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The Wisconsin primary and the Democratic National Committee : a state party struggles against national… Wekkin, Gary D. 1980

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THE WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE: A STATE PARTY STRUGGLES AGAINST NATIONAL - PARTY RULES by GARY D. WEKKIN B.A., Univ e r s i t y of Wisconsin-Madison, 1971 M.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972 A THESIS':-SUBMITTED.:TN-'PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May 1980 © Gary D. Wekkin, 1980 In presenting this thesis in partial fulf i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. I t is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of Brit ish Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 > E - 6 B P 7 5 - 5 1 1 E i i ABSTRACT THE WISCONSIN PRIMARY AND THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE: A STATE PARTY STRUGGLES AGAINST NATIONAL PARTY RULES by GARY D. WEKKIN In 1975 the Wisconsin p r e s i d e n t i a l primary became the center of an i n t e r n a l party dispute between the Democratic National Committee and the state Democratic party of Wisconsin. The cause of the dispute was that one of the Democratic National Committee's delegate s e l e c t i o n rules for the 1976 nati o n a l convention c a l l e d for Wisconsin's revered 70 year-old "open" p r e s i d e n t i a l primary to be closed to crossover voting. This mandate, which r e f l e c t e d the nationa l committee's fear that Republican and independent crossover voters would boost George Wallace's candidacy or help nominate a weak Democratic candidate, c o n f l i c t e d with the p r i n c i p l e tenets of Wiscon-sin's Progressive, anti-party p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . D i s t r u s t of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s widespread i n Wisconsin, and the r i g h t s of crossover voting and absolute secrecy i n the voting booth have been the objects of highly favor-able p o l i t i c a l orientations there ever since the open primary was introduced by the state's most beloved and famous son, Robert M. La F o l l e t t e , Sr. The r e s u l t i n g states' r i g h t s c o n f l i c t between the Wisconsin and na t i o n a l Demo-c r a t i c p a r t i e s i l l u s t r a t e s the d e c e n t r a l i z i n g e f f e c t the fede r a l structure has had upon the nationa l p a r t i e s , and sheds some l i g h t upon the degree to which the power r e l a t i o n s h i p between the DNC and i t s state components has changed since the Supreme Court's landmark Cousins v. Wigoda (1975) decision. i i i In a d d i t i o n to the c o n f l i c t between the Wisconsin and na t i o n a l p a r t i e s , the primary question also produced much disagreement among Wisconsin Demo-cr a t s , and eventually within the DNC as w e l l . The dissension i n the Wis-consin party i l l u s t r a t e s Sorauf's point that U.S. p o l i t i c a l parties are r e a l l y three p a r t i e s i n one: the party organization, the party-in-the-e l e c t o r a t e , and the party-in-the-government. Each of these components of the Wisconsin Democratic party had i t s own separate i n t e r e s t s i n the p r i -mary dispute, and behaved i n c o n f l i c t u a l fashion toward each other. The Wisconsin Democratic organization leaders were unable to secure the coopera-t i o n of t h e i r party's l e g i s l a t i v e wing i n attempting to comply with the DNC's closed primary d i r e c t i v e , and were forced to adopt a caucus system of delegate s e l e c t i o n instead. The subsequent meaninglessness of the Wisconsin primary engendered c o n f l i c t within the n a t i o n a l Democratic party, which e a r l i e r had been united on the necessity of banning crossover voting. As the race for the party's p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination progressed, elements favoring p r e s i d e n t i a l candi-dates expected to do w e l l i n the Wisconsin primary suddenly became amenable to i t s r e s t o r a t i o n as the method of s e l e c t i n g the state's delegates. Wisconsin's Democratic Governor, P a t r i c k J. Lucey, hoping to save Wisconsin's t r a d i t i o n and influence the nomination race, formed a c o a l i t i o n of these nationa l party elements which forced the DNC to restore the state's open primary for delegate s e l e c t i o n purposes one month before the primary was due to take place. The b u i l d i n g of that c o a l i t i o n reveals much about c o a l i t i o n p o l i t i c s , the motivations of p o l i t i c i a n s , and what p o l i t i c i a n s do when they must choose between two goods. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v i i CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 I I : CROSSOVER VOTING: THE DNC'S REASON FOR WANTING A CLOSED PRIMARY. 24 I I I : PARTY POLITICS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: WISCONSIN'S POLITICAL CULTURE . . . 43 IV: THE ACTORS 77 V: THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE . 123 VI: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WISCONSIN 166 VII: THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE 213 VIII: THE GOVERNOR 287 IX: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: A PARTY-WIDE COALITION REVERSES THE CRC 348 X: CONCLUSION 370 BIBLIOGRAPHY 395 GLOSSARY 407 CHRONOLOGY: THE WISCONSIN PRIMARY QUESTION 421 V * T^I.SXM:TABLES~^, Tables Page 1 Interviews Categorized by Role of Respondents 17 2 Democratic Voter Turnout i n 1972 Open and Closed Primaries 26 3 Wisconsin Voter Turnout i n Primary and General P r e s i d e n t i a l Elections 26 4 Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Voters Casting B a l l o t s for Leading Candidates i n the 1964 and 1968 Wisconsin Democratic P r e s i d e n t i a l Primaries 29 5 Frequency of Themes i n E d i t o r i a l s on Closed Primaries. 59 6 Most Reliable Sources of Information about P o l i t i c s . . 63 7 Most Important Sources of Information i n Vote Decision 64 8 P r e s i d e n t i a l Preference of 1975 DPW State Convention Delegates 90 9 CRC Vote Association Scores, A l l Members 130 10 CRC Bloc D i s p o s i t i o n Toward State Party Compliance . . 134 11 Senate D i s t r i c t Competitiveness According to Republican Percentage of Major Party Vote i n 1972 Elections and Willingness to Vote for Closed Primary among 19 Senate Democrats 250 12 Terms i n O f f i c e and Willingness to Vote for Closed Primary among 19 Senate Democrats 251 13 E l e c t i o n V i c t o r y Margins and Willingness to Vote for Closed Primary among 19 Senate Democrats. . . 253 14 Primary Victo r y Margins and Willingness to Vote for Closed Primary among 19 Senate Democrats 254 15 How the CRC Blocs Voted on the Wisconsin Waiver. . . . 351 16 P r e s i d e n t i a l Preference of Wisconsin Democratic Leaders, December 1975 352 v i LIST OF FIGURES Page FIGURE 1 'Le g i s l a t i v e Closed Primary I n i t i a t i v e s and Their L i f e Spans 179 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It i s impossible to research and write a work as d e t a i l e d and lengthy as t h i s without the cooperation and assistance of many people. The manu-s c r i p t was typed with great professionalism by Lynda Reigstad, who was kind enough to work overtime to accomplish the task. The research was eased by the cooperation of such people as l i b r a r i a n s H. R. Barwick and Gerard Holder at the Democratic National Committee, a r c h i v i s t Nancy Kaufman at the Wis-consin State H i s t o r i c a l Society, and research analyst Clark Radatz and others at the Wisconsin L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau. State Democratic chairpersons Michael Bleicher of Wisconsin and Morley Winograd of Michigan opened up t h e i r p a r t i e s ' f i l e s to me (the l a t t e r by mail), as did Mary Scheckelhoff and her superiors at A.F.S.CM.E.'s Washington o f f i c e . A s p e c i a l debt i s owed Governor P a t r i c k J. Lucey, who permitted early access to h i s o f f i c i a l papers, and k i n d l y consented to a most valuable personal interview. Also granting multiple interviews as well as access to t h e i r extremely u s e f u l personal papers were Brady C. Williamson and Linda R e i v i t z of Madison. Reid Beveridge of the Wisconsin State Journal provided the r e s u l t s of a u s e f u l l e g i s l a t i v e questionnaire done by that paper; Charles Longley of Bucknell U n i v e r s i t y kindly provided h i s paper on the Compliance Review Commission; and Steven Schier of the University of Wisconsin granted access to a c o l l e c t i o n of Mikulski Commission documents. Many others allowed me to interview them for this study; and I wish to thank every one of them. Among these, s p e c i a l thanks must go to Mark A. Siegel of the White House, and Congressman Morris K. U d a l l , both of whom went to great lengths to answer my questions. I also would l i k e to thank my f r i e n d , Representative James W. Wahner, who a s s i s t e d i n securing v i i i interviews with some of his l e g i s l a t i v e colleagues. I also must thank the several mentors and colleagues who have read and commented on e a r l i e r d r a f t s of t h i s study. These include Leon D. Epstein, who was kind enough to give time to a graduate student from another univer-s i t y , Donald E. Blake and H. B. Chamberlain, both members of my d i s s e r t a t i o n committee at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, and my d i s s e r t a t i o n ad-v i s o r and f r i e n d , David J . E l k i n s , whose patient guidance has sustained both t h i s project and my development as a scholar. F i n a l l y , not every scholar i s p r i v i l e g e d to c i t e his wife as a mentor or colleague, but I f e e l that I must do so: her experience i n party and l e g i s l a t i v e p o l i t i c s i n Wisconsin has been an invaluable resource. Even more than t h i s , her patience, tenderness, and endurance have sustained me and kept me going these past three years. 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In 1975 the Wisconsin p r e s i d e n t i a l primary, which h i s t o r i c a l l y has been one of the most important such contests on the American campaign t r a i l , be-came the center of a controversy which resulted i n open p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t between the Democratic Party of Wisconsin and the Democratic National Committee, and within the ranks of both organizations as w e l l . The cause of the controversy was that one of the Democratic National Committee'.s new delegate s e l e c t i o n rules for the 1976 Democratic natio n a l convention d i r e c t l y contravened Wisconsin's revered 70 year-old "open" primary law. This par-t i c u l a r reform, r u l e 2A, sought to r e s t r i c t crossover voting i n Democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries by requiring state Democratic partie s to "take a l l f e a s i b l e steps to r e s t r i c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the delegate s e l e c t i o n process to Democratic voters only.""'" To the extent that compliance with this and other delegate s e l e c t i o n rules required the changing of c o n f l i c t i n g state laws, state Democratic p a r t i e s were required to "take provable p o s i t i v e steps to achieve l e g i s l a t i v e changes to bring the state law into compliance with the 2 provisions of these r u l e s . " Only i f a "good f a i t h e f f o r t " to change the laws were t r i e d and f a i l e d could a state party escape being ruled non-compliant. 2 In Wisconsin's case, the Democrats were i n possession of the Governor's chair and both houses of the l e g i s l a t u r e , which disposed the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to regard that almost nothing less than the actual change of Wisconsin's open primary law could be accepted as a "good f a i t h 3 e f f o r t " to comply with the nation a l r u l e s . The offending section of the Wisconsin law which r u l e 2A required amending permitted crossover voting i n a l l of the state's primary e l e c t i o n s , p r e s i d e n t i a l primary included. The DNC wanted t h i s law amended so that henceforth only voters acknowledging themselves to be Democratic party supporters could cast b a l l o t s on the Demo-c r a t i c side of the state's p r e s i d e n t i a l primary. I t was hoped that this change would discourage the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of independents and Republicans who had been " d i l u t i n g " the voice of true Democratic voters by crossing over into the Democratic primary, usually to vote for George Wallace. In Wisconsin, however, the r i g h t of crossover voting i s seen as a pro-gressive, anti-machine reform engineered by the state's most beloved and famous son, Robert M. La F o l l e t t e , Sr., and long has been a focus of p o l i t i -c a l o r i e n t a t i o n strongly entrenched i n the state's p o l i t i c a l culture. Dis-trus t of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s widespread i n Wisconsin, and public opposition to the proposed " c l o s i n g " of the open primary was immediate, strong, and unrelenting. Before the clash between these two reforms was over, p o l i t i c a l observers would be treated to the sort of spectacle Democrats are famous f o r : internecine warfare involving the DNC, the state Democratic party organiza-t i o n of Wisconsin, the state's Democratic governor, and a Democrat-co n t r o l l e d state l e g i s l a t u r e , with an antagonistic press and Republican opposition also interested i n the outcome. How these actors eventually resolved the open-vs.-closed primary controversy i n Wisconsin i s a case worth studying i n intimate d e t a i l for the lessons i t contains about r e l a t i o n s 3 between the nat i o n a l p a r t i e s and t h e i r components, the state p a r t i e s , i n our f e d e r a l p o l i t i c a l structure. The impact of that federal structure on the organizational structure of the n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s has been profoundly d e c e n t r a l i z i n g . As Leon D. Epstein points out, "Organizing parties b a s i c a l l y at subnational l e v e l s i s a common feature of f e d e r a l systems. . . . [W]herever there are s u b s t a n t i a l , c o n s t i -t u t i o n a l l y guaranteed powers at the regional l e v e l , p a r t i e s organize to compete for power at that l e v e l . A n a d d i t i o n a l feature of the American fe d e r a l system which heightens i t s d e c e n t r a l i z i n g e f f e c t i s that i t also requires p a r t i e s to be o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y strong at the state l e v e l i n order to compete for national power. The e l e c t o r a l college device interposed be-tween the popular vote and the e l e c t i o n of presidents makes v i c t o r y at the state l e v e l absolutely e s s e n t i a l to v i c t o r y at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l . Thus, p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c a l necessity h i s t o r i c a l l y has meant a more powerful s t r a -tegic p o s i t i o n i n the n a t i o n a l party for those who c o n t r o l the state party organizations than for those who head the national party organization i t s e l f . Moreover, the Constitution grants powers to the states as sovereign p o l i t i c a l units which they have used to regulate the conduct of party a f f a i r s within t h e i r boundaries to a degree which Frank J. Sorauf believes i s not equalled i n any other western democracy.^ And, as Epstein's observation suggested, as sovereign p o l i t i c a l u nits the states o f f e r an array of e l e c t i v e o f f i c e s to f i l l and governing functions to perform, which have the e f f e c t of s e t t i n g the states up as a r i v a l focus for the orientations and atten-tions of l o c a l party members. The r e s u l t has been the development of d i s -parate state p o l i t i c a l cultures (e.g., Progressivism i n Wisconsin, non-parti s a n p o l i t i c s i n Minnesota, and white p o l i t i c s i n Alabama) which are at odds not only with one another, but also with the idea that national party organizations, which are not even mentioned i n the Constitution, should be able to impose uniform standards of behavior upon those state p o l i t i c a l c u l -tures from the outside. The c o n f l i c t between Wisconsin Democrats and t h e i r n a t i o n a l party, then, i s not a new or unique one: i t i s as old as the nation i t s e l f . In a word, the open-vs.-closed primary controversy i n that state i s a question of states' r i g h t s , l i k e those of slavery, p o l l taxes, and the white primary. But the Wisconsin primary question i s an important new chapter on the subject of states' r i g h t s , at l e a s t as far as p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and e l e c t i o n laws are concerned. The Wisconsin controversy takes place a f t e r the United States Supreme Court's landmark Cousins v. Wigoda (1975) decision,^ and sheds l i g h t on how the power r e l a t i o n s h i p between the party nation a l committees and the state par t i e s has changed ( i n the Democratic party, at least) since that d e c i s i o n upheld the r i g h t of natio n a l committees to impose t h e i r own dele-gate s e l e c t i o n standards upon states. On the one hand, much of the evidence which w i l l be presented i n t h i s study suggests that the p o s i t i o n of the nation a l Democratic party unquestion-ably has been strengthened by Cousins y_. Wigbda (1975) and the delegate s e l e c t i o n reforms of the 1970's. These reforms, which were aimed at o f f -s e t t i n g environmental obstacles to party strength such as federalism, e l e c -t i o n laws, statutory regulation, and p o l i t i c a l culture, have had a rather dramatic impact. The delegate s e l e c t i o n rules have become important s t r a t e -gic considerations i n the race for the Democratic party's p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination, as the i n t e r e s t of the 1976 p r e s i d e n t i a l candidates i n the out-come of the Wisconsin primary dispute w i l l a t t e s t . In so doing, these rules have made the party organization more i n f l u e n t i a l i n the s e l e c t i o n of the p r e s i d e n t i a l nominee, and less the captive of such environmental factors as 5 federalism and state laws. Indeed, i t i s my contention that the o v e r a l l i n t e r a c t i o n between Wisconsin Democrats and the DNC during t h i s rules d i s -pute lends some weight to William J. Crotty's recent conclusion that "The h i s t o r i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between the national [Democratic] party and i t s l o c a l g and state units [has been] al t e r e d , and . . . dramatically reversed." With respect to the important functions of delegate s e l e c t i o n and p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination, the DNC now di c t a t e s terms to the state and l o c a l Democratic parties which i t once was ju s t the creature of. On the other hand, the outcome of the controversy under study saw Wisconsin Democrats gain a last-minute reprieve for t h e i r open primary from the DNC, which suggests that the DNC's court-backed reform rules s t i l l may be challenged s u c c e s s f u l l y . Why, then, do I contend that these rules have strengthened the DNC r e l a t i v e to i t s state components? Because the condi-tions under which Wisconsin's defiance of ru l e 2A ulti m a t e l y succeeded were quite d i f f e r e n t from those under which i t e a r l i e r had f a i l e d . The evidence which w i l l follow strongly suggests that Wisconsin's resistance to compli-ance, which was f r u i t l e s s so long as Wisconsin stood by i t s e l f , succeeded only when i t was joined by last-minute pressure o r i g i n a t i n g throughout most of the national Democratic party. The Wisconsin Democrats did gain a s p e c i a l exemption from the nationa l r u l e s , but only at the sufferance of a broad, majority c o a l i t i o n of na t i o n a l party elements, each of which had the i r own late-blooming i n t e r e s t i n keeping the Wisconsin primary open and binding. In f a c t , what had been only a states' r i g h t s struggle between a state and nat i o n a l party suddenly was absorbed into a larger struggle between DNC fac-tions seeking competitive advantage f o r t h e i r respective candidates i n the ongoing race f o r the party's p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination. Consequently, i t appears that the DNC has met with some success i n i t s e f f o r t to lessen the weakening and d e c e n t r a l i z i n g e f f e c t s of the f e d e r a l structure, which i s at the very core of the d i f f i c u l t environment i n which American p o l i t i c a l 9 p a r t i e s must operate. OTHER THEMES There also i s much more about party p o l i t i c s , and p o l i t i c s i n general, that can be learned from close study of the Wisconsin primary dispute. Following are three themes that recur throughout this study. Factionalism This study's concentration on a s p e c i f i c r u l e c o n f l i c t between a party nationa l commitee-=- and a state party should i l l u s t r a t e that state p a r t i e s as w e l l as n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s are not monoliths. They frequently contain groups divided along the l i n e s of i n t e r e s t , which q u a l i f i e s these groups for the l a b e l of " f a c t i o n . " 1 0 Within the Wisconsin party, for example, such a d i v i s i o n of i n t e r e s t existed between the three s t r u c t u r a l elements Sorauf has l a b e l l e d as the party organization, party-in-government, and p a r t y - i n - t h e - e l e c t o r a t e ; 1 1 elements which i n Wisconsin's case correspond very c l o s e l y to those f a c t i o n a l groupings which James Q. Wilson and others have termed as party "amateurs," 12 "p r o f e s s i o n a l s , " and "voters." The Democratic Party of Wisconsin (DPW) 13 was a volunteer organization dominated by "amateurs," whose chief concern during t h i s controversy was to get t h e i r state delegation admitted without challenge to the 1976 nation a l convention. The chief concern of the Demo-c r a t i c "voters" who were not enrolled members of the party but usually voted f o r i t s candidates was to preserve t h e i r anonymity and independence from 7 organizational c o n t r o l . The main concern of the " p r o f e s s i o n a l " p o l i t i c i a n s elected as Democrats to the state l e g i s l a t u r e was to avoid the e l e c t o r a l consequences that might r e s u l t from enacting a b i l l r e q u i r i n g the "voters" to declare themselves Democrats p u b l i c l y before being allowed to vote i n the Democratic h a l f of the state's heretofore open primary. Within the Democratic National Committee, a s i m i l a r but b i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n of opinion existed between the l i b e r a l - l e f t party reformers (usually "amateurs"), who believed that the nation a l rules must be enforced uniformly upon the states i n the i n t e r e s t of legitimacy and f a i r n e s s , and the mostly-moderate party regulars (usually " p r o f e s s i o n a l s " ) , who believed that the rules ought to be f l e x i b l e i n cases l i k e Wisconsin's, where s t r i c t enforcement might harm the state party's candidates competitively. Yet these two factions began to fragment and r e a l i g n once the race for the party's p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination was o f f i c i a l l y underway, and c e r t a i n members i n each began to perceive that t h e i r f a v o r i t e candidates stood to benefit i f r u l e 2A were enforced somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y i n Wisconsin's case than they o r i g i n a l l y had preferred. Cognizant of the r o l e which rules may play i n determining who 14 wins and who loses i n p o l i t i c s , they began to support or oppose Wisconsin's case for an open primary according to the c r i t e r i o n of candidate advantage, rather than the p r i n c i p l e s of states' r i g h t s versus a c c o u n t a b i l i t y to the r u l e s . Thus, ult i m a t e l y , the stakes involved i n the open-vs.