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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Consciousness and the evolution of conceptual frameworks Thurston, Bonnie Colleen 1981

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CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS  by  BONNIE COLLEEN THURSTON B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department o f P h i l o s o p h y )  We a c c e p t t h i s  t h e s i s as conforming  to the r e q u i r e d  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1981  Bonnie C o l l e e n  T h u r s t o n , 1981  In  presenting  requirements of  British  it  freely  agree for  this  thesis  f o r an a d v a n c e d  Columbia, available  that  I agree  f u l f i l m e n t of the  degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y that  f o r reference  permission  scholarly  in partial  the Library  shall  and study.  I  f o r extensive  copying  p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d  for  that  financial  copying o r p u b l i c a t i o n  gain  shall  Department o f  D F - f i O>/7<n  Columbia  thesis  by t h e h e a d o f my  of this  It is thesis  n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my  permission.  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , Canada V6T 1W5  further  of this  d e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s o r h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . understood  make  written  ii ABSTRACT  I t i s argued t h a t any  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theory which takes as i t s  s t a r t i n g p o i n t the assumption of a d u a l i t y between a s u b j e c t and form of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y i s doomed to f a i l u r e .  An  some  attempt i s made to  show t h a t i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s k i n d of p o i n t which must be seen as underlying Wilfrid  S e l l a r s ' powerful  argument a g a i n s t the g i v e n .  But w h i l e h i s  argument a g a i n s t the g i v e n i n v o l v e s a r e j e c t i o n of the p r o b l e m a t i c at the lowest  level—specifically,  s e n s a t i o n s — S e l l a r s ' own  of the d u a l i t y between a s u b j e c t and i t s  l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness i n v o l v e s  r e i n t r o d u c t i o n of the same type of d u a l i t y at a h i g h e r a s u b j e c t and  i t s l i n g u i s t i c utterances.  awareness o|_ (something); stood, no  duality  but h i s own  the  l e v e l — n o w between  For S e l l a r s , a l l awareness i s  negative  argument, p r o p e r l y under-  amounts to a d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t t h e r e can be,  i n some s t r o n g  sense,  such t h i n g as awareness o f . An attempt i s made to remove the impression  purports  to show t h a t t h e r e i s no  wrong by showing how  t h a t any  argument which  such t h i n g as awareness of_ has  got to  i t might be p o s s i b l e to account f o r the a p p a r e n t l y  be dual  s t a t e , the s t a t e o f awareness of_, i n terms of a non-dual s t a t e , the s t a t e of awareness. whereas f o r S e l l a r s , the e x i s t e n c e of language, as an developed, S-R he has  evolutionarily  a c q u i r e d phenomenon, p r e s e n t s no p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems,  and  i t p l a y i n g a c e n t r a l r o l e i n h i s attempt to account f o r the p h i l o s o -  p h i c a l l y p e r p l e x i n g phenomenon of awareness, an i n t e r e s t i n g l y opposed e q u a l l y u n t e n a b l e p o s i t i o n takes  and  the e x i s t e n c e of awareness, even of complex  k i n d s of awareness, as p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y u n p r o b l e m a t i c and  presupposes i t i n  iii an attempt t o account f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f language. i s known as meaning-nominalism shares  The l a t t e r  position  and i s developed by Jonathan Bennett.  w i t h t h e S e l l a r s p o s i t i o n t h e assumption t h a t awareness  It  i s dualistic.  By a v o i d i n g t h a t d u a l i s m , t h e p r e s e n t account i s a b l e t o acknowledge, and address i t s e l f t o , p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h both and language.  A s i m p l e form o f awareness  awareness  i s h e l d t o be presupposed by  language a c q u i s i t i o n but language i s h e l d t o be presupposed by t h e complex k i n d s o f awareness  taken as b a s i c by nominalism.  The suggested account o f awareness c o n t r a r y to arguments  i s a l s o h e l d t o show t h a t ,  by S e l l a r s and P a u l Churchland, f a c t s about  sensations  must p l a y a c e n t r a l and i n d i s p e n s a b l e r o l e i n t h e meaning o f common observation predicates.  iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract Acknowledgement Introduction 1.  The Programme (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 2. M a t e r i a l i s m , t h e P - t h e o r y and t h e C o n s c i o u s n e s s Theory (i) (ii) Notes Chapter I The R e l a t i o n s h i p between Language and Awareness: Two Opposing Views 1. S e l l a r s ' L i n g u i s t i c Account of Awareness R e j e c t e d (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 2. A g a i n s t Meaning-Nominalism (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Notes Chapter I I Givenness and Sense-Data: L o g i c a l l y and Phenomenologically Attacked 1. Introduction 2. S e l l a r s ' L o g i c a l Argument A g a i n s t the G i v e n (i) (ii) (iii)  1 4 4 5  6 9 14  15 17 22 25 27 29 31 34 40 42  45 47 48 51  V  Page 3.  F i r t h ' s Phenomenological Sense-Data  A t t a c k on  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) Notes Chapter The 1. 2.  III P-theory Account of Awareness Introduction The ' L i g h t i n g - U p ' C o n c e p t i o n of Awareness (i) (ii) 3. The 'Causal' Conception o f Awareness 4. The Problem w i t h Awareness of_ 5. The S e l l a r s View Recast 6. The Source o f the Problem? Notes  53 54 55 57 59 63 65  67  69 71 74 76 80 88 89  Chapter IV A Non-dual Account of Awareness o f : E x p l o r i n g the P o s s i b i l i t y 1. The S u b j e c t i v e / O b j e c t i v e Dualism  2.  (i) (ii) The O u t l i n e s o f a Theory  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) Notes Chapter V Some I m p l i c a t i o n s of the Consciousness Theory 1. The N o t i o n s of P o i n t s o f View and Conceptual Frameworks 2. The R e l a t i o n s h i p between L o o k s - T a l k and Is-Talk 3. An Account of the Phenomenological Appeal Notes  90 92 99 102 109 112 114 117 122 126  127 133 134 141  vx Page Chapter VI A Consciousness Theory A l t e r n a t i v e to Meaning-Nominalism 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 2. The Account (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Notes Chapter V I I Some Semantic I m p l i c a t i o n s of the Consciousness Theory 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n (i) (ii) 2. O r d i n a r y Language and S e n s a t i o n s : An Argument by P a u l Churchland (i) (ii) 3. O r d i n a r y Language and S e n s a t i o n s : An Argument by W i l f r i d S e l l a r s (i) (ii) 4. S e n s a t i o n s and ' I n t r i n s i c Meaning' 5. F a c t s about S e n s a t i o n s : The Only A c c e s s i b l e Content i n T a l k about O b j e c t i v e Parameters Notes Bibliography  142 144 145 151 152 156  157 159  161 165  167 174 -i_81  289 190  vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  I would  l i k e t o thank my S u p e r v i s o r , S.C. C o v a l , f o r seven y e a r s  o f p h i l o s o p h y d i s c u s s i o n s and f o r h i s apparent c o n f i d e n c e i n my a b i l i t y which,  i n combination, gave me t h e m o t i v a t i o n and t h e encouragement t o go on.  I would a l s o l i k e t o thank G.A. Wedeking f o r a l o n g h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y d i s c u s s i o n s which were a c o n t i n u a l s o u r c e o f i n s p i r a t i o n .  His detailed  comments on t h e o r i g i n a l d r a f t o f t h e t h e s i s were p a r t i c u l a r l y T.E. P a t t o n read t h e t h e s i s i n i t s o r i g i n a l and r e v i s e d d r a f t  helpful. forms and made  e x t e n s i v e and v a l u a b l e comments. The s e c t i o n s o f Chapter V I I which d i s c u s s P a u l Churchland's book, S c i e n t i f i c R e a l i s m and t h e P l a s t i c i t y o f Mind,  ( s p e c i f i c a l l y , Chapter V I I ,  p a r t s 2, 4 and 5 ) , were w r i t t e n j o i n t l y by P r o f e s s o r C o v a l and m y s e l f .  The  paper from which they a r e taken, " S e n s a t i o n , Theory and Meaning", was p r e s e n t e d by P r o f e s s o r C o v a l and myself t o t h e Western  Canadian P h i l o s o p h y  A s s o c i a t i o n Meetings i n Regina i n October, 1980. G.A. Wedeking read and commented on t h e o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n o f t h a t paper. was  t h e commentator a t t h e meetings  and M. F e l d  J . Macintosh  i n Regina.  Chapter I P a r t 2 and Chapter VI a r e taken l a r g e l y from a paper, " A g a i n s t Meaning-Nominalism",  which appears i n Mind  ( A p r i l , 1981).  The paper  grew out o f d i s c u s s i o n s between S.C. C o v a l and myself and was commented on extensively i n draft  form by T.E. P a t t o n and H. Jackson.  Chapter I P a r t 1 i s taken l a r g e l y from a paper, "On S e l l a r s ' L i n g u i s t i c Account o f Awareness", p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Canadian P h i l o s o p h y A s s o c i a t i o n Meetings in. H a l i f a x i n May, 1981. B. Hunter commented on t h e paper i n H a l i f a x .  viii I would l i k e t o thank Bruce T h u r s t o n , Jan Johnson and Jan P l e c a s h for contributing their Finally,  time and t y p i n g  expertise.  I would l i k e to express my a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r f i n a n c i a l  support p r o v i d e d by the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia i n the y e a r s 1977-78, 1978-79 and 1980-81 and by the Canada C o u n c i l i n the y e a r 1979-80.  1 INTRODUCTION  1. The  i)  Jean P i a g e t has  Programme  written:  . . . t h e r e seems to be a common p o s t u l a t e of accepted e p i s t e m o l o g i e s , v i z . the assumption t h a t t h e r e e x i s t s at a l l l e v e l s a s u b j e c t aware of i t s powers i n v a r i o u s degrees (even i f these are reduced to the mere p e r c e p t i o n o f o b j e c t s ) ; t h a t t h e r e are o b j e c t s e x i s t i n g as such f o r the s u b j e c t (even i f they are reduced to 'phenomena'); and above a l l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ( p e r c e p t i o n s or concepts) which mediate between the s u b j e c t and o b j e c t s and v i c e v e r s a . Now the f i r s t r e s u l t s of p s y c h o g e n e t i c a n a l y s i s seem to c o n t r a d i c t these assumptions. On the one hand, knowledge a r i s e s n e i t h e r from a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s s u b j e c t , nor from o b j e c t s a l r e a d y c o n s t i t u t e d (from the p o i n t of view of the s u b j e c t ) which would impress themselves on him; i t a r i s e s from i n t e r a c t i o n s t h a t take p l a c e mid-way between the two and thus i n v o l v e b o t h at the same time, but by r e a s o n o f t h e i r complete u n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n r a t h e r than of an i n t e r p l a y between d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of t h i n g s . Wilfrid  S e l l a r s has  o f f e r e d an argument a g a i n s t  l o g i c a l g i v e n which, i f I am would show t h a t P i a g e t ' s  to a n a l y z e  epistemo-  t h a t argument,  e m p i r i c a l r e j e c t i o n of a g e n e t i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e  subjective/objective s p l i t a l o g i c a l nature.  r i g h t about how  the n o t i o n of an  i s c o n c l u s i v e l y supported by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  S e l l a r s ' argument, I b e l i e v e , j u s t assumes, and  of  assumes  e s s e n t i a l l y , t h a t the n o t i o n of givenness i s fundamentally d u a l i s t i c .  I  s h a l l make much, i n the d i s c u s s i o n s which f o l l o w , of a d i s t i n c t i o n between a s t a t e of awareness and t h a t S e l l a r s would accept  a s t a t e of awareness of_ (something). such a d i s t i n c t i o n as b e i n g  I believe  r e l e v a n t to h i s  . 2  argument against the given, i f only to the extent that i t reveals an appreciation of the problem which he perceives.  S e l l a r s would acknowledge,  I believe, that the problem connected with epistemological givenness just i s a problem about the nature of states of awareness of_. however—on the basis of the fact that he d i d n ' t  I suspect,  attempt to do what I  s h a l l attempt but t r i e d rather to get states of awareness of_ out of the a c q u i s i t i o n of language—that S e l l a r s might be inclined to believe that the notion of pure states of awareness has insuperable problems own.  But S e l l a r s ,  effect.  of  its  so far as I know, has given us no arguments to that  The target of his attack in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of  Mind", for example, presuppose, accordingly,  i s exclusively,  I'm claiming, empiricisms which  in some essential way, states of awareness of_.  Arguing,  that "Hume i s in the same boat as Berkeley and Locke",  S e l l a r s claims that Hume shares with Berkeley and Locke "the presupposition that we have an unacquired a b i l i t y to be aware of determinate repeatables". This fact about Hume's p o s i t i o n , ( i f  indeed i t i s a fact—I  regret that I am not in a position to assess S e l l a r s ' analyses of the e m p i r i c i s t s ; but my interest at t h i s point i s , at any rate, only to analyze S e l l a r s ' own  position and for that I need only know what he  thinks they held and not what they .actually, did''hold), makes i t , that of Berkeley and Locke, vulnerable to S e l l a r s ' argument outlined in the second part of Chapter II)  like  (to be  against the given.  But  S e l l a r s suggests a possible "small twist of Hume's p o s i t i o n " by means of which we can get,  he claims, "a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t view".  us to make the supposition that "instead of characterizing elements of experience as impressions of_ e.g.  red, Hume had  He asks  the i n i t i a l characterized  them as r e d p a r t i c u l a r s . "  He adds, p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , t h a t he "would  the l a s t t o deny t h a t not o n l y Hume, but perhaps B e r k e l e y and as w e l l , o f t e n t r e a t red p a r t i c u l a r s " . account  Locke  i m p r e s s i o n s or i d e a s of r e d as though they were  Hume's view, so  ' t w i s t e d ' and  d e t e r m i n a t e s as w e l l as d e t e r m i n a b l e s " ,  "expanded to take  a s s o c i a t i o n of words (e.g. 'red') w i t h c l a s s e s of r e s e m b l i n g  s t r u c t u r e to j u s t  In the f i r s t  f e r e d l i n g u i s t i c account  of the n a t u r e of awareness  I , I s h a l l c o n s i d e r and r e j e c t  of awareness.  ( S e l l a r s ' attempted  h e a v i l y r e l i a n t on the r e s o u r c e s of Stimulus-Response say, perhaps, it is,  on Stimulus-Response  is  I should  programme  i n d e p e n d e n t l y of i t s r e l i a n c e  Theory.)  i s the major u n d e r l y i n g c o n t e n t i o n of the e n t i r e p r e s e n t  endeavor t h a t S e l l a r s f a i l e d  to b e n e f i t from h i s own  to a p p r e c i a t e t h a t the source  i n the n o t i o n of g i v e n n e s s d u a l i t y between s u b j e c t and fundamental s t r u c t u r e  powerful  insight  of the problems he d i s c e r n e d  i s the e v e r - p r e s e n t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of a object.  of h i s own  Through a f a i l u r e to a p p r e c i a t e the  i n s i g h t , S e l l a r s r e t a i n e d the  p o s i t i o n of a d u a l i t y between s u b j e c t and way  account  Theory.  i t as l e g i t i m a t e ; but S e l l a r s '  I hope to show, d e f e a s i b l e c o m p l e t e l y  by f a i l i n g  Sellars' prof-  t h a t w h i l e I do not a t any p o i n t d i s p u t e t h a t r e l i a n c e ,  i s not because I a c c e p t  It  the  t o p r o v i d e some content  such a l i n g u i s t i c account  h a l f of Chapter  an  particulars".  S e l l a r s ' p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the problem of c h a r a c t e r i z i n g f o u n d a t i o n s of human knowledge i s an attempt  into  becomes, S e l l a r s c l a i m s ,  "the view t h a t a l l c o n s c i o u s n e s s of s o r t s or r e p e a t a b l e s r e s t s on  and  be  to overcome the problem of how  o b j e c t and  tried  presup-  to f i n d  a  t h e r e c o u l d ever be a r e l a t i o n of  awareness of_ type between the p a r t s of such a d u a l i t y .  I t w i l l be  the  the  burden of the arguments of the t h i r d c h a p t e r to show t h a t t h i s problem is in fact  insurmountable.  Such arguments must, I h o l d , f o r c e us  to  assume a f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t , s p e c i f i c a l l y , a n o n - d u a l i s t i c , approach to the a n a l y s i s of awareness.  Non-dualistic  be taken as b o t h l o g i c a l l y and  g e n e t i c a l l y b a s i c and  made to g i v e account of the a p p a r e n t l y i n what a r e u l t i m a t e l y non-dual terms.  dual  s t a t e s of awareness must an attempt must  s t a t e s , s t a t e s of awareness o f ,  In e f f e c t , I a c c e p t  ' t w i s t e d ' v e r s i o n of Hume; but, u n l i k e S e l l a r s , I h o l d are p a r t s of non-dual s t a t e s of awareness. to show how  t h a t red p a r t i c u l a r s  s t a r t from non-dual  of awareness which c o n t a i n , as p a r t s , red p a r t i c u l a r s and  Chapter IV w i l l an  sketch,  Sellars'  In Chapter IV I w i l l undertake  i t i s t h a t g e n e t i c development can  what appear to be d u a l  vague terms, the  states  achieve,  s t a t e s of awareness of_ r e d ; or at any i n sweeping and  be  ultimately,  rate,.  shape of  such  undertaking.  ii)  In a d d i t i o n to o u t l i n i n g S e l l a r s ' argument a g a i n s t  the  second c h a p t e r w i l l l o o k a t an argument by R o d e r i c k F i r t h  the t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n l o g i c a l and  of sense-data.  given, against  F i r t h ' s argument i s phenomeno-  assumes, moreover, a d u a l i s t i c a n a l y s i s of the phenomenon  of i n t r o s p e c t i o n .  Firth,  awareness i s b a s i c a l l y and and  the  l i k e S e l l a r s , assumes t h a t the s t r u c t u r e of e s s e n t i a l l y a r e l a t i o n s h i p between a  some form of o b j e c t i v i t y .  The  subject  argument of Chapter I I I , i n  which I undertake to show t h a t t h a t p i c t u r e of awareness i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y incoherent, i s thus e q u a l l y an argument a g a i n s t  iii)  The  F i r t h as a g a i n s t  i s s u e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and  i s of major importance to the  Sellars.  awareness  i s s u e of the n a t u r e of awareness i n  5 general.  And w h i l e I r e j e c t t h e S e l l a r s i a n development o f a ' t w i s t e d '  Humean account, which would have awareness a r i s i n g out o f t h e s t i m u l u s / response a c q u i s i t i o n o f language,  I r e j e c t as w e l l a type o f a l t e r n a t i v e  account, known as meaning-nominalism, which sees language as i n t e n t i o n a l l y developed and c o n s e q u e n t l y as p r e s u p p o s i n g t h e p r i o r e x i s t e n c e of complex k i n d s o f awareness.  Thus though  I accept, against S e l l a r s , the  p o s i t i o n t h a t some form o f awareness i s p r i m i t i v e and a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f language,  I h o l d f u r t h e r t h a t f o r some o t h e r  forms, o r l e v e l s , o f awareness, the e x i s t e n c e and o p e r a t i o n o f language is i t s e l f a prerequisite. presupposes  Moreover, t h e l e v e l o f awareness which  p o s s e s s i o n o f language  i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d , I s h a l l argue i n  Chapter I , by p r e c i s e l y t h e c o n c e p t u a l t o o l s which a r e r e q u i r e d by a meaning-nominalist  account o f t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f language.  of Chapter I , then, I w i l l c o n s i d e r and r e j e c t account o f language  acquisition.  Finally,  In P a r t 2  t h e meaning-nominalist  i n the s i x t h c h a p t e r ,  I w i l l p r o v i d e , i n the s p i r i t o f the n o n - d u a l i s t i c account o f awareness developed  i n IV, an a l t e r n a t i v e p i c t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between  language and awareness.  iv) attempts  L i k e t h e s i x t h c h a p t e r , t h e f i f t h and seventh c h a p t e r s i n v o l v e to a p p l y t h e t h e o r y sketched i n IV.  In V the notions of  a p o i n t o f view, o f c o n c e p t u a l frameworks, and o f i n t r o s p e c t i o n , be a n a l y z e d i n i t s terms.  Chapter V I I r e p r e s e n t s an attempt  t h a t the t h e o r y i n IV has what I take t o be some i n t u i t i v e l y i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r c e n t r a l i s s u e s i n semantics. t h a t f a c t s about  will  t o show satisfying  In p a r t i c u l a r , the claim  .  the i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e s o f our s e n s a t i o n s p l a y an e s s e n t i a l  6 and  c e n t r a l r o l e i n the meaning of o b s e r v a t i o n p r e d i c a t e s w i l l  be,  I t h i n k , p e r s u a s i v e l y defended a g a i n s t r e c e n t m a t e r i a l i s t i c a l l y . I n c l i n e d attempts to undermine our  'common-sense' b e l i e f  i n such a r o l e .  2. M a t e r i a l i s m , the P-theory and  the Consciousness Theory  i)  M a t e r i a l i s m , whether r e d u c t i v e or e l i m i n a t i v e , i s repugnant  to me.  Q u i t e why  down; or a t l e a s t  t h i s i s so i s , however, s u r p r i s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to p i n to p i n down i n any way  towards d i s s u a d i n g a m a t e r i a l i s t . t h a t I am  i n c l i n e d to do,  simply  To  which might go any  say,  f o r example, as I must  t h a t i t i s too o b v i o u s l y f a l s e to  even worth d i s c u s s i n g c e r t a i n l y does not c o n v e r t In the pages which f o l l o w I w i l l  The  frameworks w i t h i n Why  and  and  P o s i t i v e l y construed, i t  the e v o l u t i o n of  theory  conceptual  consciousness.  o f t e n speak of those who  f a n c y themselves m a t e r i a l i s t s so  reject materialist  c o n c l u s i o n s as though  they l a c k e d some a p p r o p r i a t e form of modesty?  ourselves  any  defend a g a i n s t c r i t i c i s m , a  about concepts and  i s i t t h a t p e o p l e who  materialist  sworn m a t e r i a l i s t s .  f o r c e of the o v e r a l l argument i s , at  i n v o l v e s an attempt to develop,  be  I f e a r , w i l l be somewhat  r a t e , o n l y i n d i r e c t l y an a t t a c k on m a t e r i a l i s m .  about c o n s c i o u s n e s s  any  confess  endeavor to keep t h i s a t t i t u d e as much  i n the background as p o s s i b l e , though success, l e s s than complete.  distance  i s c o n c e i t e d l y contending  i s somehow u l t i m a t e and  As though the  t h a t our present  unsurpassable?  non-  conception  As though he  has  of  7  f a i l e d to recognize  t h a t he and h i s f e l l o w human b e i n g s a r e , f o r a l l  t h e i r apparent c o m p l e x i t y mere a n i m a l s ? misconception.  by our p r e s e n t earth-bound s t a n d a r d s ,  These i n s i n u a t i o n s i n v o l v e , I hope to show, a  still  serious  That the blame f o r t h i s m i s c o n c e p t i o n p r o b a b l y l i e s  as much w i t h n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t s as w i t h m a t e r i a l i s t s i s not a t a l l unlikely.  The  p o i n t i s n o t , however, t o l e v e l blame but r a t h e r t o s o r t  out a p e r v a s i v e and hence p r o b l e m a t i c  confusion.  Far from b e i n g  d e n i e d , o r , worse, s i m p l y o v e r l o o k e d ,  by the n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t ,  our  i  s t a t u s as  'mere' a n i m a l s i s , whether he a p p r e c i a t e s  i t or not, p r e c i s e l y  the a l l - i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of what we a r e w h i c h he i s concerned to defend a g a i n s t the t h r e a t of r e d u c t i o n or e l i m i n a t i o n o r the charge of i r r e l e v a n c y by the m a t e r i a l i s t .  I t i s our  'animalness' w h i c h , f a r from  'mere', keeps us a l i v e , c o n s c i o u s ,  and hence, the  being  non-materialist  u r g e s , unamenable t o m a t e r i a l i s t a n a l y s i s . The m a t e r i a l i s t c l a i m t h a t our common-sense p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y , or P - t h e o r y , as i t ' s coming t o be c a l l e d i n the  literature,  4  might be i n a d e q u a t e or even " p r o f o u n d l y  awry"  i s i n no way  p a r t of what the n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t i s concerned t o deny.  a necessary  (Though some,  perhaps many, n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t s have i n f a c t d e n i e d t h i s . )  The  contention  i s , t h e n , t h a t a s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n of a n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n might h o l d : 1)  That what we a r e a r e  'mere  animals';  2)  That m a t e r i a l i s t t h e o r i e s must i n e v i t a b l y l e a v e of account t h a t a s p e c t of o u r s e l v e s we a r e  animals;  out  i n v i r t u e of w h i c h  8 3)  That our common-sense p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y , the aim o f which i s t o g i v e account  o f t h a t aspect o f o u r s e l v e s  i n v i r t u e o f which we a r e animals, s u f f e r s from (or might s u f f e r from), a) gross o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , o r b) erroneous  d i s t i n c t i o n s , o r both.  I t i s n o t , i t seems t o me, uncommon t o hear m a t e r i a l i s t s r e f e r s c a t h i n g l y to t h e 'crudeness' and t h e 'common-sensicalness' o f t a l k w i t h i n the P-theory  about b e l i e f s , thoughts,  intentions, desires, sensations, e t c .  They speak w i s t f u l l y o f t h e day when such expressions- w i l l i n t h e common p a r l a n c e , e i t h e r reduced  be.replaced  by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h , o r  e l i m i n a t e d i n f a v o u r o f , e x p r e s s i o n s b e l o n g i n g to a more p o w e r f u l , more encompassing t h e o r y i n t h e f i r s t the second  case.  case, o r a more a c c u r a t e t h e o r y i n  The p r e s e n t p o i n t amounts t o an admission  p o s s i b i l i t y i s c l e a r l y open t h a t t a l k about b e l i e f s ,  that the  thoughts,  intentions,  e t c . , may be perhaps n e i t h e r as p o w e r f u l and encompassing as i t might be hoped, (3(a)), nor even c o m p l e t e l y a c c u r a t e i n the d i s t i n c t i o n s which it  imposes, (3(b)).  I t i s b e i n g here d e n i e d , however, t h a t t h e t h e o r y  which might reduce o r e l i m i n a t e t h e P-theory  c o u l d ever be m a t e r i a l i s t .  I f n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t s a r e f r e q u e n t l y , and I suspect t h a t they a r e , g u i l t y o f o v e r - c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e power and adequacy o f t h e P-theory, m a t e r i a l i s t s a r e e q u a l l y commonly g u i l t y o f over-corif ldence:"-±n: s c i e n c e las it  i s p r e s e n t l y conceived:  about c a u s a l i t y , matter, h o l d i n g between them.  i n science, that i s , laden with  energy,  preconceptions  time, space and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s  I f n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t s are f r e q u e n t l y g u i l t y of over-  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n and o f l a c k o f i m a g i n a t i o n and v i s i o n ,  s u r e l y the same i s  t r u e , and i n g r e a t e r measure o f m a t e r i a l i s t s who, o v e r l y impressed  with  9 s c i e n c e ' s achievements  i n the realm to which i t i s i n f a c t  adequate,  assume b l i n d l y t h a t no realm c o u l d be r e c a l c i t r a n t to i t s means and methods.  At l e a s t the n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t has the i n s i g h t , however foggy,  most important o f a l l ,  the courage  i n the f a c e o f a d v e r s i t y ,  (and  and,  the  a d v e r s i t y i s not without c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r e n g t h , f o r the s u c c e s s e s o f s c i e n c e have indeed been i m p r e s s i v e ) , to hang on s t u b b o r n l y to t h a t which he sees must, though he may be accounted  o r may  not admit  t h a t he sees not  f o r by any adequate t h e o r y o f 'human a n i m a l s ' .  how,  Witness  that  W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , whose p r o c l i v i t y towards m a t e r i a l i s m i s as s t r o n g as  any,  but whose a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the s t r e n g t h o f i t s o p p o s i t i o n appears c o n s i d e r a b l y b e t t e r than most, f e e l s h i m s e l f u l t i m a t e l y c o n s t r a i n e d to admit  that: ...the s c i e n t i f i c image i s not y e t complete; we have not y e t p e n e t r a t e d a l l the s e c r e t s o f n a t u r e . . . a l t h o u g h f o r many purposes the c e n t r a l nervous system can be c o n s t r u e d without l o s s as a complex system of p h y s i c a l p a r t i c l e s , when i t comes to an adequate u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the r e l a t i o n o f sensory c o n s c i o u s n e s s to neurophysi o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s , we must p e n e t r a t e to the non^part i c u l a t e f o u n d a t i o n o f the p a r t i c u l a t e image...  ii)  In t r y i n g to show the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the o p t i o n o f b e i n g a  n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t without  f u l l y e n d o r s i n g the P-theory,  playing with i d l e p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  I am not  I would, f o r example, accept  f o l l o w i n g assessment by Churchland o f the P-theory's  merely the  s u c c e s s e s (or  r a t h e r l a c k t h e r e o f ) as b e i n g , i f not e x a c t l y sympathetic, n e v e r t h e l e s s not w i t h o u t  some a c c u r a c y .  Churchland w r i t e s :  . . . i t s s u c c e s s i s i n many r e s p e c t s r a d i c a l l y incomplete. I t s comprehension both o f p r a c t i c a l and of f a c t u a l r e a s o n i n g i s sketchy a t b e s t ; the k i n e m a t i c s and dynamics o f emotions i t p r o v i d e s i s vague and s u p e r f i c i a l ; the v i c i s s i t u d e s o f p e r c e p t i o n and p e r c e p t u a l i l l u s i o n a r e ,  i n i t s terms, l a r g e l y m y s t e r i o u s ; i t s comprehension o f the l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s i s e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y t h i n ; and i t s grasp o f the n a t u r e and causes o f mental i l l n e s s i s almost n i l . I n sum, t h e r e i s much about o u r s e l v e s , qua p e r c e i v i n g / r e a s o n i n g / p a s s i o n a t e c r e a t u r e s , t h a t we do not understand a t a l l , and much about our behaviour t h a t we cannot b e g i n to e x p l a i n . The P-theory g i v e s us what i s o b v i o u s l y a s u p e r f i c i a l g l o s s on a v e r y complex s e t of phenomena.^ U n l i k e C h u r c h l a n d , however, I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t i t w i l l be t h e case t h a t d i a g n o s i s o f the i n a d e q u a c i e s  i n general  o f the P-theory w i l l  p o i n t t o a need f o r r e v i s i o n i n t h e f a c e o f a w e a l t h o f i n p u t the blossoming s c i e n c e o f n e u r o p h y s i o l o g y .  from  (Though  I do n o t deny t h a t c l o s e r a l l i a n c e w i t h t h a t s c i e n c e would, o r , a t l e a s t that i t c o u l d , prove v e r y f r u i t f u l . )  The c e n t r a l problem w i t h t h e  P-theory l i e s r a t h e r , I b e l i e v e , i n the f a c t t h a t i t m i s l e a d i n g l y without  b e i n g p r o p e r l y c o n t e x t u a l i z e d w i t h i n a theory o f The  operates  consciousness.  P-theory takes as b a s i c some d i s t i n c t i o n s which the theory  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  a s k e l e t o n o f which I w i l l endeavor t o p r o v i d e , would  take as developed. their beliefs,  The P-theory t a l k s about p e o p l e ( o r animals) and  thoughts, i n t e n t i o n s , d e s i r e s , e t c . and o f t h e p h y s i c a l  world, which p e o p l e ' s b e l i e f s and thoughts a r e about and towards which are d i r e c t e d t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s and d e s i r e s . and  the objects  I b e l i e v e t h a t both t h e s u b j e c t  o f t h e v a r i o u s mental a t t i t u d e s — b e l i e v i n g , t h i n k i n g ,  i n t e n d i n g , d e s i r i n g , e t c . — w h i c h p l a y so i n t e g r a l a r o l e i n t h e P-theory, are c o n s t r u c t e d by t h e o r d e r i n g a c t i v i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  The s e l f ,  which seems t o us t o be a c t i v e and i n c o n t r o l , s e t t i n g t h e d i r e c t i o n o f and  o r i g i n a t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g  an o b j e c t , c o m p l e t e l y  without  our e f f o r t s ,  i s itself,  i n a sense,  power, c r e a t e d and used by c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n  i t s e f f o r t s to a b s t r a c t o r d e r from, and/or impose o r d e r on, i t s i n i t i a l  s t a t e o f chaos.  T h i s f a c t , i f i t i s a f a c t , t h a t the s e l f  is a  powerless  o b j e c t r a t h e r than the mover behind our e x p e r i e n c e s would e x p l a i n Hume's b a r r e n s e a r c h f o r i t ( g i v e n what he was as I hope t o show, account  looking f o r ) .  I t could also,  f o r problems w i t h the d o c t r i n e of the g i v e n ,  both when i t i s examined from a l o g i c a l p o i n t o f view ( S e l l a r s ) and a phenomenological  p o i n t of view  (Firth).  A word o f q u a l i f i c a t i o n must be q u i c k l y e n t e r e d l e s t sound l i k e c o n s c i o u s n e s s i t s e l f must p l a y some r o l e analogous which i s here b e i n g denied to s e l f .  Consciousness  something  to the  one lies  Consciousness  the s u b j e c t i v e h a l f of a r e l a t i o n between  which knows, senses, e x p e r i e n c e s , or whatever, and  e l s e which i s i t s o b j e c t .  i t b e g i n to  i s not t h a t which  behind, a l t e r n a t e l y r e c e i v i n g and d i r e c t i n g , e x p e r i e n c e . i s n o t , i t w i l l be argued,  from  something  R e l a t i o n s e x i s t w i t h i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s and  knowable, where knowing i t s e l f  i s to be a n a l y z e d i n terms o f the  up o f f u r t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  But  are  setting  i f there i s a  f o r c e which e x i s t s o u t s i d e o f , and a c t s on c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and which ought, i n the s t r i c t e s t  sense, to be c a l l e d o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y — a n d  though  I w i l l not t r y t o argue the p o i n t , I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e must be such a force—its about  t r u e n a t u r e must remain n e c e s s a r i l y unknown.  Only  facts  the c a u s a l c a p a c i t i e s of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , assuming t h a t i t  even makes sense to t a l k i n t h i s way, known about  can ever be known; and  these a r e  on the b a s i s o f i n f e r e n c e s from what a r e taken to be  e f f e c t s w i t h i n consciousness.  O b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , by the p r e s e n t  their position,  though c a u s a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a s p e c t s o f s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i s never p r e s e n t e d t o , or b e f o r e c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  Though c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s ,  by t h i s p o s i t i o n , the s u b j e c t i v e h a l f o f an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y ,  the  12 d u a l i t y does not take the form o f the d u a l i t y presupposed  by  the  P-theory. T h i s f a c t , t h a t the P-theory  takes as b a s i c a c e r t a i n  form  of d u a l i t y which the c e n t r a l t e n e t o f the t h e o r y which I w i l l —let  me  call  i t the 'consciousness t h e o r y ' — i s concerned  c o n s t i t u t e s a major o b s t a c l e c o n f r o n t i n g a proponent theory.  develop  to deny,  o f the c o n s c i o u s n e s s  A d m i t t e d l y , the c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e o r y i s no more c o n s t r a i n e d to  reduce the d i s t i n c t i o n s and  the o n t o l o g y o f the common-sense P-theory  than i s the m a t e r i a l i s t t h e o r y .  But the c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e o r y i s , i t  would seem, and u n l i k e the m a t e r i a l i s t t h e o r y , r e q u i r e d , because i t shares w i t h the P-theory  the g o a l of g i v i n g account  o u r s e l v e s i n v i r t u e of which we and account  a r e a n i m a l s , to g i v e some a n a l y s i s o f  o f the d i s t i n c t i o n s w i t h i n the P-theory.  i t w i l l be r e q u i r e d to show how they have, how  of t h a t aspect of  Specifically,  they have managed to work as w e l l  they a r e inadequate, and how  they w i l l be,  to the extent  that they a r e , i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o o r r e p l a c e d w i t h i n , the new I w i l l t r y , most p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  to p o i n t the way  as  theory.  to an a n a l y s i s o f the  a p p a r e n t l y d u a l s t a t e of b e i n g aware o f (something)  i n terms o f what I  c l a i m i s a l o g i c a l l y and g e n e t i c a l l y p r i o r , and o n t o l o g i c a l l y  non-  d u a l s t a t e , the s t a t e o f b e i n g aware. While  i n some sense my  argument must be seen as an argument  a g a i n s t the P - t h e o r y — f o r I s h a l l argue considerable extent, i n c o n s i s t e n t — i t seen as an attempt  t h a t t h a t t h e o r y i s , to some  i s , I-think,..more-accurately  to e x p l a i n the P-theory.  For I b e l i e v e , and  s h a l l endeavor to p r o v i d e p l a u s i b i l i t y f o r the b e l i e f , t h a t the e n c i e s which I w i l l p o i n t to i n the P-theory a r e an i n e v i t a b l e of the p r a c t i c a l r o l e which i t s e r v e s .  I inconsistfunction  As I h i n t e d e a r l i e r , the g e n e r a l  shape o f t h e p o s i t i v e p r o j e c t c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n is., an attemptv t o "place the P-theory i n the c o n t e x t of a t h e o r y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Perhaps one go even f u r t h e r and say t h a t the new P-theory—just the  could  t h e o r y i s a t h e o r y about the  as much as i t i s about the phenomenon o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  n a t u r e of which g e n e r a t e s the P-theory. I t u r n now  to a d i s c u s s i o n of the two extreme  alternative  views on the n a t u r e o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and to which I r e f e r r e d  earlier.  awareness  I hope u l t i m a t e l y to show t h a t between  the  u n t e n a b l e view t h a t awareness, o f any form, presupposes language and  the  e q u a l l y u n t e n a b l e view t h a t language i s the p r o d u c t of a  form o f awareness,  there l i e s a p l a u s i b l e t h i r d  alternative.  complex  NOTES  Jean P i a g e t , The P r i n c i p l e s o f G e n e t i c Epistemology, Wolfe Mays (New York: B a s i c Books, I n c . , 1972), p. 19.  trans.  2 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , " E m p i r i c i s m and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," i n S c i e n c e , P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i b r a r y o f P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1963), p. 159. 3 S e l l a r s , p. 160.  4 P a u l M. Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c Mind, Cambridge S t u d i e s i n P h i l o s o p h y P r e s s , 1979), p. 6.  Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y o f (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y  S e l l a r s , " P h i l o s o p h y and t h e S c i e n t i f i c S c i e n c e , P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y , p. 37. Churchland,  pp. 114-15.  Image o f Man," i n  15 CHAPTER I.  The R e l a t i o n s h i p between Language and Awareness: Two Opposing Views 1. S e l l a r s ' L i n g u i s t i c Account o f Awareness R e j e c t e d  i)  I n " E m p i r i c i s m and t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind"''"and i n h i s t h r e e  2 l e c t u r e s e n t i t l e d "The S t r u c t u r e o f Knowledge",  Wilfrid  S e l l a r s o f f e r s an  argument i n t e n d e d t o show t h a t " a l l awareness o f s o r t s , resemblances, f a c t s , e t c . , i n s h o r t , a l l awareness o f a b s t r a c t e n t i t i e s — i n d e e d , a l l  awareness  3 even o f p a r t i c u l a r s — - i s a l i n g u i s t i c a f f a i r "  .  Awareness i s , f o r  S e l l a r s , s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y c o g n i t i v e ; and a c c o r d i n g l y , t a l k o f awareness i s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e w i t h t a l k o f knowledge.  S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account o f what  I s h a l l c a l l the upsurge o f awareness—where by 'upsurge' I mean t o c a p t u r e an i m p r e s s i o n I get from S e l l a r s ' account t h a t awareness i s t o be seen as s p r i n g i n g suddenly and h o l i s t i c a l l y  i n t o e x i s t e n c e subsequent t o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f  l a n g u a g e — i s thus e q u a l l y an account o f t h e upsurge o f knowledge.. c u l a r , i t i s , he b e l i e v e s , a s t r i c t l y  In p a r t i -  'Rylean' account o f the coming i n t o  e x i s t e n c e o f what he takes to be the l o g i c a l l y and c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y b a s i c form o f knowledge:  O b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge o f p h y s i c a l  objects.  The view t o which S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness o r knowledge i s i n t e n d e d to be an a l t e r n a t i v e i n v o l v e s , and, he says, i n v o l v e s i n i t s most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d form, what S e l l a r s has dubbed 'The Myth o f the Given'.  A c c o r d i n g to t h e t r a d i t i o n a l  empiricist  view to which he so r e f e r s , t h e r e e x i s t s "a stratum o f a u t h o r i t a t i v e  16 nonverbal  episodes  ('awarenesses'), t h e a u t h o r i t y o f which  to a s u p e r s t r u c t u r e o f v e r b a l a c t i o n s , p r o v i d e d  accrues  that the expressions  4 o c c u r r i n g i n these a c t i o n s a r e p r o p e r l y used." While I accept Given,  S e l l a r s ' argument a g a i n s t the Myth o f the  I s h a l l attempt i n t h e ensuing  d i s c u s s i o n t o show t h a t h i s  suggested a l t e r n a t i v e to t h e account o f o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge i n t r i n s i c t o t h a t view i s not i t s e l f a c c e p t a b l e .  I t i s unacceptable,  I s h a l l argue, because i t l a n d s him w i t h an i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s ; and not the one o f which he sees h i m s e l f f a l s e l y accused. The  f u l l weight o f S e l l a r s ' famous Jones myth, a c c o r d i n g t o  which s e n s a t i o n s and thoughts a r e a t bottom t h e o r e t i c a l  entities  i n t r o d u c e d by analogy w i t h p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and o v e r t v e r b a l r e p o r t s r e s p e c t i v e l y , r e s t s on t h i s attempt t o g i v e a l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness and i n so doing myth. fails  t o secure a 'Rylean' s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r t h e  But, I s h a l l argue, the l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness not o n l y i n i t s b i d t o secure  the required  'Rylean' s t a r t i n g p o i n t but  i t harbours as w e l l t h e k e r n e l o f incoherence myth i t s e l f .  which plagues the Jones  The a n a l o g i c a l accounts o f s e n s a t i o n s and thoughts  presuppose a type o f account o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s which t h e l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s The negative.  precludes.  argument which I am about to develop i s almost e x c l u s i v e l y I n t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e next t h r e e c h a p t e r s  I will  argue  t h a t t h e r e i s a type o f p o s i t i o n which i s i n some broad sense e m p i r i c i s t and  t o which S e l l a r s ' argument a g a i n s t t h e g i v e n does not a p p l y .  The n o t i o n o f 'givenness' is,  a g a i n s t which S e l l a r s ' argument i s d e v a s t a t i n g  I hold, e s s e n t i a l l y d u a l i s t i c .  T h e o r i e s which presuppose the  r e l e v a n t k i n d o f d u a l i s m a r e , f o r S e l l a r s i a n and o t h e r r e a s o n s , I t w i l l be argued, u n t e n a b l e . a type o f p o s i t i o n  In Chapter IV I w i l l attempt to p o i n t the way  which a v o i d s both S e l l a r s ' argument a g a i n s t the  g i v e n and the argument which I am about to g i v e a g a i n s t  Sellars'  proposed l i n g u i s t i c account, and which does so i n v i r t u e essentially  ii)  is linguistic.  i s an e v o l u t i o n a r i l y  acquisition  i s the c l a i m t h a t  Language i t s e l f , by the S e l l a r s i a n account,  developed phenomenon, a c q u i r e d anew i n each  i d u a l by means of a p r o c e s s o f s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n i n g . child's  of b e i n g  non-dualistic.  The essence o f S e l l a r s ' account of awareness  awareness  to  Sellars  indiv-  says of the  o f language:  ...he b e g i n s by u t t e r i n g n o i s e s which sound l i k e words and sentences, and ends by u t t e r i n g " n o i s e s which a r e words and sentences. We might use quoted words to d e s c r i b e what he i s d o i n g a t both s t a g e s , but i n the e a r l i e r s t a g e we a r e c l a s s i f y i n g h i s u t t e r a n c e s as sounds and o n l y by c o u r t e s y and a n t i c i p a t i o n as words;5 T h i s i s n o t , as i s o b v i o u s , the c l a i m t h a t the . c h i l d b e g i n s b y . u t t e r i n g words which sound l i k e our words, but which, because words t a k e t h e i r meanings w i t h i n a system o f meaning, and because the c h i l d ' s meaning i s r a d i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o , and even different  from, our system o f meaning, a r e not our words.  system o f  qualitatively This h o l i s t i c  view o f meaning, where the meaning o f a word i s to some v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e n t , a f u n c t i o n o f i t s p l a c e and r o l e i n a system, i s i n f a c t , which I f u l l y endorse. The c h i l d ' s scribing Sellars  But S e l l a r s ' c l a i m i s r a d i c a l l y  'word' i s not a word; not a word a t a l l .  the i s s u e I wish to e x p l o r e a r i s e s  one  different:  One way  out o f t h i s :  see the t r a n s i t i o n from w o r d - l i k e sounds to words?  How In  o f dedoes particular  1)  What e x a c t l y i s m i s s i n g gets added at the  and,  2)  E x a c t l y how  from the lower l e v e l  that  higher?  i s the a d d i t i o n of the new  ingredient  achieved? S e l l a r s t e l l s us t h a t :  "There i s a l l the d i f f e r e n c e i n the world  between p a r r o t i n g words and How,  then, by  thinking-out-loud  i n terms of words."  S e l l a r s ' account, s i n c e the c h i l d a l l e g e d l y s t a r t s  mere p a r r o t i n g , does the c h i l d come to t h i n k - o u t - l o u d ? t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e between p a r r o t i n g and f a c t t h a t the u t t e r a n c e s "cohere w i t h each o t h e r a way  which one and  i n saying  makes when one  w i t h the context  But  i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of 'This i s  knowledge, i t seems c l e a r t h a t the transition  which express o b s e r v a -  t i o n a l knowledge, where, by S e l l a r s ' a n a l y s i s , e x p r e s s i o n s t i o n a l knowledge i n v o l v e i n an e s s e n t i a l way,  but  are not  the mature language u s e r ,  merely,  does.  to a d e q u a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z e what  s a i d - t o express o b s e r v a t i o n a l  to the thermometer view:  he,  Thus S e l l a r s makes i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t  the s o - c a l l e d 'thermometer view' of the  'This i s g r e e n ' : i s  of o b s e r v a -  S e l l a r s i s q u i t e prepared to admit t h a t more than  the n o t i o n of coherence i s r e q u i r e d  he does not h o l d  notion  In so f a r as an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of what  the mature language u s e r does i s make u t t e r a n c e s  thinkings-out-loud,  i n the  i n which they o c c u r i n  of coherence a l o n e cannot g i v e us what i s added i n the from w o r d - l i k e sounds to words.  lies  us  thinks-out-loud  t h a t , f o r example, a token of  green' expresses o b s e r v a t i o n a l  tells  thinking-out-loud  which i s absent i n mere p a r r o t i n g . " ^  what i s i n v o l v e d  He  by  sense i n which  knowledge.  According  An o v e r t or c o v e r t token of 'This i s green' i n the presence of a green item i s a K o n s t a t i e r u n g and expresses o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge i f and o n l y i f i t i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a tendency to produce o v e r t or c o v e r t tokens of 'This i s g r e e n ' — g i v e n a c e r t a i n s e t — i f and o n l y i f a green o b j e c t i s b e i n g looked at i n standard c o n d i t i o n s . 8 On  such a view, says S e l l a r s : .. .the o c c u r r e n c e of.': such •-•tokens ;6f ".This i s green' would be ' f o l l o w i n g a r u l e ' o n l y i n the sense t h a t they are i n s t a n c e s of a u n i f o r m i t y , a u n i f o r m i t y d i f f e r i n g from the l i g h t n i n g thunder case i n t h a t i t i s an a c q u i r e d c a u s a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the language u s e r . 9  But  s u r e l y mere coherence, between utterences,;:and. between  utterances  and  the c o n t e x t s  not  i n v o l v e any n o t i o n of m e a n i n g — w h i c h i t o b v i o u s l y does not  was  i n t r o d u c e d as an a l t e r n a t i v e to such a n o t i o n ^ — c a n  i n which they o c c u r , where the n o t i o n of coherence does  n o t h i n g more than u n i f o r m i t y .  since i t  amount to  What e l s e c o u l d i t i n v o l v e ?  So  the  c h i l d , on becoming a f u l l - f l e d g e d language u s e r , must have accomplished something more, by S e l l a r s ' account, than becoming an a c c u r a t e l y ibrated  'thermometer'.  But what i s the more?  S e l l a r s t e l l s us t h a t , f o r u t t e r a n c e s of count as e x p r e s s i o n s  cal-  'This i s green' to  of o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge, the u t t e r e r must  not o n l y , upon u t t e r i n g 'This i s green': 1)  Be e x h i b i t i n g a v e r y s p e c i f i c type of u n i f o r m i t y w i t h i n a s p e c i f i c type of  and,  2)  Be e x h i b i t i n g a p r o p e r l y a c q u i r e d c a u s a l  where (1) and instrument 3)  situation, characteristic,  (2) t o g e t h e r amount to b e i n g a p r o p e r l y c a l i b r a t e d  f o r the d e t e c t i o n of green o b j e c t s , but a l s o : Be e x h i b i t i n g a g e n e r a l mode of behaviour which  has  authority, and,  4)  Be capable  of r e c o g n i z i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the  general  mode of behaviour which he  i s exhibiting.  ( 4 ) , I contend, amounts to the c l a i m t h a t the mature language u s e r must, i n a d d i t i o n to being possession  a w e l l - c a l i b r a t e d 'thermometer', be  of the a b i l i t y to  'read h i s own  he  i s reading  of  (3) i s , I s h a l l argue, redundant.  (an a c c u r a t e l y c a l i b r a t e d ) thermometer.  a restatement of word  (1) and  'authority'—he  interchangeable beyond the acquired  thermometer' and  (2).  The  The  in  know t h a t inclusion  (3) amounts to no more than  sense i n which S e l l a r s uses  uses ' c r e d i b i l i t y ' and  ' r e l i a b i l i t y ' as  the  though  w i t h i t — s e e m s to r e q u i r e f o r i t s e x p l i c a t i o n n o t h i n g  i d e a of a p a r t i c u l a r u n i f o r m i t y which was  i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner.  type of c a u s a l c h a i n between a  Thus we  acquired  seem to have the  'response' and  and  i d e a of a  t h a t of which i t i s a  ( r e l i a b l e ) s i g n where the s e t t i n g up of the c a u s a l c h a i n has  an element of  c o m p l e x i t y which might have gone wrong but which, because i t d i d n ' t , g i v e s the  'response' a u t h o r i t y .  l i g h t n i n g as b e i n g  (We  don't, f o r example, speak of  a remark made w i t h a u t h o r i t y by  the sky.)  Sellars  doesn't seem to be q u i t e c l e a r about what he wants ' a u t h o r i t y ' to mean. In " E m p i r i c i s m  and  the P h i l o s o p h y of Mind" he  says:  C l e a r l y , on t h i s account the o n l y t h i n g t h a t can remotely be supposed to c o n s t i t u t e such a u t h o r i t y i s the f a c t t h a t one can i n f e r the presence of a green o b j e c t from the f a c t t h a t someone makes this report.il That seems to make (3) i d e n t i c a l w i t h (1) a l o n e . Knowledge" he Jones has  says:  learned  how  "The  authority...can  to use  In "The  Structure  be t r a c e d to the f a c t  of  that  the r e l e v a n t words i n p e r c e p t u a l s i t u a t i o n s . "  That seems to make (3) i d e n t i c a l w i t h  (2).  I t i s , I'm  claiming,  identical  w i t h the c o n j u n c t i o n causally  of  (1) and  (2):  With the i d e a of a  uniformity,  acquired. Turning  to  (4) then.  I f S e l l a r s can g i v e us a  account of the d i f f e r e n c e between b e i n g or having  linguistic  a thermometer and  being  o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge, then the j u s t i f i c a t i o n and  a t i o n of the a d d i t i o n of  (4) must be where he does i t .  aware explan-  Sellars  says:  . . . i f the a u t h o r i t y of the r e p o r t 'This i s green' l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t the e x i s t e n c e of green items a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e l a t e d to the p e r c e i v e r can be i n f e r r e d from the o c c u r r e n c e of such r e p o r t s , i t f o l l o w s t h a t o n l y a p e r s o n who i s a b l e to draw t h i s i n f e r e n c e , and t h e r e f o r e who has not o n l y the concept green, but a l s o the concept of u t t e r i n g 'This i s g r e e n ' — i n d e e d , the concept of c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s of p e r c e p t i o n , those which would c o r r e c t l y be c a l l e d 'standard c o n d i t i o n s ' — c o u l d be i n a p o s i t i o n to token 'This i s green' i n r e c o g n i t i o n of i t s a u t h o r i t y . 1 3 I am  reconstruing  t h i s as b e i n g analogous to the c l a i m t h a t i f a  r e a d i n g on a p r o p e r l y c a l i b r a t e d thermometer was  to count as an  instance  of the thermometer knowing the temperature, the thermometer would have to be a b l e to r e c o g n i z e of the temperature.  