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The Trikâya : a study of the Buddhology of the early Vijñânavâda school of Indian Buddhism Hanson, Mervin Viggo 1980

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THE TRIKAYA: A STUDY OF THE BUDDHOLOGY OF THE EARLY VIJNANAVADA SCHOOL OF INDIAN BUDDHISM by MERVIN VIGGO HANSON M.A., University of Saskatchewan, 1970 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY. in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Religious Studies We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1980 (5)Mervin Viggo Hanson, 1980 In present ing t h i s t he s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t ha t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r re fe rence and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permiss ion f o r ex tens i ve copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t he s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l ga in s h a l l not be a l lowed wi thout my w r i t t e n permi s s ion . Department of R E L I G I O U S S T U D I E S The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P lace Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date August 1980 ABSTRACT This i s a study of the t r i k a y a (the so- c a l l e d "three bodies of the Buddha") doctrine whereby the early Indian Vijnanavada Buddhists harmonized various b e l i e f s about the Buddha. The most important twentieth-century studies are reviewed, but are found to contain no r e l i a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the early doctrine. Therefore, I have undertaken t h i s study to c l a r i f y and int e r p r e t the t r i k a y a . The main te x t u a l source i s Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha, which contains the e a r l i e s t systematic o u t l i n e of the Vijfia.nava.da system. The Buddhological passages have f i r s t been t r a n s l a t e d (from Tibetan and Chinese) i n l i g h t of the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhava. They have then been compared and arranged to expose the general structure of Asanga's t r i k a y a . Why did Asanga introduce the t r i k a y a when other i n t e g r a t i v e Buddhologies ( e s p e c i a l l y the rupakaya/dharmakaya of the prajnaparamita) were already at hand? A comparison of his app l i c a t i o n . o f the t r i k a y a with the prajnaparamita treatment of s i m i l a r concerns reveals that the former integrates one idea that the l a t t e r does n o t — t h a t of the Buddhafield. The necessity to include t h i s nascent doctrine appears to have been the main reason f o r the introduction of the t r i k a y a . In the conclusion, the t r i k a y a has been analyzed further to obtain an abstract S t r u c t u r a l i s t model e x h i b i t i n g Asanga's Buddhology i n terms accept-able to the non-believer. It i s a useful framework within which to study the concept of Buddhahood i t s e l f , and i t s r e l a t i o n to other Vijnanavada dogma. It i s also a convenient way to compare the r e s u l t s of modern "".investigations. This model, derived by an extension of Asanga's own search f o r the i m p l i c i t pattern behind diverse s c r i p t u r a l statements about Buddhahood, i s s i m i l a r to those used by the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. Therefore, various hypotheses were suggested by h i s writings. The model i s a two-dimensional diagram which represents the encounter between Buddha (Svabhavikakaya—at the top) and Man (Prthagjana—at the bottom). They are, simultaneously, poles of a d i a l e c t i c a l tension and uninhabited e x i s t e n t i a l categories. The inhabited region in-.the middle of the diagram i s composed of a continuum of three s i t u a t i o n s along the h o r i z o n t a l axis. Each contains three elements: Buddha, Aspirant and Environment. The actual encounters between Buddha and Aspirant occur i n these s i t u a t i o n s . "They include that of the Neophyte i n the world, for whom the Buddha i s merely a message; the Sravaka who i s approached by a Nirmanakaya ( " h i s t o r i c a l Buddha") who teaches him by pain, and the Bodhisattva who approaches the Sambhogakaya (the god-like f i gure i n a Buddhafield) who matures him through pleasure. In the course of these three, the aspirant undergoes " r e o r i e n t a t i o n , " i . e . , moves up the v e r t i c a l axis to become a Buddha who, i n turn, reaches out to another aspirant. The remainder "of the Buddhological ideas from the text are placed within t h i s diagram. F i n a l l y , the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s model to other Buddhological questions i s examined. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ABSTRACT i i LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS i x LIST OF FIGURES x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x i INTRODUCTION 1 •'!• NOTES k CHAPTER I. REVIEW OF SCHOLARSHIP 5 1. W. W. R o c k h i l l , The L i f e of the Buddha (1907)- . . . . 5 2. H. Kern, "Sur 1 'invocation d'une i n s c r i p t i o n bouddhique" (.1906) 6 3. L. de La Vallee Poussin, "The Three Bodies of a Buddha" (.1906) 8 k. D. T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (1907) • • 10 5. M. P. Masson-Oursel, "Les t r o i s corps du bouddha" (1913) 13 6. L. de La Valle e Poussin, "Note sur l e s corps du Bouddha" (.1913) 19 J. A. Coomaraswamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism (1916) 2k 8. C. Akanuma, " T r i p l e Body of the Buddha" (.1922) . . . . 25 9. L. de La Vallee Poussin, Vijnaptimatratasiddhi (1928-29) . . . . . 28 V CHAPTER PAGE 10. D. T. Suzuki, Studies i n the Lankavatara S u t r a (1932) . 32 11. Hobogirin 3^+ 12. A. K. C h a t t e r j e e , The Yogacara Idealism-(.19.62) . . . 36 13. A. Matsunaga, The Buddhist Philosophy of A s s i m i l a t i o n (1969) 38 1^. G. P a r r i n d e r , Avatar and In c a r n a t i o n (1970) . . . . ^1 15. G. Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-Body" (.1973) . . . ^3 SUMMARY OF SCHOLARSHIP k6 CONCLUSION 60 1. MAITREYA 62 2. ASANGA 63 3. VASUBANDHU 6k NOTES 67 I I . THE TRIKAYA DOCTRINE IN THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA 70 A. SOURCES 71 B. WHAT IS THE VIJNANAVADA? 73 C. VIJNANAVADA OF THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA 80 D. A STUDY OF VIJNANAVADA BUDDHOLOGY IN THE  MAHAYANASAMGRAHA 85 1. 11:33: THE TWENTY-ONE GUNAS OF THE BUDDHA . . 87 a. The Noetic A b i l i t i e s 92 b. The E f f e c t i v e A b i l i t i e s 92 i . The Domain of the Buddha . . . . 93 i i . The Buddha-body 95 i i i . The Buddha-mind 96 v i CHAPTER PAGE 2. THE DHARMAKAYA 98 a. Obtaining the Dharmakaya 98 i . R e o r i e n t a t i o n of the A l a y a v i j n a n a . 98 i i . Obtaining the Dharmakaya: The Epistemic E x p l a n a t i o n . . . . 100 — By Non-conceptual and Subsequent Awareness . . . . 101 — By the F i v e - F o l d P r a c t i c e . . . 105 — By Amassing the Accumulation of  Equipment on A l l Bhumis . . . 107 — By the Vajropamasamadhi . . . 107 i i i . The Dharmakaya as R e o r i e n t a t i o n of the Skandhas 108 b. The Dharmakaya — What Is I t ? . . . . 113 i . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Claksanas) of the Dharmakaya Ilk i i . X:7: The Buddhadharmas . . . . 125 i i i . X:9-27: Gunas A s s o c i a t e d w i t h the Dharmakaya 128 c. The Dharmakaya as Seen by the Bodhisattva . 130 d. The Dharmakaya — A Summary 133 3. THE TRIKAYA l l l l a. A U n i f i e d T r i k a y a or Three Kayas? . . . iki b. Which Three Kayas? lk3 v i i CHAPTER PAGE c. The Mrmanakaya: Buddha i n the World . . ihQ i . The Mrmanakaya: A Summary . . . 156 d. The Sambhogakaya — Buddha i n the Buddhafield 159 i . The Sambhogakaya — General . . . 159 i i . The Buddhafield l6k i i i . Bodhisattvas — Residents of the Buddhafield 168 — Pleasure 171 — Reorientation 172 — Sovereignty 172 — Awareness (j nana or n i r v i k a l p a j nana 175 — Pleasure and the Other . . . . 177 — Pleasure and the Bodhisattva's  Maturation 178 e. The Three Kayas: I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . . 180 i . Mrmanakaya and Sambhogakaya Compared 185 i i . The Trikaya and C l a s s i c a l Problems . 187 — One Buddha, or Many Buddhas? . . 188 — Is the Buddha Mortal, or Immortal? 192 — Does the Buddha Remain i n Nirvana, or Not? 196 v i i i CHAPTER PAGE — C o n c l u s i o n 198 f . Why Three Kayas? 198 NOTES 200 I I I . CONCLUSION 216 A. CRITERIA FOR A MODEL 220 B. ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL 221 C. STRUCTURALISM 22*1 D. DEVELOPING THE MODEL 227 1. THE PRTHAGJANA 231 2. THE NEOPHYTE 232 3. THE SRAVAKA-NIRMANAKAYA ENCOUNTER . . . . 232 k. REORIENTATION 23k 5. THE SAMBHOGAKAYA-BODHISATTVA ENCOUNTER . . . 23h 6. THE SVABHAVIKAKAYA 235 7. THE FULL MODEL 236 8. THE MODEL APPLIED 2h0 a. R e o r i e n t a t i o n and S o t e r i o l o g i c a l P r o g r e s s 2^1 b. S v a b h a v i k a k a y a , Dharmakaya, and Su p p o r t f o r t h e Rupakayas 2^3 E. FINAL COMMENTS 2^7 NOTES 252 APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SECONDARY SOURCES 25^ APPENDIX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTED PRIMARY SOURCES . . . 262 i x ABBREVIATIONS BEFEO B u l l e t i n de l ' E c o l e Frangaise d'Extreme-Orient. Dk Dharmakaya JAOS Journal of the American O r i e n t a l Society LC Lokesh Chandra, Tibetan Sanskrit Dictionary (New Delhi: International Academy for Indian Culture, i960) Mvy Mahavyutpatti and Index to Mahavyutpatti. C o l l e g i a t e Series, no. 3, 3rd p r i n t i n g (Kichudo: Kyoto U n i v e r s i t y , Dept. of L i t e r a t u r e , 1965) Nk Nirmanakaya Sbk Sambhogakaya Svk Svabhavikakaya X LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE 1 223 2 229 3 231 h 238 5 2kh 6 2U8 x i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank those who have helped prepare t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y L. Hurvitz, my advisor, who has read i t scrupulously at the l a s t minute. His d e t a i l e d suggestions have greatly eased the f i n a l w r i t i n g . Many f a c u l t y and graduate students have contributed ideas and comments. Special thanks are due to Professor G. Nagao (Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University) and Alan Sponberg (Princeton). Professor Nagao's encouragement and advice has helped me to f i n d , and keep t o , a productive l i n e of enquiry. Dr. Sponberg has p a t i e n t l y shared hi s knowledge of te x t u a l sources, and given valuable c r i t i c i s m . Professors N i c h o l l s , C l i f f o r d , Kassis and Mosca have struggled m i g h t i l y to administer the doctoral program and myself. As administrators can expect l i t t l e appreciation short of the eschaton, may they a l l be granted that s p e c i a l corner o f f i c e reserved for those who a r r i v e with t h e i r f i l e s In Order. Mrs. Ruby Toren has displayed remarkable patience and co-operation through t h i s d i f f i c u l t typing job. The q u a l i t y of her work speaks f o r i t s e l f . I would also l i k e to thank those whose extraordinary assistance has made my studies at UBC possible. F i r s t mention must go to Dr. S. I i d a , whose many kindnesses i n the f i r s t years, i n c l u d i n g his willingness to vouch for an inexperienced l e c t u r e r , opened the program to: me. A l l of us i n the Buddhist program owe Dr. I i d a an acknowledgement for h i s personal sponsorship of Professor'Nagao's 1976,visit. I f Dr. K. C i s s e l l had not spent a tremendous amount of her own time teaching me to read Buddhist Chinese, the Chinese texts would s t i l l be closed. Thank you, Kathy. x i i E s p e c i a l l y warm thanks are due J . Richardson and N. K. C l i f f o r d who, i n addition to o f f e r i n g innumerable gestures of personal f r i e n d s h i p and o f f i c i a l a i d , have been i n s p i r a t i o n s to the s c h o l a r l y l i f e . From Professor Richardson i n p a r t i c u l a r , I learned that the study of another's f a i t h i s p r i m a r i l y an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d act of respect. The importance of the t r i k a y a was brought to my attention by the a c t i v i t i e s of the Tibetan sprul-sku, whose t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e i s informed and l e g i t i m i z e d through t h i s doctrine. Their Western careers show that i t i s a powerful mold for human asp i r a t i o n s . P a r t i c u l a r thanks go to Tarthang Tulku, who gave me many days of his time. I must also acknowledge with great respect the examples of the Venerable Dezhung Tulku and Kalu Rinpoche. Both are paragons of the concepts studied here. The usual inadequate thanks go to my wife, Judith. Her capable • assistance throughout the study has again proven the truism that wives of graduate students must read two canonical languages, be experienced copy-e d i t o r s , published authors and secure c i v i l servants. She i s ; and we made i t . 1 INTRODUCTION This d i s s e r t a t i o n i s a study of the t r i k a y a (the so- c a l l e d "three bodies of the Buddha") do c t r i n e — o n e of the main schemes through which Mahayana Buddhists have understood the concept "buddha." Buddhahood^" i s the most important notion underlying the Buddhist b e l i e f s and p r a c t i c e s of the past two m i l l e n n i a . It i s both the impetus f o r , and the goal of, the r e l i g i o u s l i f e . The Buddhist t r a d i t i o n o f f e r s a saving message to those enmeshed i n a p a i n - f i l l e d world. This message originated from a Buddha, who claims to be a r t i c u l a t i n g the method by which he personally found release from pain, and works to convert the aspirant, who has accepted the message, into a Buddha. This new Buddha then reformulates a message for the salvati o n of others. While these are two d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s i n s o f a r as they possess d i f f e r e n t personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , they share the same Buddhahood insofar as the e f f i c a c y of t h e i r teaching i s concerned. The e a r l y Indian community s p l i t into several schools which developed numerous b e l i e f s about Buddhahood. While the h i s t o r y of t h i s period i s murky, i t i s safe to say that many leading masters of the fourth century A.D. were acquainted with a broad spectrum of b e l i e f s i n every area of dogma and were attempting to formulate c a t h o l i c systems within which these could be accommodated. The broadest of the r e s u l t i n g schools was the Vijnanavada (or Yogacara ) whose development continued i n both Tibet and the Far East. The founders of the Vijnanavada divided Buddhist theory into several categories of concerns and developed a comprehensive theory, capable of inc o r -porating a wide range of opinions, around each. The category which included the various early ideas about Buddhahood was organized around the hew., t r i k a y a theory. In addition to harmonizing the early ideas, the t r i k a y a has since 2 proven capable of stimulating the development of new Buddhological doctrines :. i n other cultures, and i n harmonizing them with the Indian ones. Despite i t s importance, no s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation of the t r i k a y a i s a v a i l a b l e . Modern in t e r p r e t a t i o n s have f a i l e d i n at l e a s t one of three ways: — Many scholars, working only from the t r i k a y a passages of the Vijnanavadin t r e a t i s e s , have produced inter p r e t a t i o n s which contradict other key aspects of the system. — Many have produced narrow inter p r e t a t i o n s of the doctrine i n one c l a s s i c a l t e x t , which are inap p l i c a b l e to l a t e r developments grounded i n the c l a s s i c a l 3 t r i k a y a and explained by reference to i t . — The few scholars who have worked from the l a t e r t r a d i t i o n s (e.g., H. V. Guenther) have often produced inter p r e t a t i o n s which appear to be anachro-n i s t i c when applied to the e a r l i e r t e x t s . In t h i s study I attempt to develop an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which w i l l be a p p l i -cable to the entire range of Indo-Tibetan Buddhology. The study includes a survey of previous scholarship, an intensive examination of the t r i k a y a doctrine as i t appears i n Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha, the derivation of a st r u c -t u r a l model through which to in t e r p r e t the doctrine, and a b r i e f commentary of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s model to other t e x t s . In ad d i t i o n , a bibliography of primary sources for an expanded study i s included -' i n Appendix B. While the arrangement and analysis of the data from the Mahayan as amgr aha constitutes the bulk of the study, i t s focus i s the new s t r u c t u r a l model. •While formulating t h i s model:, i t became obvious that-the'analysis of the factors which l e d Buddhists to replace a two-kaya-by a t r i k a y a theory, and to • 3 defend the l a t t e r even while adopting further multi-kaya th e o r i e s , illuminates the broader question of how the r e l a t i o n s h i p between aspirant and other gives r i s e to various two, three and four-term descriptions of r e l i g i o u s experience. One of the next stages i n an extended enquiry would be to begin a comparative study of t r i n i t a r i a n i s m on the basis of these i n s i g h t s . k NOTES ^ Western emphasis on the h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l has degraded the symbolic "buddha" to a proper noun, a personal designation which i s automatically read as "a Buddha" or "the Buddha." In order to preserve some polyvalence, t h i s term which would simply be "buddha" i n the texts under consideration w i l l be rendered by "Buddhahood" i n t h i s study. Please note that "Buddhahood" i s not a state of being i n which an i n d i v i d u a l Buddha may e x i s t . 2 The lack of agreement on a name for t h i s school i s due to the many t r a d i t i o n s descending from the early masters (who usually c a l l e d t h e i r message simply the "Mahayana"). Later adherents to t h i s t r a d i t i o n i n India, Tibet, China and Japan understood the teaching i n s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t ways, accepted d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s about i t , and c a l l e d i t by d i f f e r e n t names. In addition, some saw the early Vijnanavada as several t r a d i t i o n s and applied a d i f f e r e n t name to each. Most of the names are versions of three l a b e l s : Vijnanavada (those who speak about vijnana), Vijnaptimatra or Cittamatra ("Ideation-only" or "Mind-only"), Yogacara ("Practitioners of Yoga") or Fa-hsiang ("Dharma-marks"—a Far-Eastern term). In the present study the early t r e a t i s e s ascribed to Maitreya-Asanga-Vasubandhu are regarded as one loose "Vijnanavada" system. This term was chosen over "Yogacara" because i t stresses the systematic rather than the meditative aspect. An example i s the Tibetan i n s t i t u t i o n of "'.sprul-sku" in- which a c e r t a i n monastic r o l e i s continuously f i l l e d by the same i n d i v i d u a l v i a the o f f i c i a l recognition of his or her successive reincarnations. This i n s t i t u t i o n i s derived from the t r i k a y a (";spr.ui-sku" i s simply the Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n of ''Mrmanakaya," one of the three kayas of the trikaya) and can be understood only through the parent doctrine. I f that i s interpreted i n the usual way ( i . e . , the Mrmanakaya i s an incarnation of a r e a l transcendent Buddha), many d e t a i l s of the '. sprulrsku's status and* functions remain-incomprehensible. CHAPTER I REVIEW OF SCHOLARSHIP 5 The lack of any adequate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a i s not due to neglect of the t o p i c . As early as 1939 Lamotte had spoken of the "immense" l i t e r a t u r e on the t o p i c , ^ and several studies have been published since. New research must begin with a c a r e f u l review of the e a r l i e r work. In t h i s section I s h a l l present such a review and attempt to define those approaches which have been most (and l e a s t ) successful. A complete survey of scholarship i s unnecessary. The. following review deals only with the major twentieth-century studies. No mention has been made of notices from the nineteenth century (Burnouf, Edkins, Beal, Schlagintweit and Kern a l l touched on i t ) , or of passing references i n p r a c t i c a l l y a l l l a t e r populatizations of the Mahayana. In addition to the primary s c h o l a r l y i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , a few Indian, Japanese and B r i t i s h works have been included because they represent the popular modern understanding of the doctrine i n those countries. The entries are i n chronological order. As several of these studies are sprinkled with non-standard, inconsistent restorations of Sanskrit terms and other d i f f i c u l t i e s , I have not marked s p e c i f i c errors within quotations. 1. W. W. R o c k h i l l . The L i f e of the Buddha. London: Kegan Paul & Co., 1907 (actual t r a n s l a t i o n s done i n 188^). This pastiche of Tibetan texts includes the abbreviated sutra on the ^ 2 t r i k a y a c a l l e d the 'phags-pa sku-gsum shes-bya-ba theg-pa chen-po'i mdo. Rockhill's t r a n s l a t i o n reads as follows: Once I heard the following discourse (said Ananda), while the Blessed One was stopping at Rajagriha, on the Vulture's Peak, together with an innumerable number of bodhisattvas, devas, and nagas who were doing him homage. Then from out t h i s company, the Bodhisattva Kshitigarbha (Sa'i-snying-po), who was (also) there, arose from hi s seat and spoke as follows 6 to the Blessed One: 'Has the Blessed One a body?' The Blessed One sa i d , 'Kshitigarbha, the Blessed One, the Tathagata, has three bodies: the body of the law (Dharmakaya), the body of perfect enjoyment (Sambhogakaya), the a p p a r i t i o n a l body (Nirmanakaya). Noble s i r (Kulaputra), of the three bodies of the Tathagata, the Dharmakaya i s a p e r f e c t l y pure nature (svabhava), the Sambhoghakaya i s a p e r f e c t l y pure samadhi; a p e r f e c t l y pure l i f e i s the Nirmanakaya of a l l Buddhas. Noble s i r , the Dharmakaya of the Tathagata i s the preroga-t i v e of being without svabhava l i k e space; the Sambhogakaya i s the prerogative of being v i s i b l e l i k e a cloud; the Nirmanakaya being the object of a l l Buddhas, i s the prerog-ative of permeating a l l things as does a r a i n . ' . . . The Bodhisattva Kshitigarbha said to the Blessed One, 'Make v i s i b l e these d e f i n i t i o n s of the true bodies of the Blessed One.' Then the Blessed One said to the Bodhisattva Kshitigarbha: 'Noble s i r , the three bodies of the Tathagata w i l l be discerned thus: the Dharmakaya i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n the whole a i r of the Tathagata; the Sambhogakaya i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n the whole a i r of a bodhisattva; the Nirmanakaya i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n the a i r of d i f f e r e n t pious'men. Noble s i r , the Dharmakaya i s the nature inherent to a l l buddhas; the Sambhogakaya i s the samadhi inherent to a l l buddhas; the Nirmanakaya i s the object of a l l buddhas. Noble s i r , p u r i t y i n the abode of the soul, the science l i k e a mirror (adarsadjnana), i s the Dharmakaya; p u r i t y i n the abode of the s i n f u l mind i s the science of equality (samatajnana); p u r i t y i n the perceptions of the mind, the science of thoroughly analysing, i s the Sambhogakaya; p u r i t y i n the abode of the perceptions of the f i v e doors, the science of the achievement of what must be done, i s the Nirmanakaya' (pp. 200-202). While R o c k h i l l made no attempt to explain t h i s l i t t l e passage, l a t e r references show that i t provided a succinct statement of the doctrine which enabled everyone to discuss the same thin g , no small matter i n the early days of widespread confusion about Mahayana texts and doctrines. 2. H. Kern. "Sur.1'invocation d'une i n s c r i p t i o n bouddhique de Battambang." Translated by La Vallee Poussin from an a r t i c l e i n Dutch, 1899- Museon, T (1906): i+5-66. ':. This begins: 7 namo stu paramarthaya vyomakalpaya yo dadhau dharma-sambhogi-nirmana-kayam ( l ) trailokyamuktaye: Nous traduisons: "Hommage a l a supreme v e r i t e , semblable a. l'espace vide, qui pour d e l i v r e r l e t r i p l e monde, a p r i s un Dharmakaya, un Sambhogakaya, un Nirmanakaya.' (p. k9). Kern begins by asking how " l a supreme v e r i t e " (paramartha) beyond the realm of thought, can clothe i t s e l f i n a t r i p l e body for the salvati o n of the world. He proposes (somewhat doubtfully) that the three are conventional (samvrti) bodies as i s the world which they save. Hence the ultimate does not r e a l l y become or assume form. What r e a l l y i n t e r e s t s Kern i s the place of t h i s doctrine i n Indian thought. Is i t merely a Buddhist version of the Hindu t r i m u r t i ? He notes that the t r i m u r t i r e f e r s t© both: past-present-future, and the manifestation of the supreme being--through the three • gunas. For the t r i k a y a to be re l a t e d to these, i t would have to exhibit a s i m i l a r meaning. To determine whether or not such a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s , he defines the terms dharma, sambhoga and nirmana. His d e f i n i t i o n s , and consequent i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the t r i k a y a theory with the Samkhya, are simply too i l l - i n f o r m e d to be s e r i o u s l y considered. However, his major conclusion s t i l l stands, although we might question why he chose the h o r i z o n t a l t r i m u r t i rather than a v e r t i c a l t r i a d such as Brahma-Visnu-Krsna: De ce qui precede, i l s u i t qu'entre l a Trimurti et l e Trikaya i l y a seulement ce c i de commun q u ' i l s disposent en tr i a d e s l a serie des phenomenes. F i n a l l y , Kern asks, Pour quelle raison l e s Mahayanistes o n t - i l s i n t r o d u i t dans l e u r systeme i d e a l i s t e , et y o n t - i l s adapte, t a l i t e r 8 q u a l i t e r , une doctrine a fondements m a t e r i a l i s t e s et r e a l i s t e s comme l ' e s t evidemment l a doctrine des t r o i s corps? Nous ne l e savons pas. On peut conjecturer que certaine condescendance a l'egard d'adversaires portes a l'accommodement, avec lesquels on se sentait apparente sous beaucoup de rapports et qu'on se s e r a i t v o l o n t i e r s associes contre un puissant et commun ennemi, a eu pour consequence l a c o n c i l i a t i o n de deux systemes primitivement divergents: mais l e s donnees necessaires nous manquent pour v e r i f i e r cette hypothese (p. 57) -Although there i s l i t t l e validf.information i n t h i s a r t i c l e , Kern's : approach', i s very interesting.. ^e^does^hot"" simply quote-definitions from a sastra, but bases his i n v e s t i g a t i o n on the following considerations: — As Buddhism developed v i s - a - v i s other Indian systems, a doctrine should be explained i n i t s Indian context. — Certain l o g i c a l problems are obvious to the European scholar. An attempt to resolve them w i l l shed l i g h t on the theory. — F i n a l l y , the raison d'etre of the theory must be considered. Kern's a r t i c l e i s the l a s t of the "remarks" by the older scholars. A more informed debate was i n i t i a t e d i n the same year by two d i s s i m i l a r and aggressive young men: Louis de La Vallee Poussin and D. T. Suzuki. 