-^-closed primary controversy grew to include competitive p o s i t i o n i n the race f o r the party's p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination, i n addition to the DNC's a b i l i t y to enforce i t s rules upon the states and the r i g h t of Wisconsin Democrats to abide by t h e i r state's long-standing t r a d i t i o n . These i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s i n both party organizations influenced the acting out of the c o n f l i c t between the DNC and Wisconsin Democrats, so that, 8 with factions i n each having input, the f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n of Wisconsin's primary i n 1976 was n e c e s s a r i l y a group deci s i o n . A c o a l i t i o n had to be formed from among those interested, which suggests a second general lesson of t h i s case study. C o a l i t i o n - B u i l d i n g The t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n of the party into amateurs, professionals, and voters (or party organization, party-in-government, and party-in-the-e l e c t o r a t e ) , compounded by the d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the party structure caused by the f e d e r a l system, makes i t "useful to think of p a r t i e s as coa-l i t i o n s of players whose members must somehow reach agreement among them-selves i f they are to be e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l forces.""^ Indeed, c o a l i t i o n behavior i s so t y p i c a l , not only of party p o l i t i c s but of our p l u r a l i s t i c p o l i t i c s i n general, that "American p o l i t i c s i s almost u n i v e r s a l l y seen as the p o l i t i c s of c o a l i t i o n - b u i l d i n g . " " ^ Consequently, much scholarship has been done on the c o a l i t i o n - b u i l d i n g process; but most of i t , such as that done by William H. Riker and Steven J. Brains,"*"^ i s t h e o r e t i c a l work applying game theory to the task of construct-ing a s e r i e s of general statements about how the c o a l i t i o n process operates. Not much of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e takes the "worm's-eye" approach to c o a l i t i o n -b u i l d i n g ; and thus very few good, in-depth examples e x i s t of how r e a l p o l i -t i c i a n s faced with the task of b u i l d i n g a c o a l i t i o n a c t u a l l y go about accomplishing that feat. Important concepts relevant to coalition-formation, such as "side payments" to a t t r a c t members into the c o a l i t i o n , have been 18 elucidated by Riker and others, but l i t t l e a t tention has been paid to such questions as what form a "side payment" a c t u a l l y might take, and how a 9 c o a l i t i o n leader might go about o f f e r i n g such inducements to prospective c o a l i t i o n partners. This study does not provide an answer to such questions i n any general sense, but i t does provide a f a s c i n a t i n g , enlightening, and even entertaining example of how one successful c o a l i t i o n was forged. The rather s u r p r i s i n g composition of the c o a l i t i o n of intraparty forces which saved Wisconsin's open primary, along with the calculated and s k i l l f u l manner i n which that c o a l i t i o n was put together, should provide readers some in s i g h t into the p r a c t i c a l techniques, or "nuts-and-bolts" of c o a l i t i o n - b u i l d i n g . S e l f - i n t e r e s t and the Dilemma of Choice F i n a l l y , a l l of this c o n f l i c t between national party and state party, and between factions within those p a r t i e s , i s perhaps as enlightening about i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l behavior as i t i s about group behavior. The c o n f l i c t s of opinion and i n t e r e s t that existed among the aforementioned group actors also existed i n s i d e or confronted many of the i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c i a n s who comprised those groups or f a c t i o n s . Their i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t -ing i d e a l s of states' r i g h t s and party r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and t h e i r juggling of the c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s of r e - e l e c t i o n and convention p a r t i c i p a t i o n , pro-vide us some i n s i g h t into the question of how p o l i t i c i a n s choose when they must choose between two or more values dear to them. Austin Ranney has noted that " r e a l l i f e p o l i t i c a l decisions are r a r e l y choices between flawless goods and unmitigated e v i l s ; they are usually choices between one good thing 19 and another." How do p o l i t i c i a n s go about choosing between two goods? Do they choose on the basis of which i s the greater p r i n c i p l e , or which better serves t h e i r s e l f i n t e r e s t , or what? 10 To ask t h i s question i s r e a l l y to ask what are the roots of p o l i t i c a l behavior; f o r , according to many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , ideology and i n t e r e s t 20 are the two most e s s e n t i a l motivating elements i n the realm of p o l i t i c s . Many argue that ideology, which Daniel B e l l sums up as "the conversion of 21 i d e a l s into s o c i a l l e v e r s , " i s a powerful motivating force i n human a c t i v -i t y . They point out that the potency of ideology i s borne out by the f a c t that i n t e r e s t s are more negotiable than b e l i e f s . When i n t e r e s t s c o n f l i c t i n a democratic system, they may be adjusted through bargaining; but when be-l i e f s c o n f l i c t , people tend to "dig i n t h e i r heels," and the c o n f l i c t i s more 22 l i k e l y to a t t a i n and/or remain at a high p i t c h . However, other scholars, 23 such as V. 0. Key, argue that ideology and i n t e r e s t are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d ; and some i n f a c t argue that ideologies are, among other things, r a t i o n a l i z a -tions of i n t e r e s t s . The " s e l e c t i o n " of an ideology, or of b i t s and pieces of an ideology, or of an opinion, i s , of course, dependent upon how * i • • 24 u s e f u l xt xs to a man or group. Which, then, of these two e s s e n t i a l motive forces i s greater? I t would be f o o l i s h and presumptuous to attempt to answer t h i s question i n a study as narrow i n scope as t h i s one. However, I w i l l contend that the i n d i v i d u a l voting behavior and other evidence presented i n the chapters ahead do strongly suggest two conclusions concerning how p o l i t i c i a n s choose. One i s that i n t e r e s t appears to outweigh ideology as a determinant of i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l behavior. The other i s that, the f i r s t conclusion aside, choosing between two goods i s a d i f f i c u l t , p a i n f u l proposition for the p o l i t i c i a n s — one i n which more time often i s spent t r y i n g to f i g u r e out how to have i t both ways than i n consideration of which good to choose. 11 THE APPROACH The case study method, which i s employed here, has both disadvantages and advantages. On the one hand, i t i s too often d e s c r i p t i v e rather than a n a l y t i c , focuses on the unique rather than the general, and as a r e s u l t sometimes contributes l i t t l e to the advancement of p o l i t i c a l science as a t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c body of knowledge. On the other hand, i t permits an inten-sive examination of the p a r t i c u l a r s under study, and i s we l l applied i n those instances i n which the scholar fears diminishment of the richness of the data, and the story i t t e l l s , may r e s u l t from the a p p l i c a t i o n of a r b i -t r a r y a. p r i o r i concepts. It i s my b e l i e f that such diminishment would have been the almost un-avoidable r e s u l t of the a p p l i c a t i o n of any other method to the study of the Wisconsin open-vs.-closed primary dispute, for there i s so much of i n t e r e s t i n that dispute which i s unique as we l l as general. The Progressive p o l i t i -c a l c ulture which underlay Wisconsin's opposition to the DNC's ru l e 2A i s unique; yet the r e s u l t i n g c o n f l i c t between the national party and i t s state component i s a recurrent theme i n American party p o l i t i c s . The c o a l i t i o n -b u i l d i n g strategy employed to save the open primary was conceived and exe-cuted by a rare p o l i t i c a l v i r t u o s o ; yet, as already mentioned, c o a l i t i o n p o l i t i c s are almost the very embodiment of American p o l i t i c s . The f a c t i o n a l turn-abouts and defections which occurred i n the DNC r u l e enforcement commission's last-minute vote to restore Wisconsin's open primary were unique i n the annals of that commission; yet, the i n t e r e s t which spurred those defections and reversals i s , as already mentioned, a general deter-minant of p o l i t i c a l behavior. Consequently, I have endeavored to t e l l the story of t h i s controversy i n minute d e t a i l , using the concluding sections of 12 each chapter to extract from the d e t a i l that which i s of more general i n t e r e s t . The plan employed for the organization of data i n th i s study i s an actor-oriented one. Chapters II and III set the background f o r the actors and t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n by d e t a i l i n g , f i r s t , the DNC's perception of a need to r e s t r i c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n by crossover voters i n i t s delegate s e l e c t i o n pro-cess; and second, the anti-party/pro-openness orientations of the Wisconsin p o l i t i c a l c ulture which influenced that state's various Democratic actors. Chapter IV describes each of the actors i n the d i s p u t e — t h e Democratic National Committee, the Democratic Party of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Demo-c r a t i c l e g i s l a t o r s , and Democratic Governor P a t r i c k J. Lucey—and s p e l l s out the s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t each actor had at stake i n the open-vs.-closed primary issue, and how that i n t e r e s t helped shape the actor's stance on the issue. The next four chapters cover the controversy from the standpoint of each actor, and d e t a i l the actions taken by each from the beginning of the controversy i n December, 1974 to i t s conclusion on March 5, 1976. As the creators and enforcers of ru l e 2A, the Democratic National Committee's actions set the stage f o r those of the various Wisconsin actors; hence, the f i r s t of these chapters (Chapter V) describes the r o l e and involvement of the DNC and i t s Compliance Review Commission, the q u a s i - j u d i c i a l compliance-monitoring and enforcement body which i s the instrument of national party control over the delegate s e l e c t i o n processes of the state party organiza-tions. Chapter VI undertakes the next l o g i c a l step, which i s the examination of the reactions of the Wisconsin Democratic party organization (the DPW) to the DNC's closed primary mandate, and to the new party commission which en-forced that mandate and monitored the Wisconsin Democrats' e f f o r t s to comply with i t . Chapter VII, which deals with the actions taken by the Wisconsin 13 l e g i s l a t u r e , shows how those l e g i s l a t o r s had a much more s u b s t a n t i a l stake i n the controversy than did the state party organization, and, being very independent of that organization anyway, behaved more d e f i a n t l y toward the DNC than the state party organization might have wished. Chapter VIII deals with Democratic Governor P a t r i c k J. Lucey's involvement, including h i s attempt i n the l a s t days of the c r i s i s to use h i s own national prestige and the ongoing race f o r the Democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination to form a c o a l i -t i o n of natio n a l party elements to save Wisconsin's open primary. F i n a l l y , i n Chapter IX, t h i s same c o a l i t i o n - b u i l d i n g process i s ex-amined a second time, from the perspective of the needs of Governor Lucey's c o a l i t i o n partners, rather than j u s t those of Mr. Lucey and Wisconsin. From this perspective, i t appears that those nation a l party elements, rather than the Governor and h i s fellow Wisconsin Democrats, were perhaps the r e a l engineers of the s a l v a t i o n of Wisconsin's open primary. The campaigns of no le s s than three of the top p r e s i d e n t i a l contenders—one each from the party's l e f t , r i g h t , and c e n t e r — a c t i v e l y sought the last-minute r e s t o r a t i o n of the primary as the means of the s e l e c t i o n of Wisconsin's delegates. Each of these candidates thought they could win or f i n i s h high i n Wisconsin, and each furthermore v i t a l l y needed a win or high f i n i s h j u s t then for various s t r a t e g i c reasons. This leads to the conclusion that i t r e a l l y was the nationa l Democratic party i t s e l f , and not j u s t a state party, which forced the DNC to back down on the question of Wisconsin's compliance with r u l e 2A. THE DATA Most of the data for t h i s study comes from document and newspaper c o l l e c t i o n s located i n Washington, D.C. and Madison, Wisconsin, and from 14 interviews conducted i n those c i t i e s . Documents Much of the documentary evidence i s taken from the f i l e s of the Demo-c r a t i c National Committee i n Washington, D.C, the f i l e s of the Democratic Party of Wisconsin i n Madison, Wisconsin, the f i l e s of the Wisconsin Legis-l a t i v e Reference Bureau i n the state C a p i t o l at Madison, and the archives of the State H i s t o r i c a l Society of Wisconsin, also at Madison. The f i l e s at the two party headquarters' o f f i c e s u i t e s , although incomplete and disorganized due to lack of space and s t a f f , were the most valuable sources of documents. They contained much correspondence between the nation a l and state party organizations i n regard to compliance, minutes and t r a n s c r i p t s of important meetings, and i n t e r n a l memoranda. The L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau's f i l e s contained relevant b i l l s , as well as a few pieces of o f f i c i a l correspondence, press releases, and b r i e f i n g papers that were us e f u l . The State H i s t o r i c a l Society's archives were consulted because they contained the o f f i c i a l papers of Governor P a t r i c k J. Lucey and the personal papers (1964-1974 only) of Wisconsin DNC member Michael Bleicher. Both were somewhat us e f u l sources of relevant newspaper c l i p p i n g s ; but aside from t h i s contained very l i t t l e s e n s i t i v e material except the Governor's telephone log and d a i l y schedules. More f r u i t f u l than these were two pr i v a t e c o l l e c t i o n s of papers kindly made a v a i l a b l e to me by former Lucey associates Linda R e i v i t z and Brady C. Williamson. These contained much us e f u l information about the Governor's stance and p o l i c y on the primary question, mainly i n the form of working notes, i n t e r n a l memoranda, and correspondence. E s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l was a f a s c i n a t i n g index card f i l e used by the Governor to determine how to approach 15 members of the DNC's Compliance Review Commission, who would vote on the last-minute r e s t o r a t i o n of Wisconsin's open primary. Newspapers The L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau's f i l e s were extremely valuable as a source of newspaper c l i p p i n g s . The LRB maintains a running c l i p p i n g s c o l l e c -t i o n , organized by topic and drawn from eight Wisconsin d a i l i e s and several 25 New York, Washington, and other n a t i o n a l l y prominent newspapers. Because Wisconsin p o l i t i c s were covered by th i s invaluable service from the stand-point of eight d i f f e r e n t d a i l i e s , I almost always was able to gain more than one perspective on the same news event. The f i l e s of the Democratic National Committee, which subscribes to the Press-Intelligence, Inc. clip p i n g s service f o r the information of i t s leaders and s t a f f , also con-tained many u s e f u l a r t i c l e s on the p o l i t i c s of the DNC from Washington and other b i g - c i t y d a i l i e s , which I augmented by scanning the Wisconsin State H i s t o r i c a l Society's microfilm holdings of the New York and Washington d a i l i e s between December, 1974 and July, 1976. Interviews A t h i r d important source of data for this study was the interview. Fifty-one i n d i v i d u a l s d i r e c t l y involved i n the open-vs.-closed primary controversy i n some capacity were interviewed a t o t a l of 69 times (several were re-interviewed a second and t h i r d time). Included were state l e g i s l a -tors, DPW organization leaders, and the Governor and h i s s t a f f i n Wisconsin, and members of the Democratic National Committee and i t s s t a f f , the DNC's Compliance Review Commission and i t s s t a f f , the Udall f o r President campaign, 16 and assorted other prominent Democratic leaders i n Washington, D.C. and elsewhere around the country. A number of those interviewed, however, wore more than one hat (e.g., were state l e g i s l a t o r s and DPW organization lead-e r s ) , so that the t o t a l number of l e g i s l a t o r s , state party leaders, DNC s t a f f , etc. a c t u a l l y interviewed exceeds 51, as the c a t e g o r i c a l breakdown i n Table 1 in d i c a t e s . The interviews, a l l of which were conducted by myself, were unstruc-tured ; although many questions were asked of several or a l l interviewees i n order to assure corroboration of important points. Twenty-one of the 69 interviews were conducted by telephone: most of these were either b r i e f , follow-up interviews, or were long-distance interviews of important actors who did not reside i n Washington or Wisconsin, and could not be interviewed i n person. Another 13 interviews a c t u a l l y consisted of wr i t t e n questions which were answered and returned by d i s t a n t respondents, four of whom were interviewed by telephone as w e l l . The remaining 35 interviews were conducted i n person, ranged i n length from 20 minutes to two-and-one-half hours, and almost always took place i n the privacy of the respondents' homes or o f f i c e s . Most were recorded on tape a f t e r the respondents were given the choice of notes or recording. To make sure that neither method would i n h i b i t the respondents, they were asked to s i g n a l i f they wished to say something not f o r a t t r i b u t i o n , and the recorder was turned o f f i f i t was i n use. Several respondents took advantage of t h i s safety valve, often more than once. Occasionally, when my own judgment led me to a n t i c i p a t e that a c e r t a i n respondent might f i n d a p a r t i c u l a r question too s e n s i t i v e to give a completely frank answer, I v o l u n t a r i l y turned the recorder o ff and assured the respondent that what he or she said would not be f o r a t t r i b u t i o n . 17 TABLE 1 Interviews Categorized by Role of Respondents* Democratic l e g i s l a t o r s Democratic National Committee DNC Compliance Review Commission Democratic Party of Wisconsin Administrative Committee Governor of Wisconsin and s t a f f Press (Wisconsin) Republican l e g i s l a t o r s U d a l l f o r President campaign Others Members I I 3 6 1 4 \> 5 Staff 2 2 1 2 5 1 7 To t a l N Roles of Those Interviewed 66 ^Respondents may occupy more than one r o l e 7 Assembly members, 4 Senators Congressman Morris K. Uda l l himself 18 Personal Records and Recollections The f i n a l , i f somewhat slanted, source of data i s my own f i l e of records, notes, and r e c o l l e c t i o n s from employment with the Democratic Party of Wisconsin during the period May, 1975 to February, 1976. In t h i s capacity as a member of the state party headquarters s t a f f , I attended and took notes on most meetings of the DPW's state Administrative Committee, a l l of the 1975-76 l e g i s l a t i v e f l o o r debates dealing with the b i l l s which would have closed the open primary, most of the l e g i s l a t i v e hearings on that same ques-t i o n , one of the meetings of Governor Lucey's "Ad Hoc Committee," and of course was party to several private discussions with various actors (which are used here "on background" only). For about three and a h a l f months p r i o r to the a r r i v a l of a new executive d i r e c t o r at DPW state headquarters, I was responsible for a l l matters having to do with delegate s e l e c t i o n to the 1976 n a t i o n a l convention. During t h i s time everything relevant to the p r i -mary question that came through state,party leaders"landed" oh my desk; and I t r a v e l l e d to roughly 60 of Wisconsin's 72 counties for unit membership meetings or discussions with county party headquarters which almost always involved the primary issue as w e l l as other delegate s e l e c t i o n matters. For these reasons, a personal f a m i l i a r i t y with the subject and the actors that i s not normally present i n academic studies may reveal i t s e l f i n t h i s work. Although this f a m i l i a r i t y almost c e r t a i n l y c a r r i e s with i t cer-t a i n biases, I have t r i e d to be as conscious of them as possible, and hope that the intimacy and f e e l f o r the issue and the actors conveyed here w i l l more than o f f s e t any s u b j e c t i v i t y on my part. With that warning to the reader, I now move on to a discussion of how the openness of Wisconsin's p r e s i d e n t i a l primary came to be an issue within the Democratic National C o m m i t t e e i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . 20 NOTES CHAPTER I "^Delegate Selection Rules for the 1976 Democratic National Convention (Washington, D.C: Democratic National Committee, 1 March 1975), 1. 2 I b i d . , 17-18. 3 See e s p e c i a l l y Scott Lang, Memorandum to Ron Steinhoff on "Wisconsin's 1976 Delegate Selection Process," DPW f i l e s , Madison, Wisconsin 14 March 1975. Also see "State Democrats Under Pressure," Milwaukee Sentinel, 6 November 1975; and "Primary Dilemma Hits Dems," Madison C a p i t a l Times, 5 May 1975. 4 Wisconsin Statutes 1975, section 8.12. ^Leon Epstein, "The Old States i n a New System," Anthony King, editor, The New American P o l i t i c a l System (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise I n s t i t u t e , 1978), 354. "No other p a r t i e s among the democracies of the world are so bound up i n l e g a l regulations as are the American p a r t i e s . The forms of t h e i r or-ganization are prescribed by the states i n endless, often f i n i c k y d e t a i l . The statutes on party organization set up grandiose layers of party committees and often chart the d e t a i l s of who w i l l compose them, when they w i l l meet, and what t h e i r agenda w i l l be. State law also defines the pa r t i e s themselves, often i n defining the r i g h t to place candidates on the b a l l o t . A number of states also undertake to regulate the a c t i v i t i e s of p a r t i e s ; many, for example, regulate t h e i r finances, and most place at le a s t some l i m i t s on t h e i r campaign p r a c t i c e s . So severe can these regula-tions be, i n f a c t , that i n some states the pa r t i e s have developed elaborate 21 st r a t e g i e s to evade the worst burdens of regul a t i o n . " Frank J. Sorauf, Party P o l i t i c s i n America, t h i r d e d i t i o n (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1976), 23. 7Cousins v. Wigoda, 73-1106, 95 Sup. Ct. 541 (1975). g William J. Crotty, Decision for the Democrats (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni v e r s i t y Press, 1978), 257. 9 Most contemporary s p e c i a l i s t s on the American p o l i t i c a l parties seem to f e e l that those parties are very much the creatures of t h e i r surrounding environment, which o v e r a l l i s quite h o s t i l e to t h e i r development and success. On t h i s , see e s p e c i a l l y Sorauf, Party P o l i t i c s i n America, 21-26; William J. Keefe, P a r t i e s , P o l i t i c s , and Public P o l i c y i n America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 1; and Leon Epstein, P o l i t i c a l P arties i n  Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), 8-9. "^The editors of the most recent (and perhaps most thorough) work on fa c t i o n a l i s m define a f a c t i o n as "any r e l a t i v e l y organized group that e x i s t s within the context of some other group and which competes with r i v a l s f o r power advantages within the larger group of which i t i s a part." See Dennis C. B e l l e r and Frank P. B e l l o n i , "Party and Faction: Modes of P o l i t i c a l Competition," i n B e l l o n i and B e l l e r , e d i t o r s , Faction P o l i t i c s (Santa Barbara, C a l . : ABC C l i o Press, 1978), 419. "'"''"Sorauf, Party P o l i t i c s i n America, 9-11. 12 James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago: Un i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1962). 1 3 See i b i d . , 160, 183-84; and Frank J . Sorauf, "Extra-Legal P o l i t i c a l P a rties i n Wisconsin," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 48 (September 1954), 695-96, 701-03. 22 Austin Ranney explains the p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of rules thusly: " F i r s t , the structure of a party's organization, whatever may be i t s u l t i -mate s i g n i f i c a n c e or i n s i g n i f i c a n c e for the Republic, has a profound i n f l u -ence on contests to win the party's nominations, e l e c t i t s candidates, d i s t r i b u t e i t s patronage, formulate i t s programs, and a l l o c a t e whatever other goods i t s members seek. Second, the party's structure i s determined most immediately by the content, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and a p p l i c a t i o n of i t s own rules and the relevant public laws. Third, people can and do preserve or change the party's structure by making and amending the rules and laws. And fourth, the contests between those who urge and those who r e s i s t p a r t i c u l a r reform proposals are r e a l f i g h t s over important stakes, and any party p o l i t i c i a n who recognizes that such a f i g h t may put h i s own p o s i t i o n i n the balance has no choice but to p a r t i c i p a t e . " Curing the Mischiefs of Faction (Berkeley: Un i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1975), 10-11. "'"^Steven J. Brams, The P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n Game (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1978), 136. 16 Anthony King, "The American P o l i t y i n the Late 1970's: Building C o a l i t i o n s i n the Sand," Anthony King, editor, The New American System, 388. "^See, e.g., Brams, The P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n Game; Steven J. Brams, "P o s i t i v e C o a l i t i o n Theory: The Relationship Between Postulated Goals and Derived Behavior," Cornelius P. Cotter, e d i t o r , P o l i t i c a l Science Annual, IV: An International Review (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), 101-24; Steven J . Brams and William H. Riker, "Models of C o a l i t i o n Formation i n Voting Bodies," James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd, e d i t o r s , Mathematical  Applications i n P o l i t i c a l Science, VI ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e : U n i v e r s i t y of V i r g i n i a Press, 1972), 79-124; and William H. Riker, The Theory of P o l i t i c a l 23 Coa l i t i o n s (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962). I Q I b i d . , 3 4 , 105-06. 19 Ranney, Curing Faction, 195. 20 See David E. Apter, Introduction to P o l i t i c a l Analysis (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1977), 226, 232. 21 Daniel B e l l , The End of Ideology (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960), 371. 22 Arnold M. Rose, ed i t o r , Human Behavior and S o c i a l Processes (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n , 1962), 3-19. 23 Key, c i t e d by Apter, P o l i t i c a l Analysis, 232. 24 Robert E. Lane, P o l i t i c a l Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1962), 431-32. 25 The relevant c o l l e c t i o n s used here are f i l e s 324.34/Z and 324.346/Z, both of which concern p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries. 24 CHAPTER II CROSSOVER VOTING: THE DNC'S REASON FOR WANTING A CLOSED PRIMARY To understand the dispute between the nat i o n a l and Wisconsin Democratic p a r t i e s , i t i s f i r s t necessary to understand why the DNC passed a r u l e ban-ning open primaries. The problem that the DNC sought to r e c t i f y was that committed Democrats sometimes were not the sole determinants of the outcomes of Democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries. While some crossover voting takes place i n a l l primaries, DNC o f f i c i a l s were convinced that t h i s was e s p e c i a l l y true i n those states whose p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries were "open.""'" The source of t h i s b e l i e f was two-fold: f i r s t , a d i s p a r i t y existed i n the percentage of t o t a l Democratic strength turning out to vote i n open primaries as opposed to closed primaries; and second, Democratic voter turnout i n open p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries tended to be greater than the Democratic turnout i n those same states i n November. An i n t e r n a l memorandum from Compliance Review Commission Executive Director Scott Lang to DNC Deputy Chairperson Mary Lou Burg reported that the percentage of t o t a l Democratic strength turning out to vote i n Wiscon-sin's 1972 p r e s i d e n t i a l primary not only was f a r higher than that of most closed p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries, but was even i n excess of 100 percent of. 25 2 that estimated strength (see Table 2). Obviously, according to t h i s a n a l y s i s , more Democratic votes were cast i n Wisconsin's (and Tennessee's) 1972 primary than l e g i t i m a t e l y existed i n the state. A subsequent com-parison of Democratic voter turnout figures for the l a s t four Wisconsin p r i -mary and general p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s suggested that Wisconsin c o n s i s t e n t l y seemed to have many more Democrats at primary-time than i t did i n November (see Table 3). As Compliance Review Commission member Marge Pattison of Wisconsin pointed out i n making these figures p u b l i c , In each of [the l a s t ] four Wisconsin p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries the people of t h i s state voted the Democratic t i c k e t by margins of two-to-one, and i n 1972 by a margin of almost four-to-one. Yet the Republican candidate for president c a r r i e d t h i s state i n three 3 out of four of those years i n November. The problem, though, was not j u s t that non-Democrats were casting b a l l o t s i n Democratic primaries, but that i n doing so they were d i l u t i n g the w i l l of true Democrats, who presumably might prefer a d i f f e r e n t type of candidate than do Republicans and independents. In the eyes of many Demo-cra t s , most of them l i b e r a l s and residents of the other 49 states, t h i s d i l u t i o n was too often the r e s u l t of a conscious attempt to sow mischief i n the ranks of the Democratic party. The open primary, which once was a r e -form protecting the vote of small entrepreneurs and laborers from customer 4 and employer pressure, now was perceived by high DNC o f f i c i a l s as "the mechanism of the most fl a g r a n t manipulation of democratic d e c i s i o n -making. . . . 26 TABLE 2 Democratic Voter Turnout i n 1972 Open and Closed Primaries" State Percentage of States' T o t a l Democratic Strength Voting Pure open primaries Michigan Wisconsin 92 % 100+ % Primaries i n which voter's preference i s declared but unrecorded Tennessee 100+ % Primaries i n which voter's preference i s declared and recorded I l l i n o i s Indiana Ohio New Jersey Rhode Island 54 83 63 6 15 Adapted from Scott Lang, Memorandum to MLB (DNC Deputy Chair-person Mary Lou Berg), "Re: Wisconsin Crossover Vote," undated (Rei v i t z f i l e s ) . TABLE 3 Wisconsin Voter Turnout Primary and General P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n s * Primary General 1960 Rep. Dem. 339.4 842.8 895.2 830.6 1964 Rep. Dem. 1968 Rep. Dem. 1972 Rep. Dem. 299.6 788.5 489.9 733.0 286.4 1128.6 638.5 1050.4 810.0 748.8 989.4 810.2 In hundred thousands. Data compiled from Wisconsin L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Blue Book (Madison: Department of Administration, 1961, 1965, 1969, and 1973). 27 The Case Against Crossover Voting Most p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s maintain that crossover voting with mis-chievous intent i s not widespread, i f i t e x i s t s at a l l ; ^ but those p o l i t i -cians with p r a c t i c a l experience i n managing campaigns and running for o f f i c e have ever maintained that i t does. I t matters not who i s r i g h t ; what i s important here i s that i t i s the p o l i t i c i a n s , and not the p o l i t i c a l s cien-t i s t s , who make the nation a l delegate s e l e c t i o n r u l e s . The record, or legend, of purported crossover abuses that served as a p r i n c i p l e part of t h e i r case for banning open primaries was a r i c h one, and much of i t i n -volved Wisconsin e l e c t i o n s . In the 1946 C a l i f o r n i a gubernatorial primary, Governor E a r l Warren was nominated as both the Republican and Democratic candidate f o r governor be-cause the Republican primary was uncontested and Republicans voted en masse i n the Democratic primary.^ In that same year, Wisconsin Democrats reputedly crossed over to vote i n the Republican primary for what they thought was the weaker of the two candidates, and gave the nomination to an unknown named r 8 Joe McCarthy over the incumbent, Robert La F o l l e t t e , J r . Ten years l a t e r , many Wisconsin Democrats knowingly voted for Republican Senator Alexander Wiley because they thought h i s primary challenger, Congressman Glenn Davis, 9 would be harder for Democrat William Proxmire to beat. Vote t o t a l s i n the 1952 Wisconsin p r e s i d e n t i a l primary r e f l e c t e d what the Brookings I n s t i t u t e and the American P o l i t i c a l Science Association termed "a migration of Demo-c r a t i c voters into the Republican primary . . . who were s o l e l y interested i n aiding the [Earl] Warren s l a t e against the [Robert] Taft s l a t e . I n the 1956 Minnesota primary, Senator Estes Kefauver defeated A d l a i Stevenson and won most of that state's delegation with the help of a heavy Republican 28 crossover. Mr. Stevenson's campaign immediately charged that the 125,000 voters who crossed party l i n e s had done so i n a concerted e f f o r t to stop the strongest Democratic candidate. David, Goldman, and Bain conclude that the crossover probably consisted of "both a s u b s t a n t i a l bona f i d e farm vote for Kefauver and a considerable Republican crossover that appeared -to be d e l i b e r -ately intended to confuse the issue f or the Democratic party."1"'" They note that without the crossover, Mr. Stevenson might have won by "a small majori-t y , " and that t h i s episode "undoubtedly" played a major r o l e i n the subse-quent repeal of Minnesota's primary law. Equally as alarming as these reputed incidents of mischievous crossover voting were some i n which mischief may not have been intended. E s p e c i a l l y notable among these were the s u r p r i s i n g showing i n the 1964 Wisconsin p r i -mary by George Wallace, whose 30 percent of the Democratic vote consisted mostly of Republican and independent crossover votes (see Table 4); the upset v i c t o r y i n the 1968 Wisconsin primary of Eugene McCarthy, who apparently drew more than a t h i r d of h i s t o t a l vote from Republicans and independents (Table 4); and the upset v i c t o r y of George McGovern i n the 1972 Wisconsin primary, i n which i t was revealed by a New York Times p o l l (N=382) that 19.3 percent of the 1,128,584 voters casting Democratic b a l l o t s were Republicans, 12 and another 7.3 percent were independents. In other words, roughly 218,000 Republicans p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the 1972 Democratic primary, while only 286,444 voters (some of whom must have been independents) cast b a l l o t s i n the Republican primary. An angry Hubert Humphrey to l d the Times the day a f t e r Senator McGovern's Wisconsin v i c t o r y that that outcome was not an accurate r e f l e c t i o n of Democratic voters' wishes: "A 50 percent Republican crossover 13 louses i t up, and everyone knows i t . " Worst of a l l , i t seemed possible to some Democrats that crossover TABLE 4 Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Voters Casting Ba l l o t s f o r Leading Candidates i n the 1964 and 1968 Wisconsin Democratic P r e s i d e n t i a l Primaries* 1964 1968 Voters' Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Wallace N % Reynolds N % Total N % McCarthy N % Johnson N % Others a N % Tota l N : IDemocrat 10 6.8 127 93.2 137 100 .0 68 47.9 56 39.4 18 12.7 142 100 .0 Crossovers 30 62.5 18 37.5 48 100 .0 39 69.6 8 14.3 9 16.1 56 100 .0 Independent 4 22.2 14 77.8 18 100 .0 12 54.5 5 22.7 5 22.7 22 99 .9 Republican 26 86.7 4 13.3 30 100 .0 27 79.4 3 8.8 4 11.8 34 100 .0 *Adapted from David Adamany, "Crossover Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules, American  P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 70 (June 1976), 539. Consists of w r i t e - i n votes f o r Hubert Humphrey, Robert Kennedy, and George Wallace. 30 voting on such a grand scale might occur again i n 1976. Indeed, former Congressman Melvin L a i r d , a leading Wisconsin Republican and close advisor of President Ford, had predicted p u b l i c l y that up to 60 percent of Wiscon-sin's Republicans might cross over to vote i n the 1976 Democratic primary. The Growing Consensus Against Open Primaries Consequently, many throughout the national Democratic party began to question the open primary concept because, regardless of whether mischief was intended or not, Republicans and independents were influ e n c i n g the race for the Democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination. This r e a l i z a t i o n came rather slowly at f i r s t . The o r i g i n a l McGovern-Fraser delegate s e l e c t i o n rules written i n 1970 did not include a closed primary p r o v i s i o n ; although the McGovern-Fraser Commission did consider crossover voting a problem, and noted i n i t s report that "a f u l l opportunity for a l l Democrats to p a r t i c i p a t e i s d i l u t e d i f members of other p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s are allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the tf- 15 s e l e c t i o n of delegates to the Democratic National Convention." Several events occurring a f t e r that report had been written, however, had the e f f e c t of r a p i d l y spreading the commission's concern throughout the Democratic party. One was the massive crossover voting which occurred i n the 1972 Michigan and Wisconsin open primaries, which many party regulars pointed to as the reason George Wallace and George McGovern won those p r i -maries, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Another was the d r a s t i c increase i n the number of states holding binding p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries, from 15 i n 1968 to 22 i n 1972, with another eight states adding primaries by 1976. At stake i n those 30 primaries to be held i n 1976 would be almost 75 percent of a l l delegates attending the convention, compared with 66 percent i n 1972 and 47 percent 31 i n 1968. ^ I n f l u e n t i a l Democratic s t r a t e g i s t s l i k e former McGovern dele-date-counter Rick Stearns responded to t h i s increase by warning that as the number of delegates chosen by primary voters went up, so the d i l u t i n g poten-t i a l of crossover voting went up."'"7 A t h i r d event which added to Democrats' fear of crossover voting was the replacement of the "winner-take-all" system of delegate apportionment with a system apportioning delegates proportional to each p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate's share of the vote. Rule 11 of the Mikulski rules f or delegate s e l e c t i o n i n 1976 required that each state's delegation " f a i r l y r e f l e c t the d i v i s i o n of preferences expressed by those who p a r t i c i -18 pate i n [ i t s ] p r e s i d e n t i a l nominating process"; which meant that George Wallace, who had done very well i n past open primaries thanks to s i g n i f i c a n t crossover voting, might win a large portion of the delegations from the c r u c i a l states of Michigan and Wisconsin. This l a t t e r prospect, e s p e c i a l l y , did not appeal to the Democratic party's l i b e r a l - l e f t or party reform element, which remained i n a very strong p o s i t i o n on the Democratic National Committee a f t e r 1972. Reform leaders Kenneth A. Bode and Joseph L. Rauh pressed forward the argument that party members, as i d e o l o g i c a l advocates, possess a F i r s t Amendment r i g h t to r e s t r i c t access to t h e i r party's decision-making bodies, on a non-discrimina-19 tory b a s i s , i n order to promote t h e i r p o l i t i c a l views e f f e c t i v e l y . The l i b e r a l ADA's 1973 Report on the Democratic Party's Delegate Selection Guide- l i n e s c a l l e d f o r (1) State parti e s [to] make a l l f e a s i b l e e f f o r t s to enact state laws re q u i r i n g party r e g i s t r a t i o n , and preventing persons i n other p a r t i e s from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the Democratic Party's dele-20 gate s e l e c t i o n process. . . . 