Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

The C.P.R.’s capacity and investment strategy in Rogers Pass, B.C., 1882-1916 Backler, Gary G. 1981

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1981_A4_6 B33.pdf [ 21.01MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0095109.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0095109-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0095109-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0095109-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0095109-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0095109-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0095109-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0095109-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0095109.ris

Full Text

THE C.P.R.'S CAPACITY AND INVESTMENT  STRATEGY  IN ROGERS PASS, B.C., 1882-1916. By  y ^ - y G a r y G.  Backler,  B. A., Oxon., 1976. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (BUSINESS  ADMINISTRATION)  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES F a c u l t y of Commerce and Business Administration We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May 1981  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s requirements  thesis i n p a r t i a l  f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y  of  B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree  it  freely  agree  f u l f i l m e n t o f the  t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make  a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study.  t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes understood  that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s  financial  thesis  may be g r a n t e d by t h e head o f my  department o r by h i s o r h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . for  I further  It is thesis  g a i n s h a l l n o t be allowed without my w r i t t e n  permission.  Department o f  cv^r-ieg-c^e;  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date  np-fi  17/19)  AroD  S u S i ^ E S ^  Columbia  A O H i ^ i S T i c p n o r v i  i i  ABSTRACT CP R a i l its  main  i s c u r r e n t l y confronted  line  in  Rogers  Mountains.  The  inadequate  f o r the  Pass,  single-track,  by a  capacity  problem  on  at the summit of the S e l k i r k  steeply  graded  facility  f o r e c a s t e d demand f o r t r a f f i c  is  flows i n the  westbound d i r e c t i o n . The Company must decide whether to continue to operate over the present and  e s c a l a t i n g congestion  mile tunnel traffic, costs  line,  the  stem congestion  i n f u t u r e years.  CP R a i l must  completion  of  occasions.  surface  crossing  The f i r s t  the i n i t i a l  through  that p r i o r t o the surface  alignment beneath  identifies decisions to  the  the  against  a  trade-off  i n Rogers Pass on at  occasion  was that  transcontinental the  Selkirk  rail  taken  in  1913,  to  summit  and  l i n k , when by  of  the  examines  the  a was  the  of a f i v e - m i l e  Selkirks.  which impelled  abandon  This  thesis  the t a k i n g of t r a d e - o f f  i n each s i t u a t i o n , a l l o c a t e s an a p p r o p r i a t e factors,  prior  Mountains  through Rogers Pass i n favour  factors  between  Rogers Pass. The second occasion  decision,  the  westbound  costs.  the d e c i s i o n was taken t o breach  tunnel  make  Company has made such a t r a d e - o f f  l e a s t two previous to  gradient  and reduce the l e v e l of o p e r a t i n g  c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s and o p e r a t i n g The  costs  c o s t s , or whether t o i n v e s t i n an 8.9-  which, by reducing  will  i n c u r r i n g high o p e r a t i n g  criteria  upon  weighting which the  investment d e c i s i o n s were based. Previous Pass  h i s t o r i a n s of the C.P.R.'s  emphasise  operations  in  Rogers  the i n f l u e n c e of avalanches upon the investment  d e c i s i o n s taken. Many of these h i s t o r i a n s i n t e r p r e t the C.P.R.'s surface  operations  as an u n r e m i t t i n g  campaign  to  protect  its  traffic  against  snowslides,  and  they i n t e r p r e t the Company's  d e c i s i o n to c o n s t r u c t the Connaught Tunnel as an acknowledgement of defeat  i n the campaign.  T h i s t h e s i s emphasises th°e economic and commercial of  the  C.P.R.'s  operations  aspects  i n Rogers Pass, and a q u a n t i t a t i v e  approach towards the a n a l y s i s i s adopted. Part One of the t h e s i s is  concerned  C.P.R. main  with line  the across  initial the  decision  surface  Part  and  C.P.R. i n  examines  the  expectations operation  abandon  how  specific  of  the  l i n e s through  mountainous  these problems were handled by the  circumstances  railway  of the engineering and  of  builders  Rogers  Pass.  The  for construction  and  through the Pass are compared with the r e a l i t i e s which  encountered.  expectations  and  Analysis realities  reveals  that  the  gap  between  was not wide, and that the s u r f a c e  alignment adopted by the C.P.R. provided s o l u t i o n to the problem of breaching rail,  the  alignment.  economic problems of l o c a t i n g railway  were  the d e c i s i o n to  One begins with an e x p l a n a t i o n  terrain,  construct  of the S e l k i r k s through  Rogers Pass. Part Two i s concerned with the s u r f a c e  to  an adequate, economical  the  Selkirk  Mountains  by  at l e a s t u n t i l the turn of the 20th Century. Part  Two  begins  with  an  analysis  of  the i n f l u e n c e of  avalanches i n Rogers Pass upon the d e c i s i o n to r e l o c a t e the main l i n e underground. The a n a l y s i s s t r o n g l y the  1910  avalanche  protecting t r a f f i c to j u s t i f y An  disaster  in  suggests  particular,  from snowslides i n g e n e r a l ,  that  neither  nor the cost of were  sufficient  investment i n the Connaught Tunnel.  examination of the o p e r a t i n g  conditions, t r a f f i c  growth  iv  and  traffic  f o r e c a s t s through the S e l k i r k Mountains i n the e a r l y  years of the 20th Century r e v e a l s operating  costs  that  the  and e s c a l a t i n g congestion  route by 1913. The  Company  had  already  C.P.R. faced  c o s t s on the s u r f a c e invested  improvements elsewhere i n the mountains i n order c o s t s . Confronted forecasted  and  to  abandon  train-haulage  costs,  avalanche defence.  these  i n 1913 t o  tunnel beneath the summit of the S e l k i r k s ,  the  economic  system  f a c i l i t y for  demand i n Rogers Pass, the C.P.R. decided  surface  route.  A n a l y s i s of the C.P.R.'s  e v a l u a t i o n s of a l t e r n a t i v e proposed tunnels principal  in  to reduce  by the inadequacy of i t s e x i s t i n g  d r i v e a double-track  high  benefit and  of not  confirms  that  the  the p r o j e c t was the savings i n the  savings  in  the  cost  of  CONTENTS ABSTRACT LIST OF TABLES LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ii viii x xi  Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION  1  Objectives Scope of the T h e s i s O u t l i n e . .' Data Sources and L i m i t a t i o n s  4 6 7 9  PART ONE UP AND OVER 2  RAILWAYS AND MOUNTAINS 2.1 The Two S o l u t i o n s (a) "Low C a p i t a l Cost, High Operating Cost" S o l u t i o n (i) Gradients ( i i ) Curvature (b) "High C a p i t a l Cost, Low Operating Cost" S o l u t i o n 2.2 The Trade-Off  3  RAILWAYS AND ROGERS PASS 3.1 Rogers Pass (a) L o c a t i o n (b) Topography (c) Climate 3.2 The S e l e c t i o n of Rogers Pass f o r the F i r s t T r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l R a i l Link 3.3 The E x p e c t a t i o n s of the B u i l d e r s (a) The Character of C o n s t r u c t i o n Work ... (b) The Cost of C o n s t r u c t i o n (c) Time Required f o r C o n s t r u c t i o n (d) Operating Methods and T r a f f i c Forecasts (e) Snowslide P r o t e c t i o n  4  REALITIES (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)  The Character of C o n s t r u c t i o n Work The Cost of C o n s t r u c t i o n Time Required f o r C o n s t r u c t i o n Operating Methods and T r a f f i c Flows Snowslide P r o t e c t i o n  13 15 15 17 20 24 27 28 35 35 37 37 39 42 50 51 52 53 54 56 68 69 75 78 81 88  vi  PART TWO THE .5  BIG BORE  I l l  AVALANCHE PROBLEMS 5.1 The 1910 D i s a s t e r 5.2 The Snow Problem In General (a) The D i r e c t Costs of M a i n t a i n i n g the Avalanche Defence System (b) The I n d i r e c t Cost of D i s r u p t i o n s t o Traffic ( i ) The Nature of D i s r u p t i o n Costs ( i i ) The Incidence of D i s r u p t i o n .. ( i i i ) D i v e r s i o n a r y Arrangements .... ( i v ) Was D i s r u p t i o n Increasing? ... (v) D i s r u p t i o n Costs and the Abandonment D e c i s i o n  6  CAPACITY PROBLEMS 6.1 The Capacity of the Main L i n e (a) T r a i n Weight (b) T r a i n Paths 6.2 T r a f f i c Flows (a) T o t a l T r a f f i c L e v e l s (b) Changes i n S p e c i f i c T r a f f i c Flows .... ( i ) Passenger ( i i ) Lumber ( i i i ) Grain (iv) Fish (v) Other T r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l Traffic (vi) Local T r a f f i c 6.3 Competitive Pressures (a) C.P.R. Rates i n the Mountains (b) The Sources of Competitive Pressure .. (c) The C.P.R.'s P e r c e p t i o n of the Pressures 6.4 "System" Improvements t o the C.P.R (a) Large-Scale Improvements Beyond the Selkirks ( i ) The O t t e r t a i l D i v e r s i o n ( i i ) The P a l l i s e r Tunnel ( i i i ) The S p i r a l Tunnels ( i v ) C.P.R. Investment S t r a t e g y i n the Rockies (b) S m a l l e r - S c a l e Improvements Within the Selkirks ( i ) Improvements to R o l l i n g Stock. ( i i ) Improvements to Infrastructure ( i i i ) C.P.R. Investment S t r a t e g y i n the S e l k i r k s  114 115 123 123 129 130 133 156 158 161 173 173 174 182 185 185 191 191 195 198 202 205 206 207 207 210 214 220 221 221 222 223 230 235 235 242 249  vii  6.5 The F i n a n c i a l Resources of the C.P.R 6.6 T r a f f i c F o r e c a s t s and t h e i r I m p l i c a t i o n s  258 ...  259  7  ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR EVALUATION  285  8  7.1 A l t e r n a t i v e s Beyond the S e l k i r k Mountains .. (a) A l t e r n a t i v e s south of Rogers Pass .... (b) The Yellowhead Pass 7.2 A l t e r n a t i v e s Within the S e l k i r k Mountains .. 7.3 A l t e r n a t i v e Tunnels (a) The K i l p a t r i c k Tunnel (b) The Busteed Tunnel (c) The S u l l i v a n Tunnel 7.4 C r i t e r i a and O b j e c t i v e s THE CONNAUGHT TUNNEL  285 286 288 289 301 302 317 324 325 338  8.1 The Alignment as C o n t r a c t e d 8.2 A " S o c i a l C o s t - B e n e f i t A n a l y s i s " of the C o n t r a c t e d Alignment 8.3 The Alignment as C o n s t r u c t e d 9  CONCLUSIONS Suggestions f o r F u r t h e r Research  SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY  339 353 364 394 407 414  I  vi i i  LIST OF TABLES 1. S i d i n g Accommodation i n the S e l k i r k Mountains, c. 1896 2. Passenger T r a i n Record, Mountain S u b d i v i s i o n , 1908. 3. Average Number of T r a i n s Per Day, Mountain and Shuswap S e c t i o n s , 1906-1908 4. Average Weight of T r a i n s , Mountain and Shuswap S e c t i o n s , 1906-1908 5. T o t a l E q u i v a l e n t Gross Tonnage Per Month, Mountain and Shuswap S e c t i o n s , 1906-1908 6. Comparison of T r a f f i c on Mountain, and Shuswap S e c t i o n s , S l i d e Seasons ( J a n u a r y - A p r i l ) , 1906-1908 7. T o t a l E q u i v a l e n t Gross Ton Mileage Per Month, Mountain S u b d i v i s i o n , 1910 and 1911 8. Comparison of E q u i v a l e n t Gross Ton M i l e a g e s , Mountain S u b d i v i s i o n , 1910 and 1911 9. Tonnage Ratings f o r s i n g l e 210% locomotive between s t a t i o n s on Mountain S u b d i v i s i o n , p r i o r to June 1913 10. Average T r a i n Weights, Mountain S u b d i v i s i o n , 1906-1913 11. Gross Tonnage of Passenger and F r e i g h t T r a f f i c over each m i l e of road, Mountain and Shuswap S u b d i v i s i o n s , 1904-1913 12. Annual Rates of Change i n Gross Tonnage per m i l e , Mountain and Shuswap S u b d i v i s i o n s , 1904-1913 13. Balance of T r a f f i c Flows through Rogers Pass, 1889-1913 14. Passenger Volume through Rogers Pass, v a r i o u s months, 1893-1908 15. Lumber T r a f f i c through Rogers Pass, v a r i o u s years, 1900-1918 16. Grain T r a f f i c through Rogers Pass, v a r i o u s years, 1903-1917 17. B.C. Salmon P r o d u c t i o n and Tra-de, 1887-1918 18. The A l l o c a t i o n of I n f r a s t r u c t u r e Investment on the C.P.R., 1901-1913 19. Bridge Improvements i n the S e l k i r k Mountains, 1893-1909 20. P r o p o r t i o n of T o t a l C.P.R. F r e i g h t T r a f f i c handled over S e l k i r k Mountains, 1904-1913 21. Annual Rates of.Change i n Regional D i s t r i b u t i o n of F r e i g h t T r a f f i c , 1904-1913 22. Cost Comparison of Double-Tracking A l t e r n a t i v e s through the S e l k i r k Mountains, October 1912 ....  87 137 140 143 146 149 152 153 175 179 186 187 189 192 196 200 203 232 245 252 253 294  ix  23. R e s u l t s of Cost Analyses of A l t e r n a t i v e Investments i n Rogers Pass, 1912-13 24. C o s t - B e n e f i t A n a l y s i s of K i l p a t r i c k ' s Proposed Tunnel Alignment of May 1912 25. C o s t - B e n e f i t A n a l y s i s of Busteed's Proposed Tunnel Alignment of October 1912 26. Comparison of Percentage Tenders of Cost Per Foot of Rock S e c t i o n , Rogers Pass Tunnel 27. C o s t - B e n e f i t A n a l y s i s of Connaught Tunnel Alignment, as C o n t r a c t e d f o r , June 1913 28. Revised Estimate of B e n e f i t s of Contracted Tunnel Alignment 29. G r a i n E x p o r t s from Vancouver, 1910-1935 30. Costs and B e n e f i t s of the C a n c e l l a t i o n of the East-Slope Revision 31. C o s t - B e n e f i t A n a l y s i s of Connaught Tunnel Alignment, as Completed, December 1916  299 312 320 346 348 363 378 381 383  x  LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Map I. C.P.R. Main L i n e from Revelstoke to Laggan I I . L o c a t i o n of A l t e r n a t i v e Alignments Proposed at C o n s t r u c t i o n Time on the C.P.R. Main Line i n Rogers Pass I I I . L o c a t i o n of A l t e r n a t i v e Alignments and Tunnels on the C.P.R. Main Line i n Rogers Pass Figure 1. P r o f i l e of C.P.R. Main Line between Revelstoke and Beavermouth, showing Tonnage Ratings f o r s i n g l e 210% locomotive before and a f t e r Dynamometer T e s t s , May 1913 2. P r o f i l e s of A l t e r n a t i v e Alignments and Tunnels on the C.P.R. Main Line i n Rogers Pass  l  36 71 304  180 305  xi  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I  would l i k e t o express at the outset  my deepest  to Dr. T. D. Heaver, Chairman of the T r a n s p o r t a t i o n the  University  gratitude  Division  at  of B r i t i s h Columbia, f o r h i s m o t i v a t i o n of t h i s  p r o j e c t , and f o r h i s s u s t a i n e d  i n t e r e s t i n i t s p r o g r e s s . I would  a l s o l i k e t o thank the members of my t h e s i s committee f o r t h e i r ready guidance of my research For  their  assistance  archival material, the  efforts. i n making  available  indispensable  I wish t o extend thanks t o each  f o l l o w i n g : - 0. S. A. L a v a l l e e ,  and  all  of  James S h i e l d s , and the s t a f f  of the Canadian P a c i f i c Corporate A r c h i v e s i n Montreal; Dr. C a r l V i n c e n t , and the s t a f f of the P u b l i c A r c h i v e s Woods,  and  the  British  City  Collections  John  National  and CP R a i l , Vancouver; the s t a f f of the  I n s t i t u t e ; the s t a f f of the P u b l i c  Columbia  Vancouver  Canada;  s t a f f of Mount Revelstoke and G l a c i e r  Parks; Dave L i g h t h e a r t , Glenbow A l b e r t a  of  Archives  of  and the L e g i s l a t i v e L i b r a r y ; the s t a f f of the Archives;  division  at  and  the  U.B.C.  In  staff  of  addition,  the  Special  I would l i k e t o  o f f e r e s p e c i a l thanks t o Mr. and Mrs. Donald K i l p a t r i c k , here i n Vancouver, f o r t h e i r g e n e r o s i t y the  private  generosity excellent  papers  in providing supper.  of  in providing  Thomas  me with  Kilpatrick,  and  me, on more than one o c c a s i o n ,  access  to  for their with  an  xii  To ANDREA,  " 0 how  I long to t r a v e l l  And t r e a d again  that a n c i e n t  Henry Vaughan,  back track..."  "The  Retreate"  1  CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION  Rail  access  to  the  expensive by the topography major  mountain  west  coast  of  of  British  B.C.,  to  Clearly, operating  obtain  constructing  railways  high  inferior  operating  these  of  line  an easy alignment over which t r a f f i c  trade-offs  costs  standards in  between  the  and  of  any  construction,  constructional  flow  of t r a i n s . costs  indeed  and costs,  i n the  transportation i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . Nevertheless,  the t r a d e - o f f s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y particularly  and  in  subsequently  movement  construction  may  c o s t s , and between immediate c o s t s and delayed  must be made i n a l l railway provision  four  the b u i l d e r s have always had to face the dilemma  smoothly, or b u i l d i n g to incurring  where  ranges i n t r u d e between the western seaboard and  of e i t h e r i n v e s t i n g l a r g e sums of c a p i t a l per mile order  i s rendered  Columbia,  the eastern boundary of the p r o v i n c e . In through  Canada  acute,  in  and  operating  crucial,  regions  of  and rugged  characteristics,  the  dilemma  terrain, and  is  where  therefore  c o s t s , o f t e n d i f f e r markedly between a l t e r n a t i v e r o u t e s . CP seeks  Rail a  i s presently  solution  problem. T h i s  to  problem  confronted  i t s next i s posed  major by  by such a dilemma as i t main-line  capacity  the 8.16-mile ascent  Rogers to Stoney Creek, on the e a s t e r n approach t o Rogers  from Pass,  B.C., at the summit of the S e l k i r k Mountains. The ascent  i s over  s i n g l e t r a c k , and at a maximum g r a d i e n t of 2.2 per cent,  against  westbound t r a f f i c  f o r most of the d i s t a n c e . The e l e v a t i o n gained  2  in  t h e 8.16 m i l e s  already  of  an  R o g e r s and S t o n e y complete  stand  pushers  are  necessity  of  of  trains,  to  Rail  s e c o n d main Rogers  Selkirk  a  point  the  and  alternative  flow  main  line and  the  of  between  brought  t h e summit  3.1  miles  maximum  and  westbound  of  over  gradient  a t $300 m i l l i o n  the  down t h e restricts  Beavermouth, to  and  the  west,  passing  of  the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a Selkirks,  of G l a c i e r .  curvature  westbound  would  be s i x  with  the n e c e s s i t y f o r  the  conflict  s i n c e eastbound line.  between  The maximum  against  However,  between  traffic in  would  order  to  and c u r v a t u r e , c o n s t r u c t i o n o f  r e q u i r e the d r i v i n g  o f an  The c o s t o f t h e r e a l i g n m e n t in  the  single-track  between  the  resolve  the present  route would  viability  of  flows,  a  capacity.  would d i s p e n s e would  with  light  Glacier,  west  angle  to  when t h e  traffic,  meeting  the  This necessity to  Moreover,  main-line  beneath Rogers Pass.  financial  line.  summit, in  the s t i p u l a t e d  estimated  require  together  t r a c k w o u l d be one p e r c e n t ,  to travel  maintain  be  locomotives  therefore contemplating  locomotives,  continue  is  main  Such an a l i g n m e n t  eastbound  tunnel  the  is  and  degrees.  pusher  the p r e v a i l i n g  delays  of t h i s  traffic,  must  miles,  trains,  locomotives  the ascent.  ten  the  track across  and  gradient  this  within  further restricting  CP  Golden,  pusher  train  after  of the e x i s t i n g  the  contributes  out  twice  track against  of  five  Each  returning  configuration  pusher  Creek.  switched  capacity  east  additional  from  when t h e p u s h e r s a r e i n s e r t e d , and a g a i n  stop the t r a i n s  the  The h e a v i e s t westbound  powered by e i g h t l o c o m o t i v e s  assistance  single  i s 899.9 f e e t .  1980  dollars.  of t h e p r o j e c t i s rendered  1  8.9-mile project  Moreover,  the  q u e s t i o n a b l e by  3  the  uncertainty  unremunerative  of  future  nature  of  traffic  volumes  the g r a i n t r a f f i c ,  and  by  the  which c o n s t i t u t e s  some f i f t e e n per cent, of CP R a i l ' s westbound flow by weight.  the  CP R a i l ,  then, i s c o n f r o n t e d by a dilemma at the summit  Selkirk  Mountains.  It  must  operate over the present l i n e , and  escalating  massive,  congestion  to stem c o n g e s t i o n operating  and  costs. This  incurring  high  or  to  reduce  decision  operating  whether  investment  f a c e t s , and these may be framed what  decide whether to continue to  costs,  indivisible capital  to undertake a  intended i n f u t u r e years  permanently situation  in  costs  the  has  level  two  interrogative  through the mountains? Then, second,  what  level  be  secure  investment  this  questions  which  alignment? have  been  should  Only  after  answered  is  form.  