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Consciousness and the evolution of conceptual frameworks Thurston, Bonnie Colleen 1981

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CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS by BONNIE COLLEEN THURSTON B.A., The Univ e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1975 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Philosophy) We accept t h i s t hesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1981 Bonnie Colleen Thurston, 1981 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department o r by h i s o r her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 DF-fi O>/7<n i i ABSTRACT It i s argued that any epistemological theory which takes as i t s s t a r t i n g point the assumption of a d u a l i t y between a subject and some form of objective r e a l i t y i s doomed to f a i l u r e . An attempt i s made to show that i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s kind of point which must be seen as under-l y i n g W i l f r i d S e l l a r s ' powerful argument against the given. But while h i s argument against the given involves a r e j e c t i o n of the problematic d u a l i t y at the lowest l e v e l — s p e c i f i c a l l y , of the d u a l i t y between a subject and i t s s e n s a t i o n s — S e l l a r s ' own l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness involves the re i n t r o d u c t i o n of the same type of d u a l i t y at a higher l e v e l — n o w between a subject and i t s l i n g u i s t i c utterances. For S e l l a r s , a l l awareness i s awareness o|_ (something); but h i s own negative argument, properly under-stood, amounts to a demonstration that there can be, i n some strong sense, no such thing as awareness of. An attempt i s made to remove the impression that any argument which purports to show that there i s no such thing as awareness of_ has got to be wrong by showing how i t might be possible to account for the apparently dual state, the state of awareness of_, i n terms of a non-dual state, the state of awareness. whereas for S e l l a r s , the existence of language, as an e v o l u t i o n a r i l y developed, S-R acquired phenomenon, presents no p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems, and he has i t playing a c e n t r a l r o l e i n h i s attempt to account for the philoso-p h i c a l l y perplexing phenomenon of awareness, an i n t e r e s t i n g l y opposed and equally untenable p o s i t i o n takes the existence of awareness, even of complex kinds of awareness, as p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y unproblematic and presupposes i t i n i i i an attempt to account for the p o s s i b i l i t y of language. The l a t t e r p o s i t i o n i s known as meaning-nominalism and i s developed by Jonathan Bennett. I t shares with the S e l l a r s p o s i t i o n the assumption that awareness i s d u a l i s t i c . By avoiding that dualism, the present account i s able to acknowledge, and address i t s e l f to, phi l o s o p h i c a l problems i n connection with both awareness and language. A simple form of awareness i s held to be presupposed by language a c q u i s i t i o n but language i s held to be presupposed by the complex kinds of awareness taken as basic by nominalism. The suggested account of awareness i s also held to show that, contrary to arguments by S e l l a r s and Paul Churchland, fac t s about sensations must play a c e n t r a l and indispensable r o l e i n the meaning of common observation predicates. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Abs t r a c t Acknowledgement I n t r o d u c t i o n 1. The Programme ( i ) ( i i ) ( i i i ) ( i v ) 2. M a t e r i a l i s m , the P-theory and the Consciousness Theory ( i ) ( i i ) Notes Chapter I The R e l a t i o n s h i p between Language and Awareness: Two Opposing Views 1. S e l l a r s ' L i n g u i s t i c Account of Awareness Rejected ( i ) ( i i ) ( i i i ) ( i v ) (v) 2. Against Meaning-Nominalism ( i ) ( i i ) ( i i i ) ( i v ) Notes Chapter I I Givenness and Sense-Data: L o g i c a l l y and Phenomenologically Attacked 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 2. S e l l a r s ' L o g i c a l Argument Against the Given ( i ) ( i i ) ( i i i ) Page 1 4 4 5 6 9 14 15 17 22 25 27 29 31 34 40 42 45 47 48 51 V Page 3. F i r t h ' s Phenomenological Attack on Sense-Data (i) 53 ( i i ) 54 ( i i i ) 55 (iv) 57 (v) 59 (vi) 63 Notes 65 Chapter III The P-theory Account of Awareness 1. Introduction 67 2. The 'Lighting-Up' Conception of Awareness (i) 69 ( i i ) 71 3. The 'Causal' Conception of Awareness 74 4. The Problem with Awareness of_ 76 5. The S e l l a r s View Recast 80 6. The Source of the Problem? 88 Notes 89 Chapter IV A Non-dual Account of Awareness of: Exploring the P o s s i b i l i t y 1. The Subjective/Objective Dualism (i) 90 ( i i ) 92 2. The Outlines of a Theory (i) 99 ( i i ) 102 ( i i i ) 109 (iv) 112 (v) 114 (vi) 117 ( v i i ) 122 Notes 126 Chapter V Some Implications of the Consciousness Theory 1. The Notions of Points of View and Conceptual Frameworks 127 2. The Relationship between Looks-Talk and Is-Talk 133 3. An Account of the Phenomenological Appeal 134 Notes 141 vx Chapter VI A Consciousness Theory A l t e r n a t i v e to Meaning-Nominalism 1. Introduction 2. The Account (i) ( i i ) ( i i i ) (iv) Notes Page 142 144 145 151 152 156 Chapter VII Some Semantic Implications of the Consciousness Theory 1. Introduction (i ) ( i i ) 2. Ordinary Language and Sensations: An Argument by Paul Churchland (i ) ( i i ) 3. Ordinary Language and Sensations: An Argument by W i l f r i d S e l l a r s ( i ) ( i i ) 4. Sensations and ' I n t r i n s i c Meaning' -i_81 5. Facts about Sensations: The Only Accessible Content i n Talk about Objective Parameters Notes 289 157 159 161 165 167 174 Bibliography 190 v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to thank my Supervisor, S.C. Coval, for seven years of philosophy discussions and for h i s apparent confidence i n my a b i l i t y which, i n combination, gave me the motivation and the encouragement to go on. I would also l i k e to thank G.A. Wedeking f o r a long h i s t o r y of philosophy discussions which were a continual source of i n s p i r a t i o n . His de t a i l e d comments on the o r i g i n a l d r a f t of the thesis were p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l . T.E. Patton read the thesis i n i t s o r i g i n a l and revised draft forms and made extensive and valuable comments. The sections of Chapter VII which discuss Paul Churchland's book, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind, ( s p e c i f i c a l l y , Chapter VII, parts 2, 4 and 5), were written j o i n t l y by Professor Coval and myself. The paper from which they are taken, "Sensation, Theory and Meaning", was presented by Professor Coval and myself to the Western Canadian Philosophy Association Meetings i n Regina i n October, 1980. G.A. Wedeking and M. Feld read and commented on the o r i g i n a l version of that paper. J . Macintosh was the commentator at the meetings i n Regina. Chapter I Part 2 and Chapter VI are taken l a r g e l y from a paper, "Against Meaning-Nominalism", which appears i n Mind ( A p r i l , 1981). The paper grew out of discussions between S.C. Coval and myself and was commented on extensively i n draft form by T.E. Patton and H. Jackson. Chapter I Part 1 i s taken l a r g e l y from a paper, "On S e l l a r s ' L i n g u i s t i c Account of Awareness", presented to the Canadian Philosophy Association Meetings in. H a l i f a x i n May, 1981. B. Hunter commented on the paper i n Halifa x . v i i i I would l i k e to thank Bruce Thurston, Jan Johnson and Jan Plecash for contributing t h e i r time and typing expertise. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to express my appreciation f o r f i n a n c i a l support provided by the Uni v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia i n the years 1977-78, 1978-79 and 1980-81 and by the Canada Council i n the year 1979-80. 1 INTRODUCTION 1. The Programme i ) Jean Piaget has written: ...there seems to be a common postulate of accepted epistemologies, v i z . the assumption that there e x i s t s at a l l l e v e l s a subject aware of i t s powers i n various degrees (even i f these are reduced to the mere perception of objects); that there are objects e x i s t i n g as such f o r the subject (even i f they are reduced to 'phenomena'); and above a l l intermediaries (perceptions or concepts) which mediate between the subject and objects and v i c e versa. Now the f i r s t r e s u l t s of psychogenetic analysis seem to contradict these assumptions. On the one hand, knowledge a r i s e s neither from a self-conscious subject, nor from objects already constituted (from the point of view of the subject) which would impress themselves on him; i t a r i s e s from i n t e r a c t i o n s that take place mid-way between the two and thus involve both at the same time, but by reason of t h e i r complete u n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n rather than of an i n t e r p l a y between d i f f e r e n t kinds of things. W i l f r i d S e l l a r s has offered an argument against the notion of an epistemo-l o g i c a l given which, i f I am r i g h t about how to analyze that argument, would show that Piaget's empirical r e j e c t i o n of a g e n e t i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e subjective/objective s p l i t i s conclusively supported by considerations of a l o g i c a l nature. S e l l a r s ' argument, I believe, j u s t assumes, and assumes e s s e n t i a l l y , that the notion of givenness i s fundamentally d u a l i s t i c . I s h a l l make much, i n the discussions which follow, of a d i s t i n c t i o n between a state of awareness and a state of awareness of_ (something). I believe that S e l l a r s would accept such a d i s t i n c t i o n as being relevant to h i s . 2 argument against the given, i f only to the extent that i t reveals an appreciation of the problem which he perceives. Sellars would acknowledge, I believe, that the problem connected with epistemological givenness just is a problem about the nature of states of awareness of_. I suspect, however—on the basis of the fact that he didn't attempt to do what I shall attempt but tr ied rather to get states of awareness of_ out of the acquisition of language—that Sellars might be inclined to believe that the notion of pure states of awareness has insuperable problems of i t s own. But Sel lars , so far as I know, has given us no arguments to that effect . The target of his attack in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", for example, is exclusively, I'm claiming, empiricisms which presuppose, in some essential way, states of awareness of_. Arguing, accordingly, that "Hume is in the same boat as Berkeley and Locke", Sellars claims that Hume shares with Berkeley and Locke "the presupposition that we have an unacquired a b i l i t y to be aware of determinate repeatables". This fact about Hume's position, ( if indeed i t is a fact—I regret that I am not in a position to assess Sel lars ' analyses of the empiricists; but my interest at this point i s , at any rate, only to analyze Sel lars ' own position and for that I need only know what he thinks they held and not what they .actually, did''hold), makes i t , l i k e that of Berkeley and Locke, vulnerable to Sel lars ' argument (to be outlined in the second part of Chapter II) against the given. But Sellars suggests a possible "small twist of Hume's position" by means of which we can get, he claims, "a radical ly different view". He asks us to make the supposition that "instead of characterizing the i n i t i a l elements of experience as impressions of_ e.g. red, Hume had characterized them as red p a r t i c u l a r s . " He adds, p a r e n t h e t i c a l l y , that he "would be the l a s t to deny that not only Hume, but perhaps Berkeley and Locke as well, often treat impressions or ideas of red as though they were red p a r t i c u l a r s " . Hume's view, so 'twisted' and "expanded to take into account determinates as well as determinables", becomes, S e l l a r s claims, "the view that a l l consciousness of sorts or repeatables r e s t s on an a s s o c i a t i o n of words (e.g. 'red') with classes of resembling p a r t i c u l a r s " . S e l l a r s ' p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the problem of characterizing the foundations of human knowledge i s an attempt to provide some content and structure to j u s t such a l i n g u i s t i c account of the nature of awareness In the f i r s t half of Chapter I, I s h a l l consider and r e j e c t S e l l a r s ' prof-fered l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness. ( S e l l a r s ' attempted account i s heavily r e l i a n t on the resources of Stimulus-Response Theory. I should say, perhaps, that while I do not at any point dispute that r e l i a n c e , i t i s not because I accept i t as legitimate; but S e l l a r s ' programme i s , I hope to show, defeasible completely independently of i t s r e l i a n c e on Stimulus-Response Theory.) It i s the major underlying contention of the en t i r e present endeavor that S e l l a r s f a i l e d to benefit from h i s own powerful insight by f a i l i n g to appreciate that the source of the problems he discerned in the notion of givenness i s the ever-present presupposition of a  d u a l i t y between subject and object. Through a f a i l u r e to appreciate the fundamental structure of h i s own i n s i g h t , S e l l a r s retained the presup-p o s i t i o n of a d u a l i t y between subject and object and t r i e d to f i n d a way to overcome the problem of how there could ever be a r e l a t i o n of the awareness of_ type between the parts of such a d u a l i t y . It w i l l be the burden of the arguments of the t h i r d chapter to show that t h i s problem i s i n f a c t insurmountable. Such arguments must, I hold, force us to assume a fundamentally d i f f e r e n t , s p e c i f i c a l l y , a n o n - d u a l i s t i c , approach to the a n a l y s i s of awareness. Non-dualistic states of awareness must be taken as both l o g i c a l l y and g e n e t i c a l l y basic and an attempt must be made to give account of the apparently dual states, states of awareness of, i n what are u l t i m a t e l y non-dual terms. In e f f e c t , I accept S e l l a r s ' 'twisted' version of Hume; but, u n l i k e S e l l a r s , I hold that red p a r t i c u l a r s are parts of non-dual states of awareness. In Chapter IV I w i l l undertake to show how i t i s that genetic development can sta r t from non-dual states of awareness which contain, as parts, red p a r t i c u l a r s and achieve, ultimately, what appear to be dual states of awareness of_ red; or at any rate,. Chapter IV w i l l sketch, i n sweeping and vague terms, the shape of such an undertaking. i i ) In a d d i t i o n to o u t l i n i n g S e l l a r s ' argument against the given, the second chapter w i l l look at an argument by Roderick F i r t h against the t r a d i t i o n a l notion of sense-data. F i r t h ' s argument i s phenomeno-l o g i c a l and assumes, moreover, a d u a l i s t i c a n a l y s i s of the phenomenon of int r o s p e c t i o n . F i r t h , l i k e S e l l a r s , assumes that the structure of awareness i s b a s i c a l l y and e s s e n t i a l l y a r e l a t i o n s h i p between a subject and some form of o b j e c t i v i t y . The argument of Chapter I I I , i n which I undertake to show that that p i c t u r e of awareness i s fundamentally incoherent, i s thus equally an argument against F i r t h as against S e l l a r s . i i i ) The issue of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and awareness i s of major importance to the issue of the nature of awareness i n 5 general. And while I r e j e c t the S e l l a r s i a n development of a 'twisted' Humean account, which would have awareness a r i s i n g out of the stimulus/ response a c q u i s i t i o n of language, I r e j e c t as well a type of a l t e r n a t i v e account, known as meaning-nominalism, which sees language as i n t e n t i o n -a l l y developed and consequently as presupposing the p r i o r existence of complex kinds of awareness. Thus though I accept, against S e l l a r s , the po s i t i o n that some form of awareness i s p r i m i t i v e and a pre r e q u i s i t e for the a c q u i s i t i o n of language, I hold further that f o r some other forms, or l e v e l s , of awareness, the existence and operation of language i s i t s e l f a p r e r e q u i s i t e . Moreover, the l e v e l of awareness which presupposes possession of language i s characterized, I s h a l l argue i n Chapter I, by p r e c i s e l y the conceptual tools which are required by a meaning-nominalist account of the a c q u i s i t i o n of language. In Part 2 of Chapter I, then, I w i l l consider and re j e c t the meaning-nominalist account of language a c q u i s i t i o n . F i n a l l y , i n the s i x t h chapter, I w i l l provide, i n the s p i r i t of the non-dualistic account of awareness developed i n IV, an a l t e r n a t i v e p i c t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and awareness. iv) Like the s i x t h chapter, the f i f t h and seventh chapters involve attempts to apply the theory sketched i n IV. In V the notions of a point of view, of conceptual frameworks, and of introspection, w i l l be analyzed i n i t s terms. Chapter VII represents an attempt to show that the theory i n IV has what I take to be some i n t u i t i v e l y s a t i s f y i n g implications f o r c e n t r a l issues i n semantics. In p a r t i c u l a r , the claim . that f a c t s about the i n t r i n s i c natures of our sensations play an e s s e n t i a l 6 and c e n t r a l r o l e i n the meaning of observation predicates w i l l be, I think, persuasively defended against recent m a t e r i a l i s t i c a l l y .Inclined attempts to undermine our 'common-sense' b e l i e f i n such a r o l e . 2. Materialism, the P-theory and the Consciousness Theory i) Materialism, whether reductive or e l i m i n a t i v e , i s repugnant to me. Quite why t h i s i s so i s , however, s u r p r i s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to pin down; or at l e a s t to p i n down i n any way which might go any distance towards dissuading a m a t e r i a l i s t . To say, for example, as I must confess that I am i n c l i n e d to do, simply that i t i s too obviously f a l s e to be even worth discussing c e r t a i n l y does not convert any sworn m a t e r i a l i s t s . In the pages which follow I w i l l endeavor to keep t h i s a t t i t u d e as much i n the background as possible, though success, I fear, w i l l be somewhat l e s s than complete. The force of the o v e r a l l argument i s , at any rate, only i n d i r e c t l y an attack on materialism. P o s i t i v e l y construed, i t involves an attempt to develop, and defend against c r i t i c i s m , a theory about consciousness and about concepts and the evolution of conceptual frameworks within consciousness. Why i s i t that people who fancy themselves m a t e r i a l i s t s so often speak of those who r e j e c t m a t e r i a l i s t conclusions as though they lacked some appropriate form of modesty? As though the non-m a t e r i a l i s t i s conceitedly contending that our present conception of ourselves i s somehow ultimate and unsurpassable? As though he has 7 f a i l e d to recognize that he and h i s f e l l o w human beings are, f o r a l l t h e i r apparent complexity by our present earth-bound standards, s t i l l mere animals? These i n s i n u a t i o n s i n v o l v e , I hope to show, a s e r i o u s misconception. That the blame f o r t h i s misconception probably l i e s as much w i t h n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t s as w i t h m a t e r i a l i s t s i s not at a l l u n l i k e l y . The point i s not, however, to l e v e l blame but r a t h e r to s o r t out a pervasive and hence problematic confusion. Far from being denied, o r , worse, simply overlooked, by the n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t , our i s t a t u s as 'mere' animals i s , whether he appreciates i t or not, p r e c i s e l y the a l l - i m p o r t a n t aspect of what we are which he i s concerned to defend against the t h r e a t of r e d u c t i o n or e l i m i n a t i o n or the charge of i r r e l e v a n c y by the m a t e r i a l i s t . I t i s our 'animalness' which, f a r from being 'mere', keeps us a l i v e , conscious, and hence, the n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t urges, unamenable to m a t e r i a l i s t a n a l y s i s . The m a t e r i a l i s t c l a i m that our common-sense p s y c h o l o g i c a l theory, or P-theory, as i t ' s coming to be c a l l e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e , 4 might be inadequate or even "profoundly awry" i s i n no way a necessary part of what the n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t i s concerned to deny. (Though some, perhaps many, n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t s have i n f a c t denied t h i s . ) The contention i s , then, that a s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n of a n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n might hold : 1) That what we are are 'mere animals'; 2) That m a t e r i a l i s t t h e o r i e s must i n e v i t a b l y leave out of account that aspect of ourselves i n v i r t u e of which we are animals; 8 3) That our common-sense psychological theory, the aim of which i s to give account of that aspect of ourselves i n v i r t u e of which we are animals, su f f e r s from (or might suffe r from), a) gross o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , or b) erroneous d i s t i n c t i o n s , or both. I t i s not, i t seems to me, uncommon to hear m a t e r i a l i s t s r e f e r scathingly to the 'crudeness' and the 'common-sensicalness' of t a l k within the P-theory about b e l i e f s , thoughts, intentions, desires, sensations, etc. They speak w i s t f u l l y of the day when such expressions- w i l l be.replaced i n the common parlance, either reduced by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with, or eliminated i n favour of, expressions belonging to a more powerful, more encompassing theory i n the f i r s t case, or a more accurate theory i n the second case. The present point amounts to an admission that the p o s s i b i l i t y i s c l e a r l y open that t a l k about b e l i e f s , thoughts, intentions, etc., may be perhaps neither as powerful and encompassing as i t might be hoped, (3(a)), nor even completely accurate i n the d i s t i n c t i o n s which i t imposes, (3(b)). I t i s being here denied, however, that the theory which might reduce or eliminate the P-theory could ever be m a t e r i a l i s t . I f non-materialists are frequently, and I suspect that they are, g u i l t y of over-confidence i n the power and adequacy of the P-theory, m a t e r i a l i s t s are equally commonly g u i l t y of over-corif ldence:"-±n: science las i t i s presently conceived: i n science, that i s , laden with preconceptions about c a u s a l i t y , matter, energy, time, space and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s holding between them. If non-materialists are frequently g u i l t y of over-s i m p l i f i c a t i o n and of lack of imagination and v i s i o n , surely the same i s true, and i n greater measure of m a t e r i a l i s t s who, overly impressed with 9 science's achievements i n the realm to which i t i s i n fact adequate, assume b l i n d l y that no realm could be r e c a l c i t r a n t to i t s means and methods. At l e a s t the non-materialist has the i n s i g h t , however foggy, and, most important of a l l , the courage i n the face of adversity, (and the adversity i s not without considerable strength, for the successes of science have indeed been impressive), to hang on stubbornly to that which he sees must, though he may or may not admit that he sees not how, be accounted for by any adequate theory of 'human animals'. Witness that W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , whose p r o c l i v i t y towards materialism i s as strong as any, but whose appreciation of the strength of i t s opposition appears considerably better than most, f e e l s himself ult i m a t e l y constrained to admit that: ...the s c i e n t i f i c image i s not yet complete; we have not yet penetrated a l l the secrets of nature...although for many purposes the c e n t r a l nervous system can be construed without los s as a complex system of physical p a r t i c l e s , when i t comes to an adequate understanding  of the r e l a t i o n of sensory consciousness to neurophys-i o l o g i c a l process, we must penetrate to the non^par-t i c u l a t e foundation of the p a r t i c u l a t e image... i i ) In t r y i n g to show the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the option of being a non-materialist without f u l l y endorsing the P-theory, I am not merely playing with i d l e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I would, for example, accept the following assessment by Churchland of the P-theory's successes (or rather lack thereof) as being, i f not exactly sympathetic, nevertheless not without some accuracy. Churchland writes: . . . i t s success i s i n many respects r a d i c a l l y incomplete. I t s comprehension both of p r a c t i c a l and of f a c t u a l reasoning i s sketchy at best; the kinematics and dynamics of emotions i t provides i s vague and s u p e r f i c i a l ; the v i c i s s i t u d e s of perception and perceptual i l l u s i o n are, i n i t s terms, l a r g e l y mysterious; i t s comprehension of the learning process i s e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y t h i n ; and i t s grasp of the nature and causes of mental i l l n e s s i s almost n i l . In sum, there i s much about ourselves, qua perceiving/reasoning/passionate creatures, that we do not understand at a l l , and much about our behaviour that we cannot begin to explain. The P-theory gives us what i s obviously a s u p e r f i c i a l gloss on a very complex set of phenomena.^ Unlike Churchland, however, I do not believe that i t w i l l i n general be the case that diagnosis of the inadequacies of the P-theory w i l l point to a need for r e v i s i o n i n the face of a wealth of input from the blossoming science of neurophysiology. (Though I do not deny that closer a l l i a n c e with that science would, or, at l e a s t that i t could, prove very f r u i t f u l . ) The c e n t r a l problem with the P-theory l i e s rather, I believe, i n the fact that i t misleadingly operates without being properly contextualized within a theory of consciousness. The P-theory takes as basic some d i s t i n c t i o n s which the theory of consciousness, a skeleton of which I w i l l endeavor to provide, would take as developed. The P-theory t a l k s about people (or animals) and th e i r b e l i e f s , thoughts, intentions, desires, etc. and of the physical world, which people's b e l i e f s and thoughts are about and towards which are d i r e c t e d t h e i r intentions and desires. I believe that both the subject  and the objects of the various mental a t t i t u d e s — b e l i e v i n g , thinking, intending, d e s i r i n g , etc.—which play so i n t e g r a l a r o l e i n the P-theory, are constructed by the ordering a c t i v i t y of consciousness. The s e l f , which seems to us to be a c t i v e and i n c o n t r o l , s e t t i n g the d i r e c t i o n of and o r i g i n a t i n g and maintaining our e f f o r t s , i s i t s e l f , i n a sense, an object, completely without power, created and used by consciousness i n i t s e f f o r t s to abstract order from, and/or impose order on, i t s i n i t i a l state of chaos. This f a c t , i f i t i s a f a c t , that the s e l f i s a powerless object rather than the mover behind our experiences would explain Hume's barren search for i t (given what he was looking f o r ) . I t could also, as I hope to show, account for problems with the doctrine of the given, both when i t i s examined from a l o g i c a l point of view (Sel l a r s ) and from a phenomenological point of view ( F i r t h ) . A word of q u a l i f i c a t i o n must be quickly entered l e s t i t begin to sound l i k e consciousness i t s e l f must play some r o l e analogous to the one which i s here being denied to s e l f . Consciousness i s not that which l i e s behind, a l t e r n a t e l y r e c e i v i n g and d i r e c t i n g , experience. Consciousness i s not, i t w i l l be argued, the subjective h a l f of a r e l a t i o n between something which knows, senses, experiences, or whatever, and something else which i s i t s object. Relations e x i s t within consciousness and are knowable, where knowing i t s e l f i s to be analyzed i n terms of the s e t t i n g up of further r e l a t i o n s h i p s within consciousness. But i f there i s a force which e x i s t s outside of, and acts on consciousness, and which ought, i n the s t r i c t e s t sense, to be c a l l e d objective r e a l i t y — a n d though I w i l l not t r y to argue the point, I believe that there must be such a f o r c e — i t s true nature must remain n e c e s s a r i l y unknown. Only f a c t s about the causal c a p a c i t i e s of objective r e a l i t y , assuming that i t even makes sense to t a l k i n t h i s way, can ever be known; and these are known about on the basis of inferences from what are taken to be t h e i r e f f e c t s within consciousness. Objective r e a l i t y , by the present p o s i t i o n , though causally responsible for aspects of states of consciousness, i s never presented to, or before consciousness. Though consciousness i s , by t h i s p o s i t i o n , the subjective h a l f of an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y , the 12 d u a l i t y does not take the form of the d u a l i t y presupposed by the P-theory. This f a c t , that the P-theory takes as basic a c e r t a i n form of d u a l i t y which the c e n t r a l tenet of the theory which I w i l l develop — l e t me c a l l i t the 'consciousness t h e o r y ' — i s concerned to deny, constitutes a major obstacle confronting a proponent of the consciousness theory. Admittedly, the consciousness theory i s no more constrained to reduce the d i s t i n c t i o n s and the ontology of the common-sense P-theory than i s the m a t e r i a l i s t theory. But the consciousness theory i s , i t would seem, and unlike the m a t e r i a l i s t theory, required, because i t shares with the P-theory the goal of giving account of that aspect of ourselves i n v i r t u e of which we are animals, to give some analysis of and account of the d i s t i n c t i o n s within the P-theory. S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t w i l l be required to show how they have managed to work as well as they have, how they are inadequate, and how they w i l l be, to the extent that they are, incorporated into or replaced within, the new theory. I w i l l t r y , most p a r t i c u l a r l y , to point the way to an analysis of the apparently dual state of being aware of (something) i n terms of what I claim i s a l o g i c a l l y and g e n e t i c a l l y p r i o r , and o n t o l o g i c a l l y non-dual state, the state of being aware. While i n some sense my argument must be seen as an argument against the P - t h e o r y — f o r I s h a l l argue that that theory i s , to some considerable extent, i n c o n s i s t e n t — i t i s , I-think,..more-accurately seen as an attempt to explain the P-theory. For I believe, and I s h a l l endeavor to provide p l a u s i b i l i t y for the b e l i e f , that the i n c o n s i s t -encies which I w i l l point to i n the P-theory are an i n e v i t a b l e function of the p r a c t i c a l r o l e which i t serves. As I hinted e a r l i e r , the general shape of the p o s i t i v e project contained herein is., an attemptv to "place the P-theory i n the context of a theory of consciousness. Perhaps one could go even further and say that the new theory i s a theory about the P - t h e o r y — j u s t as much as i t i s about the phenomenon of consciousness, the nature of which generates the P-theory. I turn now to a discussion of the two extreme a l t e r n a t i v e views on the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and awareness to which I referred e a r l i e r . I hope ultimately to show that between the untenable view that awareness, of any form, presupposes language and the equally untenable view that language i s the product of a complex form of awareness, there l i e s a p l a u s i b l e t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e . NOTES Jean Piaget, The P r i n c i p l e s of Genetic Epistemology, trans. Wolfe Mays (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), p. 19. 2 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," i n Science, Perception and Re a l i t y , International Library of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 159. 3 S e l l a r s , p. 160. 4 Paul M. Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of  Mind, Cambridge Studies i n Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 6. S e l l a r s , "Philosophy and the S c i e n t i f i c Image of Man," i n Science, Perception and Reality, p. 37. Churchland, pp. 114-15. 15 CHAPTER I. The Relationship between Language and Awareness: Two Opposing Views 1. S e l l a r s ' L i n g u i s t i c Account of Awareness Rejected i ) In "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"''"and i n h i s three 2 lectures e n t i t l e d "The Structure of Knowledge", W i l f r i d S e l l a r s o f f e r s an argument intended to show that " a l l awareness of sorts, resemblances, f a c t s , etc., i n short, a l l awareness of abstract e n t i t i e s — i n d e e d , a l l awareness 3 even of p a r t i c u l a r s — - i s a l i n g u i s t i c a f f a i r " . Awareness i s , for S e l l a r s , straightforwardly cognitive; and accordingly, t a l k of awareness i s interchangeable with t a l k of knowledge. S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account of what I s h a l l c a l l the upsurge of awareness—where by 'upsurge' I mean to capture an impression I get from S e l l a r s ' account that awareness i s to be seen as spring-ing suddenly and h o l i s t i c a l l y into existence subsequent to the a c q u i s i t i o n of la n g u a g e — i s thus equally an account of the upsurge of knowledge.. In p a r t i -cular, i t i s , he believes, a s t r i c t l y 'Rylean' account of the coming into existence of what he takes to be the l o g i c a l l y and chr o n o l o g i c a l l y basic form of knowledge: Observational knowledge of physical objects. The view to which S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness or knowledge i s intended to be an a l t e r n a t i v e involves, and, he says, involves i n i t s most straightforward form, what S e l l a r s has dubbed 'The Myth of the Given'. According to the t r a d i t i o n a l empiricist view to which he so r e f e r s , there e x i s t s "a stratum of a u t h o r i t a t i v e 16 nonverbal episodes ('awarenesses'), the authority of which accrues to a superstructure of verbal actions, provided that the expressions 4 occurring i n these actions are properly used." While I accept S e l l a r s ' argument against the Myth of the Given, I s h a l l attempt i n the ensuing discussion to show that h i s suggested a l t e r n a t i v e to the account of observational knowledge i n t r i n s i c to that view i s not i t s e l f acceptable. I t i s unacceptable, I s h a l l argue, because i t lands him with an i n f i n i t e regress; and not the one of which he sees himself f a l s e l y accused. The f u l l weight of S e l l a r s ' famous Jones myth, according to which sensations and thoughts are at bottom t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s introduced by analogy with physical objects and overt verbal reports re s p e c t i v e l y , r e s t s on t h i s attempt to give a l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness and i n so doing to secure a 'Rylean' s t a r t i n g point for the myth. But, I s h a l l argue, the l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness not only f a i l s i n i t s bid to secure the required 'Rylean' s t a r t i n g point but i t harbours as well the kernel of incoherence which plagues the Jones myth i t s e l f . The analogical accounts of sensations and thoughts presuppose a type of account of physical objects which the l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness of phys i c a l objects precludes. The argument which I am about to develop i s almost e x c l u s i v e l y negative. In the discussions of the next three chapters I w i l l argue that there i s a type of p o s i t i o n which i s i n some broad sense e m p i r i c i s t and to which S e l l a r s ' argument against the given does not apply. The notion of 'givenness' against which S e l l a r s ' argument i s devastating i s , I hold, e s s e n t i a l l y d u a l i s t i c . Theories which presuppose the relevant kind of dualism are, for S e l l a r s i a n and other reasons, It w i l l be argued, untenable. In Chapter IV I w i l l attempt to point the way to a type of p o s i t i o n which avoids both S e l l a r s ' argument against the given and the argument which I am about to give against S e l l a r s ' proposed l i n g u i s t i c account, and which does so i n v i r t u e of being e s s e n t i a l l y n o n - d u a l i s t i c . i i ) The essence of S e l l a r s ' account of awareness i s the claim that awareness i s l i n g u i s t i c . Language i t s e l f , by the S e l l a r s i a n account, i s an e v o l u t i o n a r i l y developed phenomenon, acquired anew i n each i n d i v -i d u a l by means of a process of s o c i a l conditioning. S e l l a r s says of the c h i l d ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of language: ...he begins by u t t e r i n g noises which sound l i k e words and sentences, and ends by uttering"noises which are words and sentences. We might use quoted words to describe what he i s doing at both stages, but i n the e a r l i e r stage we are c l a s s i f y i n g h i s utterances as sounds and only by courtesy and a n t i c i p a t i o n as words;5 This i s not, as i s obvious, the claim that the .child begins by.uttering words which sound l i k e our words, but which, because words take t h e i r meanings within a system of meaning, and because the c h i l d ' s system of meaning i s r a d i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d with respect to, and even q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from, our system of meaning, are not our words. This h o l i s t i c view of meaning, where the meaning of a word i s to some very s i g n i f i c a n t extent, a function of i t s place and r o l e i n a system, i s i n f a c t , one which I f u l l y endorse. But S e l l a r s ' claim i s r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t : The c h i l d ' s 'word' i s not a word; not a word at a l l . One way of de-s c r i b i n g the issue I wish to explore a r i s e s out of t h i s : How does S e l l a r s see the t r a n s i t i o n from word-like sounds to words? In p a r t i c u l a r 1) What exactly i s missing from the lower l e v e l that gets added at the higher? and, 2) Exactly how i s the addition of the new ingredient achieved? S e l l a r s t e l l s us that: "There i s a l l the d i f f e r e n c e i n the world between parroting words and thinking-out-loud i n terms of words." How, then, by S e l l a r s ' account, since the c h i l d a l l e g e d l y s t a r t s by mere parroting, does the c h i l d come to think-out-loud? He t e l l s us that the d i f f e r e n c e between parroting and thinking-out-loud l i e s i n the fact that the utterances which one makes when one thinks-out-loud "cohere with each other and with the context i n which they occur i n a way which i s absent i n mere parroting."^ But i n h i s discussion of what i s involved i n saying that, for example, a token of 'This i s green' expresses observational knowledge, i t seems clear that the notion of coherence alone cannot give us what i s added i n the t r a n s i t i o n from word-like sounds to words. In so f a r as an e s s e n t i a l part of what the mature language user does i s make utterances which express observa- t i o n a l knowledge, where, by S e l l a r s ' a n alysis, expressions of observa-t i o n a l knowledge involve i n an e s s e n t i a l way, but are not merely, thinkings-out-loud, S e l l a r s i s quite prepared to admit that more than the notion of coherence i s required to adequately characterize what he, the mature language user, does. Thus S e l l a r s makes i t quite c l e a r that he does not hold the so-called 'thermometer view' of the sense i n which 'This i s green':is said-to express observational knowledge. According to the thermometer view: An overt or covert token of 'This i s green' i n the presence of a green item i s a Konstatierung and expresses observational knowledge i f and only i f i t i s a manifestation of a tendency to produce overt or covert tokens of 'This i s green'—given a c e r t a i n s e t — i f and only i f a green object i s being looked at i n standard conditions.8 On such a view, says S e l l a r s : .. .the occurrence of.': such •-•tokens ;6f ".This i s green' would be 'following a r u l e ' only i n the sense that they are instances of a uniformity, a uniformity d i f f e r i n g from the l i g h t n i n g -thunder case i n that i t i s an acquired causal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the language user.9 But surely mere coherence, between utterences,;:and. between utterances and the contexts i n which they occur, where the notion of coherence does  not involve any notion of meaning—which i t obviously does not since i t was introduced as an a l t e r n a t i v e to such a n o t i o n ^ — c a n amount to nothing more than uniformity. What else could i t involve? So the c h i l d , on becoming a f u l l - f l e d g e d language user, must have accomplished something more, by S e l l a r s ' account, than becoming an accurately c a l -ibrated 'thermometer'. But what i s the more? S e l l a r s t e l l s us that, for utterances of 'This i s green' to count as expressions of observational knowledge, the utterer must not only, upon u t t e r i n g 'This i s green': 1) Be e x h i b i t i n g a very s p e c i f i c type of uniformity within a s p e c i f i c type of s i t u a t i o n , and, 2) Be e x h i b i t i n g a properly acquired causal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , where (1) and (2) together amount to being a properly c a l i b r a t e d instrument for the detection of green objects, but also: 3) Be e x h i b i t i n g a general mode of behaviour which has authority, and, 4) Be capable of recognizing the authority of the general mode of behaviour which he i s e x h i b i t i n g . (4), I contend, amounts to the claim that the mature language user must, i n a d d i t i o n to being a w e l l - c a l i b r a t e d 'thermometer', be i n possession of the a b i l i t y to 'read h i s own thermometer' and know that he i s reading (an accurately calibrated) thermometer. The i n c l u s i o n of (3) i s , I s h a l l argue, redundant. (3) amounts to no more than a restatement of (1) and (2). The sense i n which S e l l a r s uses the word ' a u t h o r i t y ' — h e uses ' c r e d i b i l i t y ' and ' r e l i a b i l i t y ' as though interchangeable with i t — s e e m s to require for i t s e x p l i c a t i o n nothing beyond the idea of a p a r t i c u l a r uniformity which was acquired and acquired i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner. Thus we seem to have the idea of a type of causal chain between a 'response' and that of which i t i s a ( r e l i a b l e ) sign where the s e t t i n g up of the causal chain has an element of complexity which might have gone wrong but which, because i t didn't, gives the 'response' authority. (We don't, for example, speak of l i g h t n i n g as being a remark made with authority by the sky.) S e l l a r s doesn't seem to be quite c l e a r about what he wants 'authority' to mean. In "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" he says: C l e a r l y , on t h i s account the only thing that can remotely be supposed to constitute such authority i s the f a c t that one can i n f e r the presence of a green object from the fact that someone makes t h i s r e p o r t . i l That seems to make (3) i d e n t i c a l with (1) alone. In "The Structure of Knowledge" he says: "The authority...can be traced to the f a c t that Jones has learned how to use the relevant words i n perceptual s i t u a t i o n s . " That seems to make (3) i d e n t i c a l with (2). It i s , I'm claiming, i d e n t i c a l with the conjunction of (1) and (2): With the idea of a uniformity, causally acquired. Turning to (4) then. If S e l l a r s can give us a l i n g u i s t i c account of the d i f f e r e n c e between being a thermometer and being aware or having observational knowledge, then the j u s t i f i c a t i o n and explan-ation of the addition of (4) must be where he does i t . S e l l a r s says: . . . i f the authority of the report 'This i s green' l i e s i n the fact that the existence of green items appropriately r e l a t e d to the perceiver can be i n f e r r e d from the occurrence of such reports, i t follows that only a person who i s able to draw t h i s inference, and therefore who has not only the concept green, but also the concept of u t t e r i n g 'This i s green'—indeed, the concept of c e r t a i n conditions of perception, those which would c o r r e c t l y be c a l l e d 'standard conditions' — could be i n a p o s i t i o n to token 'This i s green' i n recognition of i t s authority.13 I am reconstruing t h i s as being analogous to the claim that i f a reading on a properly c a l i b r a t e d thermometer was to count as an instance of the thermometer knowing the temperature, the thermometer would have to be able to recognize that i t s present state was a symptom or sign of the temperature. (Where the a l t e r n a t i v e , remember, i s that the thermometer i s subject to 'primordial awarenesses' of that state of i t s environment which we c a l l 'temperature', which i t then, having been properly 'trained' i n the appropriate language, c o r r e c t l y expresses. S e l l a r s ' suggestion, then, i s t h i s : "...observational knowledge of any p a r t i c u l a r f a c t , e.g. that t h i s i s green, presupposes that one know 14 general f a c t s of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y." Such a view, he adds, "requires an abandonment of the t r a d i t i o n a l empiricist idea that observational knowledge 'stands on i t s own feet'.""'""' i i i ) The issue i s t h i s : Can we make sense of the claim that the way i n which utterances of the form 'This i s green' can be said to count as expressing observational knowledge involves the utterer being i n possession of, and being able to make correct inferences from, f a c t s of the form, "utterances of 'This i s green' are r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r s - o f -16 the presence of green objects i n standard conditions of perception". S e l l a r s thinks he foresees :the. p o s s i b i l i t y of a charge of i n f i n i t e regress and he o f f e r s as a r e f u t a t i o n of that charge a type of h o l i s t i c view of the way i n which tokens of 'This i s green' come, within the i n d i v i d u a l agent's conceptual development, to be used for the expression of observational knowledge. Thus, he claims, the cor-rectness of the statement that Jones' tokening now of 'This i s green' counts as expressing observational knowledge, "requires only that i t i s correct to say that Jones now knows, thus remembers, that Zfacts of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y/ did obtain. I t does not require that at the time these fa c t s did obtain he then knew them to obtain. And the regress disappears.""