3. L. de La Vallee Poussin. "Studies i n Buddhist Dogma: The Three Bodies of a Buddha (Trikaya)." JRAS (1906): 9U3-9TT. M. La Vallee Poussin connects the t r i k a y a with the "Mahayana school," paying l i t t l e a ttention to possible differences between actual schools i n India, China, Japan and Tibet * He distinguishes three phases: — an early speculative doctrine of Buddhahood drawn from Sunyavadin sources. — a broadening of t h i s early doctrine to cover the e n t i r e f i e l d of dogmatics 9 (the Yogacara d o c t r i n e — a l t h o u g h La Vallee Poussin understands Yogacara as the system of Asvaghosa),./ — a concluding t a n t r i c phase. He i s interested only i n the f i r s t two phases. He knew, and wished to know, nothing whatsoever about the tantras; The Tantric authors . . . are more obscure and abstruse the more vulgar and obscene are the fa c t s that they have made the starting-point of t h e i r insane or f r a n t i c lucubrations . . Using the above d i v i s i o n s , La Vallee Poussin examines each of the three kayas i n turn. Unfortunately, his understanding of Mahayana theory was incom-plete and few of h i s comments are acceptable. It w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to quote his summary: I. The doctrine of the Trikaya as Buddhology, a f t e r i t s com-p l e t i o n , but yet free from the "ontological" and cosmogonic speculations. (A) The very nature of a Buddha i s the Bodhi (Enlightenment), of Prajnaparamita (Perfect Wisdom), or knowledge of the Law (Dharm'a), i . e . , of the absolute Truth. By acquiring t h i s knowledge, nirvana i s r e a l i z e d i n potentia or i n actu. The Dharmakaya, Body of the Law, of a Buddha i s the Buddha i n nirvana or i n nirvana-like rapture (samadhikaya = dharmakaya). (B) A Buddha, as long as he i s not yet merged into nirvana, possesses and enjoys, for h i s own sake and for others' welfare, the f r u i t of h i s charitable behavior as a Bodhisattva. The second body i s the Body of Enjoyment or B e a t i f i c Body (sambhogakaya). (C) Human beings known as Buddhas are magical contrivances (nirmanakaya) created at 'random by r e a l Buddhas, i . e . , by Buddhas possessed of b e a t i f i c bodies, sovereigns of celes-t i a l worlds , Tusita-heavens or 'Paradises' (Sukhavatis). I I . The doctrine of Trikaya as an ontologic and cosmologic system. (A) By Body of Law one has to understand the void and perma-nent r e a l i t y that underlies every phenomenon (dharma), or the store of the 1dharmas,' or more exactly the uncharacterized I n t e l l e c t (vijnana). (B) Body of Enjoyment i s the Dharmakaya evolved as Being, B l i s s , Charity, Radiance, or the I n t e l l e c t as f a r as i t i s i n d i v i d u a l i z e d as Buddha or Bodhisattva. (C) Magical or rather Transformation Body i s the same I n t e l -l e c t when d e f i l e d , when i n d i v i d u a l i z e d as 'common people' (prthagjana), i n f e r n a l being, etc. (pp. 9^5-9^+6). While t h i s pioneering study helped to open the subject to Western scholarship, i t contains l i t t l e acceptable information. In t h i s early phase of his career La Valle e Poussin was acquainted with only a few Buddhist t e x t s , and lacked the overview of Mahayana Buddhism necessary to make h i s t o r i c a l and do c t r i n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s within the "Mahayana school." His three-stage model i s confused and, should the reader supply more accurate d i s t i n c t i o n s , the argument disin t e g r a t e s . Above a l l , the author i s not dealing with the t r i k a y a doctrine but with a doctrine of three separate kayas, each studied i n an historical-developmental manner. k. D. T. Suzuki. Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism. London: Luzac, 1907-The sole s i m i l a r i t y between the approaches of La Vallee Poussin and Suzuki i s the fact that both describe a Mahayana school i r r e s p e c t i v e of time and culture. La Vallee Poussin was the European scholar for whom Buddhism was an extension ( v i a Sanskrit) of c l a s s i c a l s t u d i e s — a complex t e x t u a l puzzle. He seems not to have entertained the s l i g h t e s t suspicion that a continuing Mahayana t r a d i t i o n might be extant, or that adherents to i t could throw l i g h t 3 on t h e i r own scr i p t u r e s . Suzuki's apologetic i s a breath of l i f e amidst t h i s a r i d arrogance. His Mahayana i s not a p h i l o l o g i c a l game but a developing f a i t h : It i s naught "but an i d l e t a l k to question the h i s t o r i c a l value of an organism, which i s now f u l l of v i t a l i t y and active i n a l l i t s functions, and to t r e a t i t l i k e an archeological object, dug out from the depths of the earth, or l i k e a piece of bric-a-brac, discovered i n the ruins of an ancient r o y a l palace. Mahayanism i s not an object of h i s t o r i c a l c u r i o s i t y . Its v i t a l i t y and a c t i v i t y concern us i n our d a i l y l i f e . It i s a great s p i r i t u a l organism; i t s moral and r e l i g i o u s forces are s t i l l e xercising an enormous power over m i l l i o n s of souls; and i t s further development i s sure to be a very valuable contribution to the world-progress of the r e l i g i o u s conscious-ness. What does i t matter, then, whether or not Mahayanism i s the genuine teaching of the Buddha? (p. 15)-This attit u d e underlies the en t i r e book. Suzuki accepts the Japanese t r a d i t i o n , as i t reached him, as "Mahayana." He shows comparatively l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n i t s h i s t o r y , p r e f e r r i n g to present a doctrine palatable to West tastes. The fact that t h i s w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be a modified form of the doctrine he himself has received bothers him not at a l l . A f t e r a l l , i t has been continuously adapting for more than two millennia—why stop now? In b r i e f , Suzuki i s a missionary. From his Western contacts (e.g., Paul Carus), Suzuki seems to have concluded that the modern consciousness i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y Hegelian and devoutly C h r i s t i a n , and has presented Buddhism i n terms drawn from both. Two chapters of the Outlines are e s p e c i a l l y relevant: chapter IX, "The Dharmakaya," and chapter X, "The Doctrine of Trikaya." Suzuki views the Dharmakaya as the cornerstone of h i s Mahayana-Hegelian-Christianity (with some Vedanta thrown i n for u n i v e r s a l i t y ) : The Dharmakaya may be compared i n one sense to the God of C h r i s t i a n i t y and i n another sense to the Brahman or Paratman of Vedantism. It i s d i f f e r e n t , however, from the former i n that i t does not stand transcendentally above the universe, which, according to the C h r i s t i a n view, was created by God, but which i s , according to Mahayanism, a. manifesta-t i o n of the Dharmakaya himself. I t i s also d i f f e r e n t from Brahman i n that i t i s mot absolutely impersonal, nor i s i t a mere being. The Dharmakaya, on the contrary, i s capable of w i l l i n g and r e f l e c t i n g , or, to use Buddhist phraseology, i t i s Karuna (love) and Bodhi ( i n t e l l i g e n c e ) , and not the mere state"of being. This pantheistic and at the same time e n t h e i s t i c Dharma-kaya i s working i n every sentient being, for sentient beings are nothing but a self-manifestation of the Dharmakaya. Individuals are not i s o l a t e d existences, as imagined by most people. I f i s o l a t e d , they are nothing, they are so many soap-bubbles which vanish one a f t e r another i n the vacuity of space. A l l p a r t i c u l a r existences acquire t h e i r meaning only when they are thought of i n t h e i r oneness i n the Dharma-kaya. The v e i l of Maya, i . e . , subjective ignorance, may temporally throw an obstacle to our perceiving the u n i v e r s a l l i g h t of Dharmakaya, i n which we are a l l one. But when our Bodhi or i n t e l l e c t , which i s by the way a r e f l e c t i o n of the Dharmakaya i n the human mind, i s so f u l l y enlightened, we no more b u i l d the a r t i f i c i a l b a r r i e r of egoism before our s p i r i t u a l eye; the d i s t i n c t i o n between the meurn and t e m i s o b l i t e r a t e d , no dualism throws the nets of entanglement over us; I recognise myself i n you and you recognise you r s e l f i n me; t a t tvam a s i . . . This state of enlightenment may be c a l l e d the s p i r i t u a l expansion of the ego, or, negatively, the i d e a l a n n i h i l a t i o n of the ego. A never-dying stream" of sympathy and love which i s the l i f e of r e l i g i o n w i l l now spontaneously flow out of the fountainhead of Dharmakaya (pp. k6-kl,). Suzuki sees the "Doctrine of Trikaya" as a somewhat d i f f e r e n t doctrine, which he does not r e a l l y understand. He quotes from the Suvarnaprabhasa but does not seem to.'.utilize i t s ideas. Suzuki has no d i f f i c u l t y with the two-kaya model, into which he quickly s l i p s . The Dharmakaya i s God or Being, which i s manifested i n the phenomenal earthly Nirmanakaya. Suzuki r e a l i z e s , with some embarrassment, that t h i s does not r e a l l y touch the three kaya doctrine, and t r i e s to explain away the Sambhogakaya as an i n t e r l o p e r : But the conception of Sambhoghakaya i s altogether too mysterious to be fathomed by a l i m i t e d consciousness. . . . the most pl a u s i b l e conclusion that suggests i t s e l f to modern s c e p t i c a l minds i s that the Sambhogakaya must be a mere creation of an i n t e l l i g e n t , f i n i t e mind, which i s i n t e n t l y bent on reaching the highest r e a l i t y , but, not being able, on account of i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , ' t o grasp the object i n i t s absoluteness, the f i n i t e mind fabr i c a t e s a l l i t s i d e a l s a f t e r i t s own fashion into a s p i r i t u a l - m a t e r i a l being, which i s l o g i c a l l y a con t r a d i c t i o n , but r e l i g i o u s l y an object deserving veneration and worship. And t h i s being i s no more than the Body of B l i s s . It l i e s h a l f way between the pure being of Dharmakaya and the earthly form of Nirmanakaya," the Body of Transformation. It does not belong to e i t h e r , but partakes something of both. I t i s i n a sense s p i r i t u a l l i k e the Dharmakaya, and yet i t cannot go beyond material l i m i t a -t i o n s , f o r i t has a form, d e f i n i t e and determinate. When the human soul i s t h i r s t y a f t e r a pure being or an absolute which cannot be comprehended i n a palpable form, i t creates a hybrid, an i m i t a t i o n , or a r e f l e c t i o n , and t r i e s to be s a t i s -f i e d with i t , j u st as a l i t t l e g i r l has her innate and not yet f u l l y developed maternity s a t i s f i e d by tenderly embracing and nursing the d o l l , an inanimate i m i t a t i o n of a r e a l l i v i n g baby. And the Mahayanists seem to have made most of t h i s c h i l d i s h humanness. They produced as many sutras as t h e i r s p i r i t u a l yearnings demanded, quite regardless of h i s t o r i c a l f a c t s , and made the Body of B l i s s of the Tathagata the author of a l l these works... . (pp. 267-268). Modern Mahayanists i n f u l l accordance with t h i s i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n of the Doctrine of Trikaya do.not place much importance on the objective aspects of the Body of B l i s s (Sambhogakaya). They consider them at best the f i c t i t i o u s products of an imaginative mind . . . modern Buddhists look with disdain on these e g o t i s t i c m a t e r i a l i s t i c conceptions of r e l i g i o u s l i f e (pp. 268-269). In b r i e f , Suzuki s h i f t s to a two-kaya theory interpreted o n t o l o g i c a l l y , A f i n a l attempt to deal with the t r i k a y a by homologizing i t to the C h r i s t i a n t r i n i t y founders on the fact that he understands the Holy S p i r i t no better -than the Sambhogakaya... 5- M.. P. Masson-Oursel. . "Les t r o i s corps du bouddha." Journal Asiatique series 2, 1 (1913): 58I-618. M. Masson-Oursel had the following materials at h i s disp o s a l : two i n -s c r i p t i o n s , Stael-Holstein's Tibetan version of the Trikayastava, R o c k h i l l text, La Vallee Poussin's 1906 a r t i c l e , Suzuki's Outlines, the text of the Aphisamayalankara (which he had read with S. L e v i ) , and a r e l a t e d portion of an u n i d e n t i f i e d manuscript. He proposes a t e n t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these materials, e s p e c i a l l y of the data offered by La V a l l e e Poussin and Suzuki. The a r t i c l e i s i n three parts: — an examination of each kaya. — a discussion of the h i s t o r i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l roots of the doctrine. — extracts from the Abhisamayalankara and the u n i d e n t i f i e d manuscript. He begins by defining kaya as "organism" or "system" rather than "body," pointing out that i n Buddhist theory, the only s t a b i l i t y i s to be found i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p s which occur between phenomena: "Kaya designe une l o i de ce genre, par opposition a l a f i x i t e r i g i d e d'une substance ou d'une personnalite." The author maintains that "dharma" i n "Dharmakaya" has a dual s i g n i f i c a -t i o n : the sense of a moral r u l e or law (as i n the P a l i dhammakaya), and the sense of e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t y , r e a l i t y , true nature. As the prototype of morality i t i s the f i r s t r e l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e . As the supreme abstraction i t i s the f i r s t metaphysical p r i n c i p l e . While La Vallee Poussin has c r i t i c i z e d Suzuki f o r accepting the former, Masson-Oursel castigates him for ignoring the l a t t e r . Further, he points out the inconsistency between La Vallee Poussin's r e j e c t i o n of the Dharmakaya as o n t o l o g i c a l substrate and the o n t o l o g i c a l l y oriented explanation i n h i s 1906 a r t i c l e . Masson-Oursel goes on to i d e n t i f y the tathagatagarbha with the alayavijnana and tackles the problem which to La Vallee Poussin had presented a "cosmic" dimension: II peut sans doute sembler etrange que l e Dharmakaya 15 d'un Bouddha (car tous l e s Bouddhas possibles possedent, theoretiquement, l e s t r o i s kaya) s o i t proclame l a matrice des autres Bienheureux; mais c'est simplement .urie facon d'indiquer que l e Dharmakaya appartient en commun a tous l e s Tathagatas, c'est-a-dire d'affirmer l ' u n i t e du bouddhisme, l ' i d e n t i t e de sa philosophie et de sa morale a travers l ' i n f i n i e m u l t i p l i c i t e des Bouddhas concevables (pp. 58^-585). He also mentions the mythical i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Dharmakaya with such figures as Vairocana. He concludes that, "en raison de ses a t t r i b u t s a l a f o i s metaphysiques et moraux, est proprement l a conception Mahayaniste de l'absolu." As such, i t i s somehow "above" the other two— they are aspects of i t . The author t r a n s l a t e s "Sambhogakaya" l i t e r a l l y as "body of beatitude," of "body of sympathy," but admits that t h i s helps very l i t t l e . He begins with La Valle e Poussin's observation that, "un Bouddha, tant q u ' i l n'est pas encore plonge dans-le Nirvana, j o u i t , pour son propre avantage et pour l'avantage d'autrui, du f r u i t de sa conduite c h a r i t a b l e comme Bodhisattva." But, objects Masson-Oursel, i f the Sambhogakaya i s a stage p r i o r to f u l l Buddhahood, how can i t be a body of the Buddha? La Va l l e e Poussin's second explanation was that " l e Dharmakaya evolue a l ' e t a t d'etre, de beatitude, de cha r i t e , d'eclat lumineux ou 1 ' i n t e l l e c t (vijnana) en tant q u ' i l est i n d i v i d u -a l i s e comme Bouddha ou Bodhisattva." To t h i s Masson-Oursel asks, "Nous aimerionsasavoir quel est l e rapport entre l a jouissance qu'a l e Dharmakaya lui-meme, et son e x t e r i o r i s a t i o n en d'autres etres." Presumably t h i s i s an honest question and not a r h e t o r i c a l r e f u t a t i o n l i k e the l a s t . C e r t a i n l y i t has been a key question for the Buddhists themselves. Masson-Oursel's own understanding i s that the Sambhogakaya i s an i n t e r -mediate kaya, sharing the natures of both Dharmakaya and Nirmanakaya. It i s 16 manifested for the benefit of the Bodhisattvas, whose nature explains the character of the manifestation. To t h i s idea he t i e s an explanation of the samadhikaya, the vipakakaya or punya-sambhara, and of the marks of the Buddha. But a l l of t h i s does not explain how or why the t o t a l l y transcendent Dharmakaya manifests i t s e l f . Masson-Oursel notes La Vallee Poussin's dual explanation: — that the Buddha's store of merit automatically gives r i s e to a Sambhogakaya for the sal v a t i o n of a l l beings. — that the Sambhogakaya represents a compassionate response on the part of the Buddha. But, Masson-Oursel asks, i f the manifestation i s mechanical or automatic, why i s the concept of compassion necessary? These two are, he f e e l s , contra-d i c t o r y . We may remark here that Masson-Oursel seems to be unacquainted with the Bodhisattva vow and i s probably trapped by Western connotations of "compassion." To answer the question of how a Buddha may possess a Sambhogakaya, the author r e f e r s to a passage of the Suvarnaprabhasa quoted by Suzuki: the simile of moon, water and v i s u a l patch, a l l three of which are required to constitute an image, The moon represents the Dharmakaya, the water the Bodhisattva, the v i s u a l patch the Sambhogakaya which unites them. This tapers o f f into an obscure argument from Spinoza. F i n a l l y , he says: La p r i n c i p a l e d i f f i c u l t e que nous eprouvons a nous f a i r e une idee du Sambhogakaya reside dans son caractere a l a f o i s o b j e c t i f , comme manifestation, et s u b j e c t i f , comme beatitude. Mais toute metaphysique a ete forcee, bon gre, mal gre, de reconnaitre a l'absolu ces deux caracteres; l e Dharmakaya n ' e t a i t - i l pas deja etre et bodhi? Nous ne nous f l a t t o n s pas, d i a i l l e u r s de d i s s i p e r l e s i n c e r t i t u d e s qui f l o t t e n t 17 autour du concept de Sambhogakaya: l e rendre pleinement i n t e l l i g i b l e s e r a i t se meprendre sur sa s i g n i f i c a t i o n authen-tique, p u i s q u ' i l faudrait etre Bodhisattva pour penetrer veritablement son sens, de meme que l e Dharmakaya n'est comprehensible—a supposer qu'on a i t encore l e d r o i t .•c~ d'employer ce mot—qu'aux seuls Bouddhas (p. 590)-Although t h i s explanation i s c e r t a i n l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , Masson-Oursel has brought out two important points: — the close r e l a t i o n s h i p between Sambhogakaya and Bodhisattva. — the intermediate, r e l a t i o n a l character of the Sambhogakaya. Both of these must be retained i n any future discussion. The author i s much more ce r t a i n about the Nirmanakaya: Dans l e Dharmakaya l.Vessence du Bouddha e t a i t tellement i n t e r i e u r e a elle-meme, qu'.'elle se renfermait en une i n d i v i -s i b l e unite, superieure a toute conscience; dans l e Sambho-gakaya cette essence se rend a c c e s s i b l e , sans to u t e f o i s se d i v i s e r , aux etres devenus l e s plus proches d'elle-meme; dans l e Nirmanakaya e l l e s'.'exteriorise en apparences impar-f a i t e s , i n d i v i d u e l l e s , multiples. . . . Nirmanakaya designe avant tout l e s Bouddhas sous l a forme ou i l s ont apparu ou apparaitront sur cette t e r r e . Au l i e u de r e s t e r indifferents. dans l ' e t e r n i t e , i l s envoient en ce monde de misere des r e f l e t s (pratibimba) d'eux-memes. . . (p. 591). This seems reasonable. However, he continues: Le nom de Nirmanakaya s'applique en outre, en un sens plus l a r g e , a toutes apparences sensibles, aux phenomenes du monde du desir (kamaloka). Aussi ce kaya e s t - i l present partout (sarvatraga); i l est l e createur (nirmatar) de cet univers, theatre de notre v i e (p. 591)• The author accounts for these two ideas (Nirmanakaya as Sakyamuni and Nirmanakaya as samsara) by suggesting that they r e f e r to opposite views of the 18 same r e a l i t y , that the Nirmanakaya i s an ambiguous concept, "La meme idee se retrouve i c i sous une forme plus imagee, dans cette i d e n t i t e du createur et du saveur ausein du Nirmanakaya." Should t h i s suggestion r e a l l y hold up, i t would provide an a l t e r n a t i v e to La V a l l e e Poussin's h i s t o r i c a l stages separating the Buddhological from the cosmological. A f t e r h i s review of each kaya, the author surveys the h i s t o r i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the doctrine. He says frankly, II est regrettable que 1'insuffisance des documents dont nous disposons nous a i t contraint de r e s t i t u e r cette abstruse theorie des t r o i s corps au moyen de textes des provenances et des epoques l e s plus disparates. Le sens de l a doctrine ne sera vraiment connu que lorsque nous pourrons determiner dans quelles circonstances e l l e est nee, dans quelle mesure e l l e a v a r i e (p. 592). A f t e r a b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l sketch,:of the Lokpttara idea, Masson-Oursel summarizes: A i n s i , l e probleme des t r o i s corps naquit d'un e f f o r t s p e c u l a t i f pour c o n c i l i e r l e s t r a i t s c o n t r a d i c t o i r e s de l a personnalite du Bouddha: l a valeur absolue de son enseigne-ment et l e s contingences de sa v i e humaine. La s o l u t i o n consiste a poser dans l ' e t e r n e l un Dharmakaya absolu, et a projeter dans l e temps, dans l'espace, dans l e monde, une ombre de ce dieu, l e Nirmanakaya. . . . l a doctrine prend une forme metaphysique bien plus a b s t r a i t e chez Asanga. . . . E l l e revet aussi l a forme d'un c u l t e populaire; des exvoto sont consacres au Sambhogakaya ou au Nirmanakaya comme chez nous au Sacre-Coeur. Le dogme nouveau s'etend au Tibet, a l a Chine, a l a Mongolie, au Japon, i l s'y perpetue jusqu'a nos jours. Au cours du moyen age, l e tantrisme m u l t i p l i a selon sa f a n t a i s i e l e s corps du Bouddha, qui furent quatre, cinq, ou plus nombreux encore (p. 59^)-This, of course, does not r e a l l y explain the t r i k a y a system, only a two-kaya idea, plus an added popular cult.- Masson-Oursel also speaks of. the influence of 'Tpopula;*"' Hinduism: "Le trikaya-fait," en quelque . sort e pendant a. .la t r i m u r t i , " 19 but does not go so f a r as to suggest that the t r i a d i c pattern was simply a c u l t u r a l given which could account for the t r i k a y a independently of .any l o g i c i n t e r n a l to the doctrine. Two Sanskrit texts and t r a n s l a t i o n s dealing.with the'-kayas:. are" appended to t h i s a r t i c l e . The f i r s t i s an extract from the Abhisamay&lankara. The second i s an u n t i t l e d Vijffanavadin manuscript. From these he reaches the following conclusions: Pour conclure, en ce qui concerne l a theorie des corps, l a contribution p r i n c i p a l e que l e s textes c i t e s apportent a notre enquete, c'est que l e Svabhavikakaya et l e Dharmakaya sont des systemes d'ideaux (dharma, dharmata), conditions abstraites de l a connaissance supreme, sans d u a l i t e , sans m u l t i p l i c i t y , sans developpement; que l e Sambhogakaya est un systeme de signes (laksana, anulaksana) par lesquels un Bouddha se manifeste aux Bodhisattvas| enfin que l e Nair-manikakaya est.un systeme d'actions (karmani) par l e q u e l un Bouddha se revele d'une fagon phenomenale aux Cravakas, etc. . . . Quant a f i x e r l e sens precis de l a multitude de con-cepts auxquels i l est f a i t a l l u s i o n dans ces textes, c'est pour 1'instant une entreprise peu abordable, car nous n'avons guere pour l a plupart d'entre eux d'autre point de comparai-son que l e Mahayana-SutraUamkara d'Asanga, . . (pp. 6l7-6l8). , 6. L. de La Val l e e Poussin. "Note sur l e s Corps du Bouddha." Museon,- 32 (1913): 257-29 0., La Vallee." .Poussin. rejoins:' the 'discussion with a flourish.: Pour se f a i r e une idee exacte des Corps du Bouddha, c'est-a-dire d'un chapitre important de l a "bouddhologie," • i l faut embrasser toute l ' h i s t o i r e du Bouddhisme, depuis le s origines jusqu'aux mythologies et aux theosophies s i penetrees de Civaisme qu'elles meritent a peine l e nom de bouddhiques. II faut aussi passer en revue diverses philosophies. . . . Et c'est l a notre ambition (p. 257)-Although the notes which follow f a l l short of t h i s grand i n t e n t i o n , they reveal the author's growing awareness of the complexity of Buddhist doctrine. 20 He maintains h i s e a r l i e r perspective hut subdivides h i s three stages and inte r p r e t s them i n a more sophisticated manner. He f i r s t discusses "Archaic Buddhism," which recognized a - v i s i b l e form (rupakaya), and the l i v i n g embodi-ment of the doctrine (Dharmakaya). He does not explain his r e j e c t i o n of the notion that the "kaya" i n Dharmakaya indicates that the doctrine was the l a t e r representative of the charismatic Buddha. He then turns to "Scholasticism," i n which the Buddhists retained the word "Dharmakaya" but s h i f t e d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of "dharma" to an Abhidharmic sense. Hence, Dharmakaya came to mean: . . . l e Bouddha lui-meme, c'est l a c o l l e c t i o n , l'aggre-gat et l a se r i e des elements psychiques et materiels qui constituent l ' i n d i v i d u qu'on appelle un Bouddha, son ame et son corps, dans notre langage occidental. — Mais dharmakaya s'entendra au propre des "elements" qui font que cet i n d i v i d u est un Bouddha. Le Bouddha, en tant q u ' i l est v i s i b l e , l e rupakaya, "corps v i s i b l e , " c o l l e c t i o n des dharmas v i s i b l e s ou materiels, n'est qu'une portion du Bouddha. Ces dharmas v i s i b l e s , plus l e s dharmas i n v i s i b l e s , sensations, pensees, etc., sont tout l e Bouddha (p. 258). However, he r e a l i z e s that f i n e r d i s t i n c t i o n s must be made: 3. Mais i l faut distinguer t r o i s ecoles. A. L'ecole d'Abhidharma ou du P e t i t Vehicule. . . . Cette ecole c r o i t a l a r e a l i t e s u b s t a n t i e l l e des dharmas, et sa c r i t i q u e s'arrete a l a negation de l ' i n d i v i d u (pudgala- nairatmya). B. -C. L'ecole Madhyamika ou n i h i l i s t (premier s i e c l e de notre ere?) et l ' e c o l e Vijnanavadin ou i d e a l i s t e (un peu posterieure?) nient.1'existence en soi des dharmas: c'est l a 21 these du dharmanairatmya, qui ca r a c t e r i s e l e s philosophies du Grand Vehicule. Ces deux ecoles tiennent que tous l e s corps et toutes l e s pensees sont "vides" (gunya). La r e e l l e nature (tathata) des choses comme des in d i v i d u s , des Bouddhas comme de tous l e s etres, c'est l a "vacuite" (guriyafa); et 1'expres-sion dharmakaya peut etre comprise dans l e sens de " r e e l l e nature," "corps e s s e n t i e l " (svabhavika kaya) (pp. 258-259). The author now s h i f t s to the t r i k a y a . He examines each i n the l i g h t of each of the two Madhyamika perspectives. From the conventional perspective they appear mythological: . . . le s Bouddhas sont de grands personnages d i v i n s , entoures de grands saints qui sont de futurs Bouddhas; tous les etres doivent, pour parvenir au Nirvana, passer d'abord par l ' e t a t de Bouddha. On distinguera done t r o i s corps du Bouddha. 1. Le Dharmakaya, dont-la d e f i n i t i o n se superpose a peu pres a c e l l e de 1'Abhidharma. C'est 1'ensemble des connaissances et des qualites morales du Bouddha, aussi bien c e l l e s qui se rapportent au monde que c e l l e s qui sont productrices du Nirvana: d'une part, l a compassion, l e pou-vo i r de detruire l e s passions de ceux qui voient l e Bouddha; d'autre part, l e s meditations abstruses qui aboutissent a 1'inconscience: t e l l e par exemple l a meditation du neant. 2. Le Sambhogakaya, corps glorieux, l e Bouddha en tant que v i s i b l e , " l e corps orne des trente-deux marques": c'est l e rupakaya, l a "forme v i s i b l e " de l a v i e i l l e t r a d i t i o n . — Mais ce corps, comme nous allons l e d i r e , est i n v i s i b l e aux simples mortels. Ceux-ci n'en apergoivent que des doubles magiques, plus ou moins ressemblants a 1 ' o r i g i n a l . 