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An assessment of LPG tanker operating regulations in the port of Vancouver, B.C. Marston, Joseph Charles 1982

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AN ASSESSMENT OF LPG TANKER OPERATING REGULATIONS IN THE PORT OF VANCOUVER, B.C. by JOSEPH CHARLES MARSTON, JR. B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a , 1973 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (School of Community and Regional Planning) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1982 (c) Joseph Charles Marston, J r . , 1982 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be gran t e d by the head of my department o r by h i s o r her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t c o p y i n g or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f Community & Regional Planning The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date 19 October 1982 i i ABSTRACT In recent years, the Port of Vancouver has emerged as a major transshipment centre f o r a broad range of hazardous materials. This, i n turn, has led to growing public concern over the problems associated with the large-volume production, storage, and movement of dangerous commodities i n populated areas. The shipment of l i q u e f i e d petroleum gas (LPG) by means of re f r i g e r a t e d oceangoing gas tankers i s considered to be one of the p o t e n t i a l l y most dangerous aspects of the hazardous materials trade i n the Port of Vancouver. In t h i s regard, the thesis examines the q u a l i t a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the regulatory standards governing the safe movement of LPG c a r r i e r s i n the Port of Vancouver, and those i n e f f e c t i n selected urban gas ports i n Europe (Canvey Island, U.K.; Europoort, Holland; and Le Havre, France) and the United States (Boston, Massachusetts and Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a ) . By means of comparative assessment, the research i s o l a t e s a number of instances where l o c a l gas tanker operating standards do not compare favourably i n terms of substances, scope, or a p p l i c a b i l i t y with the requirements i n force i n the f i v e control ports. In those instances where the Vancouver regulations are d e f i c i e n t to the extent that they are deemed to constitute an unnecessary r i s k to public safety, the research r a t i o n a l i z e s the need to upgrade l o c a l requirements to a l e v e l which either meets, or exceeds the consensus standard for the control ports. The thesis addresses i n some d e t a i l such related items as the properties, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and p o t e n t i a l hazards associated with the marine transportation of LPG and LNG; the composition and operating hi s t o r y of the i i i world l i q u e f i e d gas tanker f l e e t , i n c l u d i n g an overview and assessment of the s a f e t y record of t h i s f l e e t ; and the bas i c s t r u c t u r e of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l marine trade i n l i q u i d gases. Moreover, the research i d e n t i f i e s a number of a d d i t i o n a l p u b l i c s a f e t y issues p e r t a i n i n g to the production, storage, and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of hazardous m a t e r i a l s g e n e r a l l y i n the Port of Vancouver, and suggests a s t r a t e g i c e v a l u a t i o n process whereby these concerns might reasonably be addressed, and e i t h e r m i t i g a t e d or reso l v e d . In t h i s l a t t e r regard, the t h e s i s makes s e v e r a l broad-based recommendations ranging from the need f o r a f e d e r a l i n q u i r y to address the o v e r a l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the hazardous m a t e r i a l s question as i t r e l a t e s to the Port of Vancouver, to a suggestion that the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r port s a f e t y should be t r a n s f e r r e d to the Canadian Coast Guard i n order to e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of a serious c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g between the Board's marketing and s a f e t y concerns. Although the research i s p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d to circumstances o c c u r r i n g i n the Port of Vancouver, much of the informat i o n contained i n the t h e s i s i s l i k e l y to have v a l i d a p p l i c a t i o n i n other Canadian ports which are e i t h e r c u r r e n t l y engaged i n the marine t r a n s f e r of hazardous m a t e r i a l s , or are a n t i c i p a t i n g the p o s s i b l e establishment of such a trade i n the foreseeable f u t u r e . iv TABLE OF•CONTENTS Page A b s t r a c t i i Table of Contents i v L i s t of Tables v i L i s t of Figures v i i Acknowledgement v i i i 1.0 I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 1.1 E v o l u t i o n of the L o c a l Hazardous M a s t e r i a l s Trade 1 1.2 A Regional P e r s p e c t i v e on the Dangerous Goods Issue 3 1.3 Purpose of Study 10 1.3.1 Study Environment 10 1.3.2 Hypothesis 11 1.3.3 R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Research 13 1.3.4 Test Port S e l e c t i o n C r i t e r i a 17 1.3.5 Methodology 18 1.3.5.1 Compilation of Background M a t e r i a l 18 1.3.5.2 F i e l d I n v e s t i g a t i o n 19 1.3.5.3 A n a l y s i s 20 2.0 T r a n s p o r t a t i o n of Hazardous M a t e r i a l s by Marine Mode: L e g i s l a t i v e S t r u c t u r e 30 2.1 Marine Terminal S i t i n g Considerations 30 2.2 P e r t i n e n t Hazardous Marine Terminal S i t i n g L e g i s l a t i o n 32 2.2.1 Fede r a l L e g i s l a t i o n 32 2.2.1.1 Navigable Waters P r o t e c t i o n Act 32 2.2.1.2 Termpol Code 34 2.2.1.3 Environmental Assessment and Review Process 35 2.2.1.4 F i s h e r i e s Act , 37 2.2.1.5 N a t i o n a l Harbours Board Act 38 2.2.2 P r o v i n c i a l L e g i s l a t i o n 39 2.2.2.1 P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l Act 39 2.2.2.2 F i r e S e r v i c e s Act 40 2.2.2.3 U t i l i t i e s Commission Act 40 2.3 L e g i s l a t i o n P e r t a i n i n g to the Bulk Shipment of Hazardous M a t e r i a l s by Marine Mode 41 2.3.1 F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i o n 41 2.3.1.1 Canada Shipping Act 41 2.3.1.2 N a t i o n a l Harbours Board Act 43 3.0 Marine Shipment of LPG and Related Commodities 45 3.1 E v o l u t i o n of the L i q u e f i e d Gas Tanker Trade 45 3.2 LPG i n Vancouver 55 3.3 The Issues 58 3.3.1 Background 58 3.3.2 LPG Hazard Assessment 64 3.3.3 The Gas Tanker Safety Record 71 3.3.3.1 Phase I - 1964-1978 71 3.3.3.2 Phase I I - 1979-1982 76 V Page 4.0 The P u b l i c Safety Imperative: A Review of S p e c i a l Requirements f o r L i q u e f i e d Gas C a r r i e r s Operating In S elected World Ports 91 4.1 Overview 91 4.2 Canada 92 4.2.1 Current S i t u a t i o n Assessment 92 4.2.2 Vancouver 93 4.3 United States 105 4.3.1 Current S i t u a t i o n Assessment 105 4.3.2 Boston 108 4.3.3 Los Angeles 113 4.4 Europe 117 4.4.1 S i t u a t i o n Assessment 117 4.4.2 Planning Considerations 118 4.4.3 Le Havre, France 122 4.4.3.1 P h y s i c a l Considerations 122 4.4.3.2 Regulatory Considerations 122 4.4.4 Europoort, Holland 124 4.4.4.1 I n t r o d u c t o r y Note 124 4.4.4.2 P h y s i c a l Considerations - Shell-BP Proposal 127 4.4.4.3 Regulatory Considerations - Shell-BP Proposal 127 4.4.5 Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. 128 4.4.5.1 P h y s i c a l Considerations 128 4.4.5.2 Regulatory Considerations 131 5.0 Conclusions 137 5.1 R e c a p i t u l a t i o n 145 6.0 Recommendations 148 6.1 Primary Recommendations - LPG Tanker O p e r a t i o n a l Safety 148 6.2 Supplementary Observations/Recommendations 157 B i b l i o g r a p h y 171 Appendix I - A P a r t i a l L i s t of V i s i t s by Hazardous M a t e r i a l s C a r r i e r s to the Port of Vancouver Between 1 January 1981 and 31 August 1982. 182 Appendix I I - C h r o n o l o g i c a l L i s t of Mishaps I n v o l v i n g LPG C a r r i e r s 189 Appendix I I I - C h r o n o l o g i c a l L i s t of Mishaps I n v o l v i n g LNG C a r r i e r s 236 Appendix IV - Canadian Gas Port Proposals 263 LIST OF TABLES P h y s i c a l / L e g i s l a t i v e Considerations A Comparison of Re s u l t s of Four Models D e s c r i b i n g the Dimensions of the LFL Extent of a Cloud F o l l o w i n g a 25 000 m3 LNG S p i l l S p i l l s on Water (Under Worst Weather Con d i t i o n s ) LPG Incidents of Note 28 June 1979 - 28 February 1982 LNG In c i d e n t s of Note 28 June 1979 - 28 February 1982 Very Serious C a s u a l t i e s : Impact Assessment f o r the Pe r i o d 28 June 1979 - 28 February 1982 Comparison of S p e c i a l Regulations i n E f f e c t During Harbour Passage of LPG/LNG Tankers LPG Tanker Operating Years 28 June 1979 - 28 February 1982 v i i LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1.1 Chemical Tanker Hamakaze 14 2.1 Hazardous M a t e r i a l s on Vancouver Waterfront 33 3.1 Temperature/Vapour Pressure R e l a t i o n s h i p of Selected Ship-borne Gases 50 3.2 Westridge LPG Terminal, Burnaby, B.C. 56 3.3 LNG C a r r i e r Khannur at Sodegaura, Japan 75 3.4 F i r e b o a t i n Vancouver Harbour 86 4.1 Port of Vancouver: P r i n c i p a l Hazardous Goods Storage P o i n t s 94 4.2 Port of Vancouver: Land Use P a t t e r n 95 4.3 Port of Boston, MA 109 4.4 Port of Los Angeles, CA 113 4.5 Le Havre, France 123 4.6 Europoort, Holland 125 4.7 Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. and Environs 130 6.1 LPG C a r r i e r Yamahide Maru at Westridge Terminal ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v i i i During the past three years, I have had an opportunity to meet w i t h many people i n Europe and North America who, from varying p e r s p e c t i v e s , have c o n t r i b u t e d g r e a t l y to the prep a r a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s . While I cannot mention them a l l by name i n the l i m i t e d space a v a i l a b l e , I must express to these people my g r a t i t u d e f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n , and support f o r , t h i s p r o j e c t . I would be remiss, however, i f I d i d not a f f o r d s p e c i a l mention to s e v e r a l people whose c o n t r i b u t i o n s were perhaps above and beyond the c a l l of duty. F i r s t l y , I would l i k e to thank P r o f e s s o r Peter Nemetz of the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia and P r o f e s s o r David Anderson of the U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a f o r encouraging me to develop the research t o p i c , and f o r supporting my a p p l i c a t i o n f o r re-admission to the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. While I may not have always seen the wisdom of t h e i r ways at the time, I can now say with c o n v i c t i o n that the comments and suggestions of my t h e s i s advisory committee - comprised of Profe s s o r s Setty Pendakur (Community & Regional P l a n n i n g ) , Frank Navin (Engineering), and Peter Nemetz (Commerce) - have made t h i s a much b e t t e r document than i t could ever have been without the b e n e f i t of t h e i r combined p r a c t i c a l and academic i n s i g h t s -I a l s o make p a r t i c u l a r reference to the many f r i e n d s and colleagues who have o f f e r e d t h e i r u n q u a l i f i e d support f o r t h i s p r o j e c t f o r so lon g - e s p e c i a l l y to Ms. Brenda Zappia, without whose typing s k i l l s , p a tience, and sense of humour the t h e s i s may never have been completed, and to Mr. Richard F a i r e y , who, f o r more years than I am sure e i t h e r of us care to remember, has threatened, badgered, and c a j o l e d me to complete my Master's Degree program, and who w i l l no doubt be somewhat shocked to discover that t h i s o b j e c t i v e has, indeed, now been r e a l i z e d . ix F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to acknowledge the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of my f a m i l y -p a r t i c u l a r l y those of my w i f e Jeanette whose commitment to t h i s p r o j e c t has never f a l t e r e d . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r any e r r o r s , m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , or omissions r e s t s s o l e l y w i t h the w r i t e r . Joseph C. Marston, J r . Vancouver, B.C. 1 October 1982 1 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 E v o l u t i o n of the L o c a l Hazardous M a t e r i a l s Trade The lower mainland area* of southwestern B r i t i s h Columbia, i n i t s c a p a c i t y as a major seaport and r a i l terminus, has had a long a s s o c i a t i o n with the handling and shipment of a wide assortment of dangerous commodities. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Hooker Chemical c h l o r i n e manufacturing plant i n North Vancouver during the mid-1950s, however, marked an important t u r n i n g point i n terms of both the nature and d i r e c t i o n of the dangerous goods trade l o c a l l y . P r i o r to that time, the movement of e s p e c i a l l y hazardous substances through the area had u s u a l l y been l i m i t e d to f a i r l y s m a l l consignments. Moreover, with perhaps the exception of the r e s i d u a l production of small amounts of t o x i c or e x p l o s i v e substances i n co n j u n c t i o i w i t h the petroleum r e f i n i n g process at any of the s e v e r a l area r e f i n e r i e s , the lower mainland was not viewed as a s i g n i f i c a n t manufacturer of dangeroi goods. The Hooker Chemical plant s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r e d that impression by s i g n i f y i n g a permanent, large s c a l e c h l o r i n e storage/production presence w i t h i n the s e t t l e d l i m i t s of the community. The Hooker operation a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d to the generation of many more l o c a l road, r a i l , and marine movements of hazardous m a t e r i a l s (such as c h l o r i n e and c a u s t i c soda) than had p r e v i o u s l y been the case. During the course of the next two decades (1957-1977), the region experienced a steady, but unspectacular, growth i n the hazardous m a t e r i a l s *For the purposes of t h i s t h e s i s , the term "lower mainland" s h a l l be viewed as synonomous with the Greater Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t (G.V.R.D.), a g e o p o l i t i c a l u n i t comprised of 14 m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ( i n c l u d i n g the C i t y of Vancouver) and three e l e c t o r a l areas. The r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t covers an area of some 2 600 km^, and has an estimated population of approximately 1.1 m i l l i o n (1976 Census). 2 trade. Increased demand from i n d u s t r i a l concerns on Vancouver I s l a n d and elsewhere along the coast f o r commodities such as c h l o r i n e , propane, and s u l p h u r i c a c i d served to enhance the Port of Vancouver's p o s i t i o n as a r a i l / m a r i n e transshipment i n t e r f a c e f o r a v a r i e t y of hazardous chemical and petrochemical products. A d d i t i o n a l l y , two new deepwater petrochemical terminals were brought on l i n e during t h i s p e r i o d - Trans Mountain P i p e l i n e Company's l i q u e f i e d petroleum gas (LPG) f a c i l i t y i n Burnaby i n 1966, followed by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Vancouver Wharves Limited's North Vancouver methanol t e r m i n a l a few years l a t e r . The period 1977-82 has seen a dramatic s h i f t away from the sporadic p a t t e r n of growth which c h a r a c t e r i z e d the l o c a l trade i n hazardous commodities throughout the ' s i x t i e s and much of the 'seventies. The r a p i d e v o l u t i o n of the petrochemical i n d u s t r y i n western Canada, combined with the development of new l a r g e volume markets i n Japan and other P a c i f i c Rim c o u n t r i e s , has generated considerable pressure to improve and expand the deepwater petrochemical t e r m i n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e on the west coast. Since 1979 alone, the lower mainland has experienced the c o n s t r u c t i o n of one major new petrochemical transshipment f a c i l i t y by Dow Chemical (Canada) L t d . , and has witnessed s i g n i f i c a n t c a p i t a l investment by Vancouver Wharves and Canadian O c c i d e n t a l Petroleum L t d . (formerly Hooker Chemical) f o r the purpose of upgrading t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e methanol and c h l o r i n e / c a u s t i c soda t e r m i n a l operations. Furthermore, recent proposals by B r i t i s h Columbia Hydro to construct a l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas (LNG) peak shaving plant near the eastern end of Burrard I n l e t , and by Canterra Energy L t d . to b u i l d a world-scale petrochemical production f a c i l i t y i n the v i c i n i t y of the Fraser R i v e r estuary, suggest that the production and movement of dangerous goods w i l l continue to f i g u r e prominently i n the debate over the mid- to long-term 3 growth a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e to the lower mainland area. 1.2 A Regional P e r s p e c t i v e on the Dangerous Goods Issue The manufacture, storage, and safe c a r r i a g e of dangerous goods has emerged as an important p u b l i c i s s u e w i t h i n the Greater Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t (G.V.R.D.) i n recent years. The o r i g i n s of the current high l e v e l of community i n t e r e s t i n t h i s t o p i c can perhaps best be traced back to two s i g n i f i c a n t events which t r a n s p i r e d during the summer of 1978. The f i r s t , o c c u r r i n g on 29 August 1978, involved a c o l l i s i o n between a f r e i g h t t r a i n h a u l i n g 41 tankcars loaded w i t h h i g h l y inflammable LPG and three runaway boxcars i n Vancouver's East End. Although s e v e r a l of the gas tankers were d e r a i l e d , none was ruptured and t h e i r cargoes remained i n t a c t . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to estimate the extent to which p u b l i c s a f e t y might have been jeopardized had t h i s c o l l i s i o n r e s u l t e d i n the escape of a large volume of gas. O f f i c i a l s speculated at the time that the i g n i t i o n of vented gas from a ruptured tankcar could have led to an e x p l o s i o n o r , f o r that matter, a chain r e a c t i o n of explosions i n v o l v i n g s e v e r a l or a l l of the LPG u n i t s which comprised the t r a i n . 1 The accident d i d present a s u f f i c i e n t hazard to prompt p o l i c e and f i r e a u t h o r i t i e s to urge r e s i d e n t s l i v i n g w i t h i n a four block radius of the c o l l i s i o n s i t e to temporarily evacuate the area. In order to gain a sense of perspective as to the d e s t r u c t i v e p o t e n t i a l i n -herent i n t h i s a c c i d e n t , while bearing i n mind that both circumstances and subsequent e f f e c t s would be l i k e l y to vary widely from one LPG i n c i d e n t to the next, i t i s worthy of note that the explosion of a s i n g l e d e r a i l e d 4 tanker c o n t a i n i n g some 9 000 l i t r e s of LPG k i l l e d 15 people i n Waverly, Tennessee during February of 1978. 2 By c o n t r a s t , each tankcar i n the Vancouver accident contained approximately 128 000 l i t r e s of gas, f o r a t o t a l t r a i n l o a d c a p a c i t y i n excess of 5 m i l l i o n l i t r e s . 3 In view of the large volume of gas i n v o l v e d , and given the c l o s e p r o x i m i t y of the derailment to suburban r e s i d e n t i a l neighbourhoods, one cannot escape the conclusion that Vancouver was indeed fortunate to avoid a major d i s a s t e r . Less than a month l a t e r , on 25 September 1978, a 450 l i t r e c a n i s t e r c o n t a i n i n g l i q u i d c h l o r i n e f e l l from the rear of a truck on Main S t r e e t . The c a n i s t e r ruptured upon impact, r e l e a s i n g some 300 l i t r e s of t o x i c c h l o r i n e gas i n t o the atmosphere before the leak could be brought under c o n t r o l . ^ In terms of volume, the amount of gas vented was s m a l l . Nevertheless, no fewer than 78 persons were h o s p i t a l i z e d w i t h a v a r i e t y of complaints ranging from minor s k i n and eye i r r i t a t i o n s to more serious r e s p i r a t o r y c o m p l i c a t i o n s . Notwithstanding the grave nature of the p r e v i o u s l y described a c c i d e n t s , i t must a l s o be emphasized that s e v e r a l important lessons have been learned from these experiences. The c h l o r i n e s p i l l , i n p a r t i c u l a r , was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n b r i n g i n g to l i g h t a number of d e f i c i e n c i e s w i t h i n the l o c a l emergency planning/response process. Moreover, i t served to underscore i n a most dramatic f a s h i o n the serious nature of p o t e n t i a l problems a r i s i n g from the l a r g e l y unregulated day-to-day movement of dangerous goods on lower mainland s t r e e t s and r a i l l i n e s . In a p r a c t i c a l sense, the G.V.R.D. and a number of i t s member m u n i c i p a l i t i e s have since attempted to address many of these shortcomings, and have made progress i n terms of both improving i n t e r n a l emergency response c a p a b i l i t i e s and, perhaps more i m p o r t a n t l y , reducing the 5 l i k e l i h o o d of s e r i o u s road accidents i n v o l v i n g the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of hazardous commodities i n the f u t u r e . This has been achieved p r i m a r i l y through the i n t r o d u c t i o n of workable new v e h i c l e s a f e t y standards and operating r e g u l a t i o n s (such as more frequent v e h i c l e i n s p e c t i o n s , l i m i t i n g trucks c a r r y i n g s p e c i f i e d dangerous cargoes to c e r t a i n routes and c e r t a i n hours of t r a v e l , e t c . ) , and by improving the e x i s t i n g channels of communication between l o c a l government agencies and p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y . Evacuation planning, too - an item which received l i m i t e d a t t e n t i o n i n the past - has emerged as a t o p i c of considerable concern to G.V.R.D. p o l i t i c i a n s and planners a l i k e , as they endeavour to formulate and improve upon comprehensive and mutually compatible emergency evacuation s t r a t e g i e s f o r the lower mainland. The preceding p u b l i c s a f e t y i n i t i a t i v e s , while valuable i n t h e i r own r i g h t , are nevertheless symptomatic of the widespread r e g u l a t o r y p r a c t i c e of upgrading e x i s t i n g design or o p e r a t i o n a l safety requirements only a f t e r a serious accident has occurred. In most cases, these accidents were n e i t h e r t o t a l l y u n a n t i c i p a t e d , nor were they unavoidable. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s type of r e a c t i v e response to r i s k management i s p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i n instances where the p r o b a b i l i t y of a major accident i s very s m a l l , but the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s upon p u b l i c s a f e t y i n the event of such an accident would be extremely severe. I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , encouraging to note that s e v e r a l l o c a l communities have adopted a much more proa c t i v e approach to addressing the many p u b l i c s a f e t y problems posed by the various aspects of the lower mainland hazardous m a t e r i a l s trade. The C i t y of Vancouver, f o r example, has waged a lengthy campaign to remove a l l a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v i n g the l a r g e - s c a l e storage and shipment of dangerous commodities w i t h i n the community. For some time, c i t y c o u n c i l ' s primary o b j e c t i v e i n t h i s regard has been to 6 convince the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway to discontinue the p r a c t i c e of s t o r i n g r a i l c a r s loaded with t o x i c and inflammable substances on the periphery of the downtown commercial core. Thus f a r , C P . R a i l has refused to comply with the c i t y ' s request and, i n view of the f a c t that r a i l w a y lands f a l l under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the f e d e r a l Railway Act, c o u n c i l has been powerless to forc e the i s s u e . During the f a l l of 1981, however, C P . R a i l ' s r e a l estate development arm, Marathon R e a l t y , requested approval from the c i t y to construct a $100 m i l l i o n o f f i c e / r e t a i l complex on the w a t e r f r o n t . C i t y c o u n c i l has refused to approve the p r o j e c t unless C P . R a i l agrees to h a l t the shipment of hazardous m a t e r i a l s through the waterfront p r e c i n c t . ^ The D i s t r i c t of North Vancouver, which accommodates a wide v a r i e t y of hazardous m a t e r i a l s - o r i e n t e d i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s , r e c e n t l y adopted a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n on the problem as that e s t a b l i s h e d by the C i t y of Vancouver, although under somewhat d i f f e r e n t m o t i v a t i n g circumstances. In recent years, the growing p u b l i c debate over the dangerous goods controversy has spawned a number of e s s e n t i a l l y s i n g l e purpose community i n t e r e s t groups. Among the most prominent of these has been the North Shore-based Chemical Hazards A l e r t Committee (C.H.A.C), which was formed i n e a r l y 1980 f o r the purpose of conveying the p o s i t i o n that the Canadian O c c i d e n t a l c h l o r i n e p l a n t i n North Vancouver c o n s t i t u t e d an unacceptable safety r i s k to area r e s i d e n t s and, as such, should be removed from the community. Although C.H.A.C has yet to r e a l i z e t h i s fundamental g o a l , the o r g a n i z a t i o n was nonetheless instrumental i n persuading the D i s t r i c t of North Vancouver to sponsor a Community Hazards Task Force, the mandate of which was to address the broad spectrum of contentious issues p e r t a i n i n g to the production, storage, and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of hazardous m a t e r i a l s on the North Shore, and to subsequently prepare appropriate s t r a t e g i c responses designed to e i t h e r 7 m i t i g a t e or e l i m i n a t e serious r i s k s . Due l a r g e l y to the f i n d i n g s and recommendations of the task f o r c e , the d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l , i n October of 1981, placed a ban on the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new high r i s k chemical and petrochemical i n d u s t r i e s to the community, and, i n conjunction w i t h other l e v e l s of government, agreed to examine ways and means of e v e n t u a l l y removing the Canadian O c c i d e n t a l plant from the North Shore.6 In a r e l a t e d v e i n , Canterra Energy L t d . , i n i t s recent ( s p r i n g 1982) b i d to secure approval to construct a large new petrochemical plant i n the Lower Mainland, endeavoured to s o l i c i t p u b l i c input r e l a t i v e to a l l aspects of the proposal. While a number of l o c a l government and i n d u s t r i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s have, i n c e r t a i n i n s t a n c e s , chosen to address hazardous m a t e r i a l s - r e l a t e d concerns i n a reasonably open and f o r t h r i g h t manner, i t would be i n c o r r e c t to assume that t h i s p r a c t i c e has been u n i v e r s a l l y endorsed. H i s t o r i c a l l y , there has e x i s t e d a tendency on the part of both i n d u s t r y and government r e g u l a t o r y agencies to downplay the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the p o t e n t i a l h e a l t h and s a f e t y concerns a s s o c i a t e d w i t h many hazardous products. Many or g a n i z a t i o n s i n v o l v e d w i t h the r o u t i n e production, movement, or r e g u l a t i o n of dangerous commodities continue to adhere to the convenient dictum that " i t won't happen here" as a means of d i s c o u n t i n g the l i k e l i h o o d of a s e r i o u s chemical or petrochemical a c c i d e n t . This p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach p e r i o d i c a l l y (although l e s s f r e q u e n t l y than i n the past) manifests i t s e l f i n an extreme form through the i n t e n t i o n a l w i t h o l d i n g from the p u b l i c of i n f o r m a t i o n regarding e i t h e r the proposed c o n s t r u c t i o n of a p o t e n t i a l l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l f a c i l i t y c a t e r i n g to the hazardous ma t e r i a l s trade or the s u b s t a n t i a l r e v i s i o n of an e x i s t i n g operation. The purpose i s to avoid damaging 8 c o n f l i c t s w i t h groups or i n d i v i d u a l s holding s t r o n g l y divergent a t t i t u d e s to those of the p r o j e c t sponsors. On occasion, the manoeuvre works to the b e n e f i t of the proponent, as evidenced by the recent (1979-80) c o n s t r u c t i o n of a Dow Chemical Company storage and transshipment t e r m i n a l on N a t i o n a l Harbours Board property i n the D i s t r i c t of North Vancouver. The Dow f a c i l i t y handles three separate bulk chemical products - ethylene d i c h l o r i d e (EDC), a source of p o l y v i n y l c h l o r i d e p l a s t i c r e s i n ; ethylene g l y c o l , used i n the manufacture of a n t i - f r e e z e ; and c a u s t i c soda s o l u t i o n , which i s required by the pulp/paper and aluminum processing i n d u s t r i e s . Although a l l three substances, f o r reasons of t o x i c i t y , c o r r o s i v e n e s s , or i n f l a m m a b i l i t y , r e q u i r e s p e c i a l handling procedures, ethylene d i c h l o r i d e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , could present a serious threat to p u b l i c s a f e t y i n the event of a major s p i l l . In a d d i t i o n to being h i g h l y inflammable, EDC, when heated to decomposition, produces deadly phosgene gas s i m i l a r to that deployed i n trench warfare during the F i r s t World War. I t i s a l s o a known cancer causing agent i n animals, and i s suspected of being c a r c i n o g e n i c to humans.^ Despite the acknowledged hazardous nature of these m a t e r i a l s , Dow Chemical made l i t t l e , i f any, e f f o r t to inform the p u b l i c as to the nature of the p r o j e c t u n t i l a f t e r a l l of the necessary r e g u l a t o r y permits had e i t h e r been issued or approved i n p r i n c i p l e . ^ Moreover, the government agencies c l o s e s t to the proposal - that i s , the D i s t r i c t of North Vancouver and the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board - remained e q u a l l y s i l e n t throughout the p r o j e c t approval process. In t h i s manner, i t was v i r t u a l l y assured that any immediate p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m of the p r o j e c t would be both l i m i t e d i n scope and e a s i l y manageable. 9 An item of equal concern was the r e l a t i v e ease with which Dow secured p r o j e c t approval from various r e g u l a t o r y agencies at a l l l e v e l s of government. For i n s t a n c e , at no time was a d e t a i l e d s o c i a l impact a n a l y s i s ever requested, or undertaken. Hence, a number of important questions remain unanswered, i n c l u d i n g : a) why d i d Dow Chemical e l e c t to construct a f a c i l i t y designed to st o r e l a r g e volumes of h i g h l y inflammable and t o x i c chemical m a t e r i a l s i n the midst of a densely populated urban area? b) could a v e s s e l loaded w i t h EDC or other t o x i c chemical compounds e f f e c t a quick, o r d e r l y , and safe departure from the t e r m i n a l docking area i n the event of a serious shipboard or shoreside f i r e , given the l i m i t e d room f o r manoeuvreability at the Dow berth and the dangerous t i d a l c o n d i t i o n s i n the v i c i n i t y of the Second Narrows? and c) i n the event of a d i s a s t e r scenario i n v o l v i n g a major u n c o n t r o l l e d EDC pool f i r e at the t e r m i n a l and an onshore windflow, to what extent would the generation of t o x i c gases present a threat to l o c a l r e s i d e n t s , and what contingencies have been prepared to m i t i g a t e any r e l a t e d impacts? I t must be s t r e s s e d that Dow Chemical, while e x e r c i s i n g questionable e t h i c a l judgement by w i t h o l d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n on the p r o j e c t u n t i l the necessary r e g u l a t o r y permits had been secured, was by no means operating outside the law. In t h i s regard, part of the problem r e s t s both with the government r e g u l a t o r y agencies f o r f a i l i n g to recognize the need f o r g r e a t l y improved p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e standards, and with l e g i s l a t o r s f o r not i n s i s t i n g upon i t . Thus, the general p u b l i c has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been i n such a p o s i t i o n as to e x e r c i s e , at best, only l i m i t e d i n f l u e n c e over those d e c i s i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to the s i t i n g and c o n s t r u c t i o n of major hazardous m a t e r i a l s - o r i e n t e d operations w i t h i n the community. Moreover, the standards, g u i d e l i n e s , and procedures governing the operation of these f a c i l i t i e s tend to have been e s t a b l i s h e d i n the absence of any meaningful p u b l i c i n p u t , despite the f a c t that i t i s 10 i n v a r i a b l y l o c a l area r e s i d e n t s who w i l l i n c u r the most serious consequences i n the event of a severe breakdown or d e f i c i e n c y i n the o p e r a t i o n a l s a f e t y framework. 1.3 Purpose of Study 1.3.1 Study Environment The trend towards i n c r e a s i n g p u b l i c i n t e r e s t on matters having to do w i t h the hazardous m a t e r i a l s trade g e n e r a l l y , and the corresponding emphasis upon both emergency planning and improved r i s k management and avoidance techniques, i s by no means a r e g i o n a l phenomenon. H i g h l y p u b l i c i z e d events such as the Love Canal t o x i c chemical dump controversy i n Niagara F a l l s , New York, the Three M i l e I s l a n d , Pennsylvania nuclear r e a c t o r a c c i d e n t , or, i n Canada, the 1979 derailment of a f r e i g h t t r a i n c a r r y i n g t o x i c and e x p l o s i v e products near M i s s i s s a u g a , Ontario have served to engender a much stronger sense of p u b l i c awareness as to the scope and nature of the problem than had p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t e d . One of the more noteworthy c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the current p a t t e r n of l o c a l i n t e r e s t i n the dangerous goods i s s u e , however, i s that p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n i n the Greater Vancouver area has remained focussed almost e x c l u s i v e l y upon the land-based aspect of the hazardous m a t e r i a l s trade. The marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of hazardous substances, with fewer i n d i v i d u a l cargo movements than i t s road or r a i l counterparts, and a correspondingly lower accident p r o b a b i l i t y , has l a r g e l y avoided the mainstream of l o c a l debate. I t i s important to bear i n mind that the Port of Vancouver has, since the Second World War, emerged as an important storage and marine d i s t r i b u t i o n 11 centre f o r a broad range of dangerous chemical and petrochemical products. In t h i s regard, the seaborne movement of t o x i c , c o r r o s i v e , and inflammable commodities w i t h i n the port p r e c i n c t , by v i r t u e of the g e n e r a l l y large volumes of m a t e r i a l i n v o l v e d , represents one of the g r e a t e s t , but g e n e r a l l y l e a s t recognized, thr e a t s to p u b l i c safety l o c a l l y . Of p a r t i c u l a r concern are the frequent bulk movements of c h l o r i n e (by barge from the Canadian O c c i d e n t a l plant i n North Vancouver), methanol (by chemical tanker from the Vancouver Wharves t e r m i n a l , North Vancouver D i s t r i c t ) , ethylene d i c h l o r i d e (by chemical tanker from the Dow Chemical t e r m i n a l , North Vancouver), assorted dangerous chemicals (by r a i l barge from the C P . R a i l berth i n downtown Vancouver), and LPG (by r e f r i g e r a t e d gas tanker from the Trans Mountain P i p e l i n e Company export terminal i n Burnaby.)* An a c c i d e n t a l large volume discharge of any one of the above-noted commodities r e s u l t i n g from a serious shipping mishap i n the Port of Vancouver could, under various circumstances, j e o p a r d i z e the l i v e s of many thousands of people working or r e s i d i n g w i t h i n c l o s e p r o x i m i t y to the shores of Burrard I n l e t . 1.3.2 Hypothesis In November of 1979, the O f f i c e of the Harbour Master, Port of Vancouver stat e d that " . . . ( s h i p p i n g ) s a f e t y standards i n the Port of Vancouver r e f l e c t — to the extent humanly and reasonably p o s s i b l e — l o c a l , r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l concerns, and can be compared favourably w i t h s i m i l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l *For a p a r t i a l l i s t of hazardous m a t e r i a l s c a r r i e r s which have v i s i t e d the Port of Vancouver since 1 January 1981, r e f e r to Appendix I . experience." y These remarks were issued i n d i r e c t response to an e a r l i e r l e t t e r to the Harbour Master expressing serious concern over both the q u a l i t y and adequacy of l o c a l o p e r a t i o n a l s a f e t y r e g u l a t i o n s governing the passage of deepsea l i q u e f i e d petroleum gas (LPG) c a r r i e r s through the Port of Vancouver.1^ The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s , then, w i l l be to t e s t the v a l i d i t y of the Harbour Master's statement (hypothesis) of 22 November 1979 as i t a p p l i e s to the i m p o s i t i o n of n a v i g a t i o n a l safety c o n s t r a i n t s f o r LPG c a r r i e r s operating i n the Port of Vancouver, against those r e g u l a t i o n s i n e f f e c t f o r LPG and LNG* c a r r i e r s i n s e v e r a l comparable European and American gas p o r t s . Within t h i s context, the p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i v e s of the research w i l l be t o : a) examine and assess the problems/hazards a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of inflammable l i q u e f i e d gases i n g e n e r a l , and through congested or h e a v i l y populated port p r e c i n c t s i n p a r t i c u l a r ; b) conduct a d e t a i l e d review of the s a f e t y record of both LPG and LNG c a r r i e r s since 1964, w i t h an emphasis upon the p e r i o d 1979-1982; c) review and, where p o s s i b l e , r a t i o n a l i z e the r e g u l a t o r y responses to the p o t e n t i a l problems or hazards i d e n t i f i e d i n "a" (above), as r e f l e c t e d by the l e g i s l a t i o n and s p e c i a l operating requirements/ procedures which are a p p l i c a b l e to deepsea v e s s e l s engaged i n the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of e i t h e r LPG or LNG w i t h i n the confines of the s e l e c t e d urban gas ports i n Europe and North America; d) undertake a comparative a n a l y s i s of the r e g u l a t i o n s / l e g i s l a t i o n i n f o r c e f o r the above-noted p o r t s , and to i d e n t i f y any areas where the Port of Vancouver appears to be c l e a r l y d e f i c i e n t i n maintaining gas tanker operating standards at a l e v e l e q uivalent t o , or esceeding, those i n e f f e c t i n the m a j o r i t y of the other gas ports examined; and *Although LPG and LNG d i s p l a y somewhat d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s from one another i n terms of p h y s i c a l composition, t r a n s p o r t a b i l i t y , f l a m m a b i l i t y , explosiveness, e t c . , i t i s common p r a c t i s e i n American gas ports to apply s p e c i a l n a v i g a t i n g requirements equall y to both LPG and LNG c a r r i e r s . 13 e) provide s p e c i f i c recommendations designed to upgrade r e g u l a t o r y d e f i c i e n c i e s i n the Port of Vancouver (as defined i n "d" above) to a l e v e l at l e a s t equivalent to the accepted or i d e n t i f i a b l e standard i n place f o r the other gas ports examined. As a point of c l a r i f i c a t i o n , the above-noted o b j e c t i v e s r e l a t e only to the  a c t u a l p h y s i c a l movement of l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s i n the Port of Vancouver, not to such a f f i l i a t e d items as the s i t i n g or safe operation of shoreside l i q u e f i e d gas t e r m i n a l s , or the regulatory standards i n place f o r other hazardous m a t e r i a l s c a r r i e r s (such as chemical tankers) operating w i t h i n the p o r t . Nevertheless, d u r i n g , and subsequent t o , the data c o l l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s phases of the e x e r c i s e , numerous other hazardous m a t e r i a l s concerns were brought to the author's a t t e n t i o n . Passing reference i s made to many of these issues throughout the course of the t e x t . While a l a c k of time, f i n a n c i a l resources, and t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e precluded an i n depth examination of these items, S e c t i o n 6.2 of the r e p o r t , e n t i t l e d "Supplementary Observations/Recommendations", attempts to summarize some of the more important concerns, and to provide a general framework f o r addressing these issues i n the near f u t u r e . 1.3.3 R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Research LPG tankers i n v o l v e d i n the Vancouver-Japan trade have been v a r i o u s l y described as "...the s i n g l e most hazardous v e s s e l ( s ) that move( ) r e g u l a r l y through the Port of V a n c o u v e r . . . a n d as presenting "...a r i s k equal to that of Canadian Oxy's c h l o r i n e b a r g e . W h i l e the i s s u e as to whether or not LPG c a r r i e r s do, indeed, represent the most serious shipping threat to p u b l i c s a f e t y (there i s , i n f a c t , a strong argument to be made that the r a p i d l y e s c a l a t i n g p a r c e l chemical tanker trade i n Vancouver poses the greatest l o c a l s h i p ping s a f e t y concern i n terms of the s i z e and number of chemical tankers s e r v i n g the p o r t , and by the o f t e n mixed nature of t h e i r F i g u r e 1.1 Chemical Tanker Hamakaze 15 cargoes), i t i s widely recognized w i t h i n the shipping community that LPG, by v i r t u e of i t s inflammable and p o t e n t i a l l y e x p l o s i v e nature, i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous commodity r e q u i r i n g s p e c i a l handling and shipment precautions i n excess of those normally a p p l i e d to more conventional cargoes. The problem f a c i n g port o f f i c i a l s i s one of e s t a b l i s h i n g an appropriate r e g u l a t o r y balance between the economic and p u b l i c s a f e t y concerns of the community. I n t h i s regard, the case supporting greater r e g u l a t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the deepsea LPG trade l o c a l l y i s based upon the precept of reducing the l i k e l i h o o d of a s e r i o u s accident i n v o l v i n g a gas tanker to an "acceptable" l e v e l . The task of determining a " p u b l i c l y acceptable" l e v e l of accident r i s k , however, i s one which w i l l always be open to widespread i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . In i t s most extreme form, acceptable r i s k may be defined as zero r i s k - a c o n d i t i o n which could be brought about by e i t h e r banning gas tankers from the port e n t i r e l y , or by i n t r o d u c i n g such economically p r o h i b i t i v e r e g u l a t o r y c o n s t r a i n t s as to render the shipment of LPG from Vancouver u n p r o f i t a b l e . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , there i s evidence of the "zero r i s k " philosophy having had considerable impact upon d e c i s i o n s to e i t h e r p r o h i b i t , or forego, gas port development i n at l e a s t two documented ins t a n c e s . The explosion of an empty LNG storage tank on Staten I s l a n d i n 1973 subsequently l e d to a complete ban on LPG and LNG marine t e r m i n a l development i n the Port of New York.13 In Europoort, Holland, B r i t i s h Petroleum and S h e l l (Netherlands) r e c e n t l y withdrew t h e i r j o i n t proposal to construct a major new LPG import f a c i l i t y , c i t i n g the high cost of s a f e t y measures as a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r to the d e c i s i o n . 1 ^ 16 On the other hand, the case f o r l i m i t i n g r e g u l a t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i s based l a r g e l y upon economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the Trans Mountain P i p e l i n e Co. LPG production and overseas export program, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , provides jobs throughout B r i t i s h Columbia, c o n t r i b u t e s to l o c a l and r e g i o n a l tax bases, and, arguably, supports n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l o b j e c t i v e s by adding t o Canada's favourable f o r e i g n trade surplus w i t h Japan. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of economically p r o h i b i t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s could s e r i o u s l y jeopardize any or a l l of these p o s i t i v e aspects of the Trans Mountain LPG o p e r a t i o n . Given that Trans Mountain has operated i t s Westridge LPG export t e r m i n a l without serious i n c i d e n t since 1966, and that the company i s l e g a l l y e n t i t l e d to continue to operate from the Westridge f a c i l i t y , i t would seem that any recommendations emanating from t h i s t h e s i s which would support the immediate e x c l u s i o n of l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s from the port would be both premature and l a r g e l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e . In l i g h t of the preceding o b s e r v a t i o n , i t i s assumed f o r the purposes of the research t h a t : • l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r movements i n the Port of Vancouver can be managed s a f e l y and e f f i c i e n t l y w i t h i n a c e r t a i n range of c o n s t r a i n t s ; • i n view of the acknowledged hazardous nature of LPG, the operating requirements c u r r e n t l y i n e f f e c t f o r l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s i n the Port of Vancouver s h a l l represent the minimum acceptable standards, and w i l l not be diminished i n terms of scope, a p p l i c a b i l i t y , or enforcement, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the outcome of the research; • i n the absence of d e f i n i t i v e standards r e l a t i v e to the c o n s t i t u t i o n of an acceptable l e v e l of p u b l i c r i s k , the gas tanker operating r e g u l a t i o n s i n e f f e c t i n Vancouver w i l l be measured against s i m i l a r requirements i n s e v e r a l other world gas p o r t s , and i n those instances where i t can be reasonably demonstrated that the q u a l i t y or substance of s p e c i f i c r e g u l a t i o n s governing gas tanker operations l o c a l l y do not compare favourably w i t h those i n force i n the m a j o r i t y of other ports examined, the m a j o r i t y response s h a l l be viewed as the "accepted" standard f o r l o c a l implementation. 17 In t h i s manner, i t i s hoped that the f i n d i n g s and conclusions of the research w i l l serve as a r a t i o n a l basis upon which to implement a program of recommendations designed to both protect and enhance p u b l i c s a f e t y concerns i n the port (at l e a s t to the extent that they might be a f f e c t e d by the marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of LPG) without s e r i o u s l y j e o p a r d i z i n g the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the Westridge terminal operation. 1.3.4 C o n t r o l Port S e l e c t i o n C r i t e r i a In a d d i t i o n to Vancouver, a t o t a l of 10 separate European and American gas port operations were examined i n d e t a i l . The purpose of the port s e l e c t i o n process was to i d e n t i f y gas ports which d i s p l a y many of the bas i c p h y s i c a l or l e g i s l a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are common to the Port of Vancouver i n order that a meaningful comparative assessment of gas tanker operating requirements might be undertaken. Table 1.1 P h y s i c a l / L e g i s l a t i v e Considerations C h a r a c t e r i s t i c Port Boston, MA Cove P o i n t , MD Elba I s l a n d , GA Los Angeles, CA New York, NY Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. Europoort, Holland Le Havre, France Porsgrunn, Norway Zeebrugge, Belgium Those ports d i s p l a y i n g four or more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s common to the Port of Vancouver - i n c l u d i n g the e s s e n t i a l c r i t e r i o n that the gas t e r m i n a l must be s i t u a t e d i n an urban s e t t i n g - were sel e c t e d to form the basis f o r reg u l a t o r y comparison w i t h Vancouver. The s i n g l e exception was the Port of 18 New York which, d e s p i t e the existence of both the f a c i l i t i e s to serve the deepsea l i q u e f i e d gas trade and an approved Coast Guard operating plan f o r LPG and LNG, has chosen to exclude gas c a r r i e r s f o r a v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l and p u b l i c s a f e t y reasons. Thus, the f o r e i g n gas ports which w i l l be examined i n greater d e t a i l i n c l u d e : Boston, Massachusetts Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. Europoort, Holland Le Havre, France •the p r o p e r t i e s , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and p o t e n t i a l hazards associated w i t h LPG and LNG; •the composition and operating h i s t o r y of the world l i q u e f i e d gas tanker f l e e t , i n c l u d i n g the safe t y record of t h i s f l e e t ; • l i q u e f i e d gas tanker design and s a f e t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; •the basic market c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l marine trade i n l i q u e f i e d gases, and the nature of i t s attendant s e r v i c e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ; • s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e and r e g u l a t o r y p r o v i s i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to a l l aspects of the LPG and LNG trades, but emphasizing the marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n component; •the a t t i t u d e s , p erceptions, and opinions of p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y , government r e g u l a t o r y agencies, and the general p u b l i c as they r e l a t e to the LPG/LNG sa f e t y question; and •issues p e r t a i n i n g to any other s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of the production, storage, and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of hazardous m a t e r i a l s g e n e r a l l y . 1.3.5 Methodology 1.3.5.1 Compilation of Background M a t e r i a l Purpose: To gather support documentation r e l a t i v e t o: 19 Sources: i ) L i t e r a t u r e Review •government documents •government l e g i s l a t i o n and r e g u l a t i o n s • t e c h n i c a l and shipping j o u r n a l s "newspapers •industry-sponsored p r o j e c t i n f o r m a t i o n brochures •published l i t e r a r y accounts d e a l i n g w i t h the LPG and LNG i n d u s t r i e s •marine sa f e t y manuals governing the handling of LPG and LNG c a r r i e r s •academic/technical papers on the t o p i c of r i s k a n a l y s i s / r i s k management theory i i ) P r o f e s s i o n a l Contacts A d e t a i l e d l i s t of o r g a n i z a t i o n s contacted i n conjunction w i t h the research i s included i n Sectio n C of the B i b l i o g r a p h y . 1.3.5.2 F i e l d I n v e s t i g a t i o n Purpose: In order to gain a broader p e r s p e c t i v e on the marine LPG/LNG trade, the p o t e n t i a l hazards a s s o c i a t e d therewith, and the nature of the l e g i s l a t i v e / r e g u l a t o r y responses to those hazards, f i e l d research was conducted i n s e v e r a l European countries during the spring of 1980. The f i e l d i n v e s t i g a t i o n addressed the f o l l o w i n g : a) C o n s i d e r a t i o n : Review and r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of r e g u l a t o r y standards i n overseas p o r t s . Response: Meetings were held w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the Ports of Rotterdam and Le Havre to d i s c u s s , i n d e t a i l , the nature and perceived adequacy of the s p e c i a l LPG/LNG shipping requirements i n e f f e c t i n these harbours. 20 b) C o n s i d e r a t i o n : Examination of LPG/LNG tanker c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y . Response: V i s i t s to two of the world's foremost b u i l d e r s of l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s - Kockums Shipyards of Malmo, Sweden and Moss Werft of Moss, Norway -were arranged i n order to o b t a i n greater i n s i g h t i n t o both the s p e c i a l t e c h n i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s inherent i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of l i q u e f i e d gas tankers, and the economic s t a t e of the LPG/LNG shipping i n d u s t r y as a whole. c) C o n s i d e r a t i o n : Assessment of r i s k a n a l y s i s and impact f o r e c a s t i n g techniques as they r e l a t e to the marine shipment of LPG and LNG. Response: The Norwegian ship c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o c i e t y Det norske V e r i t a s , and the consultant engineering f i r m SOGREAH, which operates the Port Revel Marine Research and T r a i n i n g Centre near Grenoble, France provided valuable background i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i v e to LPG/LNG r i s k a n a l y s i s techniques and ship handling c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1.3.5.3 A n a l y s i s  Conceptual Framework The establishment of r e g u l a t i o n s designed to govern the safe s i t i n g , c o n s t r u c t i o n and operation of large scale l i q u e f i e d gas import/export te r m i n a l s has h i s t o r i c a l l y been i n f l u e n c e d by two general a n a l y t i c a l concepts - q u a l i t a t i v e assessment (based upon p r a c t i c a l experience, p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment, and a l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the a v a i l a b l e data); and s t a t i s t i c a l f o r e c a s t i n g techniques i n v o l v i n g accident p r o b a b i l i t y a n a l y s i s and hazard impact modelling. The a p p l i c a t i o n of r i s k a n a l y s i s as a means of a s s i s t i n g i n the determination of appropriate r e g u l a t o r y standards f o r high r i s k commercial development p r o j e c t s dates back more than two decades. In 1957, the Brookhaven N a t i o n a l Laboratory produced a c o n t r o v e r s i a l report e n t i t l e d " T h e o r e t i c a l P o s s i b i l i t i e s and Consequences of Major Accidents i n Large 21 Nuclear Power P l a n t s " (more commonly known as the WASH-740 study). WASH-740 represented something of a breakthrough i n that i t l e g i t i m i z e d the use of r i s k a n a l y s i s as a v a l i d accident and impact f o r e c a s t i n g t o o l w i t h i n the context of p u b l i c s e c t o r p r o j e c t s . I t was not u n t i l the mid-1970's that r i s k a n a l y s i s began to emerge as a recognized a i d i n determining the s u i t a b i l i t y of s p e c i f i c gas t e r m i n a l development proposals. P r i o r to that time, r e g u l a t o r y o f f i c i a l s i n most e s t a b l i s h e d gas ports had tended to overlook the p r o b a b i l i t y of a major LPG or LNG accident o c c u r r i n g , or the l i k e l y e f f e c t s (impact) r e s u l t i n g from such events. Instead, the regulatory emphasis remained more or le s s i n accordance with the enforcement of e s t a b l i s h e d c o n s t r u c t i o n and management procedures, augmented by any s p e c i a l operating p r o v i s i o n s which may have been deemed necessary, given the nature of the cargoes i n question. Today, r i s k a n a l y s i s forms an i n t e g r a l part of the LNG and LPG approvals process i n most, i f not a l l , western nations. Nevertheless, i n s p i t e of the many t e c h n i c a l and methodological improvements which have evolved since the days of the WASH-740 r e p o r t , r i s k a n a l y s i s i t s e l f remains the object of considerable controversy. Many of the shortcomings a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r i s k a n a l y s i s as i t a p p l i e s to the LNG i n d u s t r y are c i t e d i n the book "Frozen F i r e " by Lee N. Davis. In p a r t i c u l a r , Davis concentrates on a number of problems inherent i n two separate LNG r i s k a n a l y s i s s t u d i e s undertaken during the mid-1970's. The f i r s t , prepared i n 1974, examines the p r o b a b i l i t y of a major LNG shipping accident at proposed terminals at both Staten I s l a n d and Providence, Rhode I s l a n d . 