that i t s present  to  i t s environment which we  any  call  'temperature', which i t then,  then, i s t h i s :  p a r t i c u l a r f a c t , e.g.  the  ' p r i m o r d i a l awarenesses' of t h a t s t a t e of  ' t r a i n e d ' i n the a p p r o p r i a t e  S e l l a r s ' suggestion,  a symptom or s i g n  (Where the a l t e r n a t i v e , remember, i s t h a t  thermometer i s s u b j e c t  been p r o p e r l y  s t a t e was  having  language, c o r r e c t l y  expresses.  " . . . o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge of  t h a t t h i s i s green, presupposes t h a t one  know  14 general  f a c t s of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y."  Such a  view, he adds, " r e q u i r e s an abandonment of the t r a d i t i o n a l e m p i r i c i s t i d e a t h a t o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge 'stands on i t s own feet'.""'""'  iii) way  The i s s u e i s t h i s : i n which u t t e r a n c e s  count as e x p r e s s i n g i n possession  Can we make sense o f t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e  o f t h e form 'This i s green' can be s a i d t o  o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge i n v o l v e s t h e u t t e r e r b e i n g  o f , and b e i n g  of t h e form, " u t t e r a n c e s  a b l e t o make c o r r e c t i n f e r e n c e s from, f a c t s  o f 'This i s green' are r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r s - o f 16  the presence o f green o b j e c t s i n standard  conditions of perception".  S e l l a r s t h i n k s he f o r e s e e s :the. p o s s i b i l i t y o f a charge o f i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s and he o f f e r s as a r e f u t a t i o n o f t h a t charge a type of h o l i s t i c view o f the way i n which tokens o f 'This i s green' come, w i t h i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l agent's c o n c e p t u a l the e x p r e s s i o n  development, t o be used f o r  o f o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge.  Thus, he c l a i m s , t h e c o r -  rectness o f t h e statement t h a t Jones' tokening counts as e x p r e s s i n g it  now o f 'This i s green'  o b s e r v a t i o n a l knowledge, " r e q u i r e s o n l y  that  i s correct t o say t h a t Jones now knows, thus remembers, t h a t  of t h e form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom o f Y/ d i d o b t a i n .  Zfacts  I t does n o t  r e q u i r e t h a t a t t h e time these f a c t s d i d o b t a i n he then knew them t o obtain.  And t h e r e g r e s s d i s a p p e a r s . " " ^  i d e a i n a f o o t n o t e added i n 1963: direct  S e l l a r s t r i e s to c l a r i f y  his  "My thought was t h a t one can have  ( n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l ) knowledge o f a past  f a c t which one d i d n o t  or even (as i n t h e case envisaged) c o u l d n o t c o n c e p t u a l i z e  a t t h e time  xt was p r e s e n t . With a h o l i s t i c account o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f awareness I am i n complete agreement.  Such an account, i s , I am convinced,  a  completely  e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f t h e s t o r y o f how we manage t o move from one l e v e l of awareness  t o another.  I s h a l l urge, however, t h a t as S e l l a r s hopes  to use i t , as an account o f what I have c a l l e d i t i s quite obviously useless.  the upsurge o f awareness,  23 The how  p o i n t of S e l l a r s ' argument, bear i n mind, i s to e x p l a i n  i t i s t h a t we  come to be aware o f , n o t i c e , have o b s e r v a t i o n a l  knowledge o f , f a c t s about p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . and  thoughts, remember, comes, a c c o r d i n g  f u r t h e r down the l o g i c a l and l a t e r to be  chronological l i n e .  'primary s e n s e ' ) ,  are,  be p o i n t e d out,  f o r example, the greenness of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . sensations,  overt  t h a t , f o r example, the c o l o u r s and  thoughts,  s e r v e as the models f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l .entities"; ; s e n s a t i d n s .  a t h i s c l a i m t h a t f o r a token o f  look  'This i s green' to express o b s e r v a t i o n a l  knowledge i t s u t t e r e r must know and  be a b l e to c o r r e c t l y make the  i n f e r e n c e from, a f a c t of the form, X i s a r e l i a b l e  of Y; where X i s an u t t e r a n c e , made by one o f the language, of  symptom  p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d i n the  use  'This i s green', and Y i s the presence, s u i t a b l y  positioned with respect The  verbal  shapes of p h y s i c a l  With these f a c t s about S e l l a r s ' t h e s i s i n mind, l e t ' s  appropriate  public  Accord-  s e r v e as the models f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s ,  the way  objects w i l l  (which a r e  They a r e , f o r t h a t reason,  i n the p a r a l l e l accounts of thoughts and  reports w i l l in just  Overt v e r b a l r e p o r t s ,  i t should  p r o p e r t i e s of p u b l i c o b j e c t s — h u m a n b e i n g s . on a par w i t h ,  sensations  to S e l l a r s ' a n a l o g i c a l account,  t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e c a s t as t h i n k i n g s - o u t - l o u d ,  thoughts i n the  ingly,  Awareness of  to the u t t e r e r , of a green o b j e c t .  r e g r e s s of which S e l l a r s a n t i c i p a t e s he w i l l be  accused  presupposes the t r a d i t i o n a l e m p i r i c i s t p i c t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between g e n e r a l and to g e n e r a l we  f a c t s [of  particular facts.  On  such a p i c t u r e , "...  the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y/  have come to know by o b s e r v a t i o n  we  come  only a f t e r  a number of p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s which  19 support  the h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t X i s a symptom of Y".  Operating  on  the  basis of this presupposition, S e l l a r s ' imaginary c r i t i c characterizes the Sellars view as t e l l i n g us "that observational knowledge at time t presupposes knowledge of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y, which presupposes p r i o r observational knowledge, which presupposes other knowledge of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y, which presupposes s t i l l other, and p r i o r , observational knowledge, and so 20  on..."  The regress S e l l a r s sees himself charged with, i n other  words, assumes the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r type of awareness, of conceptually mediated awareness;of:particular matters of fact, a r i s i n g i n a h o l i s t i c way  simultaneously with the awareness of a  general fact to which those p a r t i c u l a r facts stand i n the r e l a t i o n of being evidence.  His reply, perhaps best captured i n the footnote quoted  e a r l i e r , that there i s no such i m p o s s i b i l i t y , i s , I take i t , w e l l founded.  To requote:  "...one can have direct (non-inferential)  knowledge of a past fact which one did not or even (as i n the case 21  envisaged) could not conceptualize at the time i t was  present."  But for S e l l a r s there i s only one kind of awareness. A l l awareness i s conceptually mediated.  So for S e l l a r s , when conceptually  mediated awareness of p a r t i c u l a r matters of fact arises simultaneously with and i s dependent upon conceptually mediated awareness of general matters of' fact, awareness arises for the f i r s t time.  But i f we  run  S e l l a r s ' own l i n g u i s t i c analysis rigourously, at no point tangling i t with the empiricist o n e — a t no point, that i s , admitting any form of  'primeval' awareness—it  becomes clear that no such account of the  uprising of awareness has been given.  S e l l a r s ' analysis catches  him, I s h a l l argue, i n a form of regress from which a h o l i s t i c approach cannot hope to rescue  him.  iv)  I n an attempt t o shed l i g h t on why a h o l i s t i c approach to t h e  relationship  between awareness o f g e n e r a l and o f p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r s o f  fact provides a valuable a l t e r n a t i v e picture  of that  t o the t r a d i t i o n a l e m p i r i c i s t  r e l a t i o n s h i p without b e i n g o f any use t o S e l l a r s i n h i s  attempt t o g i v e a l i n g u i s t i c account o f what awareness i s , l e t me s t a r t by c o n s i d e r i n g  what k i n d  o f g e n e r a l f a c t s f a c t s o f the form  X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom o f Y are.  What, f i r s t  o f a l l , i s t h e form  of the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s which stand i n t h e r e l a t i o n o f b e i n g evidence for  general f a c t s of that  form?  They a r e ,  i n s t a n c e s o f some type o f X/Y r e g u l a r i t y . by  I take i t , i n d i v i d u a l X i s regularly  the s p a t i a l o r temporal p r o x i m i t y o f Y.  The p o i n t  accompanied  to n o t i c e  i s this:  Both t h e g e n e r a l f a c t and t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s a r e i n a certain relevant  sense complex.  The c o m p l e x i t y I have i n mind  arises  from the r o l e s p l a y e d by X and Y i n the schemas f o r both t h e g e n e r a l and the p a r t i c u l a r forms o f f a c t s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  Since f o r S e l l a r s  the upsurge o f awareness, i . e . awareness i n i t s most b a s i c supposes awareness, a l l e g e d l y  form p r e -  accomplished by some h o l i s t i c means, o f  f a c t s o f the g e n e r a l form which I have been d i s c u s s i n g ,  t h i s element  of c o m p l e x i t y , t h e presence o f which I have j u s t p o i n t e d t o , ought not  t o have any troublesome i m p l i c a t i o n s  But  i t surely  for Sellars' linguistic  account.  does.  Consider:  What must we know i f we a r e t o know, and be a b l e  to make any use o f , g e n e r a l f a c t s o f the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom o f Y Presumably we must know:  and,  1)  How t o t e l l when t h e r e has been an o c c u r r e n c e o f X;  2)  What, i f o n l y i n i n d i r e c t terms, t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , Y,  involves.  The  i n f i n i t e regress  i n which S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s o f awareness  i s caught a r i s e s out o f (1).  F u r t h e r problems a r i s i n g from v a r i o u s  c o n s t r a i n t s o p e r a t i n g on t h e t y p e o f t h i n g s which S e l l a r s can p o s s i b l y say about  (2) w i l l plague h i s a n a l o g i c a l accounts o f thoughts and  sensations;  accounts a l r e a d y d e p r i v e d ,  does indeed  e x i s t , o f t h e i r presupposed  First utterances  the r e g r e s s .  i f the r e g r e s s  I shall  'Rylean' s t a r t i n g  X's a r e u t t e r a n c e s  describe  point.  o f 'This i s green';  o f 'This i s green', a t t h e h i s t o r i c o - g e n e t i c l e v e l a t which  we a r e l e a r n i n g how to make o b s e r v a t i o n  r e p o r t s about p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s ,  are o v e r t v e r b a l r e p o r t s ; o v e r t v e r b a l r e p o r t s a r e p u b l i c p r o p e r t i e s of p u b l i c o b j e c t s .  Y i s t h e presence o f a green o b j e c t i n standard  conditions of perception. holistically  acquired,  The o c c u r r e n c e o f X's i s our grounds, a l l e g e d l y  f o r our i n f e r e n c e to knowledge c l a i m s  about  Y's.  So:  Where's t h e grounds f o r our i n f e r e n c e to knowledge c l a i m s  X's?  I f , as by S e l l a r s ' account, knowing t h a t I o r anyone e l s e has  just uttered  about  'This i s green' i s t o know t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t has a p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t y ,  no l e s s than i s knowing  t h a t t h i s i s green t o know t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i c a l o b j e c t has a p a r t i c u l a r p h y s i c a l property,  then where i s t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y of. c l a i m i n g  t h a t I can know about a Y o n l y by i n f e r e n c e from t h e f a c t o f an o c c u r r e n c e of a X u n l e s s  i t i s added t h a t I can know about t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f an  X o n l y by t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f a Z and about a Z by t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f a W and  so on.  But what c o u l d Z's even be?  they would have t o be u t t e r a n c e s 'This i s green''.  like:  account  'This i s an u t t e r a n c e o f  Obvious and insurmountable t e n s i n g problems make  t h i s i n f i n i t e l y u n l i k e l y suggestion agent, i n o r d e r  By S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c  even worse.  Not o n l y would an  t o be aware o f the f a c t t h a t an o b j e c t which i s p r e s e n t  to h i s senses i s green, have to make an i n f i n i t e number o f  utterances,  but he would have to make them a l l a t once, each one r e f e r r i n g t o , and longer  than, i t s s t r u c t u r a l p r e d e c e s s o r , w i t h the l e n g t h of the  utterances  increasing i n f i n i t e l y .  of i n s t a n c e s  Not, I submit, a p l a u s i b l e a n a l y s i s  o f awareness o f the presence o f green o b j e c t s .  Let me t r y to c h a r a c t e r i z e the s t r u c t u r e o f my argument.  While  I accept S e l l a r s ' c l a i m t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a r t i c u l a r and general  f a c t s can be u s e f u l l y and p l a u s i b l y construed  in a  holistic  m a n n e r — s u c h t h a t awareness o f , o r the c a p a c i t y to be aware o f , v a r i o u s p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s a r i s e s simultaneously fact—I  am a r g u i n g  linguistic  w i t h awareness o f a  t h a t such a c o n s t r u a l i s of no use to S e l l a r s '  account o f awareness.  I am a s k i n g how,  as an account o f  how we become aware o f p r o p e r t i e s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s any s o r t ) , o t h e r way)  general  i t can be o f any h e l p  to say t h a t we  (properties of  (holistically  or any  become aware o f an e v i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p h o l d i n g  one k i n d o f p r o p e r t y  of p h y s i c a l objects  another ( c o l o u r s , f o r example).  between  ( o v e r t v e r b a l r e p o r t s ) and  H o l i s m can get us awareness o f the  r e l a t i o n s h i p between X and Y but i t can't  get us awareness o f " t h i n g s  of the s o r t Y i f X and Y a r e t h i n g s o f the same s o r t .  I t can't  get us  awareness o f Y, t h a t i s , i f X and Y a r e both p r o p e r t i e s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and what we wanted was an account o f how we become aware of properties of p h y s i c a l objects.  v)  Turning  q u i c k l y to (2); to the r o l e o f Y i n the schema X i s a  r e l i a b l e symptom o f Y.  I f we don't ever h a v e — a n d on Sellars'""view  how c o u l d w e ? - — d i r e c t awareness o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , then can we make  the r i g h t S e l l a r s i a n k i n d of sense of t a l k of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s claim that utterances  of  in  the  'This i s green' are r e l i a b l e symptoms of  the  presence of green o b j e c t s ?  Can we,  such t a l k which i s r e q u i r e d by X's,  i n t h i s case, are not  l e v e l , j u s t one  way  The  have no  the r e s t of S e l l a r s ' complex programme?  supposed to be,  i s present.  independent way  p o i n t comes to t h i s :  the p r o p e r t y  o b s e r v e r s under standard  the a p p r o p r i a t e conditions,  than c a u s a l p r o p e r t i e s .  to be  i d e n t i f i e d with  colour  By  i n normal o b s e r v e r s i n standard  to be  sensations  t u r n out  causal  identified  with  i n normal  i t seems c l e a r t h a t by  Sellars'^own  to be  nothing  S e l l a r s ' a n a l y s i s they a r e the  which cause thoughts of the form, f o r example,  Thus we  Y.  A l t h o u g h S e l l a r s i s adamant t h a t , f o r example,  a n a l y s i s the c o l o u r s of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s can other  of knowing.  of c h e c k i n g f o r the s t a t e of a f f a i r s ,  i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t they are not  of c a u s i n g  obtains;  Rather they are the way  the c o l o u r s of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s are not p r o p e r t i e s , and  at t h i s p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l  among many or s e v e r a l of knowing t h a t Y  that a p h y s i c a l object We  t h a t i s , make the k i n d of sense of  properties  'This i s green', to o c c u r  c o n d i t i o n s when green o b j e c t s are  present.  seem l e f t w i t h e x a c t l y what S e l l a r s , i n the. f i r s t of..his' t h r e e  l e c t u r e s on the s t r u c t u r e of knowledge, makes c l e a r t h a t : he'.doesn't want, and  w i t h e x a c t l y what, g i v e n h i s a n a l o g i c a l account of  he cannot have: to an  'occurrent'  We  seem l e f t w i t h what he  c a l l s an  sensations,  ' i f f y ' as opposed  account of the p r o p e r t i e s of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s .  So  where i s the content to come from to make S e l l a r s ' a n a l o g i c a l , accounts of s e n s a t i o n s  and  thoughts go?  S e n s a t i o n s are modelled on  physical  o b j e c t s ; thoughts a r e modelled on o v e r t v e r b a l r e p o r t s ; o v e r t r e p o r t s are p r o p e r t i e s of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s .  But  verbal  a green p h y s i c a l o b j e c t  i s whatever i t i s t h a t i s c a u s a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e thought, 'This i s green', i n normal o b s e r v e r s i n s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s . S e l l a r s ' complex  Everything i n  system p o i n t s to p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s ; but p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s o n l y p o i n t away a g a i n .  2. Against  i)  Standing i n d i r e c t  awareness i s l i n g u i s t i c  Meaning-Nominalism  c o n t r a s t t o S e l l a r s ' attempt t o show t h a t  i s an attempt t o show t h a t an account o f t h e  existence of c o n v e n t i o n s — o f l i n g u i s t i c can  conventions i n p a r t i c u l a r —  be g i v e n i n terms o f t h e communicative i n t e n t i o n s o f agents.  whereas t h e S e l l a r s i a n p o s i t i o n t r i e d  Thus  t o show t h a t awareness i s the o u t -  come o f t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f language, t h e p o s i t i o n which I am about to c o n s i d e r h o l d s t h a t language i s t h e p r o d u c t o f the o p e r a t i o n o f complex k i n d s o f i n t e n t i o n s i n agents, where t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e s e complex of  i n t e n t i o n s presupposes t h e e x i s t e n c e , p r i o r to the p o s s e s s i o n  language, o f complex k i n d s o f awareness.  as meaning-nominalism.  The p o s i t i o n i s known  I hope to show u l t i m a t e l y t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o  what S e l l a r s argues, some form.of awareness i s presupposed by t h e p r o c e s s o f a c q u i r i n g language; and t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f m e a n i n g - n o m i n a l i s t s , c e r t a i n complex forms o f awareness must be seen as  the product o f , and not e n t e r i n t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f , the a c q u i s i t i o n  of  language. A c c o r d i n g t o meaning-nominalism,  the i n d i v i d u a l instance of  meaning, s p e c i f i c a l l y o f G r i c e a n meaning, i s l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o , s i m p l e r than, a n y t h i n g which might be c l a s s e d as c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning.  The  G r i c e a n account of meaning, which a n a l y z e s 'By u t t e r i n g x, U meant t h a t  P'  i n t o a complex statement about U's  i n t e n t i o n s and which  i n no  way  a l l u d e s to the concept o f language, i s always taken as the c o r n e r s t o n e of meaning-nominalism.  S i n c e the p u b l i c a t i o n o f G r i c e ' s well-known  22 paper i n 1957,  then, p r o b a b l y a g r e a t many p h i l o s o p h e r s of  have been m e a n i n g - n o m i n a l i s t s ; but few have t r i e d the d e t a i l s o f t h a t programme. have done us t h a t s e r v i c e .  language  to work out  explicitly  Jonathan Bennett i s among the few  who  In a paper, "The Meaning-Nominalist S t r a t e g y " ,  Bennett o f f e r s what he c o n s i d e r s to be a " s u b s t a n t i a l v i n d i c a t i o n o f meaning-nominalism,  as not j u s t a p i o u s hope but a p r a c t i c a l  analytic  23 programme";  t h i s same concern c o n s t i t u t e s one o f the c e n t r a l themes o f  h i s book, L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour.  Being a c l e a r statement o f a p o s i t i o n  which I i n t e n d to show i s c l e a r l y f a l s e , Bennett's f o r m u l a t i o n o f the m e a n i n g - n o m i n a l i s t ' s p o s i t i o n s e r v e s as an e x c e l l e n t t a r g e t f o r an a t t a c k on the t e n a b i l i t y o f t h a t p o s i t i o n i n g e n e r a l . I s h a l l argue t h a t m e a n i n g - n o m i n a l i s t s , as r e p r e s e n t e d by Bennett, a r e j u s t wrong about what G r i c e has shown.  I shall  attempt  to show what Lewis p r o b a b l y meant when he s a i d t h a t G r i c e a n meaning 24 i s "a consequence  of conventional s i g n a l i n g " ;  i n s t a n c e o f o c c a s i o n meaning which (it  i s my  s p e c i f i c a l l y that  an  i s an i n s t a n c e o f G r i c e a n meaning,  o p i n i o n t h a t G r i c e a n meaning i s o n l y a sub-set o f what  G r i c e has c a l l e d  'meaning n o n n a t u r a l ' ) , must l o g i c a l l y presuppose  the  e x i s t e n c e o f , and e i t h e r the p r i o r or the p r e s e n t o p e r a t i o n o f , c o n v e n t i o n s . I s h a l l proceed by t r y i n g to show, i n the p r e s e n t c h a p t e r , where  Bennett  and, though l e s s o b v i o u s l y , p r o b a b l y G r i c e as w e l l , makes an  assumption t o which he i s t o t a l l y u n e n t i t l e d and thereby to  isn't forced  see t h a t c o n v e n t i o n s must be o p e r a t i n g f o r any i n s t a n c e s o f G r i c e a n  meaning t o o c c u r .  Finally,  i n Chapter  VI subsequent t o some g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n s , b o t h c r i t i c a l and, h o p e f u l l y , s u g g e s t i v e , o f the g e n e r a l problem o f the n a t u r e o f awareness, I w i l l o f f e r my own rough s k e t c h of  the a n c e s t r y , l o g i c a l and c h r o n o l o g i c a l as w e l l , o f a f i r s t  of  G r i c e a n meaning. Some d e f i n i t i o n s w i l l be h e l p f u l a t the o u t s e t .  I am c a l l i n g  occasion  I take what  'Gricean meaning' t o be d e f i n e d by G r i c e as f o l l o w s :  'U meant something by u t t e r i n g x' i s t r u e i f f , f o r some audience A, U u t t e r e d x i n t e n d i n g (1) A t o produce a p a r t i c u l a r response r (2) A to t h i n k ( r e c o g n i z e ) t h a t U i n t e n d s (1) (3) A t o f u l f i l l (1) on t h e b a s i s o f h i s f u l f i l l m e n t of (2). 2 5  I s h a l l o f t e n speak, as w e l l , o f an agent h a v i n g a G r i c e a n  intention,  meaning thereby t h a t h i s u t t e r a n c e i s an i n s t a n c e o f G r i c e a n meaning. When I speak o f a L e w i s i a n r e g u l a r i t y , o r a c o n v e n t i o n , I have i n mind the f o l l o w i n g account  which o c c u r s  i n Convention:  A r e g u l a r i t y R i n t h e b e h a v i o r o f . t h e members o f a p o p u l a t i o n P when they a r e agents i n a r e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n S i s a c o n v e n t i o n i f and o n l y i f i t i s t r u e t h a t , and i t i s common knowledge i n P t h a t , i n any i n s t a n c e o f S among the members o f P, (1) everyone conforms to R; (2) everyone expects everyone e l s e to conform t o R; (3) everyone p r e f e r s t o conform t o R on c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e o t h e r s do, s i n c e S i s a c o o r d i n a t i o n problem and u n i f o r m c o n f o r m i t y to R i s a c o o r d i n a t i o n e q u i l i b r i u m i n S. ^ 2  ii)  L e t me b e g i n by i n t r o d u c i n g Bennett's  which he p r e s e n t s i n L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour  p r i m e v a l case.  The case  i s d i f f e r e n t , but n o t f o r my  purposes s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t , i n "The Meaning-Nominalist  from t h e s i t u a t i o n which he e n v i s a g e s  Strategy".  I w i l l r e f e r only to the l a t t e r  but t h e p o i n t s which I make a g a i n s t i t w i l l  a p p l y e q u a l l y t o the  former. In "The Meaning-Nominalist  S t r a t e g y " , then, we a r e i n v i t e d  to c o n s i d e r a t r i b e o f a n t h r o p o i d organisms  and t o imagine a steady  growth i n our knowledge o f them; a p o i n t i s reached i n our o b s e r v a t i o n s a t which "we have l e a r n e d a g r e a t d e a l about our s u b j e c t - t r i b e ' s needs and wants and p e r c e p t i o n s and b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g b e l i e f s about  i n t e n t i o n s and so f o r t h , though we have n o t y e t  been i n a p o s i t i o n t o c r e d i t  them w i t h a language o r even w i t h ever 27  meaning a n y t h i n g by what they do". f o l l o w i n g event:  At t h i s p o i n t , we w i t n e s s the  " U t t e r e r performs a crude enactment o f a man b e i n g  h i t on t h e head by a heavy o b j e c t , and Audience sees t h i s and s t e p s out from under t h e palm-tree j u s t b e f o r e a coconut f a l l s on t h e p l a c e where 28 he was s t a n d i n g . " I t i s never q u i t e c l e a r what Bennett t h i n k s he i s d e s c r i b i n g i n h i s paper:  (1) How we as o b s e r v e r s c o u l d l e a r n about an a n t h r o p o i d a l  t r i b e ' s a l r e a d y f u l l y o p e r a t i v e language, o r (2) How they c o u l d develop such a language b e f o r e our eyes. he i s q u i t e e x p l i c i t  actually  I n L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, however,  about h i s g o a l ; the " d e c o r a t i v e c h r o n o l o g i c a l  a s i d e , what he r e a l l y wants i s " l o g i c a l  independence":  garb"  "When I say, 'We  can now a p p l y concept C to the t r i b e , but n o t y e t C*', I r e a l l y mean t h a t 29 the a p p l i c a t i o n o f C does n o t l o g i c a l l y r e q u i r e t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f C*." But Bennett does n o t seem to see t h a t he has, i n s a y i n g t h i s , now chosen  33 between the two  a l t e r n a t e ways of l o o k i n g at h i s p r i m e v a l  case:  He  hereby promised to g i v e us a s t o r y about the i n t e r n a l , l o g i c a l ment of the tribesmen's system of concepts. way,  however, he c o n t i n u a l l y tends to l o o k at and  i n terms of the o t h e r way. p l a u s i b l e " the h y p o t h e s i s  He  to e s t a b l i s h (at l e a s t  behavioural  struggles with  t h a t we  on the b a s i s of b e h a v i o u r a l is,  D e s p i t e having  chosen i n t h i s  ( 1 ) , t r y i n g to  "render  c o u l d a t t r i b u t e to these c r e a t u r e s ,  evidence,  c e r t a i n b e l i e f s and  But  the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be)  t h a t i s j u s t not  purely  sense of mean) by  same b e l i e f s  i n t e n t i o n s , which i s i n f a c t much more l i k e t r y i n g to d e s c r i b e succeed i n g i v i n g p u r e l y b e h a v i o u r a l , of a G r i c e a n  s p e c i f i c conventions.  b e h a v i o u r of an agent, though i t may  My  a c e r t a i n a b i l i t y , may  to make and  challenge,  then,  a  be,  The  w e l l be c o n c l u s i v e evidence i n f a c t g e n e r a l l y w i l l be,  for no  i n h i s p a s t , of what concepts of which he  is this:  Can  ability  the s t a t e of mind r e q u i r e d both  to c o r r e c t l y i n t e r p r e t a G r i c e a n u t t e r a n c e be achieved  o f a system of conventions?  for  conventions—it is  i s a l r e a d y i n command, account f o r the e x i s t e n c e of t h a t present of h i s .  To  i n s t a n c e s of G r i c e a n u t t e r a n c e s which do  not r e q u i r e the e x p l i c i t o p e r a t i o n of any  i n d i c a t i o n of what e x p e r i e n c e s  (2).  to prove t h a t t h e r e can be  i n t e n t i o n p r i o r to the e x i s t e n c e of l i n g u i s t i c  a t t r i b u t i n g to him  and  t h a t i s n o n - l i n g u i s t i c , evidence  i n t e n t i o n i s not  o n l y to show t h a t t h e r e can be  our  the same t h i n g as g i v i n g an a n a l y s i s of  the dependence r e l a t i o n s h i p s which e x i s t between those  the o c c u r r e n c e  solely  i n t e n t i o n s ; that  c r i t e r i a which would e n t i t l e us to say of the members of  what they do.  present  develop-  to argue f o r h i s example  s u b j e c t - t r i b e t h a t they mean something ( i n the G r i c e a n  Gricean  has  outside  Bennett., whose " r e a l c o n e e r n ' - i s ' t h e o l o g i c a l  independence" of c e r t a i n concepts, for  s p e c i f i c a l l y of the concepts  required  G r i c e a n meaning from those p o s s i b l e o n l y w i t h the o p e r a t i o n of conven-  t i o n , must show us how mind without  we  can account  a p p e a l i n g to c o n v e n t i o n s .  f o r the e x i s t e n c e of t h a t s t a t e of Bennett's  meaning-nominalism needs  an answer to ( 2 ) ; a t b e s t he g i v e s us a r a t h e r p e c u l i a r p i c t u r e of ( 1 ) .  iii) to  That b r i n g s us to Bennett's  u n w i t t i n g assumption which manages  sneak i n u n n o t i c e d because he i s answering  amswering ( 2 ) .  Bennett's  first  (1) when he should  be  i n s t a n c e o f a G r i c e a n i n t e n t i o n , not  mention the many i n s t a n c e s of agents o f f e r i n g " i n t e n t i o n - f r e e  to  evidence"  31 p r i o r to i t ,  depends upon the agents i n v o l v e d p o s s e s s i n g a t h e o r y o f ,  b e l i e f s about, o t h e r minds.  We  c e r t a i n l y know how  to g i v e b e h a v i o u r a l  evidence, which anyone but a s o l i p s i s t would a c c e p t , to support b u t i o n of such b e l i e f s : Bennett  has arranged  Bennett's  example does n i c e l y .  attri-  I t i s a warning;  the case so t h a t i t i s a s i n c e r e warning  has n o t h i n g to g a i n p e r s o n a l l y from h i s b e h a v i o u r ) .  the  (the u t t e r e r  S i n c e r e warnings r e s t  on a l t r u i s m , on concern  f o r someone e l s e ' s w e l f a r e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , f o r h i s  avoidance  of p a i n .  o f c o u r s e , b e l i e f s about o t h e r s ' w e l f a r e ,  p a i n s and  p l e a s u r e s , e n t a i l b e l i e f s about t h e i r minds.  And  But has  their  Bennett  done a n y t h i n g b e s i d e s d e s c r i b e a s i t u a t i o n about which we would be to  say t h a t , yes, the u t t e r e r and,  about o t h e r minds?  yes, the audience  In p a r t i c u l a r has he t o l d us how  i n v o l v e d have b e l i e f s they c o u l d have ever  come to have those b e l i e f s ?  Has  e x i s t e n c e of those b e l i e f s ?  Meaning-nominalism, a t h e s i s about the  he not r a t h e r j u s t had  to assume the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s between concepts, must make no such assumptions. indeed  willing  logical  I f , as i s  the case, t h e r e cannot be an i n s t a n c e of G r i c e a n meaning u n l e s s  both  35 the u t t e r e r and t h e audience i n v o l v e d  have a concept o f o t h e r minds, then  the m e a n i n g - n o m i n a l i s t , to make h i s case, must show t h a t  t h e concept o f  o t h e r minds i s independent o f any form o f c o n v e n t i o n a l meaning. as  I see i t , t h e c r i t i c a l  a t e s t which, as I i n t e n d The  This i s ,  t e s t f o r t h e m e a n i n g - n o m i n a l i s t ; i t i s , moreover, t o show, he must i n e v i t a b l y  fail.  c l o s e s t Bennett's h a n d l i n g o f nominalism ever comes t o even  b r o a c h i n g t h i s important problem i s h i s acknowledgement o f a s l i g h t c h a l l e n g e i n showing t h a t n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r i s c a p a b l e o f s u p p o r t i n g the a t t r i b u t i o n o f b e l i e f s about i n t e n t i o n s beliefs.  and o f i n t e n t i o n s  O b v i o u s l y , i f one can a t t r i b u t e an i n t e n t i o n  (in a full-blooded  t o produce  to produce a b e l i e f  sense o f i n t e n t i o n and b e l i e f — I s h a l l e l a b o r a t e s h o r t l y ) ,  then one i s a l s o a t t r i b u t i n g a t h e o r y o f o t h e r minds. A c l o s e l o o k a t Bennett's attempts t o d e a l w i t h the c h a l l e n g e which he  sees r e v e a l s  i s r e a l l y there.  t h a t he has n o t s u c c e s s f u l l y d e a l t w i t h t h e c h a l l e n g e  I n " T h e Meaning-Nominalist S t r a t e g y " he o f f e r s an argument  which p u r p o r t s t o show t h a t  i f n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r can support the  a t t r i b u t i o n o f simple b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s  then i t can a l s o  a t t r i b u t i o n o f more complex b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s : intentions The  and o f i n t e n t i o n s  of n o n - l i n g u i s t i c (1)  support t h e  o f b e l i e f s about  t o produce b e l i e f s .  argument has two premises i n which he uses  i n t e n t i o n Z b e l i e f J ' t o mean basis  that  "'non-linguistic  'intention / b e l i e f / attributed  s o l e l y on the  behaviour'":  "Non-linguistic  b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s  are behavioural  d i s p o s i t i o n s o f c e r t a i n s o r t s ; o r a t l e a s t the e x i s t e n c e o f b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s can be s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e  existence (2)  o f b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s . "  "There can be a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c i n t e n t i o n t o produce a c e r t a i n d i s p o s i t i o n i n something (e.g.  t o make i t f l e x i b l e  or f r i e n d l y ) , and t h e r e can be a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f t h a t something has a c e r t a i n d i s p o s i t i o n (e.g.  that  i ti s fragile  or a f r a i d ) . " Substituting  from (1) i n t o  (2) on t h e b a s i s o f the r e o c c u r r e n c e o f  ' d i s p o s i t i o n s ' , Bennett concludes t h a t , " I f those premises a r e r i g h t , then n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s about i n t e n t i o n s , don't i n v o l v e any d i f f i c u l t y o f principle;  f o r they a r e j u s t i n t e n t i o n s  t o produce ( o r b e l i e f s about) 32  d i s p o s i t i o n s which a r e merely more complex than f l e x i b i l i t y o r f e a r . " Above I spoke o f a ' f u l l - b l o o d e d sense' o f i n t e n t i o n and b e l i e f ; i n t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f Bennett's argument, I s h a l l t r y t o c l a r i f y what I had i n mind, t h e r e b y showing t h a t of which Bennett speaks i s c o n s i d e r a b l y Let's  first  t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n 'complexity' more s i g n i f i c a n t than he a l l o w s .  l o o k a t Bennett's r a t h e r  does 'can be s u f f i c i e n t ' mean anyway?).  s t r a n g e premise  (1)—(what  G r a n t i n g t h a t p a r t o f what non-  l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s a r e i s b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  that  cannot be s u f f i c i e n t — p l a n t s d i s p l a y b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s t o t u r n towards the sun but we would r e s i s t a s c r i b i n g e i t h e r i n t e n t i o n s o r b e l i e f s  33 to them t o account f o r t h e i r b e h a v i o u r . comes up w i t h another important i n g r e d i e n t , d i s p o s i t i o n s , which i s i n v o l v e d A,believes  a d d i t i o n a l to behavioural  i n n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s :  t h a t P e n t a i l s t h a t "A i s h i g h l y  kinds of propositions  I n L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour Bennett  educable w i t h r e g a r d t o many  which do not e x c l u d e any important k i n d s t o which P  37 belongs."  34  T h i s i s an  important a d d i t i o n .  C e r t a i n l y i t gives  (at l e a s t p a r t o f ) the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r our i n t e n t i o n s and  b e l i e f s to p l a n t s .  us  r e l u c t a n c e to a s c r i b e  What e x a c t l y , i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s ,  an account o f e d u c a b i l i t y w i l l l o o k l i k e i s , of course,  f a r from c l e a r .  I t does seem c l e a r , however t h a t t h e r e i s some such c a p a c i t y f o r which an account must be g i v e n and standing  have some g e n e r a l  under-  of what t h a t c a p a c i t y amounts t o . The  r e a l l y important t h i n g to note about Bennett's f i r s t  though, i s t h i s : and not  f u r t h e r t h a t we  I t i s about a s u b - c l a s s of b e l i e f s and  about a l l b e l i e f s and  premise.  intentions;  premise  intentions  the same i s t r u e of h i s second  In h i s c o n c l u s i o n , however, Bennett i l l e g i t i m a t e l y moves  from t a l k i n g about the s u b - c l a s s , n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and to the i n c l u s i v e c l a s s , b e l i e f s and  intentions i n general.  I hope i t would be r e a d i l y conceded t h a t t h e r e i s a blooded sense of b e l i e f and a mere b e h a v i o u r a l  intentions,  full-  i n t e n t i o n which i n v o l v e s much more than  d i s p o s i t i o n and  a p o t e n t i a l to be educated i n t o  or out of t h a t same d i s p o s i t i o n , and  t h a t the concept of a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c  b e l i e f which can o n l y be b e h a v i o u r a l l y m a n i f e s t e d  i n very  specific  s i t u a t i o n s i s a d e r i v a t i v e of the concept of a b e l i e f which i s c o n s c i o u s l y formulable me  and  e x p l i c i t l y e x p r e s s i b l e under any  i l l u s t r a t e the degree of complexity  circumstances.  which Bennett has  Let  allowed  to  s l i p i n by moving i n h i s c o n c l u s i o n from t a l k i n g about n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and  i n t e n t i o n s to t a l k i n g about b e l i e f s and  g e n e r a l , which i n c l u d e s f u l l - b l o o d e d b e l i e f s and l e t me  intentions in  intentions.  i l l u s t r a t e the d i f f e r e n c e i n the complexity  of a mere  That i s , behavioural  38 disposition  ( p l u s e d u c a b i l i t y ) and  I have a b e l i e f I should  not  a f u l l - b l o o d e d b e l i e f or i n t e n t i o n .  t h a t i n a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n a red l i g h t means t h a t  c r o s s the s t r e e t ; but  i t simply  i s not  t r u e t h a t the  evidence which c o u l d be c o l l e c t e d to support the a t t r i b u t i o n of a b e l i e f to me  would be my  behaviour i n t h a t v e r y  i s i t t r u e t h a t the o n l y way i n v o l v e me  I c o u l d be  encountering several  specific  educated out of my  nor  could  i t be  shown t h a t the o n l y way  t h a t b e l i e f was  by b e i n g  'red-light' situations:  In f a c t , i f my  more of t h i s i n Chapter VI) ( s o l e l y ) i n t h a t way.  belief,  with others; and  I can  b e l i e f about r e d - l i g h t s i n v o l v e s regularity (i.e. convention—  represent  my  belief;  belief;  I can a p p r e c i a t e  most important, my  up n a t u r a l l y ; I  I t r y to i n t r o d u c e  i n someone e l s e , my affect his  'picture o f  a c o r r e s p o n d i n g , and  can  representation,  I can be exposed to belief;  the L e w i s i a n  b e l i e f can  my  b e l i e f to myself  through the mechanism of a shared  i n t h i s case a s m a l l p a r t o f , my if  unchallenging;  accept or d i s p e l or d i s r e g a r d arguments a g a i n s t my  i n v o l v e d ; and,  the  at work, then I c o u l d not have come to  I can argue f o r or from my  a s s e r t or deny my  b e l i e f would  I c o u l d ever have come to h o l d  o u t s i d e of the s i t u a t i o n i n which i t i s c o n j u r e d share my  situation; neither  educated i n t o i t through encounters w i t h  an adequate a p p r e c i a t i o n of the L e w i s i a n  belief  such  ' r e d - l i g h t ' s i t u a t i o n s i n which  c a r s behaved i n ways which made c r o s s i n g the s t r e e t  only  can  regularity  form a p a r t o f , myself, my  I  albeit  'self-concept';  similarly full-blooded belief  endeavor e n t a i l s the awareness t h a t I am  t r y i n g to  'self-concept'.  I t h i n k Bennett would agree t h a t a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f intention, a behavioural  d i s p o s i t i o n s u s c e p t i b l e of e d u c a t i o n ,  or  does not  39 at l e a s t e n t a i l any b e l i e f s about  the agent's own  or o t h e r s ' ' s e l f -  concepts'; but he has not o f f e r e d us any argument to support the c l a i m t h a t they c o u l d l o g i c a l l y support such b e l i e f s . argument i n "The Meaning-Nominalist a c c e p t s h i s premises  So r e a l l y a l l Bennett's  S t r a t e g y " shows i s t h a t , i f one  ( w i t h the amended v e r s i o n o f (1), I would be  w i l l i n g t o ) , then one would have to agree t h a t t h e r e can be l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s about n o n - l i n g u i s t i c i n t e n t i o n s and i n t e n t i o n s to produce n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s .  non-linguistic  I f a c r e a t u r e capable  o f o n l y n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s had a b e l i e f o r had  non-  about,  i n t e n t i o n a l l y produced, an i n t e n t i o n o r b e l i e f which was  i n fact  f u l l - b l o o d e d , such a c r e a t u r e would be i n c a p a b l e o f a p p r e c i a t i n g more than the b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n element.  This conclusion  involving  o n l y these s i m p l e r types o f b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s i s easy to a c c e p t ; but i t c e r t a i n l y doesn't get the m e a n i n g - n o m i n a l i s t ' s p r i m e v a l ( G r i c e a n ) case o f f the ground.  The i n t e n t i o n s and b e l i e f s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s a r g u -  ment a r e a l l m a n i p u l a t i v e ; what one needs f o r t h i s p r i m e v a l case to work p r o p e r l y a r e communicative it  ones.  To have a communicative  intention  i s n e c e s s a r y to have b e l i e f s about, and thus to have a concept o f ,  both one's own  and o t h e r s ' minds.  To have a concept o f one's own  mind,  of one's b e l i e f s , g o a l s , or p r o j e c t s , appears to i n v o l v e , as I have t r i e d to i l l u s t r a t e , a complex c a p a c i t y to r e p r e s e n t o n e s e l f to o n e s e l f , to r e p r e s e n t one's b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s f o r or to o n e s e l f .  The  of o t h e r minds, moreover, seems t i e d to the concept o f one's own  concept mind  a t l e a s t to the e x t e n t t h a t i t w i l l not be p o s s i b l e , f o r example, to have a concept o f the p r o j e c t s o f o t h e r s (other than i n a p u r e l y b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n sense) p r i o r to a concept o f one's own  projects.  The meaning-nominalist  has n o t shown us how a l a n g u a g e l e s s c r e a t u r e  c o u l d have b e l i e f s about h i s own and o t h e r s ' minds and t h e r e f o r e he has not shown us how such a c r e a t u r e c o u l d have communicative  intentions.  By c o n t r a s t , t o have a m a n i p u l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n i t i s n e c e s s a r y o n l y t o have b e l i e f s about o b j e c t s — t o be c o n s c i o u s but n o t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s . Some o f t h e o b j e c t s about which the n o n - s e l f - c o n s c i o u s c r e a t u r e has b e l i e f s may be a c t i v e and i n some cases t h i s a c t i v i t y may i n v o l v e the presence  o f a c o n s c i o u s b e i n g , perhaps even, though n o t i n t h e p r i m e v a l  case, a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s b e i n g .  But t h i s f a c t w i l l  go u n a p p r e c i a t e d  by a c r e a t u r e capable o f o n l y m a n i p u l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n s . i n t e n t i o n s , then, e n t a i l thoughts  Communicative  about one's own and o t h e r ' s minds;  m a n i p u l a t i v e ones do n o t .  iv)  Bennett  doesn't  do any b e t t e r i n L i n g u i s t i c  begins h i s s e c t i o n 34, " B e l i e f s  Behaviour.  He  about b e l i e f s " , w i t h the v e r y c o n f i d e n t  35 statement,  "There can a l s o be l a n g u a g e l e s s b e l i e f s about b e l i e f s " ,  and never l o o k s back from t h e r e .  Remember t h a t what he ought t o be  doing i n t h i s s e c t i o n i f he wants to support t h i s c o n f i d e n t is this:  i)  statement  g i v i n g a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f what i s i n v o l v e d i n a.  h a v i n g a b e l i e f about JJ'S b e l i e f , and then, i i )  showing how a  l a n g u a g e l e s s a. c o u l d s u c c e s s f u l l y f u l f i l l :those. l o g i c a l But Bennett  requirements.  simply d i s m i s s e s t h e need f o r t h a t k i n d o f p r o -  gramme; by the end o f t h r e e s h o r t paragraphs  i n a section  supposedly  aimed a t p r o v i n g t h a t a l a n g u a g e l e s s c r e a t u r e c o u l d have b e l i e f s another c r e a t u r e ' s b e l i e f s , Bennett  has e f f e c t i v e l y  t o l d u s : Of.  c o u r s e a l a n g u a g e l e s s c r e a t u r e a. c o u l d have b e l i e f s about  another  about  c r e a t u r e b_'s b e l i e f s — a l l  t h a t a_ l a c k s i s a language but t h a t i s c e r t a i n l y  no h u r d l e — n o w , t o t u r n t o a more s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n , What b e h a v i o u r a l evidence c o u l d we have t o j u s t i f y a t t r i b u t i n g such a b e l i e f t o a? How c o u l d l a n g u a g e l e s s a_ b e h a v i o u r a l l y m a n i f e s t such a b e l i e f ?  Of  course we r e c o g n i z e t h e move; i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h e same one which I remarked  on e a r l y i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n .  Bennett i s t a l k i n g about (1),  what counts as s u f f i c i e n t b e h a v i o u r a l evidence f o r a s c r i b i n g a c e r t a i n b e l i e f t o a. when he ought  t o be showing  (2), how t h i s p a r t i c u l a r  belief  of the l a n g u a g e l e s s a. i s accounted f o r by h i s o t h e r b e l i e f s and how any of h i s b e l i e f s a r e accounted f o r by h i s e x p e r i e n c e s . a t i o n o f t h e f o u r t h and f i f t h paragraphs  ( C a r e f u l examin-  i n s e c t i o n 34 r e v e a l s , I  b e l i e v e , t h a t Bennett doesn'toeven make good h i s promise .to g i v e - u s - a n answer t o  (1).^)  I s h a l l r e t u r n e v e n t u a l l y , i n Chapter V I , t o t h e i s s u e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e n t i o n s and c o n v e n t i o n s and attempt an a l t e r n a t i v e t o Bennett's meaning-nominalist  account.  to provide  42 NOTES  W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , " E m p i r i c i s m and the P h i l o s o p h y of Mind," i n S c i e n c e , P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i b r a r y o f P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: R o u t l e d g e & Kegan P a u l , 1963). 1  2 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "The S t r u c t u r e o f Knowledge: (1) P e r c e p t i o n , (2) Minds, (3) E p i s t e m i c P r i n c i p l e s , " i n A c t i o n , Knowledge and R e a l i t y : Essays i n Honor of W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , ed. H e c t o r - N e r i Castaneda ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : The B o b b s - M e r r i l l Company, I n c . , 1975). 3 S e l l a r s , 'Empiricism and t h e P h i l o s o p h y of Mind," P- 160. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22  Sellars,  'Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 167.  Sellars,  'The S t r u c t u r e o f Knowledge,"  p. 320.  S e l l a r s , ''The S t r u c t u r e of Knowledge,"  p. 322.  Sellars,  1  'The S t r u c t u r e o f Knowledge,"  p. 322.  Sellars,  1  'Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y of Mind," P- 167.  Sellars,  1  'Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 167.  S e l l a r s , ''The S t r u c t u r e o f Knowledge,"  p. 322.  Sellars,  1  'Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 167.  Sellars,  1  'The S t r u c t u r e o f Knowledge,"  p. 324.  S e l l a r s , ''Empiricism and:the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 168. Sellars,  1  'Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 168.  Sellars,  1  'Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P-  Sellars,  1  'Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 169.  168.  S e l l a r s , ''Empiricism and t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 169. S e l l a r s , ''Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 169. Sellars,  1  'Empiricism and t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 168.  S e l l a r s , ''Empiricism and t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 169. Sellars,  1  'Empiricism and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," P- 169.  H.P. . G r i c e , "Meaning," P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 66 (1957).  43 23  Jonathan B e n n e t t , "The M e a n i n g - N o m i n a l i s t S t r a t e g y , " of Language, 10 (1973), 149.  Foundations  24 D a v i d K. L e w i s , C o n v e n t i o n : A P h i l o s o p h i c a l Study (Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969), p. 154. 25 H.P. G r i c e , " U t t e r e r ' s Meaning and I n t e n t i o n s , " P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 78 (1969), 151. 26 L e w i s , C o n v e n t i o n , p. 58. 27 28  B e n n e t t , "The M e a n i n g - N o m i n a l i s t S t r a t e g y , " p.  146.  B e n n e t t , "The M e a n i n g - N o m i n a l i s t S t r a t e g y , " p.  147.  29  Jonathan B e n n e t t , L i n g u i s t i c B e h a v i o u r (Cambridge: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976), p. 137. 30 31 32  B e n n e t t , L i n g u i s t i c B e h a v i o u r , p.  137.  B e n n e t t , L i n g u i s t i c B e h a v i o u r , p.  138.  B e n n e t t , "The M e a n i n g - N o m i n a l i s t S t r a t e g y , " p.  Cambridge  145.  33  N o t i c e t h a t i f we r e s i s t a s c r i b i n g b e h a v i o u r t o p l a n t s then we must admit t h a t t h e concept of b e h a v i o u r i s a l o a d e d one: I t implies the presence o f b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s . Then, r a t h e r than b e i n g a b l e to a s c r i b e b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s on the b a s i s of b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e we would have t o a s c r i b e b e h a v i o u r on t h e b a s i s of e v i d e n c e of t h e presence of b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s ; presumably t h i s e v i d e n c e would t a k e t h e form o f a c t i v i t y i n the organisms under s u r v e i l l a n c e . I am u s i n g 'behaviour' i n the s i m p l e sense which i m p l i e s a c t i v i t y but which does not i m p l y b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s . Bennett i s c l e a r l y u s i n g i t i n t h i s way as w e l l — h e speaks of the b e h a v i o u r of g r a s s and of s e l f - g u i d i n g m i s s i l e s (see L i n g u i s t i c B e h a v i o u r , p. 5 2 ) . 34 B e n n e t t , L i n g u i s t i c B e h a v i o u r , p. 87. 35 B e n n e t t , L i n g u i s t i c B e h a v i o u r , p.  110.  36 To f u l f i l l h i s promise t o g i v e us an answer t o ( 1 ) — t o g i v e us what would count as b e h a v i o u r a l e v i d e n c e f o r a s c r i b i n g t o a a b e l i e f about _b's b e l i e f s — B e n n e t t must g i v e us b e h a v i o u r of a's which c o n v i n c e s us t h a t not o n l y d i d a. b e l i e v e t h a t b_ was g o i n g t o do s o m e t h i n g — i n t h e case w h i c h Bennett c o n s i d e r s , a. b e l i e v e s t h a t b_ i s g o i n g t o d i v e i n t o t h e w a t e r — b u t as w e l l , a.'s b e h a v i o u r must c o n v i n c e us t h a t a h o l d s t h a t b e l i e f about b_ on the b a s i s of b e l i e f about b's b e l i e f s . Bennett needs, t h a t i s , a case such t h a t we, as o b s e r v e r s , a r e "unable to e x p l a i n a_'s coming to t h i n k t h a t b w i l l swim except by s u p p o s i n g / something l i k e _ / t h a t a_ has j u s t come t o t h i n k t h a t b b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e i s a p r e d a t o r nearby." (Linguistic B e h a v i o u r , p. I l l ) U l t i m a t e l y , Bennett r e g r e s s e s i n s t e a d i n t o a reminder  44 about, (3) what b e h a v i o u r a l evidence e i t h e r we or a would need to j u s t i f y a t t r i b u t i n g a b e l i e f to b. He g i v e s us an example which he f e e l s c l i n c h e s (1): "Some event has j u s t o c c u r r e d , p e r c e p t i b l e to a., which would be apt to make JD t h i n k t h e r e was a p r e d a t o r nearby, and n o t h i n g e l s e has happened which bears i n any way on the l i k e l i h o o d of Jp_'S swimming", and a_ has g i v e n us b e h a v i o u r a l evidence to the e f f e c t t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h a t b w i l l swim. Bennett t h i n k s t h a t p r o v i d e d (3) i s f u l f i l l e d , we c o u l d , g i v e n such a case, " r e a s o n a b l y c o n j e c t u r e t h a t a_ reached h i s b e l i e f t h a t Jp_ would swim v i a a b e l i e f t h a t ID b e l i e v e d t h a t he was t h r e a t e n e d by a p r e dator." ( L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, p. I l l ) S p e l l e d - o u t , the argument l u r k ing i n the example l o o k s l i k e t h i s : a)  a. f u l f i l l s the requirements f o r the a t t r i b u t i o n of the b e l i e f t h a t b_ w i l l jump; b) JD f u l f i l l s the requirements f o r the a t t r i b u t i o n of the b e l i e f t h a t a p r e d a t o r i s nearby and of the i n t e n t i o n to jump; ( i . e . (3) i s s a t i s f i e d ) ; c) we can see t h a t a. i s w i t n e s s to the b e h a v i o u r a l evidence which j u s t i f i e s the a t t r i b u t i o n s made to b_ i n (b) ; d) we know t h a t a. has not been w i t n e s s to any o t h e r evidence b e s i d e s t h a t r e f e r r e d to i n (c) which would l e a d him to the b e l i e f a t t r i b u t e d to him i n ( a ) ; Conclusion: e) a. a r r i v e d at the b e l i e f a t t r i b u t e d to him i n (a) v i a the bel i e f ( f o r which (c) a s s u r e s us he has s u f f i c i e n t evidence) t h a t JD b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e i s a p r e d a t o r nearby. The o n l y b e l i e f which a_ m a n i f e s t s i n the example i s d e s c r i b e d i n (a) and the o n l y way i n which we c o u l d a t t r i b u t e to a_, on the b a s i s of the premises, the f u r t h e r b e l i e f d e s c r i b e d i n the c o n c l u s i o n i s by assuming (as Bennett e x p l i c i t l y d o e s ) , t h a t i f a_ has the n e c e s s a r y e p i s t e m i c input to have a b e l i e f about JD'S b e l i e f then he w i l l have t h a t b e l i e f (as l o n g as he i s capable of having b e l i e f s about Jp_ at a l l ) . But t h a t i s a v e r y l a r g e and t o t a l l y u n j u s t i f i a b l e assumption. Given t h a t a. has the e p i s t e m i c input n e c e s s a r y to have a b e l i e f about JD'S b e l i e f s , we don't need any of the p o s s i b l e sources of evidence which (d) b l o c k s i n o r d e r to show t h a t a_ c o u l d have g o t t e n h i s b e l i e f r e f e r r e d to i n (a) v i a some o t h e r l e s s complex r o u t e than a b e l i e f about JD'S b e l i e f . That i s to say, the b e h a v i o u r a l e v i dence which (c) t e l l s us a_ i s w i t n e s s to can be o r g a n i z e d i n v a r i o u s ways. One of the most, p r o b a b l y the most, complex way i n which a might o r g a n i z e t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n would i n v o l v e a. a t t r i b u t i n g a b e l i e f to JD. But t h e r e i s a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g i n the bare f a c t t h a t a., about whose o r g a n i z a t i o n schema we know n o t h i n g , i s w i t n e s s to t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n which f o r c e s us to the conc l u s i o n t h a t he has o r g a n i z e d i t i n t h i s complex way. L e t me i l l u s t r a t e by g i v i n g an a l t e r n a t e account of how (a) and (b) c o u l d be t r u e and e x p l a i n e d ( (c) and (d) can a l s o be t r u e but a r e now b e s i d e the p o i n t ) , without i n any way i m p l y i n g ( e ) : a. w i t n e s s e s a c e r t a i n e v e n t — a b e h a v i o u r a l l y d e s c r i b a b l e e v e n t — x i s c h a s i n g JD; a. knows t h a t whenever JD or or d or e are chased by x and t h e i r f l i g h t b r i n g s them to the water's edge, another event o c c u r s ; b or c or d or e jumps i n t o the water. I f the e f f e c t of t h a t jump i s r e l e v a n t to a., and i t p r o b a b l y i s or he wouldn't have n o t i c e d the conn e c t i o n which he has n o t i c e d , then when a. w i t n e s s e s such a c h a s i n g scene he w i l l r e a c t i n a way which g i v e s us b e h a v i o u r a l evidence to the e f f e c t t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h a t b_ w i l l jump. A b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g i n the example f o r c e s us to g i v e a. any but s e l f - c e n t r e d concepts.  