3. Le Nirmanakaya, "corps cree par magie," sur l e q u e l nous ins i s t e r o n s davantage. .Cakyamuni, dans leBouddhisme du P e t i t Vehicule, est un homme. . . . Cet homme obtint l a qua l i t e de Bouddha, revela l e chemin, et entra dans l e Nirvana, desormais i n v i s i b l e aux dieux et aux hommes: car i l est d e l i v r e de 1'existence. La secte des Vetulyakas que l a t r a d i t i o n place avant Agoka, et que je cr o i s t r e s ancienne, congut une idee plus haute de Qakyamuni et du Bouddha. . . . gakyamuni est devenu Bouddha i l y a t r e s longtemps; i l regne dans l e c i e l des dieux Tusitas d'ou on crut faussement q u ' i l e t a i t descendu pour s'incarner et conquerir i c i l a qua l i t e de Bouddha; l e Qakyamuni que l e s hommes ont T U n'est qu'un fantome cree par l e v r a i Cakyamuni, un "corps magique" ou un "corps cree" (nirmanakaya). Ce docetisme aboutit, dans l e Grand Vehicule . . . a l a conception de Bouddhas presque eternels, intervenant i c i - b a s par des apparitions magiques qui prechent et donnent aux hommes l e spectacle e d i f i a n t et i n s t r u c t i f de toute l a geste d'un Bouddha, de toute l a genese de l a qua l i t e de Bouddha. Les Bouddhas sont de grands dieux mythologiques, tronant dans quelque paradis ou de grands saints l e s entourent. A l a seule apparition' magique dont p a r l a i e n t l e s premiers docetes, du moins a en c r o i r e nos sources, beaucoup •d.'autres sont ajoutees: pendant l a longue periode de son regne, et dans 1'univers qui est son "champ," un Bouddha est l' u n i v e r -s e l l e providence: par son corps magique, d i v i s e a l ' i n f i n i , i l "murit" l e s etres pour l e salut (pp. 277-278). From the ultimate perspective: Nous arriverons au Nirvana en p r o f i t a n t de l'enseigne-ment que donnent l e s corps magiques (nirmanakaya, en contem-plant l e corps glorieux. lorsque nous serons devenus des saints (bbdhisattvas); en devenant nous-memes des Bouddhas, c'est-a-dire des dharmakayas, c o l l e c t i o n s de dharmas tr e s purs qui constituent des etres deja illumines (buddha) et tre s proches du Nirvana. — Et i l n'y a pas d'autre moyen d'arriver au Nirvana. Cependant, au point de vue metaphysique, l a p o s i t i o n des N i h i l i s t e s n'est pas exactement c e l l e des'Idealistes. Pour l e s N i h i l i s t e s , l e s deux premiers corps (dharma° . et sambhogakaya) forment un seul etre, l e Bouddha, etre r e e l au point de vue de 1'experience, mais "vide" au point de vue metaphysique: car l e s dharmas qui l e composent n'existent pas en s o i . Pour l e s I d e a l i s t e s , l e dharmakaya est l e Bouddha t e l q u ' i l s'apparait a lui-meme, t e l q u ' i l a conscience de s o i : connaissances productrices de Nirvana et pensees mondaines, tournees vers l e salut du monde: l e s premieres, l o r s q u ' e l l e s sont tres pures, se confondent avec ce que nous avons appele " l a pensee sans plus" (p. 273); ce sont des connaissances d'ou 1'opposition de "connaissable" et "connaissance" est exclue et, par consequent, des connaissances qui sont des non-connaissances; l e s secondes sont "imaginees" dans l a mesure, tr e s reduite, ou e l l e s comportent cette opposition: car l a charite du saint est vide de l ' i d e e de "donneur," de 23 don et de "receveur"; — l e corps glorieux est l e Bouddha t e l q u ' i l apparait aux saints (bodhisattvas), qui croient encore a 1'existence de l a matiere (rupa); — l e corps magique est l e Bouddha t e l q u ' i l apparait aux etres i n f e r i e u r s (gravakadi ) qui ne peuvent encore v o i r que des formes t r e s p a r t i c u l a r i s m s . Les deux derniers corps apparaissent aux saints et aux etres i n f e r i e u r s par l ' e f f i c a c e de l a pensee mondaine qui est une pa r t i e du dharmakaya, par l ' e f f i c a c e aussi du merite acquis par l e s saints et l e s etres i n f e r i e u r s eux-memes. On peut, e n f i n , considerer comme l e v r a i corps (kaya) du Bouddha, ce que l e Bouddha est au point de vue de l a v e r i t e absolue. La nature vraie (dharmata) d'un Bouddha sera appelee son dharmakaya, en termes plus c l a i r s , son svabhavi- kakaya ou dharmatakaya, son corps v r a i . — Nous sommes ren-seignes sur l a nature vraie des dharmas qui constituent l e Bouddha: ces dharmas ne sont pas produits "en s o i " ; i l s ne sont pas produits, au point de vue de l a v e r i t e absolue; i l s sont "vides"; i l s ont pour nature l a "vacuite" (gunyata). On peut en dire autant de tous l e s dharmas, et de l a foule des etres que constituent l e s dharmas: tous l e s etres ont done l e meme v r a i corps (svabhavikakaya = dharmatakaya = dharmakaya) que l e s Bouddhas. Toutefois, dans l e s Bouddhas predominent l e s dharmas producteurs^de Nirvana ( l o k o t t a r a ) , a 1'exclusion des dharmas mondains. Les Bouddhas ont done, a peu pres, p u r i f i e l e u r v r a i corps: i l s sont vides, ou a peu pres, au "point. '.;de .-.vue.' meme de l a v e r i t e d'apparence (pp. 279-281).. F i n a l l y , the author notes various t h e o r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the tathagatagarbha, which he considers to be part of the "immanentise"Buddhology of the Mantrayana, and speculates on p a r a l l e l s between Mahayana Buddhism and Vedanta. He c l e a r l y wishes to see the t r i k a y a within the general context of the development of Indian r e l i g i o u s thought but does not have the necessary expertise to do more than draw attention to a few s i m i l a r i t i e s . This a r t i c l e has been quoted i n d e t a i l because, despite shortcomings i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t o f f e r s the f i r s t summary of the major features which l a t e r scholars came to consider t h e i r prime data. 2h 7. A. Coomaraswamy. Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916. This hook i s important because i t establishes the p o s i t i o n found i n most l a t e r popular Indian works. Like Suzuki, Coomaraswamy sees the t r i k a y a as an o n t o l o g i c a l doctrine, but draws p a r a l l e l s to Vedanta rather than C h r i s t i a n i t y . The Mahayana i s thus distinguished by i t s mystical Buddha theology. . . . The Mahayana Buddha theology, as remarked by Rhys Davids, " i s the greatest possible contra-d i c t i o n to the Agnostic Atheism," which i s the c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c of Gautama's system of philosophy. But t h i s opposition i s simply the i n e v i t a b l e contrast of r e l i g i o n and philosophy, r e l a t i v e and absolute t r u t h , and those who are interested i n the science of theology, or are touched by a r t , w i l l not be l i k e l y to agree i n denouncing the Buddha gods as the inventions "of a s i c k l y scholasticism, hollow abstractions without l i f e or r e a l i t y " : i n t h i s contingent world we l i v e every day by r e l a t i v e t r u t h s , and for a l l those who do not wish to avoid the world of Becoming at the e a r l i e s t possible moment these r e l a t i v e truths are f a r from lacking:'in l i f e or r e a l i t y . The Mahayana as a t h e i s t i c f a i t h i s so only to the same extent as the Vedanta, that i s to say i t has an esoteric aspect which speaks i n negative terms of a Suchness and a Void which cannot be known, while on the other i t has an exoteric and more elaborate part in.which the Absolute i s seen through the glass of time and space, contracted and i d e n t i f i e d into v a r i e t y . This development appears i n the doctrine of the Trikaya, the Three Bodies of the Buddha. These three are ( l ) the Dharma-" -kaya, or Essence-body; (2) i t s heavenly manifestations i n the Sambhogakaya, or Body of B l i s s ; and (3) the emanation, trans-formation, or p r o j e c t i o n thereof, c a l l e d Nirmanakaya, apparent as the v i s i b l e i n d i v i d u a l Buddha on earth. This i s a system which hardly d i f f e r s from what i s implied i n the C h r i s t i a n doctrine of Incarnation. . . . Thus the Dharmakaya may be compared to the Father; the Sambhogakaya to the f i g u r e of Christ i n glory; the Nirmanakaya to the v i s i b l e Jesus who announces i n human speech that 'I and my Father are One.' Or again with the Vedanta: the Dharmakaya i s the Brahman, timeless and unconditioned; the Sambhogakaya i s r e a l i z e d i n the forms of Isvara; the Nirmanakaya i n every avatar. The essence of a l l things, the one r e a l i t y of which t h e i r f l e e t i n g shapes remind us, i s the Dharmakaya. The Dhar-makaya i s not a personal being who reveals himself to us i n a single incarnation, but i t i s the all-pervading and t r a c e l e s s ground of the soul, which does not i n fact s u f f e r any 25 modification' but appears t o us t o assume a v a r i e t y of forms: we read t h a t though the Buddha (a term which we must here understand as impersonal) does not depart from h i s seat i n the tower ( s t a t e of Dharmakaya), yet he may assume a l l and every form, whether of a brahma, a god, or a monk, or a p h y s i c i a n , or a tradesman, or an a r t i s t ; he may r e v e a l h i m s e l f i n every form of a r t and i n d u s t r y , i n c i t i e s or i n v i l l a g e s : from the highest heaven t o the lowest h e l l , there i s the Dharmakaya, i n which a l l s e n t i e n t beings are one. The Dharmakaya i s the personal ground of Buddhahood from which the personal w i l l , thought and love of innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas ever proceed i n response t o the needs of those i n whom;, the p e r f e c t nature i s not yet r e a l -i z e d . In some of the l a t e r phases of the Mahayana, however, the Dharmakaya i s p e r s o n i f i e d as Adi-Buddha (sometimes Vairocana) who i s then t o be regarded as the Supreme Being, above a l l other Buddhas, and whose s a k t i i s Prjnaparamita. Dharmakaya i s commonly t r a n s l a t e d 'Body of the Law,' but i t must not be'.interpreted merely as equivalent t o the sum of the s c r i p t u r e s (pp. 237-239). I t i s h a r d l y necessary t o point out th a t these remarks, which are grounded i n a thorough r e d u c t i o n of Buddhism t o Vedanta, are an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o o l f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g a Vijnanavadin theory t o the modern Westerner. They are u s e f u l as a c l e a r and elegant i n t r o d u c t i o n • of • an • u n s a t i s f a c t o r y answer which, i s met., many times i n l a t e r w r i t i n g s , f r e q u e n t l y i n an obscured form.-8. Akanuma, Chizen. " T r i p l e Body of the Buddha." Eastern Buddhist, 2 (1922): 1-29-Akanuma, l i k e S uzuki, was a b e l i e v e r , but one w i t h greater knowledge and l e s s w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept f a c i l e comparisons. He r e f e r s t o a wide range of Indian Buddhist t e x t s . Akanuma b e l i e v e s t h a t the Dharmakaya was the f i r s t aspect of the t r i k a y a to appear. He sees the Dharmakaya d o c t r i n e as the r e s u l t of three f a c t o r s : The strong f a i t h o r i e n t a t i o n of Buddhism. There i s no doubt that the ra p i d growth of Buddhism i n India was c h i e f l y due to the greatness of the Buddha's own personality which demanded f a i t h and love i n his d i s c i p l e s . They were unconsciously drawn towards t h e i r leader and took i n a l l h i s words with absolute f a i t h . . . . This attitu d e . . . n a t u r a l l y r e f l e c t e d i t s e l f i n t h e i r conception of the personality of the Master, r e a d i l y preparing the way for h i s d e i f i c a t i o n by the l a t e r Buddhists (pp. 1-3). I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Buddha and dharma. By "Dharma," or "Dhamma" ( i n P a l i ) , i s meant f i r s t of a l l the doctrine of the Buddha. . . . And as the doctrine taught by the Buddha i s the t r u t h , u n i v e r s a l and absolute, which was revealed i n his inmost consciousness, the term n a t u r a l l y came to be i d e n t i f i e d with the Law; and then the Law and the Doctrine were conceived to have united themselves i n the personality of the Buddha. The Buddha therefore was not a body which was only apparent to our ph y s i c a l eye, but a s p i r i t or a moral person i n whom the Dharma or Law was incarnated . . . the Doctrine i s what constitutes the Body of the Buddha, and he who sees the Doctrine and the Truth as revealed i n i t i s he who sees the Buddha. Buddhahood consists i n his s p i r i t u a l i t y and not i n his p h y s i c a l being, however majestic i t may be. To interview him, therefore, means to understand the Truth through the teaching of the Buddha. When t h i s idea was further developed by the l a t e r Buddhists as one of t h e i r metaphysical problems the Buddha-Body came L: to be i d e n t i f i e d with the Law or Truth or Tathata (suchness) . . . (pp. k; 6-7; 8-9). The transcendental conception of the dharma. I f a l l the Buddhas and Bhikkhus and i n fact any Buddhist followers were enabled to a t t a i n i l l u m i n a t i o n by means of the one vehicle (ekayana) of the Dharma, i t was quite natural f o r Buddhists to assume the transcendental existence of one Truth, which was designated by them as Dharmata or Tathata meaning the essence or suchness of things. This i t was that would -exist f o r ever regardless of the appearance or disappearance of the Tathagata, and the Dharmakaya which had been understood as meaning one who experienced or was i n possession of the Dharma or Truth, came to mean one i n whom the Truth i t s e l f was embodied or one whose body was the Dharma i t s e l f . ' The idea of the Buddha as the Dharmakaya thus came to be enter-tained by his d i s c i p l e s as time went on a f t e r his entrance into Parinirvana (p. 9). 27 These three strands converged around a d e v o t i o n a l i s t i c core to form the mature Dharmakaya. As years r o l l e d on, the d i s c i p l e s grew more and more convinced of the e t e r n a l i t y and supernatural p e r s o n a l i t y of the Buddha. While he was walking among them on earth, the love and reverence they f e l t f o r him was r e a d i l y s a t i s f i e d , hut with his passing t h e i r emotional l i f e would not he p a c i f i e d with empty i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m (p. 1 0 ) . Akanuma traces the r i s e of multi-body theories from t h i s single numinous Dharmakaya. He sees the Jataka s t o r i e s , the t r a d i t i o n of the thirty-two marks, and the l o k o t t a r a tendencies, as elements which were l a t e r systematized as the t r i k a y a doctrine. He believes that t h i s systematization f i r s t appeared i n those Mahayana sutras ( e s p e c i a l l y the Prajnaparamita) which revealed a p l u r a l i t y of Buddhas and culminated i n the "Nagarjian" two-kaya system of the Ta Chih Tu Lun. Akanuma:..realizes that the l o g i c a l gap between the two and the three-kaya systems cannot be bridged by the supposition that the two just n a t u r a l l y developed into the three. Furthermore, he r e j e c t s the pious so l u t i o n of sup-posing that Nagarjuna himself formulated the t r i k a y a . In doing so" he i s drawn into another important problem — Why didn't Nagarjuna do so? He must'have been acquainted with the figure of Amitabha i n the Pure Land sutras. Why did he not r e a l i z e that Amitabha would not f i t within a two-kaya system, a r e a l i z a -t i o n which would force him to some type of trikaya? Akanuma concludes that Nagarjuna must never have grasped t h i s d i f f i c u l t y . b e c a u s e - i t i s a - h i s t o r i c a l fact that the t r i k a y a , f i r s t appearing i n such t r a n s i t i o n a l sutras as the Mahaparinirvana and Samdhinirmocana, postdates Nagarjuna. Akanuma maintains that the f u l l t r i k a y a doctrine was f i r s t stated by Asanga i n the Mahayanasam- graha. He paraphrases: 28 The Body of Self-nature (svabhavakakaya) corresponding to the Dharmakaya, and the Body of Enjoyment (sambhogakaya) corresponding to the Vipakakaya (Recompense Body) together with the Body of Transformation (nirmanakaya), have f i n a l l y come to e s t a b l i s h the dogma; of the T r i p l e Body of the Tathagata. The basis and reason of the T r i p l e Body i s the Dharmakaya, through which the other two Bodies are capable of maintaining t h e i r existence, and consequently the three separate bodies are i n fac t the three aspects of one essence i n which we conceive Tathagatahood. The object of worship or f a i t h has thus now been t r a n s f e r r e d from the h i s t o r i c a l and natural Buddha to the Vipakakaya Buddha or Recompense Body of Tathagatahood. In conclusion: . . . the dogma of the T r i p l e Body f i r s t started from the worshipful a t t i t u d e of the e a r l i e r Buddhists towards t h e i r Master, which res u l t e d i n the conception of the Law Body (Dharmakaya), and how t h i s l a t t e r conception, once fi n d i n g an a r t i c u l a t e expression both i n the Sutras and the sastras, s t e a d i l y grew up so as to make Nagarjuna formulate his theory of the Two Bodies (dvikaya) of the Tathagata, and f i n a l l y how t h i s Nagarjuna doctrine developed into Asang'a's • T r i n i t y where the t h i r d Body, the Vipakakaya or the Body of Recompense, came to f i n d i t s legitimate place. The T r i n i t y , thus complete as dogma, has now put the Vipa-kakaya Buddha i n the place of the natural Buddha as the Buddhist object of f a i t h , making i t s content ever deeper and ever more enhancing. This reconstruction of the theory of the Buddha-body marks one of the d i v i d i n g l i n e s between the Mahayana and Hinayana (pp. 28-29). 9. L. de La Vallee Poussin. Vijnaptimatratasiddhi: l a siddhi de Hiuan-tsang. P a r i s : Paul Geuthner, 1928-29. This i s an annotated t r a n s l a t i o n of Hsuan-tsang's seventh-century compendium of Vijnanavadin thought, the Ch'.'.eng Wei Shih Lun. The penultimate section deals with the t r i k a y a , and the appendix contains La Vall e e Poussin's mature study of the t o p i c . Having t r a n s l a t e d both t h i s text and the Abhidhar- makosa and studied much of the r e l a t e d l i t e r a t u r e , he has replaced the v i t r i o l of his e a r l i e r writings with concrete references. While no nearer to his • 29 grand plan of 1913, he has a more r e a l i s t i c appreciation of the problem. 1. Ces notes sur l e s corps du Bouddha sont presque exclusivement d'ordre dogmatique. De toute evidence, l a speculation et l e s inventions de l ' e c o l e ont leurs causes l o i n t a i n e s ou proches dans l e s r e l i g i o n , c u l t e , mythologie, iconographie. En plusieurs rencontres, l a chronologie ne trouve d'appui que dans l e s monuments fi g u r e s . La descrip-t i o n des theories abstraites n'est qu'une p a r t i e , non negligeable, d ' h i s t o i r e de l a bouddhologie. Ces notes ne sont pas meme un sastra. N'ecrit pas un sastra qui veut. De graves lacunes: l e Sraddhotpada deliberement exclu.. (voir p. *j6k, 788); l e s grands Sutras, t e l s l e Lotus, l e Lankavatara, a peine examines; l e s v a r i -antes des Sastras f o r t imparfaitement resumees, et 1'echeveau des sectes chinoises insoupconne (voir Demieville, Sur 1'authenticity...); sans p a r l e r de l a theorie des corps applique . au pantheon. Notre propos e t a i t d'etudier l e s antecedents des doctrines de l a Siddhi, c a r r i e r e du Bodhi-sattva, Tathata et l e reste. II est a t t e i n t s i nous avons montre qu'Asahga est au bout d'une l i g n e speculative toute bouddhique. 2. F a u t - i l ajouter que cette l i g n e est, aussi bien, indienne? — S i Gaudapada emprunte des expressions bouddhiques, bien plus, s'empare des textes p r i s dans l e s C o r b e i l l e s , Mahamati s'inquiete s i l e Bouddha du Lankavatara ne vedantise pas. On pourrait d i r e que l e Lokottaravada krishnaise. La doctrine des t r o i s corps nous apparait comme exclu-sivement f a i t e de materiaux bouddhiques: mais e l l e a ete elaboree dans un pays ou l'on adorait des Avatars, ou l'on e t a i t anxieux de L'Absolu. Le cocher d'Arjuna est un nirmanakaya: l e corps sublime q u ' i l montre a Arjuna, corps v i s i b l e aux seuls Yogins,'est l e sambhogakaya qui•est v i s i b l e aux seuls Bodhisattvas; et 1'ineffable Brahman correspond au svabhavikakaya ou, mieux encore, a l a tathata. La comparaison des deux systemes s'impose. 3. Je se r a i plus reserve en ce qui concerne.les i n f l u -ences iraniennes, occidentales, judeo-chretiennes qu'auraient subies l e Bouddhisme (pp. 8 l l - 8 l 2 ) . La Val l e e Poussin begins with an excellent bibliography (which has been incorporated into the present study) and then surveys the various kaya theories to be found i n Buddhist tex t s . This survey may be summarized as follows: 30 a. P a l i Canon theories The Nikayas d i s t i n g u i s h three kayas: — caturmahabhumikakaya: the c o r r u p t i b l e body composed of the four elements. — manomayakaya: the body i n which the Buddha v i s i t s the Brahma world or i n which he appears as Mara i n the Mara realm. — dharmakaya: the body of teaching. Only metaphorically a "body." b. Sarvastivadin theories The Abhidharmakosa mentions three kayas: — Dharmakaya: the c o l l e c t i o n of anasrava but samskrta dharmas which form a Buddha. — Vipakakaya or Rupakaya: the body, born i n Lumbini' possessing the thirty-two laksanas. — Nirmanakaya: the a p p a r i t i o n a l body created by the Buddha. c. Lokottaravadin theory The Lokottaravadins held the Buddha to be composed of dharmas unconnected with the three dhatus (e.g., of tathata and tathatajnana) while appearing i n the world by an a r t i f i c i a l body. d. The Bodhisattva and Buddha of the Ta Chih Tu Lun Although La Vallee Poussin was unable to extract a coherent system from t h i s text he has summarized the various ideas i t contains. As we now have i+ 5 Lamotte's t r a n s l a t i o n and a systematic study i t i s c l e a r that a two-kaya model i s basic to t h i s text. However, i t also contains, i n a very disorganized 31 state, most of the elements which fed into the t r i k a y a theory. e. Theories of Asanga-Dharmapala These include the mature three and four-kaya theories of such texts as the Yogasastra, the Ahhisamayalankara and the Mahayanasamgraha. La V a l l e e Poussin thinks that a l l of these teach the same doctrine i n d i f f e r e n t ways. f. Variant theories A number of texts introduce v a r i a t i o n s on Asanga's standard system. These include Vasubandhu's Saddharmapundarikasastra, the Suvarnaprabhasa, the Lankavatara and the Avatamsaka. He surveys, very b r i e f l y the kayas mentioned i n each text. g. The Eternal Buddha This survey of various theories about the duration of a Buddha's existence raises points relevant to our study, but La Vallee Poussin f a i l s to r e l a t e i t to h i s other comments. In b r i e f , La Vallee Poussin retains the historical-developmental approach of h i s e a r l i e s t w r itings. He continues to view the theory of the early Vijnanavada masters as "the" t r i k a y a doctrine and to consider l a t e r develop-ments as new ideas or deviations from the basic doctrine. 'He does not review or repudiate h i s notes of 1913, so we may assume that these s t i l l represent hi s basic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 32 10. D. T. Suzuki. Studies i n the Lankavatara Sutra. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1932, pp. 308-338. This exposition of the t r i k a y a i s very d i f f e r e n t from that i n Suzuki's 1906 Outlines. Not only has he learned more about the doctrine, "but he r e a l i z e d that a developmental study i s a better presentation f or Western readers than a simple C h r i s t i a n i z a t i o n . He quotes extensively from three sources: the Lankavatarasutra, the Suvarnaprabhasasutra and the Mahayana- sraddhotpada. In the f i r s t he finds many elements of the doctrine but no actual t r i k a y a . In the second he finds the f u l l t r i k a y a , and i n the t h i r d he finds the mature t r i k a y a doctrine of the Sino-Japanese t r a d i t i o n . Most of t h i s passage i s devoted to an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the separate e l e -ments found i n the Lankavatara. These are: a Dharmakaya and a Dharmata-Buddha which were to become the Dharmakaya of the t r i k a y a , a Nirmana-Buddha which was to become the Nirmanakaya, and Nisyanda-Buddhas and Vipaka-Buddhas which were the forerunners of the Sambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya. Suzuki takes very s e r i o u s l y the question of why each of these concepts arose, although h i s answers are naive. The Dharmakaya derives from an "innate idea" that great men are immortal (p. 31^). A major reason for the Sambhoga- kaya i s man's . . . deep human longing f or a body of t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n . We are not s a t i s f i e d with our corporeal existence, we are a l l the time oppressed by the f e e l i n g of imprisonment, our s p i r i t soars away from t h i s world of p h y s i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s , we long forever f o r a manomayakaya (will-body). This p h y s i c a l body does not f u l l y express the meaning of the s p i r i t , i t deranges, i t tyrannises. In fact a l l the r e l i g i o u s struggles and aspirations we experience i n t h i s l i f e are centered on the control of t h i s body.-.(p. 331). Suzuki's primary contribution here i s h i s discussion of the mechanism 33 whereby the Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya (or equivalent Lankavatara terms) appear i n the world. He understands that t h i s discussion must remain focussed on the Bodhisattva vow (p. 233). He also r e a l i z e s that t h i s vow sets i n motion a series of c a u s a l l y - r e l a t e d events within the world, rather than an i r r u p t i o n of sacred r e a l i t y into the world. The nature of a Vipaka-Buddha i s that of a Nishyanda-Buddha when t h i s i s understood i n the sense of a r e s u l t flowing from an antecedent cause, that i s , as one of the f i v e e f f e c t s (pancaphala), .and not i n the sense of something secondary whichiissues out of a more primary substance; . . . (p. 330). Suzuki does not explore a l l the implications of t h i s point; he does mention the major one. The aspirant cannot be a passive r e c i p i e n t of the Buddha's a i d but i s himself n e c e s s a r i l y involved i n the appearance of the Buddha i n the world. That i s , the Nirmana-Buddha i s a r e l a t i o n a l concept. Thus, the existence of the Nirmana-Buddha can be under-stood i n two ways: one from the standpoint of the Buddha himself, whose l o v i n g heart cannot help r e s o r t i n g to every possible means of s a l v a t i o n , and the other from the stand-point of s i n f u l mortals who desire every possible help from a power higher than themselves. This mutuality has f i l l e d the world with Nirmita-nairmanika Buddhas * Wherever we turn we come across one of these transformations, and i f we are earnest and sincere and longing from the depths of the heart, we can see even the r e a l Buddha himself i n and through them (p. 333). Aside from t h i s valuable i n s i g h t , t h i s work i s s t i l l badly flawed by appeals to human nature, rather than to Vijnanavadin theory.- For example, The r e l a t i o n of the three Buddhas to one another may be understood i n the analogy of an i n d i v i d u a l person; That there i s something ultimate making up the reason of t h i s i n d i v i d u a l existence i s to be granted, because the very conception of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s impossible without postulating something behind i t . . . . This corresponds to the concep-t i o n of the Dharmata, or when p e r s o n i f i e d , to the Pharma'ta-Buddha. 3^ Now t h i s i n d i v i d u a l person stands i n every possible manner of r e l a t i o n s h i p to h i s fellow-beings, human or other-wise. . . . In the case of a l i v i n g person t h i s v a r i a b i l i t y , temporal and constant, reaches i t s l i m i t s . The person him-s e l f has not apparently changed but he assumes or seems to assume d i f f e r e n t forms to his neighbours, May not t h i s aspect of h i s being be c a l l e d h i s Nirmana value? In spite of a l l these external and r e l a t i o n a l mutations, the i n d i -v i d u a l has not at a l l changed to his own consciousness. That he i s himself he at a l l times knows and he enjoys h i s per-s o n a l i t y . This corresponds to the Vipaka-Buddha, or Sambhogakaya. Every conscious being may thus f i g u r a t i v e l y or rather metaphysically be said to be the owner of the T r i p l e Body. In the case of the Buddha, the doctrine i s f i l l e d with r e l i g i o u s s i g n i f i c a n c e and i t has played a most important r o l e i n the development of Mahayana Buddhism. One thing we have to notice here i s the replacing of the Buddha-trinity by that of the Body (kaya). That Buddhist philosophers have come to t a l k of the Trikaya instead of Buddhatraya. It i s not a matter of mere change of terminology, i t involves a deeper meaning. The reason i s that Kaya has a more synthe-s i s i n g value, while Buddha suggests more of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . The three d i f f e r e n t kinds of Buddhahood make one think of three d i f f e r e n t , separate i n d i v i d u a l s , but the Trikaya means one per s o n a l i t y with three aspects. In the conception of the T r i p l e Body we trace a systematising thought (pp.- 3 3 3 - 3 3 M . This analogy i s not only vague, but, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , i t i s incompatible with Asanga's formulation of the t r i k a y a doctrine. 11. Hobogirin: Dictionnaire encyclopedique du bouddhisme, s.v. "Busshin," n.d., fasc. 2: lT"+-l85. This a r t i c l e i s a wide-ranging examination of a l l Buddhakaya (Japanese:. Busshin) theories including the t r i k a y a . Most of the a r t i c l e i s a survey of Buddhist texts which mention the various Buddhakayas. A b r i e f statement of the place of each text i n the h i s t o r y of Buddhism i s followed by a summary of relevant passages. This information has been incorporated into the b i b l i o -graphy of the present study. 