First,  can  a  flows  the a p p r o p r i a t e  undertaken  these  of  distinct  i s the alignment which i s a p p r o p r i a t e to the t r a f f i c  of  of  i n order to  two  decision  fundamental be  reached  concerning the adoption of the p r o j e c t . T h i s i s not the f i r s t Railway  management  q u e s t i o n s . Indeed,  o c c a s i o n upon which Canadian  have  they  have  sought been  answers  forced  to  Pacific  to  these  address  the  q u e s t i o n s on at l e a s t two p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s . The f i r s t o c c a s i o n was  that  rail  l i n k , when the d e c i s i o n was taken  Mountains  prior  by  to  completion of the i n i t i a l to  transcontinental  breach  Selkirk  a s u r f a c e c r o s s i n g over the summit through Rogers  Pass. The second o c c a s i o n , some t h i r t y years l a t e r , that p r i o r t o the d e c i s i o n through  the  to  abandon  the  i n 1913, was  surface  alignment  Rogers Pass i n favour of a f i v e - m i l e t u n n e l beneath the  Pass. T h i s was the Connaught Tunnel, and i t i s by means of  this  4  tunnel  that  all  Selkirk  Divide.  of  CP's  main-line  traffic  still  crosses  the  Objectives Prompted by the resurgence of today,  the  first  objective  study of these previous study  will  decisions made  identify  interest in  of  s i t u a t i o n s . Such  f a c t o r s which impelled  in each s i t u a t i o n , the  forces  and  the t a k i n g  influences  a of  which  the t a k i n g of d e c i s i o n s necessary. From the study of these  historical  s i t u a t i o n s , the  comparisons  with  the  f r e e to i n f e r h i s own realignment The from the  reader w i l l be able to draw  present "lessons  to be  learned"  first,  objective  will  be  the  current  of  this thesis, springing  directly  i s to a l l o c a t e an a p p r o p r i a t e  situations. Historians  of  CP  the d e c i s i o n s taken, and  in each of the  of CP R a i l ' s o p e r a t i o n s  because  surrounded  the  avalanches  over  reference decision the  to  alone s u f f i c i e n t e x p l a n a t i o n  historical  taken  of an underground r o u t e . i n the Pass, and  This  2  in The  specifically  the Connaught Tunnel,  neglect  is  especially  the primary documentation which  suggests  surface  the  i n f l u e n c e of avalanches upon  the economics of the d e c i s i o n to c o n s t r u c t neglected.  to  in Rogers Pass  e s p e c i a l l y upon the d e c i s i o n  to abandon the Pass in favour  have been c o n s i s t e n t l y  weighting  R a i l ' s operations  have h i t h e r t o always emphasised the  serious  for  own  proposal.  second  economics  his  d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n , and  f a c t o r s which i n f l u e n c e d the d e c i s i o n s  1913  questions  t h i s t h e s i s i s to undertake a  comparable d e c i s i o n the  these  that  alignment  the  occurrence  of  i n Rogers Pass i s not  f o r the d e c i s i o n  to  relocate  the  main  l i n e underground. The  economics of the r a i l  operation,  in p a r t i c u l a r the emergence of a major c a p a c i t y problem Pass,  appear then, as now,  significance  to have been f a c t o r s of  be analysed,  and  be of i n t e r e s t to  therefore  of those f a c t o r s . Fresh evidence  appropriate anyone  conclusions  who  has  a  drawn. The concern  the  considerable  in shaping the d e c i s i o n . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l  seek to remedy the neglect  in  and  will  results will  for  historical  accuracy. The  t h i r d and  critically Canadian  f i n a l o b j e c t i v e of t h i s t h e s i s i s to examine  the contemporary techniques Pacific  Railway  were  h i s t o r y , and  based. The  the  first  the c r i t e r i a  emphasis  in  this  central  between  operations  and  of  years  of  upon which those d e c i s i o n s  in  construction  importance  c o s t s and  delayed  placed of  of  operating costs  c o s t s , as  the  they  applied  the and to  i n Rogers Pass. A t t e n t i o n w i l l a l s o be drawn to  the manner i n which these t r a d e - o f f s course  investment  thirty-five  recurring  construction  between immediate c o s t s and rail  the  Tunnel. Throughout the a n a l y s i s , however, s t r e s s w i l l  be p l a c e d upon the trade-offs  which  examination w i l l be  p r i m a r i l y upon the d e c i s i o n to i n v e s t Connaught  appraisal  Company employed i n t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s i n Rogers Pass during the r o u t e ' s  of  were  handled  during  the  the study p e r i o d . The  r e s u l t s of t h i s examination of  the C.P.R.'s approach to previous  investment d e c i s i o n s i n Rogers  Pass w i l l be of i n t e r e s t relevance  in  a  to  the  consideration  employed by CP R a i l  today.  business of  the  historian,  evaluation  and  of  procedures  6  Scope Of The T h e s i s Previous Selkirk  studies  Mountains  biographical  locate, Pass.  3  may  and  concentrated  of  the h i s t o r y  of  d e s c r i p t i v e . The  biographical  categories,  studies  have  upon the p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n v o l v e d i n the d e c i s i o n s t o  construct  and  operate  the  railway  through  Rogers  The d e s c r i p t i v e s t u d i e s have tended e i t h e r to concentrate  built,  as  an  incidental  r e g i o n a l development. The  present  character. their  C.P.R. i n the  be grouped i n t o two general  upon the c o n s t r u c t i o n phase of the l i n e , once  the  It  situation,  i s an  that  of  emphasis  commercial  is  analytical  in  study of railway economics and for a  particular  operating  the C.P.R. i n Rogers Pass. T h e r e f o r e , i t s t u d i e s i n both emphasis and f o c u s .  in  aspects  i n the d i s c u s s i o n of  essentially  historical  implications  d i f f e r s from previous The  factor  line,  5  study  investment  or to t r e a t the  4  this  of  study  i s upon  railway o p e r a t i o n  q u a n t i t a t i v e approach i s t h e r e f o r e  the  economic  i n Rogers Pass, and a  adopted. Such  an  approach  permits i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o the a n a l y s i s of q u a n t i t a t i v e data, which has h i t h e r t o r e c e i v e d l i t t l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n and  analysts,  suggests  an  investment  and  y e t which,  alternative  decisions  as  Pass  data  from h i s t o r i a n s  has been i n d i c a t e d above,  interpretation  i n Rogers  and  of  the  C.P.R.'s  to that which i s common  currency. The  focus of t h i s study i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y narrow and  l o c a l i s e d . This f o r t y - f i v e mile line  is a  highly  d e t a i l e d study of railway economics on a  s t r e t c h of the Canadian  n e a r l y three thousand m i l e s  Pacific  main  line,  a  long. The study opens i n 1882,  7  I  the year i n which Rogers Pass was s e l e c t e d as p a r t of the for  the  transcontinental  year i n which marking  the  the  railway,  Connaught  and i t c l o s e s i n 1916, the  Tunnel  was  abandonment of s u r f a c e r a i l  Pass. Throughout that p e r i o d , railway the  economics  of  railway  the  study  period,  such  opened  will  developments as  the  will  additional  traffic,  through the  decisions  and  analysed  and  be  contemporaneous  economic  with  advance of B r i t i s h  Columbia, the opening up of the p r a i r i e s , and of  to  operations  investment  operations  e v a l u a t e d . Wider h i s t o r i c a l  route  the  construction  t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l routes, by both r a i l and water,  be c o n s i d e r e d  only  insofar  economics of C.P.R.'s o p e r a t i o n s  as  they  impinged  upon  the  first  part  inception  and  i n Rogers Pass.  Outline The  thesis  i s divided  into  two  p a r t s . The  (Chapters 2 - 4 )  i s p r i m a r i l y concerned with  the  realisation  a  Selkirk  of  accomplished Pass. T h i s  by  feasible  of  embraces  measures  route  link  means  section  l i n e and the  rail  taken  across  a  surface the to  alignment  Mountains, over  Rogers  c o n s t r u c t i o n of the o r i g i n a l consolidate  f o r trans-mountain  (Chapters 5 - 9 ) analyses  the  the  t r a f f i c . The  the f o r c e s  of  non-economic, which l e d t o q u e s t i o n i n g  change,  link  as  a  second  part  economic  and  of the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  of  the s u r f a c e alignment, and u l t i m a t e l y to the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a decision generation problem,  problem. The and  analysis  evaluation  of  proceeds  alternative  to  examine  solutions  the  to the  and concludes with an a p p r a i s a l of the achievement of  the a l t e r n a t i v e which was implemented, that  of  relocating  the  8  l i n e underground through the Connaught Part  Tunnel.  One begins with a "layman's guide"  to the e n g i n e e r i n g  problems of l o c a t i n g r a i l w a y l i n e s through mountainous and  to  terrain,  the i m p l i c a t i o n s of those problems f o r the economics of  railway  operations. Pertinent  e l u c i d a t e d . The  nature  of  engineering the  critical  concepts trade-off  are between  c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s and o p e r a t i n g c o s t s i s e x p l a i n e d . Chapter characteristics  3  describes of  the  physical  and  climatic  the S e l k i r k Mountains, and the i m p l i c a t i o n s  of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f o r r a i l w a y l o c a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n . The reasons the  f o r the s e l e c t i o n of Rogers Pass as the route  which  C.P.R. would c r o s s the S e l k i r k Mountains are e x p l a i n e d . The  e x p e c t a t i o n s of the railway b u i l d e r s f o r both operation adoption  through  the  Pass,  expectations  construction which  and  l e d to the  of the route, are made e x p l i c i t .  In Chapter 4, the r e a l i t i e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n over  by  the  s u r f a c e alignment  and  operation  are d e s c r i b e d , and the gaps between  e x p e c t a t i o n s and r e a l i t i e s are h i g h l i g h t e d . Measures intended to c l o s e these gaps are reviewed, and t h e i r  success  evaluated.  Part Two commences, i n Chapter 5, with an a n a l y s i s influence relocate  of  avalanches  the main  line  i n Rogers  of  the  snowslide  Pass upon the d e c i s i o n t o  underground.  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the 1910 avalanche problem  in  The  an  alternative  i n f l u e n c e of avalanches alignment.  widely  accepted  d i s a s t e r i n p a r t i c u l a r and  general  are  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are then c h a l l e n g e d , and as challenge  of the  interpretation  a  presented. result  i s offered  of  These this  of the  upon the d e c i s i o n t o abandon the s u r f a c e  9  Chapter through  6 contains  the  an  analysis  mountains  c o n s i d e r a t i o n of changes competitive  pressures,  improvements  undertaken  of in  traffic  B.C. The  traffic  and  and  analysis  suggests  alignment  over Rogers Pass to cope with  the  includes  composition,  cumulative on  increasing  developments  analysis  volume  the  elsewhere  the  of  results  of  C.P.R. system. The  inadequacy these  of  the s u r f a c e  developments:  a  d e c i s i o n problem i s i d e n t i f i e d and s p e c i f i e d . Chapter generated  7  reviews  alternative  Chapter  alternative  8,  alternatives.  a  detailed  evaluation  m o d i f i e d d u r i n g implementation:  the scheme as completed In  the f i n a l  This  i s based  d a t a . The of  the  first  the  Canadian  and  upon  the  thesis  are  for further research.  three  i s the  inward  Pacific  S t a t i o n , M o n t r e a l . Although established,  of  primary  sources  Letterbooks  and  of  inward  C.P.R. P r e s i d e n t s . The L e t t e r b o o k s have  been m i c r o f i l m e d , but the at  project  And L i m i t a t i o n s  correspondence  only  Tunnel. The  are both a p p r a i s e d .  chapter, the c o n c l u s i o n s  thesis  unpublished  the p r e f e r r e d  the scheme as conceived and  presented, and suggestions are o f f e r e d  Data Sources  of  i s c a r r i e d out. T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e was a realignment  which i n c l u d e d the b o r i n g of the Connaught was  s o l u t i o n s which were  f o r t h i s d e c i s i o n problem, and p r e s e n t s the r e s u l t s of  the s c r e e n i n g of these In  the  although  correspondence Corporate  these A r c h i v e s the  is  available  A r c h i v e s i n Windsor were  only  recently  task of indexing the v a u l t s of  c o r p o r a t e records i s not f a r advanced,  two  complete  files  on  10  "The  Rogers  Pass  Tunnel"  have been assembled. W h i l s t weak i n  q u a n t i t a t i v e content, the f i l e s p r o v i d e i n v a l u a b l e i n s i g h t the  objectives  of  the  project  and  the  stages  into  of i t s  implementat i o n . The  second  correspondence B.C.  source i s the c o l l e c t i o n of which  i s held  at  C.P.R. records  the Revelstoke C i t y Museum,  T h i s m i s c e l l a n e o u s c o l l e c t i o n , withheld from  Pacific 1976.  Corporate  Archives,  I t i n c l u d e s complete  was  and  the  comprehensively  Canadian  indexed  monthly records of t r a f f i c  in  volumes on  the F i r s t D i s t r i c t  of the B r i t i s h Columbia  S u b d i v i s i o n , of which  Rogers Pass was a  part,  f o r the  1910  of  expenditures  sporadic  records  years on  snow  and  1911, and  sheds  and  snow  c l e a r a n c e f o r c e r t a i n months between 1912 and 1914. The Thomas  t h i r d source i s the p e r s o n a l notebooks and Kilpatrick,  career  with  Superintendent 1912.  "The  the  Snow  King,"  C.P.R. i n  the  diaries  of  who ended a t h i r t y - y e a r mountains  of  B.C. as  of the Mountain and Shuswap S e c t i o n s from 1901 t o  H i s papers are now h e l d by h i s son, Mr. Donald  Kilpatrick,  as p a r t of a p r i v a t e c o l l e c t i o n preserved i n Vancouver, B.C. The documents  contain  many  fascinating  details  of  maintenance and o p e r a t i o n s i n the mountains throughout p e r i o d . Of p a r t i c u l a r value i n the p r e p a r a t i o n was  a  monthly  of  thesis  r e c o r d , maintained u n i n t e r r u p t e d throughout the  t h e i r weights and t r a n s i t In comparison First  the study  this  years 1906 to 1908, of the number of m a i n - l i n e t r a i n s  the  railway  per day,  times.  with the inter-war p e r i o d , the years p r i o r to  World War are r i c h  the management of the C.P.R.  i n documentary sources concerning Nevertheless, i t i s a  sad  fact  11  that  much  particularly present  information serious  thesis  has  been  f o r a sharply  d e s t r o y e d . The  focussed  project  loss  is  such as the  which attempts to apply q u a n t i t a t i v e  techniques  to the a n a l y s i s of an investment d e c i s i o n which  was  some  on the c o s t s of  seventy  operating did,  years  ago. D e t a i l e d  information  t r a i n s over Rogers Pass may never have e x i s t e d . I f i t  i t has  c e r t a i n l y not s u r v i v e d ,  the a n t i c i p a t e d c o s t s and b e n e f i t s of schemes  undertaken  which  data e x i s t s  were  proposed  concerning  traffic  and n e i t h e r has d e t a i l of the  i n 1912. flows  several  realignment  S i m i l a r l y , very through  the  little  mountains  e i t h e r by volume, commodity or d i r e c t i o n of movement. Assembly process,  drawing  remain. Where and  of  the  extant  from  possible,  many  data was a piecemeal and p a i n f u l diverse  sources. Many  the gaps have been f i l l e d  by i n f e r e n c e  assumption; where not, they have simply been i d e n t i f i e d  recorded. I t  is  to  be  hoped  that  this thesis w i l l  prevent the gaps from widening any f u r t h e r .  gaps  and  at l e a s t  12  FOOTNOTES  1  "Midweek Report," Vancouver P r o v i n c e , A p r i l 16, 1980, p. D 1.  2  See chapter 5.  See, f o r example, W. Vaughan, The L i f e And Work Of S i r W i l l i a m Van Home, New York: The Century Co., 1920; H. G i l b e r t , Awakening Continent, Aberdeen: Aberdeen U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965, and, The End Of The Road, Aberdeen: Aberdeen U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977; C. A. Shaw, T a l e s Of A Pioneer Surveyor, Toronto: Longman, 1970. 3  See, f o r example, 0. S. A. L a v a l l e e , Van Home' s Road, Montreal: R a i l f a r e E n t e r p r i s e s , 1975; P. Berton, The Last Spike: The Great Railway 1881-1885, Toronto: M c C l e l l a n d and Stewart, 1971. 4  See f o r example, J . S. Marsh, "Man, Landscape And R e c r e a t i o n In G l a c i e r N a t i o n a l Park, B r i t i s h Columbia, 1880 t o p r e s e n t , " PhD t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l g a r y , 1971; W. W. B i l s l a n d , "A H i s t o r y Of Revelstoke And The B i g Bend, " MA t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1955. 5  13  PART ONE  UP AND OVER This  part  of the t h e s i s i s concerned  s u r f a c e alignment brief  e x c l u s i v e l y with the  of the C.P.R. main l i n e through  Rogers Pass. A  i n t r o d u c t i o n i s provided t o the e n g i n e e r i n g and commercial  problems of l o c a t i n g and o p e r a t i n g r a i l w a y s i n mountains. Then, the s p e c i f i c e n g i n e e r i n g and commercial problems of l o c a t i n g and operating  the  C.P.R. main  l i n e over the summit of the S e l k i r k  Mountains are a n a l y s e d . The a n a l y s i s compares and  the  realities  and e v a l u a t e s  in  order  and  r e a l i t i e s . Part One concludes  promote correspondence  extent t o which such correspondence The  expectations  of the C.P.R. f o r s p e c i f i c areas of concern  along the s u r f a c e alignment, to  the  measures  between those  with a  undertaken expectations  consideration  of the  was achieved.  a n a l y s i s i n Part One spans the s e l e c t i o n , c o n s t r u c t i o n  and o p e r a t i o n of the Rogers Pass route u n t i l century,  that i s , p r i o r to the occurrence  d i s a s t e r . C o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s d i s a s t e r  the  turn  of the  of the 1910 avalanche  i n i t i a t e s the a n a l y s i s  in Part Two. A d i v i s i o n of the t h e s i s p r i o r to the 1910 d i s a s t e r is  maintained  i n deference  C.P.R.'s o p e r a t i o n s i n Rogers identify  the  1910  to  previous  Pass. Most  disaster  as  a  historians of  turning  C.P.R. management's p e r c e p t i o n of the v i a b i l i t y alignment. directly  The  validity  of  this  these  of  identification  of the  historians point the  in  surface  i s challenged  i n Part Two. However, the foundation f o r t h i s c h a l l e n g e  i s p r o v i d e d by the r e s u l t s of the a n a l y s i s i n Part One. There are three advantages of s t r u c t u r i n g the  analysis in  14  this  way. F i r s t ,  i t permits  establishment i n Part One of the  extent of the gaps between the e x p e c t a t i o n s and r e a l i t i e s of the C.P.R.'s  concerns with the s u r f a c e alignment, before proceeding  in Part Two to c o n s i d e r changes i n may  have  widened  these  gaps.  operating  Second,  conditions  i t permits  both the  avalanche problems and the other o p e r a t i n g problems of the to  be  considered  each  as  a  continuum,  which  line  s t r e t c h i n g from the  opening of the s u r f a c e alignment to the opening of the Connaught Tunnel. Both the avalanche and the o p e r a t i n g problems are to  have  changed  in  years of  the  measures  undertaken  s e v e r i t y but not i n nature throughout the  summit  route. Third, in  i t permits  the  remedial  response to the avalanche problems and  the other o p e r a t i n g problems to be c o n s i d e r e d as c o n t i n u a Thus,  shown  i t highlights  the  also.  extent of s u b s t a n t i v e changes i n the  responses of the C.P.R. to the changes i n  operating  conditions  over time. It  is  therefore  structure, to  determine  possible,  as  a r e s u l t of adopting t h i s  whether  or  not  the  1910  avalanche  d i s a s t e r was indeed a t u r n i n g p o i n t , and whether or not i t i s at all  even  meaningful  to t a l k of " t u r n i n g p o i n t s " i n the context  of the C.P.R.'s investments over Rogers Pass.  i n improving the  surface  alignment  15  CHAPTER 2  RAILWAYS AND MOUNTAINS This  chapter  character  a  t h e o r e t i c a l underpinning  to the  of the investment d e c i s i o n s which are analysed  remainder  of the t h e s i s . The chapter  of the two g e n e r i c of  provides  penetrating  begins with an e x p l a n a t i o n  types of investment s o l u t i o n to  mountainous  fundamental e n g i n e e r i n g  terrain  principles  i n the  with  the  problem  railway t r a c k s . The  involved  in  each  type  of  s o l u t i o n are d e s c r i b e d , and the i m p l i c a t i o n s of these p r i n c i p l e s for  the  economics  considered. and  of  railway  c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n are  The inverse r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n s t r u c t i o n  operating  costs i s explained,  and c r i t e r i a  costs  are suggested f o r  the t r a d e - o f f d e c i s i o n between the two types of c o s t s .  