problem," Philosophy of Science, 28 (1961), 15-39; "Galton's Problem: The L o g i c of Cross C u l t u r a l Research" S o c i a l Research, 32 (Winter 1965), 428-451. 3 9 See Marc Howard Ross and E l i z a b e t h Homer, "Galton's Problem i n C r o s s N a t i o n a l Research," World P o l i t i c s , 29(October 1976), 1^28, f o r e x t e n s i v e r e f e r e n c e s to r e c e n t s t u d i e s ; and A.D. C l i f f and J.K. Ord, S p a t i a l A u t o c o r r e l a t i o n (London: Pion, 1973). 4 0 N.Choucri and R.C.North, "Dynamics of I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t : Some P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s of P o p u l a t i o n , Resources and Technology," Theory and Policy, i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , World P o l i t i c s , Supplement, 24 (Spring 1972), 80-122." 110 i n e v i t a b l e i n c i d e n t s upon i t ; m a g n i f i e d them; and, as a c o n s e q u e n c e , made c r i s e s more f r e g u e n t o c c u r r e n c e s and more d a n g e r o u s o n e s . To be o f g r e a t e r r e l e v a n c e t o t h e b a l a n c e o f power t h e o r i e s , " a l l i a n c e commitment" must become l e s s o f an a t t r i b u t e o f a s t a t e and more o f a r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e s . 4 . 3 ' WAR AND RATES OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH J u s t a s " a l l i a n c e " i i i t h e b a l a n c e o f power t h e o r i e s i m p l i e s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t a t e s , n o t s i m p l y an a t t r i b u t e o f s e p a r a t e s t a t e s , s o a l s o a r e " i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h " and "war" r e l a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s . With a l l i a n c e commitments, a s t a t e c a n add t o i t s r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n and a l l i a n c e s between o t h e r s may d e t r a c t from i t s p o s i t i o n . S i i a i l a . i l y , a s t a t e ' s r e . l a t i v e p o s i t i o n may be e n h a n c e d by i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h and c a y be a l t e r e d by t h e i n d u s t r i a l g rowth o f o t h e r s - I n many s t u d i e s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h and i n t e r s t a t e war o r c o n f l i c t , i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h i s us e d t o d e f i n e r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n s . T h o s e s t u d i e s w i l l be examined i n t h e s e c t i o n f o l l o w i n g t h i s one. Here I w i l l d i s c u s s s t u d i e s r e l e v a n t t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s p r o p o s e d between t h e r a t e s o f e c o n o m i c growth and wars. The modal s t u d y i s a c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s o f a l a r g e number o f s t a t e s w h i c h s e a r c h e s o u t i n t e r s t a t e v i o l e n c e w i t h p r e d i c t o r s s u c h a s t h e r a t e o f c h a n g e i n g r o s s n a t i o n a l 111 p r o d u c t . I m p o r t a n t r e a s o n s f o r r e j e c t i n g t h e r e s u l t s o f t h i s t y p e o f s t u d y have been d i s c u s s e d above. R a t h e r t h a n c a t a l o g u i n g d i v e r s e f i n d i n g s and r e p e a t i n g t h e same ar g u m e n t s a g a i n s t a c c e p t i n g them, I w i l l p o i n t t o o t h e r , r e l a t e d , f a u l t s w h i c h p r e v e r t many s t u d i e s , be t h e y l o n g i t u d i n a l o r c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l , f r o m e v e r m e e t i n g t h e b a l a n c e o f power p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e s e f a u l t s between t a b l e s and t e x t r e s u l t f r o m t h e h a n d l i n g o f t h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e . S t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , v e r y few s t u d i e s a r e r e l e v a n t . War i s a r e l a t i v e l y r a r e o c c u r r e n c e , and i t s i n c i d e n c e i s a d i s c r e t e and, more o f t e n t h a n n o t , b i n a r y v a r i a b l e . As s u c h , t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e i n c i d e n c e o f war i s i l l - s u i t e d t o t h e f a v o u r e d s t a t i s t i c a l p r o c e d u r e s . The d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i n many s t u d i e s , t h e r e f o r e , i s " c o n f l