35 In addition, i n the "Apergu General," the author^ proposes a simple theory of the development of various Buddhakayas. He suggests that the diverse conno-tations of "Buddhakaya" developed from an ambiguity i n the term kaya. It meant both: — an organized body or organism, i n the sense of nikaya. — a material or concrete mass. The early Buddhist community, needing an object of worship, substituted the teaching (= Dharmakaya) for the departed Buddha. Others developed more complex Buddhologies, The Mahasamghikas held that the Buddha was e n t i r e l y transcendent. Others s a i d that the purely human Buddha disappeared at the parinirvana, but that the "buddha elements" p e r s i s t e d . This d i v i s i o n into a form-body and dharma-body harmonized with the two-truth idea and and continued i n the early Mahayana schools, based on the Mahaparinir- vanasutra and the Prajnaparamita sutras. The Avatamsaka, on the other hand, m u l t i p l i e d bodies unsystematically. The Vijnanavadin master Asanga formulated the d e f i n i t i v e t r i k a y a doctrine on the basis of ideas contained i n such sutras as the Lankavatara. In the mid-s i x t h century, Paramartha a r r i v e d l i n China and announced that India had f i x e d the doctrine. This was included i n his t r a n s l a t i o n of the Sraddhotpadasastra and i n the chapter added to the Suvarnaprabhasasutra. The T'ien-T'ai and -other groups b u i l t on t h i s . The author concludes with a warning that i n s u f f i c i e n t documentation i s av a i l a b l e f or a proper h i s t o r y of the t r i k a y a to be written. This a r t i c l e i s e s s e n t i a l l y a b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l essay on the primary t e x t u a l sources. As such i t i s a primary reference work for t h i s study, but contains few ideas which could be applied d i r e c t l y to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a . 12. A. K. Chatterjee. The Yogacara Idealism. Varanasi: Benaras Hindu U n i v e r s i t y , 1962. This introduction to the Vijnanavada seems to represent contemporary Indian scholarship on the subject. Chatterjee sees the Tathagata as the un i f y i n g Buddhological concept: The Tathagata occupies the same-place i n Buddhism as Isvara does i n Advaita Vedanta. He i s the God of r e l i g i o n , an object of worship and veneration. He has also i n f i n i t e compassion for the s u f f e r i n g mankind but for Whose grace t h e i r redemption would not be possible (p. 223). Chatterjee discusses the necessity and the l o g i c a l t e n a b i l i t y of t h i s concept, and then expounds his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the three kayas of the Tathagata. He draws a l l supporting references from the Mahayahasutralankara The concept of the Tathagata i s constituted by d i f f e r e n t metaphysical p r i n c i p l e s . This fact i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the theory of the three kayas of the Buddha. It i s one of the most important doctrines i n the whole of Mahayana r e l i g i o n and i t i s nothing p e c u l i a r to the Yogacara who accepted the t r a d i t i o n a l doctrine. There are three aspects of the God-head, t e c h n i c a l l y known as the three kayas of the Tathagata. They are: 1. The Svabhavika kaya. 2. The Sambhoga kaya and 3. The Nairmanika kaya. 1. The Svabhavikakaya of the Buddha i s the p r i n c i p l e or pure W i l l (visuddha Tathata) which i s the -.ultimate r e a l i t y . As such He i s i d e n t i c a l with the Absolute. It i s also c a l l e d dharma-kaya, being the dharmata (essence) of things. I t s e s s e n t i a l character (laksana) i s asrayaparavrtti, i . e . , the withdrawing or r e t r a c t i n g of the Kl&ya. When under the i n f l u -ence of Avidya, the i l l u s i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y , the Alaya i s compelled into a forward movement. It goes on creating forms of o b j e c t i v i t y which i n t h e i r turn further replenish i t . On the sublation of t h i s disturbing i l l u s i o n a r e t r a c t i n g move-ment of t h i s Alaya i s started. I t no longer p o s i t s an other but rests i n i t s e l f . This i s the state of Vijnaptimatrata, of consciousness as pure Act. It i s the dharmakaya of the Buddha and i s His natural aspect. 37 Being e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l with the Absolute, the question of the number of Buddhas has no meaning. . . . The dharmakaya of a l l the Buddhas i s i d e n t i c a l , as a l l are i d e n t i c a l with the Absolute. I t i s also beyond thought as t h i s i d e n t i t y cannot be grasped, with mere concepts. 2. The second aspect of the Buddha i s His Sambhogika  kaya — His body of B l i s s . It i s t h i s body with which the Buddha enjoys His creation (dharmasambhoga). S t r i c t l y speaking, t h i s i s the concept of God par excellence. A l l the g l o r i f i e d descriptions of the Buddha found i n the s c r i p t u r e s , e.g., rays emanating from the innumerable pores of His skin and penetrating to the remotest corners of the universe, pertain to t h i s kaya. The Buddha dwells i n the Akanistha Heaven, surrounded by a host of Bodhisattvas and other minor personages. Sambhoga kaya i s the pe r s o n a l i t y of the supreme God, associated with a l l powers and excel-lences. It i s comparable to the concept of God i n the Brahmanical systems which finds the best i l l u s t r a t i o n i n the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavad Gita. 3. The Nairmanika Kaya i s the a p p a r i t i o n a l body of the Buddha. Hence one i s e x p l i c i t l y warned that the human form which the Lord might temporarily assume should by no means be mistaken for His r e a l body. This assumption i s s o l e l y for the purpose of lending succour to mankind. The forms assumed can be i n f i n i t e i n number. . . . Whereas the body of B l i s s characterises such q u a l i t i e s e x i s t i n g f o r the sake of others. . . . In short, the human Buddha who i s o r d i n a r i l y seen i n the various worlds and exemplified i n d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s i s the nirmanakaya of the Buddha. It i s of t h i s kaya that any h i s t o r i c i t y can be ascribed. That body which i s v i s i b l e to some heavenly beings i s His Sambhogakaya which obviously has no h i s t o r i c i t y . But both the Kayas are h i s free assump-ti o n s . The u t t e r i n d i v i s i b i l i t y . . . of any form i s His Dharmakaya. This i s His r e a l essence. The Sambhogakaya i s the supreme God while the Nirmana kaya i s the Sakyamuni who a c t u a l l y took b i r t h amongst us (pp. 230-232). Chatterjee o f f e r s l i t t l e more than did Coomaraswamy i n 19l6. The i n t e r -vening developmental studies have been ignored and the doctrine treated as revealed dogma. H i s t o r i c a l assertions, i . e . , that the t r i k a y a was a general Buddhist doctrine, not a Vijnanavadin development, are not j u s t i f i e d . A l l information i s drawn from a single early text which i s not one seen as c e n t r a l 38 by other inv e s t i g a t o r s . The great exegetical t r e a t i s e s i n which such texts were discussed and c l a r i f i e d are ignored i n favor of the b l i n d assumption that the Vijnanavada i s a l l but i d e n t i c a l with the Vedanta. The r e s u l t i n g explana-t i o n i s simple and predictable but useless as a basis f or further studies. 13. Matsunaga, A l i c i a . The Buddhist Philosophy of A s s i m i l a t i o n . Tokyo: Monumenta l i p p o n i c a Monograph, 1969. This book i s t y p i c a l of modern popular works on Buddhism i n English -.published from Japan. I t promises to-be p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant" t© our enquiry as i t takes a developmental approach, showing how c e r t a i n doctrines became in t e g r a t i v e centers around which new ideas coalesced as these-doctrines developed and as Buddhism spread to China and Japan. The book does not l i v e up to its - " i n i t i a l promise. While the passages on the h i s t o r y of the Buddhology are c l e a r (although adding nothing to the Hobogirin account), the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which the authors derive from i t i s , '., at l e a s t to t h i s w r i t e r , u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Each explanation involves an appeal to some ambiguous, undefined European term. While these terms may not be ambiguous within the modern Japanese academic community, the Western reader of a work written i n English expects a shared terminology. For example, the t r i k a y a section opens: H i s t o r i c a l l y , i n Buddhism there have always been at l e a s t three points of view i n considering the 'Buddha'; f i r s t , as a human being, second as a s p i r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e , and l a s t l y , as something i n between the two former views. The actual h i s t o r -i c a l existence of Gotama (Skt. Gautama) Buddha has never had a tremendous s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the Buddhist f a i t h , as' he has been p r i m a r i l y considered to be an archetype, and secondly a h i s t o r i c a l personage (p. 78). " S p i r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e " — s u r e l y the l e a s t meaningful term p o s s i b l e — i s not 39 explained. The statement concerning the h i s t o r i c a l existence of Gautama would require an entire chapter of development before i t would be accepted (or even rej e c t e d ) . What i s meant by "archetype"? That term was popularized by C. G. Jung, but his use of i t cannot be stretched to cover the manner i n which ancient Buddhists regarded the Buddha. Even the notion that the t r a d i t i o n had a concept of a " h i s t o r i c a l " Buddha i s questionable (Caroline Rhys-Davids not-withstanding). I f i t d i d , surely t h i s i n d i v i d u a l was just that Gautama^ "Buddha who, our author- -maintains, was p r i m a r i l y an archetype, not a h i s t o r i c a l i n d i -v i d u a l . But more b a s i c a l l y , i n separating archetype and h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l , i s the author:' not d i v i d i n g the e s s e n t i a l from the e x i s t e n t i a l , the one move which many other scholars agree i s t o t a l l y against the s p i r i t of the t r i k a y a doctrine? The remainder of the exposition i s i n two parts: the t r i k a y a as r e l i g i o u s experience and the t r i k a y a as p h i l o s o p h i c a l doctrine. The d i s t i n c t i o n between these, or even the grounds for making the d i s t i n c t i o n , i s not stated. Both seem to involve theory although the " p h i l o s o p h i c a l " discussion seems to involve more Madhyamika and the " r e l i g i o u s experience" section seems to involve more Vijnanavada. The p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion opens as follows: P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , the Dharma-kaya i s equivalent to sunyata, the u n i v e r s a l t r u t h declaring that a l l subject-object d i f f e r -e n t i a t i o n based upon discriminative knowledge i s i n v a l i d . In more p o s i t i v e terms t h i s can be equated with the essence of Enlightenment (nirvana) which merely consists of an under-standing of P r a t f t y a samutpada ( r e l a t i v i t y ) or the a b i l i t y to view t h a t - w h a t - i s - a s - i t - i s ( t a t h a t t ) . We can therefore say that the Dharma-kaya. i s also the system of cosmic unity or order that exists everywhere but i s unable to be grasped by reasoning. Since the Dharma-kaya functions as a u n i v e r s a l t r u t h , i t cannot remain a mere p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r i n c i p l e , but constantly 1+0 appears i n r e l i g i o u s experience. Such an appearance or r e a l i -zation of t h i s t r u t h i s the Sambhoga-kaya., . . . In essence, the Sambhoga-k.aya i s also the experi-ence of 'enjoyment' of the t r u t h of stonyata, or the r e a l i z a t i o n of Absolute Truth. . . the Sambhoga-kaya i s not a s t a t i c state. From t h i s r e l i g i o u s experience there comes the natural desire to enlighten others and hence the Nirmana-kaya or system of the manifestation of the essence of Enlightenment (sunyata) issues forth'.to a l l sentient beings. This l a s t function or aspect of Enlightenment i s s i m i l a r to the concept of sunyata  artha or feature of recognizing the phenomenal world as based upon discriminative knowledge and using upaya to lead sentient beings from discriminative knowledge to Enlightenment (pp. 8 l -82). Comment i s hardly necessary. Every major problem i s brushed aside. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of the Dharmakaya to sunyata i s one of "equivalence." The Sambhogakaya i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of the Absolute Truth, and the Nirmanakaya i s due to a "natural des i r e . " I can see only the s l i g h t e s t connection between a l l of t h i s and the c l a s s i c a l Vijnanavada theory. As r e l i g i o u s experience, the t r i k a y a i s described by a confused s c a t t e r i n g of Vijnanavada ideas: It was the Yogacara" with t h e i r conception of conscious-' ness (vijnana) as the basis of Enlightenment that gave a systematic form to the doctrine of the Trikaya, and i t was t h i s form that permeated a l l l a t e r Mahayana. The e a r l i e s t stage of the Yog&c&fa conception can be found i n .the Lanka- vatara Sutra. . . . In the f i n a l form of the Trikaya theory the Dharma-kaya became the aspect of Buddhahood as Absolute Truth or r e a l i t y , while the Sambhoga-kaya and Nirmana-kaya were upaya or mani-fest a t i o n s of the Dharma-kaya t a i n t e d by degrees of i l l u s i o n i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the phenomenal world, hence having form. We can compare both the Sambhoga-kaya and Nirmana-kaya to mirrors r e f l e c t i n g the p u r i t y of l i g h t from the Unconditioned Dharma-kaya. The former i s a l i g h t and glorious r e f l e c t i o n , but i t i s s t i l l a mirror attempting to capture the rays of the i n f i n i t e and indescribable at an i d e a l l e v e l of r e l i g i o u s r e a l i z a t i o n , i t i s f a r removed from i t s source. The l a t t e r tends to be a dark r e f l e c t i o n , .since i t i s clouded by i t s appearance i n the phenomenal world that I l l can only f a i n t l y glimpse the dim r e f l e c t i o n i t c a r r i e s of the Absolute Truth. From the sphere of r e l i g i o u s experience, the Yogacara were able to teach that the Sambhoga-kaya and Nirmana-kaya represented mind-made emanations from the Dharma-kaya or one eternal Buddha. Both these l a t t e r forms appearing i n the i l l u s i v e world were unreal, just as a l l phenomenal existence i s unreal. . . . From such a basis of r e l i g i o u s understand-ing i t i s easy to comprehend the source of Mahayana mysticism. The Yogacara emphasis.upon.the r e l i g i o u s .experience of E n l i g h t -enment symbolized as the Trikaya as w e l l as the importance of consciousness as the basis for the movement towards Enlightenment n a t u r a l l y placed a higher value upon mystical experience than empirical knowledge (pp. 83-85). Wot only does a l l of t h i s avoid the r e a l questions but i t leaves a suspicion that the authors may not be well acquainted with t r a d i t i o n a l V i j n a -navadin theory. Was there ever a school which d i d not regard consciousness Q as the basis of enlightenment? Surely Suzuki i s correct i n saying that Vijnanavada i s distinguished by i t s theory of the mechanics of the enlighten-ment process ( i . e . , the asr a y a - p a r a v r t t i) . However, the most serious doubts a r i s e from the constant use of ontolog-i c a l models. Such phrases as "tainted by degrees of i l l u s i o n i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the phenomenal world" seem inconsistent with'the trisvabhava basis of the system. This question w i l l be taken up l a t e r when examining Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha. 1^. Geoffrey Parrinder. Avatar and Incarnation: The Wilde Lectures i n Natural  and Comparative Re l i g i o n i n the U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford. London: Faber and Faber, 1970. The previous a r t i c l e s have been the work of scholars of Buddhism or Buddhist apologists. It might be argued that t h e i r primary task was not to produce an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n but to present the l i t e r a t u r e and construct a h i s t o r y of i t s development* The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these data might he considered a task for the generalist such as the student of comparative r e l i g i o n , h i s t o r y of r e l i g i o n , and so on. Unfortunately, few generalists have dealt with the t o p i c . The present work by Parrinder i s the most promising treatment. As he begins the sixty-page section devoted to Buddhism by noting the apparent anomaly of a Nirmanakaya resembling an avatar or incarnation i n this- non-theistic r e l i g i o n , i t i s reasonable to expect him to speak d i r e c t l y to our concern — to derive a frame of reference broad enough to accommodate both Western t h e i s t i c and Buddhist ideas. This would be the key to i n t e r p r e t i n g the t r i k a y a . No such derivation i s forthcoming. The bulk of the relevant chapters i s simply a synopsis of the Buddha myth from various sutras. Parrinder seems unaware of the sastras and badly informed about the t r i k a y a d o c t r i n e — n o t one of the studies i n t h i s present survey of scholarship appears i n his b i b l i o g -raphy. With the exception of Lamotte's H i s t o i r e du bouddhisme indien, h i s secondary sources are the l e a s t r e l i a b l e of a l l the popularizers. From them he has accepted a s t a r t l i n g assortment of misunderstandings as simple data: . . . the Buddha was. a c t u a l l y a l l the Buddhas of the past. . . . The corporeal l i f e of a Buddha was i l l u s o r y anyway . . . a l l the Buddhas have the same essence . . . they can appear i n various forms to many beings. These are acts of grace. . . . So the idea of Buddhahood was devel-oped into a universal pantheism, or rather pan-Buddhism . . . (p. 178). These sources also supplied him with a very d i s t o r t e d version of the t r i k a y a , or rather with the view that the t r i k a y a was not important. Parrinder did not take the t r i k a y a s e r i o u s l y at a l l : "The basic d i s t i n c t i o n was between the phy s i c a l body and Dharma-body, i t i s these two that are u s u a l l y compared ^3 and contrasted" (p. 177). From these ideas he draws a few general conclusions, the most important heing that the Buddha theories are merely a "weak" (p. 2^0) form of the avatar doctrine and can he dismissed along with i t . A l l of t h i s i n i t i a l l y appears as a puzzling negligence on the part of such a respected scholar. The picture becomes cl e a r e r when, i n chapters 17 and 19, Parrinder throws aside h i s s c h o l a r l y guise and reveals the polemical theologian who, on the basis of the e a r l i e r conclusions, finds a l l a l i e n r e l i g i o n s wanting and exalts C h r i s t i a n i t y i n a r i n g i n g a l t a r . c a l l . Although neither Matsunaga nor Parrinder helps us d i r e c t l y , t h e i r books have been included to demonstrate how l i t t l e of the research which has been done has penetrated the popular l e v e l . As most other writers are far more naive than these, no other popular works w i l l be reviewed. 15. Wagao, Gadjin. "On the Theory of Buddha-Body." Translated by Hirano Umeyo. Eastern Buddhist, 6 (May, 1973): 25-53. Professor Nagao approaches the t r i k a y a with great sympathy, profound knowledge of the t e x t s , and a cautious a t t i t u d e . In section one, he discusses the various ideas which fed into the t r i k a y a . The section concludes: It was i n the philosophy of the Yogacara school (or the Vijnana-vada school) represented by Asafiga and Vasubandhu that the two-body theory developed u n t i l i t was consummated into a three-body theory. The ideas and f a i t h s that became ... the materials for the three-body theory must have been established i n various forms before that time. There was already a tendency toward the u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n of the con-cept of Buddha. It was thought that Gautama Buddha was not the only Buddha; that there had been many Buddhas i n the past, and there would be many Buddhas i n the future; and hk that a c t u a l l y there existed innumerable Buddhas i n the innumerable Buddha-lands i n the ten d i r e c t i o n s . Thus, names of Buddhas, such as Vairocana, Aksobhya, Amitabha, Amitayus, Bhaisajya-guru, and countless others had already been con-ceived. It was the Yogacara-vijnana school that organized the three-body (tri-kaya) theory by synthesizing these conceptions of the Buddha (p. 3 0 ) . Section two deals with the Yogacara t r i k a y a . Nagao pays p a r t i c u l a r attention to the Sambhogakaya and asks why the Sambhogakaya, sharing i n the natures of both Dharmakaya and Nirmanakaya, did not replace both of them: The sambhoghika-kaya, through t h i s double character, l i e s between the svabha*vika-kaya and nairmanika-kaya, serv-ing as a l i n k between the two. No, the sambhogika-kaya rather occupies the c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n i n the triple-body doc-t r i n e ; e s p e c i a l l y , the soteriology i n Buddhism i s developed revolving around the axis of t h i s double character of the sambhogika-kaya. In t h i s sense, the sambhogika-kaya can be c a l l e d the Buddha par excellence. However, i f i t i s so, i t might be possible to say that the one Buddha-body of sambho-. gika^kaya i s s u f f i c i e n t , and neither the svabhavika-kaya nor the nairmanika-kaya i s necessary. In f a c t , such a p o s i t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , and i t might have been supported e s p e c i a l l y from the standpoint of r e l i g i o u s monotheistic demand. But the s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Mahayanic doctrine of Buddha-body, l i e s i n the persistent maintenance of the t r i a n g u l a r p o s i t i o n of the three Buddha-bodies. For i n that respect there i s something fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from either the one-body or the two-body theory. . . . The theo r e t i c perfec-t i o n of the doctrine of Buddha-body l i e s ' i n the t r i a n g u l a r concept of the three Buddha-bodies; the two-body theory would be i n s u f f i c i e n t , and the four-body and other many-body theories would be p l e t h o r i c i n p r i n c i p l e (pp. 3 7 , 3 8 - 3 9 ) . Nagao believes that t h i s t r i a d i c scheme i s the key to Vijnanavadin Buddhology: A l l the a t t r i b u t e s and v i r t u e s of the Buddha were also c l a r i f i e d i n the system of the trikaya,. As i t i s impossible to describe them here one by one, I s h a l l only give a few examples: the Buddha's wisdom was regarded as an a t t r i b u t e e s p e c i a l l y belonging to the svabhavika-kaya; h i s w i l l (asaya, vow) was e s p e c i a l l y treated i n the sambhogika-kaya; and h i s acts (buddha karman) e s p e c i a l l y i n the naifmanika-kaya. But at the same time, since the three Buddha-bodies are not independent of each other but are i n the r e l a t i o n of a basis and a thing based on i t , these vi r t u e s are also considered transferable to each other. S i m i l a r l y , the e l u c i d a t i o n of such questions as whether there i s only one Buddha or other Buddhas numerous i n number, or for what reason the Buddha i s said to be e v e r l a s t i n g and always abiding, and so f o r t h , has been attempted through the sys-tem of the t r i k a y a . I w i l l not go into these problems here, but I would say tha t , i n short, these problems w i l l not l i k e l y be answered thoroughly without the t r i k a y a theory (p. 38 ) . In section three, Nagao develops his methodology through a c r i t i q u e of Coomaraswamy and Chatterjee's attempts to r e l a t e the t r i k a y a to C h r i s t i a n and Hindu concepts. He concludes: The t r i k a y a doctrine developed as a system with a back-ground of these Mahayana concepts, which i n t h e i r turn became ever more s o l i d i f i e d by having recourse to the t r i k a y a doc-t r i n e . Therefore, we must say that the t r i k a y a doctrine i s f a i r l y d i f f e r e n t from the T r i n i t y of C h r i s t i a n i t y or the t r i m u r t i of Hinduism (p. h2). F i n a l l y Nagao points out that while the t r i k a y a doctrine may explain a Buddha's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i t does not explain how a-Buddha comfesf into', existenc It i s true that by t h i s t r i k a y a theory the nature of the Buddha and a l l his v i r t u e s has been delineated. But as f o r how Gautama, a human being, was able to become a Buddha possessing v i r t u e s equal to those of a divine being, almost nothing has been said i n these theories. How can a leap from the r e l a t i v e world to the absolute world be made? Since Gautama was an exceptional person, as h i s d i s c i p l e s thought, i t might have been possible f o r him to become a Buddha by dint of his innumerable virtuous deeds accumulated i n the past. But i f only that, Gautama would have only been a divine existence from the beginning, and not a human being. Moreover, that would be a unique case for Gautama alone, and would not explain anything about the existence of a l l the Buddhas i n the ten d i r e c t i o n s . In Mahayana Buddhism, i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l d that a l l l i v i n g beings are expected to a t t a i n Buddhahood, but then, i t must be asked: In what way i s i t possible f or a common l i v i n g being to become a Buddha? 