1  2.1 The Two S o l u t i o n s The  physical  b a r r i e r which mountains pose to a l l forms of  human communication t r a n s l a t e s i n t o an economic b a r r i e r , as the cost  of  providing  and  mountainous t e r r a i n . For barrier rail, an  is  that  the  maintaining  rail,  low  the  communication  essence  l e v e l of f r i c t i o n  of  the  across physical  between wheel and  which a f f o r d s economic advantage i n t r a f f i c movement  even  alignment, manifests  on an adverse g r a d i e n t , and disadvantage  since  i s reduced i n  adversity  of  the  A. M. W e l l i n g t o n ' s  i t s e l f as a low l e v e l of adhesion  is  the payload  locomotive  over  therefore  turned  which can be hauled  proportion  g r a d i e n t . The  to  the  to  economic  by a s i n g l e  increase  i n the  f o l l o w i n g t a b l e , adapted from  a u t h o r i t a t i v e "The  Economic  Theory  Of  The  16  Location  Of  Railways,"  which i s caused are  those  demonstrates  the r e d u c t i o n i n payload  by i n c r e a s i n g l y adverse  which  were  capable  of  g r a d i e n t s . The  being  hauled  payloads  by a s i n g l e  "Standard Heavy C o n s o l i d a t i o n " steam locomotive, as recorded  in  1915 : 2  Gradient  Payload  (per c e n t . )  (tons)  Level  • 2,920  0.2  1,920  0.4  1,420  0.6  1,120  0.8  920  1.0  777  1.2  670  1.4  587  1.6  520  1.8  465  2.0  420  2.2  382  4.5  165  Conceptually,  there  b a r r i e r of mountains may the  one  hand,  the  are  either  adverse by  ratio  of  the  by  motive  an  i n which the p h y s i c a l railway  o p e r a t i o n . On  power to payload may  that t r a f f i c  g r a d i e n t . Such  increasing  ways  be overcome  a d j u s t e d , i n order to ensure existing  two  can be hauled over  adjustment  is  number and power of the  be the  effected, locomotives  17  which haul  the  t r a i n , or by  reducing  the weight of the  train,  or  may  be  level  of  that  no  by a combination of these approaches. On  the other hand, the e x i s t i n g  eliminated, adhesion  in order to ensure that no  between  adjustment  must be the  reducing  summit)  rail  r a t i o between  elimination  lifted  attained  wheel and  in the  necessary. An e i t h e r by  adverse  of  reduction  occurs, motive  height  and  and  gradient over  or  by  reducing  the  "development" and  of  the  line,  or, again,  by a combination of these approaches.  In order to explore for  the  first  motive power and c o s t , high that  of  the  the  The  c a p i t a l requirement be decreased by  alignment  of  necessity  for  location  in  traffic  solutions  these  be c h a r a c t e r i s e d  the  terrain  man-made accordance  for  the  route  s t r u c t u r e s . In  is the  summit)  engineering i t is  economic  r a t i o between  as a "Low second be  capital solution,  characterised  solution.  construction  a  is,  to  the  may  cost"  l o c a t i n g the in  around  operation,  according  of a d j u s t i n g  operating  that  C a p i t a l Cost, High Operating Cost"  may  the  over the  railway  e l i m i n a t i n g the adverse g r a d i e n t ,  (a) "Low  railway  the  c o s t " s o l u t i o n , and  as a "High c a p i t a l c o s t , low  2.1  of  solution,  payload, may  operating  i m p l i c a t i o n s of  economics  to c l a s s i f y The  u s u a l l y of c u r v a t u r e ,  is  effected,  rate at which that height  of length,  concepts.  is  which  insertion  appropriate  payload  (through t u n n e l l i n g , c u t t i n g , or curvature  (through  solutions  i n the  therefore,  power  adverse  the absolute  gradient  Solution. of  a  line  t r a c k s over the which  with t h i s p r i n c i p l e may  natural  minimises  mountainous  of  the  regions,  involve  either  18  steep g r a d i e n t s once  the  or p r o t r a c t e d c u r v a t u r e  location  has  over which c a p i t a l relative be  to  been decided,  disbursements  both.  Nevertheless,  the c o n s t r u c t i o n  are  spread,  will  or  relative  will  to  the  period  be c a r r i e d out upon the  of c o n s t r u c t i n g  the  line  may  over  in p r o v i d i n g the r a i l  route  l i n e . The  therefore  be  is  would  of the f a c i l i t y has  required  have  to  and  been  negotiate  capital  as  being  c o s t s . The  higher  incurred  p e r i o d during which r a i l  but  until  extreme  case,  if  c o s t s are  no  level  particular necessarily  of  related  costs w i l l  operations  traverses  the  facility  to  and  costs  gradients  its  be spread  are  and  may  out  operating  be  construction  over the  carried  and  entire  over  the  may  be  costs  not only u n t i l c o n s t r u c t i o n i s completed, l i n e . In  t r a i n s are run over the l i n e , the  "delayed"  the  higher  for perpetuity. operating  costs  i n v e r s e l y r e l a t e d to i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s ,  operating  level  an  incurred  operating  lesser  i s important to note that although the  of the f a c i l i t y are the  which  i t i s necessary to run a t r a i n over the  operating It  with  alignment. These  regarded as "delayed,"  as  the steep g r a d i e n t s  c o s t s of  inversely  operating  low-capital-cost  cost  been completed,  thereby i n c u r s higher  c u r v a t u r e . Hence, the o p e r a t i n g regarded  will  railway  regarded  have commenced, every t r a i n  protracted curvature, than  short  facility.  construction  railway o p e r a t i o n s the  be  which  "immediate" c o s t : i t i s the cost which i s "immediately"  When  period,  the p e r i o d over which i n t e r e s t on the c a p i t a l  repaid,  operations  or  of  costs  which  investment  uniform. The  level  in of  is  associated  construction operating  costs  with  a  is  not  is  also  19  r e l a t e d by a more complex f u n c t i o n which  uses  to  as  a  U-shaped  curve,  determined by v a r i a t i o n s in t r a f f i c even  the  o p e r a t i n g c o s t s may  the  costs  maintaining  most  cheaply  at f i r s t  of  providing  s u r p l u s c a p a c i t y provided  business,  c o s t s may  built  volume. T h i s  and  the marginal  behaviour  of  not be s u f f i c i e n t marginal  increase  in  power and manpower which may  is  as  utilised,  motive power and manpower and  of  over a g r e a t e r volume  continues  to i n c r e a s e ,  and  as  by the opening of the f a c i l i t y i s to r i s e with  the  expansion  r a t e of increase of the of  of locomotives increase  traffic  in  entails  be p a r t i c u l a r l y  operating  the  traffic  curve may  obtrude s i n g l y or  to handle an  which  better  the o p e r a t i n g - c o s t  e x i s t i n g resources  of  increasing t r a f f i c ,  r a t e of increase  from three f a c t o r s , which may  the  traffic  r a i l w a y , the l e v e l of  equipment  begin  exceed the marginal  First,  locus  l i n e s i d e s t r u c t u r e s are spread  absorbed, o p e r a t i n g c o s t s may of  the  d e c l i n e with  of b u s i n e s s . However, as t r a f f i c the  of  volume.  s u r p l u s l i n e c a p a c i t y i s absorbed, and  volume  the f a c i l i t y . I t i s h e l p f u l to p o r t r a y the c o s t s of  the f a c i l i t y  For  the  result  simultaneously.  and  traincrews  traffic.  may  Therefore,  i n c r e a s e s in motive severe  on  a  low-  c a p i t a l - c o s t , s t e e p l y graded alignment where the r a t i o of motive power  to  traffic the  payload  may  case  is  initially  cause congestion of  a  of the  low-capital-cost,  low.  3  facility,  p r o v i d e d . T h i s congestion  power requirements, handled  by  the  and  will  l i m i t the  i n c r e a s e in  particularly  single-track  through speeds are low and where l i m i t e d is  Second, the  passing  r a i l w a y where accommodation  i n c r e a s e f u e l consumption absolute  f a c i l i t y . As congestion  volume  in  of  and  traffic  i n c r e a s e s f u r t h e r , the  20  operating-cost  curve may  bend back upon i t s e l f ,  operations  c o n t i n u i n g to e s c a l a t e while  conducted  declines  below  uncongested f a c i l i t y .  that  T h i r d , the c o s t  s t r u c t u r e s are subjected  of t r a i n s . There may cost, to  the volume  of  lineside  i n c r e a s e as  to g r e a t e r weights and  frequencies  may  r a t i o of motive power to payload of these  an  snowsheds may  r a p i d l y c o n s t r u c t e d alignment, and  Regardless  business  maintaining  be many such s t r u c t u r e s on  pounding from locomotives  of  which i t would have been on  s t r u c t u r e s such as t r e s t l e b r i d g e s and the  with the c o s t of  a  low-capital-  the wear upon them  due  be p a r t i c u l a r l y great where the i s low.  4  f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the volume of  traffic,  the r e l a t i v e l e v e l of o p e r a t i n g c o s t s which i s a s s o c i a t e d with a l o w - c a p i t a l - c o s t alignment i s g e n e r a l l y higher operating  costs  associated  alignment. There are two the g r a d i e n t s and i) In  with  a  than the l e v e l of capital-intensive  reasons f o r t h i s , which are r e l a t e d  the curvature  of the alignment,  Gradients order  to  appreciate  the  impact of g r a d i e n t s upon the  c o s t s of o p e r a t i o n over a p a r t i c u l a r  facility,  "gradient  be  systems"  must  first  the  is  steepness therefore  embrace to  divided  single  segments,  utilisation  divisional  manner as to concentrate a  into  g r a d i e n t s of a p a r t i c u l a r  the  to  the  d i v i s i o n . The  or  "divisions,"  l e n g t h or steepness.  of motive power over a  boundaries  must  In  of  are  line which order  particular  be drawn i n such a  a l l g r a d i e n t s of s i m i l a r s e v e r i t y assembly  of  length  of p a r t i c u l a r g r a d i e n t s along the l i n e . The  ensure optimal  division,  concept  understood. T r a i n s  assembled, and motive power a l l o c a t e d , a c c o r d i n g and  to  t r a i n s and  into  a l l o c a t i o n of  21  motive power takes place at the commencement and each  division,  that  termination  i s , at " d i v i s i o n a l p o i n t s . " The  of  amount of  adjustment of t r a i n weight and motive power which i s r e q u i r e d at each d i v i s i o n a l p o i n t i s determined by the r e l a t i o n s h i p the  severity  of the g r a d i e n t s on the d i v i s i o n s  between  adjacent  to the  d i v i s i o n a l p o i n t . Minimum adjustment of t r a i n weight and power  is  commensurate with minimum c o s t for the o p e r a t i o n  the contiguous very  divisions.  definitely  o p e r a t i o n , and  Thus, "The  related  to  each  when c o n s i d e r e d  system on the e n t i r e the  present the  gradient  their  in  efficacy  may  are  effect be  on  termed  l i n e i s c l e a r l y dependent upon the  efficacy  5  The  division  gradient  systems w i t h i n the c o n s t i t u e n t d i v i s i o n s .  gradient,  the r u l i n g g r a d i e n t , and  The  gradient,  the pusher, or  gradient.  l i n e . Operations by  over the  momentum,  balancing t r a f f i c  or  i s simply maximum  The  ruling  by_ 7  one  gradient  may  in such a manner that the heavier  gradient  l e n g t h or steepness, hauled  the steepest g r a d i e n t on be  is  flow  or by always  6  that  g r a d i e n t which, "...by i t s  l i m i t s the weight  locomotive  over  the  of  train  division  that on  can  be  which  it  I t should be noted t h a t ,  The r u l i n g g r a d i e n t may or may not be the maximum g r a d i e n t on a d i v i s i o n . In the event that helper engines are used over the maximum grades, or momentum grades are employed...the next steepest grade becomes the r u l i n g grade. 8  the  conducted  by means of pusher locomotives,  descends the maximum g r a d i e n t .  occurs."  other  over  of the  The maximum gradient  either  a  a n a l y s i s d i s t i n g u i s h e s between three types of  maximum  helper,  grades of  in t h i s connection  the grade system of the d i v i s i o n . "  of  motive  22  The  importance of the r u l i n g  railway operation train  i s twofold.  load which a s i n g l e  division,  gradient  i n the  economics  of  I t determines not only the maximum  locomotive  can haul over a  particular  but a l s o the amount of motive power which i s i n e f f e c t  "wasted" on those  s e c t i o n s of the d i v i s i o n  which are not  ruling  g r a d i e n t s . Thus, . . . i t i s not so much the d i r e c t c o s t of power that makes heavy ruling grades so o b j e c t i o n a b l e , but r a t h e r the f a c t that t h i s power which must be a v a i l a b l e wherever the r u l i n g grade occurs cannot be used to advantage over other p o r t i o n s of the l i n e . ' Therefore,  it  is  the  r u l i n g gradient  rather than the maximum  g r a d i e n t which i s the c r u c i a l determinant of o p e r a t i n g over  a  angle,  particular  d i v i s i o n . For i t i s the r u l i n g  l e n g t h and frequency  together  expenses  gradient, i t s  of i n c i d e n c e on the d i v i s i o n ,  which  determine the amount of motive power which i s provided  over the e n t i r e  division  i n excess of that r e q u i r e d t o move  the  t r a i n between the p o r t i o n s of r u l i n g g r a d i e n t . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t is  the  ruling  g r a d i e n t which determines the amount of payload  which must be l e f t  o f f the t r a i n over  order  that a s i n g l e  to  ensure  locomotive  the t r a i n whenever the r u l i n g g r a d i e n t The  entire  division  can continue  severity  by  the  within  ensures  that  a  when  c o n c e n t r a t i o n of r u l i n g particular a  train  g r a d i e n t of the d i v i s i o n , utilised  to haul  may  be  g r a d i e n t s of s i m i l a r  d i v i s i o n . Such is  in  occurs.  excess of motive power, or the l o s s of payload,  minimised  A  the  concentration  assembled to match the r u l i n g  the motive  power  provided  is  fully  f o r as long as p o s s i b l e i n c r o s s i n g the d i v i s i o n . pusher  assisting  or  locomotive  helper  gradient  i s attached  is  any  to the t r a i n  g r a d i e n t where an i n order  to "help"  23  the t r a i n ascend wherever  the  the g r a d i e n t . Pusher locomotives  gradient  of  a  section  r u l i n g g r a d i e n t of the d i v i s i o n . be  inserted  into  l e n g t h . However, any  the  The  1 0  train  car  a s s i s t i n g locomotives  at  any  the number of pushers  immediately  before and  required  of the l i n e exceeds the  point  which may  s i n g l e p o i n t i s l i m i t e d by the s t r e n g t h of  the  are  may  along  its  be a t t a c h e d at  the  the car immediately  drawbar  of  behind  the  pusher u n i t s , s i n c e i t i s upon these two drawbars alone that the full  forces  of  e x e r t e d . (The  buffing  drawbar  and  is  that  pulling part  respectively  are  of the locomotive or car  which couples the v e h i c l e to adjacent v e h i c l e s . ) Moreover, steam t r a c t i o n , as was the  1950's,  difficult  operated over the S e l k i r k Mountains u n t i l  co-ordination to  with  achieve  of  electric  traction. Also,  with steam t r a c t i o n , each a d d i t i o n a l  locomotive  r e q u i r e s i t s own  t r a i n crew of at l e a s t  single train  with  in m u l t i p l e i s more and  d i e s e l and e l e c t r i c  than  locomotives  locomotives may  diesel  two  personnel,  be operated  whilst  i n m u l t i p l e by a  crew.  Pusher  gradients,  l i k e r u l i n g g r a d i e n t s , are expensive  to  operate, not simply because of the d i r e c t c o s t of s u p p l y i n g  the  additional  the  power  where  it  o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t of being power ruling  on  portions  gradients,  concentrated  as  also  steepness  the  locomotives  unable  needed, to  but  utilise  because this  of  additional  the l i n e where i t i s not n e e d e d .  therefore,  much  g r a d i e n t must of  of  is  pusher  as p o s s i b l e . The  approximate  as  gradients steepness  closely  as  11  must  Like be  of the pusher possible  the  maximum g r a d i e n t n e g o t i a b l e by the number of  i n the t r a i n . In t h i s manner, the maximum b e n e f i t i s  24  d e r i v e d from the "push," f o r i f the slightly  steeper  of  pusher locomotives  the  train. long,  1 2  ,  1 3  utilisation  gradient  is  only  than the r u l i n g g r a d i e n t , then much of the work  Finally,  and  1 4  pusher  the  i s not r e q u i r e d i n order  the pusher g r a d i e n t must  traffic  be  s u f f i c i e n t l y dense,  of the pusher locomotive  to move the sufficiently  to ensure  15  or the pusher  full  fleet,  i i ) Curvature Curvature may be i n s e r t e d i n t o a l i n e e i t h e r avoid  a summit completely,  or i n order  a  tunnel  or  to  operation  are  implications,  those  i d e n t i c a l . This of  resistance  however, i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t h e i r operating The  impact  with  which  and  identifies  distance,  upon  two  which a r e ,  constructional  and  a t r a i n meets when t r a v e l l i n g  s i n c e the n a t u r a l motion of the t r a i n in  curve  is identical  i f curvature  division,  inserted  of a  increase  i n r e s i s t a n c e which t h i s curvature to an i n c r e a s e  without  is  gradient  in effect  reducing  the  in  on the r u l i n g gradient,  the  entails i s identical  i n the r u l i n g g r a d i e n t :  i t necessitates  attachment of a d d i t i o n a l motive power to each t r a i n  which n e g o t i a t e s each t r a i n .  encountered,  i n r e s i s t a n c e which r e s u l t s from an increase  g r a d i e n t . Therefore,  the  is  i s i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e . The  r e s i s t a n c e due to c u r v a t u r e  to the i n c r e a s e  either  investment  f o r both c o n s t r u c t i o n  analysis  over s t r a i g h t track i s i n c r e a s e d when a  in e f f e c t  avoid  costs. resistance  increase  to  c u t t i n g through the summit. In each case, the  i m p l i c a t i o n s of the i n s e r t i o n of c u r v a t u r e and  order  to moderate the gradient  by which a summit i s a t t a i n e d , or i n order in  in  the curve,  or the r e d u c t i o n of the  payload  of  25  These  expedients  reduction  can  of  only  "compensated,"  be  additional  motive power and payload  obviated  if  the  order  tangent  to  ensure  and  a  constant  a  1  is a  by a t r a i n  gradient  gradient  on  on  gradient,  of  which  both  "2.2 per  the r e s i s t a n c e  i s e q u i v a l e n t i n amount to the r e s i s t a n c e  which the t r a i n would have encountered cent, g r a d i e n t  i n the  l e v e l of r e s i s t a n c e over  c u r v a t u r e . ' Thus,  cent, compensated" encountered  is  that i s , i f the i n c r e a s e i n r e s i s t a n c e which the  c u r v a t u r e e n t a i l s i s compensated by a decrease in  curvature  in  ascending  a  2.2 per  s t r a i g h t t r a c k . However, the a c t u a l angle of  ascent w i l l be l e s s than 2.2 per cent.,  because  resistance  w i l l be due not to the  encountered  on  the  ascent  some  of the  g r a d i e n t , but t o the i n c i d e n c e of c u r v a t u r e . The angle of ascent i s u s u a l l y reduced, degree  or  of c u r v a t u r e .  "compensated,"  by  0.04 per  Thus, when a ten-degree  1 7  curve  cent, per i s located  on a g r a d i e n t of 2.2 per cent., the a c t u a l angle of ascent the  curve  train  must  will  compounded  not  stall, by  exceed 1.8 per cent., f o r i f i t does, the  as  the  resistance  due  to  the  ascent,  the r e s i s t a n c e due t o the c u r v a t u r e , w i l l  the r e s i s t a n c e of  the  over  ruling  gradient  of  the  exceed  d i v i s i o n . The  n e c e s s i t y t o compensate g r a d i e n t s i n order to a v o i d the s t a l l i n g of  trains  implies  i n c r e a s e d d i s t a n c e , f o r e i t h e r the angle of  c u r v a t u r e must be reduced,  or  the  angle  of  ascent  must  be  decreased. The  increase  entails will or is  the  i n d i s t a n c e which the i n s e r t i o n of c u r v a t u r e  i n c r e a s e e i t h e r the immediate cost of  construction  delayed cost of o p e r a t i o n . Each of these c o s t i n c r e a s e s  particularly  severe  in  mountainous  terrain,  where  26  construction little line.  costs  per mile are  local traffic  i n i t i a l l y high, and where very  can be generated by the lengthening  the  insertion  of  curvature  may  i n c r e a s e d d i s t a n c e at c o n s t r u c t i o n time or costs  afterwards,  regarded rather  as a "Low than  appropriate  be  a "High c a p i t a l c o s t , low  represents  will  in which  it  least-total-cost  is  be  with  rail.  