1 ^ The report has been c r i t i c i z e d by W i l l i a m B. F a i r l e y , a former Harvard p r o f e s s o r of s t a t i s t i c s , on the basis that i t makes many unsupported and u n r e a l i s t i c assumptions i n the absence of a d e t a i l e d common data base.17 22 The second study was prepared i n 1976 by Science A p p l i c a t i o n s Inc. (SAI) f o r the purpose of determining the p o t e n t i a l r i s k s a s s o c i a t e d with the operation of a proposed LNG t e r m i n a l i n C a l i f o r n i a . Davis questions the v a l i d i t y of the a n a l y s i s , c i t i n g the rather l i m i t e d l i s t of i d e n t i f i e d " i n i t i a t i n g events" which could lead to serious shipboard or t e r m i n a l a c c i d e n t s . According to Davis, among the p o t e n t i a l i n i t i a t i n g events not included i n the SAI r i s k assessment were the f o l l o w i n g : I** •No component rat e f a i l u r e data ( i c e clogging v a l v e s , instrument malfunctions, e t c . ) ; •High winds, tornadoes, storm waves, tsunamis, f l o o d i n g ; •Earthquakes •Chance of moored LNG c a r r i e r being s t r u c k by another v e s s e l ; •Ship groundings, e x p l o s i o n s , s i n k i n g s , e t c . •Accident at nearby hazardous m a t e r i a l s i n s t a l l a t i o n spreading to LNG t e r m i n a l ; •LNG road tanker a c c i d e n t s ; •Human e r r o r ; •Sabotage; •Emergency cargo j e t t i s o n from LNG c a r r i e r . There i s no doubt that many of the i n i t i a t i n g events i d e n t i f i e d by Davis as having been e i t h e r discounted or overlooked i n the SAI report can lead (and, i n some i n s t a n c e s , have already l e d ) to serious accident s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g LNG. In view of the f a c t that both the New York/Providence and C a l i f o r n i a r i s k analyses were among the e a r l i e s t such a p p l i c a t i o n s to circumstances i n v o l v i n g LNG te r m i n a l s and shipping a c t i v i t i e s , one might reasonably a n t i c i p a t e problems of a methodological or i n t e r p r e t a t i v e nature, based 2 3 upon a l a c k of h i s t o r i c a l precedent or s p e c i f i c knowledge of the i s s u e s . However, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that B.C. Hydro r e c e n t l y commissioned a C a l i f o r n i a f i r m , Energy Resources Company (ERCO), to undertake a r i s k a n a l y s i s on Hydro's proposed Sasamat LNG peak shaving p l a n t , s i t u a t e d some 20 ki l o m e t r e s east of Vancouver. The ERCO a n a l y s i s concluded th a t : ...only a number of types of events are p l a u s i b l e which could cause (a major s p i l l of LNG). These events are a i r c r a f t impact on the tank or an earthquake exceeding the tank design. Based on the design of the proposed f a c i l i t y , events such as meteorite impact, o p e r a t i o n a l f a i l u r e of the tank or a severe windstorm (tornado) are of such low p r o b a b i l i t i e s to render them i n s i g n i f i c a n t . Only large j e t a i r c r a f t were found to possess the required weight and speed to cause a p e n e t r a t i o n and c o l l a p s e of the planned tank... Although a major earthquake has a r e l a t i v e l y high p r o b a b i l i t y of occurrence, i t i s not considered as an i n i t i a t i n g event because the tank would be designed to withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake. The design considers the maximum c r e d i b l e earthquakes f o r the a r e a . l ^ Once again, such p l a u s i b l e i n i t i a t i n g events as human e r r o r , a c t s of sabotage, or design, engineering, and c o n s t r u c t i o n f a u l t s have been completely discounted. Recent d i s c u s s i o n s with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Hydro's Gas Engineering D i v i s i o n i n d i c a t e that the company i s cognizant of the apparent d e f i c i e n c i e s i n the ERCO study, and w i l l attempt to e i t h e r r e c t i f y the s i t u a t i o n or l i m i t the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the a n a l y s i s i n terms of the o v e r a l l p r o j e c t j u s t i f i c a t i o n process.20 The second important component of r i s k a n a l y s i s , i n a d d i t i o n to determining the p r o b a b i l i t y of an a c c i d e n t , i s f o r e c a s t i n g the p o t e n t i a l impact of the event upon the surrounding community. The impact i s g e n e r a l l y measured i n terms of l o s s of l i f e , p h y s i c a l damage, depreciated property v a l u e s , or l o s s of p r o d u c t i v i t y . As a r u l e , impact modelling tends to be l e s s p r e c i s e than i s e s t a b l i s h i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of a serious a c c i d e n t a l event. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true with regard to f o r e c a s t i n g the nature and probable e f f e c t s of a large volume a c c i d e n t a l discharge of LPG or LNG on p u b l i c s a f e t y . The amount of p r a c t i c a l research undertaken to date on l i q u e f i e d gas s p i l l 24 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s vapour cloud d i s p e r s i o n patterns has been l i m i t e d . Among the o r g a n i z a t i o n s most a c t i v e l y i nvolved with the study of c o n t r o l l e d discharges of LNG and LPG have been the United States Coast Guard (on various occasions at the U.S Naval Weapons Centre, China Lake, C a l i f o r n i a ) , S h e l l O i l (aboard the LNG c a r r i e r G a d i l a i n 1973, and at Maplin Sands, Essex during the summer of 1980), and the Government of France (near Fos-sur-Mer during the e a r l y 1970's). Two s i g n i f i c a n t features emerge which are common to a l l of the above-noted t e s t s . F i r s t l y , i n most instances the volume of gas discharged seldom exceeded 20 cubic metres. The l a r g e s t c o n t r o l l e d discharge i n v o l v e d the j e t t i s o n i n g of 193 cubic metres from the B r i t i s h LNG c a r r i e r G a d i l a . 2 ^ I n r e l a t i v e terms, t h i s amount represented j u s t over 1% of the c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y of any one of Gadila's f i v e 15 000 cubic metre cargo tanks. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the United States Coast Guard has i n d i c a t e d t h a t , i n i t i a l l y , the maximum c r e d i b l e a c c i d e n t a l s p i l l aboard an LNG c a r r i e r would i n v o l v e the discharge of the contents of one tank - o r , i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , 15 000 cubic m e t r e s . 2 2 In order to apply the t e s t r e s u l t s to a c r e d i b l e s i t u a t i o n l e v e l , they must be enhanced s u b s t a n t i a l l y - a process which, i n i t s e l f , i s dependent upon considerable q u a l i t a t i v e judgment and p r o f e s s i o n a l c o n j e c t u r e . Thus, i n the absence of any hard data on la r g e s p i l l behaviour, s c i e n t i s t s are forced to speculate on the v a l i d i t y of t h e i r own s p i l l d i s p e r s i o n modelling techniques. The second noteworthy c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of c o n t r o l l e d discharge and i g n i t i o n t e s t s i n v o l v i n g l i q u e f i e d gases i s that the emphasis has always been upon LNG, r a t h e r than LPG. In f a c t , of the four gas discharge t e s t i n g programs mentioned i n the preceding paragraph, only the U.S. Coast Guard and S h e l l O i l (at the Maplin Sands t e s t s i t e ) have undertaken c o n t r o l l e d LPG rel e a s e experiments. In each i n s t a n c e , the LPG t e s t s have been secondary to simultaneously- conducted LNG discharge monitoring programs, a f a c t o r which 25 has been acknowledged by the U.S. Coast Guard.23 The net r e s u l t i s t h a t , w h ile the s p i l l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f o r volumes of LNG up to about 20 cubic metres have been f a i r l y w e l l documented, the same i s not true f o r LPG. Hence, the l i n k between small and l a r g e LPG s p i l l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s even more dependent upon conjecture than i s the case f o r LNG. The problem i s compounded by the f a c t that few r i s k a n a l y s i s a p p l i c a t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to the marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of LPG have been undertaken to date. C l e a r l y , there remain a number of serious l i m i t a t i o n s w i t h regard to the a p p l i c a t i o n of r i s k a n a l y s i s methods to l a r g e - s c a l e l i q u e f i e d gas t e r m i n a l and shipping operations. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i n the absence of a wholly r e l i a b l e q u a n t i t a t i v e methodology, the United States Coast Guard... ...does not use a f o r m a l i z e d r i s k a n a l y s i s procedure i n which the p r o b a b i l i t i e s of accident and major cargo r e l e a s e f o r each type of accident are q u a n t i f i e d and combined w i t h a damage estimate to o b t a i n a numerical value of r i s k f o r comparison with other r i s k s encountered by the p u b l i c . The c a p a b i l i t y f o r such a rigourous technique i s under development f o r general use with a l l hazardous m a t e r i a l s and a l l water t r a n s p o r t a t i o n systems but, at present, a q u a l i t a t i v e approach i s used i n which cargo hazards and accident r i s k s are considered and expert judgment used to determine proper preventive measures.24 A n a l y t i c a l Approach The r a t i o n a l e f o r undertaking the research i s based upon the key underlying assumptions th a t : a) loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d gas c a r r i e r s represent a s u b s t a n t i a l l y greater threat to p u b l i c safety than do conventional cargo s h i p s ; b) loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d gas c a r r i e r s operating w i t h i n the confines of a r e s t r i c t e d harbour, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the q u a l i t y of the s a f e t y r e g u l a t i o n s i n f o r c e , cannot be rendered t o t a l l y immune from the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p o t e n t i a l l y c a t a s t r o p h i c a c c i d e n t ; c) the i m p o s i t i o n of new, or upgraded, safety requirements can serve to reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of a serious accident o c c u r r i n g . 26 Each of the preceding assumptions i s e i t h e r t a c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y recognized i n v i r t u a l l y every l i q u e f i e d gas port i n the world, as evidenced by the common p r a c t i c e of imposing s p e c i a l operating c o n s t r a i n t s on l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s . The degree to which gas c a r r i e r s are perceived to present a sa f e t y r i s k to the community i s r e f l e c t e d by the extent to which a d d i t i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n s have been introduced. In the majority of world gas ports - and t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y true f o r LPG ports - the r e g u l a t i o n s governing the safe movement of gas c a r r i e r s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been based more upon sound p r o f e s s i o n a l and t e c h n i c a l judgment than upon r i s k a n a l y s i s or impact assessment s t u d i e s . The o v e r r i d i n g o b j e c t i v e of t h i s t h e s i s i s to ensure that the l e v e l of regu l a t o r y response to the perceived p u b l i c s a f e t y hazards posed by the movement of l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s i n the Port of Vancouver e i t h e r meets, or exceeds, the consensus re g u l a t o r y standards f o r s p e c i f i c o p e r a t i o n a l s a f e t y requirements i n place i n the c o n t r o l ports described i n S e c t i o n 1.3.4. In f i v e of the s i x gas ports which have been examined i n d e t a i l , the e x i s t i n g shipping r e g u l a t i o n s have evolved s o l e l y on the stren g t h of q u a l i t a t i v e assessment techniques based upon p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment.* In the i n t e r e s t s of e s t a b l i s h i n g a common, comparable information base, i t i s suggested that the undertaking of a d e t a i l e d r i s k a n a l y s i s f o r the Port of Vancouver would serve l i t t l e purpose unless s i m i l a r studies were conducted f o r Boston, Los Angeles, Canvey I s l a n d , and Le Havre. Severe cost and data c o l l e c t i o n c o n s t r a i n t s render t h i s l a t t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i m p r a c t i c a l w i t h i n the context *The exception was the i l l - f a t e d Shell/B.P. LPG t e r m i n a l proposal f o r Europoort, which was subjected to a r i s k a n a l y s i s and impact assessment program. The r e s u l t s of these studies are not a v a i l a b l e . 27 of t h i s research. Thus, the comparative assessment of l i q u e f i e d gas port r e g u l a t i o n s conducted h e r e i n w i l l be based upon the " r a t i o n a l man" a n a l y t i c a l approach which has long been adhered to by the U.S. Coast Guard and other port r e g u l a t o r y agencies around the world. 28 FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1.0 1 "Four run f o r l i v e s under t r a i n a c c i d e n t " The P r o v i n c e , 30 August 1978, p. 11. I b i d . ; and Beak Consultants, Chemical Hazard E v a l u a t i o n of the Maplewood  Chemical Industry (Vancouver: 1978), p. 127. 3 "'Damn lucky i t didn't blow,' say crew on propane t r a i n , " The Vancouver  Sun, 29 August 1978, p. A l . 4 " V o l r i c h c a l l s f o r s t r i c t curbs as gas f e l l s 78", The Vancouver Sun, 26 September 1978, p. A l ; and "Chlorine gas cloud i n c i t y sends 32 to h o s p i t a l " , The Province, 26 September 1978, p. 1. 5 "Council advised to put the whip to CP R a i l g i a n t " , The P r o v i n c e , 30 October 1981. 6 "Hazards cleanup given green l i g h t " , North Shore News, 21 October 1981. ^ N. I r v i n g Sax, Dangerous P r o p e r t i e s of I n d u s t r i a l M a t e r i a l s (New York: Van Nostrand Rheinhold Company, 5th ed., 1979), pp. 658-659; and N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e of Occupational Safety and Health, R e g i s t r y of Toxic E f f e c t s of  Chemical Substances 1978 (Washington: U.S. Department of Heal t h , Education and Welfare, January 1979), p. 529. 8 "Dow Chemical Pl a n t 'Safe'", The (North Shore) C i t i z e n , 28 March 1979, p. 1. ^ L e t t e r from Captain T. Elworthy, A s s i s t a n t Harbour Master, Port of Vancouver, t o J . Marston, dated 22 November 1979. 10 L e t t e r from J . Marston to Captain H. Vondette, Harbour Master, Port of Vancouver, dated 16 November 1979. 11 "Payload turns tanker i n t o f l o a t i n g bomb", The Vancouver Sun, 14 November 1979. 12 Community Hazards Task Force, North Vancouver Community Hazards Task  Force - F i n a l Report (North Vancouver: November 1980), p. 11. 13 Based upon i n f o r m a t i o n contained i n a l e t t e r from Mr. P a u l Roshkind, Manager, Marketing S e r v i c e s , Port of New York and New Jersey to J . Marston, dated 4 January 1980. 1^ " C o n t r o v e r s i a l LPG p l a n at Europoort wins approval," Lloyd's L i s t , 9 November 1981. 15 United States (Atomic Energy Commission), T h e o r e t i c a l P o s s i b i l i t i e s and  Consequences of Major Accidents i n Large Nucleur Power P l a n t s " , March 1957. 16 Theodore W. Horner and Ecosystems I n c . , " P r o b a b i l i t y Assessment of LNG Ship Accidents i n the New York and Providence Harbors", Report to the Federal Power Commission, Bureau of N a t u r a l Gas, 1974, as c i t e d i n Lee N. Davis, Frozen F i r e (San F r a n c i s c o : Friends of the Earth, 1979), pp. 135-138. 29 n W i l l i a m B. F a i r l e y , "Evaluating the 'small' p r o b a b i l i t y of a c a t a s t r o p h i c accident from the marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas", S t a t i s t i c s and P u b l i c P o l i c y (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1977), pp. 340-346. 18 Information on SAI r i s k assessment obtained from C a l i f o r n i a S t a t e L e g i s l a t u r e , Assembly Subcommittee on Energy, L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas, Hearings  J u l y 1976 (Sacramento, 1977), pp. 43-83, 568-571, as c i t e d i n Davis, op. c i t . , pp. 139-140. 19 Energy Resources Co. Inc., Risk A n a l y s i s on Sasamat S i t e Gas Storage  Plant (Torrance: November 1981). 2 0 Interview w i t h Mr. C. M i l l e r , B.C. Hydro (Gas Engineering D i v i s i o n ) , 25 August 1982. 21 Davis, op. c i t . , pp. 42-44. 22 U.S. Coast Guard (Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) , L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas  and L i q u e f i e d Petroleum Gas - Views and P r a c t i c e s (Washington, D.C: c i r c a February 1980), p. 13. 23 U.S. Coast Guard, op. c i t . , pp. 30-32; and " S h e l l to r e l e a s e and i g n i t e LNG at Maplin Sands", Lloyd's L i s t , 2 May 1980. 24 U.S. Coast Guard, op. c i t . , p. 8. 30 2.0 TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS BY MARINE MODE: LEGISLATIVE STRUCTURE 2.1 Marine Terminal S i t i n g Considerations S i g n i f i c a n t l y , and somewhat i r o n i c a l l y , given the high degree of media exposure afforded the long-standing controversy surrounding the dual question of o i l tanker s a f e t y and o i l port development on the west coast, the gradual (and co n t i n u i n g ) e v o l u t i o n of the hazardous m a t e r i a l s trade i n the Port of Vancouver has gone l a r g e l y unnoticed and, as such, unquestioned by the general p u b l i c . The i r o n y i s complete when one considers that many of the substances which are now r o u t i n e l y transported by c o a s t a l and deepsea vess e l s on the waters of Burrard I n l e t - i n c l u d i n g LPG, l i q u i d c h l o r i n e , methanol, and ethylene d i c h l o r i d e - would normally represent a greater p o t e n t i a l hazard to p u b l i c s a f e t y i n the event of a major u n c o n t r o l l e d discharge than would a l a r g e s p i l l of crude o i l . There are s e v e r a l reasons why t h i s s i t u a t i o n has been allowed to develop, foremost among which i s the basic nature of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e f o r the Port of Vancouver. J u r i s d i c t i o n over the port i s vested p r i m a r i l y w i t h a s i n g l e f e d e r a l agency - the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board (N.H.B.). The Board i s , to v a r y i n g degrees, r e s p o n s i b l e f o r such d i v e r s e f u n c t i o n s as port marketing, s e c u r i t y , t e r m i n a l management, the promulgation and enforcement of ship and shoreside o p e r a t i o n a l safety r e g u l a t i o n s , and harbour planning and development. I t i s a l s o the l a r g e s t s i n g l e a d m i n i s t r a t o r of developed and r e a d i l y developable waterfront property on Burrard I n l e t - property which i s l e g a l l y exempt from l o c a l or p r o v i n c i a l land use r e s t r i c t i o n s due to i t s f e d e r a l ownership s t a t u s . Because of t h i s e x t r a o r d i n a r y span of o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l , the Board i s i n a p o s i t i o n to e x e r c i s e a considerable amount of ( d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t ) i n f l u e n c e over the dis s e m i n a t i o n of p u b l i c 31 i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i v e to v i r t u a l l y every aspect of port business, i n c l u d i n g those having to do w i t h the trade of hazardous m a t e r i a l s . A second important c o n s i d e r a t i o n has been the h i s t o r i c a l absence of any mandatory p r o v i s i o n i n Canadian law whereby the proponents of p o t e n t i a l l y high impact harbour development p r o j e c t s (such as the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a hazardous m a t e r i a l s storage and transshipment depot) would a u t o m a t i c a l l y be required to inform the p u b l i c as to the nature of the scheme, and to s o l i c i t p u b l i c feedback on the proposal p r i o r to r e c e i v i n g f i n a l p r o j e c t approval. This i s i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t to the American experience where, under the terms of the N a t i o n a l Environmental P o l i c y Act (NEPA, 1969), the p u b l i c r i g h t to examine major development proposals i s guaranteed from an e a r l y stage i n the approval process. Moreover, safeguards have been b u i l t i n t o the American l e g i s l a t i o n to ensure that f i n a l p r o j e c t approval w i l l not be forthcoming u n t i l such time as the p r o j e c t sponsor i s judged by government r e g u l a t o r y agencies to have taken s u i t a b l e measures to m i t i g a t e a l l l e g i t i m a t e p u b l i c concerns. F i n a l l y , i n the absence of s p e c i f i c requirements to the c o n t r a r y , there has been a general reluctance on the part of many act o r s i n v o l v e d i n l o c a l port development - p a r t i c u l a r l y development r e l a t i n g to the storage and handling of dangerous m a t e r i a l s - to inform the p u b l i c as to the nature of these a c t i v i t i e s . R e g r e t t a b l y , t h i s p r a c t i c e i s not r e s t r i c t e d s o l e l y to p r i v a t e operations, but i s t a c i t l y endorsed by a number of government bodies having a vested f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t i n the development of the harbour, i n c l u d i n g the Harbours Board and, from time to time, various waterfront m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . The recent Dow Chemical experience, as described i n S e c t i o n 1.2, g r a p h i c a l l y underscores these l i m i t a t i o n s . 32 Nevertheless, the f a c t remains that government agencies at a l l l e v e l s do, to varying degrees, possess the inherent l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y to c o n t r o l the s i t i n g and operation of f a c i l i t i e s engaged i n the p r o d u c t i o n , storage, and d i s t r i b u t i o n of dangerous goods. The extent to which these r e g u l a t o r y powers can be e f f e c t i v e y a p p l i e d i n terms of both s e r v i n g and p r o t e c t i n g the best i n t e r e s t s of the p u b l i c , however, w i l l be wholly dependent upon a thorough knowledge on the part of the appropriate r e g u l a t o r y agencies as to the nature and range of the hazards presented by the p l a n t / t e r m i n a l operation, and upon an uncompromising commitment to ensuring the highest standards of community s a f e t y . Unfortunately, while the necessary a u t h o r i t i e s required to regulate a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v i n g dangerous m a t e r i a l s are, by and l a r g e , i n p l a c e , due to the o f t e n s u b j e c t i v e nature as to what c o n s t i t u t e s a "hazard" to the community, and to what degree, the extent to which r u l e s governing these operations are a p p l i e d and enforced w i t h i n the context of the e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i v e s t r u c t u r e i s o f t e n open to broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t i s the contention of the t h e s i s t h a t , as a consequence of these i n t e r p r e t a t i v e d e f i c i e n c i e s , the q u a l i t y of r e g u l a t i o n s governing c e r t a i n hazardous m a t e r i a l s operations w i t h i n the Port of Vancouver ( i n c l u d i n g those a f f e c t i n g the marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of LPG and other chemical/petrochemical products) are, e i t h e r u n w i t t i n g l y or by design, i n s u f f i c i e n t to ensure an adequate l e v e l of p u b l i c s a f e t y when compared with the r e g u l a t o r y standards governing s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s i n other western i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s . 2.2 P e r t i n e n t Hazardous Marine Terminal S i t i n g L e g i s l a t i o n 2.2.1 F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i o n 2.2.1.1 Navigable Waters P r o t e c t i o n Act-*-The Navigable Waters P r o t e c t i o n Act (NWPA) i s administered by the M i n i s t r y of Transport. One of the p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s Act i s to r e g u l a t e 33 F i g u r e H a z a r d o u s V a n c o u v e r M a t e r i a l s o n W a t e r f r o n t 34 c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h i n designated Canadian navigable waters. In t h i s r espect, S e c t i o n 10(1) of the Act s t a t e s t h a t : ...the Governor-in-Council may make such orders as he deems expedient f o r n a v i g a t i o n purposes r e s p e c t i n g any work to which t h i s Part a p p l i e s . . . While no s p e c i f i c reference i s made i n the Act to the r e g u l a t i o n of ve s s e l s t r a n s p o r t i n g hazardous m a t e r i a l s , the NWPA i s a key element i n the su c c e s s f u l a p p l i c a t i o n of the Canadian Coast Guard's "v o l u n t a r y " Termpol Code (see S e c t i o n 2.2.1.2). That i s to say, while the Termpol Code i s not a mandatory requirement i n the s t r i c t e s t sense of the word, f a i l u r e on the part of a gas or o i l t e r m i n a l proponent to provide the b a s i c i n f o r m a t i o n requested i n the Termpol Code may cause Coast Guard o f f i c i a l s to w i t h o l d necessary permits f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n of marine works a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the proposal, as required under the terms of the NWPA. 2.2.1.2 Termpol Code 2 The Termpol Code evolved during the mid-1970's i n response to p u b l i c concern over major o i l port proposals on Canada's east and west coas t s . In 1979, the Code was amended to include LNG and LPG marine t e r m i n a l proposals. E s s e n t i a l l y , the Termpol Code i s a voluntary process whereby the proponents of marine o i l or gas terminals are requested to submit to the Coast Guard a d e t a i l e d assessment as to the nature of the p r o j e c t , p a r t i c u l a r s on the co n s t r u c t i o n and p h y s i c a l lay-out of the f a c i l i t y , an i n d i c a t i o n as to the type and volume of marine t r a f f i c which w i l l be generated, a r i s k a n a l y s i s , and a statement of major p o t e n t i a l impacts and m i t i g a t i n g measures. 35 The Termpol Code i s administered by the Canadian Coast Guard. The proponent submissions, however, are reviewed by an appointed committee of experts from various f e d e r a l departments and agencies, under the chairmanship of a Coast Guard r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . To date, only one l i q u e f i e d gas proposal - the A r c t i c P i l o t P r o j e c t ( f o r d e t a i l s r e f e r to Appendix IV) has undergone the f u l l Termpol assessment. The p r o j e c t was deemed acceptable by the Termpol committee, subject to compliance w i t h c e r t a i n fundamental recommendations.3 Two other proposals, the Rimgas LNG p r o j e c t and the Western LNG p r o j e c t ( f o r d e t a i l s r e f e r to Appendix IV) are c u r r e n t l y being reviewed by a Termpol committee. I t i s f u r t h e r speculated that the Termpol Code w i l l be extended i n the near future to i n c l u d e proposed chemical and petrochemical port development, as w e l l . The Termpol Code cannot be r e t r o a c t i v e l y a p p l i e d to t e r m i n a l operations which are already i n place. 2.2.1.3 Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP)^ The Environmental Assessment and Review Process was introduced i n 1973 f o r the purpose of ensuring t h a t : a) environmental e f f e c t s are taken i n t o account e a r l y i n the planning of new f e d e r a l p r o j e c t s , programs, and a c t i v i t i e s ; b) an environmental assessment i s c a r r i e d out f o r a l l p r o j e c t s which may have an adverse e f f e c t on the environment before commitments or i r r e v o c a b l e d e c i s i o n s are made; and c) the r e s u l t s of these assessments are used i n p l a n n i n g , d e c i s i o n -making and implementation. 36 The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a d m i n i s t e r i n g EARP r e s t s w i t h the F e d e r a l Environmental Assessment Review O f f i c e (FEARO), which i s u l t i m a t e l y accountable to the M i n i s t e r of the Environment. There are two key c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to bear i n mind when examining EARP. F i r s t , i t i s a p p l i c a b l e only to p r o j e c t s that are i n i t i a t e d by f e d e r a l departments or agencies, that i n v o l v e f e d e r a l property, or where f e d e r a l funding a s s i s t a n c e has been s o l i c i t e d . Second, the process i n place i s based on the concept of self-assessment. In other words, f e d e r a l departments and agencies are responsible f o r a s s e s s i n g the environmental consequences of t h e i r own p r o j e c t s , or those which they sponsor, and f o r d e c i d i n g on the a n t i c i p a t e d environmental s i g n i f i c a n c e of the proposal. In the event a department/agency decides that the environmental impact i s l i k e l y to be i n s i g n i f i c a n t , no f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s w i l l be r e q u i r e d . For the most p a r t , p r o j e c t s are e i t h e r screened out of the EARP process, or are subjected to m i t i g a t i n g s t r a t e g i e s at the departmental l e v e l . However, p r o j e c t s which are deemed to present an environmental impact p o t e n t i a l that cannot be e f f e c t i v e l y m i t i g a t e d at the departmental l e v e l are submitted to a formal Environmental Assessment Panel. This panel i s normally comprised of between four and s i x experts (from w i t h i n and without the f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e ) whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i t i s . . . ...to review the environmental consequences of a s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t and i t s a l t e r n a t i v e s , and to evaluate the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the environmental impacts that might r e s u l t from implementing the p r o j e c t . Under the d i r e c t i o n of the Panel, the proponent department w i l l be r equired to sponsor a d e t a i l e d Environmental Impact Statement - a document which w i l l subsequently form the b a s i s f o r the Panel review, and act as a sounding board f o r p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Both the terms of reference f o r the Impact Statement, and the a c t u a l document i t s e l f , w i l l be made a v a i l a b l e to the 37 p u b l i c p r i o r to any recommendations being submitted r e l a t i v e to whether or not the p r o j e c t should proceed. Subsequent to t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n having been d i s t r i b u t e d , the Panel w i l l arrange to meet with the p u b l i c i n order to receive b r i e f s from any i n d i v i d u a l s or groups who wish to express t h e i r opinions on the matter. Based upon the combined r e s u l t s of the Impact Statement, the p u b l i c i n p u t , and any other i n f o r m a t i o n which may be considered a p p r o p r i a t e , the Panel w i l l prepare and submit i t s f i n a l recommendations on the p r o j e c t to the M i n i s t e r of the Environment. The recommendations are not b i n d i n g . To date, none of the proposed west coast l i q u e f i e d gas or petrochemical t e r m i n a l p r o j e c t s have been f o r m a l l y l i n k e d to the EARP process. However, i n the event f e d e r a l lands are involved i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h one or more of these p r o j e c t s (as may be the case w i t h N a t i o n a l Harbours Board land at P r i n c e Rupert), i t i s l i k e l y that review panels w i l l be appointed. 2.2.1.4 F i s h e r i e s A c t 5 S e c t i o n 2 of the F i s h e r i e s Act defines "Canadian f i s h e r i e s waters" as: . . . a l l waters i n the f i s h i n g zones of Canada, a l l waters i n the t e r r i t o r i a l sea of Canada and a l l i n t e r n a l waters of Canada. Under the heading of " I n j u r y to f i s h i n g grounds and p o l l u t i o n s of waters", the Act e x p r e s s l y f o r b i d s the i n t r o d u c t i o n of "...chemical substances, or drugs, poisonous matter...or any other d e l e t e r i o u s substances or t h i n g . . . ( i n t o ) any waters frequented by f i s h . . . " ( S e c t i o n 3 3 ( 2 ) ) . Furthermore, the Governor i n Council i s , under the p r o v i s i o n s of the A c t , vested w i t h the a u t h o r i t y f o r i n t r o d u c i n g r e g u l a t i o n s r e s p e c t i n g the o b s t r u c t i o n and p o l l u t i o n of waters frequented by f i s h ( S e c t i o n 34(h)). 38 Thus, chemical or petrochemical t e r m i n a l proposals which could, under c e r t a i n circumstances, r e s u l t i n the ( c o n t r o l l e d or u n c o n t r o l l e d ) discharge of substances deemed by the Governor i n C o u n c i l to be p o t e n t i a l l y d e l e t e r i o u s to f i s h must f i r s t secure approval from the Department of F i s h e r i e s & Oceans. 2.2.1.5 N a t i o n a l Harbours Board A c t b Section 14 of the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board Act defines the b a s i c terms by which the Board can i n f l u e n c e or c o n t r o l hazardous m a t e r i a l s t e r m i n a l s i t e s e l e c t i o n i n NHB p o r t s : 1 4 ( l ) t h e Governor i n C o u n c i l may make by-laws... f o r the d i r e c t i o n , conduct and government of the Board and i t s employees, and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , management and c o n t r o l of the s e v e r a l harbours, works and property under i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n c l u d i n g : (b) ...the l e a s i n g or allotment of any harbour property under the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Board... (c) the r e g u l a t i o n s of the c o n s t r u c t i o n and maintenance of wharves, p i e r s , b u i l d i n g s or any other s t r u c t u r e s w i t h i n the l i m i t s of the harbours, and anything i n c i d e n t a l t h e r e t o . ( f ) the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , handling or s t o r i n g under the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Board or any p r i v a t e property w i t h i n any harbour under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of that Board of explosives or other substances t h a t , i n the opinion of the Board, c o n s t i t u t e or are l i k e l y to c o n s t i t u t e a danger or hazard to l i f e or property. F a i l u r e on the part of a proponent to comply with such r e g u l a t o r y p r o v i s i o n s as may be deemed necessary by the Board w i t h respect to the s i t i n g , c o n s t r u c t i o n , or operation of a proposed hazardous m a t e r i a l s f a c i l i t y w i t h i n an NHB port could r e s u l t i n the Board's r e f u s a l to a u t h o r i z e the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the p r o j e c t . 39 2.2.2 P r o v i n c i a l L e g i s l a t i o n 2.2.2.1 P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l A c t 7 Under S e c t i o n 3 of the P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l Act*, the D i r e c t o r of the Waste Management Branch, Department of Environment, Is vested w i t h the power and duty to: a) determine what q u a l i t i e s and p r o p e r t i e s of water, land or a i r c o n s t i t u t e a p o l l u t e d c o n d i t i o n ; b) p r e s c r i b e standards regarding the q u a l i t y and character of the e f f l u e n t or contaminant which may be discharged i n t o any waters, land or a i r ; c) appoint advisory or t e c h n i c a l committees deemed necessary to inform the board with regard to matters r e f e r r e d by the board; and d) c a r r y out s p e c i f i e d references or i n s t r u c t i o n s made to the board under S e c t i o n 2(3). The p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i v e of the Act i s to ensure t h a t : ...no person s h a l l . . . d i s c h a r g e or cause to permit the discharge of e f f l u e n t or other waste m a t e r i a l on, i n or under land or i n t o waters without a permit or approval from the d i r e c t o r ( S e c t i o n 4 ( 1 ) ) . In t h i s regard, i t i s once again Incumbent upon the proponent to ensure that the requirements of the Act and i t s r e g u l a t i o n s are met i n ever respect p r i o r to a permit being i s s u e d . F a i l u r e on the part of a proponent to e i t h e r a) secure the necessary permit; or b) comply with the p r o v i s i o n s of the permit once i t has been issued could r e s u l t i n a f i n e "...not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment f o r The P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l Act i s scheduled to be replaced during the f a l l of 1982, subject to the proclamation of the p r o v i n c i a l Waste Management Act. The recent (1981) i n t r o d u c t i o n of the Environment Management Act (which i s a l s o administered by the Department of Environment) assumed some of the f u n c t i o n s formerly vested w i t h the P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l A c t , i n c l u d i n g the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r hearing appeals r e s u l t i n g from d e c i s i o n s made under the P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l A c t . 40 a term not exceeding one year, or to both, and i f the offence i s of a c o n t i n u i n g nature, to a f i n e not exceeding $500 f o r each day the offence i s continued...(Section 25). 2.2.2.2 F i r e S e r v i c e s A c t 8 Under the p r o v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n 59(1) and 59(2) of the F i r e S e r v i c e s A c t , the Lieutenant Governor i n Council may: a) r e g u l a t e manufacturing or trades dangerous i n causing or promoting f i r e ; b) r e g u l a t e the manufacture, storage, c a r r i a g e , s a l e and d i s p o s a l of combustible, e x p l o s i v e or flammable matter; and c) adopt the whole or part of the standards f o r the Canadian Gas A s s o c i a t i o n , the N a t i o n a l F i r e Code of Canada, and any other code, or standard on f i r e standards and f i r e s a f e t y , and to amend a code or standard adopted under t h i s paragraph. Thus, the P r o v i n c i a l F i r e Commissioner's concurrence and approval r e l a t i v e to s i t i n g , c o n s t r u c t i o n , and f i r e f i g h t i n g / p r e v e n t i o n systems must be secured i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the c o n s t r u c t i o n of marine f a c i l i t i e s designed to handle combustible, inflammable, or e x p l o s i v e m a t e r i a l s . 2.2.2.3 U t i l i t i e s Commission A c t ^ In B r i t i s h Columbia, the c o n s t r u c t i o n or operation of any regulated energy p r o j e c t can only be undertaken with the j o i n t concurrence of the M i n i s t e r of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources and the M i n i s t e r of Environment (S e c t i o n 19). In c e r t a i n i n s t a n c e s , an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r an "energy p r o j e c t c e r t i f i c a t e " or a modified "energy operating c e r t i f i c a t e " may be r e f e r r e d to the U t i l i t i e s Commission f o r review p r i o r to the necessary c e r t i f i c a t e being authorized ( S e c t i o n 19(1) (a) and ( b ) ) . The r e f e r r a l may be made on the grounds of the complexity of the a p p l i c a t i o n , or upon the grounds of p u b l i c s a f e t y or economic concerns. In those instances where an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r an energy p r o j e c t c e r t i f i c a t e i s r e f e r r e d to the Commission f o r review... 41 ...the Commission s h a l l hear the a p p l i c a t i o n i n p u b l i c hearing i n accordance with terms of reference s p e c i f i e d j o i n t l y by the M i n i s t e r of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources and the M i n i s t e r of Environment, and on c o n c l u s i o n s h a l l submit a report and recommendations to the Lieutenant Governor i n C o u n c i l (Section 2 0 ( 1 ) ) . Several west coast LNG marine t e r m i n a l proposals are p r e s e n t l y before the M i n i s t e r of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources a w a i t i n g a d e c i s i o n as to whether or not they w i l l be r e f e r r e d to the U t i l i t i e s Commission. Moreover, i t has been speculated that B.C. Hydro's Sasamat LNG t e r m i n a l proposal could be submitted to the Commission i n the near f u t u r e , l a r g e l y on the strength of the p u b l i c controversy generated by the p r o j e c t . 2.3 L e g i s l a t i o n P e r t a i n i n g to the Bulk Shipment of Hazardous M a t e r i a l s By Marine Mode  2.3.1 Federal L e g i s l a t i o n The r e g u l a t i o n of the bulk shipment of hazardous m a t e r i a l s by ship f a l l s under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Government of Canada. The o r g a n i z a t i o n s p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the promulgation and enforcement of s p e c i a l operating p r o v i s i o n s f o r hazardous ma t e r i a l s c a r r i e r s are the M i n i s t r y o: Transport (under the terms of the Canada Shipping A c t ) , the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board (under the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board A c t ) , and the various f e d e r a l l y - a p p o i n t e d Harbours Boards. This t h e s i s i s p r i m a r i l y concerned with the Canada Shipping Act and the NHB Act. 2.3.1.1 Canada Shipping kctlv Several aspects of the Canada Shipping Act r e l a t e e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to the r e g u l a t i o n of vessels t r a n s p o r t i n g hazardous materia Canadian waters. For example, i n a broad sense the Act governs the 4 2 circumstances whereby Canadian s h i p s ' o f f i c e r s , crews, and c o a s t a l p i l o t s are l i c e n s e d . The q u a l i t y of these l i c e n s i n g procedures, i n t u r n , should r e f l e c t upon the q u a l i t y of Canadian marine personnel - a feat u r e which could have an a f f e c t upon the safe management and operation of ve s s e l s c a r r y i n g dangerous goods i n Canadian waters. S i m i l a r l y , r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the establishment and maintenance of n a v i g a t i o n aids plus the p r o v i s i o n of v e s s e l t r a f f i c management ser v i c e s enhance the o v e r a l l l e v e l of o p e r a t i o n a l s a f e t y f o r hazardous m a t e r i a l s c a r r i e r s , as w e l l as other v e s s e l s . Of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e to the r e g u l a t i o n of v e s s e l s t r a n s p o r t i n g dangerous goods i s P a r t V I I I of the Act, e n t i t l e d "Safety". P a r t V I I I deals w i t h the p r o v i s i o n of steamship i n s p e c t i o n s e r v i c e s f o r domestic and f o r e i g n v e s s e l s t r a d i n g i n Canadian waters. In t h i s regard, S e c t i o n 450 of the Act (under the heading "Dangerous Goods"), provides the Governor i n C o u n c i l w i t h the a u t h o r i t y to e s t a b l i s h r e g u l a t i o n s f o r hazardous m a t e r i a l s c a r r i e r s on such matters as: - packing/stowing of cargo - q u a n t i t i e s to be c a r r i e d - l o c a t i o n s aboard v e s s e l s where dangerous goods may be stored - marking - handling procedures - powers of steamship i n s p e c t o r s - other requirements, as necessary The a c t u a l p r a c t i c e of i n s p e c t i n g such s p e c i a l i z e d hazardous m a t e r i a l s c a r r i e r s as p a r c e l chemical tankers and l i q u i f i e d gas tankers requires techiques which are unique i n the shipping world. As a r u l e , these techniques are not g e n e r a l l y developed on a nation by na t i o n b a s i s . Instead, they evolve as a r e u s l t of j o i n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation through the auspices of such bodies as the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Maritime C o n s u l t a t i v e Organization (IMCO). Canada, as a p a r t i c i p a t i n g member of IMCO, has adapted 43 i n s p e c t i o n techniques and standards f o r various types of hazardous m a t e r i a l s c a r r i e r s i n t o the Canadian steamship i n s p e c t i o n process. These s p e c i a l i n s p e c t i o n requirements are, i n t u r n , r e f l e c t e d w i t h i n the r e g u l a t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s vested i n P a r t V I I I . The r o l e of the Canada Shipping A c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y as i t r e l a t e s to the movement of hazardous m a t e r i a l s c a r r i e r s i n the Port of Vancouver i s more c l e a r l y defined i n S e c t i o n 4.2.2. 2.3.1.2 N a t i o n a l Harbours Board Act^^ The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g safe n a v i g a t i o n a l procedures f o r v e s s e l s operating w i t h i n NHB ports r e s t s not with the Canadian Coast Guard, but rat h e r w i t h the Board i t s e l f . This a u t h o r i t y i s described as f o l l o w s : 14(1) The Governor i n C o u n c i l may make by-laws... f o r the d i r e c t i o n , conduct and government of the Board and i t s employees, and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , management and c o n t r o l of the s e v e r a l harbours, works and property under i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n c l u d i n g : a) the r e g u l a t i o n and c o n t r o l of each and every matter i n connection with vessels and a i r c r a f t n a v i g a t i n g the harbours and t h e i r mooring, b e r t h i n g , d i s c h a r g i n g or loa d i n g or anything I n c i d e n t a l t h e r e t o ; and b) the r e g u l a t i o n of a l l p l a n t , machinery or ap p l i a n c e s , whether f l o a t i n g or not, f o r lo a d i n g or unloading v e s s e l s , i n c l u d i n g the power to p r e s c r i b e that none s h a l l enter any harbour or remain In i t without the permission of the Board... For a d e t a i l e d account of the s p e c i a l r e g u l a t i o n s i n e f f e c t f o r hazardous mat e r i a l s c a r r i e r s i n the Port of Vancouver, r e f e r t o S e c t i o n 4.2.2. 44 FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 2.0 1 Government of Canada, Navigable Waters P r o t e c t i o n A c t , Revised Statutes of Canada - 1970, Chapter N-19. 2 Government of Canada, Code of Recommended Standards f o r the  Prevention of P o l l u t i o n i n Marine Terminal Systems (Ottawa: Canadian Coast Guard, 22 February 1977). 3 Government of Canada, A r c t i c P i l o t P r o j e c t - Termpol Assessment (4  v o l s . ) (Ottawa: Coast Guard, 1981). ^ Government of Canada, A Guide to the Fe d e r a l Environmental  Assessment and Review Process (Ottawa: F i s h e r i e s & Environment Canada, February 1977); and i n t e r v i e w s with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Fe d e r a l Environmental Assessment and Review O f f i c e , Vancouver, B.C. ^ Government of Canada, F i s h e r i e s Act, Revised S t a t u t e s of Canada -1970, Chapter F-14. 6 Government of Canada, N a t i o n a l Harbours Board A c t , Revised Statutes of Canada - 1970, Chapter N-8. 7 Province of B r i t i s h Columbia, P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l A c t , Revised Statutes of B r i t i s h Columbia - 1979, Chapter ; and i n t e r v i e w s w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the p r o v i n c i a l Waste Management Branch, V i c t o r i a . 8 Province of B r i t i s h Columbia, F i r e Services A c t , Revised Statutes of B r i t i s h Columbia - 1979, Chapter 133. 9 Province of B r i t i s h Columbia, U t i l i t i e s Commission A c t , Assented to 22 August 1980. 10 Government of Canada, Canada Shipping A c t , Revised St a t u t e s of Canada - 1970, Chapter S-9, plus amendments. H Government of Canada, N a t i o n a l Harbours Board A c t , Revised Statutes of Canada - 1970, Chapter N-8. 45 3.0 MARINE SHIPMENT OF LPG AND RELATED COMMODITIES 3.1 E v o l u t i o n of the L i q u e f i e d Gas Tanker Trade L i q u e f i e d petroleum gas, or LPG, i s the generic term commonly a p p l i e d , e i t h e r s i n g l y or i n combination, to members of a s p e c i f i c group of chemical compounds f a l l i n g w i t h i n the lower molecular weight range of the hydrocarbon spectrum. The p r i n c i p a l components of LPG would normally be e i t h e r propane or butane. However, depending upon the source and nature of the gas mixture, i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r other compounds such as propylene or isobutane to emerge as dominant c o n s t i t u e n t s w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r gas sample. Because the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n s of the gas may vary considerably w i t h the mixture, LPG i s known under a v a r i e t y of popular names, i n c l u d i n g propane, butane, propylene, pyrofax, or simply " b o t t l e d gas". LPG i s derived from two p r i n c i p a l sources - both as a byproduct of the wellhead s e p a r a t i o n of n a t u r a l gas (methane and ethane) from l i q u i d petroleum hydrocarbons, and through the r e f i n e r y f r a c t i o n i n g of crude o i l and the f u r t h e r processing of petroleum d i s t i l l a t e s . In p r a c t i c a l terms, i t has proven to be a durable, clean burning f u e l source having a wide range of domestic, commercial, and i n d u s t r i a l a p p l i c a t i o n s worldwide. At ambient temperature (15° C) and normal atmospheric pressure, the i n d i v i d u a l chemical components of LPG would e x i s t i n a gaseous s t a t e . 4 6 However, one of the s a l i e n t features of LPG, and c e r t a i n l y the one which has served most e f f e c t i v e l y to put i t on an economically competitive f o o t i n g w i t h more t r a d i t i o n a l , non-gaseous f u e l sources, i s that i t can be r e a d i l y reduced to a l i q u i d s t a t e f o r e a s i e r storage and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n through the processes of c o o l i n g and/or p r e s s u r i z a t i o n . In i t s l i q u i d c o n d i t i o n LPG occupies approximately l/250th of i t s volume as a gas. Although commercial gas l i q u e f a c t i o n has long been p r a c t i c e d i n a v a r i e t y of forms, i t was not u n t i l a f t e r the F i r s t World War that a concerted e f f o r t was made to apply the technology to the constructon of l i q u i d gas t a n k s h i p s . * The e a r l i e s t gas c a r r i e r s were, by and l a r g e , s m all p r e s s u r i z e d tankers having a cargo c a p a c i t y of l e s s than 1 500 cubic metres. Most had been designed to serve the growing European i n t e r - c o a s t a l LPG t r a d e . During the 1950's, gas tanker technology became i n c r e a s i n g l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d . A number of v e s s e l s which came on l i n e during t h i s p eriod possessed the dual c a p a c i t y f o r both p r e s s u r i z i n g and p a r t i a l l y r e f r i g e r a t i n g t h e i r cargoes. Moreover, new tanker designs were being developed f o r the purpose of addressing the s p e c i a l problems and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the c a r r i a g e of bulk l i q u i d gases other than LPG - notably ammonia, v i n y l c h l o r i d e s , and l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas (LNG). In 1959, a new era of l i q u e f i e d gas transport was c h r i s t e n e d w i t h the s u c c e s s f u l t r a n s - A t l a n t i c c r o s s i n g of the world's f i r s t experimental LNG c a r r i e r , the Methane Pioneer, from Lake Charles, L o u i s i a n a to the B r i t i s h *The f i r s t LPG c a r r i e r was the B r i t i s h tanker Megara, which was b u i l t i n 1926 f o r the Anglo-Saxon O i l Company. The ship served the West Indies/Europe trade, c a r r y i n g o i l and propane, the l a t t e r i n r i v e t e d c y l i n d r i c a l pressure v e s s e l s . The Megara was scrapped i n 1955, although her tanks are r e p o r t e d l y s t i l l being used f o r land storage.1 47 Gas Corporation t e r m i n a l at Canvey I s l a n d , near the mouth of the R i v e r Thames. Ths h i s t o r i c voyage of the Methane Pioneer, a converted dry cargo v e s s e l , was doubly s i g n i f i c a n t i n that i t marked the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the concept of cryogenic* engineering to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a ship's cargo containment and t r a n s f e r system. The importance of t h i s event should not be allowed to pass without a few b r i e f observations on the ocean c a r r i a g e of LNG g e n e r a l l y . L i k e LPG, LNG i s comprised of lower molecular weight hydrocarbon compounds - p r i m a r i l y methane and ethane. In i t s l i q u i d s t a t e i t occupies j u s t l/600th of i t s volume as a gas. However, u n l i k e LPG, i t does not lend i t s e l f w e l l to l i q u e f a c t i o n simply through the a p p l i c a t i o n of s u f f i c i e n t pressure. The c r i t i c a l point of LNG i s -83° C, which means that i t cannot be l i q u e f i e d at any temperature above -83° C, i r r e s p e c t i v e of pressure. L i q u e f a c t i o n by d i r e c t r e f r i g e r a t i o n i n v o l v e s c o o l i n g the gas to i t s b o i l i n g point of approximately -162° C, a c o s t l y and complex procedure. Thus, engineers faced w i t h the prospect of designing a p r a c t i c a l LNG containment system s u i t a b l e f o r long-haul shipboard deployment were l e f t w i t h b a s i c a l l y three a l t e r n a t i v e s - s p e c i f i c a l l y , to develop e i t h e r : a) a non-pressurized, a c t i v e r e f r i g e r a t i o n / r e - l i q u e f a c t i o n system; b) a system combining elements of both a c t i v e r e f r i g e r a t i o n and p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s i m i l a r to the technique which had been s u c c e s s f u l l y a p p l i e d to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of small LPG tankers; or c) a passive, non-pressurized system of cargo r e f r i g e r a t i o n based upon the p r i n c i p l e of e f f i c i e n t i n s u l a t i o n . *The term cryogenics r e f e r s to the branch of physics which deals w i t h the study of low temperature phenomena g e n e r a l l y o c c u r r i n g at temperatures below -150°C. 48 Neither A l t e r n a t i v e "a" nor A l t e r n a t i v e "b" has ever proven wholly acceptable from e i t h e r an economic or an o p e r a t i o n a l standpoint. Instead, the owners of the Methane Pioneer (and, f o r that matter, of v i r t u a l l y every LNG c a r r i e r b u i l t s i n c e ) chose to incorporate a design system based upon A l t e r n a t i v e "c" - passive r e f r i g e r a t i o n through i n s u l a t i o n . Under t h i s o p t i o n , gas which has been cooled to i t s l i q u i d s t a t e at a shoreside l i q u e f a c t i o n plant i s subsequently pumped i n t o the ship's s p e c i a l l y i n s u l a t e d t a n k s . 