i c t b e h a v i o u r " , a n o t i o n which i n c l u d e s d i p l o m a t i c abuse and m i l i t a r y h o s t i l i t i e s . Assuming t h a t war i s s i m p l y more d i p l o m a t i c a b u s e , t h e p r o b l e m o f a s y m m e t r i c p r o p o s i t i o n s and s y m m e t r i c d a t a r e m a i n s . C o n f l i c t i s made t o be s o m e t h i n g g i v e n o f f i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s . As I n o t e d i n C h a p t e r 2 , Goldmann p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e s y m m e t r i c d a t a u s e d t o t e s t t h e r a n k d i s e q u i l i b r i u m h y p o t h e s i s were i n a p p r o p r i a t e . He i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t t h e s y m m e t r i c war d a t a i n f l a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y . The u s e o f i n a p p r o p r i a t e d a t a may a l s o a t t e n u a t e t h e " t r u e " c o r r e l a t i o n s - A h y p o t h e t i c a l example s u g g e s t s how t h i s m i g h t be s o . F i g u r e IV:1 d e s c r i b e s t h e 112 s c a t t e r o f t h e c o v a r i a t i o n between t h e r a t e o f e c o n o m i c growth and t h e amount o f f o r e i g n c o n f l i c t f o r a sample o f t w e l v e s t a t e s . . No r e l a t i o n s h i p e m erges i f we f o c u s upon a l l t w e l v e . I f t h e n o n - a g g r e s s i v e p a r t i e s a r e i g n o r e d , t h e " t r u e " p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s v i s i b l e . E x c l u d e A, D, L and I , and t i l t t h e r e g r e s s i o n l i n e 45 d e g r e e s * F i g u r e IV:1 O b v i o u s l y when r e s t r i c t e d t o a s l i c e o f t h e non-h y p o t h e t i c a l w o r l d , s u c h a gimmick i s i m p o s s i b l e . We c a n s t i p u l a t e w h i c h i s w h i c h a l l we want. In t h e r e a l w o r l d th e p r o c e s s must be e x a m i n e d , but t h a t i s p r e c i s e l y what c r o s s -s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s i s u n a b l e t o do. D y a d i c a n a l y s i s i s recommended by some t o g e t o u t o f t h e d i f f i c u l t y . F o r example, Eummel, a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e s t u d y j u s t c a r i c a t u r e d , p r o p o s e s t o r e s t o r e i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s by means o f d y ads o f s p a t e s . . 4 1 T h i s i s a p a l l i a t i v e w h i c h , once a c c e p t e d , o n l y s e r v e s t o e x a g g e r a t e t h e i n h e r e n t d i f f i c u l t i e s o f c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . L o n g i t u d i n a l a n a l y s i s i s a r e g u i s i t e f o r v a l i d r e s u l t s r e l e v a n t t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s , but i t i s n o t i n i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t . C h o u c r i and N o r t h , i n t h e i r l o n g i t u d i n a l s t u d i e s o f t h e g r e a t powers d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 1879 t o 1914, f i n d s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between v a r i o u s 4 1 E. Eummel, "The R e l a t i o n s h i p Between N a t i o n a l A t t r i b u t e s and F o r e i g n C o n f l i c t B e h a v i o r , " i n Q u a n t i t a t i v e I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , p.2 1 4 . HIGH fe z o o o l-l o fe 112 a H J B L E LOW HIGH HIGH INDUSTRY H u M t—I o fe LOW . HIGH INDUSTRY F i g u r e IV: 1 S c a t t e r p l o t Of R e l a t i o n s h i p Between I n d u s t r i a l Development And Fo r e i g n C o n f l i c t : H y p o t h e t i c a l Data Cn Twelve Sta t e s 113 r a t e s o f i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h and t h e l e v e l s o f e x t e r n a l v i o l e n c e . However, i n a p e r i o d f r e e from war between the E u r o p e a n g r e a t powers, t h e y d e f i n e l e v e l s o f v i o l e n c e by t h e a n n u a l c o n f l i c t p e a k s . Which g r e a t power any g r e a t power was f i g h t i n g w i t h was u n i m p o r t a n t i n t h e i r s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s e s . * 2 T h i s d e t r a c t s from i t - W h i l e t h e argument c o u l d be made t h a t c o n f l i c t between t h e g r e a t powers was s y m m e t r i c a l , t h e g u e s t i o n r e m a i n s : symmetry between whom? A f t e r f o r t y y e a r s a n d s u b s e g u e n t s t a t i s t i c a