^ S e l l a r s t r i e s to c l a r i f y h i s idea i n a footnote added i n 1963: "My thought was that one can have d i r e c t (non-inferential) knowledge of a past f a c t which one did not or even (as i n the case envisaged) could not conceptualize at the time xt was present. With a h o l i s t i c account of the evolution of awareness I am in complete agreement. Such an account, i s , I am convinced, a completely e s s e n t i a l part of the story of how we manage to move from one l e v e l of awareness to another. I s h a l l urge, however, that as S e l l a r s hopes to use i t , as an account of what I have c a l l e d the upsurge of awareness, i t i s quite obviously useless. 23 The point of S e l l a r s ' argument, bear i n mind, i s to explain how i t i s that we come to be aware of, notice, have observational knowledge of, f a c t s about physical objects. Awareness of sensations and thoughts, remember, comes, according to S e l l a r s ' analogical account, further down the l o g i c a l and chronological l i n e . Overt verbal reports, l a t e r to be t h e o r e t i c a l l y recast as thinkings-out-loud, (which are thoughts i n the 'primary sense'), are, i t should be pointed out, public properties of public objects—human beings. They are, for that reason, on a par with, for example, the greenness of p h y s i c a l objects. Accord-ingly, i n the p a r a l l e l accounts of thoughts and sensations, overt verbal reports w i l l serve as the models for the t h e o r e t i c a l e n t i t i e s , thoughts, i n j u s t the way that, f o r example, the colours and shapes of physical objects w i l l serve as the models for the t h e o r e t i c a l .entities"; ;sensatidns. With these f a c t s about S e l l a r s ' thesis i n mind, l e t ' s look at h i s claim that f o r a token of 'This i s green' to express observational knowledge i t s u t t e r e r must know and be able to c o r r e c t l y make the appropriate inference from, a f a c t of the form, X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom  of Y; where X i s an utterance, made by one properly trained i n the use of the language, of 'This i s green', and Y i s the presence, s u i t a b l y positioned with respect to the u t t e r e r , of a green object. The regress of which S e l l a r s a n t i c i p a t e s he w i l l be accused presupposes the t r a d i t i o n a l e m p i r i c i s t p i c t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between general and p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s . On such a p i c t u r e , "... we come to general f a c t s [of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y/ only a f t e r we have come to know by observation a number of p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s which 19 support the hypothesis that X i s a symptom of Y". Operating on the basis of this presupposition, Sellars' imaginary c r i t i c characterizes the Sellars view as te l l i n g us "that observational knowledge at time t presupposes knowledge of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y, which presupposes prior observational knowledge, which presupposes other knowledge of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y, which presupposes s t i l l other, and prior, observational knowledge, and so 20 on..." The regress Sellars sees himself charged with, in other words, assumes the impossibility of a particular type of awareness, of conceptually mediated awareness;of:particular matters of fact, arising in a h o l i s t i c way simultaneously with the awareness of a general fact to which those particular facts stand in the relation of being evidence. His reply, perhaps best captured in the footnote quoted earlier, that there is no such impossibility, i s , I take i t , well-founded. To requote: "...one can have direct (non-inferential) knowledge of a past fact which one did not or even (as in the case 21 envisaged) could not conceptualize at the time i t was present." But for Sellars there is only one kind of awareness. A l l  awareness is conceptually mediated. So for Sellars, when conceptually mediated awareness of particular matters of fact arises simultaneously with and is dependent upon conceptually mediated awareness of general matters of' fact, awareness arises for the f i r s t time. But i f we run Sellars' own linguistic analysis rigourously, at no point tangling i t with the empiricist one—at no point, that i s , admitting any form of 'primeval' awareness—it becomes clear that no such account of the uprising of awareness has been given. Sellars' analysis catches him, I shall argue, in a form of regress from which a hol i s t i c approach cannot hope to rescue him. iv) In an attempt to shed l i g h t on why a h o l i s t i c approach to the rel a t i o n s h i p between awareness of general and of p a r t i c u l a r matters of fact provides a valuable a l t e r n a t i v e to the t r a d i t i o n a l e m p i r i c i s t picture of that r e l a t i o n s h i p without being of any use to S e l l a r s i n h i s attempt to give a l i n g u i s t i c account of what awareness i s , l e t me sta r t by considering what kind of general fa c t s f a c t s of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y are. What, f i r s t of a l l , i s the form of the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s which stand i n the r e l a t i o n of being evidence for general fa c t s of that form? They are, I take i t , i n d i v i d u a l instances of some type of X/Y r e g u l a r i t y . X i s r e g u l a r l y accompanied by the s p a t i a l or temporal proximity of Y. The point to notice i s t h i s : Both the general f a c t and the appropriate p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s are i n a c e r t a i n relevant sense complex. The complexity I have i n mind a r i s e s from the roles played by X and Y i n the schemas f or both the general and the p a r t i c u l a r forms of fact s under consideration. Since for S e l l a r s the upsurge of awareness, i . e . awareness i n i t s most basic form pre-supposes awareness, a l l e g e d l y accomplished by some h o l i s t i c means, of fac t s of the general form which I have been discussing, t h i s element of complexity, the presence of which I have j u s t pointed to, ought not to have any troublesome implications for S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account. But i t surely does. Consider: What must we know i f we are to know, and be able to make any use of, general fa c t s of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y Presumably we must know: 1) How to t e l l when there has been an occurrence of X; and, 2) What, i f only i n i n d i r e c t terms, the state of a f f a i r s , Y, involves. The i n f i n i t e regress i n which S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c a n alysis of awareness i s caught a r i s e s out of (1). Further problems a r i s i n g from various constraints operating on the type of things which S e l l a r s can possibly say about (2) w i l l plague h i s analogical accounts of thoughts and sensations; accounts already deprived, i f the regress I s h a l l describe does indeed e x i s t , of t h e i r presupposed 'Rylean' s t a r t i n g point. F i r s t the regress. X's are utterances of 'This i s green'; utterances of 'This i s green', at the h i s t o r i c o - g e n e t i c l e v e l at which we are learning how to make observation reports about phy s i c a l objects, are overt verbal reports; overt verbal reports are public properties of public objects. Y i s the presence of a green object i n standard conditions of perception. The occurrence of X's i s our grounds, a l l e g e d l y h o l i s t i c a l l y acquired, for our inference to knowledge claims about Y's. So: Where's the grounds f o r our inference to knowledge claims about X's? I f , as by S e l l a r s ' account, knowing that I or anyone else has jus t uttered 'This i s green' i s to know that a p a r t i c u l a r physical object has a p a r t i c u l a r physical property, no l e s s than i s knowing that t h i s i s green to know that a p a r t i c u l a r physical object has a p a r t i c u l a r physical property, then where i s the p l a u s i b i l i t y of. claiming that I can know about a Y only by inference from the fact of an occurrence of a X unless i t i s added that I can know about the occurrence of an X only by the occurrence of a Z and about a Z by the occurrence of a W and so on. But what could Z's even be? By S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account they would have to be utterances l i k e : 'This i s an utterance of 'This i s green''. Obvious and insurmountable tensing problems make t h i s i n f i n i t e l y u n l i k e l y suggestion even worse. Not only would an agent, i n order to be aware of the fac t that an object which i s present to h i s senses i s green, have to make an i n f i n i t e number of utterances, but he would have to make them a l l at once, each one r e f e r r i n g to, and longer than, i t s s t r u c t u r a l predecessor, with the length of the utterances increasing i n f i n i t e l y . Not, I submit, a p l a u s i b l e analysis of instances of awareness of the presence of green objects. Let me t r y to characterize the structure of my argument. While I accept S e l l a r s ' claim that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a r t i c u l a r and general f a c t s can be u s e f u l l y and p l a u s i b l y construed i n a h o l i s t i c manner—such that awareness of, or the capacity to be aware of, various p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s a r i s e s simultaneously with awareness of a general f a c t — I am arguing that such a construal i s of no use to S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness. I am asking how, as an account of how we become aware of properties of physical objects (properties of any s o r t ) , i t can be of any help to say that we ( h o l i s t i c a l l y or any other way) become aware of an e v i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p holding between one kind of property of phy s i c a l objects (overt verbal reports) and another (colours, f o r example). Holism can get us awareness of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between X and Y but i t can't get us awareness of"things of the sort Y i f X and Y are things of the same sort. I t can't get us awareness of Y, that i s , i f X and Y are both properties of phy s i c a l objects and what we wanted was an account of how we become aware of properties of phy s i c a l objects. v) Turning quickly to (2); to the r o l e of Y i n the schema X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y. I f we don't ever have—and on Sellars'""view how could w e ? - — d i r e c t awareness of physical objects, then can we make the r i g h t S e l l a r s i a n kind of sense of t a l k of physical objects i n the claim that utterances of 'This i s green' are r e l i a b l e symptoms of the presence of green objects? Can we, that i s , make the kind of sense of such t a l k which i s required by the rest of S e l l a r s ' complex programme? X's, i n t h i s case, are not supposed to be, at t h i s p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l , j u s t one way among many or several of knowing that Y obtains; that a p h y s i c a l object i s present. Rather they are the way of knowing. We have no independent way of checking for the state of a f f a i r s , Y. The point comes to t h i s : Although S e l l a r s i s adamant that, for example, the colours of p h y s i c a l objects are not to be i d e n t i f i e d with causal properties, and i n p a r t i c u l a r that they are not to be i d e n t i f i e d with the property of causing the appropriate colour sensations i n normal observers under standard conditions, i t seems c l e a r that by Sellars'^own analysis the colours of physical objects can turn out to be nothing other than causal properties. By S e l l a r s ' analysis they are the properties which cause thoughts of the form, for example, 'This i s green', to occur i n normal observers i n standard conditions when green objects are present. Thus we seem l e f t with exactly what S e l l a r s , i n the. f i r s t of..his' three lectures on the structure of knowledge, makes clear that: he'.doesn't want, and with exactly what, given h i s analogical account of sensations, he cannot have: We seem l e f t with what he c a l l s an ' i f f y ' as opposed to an 'occurrent' account of the properties of physical objects. So where i s the content to come from to make S e l l a r s ' analogical, accounts of sensations and thoughts go? Sensations are modelled on physical objects; thoughts are modelled on overt verbal reports; overt verbal reports are properties of physical objects. But a green physical object i s whatever i t i s that i s causally responsible for the thought, 'This i s green', i n normal observers i n standard conditions. Everything i n S e l l a r s ' complex system points to physical objects; but physical objects only point away again. 2. Against Meaning-Nominalism i ) Standing i n d i r e c t contrast to S e l l a r s ' attempt to show that awareness i s l i n g u i s t i c i s an attempt to show that an account of the existence of conventions—of l i n g u i s t i c conventions i n p a r t i c u l a r — can be given i n terms of the communicative intentions of agents. Thus whereas the S e l l a r s i a n p o s i t i o n t r i e d to show that awareness i s the out-come of the a c q u i s i t i o n of language, the p o s i t i o n which I am about to consider holds that language i s the product of the operation of complex kinds of intentions i n agents, where the operation of these complex intentions presupposes the existence, p r i o r to the possession of language, of complex kinds of awareness. The p o s i t i o n i s known as meaning-nominalism. I hope to show ultimately that, contrary to what S e l l a r s argues, some form.of awareness i s presupposed by the process of acquiring language; and that, contrary to the p o s i t i o n of meaning-nominalists, c e r t a i n complex forms of awareness must be seen as the product of, and not enter into the explanation of, the a c q u i s i t i o n of language. According to meaning-nominalism, the i n d i v i d u a l instance of meaning, s p e c i f i c a l l y of Gricean meaning, i s l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to, simpler than, anything which might be classed as conventional meaning. The Gricean account of meaning, which analyzes 'By u t t e r i n g x, U meant that P' into a complex statement about U's intentions and which i n no way alludes to the concept of language, i s always taken as the cornerstone of meaning-nominalism. Since the p u b l i c a t i o n of Grice's well-known 22 paper i n 1957, then, probably a great many philosophers of language have been meaning-nominalists; but few have t r i e d to work out e x p l i c i t l y the d e t a i l s of that programme. Jonathan Bennett i s among the few who have done us that service. In a paper, "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy", Bennett o f f e r s what he considers to be a " s u b s t a n t i a l v i n d i c a t i o n of meaning-nominalism, as not j u s t a pious hope but a p r a c t i c a l a n a l y t i c 23 programme"; t h i s same concern constitutes one of the c e n t r a l themes of his book, L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour. Being a clear statement of a p o s i t i o n which I intend to show i s c l e a r l y f a l s e , Bennett's formulation of the meaning-nominalist's p o s i t i o n serves as an excellent target f or an attack on the t e n a b i l i t y of that p o s i t i o n i n general. I s h a l l argue that meaning-nominalists, as represented by Bennett, are j u s t wrong about what Grice has shown. I s h a l l attempt to show what Lewis probably meant when he said that Gricean meaning 24 i s "a consequence of conventional s i g n a l i n g " ; s p e c i f i c a l l y that an instance of occasion meaning which i s an instance of Gricean meaning, ( i t i s my opinion that Gricean meaning i s only a sub-set of what Grice has c a l l e d 'meaning nonnatural'), must l o g i c a l l y presuppose the existence of, and ei t h e r the p r i o r or the present operation of, conventions. I s h a l l proceed by t r y i n g to show, i n the present chapter, where Bennett and, though l e s s obviously, probably Grice as we l l , makes an assumption to which he i s t o t a l l y unentitled and thereby i s n ' t forced to see that conventions must be operating f o r any instances of Gricean meaning to occur. F i n a l l y , i n Chapter VI subsequent to some general discussions, both c r i t i c a l and, hopefully, suggestive, of the general problem of the nature of awareness, I w i l l o f f e r my own rough sketch of the ancestry, l o g i c a l and chronological as well, of a f i r s t occasion of Gricean meaning. Some d e f i n i t i o n s w i l l be h e l p f u l at the outset. I take what I am c a l l i n g 'Gricean meaning' to be defined by Grice as follows: 'U meant something by u t t e r i n g x' i s true i f f , for some audience A, U uttered x intending (1) A to produce a p a r t i c u l a r response r (2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1) (3) A to f u l f i l l (1) on the basis of h i s f u l f i l l m e n t of ( 2 ) . 2 5 I s h a l l often speak, as we l l , of an agent having a Gricean i n t e n t i o n , meaning thereby that h i s utterance i s an instance of Gricean meaning. When I speak of a Lewisian r e g u l a r i t y , or a convention, I have i n mind the following account which occurs i n Convention: A r e g u l a r i t y R i n the behavior of.the members of a population P when they are agents i n a recurrent s i t u a t i o n S i s a convention i f and only i f i t i s true that, and i t i s common knowledge i n P that, i n any instance of S among the members of P, (1) everyone conforms to R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since S i s a coordination problem and uniform conformity to R i s a co-ordination equilibrium i n S. 2^ i i ) Let me begin by introducing Bennett's primeval case. The case which he presents i n L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour i s d i f f e r e n t , but not f o r my purposes s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t , from the s i t u a t i o n which he envisages i n "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy". I w i l l r e f e r only to the l a t t e r but the points which I make against i t w i l l apply equally to the former. In "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy", then, we are i n v i t e d to consider a t r i b e of anthropoid organisms and to imagine a steady growth i n our knowledge of them; a point i s reached i n our observations at which "we have learned a great deal about our subject-tribe's needs and wants and perceptions and b e l i e f s and intentions, including b e l i e f s about intentions and so f o r t h , though we have not yet been i n a p o s i t i o n to c r e d i t them with a language or even with ever 27 meaning anything by what they do". At t h i s point, we witness the following event: "Utterer performs a crude enactment of a man being h i t on the head by a heavy object, and Audience sees t h i s and steps out from under the palm-tree j u s t before a coconut f a l l s on the place where 28 he was standing." It i s never quite clear what Bennett thinks he i s describing i n his paper: (1) How we as observers could learn about an anthropoidal t r i b e ' s already f u l l y operative language, or (2) How they could a c t u a l l y develop such a language before our eyes. In L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, however, he i s quite e x p l i c i t about h i s goal; the "decorative chronological garb" aside, what he r e a l l y wants i s " l o g i c a l independence": "When I say, 'We can now apply concept C to the t r i b e , but not yet C*', I r e a l l y mean that 29 the a p p l i c a t i o n of C does not l o g i c a l l y require the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of C*." But Bennett does not seem to see that he has, i n saying t h i s , now chosen 33 between the two alternate ways of looking at h i s primeval case: He has hereby promised to give us a story about the i n t e r n a l , l o g i c a l develop-ment of the tribesmen's system of concepts. Despite having chosen i n t h i s way, however, he c o n t i n u a l l y tends to look at and to argue for h i s example i n terms of the other way. He struggles with ( 1 ) , t r y i n g to "render p l a u s i b l e " the hypothesis that we could a t t r i b u t e to these creatures, s o l e l y on the basis of behavioural evidence, c e r t a i n b e l i e f s and intentions; that i s , to e s t a b l i s h (at l e a s t the p o s s i b i l i t y that there could be) purely behavioural c r i t e r i a which would e n t i t l e us to say of the members of our s u b j e c t - t r i b e that they mean something ( i n the Gricean sense of mean) by what they do. But that i s j u s t not the same thing as giving an analysis of the dependence r e l a t i o n s h i p s which ex i s t between those same b e l i e f s and intentions, which i s i n fact much more l i k e t r y i n g to describe (2). To succeed i n giving purely behavioural, that i s n o n - l i n g u i s t i c , evidence for the occurrence of a Gricean i n t e n t i o n i s not to prove that there can be a Gricean i n t e n t i o n p r i o r to the existence of l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n s — i t i s only to show that there can be instances of Gricean utterances which do not require the e x p l i c i t operation of any s p e c i f i c conventions. The present behaviour of an agent, though i t may well be conclusive evidence for a t t r i b u t i n g to him a c e r t a i n a b i l i t y , may be, i n fact generally w i l l be, no i n d i c a t i o n of what experiences i n h i s past, of what concepts of which he i s already i n command, account for the existence of that present a b i l i t y of h i s . My challenge, then, i s t h i s : Can the state of mind required both to make and to c o r r e c t l y i n t e r p r e t a Gricean utterance be achieved outside of a system of conventions? Bennett., whose " r e a l coneern'-is'theological independence" of c e r t a i n concepts, s p e c i f i c a l l y of the concepts required for Gricean meaning from those possible only with the operation of conven-t i o n , must show us how we can account for the existence of that state of mind without appealing to conventions. Bennett's meaning-nominalism needs an answer to (2); at best he gives us a rather p e c u l i a r p i c t u r e of (1). i i i ) That brings us to Bennett's unwitting assumption which manages to sneak i n unnoticed because he i s answering (1) when he should be amswering (2). Bennett's f i r s t instance of a Gricean i n t e n t i o n , not to mention the many instances of agents o f f e r i n g " i n t e n t i o n - f r e e evidence" 31 p r i o r to i t , depends upon the agents involved possessing a theory of, b e l i e f s about, other minds. We c e r t a i n l y know how to give behavioural  evidence, which anyone but a s o l i p s i s t would accept, to support the a t t r i -bution of such b e l i e f s : Bennett's example does n i c e l y . I t i s a warning; Bennett has arranged the case so that i t i s a sincere warning (the utterer has nothing to gain personally from h i s behaviour). Sincere warnings rest on altruism, on concern for someone else's welfare, i n p a r t i c u l a r , f or h i s avoidance of pain. And of course, b e l i e f s about others' welfare, t h e i r pains and pleasures, e n t a i l b e l i e f s about t h e i r minds. But has Bennett done anything besides describe a s i t u a t i o n about which we would be w i l l i n g to say that, yes, the u t t e r e r and, yes, the audience involved have b e l i e f s about other minds? In p a r t i c u l a r has he t o l d us how they could have ever come to have those b e l i e f s ? Has he not rather j u s t had to assume the existence of those b e l i e f s ? Meaning-nominalism, a thesis about the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between concepts, must make no such assumptions. I f , as i s indeed the case, there cannot be an instance of Gricean meaning unless both 35 the u t t e r e r and the audience involved have a concept of other minds, then the meaning-nominalist, to make h i s case, must show that the concept of other minds i s independent of any form of conventional meaning. This i s , as I see i t , the c r i t i c a l test for the meaning-nominalist; i t i s , moreover, a test which, as I intend to show, he must i n e v i t a b l y f a i l . The c l o s e s t Bennett's handling of nominalism ever comes to even broaching t h i s important problem i s h i s acknowledgement of a s l i g h t challenge i n showing that n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour i s capable of supporting the a t t r i b u t i o n of b e l i e f s about intentions and of intentions to produce b e l i e f s . Obviously, i f one can a t t r i b u t e an inten t i o n to produce a b e l i e f ( i n a full-blooded sense of inten t i o n and b e l i e f — I s h a l l elaborate s h o r t l y ) , then one i s also a t t r i b u t i n g a theory of other minds. A close look at Bennett's attempts to deal with the challenge which he sees reveals that he has not su c c e s s f u l l y dealt with the challenge that i s r e a l l y there. In"The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" he o f f e r s an argument which purports to show that i f n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour can support the a t t r i b u t i o n of simple b e l i e f s and intentions then i t can also support the a t t r i b u t i o n of more complex b e l i e f s and intentions: of b e l i e f s about intentions and of intentions to produce b e l i e f s . The argument has two premises i n which he uses " ' n o n - l i n g u i s t i c i n t e n t i o n Z b e l i e f J ' to mean 'intention / b e l i e f / a t t r i b u t e d s o l e l y on the basis of n o n - l i n g u i s t i c behaviour'": (1) "Non-linguistic b e l i e f s and intentions are behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n s of c e r t a i n sorts; or at l e a s t the existence of behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n s can be s u f f i c i e n t f o r the existence of b e l i e f s and intentions." (2) "There can be a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c i n t e n t i o n to produce a c e r t a i n d i s p o s i t i o n i n something (e.g. to make i t f l e x i b l e or f r i e n d l y ) , and there can be a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f that something has a c e r t a i n d i s p o s i t i o n (e.g. that i t i s f r a g i l e or a f r a i d ) . " Substituting from (1) into (2) on the basis of the reoccurrence of 'dispo s i t i o n s ' , Bennett concludes that, " I f those premises are r i g h t , then n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s about intentions, don't involve any d i f f i c u l t y of p r i n c i p l e ; f o r they are j u s t intentions to produce (or b e l i e f s about) 32 d i s p o s i t i o n s which are merely more complex than f l e x i b i l i t y or fear." Above I spoke of a 'full-blooded sense' of in t e n t i o n and b e l i e f ; i n the following discussion of Bennett's argument, I s h a l l t r y to c l a r i f y what I had i n mind, thereby showing that the dif f e r e n c e i n 'complexity' of which Bennett speaks i s considerably more s i g n i f i c a n t than he allows. Let's f i r s t look at Bennett's rather strange premise (1)—(what does 'can be s u f f i c i e n t ' mean anyway?). Granting that part of what non-l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and intentions are i s behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n s , that cannot be s u f f i c i e n t — p l a n t s display behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n s to turn towards the sun but we would r e s i s t a s c r i b i n g either intentions or b e l i e f s 33 to them to account for t h e i r behaviour. In L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour Bennett comes up with another important ingredient, a d d i t i o n a l to behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n s , which i s involved i n n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and intentions: A,believes that P e n t a i l s that "A i s highly educable with regard to many kinds of propositions which do not exclude any important kinds to which P 37 34 belongs." This i s an important addition. C e r t a i n l y i t gives us (at l e a s t part of) the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r our reluctance to ascribe intentions and b e l i e f s to plants. What exactly, i n the f i n a l a n a lysis, an account of e d u c a b i l i t y w i l l look l i k e i s , of course, f a r from c l e a r . It does seem c l e a r , however that there i s some such capacity for which an account must be given and further that we have some general under-standing of what that capacity amounts to. The r e a l l y important thing to note about Bennett's f i r s t premise though, i s t h i s : I t i s about a sub-class of b e l i e f s and intentions and not about a l l b e l i e f s and intentions; the same i s true of h i s second premise. In h i s conclusion, however, Bennett i l l e g i t i m a t e l y moves from t a l k i n g about the sub-class, n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and intentions, to the i n c l u s i v e c l a s s , b e l i e f s and intentions i n general. I hope i t would be r e a d i l y conceded that there i s a f u l l -blooded sense of b e l i e f and i n t e n t i o n which involves much more than a mere behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n and a p o t e n t i a l to be educated into or out of that same d i s p o s i t i o n , and that the concept of a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f which can only be behaviourally manifested i n very s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s i s a d e r i v a t i v e of the concept of a b e l i e f which i s consciously formulable and e x p l i c i t l y expressible under any circumstances. Let me i l l u s t r a t e the degree of complexity which Bennett has allowed to s l i p i n by moving i n h i s conclusion from t a l k i n g about n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and intentions to t a l k i n g about b e l i e f s and intentions i n general, which includes full-blooded b e l i e f s and intentions. That i s , l e t me i l l u s t r a t e the difference i n the complexity of a mere behavioural 38 d i s p o s i t i o n (plus educability) and a full-blooded b e l i e f or i ntention. I have a b e l i e f that i n a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n a red l i g h t means that I should not cross the street; but i t simply i s not true that the only evidence which could be c o l l e c t e d to support the a t t r i b u t i o n of such a b e l i e f to me would be my behaviour i n that very s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n ; neither i s i t true that the only way I could be educated out of my b e l i e f would involve me encountering several ' r e d - l i g h t ' s i t u a t i o n s i n which the cars behaved i n ways which made crossing the street unchallenging; nor could i t be shown that the only way I could ever have come to hold that b e l i e f was by being educated into i t through encounters with 'r e d - l i g h t ' s i t u a t i o n s : In f a c t , i f my b e l i e f about r e d - l i g h t s involves an adequate appreciation of the Lewisian r e g u l a r i t y ( i . e . convention— more of t h i s i n Chapter VI) at work, then I could not have come to my b e l i e f (solely) i n that way. I can represent my b e l i e f to myself outside of the s i t u a t i o n i n which i t i s conjured up n a t u r a l l y ; I can share my b e l i e f , through the mechanism of a shared representation, with others; I can argue for or from my b e l i e f ; I can be exposed to and accept or d i s p e l or disregard arguments against my b e l i e f ; I can assert or deny my b e l i e f ; I can appreciate the Lewisian r e g u l a r i t y involved; and, most important, my b e l i e f can form a part of, a l b e i t i n t h i s case a small part of, my 'picture o f myself, my 'self-concept'; i f I t r y to introduce a corresponding, and s i m i l a r l y full-blooded b e l i e f i n someone else, my endeavor e n t a i l s the awareness that I am t r y i n g to a f f e c t h i s 'self-concept'. I think Bennett would agree that a n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f or i n t e n t i o n , a behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n susceptible of education, does not 39 at l e a s t e n t a i l any b e l i e f s about the agent's own or others' ' s e l f -concepts'; but he has not offered us any argument to support the claim that they could l o g i c a l l y support such b e l i e f s . So r e a l l y a l l Bennett's argument i n "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" shows i s that, i f one accepts h i s premises (with the amended version of (1), I would be w i l l i n g t o ) , then one would have to agree that there can be non-l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s about n o n - l i n g u i s t i c intentions and n o n - l i n g u i s t i c intentions to produce n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s . I f a creature capable of only n o n - l i n g u i s t i c b e l i e f s and intentions had a b e l i e f about, or had i n t e n t i o n a l l y produced, an intention or b e l i e f which was i n fact full-blooded, such a creature would be incapable of appreciating more than the behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n element. This conclusion involving only these simpler types of b e l i e f s and intentions i s easy to accept; but i t c e r t a i n l y doesn't get the meaning-nominalist's primeval (Gricean) case o f f the ground. The intentions and b e l i e f s involved i n t h i s argu-ment are a l l manipulative; what one needs for t h i s primeval case to work properly are communicative ones. To have a communicative inte n t i o n i t i s necessary to have b e l i e f s about, and thus to have a concept of, both one's own and others' minds. To have a concept of one's own mind, of one's b e l i e f s , goals, or projects, appears to involve, as I have t r i e d to i l l u s t r a t e , a complex capacity to represent oneself to oneself, to represent one's b e l i e f s and intentions for or to oneself. The concept of other minds, moreover, seems t i e d to the concept of one's own mind at l e a s t to the extent that i t w i l l not be possible, f or example, to have a concept of the projects of others (other than i n a purely behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n sense) p r i o r to a concept of one's own projects. The meaning-nominalist has not shown us how a languageless creature could have b e l i e f s about h i s own and others' minds and therefore he has not shown us how such a creature could have communicative intentions. By contrast, to have a manipulative int e n t i o n i t i s necessary only to have b e l i e f s about o b j e c t s — t o be conscious but not self-conscious. Some of the objects about which the non-self-conscious creature has b e l i e f s may be act i v e and i n some cases t h i s a c t i v i t y may involve the presence of a conscious being, perhaps even, though not i n the primeval case, a self-conscious being. But t h i s fact w i l l go unappreciated by a creature capable of only manipulative intentions. Communicative intentions, then, e n t a i l thoughts about one's own and other's minds; manipulative ones do not. iv) Bennett doesn't do any better i n L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour. He begins h i s section 34, " B e l i e f s about b e l i e f s " , with the very confident 35 statement, "There can also be languageless b e l i e f s about b e l i e f s " , and never looks back from there. Remember that what he ought to be doing i n t h i s section i f he wants to support t h i s confident statement i s t h i s : i ) giving a l o g i c a l analysis of what i s involved i n a. having a b e l i e f about JJ'S b e l i e f , and then, i i ) showing how a languageless a. could s u c c e s s f u l l y f u l f i l l :those. l o g i c a l requirements. But Bennett simply dismisses the need for that kind of pro-gramme; by the end of three short paragraphs i n a section supposedly aimed at proving that a languageless creature could have b e l i e f s about another creature's b e l i e f s , Bennett has e f f e c t i v e l y t o l d us: Of. course a languageless creature a. could have b e l i e f s about another creature b_'s b e l i e f s — a l l that a_ lacks i s a language but that i s c e r t a i n l y no hurdle—now, to turn to a more serious question, What behavioural  evidence could we have to j u s t i f y a t t r i b u t i n g such a b e l i e f to a? How could languageless a_ behaviourally manifest such a b e l i e f ? Of course we recognize the move; i t i s p r e c i s e l y the same one which I remarked on early i n t h i s discussion. Bennett i s t a l k i n g about (1), what counts as s u f f i c i e n t behavioural evidence f o r as c r i b i n g a c e r t a i n b e l i e f to a. when he ought to be showing (2), how t h i s p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f of the languageless a. i s accounted f o r by h i s other b e l i e f s and how any of h i s b e l i e f s are accounted for by h i s experiences. (Careful examin-ation of the fourth and f i f t h paragraphs i n section 34 reveals, I believe, that Bennett doesn'toeven make good h i s promise .to give-us-an answer to (1).^) I s h a l l return eventually, i n Chapter VI, to the issue of the re l a t i o n s h i p between intentions and conventions and attempt to provide an a l t e r n a t i v e to Bennett's meaning-nominalist account. 42 NOTES 1 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," i n Science, P e r c e p t i o n and R e a l i t y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i b r a r y of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l , 1963). 2 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "The S t r u c t u r e of Knowledge: (1) P e r c e p t i o n , (2) Minds, (3) Epistemic P r i n c i p l e s , " i n A c t i o n , Knowledge and R e a l i t y : Essays i n Honor of W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , ed. Hector-Neri Castaneda (Indian-a p o l i s : The B o b b s - M e r r i l l Company, Inc., 1975). 3 S e l l a r s , 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 160. 4 S e l l a r s , 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 167. 5 S e l l a r s , 'The S t r u c t u r e of Knowledge," p. 320. 6 S e l l a r s , ' 'The S t r u c t u r e of Knowledge," p. 322. 7 S e l l a r s , 1 'The S t r u c t u r e of Knowledge," p. 322. 8 S e l l a r s , 1 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 167. 9 S e l l a r s , 1 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 167. 10 S e l l a r s , ' 'The S t r u c t u r e of Knowledge," p. 322. 11 S e l l a r s , 1 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 167. 12 S e l l a r s , 1 'The S t r u c t u r e of Knowledge," p. 324. 13 S e l l a r s , ' 'Empiricism and:the Philosophy of Mind," P- 168. 14 S e l l a r s , 1 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 168. 15 S e l l a r s , 1 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 168. 16 S e l l a r s , 1 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 169. 17 S e l l a r s , ' 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 169. 18 S e l l a r s , ' 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 169. 19 S e l l a r s , 1 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 168. 20 S e l l a r s , ' 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 169. 21 S e l l a r s , 1 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," P- 169. 22 H.P. .Grice, "Meaning," P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 66 (1957). 43 23 Jonathan Bennett, "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," Foundations  of Language, 10 (1973), 149. 24 David K. Lewis, Convention: A P h i l o s o p h i c a l Study (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1969), p. 154. 25 H.P. G r i c e , " U t t e r e r ' s Meaning and I n t e n t i o n s , " P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Review, 78 (1969), 151. 26 27 28 29 Lewis, Convention, p. 58. Bennett, "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," p. 146. Bennett, "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," p. 147. Jonathan Bennett, L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976), p. 137. 30 31 32 33 Bennett, L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, p. 137. Bennett, L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, p. 138. Bennett, "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," p. 145. Notice that i f we r e s i s t a s c r i b i n g behaviour to p l a n t s then we must admit that the concept of behaviour i s a loaded one: I t i m p l i e s the presence of b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s . Then, r a t h e r than being able to a s c r i b e b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s on the b a s i s of behavioural evidence we would have to a s c r i b e behaviour on the b a s i s of evidence of the presence of b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s ; presumably t h i s evidence would take the form of a c t i v i t y i n the organisms under s u r v e i l l a n c e . I am using 'behaviour' i n the simple sense which i m p l i e s a c t i v i t y but which does not imply b e l i e f s and i n t e n t i o n s . Bennett i s c l e a r l y using i t i n t h i s way as w e l l — h e speaks of the behaviour of grass and of s e l f - g u i d i n g m i s s i l e s (see L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, p. 52). 34 Bennett, L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, p. 87. 35 Bennett, L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, p. 110. 