2 Each tank, operating much i n the manner of a huge thermos, i s designed to maintain the cargo i n a super-cooled l i q u i d s t a t e f o r extended periods of up to s e v e r a l months by e f f e c t i v e l y r e s t r i c t i n g normal i n t e r n a l heat g a i n . Due to the extremely c o l d temperatures i n v o l v e d i n the storage of LNG, s p e c i a l engineering techniques and metal f a b r i c a t i n g m a t e r i a l s ( i n c l u d i n g h i g h l y r e s i l i e n t aluminum and n i c k e l s t e e l a l l o y s which w i l l r e t a i n t h e i r d u c t i l i t y at low temperatures) must be employed - both f a c t o r s of which c o n t r i b u t e s u b s t a n t i a l l y to the f i n a l c o s t . Because LNG i s , by i t s very nature, c o n s t a n t l y s t r i v i n g to r e t u r n to i t s gaseous s t a t e , as the cargo g r a d u a l l y (an i n e x o r a b l y ) warms up to beyond i t s vapour p o i n t , the phenomenon of " b o i l - o f f " , or v a p o u r i z a t i o n , occurs. In modern v e s s e l s , b o i l - o f f consumes about 0.2% of the t o t a l cargo d a i l y - or roughly 200-250 cubic metres of gas per day f o r a standard 125 000 cubic metre c a p a c i t y LNG c a r r i e r . 3 Cargo b o i l - o f f i s normally r e - d i r e c t e d to the engine room where i t i s used to augment the v e s s e l ' s conventional f u e l supply. In c o n t r a s t to the widespread i n t e r e s t generated throughout the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s h i pping community during, and subsequent t o , the i n a u g u r a l voyage of the Methane Pioneer, the development of a p r a c t i c a l cargo 49 containment system whereby LPG could be economically transported over long distances and/or extended periods of time created l i t t l e f a n f a r e outside the immediate i n d u s t r y . Even so, by 1962 the f i r s t ocean-going r e f r i g e r a t e d LPG c a r r i e r s i n c o r p o r a t i n g a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d cargo r e - l i q u e f a c t i o n c a p a c i t y ( s i m i l a r to that which had been deemed unsuit a b l e f o r LNG t r a n s p o r t ) were i n s e r v i c e . The new LPG design philosophy drew e x t e n s i v e l y from the r e c e n t l y compiled body of knowledge p e r t a i n i n g to the marine t r a n s p o r t of LNG. A c c o r d i n g l y , both technologies d i s p l a y e d many basic s i m i l a r i t i e s . For example, each emphasized the fundamental premise that optimum tank e f f i c i e n c y could only be recognized through the e f f e c t i v e i n s u l a t i o n of the cargo containment system. Furthermore, each system incorporated a broad range of s p e c i a l i z e d shipboard s a f e t y features to o f f s e t the enormous hazard p o t e n t i a l created by the v o l a t i l e nature of t h e i r cargoes. Notwithstanding these and other common design c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , from the standpoint of storage and t r a n s p o r t a b i l i t y LNG and LPG d i f f e r from each other i n one very important respect. The p r i n c i p a l p h y s i c a l advantage of LPG over LNG i s that a l l of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t parts w i l l be reduced to a l i q u i d s t a t e at a temperature of -48° C and one atmosphere of pressure. This compares with a l i q u e f a c t i o n temperature f o r LNG of -162° C at atmospheric pressure (see "Temperature/Vapour Pressure R e l a t i o n s h i p f o r Selected Ship-Borne Gases," p.50). Hence, the p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h LPG tanker c o n s t r u c t i o n , while s u b s t a n t i a l l y more demanding than f o r conventional s h i p b u i l d i n g p r a c t i c e , are by no means as r e s t r i c t i v e as those i n v o l v i n g LNG. Thus, there are s i g n i f i c a n t cost savings to be r e a l i z e d through the a p p l i c a t i o n of "cold temperature", as opposed to "cryogenic" engineering techniques. LPG cargo containment systems, f o r 1.1 PRESSURE RELATIONSHIP OF SELECTED SHIP-BORNE GASES* o 0 U4 K-=3 -J o to ca Uj a: o to cc uj ft. i o Q o uj to to UJ * a. 100 9 0 8 0 70 6-0 5-0 40 3-5 3 0 2 5 20 18 1-6 1-4 1-2 10 to Q: 0Q I Uj CC to to UJ t a. 0-8 o -180 _ 1 6 0 -140 -120 -100 - 8 0 - 60 . - 40 - W TEMPERATURE — DEGREES CELSIUS • Curves constructed by application of Antoine equation, using data from "Selected Values of Properties of Hydrocarbons and Related Compounds". AmSprSLL.l.M.cl. Proiect44. Thermodynamics Research Centre, Texas A. 4 M. University, and from "Advances in Chemistry Ser.es: No. 22" (1959) published by the American Chemical Society. 51 example, u t i l i z e s p e c i a l low temperature s t e e l , r a t h e r than the s u b s t a n t i a l l y more expensive aluminum and 9% n i c k e l s t e e l a l l o y s widely employed i n LNG c o n s t r u c t i o n . The non-cryogenic techniques used i n LPG c o n s t r u c t i o n a l s o enable a wider range of mechanical systems a p p l i c a t i o n s than i s economically ( o r , i n many instances, t e c h n i c a l l y ) p r a c t i c a l i n cryogenic engineering. I t i s f o r t h i s reason that shipboard r e - l i q u e f a c t i o n of gas b o i l - o f f becomes a v i a b l e option f o r LPG c a r r i e r s , w h i le i t i s not from the standpoint of LNG tanker c o n s t r u c t i o n . In recent years, the gas tanker i n d u s t r y has experienced a number of severe marketing d i f f i c u l t i e s due, i n p a r t , to s p i r a l l i n g ship c o n s t r u c t i o n and operating c o s t s , u n c e r t a i n long-range supply and demand requirements f o r gas, p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , and, i n c r e a s i n g l y , to s e r i o u s s o c i a l and environmental misgivings over the s a f e t y of l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s and t e r m i n a l f a c i l i t i e s . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of the LNG tanker trade, where the general p a t t e r n of growth over the past 10 years has d i s p l a y e d many of the d i s t i n c t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s associated with the o i l tanker boom/bust period of the 1960's and e a r l y 1970's, although on a much smaller s c a l e . In f a c t , as of January 1980, the world LNG tanker f l e e t c o n s i s t e d of only 54 v e s s e l s , with 17 others scheduled f o r d e l i v e r y by 1982. However, the average cargo c a p a c i t y per v e s s e l increased from 27 400 cubic metres i n 1964* to more than 84 000 cubic metres In 1980.^ Of perhaps even greater s i g n i f i c a n c e i s the f a c t that a l l 17 LNG c a r r i e r s on order at the beginning of 1980 had cargo c a p a c i t y r a t i n g s of 125 000 cubic metres or more.^ *The average ca p a c i t y f i g u r e s f o r 1964 exclude the Methane Pioneer and the Pythagore, both of which were used p r i m a r i l y f o r experimental, rather than commercial, LNG c a r r i a g e . 52 The preceding s t a t i s t i c s , while seemingly portending a b r i g h t economic future f o r LNG, are somewhat misleading. Unlike crude o i l , the b a s i c i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n f r a s t r u c t u r e f o r both LNG and LPG i s r e l a t i v e l y underdeveloped, and i s r e s t r i c t e d to comparatively few w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d overseas trade routes. This can be a t t r i b u t e d to the l i m i t e d a v a i l a b i l i t y of s p e c i a l i z e d gas l i q u e f a c t i o n ( l o a d i n g ) and r e c e i v i n g terminals around the world. The h i s t o r i c a l tendency w i t h i n the gas i n d u s t r y has been to construct a s p e c i f i c number of v e s s e l s designed to serve each i n d i v i d u a l route on a long-term b a s i s . Thus, there i s l i t t l e room f o r excess tanker c a p a c i t y . Nevertheless, by the summer of 1980 a considerable g l u t of surplus LNG tanker c a p a c i t y had begun to accumulate, thus i l l u s t r a t i n g the extremely f r a g i l e nature of the p r o d u c t i o n / d e l i v e r y chain a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new overseas gas tanker trade routes. Perhaps the most vulnerable l i n k i n t h i s chain i s that of the s h i p b u i l d i n g component. In order to meet production schedules, vessels must be ordered s e v e r a l years i n advance - o f t e n while the p r o j e c t i s s t i l l i n the conceptual planning stages. However, p o l i t i c a l unrest i n various producing c o u n t r i e s such as I r a n , and an i n c r e a s i n g trend and towards more s t r i n g e n t r e g u l a t o r y standards f o r both l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s and the s i t i n g of onshore terminals i n many western consuming nations, has l e d to s e v e r a l p r o j e c t s being e i t h e r delayed or c a n c e l l e d . As a r e s u l t , a number of LNG c a r r i e r s are now l a i d up i n various parts of the world. Uncertainty surrounding the futures of two major LNG development proposals, i n p a r t i c u l a r , has served to upset the d e l i c a t e supply/demand balance which has long c h a r a c t e r i z e d the i n t e r n a t i o n a l LNG takner market. The much 53 discussed Pac-Indonesia trade, c a l l i n g f o r the d e l i v e r y of Indonesian LNG to C a l i f o r n i a , has experienced lengthy delays as a r e s u l t of both p r i c i n g disputes between the United States and Indonesia, and r e g u l a t o r y d i f f i c u l t i e s at the proposed Point Conception, C a l i f o r n i a r e c e i v i n g t e r m i n a l s i t e . I t now seems u n l i k e l y that the Pac-Indonesia p r o j e c t w i l l come onstream before the l a t e 1980's.^ S i m i l a r l y , excessive costs have delayed the s t a r t - u p of the massive Bonny LNG p r o j e c t i n N i g e r i a . The Bonny proposal w i l l i n v o l v e the eventual shipment of N i g e r i a n gas to r e c e i v i n g terminals i n western Europe and the eastern United S t a t e s . C o l l e c t i v e l y , the Pac-Indonesia and Bonny p r o j e c t s could e v e n t u a l l y r e q u i r e some 23-25 new LNG c a r r i e r s , most of which have not yet been ordered. 7 Several f i r m s , however, i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of a strong LNG market during the 1980's, proceeded w i t h orders to construct a number of new gas c a r r i e r s , even i n the absence of any f i r m long-term charter commitments to t r a n s p o r t LNG. The Swedish s h i p b u i l d i n g g i a n t , Kockums of Malmo, f o r example, invested h e a v i l y i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n of two 133 000 cubic metre c a p a c i t y LNG c a r r i e r s during the mid-1970's. Kockums had o r i g i n a l l y expected to s e l l i t s i n t e r e s t i n these v e s s e l s long before t h e i r completion. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i n i t s i n i t i a l market demand f o r e c a s t s , the company f a i l e d to take i n t o account the myriad of economic, environmental, and p o l i t i c a l problems which have r e c e n t l y beset the LNG i n d u s t r y . In the v i r t u a l absence of an open LNG tanker market, Kockums was unable to d i v e s t i t s e l f of e i t h e r tanker u n t i l 1981, when one of the v e s s e l s was purchased by German i n t e r e s t s . 8 The second tanker remains unsold, and would seem destined f o r an obscure f a t e i n extended lay-up. Kockums i s by no means the only company to have experienced s e r i o u s f l e e t marketing d i f f i c u l t i e s . The twin 122 000 cubic metre tankers Gastor and 54 Nestor, which were purpose-built i n 1976 and 1977 r e s p e c t i v e l y to serve the proposed Pac-Indonesia run, have been permanently moored near Dunoon, Scotland since they were d e l i v e r e d . ^ One of the world's l a r g e s t LNG f l e e t operators, E l Paso N a t u r a l Gas, was forced to l a y up as many as seven ves s e l s at a time during 1980 and 1981, pending the r e s o l u t i o n of a gas p r i c i n g dispute between A l g e r i a and the United S t a t e s . 1 ^ One of the few p o s i t i v e notes to emerge from t h i s aspect of the i n d u s t r y i n recent years concerns the 131 500 cubic metre B e l g i a n LNG c a r r i e r Methania. B u i l t i n i t i a l l y to serve the proposed LNG trade between A l g e r i a and Belgium, she was t r a n s f e r r e d d i r e c t l y from the b u i l d e r ' s yard to a remote f j o r d near Haugesund, Norway when i t became evident that the Zeebrugge, Belgium gas r e c e i v i n g t e r m i n a l would not be completed on time. However, d u r i n g the summer of 1981, i n t e r i m arrangements were f i n a l i z e d whereby Methania w i l l commence t r a d i n g between A l g e r i a and Montoire, France i n the f a l l of 1982, pending the scheduled completion of the Zeebrugge t e r m i n a l i n the mid 1980's. 1 1 In contrast to the LNG tanker market, the sea-borne LPG trade has remained comparatively s t a b l e , i f unspectacular, over the years. The LPG s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y i s d i v i d e d i n t o two d i s t i n c t components. The c o a s t a l trade i s comprised p r i m a r i l y of small p r e s s u r i z e d and s e m i - r e f r i g e r a t e d v e s s e l s having a cargo c a p a c i t y of l e s s than 5 000 cubic metres. As of January 1980, the 368 ve s s e l s f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h i s category accounted f o r 72% of the t o t a l number of LPG c a r r i e r s , but only 9% of the worldwide LPG tanker capacity.-'- 2 The deepsea LPG f l e e t , on the other hand, i s made up almost e x c l u s i v e l y of f u l l y - r e f r i g e r a t e d vessels i n excess of 5 000 cubic metres c a p a c i t y . The 145 or so ve s s e l s which c o n s t i t u t e the deepsea f l e e t have a combined cargo c a p a c i t y of almost 5.4 m i l l i o n cubic metres, or roughly 55 600 000 cubic metres more than the t o t a l c a pacity f o r the e x i s t i n g LNG f l e e t . 1 3 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , ocean-going LPG c a r r i e r s have tended to be somewhat smaller than t h e i r LNG counterparts. Whereas vess e l s i n excess of 100 000 cubic metres account f o r some 71% of a l l LNG tanker c a p a c i t y , l e s s than 4% of the deepsea LPG cargo capacity i s contained i n v e s s e l s of 100 000 cubic metres or g r e a t e r . 1 ^ Instead, the p r e f e r r e d s i z e f o r modern r e f r i g e r a t e d tankers i s i n the range of 50-75 000 cubic metres. The f u t u r e of the l i q u e f i e d gas trade - over the short term, at l e a s t - i s by no means c l e a r . While i t i s acknowledged that the market p o t e n t i a l f o r both n a t u r a l and petroleum gas f u e l s i s e x c e l l e n t , the p o l i t i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y and p u b l i c a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the marine d e l i v e r y concept remains a s e r i o u s point of contention i n many quarters throughout the world. The r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n , f o r i n s t a n c e , has led to the i n d e f i n i t e suspension of plans to export LNG from the huge Pars offshore gas f i e l d i n the P e r s i a n Gulf to the United S t a t e s . S i m i l a r l y , s o c i a l and environmental concerns over the s a f e t y of l i q u e f i e d gases have r e s u l t e d i n lengthy delays to the proposed c o n s t r u c t i o n of major gas r e c e i v i n g terminals at Europoort, Holland (LPG), Zeebrugge, Belgium (LNG), and Point Conception, C a l i f o r n i a (LNG). 3.2 LPG IN VANCOUVER In s p i t e of the problems c u r r e n t l y f a c i n g many LPG and LNG development proposals, the m a j o r i t y of e x i s t i n g l i q u e f i e d gas d e l i v e r y systems i n v o l v i n g tankers have functioned s u c c e s s f u l l y and, f o r the most p a r t , without serious mishap over the years. One such operation has been the long-standing Vancouver-Japan LPG t r a d e . 5 6 Figure 3.2 Westridge Terminal, Burnaby, B.C. 57 Because of a chronic shortage of domestic energy resources, Japan has long depended upon overseas l i q u e f i e d gas importation to supplement i t s burgeoning f u e l requirements. In order to s a t i s f y i t s growing demand f o r LPG over the years, Japan has seen f i t to enter i n t o a number of long-term i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements f o r the purpose of securing guaranteed overseas gas s u p p l i e s . Canada, with i t s enormous p o t e n t i a l to produce and export LPG on a large volume b a s i s , became a partner to one of the e a r l i e s t gas trade arrangements, and i n 1966 the f i r s t major l i q u e f i e d gas e x p o r t i n g t e r m i n a l on the west coast - Trans Mountain P i p e l i n e Company's Westridge Terminal i n Burnaby, B.C. - went i n t o f u l l commercial o p e r a t i o n . During the i n t e r v e n i n g 16 year p e r i o d , Westridge has exported on the order of 7.0 m i l l i o n cubic metres (or approximately 44.0 m i l l i o n b a r r e l s ) of LPG to Japan. The b a s i c d e l i v e r y concept has changed l i t t l e s ince the Westridge f a c i l i t y began exporting LPG i n the mid 1960's. L i q u e f i e d propane i s transported to the t e r m i n a l i n p r e s s u r i z e d r a i l tankcars from A l b e r t a . Upon a r r i v a l at Westridge, the propane i s r e f r i g e r a t e d and pumped i n t o two 27 800 cubic metre (175 000 b a r r e l ) c a p a c i t y i n s u l a t e d storage tanks, where i t i s maintained at a temperature of approximately -45°C. On an average of once every f i v e to s i x weeks, a r e f r i g e r a t e d gas tanker a r r i v e s at Westridge to take on a consignment of LPG destined f o r markets i n Japan. Between 1966 and the s p r i n g of 1982, the Westridge t e r m i n a l was served almost e x c l u s i v e l y by the 38 000 cubic metre c a p a c i t y LPG c a r r i e r Yamahide Maru. The Yamahide Maru has since been replaced on a permanent basis by the N i c h i z a n Maru, a recently-completed gas tanker of approximately 40 000 cubic metres c a p a c i t y . Whereas the Yamahide Maru was r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the f i r s t generation of r e f r i g e r a t e d ocean-going LPG c a r r i e r s , the N i c h i z a n Maru r e f l e c t s the present s t a t e of the a r t i n terms of Japanese gas 58 tanker design technology. She i s expected to add a new dimension to the safe and e f f i c i e n t movement of LPG between Canada and Japan. While comparatively small by present standards, both the Yamahide Maru and the N i c h i z a n Maru are nevertheless capable of accommodating the equivalent of some 300 standard s i z e d (127-130 cubic metre c a p a c i t y ) r a i l c a r l o a d s of l i q u e f i e d gas, or roughly 22 200 tonnes of propane ( s p e c i f i c g r a v i t y 0.583). 3.3 The Issues 3.3.1. Background Perhaps the greatest contrast between LPG and LNG has not so much to do with t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p h y s i c a l or chemical p r o p e r t i e s as i t does with the d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t manner i n which the general p u b l i c r o u t i n e l y perceives each product. In the United S t a t e s , the p u b l i c was made aware of the v o l a t i l e nature of LNG as long ago as 1944, when a storage tank at a peak shaving f a c i l i t y i n Cleveland, Ohio ruptured, s p i l l i n g some 4 200 cubic metres of LNG i n t o the a d j o i n i n g s t r e e t s and sewer system. The subsequent f i r e and explosions k i l l e d 130 people, i n j u r e d scores of others, and devastated a 12 hectare area of the c i t y . 1 ^ The t o t a l damage estimate approached the $7 m i l l i o n mark. The Cleveland accident e f f e c t i v e l y put an end to f u r t h e r LNG development i n the United States f o r more than 20 years. By the l a t e 1960's LNG was again being widely considered f o r use i n peak shaving f a c i l i t i e s throughout the country, e s p e c i a l l y i n the h e a v i l y populated northeast. Once more, however, the gas i n d u s t r y experienced a serious setback when, i n February 1973, a supposedly empty LNG storage tank on new York's Staten I s l a n d exploded, k i l l i n g 40 workers who had been engaged i n r e p a i r i n g i t s cryogenic l i n e r . 1 7 Although the tank had 5 9 a c t u a l l y been drained some 10 months e a r l i e r , s u f f i c i e n t pockets of undetected r e s i d u a l gas remained to cause the massive concrete dome to be blown almost 10 metres i n t o the a i r . 1 8 U n l i k e the Cleveland d i s a s t e r , the Staten I s l a n d e x p l o s i o n d i d not r e s u l t i n a reinstatement of the moratorium on LNG development, although i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that both loaded LNG and LPG s h i p s have been p r o h i b i t e d from e n t e r i n g the Port of New York since the i n c i d e n t . ^ Furthermore, the accident has served to b r i n g the LNG i n d u s t r y under f a r more c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y by both government re g u l a t o r y bodies and concerned c i t i z e n s groups a l i k e than would probably have been the case had the e x p l o s i o n not occurred. In recent years, a number of e x i s t i n g and proposed gas r e c e i v i n g t e r m i n a l operations i n such major centres as Boston, Los Angeles, and, of course, New York have been subjected to much c r i t i c i s m over the s e r i o u s p u b l i c s a f e t y problems inherent i n the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and storage of LNG. The trend towards increased c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the LNG s a f e t y debate has y i e l d e d s e v e r a l p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s . The l a t e s t LNG terminals to become o p e r a t i o n a l i n the United States - one at Cove P o i n t , Maryland and another near Savannah, Georgia - are s i t u a t e d i n comparatively underpopulated areas, and are surrounded by extensive b u f f e r zones to discourage p u b l i c encroachment on the f a c i l i t y grounds. E q u a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t has been the recent d e c i s i o n on the part of the State of C a l i f o r n i a to r e s t r i c t LNG t e r m i n a l development to the i s o l a t e d Point Conception area, some 100 kilometres northwest of Los Angeles. By c o n t r a s t , LPG has never evoked the same sense of p u b l i c concern as that generated by the LNG controversy. P r o f e s s o r James Fay has explained the d i f f e r e n t p u b l i c perceptions of LNG and LPG i n the United States i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: 60 At both s t a t e and f e d e r a l l e v e l s , LNG i s regulated as a form of n a t u r a l gas whose d i s t r i b u t i o n and sales f a l l w i t h i n the scope of p u b l i c u t i l i t y law. The process of granting permits under these laws n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s a s u b s t a n t i a l review of s a f e t y , environmental, and p r i c i n g i s s u e s . The procedures open up to p u b l i c s c r u t i n y the evaluations of p u b l i c s a f e t y impact undertaken by a p p l i c a n t s and re g u l a t o r y agencies, and permit i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the r e g u l a t o r y process by c i t i z e n s groups or i n d i v i d u a l s who might be exposed to r i s k . Because of the d i r e c t involvement of government agencies, c o n t r o v e r s i e s over LNG f a c i l i t i e s f r e q u e n t l y ( i f not i n v a r i a b l y ) become p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s . In c o n t r a s t , LPG d i s t r i b u t i o n i s no more regulated than i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of any other petroleum product of equivalent f l a m m a b i l i t y . Provided the usual c o n s t r u c t i o n and operating standards f o r v e h i c l e s and storage f a c i l i t i e s are observed, no o v e r a l l r e g u l a t o r y e v a l u a t i o n of LPG f a c i l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g safety and environmental e f f e c t s , i s required by law. Because such requirements are absent, l i t t l e p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n e x i s t s on LPG r i s k s and p u b l i c controversy over f a c i l i t i e s i s almost non-existent.20 Professor Fay's observations are more c l e a r l y underscored when one considers that the recent s t a t e d e c i s i o n to r e s t r i c t f u t u r e LNG t e r m i n a l developments to a s i n g l e geographical area w i t h i n C a l i f o r n i a does not apply to the s i t i n g of LPG t e r m i n a l s . Thus, i n view of the f a c t that many government r e g u l a t o r y agencies, both i n the United States and elsewhere, do not appear to equate the hazards a s s o c i a t e d w i t h LPG equally with those of LNG, i t i s perhaps not s u r p r i s i n g that the general p u b l i c tends to perceive the widespread domestic use of such convenient and r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e products as l i q u e f i e d propane and butane with a sense of both f a m i l i a r i t y and acceptance. Assuming that the rather d e t a i l e d and, i n some i n s t a n c e s , q u i t e e x t r a o r d i n a r y precautionary measures which have been imposed by many nations upon companies engaged i n the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and storage of LNG are wholly j u s t i f i a b l e from the standpoint of ensuring an appropriate standard of p u b l i c s a f e t y , one i s prompted to question whether or not LPG does a c t u a l l y present as great a p o t e n t i a l threat to h e a l t h and s a f e t y as LNG. There i s , 61 i n f a c t , a s i z e a b l e body of opinion w i t h i n both academic and government c i r c l e s to suggest that LPG i s , i n many res p e c t s , at l e a s t as dangerous as LNG. A recent study by the Oceanographic Commission of Washington State s t a t e s t h a t : ...under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , LPG can be more hazardous than LNG. For example, u n l i k e LNG, there i s no doubt that unconfined vapor clouds of LPG can explode. When stored under pressure, there i s some p o s s i b i l i t y of a b o i l i n g l i q u i d expanding vapor e x p l o s i o n (BLEVE). Since LPG vapor i s heavier than a i r , the vapor cloud from an LPG s p i l l w i l l not become buoyant l i k e the LNG cloud, and a trapped LPG gas pocket might take longer to di s p e r s e . LPG vapor a l s o has lower flammable l i m i t s . . . , which means that the vapor cloud from an LPG s p i l l must be more d i l u t e d than an LNG vapor cloud before i t i s non-flammable. F i n a l l y , LPG has about 20 percent more energy f o r a given volume of l i q u i d than does LNG. 2 1 James Fay, i n a comparative assessment of LNG and LPG r i s k s , concludes t h a t : ...compared to LNG, LPG r i s k a n a l y s i s f o r large systems i s l e s s developed. The few studies made to date lead to the co n c l u s i o n that LPG systems are at l e a s t as r i s k y , and p o s s i b l y much more r i s k y , than equivalent LNG s y s t e m s . 2 2 As noted p r e v i o u s l y , the l i q u e f i e d gas controversy has been equated almost e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the LNG i s s u e . This has been e s p e c i a l l y true i n North America. Furthermore, i n s p i t e of i t s having been i n widespread commercial use f o r a conside r a b l y longer period of time than LNG, the body of l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g w i t h LPG-related hazards i s small by comparison. Recognizing these h i s t o r i c l i m i t a t i o n s , the United States Coast Guard -which, more than any other government agency, has been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r both l e g i t i m i z i n g the need f o r stronger gas tankship operating r e g u l a t i o n s and fo r p r o v i d i n g the fundamental models upon which to base these r e g u l a t i o n s -has r e c e n t l y i n d i c a t e d that i t w i l l place a greater emphasis upon f u t u r e research i n t o the s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the sea-borne c a r r i a g e of hazardous m a t e r i a l s other than LNG - notably LPG, ammonia, and s u l p h u r i c a c i d . 2 3 This i s not to suggest that the Coast Guard has, i n the past, been negligent i n i t s rulemaking c a p a c i t y f o r these or other 62 dangerous commodities. On the contrary, i n the absence of s u f f i c i e n t background data on the s p i l l or i g n i t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of LPG, at l e a s t , the Coast Guard has chosen to approach the v e s s e l s a f e t y question i n a manner which can only be described as prudent and r e s p o n s i b l e by applying s p e c i a l (LNG-oriented) gas tanker operating r e g u l a t i o n s e q u a l l y to both LNG and LPG c a r r i e r s (see Chapter 4.0). Other co u n t r i e s such as Japan (which has had a long t r a d i t i o n of l i q u e f i e d gas importation) and Holland (which has r e c e n t l y embarked upon an important new era of increased LPG im p o r t a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n ) are anxious to ensure that s a f e t y standards f o r ocean-going gas c a r r i e r s operating In t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l waters are at l e a s t as s t r i n g e n t as those which are now i n e f f e c t i n American p o r t s . The LPG i n d u s t r y i t s e l f has been p a r t i c u l a r l y s u c c e s s f u l i n maintaining a low p u b l i c p r o f i l e over the years. That t h i s has been so, however, i s perhaps more of a c r e d i t to the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the i n d u s t r y ' s p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s programs than to i t s o v e r a l l s a f e t y record, which has been much worse than that of the LNG i n d u s t r y . Lee Davis, i n her account of the LNG s a f e t y i s s u e e n t i t l e d "Frozen F i r e " , c h r o n i c l e s no fewer than 23 confirmed (and s i x unconfirmed) LPG accidents between 1943 and 1978 which r e s u l t e d i n deaths. By c o n t r a s t , Ms. Davis i d e n t i f i e s only four separate LNG-related accidents during t h i s same period which r e s u l t e d i n l o s s of l i f e , i n c l u d i n g the p r e v i o u s l y mentioned Cleveland f i r e of 1944 and the 1973 Staten I s l a n d e x p l o s i o n . 2 ^ I n t o t a l , at l e a s t 483 deaths were a t t r i b u t a b l e to the above-noted LPG a c c i d e n t s , as opposed to 177 f o r the LNG acci d e n t s (170 of which r e s u l t e d from the Cleveland and Staten I s l a n d d i s a s t e r s a l o n e ) . The Davis f i g u r e s r e q u i r e f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n . F i r s t l y , LPG does have a broader range of uses, and i s more widely d i s t r i b u t e d by means of road and 63 r a i l tanker than i s LNG. A c c o r d i n g l y , one must l o g i c a l l y expect a higher incidence of LPG accidents i n v o l v i n g these p a r t i c u l a r f a c e t s of the i n d u s t r y . Furthermore, by the author's own account, the accident l i s t s contained i n "Frozen F i r e " are by no means all-encompassing. On the other hand, c o n s i d e r i n g that Ms. Davis' primary i n t e r e s t was w i t h LNG rather than LPG, and given that the LNG i n d u s t r y i s both more s t r i c t l y r egulated and more l o c a l i z e d i n a geographical sense, i t i s not unreasonable to assume that the accident s t a t i s t i c s compiled i n "Frozen F i r e " r e f l e c t a more accurate and comprehensive p i c t u r e of the LNG accident s i t u a t i o n than they do f o r LPG. I t i s q u i t e conceivable, then, that many i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g LPG - p a r t i c u l a r l y those o c c u r r i n g i n c o u n t r i e s where accident r e p o r t i n g procedures are, at best, rudimentary - have gone unannounced i n the past. As a concluding remark, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that none of the LNG-related accidents reported i n "Frozen F i r e " a f t e r the Staten I s l a n d d i s a s t e r of 1973 r e s u l t e d i n a s i n g l e death. During the period February 1973 to J u l y 1978 (the date of the l a s t recorded i n c i d e n t i n the book), however, no fewer than 17 confirmed (and 3 unconfirmed) LPG a c c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g l o s s of l i f e have been d e t a i l e d . Admittedly, the preceding f i g u r e s are i n c o n c l u s i v e , and should be viewed with some ca u t i o n pending a d e t a i l e d assessment of the circumstances surrounding each separate i n c i d e n t . Nevertheless, the s u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n the r e l a t i v e s a f e t y records f o r each product would appear to i n d i c a t e serious d e f i c i e n c i e s i n terms of the q u a l i t y and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of worldwide LPG r e g u l a t o r y procedures. 64 3.3.2 LPG Hazard Assessment LPG-related hazards f a l l i n t o two broad categories - those having to do with the e f f e c t s of cold temperatures on s t e e l or human t i s s u e , and those having to do w i t h the h i g h l y inflammable nature of the product. Of the two, c o l d temperature hazards are g e n e r a l l y f e l t to present l e s s of a d i r e c t threat to p u b l i c h e a l t h or s a f e t y . In the event a qu a n t i t y of LPG i s a c c i d e n t a l l y s p i l l e d onto an untreated "mild" s t e e l s urface, i t i s p o s s i b l e that the metal could s u f f e r from the phenomenon known as b r i t t l e f r a c t u r e - or l o s s of d u c t i l i t y due to exposure to low temperatures. The s e v e r i t y of the b r i t t l e f r a c t u r e would be dependent not only upon the amount of LPG s p i l l e d and the extent to which i t i s d i s t r i b u t e d over the untreated s u r f a c e , but a l s o upon the composition of the s p i l l e d gas and the temperature at which i t was being s t o r e d . Thus, one would a n t i c i p a t e that the l i k e l i h o o d of serious b r i t t l e f r a c t u r e o c c u r r i n g would be l e s s i n the event of a s p i l l of normal butane stored at or near i t s b o i l i n g point of -1° C than i t would f o r an equivalent s p i l l i n v o l v i n g propane r e f r i g e r a t e d to -42° C. Another p o t e n t i a l c o l d temperature-related hazard i s that of f r o s t b i t e , which can r e s u l t from even b r i e f exposure of human t i s s u e to LPG. The most serious problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h LPG, however, are r e l a t e d to i t s i n f l a m m a b i l i t y . In the absence of oxygen, LPG i s a r e l a t i v e l y s a f e , s t a b l e product which i s not prone to v i o l e n t chemical r e a c t i o n s . For t h i s reason, i t i s stored and transported i n closed, oxygen-free containment systems. Unfo r t u n a t e l y , i t i s not always p o s s i b l e to maintain LPG In a c o n t r o l l e d s t a t e of oxygen d e p r i v a t i o n . Thus, i n the event of a large volume a c c i d e n t a l discharge i n t o the atmosphere, at l e a s t two important changes i n the make-up of the LPG would take place. F i r s t l y , the escaping l i q u i d would immediately endeavour to r e t u r n to i t s n a t u r a l vapour s t a t e i n what would be tantamount to a massive, u n c o n t r o l l e d b o i l - o f f . Secondly, the r e s u l t a n t 65 vapour, upon coming i n contact with oxygen i n the atmosphere would q u i c k l y be transformed i n t o an unstable, h i g h l y combustible gas mixture. The e x p l o s i v e l i m i t s f o r propane range from 2.1% (by volume) to 9.5%; f o r normal butane, from 1.8% to 8.5%. In other words, when propane vapour mixes w i t h a i r at a r a t i o of 2.1 - 9.5% gas to a i r , i t i s capable of burning upon i g n i t i o n . Assuming that the escaping LPG i s not i g n i t e d immediately, a l a r g e vapour cloud (or plume) would form, and would d r i f t downwind u n t i l e i t h e r d i s s i p a t i n g , or encountering a s u i t a b l e i g n i t i o n source. Depending upon the gas to a i r r a t i o of the vapour cloud at the point of contact with a p o t e n t i a l i g n i t i o n source, the cloud could be set on f i r e by as l i t t l e as a burning c i g a r e t t e or even an errant e l e c t r i c spark. I g n i t i o n of the vapour cloud would normally r e s u l t i n an i n t e n s e , high temperature flashback f i r e -p o s s i b l y to the i n i t i a l source of discharge. Under c e r t a i n circumstances, however, unconfined LPG vapour clouds have been known to explode upon i g n i t i o n . 2 5 According to the U.S. Coast Guard: I f . . . d e t o n a t i o n (a v i o l e n t , f o r c e f u l explosion) were to occur, the damage would be greater than that of a d e f l a g r a t i o n (simple burning). A d e f l a g r a t i n g vapor cloud i s probably f a t a l to those w i t h i n the cloud and outside b u i l d i n g s but i s not a major threat to those beyond the cloud, though there w i l l be burns from thermal r a d i a t i o n . . . . In comparison, a detonation Is not only f a t a l to those i n s i d e the cloud but a l s o due to the overpressures developed, can be harmful outside the cloud boundaries.26 The vapour cloud problem i s compounded by the f a c t that LPG, being heavier than a i r , disperses more slowly than many l i g h t e r gas compounds. Moreover, because of i t s weight, LPG vapour tends to c o l l e c t i n low l y i n g pockets where i t can remain i n e x p l o s i v e concentrations f o r extended periods of time. To date, comparatively l i t t l e i s known about the s p e c i f i c m o b i l i t y or flashback c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s s o c i a t e d with a massive LPG discharge, such as 66 might be expected to occur i n the event of a major shipping a c c i d e n t . S i m i l a r l y , e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s undertaken i n the United States and elsewhere concerning the p o s s i b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n l i m i t s of inflammable LNG vapour clouds have been the t o p i c of much controversy w i t h i n the s c i e n t i f i c community. As r e c e n t l y as 1976, independent estimates of the distance to the end of the inflammable zone f o r a plume r e s u l t i n g from a h y p o t h e t i c a l 100 000 cubic metre LNG s p i l l ranged from 5.2 kilometres (U.S. Federal Power Commission p r o j e c t i o n ) to 203 k i l o m e t r e s (based upon the c a l c u l a t i o n s of MIT Professo r James F a y ) . 2 7 The enormous discrepancy i n these f i g u r e s r e f l e c t e d the l i m i t e d amount of research which had been undertaken to that time i n the area of l i q u e f i e d gas plume behaviour, e s p e c i a l l y as i t r e l a t e d to large gas s p i l l s i t u a t i o n s . While modelling techniques have improved since 1976, "...there i s no consensus as to which (gas d i s p e r s i o n ) model i s the best, e s p e c i a l l y when used to simulate s p i l l of 25 000 m 3 of LNG f o r which no experimental r e s u l t s are a v a i l a b l e . " 2 8 This i s borne out by the r e s u l t s of four recent models which were used to fo r e c a s t the probable d i s p e r s i o n of a h y p o t h e t i c a l 25 000 cubic metre LNG s p i l l under i d e n t i c a l circumstances. As can be seen i n Table 3.1, the r e s u l t i n g cloud dimensions and cloud t r a v e l patterns d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from one another: Table 3.1 A Comparison of Re s u l t s of Four Models D e s c r i b i n g the Dimensions of the LFL Extent of a Cloud F o l l o w i n g a 25 000 m 3 LNG S p i l l Distance (Kilometres) Wind ' Germeles Colen- E&E Dimension S t a b i l i t y mls Drake E i d s v i k brander (Dome) Maximum Down- F 3 6.3 6.5 8.0 21.9 wind T r a v e l D 2 4JL 6 ^ 7_14 13.0 Maximum Cloud F 3 1.0 7.8 12.8 1.0 Width D 2 1J) 6^3 11.8 1.0 Maximum Cloud F 3 0.8 0.6 3.3 2.0 Length D 2 0JS 0^6 1^8 2 ^ Source: The Termpol Co-ordinating Committee's Assessment Report on Dome Petroleum Limited's Proposal to Construct and Operate a L i q u e f i e d  N a t u r a l Gas Marine Terminal at Grassy P o i n t . P o r t Simpson Bay, B.C. (Vancouver: Canadian Coast Guard, May 1982), as ex t r a c t e d from the Environmental Assessment and Ris k A n a l y s i s Sub-Committee Report. 67 Davis, however, c i t e s one p a r t i c u l a r l y noteworthy instance during 1973 when S h e l l O i l s c i e n t i s t s conducted a s e r i e s of c o n t r o l l e d gas discharge experiments from the LNG c a r r i e r G a d i l a i n the Bay of B i s c a y . 2 ^ During the l a r g e s t t e s t , some 193 cubic metres of LNG were j e t t i s o n e d from G a d i l a over a 10 minute period i n winds ranging from 4 to 11 knots. The subsequent gas plume extended downwind over a distance of 2250 metres. The inflammable zone was estimated at approximately 700 metres. Because both LNG and LPG vapour clouds share the common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of being able to t r a v e l over considerable distances to an i g n i t i o n source, i t i s not unreasonable to assume that a somewhat s i m i l a r r e s u l t might have been recorded i f LPG, r a t h e r than LNG, had been deployed during the G a d i l a experiment. In f a c t , t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n i s supported by at l e a s t one t h e o r e t i c a l study by the United States O f f i c e of Technology Assessment: Table 3.2 S p i l l s on Water (Under Worst Weather Conditions) LNG LPG S p i l l Quantity Max. H a l f -(Tons) Width ( F t . ) Max. Extent Max. H a l f -( M i l e s ) Width ( F t . ) 100 1000 10000 340 860 2020 1.5 4.5 12.0 320 800 2000 Max. Extent ( M i l e s ) 1.4 3.9 11.0 Source: United States Senate, L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas: Safety, S i t i n g , and P o l i c y Concerns (Washington: June 1978), p. 45. I t i s g e n e r a l l y acknowledged that the greater the volume of l i q u e f i e d gas released i n a s p i l l , the greater the distance the r e s u l t a n t vapour plume could t h e o r e t i c a l l y t r a v e l to a point of i g n i t i o n . 3 0 The volume of gas discharged during the G a d i l a experiment was comparatively s m a l l , amounting 68 roughly 1\ r a i l c a r l o a d s . By c o n t r a s t , the unscheduled r u p t u r i n g of even a s i n g l e tank aboard an ocean-going LPG c a r r i e r could lead to the p o t e n t i a l discharge of up to many thousands of cubic metres of gas over a r e l a t i v e l y short period of time, depending upon the nature and l o c a t i o n of the h u l l p e n e t r a t i o n . Under t h i s type of worst case s i t u a t i o n , and i n the extremely u n l i k e l y event that the escaping LPG does not i g n i t e immediately at the point of the tank rupture, the p o t e n t i a l formation of a vapour cloud of up to s e v e r a l k i l o m e t r e s i n length must be viewed as a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . G enerally speaking, however, i n the event of a high impact shipping accident (such as a c o l l i s i o n w i t h another v e s s e l or s t r u c t u r e , grounding, or act of sabotage) r e s u l t i n g i n an u n c o n t r o l l e d large volume discharge of LPG, the debate over vapour cloud c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s would almost c e r t a i n l y be reduced to a purely academic l e v e l . The f r i c t i o n heat and/or s t a t i c charges generated during such an event would normally be s u f f i c i e n t to i g n i t e the escaping gas vapours instantaneously. Based upon numerous smaller s c a l e LPG explosions i n v o l v i n g road tankers, r a i l c a r s , and storage f a c i l i t i e s , and upon l i m i t e d LNG f i r e experience, i t i s p o s s i b l e to speculate as to the probable form which a major ship-based LPG f i r e might take. T y p i c a l l y , l i q u e f i e d gas would pour out of the rupture, much of i t v a p o u r i z i n g upon entry i n t o the atmosphere. The r e s t , remaining temporarily i n a c o l d , l i q u i d s t a t e , would q u i c k l y spread over the surface of the water. Upon i g n i t i o n , a huge v e r t i c a l column of flame would be produced, and the f i r e would r a p i d l y extend to the outer e x t r e m i t i e s of the "pool" of l i q u e f i e d gas which had formed on the water. The u l t i m a t e outward spread of the f i r e would be d i r e c t l y dependent upon such i n f l u e n c i n g f a c t o r s as wind speed and d i r e c t i o n , t i d a l c o n d i t i o n s , and the rate of volume discharge of gas from the holed tank. 6 9 The c a r d i n a l r u l e f o r f i g h t i n g l i q u e f i e d gas f i r e s i s to avoid e x t i n g u i s h i n g the blaze u n t i l the source of the leak has been e f f e c t i v e l y sealed o f f . F a i l u r e to f o l l o w t h i s procedure w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y r e s u l t i n repeated vapour cloud flashback and r e - i g n i t i o n of the p o o l . To a l l i n t e n t s and purposes, then, the only p r a c t i c a l way to handle a la r g e shipboard gas f i r e caused by a tank rupture i s to a l l o w i t to burn i t s e l f out. Un f o r t u n a t e l y , while t h i s might be a t h e o r e t i c a l l y acceptable procedure f o r t a c k l i n g a gas-f u e l l e d f i r e aboard a v e s s e l at sea, i t would leave much to be de s i r e d when ap p l i e d to a congested, p h y s i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d harbour s i t u a t i o n . Under c e r t a i n circumstances, i t has been estimated that a f i r e aboard an ocean-going LPG c a r r i e r could burn f o r many days o r, i n theory, even months.3-'- Furthermore, once the f i r e takes hold, the hazard p o t e n t i a l increases markedly. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , gas f i r e s tend to burn at very high temperatures. At the height of the 1944 LNG f i r e i n Cle v e l a n d , f o r example, flame temperatures r e p o r t e d l y reached as much at 1650° C, and the intense r a d i a n t heat generated by the c o n f l a g r a t i o n i g n i t e d b u i l d i n g s 650 metres d i s t a n t . 3 2 S i g n i f i c a n t l y experimental flame temperatures recorded f o r both butane and propane have been m a r g i n a l l y higher than f o r methane, the p r i n c i p a l component of LNG. During t e s t s conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard, flame temperatures of up to 1875° C have been recorded f o r methane, as oposed to temperatures of 1895° C and 1925° C f o r butane 33 and propane r e s p e c t i v e l y . Thus, a f i r e aboard an LPG c a r r i e r i n a harbour such as Vancouver (where the minimum north-south width between the F i r s t Narrows and the Second Narrows i s only 200 metres and the maximum i s seldom more than 2000 metres) could lead to extensive i n d i r e c t shoreside combustion. The prospect of a massive mid-harbour LPG c o n f l a g r a t i o n takes on an added dimension when one considers the wide range of t o x i c and combustible m a t e r i a l s which are r o u t i n e l y stored i n r a i l c a r s and tank farms on both sides of Burrard I n l e t , i n c l u d i n g c h l o r i n e , propane, ethylene d i c h l o r i d e , methanol, s u l p h u r i c a c i d , and many others. 7 0 Another inherent shortcoming w i t h the " l e t i t burn" approach to LPG f i r e management i s that the longer the f i r e burns, the greater the r i s k that those cargo tanks which d i d not rupture during the i n i t i a l impact may c o l l a p s e from heat-induced s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e . In the only comparable maritime accident i n v o l v i n g LPG - that i s , the 1974 c o l l i s i o n between the L i b e r i a n - r e g i s t e r e d f r e i g h t e r P a c i f i c Ares and the Japanese LPG/naphtha c a r r i e r Yuyo Maru - the Yuyo's naphtha tanks were breached upon impact and i g n i t e d i n s t a n t l y . I n i t i a l l y , no fewer than 11 f i r e f i g h t i n g v e s s e l s were dispatched to deal w i t h the f i r e . However, due to the intense heat generated by the burning naphtha, the f i r e b o a t s were unable to get near enough to the Yuyo to b r i n g the flames under c o n t r o l . 3 ^ Nevertheless, through a combination of sound design, good l u c k , and constant water c o o l i n g by attending f i r e b o a t s , the Yuyo's LPG tanks remained i n t a c t throughout. 3-* Nothwithstanding the rather f o r t u i t o u s circumstances which prevented the Yuyo's LPG tanks from c o l l a p s i n g , the very r e a l t h r e a t of heat-induced tank f a i l u r e should by no means be discounted. A l l of t h i s leads to an i n t e r e s t i n g point of c o n j e c t u r e . I f a loaded LPG c a r r i e r was i n v o l v e d i n s e r i o u s , tank-penetrating c o l l i s i o n i n Burrard I n l e t , could systematic f a i l u r e of those cargo tanks which had not been i n i t i a l l y damaged be avoided? Obviously there i s no concrete answer to t h i s q uestion. There are, however, c e r t a i n f a c t o r s which would tend to d i s t i n g u i s h an accident i n v o l v i n g the N i c h i z a n Maru from the one which consumed the Yuyo Maru. For instance, a cargo f i r e aboard the N i c h i z a n Maru would be f u e l e d by propane, which burns at a higher temperature than the naphtha which was i n v o l v e d i n the Yuyo Maru d i s a s t e r . Secondly, the Port of Vancouver, with only one f i r e b o a t at i t s d i s p o s a l , would almost c e r t a i n l y be unable to c o n t a i n a major shipboard LPG f i r e . This l a t t e r l i m i t a t i o n would be f u r t h e r compounded should the C i t y of Vancouver ever choose to f o l l o w 71 through on i t s periodic threat to withdraw the f i r e b o a t from service completely due to rapidly escalating costs and an unwillingness on the part of other l o c a l m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and harbour agencies to contribute to the f i r e b o a t ' s upkeep and operating expenses.^6 The loss of the f i r e b o a t under these circumstances would seriously i n h i b i t any attempt to mount a co-ordinated offensive against an LPG f i r e , and would e f f e c t i v e l y remove the one f u n c t i o n a l unit which i s best trained and equipped to deal with such an emergency. I r o n i c a l l y , at a time when the trend towards increased shipborne movements of a l l manner of hazardous materials i s on the upswing i n the port, one might argue that the r e a l issue at hand should not be focussed upon the possible withdrawal of the e x i s t i n g f i r e b o a t from s e r v i c e , but whether or not more specially-designed emergency response vessels are a c t u a l l y required. The question of whether undamaged LPG tanks could be prevented from rupturing i n the event of a serious mid-harbour gas f i r e remains moot. Nevertheless, the previously-discussed factors of l i m i t e d l o c a l emergency response c a p a b i l i t y and the use of propane, instead of naphtha, as the p r i n c i p a l f u e l l i n g agent, suggest that the l i k e l i h o o d of systematic tank f a i l u r e i n the event of a f i r e aboard a loaded gas c a r r i e r i n Burrard I n l e t would be greater than i t was for the Yuyo Maru. The impact of such a tank f a i l u r e i n a crowded harbour s e t t i n g would be enormous; the e f f e c t s possibly catastrophic. 3.3.3 The Gas Tanker Safety Record 3.3.3.1. Phase I - 1964-1978 In the face of often severe public c r i t i c i s m , gas tanker proponents have long maintained that LNG and LPG c a r r i e r s are among the s a f e s t , most accident-free vessels a f l o a t . P r i o r to the l a t e 1970's, industry o f f i c i a l s 72 were quick to point out that only one " t o t a l l o s s " accident i n v o l v i n g a gas tanker had ever occurred. That, of course, was the i l l - f a t e d Yuyo Maru, which burned out of c o n t r o l f o r some 19 days a f t e r c o l l i d i n g w i t h the f r e i g h t e r P a c i f i c Ares i n November of 1974. The Yuyo Maru was e v e n t u a l l y sunk by Japanese naval g u n f i r e on 28 November 1974 a f t e r i t had been determined that the v e s s e l ' s cargo of LPG and naphtha could continue to burn f o r up to s e v e r a l months. Nevertheless, i t would be erroneous to presume t h a t , aside from the Yuyo  Maru d i s a s t e r , the gas tanker s a f e t y record has remained unblemished throughout. In f a c t , recent comments by Captain A l b e r t o A l l i e v i , gas and chemical shipping s a f e t y co-ordinator f o r Esso Europe, suggest that q u i t e the opposite has been t r u e . Captain A l l i e v i i n d i c a t e s that between 1964 and 1977, some 376 gas c a r r i e r s of fewer than 5000 cubic metres c a p a c i t y experienced a t o t a l of 394 v e s s e l c a s u a l t i e s - or 2.34 c a s u a l t i e s per month. Large gas c a r r i e r s (that i s , those i n excess of 5000 cubic metres) s u f f e r e d an average of 1.2 c a s u a l t i e s per month during t h i s period.37 Unfo r t u n a t e l y , the a r t i c l e from which Captain A l l i e v i ' s comments were extr a c t e d ("Smaller gas c a r r i e r s bigger c a s u a l t y r i s k s , " Lloyd's L i s t , 10 A p r i l 1981) i s , f o r the purposes of t h i s study, d e f i c i e n t i n two very important respects. F i r s t l y , i t provides l i t t l e i n s i g h t i n t o the s p e c i f i c nature or s e v e r i t y of the c a s u a l t i e s i n question. In marine insurance terms, a v e s s e l " c a s u a l t y " could c o n s t i t u t e anything from a r e l a t i v e l y minor i n c i d e n t which would not compromise the sa f e t y of e i t h e r the v e s s e l or i t s crew, to a t o t a l l o s s s i t u a t i o n (such as that experienced by the Yuyo Maru). Secondly, the a r t i c l e f a i l s to d i s t i n g u i s h between i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g LPG c a r r i e r s as opposed to LNG c a r r i e r s . 73 A review of s e v e r a l published accounts d e a l i n g p r i m a r i l y w i t h the LNG s a f e t y issue revealed 29 separate i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g LNG c a r r i e r s , but only s i x i n v o l v i n g LPG c a r r i e r s , during the period 1964-1978.