l s t u d i e s , A.L. M a c f i e ' s modest "The O u t b r e a k o f War and t h e T r a d e C y c l e " has y e t t o be s u p e r s e d e d . I n 1938, M a c f i e e xamined t h e 12 l a r g e wars f o u g h t by t h e g r e a t powers from 1815 t o 1914. He f o u n d t h a t " t h e o u t b r e a k s o f war a v o i d y e a r s o f c r i s i s o r b u s i n e s s p a n i c . " " B u s i n e s s p a n i c s a r e u n p l e a s a n t ; b u t a t l e a s t t h e y seem t o a b s o r b a l l o f a n a t i o n ' s s u r p l u s e n e r g y . " " S p a r k s f l y " n o t on t h e s l i d e o r i n t h e t r o u g h , b u t on t h e r i s e o f t h e e c o n o m i c c y c l e . To change t h e m etaphor, i t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e u n n a t u r a l h e a t s o f an e x c e s s i v e e x p a n s i o n a r e r e q u i r e d t o g e r m i n a t e t h e s e e d s o f w a r — n o m a t t e r when t h e y a r e sown. I f we can d i m i n i s h t h e e x c e s s o f h e a t , we s h a l l t h e n d i m i n i s h t h e r i s k o f t h e o u t b r e a k . I f t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e a c c e p t e d , we may w e l l p r a y t h a t s t a t e s m e n may be g r a n t e d an a c c e s s o f wisdom between now and 1940. 42 see t h e s t u d y l i s t e d above and "The D e t e r m i n a n t s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l V i o l e n c e , " P e a c e R e s e a r c h S o c i e t y ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) P a p e r s , XII "(1969) , 33-63; and N a t i o n s in C o n f l i c t : N a t i o n a l Growth and I n t e r n a t i o n a l V i o l e n c e (San F r a n c i s c o : W.H. FreemanT 1 9 7 5 ) , pp.25, 234-243- In t h e l a s t m e n t i o n e d , t h e y s t a t e " t a r g e t n a t i o n s i n c l u d e n o t o n l y t h e s i x m a j o r powers i n t h e s t u d y , b u t a l l s t a t e s , " 11 a And the unlucky t h i r t e e n t h case appears to have conformed to the p a t t e r n of the other t w e l v e . 4 3 However, i t d i d d i f f e r i n one r e s p e c t . Macfie examined f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the years 1 8 5 1 - 1 8 7 2 and 1 8 9 3 - 1 9 1 4 and as he s t a t e s "the reason i s s i g n i f i c a n t . " The years 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 5 3 and 1872 -1898 were r e l a t i v e l y p e a c e f u l and "such unwonted pe a c e f u l n e s s s t i m u l a t e s our a t t e n t i o n . " Comparing the p e r i o d s o f peace and war he r e p o r t s t h a t they p a r a l l e l the r i s e and f a l l of the wholesale p r i c e s e r i e s . 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 4 9 P r i c e s f a l l i n g 1 8 4 9 - 1 8 7 4 P r i c e s r i s i n g 1874- 1896 P r i c e s f a l l i n g 1 8 9 6 - 1 9 1 4 P r i c e s r i s i n g He concluded t h a t wars break out i n the p r o s p e r i t y phase of tne b u s i n e s s c y c l e "but only i n those which occur i n prosperous long p e r i o d s . " 4 4 I f so, the t h i r t e e n t h s p o i l s the p a t t e r n . K o n d r a t i e f f ( a f t e r whom long waves i n p r i c e s , i n t e r e s t , trade, a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l production have been named), a l s o contended t h a t "as a r u l e , the most 4 3 A.L. Macfie, "The Outbreak of War and the Trade C y c l e , " Economic H i s t o r y (A Supplement to the Economic J o u r n a l ) , No. 13 (February 1 9 3 8 ) , 9 3 , 9 6 . Since a b r i e f mention i n Wright's A Study Of War, which was completed d u r i n g World War I I , t h e r e have not been any r e f e r e n c e s t o t h i s a r t i c l e i n the a p p r o p r i a t e l i t e r a t u r e (save f o r B l a i n e y ' s The Causes of War. I t i s to B l a i n e y t h a t I owe the i n t r o d u c t i o n . ) 4 4 Macfie, "The Outbreak of War and the Trade C y c l e , " 9 7 . 115 d i s a s t r o u s and e x t e n s i v e wars ... o c c u r " 4 S on the long upswing. I l e a v e the t h e o r e t i c a l , s t a t i s t i c a l and p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i o n s to h i s a n a l y s i s to Chapter V. A l l t h a t i s r e l e v a n t here i s t h a t K o n d r a t i e f f was more anecd o t a l than s y s t e m a t i c i n t h i s part of h i s a n a l y s i s and that h i s c r i t i c s found to the c o n t r a r y . Oparin, s t u d y i n g the l i s t o f wars... which, ac c o r d i n g to K o n d r a t i e f f , occur most f r e q u e n t l y d u r i n g the upswings... found i n s t e a d a c l u s t e r i n g around the t u r n i n g p o i n t s . A f t e r e l i m i n a t i o n of the events of the 5-7 years i n the neighbourhood of the t u r n i n g p o i n t , important as w e l l as t r i v i a l events c i t e d by K o n d r a t i e f f were found to be e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d over the d i f f e r e n t phases of the long waves. 