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An assessment of the Salmonid Enhancement Program planning process Brown, Daryl Wayne 1981

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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SALMONID ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM PLANNING PROCESS by DARYL WAYNE BROWN B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of V i c t o r i a , 1975 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n The F a c u l t y o f Graduate S t u d i e s ( The School of Community and Regional Planning) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1981 (c) Daryl Wayne Brown, 1981 i i In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree that p ermission f o r ex t e n s i v e copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . School of Community and Regional Planning The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date .^Yv£.m,jae>A ABSTRACT A Salmonid Enhancement Program (SEP) has been i n i t i a t e d by the F e d e r a l and B r i t i s h Columbia governments with a primary o b j e c t i v e of r e b u i l d i n g the P a c i f i c salmonid resource to h i s t o r i c l e v e l s of abundance ( i . e . double c u r r e n t p r o d u c t i o n ) . To t h i s end, a d i v e r s i t y of i n d i v i d u a l enhancement p r o j e c t s have been undertaken, and others are scheduled f o r the f u t u r e . The p r o j e c t s range from simple, s m a l l - s c a l e and r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive a c t i v i t i e s , such as stream r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , to the c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e and t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y complex h a t c h e r i e s . T h i s study seeks to eva l u a t e the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the SEP pla n n i n g process as a means of producing s o c i a l l y a c c e p t a b l e salmonid enhancement d e c i s i o n s . In a d d i t i o n to r e b u i l d i n g the resource, the implementation of SEP p r o j e c t s i s viewed by government as a means of c o n t r i b u t i n g to economic, s o c i a l and environmental o b j e c t i v e s . The extent to which each of these o b j e c t i v e s i s s a t i s f i e d i s s e n s i t i v e to the type, l o c a t i o n , s c a l e , and timing of separate enhancement p r o j e c t s . D i f f e r e n t p r o j e c t s c o n f e r d i f f e r e n t kinds of b e n e f i t s and c o s t s . Since f i n a n c i a l resources are s c a r c e , t r a d e o f f among o b j e c t i v e s i s necessary. T r a d e o f f s are determined by' the dynamics of the SEP pl a n n i n g process which culminates a n n u a l l y i n d e c i s i o n s to a l l o c a t e scarce resources among competing ends. In making the resource a l l o c a t i o n , the SEP pl a n n i n g process must d e a l with c o n s i d e r a b l e u n c e r t a i n t y . The s a t i s f a c t i o n of Program o b j e c t i v e s w i l l depend u l t i m a t e l y on a s u s t a i n e d i v i n c r e a s e i n salmonid p r o d u c t i o n . While the technology e x i s t s to produce f i s h a r t i f i c i a l l y i n great numbers, i t remains unknown whether or not i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n can be s u s t a i n e d . The r e s u l t s w i l l depend in l a r g e p a r t on the r e g u l a t i o n of h a r v e s t s and h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n . It i s p o s t u l a t e d that the c o n s t i t u e n t elements of a "good" pl a n n i n g process should correspond with the precepts of l i b e r a l democratic theory. T h i s i m p l i e s that a "good" p l a n n i n g process ought to produce resource a l l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s that r e f l e c t the d e s i r e s of s o c i e t y , and i n doing so, i t should d e a l with the problem of u n c e r t a i n t y in an a c c e p t a b l e manner. A c c o r d i n g l y , the normative c r i t e r i a used to assess the SEP p l a n n i n g process a r e : 1. I n t e r e s t s (government and non-government) who w i l l be a f f e c t e d by SEP d e c i s i o n s should have the o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e , or more r e a l i s t i c a l l y , be represented i n a l l aspects of the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . 2. For i n t e r e s t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to be e f f e c t i v e and f o r p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s to be i n t e l l i g e n t , r e l e v a n t e v a l u a t i v e informat ion on a l t e r n a t i v e enhancement plans should be generated and communicated among i n t e r e s t s . 3. Planning should be e f f i c i e n t in the sense that i t i s not w a s t e f u l of time and r e s o u r c e s . The SEP p l a n n i n g process was s t u d i e d i n d e t a i l and e v a l u a t e d through a p p l i c a t i o n of >the f o r e g o i n g c r i t e r i a . Recommendations for remedying i d e n t i f i e d d e f i c i e n c i e s were developed through a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e o r i e s of p o l i t i c a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior, d e r i v e d from a study of the l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s s u b j e c t . V Strengths, Weaknesses and Proposed Improvements A. Representation of I n t e r e s t s 1. Although the range of a p p r o p r i a t e non-governmental i n t e r e s t s i s r epresented on a p u b l i c a d v i s o r y body (the Salmonid Enhancement Task Group - SETG), these i n t e r e s t s are i n v o l v e d only s u p e r f i c i a l l y i n p l a n n i n g . Furthermore, SETG members communicate i n s u f f i c i e n t l y with t h e i r a f f i l i a t e d groups, thereby l i m i t i n g the extent to which the i n t e r e s t s of the "wider c o n s t i t u e n c i e s " are represented in p l a n n i n g . To remedy t h i s s i t u a t i o n i t i s proposed t h a t : (a) a second l e v e l of r e g i o n a l a d v i s o r y task groups be formed, and (b) the e x i s t i n g SETG be p r o v i d e d with resources to o b t a i n independent t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e so that i t can f u n c t i o n more e f f e c t i v e l y i n the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . 2. The Salmonid Enhancement Board (SEB) which i s composed of p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s as w e l l as s e n i o r governmental o f f i c i a l s d e c i d e s upon programs to be undertaken and a d v i s e s on p o l i c y matters. The problems with t h i s arrangement are t h a t : (a) p r i v a t e , non-accountable i n d i v i d u a l s p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a l l o c a t i o n of p u b l i c funds, and (b) proponent agency r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , in e f f e c t , p r ovide a d v i c e to themselves. I t i s suggested that the SEB be made p u r e l y a d e c i s i o n -making body and that p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s be excluded from SEB membership. 3. While the announced p o l i c y i s to recover the c o s t s of salmonid enhancement through t a x a t i o n of f i s h h a r v e s t s , t h i s p o l i c y has not been implemented and p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e v i theory i n d i c a t e s that i t i s u n l i k e l y that i t w i l l be. If i t i s not, the Program w i l l i n v o l v e a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of income of q u e s t i o n a b l e f a i r n e s s and motivate the i n i t i a t i o n of p r o j e c t s of dubious merit from the p o i n t of view of the p u b l i c as a whole. 4. P r o v i n c i a l government i n t e r e s t s with r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a f f e c t e d by SEP (e.g. F o r e s t S e r v i c e ) are not always i n v o l v e d i n SEP p l a n n i n g . I t i s proposed that r e f e r r a l processes should be i n i t i a t e d which, as an end-product, seek agreement among the a p p r o p r i a t e agencies before an enhancement pl a n i s implemented. 5. Although mechanisms have been e s t a b l i s h e d to i n t e g r a t e the on-going elements of salmonid resource management with SEP, evidence suggests that these have, i n the past, been l a r g e l y u n s u c c e s s f u l . B. Adequacy of Information 6. Although e f f o r t s are made to generate r e l e v a n t and systematic i n f o r m a t i o n for-1 SEP decision-making, numerous d e f i c i e n c i e s remain: (a) too few p r o j e c t o p t i o n s are developed. (b) p r o j e c t s are sometimes implemented without f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n on whether or not p r o d u c t i o n can be managed s u c c e s s f u l l y . (c) not a l l p r o j e c t s r e c e i v e e v a l u a t i o n p r i o r to t h e i r i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o an annual p l a n . (d) i n c i d e n c e of e f f e c t s of plans i s conveyed a b s t r a c t l y . (e) a l t e r n a t i v e annual enhancement plans are not formulated. To improve the generation of i n f o r m a t i o n i t i s suggested that a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g i n f l u e n c e i n SEP p l a n n i n g i s r e q u i r e d . The SETG c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y provide t h i s i n f l u e n c e i f the r o l e of t h i s group i s e l e v a t e d and the funding f o r t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e i s p r o v i d e d , so that i t can e f f e c t i v e l y c r i t i q u e plans proposed v i i by the SEP s t a f f and c o n c e p t u a l i z e a l t e r n a t i v e p r o p o s a l s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . C. E f f i c i e n c y of the Process 7. I n e f f i c i e n c i e s i n the pl a n n i n g process e x i s t in the sense t h a t : (a) the p u b l i c a d v i s o r y mechanism i s r e l a t i v e l y i n e f f e c t i v e , d e s p i t e the l a r g e amounts of time and money devoted, and (b) a p o t e n t i a l d u p l i c a t i o n of f u n c t i o n e x i s t s c u r r e n t l y between the SETG and the SEB because both groups a s p i r e to provide p o l i c y l e v e l advice on SEP p l a n n i n g . These d e f i c i e n c i e s would be remedied i f recommendations made i n A and B above are implemented. SEP - A Broader P e r s p e c t i v e While SEP i s expected to achieve 85% of i t s Phase 1 pr o d u c t i o n t a r g e t there are s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s about whether enhanced stocks add to or merely r e p l a c e some of the e x i s t i n g n a t u r a l base of f i s h s t o c k s . In view of the importance of the salmonid resource to B.C. i t i s of c r i t i c a l importance that SEP pl a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n processes be made as e f f e c t i v e as p o s s i b l e . v i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE — INTRODUCTION 1 Purpose 1 The Problem of Resource A l l o c a t i o n 1 SEP Background . . 2 The Resource A l l o c a t i o n Problem - S p e c i f i c to SEP 3 Determining "The Mix" 8 A P o l i t i c a l B a s i s f o r Planning 9 Study O b j e c t i v e s 9 CHAPTER TWO -- METHODOLOGY 11 E v a l u a t i n g the SEP Planning Process 11 The E v a l u a t i v e C r i t e r i a 12 1. The c r i t e r i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s 13 2. The c r i t e r i o n of adequacy of i n f o r m a t i o n f o r decision-making 13 3. The c r i t e r i o n of decision-making e f f i c i e n c y 14 Information Sources 14 CHAPTER THREE — THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 16 The Relevance of a T h e o r e t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e 16 P u b l i c Choice Theory 17 P u b l i c c h oice as a democratic process 18 The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem 21 Other B e h a v i o r a l F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n a l Performance 23 (a) Bounded r a t i o n a l i t y 24 (b) P e r c e p t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s 25 (c) C l i e n t e l i s m 26 The Information Problem ..27 The.Uncertainty Problem 28 Summary of the Theory ' 31 CHAPTER FOUR — A DESCRIPTION OF THE SEP PLANNING PROCESS ...33 Background Information: Planning f o r SEP 33 The Development and E v a l u a t i o n of P r o j e c t Options 36 I n t e r n a l SEP Plan-Making 38 E x t e r n a l I n f l u e n c e s i n the Planning Process 40 (a) P u b l i c input i n t o p l a n n i n g 40 (b) The decision-making u n i t 43 Steps i n P o l i c y Implementation 44 SEP E v a l u a t i o n Techniques - The Five-Account Framework . . . 45 CHAPTER FIVE -- ASSESSMENT AND DISCUSSION OF THE SEP PLANNING PROCESS 50 I. REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS IN THE SEP PLANNING PROCESS 50 A. Non-Government I n t e r e s t s i n SEP Planning 50 I n d i c a t o r I - l : Opportunity to P a r t i c i p a t e 54 I n d i c a t o r 1-2: T r a n s a c t i o n Costs of P a r t i c i p a t i o n ....59 I n d i c a t o r 1-3: A Forum for Re p r e s e n t a t i o n 59 I n d i c a t o r 1-4: E f f e c t i v e n e s s of Representation 61 I n d i c a t o r 1-5: Representation of the "General I n t e r e s t " 66 B. Government I n t e r e s t s i n SEP Planning 68 1. P r o v i n c i a l agencies 68 2. Other components of f i s h e r i e s management 70 I I . ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION 73 I n d i c a t o r I I - 1 : Development and T e c h n i c a l E v a l u a t i o n of P r o j e c t Options 75 I n d i c a t o r I I - 2 : Formulation and E v a l u a t i o n of A l t e r n a t i v e Annual Enhancement Plans 80 I n d i c a t o r 11 —3 : Incidence of E f f e c t s .'....83 I n d i c a t o r 11-4: Communication of Information 84 I n d i c a t o r 11 —5: C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the "Information Problem" 87 I I I . EFFICIENCY OF THE PROCESS 95 I n d i c a t o r I I I - l : " C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n e s s " of R e p r e s e n t a t i o n ..96 I n d i c a t o r 111-2 : D u p l i c a t i o n of Function 97 I n d i c a t o r 111-3 : " C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n e s s " of Information 98 X CHAPTER SIX — CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 A. STRENGTHS OF THE SEP PLANNING SYSTEM 100 1. Repre s e n t a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s i n SEP p l a n n i n g 100 2. Information f o r SEP Decision-Making .....102 B. WEAKNESSES OF THE SEP PLANNING SYSTEM AND PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS 103 1. Repre s e n t a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s i n SEP Planning 103 (a) Weaknesses of the p u b l i c a d v i s o r y mechanism 103 -Proposed improvements 104 (b) Weaknesses of the decision-making f u n c t i o n 106 -Proposed improvements 107 (c) C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the "general i n t e r e s t " 108 (d) Weaknesses i n P r o v i n c i a l involvement 109 -Proposed improvements 109 2. Information f o r SEP Decision-Making 110 (a) Information d e f i c i e n c i e s i n SEP plan n i n g 110 -Improved i n f o r m a t i o n through improved r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 112 -Improving the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g framework as an i n f o r m a t i o n t o o l 115 3. Decision-Making E f f i c i e n c y 118 Improving the e f f i c i e n c y of SEP p l a n n i n g 118 SEP: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ...120 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES CITED 124 APPENDIX I - Persons Interviewed f o r the Study 130 APPENDIX II - Salmonid Enhancement Task Group: Membership and A f f i l i a t i o n 132 APPENDIX III - Salmonid Enhancement Task Group: Terms of Reference 134 APPENDIX IV - Salmonid Enhancement Board: Membership and A f f i l i a t i o n .140 x i APPENDIX V - Salmonid Enhancement Board: Terms of Reference 142 APPENDIX VI - Sample of the.1980/81 Five-Account E v a l u a t i v e Information as Presented to the SEB ' 146 LIST OF TABLES x i i Table 1 - S p e c i a l P r o j e c t s U n i t Funding as a P r o p o r t i o n of SEP Budgets 63 LIST OF FIGURES F i g u r e 1 - D e c l i n e of the B.C. Salmon Catch 4 F i g u r e 2 - SEP Planning Process - Proposed Improvements 78 x i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e to thank those members of the Salmonid Enhancement Board, the Salmonid Enhancement Task Group, and Salmonid Enhancement Program s t a f f who pr o v i d e d me with i n f o r m a t i o n ; my academic a d v i s o r s , P r o f e s s o r I r v i n g Fox and Anthony Dorcey f o r t h e i r guidance and support; and e s p e c i a l l y my wife Cindy, without whom t h i s p a r t i c u l a r study would not have been p o s s i b l e . 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Purpose The purpose of t h i s study i s to assess the Salmonid Enhancement Program plan n i n g process using normative c r i t e r i a . Where inadequacies are r e v e a l e d , recommendations are o f f e r e d that c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y improve upon the plann i n g p r o c e s s . The Problem Of Resource A l l o c a t i o n A l l p u b l i c expenditure programs face the d i f f i c u l t y of a l l o c a t i n g scarce resources among competing ends. Where the t a r g e t groups of such programs are p l u r a l i s t i c there can be no "optimal" a l l o c a t i o n ; f o r what i s c o n s i d e r e d "best" by one group may be c o n s i d e r e d "worst" by another. In s p i t e of t h i s dilemma, a l l o c a t i o n c h o i c e s ( i n the form of p o l i c i e s , programs and p r o j e c t s ) continue to be made d a i l y by government i n the name of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . The qu e s t i o n s which a r i s e immediately however, a r e : how are these c h o i c e s made  given the d i v e r s i t y of i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y ; and perhaps more impo r t a n t l y , how should these c h o i c e s be made i f they are to t r u l y accord with the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ? T h i s t h e s i s attempts to provide some i n s i g h t s i n t o these b a s i c q u e s t i o n s i n a case study of one such p u b l i c expenditure program - the Salmonid Enhancement Program (SEP). The focus of the study i s on the SEP pl a n n i n g process i n that i t i s t h i s process which culminates i n d e c i s i o n s to a l l o c a t e scarce funds among competing ends. 2 SEP Background SEP i s an investment i n f i s h e r i e s resource development t h a t ' s long term aim i s to r e t u r n Canada's p a c i f i c salmon and sea-run t r o u t to h i s t o r i c l e v e l s of abundance. The investment has been j u s t i f i e d i n terms of the numerous values which t h i s resource has h i s t o r i c a l l y , and c o n t i n u e s to c o n t r i b u t e to Canada. Econo m i c a l l y , the 1980 wholesale value of the f i v e s p e c i e s of salmon (commonly named sockeye, chinook, coho, pink, and chum salmon) caught and processed i n B.C. was $304 m i l l i o n . T h i s r e p r e s e n t s 59% of the wholesale value of a l l f i s h e r i e s i n the Province f o r that year. During t h i s same p e r i o d , over 11,000 people were employed at jobs r e l a t e d to h a r v e s t i n g and p r o c e s s i n g the salmon re s o u r c e . (B.C. M i n i s t r y of Industry and Small Business Development, 1980). In terms of r e c r e a t i o n a l v a l u e s , thousands of s a l t w a t e r a n g l e r s enjoyed the b e n e f i t s of the resource i n 1975, c o n t r i b u t i n g $100 m i l l i o n to the B.C. economy in t o t a l a n g l i n g e x p e n d i t u r e s . ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978). For many n a t i v e Indian bands in B.C. the salmon resource i s c e n t r a l to t h e i r c u l t u r e and the s t a b i l i t y of t h e i r communities, not only as a commercial e n t e r p r i s e , but a l s o as an important food source. F i n a l l y , the simple knowledge that the resource e x i s t s i n t a c t i s of great p s y c h o l o g i c a l value to many people. R e c o g n i t i o n of these values i s manifest i n the complex management i n s t i t u t i o n s which have evolved to t r y to preserve the i n t e g r i t y of t h i s r e s o u r c e . In s p i t e of management e f f o r t s , 3 o v e r f i s h i n g and h a b i t a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n over a p e r i o d of decades have caused salmon catches to d e c l i n e d r a m a t i c a l l y . ( F i g . 1). Conventional management s t r a t e g i e s have been unable to conserve the resource and SEP r e p r e s e n t s o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s i n a b i l i t y . The Program i s scheduled to proceed i n two d i s t i n c t phases. Phase 1 (1977-84) has r e c e i v e d F e d e r a l Cabinet a l l o c a t i o n of $150 m i l l i o n to achieve the annual incremental g e n e r a t i o n of 50 m i l l i o n pounds of salmonids. Phase 2 i s contingent upon the success of Phase 1 and c a l l s f o r an undetermined investment f o r a 16-20 year p e r i o d to produce yet an a d d i t i o n a l 140 m i l l i o n pounds a n n u a l l y . The a n t i c i p a t e d t o t a l incremental p r o d u c t i o n of these two phases (190 m i l l i o n pounds) r e p r e s e n t s an approximate d o u b l i n g of c u r r e n t p r o d u c t i o n . ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978). The Resource A l l o c a t i o n Problem - S p e c i f i c To SEP It i s important at the outset to a p p r e c i a t e that salmonid enhancement i s p e r c e i v e d by government as a means to an end(s), r a t h e r than an end in i t s e l f . That i s , SEP i s viewed as a t o o l to c o n t r i b u t e to government's broader g o a l s . "The purpose of government investment i n SEP i s not to make more f i s h — r a t h e r to generate s o c i a l and economic b e n e f i t s by making more f i s h " . (DFO, 1979(c), p.2). To t h i s end, Canada and the Province of B.C. have agreed to work towards a c h i e v i n g the f o l l o w i n g f i v e o b j e c t i v e s : 1. To augment N a t i o n a l and P r o v i n c i a l income. 2. To f o s t e r development of economically disadvantaged communities or r e g i o n s . if Figure 1 Decline of the B.C. Salmon Catch source: adapted from Fisheries & Environment Canada, 1978 and D.F.O. statistics 5 3. To improve the economic w e l l - b e i n g of n a t i v e Indian peoples, c o n s i s t e n t with the need to preserve t h e i r s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e s . 4. To c r e a t e employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Canadians. 5. To pr e s e r v e , r e h a b i l i t a t e , and/or enhance n a t u r a l salmonid h a b i t a t s , and maintain and/or r e h a b i l i t a t e v e s t i g i a l salmonid stock s of l o c a l , r e g i o n a l or n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1977, p.63). The implementation of a d i v e r s i t y of i n d i v i d u a l enhancement p r o j e c t s i s the proposed means of a c h i e v i n g these o b j e c t i v e s . The p r o j e c t s range from simple, s m a l l - s c a l e and r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive a c t i v i t i e s , such as c l e a r i n g o b s t r u c t i o n s from streams, to the c o n s t r u c t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e and t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y complex h a t c h e r i e s . The extent to which each of the f i v e above-stated o b j e c t i v e s i s s a t i s f i e d by SEP depends l a r g e l y upon the type,  s c a l e , l o c a t i o n , and ti m i n g of separate enhancement p r o j e c t s . For example, a l a r g e , w e l l - d e s i g n e d hatchery l o c a t e d near south-coast f l e e t and p r o c e s s i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s would l i k e l y score h i g h l y i n terms of the n a t i o n a l income o b j e c t i v e . That i s , the economic value of the f i s h produced from such a f a c i l i t y w i l l v i r t u a l l y always exceed p r o d u c t i o n c o s t s . However, as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to economically disadvantaged r e g i o n s , or i n terms of b e n e f i t s to n a t i v e people, (and perhaps even resource p r e s e r v a t i o n ) such a p r o j e c t might score rather p o o r l y . On the other hand, f o r the same money, a s e r i e s of s m a l l -s c a l e , north coast enhancement a c t i v i t i e s c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y make a l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n to employment or na t i v e people o b j e c t i v e s , but at the "expense" of n a t i o n a l income in terms of salmonid p r o d u c t i o n foregone, ( i . e . fewer f i s h per d o l l a r expended). T h i s i s not to deny that some p r o j e c t s are capable of 6 c o n t r i b u t i n g to a l l f i v e o b j e c t i v e s . I t i s true however, that the p r o j e c t s that end-up being implemented w i l l i n f l u e n c e the r e l a t i v e weighting that the o b j e c t i v e s s h a l l r e c e i v e . The p o i n t i s that budget resources are scarce and not a l l o b j e c t i v e s can be maximized. Spending on one type of enhancement a c t i v i t y w i l l mean that funding i s not a v a i l a b l e f o r another — t r a d e o f f i s  necessary. T h i s i s the essence of the resource a l l o c a t i o n problem with which the SEP planning process must d e a l . It i s important at t h i s p o i n t to emphasize that the s a t i s f a c t i o n of SEP o b j e c t i v e s w i l l depend, more fundamentally, on a s u s t a i n e d i n c r e a s e i n salmonid p r o d u c t i o n . Yet, i t remains u n c e r t a i n whether or not l a r g e i n c r e a s e s i n salmonid p r o d u c t i o n can be s u s t a i n e d , d e s p i t e the t e c h n o l o g i c a l c a p a b i l i t y to produce f i s h a r t i f i c i a l l y i n great numbers. An enhancement experiment of t h i s magnitude i s unprecedented. A l l s p e c i e s i n almost a l l salmonid producing regions of B.C. are scheduled fo r augmentation. The resource "system" i s b i o l o g i c a l l y , e conomically, and s o c i a l l y complex. I t i s not known for i n s t a n c e , whether or not the environmental c a p a c i t y e x i s t s f o r twice c u r r e n t p r o d u c t i o n , or i f i t i s p o s s i b l e to s u c c e s s f u l l y manage t h i s i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n . Program r e s u l t s w i l l depend in l a r g e p a r t on how w e l l SEP p l a n n i n g , as a process which a l l o c a t e s r e s o u r c e s , can deal with enhancement from a "systems p e r s p e c t i v e " . I t must a l s o be recognized that what can and cannot be i n c l u d e d i n an enhancement plan i s i n f l u e n c e d by c o n s t r a i n t s on what i s c o n t e m p o r a r i l y f e a s i b l e . B r i e f l y , , these c o n s t r a i n t s , which a r i s e from many d i f f e r e n t sources, are o u t l i n e d below. 7 1. M a n a g e a b i l i t y : Stocks that are enhanced must be capable of being harvested i n a way that does not impact d e t r i m e n t a l l y upon unenhanced s t o c k s . ( i . e . there must be a net i n c r e a s e i n p r o d u c t i o n over and above the n a t u r a l base). 2. Economics: Treasury Board has r e q u i r e d that i t s investment must be c o s t - r e c o v e r a b l e . L o g i c a l l y , f o r t h i s to be p o s s i b l e the Program must t r y to a t t a i n an o v e r a l l b e n e f i t - c o s t r a t i o of at l e a s t 1:1. The a c t u a l b e n e f i t - c o s t r a t i o t a r g e t f o r Phase 1 of SEP however, has been set at 1.5:1. The reasons that have been given f o r seeking t h i s "extra cushion" of economic e f f i c i e n c y ar e : (1) i t i s not p a r t i c u l a r i l y d e s i r a b l e to "take-back" from the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of SEP a l l the economic b e n e f i t s that the Program has p r o v i d e d to them, and (2) i t i s probably not p o s s i b l e to d e v i s e a p e r f e c t l y e f f i c i e n t or e q u i t a b l e scheme that c o u l d i d e n t i f y each and every SEP economic b e n e f i c i a r y and recover from him the exact amount that he has r e c e i v e d from the Program. (Morley, p e r s . comm.). These economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a u t o m a t i c a l l y e l i m i n a t e many p o t e n t i a l enhancement a c t i v i t i e s . 3. I n t e r n a t i o n a l : There i s l i t t l e p o i n t i n enhancing f i s h stocks that are h e a v i l y i n t e r c e p t e d by f o r e i g n fishermen, (although recent Canada/ U.S. n e g o t i a t i o n s regarding a c a t c h agreement may serve to r e l a x t h i s c o n s t r a i n t ) . 4. Resource-user i n t e r a c t i o n s : S i n g l e use of a watershed fo r f i s h p r o d u c t i o n imposes o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t s on other watershed users ( i . e . f o r e s t r y , a g r i c u l t u r e , m u n i c i p a l development, e t c . ) . In some cases these c o s t s may not be a c c e p t a b l e . 5. P h y s i c a l : Not a l l l o c a t i o n s have the p h y s i c a l a t t r i b u t e s necessary f o r c e r t a i n types of i n s t a l l a t i o n s . ( i . e . water q u a l i t y , access, water flow, power source, adequate brood stock, etc . ) . 6. Previous commitments: A c a p i t a l investment i n a f a c i l i t y r e q u i r e s that funding f o r o p e r a t i o n s and maintenance must be ongoing f o r the l i f e of the f a c i l i t y . T h i s means that d i s c r e t i o n a r y funds d e c l i n e as the Program c o n t i n u e s . 7. P o l i t i c a l : P r o j e c t s with p o t e n t i a l f o r c r e a t i n g s i g n i f i c a n t i n e q u i t i e s among c l i e n t groups, or that would impose s i g n i f i c a n t c o s t s to a p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t group would be unacceptable to the p o l i t i c i a n . Given these c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n s t r a i n t s on what enhancement plans can p r a c t i c a b l y c o n s i s t o f, and with the understanding t h a t : (a) not a l l f i v e o b j e c t i v e s can be maximized simu l t a n e o u s l y , and (b) planning must operate i n the face of 8 c o n s i d e r a b l e u n c e r t a i n t y , how i s the most d e s i r a b l e mix of enhancement p r o j e c t s to be determined? Determining "The Mix" C o n c e p t u a l l y , t h i s q u e s t i o n has not been overlooked by SEP pl a n n e r s . In d e s c r i b i n g the goals of the Program an analogy has been drawn between SEP and the f u n c t i o n of the marketplace. (DFO, 1980(a)). The "sha r e h o l d e r s " ( i . e . the f i n a n c i e r s ) are the Treasury Board and Cabinet; the "market" are fishermen, p r o c e s s o r s and consumers; and "SEP products" are n a t i o n a l income, r e g i o n a l development, employment, and n a t i v e people and environmental and resource management b e n e f i t s that flow from i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n of salmonids. " I t i s the r o l e of SEP management to maintain a balance between the i n t e r a c t i n g a s p i r a t i o n s of shareholders and market...by a d j u s t i n g the SEP products and processes." (DFO, 1980(a), p.3). The task of SEP management i s problematic because of the d i v e r s i t y of a s p i r a n t s , and the complexity of t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s . T h i s i s shown i n the s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n the p e r s p e c t i v e s , not only among the "market" i t s e l f , but a l s o between the "market" and the " s h a r e h o l d e r s " . C l i e n t groups are concerned with the in c i d e n c e of Program e f f e c t s , s i n c e d i f f e r e n t enhancement p r o j e c t s confer d i f f e r e n t i a l b e n e f i t s (and c o s t s ) . Treasury Board, on the other hand, i s a f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n and i s concerned that i t s investments are sound. The d i f f i c u l t r o l e of SEP management then, i s to somehow s t r i k e a balance between l a r g e and small developments; low technology and high technology; c e n t r a l i z e d and d e - c e n t r a l i z e d ; and among s p e c i e s and stock mixes, that w i l l keep a l l a s p i r a n t s 9 g e n e r a l l y s a t i s f i e d . Although o p t i m i z a t i o n methods are a v a i l a b l e to a s s i s t with such d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s , i t i s g e n e r a l l y accepted these days, that they should not be r e l i e d upon as the s o l e determinants of a l l o c a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , SEP management must turn to an i n t e r a c t i v e form of decision-making — a form that has i t s r o o t s in the p o l i t i c a l process, s i n c e SEP a f t e r a l l , i s i n the business of p r o v i d i n g a p u b l i c good. A P o l i t i c a l B a s i s For Planning I n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements are e s t a b l i s h e d f o r p o l i t i c a l decision-making in our s o c i e t y . Fox (1976, p.743) has d e f i n e d an i n s t i t u t i o n as "an e n t i t y ; an o r g a n i z a t i o n or an i n d i v i d u a l , or a r u l e ; a law, r e g u l a t i o n or e s t a b l i s h e d custom" and an i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement as an " i n t e r r e l a t e d set of e n t i t i e s and r u l e s that serve to organize s o c i e t i e s ' a c t i v i t i e s so as to achieve s o c i a l g o a l s " . In terms of salmonid enhancement, i t i s the i n t e r a c t i o n and i n f o r m a t i o n exchange between resource user groups, b u r e a u c r a t i c resource managers and p o l i t i c i a n s that c o n s t i t u t e the i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement w i t h i n which salmonid enhancement p o l i c y , program and p r o j e c t d e c i s i o n s are made. The dynamics of t h i s " p r o v i s i o n system" (Sproule-Jones, 1979) w i l l u l t i m a t e l y determine the way enhancement s h a l l proceed. Study O b j e c t i v e s SEP s u b s c r i b e s to a r e l a t i v e l y systematic p l a n n i n g framework to c o o r d i n a t e and f a c i l i t a t e the resource a l l o c a t i o n f u n c t i o n . Whether or not t h i s framework adequately serves the 10 needs of salmonid enhancement and more broadly, the i n t e r e s t s of Canadians, i s the general concern of t h i s t h e s i s . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the study o b j e c t i v e s a r e : 1. To understand and document as f u l l y as i s p r a c t i c a b l e , the o p e r a t i o n of the SEP p l a n n i n g process as i t occured i n the 1980-81 p l a n n i n g e x e r c i s e , ( i . e . the groups i n v o l v e d and the nature of t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s ) . 2. To ev a l u a t e the adequacy of the SEP planning process as an i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement f o r a r r i v i n g at s o c i a l l y d e s i r a b l e salmonid enhancement d e c i s i o n s . 3. To make recommendations re g a r d i n g p o t e n t i a l changes in the SEP pla n n i n g process where the e v a l u a t i o n r e v e a l s that such changes are a p p r o p r i a t e . 