45 CHAPTER I I  Givenness and  Sense-Data:  L o g i c a l l y and P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y A t t a c k e d  1. Introduction  I f S e l l a r s and Bennett have come a t the i s s u e o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between awareness and c o n v e n t i o n s from o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s and each has developed a p o s i t i o n which  i s u n a c c e p t a b l e , then i t seems  c l e a r t h a t the t r u t h o f the matter must l i e somewhere between these two p o s i t i o n s . attempt  T h i s i s , at any r a t e , the c o n t e n t i o n f o r which I w i l l  to o f f e r s u p p o r t .  On the one hand, and a g a i n s t S e l l a r s , I  w i l l argue t h a t some form o f awareness must precede, and indeed account f o r , the a c q u i s i t i o n o f language.  On the o t h e r hand, and  against  Bennett, I have argued a l r e a d y t h a t the k i n d o f awareness which  precedes  the a c q u i s i t i o n of language i s c a p a b l e o f s u p p o r t i n g o n l y a simple form of i n t e n t i o n which d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y from the complex G r i c e a n ones which he sees as p l a y i n g an e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n the o r i g i n s o f the phenomenon of c o n v e n t i o n s i n g e n e r a l and o f l i n g u i s t i c  conventions i n p a r t i c u l a r .  As  an a l t e r n a t i v e to Bennett's p o s i t i o n , then, I w i l l o f f e r some s u g g e s t i o n s as to how  the phenomenon of language a r i s e s i n a non-Gricean way  and,  h a v i n g a r i s e n , makes p o s s i b l e the o c c u r r e n c e o f G r i c e a n i n t e n t i o n s . But t h a t account must w a i t t i l l  Chapter VI.  In the p r e s e n t chapter  I w i l l examine the concepts o f givenness and  ' p r i m o r d i a l awareness'  a g a i n s t which S e l l a r s argues c o n v i n c i n g l y and as an a l t e r n a t i v e to which he o f f e r s the l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness which I have r e c e n t l y rejected.  I w i l l be concerned  to show t h a t S e l l a r s ' argument a g a i n s t  the concept o f givenness can be r i g h t and i t n e v e r t h e l e s s remain  the  case t h a t t h e r e i s an important, indeed an e s s e n t i a l , t r u t h hidden i n t h a t concept, u n h a p p i l y l a d e n as i t i s , w i t h an a c t / o b j e c t of s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e .  analysis  In f a c t I s h a l l argue t h a t S e l l a r s a c t u a l l y  retains  p r e c i s e l y t h a t a s p e c t o f the n o t i o n o f givenness which i s p r o b l e m a t i c . Thus though h i s argument shows t h e r e to be something  wrong w i t h the  i d e a o f an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l g i v e n , S e l l a r s i n e f f e c t draws the wrong c o n c l u s i o n from h i s own  argument.  The p r e s e n t c h a p t e r w i l l examine as w e l l a  phenomenological  argument which R o d e r i c k F i r t h b r i n g s a g a i n s t the t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a o f sense-data as e n t i t i e s g i v e n to us e i t h e r i n o r immediately p r i o r to moments o f p e r c e p t u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ment, F i r t h ' s argument presupposes  Being a phenomenological  the n o t i o n o f a  phenomenological  a p p e a l ; and by t a k i n g f o r granted the t r a d i t i o n a l a c t / o b j e c t of t h a t n o t i o n , F i r t h ' s argument, much i n the way to r e t a i n what's wrong about what's - r i g h t about  it.  argu-  analysis  S e l l a r s ' does, manages  Sense-datum Theory w h i l e j e t t i s o n i n g  Aga i n s t : both._ S e l l a r s and F i r t h I w i l l  argue  i n Chapter I I I t h a t a d i s t i n c t i o n must be made between awareness and awareness o f .  The  former w i l l be taken to be b a s i c , both  logically  and c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y , and an attempt w i l l be made i n Chapter IV to p o i n t the way  to a p o s s i b l e a n a l y s i s o f the l a t t e r i n terms o f the  former;  an a n a l y s i s which r e j e c t s , w h i l e a t the same time t r y i n g to account f o r  47 the apparent presence o f , an a c t / o b j e c t , knower/known, s u b j e c t / o b j e c t distinction,  i n a l l areas of the P h i l o s o p h y  of Mind.  2.  S e l l a r s ' L o g i c a l Argument A g a i n s t  i)  In "The  " p e r f e c t e d and  World W e l l L o s t " Rorty  the Given  speaks of a d i s t i n c t i o n  c o d i f i e d by Kant", between s p o n t a n e i t y  " S i n c e Kant", R o r t y  c l a i m s , "we  and  receptivity.  f i n d i t almost i m p o s s i b l e not  of the mind as d i v i d e d i n t o a c t i v e and  p a s s i v e f a c u l t i e s , the  u s i n g concepts to  ' i n t e r p r e t ' what 'the w o r l d ' imposes on the  That g i v e s us two  more d i s t i n c t i o n s :  conceptual;  and  latter".^ and  have t h a t which the mind p a s s i v e l y  t h a t which the mind a c t i v e l y c r e a t e s ,  the  as w e l l , the g i v e n must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h a t  which i s i t s cause, the w o r l d . and  think  former  A l o n g w i t h the r e c e p t i v e  spontaneous f a c u l t i e s of the mind, we undergoes, the g i v e n , and  to  The  tendency to t h i n k of  spontaneity  r e c e p t i v i t y as f a c u l t i e s o f the mind, which tendency b r i n g s i n  i t s t r a i n the three-way g i v e n / c o n s t r u c t e d / w o r l d  distinction,  t i e d to a p a r t i c u l a r , g e n e r a l l y unquestioned, c o n c e p t i o n Knowledge i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , and assumed to i n v o l v e a two a known o b j e c t .  f o r the most p a r t  i s closely  o f knowledge.  uncritically,  p a r t r e l a t i o n between a knowing s u b j e c t  Thus the proponents o f the  and  given/constructed/world  s p l i t have o f f e r e d i n defence of givenness the f o l l o w i n g types of argument: 1)  They have argued t h a t a l l knowledge which i s g e n e r a l or c l a s s i f a c t o r y i n n a t u r e ,  t h a t i s to say, which i s  c o n c e p t u a l l y mediated, must be a c q u i r e d ; and  i t must  48 be a c q u i r e d on the b a s i s o f some more b a s i c type of knowledge, knowledge which i s g i v e n d i r e c t l y , any 2)  conceptual  without  mediation.  They have argued t h a t our knowledge at the  conceptual  l e v e l must be f i r m l y founded by our knowledge at non-conceptual l e v e l , incorrigible  the l a t t e r amounting to a s e t of  (or i n f a l l i b l e o r i n d u b i t a b l e ) f a c t u a l  c l a i m s a g a i n s t which the t r u t h o r f a l s i t y of c l a i m s made at the former can be  the g i v e n / w o r l d  d i s t i n c t i o n s , then, we  w i t h the i s s u e o f whether or not we o f i n c o r r i g i b l e , and  and  the l i k e .  But  concerned  do have o r must have some form  q u e s t i o n s which a r e v a r i o u s l y formulated  iality,  given/constructed  have as w e l l q u e s t i o n s  therefore non-conceptually  immediate, o r , as S e l l a r s says,  factual  evaluated.  D i r e c t l y connected w i t h the s p o n t a n e i t y / r e c e p t i v i t y , the and  the  mediated, knowledge;  i n terms o f d i r e c t  access,  ' p r i m o r d i a l ' , awareness, n o n - i n f e r e n t -  s i n c e S e l l a r s wrote " E m p i r i c i s m  and  the  Philosophy  o f Mind", i t has been f r e q u e n t l y contended t h a t such t a l k i s u l t i m a t e l y incoherent.  ii)  S e l l a r s ' argument a g a i n s t the g i v e n i s a l o g i c a l one.  l a y s bare an i n c o n s i s t e n c y between:  1)  He  What k i n d of t h i n g must be  2 g i v e n i f the " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r y o f the g i v e n "  i s to be a b l e to  fulfill  2)  the purpose f o r which i t was  things are g e n e r a l l y conceived n o t i o n o f givenness  i n t r o d u c e d ; and,  What k i n d of  of as b e i n g g i v e n and must be g i v e n i f the  i s to meet o t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s which o p e r a t e on i t .  Thus the attempt to make sense of the concept  of givenness  by the f a c t t h a t on the one hand i t i s taken to i n v o l v e  i s thwarted  "nonverbal  episodes of awareness—awareness t h a t something i s the case, t h a t t h i s i s green",  and  e.g.  on the o t h e r hand i t i s g e n e r a l l y assumed  t h a t i t i s p a r t i c u l a r s r a t h e r than f a c t s — w h e r e p a r t i c u l a r s are c o n t e n t s and  f a c t s a r e "items of the form something's b e i n g  and-so or something's s t a n d i n g  sense  thus-  i n a c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n to something  4  e l s e " — w h i c h are given. foundation  In the f i r s t  case, i t i s i t s r o l e as  the  of e m p i r i c a l knowledge which d i c t a t e s t h a t a c q u i r i n g  the  g i v e n must amount to a c q u i r i n g f a c t s , to a c q u i r i n g " n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge of matter of f a c t " ; " ' w h i l e i n the second case, i t i s the t h a t , as S e l l a r s p u t s i t , "...most e m p i r i c a l l y minded are s t r o n g l y i n c l i n e d to t h i n k t h a t a l l c l a s s i f i c a t o r y  fact  philosophers consciousness,  a l l knowledge t h a t something i s thus-and-so, o r , i n l o g i c i a n s ' j a r g o n , all  subsumption o f p a r t i c u l a r s under u n i v e r s a l s , i n v o l v e s l e a r n i n g ,  concept f o r m a t i o n ,  even the use  o f symbols",  which d i c t a t e s t h a t  a c q u i r i n g the g i v e n must amount t o a c q u i r i n g p a r t i c u l a r s — s e n s e  contents,  S e l l a r s c a l l s them. Richard  R o r t y and M i c h a e l W i l l i a m s  c o n f l i c t i n g t e n d e n c i e s which S e l l a r s has  c r y s t a l l i z e the  d i s c l o s e d yet f u r t h e r .  Sense-datum T h e o r i s t wants the a c t of a c q u i r i n g the g i v e n 1)  i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y and  2)  put  introduces But  it  i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l form.  the dilemma i n terms of e f f a b i l i t y .  ' i n e f f a b l e ' as a p e j o r a t i v e way  to i n v o l v e both  (Both R o r t y  Williams  of s a y i n g  i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y presupposes i n e f f a b i l i t y .  acquired  The  e f f a b i l i t y , where f o r t h a t which i s g i v e n  to be e f f a b l e i s f o r i t to be Williams  logically  and  explicity  non-propositional.^)  Thus t h a t which i s  must amount to i n c o r r i g i b l e knowledge of matter of f a c t i f  i s to be  capable of p r o v i d i n g a s o l i d  immutable f o u n d a t i o n  for empirical  knowledge.  But  to be knowledge of matter of f a c t  i s to be e f f a b l e  and  to be i n c o r r i g i b l e i s to be i n e f f a b l e — f o r the g i v e n must a v o i d b e i n g c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i f the c a p a c i t y to a c q u i r e i t i s to be unacquired, i t must be i f i t s a c q u i s i t i o n i s to i n v o l v e i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . dilemma f a c i n g the proponent of givenness  now  The  takes the f o l l o w i n g form:  I n s o f a r as our a c q u i s i t i o n of the g i v e n i s e f f a b l e , i t i s j u s t p e r c e p t u a l judgment, and is ineffable,  thus i s not  which  incorrigible.  a  I n s o f a r as i t  i t i s i n c a p a b l e of h a v i n g an e x p l a n a t o r y f u n c t i o n .  ( T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n f o l l o w s c l o s e l y , but does not reproduce  verbatim,  g R o r t y ' s v e r s i o n of the dilemma i n "The -"  World W e l l L o s t " . )  The R o r t y / W i l l i a m s v e r s i o n of the argument p o i M s more d i r e c t l y ,  I t h i n k , than does S e l l a r s , 1  datum Theory: knowledge and  to the source of the problem i n Sense-  I t i s the o b s e s s i o n w i t h the i d e a of founding e m p i r i c a l the r e s u l t i n g quest  f o r i n c o r r i g i b l e knowledge.  u l t i m a t e l y , the p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n suggests,  And  the source of the problem  l i e s w i t h the c o n c e p t i o n of knowledge as a type of r e l a t i o n between a knower and an o b j e c t i v e matter of f a c t . i n e f f a b i l i t y problem.  Why  Consider  the  effability/  i s i t p l a u s i b l e to c l a i m t h a t i f t h a t which  i s g i v e n i n e f f a b l e then i t i s i n c a p a b l e of h a v i n g an e x p l a n a t o r y f u n c t i o n ? As W i l l i a m s puts i t , t h a t i f t h a t which i s g i v e n i s c o n c e i v e d of as i n e f f a b l e , then, "The  c e r t a i n t y j o f '-thee; given;; i s ; ^ saved'iony- a f the).': l  c o s t of making i t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e how as a check on a n y t h i n g , how  awareness of the g i v e n c o u l d  such knowledge c o u l d ever count  serve  i n favour  9  o f one h y p o t h e s i s r a t h e r than another."  S u r e l y the p l a u s i b i l i t y  of  t h i s c l a i m stems d i r e c t l y from the f a c t t h a t t h a t which i s i n e f f a b l e i s c o n c e i v e d of as b e i n g g i v e n to s o m e t h i n g — t h e mind o r the l i k e — w h i c h  51 i s then i n c a p a b l e  because o f the f a c t o f i n e f f a b i l i t y o f doing  w i t h t h a t which i t has been g i v e n .  The u n d e r l y i n g  anything  i d e a seems to be  t h a t the something which i s aware must be a b l e t o express t o i t s e l f that o f which i t i s aware b e f o r e that o f which i t i s aware.  i t w i l l be a b l e to make any use o f  I f t h e mind has a c c e s s t o any r e s e r v o i r  of i n f o r m a t i o n which i t cannot express t o i t s e l f , i s o f no use to t h e mind. has  such a r e s e r v o i r  I n o t h e r words, e f f a b i l i t y o r i n e f f a b i l i t y  to be r e l a t i v e t o something which t r i e s t o express t h a t which i s  s a i d to be e f f a b l e o r not.  But o n l y the i d e a t h a t t h e awareness i s  a r e l a t i o n between something and something, i . e . i s i n h e r e n t l y "dual, c o u l d g i v e r i s e t o t h e i d e a t h a t t h e o n l y u s e f u l k i n d o f awareness w i l l i n v o l v e a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h an o b j e c t o f awareness the n a t u r e o f which the s u b j e c t o f awareness can express t o i t s e l f .  iii)  S e l l a r s argued t h a t s e n s i n g  without q u e s t i o n  t h e assumption t h a t awareness i s e p i s t e m i c .  effectively split, be c o n s c i o u s ,  i s n o n - e p i s t e m i c but r e t a i n e d  that i s , sensing  i s not,  from awareness.  f o r S e l l a r s , t o be aware.  w h i l e l e a r n i n g t o use t h e word  He  To sense, o r t o  Thus he says t h a t  'red' does n o t i n v o l v e "antecedent  e p i s o d e s o f awareness o f redness", such episodes a r e "not to be confused, of course, w i t h s e n s a t i o n s arguing  o f red"."*"^  The p o s i t i o n f o r which I am  accepts S e l l a r s ' c l a i m that sensing  i s n o n - e p i s t e m i c but  h o l d s f u r t h e r t h a t awareness as w e l l i s n o n - e p i s t e m i c , where  .'epistemic'  i s taken t o mean what i t i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y taken to mean; where, t h a t i s an e p i s t e m i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p i s taken t o be a type o f d i r e c t o r immediate  r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s u b j e c t i v e and the o b j e c t i v e . ' Needless to say the c o s t o f t h i s f u r t h e r c l a i m can be met o n l y by s u b j e c t i n g the :.:  common-sense n o t i o n o f the e p i s t e m i c  to a c r i t i c a l  examination, f o r  the i m p l i c a t i o n of the c l a i m t h a t awareness i s n o n - e p i s t e m i c would seem to be  that nothing  n o t i o n of the e p i s t e m i c  i s epistemic.  And  indeed, u n t i l we  The  arguing.  Nothing i s e p i s t e m i c  element o f d u a l i t y i n h e r e n t  epistemic enquiry  w i l l be  f o r which I  i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense of  i n the common-sense n o t i o n of  the  i n t o the n a t u r e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . be c l e a r why,  by  t h i s account, S e l l a r s '  to account f o r the upsurge o f awareness i n a l i n g u i s t i c , or way,  cannot hope to succeed.  ment w i t h S e l l a r s t h a t i t i s not, then, I am  arguing,  cannot be,  present  exist.  The  the known. of being  We  higher  o f t e n , however, speak of being  of the word  'of;  t h a t of which i t i s aware. epistemic  at the  the  the  i n agreeoutset, given. rejected  sensed—never  aware of_, and  and  similarly,  D u a l i t y i s unmistakably  implied  d u a l i t y between t h a t which i s aware  And  forms of e x p r e s s i o n :  that, etc.  I am  l e v e l e i t h e r — b e t w e e n , t h a t i s , the knower  c o n s c i o u s of_, c e r t a i n t h i n g s .  by t h i s use  indeed  d u a l i t y which S e l l a r s has  at the most b a s i c l e v e l — b e t w e e n the sensor and o c c u r s a t any  and  no account of i t s upsurge c o u l d ever be  Such awareness does not  attempt  If_ t h a t k i n d of awareness, f o r  upsurge of which S e l l a r s seeks an account, i s not,  see  epistemic.  shown to have s e r i o u s l y m i s l e d much of p h i l o s o p h i c a l  I t should  i n any  the  from the t r a d i t i o n a l , l a r g e l y unexamined con-  c e p t i o n of i t , i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s type of c o n c l u s i o n am  free  and  so a l s o i s d u a l i t y i m p l i e d by a l l o t h e r know t h a t , b e l i e v e t h a t , n o t i c e  that,  What the attempt to g i v e an account of the d u a l i t y ,  apparent or o t h e r w i s e , of the e p i s t e m i c  r e q u i r e s , and what S e l l a r s  in effect o f f e r s , i s a logico-genetic story.  But  S e l l a r s attempts  to g i v e such a s t o r y u s i n g o n l y r e s o u r c e s r a d i c a l l y inadequate to the task.  I t appears  t h a t e i t h e r one must be s a t i s f i e d w i t h a p u r e l y  b e h a v i o u r i s t account o f awareness—must a c c e p t , t h a t i s , the thermometer view which S e l l a r s e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s — o r  must concede t h a t  awareness, o f one s o r t o r another, e x i s t s p r i o r t o , and i s i n f a c t essential  to an account o f , the development o f language.  to want i t both ways.  He wants a more than s t r i c t l y  S e l l a r s seems  behaviourist  account o f what awareness is_ but he has i t a r i s i n g m y s t e r i o u s l y and unaccountably out o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r .  3. F i r t h ' s Phenomenological  i)  A t t a c k on  Sense-Data  I s h a l l r e t u r n i n Chapter I I I P a r t 5 to the n o t i o n o f  effability  and suggest t h a t t h a t n o t i o n , steeped as i t i s i n the knower/known duality,  i s i t s e l f confused i n the same way  i s S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness.  and the same measure as Indeed  i t will  turn  out t h a t the c o n f u s i o n i n v o l v e d i n the n o t i o n o f e f f a b i l i t y j u s t i s the c o n f u s i o n a t work i n S e l l a r s ' argument.  F i r s t , however, I would  l i k e to l o o k a t another and d i f f e r e n t type o f argument which has been brought a g a i n s t the t r a d i t i o n a l concept o f g i v e n n e s s .  The  version  of the argument to which I w i l l r e f e r o c c u r s i n R o d e r i c k F i r t h ' s "Sense-Data  and the P e r c e p t Theory".  Whereas S e l l a r s ' a t t a c k on the  g i v e n i s a l o g i c a l one, F i r t h ' s i s phenomenological. D i f f i c u l t i e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h F i r t h ' s argument a r i s e when we  cease to take f o r granted t h a t we know what a  phenomenological  appeal jLs and attempt Instead  t o g i v e some a n a l y s i s o f i t s s t r u c t u r e .  At t h a t p o i n t t h e knower/known d u a l i t y which pervades t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind w i l l once a g a i n a r i s e and my d i s c u s s i o n o f F i r t h ' s argument a g a i n s t t h e g i v e n w i l l merge w i t h my d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e e f f a b i l i t y in  issue  Sellars'.  ii)  Sense-datum Theory, t h e theory  t h a t the givenness,  awareness' o r 'immediate p e r c e p t i o n ' o f p a r t i c u l a r s c a l l e d  'direct 'sense-  d a t a ' p l a y s an a b s o l u t e l y i n d i s p e n s a b l e r o l e i n the p r o c e s s we p e r c e i v e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , has, F i r t h p o i n t s out, taken two d i s t i n c t  forms.  according  Inference  Both forms a r e , he argues,  w i t h e m p i r i c a l f a c t s phenomenologically  D i s c u r s i v e Inference  historically  One form he c a l l s t h e ' D i s c u r s i v e  Theory'; t h e o t h e r , t h e 'Sensory Core Theory'. incompatible  by which  obtained.  The  Theory, t h e t r a d i t i o n a l exponents o f which,  to F i r t h , a r e Locke and B e r k e l e y ,  h o l d s t h a t t h e givenness o f  sense-data and t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s a r e t e m p o r a l l y d i s t i n c t moments o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  the l a t t e r f o l l o w i n g t h e former  subsequent t o an i n t e r v e n i n g a c t o f judgiiient;  The proponents o f t h e  D i s c u r s i v e I n f e r e n c e Theory were, F i r t h n o t e s ,  prepared  the temporal s u c c e s s i o n o f an awareness o f sense-data,  to admit t h a t an a c t o f  judgment, and a p e r c e p t i o n o f a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t , may o c c u r ,  as a  f u n c t i o n o f " s e t t l e d habit","'"''' w i t h such l i g h t n i n g r a p i d i t y as t o make c o g n i z a n c e o f i t d i f f i c u l t . Berkeley  found i t merely d i f f i c u l t  But, says F i r t h ,  "whereas Locke and  to d i s t i n g u i s h a temporally  distinct  s t a t e o f d i r e c t awareness i n every p e r c e p t i o n , most contemporary. p s y c h o l o g i s t s and e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s have found i t q u i t e  impossible.  12  Thus, on phenomenological grounds, most contemporary adherents of Sense-datum Theory have r e j e c t e d the D i s c u r s i v e I n f e r e n c e the theory  i n favour  o f the Sensory Core v e r s i o n .  Firth's  i s t h a t t h i s v e r s i o n as w e l l i s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y  iii)  The  i s a twofold datum and  (2)  (1)  of  contention  falsified.  Sensory Core Theory h o l d s t h a t , " p e r c e p t u a l s t a t e c o n s i s t i n g of  version  consciousness  d i r e c t awareness of a sense-  an element of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , and  i t holds further  13 t h a t , " t h e s e two  parts e x i s t simultaneously".  Against  the  Sensory  Core Theory, F i r t h , as a defender of P e r c e p t Theory, m a i n t a i n s t h a t in ordinary perception,  "we  are c o n s c i o u s i n a c e r t a i n manner of a  p h y s i c a l o b j e c t which i s somehow p r e s e n t e d to us c o m p l e t e l y c l o t h e d sensuous q u a l i t i e s " . the o b j e c t " and  These q u a l i t i e s "are p r e s e n t e d as q u a l i t i e s  are " i n no  sense a b s t r a c t e d  from the p r e s e n t e d o b j e c t " . " ^  And  r e s t r i c t e d to  q u a l i t i e s which have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been c l a s s e d as sense-data,  "simplicity, all  'feline',  'ethereal',  by  ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' and",  o f the a d j e c t i v e s i n the dictionary"."'"^ Theory m a i n t a i n s t h a t "the  and  even i n such  such a d j e c t i v e s as  'reptilian',  F i r t h adds, "perhaps most But most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  sensuously c l o t h e d object  sensuous content of c o n s c i o u s n e s s d u r i n g o r d i n a r y F i r t h quotes a passage from P r i c e , one  i s the  Percept  only 16  perception". of the p r i n c i p a l  proponents of the Sensory Core Theory, which shows c l e a r l y t h a t p o s i t i o n of Sense-datum T h e o r i s t s can,  as  gracefulness,  the innumerable s o - c a l l e d ' s h a p e - q u a l i t i e s ' " ; and described  the  the  as w e l l i n such q u a l i t i e s  r e g u l a r i t y , harmoniousness, c l u m s i n e s s ,  q u a l i t i e s as are " f i t t i n g l y  of  or o t h e r w i s e d i s t i n g u i s h e d  r a t h e r than b e i n g  sensuously c l o t h e d o b j e c t comes d r e s s e d  in  at l e a s t , be  the  i n accord w i t h  the  56 p o s i t i v e a s p e c t s of P e r c e p t Theory.  Price writes:  Somehow i t i s the whole t h i n g , not j u s t a j e j u n e e x t r a c t from i t , which i s b e f o r e the mind from the f i r s t . From the f i r s t i t i s the complete m a t e r i a l t h i n g , w i t h back, s i d e s , and i n s i d e s as w e l l as f r o n t , t h a t we 'accept', t h a t 'ostends i t s e l f to us, and n o t h i n g l e s s ; a t h i n g , too, p e r s i s t i n g through time both b e f o r e and a f t e r . . . and possessed o f v a r i o u s c a u s a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . . . A l r e a d y i n t h i s s i n g l e a c t , even i n a momentary g l a n c e , we take a l l these elements of the o b j e c t to be t h e r e , a l l o f them.., 17  It  i s the n e g a t i v e  other  aspect  of Percept Theory, the d e n i a l t h a t  than the s e n s u o u s l y c l o t h e d o b j e c t  i s present  anything  i n ordinary  per-  c e p t i o n , which c o n f l i c t s w i t h the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d f o r m u l a t i o n s  of  the  Sensory Core v e r s i o n o f Sense-datum Theory. Having i n t r o d u c e d o f P e r c e p t Theory ought not i s p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s but  a d i s t i n c t i o n according to say t h a t what we  to which advocates  a r e d i r e c t l y aware o f  r a t h e r o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , the  t i n c t i o n b e i n g m o t i v a t e d on the grounds t h a t , "the word used i n such a c o n t e x t , which are not  may  have c e r t a i n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  dis-  ' d i r e c t l y ' , when connotations  r e l e v a n t to the phenomenological i s s u e " , F i r t h n o t e s t h a t :  I f the Sense-datum Theory were t r u e , indeed, i t would r a r e l y , i f ever, be c o r r e c t to apply the same d e t e r m i n a t e a d j e c t i v e s both to an o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t and to the sense-datum which i s p r e s e n t e d a l o n g w i t h i t . Thus we should have to m a i n t a i n t h a t whenever we are p e r c e i v i n g a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t w i t h a s u r f a c e which i s o s t e n s i b l y red and c i r c u l a r , we are a l s o d i r e c t l y aware of a sense-datum which i s p r o b a b l y e l l i p t i c a l i n shape and which may v e r y w e l l be orange or p u r p l e or grey i n c o l o u r , We should have to m a i n t a i n , i n s h o r t , t h a t even when we l o o k at a s i n g l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t we a r e almost always c o n s c i o u s , though i n d i f f e r e n t ways, of two c o l o u r s and two shapes."'" It  i s at t h i s p o i n t t h a t F i r t h ' s argument makes i t s phenomenological  appeal. Support f o r the phenomenological a p p e a l comes even from Sense-datum T h e o r i s t s themselves.  F i r t h quotes P r i c e as s a y i n g  the  that i n  o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t i o n we  "fail  to d i s t i n g u i s h " between the  sense-datum  19 and in  the o s t e n s i b l e o b j e c t . perception  By P r i c e ' s own  account, our  s t a t e of mind  " i s , as i t were, a dreamy, half-awake s t a t e , i n which  we  are unaware o f a d i f f e r e n c e between the sense-datum and the o s t e n 20 s i b l e physical object". In response to such remarks, F i r t h makes the o b v i o u s query: I f i t be a d m i t t e d . . . t h a t i n p e r c e p t i o n we are not aware of any d i f f e r e n c e between the sense-datum and the o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t , what p o s s i b l e evidence c o u l d t h e r e be t h a t both o f them are p r e s e n t to consciousness during perception?21  He  concludes t h a t even Sense-datum T h e o r i s t s would, i f . p r e s s e d , admit  t h a t i t . i s not by  the method o f d i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n t h a t sense-data  found to be c o n s t i t u e n t s of o r d i n a r y  iv)  are  perception.  There i s , however, another method, b e s i d e s  direct inspection, in  which F i r t h f e e l s the Sense-datum T h e o r i s t , whether " w i t t i n g l y or 22 unwittingly"  places  greater  faith.  Sense-datum T h e o r i s t s u t i l i z e a  method or o p e r a t i o n which F i r t h l a b e l s ' p e r c e p t u a l moreover they a c c e p t i n c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h the o p e r a t i o n  r e d u c t i o n an h y p o t h e s i s which he c a l l s the perform a perceptual c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s (1) o b j e c t which was  of  and  perceptual  'Exposure H y p o t h e s i s ' .  r e d u c t i o n on a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f  To  perceptual  to b r i n g i t about t h a t the o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l  immediately p r e s e n t  g r e s s i v e l y l e s s and  reduction';  to c o n s c i o u s n e s s becomes p r o -  l e s s determinate; and  (2)  to cause a new  object,  a sense-datum, to be p r e s e n t e d w i t h i n c r e a s i n g determinateness to consciousness.  In c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h t h i s two  gait 'process,, .the Exposure  Hypothesis m a i n t a i n s  that:  ...the o p e r a t i o n o f p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n does not produce a s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s which i s simply o t h e r than t h e o r i g i n a l s t a t e o f p e r c e p t i o n on which i t i s performed. I t produces, on the c o n t r a r y , a s t a t e o f d i r e c t awareness which was c o n t a i n e d i n the o r i g i n a l p e r c e p t i o n . . . e x p o s u r e i s achieved...by d e s t r o y i n g the c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s which accompanies and obscures t h e sense-data, so t h a t bare sense-data themselves become a c c e s s i b l e to subsequent a c t s o f d i r e c t inspection.23 A g a i n s t t h e Exposure  H y p o t h e s i s , F i r t h p o i n t s out t h a t t h e  'reducing a t t i t u d e ' which t h e o p e r a t i o n o f p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n s e t s i n motion  i s " o n l y one among a seemingly  which we can adopt  i n f i n i t e number o f a t t i t u d e s  i n t h e presence o f an o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t " .  He suggests as examples mercenary a t t i t u d e s , p e d a g o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s and martial attitudes.  And he argues  t h a t i t would " s c a r c e l y o c c u r t o  anyone to suggest" t h a t one can f i n d i n the s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s brought  about by such changes o f a t t i t u d e , " t h e r e a l but p r e v i o u s l y  unobservable "The  content o f the o r i g i n a l s t a t e " .  He c o n t i n u e s by s a y i n g :  two s t a t e s would be regarded as r e l a t e d t o one another, t o be  s u r e , by t h e f a c t t h a t they a r e caused by the same e x t e r n a l s t i m u l u s , 25 but the one would s c a r c e l y be taken t o be a c o n s t i t u e n t o f t h e o t h e r . " But t h e r e a r e problems, the f i r s t  I t h i n k , w i t h F i r t h ' s argument.  In  p l a c e I t h i n k t h a t i t i s t r u e n e i t h e r i n the case o f the  case o f t h e r e d u c i n g a t t i t u d e n o r i n t h e case o f mercenary, p e d a g o g i c a l o r m a r t i a l a t t i t u d e s t h a t the o b j e c t o f these a t t i t u d e s i s an o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t as F i r t h uses the e x p r e s s i o n .  And furthermore, I  t h i n k t h a t t h e type o f o b j e c t s onto which we b r i n g t o bear t h e r e d u c i n g attitude i s different  from t h e type o f o b j e c t s towards which we  the o t h e r mentioned types o f a t t i t u d e s .  adopt  Thus, where t h e d i s t i n c t i o n  between an o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t and a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t  is, for  F i r t h , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between something such t h a t "some o f i t s p r o p e r ties,  i f not a l l ,  can be d i s c o v e r e d  state of perceptual  by d i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n o f a s i n g l e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s " and something which i s " a t the v e r y  l e a s t a t h i n g which t r a n s c e n d s any one o f t h e s t a t e s which might be  26 c a l l e d a perception  of_ i t " ,  i t seems c l e a r t h a t i t i s the l a t t e r and  not  t h e former type o f t h i n g , t h e type o f t h i n g which " t r a n s c e n d s any  one  s t a t e which might be c a l l e d a p e r c e p t i o n  of_ i t " ,  towards which  we adopt mercenary, p e d a g o g i c a l and m a r t i a l a t t i t u d e s :  It i s physical  o b j e c t s n o t o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s towards which we adopt such attitudes.  And as f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n  of perceptual  reduction, i t  seems e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t i t i s s t a t e s o f p e r c e p t u a l not  consciousness—  o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s — w h i c h a r e the o b j e c t s o f the type o f  a t t i t u d e which i s i n v o l v e d t h e r e . reducing  But t o undermine t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e  a t t i t u d e shares important f e a t u r e s w i t h a t t i t u d e s such as t h e  mercenary, p e d a g o g i c a l ,  e t c . , i s t o undermine t h e c l a i m t h a t i t i s u n l i k e l y  to be d i f f e r e n t from them i n any important, r e l e v a n t  sense.  (In the  l o n g run I s h a l l c l a i m t h a t t a l k o f assuming a t t i t u d e s towards s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , as though they were o b j e c t s o f some s o r t , i s a t b e s t a facon de p a r l e r and a m i s l e a d i n g point  one a t t h a t ; but f o r t h e present  i t i s enough t o p o i n t out t h a t i f t h e r e d u c i n g  a t t i t u d e takes  an o b j e c t a t a l l i t must be a s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s and n o t a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t o r an o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l v)  object.)  F i r t h o f f e r s , c u r s o r i l y , another argument a g a i n s t  Hypothesis.  He c l a ims  the Exposure  t h a t j u s t as "those who accept Sense—datum Theory  have...pointed  out t h a t we  cannot l e a r n more about a p a r t i c u l a r  datum by changing the p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of o b s e r v a t i o n " , i n attempting  to do so "'we  i s b e i n g made by those who t h a t "we  and  sensethat  murder to d i s s e c t ' " , an analogous argument r e j e c t the Exposure H y p o t h e s i s to the  f r u s t r a t e o u r s e l v e s i f we  perform the o p e r a t i o n of  effect  perceptual  27 reduction i n order  to d e s c r i b e p e r c e p t u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "  on the o t h e r hand, t h a t the p r o c e s s  of d i r e c t  He a s s e r t s ,  i n s p e c t i o n "does not  28 d e s t r o y the v e r y t h i n g which i s to be It t h a t we  i s s u r e l y c l e a r why  analysed".  the Sense-datum T h e o r i s t would c l a i m  cannot hope to l e a r n more about a sense-datum by changing  p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of o b s e r v a t i o n .  I f a sense-datum i s taken to  the be  t h a t which i s the t o t a l phenomenological r e s u l t of the impingement of p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y on one conceptual —either  of our senses i n d e p e n d e n t l y  element of  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then c l e a r l y , to change the p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s  of our  sense r e c e p t o r or of the o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s — i s  i t about t h a t the sense-datum which we about i s r e p l a c e d by a new ent  of any  and  endeavoured thereby  u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t one.  to b r i n g  to l e a r n more  Utterly differ-  i n the sense t h a t , however great or s m a l l the q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e  between the two d i f f e r e n t one  might be,  the second sense-data i s a new,;  from the f i r s t ;  numerically  i t does not c o n t a i n p a r t s o f the  A l t e r n a t i v e l y , a sense-datum i s o f t e n taken to be any  individual  aspect  of the t o t a l e f f e c t of the world  on one  or squareness, f o r example.  a g a i n , changing the p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s  But  of our  first.  s e n s e s — t h u s redness  o f p e r c e p t i o n g a i n s us n o t h i n g  and  runs the r i s k of e l i m i n a t i n g the  sense-datum we  But  how  seek to study.  r e s p e c t of the Exposure H y p o t h e s i s go?  does the analogous argument i n What, i n p a r t i c u l a r ,  i s i t that  61 we a r e unable, on p a i n o f b r i n g i n g about, o r r i s k i n g , to study by p e r f o r m i n g  a perceptual  I t i s , o f course,  reduction?  a s t a t e o f perceptual consciousness  which i t i s , i n t h i s case, b e i n g But  i t s destruction,  of  s a i d t h a t we 'murder to d i s s e c t ' .  t o speak o f s t a t e s o f p e r c e p t u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s to r a i s e  questions  the answers t o which we must have b e f o r e we can d e c i d e whether o r n o t the o p e r a t i o n o f p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n must i n e v i t a b l y d e s t r o y , than r e v e a l the d e t a i l s o f , such s t a t e s .  rather  J u s t - as we must know what a  sense-datum i s i f we a r e to know whether i t i s t h e s o r t of' t h i n g such t h a t changing the p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f p e r c e p t i o n w i l l , o r might, d e s t r o y i t , so we must know what a s t a t e o f p e r c e p t u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s j_s_ i f we a r e t o be a b l e t o answer t h e analogous q u e s t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o it  and t h e o p e r a t i o n o f p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n .  The Exposure H y p o t h e s i s  amounts t o a p a r t i c u l a r t h e s i s about t h e n a t u r e First  of states of  i t must be noted t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f p e r f o r m i n g  r e d u c t i o n shares w i t h t h e n o t i o n o f d i r e c t  consciousness.  a perceptual  inspection a presupposition  that s t a t e s o f consciousness  a r e , i n some sense, o b j e c t s t o which  consciousness  i n relation.  o r mind stands  Exposure H y p o t h e s i s i n c o n n e c t i o n  The c l a i m made by the  with the operation o f perceptual  r e d u c t i o n embodies an a d d i t i o n a l assumption about the s o r t o f o b j e c t s which s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  are.  According  i t would seem, s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  to the Exposure  Hypothesis,  a r e o b j e c t s which p o s s e s s some  k i n d o f depth; they a r e l a y e r e d , one might say. D i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n , without  t h e a i d o f p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n , can r e v e a l o n l y t h e top l a y e r .  P e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n , by s t r i p p i n g o f f the masking l a y e r s , r e v e a l s t o subsequent d i r e c t  inspections the nature  o f those which l i e beneath.  But  i f t h i s i s the type o f c l a i m t h a t the Exposure H y p o t h e s i s r e p -  resents way  about the n a t u r e of s t a t e s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s then s u r e l y the  to undercut t h a t h y p o t h e s i s i s to undercut t h i s c l a i m .  For  only  i f the  t r u t h of t h i s c l a i m were to be assumed, then F i r t h ' s attempt to argue t h a t to p e r f o r m a p e r c e p t u a l of c o n s c i o u s n e s s — r a t h e r flat.  The  metaphor o f  r e d u c t i o n would be  to d e s t r o y  a  state  than to r e v e a l the d e t a i l s of i t — w o u l d 'murdering to d i s s e c t ' seems, moreover,  fall inept  even i n the case of sense-data; changing the p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s perception  doesn't  'merely murder' sense-data.  It eliminates  of  them  without a t r a c e ; w i t h o u t , as i t were, even l e a v i n g a c o r p s e to d i s s e c t . C l e a r l y , i f s t a t e s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s are e n t i t i e s l a y e r e d  i n the  i n which the Exposure H y p o t h e s i s presupposes, then p e r c e p t u a l would not  eliminate  of c o u r s e , be  such s t a t e s without a t r a c e .  so e l i m i n a t e d — t h e  that a perceptual  reduction  The  reduction  P a r t s o f them would,  upper l a y e r s , t h a t i s — b u t  p e r f e c t l y i n keeping w i t h the h y p o t h e s i s .  that i s  c l a i m would be,  doesn't c r e a t e a new  way  state of  then,  consciousness  s i n c e the r e s u l t i n g s t a t e doesn't i n v o l v e a n y t h i n g n e w — a s would, f o r example, a s t a t e brought about by a change o f p e r c e p t u a l  conditions  by a change of thought about or a t t i t u d e towards the p e r c e i v e d s t a t e of a f f a i r s .  Remember t h a t the a t t i t u d e o f p e r c e p t u a l  i s n ' t an a t t i t u d e towards the p e r c e i v e d rather  I t may  e l i m i n a t e a t t i t u d e s towards o b j e c t i v e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s , e l i m i n a t e any  reduction  new  a t t i t u d e s towards them.  I f one  states of consciousness are e n t i t i e s layered  but  therefore i t may  even  awareness of those s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s at a l l ; but i t  cannot i n t r o d u c e that  objective  o b j e c t i v e s t a t e of a f f a i r s  towards the s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i t s e l f .  or  accepts,  in a certain  then, way,  the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f the iclaim t h a t d i r e c t  i n s p e c t i o n might be a p r o c e s s  which has a c c e s s o n l y to the uppermost l a y e r s and.that p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n can without adding a n y t h i n g , s t r i p away those upper l a y e r s thereby r e v e a l i n g the lower ones seems hard to d i s p u t e .  The  fact  that  the s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s , i n some obvious sense, d e s t r o y e d by  such  s t r i p p i n g away—much as an a p p l e i s d e s t r o y e d when i t i s p e e l e d — doesn't, because the sense i n which i t i s d e s t r o y e d doesn't i t b e i n g a n n i h i l a t e d , l e n d any support to t h i s l a s t which F i r t h t r i e d to use a g a i n s t the Exposure  vi)  Yet s t i l l ,  the Exposure  i t seems to me,  Hypothesis.  much h e l p to F i r t h .  But  type o f argument  Hypothesis.  t h e r e i s something  i t i s not something  For though I w i l l  suggest  amount t o  wrong w i t h  which would be o f  t h a t an e s s e n t i a l aspect  of the Sense-datum T h e o r i s t ' s c l a i m w i l l have to go, much o f what b o t h e r s F i r t h about  i t w i l l remain.  My  d i s c o n t e n t w i t h the Exposure  must be t r a c e d back to the common and p r i o r assumption  Hypothesis  which u n d e r l i e s  b o t h t h e n o t i o n s o f d i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n and o f p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n , to w i t , the assumption  that states of consciousness are l i k e o b j e c t s  — l a y e r e d o r o t h e r w i s e — t o which mind o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s stands i n r e l a t i o n . T h i s assumption  i s , I s h a l l endeavor to show, not coherent.  The  position  f o r which I w i l l argue h o l d s not t h a t assuming a r e d u c t i v e a t t i t u d e destroys  s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s but r a t h e r t h a t s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a r e the s o r t s o f t h i n g s which j u s t n a t u r a l l y , p e r p e t u a l l y and u o u s l y fade o f t h e i r own that i t i s j u s t  a c c o r d out o f e x i s t e n c e .  contin-  I t w i l l be c l a i m e d  s i m p l y not p o s s i b l e f o r s t a t e s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s to be  c o n c e i v e d of as e n t i t i e s to which a n y t h i n g stands i n c o g n i t i v e  relations.  C o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s occur w i t h i n s t a t e s of consciousness.  Attendant  on t h e development o f such a p o s i t i o n w i l l be t h e need t o g i v e some a l t e r n a t i v e account  o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f the phenomenological  (where by 'phenomenological of  appeal  a p p e a l ' I mean t o c a p t u r e t h e whole range  phenomena which i n v o l v e , or a r e g e n e r a l l y taken t o i n v o l v e , a  c o g n i t i v e a t t i t u d e d i r e c t e d towards a s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) . method o f d i r e c t  i n s p e c t i o n , w i t h i t s as y e t u n c h a l l e n g e d  as t h e t o o l o f t h e phenomenological  The  credentials  a p p e a l , w i l l be seen to be as  g r e a t l y wrought w i t h c o n f u s i o n s as i s t h e o p e r a t i o n o f p e r c e p t u a l reduction.  What i s i t t h a t i n s p e c t s ?  The n e g a t i v e argument o f the next e v e n t u a l l y , by an attempt,  What i s i t t h a t i s i n s p e c t e d ?  chapter w i l l be complemented,  i n Chapter V, t o answer these  on t h e b a s i s o f t h e t h e o r y t o be sketched  i n IV.  questions  65 NOTES  R i c h a r d R o r t y , "The World W e l l L o s t , " The J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h y , (1972), 649. 1  69  2 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , " E m p i r i c i s m and the P h i l o s o p h y of Mind," i n S c i e n c e , P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i b r a r y of P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1963), p. 128. 3 S e l l a r s , p. 167.  4 Sellars,  p.  128.  5  Sellars,  p.  128.  6  Sellars,  p.  131.  M i c h a e l W i l l i a m s , Groundless B e l i e f : An Essay on the Epistemology (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1977), p. 7  of  Q 9  ^  R o r t y , p.  650.  W i l l i a m s , p. Sellars,  Possibility 29.  p.  32. 162.  R o d e r i c k F i r t h , "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory," i n P e r c e i v i n g , Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J . Swartz (Garden C i t y , New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22  Firth,  P-  216.  F i r t h , P-  217.  F i r t h , P. 223. F i r t h , P-  221.  Firth,  P-  223.  Firth,  P-  225.  Firth,  P. 229.  Firth,  P. 231.  Firth,  P-  232.  Firth,  P-  239.  Firth,  P-  234.  F i r t h , p.  238  F i r t h , p.  239  F i r t h , p.  239  F i r t h , p.  251  F i r t h , p.  241  F i r t h , p.  240  67 CHAPTER I I I  The P-Theory Account o f Awareness  1. Introduction  The  knower/known d u a l i t y seems t o r e a r i t s head a t every  t u r n i n t h e l a b y r i n t h which i s t h e P h i l o s o p h y  o f Mind.  At t h i s p o i n t  F i r t h ' s argument a g a i n s t t h e g i v e n e s t a b l i s h e s c o n t a c t , i n t h e context of t h e o v e r a l l p i c t u r e , w i t h t h e form i n which I l e f t The  i s s u e o f t h e knower/known d u a l i t y b r i n g s them t o g e t h e r ;  i t b r i n g s my d i s c u s s i o n o f them t o g e t h e r . a r i s e s i n connection just  that of S e l l a r s ' .  appeal  In S e l l a r s t h e d u a l i t y i s s u e  with the n o t i o n o f e f f a b i l i t y ;  saw, i t a r i s e s i n c o n n e c t i o n  or rather,  i n F i r t h , as we  w i t h t h e n o t i o n o f a phenomenological  or introspectability. S e l l a r s took as o b v i o u s the p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e form o f c o n t a c t  which we make w i t h t h e g i v e n has t o be e f f a b l e i f i t i s t o be o f any use;  i f i t i s t o p l a y any r o l e whatsoever i n an account o f our knowledge  of the world.  I t f o l l o w e d from t h a t assumption t h a t an account o f  e f f a b l e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e g i v e n c o u l d not i n any way be h e l d t o r e s t on i n e f f a b l e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e g i v e n :  I f i n e f f a b l e c o n t a c t was u s e l e s s  i n t h e one account then i t was e q u a l l y u s e l e s s i n t h e o t h e r .  But i f  c o n t a c t w i t h t h e g i v e n has t o be e f f a b l e then i t must be c o n c e p t u a l l y mediated, i n which case i t i s n ' t c o n t a c t w i t h a n y t h i n g  which i s merely  given.  S e l l a r s attempted  an a l t e r n a t i v e account which had  effable  c o n t a c t w i t h p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s a r i s i n g out o f n e i t h e r e f f a b l e nor i n e f f a b l e awareness o f the g i v e n but r a t h e r out o f the a c q u i s i t i o n , s t i m u l u s / r e s p o n s e means, o f a p u b l i c language objects.  Having  by  f o r r e f e r r i n g to p u b l i c  r e j e c t e d t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e S e l l a r s i a n account,  the  need to r e t u r n to the e f f a b l e / i n e f f a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n and take a c l o s e r l o o k a t the r o l e which i t p l a y s i n S e l l a r s ' n e g a t i v e t h e s i s becomes obvious. J u s t as S e l l a r s assumed a c e r t a i n type o f  meaningfulness  f o r the e f f a b l e / i n e f f a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n , F i r t h assumed a c e r t a i n of a n a l y s i s o f the s t r u c t u r e o f the phenomenological two  assumptions  come t o g e t h e r , I'm  of an i d e n t i c a l assumption  about  appeal.  type The  holding, i n v i r t u e of a r i s i n g  c o n s c i o u s n e s s and  out  i t s states.  While I should expect t h a t the i s s u e o f the n a t u r e o f awareness stands i n c o n t e s t a b l y a t the h e a r t o f the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind, i t n e v e r t h e l e s s remains  commonplace t h a t t a l k about  such i s s u e s as  intro-  s p e c t a b i l i t y and e f f a b i l i t y o c c u r s i n ways which beg what I take to be a b s o l u t e l y fundamental  q u e s t i o n s about  the n a t u r e o f awareness.  awareness i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y a d u a l phenomenon, a r e l a t i o n two  terms,  i s simply presupposed  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s to i t s s t a t e s . t h i s d u a l i t y o f which I'm  involving  by most d i s c u s s i o n s o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p In the I n t r o d u c t i o n I c l a i m e d t h a t  speaking i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the common-sense  p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y — o f the s o - c a l l e d P-theory.  I t i s the burden  o f the ensuing d i s c u s s i o n to show t h a t i t i s the a s p e c t o f the which S e l l a r s ' attempted  That  P-theory  l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness l a r g e l y  p r e s e r v e s — t h e d u a l i s m between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t — w h i c h  i s the source  of i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n a d e q u a c i e s , and m a t e r i a l i s m t r i e s to r e j e c t — t h a t  t h a t i t i s t h a t aspect which  t h e r e must be some n o n - m a t e r i a l  n o t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y o p e r a t i v e i n any adequate account animals'—which  accounts,  on the o t h e r hand, f o r the s t r e n g t h and  r e s i l i e n c y o f t h e P-theory. m a t e r i a l i s t bent, account  of 'human  S e l l a r s , I s h a l l argue, though o f  i s s e n s i t i v e to the inadequacy of a p u r e l y m a t e r i a l i s t  of awareness; but i n t r y i n g to d e a l w i t h t h a t inadequacy,  e f f e c t i v e l y r e i n t r o d u c e s p r e c i s e l y t h a t aspect of the P-theory was  he  which  the source o f the problem which he had h i m s e l f d i s c e r n e d i n the  older  theory.  2. The  'Lighting-Up' Conception  At l e a s t two  of Awareness  threads can be found  t a n g l e d t o g e t h e r i n the  k n o t t y mess which the i s s u e o f awareness forms a t the h e a r t o f the P-theory.  One  can d i s c e r n t h e r e , I b e l i e v e , two  separate  tendencies,  not even c o n s i s t e n t w i t h one another, but .mergiedy'f.in-jsirCuexof^haylng 1  common the assumption t h a t awareness i s a r e l a t i o n i n v o l v i n g two i n t o one  l a r g e l y i n a r t i c u l a t e , incoherent  in  terms,  'common-sense' p o s i t i o n .  