4 6 More r e c e n t and more syste m a t i c s t u d i e s of p e r i o d i c i t y i n war do not suggest a 50-60 year c y c l e . Singer and Small re c o r d a 20 year p e r i o d i c i t y i n the amount of war underway i n the c e n t r a l s t a t e group from 1815 to 1965. 4 7 Denton and P h i l l i p s , i n an a n a l y s i s of Wright's data which cover a longer span, a l s o found a 20-25 year p e r i o d i c i t y and h i n t at 4 5 K o n d r a t i e f f , "The Long Waves i n Economic L i f e , " 536. 4 6 Garvy, " K o n d r a t i e f f • s Theory of Long C y c l e s , " 212. 4 7 " P a t t e r n s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Warfare, 1816-1965," The Annals 149-150; and The Wages of War, pp.203-215. 4 8 Frank Denton and Warren P h i l l i p s , "Some Patterns i n the H i s t o r y of V i o l e n c e , " J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , v o l . 12, no. 2 (June 1968) ?82-195. See George Modelsici, "The Long C y l c e of G l o b a l P o l i t i c s and the N a t i o n - S t a t e , " Comparative Studi e s i n S o c i e t y and H i s t o r y , f o r an a n a l y s i s of the p o l i t i c a l dynamics of such a movement and A l b e r t Rose, "Wars, Innovation and Long C y c l e s : A B r i e f Comment," American Economic Re.view, 31 (1941), 105-107. f o r an a n a l y s i s of the p o l i t i c a l economy of t h e same movement. 116 a 80-120 year movement. 4 8 The b a s i c index which Macfie used t o r e f l e c t economic c o n d i t i o n s was the unemployment f i g u r e s f o r B r i t a i n . Here c a u t i o n i s i n or d e r . Macfie h i m s e l f i s c a u t i o u s ; but, aside from prose surveys of business c o n d i t i o n s i n each s t a t e , which he p r o v i d e s and which support h i s c o n c l u s i o n s , other s y s t e m a t i c data were not a v a i l a b l e to him. Be t t e r i n d i c e s and more e x t e n s i v e data are now a v a i l a b l e , thanks to the l a b o u r s of other economic h i s t o r i a n s . Haas had the advantages of f u l l e r i n f o r m a t i o n i n h i s study of s o c i a l s t r e s s e s and s t r a i n s l e a d i n g to war. Moreover, he c a r e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d between p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war and a g g r e s s i v e n e s s . During the p e r i o d 1900-1960, he r e p o r t s , " c o u n t r i e s with high unemployment are i n v o l v e d i n f r e q u e n t l y i n war" and "unemployment i s c o r r e l a t e d with nonaggressive war p a r t i c i p a t i o n " . Although they are i n sympathy with those of Macfie's study, these r e s u l t s are based upon a c r o s s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s o f ten s t a t e s , and, t h e r e f o r e , are s u s p e c t . 4 9 In a l o n g i t u d i n a l a n a l y s i s Haas d i s c e r n s " f o r most c o u n t r i e s " (of the o r i g i n a l 10) the p a t t e r n : upswings i n i n d u s t r i a l growth f o l l o w e d by upswings i n m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s and f a l l s i n the unemployment 4 9 Michael Haas, " S o c i a l Change and N a t i o n a l Aggressiveness, 1900-1960" i n Q u a n t i t a t i v e I n t e r n a i o n a l P o l i t i c s , pp.215-246. A more complete d i s c u s s i o n i s found i n h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , Some S o c i e t a l C o r r e l a t e s of I n t e r n a t i n a l P o l i t i c a l Behavior, Stanford U n i v e r s i t y , 196 4. so Haas's most r e c e n t study i s c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l and the 117 r a t e s . s 0 4.4 RELATIVE POWER POSITION AND WAR The s t u d i e s r e l e v a n t to the r e l a t i v e power position/war r e l a t i o n s h i p a re grouped a c c o r d i n g t o the method of d e f i n i n g and measuring the independent v a r i a b l e , r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n . There are f o u r types of i n d i c e s i n the l i t e r a t u r e : (1) the a b s o l u t e d i f f e r e n c e s i n c a p a b i l i t i e s between p a i r s of s t a t e s and/or a l l i a n c e s , or t h e i r r a t i o s ; (2) the rank order of c a p a b i l i t i e s ; (3) the percentage share of the t o t a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f a group of s t a t e s ; and (4) the percentage d e v i a t i o n from the mean share of the group. Each of these has s i g n i f i c a n t l i m i t a t i o n s , the common denominator of which i s the i n a b i l i t y to e x p l o i t f u l l y the e x i s t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n on the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s . I n a d d i t i o n , many of the s t u d i e s reviewed s u f f e r from the methodological p i t f a l l s d e s c r i b e d above and, as we have seen, t h e i r common denominator i s an i n a b i l i t y t o analyse i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . 4.4.1 P a i r w i s e D i f f e r e n c e s or R a t i o s The balance of power t h e o r i e s and Hummel*s " s o c i a l f i e l d t h e o r y , " 5 1 dressed as they are i n d i f f e r e n t languages, r e s u l t s are mixed. See h i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t (New York: B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1974), pp.186-196. 5 1 R..J. Rummel, "A F i e l d Theory of S o c i a l A c t i o n , " i n General Systems Yearbook, X (1965), pp.183-211. 118 appear to be odd companions; but they share the basic argument that the d i s p a r i t i e s i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s between states determine the extent of c o n f l i c t between states. Various empirical investigations of s o c i a l f i e l d t h e o r y 5 2 suggest there i s l i t t l e to the r e l a t i o n s h i p . Insofar as s o c i a l f i e l d theory " i s based on s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and r e l a t i v e positions" and i t s underlying premise " i s that behavior i s the conseguence of the t o t a l s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n , 1 1 5 3 the v a l i d i t y of the findings should be impervious to the c r i t i c a l comments l e v e l l e d at each of the preceding studies. Such i s not the case. When they are s i m i l a r l y pressed, substantive and methodological holes appear, and the cumulative e f f e c t of these c r i t i c i s m s l e t s us place l i t t l e confidence in the theory and i t s empirical conseguences. The guestion of the adequacy of the event data sources of the Dimensions of Nations project, of which s o c i a l f i e l d theory constitutes the t h e o r e t i c a l core, has stimulated numerous c r i t i c a l evaluations and r e l i a b i l i t y studies which are summarized elsewhere 5* and need not concern us here. 5 2 R.J. Rummel, "U.S. Foreign Relations: C o n f l i c t , Cooperation and Attribute Distances," in Peace, War and Numbers, pp.71-114; and "A Social F i e l d Theory o f Foreign C o n f l i c t Behavior," Peace Research Society ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l ) Papers, IV (1966),~131-150.~ 5 3 "A F i e l d Theory of Social Action," 183. 5 4 For example, J.M. Scolnick J r . , "An Appraisal of Studies of the Linkage Between Domestic and International C o n f l i c t , " Comparative P o l i t i c a l Studies, 6 (1974), 485-510. 119 Factor analysis, the p r i n c i p a l research technigue, has drawn less voluminous but more t e l l i n g comment: when using i t , t h e o r e t i c a l decisions often and e a s i l y pass themselves off as merely technical ones, with disastrous r e s u l t s . Although t h i s i s not the place to enter into an extended discussion of the technigue, some discussion i s unavoidable because the factor analysis model i s the basis f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l model of s o c i a l f i e l d theory. The factor analysis model i s taken "as an actual model with a mathematical structure that describes... r e a l i t y . " 5 5 If i n f a c t i t does, one wonders why " r e a l i t y " must be mangled by a variety of transformations i n order to f i t the model. Many variables are beaten i n t o normality with "x", "x^" and "sine-1 1 1 "/x" transforms and they lose t h e i r substantive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n the process. Theories, not data, should be beaten. The l a t t e r are to be lured and gently coaxed. The unit of analysis i n s o c i a l f i e l d theory i s the dyad, or pair of states, and the goal i s to account for the type and extent of in t e r a c t i o n which couples them i n terms of the i r "distance" from each other on various a t t r i b u t e dimensions, of which "power" i s one. To reduce the mathematical complexities, each dyad often i s assumed to be symmetric. That i s : state A's actions toward state B are assumed to be of the same magnitude and quality as B's toward A. The absolute distances on cap a b i l i t y dimensions, 5 5 "A F i e l d Theory of S o c i a l Action," 1 8 4 . 