Its  determined by  the  adopted. The  analysis  solutions  has  overcoming  of  "Low  demonstrated  mountains  by  solution  in  comparison  reduced  the  construction  that i s , the  through  facility  the f a c i l i t y .  The  is  mountains,  required  to  upon  the f o r e g o i n g of payload.  cost."  solution,  that  only  be  be  operating costs  transported  opportunity  of  "High  costs  It i s appropriate  c o n t r a s t the r e s u l t s of t h i s a n a l y s i s with an obverse  can  c o s t s are e i t h e r d i r e c t c o s t s consequent  upon the deployment of more motive power, or consequent  of  immediate c o s t of  has opened. These higher o p e r a t i n g  i n c u r r e d only when t r a f f i c  cost"  costs  at the expense of i n c u r r i n g r e l a t i v e l y higher  c o s t s once the  over  that  with  inclines.  c a p i t a l c o s t , high o p e r a t i n g  rail,  providing a railway f a c i l i t y  inference  i s adopted in p r a c t i c e , i t  e i t h e r c o n s t r u c t i n g a tunnel or o p e r a t i n g over steep This  solution  operating cost" s o l u t i o n  always  that where c u r v a t u r e  the  either  operating  cost"  mountainous t e r r a i n  classification  drawn  increased  c a p i t a l c o s t , high o p e r a t i n g  s p e c i f i c circumstances must  entail  i t i s not c l e a r that curvature can always be  the problem of breaching  are  the  1 8  Since  to  of  analysis  c a p i t a l c o s t , low  of  to the  operating  27 I  2.1  (b) "High C a p i t a l Cost, Low  Operating Cost" S o l u t i o n .  In the p e r i o d of c o n s t r u c t i o n of mountains,  large  sums  e l i m i n a t e an adverse tunnelling i  that  !  However,  or  i s , before  of  gradient  from outlay  any  can  traffic  f a c i l i t y has  the cost of o p e r a t i n g  for  train  than  o b l i g e d to n e g o t i a t e  high  the  invested  through  traffic  capital  gradient,  only  "immediately,"  the  during  on the  c o s t s can  investment  traffic  which  is  uses  be  must  the  period  the  the  facility.  the  gradient is  less  the t r a f f i c  been  since  the  reduction entire  need  of  represents  cost  be  construction,  r e a l i s e d . Moreover, the  determined  either  "immediately,"  investment p r o j e c t must be e n t i r e l y completed before in o p e r a t i n g  to  to  payload i s a v e r t e d .  cost of g r a d i e n t  "lumpy" investment. Not  by  over the l i n e  i t would have been had  the steeper  through  i n order  alignment  i s incurred  flow  deploy more motive power or forego The  be  line  been completed, and  eliminated, every  railway  c a p i t a l may  c u t t i n g . The  once the  a  strictly  f a c i l i t y . In  by  the  savings  r a t e of the  borne  but  any  a  return  volume  of  the extreme case, i f no  I  t r a i n s are at  a low  return  run over the l i n e ,  operating on  the  cost w i l l  the  f a c t that t r a f f i c  be of  investment. Thus, the  no  benefit  i s not alone  savings:  must be a v a i l a b l e i n order  the low  operating  costs.  in  be moved  securing  a  investment of l a r g e sums of  c a p i t a l per mile traffic  can  sufficient  to  ensure  operating  to take advantage of  28  2.2  The  Trade-off  The  engineering  solutions  to  and  economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a l t e r n a t i v e  the problem of l o c a t i n g and  mountainous t e r r a i n r e q u i r e a costs"  and  "delayed off,  "operating c o s t s , " and  c o s t s . " In order  that i s , i n order  schemes,  the two  answered.  First,  19  the t r a f f i c  expectation  will  the  appropriate  costs  will  high  interest  not  questions  posed in the I n t r o d u c t i o n have to be  what i s the alignment which i s a p p r o p r i a t e  flows are u n c e r t a i n , or  where  to o b t a i n low  with  sufficient  on  early  the  North  traffic,  and  cheaply,  the f u t u r e , and  i n order  capital  and  cost,  high  operating  to o f f s e t  the in  transcontinental  the  expectation "Low  of  capital  l i n e s were  generate  built  revenues  reduce o p e r a t i n g c o s t s as  o p e r a t i n g c o s t s accepted long as the t r a f f i c  operating  to minimise i n t e r e s t charges f o r  developed. Immediate c o n s t r u c t i o n  As  an  costs  invested  American  the sooner to  to upgrade the l i n e  low  t h e r e f o r e adhered to the  in order  is  operating  frequency  under u n c e r t a i n t y , or with  light  there  the  c o s t , high o p e r a t i n g c o s t " s o l u t i o n : the f i r s t  higher  to  an alignment which e n t a i l s  f o r the b e n e f i t of  charges  railways, b u i l t  be l i g h t ,  c o s t s in order  accrue  c o n s t r u c t i o n . The  which  trade-  to choose between a l t e r n a t i v e engineering  not be a p p r o p r i a t e ,  quickly  "construction  between "immediate c o s t s " and  to determine  that flows w i l l  construction  initially  between  railways in  flows through the mountains?  Where t r a f f i c  high  trade-off  operating  costs  were  i n the short  cost"  alignment  a p p r o p r i a t e . However, as the t r a f f i c  volume  traffic  diminished,  run.  volume remains low,  with  and  2 0  the  "Low  continues increases,  capital to  be  and  as  29  operating  c o s t s e s c a l a t e as a p r o p o r t i o n  alignment  becomes  less appropriate,  between c a p i t a l c o s t s and cut. Ultimately, extent  the  that the expected  alignment  in  alternative, that  when  operating  the  the  future  of  "Low  operating  exceeds  who  for the volume  track  the  second  to such an  trains  it  of  may  over  be  the  invested  an  concluded  c o s t " alignment  business  question,  which  in order  that  l e v e l of investment which should  to secure the a p p r o p r i a t e  to  has  it  is  obtain  later  be  i s , what i s the undertaken  in  alignment, i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e to  the p r i n c i p l e advanced i n 1906  would  clear-  alignment.  answering  consider  less  the cost of c o n s t r u c t i n g  c a p i t a l c o s t , high o p e r a t i n g  a more a p p r o p r i a t e  order  becomes  volume i n c r e a s e s  r e q u i r e d to support. C a p i t a l must be  appropriate  the t r a d e - o f f d e c i s i o n  l e s s severe alignment, then  become i n a p p r o p r i a t e  In  and  costs  traffic  cost  of t o t a l c o s t s , such an  by  the  C.P.R. engineer  be charged with the task of l o c a t i n g a double  for the C.P.R. main l i n e  from Calgary  to the West Coast:  "The question of reducing grades over a c e r t a i n section should be considered advantageous or economical when the saving e f f e c t e d i n o p e r a t i n g per annum over the s e c t i o n , due to grade r e d u c t i o n , more than represents the i n t e r e s t on the c a p i t a l o u t l a y necessary to make the reduction. . . " F i g u r i n g on the t r a f f i c being the same before and a f t e r the r e v i s i o n , the most economical l o c a t i o n to make i s the one which w i l l require the least outlay for construction, and which w i l l reduce o p e r a t i n g expenses by an amount more than s u f f i c i e n t to pay interest on this outlay." 2 1  This  principle,  C.P.R.'s  own  which  criteria  c o n s t r u c t i o n and  may  be  regarded  operating  costs,  and  simple,  the  in  of  i n d i c a t i v e of  the  for making the t r a d e - o f f d e c i s i o n between  delayed c o s t s , i s d e c e p t i v e l y problem  as  investing  between  immediate  e s p e c i a l l y when a p p l i e d  railways  through  and to  mountainous  30  t e r r a i n , where the t r a d e - o f f d e c i s i o n i s difficult  i n p r a c t i c e by three  First,  rendered  factors.  c o n s t r u c t i o n a l and  operating  characteristics differ  markedly between a l t e r n a t i v e alignments through phenomenon level  in  of  turn  investment  reductions interest  of any charges  o f f s e t these high of  making  large  w i l l e x i s t only drastic, the  has  or  mountains. T h i s  ramifications. F i r s t ,  required  in  order  significance is likely w i l l a l s o be high,  to  the  obtain  to be h i g h .  in o p e r a t i n g  gradient  i n order  i n t e r e s t charges, the p o s s i b i l i t y savings  absolute  Concomitant  t h e r e f o r e , and  must  costs. This  i f the proposed gradient  if  reduction  two  particularly  exist  possibility  reduction  project  be  in o p e r a t i n g  costs  is  considerable.  Second,  "next  investment  most  c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s and The  in i t s  "most  preferred"  p r e f e r r e d " a l t e r n a t i v e may  fewer b e n e f i t s than the  likely  second f a c t o r  alternative,  offer significantly  "most p r e f e r r e d " a l t e r n a t i v e i n terms of operating which  savings.  renders  the  trade-off  to make in p r a c t i c e i s the n e c e s s i t y  estimation  of c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s , s i n c e the alignment should  only  investments  if  the o p e r a t i n g  will  outweigh  investment. C l e a r l y , costs  is  a  the  the  difficulty  problem  e v a l u a t i o n s . However, the  the  savings  which difficulty  f i e l d of mountain r a i l w a y  for the  decision  difficult  adopted  the  "continuous." Thus, i f the railway company i s j u s t unable  to a f f o r d the the  is  the volume of t r a f f i c , f o r e c a s t to b e n e f i t from  range of a l t e r n a t i v e p r o j e c t s from which to choose i s not to  to  accurate be  r e l a t i v e to a l t e r n a t i v e  cost  of  the  of a c c u r a t e l y pervades  initial forecasting  all  project  i s p a r t i c u l a r l y acute in  l o c a t i o n , where c o n t i n g e n c i e s  are  31  often d i f f i c u l t The  to foresee, and c o s t overruns easy to i n c u r .  final  difficult  of  operating  renders  the  savings. T h i s  f o r e c a s t i n g of f u t u r e t r a f f i c  alignment. Again,  i n turn  common  accurate  r e q u i r e s the  to  t o o , however, the d i f f i c u l t y  a l l project  i s particularly  i n the f i e l d of mountain r a i l w a y l o c a t i o n , where the s c a l e  of investment c o s t s which must be recovered and  trade-off decision  volumes over the proposed  this i s a d i f f i c u l t y  a p p r a i s a l . Again, acute  which  to make i n p r a c t i c e i s the n e c e s s i t y f o r the  estimation accurate  factor  where  traffic  flexibility  to  levels i s d i f f i c u l t  cope to  i s usually  economically  incorporate  large,  with extremes of  into  the  proposed  facility. The  role  of  these  three f a c t o r s i n shaping  d e c i s i o n s which were made Mountains  will  be  by  which the C.P.R., as r e v e a l e d to  have  reached  clearly  matter  alignment investment  to be  of be  d i s c e r n and a p p r a i s e by  their  elicited  involves  p r i n c i p l e s and economic crucial  as  costs  more and  t i m i n g . When,  considered  undertaken  alignment  should  in  response simply  f o r how  i s intended  to  involves long, should  to secure  the  i s an the  a "more  i s i t intended  be "more a p p r o p r i a t e " ?  each  engineering  "appropriate"? When  which  decisions,  posed above. The  benefits. It and  the answers  investment  than  a p p r o p r i a t e " alignment, and f o r how long this  the S e l k i r k  i n the remainder of  on the two questions  i s s u e of " a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s , " question,  C.P.R. through  d e s c r i b e d and d i s c u s s e d  this thesis. This analysis w i l l  appear  the  the t r a d e - o f f  that  In a n a l y s i n g the  nature  and r a t i o n a l e of the t r a d e - o f f d e c i s i o n s made  in  Rogers  Pass,  t h i s t h e s i s must p e r f o r c e examine the manner i n which the  32  C.P.R. addressed t h i s c r u c i a l  i s s u e of  timing.  33  FOOTNOTES  T h i s d i s c u s s i o n has no p r e t e n s i o n s to be a comprehensive review of the e n g i n e e r i n g p r i n c i p l e s of mountain railway c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n , nor i s i t intended as such. For a thorough and contemporaneous treatment of the f i e l d of r a i l w a y e n g i n e e r i n g , see, f o r example, A. M. W e l l i n g t o n , The Economic Theory Of The Location Of Railways , New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 6th e d i t i o n , 1915; C. C. W i l l i a m s , The Design Of Railway Location, New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1st ed., 1917; W. L. Webb, R a i l r o a d C o n s t r u c t i o n , Theory And Practice, New York, John Wiley & Sons, i n c . , 8th e d i t i o n , 1926. 1  2  W e l l i n g t o n , op. c i t . , Table 170, pp. 544-551.  3  See below, pp. 21-23.  " C o n s i d e r a b l y over h a l f of the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t r a c k comes from the passage of engines over i t , and the remainder only from the passage of c a r s , which may weigh ten or twenty times as much." W e l l i n g t o n , op. c i t . , p. 701. 4  5  W i l l i a m s , op. c i t . ,  6  Ibid.,  p.  7  Ibid.,  p. 219. My  8  p.  219.  265. italics.  Ibid.  ' Ibid.,  p.  220.  Unless the g r a d i e n t i s operated e i t h e r by momentum or by b a l a n c i n g t r a f f i c . See note (6) above. 1 0  " I t i s a t r u t h of the f i r s t importance, that the o b j e c t i o n to high g r a d i e n t s i s not the work which engines have to do on them, but i t i s the work which they do NOT do when they are thundering over the t r a c k with a l i g h t t r a i n behind them, from end to end of a d i v i s i o n , i n order that the needed power may be at hand at a few s c a t t e r e d p o i n t s where alone i t i s needed." Wellington, op. c i t . , pp. 589-590. 1 1  1 2  W i l l i a m s , op. c i t . ,  pp. 266-7.  "The rate of grade should be such as to r e q u i r e the f u l l power of the pusher engine i n a d d i t i o n to that of the regular engine to handle the maximum load over the balance of the s e c t i o n , as t h i s w i l l reduce the l e n g t h of the pusher grade and consequently the pusher engine mileage." F. F. Busteed, "The Saving E f f e c t e d By Grade Reductions," i n , C.P.R. Co., "Proceedings Of The Meeting Of Western L i n e s O f f i c i a l s Held At F i e l d , B.C., February t w e l f t h and thirteenth nineteen hundred and s i x . " Public A r c h i v e s of B r i t i s h Columbia, V i c t o r i a , B.C. 1 3  34  (henceforth "PABC,") NWp 971B C225pr. p. 62. "The maximum efficiency i n o p e r a t i n g pusher engines i s obtained when the pusher engine i s kept c o n s t a n t l y at work, and this i s f a c i l i t a t e d when the pusher grade i s as long as possible, that i s , when the heavy grades and the great bulk of the d i f f e r e n c e of e l e v a t i o n to be surmounted i s at one p l a c e . For example, a pusher grade of three m i l e s f o l l o w e d by a comparatively l e v e l s t r e t c h of three m i l e s and then by another pusher grade of two m i l e s cannot a l l be operated as cheaply as a continuous pusher grade of f i v e m i l e s . " Webb, op. c i t . , pp. 58081. 1 4  "...the c o n d i t i o n that the pushers must be kept busy and be always on hand to have them economical must be remembered. The larger the t r a f f i c of the road the more e a s i l y can t h i s be assured, and consequently the more f r e q u e n t l y can pushers be used." W e l l i n g t o n , op. c i t . , p. 606. 1 5  1 6  W i l l i a m s , op. c i t . ,  1 7  Webb, op. c i t . ,  p. 296.  p. 563.  I t should be noted that compensation i s a l s o r e q u i r e d i n railway t u n n e l s which are l o c a t e d on g r a d i e n t s . Here, the increase in resistance i s due to damp r a i l s and i n c r e a s e d a i r r e s i s t a n c e w i t h i n the t u n n e l . 1 8  1 9  See above, p. 3.  "Whereas European engineers i n c l i n e d to a permanent type of c o n s t r u c t i o n , American r a i l r o a d s were o f t e n best b u i l t when most cheaply built, with l i g h t rails, sharp curves and steep grades. Only such roads c o u l d expect to earn i n t e r e s t on t h e i r investment, i n view of the scant p o p u l a t i o n of the country and the pioneer c h a r a c t e r of many of the e a r l y enterprises." S. Daggett, Principles Of Inland T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , New York, Harper, 4th e d i t i o n , 1928, pp. 63-64. 2 0  2 1  F. F. Busteed, op. c i t . ,  p. 62.  35  CHAPTER 3  RAILWAYS AND ROGERS PASS The and  purpose of t h i s chapter  economic  concepts  circumstances  relate  describes  the  of the previous chapter  of railway c o n s t r u c t i o n and  Pass, B.C. The chapter section  i s to  engineering  to the s p e c i f i c  operation  in  i s d i v i d e d i n t o three s e c t i o n s . The f i r s t  the p h y s i c a l and c l i m a t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of  the S e l k i r k Mountains, and c o n s i d e r s the i m p l i c a t i o n s characteristics section  for  explains  alternative  why  routes  section  of  these  railway l o c a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n . The second Rogers  Pass  available  examines  the  was  for  t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l main l i n e through third  Rogers  the  the  from  location  mountains  specific  C.P.R. harboured f o r the impact of  selected  of  expectations  these  of  the the  B.C. The which the  characteristics  upon  p r o s p e c t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n a l and o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s i n the Pass.  3.1 Rogers Pass The  direct  route  west from the foot of the K i c k i n g Horse  Pass c r o s s e s the n o r t h e r l y flowing Columbia R i v e r , and faced  by  great  mass  of  Map I ) . These mountains  pose  a  construction related  to  the  and the  operation location,  of the  the  Selkirk  number  of  is  Mountains  problems  problems  topography  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the S e l k i r k Mountains.  (See  f o r the  r a i l w a y s . These and  then  are  climatic  37  a) L o c a t i o n The S e l k i r k Mountains form a c h a i n l y i n g to the west of the Rocky Mountains. They are d i v i d e d from them by the Columbia V a l l e y , running approximately north and south, and through which the r i v e r of the same name flows. T h i s r i v e r sweeps round the northern e x t r e m i t y of the S e l k i r k c h a i n , forming what is called the 'Big Bend,' and then flows s o u t h e r l y i n t o Oregon T e r r i t o r y , scooping out a deep v a l l e y , which d i v i d e s the Selkirks from the Gold Range, l y i n g f u r t h e r to the west. The S e l k i r k s are thus bounded on e i t h e r s i d e , and enclosed at their northern end, by the Columbia V a l l e y . T h e i r length i s about 250 miles i n Canadian T e r r i t o r y , and width from 50 to 80 m i l e s . 1  Situated just of  B.C.,  the  i n s i d e , and p a r a l l e l with, the e a s t e r n border  Selkirks  are  the  second  of four great mountain  ranges,  the Rockies, the S e l k i r k s , the Gold Range and  Range,  which  stand  astride  the  Coast  southern Canadian routes from  the  p r a i r i e s to the west c o a s t .  b) Topography In general c h a r a c t e r (the S e l k i r k s ) are lofty, rugged, and steep; i n t e r s e c t e d and d i v e r s i f i e d by narrow passes, and p r e c i p i t o u s , rocky canons [ s i c ] . The height of the h i g h e s t peaks i s ten or eleven thousand feet above the sea; long p a r a l l e l r i d g e s of not much i n f e r i o r e l e v a t i o n may be f r e q u e n t l y observed i n c l o s e p r o x i m i t y , forming between them a narrow V shaped v a l l e y , whose s i d e s extend upwards, at an even and very steep slope, for five or s i x thousand f e e t , and along the bottom of which there flows a t u r b u l e n t mountain stream. 2  A "low the  c a p i t a l cost" railway l o c a t i o n ,  natural  alignment  of the t e r r a i n ,  these narrow passes as c o r r i d o r s through the v a l l e y and  f l o o r s i n the S e l k i r k s are  densely  i s compelled  overgrown.