36 To f u l f i l l h i s promise to give us an answer to ( 1 ) — t o give us what would count as behavioural evidence f o r a s c r i b i n g to a a b e l i e f about _b's b e l i e f s — B e n n e t t must give us behaviour of a's which convinces us that not only d i d a. b e l i e v e that b_ was going to do s o m e t h i n g — i n the case which Bennett c o n s i d e r s , a. b e l i e v e s that b_ i s going to dive i n t o the w a t e r — b u t as w e l l , a.'s behaviour must convince us that a holds that b e l i e f about b_ on the b a s i s of b e l i e f about b's b e l i e f s . Bennett needs, that i s , a case such that we, as observers, are "unable to e x p l a i n a_'s coming to t h i n k that b w i l l swim except by supposing / something l i k e _ / that a_ has j u s t come to t h i n k that b b e l i e v e s that there i s a predator nearby." ( L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, p. I l l ) U l t i m a t e l y , Bennett regresses i n s t e a d i n t o a reminder 44 about, (3) what behavioural evidence either we or a would need to j u s t i f y a t t r i b u t i n g a b e l i e f to b. He gives us an example which he f e e l s clinches (1): "Some event has j u s t occurred, perceptible to a., which would be apt to make JD think there was a predator nearby, and nothing else has happen-ed which bears i n any way on the l i k e l i h o o d of Jp_'S swimming", and a_ has given us behavioural evidence to the e f f e c t that he believes that b w i l l swim. Bennett thinks that provided (3) i s f u l f i l l e d , we could, given such a case, "reasonably conjecture that a_ reached h i s b e l i e f that Jp_ would swim v i a a b e l i e f that ID believed that he was threatened by a pre-dator." ( L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour, p. I l l ) Spelled-out, the argument lu r k -ing i n the example looks l i k e t h i s : a) a. f u l f i l l s the requirements for the a t t r i b u t i o n of the b e l i e f that b_ w i l l jump; b) JD f u l f i l l s the requirements for the a t t r i b u t i o n of the b e l i e f that a predator i s nearby and of the i n t e n t i o n to jump; ( i . e . (3) i s s a t i s f i e d ) ; c) we can see that a. i s witness to the behavioural evidence which j u s t i f i e s the a t t r i b u t i o n s made to b_ i n (b) ; d) we know that a. has not been witness to any other evidence besides that referred to i n (c) which would lead him to the b e l i e f a t t r i b u t e d to him i n (a); Conclusion: e) a. a r r i v e d at the b e l i e f a t t r i b u t e d to him i n (a) v i a the be-l i e f (for which (c) assures us he has s u f f i c i e n t evidence) that JD believes that there i s a predator nearby. The only b e l i e f which a_ manifests i n the example i s described i n (a) and the only way i n which we could a t t r i b u t e to a_, on the basis of the premises, the further b e l i e f described i n the conclusion i s by assuming (as Bennett e x p l i c i t l y does), that i f a_ has the necessary epistemic input to have a b e l i e f about JD'S b e l i e f then he w i l l have that b e l i e f (as long as he i s capable of having b e l i e f s about Jp_ at a l l ) . But that i s a very large and t o t a l l y u n j u s t i f i a b l e assumption. Given that a. has the epistemic input necessary to have a b e l i e f about JD'S b e l i e f s , we don't need any of the possible sources of evidence which (d) blocks i n order to show that a_ could have gotten h i s b e l i e f referred to i n (a) v i a some other l e s s complex route than a b e l i e f about JD'S b e l i e f . That i s to say, the behavioural e v i -dence which (c) t e l l s us a_ i s witness to can be organized i n various ways. One of the most, probably the most, complex way i n which a might organize that information would involve a. a t t r i b u t i n g a b e l i e f to JD. But there i s absolutely nothing i n the bare fact that a., about whose organization schema we know nothing, i s witness to t h i s information which forces us to the con-cl u s i o n that he has organized i t i n t h i s complex way. Let me i l l u s t r a t e by giving an alternate account of how (a) and (b) could be true and explained ( (c) and (d) can also be true but are now beside the p o i n t ) , without i n any way implying (e): a. witnesses a c e r t a i n e v e n t — a behaviourally describ- able e v e n t — x i s chasing JD; a. knows that whenever JD or or d or e are chased by x and t h e i r f l i g h t brings them to the water's edge, another event occurs; b or c or d or e jumps into the water. If the e f f e c t of that jump i s relevant to a., and i t probably i s or he wouldn't have noticed the con-nection which he has noticed, then when a. witnesses such a chasing scene he w i l l react i n a way which gives us behavioural evidence to the e f f e c t that he believes that b_ w i l l jump. Absolutely nothing i n the example forces us to give a. any but self-centred concepts. 45 CHAPTER II Givenness and Sense-Data: L o g i c a l l y and Phenomenologically Attacked 1. Introduction I f S e l l a r s and Bennett have come at the issue of the r e l a -tionship between awareness and conventions from opposite d i r e c t i o n s and each has developed a p o s i t i o n which i s unacceptable, then i t seems clear that the t r u t h of the matter must l i e somewhere between these two p o s i t i o n s . This i s , at any rate, the contention for which I w i l l attempt to o f f e r support. On the one hand, and against S e l l a r s , I w i l l argue that some form of awareness must precede, and indeed account f o r , the a c q u i s i t i o n of language. On the other hand, and against Bennett, I have argued already that the kind of awareness which precedes the a c q u i s i t i o n of language i s capable of supporting only a simple form of i n t e n t i o n which d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y from the complex Gricean ones which he sees as playing an e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n the o r i g i n s of the phenomenon of conventions i n general and of l i n g u i s t i c conventions i n p a r t i c u l a r . As an a l t e r n a t i v e to Bennett's p o s i t i o n , then, I w i l l o f f e r some suggestions as to how the phenomenon of language a r i s e s i n a non-Gricean way and, having arisen, makes possible the occurrence of Gricean intentions. But that account must wait t i l l Chapter VI. In the present chapter I w i l l examine the concepts of givenness and 'primordial awareness' against which S e l l a r s argues convincingly and as an a l t e r n a t i v e to which he o f f e r s the l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness which I have recently rejected. I w i l l be concerned to show that S e l l a r s ' argument against the concept of givenness can be r i g h t and i t nevertheless remain the case that there i s an important, indeed an e s s e n t i a l , truth hidden i n that concept, unhappily laden as i t i s , with an act/object analysis of sense-experience. In fa c t I s h a l l argue that S e l l a r s a c t u a l l y retains p r e c i s e l y that aspect of the notion of givenness which i s problematic. Thus though h i s argument shows there to be something wrong with the idea of an epistemological given, S e l l a r s i n e f f e c t draws the wrong conclusion from h i s own argument. The present chapter w i l l examine as well a phenomenological argument which Roderick F i r t h brings against the t r a d i t i o n a l idea of sense-data as e n t i t i e s given to us ei t h e r i n or immediately p r i o r to moments of perceptual consciousness. Being a phenomenological argu-ment, F i r t h ' s argument presupposes the notion of a phenomenological appeal; and by taking f or granted the t r a d i t i o n a l act/object analysis of that notion, F i r t h ' s argument, much i n the way S e l l a r s ' does, manages to r e t a i n what's wrong about Sense-datum Theory while j e t t i s o n i n g what's -right about i t . Aga i n s t : both._ S e l l a r s and F i r t h I w i l l argue i n Chapter I I I that a d i s t i n c t i o n must be made between awareness and awareness of. The former w i l l be taken to be basic, both l o g i c a l l y and chro n o l o g i c a l l y , and an attempt w i l l be made i n Chapter IV to point the way to a possible analysis of the l a t t e r i n terms of the former; an analysis which r e j e c t s , while at the same time t r y i n g to account for 47 the apparent presence of, an act/object, knower/known, subject/object d i s t i n c t i o n , i n a l l areas of the Philosophy of Mind. 2. S e l l a r s ' L o g i c a l Argument Against the Given i ) In "The World Well Lost" Rorty speaks of a d i s t i n c t i o n "perfected and c o d i f i e d by Kant", between spontaneity and r e c e p t i v i t y . "Since Kant", Rorty claims, "we f i n d i t almost impossible not to think of the mind as divided into a c t i v e and passive f a c u l t i e s , the former using concepts to ' i n t e r p r e t ' what 'the world' imposes on the l a t t e r " . ^ That gives us two more d i s t i n c t i o n s : Along with the receptive and spontaneous f a c u l t i e s of the mind, we have that which the mind passively  undergoes, the given, and that which the mind a c t i v e l y creates, the conceptual; and as w e l l , the given must be distinguished from that  which i s i t s cause, the world. The tendency to think of spontaneity and r e c e p t i v i t y as f a c u l t i e s of the mind, which tendency brings i n i t s t r a i n the three-way given/constructed/world d i s t i n c t i o n , i s c l o s e l y t i e d to a p a r t i c u l a r , generally unquestioned, conception of knowledge. Knowledge i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , and for the most part u n c r i t i c a l l y , assumed to involve a two part r e l a t i o n between a knowing subject and a known object. Thus the proponents of the given/constructed/world s p l i t have offered i n defence of givenness the following types of argument: 1) They have argued that a l l knowledge which i s general or c l a s s i f a c t o r y i n nature, that i s to say, which i s conceptually mediated, must be acquired; and i t must 48 be acquired on the basis of some more basic type of knowledge, knowledge which i s given d i r e c t l y , without any conceptual mediation. 2) They have argued that our knowledge at the conceptual l e v e l must be f i r m l y founded by our knowledge at the non-conceptual l e v e l , the l a t t e r amounting to a set of i n c o r r i g i b l e (or i n f a l l i b l e or indubitable) f a c t u a l claims against which the truth or f a l s i t y of f a c t u a l claims made at the former can be evaluated. D i r e c t l y connected with the spontaneity/receptivity, the given/constructed and the given/world d i s t i n c t i o n s , then, we have as well questions concerned with the issue of whether or not we do have or must have some form of i n c o r r i g i b l e , and therefore non-conceptually mediated, knowledge; questions which are v a r i o u s l y formulated i n terms of d i r e c t access, immediate, or, as S e l l a r s says, 'primordial', awareness, non-inferent-i a l i t y , and the l i k e . But since S e l l a r s wrote "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", i t has been frequently contended that such t a l k i s ultimately incoherent. i i ) S e l l a r s ' argument against the given i s a l o g i c a l one. He lays bare an inconsistency between: 1) What kind of thing must be 2 given i f the "epistemological category of the given" i s to be able to f u l f i l l the purpose for which i t was introduced; and, 2) What kind of things are generally conceived of as being given and must be given i f the notion of givenness i s to meet other constraints which operate on i t . Thus the attempt to make sense of the concept of givenness i s thwarted by the f a c t that on the one hand i t i s taken to involve "nonverbal episodes of awareness—awareness that something i s the case, e.g. that t h i s i s green", and on the other hand i t i s generally assumed that i t i s p a r t i c u l a r s rather than facts—where p a r t i c u l a r s are sense contents and f a c t s are "items of the form something's being thus-and-so or something's standing i n a c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n to something 4 e l s e " — w h i c h are given. In the f i r s t case, i t i s i t s r o l e as the foundation of empirical knowledge which dict a t e s that acquiring the given must amount to acquiring f a c t s , to acquiring " n o n - i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge of matter of fact";"' while i n the second case, i t i s the fact that, as S e l l a r s puts i t , "...most em p i r i c a l l y minded philosophers are strongly i n c l i n e d to think that a l l c l a s s i f i c a t o r y consciousness, a l l knowledge that something i s thus-and-so, or, i n l o g i c i a n s ' jargon, a l l subsumption of p a r t i c u l a r s under universals, involves learning, concept formation, even the use of symbols", which dict a t e s that acquiring the given must amount to acquiring p a r t i c u l a r s — s e n s e contents, S e l l a r s c a l l s them. Richard Rorty and Michael Williams c r y s t a l l i z e the l o g i c a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g tendencies which S e l l a r s has d i s c l o s e d yet further. The Sense-datum Theorist wants the act of acquiring the given to involve both 1) i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y and 2) e f f a b i l i t y , where for that which i s given to be e f f a b l e i s f o r i t to be i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l form. (Both Rorty and Williams put the dilemma i n terms of e f f a b i l i t y . Williams e x p l i c i t y introduces ' i n e f f a b l e ' as a pejorative way of saying non-propositional.^) But i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y presupposes i n e f f a b i l i t y . Thus that which i s acquired must amount to i n c o r r i g i b l e knowledge of matter of fact i f i t i s to be capable of providing a s o l i d immutable foundation for empirical knowledge. But to be knowledge of matter of fact i s to be e f f a b l e and to be i n c o r r i g i b l e i s to be i n e f f a b l e — f o r the given must avoid being conceptualized i f the capacity to acquire i t i s to be unacquired, which i t must be i f i t s a c q u i s i t i o n i s to involve i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y . The dilemma facing the proponent of givenness now takes the following form: Insofar as our a c q u i s i t i o n of the given i s e f f a b l e , i t i s j u s t a perceptual judgment, and thus i s not i n c o r r i g i b l e . Insofar as i t i s i n e f f a b l e , i t i s incapable of having an explanatory function. (This formulation follows c l o s e l y , but does not reproduce verbatim, g Rorty's version of the dilemma i n "The World Well Lost". ) -" The Rorty/Williams version of the argument p o i M s more d i r e c t l y , I think, than does S e l l a r s 1 , to the source of the problem i n Sense-datum Theory: I t i s the obsession with the idea of founding empirical knowledge and the r e s u l t i n g quest for i n c o r r i g i b l e knowledge. And ultimately, the present p o s i t i o n suggests, the source of the problem l i e s with the conception of knowledge as a type of r e l a t i o n between a knower and an objective matter of f a c t . Consider the e f f a b i l i t y / i n e f f a b i l i t y problem. Why i s i t p l a u s i b l e to claim that i f that which i s given i n e f f a b l e then i t i s incapable of having an explanatory function? As Williams puts i t , that i f that which i s given i s conceived of as i n e f f a b l e , then, "The c e r t a i n t y j o f '-thee; given;; is; ^  saved'iony-l a f the).': cost of making i t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e how awareness of the given could serve as a check on anything, how such knowledge could ever count i n favour 9 of one hypothesis rather than another." Surely the p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h i s claim stems d i r e c t l y from the fa c t that that which i s i n e f f a b l e i s conceived of as being given to something—the mind or the l i k e — w h i c h 51 i s then incapable because of the fact of i n e f f a b i l i t y of doing anything with that which i t has been given. The underlying idea seems to be that the something which i s aware must be able to express to i t s e l f that of which i t i s aware before i t w i l l be able to make any use of that of which i t i s aware. I f the mind has access to any re s e r v o i r of information which i t cannot express to i t s e l f , such a re s e r v o i r i s of no use to the mind. In other words, e f f a b i l i t y or i n e f f a b i l i t y has to be r e l a t i v e to something which t r i e s to express that which i s said to be e f f a b l e or not. But only the idea that the awareness i s a r e l a t i o n between something and something, i . e . i s inherently "dual, could give r i s e to the idea that the only u s e f u l kind of awareness w i l l involve a r e l a t i o n s h i p with an object of awareness the nature of which the subject of awareness can express to i t s e l f . i i i ) S e l l a r s argued that sensing i s non-epistemic but retained without question the assumption that awareness i s epistemic. He e f f e c t i v e l y s p l i t , that i s , sensing from awareness. To sense, or to be conscious, i s not, for S e l l a r s , to be aware. Thus he says that while learning to use the word 'red' does not involve "antecedent episodes of awareness of redness", such episodes are "not to be confused, of course, with sensations of red"."*"^ The p o s i t i o n for which I am arguing accepts S e l l a r s ' claim that sensing i s non-epistemic but holds further that awareness as well i s non-epistemic, where .'epistemic' i s taken to mean what i t i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y taken to mean; where, that i s an epistemic r e l a t i o n s h i p i s taken to be a type of d i r e c t or immediate r e l a t i o n s h i p between the subjective and the objective. ' Needless to say the cost of t h i s further claim can be met only by subjecting the :.: common-sense notion of the epistemic to a c r i t i c a l examination, for the implication of the claim that awareness i s non-epistemic would seem to be that nothing i s epistemic. And indeed, u n t i l we free the notion of the epistemic from the t r a d i t i o n a l , l a r g e l y unexamined con-ception of i t , i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s type of conclusion for which I am arguing. Nothing i s epistemic i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense of epistemic. The element of d u a l i t y inherent i n the common-sense notion of the epistemic w i l l be shown to have s e r i o u s l y misled much of philosophical enquiry into the nature of consciousness. It should be c l e a r why, by t h i s account, S e l l a r s ' attempt to account for the upsurge of awareness i n a l i n g u i s t i c , or indeed i n any way, cannot hope to succeed. If_ that kind of awareness, for the upsurge of which S e l l a r s seeks an account, i s not, and I am i n agree-ment with S e l l a r s that i t i s not, cannot be, present at the outset, then, I am arguing, no account of i t s upsurge could ever be given. Such awareness does not e x i s t . The d u a l i t y which S e l l a r s has rejected at the most basic level—between the sensor and the sensed—never occurs at any higher l e v e l either—between, that i s , the knower and the known. We often, however, speak of being aware of_, and s i m i l a r l y , of being conscious of_, c e r t a i n things. Duality i s unmistakably implied by t h i s use of the word ' o f ; d u a l i t y between that which i s aware and that of which i t i s aware. And so also i s d u a l i t y implied by a l l other epistemic forms of expression: know that, believe that, notice that, see that, etc. What the attempt to give an account of the d u a l i t y , apparent or otherwise, of the epistemic requires, and what S e l l a r s i n e f f e c t o f f e r s , i s a logico-genetic story. But S e l l a r s attempts to give such a story using only resources r a d i c a l l y inadequate to the task. It appears that e i t h e r one must be s a t i s f i e d with a purely behaviourist account of awareness—must accept, that i s , the therm-ometer view which S e l l a r s e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s — o r must concede that awareness, of one sort or another, ex i s t s p r i o r to, and i s i n fact e s s e n t i a l to an account of, the development of language. S e l l a r s seems to want i t both ways. He wants a more than s t r i c t l y behaviourist account of what awareness is_ but he has i t a r i s i n g mysteriously and unaccountably out of l i n g u i s t i c behaviour. 3. F i r t h ' s Phenomenological Attack on Sense-Data i ) I s h a l l return i n Chapter III Part 5 to the notion of e f f a b i l i t y and suggest that that notion, steeped as i t i s i n the knower/known d u a l i t y , i s i t s e l f confused i n the same way and the same measure as i s S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness. Indeed i t w i l l turn out that the confusion involved i n the notion of e f f a b i l i t y j u s t i s the confusion at work i n S e l l a r s ' argument. F i r s t , however, I would l i k e to look at another and d i f f e r e n t type of argument which has been brought against the t r a d i t i o n a l concept of givenness. The version of the argument to which I w i l l r e f e r occurs i n Roderick F i r t h ' s "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory". Whereas S e l l a r s ' attack on the given i s a l o g i c a l one, F i r t h ' s i s phenomenological. D i f f i c u l t i e s i n connection with F i r t h ' s argument a r i s e when we cease to take for granted that we know what a phenomenological appeal jLs and attempt Instead to give some analysis of i t s structure. At that point the knower/known d u a l i t y which pervades the Philosophy of Mind w i l l once again a r i s e and my discussion of F i r t h ' s argument against the given w i l l merge with my discussion of the e f f a b i l i t y issue i n S e l l a r s ' . i i ) Sense-datum Theory, the theory that the givenness, 'direct awareness' or 'immediate perception' of p a r t i c u l a r s c a l l e d 'sense-data' plays an absolutely indispensable r o l e i n the process by which we perceive p h y s i c a l objects, has, F i r t h points out, h i s t o r i c a l l y taken two d i s t i n c t forms. One form he c a l l s the 'Discursive Inference Theory'; the other, the 'Sensory Core Theory'. Both forms are, he argues, incompatible with empirical facts phenomenologically obtained. The Discursive Inference Theory, the t r a d i t i o n a l exponents of which, according to F i r t h , are Locke and Berkeley, holds that the givenness of sense-data and the perception of physical objects are temporally d i s t i n c t moments of consciousness, the l a t t e r following the former subsequent to an intervening act of judgiiient; The proponents of t h e Discursive Inference Theory were, F i r t h notes, prepared to admit that the temporal succession of an awareness of sense-data, an act of judgment, and a perception of a physical object, may occur, as a function of " s e t t l e d habit","'"''' with such l i g h t n i n g r a p i d i t y as to make cognizance of i t d i f f i c u l t . But, says F i r t h , "whereas Locke and Berkeley found i t merely d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h a temporally d i s t i n c t state of d i r e c t awareness i n every perception, most contemporary. 12 psychologists and epistemologists have found i t quite impossible. Thus, on phenomenological grounds, most contemporary adherents of Sense-datum Theory have rejected the Discursive Inference version of the theory i n favour of the Sensory Core version. F i r t h ' s contention i s that t h i s version as well i s phenomenologically f a l s i f i e d . i i i ) The Sensory Core Theory holds that, "perceptual consciousness i s a twofold state c o n s i s t i n g of (1) d i r e c t awareness of a sense-datum and (2) an element of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , and i t holds further 13 that, "these two parts e x i s t simultaneously". Against the Sensory Core Theory, F i r t h , as a defender of Percept Theory, maintains that i n ordinary perception, "we are conscious i n a c e r t a i n manner of a physical object which i s somehow presented to us completely clothed i n sensuous q u a l i t i e s " . These q u a l i t i e s "are presented as q u a l i t i e s of the object" and are " i n no sense abstracted or otherwise distinguished from the presented object"."^ And rather than being r e s t r i c t e d to the q u a l i t i e s which have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been classed as sense-data, the sensuously clothed object comes dressed as w e l l i n such q u a l i t i e s as " s i m p l i c i t y , r e g u l a r i t y , harmoniousness, clumsiness, gracefulness, and a l l the innumerable so-called 'shape-qualities'"; and even i n such q u a l i t i e s as are " f i t t i n g l y described by such adjectives as ' r e p t i l i a n ' , ' f e l i n e ' , 'ethereal', 'substantial' and", F i r t h adds, "perhaps most of the adjectives i n the dictionary"."'"^ But most importantly, Percept Theory maintains that "the sensuously clothed object i s the only 16 sensuous content of consciousness during ordinary perception". F i r t h quotes a passage from P r i c e , one of the p r i n c i p a l proponents of the Sensory Core Theory, which shows c l e a r l y that the p o s i t i o n of Sense-datum Theorists can, at l e a s t , be i n accord with the 56 p o s i t i v e aspects of Percept Theory. P r i c e writes: Somehow i t i s the whole thing, not j u s t a jejune extract from i t , which i s before the mind from the f i r s t . From the f i r s t i t i s the complete material thing, with back, sides, and insides as well as front, that we 'accept', that 'ostends i t s e l f to us, and nothing l e s s ; a thing, too, p e r s i s t i n g through time both before and a f t e r . . . and possessed of various causal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . . . A l r e a d y i n t h i s s i n g l e act, even i n a momentary glance, we take a l l these elements of the object to be there, a l l of them.., 1 7 It i s the negative aspect of Percept Theory, the denial that anything other than the sensuously clothed object i s present i n ordinary per-ception, which c o n f l i c t s with the most sophisticated formulations of the Sensory Core version of Sense-datum Theory. Having introduced a d i s t i n c t i o n according to which advocates of Percept Theory ought not to say that what we are d i r e c t l y aware of i s p hysical objects but rather ostensible physical objects, the d i s -t i n c t i o n being motivated on the grounds that, "the word ' d i r e c t l y ' , when used i n such a context, may have c e r t a i n epistemological connotations which are not relevant to the phenomenological issue", F i r t h notes that: If the Sense-datum Theory were true, indeed, i t would r a r e l y , i f ever, be correct to apply the same determinate adjectives both to an ostensible physical object and to the sense-datum which i s presented along with i t . Thus we should have to maintain that whenever we are perceiving a p h y s i c a l object with a surface which i s ostensibly red and c i r c u l a r , we are also d i r e c t l y aware of a sense-datum which i s probably e l l i p t i c a l i n shape and which may very well be orange or purple or grey i n colour, We should have to maintain, i n short, that even when we look at a s i n g l e physical object we are almost always conscious, though i n d i f f e r e n t ways, of two colours and two shapes."'" It i s at t h i s point that F i r t h ' s argument makes i t s phenomenological appeal. Support for the phenomenological appeal comes even from the Sense-datum Theorists themselves. F i r t h quotes P r i c e as saying that i n ordinary perception we " f a i l to d i s t i n g u i s h " between the sense-datum 19 and the ostensible object. By Price's own account, our state of mind in perception " i s , as i t were, a dreamy, half-awake state, i n which we are unaware of a d i f f e r e n c e between the sense-datum and the osten-20 s i b l e p h y s i c a l object". In response to such remarks, F i r t h makes the obvious query: If i t be admitted...that i n perception we are not aware of any d i f f e r e n c e between the sense-datum and the ostensible p h y s i c a l object, what possible evidence could there be that both of them are present to consciousness during perception?21 He concludes that even Sense-datum Theorists would, if.pressed, admit that i t . i s not by the method of d i r e c t inspection that sense-data are found to be constituents of ordinary perception. iv) There i s , however, another method, besides d i r e c t inspection, i n which F i r t h f e e l s the Sense-datum Theorist, whether " w i t t i n g l y or 22 unwittingly" places greater f a i t h . Sense-datum Theorists u t i l i z e a method or operation which F i r t h l a b e l s 'perceptual reduction'; and moreover they accept i n connection with the operation of perceptual reduction an hypothesis which he c a l l s the 'Exposure Hypothesis'. To perform a perceptual reduction on a p a r t i c u l a r state of perceptual consciousness i s (1) to bring i t about that the ostensible physical object which was immediately present to consciousness becomes pro-gres s i v e l y l e s s and l e s s determinate; and (2) to cause a new object, a sense-datum, to be presented with increasing determinateness to consciousness. In connection with t h i s two gait 'process,, .the Exposure Hypothesis maintains that: ...the operation of perceptual reduction does not produce a state of consciousness which i s simply other  than the o r i g i n a l state of perception on which i t i s performed. I t produces, on the contrary, a state of d i r e c t awareness which was contained i n the o r i g i n a l perception...exposure i s achieved...by destroying the consciousness of physical objects which accompanies and obscures the sense-data, so that bare sense-data themselves become accessible to subsequent acts of d i r e c t inspection.23 Against the Exposure Hypothesis, F i r t h points out that the 'reducing a t t i t u d e ' which the operation of perceptual reduction sets i n motion i s "only one among a seemingly i n f i n i t e number of attitudes which we can adopt i n the presence of an ostensible p h y s i c a l object". He suggests as examples mercenary a t t i t u d e s , pedagogical at t i t u d e s and martial a t t i t u d e s . And he argues that i t would "scarcely occur to anyone to suggest" that one can f i n d i n the states of consciousness brought about by such changes of a t t i t u d e , "the r e a l but previously unobservable content of the o r i g i n a l state". He continues by saying: "The two states would be regarded as re l a t e d to one another, to be sure, by the fact that they are caused by the same external stimulus, 25 but the one would scarcely be taken to be a constituent of the other." But there are problems, I think, with F i r t h ' s argument. In the f i r s t place I think that i t i s true neither i n the case of the case of the reducing a t t i t u d e nor i n the case of mercenary, pedagogical or martial a t t i t u d e s that the object of these at t i t u d e s i s an ostensible  physical object as F i r t h uses the expression. And furthermore, I think that the type of objects onto which we bring to bear the reducing a t t i t u d e i s d i f f e r e n t from the type of objects towards which we adopt the other mentioned types of a t t i t u d e s . Thus, where the d i s t i n c t i o n between an ostensible physical object and a physical object i s , f o r F i r t h , the d i s t i n c t i o n between something such that "some of i t s proper-t i e s , i f not a l l , can be discovered by d i r e c t inspection of a sing l e state of perceptual consciousness" and something which i s "at the very l e a s t a thing which transcends any one of the states which might be 2 6 c a l l e d a perception of_ i t " , i t seems clear that i t i s the l a t t e r and not the former type of thing, the type of thing which "transcends any one state which might be c a l l e d a perception of_ i t " , towards which we adopt mercenary, pedagogical and martial a t t i t u d e s : It i s physical objects not ostensible physical objects towards which we adopt such a t t i t u d e s . And as for the operation of perceptual reduction, i t seems equally c l e a r that i t i s states of perceptual consciousness— not ostensible p h y s i c a l objects—which are the objects of the type of at t i t u d e which i s involved there. But to undermine the claim that the reducing a t t i t u d e shares important features with at t i t u d e s such as the mercenary, pedagogical, etc., i s to undermine the claim that i t i s u n l i k e l y to be d i f f e r e n t from them i n any important, relevant sense. (In the long run I s h a l l claim that t a l k of assuming att i t u d e s towards states of consciousness, as though they were objects of some sort, i s at best a facon de pa r l e r and a misleading one at that; but for the present point i t i s enough to point out that i f the reducing a t t i t u d e takes an object at a l l i t must be a state of consciousness and not a phys i c a l object or an ostensible p h y s i c a l object.) v) F i r t h o f f e r s , c u r s o r i l y , another argument against the Exposure Hypothesis. He c l a ims that j u s t as "those who accept Sense—datum Theory have...pointed out that we cannot learn more about a p a r t i c u l a r sense-datum by changing the physical conditions of observation", and that i n attempting to do so "'we murder to d i s s e c t ' " , an analogous argument i s being made by those who r e j e c t the Exposure Hypothesis to the e f f e c t that "we f r u s t r a t e ourselves i f we perform the operation of perceptual 27 reduction i n order to describe perceptual consciousness." He asserts, on the other hand, that the process of d i r e c t inspection "does not 28 destroy the very thing which i s to be analysed". It i s surely c l e a r why the Sense-datum Theorist would claim that we cannot hope to learn more about a sense-datum by changing the physical conditions of observation. I f a sense-datum i s taken to be that which i s the t o t a l phenomenological r e s u l t of the impingement of physical r e a l i t y on one of our senses independently of any element of conceptual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , then c l e a r l y , to change the p h y s i c a l conditions — e i t h e r of our sense receptor or of the objects t h e m s e l v e s — i s to bring i t about that the sense-datum which we endeavoured thereby to learn more about i s replaced by a new and u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t one. U t t e r l y d i f f e r -ent i n the sense that, however great or small the q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e between the two might be, the second sense-data i s a new,; numerically d i f f e r e n t one from the f i r s t ; i t does not contain parts of the f i r s t . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , a sense-datum i s often taken to be any i n d i v i d u a l aspect of the t o t a l e f f e c t of the world on one of our senses—thus redness or squareness, for example. But again, changing the physical conditions of perception gains us nothing and runs the r i s k of eliminating the sense-datum we seek to study. But how does the analogous argument i n respect of the Exposure Hypothesis go? What, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s i t that 61 we are unable, on pain of bringing about, or r i s k i n g , i t s destruction, to study by performing a perceptual reduction? It i s , of course, a state of perceptual consciousness of which i t i s , i n t h i s case, being said that we 'murder to d i s s e c t ' . But to speak of states of perceptual consciousness i s to r a i s e questions the answers to which we must have before we can decide whether or not the operation of perceptual reduction must i n e v i t a b l y destroy, rather than reveal the d e t a i l s of, such states. Just - as we must know what a  sense-datum i s i f we are to know whether i t i s the sort of' thing such that changing the phys i c a l conditions of perception w i l l , or might, destroy i t , so we must know what a state of perceptual consciousness j_s_ i f we are to be able to answer the analogous question with respect to i t and the operation of perceptual reduction. The Exposure Hypothesis amounts to a p a r t i c u l a r t hesis about the nature of states of consciousness. F i r s t i t must be noted that the notion of performing a perceptual reduction shares with the notion of d i r e c t inspection a presupposition that states of consciousness are, i n some sense, objects to which consciousness or mind stands i n r e l a t i o n . The claim made by the Exposure Hypothesis i n connection with the operation of perceptual reduction embodies an a d d i t i o n a l assumption about the sort of objects which states of consciousness are. According to the Exposure Hypothesis, i t would seem, states of consciousness are objects which possess some kind of depth; they are layered, one might say. Direct inspection, without the a i d of perceptual reduction, can reveal only the top lay e r . Perceptual reduction, by s t r i p p i n g o f f the masking l a y e r s , reveals to subsequent d i r e c t inspections the nature of those which l i e beneath. But i f t h i s i s the type of claim that the Exposure Hypothesis rep-resents about the nature of states of consciousness then surely the only way to undercut that hypothesis i s to undercut t h i s claim. For i f the truth of t h i s claim were to be assumed, then F i r t h ' s attempt to argue that to perform a perceptual reduction would be to destroy a state of consciousness—rather than to reveal the d e t a i l s of i t — w o u l d f a l l f l a t . The metaphor of 'murdering to d i s s e c t ' seems, moreover, inept even i n the case of sense-data; changing the p h y s i c a l conditions of perception doesn't 'merely murder' sense-data. I t eliminates them without a trace; without, as i t were, even leaving a corpse to d i s s e c t . C l e a r l y , i f states of consciousness are e n t i t i e s layered i n the way i n which the Exposure Hypothesis presupposes, then perceptual reduction would not eliminate such states without a trace. Parts of them would, of course, be so e l i m i n a t e d — t h e upper layer s , that i s — b u t that i s p e r f e c t l y i n keeping with the hypothesis. The claim would be, then, that a perceptual reduction doesn't create a new state of consciousness since the r e s u l t i n g state doesn't involve anything new—as would, for example, a state brought about by a change of perceptual conditions or by a change of thought about or a t t i t u d e towards the perceived objective state of a f f a i r s . Remember that the a t t i t u d e of perceptual reduction i s n ' t an a t t i t u d e towards the perceived objective state of a f f a i r s but rather towards the state of consciousness i t s e l f . I t may therefore eliminate a t t i t u d e s towards objective states of a f f a i r s , i t may even eliminate any awareness of those states of a f f a i r s at a l l ; but i t cannot introduce new a t t i t u d e s towards them. I f one accepts, then, that states of consciousness are e n t i t i e s layered i n a c e r t a i n way, the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the iclaim that d i r e c t inspection might be a process which has access only to the uppermost layers and.that perceptual reduction can without adding anything, s t r i p away those upper layers thereby revealing the lower ones seems hard to dispute. The fact that the state of consciousness i s , i n some obvious sense, destroyed by such s t r i p p i n g away—much as an apple i s destroyed when i t i s p e e l e d — doesn't, because the sense i n which i t i s destroyed doesn't amount to i t being ann i h i l a t e d , lend any support to t h i s l a s t type of argument which F i r t h t r i e d to use against the Exposure Hypothesis. v i ) Yet s t i l l , i t seems to me, there i s something wrong with the Exposure Hypothesis. But i t i s not something which would be of much help to F i r t h . For though I w i l l suggest that an e s s e n t i a l aspect of the Sense-datum Theorist's claim w i l l have to go, much of what bothers F i r t h about i t w i l l remain. My discontent with the Exposure Hypothesis must be traced back to the common and p r i o r assumption which underlies both the notions of d i r e c t inspection and of perceptual reduction, to wit, the assumption that states of consciousness are l i k e objects — l a y e r e d or o t h e r w i s e — t o which mind or consciousness stands i n r e l a t i o n . This assumption i s , I s h a l l endeavor to show, not coherent. The p o s i t i o n f o r which I w i l l argue holds not that assuming a reductive a t t i t u d e destroys states of consciousness but rather that states of consciousness are the sorts of things which j u s t n a t u r a l l y , perpetually and contin-uously fade of t h e i r own accord out of existence. It w i l l be claimed that i t i s j u s t simply not possible for states of consciousness to be conceived of as e n t i t i e s to which anything stands i n cognitive r e l a t i o n s . Cognitive r e l a t i o n s h i p s occur within states of consciousness. Attendant on the development of such a p o s i t i o n w i l l be the need to give some al t e r n a t i v e account of the structure of the phenomenological appeal (where by 'phenomenological appeal' I mean to capture the whole range of phenomena which involve, or are generally taken to involve, a cognitive a t t i t u d e directed towards a state of consciousness). The method of d i r e c t inspection, with i t s as yet unchallenged credentials as the t o o l of the phenomenological appeal, w i l l be seen to be as greatly wrought with confusions as i s the operation of perceptual reduction. What i s i t that inspects? What i s i t that i s inspected? The negative argument of the next chapter w i l l be complemented, eventually, by an attempt, i n Chapter V, to answer these questions on the basis of the theory to be sketched i n IV. 65 NOTES 1 Richard Rorty, "The World Well Lost," The Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972), 649. 2 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," i n Science, Perception and R e a l i t y , International Library of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 128. 3 S e l l a r s , p. 167. 4 S e l l a r s , p. 128. 5 S e l l a r s , p. 128. 6 S e l l a r s , p. 131. 7 Michael Williams, Groundless B e l i e f : An Essay on the P o s s i b i l i t y  of Epistemology (New Haven: Yale Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1977), p. 29. Q Rorty, p. 650. 9 Williams, p. 32. ^ S e l l a r s , p. 162. Roderick F i r t h , "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory," i n Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J . Swartz (Garden C i t y , New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co 12 F i r t h , P- 216. 13 F i r t h , P- 217. 14 F i r t h , P. 223. 15 F i r t h , P- 221. 16 F i r t h , P- 223. 17 F i r t h , P- 225. 18 F i r t h , P. 229. 19 F i r t h , P. 231. 20 F i r t h , P- 232. 21 F i r t h , P- 239. 22 F i r t h , P- 234. F i r t h , p. 238 F i r t h , p. 239 F i r t h , p. 239 F i r t h , p. 251 F i r t h , p. 241 F i r t h , p. 240 67 CHAPTER III The P-Theory Account of Awareness 1. Introduction The knower/known d u a l i t y seems to rear i t s head at every turn i n the l a b y r i n t h which i s the Philosophy of Mind. At t h i s point F i r t h ' s argument against the given establishes contact, i n the context of the o v e r a l l p i c t u r e , with the form i n which I l e f t that of S e l l a r s ' . The issue of the knower/known d u a l i t y brings them together; or rather, i t brings my discussion of them together. In S e l l a r s the d u a l i t y issue a r i s e s i n connection with the notion of e f f a b i l i t y ; i n F i r t h , as we j u s t saw, i t a r i s e s i n connection with the notion of a phenomenological appeal or i n t r o s p e c t a b i l i t y . S e l l a r s took as obvious the p o s i t i o n that the form of contact which we make with the given has to be e f f a b l e i f i t i s to be of any use; i f i t i s to play any r o l e whatsoever i n an account of our knowledge of the world. I t followed from that assumption that an account of ef f a b l e contact with the given could not i n any way be held to rest on i n e f f a b l e contact with the given: I f i n e f f a b l e contact was useless i n the one account then i t was equally useless i n the other. But i f contact with the given has to be e f f a b l e then i t must be conceptually mediated, i n which case i t i s n ' t contact with anything which i s merely given. S e l l a r s attempted an a l t e r n a t i v e account which had e f f a b l e  contact with phy s i c a l objects a r i s i n g out of neither e f f a b l e nor i n e f f a b l e awareness of the given but rather out of the a c q u i s i t i o n , by stimulus/response means, of a public language for r e f e r r i n g to public objects. Having rejected that a l t e r n a t i v e S e l l a r s i a n account, the need to return to the e f f a b l e / i n e f f a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n and take a closer look at the r o l e which i t plays i n S e l l a r s ' negative thesis becomes obvious. Just as S e l l a r s assumed a c e r t a i n type of meaningfulness for the e f f a b l e / i n e f f a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n , F i r t h assumed a c e r t a i n type of analysis of the structure of the phenomenological appeal. The two assumptions come together, I'm holding, i n v i r t u e of a r i s i n g out of an i d e n t i c a l assumption about consciousness and i t s states. While I should expect that the issue of the nature of awareness stands incontestably at the heart of the Philosophy of Mind, i t never-theless remains commonplace that t a l k about such issues as i n t r o -s p e c t a b i l i t y and e f f a b i l i t y occurs i n ways which beg what I take to be absolutely fundamental questions about the nature of awareness. That awareness i s straightforwardly a dual phenomenon, a r e l a t i o n i n v o l v i n g two terms, i s simply presupposed by most discussions of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of consciousness to i t s states. In the Introduction I claimed that t h i s d u a l i t y of which I'm speaking i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the common-sense psychological t h e o r y — o f the so-called P-theory. I t i s the burden of the ensuing discussion to show that i t i s the aspect of the P-theory which S e l l a r s ' attempted l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness l a r g e l y p r e s e r v e s — t h e dualism between subject and object—which i s the source of i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l inadequacies, and that i t i s that aspect which materialism t r i e s to r e j e c t — t h a t there must be some non-material notion of s u b j e c t i v i t y operative i n any adequate account of 'human animals'—which accounts, on the other hand, for the strength and r e s i l i e n c y of the P-theory. S e l l a r s , I s h a l l argue, though of m a t e r i a l i s t bent, i s s e n s i t i v e to the inadequacy of a purely m a t e r i a l i s t account of awareness; but i n t r y i n g to deal with that inadequacy, he e f f e c t i v e l y reintroduces p r e c i s e l y that aspect of the P-theory which was the source of the problem which he had himself discerned i n the older theory. 