* Among the mishaps c h r o n i c l e d f o r t h i s p eriod were s e v e r a l experienced by the world's f i r s t LNG c a r r i e r s - the A r i s t o t l e (formerly the Methane P i o n e e r ) , and the 27 400 cubic metre s i s t e r ships Methane P r i n c e s s (1964) and Methane Progress (1964). A l l of these v e s s e l s have, from time to time, proven to be d i s t u r b i n g l y s u s c e p t i b l e to a host of mechanical malfunctions and serious e r r o r s i n human judgment, as i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g s e r i e s of events which b e f e l l A r i s t o t l e during a s i n g l e 24-month period i n the mid-1960*s: 3 8 November 1966: Damage to main bearing r e s u l t s i n mid-ocean breakdown r e q u i r i n g 53 days to r e p a i r . Date u n s p e c i f i e d , 1967: C y l i n d e r l i n e r breaks. Two cargo pumps subsequently damaged. September 1968: Stranded f o r 61 hours o f f coast of Mexico f o l l o w i n g grounding. Sustains minor bottom damage and requires tug a s s i s t a n c e to r e f l o a t . November 1968: Loses rudder i n storm north of Azores. Towed to Boston f o r r e p a i r s . Both the Methane Princess and Methane Progress have, at various times, experienced cargo containment system disorders ranging from " c o l d spots" on the inner h u l l (caused by c o n s t r u c t i o n defects i n the cryogenic i n s u l a t i o n ) to more serious s t r u c t u r a l cracking.^1 I n 1974, the Methane Progress was r e p o r t e d l y l a i d up f o r more than 70 days while r e p a i r s were made to her s t e e r i n g gear f o l l o w i n g a grounding episode at Arzew, A l g e r i a . ^ 2 i n December of the same year, she was rammed i n the s t e r n by the B r i t i s h coaster Tower P r i n c e s s . ^ 3 F o r t u n a t e l y , the accident was w e l l removed from the cargo tanks and there was no s p i l l a g e of LNG. *For a more d e t a i l e d chronology of reported i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s from 1964 to 1982, r e f e r to Appendix I I ( f o r LPG tanker c a s u a l t i e s ) and Appendix I I I ( f o r LNG tanker c a s u a l t i e s ) . 74 Another noteworthy i n c i d e n t which occurred during the 1964-1978 period i n v o l v e d the small Swedish gas c a r r i e r Claude. In the f a l l of 1968, while c a r r y i n g some 900 cubic metres of l i q u e f i e d butane, Claude c o l l i d e d i n fog with a B r i t i s h f r e i g h t e r o f f Southampton, England. The f o l l o w i n g account of the accident i s from Noel Mostert's Supership: "Seconds a f t e r the c o l l i s i o n , " Captain Bayley w r i t e s ( i n Safety at  Sea I n t e r n a t i o n a l , J.C.M.), "the p i l o t of the Claude found himself alone on the bridge of the s t r i c k e n s h i p , the r e s t of the crew having jumped i n t o the fog-shrouded water. The gas tanker's engine was l e f t t u r n i n g w i t h a s l i g h t reverse p i t c h on the p r o p e l l e r ! The p i l o t knew nothing of the cargo beneath him, but f i g u r i n g that the crew knew what was best f o r t h e i r own s k i n s , he too abandoned s h i p . " The abandoned Claude d r i f t e d back the way she had come, a s s i s t e d by her p r o p e l l e r and the t i d e , and went aground. The drama however d i d not end there. The ship was towed to a r e f i n e r y and a Portuguese gas ship was chartered to take o f f the Claude's cargo. During the t r a n s f e r operation one of the hoses sprang a leak and a "vast cloud of gas was c a r r i e d on the wind towards the r e f i n e r y and the c i t y of Southampton. "In a f i n e d i s p l a y of panic...the Portuguese tanker steamed away, i g n o r i n g the r u p t u r i n g of hoses and p i p e l i n e s , i n e s t i m a b l y i n c r e a s i n g the r i s k of e x p l o s i o n . The r a p i d evaporation of the l i q u i d gas caused i c e to form and volunteers working without gas masks...had a hard job to c l o s e the valves l e f t open by the departing gentlemen of Portugal."42 The Claude episode was one of the f i r s t to draw p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n to the hazards a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the marine c a r r i a g e of bulk l i q u e f i e d gases. I t a l s o served to i l l u s t r a t e , with considerable emphasis, the extent to which the human f a c t o r can have a s e r i o u s , even d e b i l i t a t i n g , e f f e c t upon the safe operation of any v e s s e l . Even so, the t o t a l volume of gas in v o l v e d was small by present shipping standards and, a c c o r d i n g l y , the damage p o t e n t i a l somewhat l i m i t e d i n terms of p h y s i c a l scope. In a d d i t i o n to the i n c i d e n t s already described i n t h i s chapter, gas c a r r i e r s were i n v o l v e d i n a v a r i e t y of episodes between 1964 and 1978, i n c l u d i n g c o l l i s i o n s ( E u c l i d e s - 1974; LNG Challenger - 1977 and 1978; L i n c o l n s h i r e -1977; and Khannur - 1978), groundings ( E u c l i d e s - 1974), shipboard f i r e s ( M i l l i - 1974), and, i n at l e a s t one ins t a n c e , breaking a d r i f t from secure moorage during storm-force winds and severe t i d a l c o n d i t i o n s (LNG A r i e s -1978). 7 5 Figure 3.3 LNG Carrier Khannur at Sodegaura, Japan 76 3.3.3.2 Phase I I - 1979-1982 The preceding f i n d i n g s f o r the period 1964-1978 are d i s c o n c e r t i n g i n two respects. F i r s t l y , they represent only a f r a c t i o n of the more than 400 gas tanker c a s u a l t i e s r e f e r r e d to by Captain A l l i e v i of Esso Europe f o r the corresponding p e r i o d . Furthermore, only s i x of the 35 i n c i d e n t s documented in v o l v e d LPG c a r r i e r s . Small and large LPG c a r r i e r s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y outnumbered LNG c a r r i e r s by a very wide margin. In f a c t , i n 1966 operating LPG c a r r i e r s outnumbered LNG c a r r i e r s by a r a t i o of 29 t o 1 (145 LPG c a r r i e r s to 5 LNG c a r r i e r s ) ; by 1977, the r a t i o stood at approximately 11 to 1 (441 LPG c a r r i e r s , as opposed to 39 LNG c a r r i e r s ) . ^ 3 This would tend to suggest that e i t h e r a) LNG tankers have had a s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher accident rate than LPG c a r r i e r s , or b) the researchers who compiled gas tanker accident s t a t i s t i c s during the 1960's and 1970's were biased towards i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g LNG c a r r i e r s and, as such, tended to overlook a l l but the most s e r i o u s LPG tanker mishaps. The l a t t e r e x p l a n a t i o n would seem to be the more appropriate of the two. However, i n the absence of d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n to support t h i s hypothesis, a d a i l y a n a l y s i s was conducted of a l l LPG and LNG accident reports f i l e d w i t h Lloyd's L i s t between 28 June 1979 and 28 February 1982 - a t o t a l of 32 months. The f i n d i n g s of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n are e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g i n that they appear to cast serious doubt upon the long-held c l a i m that l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s are i n h e r e n t l y safer and, hence, l e s s s u s c e p t i b l e to serious mishaps than other types of cargo s h i p s . During the course of the review p e r i o d , 85 i n c i d e n t s of note i n v o l v i n g LPG c a r r i e r s were i d e n t i f i e d , as opposed to 23 LNG c a s u a l t i e s . * The r e s u l t s of the review f o r each category of v e s s e l (LPG and LNG) are as f o l l o w s : *Note: Approximately 10% of the t o t a l number of LPG and LNG c a s u a l t i e s i d e n t i f i e d were removed from the a n a l y s i s due to the c l e a r l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t nature of the event. Table 3.3: LPG Incidents of Note 28 June 1979 - 28 February 1982 77 Casualty Type Casualty Status G C T L W M S F E T o t a l 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 11 0 4 7 2 2 3 7 2 2 0 29 • 13 1 2 2 3 8 3 1 0 33 f t 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 2 9 • • t 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 T o t a l 20 13 5 5 7 20 6 7 2 85 Source: Lloyd's L i s t , various e d i t i o n s Table 3.4: LNG Incidents of Note 28 June 1979 - 28 February 1982 Casualty Type Casualty Status G C T L w M S F E T o t a l 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 1 2 4 0 0 0 8 • 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 ••• 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 T o t a l 4 5 4 1 2 5 1 1 0 23 Source: Lloyd's L i s t , v a r i o us e d i t i o n s 78 E x p l a n a t i o n of Symbols f o r Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (above): A. Status of Casualty Symbols 0 Minor i n c i d e n t - l i t t l e or no damage 8 Incident of undetermined s t a t u s • Serious i n c i d e n t , but not c r i t i c a l to v e s s e l or crew sa f e t y #• Very s e r i o u s Incident - imminent danger to s a f e t y of v e s s e l , crew, and/or p u b l i c ••• T o t a l l o s s of v e s s e l B. Casualty Type Symbols G - grounding C - c o l l i s i o n or contact w i t h another v e s s e l or obstacle (such as a p i e r , b r i d g e , etc.) T - damage to cargo containment system L - damage to cargo handling system W - weather damage M - damage to the vess e l s mechanical or e l e c t r i c a l system S - s t e e r i n g / p r o p e l l e r damage F - f i r e E - e x p l o s i o n P r i o r to examining the r e s u l t s of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (above) i n greater d e t a i l , a few words of explanation as to how these t a b l e s were derived i s i n order. The "casualty type" c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s are e s s e n t i a l l y s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y and, as such, req u i r e l i t t l e f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n . The "casualty s t a t u s " c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , on the other hand, represent an attempt to c a t e g o r i z e i n c i d e n t s based on the perceived degree of s e v e r i t y a t t r i b u t a b l e to each mishap. In many in s t a n c e s , there was i n s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n presented i n the d a i l y Lloyd's L i s t c a s u a l t y reports to enable a meaningful judgment as to the s e v e r i t y of a p a r t i c u l a r mishap. These i n c i d e n t s of undetermined 79 status are noted t h u s l y "e", and account f o r approximately 34% of the t o t a l number of LPG accidents recorded, and 35% of the LNG accidents recorded. The perceived d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between minor i n c i d e n t s (0) and serious  i n c i d e n t s (•) i s perhaps open to the broadest i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true under such "casualty type" cat e g o r i e s as groundings, c o l l i s i o n s , and m e c h a n i c a l / e l e c t r i c a l system d i s o r d e r s . For example, under the heading "groundings", the p o s i t i o n has been taken that a s i t u a t i o n i n which a v e s s e l b r i e f l y touches bottom, but does not remain hard aground and does not i n c u r bottom damage as a r e s u l t , should be viewed as a minor  i n c i d e n t . On the other hand, during any instance whereupon a v e s s e l grounds, and subsequently remains stranded f o r a period of time, the episode w i l l be viewed, at the very l e a s t , as a serious i n c i d e n t , even i f the ship i s deemed to have s u f f e r e d no appreciable damage as a r e s u l t of the acci d e n t . With regard to i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g c o l l i s i o n s between two or more v e s s e l s , low speed "contact" c a s u a l t i e s r e s u l t i n g i n s u p e r f i c i a l or cosmetic damage only ( c l a s s i f i e d as minor i n c i d e n t s ) are d i s t i n g u i s h e d from more s i g n i f i c a n t i n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g h u l l p e n e t r a t i o n or i n t e r n a l damage to the gas c a r r i e r or other v e s s e l ( c l a s s i f i e d as s e r i o u s , at the very l e a s t ) . On the matter of mechanical or e l e c t r i c a l system d i s o r d e r s , the c r i t e r i o n of m o b i l i t y has been used as the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature between se r i o u s and minor i n c i d e n t s . That i s , i f a v e s s e l i s rendered immobile as a r e s u l t of an engine malfunction and requires towing a s s i s t a n c e to reach p o r t , the i n c i d e n t would be viewed as s e r i o u s . Conversely, i f a v e s s e l experiences a mechanical or e l e c t r i c a l d i s o r d e r , but i s s t i l l able to proceed under i t s own power, the i n c i d e n t would be considered minor ( u n l e s s , of course, there 80 are s i g n i f i c a n t and well-documented extenuating circumstances to suggest otherwise). The very serious c l a s s i f i c a t i o n (••), simply s t a t e d , a p p l i e s to circumstances i n which, as a r e s u l t of mishap, the s a f e t y of a v e s s e l , i t s crew, o r , i n some i n s t a n c e s , the general p u b l i c has been placed i n a p o s i t i o n of great jeopardy. In most, although not a l l , cases the presence of LPG or LNG aboard a v e s s e l i n d i s t r e s s may be the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c between a serious and a very serious i n c i d e n t . In f a c t , i n at l e a s t s i x (and p o s s i b l y seven) of nine very s e r i o u s LPG ac c i d e n t s i d e n t i f i e d during the 1979-1982 review period loaded gas tankers were i n v o l v e d . S i m i l a r l y , of three very serious LNG a c c i d e n t s , two inv o l v e d loaded v e s s e l s (see Table 3.5 - Page 81). L a s t l y , f o r the purposes of t h i s t h e s i s , t o t a l l o s s c a s u a l t i e s (•••) r e f e r to those s i t u a t i o n s wherein a v e s s e l , by reason of misadventure or some form of t e c h n i c a l l i m i t a t i o n , i s rendered permanently unable to transport l i q u e f i e d gases. In t h i s respect, the t o t a l l o s s category i s somewhat misleading i n that i t need not in v o l v e the a c t u a l s i n k i n g of a v e s s e l . In f a c t , of s i x LPG and LNG t o t a l losses i d e n t i f i e d between 1979 and 1982, only two i n v o l v e d v e s s e l s i n k i n g s . Moreover, i n both instances the s i n k i n g s were undertaken d e l i b e r a t e l y . The LPG c a r r i e r Babounis Costas was s c u t t l e d o f f the coast of N i g e r i a i n December of 1979, some two months a f t e r experiencing severe l e a k i n g problems near Lagos. The LPG c a r r i e r Gaz East, which capsized i n high winds o f f the French R i v i e r a during October of 1980, was subsequently sunk by the French navy because i t presented an unacceptable r i s k to shipping and p u b l i c s a f e t y . Table 3.5: Very Serious Casualties: Impact Assessment f or the Period 28 June 1979 - 28 February 1982 Nature of Loss Of Date Vessel (Type) Cargo (m 3) Mishap L i f e Injured Evacuated 29 June 79 E.P. Paul Kayser (LNG) 99 500 Grounding N i l N i l 7 18 Sept 79 J a t a i (LPG) Empty Explosion 1 4 N i l 28 Dec 79 Butaseis (LPG) 1 200 F i r e N i l N i l N i l 21 Jan 80 Regitze Tholstrup (LPG) 400 Grounding N i l N i l Local 25 Jan 80 Rudi M. (LPG) Empty F i r e 1 4 N i l 17 Aug 80 Cetane (LPG) ? Explosion N i l ? N i l 12-14 Sept 80 Mary Else Tholstrup (LPG) 630 Grounding & Explosion N i l 2 N i l 12 Dec 80 LNG Taurus (LNG) 125 000 Grounding 1 N i l N i l 24 Apr 81 Prins Maurits (LPG) Empty F i r e & Explosion N i l 2 N i l 16 May 81 Gaz Fountain (LPG) 38 500 F i r e N i l N i l N i l 31 May 81 Olav Trygvason (LPG) 4 100 Discharge S p i l l 1 2 N i l 17 Dec 81 E.P. Columbia (LNG) Empty Grounding TOTALS N i l 4 N i l 14 N i l Source: Lloyd's L i s t , various e d i t i o n s . 82 Of the 108 combined LPG and LNG c a s u a l t i e s recorded i n Tables 3.1 and 3.2, those f a l l i n g under the very serious and t o t a l l o s s c a t e g o r i e s should be viewed w i t h p a r t i c u l a r concern i n that they represent, w i t h few exceptions, the greatest threat to v e s s e l and crew s a f e t y . While the b a s i c circumstances surrounding each of these i n c i d e n t s are described i n Appendices I I and I I I , a b r i e f review of some of the more s i g n i f i c a n t gas tanker accidents to have occurred since 1978 i s warranted. For example, there i s the spectre of a serious f i r e aboard the LPG c a r r i e r Gaz Fountain, loaded w i t h some 38 500 cubic metres of propane and butane, or the c a p s i z i n g and subsequent s i n k i n g by the French navy of the i l l - f a t e d tanker Gaz East and i t s cargo of 2000 cubic metres of l i q u e f i e d butane. Furthermore, one should not overlook the tremendous burden of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y assumed by the crews of these v e s s e l s . The uniquely hazardous nature of unconventional l i q u e f i e d gas cargoes must s u r e l y add an e x t r a dimension of pressure on even the most seasoned mariners. Captain Peter Winkler of the A l g e r i a n LNG c a r r i e r L a r b i Ben M'hidi o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g comments to Vancouver Sun r e p o r t e r Alan Daniels during a November 1980 shipboard i n t e r v i e w at Boston, Massachusetts: The most dangerous time i s during d i s c h a r g e . . . I f a pipe breaks, i f a valve was suddenly shut o f f ashore and there was a surge of pressure which f r a c t u r e d a pipe, enough LNG would be s p i l l e d on deck before the emergency shut o f f could be operated that the deck would crack open. The LNG would f a l l onto a tank below and i t would a l s o rupture. In such a case a f i r e would be a c e r t a i n t y because there are enough hot p o i n t s to set i t burning. A f i r e i n one tank could not be fought and because of the heat the other tanks would c e r t a i n l y be melted and a l l would go. The d i s a s t e r , i n a crowded m e t r o p o l i t a n area, would be u n i m a g i n a b l e . ^ On the morning of 12 December 1980, the American l i q u e f i e d gas tanker LNG  Taurus, inbound f o r Tobata, Japan ran aground near M o j i , o f f the west coast of Honshu. LNG Taurus was loaded w i t h some 125 000 cubic metres of LNG at the time of the a c c i d e n t , which occurred during poor weather 83 c o n d i t i o n s . 4 5 On 15 December 1980, the v e s s e l ' s master, Captain C.L. Peterson, anguished over an accident f o r which he accepted f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , committed s u i c i d e i n h i s stateroom w h i l e h i s v e s s e l was s t i l l aground, although apparently i n no immediate d a n g e r . ^ However, the one i n c i d e n t which symbolizes both the best and worst of the l i q u e f i e d gas tanker s a f e t y argument involved the 29 June 1979 grounding of the 125 000 cubic metre c a p a c i t y LNG c a r r i e r E l Paso Paul Kayser. The L i b e r i a n - r e g i s t e r e d E.P. Paul Kayser, loaded w i t h some 99 500 cu b i c metres of A l g e r i a n LNG, was outbound i n fog through the S t r a i t of G i b r a l t a r when she ran aground o f f the Spanish coast while apparently attempting to avoid c o l l i s i o n w i t h another s h i p . ^ 7 The grounding occurred while the E.P.  Paul Kayser was t r a v e l l i n g at s e r v i c e speed (18 k n o t s ) , and r e s u l t e d i n a massive 170-metre long p e n e t r a t i o n of her outer h u l l . ^ 8 E v e n t u a l l y , some 95 000 cubic metres of cargo was removed to her s i s t e r ship the E l Paso  Sonatrach i n what c o n s t i t u t e d , up u n t i l that time, an unprecedented s h i p - t o - s h i p gas t r a n s f e r manoeuvre. The E.P. Paul Kayser was r e f l o a t e d on 4 J u l y 1979, and was subsequently towed to S t . Nazaire, France i n order to e f f e c t r e p a i r s which would take almost two years to complete. P r i o r to examining some of the more s i g n i f i c a n t s a f e t y i m p l i c a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the E.P. Paul Kayser accident, one must f i r s t draw a t t e n t i o n to the f a c t that the cargo containment system s u c c e s s f u l l y withstood the enormous impact of the grounding. T h i s , i n i t s e l f , i s a great t r i b u t e to the v e s s e l ' s designers (Gaz/Transport, P a r i s ) and her b u i l d e r s (Chantiers de France, Dunkerque). Nevertheless, i n s p i t e of the s u b s t a n t i a l t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances which have been made over the past decade with regard to gas tanker design and s a f e t y , the E.P. Paul Kayser episode s e r v i c e s to once again underscore the c r i t i c a l importance of the human f a c t o r . In the absence of a 84 d e t a i l e d account of the events leading up to the grounding of the E.P. Paul  Kayser, many questions remain unanswered. However, i f the l i m i t e d d e t a i l s of the accident which have been presented i n such normally r e l i a b l e p u b l i c a t i o n s as Lloyd's L i s t , Clarkson's L i q u i d Gas C a r r i e r R e g i s t e r , and Marine Engineering/Log are c o r r e c t , one might reasonably presume that the E.P. Paul Kayser was t r a v e l l i n g w e l l i n excess of what would normally be considered a safe speed, given the p r e v a i l i n g (foggy) weather c o n d i t i o n s , the p r o x i m i t y of the v e s s e l to land, and the general s t a t e of congestion which e x i s t s i n the S t r a i t of G i b r a l t a r , one of the world's b u s i e s t waterways. Under these circumstances, i t would be d i f f i c u l t to conclude that the grounding was not a t t r i b u t a b l e , i n large measure, to a very s e r i o u s e r r o r i n judgment on the part of the master of the E.P. Paul Kayser. In r e t r o s p e c t , had the above-described accident i n v o l v e d an ol d e r v e s s e l , or one of l e s s e r design q u a l i t y than the E.P. Paul Kayser, the r e s u l t s may have been much worse. More i m p o r t a n t l y , i f a severe grounding such as the one which d i s a b l e d the E.P. Paul Kayser can happen, there i s l i t t l e to suggest t h a t , as a r e s u l t of human e r r o r or mechanical f a i l u r e , a high speed c o l l i s i o n i n v o l v i n g one, or p o s s i b l y even two, la r g e gas c a r r i e r s could not occur. In the event of such a c o l l i s i o n , the l i k e l i h o o d of deep tank pe n e t r a t i o n would normally be considered much greater than I t would i n a grounding a c c i d e n t . A recent study by the Norwegian c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o c i e t y , Det norske V e r i t a s , i n d i c a t e s that a 10 000 deadweight ton (dwt) v e s s e l c o l l i d i n g broadside w i t h a s t a t i o n a r y 125 000 cubic metre LNG c a r r i e r employing the Kvaerner-Moss s p h e r i c a l tank containment design (which i s considered to be t h e o r e t i c a l l y one of the most impact r e s i s t a n t of a l l gas containment systems) could penetrate the cargo tank w a l l at a speed of approximately 11 knots, assuming that the point of impact occurred at or 85 near mid-tank - that i s , at the point where the sphere i s c l o s e s t to the h u l l . ^ The report f u r t h e r t h e o r i z e s that a 50 000 dwt v e s s e l c o l l i d i n g w i t h a Kvaerner-Moss design gas c a r r i e r under i d e n t i c a l circumstances could p i e r c e the cargo containment w a l l at only 6 knots. Another, l e s s o p t i m i s t i c , a n a l y s i s prepared by the f i r m of Arthur D. L i t t l e , Inc. i n d i c a t e s that a 38 000 dwt v e s s e l c o l l i d i n g at a 90° angle w i t h a berthed 120 000 cubic metre LNG c a r r i e r i n c o r p o r a t i n g the Technigaz/Conch Ocean membrane containment design would have s u f f i c i e n t forward momentum to cause a gas s p i l l at only 3.4 knots.^® Both the norske V e r i t a s and Arthur D. L i t t l e s t udies apply to LNG, r a t h e r than LPG, c a r r i e r s . There are, however, s e v e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which would suggest that LPG c a r r i e r s would, i n f a c t , be more s u s c e p t i b l e to low speed h u l l p e n e t r a t i o n i n the event of a c o l l i s i o n than would t h e i r LNG counterparts. For example, whereas the vast m a j o r i t y of LNG c a r r i e r s are double h u l l e d , most LPG c a r r i e r s are n o t . ^ l Furthermore, LNG tanks are designed to accommodate cargoes at cryogenic temperatures, whereas LPG tanks are not. A c c o r d i n g l y , the s t r e s s a n a l y s i s requirements f o r LPG tanks, as e s t a b l i s h e d by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Maritime C o n s u l t a t i v e O r g a n i z a t i o n (IMCO) codes f o r new and e x i s t i n g gas c a r r i e r s , are l e s s s t r i n g e n t than f o r LNG tanks.^2 In the only comparable r e a l - l i f e c o l l i s i o n event i n v o l v i n g a l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r , the 16 000 dwt P a c i f i c Ares was t r a v e l l i n g at an estimated 4-7 knots when she penetrated the h u l l of the LPG/naphtha tanker Yuyo Maru i n Tokyo Bay.->3 That there have not been more gas tanker accidents on the s c a l e of the Yuyo  Maru d i s a s t e r i s , i n i t s e l f , q u i t e remarkable. However, as more large gas c a r r i e r s are introduced, and as the e x i s t i n g f l e e t becomes p r o g r e s s i v e l y o l d e r , the p r o b a b i l i t y of a major accident o c c u r r i n g w i l l i n c r e a s e . 86 U n d o u b t e d l y , t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s i n s h i p c o n s t r u c t i o n , n a v i g a t i o n a l a i d s , a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s u p e r i o r c a r g o c o n t a i n m e n t d e s i g n s w i l l p r o v i d e u p c o m i n g g e n e r a t i o n s o f v e s s e l s w i t h a n a d d e d d i m e n s i o n o f s a f e t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e g r o u n d i n g o f t h e E l P a s o P a u l K a y s e r c l e a r l y d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n c a n n o t , i n i t s e l f , c o m p l e t e l y o f f s e t t h e p o t e n t i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f t h e one t r u l y weak l i n k i n t h e h a z a r d p r e v e n t i o n c h a i n - a n d t h e one w h i c h , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , c a n n o t be e f f e c t i v e l y l e g i s l a t e d o u t o f e x i s t e n c e - human e r r o r . I t h a s b e e n e s t i m a t e d t h a t f u l l y 80% o f a l l m a r i n e a c c i d e n t s a r e b a s e d u p o n a t l e a s t a m e a s u r e o f human e r r o r o r n e g l i g e n c e . 5 4 U n d e r t h e s e r a t h e r f o r e b o d i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e m e d i u m r a n g e o u t l o o k f o r g a s t a n k e r s a f e t y c a n p e r h a p s b e s t be summed up i n t h e w o r d s o f C a p t a i n R i c h a r d S i m o n d s o f t h e U . S . C o a s t G u a r d : W e ' v e j u s t b e e n p l a i n l u c k y s o f a r . A m a j o r i n c i d e n t m u s t o c c u r . W e ' r e j u s t w a i t i n g . I t ' s a q u e s t i o n o f w h e n , n o t i f . ^ 5 3.4 F i r e b o a t i n V a n c o u v e r H a r b o u r 87 FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 3.0 1 " S p e c i a l Report - Gastech *81", Lloyd's L i s t , 20 October 1981. 2 Since the f i r s t LNG tankers were introduced more than two decades ago, more than 20 d i f f e r e n t i n s u l a t e d LNG containment systems have been proposed. B a s i c a l l y , these systems can be grouped i n t o three main ca t e g o r i e s : 1) free standing tanks ( i . e . s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g s t r u c t u r a l e n t i t i e s which do not form an i n t e g r a l part of the h u l l s t r u c t u r e , and do not c o n t r i b u t e to h u l l s t r e n g t h ) ; 2) membrane tanks (which are n o n - s e l f -supporting tanks i n the form of compartments bounded by the ship's h u l l s t r u c t u r e , and l i n e d w i t h i n s u l a t i o n and primary and secondary b a r r i e r s ) ; and 3) semi-membrane tanks (which are a hyb r i d of both f r e e - s t a n d i n g and membrane tank d e s i g n s ) . For an e x c e l l e n t i n t r o d u c t i o n to the v a r i o u i s LNG cargo containment systems p r e s e n t l y i n use or i n the conceptual design stages, r e f e r to Charles Zeien and W i l l i a m Dubarry Thomas, "Ship Containment Systems," Seminar on N a t u r a l Gas from the A r c t i c by Marine Mode: A  P r e l i m i n a r y Assessment (Ottawa: 1977), pp. 91-107. 3 Lee N. Davis, Frozen F i r e (San F r a n c i s c o : Friends of the E a r t h , 1979), p. 45. 4 H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , L i q u i d Gas C a r r i e r R e g i s t e r - 1980 (London: H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , 1980), p. 16. 5 I b i d . , p. 17. 6 "More obstacles f o r Pac-Indonesia orders", Lloyd's Shipping  Economist, V o l . 3, No. 2 (February 1981), p. 36. 7 Lloyd's Shipping Economist, V o l . 3, No. 2 (February 1981), pp. 34-36. 8 H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , L i q u i d Gas C a r r i e r R e g i s t e r - 1981 (London: H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , 1981), p. 144. 9 "Ocean's f i g u r e s might even s u r p r i s e the o p t i m i s t s " , Lloyd's L i s t , 19 June 1981. 1 0 "The E l Paso E f f e c t " , Lloyd's Shipping Economist, V o l . 3, No. 2 (February 1981), p. 5; and " E l Paso f l e e t i s l a i d up f o r s a l e " , Lloyd's  L i s t , 26 January 1981; and Lloyd's L i s t , 9 A p r i l 1981. H "Kockums order to rec o n s t r u c t CMB gas c a r r i e r " , Lloyd's L i s t , 19 June 1981. I 2 H. Clarkson & Co. L t d . , op. c i t . (London: 1980), p. 16. 2 3 I b i d . , p. 16. 8 8 14 As of 1 January 1980 the world LNG f l e e t contained 27 v e s s e l s i n excess of 100 000 m3 c a p a c i t y , with 17 more ships i n t h i s category on order f o r d e l i v e r y by 1982. By c o n t r a s t , only two LPG c a r r i e r s are i n the 100 000 m3 category - the Esso Westernport (101 000 m 3) and the Esso F u j i (100 200 m 3). The l a r g e s t LPG tanker scheduled f o r d e l i v e r y to the end of 1982 w i l l have a cap a c i t y of 83 000 m3. I b i d . , p. 22 and p. 28. 15 Trans Mountain P i p e l i n e Company L t d . , Annual Reports 1975-1981 (Vancouver: 1976-1982). 1 6 Davis, op. c i t . , p. 269. 1 7 Richard G. Wooler, Marine T r a n s p o r t a t i o n of LNG and Related Products (Cambridge, MD: C o r n e l l Maritime Press, 1975), pp. 88-97. 1^ Peter van der Linde, Time Bomb (Garden C i t y : Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1978), p. 26. 1^ Based upon in f o r m a t i o n contained i n a l e t t e r to the author from Mr. Paul Roshkind, Manager, Marketing S e r v i c e s , Port A u t h o r i t y of New York and New Jersey, dated 4 January 1980. 2 0 James A. Fay, "Risks of LNG and LPG", as e x t r a c t e d from Annual Review  of Energy - 1980, p. 5:92. 21 Oceanographic I n s t i t u t e of Washington, LNG and LPG Hazards Management  i n Washington State ( S e a t t l e : December 1978), p. 1-8. 2 2 Fay, op. c i t . , p. 5:101. 2 3 U.S. Coast Guard (Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) , L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l  Gas and L i q u e f i e d Petroleum Gas - Views and P r a c t i c e s (Washington, D.C: c i r c a February 1980), p. 32. 24 Davis, op. c i t . , pp. 269-282. 2 5 Oceanographic I n s t i t u t e of Washington, op. c i t • , p. V I I - 7; and U.S. Coast Guard, LNG and LPG - Views and P r a c t i c e s , p. 11. 2 6 U.S. Coast Guard, LNG and LPG - Views and P r a c t i c e s , p. 11. 2 7 F.W. Murray et a l , Hazards Associated w i t h the Importation of  L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas (Santa Monica: Rand C o r p o r a t i o n , 1976), p. 48. 2 8 The Termpol Co-ordinating Committee's Assessment Report on Dome  Petroleum Limited's Proposal to Construct and Operate a L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l  Gas Marine Terminal at Grassy P o i n t , Port Simpson Bay, B.C. (Vancouver: Canadian Coast Guard, May 1982), from the Environmental Assessment and Risk A n a l y s i s Sub-Committee Report, p. 9. Davis, op. c i t . , pp. 42-43. 89 3 0 U.S. Coast Guard (Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) , P r e d i c t a b i l i t y of  LNG Vapor D i s p e r s i o n from C a t a s t r o p h i c S p i l l s onto Water: An Assessment (Washington, D.C: A p r i l 1977), pages 24, 50, and 80. 31 van der Linde, op. c i t . , p. 23. 3 2 I b i d . , p. 13; and Davis, op. c i t . , p. 35. 33 U.S. Coast Guard, LNG and LPG - Views and P r a c t i c e s , p. 7. 34 "34 feared l o s t i n f i e r y ship e x p l o s i o n , " The Vancouver Sun, 9 November 1974, p. 1. 3 5 Based upon an account of the Yuyo Maru d i s a s t e r by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, as reported i n Davis, op. c i t . , pp. 79-80; and van der Linde, op. c i t . , pp. 17-23. 36 "Fear of i n f e r n o i n Vancouver haunts experts", The Vancouver Sun, 2 September 1980. 3 7 "Smaller gas c a r r i e r s bigger casualty r i s k s " , Lloyd's L i s t , 10 A p r i l 1981. 3 8 van der Linde, op. c i t . , pp. 64-65. 3 9 Robert P. Curt et a l , Marine T r a n s p o r t a t i o n of L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas, (King's P o i n t , NY: a report produced under the auspices of The N a t i o n a l Maritime Research Center, 1973), p. 178; and Wooler, op. c i t . , pp. 25-31. 4° P.L.L. Vrancken and J . McHugh, "Twelve Years Operating Experience with Methane P r i n c e s s and Methane Progress", LNG-5 (Dusseldorf: 1977), Session VI, Paper 6, Part I I , as described i n Davis, op. c i t . , p. 52 (footnote #11). 41 Davis, op. c i t . , p. 70. 42 Based upon an e x t r a c t from an a r t i c l e by a Captain Bayley i n Safety  at Sea I n t e r n a t i o n a l (date undetermined), as reported i n Noel Mostert, Supership (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1976), pp. 372-373. 4 3 H. Clarkson & Co. L t d . , op. c i t . (London: 1981), p. 25. 44 "Cargo has a c i t y h o l d i n g i t s breath", The Vancouver Sun, 15 November 1980, p. A10. 45 "LNG c a r r i e r aground w i t h explosive cargo", Lloyd's L i s t , 13 December 1980. 4 6 "Grounded LNG ship's master k i l l s h i m s e l f " , Lloyd's L i s t , 16 December 1980. 4 7 Lloyd's L i s t , 29 June 1979. 48 H. Clarkson & Co. L t d . , op. c i t . (London: 1980), p. 4. 90 4 y From an unpublished report prepared by Det Norske V e r i t a s , as reported i n Davis, op. c i t . , p. 74. 50 Arthur D. L i t t l e , Inc., "The C o l l i s i o n Resistance of the Ben  F r a n k l i n " , c i t e d i n General Accounting O f f i c e , L i q u e f i e d Energy Gases  Safety , V o l . I l l , p. 519, as reported i n Oceanographic I n s t i t u t e of Washington, op. c i t . , p. I I - I I . 51 Comptroller General of the United S t a t e s , Report to the Congress - L i q u e f i e d Energy Gases Safety (Washington: 31 J u l y 1978), V o l . 1, p. 6-6. 5 2 I b i d . , p. 6-6. 53 Based upon an account of the Yuyo Maru d i s a s t e r by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, as c i t e d i n van der Linde, op. c i t . p. 19. 54 Oceanographic I n s t i t u t e of Washington, op. c i t . , p. I I - 6 . 55 Captain Richards Simonds, USCG, as quoted i n van der L i n d e , op. c i t . , p. 65. 91 4.0 THE PUBLIC SAFETY IMPERATIVE: A REVIEW OF SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LIQUEFIED GAS CARRIERS OPERATING IN SELECTED WORLD PORTS 4.1 Overview Due to the unique nature of t h e i r cargoes, l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s began to a t t r a c t s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n among ship i n s u r e r s , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o c i e t i e s , and government r e g u l a t o r y agencies long before the Methane Pioneer embarked upon her h i s t o r i c t r a n s - A t l a n t i c voyage from the U.S. Gulf Coast to Canvey I s l a n d back i n 1959. Recognizing the enormous hazard p o t e n t i a l inherent i n the sea-borne c a r r i a g e of l i q u e f i e d gases g e n e r a l l y , these and other o r g a n i z a t i o n s , through the auspices of the U . N . - a f f i l i a t e d Intergovernmental Maritime C o n s u l t a t i v e Organization (IMCO), have been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n c o n t r i b u t i n g to the gradual e v o l u t i o n of a sound code of minimum standards governing both the c o n s t r u c t i o n of new gas tankers and the r e t r o f i t t i n g of e x i s t i n g ones. 1 A few nations - notably the United States - have seen f i t to r e - d e f i n e many of these standards, at l e a s t to the extent that they r e l a t e to domestic f l a g v e s s e l s , i n order to f u r t h e r reduce the associated o p e r a t i o n a l r i s k f a c t o r . * S i m i l a r l y , s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s have endeavoured to upgrade e x i s t i n g manning standards f o r l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s through the a p p l i c a t i o n of s p e c i a l i z e d o f f i c e r and crew t r a i n i n g requirements. * Recently, the U.S. Coast Guard refused to c e r t i f y three 127 800 cubic metre c a p a c i t y LNG c a r r i e r s under c o n s t r u c t i o n at Avondale Shipyards i n New Orleans f o r the E l Paso Marine Company. Coast Guard in s p e c t o r s discovered cracks i n the polyurethane i n s u l a t i o n surrounding the v e s s e l s ' cargo tanks. The b u i l d e r was unable to i s o l a t e the cause of the problem, nor was i t p o s s i b l e to modify the h u l l s t r u c t u r e to i n c o r p o r a t e a new cargo containment system. In October 1980, a group of insurance companies agreed to pay E l Paso $300 m i l l i o n i n the l a r g e s t marine insurance settlement i n h i s t o r y . The three v e s s e l s were e v e n t u a l l y s o l d , and were scheduled to be converted i n t o dry bulk c a r r i e r s . I n December of 1981, one of the s h i p s , E l Paso Columbia, ran aground o f f the coast of Nova S c o t i a while under tow f o r H a l i f a x , where she was to be t e m p o r a r i l y l a i d up. The f u t u r e of E l Paso Columbia i s now i n doubt. 2 92 The c r i t i c a l phase i n the o p e r a t i o n a l cycle of a gas tanker occurs when i t i s i n port - that i s , during the a r r i v a l , loading/unloading, and departure stages. I t i s at t h i s point - p a r t i c u l a r l y during the a r r i v a l and departure i n t e r v a l s - that the v e s s e l i s most vulnerable to the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s of both human e r r o r and mechanical f a i l u r e . According to Captain W.S.G. Morrison of the Canadian Coast Guard, "...about 80% of the accidents to ships occur i n . . . r e s t r i c t e d waterways and harbours." 3 Such e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s as harbour congestion, lack of f a m i l i a r i t y with the layout of the po r t , p i l o t c o n t r o l , t i d a l c o n d i t i o n s , and weather, to name but a few, may a l l c o n t r i b u t e , to a greater or l e s s e r degree, to t h i s g e n e r a l l y increased s t a t e of v e s s e l s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to mishap. I t must a l s o be recognized that i f the l e v e l of r i s k to the v e s s e l i s l i k e l y to be heightened i n po r t , then so too i s the p o t e n t i a l l e v e l of impact upon the surrounding community i n the event of a serious shipboard accident. A c c o r d i n g l y , most port and harbour a u t h o r i t i e s around the world have chosen to introduce e x t r a o r d i n a r y operating r e g u l a t i o n s which are s o l e l y a p p l i c a b l e to l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s . The remaining p o r t i o n of t h i s chapter w i l l examine these r e g u l a t i o n s as they r e l a t e to s e v e r a l North American and European p o r t s , and w i l l b r i e f l y attempt to assess some of t h e i r r e l a t i v e merits and shortcomings. 4.2 Canada 4.2.1 Current S i t u a t i o n Assessment Vancouver i s p r e s e n t l y the only deepwater port i n Canada which i s engaged i n the overseas shipment of l i q u e f i e d gases on a r e g u l a r , large volume b a s i s . However, i t i s widely speculated that f u r t h e r gas port development w i l l occur on Canada's eastern, western, and A r c t i c coasts w i t h i n the coming decade. For a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the major proposals which have been announced to date, r e f e r t o Appendix IV. 93 4.2.2 Vancouver The Port of Vancouver i s favoured w i t h one of the f i n e s t n a t u r a l deepwater harbours i n the world. Extending some 25 kil o m e t r e s eastward from the F i r s t Narrows (the s i n g u l a r point of ocean access) to Port Moody, B.C., the harbour ranges i n width from roughly 200 metres at Gosse Point to as much as 2600 metres i n the main port area (see maps, pp. 94-95). In s p i t e of i t s length and f j o r d - l i k e c o n f i g u r a t i o n , the harbour i s remarkably free of n a t u r a l o b s t r u c t i o n s to n a v i g a t i o n . The p r i n c i p a l exceptions are i n the v i c i n i t y of the F i r s t and Second Narrows, where the navigable fairway f o r ocean-going vessels c o n s t r i c t s a p p r e c i a b l y . T i d a l c o n d i t i o n s are g e n e r a l l y more pronounced i n the Narrows than elsewhere. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true f o r the Second Narrows, where t i d a l v e l o c i t i e s of up to 5.5 knots are not uncommon.^ In terms of f i x e d man-made o b s t r u c t i o n s , the Second Narrows r a i l w a y bridge has been the greatest source of concern to mariners over the years. On 12 October 1979, the outbound f r e i g h t e r Japan E r i c a c o l l i d e d w i t h the bridge i n dense fog, thereby d i s r u p t i n g r a i l s e r v i c e to the north shore of Burrard I n l e t f o r almost f i v e months. This a c t i o n prompted the Harbour Master's o f f i c e to i s s u e s t r i c t new shipping r e g u l a t i o n s f o r the area, the substance of which w i l l be more f u l l y addressed l a t e r i n t h i s s e c t i o n . Perhaps the l e a s t d e s i r a b l e aspect of the port i n terms of i t s p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e has been the h i s t o r i c a l tendency among many i n d u s t r i e s c a t e r i n g to the hazardous m a t e r i a l s trade to lo c a t e on the eastern side of the Second Narrows. In f a c t , most l o c a l marine shipments of LPG, c h l o r i n e , and petroleum products o r i g i n a t e from terminals s i t u a t e d between the Second Narrows and Port Moody. Vessels wishing to gain access t o , or egress from, PORT OF VANCOUVER: PRINCIPAL HAZARDOUS GOODS STORAGE POINTS LEGEND Chemical/Petrochemical Terminals: 1 VANCOUVER WHARVES (Methanol ) 2. DOW C H E M I C A L (Ethylene D i c h l o r i d e , C a u s t i c Soda , E t h y l e n e G l y c o l ) 3. C A N A D I A N O C C l D E N T AL - HOOK ER ( C h l o r i n e and o t h e r s ) 4. ERCO INDUSTRIES (Sodium Chlorate) 5. TRANS MOUNTAIN PI PELINE ( L P G ) Deepwater Berth Railcar Holding Area Barge Facility 1 km F i g u r e A. 1 P O R T O F V A N C O U V E R : L A N D U S E P A T T E R N Figure 4.2 96 these f a c i l i t i e s have no a l t e r n a t i v e but to pass through the heart of the busiest port on the west coast, as w e l l as the r e s t r i c t e d waters of the F i r s t and Second Narrows. C l e a r l y , t h i s i s a l e s s than i d e a l s i t u a t i o n , as i t exposes the v e s s e l and, by extension, a p o t e n t i a l l y l a rge segment of the Lower Mainland p o p u l a t i o n , to among the highest l e v e l s of o p e r a t i o n a l r i s k i n the harbour. The task of reducing the hazards associated w i t h the sea-borne c a r r i a g e of dangerous goods i n the port r e s t s p r i m a r i l y with two f e d e r a l agencies - the Canadian Coast Guard and the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board. Coast Guard involvement takes two d i s t i n c t forms - one r e g u l a t o r y , the other a d v i s o r y . The Ship Safety Branch of the Coast Guard i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r ensuring that c o n s t r u c t i o n , manning, and operating standards f o r v e s s e l s f u n c t i o n i n g i n Canadian waters are i n conformity with the p r o v i s i o n s of the Canada Shipping Act, as w e l l as any i n t e r n a t i o n a l conventions on maritime s a f e t y to which Canada i s a c o n t r a c t i n g member. Unfortunately, due to the l a r g e number of v i s i t s by f o r e i g n - f l a g v e s s e l s to B r i t i s h Columbia ports annually, and to l i m i t e d s t a f f resources w i t h i n the Ship Safety Branch, i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r Coast Guard o f f i c i a l s to p e r s o n a l l y examine each incoming v e s s e l . Instead, a s u b s t a n t i a l p r o p o r t i o n of a l l shipboard i n s p e c t i o n s by Coast Guard marine surveyors are, by n e c e s s i t y , conducted on a more or l e s s ad hoc b a s i s , or at the request of q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l s (such as coast p i l o t s ) who have reason to b e l i e v e that a p a r t i c u l a r v e s s e l i s i n contravention of Canadian shipping r e g u l a t i o n s . * Under these circumstances, i t i s *The major exceptions to t h i s p r a c t i c e are o i l and, more r e c e n t l y , chemical tankers which, based upon s p e c i a l p o l l u t i o n prevention r e g u l a t i o n s introduced under the a u t h o r i t y of Section 730 (2) of the Canada Shipping Act ( C e r t i f i c a t e s evidencing compliance), are r e q u i r e d to undergo mandatory i n s p e c t i o n s at l e a s t every two years. L i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s , by v i r t u e of the e s s e n t i a l l y n o n - p o l l u t i n g nature of t h e i r cargoes, are exempt from these r e g u l a t i o n s . 97 conceivable that a l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r could serve the Port of Vancouver on a r e g u l a r basis f o r an extended period of years without ever being subjected to a d e t a i l e d i n s p e c t i o n by Canadian a u t h o r i t i e s . The other means whereby the Coast Guard can e f f e c t i v e l y e x e r c i s e a c e r t a i n degree of i n f l u e n c e over harbour safety i s through i t s V e s s e l T r a f f i c Management (VTM) s e r v i c e . L o c a l l y , the t r a f f i c management system has four primary o b j e c t i v e s : 5 1) to e s t a b l i s h v i a b l e t r a f f i c routes; 2) to e s t a b l i s h two-way communication with a l l commercial v e s s e l s operating w i t h i n , or at the approaches to, the harbour i n order to provide f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n on t r a f f i c and c o n d i t i o n s ; 3) to e s t a b l i s h radar s u r v e i l l a n c e of the port; and 4) to manage t r a f f i c i n a safe and e f f e c t i v e f a s h i o n . The s e r v i c e has been i n operation since the mid-1970's, and has doubtless played an instrumental r o l e i n maintaining Vancouver's r e p u t a t i o n as one of the world's s a f e s t p o r t s , i n s p i t e of a continuing tendency towards growth i n terms of both v e s s e l s i z e and the number of v e s s e l movements w i t h i n the port p r e c i n c t . I f the system i s to be f a u l t e d f o r any reason, i t would have to be on the basis that i t has not yet been allowed to reach i t s optimum p o t e n t i a l . At present, the s e r v i c e i s advisory only, and must r e l y upon the v o l u n t a r y co-operation of a l l p i l o t s and ships' crews i n order to be most e f f e c t i v e . Although the vast m a j o r i t y of v e s s e l s o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n the sphere of i n f l u e n c e of the VTM system, both l o c a l l y and elsewhere on the coast, do co-operate f u l l y i n t h i s respect, there are o c c a s i o n a l instances where v e s s e l s f a i l to e s t a b l i s h proper contact w i t h the t r a f f i c management centre. In an era of i n c r e a s i n g l y regimented marine t r a f f i c r o u t i n g , the 98 presence of non-conforming vessels i s a major source of concern, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a crowded harbour area where manoeuvring room i s g e n e r a l l y at a premium. The u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y to regulate shipping i n the Port of Vancouver, however, r e s t s with the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board. As s t a t e d i n S e c t i o n 59 of the N.H.B. Operating By-law: ...every v e s s e l ( i n the Port of Vancouver) i s subject to the orders of the Board i n respect of i t s draught, l o c a t i o n , speed and d i r e c t i o n , and i n respect of i t s means and methods of movement. The Harbour Master, on behalf of the Board, i s charged with the o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a d m i n i s t e r i n g both the standard shipping r e g u l a t i o n s as p r e s c r i b e d i n the Operating By-Law, plus any f u r t h e r d i s c r e t i o n a r y s a f e t y measures which he may wish to introduce under the a u t h o r i t y of the By-law. Ac c o r d i n g l y , h i s powers i n the matter of harbour management and s a f e t y are s u b s t a n t i a l . The p r o v i s i o n s of the Operating By-law as they r e l a t e to marine s a f e t y are, f o r the most p a r t , reasonably broad i n terms of scope, a p p l i c a t i o n , and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Derived l a r g e l y from accepted i n t e r n a t i o n a l shipping p r a c t i c e s , they e s t a b l i s h the e s s e n t i a l terms under which a l l v e s s e l s must operate i n the harbour. Due to t h e i r almost u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y , many of the p r o v i s i o n s of the By-law are a c t u a l l y operating " g u i d e l i n e s " , r a t h e r than hard and f a s t " r e g u l a t i o n s " . In t h i s regard, and d e s p i t e the f a c t that P a r t IV of the By-law deals with explosives and other dangerous cargoes, there i s l i t t l e i n the document r e f l e c t i n g the s p e c i a l needs or 99 c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of such non-conventional hazardous commodity c a r r i e r s as chemical or l i q u e f i e d gas tankers. Nevertheless, the By-law does provide the necessary r e g u l a t o r y foundation upon which the Harbour Master may introduce f u r t h e r , more s p e c i f i c , operating requirements should he deem i t necessary to do so. A recent example of t h i s , and one which, c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , has done more to reduce the o v e r a l l l e v e l of o p e r a t i o n a l r i s k i n v o l v i n g l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s f u n c t i o n i n g w i t h i n the harbour area, has been the i n s t i t u t i o n of s t r i c t new n a v i g a t i n g r u l e s f o r the Second Narrows. The d e c i s i o n to s i g n i f i c a n t l y upgrade v e s s e l operating procedures i n the area came as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the October 1979 c o l l i s i o n i n v o l v i n g the r a i l w a y bridge and the cargo ship Japan E r i c a . The f i r s t deepsea vessels to pass through the Narrows f o l l o w i n g the accident were subjected to a number of hastily-assembled operating requirements governing such aspects as t i d a l r e s t r i c t i o n s , tug e s c o r t s , speed l i m i t s , and v i s i b i l i t y standards. During the course of the next two years, the Second Narrows r u l e s were reviewed and upgraded on a f a i r l y r e g u l a r basis u n t i l , i n December of 1981, the Harbour Master issued permanent Standing Orders f o r the area. The Standing Orders are contained i n a d e t a i l e d , 19-page document covering a d i v e r s e range of c o n d i t i o n s and operating procedures. The h i g h l i g h t s of the r u l e s , at l e a s t to the extent that they are l i k e l y to apply to gas tanker t r a f f i c , can be summarized as f o l l o w s : 7 1 0 0 Part I - I n t e r p r e t a t i o n : Section 1. In these Orders: "MRA" means the Second Narrows Movement R e s t r i c t i o n Area and comprises that area enclosed w i t h i n l i n e s drawn 000° from the f i x e d l i g h t on the northeastern end of Terminal Dock to the North Vancouver S h o r e l i n e at Neptune Terminals and a l i n e drawn 000° from Berry P o i n t L i g h t (approximately 1.5 miles east of the CN Bridge on the South Shore of Vancouver Harbour) t o the North Shore on the opposite side of the channel. Part I I I - R e s t r i c t e d Periods and Conditions Periods Section 3.(1) Deep sea vessels intending to t r a n s i t under the Second Narrows Bridges s h a l l do so during periods of o p e r a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d e i t h e r side of high and low water s l a c k with deepsea ves s e l s t r a n s i t i n g under the Second Narrows Bridges at s l a c k water or stemming the c u r r e n t . (3) T r a n s i t s at times other than those s p e c i f i e d i n subsection (1) s h a l l be made only where the Master and p i l o t consider i t safe and where permission of the Harbour Master i s obtained p r i o r to the t r a n s i t . 4. During the periods of operation r e f e r r e d to i n s e c t i o n 3, t r a n s i t p r i o r i t y w i l l be given, i n the f o l l o w i n g order, t o : (a) deep sea vessels c a r r y i n g dangerous goods; (b) a l l other deep sea v e s s e l s (c) small c r a f t c a r r y i n g dangerous goods; and (d) a l l other small c r a f t , v e s s e l s and tows. Wind 7.(1) No v e s s e l s h a l l attempt to t r a n s i t the MRA where wind c o n d i t i o n s are such that d i f f i c u l t y i n manoeuvring may be experienced as a r e s u l t of l i g h t v e s s e l draught and/or high freeboard f a c t o r s . V i s i b i l i t y 8.(1) No deep sea v e s s e l , or small c r a f t c a r r y i n g dangerous goods, i n t e n d i n g to pass under the Second Narrows Bridges, s h a l l t r a n s i t through the MRA unless there i s a c l e a r v i s i b i l i t y range at the CN Bridge of at l e a s t 1.5 miles to the east and 1 mile to the west (defined l i m i t s of the MRA). 101 Part IV - C o n t r o l and Procedures Section 9.(1) Vessel T r a f f i c Management Centre (VTMC) procedures, i n c l u d i n g clarance and operating procedures, as o u t l i n e d i n the s a i d "Notices to Mariners" are mandatory f o r a l l the f o l l o w i n g v e s s e l s that are intending to t r a n s i t the MRA i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n or move w i t h i n the MRA: (a) a v e s s e l of 20 metres (65.6 f e e t ) or more i n le n g t h ; (b) a towing v e s s e l of 8 metres (26.2 f e e t ) or more i n len g t h ; (c) a towing v e s s e l of l e s s than 8 metres...in length that i s towing one or more vessels or f l o a t i n g objects that have an aggregate extreme breadth of 20 metres ... or more; or an aggregate o v e r a l l l e n g t h , measured from the s t e r n of the towing v e s s e l to the s t e r n of the l a s t v e s s e l or object towed, of 30 metres (98.4 f e e t ) or more; (d) an a i r cushion v e h i c l e of 8 metres ... or more i n length when on or over the water. (4) The Harbour Master s h a l l be advised of the proposed t r a n s i t time, as e a r l y as p o s s i b l e , of a l l v e s s e l s r e f e r r e d to i n paragraphs ( a ) , (b) and (c) of S e c t i o n 4, and at l e a s t 12 hours p r i o r to the proposed t r a n s i t , and of any changes the r e t o . Part V - T r a n s i t Speed Sectio n 10. Except f o r reasons of emergency, or to avoid damage to the Second Narrows Bridges, no deep sea v e s s e l s h a l l proceed w i t h i n the MRA at a t r a n s i t speed i n excess of 6 knots. 