32 Also among those pushing for such r e s t r i c t i o n s on p a r t i c i p a t i o n were many party r e g u l a r s — e s p e c i a l l y those who had supported Senator Humphrey i n 1972 and believed that crossover voting had cost him the Wisconsin primary. The C o a l i t i o n for a Democratic Majority, and several Humphrey campaign alumni who had worked for CDM before being hired onto Robert S. Strauss's DNC s t a f f , were very much i n favor of measures barring non-Democrats from the 21 delegate s e l e c t i o n process. Two of the l a t t e r who were instrumental i n pushing for and l a t e r enforcing r u l e 2A were DNC Executive Director Mark A. Siegel, and the aforementioned Compliance Review Commission Executive Direc-tor, Scott Lang. As Mr. Siegel put i t , I j u s t want to d i r e c t you to an a r t i c l e i n the New York Times the day a f t e r the Wisconsin primary i n 1972, which, indicated that i f only Democrats had been allowed to vote i n [that] p r i -mary, Hubert Humphrey would have won. Now, we're dealing with actors, right? Well, I'm one of the actors and Scott Lang was one of the actors. We were very much influenced by that [Humphrey's loss i n Wisconsin], and also by the whole 1972 22 credentials process. Heightening Mr. Siegel's determination to end crossover voting was his publicly-expressed fear that Mr. Laird's p r e d i c t i o n of a 60 percent cross-over i n 1976 indicated that a massive crossover e f f o r t was going to be 23 "organized and led by the Republican party." In short, a broad spectrum of Democrats, ranging from the party's center to the l e f t , began to view open primaries as anathema, and started to a g i t a t e for banishment of the open primary format at the s i x regional hear-ings on delegate s e l e c t i o n held i n 1973 by the McGovern-Fraser Commission's 33 successor, the Mikulski Commission. A few samples of the testimony given at these hearings w i l l demonstrate the emerging consensus within the n a t i o n a l Democratic party with respect to crossover voting: "I would urge . . . your Commission to adopt under Guideline C-3 a requirement that only party members . . . be allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e . " (Keith Henning, Wyoming AFL-CIO) "There should be no c r o s s - f i l i n g , and no open primaries." (Marilyn Schoenberger, Maine delegate, 1972) "I strongly urge . . . that the National Democratic Party take measures so that a l l state Democratic Parties work to have the primary laws changed to make i t necessary to be a Democrat to vote i n the Democratic primary." (Harry Kantor, Marquette University professor) "I would hope that . . . requirements would be adopted i n order to allow only those that are party members . . . to p a r t i c i p a t e . " (Gene Moats, I l l i n o i s Service Employes' Union) "Labor strongly supports a c t i o n by the Texas l e g i s l a t u r e for a party r e g i s t r a t i o n law that would eliminate the 'crossover vote.'" (Harry Hubbard, Texas AFL-CIO) "I t ' s time we get the Republicans out of our primaries and out 24 of our party." (Pat Pangburn, Texas Democrat) The Mikulski Commission heard t h i s testimony and much more, and reacted by recommending to the DNC that r u l e 2A, r e s t r i c t i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n each state 34 Democratic party's delegate s e l e c t i o n process to sworn Democrats only, be i n s t i t u t e d . V i r t u a l l y the en t i r e n a t i o n a l Democratic party had demanded i t . Cousins v. Wigoda and National Party Supremacy One aspect of the DNC's i n s t i t u t i o n of r u l e 2A that must be touched on i s the o r i g i n of i t s authority to make and enforce such rules upon the states. U n t i l the 1960's, there were no national party rules governing how primaries were run or how delegates were selected. From 1832 to 1964, state p a r t i e s (or states, anyway) were free to choose t h e i r delegates as they wished. On what basis, then, was the DNC able to make such rules and en-force them on the states, to whom the Constitution gave the r i g h t to deter-mine e l e c t i o n laws? In 1964, the DNC took the f i r s t steps toward deciding how delegates ought to be chosen by f i r s t deciding how they ought not to be chosen ( i . e . , no r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ) . These a n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n guidelines were b o l -stered somewhat i n 1968, but the f i r s t comprehensive set of delegate s e l e c -t i o n rules was not created u n t i l 1969-70, under the aegis of the McGovern-Fraser Commission mandated by the 1968 convention to look into the question of how the party's delegate s e l e c t i o n process might be improved. I t was the c r i s p enforcement of these 18 new rules upon the state p a r t i e s i n 1972 which provoked the i n e v i t a b l e state l e g a l challenge out of which grew the landmark court f i n d i n g of the supremacy of na t i o n a l party rules ( i n the matter of delegate s e l e c t i o n ) . Cousins v. Wigoda (1975) resulted from a credentials f i g h t i n the I l l i n o i s delegation at the 1972 Democratic nation a l convention i n Miami. The Wigoda delegates, elected under I l l i n o i s ' primary law and c o n s t i t u t i n g 35 the "regular" ( i . e . Daley) delegation, were challenged at that convention by the Cousins group on the grounds that the s l a t e elected i n the primary was handpicked by Mayor Richard Daley and ignored party guidelines concerning the involvement of m i n o r i t i e s , women, and young people i n the delegate selec-t i o n process. The Credentials Committee agreed and seated the Cousins group, prompting the regulars to obtain an inj u n c t i o n from the C i r c u i t Court of Cook County enjoining the Cousins group from taking the Wigoda group's 25 seats. When the I l l i n o i s Appellate Court upheld the C i r c u i t Court's i n j u n c t i o n on the bases that (1) "the r i g h t to s i t as a delegate representing I l l i n o i s at the na t i o n a l nominating convention i s governed e x c l u s i v e l y by the I l l i n o i s E l e c t i o n Code," and (2) "the i n t e r e s t of the state i n protecting the e f f e c -t i v e r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n primaries i s superior to whatever other i n t e r -26 ests the party i t s e l f might wish to protect," the United States Supreme 27 Court decided to hear the case. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the I l l i n o i s court, r u l i n g that the administrative prerogatives of the state do not extend to pa r t i s a n delegate s e l e c t i o n . J u s t i c e Brennan, w r i t i n g for the majority, held that: Consideration of the s p e c i a l function of delegates to such a Convention m i l i t a t e s persuasively against the conclusion that the asserted i n t e r e s t [by the I l l i n o i s Appellate Court] c o n s t i -tutes a compelling state i n t e r e s t . Delegates perform a task of supreme importance to every c i t i z e n of the Nation regardless of t h e i r state of residence. The v i t a l business of the Convention i s the nomination of the Party's candidates for the o f f i c e s of President and Vice President of the United States. . . . The 36 states themselves have no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated r o l e i n the task of the s e l e c t i o n of P r e s i d e n t i a l and Vice P r e s i d e n t i a l candidates. If the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and e l i g i b i l i t y of delegates to the National P o l i t i c a l Party Conventions were l e f t to state law " . . . each of the f i f t y states could e s t a b l i s h the q u a l i -f i c a t i o n s of i t s delegates to the various party conventions with-out regard to party p o l i c y , an obviously i n t o l e r a b l e r e s u l t . " Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82, 86 (1972). Such a regime could s e r i o u s l y undercut or indeed destroy the effectiveness of the National Party Convention as a concerted enterprise en-gaged i n the v i t a l process of choosing P r e s i d e n t i a l and Vice P r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d i d a t e s — a process which usually involves coa-l i t i o n s c u t t i n g across state l i n e s . The Convention serves the pervasive n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the s e l e c t i o n of candidates for na t i o n a l o f f i c e , and t h i s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i s greater than any 28 i n t e r e s t of an i n d i v i d u a l state. Thus, Mr. J u s t i c e Brennan by i m p l i c a t i o n draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between non-p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries and elections for o f f i c e on the one hand, and the s e l e c t i o n of delegates to a p a r t i s a n convention on the other. In addition, the Supreme Court ruled that any attempt to impose state regulations on the delegate s e l e c t i o n process would v i o l a t e r i g h t s of a s s o c i a t i o n . "The National Democratic Party and i t s adherents enjoy a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - p r o -tected r i g h t of p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n , " J u s t i c e Brennan wrote, c i t i n g an a d d i t i o n a l case to demonstrate that such ass o c i a t i o n i s an "orderly group a c t i v i t y " protected by the F i r s t and Fourteenth Amendments. 37 Summary To sum up, the e f f e c t of large-scale crossover voting i n open primary states such as Michigan and Wisconsin could be a c r i t i c a l f actor i n the race for the Democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l nomination. And the p o s s i b i l i t y that cross-overs on such a scale would occur again i n 1976 was not far-fetched, as f a r as the DNC o f f i c i a l s were concerned. Consequently, they were determined to see r u l e 2A enforced, and intended to make Wisconsin either close i t s open primary, or adopt another format f o r the s e l e c t i o n of i t s delegates (e.g., caucuses or conventions). That they had the r i g h t to make and enforce such a rul e had been affirmed by the Supreme Court i n Cousins v. Wigoda (1975). However, the pecu l i a r p o l i t i c a l culture of Wisconsin did not dispose anyone i n that state (even Democrats) to submit to such a change i n i t s primary law, as the next chapter w i l l show. 38 NOTES CHAPTER II "'"Dr. Mark A. Siegel, interview at the White House, Washington, D.C, 18 August 1977. 2 Scott Lang, Memorandum to MLB (DNC Deputy Chairperson Mary Lou Burg) "Re: Wisconsin Crossover Vote," undated, personal f i l e s of Linda R e i v i t z , Madison, Wisconsin. This memo was written p r i o r to July 28, 1975, as a copy of i t i s stamped "received" on that date by the Wisconsin Department of Administration. Table 2, which i s taken from t h i s memo, obviously i s de-rived from a larger Table done by the C o a l i t i o n f o r a Democratic Majority (see Table 7.5 i n William J. Crotty, P o l i t i c a l Reform and the American  Experiment [New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1977], 223-27). Since Wisconsin does not have party r e g i s t r a t i o n , the CDM estimated Wisconsin's r e a l Demo-c r a t i c strength by averaging the number of voters i n the state's Democratic p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries i n 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972. 3 Marge Pattison, "Statement to the Assembly Committee on Elections of the Wisconsin L e g i s l a t u r e , " 23 June 1975, f i l e s of the Assembly Committee on Elections Chairperson, Madison, Wisconsin (mimeographed). 4 Wilber G. Katz, The Direct Primary and Party R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n Wisconsin (B.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1923), 22-23. (Winner, Jubilee Medal.) "'Mark A. Sie g e l , "Democratic Leader Responds to Open Primary E d i t o r i a l , " Madison Cap i t a l Times, 21 July 1975. E.g., Sorauf, Party P o l i t i c s i n America, 216; and David Adamany, "Crossover Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules," American 39 P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 70 (June 1976), 538. 7 I b i d . , 217. g Robert C. Nesbit, Wisconsin: A History (Madison: University of Wiscon-s i n Press, 1973), 528. John Wyngaard, dean of Wisconsin's C a p i t o l press corps, confirms that McCarthy had Democratic help, and i n fa c t had counted on a t t r a c t i n g a strong crossover vote from I r i s h - C a t h o l i c Democrats. Wyngaard, "Crossovers Sure Thing," Green Bay Press-Gazette, 17 June 1975. 9 William C h r i s t o f f e r s o n , "Dems Take Calculated Risk on Primary," Wisconsin State Journal, 3 August 1975. ^ P a u l T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman, e d i t o r s , Presiden- t i a l Nominating P o l i t i c s i n 1952, volume 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1954), 138-39. This conclusion was supported by a county-by-county analysis of returns: "Senator Taft's campaign drew most votes i n areas that are usually 'regular' Republican, while Governor Warren was strongest i n communities where Democrats have shown maj o r i t i e s i n recent elections . . . [e.g.,] i n i n d u s t r i a l Milwaukee county, normally Democratic, where his delegates had the support of the Milwaukee Journal, which endorsed them as a means of giving expression to the Eisenhower candidacy. The Warren delegates were s i m i l a r l y strong i n the second d i s t r i c t , embracing Democratic Dane county (Madison), where pro-Eisenhower newspaper support was also regarded as i n f l u e n t i a l . " "^Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, The P o l i t i c s of  National Party Conventions, revised (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 204-05. 12 Douglas Kneeland, "McGovern Gains 54 of Delegates i n Wisconsin Race," New York Times, 6 A p r i l 1972. A l a t e r and larger, more sophisticated p o l l 40 (N=839) by the University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory found that 22.4 percent of those voting i n the 1972 Democratic primary had been Republi-cans, and 11.2 percent independents. DNC decision-makers commonly referred to the Times' f i g u r e s , however; probably because the Survey Research Labora-tory figures were published a f t e r the Mikulski Commission was past the research stage. As far as I c a n ' t e l l , Adamany's "Crossover Voting and Reform Rules," 538, i s the f i r s t source to publish these r e s u l t s . 13 Ibid. Mr. Humphrey and his campaigners were not the only ones who f e l t that the heavy crossover had d i s t o r t e d the Wisconsin primary r e s u l t . Many astute observers i n the press agreed with them. See the opinion of Newsweek's John J. Lindsay, paraphrased i n Timothy Crouse, The Boys on the  Bus (New York: Random House, 1972, 1973), 64-65. Three years l a t e r , i n the middle of the primary controversy, the New York Times came out i n favor of c l o s i n g Wisconsin's primary i n an e d i t o r i a l which noted: "Many p o l i t i c a l observers of the 1972 Wisconsin primary be l i e v e that Senator Hubert H. Humphrey would have been the state's Democratic preference that year i f Republicans, fearing h i s strength i n November, had not crossed over to weaken him with a flood of votes for Senator George McGovern and Governor George Wallace." New York Times e d i t o r i a l , 26 August 1975. 14 Mr. L a i r d was quoted thusly by both Mark A. Siegel and Wisconsin CRC member Marge Pattison. See John Keefe, "Democrat Raps State on Primary," Wisconsin State Journal, 10 June 1975; and Pattison, "Statement to Assembly Committee on E l e c t i o n s . " "'"^Report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, Mandate for Reform (Washington: Democratic National Committee, 1970), 47. 16 Sorauf, Party P o l i t i c s i n America, 274; and Joseph Gorman, "E l e c t i o n s : 41 P r e s i d e n t i a l Primaries" (Library of Congress Issue Bri e f No. IB75026), 25 August 1975. 1 7 A l a n L. Otten, " P o l i t i c s and People," Wall Street Journal, 8 July 1976. 18 1976 Delegate Selection Rules, 6. 19 Joseph L. Rauh, Kenneth A. Bode, and J e f f r e y Fishback, "National Con-vention Apportionment: The P o l i t i c s and the Law," American Un i v e r s i t y Law  Review, 23 (1973), 27-31. 20 Americans for Democratic Action, Let Us Continue: A Report on the  Democratic Party's Delegate Selection Guidelines (Washington: Americans for Democratic Action, August 1973), 23-24. 21 C o a l i t i o n for a Democratic Majority, Unity Out of D i v e r s i t y ( d r a f t ) , undated, 9 (mimeographed). I am indebted to Steven Schier of the Un i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin-Madison for making t h i s and the documents c i t e d i n footnote 24 a v a i l a b l e to me. 22 Si e g e l , interview, 18 August 1977. 23 Siegel, quoted i n John Keefe, "Democrat Raps State on Primary," Wisconsin State Journal, 10 June 1975. 24 Barbara A. Mikulski, Memoranda to Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure members summarizing regional hearings i n Milwaukee, Boston, San Francisco, and Denver; dated 22 June 1973, 16 July 1973, 1 August 1973, and 4 August 1973, r e s p e c t i v e l y , personal papers of Steven Schier, Madison, Wisconsin. Others t e s t i f y i n g i n favor of r e s t r i c t i n g the delegate s e l e c t i o n process to Democrats only included Prentice Witherspoon, of the C o a l i t i o n for a Democratic Majority; Terence McGarty, MIT professor; Ann Lee Roy, Texas Democrat; Gladys Hansen, New Mexico state senator; and Roy Young, C a l i f o r n i a 42 p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t — t o name j u s t a few. 25 However, the Cousins delegates were seated and p a r t i c i p a t e d throughout the e n t i r e convention. 26 Quoted i n Wisconsin L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau, "The Wisconsin P r e s i -d e n t i a l Primary: Open or Closed?" Research B u l l e t i n 75-RB-l (August 1975), 3. 27 As Ju s t i c e Brennan explained i t , "We granted c e r t i o r a r i to decide the important question presented whether the Appellate Court was correct i n according primacy to state law over the National P o l i t i c a l Party's rules i n the determination of the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and e l i g i b i l i t y of delegates to the Party's National Convention." 73 - 1106 95 Sup. Ct. 541 (1975), quoted i n United States Law Week, 43 (14 January 1975), 4156. 28 Brennan, quoted i n i b i d . 43 CHAPTER I I I PARTY POLITICS IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: WISCONSIN'S POLITICAL CULTURE Opposition i n Wisconsin to a closed p r e s i d e n t i a l primary stems d i r e c t l y from the anti-machine progressivism of Governor Robert M. La F o l l e t t e , Sr., who i n 1903 succeeded i n replacing the "boss-ridden" Republican state con-vention with the d i r e c t primary as a nominating device. In so doing, he r a d i c a l l y changed the s p i r i t and structure of Wisconsin p o l i t i c s for genera-tions to come. Known scant years previously as a p o l i t i c a l l y corrupt, one-party state i n which the w i l l of the r a i l r o a d s and lumber concerns was usually d e c i s i v e i n p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s , ^ Wisconsin during the La F o l l e t t e era came to be known as the nation's "Laboratory of Democracy." Among the l e g i s l a t i o n enacted between 1901 and 1919 were a landmark c i v i l service code, the nation's f i r s t successful state income tax, i t s f i r s t workmen's compen-sation program, i t s f i r s t open d i r e c t p r e s i d e n t i a l primary, a state insurance fund which anticipated the "yardstick p r i n c i p l e " of Roosevelt's TVA, a path-breaking u n i v e r s i t y extension system, and a host of les s famous reforms and innovations concerned with monopolies, equitable taxation, r e g u l a t i o n of 2 ir r e s p o n s i b l e f i n a n c i a l power, and the machinery of democratic government. That Wisconsinites s t i l l cherish the na t i o n a l reputation which t h e i r 44 state came to enjoy during the La F o l l e t t e era i s only human and not at a l l s u r p r i s i n g . D i s t i n c t i o n s of acclaim are seldom rejected or forgotten any-where; s t i l l less when they are few or derived from only one source. What i s important to understand here i s that the premier d i s t i n c t i o n of Wisconsin, which i n most respects d i f f e r s l i t t l e from other Midwestern states, i s the Progressive legacy of clean and responsive government given by i t s greatest native son; a heritage c a r e f u l l y maintained and nurtured by i t s c i t i z e n s for the very d i s t i n c t i o n and i d e n t i t y i t gives them. In f a c t , Wisconsinites seem to define t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y so much i n terms of the Pro-gressive t r a d i t i o n that c e r t a i n of the p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s fashioned by La F o l l e t t e — e s p e c i a l l y the d i r e c t open primary law—may act as independent va r i a b l e s which influence p o l i t i c a l behavior i n somewhat the same way that s o c i a l or economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s do. As Leon D. Epstein remarks: P o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are usually taken to be dependent v a r i a b l e s . . . . However, c e r t a i n features of Wisconsin p o l i -t i c s are so f i r m l y established by c o n s t i t u t i o n or custom that they provide part of the environmental s e t t i n g for p o l i t i c a l behavior i n a way that i s at l e a s t analogous to the influence 3 of s o c i a l and economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . This being the case, the p o l i t i c a l culture of Wisconsin was, and i s , uncon-genial to any kind of formal party c o n t r o l over nominations such as that required by the n a t i o n a l Democratic party for the 1976 Wisconsin p r e s i d e n t i a l primary. Before the antipathy of t h i s culture i s described any further, how-ever, i t i s wise to outline the h i s t o r y of Wisconsin's open primary law. 45 La F o l l e t t e and the Direct Primary The d i r e c t primary law enacted i n Wisconsin i n 1903 was the culmination of a decade of struggle between opposing factions of the Republican party, 4 which had dominated state p o l i t i c s almost completely since 1855. Those be-longing to Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s "Progressive" f a c t i o n , f i n d i n g themselves repeatedly f r u s t r a t e d at party nominating conventions i n the 1890's by the loose c o a l i t i o n of party regulars or "Stalwarts" which then co n t r o l l e d the Republican organization, decided that the only way to achieve progressive l e g i s l a t i v e goals was f i r s t to return c o n t r o l of party a f f a i r s to the people, so that progressive candidates might be nominated."' They set about working for the passage of d i r e c t primary l e g i s l a t i o n , a campaign which Mr. La F o l l e t t e kicked off i n February 1897 with h i s now-famous address on "The Menace of the Machine" at the University of Chicago and continued promoting with almost single-minded zeal u n t i l he signed the b i l l into law i n 1903. That the stalwart c o a l i t i o n was a corrupt, patronage-fueled, "boss-ridden" ( i f somewhat f a c t i o n a l i z e d ) p o l i t i c a l machine i s