1+6 The p o s s i b i l i t y of a l l l i v i n g beings a t t a i n i n g Buddha-hood i s a problem that seems to have been answered from two sides. One i s the idea that i s mainly advocated by the tathagata-garbha (tathagata-matrix) theory. The other i s the introduction of asraya-paravrtti (the revolving of the basis) . . . (p. kk). The d e s c r i p t i o n of these theories constitutes the bulk of the a r t i c l e . While t h i s short a r t i c l e only touches upon each issue, i t establishes a reasonable model for a study. Nagao's insistence that the t r i k a y a i s an i n t e g r a t i v e scheme within the Vijnanavada, and hence should be interpreted by reference to the ideas i t incorporates, w i l l prevent much premature compar-ative r e l i g i o n . His separation of questions about the structure and function of the t r i k a y a from questions about i t s o r i g i n should prevent the h i s t o r i c a l questions from obscuring the f u n c t i o n a l ones. The b i b l i o g r a p h i c information on Chinese texts contained i n his footnotes has been incorporated into the bibliography of the present study. SUMMARY OF SCHOLARSHIP The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a by the remaining important "scholar, H. V. Guenther, w i l l be examined l a t e r i n l i g h t of the following summary. As the contributions made by these divers scholars over nearly a century are s t i l l very d i f f i c u l t to compare, I w i l l now summarize the previous a r t i c l e s to obtain a basis for planning future research. La V a l l e e Poussin's 1906 a r t i c l e , with i t s d i v i s i o n of the t r i k a y a into a Buddhological and an o n t o l o g i c a l doctrine, began to reveal the complexity of the concept and marked the end of r e d u c t i o n i s t i c treatments. Later workers generally treated i t as a symbolic or open-ended scheme for organizing a 1*7 v a r i e t y of ideas rather than as a t i g h t l y circumscribed dogma. By 1913 he had extended his understanding to the r e a l i z a t i o n that the t r i k a y a could not be understood i n i s o l a t i o n from the h i s t o r y of Indian Buddhism ( t a n t r i c developments, exempted) and made some progress toward seeing i t i n that perspective. To do t h i s he revived Kern's use of the d i s t i n c t i o n between conventional and absolute t r u t h to resolve apparently contradictory notions within the doctrine. While t h i s idea w i l l be discussed l a t e r , i t i s safe to say that La Vallee Poussin's.. 1913-..understanding of the d i s t i n c t i o n between Madhyamika and Vijnanavada was so incomplete t h a t - i t should not be-taken se r i o u s l y . La Vallee Poussin's f i n a l contribution i n the Vijnaptimatratasiddhi (1928) contains l i t t l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . It i s an expanded s e l e c t i o n of Indian t e x t u a l sources ( s t i l l avoiding the t a n t r i c ) and a bibliography of scholarship. Both are s t i l l u s e f u l . In the 1913 a r t i c l e Masson-Oursel consolidates the previous conclusions and examines a c l a s s i c a l Vijnanavadin t e x t , from which he i s able to formulate two advances. F i r s t , he states e x p l i c i t l y what La Vallee. Poussin has recog-nized i m p l i c i t l y — t h a t the term kaya i n the t r i k a y a i s only metaphorically a "body" but a c t u a l l y designates a set of o r g a n i c a l l y - r e l a t e d facts about Buddha-hood. The p r e f i x (e.g., Dharma-) i d e n t i f i e s the p a r t i c u l a r c l u s t e r of f a c t s . Second, he c l a r i f i e s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Sambhogakaya, although he f a i l s to explain i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the other two kayas. It i s c l e a r that Masson-Oursel could have resolved h i s dilemma regarding the Sambhogakaya as compassionate response, had he possessed s u f f i c i e n t general knowledge of the Vijnanavada to r e a l i z e the r o l e of the Bodhisattva vow. 1+8 While Suzuki's i n t e n t i o n may not have a l t e r e d between the Outlines (1906) and the Studies (1930), his knowledge increased and his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (or presentation) changed almost beyond recognition. While the Outlines contains few u s e f u l ideas, the ease with which Suzuki, as a b e l i e v e r , modifies the concept of kaya supports La Vallee Poussin's and Masson-Oursel's idea that i t i s not a f i x e d "body." The works of these three writers appear to have discouraged others from wasting e f f o r t on a search for the " r e a l " or " o r i g i n a l pure" t r i k a y a doctrine. Most concentrated on the ideas that i t systematizes i n any p a r t i c u l a r text or system. Suzuki's major contribution i n the Studies i s the insistence that the Nirmana-Buddha of the Lankavatara (and by i m p l i c a t i o n , a l l three of the kayas that emerged from the tri-Buddha system of that text) i s a r e l a t i o n a l concept. While I doubt that the idea should be pushed as f a r as Suzuki does, i t w i l l be a key to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Mahayanasamgraha. Akanuma (1922) and Nagao (.1973) have adopted s i m i l a r approaches. As Nagao has the advantage of the intervening half-century, his a r t i c l e may be regarded as the culmination of Akanuma's work. Their approach i s distinguished by a primary l o y a l t y to the Buddhist sources rather than to the Western or Indian analogs. This l o y a l t y leads to"1 more applicable categories and more relevant primary questions. The basic message of Nagao's a r t i c l e appears i n the portions quoted. Although i t may be u n f a i r to c a l l these preliminary r e s u l t s "conclusions," they are the most sophisticated preliminary r e s u l t s i n t h i s set of a r t i c l e s . The other studies may be set aside just as were those of Parrinder and Matsunaga. Coomaraswamy and Chatterjee both ignore any h i s t o r i c a l development or v a r i a t i o n of the doctrine which they simply regard as a theism. They have not used t h e i r knowledge of the Indian m i l i e u . Their sources are r e s t r i c t e d , h9 t h e i r methods u n c r i t i c a l and t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s r e d u c t i o n i s t i c . R o c k h i l l ' s l i t t l e sutra and the Hobogirin a r t i c l e have been important sources but neither suggests an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The bulk of these studies a c t u a l l y constitutes data for a h i s t o r y of the Vijnanavada, i . e . , information about texts and contents, comments on t h e i r h i s t o r y , and insights into the structure of the system. Incorporation of these data into a h i s t o r i c a l account i s a straightforward process. Interpretation of them i s more d i f f i c u l t . A few general i n t e r p r e t a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s can be derived from these studies. The f i r s t i s that the word "kaya" i s . not a simple object but an open concept which has attracted a v a r i e t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . I would suggest that t h i s notion can be maintained by regarding kaya as a symbolic rather than a denotative concept. The general Buddhakaya, i n p a r t i c u l a r , has been found to contain several general categories of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . It i s obviously the r e s u l t of r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e , i . e . , i t i s something obtained by following the p r e s c r i p t i v e message, .I.e., the Buddha i s , i n some sense, a reoriented aspirant. The l o g i c a l p o s s i -b i l i t y of t h i s transformation i s accounted for by the tathagatagarbha theory, and the abstract mechanical question of how i t occurs i s answered by the asrayaparavrtti theory. This aspect of Buddhahood does not appear to r a i s e any problems whose answer i s not touched upon i n the a r t i c l e s . However, the Buddha i s also what La Val l e e Poussin c a l l s an "o n t o l o g i c a l or cosmological" concept which, as a form of the "dharma" or u n i v e r s a l norm, transcends the personal and accidental. When seen anthropomorphically as an object of r e l i g i o u s devotion, t h i s may be the aspect which Masson-Oursel understood as the cosmogonic Buddha. The clearest agreement i s on the h i s t o r i c a l development of the t r i k a y a . An o r i g i n a l doctrine centered on Sakyamuni quickly developed into a two-kaya form as the need was f e l t to d i s t i n g u i s h between Sakyamuni the teacher and other ways of viewing him ( e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the parinirvana). The two-kaya model was the e s s e n t i a l pattern underlying many of the multi-Buddha or m u l t i -kaya theories of the early sects, e s p e c i a l l y those based on the prajnaparami- tasutras. The t r i k a y a was an innovation of the early Vijnanavadin masters Maitreya-Asanga-Vasubandhu. It became the basis for l a t e r multi-kaya t a n t r i c develop-ments i n Indian and for various Sino-Japanese elaborations. The d e t a i l e d h i s t o r y of the appearance of the t r i k a y a i n the writings of the Vijnanavadin masters i s more obscure and the h i s t o r y of the l a t e r Indo-Tibetan and Sino-Japanese developments has attracted even l e s s attention. Kern's desideratum, that the t r i k a y a should be understood i n r e l a t i o n to the general development of Indian r e l i g i o u s thought, i s s t i l l i m p r a c t i c a l . Scholars became more d i f f i d e n t as they became better acquainted with the problem. The great modern surveys of Indian i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y ( i . e . , Renou and F i l l i o z a t ' s L'Inde classique and Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy) have simply drawn attention to the magnitude of the remaining task and paucity of r e l i a b l e sources. At present no scholar of Buddhism can be expected to produce a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r y of the relevant area of Indian thought and then f i t the t r i k a y a into i t . While incorporation of a general i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y i s s t i l l a long-term desideratum, the fact that our authors have produced s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s based only on the i n t e r n a l structure of the t r i k a y a doctrine suggests that such a h i s t o r y i s not indispensable. For our purposes, the more important question i s why each of these devel-opments occurred. Suggested reasons for the s h i f t from one to two-kaya models 51 include: need to d i f f e r e n t i a t e the human from the abstract Buddha; need for a c u l t focus a f t e r the parinirvana; need to apply the Madhyamika two-truth model to the Buddhology, etc. At l e a s t some of these sound reasonable. The d i f f i c u l t question i s why the two kayas (which could a c t u a l l y accom-modate varying number's of kayas under a two-term-model) were turned i n t o a t r i k a y a . Since only a few of our authors have noted the force of t h i s question and none has produced a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer, t h i s i s one of the basic questions for further study. An answer to the above question w i l l provide the context for considering the c e n t r a l one: What i s the t r i k a y a doctrine? While a l l writers agree that the three kayas provide a framework by which apparently diverse aspects of Buddhahood may be affirmed simultaneously, there i s l i t t l e agreement on how the d i v i s i o n s should be understood. Kern's suggestion that they represent the ultimate and conventional standpoints i s expanded by Masson-Oursel and the others to encompass an idea of three t r u t h s , i . e . , that the three are the same Buddha seen from three d i f f e r e n t perspectives. However, t h i s notion i s obviously inadequate as i t throws a l l the respon-s i b i l i t y on the aspirant and ignores the mechanics of his Bodhisattva vow. Suzuki's r e l a t i o n a l explanation seems more s a t i s f a c t o r y . Once the fundamental nature of the three d i v i s i o n s i s s e t t l e d , the. f i n a l two questions can be r a i s e d : What i s each kaya, and what are the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the three? Since each i s an open-ended symbolic concept, the "What" can be answered only by a tabulation of the aspects a t t r i b u t e d to each. While a c e r t a i n number of these are found i n the a r t i c l e s reviewed, a glance at a major t r i k a y a text (e.g., chapter X of the Mahayanasamgraha) reveals many more. The study of these should be straightforward. The question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the three should be answered 52 . l a s t , as i t -will "be l a r g e l y determined by the answers to the previous questions. We need only note the tremendous v a r i e t y of ideas i n the a r t i c l e s . Those who saw the basic pattern as a two-reality model had t r e a t t r o u b l e . f i n d i n g any room for the Sambhogakaya, l e t alone deciding how i t was r e l a t e d to the others. Nagao, however, s e r i o u s l y wonders why any kaya other than the Sambhogakaya i s necessary! Many of the basic but elusive c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Buddhahood, such as tathata and tathatajnana, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Buddhaland, and the actions of the Nirmanakaya, also seem to be bound up with the question of r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; and have been dealt with as such. Although none of the preceding works contains a broad, s o l i d framework within which any reasonable version of the t r i k a y a may be understood, we must consider one f i n a l scholar who appears to o f f e r just that. H. V. Guenther's understanding of the doctrine i s the most promising, and most i d i o s y n c r a t i c , of any examined so f a r . Although he has published only short a r t i c l e s on the t r i k a y a , t h i s doctrine i s c e n t r a l to h i s v i s i o n of Buddhism and i s mentioned i n most of his numerous pu b l i c a t i o n s . P a r t i c u l a r l y useful passages can be found i n The Jewel  Ornament of L i b e r a t i o n , 1959 (chapters 20 and 21); The L i f e and Teaching of  Naropa, 1963 (pp. ^7-50, llH-ll+5); Tibetan Buddhism Without M y s t i f i c a t i o n , 1966 (pp. 57-59); and Kindly Bent to Ease Us, 1975 (chapter 13). The most extensive development of his ideas on the t r i k a y a i s probably "The Experience of Being: The Trikaya Idea i n I t s Tibetan Interpretation" ( i n Roy C. Amore, ed., Devel- opments i n Buddhist Thought, 1979). Guenther's approach to the t r i k a y a i s unique i n that he works from the l a t e r Tibetan texts which others have set aside as " t a n t r i c " and therefore non-Vijnanavadin. Guenther sees these texts as containing the culmination of 53 the Vijnanavada doctrine begun f i f t e e n hundred years ago i n the writings of Asahga and Vasubandhu. His i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a i s inseparable from hi s understanding of t h i s mature t a n t r i c Vijnanavada. This understanding i s summarized i n many of his books. A t y p i c a l passage occurs i n The Tantric  View of L i f e (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1972): Tantrism begins with the concrete human s i t u a t i o n of man's l i v e d existence, and i t t r i e s to c l a r i f y the values that are already i m p l i c i t i n i t . . . . i t attempts to study the f i n i t e existence of man as l i v e d from within. . . . the world of man i s h i s horizon of meaning without which there can neither be a world nor an understanding, of i t so that man can l i v e . This horizon of meaning i s not something f i x e d once and for ever, but i t expands as man grows and growth i s the a c t u a l i t y of man's l i v e d existence. Meanings do not constitute another world, but provide another dimension to the one world which i s the locus of our actions. . . . There i s thus no escape from Being, and what Tantra i s t e l l i n g us i s that we have to face up to Being; to f i n d meaning i n l i f e i s to become Buddha —' e n l i g h t e n e d , ' but what t h i s meaning i s cannot be sa i d without f a l s i f y i n g i t . . . . the problem i s not man's essence or nature, but what man can make of his l i f e i n t h i s world so as to r e a l i z e the supreme values that l i f e affords . . . . In the pursuit of Being there i s a joyousness and directness which appears elsewhere to be found only i n Zen, that i s , the culmination of Sino-Japanese Buddhism. . . . Tantrism can be sai d to be the culmination of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism (pp. 2 - 5 ) . In short, Buddhism points to a meaningful present by a theory which concentrates on concrete existence rather than on abstract essence. This value-charged l i f e i s r e f e r r e d to as "Buddha" and described by means of the tr i k a y a . Guenther makes much of the fact that "kaya" was understood to be ambiguous by the Tibetans who tran s l a t e d i t (according to context) by either " l u s " (the ordinary body) or "sku" (the kaya of the Buddha). While he i s content to tr a n s l a t e lus as "body" he maintains that sku i s a dynamic, organizational concept for which "body" i s inappropriate. He writes: 5h This single r e a l i t y has s i g n i f i c a n t ramifications within the l i f e of man. It i s these ramifications that are r e f e r r e d to by the t e c h n i c a l term t r i k a y a (sku gsum), commonly, though quite l u d i c r o u s l y , t r a n s l a t e d as the 'Three Bodies of the Buddha,' due to the fact that the e a r l y t r a n s l a t o r s and t h e i r l a t e r copyist f a i l e d to understand or to note the purely des c r i p t i v e character of the word buddha ( s a n g s - r g y a s ) . . . . The word buddha i s a past p a r t i c i p l e of the verb budh "to wake up," and i t s e x c l u s i v e l y a d j e c t i v a l use describes the experience a person has had, but not the person. This alone should s u f f i c e to show that i t i s meaningless to speak of "bodies." An experience tends to get expressed, but i t i s neither fact nor bare ideas that get expressed but "values": how i t f e e l s to be; and the meaning of f u l l n e s s of being i s apprehended as embodied (p. 5 5 ) . And again: The human being has h i s house and family, and also h i s homeland to which he becomes attached. His very l i f e depends on the i n t e r a c t i o n between his existence conditioning t h i s v i t a l f i e l d and the f i e l d conditioning h i s existence. This explains why the world he inhabits i s c a l l e d a Nirmanakaya just as he. himself i s a Nirmanakaya (p. 5 5 ) . This f u l l n e s s of being presents i t s e l f i n two ways which may be considered epistemological and o n t o l o g i c a l : Fullness of Being and the f e e l i n g of happiness which i s at the same time the awareness of t h i s f u l l n e s s , are not two contrasting e n t i t i e s , but the two aspects of a single r e a l i t y . Awareness c a r r i e s with i t the c e r t a i n t y that awareness is_ and Being is_ i n so f a r as there i s awareness of i t . The one i s the other and the d i s t i n c t i o n i s a matter of emphasis rather than of difference, . . . The t r i k a y a doctrine i s so complex because i t may be described from both standpoints: kLong-chen rab-'byams-pa i n t e r p r e t s the t e c h n i c a l term sku, which I have rendered as " e x i s t e n t i a l value pattern," i n two d i f f e r e n t ways which are nevertheless intimately r e l a t e d to each other. The one may be c a l l e d "epistemological" and the other " o n t o l o g i c a l . " The "epistemological value-55 pattern" i s " i n t r i n s i c awareness with i t s object- appearance." I t i s "That which appears before our senses (in i t s immediacy) without being i n need of being asserted or denied, and that which can be analyzed into ( i ) the senses (as c o n t r o l l i n g powers), ( i i ) the psycho-physical constituents, and ( i i i ) the (complex of the) objective s i t u a t i o n and the owner of the objective s i t u a t i o n . " To term t h i s complex a "value-pattern" i s j u s t i f i e d by the fa c t that value does not reside i n one aspect alone, but i n the t o t a l i t y of what constitutes the pattern. The " o n t o l o g i c a l value-pattern" as a "form of c r e a t i v i t y " i s represented as two patterns, the one holding to what i t i s on the unerring path, the other just being the being-there as pure existence. Of the former, kLong-chen rab 'byams-pa says: "As i t holds to what i t i s i n i t s t r i a d of f a c t i c i t y , a c t u a l i t y , and cognitive responsiveness and leads to f u l l n e s s of being as goal, i t is'.known (by such terms) as 'great p l a y f u l f a s c i n a t i o n pattern,' 'crown-jewel pattern,' ' l i f e -s t y l e supporting pattern.'" The pure existence pattern i s said to be "The t r i a d of the ground, path, and goal. The ground i s the presence of absolute o r i g i n a l awareness; the path i s the invariableness of an outward appearance i n radiancy and as an (aesthetic) f i e l d pattern. The goal i s the absoluteness of the three e x i s t e n t i a l patterns i n e f f o r t l e s s presence." The e x i s t e n t i a l value-patterns which are both i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c , are by no means to be considered as s t a t i c e n t i t i e s to which man has to submit. Rather are they man's very l i f e , p u l s a t i n g with wondrous experiences. The mani-f e s t a t i o n of these value-patterns holds a f a s c i n a t i o n which i s f e l t as pure playfulness, . . . (pp. k2-h3). A s i m p l i f i e d summary of Guenther's t r i k a y a i s found i n Tibetan Buddhism  Without M y s t i f i c a t i o n (Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1966): . . . c e r t a i n norms are revealed, which are always active and dynamic. They have become known by t h e i r Indian names, Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Nirmanakaya, but never have been understood properly, within the framework of t r a d i t i o n a l Western semantics, because, of the e s s e n t i a l i s t premises of Western philosophies. Essence i s that which marks a thing o f f and separates i t from other e n t i t i e s of a d i f f e r e n t kind. From such a point of view a l l of man's actions spring from that which i s considered to he his i n t r i n s i c nature. I t s f a l l a c y . i s that i t makes us overlook man's r e l a t i o n a l being; the actual person always l i v e s in_ a world with others. And, i n human l i f e , essence t e l l s man that he i s already what he can be, so there i s no need to set out on a path of s p i r i t u a l development. Seen as e x i s t e n t i a l norms these three patterns reveal t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e . Dharmakaya indicates the i n t e n t i o n a l structure of the noetic i n man. I t i s the merit of Buddhism that i t has always recognized t h i s feature of awareness: I cannot know without knowing something, just as I cannot do without doing something. But i n ordinary knowledge whatever I know i s overshadowed by b e l i e f s , presuppositions, l i k e s and d i s l i k e s . However, the more I succeed i n removing myself from sel f - c e n t r e d concerns and s i t u a t i o n s and free myself from a l l b i a s , the more I am enabled to apprehend things as they are. This happens i n d i s c i p l i n e d philosoph-i c a l enquiry through which one gradually approaches no-thingness and indeterminacy, from the vantage point of which one can achieve a view of r e a l i t y without i n t e r n a l warping. This cognitive indeterminacy which underlies the whole noetic enterprise of man i s r i c h e r i n contents and broader i n i t s horizons than any other awareness because i t i s an u n r e s t r i c t e d perspective from which nothing i s screened or excluded. I f anything can be predicated about i t , i t i s pure potency which, when act u a l i z e d , enables us to see ourselves and things as we and they r e a l l y are. In order to gain t h i s capacity we have to develop our i n t e l l i g e n c e , our c r i t i c a l acumen, which i s the main theme of the Paramitayana and without which Mantrayana i s impossible. But a l l the i n f o r -mation we receive through such sustained analysis i s not merely for the sake of pure awareness or contemplation, but i n order that we may act. Every ins i g h t i s barren i f i t does not f i n d expression i n action, and every action i s f u t i l e i f i t i s not supported by sound i n s i g h t . Only when we succeed i n understanding ourselves, our projects and our world from a point of view which i s no point of view, w i l l a sound d i r e c t i o n of human action be p o s s i b l e , because i t i s no longer subordinated to petty, s e l f - c e n t r e d concerns. This active mode of being i s r e a l i z e d through the two operational patterns or norms, the Sambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya, both of which have t h e i r raison d'etre i n the c o g n i t i v e - s p i r i t u a l mode. S t r i c t l y speaking, only the Nirmanakaya.is perceptible,, although i t would be wrong to assume that i t i s of a p h y s i c a l nature. . . . Nirmanakaya s i g n i f i e s being i n the world, not so much as a being among things and a r t i f a c t s , but as an active being i n r e l a t i o n to a vast f i e l d of surrounding e n t i t i e s 57 which are equally v i b r a t i n g with l i f e , a l l of them ordered i n a world structure. As an active mode of being Nirmanakaya i s the implementation of man's whole being, the ordering of h i s world i n the l i g h t of his ultimate p o s s i b i l i t i e s . . . . Real being with others must spring up on the spur of the moment and arouse us to our p o s s i b i l i t i e s . That which does so i s the Sambhogakaya. Grounded i n u n r e s t r i c t e d and unbiased cognition i t can e s t a b l i s h contact with others and s t i r them to authentic action (pp. 5 7 - 5 9 ) . From t h i s , Guenther develops a complex i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t a n t r i c w r i t e r s ' multi-kaya theories. However, as these represent a stage beyond t h i s study I w i l l simply point out that the a b i l i t y of his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to deal with extensions of the basic doctrine indicates that i t w i l l be a serious contender i n a broader study. Here we w i l l discuss only the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n outlined i n the preceding quotations. An evaluation of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n involves two questions: — that of the v a l i d i t y of his view of t a n t r i c Buddhism — that of the v a l i d i t y of h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a . The l a t t e r question can be answered only a f t e r a p o s i t i v e answer to the former. I s h a l l assume such an answer. In p a r t i c u l a r , I s h a l l assume: — Guenther's acquaintance with a wide v a r i e t y of relevant Buddhist sources — h i s f a m i l i a r i t y with European philosophy — the legitimacy of a hermeneutic which expresses Buddhist ideas i n terms and thought-patterns drawn from contemporary philosophy and psychology. Furthermore, I must i n s i s t that t h i s discussion does not turn upon the peripheral issue (which Bharati, i n his "Tibetan Buddhism i n America," Tibet  Journal k, no. 3 , p. 8 , c a l l s one of the "red flags he keeps h o i s t i n g f or his c r i t i c s and detractors") of whether Guenther's replacement of "standard" 58 mistranslations by more accurate English terms i s j u s t i f i e d . I w i l l discuss only the second question, i . e . : Is Guenther's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the doctrine s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r and general to be applied to any major Indo-Tibetan version of the t r i k a y a , and to. any major doctrine based on i t ? This can be divided into sub-questions: that of the g e n e r a l i t y , and that of the c l a r i t y . The concern of generality i s the more important. It i s usually phrased somewhat as follows: Even granting that Tibetan t a n t r i c Buddhism (e.g., that of Klong-chen-pa, l ^ t h century A.D.) i s the l o g i c a l culmination of the Indian Vijnanavada, can an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n derived from i t be applied to much e a r l i e r statements of the Indian masters (e.g., Vasubandhu, Uth century A.D.)? I suggest that the answer depends p r i m a r i l y upon the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s i n t e n t . I f he i s p r i m a r i l y an apologist, i t i s mandatory that he i n t e r p r e t the e a r l i e r writings by reference to l a t e r a u t h o r i t i e s . For example, a C h r i s t i a n w i l l i n t e r p r e t Genesis i n l i g h t of the Adam of the New Testament, understood through theologians such as Aquinas or Luther, who w i l l themselves be understood--via the writings of modern theologians or popularizers. Since Guenther obviously i s such an apologist, and since the present study i s not an apologetic work, t h i s approach i s suspect. I f we regard his work as a more d i s i n t e r e s t e d study containing f a c t u a l assertions, a l o g i c a l problem appears. I f something should be found i n the e a r l i e r l i t e r a t u r e to which his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would not: apply, the l a t t e r would not be s u f f i c i e n t l y general. However, t h i s can be determined only a f t e r a l l major instances have been examined. Hence his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot, on p r i n c i p l e , be judged without further i n v e s t i g a t i o n . This i s simply an instance of the truism t h a t , while a t h e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may y i e l d a p r i o r i knowledge, an i n v e s t i g a -t i o n by an outsider can deal only i n a p o s t e r i o r i f a c t s . 