11.(1) Deep sea vessels intending to t r a n s i t under the Second Narrows Bridges which are unable to maintain a t r a n s i t speed of 6 knots or l e s s , or are unable to s a f e l y navigate at 6 knots or l e s s , s h a l l : (a) remain at berth or anchorage, or (b) proceed to a remain at a designated berth or anchorage, u n t i l the arrangements s p e c i f i e d i n subsection (2) are made to a s s i s t such v e s s e l i n i t s movement. (2) The arrangements refered to i n subsection (1) i n c l u d e : (a) a minimum of 3 tugs, each of 1500 B.H.P. or g r e a t e r , (b) a r e s t r i c t e d t r a n s i t time at or near s l a c k water, and (c) p r i o r approval of the Harbour Master. 102 Part VI - C l e a r Narrows Section 13.(1) A Clear Narrows i s required f o r : (a) LPG/LNG tankers Part V I I - Method of Operation Section 15.(1) No deepsea v e s s e l intending to t r a n s i t the MRA s h a l l : (a) commence i t s t r a n s i t u n t i l a deep sea v e s s e l t r a n s i t i n g i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n has completed i t s t r a n s i t ; or (b) enter the MRA u n t i l any preceding deep sea v e s s e l s t r a n s i t t i n g i n the same d i r e c t i o n have c l e a r e d the Second Narrows Bridges by a minimum distance of 2 cables (0.2 n a u t i c a l m i l e ) . Part V I I - Attendant Tugs Section 17.(1) Except as s p e c i f i c a l l y exempted by the Harbour Master, deep sea v e s s e l s , other than non s e l f - p r o p e l l e d barges of 6,500 tonnes displacement or gr e a t e r , i n t e n d i n g the t r a n s i t under the Second Narrows Bridges s h a l l employ a minimum of 2 tugs, which tugs s h a l l remain i n close attendance from at l e a s t 5 cables (0.5 n a u t i c a l mile) before the Second Narrows Bridge u n t i l such ves s e l s have cleared the Second Narrows Bridges by a minimum of 2 cables... (2) The t o t a l b o l l a r d p u l l of the tugs r e f e r r e d to i n subsection (1) s h a l l be equivalent to that set out i n Appendix B which p u l l i s determined on the basis of the deadweight tonnage of the v e s s e l being a s s i s t e d . (3) Where the deadweight tonnage of a deep sea v e s s e l exceeds that provided f o r i n Appendix B, the Harbour Master may r e q u i r e tugs i n a d d i t i o n to the minimum number and, i n any event, approval of the Harbour Master i s r e q u i r e d p r i o r to the proposed t r a n s i t . APPENDIX B Design Ship Tonnage/Tug H.P. C o m p a t i b i l i t y Design Ship No. of B o l l a r d P u l l Tonnage (DWT) Tugs BHP Per Tug/Total 6 000 2 400 7.5 T 15.0 T 10 000 2 550 8.0 T 16.0 T 20 000 2 700 10.5 T 21.0 T 30 000 2 900 15.0 T 30.0 T 40 000 2 1200 18.5 T 37.0 T 50 000 2 1650 22.0 T 44.0 T 103 The Harbour Master has come under some p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m from the shipping i n d u s t r y since f i r s t i n t r o d u c i n g s p e c i a l n a v i g a t i n g measures f o r the Second Narrows f o l l o w i n g the Japan E r i c a i n c i d e n t i n 1979. In p a r t i c u l a r , i n d u s t r y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s have s t a t e d that the mandatory tug escort requirement adds s u b s t a n t i a l l y to the shipowner's round t r i p costs through the p o r t , thereby p r o v i d i n g an economic advantage to terminals s i t u a t e d to the west of the Second Narrows. 8 Furthermore, i t has been suggested that tug escorts would not be p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n an emergency s i t u a t i o n unless they are secured by l i n e s to the l a r g e r v e s s e l . In p a r t i a l response to these claims, i t i s suggested t h a t , f o r LPG c a r r i e r s at l e a s t , the p r o v i s i o n of a mandatory tug e s c o r t , while admittedly i n c r e a s i n g the cost of the t r a n s i t , would not provide t e r m i n a l operators to the west of the Second Narrows with any kind of economic advantage, as there are no f a c i l i t i e s to the west of the bridge capable of accommodating LPG c a r r i e r s . On the matter of the second question, i t i s acknowledged that e s c o r t i n g tugs, whether secured or not, would be of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l value i n c e r t a i n i n s t a n c e s . The escort question i s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , very much open to debate. On 10 February 1980, through an apparent mix-up i n i n s t r u c t i o n s , both the inbound B r i t i s h s a l t c a r r i e r A r g y l l and the outbound Greek f r e i g h t e r S t a r Centaurus met unexpectedly i n the v i c i n i t y of the Second Narrows. Although the i n c i d e n t occurred p r i o r to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the new r u l e s , i n t e r i m measures which had been brought i n t o e f f e c t immediately a f t e r the Japan E r i c a episode i n October of 1979 d i d provide f o r a mandatory tug escort through the Narrows. In the words of P a c i f i c P i l o t a g e A u t h o r i t y Chairman Peter Evans, "...with the help and great e f f o r t of ( a s s i s t i n g t u g s ) , the A r g y l l was moved to the north side of the channel s u f f i c i e n t l y to 104 c l e a r the way f o r Star Centaurus, although a c l o s e - q u a r t e r s passing d i d r e s u l t . " y In a r e l a t e d type of i n c i d e n t s e v e r a l years e a r l i e r , the f u l l y - l a d e n American tanker Arco Sag R i v e r l o s t i t s s t e e r i n g c a p a b i l i t y i n Rosario S t r a i t , near Cherry P o i n t , Washington. Again, attending tugs (as required f o r l a r g e o i l tankers operating i n c o a s t a l waters east of Port Angeles, Washington) managed to keep the temporarily d i s a b l e d v e s s e l on a proper heading u n t i l s t e e r i n g had been r e s t o r e d . ^ While the primary o b j e c t i v e of the new r e g u l a t i o n s i s to protect the r a i l w a y bridge from f u r t h e r mishap, by d e f i n i t i o n they a l s o represent an important step i n improving the l e v e l of p u b l i c p r o t e c t i o n from the r i s k s associated w i t h the operation of ships t r a n s p o r t i n g high impact hazardous m a t e r i a l s through the p o r t . I t i s , i n f a c t , the s t r o n g l y held contention of t h i s t h e s i s that many of the s p e c i a l s a f e t y measures now i n e f f e c t f o r the Second Narrows area should l o g i c a l l y be extended to i n c l u d e the e n t i r e harbour p r e c i n c t , at l e a s t to the extent that they would be a p p l i c a b l e to v e s s e l s t r a n s p o r t i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous commodities such as c h l o r i n e , ethylene d i c h l o r i d e , and, of course, LPG. At present, the mandatory i m p o s i t i o n of speed l i m i t r e s t r i c t i o n s , tug e s c o r t s , and c l e a r passage requirements are dropped once a v e s s e l has c l e a r e d the Second Narrows MRA, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the nature of i t s cargo. In a d d i t i o n to the s p e c i a l r u l e s c i t e d f o r the Second Narrows, the Harbour Master has a l s o imposed s e v e r a l d i s c r e t i o n a r y s a f e t y requirements which r e l a t e d i r e c t l y to l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s . The N i c h i z a n Maru, f o r example, i s only permitted to t r a n s i t the port during d a y l i g h t hours, and w i t h a 105 c l e a r channel through both the F i r s t and Second Narrows, unless otherwise advised by the Harbour Master. 4.3 United States 4.3.1 Current S i t u a t i o n Assessment Since the e a r l y 1970's, the United States has emerged as a major importer of l i q u e f i e d gases from overseas sources - notably A l g e r i a . During the course of the past decade s e v e r a l American ports have, at one time or another, re c e i v e d tanker shipments of gas, i n c l u d i n g Boston (LNG and LPG), Providence, Rhode I s l a n d (LPG), Cove P o i n t , Maryland (LNG), Elba I s l a n d , Georgia (LNG), Los Angeles (LPG), and Cherry P o i n t , Washington (LPG), Houston, Texas (LPG), and P h i l a d e l p h i a , Pennsylvania (LPG).* The sole American l i q u e f i e d gas exporting f a c i l i t y i s s i t u a t e d at Kenai, Alaska from whence Cook I n l e t n a t u r a l gas has been r e g u l a r l y shipped to Japan since 1969 aboard the L i b e r i a n - r e g i s t e r e d tankers A r c t i c Tokyo and P o l a r Alaska. The a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e f o r r e g u l a t i n g marine operations i n American gas ports d i f f e r s from Vancouver i n one fundamental regard. In Vancouver, the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r both port marketing and marine s a f e t y . In view of the enormous p u b l i c and p o l i t i c a l pressure placed upon l o c a l NHB o f f i c i a l s to c o n s t a n t l y improve the economic performance of the p o r t , the p o s s i b i l i t y of ship s a f e t y requirements being s a c r i f i c e d i n order to promote the economic i n t e r e s t s of the port should not be discounted. *The P o r t s of P h i l a d e l p h i a LPG terminals are a c t u a l l y l o c a t e d at Paulsboro, New Jersey (the Mantua butadiene t e r m i n a l ) and G i r a r d P o i n t , Pennsylvania (the Gulf O i l butane t e r m i n a l ) . Both f a c i l i t i e s f a l l under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Captain of the P o r t , P h i l a d e l p h i a . 106 In the United S t a t e s , the l i k e l i h o o d of such a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s i t u a t i o n developing i s remote, as the U.S. Coast Guard, with no vested economic i n t e r e s t i n the operation of any p o r t , i s t o t a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r implementing and enforcing marine s a f e t y r e g u l a t i o n s i n a l l c o a s t a l ports and waterways. The task of marketing and managing the f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s of each port w i t h i n the r e g u l a t o r y c o n s t r a i n t s e s t a b l i s h e d by the Coast Guard r e s t s with the i n d i v i d u a l port a u t h o r i t y . In recent years, i t has become standard p r a c t i c e i n American gas ports f o r the Coast Guard to introduce operations plans s p e c i f i c a l l y designed to govern the movement of l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s . Many of the r e g u l a t o r y p r o v i s i o n s contained i n each i n d i v i d u a l LPG/LNG operations plan are common to a l l of the American ports examined f o r the purpose of t h i s t h e s i s , i n c l u d i n g the f o l l o w i n g items ;H 1) the master of any v e s s e l c a r r y i n g LNG/LPG as cargo s h a l l n o t i f y the Captain of the Port (COTP) at l e a s t 72 hours i n advance of the ve s s e l ' s a r r i v a l i n po r t ; 2) p r i o r to the ves s e l ' s a r r i v a l i n p o r t , the master of the gas c a r r i e r must f u r n i s h the Coast Guard w i t h a standard statement s i m i l a r to the f o l l o w i n g : "To the best of my knowledge and b e l i e f there are no c a s u a l t i e s to t h i s v e s s e l , i t s machinery, or n a v i g a t i o n a l equipment which might a f f e c t s i t s seaworthiness or a b i l i t y to navigate w i t h i n the harbour of . I f u r t h e r s t a t e that a l l cargo handling and gas d e t e c t i o n equipment i s i n proper operating c o n d i t i o n . " I 2 3) f o r e i g n - f l a g gas c a r r i e r s must be i n possession of a v a l i d L e t t e r of Compliance issued by the Coast Guard p r i o r t o . i n i t i a l entry i n t o American t e r r i t o r i a l waters. Vessels r e g i s t e r e d i n the United States must carry a v a l i d C e r t i f i c a t e of Ins p e c t i o n ; 4) every incoming l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s h a l l be subjected to a d e t a i l e d shipboard i n s p e c t i o n by q u a l i f i e d Coast Guard personnel p r i o r to commencing cargo t r a n s f e r operations. A s e r i o u s , uncorrectable d e f i c i e n c y noted by the saf e t y i n s p e c t i o n party which could create a hazard to the v e s s e l or the surrounding area would be s u f f i c i e n t cause to order the v e s s e l to r e t u r n to i n t e r n a t i o n a l waters, or to take other a c t i o n as d i r e c t e d by the COTP; and 107 5) a q u a l i f i e d Coast Guard monitoring team must be on hand at a l l times throughout the cargo t r a n s f e r phase (exception - Ports of P h i l a d e l p h i a ) . Due to the unique p h y s i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l composition of each p o r t , no two operations plans are e x a c t l y a l i k e . Hence, from a n a v i g a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e , i n d i v i d u a l plan r e s t r i c t i o n s concerning such items as pre-entry clearance requirements, v e s s e l speed, weather c o n d i t i o n s , t r a f f i c management procedures, or the p r o v i s i o n of escorts may vary from one port to the next. In a broad sense, however, operations plans tend to f a l l i n t o two f a i r l y d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r i e s . F i r s t l y , there are those which govern gas tanker operating procedures i n the v i c i n i t y of terminals such as Cove P o i n t , Maryland and E l b a I s l a n d , Georgia, both of which are s i t u a t e d i n r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e , yet r e l a t i v e l y underpopulated areas. The second group of plans r e l a t e to instances where e i t h e r the gas t e r m i n a l i s located i n the midst of a m e t r o p o l i t a n p o r t , or where a gas c a r r i e r must tr a v e r s e a busy, densely populated s t r e t c h of waterway i n order to gain access to the t e r m i n a l . The r e g u l a t i o n s governing gas tanker movements (as defined i n the various operations plans) are g e n e r a l l y l e s s s t r i n g e n t under the former circumstances, as the gas c a r r i e r does not present as great a threat to e i t h e r p u b l i c s a f e t y or shipping. By d e f i n i t i o n , Vancouver has l i t t l e i n common with the i s o l a t e d , s i n g l e purpose gas ports at Cove Point or E l b a I s l a n d . A c c o r d i n g l y , the report w i l l not d w e l l f u r t h e r upon the s p e c i a l shipping r e g u l a t i o n s i n force at e i t h e r s i t e . Instead, the b a s i c problems l i k e l y to be encountered l o c a l l y w i t h regard to the safe management of l i q u e f i e d gas tanker t r a f f i c more c l o s e l y resemble those which could be reasonably a n t i c i p a t e d i n the h i g h l y developed port c i t i e s of Boston and Los Angeles. 108 4.3.2 Boston The Port of Boston has been as s o c i a t e d w i t h the overseas l i q u e f i e d gas trade s i n c e 1970, when the Panamanian-registered LNG c a r r i e r A r i s t o t l e (formerly the Methane Pioneer) d e l i v e r e d the f i r s t consignment of A l g e r i a n gas to the new Boston Gas Company r e c e i v i n g t e r m i n a l at Commercial P o i n t . ^ Boston occupies a unique p o s i t i o n among the gas ports examined i n t h i s t h e s i s i n that the community accommodates three separate l i q u e f i e d gas terminals w i t h i n i t s boundaries. In a d d i t i o n to Boston Gas, both D i s t r i g a s (LNG) and Exxon (LPG) constructed large import r e c e i v i n g f a c i l i t i e s at E v e r e t t , on the north bank of the M y s t i c R i v e r , during 1971 and 1972 r e s p e c t i v e l y (See Map. p. 109.). Of the three, however, only the D i s t r i g a s and Exxon terminals were expressly designed to accommodate large ocean-going gas c a r r i e r s . * The Boston LNG/LPG operations plan i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h managing deepsea gas tankers destined f o r these two f a c i l i t i e s . U n l i k e Vancouver, which has r a r e l y been v i s i t e d by gas tankers other than the Yamahide Maru or, more r e c e n t l y , the N i c h i z a n Maru, Boston has hosted many d i f f e r e n t LNG and LPG c a r r i e r s over the years. Furthermore, whereas LPG c a r r i e r s tend to v i s i t Vancouver on a more or l e s s r e g u l a r b a s i s throughout the year, the Boston gas tanker trade i s of a more seasonal nature, averaging perhaps two v i s i t s per month during the w i n t e r , and few, i f any, throughout the remainder of the year. Each port w i l l normally r e c e i v e on the order of 10 to 15 gas tanker c a l l s a n n u a l l y . *The Boston Gas f a c i l i t y at Commercial P o i n t , because of b e r t h i n g and channel draught l i m i t a t i o n s , i s l a r g e l y r e s t r i c t e d to the handling of c o a s t a l barge t r a f f i c or the o c c a s i o n a l small LNG tanker. Figure 4.3 . no The sea approach to the Exxon and D i s t r i g a s terminals i s , i n some resp e c t s , s i m i l a r to the approach i n t o the Westridge LPG t e r m i n a l i n Burnaby. For i n s t a n c e , access to e i t h e r the E v e r e t t , Massachusetts or Burnaby, B.C. gas f a c i l i t i e s r e q u i r e s a lengthy harbour t r a n s i t by way of an often narrow navigable channel.* The channel width problem i s compounded i n Boston by the f a c t that v e s s e l s destined f o r Exxon or D i s t r i g a s must make s e v e r a l pronounced course adjustments, i n c l u d i n g one of approximately 90° at the entrance to the M y s t i c R i v e r . The s i n g l e most dominant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c common to both p o r t s , however, i s that v e s s e l s wishing to gain access to l o c a l deepwater gas t e r m i n a l f a c i l i t i e s must negotiate the c e n t r a l harbour p r e c i n c t , w h i le at the same time s k i r t i n g the downtown core of each c i t y . In t h i s regard, the v e s s e l r o u t i n g system i n t o (and out o f ) the Everett and Burnaby f a c i l i t i e s would l i k e l y place more people at p o t e n t i a l r i s k i n the event of a gas tanker accident than any of the other ports examined. In order to o f f s e t the l o c a t i o n a l shortcomings a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the E v e r e t t gas t e r m i n a l s , the U.S. Coast Guard introduced i t s i n i t i a l operations plan f o r the Port of Boston as long ago as 1971. Over the years, the plan has been c o n s t a n t l y amended and upgraded i n response to changes i n both p u b l i c a t t i t u d e and gas tanker technology. In so doing, i t has come to be widely regarded as the model upon which many other ports have based t h e i r gas tanker operating r e g u l a t i o n s . The Port of Boston operations plan i s d i v i d e d i n t o four segments -n o t i f i c a t i o n and a r r i v a l ; harbour t r a n s i t ; cargo discharge; and departure. *The Port of Vancouver harbour t r a n s i t f o r l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s i s approximately 15 k i l o m e t r e s (from F i r s t Narrows Bridge to Westridge), as opposed to 8 k i l o m e t r e s i n Boston. I l l This t h e s i s , however, w i l l concentrate upon the s a l i e n t features of Phase I I - harbour t r a n s i t - and only to the extent that the r u l e s apply to deepsea l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s destined f o r the Exxon and D i s t r i g a s terminals at E v e r e t t . Upon completion of a mandatory pre-entry v e s s e l i n s p e c t i o n , and assuming that the Coast Guard has granted the gas tanker permission to enter the p o r t , the f o l l o w i n g r e g u l a t i o n s a u t o m a t i c a l l y come i n t o f o r c e , unless waived by the Captain of the Port:14 a) t r a n s i t must occur during d a y l i g h t hours only f o r loaded or p a r t i a l l y loaded v e s s e l s ; b) a v e s s e l s h a l l not commence t r a n s i t unless the minimum v i s i b i l i t y i s at l e a s t two m i l e s . Should v i s i b i l i t y d e t e r i o r a t e to l e s s than two miles while the v e s s e l i s underway, the f o l l o w i n g measures s h a l l be taken: i ) i f s t i l l i n Broad Sound, the v e s s e l s h a l l not enter port; i i ) i f e n t e r i n g the harbour inbound f o r Everett and not yet past the F o r t Point Channel, n o t i f y Coast Guard and proceed back to Broad Sound; i i i ) i f e n t e r i n g the harbour inbound f o r E v e r e t t and already past the F o r t Point Channel, n o t i f y Coast Guard and continue to berth; i v ) i f outbound from E v e r e t t , n o t i f y Coast Guard and continue outbound. c) no l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s h a l l t r a n s i t the harbour unless accompanied by a Coast Guard escort v e s s e l ; d) loaded or p a r t i a l l y loaded vessels i n excess of 60 000 cubic metres c a p a c i t y w i l l be attended by a minimum of f i v e tugs, two of which must be of 3000 h.p. or g r e a t e r , and the remaining three of 1200 h.p. or g r e a t e r . Loaded or p a r t i a l l y loaded v e s s e l s of l e s s than 60 000 cubic metres w i l l be attended by a minimum of three tugs, i n c l u d i n g two of 3000 h.p. or g r e a t e r , and the t h i r d of 1200 h.p. or g r e a t e r . The tugs w i l l meet the incoming v e s s e l at the eastern end of P r e s i d e n t Roads and be u t i l i z e d as needed throughout the v e s s e l ' s t r a n s i t of Boston Harbour. During the docking/undocking operation the tugs w i l l be s t r a t e g i c a l l y p o s i t i o n e d , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the Master's sound judgment, and based upon c o n s u l t a t i o n with the docking m a s t e r / p i l o t . Tugs w i l l meet outbound vessels at the berth and attend to t h e i r needs u n t i l they have cleared President Roads; 112 e) whenever a loaded or p a r t i a l l y loaded l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r i s i n t r a n s i t of Boston Inner Harbour, no other v e s s e l w i l l be permitted to get underway without the expressed a u t h o r i z a t i o n of the Captain of the P o r t . Permission to t r a n s i t w i l l be granted on a case by case basis using the concept of a "moving sa f e t y zone". That i s , the v e s s e l requesting permission to t r a n s i t the harbour must remain at l e a s t two n a u t i c a l miles ahead, or one n a u t i c a l mile a s t e r n , of the gas tanker. T r a f f i c movement w i l l be l i m i t e d to the same d i r e c t i o n as the gas c a r r i e r i n order to avoid passing s i t u a t i o n s . N.B. Vessels under 100 gross tons and towboats without tow may t r a n s i t the harbour without the p r i o r consent of the Captain of the P o r t , provided they are capable of n a v i g a t i n g s a f e l y outside the main shipping channel. f ) during the t r a n s i t of a l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r , the maximum allo w a b l e speed f o r any v e s s e l operating w i t h i n the moving sa f e t y zone w i l l be eight knots; and g) no a i r c r a f t w i l l be permitted to o v e r f l y a l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r w h i l e i n the Port of Boston. Furthermore, no a i r c r a f t wishing to photograph an LPG or LNG tanker w i l l be permitted to operate w i t h i n 1000 f e e t of that v e s s e l . The preceding r e g u l a t i o n s represent only a small p o r t i o n of the t o t a l number of s p e c i a l requirements f o r l i q u e f i e d gas tankers operating i n the Port of Boston. Even so, they r e v e a l s e v e r a l i n t e r e s t i n g features which could have a s i g n i f i c a n t bearing upon the future implementation of a d d i t i o n a l operating requirements f o r v e s s e l s t r a n s p o r t i n g hazardous chemical or petrochemical substances w i t h i n the Vancouver harbour p r e c i n c t . The Boston r u l e s c l e a r l y emphasize that the U.S. Coast Guard's primary commitment i s to ensuring a high l e v e l of p u b l i c s a f e t y , not to the s p e c i a l marketing i n t e r e s t s of the l o c a l gas i n d u s t r y . More impo r t a n t l y , though, both the Exxon and D i s t r i g a s operations at E v e r e t t have s u c c e s s f u l l y adapted to any a d d i t i o n a l economic c o n s t r a i n t s r e s u l t i n g from the i n t r o d u c t i o n of these e x t r a o r d i n a r y o p e r a t i o n a l s a f e t y requirements. This i s borne out by the f a c t that Boston continues to f u n c t i o n as a major l i q u e f i e d gas importing centre. 113 4 . 3 . 3 . L o s A n g e l e s The P o r t o f L o s A n g e l e s i s by no means a n i m p o r t a n t l i q u e f i e d g a s t e r m i n a l on t h e s c a l e o f e i t h e r B o s t o n o r V a n c o u v e r . I n f a c t , a c c o r d i n g t o M s . J . N a t o w o f t h e L o s A n g e l e s P o r t A u t h o r i t y , as o f N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 9 t h e p o r t h a d r e c e i v e d f e w e r t h a n h a l f a d o z e n d e e p s e a g a s t a n k e r s i n i t s e n t i r e h i s t o r y . ^ N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e C o a s t G u a r d h a s e l e c t e d t o i n t r o d u c e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e L P G t a n k e r o p e r a t i o n s p l a n w h i c h , i n some i n s t a n c e s , i s e v e n more s t r i n g e n t t h a n t h e B o s t o n p l a n . T h e r e a s o n s f o r t h i s a r e e s s e n t i a l l y t w o f o l d . F i r s t l y , a s w i t h B o s t o n , a c c e s s t o t h e P e t r o l a n e L P G o f f l o a d i n g f a c i l i t y i n L o s A n g e l e s c a n be g a i n e d o n l y by t r a n s i t i n g t h e n a r r o w , 2 2 0 m e t r e w i d e M a i n C h a n n e l . T h e p a s s a g e t h r o u g h t h e M a i n C h a n n e l t o t h e 4 5 0 m e t r e w i d e I n n e r H a r b o r T u r n i n g B a s i n c o v e r s a d i s t a n c e o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4 k i l o m e t r e s . U p o n a r r i v a l a t t h e I n n e r H a r b o r T u r n i n g B a s i n , t h e t a n k e r m u s t n e g o t i a t e a 9 0 ° t u r n t o p o r t . T h e P e t r o l a n e P O R T O F L O S A N G E L E S , C A 1 km S E T T L E D AREAS INDUSTRIAL AREAS F i g u r e 4 . 4 114 wharf, designated as Berth 120, Port of Los Angeles, i s s i t u a t e d roughly one k i l o m e t r e to the northwest of the t u r n i n g basin (See map p. The second important f a c t o r governing the s t r i c t gas tanker r e g u l a t i o n s which are i n e f f e c t i n Los Angeles i s that the suburban community of San Pedro f r o n t s d i r e c t l y onto the Main Channel. During the mid-1970's, southern C a l i f o r n i a r e s i d e n t s were subjected to a lengthy debate over the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of c o n s t r u c t i n g an LNG r e c e i v i n g f a c i l i t y on Terminal I s l a n d , s i t u a t e d i n the heart of Los Angeles harbour. A f t e r much c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the proposal (by Western LNG Terminal Company) was r e j e c t e d , and new s t a t e l e g i s l a t i o n was introduced r e s t r i c t i n g f u t u r e LNG t e r m i n a l development i n C a l i f o r n i a to a remote area north and west of Los Angeles.* In the aftermath of the controversy, however, p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n s h i f t e d towards the more immediate problem of LPG tankers operating, a l b e i t i n f r e q u e n t l y , i n Los Angeles harbour. The issue reached a head i n December of 1978 when i t was announced that the 22 000 cubic metre LPG c a r r i e r F e r n v a l l e y (subsequently re-named D i s c a r i a ) was scheduled to b r i n g a shipment of Venezuelan gas to Los Angeles during mid-January of 1979. This followed a 17 November 1978 v i s i t to the port by the B r i t i s h gas tanker Cavendish, and prompted some San Pedro r e s i d e n t s to demand that the s t a t e adopt a s i m i l a r p o l i c y stance w i t h regard to LPG as i t had f o r LNG. 1 6 *0n 16 December 1976 Los Angeles c i t y c o u n c i l voted i n favour of the Western LNG Terminal Co. proposal. I r o n i c a l l y , the f o l l o w i n g day, the empty o i l tanker Sansinena exploded while berthed at the Union O i l dock i n San Pedro harbour. The b l a s t shattered windows up to 32 kilometres away, and l e f t 9 persons dead and 50 i n j u r e d . The s e v e r i t y of the accident prompted c o u n c i l to reverse i t s i n i t i a l d e c i s i o n the f o l l o w i n g week, and l e d one member to comment that c o u n c i l had acted "too h a s t i l y " on the 17 m a t t e r . L / 115 The Cavendish v i s i t was the f i r s t to the port i n roughly two years, and was the i n i t i a l t e s t of the Coast Guard's new LPG tanker operations plan which had been introduced the previous month (October 1978). Many of the b a s i c elements contained i n the Boston operations plan have been incorporated i n t o the Los Angeles p l a n . 1 8 For i n s t a n c e , p r e - a r r i v a l clearance and i n s p e c t i o n procedures are e s s e n t i a l l y the same at both p o r t s , as i s the requirement f o r a Coast Guard monitoring team to be i n attendance at the t e r m i n a l at a l l times during the o f f - l o a d i n g process. Other r e g u l a t i o n s d i f f e r m a r g i n a l l y between Boston and Los Angeles. The minimum acceptable v i s i b i l i t y under which a gas c a r r i e r may enter the port of Los Angeles, f o r example, i s only one m i l e , as opposed to two miles i n Boston. The nature of the mandatory tug escort requirement a l s o v a r i e s between the two p o r t s . In Boston, both the number of tug esco r t s and t h e i r minimum horsepower r a t i n g s have been c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d , based upon the s i z e of the gas c a r r i e r . In Los Angeles, the plan s t a t e s only that a minimum of two tugs (power u n s p e c i f i e d ) must be i n attendance of an LPG tanker t r a n s i t i n g the harbour, r e g a r d l e s s i t s s i z e . An i n t e r e s t i n g p r o v i s i o n of the Los Angeles tug escort requirement which i s not contained i n the Boston p l a n , however, i s that the tugs must be secured to the gas c a r r i e r - one at the bow and one at the s t e r n . F i n a l l y , there are s e v e r a l important requirements which are unique to the Los Angeles plan. Included among t h i s group are the f o l l o w i n g a) Los Angeles Main Channel w i l l be closed to a l l commercial v e s s e l s (excluding small v e s s e l s ) during t r a n s i t by the l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r . Under c e r t a i n circumstances, one-way t r a f f i c i n the d i r e c t i o n of the LPG c a r r i e r may be authorized by the Captain of the P o r t , provided that a minimum distance of one mile i s maintained between the LPG tanker and other v e s s e l s at a l l times; 116 b) no ve s s e l s of any kind s h a l l be permitted to occupy Berths 118, 119 or 121 while an LPG c a r r i e r i s docked at Berth 120, Los Angeles harbour; c) no ve s s e l s other than those representing concerned agencies w i l l be permitted to t r a n s i t w i t h i n 100 yards of a moored LPG c a r r i e r ; d) seaplanes which use the Main Channel and h e l i c o p t e r s which operate i n the v i c i n i t y , w i l l be n o t i f i e d i n advance of an LPG tanker t r a n s i t of the harbour, and w i l l be d i r e c t e d not to take o f f , l a n d , or t a x i i n the channel while the gas c a r r i e r i s underway; and e) passage out of the harbour by an empty gas c a r r i e r w i l l be made under the same con d i t i o n s as those set f o r t h f o r v e s s e l s e n t e r i n g the harbour, i n c l u d i n g mandatory tug and Coast Guard es c o r t requirements. In a d d i t i o n to the above, Sect i o n 2(b) of Phase I I (Vessel T r a n s i t i n P o r t ) of the Los Angeles operations plan makes sub t l e reference to one aspect of gas tanker s a f e t y which, w i t h the exception of the E l b a I s l a n d , Georgia p l a n , i s not r e f e r r e d to d i r e c l y i n other U.S. port operations plans - that i s , the question of ship and ter m i n a l s e c u r i t y against attempted acts of sabotage. The Los Angeles plan s t a t e s t h a t : ...a s e c u r i t y check w i l l be made of the f a c i l i t y grounds and under the dock, again r e p o r t i n g unusual circumstances to the Captain of the P o r t . P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n s h a l l be paid to unauthorized v e s s e l s / v e h i c l e s l o i t e r i n g i n the area of the f a c i l i t y and dock. Moreover, S e c t i o n 3(b) of Phase I I I f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e s t h a t : ...Coast Guard harbour p a t r o l boats w i l l check on the LPG v e s s e l while berthed and report...any and a l l unusual boat a c t i v i t y i n the area and any other circumstances out of the or d i n a r y . Given the infrequency of gas tanker v i s i t s to the p o r t , the Los Angeles r e g u l a t i o n s r e f l e c t a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong sense of p u b l i c concern over the LPG i s s u e which i s perhaps u n r i v a l l e d anywhere e l s e i n the world. 1 1 7 4.4 Europe 4.4.1. S i t u a t i o n Assessment Since the Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas r e c e i v i n g f a c i l i t y f i r s t went i n t o commercial operation i n 1964, s e v e r a l southern and western European nations have a l s o constructed deepwater port f a c i l i t i e s f o r the purpose of accepting large volumes of l i q u e f i e d gases from offshore sources - notably A l g e r i a and L i b y a . U n t i l r e c e n t l y , LNG had been the favoured import commodity over LPG f o r reasons of both cost and a c c e s s i b i l i t y to s u p p l i e s . In a d d i t i o n to Canvey, LNG r e c e i v i n g terminals were e s t a b l i s h e d at La Spezia, I t a l y (1969), Le Havre and Fos-sur-Mer, France (1964 and 1971, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , and Barcelona, Spain (1969). During the l a t t e r h a l f of the 1970's, however, a combination of f a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g changing patterns of use among gas consumers and gas p r i c i n g s t r u c t u r e r e v i s i o n s , l e d to a p a r t i a l demand s h i f t i n Europe away from LNG to o f f s h o r e LPG. This i s perhaps best t y p i f i e d by the recent inauguration of an LPG marine d e l i v e r y s e r v i c e to the petrochemical p l a n t s at Rafnes and Her0ya, near Porsgrunn, Norway. In coming years, i t i s estimated that l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s of up to 30 000 cubic metres capacity w i l l make an average of 240 port c a l l s annually to the Porsgrunn area (90 a r r i v a l s at Rafnes, and 150 at H e r 0 y a ) . l y Elsewhere on the c o n t i n e n t , the German Mundogas c o r p o r a t i o n inaugurated a l a r g e new LPG r e c e i v i n g operation at Europoort, Holland during the s p r i n g of 1982.20 The Mundogas te r m i n a l i s capable of accommodating a maximum throughout of up to 750 000 tonnes annually. Dutch o f f i c i a l s have a l s o r e c e n t l y (summer 1981) a u t h o r i z e d a major expansion of the Eurogas LPG import f a c i l i t y at F l u s h i n g , Holland. Four new 55 000 cubic metre storage tanks w i l l i ncrease e x i s t i n g c a p a c i t y at F l u s h i n g from 20 000 cubic metres to 240 000 c u b i c metres.21 118 4.4.2. Planning Considerations In a comparative sense, European port planners have h i s t o r i c a l l y maintained a somewhat d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e towards the fundamental r e l a t i o n s h i p between n a v i g a t i o n a l s a f e t y and l i q u e f i e d gas t e r m i n a l s i t i n g than t h e i r North American counterparts. I n Canada and the United S t a t e s , the standard approach throughout the 1960's and most of the 1970's was to minimize the l e v e l of p o t e n t i a l r i s k to the gas c a r r i e r during the harbour t r a n s i t phase by means of proper access channel design and maintenance ( i n terms of width, depth, t i d a l e f f e c t s , e t c . ) , v e s s e l t r a f f i c management, and, where necessary, through the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l c o n t r o l r e g u l a t i o n s . L i t t l e d i r e c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n was given to the p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s of a serious mid-harbour accident i n v o l v i n g a loaded or p a r t i a l l y loaded gas tanker upon the l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n . Consequently, ports such as Boston, Los Angeles, and l a t t e r l y Vancouver have i n c r e a s i n g l y come under c r i t i c i s m on the grounds t h a t , as a r e s u l t of questionable t e r m i n a l s i t i n g p r a c t i c e s i n the past, a l a r g e segment of the l o c a l population has been placed i n a p o s i t i o n of undue r i s k during the harbour t r a n s i t phase of an LNG or LPG tanker. In Europe, however, i n a d d i t i o n to the r o u t i n e n a v i g a t i o n a l r i s k r e duction measures described i n the preceding paragraph, the f o l l o w i n g p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been incorporated i n t o the b a s i c gas t e r m i n a l s i t i n g equation: a) L i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s s h a l l remain p h y s i c a l l y removed from major concentrations of population to as great an extent as p o s s i b l e ; or 119 b) where (a) i s not always p r a c t i c a l , the te r m i n a l s h a l l be loc a t e d at or near the harbour entrance i n order to minimize the length of the v e s s e l t r a n s i t through a populated or h e a v i l y congested port p r e c i n c t . * The B r i t i s h Gas Corporation LNG t e r m i n a l at Canvey I s l a n d , f o r example, i s s i t u a t e d some 25 kil o m e t r e s upstream from the mouth of the R i v e r Thames i n what was, u n t i l q u i t e r e c e n t l y , a comparatively underpopulated area. The gas port at Le Havre, France, the proposed LNG r e c e i v i n g t e r m i n a l at Zeebrugge, Belgium, and a r e c e n t l y - c a n c e l l e d plan by B r i t i s h Petroleum and S h e l l O i l to construct a new LPG import f a c i l i t y at Europoort, Holland, on the other hand, are more c l e a r l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the planning philosophy described i n approach "b" (above). The ( a c t u a l or proposed) t e r m i n a l operations i n these communities have been s i t u a t e d i n clo s e proximity to the r e s p e c t i v e harbour entrances. Nevertheless, European gas ports are not without t h e i r share of o p e r a t i o n a l s a f e t y l i m i t a t i o n s . For ins t a n c e , the gas terminals at Canvey and Le Havre, plus the defunct Shell-BP proposal f o r Europoort, are a l l s i t u a t e d i n the midst of extensive petroleum and petrochemical complexes. This has been done, presumably, i n order to take advantage of the economies of agglomeration - p a r t i c u l a r l y as they are i n f l u e n c e d by the common usage of s p e c i a l i z e d s e r v i c e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s . The major shortcoming w i t h t h i s arrangement, however, i s that the s e c u r i t y of the l i q u e f i e d gas storage f a c i l i t i e s could be s e r i o u s l y jeopardized i n the event of an explosion and/or f i r e at one or more of the neighbouring p l a n t s . Conversely, a *The recent d e c i s i o n s to l o c a t e LNG r e c e i v i n g terminals i n r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d communities such as Cove P o i n t , Maryland and E l b a I s l a n d , Georgia, along w i t h the C a l i f o r n i a r u l i n g which r e s t r i c t s LNG t e r m i n a l development i n that s t a t e to s p e c i f i e d remote areas, suggest that the European approach towards gas t e r m i n a l s i t i n g i s , of n e c e s s i t y , g a i n i n g favour on t h i s c o n t i n e n t . 120 c r i t i c a l accident at the LPG/LNG f a c i l i t y could touch o f f a chain r e a c t i o n of f i r e s / e x p l o s i o n s throughout the surrounding area. This concern i s e s p e c i a l l y acute at Canvey I s l a n d where, w i t h i n a space of f i v e k i l o m e t r e s , there i s a v i r t u a l l y u ninterrupted concentration of i n d u s t r i e s engaged i n the production, storage, r e f i n i n g , and movement of large volumes of hazardous m a t e r i a l s , i n c l u d i n g l i q u e f i e d gases, crude and r e f i n e d petroleum products, l i q u e f i e d ammonia compounds, and e x p l o s i v e s . The problem at Canvey i s f u r t h e r aggravated by the f a c t that the surrounding region has become i n c r e a s i n g l y a t t r a c t i v e as a commuter suburb of London i n recent years. The permanent population of Canvey I s l a n d stood at roughly 33 000 i n 1978, as opposed to only 11 000 i n 1951. 2 2 S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the worsening land use c o n f l i c t between i n d u s t r i a l and r e s i d e n t i a l concerns at Canvey I s l a n d c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l s the s i t u a t i o n at Burnaby, B.C. where the nearest homes are l o c a t e d w i t h i n 150 metres of the LPG storage tanks. As a footnote, i n March of 1981 Environment Secretary Michael H e s e l t i n e ordered a f u l l i n q u i r y i n t o the s a f e t y of the B r i t i s h Gas LNG t e r m i n a l operation at Canvey I s l a n d . 2 3 The i n q u i r y c a l l was sparked by a government report on the s a f e t y aspects of a proposed new o i l r e f i n e r y at Canvey by United R e f i n e r i e s L t d . According to Mr. H e s e l t i n e , the report "...judged that i t would be wrong f o r ... the B r i t i s h Gas t e r m i n a l to remain s i t e d so c l o s e to the r e s i d e n t population unless a f o o l p r o o f device f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of the p u b l i c could be i n s t a l l e d . 2 ^ The i n q u i r y commenced on 20 October 1981, and i s scheduled to continue i n t o 1982, at which time a recommendation on whether or not to close the B r i t i s h Gas t e r m i n a l w i l l be passed on to Mr. H e s e l t i n e by i n q u i r y chairman Robert de P i r o s . 121 Neither Le Havre nor the i l l - f a t e d Shell-BP gas port proposal for Europoort have been affected by the d i r e c t influences of r e s i d e n t i a l encroachment. In each instance, the terminal i s remotely situated near the seaward l i m i t of lengthy l a n d f i l l extensions into the Seine (Le Havre) and Rhine (Europoort) r i v e r e s t u a r i e s . These l a n d f i l l areas have been set aside e x c l u s i v e l y f o r i n d u s t r i a l purposes. Even so, the Shell-BP proposal did generate a great deal of l o c a l controversy - p a r t i c u l a r l y among the residents of the nearby community of Hoek van Holland, situated some three kilometres to the north of the terminal. Another problem which, to varying degrees, i s common to a l l gas ports concerns the exposure of berthed l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s to oncoming marine t r a f f i c . Although there have been several reported instances of minor c o l l i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g moored gas tankers, the p o t e n t i a l gravity of this issue has perhaps been most gra p h i c a l l y underscored on three separate occasions at Canvey Island - i n 1974 when the B r i t i s h coaster Tower Princess c o l l i d e d with the docked LNG c a r r i e r Methane Progress; again i n 1976 when the Cypriot o i l tanker B r i t t rammed the B r i t i s h Gas Co. j e t t y at Canvey, coming to rest a short distance from a loaded large-diametre ship-to-shore LNG discharge pipe; and, most recently, i n May of 1982 when the coaster Jemrix h i t the methane wharf, f r a c t u r i n g a gas pipe which resulted i n a minor s p i l l of LNG into the River Thames.2^ Incidents such as these were l a r g e l y responsible f o r prompting the designers of the proposed Shell-BP LPG terminal at Europoort to incorporate into the plan a completely enclosed berth which would have a l l but eliminated the l i k e l i h o o d of a c o l l i s i o n while the gas tanker was docked. 2 6 The f u l l y enclosed berth concept would have also served to contain the immediate spread of any acci d e n t a l LP( s p i l l . 122 4.4.3 Le Havre, France 4.4.3.1 P h y s i c a l Considerations Access to the Gaz de France LNG terminal at Le Havre involves a more or less d i r e c t one kilometre t r a n s i t through the port's outer harbour (see map, p. 123). Incoming gas tankers must b r i e f l y pass within approximately 300 metres of the nearest commercial and r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i c t s of the community. The actual terminal berth i s situated roughly one kilometre from the closest n o n - i n d u s t r i a l areas. 4.4.3.2 Regulatory Considerations According to information provided by o f f i c i a l s at the Port Authority of Le Havre during May of 1980, l i q u e f i e d gas tankers are required by law to e s t a b l i s h radio contact with the vessel t r a f f i c centre p r i o r to entering the harbour. This feature i s compulsory for a l l deepsea vessels approaching ei t h e r Le Havre or the nearby petroleum superport of Le H a v r e - A n t i f e r . 2 7 Furthermore, gas c a r r i e r s must be attended by a tug escort while underway i n the harbour. As i n the United States, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for introducing and enforcing s p e c i a l operating regulations for gas c a r r i e r s i n French ports rests with the f e d e r a l government - i n t h i s instance the M i n i s t r y of Maritime A f f a i r s -rather than the i n d i v i d u a l port authority. i LE HAVRE, FRANCE Figure 4.5 124 4.4.4 Europoort, Holland 4.4.4.1 In t r o d u c t o r y Note During the mid-1970's, S h e l l O i l and B r i t i s h Petroleum put f o r t h a j o i n t proposal to the C i t y of Rotterdam (which administers the Rotterdam-Europoort port complex) to b u i l d a major LPG import r e c e i v i n g t e r m i n a l capable of accommodating v e s s e l s of up to 75 000 cubic metres c a p a c i t y . The t e r m i n a l was to have been lo c a t e d on BP property s i t u a t e d near the entrance to the North Sea, some three k i l o m e t r e s south of the community of Hoek van Holland (see map, p. 125). By the s p r i n g of 1980, the Port of Rotterdam had endorsed the p r o j e c t i n p r i n c i p l e , but was w i t h o l d i n g f i n a l approval pending the r e s o l u t i o n of s e v e r a l contentious p o i n t s , plus the completion of p u b l i c hearings on the p r o j e c t . Nevertheless, i t was apparent that the proposal, as i t stood i n 1980, had taken i n t o account, and had attempted to r e c t i f y , many of the most commonly expressed p u b l i c concerns r e l a t i v e to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of new gas t e r m i n a l s . For t h i s reason, the s a l i e n t features of the Shell-BP proposal have been addressed i n Sections 4.4.4.2. ( P h y s i c a l Considerations) and 4.4.4.3. (Regulatory C o n s i d e r a t i o n s ) . In November of 1981, Shell-BP announced t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to abandon plans to construct an LPG t e r m i n a l at Europoort, o f f i c i a l l y c i t i n g the high cost of s a f e t y measures and a g e n e r a l l y slackening demand f o r L P G . 2 8 A b r i e f review of the circumstances l e a d i n g up to the Shell-BP announcement to cancel the p r o j e c t , however, would suggest that the o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n had been somewhat o v e r s i m p l i f i e d . In f a c t , problems began to surface as f a r back as the e a r l y months of 1981, when the Dutch government approved the l a n d i n g of large volumes of LPG at both F l u s h i n g and Europoort, instead of j u s t Europoort.29 Representatives from the C i t y of Rotterdam and the 125 Figure 4 . 6 126 Province of Zuid-Holland accused the federal government of pursuing a confusing p o l i c y on the matter. At the same time, S h e l l announced that the need for a major terminal at Europoort had been reduced as a re s u l t of the government's decision, which would enable S h e l l to supply i t s Europoort f a c i l i t i e s with gas landed at F l u s h i n g . 3 0 Rotterdam a u t h o r i t i e s expressed concern that LPG would be transported from Flushing to the S h e l l and BP operations at Europoort by means of increased r a i l and coastal shipping movements, with a l l of the attendant safety r i s k s . Furthermore, c i v i c o f f i c i a l s feared that the Port of Rotterdam would lose much of the Shell-BP terminal's proposed annual throughput of 1.5 m i l l i o n tonnes of LPG - to the extent that the c i t y offered to pay F l s . 20 m i l l i o n of the estimated F l s . 60-70 m i l l i o n construction cost f o r the project.31 By August of 1981, i n the absence of a firm commitment from Shell and BP to proceed with the project, and increasingly experiencing the ef f e c t s of a severe global economic downturn, Rotterdam a u t h o r i t i e s agreed to relax a previous condition that the o i l companies would have to construct a separate, enclosed berth for the discharge of LPG. 3 2 Apparently these concessions were not enough, as S h e l l and BP ultimately scrapped the project i n November of 1981. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , one week a f t e r the collapse of the Shell-BP proposal, Rotterdam c i t y council approved another proposal, t h i s one by Mundogas, to transship LPG d i r e c t l y from oceangoing gas c a r r i e r s to coastal and inland vessels. The Mundogas terminal, l i k e the Shell-BP proposal, i s situated i n the Maasvlakte d i s t r i c t of the Europoort r e f i n e r y complex. The f a c i l i t y i s capable of handling a throughput capacity of some 750 000 tonnes per annum. De t a i l s of the s p e c i a l operating requirements applicable to deepsea LPG c a r r i e r s serving the new Mundogas terminal are unavailable. However, i t i s u n l i k e l y that they d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y from 127 the r e g u l a t i o n s which had been proposed f o r the Shell-BP operation (see S e c t i o n 4.4.4.3 - Regulatory C o n s i d e r a t i o n s ) . 4.4.4.2 P h y s i c a l Considerations - Shell-BP Proposal The Shell-BP gas r e c e p t i o n f a c i l i t y was to have been s i t u a t e d some s i x k i l o m e t r e s i n s i d e the harbour p r e c i n c t . However, despite a somewhat longer harbour t r a n s i t than i s required f o r Le Havre, the Europoort proposal d i s p l a y e d s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t l o c a t i o n a l advantages over i t s French counterpart. Foremost among these was the f a c t that loaded gas tankers would, at no time, have been required to come w i t h i n 2500 metres of the nearest commercial or r e s i d e n t i a l areas. Moreover, as p r e v i o u s l y i n d i c a t e d , the a c t u a l s i t e chosen f o r the t e r m i n a l was s i t u a t e d approximately three k i l o m e t r e s from the c l o s e s t centre of p o p u l a t i o n , Hoek van H o l l a n d . While t h i s precaution would not, i n i t s e l f , have c o n s t i t u t e d an absolute guarantee of p u b l i c s a f e t y i n the event of a serious mishap, the existence of a minimum three-kilometre radius b u f f e r zone, e s p e c i a l l y i n a country where the a v a i l a b i l i t y of open or underpopulated space i s at a tremendous premium, i n d i c a t e s a s i g n i f i c a n t commitment on the part of the p r o j e c t planners to the fundamental premise that l i q u e f i e d gas terminals should be kept p h y s i c a l l y remote from the general p u b l i c to as great an extent as p o s s i b l e . 4.4.4.3 Regulatory Considerations - Shell-BP Proposal The h i g h l i g h t s of the proposed s p e c i a l gas tanker operating r e g u l a t i o n s f o r v e s s e l s s e r v i n g the proposed Shell-BP t e r m i n a l were as f o l l o w s : 3 3 a) inbound gas c a r r i e r s would be required to e s t a b l i s h r a d i o contact with the Port of Rotterdam w e l l i n advance of a r r i v a l i n order to secure clearance to enter the harbour; 128 b) f u l l y - or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d gas tankers would not be permitted entry i n t o the harbour during periods of l i m i t e d v i s i b i l i t y or i n high wind c o n d i t i o n s (standards to be e s t a b l i s h e d ) ; c) present r e g u l a t i o n s , which req u i r e loaded o i l and gas tankers to assume a compulsory tug escort once the v e s s e l has entered the harbour, would be modified to the extent that the tug escort would be picked up some two or three k i l o m e t r e s west of the harbour entrance. (N.B. A p r e l i m i n a r y report e n t i t l e d LPG i n Europoort, produced by the p r o j e c t sponsors i n 1978 or 1979, suggested that incoming LPG tankers would be attended by two tugs - one attached at the bow, and the other at the s t e r n . ) 3 ^ d) a harbour p a t r o l boat would be assigned to each incoming gas c a r r i e r f o r the purpose of maintaining a c l e a r navigable channel ahead of the tanker throughout the harbour t r a n s i t phase (N.B. As of May 1980, i t had not been e s t a b l i s h e d whether the port would introduce a "moving s a f e t y zone" concept s i m i l a r to that i n e f f e c t i n Boston, or the shipping channel c l o s u r e technique p r a c t i c e d at Los Angeles) e) gas tankers operating e i t h e r w i t h i n the confines of, or the approaches t o , the Port of Rotterdam would be required to have both a c o a s t a l and a r i v e r p i l o t on board at a l l times; f ) l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s would be re q u i r e d to maintain r a d i o contact w i t h the v e s s e l t r a f f i c s e r v i c e while underway i n the p o r t . 4.4.5 Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. 4.4.5.1 P h y s i c a l Considerations Outwardly, Canvey I s l a n d would appear to have the most i n common with the Port of Vancouver from a t e r m i n a l s i t i n g p e r s p e c t i v e . In both i n s t a n c e s , the r e s p e c t i v e gas terminals are s i t u a t e d many kil o m e t r e s from the open sea. S i m i l a r l y , when constructed during the e a r l y 1960's there was l i t t l e i n the way of concentrated suburban r e s i d e n t i a l development i n the immediate v i c i n i t y of e i t h e r f a c i l i t y (although t h i s c o n d i t i o n has since reversed i t s e l f i n each case). 