2. The 'Lighting-Up' Conception of Awareness At l e a s t two threads can be found tangled together i n the knotty mess which the issue of awareness forms at the heart of the P-theory. One can discern there, I believe, two separate tendencies, not even consistent with one another,1 but .mergiedy'f.in-jsirCuexof^haylng i n common the assumption that awareness i s a r e l a t i o n i n v o l v i n g two terms, into one l a r g e l y i n a r t i c u l a t e , incoherent 'common-sense' p o s i t i o n . The obvious fa c t that consciousness must be acknowledged to be character-ized by two aspects, an a c t i v e and a passive, has been, I'm claiming, confusedly interpreted i n such a way as to involve a subjective/objective s p l i t within awareness. The subjective, or a c t i v e aspect, the nature of which i s only f o g g i l y discerned i n conscious experience, i s crudely conceived of as having given to i t the objective aspect; where the objective aspect i s va r i o u s l y conceived of as physical objects, sense-data, and even as states of consciousness themselves. It should be noted before continuing that P-theory use of the word 'consciousness' i s ambiguous. Consciousness i s sometimes taken to be the subjective h a l f of the subjective/objective d u a l i t y and at other times to be the product of the i n t e r a c t i o n of the two halves of that d u a l i t y , where the subjective h a l f i s taken to be the mind or the s e l f or the l i k e . Consciousness, i n other words, may be conceived of as either the subject of or the product of awareness. To further complicate matters, 'being conscious o f i s frequently used as though synonymous with 'being aware o f . This l a s t use of 'consciousness', which would have consciousness i d e n t i c a l with awareness, i s , I hold, the correct way to go once we have purged the notion of awareness of i t s d u a l i s t i c presuppositions. It i s problems i n connection with the other two notions of consciousness,"..arising out of t h e i r e s s e n t i a l presupposition of a d u a l i s t i c analysis of awareness which I wish i n the following to demonstrate. I believe, i n f a c t , that i f we look c a r e f u l l y at the f i r s t two uses of the word 'consciousness' we can see that we r e a l l y have here only a di f f e r e n c e of word usage and no actual di f f e r e n c e i n t h e o r e t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s . In the f i r s t case, 'consciousness' i s taken as synonymous with 'mind' or ' s e l f and states of consciousness are e n t i t i e s caused by the i n t e r a c t i o n of consciousness and some form of o b j e c t i v i t y and are possessed by, i n the sense of being a v a i l a b l e for i n t rospection by, consciousness. In the second case, on the other hand, consciousness i s the unity of those states of consciousness caused by the i n t e r a c t i o n between mind and some form of o b j e c t i v i t y and i s i t s e l f possessed by, and a v a i l a b l e , i n i t s present state, for i n t r o -spection by, the mind. The notion of either consciousness or the mind standing i n the r e l a t i o n of possessing and introspecting i t s states of consciousness, l i k e the notion of consciousness or the mind standing i n the r e l a t i o n of being aware of the objective realm, i s at the core of a d u a l i s t i c a nalysis of awareness. It i s t h i s d u a l i s t i c analysis of awareness which I hope i n the present chapter to show to be untenable. Throughout the following discussion I w i l l use 'consciousness' i n the sense i n which i t r e f e r s to the subjective h a l f of the subjective/ objective d u a l i t y taken to be involved i n the P-theory account of awareness. i i ) The overwhelming tendency to conceive of awareness as character-ized by a subjective/objective s p l i t , and i n that tendency, the f i r s t thread i n the P-theory account of awareness, has i t s o r i g i n s , I believe, i n the common-sense conception of perceiving; of v i s u a l perception most p a r t i c u l a r l y , but by no means ex c l u s i v e l y . Common-sensically, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between consciousness and objective r e a l i t y which constitutes the perception of r e a l i t y by consciousness i s interpreted i n a naive  r e a l i s t manner. We see physical objects; they are there, before us. We are aware of them; we are d i r e c t l y i n t h e i r presence. The multitude of mundane fact s about perception which force us to enrich our language of perception with a l l the complexity inherent i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between, for example, the verbs to be , to look , and to see , doesn't i n the l e a s t dissuade us from our commitment, at the l e v e l of u n c r i t i c a l common-sense, to a naive r e a l i s t conception of perceiving. 72 Our a g i l i t y i n maneuvering, and the p r a c t i c a l e f f i c a c y of, the d i s t i n c t i o n s between being, looking to be, and being seen to be, prevents us from recognizing the f a c t that the need for these d i s t i n c t i o n s i s i n d i c a t i v e of the f a l s i t y of naive realism. V i s u a l experiences, for example, cannot amount to d i r e c t apprehension of physical objects i f i t i s possible for the nature of a v i s u a l experience to be at odds with the nature of the physical object supposedly being d i r e c t l y apprehended. I f naive realism was true nothing could ever look other than i t was. Obviously, i t seems to me, naive realism i s f a l s e ; but j u s t as obviously, however, our common-sense conception of perceiving i s , i n i t s basic presuppositions, naive r e a l i s t . The naive r e a l i s t conception of, for example, seeing, would seem to have i t that consciousness i s l i k e some kind of s p o t l i g h t ; to be 'illuminated' i s to be seen. To be aware of something i s , so to speak, to be shining the l i g h t of consciousness onto that something. On such a view, s t r i c t l y adhered to, there i s n ' t even any room for states of consciousness;"'" unless what i s thereby referred to i s j u s t some fact or fac t s about the s p o t l i g h t i t s e l f : I t s i n t e n s i t y , scope, or the l i k e . Aside from that, every other feature operative i n any p a r t i c u l a r subjective/objective i n t e r a c t i o n w i l l be a feature of the objects being looked at. Being illuminated, i n other words, i n no way involves being brought into consciousness; nor does i l l u m i n a t i o n cause or create anything—other than ' l i t - u p ' objects. The subject on t h i s view i s i d e n t i c a l with consciousness; the subject i s simply the non-material 'something' which looks. Even i f i t was possible for the phenomenon of awareness to be- captured by t h i s s p o t l i g h t metaphor (and I s h a l l argue that i t i s not), s t r i c t adherence to t h i s view i s simply not possible. A thoroughgoing naive r e a l i s t approach to perception cannot be, I've recently argued, sustained. The need to move away from mere l i t - u p objects to something l i k e states of consciousness—to subjective states q u a l i t a t i v e l y characterized as opposed to pure objective ones — i s c l e a r l y d i ctated by the same facts which d i c t a t e the introduction of, f o r example, the being , looking , and seeing d i s t i n c t i o n s . But instead of being renounced, the naive r e a l i s t conception of 'looking at' objective r e a l i t y i s incoherently retained and even reapplied at the l e v e l of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between consciousness and i t s own states. Some c l a r i f i c a t i o n of my p o s i t i o n might be gained by r e s t a t i n g the preceding point i n the following way. Contrary to F i r t h , I believe that the common-sense, "man i n the s t r e e t " conception of perception does not recognize a d i s t i n c t i o n between physical objects and ostensible physical objects. According to F i r t h , "To possess the concept of i l l u s i o n " , some version of which, as he r i g h t l y asserts, the man i n the street must possess, " i s to recognize, at l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y , the very 2 difference between a physical object and an ostensible p h y s i c a l object". But, I suggest, an i m p l i c i t recognition i s no recognition at a l l . The fact that the occurrence of i l l u s i o n s i s i n c o n f l i c t with ther.naive r e a l i s t presuppositions of our common-sense notion of perceiving does not e n t a i l that recognition of the fact of the occurrence of i l l u s i o n s w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y force some move away from naive realism. Only an e x p l i c i t recognition of the c o n f l i c t could force such a move. But, I'm claiming—and contrary to what some philosophers, F i r t h apparently among them, would hold—one can hold p a i r s of c o n f l i c t i n g b e l i e f s without f e e l i n g the pressure of the c o n f l i c t . Being a l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d consequence of a fact recognized by common-sense does not i t s e l f e n t a i l being recognized or even 'recognized' by common-sense. That the man on the street can, under pressure (probably considerable), be brought to acknowledge the need for some sort of move away from phy s i c a l objects doesn't i n the l e a s t support the claim that recognition of that need existed i n any sense p r i o r to the pressure. Such needs aren't, contrary to what F i r t h seems to believe, the sorts of things of which common-sense i s incapable of remaining o b l i v i o u s . 3. The 'Causal' Conception of Awareness The tendency to think of perception i n a naive r e a l i s t manner constitutes the f i r s t and the simplest of the two threads i n the common-sense conception of awareness. Objective r e a l i t y i s assumed to be d i r e c t l y given, revealed, so to speak, to us. And while I think that F i r t h i s wrong, i n v i r t u e of the strength of the naive r e a l i s t conception of physical objects, to a t t r i b u t e a d i s t i n c t i o n between physical objects and ostensible p h y s i c a l objects to the P-theory, i t i s c l e a r that there remains, nevertheless, some sense i n which the P-theory i s s e n s i t i v e to, though without anything l i k e a recognition of, the inadequacies of t h i s naive r e a l i s t account of perceiving. A l l the subtlety of l o o k s - t a l k i s evidence, at the p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , of t h i s s e n s i t i v i t y , however i n a r t i c u l a t e from a t h e o r e t i c a l point of view i t might be. The second thread i s introduced into the tangle with the appearance of the notion of states of consciousness. To the notion that 75 looking at phys i c a l objects i s a process which 'lights-up' physical objects i s i n c o n s i s t e n t l y , but without r e t r a c t i o n , added the notion that looking at physical objects i s a process which causes e n t i t i e s c a l l e d states of con-sciousness. The inconsistency a r i s e s because, as I said e a r l i e r , the naive r e a l i s t conception leaves no room f or states of consciousness i n anything l i k e the sense here being introduced. States of consciousness are, according to t h i s new notion of looking at, conceived of as being possessed by the con-sciousness which did the looking. Moreover, the capacity to look at i s one possessed by consciousness both i n respect of physical objects and, i n some analogous sense, i n respect of i t s own states as we l l . Thus looking at physical objects causes states of consciousness which belong to the conscious-ness which looked and the states of consciousness thereby caused are themr-selves e n t i t i e s of a sort which can be looked at i n turn; accordingly gener-ating new and higher order states of consciousness which can themselves be looked at; and so on. To look at a state of consciousness i s , of course, to introspect. Though t h i s way of conceiving of the notion of 'looking at', which I s h a l l c a l l the causal conception and according to which looking at i s a process which causes states of consciousness and states of consciousness are, l i k e objects, e n t i t i e s of a sort which can themselves be looked at, cannot be coherently combined with the naive r e a l i s t or 'lighting-up' conception, the two conceptions are not generally, I believe, even distinguished. Indeed I think, as I said e a r l i e r , that the lighting-up conception i s even reapplied at the l e v e l of the re l a t i o n s h i p between consciousness and i t s own states. I f t h i s r e -ap p l i c a t i o n happened only once and e f f e c t i v e l y replaced, at some point, the causal c o n c e p t i o n — i f i t were claimed, that i s , that 'looking at' r e f e r s to two d i s t i n c t types of ope r a t i o n — t h e n i t would be, however i n t u i t i v e l y implausible and em p i r i c a l l y unacceptable, at le a s t not incoherent. Such a tendency to supplement, at some point, the causal , conception with the lighting-up conception probably indicates some dim recognition of the fact that the causal conception alone can y i e l d nothing but an i n f i n i t e regress. But the lighting-up conception stops the regress without coming any closer to achieving that which each move i n the regress sought to a t t a i n . 4. The Problem with Awareness of That t h i s i s the case w i l l be r e a l i z e d once i t i s appreciated that i f consciousness (or mind) i s conceived of as pure s u b j e c t i v i t y (as, that i s , the subjective h a l f of a subjective/objective d u a l i t y ) and i t s states are conceived of as e n t i t i e s to which i t stands i n r e l a t i o n , analogous to the way i n which physical objects are e n t i t i e s to which the mind or consciousness stands i n r e l a t i o n , and i r r e s p e c t i v e of how that r e l a t i o n i t s e l f i s conceived of, then states of consciousness must remain always, n e c e s s a r i l y , and us e l e s s l y , outside of consciousness; j u s t i n the way i n which physical objects do. I f , that i s , as I claimed at the outset of t h i s discussion about the nature of awareness, the fact that consciousness must be acknowledged as having two aspects, an act i v e and a passive, i s mistakenly interpreted as i n d i c a t i v e of the existence of a subjective/objective s p l i t within awareness, and i f consciousness i s taken to be the subjective h a l f of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p and i t s states are, l i k e p h y s i c a l objects, taken to be c o n s t i t u t i v e of the objective h a l f , then we are faced with one h a l f of the dilemma with which S e l l a r s ' argument against the given confronts us. The subjective h a l f of a subjective/objective r e l a t i o n s h i p , i f i t i s to be able to make any use of i t s contact with the objective i n i t s endeavor to found empirical knowledge, must be able to assimilate, somehow, the objective into i t s e l f But sensing construed, as by the P-theory, i n e i t h e r of the two looking at manners does not allow for such a s s i m i l a t i o n and thus does not allow the p o s s i b i l i t y of awareness. Being aware of physical objects seems to require getting some content into consciousness. But i f we are faced with a choice between l i t - u p p h y s i c a l objects and states of consciousness which are caused by physical objects but which are no more inside of consciousness than are physical objects themselves, then we don't seem to be one whit c l o s e r to the existence of awareness than we were before physical objects became illuminated or caused the existence of states of consciousness. Neither the lighting-up nor the causal conception of looking at makes possible the a s s i m i l a t i o n of the objective by the subjective. The causal conception, moreover, involves an i n f i n i t e regres of p r e c i s e l y the same form as the one: involved:.in S e l l a r s ' i l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness. Thus i f , as according to the causal conception of sensing, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of consciousness to i t s states i s presupposed to be one of possession rather than one of the whole to i t s parts, and looking at these states i s assumed to be an a b i l i t y which consciousness does, and indeed, must be able to exercise i n connection with i t s states, then the occurrence of an instance of awareness w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y remain an i n f i n i t e l y e l u s i v e event. For i f states of consciousness are conceived of as e n t i t i e s which a mind must be able to look at i f i t i s to be aware of them, i f that i s , awareness i s not to be construed as d i r e c t , immediate, and non-dual, then the need automatically a r i s e s for the mind to, i n the same way, look at the r e s u l t s of i t s p r i o r acts of looking. And so we are on the road to regress. More f u l l y described, the regress goes as follows: The unacceptability of the naive r e a l i s t , lighting-up, conception of looking at forced us to move to the causal conception of looking at which would have us interpose states of consciousness as intermediaries between physical objects and consciousness; but now we are faced with a choice of reintroducing the lighting-up conception of looking at at the l e v e l of introspection or of reapplying the causal conception and thereby of interposing new and higher order states of consciousness between consciousness and i t s own states. I f we choose the l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e we w i l l be forced to an i n f i n i t e regress of lookings at, a regress which w i l l not be j u s t a p o s s i b i l i t y but a necessity (so long as we s t i c k to the causal conception of looking at) since each new state of consciousness i s an intermediary between consciousness and the state of consciousness or, at t h e ; f i r s t , l e v e l , the physical object, which was looked at previously. We can't, i n other words, stop the regress by saying that we have no need for an i n f i n i t e l y complex l e v e l of introspection. For t h i s i n f i n i t e chain of lookings at i s a l l i n pursuit of awareness at the f i r s t l e v e l ; at the l e v e l of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between consciousness and physical objects. In t h i s sense the regress which I'm now describing i s v i c i o u s i n exactly the way i n which the one I claimed must plague S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness i s : Each lower stage i n the regress i s dependent upon each of the i n f i n i t e l y many higher ones. The need for an i n f i n i t e number of a c t s — i n t h i s case of lookings at and i n S e l l a r s ' case of utterings and recognizings—opens up, as i t were, between the subject and the object of which i t s t r i v e s f o r awareness. I f each act of looking at generates, as on the causal conception, a new state of consciousness, but a state of consciousness i s i t s e l f only.a possible object of awareness, and not i t s e l f a moment of awareness, then no amount of looking at could ever generate awareness. The point i s that while d u a l i t y may e x i s t between a consciousness and that which i s the cause of i t s states, and which we may express by saying that the conscious being 'looks at' the world, i t i s not possible, on pain of regress, f o r there to be a d u a l i t y between a conscious being and i t s own  states. To be a conscious being i s to be a series of conscious states — n o t to have such a s e r i e s . And so a conscious being cannot, s t r i c t l y speaking, inspect i t s own states; f o r to do so requires that i t be able to stand i n r e l a t i o n to i t s states i n a way which i t cannot. A conscious being looks at the world; the world causes i n the conscious being states of consciousness. I f awareness i s not immediately, as a non-dual phenomenon, thereby achieved, i f the conscious being i s conceived of as having now to 'look at' i t s own states i n order to become aware of them, then the question i s , At what point and how can the process of looking at ever bring i t about that the conscious being i s aware? 'Looking at' w i l l be a causal process, the product of which i s conscious states, the causal lineage of which w i l l become increasingly complex— thus there w i l l be conscious states caused by looking at physical objects, and conscious states caused by looking at conscious states caused by looking at physical objects, and so on-—but 'looking at' w i l l never cause awareness unless at some stage conscious states j u s t are awareness. But that stage w i l l have to be the very f i r s t stage; for the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of getting r i d of, once i t has been introduced, the thing, the pure, empty s u b j e c t i v i t y , which was doing the 'looking at' at each of the stages which follow the f i r s t stage w i l l bring with i t the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of escaping from a regress of 'lookings at'; or at le a s t of escaping from i t i n any s a t i s f a c t o r y way. The option of switching at some point from the causal to the l i t - u p conception of looking at remains open. But as I said at the outset of t h i s discussion, the l i t - u p conception of looking at leaves consciousness j u s t as empty, and the given, whether physical objects, sense-data, states of consciousness or whatever, j u s t as u s e l e s s l y outside of consciousness as does the causal conception. 5. The S e l l a r s View Recast S e l l a r s ' claim that sensing i s non-epistemic, that there are no primordial awarenesses—where awareness, for S e l l a r s , i s j u s t assumed to be awareness of_, to be inherently dual—amounts, I believe, to the recognition that sensing, interpreted, as i t i s , i n either of the two 'looking at' manners—as a r e l a t i o n s h i p between consciousness and p a r t i c u l a r s — c o u l d never f u l f i l l the r o l e which i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been assigned at the foundation of empirical knowledge. Sensing, so conceived, i s useless; or, at any rate, by i t s e l f i t ' s useless. It cannot amount to awareness; to an epistemic r e l a t i o n s h i p between consciousness and any aspect of objective r e a l i t y . But though S e l l a r s rejected the problematic d u a l i s t i c conception of sensing, he retained the problem by assuming that awareness i s d u a l i s t i c . Thus he t r i e s to construct out of a non-dualistic notion of sensing, using a stimulus/ response account of language a c q u i s i t i o n , a d u a l i s t i c form of awareness. S e l l a r s ' account of awareness, i n terms of recognizing r e l a t i o n a l facts about utterances has the same structure as, and hence involves the same form of i n f i n i t e regress as, the causal conception of sensing i n terms of looking at states of consciousness. S e l l a r s i n e f f e c t avoided the problem at one place only to re i n s t a t e i t at another. S e l l a r s recognized that i f awareness was to f u l f i l l some r o l e i n the theory of knowledge which replaced the r o l e t r a d i t i o n a l l y , but f a l s e l y , thought to be f u l f i l l e d by sensing, then i t must, unlike sensing as t r a d i t i o n a l l y conceived, be capable of getting some content into consciousness. By means of the 'expressing' r e l a t i o n s h i p , I'm contending, S e l l a r s hoped that i t would be possible to achieve what the 'looking at' r e l a t i o n s h i p alone was incapable of achieving. Thus I'm construing the S e l l a r s i a n e f f a b i l i t y t hesis as the claim that sensing, as t r a d i t i o n a l l y conceived of, i s a re l a t i o n s h i p between consciousness and p a r t i c u l a r s and that i t , as such, n e c e s s a r i l y leaves consciousness empty; standing u s e l e s s l y i n r e l a t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r s . In order for content to be, i n any sense, gotten into consciousness, the thesis holds, i t must be gotten i n as information about p a r t i c u l a r s . Whatever gets into consciousness gets i n i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l form; as fac t s of the form X i s 0 or X resembles Y. An epistemic r e l a t i o n s h i p which manages, somehow, to close, within the subjective, the gap between the subjective and the objective must be achieved. But S e l l a r s , I contend, overlooked the fact that there i s a world of diffe r e n c e between e x h i b i t i n g a stimulus/response acquired tendency to l i n g u i s t i c behaviour and expressing a proposition. His l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness seems c l e a r l y to be an attempt to get the l a t t e r out of the former. While I am undeniably imposing an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n onto S e l l a r s , allow me, nevertheless, to pursue t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; i t i s , I believe, worth exploring. The f i r s t thing that must be noted i s that i f S e l l a r s i s indeed__sensitive to the problem of awareness i n anything l i k e the form i n which I have presented i t , then t h i s s e n s i t i v i t y on h i s part can only be at war with h i s strong tendency to favour a m a t e r i a l i s t account of conscious phenomena; for the form i n which I have presented i t professes to be an analysis of the form which i t takes i f one follows through the P-theory account of i t , where one of i t s fundamental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s the non-materialist nature of the subjective ingredient. That he i s i n fact subject to p r e c i s e l y such warring tendencies i s , I think, revealed i n the account, which I have already rejected, which he o f f e r s of awareness. His unease with a m a t e r i a l i s t account once i t ' s a l l i n , drives him to add to that account something which pushes i t to a form of regress p r e c i s e l y p a r a l l e l to one which can be shown to a f f e c t the P-theory account of sensing, an account which he had, for demonstrably r e l a t e d reasons, rejected. As a m a t e r i a l i s t , S e l l a r s would, I suggest, analyze sensing i n accordance with a s t r i c t l y m a t e r i a l i s t version of what I have c a l l e d the causal conception. For S e l l a r s , sensations are part of objective r e a l i t y j u s t as physical objects are; thus he i s f u l l y prepared to admit that a completed s c i e n t i f i c account might recognize the existence of p a r t i c u l a r s c a l l e d sense-data, but as p a r t i c u l a r s which, far from being the objects of immediate awareness, are postulated by h i g h - l e v e l s c i e n t i f i c t heorizing and are u l t i m a t e l y discovered to be states of the brain which play a mere causal r o l e i n the process by which awareness i s achieved. Indeed consciousness i t s e l f , though he recognizes problems both here and i n connection with sensations, given the present state of science, w i l l also turn out to be a state of the brain, i n t h i s case the t o t a l state of the brain. Sensing physical objects i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the brain and objects which causes states of the b r a i n ( i . e . sensations); introspecting, the ' i n t e r n a l ' counterpart of sensing, i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the brain and i t s own states which causes further states of the b r a i n , and these states could, i n theory at l e a s t , be introspected i n turn, causing yet further states of the brain. But an i n f i n i t e process of i n t r o -specting, on the m a t e r i a l i s t version of the causal conception i s only a p o s s i b i l i t y and not a necessity; for sensing, and thus looking at, i s not a r e l a t i o n i n any bothersome sense. Each state of consciousness or sensation caused by looking at i s , on t h i s view, a state of the brain, of the material subject; but since sensing i s non-epistemic i t i s not a state which must i n turn become the object of an epistemic a t t i t u d e . According to S e l l a r s ' view awareness a r i s e s when l i n g u i s t i c responses are, by stimulus/response means, set up f i r s t i n connection with physical object states and l a t e r i n connection with sensory states. If S e l l a r s had stopped there, giving as h i s account of awareness the so - c a l l e d 'thermometer view' according to which to be aware of the presence of a c e r t a i n sort of physical object i s to make the appropriate S-R conditioned response (had he kept, i n other words, awareness also non-epistemic), he would have given, however implausible i t might seem, a thoroughgoing, consistent, m a t e r i a l i s t account of sensing and awareness. But S e l l a r s saw and acknowledged the i m p l a u s i b i l i t y . 3 The thermometer view of awareness i s unacceptable. Notice that on the s t r i c t l y m a t e r i a l i s t version of the causal account of awareness which I have j u s t described there i s no room to make sense of the type of claim which I have been making to the e f f e c t that being aware must involve getting something into consciousness. Consciousness i s the t o t a l state of the brain; sensations are aspects of the t o t a l state of the brain; clearly, on t h i s account sensations are i n consciousness even before 'awareness' of them generates new aspects of consciousness or states of the brain. S u b j e c t i v i t y , consciousness, i s not'-empty and standing i n r e l a t ion to i t s states i n the way i n which I e a r l i e r claimed that the causal conception (or the lighting-up conception) would leave i t . But despite h i s powerful m a t e r i a l i s t i n c l i n a t i o n s , S e l l a r s seems unable 85 to r e j e c t completely a n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t n o t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y . By a d m i t t i n g that the thermometer view of awareness i s i n s u f f i c i e n t and by supplementing i t w i t h the a d d i t i o n a l requirement t h a t , to be aware of the presence of a p h y s i c a l object of a c e r t a i n s o r t , a subject must not only u t t e r the appropriate sentence of the form 'x i s 0 ' but must a l s o recognize t h a t utterances of sentences of that form are r e l i a b l e symptoms of the presence of obj e c t s of that s o r t , S e l l a r s r e i n t r o d u c e s a n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t n o t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y . S i m i l a r l y , i f the m a t e r i a l i s t v e r s i o n of the causal conception of l o o k i n g at i s augmented by a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n such that s t a t e s of consciousness or sensations are obj e c t s of act s of l o o k i n g a t , a n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t n o t i o n of l o o k i n g at has been reintroduced and w i t h i t the type of regress which I have described reappears. Noti c e that i f someone—Sellars perhaps—-were to i n s i s t that what has been added i s n o n - m a t e r i a l i s t , the regress w i l l occur anyway. But c a r e f u l s e l f - a n a l y s i s would, i n both cases, I contend, r e v e a l to the m a t e r i a l i s t - i n c l i n e d t h e o r i z e r that only a sympathy f o r a s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n , the s u b j e c t i v e i n g r e d i e n t of which i s non-material, could have forced him to make the problematic, r e g r e s s - e n t a i l i n g a d d i t i o n i n the f i r s t place. What e l s e could lead him to say, c l e a r l y contrary to h i s m a t e r i a l i s t i n c l i n a t i o n s , that acts of u t t e r i n g or s t a t e s of the b r a i n aren't themselves awarenesses u n t i l , as i n the f i r s t case, they are recognized as such, o r, as i n the second case, u n t i l they are looked a t . I t should be p o s s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , to put the problem w i t h S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness i n terms of the metaphor of 'getting something i n t o ' consciousness—where that notion i s taken to involve something more than the m a t e r i a l i s t one exemplified by the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the brain and i t s states. S e l l a r s , I claimed, rejected the t r a d i t i o n a l notion of sensing on the grounds that i t involved a s i t u a t i o n i n which the subject stood i n a useless  r e l a t i o n s h i p to objective e n t i t i e s — s e n s e - d a t a , physical objects, states of consciousness or whatever. S e l l a r s t r i e d , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , to construe sensings as non-epistemic states of the subject which played a causal r o l e i n the subject coming to be able to express  to i t s e l f , and hence to be aware of, f a c t s about objective states of a f f a i r s . I have argued that S e l l a r s ' attempt to get an awareness  of r e l a t i o n s h i p out of the expressing r e l a t i o n s h i p and a purely causal account of sensing—where, notice, the expressing r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i t s e l f construed purely i n terms of the occurrence of l i n g u i s t i c  behaviour supposedly b e h a v i o u r i s t i c a l l y acquired-—cannot work. The same form of regress which arose i n connection with a non-materialist version of the causal conception of sensing w i l l a r i s e as soon as S e l l a r s augments—as he does—the thermometer account of awareness with the need for acts of recognizing. But at that point S e l l a r s ' account of awareness i s beset with exactly the problem which he perceived at the l e v e l of sensings: The subject cannot u s e f u l l y assi m i l a t e that of which i t i s 'aware'. Thus i f the thought that 'x i s 0 ' i s , i n i t s 'primary sense', conceived of as an S-R conditioned overt verbal response, awareness of which i s to be explained i n terms of hearing ( S e l l a r s says: "...we can know what we think, i n the primary sense, by l i t e r a l l y hearing ourselves think." ) then the structure of that response, i t s p r o p o s i t i o n a l form, w i l l be simply a fact which, no l e s s than the fact of possession of the property 0 by the object x, remains outside of consciousness. Nothing distinguishes facts about overt verbal responses from fac t s about other objective states of a f f a i r s to which consciousness stands i n r e l a t i o n . I f there i s a problem about awareness i n the one case then there must equally be a problem i n the other. I t was t h i s kind of point which I had i n mind when I claimed, i n Section 3(1) of the l a s t chapter, that the notion of e f f a b i l i t y i s i t s e l f confused i n the same way as S e l l a r s ' l i n g u i s t i c account of awareness. Indeed, the source of the confusion operating i n the S e l l a r s i a n argument j u s t i s a confusion about e f f a b i l i t y . The expressing r e l a t i o n s h i p j u s t simply can't be a r e l a t i o n s h i p which closes the gap between the subjective and the objective. whatever the expressing r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i t can't be, as S e l l a r s assumed, a pr e r e q u i s i t e f o r awareness; for awareness, i t would seem i s presupposed by i t . I t has been shown, I hope, that, f a r from being the most basic form of awareness, the expression of a fact presupposes awareness both of that which i s expressed and of that which expresses i t . To repeat the point i n the e x p l i c i t l y S e l l a r s i a n terms i n which i t arose, recognition of fac t s of the form X i s a r e l i a b l e symptom of Y cannot be the most basic form of awareness; for surely such a recognition presupposes p r i o r awarenesses (of some sort) both of X and of Y. And holism, though an e s s e n t i a l part of the story, doesn't evade t h i s consequence. 88 6. The Source of the Problem? Having accepted S e l l a r s ' argument to show that the P-theory version of sensing cannot serve, i n the manner t r a d i t i o n a l l y assumed, as the foundation of empirical knowledge, and having found that h i s attempt to r e t a i n , i n connection with awareness, a c e n t r a l aspect of the P-theory version of s e n s i n g — a type of subjective/objective s p l i t — r e s u l t s ultimately,- i f one i s , l i k e S e l l a r s , unwilling to accept the 'thermometer view' of awareness, i n the reappearance of the same type of problems which plague the P-theory account of sensing, the obvious move seems to be to re-examine that aspect of the P-theory which S e l l a r s retained. Perhaps the unacceptability of the P-theory l i e s i n i t s assumption, not j u s t , as S e l l a r s noticed, at the l e v e l of sensing, but at any l e v e l of awareness, of a subjective/objective s p l i t . In the chapter which follows the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e j e c t i n g the subjective/ objective analysis of awareness and knowledge w i l l be explored. 89 NOTES I s h a l l acknowledge l a t e r an important, but for the present point i r r e l e v a n t , sense i n which t h i s claim i s an o v e r - s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . 2 Roderick F i r t h , "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory," i n Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J . Swartz (Garden Cit y , New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 255. 3 W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," i n Science, Perception and Re a l i t y , International Library of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 162, 167. ^ W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "The Structure of Knowledge: (1) Perception, (2) Minds, (3) Epistemic P r i n c i p l e s , " i n Action, Knowledge and Re a l i t y : Essays i n Honor of W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , ed. Hector-Neri Castaneda (Indian-a p o l i s : The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975), p. 323. 90 CHAPTER IV A Non-dual Account of Awareness of: Exploring the P o s s i b i l i t y 1. The Subjective/Objective Dualism i ) Like Piaget, I believe that the concepts of space, time, motion, object, s e l f and other are a l l constructed by the conscious organism. At the outset of i t s l i f e the human infant i s completely egocentric: It s experiences are u t t e r l y devoid of any hint of a subjective/ objective d i s t i n c t i o n . Objectively speaking, the infant has, or, better perhaps, animates a body which e x i s t s i n a c e r t a i n place at a c e r t a i n time; h i s body has a c e r t a i n s i z e and a c e r t a i n shape; as we l l , i t has c e r t a i n c a p a c i t i e s for movement, some of which, c a l l e d r e f l e x e s , operate automatically without the conscious d i r e c t i o n of the infant; and others of which e x i s t at the outset only as p o t e n t i a l i t i e s and which w i l l become actual only gradually and i n connection with the gradually expanding awareness and the increasing a b i l i t y to intend (and, of course, the physical maturation), of the infant and c h i l d . This c o l l e c t i o n of objective f a c t s about an infant organism constitutes what Sartre would c a l l h i s f a c t i c i t y . His f a c t i c i t y , by s e t t i n g , or perhaps by con s i s t i n g of, objective l i m i t a t i o n s on h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p with the rest of objective r e a l i t y , determines the conditions under which a conscious-ness, a s u b j e c t i v i t y , can come into contact with objective r e a l i t y as a whole; determines, that i s , an organism's point of view on objective r e a l i t y . But subjective experience, though i t rests u l t i m a t e l y on r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g within objective r e a l i t y , does not at the outset, being egocentric, involve any appreciation whatsoever of hdw~~ i n d i v i d u a l experiences f i t into the objective p i c t u r e . There i s a complete lack of d u a l i t y , of any d i s t i n c t i o n between the s e l f and the n o t - s e l f i n the neonate's experience. The h i s t o r y of each human i n d i v i d u a l and of the human race i n general i s the h i s t o r y of a progressive evolution towards an ever l e s s subjective point of view on experience; towards the development of an ever more objective framework within which to place and to organize, thereby granting an increasing measure of order and coherence to, subjective experience. When, as chi l d r e n , we discover that the sounds which we hear have v i s u a l and t a c t u a l c o r r e l a t e s and accordingly we 'postulate' the physical world, the move i s re l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r to the move which we make when, contemplating, amongst other things, the nature of our eardrums and the motion of. a guitar s t r i n g , we postulate sound waves; or when, contemplating, amongst other things, the negative r e s u l t s of the Michelson-Morley experiment, we, i f we ju s t happen to be a genius l i k e E i n s t e i n , postulate curved space-time. Each of these moves has, as Thomas Nagel puts i t , a d i r e c t i o n ; from subjective to objective. Each move i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n allows us to make couhterfactual statements of greater generality. But i f being subjective means having  a point of view and being objective means having none, then only the move from l i v i n g to dying, from being conscious to being non-conscious, constitutes a move from being subjective to being objective. In f a c t , of course, the move towards o b j e c t i v i t y doesn't involve leaving behind a l l points of view, a l l s u b j e c t i v i t y , i t only involves abandoning (perhaps only for the time being), a r e l a t i v e l y l e s s encompassing point of view i n favour of a more encompassing one. No matter how objective our theories, that i s to say our descriptions, predictions and explanations, become, they are always subj ective because the very act of t h e o r i z i n g , of describing, p r e d i c t i n g or explaining, e n t a i l s a point of view, which i n turn e n t a i l s consciousness, experiences, about which to theorize. i i ) I w i l l endeavor i n the present chapter to make sense of the notions of s u b j e c t i v i t y , o b j e c t i v i t y , point of view, and theory construction as they occur i n the foregoing statement of p o s i t i o n i n some way such that they manage to avoid the problems which I have claimed b e f a l l the t r a d i t i o n a l d u a l i s t i c - t y p e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to which they are generally subjected. An adequate treatment of the subjective/objective s p l i t must, I believe, begin by recognizing that i t reappears on three separate, though re l a t e d , planes of discourse Thus we have an o n t o l o g i c a l , an '. epistemic, and a semantic issue. Though t h i s way of putting i t i s misleading; for while i t seems cle a r that we have an issue within the o n t o l o g i c a l , my contention w i l l be that we have issues about the epistemic and the semantic. What ijs an epistemic or a semantic r e l a t i o n ? Though I s h a l l not attempt to argue for a p o s i t i o n on the o n t o l o g i c a l issue, my i n c l i n a t i o n s are towards the b e l i e f that, on the o n t o l o g i c a l plane, the subjective/objective s p l i t can be made i n such a way as to pick out an actual d u a l i t y . I am, therefore, a d u a l i s t 93 But the type of dualism which I accept comes nowhere near the traditional P-theory mental/physical duality. In my discussion of the P-theory account of our awareness of physical objects I over-simplified by talking as though the notion of states of consciousness only became introduced under pressure from the inadequacies of naive realism. In fact, of course, the occurrence:of sensations such as pains, pleasures, tickles, etc., as well as a l l the mental attitudes, both cognitive and affective, makes some such:_notion as that of states of consciousness very basic. And indeed, this fact, of the prior presence and operation of such a notion, probably explains the ease with which we uncritically move back and forth between the notions of, for example, seeing a red object and having a sensation of red, the need for the presence of both of which amounted, I contended, to a demonstration of the f a l s i t y of naive realism. To my earlier, over-simplified account of the connection between a naive realist position on perception and the notion of states of consciousness I have just added the admission that naive realism, in that i t does not conceive of pains and pleasures as properties of physical objects, is not only compatible with, but in fact requires the public/private distinction which the physical objects/states of consciousness distinction involves. But in keeping with my earlier account let me reiterate that naive realism is f a l s i f i e d when i t is forced to treat what are supposed by the position to be publicly available (states of physical objects) as though they were available only via private intermediaries (states of consciousness, sense-data or whatever). I wish to show now that the mental/physical l i n e which the P-theory draws and holds as marking an on t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n i n fact divides a c l a s s which i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y