59 This simple point i s frequently obscured by Guenther's ex cathedra affirmations that h i s i s the correct understanding "of Buddhism." As i t i s obvious that his work i s more apologetic than d i s i n t e r e s t e d , we must stand back and r e a l i z e that the judgement of whether or not h i s understanding can f i t the doctrine i n other texts and cultures can be made only a f t e r that doctrine i s examined. One obvious focus for t h i s further study would seem to be\the doctrine i n the writings of the e a r l y Vijnanavadin masters. Of course, a completely new study of each Vijnanavadin text would be ludicrous. The actual procedure would be that of any other piece of research. One would devise and administer to each a t e s t of the t h e o r e t i c a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Guenther's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Unfortunately, the d i s s i m i l a r i t y among the previous a r t i c l e s prevents us from shortening the process s t i l l further by simply using t h e i r data. It w i l l be necessary to examine each text ourselves. The second consideration within the question of v a l i d i t y , that of c l a r i t y , c a l l s f o r a more subjective judgement. As we have seen, Guenther frequently quotes very abstract formulations of the t r i k a y a which he i n t e r p r e t s i n an equally abstract manner. Do these ill u m i n a t e the very concrete phenomena to which the scheme i s applied? Again, a thorough answer should involve an examination of both his work and the t r i k a y a t e x t s . However, as Guenther himself often seems unable to bridge the gap between the abstract and the a c t u a l , the answer i s probably no. For example, his explanation of the t r i k a y a i n Tilopa's attunement i n s t r u c t i o n s (Naropa pp. U^-kQ, lUl-155) reads, ". . . CattunementH . . . i s n i n e f o l d : attunement to the three e x i s t e n t i a l patterns or norms, while dying, sleeping, and becoming awake" (p. h8). Guenther explains: The aim of the various p r a c t i c e s outlined i n the i n s t r u c -tions given to Naropa i s to a r r i v e at stable structures of 60 authentic being. S t a b i l i t y i s achieved by shedding whatever there i s of con-structions, by dismantling the maze of dead and deadening concepts, and by penetrating to a spaciousness that i s pulsating with l i f e . The f i r s t step i s to experience one's being-in-the-world as a god or goddess i n a mansion which has the character of a magic s p e l l . It i s the magic that i s important, not the s p e l l i t s e l f or i t s content (p. lh9) • The problem i s obvious. Guenther f e e l s that the actual d e t a i l s of the r i t u a l are t r i v i a l compared to the meaning. It i s d i f f i c u l t to r e a l i z e that he i s discussing c e r t a i n very s p e c i f i c , complex meditation r i t u a l s . This denigration of the r i t u a l i s not the Tibetan view. The Tibetan masters usually follow the l i t u r g i c a l axiom pratique d'abord. They stress that the r i t u a l performance ("the s p e l l and i t s content") i s the s i t u a t i o n from which the magic or meaning w i l l emerge. I t i s at the s p e c i f i c l e v e l that important differences (e.g., differences of meaning determined by which Bodhisattvas are involved) are present. I do not f i n d Guenther's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to be h e l p f u l f o r such questions. In short, although Guenther! s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of-the' t r i k a y a is-ivalid^and' u s e f u l f o r general • discussions of-many"^aspects of Tibetan .Buddhism, i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y cover the theory i n a l l Buddhist sects and i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c to c l a r i f y d e t a i l s of practice' and .theory. Therefore, although h i s in t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the best a v a i l a b l e , further research, i s j u s t i f i e d , e s p e c i a l l y on the older t e x t s , to reach a more useful understanding. CONCLUSION We now possess a f a i r idea of the development of the. surviving Indian Buddhist l i t e r a t u r e , and can reconstruct the outlines of the development of the concept of Buddhahood. It i s obvious that various c l u s t e r s of ideas about Buddhahood became each of the kayas. Many of these ideas have been examined and c l a r i f i e d . However, i t i s also c l e a r that the t r i k a y a i s more than the sum t o t a l of three s t r a n d s — i t i s a unique scheme defined by the relationships among the three terms. What i s s t i l l l a c k i n g i s a general understanding of the patterns i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , s p e c i f i c a l l y an understanding expressed as a h e u r i s t i c model capable of i n t e r p r e t i n g various versions of the doctrine. Guenther o f f e r s a developed model but i t s generality and c l a r i t y are both i n doubt. Nagao has made a modest beginning but has not developed i t . Therefore, I suggest that the need for further research i s self-evident. Also evident i s the fact that t h i s cannot be a simple continuation of any previous study but must involve a fresh s t a r t and a wider scope. As none of the previous studies has a c t u a l l y analyzed i n d e t a i l the doctrine i n one author i t a t i v e text, I suggest that the f i r s t step should be a d e t a i l e d study 9 of such a text. This study should be informed by the findings of e a r l i e r scholars but should not be bound by them. The choice of a text i s c r i t i c a l . It cannot be just any available text which deals with the t r i k a y a but should be one which i s seen as autho r i t a t i v e by as many branches of the t r a d i t i o n as possible. This l i m i t s the choice to the early Vijnanavadin writings i n which that t r a d i t i o n was f i r s t defined. A summary of these writings follows. As the t r a d i t i o n s regarding the early Vijnanavada have been summarized many t i m e s , a n d as l i t t l e agreement exists on t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l value, t h i s w i l l merely be a survey of the major t e x t s . More d e t a i l s on those which are most useful for a t r i k a y a study w i l l be found i n Appendix B, "Bibliography of Selected Primary Sources." The Vijnanavada arose as a systematic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of those Mahayana sutras which appeared i n India during the f i r s t centuries of our era. Although we do not know which sutras were adopted by any s p e c i f i c Vijnanavadin master, a small group i s c l e a r l y c e n t r a l to the t r a d i t i o n . It includes: the prajna- paramita (most l i k e l y the Astasahasrika-prajnaparamita), the Lankavatara, the Dasabhumika, some of the Ratnakuta group ( e s p e c i a l l y the Srimaladevi), and above a l l , the Samdhinirmocana. A l l t r a d i t i o n s c r e d i t three f i g u r e s — M a i t r e y a , Asanga and Vasubandhu— with the basic formulation of new doctrine. Their major sastras are discussed below. 1. MAITREYA Maitreya i s e i t h e r an earthly teacher or the Bodhisattva Maitreya i n the T u s i t a heaven. He i s generally regarded as the author of the following works: The Yogacarabhumi, which i s one of the longest, e a r l i e s t and loosest of the sastras. Although i t contains doctrines about Buddhahood, i t does not seem to be an important source for the t r i k a y a . I t may represent a stage p r i o r to the f u l l systematization of the Vijnanavada. Only a few chapters have been t r a n s l a t e d into Western languages. The Mahayanasutralamkara, an elegant verse summary of the Vijnanavada, which would be nearly incomprehensible without the commentaries by Vasubandhu, Asvabhava and Sthiramati. Asanga has incorporated p r a c t i c a l l y a l l of the relevant passages on the Buddha into h i s own Mahayanasamgraha. The fa c t that t h i s text i s one of the few Vijnanavadin works s t i l l extant i n Sanskrit may account for i t s popularity with modern Indian scholars. 63 The Madhyantavibhaga i s again a work which would he incomprehensible without the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. This t e x t , whose t i t l e might be t r a n s l a t e d as "Discrimination between the middle and extremes," defines the orthodox ("middle") VijKanavadin metaphysical stance. I t does not o f f e r a Buddhology per se and only a few chapters are a v a i l a b l e i n Western languages. The Dharmadharmatavibhaga. i s a further treatment of the metaphysical stance, centered on the trisvabhava. It also c a r r i e s a commentary by Vasu-bandhu. It has received l i t t l e study i n modern times outside Japan. The Abhisamayalankara, a prajnaparamita text with commentaries by Vasu-bandhu's p u p i l Aryavimuktisena and l a t e r w r i t e r s , contains a short passage on the t r i k a y a but i s not a c e n t r a l Buddhological text. It i s b a s i c a l l y a system-a t i z a t i o n of the Mahayana from a Madhyamika standpoint which has been placed within the Vijnanavada. It provides a v i v i d demonstration that the Vijnanavada masters were attempting to include rather than replace the other schools. The Uttaratantra (or Ratnagotravibhaga) includes an important passage on the t r i k a y a , but i s best known as the source of the tathagatagarbha theory. Asanga has written a commentary to i t . 2. ASANGA Tr a d i t i o n holds that either Asanga was the p u p i l of a teacher named Maitreya, or he was taken to the T u s i t a heaven where the Bodhisattva Maitreya dictated to him the Yogacarabhumi and other tex t s . In addition to the commentaries on the Maitreya t r e a t i s e s , he i s credited with: 6k The Abidharmasamuccaya, a Vijnanavadin abhidharma which, l i k e v the Vijnana-vadin prajnaparamita of the Abhisamayalankara, shows how the e a r l i e r ideas were integrated within the Vijnanavada. I t contains no d i r e c t discussions of the t r i k a y a . The Mahayanasamgraha, a systematic work which, inc l u d i n g the commentaries on i t by Vasubandhu and Asvabhava, establishes the broad outlines of the Vijnanavadin system. Asanga arranged a l l the i n d i v i d u a l elements ( i . e . , the abhidharma, the vijnaptimatra, the trisvabhava, the prajnaparamita, and the trikaya) i n a new perspective. As t h i s text i s the focus of the present study i t w i l l be discussed i n d e t a i l l a t e r . 3. VASUBANDHU The r i c h and enigmatic t r a d i t i o n a l figure Vasubandhu i s usually considered to have written the b r i l l i a n t Abhidharmakosa before being converted to Mahayana by his brother Asanga. In addition to the commentaries already noted, Vasu-bandhu i s credited with several important primary tex t s . These include: The Karmasiddhiprakarana, i n which the abhidharma reasoning of the Abhi- dharmakosa i s developed i n a Vijnanavadin d i r e c t i o n . L i t t l e of i t i s d i r e c t l y applicable to the t r i k a y a question. The Vimsika and Trimsika are c r y p t i c verse summaries—the f i r s t of the arguments for the mind-only t h e s i s , the second of the en t i r e Vijnanavadin system. The importance of the Trimsika derives from i t s use by the Chinese p i l g r i m scholar Hsuan-tsang as the backbone for h i s Ch'eng Wei Shih.Lun, h i s grand summary of the Vijnanavadin ideas current i n seventh-century India. In t h i s work the opinions of various Indian masters are placed as commentaries to appropriate verses of the Trims'ika. As l a t e r Chinese and Japanese masters regarded the Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun as the a u t h o r i t a t i v e exposition of the V i j n a -navadin system, the Trimsika came to be regarded as the basis of the Indian Vijnanavadin t r a d i t i o n s . These are merely the c e n t r a l sastras. Each of the three masters i s credited with a d d i t i o n a l minor works, and t h e i r d i s c i p l e s produced a flo o d of writings during the following centuries. Moreover, t h e i r influence was not confined to any one sect—most subsequent Mahayana Buddhist thinkers adopted many of t h e i r ideas. Some attempted to form a Vijnanavadin-Madhyamika. Many l a t e r popularizers, such as Santideva, obviously saw t h e i r basic ideas as simply "Mahayana Buddhism." In China, the Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun became the t e x t u a l basis for the Fa-hsiang school which has continued to develop i n both China.and Japan. The Vijnanavada, as well as the various Vijnanavada-Madhyamika systems, was the basis for indigenous Tibetan developments. Tantric thought of India, Tibet and Japan developed d i r e c t l y from the Vijnanavada. A f t e r reaching t h i s point, ( i . e . , having read the preceding studies and become acquainted with the l i t e r a t u r e ) , I had the opportunity, i n J u l y 1976, to discuss the choice of a textual focus with Professor Nagao. In response to a query about s c r i p t u r a l authority for the t r i k a y a doc-t r i n e , he said that a search for such authority i n the e a r l y Mahayana sutras was u n l i k e l y to be f r u i t f u l . Instead, he suggested that the voluminous Yoga- carabhumi might y i e l d the e a r l i e s t d e t a i l s . He did mention one sutra passage— the chapter added to the Chinese Suvarnaprabhasasutra—but only as a l a t e r culmination of the doctrine rather than an early authority for i t . 66 He suggested focussing f i r s t on the Mahayanasamgraha and Mahayanasutra- laiikara and, to a l e s s e r extent, on the Abhi samayalankara. He also f e l t that the Ratnagotravibhaga should not he a primary t e x t , hut agreed that i t s tathagatagarhha theory could not he ignored. The major Chinese sources which he recommended were Hsiian-tsang's Ch'eng  Wei Shih Lun and Hui-yuan's Ta - Slneng I Chang (T. 1851), a sixth-century survey of Buddha-body theories. A f t e r a discussion of h i s 1973 a r t i c l e (above), Professor Nagao stated that he s t i l l agreed with the methods and sources but f e l t that he had not s u f f i c i e n t l y emphasized the Mahayanasamgraha. At t h i s point the best approach to the t r i k a y a doctrine appeared to be through an intensive study of the Mahayanasamgraha. The choice of t h i s text was dictated by the fact that i t i s the most systematic of the early t e x t s . It contains more d e t a i l e d arguments than do the others, and i t locates them within the context of Asanga's complete system. Each of the other early sastras explains some p a r t i c u l a r idea: the Abhidharmasamuccaya outlines the dharma theory; the Madhyant avibhaga- •defines the l o g i c a l viewpoint of the school and d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t from that of the Madhyamika; and the Ratnagotravibhanga develops the tathagatagarhha. Only the Mahayanasamgraha and the Mahayanasutra- lankara integrate these into an- i n c l u s i v e s y s t e m . T h e importance of such d o c t r i n a l context cannot be overstressed. A study of any s p e c i f i c notion must be guided by an understanding of the wider net of theory i n which i t functions. The Mahayanasutralartkara was eliminated from consideration a f t e r a c a r e f u l reading of both i t and the Mahayanasamgraha revealed that the Buddhological verses of the former were incorporated and explained i n the l a t t e r . Therefore, the next section of t h i s study i s an examination of the Buddhological passages of the Mahayanasamgraha. 67 NOTES ^ Etienne Lamotte, La Somme du grand vehicule d'Asanga (Mahayanasamgraha), tomes 1-2 . Louvain: I n s t i t u t O r i e n t a l i s t e , 1973, tome 2 , p. "+9-2 R o c k h i l l ' s text was some version of the 'phags-pa sku gsum shes-bya-ba  theg-pa chen-po'i mdo (Suzuki r e p r i n t e d i t i o n No. 9^9: v. 37» P- 108 -2 -2 ) . The c e n t r a l portion reads as follows: /rigs-kyi-bu de-bzhin-gshegs-pa'i sku gsum n i rang-bzhin rnam-par-dag-pa n i chos-kyi sku'o/ /ting-nge-'dzin rnam-par-dag-pa n i long-spyod-rdzogs-pa 1i sku'o / /spyod-pa rnam-par-dag-pa n i sangs-rgyas thams-cad-kyi sprul-pa'i sku'o/ ri g s - k y i - b u de-bzhin-gshegs-pa'i chos-kyi sku n i nam-mkha' l t a r rang-bzhin med-pa'i don-no/ /longs-spyod-rdzogs-pa'i sku n i sbrin l t a r 'byung-ba'i don-no/ sprul-pa'i sku n i sangs-rgyas. thams-cad-kyi ''phrin-las t e / char-ba l t a - b u ste thams-cad bdas-pa'i don-no/ /bcom-ldan-'das l a byang-chub-sems-dpa' s a ' i snying-pos 'di skad ces gsol-to/ /bcom-ldan- 'das-kyi sku gsum-gyi bshad-pa j i - l t a r b l t a r - b a r bgyi/ bcom-ldan-'das-kyis byang-chub-sems-dpa' s a ' i snying-po-la bka'-stsal-pa/ rig s - k y i - b u de-bzhin-gshegs-pa'i sku gsum n i 'di l t a r blta-bar bya'o/ /chos-kyi sku n i de-bzhin-gshegs-pa'i ngo-gang l a blta-bar j bya'o/ /longs-spyod-rdzogs-pa'i sku n i byang-chub-sems-dpa'i ngo-gang l a blta-bar bya'o/ sprul-pa'i sku n i mos-pas spyod-pa'i so-so skye-bo'i ngo-gang l a b l t a -bar bya'o rig s - k y i - b u chos-kyi sku n i sangs rgyas thams-cad dang rang-bzhin mthun-par gnas-so/ /longs-spyod-rdzogs-pa'i sku n i sangs-rgyas thams-cad dang ting-nge-'dzin mthun-par gnas-so/ /sprul-pa'i sku n i sangs-rgyas thams-cad dang 'phrin-las mthun-par gnas-so/ rigs - k y i - b u kun-gzhi gnas-su dag-pa n i me-long l t a - b u ' i ye-shes te chos-kyi sku'o/ nyon-mongs-pa'i y i d gnas-su dag-pa n i mnyam-par-nyid-kyi ye-shes-so/ /yi d - k y i rnam-par shes-pa 68 gnas-su dag-pa n i so-sor kun-tu rtog-pa'i ye-shes t e / longs-spyod-rdzogs-pa'i sku'o/ sgo-lnga'i rnam-par shes-pa gnas-su dag-pa n i bya-ba grub-pa'i ye-shes te sprul-pa'i sku'o/ 3 This point i s evident i n La V a l l e e Poussin's review of Suzuki's Outlines i n the Journal o f the R o y a l s A s i a t i c Society of Great B r i t a i n and Ireland, 1908, 885 - 8 9 I + . While he i s w i l l i n g to extend a l l due courtesy to Suzuki the scholar, he i s outraged at Suzuki the theologian's manipulations of the doctrines of his own f a i t h . Of course, a good part of h i s pique i s caused by Suzuki's penchant f o r "nourishing himself with the vapours of the German philosophic alembics," and making "absurd comparisons" between C h r i s t i a n i t y and the Buddhist "mysticism of sophistic n i h i l i s m " ! ^ Etienne Lamotte, Le T r a i t e de l a grande vertu de sagesse (Louvain: I n s t i t u t O r i e n t a l i s t e , tomes 1-k, 19^9-76). ^ K. Venkata Ramanan, Nagarjuna's Philosophy: As Presented i n the Maha- Pra.inaparamita-Sastra (Tokyo, Vermont: Charles E. T u t t l e Company Inc., 1966). ^ The a r t i c l e i s unsigned. However, La Vallee Poussin, i n a b i b l i o g r a p h -i c a l note i n Melanges ehiriois et bouddhiques, 1 (1932), p. 399, i d e n t i f i e s Paul Demieville as the author. 7 For d e t a i l s see Appendix A — B i b l i o g r a p h y of Primary Texts. Note that the Mahayanasutralankara i s a curious choice for the sole source of informa-t i o n . It i s an early Maitreyan text which i s hardly comprehensible without commentary. Asanga incorporated i t s Buddhological statements into chapter X of h i s Mahayanasamgraha, where they appear as only one strand feeding into h i s t r i k a y a . It was Asanga's t r i k a y a rather than the more p r i m i t i v e versions which appears to have been accepted by the Vijnanavadin t r a d i t i o n s . As the Mahayana- sutralankara i s one of the few early Vijnanavadin texts s t i l l extant i n Sanskrit, i t i s tempting to wonder i f the author has chosen i t f o r any more serious reason than an i n a b i l i t y to read the more relevant texts which are av a i l a b l e only i n Chinese or Tibetan. 8 See Suzuki, Studies i n the Lankavatara Sutra, p. l8h. 69 y Note that Ruegg, i n h i s Tathagatagarhha (pp. 6-7) says that he was l e d by s i m i l a r reasoning to base his study of the•Tathagatagarhha "concept on a detailed'analysis of" the Ratnagotravibhaga. There i s l i t t l e r e l i a b l e h i s t o r i c a l information on the e a r l y devel-opment of the Vijnanavada. Most accounts are based on a few Chinese and Tibetan summaries of the t r a d i t i o n a l legends. The most important of these summaries are contained i n Paramartha's sixth-century Chinese biography of Vasubandhu, Bu-ston's fourteenth-century Tibetan h i s t o r y of Buddhism, and Taranatha's sixteenth-century h i s t o r y of Buddhism i n India. The t r a d i t i o n s summarized i n these works disagree on the basic h i s t o r -i c a l questions, e.g.: Was Maitreya a man or a great Bodhisattva? How many Vasubandhus were there? What i s the basic chronology? These questions have been the focus of heated discussions by such scholars as Takakusu, Obermiller, Lamotte, Johnston, Frauwallner, Schmithausen, Wayman, and Anacker. Summaries of these controversies and bi b l i o g r a p h i e s may be found i n : — Ruegg, Tathagatagarhha, pp. 39-55-— Walpola Rahula's a r t i c l e "Asanga" i n Malalasekera's Encyclopaedia of  Buddhism, v o l . 2:1, pp. 133-1^6. — Jacques May's "La philosophie bouddhique i d e a l i s t e . " — Anacker's "Vasubandhu: Three'Aspects," pp. 1-33,-' This contains an-excellent summary and discussion of the t r a d i t i o n s and recent studies concerning the l i f e of Vasubandhu". 1 1 Janice D. W i l l i s a r r i v e d at a s i m i l a r view i n her'"Chapter 'on R e a l i t y . " She says, "Asanga authored both the Yogacarabhumi and the Mahayanasamgraha (among other works). Of these two, the l a t t e r i s the most representative as a whole of h i s Mahayana views" (p. 3). CHAPTER II THE TRIKAYA DOCTRINE IN THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA 71 A. SOURCES The Mahayanasamgraha i s the most accessible of the early t e x t s . It i s av a i l a b l e i n both the Taisho (Chinese) and Peking (Tibetan) c o l l e c t i o n s . In addition, a multitextual comparative e d i t i o n of four Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s (T. 159^ - by Hsuan-tsang, T. 1596 by Dharmagupta, T. 1593 by Paramartha, and T. 1592 by Buddhasanta) has been published by,Sasaki Gessho (Kan'yaku Shihon- taisho Shodaijoron. Tokyo: Nakayama Shobo, 1959). The edited Tibetan text •„ and', a French t r a n s l a t i o n of the basic t e x t , together with t r a n s l a t i o n s of selected portions of the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhava, has been published by Etienne Lamotte as La Somme  du grand "vehicule d'Asanga (Mahayanasamgraha), tome 1: versions TIbetaine et Chinoise (Hiuan-Tsang); tome 2: traduction et commentaire. Louvain: I n s t i t u t O r i e n t a l i s t e , 1973. The present study i s based upon two versions of the Mahayanasamgraha: — Hsuan-tsang's Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n , ca. 6h8 A.D. (Taisho 159^; v o l . 31, pp. 132-152), r e f e r r e d to as "H" and c i t e d by Taisho page, r e g i s t e r and l i n e . — The ninth-century Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n by Jinamitra, Silendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde (Otani 55^9; v o l . 112), r e f e r r e d to as "T" and c i t e d by Peking f o l i o numbering. 7 2 While I hare attempted to in t e r p r e t the Buddhology of the Mahayanasamgraha i n terms of i t s own i n t e r n a l l o g i c with minimal re l i a n c e on the opinions of l a t e r commentators, t h i s has frequently proved impossible. In such cases I have consulted Vasubandhu's Bhasya, which i s av a i l a b l e i n two versions: — Hsuan-tsang's Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n (Taisho 1 5 9 7 ; v o l . 3 1 , pp. 3 2 1 - 3 8 0 ) , r e f e r r e d to as "Bh" and c i t e d by Taisho page, r e g i s t e r and l i n e . — The eleventh-century Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n by A t i s a and Tshul-khrims (Otani 5551; v o l . 1 1 2 , pp. 2 7 2 - 3 0 7 ) , r e f e r r e d to as "bh" and c i t e d by Peking f o l i o number and l i n e . As the Bhasya's glosses are, by the very nature of that genre of commen-tary , terse (often no: more than c l a r i f i c a t i o n s of the grammar of the l o s t S a n s k r i t ) , I have frequently been forced to consult Asvabhava's Upanibandhana, which i s also a v a i l a b l e i n two versions: — Hsuan-tsang's t r a n s l a t i o n (Taisho. 1598; v o l . . 3 1 , pp. 3 8 5 - ^ 9 ) , r e f e r r e d to as " U " and c i t e d by Taisho- page, r e g i s t e r and l i n e . —- The Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n by Jinamitra, Silendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde (Otani 5552; v o l . 1 1 3 , pp. 1 - ^ 3 ) , r e f e r r e d to as "u" and c i t e d by Peking f o l i o number and l i n e . While Asvabhava undoubtedly postdated Asanga, I have f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n consulting him because his comments seem to be grounded i n the l o g i c of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r text rather than i n the orthodoxy of some l a t e r school. At any rate, since h i s i s the f i r s t unambiguous l e v e l . o f commentary on many passages, there i s l i t t l e a l t e r n a t i v e . Lamotte also r e l i e d heavily on the Upanibandhana. 73 In t h i s study, references to the Mahayanasamgraha i t s e l f are c i t e d according to Lamotte's d i v i s i o n s , while Taisho references are reserved f o r drawing attention to some feature of Hsuan-tsang's Chinese t e x t . Readers of the Chinese should note that, while Lamotte.. divided the text into a prastavaria' (foreword) followed by ten "chapters," Hsuan-tsang numbered each section consecutively, beginning with the prastavana. " Hence,, -Lambtte-'s chapter one w i l l be Hsuan-tsang's section two, and so on. B. WHAT IS THE VIJHAHAVADA ? The most s t r i k i n g feature of the system of which the t r i k a y a i s the culmination i s i t s inclusiveness. G. Tucci^" wrote: . . . we cannot f a i l to notice a general and fundamen-t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c common to a l l . I mean the attempt f o r the c o n c i l i a t i o n of the various tendencies existent i n Buddhism. . . . . . . i t was c e r t a i n l y d i f f i c u l t to combine i n a l o g i -c a l way a l l p r a c t i c a l , dogmatical, mystical and t h e o l o g i c a l tenets representing the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the two schools. This was attempted by MaitreyaCnathal i n the Sutralankara and c h i e f l y i n the Abhisamayalankara, where the Hinayana as well as the Mahayana-c arya are combined i n the abhisamaya. . . . The Mahayanasamgraha i s also an i n c l u s i v e work, incorporating nearly every f a m i l i a r abhidharma concept, snippets of prajnaparamita, and the major theories usually i d e n t i f i e d with a wide v a r i e t y of Mahayana sutras• Asanga's innovation consists of the way i n which these are arranged to form a harmonious system. This system can be described as..'a/hierarchy of nested concerns and theories each contained within, and oriented by, i t s superior. An understanding'.of the r e l a t i v e importance and r o l e of each l e v e l of the hierarchy w i l l prevent either 7^ under- or over-evaluation of.