The obvious  f a c t t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s must be acknowledged to be c h a r a c t e r -  i z e d by two  a s p e c t s , an a c t i v e and a p a s s i v e , has been, I'm  c o n f u s e d l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n such a way s p l i t w i t h i n awareness.  The  claiming,  as to i n v o l v e a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e  s u b j e c t i v e , or a c t i v e a s p e c t , the  of which i s o n l y f o g g i l y d i s c e r n e d i n c o n s c i o u s e x p e r i e n c e ,  nature  i s crudely  c o n c e i v e d o f as having g i v e n to i t the o b j e c t i v e a s p e c t ; where the  o b j e c t i v e a s p e c t i s v a r i o u s l y c o n c e i v e d o f as p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , sensed a t a , and even as s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s It  s h o u l d be noted b e f o r e c o n t i n u i n g t h a t P-theory use o f t h e  word ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' i s ambiguous. to  themselves.  Consciousness  i s sometimes taken  be t h e s u b j e c t i v e h a l f o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d u a l i t y and a t  o t h e r times t o be t h e product o f the i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e two h a l v e s o f t h a t d u a l i t y , where t h e s u b j e c t i v e h a l f i s taken t o be t h e mind o r t h e s e l f o r the l i k e . of  Consciousness,  i n o t h e r words, may be c o n c e i v e d  as e i t h e r t h e s u b j e c t o f o r the product o f awareness.  complicate matters, synonymous w i t h  To f u r t h e r  'being c o n s c i o u s o f i s f r e q u e n t l y used as though  'being aware o f .  T h i s l a s t use o f ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' ,  which would have c o n s c i o u s n e s s i d e n t i c a l w i t h awareness, i s , I h o l d , the c o r r e c t way t o go once we have purged of  i t s d u a l i s t i c presuppositions.  t h e n o t i o n o f awareness  I t i s problems i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h  the o t h e r two n o t i o n s o f consciousness,"..arising out o f t h e i r  essential  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a d u a l i s t i c a n a l y s i s o f awareness which I wish i n the f o l l o w i n g t o demonstrate. c a r e f u l l y at the f i r s t  I b e l i e v e , i n f a c t , t h a t i f we l o o k  two uses o f t h e word  ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' we can see  t h a t we r e a l l y have here o n l y a d i f f e r e n c e o f word usage and no a c t u a l difference i n theoretical distinctions. i s taken as synonymous w i t h  In the f i r s t  'mind' o r ' s e l f  case,  'consciousness'  and s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a r e e n t i t i e s caused by t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s and some form of for  o b j e c t i v i t y and a r e possessed by, i n t h e sense o f b e i n g i n t r o s p e c t i o n by, c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  I n t h e second  available  case, on t h e o t h e r  hand, c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s t h e u n i t y o f those s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s caused by t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between mind and some form o f o b j e c t i v i t y and  i s i t s e l f p o s s e s s e d by,  and  a v a i l a b l e , i n i t s present s t a t e , f o r  s p e c t i o n by,  The  n o t i o n of e i t h e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s or the mind  standing  the mind.  i n the r e l a t i o n of p o s s e s s i n g  c o n s c i o u s n e s s , l i k e the n o t i o n  and  intro-  introspecting i t s states  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s or the mind  of  standing  i n the r e l a t i o n of b e i n g aware of the o b j e c t i v e realm, i s at the c o r e of a d u a l i s t i c a n a l y s i s of awareness.  It i s this d u a l i s t i c analysis  awareness which I hope i n the p r e s e n t c h a p t e r to show to be Throughout the  f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n I w i l l use  sense i n which i t r e f e r s to the o b j e c t i v e d u a l i t y taken to be  untenable.  'consciousness' i n  s u b j e c t i v e h a l f of the  involved  of  the  subjective/  i n the P-theory account  of  awareness.  ii)  The  overwhelming tendency to c o n c e i v e o f awareness as  i z e d by a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e thread  split,  and  i n t h a t tendency, the  i n the P-theory account of awareness, has  i n the common-sense c o n c e p t i o n of p e r c e i v i n g ; p a r t i c u l a r l y , but  by no means e x c l u s i v e l y .  r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n s c i o u s n e s s and the p e r c e p t i o n  We  i t s origins, I believe,  of v i s u a l p e r c e p t i o n  Common-sensically,  most  the  o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y which c o n s t i t u t e s  see p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s ;  are aware of them; we  they are t h e r e ,  are d i r e c t l y i n t h e i r presence.  o f mundane f a c t s about p e r c e p t i o n of p e r c e p t i o n  first  o f r e a l i t y by c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s i n t e r p r e t e d i n a n a i v e  r e a l i s t manner. We  character-  The  between, f o r example, the v e r b s to be  i n the  , to l o o k  from our  language  relationships  , and  to see  commitment, at the  of u n c r i t i c a l common-sense, to a n a i v e r e a l i s t  us.  multitude  which f o r c e us to e n r i c h our  w i t h a l l the c o m p l e x i t y i n h e r e n t  doesn't i n the l e a s t d i s s u a d e us  before  c o n c e p t i o n of  ,  level perceiving.  72 Our  a g i l i t y i n maneuvering, and the p r a c t i c a l e f f i c a c y o f , the  distinctions  between b e i n g , l o o k i n g to be, and b e i n g seen t o be, p r e v e n t s us  from  r e c o g n i z i n g the f a c t t h a t the need f o r these d i s t i n c t i o n s i s i n d i c a t i v e of the f a l s i t y of n a i v e r e a l i s m . cannot  V i s u a l e x p e r i e n c e s , f o r example,  amount to d i r e c t apprehension  of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s i f i t i s p o s s i b l e  f o r the n a t u r e o f a v i s u a l e x p e r i e n c e to be at odds w i t h the n a t u r e o f the p h y s i c a l o b j e c t supposedly  b e i n g d i r e c t l y apprehended.  t r u e n o t h i n g c o u l d ever l o o k o t h e r than i t was.  I f n a i v e r e a l i s m was  O b v i o u s l y , i t seems to  me,  n a i v e r e a l i s m i s f a l s e ; but j u s t as o b v i o u s l y , however, our common-sense c o n c e p t i o n of p e r c e i v i n g i s , i n i t s b a s i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , n a i v e The n a i v e r e a l i s t  c o n c e p t i o n o f , f o r example, s e e i n g , would seem  to have i t t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' i l l u m i n a t e d ' i s to be seen.  i s l i k e some k i n d of s p o t l i g h t ; to be To be aware o f something i s , so to speak,  to be s h i n i n g the l i g h t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s onto t h a t something. a view, s t r i c t l y adhered  realist.  On  such  t o , t h e r e i s n ' t even any room f o r s t a t e s of  consciousness;"'" u n l e s s what i s thereby r e f e r r e d to i s j u s t some f a c t f a c t s about the s p o t l i g h t i t s e l f :  I t s i n t e n s i t y , scope, o r the  A s i d e from t h a t , every o t h e r f e a t u r e o p e r a t i v e i n any  or  like.  particular  s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n w i l l be a f e a t u r e of the o b j e c t s b e i n g looked a t . b e i n g brought  Being i l l u m i n a t e d , i n o t h e r words, i n no way  involves  i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; nor does i l l u m i n a t i o n cause or  create anything—other  than  'lit-up' objects.  The  s u b j e c t on t h i s view  i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; the s u b j e c t i s simply the n o n - m a t e r i a l 'something' which l o o k s .  Even i f i t was  p o s s i b l e f o r the phenomenon  of awareness to be- c a p t u r e d by t h i s s p o t l i g h t metaphor (and I s h a l l argue that i t i s n o t ) , s t r i c t  adherence to t h i s view i s simply not  possible.  A thoroughgoing n a i v e  r e a l i s t approach t o p e r c e p t i o n  r e c e n t l y argued, s u s t a i n e d . objects  The need to move away from mere l i t - u p  t o something l i k e s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — t o  states q u a l i t a t i v e l y — i s  cannot be, I've  clearly  subjective  c h a r a c t e r i z e d as opposed t o pure o b j e c t i v e ones  d i c t a t e d by the same f a c t s which d i c t a t e the i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f , f o r example, t h e b e i n g  , looking  , and s e e i n g  But  i n s t e a d o f being  at'  o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y i s i n c o h e r e n t l y r e t a i n e d and even r e a p p l i e d  at  renounced, t h e n a i v e  distinctions.  r e a l i s t conception  of 'looking  t h e l e v e l o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n s c i o u s n e s s and i t s own  states. Some c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f my p o s i t i o n might be gained by r e s t a t i n g the p r e c e d i n g  p o i n t i n the f o l l o w i n g way.  Contrary  to F i r t h ,  t h a t t h e common-sense, "man i n the s t r e e t " c o n c e p t i o n does n o t r e c o g n i z e  a distinction  physical objects.  According  illusion",  I believe  of perception  between p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and o s t e n s i b l e  t o F i r t h , "To p o s s e s s t h e concept o f  some v e r s i o n o f which, as he r i g h t l y  s t r e e t must p o s s e s s , " i s t o r e c o g n i z e ,  a s s e r t s , t h e man i n the  at least  implicitly,  the v e r y  2 d i f f e r e n c e between a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t and an o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l But,  I suggest, an i m p l i c i t  fact  that the occurrence of i l l u s i o n s i s i n c o n f l i c t with  r e a l i s t presuppositions not  entail  r e c o g n i t i o n i s no r e c o g n i t i o n a t a l l .  The  ther.naive  o f our common-sense n o t i o n o f p e r c e i v i n g does  t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n o f the f a c t  o f the o c c u r r e n c e o f i l l u s i o n s  w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y f o r c e some move away from n a i v e e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f the c o n f l i c t I'm c l a i m i n g — a n d c o n t r a r y  could  realism.  t o what some p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  the p r e s s u r e  Only an  f o r c e such a move. Firth  among them, would h o l d — o n e can h o l d p a i r s o f c o n f l i c t i n g without f e e l i n g  object".  of the c o n f l i c t .  But,  apparently  beliefs  Being a l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d  consequence o f a f a c t r e c o g n i z e d being recognized  by common-sense does not  or even ' r e c o g n i z e d '  on the s t r e e t can, under p r e s s u r e  by common-sense.  itself  entail  That the  man  (probably c o n s i d e r a b l e ) , be brought  to acknowledge the need f o r some s o r t o f move away from p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s doesn't i n the l e a s t t h a t need e x i s t e d i n any  support  the c l a i m t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n o f  sense p r i o r to the p r e s s u r e .  Such needs  a r e n ' t , c o n t r a r y to what F i r t h seems to b e l i e v e , the s o r t s o f  things  of which common-sense i s i n c a p a b l e of remaining o b l i v i o u s .  3.  The  The  'Causal' Conception  o f Awareness  tendency to t h i n k of p e r c e p t i o n i n a n a i v e r e a l i s t manner  c o n s t i t u t e s the f i r s t  and  common-sense c o n c e p t i o n  the s i m p l e s t of the two  o f awareness.  threads  i n the  O b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y i s assumed to  d i r e c t l y g i v e n , r e v e a l e d , so to speak, to us.  And  be  while I think that  F i r t h i s wrong, i n v i r t u e o f the s t r e n g t h o f the n a i v e r e a l i s t  conception  o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , to a t t r i b u t e a d i s t i n c t i o n between p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and  o s t e n s i b l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s to the P-theory, i t i s c l e a r t h a t  t h e r e remains, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  some sense  s e n s i t i v e t o , though without  anything  inadequacies  i n which the P-theory i s  l i k e a recognition of,  o f t h i s n a i v e r e a l i s t account o f p e r c e i v i n g .  s u b t l e t y of l o o k s - t a l k i s evidence,  the  A l l the  at the p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , o f  this  s e n s i t i v i t y , however i n a r t i c u l a t e from a t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t of view i t might be.  The  second t h r e a d  i s introduced  i n t o the t a n g l e w i t h  appearance of the n o t i o n of s t a t e s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  the  To the n o t i o n t h a t  75 looking at physical objects  i s a p r o c e s s which ' l i g h t s - u p ' p h y s i c a l  i s i n c o n s i s t e n t l y , but without r e t r a c t i o n , added the n o t i o n physical objects sciousness. realist  that looking at  i s a p r o c e s s which causes e n t i t i e s c a l l e d s t a t e s o f con-  The i n c o n s i s t e n c y a r i s e s because, as I s a i d e a r l i e r , t h e n a i v e  conception  l e a v e s no room f o r s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n a n y t h i n g  the sense here being  introduced.  which d i d t h e l o o k i n g .  o f as being  possessed by the con-  Moreover, the c a p a c i t y t o l o o k a t i s one  possessed by c o n s c i o u s n e s s both i n r e s p e c t analogous sense, i n r e s p e c t  like  States of consciousness are, according to  t h i s new n o t i o n o f l o o k i n g a t , conceived sciousness  objects  o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and, i n some  o f i t s own s t a t e s as w e l l .  Thus l o o k i n g a t  p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s causes s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s which b e l o n g to t h e c o n s c i o u s ness which looked  and the s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e r e b y caused a r e themr-  s e l v e s e n t i t i e s o f a s o r t which can be looked a t i n g new and h i g h e r looked  order  a t ; and so on.  at i n turn; accordingly  gener-  s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s which can themselves be  To l o o k a t a s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s , o f course, t o  introspect. Though t h i s way o f c o n c e i v i n g which I s h a l l c a l l t h e c a u s a l c o n c e p t i o n  o f the n o t i o n o f ' l o o k i n g a t ' , and a c c o r d i n g  t o which l o o k i n g  at i s a p r o c e s s which causes s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s and s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s a r e , l i k e o b j e c t s , e n t i t i e s o f a s o r t which can themselves be looked or  a t , cannot be c o h e r e n t l y  'lighting-up' conception,  combined w i t h t h e n a i v e  realist  the two c o n c e p t i o n s a r e not g e n e r a l l y ,  I b e l i e v e , even d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  Indeed I t h i n k , as I s a i d e a r l i e r ,  t h a t the l i g h t i n g - u p c o n c e p t i o n  i s even r e a p p l i e d a t t h e l e v e l o f t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n s c i o u s n e s s and i t s own s t a t e s .  If this re-  a p p l i c a t i o n happened o n l y once and e f f e c t i v e l y r e p l a c e d ,  a t some p o i n t ,  the c a u s a l c o n c e p t i o n — i f  'looking a t '  i t were claimed,  that i s , that  r e f e r s t o two d i s t i n c t i n t u i t i v e l y implausible incoherent.  types o f o p e r a t i o n — t h e n i t would be, however and e m p i r i c a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e , a t l e a s t n o t  Such a tendency t o supplement, a t some p o i n t , t h e c a u s a l ,  c o n c e p t i o n w i t h t h e l i g h t i n g - u p c o n c e p t i o n p r o b a b l y i n d i c a t e s some dim r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c a u s a l c o n c e p t i o n a l o n e can y i e l d n o t h i n g b u t an i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s .  But t h e l i g h t i n g - u p c o n c e p t i o n s t o p s  the r e g r e s s w i t h o u t coming any c l o s e r move i n t h e r e g r e s s  to achieving  t h a t which each  sought t o a t t a i n .  4.  The  Problem w i t h Awareness o f  That t h i s i s t h e case w i l l be r e a l i z e d once i t i s a p p r e c i a t e d that  i f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ( o r mind) i s c o n c e i v e d o f as pure s u b j e c t i v i t y  (as, t h a t i s , t h e s u b j e c t i v e h a l f o f a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e and  duality)  i t s s t a t e s a r e c o n c e i v e d o f as e n t i t i e s to which i t stands i n r e l a t i o n ,  analogous t o the way i n which p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s  a r e e n t i t i e s to which  the mind o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s stands i n r e l a t i o n , and i r r e s p e c t i v e o f how that r e l a t i o n i t s e l f  i s c o n c e i v e d o f , then s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s must  remain always, n e c e s s a r i l y , and u s e l e s s l y , o u t s i d e just  i n t h e way i n which p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s  at the outset  do.  of consciousness;  I f , t h a t i s , as I c l a i m e d  o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n about t h e n a t u r e o f awareness, t h e f a c t  t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s must be acknowledged as h a v i n g two a s p e c t s , and  a passive,  an a c t i v e  i s m i s t a k e n l y i n t e r p r e t e d as i n d i c a t i v e o f the e x i s t e n c e  of a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e  s p l i t w i t h i n awareness, and i f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s  taken to be are,  the  s u b j e c t i v e h a l f of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p and  l i k e physical objects,  h a l f , then we  are  argument a g a i n s t  f a c e d w i t h one the g i v e n  subjective/objective of i t s c o n t a c t  taken to be  i t s states  c o n s t i t u t i v e of the  objective  h a l f o f the dilemma w i t h which S e l l a r s '  confronts  us.  The  s u b j e c t i v e h a l f of a  r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f i t i s to be a b l e  to make any  w i t h the o b j e c t i v e i n i t s endeavor to found  empirical  knowledge, must be a b l e to a s s i m i l a t e , somehow, the o b j e c t i v e But  sensing  c o n s t r u e d , as by  at manners does not the p o s s i b i l i t y  allow  into  the P-theory, i n e i t h e r of the two  f o r such a s s i m i l a t i o n and  of awareness.  Being aware of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s  w i t h a c h o i c e between l i t - u p p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s  and  But  allow  seems  i f we  s t a t e s of  itself  looking  thus does not  to r e q u i r e g e t t i n g some content i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  use  are  faced  consciousness  which a r e caused by p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s but which are no more i n s i d e of c o n s c i o u s n e s s than are p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s to be one  whit c l o s e r to the e x i s t e n c e  physical objects consciousness.  themselves, then we of awareness than we  became i l l u m i n a t e d or caused the e x i s t e n c e Neither  the l i g h t i n g - u p nor  the c a u s a l  don't seem were b e f o r e of states  c o n c e p t i o n of  l o o k i n g at makes p o s s i b l e the a s s i m i l a t i o n o f the o b j e c t i v e by subjective.  The  of p r e c i s e l y the  causal  c o n c e p t i o n , moreover, i n v o l v e s an  same form as the one: involved:.in  of  the  infinite  regres  Sellars'ilinguistic  account of awareness. Thus i f , as a c c o r d i n g  to the c a u s a l  c o n c e p t i o n of  sensing,  the r e l a t i o n s h i p of c o n s c i o u s n e s s to i t s s t a t e s i s presupposed to one  of possession  looking  rather  than one  of the whole to i t s p a r t s ,  be  and  at these s t a t e s i s assumed to be an a b i l i t y which c o n s c i o u s n e s s  does, and indeed, must be a b l e t o e x e r c i s e i n c o n n e c t i o n  with i t s states,  then t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f an i n s t a n c e o f awareness w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y remain an i n f i n i t e l y  e l u s i v e event.  For i f s t a t e s o f consciousness are conceived  of as e n t i t i e s which a mind must be a b l e to l o o k a t i f i t i s to be aware of them, i f t h a t i s , awareness i s n o t t o be c o n s t r u e d and non-dual, then t h e need a u t o m a t i c a l l y  as d i r e c t ,  immediate,  a r i s e s f o r t h e mind t o , i n  the same way, l o o k a t t h e r e s u l t s o f i t s p r i o r a c t s o f l o o k i n g . so we a r e on t h e road t o r e g r e s s . goes as f o l l o w s : conception  More f u l l y d e s c r i b e d ,  The u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f t h e n a i v e  the regress  realist,  o f l o o k i n g a t f o r c e d us t o move t o the c a u s a l  of l o o k i n g a t which would have us i n t e r p o s e  And  lighting-up,  conception  states of consciousness  as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; but now we a r e f a c e d w i t h a c h o i c e o f r e i n t r o d u c i n g t h e l i g h t i n g - u p  conception  of l o o k i n g a t a t t h e l e v e l o f i n t r o s p e c t i o n o r o f r e a p p l y i n g  the c a u s a l  conception  and t h e r e b y o f i n t e r p o s i n g new and h i g h e r  order  states  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s between c o n s c i o u s n e s s and i t s own s t a t e s .  I f we  choose t h e l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e we w i l l be f o r c e d t o an i n f i n i t e of l o o k i n g s necessity  regress  a t , a r e g r e s s which w i l l n o t be j u s t a p o s s i b i l i t y but a  (so l o n g as we s t i c k t o t h e c a u s a l c o n c e p t i o n  s i n c e each new s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s an i n t e r m e d i a r y  of looking at) between  c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r , a t t h e ; f i r s t , l e v e l , the p h y s i c a l o b j e c t , which was looked o t h e r words, stop  the regress  at previously.  by s a y i n g  t h a t we have no need f o r an  i n f i n i t e l y complex l e v e l o f i n t r o s p e c t i o n . lookings  We c a n ' t , i n  For t h i s i n f i n i t e chain of  a t i s a l l i n p u r s u i t o f awareness a t t h e f i r s t  l e v e l ; at the  l e v e l o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n s c i o u s n e s s and p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . In  t h i s sense t h e r e g r e s s which I'm now d e s c r i b i n g i s v i c i o u s i n  e x a c t l y t h e way i n which the one I c l a i m e d must plague linguistic  account  o f awareness i s :  Each lower  Sellars'  stage i n the r e g r e s s  i s dependent upon each o f the i n f i n i t e l y many h i g h e r ones. for  an i n f i n i t e number o f a c t s — i n  The need  t h i s case o f l o o k i n g s a t and i n  S e l l a r s ' case o f u t t e r i n g s and r e c o g n i z i n g s — o p e n s up, as i t were, between  t h e s u b j e c t and the o b j e c t o f which i t s t r i v e s f o r awareness. I f each a c t o f l o o k i n g a t generates, as on the c a u s a l c o n c e p t i o n ,  a new s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , but a s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s itself  o n l y . a p o s s i b l e o b j e c t o f awareness, and not i t s e l f a moment o f awareness, then no amount o f l o o k i n g a t c o u l d ever generate awareness.  The p o i n t  i s t h a t w h i l e d u a l i t y may e x i s t between a c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h a t which i s the cause o f i t s s t a t e s , and which we may express by s a y i n g t h a t t h e conscious being  'looks a t ' t h e w o r l d ,  i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e , on p a i n o f  r e g r e s s , f o r t h e r e to be a d u a l i t y between a c o n s c i o u s b e i n g and i t s own states. —not  To be a c o n s c i o u s b e i n g i s t o be a s e r i e s o f c o n s c i o u s s t a t e s  t o have such a s e r i e s .  And so a c o n s c i o u s b e i n g cannot,  strictly  speaking, i n s p e c t i t s own s t a t e s ; f o r t o do so r e q u i r e s t h a t i t be a b l e to  stand i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s s t a t e s i n a way which i t cannot. A c o n s c i o u s b e i n g l o o k s a t the world;  conscious being s t a t e s of consciousness.  t h e world causes  i n the  I f awareness i s n o t immediately,  as a non-dual phenomenon, thereby a c h i e v e d , i f the c o n s c i o u s b e i n g i s c o n c e i v e d o f as having now t o 'look a t ' i t s own s t a t e s i n o r d e r t o become aware o f them, then t h e q u e s t i o n i s , A t what p o i n t and how can t h e p r o c e s s of  l o o k i n g a t ever b r i n g i t about t h a t the c o n s c i o u s b e i n g i s aware?  'Looking a t ' w i l l be a c a u s a l p r o c e s s ,  the product o f which i s c o n s c i o u s  s t a t e s , t h e c a u s a l l i n e a g e o f which w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p l e x — thus there w i l l be c o n s c i o u s s t a t e s caused by l o o k i n g a t p h y s i c a l and  c o n s c i o u s s t a t e s caused by l o o k i n g a t c o n s c i o u s s t a t e s caused by  l o o k i n g a t p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , and so on-—but cause awareness u n l e s s But  objects,  'looking at' w i l l  never  a t some stage c o n s c i o u s s t a t e s j u s t a r e awareness.  t h a t stage w i l l have t o be t h e v e r y  first  stage;  o f g e t t i n g r i d o f , once i t has been i n t r o d u c e d ,  f o r the i m p o s s i b i l i t y  the t h i n g , t h e pure,  empty s u b j e c t i v i t y , which was d o i n g t h e ' l o o k i n g a t ' a t each o f t h e s t a g e s which f o l l o w t h e f i r s t of e s c a p i n g it  from a r e g r e s s o f ' l o o k i n g s  i n any s a t i s f a c t o r y way.  as I s a i d a t the o u t s e t  of l o o k i n g a t l e a v e s  a t ' ; o r a t l e a s t o f escaping  The o p t i o n o f s w i t c h i n g  from t h e c a u s a l t o t h e l i t - u p But  stage w i l l b r i n g w i t h i t t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y  conception  from  a t some p o i n t  o f l o o k i n g a t remains open.  o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , the l i t - u p  conception  c o n s c i o u s n e s s j u s t as empty, and t h e g i v e n ,  whether  p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , sense-data, s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r whatever, j u s t as u s e l e s s l y o u t s i d e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s as does t h e c a u s a l  conception.  5. The  S e l l a r s View Recast  S e l l a r s ' claim that sensing  i s non-epistemic, that there are  no p r i m o r d i a l awarenesses—where awareness, f o r S e l l a r s , i s j u s t assumed to be awareness of_, t o be i n h e r e n t l y d u a l — a m o u n t s , I b e l i e v e , t o t h e r e c o g n i t i o n that sensing,  i n t e r p r e t e d , as i t i s , i n e i t h e r o f t h e two  ' l o o k i n g a t ' m a n n e r s — a s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n s c i o u s n e s s and p a r t i c u l a r s — c o u l d never f u l f i l l  the r o l e which i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been a s s i g n e d a t t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f e m p i r i c a l knowledge. so c o n c e i v e d , It  i s u s e l e s s ; o r , a t any r a t e , by i t s e l f  Sensing,  i t ' s useless.  cannot amount to awareness; to an e p i s t e m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between  consciousness  and any aspect o f o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y .  But though S e l l a r s  r e j e c t e d t h e p r o b l e m a t i c d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f s e n s i n g , he r e t a i n e d the problem by assuming t h a t awareness i s d u a l i s t i c .  Thus he t r i e s t o  c o n s t r u c t out o f a n o n - d u a l i s t i c n o t i o n o f s e n s i n g , u s i n g a s t i m u l u s / response  account  S e l l a r s ' account  o f language a c q u i s i t i o n , a d u a l i s t i c  form o f awareness.  o f awareness, i n terms o f r e c o g n i z i n g r e l a t i o n a l  facts  about u t t e r a n c e s has t h e same s t r u c t u r e a s , and hence i n v o l v e s the same form o f i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s a s , t h e c a u s a l c o n c e p t i o n o f s e n s i n g i n terms of  l o o k i n g at s t a t e s o f consciousness.  S e l l a r s i n e f f e c t avoided the  problem a t one p l a c e o n l y to r e i n s t a t e i t a t another. S e l l a r s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i f awareness was t o f u l f i l l i n t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge which r e p l a c e d the r o l e but f a l s e l y , thought  t o be f u l f i l l e d  some r o l e  traditionally,  by s e n s i n g , then i t must,  u n l i k e s e n s i n g as t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o n c e i v e d , be capable o f g e t t i n g some content  into consciousness.  r e l a t i o n s h i p , I'm contending,  By means o f the ' e x p r e s s i n g '  S e l l a r s hoped t h a t i t would be p o s s i b l e  to  a c h i e v e what the ' l o o k i n g a t ' r e l a t i o n s h i p alone was i n c a p a b l e  of  achieving.  Thus I'm c o n s t r u i n g t h e S e l l a r s i a n e f f a b i l i t y  thesis  as the c l a i m t h a t s e n s i n g , as t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o n c e i v e d o f , i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n s c i o u s n e s s  and p a r t i c u l a r s and t h a t i t ,  as such, n e c e s s a r i l y l e a v e s c o n s c i o u s n e s s  empty; s t a n d i n g u s e l e s s l y  i n r e l a t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r s .  In o r d e r f o r content to be, i n any  sense,  g o t t e n i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s , the t h e s i s h o l d s , i t must be g o t t e n i n as i n f o r m a t i o n about p a r t i c u l a r s .  Whatever gets i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s  gets i n i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l form; as f a c t s o f the form X i s 0 o r X resembles Y.  An e p i s t e m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p which manages, somehow,  to c l o s e , w i t h i n the s u b j e c t i v e , the gap between the s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e must be a c h i e v e d .  the  But S e l l a r s , I contend, o v e r l o o k e d  the f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a w o r l d o f d i f f e r e n c e between e x h i b i t i n g a s t i m u l u s / r e s p o n s e a c q u i r e d tendency to l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o u r and expressing a proposition. c l e a r l y to be an attempt  H i s l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness seems to get the l a t t e r out o f the former.  While I am u n d e n i a b l y imposing an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n onto S e l l a r s , a l l o w me, it  n e v e r t h e l e s s , to pursue t h i s  i s , I b e l i e v e , worth e x p l o r i n g .  The f i r s t  interpretation;  t h i n g t h a t must be noted  i s t h a t i f S e l l a r s i s indeed__sensitive to the problem o f awareness i n a n y t h i n g l i k e the form i n which I have p r e s e n t e d i t ,  then  this  s e n s i t i v i t y on h i s p a r t can o n l y be at war w i t h h i s s t r o n g tendency to f a v o u r a m a t e r i a l i s t account o f c o n s c i o u s phenomena; f o r the form i n which I have p r e s e n t e d i t p r o f e s s e s to be an a n a l y s i s o f the form which  i t takes i f one f o l l o w s through the P-theory account o f i t ,  where one o f i t s fundamental  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s the n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t  n a t u r e o f the s u b j e c t i v e i n g r e d i e n t .  That he i s i n f a c t s u b j e c t to  p r e c i s e l y such w a r r i n g t e n d e n c i e s i s , I t h i n k , r e v e a l e d i n the account, which I have a l r e a d y r e j e c t e d , which he o f f e r s o f awareness.  His  unease w i t h a m a t e r i a l i s t account once i t ' s a l l i n , d r i v e s him to add to t h a t account something which pushes i t to a form o f r e g r e s s  p r e c i s e l y p a r a l l e l to one account of s e n s i n g , reasons,  which can be  shown to a f f e c t the  an account which he had,  P-theory  f o r demonstrably r e l a t e d  rejected. As  a m a t e r i a l i s t , S e l l a r s would, I suggest, a n a l y z e  sensing  i n accordance w i t h a s t r i c t l y m a t e r i a l i s t v e r s i o n o f what I have c a l l e d the c a u s a l  conception.  For  S e l l a r s , sensations  o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y j u s t as p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s  are;  are p a r t  thus he  is fully  prepared to admit t h a t a completed s c i e n t i f i c account might the e x i s t e n c e  o f p a r t i c u l a r s c a l l e d sense-data, but  which, f a r from b e i n g the o b j e c t s  by h i g h - l e v e l s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i z i n g and  discovered  to be  though he r e c o g n i z e s  problems both here and  physical objects  t o t a l s t a t e o f the b r a i n .  of s e n s i n g ,  f u r t h e r s t a t e s of the b r a i n .  specting,  on  not  But  an  a necessity;  a r e l a t i o n i n any  or s e n s a t i o n  state  objects  introspecting,  introspected  the brain  and  i n turn,  i n f i n i t e process of  causing  intro-  the m a t e r i a l i s t v e r s i o n of the c a u s a l c o n c e p t i o n i s  o n l y a p o s s i b i l i t y and a t , i s not  sensations,  i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the  i n t h e o r y at l e a s t , be  itself,  Sensing  s t a t e s which causes f u r t h e r s t a t e s o f the b r a i n ,  these s t a t e s c o u l d , yet  to be a  i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the b r a i n and  ' i n t e r n a l ' counterpart  role in  i n connection with  which causes s t a t e s of the b r a i n ( i . e . s e n s a t i o n s ) ;  i t s own  ultimately  Indeed c o n s c i o u s n e s s  the p r e s e n t s t a t e of s c i e n c e , w i l l a l s o t u r n out  of the b r a i n , i n t h i s case the  and  are  are  s t a t e s of the b r a i n which p l a y a mere c a u s a l  the p r o c e s s by which awareness i s a c h i e v e d .  given  recognize  as p a r t i c u l a r s  of immediate awareness,  postulated  of  f o r sensing,  bothersome sense.  caused by l o o k i n g at i s , on  and  thus  Each s t a t e o f  looking consciousness  t h i s view, a s t a t e o f the  brain,  o f the m a t e r i a l s u b j e c t ; but s i n c e s e n s i n g i s non-epistemic  i t i s not  a s t a t e which must i n t u r n become the o b j e c t o f an e p i s t e m i c a t t i t u d e . A c c o r d i n g to S e l l a r s ' view awareness a r i s e s when l i n g u i s t i c a r e , by s t i m u l u s / r e s p o n s e means, s e t up f i r s t  i n connection with  p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s t a t e s and l a t e r i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h sensory I f S e l l a r s had the s o - c a l l e d  responses  states.  stopped t h e r e , g i v i n g as h i s account o f awareness 'thermometer view' a c c o r d i n g to which to be aware o f  the presence o f a c e r t a i n s o r t of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t i s to make the a p p r o p r i a t e S-R  c o n d i t i o n e d response  (had he kept, i n o t h e r words,  awareness a l s o n o n - e p i s t e m i c ) , he would have g i v e n , however i m p l a u s i b l e i t might seem, a thoroughgoing, s e n s i n g and awareness.  c o n s i s t e n t , m a t e r i a l i s t account  But S e l l a r s saw  and acknowledged the  of  implausibility.  3  The thermometer view o f awareness i s u n a c c e p t a b l e . N o t i c e t h a t on the s t r i c t l y m a t e r i a l i s t v e r s i o n o f the c a u s a l account o f awareness which I have j u s t d e s c r i b e d t h e r e i s no room to make sense o f the type o f c l a i m which I have been making to the e f f e c t t h a t b e i n g aware must i n v o l v e g e t t i n g something consciousness.  Consciousness  into  i s the t o t a l s t a t e o f the b r a i n ;  s e n s a t i o n s a r e a s p e c t s of the t o t a l s t a t e o f the b r a i n ; c l e a r l y , on t h i s account  s e n s a t i o n s a r e i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s even b e f o r e  of them generates new  'awareness'  a s p e c t s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r s t a t e s o f the b r a i n .  S u b j e c t i v i t y , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i s not'-empty and s t a n d i n g i n r e l a t i o n to i t s s t a t e s i n the way conception  i n which I e a r l i e r c l a i m e d t h a t the c a u s a l  (or the l i g h t i n g - u p c o n c e p t i o n ) would l e a v e i t .  But  d e s p i t e h i s p o w e r f u l m a t e r i a l i s t i n c l i n a t i o n s , S e l l a r s seems unable  85  to r e j e c t completely  a non-materialist notion of s u b j e c t i v i t y .  By a d m i t t i n g t h a t t h e thermometer v i e w o f awareness i s i n s u f f i c i e n t and by s u p p l e m e n t i n g i t w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n a l requirement t h a t , t o be aware o f t h e p r e s e n c e o f a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t o f a c e r t a i n s o r t , a s u b j e c t must n o t o n l y u t t e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 'x i s 0 ' b u t must a l s o r e c o g n i z e  sentence o f t h e form  that utterances  of sentences  of t h a t form a r e r e l i a b l e symptoms o f t h e p r e s e n c e o f o b j e c t s o f t h a t s o r t , S e l l a r s reintroduces a non-materialist notion of s u b j e c t i v i t y . S i m i l a r l y , i f the m a t e r i a l i s t v e r s i o n of the causal conception of l o o k i n g a t i s augmented by a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n such that states of consciousness or sensations  are objects of acts of  l o o k i n g a t , a n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t n o t i o n o f l o o k i n g a t has been and w i t h i t t h e t y p e o f r e g r e s s w h i c h I have d e s c r i b e d  reintroduced  reappears.  N o t i c e t h a t i f s o m e o n e — S e l l a r s perhaps—-were t o i n s i s t t h a t what has been added i s n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t , t h e r e g r e s s w i l l o c c u r anyway.  But  c a r e f u l s e l f - a n a l y s i s would, i n b o t h c a s e s , I c o n t e n d , r e v e a l t o t h e m a t e r i a l i s t - i n c l i n e d t h e o r i z e r t h a t o n l y a sympathy f o r a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n , the s u b j e c t i v e i n g r e d i e n t o f which i s non-material,  c o u l d have f o r c e d him t o make t h e p r o b l e m a t i c ,  regress-entailing addition i n the f i r s t place.  What e l s e c o u l d  him t o s a y , c l e a r l y c o n t r a r y t o h i s m a t e r i a l i s t i n c l i n a t i o n s , acts of u t t e r i n g o r states of the b r a i n aren't  lead  that  themselves awarenesses  u n t i l , as i n t h e f i r s t c a s e , they a r e r e c o g n i z e d  as such, o r , as  i n t h e second c a s e , u n t i l t h e y a r e l o o k e d a t . I t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , t o put t h e problem w i t h S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness i n terms o f t h e metaphor o f  ' g e t t i n g something i n t o ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s — w h e r e t h a t n o t i o n i s taken to i n v o l v e something more than the m a t e r i a l i s t one the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the b r a i n and claimed,  exemplified  i t s states.  by  Sellars,  I  r e j e c t e d the t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n of s e n s i n g on the grounds  t h a t i t i n v o l v e d a s i t u a t i o n i n which the s u b j e c t  stood  in a  useless  r e l a t i o n s h i p to o b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s — s e n s e - d a t a , p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , s t a t e s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s to c o n s t r u e played  sensings  or whatever.  and  of a f f a i r s .  alternatively,  as n o n - e p i s t e m i c s t a t e s o f the s u b j e c t which  a c a u s a l r o l e i n the s u b j e c t  to i t s e l f ,  Sellars tried,  coming to be a b l e to express  hence to be aware o f , f a c t s about o b j e c t i v e s t a t e s  I have argued t h a t S e l l a r s ' attempt to get an awareness  of r e l a t i o n s h i p out o f the e x p r e s s i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p and  account o f s e n s i n g — w h e r e , n o t i c e , the e x p r e s s i n g i t s e l f construed  a purely  relationship is  p u r e l y i n terms of the o c c u r r e n c e o f  linguistic  b e h a v i o u r supposedly b e h a v i o u r i s t i c a l l y a c q u i r e d - — c a n n o t work. same form o f r e g r e s s which a r o s e i n c o n n e c t i o n v e r s i o n of the c a u s a l c o n c e p t i o n  causal  The  with a non-materialist  of s e n s i n g w i l l a r i s e as  soon  as S e l l a r s a u g m e n t s — a s he d o e s — t h e thermometer account of awareness w i t h t h e need f o r a c t s of r e c o g n i z i n g . account of awareness i s beset w i t h perceived  a t the l e v e l of s e n s i n g s :  at t h a t p o i n t  Sellars'  e x a c t l y the problem which The  a s s i m i l a t e t h a t of which i t i s 'aware'. 'x i s 0'  But  s u b j e c t cannot u s e f u l l y Thus i f the thought  i s , i n i t s 'primary sense', c o n c e i v e d  o f as an S-R  o v e r t v e r b a l response, awareness o f which i s to be e x p l a i n e d terms o f h e a r i n g  ( S e l l a r s says:  "...we can know what we  p r i m a r y sense, by l i t e r a l l y h e a r i n g  he  ourselves  that conditioned in  t h i n k , i n the  t h i n k . " ) then  s t r u c t u r e of t h a t response, i t s p r o p o s i t i o n a l form, w i l l be  the simply  a  f a c t which, no l e s s than the f a c t o f p o s s e s s i o n of the p r o p e r t y 0 by the o b j e c t x, remains o u t s i d e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  Nothing d i s t i n g u i s h e s  f a c t s about o v e r t v e r b a l responses from f a c t s about o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s to which c o n s c i o u s n e s s stands i n r e l a t i o n . t h e r e i s a problem about awareness e q u a l l y be a problem i n the o t h e r .  If  i n the one case then t h e r e must I t was  t h i s kind of point  which  I had i n mind when I c l a i m e d , i n S e c t i o n 3(1) of the l a s t c h a p t e r , t h a t the n o t i o n o f e f f a b i l i t y i s i t s e l f c o n f u s e d i n the same way as S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account o f awareness.  Indeed, the source  o f the c o n f u s i o n o p e r a t i n g i n the S e l l a r s i a n argument j u s t c o n f u s i o n about e f f a b i l i t y .  is a  The e x p r e s s i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p j u s t s i m p l y  can't be a r e l a t i o n s h i p which c l o s e s the gap between the s u b j e c t i v e and the o b j e c t i v e .  whatever  the e x p r e s s i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i t can't be,  as S e l l a r s assumed, a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r awareness; would  seem i s presupposed by i t .  I t has been shown, I hope, t h a t ,  f a r from b e i n g the most b a s i c form o f awareness, a f a c t presupposes awareness t h a t which e x p r e s s e s i t .  f o r awareness, i t  the expression of  b o t h o f t h a t which i s expressed and o f  To r e p e a t the p o i n t i n the e x p l i c i t l y  S e l l a r s i a n terms i n which i t a r o s e , r e c o g n i t i o n of f a c t s o f the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom o f Y cannot be the most b a s i c form o f f o r s u r e l y such a r e c o g n i t i o n presupposes p r i o r awarenesses s o r t ) b o t h o f X and of Y. s t o r y , doesn't evade t h i s  awareness;  ( o f some  And h o l i s m , though an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f the consequence.  88  6. The  Source of the Problem?  Having accepted S e l l a r s ' argument to show t h a t the v e r s i o n of s e n s i n g as the  cannot serve,  i n the manner t r a d i t i o n a l l y assumed,  f o u n d a t i o n of e m p i r i c a l knowledge, and  attempt to r e t a i n ,  P-theory  h a v i n g found t h a t  his  i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h awareness, a c e n t r a l a s p e c t  the P-theory v e r s i o n of s e n s i n g — a type of s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e — r e s u l t s u l t i m a t e l y , - i f one the  of  split  i s , l i k e S e l l a r s , u n w i l l i n g to accept  'thermometer view' o f awareness, i n the reappearance o f the same  type o f problems which plague the P-theory account of s e n s i n g , obvious move seems to be Sellars retained.  but  at any  to re-examine t h a t aspect of the P-theory which  Perhaps the u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the P-theory  i n i t s assumption, not sensing,  the  j u s t , as S e l l a r s n o t i c e d ,  at the l e v e l  lies of  l e v e l of awareness, of a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e  I n the c h a p t e r which f o l l o w s the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e j e c t i n g the o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s of awareness and  knowledge w i l l be  split.  subjective/  explored.  89 NOTES  I s h a l l acknowledge l a t e r an important, but f o r the present i r r e l e v a n t , sense i n which t h i s c l a i m i s an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n .  point  2 Roderick F i r t h , "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory," i n P e r c e i v i n g , Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J . Swartz (Garden C i t y , New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, I n c . , 1965), p. 255. 3 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , " E m p i r i c i s m and t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," i n S c i e n c e , P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i b r a r y o f P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1963), pp. 162, 167. ^ W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "The S t r u c t u r e o f Knowledge: (1) P e r c e p t i o n , (2) Minds, (3) E p i s t e m i c P r i n c i p l e s , " i n A c t i o n , Knowledge and R e a l i t y : Essays i n Honor o f W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , ed. H e c t o r - N e r i Castaneda ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : The B o b b s - M e r r i l l Company, I n c . , 1975), p. 323.  90 CHAPTER IV  A Non-dual Account o f Awareness o f : Exploring  the P o s s i b i l i t y  1. The  i) object,  Like Piaget, s e l f and o t h e r  At t h e o u t s e t  Subjective/Objective  I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e concepts o f space, time, motion, are a l l constructed  of i t s l i f e  by the c o n s c i o u s organism.  the human i n f a n t i s c o m p l e t e l y  I t s e x p e r i e n c e s a r e u t t e r l y devoid objective distinction.  Dualism  egocentric:  o f any h i n t o f a s u b j e c t i v e /  O b j e c t i v e l y speaking, t h e i n f a n t has, o r , b e t t e r  perhaps, animates a body which e x i s t s i n a c e r t a i n p l a c e a t a c e r t a i n time; h i s body has a c e r t a i n s i z e and a c e r t a i n shape; as w e l l , i t has c e r t a i n c a p a c i t i e s f o r movement, some o f which, c a l l e d r e f l e x e s , o p e r a t e a u t o m a t i c a l l y without the c o n s c i o u s d i r e c t i o n o f the i n f a n t ; and others  o f which e x i s t a t t h e o u t s e t  o n l y as p o t e n t i a l i t i e s and which  w i l l become a c t u a l o n l y g r a d u a l l y and i n c o n n e c t i o n expanding awareness and the i n c r e a s i n g a b i l i t y the p h y s i c a l m a t u r a t i o n ) ,  with the gradually  to i n t e n d  o f the i n f a n t and c h i l d .  This  (and, o f course, collection  of o b j e c t i v e f a c t s about an i n f a n t organism c o n s t i t u t e s what would c a l l h i s f a c t i c i t y .  Sartre  H i s f a c t i c i t y , by s e t t i n g , o r perhaps by  c o n s i s t i n g o f , o b j e c t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s on h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e r e s t o f o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , determines the c o n d i t i o n s under which a n e s s , a s u b j e c t i v i t y , can come i n t o c o n t a c t  conscious-  w i t h o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y as  a whole; determines, reality.  t h a t i s , an organism's p o i n t o f view on o b j e c t i v e  But s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , though i t r e s t s  ultimately  on r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g w i t h i n o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , does not a t t h e o u t s e t , b e i n g e g o c e n t r i c , i n v o l v e any a p p r e c i a t i o n whatsoever o f hdw~~ i n d i v i d u a l experiences f i t into the o b j e c t i v e p i c t u r e .  There i s  a complete l a c k o f d u a l i t y , o f any d i s t i n c t i o n between the s e l f and the n o t - s e l f i n the neonate's e x p e r i e n c e .  The h i s t o r y o f each human  i n d i v i d u a l and o f t h e human r a c e i n g e n e r a l i s t h e h i s t o r y o f a p r o g r e s s i v e e v o l u t i o n towards an ever l e s s s u b j e c t i v e p o i n t o f view on e x p e r i e n c e ; towards the development o f an ever more o b j e c t i v e framework w i t h i n which t o p l a c e and to o r g a n i z e , thereby g r a n t i n g an i n c r e a s i n g measure o f o r d e r and coherence  to, s u b j e c t i v e experience.  When, as c h i l d r e n , we d i s c o v e r t h a t t h e sounds which we hear have v i s u a l and t a c t u a l c o r r e l a t e s and a c c o r d i n g l y we ' p o s t u l a t e ' the p h y s i c a l w o r l d , t h e move i s r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r to t h e move which we make when, c o n t e m p l a t i n g ,  amongst o t h e r t h i n g s , the n a t u r e o f  our eardrums and t h e motion of. a g u i t a r s t r i n g , we p o s t u l a t e sound waves; o r when, c o n t e m p l a t i n g , of t h e M i c h e l s o n - M o r l e y  amongst o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e n e g a t i v e  experiment,  we, i f we j u s t happen t o be  a genius l i k e E i n s t e i n , p o s t u l a t e curved space-time. moves has, as Thomas Nagel puts i t , objective. statements  results  a direction;  Each o f these  from s u b j e c t i v e t o  Each move i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n a l l o w s us t o make c o u h t e r f a c t u a l of greater generality.  But i f b e i n g s u b j e c t i v e means h a v i n g  a p o i n t o f view and b e i n g o b j e c t i v e means having none, then o n l y t h e move from l i v i n g t o d y i n g , from b e i n g c o n s c i o u s t o b e i n g  non-conscious,  c o n s t i t u t e s a move from b e i n g s u b j e c t i v e t o b e i n g o b j e c t i v e . of c o u r s e , the move towards o b j e c t i v i t y doesn't  In f a c t ,  involve leaving  behind  a l l p o i n t s of view, a l l s u b j e c t i v i t y , i t o n l y i n v o l v e s abandoning (perhaps o n l y  f o r the time b e i n g ) ,  p o i n t of view i n favour o b j e c t i v e our and  a r e l a t i v e l y l e s s encompassing  of a more encompassing one.  No  matter  how  t h e o r i e s , t h a t i s to say our d e s c r i p t i o n s , p r e d i c t i o n s  explanations,  become, they are always subj e c t i v e because  v e r y a c t of t h e o r i z i n g , o f d e s c r i b i n g , p r e d i c t i n g or  the  explaining,  e n t a i l s a p o i n t of view, which i n t u r n e n t a i l s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , experiences,  ii)  about which to  I will  the n o t i o n s  theorize.  endeavor i n the present  c h a p t e r to make sense o f  o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , o b j e c t i v i t y , p o i n t of view, and  c o n s t r u c t i o n as they o c c u r i n the f o r e g o i n g some way claimed  such t h a t they manage to a v o i d  statement of p o s i t i o n i n  the problems which I have  b e f a l l the t r a d i t i o n a l d u a l i s t i c - t y p e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  to which they are g e n e r a l l y s u b j e c t e d .  An  adequate treatment  the s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e s p l i t must, I b e l i e v e , b e g i n by t h a t i t reappears on Thus we  theory  three  separate,  c l e a r t h a t we be t h a t we  of p u t t i n g i t i s misleading;  discourse  a semantic i s s u e .  f o r w h i l e i t seems  and  contention  the semantic.  will  What ijs  or a semantic r e l a t i o n ?  Though I s h a l l not o n t o l o g i c a l i s s u e , my o n t o l o g i c a l plane, such a way  and  have an i s s u e w i t h i n the o n t o l o g i c a l , my  have i s s u e s about the e p i s t e m i c  an e p i s t e m i c  recognizing  though r e l a t e d , p l a n e s of  have an o n t o l o g i c a l , an '. e p i s t e m i c ,  Though t h i s way  of  attempt to argue f o r a p o s i t i o n on  the  i n c l i n a t i o n s are towards the b e l i e f t h a t , on  the s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e s p l i t  as to p i c k out  an a c t u a l d u a l i t y .  the  can be made i n  I am,  therefore, a dualist  93 But the type of dualism which I accept comes nowhere near the t r a d i t i o n a l P-theory mental/physical duality.  In my discussion of  the P-theory account of our awareness of physical objects I overs i m p l i f i e d by talking as though the notion of states of consciousness only became introduced under pressure from the inadequacies of naive realism.  In f a c t , of course, the occurrence:of sensations  such as pains, pleasures, t i c k l e s , etc., as well as a l l the mental attitudes, both cognitive and a f f e c t i v e , makes some such:_notion as that of states of consciousness very basic.  