11 CHAPTER TWO METHODOLOGY E v a l u a t i n g The SEP Planning Process For the past s e v e r a l years SEP has made numerous implementation d e c i s i o n s . Whether or not these d e c i s i o n s have been "good" d e c i s i o n s can be ev a l u a t e d i n two main ways. The f i r s t and most c o n v e n t i o n a l method (often c a l l e d e v a l u a t i o n research) r e l a t e s to a program's a b i l i t y to s a t i s f y i t s intended o b j e c t i v e s . (see Rossi and W i l l i a m s , 1972; Weiss, 1972 and Wholley, 1970). The main problem i n t h i s method however, i s that program o b j e c t i v e s are r a r e l y d e f i n e d p r e c i s e l y enough ( i n o p e r a t i o n a l terms) f o r e v a l u a t o r s to know i f goals have or have not been met. Rel a t e d to t h i s i s the f a c t that progress towards s o c i a l or environmental o b j e c t i v e s o f t e n cannot be measured q u a n t i t a t i v e l y . A l s o , o b j e c t i v e s can be expected to change over time and are meaningful only to the extent that there i s agreement on what they should be, the weights they should r e c e i v e , and the l e v e l that f i n a n c i a l resources are c o n s i s t e n t l y a v a i l a b l e to managers to meet them. In the case of SEP e v a l u a t i o n , these and other problems are apparent. O b j e c t i v e s are broadly s t a t e d and are not a l l q u a n t i f i a b l e . O b j e c t i v e s that are q u a n t i f i a b l e were " i n t e r p r e t e d " i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l t a r g e t s by SEP economists a f t e r the Program was we l l underway. There was no c l e a r agreement as to what these t a r g e t s should have been p r i o r to SEP implementation. F i n a n c i a l resources have d e c l i n e d s i n c e the time that the o p e r a t i o n a l t a r g e t s were s e t , thereby r e n d e r i n g them 12 g e n e r a l l y u n a t t a i n a b l e and thus, meaningless f o r purposes of e v a l u a t i o n . More p r a g m a t i c a l l y , the l a g time between p r o j e c t implementation and the r e a l i z a t i o n of b e n e f i t s (and c o s t s ) makes t h i s type of e v a l u a t i o n i m p r a c t i c a b l e u n t i l a l a t e r time i n the l i f e of the Program. The second method of d e c i s i o n a n a l y s i s (and the one used i n t h i s e v a l u a t i o n ) d e a l s with the adequacy of the process by which d e c i s i o n s are made ( i . e . the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s ) . If the p l a n n i n g process i s a "good one" i t i s p o s t u l a t e d that the a c t i o n s that occur as a r e s u l t of the d e c i s i o n are more apt to be a l s o "good". That i s , a good process w i l l produce d e c i s i o n s that r e f l e c t the d e s i r e s of s o c i e t y . (Fox, 1976).' Obviously, the fundamental requirement of t h i s methodology i s a normative d e s c r i p t i o n of a "good" plan n i n g process which can be used as a standard f o r e v a l u a t i n g other p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s e s . I t i s accepted here as a premise, that the c o n s t i t u e n t elements of a "good" p l a n n i n g process ought to correspond to the precepts of l i b e r a l democratic theory, s i n c e these are the b a s i c values which determine the type of p o l i c y processes that are a c c e p t a b l e i n our s o c i e t y . T h i s t h e s i s uses these precepts as the normative c r i t e r i a upon which the assessment of the SEP p l a n n i n g process i s made. The E v a l u a t i v e C r i t e r i a Although we t r a d i t i o n a l l y connect democratic p r i n c i p l e s with the "macro" l e v e l of policy-making by e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s , the same b a s i c - p r i n c i p l e s should be evident at the "micro" policy-making l e v e l that i s found lower i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 13 h i e r a r c h y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , these b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s ( i . e . the e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a ) a re: 1. The c r i t e r i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s I n t e r e s t s (government and non-government) whose wel f a r e s w i l l be d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by p l a n n i n g d e c i s i o n s should have the o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e , or more r e a l i s t i c a l l y , be represented i n a l l aspects of the plann i n g p r o c e s s . I n t e r a c t i o n among i n t e r e s t s permits a m e l i o r a t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g viewpoints through b a r g a i n i n g and t r a d e - o f f . The domain of the common pro p e r t y resource or the p u b l i c good being s u p p l i e d determines the i n t e r e s t s that should be i n v o l v e d . (Ostrom, 1973). 2. The c r i t e r i o n of adequacy of in f o r m a t i o n f o r  dec i sion-making For i n t e r e s t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to be e f f e c t i v e and for p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s to be i n t e l l i g e n t , r e l e v a n t e v a l u a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n on p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s should be generated and communicated among i n t e r e s t s . The b e t t e r informed an i n t e r e s t , the more l i k e l y i t i s that that i n t e r e s t w i l l n e g o t i a t e a p o s i t i o n i n i t s f a v o u r . It f o l l o w s l o g i c a l l y , that i f a l l i n t e r e s t s are well - i n f o r m e d , the more l i k e l y the r e s u l t w i l l be in the g r e a t e s t c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t of a l l p a r t i e s . T h i s i s d e s i r a b l e from the s o c i a l p o i n t of view. (Dorcey et a l , 1980). A normative d e s c r i p t i o n of the basic c a t e g o r i e s of i n f o r m a t i o n that are t y p i c a l l y v a l u a b l e i n a pl a n n i n g e x e r c i s e i n c l u d e s : (a) a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s to a problem or o p p o r t u n i t y as determined to be r e l e v a n t by the value frameworks of a f f e c t e d i n t e r e s t s . (b) economic, s o c i a l and environmental consequences of each a l t e r n a t i v e and the marginal d i f f e r e n c e s of these consequences f o r each a l t e r n a t i v e . (c) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of what groups i n s o c i e t y can be expected to r e c e i v e the b e n e f i t s from a l t e r n a t i v e resource developments, and those that w i l l bear the c o s t s . 14 3. The c r i t e r i o n of decision-making e f f i c i e n c y An o v e r - r i d i n g requirement of democratic d e c i s i o n processes i s that they should not r e q u i r e an i n o r d i n a t e amount of time and r e s o u r c e s . E f f i c i e n c y of a process however, i s r e l a t i v e to the a n t i c i p a t e d outcomes ( i . e . d e c i s i o n s ) that r e s u l t from that p r o c e s s . For example, a c o s t l y process that produces "good" d e c i s i o n s might be c o n s i d e r e d more e f f i c i e n t than an inexpensive process that r e s u l t s i n r e l a t i v e l y "poor" d e c i s i o n s . In t h i s sense, t h i s c r i t e r i o n can be l o o s e l y i n t e r p r e t e d as a form of c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s a n a l y s i s . That i s , a n a l y s i s where d o l l a r (and time) c o s t s are compared to u n i t s of output. As used here, output r e f e r s to s u b j e c t i v e judgements on the adequacy of the p l a n n i n g process in terms of our other two e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a . Hence, c o s t s of p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n , or c o s t s of g e n e r a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f o r decision-making are j u s t i f i e d so long as they are e f f e c t i v e i n f l u e n c e s in shaping an improved p l a n n i n g process. T h e r e f o r e , the term e f f i c i e n c y i s s p e c i f i c to the p l a n n i n g process and i s not to be confused with the c o n v e n t i o n a l economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o j e c t or program e f f i c i e n c y where a p r o j e c t or program i s e f f i c i e n t i f b e n e f i t s (outputs) exceed or are equal to c o s t s ( i n p u t s ) . I t i s r e c o g n i z e d that due to s u b j e c t i v i t y inherent i n the use of these three c r i t e r i a , a p r e c i s e measure of SEP's i n s t i t u t i o n a l performance i s not p o s s i b l e . However, as Fox (1976, p.748) e x p l a i n s , " . . . i t i s b e l i e v e d that the c r i t e r i a -s p e c i f i e d p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r a s k i n g s e a r c h i n g q u e s t i o n s about the performance of any i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement." Information Sources In conducting t h i s e v a l u a t i o n i t was necessary to engage i n two b a s i c a c t i v i t i e s : 1. To become f a m i l i a r with the i n t r i c a c i e s of the SEP p l a n n i n g process ( i . e . the groups and i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d and the nature and timing of t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s ) . 15 2. To develop a t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e (a model) of p u b l i c p o l i c y a n a l y s i s which served as a b a s i s f o r recommending p o t e n t i a l changes i n the SEP i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . In connection with these two a c t i v i t i e s the f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n sources were u s e f u l : 1. SEP p l a n n i n g documents and r e l a t e d Department of F i s h e r i e s and Oceans (DFO) p u b l i c a t i o n s to gain an understanding of the mechanics of the p l a n n i n g process 2. minutes of meetings of the major p a r t i c i p a n t groups 3. s t r u c t u r e d i n t e r v i e w s with government and non-government i n d i v i d u a l s connected with SEP p l a n n i n g , (see Appendix I f o r a l i s t of t h e s e ' p e r s o n s ) . 4. p a r t i c i p a t i o n (as an observer) i n a weekend meeting between a c o l l e c t i o n of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t groups and SEP planning personnel 5. a p p r o p r i a t e processes and i n d i v i d u a l s and l i t e r a t u r e concerning p u b l i c p o l i c y p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behaviour of o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 16 CHAPTER THREE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The Relevance Of A T h e o r e t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e Upon e v a l u a t i n g the SEP pl a n n i n g process we may want to p r e s c r i b e some o r g a n i z a t i o n a l or p r o c e d u r a l changes that p o t e n t i a l l y c o u l d b r i n g the pl a n n i n g system c l o s e r i n l i n e with the normative c r i t e r i a set f o r t h e a r l i e r . Recommendations for i n s t i t u t i o n a l improvement should not however, be random, or based p u r e l y on the a n a l y s t ' s i n t u i t i o n . They should be made on the b a s i s of what i s p l a u s i b l e , given our knowledge of the way i n d i v i d u a l s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s behave i n policy-making s e t t i n g s . There i s a good deal of l i t e r a t u r e on the subj e c t of p o l i t i c a l -a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior as r e l a t e d to p o l i c y a n a l y s i s , some of which may be u s e f u l f o r the purpose of understanding and improving the SEP plann i n g arrangement. T h i s chapter seeks to a r t i c u l a t e a model that can serve as a t o o l f o r e x p l a i n i n g (at l e a s t i n p a r t ) the s t r u c t u r e and past behavior of the SEP i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement, and a l s o as a foundation f o r recommending p o t e n t i a l improvements to the SEP pla n n i n g system. To these ends, the main f e a t u r e s of p o l i t i c a l -a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior are d i s c u s s e d that have relevance to our case-study and that the l i t e r a t u r e shows to be important i n f l u e n c e s i n the way d e c i s i o n s are made i n the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods. Much of what has been w r i t t e n r e l a t i n g to t h i s s u b j e c t can be grouped under what i s known as p u b l i c c h o i c e theory. The main f e a t u r e s of t h i s theory of i n t e r a c t i v e p o l i c y making are 17 d i s c u s s e d i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . P u b l i c Choice Theory As the name suggests, p u b l i c c h o i c e d e a l s with the way i n which c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e s are made i n the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods. A p a r a l l e l can be drawn to micro-economic theory . of markets as the way i n which the theory e x p l a i n s how these c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e s are made. Li k e economic theory, p u b l i c c h o i c e theory assumes that i n d i v i d u a l s act i n t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . For t h i s reason, Mueller (1976, p. 395) has d e f i n e d p u b l i c choice as "the economic study of non-market decision-making, or simply the a p p l i c a t i o n of economics to p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e " . The fundamental assumption of t h i s model then, i s that behavior i s r a t i o n a l ; that i s , i n d i v i d u a l s have p r e f e r e n c e s which determine t h e i r d e c i s i o n s and they w i l l a c t i n such a way as to provide themselves the g r e a t e s t net b e n e f i t as weighed by these p r e f e r e n c e s . Rationa-lity presumes cognizance of a l l p o s s i b l e s t r a t e g i e s that are a v a i l a b l e f o r the f u l f i l l m e n t of perso n a l o b j e c t i v e s , that these can be ranked c o n s i s t e n t with p r e f e r e n c e , and that c a l c u l a t i o n s to choose among a l t e r n a t i v e s can be made with n e i t h e r cost nor e r r o r . Once again we note the s i m i l a r i t y between t h i s p u b l i c c h o i c e assumption and the assumption of comprehensive consumer and producer r a t i o n a l i t y in market theory. L a t e r , we w i l l see that there are l i m i t a t i o n s on the extent to which a l l behavior can be e x p l a i n e d by r a t i o n a l i t y as i t i s d e f i n e d here. While r e c o g n i z i n g these l i m i t a t i o n s , i t i s nonetheless assumed f o r the general purposes of our model, that people are b a s i c a l l y s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d and act a c c o r d i n g l y . 18 T h e r e f o r e , with regard to the a c t o r s that are t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n v o l v e d i n p o l i c y processes, i t i s suggested t h a t : 1. P o l i t i c i a n s are r a t i o n a l i n the sense that they are vote-maximizers. Downs (1967, p. 18) suggests that p o l i t i c i a n s are " i n t e r e s t e d i n a c i t i z e n ' s vote, not h i s w e l f a r e ; they must however, c a t e r to h i s view of welfare to get h i s vote". 2. Bureaucrats each have a set of goals connected with t h e i r own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . These goals may be at odds with the expressed goals of t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e i r behavior i s r a t i o n a l i n that they generate i n f o r m a t i o n , support p o l i c i e s e t c . , which are c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i r g o a l s . (Downs, 1967). 3. I n t e r e s t groups are r a t i o n a l in that t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n decision-making i s g e n e r a l l y to promote t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Each i n t e r e s t c a l l s a t t e n t i o n to the f o r c e s that must be r e c o n c i l e d and the d i f f e r e n c e s that must be compromised. P u b l i c c h o i c e as a democratic p o l i c y process On the s u r f a c e , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand how the s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d behavior of a l l a c t o r s as inherent i n the p u b l i c choice model can produce s o c i a l l y d e s i r a b l e p o l i c y outcomes, and at the same time remain " f a i t h f u l " to democratic p r e c e p t s . T h i s q u e s t i o n has r e c e i v e d c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n from the p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h e o r i s t - - V i n c e n t Ostrom. In s e t t i n g out the r a t i o n a l e f o r why the range of l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s should p a r t i c i p a t e in p o l i c y processes Ostrom (1973, p. 62) s t a t e s : " I f p u b l i c agencies are orga n i z e d in a way that does not allow f o r an e x p r e s s i o n of a d i v e r s i t y of pr e f e r e n c e s among d i f f e r e n t communities of people, then producers of p u b l i c goods and s e r v i c e s w i l l be ta k i n g a c t i o n without i n f o r m a t i o n as to the changing p r e f e r e n c e s of the persons they serve. Expenditures w i l l be made with l i t t l e r e f e r e n c e to consumer u t i l i t y . Producer e f f i c i e n c y i n the absence of c o n s u m e r . u t i l i t y i s without economic meaning". The b a s i s of t h i s p o s i t i o n i s that d e c i s i o n processes i n 19 the p u r s u i t of e f f i c i e n c y that do not take account of the p r e f e r e n c e s of a range of l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s may r e s u l t i n p o l i c i e s that impose unacceptable e x t e r n a l c o s t s ( i n c l u d i n g i n e q u i t i e s ) among some i n t e r e s t s . The analagous requirement in economic theory i s that u n l e s s there are a l a r g e number of independent buyers and s e l l e r s i n the exchange process ( i . e . p e r f e c t c o m p e t i t i o n ) , optimal resource a l l o c a t i o n w i l l not occur. The value that can be d e r i v e d from i n t e r e s t p a r t i c i p a t i o n in environmental decision-making has been amply documented elsewhere (see Utton et a l , 1976; Saddler, 1979) and i t i s not the i n t e n t i o n here to belabour that argument. Our concern i s to determine how a p u b l i c c h o i c e model of policy-making can e f f e c t i v e l y i n t e g r a t e t h i s democratic requirement i n t o p l a n -making . Ostrom argues that e f f e c t i v e involvement w i l l occur i f there are m u l t i p l e l e v e l s i n the b u r e a u c r a t i c h i e r a r c h y , each a v a i l a b l e to r e c e i v e i n t e r e s t group input. He r e f e r s to m u l t i p l i c i t y of s t r u c t u r e as a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p l u r a l i s m . A f e d e r a l system of " o v e r l a p p i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n s and fragmentation of a u t h o r i t y " can b r i n g a c c o u n t a b i l i t y to b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s c r e t i o n because each l e v e l i s r e s p o n s i b l e to the c o n s t i t u e n c y i t serves, and because each l e v e l a c t s as a check on the power of other l e v e l s . In the words of Ostrom (1973, p. 144): 20 " A d m i n i s t r a t o r s as p u b l i c s e r v a n t s or p u b l i c employees are exposed to reviews and r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h e i r d e c i s i o n s by other d e c i s i o n s t r u c t u r e s which occupy p o t e n t i a l veto p o s i t i o n s i n . r e l a t i o n to t h e i r d e c i s i o n s . . . I f the game of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s one dominated by e x c l u s i v e c a l c u l u s of p l e a s i n g s u p e r i o r s (as s e l f - i n t e r e s t would m o t i v a t e ) , the consequences w i l l be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t than i f p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t o r s stand exposed to the s c r u t i n y of common c o u n c i l s r e p r e s e n t i n g c i t i z e n s . . . t o s c r u t i n y by a f r e e press, as w e l l as to the s c r u t i n y of other e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r s and a g e n c i e s . " Sproule-Jones (1972) concurs that a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p l u r a l i s m encourages a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . Fragmented a u t h o r i t y means that no one a u t h o r i t y enjoys independence i n the making of p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n s . He s t a t e s : "The combined e f f e c t of these m u l t i p l e d e c i s i o n s t r u c t u r e s , a l l of which are potent but not omnipotent c e n t e r s of power, i s to r e q u i r e the support f o r any p u b l i c p o l i c y or choice of more than a mere m a j o r i t y of i n t e r e s t e d c i t i z e n s . . . p u b l i c entrepreneurs have an i n c e n t i v e to come to terms with t h e i r p u b l i c c l i e n t e l e , and with other a gencies...the e x t e r n a l i t i e s of p u b l i c c h o i c e can be i n t e r n a l i z e d and p u b l i c goods produced at the a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l at one and the same time. " (Sproule-Jones, 1972 pp. 185-186). Futher commenting on the way that f e d e r a l i s m can c o n t r i b u t e to a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i n d e c i s i o n s t r u c t u r e , Ostrom (1973, p. 109) says: "Power can be d i v i d e d and arranged among the s e v e r a l o f f i c e s of government in such a manner that each w i l l be a check on the other...Agreement w i l l p r e v a i l when b e n e f i t s accrue from mutual advantage. C o n f l i c t w i l l i n tervene when some seek an advantage at the expense of o t h e r s . P o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s are but a method f o r e n c a p s u l a t i n g c o n f l i c t while due d e l i b e r a t i o n i s s u s t a i n e d u n t i l human reason can search out new and improved s o l u t i o n s . " The r e - o c c u r r i n g theme i n p u b l i c choice theory, that c o n f l i c t s between s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d groups i s the b a s i s f o r consensus, deserves q u a l i f i c a t i o n at t h i s p o i n t . I n t e r e s t s are not a l l mutually e x c l u s i v e of each other. In many cases they 21 share common g o a l s . Buchanan and T u l l o c k (1962) r e f e r to these as " p l u r a l i s t i c l o y a l t i e s " . For example, i n terms of SEP, there i s g eneral agreement among a l l groups that i n p r i n c i p l e , salmonid enhancement i s a good t h i n g . Divergence of o p i n i o n i s based i n d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s on how the Program ought to proceed. The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem The p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n c o n s i d e r e d the normative a p p l i c a t i o n of p u b l i c c h o i c e theory. I t was shown that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the range of l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s i n p o l i c y processes i s important to minimize the e x t e r n a l e f f e c t s of d e c i s i o n s and f o r reasons of ensuring b u r e a u c r a t i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . Mancur Olson (1965) however, has shown that the " l o g i c of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n " may a c t u a l l y prevent r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a l l i n t e r e s t s i n decision-making. T h i s i s because r a t i o n a l , s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s may not be motivated to organize to i n f l u e n c e decision-making, even i f those i n d i v i d u a l s share a common concern. He s t a t e s t h a t : "... unless the number of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a group i s q u i t e s m a l l , or unless there i s c o e r c i o n or some other s p e c i a l device ( i . e . separable b e n e f i t s f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s ) to make i n d i v i d u a l s act i n t h e i r common i n t e r e s t , r a t i o n a l and s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l not act to .achieve t h e i r common or group i n t e r e s t . " (Olson, 1965, p. 2) Although groups may have a common i n t e r e s t i n o b t a i n i n g a c o l l e c t i v e b e n e f i t , they have no common i n t e r e s t i n paying the cost of p r o v i d i n g that c o l l e c t i v e b e n e f i t . I f i n d i v i d u a l s p e r c e i v e that they w i l l b e n e f i t whether or not they p a r t i c i p a t e , each would p r e f e r that the other members pay the f u l l c o s t s 22 (time and money) of p r o v i d i n g the p u b l i c good. I t i s i n e f f e c t , a demonstration of the " f r e e - r i d e r " problem that economists have i d e n t i f i e d as the reason why the market system f a i l s to pro v i d e pure p u b l i c goods. Vincent and E l i n o r Ostrom (1971, p. 207) el a b o r a t e t h a t : "An i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i o n s w i l l be c a l c u l a t e d by the p r o b a b i l i t y that h i s e f f o r t s alone w i l l make a d i f f e r e n c e ( i n the p r o v i s i o n of a p u b l i c good). I f that p r o b a b i l i t y i s n i l , and i f he i s a r a t i o n a l person, we would expect h i s e f f o r t to be n i l . " S t a t e d a l t e r n a t e l y , i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l be motivated to organize and p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i c y processes, only i f the a n t i c i p a t e d b e n e f i t s from doing so exceed the t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . F r e q u e n t l y , these c o s t s may a l s o i n v o l v e c o n s i d e r a b l e time and payment of t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e that i s r e q u i r e d to become f u l l y informed about the i s s u e s and a l t e r n a t i v e s . These c o s t s may be the most s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e s to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t should be noted that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n some groups does occur, d e s p i t e Olsonian l o g i c . For example, membership i n c o n s e r v a t i o n groups such as the S i e r r a Club o f t e n cannot be ex p l a i n e d i n terms of pure s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d economic r a t i o n a l i t y . The e x p l a n a t i o n i s that " i d e o l o g y " p r o v i d e s the m o t i v a t i o n f o r membership. In spi'te of " i d e o l o g i c a l m o t i v a t i o n " i t i s evident that there are many i n d i v i d u a l s with common i n t e r e s t s that do not organize to t r y to i n f l u e n c e decision-making. The general p u b l i c ( i . e . the consumer/the taxpayer) f a l l s i n t o t h i s c a t egory. Olson (1965) r e f e r s to these as " f o r g o t t e n groups" simply because they have no s p e c i f i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n v i s a v i s vested 23 i n t e r e s t s , in p o l i c y p r o c e s s e s . As i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e i r t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s are too great i n r e l a t i o n to the b e n e f i t s that can be expected to be d e r i v e d from involvement. As a r e s u l t , we can expect s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s to dominate p o l i c y processes and consequent p o l i c y outcomes to be weighted in favour of these i n t e r e s t s . T h i s " l o g i c of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n " has s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r what Theodore Lowi (1972) r e f e r s to as " d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s " . The t h r u s t of h i s argument i s that i t i s e a s i e r p o l i t i c a l l y to d i v e r t p u b l i c funds to p a r t i c u l a r groups in s o c i e t y at the expense of the general taxpayer. The s u s c e p t i b i l i t y of a d m i n i s t r a t o r s to pressure from i n t e r e s t s of i n t e n s e p r e f e r e n c e , i n the absence of c o u n t e r v a i l i n g viewpoints in the d e c i s i o n process, i s at the root of the d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s problem. Lowi warns that p o l i c i e s which a l l o c a t e b e n e f i t s to i d e n t i f i a b l e groups in s o c i e t y amounts to " p r i v a t i z a t i o n of the p u b l i c " . T h i s i s s u e of d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s has strong i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r SEP i n that the main b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the Program are r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e and the Program i s 100% p u b l i c l y funded at t h i s p o i n t i n time. Other B e h a v i o r a l F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g I n s t i t u t i o n a l Performance Although p u b l i c c h o i c e theory, with i t s assumptions of r a t i o n a l i t y and s e l f - i n t e r e s t , can e x p l a i n a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior, i t cannot e x p l a i n i t a l l . We have a l r e a d y mentioned that " i d e o l o g y " i s a b e h a v i o r a l i n f l u e n c e that- i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with the economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y . Beyond t h i s , the l i t e r a t u r e shows there a l s o to be 24 other i n f l u e n c e s which are important determinants of i n d i v i d u a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior. In e f f e c t , these i n f l u e n c e s are l i m i t a t i o n s on the p u b l i c c h o i c e model. B r i e f l y , these are d i s c u s s e d below. (a) Bounded r a t i o n a l i t y The main c h a l l e n g e to the assumption of comprehensive r a t i o n a l i t y comes from Herbert Simon (1957). In what i s perhaps a more r e a l i s t i c view of how i n d i v i d u a l s respond to p o l i c y i s s u e s , Simon c l a i m s that comprehensive r a t i o n a l i t y i s f r u s t r a t e d by an u n c e r t a i n and complex environment. A c c o r d i n g l y , i n d i v i d u a l s operate with "bounded r a t i o n a l i t y " . Simon c l a i m s that people are " s a t i s f i c e r s " as opposed to maximizers, i n f e r r i n g that there i s a l i m i t e d search f o r s o l u t i o n s to a problem. "As the i n d i v i d u a l , i n h i s e x p l o r a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s , f i n d s i t easy to d i s c o v e r s a t i s f a c t o r y a l t e r n a t i v e s , h i s a s p i r a t i o n l e v e l r i s e s ; as he f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t to f i n d s a t i s f a c t o r y a l t e r n a t i v e s , h i s a s p i r a t i o n l e v e l f a l l s " . (Simon 1957, p. 253) Furthermore, dramatic i n n o v a t i o n i n problem s o l v i n g i s u n l i k e l y because i n d i v i d u a l s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s e t t i n g s are g e n e r a l l y r i s k averse. A c c o r d i n g l y , s o l u t i o n s a r r i v e d at by p u b l i c agencies seldom d e v i a t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the s t a t u s quo. T h i s may' be because i n d i v i d u a l s i n the bureaucracy are g e n e r a l l y not rewarded f o r t a k i n g chances, even i f the r e s u l t s may be s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e n e f i c i a l . At the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l , behavior i s i n f l u e n c e d by the n e c e s s i t y to present a s i n g l e , common p o s i t i o n on an i s s u e . When o r g a n i z a t i o n s are composed of a d i v e r s i t y of p r o f e s s i o n a l 25 backgrounds, each "bounded", c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n i s t y p i c a l l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i n t e r n a l n e g o t i a t i o n and bargaining. I n c o n s i s t e n c i e s between bureaucrats' goals are resolved by " c o a l i t i o n formation and t r a d e - o f f " . (Downs, 1967). In order to accommodate the d i v e r s i t y of perceptions and a t t i t u d e s w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , a t t e n t i o n i s t y p i c a l l y focused on short term problems and marginal a c t i o n s . The explanation i s that i t i s simply e a s i e r for groups of i n d i v i d u a l s to agree upon a means of s o l v i n g an immediate problem than to deal with long-term goals. To t h i s end, agencies t y p i c a l l y r e l y h e a v i l y on "standard operating procedures" that may or may not be w e l l adapted to the problem at handi Charles Lindblom (1959) l a b e l s t h i s s t y l e of policy-making as " d i s j o i n t e d incrementalism", or more c o l l o q u i a l l y as "the science of muddling through". He claims that incrementalism i s l a r g e l y a response to u n c e r t a i n t y and goes so f a r as to advocate i t as a p r e f e r r e d " s t r a t e g y • f o r d e c i s i o n " . Lindblom's comments serve to f u r t h e r emphasize the l i m i t s on comprehensive r a t i o n a l i t y at the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l . (b) Perceptions and a t t i t u d e s I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g and experience a f f e c t resource managers' perceptions of and a t t i t u d e s to the problems with which they d e a l . Sewell (1-971), Ingram (1973) and others have shown e m p i r i c a l l y that background and experience can d r a m a t i c a l l y i n f l u e n c e the range of a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s - to problems that are presented. For example, engineers as a p r o f e s s i o n a l group have t r a d i t i o n a l l y 26 shown a preference towards p r o j e c t s that i n v o l v e design and c o n s t r u c t i o n . On the other hand, b i o l o g i s t s are t y p i c a l l y " c a u t i o u s " i n t h e i r view of the world and favour courses o f a c t i o n that give p r i o r i t y to e c o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Proposed a l t e r n a t i v e s may be r a t i o n a l from the proponent's viewpoint, but might not represent the complete range of s o l u t i o n s that would be expected under a s t y l e of decision-making that i n v o l v e d other v i e w p o i n t s . In support of t h i s n o t i o n , Wolman (1976, p. 775) c l a i m s t h a t : " T e c h n o l o g i c a l or p h y s i c a l f a c t o r s may markedly l i m i t the range of f e a s i b l e s o l u t i o n s or approaches to a problem... Not i n f r e q u e n t l y however, what may appear to be a t e c h n o l o g i c a l or p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t are matters of custom or s o l u t i o n s p r e f e r r e d by those who have dominated the process of s e l e c t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s deemed s u i t a b l e f o r review." I t i s evident then, that there i s o f t e n a standard r e p e r t o i r e of a l t e r n a t i v e s that are taken from a bureaucrat's "response map" f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . (c) C l i e n t e l i s m Another phenomenon which can sometimes i n f l u e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior i s what Wildavsky (1964) has r e f e r r e d to as " c l i e n t e l i s m " . T h i s r e f e r s to the tendency f o r r e g u l a t o r y bodies to favour the o b j e c t i v e s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n s they r e g u l a t e . The s e t t i n g and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o l i c y i s a c c o r d i n g l y sympathetic to those o b j e c t i v e s (Fox, 1976). If an agency becomes e f f e c t i v e l y "captured" by i t s primary c l i e n t e l e , to the extent that other p o s i t i o n s in s o c i e t y ( i . e . other p e r c e p t i o n s of r a t i o n a l i t y ) are not adequately c o n s i d e r e d in policy-making processes, we can conclude that the process i s 27 undemocrat i c . The Information Problem The above understanding of p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior suggests that agencies w i l l seldom a r r a y f o r c h o i c e the f u l l range of p o s s i b l e approaches to a problem or o p p o r t u n i t y . Furthermore, the e v a l u a t i o n of s o l u t i o n s that are arrayed, w i l l be b i a s e d from the p o i n t of view of the agency. The important p o i n t i s that i n f o r m a t i o n on the consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n p r o v i d e s the b a s i s f o r d e c i d i n g what course of a c t i o n w i l l best serve the s e l f - i n t e r e s t of the i n d i v i d u a l . If c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n that might be important to p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s i s p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e , but i s not generated because of p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior, then those i n t e r e s t s w i l l be unaware of where t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t s l i e . In such i n s t a n c e s , these i n t e r e s t s may be e f f e c t i v e l y excluded from meaningful p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . With t h i s i n mind, i t i s understandable that c e r t a i n groups (provided they have managed to overcome the " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem") might want to generate some of t h e i r own i n f o r m a t i o n to enhance t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s i n the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . T h i s i s because groups must be able to s u b s t a n t i a t e the t e c h n i c a l v a l i d i t y of t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , and a l s o why t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r p r i o r i t i e s deserve i m p o s i t i o n on a l l members of s o c i e t y — t h e r e must" be v a l i d reasons. Flathman (1966) suggests that value c o n f l i c t s are a d j u d i c a t e d by " g i v i n g reasons" and that u l t i m a t e l y , reasons guide c h o i c e . There are however, two b a s i c o b s t a c l e s to adequate i n f o r m a t i o n f o r groups: 28 (a) Information Costs - The c o l l e c t i o n and s y n t h e s i s of t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n can be p r o h i b i t i v e l y expensive i n both temporal and f i n a n c i a l terms. If a p a r t i c u l a r group i s the only one that f e e l s that the new i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e l e v a n t , t r a d i t i o n a l l y i t must bear the co s t of p r o v i d i n g that i n f o r m a t i o n . Often, such groups do not have the f i n a n c i a l resources r e q u i r e d to h i r e the necessary t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e . A l s o , i n f o r m a t i o n c o s t s can comprise a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of groups' t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s . We have a l r e a d y shown that i f t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s are too gre a t , groups w i l l not p a r t i c i p a t e at a l l in decision-making. (b) "Monopoly" of Information - By v i r t u e of t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e mandate, resource management agencies f r e q u e n t l y have a v i r t u a l monopoly on the c a p a b i l i t y to make analyses of a l t e r n a t i v e p l a n n i n g o p t i o n s . Other i n t e r e s t s may simply not have access to the resources ( i . e . the data, the t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e ) that are necessary to c o n c e p t u a l i z e and analyze t e c h n i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s that a c c o r d with t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e systems. Without these a b i l i t i e s i t i s probable that the p r i o r i t i e s of c e r t a i n groups w i l l not be adequately c o n s i d e r e d i n plan f o r m u l a t i o n , unless the proponent agency and the i n t e r e s t s share common o b j e c t i v e s . The U n c e r t a i n t y Problem The preceding d i s c u s s i o n s have c o n s i d e r e d problems a r i s i n g from human behavior. The " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem", the" problem of " d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s " , and the " i n f o r m a t i o n problem" are a l l a t t r i b u t a b l e to the a c t i o n s (or non-actions) of i n d i v i d u a l s as determined by r a t i o n a l i t y or l i m i t a t i o n s to r a t i o n a l i t y . 