* Even today, to s k i r t  enough  to  accommodate  follow  would n e c e s s a r i l y seek the mountains. However,  poorly  drained,  marshy,  the Trans - Canada Highway  these areas by t a k i n g to the v a l l e y  Thus, even where l e v e l v a l l e y wide  3  i n t e n d i n g to  f l o o r s e x i s t , and where  sides.  they  are  even a s i n g l e l i n e of r a i l w a y , no  38  t r a c k can be l a i d without massive investment  i n ground c l e a r a n c e  and drainage. Instead, t r a c k must be thrown up the v a l l e y  sides,  c l e a r of the area prone to f l o o d i n g . Moreover, where the v a l l e y f l o o r s are d r a i n e d , the descend  streams  very s t e e p l y towards the major r i v e r s , too s t e e p l y to be  f o l l o w e d by r a i l w a y l i n e s . In seeking l e s s p r e c i p i t o u s descents, t r a c k s n e c e s s a r i l y d i v e r g e from the r i v e r v a l l e y s and are thrown high  up  the  order to reach thereby  valley the  incurring  The  sides. valley  They must then be  5  floors  by  of abandoning the v a l l e y  the mountain s i d e s , whether induced by poor  drainage  consequences adverse First,  practicable  in  gradients,  i n c r e a s e d d i s t a n c e and c u r v a t u r e .  necessity  valley,  "developed"  or  to  steeply  railway  f l o o r s and  the  narrowness  flowing  rivers,  construction  and  seeking of  the  has  six  operation.  i t e n t a i l s steep g r a d i e n t s , i n order to reach the refuge  of the v a l l e y s i d e s and possible.  Second,  then r e t u r n to the  valley  i t i n v o l v e s c o n s t r u c t i o n through  floor  where  the densely  f o r e s t e d v a l l e y s i d e s , which would be s c a r c e l y l e s s expensive c l e a r than the dense undergrowth of the  marshy  Third,  into  it  entails  extensive  mountain above the v a l l e y  cutting  floor,  upon which to l a y the r a i l s .  The  increased  of  by  "development"  the  l i n e over these  extent the  degrades  side  of the  of  this  cutting  is  l i n e . Fourth, i t involves stable  foundation  "benches," s i n c e i n the S e l k i r k s ,  rock being f o r the most p a r t . . . c l a y and and  the  floors.  i n order to carve out a "bench"  i n c r e a s e d expenditure upon the s e c u r i n g of a for  valley  to  slate  "the  shales...crumbles  e a s i l y under the a c t i o n of the weather, and l a r g e  masses of d e b r i s are thus c o n s t a n t l y  gathering  in  the  valley  39  bottoms, and the  while the mountain s i d e s are deeply s c a r r e d by g u l l i e s  fissures." many  6  Fifth,  mountain  i t involves bridging  streams,  alignment along the v a l l e y  a l l of  floor.  7  these  which  are avoided i n an  and  streams,  bridges,  f o r the  violent  fields  s t r e n g t h of  f l o o d i n g of these many streams.  T h i s f l o o d i n g , the r e s u l t of warm  weather  melting  "the snow-  and i c e masses..., may occur at any p e r i o d of the summer  months, and may l a s t location  along  f o r days, the  or  mountain  perhaps side  weeks." leads  p e r p e n d i c u l a r l y across the paths of avalanches the  and  b r i d g i n g w i l l t h e r e f o r e be expensive and complex. Moreover,  allowance must be made, i n both t h e l e n g t h and the the  and  The b r i d g e s may be s h o r t , but  the c r o s s i n g s w i l l be high above the g u l l i e s the  gullies  peaks  above  to  the v a l l e y  avalanches w i l l be examined  Finally,  8  the  tracks  descending  from  f l o o r beneath. T h i s problem of  further  in  the  consideration  of  c l i m a t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s below.  c) Climate The Selkirk chain forms, as i t were, a l o f t y w a l l running north and south. Being very much higher than the mountains to the west, i t i s the f i r s t and c h i e f b a r r i e r that the moisture laden c u r r e n t s of a i r from the P a c i f i c Ocean encounter on t h e i r eastward passage. T h i s warm a i r i s i n t e r c e p t e d and the moisture condensed by c o n t a c t with the c o l d S e l k i r k s , e n t a i l i n g heavy r a i n i n summer and deep snow i n w i n t e r . . . ' The average annual s n o w f a l l ranges feet,  thirty  f a l l i n g mostly between October and A p r i l ,  1 0  much more h e a v i l y upon the western slope.  from  1 2  The  heavy  snowfall,  steep, f i s s u r e d p r o f i l e  of  avalanche  severity  danger.  The  the  slope than upon  1 1  to  fifty  and f a l l i n g the e a s t e r n  coupled with high winds and the mountains, of  the  creates danger  a  lies  severe i n the  40  v e l o c i t y of the avalanches, the volume of snow which s l i d e s , the weight may  of that snow. Hard-packed and  weigh  from  the s l i d e s may  frozen, the snow  and  alone  25 to 38 l b s . per c u b i c f o o t , and the f o r c e of  tear down whole t r e e s or  i n t o the v a l l e y s with the a v a l a n c h e .  rocks  and  carry  them  13  The time of year when s l i d e s are l a r g e s t and most frequent i s from the middle of January to the latter part of February. These are 'winter s l i d e s , ' formed of l a r g e masses of q u i t e dry snow. In March and A p r i l there are numerous 'sun s l i d e s , ' caused by the m e l t i n g of the snow and i c e , but these are not of any importance as compared with the o t h e r s . 1 4  The hazard  i n c i d e n c e of these s l i d e s poses a c o n s i d e r a b l e seasonal to  both  transportation  the  construction  corridors  through  and the  the Selkirks,  i n c r e a s e s the expense of keeping open those already  been  floors, of  noted  that  operation and  corridors.  It  on  has  i n being compelled to abandon v a l l e y paths  the mountain s i d e s . However, even the v a l l e y  f l o o r s do not n e c e s s a r i l y p r o v i d e a refuge from the Many  greatly  r a i l w a y l i n e s would be f o r c e d d i r e c t l y a c r o s s the  avalanches  of  avalanches.  of the v a l l e y s are too narrow to permit the s l i d e s to "run  o f f " h a r m l e s s l y , and the l a r g e r momentum  to  cross  the  avalanches  valley  acquire  sufficient  f l o o r s and t r a v e l c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s t a n c e up the s i d e s of the mountains o p p o s i t e . S t r u c t u r e s intended to defend r a i l w a y l i n e s from the must be strong enough to withstand not merely the weight cumulative  snowfall,  nor  even  themselves, but a l s o the weight which  accompany  would be arduous several  hundred  slides of  the  the s t r e n g t h of the avalanches of the f a l l i n g  rocks  and  trees  the s l i d e s . Clearance of the snow s l i d e s alone and expensive enough: many of them would feet  of  line,  sometimes  cover  to a depth of over  41  thirty  feet.  exacerbates  The presence of rocks  1 5  the  clearance  trees  and  operation  noted that peculiar  and  these to  the  are  constraints  the  thus  corridors.  railway  location  c l i m a t e of the S e l k i r k s . I t should be are  to  a  considerable  and  less  overgrown,  eminently s u i t a b l e t o accommodate t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  Moreover, they  being  receive  a  situated  further  east  than  which experiences c o n s i d e r a b l e  Even  in  the  i s much  lighter,  and  g e n e r a l l y d i s p l a c e rocks and t r e e s . Moreover, the c o n s t r a i n t s peculiar  to  are  road  vehicles,  mountain gradients  the  slides  to  a  considerable  or  may  curvature  do not  extent  of r a i l w a y s . Due to the  cornering  capabilities  highways may f o l l o w the severe g r a d i e n t s  streams, and  snow  f o r the  1 6  the l o c a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n  s u p e r i o r adhesion, a c c e l e r a t i o n and  Sierra  s n o w f a l l and avalanches,  the problems are f a r l e s s severe than i n the S e l k i r k s , itself  alternatively  choose  both  of  of the severe  as means of a v o i d i n g avalanche paths,  g u l l i e s or f l o o d e d v a l l e y s . These a l t e r n a t i v e s are a v a i l a b l e rail  the  f a r l e s s e r s n o w f a l l , m i t i g a t i n g the  problems of avalanches and snow c l e a r a n c e .  snow  extent  S e l k i r k Mountains. In the Rockies, the v a l l e y  f l o o r s are g e n e r a l l y wider, b e t t e r drained  Nevada,  i f mechanical  i n those mountains. The c o n s t r a i n t s are imposed by  topography  Selkirks,  debris  i n t r o d u c t i o n to the geography of the S e l k i r k Mountains  h i g h l i g h t e d the p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s upon  and  the  operation.  has  the  in  problem, p a r t i c u l a r l y  ploughs are used i n the c l e a r i n g This  and  to  i n only l i m i t e d measure. This  analysis  of  the  implications  c l i m a t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the S e l k i r k  of  the p h y s i c a l and  Mountains  for  railway  42  construction  and  o p e r a t i o n has r e v e a l e d that the nature of the  t e r r a i n would pose a formidable c h a l l e n g e to the l o c a t i o n rail  corridor  from  the  prairies  l e g i t i m a t e l y wonder why and how could  be  expected  to  to  a  will  sections  of  link  barrier  this  chapter  endeavour t o answer these q u e s t i o n s .  3.2 The S e l e c t ion Of Rogers Pass For The F i r s t R a i l Link The was  rail  t h i s awesome n a t u r a l  a g a i n s t communication. The next two  a  the west c o a s t . One may  transcontinental  penetrate  of  purpose  selected  of t h i s s e c t i o n  as  C.P.R. would  one  cross  segment  Transcontinental  i s to e x p l a i n why Rogers Pass  of  the  the mountains  route  which  be  f o r ever  implicated  which  the  between  the  decision,  the  stood  p r a i r i e s and the west c o a s t . As a r e s u l t of t h i s C.P.R. would  by  i n the s t r u g g l e with the  adverse p h y s i c a l and c l i m a t i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o u t l i n e d above. I t should be noted that transcontinental  the  link  interrelated  decisions.  question  the  of  selection  was  Pass  first  decision  addressed  mountains.  the question of the s p e c i f i c  The  second  concentrate  because  the  elsewhere,  11  first  the  question  second has  decision  analysis  of these q u e s t i o n s , been  discussed  partly  thoroughly  and p a r t l y because the second q u e s t i o n r e v e a l s more  than the f i r s t elaborated  upon  the  l o c a t i o n which should be  adopted i n c r o s s i n g the S e l k i r k Mountains of B.C. T h i s will  f o r the  alignment which should be adopted i n  c r o s s i n g the western Canadian addressed  Rogers  the consequence of two separate but  The  general  of  question about the manner i n which the t r a d e - o f f s  in  Chapter  2  were  handled  environment of the S e l k i r k Mountains.  in  the  particular  43  The  need to c r o s s the S e l k i r k  avoided  entirely  had  the  c o n t r a c t and c o n s t r u c t e d Pass  v i a Jasper  Mountains  C.P.R. adhered  the main l i n e  House.  Such  a  could to  have  their  through  the  1 8  contract  original Yellowhead  route would have had maximum  g r a d i e n t s of one per cent., and would have been f r e e slides.  been  from  snow  However, s h o r t l y a f t e r the C.P.R. had been awarded the to  build  the  search was i n i t i a t e d  t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l main l i n e ,  for a  more  southerly  route  i n 1881, a across  the  p r a i r i e s and through the mountains. By 1883, the Yellowhead Pass a l t e r n a t i v e had been abandoned. It  i s not  proposed  surrounds the  rationale  objective  the  of  to  reopen  for this  equated  costs,  2 0  C.P.R. i n seeking  these  mountains.  economic  savings,  22  in  in future  distance operating  the  further  encroachment  Certainly,  compete  In order to  2 1  c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s on a shorter l i n e through the  However,  route  The  i t appears that the C.P.R. was prepared to  decision  the  by  to abandon the Yellowhead political  considerations,  south would more r e a d i l y of  the United  Canadian p r a i r i e s and southern decision  B.C. to  c r o s s i n g of the mountains appears political  T h i s saving  1 5  for transcontinental t r a f f i c .  Pass may a l s o have been motivated a  decision.  and with an improvement i n t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y t o  s a n c t i o n higher  since  which  a more s o u t h e r l y route was  by the C.P.R. with a r e d u c t i o n  with American r i v a l s secure  controversy  abandonment  o s t e n s i b l y to o b t a i n a s h o r t e r l i n e . was  the  considerations.  States  to  P r e s i d e n t of the C.P.R., would l a t e r  into  both  the  23  reject  Sir  f o r e s t a l l the  have  Thomas assert  an  extreme  been  southern  dominated  Shaughnessy, that  the  by  third Company  44  "would  have  preferred  to  build  v i a the Crow's Nest, but the  Government of the day d i d not approve t h i s , as the l i n e would be too c l o s e to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Boundary. As present  route  That  was a d o p t e d . "  "present  a  consequence  24  route"  would penetrate  the Rockies through  the K i c k i n g Horse Pass and the S e l k i r k s through Rogers Pass. was  the  decision  to  the  It  f o l l o w the K i c k i n g Horse Pass which made  necessary a d e c i s i o n concerning  the a p p r o p r i a t e  c r o s s i n g of the  S e l k i r k Mountains. Two a l t e r n a t i v e s were a v a i l a b l e . An alignment could  be  followed  s k i r t i n g the northern  around the B i g Bend of the Columbia V a l l e y , extremity  of the range, o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  a d i r e c t c r o s s i n g c o u l d be sought through the S e l k i r k s . The  C.P.R.'s e v a l u a t i o n  assessed.  From  of these a l t e r n a t i v e s w i l l  now  be  t h i s assessment, i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e to analyse  the manner i n which the C.P.R.  handled the t r a d e - o f f s  explained  in Chapter 2. The a n a l y s i s w i l l be i n s t r u c t i v e f o r the a p p r a i s a l of l a t e r t r a d e - o f f d e c i s i o n s made  by  the  C.P.R., because  t r a d e - o f f s made i n the S e l k i r k s appear not to have been by  p o l i t i c a l considerations,  the  coloured  but to have been based p u r e l y upon  p r i n c i p l e s of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n economics. The miles,  l e n g t h of the B i g Bend and  gradient  f e e t per m i l e , to  be  2 6  operated  elsewhere  estimated  used  in p l a c e s . "  as  pusher  be  short  would  would  difficult  to  at  140  of 80 or 90 Since  2 5  the  on the C.P.R. system was to be 52.8  these s e c t i o n s of the B i g Bend route  gradients be  was  i t seemed "quite c e r t a i n that g r a d i e n t s  f e e t per mile would have to be ruling  route  gradients.  Moreover,  and d i s p e r s e d ,  conduct  would have since  the pusher  economically.  the  operation  Finally,  the  45  adoption  of the lengthy  necessarily estimate  preclude  has  alignment around the B i g Bend would not  the  need  for tunnelling,  required.  When the C.P.R.  2 7  a p p l i e d f o r s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o abandon  the Yellowhead Pass, the  B i g Bend  a l t e r n a t i v e on the southern route:  represented  had  a  "fail-safe"  i t c o u l d be adopted as a l a s t  i f no d i r e c t c r o s s i n g of the S e l k i r k s c o u l d be f o u n d .  However, i f the C.P.R. had been d r i v e n to adopt the  potential  saving  i n distance  the  28  B i g Bend,  on the southern route,  which  induced them to abandon the Yellowhead Pass, would have been  eroded to between t h i r t y - f i v e doubtful  that  the  savings  and in  forty-five  the  cost  miles.  of  It i s  2 5  operating  d i s t a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y over the p o t e n t i a l l y uneconomical gradients,  would  have  o f f s e t the i n c r e a s e d  If  3 0  this pusher  construction  which were a n t i c i p a t e d i n the K i c k i n g Horse P a s s . of  no  s u r v i v e d of the a c t u a l length of t u n n e l l i n g which  might have been  resort  although  costs  adoption  the southern route were to be j u s t i f i e d on economic grounds,  t h e r e f o r e , the C.P.R. had to be prepared heavily  at  construction  time  d i s t a n c e and c o s t of o p e r a t i n g saved.  As  the  C.P.R.'s  in  admitted, "'to save t h i s d i s t a n c e would  ordinarily  expense.'"  be  of  in  Manager,  to  even  ensure  B i g Bend Van  work w i l l be  more  that the would  Home,  impracticable  on  be  freely  undertaken  understood  and  expected  that  the S e l k i r k s would n e c e s s i t a t e a heavy  investment. The exact invest  considered  the  invest  that  account of  31  It was t h e r e f o r e crossing  order  around  General  to  order  amount which the  to secure the saving  C.P.R. was i n distance  a  direct  "immediate" prepared  to  i s not known,  46  but an i n t e r e s t i n g r e v e a l e d - p r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n may be  deduced,  which o f f e r s at l e a s t a general i n d i c a t i o n of the extent of that preparedness. The  engineer  Walter Moberly, 'having d i s c o v e r e d Eagle  through the Gold Range i n the 1860's, sought pass  through  surveys  with  the  Selkirks,  the  conclusion  but that  to l i n k  Pass  i t with  a  i n 1871 he had abandoned h i s such  a  pass  "would  be  i m p r a c t i c a b l e f o r a r a i l w a y unless a long t u n n e l , probably 14 t o 15  miles  range."  in  length,  The  32  tunnelling  report  should of  be excavated through the S e l k i r k  the  necessity  for this  length  probably expedited the F e d e r a l Government's d e c i s i o n  in favour of the Yellowhead  Pass, announced while Moberly  V i c t o r i a , having returned from h i s 1871 e x p l o r a t i o n s . Ten years l a t e r , when the C.P.R. requested adopt  a  southern  route,  the  of  C.P.R. was  ordinarily it  the S e l k i r k s . prepared  be  3 4  to  order  to  was i n  3 3  permission  the e x p e c t a t i o n was s t i l l  long t u n n e l s " would be r e q u i r e d i n crossing  of  to  that "some  secure  a  direct  Although, as has been noted above, undertake  "work... which  c o n s i d e r e d i m p r a c t i c a b l e on account  would  of expense,"  i s not c l e a r that they regarded t h i s amount of t u n n e l l i n g  as  a c c e p t a b l e , f o r they continued to r e s e r v e the o p t i o n of b u i l d i n g around  the B i g B e n d .  The  amount  accept appears  35  of t u n n e l l i n g which the C.P.R. was prepared to  to have been a maximum of 2 1/2 m i l e s , f o r i t was  only at the end of the 1882 surveying season, a f t e r Major A. Rogers  had  e s t a b l i s h e d that no more t u n n e l l i n g than t h i s would  be r e q u i r e d i f a route through Rogers Pass were t o that  the  B.  C.P.R. a p p l i e d  specifically  be  adopted,  f o r p e r m i s s i o n to l o c a t e  47  the l i n e d i r e c t l y a c r o s s the S e l k i r k s . of  tunnelling  proved  not  to  3 6  When even  be necessary  this  amount  i n order to secure  a c c e p t a b l e g r a d i e n t s , the d i r e c t c r o s s i n g v i a Rogers Pass became c l e a r l y p r e f e r a b l e to the Bend,  saving  some  circuitous  seventy-seven  mountain r a i l w a y c o n s t r u c t i o n . The  into  the  extent  undertake "immediate" operating  savings.  the o p e r a t i n g  return  to  i s possible  of  which  f u n c t i o n has o f f e r e d  some  in  order  to  secure  future  now to e s t a b l i s h the extent  the  C.P.R. would  require  in  to o b t a i n some i n s i g h t  of  revealed  C.P,R.'s preparedness projected  i s a v a i l a b l e . Again,  on  preference  i n t o the t r a d e - o f f from  i s available  to accept g r a d i e n t s steeper than  feet  year's  [ s i c ] , and from thence  surveys,  estimates upwards, l o c a t i n g of  twenty  he  was  to the  "a l i n e  compelled ascending  exceed  the same r a t e f o r the same d i s t a n c e . . . " ' 3  clearly  Fork  summit 3 8  of  A f t e r the  to r e v i s e westerly  these for a  m i l e s to the summit of the S e l k i r k s at the  r a t e of 105 6/10 feet per m i l e , and descending  C.P.R. was  initially  reported "a grade not to  the S e l k i r k s not to exceed e i g h t y feet to the m i l e . "  distance  the  to the mile between Kamloops and the North  the I l l i - c i l l e - w a n t  following  in  the Rogers Pass r o u t e . Rogers, when surveying the  S e l k i r k s i n 1881, had i n i t i a l l y sixty-six  too, however,  of p r e f e r e n c e s , both r e v e a l e d and e x p l i c i t .  Evidence  at  miles  f o r i t s w i l l i n g n e s s to accept higher c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s .  