120 or the power d i s p a r i t i e s , are then c o r r e l a t e d with the sum of the i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n a dyad across a l l dyads. T h e r e f o r e , f o l l o w i n g the arguments made above, i t would appear that a f a n c i f u l p i c t u r e of the i n t e r s t a t e system l i e s beneath the massive columns of " r " , "beta" and " R 2 " which c h a r a c t e r i z e assessments of s o c i a l f i e l d theory. O n l i k e i n c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s e s of s t a t e s , i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s , very p e c u l i a r ones are found. In thousands of dyads s c a t t e r e d about i n N(N-1)/2 s p a t i a l dimension, each partner i s mutually and e x c l u s i v e l y i n v o l v e d with the other.. Both behave as one and are disconnected from a l l o t h e r s , even though each r e t a i n s the a b i l i t y t o be i n N-1 d i s t i n c t independent p l a c e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I f the s t a t e dyads are c o n s i d e r e d asymmetric-- (A->B) a u n i t independent of (B>A)—the p i c t u r e of the i n t e r s t a t e system becomes ever more f a n c i f u l . 5 6 Two rec e n t papers on the post-World War I I p e r i o d , one by Garnham and one by Weede, appear t o add weight to the peace through preponderance p r o p o s i t i o n . 5 7 However, both papers r e p o r t a n a l y s i s of dyads, and d i s p l a y the p e r s n i c k e t y t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s a t the expense of substance. Both 5 6 T h i s , an a n a l y s i s o f " d i r e c t e d dyads", i s the recommended procedure a c c o r d i n g to Kegly and Skinner. See my comments above, pp.9 4-96. 5 7 David Garnham, "Power P a r i t y and L e t h a l I n t e r n a t i o n a l V i o l e n c e , 1969-1973," J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 20 (September 1976), 379-394; and E r i c Weede, "Overwhelming Preponderance as a P a c i f y i n g C o n d i t i o n Among Contiguous A s i a n Dyads, 1950-1969," J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 20 (September 1976) , 395-411,. 121 " c o n t r o l l e d " f o r geographic p o s i t i o n by choosing contiguous p a i r s o f s t a t e s f o r c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . Garnham c o n s t r u c t e d h i s pool o f cases by s e l e c t i n g a l l contiguous s t a t e s which had engaged i n " l e t h a l c o n f l i c t " and then adding a l l s t a t e s contiguous to each of them. " L e t h a l c o n f l i c t " i s d e f i n e d as h o s t i l i t i e s which r e s u l t i n at l e a s t one f a t a l i t y . The advantage of a low t h r e s h o l d i s that i t produces a l a r g e r number of case s f o r a n a l y s i s . T h i s i s important because l e t h a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s are r a t h e r i n f r e g u e n t ; i n f a c t , i n some r e g i o n s o f the world t h e r e have been no occur r e n c e s i n re c e n t y e a r s . 5 8 Garnham f i n d s s i x t e e n l e t h a l c o n f l i c t s and the common form of l e t h a l c o n f l i c t , g r e a t power i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e i r s o c i a l and g e o g r a p h i c a l p e r i p h e r i e s , i s e v a l u a t e d . Surely to i n c l u d e the North Vietnam/South Vietnam, and the China/North Vietnam dyads and to leave out the OSA/South Vietnam, OSA/North Vietnam and the DSA/China dyads i s t o miss some th i n g s of importance i n the 1969-1973 period a n a l y z e d . The same i s t r u e o f Weede's study which i s c o n f i n e d to Asian dyads duri n g 1950-1969. Geographic p r o x i m i t y i s important, but s t a t e s a l t e r p o l i t i c a l geography with t e c h n o l o g i c a l changes, a l l i a n c e s and warfare. Maps, r a t h e r than a map, are necessary. Consider two more r e c e n t s t u d i e s which are o p p o s i t e s i n terms of r e s e a r c h design but are s i m i l a r i n t h a t they take geography r a t h e r than p o l i t i c a l geography i n t o account. The 5 8 Garnham, "Power P a r i t y , " 382. 