29 The problem of u n c e r t a i n t y however, i s independent of human behavior. I t i s a r e s u l t of the i n t r i n s i c nature of t e c h n i c a l l y complex problems (such as f i s h e r i e s management). H i c k l i n g (1975) suggests that there are three types of u n c e r t a i n t y with which every p l a n n i n g e x e r c i s e must d e a l . These are : 1. u n c e r t a i n t y about the economic, s o c i a l , environmental and p o l i t i c a l consequences of a given a c t i o n . 2. u n c e r t a i n t y about " p o l i c y v a l u e s " , (e.g. what are the r e a l o b j e c t i v e s of an agency or program?) 3. u n c e r t a i n t y about the e f f e c t s that o t h e r s ' a c t i o n s (or non-actions) may have on your proposed a c t i o n s . H i c k l i n g s t a t e s f u r t h e r that there are e s s e n t i a l l y three approaches to d e a l i n g with these c l a s s e s of u n c e r t a i n t y . I t can be ignored (the most common response), i t can be reduced, or i t can be accepted. Ignoring u n c e r t a i n t y i s a dangerous t h i n g to do because f u t u r e unforeseen s i t u a t i o n s that i n e v i t a b l y a r i s e , might be more c o s t l y than they need have been. Reducing u n c e r t a i n t y r e q u i r e s e i t h e r the c o l l e c t i o n of more in f o r m a t i o n , c l a r i f i c a t i o n of o b j e c t i v e s , or c l o s e r c o l l a b o r a t i o n among r e l a t e d i n t e r e s t s and agencies. To e l i m i n a t e or reduce u n c e r t a i n t y however, i s not always p o s s i b l e , and attempts to do so can be exceedingly expensive. A c c o r d i n g l y , i t might be d e s i r a b l e i n many pl a n n i n g circumstances to simply accept the u n c e r t a i n t y . H i c k l i n g (1975, p.43) suggests that i f i t i s decided to accept u n c e r t a i n t y , the f i r s t t h i n g that must be done i s to get to know the u n c e r t a i n t i e s , "so that we know what we are a c c e p t i n g " . Risk 30 assessment i s one way of doing t h i s i f the u n c e r t a i n t i e s can be i d e n t i f i e d and i f p r o b a b i l i t i e s of t h e i r p o t e n t i a l occurrence can be a s s i g n e d . However, where u n c e r t a i n t i e s and p r o b a b i l i t i e s cannot be i d e n t i f i e d , an a l t e r n a t i v e approach i s r e q u i r e d i n the acceptance stragegy -- i . e . attempts should be made to accommodate u n c e r t a i n t y . By t h i s , H i c k l i n g means that a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s should be judged a c c o r d i n g to how much "leeway" they permit i n terms of being able to change your mind, should some unforeseen event a r i s e . That i s , a l t e r n a t i v e s should be e v a l u a t e d i n terms of op t i o n f o r e c l o s u r e . If an a c t i o n i s taken which i t s e l f i s i r r e v e r s i b l e , or which induces e f f e c t s which are i r r e v e r s i b l e , then that a c t i o n w i l l have reduced the p o t e n t i a l f o r f u t u r e f l e x i b i l i t y i n p l a n n i n g ; an e s s e n t i a l element i n the management of u n c e r t a i n t y . H i c k l i n g ' s arguments on f l e x i b i l i t y are . e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with H o l l i n g ' s (1978) proposed response to u n c e r t a i n t y . H o l l i n g suggests that the goal should be always to develop " r e s i l i e n t " p o l i c i e s . That i s , p o l i c i e s which can be e f f e c t i v e i n d e a l i n g with the problem f o r which they were designed, but at the same time, can accomodate f u t u r e " s u r p r i s e s " . As a proponent of r e s i l i e n t p o l i c y design Walters (1977) has i d e n t i f i e d s i x c l a s s e s of major u n c e r t a i n t y that are important to the b i o l o g y of salmonid enhancement. 1. mechanical f a i l u r e s of a r t i f i c i a l d e v i c e s 2. p o l i t i c a l i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of bad d e c i s i o n s 3. f u t u r e c o n t r o l of f i s h i n g e f f o r t s and investment 4. ocean l i m i t a t i o n to p r o d u c t i o n 5. i n t e r a c t i o n s between stocks 6. d i f f e r e n t i a l impacts to f i s h i n g 31 In a d d i t i o n , there are u n c e r t a i n t i e s r e g a r d i n g the s o c i o -economic impacts of p a r t i c u l a r p r o j e c t s , and a l s o of the cumulative socio-economic e f f e c t s of the e n t i r e Program. Walters' suggest response to these u n c e r t a i n t i e s i s to proceed with c a r e f u l l y p r e s c r i b e d t r i a l and e r r o r f i s h e r i e s management, s i n c e no amount of f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h can f u l l y r e s o l v e these u n c e r t a i n t i e s . . T h i s "adaptive" response to salmonid enhancement i s e x p l i c i t l y " a c t i v e " i n the sense that i t i n v o l v e s monitoring and l e a r n i n g from e x p e r i m e n t a l l y induced e f f e c t s . I t i s not a " p a s s i v e " ( i . e . r e a c t i v e ) response to the unexpected. L o g i c a l l y , an a c t i v e , r a t h e r than p a s s i v e response, i s a p r e f e r r e d way of d e a l i n g with u n c e r t a i n t y . Summary of the Theory The p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of recommendations to improve the SEP p l a n n i n g process ( i n terms of our normative c r i t e r i a ) w i l l depend l a r g e l y on whether or not recommendations are c o n s i s t e n t with p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior. The l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s s u b j e c t shows that s e l f - i n t e r e s t and r a t i o n a l i t y can e x p l a i n a good deal of such behavior, but cannot e x p l a i n i t a l l . Personal i d e o l o g y , "bounded r a t i o n a l i t y " , p e r c e p t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s as i n f l u e n c e d by p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g and experience, and the p r o p e n s i t y f o r agencies to demonstrate " c l i e n t e l i s m " are other important determinants of i n d i v i d u a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior. Due to t h i s behavior, s e v e r a l problems emerge which can i n h i b i t p o l i c y processes from converging on the s a t i s f a c t i o n of our normative c r i t e r i a . The " l o g i c - of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n " may 32 cause some i n t e r e s t s not to be represented i n p o l i c y p r o c e s s e s . The g e n e r a l , unorganized p u b l i c i s one such i n t e r e s t . T h i s i n t u r n , leads to the problem of " d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s " where p u b l i c funds are a l l o c a t e d to s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . P o l i t i c a l -a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior a l s o g i v e s r i s e to the " i n f o r m a t i o n problem". T y p i c a l l y , an agency w i l l c o n c e p t u a l i z e and evaluate a l t e r n a t i v e s from i t s p e r s p e c t i v e o n l y . Unless i n f o r m a t i o n i s generated that i s c o n s i s t e n t with the f u l l range of p e r s p e c t i v e s , some l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s may be e f f e c t i v e l y excluded from r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . Other problems not a r i s i n g from human behavior r e l a t e to the c o s t s of generating t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n and the d i f f i c u l t y of d e a l i n g with u n c e r t a i n t y . These d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e out of the inherent nature of complex management problems. In making recommendations to move the SEP p l a n n i n g process more c l o s e l y i n l i n e with our three normative c r i t e r i a , the above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s must be e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d . 33 CHAPTER FOUR A DESCRIPTION OF THE SEP PLANNING PROCESS Background Information: Planning For SEP Recent SEP d e c i s i o n processes cannot be i s o l a t e d f o r a n a l y s i s without an a p p r e c i a t i o n of h i s t o r i c SEP p l a n n i n g events. Many of the i n d i v i d u a l enhancement p r o j e c t s that are c u r r e n t l y being implemented were proposed and e v a l u a t e d i n an i n i t i a l two year p l a n n i n g p e r i o d beginning e a r l y i n 1975. During t h i s i n i t i a l p l a n n i n g p e r i o d a c o - o p e r a t i v e F e d e r a l / P r o v i n c i a l s t e e r i n g group conducted economic, s o c i a l , b i o - e n g i n e e r i n g and environmental s t u d i e s that culminated i n a proposed " o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y p l a n " f o r Phase 1 of SEP. Geographic and s p e c i e s s p e c i f i c f i s h p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s and a corresponding l i s t of approximately 170 candidate enhancement p r o j e c t s , along with a t e n t a t i v e f i n a n c i a l flow schedule comprised the main elements of the " o v e r a l l p l a n " . The i n i t i a l p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s and l i s t of p r o j e c t p r o p o s a l s were developed by three F e d e r a l / P r o v i n c i a l Geographic  Working Groups (GWG's). These groups were composed o r i g i n a l l y of b i o l o g i s t s , engineers and economists from the Department of F i s h e r i e s and Oceans and the B.C. M i n i s t r y of .Environment. P r o j e c t p r o p o s a l s were developed to meet p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s on the b a s i s of reconnaissance and f e a s i b i l i t y s t u d i e s of b i o l o g i c a l p o t e n t i a l s , e n g i n e e r i n g f e a s i b i l t y and economic f a c t o r s such as p r o d u c t i o n c o s t s and commercial f i s h v a l u e s . Other p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n c l u d e d : saving threatened s t o c k s , extending the f i s h i n g season, d i s p e r s i n g the 34 f l e e t , improving the technology, minimizing i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r c e p t i o n s , improving Native f i s h i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s , e t c . ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.23). The " o v e r a l l SEP p l a n " was then presented f o r p u b l i c s c r u t i n y i n a round of p u b l i c i n q u i r i e s i n 18 communities throughout B r i t i s h Columbia. A number of i s s u e s were r a i s e d at the " i n q u i r i e s " but the general consensus was p o s i t i v e support f o r the enhancement concept. On May 30, 1977 the M i n i s t e r of F i s h e r i e s and Environment announced Cabinet approval of Phase 1 of SEP f o r an investment of $150 m i l l i o n over a f i v e year p e r i o d . In 1978 Phase 1 was extended to seven years with no i n c r e a s e i n funding as p a r t of the f e d e r a l government's commitment to f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t . The P r o v i n c i a l investment i n SEP (approximately $7.5 m i l l i o n ) was f o r m a l i z e d at the s i g n i n g of a F e d e r a l / P r o v i n c i a l Agreement in March 1979. To f a c i l i t a t e such s p e c i f i c funding d i r e c t i v e s , SEP was set-up as a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d branch w i t h i n the P a c i f i c region of the Department of F i s h e r i e s and Environment. U n l i k e a l l other branches, the E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r of SEP does not r e p o r t through the D i r e c t o r General f o r the P a c i f i c r e g i o n , and no formal o r g a n i z t i o n a l l i n k has been set up. T h i s may c o n t r i b u t e to problems of c o o r d i n a t i o n between the v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n s of F i s h e r i e s as i s e x p l a i n e d l a t e r . The m a j o r i t y of SEP's Phase 1 funds were earmarked i n i t i a l l y f o r "major p r o d u c t i o n " f a c i l i t i e s . A s m a l l e r p o r t i o n of funds was set aside f o r " l e s s ambitious" p r o j e c t s that are not so much concerned with the economics of f i s h p r o d u c t i o n but 35 r a t h e r are s e l e c t e d f o r t h e i r a b i l i t y to c o n t r i b u t e to the non-n a t i o n a l income o b j e c t i v e s of the Program. P r o j e c t s in t h i s c l a s s i n c l u d e such t h i n g s as stream r e h a b i l i t a t i o n a c t i v i t i e s and the l e t t i n g of c o n t r a c t s to community groups to engage i n a c t u a l f i s h p r o d u c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s (community development p r o j e c t s ) . The i n t e n t i o n i s that the e f f i c i e n t c l a s s of p r o j e c t s can p r o v i d e the economic compensation f o r the l e s s p r o d u c t i v e c l a s s of p r o j e c t s , so that the o v e r a l l Program can remain economically j u s t i f i e d . The " o v e r a l l SEP p l a n " of 170 p r o j e c t s was not however, "cast i n stone". There was a commitment at the outset of the Program to an adaptive p l a n n i n g process that would emphasize the continued search f o r new enhancement o p p o r t u n i t i e s and the ex-post e v a l u a t i o n and m o nitoring of p r o j e c t s a l r e a d y implemented. To these ends the program was conceived i n p r i n c i p l e , as a "...dynamic and e v o l v i n g process, a process that w i l l be responsive to the l e g i t i m a t e and changing needs of people and to the t a r g e t s of government f o r economic growth and s o c i a l improvement". ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.23). Since implementation of SEP p o l i c y occurs e s s e n t i a l l y at the i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t l e v e l , the b a s i c requirements of such a process are i n t u i t i v e l y obvious: 1. New enhancement i n i t i a t i v e s must c o n s t a n t l y be developed that r e f l e c t p u b l i c and government a s p i r a t i o n s so that a l t e r n a t i v e o p t i o n s can be arrayed f o r c h o i c e , and; 2. P r o j e c t s should be designed and implemented in a manner that f a c i l i t a t e s the accumulation of knowledge and experience u s e f u l f o r f u t u r e a p p l i c a t i o n , while at the same time ensuring the e c o l o g i c a l i n t e g r i t y of the r e s o u r c e . 3 6 Although these requirements r a i s e q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the d e f i n i t i o n and d etermination of " p u b l i c and government a s p i r a t i o n s " , SEP attempts to accommodate them at the p r o j e c t i n i t i a t i o n stage with the s e r i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of the t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a of " e n h a n c e a b i l i t y " , " d e s i r a b i l i t y " and "manageability". The Development And E v a l u a t i o n Of P r o j e c t Options A n a l y s i s f o r e n h a n c e a b i l i t y i s t y p i c a l l y the f i r s t s tep i n the development and "flow" of a new p r o j e c t . T h i s c r i t e r i o n d e a l s with such t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n s as adequacy of water supply, s i t e s u i t a b i l i t y , a v a i l a b i l i t y of brood stocks to be enhanced and other p h y s i c a l requirements of s u c c e s s f u l p r o j e c t o p e r a t i o n . B i o l o g i c a l and e n g i n e e r i n g f i e l d s t a f f conduct- these i n i t i a l " b i o - r e c o n n a i s s a n c e " surveys. If a s i t e and c o r r e s p o n d i n g technology are i d e n t i f i e d that make the proposal appear to be t e c h n i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , the p r o p o s a l ( o u t l i n i n g p o t e n t i a l c o s t s and p r o d u c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y ) i s submitted to the "economics plann i n g u n i t " f o r e v a l u a t i o n of a p r o j e c t ' s a b i l i t y to s a t i s f y the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e s of the Program. T h i s economic a n a l y s i s r e p r e s e n t s a p r e l i m i n a r y e v a l u a t i o n of a p r o j e c t ' s d e s i r a b i l i t y - Is a p r o j e c t economically sound and how w e l l does i t s a t i s f y the n o n - n a t i o n a l income o b j e c t i v e s of SEP? A l s o a s s o c i a t e d with t h i s c r i t e r i o n i s the requirement that a p r o j e c t should be designed, i f p o s s i b l e , i n a manner that w i l l generate new t e c h n o l o g i c a l knowledge that may be u s e f u l i n g u i d i n g subsequent SEP a c t i o n s , and i n a manner that w i l l not f o r e c l o s e upon f u t u r e p o t e n t i a l enhancement o p t i o n s . 37 From here, p r o j e c t s are handed to GWG members to comment upon the manageability i s s u e , and g e n e r a l l y on how w e l l the pr o j e c t f i t s i n t o f i s h production t a r g e t s and t h e i r timing for the p a r t i c u l a r area i n question. The current membership and r o l e of the GWG's has changed appre c i a b l y since the time when they were involved i n the development of the i n t i a l " o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y p l a n " for SEP. Each GWG i s now composed mainly of non-SEP i n d i v i d u a l s . Federal senior management b i o l o g i s t s , one or more d i s t r i c t s u pervisors from the GWG area, a h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n d i v i s i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , and f i n a l l y a SEP planning coordinator comprise the membership of each GWG. In terms of f u n c t i o n , these groups (of which there are now four) no longer i n i t i a t e p r o j e c t o p t i o n s . Their prime r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s to determine whether or not the production from s p e c i f i c enhancement proposals ( i n i t i a t e d by other SEP s t a f f ) can be e f f e c t i v e l y managed .without impacting d e t r i m e n t a l l y on other stocks i n the same f i shery. Manageability remains one of the most complex and uncertain issues w i t h i n SEP and as a r e s u l t the " b i o l o g i c a l planning u n i t " of SEP works c l o s e l y with GWG's to t r y to resolve manageability problems a s s o c i a t e d with s p e c i f i c enhancement i n i t i a t i v e s . Each p r o j e c t proposal must s a t i s f y the requirements of these three f e a s i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a (as f a r as i s p o s s i b l e ) before they are considered s e r i o u s l y for implementation. (DFO, 1980(a) and F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978). 38 I n t e r n a l SEP Plan-Making The i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g and p r o j e c t e v a l u a t i o n to t h i s p o i n t i n the annual "process" i s a r e l a t i v e l y rough, " f i r s t - c u t " a n a l y s i s of p o t e n t i a l enhancement o p p o r t u n i t i e s and i s used mainly f o r p r e l i m i n a r y "plan-making". To h e l p understand how i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t p r o p o s a l s are i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o an annual plan an overview of the i n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of SEP i s o u t l i n e d below. The D i r e c t o r of Operations f o r SEP r e p o r t s to the E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r of the Program and i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the D i v i s i o n s undertaking a c t u a l enhancement work. These and t h e i r f u n c t i o n s are as f o l l o w s : 1. E n g i n e e r i n g - designs and c o n s t r u c t s major enhancement f a c i l i t i e s such as h a t c h e r i e s , spawning channels and fishways. ( i . e . r e l a t i v e l y c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e and t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d p r o j e c t s ) . 2. F a c i l i t y Operations - operates the above enhancement p r o j e c t s a f t e r c o n s t r u c t i o n i s completed. 3. S p e c i a l P r o j e c t s - undertakes s m a l l - s c a l e enhancement a c t i v i t i e s u s ing r e l a t i v e l y low technology. Community development p r o j e c t s ( c o n t r a c t e d out to communities throughout B.C.), small stream r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , and p u b l i c involvement p r o j e c t s (where the general p u b l i c takes part i n enhancement a c t i v i t i e s ) are a l l a d m i n i s t e r e d by t h i s D i v i s i o n . Research, as a separate D i v i s i o n , conducts b i o l o g i c a l experiments in e f f o r t s to improve r a t e s of p r o d u c t i v i t y at enhancement s i t e s . The Lake F e r t i l i z a t i o n program was i n i t i a t e d w i t h i n the Research D i v i s i o n . F i n a l l y , r e p o r t i n g to the E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r of SEP i n a s e r v i c e and a d v i s o r y c a p a c i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y , are the Finance and Planning D i v i s i o n s . At the annual "plan-making" stage ( u s u a l l y around J u l y -September) the s e n i o r bureaucrats in charge of each p a r t i c u l a r SEP D i v i s i o n choose a l i s t of p r o j e c t s and a c t i v i t i e s that they 39 would l i k e to see implemented in t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e D i v i s i o n i n the coming f i s c a l year. The l i m i t of p r o j e c t s and a c t i v i t i e s i n each D i v i s i o n i s c o n s t r a i n e d by an approximate budget " c e i l i n g " imposed by the Executive D i r e c t o r of the Program. These a l l o c a t i o n s are based upon h i s p e r c e p t i o n of D i v i s i o n needs and commitments, precedence of f i n a n c i a l a l l o c a t i o n as manifest i n p r e v i o u s years' budgets, and on what i t i s p e r c e i v e d the p u b l i c and decision-making bodies w i l l f i n d a c c e p t a b l e (based upon past d i r e c t i o n from these groups). N e g o t i a t i o n and c o - o r d i n a t i o n among D i v i s i o n s over annual budget a l l o c a t i o n s i s f a c i l i t a t e d by the SEP Management  Committee. T h i s i s a 10 member group composed of SEP D i v i s i o n c h i e f s and other s e n i o r f i s h e r i e s bureaucrats, i n c l u d i n g a P r o v i n c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . They meet weekly as a group to c o o r d i n a t e day to day SEP f u n c t i o n s as w e l l as to d i s c u s s broader t o p i c s regarding SEP p l a n n i n g and d i r e c t i o n s t r a t e g y . At "budget-time" t h i s group devotes i t s energies to r a t i f y i n g a mix of enhancement p r o j e c t s and a c t i v i t i e s that w i l l c o n s t i t u t e the "Executive P l a n " that i s recommended to the decision-making u n i t , the Salmonid Enhancement Board (SEB). T h i s i s the group i n the SEP process that e x e r c i s e s decision-making a u t h o r i t y . A d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i r r o l e f o l l o w s l a t e r in t h i s c h a p ter. But before i t i s presented to the SEB, the "Executive P l a n " r e c e i v e s formal comment from a v a r i e t y of groups. F i r s t l y , the GWG's are presented the plan and are given the o p p o r t u n i t y to r a i s e comments reg a r d i n g the manageability i s s u e . I d e a l l y , only minor m o d i f i c a t i o n of the plan would be r e q u i r e d at t h i s p o i n t due to continuous l i a i s o n with these groups and the SEP 0 40 " b i o l o g i c a l p l a n n i n g u n i t " throughout the e n t i r e p r o c e s s . The plan i s then shown to the Salmon Resource Board. T h i s i s a group of high-ranking F e d e r a l f i s h e r i e s personnel concerned with the wider aspects of salmonid resource management, i n c l u d i n g : h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n , r e g u l a t i o n , enforcement, e t c . , as w e l l as the enhancement f u n c t i o n . T h e i r primary i n t e r e s t i s that the proposed plan c o i n c i d e s g e n e r a l l y with other f i s h e r i e s p o l i c i e s . E x t e r n a l I n f l u e n c e s In The Planning Process (a) P u b l i c input i n t o p l a n n i n g Next, the Salmonid Enhancement Task Group (SETG - formerly known as the B.C. Task Group) i s i n v i t e d to respond to the "Executive P l a n " . T h i s group i s composed of a c o l l e c t i o n of i n t e r e s t s and user groups that e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , w i l l be impacted upon by SEP. Membership was determined o r i g i n a l l y ( i n 1976) by a c o n s u l t i n g p u b l i c involvement s p e c i a l i s t on the b a s i s of h i s p e r c e p t i o n s of the a p p r o p r i a t e groups to be i n c l u d e d and a l s o on the b a s i s of g e o g r a p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , (see Appendix II f o r c u r r e n t SETG membership and the i n t e r e s t s they r e p r e s e n t ) . The SETG f u n c t i o n s p r i m a r i l y as an a d v i s o r y committee to SEP s t a f f and to decision-makers, a s p i r i n g to p r o v i d e them with a broad-based consensus view on the p r e f e r e n c e s of the B.C. community re g a r d i n g how salmonid enhancement should proceed, (see Appendix III f o r the SETG Terms of R e f e r e n c e ) . As i s apparent from past SETG d i s c u s s i o n s and t h e i r formal P o l i c y Statement, the b a s i c p h i l o s o p h y that t h i s group t r i e s to 41 communicate i s composed of four main elements: 1. That p u b l i c education, p u b l i c a d v i s o r y input i n t o p l a n n i n g , and p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a c t u a l enhancement a c t i v i t i e s are c r u c i a l to the success of the Program. 2. That SEP must not operate i n i s o l a t i o n from the l a r g e r f i s h e r i e s mandate. ( i . e . h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n , enforcement and regulation/management). 3. That i n t e g r a t e d resource management i s key to r e s o l v i n g many of the c u r r e n t problems faced by the salmonid f i s h e r y . 4. That a d i v e r s i t y of smaller " n a t u r a l i s t i c " methods of enhancement are p r e f e r r e d over an imbalance of l a r g e - s c a l e " a r t i f i c i a l " p r o j e c t s . An o v e r a l l concern that a l s o appears to be foremost i n the mind of the SETG i s f o r s p e c i f i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the s p o r t s -f i s h i n g i n t e r e s t . The SETG's formal avenue of input i n t o p l a n n i n g i s v i a t h e i r chairman, who s i t s as a member of the SEB. The group maintains an e l e c t e d executive and an e x t e r n a l e x e c u t i v e s e c r e t a r y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the m u l t i t u d e of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s connected with Task Group o p e r a t i o n . Although members are not p a i d by government to p a r t i c i p a t e in p l a n n i n g , they are reimbursed f o r t h e i r a c t u a l c o s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . As an i n d i c a t i o n of the commitment SEP has made to t h i s body, the 1980-81 budget f o r SETG o p e r a t i o n was i n excess of $90,000. The bulk of SETG funding goes to accommodation and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of members to and from meetings, and f o r p r o v i s i o n of the e x e c u t i v e s e c r e t a r i a l s e r v i c e . They meet s e v e r a l times each year e i t h e r en masse, or i n sub-committee, g e n e r a l l y to d i s c u s s t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s toward o v e r a l l SEP philosophy and p o l i c y as opposed to s i t e s p e c i f i c , 42 p r o j e c t - o r i e n t e d d e t a i l s . T h i s "macro-level" of p u b l i c input i n t o p l a n n i n g was decided upon e a r l y i n Task Group development. At. t h e i r second meeting i n December 1976 the minutes r e c o r d the statement t h a t , "We must not get too t e c h n i c a l or attempt to i n v o l v e o u r s e l v e s i n r e g u l a r management a c t i v i t i e s . We want to be kept i n the broad p i c t u r e , with emphasis on the s t r a t e g i e s l e v e l and general budget a l l o c a t i o n . . . T h e group i t s e l f must s t r i v e f o r consensus, i t must be more g e n e r a l i s t i c than the i n t e r e s t groups and/or areas we represent".'. T h i s p o s i t i o n was subsequently r e a f f i r m e d in the SETG formal Terms of Reference that s t a t e , "The Task Group s h a l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n the broad aspects of the philosophy and policy-making of salmonid resource management and s h a l l leave* the d e t a i l e d o p e r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s to those so accountable". In accordance with t h i s p o l i c y - l e v e l approach, the Task Group was f o r m a l l y presented by SEP s t a f f planners i n mid-August 1979 with the proposed 1980-81 expenditure p l a n , and were s p e c i f i c a l l y asked to review i t with c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r the f o l l o w i n g elements: (a) s p e c i e s balance (b) adequate uses of technology (c) employment l e v e l s » (d) r e g i o n a l b e n e f i t s ' (e) n a t i v e b e n e f i t s ( f ) e f f e c t s on the environment (g) e q u i t y among types of f i s h i n g gear (h) general p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s The SETG membership d i s c u s s e d the plan and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s with s t a f f planners and then reviewed i t i n d i v i d u a l l y i n more d e t a i l at home. In e a r l y Septmber 1979, a consensus statement on SETG response to the plan was i s s u e d to SEP s t a f f and the SEB. Although the SETG d i d not l i m i t i t s response e x c l u s i v e l y to the above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , the comments that were " p l a n - s p e c i f i c " 43 mainly concerned o v e r a l l s p e c i e s balance and a l s o that the S p e c i a l P r o j e c t D i v i s i o n of SEP should r e c e i v e i n c r e a s e d budget a l l o c a t i o n to pursue more " n a t u r a l i s t i c " , p u b l i c - o r i e n t e d forms of enhancement. (b) The decision-making u n i t Although in theory, the SEB f u n c t i o n s s t r i c t l y as an a d v i s o r y body to the the F e d e r a l M i n i s t e r of F i s h e r i e s and Oceans and P r o v i n c i a l M i n i s t e r of Environment, in p r a c t i c e , t h e i r d e c i s i o n s on p o l i c y and Program op t i o n s and budget a l l o c a t i o n can be c o n s i d e r e d as f i n a l d e c i s i o n s . The SEB i s composed of f i v e h i g h - r a n k i n g government bureaucrats; (three F e d e r a l and two P r o v i n c i a l ) and seven members from the p r i v a t e s e c t o r ; a l l appointed by the M i n i s t e r s . The p r i v a t e members have been i n s t r u c t e d that t h e i r purpose i s not to attempt to i n f l u e n c e SEP p o l i c y and d i r e c t i o n as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s or spokesmen for t h e i r a f f i l - i a t e d user group. Rather, they have been i n v i t e d to s i t on the SEB due to t h e i r knowledge of a p a r t i c u l a r aspect of the salmonid resource. The d e c i s i o n s that they a r r i v e a t , are among other t h i n g s , the r e s u l t of the i n t e r a c t i o n among t h i s d i v e r s i t y of p e r s p e c t i v e s . (See Appendix IV f o r SEB membership, and Appendix V f o r t h e i r Terms of R e f e r e n c e ) . In r e l a t i o n to the 1980-81 pl a n n i n g e x e r c i s e , the SEB was asked to review the plan recommended to them and decide i f the broader p o l i c y aspects of "balance" among s p e c i e s , regions and o b j e c t i v e s was a c c e p t a b l e . The SEB recommended m o d i f i c a t i o n of the "Executive Plan" to i n c l u d e i n c r e a s e d emphasis on lake 44 f e r t i l i z a t i o n because of the high p r o j e c t e d y i e l d from such p r o j e c t s . This d i r e c t i v e was then l e f t to the d i s c r e t i o n of the Executive D i r e c t o r of SEP to make the appropriate funding adjustments among D i v i s i o n s . From here, the 1980-81 plan was presented to Treasury Board and a few months l a t e r budget approval of the plan was received.' Steps In P o l i c y Implementation The above sequence of a c t i v i t i e s and i n t e r a c t i o n s comprise the basic i n s t i t u t i o n a l elements of annual SEP planning, c u l m i n a t i n g i n a d e c i s i o n to implement p o l i c y as i s manifest i n the array of proposed i n d i v i d u a l enhancement a c t i v i t i e s and f u n c t i o n s . Decisions are based on t e c h n i c a l information a v a i l a b l e at the time and for the purposes of broad Program planning, the information and i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n may be adequate. However, at the p o l i c y implementation stage, SEP seeks to r e f i n e much of the t e c h n i c a l information that was gathered p r e v i o u s l y . This " f i n e - t u n i n g " i s done mainly for major production i n i t i a t i v e s that may involve the investment of s e v e r a l m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . As a way of having t i g h t e r c o n t r o l over major expenditures of t h i s nature, Treasury Board requires a d e t a i l e d submission p r i o r to the a c t u a l i n i t i a t i o n of c a p i t a l p r o j e c t s c o s t i n g over $500,000. This n e c e s s i t a t e s a more i n -depth e s t i m a t i o n of p r o j e c t costs and projected f i s h production than what was required for the purposes of i n i t i a l planning. I f the p r o j e c t s t i l l appears to meet the three f e a s i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a , and i f the GWG i s s a t i s f i e d that any updated production f i g u r e s are s t i l l manageable, then the D i v i s i o n Chief 4 5 prepares a d e t a i l e d Treasury Board submission. If these requirements are not s a t i s f i e d , then the p r o j e c t may be e i t h e r m o d i f i e d or delayed u n t i l more i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e . SEP E v a l u a t i o n Techniques - The Five-Account Framework The socio-economic e v a l u a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t s and of o v e r a l l annual plans i s a c r i t i c a l component of SEP p l a n n i n g . By using common c r i t e r i a to analyze a l l i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t s SEP economists attempt to present t h e i r f i n d i n g s i n a systematic and s t a n d a r d i z e d form which t h e o r e t i c a l l y permits ease of comparison among i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t s and p l a n s . The f i v e - a c c o u n t e v a l u a t i o n methodology that i s used by SEP i s a m o d i f i c a t i o n of the Water Resources C o u n c i l ' s " m u l t i p l e -o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g " methodology that i s used in p l a n n i n g water resource developments in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . (U.S. Water Resources C o u n c i l , 1973). A system of accounts has been d e v i s e d which attempt to s e p a r a t e l y c o n s i d e r s o c i a l and environmental consequences of p r o j e c t developments in a d d i t i o n to the t r a d i t i o n a l economic e f f e c t s . The f i v e a c counting methodologies are p a r a l l e l s of the f i v e program o b j e c t i v e s . The main elements of each of the accounts are o u t l i n e d b r i e f l y below: 1. The N a t i o n a l Income Account re p r e s e n t s t r a d i t i o n a l economic e f f i c i e n c y i n f o r m a t i o n input to the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . C o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s of a l t e r n a t i v e p r o j e c t s i s conducted which takes i n t o account p r o j e c t b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g to commercial, r e c r e a t i o n a l and Indian food-f i s h i n g s e c t o r s , compared to the c o s t s of development and management of the enhancement f a c i l i t i e s . T h i s account d e a l s s t r i c t l y with those c o s t s and b e n e f i t s that are e a s i l y q u a n t i f i a b l e i n monetary terms; s o c i a l and environmental c o s t s and b e n e f i t s are d e a l t with i n the other accounts. 