homogeneous. Thus I wish to argue that even i f the naive r e a l i s t presupposition was not upset by the need to have what ought to be public turn out to be private, the pu b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n s t i l l could only at best be seen as making a useful subdivision within a sing l e o n t o l o g i c a l realm. The pu b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n , s l o p p i l y used, as i t so often i s , to make an on t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between a mental and a physical realm, begs the phi l o s o p h i c a l question at issue: In so far as the pu b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n i s assumed to have onto-l o g i c a l implications, i t i s being used to make a d i s t i n c t i o n which i t can, so understood, only properly be seen as being the product of. Common-sensically we think of the physi c a l world, as d i s t i n c t from the mental realm, as being, for example, v i s i b l e and tangible or concrete. But we can, i f we think c a r e f u l l y about i t , see that t h i s common-sense c r i t e r i o n of the physical cannot give content to the o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n which i t i s c a l l e d upon to support. When I touch something my experience i s j u s t as 'phenomenal' as my experience of, say, pain. Consider: I am holding a pen i n my hand; I tighten my grip on i t and I experience what we think of as (an awareness of) contact with a concrete object; I have touched something hard, something hard i s 'out there'. Now i f I press the point of the pen into the palm of my other hand I have a d i f f e r e n t type of experience, one of pain. But the experience, though d i f f e r e n t , i s not d i f f e r e n t i n any way which w i l l help us to make the mental/ physical d i s t i n c t i o n . One of these experiences i s considered para-digmatic of the p h y s i c a l , the other i s considered paradigmatic of the mental. In f a c t , both, when considered independently of the question-begging p u b l i c / p r i v a t e d i s t i n c t i o n , can be seen to be nothing but sensations; and, as such, are inescapably phenomenal or subjective. Berkeley, of course, has argued for what I have i n e f f e c t j u s t pointed to. Whereas I have simply claimed that there i s nothing about the two s i t u a t i o n s which j u s t i f i e s our d i s t i n c t i o n between perceiving s o l i d i t y and sensing pain, Berkeley argued the point by showing that frequently, as i n the case of perceiving great heat and sensing pain, the perceptual state i s i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the sensory state. To show that the aspect of the 'public' property which i s being perceived can be i d e n t i c a l with the 'private' sensation being undergone makes the same point that much more strongly. D.M. Armstrong has claimed that Berkeley's argument, "...would prove at best that our sense-impressions of heat are simply sensations.../and/ would do nothing to show that any q u a l i t y of a p h y s i c a l object, such as the q u a l i t y heat, i s a sensation".''' Armstrong's remark reveals how easy i t i s to equivocate on the notion of o b j e c t i v i t y . For while i t i s true that, i f there i s an o b j e c t i v e realm, the q u a l i t i e s which are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i t w i l l not be sensations, i t i s f a r from c l e a r that Armstrong i s using the expression 'physical object' i n the above quotation i n such a way that i t picks out, or aims at picking out, e n t i t i e s within the elusive objective realm (assuming that there even i s one). Indeed i t seems cl e a r that Armstrong i s not using 'physical object' i n that way. 96 Thus his use of that expression seems to be such as to make h i s remark quoted above—given that i n the other, more usual way of using 'physical objects', properties of physical objects are perceived by us—amount to a simultaneous acceptance and r e j e c t i o n of Berkeley's argument. As Philonous r e p l i e s to Hylas, so Berkeley would reply to Armstrong: Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, the things we  immediately perceive by our senses, whatever other q u a l i t i e s , therefore, you speak of, as d i s t i n c t from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at a l l belong to the point i n dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s which you do not perceive, and assert those i n s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s e x i s t i n f i r e and sugar. But what use can be made of t h i s to your present purpose, I am at a l o s s to conceive. While I would not wish to be seen as 'pretending' that we can discover q u a l i t i e s which we cannot perceive, I would maintain that the subjective/objective d i s t i n c t i o n can, nevertheless, be sensibly held to mark an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y . I would add that we, as conscious beings, are absolutely locked within the confines of the subjective side of the d u a l i t y , with the true nature of the objective side n e c e s s a r i l y and completely eluding us. At best what we can say about the objective side i s that i t has c e r t a i n sorts of causal c a p a c i t i e s , the e f f e c t s of which are apparent i n the subjective side of which we are c o n s t i t u t i v e . (Though I do not mean to be assuming here that t a l k about c a u s a l i t y i s non-problematic, I am, I guess, assuming that some sort of phenomenon, recognizably a counterpart of that to which the common^sense""n6tion:df:causality i s applied, does i n fact occur, both within and across o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e s ; or, at the very l e a s t , that we have some idea of what i t means to t a l k as though there were such a 97 phenomenon and that the facts as we know them seem to require such talk.) I am well aware that the place at which I am claiming that the o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e ought, i f i t i s to be drawn at a l l , to be drawn, does not meet with general acceptance. But I have argued i n two ways that the usual way of drawing the l i n e i s problematic. Thus I have j u s t argued that such a d i s t i n c t i o n can't be upheld by the evidence offered i n i t s support—by, that i s , the difference between, for example, the experience of pain and those other experiences generally taken to involve d i r e c t awareness of physical objects. And I argued e a r l i e r that the r e q u i s i t e kind of s e n s e — r e q u i s i t e , that i s , to play a r o l e i n an account of empirical knowledge—cannot be made out of any form of the subjective/objective d i s t i n c t i o n — s u c h as the mental/ physical one—which has the subjective aspect standing i n some form of awareness of r e l a t i o n s h i p with the objective aspect, such that the objective i s present to, or before, the subjective. Indeed I construed the e f f a b i l i t y / i n e f f a b i l i t y issue i n S e l l a r s ' argument against givenness as being j u s t another way of making the same point; a point which I put i n terms of 'getting some'thiSg:'-ihto' .the^subjective. The objective has, I would suggest, a causal influence on the nature of the subjective and to that extent i t 'gets into the subjective'. But the objective i s not, cannot be, as common-sense would have i t , presented to, and subsequently conceptually assimilated into, the subjective. The true nature of the objective n e c e s s a r i l y eludes the subjective. The claim that though there i s (or might be) an o n t o l o g i c a l duality,- we, as conscious beings, are s t r i c t l y locked within, indeed are c o n s t i t u t i v e of, one h a l f of that d u a l i t y , amounts to a tendency to sympathize with t r a d i t i o n a l phenomenalist-type p o s i t i o n s . But i n most cases, I think, even the phenomenalist f a l l s prey to the type of d u a l i t y which I am r e j e c t i n g ; f o r , l i k e the d i r e c t r e a l i s t , he, as S e l l a r s also noted, has the subject standing, u s e l e s s l y , i n r e l a t i o n to something which i t i s given. For the phenomenalist, the subject stands to sense-data as, for the naive r e a l i s t , i t stands to physical objects. Thus to the extent that epistemic and semantic issues are confined within the subjective h a l f of the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y , and I suggest that to a very large extent they are, the account which I w i l l suggest for the epistemic, and u l t i m a t e l y for the semantic issue, w i l l be more monistic than phenomenalism. (In the l a s t chapter, for example, I w i l l suggest that though reference r e l a t i o n s aim at crossing the o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e , t h i s i s only i d e a l l y and never i n fact achievable.) C l e a r l y the major and pressing problem confronting the p o s i t i o n which I am developing i s the need to provide some a l t e r n a t i v e to the type of dualism, between a subject and an o b j e c t i v i t y to which i t stands somehow i n an awareness of r e l a t i o n , which I have everywhere rejected as inadequate. C l e a r l y , as w e l l , the passage with which I began t h i s chapter shows that the non-dualist a l t e r n a t i v e which I o f f e r must allow me to make some kind of sense, within what I claim to be ontologic- a l l y purely subjective, of t a l k of a subjective/objective d i s t i n c t i o n , of points of view, of awareness of_, of theorizing, of conceptual frame-works, etc. . The Outlines of a Theory i) In the pages which follow I w i l l o f f e r a sketch of a p o s i t i o n on the nature of consciousness. There i s , l e t me s t a r t by assuming, a p l u r a l i t y of consciousnesses. C o l l e c t i v e l y , the p l u r a l i t y of consciousnesses make up the subjective h a l f of the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y . As a theory about consciousness, the theory I am about to sketch i s therefore, at the same time, a theory about the s u b j e c t i v e — i n so far as i t i s a theory about a representative part of the subjective as a whole. I w i l l not attempt to argue for the p o s i t i o n which I w i l l develop beyond the negative arguments which motivated i t s creation. I hope that once the sketch i s complete some advantages of the p o s i t i o n may begin to emerge as such issues as awareness, conceptual development, the phenomenological appeal and, i n the l a s t chapter, semantic r e l a t i o n s , are considered i n i t s l i g h t . The p o s i t i o n developed w i l l be crude and grossly inadequate; but i f I mean thereby to make an apology i t i s not so much for the inadequacy of the attempt as f o r the audacity involved i n the very making of i t . For surely nothing could be more audacious than to attempt to say something worth saying about that most b a f f l i n g of a l l phenomena, the phenomenon of consciousness. It i s a measure of the mystery of the phenomenon, and a sorry but accurate measure of our lack of comprehension of i t , that even a crude and grossly inadequate account may have something to add to the accounts which precede i t , however subtle and d e t a i l e d i t s predecessors might be. We are, i t seems to me, s t i l l very much i n 100 search of new d i r e c t i o n s i n which to head. Before launching into the account I should add as well a word of warning about the method which I w i l l use. The fact i s that i t i s n ' t even e n t i r e l y c l e a r to me what the method i s that I am using. It amounts, I think, to some combination of describing (near verging, at times, on mere naming—in some hopefully suggestive way), and theoriz i n g . The notion of theorizing i s generally t i e d to the idea of introducing imperceptible, or at l e a s t , as yet unperceived, e n t i t i e s . But i n the context of 'theorizing' about the nature of consciousness that idea doesn't seem to be of much help. For, more than most, i t i s the notion of perceiving, and the rel a t e d notions of n o t i c i n g and being aware o f — e v e n of theorizing i t s e l f — w h i c h i s up for grabs i n constructing a theory of consciousness. While one of the things which c l e a r l y I am not doing, I think, i s postulating 'unperceived' e n t i t i e s , i t nevertheless can't be true that what I am doing i s j u s t describing, as d i s t i n c t from t h e o r i z i n g . Whatever t h e o r i z i n g i s c o r r e c t l y understood to involve, an e s s e n t i a l part of what I'm doing has to be theori z i n g . Philosophers of science have long recognized that d e s c r i p t i o n i s inseparable from theory. Perhaps what I'm doing, then, i s describing and i n so doing revealing a theory. I f one t r i e s to bear i n mind the e s s e n t i a l respect i n which what I am doing i s describing i t may be possible to a l l e v i a t e , somewhat, the impression that I seem frequently to draw d i s t i n c t i o n s from nowhere. I ostensibly o f f e r no argument for them. I j u s t make them. Please understand that my argument for these d i s t i n c t i o n s , and my only argument for them, i s that I, i n some sense, f i n d them—I take 101 the d i s t i n c t i o n s which I make to be the crude analogues, f i r s t approximations, of those which I discern dimly to be operative i n the phenomenon of consciousness. F i n a l l y I should add that several of the more important d i s t i n c t i o n s which w i l l be made i n the succeeding pages are ones which I — i n a d i f f e r e n t sense of found.'—have found ready-made i n Piaget. My e n t i r e p o s i t i o n i s , I believe, profoundly Piagetian. I hope that, were i t possible to ask him, he would be able to recognize i t as such. In weaving Piaget's d i s t i n c t i o n s into the context of my own I hope that I do him no greater i n j u s t i c e than that of having taken them from t h e i r o r i g i n a l contexts and s i m p l i f i e d them for my own purposes. Indeed I hope that I have not misunderstood Piaget and that, to some great extent, my_ purposes are h i s purposes. Having been able, i n the opening paragraphs of the Introduction, to put the major, underlying assumption of the e n t i r e present discussion i n the words of Piaget, i t seems not the l e a s t s u r p r i s i n g that large and c e n t r a l chunks of Piaget's elaborate theory should, or should seem to, f i t p e r f e c t l y into place i n an attempt to follow up that assumption. The assumption to which I r e f e r i s , of course, the one involved i n the r e j e c t i o n of a g e n e t i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e subjective/objective s p l i t . Since Piaget was, where I am not, concerned to avoid as much as possible pure ph i l o s o p h i c a l speculation, there i s room, I believe, even a crying need, for a p h i l o s o p h i c a l examination of the type of conceptual evolution the occurrence:of which Piaget's. empirical investigations have, I believe, b r i l l i a n t l y established. The progressive diminution of the r a d i c a l egocentrism—as Piaget r e f e r s to the i n i t i a l t o t a l lack of a 102 subjective/objective s p l i t — w h i c h i s c o n s t i t u t i v e of the conceptual evolution of the conscious organism, c r i e s out for p h i l o s o p h i c a l underpinnings. In fact I am convinced, though I w i l l not t r y to develop the idea here, that i t i s the absence of such a p h i l o s o p h i c a l underpinning which leaves Piaget apparently at a l o s s for a way to answer the type of attack which Jerry Fodor brings against h i s : 3 stage-wise theory of conceptual evolution. The structure of Fodor's attack, according to which a l l concepts must be innate, i s highly s i m i l a r to that of the S e l l a r s i a n programme which would have a l l awareness a function of the stimulus/response a c q u i s i t i o n of language. Common to both S e l l a r s and Fodor i s the assumption of a pervasive subjective/ objective s p l i t , i m p l i c i t i n which assumption are some fundamentally wrong assumptions about the nature and operation of concepts. As pure, often wild, p h i l o s o p h i c a l speculation, the endeavor which follows i s u n l i k e l y to be one of which Piaget would approve; nevertheless, as designed to lay bare the p h i l o s o p h i c a l foundations of h i s theory of genetic epistemology, i t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y borrows, wherever::ppss±blei• from the Piagetian wealth of empirically-based d i s t i n c t i o n s a l l of which are ph i l o s o p h i c a l l y - l a d e n . i i ) With a reader, I hope, s u f f i c i e n t l y warned, l e t me f i n a l l y launch into my attempt to provide an a l t e r n a t i v e to the t r a d i t i o n a l , e s s e n t i a l l y d u a l i s t i c accounts of consciousness. F i r s t of a l l I should say that I accept as an important fact about consciousness the existence of two aspects of consciousness—an a c t i v e and a passive one. Consciousness i s a flow of states the flow of which has.causal sources both within and without (where that which i s out 103 of consciousness i s either within another consciousness or within the objective h a l f of the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y ; causal e f f e c t s the o r i g i n s of which l i e within another consciousness are l i k e l y made possible by intermediary e f f e c t s within the objective, but nothing i n the p o s i t i o n to be developed w i l l hang on whether or not t h i s p a r t i c u l a r suspicion of mine i s true). While the fact of the d u a l i t y of aspects c o n s t i t u t i v e of consciousness w i l l be shown to play an absolutely e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n accounting for the form of subjective/objective d i s t i n c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the P-theory, i t amounts to only the very beginning of that account. The s e l f / n o t -s e l f d i s t i n c t i o n of the P-theory cannot be aligned with the d i s t i n c t i o n between that which i s a c t i v e and that which i s passive i n consciousness. Much on the s e l f side of the s e l f / n o t - s e l f d i s t i n c t i o n i s passive. Nevertheless, the s e l f / n o t - s e l f d i s t i n c t i o n would never have emerged i f i t were not for the fact that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the flow of conscious states l i e s p a r t l y within consciousness i t s e l f . In an important sense I accept as w e l l , as I have frequently hinted, the existence of something l i k e what philosophers have c a l l e d sense-data. But I r e j e c t any form of act/object account of sensing such that sense-data are the objects of such acts. Sensing i s , one might say, something which happens to consciousness; not something which consciousness does. Put i n terms of what I claimed was the o n t o l o g i c a l l y correct way of drawing the subjective/objective l i n e (where, i n the sense i n which the phenomenalist says that everything i s phenomenal, everything i s subjective and, for me, though not for t r a d i t i o n a l phenomenalists, the objective i s i n f e r r e d only by what are taken to be 104 i t s causal e f f e c t s within the subjective) sensing i s a causal process  running from the objective to the subjective. Sense-data are the causal r e s u l t s , within the subjective, of the causal process, sensing. Sense-data are, i n some sense., then, parts of states of consciousness. Because sense-data are parts of states of consciousness which are caused, they belong to that aspect of consciousness which i s passive. But i t should be very c l e a r by now, I hope, that by t h i s account they are not, for a l l that, given to consciousness. Consciousness i s n ' t given that which i s a part of i t s e l f . Sense-data are, I suggest further, caused to ex i s t on several planes. For each sensory mode, that i s , a separate plane or layer of sense-data i s caused to e x i s t . At the outset of i t s existence, when the conscious being i s u t t e r l y egocentric, each layer of sense-data i s somehow d i s t i n c t from, unrelated to, any of the others. The claim that sense-data are caused to ex i s t i n planes or l a y e r s — s u c h that being d i f f e r e n t parts of the same layer i s characterizable i n terms of entering into c e r t a i n sorts of ordering r e l a t i o n s (for example, beside, l a r g e r , brighter, etc. in the v i s u a l layer; louder, higher, longer, etc. i n the auditory layer;) and not being parts of the same layer i s characterizable by the absence of any such, except temporal, ordering r e l a t i o n s — s h o u l d seem, i n so far as one i s prepared to condone t a l k about sense-data at a l l , r e l a t i v e l y uncontentious. To the claims that .sense-data are parts of states of consciousness, parts caused to ex i s t by processes o r i g i n a t i n g i n the objective realm, and caused to ex i s t i n layers , I would l i k e to add the claim that conscious- ness j u s t i s awareness. For there to be states of consciousness i s for 105 there to be awareness; not, for the most part, awareness of, but awareness. Thus, s t r i c t l y contrary to S e l l a r s , the present account holds that i f there i s s e n s i n g — i f , that i s , sense-data have been, or are being, caused to e x i s t — t h e n there i s awareness. The conjunction of a l l these claims, that sense-data are parts of states of consciousness and exi s t i n layers and that the existence of consciousness i s i d e n t i c a l with the existence of awareness, has some seemingly strange implications for the nature of awareness. But the strange-ness i s only, I think, a function of our preoccupation with awareness of and as such i s only apparent. Ultimately, I would urge, the implications are not only not strange but are a c t u a l l y p e r f e c t l y f i t t e d to the f a c t s . The basic implication of t h i s conjunction of r e l a t i v e l y uncon-tentious claims (the claim that a state of consciousness j u s t i s a state of awareness would have to be seen as the place at which the contentious-ness gets i n , given that there i s , I have claimed, a general tendency to construe states of consciousness as e n t i t i e s of which we are aware) might perhaps be expressed as the claim that awareness i s spread-out. I t would be hard to over-estimate the r o l e being played i n the present thesis by the claim that awareness i s spread-out. In making t h i s claim I mean to tr y to capture the idea that a moment of awareness exhibits an extreme, indeed an i n f i n i t e , degree of complexity. Awareness of-type a c c o u n t s — accounts, that i s , which take awareness to be an e s s e n t i a l l y dual phenome-no n — g e n e r a l l y f a i l to do j u s t i c e to the continuity and i n f i n i t e complexity of a moment of awareness by t r y i n g to push i t into a type of t h e o r e t i c a l mold characterized by discreteness and f i n i t u d e — l e a v i n g , as i t were, the 106 continuity and complexity i n what they take to be the objects of awareness. Thus i t seems to me that the idea that the given must be i n , or gotten into, p r o p o s i t i o n a l form i s ultimately the idea that the given, which i s characterized by continuity and complexity, must be made 'accessible', useful, to the subject by rendering i t down into a f i n i t e number of d i s t i n c t elements. That there must rather be a non-dual, spread-out form of aware-ness i s the heart of the claim which I am making against S e l l a r s . I t i s at the heart, as we l l , of the explanation of claims which I have made and w i l l make to the e f f e c t that the moves between increasing l e v e l s of awareness or conceptualization, and the nature of semantic r e l a t i o n s i n general, are h o l i s t i c . A l l forms of h o l i s t i c explanation rest ultimately, I'm suggest-ing, on a 'spread-out' account of awareness. The notion of spread-outness i s intended to play an e s s e n t i a l r o l e also i n char a c t e r i z i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n I've made between awareness and awareness of. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , as I've said over and over again, the attempt to account for the evolution of awareness has taken awareness of_ as the basic, indeed the only, form of awareness. And awareness ojE, taken as basi c , has seemed obviously a dual phenomenon, with the p o s s i b i l i t y of a s s i m i l a t i n g the objective into the subjective seeming to presuppose the p o s s i b i l i t y of categorizing i t i n terms of dis c r e t e , determinate, f i n i t e l y denumerable properties. But even i f we could ignore the S e l l a r s i a n problems associated with such an account, features such as discreteness, determinateness and f i n i t u d e have seemed to lock us within t r a d i t i o n a l inductive/deductive analyses of conceptual advance and to preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of h o l i s t i c analyses. On aware- ness of-rtype accounts, for example, we either notice something or we don't; and i f we don't then there doesn't seem to be any way to claim (as S e l l a r s 107 t r i e d to) that we can become aware of i t , i n some h o l i s t i c manner, on the basis of relevant f a c t s from our past, facts which, S e l l a r s would have i t , we can bring from our pasts by memory even though we weren't aware of them at the time they were present. If something i s never a part of any present moment of awareness, how could i t ever be brought from the past by memory? Though I would agree that we can r e c a l l an event i n terms of a higher l e v e l of conceptual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n than we were capable of at the actual time of the event—and thus that we can r e c a l l an event d i f f e r e n t l y than we o r i g i n a l l y experienced i t ; (Piaget has established experimentally that such increases i n conceptualization between event and r e c a l l do i n 4 fact occur. ) — I am claiming that i t i s j u s t nonsense to hold that we can, at some point, become, h o l i s t i c a l l y , aware of an event as being of a c e r t a i n type when previously we had.no awareness of any sort of such events. To say that sense-data, as parts of consciousness, are caused to e x i s t i n layers i s to say more than j u s t that awareness, as i d e n t i c a l with consciousness, i s spread-out. I t i s to say as well something about how awareness i s spread-out. The layeredness claim has two types of implications about the nature of the spread-outness of awareness. On the one hand, to speak of layers -.involveg;"-"attrlbuting, "within the~layers a - type of continuity;. on-the other:; hand^; there is-being:.made an a t t r i b u t i o n of a type of d i s c o n t i n u i t y between the layers. Thus on the one hand I am a t t r i b u t i n g , probably, more order and structure to the nascent conscious-ness than would be a t t r i b u t e d to i t by c l a s s i c a l Sense-datum Theorists. Like the Gestalt Theorist I am denying that i t i s necessary for conscious-ness to construct ordering or 'next to' r e l a t i o n s amongst sense-data causally dependent upon the same perceptual apparatus. Sensory f i e l d s , 108 r e l a t i v e to each sensory mode, are not constructed by the a c t i v i t y of consciousness, they are rather, and from the outset, j u s t a feature of the passive aspect of consciousness. At the same time as implying a kind of continuity, however, to speak of layers i s to imply a r a d i c a l kind of s p l i n t e r i n g within the structure of spread-out awareness. The layers of sense-data character-i s t i c of d i f f e r e n t sensory modes, though somehow superimposed upon one another i n a way r e q u i s i t e to being parts of the same consciousness, are, at the same time, divided from one another i n such a way as to make impossible the type of 'next to' r e l a t i o n s e s s e n t i a l to the existence . of sensory f i e l d s . The account which I have j u s t given of awareness as being spread-out and characterized by both a type of continuity and a type of d i s c o n t i n u i t y i s supposed to provide the basis for an a l t e r n a t i v e to t r a d i t i o n a l accounts of the nature of consciousness which seem to s t a r t by assuming that awareness i s b a s i c a l l y a r e l a t i o n between a subject and some form of o b j e c t i v i t y . But the present account cannot sensibly deny that there i s a type of phenomenon to which we are r e f e r r i n g when we speak of awareness of_. If the spread-out account i s to be of any help, there-fore, a way must be demonstrated, within the confines of such an account, of adequately d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g states of awareness of from what i s being claimed to be the more general and basic state, states of awareness. In e f f e c t , some account must be given of the phenomenon of attention. Further, some hint must be given of how i t i s that what are o r i g i n a l l y 'splintered o f f layers of sense-data are ult i m a t e l y orches-trated into a-pattern of awareness—of spread-out awareness—'-the layers of which complement one another as parts of a u n i f i e d whole. Thus Piaget, making what 1 think amounts to a claim s i m i l a r to my claim that awareness i s spread-out i n a way characterized, i n the e a r l i e s t genetic stage, by both continuity and d i s c o n t i n u i t y , says that space, at the . beginning of cognitive development, consists "of a p l u r a l i t y of spaces (buccal, t a c t i l e - k i n e s t h e t i c , etc.) centered on one's own body". Piaget holds that, "...at about eighteen months through a s h i f t of perspective (decentration) t r u l y comparable to the Copernican revolution, space becomes a s i n g l e homogeneous container i n which a l l objects are situated, including one's own body.""' Thus at about eighteen months genetic development manages, somehow, to overcome the d i s c o n t i n u i t y or s p l i n t e r e d -ness which characterizes the nascent form of awareness. I t w i l l be important to t r y to explain how t h i s can be so; how a p l u r a l i t y of spaces centred on one's body can be transformed such that awareness i s of one's body as an object among others situated or contained i n a homogeneous space. i i i ) Several things need to be added to the account as i t stands. But f i r s t l e t me survey what we have so f a r . Consciousness, as the subjective h a l f of an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y , i s a non-dual phenomenon caused, i n part, by the objective realm but i n no way entering into any form of d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p , as perceiving i s mistakenly supposed to be, with the objective. Consciousness i s a flow of states the causal determinants of which o r i g i n a t e both within and without. Thus i t involves two aspects, an a c t i v e and a passive one. Consciousness i s the same as awareness. Awareness occurs, o r i g i n a l l y , i n layers which are spread-out and s p l i n t e r e d o f f from one another. As an a l t e r n a t i v e to the idea that attending to or being aware of something i s a phenomenon to be analyzed i n terms of something l i k e the inherently dual metaphor of a l i g h t shining onto that of which there i s awareness, I suggest that the layers of sense-data, i n addition to being spread-out, are shaped. Aspects of i n d i v i d u a l layers become—as a function of factors which w i l l be discussed s h o r t l y — r e l i e f e d against the background of the rest of the layer. By t h i s account, then, while the sense-data which form the background are part of awareness ( i . e . are i n consciousness), there i s , as w e l l , awareness of those which are r e l i e f e d . Though i t i s n ! t possible to speak of i n d i v i d u a l layers of sense-data r e l i e f i n g against one a n o t h e r — i n that the r e q u i s i t e continuity r e l a t i o n s , r e q u i s i t e f o r the formation of sensory f i e l d s , do not hold between layers of s e n s e - d a t a — i t can be said that the layers compete with one another. Consciousness as a t o t a l i t y i s , l i k e the i n d i v i d u a l layers of sense-data, though i n some more complex sense, shaped as well. Thus i n so f a r as the layers are, as I claimed e a r l i e r , superimposed on one another, i t can be said that the phenomenon of superimposition i s such as to admit of ordering r e l a t i o n s . Sense-data layers are ordered amongst themselves and that ordering can and does f l u c t u a t e . The notion of shape, both within and between layers of sense-data w i l l seem l e s s l i k e complete nonsense, I believe, i f one keeps i n mind what t h e o r e t i c a l function i t i s being held to f u l f i l l . The notion, l e t me repeat, i s being introduced as a possible a l t e r n a t i v e to inherently dual analyses of the phenomenon of being aware of or attending to something. And attention, i t seems to me, c l e a r l y admits of two dimensions: I am, for I l l example, presently attending more to the contents of my v i s u a l f i e l d than, say, my auditory, and I am attending more to c e r t a i n of the contents of my v i s u a l f i e l d than to others. In the f i r s t case, I'm suggesting, my attention i s a function of ordering r e l a t i o n s holding between my superim-posed layers of sense-data; i n the second case, my attention i s a function of r e l i e f i n g r e l a t i o n s holding within my layer of v i s u a l sense-data. In summary, i f consciousness i s a flow, i t s flow i s a function of (at least) two f a c t o r s : the changing content of the layers of sense-data and the changing shape of those laye r s , both within i n d i v i d u a l layers and i n the ordering r e l a t i o n s holding between them. At the genetic beginnings of awareness, r e l i e f i n g within i n d i v i d u a l layers i s a function of two (related) f a c t o r s . F i r s t , c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l types of sense-data are possessed of what I s h a l l c a l l i n t r i n s i c meaning which sets them o f f against the other i n d i v i d u a l types of sense-data occurring within the same layer. Certain types of sense-data are, that i s , pleasant or p a i n f u l , i n t e r e s t i n g or boring, soothing or f r i g h t e n i n g , etc. Such sense-data are, i t ' s being claimed, r e l i e f e d against the t o t a l i t y of the sensory layer i n which they occur. Being r e l i e f e d i s n ' t r e a l l y , when the r e l i e f i n g i s a function of i n t r i n s i c meaning, something besides having i n t r i n s i c meaning. The two are j u s t d i f f e r e n t ways of describing the same phenomenon, one way being to describe the r e l a t i o n s occurring within the sense-data layer and the other way being to ascribe to aspects of the layer the property which accounts for those r e l a t i o n s . The second type of r e l i e f i n g operative at the outset i s a func-t i o n of the structure of the perceptual apparatus, p a r t i c u l a r l y of those 112 apparatus associated with the v i s u a l and ta c t u a l layers of sense-data. These apparatus are so structured as to have f o c a l points such that i n d i -v i d u a l sense-data-types are caused to r e l i e f and recede as a function of the motion of those f o c a l points. (Talk of perceptual apparatus i s obviously highly complicated since given the on t o l o g i c a l form of the subjective/objective s p l i t which I have endorsed, such t a l k should be formulable within e i t h e r the subjective or the objective mode. Within the objective i t would have to be i n terms of causal chains responsible for the content and shape of sense-data lay e r s . Within the subjective mode i t would require a highly complex account i n terms of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the various sense-data laye r s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the simultaneously a l t e r i n g content and shape of d i f f e r e n t layers such as, for example, the v i s u a l and the ki n e s t h e t i c . The complexity involved with e i t h e r way of formulating t a l k about percep-t u a l apparatus i s such that I wouldn't even go as far as to claim that i t could be done, l e t alone to claim that I can do i t . But I hope to have given some vague impression, at l e a s t , of how such formulations might go.) iv) I f I can be generously granted the benefit of the doubt that t a l k of r e l i e f i n g as a function of eit h e r the i n t r i n s i c meaning of types of sense-data or of the structure of perceptual apparatus makes some very loose type of sense, l e t me now add to that that these two types of r e l i e f i n g enter into combination with each other and with the ac t i v e aspect of consciousness i n a c e r t a i n c r u c i a l l y important way. C r u c i a l l y important, that i s , to the attempt to give a genetic account 113 of the evolution of l e v e l s of awareness. The nascent consciousness, though capable of exerting energy (being, as i t i s , characterized by an a c t i v e as well as a passive aspect) i s incapable of acting, i n that acting involves i n t e n t i o n which i n turn involves, at the very l e a s t , representation and expectation, neither of which can be i n -voked by ei t h e r the account to t h i s point or the consciousness at that genetic stage. But though the a b i l i t y to d i r e c t i t s energy must be developed, the a b i l i t y to exert i t s energy i s , at the begin-ning, triggered automatically; the nascent consciousness, as we say, responds r e f l e x i v e l y to c e r t a i n s t i m u l i . Thus i n t r i n s i c a l l y meaning-f u l sense-data, the ones which hurt, f e e l nice, i n t e r e s t or bore, t r i g g e r automatic, i n t e n t i o n l e s s exertion of e f f o r t . The e f f o r t i s , as a function of complex fac t s about the way the subjective i s causal-l y lodged within the objective, channelled i n ways which a f f e c t the various perceptual apparatus, thereby a f f e c t i n g the flow of sense-data: Pleasant or i n t e r e s t i n g sense-data may be brought into focus, p a i n f u l or boring ones may be removed. Both e f f e c t s being achieved quite, i t must be remembered, a c c i d e n t a l l y or u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y . Highly s p e c i f i c forms of r e f l e x i v e behaviour e x i s t as well and also play an absolutely c e n t r a l r o l e i n the development of the a b i l i t y to intend. Sucking responses, looking responses and grasping responses are triggered by s p e c i f i c forms of stimulation. Even more than the general types of responses which can be triggered by various, non-specific types of sense-data complexes, these s p e c i f i c responses to s p e c i f i c types of stimulation are e s s e n t i a l to an account of i n t e n t i o n a l behaviour. In r e f l e x i v e behaviour we have now the f i r s t signs of what w i l l eventually 114 become a two-way st r e e t , a feedback r e l a t i o n s h i p as i t were, between the' layer of consciousness connected with k i n e s t h e t i c sensations, some of which are sensations of e f f o r t , and the other layers connected with the operation of the various perceptual apparatus. We have now the rudimentary requirements for a feedback r e l a t i o n s h i p between action and perception. We have yet to see how the exertion of e f f o r t becomes i n t e n t i o n a l . Requisite for such a develop-ment, i t was claimed e a r l i e r , are the re l a t e d c a p a c i t i e s of perceiving repre-sentation r e l a t i o n s h i p s and having expectations. These two c a p a c i t i e s involve conscious experience becoming, i n some p r i m i t i v e sense, temporalized and ob- j e c t i f i e d . Becoming p r i m i t i v e l y temporalized and o b j e c t i f i e d , but p a r t i c u l a r -l y the l a t t e r , amounts to the beginnings of the emergence of a subjective/ objective s p l i t within consciousness. Making a subjective/objective s p l i t within consciousness amounts to importing, and for very good reasons, the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y into consciousness. v) The p o s s i b i l i t y of the importation of an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y into what i s i n fa c t o n t o l o g i c a l l y non-dual rests on the fact that the passive aspect of consciousness, a f t e r i t s very e a r l i e s t stages, i s characterized by more than j u s t layers of sense-data. I s h a l l c a l l the more ghostliness. Along with present layers of sense-data, conscious-ness frequently contains ghosts of ones which have gone before and, based on past sense-data, ghosts of ones which are yet to come. I t should be cautioned that though from the things that w i l l be said about ghosts i t might seem that ghosts are i d e n t i c a l with images—for example v i s u a l and auditory i m a g e s — t h i s i s not i n fact so; images are ghosts but not a l l ghosts are images. Images, i t might be said, are ghosts brought out from the shadows. Less c o l o u r f u l l y , images are ghosts about which we must speak of awareness of_. The vast majority Of ghosts, l i k e the vast majority of sense-data, are part of awareness (consciousness) without being that part of awareness which i s r e l i e f e d . Moreover, images are ghosts themselves frequently haunted by ghosts. Whereas images compete with sense-data, much i n the way that layers of sense-data compete with one another, ghosts haunt both sense-data and images. In the most s t r i k i n g cases of ghosts—where the ghosts involved might be, but need not, I think, be images—types of sense-data complexes which have i n the past preceded ei t h e r s t r e s s f u l or pleasing types of sense-data conjure up the ghosts of those past and s t r e s s f u l or pleasing sense-data. But ghosts are much more common than are the occurrences of p a r t i c u l a r l y pleasing or s t r e s s f u l sense-data. Much i n the infant organism's flow of experience i s r e p e t i t i v e . Thus because, from the P-theory point of view, the infant i s frequently exposed to the same objective surroundings and to highly s i m i l a r sorts of objective events, whole patterns of sense-data have a tendency to repeat themselves i n h i s experience; and repetitiveness, l i k e stressfulness or pleasingness, can conjure up ghosts. Patterns of experience f e e l f a m i l i a r when ghosts of t h e i r past instances haunt t h e i r present occurrence. Further, when the patterns of sense-data have a s u f f i c i e n t temporal duration and involve a d i s t i n c t i v e temporal succession, the e a r l i e r stages of the succession may arouse not only the ghosts of t h e i r own precursors but those of the succeeding stages of the pattern as w e l l . The arousal of t h i s type of ghost amounts to the existence of a p r i m i t i v e form of a n t i c i p a t i o n or expectation. And thus while the ghosts from the past don't have enough independence from present sense-data to amount to retrospection—images 116 w i l l be required before retrospection i s p o s s i b l e — t h e s e ghosts of the future do give to conscious experience the f i r s t hints of temporaliza-t i o n . They give to experience, moreover, the f i r s t h i n t s of that aspect of temporalization required for int e n t i o n : They give i t a future, a l b e i t a highly immediate and an apparently predetermined one. But an apparently predetermined future i s useless i n an account of int e n t i o n . What i s needed i s a ghost of a possible future with, as we l l , the p o s s i -b i l i t y of ensuring i t s occurrence or of avoiding i t , depending on whether the ghost i s a ghost of desired or dreaded sorts of sense-data. Ghosts, i t should be made c l e a r , haunt k i n e s t h e t i c sense-data j u s t as they haunt those of v i s i o n , touch and the re s t . Accordingly, the infant's own r e f l e x i v e movements and e f f o r t s acquire a sense of f a m i l i a r i t y as w e l l . With the appearance of ghosts i n the infant's experience the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i v i t y occurring i s advanced considerably. A feedback r e l a t i o n s h i p between k i n e s t h e t i c sensations and those asso-ciated with perceiving becomes immanent. By making h i s own responses f a m i l i a r and the r e s u l t i n g perceptual states of a f f a i r s both f a m i l i a r aind expected, ghosts make possible the transformation of consciousness from a complex multi-layered f l u x of sense-data into a highly structured, temporalized subjective/objective d u a l i t y . The problematic sense of predeterminedness w i l l be progres-s i v e l y undermined while nevertheless maintaining the r e q u i s i t e sense of f a m i l i a r i t y and the f e e l i n g of expectation by the fact that perceptual s i t u a t i o n s aren't always, indeed are never, exactly a l i k e ; nor are ex-pected events ever exact r e p l i c a s of t h e i r predecessors. As a function, then, of r e l a t i v e l y s l i g h t disadaptation against a background of f a m i l i -a r i t y and f u l f i l l e d expectation, and driven by the desire to bring to, or remove from, perceptual focus what were e a r l i e r c a l l e d i n t r i n s i c a l l y meaningful sense-data, the degree and d i r e c t i o n of the exertion of energy by the a c t i v e aspect of the infant consciousness w i l l become incr e a s i n g l y appropriate to present and future patterns i n the passive aspect of con-sciousness. In e x p l i c i t l y Piagetian terms, the conscious organism adapts to new but l a r g e l y f a m i l i a r circumstances by a complementary process of accommodating i t s old response pattern, thereby expanding i t , and a s s i m i l a t i n g the new stimulus thereby to some extent deforming i t by ignoring aspects of i t s newness. v i ) The e a r l i e s t signs of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of experience make t h e i r appearance when the sense of f a m i l i a r i t y and the sense of expectation are s u f f i c i e n t l y strengthened to f a c i l i t a t e and merge with the p r i m i t i v e ancestors of representation r e l a t i o n s h i p s . With the advent of what Piaget c a l l s s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s the importation of the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y into consciousness i s well under way. S i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s are, by the account which I s h a l l give, j u s t complex forms of haunting r e l a -t i o n s . I f the simplest forms of haunting r e l a t i o n s are, as I have said, characterized by a sense of f a m i l i a r i t y and/or of expectation, s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s are characterized by a greater degree of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the ghosts and that which they haunt—such that that which i s haunted becomes the s i g n i f i e r and the haunting ghosts become the s i g n i f i e d . The sense of f a m i l i a r i t y i s progressively transformed into a sense of recogni-t i o n as importation of the objective into consciousness introduces a kind of 'distance' between the a c t i v e aspect of consciousness and c e r t a i n of 118 the passive aspects of i t , i n p a r t i c u l a r , those sense-data which are not ki n e s t h e t i c sensations. The sense of expectation i s progressively trans-formed into representation r e l a t i o n s as the accumulation of past experi-ences enriches the s i g n i f i e d system of ghosts and the increasing a b i l i t y to intend d i s s i p a t e s the sense of predeterminedness and makes possible the i n t u i t i o n of a set of possible futures. The same type of process which i t was j u s t claimed i s operative i n the gradual transformation of mere haunting r e l a t i o n s into haunting r e l a t i o n s which are s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s serves to bring about increasingly complex types of s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s as well. Piaget distinguishes three types of s i g n i f i e r s : the 'i n d i c a t i o n ' , the 'symbol' and the 'sign'. At the lowest l e v e l , and close s t to mere haunting r e l a t i o n s , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i c a t i o n and the indicated i s completely t i e d to perceptual s i t u a t i o n s but i s , nevertheless, i n v i r t u e of not being governed s t r i c t l y by f a m i l i a r i t y and expectation, more than a mere haunting r e l a t i o n . Thus, for example, the v i s u a l image of the d o l l ' s foot s t i c k i n g out from under the baby's blankets comes to indic a t e f o r the c h i l d the ghosts associated with the v i s u a l image of the rest of the d o l l , the f e e l of the d o l l , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of holding i t , shaking i t , sucking i t , throwing i t , e t c . — none of which are expected but which are rather conjured up as p o s s i b i l i t i e s . In the symbol and the sign the s i g n i f i e r i s no longer a mere part of a perceptual s i t u a t ion. The s i g n i f i e r i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from the s i g n i -f i e d to the point where the s i g n i f i e r i s , or can be, i n t e n t i o n a l l y chosen to represent the s i g n i f i e d and the s i g n i f i e d i t s e l f i s to a greater extent determined i n t e n t i o n a l l y — r a t h e r than, as was the case with the i n d i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n s , being determined passively by haunting r e l a t i o n s . While haunting 119 r e l a t i o n s w i l l remain the core of s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s , the haunting r e l a t i o n s i n connection with symbols and signs are to some extent, or at any rate can be, i n t e n t i o n a l l y constructed and invoked and not simply passively undergone. As to the d i f f e r e n c e between signs and symbols themselves, the former i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e while the l a t t e r i s not. Piaget says: "A 'symbol' i s an image evoked mentally or a material object i n t e n t i o n a l l y chosen to designate a class of actions or objects... The ' s i g n ' . . . i s a c o l l e c t i v e symbol, and consequently 'arbitrary'...Symbol and sign are only the two poles, i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l , of the same elab-oration of meanings."