the evidence  of  eighty-seven  the B i g  which the C.P.R. was prepared to  I t i s necessary  savings  around  3 7  investment  Again, no q u a n t i t a t i v e data it  or  s k e t c h i n g of t h i s p r e f e r e n c e  insight  of  passage  aware  of  this  gradient  the western slope Nevertheless,  the  system when they  48  a p p l i e d f o r permission prepared  to accept  When  it.  Rogers  to e x p l o i t Rogers Pass, and  was  clearly  4 0  l a t e r recommended that the g r a d i e n t s again be  r e v i s e d upwards, to 116  feet  per  mile,  i t was  4 1  still  not  expected that the r e v i s i o n would negate the advantages of Rogers Pass  over  the B i g Bend. "(I)nasmuch as a s s i s t a n t engines would  be r e q u i r e d on a grade of n i n e t y f e e t as w e l l as on one feet  per  mile...,"  from pushers over scattered in  better  4 2  the  operate  summit  than  from  pushers  g r a d i e n t s around the B i g Bend. T h e r e f o r e ,  over the steeper  Evidence  of  116  u t i l i s a t i o n c o u l d be a n t i c i p a t e d  Selkirk  d i s t a n c e would not be  of  offset  by  the  costs  on  the savings  of  having  to  gradients.  explicit  preference  Home's own r e t r o s p e c t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n  i s available  from Van  of the t r a d e - o f f d e c i s i o n .  In h i s e v a l u a t i o n , Van Home assumed that no pusher g r a d i e n t s at all  would be r e q u i r e d on the B i g Bend. T h e r e f o r e ,  d i s t a n c e over Rogers Pass would be o f f s e t by the the  pusher  operation  route. Even under t h i s alternative savings  was  still  would  gradients.  revealed p r e f e r e n c e inferred  that  the  the  concerning savings  potentially  full  cost  of  r e q u i r e d on the summit  however,  preferred.  the  Rogers  Pass  E x p l i c i t l y , the a n t i c i p a t e d  the  Implicitly,  4 3  be  assumption,  i n d i s t a n c e would o f f s e t  steeper  offset  which  the savings i n  cost  from  of  the  construction  operating  over  above evidence of  costs,  i t may  be  i n d i s t a n c e were a l s o expected t o  higher  cost  of  construction  through  Rogers Pass. From the evidence it  of both r e v e a l e d and e x p l i c i t  preference,  i s c l e a r that the prime f a c t o r i n i n f l u e n c i n g the d e c i s i o n to  49  adopt Rogers Pass was and  i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n the operating  this an  the a n t i c i p a t e d saving  saving  in the o p e r a t i n g  improved c a p a b i l i t y  manner  in  which  to  the  compete  S e l k i r k Mountains was  consistent  which had  search  This  analysis  explains  Pass.  dismiss  to  Nest Pass a l t e r n a t i v e s was grounds.  Nevertheless,  d e c i s i o n was based  through  decision with  why  railway  decision  for  was  Insofar  the  objectives  was  l i n e of the  located  is  Rogers  the Yellowhead Pass and  by  no  means  clear  Crow's  political that  upon  principles  of  railway  been  economics. With  s e l e c t i o n of Rogers Pass, i t appeared that the o b j e c t i v e s the  more  fulfilled, prepared  southerly and to  make,  Indeed,  alternatives, would  be  location  that the  trade-off  in  Rogers  not at a l l c l e a r  C.P.R. had  been  construction  costs  costs was that  that  4 5  been  later, selected  had  been  from  construction  the costs  b u i l d i n g through the Pass than they would  t o , in p r a c t i c e  necessary." accept  the  the  which  to achieve had  Big  Bend,  for  been prepared to accept 2 1 / 2 miles  C.P.R. had had  which  Pass  have been i n b u i l d i n g around the  i t had  intended  to save o p e r a t i n g  when  i t was  higher  was  that of i n c u r r i n g higher  immediately i n order made.  this  i n c o n s i s t e n t with a d e c i s i o n which would have  purely  4 4  first  through  based at l e a s t p a r t l y upon  it  the  handled i n the  stated  main  as  equated with traffic,  was  the  costs,  for a more s o u t h e r l y l o c a t i o n .  Canadian t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l The  cost of d i s t a n c e .  cost of d i s t a n c e  trade-off  prompted the  in o p e r a t i n g  there  were  although  the  of t u n n e l l i n g i f  virtually  "no  tunnels  Moreover, although the C.P.R. had  been prepared to  the  over Rogers Pass  cost of the pusher o p e r a t i o n  would o f f s e t some of the  saving  in distance,  in p r a c t i c e  it  is  50  likely was  that  the  cost of the pusher o p e r a t i o n  over Rogers Pass  a c t u a l l y l e s s than the cost would have been  operation  which  would  of  the  pusher  c e r t a i n l y have been r e q u i r e d around  the  Big Bend. The  s e l e c t i o n of Rogers Pass, t h e r e f o r e , was  necessary  expedient.  I t was  Kicking  Horse  Pass with no  e x i t . * ' Rather, i t was  a p o s i t i v e choice. the  r a i l . The  C.P.R. was  and  It.  appropriate  expectations,  3.3  The  and  well p l e a s e d ,  the  Expectations  The  Of The  which  the  c o n d i t i o n s over  construction  and  to  following expectations  time  It represented Selkirk  Mountains  expectations  consider  the  a sound  is  to  nature  examine  C.P.R. harboured  of  these  Rogers of  Pass,  The  further  for construction prior  to  the  the t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l  between the C.P.R.'s  the r e a l i t i e s which w i l l be  and  analysis  of  operational  the  concern.  of c o n s t r u c t i o n work, the cost  required  f o r ' construction,  the  of  in  facility  from snow s l i d e s .  The  areas are  of  the  specific  construction,  the  and  expectations  C.P.R.'s  methods  the  actual  link.  examined  These  i n c l u d i n g f o r e c a s t s of t r a f f i c volumes, and p r o t e c t i o n of the  by  were h i g h .  i n Rogers Pass w i l l examine f i v e d i s t i n c t areas  constructional character  4 7  section  inception  chapter.  via  Builders  examination h i g h l i g h t s the gap of the route, and  the  foundations f o r optimism.  purpose of t h i s  expectations operating  now  the Rockies  a  sure knowledge of i t s means of  s o l u t i o n to the problem of c r o s s i n g  is  merely  not an a l t e r n a t i v e f o r c e d upon  C.P.R. by the Company's b l i n d d e c i s i o n to enter the  not  of the the  operation,  necessity  for  51  a) The Character Of C o n s t r u c t i o n Work On felt  first  traversing  the Pass i n 1882,  Rogers himself  had  " e n t i r e l y safe i n r e p o r t i n g a p r a c t i c a b l e l i n e through  range," although he expected and  expensive."  The  48  that the work would be  following  year, a f t e r  Rogers again r e p o r t e d o p t i m i s t i c a l l y : work  "Through the S e l k i r k s  presents no s p e c i a l e n g i n e e r i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s may  be  lineal  feet  on  T u n n e l l i n g was  4 5  the  comparison with 1,800 feet  on  Canyon. Work,"  entire  expected  distance  feet on the  50  In a "Memorandum  prepared  observed  and  for  in  of  February  the 1884,  and  mountain  of rock  being  not to exceed  1,200  a c r o s s the S e l k i r k s , i n  Upper  the Lower K i c k i n g Horse and  the  the Rockies  c o n s i d e r e d moderate, the percentage  unusually s m a l l . "  heavy  f u r t h e r surveys,  i s more u n i f o r m l y d i s t r i b u t e d than through  work  "very  this  Kicking  2,200 feet General  Horse,  1,400  i n the Columbia  Character  of  the C.P.R.'s Chief  the  Engineer  that,  From the east foot of S e l k i r k s to mouth of Eagle Pass:The work may be c o n s i d e r e d moderate f o r mountain work, being l a r g e l y composed of g r a v e l . " 5 1  Again the may very  t h i s c o n t r a s t e d with c o n d i t i o n s i n the Rockies, where, west  slope,  i n the C h i e f Engineer's  be c l a s s e d as g e n e r a l l y heavy, heavy."  52  In  c o n s t r u c t i o n through engineer  who  had  September  with 1884,  e s t i m a t i o n , "The some mere  the S e l k i r k s commenced, located  the  mountain  short  53  before  Reed,  the  s e c t i o n of the Union  P a c i f i c R a i l r o a d , reported t h a t , The l i n e over the S e l k i r k Mountains, a d i s t a n c e of sixty-three miles, i s remarkably easy to c o n s t r u c t , there being comparatively l i t t l e rock excavation, and but one short t u n n e l . The great bulk of the work w i l l be in e a r t h and loose r o c k . 5 4  work  distances  months  S. B.  on  52  b) The  Cost Of  Few  Construction  specific  Selkirks survive. Canada  had  forecasts  construction  costs  In February 1 8 8 4 , the House  5 5  been  of  informed  that  of  million,  an average of $ 4 4 , 7 7 6  5 6  When Reed t r a v e l l e d the route that, the  "between Rocky  at  an  dollars  c o n c l u s i o n was  f o r each of the 2 6 8  August  1884,  he  section  average  cost  ($33,000)  per  of  not  the  mile."  5 7  was  miles.  calculated  the summit of  road  exceeding  of  f o r the  Kamloops  summit of the Gold Range and  Mountains... t h i s  constructed thousand  the  in  the  Commons  the C.P.R.'s estimate  e n t i r e d i s t a n c e from the summit of the Rockies to $12  in  can  thirty  Reed's  be three  glowing  that,  In view of the rugged mountain country, through which the l i n e passes, from Savonna [ s i c ] F e r r y to the summit on the main range of Rocky Mountains, a d i s t a n c e of two hundred and ninety miles...you have an exceedingly cheap l i n e to b u i l d , c o s t i n g f a r l e s s per mile than the mountain work of the Union and Central P a c i f i c roads." " 5  The  more c o n s e r v a t i v e estimates  f o r submission  which the C.P.R.  to the F e d e r a l Government the next month f o r e c a s t  an  average c o s t f o r t h i s same s e c t i o n of some $ 3 7 , 0 0 0  and  the f o r e c a s t c o s t of c o n s t r u c t i o n a c r o s s  actually  slightly  below  this average.  59  that the Big Bend c o u l d have been operated direct  crossing,  would have had Big  Bend  formulated  construction  the  route  S e l k i r k Mountains by  rail.  to 6 0  was  as  cheaply  as  the  c o s t s around the Columbia River  to have represented  than the Rogers Pass  Selkirks  mile,  Even i f i t i s assumed  to have been l e s s than $ 2 0 , 0 0 0  route  per  the  per mile  for  the  a cheaper o v e r a l l s o l u t i o n problem  of  crossing  the  53  c) Time Required  For C o n s t r u c t i o n  In t h e i r o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t with the F e d e r a l Government, the C.P.R. had  been  committed  to  complete  t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l f a c i l i t y w i t h i n ten years,  the  that  entire  i s , by  1891.  Rapid  factor  i n e n a b l i n g t h i s d e a d l i n e to be brought forwards,  May  progress across the p r a i r i e s was d o u b t l e s s a major  l o c a t i o n of  a  direct  route  through  the  Selkirks,  but the and the  o p t i m i s t i c p r o j e c t i o n s of i t s e n g i n e e r i n g  f e a s i b i l i t y , must a l s o  have  the  contributed  to  the  revision  of  target.  C.P.R.'s P r e s i d e n t , S i r George Stephen, reported of  Rogers  Pass  volunteered: Pacific  to  "Expect  Ocean  sooner than  to have the whole  line  by January f i r s t ,  had  revised.  Stephen  "to  complete  their  was  expected  to open d u r i n g 1 8 8 6 . when  the  63  Up t o t h i s  December  and  years  time,  project the  the  the  across  the  scheduled  These e x p e c t a t i o n s were unchanged a a  contract  for  year  financial  Contracting  Company  of the mountain s e c t i o n by December of  the  Lake  Superior  section  by  When t h i s c o n t r a c t lapsed, and the F e d e r a l  intervened  were  at  64  work  that  to be the l a s t completed,, being  C.P.R. concluded  31, 1 8 8 6 .  expectations  mountains  four  Superior  completion  Government again  the e n t i r e  over  to  Lake  62  s t i p u l a t e d completion  1885,  61  Montreal  stated own  a s s i s t a n c e from the North American Railway  31,  from  1887,"  been  mountains" d u r i n g 1 8 8 5 .  which  discovery  the Marquis of L o m e i n September 1882, he  open  C.P.R. expected  later,  the  the c o n t r a c t e d d e a d l i n e . By December 1882, even t h i s  expectation  section  When the  revised. by  May  expense  with  loans  to  the  C.P.R.,  the  The C.P.R. undertook completion of 1886, of  thus  buying  time  time on Lake S u p e r i o r .  i n the 4 5  In May  54  1884,  Van Home c o n f i d e d to Major Rogers, "(W)e hope  men on c o n s t r u c t i o n from the East w i l l of  the Columbia  year..." '  and  possibly  reach the second c r o s s i n g  Eagle  only s l i g h t l y tempered t h i s c o n f i d e n c e . assured  difficulty this  the  pass by the end of t h i s  Slow progress down the western slope of the R o c k i e s  6  Home  that  the D i r e c t o r s ,  i n completing  "I  In September  think  there  6 7  1884, Van will  be no  the mountain s e c t i o n w i t h i n a year  from  date..  d) Operating  Methods And T r a f f i c  Forecasts  As the above a n a l y s i s d e m o n s t r a t e d , when  Rogers  Pass  was  discovered  69  that  the C.P.R. was  aware  whether the main l i n e  followed the B i g Bend or t r a v e r s e d the Pass, a pusher  operation  would be r e q u i r e d f o r e i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e . S e v e r a l arguments were advanced i n favour of the pusher o p e r a t i o n over Rogers Pass. The pusher  gradients  either  side  utilisation "represented depot  would  of  the S e l k i r k  of  the pusher  summit, fleet.  as being admirably  for marshalling  distance  be concentrated  of  about  permitting  The  summit  intensive itself  adapted f o r the l o c a t i o n  trains,  three  70  w i t h i n twenty miles on  being  quarters  of  practically a  mile."  of a  level  7 1  was  for a  Moreover,  " c o n s i d e r i n g the f a c t that the heavy grades i n the S e l k i r k Range are  embraced  within  a  comparatively  short  distance,  disadvantage  i s very l i t t l e as compared with the great  in  distance."  through  7 2  Less  their savings  pusher c a p a c i t y would be wasted  over Rogers Pass than on the l i g h t e r pusher g r a d i e n t s around the Big B e n d . expected  73  Finally,  to  be  s i n c e the only other  f o r twenty  miles  on  pusher  gradient  was  the west slope of the  55  Rockies,  the pusher g r a d i e n t s  7 4  i n the S e l k i r k s complemented the  g r a d i e n t system of the e n t i r e t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l r a i l w a y , a system which compared favourably Pacific for  with those  Railways, the standards  of the C e n t r a l  and  of which had provided  Union  the model  the C.P.R.  75  It  i s likely  that these arguments alone would have s u f f i c e d  to persuade both the C.P.R. D i r e c t o r s and the F e d e r a l Government that  the pusher  detrimental B.C.,  operation  over  Rogers  t o the movement of t r a f f i c  Pass  would  through the mountains of  but r a t h e r , i n c o n j u n c t i o n with the saving  would be a s t r e n g t h of the southern in favour  first  was  that t r a f f i c  mountains would be l i g h t Therefore,  a small f l e e t  handle the b u s i n e s s . "three,  "for a  in  by the C.P.R.  requiring transit  number  of  years  of pusher locomotives  In the Rockies,  Van  through the to  t o be done...,"  the case of passenger  trains  77  Home  and expressed double  come."  76  would s u f f i c e t o forecast  or a t most f o u r , t r a i n s each way per day w i l l  the business  distance,  route. Two f u r t h e r arguments  of the pusher o p e r a t i o n were presented  The  not be  carry a l l  the b e l i e f  locomotive  that  "that i n  service  will  seldom be r e q u i r e d ; o r d i n a r i l y the s u b s t i t u t i o n of a heavy f o r a light  locomotive  traffic timber Home. as  answer the p u r p o s e . "  volume appear i n t e r n a l l y and mineral 80  was  The  resources  Nevertheless, carried  78  The f o r e c a s t s of  i n c o n s i s t e n t with the boasts of  vaunted by both S t e p h e n  79  Van Home was c o n f i d e n t that such  through  the mountains  would  and Van traffic  be  carried  second argument was "that the preponderance of  through  profitably.  traffic  will  8 1  a c r o s s the c o n t i n e n t  (would be) l a r g e l y west bound, and  56  I  that the two heavy g r a d i e n t s r i s i n g eastward might t h e r e f o r e still  heavier  without  material disadvantage."  82  This  forecast  f l a t l y c o n t r a d i c t e d those generated by members of the B.C. of  Trade, which emphasised  the  argument  pusher  does  eastbound flows from B.C.  highlight  gradients  over  C.P.R. t r a n s c o n t i n e n t a l  Selkirks.  "system,"  was p r e f e r a b l e , s i n c e t h i s was  trains  conveying  traffic  On  the  while  longer  Selkirk  total  Thus,  8 4  joint  length,  a  trains  of  the.traffic  cost  of  the  approximately  p e r f e c t balance of flows would be o p t i m a l , i n  order to ensure even u t i l i s a t i o n of  the  Mountains themselves, however,  s i n c e the pusher g r a d i e n t s were expected to be of equal  and  revenue, c o u l d be hauled a g a i n s t  imbalance would a c t u a l l y reduce the Within  entire  revenue t r a f f i c ,  two adverse eastbound r u l i n g g r a d i e n t s .  operation.  the  would have to be t a i l o r e d to  ruling gradient,  empties, g e n e r a t i n g zero d i r e c t the  However,  83  a westbound preponderance of  traffic  only one r e s t r i c t i v e  Board  the "system" i m p l i c a t i o n s of the  the  revenue  be  of motive power on e i t h e r  side  the summit. An imbalance i n favour of e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n  would  be e q u a l l y c o s t l y , but the a c t u a l would be i r r e l e v a n t  direction  of  the  imbalance  to the economics of the pusher o p e r a t i o n .  e) Snowslide P r o t e c t i o n The  C.P.R. had  long  been  aware  of  p o t e n t i a l avalanche  problems  i n c r o s s i n g the S e l k i r k s d i r e c t l y .  Rogers'  recommendation  i n c r e a s e d from 105.6  that  gradients  feet per m i l e to 116  order to a v o i d some p o i n t s where dangerous feared." ' 8  This  recommendation  8 5  They had  accepted  through Rogers Pass be feet  per  mile,  "in  snow s l i d e s are to be  had been r e l a t i v e l y  "cheap" to  57  implement, slides  but  87  were  increase  f u r t h e r gradient  impracticable,  in the  increases  since  r u l i n g gradient  of the  their  o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t , which had  of 2.2  per  cent, compensated.  avalanches  does  not  construction  time.  8 8  avoided, the C.P.R. intended sheds.  When  Rogers  had  to  would e n t a i l a c o s t l y and  breach  s t i p u l a t e d maximum  to  have  in been  As  8 5  late  as  to p r o t e c t  to  the main l i n e with  traversed  1884,  5 0  distance He  be r e q u i r e d  making  Rocky  twelve  f i f t y miles road."  $1,731,000  in  5 1  of these are  Thirty-two  the  1860's.  miles 52  snowsheds  in  but  of  these  In March 1885, for  the  probably  pointed  sheds  the had  the C.P.R. construction  53  t h e i r sheds f o r the same cost as  out  on  the m o u n t a i n s : i f they were expecting  able to c o n s t r u c t  the  fifteen  in s u c c e s s f u l use  estimated that $450,000 would be r e q u i r e d  snowsheds  but  on which these occur does not exceed  f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the t r a c k , "  Central P a c i f i c  P a c i f i c had  Mountains,  admitted t h a t , "A number of snowsheds w i l l  "nearly  miles  or  near Roger's [ s i c ] Pass, i n the S e l k i r k Range, a l s o near  aggregate  of  expected  seen  summit of the main range of the  Reed,  felt  "evidences of snow s l i d e s were  the  cost  snow  the Pass, he had be  be  same  and  that  at  the  at  miles."  avoid  considered  i n which d i f f i c u l t i e s may  August  c r o s s i n g , would report that  of  gradients  order  in c r o s s i n g the S e l k i r k Range w i l l be reduced to ten miles."  avoid  where avalanche paths c o u l d not  first  "assured that the d i s t a n c e  order  system,  Tunnelling  appear  Instead,  they  in  the  to  be  Central  i n c u r r e d , they c o u l d expect to completely cover with at  least  identified  eight  miles  of those f i f t e e n  troublesome  i n the mountains.  This d e t a i l e d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n of  the  specific  expectations  58  which  the  C.P.R.  harboured  for  construction  and o p e r a t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s over Rogers Pass p r i o r to the a c t u a l commencement work  in  the S e l k i r k s r e v e a l s the p a r t i c u l a r grounds upon which  r e s t e d the Company's s a t i s f a c t i o n Rogers  Pass  operations  and over  their the  i n s e c u r i n g a l o c a t i o n through  confidence  Adoption  of  completion of the rapid  in  contemplating  the  less costly  than  entire  subsequent  operation  transcontinental  improvements  over the S e l k i r k  system of the  entire  alternative  Rogers Pass route would enable e a r l y facility,  g e n e r a t i o n of revenues from through t r a f f i c  support  future  S e l k i r k s . C o n s t r u c t i o n was expected to be  r e l a t i v e l y easy and s i g n i f i c a n t l y routes.  