- any sub-theory (such as the trikaya'), and thus i s the fundamental pr e r e q u i s i t e for more d e t a i l e d research. A f t e r a c a r e f u l reading of the Mahayanasamgraha and associated l i t e r a t u r e , I have concluded that the o v e r a l l structure of i t s system i s as follows: The primary concern i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l — the e n t i r e text i s a guidebook for a s p i r i t u a l career. Within t h i s , the secondary concern is-.epistemological Asanga wishes to elucidate the mechanism which w i l l allow the aspirant to progress toward the ultimate goal of enlightenment (or "omniscience"). F i n a l l y , at a t e r t i a r y l e v e l of concern, Asanga i s attempting to integrate the various theories into a metaphysics. As t h i s conclusion i s both c r u c i a l to my approach to the t r i k a y a and; d i r e c t l y opposed to the usual view, I s h a l l summarize the considerations that l e d to i t . Any discussion of t h i s topic must begin with the simple fact that the majority of contemporary scholars consider the Vijnanavada to be an idealism. Should we accept t h i s designation for the doctrine of the Mahayanasamgraha,: we' must explain exactly what type of an idealism i t i s , and why c e r t a i n non-i d e a l i s t ideas have been included. Should we r e j e c t i t , we must demonstrate why so many competent scholars have been mistaken. For the purposes of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , B. K. M a t i l a l ' s i s the best and c e r t a i n l y one of the broadest d e f i n i t i o n s of idealism: ". . . a denial of the common-sense view that material/external objects exist independently of the mind, i . e . , independently of t h e i r being perceived." At f i r s t glance, t h i s seems to describe the doctrine of the Mahayana- samgraha. For example, Asanga '<(-i"21-)v says : In short, the alayavijnana i s a r e s u l t i n g - v i j n a n a Ei.e., r e s u l t i n g from previous experienced whose nature 75 i s a l l the seeds [of future experienceH. It embraces (samgrhita; bsdus; ) a ^ bodies i n the three worlds 3 and a l l stations of r e b i r t h . Obviously, the alayavijnana (which i s frequently t r a n s l a t e d as some sort of "mind") contains the entire perceived world. However, t h i s one idea does not comprise a metaphysic. More d e t a i l s are required, e.g.: How does t h i s r e l a t e to ordinary experience? What guidance does i t give i n f u l f i l l i n g r e l i g i o u s aspirations? What does i t r e a l l y mean? It i s cl e a r that the various investigators have reached widely varying conclusions.. P. T. Raju, -in I d e a l i s t Thought i n India, sees the Vijnanavada as a minor v a r i a t i o n of the Advaita Vedanta. Therefore, the idealism l a b e l frees him from the necessity of dealing with these problems at a l l . The Vijnanavada texts are a l l footnotes to the h i s t o r y of Vedantac -though**-;-Jacques May i n "La Philosophie bouddhique i d e a l i s t e " takes the i d e a l i s t i c nature of the doctrine as an a p r i o r i f a c t . It i s simply part of the general Western discussion of i d e a l i s t i c philosophy. As he e x p l i c i t l y disregards any ideas which he i s unable to integrate within h i s i d e a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , no problems (or fresh i n s i g h t s ) can a r i s e . B. K. M a t i l a l i n h i s "Cr i t i q u e of Buddhist Idealism" has taken the tex t u a l evidence ( c h i e f l y from surviving Sanskrit texts) much more seriously.'' He has seen that as an idealism the doctrine i s a f a i l u r e , and i s forced to note the r e l i g i o u s ( i . e . , s o t e r i o l o g i c a l ) ideas necessary to make sense of i t . The best known modern i n t e r p r e t e r i s probably A. K. Chatterjee who, i n Yogacara Idealism, has also worked from the surviving Sanskrit t e x t s . He r e -gards the fundamental projects of Hegelian philosophers and the Vijnanavada 76 thinkers as very s i m i l a r . The major diffe r e n c e i s that Hegel retained both subject and object, while the Vijnanavada masters have rejected the object to es t a b l i s h a pure Absolute. He sees t h i s notion as the l o g i c a l culmination of the c r i t i c a l and s u b j e c t i v i s t i c trends present throughout a l l Buddhis.ts philosophy. S o t e r i o l o g i c a l ideas are unconnected with the e s s e n t i a l philosoph-i c a l concepts. These premises are r e f i n e d and restated but not changed i n his Readings on Yogacara Buddhism. While reviewing Yogacara Idealism Alex Wayman severely c r i t i c i z e s Chatter-jee' s presupposition that the fundamental Yogacara p o s i t i o n i s that conscious-ness i s the sole r e a l i t y . He suggests that, i n fore ing 't:h.e doctrine into such a mold, Chatterjee has produced an: inadequate and misleading i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . While Wayman does not develop hi s own view, i t i s cl e a r that he would place greater emphasis on the demands of s o t e r i o l o g i c a l p r a c t i c e s ( e s p e c i a l l y meditation), on the Abhidharma portion, and on the tfisvabhava. Above a l l , Wayman i n s i s t s that those passages which describe the genesis of the perceived world from mind must be read i n the l i g h t of s i m i l a r Samkhya doctrines which he sees as t h e i r prototype. A l a t e r essay by Chatterjee, contained i n Facets of Buddhist Thought, i s more c l o s e l y reasoned and meets some of Wayman's c r i t i c i s m , but does not show any fundamental change i n stance. Although others have written on the subject, these scholars are among the most respected. Their work shows that i n t e r p r e t i n g the Vijnanavada as an idealism raises problems which are almost impossible to solve without ignoring portions of the texts . A fresh .approach i s indicated. A second major reason for questioning the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e i r notions i s that they have drawn t h e i r ideas from a very narrow s e l e c t i o n of the early 77 Vijnanavada works, c h i e f l y the few surviving i n Sanskrit. This i s c l e a r , f o r example, i n Chatterjee's comment that " . . . canonical l i t e r a t u r e , p e r t a i n i n g e x c l u s i v e l y to the Yogacara, i s not p l e n t i f u l . " ^ This statement becomes comprehensible, i f i n c r e d i b l e , when we r e a l i z e that he"'is ignoring the immense corpus of Tibetan and Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s and basing h i s research on the Mahayanasutralankara with some reference to the Madhyantavibhaga and Vasu-bandhu' s Vimsatika and Trimsika. I f the author's primary concern i s not i d e a l i s t i c , w';at.,.may;...it'-~be? '' There are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s : s o t e r i o l o g i c a l or p h i l o s o p h i c a l . I f the former, the text w i l l present a doctrine which w i l l p r i m a r i l y advance the aspirant's s p i r i t u a l progress. Although we should expect most of the doctrine to be l o g i c a l l y consistent, i f some aspect does not seem to f i t , our question would be, "Does i t , or does i t ' not, further the aspirant's progress?" and not, " i s i t l o g i c a l l y consistent with the rest of the t e x t ? " I f the text i s b a s i c a l l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l , i t .may be either epistemological- . or metaphysical. I f the former, we should expect a de s c r i p t i o n of the causes of the various experiences open to man. There would be no necessity for an explanation of the l o g i c a l status of the experiences. Only i f i t i s p r i m a r i l y metaphysical should we expect a l l other considerations to be subordinated to an account of the l o g i c a l status of such experience. Some comments by H. V. Guenther w i l l help us to see possible a l t e r n a t i v e s to idealism. In "Mentalism and Beyond i n Buddhist Philosophy" and i n Buddhist  Philosophy i n Theory and P r a c t i c e , he i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s any p o s s i b i l i t y of separating soteriology from philosophy — both are aspects of true philosophy. What, then, do we have to understand by 'philosophy'? C e r t a i n l y , i t can never be an achievement; i t remains a movement, a continual s t r i v i n g f o r t r u t h by pre-eminently 78 i n t e l l e c t u a l means. In t h i s quest for t r u t h philosophy brings about a change i n ourselves by opening our eyes to wider horizons. Such a v i s i o n i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the desire to c u l t i v a t e and r e f i n e the p e r s o n a l i t y . Moreover, philosophy as an encompassing v i s i o n wants to know a l l that i s knowable; unlimited cognition i s i t s basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Any l i m i t a t i o n imposed on i t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y k i l l i t . But the most decisive point i s that i n t h i s s t r i v i n g f o r t r u t h , t r u t h i t s e l f i s the primal source of our thinking. Yet i t becomes perverted e a s i l y by p o s i t i n g as absolute something which i s v a l i d from c e r t a i n points of view and i n c e r t a i n respects and at a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l of thinking. It also becomes f a l s e by considering the p a r t i c u l a r knowledge of something within Being as the knowledge of Being as such and as a whole. Philosophy as a quest for t r u t h born out of t r u t h i s therefore constantly struggling against i t s two foes: a b s o l u t i z a t i o n and c o n c r e t i z a t i o n . This i s the theme of Buddhist philosophy i n p a r t i c u l a r . It begins with a v i s i o n of what there i s , and then progressively enlarges t h i s v i s i o n . Its r e j e c t i o n of the non-Buddhist systems, a l l of which i n some way succumb.to a n t i - p h i l o s o p h i c a l tendencies, as well as i t s trenchant c r i t i q u e of i t s own digressions into t h i s dangerous t e r r i t o r y , are due to, and r e f l e c t , the endeavour to keep the p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p i r i t alive.''' This notion that the Vijnanavada maintains the congruence of philosophy and soteriology i s a t t r a c t i v e to an i n t e r p r e t e r of the Mahayansamgraha. The two are not separated i n the text and,' i f i t s message can be understood without introducing such a separation, the r e s u l t i s l i k e l y to be f a i t h f u l to the original.. The problem ;that arises ^ i s that Western i n t e r p r e t e r s , l i k e Guenther, are apt-t'o respect such a philosophy only i n s o f a r as i t embodies a search for the t r u t h by "pre-eminently i n t e l l e c t u a l means." However, the text contains much more than i n t e l l e c t u a l means. It authorizes meditational and even mantric techniques.. (V:2 . 1 0 ) . How can these possibly" f a l l t h i n any Western 1 concept of philosophy? Guenther's answer i s that such a 'philosophy' includes both epistemological and metaphysical components. The former, comprising the 'mind-only' doctrine, can c e r t a i n l y involve the various psychological techniques for understanding 79 the operation of the perceptual mechanism. But t h i s can never be a metaphysical doctrine of any kind, l e t alone an idealism. The metaphysical doctrines are not the 'mind-only' ones, but the t r i s v a - bhava and the t r i k a y a , which Guenther describes i n Buddhist Philosophy'. However, such a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between epistemology and metaphysics does not occur i n the early Vijnanavada tex t s . Guenther a t t r i b u t e s t h i s absence.to a confusion on the part of the early thinkers: It i s also obvious that the Indian Buddhist i d e a l i s t s whose thought i s r e f l e c t e d by the bKa'-brgyud-pas, were above a l l concerned with epistemology, the r e l a t i o n between the psychic event of the moment with i t s objective duplicate. Only secondarily were they metaphysically inte r e s t e d , as when they reduced the whole of r e a l i t y to the one p a r t i c u l a r existent of sems (mind). It seems that the bKa 1-brgyud-pas, just as t h e i r Indian prototypes, due to t h e i r preoccupation with epistemological problems, misunderstood the l o g i c a l character of the metaphysical premise. They saw sems 'mind' as a starting-point on which other assertions were to be based, i n a word, as the basic premise, summed up i n the words: "The whole of r e a l i t y i s mental." However, epistemology i s one fact of philosophy, meta-physics another. What distinguishes a metaphysician from other philosophers i s not the premise he s t a r t s from but the p r i n c i p l e o f ^ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n he brings to bear. He c e r t a i n l y does not claim to reveal truths about a world which l i e s beyond the realm of the senses. His concern i s with how to take what happens here and now or how to get the things of t h i s world into perspective. . . .9 Later, while summarizing the'Dk doctrine, I s h a l l show that t h i s comment i s d i r e c t l y applicable to the Mahayanasamgraha, and argue that ..the task of i n t e r p r e t i n g i t s doctrine involves deriving a metaphysics which w i l l harmonize with the stated epistemology. 80 C. VIJNANAVADA OF THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA Our study must begin .with Asanga's foreword -(prastavana) with i t s concise apologetic for "the Mahayana" ( i . e . , the Vijnanavada). While t h i s appears to constitute a cl e a r statement of the primary concern of the t e x t , i t i s almost impossible to force into an i d e a l i s t i c mold. I f the body of the text contains an i d e a l i s t i c system, t h i s foreword i s an embarrassing appendage. I f , however, the p o s s i b i l i t y that the contents are not an idealism i s allowed, then t h i s foreword becomes a key to the author's int e n t . Asanga states that the Mahayana message consists of the contents of the ten chapters of the Mahayanasamgraha arranged i n the order necessary for the aspirant's s p i r i t u a l development. They chart a c r e d i b l e , l o g i c a l path to great enlightenment (mahabodhi). That i s , h i s primary intent i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l , and within t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n he has arranged and integrated the teachings into a coherent system. His aim i s fundamentally s o t e r i o l o g i c a l and secondarily p h i l o s o p h i c a l . This viewpoint w i l l a f f e c t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of every element of the system. I f the Mahayanasamgraha were regarded as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t e x t , the unif y i n g p r i n c i p l e would have to be p h i l o s o p h i c a l . As there are several major p h i l o s o p h i c a l ideas contained i n the t e x t , one would have to be elevated to a primary p o s i t i o n . As we have seen, the usual candidate has been the c l u s t e r of i d e a l i s t i c notions. However, t h i s means that those other ideas-that w i l l not f i t must be explained away or set aside. I f however, the uni f y i n g viewpoint i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l , there i s no need to assert the primacy of any one of the ph i l o s o p h i c a l theories so long as t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s can be shown. Freed from the necessity to elevate the 81 content of one of the chapters to the status of "the" core of the system, we can examine the secondary l e v e l of concern with fewer preconceptions. Asanga lays out the structure of t h i s secondary l e v e l i n his foreword. [The actual content of each chapter of the Mahayanasamgraha:" i s : D I. The alayavijnana i s c a l l e d the support of the knowable (jneyasraya; shes-bya'i gnas; ^fj %0 )• I I . The trisvabhava: i . e . , the paratantrasvabhava, the parikalpitasvabhava, and the p a r i n i spanrias vabhava, are the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the knowable (jneyalaksana; shes-bya'i mtshan-nyid; - ^ J ^ $ ^S- ) • I I I . Ideation-only (vi.jnaptimatrata) i s the entry into the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the knowable (jneyalaksanapravesa; s n e s ~ k y a ' i mtshan-nyid-la' jug-pa; ^ Jifj ^ Q ). IV. The s i x paramitas are the cause and the r e s u l t of t h i s entry. V. The ten bodhisattvabhumis are the various ways i n which the cause and r e s u l t of t h i s entry are c u l t i v a t e d . VI. The Bodhisattva d i s c i p l i n e i s the higher morality ( a d h i s i l a ) involved i n t h i s . VII. The samadhis ... are the higher mentation ( a d h i c i t t a ) involved i n t h i s . VIII. Non-discriminating awareness (nirvikalpajnana) i s the higher awareness (adhiprajna) involved i n t h i s . IX. Non-staying nirvana i s the severance-result (phalaprahana) of t h i s . X. The t r i k a y a ... i s the awareness-result (phalajnana) of t h i s . 82 The key notion i s obviously "the knowable" and the basic s o t e r i o l o g i c a l act i s the "entry" (pravesa; 'jug-pa; ^ ) to the knowable. The term "the knowable" i s not a focus of i n t e r e s t by i t s e l f . Vasubandhu (Bh 322b29-cl; bhll+5al) glosses i t as "that which may be Cor "should be"] known,''"'""1 and i d e n t i f i e s ^ i t with ,the s o i l e d and p u r i f i e d dharmas, or with the t r i svabhava. Furthermore, he says (Bh322c7-8; bhl^a^ O that the entry can be equated with vijnaptimatrata i n the sense that t h i s s p e c i f i e d the manner or'., means of entry. Asanga i s not p o s i t i n g some new transcendent e n t i t y c a l l e d "the knowable." Had he wished to do t h i s , he already had a quasi-ontological tathata at hand. I can only conclude that t h i s term throws the e n t i r e theory into an epistemo-l o g i c a l form. That i s , within t h i s primary s o t e r i o l o g i c a l structure, Asanga has chosen to order the i n d i v i d u a l ideas i n an epistemological perspective indicated by "the knowable." He i s l e s s concerned.with describing how the world looks from a l i b e r a t e d viewpoint than with explaining the mechanism whereby the aspirant can acquire such a viewpoint. Only at a t e r t i a r y l e v e l of emphasis does Asanga introduce the i n d i v i d u a l t h e o r i e s , such as that of the alayavijflana or v i j napt imat ra t a, which might be termed i d e a l i s t were they presented on the primary l e v e l . However, they are not. They are on the same l e v e l as, and elaborately interconnected with, the trisvabhava, paramitas, bhumis, samvara, samadhi, n i r v i k a l p a j nana, a p r a t i s t h i t a - nirvana and t r i k a y a . The trap f o r the unwary i n t e r p r e t e r i s the fact that any of these, i n the hands of a determined r e d u c t i o n i s t , could be made to contain a l l the others and thus become "the e s s e n t i a l " doctrine. Only by some sens i -t i v i t y to Asanga's stated aim can we appreciate the importance of each, and hence be i n a p o s i t i o n to investigate h i s use of any one theory. 83 The view of chapters I-II can be summarized as follows: Asanga, l i k e a Western phenomenologist, wishes to begin h i s project with the raw fact s of experience. To him, r e a l i t y i s composed of a beginningless series of these experiences which, because they make themselves known d i r e c t l y to the mind, are cast i n me n t a l i s t i c terms. The ground f o r the ent i r e e x p e r i e n t i a l process i s c a l l e d the alayavijnana and each experience i s termed v i j n a p t i . Questions about the r e l a t i o n of t h i s m e n t a l i s t i c language to ordinary uses of these terms are d i f f i c u l t and complex. I w i l l only point out that the alayavijnana i s not some supermind. It belongs to a l e v e l of discourse i n which inter p r e t a t i o n s of the events, such as the notion that they pertain to a "mind" ( i n any common sense) have been set aside. The v i j n a p t i are not simply raw sense-data but, because of the organizing e f f e c t of past experiences, present themselves as full-blown perceptions. These include the perception of oneself as a perceiver with body and mind; the perception of a sensory apparatus; the perception of an object of perception, and the perception ofrlinterpretative schema (11:2). As these have no indepen-dent r e a l i t y but are merely moments i n the a c t i v i t y of the alayavijnana, they are said to be dependent on the alayavi j nana. The common man. .may adopt one of two possible attitudes toward these per-ceptions. He usually hypostatizes them into concrete things, thus strengthening the notion that he i s a person surrounded by an environment of objects. Asanga terms such objects " t o t a l l y imaginary" (II:3). On the other; hand, under the influence of Mahayana teachings, he may begin to see through the apparent s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of these perceptions. As he does so, he becomes free from the ideas that he and his surroundings are immutable objects. His perceptions are o 12 brought to p e r f e c t i o n " ( I I : M . 8k In either case the perceiver, object and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are mutually 13 dependent and co-variable. None of them remains constant while the others change. There i s no room i n t h i s theory for a single observer who sees things d i f f e r e n t l y or who sees, d i f f e r e n t things; there i s no notion of a r e a l world which appears d i f f e r e n t to common man and Buddha. There i s no need to hold any of these terms constant, since continuity i s provided by the alayavijnana: the perceptual a c t i v i t y from which the common man and his world, and the - Ik Buddha and his world, may-emerge.. The way i n which these ideas apply to the i n d i v i d u a l on the r e l i g i o u s path i s worked out i n d e t a i l throughout the text. F i n a l l y , we should note an i n t e r e s t i n g extension of the Abhidharmic term dharma to generate terms which apply to the Buddha. Asanga e a s i l y finds terms for the ordinary perceiver, the object of his perception and the s e i z i n g perceptions he employs, but a problem arises when speaking of the Buddha, the environment which he perceives and the way i n which he perceives i t . Asanga's solu t i o n i s to adopt a terminology based on the word dharma. Whereas the common man sees himself as a s p e c i a l sort of object surrounded by other objects at which he grasps, the Buddha sees himself as a group of dharmas (Dharmakaya), surrounded by dharmas over which he exercises sovereignty. The f i e l d within which t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n occurs i s c a l l e d the "dharma-realm" (dharmadhatu).""" ^  The i n t e r p r e t a t i v e , scheme that has.led him'to t h i s v i s i o n i s c a l l e d the ": "Mahayana dharma," As i t has been given to him by others who have previously attained such a v i s i o n , i t i s c a l l e d an "outflow" of the dharmadhatu. 85 D. A STUDY OF VIJNANAVADA BUDDHQLOGY IN THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA As we have seen, Asanga has c i t e d a great number of t r a d i t i o n a l " f a c t s " about Buddhahood from the a u t h o r i t a t i v e sutras and sastras. He does not appear to have selected these for c o m p a t i b i l i t y since even the most contradictory notions (e.g., there i s one Buddha/there are many Buddhas) are reproduced. As the h i s t o r y and development of many of these have been studied elsewhere,^ I have examined an i n d i v i d u a l notion i n d e t a i l only when such information i s necessary to understand the use of i t i n t h i s t e x t . The present study w i l l be p r i n c i p a l l y concerned with those doctrines by which Asanga attempts to resolve contradictions between the i n d i v i d u a l ideas. The general procedure.was as follows: A l l statements about Buddhahood were located. Where they occurred i n c l u s t e r s , the.degree of r e l a t i o n s h i p between contiguous elements was assessed and a decision made on whether each could stand alone or whether the c l u s t e r should be retained i n t a c t . That i s , each statement was i s o l a t e d as f a r as l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e . In most cases, this, judgement proved easier than expected. For example, as the twenty-one gunas of the Buddha at 11:33 are obviously l i f t e d en bloc from the Samdhinifmocana- sutra and are separated from the other Buddhology and int e r p r e t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t manner by Asanga, they should be kept together. The. same reasoning applies to the "associated" gunas at X:9-2T. On the other hand, many st a t e -ments are c l e a r l y d i s c r e t e or are embedded i n a discussion of some other t o p i c . In either case, they may be removed from context and regrouped to i l l u s t r a t e features of the basic framework, e.g., to bring together a l l statements r e f e r r i n g to the Dharmakaya. The ease with, which t h i s regrouping i s possible r e f l e c t s the e a r l y state 86 of t h i s t e x t . Although the chapters are i n a l o g i c a l order, many blocks of doctrine within the chapters ( e s p e c i a l l y i n chapter X) are i n no obviously meaningful order, and may be rearranged.' These.passages f e l l i nto three categories, each of which required a d i f f e r e n t treatment: 1. The l i s t of gunas at 11:33 stands by i t s e l f . As i t i s not r e a l l y integrated with the rest of the text, i t received only a cursory examination. 2. The passages dealing with the Dharmakaya showed that Asanga had used t h i s term as a synonym for Buddhahood i n general. These passages contain most of the t r a d i t i o n a l ideas with which he deals, but contribute d i r e c t l y to h i s systematic project only by answering the question of how Buddhahood i s obtained. Therefore, I have structured the examination of these around that question. 3. Those passages (mainly from chapter X) which show Asanga's attempts to systematize the Buddhological ideas by the t r i k a y a scheme. These are the primary focus of t h i s study. Before beginning, a possible source of confusion must be noted. The Buddhology of the Mahayanasamgraha hinges on the term "body." Lamotte has t r a n s l a t e d a v a r i e t y of Tibetan and Chinese terms by " l e corps" ("body"), and regarded them a l l as equivalent to the Sanskrit "kaya." Examining the t e x t s , I found that he has used '"le corps" for the following terms: 1. T: sku, H: for any aspect of a Buddha (e.g., 'Nirmanakaya, Sambhogakaya, Dharmakaya, Svabhavikakaya). These were undoubtedly kaya i n the Sanskrit. 2. T: lus and Hi'jpj? for the p h y s i c a l bodies of ordinary beings, 87 of Sravakas and of Pratyekabuddhas (e.g., '1:1+8; 1:50; 11:2.2; 11:11, etc. ). 3. T: lus_ and H: C t l for "category or " c l a s s " ( l : l l , I : 2 l ) . Thus, by taking both Tibetan and Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s into account, i t i s always possible to determine which of the three senses of "body" i s intended. 1. 11:33 THE TWENTY-ONE GUNAS OF THE BUDDHA 11:33 contains a short, and apparently separate, Buddhology based on the following l i s t of q u a l i t i e s (gunas) of a Buddha. This l i s t i s drawn from a ' ' ~ 17 prominent passage of the Samdhinirmocanasutra. The Buddha: 0. Has a very pure i n t e l l i g e n c e shin-tu rnam-par dag-pa'i bio mnga'-ba & : i M> 1. Acts i n non-duality kun-tu spyod-pa'i gnyis mi-mnga'-ba * — n 2. Enters the c h a r a c t e r l s t i c l e s s dharma mtshan-nyid med-pa'i chos-la mchog-tu gzhol-bar mdzad-pa 88 3. Resides i n the Buddha-residence sangs-rgyas-kyi gnas-pas- gnas-pa 4i f& it k. Obtains an equality with a l l Buddhas sangs-rgyas thams-cad dang mnyam-pa-nyid brnyes-pa l i . f l - M ih if- % ML 5. Having no obstacles, reaches an understanding Sgrib-pa mi-mnga'-bas rtogs-par thugs-su chud-pa 6. Has a dharma which cannot be overturned phyir mi-zlog-pa'i chos dang-ldan-pa 7. Is not diminished by h i s sphere of action spyod-yul-gyis mi-'phrogs-pa 8. Has a system which i s inconceivable rnam-par bzhag-pa bsam-gyis mi-khyab-pa 9. Has reached the equality of the three times dus-gsum mnyam-pa-nyid-du thugs-su chud-pa 89 10. Has a body that extends over a l l areas of the universe ' j i g - r t e n - g y i khams thams-cad-du khyab-pa'i sku dang-ldan-pa 11. Has a v e r i d i c a l awareness of things chos-thams-cad-la the-tshorn med-pa'i ye-shes mnga'-ba %> _ n ; i * j ^ i i . 12. Has a mind containing a l l p r actices •-spyod-pa thams-cad dang-ldan-pa'i bio mnga'-ba its — w it K tt 13. Has-an erforless_khowledge of things chos mkhyen-pa-la nem-nur med-pa *• Vi it *t fe Jk lh. Has a body CH: "as perceived by ordinary beings"] which i s not imaginary rnam-par ma-brtags-pa'i sku mnga'-ba 15. Has.an awareness which i s the goal of the vows of a l l Bodhisattvas ye-shes byang-chub sems-dpa' thams-cad-kyis yang-dag-par mnos-pa [ s i c ] - I. § . % n * « 16. Has t r u l y reached the perf e c t i o n of the non-dual Buddha-residence sangs-rgyas-kyi gnas-pa gnyis-su med-pa dam-pa'i pha-rol-tu phyin-pa 4! & - ^ ; T 4 J U f ' . 90 17. Has arrived, at the culmination of the Tathagata's undefiled l i b e r a t i n g awareness de-bzhin gshegs-pa ma-'dres-pa'i rnam-par thar-par mdzad-pa'i ye-shes-kyi mthar phyin-pa 18. Has reached the equal Buddhaland which has neither center nor outlying areas mtha'-dang dbus med-pa'i sangs-rgyas-kyi sa mnyam-pa nyid-du thugs-su chud-pa 19. Has reached the dharmadhatu chos-kyi dbyings-kyis klas-pa ft TY> %~ 20. Has reached the l i m i t of open space nam-mkha'i khams-kyi mtha' gtugs-pa 21. Completely reaches the f i n a l l i m i t s phyi-ma'i mtha'i mur thug-pa Asanga's reason f o r g r a f t i n g t h i s passage tenuously onto the-..end of the »• v l 8 t r i svabhava chapter',, rather than: i n t e g r a t i n g i t within the trikaya, i s obscure. However, as he has kept i t separate and interpreted i t d i f f e r e n t l y , almost to the point of developing an alternate Buddhology, I have maintained his d i v i s i o n 91 and placed a short study of i t i n the following section. The most obvious c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the above l i s t i s i t s imagery. It evokes a mythopoeic image of a v i r t u a l l y omniscient and omnipotent Buddha of cosmic dimensions i n h a b i t i n g a Buddha-residence, within a Buddhaland, i n a state of perfect knowledge. The remainder of 11:33 shows us the e x i s t e n t i a l interpretation"*"^ to which Asanga subjected t h i s l i s t as well as Vasubandhu's and Asvabhava's expansion of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I must repeat that the subject under i n v e s t i g a t i o n here i s not the t r a d i t i o n a l image.but the manner i n which Asanga has interpreted i t . Unfortu-nately, h i s only e x p l i c i t p r i n c i p l e i s expremely puzzling. He says, "The phrase, 'The Buddha has a very pure i n t e l l i g e n c e (buddhi)' i s c l a r i f i e d by the other phrases." A l l versions add, "Thus, the X i s properly explained." "X" i s v a r i o u s l y , dharmata (Tibetan and H), ' f ' j r (Dharmagupta and Buddha-santa) dr (Paramartha), or " l a nature du Buddha" (Lamotte). The author obviously wishes to subsume a l l other gunas under the undefined concept of "pure buddhi." Neither Vasubandhu nor Asvabhava o f f e r s substantial commentary, and the idea i s not a major focus elsewhere i n the Mahayanasamgraha. I can only suggest that i t may r e f e r to the doctrine which D. S. Ruegg has c a l l e d 20 " l a luminosite n a t u r e l l e de l a pensee," but i t s importance here i s impossible to determine. Asanga's comments reveal a consistent and comprehensible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . He sees each guna—even those ostensibly describing the Buddha's residence, e t c . — a s a reference to some q u a l i t y of the Buddha's persona l i t y . These may be generally divided into those gunas which he regards as references to the Buddha's noetic a b i l i t i e s , and those which he regards as references to the Buddha's e f f e c t i v e a b i l i t i e s . 