129 There are, however, s e v e r a l important c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which set Vancouver and Canvey apart from one another. F i r s t l y , whereas the maximum width of Burrard I n l e t seldom exceed 2500 metres at any p o i n t , the R i v e r Thames between the B r i t i s h Gas Corporation j e t t y at Canvey and the Former Seaward L i m i t of the Port of London, some 22 kil o m e t r e s downstream, never c o n s t r i c t s to l e s s than 2500 metres (see map, p. 130). In f a c t , the minimum width of the r i v e r between Canvey P o i n t (the easternmost extremity of Canvey Is l a n d ) and the Former Seaward L i m i t i s approximately s i x k i l o m e t r e s . Because the Thames deepsea shipping channel i s , f o r the most p a r t , g e o g r a p h i c a l l y s i t u a t e d i n m i d - r i v e r , l i q u e f i e d gas tankers are assured a minimum buffe r of at l e a s t two kil o m e t r e s on e i t h e r side between the v e s s e l and the c o a s t l i n e f o r a l l but the l a s t f i v e kilometres of the journey i n t o the Canvey t e r m i n a l . The second s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the two ports stems from the f a c t that the harbour t r a n s i t through the Port of Vancouver places tens, perhaps even hundreds, of thousands of people who l i v e or work along the shores of Burrard I n l e t at r i s k . The c o a s t a l population r e s i d i n g along the R i v e r Thames between Canvey and the Former Seaward L i m i t , on the other hand, i s n e i t h e r as l a r g e nor as densely concentrated as i n Vancouver. This f e a t u r e , combined w i t h the knowledge that loaded gas tankers approaching the B r i t i s h Gas t e r m i n a l are g e n e r a l l y smaller and, i n a p h y s i c a l sense, f u r t h e r removed from the immediate c o a s t a l population than i s the case i n Vancouver, suggests that Canvey-bound gas c a r r i e r s present l e s s of a d i r e c t threat to p u b l i c s a f e t y than do l i q u e f i e d propane tankers during t h e i r r e g u l a r 130 CANVEY ISLAND, U.K. & ENVIRONS F i g u r e 4 . 7 131 t r a n s i t s of Burrard I n l e t . * A f i n a l point to consider i s that l i q u e f i e d gas tankers operating i n the lower reaches of the Thames are not required to contend with such p o t e n t i a l hazards as cross-harbour commuter f e r r i e s , deepsea vessels moored either within, or i n close proximity to, the navigable fairway, or railway and automobile bridges, a l l of which are d i s t i n c t navigational concerns i n the Port of Vancouver. 4.4.5.2 Regulatory Considerations Liquefied natural gas c a r r i e r s functioning within the Port of London have, for a number of years, been governed by a s p e c i a l operating by-law. 3 5 However, contrary to recent regulatory experience i n the United States where the tendency on the part of the coastal state has i n c r e a s i n g l y been one of e x e r c i s i n g greater "hands on" control over actual ship operations, the London LNG by-law has been drafted i n such a fashion as to leave the vessel master's authority more or less i n t a c t . Thus, while inbound gas c a r r i e r s are required to secure Harbour Master's clearance to both enter and move within the port, and while they are bound to observe a number of s p e c i a l precautions concerning vessel berthing and cargo offloading procedures, gas tankers are not affected by such constraints as the mandatory provision of escorts, tug assistance during docking, shipping lane closures, or the i n s t i t u t i o n of moving safety zones. *The two vessels which r e g u l a r l y service the Canvey Island LNG terminal -that i s the Methane Progress and the Methane Princess - have cargo capacities on the order of 27 400 m3. The cargo capacity ratings for the three most recent LPG c a r r i e r s to v i s i t Westridge Terminal i n Burnaby (p r i o r to 31 August 1982) were as follows: Yamahide Maru - 38 160 m3 Tatsuno Maru - 50 670 m3 Nichizan Maru - 40 000 m3 (estimated) 132 The apparent reluctance on the part of Port of London o f f i c i a l s to introduce more s t r i n g e n t operating r e g u l a t i o n s f o r l i q u e f i e d gas tankers undoubtedly stems from a combination of f a c t o r s ranging from a long-standing sense of B r i t i s h maritime t r a d i t i o n to the rather questionable hypothesis t h a t , since the port has experienced no ser i o u s gas tanker accidents i n 18 f u l l years of oper a t i o n , there i s no perceived need to upgrade e x i s t i n g standards. As wi t h Vancouver, Port of London o f f i c i a l s , e i t h e r , u n w i t t i n g l y or otherwise, appear to have e s t a b l i s h e d t h e i r r e g u l a t i o n s on the assumptions t h a t : a) i n d i v i d u a l gas tankers w i l l not be placed i n hazardous circumstances as a r e s u l t of e i t h e r mechanical f a i l u r e or human e r r o r ; b) gas tanker safety w i l l not be jeopardized as a r e s u l t of mechanical f a i l u r e or human e r r o r on other v e s s e l s ; and c) i n the u n l i k e l y event a gas tanker i s inv o l v e d i n a serious a c c i d e n t , the s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of the cargo containment system w i l l remain i n t a c t throughout. H i s t o r y may, i n f a c t , bear out the preceding assumptions. However, as has been i n d i c a t e d elsewhere i n t h i s t h e s i s , r e g u l a t o r y agencies i n the United States and on the European continent have widely r e j e c t e d t h i s approach to rulemaking on the basis that i t f a i l s to inco r p o r a t e s u f f i c i e n t back-up s a f e t y measures capable of responding i n an e f f e c t i v e manner to any i n i t i a l emergency s i t u a t i o n which may r e s u l t should e i t h e r of assumptions "a" or "b" (above) prove i n c o r r e c t . For example, the presence of e s c o r t i n g tugs could prove i n v a l u a b l e i n the event a l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r sustains a l o s s of power or rudder malfunction i n a c o n s t r i c t e d or congested area. The i n t r o d u c t i o n and enforcement of a moving sa f e t y zone, by the same token, would serve to v i r t u a l l y e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of a major c o l l i s i o n between v e s s e l s , f o r whatever reason(s). .133 Another d i s t u r b i n g feature on the part of the Port of London A u t h o r i t y (PLA) has been i t s tendency to introduce sometimes l o o s e l y worded operating g u i d e l i n e s which are open to broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by i n d i v i d u a l masters and p i l o t s and which, by d e f i n i t i o n , would almost c e r t a i n l y prove d i f f i c u l t to enforce. For i n s t a n c e , PLA Notice to Mariners 8 of 1980 (issued i n January 1980) s t a t e s that a l l v e s s e l s operating between Sea Reach No. 7 and West B l y t h Buoys ( i . e . i n the immediate v i c i n i t y of Canvey I s l a n d ) " . . . s h a l l proceed at a moderate speed when passing berths where s p e c i f i e d v e s s e l s w i t h cargoes of LNG, LPG, Ammonia or E x p l o s i v e s are present or manoeuvring i n the v i c i n i t y . . . " , and furthermore that s p e c i f i e d v e s s e l s " . . . s h a l l , when above Sea Reach No. 7, at a l l times proceed at moderate speed." 3 6 The operative term i n both instances i s "moderate speed" which, i n t u r n , has been defined by the PLA as being "...not more than 8 knots through the water, or minimum speed necessary f o r adequate c o n t r o l and safe n a v i g a t i o n , whichever i s g r e a t e r . " 3 7 A c c o r d i n g l y , while 8 knots i s a "suggested" maximum speed, the wording of the d e f i n i t i o n i s such that any v e s s e l could be operated at speeds i n excess of 8 knots should the master deem i t necessary to maintain proper c o n t r o l . This somewhat i n t e r p r e t i v e approach towards n a v i g a t i o n a l rulemaking i s i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t to the s t r i c t , p r e c i s e l y - d e f i n e d s a f e t y r e g u l a t i o n s which have become the hallmark of American gas tanker r e g u l a t o r y experience. 134 FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 4.0 1 For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s see Intergovernmental Maritime C o n s u l t a t i v e O r g a n i z a t i o n , Code f o r the Construction and Equipment of Ships C a r r y i n g  L i q u e f i e d Gases i n Bulk (London: The O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1976); and Intergovernmental Maritime C o n s u l t a t i v e O r g a n i z a t i o n , Code f o r E x i s t i n g  Ships C a r r y i n g L i q u e f i e d Gases i n Bulk (London: The O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1976). 2 Lloyd's L i s t , see e d i t i o n s 4 October 1980 and 18 and 19 December 1981. 3 Captain W.S.G. Morrison, as quoted i n West Coast - A Digest of  Evidence presented to the West Coast O i l P o r t s I n q u i r y (Vancouver: prepared by Westwater Research Centre, 1977), p. 28. 4 F i s h e r i e s and Oceans, S a i l i n g D i r e c t i o n s - B r i t i s h Columbia Coast  (South P o r t i o n ) , (Ottawa: F i s h e r i e s and Oceans Canada - S c i e n t i f i c Information and P u b l i c a t i o n s Branch, 1979), V o l . 1, eleventh e d i t i o n , p. 188. 5 Transport Canada, The Modern Tale of the Timeless Seas (Vancouver: Canadian Coast Guard, c i r c a 1976), p. 3. 6 Government of Canada, N a t i o n a l Harbours Board Operating By-law (Ottawa: Queen's P r i n t e r f o r Canada, 1978), s e c t i o n 59. 7 Port of Vancouver, Second Narrows MRA Standing Orders (Vancouver: N a t i o n a l Harbours Board, 1 December 1981), pp. 1-19. 8 "Tug e s c o r t s ' w i l l r a i s e 1 cost of Narrows t r a n s i t s " , The Vancouver  Sun, 25 March 1980. y "Near-misses plague Second Narrows", The P r o v i n c e , 11 March 1980. 10 "Tanker loses s t e e r i n g " , The Vancouver Sun, 27 November 1977. 11 Based upon informa t i o n e x t r a c t e d from U.S. Coast Guard l i q u e f i e d gas tanker operations plans f o r Boston, Massachusetts; Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a ; Providence, Rhode I s l a n d ; Elba I s l a n d (Savannah), Georgia; Cove P o i n t , Maryland; and P h i l a d e l p h i a , Pennsylvania. 12 Quotation ex t r a c t e d from U.S. Coast Guard (Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) , Port of Los Angeles - L i q u e f i e d Petroleum Gas Operations/  Emergency P l a n (Los Angeles: October 1978), Part I I I , S ection A, Subsection l a , p. 3. I t should be noted that the a c t u a l wording of the d i s c l o s u r e may vary m a r g i n a l l y from one port to the next, although the substance of the t e x t remains e s s e n t i a l l y the same. 1 3 Background i n f o r m a t i o n on the e v o l u t i o n of Boston as a gas port e x t r a c t e d from a l e t t e r addressed to the w r i t e r from Mr. R. M o r i c o n i , A s s i s t a n t Port D i r e c t o r - T r a f f i c , Massachusetts Port A u t h o r i t y , dated 14 December 1979. 135 !4 U.S. Coast Guard (Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) , The Port of Boston  - LNG-LPG V e s s e l Management Plan and Emergency Plan (Boston: U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety O f f i c e , 1 August 1979), pp. 1-2 to 1-4, p. I - I I - l , and p. I - I I - l . 15 Based upon telephone conversation between w r i t e r and Ms. J . Natow, Port of Los Angeles, 28 November 1979. 16 "Tanker scheduled to b r i n g second LPG shipment", Los Angeles Times, c i r c a December 1978. 1 7 Davis, op. c i t . , p. 158. 18 Unless otherwise i n d i c a t e d , a l l i n f o r m a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g to gas tanker r e g u l a t i o n s i n the Port of Los Angeles has been derived from U.S. Coast Guard (Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) , Port of Los Angeles - L i q u e f i e d  Petroleum Gas Operations/Emergency Plan (Los Angeles: October 1978). 19 T.K. Jennssen, "Risk A n a l y s i s of LPG T r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n the Porsgrunn Area", V e r i t a s (Oslo: Det norske V e r i t a s ) , V o l . 24, No. 94, December 1978, p. 9. 2 0 Lloyd's L i s t , 26 A p r i l 1982. 2 1 "Progress on LPG t e r m i n a l " , Lloyd's L i s t , 10 August 1981. 2 2 Health & Safety Executive, Canvey: Summary of an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of  p o t e n t i a l hazards from operations i n the Canvey Island/Thurrock area (London: Her Majesty's S t a t i o n a r y O f f i c e , 1978), p. 2. 2 3 Lloyd's L i s t , 25 March 1981. 2 4 I b i d . , 25 March 1981. 2 5 Lee M. Davis, Frozen F i r e (San F r a n c i s c o : Friends of the E a r t h , 1979), pp. 275-276; and Lloyd's L i s t , 21 May 1982. 2 6 BP R a f f i n a d e r i j Nederland N.V. and S h e l l Nederland B.V., LPG i n  Europoort (Rotterdam?: p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n brochure released c i r c a 1978 or 1979), p. 9. 2 7 Based upon i n t e r v i e w s between the w r i t e r and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Port Autonome du Havre, Le Havre, France, 26 May 1980. 2 8 " C o n t r o v e r s i a l LPG plan at Europoort wins approval", Lloyd's L i s t , 9 November 1981. 2 9 "Rotterdam row over landing p o l i c y " , Lloyd's L i s t , 19 March 1981. 3 0 I b i d . , 19 March 1981. 3 1 I b i d . , 19 March 1981. 3 2 "Rotterdam anxious f o r LPG s t a r t - u p " , Lloyd's L i s t , 8 August 1981. 136 J J P r e l i m i n a r y i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e p r o p o s e d g a s t a n k e r r e g u l a t i o n s f o r E u r o p o o r t f u r n i s h e d b y Mr. P e t e r Noe, R e s e a r c h P r o j e c t M a n a g e r , P o r t o f R o t t e r d a m d u r i n g a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e w r i t e r , 30 May 1980, e x c e p t a s o t h e r w i s e i n d i c a t e d . 3 Z > BP R a f f i n a d e r i j N e d e r l a n d N.V. a n d S h e l l N e d e r l a n d B.V., o p . c i t . , p . 9. 35 P o r t o f L o n d o n A u t h o r i t y , B y - l a w s made by t h e P o r t o f L o n d o n  A u t h o r i t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i m p o r t a t i o n , e x p o r t a t i o n a n d h a n d l i n g o f  l i q u i d m e t h a n e i n t h e p o r t o f L o n d o n ( L o n d o n : P.L.A., c i r c a N o v e m b e r 1965). 36 P o r t o f L o n d o n A u t h o r i t y , N o t i c e t o M a r i n e r s 8 o f 1980 - P r e c a u t i o n s  t o be O b s e r v e d b y V e s s e l s ( L o n d o n : P.L.A., 30 J a n u a r y 1980). 3 7 I b i d . 137 5.0 CONCLUSIONS I t i s apparent that two f a i r l y d i s t i n c t schools of thought have emerged among the port r e g u l a t o r y agencies examined i n t h i s t h e s i s concerning the matter of n a v i g a t i o n a l s a f e t y requirements f o r l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s . On the one hand, there are those who would advocate strong r e g u l a t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n on the part of the host n a t i o n , as has c l e a r l y been the case i n both the United States and, more r e c e n t l y , Holland. The essence of t h i s philosophy i s to di m i n i s h the inherent r i s k f a c t o r to the lowest p o s s i b l e l e v e l short of excluding gas tankers from the port e n t i r e l y . By c o n t r a s t , a u t h o r i t i e s at both the Port of London and the Port of Vancouver have t r a d i t i o n a l l y tended to avoid d i r e c t r e g u l a t o r y i n t e r v e n t i o n wherever p o s s i b l e . As a r e s u l t , the s p e c i a l gas tanker operating requirements i n e f f e c t f o r both the lower Thames region and Vancouver harbour are n o t i c e a b l y l a c k i n g i n terms of substance, scope, and c l a r i t y when contrasted w i t h such communities as Boston, Los Angeles, or Rotterdam/ Europoort. I t must ther e f o r e be concluded that the hypothesis tested - that " . . . s a f e t y standards i n the Port of Vancouver r e f l e c t — to the extent humanly and reasonably p o s s i b l e — l o c a l , r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l concerns and can be compared favourably with s i m i l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l experience..."! - cannot be supported on the strength of the evidence presented, at l e a s t to the extent that i t a p p l i e s to the safe passage of l i q u e f i e d petroleum gas c a r r i e r s through the p o r t . In a c t u a l point of f a c t , given such c o n s t r a i n t s as the s i z e and c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the harbour, the volume and nature of shipping t r a f f i c i n the p o r t , and the geographical l o c a t i o n of the Westridge t e r m i n a l , l o c a l LPG s a f e t y standards i n such areas as tug escort requirements, v e s s e l i n s p e c t i o n and clearance procedures, speed l i m i t 1.3.8 r e s t r i c t i o n s , or the i m p o s i t i o n of mandatory s a f e t y zones around l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s bear l i t t l e resemblance to those i n e f f e c t i n the m a j o r i t y of the American or European gas ports examined. Table 5.1 Comparison of S p e c i a l Regulations i n E f f e c t During Harbour Passage of LPG/LNG Tankers  P o r t : C % n j V k o u Standard 1. Frequent gas tanker s a f e t y i n s p e c t i o n s by host n a t i o n * * ? ? ? 2. Mandatory tug escort * * * * Second Narrows Only 3. Harbour speed l i m i t r e s t r i c t i o n * * * * Second Narrows Only 4. Moorage p r o h i b i t e d i n or near navigable fairway * * * * * 5. Safety zone around moving gas c a r r i e r * * * 6. Mandatory p r o v i s i o n of harbour master escort * * * ? 7. A i r c r a f t movement r e s t r i c t i o n s * * ? 8. D a y l i g h t passage only (loaded v e s s e l s ) * * * ? * 9. V i s i b i l i t y r e s t r i c t i o n s * * * 1 * * 10. S p e c i a l bylaw or operations p l a n * * * * 11. V e s s e l t r a f f i c management system * * * * I t i s conceivable that the A s s i s t a n t Harbour Master's statement of November 1979 was based, e i t h e r i n whole or i n p a r t , upon any of three separate assumptions/considerations: 139 A) A geniune, but mistaken, b e l i e f that gas tanker rules were,  indeed, on a par with other World ports. B) The assumption that, since there have been no reported gas tanker  accidents to date in"the"Port"Of Vancouver, the e x i s t i n g safety  standards must be adequate atid, therefore; a t " l e a s t equivalent to  those i n e f f e c t i n other ports. There are several flaws i n t h i s argument, which r e f l e c t s a serious misinterpretation of h i s t o r i c events, both l o c a l l y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . F a i r l e y and others have suggested that r i s k analysis based upon l i m i t e d , accident free operating h i s t o r i e s should be viewed with c a u t i o n . 2 The Port of Vancouver has experienced perhaps 400 (inbound and outbound) LPG tanker t r a n s i t s during the past 16 years, or roughly 25 t r a n s i t s per year. That there have been no serious gas tanker accidents during that period does not necessarily e s t a b l i s h a " s i g n i f i c a n t " p r o b a b i l i t y f a c t o r , and should not be construed as i n d i c a t i n g that, based upon previous operating experience, there i s a zero p r o b a b i l i t y of an LPG accident occurring i n the harbour. In a c t u a l i t y , i t i s more r e a l i s t i c to assume that the p r o b a b i l i t y of a major accident occurring at some time i n the future i s equal to some range of values, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the previous operating record. The preceding comments should be further tempered by the fact that, of 45 serious, very serious, and t o t a l loss LPG tanker casualties between 28 June 1979 and 5 February 1982 (as i d e n t i f i e d i n Appendix I I ) , at least 18 occurred i n , or i n close proximity to, populated harbour areas. Based upon information provided i n Clarkson's L i q u e f i e d Gas C a r r i e r Register - 1981, i t i s estimated that the world LPG tanker f l e e t during t h i s period constituted some 1400 tanker operating y e a r s : 3 140 Table 5.2 LPG Tanker Operating Years 28 June 1979 - 28 February 1982 Year a) World LPG Tanker F l e e t b) P o r t i o n of Year Under C o n s i d e r a t i o n c) Tanker Years (a X b = c) 1979 500 6 months (6/12) 250 1980 528 12 months (12/12) 528 1981 568 12 months (12/12) 568 1982 570 ( e s t . ) 1 month (1/12) 48 T o t a l 1394 Thus, the incidence of s e r i o u s LPG tanker accidents i n or near populated harbour areas during t h i s period amounted to approximately one c a s u a l t y f o r every 78 tanker years. I t i s p o s s i b l e that the shipping r e g u l a t i o n s p r e s e n t l y i n place may, thus f a r , have had l i t t l e bearing whatsoever on the safe passage of gas c a r r i e r s through the Port of Vancouver. A combination of good seamanship, s t r i c t adherence to the n a v i g a t i o n a l r u l e s of the road, and the absence of any e x t r a o r d i n a r y operating circumstances may, i n f a c t have precluded the l i k e l i h o o d of a serious accident o c c u r r i n g on any of the 200 or so previous gas tanker v i s i t s to the p o r t . The question remains, however, as to whether or not the e x i s t i n g standards would be s u f f i c i e n t to deter a major, p o s s i b l y c a t a s t r o p h i c , accident from o c c u r r i n g i n the event of a serious equipment malfunction or e r r o r i n judgment. I t i s the contention of t h i s t h e s i s that they would not be adequate. The 12 October 1979 i n c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g the f r e i g h t e r Japan E r i c a more f u l l y underscores the shortcomings a s s o c i a t e d with the "adequacy of the e x i s t i n g standards" argument. P r i o r to that date, i t i s reasonable to assume that shipping r e g u l a t i o n s i n f o r c e f o r the Second Narrows might a l s o have been considered both appropriate and e f f e c t i v e , based upon the previous ship s a f e t y record f o r the area. However, on the evening of 12 October, the outbound Japan E r i c a c o l l i d e d w i t h the Second Narrows Railway Bridge during a period of dense fog and, i n so doing, i n f l i c t e d heavy damage to the bridge's l i f t span. In a b r i e f moment, the b a s i c inadequacies of the Second Narrows Operating r e g u l a t i o n s were exposed i n the worst p o s s i b l e l i g h t . In simplest terms, the Japan  E r i c a should not have been permitted to s a i l under the p r e v a i l i n g fog c o n d i t i o n s on the night of 12 October. C l e a r l y , the shipping r e g u l a t i o n s i n e f f e c t at that time were not s u f f i c i e n t l y rigourous to compensate f o r the poor q u a l i t y of seamanship displayed by the master and p i l o t aboard the Japan E r i c a . Port a u t h o r i t i e s may c o n s c i o u s l y have r e s i s t e d i n t r o d u c i n g more  app r o p r i a t e operating standards f o r gas tankers on the basis that the  Port of Vancouver i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d u a l , and not e n t i r e l y  compatible, p o r t f o l i o of port marketing and harbour s a f e t y . Under these circumstances, there e x i s t s the very r e a l concern that port o f f i c i a l s , i n an e f f o r t to e i t h e r a t t r a c t new businesses or r e t a i n e x i s t i n g ones, may choose to place marketing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ahead of p u b l i c s a f e t y concerns. The hasty manner by which s t r i c t new shipping r e g u l a t i o n s were introduced f o r the Second Narrows area f o l l o w i n g the Japan E r i c a accident lends considerable support to the preceding o b s e r v a t i o n . I t i s a matter of p u b l i c record that Dr. Hugh Horner, -14-2 formerly of the Canadian Wheat Board made "...very strong r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . . . " to the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board p r i o r to the re-opening of the Second Narrows r a i l w a y bridge i n February of 1980 i n an attempt to gain assurances that s t r i n g e n t measures would be taken to ensure that the bridge would not be h i t again.^ The Harbours Board responded t o Mr. Horner's overtures by i n t r o d u c i n g the most comprehensive mandatory operating r e g u l a t i o n s c u r r e n t l y i n force i n the harbour (See S e c t i o n 4.2.2). While the recent i n t r o d u c t i o n of s p e c i a l n a v i g a t i o n r u l e s f o r the Second Narrows - at l e a s t to the extent that they apply to v e s s e l s t r a n s p o r t i n g hazardous m a t e r i a l s - does, i n a sense, r e f l e c t the goals of t h i s t h e s i s , i t must not be overlooked that the primary o b j e c t i v e of the new r e g u l a t i o n s i s not so much to increase the l e v e l of p u b l i c i s a f e t y i n the v i c i n i t y of the Second Narrows as i t i s to protect both the s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of the r a i l w a y bridge and the economic i n t e r e s t s i n serves. That the NHB appears to perceive i t s commitment to ensuring a high l e v e l of p u b l i c s a f e t y as secondary to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of economically s t r a t e g i c p r o p e r t i e s i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t that once a ship t r a n s p o r t i n g dangerous m a t e r i a l s (such as LPG) has c l e a r e d the Second Narrows, the p r i n c i p a l elements of a c t i v e v e s s e l p r o t e c t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g tug e s c o r t s , speed r e s t r i c t i o n s , and c l e a r channel requirements) are immediately dismissed. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , an outbound gas tanker t r a v e r s i n g Vancouver's main harbour (that i s , the harbour area s i t u a t e d to the west of the Second Narrows) would r o u t i n e l y expect to encounter such p o t e n t i a l hazards to n a v i g a t i o n as passing deepsea v e s s e l s , large cargo ships moored at any of the f i v e c r i t i c a l l y l o c a t e d mid-harbour anchorages, tug and barge t r a f f i c , c o a s t a l and c r o s s - harbour f e r r y movements, extensive seaplane 143 a c t i v i t y , and numerous small commercial and r e c r e a t i o n a l c r a f t . In the event of a serious mid-harbour gas tanker accident o c c u r r i n g between the F i r s t and Second Narrows, i t i s arguable t h a t , depending upon the l o c a t i o n and nature of the mishap, a greater number of l i v e s would almost c e r t a i n l y be placed ar r i s k than would be the case f o r an i d e n t i c a l accident o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n the s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l l e d l i m i t s of the Second Narrows. Thus, while there i s a compelling r a t i o n a l e from a p u b l i c s a f e t y perspective to upgrade the q u a l i t y of gas tanker operating standards throughout the remainder of the p o r t , the Harbours Board has done l i t t l e i n the way of responding to t h i s challenge. Regardless of the o f f i c i a l corporate reasoning behind the Port of Vancouver's d e c i s i o n to implement LPG n a v i g a t i o n a l s a f e t y r u l e s which do not compare favourably w i t h those i n f o r c e i n other gas p o r t s , c e r t a i n recent events suggest that port o f f i c i a l s may f i n d themselves i n an i n c r e a s i n g l y compromised p o s i t i o n should they continue to adhere to the current r e g u l a t o r y philosophy as i t r e l a t e s to the bulk storage and marine transport of dangerous goods. In order to put t h i s statement i n t o proper context, one might b r i e f l y consider B.C. Hydro's recent proposal to construct an LNG peak shaving plant near Sasamat Lake, some 20 k i l o m e t r e s east of Vancouver. The Hydro proposal c a l l s f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a 70 000 cubic metre c a p a c i t y LNG storage f a c i l i t y f o r the purpose of supplying n a t u r a l gas during periods of peak energy demand. The Sasamat s i t e was s e l e c t e d over s e v e r a l others on the s t r e n g t h of purportedly superior engineering, p u b l i c s a f e t y , and environmental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . N a t u r a l gas would be piped to the Sasamat p l a n t , where i t would be l i q u e f i e d and subsequently stored u n t i l r e q u i r e d . The plan would not r e q u i r e the movement of LNG by e i t h e r marine or r a i l mode. 144-. However, d e s p i t e the comparatively underpopulated nature of the area, and notwithstanding Hydro's sta t e d i n t e n t i o n to i n c o r p o r a t e the highest design standards i n t o the p r o j e c t , the p u b l i c r e a c t i o n against the proposal was s u f f i c i e n t l y intense to cause the company to thoroughly re-assess the p r a c t i c a l i t y of l o c a t i n g at the Sasamat s i t e . The proposal i s p r e s e n t l y on i n d e f i n i t e h o l d , pending an improvement i n the general economic c l i m a t e . In c o n t r a s t , the Westridge LPG t e r m i n a l operation i n Burnaby i s a f f e c t e d by a number of severe l o c a t i o n a l and o p e r a t i o n a l disadvantages which are not inherent i n the Hydro proposal. For i n s t a n c e , Westridge i s unfavourably s i t u a t e d i n c l o s e proximity to r e s i d e n t i a l neighbourhoods, and i s not separated from these areas by an e f f e c t i v e n e u t r a l b u f f e r zone. I t has been estimated that between 1000 and 2000 people r e s i d e w i t h i n a 600 metre radius of the Westridge f a c i l i t y . ^ Furthermore, Westridge i s dependent upon r a i l and marine d e l i v e r y systems, both of which req u i r e lengthy t r a n s i t s through densely populated areas, and are more s u s c e p t i b l e to the r i s k of serious l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g accidents than are p i p e l i n e s . F i n a l l y , as noted i n S e c t i o n 3.3.1 of t h i s document, LPG i s , i n many re s p e c t s , considered to be a more dangerous commodity to handle than LNG. In view of these circumstances, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to understand why port o f f i c i a l s have been r e l u c t a n t to draw p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n to the existence of a l a r g e volume overseas LPG trade operating out of Vancouver. By so doing, they would undoubtedly run the r i s k of i n c u r r i n g a serious p u b l i c backlash. Moreover, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of s t r i c t new operating r e g u l a t i o n s f o r gas tankers at t h i s time might only serve to emphasize that the e x i s t i n g requirements are inadequate. On the other hand, f a i l u r e to upgrade e x i s t i n g standards could a l s o r e s u l t i n severe repercussions i n the event of e i t h e r 145 a s e r i o u s gas tanker i n c i d e n t i n the po r t . In any event, p u b l i c t r u s t i n the operating methods of the Port of Vancouver could be s u b s t a n t i a l l y , and j u s t i f i a b l y , undermined. In the wake of events such as the Japan E r i c a episode, there can be l i t t l e doubt that a major, l i f e - t h r e a t e n i n g accident i n v o l v i n g a l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r could occur i n the Port of Vancouver, given the appropriate circumstances. Furthermore, i t would be wrong to presume that the l i k e l i h o o d of such an accident o c c u r r i n g could ever be t o t a l l y e l i m i n a t e d as long as the port continues to serve the deepsea l i q u e f i e d gas tanker trade. Nevertheless, the accident r i s k f a c t o r could be reduced s i g n i f i c a n t l y through the i n t r o d u c t i o n of more s t r i n g e n t r e g u l a t i o n s , both i n terms of substance and enforcement. That the Yamahide Maru has now been permanently replaced by the N i c h i z a n Maru should be viewed as the inauguration of a new era i n gas tanker operations i n the p o r t , and as an opportunity to upgrade e x i s t i n g r e g u l a t o r y standards to a recognized world l e v e l p r i o r t o , r a t h e r than a f t e r , a serious mishap has occurred. 5.1 R e c a p i t u l a t i o n In summary, i t i s concluded t h a t : • i n terms of i n f l a m m a b i l i t y / e x p l o s i v e n e s s , the hazard p o t e n t i a l inherent i n the marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of LPG by ocean-going gas c a r r i e r s i s as great as, i f not greater than, that of LNG, and should be recognized a c c o r d i n g l y i n terms of the a p p l i c a t i o n and enforcement of appropriate s p e c i a l in-harbour o p e r a t i o n a l s a f e t y r e g u l a t i o n s ; •the s p e c i a l operating requirements p r e s e n t l y i n force i n the Port of Vancouver f o r vess e l s t r a n s p o r t i n g LPG do not compare favourably w i t h s i m i l a r r e g u l a t o r y circumstances i n e i t h e r the United States or Western Europe. 146 • l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s operating w i t h i n the confines of Vancouver's Burrard I n l e t are r o u t i n e l y exposed to a wide v a r i e t y of n a v i g a t i o n hazards ranging from shipping congestion to p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t s w i t h seaplane a c t i v i t y . With few exceptions, the Port of Vancouver has f a i l e d to introduce s p e c i a l s a f e t y measures which are both cognizant of the dangerous nature of LPG and which are designed to m i t i g a t e the inherent hazard p o t e n t i a l a s s o c i a t e d therewith; • i t i s conceivable that a loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d l i q u e f i e d gas tanker could be i n v o l v e d i n a serious harbour accident due to mechanical f a i l u r e or human e r r o r ( e i t h e r aboard the gas c a r r i e r or another v e s s e l ) ; • i t would be d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to contain a major shipboard LPG f i r e i n the Port of Vancouver due to a c r i t i c a l l o c a l shortage of appropriate marine emergency response equipment. This s i t u a t i o n would be exacerbated i n the event the C i t y of Vancouver chooses to withdraw the only e x i s t i n g f i r e b o a t from s e r v i c e e n t i r e l y ; and •the e f f e c t s of a serious mid-harbour LPG f i r e and/or ex p l o s i o n could be c a t a s t r o p h i c to both p u b l i c h e a l t h and property, depending upon such v a r i a b l e f a c t o r s as the time and l o c a t i o n of the a c c i d e n t , and upon p r e v a i l i n g t i d a l and weather c o n d i t i o n s . 147 FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 5.0 1 L e t t e r from Capt. T. Elworthy, Assis t a n c e Harbour Master, Port of Vancouver, to J . Marston, 22 November 1979. 2 W i l l i a m B. F a i r l e y and F r e d e r i c k M o s t e l l e r , S t a t i s t i c s and P u b l i c  P o l i c y (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1977), pp. 331-353; and F.W. Murray et a l , Hazards Associated w i t h the Importation of  N a t u r a l Gas (Santa Monica: The Rand Co r p o r a t i o n , 1976), pp. 5-6. 3 H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , L i q u i d Gas C a r r i e r R e g i s t e r - 1981 (London: H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , 1981), p. 25. 4 "Bridge safeguards urged", The P r o v i n c e , 17 February 1980. 5 Canadian Transport Commission, R a i l r o a d Transport of Dangerous Goods  i n the Greater Vancouver Region (Vancouver: May 1982), p. 53. 148 6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 Primary Recommendations -LPG Tanker Opera t i o n a l Safety In the i n t e r e s t s of improved p u b l i c s a f e t y , i t i s concluded that the operating standards f o r both LPG and LNG tankships f u n c t i o n i n g w i t h i n the confines of the Port of Vancouver should be upgraded to a l e v e l more or l e s s equivalent to those i n force i n the American and c o n t i n e n t a l European gas ports examined i n the research. In order to achieve t h i s o b j e c t i v e , i t i s recommended that the f o l l o w i n g s p e c i a l r e g u l a t o r y p r o v i s i o n s f o r deepsea l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s should be brought i n t o e f f e c t f o r t h w i t h : A. I n s p e c t i o n Requirements A d e t a i l e d shipboard i n s p e c t i o n of every incoming l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r should be undertaken by q u a l i f i e d Canadian Coast Guard personnel p r i o r to the commencement of cargo t r a n s f e r operations. The mandatory i n s p e c t i o n requirement should not be waived f o r frequent v i s i t o r s to the po r t . Loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d v e s s e l s should be inspected p r i o r to the v e s s e l e n t e r i n g the Port of Vancouver, while empty v e s s e l s that are c e r t i f i e d to be gas fr e e should be inspected while at berth or l o c a l anchorage. R a t i o n a l e : There have been a number of documented instances where shipboard Inspections by U.S. Coast Guard teams have determined serious gas d e t e c t i o n system malfunctions on l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s . In 1973, the Norwegian LPG tanker Havis was refused permission to unload i n Boston Harbour when i t was discovered that the ves s e l ' s gas d e t e c t i o n alarm could not be shut o f f . l The pressure r e l i e f valves had been improperly set by the crew, rather than by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y c e r t i f i e d team, as r e q u i r e d . 149 I n February 1977, an unnamed LPG c a r r i e r was ordered to leave the port of Providence, Rhode I s l a n d when the gas d e t e c t i o n system apparently malfunctioned. According to the Coast Guard Marine Safety O f f i c e , Providence, the v e s s e l spent s e v e r a l days offshore w h i l e attempting to remedy the problem. Apparently unable to do so, i t e v e n t u a l l y departed without d i s c h a r g i n g i t s cargo. 2 The strongest supporting r a t i o n a l e f o r the pre-cargo t r a n s f e r i n s p e c t i o n process, however, comes from Coast Guard o f f i c i a l s i n Boston and P h i l a d e l p h i a . Kenneth A. Rock of the Marine Safety O f f i c e , Boston, stated r e c e n t l y that "...experience at (Boston)...has shown that approximately 15-20% of l i q u e f i e d gas ve s s e l s e n t e r i n g t h i s port on t h e i r i n i t i a l v i s i t are delayed o f f port due to malfunctioning equipment or incomplete documents. Approximately 10% of l i q u e f i e d gas v e s s e l s e n t e r i n g on a r e g u l a r trade are delayed o f f p o r t . " 3 Captain D.B. Charter, Captain of the P o r t , P h i l a d e l p h i a , has added that " . . . i n the past two years we have not denied entry to a n y . . . ( l i q u e f i e d gas) s h i p . We have, however, had to send a ship to anchorage to f u r t h e r cool cargo before a l l o w i n g i t to t r a n s f e r and refused operations of two vess e l s without the required span gas.* *"Span gas" i s gas c e r t i f i e d to conta i n 30% of the exp l o s i v e l i m i t f o r LPG and LNG, and i s used to t e s t gas d e t e c t i o n equipment. 150 T h i s . . . i s why we f e e l i t i s important to inspect these ships every port v i s i t . The gas d e t e c t i o n system, span gas, alarms and f i r e f i g h t i n g equipment are items that can change during t r a n s i t . They are a l s o v i t a l to the saf e t y of the v e s s e l and po r t . We have had a v e s s e l come i n t o port w i t h an i c i n g problem on t h e i r quick c l o s i n g valves which wasn't discovered u n t i l the Coast Guard... i n s p e c t i o n . B. Attending Tugs Loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d oceangoing LPG and LNG c a r r i e r s operating w i t h i n the confines of Burrard I n l e t or i t s contiguous navigable waters should, while underway, be attended at a l l times by a compulsory escort of at l e a s t two tugs. The mandatory escort area should i n c l u d e a l l navigable waters s i t u a t e d to the east of the F i r s t Narrows Bridge. Escort tug horsepower and b o l l a r d p u l l standards should correspond w i t h those e s t a b l i s h e d i n Appendix B of the Port of Vancouver's Second Narrows MRA Standing Orders, dated 1 December 1981 (See Se c t i o n 4.2.2., p. 100 of t h i s t h e s i s ) . R a t i o n a l e : Mandatory tug escort requirements are common to a l l of the American and c o n t i n e n t a l European gas port examined. The a v a i l a b i l i t y of adequately powered and h i g h l y manoeuvrable tug escorts could prove i n v a l u a b l e i n various emergency s i t u a t i o n s which could a r i s e during the harbour t r a n s i t of a gas c a r r i e r . Among the most p l a u s i b l e emergency events i n which tug a s s i s t a n c e could be b e n e f i c i a l would 151 be l o s s of s t e e r i n g , l o s s of power or a gas tanker being placed on a c o l l i s i o n course w i t h another v e s s e l or o b s t a c l e . C. Speed R e s t r i c t i o n s Except under emergency circumstances, as determined by the master or p i l o t , loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d LPG and LNG c a r r i e r s operating w i t h i n the mandatory escort area (as described i n Recommendation "B"), should maintain a speed not i n excess of 6 knots, e x c l u s i v e of those areas i n the port where lower maximum speed l i m i t s are i n f o r c e . R a t i o n a l e ; The proposed 6 knot maximum speed requirement, l i k e the proposed tug escort requirement l i s t e d i n Recommendation "B", i s a d i r e c t extension of the standards c u r r e n t l y i n place f o r the Second Narrows MRA. In t h i s regard, the tug escort and v e s s e l speed l i m i t standards are compatible w i t h one another i n order to ensure optimum esc o r t e f f e c t i v e n e s s . I t i s acknowledged that the maximum safe operating speed f o r a l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r (under e s c o r t ) i n the open harbour might reasonably be higher than f o r the r e s t r i c t e d Second Narrows area. However, power requirements f o r attending tugs l i s t e d i n Recommendation "B" would have to be amended a c c o r d i n g l y i n order f o r the escort to remain e f f e c t i v e at higher speeds, as i t would r e q u i r e g r e a t e r energy to e i t h e r stop or change the heading on a large t r a v e l l i n g at a speed of 8 knots than i t would f o r the same v e s s e l t r a v e l l i n g at 6 knots. 152 I t i s suggested that the i s s u e of e s t a b l i s h i n g appropriate long-term tug escort and speed l i m i t requirements (Recommendations "B" and "C") should be afforded p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n by the J o i n t T e c h n i c a l Committee (described i n Recommendation "H"). D. Inner Anchorage Moorage No ve s s e l s should be permitted to moor at Inner Anchorages A through E, Port of Vancouver, during e i t h e r the inbound or outbound passage of a loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r . R a t i o n a l e : The existence of moored deepsea ves s e l s i n the midst of the main harbour area of the Port of Vancouver represents an unnecessary impediment to the safe n a v i g a t i o n of a large gas tanker. Through proper scheduling, i t should be p o s s i b l e to ensure t h a t Inner Anchorages A through E w i l l remain vacant during the main harbour passage of deepsea gas c a r r i e r s , thereby e l i m i n a t i n g a p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t to ship s a f e t y . E. Safety Zone Loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s t r a n s i t t i n g the port should do so w i t h i n a moving s a f e t y zone i n order to avoid p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous c r o s s i n g or passing s i t u a t i o n s w i t h other l a r g e v e s s e l s . The s a f e t y zone should extend three kilometres ahead of the gas c a r r i e r , and two kilometres a s t e r n at a l l times. No other v e s s e l s underway i n the port would be permitted to encroach upon t h i s s a f e t y zone. Outside the s a f e t y zone, v e s s e l s i n excess of 100 gross tons would not be allowed to t r a n s i t the harbour 153 during the passage of a gas c a r r i e r without the expressed permission of the Harbour Master. R a t i o n a l e : The i m p o s i t i o n of a moving s a f e t y zone would s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduce the l i k e l i h o o d of a c o l l i s i o n i n v o l v i n g the gas c a r r i e r and another l a r g e v e s s e l w i t h i n the confines of the harbour, e s p e c i a l l y i n high speed c r o s s i n g and (oncoming) passing s i t u a t i o n s . Furthermore, i n the event of another large v e s s e l a c c i d e n t a l l y encroaching upon the s a f e t y zone, the gas c a r r i e r , along with i t s attendant tug e s c o r t , would l i k e l y be afforded s u f f i c i e n t opportunity to manoeuvre out of danger. The moving sa f e t y zone has an added economic advantage over a t o t a l harbour c l o s u r e (such as that which i s imposed f o r the Los Angeles Main Channel during the passage of loaded gas c a r r i e r s ) i n that i t w i l l have l i t t l e e f f e c t upon t r a f f i c proceeding i n the same d i r e c t i o n as the gas c a r r i e r . Oncoming v e s s e l s could be disadvantaged to a somewhat greater degree should they wish to enter port during the outbound passage of a loaded gas c a r r i e r . I t i s suggested, however, that such inconveniences could be kept to a minimum, i f not e l i m i n a t e d e n t i r e l y , w i t h proper v e s s e l movement scheduling. F. NHB Escort The Harbour Master's O f f i c e should a s s i g n a p a t r o l v e s s e l to accompany loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s w h i le underway w i t h i n the mandatory escort area (as described i n Recommendation "B"). The NHB escort would be expected to take up normal s t a t i o n s e v e r a l hundred metres ahead of the gas c a r r i e r . 154 R a t i o n a l e ; The NHB escort would be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r ensuring the i n t e g r i t y of the moving sa f e t y zone, and f o r e n f o r c i n g a l l other v e s s e l t r a f f i c r e g u l a t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to the safe passage of the gas c a r r i e r . In the event of a s e r i o u s , or p o t e n t i a l l y s e r i o u s , s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g aboard the gas c a r r i e r , the master of the escort v e s s e l would be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o n t a c t i n g the Harbour Master immediately, and f o r p r o v i d i n g s t r i c t t r a f f i c c o n t r o l and other a s s i s t a n c e i n the v i c i n i t y of the gas c a r r i e r , as r e q u i r e d . G. A i r c r a f t R e s t r i c t i o n s The Harbour Master's O f f i c e should n o t i f y the harbour a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l centre at l e a s t 24 hours i n advance of any scheduled t r a n s i t of Burrard I n l e t by a loaded or p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d gas c a r r i e r . No seaplane l a n d i n g / t a k e o f f s should be permitted u n t i l the gas tanker i s at l e a s t two kilometres past the designated a i r c r a f t movement area. Furthermore, no a i r c r a f t should be permitted to f l y w i t h i n a 1000 metre radius of any loaded, p a r t i a l l y - l o a d e d , or unloaded l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r , e i t h e r moving or s t a t i o n a r y . R a t i o n a l e : S t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g a i r c r a f t movements w i t h i n the Port of Vancouver have been c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n recent years by s e v e r a l serious accidents and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a separate a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l centre f o r the harbour p r e c i n c t . Given the extensive amount of a i r c r a f t a c t i v i t y i n the port area, combined w i t h the f a c t that l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s engaged i n the t r a n s i t of the harbour must encroach upon 155 a c t i v e seaplane l a n d i n g / t a k e - o f f zones, the p o s s i b i l i t y of a serious a i r p l a n e or h e l i c o p t e r accident i n v o l v i n g a gas c a r r i e r cannot be discounted. I t i s therefore concluded that the i m p o s i t i o n and enforcement of more s t r i n g e n t , but r e a d i l y manageable, a i r c r a f t movement r e s t r i c t i o n s as described i n Recommendation "G" w i l l serve to enhance the o v e r a l l l e v e l of p u b l i c s a f e t y i n the port p r e c i n c t . H. Review and Implementation The recommended operating requirements "A" through "G" should be brought i n t o force immediately on an i n t e r i m basis under the a u t h o r i t y of the Harbour Master's Standing Orders. Subsequent to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of these proposed i n t e r i m measures, a J o i n t T e c h n i c a l Committee comprised of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board, the Canadian Coast Guard, the P a c i f i c P i l o t a g e A u t h o r i t y , the towboat i n d u s t r y , and the marine d i v i s i o n of the Vancouver F i r e Department should be formed f o r the purpose of: i ) reviewing and, as necessary, amending Recommendations "A" through "G"; i i ) preparing a d e t a i l e d LPG/LNG tanker operations plan, based upon the U.S. Coast Guard model; and i i i ) e s t a b l i s h i n g a comprehensive LPG/LNG emergency response p l a n f o r the Port of Vancouver. R a t i o n a l e : Recommendations "A" through "G" represent a p r e l i m i n a r y attempt to upgrade gas tanker s a f e t y requirements i n the Port of Vancouver to a widely recognized - and g e n e r a l l y accepted - world standard f o r urban gas p o r t s . Nevertheless, while the b a s i c concept inherent i n each recommendation i s , from the p e r s p e c t i v e of the research, e s s e n t i a l l y i n v i o l a t e , i t i s acknowledged that the s p e c i f i c terms of 156 t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l a p p l i c a t i o n , as e s t a b l i s h e d i n S e c t i o n 6.1, could, under c e r t a i n circumstances, be open to v a r y i n g degrees of p r o f e s s i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , while the i m p o s i t i o n of a mandatory tug escort requirement i s common to a l l of the American and c o n t i n e n t a l European gas ports examined, the composition of the escort and the minimum power r a t i n g s f o r attending tugs d i f f e r markedly from one port to the next. This i s evident upon a b r i e f examination of tug escort requirement as they would apply to the 40 000 cubic metre c a p a c i t y , 29 800 dwt N i c h i z a n Maru i n four North American gas p o r t s : # of B o l l a r d Tug Secured Port Tugs H.P. P u l l to LPG c a r r i e r Boston 3 2 @ 3000 H.P. 1 @ 1200 H.P. u n s p e c i f i e d u n s p e c i f i e d no Los Angeles 2 u n s p e c i f i e d u n s p e c i f i e d yes P h i l a d e l p h i a 1 u n s p e c i f i e d u n s p e c i f i e d no Vancouver* 2 2 @ 900 H.P. 15.0 T each no S i m i l a r l y , gas c a r r i e r speed r e s t r i c t i o n s at these ports vary as f o l l o w s : •Assumes a p p l i c a t i o n of e x i s t i n g Second Narrows MRA standards 157 Boston Los Angeles P h i l a d e l p h i a Vancouver* Port Maximum Speed 8 knots ? 10 knots 6 knots * Assumes a p p l i c a t i o n of e x i s t i n g Second Narrows MRA standards. Given the t e c h n i c a l complexity of the debate, i t i s concluded that the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r e f i n i n g the long-term gas c a r r i e r operating speed and tug escort standards f o r the Port of Vancouver must r e s t with a competent committee of marine p r o f e s s i o n a l s who are f u l l y conversant w i t h the problem. The i n t e r i m standards, as described i n Recommendations "B" and "C", would remain i n f o r c e , subject to the review f i n d i n g s and conclusions of the J o i n t T e c h n i c a l Committee. The p r e p a r a t i o n of a d e t a i l e d operations plan and emergency response plan would be expected to evolve l o g i c a l l y from the j u s t - d e s c r i b e d p r e l i m i n a r y standard upgrading process. 6.2 Supplementary Observations/Recommendations L i q u e f i e d gas tanker safety i s only one of many dangerous commodity-related is s u e s i n v o l v i n g the Port of Vancouver which have yet to be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y r e s o l v e d . For example, the port has experienced a marked increase i n the frequency of v i s i t s by " p a r c e l " chemical tankers since the inauguration of Dow Chemical's new Lynnterm f a c i l i t y i n North Vancouver during 1980. An average of between one and two chemical tankers now c a l l i n t o Vancouver every week. The term " p a r c e l " tanker a p p l i e s to vess e l s which have been s p e c i f i c a l l y designed to ca r r y s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t chemicals at once i n small consignments, 158 or p a r c e l s . The 31 000 dwt L i b e r l a n tankers S t o l t S i n c e r i t y and S t o l t P r i d e , both of which are o c c a s i o n a l v i s i t o r s to the Port of Vancouver are capable of accommodating upwards of 40 separate chemicals i n bulk l i q u i d form.^ Under c e r t a i n circumstances, and depending upon the nature, volume, and array of chemical substances on board, i t i s conceivable that a serious harbour accident i n v o l v i n g a chemical tanker could present as great a threat to p u b l i c s a f e t y as that posed by a gas tanker f i r e or e x p l o s i o n . Furthermore, si n c e there Is no set cargo mix of chemicals from one tanker to the next, emergency response forces would be hard-pressed to i d e n t i f y and implement the optimum contingency plan i n the event of an a c c i d e n t . Despite the preceding concerns, l o c a l r e g u l a t i o n s governing the movement of chemical tankers i n the port tend to be l e s s s t r i n g e n t than those which p e r t a i n to l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s . For i n s t a n c e , the "d a y l i g h t passage" requirement which has been a p p l i e d to gas tankers f o r a number of years i s r o u t i n e l y waived f o r chemical tankers. I t i s not uncommon f o r loaded chemical c a r r i e r s to depart the harbour a f t e r darkness and without the b e n e f i t of a proper tug e s c o r t . Yet another s i g n i f i c a n t area of l o c a l concern, and one which has taken on i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l overtones of l a t e , i n v o l v e s the s i t i n g of t e r m i n a l f a c i l i t i e s designed to handle hazardous m a t e r i a l s . The te r m i n a l s i t i n g issue came to a head i n February of 1980 f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c r elease of a c o n f i d e n t i a l study c h r o n i c l i n g many of the p o t e n t i a l dangers associated w i t h the Canadian O c c i d e n t a l Petroleum (Hooker Chemical D i v i s i o n ) c h l o r i n e p l a n t and the nearby Erco I n d u s t r i e s sodium c h l o r a t e production f a c i l i t y i n North Vancouver. 6 A subsequent report prepared f o r North Vancouver D i s t r i c t 159 c o u n c i l by volunteer members of the Community Hazards Task Force i n November of 1980 i s o l a t e d f u r t h e r s a f e t y inadequacies a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the production and shipment of hazardous m a t e r i a l s on the North Shore of Burrard I n l e t , and recommended "...that the municipal government, i n concert w i t h the f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments, seek a means by which the Canadian Oxy f a c i l i t y can be r e l o c a t e d from the North Shore." 