122 f i r s t , another by Garnham, i s an a n a l y s i s of hundreds of dyads. The second, by Sva l a s t o g a , i s an a n a l y s i s of a s i n g l e dyad over one hundered years. Garnham, i n h i s study of geographic p r o x i m i t y , power p a r i t y and i n t e r s t a t e war during 1815-1965, c a l c u l a t e d the p h y s i c a l d i s t a n c e s between p a i r s of n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l s with a computer program designed to t a r g e t m i s s i l e s from p o i n t to point on the s u r f a c e of the g l o b e . 5 9 In e f f e c t , the p o l i t i c a l geography of the m i s s i l e age i s imposed upon the ages of horsepower, s a i l , and steam. Whether a m i s s i l e t r a v e l s over water, mountains or d e s e r t i s i m m a t e r i a l . That the d i s t a n c e through the sky between London and P a r i s i s l e s s than the d i s t a n c e between P a r i s and B e r l i n matters i n m i s s i l e technology, but matters not at a l l given the m i l i t a r y technology o f most of the p e r i o d under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Garnham expresses a d e s i r e f o r more accurate maps so as t o improve h i s measure o f g e o g r a p h i c a l proximity between p a i r s o f s t a t e s , but we need only crude maps and crude knowledge of the h i s t o r i c a l c ontext i n order to pick out the s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s . Furthermore, t o a n a l y z e the d i s t a n c e s between p a i r s of s t a t e s and to assume f o r purposes of s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s that the dyads are u n r e l a t e d to each other, as Garnham does, destroys the s p a t i a l arrangement which prompts the argument about g e o g r a p h i c a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s 5 9 David Garnham, "Dyadic I n t e r n a t i o n a l War, 1816-1965: The Role o f Power P a r i t y and Geographical P r o x i m i t y , " The Eastern P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 29 (1976), 231-242. 123 f o r war: my neighbour i s my enemy but my neighbour's neighbour i s my f r i e n d . L a s t l y , t o r e s t r i c t the a n a l y s i s to dyadic war, t h a t i s to duels o n l y , e l i m i n a t e s approximately H0% of the i n t e r s t a t e wars, i n c l u d i n g the more bloody of the great power wars. Two of the twenty wars Garnham e x c l u d e d — t h e Franco-P r u s s i a n and World War I — a r e the s u b j e c t of Svalastoga's study of d i f f e r e n t i a l r a t e s of change i n power c a p a b i l i t i e s and war between France and Germany during 1820- 1920- 6 0 Among the reasons these two great powers were chosen i s the f a c t t h a t they are contiguous, but by f o c u s s i n g a l l h i s a t t e n t i o n on the p a i r o f great powers, Svalastoga l o s e s the g e o p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t and thereby misrepresents some of the q u a n t i t a t i v e evidence which he p r e s e n t s and renders h i s argume . i i t , i n i t i a l l y weak, weaker s t i l l . When d i s c u s s i n g the changes i n m i l i t a r y expenditures f o r the 1860-1910 p e r i o d (the only p e r i o d f o r which the s t a t i s t i c s were a v a i l a b l e to him), Svalastoga s t a t e s : A l l r a t e s computed were p o s i t i v e suggesting a steady b u i l d - u p o f t e n s i o n between the two n a t i o n s . T h i s b u i l d - u p proceeded at a high speed i n 1860-1880 i n both n a t i o n s . The r a t e f o r France i n 1880-1900 was much lower...whereas the German r a t e came c l o s e t o 00.0. In c o n t r a s t Germany showed a much f a s t e r b uild-up i n 1900-1910, when the French r a t e approached z e r o . Thus throughout the p e r i o d the r i s k of war was on the i n c r e a s e . 6 1 6 ° Kaare Svalastoga, " D i f f e r e n t i a l Rates of Change and V i o l e n c e : France and Germany, 1820-1920," Acta S o c i o l o q i c a , 21 (1978), 23-33. <** S v a l a s t o g a , &q