of  to  the  and  the  with which to  line.  The  pusher  summit would complement the gradient  transcontinental  facility,  and  it  was  expected that the avalanche problem, which d i d not appear unduly burdensome  when  set  against  conditions  e x p e r i e n c e d by  r a i l w a y s , would be e f f e c t i v e l y e l i m i n a t e d by  a  modest  rival  capital  o u t l a y at c o n s t r u c t i o n time. The  r e s u l t s of t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e i n f o r c e the c o n c l u s i o n  reached i n the second s e c t i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r , that Pass  route  appeared  merely expedient Selkirk  Mountains  Rogers  to o f f e r a p o s i t i v e l y sound r a t h e r than a  solution by  the  to  rail.  The  problem  of  C.P.R. had  been prepared to  operating  savings i n the f u t u r e . Yet not only d i d the o p e r a t i n g  operating "immediate" order  to  appear  likely  in  the  heavy  Pass  investment  breaching  undertake  c o s t s over Rogers  "immediate"  the  to  order  be  far  to  obtain  less  than  c o s t s around the B i g Bend, but i t seemed that a heavy investment of c a p i t a l  would  not  be  necessary  in  o b t a i n the s a v i n g s i n o p e r a t i n g c o s t s . Thus, although  59  the  C.P.R. had  construction  been  costs  prepared and  to  operating  make costs,  would not i n p r a c t i c e have to make such Rogers  a  trade-off  between  i t seemed that they  a  trade-off,  for  Pass route represented the l e a s t - c a p i t a l - c o s t and  operating-cost Moreover,  the  least-  solution. the d e c i s i o n to adopt Rogers Pass  in preference  to the Big Bend was much l e s s c o n t r o v e r s i a l than the d e c i s i o n to adopt the K i c k i n g Horse Pass i n favour of the Howse Pass through the  Rockies. The engineers Fleming, Hogg, Rogers and James Ross  were each independently d i s p a t c h e d through various  attempts  to  establish  the  the  Howse  Pass  feasibility  of  a l t e r n a t i v e . I t was not u n t i l November 1883, a f t e r the had  a l r e a d y advanced  that  railhead  f a r to the west of C a l g a r y , and a f t e r  even  more surveys through Howse Pass had been undertaken, that the  manager  feeling best  of  construction  through  the  Ross,  i n the mountains, would admit to  " q u i t e s a t i s f i e d that we have secured beyond  line  in  Mountains."'  4  The  doubt  the  wrangling with the  M i n i s t r y of Railways and Canals which accompanied  the submission  of the C.P.R.'s l o c a t i o n p l a n s f o r  slope  Rockies'  5  the  and the Kamloops Lake s e c t i o n s '  western 6  of  the  was completely absent  from the submission of the p r o f i l e s of the alignment over Rogers Pass.  These  latter  plans  were approved and returned  q u i c k l y and without q u e s t i o n d u r i n g the ample  time  for  the  S e l k i r k s the f o l l o w i n g  commencement spring.  autumn  of  quietly,  1884,  57  in  of c o n s t r u c t i o n through the  60  FOOTNOTES  G. C. Cunningham, "Snow S l i d e s i n the S e l k i r k Mountains," T r a n s a c t i o n s of the Canadian S o c i e t y of C i v i l E n g i n e e r s , V o l . I, Part I I , October-December 1887, p. 18. 1  2  I b i d . , pp. 18-19.  3  See above, pp. 17-18.  * For a graphic d e s c r i p t i o n of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of p e n e t r a t i n g the S e l k i r k s on f o o t , see, S. Fleming, England and Canada. A Summer Tour between Old and New Westminster, with H i s t o r i c a l Notes, M o n t r e a l , Dawson Brothers, 1884, pp. 271-94. In three full days of marching, Fleming's p a r t y managed b a r e l y ten m i l e s through the S e l k i r k s . 5  Cunningham, op. c i t . , p. 19.  * Ibid. 7  Ibid.  W. S. Vaux, J r . , "The Canadian P a c i f i c Railway from Laggan to Revelstoke, B.C.," R e p r i n t e d from the Proceedings of the Engineers' Club of P h i l a d e l p h i a , V o l . XVII, No. 2, May 1900, p. 72. 8  5  Cunningham, op. c i t . , pp. 19-20.  A. C. Dennis, " C o n s t r u c t i o n Methods f o r Rogers Pass Tunnel," Proceedings of the American S o c i e t y of C i v i l Engineers, V o l . X L I I I , No. 1, January 1917, p. 6. 1 0  T. C. Keefer, "The Canadian Pacific Railway," Transact ions of the American Soc i e t y of C i v i l Engineers, V o l . XIX, No. 394, June 1888, pp. 83-84. 1 1  1 2  Cunningham, op. c i t . , p. 20.  1 3  I b i d . , pp. 20-24.  1 4  I b i d . , p. 24.  For an a n a l y s i s of the frequency and mass of avalanches on major avalanche paths i n the S e l k i r k Mountains from 1909 to 1979, see, B. B. F i t z h a r r i s and P. A. Schaerer, The Frequency of Major Avalanche Winters, Ottawa, N a t i o n a l Research C o u n c i l Of Canada, D i v i s i o n of B u i l d i n g Research, June 1979. Cunningham himself recorded one snow s l i d e standing f o r t y feet deep on the roof of a C.P.R. snow shed. Cunningham, op. c i t . , p. 30. 1 5  1 6  M.  F o r an account of snow problems i n the S i e r r a Nevada, see, G. Best, Snowplow: Clearing Mountain Ra i 1 s , Berkeley,  61  California, Howell-North op.cit.,p.25.  Books,  1966.  See  also  Cunningham,  See, f o r example, W. Kaye Lamb, The H i s t o r y of the Canadian Pacific Railway, Toronto, Macmillan, 1977, pp. 79-81; J . H. E. Secretan, Canada's Great Highway: From the F i r s t Stake to the Last Spike, London, John Lane, 1924, pp. 247-8; C. A. Shaw, op. c i t . , pp. 10-11; R. G. MacBeth, The Romance of the Canadian Pacific Railway, Toronto, The Ryerson P r e s s , 1924, p. 85; N. Thompson and J . H. Edgar, Canadian R a i l r o a d Development from the E a r l i e s t Times, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1933, p. 138; M. Sprague, The Great Gates; the s t o r y of the Rocky Mountain passes, Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1964, p. 293; G. P. de T. Glazebrook, A H i s t o r y of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n Canada, Toronto, The Ryerson P r e s s , 1938, p. 275; A. J . Johnson, "The Canadian Pacific Railway and British Columbia, 1871-1886," MA T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1936, pp. 151-155. 1 7  E. E. Pugsley, The Great K i c k i n g 1973, pp. v - v i . 1 8  Horse  Blunder,  Vancouver,  A C.P.R. engineer i n the west would r e c a l l the day t h a t , "Van Home sent f o r me, and announced i n a most a u t o c r a t i c manner that he wanted "The s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e commercial line" between Winnipeg and Vancouver..." Secretan, op. c i t . , p. 99. 1 5  "...the Canadian Pacific Railway company propose to c a r r y t h e i r r a i l w a y f a r to the South of Edmonton i f a p r a c t i c a b l e l i n e can be found by the K i c k i n g Horse Pass that will shorten the distance very c o n s i d e r a b l y and thereby reduce the cost of o p e r a t i n g i t . " Marcus Smith to Collingwood S c h r e i b e r , Chief Engineer of the C.P.R., A p r i l 10, 1882, Department of Railways and Canals, Railway Branch, Central Registry Files, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, (henceforth "PAC"). RG 43 A 2 (a) 6710 V o l . 223. 2 0  "The importance of the great saving i n d i s t a n c e by t h i s line cannot be o v e r e s t i m a t e d . I t a f f o r d s a l i n e a c r o s s the c o n t i n e n t m a t e r i a l l y s h o r t e r than that from New York to San Francisco by way of the Union and C e n t r a l P a c i f i c Railways, and p l a c e s beyond a doubt the a b i l i t y of t h i s Company to compete s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r the t r a n s - c o n t i n e n t a l f r e i g h t and passenger t r a f f i c . " Charles Drinkwater, C.P.R. Co.' S e c r e t a r y , to S i r C h a r l e s Tupper, M i n i s t e r of Railways and Canals, February 21, 1883, Dominion Sessional Papers, Ottawa, (henceforth "DSP,") V o l . XVI, 1883, 27e p. 173. 2 1  "'Major Rogers reports that there i s no q u e s t i o n about feasibility of good l i n e with easy grades through K i c k i n g Horse Pass although work w i l l be very expensive.'" Van Home, Telegram to Drinkwater, c i t e d by Tupper, O f f i c i a l Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, Ottawa, T h e n c e f o r t h "HoC D e b a t e s , " T ~ A p r i l 17, 1882, p. 953. 2 2  2 3  W. Vaughan, op. c i t . , p. 80.  62  S i r Thomas Shaughnessy t o R. Douglas, S e c r e t a r y , Geographic Board, Ottawa, March 23, 1921, Department of Railways and Canals, Railway Branch, C e n t r a l R e g i s t r y F i l e s , PAC. RG 43 A 2 (a) 6710 V o l . 223. In the same l e t t e r , Shaughnessy a v e r r e d that "the first D i r e c t o r s and the E x e c u t i v e of the Canadian P a c i f i c considered the route v i a the Yellowhead Pass too f a r t o the North and i n v o l v i n g u n d e s i r a b l e l e n g t h of l i n e . " See a l s o , J . L. McDougall, Canadian P a c i f i c : A B r i e f H i s t o r y , Montreal, M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968, p. 69; Shaw, op. c i t . , p. 11; Sprague, op. c i t . , p. 296. 2 4  2 5  Van Home t o Tupper, DSP, V o l . XVI, 1883, 27 1 p. 7.  2 6  Ibid.  2? "The r i v e r has i t s canons [ s i c ] , and i n p l a c e s washes the base of the mountains, so that heavy work and p o s s i b l y some tunnelling would have been encountered on the longer route." Keefer, op. c i t . , p. 75. Vaux, op. c i t . , p. 73, goes so f a r as to c l a i m that i t was "the c o s t of t u n n e l l i n g and b r i d g i n g " alone which persuaded the C.P.R. t o seek a d i r e c t route across the S e l k i r k s . P u b l i s h e d evidence does not support this view. See, Van Home t o Tupper, op. c i t . 2 8 "'The worst that can happen i n case of f a i l u r e t o c r o s s S e l k i r k i s , that the l i n e may be f o r c e d round the great bend of the Columbia, which would c o n s i d e r a b l y increase d i s t a n c e . . . " Van Home, Telegram t o Drinkwater, op. c i t . Van Home estimated the d i s t a n c e around the B i g Bend at 140 m i l e s , and the d i s t a n c e by the d i r e c t c r o s s i n g over Rogers Pass at 63 m i l e s , y i e l d i n g a saving i n d i s t a n c e v i a the l a t t e r of 77 m i l e s . Van Home t o Tupper, op. c i t . , p. 7. Howard Palmer estimated the d i s t a n c e around the B i g Bend a t 150 m i l e s , and, using the estimate of 63 miles over Rogers Pass, obtained an estimate f o r the savings v i a the d i r e c t route of 87 m i l e s . Palmer a l s o estimated that the d i s t a n c e from Winnipeg t o Kamloops v i a Edmonton, the Yellowhead Pass and the Albreda Pass was 1,346 m i l e s , a g a i n s t an estimate of 1,224 m i l e s v i a Calgary, the K i c k i n g Horse Pass, Rogers Pass and Revelstoke, yielding a saving f o r the s o u t h e r l y route of 122 miles i f Rogers Pass were adopted, and of 35 miles i f the B i g Bend were f o l l o w e d . H. Palmer, " E a r l y E x p l o r a t i o n s f o r the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway," B u l l e t i n of the Geographical Soc i e t y of P h i l a d e l p h i a , V o l . XVI, No. 3, J u l y 1918, p. 78. 2 9  30  3 1  See note (22) . Van Home, Telegram to Drinkwater, op. c i t .  W. Moberly, "The I n t r o d u c t o r y Chapter i n the H i s t o r y of the Canadian Pacific Railway," Moberly Papers, Vancouver City A r c h i v e s , ( h e n c e f o r t h "VCA,") p. D915. 3 2  I b i d . Moberly himself proposed for the f o l l o w i n g year, "A t r i a l survey a c r o s s the S e l k i r k Range by the v a l l e y s of the Gold 3 3  63  River and Gold Creek, t o a s c e r t a i n what l e n g t h of t u n n e l l i n g would be r e q u i r e d to connect those v a l l e y s . " ' N. Robinson, B l a z i n g the T r a i l Through the Rockies: The Story of Walter Moberly, Vancouver, News - A d v e r t i s e r , p r i n t e r s , 1913, p. 75. '"The c r o s s i n g of the S e l k i r k Range i s the only t h i n g i n doubt, but e x p l o r a t i o n s have progressed s u f f i c i e n t l y t o j u s t i f y belief that they can be c r o s s e d by use of some long t u n n e l s . ' " Van Home, Telegram t o Drinkwater, op. c i t . 3 4  35  I b i d . See note  (28) .  Drinkwater t o Tupper, September 1883, 27, p. 25. 3 6  3 7  15,  1882, DSP,  Vol.  XVI,  Ibid.  Stephen t o J . H. Pope, A c t i n g M i n i s t e r of Railways and Canals, September 29, 1882, DSP, V o l . XVI, 1883, 27e, p. 168. 3 8  3 9  4 0  Ibid. Drinkwater t o Tupper, September 15, 1882, op. c i t .  Rogers, Engineer, Mountain D i v i s i o n , to Van 10, 1883, DSP, V o l . XVI, 1883, 27e, p. 171. 4 1  Home,  January  Van Home t o Tupper, A p r i l 18, 1883, DSP, V o l . XVI, 1883, 27 1, p. 6. The C.P.R. would use t h i s reasoning t o defend an even more d r a s t i c upward revision on the western slope of the Rockies, from n i n e t y feet per m i l e t o 116 f e e t . I b i d . , pp. 6-7. 4 2  4 3  I b i d . , p. 7.  4 4  See notes (20) and (21).  Stephen, Telegram to Marquis of Lome, September 1882, quoted in Pugsley, op. c i t . , p. v i . 4 5  As Howay, and p a r t i c u l a r l y Pugsley, maintain that i t was. See F. W. Howay, B r i t i s h Columbia From the E a r l i e s t Times t o the Present, V o l . I I , Vancouver, S. J . C l a r k e Co., 1914, p. 424; Pugsley, op. c i t . , p. 11. 4 4  See, f o r example, Drinkwater t o Tupper, op. c i t . 4 7  4 8  February  21, 1883,  Rogers t o Van Home, op. c i t .  Rogers t o Van Home, November 20, 1883, DSP, V o l . XVII, 1884, 31f, p. 40. 4 9  5 0  Ibid.  "Memorandum of the General Character of the Work, Prepared from the Last Information a t Command," S c h r e i b e r , February 1, 5 1  64  1884, 5 2  DSP, V o l . XVII, 1884, 31f, p. 43.  Ibid.  The r a i l h e a d c r o s s e d the Columbia i n October 1884, and reached Beavermouth i n November. Lamb, op. c i t . , p. 119. 5 3  Reed t o Van Home, September 9, 1884, DSP, V o l . XVIII, 25n, p. 5. 5 4  1885,  As l a t e as February 1884, one member of the House of Commons would complain that no c o s t estimates had been submitted f o r any of the work west of the summit of the Rockies. HoC Debates, February 18, 1884, p. 359. 5 5  5 6  I b i d . , p. 458.  5 7  Reed t o Van Home, op. c i t . ,  5 8  p. 5.  Ibid.  $36,927.08 per mile f o r the e n t i r e s e c t i o n , compared with $36,557.38 per mile a c r o s s the S e l k i r k s . The former average i s calculated from an estimate of $10,635,000 f o r the 288 miles from the summit of the Rocky Mountains t o Savona's F e r r y . T h i s estimate i s contained i n " S c h r e i b e r ' s Estimate, Summit of Rocky Mountains t o Middle of Eagle Pass," e n c l o s e d with, Ross to Van Home, October 7, 1884, "Van Home L e t t e r b o o k s , " V o l . 7, p. 928. The latter average, from the same source, i s based on an estimate f o r the t o t a l c o s t of c o n s t r u c t i o n between M i l e s 1,039 and 1,100, west of Winnipeg, of $2,230,000. Ross presumed that these estimates were "intended t o be e n t i r e l y s a f e . " I b i d . , p. 927. 5 9  The estimates per m i l e f o r each s e c t i o n may be c a l c u l a t e d from S c h r e i b e r , op. c i t . , as f o l l o w s : - M i l e 963 (summit of Rockies) - 966, $26,250; 967 - 975, $155,555.56; 976 - 1,024, $37,755; 1,025 - 1,038 (the c r o s s i n g of the Beaver R i v e r , the point a t which the r a i l l i n e d i v e r g e d from the Columbia R i v e r ) , $60,714.28; 1,039 - 1,057 (summit of Rogers Pass a t 1,054), $35,789.47; 1,058 1,072, $36,666.66; . 1,073 - 1,100 (Revelstoke, the p o i n t a t which the Columbia River was rejoined), $35,714.24. I b i d . These estimates correspond e x a c t l y with those contained i n "Progress Estimate No. 56, C e n t r a l Section, E a s t e r n D i v i s i o n , " November 4, 1884, DSP, V o l . XVIII, 1885, 25a, p. 90, except f o r the estimate of the c o s t of the section between M i l e s 967 and 975. In the Dominion S e s s i o n a l Papers, the estimate f o r the t o t a l c o s t i s given as $400,000, yielding an average c o s t per mile of $44,444.44. S c h r e i b e r ' s estimate f o r the t o t a l c o s t of the nine-mile section i s quite distinctly s t a t e d as $1,400,000, y i e l d i n g an average cost per mile of $155,555.56. This c a p i t a l cost i n c l u d e s an estimate of $450,000 f o r snowsheds on the d i r e c t c r o s s i n g . See note 93. The c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d on the B i g Bend route would have had to have been less 6 0  65  than $2,680,000 ( i . e. $2,230,000 + $450,000). I f the d i s t a n c e around the B i g Bend were 140 m i l e s , the cost per m i l e would have had t o have been l e s s than $19,142.86. I f the d i s t a n c e were 150 miles, the c o s t would, have had t o have been less than $17,866.67. These r a t e s would have been unprecedented f o r mountain r a i l w a y c o n s t r u c t i o n .to m a i n - l i n e standards. 6 1  Stephen t o L o m e , op. c i t .  "Official Memorandum Respecting the P o s i t i o n and Prospects of the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway," S i r George Stephen, December 12, 1882, DSP, V o l . XVI, 1883, 27n, p. 5. 6 2  Ibid.  6 3  6 4  DSP, V o l . XVII, 1884, 31g, pp. 52-53.  6 5  DSP, V o l . XVII, 1884, 31z, pp. 250-54.  6 6  Vol.  Van Home t o Rogers, May 23, 1884, "Van Home L e t t e r b o o k s , " 6, p. 251.  6 7  0. S. A. L a v a l l e e , op. c i t . , p. 174.  6 8  Van Home t o C.P.R. D i r e c t o r s , DSP, V o l . XVIII, 1885, 25n, p.  2. 6  ' See above, p. 44.  TO n — distance which, as everyone familiar with railway management knows, i s extremely convenient f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of a pilot engine." Tupper, HoC Debates, May 4, 1883, p. 960. See a l s o , Drinkwater t o Tupper, September 15, 1882, op. c i t . , and, Rogers to Van Home, January 10, 1883, op. c i t . a  7 1  Drinkwater t o Tupper, September 15, 1882, op. c i t .  7 2  Stephen t o Pope, op. c i t . See note ( 4 2 ) .  7 4  Van Home t o Tupper, op. c i t . , p. 8.  T S "<rhe h e a v i e r g r a d i e n t s , which w i l l i n no case exceed those of the Central Pacific Railway, w i l l be c o n f i n e d t o the mountain s e c t i o n , and w i t h i n a space of 150 m i l e s . " I t i s a l s o t o be noted that the e n t i r e mountain s e c t i o n i s embraced w i t h i n a d i s t a n c e of l e s s than 550 m i l e s from the Pacific coast, while that of the C e n t r a l and Union P a c i f i c Railways covers about 1,250 m i l e s and l i e s a t a much greater e l e v a t i o n . " " O f f i c i a l Memorandum," by Stephen, op. c i t . 7 6  for on  The phrase i s Van Home's, used i n d e s c r i b i n g the adequacy t r a f f i c purposes of the "temporary" 4.5 per c e n t , g r a d i e n t the western slope of the R o c k i e s . Van Home t o M i n i s t e r of  66  Railways and Canals, May 19, 1884, DSP, V o l . XVIII, p. 10. 7 7  7 8  7 5  8 0  1885, 25a,  I b i d . , p. 11. Van Hofne t o Tupper, op. c i t . ,  p. 7.  " O f f i c i a l Memorandum," by Stephen,  op. c i t . ,  Van Home t o C.P.R. D i r e c t o r s , op. c i t . ,  p. 9.  p. 2.  "I do not h e s i t a t e t o say...that every part of the l i n e , Montreal t o the P a c i f i c , w i l l pay." I b i d . , p. 3. 8 1  8 2  Van Home t o Tupper, op. c i t . ,  from  p. 8.  "I have shown that a l a r g e amount of ore or base metal w i l l be shipped from the Kootenay mines over the C.P.R....It w i l l be a v a l u a b l e trade f o r that r a i l w a y , as the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n w i l l be westwardly, while the bulk of t h e i r other f r e i g h t w i l l be i n a c o n t r a r y d i r e c t i o n . " G. B. Wright t o J . H. Pope, June 11, 1883, B r i t i s h Columbia Board of Trade, Annual Reports, V i c t o r i a , 188283, p. 31. 8 3  "With the f a s t - a p p r o a c h i n g completion of the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway, whereby d i r e c t and speedy transport eastward will be secured, the f o o d - f i s h trade of t h i s Province must r e c e i v e a notable impulse. . .A l a r g e demand w i l l necessarily arise throughout the l i n e of the r a i l w a y , where settlement has been e s t a b l i s h e d , and i n Manitoba; and eastward again of the last named l o c a l i t y , i n . O n t a r i o and elsewhere, i t i s probable t h a t , d u r i n g the winter season, some of our s e a - f i s h e s may prove abundantly a t t r a c t i v e , and f i n d a ready and l u c r a t i v e market." op. c i t . , 1883-84, pp. 96-97. 8 4  Van Home t o Tupper, op. c i t . ,  pp. 7-8.  