7 The Canadian Oc c i d e n t a l i s s u e , however, i s only part of a much l a r g e r dilemma. In s p i t e of l o c a l e f f o r t s to have the Canadian O c c i d e n t a l operation removed from the community the f a c t remains that the hazardous m a t e r i a l s trade w i t h i n the port p r e c i n c t - and e s p e c i a l l y on the North Shore - has increased d r a m a t i c a l l y i n recent months. The 1980 completion of Dow Chemical's new ethylene d i c h l o r i d e storage t e r m i n a l l e s s than a kilo m e t r e to the west of the c o n t r o v e r s i a l Canadian Oc c i d e n t a l plant i s a t y p i c a l case i n p o i n t . In a r e l a t e d matter, on 22 December 1980 North Vancouver D i s t r i c t c o u n c i l approved the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a new 18 m i l l i o n l i t r e c a p a c i t y methanol storage tank at the Vancouver Wharves s i t e near the harbour entrance. The new tank augments Vancouver Wharves' e x i s t i n g 27 m i l l i o n l i t r e methanol storage c a p a c i t y on the property. By coincidence, the a p p l i c a t i o n was approved by c o u n c i l the same day a rai l w a y tankcar c o n t a i n i n g methanol - a l i g h t , inflammable, and t o x i c l i q u i d - caught f i r e f o l l o w i n g an accident at B r i t i s h Columbia Railway's main sw i t c h i n g yard i n North Vancouver, not f a r from the Vancouver Wharves t e r m i n a l . 8 Land use c o n f l i c t s a l s o f i g u r e prominently i n the te r m i n a l s i t i n g i s s u e . This i s e s p e c i a l l y true at Trans Mountain P i p e l i n e ' s Westridge terminal i n 160 Burnaby, where the nearest homes are s i t u a t e d w i t h i n 150 metres of the LPG storage tanks. In the event of a major u n c o n t r o l l e d propane f i r e or ex p l o s i o n at the t e r m i n a l , there i s every reason to b e l i e v e that the saf e t y of those persons r e s i d i n g on or near the western and southern perimetres of the Westridge s i t e would be placed i n serious jeopardy. Westridge i s by no means unique i n t h i s regard. In f a c t , a number of gas terminals i n other parts of the world, i n c l u d i n g Boston (LNG and LPG), Los Angeles (LPG), and Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. (LNG) are s i t u a t e d w i t h i n 500 metres of s e t t l e d areas. However, i n l i g h t of increased p u b l i c concern over the l i q u e f i e d gas storage i s s u e , i t i s u n l i k e l y that any new te r m i n a l proponents would e i t h e r wish, or be permitted, to l o c a t e i n the midst of a populated community. Recent experience at both Cove P o i n t , Maryland and E l b a I s l a n d , Georgia where the new LNG r e c e i v i n g terminals are s i t u a t e d s e v e r a l kilometres from the nearest s e t t l e d areas, tends to support t h i s observation. Michael B e l l , president of M e l v i l l e s h i p p i n g , the marine component of the A r c t i c P i l o t P r o j e c t , f u r t h e r adds that " . . . i f you had (a gas s p i l l ) here i n Montreal and i t caught a l i g h t , people would run f o r t h e i r l i v e s ; but our approach i s that there i s no bloody way we are going to have a ( l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas) t e r m i n a l near a major population c e n t r e . " y U n f o r t u n a t e l y , u n l i k e the newer terminals i n Europe and the United S t a t e s , the land use i n t e r f a c e at Westridge i s w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d and, over the medium term at l e a s t , l a r g e l y i r r e v e r s i b l e . P r o h i b i t i v e l e g a l and f i n a n c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s would almost c e r t a i n l y preclude any attempt on the part of the government to e i t h e r c l o s e down the Westridge operation prematurely, or to impose upon Trans Mountain P i p e l i n e a s p e c i a l requirement c a l l i n g f o r the c r e a t i o n of a p u b l i c s a f e t y zone around the t e r m i n a l - that i s , assuming the 161 minimum acceptable dimensions of such a b u f f e r zone could be reasonably e s t a b l i s h e d . In the meantime, though, Trans Mountain and other l o c a l firms engaged i n the l a r g e volume production, storage, and handling of hazardous m a t e r i a l s must be encouraged to improve upon a l l aspects ,of emergency response planning, ranging from the upgrading of e x i s t i n g accident d e t e c t i o n systems to the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new and more e f f e c t i v e s p i l l containment and f i r e c o n t r o l t e c h n o l o g i e s . Furthermore, companies such as Trans Mountain, Canadian O c c i d e n t a l , Dow Chemical and others w i l l have to take a more a c t i v e p o s i t i o n on the matter of both informing the community as to the nature of the products being handled and to the emergency response procedures which must be observed by members of the p u b l i c i n the event of a serious plant accident. In t h i s respect, a broad-based p u b l i c education program designed to advise the average c i t i z e n as to h i s / h e r r o l e w i t h i n the context of s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t d i s a s t e r scenarios i n v o l v i n g hazardous m a t e r i a l s should be j o i n t l y prepared by government and i n d u s t r y , and made a v a i l a b l e to the general p u b l i c on a r e g u l a r b a s i s . The t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of hazardous m a t e r i a l s by road and r a i l , too, continues to present l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s with a number of l a r g e l y unresolved p u b l i c s a f e t y concerns. In s p i t e of attempts on the part of many r e g i o n a l agencies to upgrade the q u a l i t y of r e g u l a t i o n s governing the movement of v e h i c l e s t r a n s -p o r t i n g s p e c i f i e d dangerous goods - e s p e c i a l l y since the September 1978 c h l o r i n e s p i l l on Main Street - there would appear to e x i s t considerable room f o r f u r t h e r improvement. In recent months, Greater Vancouver has experienced s e v e r a l s e r i o u s motor v e h i c l e accidents i n v o l v i n g such m a t e r i a l s as oxygen and acetylene, propane, naphtha, and c a u s t i c soda.-*-0 162 The circumstances surrounding the r e g u l a t o r y c o n t r o l of r a i l t r a f f i c d i f f e r markedly from those a f f e c t i n g motor v e h i c l e s . Railway transport i s governed l a r g e l y by the f e d e r a l Railway Act and the N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n A c t . A c c o r d i n g l y , l o c a l l e v e l s of government e x e r c i s e l i t t l e j u r i s d i c a t i o n over the r a i l movement of dangerous goods through populated communities. To b e t t e r i l l u s t r a t e t h i s , the C i t y of Vancouver has, on s e v e r a l occasions i n recent years, attempted to convince the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway to abandon the p r a c t i c e of s t o r i n g r a i l c a r s laden w i t h hazardous m a t e r i a l s along the c i t y ' s downtown w a t e r f r o n t . ^ Nevertheless, on any given day one can s t i l l f i n d a wide range of tankcars c a r r y i n g c o r r o s i v e s , l i q u e f i e d gases, and other t o x i c m a t e r i a l s which are completely incompatible w i t h adjacent high d e n s i t y urban commercial and r e s i d e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s . A s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s on the north shore of Burrard I n l e t , although on a somewhat l e s s dramatic s c a l e , as the p h y s i c a l separation between the r a i l y a r d s and the c l o s e s t high d e n s i t y population centres i s g e n e r a l l y g r e a t e r than on the south (downtown) side of the I n l e t . Even so, at l e a s t four separate r a i l accidents i n v o l v i n g ethylene d i c h l o r i d e (26 March), c a u s t i c soda (25 J u l y ) , anhydrous ammonia (18 September), and methanol (22 December) were reported on the North Shore during 1980.I 2 The l a s t i n c i d e n t , i n which a tankcar loaded w i t h h i g h l y inflammable methanol caught f i r e during a switching a c c i d e n t , was of p a r t i c u l a r concern to emergency crews i n that i t occurred i n c l o s e p r o x i m i t y to another car c o n t a i n i n g L P G . l 3 Although the LPG tanker was subsequently removed from the danger zone, the methanol f i r e d i d spread to f i v e other cars c o n t a i n i n g pulp and paper. In view of the ever i n c r e a s i n g volumes of hazardous m a t e r i a l s being shipped by r a i l through North Shore communities, there i s 163 l i t t l e reason to b e l i e v e that the frequency of accidents i n v o l v i n g dangerous chemicals w i l l d i m i n i s h i n coming years unless dramatic new measures are introduced to c o n t r o l the s i t u a t i o n . The N i c h i z a n Maru represents but a s i n g l e element i n the o v e r a l l LPG p r o d u c t i o n / d e l i v e r y chain. As such, i t i s a comparatively simple task to i d e n t i f y and implement e f f e c t i v e measures to improve the l e v e l of o p e r a t i o n a l s a f e t y f o r that p a r t i c u l a r v e s s e l w i t h i n the port p r e c i n c t . The problem of upgrading the general l e v e l of s a f e t y w i t h i n the broad context of the e n t i r e hazardous m a t e r i a l s trade i n the Port of Vancouver, on the other hand, i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y more complex. L o c a l l y , the s i t u a t i o n has been allowed to d e t e r i o r a t e i n the face of such v a r i a b l e s as badly fragmented l e g i s l a t i o n , confused and oft e n c o n f l i c t i n g l i n e s of government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , a lack of common p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n and c o - o r d i n a t i o n at a l l l e v e l s of government and among member m u n i c i p a l i t i e s w i t h i n the Greater Vancouver Regional D i s t r i c t , and sometimes questionable p r o j e c t e v a l u a t i o n and approvals processes. In the continued absence of a comprehensive s t r a t e g i c plan which has been s p e c i f i c a l l y designed to both i d e n t i f y and re s o l v e hazardous m a t e r i a l s - r e l a t e d concerns before they have had an opportunity to become entrenched, the community w i l l be forced i n t o a p o s i t i o n of having to react to serious events only a f t e r they have occurred. The Japan E r i c a i n c i d e n t , while not i n v o l v i n g hazardous m a t e r i a l s , i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the r e a c t i v e philosophy c u r r e n t l y adhered to by many l o c a l r e g u l a t o r y bodies. While i t i s beyond the scope and t e c h n i c a l c a p a c i t y of t h i s report to address these and other dangerous m a t e r i a l s issues i n d e t a i l , i t i s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , recommended that the f o l l o w i n g measures should be i n s t i t u t e d at an e a r l y date i n order to e s t a b l i s h the e s s e n t i a l d e c i s i o n making framework f o r the purpose 164 of improving the r e g u l a t i o n of the hazardous m a t e r i a l s trade i n the Port of Vancouver: a) A fe d e r a l l y - s p o n s o r e d enquiry commission comprised of recognized experts i n the f i e l d s of managing and r e g u l a t i n g the production, storage, and t r a n s f e r of hazardous m a t e r i a l s , and vested with the a u t h o r i t y to subpoena witnesses and documents as r e q u i r e d , should be appointed f o r the purpose of i n v e s t i g a t i n g a l l aspects of p u b l i c s a f e t y i n the port as they r e l a t e to the l o c a l dangerous goods trade. The commission would be responsible f o r : i ) i d e n t i f y i n g areas of immediate concern to p u b l i c s a f e t y , and e s t a b l i s h i n g s u i t a b l e s h o r t - and long-term response s t r a t e g i e s f o r e i t h e r m i t i g a t i n g or e l i m i n a t i n g the associated element of p u b l i c r i s k ; i i ) i s o l a t i n g d e f i c i e n c i e s w i t h i n the e x i s t i n g r e g u l a t o r y s t r u c t u r e , and recommending appropriate measures designed to make the reg u l a t o r y process both more responsive and re s p o n s i b l e ; and i i i ) c a t e g o r i z i n g hazardous m a t e r i a l s and the various o p e r a t i o n a l components as s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e i r production, storage, and t r a n s f e r on the basis of the l e v e l of inherent r i s k to the general p u b l i c , and i s o l a t i n g those m a t e r i a l s and/or operations which, i n the opinion of the committee, are judged to possess a s u f f i c i e n t l y high hazard p o t e n t i a l to render them both incompatible w i t h more conventional urban f u n c t i o n s , and ther e f o r e unacceptable w i t h i n the context of t h e i r e x i s t i n g geographical s e t t i n g s . The enquiry process should be open to the general p u b l i c , and should i n c l u d e adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r re p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the p u b l i c at l a r g e to voice t h e i r concerns on any relevant aspect of the hazardous m a t e r i a l s i s s u e s . b) A j o i n t l y - s p o n s o r e d f e d e r a l / p r o v i n c i a l task f o r c e comprised of se n i o r government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and designed to work i n close conjunction w i t h the enquiry commission described i n "a" (above), i n d u s t r y o f f i c i a l s , and appropriate p u b l i c i n t e r e s t groups should be formed i n order to e s t a b l i s h a r a t i o n a l , v i a b l e , and mutually acceptable r e l o c a t i o n s t r a t e g y and time schedule f o r those operations described i n " a - i i i " ( a b o v e ) as being incompatible with conventional urban f u n c t i o n s . Included w i t h i n the task force terms of reference should be the p r o v i s i o n f o r i d e n t i f y i n g s u i t a b l e a l t e r n a t e l o c a t i o n s on the coast which more a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e f l e c t such fundamental s i t i n g c r i t e r i a f o r these p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i a l f u n c t i o n s as p h y s i c a l remoteness from centres of popula t i o n , seismic s t a b i l i t y , and sa f e , economical road, sea, and r a i l access. 165 In the i n t e r e s t of improving the l e v e l of maritime safety i n the Port of Vancouver, the f e d e r a l M i n i s t e r of Transport should examine the f e a s i b i l i t y / p r a c t i c a l i t y of: i ) t r a n s f e r r i n g the p o s i t i o n and duties of the O f f i c e of the Harbour Master, Port of Vancouver, from the N a t i o n a l Harbours Board to the Canadian Coast Guard i n order to c o n s o l i d a t e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r both c o a s t a l and harbour marine s a f e t y under the auspices of a s i n g l e agency, and to thereby remove any p u b l i c doubt over p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s i t u a t i o n s a r i s i n g between the marketing and s a f e t y concerns of the NHB; and i i ) i n t r o d u c i n g a compulsory r e p o r t i n g system whereby a l l v e s s e l s i n excess of 20 metres i n l e n g t h , and a l l tugs with tows, would, at various designated points w i t h i n the harbour, be required to advise the Vessel T r a f f i c Centre by ra d i o as to t h e i r p o s i t i o n , speed, d e s t i n a t i o n , or any other p e r t i n e n t i n f o r m a t i o n requested by the Coast Guard. In view of the f a c t that the Port of Vancouver operates on a 24-hour per day b a s i s , and given that the O f f i c e of the Harbour Master i s the f o c a l point f o r the c o - o r d i n a t i o n of shipping operations and marine emergency response procedures w i t h i n the harbour, an o f f i c e r of at l e a s t the rank of A s s i s t a n t Harbour Master should be on duty at a l l times. Federal and p r o v i n c i a l p r o j e c t review c a p a b i l i t i e s should be expanded and strengthened to ensure that a l l high impact p o t e n t i a l development proposals i n v o l v i n g hazardous m a t e r i a l s are subjected to a d e t a i l e d s o c i a l and environmental impact a n a l y s i s , and that the p u b l i c w i l l be guaranteed an opportunity to provide input i n t o any of these proposals through the i n s t i t u t i o n of a compulsory hearings process p r i o r to government p r o j e c t approval being awarded. For a l l l i q u e f i e d gas c a r r i e r s i n excess of 5000 cubic metres c a p a c i t y , and a l l bulk chemical tankers i n excess of 5000 tons dwt, the O f f i c e of the Harbour Master should provide a d e t a i l e d manifest of cargo to be loaded or unloaded i n the Port of Vancouver to the f o l l o w i n g agencies: i ) Canadian Coast Guard: •Regional Marine Emergency O f f i c e •Vessel T r a f f i c Management Centre i i ) C i t y of Vancouver: • F i r e Department •Emergency O f f i c e i i i ) Burnaby Fire Department iv) North Vancouver D i s t r i c t F i r e Department v) North Vancouver City Fire Department v i ) Port Moody F i r e Department v i i ) West Vancouver F i r e Department The required information should be forwarded to the above-noted agencies at least 24 hours prior to the a r r i v a l of the gas or chemical c a r r i e r at the Port of Vancouver. F i g u r e 6.1 LPG C a r r i e r Yamahide Maru at Westridge T e r m i n a l 1 6 7 FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 6.0 1 van der L i n d e , op. c i t . , , p. 140 2 Based upon telephone i n t e r v i e w w i t h L t . G r e n i e r , USCG Marine Safety O f f i c e , Providence, R l , 5 September 1980. 3 L e t t e r from K.A. Rock, USCG Marine Safety O f f i c e , Boston to J . Marston, undated ( c i r c a 31 August 1982). 4 L e t t e r from Capt. D.B. Charter, Captain of the P o r t , P h i l a d e l p h i a , d/16 August 1982. 5 H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , The Tanker R e g i s t e r - 1980 (London: H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , 1980). 6 "North Van ends 20-month blackout on Beak r e p o r t " , The Vancouver Sun, 26 February 1980, p. A3; and Beak Consultants, op. c i t . 7 Community Hazards Task Force, F i n a l Report (North Vancouver: a report commissioned by the D i s t r i c t of North Vancouver, November 1980, p. 30. 8 "Methanol Storage Okayed", The Vancouver Sun, 23 December 1980; "Chemical f i r e c loses bridge", The Vancouver Sun, 23 December 1980; and "Methanol: F i r s t the f i r e , next comes bulk storage", (North Shore) Sunday  News, 28 December 1980, p. A3. y "LNG tankers to smash through i c e " , The Vancouver Sun, 19 November 1980, p. A18. 10 "Deadly tank t r a i l e r c o r r a l l e d " , The Vancouver Sun, 18 November 1981; "Eleven Chemical s p i l l s i n 1980", North Shore News, 25 March 1981; and "Vancouver Firemen..." The Vancouver Sun, photo c a p t i o n , 30 A p r i l 1981, p. 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Business Week, "Dangerous cargo r u l e s change ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' , " 5 September 1979. D a i l y Commercial News, "LNG p r o j e c t would create 700 jobs," 24 February 1977. , "U.S. s i t e s under study f o r Tenneco p r o j e c t , " 19 J u l y 1977. Calgary H e r a l d , "500 f l e e t o x i c t r a i n f i r e , " 1 March 1982. F i n a n c i a l Times of Canada, "Environmental fears pose biggest b a r r i e r to Saint John p l a n , " 17 January 1977. , " L i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas: U.S. t a k i n g a hard l i n e , " 17 January 1977. Lloyd's L i s t . London: numerous e d i t i o n s between 1974 and 1982. Los Angeles Times, "Tanker scheduled to b r i n g second LPG shipment," c i r c a December 1978. North Shore News, "Hooker may be here 10 years - task f o r c e , " 15 October 1980. , "A community s i t t i n g on a time bomb," 19 November 1980. , "Chemical storage ban looms," 17 December 1980. , "Hooker to i n v e s t $14 M i n NV p l a n t , " 17 December 1980. , "Eleven chemical s p i l l s i n 1980," 25 March 1981. , " B l a s t closed down NV p l a n t , " 17 June 1981. , "Hazards clean-up given green l i g h t , " 21 October 1981. , " F i r e Chief demands c h l o r i n e answers," 5 May 1982. _, " B e l l wants a c t i o n on moving Hooker," 6 June 1982. , "Dangerous goods bylaw f i n a l l y adopted", 16 June 1982. 175 North Shore Sunday News, "Beak Bared," 2 March 1980. , "Methanol: F i r s t the f i r e , next comes bulk storage,' 28 December 1980. , "Hooker r e l o c a t i o n - i t ' s d e c i s i o n time," 11 January 1981. , "Sea Bus rams minesweeper," 18 January 1981. The C i t i z e n (North Shore), "Dow chemical plant 'safe'," 28 March 1979. The C o u r i e r , "Dow's b u i l d i n g a new t e r m i n a l , " 27 March 1979. The Kamloops News, "5 cars s t i l l l e a k i n g , " 5 March 1982. , "Safety r e g u l a t i o n s f o r transport of dangerous goods l a c k i n g , " 5 March 1982. The Province "Chlorine gas cloud i n c i t y sends 32 to h o s p i t a l , " 26 September 1978. "'Gas bomb' scare ends as tanker r i g h t e d , " 26 September 1979. "Ships w i l l defer to t r a i n s , " 13 February 1980. "Coastguards blame skipper i n CN bridge crash," 14 February 1980. February "Four run f o r l i v e s a f t e r t r a i n a c c i d e n t , " 30 August 1978. "North Shore people 'trapped' i f c h l o r i n e s p i l l e d , " 15 February 1980. "Bridge safeguards urged," 17 February 1980. "Chlorine threat leads to review of d i s a s t e r p l a n , " 27 1980. " V o l r i c h ' s 'time bomb' plan b l a s t e d , " 27 February 1980. "The chemical bombs," 29 February 1980. "Near-misses plague Second Narrows," 11 March 1980. "Last d i t c h b i d to save f i r e b o a t , " 27 May 1980. 176 November 1981. 18 Octobe 1981. 24 March ' C i t i z e n s ' group seeks c h l o r i n e plant s h i f t , " 21 J u l y 1980. 'Town deserted a f t e r t r a i n derailment," 28 J u l y 1980. 'Gas plants proposed," 4 November 1980. 'New poignance i n Remembrance Day f o r Missis s a u g a , " 10 1980. 'Lesson of Mississauga l o s t on the government," 25 January 'Seared ship reached port only to h i t bottom," 6 August 1981. 'Ra i l chemical s p i l l f orces evacuation," 27 August 1981. "Death ship was 'an i n f e r n o ' , " 27 August 1981. 'Washington wreck c a l l e d 'a p o t e n t i a l bomb'," 7 October 1981. S p i l l breeds confusion," 8 October 1981. F r e i g h t e r d r i f t e d out i n t o harbour a f t e r l i n e s broke," • 1981. Co u n c i l advised to put the whip to CP R a i l g i a n t , " 30 October Mega-bids chase gas s u p p l i e s , " 3 December 1981. Regulations exempt Kingcombe," 3 December 1981. Smoke f i l l s a i r as t r a i n d e r a i l s , " 11 January 1982. CPR h i t by two upsets," 1 March 1982. Proposed f e r t i l i z e r plant ' w i l l produce cancer agent'," 1982. '400 pr o t e s t gas plant p l a n , " 2 A p r i l 1982. 'LNG plant f o r loco on ho l d , " 18 A p r i l 1982. 'Runaway cars s t i l l burning," 28 June 1982. 'Japanese win nod f o r Dome," 16 J u l y 1982. _, "Dome deal faces NEB s c r u t i n y , " 18 J u l y 1982. The Vancouver Sun, "34 feared l o s t i n f i e r y ship e x p l o s i o n , 9 November 1974. August 1978. " V o l r i c h c a l l s f o r s t r i c t curbs as gas f e l l s 78," 26 September 1978. October October January 1980. 1980. harbour 1980. 1980. "Natural gas accident 'improbable'," 24 May 1977. "Tanker loses s t e e r i n g , " 27 November 1977. "'Damn lucky i t didn't blow', say crew on propane t r a i n , " 29 J u l y 1980. "Why was a ship wandering i n the fog, t e r m i n a l men ask," 16 1979. "Navigation r u l e s tightened i n c r i p p l e d r a i l bridge area," 17 1979. "Payload turns tanker i n t o f l o a t i n g bomb," 14 November 1979. "Most dangerous i n Canada," 27 November 1979. "Tanker on the rocks," 21 January 1980. "Coast guard report blames c a p t a i n f o r bridge damage," 26 1980. "Harbor n e a r - c o l l i s i o n i n v e s t i g a t e d , " 12 February 1980. "Decision to s a i l i n fog 'not good seamanship'," 13 February "Chemical report r a i s e s f u r o r e , " 18 February 1980. "'68 could p e r i s h ' i n c h l o r i n e s p i l l " 26 February 1980. "North Van ends 20-month blackout on Beak Report," 26 February "Hooker plant probe urged," 27 February 1980. "Burnaby r e s i d e n t s f e a r f u l of c h l o r i n e s p i l l , " 1 March 1980. "Japan E r i c a A f f a i r - I n i t s wake many questions surface on acc i d e n t s , " 13 March 1980. "Harbor t r a f f i c faces new r u l e s to pr o t e c t bridge," 13 March "Tug escorts ' w i l l r a i s e ' c ost of Narrows t r a n s i t s , " 25 March "Waterfront evacuated i n gas scare," 6 May 1980. " P r a i r i e town emptied twice as gas tank rupture feared," 28 178 1980. "Four c a u s t i c soda tankers d e r a i l , " 25 J u l y 1980. " L i f e i n New York...," 8 August 1980 (photo c a p t i o n , p. A8). "Fear of in f e r n o i n Vancouver haunts experts," 2 September "Warning: Overdue f o r D i s a s t e r , " 23 October 1980. "Accident t h r e a t , chemicals draw scenario of t e r r o r , " 23 October 1980. "Residents f e a r signs i n shadow of p l a n t , " 23 October 1980. "Dome plans $2.8 b i l l i o n LNG plan t f o r B.C.," 27 October "B.C. shipyards 'can't b u i l d ' LNG tankers," 28 October 1980. "LNG exp l o s i o n has k i l l f a c t o r second only to 'nuclear holocaust'," 29 October 1980. "$2 b i l l i o n petrochemical plant set f o r B.C.," 3 November 1980. 1980. deadly 1980. December " A r c t i c gas p r o j e c t gets environmental nod," 7 November 1980. "Cargo has a c i t y h o l d i n g i t s breath," 15 November 1980. "Plans f o r $2 b i l l i o n gas plant bared," 17 November 1980. "Constant h i s s i n g l i k e a d e v i l ' s s i g h aboard tanker c a r r y i n g f u e l , " 17 November 1980. "LNG scheme a t t r a c t s new entrant," 18 November 1980. "Ignored - u n t i l 40 men died i n an LNG b l a s t , " 18 November "LNG tankers to smash through i c e , " 19 November 1980. "Deadly tank t r a i l e r c o r r a l l e d , " 18 November 1980. "Dome shipyard plan sees 2,000 B.C. job s , " 17 December 1980. "For the reco r d , " 29 November 1980. "Methanol storage okayed," 23 December 1980. "Chemical f i r e closes bridge," 23 December 1980. "Cruise l i n e drops plan to sue over s i n k i n g of Prinsendam," 30 1980. "Why was navy c r a f t doing t r i a l s i n fog?" 19 January 1981. 179 January 1981. January February 1982. 1982. "Dome wants to use B.C. s i t e to ship Beaufort Sea gas," 21 1981. "Power to the people: j u s t an i s l a n d dream?" 24 January 1981. "Port A l b e r n i : s o f t l y , s o f t l y , catch a gas p l a n t , " 24 January "Dome discusses LNG port with P r i n c e Rupert groups," 28 1981. "24 i n j u r e d as explosion r i p s apart chemical p l a n t , " 11 1981. " P o l i c e masks sought," 11 February 1981. " C o l l i s i o n ' e r r o r s ' c i t e d , " 16 February 1981. "Dome picks port s i t e to ship LNG," 7 March 1981. "Tanker c o n t r a c t s ' w i l l l i k e l y go to Japan'," 30 March 1981. "Westcoast move heats up LNG race," 21 A p r i l 1981. "Burning tanker threatens p o r t , " 25 A p r i l 1981. "Huge ' r i s k y ' ships i n port to buy f u e l , " 29 A p r i l 1981. "New r u l e s on way f o r Second Narrows," 29 A p r i l 1981. "Vancouver Firemen..." 30 A p r i l 1981 (photo c a p t i o n , p. A l ) . "Tighter charter boat r u l e s urged," 5 May 1981. "Unlucky ship saved again," 16 October 1981. "Chemical posed t h r e a t , " 5 December 1981. "Gas tanker s t i l l on the rocks," 18 December 1981. "4 motorists overcome by gas from loco r e f i n e r y , " 3 February "Track r e l o c a t i o n urged f o r Calgary to reduce hazard," 10 February 1982. "Tank car s p i l l s chemical i n t o r i v e r , " 4 March 1982. " R a i l chemical s p i l l ' far worse' than reported," 5 March "A determined Dome...," 17 March 1982. "A time-bomb i n l o c o ? " , 29 March 1982. LIST OF AGENCIES CONTACTED . Government of Canada: Canadian Coast Guard Environment Canada Fe d e r a l Environmental Assessment and Review O f f i c e Port of Vancouver ( N a t i o n a l Harbours Board) N a t i o n a l Energy Board . Government of B r i t i s h Columbia: B r i t i s h Columbia U t i l i t i e s Commission B.C. Hydro (Gas Engineering D i v i s i o n ) M i n i s t r y of Environment (Waste Management Branch) . C i t y of Vancouver: Emergency Program O f f i c e Vancouver F i r e Department . D i s t r i c t of North Vancouver F i r e Department . United States Coast Guard: Marine Safety O f f i c e , Boston, Massachusetts Marine Safety O f f i c e , Cove P o i n t , Maryland Marine Safety O f f i c e , Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a Marine Safety O f f i c e , Savannah, Georgia Marine Safety O f f i c e , S e a t t l e , Washington Captain of the P o r t , P h i l a d e l p h i s , Pennsylvania Captain of the P o r t , Providence, Rhode I s l a n d . Port of Boston . Port of Los Angeles Port of New York/New Jersey . Port Autononome du Havre . Port of London A u t h o r i t y . Port of Rotterdam . U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia (Vancouver) . U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a ( V i c t o r i a , B.C.) . P a c i f i c Marine T r a i n i n g I n s t i t u t e (Vancouver) . B.C. Research (Vancouver) . Oceanographic I n s t i t u t e of Washington ( S e a t t l e ) . SOGREAH * (Grenoble, France) . Det norske V e r i t a s (Oslo) . Lloyd's of London (London) . Rivtow S t r a i t s L t d . (Vancouver) . Moss Werft (Moss, Norway) . Kockum's Shipyards (Malmo, Sweden) * A d m i n i s t r a t o r s of the Port Revel Marine Research and T r a i n i n g Cent 182 APPENDIX I A P a r t i a l L i s t of V i s i t s by Hazardous M a t e r i a l s C a r r i e r s to the Port of Vancouver between 1 January 1981 and 31 August 1982* *The i n f o r m a t i o n presented i n Appendix I was based upon a frequent review of l o c a l s h i p ping movements as presented i n The Province and The Vancouver Sun newspapers, Canadian Coast Guard Vessel T r a f f i c r e p o r t s , and v i s u a l o b s e r v a t i o n s . The Appendix does not l a y c l a i m to being a complete record of hazardous m a t e r i a l s c a r r i e r movements i n the Port of Vancouver during the period i n question. TERMINAL: Westridge Terminal (Burnaby) PRODUCT: L i q u e f i e d Petroleum Gas (Propane) 183 Duration of V i s i t 1981 31 Jan. I - 2 Feb. 6-8 Mar. 8-10 Apr. I I - 12 May 1-3 J u l y 4-5 Aug. 8-9 Sept. 19-20 Oct. 1982 3- 5 Mar. 15-17 Apr. 8- 9 May 4- 6 June 6-7 J u l y 9- 10 Aug. Vessel Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Yamahide Maru Tatsuno Maru N i c h i z a n Maru N i c h i z a n Maru N i c h i z a n Maru R e g i s t r y Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Year B u i l t 1966 DWT 29 059 * Cap'y (m 3 ) 38 160 * * * * * 1967 38 628 50 670 1982(?) 29 786 App. 40 000 * I n d i c a t e s that v e s s e l i n f o r m a t i o n has already been provided. 184 TERMINAL: Lynnterm (North Vancouver) PRODUCTS: Ethylene D i c h l o r i d e ; Ethylene G l y c o l ; C a u s t i c Soda S o l u t i o n Duration Year of V i s i t V e s sel R e g i s t r y B u i l t DWT Cargo 1981 2 Jan. Asakaze(?) Japan 1980 16 982 ? 6 Jan. Marine Chemist U.S. 1970 35 949 11 14 Jan. Unknown ? ? 1 ? 2 Feb. Marine Chemist* U.S. * * * 18-19 Feb. Hamakaze Japan 1980 16 617 ? 24-25 Feb. Asakaze Japan * * * 26-27 Feb. Marine Chemist U.S. * * 12-13 Mar. Risanger Norway 1976 27 582 42 2-3 Apr. Hamakaze Japan * * 6 Apr. F u j i h o s h i Maru Japan 1976 14 435 21 9-10 Apr. Osco S t r i p e Norway 1974 33 415 27 22-24 Apr. Matsukaze Japan ? ? 25-26 May Marine Chemist U.S. * * * 26-27 May Hamakaze Japan * * * 4-5 June Matsukaze Japan * * * 5 J u l y Hamakaze Japan * * * 10 J u l y Marine Chemist U.S. * * * 22-23 J u l y Bow Spring Norway 1976 27 616 38 30-31 J u l y Asakaze Japan * * * 19-21 Aug. Bruse J a r l Norway 1974 32 060 34 24-26 Aug. Matsukaze Japan * * * 1-2 Sept. Osco S i e r r a Norway 1974 33 415 27 9-10 Sept. Asakaze Japan - - -18-20 Sept. Bow Fortune Norway 1975 27 511 42 1-2 Oct. Formosa One L i b e r i a ? 1 ? 21-22 Oct. Osco S i e r r a Norway * * * 1982 5-6 Jan. 26-27 Jan. Hamakaze Asakaze Japan Japan * * A * * * I n d i c a t e s that v e s s e l i n f o r m a t i o n has already been provided. 185 Duration • Year # ol of V i s i t V e s sel R e g i s t r y B u i l t DWT Cargo ' 1-2 Feb. Fujinami Japan ? ? ? 12-14 Feb. Hamakaze Japan * * * 15 Feb. Marine Chemist • U.S. * * * 23-24 Feb. Matsukaze Japan * * * 9 Mar. Asakaze Japan * * * 24-25 Mar. Osco S i e r r a Norway * * * 31 Mar. Marine Chemist U.S. * * * 1 Apr. Marine Chemist U.S. * * * 4 Apr. Hamakaze Japan * * 6 Apr. Matsukaze Japan * * * 17-18 Apr. F u j i h o s h i Maru Japan * * * 26-27 Apr. Hakko Minerva Japan 1979 6304 30 Apr. Jo C l i p p e r Norway 1 1 May Jo C l i p p e r Norway * * * 8 May Asakaze Japan * * * 21 May Matsukaze Japan * * * 29-30 May Hamakaze Japan * * * 7-8 June F u j i h o s h i Maru Japan * * * 10-11 June Osco Stream Norway 1 ? 26 June Matsukaze Japan * * * 10-11 J u l y Hamakaze Japan * * * 13-14 J u l y Marine Chemist U.S. * * * 15 J u l y F u j i h o s h i Maru Japan * * * 7 Aug. Asakaze Japan A * * 8-9 Aug. Golar Petrotrade L i b e r i a 1975 32 060 34 15 Aug. Tsokaze Japan 1980 16 628 ? 16 Aug. Botany Troubador 9 ? ? ? 23 Aug. Hamakaze Japan * * * 26-29 Aug. Formosa One L i b e r i a * * * TERMINAL: Vancouver Wharves (North Vancouver) 186 PRODUCT: Methanol Duration of V i s i t 1981 20 Feb. 16- 17 Mar. 3-5 Apr. 27-29 Apr. 6 May 8-10 June 18-19 June 3- 4 J u l y 10 J u l y 15-17 J u l y 4- 5 Aug. 17- 20 Aug. 4-6 Sept. 14-15 Sept. 20- 21 Sept. 21- 22 Sept. 3-4 Oct. 26-27 Oct. 29-30 Oct. Vessel Hamakaze A l b e r t a Glory F u j i h o s h i Maru Ocean V i c t o r i a A l b e r t a Glory Ocean V i c t o r i a A l b e r t a Glory Hamakaze Matsukaze Ocean V i c t o r i a A l b e r t a Glory Ocean V i c t o r i a Asakaze Shiokaze A l b e r t a Glory Ocean V i c t o r i a Formosa One Asakaze Ocean V i c t o r i a R e g i s t r y Japan Japan Japan Panama Japan Panama Japan Japan Japan Panama Japan Panama Japan Japan Japan Panama Taiwan Japan Panama Year B u i l t 1980 1979 1976 * * * * * 1980 1 * * 1 * * # of DWT Cargo Tanks 16 617 8 858 14 435 * * * ? * * 16 982 ? * * ? * * 15 21 ? * * 7 * * * 1 1 * * 9 * * 1982 7-8 Jan. 14- 16 Feb. 17-18 Feb. 10 Mar. 30-31 Mar. 6 Apr. 7 Apr. 15- 16 Apr. 17-18 Apr. Ocean V i c t o r i a Ocean V i c t o r i a A l b e r t a Glory Asakaze Ocean V i c t o r i a Hamakaze Matsukaze F u j i h o s h i Maru S t o l t P r i d e Panama Panama Japan Japan Panama Japan Japan Japan L i b e r i a * * * * * * * 1976 * * * * * * 30 822 * * * * 46 *I n d i c a t e s that v e s s e l i n f o r m a t i o n has already been provided. 1 8 7 Duration Year # Of of V i s i t V essel R e g i s t r y B u i l t DWT Cargo Tanks 6-7 May Ocean V i c t o r i a Panama * A A 25-26 May A l b e r t a Glory Japan * A A 31 May Hamakaze Japan * A A 6-7 June F u j i h o s h i Maru Japan * A A 13-14 June Ocean V i c t o r i a Panama A A A 17-20 June S t o l t S i n c e r i t y L i b e r i a 1976 30 822 46 24-26 June F u j i Nami Japan 1 ? ? 27-29 June Matsukaze Japan * A A 12 J u l y Hamakaze Japan A A A 12-13 J u l y F u j i h o s h i Maru Japan A A A 3-5 Aug. Senyo Glory Japan 1982 ? ? 7-10 Aug. S t o l t Span L i b e r i a 1970 23 450 36 15-17 Aug. Bow Flower Norwegian 1975 31 500 30 18 Aug. Isokaze Japan 1980 16 628 7 19-20 Aug. A l b e r t a Glory Japan A A A 24 Aug. Ocean V i c t o r i a Panama A A A 188 TERMINAL: Miscellaneous Duration of V i s i t 1981 2-4 Mar. 17 Mar. 4-5 Apr. 23 June 13 J u l y 31 J u l y 1 Aug. 29-30 Aug. Vessel C a r l i n k a Shiokaze Hamakaze Shiokaze Matsukaze Maaskroon Maaskroon Isokaze Type Tanker Chemical Chemical Chemical Chemical Chemical Chemical Chemical R e g i s t r y ? Japan Japan Japan Japan Belgium Belgium Japan Year B u i l t DWT Terminal Gulf O i l Bby. Neptune 1980 16 617 Neptune * * Neptune ? ? Neptune 1976 32 235 Vanterm * * Vanterm 1980 16 628 Neptune 1982 7 Jan. 11-25 Mar. 5 Apr. 5 Apr. 28-31 May 30-31 May 1-5 June 1 June 27-28 June 14 J u l y 14-15 J u l y Hamakaze Chemical Hoegh S h i e l d LPG Hamakaze Matsukaze Mundogas A t l a n t i c Isokaze Mundogas A t l a n t i c Isokaze Shiokaze F u j i h o s h i Maru Ocean V i c t o r i a Chemical Chemical LPG Chemical LPG Chemical Chemical Chemical Chemical Japan Norway Japan Japan L i b e r i a Japan L i b e r i a Japan Japan Japan Panama 1969 8 700 * 1969 * * * * * * 8 784 * * * * 1976 14 435 ? ? Neptune Burrard-Yarrows Vanterm Neptune Burrard/Yarrows Vanterm Burrard/Yarrows Vanterm * Neptune Centennial 23 Aug. 24 Aug. 25-26 Aug. Ocean V i c t o r i a Hamakaze Hamakaze Chemical Chemical Chemical Panama Japan Japan * * * * * Centennial Neptune B.C. Sugar * I n d i c a t e s that v e s s e l i n f o r m a t i o n has already been provided. 189 APPENDIX II CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MISHAPS INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS Status of Casualty Symbols 0 Minor incident - l i t t l e or no damage 9 Incident of undetermined status • Serious incident, but not c r i t i c a l to vessel or crew safety i# Very serious incident - imminent danger to safety of vessel, crew, and/or public ••• Total loss of vessel APPENDIX I I CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MISHAPS INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y LOCATION F a l l 1968 Claude Sweden 1 yr. 1511 Nr. Southampton, U.K. PARTICULARS: Claude c o l l i d e s with inbound B r i t i s h f r e i g h t e r . Crew abandons s h i p , which subsequently runs aground. A Portuguese LPG c a r r i e r i s l a t e r chartered to remove the butane cargo. However, a discharge hose springs a l a c k , sending a cloud of inflammable vapour towards Southampton. Volunteers are c a l l e d i n to board Claude and close v a l v e s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Noel Mostert, Supership, pp. 372-373. DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 1973 Havis ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Norway 3 yrs. 15 285 Nr. Boston, Mass. Norwegian LPG c a r r i e r Havis refused entry i n t o Port of Boston when i t i s determined by U.S. Coast Guard inspectors that the vessel's gas d e t e c t i o n alarm system cannot be shut o f f . The pressure r e l i e f valves had been improperly set by the ship's crew, rather than by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y c e r t i f i e d team, as r e q u i r e d . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: P. van der Linde, Time Bomb, p. 65 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION June 1974 M i l l i ? ? ? Grangemouth, Scotland PARTICULARS: While i n port, M i l l i begins to leak propane through f a u l t y valve. Vapour catches f i r e , touching off minor explosion. Authorities close port, fearing major conflagration. Repair team eventually seals leaking valve. One person k i l l e d . STATUS: •#. SOURCE: Lee Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 274 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 09 Nov. 1974 Yuyo Maru Japan 8 yrs. 80 000 Tokyo Bay, Japan PARTICULARS: LPG/naphtha c a r r i e r Yuyo Maru c o l l i d e s with cargo ship P a c i f i c Ares, rupturing naphtha tanks and causing massive shipboard f i r e . S t i l l burning out of control a f t e r two weeks, vessel i s sunk by Japanese navy. Thirty-three persons k i l l e d . STATUS: SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 275 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION Feb. 1977 Unnamed Nr. Providence, R.I. PARTICULARS: Unnamed LPG c a r r i e r refused entry i n t o Port of Providence by U.S. Coast Guard, pending r e p a i r s to f a u l t y gas d e t e c t i o n system. A f t e r s e v e r a l days at anchorage o f f s h o r e , v e s s e l departs U.S. waters with cargo s t i l l aboard, apparently unable to r e p a i r d e t e c t i o n system malfunction. STATUS: SOURCE: L t . Gre n i e r , USCG Marine Safety O f f i c e , Providence, Rhode I s l a n d , 5 Sept. 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 07 June 1977 L i n c o l n s h i r e B r i t a i n 5 y r s . 31 290 Bahrain PARTICULARS: LPG c a r r i e r L i n c o l n s h i r e i s reported to have c o l l i d e d w i t h LNG c a r r i e r LNG  Challenger while the l a t t e r i s moored. LNG Challenger s u s t a i n s damage to starboard quarter and engine room. No report of damage to L i n c o l n s h i r e . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 277 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 28 June 1979 Gas A l Burgan Kuwait 1 yr. 72 100 Suez Canal PARTICULARS: Sustains extensive h u l l damage following grounding i n Suez Canal. Repairs deferred by owners to July 1980. STATUS: SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 12 & 30 July 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 10 July 1979 Garinda REGISTRY B r i t a i n VESSEL AGE 1 yr. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 54 220 LOCATION Nr. Buenos Aires PARTICULARS: Inbound for Buenos Aires i n par t l y loaded condition, Garinda runs aground at kilometre 5 of the South Entrance Channel. Vessel r e f l o a t e d 0740 hours, 12 July 1979. Surveyor reports no serious damage to h u l l of Garinda. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 12 & 13 July 1979 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 23 J u l y 1979 Faraday B r i t a i n 8 y r s . 31 215 Unsp e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel reports turbo-blower damage while docked at La C i o t a t , Spain. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 23 J u l y 1979 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 31 Aug. 1979 Caribe I Panama 18 y r s . 879 Rio Haina PARTICULARS: During hurricane 'David', MV K a l l i o p e breaks away from mooring. Vessel blows acr harbour, coming i n contact w i t h LPG c a r r i e r Caribe I . Caribe I reported to have suf f e r e d severe s t r u c t u r a l damage and water i n engine room. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 7 & 12 Sept. 1979 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL 06 Sept. 1979 Lincolnshire REGISTRY B r i t a i n VESSEL AGE 7 yrs. CAP'Y (M 3) 31 290 LOCATION Buenos Aires PARTICULARS: Lincolnshire reported to have contacted French LPG c a r r i e r A t l a n t e . Both vessels sustain s u p e r f i c i a l damage. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 8 Sept. 1979 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 06 Sept. 1979 Atlante France 6 yrs. 53 400 PARTICULARS: See previous reference to LPG c a r r i e r L i n c o l n s h i r e . LOCATION Buenos Aires STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 8 Sept. 1979 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 14 Sept. 1979 Ogden Bridgestone Panama 6 y r s . 74 580 Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Stern gland found to be l e a k i n g . V essel drydocked Sakaide, Japan i n order to e f f e c t necessary r e p a i r s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 15 Sept. 1979 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 18 Sept. 1979 J a t a i REGISTRY B r a z i l VESSEL AGE 1 y r . CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 4 100 LOCATION B i l b a o , Spain PARTICULARS: J a t a i , while under c o n s t r u c t i o n at Tomas Ruiz de Velasco Shipyard, experiences explosion aboard v e s s e l . Vessel sustains s u b s t a n t i a l damage. One workman k i l l e d , and four others i n j u r e d . STATUS: •• SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 21 Sept. 1979 and 15 Oct. 1979 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 30 Sept. 1979 Babounis Costas Greece 33 y r s . 670 Nr. Lagas, N i g e r i a PARTICULARS: Vessel reported at anchor o f f Lagos, N i g e r i a when leakage n o t i c e d . Babounis Costas subsequently beached, and engine room flooded. On 6 December 1979, ship r e f l o a t e d , taken out to sea, and d e l i b e r a t e l y sunk. STATUS: ••• SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 9 Oct. 1979 and 14 Feb. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 04 Oct. 1979 9 de Octubre Peru 20 y r s . 318 Nr. Macapa, B r a z i l PARTICULARS: Vessel grounded some 50 kilometres from Macapa; near the mouth of the Amazon R i v e r . The 9 de Octubre i s r e f l o a t e d at 0530 hours, 11 October 1979, only to ground again f i v e minutes l a t e r . P o r t i o n of vessel's o i l and LPG cargo subsequently o f f l o a d e d i n t o barges on 13 October 1979. Ship r e f l o a t e d f o l l o w i n g day with tug a s s i s t a n c e . Surveyor reports no apparent serious h u l l damage. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t ' 12, 13, 15, & 16 Oct. 1979 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION 29 Oct. 1979 Emiliano Zapata Mexico 9 y r s . 3 380 Tuxpan, Mexico PARTICULARS: Seawater leakage through holes i n #2 starboard double bottom discovered. Serious damage to #2 cargo tank i n s u l a t i o n and i n e r t gas space as a r e s u l t of v e r t i c a l movement by #2 cargo tank (by e i t h e r i c e a c t i o n or f l o t a t i o n ) . V e ssel requires extensive r e p a i r s to pumping system, cargo tank, l i q u e f a c t i o n p l a n t , i n s u l a t i o n , e t c . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 28 Nov. 1979 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION Nov. 1979 Hampshire B r i t a i n 5 y r s . 52 650 M i s s i s s i p p i R i v e r PARTICULARS: While en route New Orleans to Turkey, with 34 000 tonnes ammonia, Hampshire reports serious cracking and s h e l l p l a t e damage. Speculation that damage r e l a t e d to grounding i n c i d e n t i n M i s s i s s i p p i R iver (date u n s p e c i f i e d ) . Vessel unable to enter V a l l e t t a , Malta harbour on 19-20 November 1979 due to bad weather. Crew forced to e f f e c t emergency h u l l r e p a i r s while v e s s e l at sea. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 20, 21, & 24 Nov. 1979 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) 126 227 LOCATION Nov. 1979 H i l l i L i b e r i a 4 y r s .  227 U n s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: LPG/LNG c a r r i e r H i l l i requests survey at Singapore (26 March 1980) concerning a reported f a i l u r e of cargo tank i n s u l a t i o n the previous November. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s a v a i l a b l e . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 27 March 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY Panama VESSEL AGE 13 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 826 LOCATION Un s p e c i f i e d C i r c a 15 Nov. Rudi M 1979 PARTICULARS: Vessel a r r i v e s London a f t e r having sustained serious damage to cargo tank i n s u l a t i o n due to LPG s a t u r a t i o n . Extensive r e p a i r s r e q u i r e d . Vessel declared compromised c o n s t r u c t i v e t o t a l l o s s . STATUS: ••• SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 18 Jan. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 11-12 Dec. Claude Panama 12 y r s . 1 511 E n g l i s h Channel 1979 PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains heavy weather damage while en route Antwerp to M i l f o r d Haven, U.K. Two wash bulkheads col l a p s e d i n #4 tank. Repairs e f f e c t e d a t Le Havre, March 1980. STATUS; • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 14 March 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 12 Dec. 1979 Gay Lussac Panama 10 y r s . 40 232 Marcus Hook, Penn. PARTICULARS: Vessel grounded while on part loaded passage inbound f o r Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. Various bottom damage i n c u r r e d . Repairs to be deferred u n t i l r o u t i n e drydocking i n Europe, e a r l y 1980. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 11 Jan. 1980 and 2 May 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M-3) LOCATION 28 Dec. 1979 Butaseis Span 20 y r s . 1 414 Nr. Brixham, U.K. PARTICULARS: Crews quarters catch f i r e while v e s s e l o f f Brixham. V e s s e l loaded w i t h butane. Crew of 18 abandons ship, which i s subsequently towed to remote l o c a t i o n . F i r e burns f o r two days before being brought under c o n t r o l . Serious damage to wheelhouse, storerooms, crew's accommodation. Butaseis denied entry i n t o Plymouth harbour a f t e r f i r e due to concern f o r p u b l i c s a f e t y . Cargo remained i n t a c t throughout. STATUS: SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 29 & 31 Dec. 1979 and 2 & 12 Jan. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 28 Dec. 1979 Pythagore Panama 12 y r s . 14 258 Aegean Sea PARTICULARS: Vessel reported grounded 28 December 1979 i n Aegean Sea while en route (loaded) from Odessa to the United States eastern seaboard. Pythagore surveyed a f l o a t at P h i l a d e l p h i a , 17 January 1980. Minor h u l l damage i d e n t i f i e d . Vessel's owners' i n t e n t i o n s unknown, but considering loading cargo of ammonia i n Mexico, destined f o r Europe. Pythagore l i k e l y to be drydocked i n Spain to e f f e c t r e p a i r s . STATUS: <* SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 17 Jan. 1980 and 1 Feb. 1980 ro o INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY 21 Jan. 1980 Regitze Tholstrup Denmark VESSEL AGE 17 y r s . CAP'Y (M 3) 388 LOCATION Lough Lame, E i r e PARTICULARS: Regitze T h o l s t r u p , w i t h cargo of butane, grounds at entrance to Lough Larne, E i r e . Engine room holed. A u t h o r i t i e s evacuate l o c a l r e s i d e n t s . Cargo p a r t i a l l y o f f l oaded i n t o road tankers. Vessel r e f l o a t e d . STATUS: SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 22 & 23 Jan. 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 25 Jan. 1980 Rudi M REGISTRY Panama VESSEL AGE 14 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 826 LOCATION London PARTICULARS: While r e p a i r s to i n s u l a t i o n s a t u r a t i o n being e f f e c t e d (see casu a l t y reference 15 November 1979, t h i s Appendix), f i r e breaks out aboard Rudi M. One fireman k i l l e d ; four other i n j u r e d . STATUS: SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 26 Jan. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 25 Jan. 1980 Copernico C h i l e 17 y r s . 3 428 Nr. C o r r a l , C h i l e PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences engine breakdown. Towed to Talcahuano, C h i l e . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 29 Jan. 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY L i b e r i a VESSEL AGE 8 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 52 647 LOCATION Un s p e c i f i e d C i r c a 06 Feb. Mundogas America 1980 PARTICULARS: Owners request survey at New York as a r e s u l t of damage sustained f o l l o w i n g contact with tug, date and l o c a t i o n u n s p e c i f i e d . STATUS: © SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 18 Feb. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 17 Feb. 1980 Karama Dubai 15 y r s . 900 Dubai PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains minor h u l l damage f o l l o w i n g contact w i t h bridge fender. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 21 Feb. 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 22 Feb. 1980 K a t r i s a REGISTRY Greece VESSEL AGE 12 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 18 422 LOCATION Mediterranean PARTICULARS: Experiences main engine damage while en route from Skikda, A l g e r i a to Leghorn, I t a l y . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 20 March 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 29 Feb. 1980 Sunny Fellow Singapore 12 y r s . 1 526 West coast of Spain PARTICULARS: Experiences main engine problems while en route f o r Vigo, Spain STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 3 March 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 04 March 1980 Eva Tholstrup Denmark 22 y r s . 889 PARTICULARS: Incurs p r o p e l l e r damage while inbound f o r M i l f o r d Haven, U.K. Nr. M i l f o r d Haven, U.K. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 5 March 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION C i r c a 17 March Mundogas P a c i f i c L i b e r i a 11 y r s . 11 795 Un s p e c i f i e d 1980 PARTICULARS: Surveyor reports #5 and 6 ammonia compressors h e a v i l y damaged due to seawater contamination. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 17 March 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 20 March 1980 Gazala Dubai 16 y r s . 646 Bahrain PARTICULARS; Gazala reports contact w i t h j e t t y catwalk at Bahrain. Minor h u l l damage i n c u r r e d . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 25 March 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 25 March 1980 Garbeta Mediterranean B r i t a i n 15 y r s . 22 765 PARTICULARS: Garbeta a r r i v e s M a r s e i l l e s 25 March 1980 wi t h heavy weather damage. Vessel s a i l s 8 A p r i l 1980 upon completion of damage r e p a i r s . Vessel forced to return to M a r s e i l l e s three days l a t e r upon discovery of f u r t h e r damage to double bottoms. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 14 A p r i l 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 28 March 1980 Razi REGISTRY Iran VESSEL AGE 13 y r s . CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 70 900 LOCATION Ras Tanura, Saudi A r a b i a PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains damage to #3 cargo pump. Permanent r e p a i r s deferred u n t i l May 1980. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 17 A p r i l 1980 o INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 01 A p r i l 1980 Ultragas C h i l e 21 y r s . 1 460 Le Havre, France PARTICULARS: Ultragas reports damage sustained f o l l o w i n g contact with T u r k i s h tanker A m i r a l F a h r i Engin. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 3 A p r i l 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION c i r c a 12 Gambhira B r i t a i n 11 y r s . 14 103 Nr. Bombay A p r i l 1980 PARTICULARS: Vessel reports cracks i n LPG compressor c y l i n d e r block. Time and date u n s p e c i f i e d . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 12 A p r i l 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE 05 May 1980 A n t i l l a Cape NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 29 540 Un s p e c i f i e d 12 y r s . Netherlands A n t i l l e s PARTICULARS: A n t i l l a Cape reports #2 and 3 generator f a i l u r e s , broken p i s t o n , and f a i l u r e of the main engine c o o l i n g water system. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 07 May 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 19 May 1980 Mundogas P a c i f i c L i b e r i a 11 y r s . 21 795 Caribbean PARTICULARS: While en route from Panama Canal to Maracaibo, Venezuela v e s s e l reports breakdown of main engine a f t turbo-blower, plus port and starboard generator breakdowns. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 5 June 1980 r o o INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 75 610 Dubai 27 May 1980 Northern Arrow L i b e r i a 2 y r s . PARTICULARS: Vessel reports f l o o d i n g i n No. 3 v o i d space - requests survey. Northern Arrow i n loaded c o n d i t i o n . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 29 May 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 30 May 1980 Gaz Pioneer Panama 15 y r s . 4 163 A l e x a n d r i a , Egypt PARTICULARS: Gaz Pioneer reported i n c o l l i s i o n with Panamanian f r e i g h t e r Ocean Ace. Both vessels s u s t a i n minor contact damage. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 11 June 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION C i r c a 05 Ultragas C h i l e 21 y r s . 1 460 Un s p e c i f i e d June 1980 PARTICULARS; Vessel reports p r o p e l l e r damage. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 5 June 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 10 June 1980 Sunny G i r l Singapore 13 y r s . 900 Nr. Whitby, England PARTICULARS: While some 5 kilometres southeast of Whitby, England, v e s s e l reports engine room f i r e . F i r e brought under c o n t r o l q u i c k l y . Sunny G i r l empty f o l l o w i n g discharge of cargo at Tees, England. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 12 June 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 24 J u l y 190 Ogden Bridgestone Panama 7 y r s . 