2. The Regional Development Account seeks to r a t e a p r o j e c t ' s c a p a b i l i t y of p r o v i d i n g a "greater balance 46 i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o p u l a t i o n , wealth and i n d u s t r y throughout the p r o v i n c e " . ( B l a s e t t i and F r a s e r , 1979, p.2). The wealth generated i n l e s s developed regions of the Province i s c o n s i d e r e d "to be worth more" than i f i t were generated i n the Vancouver or V i c t o r i a m e t r o p o l i t a n r e g i o n s . These p e r c e i v e d d i f f e r e n c e s in value are r e f l e c t e d by simply weighting the incomes expected from remote p r o j e c t s more h e a v i l y than incomes from p r o j e c t s l o c a t e d near the Lower Mainland. 3. The Native People Account. Although the SEP i t s e l f i s g e n e r a l l y b e n e f i c i a l to the Native people of B.C. the "magnitude and d i s t r i b u t i o n of e f f e c t s are s e n s i t i v e to c h o i c e s made durin g program p l a n n i n g " . ( F r i e d l a e n d e r , 1979, p.2). In order to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y rank these e f f e c t s t h i s methodology looks at economic and s o c i a l impacts on: (a) employment, income and community s a t i s f a c t i o n e f f e c t s that accrue to Na t i v e groups l i v i n g near the proposed p r o j e c t s i t e . (b) i n c r e a s e d income f o r Indian commercial fishermen. (c) a d d i t i o n a l N a t i v e employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s in the f i s h p r o c e s s i n g s e c t o r . (d) improvements i n Indian food f i s h e r i e s . 4. The Employment Account. T h i s account ranks p r o j e c t s on the b a s i s of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to gen e r a t i n g employment i n the f i s h i n g and p r o c e s s i n g s e c t o r s with the use of labour resources that are c u r r e n t l y under-or un-employed. 5. The Environmental and Resource P r e s e r v a t i o n  Account. Each a l t e r n a t i v e p r o j e c t r e c e i v e s a r a t i n g based upon an e v a l u a t i o n of c e r t a i n key i n d i c a t o r s (such as a p r o j e c t ' s e f f e c t on changes i n stock c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i n t r a - and i n t e r - s p e c i e s i n t e r a c t i o n s , stock m a n a g e a b i l i t y , e t c . ) . The p e r c e i v e d d i r e c t i o n , magnitude, importance, p r o b a b i l i t y , and p o t e n t i a l f o r m i t i g a t i o n of key i n d i c a t o r values r e p r e s e n t s the f i n a l p r o j e c t score which g i v e s the degree of b e n e f i c i a l or adverse impact that i s expected from the implementation of p a r t i c u l a r p r o j e c t s . P r o j e c t s with l a r g e p e r c e i v e d e c o l o g i c a l value are r a t e d higher than p r o j e c t s that make a small c o n t r i b u t i o n (or d e t r a c t from) environmental/resource p r e s e r v a t i o n . (Gregory, 1979). P r o j e c t s evaluated in the s o c i a l and environmental accounts r e c e i v e a "score" on a f i v e step o r d i n a l s c a l e ranging from very poor to a very good c o n t r i b u t i o n to the o b j e c t i v e (account) i n 47 question. P r o j e c t "scores" can then be compared to each other w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r account. Many of the " s m a l l - s c a l e " p r o j e c t s i n i t i a t e d by SEP however, do not undergo e x p l i c i t f i v e account e v a l u a t i o n by the economic planners. This i s mainly because of the d i f f i c u l t y i n estim a t i n g the f i s h production that can be a t t r i b u t e d to an enhancement a c t i v i t y such as removing a log-jam or improving c o n d i t i o n s for spawning in a small stream. S i m i l a r i l y , the major f e a s i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a of enhanceabi1ity, d e s i r a b i l i t y and manageability are often waived or modified f o r these s m a l l , low-impact r e h a b i l a t i v e p r o j e c t s . (DFO, 1980(a)). For those p r o j e c t s where f u l l e v a l u a t i o n i s conducted the f i v e account methodology i s e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n of the fa c t that s o c i e t y has a m u l t i p l i c i t y of goals, not a l l of which are communicable i n monetary terms. The Department of F i s h e r i e s and Oceans has l o o s e l y a r t i c u l a t e d these goals i n 'terms o p e r a t i o n a l l y appropriate for SEP and has at i t s d i s p o s a l $150 m i l l i o n to implement p r o j e c t s capable of working towards these goals. Although the requirement of economic e f f i c i e n c y has imposed a considerable c o n s t r a i n t on Program choice by emphasizing the n a t i o n a l income o b j e c t i v e , the remaining o b j e c t i v e s remain un-prior.ized. Varying mixes of a l t e r n a t i v e enhancement p r o j e c t s w i l l each s a t i s f y the o b j e c t i v e s to varying degrees. Therefore, SEP decision-makers must deal with the question of how much of one o b j e c t i v e they are w i l l i n g to trade-o f f in order to achieve a c e r t a i n l e v e l of another. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of " t r a d e - o f f s " among o b j e c t i v e s were 48 i d e n t i f i e d for decision-makers during the 1980-81 planning e x e r c i s e with the a s s i s t a n c e of three a l t e r n a t i v e "maximization plans" constructed by SEP economic planning s t a f f . These three plans were i n a d d i t i o n to the "Executive Plan" that was recommended to decision-makers. Each of these "maximization plans" emphasized a d i f f e r e n t mix of p r o j e c t s that scored r e l a t i v e l y h i g h l y in the p a r t i c u l a r account i n question. For example, the N a t i o n a l Income Maximization Plan mainly included p r o j e c t s that would best meet the requirements of economic e f f i c i e n c y . P r o j e c t s and f u n c t i o n s included i n t h i s plan were arrayed i n order of descending c o s t - b e n e f i t r a t i o u n t i l the annual budget was exhausted. The Income R e d i s t r i b u t i o n Plan emphasized p r o j e c t s capable of p r o v i d i n g employment and subsequent income b e n e f i t s to regions outside the Vancouver and V i c t o r i a metropolitan areas. The Environmental Maximization Plan emphasized p r o j e c t s i d e n t i f i e d as having r e l a t i v e l y strong p o s i t i v e environmental and resource p r e s e r v a t i o n a t t r i b u t e s . The perceived value of the maximization plans i s t h e i r use as benchmarks to h i g h l i g h t how much of one o b j e c t i v e must be given up to a t t a i n another, (see Appendix VI f o r a sample of the 1980/81 f i v e account e v a l u a t i o n information as i t was presented to decision-makers). The 1980-81 plan recommended by SEP planners (the Executive Plan) ' represented a compromise among o b j e c t i v e s that was considered by decision-makers v i s a v i s the maximization plans. "The question of whether the environmental and r e g i o n a l development b e n e f i t s for example, of a p a r t i c u l a r development plan are worth l e s s , the same, or more than the amount of n a t i o n a l income gains foregone, w i l l have to remain a matter of judgement by policy-makers in each and every case". 49 ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.35). I t was suggested at the outset of SEP that the in f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n the f i v e account system i s a l l that i s r e q u i r e d f o r decision-makers to make informed c h o i c e on t r a d e - o f f s among o b j e c t i v e s . ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment, Canada, 1978, p.40). 50 CHAPTER FIVE ASSESSMENT AND DISCUSSION OF THE SEP PLANNING PROCESS I. REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS IN THE SEP PLANNING PROCESS There are two ba s i c c a t e g o r i e s of i n t e r e s t which deserve c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n SEP p l a n n i n g : non-government i n t e r e s t s and government i n t e r e s t s . (A) Non-government i n t e r e s t s c o n s t i t u t e those p u b l i c groups whose i n t e r e s t s impinge on, or are impinged upon by SEP d e c i s i o n s , (e.g. commercial and sport fishermen, p r o c e s s e r s , the f o r e s t i n d u s t r y , n a t i v e communities, e t c . ) . To determine whether or not the c r i t e r i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of non-government i n t e r e s t s has been s a t i s f i e d , the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s are suggested as r e l e v a n t i n d i c a t o r s of SEP performance: I n d i c a t o r 1-1: Opportunity to P a r t i c i p a t e Simply, can the a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r e s t s be i d e n t i f i e d as having had the o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the SEP planni n g process at a l l stages? The " a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r e s t s " are those i n t e r e s t s which can be r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i e d as having a l e g i t i m a t e concern regarding the d i r e c t i o n of SEP, as determined by the "domain of the common pr o p e r t y or the p u b l i c good being s u p p l i e d " . (Ostrom, 1973). I n d i c a t o r 1-2: T r a n s a c t i o n Costs of P a r t i c i p a t i o n R e c a l l that Olson (1971) has shown that i n d i v i d u a l s of common i n t e r e s t may not be motivated to org a n i z e to f u r t h e r that common i n t e r e s t i f the c o s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n exceed the a n t i c i p a t e d b e n e f i t s from doing so. ( i . e . i f t h e i r " t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s " are too g r e a t ) . Has SEP taken any a c t i o n s to ensure that t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n do not i n h i b i t any i n t e r e s t s from being represented in the planning process? 51 I n d i c a t o r 1-3: A Forum f o r Representation For groups that are a c t i v e i n SEP p l a n n i n g , i s there an o f f i c i a l forum f o r input and exchange that lends s t r u c t u r e to the way that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n occurs? A forum should f a c i l i t a t e two-way communication among p a r t i c i p a n t s and enhance d i s c u s s i o n and b a r g a i n i n g that i s not dominated by a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t ( s ) . (Haefele, 1973). I n d i c a t o r 1-4: E f f e c t i v e n e s s of R e p r e s e n t a t i o n Is there any evidence to suggest that i n t e r e s t s have been e f f e c t i v e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the d i r e c t i o n of SEP, c o n s i s t e n t with the p r e f e r e n c e s of those i n t e r e s t s (and of course, c o n s i s t e n t with what can p r a c t i c a b l y be implemented)? Unless an i n t e r e s t can p o i n t to a d e c i s i o n outcome, s a t i s f i e d that i t has been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n shaping that outcome, the i n t e r e s t w i l l be unable to r a t i o n a l i z e continued p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . A l s o , i t stands to reason that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i l l be most e f f e c t i v e when i t occurs e a r l y in the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s , before the "agenda" has been s e t . I n d i c a t o r 1-5: Representation of the "General I n t e r e s t " Has SEP taken steps to r e s o l v e the problem that Lowi (1972) r e f e r s to as " d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s " . A l l Canadians pay f o r SEP and yet only c e r t a i n groups are expected to d e r i v e d i r e c t b e n e f i t s from the Program. Are there any mechanisms w i t h i n SEP which attempt to p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s of the wider p u b l i c and prevent " p r i v a t i z a t i o n o f • t h e p u b l i c " ? (B) Government i n t e r e s t s that deserve c o n s i d e r a t i o n by SEP p l a n n i n g i n c l u d e those agencies whose "spheres of i n f l u e n c e " i n t e r f a c e with salmonid enhancement, (e.g. B.C Hydro, M i n i s t r y of F o r e s t s , M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e , and l o c a l and r e g i o n a l governments i n p r o x i m i t y to enhancement a c t i v i t i e s ) . I t i s important that these agencies be recognized i n SEP p l a n n i n g because of the e x t e r n a l c o s t s p o t e n t i a l l y imposed upon SEP by the resource users that these agencies r e g u l a t e or r e p r e s e n t . Another c o n s i d e r a t i o n here i s the i n t e g r a t i o n of other DFO i n t e r e s t s with SEP p l a n n i n g . ( i . e . h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n and 52 regulation/management). T h i s i n t e g r a t i o n i s important f o r pragmatic reasons that c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y i n f l u e n c e whether or not SEP can be as s u c c e s s f u l as o r i g i n a l l y a n t i c i p a t e d . These reasons are e x p l a i n e d below. The causes of the gradual d e c l i n e i n the p r o d u c t i v i t y of the salmonid resource have been a t t r i b u t e d to o v e r f i s h i n g and h a b i t a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n . ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978). L o g i c a l l y , e f f o r t s to i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i v i t y would address these two causes. SEP however, was i n s t i t u t e d under a f r e s h mandate in 1977 to m i t i g a t e the symptoms of the above two causes r a t h e r than to deal with the causes,.per se. The d e c i s i o n to deal with d e c l i n i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y through an an enhancement s t r a t e g y was founded in the b e l i e f that such an approach was, i n a l l r e s p e c t s f e a s i b l e , and c o u l d be e f f e c t i v e , " . . . i f improved h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n and stock management regimes are a p p l i e d c o n c u r r e n t l y to p r o t e c t the n a t u r a l base l e v e l of salmonid p r o d u c t i o n . " ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.20). The q u e s t i o n i s whether or not these other two dimensions of salmonid resource management can be expected to keep pace with i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n without being c o o r d i n a t e d c l o s e l y with SEP p l a n n i n g . The d i f f i c u l t y l i e s mainly in the management of "mixed stock f i s h e r i e s " , where enhanced stocks i n t e r m i n g l e with and cannot be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from unenhanced s t o c k s . Gregory (1979, p.28) p r o v i d e s an e x p l a n a t i o n of the stock manageability problem. "Salmonid enhancement p r o j e c t s , are designed to i n c r e a s e the abundance of salmonid s t o c k s , and t h i s i n c r e a s e i n turn serves to boost f i s h i n g e f f o r t . If salmonid . stocks are then su b j e c t to common e x p l o i t a t i o n i n the f i s h e r y , f o l l o w i n g an o v e r a l l 53 managerial o b j e c t i v e which seeks to i n c r e a s e the c a t c h from the t o t a l system, the impact of i n c r e a s e d f i s h i n g p r e ssure on unenhanced stocks c o u l d prove h i g h l y adverse." The a d v e r s i t y to which Gregory r e f e r s i s caused by d i f f e r e n t r a t e s of p r o d u c t i v i t y between enhanced and unenhanced f i s h . For example, in order f o r a hatchery run to be s u s t a i n e d , only r e l a t i v e l y few a d u l t s are r e q u i r e d as "escapement". T h e i r p r o d u c t i v i t y i s high because i t i s a r t i f i c i a l l y enhanced. However, to ensure the v i t a l i t y of a n a t u r a l stock, a l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n of escapement i s r e q u i r e d . Because the r e l a t i v e p r o d u c t i v i t y of n a t u r a l s t o c k s i s low, they cannot s u s t a i n as high a l e v e l of harvest as . a r t i f i c i a l p r o d u c t i o n , or r e p r o d u c t i o n w i l l be endangered. (Graham, 1981). T h e r e f o r e , unless stock m a n a g e a b i l i t y i s a p r i o r i t y of SEP p l a n n i n g , the p o t e n t i a l r e s u l t s may be a d e c l i n e i n n a t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n that can d r a m a t i c a l l y l e s s e n the impact of the Program and perhaps more im p o r t a n t l y , l e a d to a r e d u c t i o n i n o v e r a l l system r e s i l i e n c e and s t a b i l i t y due to i n c r e a s e d system homogeneity. The involvement of f i s h e r i e s managers who are i n v o l v e d with h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n ought a l s o to be a p r i o r i t y of SEP p l a n n i n g . Enhancement of. production i n the absence of environmental r e a r i n g c a p a c i t y to s u s t a i n that i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n i s p o i n t l e s s . For these reasons, the extent to which a l l dimensions of salmonid resource management are found to be i n t e g r a t e d i n t o SEP p l a n n i n g , c o n s t i t u t e s an important aspect of the c r i t e r i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s . 54 A. Non-Government I n t e r e s t s i n SEP Planning I n d i c a t o r 1-1: Opportunity to P a r t i c i p a t e E f f o r t s to i n v o l v e the p u b l i c i n SEP plan n i n g began o r i g i n a l l y i n 1976 with a round of p u b l i c i n q u i r i e s i n 18 communities throughout B.C. A second set of i n q u i r i e s i n 20 communities was conducted i n 1978.(DFO, 1980(b)). Other past a c t i v i t i e s to r e c e i v e p u b l i c input have i n c l u d e d o c c a s i o n a l meetings between SEP p l a n n i n g s t a f f and p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t groups such as the P a c i f i c T r o l l e r s A s s o c i a t i o n and the Union of Fishermen and A l l i e d Workers. (Morley, p e r s . comm.). The primary mechanism however, f o r input i n t o Program pl a n n i n g i s the Salmonid Enhancement Task Group (SETG). V i r t u a l l y every i n t e r e s t that i s connected with the salmonid resource i s represented on t h i s group. Included i n the membership are i n t e r e s t s that- w i l l r e c e i v e b e n e f i t s from SEP as w e l l as those that might bear c o s t s . B e n e f i c i a r i e s are represented by members from i n t e r e s t s such as fishermen's unions, salmon p r o c e s s o r s , n a t i v e groups, and commercial and sport fishermen groups. Members a s s o c i a t e d with mining, hydro-e l e c t r i c development, and f o r e s t r y p r o v i d e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s that might bear c o s t s due to SEP. (see Appendix I I ) . Those SEP p l a n n i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s that were interv i e w e d f o r t h i s study, concur that the f u l l range of l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s are represented on the SETG. Indeed, t h i s was the primary c r i t e r i o n of membership s e l e c t i o n t h at was used by the c o n s u l t i n g s p e c i a l i s t who i n t i t i a t e d the SETG. ( S i n c l a i r , p e r s . comm.). There i s a l s o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of some i n t e r e s t s with 55 l e s s obvious connections to the salmonid resource, as w e l l as g e o g r a p h i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s . Although there may be some q u e s t i o n of the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of the way i n which Task Group membership was determined ( i . e . a c o n s u l t a n t f o r the proponent agency s e l e c t i n g those who s h a l l p a r t i c i p a t e ) , i t i s suggested that such methods may enjoy g r e a t e r e f f e c t i v e n e s s than t r a d i t i o n a l methods of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n . O'Riordan and O'Riordan (1979) argue that the value of p r e - s e l e c t e d a d v i s o r y bodies such as the SETG i s that they operate from a p o s i t i o n of r e l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e . Because members have been i n v i t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e as " c o n s u l t a n t s " they are more l i k e l y to be c o n s i d e r e d as equals i n the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . " C o n s u l t a t i o n through a d v i s o r y groups can ensure more r e f l e c t i v e input p r o v i d e d the groups are c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d , and enables a more e f f e c t i v e u t i l i z a t i o n of the c o n s i d e r a b l e t e c h n i c a l , s o c i a l and l o c a l knowledge that l i e s o u t s i d e government... decision-makers o f t e n regard input from c o n s u l t a t i v e groups as more c r e d i b l e than coming from mass p u b l i c meetings." (O'Riordan and O'Riordan, 1979, p.91). It i s important to recognize however, that i f " c o n s u l t a n t s " such as the SETG are to be t r u l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the i n t e r e s t s with which they are a f f i l i a t e d they must communicate c l o s e l y and be accountable to t h e i r " c o n s t i t u e n t s " . (O'Riordan, 1976). Unless t h i s two-way education o c c u r s , members may i n f a c t become u n - r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the r e a l a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e i r a f f i l i a t e d i n t e r e s t . I n d i v i d u a l s should have the " o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e " through the SETG member r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e i r group. Concern has been expressed by the SETG i t s e l f that t h i s l a c k of communication may be a problem with t h e i r a d v i s o r y body. 56 In an August 1980 meeting the q u e s t i o n was posed whether members more a c c u r a t e l y represent themselves than they do t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e groups. It was moved that ways be found to communicate more e f f e c t i v e l y with a f f i l i a t e d i n t e r e s t s and the p u b l i c at l a r g e . T h i s communication i s s u e as p e r c e i v e d by the Task Group r e l a t e s perhaps to a l a r g e r q u e s t i o n . In the past four years Task Group members have become i n c r e a s i n g l y well-educated on the c o m p l e x i t i e s of salmonid enhancement. In e f f e c t , the group q u a l i f i e s as a panel of experts t h a t , as a u n i t , has become f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the SEP p l a n n i n g process. According to t h e i r mutually agreed upon terms of r e f e r e n c e t h e i r mandate i s to provide p o l i c y l e v e l , consensus input i n t o p l a n n i n g . Given these a t t r i b u t e s , the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n a r i s e s i n connection with the Task Group's l e v e l of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s : Has the SETG (due to i t s long-term, consensus-seeking, and p o l i c y l e v e l nature) evolved to a l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n where the o b j e c t i v e s of the i n d i v i d u a l member i n t e r e s t s have been sublimated by the o b j e c t i v e s of the l a r g e r i n t e g r a t e d group? If the answer to t h i s s u b j e c t i v e q u e s t i o n i s yes, then i t may provide an e x p l a n a t i o n of why i t might be d i f f i c u l t f o r Task Group p a r t i c i p a n t s to communicate and j u s t i f y Task Group a c t i v i t i e s to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s . That i s , the o b j e c t i v e s and hence, the f u n c t i o n s of the o v e r a l l Task Group, d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the narrower and perhaps more s e l f -i n t e r e s t e d p e r c e p t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r c l i e n t groups. T h i s i s not to i n s i n u a t e that having an informed and c o h e s i v e body such as the SETG i s a negative t h i n g . On the 57 c o n t r a r y , i t i s d e s i r a b l e to have such a group ensuring i n c r e a s e d a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of government by c o n c e n t r a t i n g on b a s i c i s s u e s that i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t groups would not be motivated to pursue. The q u e s t i o n i s how to r e t a i n the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of the SETG and at the same time ensure that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t r u l y connected to the wider c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . C o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s q u e s t i o n i n terms of the theory developed p r e v i o u s l y , i s provided i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. The Salmonid Enhancement Board The p r i v a t e members of the SEB, as d i s t i n c t from the SETG, are not r e s p o n s i b l e to t h e i r a f f i l i a t e d user groups. "While i n d i v i d u a l members may have vested i n t e r e s t s i n the t h r u s t s of the Program, they have not been appointed to represent those s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s on the Board except i n s o f a r as they may c o i n c i d e with the o v e r a l l purpose of the Program." (SEB, 1978). Although the SEB mandate i s supposedly a l s o a d v i s o r y , i t operates from a p o s i t i o n that i s c o n s i d e r a b l y more i n f l u e n t i a l than that of the SETG. For a l l i n t e n t s and purposes, SEB judgements on Program a l l o c a t i o n can be c o n s i d e r e d as f i n a l implementation d e c i s i o n s s i n c e the two M i n i s t e r s have never opposed or a l t e r e d SEB recommendations. Two i s s u e s are evident with regard to the SEB and the c r i t e r i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s i n the SEP p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . The f i r s t i s sue concerns the q u e s t i o n of whether or not i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e that p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s are d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n what i s a p u b l i c decision-making f u n c t i o n . Haefele (1973, p.81) has w r i t t e n with regard to t h i s concern ( a l b e i t , not with 58 s p e c i f i c i t y to SEP). "So long as t e c h n i c a l committees and ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' i s a d v i s o r y , much good can be accomplished. When however, the a d v i s o r s become the p o l i c y makers.;.or when .they are used to give the appearance of ' p u b l i c ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the d e c i s i o n process...a d i f f e r e n t i s s u e a r i s e s " . H a e f e l e ' s primary concern here i s that decision-making by p o l i t i c a l l y non-accountable i n d i v i d u a l s , and e s p e c i a l l y by those whose i n t e r e s t s are p o t e n t i a l l y vested, i s c l e a r l y undemocratic. T h i s apparent d i s r e g a r d of democratic prec e p t s may ( i n the case of SEP) be compensated by the f a c t that the SEB i s c h a i r e d by the Deputy M i n i s t e r of DFO and i s composed of other h i g h -ranking government o f f i c i a l s , who may be c o n s i d e r e d as l e g i t i m a t e decision-making d e l e g a t e s of the two r e s p o n s i b l e M i n i s t e r s . I r o n i c a l l y , t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t government r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the SEB g i v e s r i s e to the second issue r e g a r d i n g the c r i t e r i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s . C l e a r l y , these s e n i o r government o f f i c i a l s should be c e n t r a l l y a c t i v e i n the management of SEP. But, i s i t a p p r o p r i a t e that they p a r t i c i p a t e as l e a d i n g members of what i s o s t e n s i b l y an o b j e c t i v e a d v i s o r y body? I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e that heavy government r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the SEB c o u l d i n f l u e n c e recommendations that might be s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t than i f government r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was excluded from the SEB. In sh o r t , the key q u e s t i o n i s , should the proponent agencies be p r o v i d i n g a d v i c e to themselves, routed through an a d v i s o r y mechanism? These comments are not without b a s i s . C r i t i c i s m s have been l e v e l l e d by some SEP p l a n n i n g s t a f f and have been i n s i n u a t e d by the SETG that s e n i o r bureaucrats have "hoodwinked" the SEB and that t h e i r concepts have been " r a i l r o a d e d through", c a s t i n g 59 s u s p i c i o n that SEB d e c i s i o n s are not always t r u l y r e f l e c t i v e of o b j e c t i v e d e l i b e r a t i o n . Those SEB members int e r v i e w e d however, were of the f e e l i n g that there was adequate o p p o r t u n i t y f o r due d e l i b e r a t i o n . P o t e n t i a l improvements to SEP p l a n n i n g in connection with these two i s s u e s surrounding the f u n c t i o n of the SEB, are d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . I n d i c a t o r 1-2: T r a n s a c t i o n Costs of P a r t i c i p a t i o n A l l SETG and SEB f u n c t i o n s occur at no economic expense to to p a r t i c i p a n t s . The o p e r a t i n g budgets of the SETG and the SEB i n 1979/80 r e s p e c t i v e l y were $68,525 and $11,832; a l l of which was "picked-up" by government. In t h i s sense, SEP has overcome a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n of these groups' t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s which were i d e n t i f i e d e a r l i e r as a prime component of the " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem". Obviously, these groups would not e x i s t i f t h i s "subsidy" was not i n e f f e c t . Members do however', c o n t r i b u t e a c o n s i d e r a b l e p o r t i o n of t h e i r p e r s o n a l time to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n these a d v i s o r y groups. I t i s probable that p e r s o n a l ideology and a l s o perhaps the p r e s t i g e of being i n v o l v e d i n these r e l a t i v e l y h i g h l y regarded and p o t e n t i a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l groups, provide the necessary m o t i v a t i o n f o r i n d i v i d u a l s to give up t h e i r time. I n d i c a t o r 1-3: A Forum f o r R e p r e s e n t a t i o n The very e x i s t e n c e of both the SETG and the SEB permits arid encourages a forum for s t r u c t u r e d d i s c u s s i o n that otherwise would not occur. Regular meetings are h e l d by both groups and 60 about once a year the SETG and the SEB meet j o i n t l y . SEP s t a f f p a r t i c i p a t e at a l l meetings, e i t h e r to present i n f o r m a t i o n or to be a v a i l a b l e f o r q u e s t i o n s . Attendance by Task Group and SEB members i s g e n e r a l l y good at a l l meetings as i s evident from SETG and SEB minutes. The smooth running of the Task Group o p e r a t i o n s i s f a c i l i t a t e d by an e x e c u t i v e s e c r e t a r y who takes care of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e t a i l s and i n f o r m a t i o n d i s p e r s a l to members. A l l members of the SETG appear to have adequate o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n d i s c u s s i o n s , although the SETG has been m i l d l y c r i t i c i z e d as being dominated by the s p o r t s f i s h i n g f r a t e r n i t y . N a t u r a l l y , the nature of i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s has a great deal to do with the "vocalness" of both SETG and SEB p a r t i c i p a n t s . R e s t r u c t u r i n g of the a d v i s o r y f u n c t i o n s to encourage l i a i s o n with the "wider c o n s t i t u e n c i e s " c o u l d perhaps f u r t h e r enhance the l e v e l to which a forum f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e x i s t s . The e x i s t e n c e of a good forum f o r a d v i s o r y input does not however, ensure that i n t e r e s t s w i l l be represented e f f e c t i v e l y . E f f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i l l a l s o depend on involvement of i n t e r e s t s at a l l stages of the p l a n n i n g process ( i . e . d u r i n g problem i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s , e v a l u a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s , and implementation). Our t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e of p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior i n d i c a t e s why t h i s i s necessary. A n a l y s i s of the SEP p l a n n i n g process however, shows that the SETG i s not i n v o l v e d u n t i l annual plans have a l r e a d y been c o n c e p t u a l i z e d and e v a l u a t e d . I t i s only at t h i s p o i n t that the 61 Task Group i s asked to input i n t o the p l a n n i n g process, by responding to p l a n s . T h i s has c o n t r i b u t e d to the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i s group as shown in the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . E f f e c t i v e n e s s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a l s o c l o s e l y l i n k e d to the type of i n f o r m a t i o n that i s a v a i l a b l e to i n t e r e s t s . T h i s i s i n v e s t i g a t e d i n r e l a t i o n to SEP p l a n n i n g under the second c r i t e r i o n of e v a l u a t i o n . I n d i c a t o r 1-4: E f f e c t i v e n e s s of R e p r e s e n t a t i o n I t i s a r e s p o n s i b l i t y of SEP planners to c o n c e p t u a l i z e the p o l i c y concerns of the Program's a d v i s o r y bodies i n t o implementation s t r a t e g i e s . T h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s i n keeping with the Program's s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e to be, "...a process that w i l l be r e s p o n s i v e to the l e g i t i m a t e and changing needs of people and to the t a r g e t s of government...". ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.23). The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with what one would expect from a planning process that i s s i n c e r e i n i t s commitment to p u b l i c input i n t o decision-making. Three p o l i c y l e v e l concerns of the SETG which have been c l e a r l y conveyed to SEP planners and the SEB, and which can be r e a d i l y "separated-out" of annual budget a l l o c a t i o n s f o r a n a l y s i s a r e : (a) p u b l i c involvement i n a c t u a l f i s h p r o d u c t i o n (b) community development p r o j e c t s (c) small stream enhancement The SETG has e m p h a t i c a l l y recommended that i n c r e a s e d funding be made a v a i l a b l e to these three enhancement a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s evident however, that d e s p i t e Task Group r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , the cumulative p r o p o r t i o n of annual budgets a l l o c a t e d to these 62 three a c t i v i t i e s has over time, (with the exce p t i o n of one y e a r ) , shown a gradual d e c l i n e . A l l o c a t i o n s to these c a t e g o r i e s f o r the remainder of Phase 1, are p r o j e c t e d to d e c l i n e f u r t h e r . (Table 1). A main reason f o r t h i s apparent i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the SETG i s that the "agenda" f o r SEP was set e a r l y - o n , i n the days when the " o v e r a l l SEP p l a n " and i t s s t a g i n g was agreed to by Cabinet. In order to meet the Phase 1 p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s , ( i . e . to produce an incremental 50 m i l l i o n pounds of salmonids at no cost to government) an emphasis of r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e and e f f i c i e n t p r o j e c t s of economic s c a l e has been necessary. A consequence of t h i s emphasis i s that not only are these p r o j e c t s c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e , but as Phase 1 pro g r e s s e s , they consume an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of annual SEP budgets f o r t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s and maintenance. A c c o r d i n g l y , d i s c r e t i o n to a l l o c a t e funds to SETG p r i o r i t i e s i s i n h i b i t e d . The present i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s emphasis on major pr o d u c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s i s that SEP's a d v i s o r y groups cannot expect to be very e f f e c t i v e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the remainder of Phase 1 p l a n n i n g . There i s no apparent reason to expect an improvement i n t h e i r l e v e l of e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n Phase 2 unless there i s a change in the p r i o r i t i e s of SEP d i r e c t i o n . As ye t , no f i r m commitments regarding Program d i r e c t i o n f o r Phase 2 have been made. In d e s i g n i n g an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e that can ensure a d v i s o r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s , i t i s evident then, that p u b l i c input must occur e a r l y i n the p l a n n i n g process, before the "agenda" i s s e t . For example, the involvement of a SETG in the o r i g i n a l T a b l e 1 SPECIAL PROJECTS UNIT FUNDING AS A PROPORTION OF SEP BUDGETS Enhancement A c t i v i t y , F i s c a l Y e a r 1977 /78 7 8 / 7 9 7 9 / 8 0 8 0 / 8 1 8 1 / 8 2 8 2 / 8 3 8 3 / 8 4 P u b l i c I n v o l v e m e n t Communi ty Deve lopment P r o j e c t s S m a l l S t r e a m Enhancement 5.6% 5.0% 2.5% 4 .2% 9.8% . 