undeniable. What i s les s evident, when some of Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s own p o l i t i c a l t a c t i c s :are taken into account, i s whether or not one of his main objections to the Wisconsin Republican party i n the 1890's was simply that the wrong bosses were at i t s head. Personal p o l i t i c a l power i s almost always achieved at a p r i c e , and Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s own path to the top i s strewn with d i s i l l u s i o n e d supporters (e.g., N i l s Haugen, Irvine Lenroot, James Davidson, Isaac Stephenson, Francis McGovern, and James Tittemore) who bear both mute and not-so-mute testimony that a l l was not exactly as i t has been portrayed i n La Follette'-S Autobiog-raphy. Albert 0. Barton, who was secretary to Mr. La F o l l e t t e i n Washing-ton, wrote i n 1922 that 46 I t has become a serious question with many people whether or not, at le a s t i n i t s f i r s t years, the La F o l l e t t e reform move-ment was inspir e d by any motive other than the personal ambition of La F o l l e t t e . But to whatever degree hi s personal ambitions were the i n s p i r a t i o n of the up r i s i n g , i t must be said he had a remarkable f a c i l i t y or fortune i n making himself and h i s cause interchangeable i n the public mind. . . P Wisconsin h i s t o r i a n Robert C. Nesbit adds that while Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s s i n -c e r i t y as a t r u l y great Progressive i s se l f - e v i d e n t , he was a "superbly endowed p o l i t i c a l man" with a highly s e l e c t i v e memory that constantly must be checked on. "A p o l i t i c a l weathervane i n h i s early career, he remembered only that he had never compromised h i s p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s . " I r o n i c a l l y , i n 1922, ten years a f t e r the pu b l i c a t i o n of h i s remarkably successful campaign autobiography, the continuing decline of Progressive strength at the p o l l s due to that f a c t i o n ' s multiple candidacies i n previous primaries resulted i n the s e l e c t i o n of a Progressive primary s l a t e "nominated by a co t e r i e of leaders meeting under the personal d i r e c t i o n of Senator La F o l l e t t e , while the anti-La F o l l e t t e forces resorted to a convention of delegates to decide 9 on t h e i r nominees." A prime example of the f i c k l e n e s s of Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s memory and of the extent to which the Wisconsin p o l i t i c a l culture has canonized h i s deeds as he recorded them, i s the obscurity surrounding the f a c t that at the s t a r t of h i s campaign for d i r e c t primary l e g i s l a t i o n , Mr. La F o l l e t t e had wanted the primaries to be "closed" to crossover voting. In an address e n t i t l e d "Primary E l e c t i o n s " given to the Good Government Club of the Un i v e r s i t y of Michigan i n Ann Arbor, March 12, 1898, he urged passage of a primary law 47 which provided that . . . when each voter enters the e l e c t i o n booth on primary e l e c t i o n day he s h a l l f i n d a committee of h i s party i n charge of a separate b a l l o t box, and the o f f i c i a l primary e l e c t i o n b a l l o t on which i s printed the names of a l l candidates of h i s party for nomination. . . . each voter may take the b a l l o t of the party with which he a f f i l i a t e s , and i n priv a t e , indicate thereon the names of the men who are h i s choice as the nominees of h i s party, and that he may then deposit that b a l l o t i n the b a l l o t box of his - 1 0 party. A l l of the d i r e c t primary b i l l s introduced i n the state l e g i s l a t u r e p r i o r to 1903 provided f o r a closed primary, and a l l of these b i l l s (except the one drafted by Representative Fenner Kimball i n 1895, one year before Mr. La F o l l e t t e claims to have heard of the primary concept) had Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s support. In 1897, Representative William T. Lewis of Racine introduced a d i r e c t primary b i l l drafted under Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s supervision by h i s law partners, A. G. Zimmermann and Samuel Harper. Section 5 of th i s b i l l , 1897 AB-580, read: " A l l persons who are l e g a l voters s h a l l have the r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n such primary elections subject to the provisions herein pre-scribed; but only those a f f i l i a t i n g with and claiming membership i n a p o l i t i -c a l party s h a l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n the primary e l e c t i o n held f o r the nomination of the candidates for such p o l i t i c a l party."''""'" The b i l l went on to provide that i n those urban precincts where voter r e g i s t r a t i o n was required, the voters must r e g i s t e r t h e i r party a f f i l i a t i o n and then only could vote i n the primary of that party, and that voters i n r u r a l areas without voter 48 r e g i s t r a t i o n must declare t h e i r party preference before r e c e i v i n g a b a l l o t . This b i l l died i n the Assembly, as did a s i m i l a r b i l l introduced i n the 1899 session by Representative George E. Bryant, Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s former cam-paign manager. During the 1901 session of the l e g i s l a t u r e (Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s f i r s t term as Governor), i d e n t i c a l primary b i l l s designated AB-98 and SB-73 were i n t r o -duced i n both houses of the l e g i s l a t u r e . Section 16 of these b i l l s read: "At any primary e l e c t i o n , no person s h a l l vote any t i c k e t but that of the party with which he a f f i l i a t e s . The r i g h t of any person to vote at any p r i -mary e l e c t i o n may be challenged . . . on the ground that he i s not a member 12 of the party, the t i c k e t of which he proposes to vote." But the Assembly Committee on Elections and P r i v i l e g e s , a f t e r considering 1901 AB-98, recom-mended the adoption of a substitute amendment which changed the primary to an open one. Instead of req u i r i n g that the voter be a member of the party i n whose primary he was voting, Substitute Amendment 1 to 1901 AB-98 c a l l e d for the voter to receive the b a l l o t s of a l l parties and, i n the secrecy of the voting booth, mark the b a l l o t of the party of his choice, discarding the re s t . This substitute motion passed the Assembly but was defeated i n the Senate, where the Stalwart opposition passed 1901 SB-73 i n an amended form which provided for optional, rather than mandatory, primary e l e c t i o n s . This version then passed both houses but was vetoed by Governor La F o l l e t t e , who acted on the p r i n c i p l e that ". . . i n l e g i s l a t i o n no bread i s often better than h a l f a l o a f . I believe i t i s usually better to be beaten and come r i g h t back at the next session and make a f i g h t for a thorough-going law 13 than to have w r i t t e n on the books a weak and i n d e f i n i t e s t a t u t e . " In a sti n g i n g veto message accompanying the return of 1901 SB-73 to the l e g i s l a -ture, Governor La F o l l e t t e argued that ". . . the voter cannot a n t i c i p a t e 49 what ac t i o n w i l l follow the e l e c t i o n of a given set of o f f i c i a l s upon the matters i n which he i s most deeply interested, excepting as the candidates 14 are committed i n advance by pledges of the respective p a r t i e s . " He, La F o l l e t t e , would not countenance any primary law other than one f a i t h f u l to the platform of the state Republican party, which had set f o r t h to the people of t h i s state a plank which read: Substitute for both the caucus and the convention a primary e l e c t i o n held under a l l the sanctions of law which p r e v a i l at general e l e c t i o n s , where the c i t i z e n may cast h i s vote d i r e c t l y to nominate the candidates of the party with which he a f f i l i a t e s , and have i t canvassed and returned as he cast i t . 1 " ' Thus, while Governor La F o l l e t t e ' s reason for vetoing the Stalwarts' version of 1901 SB-73 was that i t rendered the proposed statewide primary optional, i n doing so he made i t c l e a r that he wished to see the primary b i l l on h i s desk i n i t s o r i g i n a l , closed form during the next session. Between the 1901 and 1903 sessions, however, intervened the gubernatorial e l e c t i o n of 1902, during which Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s Democratic opponent, Mayor David S. Rose of Milwaukee, attacked the closed primary on the grounds that i t v i o -lated the secrecy of the b a l l o t by f o r c i n g the voter to make public h i s party preference. Mayor Rose made a much closer race of i t than had La F o l l e t t e ' s opponent i n 1900, which perhaps explains why 1903 AB-97, the p r i -mary b i l l which the Governor signed into law i n 1903, was v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l to Substitute Amendment 1 to 1901 AB-98 and created an open rather than closed primary. Yet j u s t one year l a t e r , during the campaign preceding the statewide referendum on the d i r e c t primary s t i p u l a t e d by AB-97, Governor La F o l l e t t e 50 disingenuously t o l d an audience i n Marshfield that "The b i l l i s now before the people i n i t s o r i g i n a l form. . . . ""^ In h i s Autobiography, w r i t t e n a decade l a t e r , Mr. La F o l l e t t e never once raised the issue of an open primary versus a closed one, and never mentioned that he had supported the l a t t e r . Rather, he simply commented that except for the lack of a p r o v i s i o n allowing primary voters to ind i c a t e their second choice, "I think i t i s the most 18 perfect law for the nomination of candidates by d i r e c t vote ever enacted." Even Mr. La F o l l e t t e ' s statement c a l l i n g for a closed primary at Ann Arbor i n 1898 i s conspicuously absent from the extract of that speech contained i n the "Primary E l e c t i o n s " chapter of the compendium e n t i t l e d La F o l l e t t e ' s P o l i t i -19 c a l Philosophy published by h i s own company i n 1920. To complete the story, Wisconsin's mandatory primary e l e c t i o n law was enacted by Chapter 451, Laws of 1903. The f i n a l enactment of the law, how-ever, was contingent upon i t s approval by referendum i n the November 1904 general e l e c t i o n . The measure won approval by the seemingly handy margin of 130,699 votes f o r , to 80,192 votes against; but i t should be borne i n mind that these figures together amounted to only 50 percent of the t o t a l vote cast i n both the gubernatorial and p r e s i d e n t i a l elections that same November. The other 50 percent of the electorate voting i n that same e l e c t i o n (as w e l l 20 as those not voting) expressed no opinion on the primary issue at a l l . By the time of the next p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n i n 1908, the primary law had been amended to require that the state's delegates to nation a l party conventions also be selected i n primary e l e c t i o n s (Chapter 369, Laws of 1905). The Open Primary and Popular  P o l i t i c a l Orientations Today Today, however, there i s l i t t l e i f any d i v i s i o n of opinion i n Wisconsin s i m i l a r to that i n 1904 on the merits of the open primary system. The seventy years that have passed since then have witnessed a p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i -zation process e l i c i t i n g a popular o r i e n t a t i o n toward the open primary i n Wisconsin that i s so strong change only could be accomplished at the cost of perhaps dozens of p o l i t i c a l careers. V i r t u a l l y every c h i l d educated i n a public school i n Wisconsin can be expected to encounter two things pertinent to the h i s t o r y and p o l i t i c s of his state: f i r s t , that Wisconsin was a p r i n c i -p a l center of the Progressive Movement and has a n a t i o n a l reputation for clean and progressive p o l i t i c s ; and second, that t h i s reputation stems c h i e f -l y from the open primary, c i v i l s e rvice, and other reforms i n i t i a t e d by the 21 state's most beloved son, "Fighting Bob" La F o l l e t t e . The student i s usually impressed by the singular, d i s t i n c t i v e q u a l i t i e s of both Governor La F o l l e t t e and the primary system which was h i s greatest achievement; q u a l i t i e s which because of t h e i r very d i s t i n c t i o n r e i n f o r c e the high esteem which the man and his reform enjoy i n Wisconsin today. The Wisconsin mandatory st a t e -wide primary law was the f i r s t law of i t s type passed i n the United States, and i t has always been one of only a few primaries—sometimes the only o n e — i n which the voter i s not required to i d e n t i f y h i s party preference. Mr. La F o l l e t t e , i n addition to the record and leading r o l e i n the Progressive Movement for which he w i l l always be remembered, owns the d i s t i n c t i o n of having been the only man from Wisconsin ever to run for President, and of being one of only f i v e Senators whose bust i s enshrined i n the parlors of the United States Senate (the others being Calhoun, Clay, Webster, and Robert T a f t ) . Further reinforcement of the Progressive t r a d i t i o n of which the open primary i s such an i n t e g r a l part derives from the state's opinion-leaders, many of whom are ex-Progressive party members or self-avowed La F o l l e t t e -p h i l e s . Several of the most i n f l u e n t i a l members of the state p r e s s — e s p e c i a l l y Miles M c M i l l i n and John P a t r i c k Hunter, then publisher and associate editor of the Progressive-influenced Madison C a p i t a l Times, re-s p e c t i v e l y , and John Wyngaard, Republican author of the most widely syndi-cated p o l i t i c a l column i n the s t a t e — a r e acknowledged admirers of Mr. La F o l l e t t e who often eulogize the man and h i s open primary legacy every time a 22 primary e l e c t i o n date draws near. A l l three v o c i f e r o u s l y opposed the Democrats' attempt to pass a law r e q u i r i n g voters i n the 1976 p r e s i d e n t i a l primary to i d e n t i f y t h e i r party a f f i l i a t i o n before r e c e i v i n g a b a l l o t , as w i l l be shown a few pages hence. Equally defensive of the open primary t r a d i t i o n were elected o f f i c e -holders and party o f f i c i a l s of both major partie s who once had been members of the Progressive party years before. Epstein has t r i e d to trace the flow of ex-Progressives into the two major p a r t i e s a f t e r the collapse of that party i n 1946. In general, the older, r u r a l and p r o - i s o l a t i o n i s t members, e s p e c i a l l y the o f f i c e h o l d e r s , followed Robert J r . back into the Republican ranks from which they had bolted i n the e a r l y 1930's, while a larger number of young, urban, and p r o - i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t Progressives joined with the few l i b e r a l Democrats existent i n Wisconsin i n 1948 to form the voluntary Demo-c r a t i c Organizing Committee i n place of the moribund statutory Democratic 23 party. The c o r r e l a t i o n Epstein found i n 1955 between old Progressive and current Democratic voting patterns was j u s t strong enough to i n d i c a t e that the l a t t e r party has i n h e r i t e d much of the former's rank-and-file strength, 24 as w e l l as the i d e a l s which that rank-and-file embodied. To these ex-Progressives, anything that represents party c o n t r o l over nominations seems undemocratic, and ". . . i t i s too much for the [modern Democratic party] organization even to seek to d i r e c t the voter's choice i n the primary" by 53 25 means of endorsement. Today, some of these old La F o l l e t t e supporters are among the most i n f l u e n t i a l leaders i n the Democratic party, and i n the GOP, 26 too. The effectiveness of th i s s o c i a l i z a t i o n i s t e s t i f i e d to by the undenia-ble strength which the La F o l l e t t e legend s t i l l enjoys i n Wisconsin today. The magic that the La F o l l e t t e name held for Wisconsin voters from 1900 to 1940 proved s t i l l e f f e c t i v e i n 1974, when not one but two young La F o l l e t t e s , Bronson and Douglas, won contested primaries and then e l e c t i o n i n November to the o f f i c e s of Attorney General and Secretary of State of Wisconsin, respec-t i v e l y . But i f anything supercedes the a f f e c t i o n and support which the La F o l l e t t e name s t i l l commands i n Wisconsin, i t i s probably the open primary t r a d i t i o n associated with that name. A Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory p o l l i n 1966 discovered that an overwhelming degree of public support exists i n Wisconsin for the open primary format. When a sample of 607 Wisconsin adults were asked whether they thought the state should change to a closed 2 8 primary, only nine percent said yes, while 82 percent said no. When the respondents were asked why they f e l t as they did about open primaries, 31 percent r e p l i e d that one should always vote for the man rather than the party; and another 36 percent said the open primary guarantees freedom for everyone by allowing independents to vote and partisans to change t h e i r minds. Today, many Wisconsinites, unaccustomed as they now are to having t h e i r party a f f i l i a t i o n s formalized, f e e l strongly that i t i s undemocratic to be asked to i d e n t i f y p u b l i c l y with a party as a prerequisite f o r primary 29 voting. A Wisconsin C i v i l L i b e r t i e s Union member spoke for many when he wrote: 54 This state has an outstanding record dating from Bob La F o l l e t t e i n assuring government by popular choice at a l l stages of the e l e c t o r a l process. To the extent the Demo-c r a t i c National Committee, a group mainly from outside Wisconsin, can i n t e r f e r e with the e l e c t o r a l p r i v i l e g e s of Wisconsin c i t i z e n s , which have been protected by state law for many years, there i s an ominous portent f o r the voting 30 r i g h t s and personal l i b e r t i e s of us a l l . Many voters r e t a i n fears, stemming from the days when Wisconsin was a one-party (Republican) state, that d i s c l o s u r e of t h e i r party a f f i l i a t i o n could 31 cost them jobs, government contracts, or t h e i r business c l i e n t e l e . In f a c t , there always has existed a small but not inconsiderable body of opinion i n Wisconsin which holds that the primary format should be opened up even further, to permit s p l i t - t i c k e t voting l i k e that i n Washington's "blanket" primary. John R. Commons, the Un i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin's famous Progressive economist, argued i n favor of ". . . a blanket b a l l o t containing the names of a l l candidates for nomination by a l l p a r t i e s , and . . . dispensing with 32 a l l declarations or oaths of party a f f i l i a t i o n . " Organized labor i n Wis-consin lobbied on behalf of a blanket primary for years, hoping thereby to 33 achieve " c l o u t " i n not one but both major p a r t i e s . Indeed, the DNC's order to Wisconsin Democrats to close t h e i r open primary provoked several l e g i s l a t o r s i n both p a r t i e s to take up once again this old cause and i n t r o -duce several b i l l s which would allow s p l i t - t i c k e t primary voting (see below, Chapter VII). The resentment contemporary Wisconsin voters harbor toward any and a l l attempts to formalize t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s i s symptomatic of a 55 p o l i t i c a l c ulture which d i s t r u s t s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ; a t r a i t d i r e c t l y i n -h e r i t e d from the La F o l l e t t e Progressives who found themselves repeatedly shut out of Republican party decision-making at the end of the l a s t century. As Epstein observes, P a r t l y as a way of summarizing the import of the state's i n s t i -t u t i o n a l forms, i t i s us e f u l to stress the strong l e g a l bias against any organized p o l i t i c a l apparatus. There has been a delibe r a t e e f f o r t , dating at l e a s t from the Progressive era of the early years of t h i s century, to l i m i t the i n t e r c e s s i o n of any agency between the voter and h i s elected o f f i c i a l s . This goes beyond the Jacksonian Democratic t r a d i t i o n , also perpetuated i n the state, of having many administrative o f f i c i a l s elected rather than appointed. What Wisconsin, c e r t a i n l y as much as any other state, has also t r i e d to do i s to have these o f f i c i a l s nominated as w e l l as elected by voters as i n d i v i d u a l s . This i s the meaning of the open primary and of the ban imposed on the l e g a l nomination of candidates by organized p a r t i e s . Wisconsin law treats p a r t i e s as though they might pervert the r e a l w i l l of the voters. The resemblance of th i s outlook to the famous view of Jean-Jacques Rousseau i s probably a c c i d e n t a l , but the basic assumption i s surely s i m i l a r . Like Rousseau's underlying b e l i e f , that on which Wisconsin's i n s t i t u t i o n s rests i s that the c i t i z e n can choose most t r u l y when he acts as an i n d i v i d u a l member of the whole community and not as a member of any group within that 34 community. From t h i s assumption i t i s only a short leap to the conclusion that the 56 r i g h t s of private i n d i v i d u a l s are to be preferred to the r i g h t s of those who belong to groups, such as party members who wish to prevent outsiders from having a say i n nominations and i n t e r n a l party matters. But i f parties and t h e i r members are the objects of unfavorable orie n -tations i n Wisconsin's p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , the open primary format, as the survey data presented above i n d i c a t e s , i s not. The open primary i s the ob-j e c t of a highly favorable o r i e n t a t i o n f o r Wisconsin c i t i z e n s ; so favorable, i n f a c t , that the open primary may be seen to act, i n Epstein's words, as an independent v a r i a b l e rather than a dependent one. In other words, Governor La F o l l e t t e ' s secretary's comment that La F o l l e t t e enjoyed a "remarkable f a c i l i t y i n making