^ The guiding i n t u i t i o n of my attempt i n Chapter VI to provide an a l t e r n a t i v e to the meaning-nominalist p o s i t i o n discussed i n Chapter I w i l l be the contention that language i t s e l f , the r e l a t i o n s h i p between words and t h e i r meanings, need not, i n i t i a l l y , indeed could not i n i t i a l l y , be appreciated as a s i g n i f i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p of the complex type involving signs, but i s rather f i r s t acquired as a p a r t i c u l a r l y convenient set of i n d i c a t i n g r e l a t i o n s . Names, Piaget found, are not thought of by c h i l d r e n as being conventionally associated with objects but rather as being parts or aspects of the objects to which they r e f e r ; names, for the c h i l d from f i v e to s i x , are regarded as "belonging to" or g "emanating from" objects. The r o l e of i n d i c a t i o n s i n the two-way process of sense-data helping to organize actions or k i n e s t h e t i c sensations and of k i n e s t h e t i c sensations organizing and i n s t i l l i n g objective meaning into perceptions i s p l a i n l y i l l u s t r a t e d i n the act of reaching out. The f i r s t directed reach into the world (as opposed to random, d i r e c t i o n l e s s arm-waving) by the normal, sighted c h i l d i s done under the influence and guidance of v i s u a l 120 sense-data. The object for which the c h i l d reaches and the action which he performs are s i g n i f i e d f o r him by the sense-data provided by sight. I t i s the simultaneous perception, within the same v i s u a l f i e l d , of the hand and an object which f i r s t leads the sighted c h i l d to reach f o r an object. Before that he w i l l have learnt f i r s t to follow the movements of h i s hands with h i s eyes and then to keep the 9 a c t i v i t y of h i s hand within the l i m i t s of h i s v i s u a l f i e l d . Having frequently watched himself i n the process of grasping, the sight of the object has come to be haunted by, and/ultimately to s i g n i f y the p a r t i c u l a r t a c t u a l properties of the object; and the sight of the hand has come likewise to s i g n i f y the p o s s i b i l i t y of experiencing those tactu a l pro-p e r t i e s . Piaget says: When "....the c h i l d succeeds i n seeing i n a continuous way the object which escapes and the hand which overtakes i t , the displacements he perceives are arranged i n a group; the aggre-gate of the movements of the object and those of the hand constitute a coherent s e l f - l i m i t e d c y c l e " . ^ Thus the r e l a t i o n s h i p between, for example, the opposite acts of reaching out and of withdrawing the hand are 'indicated' through v i s u a l sense-data i n a way which i s i n t u i t i v e l y valuable. On the other hand, the v a r i a t i o n s i n sense-data, v i s u a l , t a c t u a l , auditory and buccal, which are brought about by the action of the hand upon the object are discovered to vary i n co n s i s t e n t l y s i m i l a r ways. Individual sense-data are becoming in d i c a t i o n s of systems of ghosts, systems 'held together', so to speak, by the actions which bring about the transformations from one sense-data to another. These 'systems of ghosts', as I have c a l l e d them, are none other than objects; i t i s s i g n i f i e d 'systems of ghosts' which we perceive, not i s o l a t e d , 121 self-contained, meaningless sense-data. Sense-data reach beyond themselves to i n d i c a t e objects, and they do so through the dynamics of action and the medium of ghosts. It i s only by systematically (where systematic v a r i a t i o n involves the whole Poincareian-Piagetian idea of 'groups': s t a r t i n g points, routes, compensations, r e v e r s i b i l i t y , etc.) and i n t e n t i o n a l l y moving between and comparing i n d i v i d u a l layers of sense-data that a framework capable of granting coherence to the flow of perceptions and of bringing out the d e t a i l of i n d i v i d u a l layers of sense-data can be created; and though, ultimately, systematic and i n t e n t i o n a l comparisons can be done purely i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , the element of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y required can only be accounted for i f i t i s grounded o r i g i n a l l y i n physical action and u l t i m a t e l y i n automatically triggered exertions of energy. Thought i t s e l f , any attempt to extract r e g u l a r i t i e s from or to create r e g u l a r i t i e s within, that i s to comprehend or to organize, the flow of experience by i n t e l l e c t u a l as opposed to physical means, i s continuous with the attempt to comprehend and to organize by p h y s i c a l means; thought, as Piaget would put i t , i s the same process as action only c a r r i e d out at a higher l e v e l of equilibrium and on the symbolic representatives of objects rather than on the r e a l objects themselves. But the a b i l i t y to i n t e n t i o n a l l y exert energy at the higher l e v e l presupposes the a c q u i s i t i o n of the a b i l i t y to do so at the lower. S i m i l a r l y and c r u c i a l l y , systematic v a r i a t i o n s are not immediately and unaccountably given to the awareness of the conscious organism. An ordering of actions i s s p a t i a l ; indeed, space i s an ordering  of actions, and an organism must discover and construct that ordering f o r i t s e l f through i t s own a c t i v i t y . It must structure for i t s e l f the 122 'group of displacements'. The st r u c t u r i n g process involved i s a two-way s t r e e t — t h r o u g h i t s own voluntary actions the organism achieves structure i n i t s own sensations and i t s sensations serve as ' s i g n i f i e r s ' through the help of which i t orders, structures, i t s own actions. Speaking of the "complementary r o l e s of sense perception and motor a c t i v i t y " , Piaget says: "From the l a t t e r stem the s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s themselves, while as soon as t h i s process of development has begun—and the more so when i t i s complete—such r e l a t i o n s h i p s are indicated or ' s i g n i f i e d ' by ' s i g n i f i e r s ' , and these consist p r e c i s e l y of sensory signs or pointers. Consequently, with a shape seen i n depth or i n perspective, a whole serie s of ' v i r t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s ' w i l l be brought into play, going beyond the data recorded by the sensory receptors. These v i r t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s are the product of sensori-motor a c t i v i t y and the sense-data merely act as pointers i n d i -11 eating them." v i i ) Something more needs to be said about ghosts; for they are playing a fundamental r o l e i n the present account. Together sense-data and ghosts constitute the passive content of consciousness. Negatively denoted, ghosts are the part of the passive aspect of consciousness which i s n ' t sensory experience. The evolution of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the a c t i v e and the passive aspects of consciousness i s , as should be c l e a r from the account so f a r , what the evolution of l e v e l s of conscious-ness or awareness i s a l l about; and the r o l e of ghosts i n that evolution has already begun to emerge. In mixed consciousness and P-theory terms, ghosts are those passive aspects of consciousness a causal account of which would involve reference to the brain acting as some sort of computer, sto r i n g and to some extent r e v i v i n g past sense-data. But as was the case i n respect of sense-data, the a c t i v e aspect of consciousness can gain an increasing degree of control over the flow of ghosts. And the d i f f e r -ence between ghosts and sense-data w i l l make the degree of control ever so much gre a t e r f i n the case of ghosts as compared to sense-data. Thought, though continuous with the process of physical action w i l l be to a great degree l i b e r a t e d from the causal contingencies o r i g i n a t i n g within the objective realm. Some hint of how t h i s can be so must be given. In the account of how t h i s can be so w i l l l i e the tools with which to give the promised account of the notions of a point of view and of conceptual frameworks and also the promised a l t e r n a t i v e to the rejected 'looking at' account of the phenomenological appeal. It should already be apparent that ghosts are being held to play a r o l e at the heart of a theory of meaning. That conscious experience must be temporalized and o b j e c t i f i e d for meaning r e l a t i o n s to occur seems obvious. And ghosts, i t was suggested, make possible the p r i m i t i v e beginnings of the process of temporalizing and o b j e c t i f y i n g experience. R e l i e f e d ghosts or images w i l l now be shown to play the c e n t r a l r o l e i n the progressive s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of the temporalization and o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of experience; In being r e l i e f e d , ghosts become s u f f i c i e n t l y l i b e r a t e d from the sense-data with which they were o r i g i n a l l y associated as to be able to play the r o l e of the s i g n i f i e r as well as the s i g n i f i e d . Where once sense-data were required to s i g n i f y systems of ghosts, now r e l i e f e d ghosts of those sense-data are able to f u l f i l l the same s i g n i f y i n g r o l e . Once i t has become possible f or ghosts to play the s i g n i f i e r as well as the s i g n i f i e d , the a c t i v e aspect of consciousness w i l l be i n an important respect freed from the burden of the passive constraints imposed on i t , 124 p a r t i c u l a r l y by sense-data but by ghosts as we l l . The layered nature of consciousness i s gra p h i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e d i n the phenomenon, made possible by the existence of r e l i e f e d ghosts, of thought seemingly f l i t t e r i n g over the surface of sense-data. 'Silent thinking', I'm suggesting, i s the r e l i e f e d ghosts of auditory sense-data, haunted by the same ghosts which haunt the rela t e d auditory sense-data themselves, being 'pushed around', as i t were, by the act i v e aspect of consciousness. But not only can the act i v e aspect of consciousness push r e l i e f e d ghosts, i n t h e i r capacity as s i g n i f i e r s , around. In addition, the a c t i v e aspect can, to some extent, a l t e r or construct the r e l i e f e d ghosts; and i t can also, to some extent, a l t e r or construct the s i g n i -f y ing r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f . The f i r s t case amounts to the p o s s i b i l i t y of constructing complex images which, though ultimately dependent on past sense-data, are i n v i r t u e of t h e i r complexity, i n an important sense, free of past sense-data. To imagine i s to construct the 'ghosts' of possible experiences which have never i n fact been had from the raw materials provided by experiences which have i n fact been had. 'Imagination' or ' c r e a t i v i t y ' i s also used to characterize the a c t i v i t y o r i g i n a t i n g within consciousness when the s i g n i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f i s al t e r e d or construc-ted. The s i g n i f i e r may remain unchanged while the system of ghosts which i t serves to conjure up may be enlarged, r e s t r i c t e d or reorganized. But to the extent that t h i s i s so i t w i l l follow that the i n d i v i d u a l ghosts within the system have been themselves r e l i e f e d . This r e l i e f i n g of s i g n i -f i e d ghosts i s not generally, or maybe even ever, t o t a l l y achievable. Meaning r e l a t i o n s , at l e a s t as they occur n a t u r a l l y (and thus wherever analysis and not pure construction i s concerned) are h o l i s t i c . They can 125 be to some degree elucidated by the r e l i e f i n g process but t h i s i s i n e v i t a b l y only p a r t i a l l y successful because of what I have c a l l e d the 'spread-outness' of sense-data and of the corresponding q u a l i t y i n t h e i r respective ghosts. Representation, according to the ghostly analysis i s a very inexact process. The demand for necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions under which to c o r r e c t l y apply a concept i s seen to be highly u n r e a l i s t i c . The assumption that the r e l a t i o n s h i p s holding between i n d i v i d u a l concepts within p a r t i c u l a r n a t u r a l -l y occurring conceptual frameworks w i l l be n e c e s s a r i l y coherent no longer holds any p l a u s i b i l i t y . Indeed, one of the major implications of the theory of consciousness being developed w i l l be a new perspective on the whole tangle of problems which have so intrigued philosophers of language and which have arisen l a r g e l y , i t w i l l be claimed, out of a misguided attempt to draw, i n a way which i s n ' t possible, a d e f i n i t i v e l i n e between sense and reference. I f the o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e between subjective and objective l i e s where the present p o s i t i o n holds that i t does, then reference r e l a t i o n s must be quite d i f f e r e n t than they are generally assumed to be. S i m i l a r l y , i f the h o l i s t i c account of meaning here alluded to i s anywhere near the truth of the matter, there w i l l be important implications for the meaning of t a l k about the sense of an expression. Facts about the i n t r i n s i c nature of i n d i v i d u a l types of sensory experience and about the chronological r e l a t i o n s holding between i n d i v i d u a l experiences w i l l , i n p a r t i c u l a r , be shown to play e s s e n t i a l r o l e s i n the establishment and evolution of meaning r e l a t i o n s . The l a s t chapter w i l l be devoted to a preliminary exploration of these issues. 126 NOTES D.M. Armstrong, Perception and the Physical World, International Library of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 5. 2 George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, i n Berkeley: Essay, P r i n c i p l e s , Dialogues with Selections from Other Writings, ed. Mary Whiton Calkins (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. 235. 3 Jerry A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, The Language and Thought Series (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1979), pp. 87-95; Jerry Fodor, "F i x a t i o n of B e l i e f and Concept A c q u i s i t i o n , " and Jean Piaget, "Discussion," i n Language and Learning, ed. Massimo P i a t e l l i -Palmarini (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 143-5.1. 4 . Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n with Hermine Si n c l a i r - d e Zwart, Memory and I n t e l l i g e n c e , (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973). Jean Piaget, "Comments," trans. Anne Parsons, rev. and ed. E. Hanf-mann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962), p. 4; appears as a pamphlet i n Thought and Language, Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, ed. and trans. E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962). Jean Piaget, The Origins of I n t e l l i g e n c e i n Children, trans. Margaret Cook (New York: International U n i v e r s i t i e s Press, Inc., 1952), pp. 189-92; Jean Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation i n Childhood, trans. C. Gattegno and F.M. Hodgson (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 98. 7 Piaget, The Origins of I n t e l l i g e n c e i n Children, p. 191. g Jean Piaget, The Child's Conception of the World, trans. Joan and Andrew Tomlinson (Totowa, New Jersey: L i t t l e f i e l d , Adams & Co., 1976), p. 63. 9 Piaget, The Origins of I n t e l l i g e n c e i n Children, pp. 95-110. ^ Jean Piaget, The Construction of R e a l i t y i n the Chil d , trans. Margaret Cook (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), p. 131. 11 Jean Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, The Child's Conception of Space, trans. F.J. Langdon and J.L. Lunzer (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 451-52. 127 CHAPTER V Some Implications of the Consciousness Theory 1. The Notions of Points of View and Conceptual Frameworks In t h i s chapter I w i l l endeavor to point the way to an analysis of the notions of points of view, conceptual frameworks, and introspection i n terms of the p o s i t i o n j u s t outlined. In P-theory terms, a point of view i s a point of view onto something; onto the objective. I t i s that type of account to which I am committed, by my own arguments, to providing an a l t e r n a t i v e . At the outset of the l a s t chapter I talked, i n loos e l y Piagetian terms, about the evolution of points of view, about the development of more encompassing conceptual frameworks and, i n general, about the need to move i n the subjective-to-objective d i r e c t i o n . While prepared to endorse an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y , I rejected the assumption that an on t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y of the required sort could e x i s t which would sustain the common-sense, naive r e a l i s t accounts of what i t means to have a point of view, to operate within a conceptual framework, to make a phenomenological appeal or to perform a perceptual reduction. Points of view e x i s t within, and are thus a function of, conceptual frameworks. The two notions are therefore c l o s e l y t i e d . I s h a l l d i s t i n g u i s h between two types of points of view: actual points of view and t h e o r e t i c a l points of view. To speak of an actual point of view i s n ' t meant, however, to e n t a i l a claim about the correctness of the conceptual framework within which 128 i t e x i s t s ; i t i s n ' t meant, that i s , to a t t r i b u t e to the point of view any form of absoluteness. For a conceptual frame i s always t h e o r e t i c a l and i n that sense, i n so f a r as a point of view i s always a function of a conceptual frame, a point of view i s always t h e o r e t i c a l . The intended d i s t i n c t i o n between an actual and a t h e o r e t i c a l point of view has to do with the presence or absence of sense-data; i n P-theory terms, with the presence or absence of perception. Thus, i n so f a r as sense-data serve to s i g n i f y the appropriate system of ghosts, i n accordance with the concep-t u a l frame which i s operative, i t i s necessary to speak of an actual point of view. When, on the other hand, r e l i e f e d ghosts (of the ri g h t s o r t — i n p a r t i c u l a r , the r e l i e f e d ghosts of in d i c a t i o n s (or possible indications) and not of signs or symbols (see Chapter IV, p. )) serve as the s i g n i f i e r s , a t h e o r e t i c a l point of view e x i s t s . Conceptual frameworks, and thus the complexity and appropriateness of actual points of view, evolve as a function of the bringing to bear of various t h e o r e t i c a l points of view onto the actual points of view. The process involved, by which t h e o r e t i c a l points of view are brought to bear upon and bring about the evolution of, actual points of view i s what Piaget has c a l l e d a process of decentration. A more s p e c i f i c discussion should make the ideas suggested i n the foregoing somewhat c l e a r e r . But before attempting to i l l u s t r a t e the process of decentration, l e t me add that not only do actual points of view, under the influence of t h e o r e t i c a l points of view, evolve, but they also exhibit a tendency to expand. For an actual point of view to expand i s not, as i t might sound, to have the amount of sense-data i n consciousness increase; i t i s not, i n other words, to have the perceptual f i e l d enlarge. Rather, what Piaget has c a l l e d 129 the web of v i r t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and what I have c a l l e d the s i g n i f i e d system of ghosts, expands. The implications from sense-data increase as represen-t a t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s extend further i n space and time. Working o f f of a singl e continuous stream of sense-data and within a sin g l e conceptual frame-work, the complexity and span of expectations w i l l increase as one's point of view expands. In the l a s t chapter I quoted from Piaget a reference to the f i r s t major decentration or s h i f t of perspective which occurs i n the cognitive development of the human infant: At about eighteen months the c h i l d ' s conception of space s h i f t s from being that of a p l u r a l i t y of spaces centred on h i s own body to that of a sing l e homogeneous container i n which h i s own body e x i s t s as an object among other objects. In t h i s . e a r l y cognitive s h i f t we can see the simplest possible form of i n t e r a c t i o n between actual and t h e o r e t i c a l points of view. The various viewpoints involved are provided by the i n d i v i d u a l and d i s t i n c t i v e functioning of each of the infant's own perceptual mechanisms; thus we have v i s u a l , auditory, buccal, t a c t i l e , etc., points of view. P r i o r to eighteen months, the infant's sensory experiences tend strongly to, as I put i t , e x i s t i n layers which are s p l i n t e r e d o f f from one another. P r i m i t i v e expectation r e l a t i o n s w i l l , i t has been suggested, become possible with the advent of ghosts. Splinteredness w i l l be p a r t i a l l y overcome by the fac t that expectation r e l a t i o n s w i l l hold not only within but across layers of sense-data as we l l . A p a r t i c u l a r type of auditory experience may, f o r example, come to s i g n i f y a p a r t i c u l a r type of v i s u a l experience. But simple expectation r e l a t i o n s h i p s holding between i n d i v i d u a l experiences do not yet amount to a concept of i n d i v i d u a l objects enduring through time and continuously occupying space. We have as yet only a .. 130 s i n g l e point of view expanding—or rather, i n t h i s somewhat strange case, a group of i n d i v i d u a l points of view. There i s not yet the evo-l u t i o n of a new, integrated and more complex point of view. We have so far only a group of actual points of view, none of which have been integrated with the t h e o r e t i c a l points of view connected with each of the others. In h i s famous and f a s c i n a t i n g studies of the development of the object concept i n h i s own i n f a n t s , Piaget remarked the fa c t that the c h i l d learns early to expect that objects which disappear behind other masking objects w i l l reappear but only l a t e r discovers that the object continues to e x i s t behind the masking object. Thus the act of reaching for a coveted p r i z e i s promptly abandoned and replaced by f r e t t i n g behav-iour i f the object sought i s placed behind even a simple, removable or e a s i l y gotten around screen. Notice, as a relevant aside, that the fact that there i s a c l e a r d i f f e r e n c e i n conceptual complexity between expecting a type of experience to r e o c c u r — a s happens when an object reappears from behind a screen—and b e l i e v i n g that a physical object continues to e x i s t behind a screen, undermines T.G.R. Bower's assumption that to provide evidence of a n t i c i p a t i o n of the reoccurrence of types of sensory events i n infants i s to provide evidence of the existence of the concept of object constancy i n those same infan t s . Bower found experimental support for the hypothesis that " . . . i n infants of seven weeks of age suppression of sucking not only mirrors s t a r t l e but also a n t i c i p a t i o n " . He concluded from that that: "...therefore suppression of sucking may provide us with a measure of existence constancy and i t s duration"."'" But Bower's conclusion does not follow. I f the same infant who displays a n t i c i p a t i o n responses i n Bower's experiment f a i l s to exhibit search behaviour i n Piaget's screening experiment 131 surely i t i s not, as Bower seems to think, because the former type of experiment involves a more s e n s i t i v e means of detecting the same type of phenomenon being measured i n the l a t t e r . Surely i t i s rather because the two are t e s t i n g for the presence of d i f f e r e n t , though r e l a t e d , l e v e l s of conceptual a b i l i t y . I f the infant i n Piaget's experimental s i t u a t i o n has a concept of an object continuing to exist behind a screen, why i s i t that he stops reaching and s t a r t s crying? That he expects a type of phe-nomenal event to reoccur i s one thing; that he believes that one object screens a second i s quite another. The o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of sense-data occurs when the actual point of view, say hearing an object, i s integrated with the various t h e o r e t i c a l points of view, with the ghosts of seeing i t , touching i t , etc. When the web of v i r t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s or the system of ghosts s i g n i f i e d by the sense-data supplied by one perceptual apparatus extends to the ghosts, not j u s t of expected but of possible, sense-data of the other perceptual appa-ratus then the actual point of view has been integrated with t h e o r e t i c a l points of view; and the r e s u l t i n g decentration from the actual point of view has brought about the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of sensory experience. Decentring has issued i n a new and r a d i c a l l y more complex and e f f i c i e n t conceptual framework. This i s the achievement, comparable, Piaget says, to the Copernican r e v o l u t i o n , which characterizes the cognitive development of the human infant at about eighteen months. The notion of other, what I have c a l l e d t h e o r e t i c a l , points of view seems, perhaps, more natural once we have the notion of other minds. Indeed the notion of other minds j u s t ijs, i n an important sense, the notion of other points of view. Appreciation of the p o s s i b i l i t y of other, simultaneous, same type, but not i d e n t i c a l points of view w i l l r e s u l t again and again i n decentrations of, and increasing appropriateness i n , the i n d i v i d u a l ' s perspective. But such appreciation i s not achieved once and f o r a l l , being thereafter automatic. E f f o r t i s required to bring to bear the p o s s i b i l i t y of other points of view on each of the many and diverse types of s i t u a t i o n s to which i t i s relevant. Speaking of h i s well-known example, Piaget says: "....the development of the notion 'brother' shows what an e f f o r t i s required of a c h i l d who has a brother to understand that h i s brother also has a brother, that t h i s concept 2 r e f e r s to a r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and not to an absolute 'property'." Nor does having once achieved a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l of conceptual development and the appropriately enlightened point of view ensure that one w i l l not subsequently s l i p back into former, l e s s decentred ways of thinking. That t h i s i s so i s p a r t i c u l a r l y well i l l u s t r a t e d on the a f f e c t i v e l e v e l . Piaget comments that: "On the a f f e c t i v e l e v e l , i t would require quite a dose of optimism to believe that our elementary interpersonal f e e l i n g s are always well adapted: reactions such as jealousy, envy, vanity, which are doubt-l e s s u n i v e r s a l , can c e r t a i n l y be considered various types of systematic error i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s emotional perspective." In Chapter VI I w i l l o f f e r some suggestions as to how an account of the type presented i n t h i s chapter might be extended to cover the a c q u i s i t i o n of the notion of other minds. The c e n t r a l argument of that chapter w i l l be an attempt to show that, contrary to the p o s i t i o n of the meaning-nominalist, the phenomenon of language i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r , and not a consequence of, that a c q u i s i t i o n . In addition to t h e o r e t i c a l points of view a r i s i n g out of the r e l a -tionships between one's own perceptual apparatus, and those a r i s i n g out of 133 the p o s s i b i l i t y of other minds, conceptual revolutions have been founded as well on the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t points of view a r i s i n g out of the use of perceptual aids such as microscopes and telescopes or out of the introduction of factors such as high speeds or extreme temperatures. 2. The Relationship between Looks-Talk and Is-Talk Considerable i l l u m i n a t i o n i s shed, I think, on the problematic r e l a t i o n s h i p between looks-talk and i s - t a l k i f i t i s thought of i n terms of conceptual frameworks and of actual and t h e o r e t i c a l points of view as characterized by the present account. I s - t a l k i s n ' t , as we tend to think, absolute, but i s rather a function of the highest presently a v a i l a b l e or operative conceptual framework. As such, i s - t a l k i s a function of the act of i n t e r r e l a t i n g actual points of v iew—the ones inv o l v i n g sense-data—with t h e o r e t i c a l points of view. Looks-talk r e f l e c t s the fact that the decentring process has evolved the system of ghosts attached to present sense-data. Accordingly operating with a higher l e v e l of i s - t a l k , one says not what would be said was the case at the lower l e v e l of conceptual development but rather what looks the case, (thereby implying what, according to the higher conceptual frame, jLs the case). I t i s never the sense-data themselves which are the case, rather i t i s complex fac t s about r e l a t i o n s between possible sense-data (or ghosts) which are the case and which are s i g n i f i e d by i s - t a l k . Thus at c e r t a i n stages of conceptual development we might, ( i f we could) say of an object that i t looks l i k e i t went out of and came back into existence but a c t u a l l y i t went behind another object; and we would say 134 t h i s on the ground t h a t , f o r example, we can f e e l things that we can't see. S i m i l a r l y , we f r e q u e n t l y say that an object looks e l l i p t i c a l but that i n f a c t i t i s round; we could, i f we wanted t o , look at i t from another angle. We sometimes say that an ob j e c t looks l i k e i t ' s s o l i d but r e a l l y i t ' s a cloud of molecules; or we say of two events that they look l i k e they're simultaneous but r e a l l y they're r e l a t e d i n a s p a c e - l i k e way; and so on. Depending on the s i z e and complexity of the system of ghosts s i g n i f i e d by any p a r t i c u l a r sense-data complex, which i s i t s e l f a f u n c t i o n of the number and the complexity of the t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s of view w i t h which i t , as an a c t u a l point of view has been i n t e g r a t e d , the gap between l o o k s - t a l k and i s - t a l k i n c r e a s e s . The is s u e of the r e l a t i o n -ship between looks-, and. i s r t a l k w i l l a r i s e again i n the f i n a l chapter. 3. An Account of the Phenomenological Appeal I f the argument of the t h i r d chapter i s r i g h t and an a c t / o b j e c t account of awareness i s untenable, then, s t r i c t l y speaking, there can be .no such t h i n g as a phenomenological appeal. Consciousness can't coherently be conceived of as an empty 'something' which l o o k s — w h i c h l o o k s , i n the case of d i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n , at i t s own s t a t e s . But there ±s_ some d i s t i n c t i v e type of event to which we r e f e r when we say that we have performed a d i r e c t i n s p e c t i o n ; and, s i m i l a r l y , a p e r c e p t u a l r e d u c t i o n . I promised to provide a p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to the a c t / o b j e c t account of such events. Consciousness, I have suggested, i s a flow of s t a t e s the cau s a l determinants of which o r i g i n a t e both w i t h i n and without. Thus s t a t e s of 135 consciousness are characterized by an a c t i v e and a passive aspect. The passive aspect consists of two components, sense-data and ghosts. Further I hypothesized that the passive content of states of consciousness i s layered; and that the layers themselves are spread-out and shaped, both within and across lay e r s . Both the content and the shape of the spread-out layers as well as the shape of t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s are to various degrees under the control of the a c t i v e aspect. In performing a d i r e c t inspection, the energies of the act i v e aspect are directed towards holding constant the content and shape of a p a r t i c u l a r moment i n the flow of conscious states. The attempt i s i n e v i t a b l y doomed to only p a r t i a l success. In so f a r as the energy of the a c t i v e aspect played an e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n creating the shape and bringing about and sustaining the content of the spread-out layers within the passive aspect of consciousness, the s h i f t of energy required by the attempt to 'freeze' the flow at that state w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y drain o f f , by r e d i r e c t i n g , the energy which brought about and sustained that state i n the f i r s t place. The shape and the content of consciousness cannot be frozen. The point i s that any moment i n the flow of consciousness amounts to a unique i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the act i v e and the passive aspects of consciousness, aspects of the passive being i n various degrees under the control of the act i v e . Redirecting the act i v e inevitably, a l t e r s , to some extent, the shape and content, as represented i n i t s passive aspect, of consciousness. Changes i n the content of the 'inspected' state w i l l be most apparent and immediate i n the disappearance of some r e l i e f e d ghosts. The drain o f f of energy w i l l most noticeably a f f e c t them. Content 136 w i l l not be a l t e r e d at a l l In the case of sense-data, but shape may be. The claim that r e l i e f e d ghosts and the shape of sense-data layers are most r e a d i l y affected by the attempt to inspect should become more comprehensible when the r e l a t i o n s h i p between d i r e c t inspection and perceptual reduction i s seen i n the present terms. I t should, that i s , take on some p l a u s i b i l i t y once the sketch of the p o s i t i o n i s completed. Whereas d i r e c t inspection represents an attempt to u t i l i z e the energy of the a c t i v e aspect of consciousness to freeze the content and the shape of a p a r t i c u l a r state of consciousness, perceptual reduction represents the attempt to exorcize from a state of consciousness, to the greatest extent possible, a l l passive content. The form which the exertion of energy i n such an 'exorcism' may take i s a r t i f i c i a l l y r e s t r i c t e d i n such a way that changes i n the perceptual apparatus are not permitted. Properly performed and taken to i t s l i m i t , such an exorcism r e s u l t s i n a state of consciousness the passive content of which consists s o l e l y of sense-data. The theory being developed suggests the following hierarchy: Reliefed ghosts, ghosts, that i s , which amount to images or are being used as s i g n i f i e r s , are, as was noted e a r l i e r , most amenable of a l l the passive contents of consciousness to the a f f e c t s of e f f o r t being exerted by the a c t i v e aspect. Complex images can be constructed and a l t e r e d ; s i m i l a r l y with s i g n i f i c a t i o n r e l a t i o n s ; and as s i g n i f i e r s , r e l i e f e d ghosts can be e a s i l y 'pushed around' i n the process we c a l l thinking. But a l l these processes require considerable expenditure of e f f o r t . Just to sustain the r e l i e f i n g of a ghost requires e f f o r t . S i m i l a r l y some forms of r e l i e f i n g of sense-data may require the expenditure of energy. Imaging, thinking 137: and attending seem to fade even as we t r y to inspect them. At the next l e v e l , the non-reliefed ghosts which haunt sense-data, the ones by means of which our sense-data, i n p a r t i c u l a r r e l i e f e d sense-data, have meaning, and i n v i r t u e of which we are 'given' the physical world and not meaningless sense-data, require exorcism. Both non-reliefed, haunting ghosts and the r e l i e f i n g r e l a t i o n s holding between sense-data can, by the exertion of e f f o r t , be exorcized. Far from requiring energy to sustain them, energy i s required to get r i d of them. And f i n a l l y , at the opposite extreme from r e l i e f e d ghosts, and within the a r t i f i c i a l . r e s t r i c t i o n s which the method of perceptual reduction imposes on the form which the exertion of energy may t a k e — s u c h that i t can't be channelled through any of the perceptual mechanisms—sense-data are absolutely r e s i s t a n t to the attempt to exorcize them. The a c t i v e aspect of consciousness, a r t i f i c i a l l y r e s t r i c t e d , has no con t r o l over them. Possible c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the present p o s i t i o n might be gained by seeing what i t s implications are with respect to the claim, apparently ent a i l e d by the Sensory Core version of Sense-datum Theory, according to which: whenever we are perceiving a physical object with a surface that i s ostensibly red and c i r c u l a r , we are also d i r e c t l y aware of a sense-datum which i s probably e l l i p t i c a l i n shape and which may very well be orange or purple or grey i n c o l o u r . . . . i n short, that even when we look at a s i n g l e p h y s i c a l object we are almost always conscious, though i n d i f f e r e n t 4 ways, of two colours and two shapes." It was t h i s claim, remember, against which F i r t h argued—and indeed he drew support for h i s own argument from statements by Sensory Core Theorists themselves—that i t could not be supported by the method of d i r e c t inspection. F i r t h concluded that 138 Sense-datum Theorists, whether, he says, " w i t t i n g l y or unwittingly", employ another method: the method of perceptual reduction."' While d i f f e r i n g from Sense-datum Theory i n a very important respect, the present theory neverthe-l e s s o f f e r s strong support f o r that aspect of Sense-datum Theory against which F i r t h i s concerned to argue. Sense-data are (a very important) part of ordinary states of perceptual consciousness. What I think i s a very p l a u s i b l e account of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between sense-data and physical objects i s i m p l i c i t i n the recently outlined account of consciousness. The one e s s e n t i a l disagreement between the present p o s i t i o n and the Sense-datum Theory, remember, a r i s e s out of the r e j e c t i o n of the older theory's act/object analysis of sensing. Viewed from the perspective of the consciousness theory, the notion of givenness, i n v i r t u e of i t s t o t a l r e l i a n c e on the mistaken act/object analysis of sensing, harbours a dangerous confusion i n face of the f a c t s . Whereas the consciousness theory allows room for a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between 1) being a part of the passive aspect of consciousness; being part of awareness; and, 2) being the object of awareness of ( i . e . being r e l i e f e d ) , Sense-datum Theory i s r e s t r i c t e d to holding that i f anything i s given to consciousness i t w i l l be the object of_ awareness. In Chapter IV I claimed that any approach r e l i a n t s t r i c t l y on the notion of awareness of_ had the c r u c i a l l y damaging consequence of f o r c i n g one to deny the continuity and i n f i n i t e complexity of a moment of awareness. A proponent of the consciousness theory can, on the other hand, maintain that sense-data, themselves characterized by continuity and i n f i n i t e complexity, are parts of states of perceptual consciousness, and thus of moments of awareness, without having to be the l e a s t b i t embarrassed by the fac t that there i s , i n such states, no awareness of sense-data. 139 The vast majority of sense-data in ordinary states of perceptual consciousness are part of awareness but are not reliefed. In addition to being reliefed, many sense-data, or complexes of them, are haunted as well. The ghosts of actual and possible future and past sense-data are part of states of perceptual consciousness just as sense-data are. The reliefing and the haunting account for the difference between a perception of_ a red and circular physical object and the rele-vant reduced state of awareness containing only sense-data; and in particular, containing a sense-datum which " i s probably e l l i p t i c a l in shape and which may very well be orange or purple or grey in colour". The ordinary, unreduced perceptual state contains exactly the same sense- datum. It contains something more as well; but the more isn't anything remotely like other conflicting sense-data. The more which the ordinary perceptual state contains, specifically shape and ghosts, amounts to meaning. Notice, as an important consequence, that a proponent of the consciousness theory need not be at a l l bothered.by. the persuasive ^ c r i t l -cism of traditional Sense-datum Theories which would have them translate statements about physical objects into statements about sense-data. According to the present position, the sense-data complexes contained in states of perceptual consciousness are i n f i n i t e l y complex and physical objects, as sense-data complexes plus ghosts plus shape, are only that much more so. Resistance to the idea that an e l l i p t i c a l purple sense-datum may be just as much a part of the state involved in perceiving a round red table as i t is a part of the corresponding reduced state may be stub-born. Perhaps one might weaken such resistance by thinking about i t this way. When we t r y to draw the round red table at which we are looking and we begin, f a l t e r i n g l y , by drawing i t that way—round and red—we quickly r e a l i z e that that i s n ' t what we see. We must r e s i s t the impulse to be naive r e a l i s t s and keep i n mind that a l l that d e t a i l which i s so d i f f i c u l t to reproduce i n our drawing and which we common-sensically place ' i n the world' i s r e a l l y part of us; more p r e c i s e l y , i s part of states of consciousness. We mustn't mislead ourselves by the fact that we say that we see a round red table. Our words are themselves only s i g n i f i e r s ; and they s i g n i f y exceedingly complex systems of sense-data and ghosts. 