And indeed, t h i s fact,  of the prior presence and operation of such a notion, probably explains the ease with which we u n c r i t i c a l l y move back and forth between the notions of, for example, seeing a red object and having a sensation of red, the need for the presence of both of which amounted, I contended, to a demonstration of the f a l s i t y of naive realism. To my e a r l i e r , over-simplified account of the connection between a naive r e a l i s t position on perception and the notion of states of consciousness I have just added the admission that naive realism, in that i t does not conceive of pains and pleasures as properties of physical objects, i s not only compatible with, but i n fact requires the public/private d i s t i n c t i o n which the physical objects/states of consciousness d i s t i n c t i o n involves. But i n keeping with my  earlier  account l e t me r e i t e r a t e that naive realism i s f a l s i f i e d when i t i s forced to treat what are supposed by the position to be p u b l i c l y available (states of physical objects) as though they were available only v i a private intermediaries (states of consciousness, or whatever).  sense-data  I w i s h t o show now t h a t  the m e n t a l / p h y s i c a l l i n e which t h e  P-theory draws and h o l d s as marking an o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n i n f a c t d i v i d e s a c l a s s which i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y homogeneous.  Thus I  wish t o argue t h a t even i f t h e n a i v e r e a l i s t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n not  upset by t h e need t o have what ought t o be p u b l i c t u r n out to  be p r i v a t e , t h e p u b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n s t i l l be  was  seen as making a u s e f u l s u b d i v i s i o n w i t h i n  realm. often  could  only at best  a single ontological  The p u b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n , s l o p p i l y used, as i t so i s , t o make an o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between a mental and  a p h y s i c a l realm, begs the p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e :  In  so f a r as t h e p u b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n i s assumed to have ontol o g i c a l implications, can,  i t i s b e i n g used t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n which i t  so understood, o n l y p r o p e r l y  be seen as b e i n g the product o f .  Common-sensically we t h i n k o f the p h y s i c a l w o r l d , as distinct  from t h e mental realm, as b e i n g , f o r example, v i s i b l e and  tangible or concrete. see  that  But we can,  i f we t h i n k c a r e f u l l y about i t ,  t h i s common-sense c r i t e r i o n o f t h e p h y s i c a l cannot  give  content to the o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n which i t i s c a l l e d upon to support. When I touch something my e x p e r i e n c e i s j u s t as 'phenomenal' as my e x p e r i e n c e o f , say, p a i n .  Consider:  I am h o l d i n g  a pen i n my  hand; I t i g h t e n my g r i p on i t and I e x p e r i e n c e what we t h i n k o f as (an awareness o f ) c o n t a c t  with a concrete object;  something hard, something hard i s 'out t h e r e ' .  I have touched  Now i f I p r e s s t h e p o i n t  o f t h e pen i n t o the palm o f my o t h e r hand I have a d i f f e r e n t type of e x p e r i e n c e , one o f p a i n .  But t h e e x p e r i e n c e , though d i f f e r e n t ,  i s not d i f f e r e n t  i n any way  physical distinction.  One  which w i l l h e l p us to make the mental/ of these e x p e r i e n c e s  i s considered  para-  d i g m a t i c of the p h y s i c a l , the o t h e r i s c o n s i d e r e d p a r a d i g m a t i c mental.  In f a c t , both, when c o n s i d e r e d  independently  of the  as such,  Berkeley, just pointed to. about the two  the  question-  begging p u b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n , can be seen to be n o t h i n g s e n s a t i o n s ; and,  of  but  a r e i n e s c a p a b l y phenomenal o r s u b j e c t i v e .  of course, has argued f o r what I have i n e f f e c t  Whereas I have simply c l a i m e d  that there i s nothing  s i t u a t i o n s which j u s t i f i e s our d i s t i n c t i o n between  p e r c e i v i n g s o l i d i t y and  s e n s i n g p a i n , B e r k e l e y argued the p o i n t  by  showing t h a t f r e q u e n t l y , as i n the case of p e r c e i v i n g g r e a t heat  and  s e n s i n g p a i n , the p e r c e p t u a l s t a t e i s i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the  sensory  state.  To  show t h a t the aspect of the  b e i n g p e r c e i v e d can be  ' p u b l i c ' p r o p e r t y which i s  i d e n t i c a l w i t h the  ' p r i v a t e ' sensation being  undergone makes the same p o i n t t h a t much more s t r o n g l y . has c l a i m e d t h a t B e r k e l e y ' s sense-impressions to show t h a t any heat,  if  Armstrong  argument, "...would prove at b e s t t h a t  of heat a r e simply s e n s a t i o n s . . . / a n d /  would do  q u a l i t y of a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t , such as the  i s a sensation".'''  to e q u i v o c a t e  D.M.  Armstrong's remark r e v e a l s how  on the n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y .  t h e r e i s an o b j e c t i v e realm,  our  nothing  quality  easy i t i s  For w h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t ,  the q u a l i t i e s which a r e  characteristic  of i t w i l l not be s e n s a t i o n s , i t i s f a r from c l e a r t h a t Armstrong i s u s i n g the e x p r e s s i o n a way  t h a t i t p i c k s out, or aims at p i c k i n g out, e n t i t i e s w i t h i n the  e l u s i v e o b j e c t i v e realm it  ' p h y s i c a l o b j e c t ' i n the above q u o t a t i o n i n such  (assuming t h a t t h e r e even i s one).  seems c l e a r t h a t Armstrong i s not u s i n g  Indeed  'physical object' i n that  way.  96 Thus h i s use  of t h a t e x p r e s s i o n  seems to be  such as to make h i s  remark quoted a b o v e — g i v e n t h a t i n the o t h e r , more u s u a l way  of  using  perceived  ' p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s ' , p r o p e r t i e s of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s are  by us—amount to a simultaneous acceptance and argument.  As P h i l o n o u s r e p l i e s to H y l a s ,  r e j e c t i o n of  so B e r k e l e y  Berkeley's  would r e p l y  to Armstrong: Our d i s c o u r s e proceeded a l t o g e t h e r c o n c e r n i n g s e n s i b l e t h i n g s , which you d e f i n e d to be, the t h i n g s we immediately p e r c e i v e by our senses, whatever o t h e r q u a l i t i e s , t h e r e f o r e , you speak o f , as d i s t i n c t from these, I know n o t h i n g of them, n e i t h e r do they at a l l belong to the p o i n t i n d i s p u t e . You may, indeed, p r e t e n d to have d i s c o v e r e d c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s which you do not p e r c e i v e , and a s s e r t t h o s e i n s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s e x i s t i n f i r e and sugar. But what use can be made of t h i s to your present purpose, I am at a l o s s to c o n c e i v e . While I would not w i s h to be d i s c o v e r q u a l i t i e s which we  seen as  cannot p e r c e i v e ,  'pretending'  I would add  be  sensibly  t h a t we,  as  c o n s c i o u s b e i n g s , are a b s o l u t e l y l o c k e d w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s o f s u b j e c t i v e s i d e o f the d u a l i t y , w i t h the t r u e n a t u r e of the s i d e n e c e s s a r i l y and  completely e l u d i n g us.  about the o b j e c t i v e s i d e i s t h a t i t has  can  I would m a i n t a i n that  the s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n can, n e v e r t h e l e s s , h e l d t o mark an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y .  t h a t we  At best what we  the  objective can  say  c e r t a i n sorts of causal c a p a c i t i e s ,  the e f f e c t s of which are apparent i n the s u b j e c t i v e s i d e of which we  are c o n s t i t u t i v e .  (Though I do not mean to be assuming here t h a t  t a l k about c a u s a l i t y i s n o n - p r o b l e m a t i c , I am, some  s o r t of phenomenon, r e c o g n i z a b l y  I guess, assuming t h a t  a counterpart  of t h a t  to  which the common^sense""n6tion:df:causality i s a p p l i e d , does i n f a c t both w i t h i n and we  across  o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e s ; o r , at the v e r y  occur,  l e a s t , that  have some i d e a of what i t means to t a l k as though t h e r e were such a  97 phenomenon and  t h a t the f a c t s as we  know them seem to r e q u i r e  such  talk.) I am w e l l aware t h a t the p l a c e at which I am  claiming  the o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e ought, i f i t i s to be drawn at a l l , does not meet w i t h g e n e r a l ways t h a t the u s u a l way  acceptance.  But  to be drawn,  I have argued i n  two  of drawing the l i n e i s p r o b l e m a t i c .  have j u s t argued t h a t such a d i s t i n c t i o n can't  that  Thus I  be upheld by the  evidence  o f f e r e d i n i t s s u p p o r t — b y , t h a t i s , the d i f f e r e n c e between, f o r example, the e x p e r i e n c e of p a i n and  those o t h e r  experiences  taken to i n v o l v e d i r e c t awareness of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . e a r l i e r t h a t the r e q u i s i t e k i n d of s e n s e — r e q u i s i t e ,  And  generally I argued  t h a t i s , to p l a y  a r o l e i n an account o f e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e — c a n n o t be made out any  form of the s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n — s u c h as the mental/  p h y s i c a l o n e — w h i c h has  the s u b j e c t i v e aspect  standing  i n some form of  awareness of r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the o b j e c t i v e a s p e c t ,  such t h a t  o b j e c t i v e i s present  Indeed I  construed  p o i n t which I put o b j e c t i v e has,  the s u b j e c t i v e and  j u s t another way i n terms of  the s u b j e c t i v e .  of making the same p o i n t ;  against  a  ' g e t t i n g some'thiSg:'-ihto' . t h e ^ s u b j e c t i v e .  to t h a t extent cannot be,  subsequently c o n c e p t u a l l y  i n f l u e n c e on  the n a t u r e of  i t 'gets i n t o the s u b j e c t i v e ' .  But  as common-sense would have i t , p r e s e n t e d a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o , the s u b j e c t i v e .  t r u e n a t u r e o f the o b j e c t i v e n e c e s s a r i l y e l u d e s the The  the  i s s u e i n S e l l a r s ' argument  I would suggest, a c a u s a l  the o b j e c t i v e i s not, t o , and  t o , or b e f o r e ,  the e f f a b i l i t y / i n e f f a b i l i t y  givenness as b e i n g  The  of  c l a i m t h a t though t h e r e  subjective.  i s (or might be)  an o n t o l o g i c a l  The  duality,- we,  as c o n s c i o u s b e i n g s , are s t r i c t l y l o c k e d w i t h i n ,  are c o n s t i t u t i v e o f , one  h a l f of t h a t d u a l i t y , amounts to a tendency to  sympathize w i t h t r a d i t i o n a l phenomenalist-type p o s i t i o n s . most cases,  But  in  I t h i n k , even the phenomenalist f a l l s p r e y t o the type of  d u a l i t y which I am  r e j e c t i n g ; f o r , l i k e the d i r e c t r e a l i s t ,  as S e l l a r s a l s o noted, has  the s u b j e c t  to something which i t i s g i v e n . stands to sense-data as, objects.  indeed  uselessly, in relation  For the phenomenalist, the  f o r the n a i v e  Thus to the extent  standing,  realist,  that epistemic  and  he,  subject  i t stands to p h y s i c a l semantic i s s u e s  are  c o n f i n e d w i t h i n the s u b j e c t i v e h a l f of the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y , and suggest t h a t to a v e r y l a r g e extent suggest f o r the e p i s t e m i c , w i l l be more m o n i s t i c example, I w i l l  and  they a r e , the account which I w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y f o r the semantic i s s u e ,  than phenomenalism.  (In the l a s t c h a p t e r ,  suggest t h a t though r e f e r e n c e  the o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e ,  t h i s i s only  C l e a r l y the major and p o s i t i o n which I am  developing  i d e a l l y and  r e l a t i o n s aim  at  never i n f a c t  p r e s s i n g problem c o n f r o n t i n g i s the need to p r o v i d e  to the type of d u a l i s m , between a s u b j e c t and it  I  for  crossing achievable.)  the  some a l t e r n a t i v e  an o b j e c t i v i t y to which  stands somehow i n an awareness of r e l a t i o n , which I have everywhere  r e j e c t e d as inadequate.  C l e a r l y , as w e l l , the passage w i t h which I began  t h i s c h a p t e r shows t h a t the n o n - d u a l i s t a l l o w me  a l t e r n a t i v e which I o f f e r must  to make some k i n d of sense, w i t h i n what I c l a i m to be  a l l y purely  s u b j e c t i v e , of t a l k of a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e  distinction,  of p o i n t s of view, of awareness of_, of t h e o r i z i n g , of c o n c e p t u a l works, e t c . .  ontologic-  frame-  The O u t l i n e s o f a Theory  i)  In the pages which f o l l o w I w i l l o f f e r a s k e t c h o f a p o s i t i o n  on the n a t u r e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  There i s , l e t me  a p l u r a l i t y of consciousnesses.  Collectively,  s t a r t by  assuming,  the p l u r a l i t y o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s e s make up the s u b j e c t i v e h a l f o f the o n t o l o g i c a l  duality.  As a t h e o r y about c o n s c i o u s n e s s , the t h e o r y I am about to s k e t c h i s t h e r e f o r e , a t the same time, a t h e o r y about the s u b j e c t i v e — i n so f a r as i t i s a t h e o r y about a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p a r t o f the s u b j e c t i v e as a whole.  I w i l l n o t attempt t o argue f o r t h e p o s i t i o n which I w i l l  develop beyond  the n e g a t i v e arguments  which m o t i v a t e d i t s c r e a t i o n .  I hope t h a t once t h e s k e t c h i s complete some advantages o f the p o s i t i o n may  b e g i n to emerge as such i s s u e s as awareness, c o n c e p t u a l  development,  t h e phenomenological a p p e a l and, i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r ,  semantic r e l a t i o n s , a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n i t s l i g h t .  The  position  developed w i l l be crude and g r o s s l y inadequate; but i f I mean thereby to make an apology i t i s not so much f o r the inadequacy of the attempt as f o r t h e a u d a c i t y i n v o l v e d i n the v e r y making o f i t .  For s u r e l y  n o t h i n g c o u l d be more audacious than to attempt to say something worth s a y i n g about t h a t most b a f f l i n g o f a l l phenomena, the phenomenon of c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  I t i s a measure o f the mystery o f the phenomenon,  and a s o r r y but a c c u r a t e measure o f our l a c k o f comprehension t h a t even a crude and g r o s s l y inadequate account may add to the accounts which precede i t , p r e d e c e s s o r s might be.  We  of i t ,  have something to  however s u b t l e and d e t a i l e d i t s  a r e , i t seems to me,  s t i l l v e r y much i n  100 search  o f new d i r e c t i o n s i n which to head. Before launching  i n t o the account I should  word o f warning about the method which I w i l l use. it  add as w e l l a The f a c t i s t h a t  i s n ' t even e n t i r e l y c l e a r to me what the method i s t h a t I am  using.  I t amounts, I t h i n k , to some combination o f d e s c r i b i n g  (near  at times, on mere n a m i n g — i n some h o p e f u l l y s u g g e s t i v e  way), and  theorizing.  The n o t i o n o f t h e o r i z i n g i s g e n e r a l l y t i e d  of i n t r o d u c i n g i m p e r c e p t i b l e , But  i n the context  and  entities.  o f ' t h e o r i z i n g ' about the n a t u r e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s F o r , more than most,  i s the n o t i o n of p e r c e i v i n g , and the r e l a t e d n o t i o n s being  to the i d e a  o r a t l e a s t , as y e t u n p e r c e i v e d ,  t h a t i d e a doesn't seem to be o f much h e l p . it  verging,  of n o t i c i n g  aware o f — e v e n o f t h e o r i z i n g i t s e l f — w h i c h i s up f o r grabs  i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a theory  of consciousness.  While one o f the t h i n g s  which c l e a r l y I am not d o i n g , I t h i n k , i s p o s t u l a t i n g entities,  i t nevertheless  d e s c r i b i n g , as d i s t i n c t  can't  'unperceived'  be t r u e t h a t what I am doing i s j u s t  from t h e o r i z i n g .  Whatever t h e o r i z i n g i s  c o r r e c t l y understood to i n v o l v e , an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f what doing has to be t h e o r i z i n g . recognized  Philosophers  that d e s c r i p t i o n i s inseparable  I'm  o f s c i e n c e have l o n g from t h e o r y .  Perhaps  what I'm d o i n g , then, i s d e s c r i b i n g and i n so doing r e v e a l i n g a theory.  I f one t r i e s to bear i n mind the e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t  i n which  what I am d o i n g i s d e s c r i b i n g i t may be p o s s i b l e to a l l e v i a t e , somewhat, the i m p r e s s i o n from nowhere. them.  Please  t h a t I seem f r e q u e n t l y to draw d i s t i n c t i o n s  I o s t e n s i b l y o f f e r no argument f o r them.  I j u s t make  understand t h a t my argument f o r these d i s t i n c t i o n s , and  my o n l y argument f o r them, i s t h a t I, i n some sense, f i n d t h e m — I  take  101 the d i s t i n c t i o n s which I make to be the crude analogues, f i r s t of those which I d i s c e r n dimly to be o p e r a t i v e  approximations,  i n the phenomenon of  consciousness. F i n a l l y I should  add  t h a t s e v e r a l of the more important  d i s t i n c t i o n s which w i l l be made i n the s u c c e e d i n g pages are ones which I — i n  a d i f f e r e n t sense of found.'—have found ready-made i n  Piaget.  e n t i r e p o s i t i o n i s , I b e l i e v e , profoundly  My  I hope t h a t , were i t p o s s i b l e to ask him, i t as such. own  In weaving P i a g e t ' s  I hope t h a t I do him no  greater  extent,  and  my_ purposes are h i s purposes.  underlying  assumption of the e n t i r e p r e s e n t  of P i a g e t ,  i t seems not  theory  to put  should,  or should  The  assumption to which I r e f e r i s , of c o u r s e , the one  that  the major,  central  assumption.  involved  r e j e c t i o n of a g e n e t i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e  i n the  split.  concerned to a v o i d as much as  pure p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n , t h e r e  that,  seem t o ,  p e r f e c t l y i n t o p l a c e i n an attempt to f o l l o w up  where I am not,  and  own  d i s c u s s i o n i n the words  fit  Since P i a g e t was,  my  Having been  the l e a s t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t l a r g e and  elaborate  of  s i m p l i f i e d them f o r my  i n the opening paragraphs o f the I n t r o d u c t i o n ,  chunks of P i a g e t ' s  recognize  i n j u s t i c e than t h a t of having  Indeed I hope t h a t I have not misunderstood P i a g e t  to some great able,  he would be a b l e to  d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t o the context  taken them from t h e i r o r i g i n a l c o n t e x t s purposes.  Piagetian.  possible  i s room, I b e l i e v e , even a c r y i n g  need, f o r a p h i l o s o p h i c a l examination of the type of  conceptual  e v o l u t i o n the o c c u r r e n c e : o f which P i a g e t ' s . e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s have, I believe, b r i l l i a n t l y  established.  r a d i c a l egocentrism—as Piaget  The  progressive  r e f e r s to the i n i t i a l  diminution  of  the  t o t a l l a c k of a  102 subjective/objective s p l i t — w h i c h  i s c o n s t i t u t i v e of the c o n c e p t u a l  e v o l u t i o n of the c o n s c i o u s organism, underpinnings. develop  c r i e s out f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l  In f a c t I am c o n v i n c e d ,  though I w i l l not t r y to  the i d e a here, t h a t i t i s the absence of such a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  u n d e r p i n n i n g which l e a v e s P i a g e t a p p a r e n t l y a t a l o s s f o r a way  to  answer the type of a t t a c k which J e r r y Fodor b r i n g s a g a i n s t h i s :  stage-wise  3  theory of c o n c e p t u a l e v o l u t i o n .  The  s t r u c t u r e of  Fodor's  a t t a c k , a c c o r d i n g to which a l l concepts must be i n n a t e , i s h i g h l y s i m i l a r to t h a t of the S e l l a r s i a n programme which would have a l l awareness a f u n c t i o n o f the s t i m u l u s / r e s p o n s e a c q u i s i t i o n of language. to both S e l l a r s and Fodor i s the assumption objective s p l i t ,  implicit  Common  of a pervasive subjective/  i n which assumption  a r e some  fundamentally  wrong assumptions about the n a t u r e and o p e r a t i o n o f concepts.  As  pure, o f t e n w i l d , p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n , the endeavor which f o l l o w s i s u n l i k e l y to be one of which P i a g e t would approve; n e v e r t h e l e s s , as designed  to l a y bare the p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f h i s t h e o r y  of g e n e t i c epistemology,  i t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y borrows, wherever::ppss±blei•  from the P i a g e t i a n wealth of e m p i r i c a l l y - b a s e d d i s t i n c t i o n s a l l of which a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y - l a d e n . ii)  With a r e a d e r , I hope, s u f f i c i e n t l y warned, l e t me  l a u n c h i n t o my  attempt  to p r o v i d e an a l t e r n a t i v e to the  e s s e n t i a l l y d u a l i s t i c accounts of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . should say t h a t I accept as an important the e x i s t e n c e o f two p a s s i v e one.  Consciousness  traditional,  F i r s t of a l l I  f a c t about  a s p e c t s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s — a n  finally  consciousness  a c t i v e and  a  i s a f l o w of s t a t e s the f l o w of which  h a s . c a u s a l sources both w i t h i n and without  (where t h a t which i s out  103 of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s e i t h e r w i t h i n another c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r w i t h i n the o b j e c t i v e h a l f of the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y ; c a u s a l e f f e c t s  the  o r i g i n s o f which l i e w i t h i n another c o n s c i o u s n e s s a r e l i k e l y made p o s s i b l e by i n t e r m e d i a r y e f f e c t s w i t h i n the o b j e c t i v e , but n o t h i n g i n the p o s i t i o n to be developed w i l l hang on whether o r not p a r t i c u l a r s u s p i c i o n o f mine i s t r u e ) .  this  While the f a c t o f the  d u a l i t y o f a s p e c t s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s w i l l be shown to p l a y an a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n a c c o u n t i n g f o r the form o f s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the i t amounts to o n l y the v e r y b e g i n n i n g o f t h a t account. s e l f d i s t i n c t i o n o f the P-theory  P-theory, The  cannot be a l i g n e d w i t h the  self/notdistinction  between t h a t which i s a c t i v e and t h a t which i s p a s s i v e i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Much on the s e l f s i d e o f the s e l f / n o t - s e l f d i s t i n c t i o n i s p a s s i v e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the s e l f / n o t - s e l f d i s t i n c t i o n would never have emerged if  i t were not f o r the f a c t t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the f l o w o f  conscious states l i e s p a r t l y w i t h i n consciousness  itself.  In an important sense I accept as w e l l , as I have f r e q u e n t l y h i n t e d , the e x i s t e n c e o f something sense-data.  l i k e what p h i l o s o p h e r s have c a l l e d  But I r e j e c t any form o f a c t / o b j e c t account o f s e n s i n g such  t h a t sense-data a r e the o b j e c t s o f such a c t s . something  Sensing i s , one might  which happens to c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; not something  c o n s c i o u s n e s s does. c o r r e c t way  Put i n terms o f what I c l a i m e d was  o f drawing  the s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e l i n e  sense i n which the phenomenalist e v e r y t h i n g i s s u b j e c t i v e and, phenomenalists,  say,  which the o n t o l o g i c a l l y  (where, i n the  says t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s phenomenal,  f o r me,  though not f o r t r a d i t i o n a l  the o b j e c t i v e i s i n f e r r e d o n l y by what a r e taken to be  104 i t s causal e f f e c t s w i t h i n the subjective) sensing running  from t h e o b j e c t i v e t o the s u b j e c t i v e .  i s a causal  process  Sense-data a r e the c a u s a l  r e s u l t s , w i t h i n t h e s u b j e c t i v e , o f the c a u s a l p r o c e s s ,  sensing.  Sense-  data a r e , i n some sense., then, p a r t s o f s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . sense-data a r e p a r t s o f s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s belong to t h a t a s p e c t  of consciousness  which a r e caused, they  which i s p a s s i v e .  But i t should be  v e r y c l e a r by now, I hope, t h a t by t h i s account they a r e n o t , given to consciousness. of  Because  f o r a l l that,  Consciousness i s n ' t g i v e n t h a t which i s a p a r t  itself. Sense-data a r e , I suggest f u r t h e r , caused t o e x i s t on s e v e r a l  planes.  F o r each sensory mode, t h a t i s , a separate  sense-data i s caused to e x i s t . conscious distinct  being  plane or l a y e r of  At t h e o u t s e t o f i t s e x i s t e n c e , when the  i s u t t e r l y e g o c e n t r i c , each l a y e r o f sense-data i s somehow  from, u n r e l a t e d  t o , any o f the o t h e r s .  are caused t o e x i s t i n planes  or l a y e r s — s u c h  The c l a i m t h a t  that being  sense-data  different  parts  of t h e same l a y e r i s c h a r a c t e r i z a b l e i n terms o f e n t e r i n g i n t o c e r t a i n s o r t s o f o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n s ( f o r example, b e s i d e , i n the v i s u a l l a y e r ; l o u d e r , h i g h e r ,  larger, brighter,etc.  longer, etc. i n the auditory  layer;)  and n o t b e i n g p a r t s o f t h e same l a y e r i s c h a r a c t e r i z a b l e by t h e absence of any such, except temporal, o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n s — s h o u l d seem, i n so f a r as one i s prepared t o condone t a l k about sense-data a t a l l ,  relatively  uncontentious. To the c l a i m s t h a t .sense-data a r e p a r t s o f s t a t e s o f p a r t s caused to e x i s t by p r o c e s s e s and  caused t o e x i s t  ness j u s t  consciousness,  o r i g i n a t i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e realm,  i n l a y e r s , I would l i k e to add t h e c l a i m t h a t  i s awareness.  F o r t h e r e t o be s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  consciousi s for  105 t h e r e t o be awareness; n o t , f o r t h e most p a r t , awareness o f , but awareness. Thus, s t r i c t l y c o n t r a r y t o S e l l a r s , t h e p r e s e n t account is sensing—if,  holds that i f there  t h a t i s , sense-data have been, o r a r e b e i n g , caused t o  e x i s t — t h e n t h e r e i s awareness. The of  c o n j u n c t i o n o f a l l these c l a i m s , t h a t sense-data  s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s and e x i s t  consciousness seemingly  are parts  i n l a y e r s and t h a t the e x i s t e n c e o f  i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f awareness, has some  s t r a n g e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the n a t u r e o f awareness.  But the s t r a n g e -  ness i s o n l y , I t h i n k , a f u n c t i o n o f our p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h awareness o f and as such i s o n l y apparent.  U l t i m a t e l y , I would urge,  the i m p l i c a t i o n s  a r e n o t o n l y n o t s t r a n g e but a r e a c t u a l l y p e r f e c t l y f i t t e d  to the f a c t s .  The b a s i c i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s c o n j u n c t i o n o f r e l a t i v e l y uncont e n t i o u s c l a i m s (the c l a i m t h a t a s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s j u s t of  i s a state  awareness would have t o be seen as t h e p l a c e a t which t h e c o n t e n t i o u s -  ness gets i n , g i v e n t h a t t h e r e i s , I have c l a i m e d , a g e n e r a l tendency t o c o n s t r u e s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s as e n t i t i e s o f which we a r e aware) might perhaps  be expressed  as the c l a i m t h a t awareness i s spread-out.  I t would  be hard t o o v e r - e s t i m a t e the r o l e b e i n g p l a y e d i n t h e p r e s e n t t h e s i s by the c l a i m t h a t awareness i s spread-out. try  In making t h i s c l a i m I mean to  t o c a p t u r e t h e i d e a t h a t a moment o f awareness e x h i b i t s an extreme,  indeed an i n f i n i t e , accounts,  degree o f c o m p l e x i t y .  Awareness o f - t y p e  accounts—  t h a t i s , which take awareness to be an e s s e n t i a l l y d u a l phenome-  n o n — g e n e r a l l y f a i l t o do j u s t i c e t o t h e c o n t i n u i t y and i n f i n i t e of  complexity  a moment o f awareness by t r y i n g t o push i t i n t o a type o f t h e o r e t i c a l  mold c h a r a c t e r i z e d by d i s c r e t e n e s s and f i n i t u d e — l e a v i n g , as i t were, t h e  106 c o n t i n u i t y and c o m p l e x i t y i n what they take to be the o b j e c t s o f awareness. Thus i t seems t o me t h a t the i d e a t h a t the g i v e n must be i n , o r g o t t e n i n t o , p r o p o s i t i o n a l form i s u l t i m a t e l y the i d e a t h a t t h e g i v e n , which i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o n t i n u i t y and c o m p l e x i t y , must be made ' a c c e s s i b l e ' , u s e f u l , t o t h e s u b j e c t by r e n d e r i n g elements.  i t down i n t o a f i n i t e number o f d i s t i n c t  That t h e r e must r a t h e r be a non-dual, spread-out form o f aware-  ness i s t h e h e a r t o f the c l a i m which I am making a g a i n s t at t h e h e a r t ,  as w e l l , o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n  Sellars.  It i s  o f c l a i m s which I have made and  w i l l make t o the e f f e c t t h a t t h e moves between i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l s o f awareness or c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , and t h e n a t u r e o f semantic r e l a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l , a r e holistic.  A l l forms o f h o l i s t i c e x p l a n a t i o n  r e s t u l t i m a t e l y , I'm suggest-  i n g , on a 'spread-out' account o f awareness. i s intended I've  The n o t i o n o f spread-outness  t o p l a y an e s s e n t i a l r o l e a l s o i n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n  made between awareness and awareness o f .  over and over a g a i n ,  T r a d i t i o n a l l y , as I've s a i d  t h e attempt t o account f o r t h e e v o l u t i o n o f awareness  has  taken awareness of_ as t h e b a s i c , indeed t h e o n l y ,  And  awareness ojE, taken as b a s i c , has seemed  form o f awareness.  obviously  a d u a l phenomenon,  w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s s i m i l a t i n g t h e o b j e c t i v e i n t o the s u b j e c t i v e seeming t o presuppose the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c a t e g o r i z i n g i t i n terms o f d i s c r e t e , d e t e r m i n a t e , f i n i t e l y denumerable p r o p e r t i e s . could  ignore  features  But even i f we  t h e S e l l a r s i a n problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h such an account,  such as d i s c r e t e n e s s , determinateness and f i n i t u d e have seemed t o  l o c k us w i t h i n t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u c t i v e / d e d u c t i v e advance and t o p r e c l u d e  analyses  of  conceptual  the p o s s i b i l i t y of h o l i s t i c analyses.  On aware-  ness of-rtype accounts, f o r example, we e i t h e r n o t i c e something o r we don't; and  i f we don't then t h e r e doesn't seem to be any way t o c l a i m  (as S e l l a r s  107 t r i e d t o ) t h a t we  can become aware o f i t ,  i n some h o l i s t i c manner, on the  b a s i s o f r e l e v a n t f a c t s from our p a s t , f a c t s which, i t , we  can b r i n g from our p a s t s by memory even though we weren't aware o f  them a t the time they were p r e s e n t . p r e s e n t moment o f awareness, how memory?  S e l l a r s would have  I f something  i s never a p a r t o f any  c o u l d i t ever be brought  Though I would agree t h a t we  from the p a s t by  can r e c a l l an event i n terms o f a  h i g h e r l e v e l o f c o n c e p t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n than we were c a p a b l e o f a t the a c t u a l time o f the e v e n t — a n d  thus t h a t we  than we o r i g i n a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d i t ;  can r e c a l l an  event  differently  ( P i a g e t has e s t a b l i s h e d e x p e r i m e n t a l l y  t h a t such i n c r e a s e s i n c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n between event and r e c a l l do i n 4  f a c t o c c u r . ) — I am  c l a i m i n g t h a t i t i s j u s t nonsense to h o l d t h a t we  a t some p o i n t , become, h o l i s t i c a l l y ,  can,  aware o f an event as b e i n g o f a  c e r t a i n type when p r e v i o u s l y we had.no awareness o f any s o r t o f such events. To say t h a t sense-data, as p a r t s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a r e caused to e x i s t i n l a y e r s i s to say more than j u s t w i t h c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i s spread-out. how  awareness i s spread-out.  i m p l i c a t i o n s about  t h a t awareness, as  identical  I t i s t o say as w e l l something  The l a y e r e d n e s s c l a i m has two  types of  the n a t u r e o f the spread-outness o f awareness.  one hand, to speak o f l a y e r s -.involveg;"-"attrlbuting, " w i t h i n  On  the  the~layers  a - type o f c o n t i n u i t y ; . on-the other:; hand^; t h e r e is-being:.made of a type of d i s c o n t i n u i t y between the l a y e r s .  about  an a t t r i b u t i o n  Thus on the one hand I  am a t t r i b u t i n g , p r o b a b l y , more o r d e r and s t r u c t u r e to the nascent c o n s c i o u s ness than would be a t t r i b u t e d to i t by c l a s s i c a l Sense-datum T h e o r i s t s . L i k e the G e s t a l t T h e o r i s t I am denying t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r c o n s c i o u s ness to c o n s t r u c t o r d e r i n g o r 'next t o ' r e l a t i o n s amongst c a u s a l l y dependent upon the same p e r c e p t u a l apparatus.  sense-data  Sensory  fields,  108 r e l a t i v e to each sensory mode, a r e not c o n s t r u c t e d by the a c t i v i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , they are r a t h e r , and from the o u t s e t , j u s t a f e a t u r e of the p a s s i v e a s p e c t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . At the same time as i m p l y i n g a k i n d o f c o n t i n u i t y , however, to speak o f l a y e r s i s to imply a r a d i c a l k i n d o f s p l i n t e r i n g w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e o f spread-out awareness. i s t i c of d i f f e r e n t another i n a way  The l a y e r s o f sense-data c h a r a c t e r -  sensory modes, though  somehow superimposed  upon one  r e q u i s i t e to b e i n g p a r t s o f the same c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a r e ,  a t the same time, d i v i d e d from one another i n such a way  as to make  i m p o s s i b l e the type o f 'next t o ' r e l a t i o n s e s s e n t i a l to the e x i s t e n c e . of sensory  fields. The account which I have j u s t g i v e n o f awareness as b e i n g  spread-out and c h a r a c t e r i z e d by b o t h a t y p e o f c o n t i n u i t y and a type o f d i s c o n t i n u i t y i s supposed  to p r o v i d e the b a s i s f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e to  t r a d i t i o n a l accounts o f the n a t u r e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s which seem to s t a r t by assuming t h a t awareness i s b a s i c a l l y a r e l a t i o n between a s u b j e c t and some form o f o b j e c t i v i t y .  But the p r e s e n t account cannot  s e n s i b l y deny  t h a t t h e r e i s a type o f phenomenon to which we a r e r e f e r r i n g when we of awareness of_. f o r e , a way  speak  I f the spread-out account i s to be o f any h e l p , t h e r e -  must be demonstrated,  w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s o f such an  account,  o f a d e q u a t e l y d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g s t a t e s o f awareness o f from what i s b e i n g c l a i m e d to be the more g e n e r a l and b a s i c s t a t e , s t a t e s o f awareness.  In  e f f e c t , some account must be g i v e n o f the phenomenon o f a t t e n t i o n . F u r t h e r , some h i n t must be g i v e n o f how originally  i t i s t h a t what a r e  ' s p l i n t e r e d o f f l a y e r s o f sense-data are u l t i m a t e l y o r c h e s -  trated into a-pattern of awareness—of  spread-out awareness—'-the  layers  of which complement one  another as p a r t s o f a u n i f i e d whole.  Thus  P i a g e t , making what 1 t h i n k amounts to a c l a i m s i m i l a r to my awareness i s spread-out i n a way stage,  by b o t h c o n t i n u i t y and  characterized,  claim  i n the e a r l i e s t  genetic  d i s c o n t i n u i t y , says t h a t space, at the  b e g i n n i n g of c o g n i t i v e development, c o n s i s t s "of a p l u r a l i t y of ( b u c c a l , t a c t i l e - k i n e s t h e t i c , e t c . ) centered h o l d s t h a t , " . . . a t about e i g h t e e n (decentration)  that  on one's own  spaces  body".  months through a s h i f t of  .  Piaget  perspective  t r u l y comparable to the Copernican r e v o l u t i o n , space  becomes a s i n g l e homogeneous c o n t a i n e r i n c l u d i n g one's own  body.""'  i n which a l l o b j e c t s are s i t u a t e d ,  Thus at about e i g h t e e n  months  genetic  development manages, somehow, to overcome the d i s c o n t i n u i t y o r s p l i n t e r e d ness which c h a r a c t e r i z e s the nascent form o f awareness. important to t r y to e x p l a i n how centred  on one's body can be  t h i s can be  so; how  It w i l l  be  a p l u r a l i t y of  spaces  transformed such t h a t awareness i s of one's  body as an o b j e c t among o t h e r s  s i t u a t e d or c o n t a i n e d  i n a homogeneous  space.  iii) But  Several first  l e t me  t h i n g s need to be added to the account as i t s t a n d s . survey what we  have so f a r .  C o n s c i o u s n e s s , as  the  s u b j e c t i v e h a l f o f an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y , i s a non-dual phenomenon caused, i n p a r t , by the o b j e c t i v e realm but  i n no way  e n t e r i n g i n t o any  form of  d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p , as p e r c e i v i n g i s m i s t a k e n l y supposed to be, w i t h objective.  the  Consciousness i s a flow of s t a t e s the c a u s a l determinants o f  which o r i g i n a t e both w i t h i n and w i t h o u t . an a c t i v e and  a p a s s i v e one.  Awareness o c c u r s ,  originally,  Thus i t i n v o l v e s two  aspects,  Consciousness i s the same as awareness. i n l a y e r s which are spread-out and  splintered  off  from one  another.  As an a l t e r n a t i v e to the i d e a t h a t a t t e n d i n g to o r b e i n g aware of  something  i s a phenomenon to be a n a l y z e d i n terms o f something  the i n h e r e n t l y d u a l metaphor of a l i g h t  like  s h i n i n g onto t h a t o f which t h e r e  i s awareness, I suggest t h a t the l a y e r s o f sense-data, i n a d d i t i o n to b e i n g spread-out, a r e shaped.  Aspects of i n d i v i d u a l l a y e r s become—as a  f u n c t i o n o f f a c t o r s which w i l l be d i s c u s s e d s h o r t l y — r e l i e f e d a g a i n s t the background  o f the r e s t o f the l a y e r .  the sense-data which form the background are  By t h i s account, then, w h i l e a r e p a r t o f awareness ( i . e .  i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) , t h e r e i s , as w e l l , awareness o f those which are  reliefed.  Though i t i s n ! t  sense-data r e l i e f i n g  p o s s i b l e to speak o f i n d i v i d u a l l a y e r s o f  a g a i n s t one a n o t h e r — i n t h a t the r e q u i s i t e  continuity  r e l a t i o n s , r e q u i s i t e f o r the f o r m a t i o n o f sensory f i e l d s , do not h o l d between l a y e r s o f s e n s e - d a t a — i t can be s a i d t h a t the l a y e r s compete w i t h one another.  C o n s c i o u s n e s s as a t o t a l i t y  l a y e r s o f sense-data, though  i s , l i k e the i n d i v i d u a l  i n some more complex sense, shaped  Thus i n so f a r as the l a y e r s a r e , as I c l a i m e d e a r l i e r ,  as w e l l .  superimposed  on  one another, i t can be s a i d t h a t the phenomenon o f s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n i s such as to admit  of o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n s .  Sense-data  l a y e r s are ordered  amongst themselves and t h a t o r d e r i n g can and does f l u c t u a t e . of  The n o t i o n  shape, both w i t h i n and between l a y e r s o f sense-data w i l l seem l e s s  l i k e complete nonsense, I b e l i e v e , i f one keeps i n mind what t h e o r e t i c a l f u n c t i o n i t i s b e i n g h e l d to f u l f i l l .  The n o t i o n , l e t me  repeat, i s  b e i n g i n t r o d u c e d as a p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to i n h e r e n t l y d u a l a n a l y s e s of  the phenomenon of b e i n g aware o f o r a t t e n d i n g to something.  a t t e n t i o n , i t seems to me,  c l e a r l y admits o f two dimensions:  And I am,  for  Ill example, p r e s e n t l y a t t e n d i n g more t o the c o n t e n t s o f my say, my  visual field  a u d i t o r y , and I am a t t e n d i n g more to c e r t a i n o f the c o n t e n t s o f  my v i s u a l f i e l d  than to o t h e r s .  In the f i r s t case, I'm  s u g g e s t i n g , my  a t t e n t i o n i s a f u n c t i o n o f o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n s h o l d i n g between my posed l a y e r s o f sense-data; i n the second c a s e , my of  r e l i e f i n g r e l a t i o n s h o l d i n g w i t h i n my In  of  than,  superim-  attention i s a function  layer of v i s u a l  sense-data.  summary, i f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s a flow, i t s f l o w i s a f u n c t i o n  (at l e a s t ) two  factors:  the changing content o f the l a y e r s o f sense-  d a t a and the changing shape o f those l a y e r s , both w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l  layers  and i n the o r d e r i n g r e l a t i o n s h o l d i n g between them. At  the g e n e t i c b e g i n n i n g s o f awareness, r e l i e f i n g  i n d i v i d u a l l a y e r s i s a f u n c t i o n o f two individual  (related) factors.  within First,  types o f sense-data a r e possessed o f what I s h a l l  call  i n t r i n s i c meaning which s e t s them o f f a g a i n s t the o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l of  sense-data o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n the same l a y e r .  data are, that i s , pleasant or p a i n f u l , or  frightening, etc.  certain  types  C e r t a i n types o f sense-  i n t e r e s t i n g or boring, soothing  Such sense-data a r e , i t ' s b e i n g c l a i m e d , r e l i e f e d  a g a i n s t the t o t a l i t y o f the sensory l a y e r i n which they o c c u r . r e l i e f e d i s n ' t r e a l l y , when the r e l i e f i n g  i s a f u n c t i o n of  meaning, something b e s i d e s h a v i n g i n t r i n s i c meaning.  Being  intrinsic  The two a r e j u s t  d i f f e r e n t ways o f d e s c r i b i n g the same phenomenon, one way  b e i n g to  d e s c r i b e the r e l a t i o n s o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n the sense-data l a y e r and the o t h e r way  b e i n g to a s c r i b e to a s p e c t s o f the l a y e r the p r o p e r t y which accounts  for  those r e l a t i o n s . The second type o f r e l i e f i n g o p e r a t i v e at the o u t s e t i s a f u n c -  t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r e o f the p e r c e p t u a l apparatus, p a r t i c u l a r l y of those  112 apparatus a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e v i s u a l and t a c t u a l l a y e r s o f sense-data. These apparatus a r e so s t r u c t u r e d as t o have f o c a l p o i n t s such t h a t v i d u a l sense-data-types of the motion  a r e caused  indi-  t o r e l i e f and recede as a f u n c t i o n  o f those f o c a l p o i n t s .  ( T a l k o f p e r c e p t u a l apparatus i s  o b v i o u s l y h i g h l y c o m p l i c a t e d s i n c e g i v e n the o n t o l o g i c a l form o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e s p l i t which I have endorsed,  such t a l k should be  f o r m u l a b l e w i t h i n e i t h e r the s u b j e c t i v e o r the o b j e c t i v e mode.  Within  the o b j e c t i v e i t would have t o be i n terms o f c a u s a l c h a i n s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the content and shape o f sense-data l a y e r s . mode i t would r e q u i r e a h i g h l y complex account  Within the s u b j e c t i v e i n terms o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between t h e v a r i o u s sense-data l a y e r s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a l t e r i n g content and shape o f d i f f e r e n t l a y e r s such a s , f o r example, t h e v i s u a l and the k i n e s t h e t i c . c o m p l e x i t y i n v o l v e d w i t h e i t h e r way o f f o r m u l a t i n g t a l k about t u a l apparatus it  The percep-  i s such t h a t I wouldn't even go as f a r as t o c l a i m t h a t  c o u l d be done, l e t a l o n e t o c l a i m t h a t I can do i t .  But I hope t o  have g i v e n some vague i m p r e s s i o n , a t l e a s t , o f how such f o r m u l a t i o n s might go.)  iv)  I f I can be g e n e r o u s l y granted the b e n e f i t o f t h e doubt t h a t  t a l k o f r e l i e f i n g as a f u n c t i o n o f e i t h e r t h e i n t r i n s i c meaning o f types o f sense-data o r o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p e r c e p t u a l apparatus makes some v e r y l o o s e type o f sense, l e t me now add t o t h a t t h a t t h e s e two types o f r e l i e f i n g e n t e r i n t o combination w i t h each o t h e r and w i t h t h e a c t i v e a s p e c t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n a c e r t a i n c r u c i a l l y important way. C r u c i a l l y important, t h a t i s , t o the attempt  t o g i v e a g e n e t i c account  113 o f the e v o l u t i o n o f l e v e l s o f awareness. though c a p a b l e o f e x e r t i n g energy  The nascent c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  ( b e i n g , as i t i s , c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by  an a c t i v e as w e l l as a p a s s i v e a s p e c t ) i s i n c a p a b l e o f a c t i n g , i n t h a t a c t i n g i n v o l v e s i n t e n t i o n which i n t u r n i n v o l v e s , a t the v e r y l e a s t , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and e x p e c t a t i o n , n e i t h e r o f which can be i n voked by e i t h e r the account to t h i s p o i n t o r the c o n s c i o u s n e s s a t t h a t g e n e t i c stage.  But though  the a b i l i t y to d i r e c t  must be developed, the a b i l i t y to e x e r t i t s energy  i t s energy  i s , a t the b e g i n -  n i n g , t r i g g e r e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y ; the nascent c o n s c i o u s n e s s , as we responds r e f l e x i v e l y t o c e r t a i n s t i m u l i .  say,  Thus i n t r i n s i c a l l y meaning-  f u l sense-data, the ones which h u r t , f e e l n i c e , i n t e r e s t o r bore, t r i g g e r automatic, i n t e n t i o n l e s s e x e r t i o n o f e f f o r t . as a f u n c t i o n of complex f a c t s about  the way  The e f f o r t i s ,  the s u b j e c t i v e i s c a u s a l -  l y lodged w i t h i n the o b j e c t i v e , c h a n n e l l e d i n ways which a f f e c t  the  v a r i o u s p e r c e p t u a l apparatus, thereby a f f e c t i n g the f l o w o f sense-data: P l e a s a n t o r i n t e r e s t i n g sense-data may or b o r i n g ones may  be removed.  be brought  into focus, p a i n f u l  Both e f f e c t s b e i n g a c h i e v e d q u i t e , i t  must be remembered, a c c i d e n t a l l y o r u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y .  Highly specific  forms o f r e f l e x i v e b e h a v i o u r e x i s t as w e l l and a l s o p l a y an c e n t r a l r o l e i n the development o f the a b i l i t y to i n t e n d .  absolutely Sucking  responses, l o o k i n g responses and g r a s p i n g responses a r e t r i g g e r e d specific  forms o f s t i m u l a t i o n .  by  Even more than the g e n e r a l types o f  responses which can be t r i g g e r e d by v a r i o u s , n o n - s p e c i f i c types o f sense-data complexes, these s p e c i f i c responses to s p e c i f i c types o f s t i m u l a t i o n a r e e s s e n t i a l to an account o f i n t e n t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r . r e f l e x i v e b e h a v i o u r we have now  the f i r s t  s i g n s o f what w i l l  In  eventually  114 become a two-way s t r e e t , a feedback  r e l a t i o n s h i p as i t were, between the' l a y e r  of c o n s c i o u s n e s s connected w i t h k i n e s t h e t i c s e n s a t i o n s , some o f which a r e s e n s a t i o n s o f e f f o r t , and the o t h e r l a y e r s connected w i t h the o p e r a t i o n o f the v a r i o u s p e r c e p t u a l apparatus. f o r a feedback how  We  have now  the rudimentary  r e l a t i o n s h i p between a c t i o n and p e r c e p t i o n .  the e x e r t i o n o f e f f o r t becomes i n t e n t i o n a l .  ment, i t was  We  requirements have y e t to see  R e q u i s i t e f o r such a d e v e l o p -  c l a i m e d e a r l i e r , a r e the r e l a t e d c a p a c i t i e s o f p e r c e i v i n g r e p r e -  s e n t a t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s and h a v i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s .  These two  capacities  involve  c o n s c i o u s e x p e r i e n c e becoming, i n some p r i m i t i v e sense, t e m p o r a l i z e d and jectified.  Becoming p r i m i t i v e l y t e m p o r a l i z e d and o b j e c t i f i e d , but  ob-  particular-  l y the l a t t e r , amounts to the b e g i n n i n g s o f the emergence o f a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e s p l i t w i t h i n consciousness.  Making a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e  split  w i t h i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s amounts t o i m p o r t i n g , and f o r v e r y good reasons,  the  o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y into consciousness.  v)  The p o s s i b i l i t y o f the i m p o r t a t i o n o f an o n t o l o g i c a l  i n t o what i s i n f a c t o n t o l o g i c a l l y non-dual  r e s t s on the f a c t t h a t  passive aspect of consciousness, a f t e r i t s very e a r l i e s t c h a r a c t e r i z e d by more than j u s t l a y e r s o f sense-data. more g h o s t l i n e s s .  duality the  stages, i s  I shall call  the  Along w i t h p r e s e n t l a y e r s o f sense-data, c o n s c i o u s -  ness f r e q u e n t l y c o n t a i n s ghosts o f ones which have gone b e f o r e  and,  based on p a s t sense-data, ghosts o f ones which are yet to come.  It  should be c a u t i o n e d t h a t though from the t h i n g s t h a t w i l l be s a i d ghosts i t might seem t h a t ghosts a r e i d e n t i c a l w i t h i m a g e s — f o r  about  example  v i s u a l and a u d i t o r y i m a g e s — t h i s i s not i n f a c t so; images a r e ghosts but not a l l ghosts a r e images. brought  out from the shadows.  Images, i t might be s a i d , a r e ghosts Less c o l o u r f u l l y ,  images a r e ghosts  about  which we must speak o f awareness of_.  The v a s t m a j o r i t y Of ghosts,  like  the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f sense-data, a r e p a r t o f awareness ( c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) without b e i n g t h a t p a r t o f awareness which i s r e l i e f e d . images a r e ghosts themselves  Moreover,  f r e q u e n t l y haunted by g h o s t s .  images compete w i t h sense-data, much i n the way  Whereas  t h a t l a y e r s o f sense-data  compete w i t h one another, ghosts haunt b o t h sense-data and  images.  In the most s t r i k i n g cases o f g h o s t s — w h e r e the ghosts might be, but need n o t , I t h i n k , be i m a g e s — t y p e s  involved  o f sense-data complexes  which have i n the p a s t preceded e i t h e r s t r e s s f u l or p l e a s i n g types o f sense-data c o n j u r e up the ghosts o f those past and sense-data.  But ghosts a r e much more common than a r e the o c c u r r e n c e s  of p a r t i c u l a r l y p l e a s i n g o r s t r e s s f u l sense-data. organism's  s t r e s s f u l or p l e a s i n g  flow of experience i s r e p e t i t i v e .  P-theory p o i n t o f view,  the i n f a n t  Much i n the i n f a n t  Thus because,  i s f r e q u e n t l y exposed  from the  to the same  o b j e c t i v e s u r r o u n d i n g s and to h i g h l y s i m i l a r s o r t s o f o b j e c t i v e events, whole p a t t e r n s o f sense-data have a tendency  to r e p e a t themselves  in his  e x p e r i e n c e ; and r e p e t i t i v e n e s s , l i k e s t r e s s f u l n e s s or p l e a s i n g n e s s , can c o n j u r e up g h o s t s .  P a t t e r n s o f e x p e r i e n c e f e e l f a m i l i a r when ghosts o f  t h e i r p a s t i n s t a n c e s haunt  t h e i r present occurrence.  p a t t e r n s o f sense-data have a s u f f i c i e n t a d i s t i n c t i v e temporal may  F u r t h e r , when the  temporal d u r a t i o n and  involve  s u c c e s s i o n , the e a r l i e r s t a g e s o f the s u c c e s s i o n  arouse not o n l y the ghosts o f t h e i r own  s u c c e e d i n g s t a g e s o f the p a t t e r n as w e l l .  p r e c u r s o r s but those o f the The a r o u s a l o f t h i s type o f  ghost amounts to the e x i s t e n c e o f a p r i m i t i v e form o f a n t i c i p a t i o n or expectation. independence  And  thus w h i l e t h e ghosts from the p a s t don't have enough  from p r e s e n t sense-data to amount to r e t r o s p e c t i o n — i m a g e s  116 w i l l be r e q u i r e d b e f o r e r e t r o s p e c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e — t h e s e ghosts o f t h e f u t u r e do g i v e t o c o n s c i o u s e x p e r i e n c e t h e f i r s t tion. of  hints of temporaliza-  They g i v e t o e x p e r i e n c e , moreover, t h e f i r s t h i n t s o f t h a t a s p e c t  temporalization required f o r intention:  They g i v e i t a f u t u r e ,  a l b e i t a h i g h l y immediate and an a p p a r e n t l y predetermined one. a p p a r e n t l y predetermined  But an  f u t u r e i s u s e l e s s i n an account o f i n t e n t i o n .  What i s needed i s a ghost o f a p o s s i b l e f u t u r e w i t h , as w e l l , the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e n s u r i n g i t s o c c u r r e n c e o r o f a v o i d i n g i t , depending on whether t h e ghost i s a ghost o f d e s i r e d o r dreaded Ghosts, j u s t as they haunt  i t should be made c l e a r , haunt  s o r t s o f sense-data.  kinesthetic  those o f v i s i o n , touch and the r e s t .  