2.6% 2.6% 9.9% 2 .9% 2.5% 8.6% 3 .1% 2 .3% 8 .5% 2.9% 2 .3% 8 . 1 % 2.7% .01% 7.3% 1.4% 13.1% 16.6% 15.4% 14.2% 13.7% 13 .1% 8.7% S o u r c e : A c t u a l and p r o p o s e d budget f l o w as p r e s e n t e d t o t h e S . E . B . f o r t h e 1 9 8 0 / 8 1 and 8 1 / 8 2 Program P r o p o s a l s . 0~\ f .64. p l a n n i n g f o r SEP may have r e s u l t e d in a plan n i n g process capable of g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y ( i . e decreased emphasis on the economic o b j e c t i v e ) . With t h i s i n mind, a d v i s o r y input at the outset of Phase 2 planning and development appears most d e s i r a b l e . Apart from the problem of d e c l i n i n g d i s c r e t i o n a r y funds, there, appear to be two other p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r why Task Group recommendations are not always acted upon by SEP. The f i r s t r e l a t e s to an i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n Task Group recommendations. While advocating that g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n should be given to s m a l l - s c a l e " n a t u r a l i s t i c " p r o j e c t s , the Task Group a l s o s t r o n g l y recommends that a program to recover the implementation c o s t s of SEP should proceed. However, before c o s t - r e c o v e r y can occur, the b e n e f i t s of SEP must be g r e a t e r than or equal to the c o s t s of p r o v i d i n g SEP. The ec o n o m i c a l l y e f f i c i e n t c l a s s of major p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s are t h e o r e t i c a l l y , the most capable of c o n t r i b u t i n g to the s u c c e s s f u l implementation of c o s t -recovery. An e x c e s s i v e p r o p o r t i o n of l e s s economically e f f i c i e n t s m a l l - s c a l e p r o j e c t s would j e a p o r d i z e the v i a b i l i t y of c o s t -recovery . The second reason why Task Group recommendations are not always acted upon by SEP r e l a t e s to the "scope" of Task Group comments. Many of the Task Group's p o l i c y recommendations r e l a t e to i s s u e s c u r r e n t l y o u t s i d e the mandate of SEP. For example, the Task Group has r e g u l a r l y a dvised on such t h i n g s as the need f o r i n t e g r a t e d resource management, f o r b e t t e r h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n , and the need f o r an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i s h e r i e s agreement with the U.S. 65 While these suggestions are unquestionably germane to salmonid enhancement, they are o u t s i d e of the Program's s i n g u l a r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and are c o n s i d e r e d by the SEB to be p e r i p h e r a l to what the Task Group's concerns ought to be. (SEB, 1979). In t h i s regard, the o b j e c t i v e s and p r i o r i t i e s of the SETG, and hence, t h e i r recommendations are much wider i n scope than t h i s one Program can accommodate. There i s no apparent reason however, why SEP s t a f f should not set-up channels f o r t r a n s m i t t i n g the wider concerns of the SETG ( i . e . concerns that are not the e x p l i c i t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of SEP), to those groups i n DFO that are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . So long as Task Group inputs r e l a t e to the salmonid resource, i t seems unreasonable to suggest, as the SEB (1979) has done, what the SETG's concerns ought and ought not to be. The above d i s c u s s i o n i s not meant to imply that the SETG has been completely i n e f f e c t u a l i n Phase 1 p l a n n i n g . On the c o n t r a r y , the SETG appears to have had some degree of i n f l u e n c e in shaping the Program. For example, the p r o p o r t i o n of annual budgets proposed o r i g i n a l l y f o r a l l o c a t i o n to the types of p r o j e c t s that the SETG supports, was only i n the 6-8% range. ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.16). Table 1 however, shows that a c t u a l and proposed a l l o c a t i o n s are as much as two times g r e a t e r than p r o p o r t i o n s earmarked o r i g i n a l l y . The f e e l i n g by many p a r t i c i p a n t s i s that SEP would be a s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t Program, with an even g r e a t e r emphasis on major p r o d u c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s , i f the SETG. d i d not e x i s t . 66 I n d i c a t o r 1-5: Representation of the "General I n t e r e s t " P u b l i c expenditure programs face the d i f f i c u l t y of p r o t e c t i n g the i n t e r e s t of the general p u b l i c v i s a v i s the vest e d i n t e r e s t . In some r e s p e c t s , SEP has attempted to take account of t h i s d i f f i c u l t p o l i c y i s s u e . From the ou t s e t , the Program has s u b s c r i b e d to the philosophy that general tax d o l l a r s should not be d i r e c t e d at only a few b e n e f i c i a r i e s . To t h i s end, c o n s i d e r a b l e study has gone i n t o how a p o r t i o n of the in c r e a s e d economic rent that i s a n t i c i p a t e d to flow from SEP can be re-captured to pay the c o s t s of Program implementation. "The consequences of not r e c o v e r i n g c o s t s would be the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s i z e a b l e w i n d f a l l gains to a few fishermen and p r o c e s s o r s at p u b l i c expense." ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.55). Cost - r e c o v e r y however, has not yet been implemented. One reason f o r t h i s delay i s that measurable net b e n e f i t s from SEP ( i . e . the i n c r e a s e d economic rent) are not yet apparent. Understandably, i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to expect fishermen to pay f o r something which they have not yet r e c e i v e d . It i s recognized however, that by some groups' standards i t may never be a p p r o p r i a t e to implement c o s t - r e c o v e r y . T h i s may be p a r t i c u l a r i l y true i f the b e n e f i t s from SEP are not c l e a r l y enumerable. For example, SEP pr o d u c t i o n began to come o n - l i n e i n 1980. T h i s same year however, was the worst year f o r fishermen in decades. I t would very l i k e l y have been unacceptable to most i n t e r e s t s that year, to have had to pay c o s t - r e c o v e r y , even c o n s i d e r i n g that catches would have been even lower without SEP. It i s probable t h e r e f o r e , that c o s t - r e c o v e r y w i l l have a chance of success only i f there are indeed i d e n t i f i a b l e and s i g n i f i c a n t 67 w i n d f a l l gains to fishermen and p r o c e s s o r s . T h i s c o n d i t i o n w i l l r e q u i r e : ( i ) p r o t e c t i o n of the n a t u r a l f i s h e r i e s base so that SEP's augmentation e f f o r t s are not o f f s e t by a l o s s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y of the stocks we a l r e a d y have, and ( i i ) r e s t r a i n t on c a p i t a l investment i n t o the f i s h e r y so that i n c r e a s e d economic rent a t t r i b u t a b l e to SEP i s not d i s s i p a t e d . Lowi's (1974) argument however, prov i d e s an e x p l a n a t i o n of why c o s t - r e c o v e r y w i l l perhaps never be implemented, even i f such a scheme i s completely p r a c t i c a b l e . That i s , i t i s simply e a s i e r p o l i t i c a l l y to d i v e r t tax funds from the unorganized g e n e r a l p u b l i c to s a t i s f y the more inte n s e demands of organized c l i e n t s , than v i c e v e r s a . Despite such reasoning, i t appears at present that many SEP c l i e n t groups support the p r i n c i p l e of "f i n n a g e " . Perhaps t h i s support stems from a r e a l i z a t i o n that demand f o r salmon i s very high and expected to stay that way, and t h e r e f o r e , the co s t of "fin n a g e " can be simply passed-on to the consumer, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t i n g p r o f i t margins. 68 (B) Government I n t e r e s t s i n SEP Planning 1. P r o v i n c i a l agencies There are a number of P r o v i n c i a l government agencies whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a f f e c t , or are a f f e c t e d by, SEP d e c i s i o n s . The q u e s t i o n here i s whether or not SEP p l a n n i n g i s c o o r d i n a t e d with these i n t e r e s t s i n an e f f o r t to reduce p o t e n t i a l f u t u r e resource use c o n f l i c t s i n s p e c i f i c watersheds. T h i s q u e s t i o n i s r e c o g n i z a b l e as at the heart of the philosophy of i n t e g r a t e d resources management; a concept always p r a i s e d but seldom implemented, p r i m a r i l y because of the single-purposeness of most resource management agencies. In f a c t , the SEP goal to double f i s h p r o d u c t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h i s v e r t i c a l alignment of i n t e r e s t s . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g then, that a formal i n s t i t u t i o n a l mechanism does not e x i s t to i n t e g r a t e these r e l a t e d agency i n t e r e s t s i n t o SEP p l a n n i n g . As d e s i r a b l e as i t might seem, i t i s o u t s i d e the mandate of DFO, and more p a r t i c u l a r i l y the narrow SEP terms of r e f e r e n c e , to l e a d B.C. to an e x p l i c i t l y i n t e g r a t e d s t y l e of resource management. I t i s however, a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l of magnitude to expect SEP to introduce i n t e g r a t e d resource management to a l l of B.C., than to expect i t to t r y to p r o t e c t i t s investments by t a k i n g account of the p o t e n t i a l negative impacts on enhancment a c t i v i t i e s caused by other resource users that are r e g u l a t e d by P r o v i n c i a l a g encies. For example, f o r e s t h a r v e s t i n g or m u n i c i p a l development may damage f i s h h a b i t a t that i s v i t a l to the p r o d u c t i v i t y of a SEP p r o j e c t . C u r r e n t l y , two mechanisms are i n use which, to some extent, 69 ensure i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l resource use c o n f l i c t s . F i r s t l y , a l l SEP p r o j e c t s that i n v o l v e the development of P r o v i n c i a l lands are s u b j e c t to the t r a d i t i o n a l r e f e r r a l process among p o t e n t i a l l y a f f e c t e d agencies (Morley, p e r s . comm.). T h i s p r a c t i c e serves to i n d i c a t e where the more immediate c o n f l i c t s might a r i s e . Secondly, c o n s i d e r a t i o n of some c o n f l i c t i n g P r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s i s met, at the p o l i c y l e v e l , through P r o v i n c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the SEB and the SEP Management Committee. There are however, two reasons to suggest that these mechanisms are i n s u f f i c i e n t methods of i n t e g r a t i n g P r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s i n t o SEP p l a n n i n g . F i r s t - o f f , not a l l p r o j e c t s are s u b j e c t to r e f e r r a l ; and even i f a r e f e r r a l i s made, agreement i s not n e c e s s a r i l y forthcoming that f u t u r e c o n f l i c t s w i l l not a r i s e . Secondly, not a l l P r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s are represented at the p o l i c y l e v e l of Program p l a n n i n g . Although the M i n i s t r y of Environment i s w e l l - r e p r e s e n t e d on the SEB, t h i s i n t e r e s t cannot be expected to speak f o r other p o t e n t i a l l y a f f e c t e d agencies such as the M i n i s t r i e s of F o r e s t s , A g r i c u l t u r e , M u n i c i p a l A f f a i r s , Lands Parks and Housing, B.C. Hydro, e t c . Although the F i s h e r i e s Act i t s e l f may be a s i g n i f i c a n t d e t e r r e n t to a c t i v i t i e s harmful to salmonids, i t has not i n the past, shown i t s e l f to be p a r t i c u l a r i l y e f f e c t i v e i n c o n s e r v i n g the salmonid resource. In l i g h t of the above, i t i s suggested that more e x p l i c i t c o o r d i n a t i o n of P r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s with SEP p l a n n i n g would be d e s i r a b l e , not only to h e l p p r o t e c t the long term e f f e c t i v e n e s s of SEP investments, but a l s o to ensure that SEP does not impose 70 unreasonable c o s t s on other resource i n t e r e s t s . A suggestion that could p o t e n t i a l l y promote t h i s c o o r d i n a t i o n i s o u t l i n e d i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. In viewing the l i k e l i h o o d that resource i n t e r a c t i o n c o n f l i c t s w i l l undoubtedly increase i n number and magnitude, SEP should be t a k i n g f u r t h e r steps to pr o t e c t i t s investments. Day to day resource use d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v i n g c o n f l i c t i n g resource i n t e r e s t s , are c u r r e n t l y made through a r e l a t i v e l y informal process of bargaining among various r e g u l a t o r y agencies and p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s . (Dorcey et a l , 1980). A c c o r d i n g l y , SEP should develop d e f i n i t e watershed s t r a t e g i e s to which i t can r e f e r , to strengthen i t s bargaining p o s i t i o n . Such s t r a t e g i e s would mean the formulation of s t r a t e g i c p lans, o u t l i n i n g f o r each drainage, manageable production t a r g e t s , a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s f o r a t t a i n i n g these t a r g e t s , and the costs and b e n e f i t s (economic and non-economic) a n t i c i p a t e d to flow from the plans. (Dorcey et a l , 1980). Although such plans should be constructed from a " f i s h e r i e s p e r s p e c t i v e " , they should not ignore other watershed i n t e r e s t s . ( P a i s h , 1980). 2. Other components of f i s h e r i e s management Indeed, SEP subscribes to the idea of s t r a t e g i c watershed planning and a l s o perceives the need to consider other watershed i n t e r e s t s i n such plans. Studies have been commissioned by SEP to look at f i s h e r i e s / f o r e s t r y i n t e r a c t i o n s (see Sydneysmith, 1979), and a l s o the o v e r a l l question of cooperative watershed planning (see P a i s h , 1980). C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of such plans however, i s f r u s t r a t e d by the r e l a t i v e " i s o l a t i o n " of SEP from the other two main 71 dimensions of salmonid resource management ( i . e . h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n and regulation/management). I d e a l l y , changes i n stock and f l e e t management p r a c t i c e s and i n c r e a s e d enforcement and h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n would be i n t e g r a t e d c o n c u r r e n t l y with enhancement, as complementary s t r a t e g i e s to o b t a i n p r o d u c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s , as l a i d out in s t r a t e g i c p l a n s . " C l e a r l y , enhancement out of context with the r e s t of f i s h e r i e s and h a b i t a t management w i l l r e s u l t in a t r a n s f e r of p r o d u c t i o n from low c o s t n a t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n to h i g h cost a r t i f i c i a l p r o d u c t i o n , with l i t t l e or no i n c r e a s e i n ( o v e r a l l ) p r o d u c t i o n " . (DFO, 1980(a) p.2). Recognizing the n e c e s s i t y of t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s , SEP p l a n n i n g has "nurtured" the GWG mechanism. Each GWG s e t s p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s f o r i t s r e s p e c t i v e region and are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a s s u r i n g that before a SEP p r o j e c t i s implemented, i t s f i s h p r o d u c t i o n i s manageable. Although these groups i n i t i a l l y e xperienced c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t y i n meeting these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , they are r e p o r t e d now to be i n c r e a s i n g l y e f f e c t i v e i n p r o v i d i n g SEP with a d v i c e on manageability i s s u e s . To t h i s end, the SEP b i o l o g i c a l p l a n n i n g u n i t maintains c l o s e l i a i s o n with GWG's. A l s o , SEP funds a number of manageability s t u d i e s to t r y to ensure that managers have the i n f o r m a t i o n necessary to p r o p e r l y r e g u l a t e f i s h e r i e s that i n c l u d e enhanced s t o c k s . A second way which, to some extent, b r i n g s the wider i n t e g r a t i o n of i n t e r n a l DFO f u n c t i o n s i n t o SEP planning i s the involvement of the Salmon Resource Board. T h i s group, composed of s e n i o r DFO personnel ( i n c l u d i n g s t a f f from h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n and management/regulation), review annual SEP plans p r i o r t o t h e i r implementation. 72 Given these i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e v i c e s , i t i s evident that i n s p i t e of SEP's r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d mandate, e f f o r t s are being made by Program planners to improve i n t e g r a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s . Recently (1981), a pl a n n i n g f u n c t i o n has been i n i t i a t e d f o r the e n t i r e P a c i f i c region of DFG" to t r y to c o o r d i n a t e the m u l t i p l e dimensions of f i s h e r i e s management. Although no a d d i t i o n a l funds have yet been a l l o c a t e d f o r i n c r e a s e s i n h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n or management, t h i s body should i n the f u t u r e , a s s i s t i n p u t t i n g SEP i n t o balance with an i n t e g r a t e d r e g i o n a l salmonid management p l a n . T h i s hope i s i n c r e a s e d by the appointment to t h i s p o s i t i o n of the previous d i r e c t o r of SEP planning -- an i n d i v i d u a l keenly aware of the need to take a wider outlook than that to which SEP a s p i r e d i n i t i a l l y . 73 I I . ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION FOR DECISION-MAKING The ' systematic generation of r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n i s c e n t r a l to p l a n n i n g . The two key words here are "systema t i c " and " r e l e v a n t " . F i r s t , we w i l l c o n s i d e r what c o n s t i t u t e s r e l e v a n t informat i o n . (a) Relevancy i s determined by the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the pl a n n i n g problem at hand and a l s o by the o b j e c t i v e s of the p r o j e c t or program. SEP a s p i r e s to meet c e r t a i n s p a t i a l and temporal p r o d u c t i o n and s p e c i e s balance t a r g e t s which i n turn are capable of c o n t r i b u t i n g to a m u l t i p l i c i t y of broader n a t i o n a l g o a l s . T h e r e f o r e , i n f o r m a t i o n that i s r e l e v a n t to SEP pl a n n i n g must l o g i c a l l y i n c l u d e : ( i ) d e t e r m i n a t i o n and a n a l y s i s of a l t e r n a t i v e enhancement p r o j e c t s that are capable of c o n t r i b u t i n g to the t a r g e t s . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e s p r i m a r i l y to the t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t s . ( i i ) f o r m u l a t i o n and a n a l y s i s of a l t e r n a t i v e mixes of enhancement p r o j e c t s ( i . e . a l t e r n a t i v e annual plans) to determine t h e i r r e l a t i v e l e v e l s of c o n t r i b u t i o n to the n a t i o n a l g o a l s . The important c a t e g o r i e s of in f o r m a t i o n to be generated at t h i s l e v e l are the p e r c e i v e d economic, s o c i a l , and environmental consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e annual p l a n s , s i n c e these r e f l e c t the goals of the Program. These estimated impacts should be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t o terms that are meaningful to p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t e r e s t s so that each may determine i n t e l l i g e n t l y where i t s s e l f - i n t e r e s t l i e s , thereby enhancing r e a l i s t i c n e g o t i a t i o n among i n t e r e s t s . (b) The systematic -documentation of e v a l u a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n i s co n s i d e r e d important to f a c i l i t a t e communication and understanding of the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s of a l t e r n a t i v e s , and a l s o to permit easy comparison of the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s among a l t e r n a t i v e s . The preceding d i s c u s s i o n suggests that the f o l l o w i n g 74 qu e s t i o n s are p e r t i n e n t as i n d i c a t o r s of whether or not the in f o r m a t i o n that i s generated f o r SEP planning i s adequate. I n d i c a t o r I I - l : Development and T e c h n i c a l E v a l u a t i o n of P r o j e c t  Options The development of s u r p l u s f e a s i b l e enhancement op t i o n s i s d e s i r a b l e so that SEP has the op p o r t u n i t y to enhance the p o t e n t i a l f o r choice i n i t s o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n . Are a l t e r n a t i v e enhancement o p t i o n s that f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t the d i f f e r i n g p e r c e p t i o n s of the v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s being c o n t i n u o u s l y i d e n t i f i e d and evaluated f o r t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y and p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s ? I n d i c a t o r I I - 2 : Formulation and E v a l u a t i o n of A l t e r n a t i v e Annual  Enhancement Plans Are a l t e r n a t i v e mixes of i n d i v i d u a l enhancement p r o j e c t s ( i . e . annual expenditure plans) formulated and evaluated f o r t h e i r r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to Program goals? Are a l l three c a t e g o r i e s of b a s i c i n f o r m a t i o n ( i . e . economic, s o c i a l , and environmental e f f e c t s ) generated in t h i s e v a l u a t i o n ? Furthermore, does t h i s e v a l u a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n permit ease of comparison of the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s among a l t e r n a t i v e plans ( i . e . t r a d e o f f s ) ? I n d i c a t o r 11-3: Incidence of E f f e c t s Does the e v a l u a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n o u t l i n e f o r each a l t e r n a t i v e what s o c i a l groups w i l l r e c e i v e the a n t i c i p a t e d b e n e f i t s or c o s t s ? When the p e r c e i v e d consequences of a proposed a l t e r n a t i v e are i n t e r p r e t e d i n t o t a n g i b l e "end s t a t e s " that are of r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e to p a r t i c u l a r groups, decision-making i s enhanced. ( M c A l l i s t e r , 1980). I n d i c a t o r I I - 4 : Communication of Information Is e v a l u a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n communicated e f f e c t i v e l y among process p a r t i c i p a n t s ? ( i . e . Is there time f o r a s s i m i l a t i o n and d i s c u s s i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n p r i o r to a c t u a l d e c i s i o n -making? Is the in f o r m a t i o n comprehensible to n o n - t e c h n i c a l p a r t i c i p a n t s ) ? I n d i c a t o r 11-5: C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the "Information Problem" Information judged to be r e l e v a n t by a l l p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t e r e s t s i s necessary so that the b a r g a i n i n g inherent in the decision-making process i s not dominated by a p a r t i c u l a r viewpoint, by v i r t u e of the e f f e c t i v e e x c l u s i o n 75 of a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g viewpoint. R e c a l l that i f i n t e r e s t s might want to generate some independent i n f o r m a t i o n to s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e i r p o s i t i o n , there are two b a s i c o b s t a c l e s to the generation of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n : i n f o r m a t i o n c o s t s and "monopoly" over i n f o r m a t i o n . Is i t a p p r o p r i a t e that SEP p l a n n i n g should engage in any a c t i v i t i e s to h e l p overcome t h i s " i n f o r m a t i o n problem"? R e c a l l a l s o that an a c t i v e as opposed to r e a c t i v e approach i s a p r e f e r r e d s t r a t e g y f o r d e a l i n g with the issue of u n c e r t a i n t y . As a component of the " i n f o r m a t i o n problem", does SEP a c t i v e l y take steps to d e a l with u n c e r t a i n t y ? The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n a p p l i e s the f i v e above " i n d i c a t o r q u e s t i o n s " to the SEP p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . I n d i c a t o r 11-1: Development and T e c h n i c a l E v a l u a t i o n of P r o j e c t  Options Three b a s i c inadequacies of the SEP p l a n n i n g process are apparent i n connection with t h i s i n d i c a t o r . 1. Too few o p t i o n s It appears that not enough p r o j e c t o p t i o n s are being c u r r e n t l y developed by SEP to s a t i s f y a d e s i r a b l e r a t i o of "option development to o p t i o n use". A recent SEP p l a n n i n g d i s c u s s i o n paper s t a t e s t h a t : "At present, we f i n d o u r s e l v e s i n the s i t u a t i o n of having to take a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n s rather than being able to s e l e c t from an a r r a y of proven o p t i o n s " . (DFO, 1980(a) p.27). C o n s i d e r a t i o n of our theory however, r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of whether or not i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r SEP to array f o r c h o i c e the spectrum of p r o j e c t s that f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t s the d i f f e r i n g p e r c e p t i o n s of the v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s . P r o j e c t s c o n c e p t u a l i z e d by SEP w i l l always r e f l e c t the inherent b i a s of that o r g a n i z a t i o n , unless there are o p p o r t u n i t i e s and i n c e n t i v e s f o r planners to be i n f l u e n c e d by the d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s . 76 The primary i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s i s that some i n t e r e s t s may be unaware of the o p p o r t u n i t i e s p o t e n t i a l l y a v a i l a b l e to s a t i s f y t h e i r concerns, and thus, w i l l be unabie to enter the d e c i s i o n process in a s i g n i f i c a n t way. T h i s i s a fundamental o b s t a c l e to democratic decision-making that r e q u i r e s i n s t i t u t i o n a l change i f i t i s to be overcome. Another problem with an i n s u f f i c i e n t number of o p t i o n s i s the p o t e n t i a l that t h i s s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e s f o r hasty implementation of inadequately proven o p t i o n s . The n e c e s s i t y to "go with something" might r e s u l t in the o v e r s i g h t of c r i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n or the f o r e c l o s u r e of a d i f f e r e n t and p o t e n t i a l l y b e t t e r course of a c t i o n . 2. E v a l u a t i o n f o r t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y As d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter Four, p r o j e c t development i s determined by the t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a of " e n h a n c e a b i l i t y " , " d e s i r a b i l i t y " , and "manageability", i n that  order. Only those p r o j e c t s that are c o n s i d e r e d both enhanceable and d e s i r a b l e are forwarded f o r e v a l u a t i o n a g a i n s t the manageability c r i t e r i o n . The past tendency however, has been to b u i l d a p r o j e c t and then t r y to determine a c c e p t a b l e management s t r a t e g i e s f o r h a r v e s t i n g the i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n (DFO, 1980(a)). Resultant m a n a g e a b i l i t y problems are exacerbated by the temptation to "scale-up" p r o j e c t p r o p o s a l s in search of economic j u s t i f i c a t i o n at the d e s i r a b i l i t y stage. The reasons that have been given f o r c o n s i d e r i n g these three c r i t e r i a in t h i s order are that e n h a n c e a b i l i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s can move f a s t e r than the others and because 77 manageability c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are vested i n a non-SEP group ( i . e . the GWG's) with a d i f f e r e n t p r i o r i t y s t r u c t u r e . (DFO, 1980(a)). An a d d i t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s p r a c t i c e appears to a r i s e i n p a r t , out of p e r c e p t u a l and a t t i t u d i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s of the key a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n p r o j e c t development. The GWG's are composed of b i o l o g i s t s . The SEP planni n g personnel with which the GWG's are. in c l o s e s t c o n t a c t are a l s o b i o l o g i s t s . T y p i c a l l y , t h i s p r o f e s s i o n i s c a u t i o u s i n t h e i r approach to n a t u r a l systems d i s t u r b a n c e . T h e i r work i s complicated with c o m p l e x i t i e s and p a r t i c u l a r i l y by u n c e r t a i n t i e s . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s group has been r e l a t i v e l y h e s i t a n t to take the lead in watershed p l a n n i n g . The e n g i n e e r i n g component of SEP however, f a c i n g l e s s u n c e r t a i n t y i n t h e i r r o l e , and eager to get on with the job of producing f i s h , have not been so h e s i t a n t to take the l e a d . T y p i c a l of the eng i n e e r i n g p r o f e s s i o n , t h e i r enhancement pr o p o s a l s have focussed on the design and c o n s t r u c t i o n of f a c i l i t i e s . With t h e i r plans "ready to go" t h i s group has i n the past, o f t e n sought funding approval with the manageability issue not yet f u l l y r e s o l v e d . A proposed a l t e r n a t i v e to c u r r e n t p r o j e c t development, which recognizes the reasons why p r o j e c t s have i n the past, been ev a l u a t e d using t h i s sequence, i s to expose p r o p o s a l s to the manag e a b i l i t y and d e s i r a b i l i t y c r i t e r i a p r i o r t o e v a l u a t i o n f o r e n h a n c e a b i l i t y , with a p p r o p r i a t e feedbacks. ( F i g . 2 ) . A more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p o t e n t i a l l y improved arrangement i s co n t a i n e d i n a document e n t i t l e d , "SEP Planning D i s c u s s i o n Paper" (DFO, 1980(a)). S u f f i c e i t t o say here that the primary Figure 2 SEP PLANNING PROCESS--PROPOSED IMPROVEMENT GWG's set general production targets by species and area that are manageable. • SEP Planning staff to coordinate (i) specific production targets ( i i ) suitable project optionsfor scale/technology. T Reconnaissance in target areas in search and development of opportunities consistent with pre-set production targets. • SEP Planning staff reviews these options for "desirability" i.e.-establish cost limits -evaluate project risk -evaluate project contribution to knowledge -evaluate rate of U.S. interception -evaluate option foreclosure T Feasibility studies by operational groups to determine "enhanceabi1ity". • Full 5 account evaluation of options. T SEP Planning staff prepares and evaluates alternative annual Program plans. T Internal and external plan review and selection. (SEP Management Committee, GWG's, Salmon Resource Board, SETG, SEB). T Modifications as necessary to Program plans. T Plan implementation. T Monitoring. NB. Iterative feedback to occur between all steps as required. Source: Adapted from DFO 1980(a). 79 value of such an arrangement c o u l d encourage more e x p l i c i t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the manageability i s s u e and i n c r e a s e d assurance that f u t u r e enhancement op t i o n s are not being f o r e c l o s e d upon. 3. E v a l u a t i o n of s m a l l - s c a l e p r o j e c t s The t h i r d inadequacy regarding t h i s " i n d i c a t o r " i s the f a i l u r e of SEP p l a n n i n g to evaluate a l l s m a l l - s c a l e p r o j e c t s at the a p p r o p r i a t e stage in the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . C u r r e n t l y , p r o j e c t s which cost over $500,000 are r e q u i r e d by Treasury Board to r e c e i v e a d e t a i l e d f i v e account e v a l u a t i o n . "Lesser p r o j e c t s " however, are u s u a l l y exempt from t h i s requirement, and are u s u a l l y only e v a l u a t e d a f t e r they have a l r e a d y been i n c l u d e d i n an annual p l a n , or p o s s i b l y a f t e r they are a l r e a d y i n o p e r a t i o n . The apparent reasons f o r t h i s " i n f o r m a l i t y " are t h a t , ( i ) q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of b e n e f i t s from these types of p r o j e c t s i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t , and ( i i ) most of these p r o j e c t s come under the umbrella of the S p e c i a l P r o j e c t s U n i t of SEP and are i n i t i a t e d f o r purposes of a c h i e v i n g the non-national income o b j e c t i v e s of the Program, and t h e r e f o r e , are not i n economic competition with other p r o j e c t s . The problem with not e v a l u a t i n g these p r o j e c t s at the a p p r o p r i a t e time however, i s that they do not r e c e i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r budget a l l o c a t i o n on the b a s i s of t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l m e r i t s . As p a r t of the S p e c i a l P r o j e c t s Unit they are a u t o m a t i c a l l y c o n s i d e r e d to be the uneconomic p o r t i o n of the Program that must be compensated f o r by the more economically e f f i c i e n t c l a s s of p r o j e c t s . Yet without e v a l u a t i o n i t cannot r e a l l y be known i f they are indeed "non-competitive" o p t i o n s . 80 A c c o r d i n g l y , they r e c e i v e u n e q u a l • c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . If proposed p r o j e c t s do not c o n t r i b u t e to Program o b j e c t i v e s , then that i n f o r m a t i o n should be known at the o u t s e t , so that m o d i f i e d options can be developed. A l s o , i f an i n t e r e s t i s p a r t i c u l a r i l y s u pportive of t h i s c l a s s of p r o j e c t s (as i s the SETG), i n f o r m a t i o n should be a v a i l a b l e to determine whether or not support i s warranted. In a d d i t i o n , i n the long run, SEP w i l l probably undertake p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y more s m a l l - s c a l e p r o j e c t s than l a r g e . That i s because there are probably fewer l a r g e - s c a l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s than there are small (DFO, 1980(a) p.15), and a l s o because the e a s i e s t and most economic enhancement "plums" have a l r e a d y been developed. (Swan, pers. comm.). T h i s means that u l t i m a t e l y , e v a l u a t i o n techniques w i l l be r e q u i r e d f o r these " l e s s e r p r o j e c t s " . SEP should take the c u r r e n t o p p o r t u n i t y to become p r o f i c i e n t i n these d i f f i c u l t a nalyses so that p l a n n i n g f o r Phase 2 a c t i v i t i e s i s not unduly r e t a r d e d . I n d i c a t o r I I - 2 : Formulation and E v a l u a t i o n of A l t e r n a t i v e Plans Using the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g framework, SEP each f i s c a l year, has c o n s t r u c t e d and e v a l u a t e d a l t e r n a t i v e enhancement expenditure p l a n s . Each a l t e r n a t i v e e i t h e r emphasizes one or more of the o b j e c t i v e s (i.e.. the maximization of p a r t i c u l a r accounts) or r e p r e s e n t s a compromise. Presented i n a matrix s t y l e , each expenditure plan b a s i c a l l y c o n t a i n s the f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n : (1) i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t performance i n each of the accounts f o r each p l a n . 81 (2) each plan's cumulative c o n t r i b u t i o n to Program o b j e c t i v e s and pro d u c t i o n and s p e c i e s balance t a r g e t s . (3) the t r a d e o f f s inherent i n and among p l a n s . C l e a r l y , there are a number of p o s i t i v e a t t r i b u t e s of the f i v e account s t y l e of a n a l y s i s which permits the s y n t h e s i s of t h i s b a s i c i n f o r m a t i o n : 1. The methodology p r o v i d e s e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n that e q u i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are o f t e n at a c o s t to economic e f f i c i e n c y , and co n v e r s e l y , that the p u r s u i t of economic e f f i c i e n c y i s o f t e n at the expense of other s o c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Such t r a d e o f f s are documented i n a f a s h i o n that r e l a t e s a c t u a l p r o j e c t s and plans to Program o b j e c t i v e s . (Fraser and F r i e d l a e n d e r , 1980). 