himself and h i s cause interchangeable i n the public mind" did not go far enough: he a c t u a l l y interchanged h i s own p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f system with that of the public. The Response of the Progressive Culture to the DNC Mandate In t h i s atmosphere of d i s t r u s t of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , the Democratic National Committee's order to make every e f f o r t to close the state's p r e s i -d e n t i a l primary to crossover voting was not received w e l l . This can be perceived i n the already-mentioned fa c t that some Democratic l e g i s l a t o r s a c t u a l l y responded by introducing b i l l s that would open the primary up even further. In so doing, those l e g i s l a t o r s were rel a y i n g the message they had gotten from t h e i r constituents to leave the primary open—a message DPW s t a f f members t r a v e l l i n g the state also had gotten from many i n the county party u n i t s . But the response of the Wisconsin Progressive culture to th i s order can be understood best i n a quantitative sense by examining the t r e a t -ment of th i s issue i n the e d i t o r i a l pages of the Wisconsin press. The Wisconsin press i s probably as good a gauge as any, of the Progres-s i v e culture's response to closure. The press, which regards i t s e l f as the 35 voice of the people, was i n the f o r e f r o n t of the Progressive movement, and played a key r o l e i n the push to replace nominating caucuses with d i r e c t 3 6 primaries, may be said to almost personify the Progressive c u l t u r e . As Richard Hofstadter observed i n h i s c l a s s i c study of Progressivism, To an extraordinary degree the work of the Progressive movement rested upon i t s journalism. The fundamental c r i t i c a l achieve-ment of American Progressivism was the business of exposure, and journalism was the chief occupational source of i t s c r e a t i v e w r i t e r s . I t i s hardly an exaggeration to say that the Progres-37 sive mind was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y a j o u r n a l i s t i c mind. . . . Consequently, i t i s only f i t t i n g that the Wisconsin press's r e a c t i o n to the DNC's closure order was s w i f t , unanimous, vigorous, and h o s t i l e , as b e f i t t e d the state's t r a d i t i o n . During the roughly sixteen months that t h i s controversy raged (December 1974-March 1976), the eight Wisconsin d a i l i e s subscribed to by the Wisconsin L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau ran a t o t a l of 63 e d i t o r i a l s against c l o s i n g the primary, compared to only f i v e i n favor (the s p e c i a l circumstances of which are explained i n Chapter VI). These eight newspapers included the state's four largest d a i l i e s , and almost every shade of the American i d e o l o g i c a l spectrum: The four newspapers with a widespread state c i r c u l a t i o n r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l views. The Milwaukee Sentinel has supported many Republicans. The Wisconsin State Journal at Madison (which 58 obtains a statewide c i r c u l a t i o n through i t s status as o f f i c i a l publisher of state l e g a l notices) r e f l e c t s a rather bland Republicanism. The Milwaukee Journal i s "independent" Demo-c r a t i c . The Ca p i t a l Times at Madison i s the most unique p u b l i c a t i o n , because i t continues a t r a d i t i o n of i t s o l d - s t y l e Progressive founder, the l a t e William T. Evjue. Although usually favorable to Democrats, i t may turn against those Democrats whose concepts and actions are not consistent with i t s unique view of "the public i n t e r e s t . " The paper's influence i s based on the strong support i t receives from the f a i t h f u l out-state and on the f a c t that l e g i s l a t o r s read i t and thus f i n d issues structured 38 d i f f e r e n t l y from how most other observers would view state p o l i t i c s . Yet, despite t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y , each of these newspapers (as w e l l 39 as the four smaller ones clipped by the LRB) was against closure; and be-tween them generated great e d i t o r i a l pressure upon the Democrats not to implement i t . One measure of the i n t e n s i t y of t h i s pressure i s the sheer number of e d i t o r i a l s , which editors and j o u r n a l i s t s themselves characterize as "amaz-40 ing" and "astounding." Another i s the frequency with which c e r t a i n a n t i -party themes were stated i n these e d i t o r i a l s . A content analysis of these 63 e d i t o r i a l s turned up eight recurring themes (see Table 5), most of which r e f l e c t the at t i t u d e s of the surrounding Progressive culture: (1) f o r t y - s i x of the 63 e d i t o r i a l s c r i t i c i z e d the DNC for " f o r c i n g " a change i n Wisconsin's 41 primary; (2) twenty-nine c a l l e d upon Wisconsin Democrats to r e s i s t the 42 DNC's demands; (3) twenty-four pointed out that a closed primary would i n -43 f r i n g e on the r i g h t s of voters; (4) nineteen said the open primary and 59 TABLE 5 Frequency of Themes i n 63 E d i t o r i a l s on Closed Primaries N of e d i t o r i a l s T o t a l N of time^ Theme st a t i n g theme theme i s stated DNC forces Wis to close primary 47 80 Wis Dems Should Resist DNC 29 46 Rights of voters i n f r i n g e d 24 29 Open primary a Wisconsin t r a d i t i o n 19 24 Closure and caucuses conduce bossism 16 20 DNC has no r i g h t to d i c t a t e state laws 11 20 Independent voting trend good 6 6 Primaries belong to people, not parties 6 8 Data compiled from Wisconsin L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau, f i l e s 324.34/Z and 324.346/Z. Includes number of times theme i s stated more than once i n the same e d i t o r i a l . 60 44 crossover voting are i n t e g r a l parts of Wisconsin s Progressive heritage; (5) sixteen said that a closed primary or caucus system could f a c i l i t a t e 45 bossism and machine p o l i t i c s ; (6) eleven d i r e c t l y questioned the n a t i o n a l 46 Democratic party's r i g h t to " d i c t a t e " state e l e c t i o n laws; (7) s i x said 47 the trend toward independent voting today i s good; and (8) s i x said that 48 primary elections belong to the people, not the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . In a d d i t i o n to the constant r e i t e r a t i o n of views such as these, e d i -t o r i a l s frequently responded to s p e c i f i c events occurring as the controversy ran i t s .course. In the process, c r i t i c i s m was heaped upon the actions, statements, and even the characters of the various actors, who seemed to draw 49 e d i t o r i a l feedback everytime they moved. Even the hard news coverage of the dispute tended to e d i t o r i a l i z e . Consider the following extract from a story by the Associated Press's Madison bureau chief, printed without the l a b e l "news a n a l y s i s " or "opinion": The proposal, to receive a public hearing June 23 before the Assembly Ele c t i o n s Committee, c a l l s for what i s known as the "closed primary" system. It i s a system that p r e v a i l s i n I l l i n o i s , where Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley, former Governor Otto Kerner, and the l a t e Secretary of State Paul Powell exercised so much raw p o l i t i c a l power. . . . But independents can take heart. Rep. David Kedrowski, the Elections Committee chairman, i s not o p t i m i s t i c about the measure's chances for passage. In short, the Wisconsin press covered the primary dispute i n such a fashion that i t was i t s e l f almost an actor, rather than a part of the environment, i n 61 that dispute, and almost warrants treatment as such i n t h i s study. As the e d i t o r i a l themes c i t e d above suggest, the press's reasons for p r e f e r r i n g an open primary r e f l e c t a basic d i s t r u s t of, and even antipathy toward, the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . P a r t i e s should be simply vehicles through which the voters express t h e i r p o l i c y preferences, and nothing more. They should not be permitted to c o n t r o l who can vote i n primary e l e c t i o n s , as these extracts from three e d i t o r i a l s i n d i c a t e : Elections are not for p o l i t i c i a n s , elections are for the people and the people should have the f u l l e s t opportunity to decide who s h a l l represent them. ("Keep the Open Primary," C a p i t a l Times, 13 December 1974) . . . p o l i t i c s i s not simply a party a f f a i r . E l e c t i o n s , more than ever, have become a f f a i r s of the people. ("Keep I t Open," Milwaukee Sentinel, 3 January 1975) . . . the e l e c t o r a l process, including primaries, should be the property of the people, not the p a r t i e s . . . . ("Keep Open P r i -maries," Wisconsin State Journal, 30 A p r i l 1975) To sum up, i n the press's (and the Progressive culture's) preferred order of things, the p a r t i e s should be reduced i n function to the point where the term party, as i t i s commonly understood, no longer hardly a p p l i e s . The Ramifications of the Culture's Response This, then, was the Wisconsin p o l i t i c a l culture's response to the DNC's mandate that Wisconsin Democrats should close t h e i r open primary. Needless 62 to say, t h i s response created an unfriendly s e t t i n g i n which to attempt to close that primary, from the standpoint of the Democratic party organization leaders, l e g i s l a t o r s , and governor who had to survive and operate i n that environment. L e g i s l a t o r s p u b l i c l y expressed concern at the number of times newspapers were w i l l i n g to repeat the a n t i - c l o s u r e theme on t h e i r e d i t o r i a l p a g e s . G o v e r n o r P a t r i c k J. Lucey p l a i n t i v e l y t o l d the New York Times i n mid-controversy that some state newspapers already had e d i t o r i a l i z e d as many as f i v e times against closure, and that the chief obstacles to enactment of the necessary l e g i s l a t i o n were "the ghost of Bob La F o l l e t t e and the news-52 papers." By the end of the controversy almost every one of the eight newspapers subscribed to by the L e g i s l a t i v e Reference Bureau had e d i t o r i a l -ized at l e a s t f i v e times against; most i n f a c t did so close to ten times. I t seems probable that a large-scale press campaign such as t h i s would influence the concerned Wisconsin Democratic actors i n two ways, one i n d i r e c t and one d i r e c t . The i n d i r e c t way i s through the inf l u e n c i n g of public opinion, which many over the years have maintained i s not shaped s i g n i f i c a n t -l y by newspapers. A 1974 in-the-home survey of 4,004 American adults by Walter DeVries and Associates found that newspaper a r t i c l e s and e d i t o r i a l s together serve as one of the two most r e l i a b l e sources of p o l i t i c a l informa-t i o n for only 26.3 percent of the respondents (and one of the two most im-portant sources of voting information for only 20.7 percent), well behind 53 t e l e v i s i o n news (see Tables 6 and 7). I hypothesize, however, that news-papers are perhaps more i n f l u e n t i a l sources of information about state p o l i t i c s f o r the public than the DeVries figures i n d i c a t e . There i s , I be l i e v e , a considerable gap i n t e l e v i s i o n and radio news coverage of state p o l i t i c s . National network news broadcasts over both e l e c t r o n i c media almost e x c l u s i v e l y concern themselves with nation a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l news, '"' TABLE 6 Most Reliable Sources of Information About P o l i t i c s * T o t a l T e l e v i s i o n News^ T e l e v i s i o n News Newspaper A r t i c l e s Radio News Newspaper E d i t o r i a l s Magazine A r t i c l e s TV Talk Shows Not Sure 36.4 27.3 18.4 9.7 7.9 5.6 4.6 3.0 % ( A l l other information sources are mentioned by less than 4% of the respondents.) Question: "Which of these sources do you think supplies you with the most r e l i a b l e information about p o l i t i c s ? Which i s second?" l F i r s t Mention 'First and Second Mentions Combined (multiple response) 64 TABLE 7 Most Important Sources of Information i n Vote Decision* Total T e l e v i s i o n News^ 17.5 T e l e v i s i o n News 18.4 Newspaper A r t i c l e s 15.7 Radio News 6.1 P o l i t i c a l Candidates 5.0 Newspaper E d i t o r i a l s 5.0 P o l i t i c a l Party 3.6 Magazine A r t i c l e s 2.9 TV Talk Shows 2.9 Friends/Neighbors 2.3 Spouse 1.8 ( A l l other information sources are mentioned by les s than 2% of the respondents.) Question: "As you think back, which of these sources of i n f o r -mation most helped you decide for whom to vote t h i s f a l l ? Which i s second?" L F i r s t Mention F i r s t and Second Mentions Combined (multiple response) (Tables 6 and 7 from Walter DeVries, "American Perceptions of Pa r t i e s , I n s t i t u t i o n s , and P o l i t i c i a n s , " Jonathan Moore and Albert C. Pierce, e d i t o r s , Voters, Primaries, and Parties [Cambridge: Harvard I n s t i t u t e of P o l i t i c s , 1976], 21.) 65 while news broadcasts o r i g i n a t i n g from l o c a l radio and t e l e v i s i o n stations tend to cover news with i n t h e i r l i s t e n e r - and viewer-areas much more heavily than state news. Consequently, i n Wisconsin, anyway, I strongly suspect i t i s the newspaper which i s the leading source of information about state p o l i t i c s . This brings me to a rela t e d point, which i s that the p o l i t i c a l influence of a newspaper perhaps should not be measured so much by i t s supposed e f f e c t upon public opinion and voting behavior as by i t s e f f e c t upon the p o l i t i c i a n s themselves. In f a c t , newspapers appear to exercise a greater influence upon elected o f f i c e - h o l d e r s than t h e i r impact upon the electorate probably warrants. This d i r e c t influence derives from the f a c t that most p o l i t i c i a n s are, i n the words of Canadian Senator (and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t ) Maurice Lamontagne, "newsworms."^ To be well-informed i s important f o r the p o l i t i -cian, i n terms of pro f e s s i o n a l status as w e l l as effectiveness. Always hungry for p o l i t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e , the p o l i t i c i a n i s a connoisseur of rumors, exclusives, headlines, and leads, and has a much z e s t i e r appetite (which reveals i t s e l f i n animated responses ranging from chortles of glee to bellows 56 of rage) for such things than the average reader. The influence of the press with p o l i t i c i a n s stems i n large part from the s a t i s f a c t i o n of this appetite. Much more extensive and intensive consumers of news and opinion than most people, p o l i t i c i a n s also may be more susceptible to press influence than most people. As a Dartmouth p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t discovered during a term i n the Vermont state Senate: While i t ' s debatable exactly what e f f e c t the press had on public opinion, there's no doubt i n my mind that the newspapers did very d e f i n i t e l y influence the l e g i s l a t i v e process i n one key respect: 66 namely, many of the l e g i s l a t o r s themselves followed the news-papers very c l o s e l y . As a r e s u l t of t h e i r own reading habits, they believed the press to be equally important to the general pu b l i c , to a point where t h e i r own actions were influenced by press coverage . . . they appeared to act on the assumption that everyone else i n Vermont was j u s t as d i l i g e n t i n reading the papers: an assumption which hardly appeared to be grounded i n any concrete evidence. Be that as i t may, the l e g i s l a t u r e seemed to develop a dependence on the press that often bordered on f i x a t i o n , and i n t h i s respect . . . the press played a very powerful r o l e i n shaping l e g i s l a t i v e opinion."^ My own observation of the Wisconsin l e g i s l a t u r e (which, a c t u a l l y preceded reading t h i s memoir) independently confirms t h i s observation about the press-f i x a t i o n of l e g i s l a t o r s i n every d e t a i l . Summary Looking back over t h i s chapter, three general points seem worth remark-ing. F i r s t of a l l , an overwhelming majority of Wisconsin voters have formed a strong attachment to the open primary format. They have been s o c i a l i z e d by ex-Progressives i n both major partie s and a Progressive-influenced press to regard crossover voting, and non-revelation of party choice, as basic c i v i l r i g h t s . They have been taught by these s o c i a l i z i n g agents, and by the schools, that the open primary i s a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which sets Wisconsin apart from other s t a t e s : the arguments that i t i s a Progressive reform, that i t i s the legacy of Wisconsin's greatest c i t i z e n , that Wisconsin was the f i r s t (and sometimes the only) state to employ such a primary format, 67 that i t i s a 70 year-old t r a d i t i o n , and that Wisconsin enjoys a nation a l reputation for clean and responsive government, are strung together a l l i n one great case for the thesis that Wisconsin p o l i t i c s are d i f f e r e n t , better, cleaner than elsewhere. Second, the response of t h i s Progressive p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e to c l o s i n g the primary was very unfavorable. One p r i n c i p a l measure of t h i s response was the rea c t i o n of the state, press, which was extremely active and vocal i n i t s defense of the open primary, and i n i t s c r i t i c i s m of those Democrats who either wished or considered i t s a l t e r a t i o n . Third, t h i s press a c t i v i t y could not escape notice by news-devouring Democratic l e g i s l a t o r s and party leaders, and put them on notice that i t would be p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous for them, i n terms of press support, to close the open primary. Thus was the stage set for the clash between these state Democratic actors and t h e i r n a t i o n a l party over the status of Wisconsin's 1976 p r e s i -d e n t i a l primary. Both nation a l and state actors had t h e i r own separate imperatives to follow. The chapter which follows this w i l l show i n greater d e t a i l how the i n t e r e s t of each actor was s p e c i f i c a l l y affected by these imperatives, and what stance on the primary issue each actor took as a r e s u l t . 68 NOTES CHAPTER III ''"Nesbit, Wisconsin, chapter 23. 2 I b i d . , 425-26. 3 Leon D. Epstein, P o l i t i c s i n Wisconsin (Madison: Un i v e r s i t y of Wiscon-s i n Press, 1958), 11. 4 The Republicans held the governorship and usually a l e g i s l a t i v e majori-ty i n a l l but s i x years between 1855 and 1900, when Robert M. La F o l l e t t e was elected governor. ~*"It i s but ju s t to say that no l e g i s l a t u r e has assembled i n Wisconsin i n many years containing so many good men as the l a s t . But when a b i l l to punish corrupt practices i n campaigns and elections i s destroyed by amend-ment; when measures such as the Davidson b i l l s r e q u i r i n g corporations to pay ju s t share of the taxes go down i n defeat; when b i l l s to compel m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s of untaxed personal property to come from i t s hiding place and help maintain government f a i l of adequate support. . . . The remedy i s to begin at the bottom and make one supreme e f f o r t for v i c t o r y over the present bad system. Nominate and e l e c t men who w i l l pass a primary e l e c t i o n law which w i l l enable the voter to select d i r e c t l y candidates without intervention of caucus or convention or domination of machines. Thus may a permanent reform greater even than the reform affected [ s i c] by the Au s t r a l i a n b a l l o t . . . be brought about." La F o l l e t t e , "The Menace of the Machine" (Washington's Birthday address at the Univ e r s i t y of Chicago, February 22, 1897), extracted i n The P o l i t i c a l Philosophy of Robert M. La F o l l e t t e , compiled by E l l e n T o r e l l e (Madison: Robert M. La F o l l e t t e Co., 1920), 27-28. 69 Robert M. La F o l l e t t e , La F o l l e t t e ' s Autobiography (Madison: Robert M. La F o l l e t t e Co., 1913). Nesbit writes that "Dealing with the La F o l l e t t e legend i s a d i f f i c u l t exercise. Seldom has a major American p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e so s u c c e s s f u l l y converted h i s campaign autobiography into the commonly accepted story of h i s p o l i t i c a l career" (Wisconsin, 401). ^Alfred 0. Barton, La F o l l e t t e ' s Winning of Wisconsin (Madison: The Homestead Co., 1922), 55. g Nesbit, Wisconsin, 401-02. 9 Katz, Direct Primary and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 52, 82. "^Quoted i n A l l e n Fraser Lovejoy, La F o l l e t t e and the Establishment of  the Direct Primary i n Wisconsin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 45. "'""'"Ibid. , 6. Ibxd. 13 La F o l l e t t e , Autobiography, 268. 14 "La F o l l e t t e Veto Message," extracted i n T o r e l l e , Philosophy of La F o l l e t t e , 47. "^Republican platform pledge, quoted i n La F o l l e t t e ' s veto message, i b i d . , 41 (emphasis mine). 16 In 1900, Mr. La F o l l e t t e had won with 62 percent of the vote, drawing 264,419 votes to Democrat Louis Bomrich's 160,674. In 1902, however, Mr. La F o l l e t t e won with only 193,417 votes to Mayor Rose's 145,818 and S o c i a l Democrat Emil Seidel's 15,970 (see Nesbit, Wisconsin, 541, f o r vote t o t a l s ) . C e r t a i n l y another compelling reason why Mr. La F o l l e t t e adapted his prefer-ence may have been the number of what he often referred to, tongue-in-cheek, 70 as "fair-minded Democrats" who could be counted on to cross over i n support of Progressives i n the dominant Republican party's primary. "^Marshfield News, 6 October 1904, quoted i n Lovejoy, La F o l l e t t e and  Direct Primary, 88. 18 La F o l l e t t e , Autobiography, 295. 19 See T o r e l l e , Philosophy of La F o l l e t t e , 29-31. 