141 NOTES T.G.R. Bower, "The Development of Object-Permanence: Some Studies of Existence Constancy," Perception and Psychophysics, 2(9) (1967), p. 415. 2 Jean Piaget, "Comments," trans. Anne Parsons, rev. and ed. E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962), p. 3; appears as a pamphlet i n Thought and Language, Lev Semenovich Vygotsky, ed. and trans. E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962). 3 Piaget, "Comments," p. 3. 4 Roderick F i r t h , "Sense-Data and the Percept Theory," i n Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, ed. Robert J . Swartz (Garden C i t y , New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 229. 5 F i r t h , p. 234. F i r t h , p. 229. 142 CHAPTER VI A Consciousness Theory A l t e r n a t i v e to Meaning-Nominalism 1. Introduction In the s p i r i t of the fourth chapter l e t me attempt now to provide an a l t e r n a t i v e to Bennett's meaning-nominalist account of the o r i g i n s of l i n g u i s t i c conventions which was discussed i n Chapter I Part 2. I w i l l , at the same time be providing some i n d i c a t i o n as to how the type of t h e o r e t i c a l point of view involved i n the notion of other minds, which plays, I suggested i n Part 1 of the l a s t chapter, the c e n t r a l r o l e i n the majority of the conceptual decentrations undergone by human i n d i v i d u a l s , can be i t s e l f conceptually accounted f o r . In the Bennett account, remember, a s t r a t e g i c r o l e i s played by a f i c t i t i o u s anthropological event which Bennett held amounted to a primeval Gricean exchange between two members of an anthropoidal t r i b e . If i t i s to be worthy of i t s r o l e i n h i s meaning-nominalist account of conventions, Bennett must be able to show us how he can account for the occurrence of h i s primeval exchange without being forced to appeal i n any way to conventions. I argued i n Chapter I that Bennett has most c e r t a i n l y f a i l e d to adequately account for the b e l i e f s and intentions required by h i s example. In the l a s t chapter I attempted to o u t l i n e a p o s i t i o n on consciousness and on conceptual development 143 within consciousness which took the a b i l i t y to intend as being not primeval but developed and which t r i e d to give some i n d i c a t i o n as to how such a development might go. I t has been the burden of the discussion to date to show that cognitive r e l a t i o n s can be conceived of neither as a r i s i n g mysteriously, as S e l l a r s seems to think, out of the possession of a l a n g u a g e — i t s e l f acquired by stimulus/response means—nor as r e l a t i o n s which can be, as Bennett seems to hold, non-problematically presupposed i n an attempt to give account of the phenomenon of language. I m p l i c i t i n my account i s the consequence that language i s neither something which we sel f - c o n s c i o u s l y construct, nor i s i t something which we j u s t manage to acquire by non-intentional means and i n v i r t u e of which we become capable of having intentions and other cognitive a t t i t u d e s . I have i n mind the idea that there i s a form of i n t e r l o c k between representational a b i l i t y i n general—and thus l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y a f o r t i o r i — a n d the a b i l i t y to intend. One's conceptual l e v e l i s a function of one's a b i l i t y to intend and v i c e versa. The two are not only interdependent but evolve together. The present chapter w i l l t r y to i l l u s t r a t e such a p o s i t i o n by showing how cognitive a t t i t u d e s such as b e l i e f s and intentions can be operative i n the formation of representation r e l a t i o n s without that having to amount, even i n the case of representation r e l a t i o n s which operate i n i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l contexts, to such r e l a t i o n s being formed i n t e n t i o n a l l y . P l a u s i b i l i t y w i l l be gained, hopefully, f o r the p o s i t i o n that, once formed, representation r e l a t i o n s , i n so far as they enter into systems, f a c i l i t a t e moves to higher l e v e l s i n the a b i l i t y to intend. The present chapter w i l l sketch, i n p a r t i c u l a r , the barest o u t l i n e s of the way i n which the a b i l i t y to have Gricean intentions i s acquired by means of the p r i o r a c q u i s i t i o n of i n t e r - i n d i v i d u a l representation r e l a t i o n s which involve non-Lewisian, or non-conventional, r e g u l a r i t i e s . 2. The Account i ) The broad p i c t u r e looks l i k e t h i s : For the meaning-nominalist, Gricean meaning i s both l o g i c a l l y and chronologically p r i o r to conventions. Thus Bennett says: "A...plausible guess i s that meaning-conventions evolved from r e g u l a r i t i e s whose instances were l i k e my p r i m i t i v e Gricean case, with meaningful utterances becoming more conventional i n t h e i r basis as they become l e s s able to stand on t h e i r own feet.""'" By contrast, according to the present theory, the f i r s t instance of Gricean meaning w i l l be simultaneous with, i f not subsequent to, the the appearance of conventions. Lewisian r e g u l a r i t i e s , conventions, have predecessors; these act as the tools through which, by some process which, for convenience, I w i l l c a l l an argument from analogy, a theory of other minds i s acquired; a c q u i s i t i o n of that theory automatically changes the status of those predecessors; i t changes them, for the possessor of a theory of other minds, into conventions. Only then, armed with a theory of other minds and b e l i e f s about conventions, w i l l an agent be capable of making h i s f i r s t Gricean utterance. Let me s t a r t over again from the beginning. When I have spoken of Gricean meaning I have had i n mind, remember, the following d e f i n i t i o n which Grice gives i n "Utterer's 145 Meaning and Intentions": 'U meant something by u t t e r i n g x' i s true i f f , f o r some audience A, U uttered x intending (1) A to produce a p a r t i c u l a r response r (2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1) (3) A to f u l f i l l (1) on the basis of h i s f u l f i l l m e n t of ( 2 ) . 2 Thus I mean by 'Gricean meaning' what Grice means by 'meaning^'. This i s convenient for me because I am i n c l i n e d to d i s l i k e the place where Grice has drawn the l i n e between natural and non-natural 3 meaning. I have also spoken of an utterer having a 'Gricean i n t e n t i o n ' , thereby meaning that h i s utterance i s an instance of Gricean meaning. And once again, I take a Lewisian r e g u l a r i t y , a convention, to be defined as follows: A r e g u l a r i t y R i n the behavior of the members of a population P when they are agents i n a recurrent s i t u a t i o n S i s a convent ion i f and only i f i t i s true that, and i t i s common knowledge i n P that, i n any instance of S among the members of P, (1) everyone conforms to R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since S i s a coordination problem and uniform conformity to R i s a coordination equilibrium i n S. 4 Both of these d e f i n i t i o n s receive further refinements at the hands of t h e i r creators but these simpler versions are, I believe, s u f f i c i e n t l y complex for my purposes, at le a s t at t h i s preliminary sketching stage of my own theory. i i ) I.mustznow draw attention to t h r e e i d i s t i n c t i o n s which are required by the p o s i t i v e h a l f of my argument. The second d i s t i n c t i o n i s i n fact a refinement of the f i r s t , but for the sake of c l a r i t y I w i l l make the second i n two stages; the t h i r d i s p a r t i a l l y explained by the f i r s t and the second. F i r s t I contrast conventions—Lewisian r e g u l a r i t i e s , coordination equilibriums which are maintained because i t i s mutually known that they are mutually . . advantageous—with natural a s s o c i a t i o n s — a n y r e l a t i v e l y permanent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of objects or arrangements of objects, or any r e g u l a r i t y i n the sequences of events about which an agent can le a r n and i n accordance with which regulate h i s behaviour, which i s not, or at lea s t i s not understood as a Lewisian r e g u l a r i t y . And there l i e s my second d i s t i n c t i o n : An agent can learn of and act on associations, r e g u l a r i t i e s , which are i n fact Lewisian r e g u l a r i t i e s but which, because the agent involved does not possess a concept of h i s own or other minds, are not appreciated by him as such but only as natural associations. In discussing s i t u a t i o n s l i k e t h i s , I s h a l l speak of an agent operating on the basis of a convention-based natural association: An agent, x, operates on the basis of a convention-based natural association i f f : (1) a r e g u l a r i t y R i s a convention among the members of a population P when they are agents i n a recurrent s i t u a t i o n S; (2) x i s not a ( f u l l ) member of P; (3) x knows that i n S s i t u a t i o n s a c e r t a i n state of a f f a i r s A r e g u l a r l y a r i s e s ; (4) A i s the d i r e c t r e s u l t of a general conformity, among the members of P, to R; (5) x expects A to continue to a r i s e i n S s i t u a t i o n s ; (6) x prefers, on condition that A continue to a r i s e , 147 to act as a member of P would act when conforming to R i n S s i t u a t i o n s , since S i s a s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r i n g coordination of behaviour and A i s a coordination equilibrium i n S, brought about by conformity to R. What I have done here i s taken Lewis's d e f i n i t i o n of convention, s t i p u l a t e d that such a r e g u l a r i t y R does i n fact e x i s t i n the behaviour of a population P, and then shown how an agent x could act i n a way appropriate  to the behaviour of the members of P i n S s i t u a t i o n s without a c t u a l l y appreciating the conventional nature of R. To do t h i s , I have adapted Lewis's d e f i n i t i o n by removing from i t any mention of thoughts about other minds and replaced the sections which I have removed with sections r e f e r r i n g only to thoughts about the relevant behaviour, about behavioural states of a f f a i r s . Children and animals are the obvious examples of agents who act on the basis of convention-based natural associations. And of course, convention-based natural associations, and t h e i r primeval counterparts, an example of which I s h a l l describe s h o r t l y , are the predecessors of conventions of which I have spoken. Notice as well that the d i s t i n c t i o n between natural associations and conventions p a r a l l e l s exactly the d i s t i n c t i o n between i n d i c a t i o n s and signs which, following Piaget, I re f e r r e d to i n Chapter IV. Indications are s i g n i f i e r s i n v i r t u e of the existence of, and the agent's attention to, natural associations; signs are s i g n i f i e r s i n v i r t u e of the existence and the successful operation of conventions. For an agent to act, i n response to a state of a f f a i r s , A, on the basis of a convention-based natural a s s o c i a t i o n i s for that agent to respond to what, f or the members of P, i s i n fac t (or involves the presence of) a sign as though i t were a (mere) i n d i c a t i o n . F i n a l l y , I must make a d i s t i n c t i o n between manipulative and communicative behaviour. The categories of manipulative and communicative behaviour do not exactly correspond, as might be expected, to the categories of manipulative and communicative intentions. A p a r t i c u l a r action by an agent might be described as disp l a y i n g a manipulative inte n t i o n while being an instance of communicative behaviour. The class of actions involving communicative behaviour t o t a l l y includes the c l a s s of actions involving communicative intentions and i t also includes a sub-class of the c l a s s of actions i n v o l v i n g manipulative intentions. The upshot of t h i s fact i s that communication, communicative  behaviour, that i s , i s not always Gricean. I w i l l now t r y to explain the foregoing d i s t i n c t i o n . The behaviour of an animal, f o r example, when i t begs f or food i s probably best described as communicative though his i n t e n t i o n i s only manipulative: He intends only to receive food and not to have h i s 'audience' think that he desires food. He i s not interested i n , i n f a c t he i s not even aware of the existence of, the thoughts, b e l i e f s and intentions of others. He does not, cannot, therefore, intend the Gricean thing. S p e c i f i c a l l y , he cannot intend that the audience recognize that he intends the audience to feed him and that the audience feed him on the basis of that recognition. However, the fact i s , and t h i s i s what makes h i s behaviour, though not h i s int e n t i o n , communicative, he can only accomplish what he intends i f he secures f i r s t the understanding (the degree of understanding required v a r i e s according to the example), and second the compliance of, another agent. 149 Gricean communication (communication ) always involves G communicative intentions which involve thoughts about other minds; non-Gricean communication (communication ^) does not. But i f communication n involves manipulative intentions, what separates i t from straightforwardly manipulative behaviour? Bennett's argument i n "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy", which I have already shown does not y i e l d the conclusion which he needs, r e a d i l y provides the conclusion which I need here. The argument, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , i s about a sub-class of b e l i e f s and intentions, b e l i e f s and intentions which can be (at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y ) described as behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n s susceptible of education; b e l i e f s , , and intentions, ,, as I s h a l l c a l l bd bd them, unlike full-blooded b e l i e f s and intentions, do not e n t a i l b e l i e f s about the agent's own or others' 'self-concepts'. Bennett's argument supports the conclusion that there can be b e l i e f s , , about intentions, . bd bd and i n t e n t i o n s ^ to produce b e l i e f s ^ and thereby, I w i l l argue, gives us what i s required to d i s t i n q u i s h communication n from manipulative behaviour. The simplest type of i n t e n t i o n , a purely manipulative one, involves, I believe, a p r i m i t i v e f e e l i n g for two things: time and objects e x i s t i n g i n time. Given these two things, an infant or animal can see a p a r t i c u l a r arrangement of objects, desire another, and possess a b e l i e f about the p o s s i b i l i t y of (a p i c t u r e of) these objects arranged i n the desired way. He then manipulates the objects, i f only i n a t r i a l and error fashion, and the manipulation, being directed by the p i c t u r e of the desired future arrangement, i s i n t e n t i o n a l . The r e s u l t achieved i n s i t u a t i o n s such as these i s always the consequence of a 150 causal chain set i n motion by the i n t e n t i o n a l action of one agent alone. By comparison, inte n t i o n capable of explaining the simplest form of communication, communication „, must involve another element: The agent must have a f e e l i n g not only f or time and the existence of objects i n time, but also f o r the existence of what w i l l be here c a l l e d complicated objects; of objects which have a tendency to exhibit a c t i v i t y without any apparent external forces operating on them. He must have not only b e l i e f s , , but b e l i e f s , , about b e l i e f s , , and J bd bd bd intentions, ,. In communication of any kind the communicating agent bd achieves an end, i f he i s successful, v i a a causal chain which cannot be completely accounted for without reference to e f f e c t s on the b e l i e f s , , b d and intentions, , of another agent. There must always be two agents, bd two minds, involved. But t h i s f a c t , i n instances of communication , i s unappreciated by ei t h e r the u t t e r e r or h i s audience of both; each must, however, i n such instances, appreciate the existence of the other as a complicated object with behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n s accessible to a l i m i t e d degree of control at a distance, so to speak. I have j u s t d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , then, manipulative behaviour, communication , and communication : communication involves thoughts about other minds; communication^£ involves thoughts about complicated objects; and manipulative behaviour involves neither. Communication _, of course, involves not j u s t b e l i e f s , , about -vGr * b d intentions, , or b e l i e f s , , but intentions , , to produce intentions, , or bd bd bd c bd b e l i e f s ^ ^ . The communicating agent must act i n some way which i s more than j u s t appropriate to the other agent's behaviour; h i s behaviour must a c t u a l l y a f f e c t , change the o r i g i n a l course of, the behaviour of the other agent; and the e f f e c t produced i n the other agent must not be open to a purely manipulative explanation. For example, he must not push the other agent, he must cause him to move of h i s own v o l i t i o n (the concept of w i l l here being r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e — I want i t to extend over agents who are not, or not yet, self-conscious) and of course, he must cause t h i s move i n t e n t i o n a l l y . i i i ) Having b e l i e f s ^ about a complicated object's present behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n i s one thing, having an i n t e n t i o n ^ to change that behavioural d i s p o s i t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y more complex. Let me tr y to i l l u s t r a t e how the move from the lower l e v e l of complexity to the higher might occur by adapting Bennett's own 'primeval case' u n t i l i t f i t s the pi c t u r e of what I submit a t r u l y primeval case of communication, n e c e s s a r i l y communication^,, would look l i k e . There are two agents, x and y. It sometimes happens that x and y come within each other's perceptual f i e l d s . Both have i n t e l l i g e n c e l e v e l s high enough to allow them to have b e l i e f s , , about natural associa-bd tions connected with complicated objects, that i s , they can notice and appreciate r e g u l a r i t i e s i n the behaviour of complicated objects around them. (Notice that I'm not giving them any unaccounted for b e l i e f s only an unaccounted for capacity to acquire b e l i e f s — I can't account for the strange phenomenon of consciousness any more than anyone else can...) In p a r t i c u l a r , x has come to notice that when a ce r t a i n event, P, which we would describe as a cocoanut f a l l i n g on y's head, occurs, another event, Q, which we would describe as y a n g r i l y throwing cocoanuts i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , immediately follows. A f t e r not a great many exposures to barrages of cocoanuts, x comes to make another, highly s i g n i f i c a n t observation: P i s re g u l a r l y preceded by R, a cocoanut d i r e c t l y over y's head showing signs of loosening, x's b e l i e f ^ about the connection between R and Q (but for Q, P i s quite unimportant to x), leads him, on observing R, to react i n a c e r t a i n way, c a l l i t A: He covers h i s head with h i s arms and attempts to run away; x does t h i s i n t o t a l earnestness, no acting, no attempt to communicate, and c e r t a i n l y no thoughts about nor concern J for y and h i s pain. Eventually, y, by a s i m i l a r s e r i e s of observations, connects x's reaction A with h i s experience of P, being h i t on the head by a cocoanut, and manages thereby to avoid P.'.' Q i s also thereby~averted and x comes to appreciate that by doing A he somehow controls h i s environment, preventing both Q and P. The earnestness i n X's performance (now 'utterance' becomes applicable) of A gradually disappears—he hasn't been h i t for a w h i l e — a n d i t i s thereby progressively s i m p l i f i e d . (Each stage i n t h i s s i m p l i f i c a t i o n process must, of course, be s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r to the l a s t to assure y's continued recognition of A.) x and y are now e x h i b i t i n g what I am c a l l i n g communication^. The s i m p l i f i e d version of A i s the counterpart, i n the primeval case, of convention-based natural associations i n the more common case, the case of the c h i l d . Being, however, the primeval case, the natural associations involved here are n e c e s s a r i l y not convention-based. iv) That brings us to the hardest part of a l l : How i s the move from communication to communication- to be affected? My p o s i t i o n i s t h i s : F i r s t language must l e t x or the c h i l d say things about mind and body and s e l f and others; and then, what I s h a l l c a l l 'the argument from analogy', capable of operating because of that l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y , w i l l lead him to appreciate those same d i s t i n c t i o n s i n a new l i g h t . 153 Let me, i n an attempt to shed l i g h t on what i t i s that I have i n mind here, resort to a b i t of autobiography. The incident which I am about to describe probably occurred when I was between nine and eleven. I t i s not, I believe, an a t y p i c a l type of experience. My mother c a l l e d me to help her with the dishes; I didn't want to help; I'wished that I could think of some way out, that she would j u s t do them by hers e l f as she often did; I walked into the kitchen and looked at my mother and r e a l i z e d that she didn't want to do them e i t h e r ! I already knew t h i s of course; I could have, i f asked, stated i t i n words. No one l i k e s or wants to do dishes ever; not f o r i n t r i n s i c reasons anyway. What I r e a l i z e d i n that moment, i n that f l a s h , and i t was a f l a s h , was that she (and everyone else.') had a mind of her own, experiences of her own, i n f a c t , i n some sense, a 'world' of her own... As I've said, previous to my experience I was t o t a l l y capable of handling the English language which takes the fact that each of us has a mind and fe e l i n g s f o r granted, as completely obvious, given. So what was the content of my experience? I t i s as though ) the asymmetry which had, p r i o r to that experience, been involved i n the concepts of my wants and her wants (children are completely s e l f -centred) ' had suddenly been brought sharply into contrast with the symmetry of the words used to express those concepts, the r e s u l t being a replacement of the o l d asymmetric concepts by new symmetrical ones: The meaning of the words involved underwent an extensive though extremely subtle transformation. Getting x and y to the brink of t h i s t r a n s i t i o n i s consider-ably more complex than doing so for the c h i l d and though I c e r t a i n l y do not profess to have come anywhere near working out the d e t a i l of t h i s development, I am convinced that i t can be done. There are two re l a t e d sources of the d i f f e r e n c e i n complexity i n the development of a s e l f / other p i c t u r e i n the c h i l d and i n x and y. F i r s t l y , i n the primeval case, both of the agents are wholly s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d , making the communication^ between them asymmetrical i n a very fundamental way. Take the case which I have recently described. From x's point of view hi s utterance i s a preventative measure which serves to protect x himself from c e r t a i n unpleasant occurrences; from y's point of view, A i s a warning, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y unlike the warning which clouds give of impending r a i n . In the c h i l d ' s case, however, the adult i s , at the outset, aware of and concerned for the c h i l d as a being with experiences of h i s own, i n a c c e s s i b l e to the adult; i t i s thereby easy to show that the c h i l d i s exposed to an abundant number of s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n s with the adult which are j o i n t l y capable of accounting for h i s eventual t r a n s i t i o n to a sel f / o t h e r picture. But when neither agent i s capable of concern for the other, that i s both lack a sel f / o t h e r picture, inventing p l a u s i b l e and s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n s between them becomes considerably more challenging. The second diff e r e n c e between the primeval case and the case of the c h i l d l i e s i n the fact that many of the associations which the c h i l d learns are convention-based natural associations. That i s , the adult brings to h i s in t e r a c t i o n s with the c h i l d not only a concern for h i s inner well-being but as well, a ready-made, complicated set of conceptual t o o l s ; he exposes the c h i l d to Lewisian r e g u l a r i t i e s . The c h i l d amasses huge numbers of these r e g u l a r i t i e s but without appreciating t h e i r conventional nature. Only by using these associations as stepping stones can the c h i l d make the leap from a completely unself-conscious, t o t a l l y s o l i p s i s t i c p i c t ure to a sel f / o t h e r p icture capable of appreciating the conventional nature of those same associations. Simultaneously, subsequent to an a p p l i c a t i o n (however i n e x p l i c i t ) of the argument from analogy, the c h i l d becomes both aware of the operation of Lewisian r e g u l a r i t i e s and capable of Gricean intentions. By contrast, i n the primeval case, we must not only account for x and y's ultimate appreciation of complex concepts through an ap p l i c a t i o n of the argument from analogy, but, somehow, we must account for the genesis of those concepts themselves. The c h i l d learns to say 'you' and 'me', and 'your pain' and 'my pain', etc., long before he a t t r i b u t e s to you a phenomenal pain c o r r e l a t i v e to h i s own. Those concepts are f o i s t e d on him i n v i r t u e of the fact that he i s part of a complicated community of human beings, most (?) of whom are capable of appreciating the true nature of those concepts. . But i f what I am arguing has any tru t h i n i t at a l l , s p e c i f i c a l l y , i f i t i s true that preliminary exposure to the d i s t i n c t i o n s imbedded i n those concepts i s a pre r e q u i s i t e f or appreciating those d i s t i n c t i o n s , then i t should surely be possible to show how those distinctionsj-r-in t h e i r bare-boned, s o l i p s i s t i c form can be generated without:being i n t e n t i o n a l l y created by a self-conscious agent. That i s to say, i t should surely be possible to meet t h i s second challenge presented by the primeval case. NOTES Jonathan Bennett, "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," Foundations  of Language, 10 (1973), 155. 2 H.P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," Philosophical  Review, 78 (1969), 151. 3 I would prefer to see such a d i s t i n c t i o n mark the presence or absence of intentions of any form; not j u s t of complex Gricean ones. 4 David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1969), p. 58. 157 CHAPTER VII Some Semantic Implications of the Consciousness Theory 1. Introduction i ) I have claimed i n several places throughout t h i s discussion that the p o s i t i o n which I have sketched has i n t e r e s t i n g implications for problems i n the Philosophy of Language. Exploring these professed implications may, i f they are at a l l sound, serve not only to make some contribution to the discussion of those issues but may perhaps help to diminish somewhat the multiple o b s c u r i t i e s which characterize Chapter IV. As I said i n the Introduction, Chapter IV represents an attempt to a r t i c u l a t e , deplorably wide of the mark, the basic i n t u i t i o n s about what consciousness and conceptual frameworks must be l i k e which underlie each of the negative arguments contained i n the present endeavor. By adding to the number of such negative arguments, as the present chapter w i l l seek to do, i t i s hoped that tolerance f o r , perhaps even the p l a u s i b i l i t y of, the content of Chapter IV might be enhanced. The p o s i t i o n which I have recently developed places the on t o l o g i c a l l i n e between the subjective and the objective i n a r e l a t i v e l y unusual place. I have claimed that, as conscious beings, we are locked within, and are c o n s t i t u t i v e of, the subjective h a l f of an on t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y . The objective h a l f of that d u a l i t y causes, i t was claimed, aspects of the subjective but cannot be, i n anything l i k e the sense i n which the P-theory takes i t to be, present to consciousness. A w i l d attempt was made to give some a l t e r n a t i v e to, and, at the same time, some explanation of, the P-theory account of the matter. I t r i e d to say something about the nature of the subjective and of the type of evolution i t must undergo which could lend some support and content to my claim that the type of o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e inherent i n the P-theory amounts, i n some sense, to what I c a l l e d the 'importation' of an actual o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y into what i s i n fact o n t o l o g i c a l l y non-dual. It w i l l be the goal of t h i s chapter to show that t h i s type of view has implications for the r o l e of sensations, and experience i n general, i n meaning and even i n reference r e l a t i o n s . To speak of the reference of an expression i s , I think, ambiguous i n the same manner and the same degree as i s to t a l k of the objective. Just as 'objective' r e f e r s both to one h a l f of an o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y and to the r e s u l t of the attempt to import that h a l f into the other h a l f , so reference r e l a t i o n s hold i d e a l l y across an o n t o l o g i c a l l i n e but are i n fact confined within the subjective h a l f of the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i t y . In the same s p i r i t I claimed, with Thomas Nagel, that we can speak of our conceptual development as moving i n a subjective-to-objective d i r e c t i o n , but never of our theories as being objective. The upshot of the arguments of the present chapter w i l l be the contention that no matter how close the conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n s which we make might come to r e f l e c t i n g the kinds and numbers of objective parameters which operate on us, f a c t s about our sensory experiences must be seen as playing an indispensable r o l e i n the meaning of t a l k about such parameters. i i ) Competing theories about the meaning of words l i k e 'red', 'hot' and 'water' seem to be generated by c o n f l i c t i n g opinions on the degree to which the following three factors play e s s e n t i a l r o l e s i n the meaning of such terms: our sensations, our b e l i e f s , and objective parameters. There i s currently popular tendency, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n philosophers greatly impressed by actual and possible future advances i n s c i e n t i f i c theory, to want to 'get meaning out of our heads', where to see meaning as i n our heads i s taken to involve the a t t r i b u t i o n of an e s s e n t i a l r o l e to f a c t s about our sensations and to the i d i o -syncratic temporal and organizational r e l a t i o n s holding between them. Thus there i s a tendency to want to show that sensations play no r o l e or at best only an accidental r o l e i n meaning r e l a t i o n s . Very c l e a r l y , the account which I have given of meaning r e l a t i o n s , which has systems of ghosts being s i g n i f i e d e i t h e r by sense-data or by r e l i e f e d ghosts, cannot, because of what ghosts and sense-data have to be, avoid keeping meaning i n our heads and giving a c e n t r a l r o l e to our sensations. The present p o s i t i o n holds that a l l three of the above mentioned factors play indispensable r o l e s i n meaning r e l a t i o n s . Objective parameters, one might say, provide the causal input which account for the structure of our b e l i e f s and sensations provide the content which i s structured. B e l i e f s , i n other words, come out as haunting r e l a t i o n s ; and haunting r e l a t i o n s are caused by objective parameters and involve sense-data and ghosts of sense-data. 160 To claim that meaning i s 1 i n our heads 1 has what may seem to most to be a troublesome and even c r u c i a l l y damaging consequence. I should point out at the outset that not only am I prepared to accept t h i s consequence but I would a c t u a l l y be prepared to argue f o r i t on independent grounds. Meaning r e l a t i o n s , i n t h e i r most basic form, w i l l be speaker-relative r e l a t i o n s ; they w i l l be, moreover, i n some strong sense, private. The notion of in t e r s u b j e c t i v e meaning r e l a t i o n s presupposes, I suggest, the fact of the existence of private speaker-r e l a t i v e r e l a t i o n s and the fact that, across i n d i v i d u a l s , such r e l a t i o n s , happily, show a great and obvious tendency to overlap; to be, i f not i d e n t i c a l , c e r t a i n l y f o r the most part, recognizably s i m i l a r . The p o s s i b i l i t y of detecting and c r i t i c i z i n g discrepancies between speaker-relative meaning, and public meaning will.. ' rest as well on t h i s fact that though i n some strong sense speaker-r e l a t i v e meaning i s private, important forms of s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences are nevertheless recognizable across i n d i v i d u a l s . (In speaking of the basic type of meaning r e l a t i o n s as being ' i n the head' and consequently as being speaker-relative and priv a t e , I am, of course, t r y i n g to express within the terms of the P-theory what I I take would be implied by the tr u t h of the consciousness theory.) 161 2. Ordinary Language and Sensations: An Argument by Paul Churchland i ) I s h a l l begin by examining an argument of Paul Churchland's which occurs i n h i s book S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind. Churchland o f f e r s what he takes to be a development of the S e l l a r s i a n idea that sensations play a mere causal as opposed to a cognitive or or epistemic r o l e " i n the process of perception". He submits, and he takes h i s argument as o f f e r i n g powerful support f o r , the p o s s i b i l i t y that sensations might, ultimately, "even be dispensed with so far as the business of learning and t h e o r i z i n g about the world i s concerned"."*" It w i l l be argued here that Churchland's argument does not i n fact represent any improvement over that of S e l l a r s and that i n f a c t , once having l a i d bare the structure of Churchland's argument, we f i n d ourselves thrown back onto S e l l a r s . I f the Sellars-type p o s i t i o n i s r i g h t i t must be defended at the point at which S e l l a r s himself attempted to do so. The discussion of Churchland's argument w i l l lead, therefore, into a discussion of S e l l a r s ' . Churchland o f f e r s us an argument intended to show that facts about sensations are t o t a l l y i r r e l e v a n t to the meaning of observation terms, even to the meaning of common observation terms such as 'hot', 'cold', 'white', and 'black'. I t i s Churchland's contention, then, that f a c t s about t h e " i n t r i n s i c nature of sensations (as opposed to f a c t s about t h e i r r o l e s i n causal chains) are semantically i r r e l e v a n t . We are asked to imagine that a set of a l i e n s (As), exist whose members are i n a l l respects s i m i l a r to us, earthlings (Es), with the exception that they have v i s u a l sensations i n respect of the objective parameter temperature where we Es have t a c t i l e ones. Where something f e e l s to J£s i n the way which they c a l l f e e l i n g hot, warm or cold, As correspond-i n g l y have v i s u a l sensations of the sort which Es c a l l sensations of white, grey or black. (As do not possess any sensory information about the objective parameter which causes colour experiences i n Es.) We are also asked to suppose that As use the same words or-sounds i n making t h e i r v i s u a l reports of the objective parameter temperature as we 2 do i n making our t a c t i l e reports of the same parameter. Since t h i s parameter a f f e c t s them, at l e a s t under a definable set of 'normal' conditions, i n ways which are systematically c o r r e l a t a b l e with the ways i n which i t a f f e c t s us, we w i l l make, each i n our respective languages, b e l i e f utterances which w i l l , i n a s u p e r f i c i a l sense at l e a s t , be s t r i c t l y i d e n t i c a l . We w i l l each u t t e r , or be disposed to assent to the utterance of, such s t r i n g s of words as: 'Fires are hot'; 'A warm thing w i l l warm up a cooler thing but never the reverse'; and the l i k e . The question i s : Are our utterances i d e n t i c a l only i n the s u p e r f i c i a l sense that they consist.of i d e n t i c a l s t r i n g s of sounds or are they also i d e n t i c a l i n the further and deeper sense that they have the same meaning? Churchland, as has already been indicated, designed the above described imaginary case with the inten t i o n of providing a means of t e s t i n g theories about the meaning of common observation terms, terms such as 'hot'. In p a r t i c u l a r , he hopes to show that t h i s test case provides conclusively damaging counter-evidence to a theory, 3 taken from "the crude i n t u i t i o n s supplied by common-sense", according to which the meaning of such terms i s given by sensation. According to the strongest form of t h i s theory, the meaning of such terms i s given wholly i n terms of sensation; on a weaker version i t i s determined only p a r t l y by sensations. The case involving As and Es provides a test f o r the strongest version of t h i s theory about the meaning of common observation terms i n the following way: The correct theory about the meaning of t h i s c l a s s of terms, whatever i t might be, must allow for t r a n s l a t i o n s between the two languages, A and _E, which preserve the t r u t h values of the o r i g i n a l observation utterences. We must, that i s , as Es, be able to a t t r i b u t e l a r g e l y true b e l i e f s to A-utterers; be able to avoid any theory of meaning which would force us to t r a n s l a t e i n such a way as to "/JmakeJ a joke of t h e i r b e l i e f s 4 and v i s u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s " . Churchland finds the claim that theories of meaning must meet such a condition to be p a r t i c u l a r l y persuasive i n l i g h t of the fac t that the t o t a l r e c i p r o c i t y of the s i t u a t i o n would force the As to a t t r i b u t e l a r g e l y f a l s e b e l i e f s to us, to make the same joke of our b e l i e f s and v i s u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , on any theory which forced us to a t t r i b u t e l a r g e l y "false b e l i e f s to them. T.f, then, Me are to be able to make any sense of each other's utterances, and not, that i s , to each f i n d the other's observation statements to be r i d i c u l o u s l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y out of keeping with our own, we must have a theory of meaning which generates only mutually truth-preserving t r a n s l a t i o n s . It i s t h i s condition which the so-called common-sense view apparently f a i l s to f u l f i l l . What Churchland takes to be the common-sense view of the meaning of common observation terms such as 'hot' generates the a s c r i p t i o n of f a l s e b e l i e f s , by As to Es and v i c e versa, i n the following way: Remember that the As have, as a causal consequence of exposure to that same objective parameter which i s causally responsible for the occurrence i n us of the kind of sensations which we c a l l sensations of heat, the kind of v i s u a l sensations which we c a l l sensations of white. (Except where otherwise indicated, a l l use of words such as 'hot', and 'white' w i l l involve the E_, that i s our, system of meanings— whatever the meaning of such words might turn out to be.) Further, t h e i r verbal behaviour i n such s i t u a t i o n s i s s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r to ours; they say, i n A, of the object at which they are looking when they are having a sensation of white j u s t what we say, i n E, of the same object i f we are touching i t and having a sensation of heat; namely, 'It i s hot'. Now according to the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t theory of meaning we must, i t seems, given the fact that the sensation c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y associated, for them, with the claim that x i s hot i s that sensation which we c a l l a sensation of white, t r a n s l a t e utterances, by As, of 'x i s hot' as 'x i s white'. But, except for occasional coincidences where an object i s both (what we would c a l l ) hot and white, t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n procedure would have us ascribe to the As f a l s e b e l i e f s . C l e a r l y , Churchland believes, a s e n s a t i o n a l i s t view about the meaning of observation terms w i l l require the systematic a t t r i b u t i o n of f a l s e b e l i e f s by us to any being who f a i l s to share exactly our sensory modalities. In showing t h i s , the device of invoking imaginary As has, he believes, thereby provided a reductio ad absurdum of the common-sense p o s i t i o n , or at l e a s t of the strongest version of that p o s i t i o n . Churchland :dlaims thdt: "//Since/ the view that the meaning of our common observation terms i s given i n , or determined by, sensation must be rejected outright... we are l e f t with networks of b e l i e f as the bearers or determinants of understanding."^ Immediately p r i o r to drawing t h i s general conclusion, Churchland argues, against a possible tertium quid, that the suggestion that, "Perhaps a part of the meaning of the relevant terms i s given i n sensation, while the remainder i s f i x e d by a c l u s t e r of background b e l i e f s " , "has nothing to recommend i t over the /pure networks of b e l i e f 7 a l t e r n a t i v e — q u i t e the reverse". He claims that such a p o s i t i o n "/would require7 us to deny that the beings with the i n f r a r e d eyes can perceive the temperatures of objects, and indeed to deny that any beings, no matter what t h e i r sensory apparatus, can perceive the temperatures of objects unless they are subject to p r e c i s e l y the same range of bodily sensations with which we happen to respond to hot and cold objects".