2. Although i t i s not the i n t e n t here to c r i t i q u e the t e c h n i c a l aspects of account methodologies, there appear to be no apparent b i a s e s that would be r e f l e c t e d i n p r o j e c t s c o r e s . (Although the n a t i o n a l income account assumes investment r e s t r a i n t i n t o the f i s h e r y which, i f not forthcoming, c o u l d s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s e n the o v e r a l l economic e f f i c i e n c y of the Program). 3. There i s no attempt to mix economic with non-economic values as t r a d i t i o n a l c o s t - b e n e f i t techniques o f t e n do. 4. Not onl y does the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g methodology d e t a i l the impacts of i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t s , but i t reassembles the p a r t s back i n t o a comprehensible whole. In t h i s regard M c A l l i s t e r (1980) has suggested that there i s value i n e v a l u a t i o n methodologies that c o l l a p s e a complex l i s t of p o t e n t i a l impacts i n t o a few key and c o n c e p t u a l l y manageable c a t e g o r i e s of in f o r m a t i o n ( i . e . a score or a grand index) to which a simple c r i t e r i o n can be a p p l i e d f o r a c c e p t i n g or r e j e c t i n g the p r o p o s a l . On the other hand, there e x i s t s a s i g n i f i c a n t weakness with the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e framework t h a t i s not so much a c r i t i c i s m of the framework i t s e l f , as i t i s a c r i t i c i s m of the way that SEP has used i t . T h i s issue i s d i s c u s s e d b r i e f l y below. The essence of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e framework i s to a r t i c u l a t e the t r a d e o f f s among economic, s o c i a l and environmental o b j e c t i v e s that are inherent i n a l t e r n a t i v e development p r o p o s a l s . In t h i s regard, SEP has s t a t e d t h a t : 82 "Whether d i s t r i b u t i o n a l and q u a l i t y of l i f e gains are worth d o l l a r s foregone, i s , and must remain a matter fo r p o l i t i c a l r a t her than a n a l y t i c a l judgement". (Fraser and F r i e d l a e n d e r , 1980 p.8). A s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n however, made at the outset of the Program, has a f f e c t e d the f l e x i b i l i t y of subsequent decision-making, and thereby, has compromised the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e t o o l . The d e c i s i o n i s the same one which l i m i t s the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the SETG to s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r program balance -- that i s , that Phase 1 of SEP s h a l l produce an incremental 50 m i l l i o n pounds of salmonids in a manner that i n c u r s no cost to government. These t a r g e t s have made i t necessary f o r SEP planners to generate p r o j e c t options and to c o n s t r u c t annual plans which emphasize the n a t i o n a l income o b j e c t i v e . T r a d e o f f s among d i s t r i b u t i o n a l and economic o b j e c t i v e s have s t i l l been p o s s i b l e , but only to the extent that plans do not d i p below t h i s s t r i c t economic requirement. The c o n s t r a i n t has meant that the f u l l range of t r a d e o f f s have not been shown to p u b l i c groups and dec i sion-makers. I t i s recognized that c o n s t r a i n t s are a part of any p r o j e c t , program or p o l i c y . In f a c t , f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t i s the u n d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l e f o r using the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e framework in the f i r s t p l a c e . That i s , i f there was u n l i m i t e d funding- f o r SEP, t r a d e o f f among o b j e c t i v e s would be unnecessary — e f f o r t s c o u l d proceed to maximize a l l o b j e c t i v e s , s u b j e c t to b i o l o g i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s . However, p r e - s e t c o n s t r a i n t s which s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t what op t i o n s are generated f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , would appear to l e a d to a l e s s than optimal (and perhaps even 83 i n a p p r o p r i a t e ) a p p l i c a t i o n of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e framework. Advi s o r y groups and decision-makers should have the o p p o r t u n i t y to decide what c o n s t r a i n t s , and what l e v e l s of c o n s t r a i n t , are a p p r o p r i a t e , at that p a r t i c u l a r time. By not p l a c i n g a p r e - s e t emphasis on a p a r t i c u l a r Program goal area, f l e x i b i l i t y i n Program p l a n n i n g i s not t i e d to a s i n g l e p r i o r i t y from beginning to end; changing p r i o r i t i e s in government can be accommodated. If p o l i t i c a l decision-makers decide i n a p a r t i c u l a r year that they would l i k e to emphasize a p a r t i c u l a r goal area (be i t n a t i o n a l income, n a t i v e people, or whatever), they s t i l l have the unconstrained o p p o r t u n i t y to choose an a p p r o p r i a t e p l a n . Furthermore, t h e i r c h o i c e w i l l be made on the b a s i s of f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n on what i s being traded-o f f to achieve that p a r t i c u l a r emphasis. These c o n d i t i o n s should i n c r e a s e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Program a d a p t a b i l i t y to which SEP o r i g i n a l l y a s p i r e d . I n d i c a t o r 11-3 : Incidence of E f f e c t s Incidence of a n t i c i p a t e d p r o j e c t and annual plan e f f e c t s are c u r r e n t l y o u t l i n e d in a f a i r l y general and a b s t r a c t f a s h i o n w i t h i n each of the f i v e accounts. For example, the r e g i o n a l development account t e l l s whether or not a p r o j e c t / p l a n i s p e r c e i v e d to have a "poor, f a i r , good, or very good" impact on areas o u t s i d e of the Lower Mainland region of B.C. The score that a p r o j e c t or plan r e c e i v e s i n t h i s account does not i n d i c a t e what p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n i s to be a f f e c t e d , who w i t h i n the region i s to be a f f e c t e d , or by how much. It i s q u e s t i o n a b l e however, whether or not t h i s h i g h l y 84 aggregated system of impact accounting adequately conveys d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . If c l i e n t / p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n SEP i s expected to be e f f e c t i v e l y s o l i c i t e d i t i s suggested that these i n t e r e s t s should be presented with a more p r e c i s e understanding of where t h e i r r e l a t i v e s e l f - i n t e r e s t s l i e . Otherwise, d i s c u s s i o n of plans i s p o t e n t i a l l y l i m i t e d to vague g e n e r a l i t i e s . In an e f f o r t to l i n k enhancement "means" to " t a n g i b l e ends", SEP e v a l u a t i o n s should perhaps take e v a l u a t i o n s in the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l accounts one step f u r t h e r . For i n s t a n c e , the r e g i o n a l development account might show the expected i n c r e a s e s in incomes by gear type and by r e g i o n , or the jobs a n t i c i p a t e d to be generated i n the r e g i o n a l economies. The n a t i v e people account might name the bands that are most a f f e c t e d by a p r o p o s a l , o u t l i n i n g what the a c t u a l e f f e c t s are a n t i c i p a t e d to be. The resource and environmental p r e s e r v a t i o n account might show which runs are being saved and which ones may be threatened. T h i s more d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n should be q u i t e r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e s i n c e these are the inputs from which the aggregated p r o j e c t / p l a n scores of poor, f a i r , e t c . are composed. The purpose of g e n e r a t i n g t h i s type of i n f o r m a t i o n i s simply to g i v e groups an understanding of what the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r plan are f o r them, and thus to promote more e f f e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i n the p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . I n d i c a t o r I I - 4 : Communication of Information • E v a l u a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g annual enhancement plans i s communicated to i n t e r e s t s i n r e l a t i v e l y formal meeting 85 s e t t i n g s . Two general c r i t i c i s m s from those presented i n f o r m a t i o n are f r e q u e n t l y heard i n connection with these meetings. F i r s t , that there i s not enough time to a s s i m i l a t e i n f o r m a t i o n and to respond in a meaningful f a s h i o n and second, that i n f o r m a t i o n i s p o o r l y presented. SEP p l a n n i n g s t a f f c o u l d perhaps improve upon the f i r s t c r i t i c i s m by simply m a i l i n g i n f o r m a t i o n packages to p a r t i c i p a n t s e a r l i e r , and r e c e n t l y , there i s evidence to suggest that t h i s i s being done. With regard to the second c r i t i c i s m the problem i s perhaps l e s s a r e s u l t of poor communication ( i . e . poor p r e s e n t a t i o n of information) than i t i s a lack of understanding by p a r t i c i p a n t s of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g framework and the idea of t r a d e o f f s that t h i s t o o l t r i e s to convey. T h i s p o s s i b l e l a c k of understanding may be l i n k e d to the problem of c o n s t r a i n e d f l e x i b i l i t y i n a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r m u l a t i o n that was d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r . For example, in the SEB meeting to d i s c u s s the 1980/81 expenditure p l a n , only one plan was presented that was "implementable". The other three "maximization p l a n s " that were d i s p l a y e d were r e a l l y non-options s i n c e they d i d not represent enough of a compromise among Program o b j e c t i v e s . Although' the maximization plan " a l t e r n a t i v e s " were u s e f u l as "benchmarks" to show what was being given up to a t t a i n the recommended compromise, the value of the maximization plans was otherwise marginal, s i n c e decision-makers had no other c h o i c e but to "go with" the plan recommended to them. With regard to t h i s i ssue Barbour (1975, p.19), i n d i s c u s s i n g use of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e framework in the U.S., 8 6 has s t a t e d : "The e f f e c t i v e l i m i t a t i o n of c h o i c e s to only one compromise plan i s b e l i e v e d c o n t r a r y to the essence of m u l t i - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g , which i s to promote the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of meaningful and implementable c h o i c e s where there are competing o b j e c t i v e s . Comparisons of t r a d e o f f s and d i f f e r e n c e s among say three p l a n s where only one plan has reasonable p r o s p e c t s of m a t e r i a l i z i n g are h a r d l y conducive to e f f e c t i v e decision-making". A c c o r d i n g l y , SEP's use of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e framework under c o n d i t i o n s of low Program f l e x i b i l i t y appears to have r e s u l t e d i n the p r e s e n t a t i o n to decision-makers of n o n - e s s e n t i a l and perhaps c o n f u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . Indeed, those SEB members int e r v i e w e d f o r t h i s study claimed that the maximization plans were of very l i t t l e a s s i s t a n c e to t h e i r decision-making f u n c t i o n . T h e i r c o n c e n t r a t i o n was reserved f o r the plan that was "implementable". Although members expressed r e l a t i v e l y low conf i d e n c e i n the " s o f t " measurement i n d i c a t o r s of the no n - n a t i o n a l income accounts ( i . e . poor, f a i r , good, very good), they were of gene r a l agreement however, that the accounting system should be r e t a i n e d s i n c e i t f o r c e s d i s c i p l i n e d r e c o g n i t i o n of the Program's d i s t r i b u t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s . The f a c t that SEB members place r e l a t i v e l y low confidence in the " s o f t " i n d i c a t o r s used i n the non- n a t i o n a l income accounts r a i s e s an a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t . T h i s i n f e r s that r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r c o n f i d e n c e i s p l a c e d i n the accuracy of economic measures of p r o j e c t / p l a n performance. I t should be made e x p l i c i t to a l l pl a n n i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s however, that d e s p i t e . the appearance of p r e c i s i o n , economic analyses ( i n a l l cases) are a l s o only r e l a t i v e l y rough estimates of what w i l l happen i n . the 87 f u t u r e . Simply because the "language of economics" i m p l i e s accuracy does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean that p r o j e c t e d r e s u l t s w i l l a c t u a l l y occur. T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s important i n l i g h t of the f a c t that economics appears to be a powerful i n f l u e n c e i n dec i s i on-ma kin g . In s p i t e of any weaknesses inherent i n SEP's a p p l i c a t i o n of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g framework, or the impressions of p r e c i s i o n t h at economic analyses i n v a r i a b l y convey, Program planners appear to make a s i n c e r e and committed e f f o r t to communicate to a d v i s o r y bodies the p e r c e i v e d consequences and p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s of annual enhancement p l a n s . SEP s t a f f are a v a i l a b l e at a l l a d v i s o r y body meetings to c l a r i f y t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s should q u e s t i o n s a r i s e . A c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of i n f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n between i n t e r e s t s and SEP personnel a l s o occurs at most meetings. It i s suggested that a c l e a r e r a r t i c u l a t i o n to a d v i s o r y groups of the mechanics and u n d e r l y i n g i n t e n t i o n s of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e technique might be a p p r o p r i a t e at the outset of Phase 2 p l a n n i n g , p a r t i c u l a r i l y i f Phase 2 proceeds without a pre - s e t emphasis of any of the Program's o b j e c t i v e s . I n d i c a t o r I I - 5 : C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the "Information Problem" There are e s s e n t i a l y two " i n f o r m a t i o n problems". The' f i r s t i s t h a t , should e x t e r n a l groups want to generate some of t h e i r own t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n (to enhance t h e i r r e l a t i v e p o s t i t i o n s i n the p l a n n i n g process) they o f t e n face two d i f f i c u l t i e s : ( i ) the high c o s t s of generating t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , and ( i i ) the "monopoly" over t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n and e x p e r t i s e by the 8 8 proponent agency which makes i f d i f f i c u l t f o r o u t s i d e groups to c o n c e p t u a l i z e v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s that are c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i r p r i o r i t i e s . The second " i n f o r m a t i o n problem" concerns the issue of u n c e r t a i n t y -- How can we minimize the p o t e n t i a l f o r u n d e s i r a b l e and c o s t l y s u r p r i s e s ? R e f e r r i n g to the d i f f i c u l t i e s faced by o u t s i d e groups, SEP c u r r e n t l y p r o v i d e s a l l of the funding f o r SETG _ and the SEB o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s funding does not however, i n c l u d e money f o r e x t e r n a l t e c h n i c a l study. The q u e s t i o n i s , would the SEP p l a n n i n g process be enhanced i f these groups were given a d d i t i o n a l funds to conduct independent s t u d i e s ? On the s u r f a c e , such funding appears i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r one main reason. SEP i s supported as a d e s i r a b l e resource development Program by a l l groups. The o b j e c t i v e s of the i n t e r e s t s g e n e r a l l y c o i n c i d e with those of government. Desp i t e t h i s commonality of o b j e c t i v e s , the l e v e l to which v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s are a f f e c t e d by SEP i s s e n s i t i v e to the d i r e c t i o n pursued by SEP. That i s , some i n t e r e s t s c o u l d b e n e f i t e i t h e r more or l e s s than o t h e r s . N a t u r a l l y , the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of " b e n e f i t " need not be p u r e l y economic. B e n e f i t might be r e c e i v e d by an i n t e r e s t , simply knowing that salmonid enhancement has proceeded in a p a r t i c u l a r manner that i s c o n s i s t e n t with the philosophy of that i n t e r e s t . For example, i n general terms, the SETG w i l l have b e n e f i t e d c o l l e c t i v e l y simply knowing that g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n i s being given to a c e r t a i n c l a s s of enhancement a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e l a t e s to the i s s u e regarding the 89 opportunity that i n t e r e s t s have to p a r t i c i p a t e in SEP planning. From our previous d i s c u s s i o n of the c r i t e r i o n of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s we have seen that a wide range of appropriate i n t e r e s t s has been i n v i t e d to take part i n SEP planning, that t h e i r t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n have been s u b s i d i z e d , and that they are provided with a forum for r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . However, beyond simply asking who and how these i n t e r e s t s p a r t i c i p a t e i n SEP planning, i t i s v i t a l to determine the r o l e that p a r t i c i p a n t s , p l a y . In t h i s regard i t i s suggested that the r o l e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s a f u n c t i o n of information a v a i l a b l e to i n t e r e s t s . That i s , inadequacy of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n may r e s u l t from inadequacy of information. (Fox, 1976). The question being r a i s e d here i s , have the SETG and the SEB been presented the type of information that they f e e l i s important so that they can e f f e c t i v e l y input t h e i r concerns to SEP planning? In response to t h i s question i t i s perhaps i n s t r u c t i v e to b r i e f l y review the main elements of the t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , developed e a r l i e r . P u b l i c choice theory says that s e l f - i n t e r e s t w i l l determine which enhancement a c t i v i t i e s an i n d i v i d u a l (government or non-government) w i l l consider important. Further, s e l f - i n t e r e s t i s determined by perceptions and a t t i t u d e s . I t f o l l o w s then, that the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of SEP p r o j e c t s must r e f l e c t the range of i n t e r e s t s or r e s u l t s w i l l be biased i n favour of those proposing the p r o j e c t s . A l s o , e m p i r i c a l evidence (Downs, 1967) suggests that evaluations of these proposals w i l l be biased, in accordance with the o b j e c t i v e s of i n d i v i d u a l s or o r g a n i z a t i o n s undertaking the e v a l u a t i o n . 90 Our preceeding a n a l y s i s shows that a l l p r o j e c t s / p l a n s are c o n c e p t u a l i z e d and evaluated i n t e r n a l l y by SEP p e r s o n n e l . In a d d i t i o n , we have shown that too few p r o j e c t o p t i o n s are being developed, a l l s m a l l - s c a l e p r o j e c t s are not f u l l y e v a l u a t e d , not a good range of a l t e r n a t i v e plans i s presented, that i n f o r m a t i o n presented on i n c i d e n c e of e f f e c t s i s a b s t r a c t , and that SEP e n g i n e e r i n g s t a f f have shown a tendency to dominate c e r t a i n aspects of SEP plan-making. Perhaps the most important p o i n t ( i n r e l a t i o n to the theory) i s that a l l SEP p l a n n i n g a c t i v i t i e s are conducted i n t e r n a l l y . The r o l e of p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p l a n n i n g i s simply to respond to that which i s presented. T h i s i s not to i n s i n u a t e that SEP i n t e n t i o n a l l y generates b i a s e d or i n a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n , or indeed, that any of t h e i r i n f o r m a t i o n i s biased or i n a c c u r a t e . SEP planners have shown a remarkable w i l l i n g n e s s to provide f r e e access to "planning, budgeting and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n not u s u a l l y a v a i l a b l e o u t s i d e of government". (SEB, 1979). T h i s access has been combined with numerous b r i e f i n g s at the request of SEP's a d v i s o r y groups on a v a r i e t y of p l a n n i n g t o p i c s . The suggestion here, i s merely t h a t , given what we know of the p o l i t i c a l -a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior of i n d i v i d u a l s i n such s e t t i n g s , that the i n f o r m a t i o n SEP generates f o r p u b l i c s c r u t i n y may not and cannot always correspond with what o u t s i d e i n t e r e s t s may f e e l i s important. A c c o r d i n g l y , i t does not seem i n a p p r o p r i a t e to suggest that the SEP planning process would be enhanced i f these groups were pro v i d e d with the resources to conduct independent a n a l y s e s . 91 F u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the " i n f o r m a t i o n problem" in l i g h t of our theory, i s provided l a t e r . D e a l i n g with U n c e r t a i n t y The t r a d i t i o n a l response to u n c e r t a i n t y i s to ignore i t . ( H i c k l i n g , 1975). Obviously however, i t i s p r e f e r a b l e to t r y to design p o l i c i e s which take more e x p l i c i t account of the p o t e n t i a l c o s t s of the unexpected. To t h i s end, r e c a l l that H o l l i n g (1978) suggests that the c h a l l e n g e i s to design p o l i c i e s that are " r e s i l i e n t " -- that i s , p o l i c i e s which are capable of absorbing and adapting to unexpected change and d i s t u r b a n c e , and s t i l l remain e f f e c t i v e f o r the problem f o r which they were designed. The key requirement of t h i s "adaptive" approach to p o l i c y design i s that the a c t i o n s which flow from a p o l i c y should not r e s u l t i n i r r e v e r s i b l e c o n d i t i o n s which f o r e c l o s e upon f u t u r e o p t i o n s . SEP, i n many ways, takes steps to ensure that the p o l i c i e s that i t d e r i v e s are a d a p t i v e : 1. Before a new enhancement technology i s d e c l a r e d as "proven", t r i a l experimentation i s u s u a l l y i n i t i a t e d i n the form of p i l o t p r o j e c t s . 2. The e f f e c t s of major p r o j e c t s are monitored to permit the input of knowledge i n t o f u t u r e d e s i g n s . 3. A "head recovery" program (where nose-tagged f i s h from p a r t i c u l a r drainages are i d e n t i f i a b l e upon capture) i s funded by SEP to t r y to reduce u n c e r t a i n t i e s of stock movements and i n t e r a c t i o n s , and a l s o to determine what techniques of a r t i f i c i a l r e a r i n g are most s u c c e s s f u l . 4. The t e c h n i c a l s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i o n of p r o j e c t " d e s i r a b i l i t y " i s ( i n theory) designed to c o n s i d e r i f a proposed p r o j e c t i s u s e f u l i n generating new and r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n f o r p l a n n i n g , and whether or not a p r o p o s a l f o r e c l o s e s on f u t u r e enhancement o p t i o n s . 92 5. The f a c t that SEP i s a two-staged Program where Phase 2 i s contingent upon the success of Phase 1, a l s o permits a s i g n i f i c a n t element of a d a p t a b i l i t y i n p o l i c y d e s i g n . 6. The m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g framework i t s e l f , i s s u i t e d to a d a p t i v e p o l i c y design ( p r o v i d i n g that there are no pr e - s e t c o n d i t i o n s , such as the c u r r e n t n a t i o n a l income emphasis, which determine the p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s which are ev a l u a t e d and implemented). Lending support to the n o t i o n that Program o b j e c t i v e s ought not to be pre-determihed H o l l i n g (1978, p.8) has s a i d : "Even the ul t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e s of environmental p o l i c i e s and developments are u n c e r t a i n . A renewable resource i n d u s t r y might have as an i n i t i a l high p r i o r i t y o b j e c t i v e s t a b i l i z e d employment over the short term, which then s h i f t s to a major concern f o r environmental standards, then to d i v e r s i t y of op p o r t u n i t y , and then to simple economic o b j e c t i v e s . A design that assumes that o b j e c t i v e s are immutable can  r a p i d l y f o r e c l o s e o p t i o n s i f those o b j e c t i v e s s h i f t " . (emphasis added). We have seen that SEP has c o n s i d e r e d the n a t i o n a l income o b j e c t i v e "immutable". The upshot i s an emphasis on major p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , which o f t e n aggravate the mixed stock m a n a g e a b i l i t y problem. The v i a b i l i t y of weak n a t u r a l stocks i s endangered when they are f i s h e d simultaneously with l a r g e numbers of a r t i f i c i a l l y produced fish,. I f we make a d e c i s i o n now to " w r i t e - o f f " some of t h i s n a t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n i n the p u r s u i t of short-term economic j u s t i f i c a t i o n , we w i l l have f o r e v e r f o r e c l o s e d upon the o p p o r t u n i t y to reverse that d e c i s i o n , should the c u r r e n t s t r a t e g y not work-out. Another method that SEP should (and does i n t e n d to) i n i t i a t e to take more e x p l i c i t account of p e r c e i v e d u n c e r t a i n t i e s i s to i n c o r p o r a t e r i s k assessment' i n t o t h e i r economic e v a l u a t i o n procedures. The e x p l i c i t i n c l u s i o n of r i s k (as a s o c i a l c o s t ) , i s 93 r e l e v a n t to SEP p l a n n i n g i n that i t c o u l d , i n the f u t u r e , have a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the types and s c a l e s of p r o j e c t s that are implemented by SEP. For example, the p r o b a b i l i t y of f a i l u r e of a major SEP f a c i l i t y may be r e l a t i v e l y low, but the p o t e n t i a l f o r economic l o s s upon f a i l u r e i s very h i g h . On the other hand, while the p r o b a b i l i t y f o r f a i l u r e of a " l e s s e r " enhancement p r o j e c t may be somewhat hig h e r , the a n t i c i p a t e d l o s s e s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y lower. A c c o r d i n g l y , c o s t - b e n e f i t analyses that i n c l u d e d r i s k , assessment might show that major p r o j e c t s are l e s s d e s i r a b l e economically than o r i g i n a l l y b e l i e v e d , and that the opposite might be true f o r s m a l l e r p r o j e c t s . F u r t h e r to the c o n t r o v e r s y over " s c a l e " , the p o t e n t i a l f o r r e t r e a t from a p o l i c y i s , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , i n v e r s e l y p r o p o r t i o n a l to the c a p i t a l i n v e s t e d i n SEP p r o j e c t s . In t h i s regard H o l l i n g (1978) says: "...when e r r o r s are not, i n p r i n c i p l e , i r r e v e r s i b l e , the s i z e of the o r i g i n a l investment of c a p i t a l and p r e s t i g e o f t e n makes them e f f e c t i v e l y so. T h i s behaviour has i t s r o o t s in a very human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i n d u s t r i a l man: we do not l i k e to admit and pay f o r our past mistakes, we p r e f e r to c o r r e c t them. And the consequences of c o r r e c t i n g an i n f l e x i b l e plan i s o f t e n i n c r e a s i n g investment, i n c r e a s i n g c o s t s f o r c o n t r o l l i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g the system, and p r o g r e s s i v e f o r e c l o s u r e of f u t u r e d e c i s i o n o p t i o n s " . Indeed, SEP appears to have alr e a d y experienced the problem of i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y at one of i t s major f a c i l i t i e s — the Pinkut and F u l t o n spawning channels on the Skeena River system. I t was determined i n 1980 by DFO that enhanced Pinkut and F u l t o n stocks cannot be harvested using c u r r e n t management regimes, without r i s k i n g decimation of s m a l l e r and weaker n a t u r a l s t o c k s . In order not to "write these stocks o f f " two s o l u t i o n s were i d e n t i f i e d by DFO: 94 1. shut the channels down and r e b u i l d other stocks to h i s t o r i c optimum to maintain a balanced p r o d u c t i o n ; or 2. "de-emphasize" Pinkut and F u l t o n channel p r o d u c t i o n and harvest only at a r a t e the n a t u r a l stocks can withstand while they are being r e b u i l t . ( D a r n e l l , 1980). It was decided to go with the second o p t i o n which i m p l i e s a gr e a t e r c o s t of c o n t r o l l i n g the f i s h e r y and m a i n t a i n i n g the n a t u r a l s t o c k s . I t i s suggested that t h i s response can be l a r g e l y e x p l a i n e d by p r e c i s e l y what H o l l i n g has r e f e r r e d t o . The d e c i s i o n i s , i n e f f e c t , i r r e v e r s i b l e because of the s i z e of the o r i g i n a l investment and r e l u c t a n c e to take a c t i o n s that would admit that a mistake had been made. Th e r e f o r e , in order f o r SEP to maintain f l e x i b i l i t y i n l i g h t of u n c e r t a i n t y , i t i s r e - i t e r a t e d that i n plann i n g f o r Phase 2, SEP should not endorse the i m p o s i t i o n of a pr e - s e t emphasis of o b j e c t i v e s . Secondly, r i s k assessment should be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the economic e v a l u a t i o n of p r o j e c t o p t i o n s . 95 I I I . EFFICIENCY OF THE PROCESS T h i s c r i t e r i o n of e v a l u a t i o n asks the q u e s t i o n , c o u l d SEP pl a n n i n g produce a s i m i l a r product with the use of fewer resources (time, manpower and money)? Or a l t e r n a t e l y , c o u l d the investment of more resources s i g n i f i c a n t l y improve the SEP pla n n i n g process? In t h i s sense, i s SEP p l a n n i n g c o s t - e f f e c t i v e ; e f f e c t i v e n e s s being measured s u b j e c t i v e l y in terms of how we l l the c r i t e r i a of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and i n f o r m a t i o n are s a t i s i f i e d ? ' Two reasons however, permit only a r e l a t i v e l y s u p e r f i c i a l assessment of SEP plann i n g using t h i s c r i t e r i o n : (1) the no t i o n of e f f i c i e n c y of a process i s e s p e c i a l l y s u b j e c t i v e — there i s no agreed-upon "cut-o f f " p o i n t below which a process may be c o n s i d e r e d i n e f f i c i e n t and above which e f f i c i e n c y a u t o m a t i c a l l y occurs. (2) e f f i c i e n c y of the SEP pl a n n i n g f u n c t i o n cannot l o g i c a l l y be c o n s i d e r e d i n i s o l a t i o n from other components of the Program ( i . e . e n g i n e e r i n g , f a c i l i t i e s o p e r a t i o n s , p u b l i c education, e t c . ) , without which there c o u l d be no planning.- Since t h i s study d i d not re s e a r c h the a c t i v i t i e s of these components, an assessment of o v e r a l l SEP d e c i s i o n -making e f f i c i e n c y i s not a p p r o p r i a t e . Recognizing these l i m i t a t i o n s , the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s are suggested as i n d i c a t o r s of whether or not the SEP pl a n n i n g process can g e n e r a l l y be regarded as e f f i c i e n t . I n d i c a t o r I l l - l : " C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n e s s " of Repres e n t a t i o n The p u b l i c a d v i s o r y f u n c t i o n w i t h i n SEP re p r e s e n t s a s i z a b l e c o s t ( i n time and money) to the Program. In s u b j e c t i v e terms, i s SEP decision-making improved because of t h i s o u t l a y ? I n d i c a t o r I I I - 2 ; D u p l i c a t i o n of Fun c t i o n •Are there any d u p l i c a t i o n s of f u n c t i o n w i t h i n SEP pl a n n i n g which i f e l i m i n a t e d , would not s i g n i f i c a n t l y impair the q u a l i t y of SEP plann i n g d e c i s i o n s ? 96 I n d i c a t o r I I I - 3 : " C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n e s s " of Information Does SEP generate any i n f o r m a t i o n that i s of only marginal value to the planning process? The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n a p p l i e s the three above " i n d i c a t o r q u e s t i o n s " to SEP p l a n n i n g . I n d i c a t o r I I I - l : " C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n e s s " of R e p r e s e n t a t i o n In t o t a l , SETG and SEB o p e r a t i o n s have to date, cost roughly i n the order of q u a r t e r of a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . T h i s o u t l a y does not i n c l u d e the f i n a n c i a l c o s t s of h i r i n g a c o n s u l t a n t to set-up the Task Group, or the c o s t s of two rounds of p u b l i c i n q u i r i e s . Aside from f i n a n c i a l o u t l a y , a great d e a l of time i s spent by SEP p l a n n i n g personnel generating i n f o r m a t i o n f o r review by these two groups. P r i v a t e members a l s o give-up a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of time to SEP p l a n n i n g . A l l in a l l , the investment of resources to the p u b l i c a d v i s o r y f u n c t i o n has been c o n s i d e r a b l e . C e r t a i n l y t h i s investment i s j u s t i f i e d i n the sense that i t p r o v i d e s the b a s i s f o r SEP to s a t i s f y the normative requirement of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s i n p l a n n i n g . But, i s that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as good as i t might be? E a r l i e r we questioned the r o l e of the Task Group in SEP p l a n n i n g and suggested that the a d v i s o r y f u n c t i o n might be improved i f the Task Group were given the o p p o r t u n i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e beyond simply responding to plans proposed to them. Th e r e f o r e , although SEP's involvement of e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s in p l a n n i n g i s a p o s i t i v e step towards improving the d e c i s i o n process, there remains room to make p u b l i c invovement i n p l a n n i n g more e f f e c t i v e , and thereby improve upon the e f f i c i e n c y of the process. Recommendations to 97 improve the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the a d v i s o r y mechanism are presented in the next chapter. I n d i c a t o r 111-2: D u p l i c a t i o n of F u n c t i o n There i s one p o t e n t i a l d u p l i c a t i o n of f u n c t i o n that appears to r e s u l t from the c u r r e n t s t r u c t u r e of the a d v i s o r y mechanism. That i s , both the SETG and the SEB a s p i r e to provide broad management l e v e l p o l i c y advice to the Program. T h i s apparent " o v e r l a p " may i n p a r t , be a r e s u l t of the h i s t o r i c a l development of these two groups. The SETG was i n i t i a t e d i n 1976 as the s o l e group to provide a .broad-based p e r s p e c t i v e to Program implementators on the " s o c i a l and t r a d i t i o n a l values of the community to Salmonid Enhancement". (SETG, Terms of R e f e r e n c e ) . In 1978 the SEB was formed with powerful a d v i s o r y terms of r e f e r e n c e which e s s e n t i a l l y usurped the SETG f u n c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , the SETG went through an " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n c r i s i s " , a d j u s t i n g and r e - a d j u s t i n g t h e i r terms of r e f e r e n c e i n search of an i n s t i t u t i o n a l niche that was compatible with that of the SEB. A sub-committee of the SEB was s t r u c k to look at t h i s very q u e s t i o n . E v e n t u a l l y , i t was r e s o l v e d that the SETG would r e p o r t to the SEB, p r o v i d i n g them with a "window" on the p r i o r i t i e s of the wider p u b l i c . The r e l a t i o n s h i p was l i k e n e d to the SEB being the Board of D i r e c t o r s of a c o r p o r a t i o n and the Task Group -being the s h a r e h o l d e r s , v i t a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the success of the Program. (Deans, 1978). The success of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p however, r e s t s upon the a b i l i t y of the Task Group to l i a i s e c l o s e l y with t h e i r 98 r e s p e c t i v e groups, r e p o r t i n g SEP a c t i v i t i e s to them, and a l s o the l e v e l to which the Task Group i n f l u e n c e s SEB d e c i s i o n -making. We have seen however, that d i f f i c u l t i e s have been encountered with both these requirements. As a r e s u l t , there are now two bodies p r o v i d i n g a s i m i l a r s e r v i c e to SEP p l a n n i n g , a l b e i t with somewhat d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s and mandates. A r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the a d v i s o r y mechanism (as set out l a t e r ) to reduce any o v e r l a p i n the r o l e s of the SETG and the SEB c o u l d perhaps b e t t e r achieve the i n t e n t of the p u b l i c a d v i s o r y d e v i c e and at the same time, produce a more e f f i c i e n t p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . I n d i c a t o r 111 -3 : " C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n s s " of Information Other than the f a c t that the SEB may not have found the generation of maximization plans to be too u s e f u l f o r d e c i s i o n -making, there appears to be no other " i n f o r m a t i o n i n e f f i c i e n c i e s " that can be r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i e d . Although SEP pl a n n i n g makes wide use of p r i v a t e c o n s u l t a n t s to r e s e a r c h s e l e c t e d i s s u e s there i s no o b j e c t i v e i n d i c a t i o n of the extent to which t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s of only marginal value to p l a n n i n g . Indeed, those i n d i v i d u a l s i n t e r v i e w e d f o r t h i s study g e n e r a l l y i n d i c a t e d t h at SEP p l a n n i n g was a very e f f i c i e n t process r e l a t i v e to most other government o p e r a t i o n s . 