20 Indeed, one reason the stalwarts i n the l e g i s l a t u r e f i n a l l y decided to pass the primary b i l l was that they thought a majority of voters were opposed to the measure, and would defeat i t i n the referendum they had attached to the b i l l . The 1904 general e l e c t i o n figures show Mr. La F o l l e t t e re-elected by 227,253 votes to Democrat George Beck's 173,301 out of a t o t a l 449,560 votes cast, compared to only 210,891 cast i n the primary referendum. The p r e s i d e n t i a l race between Theodore Roosevelt, Alton Parker, and Eugene Debs drew a t o t a l of 443,014 votes at the p o l l s that same day. James R. Donoghue, How Wisconsin Voted, 1848-1972 (Madison: Un i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin-Extension, I n s t i t u t e of Governmental A f f a i r s , 1974), 80, 105. 21 John Wyngaard, "Democrats i n a Bind," Green Bay Press-Gazette, 23 January 1976. (My own introduction to the La F o l l e t t e legend and the Wisconsin open primary t r a d i t i o n took place during a segment on Wisconsin h i s t o r y i n the f i f t h grade; an exposure which was to be repeated many times thereafter.) 22 Mr. McM i l l i n , for example, i d e n t i f i e s himself as a "La F o l l e t t e b u f f " and confesses that "As a l i f e - l o n g La F o l l e t t e watcher I have probably read everything written about and by the La F o l l e t t e s . " See h i s "Hello Wisconsin" column, C a p i t a l Times, 19 May 1977. 23 Epstein, P o l i t i c s i n Wisconsin, 51-53. 24 " . . . there remains enough as s o c i a t i o n between current Democratic and old Progressive patterns to i n d i c a t e the l i k e l i h o o d of some continuity i n voting behavior from one party to the other. I d e o l o g i c a l l y t h i s l i k e l i h o o d seems greater than does a continuity from the former t r a d i t i o n a l Democratic party to the postwar . . . Democrats. In f a c t , postwar Democrats ran es-p e c i a l l y poorly i n some of the counties which the old Democratic party, even into the mid-1930's, used to carry." Ibid., 53. 25 Ib i d . , 95. 2 6 E.g., state Senate Minority Leader C l i f f o r d Krueger (R-Merrill) and Senator Carl Thompson (D-Stoughton), a former DNC member and Democratic nominee for governor, both were Progressive Party members. 27 Indeed, Douglas L a F o l l e t t e i s a native of Iowa who i s averred to have moved to Wisconsin i n order to take advantage of h i s name's p o l i t i c a l draw-ing power. 28 The question asked was Austin Ranney's. Data c o l l e c t e d by the Univer-s i t y of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory, Project 266 (Winter 1966), Deck 01, question 8. 29 Epstein, P o l i t i c s i n Wisconsin, 25, 81. 30 Jack E. Schanen, l e t t e r to Madison Press Connection, 30 October 1978. (Schanen i s a Member of the Board, C a p i t o l Area Chapter, Wisconsin C i v i l L i b e r t i e s Union.) 31 Representative John Gower (R-Green Bay), quoted i n William Chris-tofferson, "Closed Primary Hearing Goes National," Wisconsin State Journal, 12 June 1975. These fears s t i l l e x i s t , at l e a s t among Democrats who reside i n Republican areas. While v i s i t i n g two o f f i c e r s of the Green County Demo-c r a t i c unit on June 19, 1975, I learned that many area residents who voted Democratic reportedly were a f r a i d to a f f i l i a t e p u b l i c l y with the party be-cause most of the employers there were partisan Republicans. And Hope Cross, a member of the DPW Administrative Committee, commented at a party workshop on delegate s e l e c t i o n that voters i n her area, Washington County, feared to i d e n t i f y themselves p u b l i c l y as Democrats for the same reason. (Author's notes from P r e s i d e n t i a l Primary Delegate Selection Workshop," Wisconsin State Democratic Convention, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 10 June 1977.) 32 See John R. Commons' address i n Proceed ings of the National Conference on P r a c t i c a l Reform of Primary E l e c t i o n s , January 20-21, 1898 (Chicago: William C. H o l l i s t e r & Bro., 1898), 22. 33 John Wyngaard, "No Labels for Voters," Green Bay Press-Gazette, 24 A p r i l 1975. 34 Epstein, P o l i t i c s i n Wisconsin, 30-31. 35 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), 186. 36 V. 0. Key, American State P o l i t i c s (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1956), 126. 37 Hofstadter, Age of Reform, 186. 38 Wilder Crane and A. Clarke Hagensick, Wisconsin Government and P o l i t i c s (Madison: Un i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin-Extension, I n s t i t u t e of Governmental A f f a i r s , January 1976), 5.7. 39 The Racine Journal-Times, Green Bay Press-Gazette, La Crosse Tribune, 73 and Sheboygan Press. 40 William C h r i s t o f f e r s o n , telephone interview, 3 A p r i l 1978; and David Wagner, interview at Madison Press Connection o f f i c e s , 11 A p r i l 1979. (Mr. C h r i s t o f f e r s o n was C a p i t o l reporter for the Wisconsin State Journal during the primary controversy, and an editor with the Madison Press Connection when I interviewed him. Mr. Wagner i s e d i t o r i a l page editor for the l a t t e r newspaper, and was with the C a p i t a l Times during the controversy.) 41 E.g., "Robert Strauss, the n a t i o n a l chairman, and a group of party bosses are t r y i n g to impose a closed primary on the c i t i z e n s of Wisconsin." "Anti-Open Primary Idiocy," C a p i t a l Times e d i t o r i a l , 9 May 1975. 42 E.g., "We support the Democratic party leaders i n t h i s state who have refused to bow to the demands of the n a t i o n a l party. The state leaders should continue to r e s i s t and not cave i n under threats from the na t i o n a l party." "Democrats Shouldn't A l t e r Open P r e s i d e n t i a l Primary," Racine  Journal-Times e d i t o r i a l , 17 November 1975. 43 E.g., "Not only would such a plan do violence to the state's cherished p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n which allows an i n d i v i d u a l to vote for party candidates without i n d i c a t i o n of party a f f i l i a t i o n , i t would automatically disenfran-chise thousands of independents who have no party a f f i l i a t i o n or p a r t i s a n i n c l i n a t i o n . " "Open Primary i n Jeopardy," C a p i t a l Times e d i t o r i a l , 12 December 1975. 44 E.g., "Wisconsin Democrats are i n for a rough time i f they s e r i o u s l y expect to abolish the state's valuable, 70 year-old t r a d i t i o n of opportunity for crossover voting. . . . " "Our Open Primary a T r a d i t i o n , Let's Keep I t , " Milwaukee Journal e d i t o r i a l , 12 January 1975 (On, Wisconsin column). 74 45 E.g., "The surest way of turning Wisconsin's party p o l i t i c a l systems over to the bosses and the machines i s to repeal the open primary law." "Keep the Open Primary," C a p i t a l Times e d i t o r i a l , 13 December 1974. 46 E.g., "We do not think the people of Wisconsin should have to have any national p o l i t i c a l party t e l l them how to write t h e i r laws." " P r e s i d e n t i a l Primary," Wisconsin State Journal e d i t o r i a l , 7 November 1975. 47 E.g., "[An] open primary i s the purest exercise i n Democracy. . . . The law was not written to shut out voters or to preserve the parti s a n p o l i t i c a l organizations." "New Attack on Primary," C a p i t a l Times e d i t o r i a l , 23 June 1976. 48 See text below, page 61, for examples. 49 For example, a f t e r closure b i l l AB-807 was introduced, the Milwaukee  Sentinel attacked i t s proposed "double-decker" primary as "confusing," and as an attempt to thwart George Wallace's candidacy ("2 Ballots? No!" e d i t o r i a l , 9 June 1975). When Mark A. Siegel of the DNC attacked Governor Lucey and the DPW leadership on June 10, 1975 for t h e i r lack of e f f o r t to achieve compliance with r u l e 2A, the C a p i t a l Times responded by accusing Mr. Siegel and the DNC of tr y i n g to d i c t a t e to Wisconsin ("Open Primary a Must," e d i t o r i a l , 12 June 1975). When Mr. Siegel r e p l i e d to this e d i t o r i a l by l e t t e r , the C a p i t a l Times printed a r e b u t t a l ("The P r e s i d e n t i a l Primary," e d i t o r i a l , 21 July 1975). When hearings were held on AB-807 on June 23, 1975, a spate of e d i t o r i a l s issued f o r t h denouncing that proposal (e.g., "The Party's Stance?" Sheboygan Press e d i t o r i a l , 25 June 1975; "Wisconsin's Own Primary," Green Bay Press-Gazette e d i t o r i a l , 26 June 1975; and "Primary Tinkering," Milwaukee Sentinel e d i t o r i a l , 5 July 1975). Then, when Governor 75 Lucey and other Democratic leaders on July 30 announced t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to sue the DNC to save the open primary, the press responded with unanimous praise (e.g., "The Democratic Dilemma," C a p i t a l Times e d i t o r i a l , 1 August 1975; "Primary Test," Milwaukee Sentinel e d i t o r i a l , 1 August 1975; "An Open Primary," La Crosse Tribune e d i t o r i a l , 5 August 1975; and "Wisconsin's Own Way," Green Bay Press-Gazette e d i t o r i a l , 4 August 1975). 5 0 A r t h u r L. Srb, "Dem B i l l C a l l s for 'Closed Primary,'" A.P. release, Eau C l a i r e Leader-Telegram, 13 June 1975. "'"'"Jean Lucey, "State P r e s i d e n t i a l Primary: Dems on C o l l i s i o n Course with History," C a p i t a l Times, 24 November 1975. 52 R. W. Apple, J r . , "Rules Dispute P e r i l s Wisconsin Primary," New York Times, 26 October 1975. 53 Walter DeVries, "American Perceptions of Pa r t i e s , I n s t i t u t i o n s , .and P o l i t i c i a n s , " Jonathan Moore and Albert C. Pierce, e d i t o r s , Voters, P r i -maries , and Par t i e s (Cambridge: Harvard I n s t i t u t e of P o l i t i c s , 1976), 21. 54 In f a c t , I cannot ever r e c a l l having seen a t e l e v i s i o n set i n the o f f i c e s of any state l e g i s l a t o r i n the Wisconsin c a p i t o l . Wisconsin's current Governor, Republican Lee Dreyfus, f e l t there was such a gap i n el e c t r o n i c coverage of state p o l i t i c s i n the northern h a l f of Wisconsin that he attempted to set up a t e l e v i s i o n and radio broadcast system which would broadcast to those areas s t r a i g h t from h i s own o f f i c e . L e g i s l a t i v e Demo-cr a t s , of course, blocked t h i s move for obvious reasons. "^Maurice Lamontagne, "The Influence of the P o l i t i c i a n , " Canadian Public  Administration, 11 ( F a l l 1968), 469-70. 56 Or, "as Joseph H e l l e r described Colonel Cathcart, the p o l i t i c s - p l a y i n g s o l d i e r i n Catch-22: "He c o l l e c t e d rumors greedily and treasured gossip. He believed a l l the news he heard and had f a i t h i n none. . . . He was someone i n the know who was always s t r i v i n g p a t h e t i c a l l y to f i n d out what was going on." "^Frank Smallwood, Free and Independent (Brattleboro, Vt.: Stephen Greene Press, 1976), 192-93. 77 CHAPTER IV THE ACTORS By now the d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposite requirements of Wisconsin p o l i t i c a l culture and natio n a l Democratic party rules should be unmistakeably c l e a r . The l a s t two chapters have set the stage for a clash of w i l l s between the DNC and Wisconsin Democrats that should shed l i g h t upon r e l a t i o n s between the party n a t i o n a l committees and t h e i r component state p a r t i e s , or, i n other words, upon the impact of federalism upon the American p o l i t i c a l par-t i e s . However, before I proceed to a discussion of t h i s clash and i t s r e s u l t s and lessons, i t i s necessary to c l a r i f y that l i k e the natio n a l p a r t i e s of which they are a component part, the state p a r t i e s themselves are not monoliths, but consist of diverse elements which have t h e i r separate i n t e r e s t s and may not always agree with each other on a p a r t i c u l a r issue. Such was true of the Wisconsin Democratic party, whose various elements were at odds with one another over how to deal with the primary problem because the i n t e r e s t s each had at stake i n that issue happened to c o n f l i c t . Consequently, before the study proceeds any further, i t i s f i r s t neces-sary to introduce the various actors, d e t a i l the i n t e r e s t s each had at stake i n the dispute, and explain how those i n t e r e s t s along with the surrounding p o l i t i c a l c ulture affected the stance taken by each actor on the primary 78 issue. I t seems l o g i c a l to begin with the only non-Wisconsin actor, the Democratic National Committee. THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE Although i n theory the supreme authority i n each of the major American p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s the quadrennial n a t i o n a l convention, i n r e a l i t y the management of party a f f a i r s on a day-to-day basis long has been the preserve of the n a t i o n a l committees, or, more accurately, the chairperson and s t a f f of the n a t i o n a l committees.''" Those elements of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) t h i s study e s s e n t i a l l y i s concerned with are the chairperson, h i s or her s t a f f , the Mikulski Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, and the Compliance Review Commission (CRC). The DNC Chairperson Robert S. Strauss's chairpersonship stands as a c l a s s i c a l example of the rule-of-thumb that a leadership vacuum i n the out-party i n v i t e s increased 2 a c t i v i t y and c o n t r o l by the n a t i o n a l committee chairperson. The usual t i t u l a r leader of the party out of power, the defeated p r e s i d e n t i a l candi-date, had l o s t so overwhelmingly (and divided h i s party so badly) i n 1972 that neither he nor anyone else i n the congressional and gubernatorial ranks of the party could pick up the pieces. Except for Senator Edward Kennedy, who continued to demur for family reasons, the only other person who could step into the breach was the new DNC chairperson; assuming one acceptable to a l l f a c t i o n s could be elected to replace the defeated p r e s i d e n t i a l candi-date's appointee. Mr. Strauss, however, hardly was a compromise candidate for DNC 79 chairperson. Before the 1972 convention even was over, Mr. Strauss .was selected by Senators Humphrey, Jackson, and the AFL-CIO leadership as t h e i r 3 candidate for DNC chairperson a f t e r the expected November defeat. He was elected (with a margin of only A 1/2 votes out of more than 200 cast) by a c o a l i t i o n of those who had opposed the nomination of George McGovern: party 4 regulars, AFL-CIO COPE unio n i s t s , and southern and border state Democrats. Mr. Strauss's own p o l i t i c s coincided very much with those of h i s backers. He was very much i n agreement with the COPE-Coalition for a Democratic Majority view that several of the McGovern-Fraser reforms, e s p e c i a l l y the rules on a f f i r m a t i v e action, slate-making, e x - o f f i c i o delegates, and at-large dele-gates, had been harmful to the party i n 1972 and must be r o l l e d back."' However, as even his most b i t t e r reformist foes l a t e r would admit, Mr. Strauss came to o f f i c e determined to reunite the regular and reform factions within the party, which meant doing what he could to preserve the basic out-l i n e of party reform while at the same time maximizing the party's chances for v i c t o r y i n 1976. A f t e r paying o f f his debts to h i s supporters by appointing more than three dozen union o f f i c i a l s to party leadership posts and h i r i n g h i s s t a f f from COPE and the C o a l i t i o n for a Democratic Majority, Mr. Strauss i n f u r i a t e d George Meany and Alexander Barkan by maintaining an independent, neutral course during several important i n t r a p a r t y b a t t l e s i n which the regular f a c t i o n that had elected him l o s t to the reform f a c t i o n . Mr. Meany and Mr. Barkan had f r i t t e r e d away much of t h e i r influence with him by attempting to c o l l e c t on every issue that came along, and by i n s i s t i n g that he purge the "amateur" reformers—whose voting strength on the DNC was at l e a s t equal to t h e i r own, and whom the chairperson had to l i v e with;—right out of the p a r t y . 7 Mr. Strauss, conscious of the numbers l i k e a good p o l i t i c i a n , could only resent the impossible demands of h i s backers; and had 80 to withstand the c r i t i c i s m of both factions u n t i l the September 1973 Demo-c r a t i c Telethon, a smashing $5.25 m i l l i o n success, strengthened his p o s i t i o n as party leader. With t h i s f i n a n c i a l and a r t i s t i c success behind him, and a l l of h i s 9 appointees f i n a l l y i n place on the DNC and i t s various subgroups, Mr. Strauss began to take a stronger r o l e . Despite these appointments, however, the reform f a c t i o n i n the DNC s t i l l had the votes necessary to hold i t s own, and negotiation and compromise became the watchwords of h i s tenure. Expound-ing the theme that the di v i s i v e n e s s of the Democratic party i t s e l f was to blame for Richard Nixon's v i c t o r i e s i n 1968 and 1972, 1 0 Mr. Strauss set for himself the task of r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g party unity, or at l e a s t cessation of the public a i r i n g of d i f f e r e n c e s , so that a Democrat might win i n 1976. My purpose, as Democratic Party Chairman, i s to b u i l d a p o l i t i c a l platform where reasonable voices i n the Democratic Party can be c l e a r l y heard. This means: — B r i n g i n g Democrats closer together, widening our communica-tions with each other; — I n c r e a s i n g debate, not d i f f e r e n c e s ; —Emphasizing convergencies instead of divergencies [ s i c ] ; — B u i l d i n g the Democratic National Committee into a p r a c t i c a l service organization instead of f o s t e r i n g Democratic i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s . These are elements which assure timely Democratic v i c t o r i e s — i n Congress, governorships and l e g i s l a t u r e s — a n d w i l l f o s t e r an organization to sweep a Democrat into the White House i n 1976. 1 1 81 The P o l i t i c s of the DNC  and Its Subcommissions As may be guessed from the tenor of Mr. Strauss's remarks and the c i r -cumstances of h i s accession to o f f i c e , the primary concern of the DNC and i t s new chairperson during the period 1973-1976 was to bring under con t r o l , the f a c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t over reform which had divided the party so i n 1972. Every time Mr. Strauss spoke on record during h i s f i r s t two years as DNC Chairperson, h i s remarks r e f l e c t e d h i s single-minded, unwavering determina-12 t i o n to b r i n g the Democratic party back together again. Although i t was not always apparent then, party reformers such as Anne Wexler and Alan Baron l a t e r r e c a l l e d that compromise and harmony were indeed the hallmarks of Mr. Strauss's tenure as chairperson: As deep, b i t t e r d i v i s i o n s (on questions l i k e quotas) existed, Strauss worked hard to avoid public confrontations. In private negotiations, compromises were usually reached—and they t i l t e d toward the party's reform wing rather than the groups which elected Strauss. . . . A c t u a l l y , the pro-reformers j u s t had the votes. . . . The s e l e c t i o n of the 25 at-large DNC members i s a case i n point. Strauss bargained for weeks to draw up a 25-person s l a t e balanced enough to get by the DNC without s i g n i f i c a n t vocal 13 opposition. Despite the i n i t i a l d i s t r u s t of reformers and the AFL-CIO leadership's pique, Mr. Strauss's compromise remedy for the party's f a c t i o n a l i l l s seemed to work admirably. Washington j o u r n a l i s t s f i l e d complimentary notices about the 14 Democrats' newfound s o l i d a r i t y ; and i n 1974 Mr. Strauss, who knew how to 82 blow h i s own horn to advantage,1"* was able to report that i n t e r n a l d i v i s i v e -ness had regressed since h i s takeover: . . . 