sense-data  Accordingly,  the i n f a n t ' s own r e f l e x i v e movements and e f f o r t s a c q u i r e a sense o f f a m i l i a r i t y as w e l l . With t h e appearance  o f ghosts i n the i n f a n t ' s e x p e r i e n c e the  p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i v i t y o c c u r r i n g i s advanced c o n s i d e r a b l y . A feedback r e l a t i o n s h i p between k i n e s t h e t i c s e n s a t i o n s and those a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p e r c e i v i n g becomes immanent.  By making h i s own responses  f a m i l i a r and t h e r e s u l t i n g p e r c e p t u a l s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s both  familiar  aind expected, ghosts make p o s s i b l e t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s from a complex m u l t i - l a y e r e d f l u x o f sense-data i n t o a h i g h l y temporalized s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e  structured,  duality.  The p r o b l e m a t i c sense o f predeterminedness  w i l l be p r o g r e s -  s i v e l y undermined w h i l e n e v e r t h e l e s s m a i n t a i n i n g the r e q u i s i t e sense o f f a m i l i a r i t y and the f e e l i n g o f e x p e c t a t i o n by the f a c t t h a t p e r c e p t u a l s i t u a t i o n s a r e n ' t always,  indeed a r e never, e x a c t l y a l i k e ; n o r a r e ex-  p e c t e d events ever exact r e p l i c a s o f t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s .  As a f u n c t i o n ,  then, o f r e l a t i v e l y s l i g h t d i s a d a p t a t i o n a g a i n s t a background of a r i t y and  fulfilled  expectation,  and  d r i v e n by the d e s i r e to b r i n g t o ,  or remove from, p e r c e p t u a l f o c u s what were e a r l i e r c a l l e d m e a n i n g f u l sense-data, by the a c t i v e aspect  to new  and  w i l l become i n c r e a s i n g l y  f u t u r e p a t t e r n s i n the p a s s i v e aspect o f con-  In e x p l i c i t l y P i a g e t i a n terms, the c o n s c i o u s  but l a r g e l y f a m i l i a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s  stimulus  thereby  organism adapts  by a complementary p r o c e s s  accommodating i t s o l d response p a t t e r n , thereby a s s i m i l a t i n g the new  intrinsically  d i r e c t i o n of the e x e r t i o n of energy  of the i n f a n t c o n s c i o u s n e s s  appropriate to present sciousness.  the degree and  famili-  of  expanding i t , and  to some extent  deforming i t by  i g n o r i n g a s p e c t s o f i t s newness.  vi)  The  earliest  s i g n s of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of e x p e r i e n c e  appearance when the sense o f f a m i l i a r i t y and a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y strengthened ancestors  the sense o f  make t h e i r  expectation  to f a c i l i t a t e and merge w i t h the p r i m i t i v e  of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  With the advent of what  P i a g e t c a l l s s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s the i m p o r t a t i o n o f the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y i n t o consciousness  i s w e l l under way.  S i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s are,  by the account which I s h a l l g i v e , j u s t complex forms of haunting tions.  I f the s i m p l e s t  forms o f haunting  rela-  r e l a t i o n s a r e , as I have s a i d ,  c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a sense of f a m i l i a r i t y and/or of e x p e c t a t i o n ,  signifying  r e l a t i o n s a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a g r e a t e r degree of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the ghosts and  t h a t which they h a u n t — s u c h t h a t t h a t which i s haunted  becomes the s i g n i f i e r and  the haunting  ghosts become the s i g n i f i e d .  sense of f a m i l i a r i t y i s p r o g r e s s i v e l y transformed  i n t o a sense of r e c o g n i -  t i o n as i m p o r t a t i o n of the o b j e c t i v e i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s of  The  ' d i s t a n c e ' between the a c t i v e aspect o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  introduces a kind and  c e r t a i n of  118 the p a s s i v e a s p e c t s o f i t , i n p a r t i c u l a r , those sense-data which a r e not kinesthetic sensations.  The sense o f e x p e c t a t i o n i s p r o g r e s s i v e l y t r a n s -  formed i n t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e l a t i o n s as the accumulation ences e n r i c h e s t h e s i g n i f i e d  o f past e x p e r i -  system o f ghosts and the i n c r e a s i n g  to i n t e n d d i s s i p a t e s the sense o f predeterminedness  ability  and makes p o s s i b l e  the i n t u i t i o n o f a s e t o f p o s s i b l e f u t u r e s . The  same type o f p r o c e s s which i t was j u s t c l a i m e d i s o p e r a t i v e  i n the g r a d u a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f mere h a u n t i n g r e l a t i o n s i n t o  haunting  r e l a t i o n s which a r e s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s serves t o b r i n g about complex types o f s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s as w e l l . types o f s i g n i f i e r s :  increasingly  Piaget d i s t i n g u i s h e s three  t h e ' i n d i c a t i o n ' , t h e 'symbol' and t h e ' s i g n ' .  the lowest l e v e l , and c l o s e s t to mere h a u n t i n g r e l a t i o n s ,  At  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the i n d i c a t i o n and t h e i n d i c a t e d i s c o m p l e t e l y t i e d t o p e r c e p t u a l s i t u a t i o n s but i s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n v i r t u e o f not b e i n g governed  strictly  by f a m i l i a r i t y and e x p e c t a t i o n , more than a mere h a u n t i n g r e l a t i o n .  Thus,  f o r example, the v i s u a l image o f the d o l l ' s f o o t s t i c k i n g out from under the baby's b l a n k e t s comes t o i n d i c a t e f o r the c h i l d t h e ghosts a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e v i s u a l image o f the r e s t o f t h e d o l l , p o s s i b i l i t i e s of holding i t , none o f which a r e expected  shaking i t ,  the f e e l of the d o l l , the  sucking i t ,  throwing  it,  etc.—  but which a r e r a t h e r c o n j u r e d up as p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  In t h e symbol and t h e s i g n t h e s i g n i f i e r i s no l o n g e r a mere p a r t of a perceptual s i t u a t ion.  The s i g n i f i e r  f i e d t o t h e p o i n t where t h e s i g n i f i e r  i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from t h e s i g n i -  i s , o r can be, i n t e n t i o n a l l y  to r e p r e s e n t t h e s i g n i f i e d and t h e s i g n i f i e d i t s e l f determined  chosen  i s to a greater extent  i n t e n t i o n a l l y — r a t h e r than, as was t h e case w i t h the i n d i c a t i o n  r e l a t i o n s , b e i n g determined  p a s s i v e l y by haunting r e l a t i o n s .  While  haunting  119 r e l a t i o n s w i l l remain the core of s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s , the h a u n t i n g r e l a t i o n s i n connection at any  r a t e can be,  with  symbols and  s i g n s are to some e x t e n t ,  i n t e n t i o n a l l y constructed  p a s s i v e l y undergone.  As  and  to the d i f f e r e n c e between s i g n s and  themselves, the former i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e w h i l e "A  Piaget  says:  object  i n t e n t i o n a l l y chosen to d e s i g n a t e  ' s i g n ' . . . i s a c o l l e c t i v e symbol, and  and  s i g n are o n l y the two  o r a t i o n of meanings."^  symbols  or a m a t e r i a l  consequently  'arbitrary'...Symbol  s o c i a l , of the same e l a b -  g u i d i n g i n t u i t i o n o f my  attempt i n Chapter  VI  an a l t e r n a t i v e to the meaning-nominalist p o s i t i o n d i s c u s s e d  in  Chapter I w i l l be the c o n t e n t i o n between words and  t h a t language i t s e l f ,  t h e i r meanings, need n o t ,  initially,  the r e l a t i o n s h i p indeed  could  i n i t i a l l y , be a p p r e c i a t e d  as a s i g n i f i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p of the  type i n v o l v i n g s i g n s , but  i s rather f i r s t  convenient s e t of i n d i c a t i n g r e l a t i o n s . thought o f by c h i l d r e n as b e i n g but  r a t h e r as b e i n g  plainly  Names, P i a g e t  found, are  illustrated  refer; t o " or  g  of  and  sense-data  of k i n e s t h e t i c  i n s t i l l i n g o b j e c t i v e meaning i n t o p e r c e p t i o n s  i n the a c t of r e a c h i n g  out.  The  first  directed  (as opposed to random, d i r e c t i o n l e s s arm-waving) by  normal, s i g h t e d c h i l d  not  objects  of the o b j e c t s to which they  a c t i o n s or k i n e s t h e t i c s e n s a t i o n s  o r g a n i z i n g and  i n t o the w o r l d  as a p a r t i c u l a r l y  r o l e of i n d i c a t i o n s i n the two-way p r o c e s s  h e l p i n g to o r g a n i z e  not  complex  from f i v e to s i x , are regarded as " b e l o n g i n g  "emanating from" o b j e c t s . The  acquired  conventionally associated with  p a r t s or a s p e c t s  names, f o r the c h i l d  sensations  simply  a c l a s s of a c t i o n s o r o b j e c t s . . .  p o l e s , i n d i v i d u a l and  The  not  the l a t t e r i s n o t .  'symbol' i s an image evoked m e n t a l l y  The  to p r o v i d e  invoked and  or  i s done under the i n f l u e n c e and  guidance of  is  reach the  visual  120 sense-data.  The o b j e c t f o r which the c h i l d reaches and the a c t i o n  which he performs by s i g h t .  a r e s i g n i f i e d f o r him by the sense-data p r o v i d e d  I t i s t h e simultaneous p e r c e p t i o n , w i t h i n t h e same v i s u a l  f i e l d , o f t h e hand and an o b j e c t which f i r s t to  r e a c h f o r an o b j e c t .  leads the sighted  child  B e f o r e t h a t he w i l l have l e a r n t f i r s t to  f o l l o w t h e movements o f h i s hands w i t h h i s eyes and then t o keep t h e 9  a c t i v i t y o f h i s hand w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f h i s v i s u a l f i e l d .  Having  f r e q u e n t l y watched h i m s e l f i n t h e p r o c e s s o f g r a s p i n g , t h e s i g h t o f t h e o b j e c t has come t o be haunted by, a n d / u l t i m a t e l y t o s i g n i f y the p a r t i c u l a r t a c t u a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e o b j e c t ; and t h e s i g h t o f t h e hand has come l i k e w i s e t o s i g n i f y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c i n g those t a c t u a l p r o perties.  P i a g e t says:  When "....the c h i l d  succeeds  i n seeing i n a  c o n t i n u o u s way t h e o b j e c t which escapes and t h e hand which o v e r t a k e s it,  t h e d i s p l a c e m e n t s he p e r c e i v e s a r e arranged i n a group;  t h e aggre-  gate o f the movements o f the o b j e c t and those o f t h e hand c o n s t i t u t e a coherent s e l f - l i m i t e d c y c l e " . ^  Thus t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between, f o r  example, the o p p o s i t e a c t s o f r e a c h i n g out and o f withdrawing are  t h e hand  ' i n d i c a t e d ' through v i s u a l sense-data i n a way which i s i n t u i t i v e l y  valuable.  On t h e o t h e r hand, the v a r i a t i o n s i n sense-data,  visual,  t a c t u a l , a u d i t o r y and b u c c a l , which a r e brought about by t h e a c t i o n of  t h e hand upon t h e o b j e c t a r e d i s c o v e r e d to v a r y i n c o n s i s t e n t l y  s i m i l a r ways. of  I n d i v i d u a l sense-data a r e becoming i n d i c a t i o n s o f systems  g h o s t s , systems 'held t o g e t h e r ' , so to speak, by t h e a c t i o n s which  b r i n g about  t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s from one sense-data t o another.  These  'systems o f g h o s t s ' , as I have c a l l e d them, a r e none o t h e r than o b j e c t s ; it  i s signified  'systems o f g h o s t s ' which we p e r c e i v e , n o t i s o l a t e d ,  121 s e l f - c o n t a i n e d , meaningless sense-data. to i n d i c a t e o b j e c t s , and medium o f  they do  Sense-data reach beyond themselves  so through the dynamics of a c t i o n and  the  ghosts. It  i s o n l y by  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y (where s y s t e m a t i c  the whole P o i n c a r e i a n - P i a g e t i a n  i d e a of  compensations, r e v e r s i b i l i t y , e t c . )  and  'groups':  v a r i a t i o n involves  starting points,  routes,  i n t e n t i o n a l l y moving between  and  comparing i n d i v i d u a l l a y e r s o f sense-data t h a t a framework c a p a b l e o f g r a n t i n g coherence to the f l o w o f p e r c e p t i o n s  and  of b r i n g i n g out  d e t a i l of i n d i v i d u a l l a y e r s of sense-data can be c r e a t e d ; u l t i m a t e l y , systematic intellectually,  and  and  the  though,  i n t e n t i o n a l comparisons can be done p u r e l y  the element of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y r e q u i r e d can o n l y be  f o r i f i t i s grounded o r i g i n a l l y i n p h y s i c a l a c t i o n and a u t o m a t i c a l l y t r i g g e r e d e x e r t i o n s of energy.  accounted  ultimately in  Thought i t s e l f ,  any  attempt  to e x t r a c t r e g u l a r i t i e s from or to c r e a t e r e g u l a r i t i e s w i t h i n , t h a t i s to comprehend or to o r g a n i z e ,  the f l o w o f e x p e r i e n c e  by  intellectual  as  opposed to p h y s i c a l means, i s continuous w i t h the attempt to comprehend and  to o r g a n i z e  the same p r o c e s s e q u i l i b r i u m and  by p h y s i c a l means; thought, as P i a g e t would put as a c t i o n o n l y c a r r i e d out at a h i g h e r on the symbolic  the r e a l o b j e c t s themselves.  level  i t , is  of  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of o b j e c t s r a t h e r than  But  the a b i l i t y to i n t e n t i o n a l l y  exert  energy at the h i g h e r  l e v e l presupposes the a c q u i s i t i o n of the a b i l i t y  do so at the lower.  S i m i l a r l y and  not  immediately and  organism.  systematic  an organism must d i s c o v e r and  through i t s own  activity.  conscious  space i s an  construct  to  v a r i a t i o n s are  unaccountably g i v e n to the awareness o f the  An o r d e r i n g o f a c t i o n s i s s p a t i a l ; indeed,  of a c t i o n s , and itself  crucially,  on  ordering  that ordering f o r  I t must s t r u c t u r e f o r i t s e l f  the  122 'group o f d i s p l a c e m e n t s ' . s t r e e t — t h r o u g h i t s own i t s own  s e n s a t i o n s and  The  s t r u c t u r i n g p r o c e s s i n v o l v e d i s a two-way  v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n s the organism  achieves s t r u c t u r e i n  i t s s e n s a t i o n s s e r v e as ' s i g n i f i e r s ' through  h e l p o f which i t o r d e r s , s t r u c t u r e s , i t s own  actions.  Speaking  the  of the  "complementary r o l e s o f sense p e r c e p t i o n and motor a c t i v i t y " , P i a g e t says: "From the l a t t e r stem the s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s themselves, w h i l e as soon as t h i s p r o c e s s o f development has b e g u n — a n d the more so when i t i s complete—such  r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e i n d i c a t e d o r ' s i g n i f i e d ' by  and these c o n s i s t p r e c i s e l y o f sensory s i g n s o r p o i n t e r s .  'signifiers',  Consequently,  w i t h a shape seen i n depth o r i n p e r s p e c t i v e , a whole s e r i e s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s ' w i l l be brought by the sensory r e c e p t o r s .  'virtual  i n t o p l a y , going beyond the data r e c o r d e d  These v i r t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e the product of  s e n s o r i - m o t o r a c t i v i t y and the sense-data merely  a c t as p o i n t e r s i n d i -  11 e a t i n g them." vii)  Something more needs to be s a i d about  p l a y i n g a fundamental  ghosts; f o r they a r e  r o l e i n the p r e s e n t account.  Together  and ghosts c o n s t i t u t e the p a s s i v e content o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . denoted,  sense-data Negatively  ghosts a r e the p a r t o f the p a s s i v e aspect o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s  which i s n ' t  sensory e x p e r i e n c e .  The e v o l u t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between  the a c t i v e and the p a s s i v e a s p e c t s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s , as should be clear  from the account  so f a r , what the e v o l u t i o n o f l e v e l s o f c o n s c i o u s -  ness or awareness i s a l l about; has a l r e a d y begun t o emerge.  and the r o l e o f ghosts i n t h a t  evolution  In mixed c o n s c i o u s n e s s and P-theory  terms,  ghosts a r e those p a s s i v e a s p e c t s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s a c a u s a l account  of  which would i n v o l v e r e f e r e n c e t o the b r a i n a c t i n g as some s o r t o f computer, s t o r i n g and to some e x t e n t r e v i v i n g p a s t sense-data.  But as was  the case  i n r e s p e c t of sense-data, the a c t i v e a s p e c t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s can g a i n an i n c r e a s i n g degree o f c o n t r o l over the f l o w o f ghosts.  And  the  differ-  ence between ghosts and sense-data w i l l make the degree o f c o n t r o l ever so much g r e a t e r f i n the case o f ghosts as compared to sense-data. though  Thought,  c o n t i n u o u s w i t h the p r o c e s s o f p h y s i c a l a c t i o n w i l l be to a g r e a t  degree l i b e r a t e d from the c a u s a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s o r i g i n a t i n g w i t h i n  the  o b j e c t i v e realm.  In the  account o f how promised  Some h i n t o f how  t h i s can be so w i l l  t h i s can be so must be g i v e n .  l i e the t o o l s w i t h which to g i v e the  account o f the n o t i o n s o f a p o i n t o f view and o f c o n c e p t u a l  frameworks and a l s o the promised account o f the phenomenological  a l t e r n a t i v e t o the r e j e c t e d appeal.  I t s h o u l d a l r e a d y be apparent  t h a t ghosts a r e b e i n g h e l d to  p l a y a r o l e a t the h e a r t o f a t h e o r y o f meaning. must be t e m p o r a l i z e d and o b j e c t i f i e d seems o b v i o u s .  And  'looking a t '  g h o s t s , i t was  That c o n s c i o u s e x p e r i e n c e  f o r meaning r e l a t i o n s to o c c u r  suggested, make p o s s i b l e the p r i m i t i v e  b e g i n n i n g s o f the p r o c e s s o f t e m p o r a l i z i n g and o b j e c t i f y i n g e x p e r i e n c e . R e l i e f e d ghosts o r images w i l l now  be shown to p l a y the c e n t r a l r o l e i n  the p r o g r e s s i v e s o p h i s t i c a t i o n o f the t e m p o r a l i z a t i o n and of experience;  objectification  In b e i n g r e l i e f e d , ghosts become s u f f i c i e n t l y  liberated  from the sense-data w i t h which they were o r i g i n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d as to be a b l e to p l a y the r o l e o f the s i g n i f i e r as w e l l as the s i g n i f i e d . once sense-data were r e q u i r e d to s i g n i f y systems of g h o s t s , now ghosts o f those sense-data are a b l e t o f u l f i l l  Where reliefed  the same s i g n i f y i n g  role.  Once i t has become p o s s i b l e f o r ghosts to p l a y the s i g n i f i e r as w e l l the s i g n i f i e d , the a c t i v e a s p e c t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s w i l l be i n an r e s p e c t f r e e d from the burden  as  important  o f the p a s s i v e c o n s t r a i n t s imposed on i t ,  124 p a r t i c u l a r l y by sense-data but by ghosts as w e l l . of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s g r a p h i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e d p o s s i b l e by t h e e x i s t e n c e o f r e l i e f e d  i n t h e phenomenon, made  ghosts, o f thought  f l i t t e r i n g over t h e s u r f a c e o f sense-data. suggesting, i s the r e l i e f e d  The l a y e r e d n a t u r e  ' S i l e n t t h i n k i n g ' , I'm  ghosts o f a u d i t o r y sense-data, haunted  same ghosts which haunt t h e r e l a t e d a u d i t o r y sense-data being  'pushed around',  seemingly  by t h e  themselves,  as i t were, by t h e a c t i v e aspect o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  But n o t o n l y can t h e a c t i v e aspect o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s push r e l i e f e d ghosts, i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y as s i g n i f i e r s , around.  In a d d i t i o n ,  the a c t i v e aspect can, t o some e x t e n t , a l t e r o r c o n s t r u c t t h e r e l i e f e d ghosts; and i t can a l s o , t o some e x t e n t , a l t e r o r c o n s t r u c t t h e s i g n i fying relationship i t s e l f .  The f i r s t  case amounts to t h e p o s s i b i l i t y  of c o n s t r u c t i n g complex images which, though u l t i m a t e l y dependent on past sense-data, a r e i n v i r t u e o f t h e i r c o m p l e x i t y , i n an important sense, f r e e o f p a s t sense-data.  To imagine  o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e s which have never  i s t o c o n s t r u c t t h e 'ghosts'  i n f a c t been had from the raw  m a t e r i a l s p r o v i d e d by e x p e r i e n c e s which have i n f a c t been had. or  ' c r e a t i v i t y ' i s a l s o used t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e a c t i v i t y o r i g i n a t i n g w i t h i n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s when t h e s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f ted. it  'Imagination'  i s a l t e r e d or construc-  The s i g n i f i e r may remain unchanged w h i l e t h e system o f ghosts which  s e r v e s t o c o n j u r e up may be e n l a r g e d , r e s t r i c t e d o r r e o r g a n i z e d .  to t h e extent t h a t t h i s i s so i t w i l l w i t h i n the system have been themselves fied  f o l l o w that the i n d i v i d u a l reliefed.  But  ghosts  This r e l i e f i n g of s i g n i -  ghosts i s n o t g e n e r a l l y , o r maybe even ever, t o t a l l y a c h i e v a b l e .  Meaning r e l a t i o n s , a t l e a s t as they o c c u r n a t u r a l l y  (and thus wherever  a n a l y s i s and n o t pure c o n s t r u c t i o n i s concerned) a r e h o l i s t i c .  They can  125 be to some degree e l u c i d a t e d by the r e l i e f i n g p r o c e s s but t h i s i s i n e v i t a b l y o n l y p a r t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l because of what I have c a l l e d the o f sense-data  'spread-outness'  and of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g q u a l i t y i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e g h o s t s .  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o the g h o s t l y a n a l y s i s i s a v e r y i n e x a c t p r o c e s s . The demand f o r n e c e s s a r y and a p p l y a concept  s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s under which to c o r r e c t l y  i s seen to be h i g h l y u n r e a l i s t i c .  The assumption  t h a t the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s h o l d i n g between i n d i v i d u a l concepts w i t h i n p a r t i c u l a r l y o c c u r r i n g c o n c e p t u a l frameworks w i l l be n e c e s s a r i l y coherent no h o l d s any p l a u s i b i l i t y .  naturallonger  Indeed, one o f the major i m p l i c a t i o n s of the t h e o r y  o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s b e i n g developed  w i l l be a new  p e r s p e c t i v e on the whole  t a n g l e of problems which have so i n t r i g u e d p h i l o s o p h e r s of language and which have a r i s e n l a r g e l y , i t w i l l be c l a i m e d , out of a misguided  attempt  to draw, i n a way  sense  and r e f e r e n c e .  which i s n ' t p o s s i b l e , a d e f i n i t i v e l i n e between  I f the o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e between s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e  l i e s where the p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n h o l d s t h a t i t does, then r e f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n s must be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t than they a r e g e n e r a l l y assumed to be. if  the h o l i s t i c account  t r u t h o f the matter,  Similarly,  of meaning here a l l u d e d to i s anywhere near  t h e r e w i l l be important  of t a l k about the sense of an e x p r e s s i o n .  the  i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the meaning  F a c t s about the i n t r i n s i c  nature  of i n d i v i d u a l types of sensory e x p e r i e n c e and about the c h r o n o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h o l d i n g between i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e s w i l l ,  in particular,  shown to p l a y e s s e n t i a l r o l e s i n the e s t a b l i s h m e n t and  e v o l u t i o n of meaning  relations. these  The l a s t c h a p t e r w i l l be devoted  issues.  be  to a p r e l i m i n a r y e x p l o r a t i o n of  126 NOTES  D.M. Armstrong, P e r c e p t i o n and the P h y s i c a l World, I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i b r a r y o f P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1961), p. 5. 2 George B e r k e l e y , Three D i a l o g u e s between H y l a s and P h i l o n o u s , i n B e r k e l e y : Essay, P r i n c i p l e s , D i a l o g u e s w i t h S e l e c t i o n s from Other W r i t i n g s , ed. Mary Whiton C a l k i n s (New York: C h a r l e s S c r i b n e r ' s Sons, 1957), p. 235. 3 J e r r y A. Fodor, The Language o f Thought, The Language and Thought S e r i e s (Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979), pp. 87-95; J e r r y Fodor, " F i x a t i o n o f B e l i e f and Concept A c q u i s i t i o n , " and Jean P i a g e t , " D i s c u s s i o n , " i n Language and L e a r n i n g , ed. Massimo P i a t e l l i P a l m a r i n i (Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1980), pp. 143-5.1. 4  . Jean P i a g e t and B a r b e l I n h e l d e r i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h Hermine S i n c l a i r - d e Zwart, Memory and I n t e l l i g e n c e , (New York: B a s i c Books, Inc., 1973). Jean P i a g e t , "Comments," t r a n s . Anne Parsons, r e v . and ed. E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : The M.I.T. P r e s s , 1962), p. 4; appears as a pamphlet i n Thought and Language, Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, ed. and t r a n s . E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : The M.I.T. P r e s s , 1962). Jean P i a g e t , The O r i g i n s o f I n t e l l i g e n c e i n C h i l d r e n , t r a n s . Margaret Cook (New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s P r e s s , Inc., 1952), pp. 189-92; Jean P i a g e t , P l a y , Dreams and I m i t a t i o n i n C h i l d h o o d , t r a n s . C. Gattegno and F.M. Hodgson (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1962), p. 98. 7  P i a g e t , The O r i g i n s o f I n t e l l i g e n c e i n C h i l d r e n , p.  191.  g Jean P i a g e t , The C h i l d ' s C o n c e p t i o n o f the World, t r a n s . Joan and Andrew Tomlinson (Totowa, New J e r s e y : L i t t l e f i e l d , Adams & Co., 1976), p. 63. 9  P i a g e t , The O r i g i n s o f I n t e l l i g e n c e i n C h i l d r e n , pp. 95-110.  ^ Jean P i a g e t , The C o n s t r u c t i o n o f R e a l i t y i n the C h i l d , t r a n s . Margaret Cook (New York: B a l l a n t i n e Books, 1971), p. 131. 11 Jean P i a g e t and B a r b e l I n h e l d e r , The C h i l d ' s Conception of Space, t r a n s . F . J . Langdon and J . L . Lunzer (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 451-52.  127  CHAPTER V  Some I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f the C o n s c i o u s n e s s Theory  1.  The N o t i o n s o f P o i n t s o f View and C o n c e p t u a l Frameworks  In t h i s c h a p t e r I w i l l of t h e n o t i o n s  endeavor to p o i n t t h e way t o an a n a l y s i s  o f p o i n t s o f view, c o n c e p t u a l  i n terms o f t h e p o s i t i o n j u s t o u t l i n e d .  frameworks, and i n t r o s p e c t i o n  I n P-theory terms, a p o i n t o f  view i s a p o i n t o f view onto something; onto t h e o b j e c t i v e .  I t i s that  type o f account t o which I am committed, by my own arguments, t o p r o v i d i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e .  At the outset  of the l a s t chapter I t a l k e d , i n l o o s e l y  P i a g e t i a n terms, about t h e e v o l u t i o n o f p o i n t s o f view, about the development o f more encompassing c o n c e p t u a l  frameworks and, i n g e n e r a l ,  to move i n the s u b j e c t i v e - t o - o b j e c t i v e d i r e c t i o n .  about t h e need  While p r e p a r e d t o  endorse an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y , I r e j e c t e d t h e assumption t h a t an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y of the required naive  s o r t c o u l d e x i s t which would s u s t a i n t h e common-sense,  r e a l i s t a c c o u n t s o f what i t means t o have a p o i n t o f view, t o o p e r a t e  w i t h i n a conceptual perform a p e r c e p t u a l  framework,  t o make a phenomenological a p p e a l o r t o  reduction.  P o i n t s o f view e x i s t w i t h i n , and a r e thus a f u n c t i o n o f , frameworks.  The two n o t i o n s  are therefore c l o s e l y t i e d .  between two t y p e s o f p o i n t s o f view: p o i n t s o f view.  conceptual  I shall distinguish  a c t u a l p o i n t s o f view and t h e o r e t i c a l  To speak o f an a c t u a l p o i n t o f view i s n ' t meant, however, t o  e n t a i l a c l a i m about t h e c o r r e c t n e s s  o f the c o n c e p t u a l  framework w i t h i n which  128 it  e x i s t s ; i t i s n ' t meant, t h a t i s , to a t t r i b u t e to the p o i n t o f view any  form o f a b s o l u t e n e s s .  F o r a c o n c e p t u a l frame i s always t h e o r e t i c a l and  i n t h a t sense, i n so f a r as a p o i n t o f view i s always a f u n c t i o n o f a c o n c e p t u a l frame, a p o i n t o f view i s always t h e o r e t i c a l .  The intended  d i s t i n c t i o n between an a c t u a l and a t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t o f view has t o do w i t h t h e presence o r absence o f sense-data; i n P-theory terms, w i t h the presence o r absence o f p e r c e p t i o n .  Thus, i n so f a r as sense-data serve  to s i g n i f y t h e a p p r o p r i a t e system o f g h o s t s , i n accordance w i t h t h e concept u a l frame which i s o p e r a t i v e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o speak o f an a c t u a l p o i n t of view.  When, on t h e o t h e r hand, r e l i e f e d ghosts ( o f the r i g h t  particular,  the r e l i e f e d ghosts o f i n d i c a t i o n s  and n o t o f s i g n s o r symbols  (or p o s s i b l e  (see Chapter IV, p.  s i g n i f i e r s , a t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t o f view e x i s t s .  sort—in  indications)  ) ) s e r v e as the C o n c e p t u a l frameworks,  and thus t h e c o m p l e x i t y and a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f a c t u a l p o i n t s o f view, e v o l v e as a f u n c t i o n o f the b r i n g i n g to bear o f v a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l of view onto the a c t u a l p o i n t s o f view.  points  The p r o c e s s i n v o l v e d , by which  t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view a r e brought t o bear upon and b r i n g about t h e e v o l u t i o n o f , a c t u a l p o i n t s o f view i s what P i a g e t has c a l l e d a p r o c e s s o f decentration.  A more s p e c i f i c d i s c u s s i o n s h o u l d make the i d e a s suggested  i n t h e f o r e g o i n g somewhat c l e a r e r . But b e f o r e a t t e m p t i n g t o i l l u s t r a t e the p r o c e s s o f d e c e n t r a t i o n , l e t me add t h a t n o t o n l y do a c t u a l p o i n t s o f view, under the i n f l u e n c e o f t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view, e v o l v e , but they a l s o e x h i b i t a tendency t o expand.  F o r an a c t u a l p o i n t o f view to expand  i s n o t , as i t might sound, t o  have the amount o f sense-data i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n c r e a s e ; i t i s n o t , i n o t h e r words, t o have t h e p e r c e p t u a l f i e l d e n l a r g e .  Rather, what P i a g e t has c a l l e d  129 the web o f v i r t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and what I have c a l l e d t h e s i g n i f i e d o f ghosts,  expands.  The i m p l i c a t i o n s from sense-data i n c r e a s e as r e p r e s e n -  t a t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s extend f u r t h e r i n space and time. s i n g l e continuous  Working o f f o f a  stream o f sense-data and w i t h i n a s i n g l e c o n c e p t u a l  work, t h e c o m p l e x i t y  system  and span o f e x p e c t a t i o n s w i l l  frame-  i n c r e a s e as one's p o i n t  of view expands. In the l a s t  chapter  I quoted from P i a g e t a r e f e r e n c e t o the f i r s t  major d e c e n t r a t i o n o r s h i f t o f p e r s p e c t i v e which o c c u r s development o f t h e human i n f a n t : conception  i n the c o g n i t i v e  At about e i g h t e e n months t h e c h i l d ' s  o f space s h i f t s from b e i n g  t h a t o f a p l u r a l i t y o f spaces c e n t r e d  on h i s own body t o t h a t o f a s i n g l e homogeneous c o n t a i n e r i n which h i s own body e x i s t s as an o b j e c t among o t h e r o b j e c t s .  In t h i s . e a r l y cognitive s h i f t  we can see t h e s i m p l e s t p o s s i b l e form o f i n t e r a c t i o n between a c t u a l and t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view.  The v a r i o u s v i e w p o i n t s  involved are provided  by t h e i n d i v i d u a l and d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n i n g o f each o f the i n f a n t ' s own p e r c e p t u a l mechanisms; thus we have v i s u a l , a u d i t o r y , b u c c a l , t a c t i l e , p o i n t s o f view. tend one  P r i o r t o e i g h t e e n months, the i n f a n t ' s sensory  s t r o n g l y t o , as I put i t , e x i s t another.  etc.,  experiences  i n l a y e r s which a r e s p l i n t e r e d o f f from  P r i m i t i v e expectation r e l a t i o n s w i l l ,  become p o s s i b l e w i t h the advent o f ghosts.  i t has been suggested,  S p l i n t e r e d n e s s w i l l be p a r t i a l l y  overcome by t h e f a c t t h a t e x p e c t a t i o n r e l a t i o n s w i l l h o l d n o t o n l y w i t h i n but a c r o s s l a y e r s o f sense-data as w e l l . experience experience. experiences  A p a r t i c u l a r type o f a u d i t o r y  may, f o r example, come to s i g n i f y a p a r t i c u l a r type o f v i s u a l But simple  e x p e c t a t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s h o l d i n g between i n d i v i d u a l  do n o t y e t amount t o a concept o f i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t s  through time and c o n t i n u o u s l y occupying  enduring  space. We have as y e t o n l y a  ..  130 s i n g l e p o i n t o f view e x p a n d i n g — o r  r a t h e r , i n t h i s somewhat s t r a n g e  case, a group o f i n d i v i d u a l p o i n t s of view. l u t i o n o f a new,  There i s not yet the evo-  i n t e g r a t e d and more complex p o i n t of view.  We  have so  f a r o n l y a group of a c t u a l p o i n t s of view, none of which have been i n t e g r a t e d w i t h the t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view connected the o t h e r s .  In h i s famous and  the o b j e c t concept  f a s c i n a t i n g s t u d i e s of the development of  i n h i s own  c h i l d l e a r n s e a r l y to expect  w i t h each of  i n f a n t s , P i a g e t remarked the f a c t t h a t t h e t h a t o b j e c t s which d i s a p p e a r behind  other  masking o b j e c t s w i l l reappear but o n l y l a t e r d i s c o v e r s t h a t the o b j e c t c o n t i n u e s t o e x i s t behind the masking o b j e c t . f o r a coveted p r i z e i s promptly i o u r i f the o b j e c t sought  Thus the a c t of r e a c h i n g  abandoned and r e p l a c e d by f r e t t i n g behav-  i s p l a c e d behind even a simple, removable o r  e a s i l y g o t t e n around s c r e e n .  N o t i c e , as a r e l e v a n t a s i d e , t h a t the  fact  t h a t t h e r e i s a c l e a r d i f f e r e n c e i n c o n c e p t u a l complexity between e x p e c t i n g a type of e x p e r i e n c e to r e o c c u r — a s happens when an o b j e c t reappears behind a s c r e e n — a n d  from  b e l i e v i n g t h a t a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t c o n t i n u e s to e x i s t  behind a s c r e e n , undermines T.G.R. Bower's assumption  t h a t to p r o v i d e  evidence of a n t i c i p a t i o n of the r e o c c u r r e n c e of types o f sensory events i n i n f a n t s i s to p r o v i d e evidence o f the e x i s t e n c e of the concept of o b j e c t constancy  i n those same i n f a n t s .  Bower found e x p e r i m e n t a l support f o r the  h y p o t h e s i s t h a t " . . . i n i n f a n t s of seven weeks of age s u p p r e s s i o n o f s u c k i n g not o n l y m i r r o r s s t a r t l e but a l s o a n t i c i p a t i o n " . that:  " . . . t h e r e f o r e s u p p r e s s i o n o f s u c k i n g may  of e x i s t e n c e constancy and follow.  i t s duration"."'"  I f the same i n f a n t who  experiment  He  concluded  p r o v i d e us w i t h a measure  But Bower's c o n c l u s i o n does not  d i s p l a y s a n t i c i p a t i o n responses  f a i l s to e x h i b i t s e a r c h behaviour  from t h a t  i n Bower's  i n Piaget's screening  experiment  131 s u r e l y i t i s not,  as Bower seems to t h i n k , because the former type o f  experiment i n v o l v e s a more s e n s i t i v e means of d e t e c t i n g the same type of phenomenon b e i n g measured i n the l a t t e r . the two  a r e t e s t i n g f o r the presence of d i f f e r e n t , though r e l a t e d , l e v e l s  of c o n c e p t u a l has  S u r e l y i t i s r a t h e r because  ability.  I f the i n f a n t i n P i a g e t ' s  experimental  situation  a concept of an o b j e c t c o n t i n u i n g to e x i s t behind a s c r e e n , why  t h a t he  stops r e a c h i n g and  nomenal event to r e o c c u r screens  s t a r t s crying?  i s one  is it  That he expects a type of phe-  t h i n g ; t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h a t one  object  a second i s q u i t e another. The  o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n o f sense-data o c c u r s when the a c t u a l p o i n t  o f view, say h e a r i n g  an o b j e c t , i s i n t e g r a t e d w i t h the v a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l  p o i n t s o f view, w i t h  the ghosts of s e e i n g  web  i t , touching  i t , etc.  o f v i r t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s or the system o f ghosts s i g n i f i e d by  sense-data s u p p l i e d by one  perceptual  When the the  apparatus extends to the ghosts,  j u s t of expected but o f p o s s i b l e , sense-data of the o t h e r p e r c e p t u a l  not  appa-  r a t u s then the a c t u a l p o i n t of view has been i n t e g r a t e d w i t h t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view; and  the r e s u l t i n g d e c e n t r a t i o n  from the a c t u a l p o i n t  view has brought about the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of sensory e x p e r i e n c e . has  i s s u e d i n a new  framework.  and  r a d i c a l l y more complex and  efficient  T h i s i s the achievement, comparable, P i a g e t  says,  of  Decentring  conceptual to  the  C o p e r n i c a n r e v o l u t i o n , which c h a r a c t e r i z e s the c o g n i t i v e development of human i n f a n t at about e i g h t e e n The  the  months.  n o t i o n of o t h e r , what I have c a l l e d t h e o r e t i c a l , p o i n t s of  view seems, perhaps, more n a t u r a l once we  have the n o t i o n of o t h e r minds.  Indeed the n o t i o n o f o t h e r minds j u s t i j s , i n an important sense, the of o t h e r p o i n t s of view.  A p p r e c i a t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of  other,  notion  simultaneous, same type, but not i d e n t i c a l p o i n t s o f view w i l l r e s u l t again  and a g a i n  i n decentrations  the i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s p e c t i v e . and  for all,  being  o f , and i n c r e a s i n g a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s i n ,  But such a p p r e c i a t i o n i s n o t achieved  t h e r e a f t e r automatic.  bear t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f other  Effort  i s required  'brother'  says:  shows what an e f f o r t  to understand t h a t h i s b r o t h e r  to b r i n g to  p o i n t s o f view on each o f the many and  d i v e r s e t y p e s o f s i t u a t i o n s t o which i t i s r e l e v a n t . well-known example, P i a g e t  once  Speaking o f h i s  "....the development o f t h e n o t i o n  i s r e q u i r e d o f a c h i l d who has a b r o t h e r a l s o has a b r o t h e r ,  that t h i s  concept  2 r e f e r s t o a r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and not t o an a b s o l u t e Nor  does h a v i n g once a c h i e v e d  and  the appropriately enlightened  'property'."  a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l of conceptual  development  p o i n t o f view ensure t h a t one w i l l n o t  subsequently s l i p back i n t o former, l e s s d e c e n t r e d ways o f t h i n k i n g . t h i s i s so i s p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d on the a f f e c t i v e l e v e l . comments t h a t :  "On t h e a f f e c t i v e l e v e l ,  That Piaget  i t would r e q u i r e q u i t e a dose o f  optimism t o b e l i e v e t h a t our elementary i n t e r p e r s o n a l f e e l i n g s a r e always w e l l adapted:  r e a c t i o n s such as j e a l o u s y ,  l e s s u n i v e r s a l , can c e r t a i n l y be c o n s i d e r e d  envy, v a n i t y , which a r e doubtvarious types of  e r r o r i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s emotional p e r s p e c t i v e . "  systematic  In Chapter VI I w i l l  o f f e r some s u g g e s t i o n s as t o how an account o f the type p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r might be extended t o c o v e r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e n o t i o n o f o t h e r minds.  The c e n t r a l argument o f t h a t c h a p t e r w i l l be an attempt t o show  that, contrary  t o the p o s i t i o n o f the meaning-nominalist, t h e phenomenon  o f language i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r , and n o t a consequence o f , t h a t a c q u i s i t i o n . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view a r i s i n g out o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between one's own p e r c e p t u a l  apparatus, and those a r i s i n g out o f  133 the p o s s i b i l i t y o f o t h e r minds, c o n c e p t u a l r e v o l u t i o n s have been founded as w e l l on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view a r i s i n g out of the use of p e r c e p t u a l a i d s such as microscopes  and  t e l e s c o p e s o r out of  the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f f a c t o r s such as h i g h speeds o r extreme  temperatures.  2. The R e l a t i o n s h i p between L o o k s - T a l k  and  Is-Talk  C o n s i d e r a b l e i l l u m i n a t i o n i s shed, I t h i n k , on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between l o o k s - t a l k and  i s - t a l k i f i t i s thought  of c o n c e p t u a l frameworks and of a c t u a l and c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the p r e s e n t account.  problematic of i n terms  t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s of view as  I s - t a l k i s n ' t , as we  tend to t h i n k ,  a b s o l u t e , but i s r a t h e r a f u n c t i o n o f the h i g h e s t p r e s e n t l y a v a i l a b l e o r o p e r a t i v e c o n c e p t u a l framework.  As such,  i s - t a l k i s a f u n c t i o n of the a c t  of i n t e r r e l a t i n g a c t u a l p o i n t s of v i e w — t h e ones i n v o l v i n g t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s of view. p r o c e s s has  L o o k s - t a l k r e f l e c t s the f a c t t h a t the d e c e n t r i n g  e v o l v e d the system of ghosts a t t a c h e d to p r e s e n t  A c c o r d i n g l y o p e r a t i n g w i t h a h i g h e r l e v e l o f i s - t a l k , one would be s a i d was  the case a t the lower  r a t h e r what l o o k s t h e case, conceptual  sense-data—with  sense-data.  says not what  l e v e l o f c o n c e p t u a l development but  (thereby i m p l y i n g what, a c c o r d i n g to the h i g h e r  frame, jLs the c a s e ) .  I t i s never the sense-data  themselves  which a r e the case, r a t h e r i t i s complex f a c t s about r e l a t i o n s between p o s s i b l e sense-data by i s - t a l k . we  (or ghosts) which a r e the case and which a r e  signified  Thus at c e r t a i n s t a g e s o f c o n c e p t u a l development we might, ( i f  c o u l d ) say of an o b j e c t t h a t i t l o o k s l i k e i t went out of and  i n t o e x i s t e n c e but a c t u a l l y i t went behind  came back  another o b j e c t ; and we would  say  134 t h i s on t h e ground t h a t , f o r example, we can f e e l t h i n g s t h a t we c a n ' t see.  S i m i l a r l y , we f r e q u e n t l y say t h a t an o b j e c t l o o k s e l l i p t i c a l but  t h a t i n f a c t i t i s round; we c o u l d , i f we wanted t o , l o o k a t i t from another a n g l e .  We sometimes say t h a t an o b j e c t l o o k s l i k e i t ' s  solid  but r e a l l y i t ' s a c l o u d o f m o l e c u l e s ; o r we say o f two e v e n t s t h a t t h e y l o o k l i k e t h e y ' r e s i m u l t a n e o u s but r e a l l y t h e y ' r e r e l a t e d i n a s p a c e - l i k e way;  and so on.  Depending on the s i z e and c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e system o f  g h o s t s s i g n i f i e d by any p a r t i c u l a r s e n s e - d a t a complex, w h i c h i s i t s e l f  a  f u n c t i o n o f the number and the c o m p l e x i t y o f the t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s of v i e w w i t h w h i c h i t , as an a c t u a l p o i n t o f v i e w has been i n t e g r a t e d , the gap between l o o k s - t a l k and i s - t a l k i n c r e a s e s .  The i s s u e o f the r e l a t i o n -  s h i p between l o o k s - , and. i s r t a l k w i l l a r i s e a g a i n i n t h e f i n a l c h a p t e r .  3. An Account o f the P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l A p p e a l  I f t h e argument o f t h e t h i r d c h a p t e r i s r i g h t and an a c t / o b j e c t account o f awareness  i s u n t e n a b l e , t h e n , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , t h e r e can be  .no such t h i n g as a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p e a l .  Consciousness can't coherently  be c o n c e i v e d o f as an empty 'something' w h i c h l o o k s — w h i c h l o o k s , i n the case o f d i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n , a t i t s own s t a t e s .  But t h e r e ±s_ some d i s t i n c t i v e  type of event t o w h i c h we r e f e r when we say t h a t we have performed a d i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n ; and, s i m i l a r l y , a p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n .  I promised t o p r o v i d e  a p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o the a c t / o b j e c t account o f such e v e n t s . C o n s c i o u s n e s s , I have s u g g e s t e d , i s a f l o w o f s t a t e s t h e c a u s a l d e t e r m i n a n t s o f w h i c h o r i g i n a t e b o t h w i t h i n and w i t h o u t .  Thus s t a t e s o f  135 c o n s c i o u s n e s s a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an a c t i v e and a p a s s i v e a s p e c t . p a s s i v e aspect c o n s i s t s o f two components, sense-data and ghosts.  The Further  I h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t the p a s s i v e content o f s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s l a y e r e d ; and t h a t t h e l a y e r s themselves w i t h i n and a c r o s s l a y e r s .  a r e spread-out  and shaped, b o t h  Both t h e content and the shape o f the spread-out  l a y e r s as w e l l as t h e shape o f t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e t o v a r i o u s degrees  under the c o n t r o l o f the a c t i v e a s p e c t . In  performing a d i r e c t  i n s p e c t i o n , the energies of the a c t i v e  aspect a r e d i r e c t e d towards h o l d i n g c o n s t a n t t h e content and shape o f a p a r t i c u l a r moment i n t h e f l o w of c o n s c i o u s s t a t e s . i n e v i t a b l y doomed t o o n l y p a r t i a l  success.  The attempt i s  I n so f a r as t h e energy o f  the a c t i v e a s p e c t p l a y e d an e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n c r e a t i n g t h e shape and b r i n g i n g about and s u s t a i n i n g t h e content o f t h e spread-out the p a s s i v e aspect o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e s h i f t attempt  r e q u i r e d by the  to ' f r e e z e ' the f l o w a t t h a t s t a t e w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y d r a i n o f f , by  r e d i r e c t i n g , t h e energy which brought the f i r s t frozen.  o f energy  layers within  place.  about and s u s t a i n e d t h a t s t a t e i n  The shape and t h e content o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s cannot be  The p o i n t i s t h a t any moment i n t h e f l o w o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s amounts  to  a unique  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e a c t i v e and t h e p a s s i v e a s p e c t s  of  c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a s p e c t s o f t h e p a s s i v e b e i n g i n v a r i o u s degrees  the c o n t r o l o f t h e a c t i v e .  under  R e d i r e c t i n g the a c t i v e inevitably, a l t e r s , to  some e x t e n t , t h e shape and c o n t e n t , as r e p r e s e n t e d i n i t s p a s s i v e a s p e c t , of  consciousness. Changes i n t h e content o f t h e ' i n s p e c t e d ' s t a t e w i l l be most  apparent  and immediate i n t h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e  o f some r e l i e f e d  The d r a i n o f f o f energy w i l l most n o t i c e a b l y a f f e c t  them.  ghosts.  Content  136 w i l l not be a l t e r e d at a l l In the case of sense-data, but  shape  may  be. The c l a i m t h a t r e l i e f e d ghosts and  the shape of  l a y e r s a r e most r e a d i l y a f f e c t e d by the attempt more comprehensible  sense-data  to i n s p e c t should become  when the r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i r e c t  p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n i s seen i n the p r e s e n t terms.  i n s p e c t i o n and  I t should, t h a t i s ,  take on some p l a u s i b i l i t y once the s k e t c h of the p o s i t i o n i s Whereas d i r e c t  i n s p e c t i o n r e p r e s e n t s an attempt  the a c t i v e aspect of c o n s c i o u s n e s s  completed.  t o u t i l i z e the energy  to f r e e z e the content and  of  the shape  of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n r e p r e s e n t s the attempt  to e x o r c i z e from a s t a t e of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , to the g r e a t e s t  extent p o s s i b l e , a l l p a s s i v e c o n t e n t . energy a way  i n such an  'exorcism' may  The  form which the e x e r t i o n of  take i s a r t i f i c i a l l y  t h a t changes i n the p e r c e p t u a l apparatus  performed  and  taken to i t s l i m i t ,  r e s t r i c t e d i n such  a r e not p e r m i t t e d .  such an exorcism r e s u l t s i n a s t a t e of  c o n s c i o u s n e s s the p a s s i v e content o f which c o n s i s t s s o l e l y o f The  Properly  t h e o r y b e i n g developed  sense-data.  suggests the f o l l o w i n g h i e r a r c h y :  R e l i e f e d ghosts, ghosts, t h a t i s , which amount to images o r a r e b e i n g as s i g n i f i e r s ,  a r e , as was  contents of consciousness a c t i v e aspect.  noted  e a r l i e r , most amenable of a l l the p a s s i v e  to the a f f e c t s of e f f o r t b e i n g e x e r t e d by  Complex images can be c o n s t r u c t e d and a l t e r e d ;  'pushed around' i n the p r o c e s s we  c a l l thinking.  processes r e q u i r e considerable expenditure of e f f o r t . r e l i e f i n g o f a ghost r e q u i r e s e f f o r t . of sense-data may  be  But a l l these  J u s t to s u s t a i n  S i m i l a r l y some forms o f  r e q u i r e the e x p e n d i t u r e of energy.  the  similarly  w i t h s i g n i f i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n s ; and as s i g n i f i e r s , r e l i e f e d ghosts can easily  used  the  reliefing  Imaging, t h i n k i n g  137  :  and a t t e n d i n g seem t o fade even as we level, of  t r y to i n s p e c t them.  At t h e next  the n o n - r e l i e f e d ghosts which haunt sense-data, the ones by means  which our sense-data,  in particular reliefed  and i n v i r t u e o f which we  are  sense-data, r e q u i r e exorcism.  sense-data, have meaning,  'given' the p h y s i c a l world and not  meaningless  Both n o n - r e l i e f e d , h a u n t i n g ghosts and  the  r e l i e f i n g r e l a t i o n s h o l d i n g between sense-data can, by the e x e r t i o n o f e f f o r t , be e x o r c i z e d .  Far from r e q u i r i n g energy  r e q u i r e d to get r i d o f them.  And  to s u s t a i n them, energy i s  f i n a l l y , a t the o p p o s i t e extreme from  r e l i e f e d g h o s t s , and w i t h i n the a r t i f i c i a l . r e s t r i c t i o n s which the method of may  p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n imposes on the form which the e x e r t i o n o f take—such  t h a t i t can't be c h a n n e l l e d through any o f the p e r c e p t u a l  mechanisms—sense-data are a b s o l u t e l y r e s i s t a n t them.  energy  to the attempt  The a c t i v e aspect o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a r t i f i c i a l l y  to e x o r c i z e  r e s t r i c t e d , has  no  c o n t r o l over them. P o s s i b l e c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n might be  gained  by s e e i n g what i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e w i t h r e s p e c t to the c l a i m , a p p a r e n t l y e n t a i l e d by the Sensory Core v e r s i o n of Sense-datum Theory, which:  whenever we  a c c o r d i n g to  are p e r c e i v i n g a p h y s i c a l object with a surface  t h a t i s o s t e n s i b l y r e d and c i r c u l a r , we datum which i s p r o b a b l y e l l i p t i c a l  a r e a l s o d i r e c t l y aware o f a  i n shape and which may  very well  orange o r p u r p l e o r grey i n c o l o u r . . . . i n s h o r t , t h a t even when we a s i n g l e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t we  sensebe  look at  a r e almost always c o n s c i o u s , though i n d i f f e r e n t  4 ways, o f two  c o l o u r s and two  which F i r t h a r g u e d — a n d  shapes."  I t was  t h i s c l a i m , remember, a g a i n s t  indeed he drew support f o r h i s own  statements by Sensory Core T h e o r i s t s t h e m s e l v e s — t h a t supported by the method o f d i r e c t  inspection.  argument  i t c o u l d not  F i r t h concluded  that  from be  138 Sense-datum T h e o r i s t s , whether, he says, " w i t t i n g l y o r u n w i t t i n g l y " , employ another method:  t h e method o f p e r c e p t u a l reduction."'  While  differing  Sense-datum Theory i n a v e r y important r e s p e c t , t h e p r e s e n t t h e o r y l e s s o f f e r s s t r o n g support which F i r t h i s concerned  t o argue.  