99 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Using normative c r i t e r i a t h i s study a p p r a i s e s the pr o c e d u r a l aspects of pl a n n i n g the implementation of the Salmonid Enhancement Program - a program whose primary aim i s to r e v i v e the P a c i f i c salmonid resource to h i s t o r i c l e v e l s of abundance. The r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s study approach, i s that SEP implementation d e c i s i o n s that evolve out of a "good" plan n i n g process are more apt to be " b e t t e r " resource management d e c i s i o n s than those made i n the r e c o g n i z a b l e absence of "good" p l a n n i n g . As a precept, i t i s accepted that the key elements of "good" p l a n n i n g ought g e n e r a l l y to p a r a l l e l the normative elements of l i b e r a l democratic theory, s i n c e these are the basic values which determine the type of p u b l i c policy-making processes that are ac c e p t a b l e i n our s o c i e t y . A c c o r d i n g l y , the c r i t e r i a used to assess the SEP p l a n n i n g process a r e : 1. o p p o r t u n i t y f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s i n SEP pla n n i n g 2. adequacy of in f o r m a t i o n f o r SEP decision-making 3. e f f i c i e n c y of decision-making The a n a l y s i s i s complemented with a t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e of b e h a v i o r a l aspects of c o l l e c t i v e decision-making. A b a s i c understanding of t h i s theory of p u b l i c c h o ice i s co n s i d e r e d important so that recommendations that c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y improve the SEP plann i n g process are p r a c t i c a b l e , i n the sense that they are c o n s i s t e n t with what i s known of p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b ehavior. 100 Based upon the preceding a n a l y s i s and t h e o r e t i c a l framework the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s and recommendations are o f f e r e d . A. STRENGTHS OF THE SEP PLANNING SYSTEM Recognizing that there are l i m i t a t i o n s which, i n many cases, o f f s e t the s t r e n g t h s of SEP p l a n n i n g , there remain a number of p o s i t i v e f e a t u r e s of the process that deserve mention. 1. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n Of I n t e r e s t s In SEP Planning In many ways, SEP i s unprecedented in i t s commitment to r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s i n resource p l a n n i n g . Two s e t s of p u b l i c i n q u i r i e s were conducted throughout the Province and SEP p l a n n i n g s t a f f are a v a i l a b l e upon request to meet with any group that has a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n salmonid enhancement. The primary mechanism however, that has been developed by SEP to i n t e g r a t e p u b l i c / c l i e n t p r i o r i t i e s i n t o p l a n n i n g i s the 30 member Salmonid Enhancement Task Group (SETG). T h i s a d v i s o r y body i s composed of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from a wide d i v e r s i t y of groups (see Appendix II) that have a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n the management of the salmonid re s o u r c e . Membership in t h i s group i n c u r s no f i n a n c i a l cost to i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s . In t h i s sense, members' " t r a n s a c t i o n c o s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n " have been met by government, thereby removing i n p a r t , the common source of the " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n problem". R e c a l l that Olson (1971) has shown that i n t e r e s t s w i l l not be motivated to p a r t i c i p a t e i f the c o s t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n exceed a n t i c i p a t e d b e n e f i t s from doing so. The maintenance of the SETG a l s o p r o v i d e s a forum for 101 i n t e r e s t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , encouraging n e g o t i a t i o n and i n f o r m a t i o n exchange among groups and with government that would not otherwise occur. As O'Riordan and O'Riordan (1979) suggest, a d v i s o r y groups (such as the SETG), that have been i n v i t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e as " c o n s u l t a n t s " on Program development, operate p o t e n t i a l l y from a p o s i t i o n of r e l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e . In terms of i n t e g r a t i o n of other government resource agency i n t e r e s t s , s e v e r a l d e v i c e s are used by SEP p l a n n i n g to help ensure that the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of enhancement investments i s p r o t e c t e d . P r o j e c t s that i n v o l v e P r o v i n c i a l lands are subject to t r a d i t i o n a l r e f e r r a l processes to h i g h l i g h t where p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t s might a r i s e , and some P r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s are represented at the p o l i c y l e v e l , on the SEB and the SEP Management Committee. As i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r however, there remains room f o r improved c o o r d i n a t i o n of P r o v i n c i a l i n t e r e s t s with SEP p l a n n i n g . A problem encountered by SEP- p l a n n i n g , due to i t s i n i t i a t i o n under a separate DFO mandate, has been the d i f f i c u l t y of i n t e g r a t i n g the i n t e r e s t s of the other two main dimensions of salmonid resource management. (i.e.. h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n and regulation/management). Recognizing the n e c e s s i t y to c o o r d i n a t e a l l salmonid resource management f u n c t i o n s , SEP p l a n n i n g has "nurtured" the GWG mechanism to provide SEP with a d v i c e on stock m a n a g e a b i l i t y i s s u e s . To a s s i s t t h i s mechanism, a separate component of SEP p l a n n i n g has developed to maintain c l o s e l i a i s o n with GWG's. SEP has a l s o funded numerous manageability s t u d i e s to ensure that managers have the i n f o r m a t i o n necessary to p r o p e r l y r e g u l a t e f i s h e r i e s that i n c l u d e enhanced s t o c k s . 102 Recently, a r e g i o n a l p l a n n i n g f u n c t i o n has been i n i t i a t e d to t r y to i n t e g r a t e the m u l t i p l e dimensions of salmonid resource management, a f u n c t i o n long overdue. I t remains to be seen how w e l l a l l aspects of f i s h e r i e s management w i l l be i n t e g r a t e d v i a t h i s mechanism. 2. Information f o r SEP Decision-Making The systematic p r e s e n t a t i o n of r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n i s a c e n t r a l requirement of p l a n n i n g and SEP in many ways, has made ag g r e s s i v e e f f o r t s to meet t h i s requirement. Programs and plans are e v a l u a t e d f o r t e c h n i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y and a l s o to determine the l e v e l to which they meet Program o b j e c t i v e s . To t h i s end, e v a l u a t i o n s are conducted w i t h i n a m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g framework. T h i s framework c o n s i s t s of a system of accounts which attempt to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y and s e p a r a t e l y c o n s i d e r economic, s o c i a l and environmental consequences of enhancement p r o j e c t s and plans. Thus, there i s no attempt to "mix" economic with non-economic values as t r a d i t i o n a l c o s t - b e n e f i t analyses o f t e n do. In terms of communication of e v a l u a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n , SEP p l a n n i n g s t a f f present annual expenditure plans to a d v i s o r y groups f o r t h e i r review and to s o l i c i t t h e i r comments. As w e l l , s t a f f members are a v a i l a b l e at a l l a d v i s o r y group meetings to respond to q u e s t i o n s and to make p r e s e n t a t i o n s on t o p i c s s e l e c t e d by a d v i s o r y groups. In t h i s way, i n t e r e s t s are kept informed of Program developments. 103 B. WEAKNESSES OF THE SEP PLANNING SYSTEM AND PROPOSED  IMPROVEMENTS • The above d i s c u s s i o n suggests t h a t , in terms of two of our normative c r i t e r i a , the SEP p l a n n i n g process appears to be a r e l a t i v e l y "good" one. While t h i s i s true in many r e s p e c t s , the a n a l y s i s c o n t a i n e d i n Chapter F i v e shows, on the other hand, that there are a number of weaknesses of SEP p l a n n i n g i n connection with the e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a . The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n o u t l i n e s the major weaknesses, and on the b a s i s of our t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , proposes some changes that c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y improve the process. 1. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s i n SEP Planning (a) Weaknesses of the p u b l i c a d v i s o r y mechanism I t was suggested e a r l i e r that i f " c o n s u l t a n t s " such as the SETG are to be t r u l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the i n t e r e s t s with which they are a f f i l i a t e d , they must communicate c l o s e l y and be accountable to t h e i r " c o n s t i t u e n t s " . The SETG i t s e l f however, has suggested that t h e i r group does not communicate s u f f i c i e n t l y with t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s . A p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r why t h i s communication might be d i f f i c u l t can be found in p u b l i c c h o i c e theory. For reasons of i t s l e n g t h of term and i t s consensus-seeking and policy/management l e v e l mandate, the Task Group appears to have evolved to a l e v e l of s o p h i s t i c a t i o n where the o b j e c t i v e s of the i n d i v i d u a l member i n t e r e s t s have been sublimated by the o b j e c t i v e s of the l a r g e r i n t e g r a t e d group. A c c o r d i n g l y , i t might be d i f f i c u l t f o r members to communicate and j u s t i f y Task Group a c t i v i t i e s to the more narrowly s e l f - i n t e r e s t e d p e r c e p t i o n s of 104 i n d i v i d u a l p u b l i c / c l i e n t groups. So long as the Task Group i s r e t a i n e d as an independent o r g a n i z a t i o n that must present a s i n g l e , common p o s i t i o n , theory t e l l s us that we cannot expect i n f o r m a t i o n channels to the "wider c o n s t i t u e n c i e s " to s i g n i f i c a n t l y improve. Yet, unless t h i s two-way communication occurs, inputs to p l a n n i n g may continue to be more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Task Group i t s e l f , than of the r e a l a s p i r a t i o n s of a f f i l i a t e d i n t e r e s t s . Proposed Improvements To r e s o l v e t h i s problem, while ensuring that the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of the SETG remains i n t a c t , i t i s recommended that a second l e v e l of r e g i o n a l p u b l i c a d v i s o r y input be o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d . T h i s would give the SETG a focus f o r communication and would a l s o encourage r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of l o c a l i n t e r e s t s at the l o c a l l e v e l where enhancement a c t i v i t i e s are a c t u a l l y c o n c e p t u a l i z e d and implemented. Although i t i s not the purpose here to develop a d e t a i l e d o p e r a t i n g s c e n a r i o f o r r e g i o n a l Task Groups (RTG's), i t i s suggested that four RTG's might be formed, each connected in some way with the four GWG's (e.g. a GWG member i n v i t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e at RTG meetings). The p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n component of SEP ( i . e . v o l u n t e e r groups i n v o l v e d in a c t u a l enhancement a c t i v i t i e s ) might a l s o be l i n k e d somehow with RTG's. Each RTG would be r e s p o n s i b l e to the " c o n s t i t u e n c y " i t served. Meetings c o u l d occur as o f t e n as necessary and a l l RTG's might meet together o c c a s i o n a l l y . The emphasis of these groups would be more on l o c a l i s s u e s and l e s s on Province-wide p o l i c y 105 concerns. The e x i s t i n g SETG would remain i n v o l v e d with the p o l i c y l e v e l concerns of salmonid enhancement, but would be accountable to t h e i r r e g i o n a l a f f i l i a t e s . Current SETG members, many of whom alr e a d y r e s i d e i n the r e g i o n s , c o u l d perhaps c o n t r i b u t e t h e i r c o n s i d e r a b l e SEP e x p e r t i s e to the s u c c e s s f u l i n i t i a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n of the RTG's. There are s e v e r a l , other important j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r the proposed RTG arrangement: ( i ) The idea of r e g i o n a l task groups i s not new--the SETG i t s e l f has s t o n g l y endorsed the concept. ( i i ) The idea of RTG's i s c o n s i s t e n t with a recommendation that came out of a SEB i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the r o l e , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s and s i z e of the SETG. The SEB (1979) suggested t h a t , "...more involvement at the l o c a l l e v e l by SETG members would be most u s e f u l in p r o v i d i n g p u b l i c understanding of SEP". ( i i i ) The concept i s a l s o p e r f e c t l y c o n s i s t e n t ' with the two l e v e l s of a d v i s o r y input e n v i s i o n e d i n the o r i g i n a l SEP proposal to Cabinet. "Two l e v e l s of a d v i s o r y input w i l l be sought: ( i ) At the B r i t i s h Columbia r e g i o n a l l e v e l through a Task Group which w i l l act as a forum f o r : review of p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s ; c o n s i d e r a t i o n of s t r a t e g i e s and plans f o r a c h i e v i n g approved p o l i c y ; and, f o r suggesting new t h r u s t s and s t r a t e g i e s to management of the salmonid enhancement program... ( i i ) At the community l e v e l , through l o c a l Task Groups which w i l l review and advise on t e c h n i c a l enhancement pr o p o s a l s from the p o i n t of view of l o c a l impacts". ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.86). I t i s suggested that the c u r r e n t SETG i s i n place to p o t e n t i a l l y f u l f i l l the requirements of the f i r s t l e v e l of 106 a d v i s o r y input, and that the formation of RTG's c o u l d p r o v i d e t h i s second l e v e l of community/local a d v i c e . F i s h e r i e s personnel i n v o l v e d i n p r o j e c t c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n and implementation c o u l d work with RTG's, t a k i n g account of l o c a l p e r c e p t i o n s and v a l u e s , and making use of l o c a l knowledge. ( i v ) In a d d i t i o n , the proposed RTG arrangement i s g e n e r a l l y i n l i n e with the type of i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e advocated by Ostrom (1973) and Sproule-Jones (1972). R e c a l l t h a t these authors suggest that " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p l u r a l i s m " i n the p r o v i s i o n of p u b l i c goods encourages i n c r e a s e d a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . That i s , fragmented a u t h o r i t y means that no one a u t h o r i t y enjoys independence in the making of p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n s . In t h i s sense, RTG's would place a "check" on the a u t h o r i t y of the SETG, as w e l l as on .the government members with whom they are i n c o n t a c t . (b) Weaknesses of the decision-making f u n c t i o n According to i t s terms of r e f e r e n c e , the prime r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the SEB i s to p r o v i d e broad management and d i r e c t i o n to salmonid enhancement by making recommendations and a d v i s i n g the M i n i s t e r s on such t h i n g s as SEP p o l i c y o p t i o n s and p r i o r i t i e s , budgeting and a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s , and Program implementation. SEB' membership i s composed of f i v e s e n i o r bureaucrats (plus two who a t t e n d i n an e x - o f f i c i o c a p a c i t y ) and seven p r i v a t e members, (see Appendix I V ) . Although t h i s group i s o s t e n s i b l y an a d v i s o r y body only, i t has i n the past, a l s o f u n c t i o n e d e f f e c t i v e l y as. a d e c i s i o n -making body. There are however, two i s s u e s evident with regard 107 to t h i s r o l e of the SEB. The f i r s t i s that a c c o r d i n g to democratic p r i n c i p l e s , i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e that p r i v a t e , non-accountable i n t e r e s t s should be i n v o l v e d in the a l l o c a t i o n of p u b l i c funds. (Haefele, 1973). The second i s t h a t , even though the most s e n i o r government members on the SEB may be bona-fide p o l i t i c a l decision-makers, i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r them to be p r o v i d i n g advice to themselves, routed through an a d v i s o r y mechanism. We have a l s o seen that a tendency f o r SEB proceedings to be dominated by s e n i o r bureaucrats r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of whether or not the SEB can f u n c t i o n o b j e c t i v e l y i n an a d v i s o r y capac i t y . Proposed Improvements In l i g h t of these i s s u e s , i t i s proposed that the SEB should be made pu r e l y a decision-making body and that p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s be excluded from SEB membership. T h i s would s a t i s f y H a e f e l e ' s (1973) concern that non-accountable p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s should not be in a p o s i t i o n of a l l o c a t i n g p u b l i c funds. A l s o , there would be no c o n f u s i o n as to the r o l e of the SEB r e l a t i v e to the p u b l i c a d v i s o r y mechanism (as there as been in the past) -- the SEB would r e c e i v e a d v i c e on SEP p o l i c y and d i r e c t i o n from the SETG, a d i s t i n c t and separate e n t i t y . I m p l i c i t in the above argument i s one very important requirement. The SETG must be well-informed so that i t can p r o v i d e an e f f e c t i v e "check" on b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s c r e t i o n . P u b l i c c h o i c e theory t e l l s us that i n d i v i d u a l s ( i n c l u d i n g bureaucrats) behave in t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t s . A c c o r d i n g l y , SEB d e c i s i o n s w i l l r e f l e c t the inherent b i a s of that group. Yet, these i n d i v i d u a l s 108 are only accountable through the "chain of p o l i t i c a l command". Thi s i s l e s s than i d e a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , but nonetheless may be adequate, i f the SEB i s v u l n e r a b l e to complaint i f they do not heed the d e s i r e s of the general p u b l i c ( i . e . through the Task Group). For t h i s reason, the Task Group must have the t e c h n i c a l knowledge of whether or not a l t e r n a t i v e enhancement s t r a t e g i e s , that are c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i r p r i o r i t i e s , do i n f a c t e x i s t and are p r a c t i c a b l e . With t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , i t would t h e o r e t i c a l l y be p o s s i b l e , through a process of i n t e r a c t i o n , to a r r i v e at an enhancement approach a c c e p t a b l e to both groups. If the Task Group i s not s a t i s f i e d that i t s p o s i t i o n i s r e c e i v i n g adequate a t t e n t i o n i n p l a n n i n g , the o p t i o n remains with them to appeal to a higher p o l i t i c a l l e v e l . (c) C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the "general i n t e r e s t " Since the outset of the Program, SEP has taken the p o s i t i o n that the " i d e n t i f i a b l e " b e n e f i c i a r i e s of SEP s h a l l "repay" the c o s t s of Program implementation that have been borne by the general taxpayer. "Cost recovery" d e r i v e s from the philosophy that i t i s i n e q u i t a b l e to b e n e f i t few at the expense of many. To t h i s end, SEP has a g g r e s s i v e l y pursued economic e f f i c i e n c y i n i t s p l a n n i n g and implementation, and c u r r e n t estimates show that e c o n o m i c a l l y , c o s t - r e c o v e r y i s p o s s i b l e . Our theory however, t e l l s us that i t i s i m p r a c t i c a l to expect implementation of c o s t - r e c o v e r y because of p o l i t i c a l reasons. I t .is e a s i e r f o r government to d i v e r t tax funds from the unorganized general p u b l i c to s a t i s f y the more intense demands of organized i n t e r e s t s , than v i c e v e r s a . I t i s i n f a c t , 109 probable that t h i s issue of " d i s t r i b u t i v e p o l i c i e s " (Lowi, 1972) i s a primary reasons why cost-recovery has not yet been implemented. Yet without cost-recovery, there appears to be no other way for SEP to e x p l i c i t l y account for the unorganized general i n t e r e s t . Thus, unless the government takes a c t i o n that i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with our theory, the issue s h a l l remain unresolved. (d) Weaknesses i n P r o v i n c i a l involvement The involvement i n the planning process of P r o v i n c i a l agencies whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a f f e c t , or are a f f e c t e d by SEP d e c i s i o n s , i s important for two reasons — f i r s t , to increase the assurance that the long-term e f f e c t i v e n e s s of SEP investments w i l l be protected from the e x t e r n a l e f f e c t s of other resource users (e.g. f o r e s t r y ) ; and second, to ensure that SEP does not impose unreasonable costs on other resource i n t e r e s t s . The a n a l y s i s showed that although- some mechanisms are i n e f f e c t to accommodate t h i s i n t e g r a t i o n , t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s l i m i t e d . Not a l l p r o j e c t s are subject to r e f e r r a l among p o t e n t i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d agencies, and even i f a r e f e r r a l i s made, agreement i s not n e c e s s a r i l y forthcoming that future c o n f l i c t s w i l l not a r i s e ; and although the M i n i s t r y of Environment i s well-represented on the SEB, t h i s i n t e r e s t cannot be expected to speak for other p o t e n t i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d agencies. Proposed Improvements I t i s suggested that improved c o o r d i n a t i o n of other government i n t e r e s t s with SEP planning could be met through a 110 r e f e r r a l process which sought w r i t t e n agreements as an end-product. Such agreements would c o n s t i t u t e formal commitment among i n t e r e s t s that enhancement investments w i l l not be j e a p o r d i z e d ; and i n making an agreement, agencies w i l l ensure that SEP does not impose unreasonable c o s t s on them. T e n t a t i v e agreements would then be p a r t of what i s l a i d before the SEB. If the SEB d i d not approve, agreements can be r e f e r r e d back f o r r e n e g o t i a t i o n . A fundamental requirement of t h i s s uggestion i s that a l l p r o j e c t s should be s u b j e c t to r e f e r r a l . 2. Information f o r SEP Decision-Making (a) Information d e f i c i e n c i e s i n SEP p l a n n i n g The b a s i c c a t e g o r i e s of i n f o r m a t i o n that are c u r r e n t l y generated f o r SEP p l a n n i n g a r e : ( i ) g e n e r a t i o n and t e c h n i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l p r o j e c t o p t i o n s ( i i ) f o r m u l a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n of economic, s o c i a l and environmental e f f e c t s of annual expenditure plans ( i . e . mixes of enhancement p r o j e c t s ) . With regard to the f i r s t category of i n f o r m a t i o n we have seen that there are three main d e f i c i e n c i e s : ( i ) Too few p r o j e c t o p t i o n s are c u r r e n t l y being developed, which means that c h o i c e regarding t h e - o v e r a l l balance and d i r e c t i o n of the Program i s c o n s t r a i n e d . Furthermore, p r o j e c t s are l i m i t e d by the p e r c e p t i o n s of SEP p r o f e s s i o n a l s , which r a i s e s the question of whether or not options that are presented adequately r e f l e c t the f u l l range of i n t e r e s t s . A l i m i t e d s e l e c t i o n of p r o j e c t s a l s o c r e a t e s the p o t e n t i a l f o r a hasty implementation of unproven o p t i o n s . I l l ( i i ) P r o j e c t o p t i o n s have o f t e n i n the past, been developed and implemented before the manageability c r i t e r i o n of p r o j e c t s e l e c t i o n has been f u l l y s a t i s f i e d . T h i s p r a c t i s e , which d e r i v e s l a r g e l y from the d i f f e r e n c e s of p e r c e p t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s among SEP p r o f e s s i o n a l s , can r e s u l t i n sub-optimal enhancement a c t i v i t i e s . ( i i i ) SEP c u r r e n t l y does not submit a l i p r o j e c t s c o s t i n g l e s s than $500,000 to f u l l f i v e account e v a l u a t i o n p r i o r to t h e i r i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o an annual p l a n , and sometimes not even p r i o r to t h e i r implementation. These t y p i c a l l y s m a l l - s c a l e p r o j e c t s r e c e i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n mainly due to t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the n o n - n a t i o n a l income o b j e c t i v e s of SEP, as opposed to t h e i r economic e f f i c i e n c i e s . However, e v a l u a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n should be known e a r l i e r i n the process so that these o p t i o n s r e c e i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r implementation on the b a s i s of t h e i r r e l a t i v e m e r i t s . In terms of the second major category of i n f o r m a t i o n generated f o r SEP p l a n n i n g ( i . e . f o r m u l a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n of annual enhancement plans) there are a l s o some d e f i c i e n c i e s : ( i ) Information on the a n t i c i p a t e d i n c i d e n c e of e f f e c t s of annual plans i s presented in a h i g h l y aggregated f a s h i o n . T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e s i n t e r e s t s only a r e l a t i v e l y poor understanding of how t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s e l f - i n t e r e s t s w i l l be a f f e c t e d by proposed p l a n s . ( i i ) I n t e r e s t s and decision-makers are not presented with a range of a l t e r n a t i v e enhancement plans from which to choose. Although a l t e r n a t i v e "maximization p l a n s " are presented, these plans are generated only to show the t r a d e - o f f s among o b j e c t i v e s 112 that are inherent i n the s i n g l e plan recommmended by SEP to i n t e r e s t s . Improved i n f o r m a t i o n through improved r e p r e s e n t a t i o n L o g i c a l l y , recommendations to improve upon the i n f o r m a t i o n used i n SEP pl a n n i n g would address each of the info r m a t i o n d e f i c i e n c i e s i d e n t i f i e d above. For example, we can say t h a t : ( i ) SEP should develop and evaluate a g r e a t e r number and d i v e r s i t y of p r o j e c t o p t i o n s and plans so that the p o t e n t i a l f o r choice i n Program plan n i n g i s enhanced; ( i i ) more e x p l i c i t and c o o r d i n a t e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the manageability issue should occur; ( i i i ) e f f o r t s should be made to s u b j e c t s m a l l - s c a l e SEP p r o j e c t p r o p o s a l s to the f u l l f i v e account e v a l u a t i o n methodology at the a p p r o p r i a t e time; and, ( i v ) to encourage more i n t e l l i g e n t a d v i s o r y input to SEP p l a n n i n g , SEP e v a l u a t i o n s should l i n k "enhancement means" to " t a n g i b l e ends" ( i . e . b e t t e r i n f o r m a t i o n on the i n c i d e n c e of e f f e c t s ) . While i t i s perhaps i n s t r u c t i v e to h i g h l i g h t what these recommendations might i n v o l v e , i t i s d o u b t f u l that simply recommending such changes w i l l have the d e s i r e d e f f e c t i n a c t u a l l y improving the i n f o r m a t i o n used i n SEP p l a n n i n g . In order to t r y to e f f e c t an improvement, one must look i n t o the reasons why these i n f o r m a t i o n inadequacies e x i s t i n the f i r s t p l a c e . In t h i s regard, p u b l i c c h o i c e theory t e l l s us t h a t p l a n n i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i s generated i n the manner that i t i s , because of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior of SEP. In other words, i n f o r m a t i o n a l weaknesses of the SEP pl a n n i n g process are a r e s u l t of the inherent b i a s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , and simply to 113 recommend that those b i a s e s be r e p l a c e d with p u r e l y o b j e c t i v e and comprehensive r a t i o n a l i t y , would be u n r e a l i s t i c and f u t i l e . P u b l i c c h o i c e theory t e l l s us furthermore, that the way to improve the i n f o r m a t i o n generated f o r SEP decision-making i s to i n t r o d u c e to the p l a n n i n g process a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g i n f l u e n c e on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b i a s . That i s , to b r i n g to the SEP planning process a d i f f e r e n t set of p e r c e p t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s to act as a check on the excesses or omissions of the proponent agencies' p l a n s . T h i s " s o l u t i o n " r e l a t e s to the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and r o l e of e x t e r n a l i n t e r e s t s in SEP p l a n n i n g . While the SETG has not been i n i t i a t e d f o r the express purpose of a c t i n g as a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g i n f l u e n c e to p l a n n i n g , i t i s suggested here, that t h i s might be the primary value of such a group. There i s a f t e r a l l , no other group (government or non-government) that i s motivated to i n v o l v e i t s e l f at such a l e v e l , with the s p e c i f i c s u b j e c t of SEP p l a n n i n g . A c c o r d i n g l y , we can i d e n t i f y the SETG as a prime mechanism that c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y improve the i n f o r m a t i o n used in SEP decision-making. Our p r e v i o u s a n a l y s i s however, has shown that there are l i m i t a t i o n s on the extent to which the SETG i s f u l l y a c t i v e i n p l a n n i n g . SEP p l a n n i n g i s c u r r e n t l y an i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n from beginning to end. The r o l e of the Task Group has been simply to respond to t h a t which i s p r o v i d e d to them. The problem however, i s t h a t , given the t e c h n i c a l complexity of the subject of salmonid enhancement, l a y persons cannot r e a l l y query that which a team of t e c h n i c a l experts has produced. While the SETG might d i s a g r e e with a p a r t i c u l a r enhancement s t r a t e g y , i t cannot 114 j u s t i f y i t s p o s i t i o n i n t e c h n i c a l terms. T h i s i s the b a s i s of the " i n f o r m a t i o n problem". In l i g h t of t h i s problem, i t does not seem unreasonable to suggest that SEP's p u b l i c a d v i s o r y group should have a c c e s s i b i l i t y to independent t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e , such as a p r o f e s s i o n a l b i o l o g i s t and socio-economist (not n e c e s s a r i l y f u l l - t i m e s t a f f ) . With the a v a i l a b i l i t y of such "resources", the Task Group c o u l d evaluate some of the i s s u e s and i m p l i c a t i o n s of proposed SEP plans from i t s p e r s p e c t i v e , rather than having to accept on f a i t h that which i s presented. Topics of concern c o u l d be e x p l o r e d that they f e e l are important, but which government i s not s t r o n g l y motivated to pursue. Such independent analyses need not i n v o l v e exhaustive f i e l d r e s e a r c h ; nor should they d u p l i c a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a l r e a d y generated by SEP. The primary purpose of such s t a f f (that would re p o r t to the SETG) would be to c r i t i c a l l y . e v a l u a t e p r o j e c t s / p l a n s in order to help the SETG k-now: (1) i f SEP's e v a l u a t i o n s "stand up" as r e l i a b l e estimates of p r o j e c t / p l a n consequences, and (2) whether or not the range of a l t e r n a t i v e s i s being c o n s i d e r e d that adequately r e f l e c t s the d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s of d i f f e r e n t Task Group members. The s t a f f might a l s o p r o v i d e a l i a i s o n between the SETG and the RTG's, to ensure that r e g i o n a l concerns are a l s o being taken i n t o account. With these changes in e f f e c t , the focus of a d v i s o r y input to the p l a n n i n g process might not only be at the broad p o l i c y l e v e l , as i t i s now. But, i f the Task Group had a p o l i c y l e v e l concern, i t would a l s o be i n a p o s i t i o n to o f f e r s p e c i f i c advice on how to approach that concern, through an implementation 115 s t r a t e g y . Some of the funds c u r r e n t l y a l l o c a t e d to the Task Group f u n c t i o n c o u l d perhaps be used f o r the purposes d e s c r i b e d . Some a d d i t i o n a l funding might a l s o be r e q u i r e d but t h i s added expense must be viewed i n r e l a t i o n to the improved e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the plan n i n g process i t can be expected to b r i n g . As suggested e a r l i e r , ' t h e p l a n n i n g process and hence, the d e c i s i o n outcome, w i l l be enhanced i f a l l i n t e r e s t s are able to i n t e r a c t using i n f o r m a t i o n that i s con s i d e r e d r e l e v a n t by the value frameworks of a f f e c t e d i n t e r e s t s . Improving the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g framework as an  in f o r m a t i o n t o o l Development and e v a l u a t i o n of annual SEP expenditure plans i s conducted w i t h i n the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e p l a n n i n g framework. The essence of t h i s framework i s e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n that the s o c i a l and environmental o b j e c t i v e s of government are o f t e n achieved at an o p p o r t u n i t y cost to economic e f f i c i e n c y , and v i c e v e r s a . To t h i s end, the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e t o o l i n v o l v e s the systematic p r e s e n t a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s c e n a r i o s ( i . e . p l a n s ) , showing to decision-makers the nature of the t r a d e o f f s among o b j e c t i v e s that are inherent i n and among p l a n s . The r a t i o n a l e of the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e framework i s that u l t i m a t e l y , SEP a l l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s must be d e r i v e d p o l i t i c a l l y , not a n a l y t i c a l l y . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n d i s p l a y system w i l l encourage d e c i s i o n s that more a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t the changing a s p i r a t i o n s of the p u b l i c . SEP's a g g r e s s i v e p u r s u i t of the 50 m i l l i o n pound p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t (to occur at no expense to government) appears however, 116 to have compromised the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the m u l t i p l e -o b j e c t i v e t o o l . T h i s i s s u e i s d i s c u s s e d below b r i e f l y . P r o j e c t s are c u r r e n t l y developed in search of the g r e a t e s t p r o d u c t i o n i n the l e a s t c o s t manner. While t h i s i s unquestionably d e s i r a b l e , i t has meant that r e l a t i v e l y few p r o j e c t s are c o n c e p t u a l i z e d which, although they might have r e l a t i v e l y modest p r o d u c t i o n p o t e n t i a l , would be p a r t i c u l a r l y good at s a t i s f y i n g non-economic Program o b j e c t i v e s . A c c o r d i n g l y , the p o t e n t i a l to c o n s t r u c t a l t e r n a t i v e annual plans that f u l l y emphasize n o n - e f f i c i e n c y o b j e c t i v e s i s c o n s t r a i n e d . If d i v e r s i t y among a l t e r n a t i v e plan o p t i o n s i s low, the t r a d e - o f f s that "might have been"'cannot be shown to decision-makers — hence, the m u l t i p l e - o b j e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n t o o l cannot work to i t s f u l l e s t p o t e n t i a l . T h i s problem a r i s e s above and beyond any p o l i t i c a l -a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior of the SEP o r g a n i z a t i o n that might c o n s t r a i n p r o j e c t / p l a n c h o i c e . Rather, i t i s a f u n c t i o n of the p r e - s e t p o l i t i c a l judgement that c o s t - r e c o v e r y should occur. T h i s p r e - s e t c o n d i t i o n however, reduces the p o t e n t i a l f o r p l a n n i n g f l e x i b i l i t y . Changing p r i o r i t i e s of government cannot be e a s i l y accommodated because p r o j e c t s and thus, plans are not being c o n c e p t u a l i z e d that correspond to those p o t e n t i a l changes in p r i o r i t i e s . T h i s r e l a t e s a l s o to the issue of u n c e r t a i n t y i n SEP decision-making. In order to manage u n c e r t a i n t y using "adaptive" p r i n c i p l e s , SEP should not proceed under the i n f l u e n c e of pre-set c o n d i t i o n s that can l e a d p o t e n t i a l l y to b i o l o g i c a l or f i n a n c i a l i r r e v e r s i b i l i t i e s , thereby f o r e c l o s i n g f u t u r e o p t i o n s . 117 R e c a l l H o l l i n g ' s (1978, p.8) warning t h a t , "Even the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e s of environmental p o l i c i e s and developments are u n c e r t a i n . . . A design that assumes o b j e c t i v e s are immutable can r a p i d l y f o r e c l o s e options i f those o b j e c t i v e s s h i f t " . Removal of the economic c o n s t r a i n t might increase the p o t e n t i a l for a wider range of p r o j e c t / p l a n options to be developed -- options which are more s e n s i t i v e to the Program's non-national income o b j e c t i v e s . This does not mean however, that cost-recovery cannot occur. Decision-makers can s t i l l choose and advisory groups can s t i l l recommend s e l e c t i o n of an appropriate plan w i t h i n which cost-recovery can be accommodated. Their choice however, w i l l be made on the b a s i s of f u l l knowledge of what i s being given up ( i n terms of progress foregone in other account areas) to achieve the economic emphasis. S i m i l a r l y , i f i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l wisdom, decision-makers choose to forego an economic emphasis, they can s e l e c t an a l t e r n a t i v e plan with knowledge of how much that p a r t i c u l a r s trategy w i l l c o s t . P o l i t i c a l (and hence, t h e o r e t i c a l l y p u b l i c sentiment), as w e l l as a d a p t a b i l i t y , can be more e a s i l y accommodated i f t h i s p o t e n t i a l for informed choice i s enhanced. In l i g h t of the above, i t i s recommended that future SEP planning should proceed i n the absence of a pre-set emphasis of any of the s o c i a l or economic o b j e c t i v e s . Furthermore, planning should proceed in the absence of production and time t a r g e t s . The questions are r a i s e d , why has i t been so important for SEP to t r y to a t t a i n 50 m i l l i o n pounds incremental production, and why must t h i s be accomplished i n a short seven year period? What makes these seemingly a r b i t r a r y t a r g e t s so immutable? 118 The consequence of "chasing" these t a r g e t s appears to have pushed the Program i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n - - a d i r e c t i o n which i s not agreed u n i v e r s a l l y to be the most d e s i r a b l e . Evidence of t h i s i s found i n SETG d i r e c t i v e s to SEP f o r the balance of Phase I p l a n n i n g . They s t a t e that SEP should: ( i ) " s a c r i f i c e f i s h p r o d u c t i o n i f necessary i n order to s a t i s f y the other accounts ( i . e . r e g i o n a l development, n a t i v e people, environmental, resource management). ( i i ) s a c r i f i c e p r o d u c t i o n i f necessary to s o l v e the management problems... ( i i i ) save threatened s t o c k s . To say 'there i s n ' t enough i n f o r m a t i o n ' i s n ' t a good enough reason not to do anything f o r them." (SETG, 1980). These statements i n f e r that continued p u r s u i t of production t a r g e t s and emphasis on the n a t i o n a l income o b j e c t i v e i s not the s o c i a l l y d e s i r a b l e enhancement s o l u t i o n . The p r e - s e t c o n d i t i o n s which are l a r g e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c u r r e n t SEP d i r e c t i o n were d e r i v e d p o l i t i c a l l y , and to change these c o n d i t i o n s w i l l r e q u i r e a change in p o l i t i c a l v iewpoint. 3. Decision-Making E f f i c i e n c y Improving the e f f i c i e n c y of SEP p l a n n i n g E f f i c i e n c y of the SEP p l a n n i n g process has been c o n s i d e r e d in terms of inputs to p l a n n i n g ( i . e . time, money and manpower) and the l e v e l to which p l a n n i n g i s improved on account of these i n p u t s . In t h i s sense, we have asked i f the p l a n n i n g process i s c o s t - e f f e c t i v e ; e f f e c t i v e n e s s being measured s u b j e c t i v e l y in terms of how w e l l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s and the generation of i n f o r m a t i o n has improved the o v e r a l l p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . Our a n a l y s i s has shown that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s v i a the a d v i s o r y mechanism i s a c o s t l y a c t i v i t y i n both f i n a n c i a l 119 and temporal terms, and that although t h i s a c t i v i t y has i n c r e a s e d the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the p l a n n i n g process, there remains room f o r improved e f f e c t i v e n e s s . That i s , the. p u b l i c a d v i s o r y mechanism co u l d f u n c t i o n more e f f e c t i v e l y and thereby improve p l a n n i n g , i f i t s r o l e was e l e v a t e d beyond simply having the o p p o r t u n i t y to a t t e n d meetings and respond to i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d to i t s members. As p r e v i o u s l y suggested, t h i s c o u l d be accomplished by p r o v i d i n g the necessary resources so that the SETG has access to independent t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e . In a d d i t i o n , i t i s suggested that by moving the SEB i n t o , a p u r e l y decision-making r o l e , an i n e f f i c i e n c y i n terms of p o t e n t i a l d u p l i c a t i o n of f u n c t i o n i s e l i m i n a t e d . No longer would there be two groups, both a s p i r i n g to provide p o l i c y - l e v e l management ad v i c e to SEP. Both of the above suggestions have been j u s t i f i e d e a r l i e r f o r reasons other than improving SEP p l a n n i n g e f f i c i e n c y . The e f f i c i e n c y argument serves to s u b s t a n t i a t e f u r t h e r the v a l i d i t y of these recommendations. 120 SEP: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE To t h i s p o i n t , t h i s t h e s i s has focussed on the mehanics of the SEP p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . We have been concerned more with p r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e s than with s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e s . But, p r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e s cannot be c o n s i d e r e d i n complete i s o l a t i o n of Program "consequences". In t h i s regard, p r e l i m i n a r y estimates i n d i c a t e that SEP w i l l a t t a i n 85% of the Phase 1 50 m i l l i o n pound p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t . As a f u r t h e r premium, estimates show that t h i s p r o d u c t i o n w i l l have been achieved i n an economic manner. ( i . e . with an o v e r a l l Phase 1 c o s t - b e n e f i t r a t i o of 1.34:1). (DFO, 1981). It remains unclear however, whether or not Phase 1 pro d u c t i o n estimates represent an incremental 50 m i l l i o n pounds, over and above n a t u r a l base p r o d u c t i o n ( i . e . a net i n c r e a s e ) , or i f t h i s f i g u r e r epresents p r o d u c t i o n f o r which SEP a c t i v i t i e s alone are r e s p o n s i b l e , i n i s o l a t i o n of the n a t u r a l base pro d u c t i o n q u e s t i o n . L o g i c a l l y , SEP's p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s must be i n t e r p r e t e d to mean a net i n c r e a s e of 50 m i l l i o n pounds from the t o t a l system. The p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are c l e a r : concurrent with the augmentation pr o v i d e d by SEP, the n a t u r a l stocks that we a l r e a d y have, must not be p e r m i t t e d to f a l l below c u r r e n t p r o d u c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y . The ways of ensuring t h i s c o n s e r v a t i o n of the n a t u r a l base are by r e g u l a t i n g f o r optimum escapements and through h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n . The problem however, i s that many of SEP's major p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s exacerbate the r e g u l a t o r ' s r o l e . 121 N a t u r a l stocks of low a b u n d a n c e / r e s i l i e n c e that are f i s h e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y with a r t i f i c i a l l y produced stocks of h i g h abundance w i l l decimate those n a t u r a l s t o c k s . T h i s t r e n d towards system homogeneity appears, i n any case, to be an eventual consequence of the p r a c t i c e of mixed-stock f i s h i n g . M a r s h a l l (1981) however, p r o v i d e s a graphic e x p l a n a t i o n of how a SEP emphasis on major f a c i l i t i e s c o u l d a c c e l e r a t e t h i s t r e n d . " I t i s w e l l documented that major new p r o d u c t i o n i n mixed stock f i s h e r i e s c r e a t e s c o n s e r v a t i o n problems ra t h e r than r e s o l v i n g them...As an example of what might happen in a mixed stock f i s h i n g s i t u a t i o n , l e t ' s assume that the hard-pressed f i s h e r y manager near the end of a dismal f i s h i n g season, knows that remaining m i g r a t i n g stocks are below normal abundance. Then, along through Johnston S t r a i t comes a bumper run of hatchery-produced chums worth about $15.00 a p i e c e . What does he do? Well, he probably i s n ' t going to t e l l i n d u s t r y that we b u i l d m u l t i - m i l l i o n d o l l a r h a t c h e r i e s j u s t to watch the f i s h swim by". Unless the r e g u l a t o r can do h i s job e f f e c t i v e l y , we w i l l end up with a t r a n s f e r of low-cost n a t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n to high-c o s t a r t i f i c i a l p r o d u c t i o n , with l i t t l e or no i n c r e a s e i n o v e r a l l p r o d u c t i o n (DFO, 1980(a), p.2). The t r u t h of the matter i s t h a t , d e s p i t e SEP's estimated Phase 1 c o n t r i b u t i o n of 42 m i l l i o n pounds, i t i s c u r r e n t l y not known how e f f e c t i v e the combined e f f o r t s of enhancement, r e g u l a t i o n and h a b i t a t p r o t e c t i o n w i l l be i n e f f e c t i n g an i n c r e a s e i n o v e r a l l system p r o d u c t i v i t y . These present estimates are "best-guesses" only -- i t i s impossible to know the a c t u a l success of SEP u n t i l the end of Phase 1 and beyond. With t h i s u n c e r t a i n t y i n mind, i t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e whether or not we should go ahead with a s i m i l a r enhancement s t r a t e g y f o r Phase 2. As yet, Phase 1 i s unproven as a net producer of 122 f i s h i n the q u a n t i t i e s t a r g e t e d , with the l a r g e s t element of doubt f o r Program success a r i s i n g out of the mixed stock manageability i s s u e . I t appears that SEP's p o t e n t i a l a g gravation of t h i s m a n a g e ability problem to which M a r s h a l l r e f e r s , can be t r a c e d to two phenomonon ( i g n o r i n g f o r the moment the r e a l cause of the problem -- the d i f f i c u l t y of r e g u l a t i n g excess f i s h i n g capac i t y ) : .1. the i n a b i l i t y of SEP b i o l o g i s t s and the GWG's to keep pace with SEP e n g i n e e r i n g s t a f f , who have a g g r e s s i v e l y supported major f a c i l i t y c o n s t r u c t i o n 2. the p o l i t i c a l requirement that Phase 1 produce 50 m i l l i o n pounds, in a seven year p e r i o d , with a c o s t - b e n e f i t r a t i o of 1.5:1. A c c o r d i n g l y , " n a t u r a l " enhancement s t r a t e g i e s ( i . e . small s c a l e e n h a n c e m e n t / r e h a b i l i t a t i o n p r o j e c t s ) , which do not appear to pose s i g n i f i c a n t m anageability problems, have not r e c e i v e d equal c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n o v e r a l l p l a n n i n g because they are g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d not as economically e f f i c i e n t . I t i s p o s i t e d here however, that d e s p i t e the obvious d e s i r a b i l i t y of economic e f f i c i e n c y , i t may simply not be p o s s i b l e to a t t a i n that o b j e c t i v e i n the short run, i f we are going to do what i s best f o r the resource i n the long run. The problem with the economic d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i o n i s that i t does not c o n s i d e r the c o s t s which major f a c i l i t i e s might impose upon the t o t a l system. If these hidden c o s t s were c a l c u l a t e d , i t i s d o u b t f u l that such f a c i l i t i e s would be so a t t r a c t i v e , e c o n o m i c a l l y . On the other hand, pr o j e c t s - which are c o n s i d e r e d uneconomic i n the present, may i n the long run be economically 123 j u s t i f i e d , because of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to o v e r a l l r e s i l i e n c e / s t a b i l i t y of the r e s o u r c e . If SEP i s s i n c e r e i n i t s o b j e c t i v e to "preserve, r e h a b i l i t a t e , and/or enhance n a t u r a l h a b i t a t s , and maintain and/or enhance v e s t i g i a l salmonid s t o c k s . . . " . ( F i s h e r i e s and Environment Canada, 1978, p.63), i t w i l l have to c o n s i d e r these hidden c o s t s . A reasonable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s o b j e c t i v e i s that SEP should be t r y i n g to o f f s e t and indeed, "repay the debt" of reduced system s t a b i l i t y that i s a consequence of h a b i t a t d e t e r i o r a t i o n and the h i s t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e of mixed stock e x p l o i t a t i o n . If indeed we do "maintain and/or r e h a b i l i t a t e v e s t i g i a l salmonid s t o c k s " i t i s suggested that the economic requirement, and a l s o the other d i s t r i b u t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s of the Program w i l l , i n the long run, take care of themselves. I t i s perhaps a q u e s t i o n of a short-term l o s s , f o r a long-term g a i n . In terms of f u t u r e p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n f o r SEP p l a n n i n g , Phase 2 should not "make promises" to t r y to a t t a i n a r b i t r a r y p r o d u c t i o n t a r g e t s that lock the Program i n t o an i n f l e x i b l e commitment to a p a r t i c u l a r enhancement s t r a t e g y . A d a p t a b i l i t y must be the goal of the Program in the i n t e r e s t of the resource i t s e l f , and u l t i m a t e l y the owners of the- resource. 124 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES CITED Barbour, Edmund. 1975. " M u l t i - O b j e c t i v e Water Resource P l a n n i n g " . A paper presented f o r the Second World Congress on Water Resources, December 17, 1975. New D e l h i , I n d i a . B l a s e t t i , Frank, and G. Alex F r a s e r . 1978. "Regional Development Account Methodology". Salmonid Enhancement Program. S o c i a l Account Working Paper No. 1. B.C. M i n i s t r y of Industry and Small Business Development. 1980. "The Manual of Resources". V i c t o r i a , B.C. B.C. Task Group. 1979. "The B.C. Task Group Reaction to the 80/81 P l a n " . Vancouver, B.C. Buchanan, James M. And- Gordon T u l l o c k . 1962. The C a l c u l u s Of  Consent. U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press. Ann Arbor, Michigan. D a r n e l l , Mike. 1980. "Skeena Sockeye C r i s i s - F i s h e r i e s Plans to S l a s h Catches". The Fisherman. V o l . 45, No.20, p . l . Deans, D. 1978. " R e l a t i o n s h i p Between the B.C. Task Group and the Salmonid Enhancement Board". Department of F i s h e r i e s and Oceans - SEP memorandum to L. Edgeworth. August 18, 1978. Department, of F i s h e r i e s and Oceans, SEP. 1979(a). " D i s c u s s i o n Paper on Program P l a n n i n g : The O b j e c t i v e s of the Salmonid Enhancement Program". Vancouver, B.C. August 20, 1979. Department of F i s h e r i e s and Oceans, SEP. 1979(b). " P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s of the Salmonid Enhancement Program". Vancouver, B.C. 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APPENDIX I PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THE STUDY 131 The f o l l o w i n g persons were in t e r v i e w e d f o r the purposes of t h i s study. A l l i n t e r v i e w s (conducted i n the s p r i n g and summer of 1980) were r e l a t i v e l y i n f o r m a l , but were s t r u c t u r e d i n the sense that c a n d i d a t e s were asked to respond to a pre-determined l i s t of q u e s t i o n s . 1. Harold Swan 2. A l Wood 3. Denis Deans 4. A l L i l l 5. Rob Morley 6. Bud Graham 7. Cindy Brown 8. Howard E n g l i s h 9. Bruce Buchanan 10. Ed Vernon 11. Gerry Burch 12. Tom Murray 13. Glenn S i n c l a i r A c t i n g E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r , SEP D i r e c t o r of SEP Planning C h i e f , S p e c i a l P r o j e c t s U n i t , SEP A c t i n g D i r e c t o r of Operations, SEP Economic A d v i s o r , SEP Planning Program Development B i o l o g i s t , SEP Research and E v a l u a t i o n Economist, SEP SEB member - C o n s e r v a t i o n i s t ( p r i v a t e ) SEB member - Pres. B.C. Packers SEB member - B.C. M i n i s t r y of Environment SEB member - V i c e - P r e s . B.C.F.P. SETG (Vice-Chairman) - sp o r t s fisherman P u b l i c involvement c o n s u l t a n t NB 1. In a d d i t i o n to the above, f i v e " q u e s t i o n n a i r e s " were r e c e i v e d through the mail from SETG members. 2. The p o s i t i o n s of s e v e r a l of the persons l i s t e d above have changed s i n c e the time of the i n t e r v i e w s . APPENDIX II SALMONID ENHANCEMENT TASK GROUP: MEMBERSHIP AND AFFILIATION SALMONID ENHANCEMENT TASK GROUP SETG E x e c u t i v e : G. McKnight, Chairman G. Mackie, past Chairman G. Young, Vice-Chairman B. Thornton, Vice-Chairman D. Aberley, L o c a l Government E. B i r c h , U.F.A.W.U. M. Burgess, Processor L. Burroughs, Education B. Cox-Rogers, Steelhead S o c i e t y B. D e v i t t , C o u n c i l of Fo r e s t I n d u s t r i e s of B.C. C. Guelke, B.C. Hydro N. Lemmen, F i s h e r i e s and Oceans B. Lenz, P a c i f i c T r o l l e r s A s s o c i a t i o n R. L o t z k a r , Canadian Consumers A s s o c i a t i o n R. M a r t i n o l i c h , V e s s e l Owner's A s s o c i a t i o n J . M i t c h e l l , Native Indian Food F i s h e r y K. Munroe, P.R. Fishermen's Co-op T. Murray, B.C. Fed. Of F l y Fishermen E. Newman, Pres., Native Brotherhood Of B.C. B. Pentland, Mining B. R i c e , P a c i f i c Salmon S o c i e t y B. Rogerson, C o n s e r v a t i o n i s t S. Ross, "Consumer/Taxpayer" J . Sewid, Native Indian Fisherman L. Shaw, B.C. W i l d l i f e F e d e r a t i o n A. Whitecross, Media Supporting Members T. B i r d , F i s h e r i e s and Oceans J . Boland, F i s h e r i e s and Oceans R. Cameron, M i n i s t r y of Environment D. Deans, F i s h e r i e s and Oceans Dr. W. F a l k n e r , F i s h e r i e s and Oceans L. H i n d l e , F i s h e r i e s and Oceans D Narver, M i n i s t r y of Environment L. S t r a i g h t , F i s h e r i e s and Oceans APPENDIX III SALMONID ENHANCEMENT TASK GROUP: ) TERMS OF REFERENCE 135 CIhe 'B.C. Hask Qroup (SEP) "SALMONID ENHANCEMENT TASK GROUP" (S.E.T.G.) TERMS OF REFERENCE I. Purpose The purpose o f the Salmonid Enhancement Task Group (S.E.T.G.) s h a l l be: t i ) t o p r o v i d e the views and a d v i c e o f a b r o a d l y - b a s e d , non-governmental group on m a t t e r s which a r e w i t h i n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the Salmonid Enhancement Program, ( i i ) t o c r e a t i v e l y s u p p o r t t h e Salmonid Enhancement Program (SEP) t o m a i n t a i n t h e program as a p o s i t i v e and dynamic c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the needs and a s p i r a t i o n s o f the B.C. community. I I . R e l a t i o n s h i p t o O r g a n i z a t i o n S.E.T.G. s h a l l r e p o r t t o Salmonid Enhancement Board (SEB). As the Task Group i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c and r e s o u r c e u s e r groups thr o u g h i t s membership i t a l s o s h a l l r e p o r t i t s a c t i v i t i e s t o them. I t s h a l l respond t o r e q u e s t s by t h e Board f o r a d v i c e on s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s and programs, and s h a l l work t o m a i n t a i n an a c t i v e d i a l o g u e between t h e two groups. I I I . Aims and O b j e c t i v e s A. The S.E. Task Group s h a l l b r i n g t o g e t h e r a b r o a d a r r a y o f i n t e r e s t groups from through-o u t t h e B.C. community t o : 1. A c t as a sounding board t o the Salmonid Enhancement Program and p r o v i d e f e e d -back t o i t . 2. A c t as spokesman f o r the p u b l i c by s t r i v i n g t o de v e l o p a consensus p e r -s p e c t i v e on Salmonid Enhancement Program p o l i c i e s , s t r a t e g i e s , and i s s u e s . B. The S.E. Task Group s h a l l p r o v i d e a s s i s -t a n c e i n the e d u c a t i o n a l r o l e o f SEP by: 1. E v a l u a t i o n o f s e l e c t e d e d u c a t i o n a l p r o c e s s e s r e l e v a n t t o salmonid enhancement. 136 Oh 'B.C. Oask Qroup (SZT) 2. A s s i s t i n g i n s e n s i t i z i n g t h e s t a f f o f Salmonid Enhancement t o t h e v a l u e s , views, and concerns o f the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . C. The S.E. Task Group s h a l l p r o v i d e a p e r -s p e c t i v e on s o c i a l and t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s o f t h e community t o Salmonid Enhancement. IV. Membership A. The membership (with a l t e r n a t e s ) s h a l l be nominated by the S.E.T.G. and a p p o i n t e d by the SEB. V. S t r a t e g i e s A. To ensure t h a t the S.E. Task Group f u n c t i o n s a d e q u a t e l y ; 1. The C h a i r p e r s o n and two V i c e - C h a i r p e r s o n s s h a l l be e l e c t e d from the S.E. Task Group membership f o r a one y e a r p e r i o d a t the f a l l meeting. The p o s i t i o n o f P a s t C h a i r p e r s o n would be a n o n - e l e c t e d p o s i t i o n f i l l e d by the p r e v i o u s C h a i r p e r s o n , w i t h p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a m b a s s a d o r i a l a c t i v i t i e s on b e h a l f o f t h e Task Group, b o t h i n t e r n a l l y and e x t e r n a l l y , p r i -m a r i l y w i t h q u e s t i o n s o f Task Group membership, commitment, and u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 2. The c o - o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f the Task Group p r o c e s s s h o u l d be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the S e c r e t a r i a t . The S e c r e t a r i a t s h a l l work w i t h , and take d i r e c t i o n f o r Task Group a c t i v i t i e s from t h e Task Group C h a i r p e r s o n . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s p r i n c i p a l l y a r e ; ( i ) f i s c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f S.E.T^G. c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e Department o f S u p p l i e s and S e r v i c e s , 1}7 Oh B.C. 3ask Qroup (S'EP) r e s e a r c h (prepare background o r b r i e f i n g papers f o r f u l l , sub<-group o r E x e c u t i v e s e s s i o n s ; arrange f o r t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e t o make p r e s e n -t a t i o n s t o f u l l , s u b g r o u p o r Execu- t i v e s e s s i o n s ; reduce t e c h n i c a l papers t o s h o r t i n f o r m a t i o n p a c k e t s f o r S.E.T.G. u s e ) , p r o v i s i o n o f o f f i c e space, s t e n o g r a p h i c s e r v i c e s , r e c o r d k e e p i n g , Task Group meeting o r g a n i z a t i o n , p o s t a l and m a i l i n g and t e l e p h o n e s e r v i c e s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and message c o u r i e r i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and o t h e r s p e c i f i c and n o n - s p e c i f i c d u t i e s as may be c a l l e d f o r from time t o time. 3. - There s h a l l be r e g u l a r meetings o f the f u l l group a p p r o x i m a t e l y once e v e r y t h r e e months, where members (or t h e i r a l t e r n a t e s ) s h a l l be p r e s e n t . There w i l l be a t l e a s t one i n t e r l o c k i n g meeting w i t h the SEB a n n u a l l y . Non-attendance (without a l t e r n a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) by any member a t two c o n s e c u t i v e meetings s h a l l cause the P a s t Chairman t o c o n t a c t t h e group and member r e g a r d i n g c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the member on the Task Group. Both r e g u l a r and a l t e r n a t e members s h a l l r e c e i v e c o p i e s o f a l l p e r t i n e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . 4. The S.E. Task Group s h a l l o p e r a t e by consensus w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o the r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l groups t o t ake s e p a r a t e p o s i t i o n s on s p e c i f i c i s s u e s . In the event t h a t consensus seems u n l i k e l y , Task Group d e c i s i o n s s h a l l be made i n open s e s s i o n s , and s h a l l be moved, seconded and v o t e d upon. ( i i ) ( i i i ) ( i v ) (v) ( v i ) ( v i i ) ( v i i i ) ( i x ) Ohe S.C. Oask Qroup (SEP) 5. , (a), T h e . C h a i r p e r s o n s h a l l p r e p a r e an agenda f o r each meeting, f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i t h the SEP e x e c u t i v e -; and s h a l l submit t h i s agenda t o t h e , , Task Group two weeks p r i o r t o the meetings. (b) The E x e c u t i v e s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r n e g o t i a t i n g c o n t r a c t s w i t h t h e Salmonid Enhancement Board f o r the maintenance o f the S.E. Task Group. 6. The S.E. Task Group s h a l l m a i n t a i n adequate r e c o r d s , which s h a l l appear i n the week f o l l o w i n g t h e meetings, i f p o s s i b l e . 7. • The S.E. Task Group may e s t a b l i s h sub-committees w i t h terms o f r e f e r -ence developed a t t h e time o f a p p o i n t -ment. - - - \ 8. The S.E. Task Group membership, • w h i l e d o n a t i n g t h e i r time, s h a l l however be remunerated f o r o u t - o f - p o c k e t expenses i n c u r r e d i n a t t e n d i n g a u t h o r i z e d S.E. Task Group meetings, o r a t t e n d i n g t o t h e b u s i n e s s o f t h e S.E. Task Group. Rates s h a l l be those c u r r e n t l y i n f o r c e as l a i d down , by th e F e d e r a l T r e a s u r y Board g u i d e -l i n e s . Should S.E. Task Group members be r e q u i r e d t o a t t e n d s p e c i a l b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t i e s , which take them away from t h e i r g a i n f u l employment, payment o f an a u t h o r i z e d h o n o r a r i a w i l l be p e r m i s s i b l e . : 9. These Terms o f Reference s h o u l d be reviewed a n n u a l l y . B. To improve the i n t e r a c t i o n and under-s t a n d i n g between the v a r i o u s components i n SEP: 139 Oh B.C. Oask Qroup (SEP) 1. The S.E. Task Group s h a l l i n v i t e , as n e c e s s a r y , p e o p l e i n v o l v e d i n Salmonid Enhancement who can p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n and s i m i l a r r e s o u r c e s t o improve the awareness o f the Task Group member-s h i p and thus s t r e n g t h e n the two-way communication w i t h i n SEP, 2. The S.E. Task Group r e c e i v e r e g u l a r b r i e f i n g s from the SEP E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r ; t h e E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r , o r h i s a p p o i n t e d d e s i g n a t e , s h a l l s i t e x - o f f i c i d on t h e Task Group. 3. The S.E. Task Group s h a l l a p p o i n t a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o the P u b l i c I n v o l v e -ment Working Group and s h a l l a c c e p t a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from t h a t Working Group as a member o f the Task Group. 4. The S.E. Task Group s h a l l r e c e i v e : (a) p r o g r e s s r e p o r t s from the S e c r e t a r i a t on a c t i o n b e i n g taken w i t h r e g a r d t o recommendations o f t h e Task Group. (b) p r o g r e s s r e p o r t s from t h e E x e c u t i v e on a c t i o n b e i n g taken w i t h i n SEP w i t h r e g a r d t o recommendations from S.E.T.G. 5. The S.E. Task Group i n the main s h a l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n the broad a s p e c t s o f the p h i l o s o p h y and p o l i c y - m a k i n g o f salmonid r e s o u r c e management and s h a l l l e a v e the d e t a i l e d o p e r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s t o t h o s e so a c c o u n t a b l e . APPENDIX IV SALMONID ENHANCEMENT BOARD: MEMBERSHIP AND AFFILIATION SALMONID ENHANCEMENT BOARD: LIST OF MEMBERS Government Members: 1. Donald D. Tansley (Chairman) - Deputy M i n i s t e r , DFO 2. H. Douglas Johnston - A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r , DFO 3. Wayne Shinners (Ex o f f i c i o member) - A c t i n g D i r e c t o r General - P a c i f i c Region, DFO 4. Dr. W.E. Johnson - Chairman, DFO Research Ad v i s o r y C o u n c i l 5. Dr. Ward Fal k n e r (Ex o f f i c i o member) - E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r of SEP, DFO 6. B.E. Marr - Deputy M i n i s t e r , B.C. M i n i s t r y of Environment 7. A l Murray - A s s i s t a n t Deputy M i n i s t e r , B.C. M i n i s t r y of Envi ronment Non-government Members: 8. Bruce Buchanan - P r e s i d e n t , B.C. Packers L t d . 9. Gerry Burch - V i c e P r e s i d e n t , B.C. F o r e s t Products L t d . 10. Ray P h i l l i p s - Commercial Fisherman 11. Rodney P i e r c e - Commercial Fisherman 12. Fred Carpenter - B e l l a B e l l a Band A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O f f i c e 13. Howard E n g l i s h - C o n s e r v a t i o n i s t 14. George McKnight - Chairman, Salmonid Enhancement Task Group. APPENDIX V SALMONID ENHANCEMENT BOARD: . TERMS OF REFERENCE 143 D r a f t No. 3 ( J u l y 21, 1978) SALMONID ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM  SALMONID ENHANCEMENT BOARD TERMS OF REFERENCE 1. MANDATE Recognizing that the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r the expenditure of p u b l i c funds cannot be delegated by the M i n i s t e r , the Board w i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the broad management and d i r e c t i o n of the Program by a d v i s i n g the M i n i s t e r on: - such matters as may be r e f e r r e d s p e c i f i c a l l y to the Board by the M i n i s t e r ; - p r i o r i t y areas f o r a c t i o n ; - the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the plann i n g and implementation of the Program; and the s t a t e of the salmonid stocks and i n d i c a t e d t h r e a t s to t h e i r c o n t i n u i n g e x i s t e n c e . Without r e s t r i c t i n g the g e n e r a l i t y of the f o r e g o i n g , the Board, more p a r t i c u l a r l y , w i l l be expected to c o n s i d e r , and ad v i s e and recommend on the f o l l o w i n g aspects of the Program: - p o l i c y and program o p t i o n s ; - program p r i o r i t i e s ( s p e c i e s , g e o g r a p h i c a l areas, types of f i s h e r i e s , e t c . ) ; - performance to date, and i n d i c a t e d improvements; - budgets, and a l l o c a t i o n of resources; - c o n t r a c t i n g p o l i c i e s and procedures; - c o s t - r e c o v e r y mechanisms and procedures; - resource-use i n t e r a c t i o n s ; broad departmental and governmental p o l i c i e s and procedures; and any other matters r e l a t i n g to the pl a n n i n g , implementation and success of the Program. 144 2. MEMBERSHIP The Board w i l l comprise 12 members, as f o l l o w s : - a Chairman; - two members, r e p r e s e n t i n g the Government of Canada; two members, r e p r e s e n t i n g the Government of the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia; and - seven members, r e p r e s e n t i n g the reso u r c e - u s e r s and the p u b l i c at l a r g e . While i n d i v i d u a l members may have vested i n t e r e s t s i n the t h r u s t s of the Program, they have not been appointed to represent those s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t s on the Board except i n s o f a r as they may c o i n c i d e with the o v e r a l l purpose of the Program. The E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r of the Program i s an e x - o f f i c i o member of the Board. 3. SECRETARIAT The Board w i l l be pr o v i d e d with a f u l l - t i m e S e c r e t a r y and an a p p r o p r i a t e s e c r e t a r i a t to undertake the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s of the Board, as d i r e c t e d by the Chairman. 4. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The d e t a i l e d planning and implementation of the Program i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Ex e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r , who w i l l r e p o r t to the Chairman. 5. MEETINGS The i n i t i a l meeting of the Board w i l l be convened at the c a l l of the Chairman at the e a r l i e s t convenient date a f t e r the Board i s f o r m a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d . Subsequent meetings w i l l be c a l l e d by the Chairman i n the order of 3-4 times per year, or as of t e n as he deems a d v i s a b l e . 6. RULES OF PROCEDURE -The Board may develop and adopt by-laws to govern the conduct of the business of the Board, subject to the concurrence of the M i n i s t e r . 7. ANNUAL REPORT Each year, not l a t e r than J u l y 31, the Board s h a l l submit to the M i n i s t e r an Annual Report f o r the preceding f i s c a l year ending March 31, to serve as the formal record o f . the Board's a c t i v i t i e s f o r that year. 145 8. RENUMERATION Board members may be p a i d per diem honaria and reimbursed f o r a c t u a l expenses i n c u r r e d , as approved by the M i n i s t e r . APPENDIX VI SAMPLE OF 1980/81 FIVE ACCOUNT EVALUATIVE INFORMATION AS PRESENTED TO THE SEB SALMONID ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM 1980/81 BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE FISH PRODUCTION PROGRAM' PLANS SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS PLAN ACCOUNT IMPACT NATIONAL INCOME COST PW to 1979 i n 1976 $M at 10% PLAN I: NATIONAL INCOME 1. National Income B/C = • 2. .0MAXIMIZATION PLAN 2. Regional Development C00D 3. Native People FAIR - -4. Employment FAIR 5. Resource and Environmental POOR Preservation PLAN I I : MAXIMUM INCOME 1. National Income B/C = = 1. 9REDISTRIBUTION PLAN 2. Regional Development VERY GOOD 3. Native People VERY GOOD 48* 4. Employment GOOD (55) 5. Resource and Environmental FAIR Preservation PLAN III: RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 1. National Income B/C = • 1. ,6PRESERVATION MAXIMIZATION 2. Regional Development FAIR 276* PLAN 3. Native People FAIR (278) 4. Employment FAIR 5. Resource and Environmental VERY GOOD Preservation PLAN IV: RECOMMENDED PLAN 1. National Income B/C = • 1. ,82. Regional Development GOOD 133* 3. Native People FAIR (146) 4. Employment FAIR 5. Resource and Environmental FAIR Preservation PLAN V:- SALMONID ENHANCEMENT 1. National Income B/C = = 1 .9 BOARD PLAN 2. Regional Development GOOD 99* 3. Native People FAIR (111) 4. Employment FAIR 5. Resource and Enrivonmental FAIR Preservation * Difference between net benefits for Plan I and other plans. Bracketed figure has been adjusted to account for difference i n scale between these two plans. 

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