1973 was p r i m a r i l y a year of i n t r o s p e c t i o n and healing. Whether the forum was the Commission on Delegate Selection, the Charter Commission, or the Vice P r e s i d e n t i a l Selection Commission, our e f f o r t s were directed at bringing together a l l elements of the party i n a s p i r i t of candor and openness, tempered with respect and, on occasion, good humor. . . . Not everyone agreed with every decision. . . . But measurable progress had been achieved and the Party was f a r more u n i f i e d than when the year began. Yet, despite h i s preference for harmony through negotiation and compro-mise, Mr. Strauss was anything but a passive chairperson. "Tough, aggressive, hard-driving and a u t o c r a t i c " by nature, 1'' he worked his compromises as Lyndon Baines Johnson had done, by pushing a l l i d e o l o g i c a l d i v i s i o n s aside with "the extra quantities of energy and g a l l the Texan i n j e c t s into a l l h i s dealings 18 . . . [in] h i s own s t y l e of sweetly reasoned p a c i f i c a t i o n . . . . " Of course, he sometimes had to turn to c e r t a i n powerful quarters, such as the party's congressional and gubernatorial ranks, for backing before making h i s move; but once he had that backing he would wave i t over the DNC l i k e a club, as i n : Democratic Governors f o r c e f u l l y favored enlargement of the Charter Commission to provide proportionate representation, and expansion of the Delegate Selection Commission to provide 19 that each state has at l e a s t one member. Nor, despite his goal of party harmony, was Mr. Strauss a neutral c h a i r -83 person. Indeed, h i s personal make-up hardly could permit him to be neutral. A moderate-to-conservative "regular" at heart, n e u t r a l i t y was something he resorted to when he knew the numbers were not on h i s side. By his own admission, Mr. Strauss used h i s p o s i t i o n and h i s s t a f f to promote his own views when he could. When drawing up a s l a t e , he n a t u r a l l y favored his own side, though never so heavily that the s l a t e might not get 20 through. When vacancies on commissions occurred (sometimes he s o l i c i t e d 21 resignations ), he usually f i l l e d them i n such a way as to further strength-en h i s c o n t r o l ; unless the commission was so small that to do so would de-prive an important constituency of representation. He even appointed Azie Morton, a high-ranking, s a l a r i e d member of h i s DNC s t a f f to a vacancy on the Compliance Review Commission. When asked i f such an appointment was not improper given the influence he could wield over h i s employee's vote, Mr. Strauss r e p l i e d , "I suspect she influences me, and I hope that I influence 22 her," and professed not to see any impropriety i n the appointment. Nor did he see any impropriety i n "stacking" the f i n a l , d e c i s i v e meeting, of the Charter Commission with new appointees replacing members who had not been attending i t s meetings. In a heated emergency meeting of the DNC Executive Committee on August 15, 1974, Mr. Strauss reasoned that what he had done could not be considered "stacking," because the reformers could have done 23 the same thing with t h e i r absentee members, i f they had wished! Mr. Strauss r o u t i n e l y used his s t a f f to look a f t e r the regular faction's i n t e r e s t s before the various DNC commissions. By his own admission, h i s s t a f f spent considerable time "working on Charter Commission work," even 24 though that commission had i t s own s t a f f . Such " k i b i t z i n g " was only one aspect of the DNC s t a f f ' s involvement i n the work of the various commissions. Another p r i n c i p a l a c t i v i t y was lobbying, and sometimes even d i r e c t i n g , the 84 members of the various party commissions. During one meeting of the Charter Commission, for example, DNC Executive Director Siegel not only p a r t i c i p a t e d i n discussions regarding the Charter, but coached labor members of that commission i n his h o t e l room on how to f i l l out an important questionnaire 25 s o l i c i t i n g feedback on the Charter d r a f t . Needless to say, this p a r t i s a n use of the DNC s t a f f e l i c i t e d c r i e s of " f o u l " from the reform f a c t i o n , but Mr. Strauss r o l l e d r i g h t over them: With respect to s t a f f involvement i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the Charter Commission, those members of the s t a f f I f e l t were important to "lobby" the Chairman's point of view were i n attendance and doing so at my s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s ; and had they not done so they would have been d e r e l i c t i n the execution 26 of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Of course, Mr. Strauss and h i s s t a f f did not i n t e r f e r e so much i n the business of those commissions created and s t a f f e d a f t e r he had become ch a i r -person, for the reason that those commissions were e s s e n t i a l l y h i s own crea-tures. This was true of the Compliance Review Commission, which this study i s so concerned with. Created i n 1974, 12 of the 25 members of the CRC were appointed by Mr. Strauss, and another f i v e appointed by such natural regulars as the Senate majority leader, Speaker of the House, president of the Association of Democratic State Chairmen, and the chairpersons of the 27 Democratic Governors' and Mayors' Conferences r e s p e c t i v e l y . (More on th i s i n Chapter V.) Moreover, the two p r i n c i p l e s t a f f e r s of the CRC, Scott Lang and Monica Borkowski, worked on Mr. Strauss's DNC s t a f f p r i o r to t h e i r assignment to the CRC. Consequently, when they moved over to the CRC, the l i n e s of authority did not r e a l l y change: they s t i l l were working f o r , and 85 answered to, Mr. Strauss and h i s Executive Director, Mr. Sieg e l . Mr. Siegel sometimes l a i d plans with them which they then c a r r i e d to t h e i r nominal boss, CRC Chairperson Robert F. Wagner, and always received copies of everything the CRC s t a f f did (which he sometimes changed the language of, though never the substance). In other words, Mr. Siegel did not have to i n t e r f e r e i n CRC a f f a i r s as he had i n Charter Commission a f f a i r s : f o r one thing, both he and the CRC s t a f f thought a l i k e on most matters, and they kept him apprised of everything that went on; for another, he personally had taken part i n the d r a f t i n g of many of the regulations by which the CRC operated; and, f i n a l l y , 28 the regular bloc was i n the majority on the CRC. "With but a few excep-t i o n s , the Strauss bloc enjoyed the support of 65 percent to 75 percent of 29 the commissioners" on r o l l c a l l votes. The Wisconsin primary question, which we are concerned with here, was one of those exceptions. The DNC's Interest and Stand It already has been mentioned that many i n the nation a l Democratic party f e l t that crossover voting i n the p r e s i d e n t i a l primaries was d i l u t i n g the e f f e c t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n by true Democrats. The demand for closed primaries expressed at the Mikulski Commission's hearings had come from a l l s i d e s — from states as disparate as Maine, I l l i n o i s , Texas, and Wyoming, and from "Hum-phrey"' regulars as w e l l as reformers. I t i s apparent, then, that the DNC had a fundamental i n t e r e s t i n f o r c i n g Wisconsin Democrats to close t h e i r primary to crossover voting. It also must be recognized, however, that the DNC had other i n t e r e s t s , some of which did not square w e l l with t h i s p a r t i c u l a r one. One such, i n t e r -est was the DNC's need to minimize c o n f l i c t . The DNC always has been a loose 86 federation of state and l o c a l party organizations, and many of i t s members are i n fac t state party leaders. These often i d e n t i f y more strongly with the state party organizations which they lead than with the na t i o n a l committee they are seated on, and are opposed to too much DNC interference i n the state p a r t i e s ' a f f a i r s . To the extent, then, that the open primary was a Wisconsin t r a d i t i o n and the nation a l party rules c o n f l i c t e d with the Wisconsin party's i n t e r e s t , there were some i n the DNC and i t s commissions who would be sympathetic to Wisconsin because they f e l t that the p r i n c i p l e of l a t i t u d e for the state and l o c a l p a r t i e s was paramount to the DNC's i n t e r e s t i n preventing crossover voting. Others i n the DNC, of course, disagreed that states' r i g h t s were paramount to any of the r u l e s , each of which must be upheld because they em-bodied nation a l party supremacy. S t i l l others i n the DNC, recognizing this fundamental d i f f e r e n c e of opinion between regulars and reformers, found that t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n party unity had a moderating e f f e c t upon t h e i r enthusiasm for such absolutes as states' r i g h t s , the p u r i t y of the delegate s e l e c t i o n process, and na t i o n a l party supremacy. In a n u t s h e l l , the DNC was the furthest thing from a monolith, and i t s i n t e r e s t s and stance vary depending on which element of i t one looks at, and at what stage of the controversy. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WISCONSIN The DPW i s a r e l a t i v e l y new creature, having been created i n 1949 by a group then c a l l i n g themselves the Democratic Organizing Committee to d i s t i n -guish themselves from the d i s i n t e g r a t i n g statutory Democratic party, which never had fared w e l l against the Republicans and Progressives and existed p r i m a r i l y to take f e d e r a l patronage whenever a Democrat was i n the White 87 House. The Organizing Committee, which changed i t s name to the present form (DPW) i n 1953, set up a shadow organization of volunteers p a r a l l e l i n g the i n -e f f e c t u a l statutory organization i n the hopes of f i l l i n g the vacuum created 30 by the demise of the La F o l l e t t e s ' Progressive party i n 1946. The basic u n i t of th i s new party i s the county organization, except i n Milwaukee county, where the party i s broken down into Assembly d i s t r i c t u n i t s . The echelon of the DPW which t h i s study i s most concerned with, however, i s i t s state c e n t r a l committee, which had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or implementing the c l o s i n g of the p r e s i d e n t i a l primary as mandated by the DNC's r u l e s . This c e n t r a l committee was the DPW's 31-member Administrative Committee, which consisted of state party o f f i c e r s and DNC members elected at an annual state convention, the heads of the nine Congressional D i s t r i c t and Milwaukee county party organizations, representatives from the state Assembly and Senate Democratic caucuses, and a number of at-large members also elected at the 31 state convention. As such, the Administrative Committee members were f a i r -l y independent of the party's leader, Governor P a t r i c k J . Lucey, who wielded what influence he had over that body through his hand-picked state DPW Chair-person and the s t a f f at the DPW's state headquarters, which (while I worked there) functioned more or less as a branch of the Governor's o f f i c e . These 31 Administrative Committee members were the ones who must take the lead i n pushing for l e g i s l a t i o n c l o s i n g the state's p r e s i d e n t i a l primary to cross-over voting, or, f a i l i n g that, draw up and implement an alternate, caucus-type system of delegate s e l e c t i o n . As noted above, Sorauf and others have pointed out that the two major American p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s consist of three d i s t i n c t components which often may be at odds with one another: the party organization, the pa r t y - i n -government, and the party-in-the electorate (above, page 6). C e r t a i n l y , t h i s 88 was true of Wisconsin Democrats with respect to the issue under study here. Since i t s inception i n the l a t e 1940's, the DPW organization has been domi-nated by what Wilson c a l l s "amateurs," rather than "professionals." As such, the DPW organization enjoyed the usual d i f f i c u l t r e l a t i o n s with those e l e c t -ed o f f i c i a l s running under i t s l a b e l , who are mostly of the " p r o f e s s i o n a l " mold. The DPW has very l i t t l e c ontrol over i t s elected o f f i c i a l s ; i n large part because (1) i t does not make endorsements i n i t s primary e l e c t i o n s , and 32 (2) Wisconsin has almost no patronage for i t s p a r t i e s to dispense. The absence of these sanctions, and perhaps the amateur domination of the DPW organization as w e l l , can be a t t r i b u t e d to the influence of the Progressive movement, and the strongly anti-party p o l i t i c a l culture which that movement l e f t behind i n Wisconsin. Another factor l i m i t i n g the DPW's influence with i t s elected o f f i c i a l s i s the organization's i n a b i l i t y to r a i s e and dispense s u f f i c i e n t campaign funds (which also may be somewhat a t t r i b u t a b l e to the state's anti-party c u l t u r e ) . As one of the key l e g i s l a t i v e opponents of closure, Representative David R. Kedrowski, put i t : If we r e l i e d on the party c o f f e r s for campaign contributions, 33 we'd a l l starve to death. That's a club that's not even there. Consequently, Wisconsin's Democratic elected o f f i c i a l s , e s p e c i a l l y those who do not hold f e d e r a l or statewide o f f i c e s , b u i l d t h e i r own campaign organiza-tions and r a i s e most of t h e i r own funds. In f a c t , the Democratic caucuses of the Assembly and state Senate have well-developed s t a f f s which a s s i s t i n the performance of many marginally campaign-type functions, as w e l l as t h e i r own caucus fund-raising committees patterned somewhat a f t e r those of the congressional p a r t i e s . 89 As i s so often true of party organizations dominated by amateurs, the hierarchy of the DPW organization sometimes espoused positions d i f f e r e n t from those of the majority of the party's supporters (party-in-the-electorate) and elected o f f i c i a l s (party-in-government). This was the case i n the open-vs.-closed primary controversy. Whereas the DPW organization r e l u c t a n t l y favor-ed obeying the DNC and c l o s i n g the state's p r e s i d e n t i a l primary i f a l l e f f o r t s to get around the r u l e f a i l e d , the party electorate and the party's state l e g i s l a t o r s both strongly opposed even attempting closure. This s p l i t probably can be explained p a r t l y i n terms of the d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l per-spectives of the DPW organization on the one hand, and the party voters and l e g i s l a t o r s on the other. Most of the amateur a c t i v i s t s i n the DPW q u a l i f i e d as e i t h e r reformers or f a i r l y l i b e r a l ( i . e . , "Humphrey-type") regulars, and as such were more l i b e r a l than the majority of the party electorate and t h e i r elected representatives. This pronounced l i b e r a l - l e f t tendency i s borne out by the r e s u l t s of a p r e s i d e n t i a l preference p o l l of 501 party 34 a c t i v i s t s attending the DPW's 1975 state convention (see Table 8). Un-doubtedly, many of these mostly l i b e r a l DPW a c t i v i s t s and leaders shared the concerns of t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l mates i n the n a t i o n a l party who had pushed a f t e r the 1972 primary campaign for the adoption of r u l e 2A i n order to pre-vent Republicans and independents from crossing over to vote for George Wallace and others on the party's r i g h t . But the s p l i t between the DPW and i t s l e g i s l a t o r s and electorate over the primary issue can be explained better i n terms of the d i f f e r i n g i n t e r e s t s of these three components of the party. A l l three components may be pre-sumed to have been equally exposed to the state's Progressive culture; and a l l three i n f a c t would have preferred the status quo. Yet, despite shared backgrounds and preferences, they nevertheless took d i f f e r e n t stances on the TABLE 8 P r e s i d e n t i a l Preference of 1975 DPW State Convention Delegates* Candidate Votes Percent Morris U d a l l 151 29 Fred Harris 129 27 Edward Kennedy- 79 15 Hubert Humphrey 32 6 Jimmy Carter 24 4 Henry Jackson 24 4 Edmund Muskie 20 4 George Wallace 9 2 Undecided 8 2 Milton Shapp 7 1 J u l i a n Bond 6 1 Gaylord Nelson 4 1 Others 8 2 Tot a l 501 100 Adapted from Thomas Lawin, "Udall Tops Harris i n Convention Po Eau C l a i r e Leader-Telegram, 16 June 1975. i s s u e — a phenomenon which can be better understood by examining how c l o s i n g the primary figured to a f f e c t t h e i r separate i n t e r e s t s . The Interest and Stand of the DPW The Democratic l e g i s l a t o r s ' compelling i n t e r e s t i n t h i s issue was to hang onto t h e i r seats i n the l e g i s l a t u r e ; an i n t e r e s t which enactment of a closed primary b i l l would have endangered, given the surrounding p o l i t i c a l c u lture. (More on t h i s l a t e r . ) The party electorate's i n t e r e s t i n th i s issue was the preservation of what they viewed as a "God-given r i g h t to vote 35 i n the primary of the party they please." DPW state headquarters s t a f f members t r a v e l l i n g the state i n 1975 encountered many rank-and-file members i n l o c a l DPW u n i t s , as w e l l as many casually a f f i l i a t e d party supporters, who favored holding the open primary as usual, sending a delegation from i t to the 1976 nationa l convention, and daring the nationa l party to explain to m i l l i o n s of t e l e v i s i o n viewers that Wisconsin was being ejected from the con-36 vention because i t had encouraged too much voter p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Written objections of a s i m i l a r nature came into DPW state headquarters from party 37 supporters and lower-echelon DPW members. They wanted the state party leadership to " t e l l the DNC to go to H e l l " ; but then, unlike the DPW organi-zation leaders, those i n the party electorate and lower echelons of the organization did not stand a reasonable chance of becoming delegates to the nat i o n a l convention. The leaders on the DPW Administrative Committee, on the other hand, had a compelling i n t e r e s t i n insuring that t h e i r organization's delegation would be seated at the nationa l convention where, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , the next President of the United States would be selected. Undoubtedly, many of t h e i r own number would be members of that delegation, and a c t u a l l y might 38 play a r o l e i n what many predicted would be a brokered nomination. Nor was thi s the only i n t e r e s t of the DPW leadership that would be served by com-pliance with the DNC's mandate: several of them also had t h e i r own personal prestige and influence i n national party c i r c l e s to think of. Wisconsin DNC member Mary Lou Burg was Robert S. Strauss's personally-selected Deputy Chairperson of the DNC, responsible f o r the d a i l y management of DNC opera-tions; and DPW F i r s t Vice Chairperson Marge Pattison was a member of the DNC's Compliance Review Commission. Both of them would f i n d t h e i r respective n a t i o n a l party posts embarrassing and d i f f i c u l t to the extent that t h e i r home state's party refused to make a "good f a i t h e f f o r t " to comply with the nat i o n a l party r u l e s . Wisconsin DNC members Midge M i l l e r , Michael Bleicher, and Donald 0. Peterson also enjoyed great influence on that body and within the reform f a c t i o n ; influence which might have diminished i f the Wisconsin organization should "backslide" on reform. The idea of standing on p r i n c i p l e and refusing p a r t i c i p a t i o n at the nat i o n a l convention on the DNC's terms did not appeal so much to those who previously had tasted power, and could reasonably expect to do so again, as i t did to those who had not, and were not about to. Perhaps we may conclude from this that i n some sense the d i f f e r i n g f e e l i n g s of personal e f f i c a c y held by those at the top of the party hierarchy and those at the bottom of i t or outside i t affected t h e i r respective preferences with regard to a closed primary. It seems natural that those who f e e l l e a s t e f f i c a c i o u s should be the ones most opposed to any changes strengthening the party organization, which i n Progressive ideology i s seen as one of the causes of the i n d i -v idual's p o l i t i c a l powerlessness. On the other hand, these same DPW leaders also were aware that c l o s i n g 93 the primary undoubtedly would hurt the party with the electorate and the press, and that Democratic candidates f o r the l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1976 would s u f f e r for i t . Consequently, those on the DPW Administrative Committee were troubled by dissonance within themselves as i n d i v i d u a l s and among themselves as a group; and two of them, George Wilbur and DPW Second Vice Chairperson 39 Frank Nikolay, even came out i n p r i n t against a closed primary. Most of the r e s t were compelled by the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n and t h e i r r o l e s to take a stance favoring a closed primary; but they, too, were unenthusias-t i c about closure, and t h e i r support of i t lacked accordingly. DPW Chair-person Herbert H. Kohl spoke for a l l Administrative Committee members when he t o l d the Associated Press, "Personally, I wish the [primary] system could 40 remain j u s t as i t i s now. I think most Democrats do." Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , then, many DPW o f f i c i a l s hoped that t h e i r party might escape i t s dilemma by making an unsuccessful attempt to pass the necessary l e g i s l a t i o n , and then persuading the n a t i o n a l party to grant Wisconsin a waiver of r u l e 2A on the 41 grounds that a "good f a i t h e f f o r t " had been made. THE DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATORS As mentioned i n the previous section, most Democratic l e g i s l a t o r s great-l y feared the possible e l e c t o r a l consequences of passing a b i l l c l o s i n g the open primary. Given the surrounding Progressive p o l i t i c a l culture and the opposition of the state press, not to speak of the considerable opposition w i t h i n t h e i r own party e l e c t o r a t e , they were wise to f e e l concern. As Republican-leaning columnist John Wyngaard warned them, It would be worth the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of most l e g i s l a t o r s to support such a bold and arrogant curtailment of the absolute 94 freedom of choice that has been assured since the great wave of e l e c t o r a l reform i n Wisconsin and elsewhere around the turn of the century. Moreover, l e g i s l a t o r s had a great deal at stake i n the p o l i t i c a l l i v e s Mr. Wyngaard warned they would r i s k . The destruction of one's p o l i t i c a l career, stated i n such general terms, does not mean much unless i t i s broken down into s p e c i f i c r a m i f i c a t i o n s , such as the loss of personal income, status, and power. During the past decade, the Wisconsin l e g i s l a t u r e has been undergoing t r a n s i t i o n from a part-time l e g i s l a t u r e to a f u l l - t i m e one whose members' l i v e l i h o o d and profession i s p o l i t i c s , and only p o l i t i c s . At l e a s t 37 of the then-62 Democrats i n the Assembly and four of the 19 Democrats i n the Senate were f u l l - t i m e l e g i s l a t o r s dependent upon t h e i r $15,680 s a l a r i e s and 43 $25 per diem expense accounts for t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d . This salary would r i s e to $17,843 i f they survived the forthcoming 1976 e l e c t i o n , but there was a hurdle: the Republicans had vowed to make closure of the primary a cam-44 paign issue i n that e l e c t i o n , i f the Democrats passed such l e g i s l a t i o n . Several of these f u l l - t i m e l e g i s l a t o r s were elected to o f f i c e very early i n l i f e (often r i g h t out of college or a f t e r a period of service as l e g i s -l a t i v e s t a f f ) , and never had engaged i n any other occupation except p o l i t i c s . For many of these, i t seems l i k e l y that the status that comes with popular e l e c t i o n and the wielding of power probably figured prominently i n t h e i r 45 sense of self-worth. The prospect of loss of r e - e l e c t i o n may have connoted to some of them a period of floundering and uncertainty, not only i n the sense of facing d i f f i c u l t career decisions, but also i n terms of s e l f -assessment, of personal i d e n t i t y . 95 The threat to r e - e l e c t i o n that the closure issue represented also was a so