74 560 Unsp e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences damage to main engine t u r n i n g gear. Owner requests survey, Kobe, Japan. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 25 J u l y 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 06 August 1980 Claude Panama 13 y r s . 1 511 Le Havre, France PARTICULARS: While completing discharge at Le Havre, water hose breaks, spraying main switchboard and s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t o r s . No major damage i d e n t i f i e d . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 9 August 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 17 Aug 1980 Cetane P h i l i p p i n e s 3 y r s . 250 Manila Bay PARTICULARS; Explosion aboard Cetane while i n Manila Bay, P h i l i p p i n e s . Four out of ten crew members i n j u r e d . Vessel reported abandoned p r i o r to e x p l o s i o n . STATUS: •• SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 19 August 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 26 Aug 1980 Gaz Progress Panama 14 yrs. 3 038 Ravenna, I t a l y PARTICULARS: While l e a v i n g berth and moving slowly a s t e r n , Gaz Progress contacted tanker Assunta  Ravenna. Assunta Ravenna pushed back - i n c u r s some bow and s t e e r i n g damage. Gaz Progress sustains minor h u l l damage. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 29 Aug. 1980 and 2 Sept. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 07 Sept. 1980 Mundogas P a c i f i c L i b e r i a 11 y r s . 21 795 Coatzacoalcos, Mexico PARTICULARS: Main engine turbo-blower badly damaged while v e s s e l e n t e r i n g Coatzacoalcos inner harbour. Mundogas P a c i f i c i n b a l l a s t at time of accident. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 18 Oct. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 12 Sept. 1980 Mary E l s e Tholstrup Denmark 15 y r s . 629 Coast of I r e l a n d PARTICULARS: Mary E l s e Tholstrup, while en route from M i l f o r d Haven, Wales to Whitegate (near Cork); E i r e i n loaded c o n d i t i o n grounds on I r i s h coast. V e s s e l towed to Cork -pumped out by attending tug. S i s t e r ship U l l a T holstrup a r r i v e s Cork morning of 13 Sept. 1980 i n order to o f f - l o a d Mary E l s e Tholstrup. During i n i t i a l hook-up operations between the two v e s s e l s , e x p l o s i o n occurs aboard Mary E l s e T h o l s t r u p . Two crew members burned. STATUS: •• SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 13 & 16 Sept. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION 16 Sept. 1980 D i s c a r i a L i b e r i a 11 y r s . 22 240 Various PARTICULARS: Between 16 Sept. 1980 and 23 Oct. 1980, D i s c a r i a experiences s e v e r a l instances of engine damage (e.g. a l t e r n a t o r damage, 16 Sept. and 23 Oct.; emergency generator damage, 16 Sept.; and c y l i n d e r damage, 16 Oct.). While at Dubai, owners request survey. More engine damage i d e n t i f i e d . On 3 Nov. 1980, v e s s e l experiences complete e l e c t r i c a l system breakdown while loading. Vessel towed to anchorage to e f f e c t r e p a i r s to a l t e r n a t o r s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 3 & 5 Nov. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 18 Sept. 1980 Mundogas P a c i f i c L i b e r i a 11 y r s . 21 759 Mexican coast PARTICULARS: While en route from P a j a r i t o s , Mexico to R i o Grande, Mexico v e s s e l experiences engine room f i r e . Ship sustains c y l i n d e r l i n e r and p i s t o n damage. STATUS: O SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 30 Sept. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE 19 Sept. 1980 Marine Eagle United States 9 yrs. CAP'Y (M 3) 2 600 LOCATION Beaumont, Texas PARTICULARS: Vessel incurs extensive b o i l e r damage as a r e s u l t of using contaminated f u e l o i l . Repairs take eight days to complete. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 30 Sept. 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY 30 Sept. 1980 Petrobras Sudoeste B r a z i l VESSEL AGE 17 y r s . CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 4 000 LOCATION Salvador, B r a z i l PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences f i r e i n a u x i l i a r y engine while at Salvador. Understood that vessel's carbon dioxide f i r e f i g h t i n g system f a i l e d . F i r e extinguished by portable u n i t s . No i n j u r i e s reported. STATUS: 9 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 3 Oct. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL 02 Oct. 1980 Venus Gas REGISTRY Japan VESSEL AGE 7 yrs. CAP'Y (M 3) 2 500 LOCATION Sulu Sea PARTICULARS: While en route from Indonesia to Inchon, Korea w i t h cargo of butane gas, Venus Gas runs aground at Asna I s l a n d , Sulu Sea. Vessel r e f l o a t e d 7 October 1980, and subsequently towed to Manila f o r r e p a i r s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 4, 8, & 16 Oct. 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 05 Oct. 1980 Senho Maru Japan 7 y r s . 1 900 Off P h i l i p p i n e s PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences engine breakdown while en route from Japan to Merak, New Guinea ( ? ) . Towed to Manila i n b a l l a s t f o r r e p a i r s . STATUS: t SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 8 Oct. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 14 Oct. 1980 Gaz East Greece ? e s t . 2000 Nr. Hyeres, France PARTICULARS: Gaz East capsizes i n high winds o f f French R i v i e r a . Crew of 15 rescued. French navy quarantines area around v e s s e l i n view of r i s k to p u b l i c s a f e t y . V e s s e l e v e n t u a l l y towed out to sea and sunk by navy ( u s i n g mines placed on h u l l by d i v e r s ) . Five n a u t i c a l mile s a f e t y zone remained around spot where v e s s e l sunk u n t i l 17 October 1980. STATUS: SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 14 & 23 Oct. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 29 Oct. 1980 Monomer Venture Panama 35 y r s . 5 748 Coatzacoalcos, Mexico PARTICULARS: While at Coatzacoalcos, Mexico v e s s e l drags anchor i n heavy storm. Tug dispatched to tow Monomer Venture i n t o deep water u n t i l storm abates. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 1 Nov. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 30 Oct. 1980 Melrose B r i t a i n 9 y r s . 2 725 S. coast of England PARTICULARS: Melrose reports engine problems. Vessel proceeding e i t h e r Plymouth or Falmouth under own power with f u l l load of LPG. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 31 Oct. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 31 Oct. 1980 Ogden Bridgestone Panama 7 y r s . 74 580 Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel reported i n c o l l i s i o n with LPG c a r r i e r Petron Gasual. S u f f e r s damage to starboard s h e l l p l a t e s , engine rooms, and #1 vo i d space. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 29 J u l y 1981 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 28 857 Un s p e c i f i e d 31 Oct. 1980 Petron Gasul P h i l i p p i n e s 18 y r s . PARTICULARS: Reported i n c o l l i s i o n with LPG c a r r i e r Ogden Bridgestone (see previous reference) STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 29 J u l y 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 2-3 Nov. 1980 Pythagore REGISTRY Panama VESSEL AGE 13 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 14 258 LOCATION Various PARTICULARS: STATUS: • Between 2 Nov. 1980 and 29 May 1981, Pythagore experiences f o l l o w i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s : 1) 2-3 Nov. 1980 - s u f f e r s heavy weather damage ( l o c a t i o n u n s p e c i f i e d ) 2) Date u n s p e c i f i e d - bottom p l a t e damage ( l o c a t i o n u n s p e c i f i e d ) 3) 29 May 1981 - contacts dry dock w a l l (Genoa, I t a l y ) Damage: #1 port and starboard side b a l l a s t tanks inner s t r u c t u r e and inner h u l l p l a t i n g f r a c t u r e d numerous l o c a t i o n s , a l l o w i n g p a r t i a l f l o a d i n g of p e r l i t e i n s u l a t i o n between b a l l a s t and cargo tanks, w i t h 25 mm v e r t i c a l displacement of cargo tank. - Various f r a c t u r e s to #'s 2 and 3 port and starboard side b a l l a s t tanks (17 i n t o t a l ) . - Lengthy r e p a i r s required. SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 17 Aug. 1981 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION 05 Nov. 1980 A l Berry Saudi Arabia 1 y r . 76 700 Suez Canal PARTICULARS: Vessel grounded Suez Canal. Subsequently r e f l o a t e d w i t h tug a s s i s t a n c e . A l Berry surveyed Antwerp, Belgium c i r c a 17 Sept. 1981. Rudder stock found to be twisted 12 degrees o f f centre, and bent 6 mm between taper ends, with bearing part of rudder badly d i s t o r t e d . Rudder stock beyond r e p a i r . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 7 Nov. 1980 and 17 Sept. 1981 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 07 Nov. 1980 Durward Singapore 9 y r s . 919 E n g l i s h Channel PARTICULARS: While en route from England to Zeebrugge, Belgium i n b a l l a s t , v e s s e l experiences engine f a i l u r e . Towed to Falmouth f o r r e p a i r s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 10 Nov. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 07 Nov. 1980 U l l a Tholstrup Denmark 19 yrs. 918 S. coast of England PARTICULARS: Vessel departs M i l f o r d Haven, Wales f o r Oporto, P o r t u g a l 6 November 1980. Forced to ret u r n M i l f o r d Haven the next day a f t e r experiencing engine problems. Repairs e f f e c t e d 12 Nov. 1980. U l l a T holstrup s a i l s f o r Oporto. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 13 Nov. 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 12 Nov. 1980 Hoegh Skean Norway 9 y r s . 52 000 Pe r s i a n Gulf PARTICULARS: While en route f o r Ras Tanura, Saudi A r a b i a , v e s s e l runs aground on Shak Allum Shoal. Hoegh Skean r e f l o a t e d same day - proceeds Bahrain f o r dry docking and survey. Repairs require estimated 2 to 3 weeks. STATUS: t SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 21 Nov. 1980 ro ro ro INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION 19 Nov. 1980 Mundogas P a c i f i c L i b e r i a 11 y r s . 21 795 Off coast of Mexico PARTICULARS: Vessel dry docked San Francisco to r e p a i r l e a k i n g s t e r n tube s e a l r i n g s . Problem occurred 21 Oct. 1980 while v e s s e l en route from S a l i n a Cruz, Mexico to Guaymas, Mexico. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 24 Nov. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 21 Dec. 1980 Z e i l e n Panama 19 y r s . 720 Bahamas PARTICULARS: Vessel s t r i k e s reef at approximate p o s i t i o n l a t . 24 07 35 N; long. 75 27 05 W. Bow and rudder damage i n c u r r e d . Crew abandons ship - no i n j u r i e s . No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s a v a i l a b l e . STATUS: t SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 29 Dec. 1980 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 27 Jan. 1981 Hakusei Maru (#2?) Japan 15 y r s . (?) 613 Shiono M i s a k i , Japan PARTICULARS: Vessel grounded at Shiono M i s a k i , Japan. F u l l load LPG (350 t ) . Sustains serious cracks on double bottom p l a t i n g , plus f l o o d i n g i n engine room and double bottom tanks. Subsequently r e f l o a t e d and towed to Sakaide, Japan f o r r e p a i r s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 28 Jan. 1981 and 11 Feb. 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 11 & 13 Jan. Gammagas Germany 8 y r s . 5 202 Nr. Buenos A i r e s 1981 PARTICULARS: 11 February 1981 - v e s s e l grounds i n loaded c o n d i t i o n near mouth of Parana R i v e r , Argentina 12 February 1981 - r e f l o a t e d , but grounds once again due to s t e e r i n g f a i l u r e . 13 February 1981 - r e f l o a t e d - s t e e r i n g gear found to be i n o p e r a t i v e . - Vessel dry docked c i r c a 24 Feb. 1981 - rudder 95% missing. - Repair work estimated to take 1-2 weeks. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 28 Feb. 1981 and 19 March 1981 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION c i r c a 23 Havis Feb. 1981 PARTICULARS Norway 10 yrs, 15 285 M i d - A t l a n t i c V essel develops s t e e r i n g problems en route from Houston to Suez, as broken rudder shaft and p o s s i b l e l o s t rudder. Havis r e q u i r e s Damage diagnosed tow t o L i s b o n . V e s s e l , loaded w i t h 9000 tonnes butane, refused entry i n t o L i s b o n . Subsequently towed to Fos, France, where cargo discharged i n t o LPG c a r r i e r Northern Arrow c i r c a 21 March 1981. Rudder confirmed l o s t . Havis scheduled to proceed M a r s e i l l e s f o r r e p a i r s . STATUS: SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 24 Feb. 1981 and 19 & 20 March 1981 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 24 Feb. 1981 D i s c a r i a L i b e r i a 11 y r s , 22 240 Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: No. 2 vo i d space water d e t e c t i o n alarm a c t i v a t e d , and damp p e r l i t e i n s u l a t i o n noted upon i n s p e c t i o n . Permanent r e p a i r s deferred at that time. - 21 May 1981 - upon completion of discharge of 11 450 tonnes of propane at Leghorn, I t a l y , D i s c a r i a s a i l s f o r North S h i e l d s , England f o r dry docking, survey, and r e p a i r s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 21 May 1981 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION ? March 1981 Monagas 1 1 1 Bay of Biscay PARTICULARS: While en route from Le Havre to B i l b a o , Spain, v e s s e l sustains damage to #1 hold cargo d e r r i c k s due to heavy weather. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 11 & 19 March 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL Jame Cook REGISTRY Tonga VESSEL AGE 9 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 1 580 LOCATION Caribbean c i r c a 14 A p r i l 1981 PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains broken crank shaft while en route from Maracaibo, Venezuela to Bahamas i n loaded c o n d i t i o n . Subsequently towed to unnamed U.S. east coast port r e p a i r s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 15 & 22 A p r i l 1981 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 15 A p r i l 1981 Gas Gemini L i b e r i a 3 y r s . 77 960 Unspe c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Gas Gemini loses p r o p e l l e r blade. Under tow to Yokahama. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s a v a i l a b l e . STATUS: t SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 15 A p r i l 1981. DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 24 A p r i l 1981 P r i n s Maurits Netherlands New 3 200 Dutch coast PARTICULARS: While on maiden voyage, P r i n s Maurits experiences engine room f i r e and expl o s i o n some 50 kilometres north of Ijmuiden, Holland. Vessel i n b a l l a s t . Two crew members hurt - v e s s e l s u f f e r s serious damage. STATUS: §• SOURCE: "Two hurt i n b l a s t on new LPG c a r r i e r ", Lloyd's L i s t , 25 A p r i l 1981. ro INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 16 May 1981 Gaz Fountain Panama e s t . 38 000 Nr. C h e r c h e l l , A l g e r i a PARTICULARS: While en route Kalamai, Greece to Buenos A i r e s , v e s s e l experiences serious engine room f i r e . Ship loaded with 7646 tonnes propane and 15 605 tonnes butane. Most crew abandon ship. Vessel e v e n t u a l l y towed to Lavera, near Fos, France, where cargo off-loaded i n t o LPG c a r r i e r Garala. P r e l i m i n a r y i n s p e c t i o n reveals serious engine room damage. STATUS: •• SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 18 & 19 May 1981, and 15 J u l y 1981, DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 22 May 1981 Bridgestone Maru I I I Japan 15 y r s . 46 720 Rio de l a P l a t a PARTICULARS:Vessel runs aground while en route from Buenos A i r e s to Singapore. Upon being r e f l o a t e d , d i v e r reports no serious h u l l damage. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 27 May 1981. INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY B r i t a i n VESSEL AGE 5 yrs, May 1981 Gandara ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Nos. 1 and 3 c y l i n d e r l i n e r s badly cracked. CAP'Y (M 3) 22 500 LOCATION Un s p e c i f i e d STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 30 May 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY Tonga VESSEL AGE 14 y r s . CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 900 LOCATION South P a c i f i c J u l y 1981 Magellan ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel s u f f e r s main engine breakdown. Towed to Suva, F i j i f o r r e p a i r s . STATUS: § SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 16 J u l y 1981 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 13 J u l y 1981 E i r i k Raude Norway 14 y r s . 6 170 Caribbean PARTICULARS: 11 J u l y 1981 - v e s s e l reports loose rudder. 13 J u l y 1981 - while underway, rudder f a l l s o f f . V e s s e l towed to Willemstad, Curacao f o r survey. Upon completion of survey, v e s s e l towed to Punta Camacho f o r p a r t i a l discharge of cargo (propylene o x i d e ) . 17 J u l y 1981 (?) - E r i k Raude a r r i v e s Wilemstad under tow f o r r e p a i r s ( i . e . replacement of rudder and s t o c k ) . - upon completion of r e p a i r s , v e s s e l to proceed Plaquemine, L o u i s i a n a to complete discharge of cargo. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 20 Aug. 1981 and 10 Sept. 1981. CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 24 J u l y 1981 D i s c a r i a L i b e r i a 12 y r s . 22 240 Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences main engine c y l i n d e r damage. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 26 J u l y 1981. INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 31 J u l y 1981 Olav Trygvason Norway 6 y r s . 4 100 Sines, P o r t u g a l PARTICULARS: During discharge opertaion, cargo unloading arm becomes disconnected, r e s u l t i n g ethylene s p i l l . Two crew members burned; one shoreside worker k i l l e d . STATUS: #• SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 4 August 1981. CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 18 Sept. 1981 Shogi Maru #8 Japan 2 y r s . 800 Coast of Japan PARTICULARS: Vessel i n c o l l i s i o n with c o a s t a l chemical tanker Toho Maru #8 (175 g . r . t . ) o f f A i j i m a L i g h t , Japan. Toho Maru #8 sunk. No report of damage to Shogi Maru #8. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 19 Sept. 1981 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL 04 Oct. 1981 A l Berry REGISTRY Saudi Arabia VESSEL AGE 2 yrs, CAP'Y (M 3) 76 700 LOCATION PARTICULARS: Contacts quay w a l l of Boudouin Lock. Returns to M e r c a n t i l e Drydock to e f f e c t r e p a i r s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's l i s t , 6 & 7 Oct. 1981. DATE NAME OF VESSEL 20 Oct. 1981 Texaco Colon REGISTRY Panama VESSEL AGE 15 y r s . CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION ? Nr. Paramaribo, Surinam PARTICULARS: Vessel runs aground o f f Paramaribo, Surinam. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s a v a i l a b l e . (NB. Texaco Colon i s an o i l tanker which c a r r i e s LPG i n #2 centre tank only.) STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 22 Oct. 1981 ro to ro INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL 06 Nov. 1981 Joule REGISTRY B r i t a i n VESSEL AGE 16 y r s . CAP'Y (M 3) 11 200 LOCATION Maracaibo, Venezuela PARTICULARS: Vessel grounds near Maracaibo i n loaded s t a t e . Joule subsequently r e f l o a t e d a f t e r t r a n s f e r of po r t i o n of cargo to Norwegian LPG c a r r i e r Tordenskiold. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 18 Nov. 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 26 Dec. 1981 Garinda REGISTRY B r i t a i n VESSEL AGE 5 y r s . CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 53 000 LOCATION Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: As a r e s u l t of heavy weather, v e s s e l s u f f e r s cracks to lower double bottom hopper tanks and wing tanks, plus crack on cofferdam p l a t i n g . Contents of upper No. 4 starboard wing tank leaked. I n t e r n a l r e p a i r s r e q u i r e gas f r e e i n g i n order to undertake hot work, but drydocking not necessary. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 19 Jan. 1982. INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 11 Jan. 1982 Faraday B r i t a i n 11 y r s . 31 215 Uns p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences severe damage to 3 cargo gas compressors. STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 22 & 28 Jan. 1982 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 15 Jan. 1982 Sarrat P h i l i p p i n e s 19 y r s . 13 196 ? PARTICULARS: Sarrat ashore during strong winds, with f u l l load of LPG. V e s s e l subsequently s e t t l e d i n trench w i t h a 60° port l i s t . Experiences f l o o d i n g and engine room damage, as w e l l as h u l l damage. As of 22 February 1982 v e s s e l s t i l l aground. STATUS": • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 18 & 28 Jan. 1982, 4 & 24 Feb. 1982 INVOLVING LPG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION 20 Jan. 1982 Petrogaz Greece 17 yrs. 353 Levkas I s l a n d , Greece PARTICULARS: While preparing to berth at Levkas I s l a n d to discharge cargo, v e s s e l runs aground. Experiences extensive e x t e r i o r s t r u c t u r a l damage, plus rudder damage. Vessel towed Piraeus (?) f o r r e p a i r s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 23 Jan. 1982 and 4 Feb. 1982 DATE 5 Feb. 1982 NAME OF VESSEL Mossovet REGISTRY Soviet Union VESSEL AGE 3 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 75 000 LOCATION Sea of Marmara PARTICULARS: Vessel i n c o l l i s i o n with T u r k i s h merchant v e s s e l i n Sea of Marmara. Mossovet unable to stop, s t r i k e s small m i l i t a r y j e t t y . Vessel s u s t a i n s minor damage. Loaded w i t h cargo of ammonia at time of accident, which occurred during period of poor v i s i b i l i t y . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 6 & 7 February 1982. 236 APPENDIX III CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MISHAPS INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS Status of Casualty Symbols 0 Minor incident - l i t t l e or no damage 9 Incident of undetermined status • Serious incident, but not c r i t i c a l to vessel or crew safety §• Very serious incident - imminent danger to safety of vessel, crew, and/or public ••• Total loss of vessel APPENDIX I I I CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MISHAPS INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) 27 400 LOCATION 25 Dec. 1964 Methane Progress B r i t a i n New 400 Arzew, A l g e r i a PARTICULARS; F i r e i n forward vent r i s e r causes six-hour delay i n loading operations. F i r e caused by l i g h t n i n g s t r i k e . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 269 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE 1 y r . CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 27 400 LOCATION Unsp e c i f i e d May 1964 Methane Progress B r i t a i n ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: F a u l t y valve causes l o c a l i z e d LNG s p i l l . LNG flows i n t o d r i p pan beneath tank, but overflows when water i s poured i n t o pan. Causes minor cracking i n deck p l a t i n g . STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 269 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION May 1965 J u l e s Verne France New 25 500 Arzew, A l g e r i a ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Cargo tank guages malfunction during loading operation. LNG overflow occurs, r e s u l t i n g i n cracks to cargo tank cover and deck s t r i n g e r p l a t e . STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 270 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE • CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION Sept. 1968 A r i s t o t l e Panama ? (u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel runs aground and incurs bottom damage. before being r e f l o a t e d with tug a s s i s t a n c e . Off Mexican coast A r i s t o t l e stranded f o r 61 hours STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 270 OJ co INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION Nov. 1968 A r i s t o t l e Panama ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel loses rudder during storm. Towed to Boston f o r r e p a i r s . , M i d - A t l a n t i c STATUS: • SOURCE: van der Linde, Time Bomb, p. 65 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION Dec. 1968 Methane Princess B r i t a i n 4 y r s . 27 400 Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel s t r i k e s B r i t i s h Gas Co. j e t t y at Canvey I s l a n d . Methane P r i n c e s s s u f f e r s minor superstructure damage. Repairs necessary to j e t t y l oading arm. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 270 ro to INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 17 Nov. 1969 P o l a r Alaska L i b e r i a New 71 500 en route Kenai, Alaska PARTICULARS: Membrane w a l l of No. 1 cargo tank i s ruptured when cable t r a y breaks loose i n s i d e tank. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 270 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 13 Dec. 1969 P o l a r Alaska L i b e r i a New 71 500 Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: While attempting to r e p a i r damaged tank membrane, crew a c c i d e n t a l l y overpressurizes void space behind membrane w a l l with n i t r o g e n , causing i t to bulge i n t o the tank. Repairs deferred u n t i l A p r i l 1970. Tank not used. STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 271 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 02 Sept. 1970 A r c t i c Tokyo L i b e r i a 1 y r . 71 500 Off coast of Japan PARTICULARS: Outbound from Japan, crew detects traces of gas outside No. 1 cargo tank. Later i n v e s t i g a t i o n reveals the cause as excess cargo s l o s h i n g i n heavy weather. Sloshing causes membrane w a l l to bend i n four places, and put \ inch crack i n one weld seam. Repairs deferred u n t i l scheduled drydocking, May 1972. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 271 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 30 May 1971 Methane Princess B r i t a i n yrs. 27 400 Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. PARTICULARS: L i q u i d nitrogen loading l i n e opens, r e s u l t i n g i n s p i l l of ni t r o g e n onto foredeck. Accident r e s u l t s i n some cracks i n deck p l a t i n g . Cause: r e l i e f valve had been improperly set to lower than s p e c i f i e d pressure during annual survey. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 271 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 01 Aug. 1971 Esso Brega I t a l y 2 y r s . 41 000 La Spezia, I t a l y PARTICULARS: Pressure i n s i d e 50 000 cubic metre LNG storage tank a b r u p t l y begins to r i s e , venting clouds of vapour i n t o atmosphere. Plant o f f i c i a l s c l o s e the operation and i n i t i a t e emergency procedures. LNG c a r r i e r Esso Brega i s towed out of harbour. U l t i m a t e l y , some 300 cubic metres of gas escapes before the i n t e r n a l tank pressure subsides of i t s own accord. Cause of accident: A phenomenon known as " r o l l o v e r " i n which v i o l e n t mixing occurs when q u a n t i t i e s of LNG (or, i n theory, LPG) of d i f f e r e n t d e n s i t y , composition and temperature are brought together. STATUS: •• SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , pp. 271-272. CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 1971 Methane Pri n c e s s B r i t a i n 7 y r s . 27 400 Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Methane Princess sustains serious cracks to inner h u l l , n e c e s s i t a t i n g lengthy r e p a i r s . STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 272. INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL 31 Oct. 1971 Methane Progress REGISTRY B r i t a i n VESSEL AGE 7 y r s . CAP'Y (M 3) 27 400 LOCATION Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: L i q u i d n i trogen storage tank aboard Methane Progress i s o v e r f i l l e d , c r a c k i n g main and secondary deck p l a t i n g . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 272 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY France VESSEL AGE New CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 50 000 LOCATION Boston, U.S.A. 1971 Descartes ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences gas leak from a f t cargo tank due to f a u l t y connection between tank dome and membrane w a l l . Ship's crew r e p o r t e d l y purges area with i n e r t n i t r o g e n gas, but f a i l s to d i s c l o s e problem to U.S. Coast Guard. STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 272. INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY B r i t a i n VESSEL AGE 8 yrs. CAP'Y (M 3) 27 400 LOCATION Un s p e c i f i e d 1972 Methane Progress ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel l a i d up f o r extended period i n order to e f f e c t r e p a i r s to inner h u l l and to ' cracks caused by storage of LNG at cryogenic temperatures. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: van der Linde , Time Bomb, p. 140 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY United States VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION U n s p e c i f i e d 04 June 1974 Massachusetts (Barge) PARTICULARS: Ordnance coupling f r a c t u r e s , r e s u l t i n g i n small s p i l l of l i q u i d n i t r o g e n . Main and canopy decks cracked. STATUS: 9 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 274. INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION United States U n s p e c i f i e d 16 J u l y 1974 Massachusetts (Barge) PARTICULARS: Nitrogen purge valve i s overpressurized during l o a d i n g operations, r e s u l t i n g i n 40 g a l l o n discharge. Canopy deck cracked. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 275 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY I t a l i a n VESSEL AGE 3 yrs, CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 4 000 LOCATION Terneuzen, Holland Aug. 1974 Euclides ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel i n c o l l i s i o n with another ship - susta i n s s u p e r f i c i a l damage to bulwark p l a t i n g . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 275 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) 4 OOO LOCATION Nov. 1974 Euclid e s I t a l i a n 3 y r s . PARTICULARS: Vessel runs aground, r e s u l t i n g i n s u b s t a n t i a l h u l l and p r o p e l l e r damage. STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 275. DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 06 Dec. 1974 Methane Progress B r i t a i n 10 y r s . 27 400 Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. PARTICULARS: B r i t i s h coaster Tower P r i n c e s s , steaming o f f course, rams Methane Progress while l a t t e r berthed at B r i t i s h Gas Corp. j e t t y . No s p i l l a g e occurs. STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 275 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M-*) LOCATION Dec. 1974 Methane Progress B r i t a i n 10 y r s . 27 400 Arzew, A l g e r i a ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel runs aground, and i n so doing sustains severe rudder damage. Out of service f o r 72 days. STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 275 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 10 Sept. 1976 Gimi L i b e r i a New 126 277 Stavanger, Norway PARTICULARS: F i r e days p r i o r to c h r i s t e n i n g , v e s s e l experiences serious f i r e i n No. 2 cargo tank, where workers are welding tank sections together. Spark from welding torch i g n i t e s styropor i n s u l a t i o n - f i r e spreads r a p i d l y . Seven workers h o s p i t a l i z e d . A l l of the i n s u l a t i o n i n the tank has to be e i t h e r replaced or reworked. STATUS: SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , pp. 276-277 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 14 May 1977 H i l l i L i b e r i a 2 y r s . 126 227 Chiba, Japan PARTICULARS: On maiden voyage, H i l l i i s towed away from Chiba t e r m i n a l upon discovery of b o l t s and r e s i d u a l pieces of metal i n the vessel's discharge l i n e s . Ship remains at sea f o r a month while discharge pipes are warmed up i n order that a l l f o r e i g n objects can be removed. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 277 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 07 June 1977 LNG Challenger B r i t a i n 3 y r s . 87 600 Bahrain PARTICULARS: While moored, v e s s e l i s struck by LPG c a r r i e r L i n c o l n s h i r e . LNG Challenger s u s t a i n s damage to starboard quarter and engine room. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 277 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M-3) LOCATION 11 Jan. 1978 LNG Ar i e s United States 1 y r . 125 000 Canvey I s l a n d , U.K. PARTICULARS: Vessel breaks a d r i f t from B r i t i s h Gas Corp. j e t t y during storm force winds and fl o o d t i d e c o n d i t i o n s . Vessel drags anchor across navigable fairway. STATUS: • SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , pp. 277-278 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION June 1978 Descartes France 7 y r s . 50 000 near Boston, U.S.A. PARTICULARS: Vessel reports abnormally high concentrations of gas i n the inner b a r r i e r space of No. 3 cargo tank. A f f e c t e d area purged with i n e r t l i q u i d n i t r o g e n . STATUS: O SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 278 r o INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) 28 J u l y 1978 H i l l i L i b e r i a 3 y r s . 126 277 PARTICULARS: Vessel reported as having sustained p r o p e l l e r damage. LOCATION Abu Dhabi STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 278 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 14 Aug. 1978 Khannur L i b e r i a 1 y r . 126 360 S t r a i t s of Singapoi PARTICULARS: Vessel reported i n c o l l i s i o n with cargo ship Hong Hwa. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , pp. 278-279. INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL 26 Aug. 1978 LNG Challenger REGISTRY B r i t a i n VESSEL AGE 4 yrs. CAP'Y (M 3) 87 600 LOCATION Bahrain PARTICULARS: LNG Challenger struck by f l o a t i n g crane Magnus IX, which i s under tow. LNG Challenger sustains two holes and a lage dent when port anchor f l u k e s are d r i v e n i n t o h u l l . STATUS! SOURCE: Davis, Frozen F i r e , p. 279 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE 2 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 129 500 LOCATION 1979 L a r b i Ben M'Hidi A l g e r i a ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) PARTICULARS: Vessel l a i d up f o r extended period i n order to r e p a i r cracks i n cargo tanks, and strengthen welds which secure cargo tank to inner h u l l . STATUS: • SOURCE: "LNG tankers smash through i c e " , The Vancouver Sun, 19 Nov. 1980, p. A18 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION 29 June 1979 E l Paso Paul Kayser L i b e r i a 4 y r s . 125 000 S t r a i t of G i b r a l t a r PARTICULARS: While outbound i n fog through S t r a i t of G i b r a l t a r , E.P. Paul Kayser runs aground at a speed of 18 knots while attempting to avoid another v e s s e l . Impact tears a 170-metre gas along h u l l of the v e s s e l , which i s laden w i t h some 99 500 cubic metres of LNG. Remarkably, cargo tanks remain i n t a c t . In a h i t h e r t o unperformed operation, 95 000 cubic metres of LNG are removed from E.P. Paul Kayser to s i s t e r ship E l Paso Sonatrach, enabling v e s s e l to gain s u f f i c i e n t buoyancy to be r e f l o a t e d . Repairs to E.P. P a u l Kayser, take almost two years to e f f e c t , at an estimated cost of some $20 m i l l i o n . STATUS: SOURCE: H. Clarkson & Company L i m i t e d , L i q u i d Gas C a r r i e r R e g i s t e r 1980, p. 4; Lloyd's L i s t , 1 & 5 J u l y 1979, 22 Nov. 1980, and 16 May 1981; and telephone conversation between w r i t e r and L t . Robin Crusse, USCG, Cove P o i n t , Maryland, 19 Nov. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 19 J u l y 1979 Methane Progress B r i t i s h 15 y r s . 27 400 Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences f i r e w i t h i n i n s u l a t i n g m a t e r i a l between a f t bulkhead of No. 3 cargo and cofferdam. F i r e extinguished i n f a i r l y short order. Repairs r e q u i r e 2 weeks to complete. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 23 & 24 J u l y 1979. INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M J) LOCATION 07 Sept. 1979 LNG Capricorn United States 1 y r . 125 000 Uns p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains minor contact damage to bulbous bow as a r e s u l t of contact i n c i d e n t with tug B. Lancang I I . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 15 Sept. 1979 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 08 June 1980 E l Paso Howard Boyd United States 5 y r s . 126 540 Hampton Roads, V i r g i n i a PARTICULARS: Vessel reports suspected grounding damage a f t e r breaking a d r i f t from moorage at Hampton Roads. Surveyor reports no damage found. (NB. E.P. Howard Boyd had been i n l a y up at Hampton Roads since 15 A p r i l 1980 due to c o n t r a c t u r a l impasse between A l g e r i a and United States over LNG p r i c i n g s t r u c t u r e ) . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 19 June 1980 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE 02 J u l y 1980 LNG Leo United States 2 yrs. CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 125 000 Japan PARTICULARS: Mooring l i n e s parted during strong winds while v e s s e l d i s c h a r g i n g . LNG Leo s h i f t s , r e u s l t i n g i n damage to p i e r and seve r a l chiksan arms. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 5 J u l y 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 07 J u l y 1980 LNG L i b r a REGISTRY United States VESSEL AGE 1 yr. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 125 000 LOCATION Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel experiences f l o o d i n g damage i n forward pump room. Emergency f i r e pump motor and f u e l o i l t r a n s f e r pump motor damaged during i n c i d e n t . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 19 J u l y 1980 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 10 J u l y 1980 Geomitra B r i t i s h 5 y r s . 77 131 U n s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Reports damage to port d i e s e l generator. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 22 J u l y 1980 DATE NAME OF VESSEL 03 Oct. 1980 LNG L i b r a REGISTRY United States VESSEL AGE 1 yr. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 125 000 LOCATION Celebes Sea PARTICULARS: Vessel s u f f e r s p r o p e l l e r shaft damage while en route to Japan i n loaded c o n d i t i o n . ; Vessel towed to Davao Bay, P h i l i p p i n e s . Cargo t r a n s f e r r e d to LNG Leo, c i r c a 13 Oct. 1980. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 4, 8, 10 & 14 Oct. 1980 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) 04 Oct. 1980 Avondale Settlement LOCATION New Orleans, U.S.A. PARTICULARS: U.S. Coast Guard f a i l s to c e r t i f y three 127 800 cubic metre LNG c a r r i e r s under c o n s t r u c t i o n at Avondale Shipyards f o r E l Paso Marine Company. Coast Guard inspectors discover cracks i n polyurethane i n s u l a t i o n surrounding v e s s e l s ' cargo tanks. B u i l d e r unable to i s o l a t e cause, and unable to introduce new containment system. In October 1980, a group of insurance companies agrees to pay E l Paso $300 m i l l i o n i n the la r g e s t marine insurance settlement i n h i s t o r y . STATUS: ••• SOURCE: "Fau l t y i n s u l a t i o n i n LNG c a r r i e r s b u i l t at New Orleans", Lloyd's L i s t , 4 Oct. 1980 CARGO DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 12 Dec. 1980 LNG Taurus United States 1 y r . 125 000 West coast of Japan PARTICULARS: While en route to Tobata, Japan with a f u l l cargo of LNG, v e s s e l runs aground near M o j i , o f f west coast of Japan. Water i n s e v e r a l b a l l a s t tanks - v e s s e l assumes 4° l i s t . Cargo remains i n t a c t . I n i t i a l attempt to r e f l o a t LNG Taurus u n s u c c e s s f u l . 14 Dec. 1980 - ve s s e l ' s master commits s u i c i d e over a c c i d e n t . 16 Dec. 1980 - LNG Taurus r e f l o a t e d with a s s i s t a n c e from salvage tug Zwarte Zee and seven harbour tugs. STATUS: SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t 13, 16, 17 & 18 Dec. 1980, and 13 Jan. 1981 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL 30 Jan. 1981 LNG Capricorn REGISTRY United States VESSEL AGE 3 yrs. CAP'Y (M 3) 125 000 LOCATION Un s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: No. 2 turbo generator sustains v i b r a t i o n and j o u r n a l bearing damage. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 3 Feb. 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 12 May 1981 LNG Ar i e s United States 3 y r s . 125 000 U n s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains minor contact damage to bulbous bow. Requests survey upon a r r i v a l i n Japan. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 13 May 1981. INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 22 May 1981 LNG Gemini United States 3 y r s . 125 000 Japan PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains damage to main and a u x i l i a r y ( t u r b i n e ) tubes. No f u r t h e r d e t a i l s . STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 26 May 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 19 June 1981 L a r b i Ben M'Hidi A l g e r i a 3 y r s . 129 500 near Arzew, A l g e r i a PARTICULARS: L a r b i Ben M'Hidi i n c o l l i s i o n with Greek tanker Ionian Commander o f f Arzew while both vessels i n b a l l a s t . Master of Ionian Commander apparently a r r e s t e d by A l g e r i a n o f f i c i a l s . STATUS: 9 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 23 June 1981 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL LNG Aquarius REGISTRY VESSEL AGE United States 3 yrs. CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 125 000 Un s p e c i f i e d 19-20 June 1981 PARTICULARS: Vessel reports deck pl a t e cracking around dome of No. 5 cargo tank. Although no fu r t h e r d e t a i l s , speculate leak of LNG or l i q u i d n i t r o g e n . STATUS: 9 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 10 J u l y 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL LNG A r i e s REGISTRY United States VESSEL AGE 3 yrs. CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) 125 000 LOCATION Bontang, Borneo P r i o r 13 Aug. 1981 PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains minor h u l l damage f o l l o w i n g contact i n c i d e n t w i t h tug B. Lancang Requests survey upon a r r i v a l i n Japan. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 13 Aug. 1981 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION P r i o r 25 LNG Leo United States 3 y r s . 125 000 Various Aug. 1981 PARTICULARS: Vessel sustains f o l l o w i n g damage: - turbine damage ( c i r c a 20 Aug. 1981) - damage to rudder bearing at Sakaide (25 Aug. 1981) - rusted, scored bottom p l a t e s as a r e s u l t of a l l e g e d touching bottom at Tobata, Japan (14 Jan. 1981). STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 25 Aug. 1981 and 4 Sept. 1981. DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 30 Sept. 1981 LNG Leo United States 3 yrs. 125 000 PARTICULARS: Vessel reports contact i n c i d e n t with tug Osaka. Incurs minor h u l l damage (one port s h e l l p l a t e i n way of b a l l a s t tank). STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 3 Oct. 1981 o INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION Uns p e c i f i e d P r i o r 15 Genota B r i t i s h 6 y r s . 77 731 Dec. 1981 PARTICULARS; A r t i c l e i n Lloyd's L i s t r e f e r s to f a i l u r e s i n secondary b a r r i e r welds aboard Genota Drydock i n s p e c t i o n reveals f a i l u r e s i n lower segments of three out of f i v e cargo tanks. STATUS: SOURCE: " S h e l l gains experience i n gas c a r r i e r f u e l economy", Lloyd's L i s t , 15 Dec. 1981 DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CARGO CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 17 Dec. 1981 E l Paso Columbia United States PARTICULARS: 1 y r . 127 800 Sable I s l a n d , Nova S c o t i a While en route from Boston, Massachusetts t o H a l i f a x , Nova S c o t i a f o r lay-up, E l Paso Columbia, which i s under tow at the time, i s blown onto the coast of Sable I s l a n d during severe storm. Vessel subsequently r e f l o a t e d c i r c a 28 Dec. 1981. Sustains extensive bottom damage. STATUS: •• SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 18 & 29 Dec. 1981 INVOLVING LNG CARRIERS DATE NAME OF VESSEL REGISTRY VESSEL AGE CAP'Y (M 3) LOCATION 21 Jan. 1982 Sophie Schulte Germany 8 y r s . 2 420 U n s p e c i f i e d PARTICULARS: Deck mounted cargo gas booster and blower compressor malfunction reported. STATUS: 0 SOURCE: Lloyd's L i s t , 23 Jan. 1982 263 APPENDIX IV - CANADIAN GAS PORT PROPOSALS Name Location Major Sponsor(s) Proposal Cost (1977 $) Comments Status TENNECO PROJECT L o r n e v i l l e , New Brunswick Tenneco Inc. of Houston, Texas The plan, which was f i r s t mooted during the mid-1970's, envisaged the importation of some 45 000 cubic metres of LNG per day from A l g e r i a to L o r n e v i l l e . The LNG would then be vapourized, and shipped v i a p i p e l i n e to a d i s t r i b u t i o n point at Albany, New York. T o t a l project cost estimate, i n c l u d i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n of ships, l i q u e f a c t i o n plant i n A l g e r i a , and new p i p e l i n e i n United States: $5 b i l l i o n . Canadian p o r t i o n only: $500 m i l l i o n The proposal ran i n t o d i f f i c u l t y i n J u l y of 1977 when Lorneterm LNG Lt d . (a subsidiary of CP R a i l ) , which had been expected to p a r t i c i p a t e with Tenneco i n the constr u c t i o n and operation of the vapourization f a c i l i t y , withdrew from the project due to contract disagreements. 2 Although the N a t i o n a l Energy Board of Canada has granted p r o v i s i o n a l approval to Tenneco fo r the con s t r u c t i o n of the L o r n e v i l l e Terminal and a new 130 kilometre p i p e l i n e to the United States border at Woodland, Maine, the project has remained i n a state of limbo since 1977. 264 B) Name ARCTIC PILOT PROJECT' Location M e l v i l l e I s l a n d , Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s to an as yet undecided port s i t e i n eastern Canada. Major Sponsor(s): Proposal Cost (1980 $) Comments Petro-Canada Nova, An A l b e r t a Corporation Dome Petroleum M e l v i l l e Shipping The p r o j e c t , which was i n i t i a t e d by Petro-Canada i n 1976, c a l l s f o r the shipment of some 15 000 cubic metres of LNG d a i l y from M e l v i l l e I s l a n d i n Canada's High A r c t i c to e i t h e r Gros Cacouna, Quebec or the S t r a i t of Canso, Nova S c o t i a . The l i q u e f i e d gas w i l l be transported by means of two 140 000 cubic metre capacity A r c t i c Class 7 icebreaking tankers. Upon a r r i v a l at the east coast r e c e i v i n g t e r m i n a l , the LNG w i l l be pumped i n t o two 100 000 cubic metre i n s u l a t e d storage tanks. I t w i l l subsequently be vapourized, and d i s t r i b u t e d to eastern Canadian markets v i a p i p e l i n e . $1.5 b i l l i o n * The A.P.P. i s the most advanced proposal to ship LNG by marine mode of the seve r a l presently under co n s i d e r a t i o n . I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n that i t w i l l be the prototype f o r other, more ambitious gas and o i l development proposals i n the Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta region of the western a r c t i c . Status : The A.P.P. has been subjected to both the f e d e r a l Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) and the Canadian Cost Guard's Termpol Code review. In each instance, i t was concluded that the project i s acceptable w i t h i n the con s t r a i n t s of environmental preservation and marine safety. N a t i o n a l Energy Board hearings i n t o the t e c h n i c a l and economic aspects of the project commenced 2 February 1982. An t i c i p a t e d project completion by mid-1980's. * The $1.5 b i l l i o n cost estimate does not include f i e l d development and southern r e c e i v i n g terminal c o n s t r u c t i o n , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for which w i l l r e s t w i t h P a n a r c t i c O i l s L t d . and Trans-Canada P i p e l i n e s , r e s p e c t i v e l y . Estimated costs f o r these facets of the development ( i n 1980 $) are as f o l l o w s : Drake Point f i e l d development : $138 m i l l i o n Southern r e c e i v i n g terminal and connecting p i p e l i n e : $233 m i l l i o n C) Name 265 WESTERN ARCTIC HYDROCARBON DEVELOPMENTS3 Location : Mackenzie Delta/Beaufort Sea region of the Northwest T e r r i t o r i e s and Yukon T e r r i t o r y Major Sponsor(s): Dome Petroleum Esso Resources Canada Ltd. Gulf Canada Resources Inc. Dome, Esso and Gulf are ac t i v e l y involved i n offshore o i l and gas exploration in the Mackenzie/Beaufort region. At present, a number of alternatives involving pipelines, icebreaking oil/gas tankers, and submarine oil/gas tankers are under active consideration by the proponents. Anticipated markets w i l l l i k e l y include eastern Canada, Japan and the United States. Costs (1980$) : Estimated investment costs for a l l aspects of Mackenzie/Beaufort region hydrocarbon development by in d i v i d u a l proponent as follows: Dome Petroleum: $44 b i l l i o n Esso Resources: $ 1 b i l l i o n Gulf Canada : $ 0.7 b i l l i o n Comments : Offshore hydrocarbon exploration has been underway i n the Mackenzie/Beaufort region for more than a decade. It has yet to be established, however, whether the commercial development of proven and anticipated reserves of o i l and gas in the area w i l l be economically viable. In the event a decision i s made to ship LNG from the Mackenzie/Beaufort area by icebreaking tanker, the proponents w i l l l i k e l y draw heavily from the design, technological, and operational experience of the A r c t i c P i l o t Project. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Dome Petroleum i s responsible for the vessel design component of the A.P.P. Status : The Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office (FEARO) established an environmental assessment panel during the f a l l of 1981 i n order to examine the various Mackenzie/Beaufort development proposals. Several public hearings have thus far been held i n conjunction with the panel review (which i s part of the federal EARP process). It i s unl i k e l y that commercial production of Mackenzie/Beaufort hydrocarbons w i l l commence prior to the end of the decade. Proposals 266 D. Three separate groups have presented to the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia detailed proposals to construct large LNG export terminals on the Canadian west coast. However, due to surplus natural gas l i m i t a t i o n s , i t i s unl i k e l y that more than one of these proposals w i l l a c t ually proceed. D.l Name : WESTERN LNG PROPOSAL4 Location : Preferred location - Grassy Point, B.C. (situated some 33 kilometres north of Prince Rupert) Major Sponsor(s): Dome Petroleum Ltd. Trans-Canada Pipelines Nova, An Alberta Corporation Missho-Iwai Corp. Proposal : The Western LNG project involves the construction of a natural gas pipeline to Grassy Point. The gas would then be li q u e f i e d and shipped to several Japanese public u t i l i t y companies by four 125 000 cubic metre LNG c a r r i e r s . Cost (1980 $) : Pipeline to Grassy Point - $ 450 m i l l i o n Gas l i q u e f a c t i o n plant - $ 650 m i l l i o n 4 LNG ca r r i e r s - $ 750 m i l l i o n Total - $1850 m i l l i o n Status : In 1981, Dome Petroleum submitted i t s detailed Western LNG proposal to the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia for review. In July of 1982, the province announced i t s support for the Dome proosal. The project must now obtain approval from the National Energy Board. The proposal has also been submitted to a federal review committee i n accordance with the terms of the Termpol Code. D.2 Name : CARTER ENERGY LNG PROPOSAL5 Location : Prince Rupert, B r i t i s h Columbia Major Sponsor(s): Carter Energy Ltd. Noranda Gas Industries Canadian Hunter Exploration Ltd. Daewoo I n d u s t r i a l Co. Ltd. Sumitomo Corp. Marubeni Corp. Proposal : The proposal c a l l s for the construction of a 1080 kilometre natural gas pipeline from the B r i t i s h Columbia portion of the Rocky Mountain Deep Basin to Prince Rupert. The gas would be li q u e f i e d at Prince Rupert, and shipped to markets i n the Orient by means of four 125 000 cubic metre LNG c a r r i e r s . 267 Cost (1980 $). Gasfield development Pipeline to Prince Rupert Gas Liquefaction Plant 4 LNG ca r r i e r s Total - $ 450 m i l l i o n - $ 760 m i l l i o n - $ 610 m i l l i o n - $ 580 m i l l i o n - $2400 m i l l i o n Status D.3 Name Location The p r o v i n c i a l government has rejected the Carter proposal i n favour of the Western LNG plan. A spokesman for Carter Energy Ltd. stated in July of 1982 that the company w i l l continue to promote the project at the upcoming National Energy Board hearings. Rim Gas P r o j e c t 6 Preferred location B r i t i s h Columbia v i c i n i t y of Kitimat, Major Sponsor(s): Petro-Canada Westcoast Transmission Co. Ltd. Mitsui and Co. Ltd. Proposal The Rim Gas proposal c a l l s for the construction of a natural gas pipeline extension to a west coast gas liquefaction plant (presumably at or near Kitimat). The LNG would then be distributed to markets i n Japan (and possibly Korea) aboard four 125 000 cubic metre tankers. Cost Status Pipeline to Kitimat Gas l i q u e f a c t i o n plant 4 LNG c a r r i e r s $ 230 m i l l i o n $ 420 m i l l i o n $ 750 m i l l i o n $1400 m i l l i o n The p r o v i n c i a l government's decision to back the Western LNG (Dome) proposal has l e f t the Rim Gas project i n a state of limbo. Company o f f i c i a l s have indicated that they w i l l probably not contest the pr o v i n c i a l decision; however, i t Is l i k e l y that Rim Gas w i l l continue to promote the project at least u n t i l the Dome proposal has received National Energy Board approval. The proposal has been subjected to a Termpol review. 268 FOOTNOTES - APPENDIX IV 1 "U.S. sites under study for Tenneco project", Daily Commercial News, 19 July 1977. 2 Information r e l a t i n g to the A r c t i c P i l o t Project was obtained from two company-produced public information brochures e n t i t l e d A r c t i c P i l o t  Project - the f i r s t printed i n December 1980 and the second i n November 1981. 3 Industry, Trade and Commerce, Major Cap i t a l Projects Inventory (Ottawa: Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce), Issue 1, October 1981, p. 88 p. 10. 4 Industry, Trade and Commerce, op. c i t . , p. 1; and "Mega-bids chase gas supplies", The Province, 3 December 1981. 5 Ibid., p. 1; and "Mega-bids chase gas supplies", The Province, 3 December 1981. 0 Industry, Trade and Commerce, op. c i t . , p. 2; and "2.3 b i l l i o n LNG plant sought f o r Kitimat", The Vancouver Sun, 26 November 1981; and "Mega-bids chase gas suppies", The Province, 3 December 1981. 

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