^ This argument has serious flaws i n i t , but i t w i l l be possible to attack Churchland's general r e j e c t i o n of s e n s a t i o n a l i s t -type theories of meaning without dealing with i t d i r e c t l y . i i ) Even common-sense theories admit of l e v e l s of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ; and while Churchland may be r i g h t that the p o s i t i o n which he refutes with hi s A/E case i s i n fa c t condoned by common-sense, t h i s could, i t w i l l be argued, be true of only a very crude l e v e l of common-sense. In f a c t , the p o s i t i o n which Churchland a t t r i b u t e s to the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t can e a s i l y be shown to be f a l s e without the extravagance of invoking a l i e n s , i t s inadequateness i s exceedingly obvious. Expressions such as ' i s hot', and ' i s white', which are the type of expressions to which Churchland applies h i s A/_E test case, are connected, i n some way for which any adequate theory about the meaning of such expressions must o f f e r an account, to expressions such as 'feels hot', (or, i n A, 'looks hot'), and 'looks white'. The se n s a t i o n a l i s t theory which Churchland attacks goes s e r i o u s l y astray i n that i t completely ignores the d i s t i n c t i o n between these two types of expressions. Any adequate theory about the meaning of i s - t a l k ought to draw t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n and attempt to disentangle the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the distinguished items. Church-land's s e n s a t i o n a l i s t opponent v i r t u a l l y collapses i s - t a l k into looks-t a l k by a t t r i b u t i n g to i s - t a l k the meaning and thus the tr u t h conditions which a considerably more worthy s e n s a t i o n a l i s t opponent would a t t r i b u t e to looks-talk. Just a moment's r e f l e c t i o n , f o r the purposes of which the introduction of a l i e n s i s completely otiose, reveals that such a p o s i t i o n cannot account f o r the meaning of i s - t a l k ; even within our own language t h i s p o s i t i o n would force frequent, c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e indeed i n c o r r e c t , a t t r i b u t i o n s of f a l s e b e l i e f . Thus Churchland's s e n s a t i o n a l i s t would be forced to claim that whenever an object looks red i t i s red; even when the fac t of i t s looking red stems from some abnormality e i t h e r i n the observer, the viewing conditions or both. As we l l , of course, he would have to claim that i t i s red only i f some observer i s looking at i t and having a sensation of red. Under conditions of darkness, i n the presence of the relevant type of colour-blind i n d i v i d u a l , or i n the absence of any observer, an object simply i s n ' t red according to t h i s p o s i t i o n . That the view that an object i s red i f and only i f i t , at present, looks red to some observer 167 f a l l s to accord with ordinary usage i s , surely, beyond dispute. 3. Ordinary Language and Sensations: An Argument by Wilfrid Sellsrs i) Traditionally, the sensationalist position, as i t has appeared in the philosophical literature, fueled, of course, by 'crude intuitions supplied by common-sense', has taken the meaning of is-talk to be given in terms of looks-talk and talk about standard observers and standard conditions. The meaning of looks-talk, on the other hand, has traditionally been assumed to be amenable to a pure sensationalist analysis. Sellars attempts to defend the position that sensations are irrelevant to the meaning of words like 'red' by attacking this sensationalist position directly. Thus he attempts to support his position that facts about sensations are only causally and never semantically or epistemically relevant to talk about objective parameters by showing that such facts are irrelevant to the meaning of the word 'red' even as i t occurs in the expression 'looks red'. He advances the claim that "being red is logically prior, i s a logically simpler notion, than looking red". But then he poses the question, "but what...are we to make of the necessary,truth—and i t i s , of course, a necessary truth—that X i-s red "=" x would look red to standard observers in standard conditions?" 168 He comments that, "One begins to see the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the gambit that looking-red i s an insoluble unity, for the minute one gives 'red' (on the right-hand side) an independent status, i t becomes what i t obviously i s , namely 'red' as a predicate of p h y s i c a l objects, and the supposed d e f i n i t i o n becomes obvious c i r c l e . " ^ A large part of what I s h a l l t r y to show i n the discussion which follows i s that S e l l a r s i s r i g h t i n h i s claim that t h i s 'supposed d e f i n i t i o n ' — i f . we hold t i g h t l y to the obviously true assumption that 'red' i s a predicate of physical o b j e c t s — i n v o l v e s a c i r c l e ; perhaps even an obvious c i r c l e . But i t s obviousness notwithstanding, i t i s an ex-tremely d i f f i c u l t c i r c l e to see! But I hope to show that though S e l l a r s i s r i g h t that he has found a c i r c l e he's wrong i f he thinks that he's found a way out of i t . He has found, I w i l l suggest, a deep problem about ordinary language for which there i s , i n some strong sense, no way out. S e l l a r s now o f f e r s us a piece of ' h i s t o r i c a l f i c t i o n ' by means of which he he hopes to "bring out the e s s e n t i a l features of 8 'looks'". He t e l l s us a story about a young man named John who works i n a necktie shop. John, he supposes, has, with one exception, learned the use of colour words i n the usual way. John's case i s . unusual i n that neither he nor h i s compatriots have ever looked at an object i n other than standard conditions. At some point i n John's l i f e t i m e i t comes to pass that e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g i s invented. Unlike h i s fellows, John i s reluctant to experience t h i s new wonder. But eventually, sometime a f t e r the others have learned to deal with i t , John 'succumbs'. Making a s a l e s p i t c h to a customer very soon 169 thereafter, John says, "'Here i s a handsome green one"1, to which the customer responds that i s n ' t green and takes John "^outside. John makes the suggestion that perhaps e l e c t r i c i t y changes the colour of things and that they change back again i n daylight. But the other man r e j e c t s that suggestion as implausible and John r e l u c t a n t l y agrees with the other's observation that that would be "a queer kind of change". When John, i n bewilderment, protests that he had seen that the t i e was green in s i d e the shop, the man r e p l i e s , "'No, we didn't see that i t was green i n there, because i t wasn't green, and you can't see what i s n ' t so.'" According to S e l l a r s , John eventually learns, under pressure from hi s customers, to s t i f l e the report 'This i s green' and to make instead a f a c t - s t a t i n g use of the sentence 'This i s blue'. He learns i n time, moreover, to respond to questions such as "'What i s the colour of t h i s necktie?'" with such statements as, ' " I t looks green, but take i t outside and see.'" I want to say two things about S e l l a r s ' l i t t l e story. F i r s t , even i f the story was i n general acceptable as a piece of h i s t o r i c a l f i c t i o n , there i s an important d e t a i l i n i t , on which much hangs, which i s highly contentious. And second, the story seems to be j u s t i n general unacceptable as a p l a u s i b l e piece of h i s t o r i c a l f i c t i o n : The d i s t i n c t type of l i n e which the story t r i e s to draw between 'looks' and ' i s ' i s , on empirical grounds, simply unacceptable. Because the type of p o s i t i o n from which I am arguing holds that conceptual evolution amounts to a p r a c t i c a l adaptation to empirical c o n s t r a i n t s — i n so f a r as the exertion of energy by consciousness becomes increasingly appropriate to the patterns which occur i n the passive a s p e c t s — b e i n g e m p i r i c a l l y  unacceptable harbours the p o s s i b i l i t y of having far-reaching conceptual implications which may well be completely misleading. The f i r s t point i s simple. I question the p l a u s i b i l i t y of S e l l a r s ' easy assumption that John's society would r e j e c t so o f f -handedly the p o s s i b i l i t y that e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g changes the colours of things. The suggestion that i t might, i n the context of the story, seems not i n the l e a s t implausible. Consider the case of a society l i k e John's which had never seen water i n other than standard conditions In p a r t i c u l a r , they had never seen i t evaporate or freeze. Subsequent to the invention of r e f r i g e r a t o r s or k e t t l e s , do they deny that i t can be changed by cooling i t or heating i t and say rather that i t looks as i f i t i s s o l i d or gaseous?.' I t ' s the f a c t , I suggest, that i n our world, unlike John's, colour changes are so common (whereas changes from l i q u i d to s o l i d or gas are much l e s s s o — l u c k i l y for us; I don't mean to imply by t h i s example that but for a change i n our l i n g u i s t i c habits our l i v e s might otherwise be quite s i m i l a r i f these kinds of changes were more common.'), that forces us to t a l k both of the colour which an object has and of the colour which i t looks to have. I would l i k e to suggest as w e l l , s t i l l i n connection with my f i r s t objection to S e l l a r s ' story, that the mere fact that the p o s s i b i l i t y that e l e c t r i c i t y might cause objects to change t h e i r colour i s advanced at a l l (and S e l l a r s admits the p o s s i b i l i t y that i t would be) undercuts the claim, for which S e l l a r s i s concerned to generate support, that f a c t s about sensations are only causally and not semantically or epistemically relevant i n t a l k about objective parameters; i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t undercuts the claim that f a c t s about sensations are i r r e l e v a n t to the meaning of words l i k e 'red'. Thus i f S e l l a r s i s prepared, as he must be, to admit that what changed when John took the necktie outside was John's~sensations, and not the t i e . then f o r John to suggest that perhaps the t i e ' s colour had changed i s f o r him to reveal that facts about h i s sensations play a r o l e i n what he means by colour words.. Turning to my second point. John's conceptual development ju s t couldn't be, I s h a l l argue, a piece of our own conceptual h i s t o r y . S e l l a r s j u s t seems to have ignored how v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t John's world would have to be from our own i n order to f u l f i l l S e l l a r s ' basic under-i l y i n g supposition that John "has never looked at an object i n other 9 than standard conditions". I t ' s not j u s t e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g which, i n our world, creates differences between the colours things have (whatever that might turn out to mean) and the colours which they look, at d i f f e r e n t times, to d i f f e r e n t observers, under d i f f e r e n t conditions, to have. Thus i n the world which John inhabits, there must be no a l t e r n a t i o n of day and night, i n the sense i n which sunlight comes and goes; i n f a c t , the natural l i g h t that e x i s t s i n the world of John and h i s fellows cannot be very much l i k e our sunlight at a l l : Sunlight radiates from one d i r e c t i o n , and therefore illuminates objects i n an uneven, though systematic, and i n a continuously changing manner, the process of change being systematic as w e l l . Objects which are i n fact evenly coloured are thereby caused to exhibit the f a m i l i a r e f f e c t of appearing to be d i f f e r e n t i n colour across c h a r a c t e r i s t i c and e i t h e r d i s t i n c t or blurred l i n e s - - l i n e s which are i n fact l i n e s of contour ( t h i s shading e f f e c t undoubtedly plays a c r u c i a l r o l e i n our perception of three-dimensionality). Light i n John's world, by contrast 172 would have to be evenly d i f f u s e d and completely d i r e c t i o n l e s s , surrounding objects l i k e an absolutely uniform, u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d gas or l i q u i d . And with such evenly d i f f u s e d , ever-present l i g h t i t ' s rather hard to see why e l e c t r i c l i g h t i n g would ever be invented anyhow^—not at l e a s t f or use i n a t i e shop; perhaps as a drawing a t t r a c t i o n i n that kind of e x h i b i t i o n which features such things as d i s t o r t i n g mirrors. But speaking of mirrors. Remember that looks-talk i s n ' t unique to t a l k about colours and John and h i s compatriots, being ignorant of the l o o k s / i s d i s t i n c t i o n , must be without mirrors, d i s t o r t i n g or otherwise, since even non-distorting ones cause i t to look as though things are where they aren't. But once we s t a r t thinking about the fact that the l o o k s / i s d i s t i n c t i o n (and don't forget i t s close r e l a t i v e s , the f e e l s / i s , sounds/is, s m e l l s / i s , and t a s t e s / i s d i s t i n c t i o n s — q u e s t i o n s about them p r e c i s e l y p a r a l l e l l i n g questions about l o o k s / i s and thereby re q u i r i n g p r e c i s e l y p a r a l l e l treatment) applies to more than j u s t colours, i t becomes immediately obvious that we have as yet only scratched at the surface of the diff e r e n c e between John's world and ours. Consider the case of shapes. In our world corners which are square look, from a l l angles but two, ( d i r e c t l y above and d i r e c t l y below i n the case of a h o r i z o n t a l object), to be either obtuse or acute. But i n John's world, where nothing ever looks other than what i t a c t u a l l y i s , i t would seem that everything must ex i s t i n a two-dimensional plane with points of view on that plane e x i s t i n g only along l i n e s d i r e c t l y perpendicular to i t . And John and h i s friends w i l l probably have to be points, l i n e segments or at best plane segments.' Perhaps they could be three-dimensional objects but they couldn't perceive each other as such (and thus a higher-order l o o k s / i s d i s t i n c t i o n , of which they would be o b l i v i o u s would i n fact e x i s t ) . What's worse, i t seems u n l i k e l y that they w i l l be able to perceive t h e i r own bodies at a l l (unless they can project t h e i r e ye—they won't need two of them i n t h e i r two dimensional w o r l d — a t r i g h t angles to themselves!) I suspect that I need not pursue the issue of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t a l k about appearance and t a l k about r e a l i t y further i n the l o o k s / i s d i r e c t i o n nor even to touch on the f e e l s / i s and the much l e s s commonly discussed sounds/is, s m e l l s / i s , t a s t e s / i s , d i r e c t i o n s i n order to convince even the most reluctant reader that S e l l a r s ' l i t t l e piece of conceptual h i s t o r y i s n ' t a piece of our conceptual h i s t o r y . S e l l a r s ' grossly o v e r - s i m p l i f i e d . p i c t u r e of the perceptual s i t u a t i o n s within which the l o o k s / i s d i s t i n c t i o n operates and h i s i l l e g i t i m a t e assumption that i n such a simple s i t u a t i o n looks-talk rather than t a l k of an objective change would be the conceptual move most natural for a society l i k e John's, allows him to draw some implications about the r o l e of sensations i n the meaning of 'red' which j u s t simply do not do j u s t i c e to the way i n which words of that sort operate i n our language. The option of saying that the colours of objects change seems wide open, even obvious, i n John's society whereas i t i s — f o r p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n s — c l o s e d to us. The s i m p l i c i t y of the empirical s i t u a t i o n i n response to which the concepts i n John's language evolve j u s t can't shed any l i g h t on the complex conceptual s i t u a t i o n which has evolved i n our own language. The story about John was intended, I guess, to soften our resistance to the suggestion that fa c t s about sensations can be separated, not causally, 174 of course, but semantically or epistemically, from our t a l k about properties i n the p h y s i c a l world. I t i s of c e n t r a l importance to S e l l a r s ' e n t i r e programme, remember, to be able to show that awareness of phy s i c a l objects i s conceptually p r i o r to awareness of sensations. Awareness  of sensations, f or S e l l a r s , i s the t h e o r e t i c a l outcome of being bothered by the fa c t that s i t u a t i o n s i n which something looks to one to be red and s i t u a t i o n s i n which one sees something to be red, have something i n common. I have t r i e d to d i s c r e d i t S e l l a r s ' s t o r y by arguing that John's readiness to abandon facts about h i s sensations i n the meanings of 'green' and 'blue' i s implausible at best and j u s t downright unbelievable at worst. S e l l a r s ' piece of ' h i s t o r i c a l f i c t i o n ' not only doesn't, i t seems to me, soften our resistance to the type of p o s i t i o n which he advocates but may a c t u a l l y sharpen our i n t u i t i o n s i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n . i i ) In an e f f o r t to provide an answer to the question of what either we or John are doing when we use looks-talk, S e l l a r s develops an ingenious argument designed to force us to accept that sensations are i r r e l e v a n t to the meaning of 'red'—both i n 'looks red' and ' i s red'. L o g i c a l l y the argument i s completely compelling. As an analysis of how the words 'red', 'green', etc., work i n our language, however, i t i s unnacceptable. It i s unacceptable because i t simply cannot, I s h a l l claim, accommodate a cen t r a l f a c t about how our language works. S e l l a r s doesn't consider the p o s s i b i l i t y that though the conclusion of h i s argument seems forced upon us by the p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s about language which he c i t e s , important concepts i n our language might a c t u a l l y f a i l to be l o g i c a l l y coherent. L o g i c a l arguments about how our language ought to be, i f i t i s to be coherent, can never s u f f i c e , I suggest, to show us how our language i s . S e l l a r s doesn't l a y h i s argument out i n nearly the stark way i n which I w i l l endeavor to do so. I hope that h i s p o s i t i o n w i l l not be misrepresented by my cha r a c t e r i z a t i o n . The c e n t r a l premise i s the claim that red i s a property of physical objects. Thus he says: A: "The fundamental grammar of the a t t r i b u t e red i s 9 p h y s i c a l object x i s red at place p and at time t . " Part of the baggage that comes with A i s the assumption, true of us but contentious when made of John, that colours are conceived of as a type of property which remains constant through changes i n place, l i g h t i n g , and the l i k e . S e l l a r s ' other two premises are: B; "...the sense of 'red' i n which things look red i s , on the face of i t , the same as that i n which things are red. C: "...the experience of having something look green to one at a c e r t a i n time i s , i n so f a r as i t i s an experience, obviously very much l i k e that of seeing something to be green, i n so far as the l a t t e r i s an experience.""^ Bear i n mind that the object of S e l l a r s ' argument i s to undermine the Sense-datum Theorist's fundamental conviction. The Sense-datum Theorist i s , as S e l l a r s notes, greatly impressed by the question SD: "'How can a physical object look red to S, unless something i n that s i t u a t i o n jLs red and S i s taking 12 account of i t ? " 176 S e l l a r s ' argument has, by force of l o g i c a l considerations, the e f f e c t of so r e s t r i c t i n g the meaning of 'red' that to ask SD just, looks s i l l y . From A and B we get the consequence that red need not be a property which i s common to both the s i t u a t i o n i n which something looks red and the s i t u a t i o n i n which something i s red: Since i t i s possible for a phys i c a l object to look red and not be red, and since redness i s a property of physical objects, i t i s possible for there to be something which looks red and for there to be nothing which i n fact is_ red. From that consequence and C we get the further consequence that though there i s something common to si t u a t i o n s i n which something looks and something i s red, whatever i t i s i t i s n ' t red. 'Red' i s t i e d grammatically to a property of physical objects. When something looks red i t need not be the case that i t , and therefore that anything, i s red. Whatever i t i s that i s common to s i t u a t i o n s i n which something looks red and something i s red, i t must be a property of perceiving agents and be a property to which the predicate 'red' could only i n some new and st i p u l a t e d sense be applied. Holding fast to t h i s consequence we are now i n a better p o s i t i o n to see S e l l a r s ' 'obvious', but hard to see, c i r c l e . The supposed d e f i n i t i o n : X i s red " = " x would look red to standard observers i n standard conditions says something l i k e : X i s red ' — " x would look the way i t i s ( i . e . red) to the r i g h t kind of observers i n conditions i n which, to the right kind of observers, i t 177 would look the way It i s ( i . e . to standard observers i n standard conditions). Thus though a necessary t r u t h , t h i s b i c o n d i t i o n a l cannot amount to a d e f i n i t i o n of ' i s red' since, i n e f f e c t , ' i s red' occurs i n the would be definiens. Hence the c i r c u l a r i t y . I f the argument which I have j u s t described i s indeed S e l l a r s ' argument, and I believe that, roughly at l e a s t , i t i s , I should l i k e to say, and then to say why, that i t took me a very long time to see i t . I t i s , I suggest, hard to avoid confusing S e l l a r s ' B and C. The t o t a l foreignness of the idea that 'red' doesn't, i n any way, r e f e r to t h a t — where one does what S e l l a r s says we mustn't d a , s p e c i f i c a l l y , where one attends to that aspect, whatever i t i s , which i s common to those s i t u a t i o n s i n which one sees something to be red and to those s i t u a t i o n s i n which something looks red to one—makes i t extremely hard to keep B from saying pretty much what C says. Only by c l e a r l y recognizing the force of A can one see S e l l a r s ' argument. The r o l e of A i s fundamental. Perhaps we might, given the counter-intuitiveness (or so I strongly contend) of S e l l a r s ' conclusion, want to reconsider the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of A. But the tru t h of A, as a claim about how ordinary language works, seems i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e . When we respond to someone's claim that something i s red with the claim, 'No, i t j u s t looks red', we do seem to be saying that the property which the other thought i t had i s n ' t i n fact a property which i t does have. We do seem to be t a l k i n g about a physical object and about i t s possession of, or i t s f a i l u r e to possess, a p a r t i c u l a r property. (Compare: 'He's a f r i e n d l y dog'; 'No, he ju s t looks f r i e n d l y ' . ) But how, i f we must accept A, B and C, are we to avoid S e l l a r s ' 178 undesirable consequence? How are we to escape the conclusion that that has nothing to do with or i s only i n c i d e n t a l l y connected with what I mean when I say that S e l l a r s ' book, at which I am sta r i n g , i s red? The kind of conclusion which S e l l a r s , as a m a t e r i a l i s t , wants, and which I, as a non-materialist, f i n d not only counter-i n t u i t i v e but emp i r i c a l l y unacceptable, i s f a c i l i t a t e d somewhat by the fact that though he provides a complex analysis of each of the following types of sentences: 1) x i s red. 2) I see that x i s red. 3) x looks red. 4) It looks as though there i s a red x over there. 5) x merely looks red. he never discusses the sentence type: 6) I see a red x. But by having avoided discussing sentences l i k e (6), S e l l a r s i s able to ignore the fact that when I see my copy of Science, Perception  and R e a l i t y I take myself, naively, to be i n i t s presence; and i t has redness smeared a l l over i t . I see redness. Ordinary language i s , I'm suggesting here, as I've suggested e a r l i e r , naive r e a l i s t . Seeing, i n the common-sense, ordinary language, scheme of things i s a very strange phenomenon indeed. It amounts to some kind of d i r e c t , immediate contact with things i n the w o r l d — a r e l a t i o n s h i p between us_ and them. They are, according to common-sense, before us (bearing i n mind that what we are for common-sense i s mental, where being mental implies being something c a t e g o r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from what they are) i n a way which the S e l l a r s i a n account f a i l s completely to accommodate. If red i s a property of p h y s i c a l objects, i t i s , i t must be remembered, a property which we see, where seeing involves some kind of d i r e c t , phenomenological contact with red. Red i s not, for common-sense, a property of objects the presence of which we detect on the basis of the occurrence i n us of a s p e c i f i c type of sensation—where a sensation i s , and i s only, a state of ourselves. Seeing, as i t i s common-sensically conceived of, i s , i n an e s s e n t i a l respect with which S e l l a r s ' account cannot deal, d u a l i s t i c . That the dualism which i t involves i s , and i s even obviously, o n t o l o g i c a l l y incorrect i s simply beside the point. Semantic analysis must take i t into account. Thus naive realism i s , and i s obviously, f a l s e . And ordinary language, i n so far as i t presupposes naive realism i s , with respect to looks/is/sees/sees that, u l t i m a t e l y incoherent. Thus ordinary language i s torn between naive realism on the one hand—according to which we see p h y s i c a l objects and see t h e i r c o l o u r s — a n d an attempt to accommodate those f a c t s — t h e more s t r i k i n g instances of which are c a l l e d perceptual i l l u s i o n s — w h i c h render naive realism untenable. Looks-talk i s the product of t h i s attempt to accommodate. While we recognize and respond appropriately to numerous and subtle p r a c t i c a l implications communicated to us by means of looks-talk, we are generally i n s e n s i t i v e to the o n t o l o g i c a l implications of the need for looks-talk, to the f a c t , that i s , of the f a l s i t y of naive realism. P h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis of ordinary language struggles to come to terms with the o n t o l o g i c a l implications. Sense-datum Theory i s one of the outcomes of t h i s struggle. I t denies naive realism but r e t a i n s the d u a l i t y of the subjective/objective s p l i t . It attempts to replace the incoherent subjective/objective s p l i t of naive realism, between the mind and the world, with the mind/sense-data s p l i t . As an analysis of ordinary language, however, Sense-datum Theory runs up against S e l l a r s ' objection that 'red' applies to physical objects. S e l l a r s ' p o s i t i o n f a i l s as an analysis of ordinary language because i t f a i l s to take account of an important respect i n which ordinary language i s naively d u a l i s t i c . Sense-datum Theory f a i l s as an analysis of ordinary language because i t puts the r i g h t kind of dualism i n the wrong place. Sense-datum Theory, i n other words, involves, as does ordinary language, the lighting-up form of the looking at account of being aware; but i t places the duality—between that which i s aware and that which i s lit-up—between a subject and sense-data whereas ordinary language places i t between a subject and a physical object. The t r u t h of the matter i s that both S e l l a r s and the Sense-datum Theorist have f a i l e d to provide an analysis of ordinary language f o r the simple reason that ordinary language j u s t cannot bear the weight of coherent a n a l y s i s . (The Sense-datum Theorist, of course, unlike S e l l a r s , need not be construed as even t r y i n g to give such an analysis.) 181 4. Sensations and ' I n t r i n s i c Meaning' Let me t r y to make the point that sensations play an e s s e n t i a l r o l e i n the meaning of our common observations terms i n another way. Sensations can be, I claimed i n Chapter IV, possessed of what I there c a l l e d ' i n t r i n s i c meaning'. Facts about i n t r i n s i c meaning are, I suggest, a very important part of what i s conveyed and of what we intend to convey when we t a l k about objective parameters. As such, how could i t possibly be denied that facts about sensations are an es s e n t i a l part of the meaning of t a l k about parameters? One must be c a r e f u l , as Churchland, for example, i s not, to di s t i n g u i s h between two d i f f e r e n t types of claims. Churchland frequently s l i p s back and f o r t h between 1) The true claim that the p a r t i c u l a r sort of sensation caused i n us, Es, by the operation of a p a r t i c u l a r parameter, must not be mistaken to be an e s s e n t i a l property of the parameter involved; and, 2) The here to be disputed claim that f a c t s about how a p a r t i c u l a r objective parameter i s se n s o r i l y detected by us, Es, are i r r e l e v a n t to the meaning of, to our understanding of, t a l k about, and i n p a r t i c u l a r observation statements connected 13 with, that same parameter. (Churchland often speaks of the f i r s t of these claims as being a conclusion of h i s A/_E argument; i n f a c t , he e x p l i c i t l y assumes i t i n s e t t i n g up that argument.^) Thus Churchland says, ''...the i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t a t i v e i d e n t i t y of one's sensations i s i r r e l e v a n t to what properties one can or does perceive the world as dis p l a y i n g " . This i s a version of the true claim contained 182 i n (1). But Churchland goes on, as though r e s t a t i n g the same point, or perhaps as though making a new but l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d point: "The meaning of a term (or the i d e n t i t y of a concept) i s not determined by the i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t y of whatever sensation happens to prompt i t s observational use, but by the network of assumptions/beliefs/principles 16' i n which i t f i g u r e s . " The l a t t e r i s , i t w i l l be contended, neither the same nor a l o g i c a l l y e ntailed point. I t i s equivalent to the claim contained i n (2), a quite d i f f e r e n t claim. (2) would seem to have i t that meaning i s something other than a servant to our purposes and i n t e r e s t s . But how could that be plausible? Consider the following scenario: The p a r t i c i p a n t s i n an In t e r g a l a c t i c Philosophy Conference are beginning to assemble. Among those present at the conference are some earthlings and some of Churchland's a l i e n s . An E emerging from the crowd gathered around the coffee urn disappointedly mumbles that the coffee i s cold. An A r e p l i e s , "So what?" and pours himself a coffee. Everyone laughs. At one of the f i r s t conferences they'd ever had together they'd worked out the meaning of i s - t a l k . They a l l appreciated the fact that there was an aspect of the meaning of the E/s utterance which the As could, i n a sense, appreciate, and to that extent incorporate into t h e i r own system of meanings, but which, without some change i n t h e i r sensory repetoire, they could never t r u l y share. That the coffee was cold meant something to the Es which i t did not mean to the As. It i s , I'm suggesting, the fact that (at l e a s t some) sensations have i n t r i n s i c meaning that accounts for our motivation to b u i l d theories about, to learn about, objective parameters i n the f i r s t place. ' I t 183 i s our desire to maximize the frequency of pleasant sensations and to minimize the frequency of unpleasant ones, which motivates us to extract patterns from, and impose structure on, to postulate objective parameters as causally responsible f o r , the flow of our sensations. It i s t h i s type of 'programming' which we have and which (so far at least) computers lack: We are subject to sensations which often have meaning or value i n and of themselves; they f e e l nice or they hurt, or for more complex ones, they're comforting or d i s t r e s s i n g , i n t e r e s t i n g or boring, and so on. Surely, i f one of the primary objectives of language i s to map or model the parameters of objective r e a l i t y , the reason why we're concerned to have such a mapping i s to better equip ourselves for the p r e d i c t i o n , and thus the c o n t r o l , of the e f f e c t s which those parameters have on us. Our t a l k about those parameters cannot, It seems to me, help but be e s s e n t i a l l y about those e f f e c t s . I am arguing here that t h i s must be so because of the importance of those sensations. In the f i n a l section of t h i s chapter I w i l l claim even more strongly, that we simply couldn't, not simply that i t would be p o i n t l e s s to, t a l k about parameters without fa c t s about our sensations playing the intermediaries. I s h a l l argue there that t a l k about objective parameters would be quite contentless without fa c t s about sensations playing a c e n t r a l r o l e i n i t s meaning. 184 5. Facts about Sensations: The Only Accessible Content i n Talk about"Objective Parameters I s h a l l t r y to make the point that sensations must be part of the meaning of t a l k about objective parameters not only because they provide i t s raison d'etre, but also because i t would be quite impossible for such t a l k to have any content without sensations playing a cen t r a l r o l e , by examining another argument from Paul Churchland's book, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind."^ Churchland gives an argument intended to show the theory-ladenness o f — a n d thus, he thinks, the epistemological irrelevance of sensations t o — t h e common-sense framework i n which we perceive temperature, and indeed, of and to perceptual frameworks generally. What Churchland e f f e c t i v e l y shows i n t h i s section i s that an exceedingly naive type of naive r e a l i s t p o s i t i o n with respect to heat—whereby we would be seen as being i n d i r e c t contact, through our sensations of hot and cold, with the objective parameter temperature—won't hold up under close inspection. To show that the connection between sensations and objective parameters i s not simple and d i r e c t i s not to show, however, that there i s no connection between our sensations and the meaning of t a l k about the objective parameters which we perceive to be operating. Churchland, i n other words, i s s t i l l attacking that version of the se n s a t i o n a l i s t p o s i t i o n which f a i l s to make any d i s t i n c t i o n between looks- and i s - t a l k ; which denies to i s - t a l k any means of incorporating fa c t s about patterns i n sensation. 185 Let's look at Churchland's argument. He shows how we are i n i t i a l l y driven to hold a b e l i e f i n the operation of an objective parameter such as heat conductivity by the occurrence of phenomena incompatible with our b e l i e f i n the operation of a s i n g l e simple objective parameter such as temperature. An object, A, f e e l s warmer to the touch than a second object, B; placed i n contact with one another, however, A i s caused to warm up, to f e e l warmer to the touch than i t did before contact with B. I f we were to accept, as Churchland says we common-s e n s i c a l l y do, that f e e l i n g warmer i s the same as being warmer, that the fact of a object causing another object to warm up indicates a greater degree of warmth i n the f i r s t o b j e c t i : as well as the general p r i n c i p l e that i f an object i s warmer than a second the second i s not warmer than the f i r s t , our empirical findings would have to be acknowledged as being i n c o n f l i c t with t h i s p r i n c i p l e . We postulate a parameter, heat conductivity, or rate of exchange of heat energy from one body to another, to explain t h i s set of phenomena; B must be warmer than A ( i t has a higher degree of heat energy), because i t causes A to warm up; but A must be a better heat conductor because i t f e e l s warmer to the touch than does B — i t passes heat energy to our hand more e f f i c i e n t l y than does B. The question, now, i s t h i s : What does t a l k about heat conductivity, what do expressions l i k e ' i s a good conductor of heat', mean? And the answer i s that, i f we are to know what the claim 'A i s a better conductor of heat than B' means, we must know fact s l i k e : A w i l l f e e l warmer to the touch than B when B has an equal (or even somewhat greater) degree of heat than A; o'r: A container made out of substance A w i l l allow a hot l i q u i d to cool o f f f a s t e r than w i l l a container made out of substance B; or: An object made out of substance A w i l l become hot quicker when exposed to a source of heat than w i l l an object made out of substance B; f a c t s , that i s , of the sort which drove us to postulate the parameter i n the f i r s t place. Churchland c a l l s c o l l e c t i o n s of fact s l i k e these 'networks of b e l i e f s ' and he thinks that they t o t a l l y determine the meaning, at the 'common-sense' (in t h i s case the improved common-sense) l e v e l , of i s - t a l k . He's rig h t about that. He also thinks, however, that these networks of b e l i e f determine the meaning of i s - t a l k independently of sensations. But each strand i n these networks of b e l i e f involves e s s e n t i a l reference, i m p l i c i t perhaps, but e s s e n t i a l nonetheless, to sensations. The reference i s e x p l i c i t i n the f i r s t example given above. A w i l l f e e l  warmer than B. I t ' s i m p l i c i t i n the other two but there j u s t the same.. In both cases the content of the claims i s going to have to be spelled out i n terms of how things w i l l look and/or f e e l to observers. That we could have, as Churchland has shown, gotten at the same objective parameters through d i f f e r e n t kinds of 'lookings' and 'fee l i n g s ' had our sense receptors been d i f f e r e n t might be thought to show that though sensations are e s s e n t i a l l y involved i n networks of b e l i e f , t h e i r i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t a t i v e natures are at best only a c c i d e n t a l l y relevant to meaning. But the case of cold coffee at the I h t e r g a l a c t i c Philosophy Conference has shown us more. The need to predict and communicate fac t s about sensations i s an e s s e n t i a l , indeed, I would suggest, the e s s e n t i a l , j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the existence of t a l k about objective parameters i n the f i r s t place. I t i s the i n t r i n s i c nature of sensations which leads us to decide against using materials which 187 are known to be good heat conductors i n the making of handles for cooking u t e n s i l s . I f , as i s the case, the statement that a p a r t i c u l a r substance i s a good conductor of heat imparts the information that we should not use i t to make handles for cooking u t e n s i l s i t i s because not only fa c t s about sensations but fact s about the i n t r i n s i c natures of sensations are e s s e n t i a l l y involved i n the meaning of i s - t a l k . Thus a proponent of the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t theory of meaning i s not precluded, as Churchland implies, from holding a b e l i e f i n the p o s s i b i l i t y that our common-sense conceptual framework, and with i t our common-sense observation predicates, such as ' i s hot', ' i s hotter than ', i s t h e o r e t i c a l and might eventually be eliminated, even for the purposes of ordinary discourse, i n favour of a more powerful, more e m p i r i c a l l y adequate, conceptual framework. But on the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t p o s i t i o n the elimination of a conceptual framework— neither of a low l e v e l , common-sense one or of high order s c i e n t i f i c one (Churchland and the rest are r i g h t : the two are on a continuum and of a k i n d ) — d o e s not thereby eliminate the sensory core which i s , for the s e n s a t i o n a l i s t , an e s s e n t i a l component i n the meaning of a l l observation terms. Rather, what i s i n essence the same sensory core, expanded perhaps, or d i f f e r e n t l y divided or i n t e r r e l a t e d , i s incorporated into the new, more powerful conceptual framework. Thus the p o s s i b i l i t y of the elimination of the common-sense framework i s not, alas, the p o s s i b i l i t y which the m a t e r i a l i s t needs or wants. Our common-sense theory of perception might, as Churchland 18 claims, be f a l s e , ("or even s e r i o u s l y s u p e r f i c i a l " ), /but It <isri?t f a l s e because of a f a i l u r e to appreciate that i t i s t o t a l l y t h e o r e t i c a l and of a f a i l u r e to purge i t of a l l sensory content. Rather the problem i s that not enough information about, and/or enough systematization and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of information about, sensations has been worked into the theory. The f a c t that several objective parameters can conspire i n d i f f e r e n t combinations to account for the occurrence i n various cases of a s i n g l e type of sensation, or, as i n the A/E case, that the same objective parameter can be causally responsible for d i f f e r e n t sensations, does not imply that we could ever cut information about sensations out of the meaning of t a l k about objective parameters. 189 NOTES Paul M. Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind, Cambridge Studies i n Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 15. 2 This supposition ought not to be doing any t h e o r e t i c a l work but i t may well be the case that i t i s loading our i n t u i t i o n s i n Churchland's d i r e c t i o n . 3 Churchland, p. 8. 4 Churchland, p. 10. Churchland, p. 13. Churchland, p. 12. ^ W i l f r i d S e l l a r s , "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," i n Science, Perception and R e a l i t y , International Library of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 142. g S e l l a r s , pp. 142-44. 9 S e l l a r s , p. 142 ^ S e l l a r s , p. 153. ^ S e l l a r s , p. 141. 12 S e l l a r s , p. 144. 1 3 S e l l a r s , p. 149. 1 Z | Paul M. Churchland, "Two Grades of E v i d e n t i a l Bias," Philosophy of  Science, 42 (1975), p. 255. 15 Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind, pp. 9, 12. 16 Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind, P- 8. 17 Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind, P- 15. 18 Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind, pp. 22--24. 19 Churchland, S c i e n t i f i c Realism and the P l a s t i c i t y of Mind, P- 6. 190 BIBLIOGRAPHY Armstrong, D.M. Perception and the Physical World. International L i b r a r y of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. Bennett, Jonathan. L i n g u i s t i c Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. . "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy." Foundations of Language, 10 (1973), pp. 141-68. Berkeley, George. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. 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" In Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Ed. Massimo P i a t e l l i - P a l m a r i n i . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980, pp. 143-49. Grice, H.P. "Meaning." Phi l o s o p h i c a l Review, 66 (1957), pp. 377-88. "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions." P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 78 (1969), pp. 147-77. Lewis, David K. Convention: A Phi l o s o p h i c a l Study. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969. Piaget, Jean. The Child's Conception of the World. Trans. Joan and Andrew Tomlinson. Totowa, New Jersey: L i t t l e f i e l d , Adams & Co. 1976. Comments on Vygotsky's c r i t i c a l remarks concerning The  Language and Thought of the Child , and Judgment and Reasoning  i n the Chi l d . Trans. Anne Parsons, rev. and ed. E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962 Appears as a pamphlet i n Thought and Language. Lev Semenovich Vygotsky. Ed. and trans. E. Hanfmann and G. Vakar. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1962. . The Construction of R e a l i t y i n the Chi l d . Trans. Margaret Cook. New York: Ballantine Books, 1971. "Discussion." In Language and Learning: The Debate  between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Ed. Massimo P i a t e l l i -Palmarini. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 149-151. The Origins of I n t e l l i g e n c e i n Children. Trans. Margaret Cook. New York: International U n i v e r s i t i e s Press, Inc., 1952. Play, Dreams and Imitation i n Childhood. Trans. C. Gattegno and F.M. Hodgson. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962. The P r i n c i p l e s of Genetic Epistemology. Trans. Wolfe Mays. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972. , and Barbel Inhelder. The Child's Conception of Space. Trans. F.J. Langdon and J.L. Lunzer. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967. , and Barbel Inhelder i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n with Hermine S i n c l a i r - d e Zwart. Memory and I n t e l l i g e n c e . New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973. Rorty, Richard. "The World Well Lost." The Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972), pp. 649-65. S e l l a r s , W i l f r i d . "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind." In Science, Perception and R e a l i t y . International L i b r a r y of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, pp. 127-96. / 192 "Philosophy and the S c i e n t i f i c Image of Man." In Science,  Perception and Real i t y . International Library of Philosophy and S c i e n t i f i c Method. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, pp. 1-40. "The Structure of Knowledge: (1) Perception, (2) Minds, (3) Epistemic P r i n c i p l e s . " In Action, Knowledge and R e a l i t y : Essays i n Honor of W i l f r i d S e l l a r s . Ed. Hector-Neri Castaneda. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., pp. 295-347. Williams, Michael. Groundless B e l i e f : An Essay on the P o s s i b i l i t y of  Epistemology. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 

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