Moberly cited "avalanches of snow and rock" as a p r i n c i p a l reason f o r eschewing d i r e c t c r o s s i n g of the S e l k i r k s . Moberly Papers, op. c i t . , p. D910. He h i m s e l f r e c a l l e d running f o r h i s l i f e , c l a d i n snowshoes, to a v o i d interment i n a snow slide. I b i d . , p. D916. See a l s o Fleming, op. c i t . , pp. 264-65. 8 5  8  87  * Rogers t o Van Home, January See note  10, 1883, op. c i t .  (42) .  See below, pp. 70-72. "Memorandum by Mr. S m e l l i e , Engineer i n C h i e f a t Company headquarters, Montreal, dated A p r i l 15, 1882," c i t e d by Tupper, HoC Debates, A p r i l 17, 1882, p. 954. 9 0  9 1  Reed to Van Home, op. c i t . , Ibid.  p. 6.  67  Report of Commission P a c i f i c R a i l r o a d s , October 23o, p. 119. 5 2  9 3  DSP,  f o r e x a m i n a t i o n o f U n i o n and C e n t r a l 30, 1869, DSP, V o l . XIV, 1880-81,  Stephen t o M i n i s t e r of R a i l w a y s V o l . X V I I I , 1885, 2 5 c c , p. 6.  Ross t o Van H o m e , November 3 1 f , p . 41. 9 4  9 5  See, f o r example, DSP,  9 6  DSP, 9 7  and C a n a l s , M a r c h 18,  23, 1883, DSP,  V o l . XVIII,  1885,  Vol.  25a, pp.  XVII,  V o l . X V I I I , 1885,  25a, pp.  18-22.  1884,  10-16.  See, f o r example, S c h r e i b e r t o B r a d l e y , November V o l . X V I I I , 1885, 25a, p. 32.  DSP,  1885,  13,  1884,  68  CHAPTER 4  REALITIES The C.P.R. Management: "This i s the climax of mountain  scenery."  1  The C.P.R. Customer: " I t i s not too much to say that the Canadian Pacific passage through the mountains i s the g r e a t e s t sermon ever presented to man on the D i v i n e Majesty. The a r t i s t i s i n s p i r e d , the l o v e r of nature s a t i a t e d . " 2  The C.P.R. Employee: "In the winter i t was snow was snowslides, washouts and known t o r a i l r o a d i n g , and i n Just one c o n t i n u a l round that s o r t . "  and f r o s t . In the s p r i n g i t every other s o r t of t r o u b l e the summer i t was fires. of p l e a s u r e — i f one l i k e d  3  The d e t a i l e d e x p e c t a t i o n s of the C.P.R. f o r the Rogers Pass route having been analysed i n the p r e v i o u s chapter, the of  this  chapter  encountered  i s to  examine  i n Rogers Pass, that  the  i s , the  realities actual  purpose  which  were  c o n d i t i o n s of  both c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n which p r e v a i l e d along the r o u t e . Such  an  examination  i s necessary t o a s c e r t a i n the e x i s t e n c e of  gaps between e x p e c t a t i o n s and r e a l i t i e s . Once the  existence  any  o b j e c t i v e s of  gaps  has  been  established,  remedial measures undertaken may  be  more  clearly  the  specific  by the C.P.R. to c l o s e  understood,  and  the  these  success  of  gaps  of those  measures may be more r e a d i l y e v a l u a t e d . S e v e r a l compelling n a r r a t i v e accounts have been w r i t t e n the r e a l i t i e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n through the S e l k i r k s . the  methods  Rogers Pass  4  Evidence of  by which r a i l w a y o p e r a t i o n s were conducted i s , however, more fragmented.  In order  of  to  through preserve  the a n a l y t i c a l c h a r a c t e r of the present study, and to f a c i l i t a t e the  identification  of gaps between e x p e c t a t i o n s and r e a l i t i e s ,  69  the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of r e a l i t i e s in  structure  undertaken same  to  the  i n t h i s chapter w i l l  investigation  i n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of  five  be  similar  of e x p e c t a t i o n s which  the  previous  was  chapter.  The  areas of c o n s t r u c t i o n a l and o p e r a t i o n a l concern  will  be e x p l o r e d . In the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of o p e r a t i n g r e a l i t i e s , will  be  adopted  extended  to  i n c l u d e examination  the  analysis  of remedial measures  by the C.P.R., f o r i t i s recognized t h a t , by t h e i r  nature,  "operating  c h a r a c t e r . They may technological  or  realities" change  with  managerial  are  not  each  static  traffic  i n n o v a t i o n , and  but dynamic i n movement,  is  therefore  conclude  each  i t i s management's  u n r e m i t t i n g task to seek to narrow those gaps between e x p e c t a t i o n s and  very  operating  o p e r a t i n g r e a l i t i e s as f a r as they are a b l e . I t  appropriate  that  Part  I  of t h i s t h e s i s should  i n t h i s chapter with some c o n s i d e r a t i o n of  the  extent  to which those gaps were narrowed by C.P.R. management i n Rogers Pass.  a) The Character Of C o n s t r u c t i o n Work Construction  work  in  the S e l k i r k s was  dominated by three  c o n s t r a i n t s , those  imposed by snowslides, f i n a n c i a l pressure  time p r e s s u r e . The  nature of  closely  below.  impact  examined  5  these  constraints  will  be  T h i s s e c t i o n w i l l concentrate on  which these c o n s t r a i n t s had upon the alignment  which  and more the was  a c t u a l l y followed. In  order  to  secure cheap and  over the summit which c o u l d developed,  be  made  r a p i d completion safe  later,  the C o n s t r u c t i o n Manager, James Ross, had  of a route as  traffic  intended to  70  undertake be  "temporary  thrown  slope of  further the  successfully.  work i n the way  i n t o the h i l l s i d e s a f t e r w a r d s . "  Selkirks,  this  approach  could  On the east  6  be  implemented  However, Ross was q u i c k l y f o r c e d to concede  7  the avalanche problem had been that  of b u i l d i n g a l i n e that can  relocation  would  be  seriously  required  underestimated,  on  that and  8  the west slope i n the  i n t e r e s t s of s a f e t y . ' The alignment i n i t i a l l y the  west  slope  on  across  Cheops.  II.)  map  the  path." used  sun,  to  south-facing  bluffs  an  Mount  exposed  almost continuous avalanche  "temporary  work (which) c o u l d  take 8,350 feet of  shedding  11  and  be Ross about  f e e t of t u n n e l l i n g to operate the l i n e with any s a f e t y over 1 2  The  previous  year,  in  order to a v o i d the  c a p i t a l c o s t and delay of b u i l d i n g a 1,400-foot west  slope  of  the  Rockies,  the  permission of the F e d e r a l Government to with  contract. shortage revenue time  River,  of  d i s c o v e r e d that these bluff's,  literally  " i t will  these... s l i d e s . "  line  descended  work i n t o the permanent l i n e " proved u n t e n a b l e .  estimated that 1400  "were  the  The p l a n to undertake  1 0  had  From o b s e r v a t i o n s conducted d u r i n g the  winter of 1884-85, i t was to  Rogers  the north bank of the I l l e c i l l e w a e t  that i s , d i r e c t l y (See  proposed by  gradients  of  double  of  construct  on  the  obtained  the  a  temporary  maximum p e r m i t t e d i n i t s more  drastic  c a p i t a l and an even more p r e s s i n g need to generate  from through t r a f f i c ,  of shedding  C.P.R. had  A year l a t e r , c o n f r o n t e d with an even  1 3  and  the  tunnel  money to i n v e s t  1 4  they lacked  i n a 1,400-foot  beneath.snowslides.  resources  of  both  tunnel and 8,350 feet  71 «  • MAP I I :  L O C A T I O N OF A L T E R N A T I V E A L I G N M E N T S PROPOSED AT C O N S T R U C T I O N T I M E ON T H E C . P . R . M A I N L I N E I N ROGERS P A S S .  72  An  alternative  l o c a t i o n was sought on the south bank of the  I l l e c i l l e w a e t . However, i n order to reach the v a l l e y avoid  crossing  the  highly  active  Ross  Peak  g r a d i e n t much steeper than the c o n t r a c t u a l cent, compensated  would  have  been  slide  maximum  required.  floor  path, a  of  2.2 per  Even  1 5  and  i f the  C.P.R. had been prepared t o i n c r e a s e i t s r u l i n g g r a d i e n t , i t i s doubtful  whether  recently line  the  Federal  Government,  acceded to the c o n t r o v e r s i a l  after  request  having  for a  from the c o n t r a c t  i n the m o u n t a i n s .  developed the l i n e up the v a l l e y of F i v e - M i l e of  the  the  alignment, c o n t r i v e d  The  to reach the v a l l e y  maximum g r a d i e n t .  Creek, a t r i b u t a r y  south  bank  of  floor  within  the  Illecillewaet  1 9  the  18  Moreover,  the  "Loop"  itself  the l i n e i n t o the c e n t r e of the I l l e c i l l e w a e t V a l l e y by of  4,108  Not only was the new alignment thus c l e a r of s l i d e s from  sides  of  the  represented  a  alternative  than  valley,  f a r more  tunnelling  d o l l a r s l e s s to make "several  hundred  original.  it a  but  rapid  h i s l o c a t i o n would cost  construction  and  and  capital-intensive  snowshedding. Ross estimated  "some four safer  less  of the t r e s t l e s  to f i v e hundred thousand  line,"  2 0  and  that  i t had  degrees l e s s c u r v a t u r e upon i t " than upon the  2 1  However, the sharpest of these curves was 10° central  into  was l e s s prone to  means of f i v e t r e s t l e s , which had an aggregate l e n g t h feet.  Ross  1 7  avalanches than the north b a n k . carried  Instead,  16  I l l e c i l l e w a e t , .and by i n s e r t i n g an elongated loop  contractual  that  temporary  i n the Rockies, would have granted permission f o r a second  deviation  both  so  angle,  2 2  30'  at i t s  which was i n excess of the c o n t r a c t u a l  maximum  73  of 10°, and the remainder of the Loop was b u i l t a t that maximum. The  F e d e r a l Government had urged that curvature  be  reduced  to  e i g h t degrees wherever g r a d i e n t s exceeded s i x t y f e e t per m i l e .  2 3  Whilst  2 4  Van  Home  had complied  on the Kamloops Lake s e c t i o n ,  Ross warned t h a t i n the S e l k i r k s the c o s t of compliance would be "very h e a v y . " heavy" t o o , work  2 6  C o n s t r u c t i o n work on the new alignment was "very  25  c o n t r a r y to the e x p e c t a t i o n  of g e n e r a l l y  moderate  through the S e l k i r k s . F i n a l l y , development of the l i n e had  added  over  three  cent, g r a d i e n t ,  2 7  miles and  to  a l l of  the  length  of  S e l k i r k s was d i s e g u i l i b r a t e d . Henceforth, west  per  the a d d i t i o n a l d i s t a n c e opposed  eastbound t r a f f i c . Thus, the pusher g r a d i e n t system  the  2.2  within  the pusher g r a d i e n t on  slope would be 24.5 m i l e s long, against 21.5 miles on  the east s l o p e . the d i r e c t i o n  2 8  The d i s e q u i l i b r i u m favoured  westbound  traffic,  f o r e c a s t by the C.P.R. t o preponderate. The extent  of the imbalance would not s e r i o u s l y i n c r e a s e the o p e r a t i n g of  eastbound  movements  Nevertheless,  relative  to  westbound  accord  with  C.P.R. f o r e c a s t s ,  be  more  acute  than  g r a d i e n t s themselves been The  movements.  of  traffic  the preponderance  eastbound flow might e v e n t u a l l y pose a would  cost  the e x i s t e n c e of the imbalance between the pusher  g r a d i e n t s meant t h a t , i f the r e l a t i v e balance did  the  capacity  flows of the  problem  which  i t would have been had the pusher  balanced.  i n f l u e n c e of c a p i t a l and time  constraints,  which  had  d i c t a t e d the r e l o c a t i o n west of the summit, was a l s o manifest i n the  c h a r a c t e r o f . t h e b r i d g e - and tunnel-work undertaken through  the S e l k i r k s . B r i d g i n g , with represented,  "good  but  uncreosoted  timber,"  25  a r a p i d , l o w - c a p i t a l - c o s t a l t e r n a t i v e to f i l l i n g or  74  diverting  streams,  maintenance  although  costs.  In  3 0  it  imposed  high  subsequent  the 46.1 m i l e s between Beavermouth on  the east slope and A l b e r t Canyon oh the west, there were no l e s s than 207 b r i d g e s , with an aggregate Five  length  of  of these were each over one thousand feet l o n g .  perhaps more i n d i c a t i v e of the margin at which prepared delayed  to  trade  o f f immediate  less.  construction  118  were  feet.  3 1  However,  3 2  C.P.R. were  costs against  of these  sixteen  feet  bridges long  or  3 3  The  unforeseen  n e c e s s i t y f o r t u n n e l l i n g on the north bank  of the I l l e c i l l e w a e t having Loop,  tunnelling  west  slope,  projected,  3 5  two  been avoided  requirements  tunnels were necessary  1,251  the  o p e r a t i n g c o s t s i s the f a c t that eleven  were only s i x f e e t long, and  the  19,349  were  by the l o c a t i o n of the  largely  as  on the east slope of the  where  a  tunnels,  maximum the  of  Selkirks.  1,200  Laurie  feet  Tunnels,  and  c o n s t r a i n t s , the s i d e - d r i f t method of c o n s t r u c t i o n  was  adopted  in  the f i r s t of  these,  3 8  secure  more  rapid  and the second may not have  l e a s t a year a f t e r the main l i n e Although,  as w i l l  to  the  between Rogers capital  31  Due  been  and  to  Canyon.  had  On  time  order  Albert  3 4  aggregating  3 6  f e e t i n l e n g t h , were e v e n t u a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d  Pass  expected. No  completion been  of  completed  until  opened. ' 3  be demonstrated below, c o n s t r u c t i o n work  proved both more c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e and more time-consuming anticipated,  unforeseen  than  i n p r a c t i c e n e i t h e r the work which was undertaken  nor the alignment which was greatly  at  from  adopted  expectations.  necessity  to  The  relocate  appear single the  to  have  differed  exception  was the  line  over  the  Loop  75  immediately  west  of  the  summit.  Ross,  a t l e a s t , would have  p r e f e r r e d not to have been o b l i g e d t o make the t r a d e - o f f between construction  costs  Nevertheless,  the Loop alignment was l e s s c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e than  the to  operating  costs - in  this  o r i g i n a l l o c a t i o n , and d i d , t h e r e f o r e , represent the  trade-off  construction  west  decision  policy  circumstances. the  and  which  dictated  was to  consistent  the  slope  of  the  with  as the flow of revenue t r a f f i c  "Big H i l l "  Selkirks.  Thus,  alignment, o u t s i d e  to the t r a d e - o f f d e c i s i o n , and  the loop was much i m p r o v e d , "  c r o s s i n g the S e l k i r k s . " in  the  The  4 3  context  of  the  statement  in  exactly  the  same  manner  statement  can  only  be  the predominant c a p i t a l and time  implies  c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s and o p e r a t i n g  and t h a t , "the  42  as any that can be obtained  latter  c o n s t r a i n t s which w i l l be examined value,  across  the C.P.R. would c l a i m t h a t , "the general  l i n e as now l o c a t e d i s as favourable  accepted  soon  Rather, i t was seen as  as permanent a s o l u t i o n as the remainder of the alignment the  on  as being  to be improved as  permitted.  a satisfactory solution in i t s e l f  the  financial  Rockies, was never p e r c e i v e d  merely a "temporary" alignment, intended  40  a solution  C.P.R. by  Moreover, the Loop, u n l i k e the  41  way.  below. that  For  the  taken  trade-offs  c o s t s would have had  no  at  such  face  between  been  handled  capital  and time  constraints prevailed.  b) The Cost Of C o n s t r u c t i o n The westward,  C.P.R.'s e n t i r e was  mountain  constructed  under  r a t i o n i n g . These c o n d i t i o n s were  section,  from  the  Rockies'  c o n d i t i o n s of severe c a p i t a l already  in  effect  when  the  76  railhead  reached  severe during was  not  Rockies,  the p e r i o d  but  4 4  S e l k i r k s which was  conditions.  of c o n s t r u c t i o n  the  responsible  construction  f o r i n t e n s i f y i n g these These were  a c r o s s the Rockies, the  in order to  the  inopportune  the  deliberate  of c a p i t a l by the C.P.R. from the mountain  to the Lake S u p e r i o r s e c t i o n  accelerate  section  completion  latter.  In  March  1884,  with  the  r a i l h e a d • at the  Rockies, a $22.5 m i l l i o n f e d e r a l loan had C.P.R.  By  4s  November  1884,  however,  Beavermouth, the base of the C.P.R. were 1885,  the  again  loan, was  not  railhead  had  and  4 7  east  "lamentably  Company  obligations,  was  almost  hard  in  secured u n t i l  of up  the  a means of o b t a i n i n g  further  savings  four  of  construction s e c t i o n to be after  some  work in B.C.,  Gold Range.  and  " r a p i d l y absorbed on completion  e n t i r e c a p i t a l resources construction  51  of  the  of of  the the  the the  to  to  by  4 8  which  diverted  remaining s e c t i o n s  federal the  Meanwhile,  accorded p r i o r i t y  were from  i n May  C.P.R. be  wage  time  45  5 0  the  1885,  on  mountain Section." could  concentrated  in the  as  Capital  effected  the Lake Superior latter,  the  In March  46  its  assistance.  dollars  at  Selkirks,  meet  the the  railhead  S e l k i r k summit.  financial  million  granted  form of a f u r t h e r  20th,  the  summit of  f o r money."  unable  July  crossed  with  slope  briefly  relief,  been  completion of the Lake Superior s e c t i o n was  Only  S e l k i r k s . It  actual  f e d e r a l loans to a s s i s t the C.P.R., and  reallocation  of the  of  a c r o s s the  Three other f a c t o r s were r e s p o n s i b l e .  c a p i t a l cost of  they were at t h e i r most  of c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r i m a r i l y the c a p i t a l c o s t  across the  timing  the  S e l k i r k s and  5 2  the upon the  77  The  intensification  of  capital  S e l k i r k s f o s t e r e d the p r o p e n s i t y against  operating  costs  in  rationing  across  the  to trade o f f c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s  a manner which would minimise  immediate requirement for  capital.  reduced  to  widths  on the s e c t i o n s b u i l t d i r e c t l y by  the  less  than  those  F e d e r a l Government, would were  rail built  support.  5  Cuttings  were  the  a g a i n s t the standards  of which  i n l a t e r years. B a l l a s t i n g was  omitted,  53  entirely  of  timber,  without  Van and  masonry  or  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n c o s t s , the estimate construction  across  the  of  capital  S e l k i r k s was  the  exceeded. The  of November 1884.  the  the  first  crossing  of  From the  Illecillewaet  was  River  some $200,000, or over one  t h i r d . T h i s i n c r e a s e was  because of an  per m i l e , but  summit  of $550,000 was  exceeded  by  i n c u r r e d not  i n c r e a s e i n the c a p i t a l c o s t of the work  r a t h e r because three a d d i t i o n a l route miles had  i n s e r t e d i n t o the s e c t i o n at the  Loop.  of $41,666.66 exceeded the per-mile  Thus,  on  the  s e c t i o n between the f i r s t  and  the second c r o s s i n g of the Columbia,  the  estimate  by only fourteen per cent. A s i m i l a r margin of  constructed  to  on the west s l o p e ,  estimate  railway  excess  Beaver  however, the November 1884  cost  for  summit on the east s l o p e , the a c t u a l c o s t corresponded  c l o s e l y with the estimate  be  immediate  requirements  i n c u r r e d c h i e f l y upon the west s l o p e . Between the  much  iron  c o n d i t i o n s of c a p i t a l r a t i o n i n g , however, and  d e s p i t e the d e l i b e r a t e management p o l i c y of minimising  so  bridges  4  Despite  and  Home  corresponded  Thus, the expected c o s t , one m i l l i o n  with  where the  dollars  per-mile  of $36,666.66  error  c r o s s i n g of the  prevailed  Illecillewaet  the  length  length for  to  of  estimated.  the  twenty-  78  eight  miles,  total  cost  River,  was  e x c e e d e d by $130,000,  of c o n s t r u c t i o n as  assessed  transcontinental or  fifteen  before  per  should."  to  so  5 6  would  construction  to  done  in  most  the  Columbia the the  For  that had  more  than  every  point  every was  dollar."  5 7  successfully  l o c a t i o n of t h e L o o p n o t $500,000,  the a c t u a l  by some $830,000,  C.P.R. management's  policy  cost  or over  in  railway  t h e S e l k i r k s had been o v e r t l y t o " b u i l d t h e with  the l e a s t  in operation,  future."  east  submitted  5 5  save  the  of a f u r t h e r  $330,000,  estimate  "to s t r a i n  this  entire  was  " I t has c o s t  to  the e x p e c t a t i o n  per cent. across  as  the  This  began.  The  to the Columbia  of  the l a s t  the S e l k i r k s  example,  5 8  immediate o u t l a y  leaving  This  Y e t i t was  necessary  a s much a s p o s s i b l e  policy  had  been  the c o n s t r u c t i o n  f o r t h e C.P.R. a s i t s o u g h t  and west a c r o s s  t o be  dictated  by  p o l i c y which  to  open  t h e m o u n t a i n s of B.C.;  up  a  and t h e  s u c c e s s f u l l y implemented.  Time R e q u i r e d F o r Van  than  appeared  appropriate  was  $2,560,000.  location  expediency.  between  policy  c)  it  safety