Sense-data  a r e (a v e r y important)  i n t h e r e c e n t l y o u t l i n e d account  The one e s s e n t i a l disagreement  part  What I t h i n k i s a v e r y  o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between sense-data  objects i s i m p l i c i t  neverthe-  f o r t h a t aspect o f Sense-datum Theory a g a i n s t  of o r d i n a r y s t a t e s o f p e r c e p t u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . p l a u s i b l e account  from  and p h y s i c a l  of consciousness.  between t h e p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n and  the Sense-datum Theory, remember, a r i s e s out o f t h e r e j e c t i o n o f t h e o l d e r theory's act/object a n a l y s i s of sensing. the c o n s c i o u s n e s s  Viewed from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f  t h e o r y , the n o t i o n o f g i v e n n e s s ,  r e l i a n c e on t h e mistaken  i n v i r t u e of i t s t o t a l  a c t / o b j e c t a n a l y s i s o f s e n s i n g , harbours  confusion i n face of the f a c t s .  Whereas t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a dangerous  t h e o r y a l l o w s room  f o r a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between 1) b e i n g a p a r t o f t h e p a s s i v e aspect o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; b e i n g p a r t o f awareness; and, 2) b e i n g t h e o b j e c t o f awareness o f ( i . e . b e i n g r e l i e f e d ) , Sense-datum Theory i s r e s t r i c t e d t o h o l d i n g t h a t i f anything i s given to consciousness In Chapter  i t w i l l be t h e o b j e c t of_ awareness.  IV I c l a i m e d t h a t any approach r e l i a n t  s t r i c t l y on the n o t i o n o f  awareness of_ had t h e c r u c i a l l y damaging consequence o f f o r c i n g one t o deny the c o n t i n u i t y and i n f i n i t e c o m p l e x i t y o f a moment o f awareness. of t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e o r y can, on t h e o t h e r hand, m a i n t a i n t h a t themselves  A proponent sense-data,  c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o n t i n u i t y and i n f i n i t e c o m p l e x i t y , a r e p a r t s  of s t a t e s o f p e r c e p t u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and thus o f moments o f awareness, w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o be t h e l e a s t b i t embarrassed by the f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s , i n such s t a t e s , no awareness o f sense-data.  139 The vast majority of sense-data i n ordinary states of perceptual consciousness are part of awareness but are not r e l i e f e d . In addition to being r e l i e f e d , many sense-data, or complexes of them, are haunted as well.  The ghosts of actual and possible future and  past  sense-data are part of states of perceptual consciousness just as sensedata are.  The r e l i e f i n g and the haunting account for the difference  between a perception of_ a red and c i r c u l a r physical object and the r e l e vant reduced state of awareness containing only sense-data; and i n p a r t i c u l a r , containing a sense-datum which " i s probably e l l i p t i c a l i n shape and which may  very well be orange or purple or grey i n colour".  The ordinary, unreduced perceptual state contains exactly the same sensedatum.  It contains something more as well; but the more isn't  remotely l i k e other c o n f l i c t i n g sense-data.  anything  The more which the ordinary  perceptual state contains, s p e c i f i c a l l y shape and ghosts, amounts to meaning.  Notice, as an important consequence, that a proponent of the  consciousness theory need not be at a l l bothered.by. the persuasive ^ c r i t l cism of t r a d i t i o n a l Sense-datum Theories which would have them translate statements about physical objects into statements about sense-data. According  to the present position, the sense-data complexes contained  in  states of perceptual consciousness are i n f i n i t e l y complex and physical objects, as sense-data complexes plus ghosts plus shape, are only that much more so. Resistance may  to the idea that an e l l i p t i c a l purple sense-datum  be just as much a part of the state involved i n perceiving a round  red table as i t i s a part of the corresponding reduced state may born.  be  stub-  Perhaps one might weaken such resistance by thinking about i t this  way.  When we  t r y t o draw the round  r e d t a b l e a t which we  are  and we b e g i n , f a l t e r i n g l y , by drawing i t t h a t w a y — r o u n d and quickly realize  t h a t t h a t i s n ' t what we  see.  We  looking red—we  must r e s i s t the  impulse  to be n a i v e r e a l i s t s and keep i n mind t h a t a l l t h a t d e t a i l which i s so difficult place  to reproduce  i n our drawing and which we  common-sensically  ' i n the w o r l d ' i s r e a l l y p a r t of us; more p r e c i s e l y , i s p a r t of  s t a t e s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . t h a t we  say t h a t we  o n l y s i g n i f i e r s ; and sense-data  and  We  mustn't m i s l e a d o u r s e l v e s by the  see a round  red table.  they s i g n i f y  ghosts.  Our words a r e  fact  themselves  e x c e e d i n g l y complex systems of  141 NOTES  of  T.G.R. Bower, "The Development o f Object-Permanence: Some S t u d i e s E x i s t e n c e Constancy," P e r c e p t i o n and P s y c h o p h y s i c s , 2(9) (1967), p. 415. 2  Jean P i a g e t , "Comments," t r a n s . Anne Parsons, r e v . and ed. E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : The M.I.T. P r e s s , 1962), p. 3; appears as a pamphlet i n Thought and Language, Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, ed. and t r a n s . E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, M a s s a c h u s e t t s : The M.I.T. P r e s s , 1962). 3 P i a g e t , "Comments," p. 3. 4 R o d e r i c k F i r t h , "Sense-Data and t h e Percept Theory," i n P e r c e i v i n g , Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J . Swartz (Garden C i t y , New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, I n c . , 1965), p. 229. 5  F i r t h , p. 234. Firth,  p. 229.  142 CHAPTER VI  A Consciousness  Theory  A l t e r n a t i v e t o Meaning-Nominalism  1. Introduction  In  the s p i r i t  o f t h e f o u r t h c h a p t e r l e t me attempt now to  p r o v i d e an a l t e r n a t i v e t o Bennett's meaning-nominalist account o f t h e o r i g i n s of l i n g u i s t i c P a r t 2.  I will,  c o n v e n t i o n s which was d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter I  a t t h e same time be p r o v i d i n g some i n d i c a t i o n as to  how the type o f t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t o f view i n v o l v e d i n t h e n o t i o n o f o t h e r minds, which p l a y s , I suggested i n P a r t 1 o f t h e l a s t c h a p t e r , the  c e n t r a l r o l e i n the m a j o r i t y of the conceptual decentrations  undergone by human i n d i v i d u a l s , can be i t s e l f c o n c e p t u a l l y accounted f o r . In  t h e Bennett account, remember, a s t r a t e g i c r o l e i s p l a y e d by a  f i c t i t i o u s a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l event which Bennett h e l d amounted t o a p r i m e v a l G r i c e a n exchange between two members o f an a n t h r o p o i d a l t r i b e . I f i t i s t o be worthy  o f i t s r o l e i n h i s meaning-nominalist  account  of c o n v e n t i o n s , Bennett must be a b l e t o show us how he can account for  the o c c u r r e n c e o f h i s p r i m e v a l exchange w i t h o u t b e i n g f o r c e d t o  a p p e a l i n any way t o c o n v e n t i o n s .  I argued i n Chapter I t h a t  Bennett  has most c e r t a i n l y f a i l e d t o a d e q u a t e l y account f o r t h e b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s r e q u i r e d by h i s example.  In the l a s t  chapter I attempted  to o u t l i n e a p o s i t i o n on c o n s c i o u s n e s s and on c o n c e p t u a l  development  143 w i t h i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s which took t h e a b i l i t y primeval  to i n t e n d as being not  but developed and which t r i e d t o g i v e some i n d i c a t i o n as t o  how such a development might go.  I t has been the burden o f the  d i s c u s s i o n t o date to show t h a t c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n s can be of n e i t h e r as a r i s i n g m y s t e r i o u s l y , of t h e p o s s e s s i o n  conceived  as S e l l a r s seems t o t h i n k , out  of a l a n g u a g e — i t s e l f acquired  by s t i m u l u s / r e s p o n s e  m e a n s — n o r as r e l a t i o n s which can be, as Bennett seems t o h o l d , nonp r o b l e m a t i c a l l y presupposed i n an attempt t o g i v e account o f t h e phenomenon of language.  I m p l i c i t i n my account i s t h e consequence t h a t  language  i s n e i t h e r something which we s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y c o n s t r u c t , n o r i s i t something which we j u s t manage t o a c q u i r e by n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l and  means  i n v i r t u e o f which we become c a p a b l e o f h a v i n g i n t e n t i o n s and o t h e r  cognitive attitudes.  I have i n mind the i d e a t h a t t h e r e  of i n t e r l o c k between r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l a b i l i t y the a b i l i t y  i s a form  i n general—and to intend.  thus  linguistic  ability a fortiori—and  conceptual  l e v e l i s a f u n c t i o n o f one's a b i l i t y t o i n t e n d and v i c e  versa.  The two a r e n o t o n l y interdependent but evolve  present  c h a p t e r w i l l t r y to i l l u s t r a t e  One's  together.  The  such a p o s i t i o n by showing  how c o g n i t i v e a t t i t u d e s such as b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s can be o p e r a t i v e i n the f o r m a t i o n  of representation  r e l a t i o n s without t h a t h a v i n g t o  amount, even i n the case o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l contexts,  r e l a t i o n s which operate i n  t o such r e l a t i o n s b e i n g  formed i n t e n t i o n a l l y .  P l a u s i b i l i t y w i l l be gained, h o p e f u l l y , f o r the p o s i t i o n t h a t , once formed, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  r e l a t i o n s , i n so f a r as they enter  f a c i l i t a t e moves t o h i g h e r present  chapter w i l l  l e v e l s i n the a b i l i t y  sketch,  i n t o systems,  to intend.  The  i n p a r t i c u l a r , the barest o u t l i n e s o f the  way  i n which the a b i l i t y to have G r i c e a n i n t e n t i o n s i s a c q u i r e d by means  of the p r i o r a c q u i s i t i o n of i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e l a t i o n s which i n v o l v e non-Lewisian,  or non-conventional,  regularities.  2.  The  i)  Account  The broad p i c t u r e l o o k s l i k e t h i s :  For the  meaning-nominalist,  G r i c e a n meaning i s both l o g i c a l l y and c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to c o n v e n t i o n s . Thus Bennett  says:  " A . . . p l a u s i b l e guess i s t h a t meaning-conventions  e v o l v e d from r e g u l a r i t i e s whose i n s t a n c e s were l i k e my G r i c e a n case, w i t h meaningful  primitive  u t t e r a n c e s becoming more c o n v e n t i o n a l  i n t h e i r b a s i s as they become l e s s a b l e to stand on t h e i r own By c o n t r a s t , a c c o r d i n g to the p r e s e n t t h e o r y , the f i r s t G r i c e a n meaning w i l l be simultaneous the appearance of c o n v e n t i o n s .  feet.""'"  i n s t a n c e of  w i t h , i f not subsequent t o , the  Lewisian r e g u l a r i t i e s ,  conventions,  have p r e d e c e s s o r s ; these a c t as the t o o l s through which, by some p r o c e s s which, f o r convenience,  I w i l l c a l l an argument from analogy,  a theory  of o t h e r minds i s a c q u i r e d ; a c q u i s i t i o n of t h a t t h e o r y a u t o m a t i c a l l y changes the s t a t u s of those p r e d e c e s s o r s ; i t changes them, f o r the p o s s e s s o r o f a t h e o r y of o t h e r minds, i n t o c o n v e n t i o n s . armed w i t h a t h e o r y o f o t h e r minds and b e l i e f s about w i l l an agent be capable of making h i s f i r s t me  Only  then,  conventions,  Gricean utterance.  Let  s t a r t over a g a i n from the b e g i n n i n g . When I have spoken of G r i c e a n meaning I have had  i n mind,  remember, the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n which G r i c e g i v e s i n " U t t e r e r ' s  145 Meaning and I n t e n t i o n s " : 'U meant something by u t t e r i n g x' i s t r u e i f f , f o r some audience A, U u t t e r e d x i n t e n d i n g (1) A t o produce a p a r t i c u l a r response r (2) A to t h i n k ( r e c o g n i z e ) t h a t U i n t e n d s (1) (3) A to f u l f i l l (1) on t h e b a s i s o f h i s f u l f i l l m e n t of ( 2 ) . 2  Thus I mean by 'Gricean meaning' what G r i c e means by 'meaning^'. T h i s i s convenient f o r me because I am i n c l i n e d t o d i s l i k e t h e p l a c e where G r i c e has drawn the l i n e between n a t u r a l and  non-natural  3  meaning.  I have a l s o spoken o f an u t t e r e r having  thereby meaning t h a t h i s u t t e r a n c e And  once a g a i n ,  a 'Gricean i n t e n t i o n ' ,  i s an i n s t a n c e o f G r i c e a n meaning.  I take a L e w i s i a n  regularity, a  convention,  to be d e f i n e d as f o l l o w s : A r e g u l a r i t y R i n t h e b e h a v i o r o f the members o f a p o p u l a t i o n P when they a r e agents i n a r e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n S i s a convent i o n i f and o n l y i f i t i s t r u e t h a t , and i t i s common knowledge i n P t h a t , i n any i n s t a n c e o f S among t h e members o f P, (1) everyone conforms t o R; (2) everyone expects everyone e l s e t o conform t o R; (3) everyone p r e f e r s t o conform t o R on c o n d i t i o n t h a t the o t h e r s do, s i n c e S i s a c o o r d i n a t i o n problem and u n i f o r m c o n f o r m i t y to R i s a c o o r d i n a t i o n e q u i l i b r i u m i n S. 4  Both o f these d e f i n i t i o n s r e c e i v e f u r t h e r r e f i n e m e n t s a t the hands o f t h e i r c r e a t o r s but these s i m p l e r v e r s i o n s a r e , I b e l i e v e , s u f f i c i e n t l y complex f o r my purposes, a t l e a s t a t t h i s  preliminary  sketching  stage o f my own  theory.  ii)  I.mustznow draw a t t e n t i o n to t h r e e i d i s t i n c t i o n s which a r e  r e q u i r e d by t h e p o s i t i v e h a l f o f my argument. i s i n f a c t a refinement of the f i r s t , w i l l make t h e second i n two s t a g e s ;  The second  distinction  but f o r t h e sake o f c l a r i t y I  the t h i r d  i s partially  explained  by the f i r s t  and t h e second.  First  I contrast  conventions—Lewisian  r e g u l a r i t i e s , c o o r d i n a t i o n e q u i l i b r i u m s which a r e m a i n t a i n e d because i t i s m u t u a l l y known t h a t they a r e m u t u a l l y advantageous—with natural a s s o c i a t i o n s — a n y  . .  r e l a t i v e l y permanent  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f o b j e c t s o r arrangements o f o b j e c t s , o r any r e g u l a r i t y i n the sequences o f events about which an agent can l e a r n and i n accordance w i t h which r e g u l a t e h i s b e h a v i o u r , which i s not, l e a s t i s n o t understood as a L e w i s i a n my second d i s t i n c t i o n :  regularity.  And t h e r e  or at lies  An agent can l e a r n o f and a c t on a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  r e g u l a r i t i e s , which a r e i n f a c t L e w i s i a n  r e g u l a r i t i e s but which,  because t h e agent i n v o l v e d does n o t p o s s e s s a concept o f h i s own o r o t h e r minds, a r e n o t a p p r e c i a t e d associations.  I n d i s c u s s i n g s i t u a t i o n s l i k e t h i s , I s h a l l speak o f an  agent o p e r a t i n g An  by him as such but o n l y as n a t u r a l  on t h e b a s i s o f a convention-based n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n :  agent, x, o p e r a t e s on t h e b a s i s o f a convention-based  natural association i f f : (1)  a r e g u l a r i t y R i s a c o n v e n t i o n among the members of a p o p u l a t i o n  P when they a r e agents i n a r e c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n S; (2)  x i s n o t a ( f u l l ) member o f P;  (3)  x knows t h a t i n S s i t u a t i o n s a c e r t a i n s t a t e o f affairs A regularly arises;  (4)  A i s the d i r e c t r e s u l t o f a g e n e r a l  conformity,  among t h e members o f P, t o R; (5)  x expects A t o continue to a r i s e i n S s i t u a t i o n s ;  (6)  x p r e f e r s , on c o n d i t i o n t h a t A c o n t i n u e t o a r i s e ,  147 to a c t as a member o f P would a c t when conforming to R i n S s i t u a t i o n s , s i n c e S i s a s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r i n g c o o r d i n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r and A i s a c o o r d i n a t i o n e q u i l i b r i u m i n S, brought about by c o n f o r m i t y  t o R.  What I have done here i s taken Lewis's d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n , s t i p u l a t e d t h a t such a r e g u l a r i t y R does i n f a c t e x i s t i n t h e b e h a v i o u r o f a population  P, and then shown how an agent x c o u l d a c t i n a way  appropriate  to t h e b e h a v i o u r o f t h e members o f P i n S s i t u a t i o n s without a c t u a l l y a p p r e c i a t i n g the c o n v e n t i o n a l  n a t u r e o f R.  To do t h i s , I have adapted  Lewis's d e f i n i t i o n by removing from i t any mention o f thoughts about o t h e r minds and r e p l a c e d  t h e s e c t i o n s which I have removed w i t h  r e f e r r i n g o n l y t o thoughts about t h e r e l e v a n t b e h a v i o u r , about states of a f f a i r s .  sections behavioural  C h i l d r e n and animals a r e t h e o b v i o u s examples o f  agents who a c t on t h e b a s i s o f convention-based n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n s . of c o u r s e , convention-based n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n s , and t h e i r counterparts,  an example o f which I s h a l l d e s c r i b e  p r e d e c e s s o r s o f c o n v e n t i o n s o f which I have spoken.  And  primeval  s h o r t l y , are the Notice  as w e l l  t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n s and c o n v e n t i o n s p a r a l l e l s e x a c t l y t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between i n d i c a t i o n s and s i g n s which, following Piaget,  I r e f e r r e d t o i n Chapter IV.  s i g n i f i e r s i n v i r t u e o f the existence  Indications are  o f , and the agent's a t t e n t i o n t o ,  n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n s ; signs are s i g n i f i e r s i n v i r t u e o f the existence and  the successful operation  of conventions.  F o r an agent t o a c t ,  i n response t o a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , A, on the b a s i s o f a c o n v e n t i o n based n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n i s f o r t h a t agent t o respond t o what, f o r the members o f P, i s i n f a c t  ( o r i n v o l v e s t h e presence o f ) a s i g n  as though i t were a (mere) i n d i c a t i o n . F i n a l l y , I must make a d i s t i n c t i o n between m a n i p u l a t i v e and communicative b e h a v i o u r . behaviour  The c a t e g o r i e s o f m a n i p u l a t i v e and communicative  do n o t e x a c t l y correspond,  as might be expected,  c a t e g o r i e s o f m a n i p u l a t i v e and communicative i n t e n t i o n s .  t o the A particular  a c t i o n by an agent might be d e s c r i b e d as d i s p l a y i n g a m a n i p u l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n w h i l e b e i n g an i n s t a n c e o f communicative b e h a v i o u r . c l a s s o f a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g communicative behaviour  The  t o t a l l y includes  the c l a s s o f a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g communicative i n t e n t i o n s and i t a l s o includes a sub-class of the c l a s s of actions i n v o l v i n g intentions. behaviour,  The upshot o f t h i s f a c t  i s t h a t communication,  t h a t i s , i s not always G r i c e a n .  the f o r e g o i n g d i s t i n c t i o n .  manipulative  The behaviour  communicative  I w i l l now t r y t o e x p l a i n o f an animal,  f o r example,  when i t begs f o r food i s p r o b a b l y b e s t d e s c r i b e d as communicative though his intention i s only manipulative: and n o t t o have h i s 'audience'  He i n t e n d s o n l y to r e c e i v e food  t h i n k t h a t he d e s i r e s food.  He i s n o t  i n t e r e s t e d i n , i n f a c t he i s n o t even aware o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f , the thoughts,  b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s o f o t h e r s .  therefore, intend the Gricean t h i n g . t h a t t h e audience  recognize  him and t h a t t h e audience However, t h e f a c t  He does n o t ,  cannot,  S p e c i f i c a l l y , he cannot i n t e n d  t h a t he i n t e n d s t h e audience  to feed  f e e d him on t h e b a s i s o f t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n .  i s , and t h i s i s what makes h i s b e h a v i o u r ,  though  not h i s i n t e n t i o n , communicative, he can o n l y accomplish what he i n t e n d s i f he secures f i r s t  the understanding  ( t h e degree o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g  r e q u i r e d v a r i e s a c c o r d i n g to t h e example), and second t h e compliance o f , another  agent.  149 G r i c e a n communication  (communication ) always  involves  G  communicative i n t e n t i o n s which i n v o l v e thoughts about o t h e r minds; n o n - G r i c e a n communication communication it  y i e l d the c o n c l u s i o n  sub-class be  m a n i p u l a t i v e behaviour?  The  argument, i t w i l l be  Bennett's argument  f u l l - b l o o d e d b e l i e f s and or o t h e r s '  s u p p o r t s the c o n c l u s i o n  that  i n t e n t i o n s which  i n t e n t i o n s , ,, as I s h a l l bd  i n t e n t i o n s , do not  'self-concepts'.  call  entail beliefs  Bennett's argument  t h e r e can be b e l i e f s , , about i n t e n t i o n s , . bd bd  i n t e n t i o n s ^ to produce b e l i e f s ^ and  us what i s r e q u i r e d  conclusion  as b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s  o f e d u c a t i o n ; b e l i e f s , , and bd  about the agent's own  shown does  r e c a l l e d , i s about a  i n t e n t i o n s , b e l i e f s and  (at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y ) d e s c r i b e d  them, u n l i k e  if  which he needs, r e a d i l y p r o v i d e s the  o f b e l i e f s and  susceptible  and  But  Meaning-Nominalist S t r a t e g y " , which I have a l r e a d y  which I need h e r e .  can  does not.  i n v o l v e s m a n i p u l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n s , what s e p a r a t e s  from s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y  i n "The not  n  (communication ^)  thereby, I w i l l argue,  to d i s t i n q u i s h communication  gives  from m a n i p u l a t i v e  n  behaviour. The involves, objects can  simplest  type of i n t e n t i o n , a p u r e l y m a n i p u l a t i v e  I b e l i e v e , a p r i m i t i v e f e e l i n g f o r two  e x i s t i n g i n time.  Given these two  things,  see a p a r t i c u l a r arrangement o f o b j e c t s ,  a b e l i e f about the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n the d e s i r e d way. t r i a l and  He  an  and  time  and  i n f a n t or animal  d e s i r e another, and  (a p i c t u r e o f )  these o b j e c t s  then m a n i p u l a t e s the o b j e c t s ,  error fashion,  p i c t u r e o f the d e s i r e d  things:  one,  i f only  arranged in a  the m a n i p u l a t i o n , b e i n g d i r e c t e d by  f u t u r e arrangement, i s i n t e n t i o n a l .  a c h i e v e d i n s i t u a t i o n s such as t h e s e i s always the  The  possess  the  result  consequence o f  a  150 c a u s a l c h a i n s e t i n motion by the i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n o f one agent a l o n e . By comparison, i n t e n t i o n c a p a b l e of e x p l a i n i n g the s i m p l e s t form o f communication,  communication  „, must i n v o l v e another element:  The agent must have a f e e l i n g not o n l y f o r time and the e x i s t e n c e o f o b j e c t s i n time, but a l s o f o r the e x i s t e n c e o f what w i l l be here c a l l e d c o m p l i c a t e d o b j e c t s ; o f o b j e c t s which have a tendency to e x h i b i t a c t i v i t y w i t h o u t any apparent e x t e r n a l f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g on them.  He  must have not o n l y b e l i e f s , , but b e l i e f s , , about b e l i e f s , , and bd bd bd J  i n t e n t i o n s , ,. bd  In communication  of any k i n d the communicating  agent  a c h i e v e s an end, i f he i s s u c c e s s f u l , v i a a c a u s a l c h a i n which cannot be c o m p l e t e l y accounted f o r w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to e f f e c t s on the b e l i e f s , , bd  and i n t e n t i o n s , , o f another agent. bd two minds,  involved.  There must always be two a g e n t s ,  But t h i s f a c t , i n i n s t a n c e s o f communication  ,  i s u n a p p r e c i a t e d by e i t h e r the u t t e r e r o r h i s audience o f both; each must, however, i n such i n s t a n c e s , a p p r e c i a t e the e x i s t e n c e o f the o t h e r as a c o m p l i c a t e d o b j e c t w i t h b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s a c c e s s i b l e t o a l i m i t e d degree o f c o n t r o l a t a d i s t a n c e , so to speak. differentiated, communication  :  communication^£  I have j u s t  then, m a n i p u l a t i v e b e h a v i o u r , communication communication  , and  i n v o l v e s thoughts about o t h e r minds;  i n v o l v e s thoughts about c o m p l i c a t e d o b j e c t s ; and  manipulative behaviour involves n e i t h e r . Communication  _, o f c o u r s e , i n v o l v e s not j u s t b e l i e f s , , about  -vGr  *  bd  i n t e n t i o n s , , o r b e l i e f s , , but i n t e n t i o n s , , to produce i n t e n t i o n s , , o r bd bd bd bd c  beliefs^^.  The communicating  agent must a c t i n some way  which i s more  than j u s t a p p r o p r i a t e to the o t h e r agent's b e h a v i o u r ; h i s b e h a v i o u r must a c t u a l l y a f f e c t , change the o r i g i n a l c o u r s e o f , the b e h a v i o u r o f the o t h e r agent; and the e f f e c t produced i n the o t h e r agent must not be open to a  purely manipulative explanation. o t h e r agent,  F o r example, he must n o t push t h e  he must cause him t o move o f h i s own v o l i t i o n  (the concept  of w i l l here b e i n g r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e — I want i t t o extend over  agents  who a r e n o t , o r n o t y e t , s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ) and o f course, he must cause t h i s move i n t e n t i o n a l l y .  iii)  Having  b e l i e f s ^ about a c o m p l i c a t e d o b j e c t ' s p r e s e n t  b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n i s one t h i n g , h a v i n g an i n t e n t i o n ^ t o change t h a t b e h a v i o u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y more complex.  L e t me  t r y t o i l l u s t r a t e how the move from the lower l e v e l o f c o m p l e x i t y to t h e h i g h e r might o c c u r by a d a p t i n g Bennett's f i t s the p i c t u r e o f what I submit  own 'primeval case' u n t i l i t  a t r u l y p r i m e v a l case o f communication,  n e c e s s a r i l y communication^,, would l o o k l i k e . There a r e two agents, x and y.  I t sometimes happens t h a t  x and y come w i t h i n each o t h e r ' s p e r c e p t u a l f i e l d s .  Both have i n t e l l i g e n c e  l e v e l s h i g h enough t o a l l o w them t o have b e l i e f s , , about n a t u r a l a s s o c i a bd t i o n s connected  w i t h c o m p l i c a t e d o b j e c t s , t h a t i s , they can n o t i c e  and a p p r e c i a t e r e g u l a r i t i e s i n the behaviour around them.  of complicated objects  ( N o t i c e t h a t I'm n o t g i v i n g them any unaccounted f o r  b e l i e f s o n l y an unaccounted f o r c a p a c i t y t o a c q u i r e b e l i e f s — I account  can't  f o r t h e s t r a n g e phenomenon o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s any more than anyone  e l s e can...)  I n p a r t i c u l a r , x has come t o n o t i c e t h a t when a c e r t a i n  event, P, which we would d e s c r i b e as a cocoanut o c c u r s , another cocoanuts  event, Q, which we would d e s c r i b e as y a n g r i l y  i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , immediately  many exposures  f a l l i n g on y ' s head,  t o b a r r a g e s o f cocoanuts,  s i g n i f i c a n t observation:  follows.  throwing  A f t e r not a great  x comes t o make another, h i g h l y  P i s r e g u l a r l y preceded  by R, a cocoanut  d i r e c t l y over y's head showing s i g n s o f l o o s e n i n g ,  x's b e l i e f ^  about  the c o n n e c t i o n between R and Q (but f o r Q, P i s q u i t e unimportant l e a d s him,  on o b s e r v i n g R,  to r e a c t i n a c e r t a i n way,  He c o v e r s h i s head w i t h h i s arms and attempts i n t o t a l e a r n e s t n e s s , no a c t i n g , no attempt no thoughts  call  to x ) ,  i t A:  to run away; x does t h i s  to communicate, and  certainly  about nor concern J f o r y and h i s p a i n .  E v e n t u a l l y , y, by a s i m i l a r s e r i e s o f o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  connects  x's r e a c t i o n A w i t h h i s e x p e r i e n c e of P, b e i n g h i t on the head by a cocoanut,  and manages thereby t o a v o i d P.'.'  Q i s also  thereby~averted  and x comes t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t by doing A he somehow c o n t r o l s h i s environment, p r e v e n t i n g both Q and P. (now  The e a r n e s t n e s s  ' u t t e r a n c e ' becomes a p p l i c a b l e ) of A g r a d u a l l y  hasn't been h i t f o r a w h i l e — a n d  i n X's  performance  disappears—he  i t i s thereby p r o g r e s s i v e l y s i m p l i f i e d .  (Each stage i n t h i s s i m p l i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s must, of c o u r s e , be s i m i l a r to the l a s t a r e now  to a s s u r e y's c o n t i n u e d r e c o g n i t i o n of A.)  e x h i b i t i n g what I am The  calling  the case o f the c h i l d .  n a t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n s i n the more common case,  B e i n g , however, the p r i m e v a l case, the n a t u r a l  from communication  How  to communication- to be a f f e c t e d ?  F i r s t language must l e t x o r the c h i l d  My  i s the move position i s  say t h i n g s about mind  s e l f and o t h e r s ; and then, what I s h a l l c a l l  from analogy', will  convention-based.  That b r i n g s us to the h a r d e s t p a r t of a l l :  body and  y  communication^.  a s s o c i a t i o n s i n v o l v e d here a r e n e c e s s a r i l y not  this:  x and  s i m p l i f i e d v e r s i o n of A i s the c o u n t e r p a r t , i n the p r i m e v a l  case, of convention-based  iv)  sufficiently  and  'the argument  c a p a b l e of o p e r a t i n g because of t h a t l i n g u i s t i c  l e a d him to a p p r e c i a t e those same d i s t i n c t i o n s i n a new  ability,  light.  153 L e t me, i n an attempt  to shed l i g h t on what i t i s t h a t I have i n  mind here, r e s o r t t o a b i t o f autobiography.  The i n c i d e n t which I  am about  t o d e s c r i b e p r o b a b l y o c c u r r e d when I was between n i n e and  eleven.  I t i s n o t , I b e l i e v e , an a t y p i c a l type o f e x p e r i e n c e . My mother c a l l e d me t o h e l p her w i t h t h e d i s h e s ; I d i d n ' t  want t o h e l p ; I'wished  t h a t I c o u l d t h i n k o f some way out, t h a t she  would j u s t do them by h e r s e l f as she o f t e n d i d ; I walked i n t o the k i t c h e n and l o o k e d a t my mother and r e a l i z e d t h a t she d i d n ' t want t o do them e i t h e r ! asked,  I a l r e a d y knew t h i s o f course; I c o u l d have, i f  s t a t e d i t i n words.  No one l i k e s o r wants t o do d i s h e s ever;  not f o r i n t r i n s i c reasons anyway.  What I r e a l i z e d i n t h a t moment,  i n t h a t f l a s h , and i t was a f l a s h , was t h a t she (and everyone else.') had a mind o f her own, e x p e r i e n c e s o f her own, i n f a c t , i n some sense, a  'world' o f her own... As I've s a i d , p r e v i o u s t o my e x p e r i e n c e I was t o t a l l y  capable o f h a n d l i n g t h e E n g l i s h language which takes t h e f a c t  that  each o f us has a mind and f e e l i n g s f o r granted, as c o m p l e t e l y o b v i o u s , given.  So what was t h e content o f my experience?  I t i s as though  ) the asymmetry which had, p r i o r t o t h a t e x p e r i e n c e , been i n v o l v e d i n t h e concepts o f my wants and her wants ( c h i l d r e n a r e c o m p l e t e l y centred) ' had suddenly been brought  self-  sharply into contrast with the  symmetry o f the words used t o express those concepts, t h e r e s u l t a replacement  o f t h e o l d asymmetric concepts by new symmetrical  being ones:  The meaning o f t h e words i n v o l v e d underwent an e x t e n s i v e though extremely s u b t l e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . G e t t i n g x and y t o t h e b r i n k o f t h i s t r a n s i t i o n i s c o n s i d e r a b l y more complex than d o i n g so f o r t h e c h i l d and though I c e r t a i n l y do  not p r o f e s s t o have come anywhere near working out the d e t a i l of t h i s development, I am  convinced t h a t i t can be done.  sources o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n c o m p l e x i t y other p i c t u r e i n the c h i l d and  There a r e two  related  i n the development o f a  i n x and y.  Firstly,  self/  i n the p r i m e v a l  case, b o t h of the agents a r e w h o l l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , making the c o m m u n i c a t i o n ^ between them asymmetrical  i n a v e r y fundamental  Take the case which I have r e c e n t l y d e s c r i b e d .  way.  From x's p o i n t of  view h i s u t t e r a n c e i s a p r e v e n t a t i v e measure which s e r v e s to p r o t e c t x h i m s e l f from c e r t a i n unpleasant  o c c u r r e n c e s ; from y's p o i n t of view,  A i s a warning, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y u n l i k e the warning which c l o u d s g i v e of impending r a i n .  In the c h i l d ' s case, however, the a d u l t i s , a t the  o u t s e t , aware of and of h i s own,  concerned  f o r the c h i l d as a b e i n g w i t h  experiences  i n a c c e s s i b l e to the a d u l t ; i t i s thereby easy to show t h a t  the c h i l d i s exposed t o an abundant number of s i g n i f i c a n t  interactions  w i t h the a d u l t which a r e j o i n t l y capable of a c c o u n t i n g f o r h i s e v e n t u a l t r a n s i t i o n to a s e l f / o t h e r p i c t u r e . of concern  But when n e i t h e r agent  f o r the o t h e r , t h a t i s both l a c k a s e l f / o t h e r  i n v e n t i n g p l a u s i b l e and  significant  i s capable  picture,  i n t e r a c t i o n s between them becomes  c o n s i d e r a b l y more c h a l l e n g i n g . The  second  of the c h i l d l i e s  d i f f e r e n c e between the p r i m e v a l case and  the  case  i n the f a c t t h a t many of the a s s o c i a t i o n s which the  c h i l d l e a r n s a r e convention-based  natural associations.  That i s ,  the a d u l t b r i n g s to h i s i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h the c h i l d not o n l y a  concern  f o r h i s i n n e r w e l l - b e i n g but as w e l l , a ready-made, c o m p l i c a t e d s e t o f c o n c e p t u a l t o o l s ; he exposes the c h i l d t o L e w i s i a n r e g u l a r i t i e s .  The  c h i l d amasses huge numbers of these r e g u l a r i t i e s but without a p p r e c i a t i n g t h e i r conventional nature.  Only by u s i n g these a s s o c i a t i o n s as s t e p p i n g  stones can the c h i l d make t h e l e a p from a c o m p l e t e l y u n s e l f - c o n s c i o u s , t o t a l l y s o l i p s i s t i c p i c t u r e to a s e l f / o t h e r p i c t u r e capable of a p p r e c i a t i n g t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l n a t u r e o f those same a s s o c i a t i o n s . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , subsequent t o an a p p l i c a t i o n  (however  inexplicit)  of the argument from analogy, the c h i l d becomes both aware o f the o p e r a t i o n o f L e w i s i a n r e g u l a r i t i e s and capable o f G r i c e a n i n t e n t i o n s . By c o n t r a s t , i n t h e p r i m e v a l case, we must n o t o n l y account f o r x and y ' s u l t i m a t e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f complex concepts through an a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e argument from analogy, b u t , somehow, we must account  f o r t h e g e n e s i s o f those concepts themselves.  The c h i l d  learns  to say 'you' and 'me', and 'your p a i n ' and 'my p a i n ' , e t c . , l o n g b e f o r e he a t t r i b u t e s t o you a phenomenal p a i n c o r r e l a t i v e t o h i s own. Those concepts a r e f o i s t e d on him i n v i r t u e o f the f a c t t h a t he i s p a r t o f a c o m p l i c a t e d community o f human b e i n g s , most (?) o f whom a r e c a p a b l e o f a p p r e c i a t i n g the t r u e n a t u r e o f those concepts. . But i f what I am a r g u i n g has any t r u t h i n i t a t a l l , it  specifically, i f  i s t r u e t h a t p r e l i m i n a r y exposure t o the d i s t i n c t i o n s imbedded i n  those concepts i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a p p r e c i a t i n g those  distinctions,  then i t s h o u l d s u r e l y be p o s s i b l e t o show how those d i s t i n c t i o n s j - r - i n t h e i r bare-boned, s o l i p s i s t i c  form can be generated w i t h o u t : b e i n g  i n t e n t i o n a l l y c r e a t e d by a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s agent. it  That i s t o say,  should s u r e l y be p o s s i b l e t o meet t h i s second c h a l l e n g e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e p r i m e v a l case.  NOTES  Jonathan Bennett, "The Meaning-Nominalist of Language, 10 (1973), 155.  S t r a t e g y , " Foundations  2 H.P. G r i c e , " U t t e r e r ' s Meaning and I n t e n t i o n s , " P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 78 (1969), 151. 3 I would p r e f e r t o see such a d i s t i n c t i o n mark the presence o r absence o f i n t e n t i o n s o f any form; not j u s t o f complex G r i c e a n ones.  4 D a v i d K. Lewis, Convention: A P h i l o s o p h i c a l Study Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969), p. 58.  (Cambridge,  157 CHAPTER V I I  Some Semantic I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f t h e Consciousness Theory  1. Introduction  i)  I have c l a i m e d  i n several places  throughout t h i s  discussion  t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n which I have sketched has i n t e r e s t i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r problems i n the P h i l o s o p h y o f Language.  Exploring  these  professed  i m p l i c a t i o n s may, i f they a r e a t a l l sound, s e r v e n o t o n l y to make some c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f those i s s u e s but may perhaps help  to diminish  Chapter IV.  somewhat the m u l t i p l e o b s c u r i t i e s which c h a r a c t e r i z e  As I s a i d i n t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n ,  Chapter IV r e p r e s e n t s an  attempt t o a r t i c u l a t e , d e p l o r a b l y wide o f t h e mark, t h e b a s i c i n t u i t i o n s about what c o n s c i o u s n e s s and c o n c e p t u a l u n d e r l i e each o f t h e n e g a t i v e endeavor. present  frameworks must be l i k e which  arguments c o n t a i n e d  i n the present  By adding t o t h e number o f such n e g a t i v e  chapter w i l l  arguments, as t h e  seek t o do, i t i s hoped t h a t t o l e r a n c e f o r ,  perhaps even t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f , t h e content o f Chapter IV might be enhanced. The  p o s i t i o n which I have r e c e n t l y developed p l a c e s the  o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e between t h e s u b j e c t i v e and t h e o b j e c t i v e i n a r e l a t i v e l y unusual place.  I have c l a i m e d  t h a t , as c o n s c i o u s b e i n g s , we a r e l o c k e d  w i t h i n , and a r e c o n s t i t u t i v e o f , t h e s u b j e c t i v e h a l f o f an o n t o l o g i c a l duality.  The o b j e c t i v e h a l f o f t h a t d u a l i t y causes, i t was  claimed,  a s p e c t s o f the  s u b j e c t i v e but  cannot be,  i n which the P-theory takes i t to be, A w i l d attempt was  i n anything  present  l i k e the  to c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  made to g i v e some a l t e r n a t i v e t o , and,  same time, some e x p l a n a t i o n  sense  at  the  o f , the P-theory account of the matter.  I t r i e d to say something about the n a t u r e o f the s u b j e c t i v e and  of  type of e v o l u t i o n i t must undergo which c o u l d l e n d some support  and  content to my  c l a i m t h a t the type of o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e i n h e r e n t  P-theory amounts, i n some sense, to what I c a l l e d the  the  i n the  'importation'  o f an a c t u a l o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y i n t o what i s i n f a c t o n t o l o g i c a l l y non-dual.  I t w i l l be  the g o a l of t h i s chapter to show t h a t t h i s type of  view has  i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the r o l e of s e n s a t i o n s ,  general,  i n meaning and  reference and  even i n r e f e r e n c e  o f an e x p r e s s i o n  and  relations.  To  h a l f of an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y and  J u s t as  i d e a l l y across  an o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e but  'objective'  reference  are i n f a c t  c o n f i n e d w i t h i n the s u b j e c t i v e h a l f o f the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y . the same s p i r i t our c o n c e p t u a l  I claimed,  w i t h Thomas Nagel, t h a t we  development as moving i n a  d i r e c t i o n , but never o f our  o p e r a t e on us, p l a y i n g an  objective.  The  upshot  d i s t i n c t i o n s which we  that  make might  and numbers of o b j e c t i v e parameters which  f a c t s about our  indispensable  speak o f  c h a p t e r w i l l be the c o n t e n t i o n  c l o s e the c o n c e p t u a l  come to r e f l e c t i n g the k i n d s  can  In  subjective-to-objective  t h e o r i e s as b e i n g  of the arguments of the p r e s e n t no matter how  the  to the r e s u l t o f  the attempt to import t h a t h a l f i n t o the other h a l f , so r e l a t i o n s hold  speak of  i s , I t h i n k , ambiguous i n the same manner  the same degree as i s to t a l k of the o b j e c t i v e .  r e f e r s both to one  experience i n  sensory e x p e r i e n c e s must be  seen as  r o l e i n the meaning of t a l k about such  parameters.  ii)  Competing t h e o r i e s about the meaning of words l i k e  'red',  'hot' and  'water' seem to be generated by c o n f l i c t i n g o p i n i o n s on  the  degree to which the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e f a c t o r s p l a y e s s e n t i a l r o l e s i n the meaning of such terms:  our s e n s a t i o n s , our b e l i e f s , and  parameters.  There i s c u r r e n t l y p o p u l a r  philosophers  g r e a t l y impressed by a c t u a l and  i n s c i e n t i f i c theory,  to want to  objective  tendency, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n p o s s i b l e f u t u r e advances  'get meaning out of our  heads',  where to see meaning as i n our heads i s taken to i n v o l v e the of an e s s e n t i a l r o l e to f a c t s about our s y n c r a t i c temporal and  s e n s a t i o n s and  attribution  to the  idio-  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h o l d i n g between them.  Thus t h e r e i s a tendency to want to show t h a t s e n s a t i o n s p l a y no  role  or at b e s t o n l y an a c c i d e n t a l r o l e i n meaning r e l a t i o n s . Very c l e a r l y , the account which I have g i v e n of meaning r e l a t i o n s , which has  systems of ghosts b e i n g  sense-data or by r e l i e f e d ghosts, sense-data have to be, a c e n t r a l r o l e to our all  s i g n i f i e d e i t h e r by  cannot, because of what ghosts  and  a v o i d keeping meaning i n our heads and g i v i n g sensations.  The  present  p o s i t i o n holds  that  t h r e e o f the above mentioned f a c t o r s p l a y i n d i s p e n s a b l e r o l e s i n  meaning r e l a t i o n s .  O b j e c t i v e parameters, one might say, p r o v i d e  c a u s a l i n p u t which account f o r the s t r u c t u r e o f our b e l i e f s sensations provide  the content  words, come out as haunting  which i s s t r u c t u r e d .  r e l a t i o n s ; and  caused by o b j e c t i v e parameters and sense-data.  haunting  the  and  Beliefs,  i n other  r e l a t i o n s are  i n v o l v e sense-data and  ghosts of  160 To c l a i m t h a t meaning i s i n o u r h e a d s 1  1  has what may seem  to most t o be a troublesome and even c r u c i a l l y damaging consequence. I should  p o i n t out a t t h e o u t s e t  t h a t n o t o n l y am I prepared t o accept  t h i s consequence but I would a c t u a l l y be prepared t o argue f o r i t on independent grounds. Meaning r e l a t i o n s , i n t h e i r most b a s i c form, w i l l be s p e a k e r - r e l a t i v e r e l a t i o n s ; they w i l l be, moreover, i n some strong  sense, p r i v a t e .  The n o t i o n o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e meaning r e l a t i o n s  presupposes, I suggest, t h e f a c t o f t h e e x i s t e n c e r e l a t i v e r e l a t i o n s and the f a c t t h a t , a c r o s s relations, happily,  o f p r i v a t e speaker-  i n d i v i d u a l s , such  show a g r e a t and o b v i o u s tendency t o o v e r l a p ;  to be, i f n o t i d e n t i c a l , c e r t a i n l y f o r t h e most p a r t , r e c o g n i z a b l y The  p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e t e c t i n g and c r i t i c i z i n g  similar.  discrepancies  between s p e a k e r - r e l a t i v e meaning, and p u b l i c meaning w i l l . . r e s t as w e l l on t h i s f a c t t h a t though i n some s t r o n g  '  sense speaker-  r e l a t i v e meaning i s p r i v a t e , important forms o f s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences are nevertheless  recognizable  across  i n d i v i d u a l s . (In  speaking o f the b a s i c type o f meaning r e l a t i o n s as b e i n g and  c o n s e q u e n t l y as b e i n g  ' i n t h e head'  s p e a k e r - r e l a t i v e and p r i v a t e , I am, o f  c o u r s e , t r y i n g t o e x p r e s s w i t h i n t h e terms o f t h e P-theory what I I take would be i m p l i e d by the t r u t h o f t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e o r y . )  161 2.  O r d i n a r y Language and S e n s a t i o n s : An Argument by P a u l Churchland  i)  I s h a l l b e g i n by examining an argument o f P a u l Churchland's  which o c c u r s i n h i s book S c i e n t i f i c R e a l i s m and the P l a s t i c i t y o f Mind. Churchland o f f e r s what he takes to be a development  o f the S e l l a r s i a n  i d e a t h a t s e n s a t i o n s p l a y a mere c a u s a l as opposed  to a c o g n i t i v e or  or e p i s t e m i c r o l e " i n the p r o c e s s o f p e r c e p t i o n " .  He submits, and  he  takes h i s argument as o f f e r i n g p o w e r f u l support f o r , the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s e n s a t i o n s might, u l t i m a t e l y , "even be d i s p e n s e d w i t h so f a r as the b u s i n e s s o f l e a r n i n g and t h e o r i z i n g about the w o r l d i s concerned"."*" I t w i l l be argued here t h a t Churchland's argument does not i n f a c t r e p r e s e n t any improvement over t h a t o f S e l l a r s and t h a t i n f a c t , once h a v i n g l a i d bare the s t r u c t u r e o f Churchland's argument, we thrown back onto S e l l a r s .  find ourselves  I f the S e l l a r s - t y p e p o s i t i o n i s r i g h t i t  must be defended a t the p o i n t at which S e l l a r s h i m s e l f attempted do so.  The d i s c u s s i o n o f Churchland's argument w i l l l e a d ,  to  therefore,  into a d i s c u s s i o n of S e l l a r s ' . Churchland o f f e r s us an argument i n t e n d e d to show t h a t about  sensations are t o t a l l y i r r e l e v a n t  facts  to the meaning of o b s e r v a t i o n  terms, even t o the meaning o f common o b s e r v a t i o n terms such as 'hot', 'cold',  'white', and  'black'.  I t i s Churchland's c o n t e n t i o n , then,  t h a t f a c t s about t h e " i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e o f s e n s a t i o n s (as opposed about t h e i r r o l e s i n c a u s a l c h a i n s ) are s e m a n t i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t . are asked to imagine t h a t a s e t o f a l i e n s  to f a c t s We  ( A s ) , e x i s t whose members  are  i n a l l r e s p e c t s s i m i l a r t o us, e a r t h l i n g s ( E s ) , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n  t h a t they have v i s u a l s e n s a t i o n s i n r e s p e c t o f the o b j e c t i v e temperature where we Es have t a c t i l e  ones.  parameter  Where something f e e l s t o  J£s i n t h e way which they c a l l f e e l i n g hot, warm o r c o l d , As c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y have v i s u a l s e n s a t i o n s o f the s o r t which Es c a l l s e n s a t i o n s o f w h i t e , grey o r b l a c k .  (As do not possess any sensory i n f o r m a t i o n  about t h e o b j e c t i v e parameter which causes c o l o u r e x p e r i e n c e s i n Es.) We a r e a l s o asked t o suppose t h a t As use the same words or-sounds i n making t h e i r v i s u a l r e p o r t s o f the o b j e c t i v e parameter temperature as we  2 do i n making our t a c t i l e  r e p o r t s o f the same parameter.  Since t h i s  parameter a f f e c t s them, a t l e a s t under a d e f i n a b l e s e t o f 'normal' c o n d i t i o n s , i n ways which a r e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y c o r r e l a t a b l e w i t h the ways i n which i t a f f e c t s u s , we w i l l make, each i n our r e s p e c t i v e languages, b e l i e f u t t e r a n c e s which w i l l , l e a s t , be s t r i c t l y i d e n t i c a l .  We w i l l  i n a s u p e r f i c i a l sense a t  each u t t e r , o r be d i s p o s e d t o  assent t o the u t t e r a n c e o f , such s t r i n g s o f words a s : hot';  'Fires are  'A warm t h i n g w i l l warm up a c o o l e r t h i n g but never the r e v e r s e ' ;  and t h e l i k e .  The q u e s t i o n i s :  A r e our u t t e r a n c e s i d e n t i c a l  only  i n t h e s u p e r f i c i a l sense t h a t they c o n s i s t . o f i d e n t i c a l s t r i n g s o f sounds o r a r e they a l s o i d e n t i c a l i n the f u r t h e r and deeper sense t h a t they have t h e same meaning? Churchland, as has a l r e a d y been i n d i c a t e d , designed the above d e s c r i b e d imaginary case w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f p r o v i d i n g a means o f t e s t i n g t h e o r i e s about t h e meaning o f common o b s e r v a t i o n terms, such as 'hot'.  terms  I n p a r t i c u l a r , he hopes t o show t h a t t h i s t e s t case  p r o v i d e s c o n c l u s i v e l y damaging c o u n t e r - e v i d e n c e  to a theory, 3  taken from " t h e crude i n t u i t i o n s s u p p l i e d by common-sense", to which the meaning o f such terms i s g i v e n by s e n s a t i o n .  according According  to t h e s t r o n g e s t form o f t h i s t h e o r y , t h e meaning o f such terms i s given wholly  i n terms o f s e n s a t i o n ; on a weaker v e r s i o n i t i s determined  o n l y p a r t l y by s e n s a t i o n s .  The case i n v o l v i n g As and Es p r o v i d e s a  t e s t f o r the s t r o n g e s t v e r s i o n o f t h i s t h e o r y about t h e meaning o f common o b s e r v a t i o n terms i n the f o l l o w i n g way:  The c o r r e c t t h e o r y  about t h e meaning o f t h i s c l a s s o f terms, whatever i t might be, must a l l o w f o r t r a n s l a t i o n s between t h e two languages, A and _E, which p r e s e r v e t h e t r u t h v a l u e s o f the o r i g i n a l o b s e r v a t i o n  utterences.  We must, t h a t i s , as Es, be a b l e t o a t t r i b u t e l a r g e l y t r u e b e l i e f s to A - u t t e r e r s ; be a b l e t o a v o i d any t h e o r y o f meaning which would f o r c e us t o t r a n s l a t e i n such a way as t o "/JmakeJ a j o k e o f t h e i r  beliefs  4  and v i s u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s " .  Churchland  f i n d s the c l a i m t h a t t h e o r i e s  of meaning must meet such a c o n d i t i o n to be p a r t i c u l a r l y p e r s u a s i v e i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t o t a l r e c i p r o c i t y o f t h e s i t u a t i o n would f o r c e t h e As t o a t t r i b u t e l a r g e l y f a l s e b e l i e f s t o us, t o make t h e same j o k e o f our b e l i e f s and v i s u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , on any t h e o r y which f o r c e d us t o a t t r i b u t e l a r g e l y " f a l s e b e l i e f s t o them.  T.f, then, Me  a r e t o be a b l e t o make any sense o f each o t h e r ' s u t t e r a n c e s , and n o t , t h a t i s , to each f i n d the o t h e r ' s o b s e r v a t i o n statements t o be r i d i c u l o u s l y and  c o n s i s t e n t l y out o f keeping  meaning which generates  w i t h our own, we must have a t h e o r y o f  only mutually  truth-preserving translations.  I t i s t h i s c o n d i t i o n which t h e s o - c a l l e d common-sense view apparently  f a i l s to f u l f i l l .  What Churchland  takes t o be t h e common-sense  view of the meaning of common o b s e r v a t i o n  terms such as  'hot'  the a s c r i p t i o n o f f a l s e b e l i e f s , by As to Es and v i c e v e r s a , f o l l o w i n g way:  generates i n the  Remember t h a t the As have, as a c a u s a l consequence o f  exposure to t h a t same o b j e c t i v e parameter which i s c a u s a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e for  the o c c u r r e n c e i n us of the k i n d o f s e n s a t i o n s which we  sensations  of heat, the k i n d of v i s u a l s e n s a t i o n s which we  of w h i t e .  (Except  'hot', and  'white' w i l l  call call  where o t h e r w i s e i n d i c a t e d , a l l use of words such as i n v o l v e the E_, t h a t i s our,  whatever the meaning of such words might t u r n out  system of m e a n i n g s —  to be.)  Further,  v e r b a l behaviour i n such s i t u a t i o n s i s s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r to they say, having i f we hot'. it  i n A,  are t o u c h i n g  i t and  according  having  say,  i n E,  a s e n s a t i o n o f heat; namely, ' I t i s  to the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t theory  them, w i t h the c l a i m t h a t x i s hot  of meaning we  must,  But,  i s b o t h (what we  associated,  i s t h a t s e n s a t i o n which we  a sensation of white, t r a n s l a t e utterances, 'x i s white'.  by As,  of  except f o r o c c a s i o n a l c o i n c i d e n c e s  'x i s hot' where an  as object  false beliefs.  C l e a r l y , Churchland  b e l i e v e s , a s e n s a t i o n a l i s t view about the meaning of o b s e r v a t i o n r e q u i r e the s y s t e m a t i c  b e i n g who  fails  call  would c a l l ) hot and w h i t e , t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n procedure  would have us a s c r i b e to the As  will  are  of the same o b j e c t  seems, g i v e n the f a c t t h a t the s e n s a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  for  their  ours;  of the o b j e c t at which they are l o o k i n g when they  a s e n s a t i o n of w h i t e j u s t what we  Now  sensations  a t t r i b u t i o n o f f a l s e b e l i e f s by us to  to share e x a c t l y our  the d e v i c e of i n v o k i n g a r e d u c t i o ad absurdum  sensory m o d a l i t i e s .  imaginary As has,  any  In showing  he b e l i e v e s , thereby  this,  provided  of the common-sense p o s i t i o n , or a t l e a s t  the s t r o n g e s t v e r s i o n o f t h a t p o s i t i o n .  terms  Churchland :dlaims t h d t :  of  "//Since/ the view t h a t the meaning o f our common o b s e r v a t i o n terms i s g i v e n i n , or determined  by,  s e n s a t i o n must be r e j e c t e d  we a r e l e f t w i t h networks o f b e l i e f as the b e a r e r s o r of  understanding."^  Immediately  p r i o r to drawing  outright...  determinants  t h i s general conclusion,  Churchland argues, a g a i n s t a p o s s i b l e t e r t i u m q u i d , t h a t the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t , "Perhaps a p a r t o f the meaning o f the r e l e v a n t terms i s g i v e n i n s e n s a t i o n , w h i l e the remainder  i s f i x e d by a c l u s t e r o f background  b e l i e f s " , "has n o t h i n g to recommend i t over the /pure networks o f b e l i e f a l t e r n a t i v e — q u i t e the r e v e r s e " .  He c l a i m s t h a t such a p o s i t i o n  "/would require7 us to deny t h a t the b e i n g s w i t h the i n f r a r e d can p e r c e i v e the temperatures  7  o f o b j e c t s , and  eyes  indeed to deny t h a t  any  b e i n g s , no matter what t h e i r sensory apparatus, can p e r c e i v e the temperatures  o f o b j e c t s u n l e s s they are s u b j e c t t o p r e c i s e l y the same  range o f b o d i l y s e n s a t i o n s w i t h which we happen to respond cold objects".^  to hot  and  T h i s argument has s e r i o u s f l a w s i n i t , but i t w i l l  be p o s s i b l e to a t t a c k Churchland's  general r e j e c t i o n of  sensationalist-  type t h e o r i e s o f meaning without d e a l i n g w i t h i t d i r e c t l y .  ii)  Even common-sense t h e o r i e s admit  and w h i l e Churchland may his  A/E  of l e v e l s of  sophistication;  be r i g h t t h a t the p o s i t i o n which he r e f u t e s w i t h  case i s i n f a c t condoned by common-sense, t h i s c o u l d , i t w i l l  be argued, be t r u e o f o n l y a v e r y crude l e v e l o f common-sense. the p o s i t i o n which Churchland  a t t r i b u t e s to the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t can  be shown to be f a l s e without the extravagance inadequateness and  In f a c t ,  i s exceedingly obvious.  easily  of invoking a l i e n s , i t s  E x p r e s s i o n s such as  ' i s white', which a r e the type o f e x p r e s s i o n s to which  ' i s hot', Churchland  a p p l i e s h i s A/_E t e s t case, a r e connected,  i n some way f o r which any  adequate t h e o r y about the meaning o f such e x p r e s s i o n s must o f f e r an account, and  t o e x p r e s s i o n s such as ' f e e l s hot',  'looks w h i t e ' .  ( o r , i n A, 'looks h o t ' ) ,  The s e n s a t i o n a l i s t t h e o r y which Churchland  goes s e r i o u s l y a s t r a y i n t h a t i t c o m p l e t e l y between these two types o f e x p r e s s i o n s .  attacks  ignores the d i s t i n c t i o n  Any adequate t h e o r y about t h e  meaning o f i s - t a l k ought t o draw t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and attempt t o d i s e n t a n g l e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e d items.  Church-  l a n d ' s s e n s a t i o n a l i s t opponent v i r t u a l l y c o l l a p s e s i s - t a l k i n t o l o o k s t a l k by a t t r i b u t i n g t o i s - t a l k the meaning and thus t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s which a c o n s i d e r a b l y more worthy s e n s a t i o n a l i s t opponent would to l o o k s - t a l k .  J u s t a moment's r e f l e c t i o n ,  f o r the purposes  the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a l i e n s i s c o m p l e t e l y o t i o s e , r e v e a l s t h a t a p o s i t i o n cannot  account  attribute  o f which such  f o r the meaning o f i s - t a l k ; even w i t h i n  our own language t h i s p o s i t i o n would f o r c e f r e q u e n t , indeed i n c o r r e c t , a t t r i b u t i o n s o f f a l s e b e l i e f .  counter-intuitive  Thus  Churchland's  s e n s a t i o n a l i s t would be f o r c e d t o c l a i m t h a t whenever an o b j e c t l o o k s r e d i t i s r e d ; even when t h e f a c t o f i t s l o o k i n g r e d stems from some a b n o r m a l i t y e i t h e r i n t h e o b s e r v e r , t h e v i e w i n g c o n d i t i o n s o r both.  As w e l l , o f course, he would have t o c l a i m t h a t i t i s r e d  o n l y i f some o b s e r v e r i s l o o k i n g a t i t and h a v i n g a s e n s a t i o n o f r e d . Under c o n d i t i o n s o f darkness,  i n t h e presence  o f t h e r e l e v a n t type  of c o l o u r - b l i n d i n d i v i d u a l , o r i n t h e absence o f any o b s e r v e r , an o b j e c t simply i s n ' t r e d according to t h i s p o s i t i o n .  That t h e view t h a t  an o b j e c t i s r e d i f and o n l y i f i t , a t p r e s e n t , l o o k s r e d t o some o b s e r v e r  167 f a l l s to accord with ordinary usage i s , surely, beyond dispute.  3.  Ordinary Language and Sensations: An Argument by W i l f r i d S e l l s r s  i) appeared  T r a d i t i o n a l l y , the sensationalist position, as i t has i n the philosophical l i t e r a t u r e , fueled, of course, by  'crude  i n t u i t i o n s supplied by common-sense', has taken the meaning of i s - t a l k to be given i n terms of looks-talk and t a l k about standard observers and standard conditions.  The meaning of looks-talk, on the other hand,  has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been assumed to be amenable to a pure sensationalist analysis. S e l l a r s attempts to defend the position that sensations are irrelevant to the meaning of words l i k e 'red' by attacking t h i s sensationalist position d i r e c t l y .  Thus he attempts to support h i s  position that facts about sensations are only causally and never semantically or epistemically relevant to talk about objective parameters by showing that such facts are irrelevant to the meaning of the word 'red' even as i t occurs i n the expression 'looks red'.  He  advances the claim that "being red i s l o g i c a l l y p r i o r , i s a l o g i c a l l y simpler notion, than looking red".  But then he poses the question,  "but what...are we to make of the necessary,truth—and i t i s , of course, a necessary t r u t h — t h a t X i-s red "="  x would look red to standard observers in standard conditions?"  168 He  comments t h a t , "One  that looking-red 'red'  i s an i n s o l u b l e u n i t y , f o r the minute one  (on the r i g h t - h a n d  what i t o b v i o u s l y and  b e g i n s to see the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f the  gambit  gives  s i d e ) an independent s t a t u s , i t becomes  i s , namely 'red' as a p r e d i c a t e o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s ,  the supposed d e f i n i t i o n becomes obvious c i r c l e . " ^  A large part  of what I s h a l l t r y to show i n the d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s i s t h a t Sellars i s right we  i n h i s claim that t h i s  h o l d t i g h t l y to the o b v i o u s l y  But  tremely d i f f i c u l t  c i r c l e to see!  found a way  sense, no way  has  i t i s an  I hope to show t h a t  found a c i r c l e he's  out o f i t . He  problem about o r d i n a r y  But  'red' i s a  a c i r c l e ; perhaps even an  i t s obviousness notwithstanding,  S e l l a r s i s r i g h t t h a t he has he's  definition'—if.  t r u e assumption t h a t  predicate of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s — i n v o l v e s obvious c i r c l e .  'supposed  though  wrong i f he t h i n k s  found, I w i l l  language f o r which t h e r e  ex-  that  suggest, a deep  i s , i n some s t r o n g  out.  S e l l a r s now  o f f e r s us a p i e c e o f  means of which he he hopes to " b r i n g out  'historical fiction'  by  the e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s  of  8 'looks'".  He  t e l l s us a s t o r y about a young man  works i n a n e c k t i e learned  the use  shop.  John, he  named John  supposes, has,  w i t h one  of c o l o u r words i n the u s u a l way.  who  exception,  John's case i s  unusual i n t h a t n e i t h e r he nor h i s c o m p a t r i o t s have ever looked an o b j e c t  i n other  than standard  conditions.  At  some p o i n t  .  at  i n John's  l i f e t i m e i t comes to pass t h a t e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g i s i n v e n t e d .  Unlike  h i s f e l l o w s , John i s r e l u c t a n t to e x p e r i e n c e t h i s new  But  eventually,  sometime a f t e r the o t h e r s  John 'succumbs'.  have l e a r n e d  wonder.  to d e a l w i t h i t ,  Making a s a l e s p i t c h to a customer v e r y  soon  169  t h e r e a f t e r , John says, "'Here i s a handsome green one" , to which the 1  customer responds t h a t i s n ' t green and  takes John "^outside. John makes  the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t perhaps e l e c t r i c i t y changes the c o l o u r of t h i n g s and t h a t they change back a g a i n i n d a y l i g h t .  But  the o t h e r man  t h a t s u g g e s t i o n as i m p l a u s i b l e and John r e l u c t a n t l y agrees  rejects  with  the o t h e r ' s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h a t would be "a queer k i n d of change". When John, i n bewilderment, p r o t e s t s t h a t he had t i e was  green  t h a t i t was  i n s i d e the shop, the man  green  see what i s n ' t  seen t h a t the  r e p l i e s , "'No,  we  didn't  i n t h e r e , because i t wasn't green, and you  so.'"  see  can't  A c c o r d i n g to S e l l a r s , John e v e n t u a l l y l e a r n s ,  under p r e s s u r e from h i s customers, to s t i f l e the r e p o r t 'This i s green' and  to make i n s t e a d a f a c t - s t a t i n g use of the sentence  i s blue'.  He  l e a r n s i n time, moreover, to respond  'This  to q u e s t i o n s  as "'What i s the c o l o u r o f t h i s n e c k t i e ? ' " w i t h such statements ' " I t l o o k s green,  but take i t o u t s i d e and  I want to say two even i f the s t o r y was fiction,  i n general unacceptable The d i s t i n c t and  story.  i n g e n e r a l a c c e p t a b l e as a p i e c e o f  which i s h i g h l y c o n t e n t i o u s .  as,  see.'"  t h i n g s about S e l l a r s ' l i t t l e  t h e r e i s an important  such  First,  historical  d e t a i l i n i t , on which much hangs, And  second, the s t o r y seems to be  as a p l a u s i b l e p i e c e of h i s t o r i c a l  just  fiction:  type o f l i n e which the s t o r y t r i e s to draw between ' l o o k s '  ' i s ' i s , on e m p i r i c a l grounds, simply u n a c c e p t a b l e .  Because the  type of p o s i t i o n from which I am a r g u i n g h o l d s t h a t c o n c e p t u a l e v o l u t i o n amounts to a p r a c t i c a l a d a p t a t i o n to e m p i r i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s — i n so f a r as the e x e r t i o n o f energy by c o n s c i o u s n e s s  becomes i n c r e a s i n g l y a p p r o p r i a t e  to the p a t t e r n s which occur i n the p a s s i v e a s p e c t s — b e i n g unacceptable  harbours  the p o s s i b i l i t y of h a v i n g  empirically  f a r - r e a c h i n g conceptual  i m p l i c a t i o n s which may The  w e l l be c o m p l e t e l y  f i r s t p o i n t i s simple.  misleading.  I question  the p l a u s i b i l i t y  S e l l a r s ' easy assumption t h a t John's s o c i e t y would r e j e c t so  off-  handedly the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g changes the of things. seems not  The  suggestion  i n the l e a s t i m p l a u s i b l e .  l i k e John's which had  i n v e n t i o n of r e f r i g e r a t o r s or k e t t l e s , do  as i f i t i s s o l i d or gaseous?.'  i t and  to s o l i d or gas  mean to imply by  than standard  Subsequent  they deny t h a t i t can  say r a t h e r t h a t i t l o o k s  so common (whereas changes  f o r a change i n our  h a b i t s our l i v e s might o t h e r w i s e be q u i t e s i m i l a r i f these  and  o f the c o l o u r which i t l o o k s  I would l i k e to suggest as w e l l , s t i l l first  I don't  linguistic kinds  of changes were more common.'), t h a t f o r c e s us to t a l k both of  my  conditions  are much l e s s s o — l u c k i l y f o r us;  t h i s example t h a t but  c o l o u r which an o b j e c t has  story,  I t ' s the f a c t , I suggest, t h a t i n our  w o r l d , u n l i k e John's, c o l o u r changes are from l i q u i d  o f the  never seen i t evaporate or f r e e z e .  be changed by c o o l i n g i t or h e a t i n g  colours  C o n s i d e r the case o f a s o c i e t y  never seen water i n o t h e r  In p a r t i c u l a r , they had to the  t h a t i t might, i n the context  of  the  to have.  i n connection  o b j e c t i o n to S e l l a r s ' s t o r y , t h a t the mere f a c t t h a t  with the  p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t e l e c t r i c i t y might cause o b j e c t s to change t h e i r colour  i s advanced at a l l (and  i t would be)  S e l l a r s admits the p o s s i b i l i t y  u n d e r c u t s the c l a i m ,  f o r which S e l l a r s i s concerned to  generate support, t h a t f a c t s about s e n s a t i o n s not  semantically  that  or e p i s t e m i c a l l y r e l e v a n t  are only c a u s a l l y  i n t a l k about  and  objective  parameters; i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t u n d e r c u t s the c l a i m t h a t f a c t s about sensations  are i r r e l e v a n t to the meaning o f words l i k e  'red'.  Thus  if  S e l l a r s i s p r e p a r e d , as he must be, t o admit t h a t what changed  when John took t h e n e c k t i e o u t s i d e was J o h n ' s ~ s e n s a t i o n s ,  and not t h e t i e .  then f o r John t o suggest t h a t perhaps t h e t i e ' s c o l o u r had changed i s f o r him t o r e v e a l t h a t f a c t s about h i s s e n s a t i o n s  play a r o l e i n  what he means by c o l o u r words.. Turning j u s t couldn't Sellars just  t o my second p o i n t .  John's c o n c e p t u a l  development  be, I s h a l l argue, a p i e c e o f our own c o n c e p t u a l  history.  seems t o have i g n o r e d how v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t John's world  would have t o be from o u r own i n o r d e r  to f u l f i l l  S e l l a r s ' b a s i c under-  i l y i n g s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t John "has never looked  a t an o b j e c t i n o t h e r  9  than standard  conditions".  I t ' s n o t j u s t e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g which,  i n our w o r l d , c r e a t e s d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e c o l o u r s t h i n g s have (whatever t h a t might t u r n out t o mean) and t h e c o l o u r s which they look, at d i f f e r e n t  times,  c o n d i t i o n s , t o have.  to d i f f e r e n t observers,  under d i f f e r e n t  Thus i n t h e world which John i n h a b i t s , t h e r e  must be no a l t e r n a t i o n o f day and n i g h t ,  i n the sense i n which s u n l i g h t  comes and goes; i n f a c t , t h e n a t u r a l l i g h t  t h a t e x i s t s i n t h e world  of John and h i s f e l l o w s cannot be v e r y much l i k e our s u n l i g h t a t a l l : S u n l i g h t r a d i a t e s from one d i r e c t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e i l l u m i n a t e s o b j e c t s i n an uneven, though s y s t e m a t i c , the p r o c e s s  o f change b e i n g  i n f a c t evenly  coloured  e f f e c t o f appearing and  and i n a c o n t i n u o u s l y  systematic  as w e l l .  changing manner,  Objects  which a r e  a r e thereby caused to e x h i b i t t h e f a m i l i a r  t o be d i f f e r e n t  i n colour across  characteristic  e i t h e r d i s t i n c t o r b l u r r e d l i n e s - - l i n e s which a r e i n f a c t l i n e s o f  contour ( t h i s shading e f f e c t undoubtedly p l a y s a c r u c i a l r o l e i n our perception  of t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l i t y ) .  L i g h t i n John's world, by c o n t r a s t  172 would have to be e v e n l y d i f f u s e d and  completely d i r e c t i o n l e s s ,  surrounding  o b j e c t s l i k e an a b s o l u t e l y u n i f o r m , u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d gas o r l i q u i d . w i t h such e v e n l y d i f f u s e d , e v e r - p r e s e n t l i g h t why  And  i t ' s r a t h e r hard t o see  e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g would ever be i n v e n t e d anyhow^—not a t l e a s t f o r  use i n a t i e shop;  perhaps as a drawing a t t r a c t i o n i n t h a t k i n d of  e x h i b i t i o n which f e a t u r e s such t h i n g s as d i s t o r t i n g m i r r o r s . speaking o f m i r r o r s .  Remember t h a t l o o k s - t a l k i s n ' t unique  But to t a l k  about c o l o u r s and John and h i s c o m p a t r i o t s , b e i n g i g n o r a n t of the l o o k s / i s d i s t i n c t i o n , must be without m i r r o r s , d i s t o r t i n g o r o t h e r w i s e , s i n c e even n o n - d i s t o r t i n g ones cause i t to l o o k as though t h i n g s a r e where they a r e n ' t . looks/is distinction feels/is,  But once we (and don't  s t a r t t h i n k i n g about the f a c t t h a t the forget i t s close r e l a t i v e s ,  s o u n d s / i s , s m e l l s / i s , and  tastes/is  the  distinctions—questions  about them p r e c i s e l y p a r a l l e l l i n g q u e s t i o n s about l o o k s / i s and r e q u i r i n g p r e c i s e l y p a r a l l e l treatment) c o l o u r s , i t becomes immediately  obvious  a p p l i e s to more than t h a t we  thereby just  have as y e t o n l y  s c r a t c h e d a t the s u r f a c e of the d i f f e r e n c e between John's world ours.  C o n s i d e r the case of shapes.  and  In our world c o r n e r s which a r e  square l o o k , from a l l a n g l e s but two,  ( d i r e c t l y above and  directly  below i n the case o f a h o r i z o n t a l o b j e c t ) , to be e i t h e r obtuse o r a c u t e . But  i n John's w o r l d , where n o t h i n g ever l o o k s o t h e r than what i t  a c t u a l l y i s , i t would seem t h a t e v e r y t h i n g must e x i s t i n a  two-dimensional  p l a n e w i t h p o i n t s o f view on t h a t p l a n e e x i s t i n g o n l y a l o n g  lines  d i r e c t l y p e r p e n d i c u l a r to i t .  And  John and h i s f r i e n d s w i l l  have to be p o i n t s , l i n e segments o r a t b e s t p l a n e segments.'  probably Perhaps  they c o u l d be t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l o b j e c t s but they c o u l d n ' t p e r c e i v e each  o t h e r as such  (and thus a h i g h e r - o r d e r l o o k s / i s d i s t i n c t i o n , of which they  would be o b l i v i o u s would i n f a c t e x i s t ) .  What's worse, i t seems  u n l i k e l y t h a t they w i l l be a b l e to p e r c e i v e t h e i r own ( u n l e s s they can p r o j e c t t h e i r e y e — t h e y two  dimensional w o r l d — a t I suspect  b o d i e s at a l l  won't need two  of them i n t h e i r  r i g h t a n g l e s to themselves!)  t h a t I need not pursue the i s s u e o f the  between t a l k about appearance and  relationship  t a l k about r e a l i t y f u r t h e r i n the  l o o k s / i s d i r e c t i o n nor even to touch on the f e e l s / i s and  the much l e s s  commonly d i s c u s s e d s o u n d s / i s , s m e l l s / i s , t a s t e s / i s , d i r e c t i o n s i n o r d e r to c o n v i n c e even the most r e l u c t a n t reader t h a t S e l l a r s ' p i e c e o f c o n c e p t u a l h i s t o r y i s n ' t a p i e c e of our c o n c e p t u a l  little  history.  S e l l a r s ' g r o s s l y o v e r - s i m p l i f i e d . p i c t u r e of the p e r c e p t u a l s i t u a t i o n s w i t h i n which the l o o k s / i s d i s t i n c t i o n o p e r a t e s and h i s i l l e g i t i m a t e assumption t h a t i n such a simple s i t u a t i o n l o o k s - t a l k r a t h e r than t a l k of an o b j e c t i v e change would be the  conceptual  move most n a t u r a l f o r a s o c i e t y l i k e John's, a l l o w s him  to draw  some i m p l i c a t i o n s about the r o l e o f s e n s a t i o n s i n the meaning of 'red' which j u s t  simply do not do j u s t i c e to the way  of t h a t s o r t o p e r a t e  i n our language.  i n which words  The o p t i o n of s a y i n g t h a t the  c o l o u r s of o b j e c t s change seems wide open, even obvious, s o c i e t y whereas i t i s — f o r  i n John's  p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n s — c l o s e d to us.  s i m p l i c i t y of the e m p i r i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n response  The  to which the  concepts  i n John's language e v o l v e j u s t can't shed any l i g h t on the complex conceptual  s i t u a t i o n which has evolved i n our own  about John was  language.  The  story  i n t e n d e d , I guess, to s o f t e n our r e s i s t a n c e to the  s u g g e s t i o n t h a t f a c t s about s e n s a t i o n s can be s e p a r a t e d , not c a u s a l l y ,  174 of c o u r s e , but s e m a n t i c a l l y or e p i s t e m i c a l l y , from our t a l k about p r o p e r t i e s i n the p h y s i c a l world.  I t i s o f c e n t r a l importance to S e l l a r s '  e n t i r e programme, remember, to be a b l e to show t h a t awareness o b j e c t s i s c o n c e p t u a l l y p r i o r to awareness of s e n s a t i o n s , f o r S e l l a r s ,  of sensations.  of p h y s i c a l  Awareness  i s the t h e o r e t i c a l outcome o f b e i n g b o t h e r e d by  the f a c t t h a t s i t u a t i o n s i n which something l o o k s to one to be r e d and s i t u a t i o n s i n which one sees something t o be r e d , have something i n common.  I have t r i e d to d i s c r e d i t S e l l a r s ' s t o r y by a r g u i n g t h a t  John's r e a d i n e s s to abandon f a c t s about h i s s e n s a t i o n s i n the meanings of  'green' and  'blue' i s i m p l a u s i b l e at b e s t and j u s t  u n b e l i e v a b l e a t worst.  downright  S e l l a r s ' p i e c e o f ' h i s t o r i c a l f i c t i o n ' not  o n l y doesn't, i t seems to me,  s o f t e n our r e s i s t a n c e to the type o f  p o s i t i o n which he advocates but may  a c t u a l l y sharpen our i n t u i t i o n s i n  the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n .  ii)  In an e f f o r t to p r o v i d e an answer to the q u e s t i o n o f what  e i t h e r we o r John a r e d o i n g when we use l o o k s - t a l k , S e l l a r s develops an i n g e n i o u s argument designed to f o r c e us to accept t h a t  sensations  a r e i r r e l e v a n t to the meaning o f ' r e d ' — b o t h i n 'looks r e d ' and ' i s red'.  L o g i c a l l y the argument i s c o m p l e t e l y c o m p e l l i n g .  a n a l y s i s o f how  the words 'red',  however, i t i s u n n a c c e p t a b l e .  'green', e t c . , work i n our language,  It i s  u n a c c e p t a b l e because i t simply  cannot, I s h a l l c l a i m , accommodate a c e n t r a l f a c t about how works.  As an  our language  S e l l a r s doesn't c o n s i d e r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t though the  c o n c l u s i o n o f h i s argument seems f o r c e d upon us by t h e p a r t i c u l a r about language which he c i t e s , actually f a i l  facts  important concepts i n our language might  to be l o g i c a l l y c o h e r e n t .  L o g i c a l arguments  about how  our  language ought t o be, i f i t i s t o be coherent, can never  suffice,  I suggest, t o show us how our language i s . S e l l a r s doesn't l a y h i s argument out i n n e a r l y the s t a r k way i n which I w i l l  endeavor to do so.  I hope t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n w i l l n o t be  m i s r e p r e s e n t e d by my c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n . claim that red i s a property A:  The c e n t r a l premise i s t h e  of physical objects.  Thus he says:  "The fundamental grammar o f the a t t r i b u t e r e d i s  9 p h y s i c a l o b j e c t x i s r e d a t p l a c e p and a t time t . " P a r t o f the baggage t h a t comes w i t h A i s t h e assumption, t r u e o f us but contentious  when made o f John, t h a t c o l o u r s a r e c o n c e i v e d  of p r o p e r t y  which remains constant  and  o f as a type  through changes i n p l a c e ,  lighting,  the l i k e . S e l l a r s ' other B;  two premises a r e :  " . . . t h e sense o f 'red' i n which t h i n g s l o o k r e d i s , on the f a c e o f i t , t h e same as t h a t i n which  things  are r e d . C:  " . . . t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f h a v i n g something l o o k green t o one  a t a c e r t a i n time i s , i n so f a r as i t i s an e x p e r i e n c e ,  o b v i o u s l y v e r y much l i k e t h a t o f s e e i n g  something t o be  green, i n so f a r as t h e l a t t e r i s an e x p e r i e n c e . " " ^ Bear i n mind t h a t t h e o b j e c t o f S e l l a r s ' argument i s t o undermine the Sense-datum T h e o r i s t ' s fundamental c o n v i c t i o n . Sense-datum T h e o r i s t SD:  The  i s , as S e l l a r s n o t e s , g r e a t l y impressed by t h e q u e s t i o n  "'How can a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t  l o o k r e d t o S, u n l e s s  something i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n jLs r e d and S i s t a k i n g  12 account o f i t ? "  176 S e l l a r s ' argument  has, by f o r c e o f l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h e e f f e c t  of so r e s t r i c t i n g t h e meaning o f ' r e d ' t h a t t o ask SD j u s t , l o o k s  silly.  From A and B we get t h e consequence t h a t r e d need n o t be a p r o p e r t y which i s common t o b o t h t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which something l o o k s r e d and t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which something i s r e d :  Since i t i s  p o s s i b l e f o r a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t t o l o o k r e d and n o t be r e d , and s i n c e redness i s a p r o p e r t y o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h e r e to be something which l o o k s r e d and f o r t h e r e t o be n o t h i n g which i n f a c t is_ r e d .  From t h a t consequence and C we get t h e f u r t h e r  consequence t h a t though t h e r e i s something common to s i t u a t i o n s i n which something l o o k s and something i s r e d , whatever i t i s i t i s n ' t r e d . 'Red' i s t i e d g r a m m a t i c a l l y  to a property o f p h y s i c a l objects.  When  something l o o k s r e d i t need n o t be t h e case t h a t i t , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t anything,  i s red.  Whatever  i t i s t h a t i s common to s i t u a t i o n s i n which  something l o o k s r e d and something i s r e d , i t must be a p r o p e r t y o f p e r c e i v i n g agents and be a p r o p e r t y t o which t h e p r e d i c a t e 'red' c o u l d o n l y i n some new and s t i p u l a t e d sense be a p p l i e d . H o l d i n g f a s t t o t h i s consequence we a r e now i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o see S e l l a r s ' supposed  'obvious', but hard t o see, c i r c l e .  The  definition: X i s r e d " = " x would l o o k r e d t o standard o b s e r v e r s i n standard c o n d i t i o n s says something l i k e : X i s r e d ' — " x would l o o k t h e way i t i s ( i . e . r e d ) t o the r i g h t k i n d o f o b s e r v e r s i n c o n d i t i o n s i n which, to t h e r i g h t k i n d o f o b s e r v e r s , i t  177 would l o o k t h e way I t i s ( i . e . t o standard observers Thus though a n e c e s s a r y  i n standard c o n d i t i o n s ) .  t r u t h , t h i s b i c o n d i t i o n a l cannot amount t o a  d e f i n i t i o n of ' i s red' since, i n e f f e c t , be d e f i n i e n s .  ' i s red' occurs  i n t h e would  Hence t h e c i r c u l a r i t y .  I f t h e argument which I have j u s t d e s c r i b e d i s indeed  Sellars'  argument, and I b e l i e v e t h a t , r o u g h l y a t l e a s t , i t i s , I should l i k e t o say, and then t o say why, t h a t i t took me a v e r y l o n g time t o see i t . I t i s , I suggest,  hard t o a v o i d c o n f u s i n g S e l l a r s ' B and C.  foreignness o f the idea that  The t o t a l  'red' doesn't, i n any way, r e f e r t o t h a t —  where one does what S e l l a r s says we mustn't d a , s p e c i f i c a l l y , where one  attends  t o t h a t a s p e c t , whatever i t i s , which i s common t o those  s i t u a t i o n s i n which one sees something t o be r e d and t o those i n which something l o o k s r e d to one—makes i t extremely B from s a y i n g p r e t t y much what C says.  situations  hard t o keep  Only by c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z i n g t h e  f o r c e o f A can one see S e l l a r s ' argument.  The r o l e of A i s fundamental.  Perhaps we might, g i v e n t h e c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e n e s s ( o r so I s t r o n g l y contend) of S e l l a r s ' c o n c l u s i o n , want t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f A. But  t h e t r u t h o f A, as a c l a i m about how o r d i n a r y language works,  seems i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e . i s red with the claim,  When we respond t o someone's c l a i m t h a t something 'No, i t j u s t l o o k s r e d ' , we do seem t o be s a y i n g  t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y which t h e o t h e r thought i t had i s n ' t p r o p e r t y which i t does have.  i n fact a  We do seem t o be t a l k i n g about a p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t and about i t s p o s s e s s i o n o f , o r i t s f a i l u r e t o possess, property.  (Compare:  'He's a f r i e n d l y dog';  a particular  'No, he j u s t l o o k s  But how, i f we must accept A, B and C, a r e we t o a v o i d  friendly'.) Sellars'  178 u n d e s i r a b l e consequence?  How a r e we t o escape the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t  that has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h or i s o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y connected  with  what I mean when I say t h a t S e l l a r s ' book, a t which I am s t a r i n g , i s red?  The k i n d o f c o n c l u s i o n which S e l l a r s , as a m a t e r i a l i s t ,  wants, and which I , as a n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t , f i n d not o n l y i n t u i t i v e but e m p i r i c a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e ,  i s facilitated  countersomewhat by  the f a c t t h a t though he p r o v i d e s a complex a n a l y s i s o f each o f t h e f o l l o w i n g types o f sentences:  1) x i s r e d . 2)  I see t h a t x i s r e d .  3)  x looks red.  4)  I t l o o k s as though t h e r e i s a r e d x over  5)  x merely l o o k s r e d .  he never d i s c u s s e s t h e sentence  there.  type:  6) I see a r e d x. But by having avoided d i s c u s s i n g sentences  like  (6), S e l l a r s i s a b l e  to i g n o r e t h e f a c t t h a t when I see my copy o f S c i e n c e , P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y I take myself, n a i v e l y , t o be i n i t s presence; redness  smeared a l l over  and i t has  i t . I see redness. O r d i n a r y language i s ,  I'm s u g g e s t i n g here, as I've suggested  e a r l i e r , naive r e a l i s t .  Seeing,  i n t h e common-sense, o r d i n a r y language, scheme o f t h i n g s i s a v e r y s t r a n g e phenomenon indeed.  I t amounts t o some k i n d o f d i r e c t ,  contact with things i n the w o r l d — a  immediate  r e l a t i o n s h i p between us_ and them.  They a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o common-sense, b e f o r e us ( b e a r i n g i n mind t h a t what we a r e f o r common-sense i s mental, where b e i n g mental i m p l i e s b e i n g something c a t e g o r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t  from what they a r e ) i n a way which the  S e l l a r s i a n account f a i l s c o m p l e t e l y to accommodate. I f red i s a of p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s ,  i t i s , i t must be remembered, a p r o p e r t y  we  i n v o l v e s some k i n d of d i r e c t ,  see, where s e e i n g  contact  with red.  Red  i s not,  the presence of which we  is,  i s , and  i s only,  Seeing, as i t i s common-sensically conceived  That the d u a l i s m which i t i n v o l v e s i s , and  must take i t i n t o account. false.  And  ordinary  i s , with respect ordinary  beside  Thus n a i v e  the p o i n t .  see p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s and  Looks-talk  i s even  obviously,  i s obviously, realism  that, u l t i m a t e l y incoherent.  see  r e a l i s m on the one  i l l u s i o n s — w h i c h render n a i v e  Thus  hand—according  their colours—and  to accommodate those f a c t s — t h e more s t r i k i n g i n s t a n c e s c a l l e d perceptual  deal,  language, i n so f a r as i t presupposes n a i v e  to l o o k s / i s / s e e s / s e e s  of,  Semantic a n a l y s i s  r e a l i s m i s , and  language i s t o r n between n a i v e  to which we  objects  d e t e c t on the b a s i s of the o c c u r r e n c e i n us  o n t o l o g i c a l l y i n c o r r e c t i s simply  an  attempt  o f which  are  r e a l i s m untenable.  i s the product of t h i s attempt to accommodate. While we  and  of  i n an e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t w i t h which S e l l a r s ' account cannot  dualistic.  which  phenomenological  f o r common-sense, a p r o p e r t y  of a s p e c i f i c type o f s e n s a t i o n — w h e r e a s e n s a t i o n a s t a t e of o u r s e l v e s .  property  recognize  and  respond a p p r o p r i a t e l y to numerous  s u b t l e p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s communicated to us by means of  l o o k s - t a l k , we  a r e g e n e r a l l y i n s e n s i t i v e to the o n t o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s  of the need f o r l o o k s - t a l k , to the f a c t , t h a t i s , of the f a l s i t y naive  realism.  P h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s of o r d i n a r y  to come to terms w i t h the o n t o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . i s one  of the outcomes o f t h i s s t r u g g l e .  language  of  struggles  Sense-datum Theory  I t denies naive  r e t a i n s the d u a l i t y o f the s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e s p l i t .  realism  but  I t attempts to  r e p l a c e the i n c o h e r e n t between the mind and  subjective/objective s p l i t  realism,  the world, w i t h the mind/sense-data s p l i t .  an a n a l y s i s o f o r d i n a r y against  of n a i v e  language, however, Sense-datum Theory runs  S e l l a r s ' o b j e c t i o n that  because i t f a i l s to take account o f an important r e s p e c t language i s n a i v e l y d u a l i s t i c .  as an a n a l y s i s o f o r d i n a r y  i n v o l v e s , as does o r d i n a r y l o o k i n g at account o f being t h a t which i s aware and  i n which  Sense-datum Theory  Sense-datum Theory, i n o t h e r  language, the l i g h t i n g - u p form of aware; but  i t places  the  kind words, the  t h a t which i s l i t - u p — b e t w e e n a s u b j e c t language p l a c e s  and  a physical object.  t r u t h of the matter i s t h a t both  and  the Sense-datum T h e o r i s t have f a i l e d to p r o v i d e  The  i t between a  cannot bear the weight o f coherent a n a l y s i s . of c o u r s e , u n l i k e S e l l a r s , need not  (The  be construed  and  subject Sellars  an a n a l y s i s of  o r d i n a r y language f o r the simple reason t h a t o r d i n a r y  analysis.)  fails  duality—between  sense-data whereas o r d i n a r y  g i v e such an  language  language because i t puts the r i g h t  of d u a l i s m i n the wrong p l a c e .  up  'red' a p p l i e s to p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s .  S e l l a r s ' p o s i t i o n f a i l s as an a n a l y s i s of o r d i n a r y  ordinary  As  language j u s t  Sense-datum T h e o r i s t ,  as even t r y i n g  to  181 4.  S e n s a t i o n s and ' I n t r i n s i c Meaning'  L e t me t r y t o make t h e p o i n t t h a t s e n s a t i o n s r o l e i n t h e meaning o f our common o b s e r v a t i o n s  p l a y an e s s e n t i a l  terms i n another way.  S e n s a t i o n s can be, I claimed  i n Chapter IV, possessed o f what I t h e r e  called  F a c t s about i n t r i n s i c meaning a r e ,  ' i n t r i n s i c meaning'.  I suggest, a v e r y  important p a r t o f what i s conveyed and o f what  we i n t e n d t o convey when we t a l k about o b j e c t i v e parameters. how c o u l d  i t p o s s i b l y be denied t h a t f a c t s about s e n s a t i o n s  As such, a r e an  e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f t h e meaning o f t a l k about parameters? One  must be c a r e f u l , as Churchland, f o r example, i s not, t o  d i s t i n g u i s h between two d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f c l a i m s . f r e q u e n t l y s l i p s back and f o r t h between 1) the p a r t i c u l a r s o r t o f s e n s a t i o n  Churchland  The t r u e c l a i m  that  caused i n us, E s , by the o p e r a t i o n  o f a p a r t i c u l a r parameter, must n o t be mistaken to be an e s s e n t i a l property  o f t h e parameter i n v o l v e d ; and, 2)  The here to be d i s p u t e d  c l a i m t h a t f a c t s about how a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e parameter i s s e n s o r i l y detected  by us, Es, a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e meaning o f , t o o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f , t a l k about, and i n p a r t i c u l a r o b s e r v a t i o n  statements connected  13 with,  t h a t same parameter.  these c l a i m s  as b e i n g  (Churchland o f t e n speaks o f the f i r s t o f  a conclusion  o f h i s A/_E argument;  he e x p l i c i t l y assumes i t i n s e t t i n g up t h a t a r g u m e n t . ^ ) Churchland says, sensations  i n fact, Thus  ''...the i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t a t i v e i d e n t i t y o f one's  i s i r r e l e v a n t t o what p r o p e r t i e s one can o r does  the world as d i s p l a y i n g " .  perceive  This i s a v e r s i o n o f the true claim  contained  182 in  (1).  But Churchland goes on, as though r e s t a t i n g the same p o i n t ,  o r perhaps as though making a new but l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d p o i n t : "The  meaning o f a term ( o r t h e i d e n t i t y o f a concept) i s n o t determined  by t h e i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t y o f whatever s e n s a t i o n happens to prompt i t s o b s e r v a t i o n a l use, but by t h e network o f a s s u m p t i o n s / b e l i e f s / p r i n c i p l e s 16' i n which i t f i g u r e s . "  The l a t t e r i s , i t w i l l be contended, n e i t h e r  the same n o r a l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d p o i n t . claim contained  i n (2), a quite d i f f e r e n t claim.  have i t t h a t meaning i s something o t h e r and  interests.  t o our purposes  The p a r t i c i p a n t s i n an  Conference a r e b e g i n n i n g  t o assemble.  Among  a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e a r e some e a r t h l i n g s and some o f Churchland's  An E emerging from t h e crowd gathered around t h e c o f f e e u r n  aliens.  d i s a p p o i n t e d l y mumbles t h a t the c o f f e e i s c o l d . what?" and pours h i m s e l f  the f i r s t  a coffee.  An A r e p l i e s ,  Everyone laughs.  c o n f e r e n c e s they'd ever had t o g e t h e r  meaning o f i s - t a l k . aspect  (2) would seem t o  than a servant  the f o l l o w i n g s c e n a r i o :  I n t e r g a l a c t i c Philosophy  "So  to the  But how c o u l d t h a t be p l a u s i b l e ?  Consider  those present  I t i s equivalent  They a l l a p p r e c i a t e d  At one o f  they'd worked out t h e  t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e was an  o f the meaning o f t h e E/s u t t e r a n c e which t h e As c o u l d , i n a  sense, a p p r e c i a t e ,  and t o t h a t extent  i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o t h e i r own system  of meanings, but which, without some change i n t h e i r sensory r e p e t o i r e , they c o u l d never t r u l y share.  That the c o f f e e was c o l d meant something  to t h e Es which i t d i d n o t mean t o t h e As. It  i s , I'm s u g g e s t i n g ,  the f a c t t h a t  (at l e a s t  have i n t r i n s i c meaning t h a t accounts f o r our m o t i v a t i o n about, t o l e a r n about, o b j e c t i v e parameters i n the f i r s t  some)  sensations  to b u i l d  theories  place. ' I t  183 i s our  d e s i r e to maximize the frequency of p l e a s a n t  sensations  minimize the frequency of unpleasant ones, which m o t i v a t e s us extract patterns  from, and  impose s t r u c t u r e on,  parameters as c a u s a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e I t i s t h i s type of  f o r , the f l o w o f our  'programming' which we  l e a s t ) computers l a c k : have meaning o r v a l u e  We  are subject  i n and  Surely, map  and  i f one  so  to  to objective  sensations.  have and which (so f a r a t  to s e n s a t i o n s  which o f t e n  of themselves; they f e e l n i c e or  h u r t , or f o r more complex ones, t h e y ' r e i n t e r e s t i n g or b o r i n g ,  to p o s t u l a t e  and  comforting  they  or d i s t r e s s i n g ,  on.  of the primary o b j e c t i v e s of language i s to  or model the parameters of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ,  the reason  we're concerned to have such a mapping i s to b e t t e r equip  why  ourselves  f o r the p r e d i c t i o n , and  thus the c o n t r o l , of the e f f e c t s which those  parameters have on us.  Our  seems to me,  h e l p but be e s s e n t i a l l y about those e f f e c t s .  here t h a t t h i s must be In the f i n a l t h a t we  t a l k about those parameters cannot, I t  so because of the importance of those  arguing  sensations.  s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter I w i l l c l a i m even more s t r o n g l y ,  simply  couldn't,  not  simply  t h a t i t would be p o i n t l e s s t o ,  t a l k about parameters without f a c t s about our intermediaries. would be  I am  I s h a l l argue t h e r e  sensations  the  t h a t t a l k about o b j e c t i v e parameters  q u i t e c o n t e n t l e s s without f a c t s about s e n s a t i o n s  a c e n t r a l r o l e i n i t s meaning.  playing  playing  184 5.  F a c t s about S e n s a t i o n s :  The Only A c c e s s i b l e Content  i n Talk about"Objective  Parameters  I s h a l l t r y t o make the p o i n t t h a t s e n s a t i o n s must be p a r t o f the meaning o f t a l k about o b j e c t i v e parameters not o n l y because they p r o v i d e i t s r a i s o n d ' e t r e , but a l s o because i t would be q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e f o r such t a l k to have any content without r o l e , by examining another  sensations playing a central  argument from P a u l Churchland's  S c i e n t i f i c R e a l i s m and t h e P l a s t i c i t y o f Mind."^ argument i n t e n d e d t o show the t h e o r y - l a d e n n e s s  book,  Churchland  of—and  g i v e s an  thus, he t h i n k s ,  the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i r r e l e v a n c e o f s e n s a t i o n s t o — t h e common-sense framework i n which we p e r c e i v e temperature, p e r c e p t u a l frameworks g e n e r a l l y .  and indeed, o f and t o  What Churchland  e f f e c t i v e l y shows  i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s t h a t an e x c e e d i n g l y n a i v e type o f n a i v e  realist  p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o h e a t — w h e r e b y we would be seen as b e i n g i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t , through our s e n s a t i o n s o f hot and c o l d , w i t h the o b j e c t i v e parameter t e m p e r a t u r e — w o n ' t h o l d up under c l o s e i n s p e c t i o n .  To show  t h a t t h e c o n n e c t i o n between s e n s a t i o n s and o b j e c t i v e parameters i s not simple and d i r e c t i s n o t t o show, however, t h a t t h e r e i s no c o n n e c t i o n between our s e n s a t i o n s and t h e meaning o f t a l k about the o b j e c t i v e parameters which we p e r c e i v e t o be o p e r a t i n g . words, i s s t i l l  Churchland,  i n other  a t t a c k i n g that v e r s i o n of the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t  position  which f a i l s t o make any d i s t i n c t i o n between l o o k s - and i s - t a l k ; which d e n i e s t o i s - t a l k any means o f i n c o r p o r a t i n g f a c t s about p a t t e r n s i n sensation.  185 L e t ' s l o o k a t Churchland's argument. initially  He  shows how  we  are  d r i v e n to h o l d a b e l i e f i n the o p e r a t i o n o f an o b j e c t i v e  parameter such as heat c o n d u c t i v i t y by the o c c u r r e n c e o f phenomena i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h our b e l i e f i n the o p e r a t i o n o f a s i n g l e simple o b j e c t i v e parameter such as temperature.  An o b j e c t , A,  f e e l s warmer to the touch  than a second o b j e c t , B; p l a c e d i n c o n t a c t w i t h one another, however, A i s caused to warm up, c o n t a c t w i t h B. sensically  to f e e l warmer to the touch than i t d i d b e f o r e  I f we were t o a c c e p t , as Churchland says we  do, t h a t f e e l i n g warmer i s the same as b e i n g warmer,  t h a t the f a c t o f a o b j e c t c a u s i n g another o b j e c t to warm up a g r e a t e r degree o f warmth i n the f i r s t principle  common-  object  i :  indicates  as w e l l as the g e n e r a l  t h a t i f an o b j e c t i s warmer than a second the second i s not  warmer than the f i r s t ,  our e m p i r i c a l  f i n d i n g s would have to be acknowledged  as b e i n g i n c o n f l i c t w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e .  We  postulate a  heat c o n d u c t i v i t y , o r r a t e o f exchange o f heat energy to another, to e x p l a i n t h i s s e t o f phenomena;  parameter,  from one body  B must be warmer than A  ( i t has a h i g h e r degree o f heat e n e r g y ) , because i t causes A to warm up; but A must be a b e t t e r heat conductor because i t f e e l s warmer to the touch than does B — i t than does B.  passes heat energy to our hand more e f f i c i e n t l y  The q u e s t i o n , now,  i s this:  What does t a l k about  heat  c o n d u c t i v i t y , what do e x p r e s s i o n s l i k e ' i s a good conductor o f heat', mean?  And  the answer i s t h a t , i f we  a r e to know what the c l a i m  a b e t t e r conductor o f heat than B' means, we must know f a c t s A will  'A i s  like:  f e e l warmer to the touch than B when B has an e q u a l (or even  somewhat g r e a t e r ) degree of heat than A; o'r:  A c o n t a i n e r made out o f  substance A w i l l a l l o w a hot l i q u i d t o c o o l o f f f a s t e r  than w i l l  a  c o n t a i n e r made out o f substance B; o r : An o b j e c t made out o f substance A w i l l become hot q u i c k e r when exposed t o a source o f heat than w i l l an o b j e c t made out o f substance B; f a c t s , t h a t i s , o f t h e s o r t which drove us t o p o s t u l a t e the parameter i n t h e f i r s t c a l l s c o l l e c t i o n s o f f a c t s l i k e these  place.  Churchland  'networks o f b e l i e f s ' and he  t h i n k s t h a t they t o t a l l y determine t h e meaning, a t the 'common-sense' (in  t h i s case t h e improved common-sense) l e v e l , o f i s - t a l k .  r i g h t about t h a t .  He a l s o t h i n k s , however, t h a t these networks o f b e l i e f  determine t h e meaning o f i s - t a l k independently each s t r a n d i n these networks o f b e l i e f  reference i s e x p l i c i t  In both cases out  i n the f i r s t  It's implicit t h e content  of sensations.  But  involves e s s e n t i a l reference,  i m p l i c i t perhaps, but e s s e n t i a l n o n e t h e l e s s ,  warmer than B.  He's  to sensations.  example g i v e n above.  The  A will  i n the o t h e r two but t h e r e j u s t  feel  the same..  o f the c l a i m s i s going t o have to be s p e l l e d  i n terms o f how t h i n g s w i l l l o o k and/or f e e l t o o b s e r v e r s . That we c o u l d have, as Churchland has shown, g o t t e n a t t h e  same o b j e c t i v e parameters through d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f ' l o o k i n g s ' and ' f e e l i n g s ' had our sense r e c e p t o r s been d i f f e r e n t might be thought t o show t h a t though s e n s a t i o n s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y i n v o l v e d i n networks o f b e l i e f , t h e i r i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t a t i v e natures r e l e v a n t t o meaning. Philosophy  a r e a t best o n l y a c c i d e n t a l l y  But t h e case o f c o l d c o f f e e a t t h e I h t e r g a l a c t i c  Conference has shown us more.  communicate f a c t s about s e n s a t i o n s  The need t o p r e d i c t and  i s an e s s e n t i a l , indeed,  I would  suggest, t h e e s s e n t i a l , j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the e x i s t e n c e o f t a l k about o b j e c t i v e parameters i n t h e f i r s t  place.  I t i s the i n t r i n s i c  nature  o f s e n s a t i o n s which l e a d s us t o d e c i d e a g a i n s t u s i n g m a t e r i a l s which  187 a r e known t o be good heat cooking u t e n s i l s . substance  conductors  i n the making o f handles f o r  I f , as i s t h e case, the statement  that a p a r t i c u l a r  i s a good conductor o f heat imparts t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t  we s h o u l d not use i t t o make handles  f o r c o o k i n g u t e n s i l s i t i s because  not o n l y f a c t s about s e n s a t i o n s but f a c t s about t h e i n t r i n s i c  natures  of s e n s a t i o n s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e meaning o f i s - t a l k . Thus a proponent o f t h e s e n s a t i o n a l i s t i s n o t p r e c l u d e d , as Churchland  t h e o r y o f meaning  i m p l i e s , from h o l d i n g a b e l i e f i n  the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t our common-sense c o n c e p t u a l framework, and w i t h i t our common-sense o b s e r v a t i o n p r e d i c a t e s , such as ' i s h o t ' , h o t t e r than  'is  ', i s t h e o r e t i c a l and might e v e n t u a l l y be e l i m i n a t e d ,  even f o r t h e purposes  o f o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e , i n f a v o u r o f a more  p o w e r f u l , more e m p i r i c a l l y adequate, c o n c e p t u a l framework.  But on  the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t p o s i t i o n t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f a c o n c e p t u a l  framework—  n e i t h e r o f a low l e v e l , one  common-sense one o r o f h i g h o r d e r  (Churchland and the r e s t a r e r i g h t :  of a k i n d ) — d o e s  scientific  the two a r e on a continuum and  not thereby e l i m i n a t e the sensory c o r e which i s ,  f o r t h e s e n s a t i o n a l i s t , an e s s e n t i a l component i n t h e meaning o f a l l o b s e r v a t i o n terms. expanded perhaps,  Rather, what i s i n essence  the same sensory c o r e ,  or d i f f e r e n t l y divided or i n t e r r e l a t e d , i s incorporated  i n t o the new, more p o w e r f u l c o n c e p t u a l framework.  Thus the p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e common-sense framework i s n o t , a l a s , the p o s s i b i l i t y which t h e m a t e r i a l i s t needs o r wants. Our  common-sense t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n might, as Churchland  18 c l a i m s , be f a l s e ,  ("or even s e r i o u s l y s u p e r f i c i a l "  ) , /but It <isri?t  f a l s e because o f a f a i l u r e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a t i t i s t o t a l l y  theoretical  and  o f a f a i l u r e to purge i t of a l l sensory  content.  Rather  problem i s t h a t not  enough i n f o r m a t i o n about, and/or enough  s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n and  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n about,  has been worked i n t o the t h e o r y .  The  the  sensations  f a c t that several o b j e c t i v e  parameters can c o n s p i r e i n d i f f e r e n t combinations to account f o r the occurrence  i n v a r i o u s cases of a s i n g l e type o f s e n s a t i o n , o r ,  i n the A/E  case,  as  t h a t the same o b j e c t i v e parameter can be c a u s a l l y  responsible for different  s e n s a t i o n s , does not  imply  t h a t we  ever cut i n f o r m a t i o n about s e n s a t i o n s out of the meaning of about o b j e c t i v e parameters.  could talk  189 NOTES  P a u l M. Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c R e a l i s m and the P l a s t i c i t y o f Mind, Cambridge S t u d i e s i n P h i l o s o p h y (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1979), p. 15. 2 T h i s s u p p o s i t i o n ought not to be doing any t h e o r e t i c a l work but i t may w e l l be the case t h a t i t i s l o a d i n g our i n t u i t i o n s i n Churchland's direction. 3 Churchland, p. 8. 4 Churchland, p.  10.  Churchland, p.  13.  Churchland, p.  12.  ^ W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , " E m p i r i c i s m and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind," i n S c i e n c e , P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i b r a r y of P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1963), p. 142. g S e l l a r s , pp. 142-44. 9  Sellars,  p.  142  ^  Sellars,  p.  153.  ^  Sellars,  p.  141.  Sellars,  p.  144.  Sellars,  p.  149.  12  1 3  P a u l M. Churchland, "Two Grades of E v i d e n t i a l B i a s , " P h i l o s o p h y of S c i e n c e , 42 (1975), p. 255. 15 Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c R e a l i s m and the P l a s t i c i t y o f Mind, pp. 9, 12. 1 Z |  16 17 18 19  Churchland,  Scientific  R e a l i s m and the P l a s t i c i t y  o f Mind, P-  8.  Churchland,  Scientific  R e a l i s m and the P l a s t i c i t y  of Mind, P-  15.  Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c  R e a l i s m and the P l a s t i c i t y  o f Mind, pp. 22--24.  Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c  R e a l i s m and the P l a s t i c i t y  o f Mind, P-  6.  190 BIBLIOGRAPHY  Armstrong, D.M. P e r c e p t i o n and t h e P h y s i c a l World. International Library of P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n t i f i c Method. London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1961. Bennett, Jonathan. P r e s s , 1976.  L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour.  . "The Meaning-Nominalist 10 (1973), pp. 141-68.  Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y  Strategy."  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Trans. Margaret Cook. New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s P r e s s , Inc., 1952. P l a y , Dreams and I m i t a t i o n i n C h i l d h o o d . Trans. C. Gattegno and F.M. Hodgson. London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1962.  Mays.  The P r i n c i p l e s o f G e n e t i c Epistemology. New York: B a s i c Books, Inc., 1972.  Trans. Wolfe  , and B a r b e l I n h e l d e r . The C h i l d ' s C o n c e p t i o n of Space. Trans. F . J . Langdon and J.L. Lunzer. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, I n c . , 1967. , and B a r b e l I n h e l d e r i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h Hermine S i n c l a i r - d e Zwart. Memory and I n t e l l i g e n c e . New York: B a s i c Books, Inc., 1973. Rorty, R i c h a r d . "The World W e l l L o s t . " 69 (1972), pp. 649-65.  The J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h y ,  Sellars, Wilfrid. " E m p i r i c i s m and the P h i l o s o p h y o f Mind." In S c i e n c e , P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y . 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