92 a. The Noetic A b i l i t i e s Strangely enough, Asanga i n t e r p r e t s the two gunas which ostensibly inform us of the way i n which the Buddha "acts" or "moves" as references to h i s noetic rather than his e f f e c t i v e a b i l i t i e s : 1. "CThe Buddha] acts i n non-duality" i s glossed as "the q u a l i t y of absolutely unimpeded entrance to the knowable." "Entering the knowable" r e f e r s to obtaining an accurate comprehension of the o n t o l o g i c a l status of perceived r e a l i t y , a comprehension which w i l l i t s e l f ensure accurate perception. This •- - •'' 21 comprehension i s described i n the trisvabhava doctrine (II:9)- Asvabhava supports t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by d e f i n i n g "non-duality" as "not sometimes encountering obstacles and sometimes not encountering them," thus steering the reader away from the obvious conclusion that the "non-duality" could r e f e r to a non-dichotomizing conceptual process, a notion not i n accord with the trisvabhava. 2. "He enters the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l e s s dharma" i s interpreted as "he has gone to the supremely pure tathata which i s characterized by a non-duality of being and non-being." Asvabhava r e f e r s t h i s concept to the trisvabhava doc-t r i n e which i n the Mahayanasamgraha i s invoked to explain a l l such assertions. 22 Thus, "Buddha a c t i o n " i s interpreted as an unhampered noetic act which, together with "entry," r e f e r s to gaining a proper understanding of r e a l i t y , i . e . , an understanding by the trisvabhava. b. The E f f e c t i v e A b i l i t i e s The remainder of the gunas are references to the Buddha's a l t r u i s t i c a c t i v i t y . These may be subdivided-into those which ostensibly describe- the 93 domain or place inhabited by the Buddha, 'and those which describe the Buddha himself. i . The Domain of the Buddha 5. "Having no obstacles, he reaches an understanding." (.The Chinese says, "He has reached the non-impeded place (lUlb26).") Asanga explains t h i s as the q u a l i t y of having c u l t i v a t e d the antidote to a l l obstacles. Asvabhava adds that t h i s " c u l t i v a t i o n " i s the p r a c t i c e of the noble path. This point i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to 1. and 2., but stresses the state achieved rather than the action of achieving i t . 3- "He resides i n the Buddha-residence (vihara)" i s interpreted as showing "the q u a l i t y of r e s i d i n g i n .unceasing, spontaneous Buddha-activity." By various examples of "residence" (Devavihara, the four Brahmaviharas, the dhyanas, sunyata, animatta, e t c ) , Asvabhava (UUl0c27-29).explains "residence" to be any fundamental stance or p r i n c i p l e i n which an i n d i v i d u a l i s grounded and from which he acts. Asvabhava i d e n t i f i e s the Buddhavihara with the spontaneity with which a Buddha takes any appropriate stance to a i d sentient beings, not by some p a r t i c u l a r Buddha-stance. Here al s o , a statement a s c r i b i n g a determinate state i s interpreted as a reference to a c t i v i t y . Asanga i s not only i n t e r p r e t i n g a s p a t i a l myth i n active terms but i s also affirming that the manner of the Buddha's acts cannot be exhaustively s p e c i f i e d , but only l a b e l l e d "unceasing spontaneous Buddha actions." This phrase reveals the three parameters governing the Buddha's action i n s p e c i f i c circumstances. "Unceasing" w i l l be dealt with i n number 21 below. 9k "Spontaneity" reveals the Buddha's freedom to respond to the needs of others. The t h i r d , "Buddha-activity," i s determined by the pattern of actions set up during the graded p r a c t i c e of the paramitas which l e d to Buddhahood. This pattern i s the subject of the next guna. 16. "He has t r u l y reached the p e r f e c t i o n (paramita) of the non-dual  Buddha-residence." Asanga says that t h i s i s "the q u a l i t y of having attained the paramitas i n the equal Dharmakaya." To Asvabhava t h i s means that a l l the paramitas have been developed to the highest degree and are "equal" or "non-dual" insofar as they cannot be quantified (as they could while the Buddha was s t i l l on the bhumis). Again, the Buddha-residence i s more than a determinate pattern of action. I t i s the terminus of the development by which the Bodhisattva became a Buddha, and as such defines the manner i n which the Buddha w i l l act. 22 18. "He has reached the equal Buddhaland which has neither center nor  outlying areas." Asariga says that t h i s reveals the q u a l i t y of non-limitation of the sphere of the three Buddha-kayas. Asvabhava adds a series of comments, only two of which are of i n t e r e s t here: "the Dharmakaya, etc. l i v i n g i n t h i s universe because there i s no place e l s e " and "the Dharmakaya, etc. penetrates everywhere i n order to procure the welfare of sentient beings . . . " While the Buddha-residence was the fact of the Buddha's a l t r u i s t i c action, the Buddhaland i s the place of the action. Asvabhava concludes that t h i s place cannot be other than the universe f i l l e d with the beings for whose sake the action i s performed. 19. "He has reached the dharmadhatu" shows the q u a l i t y of having devoted himself to the welfare and happiness of a l l sentient beings u n t i l the end of samsara. Asvabhava says that the dharmadhatu can give r i s e to outflows such 95 as sutras and teachings. Therefore, the Buddha who reaches the dharmadhatu devotes himself to the welfare and happiness of a l l sentient beings. Here the s p a t i a l language i s interpreted as revealing the altruism of the Buddha's actions. 20. "He has reached the l i m i t s of open space" reveals the q u a l i t y of i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y ( o r " " i n e x h a u s t i b i l i t y " ) . .Asvabhava adds that "open space" i s a metaphor for-'the Dharmakaya which, without i t s e l f a l t e r i n g of imposing l i m i t s , works.for the welfare and happiness of sentient beings. 21. "He completely reaches the f i n a l l i m i t s . " There i s no comment by Asanga and Asvabhava makes t h i s a part of number 20., but also suggests that the " f i n a l l i m i t s " r e f e r to a perpetual non-interruption of the Buddha-activity, since there w i l l never be an end to beings to be t r a i n e d . Thus, the s p a t i a l l i m i t s are interpreted as the l i m i t l e s s n e s s of the action. 7. "He i s not diminished by h i s sphere of action CH: "His actions are unimpeded"]." Asanga explains t h i s as "the q u a l i t y of not being diminished by worldly things although born i n the world." i i . The Buddha-body Only two gunas deal e x p l i c i t l y with the body of the Buddha: 10. "His body extends over a l l areas of the universe" means to Asanga that he manifests a Sambhoghakaya and Nirmanakaya i n a l l areas of the universe. Asvabhava adds that t h i s i s for the welfare and happiness of a l l beings to be d i s c i p l i n e d . ih. "His body CH: "as perceived by ordinary beings"] i s not imaginary." Asanga says that "he manifests himself according to the expectations Cof those whom he teaches]." Asvabhava adds that although he may manifest himself with 96 a gold c o l o r , etc., his body i s not imaginary. Note that the term " i s not imaginary"^ means that the object perceived has not been generated by conceptualizing a c t i v i t y of the subject, as i s the case with ordinary perception of another's body. k. "He obtains an equality with a l l Buddhas." Asanga explains that there i s no divergence between Buddhas as f a r as the support, i n t e n t i o n and action of t h e i r Dharmakaya are concerned. Asvabhava adds that the support i s the v i suddhaj nana; intentions are the i n t e n t i o n to work for the welfare of others, and a c t i v i t i e s r e f e r to the r e s u l t i n g actions which a l l accomplish through Nirmanakaya and Sambhoghakaya. i i i . The Buddha-mind The remainder of the gunas deal with the Buddha's awareness—the way i n which he sees, knows and understands. 11. "He has a v e r i d i c a l awareness' of things." Asanga c a l l s t h i s "the q u a l i t y of c u t t i n g o f f doubts," and Asvabhava explains that, l a c k i n g doubt himself, he i s able to cut o f f the doubts of others. 15. "His awareness i s the goal of the vows of a l l Bodhisattvas." Asanga explains that "by i n c a l c u l a b l e numbers of bodies CH: "of supports"!] he under-25 ^ takes the t r a i n i n g of sentient beings." Asvabhava explains that the "bodies" belong to the Bodhisattvas whom the Buddha t r a i n s . The other Bodhi-sattvas transmit t h i s teaching and so obtain the awareness which i s the object of the vows of a l l Bodhisattvas. 13. "His knowledge of the dharma i s free from e r r o r . " Asanga says that he knows the future a r i s i n g of dharma. According to Vasubandhu and Asvabhava, the Buddha, unlike the Sravaka, i s able to perceive the subtlest seeds of 9 7 future Buddhahood i n some apparently i n c o r r i g i h l e i n d i v i d u a l , and so to encour-age him. 9 . "He has reached the equality of the three times." Asanga adds that he " i n s t r u c t s " (or "p r e d i c t s , " vyakarana). Asvabhava adds that t h i s means the Buddha can know and explain things i n the past or future as i f they were current events. 8. "His system i s inconceivable." To Asanga t h i s i s "the q u a l i t y of systematizing the dharma." Asvabhava adds that the system cannot be compre-hended by foo l s or worldlings i n general. 6. "His dharma cannot be overturned." To Asanga t h i s means "he i s not overcome by any t i r t h i k a s . " 1 7 . "He has ar r i v e d at the culmination of the Tathagata's undefiled  l i b e r a t i n g awareness." Asanga i n t e r p r e t s t h i s as the q u a l i t y of manifesting undefiled (H: "various") Buddhalands i n accord with the aspirations of beings. Asvabhava i n t e r p r e t s " l i b e r a t i n g awareness" as "awareness of a s p i r a t i o n (vimoksa)." That i s , Asvabhava i n t e r p r e t s t h i s guna as the Buddha's a b i l i t y , to be aware of the aspirations of each sentient being. 12. "His mind contains a l l p r a c t i c e s . " Asanga says that t h i s i s "the qu a l i t y of causing Cthose whom he teaches] to enter a l l sorts of p r a c t i c e s . " The Buddha who emerges from 11:33 i s c e r t a i n l y not i r r e c o n c i l a b l e with the figure found l a t e r i n chapter X. However, apart from h i s explanation of the tenth guna, Asanga has simply not reconciled them. While t h i s curious omission should make us very wary of simply reading 11:33 and chapter X together, one common element i s obvious. Both are permeated by the idea of being-in-control, an idea which the Mahayana l a b e l s "mastery" ( v a s i t a , see note h2 below). That i s , experiences do not simply impinge upon the Buddha; he takes an active r o l e i n properly understanding h i s world. From t h i s under-standing he i s able to act, spontaneously and c r e a t i v e l y , i n order to transmit t h i s understanding to others. 2. THE DHARMAKAYA The second major Buddhology i s found i n passages describing the Dharmakaya. It depicts Buddhahood as a single e n t i t y and provides the opportunity for the questions, "How i s i t obtained?" and "What i s i t ? " The former e l i c i t s a desc r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the aspirant to his goal. The l a t t e r provides the occasion f o r developing a metaphysical d e s c r i p t i o n of the Buddha. a. Obtaining the Dharmakaya While the ent i r e Mahayanasamgraha i s one long p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r obtaining the Dharmakaya, a few passages give a synopsis of the process. These may be divided into three groups according to the s t y l e of explanation i n each: — a highly abstract epistemological explanation i n v o l v i n g r e - o r i e n t a t i o n . o f the alayavijnana — a very concrete epistemological one, s t r e s s i n g meditation and i l l u s t r a t i n g the perceptual a t t i t u d e of the Dk — an active answer which involves the action of the Dk. i n the world. i . I;l+6-U8 Re-orientation of the Alayavi j nana The author has r a i s e d the question of how the s e e d - f i l l e d alayavijnana, the cause of emotional involvement i n the world, can also be the seed of ways 99 of thinking which counteract such involvement. He answers that the seed of world-transcending thought i s the impression formed i n the alayavijnana by hearing the dharma (srutavasana)• The i n i t i a l small impression gives r i s e to a greater one as the subject i s thought out, and to a s t i l l greater one as i t i s meditated upon, u n t i l i t completely takes over the alayavi j nana and dispels a l l seeds of emotivity. The de s c r i p t i o n of t h i s process shows the beginnings of the Dk: 1 : 48 . "This small, medium or great seed implanted by hearing i s also the seed of the Dharmakaya. It counteracts the a l a y a v i j n a n a — i t i s not the alayavijnana. Although i t i s worldly, as i t i s an outflow of the transworldly and very pure dharmadhatu, i t i s the seed of world-transcending thought. Even before world-transcending thought a r i s e s , i t [the seed implanted by hearing"! counteracts the snare of the klesas, Cthe p o s s i b i l i t y of r e b i r t h : inD a realm of s u f f e r i n g , and a l l bad actions. It helps one to meet Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. " i t i s involved w i t h ^ the Dharmakaya of the neophyte Bodhi-27 sattvas and i t i s also involved with the Vimuktikayas of the Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Although i t i s not the alayavijnana, i t i s involved with the Dharmakaya and Vimuktikaya. "As i t develops through the stages of small, medium and l a r g e , the vipakavijnana w i l l become devoid of seeds and a l l i t s aspects w i l l be cut o f f . " Here the Dk i s presented as a reoriented alayavijfiana. The perceptions (vijnana) of ordinary man e s t a b l i s h i n him the tendency to have s i m i l a r ones i n the future. The t o t a l set of such tendencies (alaya-vijnana) i s the basic 100 substratum of his per s o n a l i t y . According to t h i s passage, the dharma which a man hears acts i n an analogous way but establishes a new substratum, the body-of-dharma (Dharmakaya) which eventually replaces the alayavijnana as the foundation of his existence. This i s confirmed by X : 7 . 1 : "by r e o r i e n t i n g the alayavi.]nana, the Dharmakaya i s obtained." This dharma, which comes from those who have already reached enlighten-ment, i s c l e a r l y the Mahayana teaching, as the neophyte (adikarmika) Bodhisat-tvas have the Dk but the §ravakas and Pratyekabuddhas have a Vimuktikaya instead. Asvabhava (U 395bl-9) explains that the Vimuktikaya i s free ..only from the klesavarana, whereas the -Dk i s free from both klesavarana and jneyavarana. However, he then attempts to explain how a Bodhisattva can, at the very onset of his career, be said to be free from both. He li k e n s t h i s Bodhisattva to a prince who has been imprisoned immediately a f t e r r e c e i v i n g abhiseka. When he i s f i n a l l y freed from prison',, he w i l l immediately regain h i s prerogatives. This seems to suggest that a p o t e n t i a l Dk i s obtained at the moment of s e t t i n g out on the Bodhisattva career ,vbut i s -actualized only l a t e r . This notion of acquir-ing a p o t e n t i a l Dk seems to overlap with that of being born i n the Tathagata's . + 28 gotra. i i . Obtaining the Dharmakaya: The Epistemic Explanation X:k "How i s the Dharmakaya i n i t i a l l y obtained CT: 'by contact'1?" Both Vasubandhu and Asvabhava agree that the term "obtained" indicates that the Dk i s not something "produced" because the body i s perpetual. 101 By Non-Conceptual and Subsequent Awareness*"^ The f i r s t answer to the question of how the Dk i s i n i t i a l l y obtained i s : X:4.1 " . . . by non-conceptual awareness ( n i r v i k a l p a j nana) and subsequent awareness (prsthalabdhajnana) which take as t h e i r object the common Mahayana dharmas." Vasubandhu does not comment, while Asvabhava (U ^ 37b28) says only, "the meaning i s easy to understand," probably because these terms have already been defined i n e a r l i e r passages which w i l l now be examined. Chapter II has described the way i n which the p r a c t i t i o n e r begins to understand the view of r e a l i t y set out i n the f i r s t chapters and hence enters the Bodhisattva path. 111:12 describes the progress on the path: By a calm and i n s i g h t f u l world-transcending awareness which takes as i t s object the common dharmas, and by subsequent m u l t i p l e -v i j n a p t i awareness, he has attenuated a l l the image-producing seeds belonging t o the alayavijfiana and strengthened the seed of contact with the Dharmakaya. A f t e r r e o r i e n t i n g the base, by per f e c t i n g a l l the Buddhadharmas he acquires omniscient aware-ness. . . . The subsequent awareness, which'sees everything"arising from the alayavijnana and merely mental appearances to be l i k e an i l l u s i o n , a r ises by i t s very nature free from misapprehensions. Thus, just as a magician i s free from misapprehensions about the r e a l i t y of things he has created, so the Bodhisattva, although speaking of cause and e f f e c t , i s always free from misapprehensions about them. 102 This i s repeated at I I I : l 4 : In the ten Bodhisattva bhj'imis . . . . because Cthe Bodhi-sattva] p r a c t i c e s , f o r many m i l l i o n s of kalpas, the calm and i n s i g h t f u l world-transcending awareness which takes as i t s object the common dharmas and the subsequent awareness, he reorients hi s bases. In order to obtain the three aspects of the Buddha- kaya, he has pract i c e d i n t h i s way. F i n a l l y , i n the desc r i p t i o n of the Bodhisattva bhumis at V:2.10: Why i s the tenth bhumi c a l l e d the dharma-cloud? Because i t s awareness of a l l dharmas which takes as i t s object the common Cdharmas1 contains the enti r e Cgroup of] means to l i b e r a t i o n i n v o l v i n g dharartrs and samadhi Cjust as a cloud contains water], because i t o b l i t e r a t e s major impediments as a cloud o b l i t e r a t e s the sky, and because i t f i l l s the Dharmakaya. The commentaries to a l l three passages are s i m i l a r . Despite minor d i f -ferences i n terminology,, .they a l l deal with the same two types of "awareness" (jnana), a term never used for ordinary common-sense "awareness-of-something" (vijnana) but reserved f or awareness exercised by the Buddha and Bodhisattva. The two types of j nana are "calm and i n s i g h t f u l world-transcending aware-ness which takes as i t s object the common dharmas" and "subsequent awareness." As Asvabhava (U hl6o5-6) i d e n t i f i e s the f i r s t with the nirvikalpajnana, .these are the same ideas as i n the o r i g i n a l passage at X:h. In the phrase "calm and i n s i g h t f u l world-transcending awareness which takes as i t s object the common dharmas," Asvabhava (U ^ l6c6) glosses the terms 103 "calm" and " i n s i g h t f u l " r e s p e c t i v e l y as " i n a state of meditative concentration" (samahita) and "free from misapprehensions." That i s , they are to he under-stood i n t h e i r usual sense as meditational terms where "calm" (samatha) r e f e r s to the untroubled state of mind gained through one-pointed meditation, and " i n s i g h t " (vipasyana) r e f e r s to the accurate view gained by a mind i n t h i s state. ^ This awareness i s also "world-transcending" ( l o k o t t a r a ) , glossed by Asva-bhava (U U l 6 c 5 ) as "leading to enlightenment" (anasrava) and "free from con-cepts" ( n i r v i k a l p a ) . That i s , i t aids the^Bodhisattva i n his progress along -the path but should not be misunderstood as an awareness "of" a transcendent r e a l i t y , or a class of mental operations y i e l d i n g knowledge about such a r e a l i t y . F i n a l l y , t h i s awareness takes as i t s object the "common (samsrsta) dharmas'.' This i s the most puzzling aspect of the term. How.can a non-conceptual aware-ness have an object? Asvabhava (U 4l6c2) explains that, "common (f^jL £yj&. ) dharmas" means that the awareness bears upon ( $$jfL ) the manifest character-i s t i c s "common" ( ) to a l l things, i . e . , tathata. While a very s i m i l a r passage (VIII:5) contains no mention of tathata, that term occurs i n the glosses to both 111:12 and VIII:5. As the use of tathata i n t h i s l i t e r a t u r e has not been properly studied, and as i t seldom appears i n t h i s t e x t , the few passages which mention i t have been set aside. In other words, t h i s i s aware-ness of the r e a l i t y common to a l l perception, a r e a l i t y normally misapprehended and concretized into variousr.isolated concepts. While the "subsequent" of "subsequent awareness" (prsthalabdha) can merely mean "coming a f t e r , " here i t r e f e r s to the state subsequent to meditation when the calm and i n s i g h t f u l mental a t t i t u d e i s c a r r i e d over into perception of the ordinary world. As 111:12 says, i t 10k . . . sees everything a r i s i n g from the alayavijnana and a l l merely mental appearances to be l i k e an i l l u s i o n , a r i s i n g by i t s very nature free from misaprehensions. In terms of the trisvabhava view of t h i s t e x t , by subsequent awareness one sees the v i j n a p t i , which are paratantra, but appreciates the fact that 31 t h e i r nature i s " l i k e an i l l u s i o n . " Therefore, they are not misapprehended, 32 i . e . , are not p a r i k a l p i t a . "Misapprehension" i s a widely-used term explained i n the Abhidharmakosa.V:9: "Taking the impermanent as permanent, ,,the s u f f e r i n g - f i l l e d as s a t i s f y i n g , the impure as pure, and that which has no atman as-having an atman." Here, Asvabhava (U U l 6 c l 9 - 2 0 ) i d e n t i f i e s misap-prehensions as erroneous inte r p r e t a t i o n s of paratantra, i . e . , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s whose acceptance gives r i s e to p a r i k a l p i t a and whose r e j e c t i o n gives r i s e to parinispanna. In 111:12, the non-conceptual and subsequent awareness are said t o : . . . attentuate a l l the image»producing seeds belonging to the alayavijnana, and strengthen the seeds of contact with the Dharmakaya. The p r a c t i c e of non-conceptualization weakens the inveterate tendencies to r e i f y experience. Asvabhava (U l+ l6c l l-12) glosses "seeds of contact with the Dharmakaya" 3 3 a s "the influence of having heard much Mahayana [teaching!," thus i d e n t i f y i n g i t as a development of the influence which o r i g i n a l l y set the p r a c t i t i o n e r on the p a t h . ^ This may also explain the phrase "by contact" i n the Tibetan version of the o r i g i n a l question at X:^ +. The end of t h i s process i s described r e s p e c t i v e l y as "omniscience"" (at 111:12), " t r i p l e Buddhakaya" (111:1"+) and " f i l l i n g 3 6 the Dharmakaya" 105 (V:2.10). As the passages are "very s i m i l a r , i t . is-reasonable'to see these as synonymous terms. The fact that one speaks of "Buddhakaya" while the other speaks of a l l three kayas suggests that the Dk i s not merely one of the three hut can stand for a l l three. They are also synonymous with "omniscient aware-ness"—not an:.infinite extension of.the ordinary epistemie process but., ' as Asvabhava (uHl6cl.5.-l6) glos.ses, "a s t a i n l e s s and unimpeded jnana." By the F i v e - f o l d P r a c t i c e . The second answer to the question of how the Dharmakaya i s f i r s t acquired i s : X:h.2 "By the f i v e - f o l d p r a c t i c e . " Vasubandhu does not comment. Asvabhava (U !+37b28-c5) quotes the explanation from V:h and also says that the f i v e aspects are no b i r t h , no destruction, primordial calm, e s s e n t i a l peace, and no self-nature. These two explanations are apparently a l t e r n a t i v e s . The explanation at Y:h i s embedded i n a discussion of the ten Bodhisattva bhumis. The relevant portion i s as follows: How should we understand the p r a c t i c e of these bhumis? The Bodhisattva who, on bhumi a f t e r bhumi, prac t i s e s samatha and vipasyana does so by a f i v e - f o l d p r a c t i c e . The f i v e aspects of i t are: 1. common pr a c t i c e 2. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l e s s p r a c t i c e 3. spontaneous p r a c t i c e k. intensive p r a c t i c e 106 5. i n s a t i a b l e p r a c t i c e By t h i s f i v e - f o l d p r a c t i c e the Bodhisattva achieves f i v e types of r e s u l t : 1. "In each instant a l l the supports of a f f l i c t i o n are destroyed. 2. He i s freed from various notions and obtains the pleasures of the garden of the dharma. 3. Accurate awareness of the incommensurable m u l t i p l i c i t y of appearances of the dharma and the t r u l y endless [manifesta-tions ofD i t s aspects. h. The signs^which^,accompany purity^, and.'are not just imagined, are manifested in-him'.- .. 5. In order that,he may f u l f i l l ( paripuri) and perfect ( p a r i n i s p a t t i ) the Dharmakaya, he seizes upon the most perfect cause. Asvabhava (U U2l+c28-^25a29) shows that these are a l l meditative techniques and that each element of the second l i s t i s the respective r e s u l t of each pr a c t i c e i n the f i r s t . Asvabhava and Vasubandhu (Bh359b21-2"+) s u b s t a n t i a l l y agree that "the most perfect cause" i s the " i n s a t i a b l e p r a c t i c e , " i . e . , the t o t a l i t y of h i s prac-t i c e s up to that time, and that " f u l f i l l m e n t " r e f e r s to the Dk on the tenth bhumi, while " p e r f e c t i o n " r e f e r s to residence i n the Buddhaland. This passage strengthens the previous evidence that the Dk i s something gained e a r l i e r but f u l f i l l e d at the highest stage. It also shows that the Dk, not just the Sbk, can l i v e i n ( ) a Buddhaland. 107 By Amassing the Accumulation of Equipment on A l l Bhumis The t h i r d way i n which the Dharmakaya i s obtained i s : X:k:3 By amassing the accumulation of equipment (sambharasamcaya) on a l l bhumis. There i s no commentary here, but at 111:15 and 18 (U l+17b26-28 and U iil8bl6-20) Asvabhava defines i t as the s t a b i l i z e d p r a c t i c e of the s i x paramitas r e s u l t i n g from having pra c t i c e d them throughout innumerable past ages. This i s i n accord 37 with the normal use of the term. By the Vajropamasamadhi X:4.H By the Vajropamasamadhi which breaks the d i f f i c u l t - t o - b r e a k avaranas. Immediately a f t e r t h i s samadhi they are separated from a l l the avaranas. 1 " ' • • m — "Vajropamasamadhi" designates the f i n a l state of meditation i n which the 38 l a s t d i f f i c u l t i e s are overcome and f u l l enlightenment achieved. These f i n a l obstacles to enlightenment (avaranas) are "subtle and d i f f i c u l t to break." Asvabhava (U *+37c7-8) glosses t h i s as "unemotional non-awareness."^ Ting* 4 0 ' defines these as the l a s t and most d i f f i c u l t obstacles severed by the Buddha but not by the Arhat. Hence the Buddha achieves omniscience. That i s , the avaranas are commonly divided into klesavaranas (obstacles co n s i s t i n g of b l i n d emotional reaction) and jneyavaranas (obstacles c o n s i s t i n g of unawareness). The former are more e a s i l y overcome than are the l a t t e r . The "subtle d i f f i c u l t - t o - b r e a k avaranas" are the l a s t and most d i f f i c u l t of the • • • — 1 * — jneyavaranas. 108 X:"+."+ This i s the way i n which r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the-support i s -obtained. This c l o s i n g l i n e v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i f i e s obtaining the Dharmakaya with r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the support. That t h i s "support" i s each of the f i v e skandhas i s i m p l i c i t i n T and e x p l i c i t i i n H's t r a n s l a t i o n . i i i . The Dharmakaya as Reorientation of the Skandhas While the preceding passage has described the a l t e r a t i o n i n the basic perceptual stance of the aspirant who moves from common man to Dharmakaya, we may l e g i t i m a t e l y request a more d e t a i l e d account of the changes i n t h i s i n d i v i d u a l . Such an account i s found at X:5. The explanation at X:5 r e s t s upon two key terms: " r e o r i e n t a t i o n " ( p a r a v r t t i ) ^ and "sovereignty" ( v i b h u t v a ) . ^ To say that some aspect of the aspirant has been reoriented means that i t has not been abolished but has been put to a new use within the new personality. Asvabhava (U U37cl8-22) explains that the Sravaka, etc., attempts to abolish h i s misery by destroying the skandhas just as a f o o l i s h leper commits sui c i d e . The Bodhisattva attempts to reorient each skandha just as a wise leper w i l l seek a cure which w i l l transform h i s diseased body into a healthy one. Actions which have been reoriented are termed "sovereignties." Ordinary non-reoriented existence i s composed of skandhas which are forced into a determinate form by the e f f e c t s of past action (karma). The i n d i v i d u a l i s trapped into existence i n a c e r t a i n type of world by what appear to be powerful 109 external forces. The Buddha i s not trapped hut i s himself i n c o n t r o l — he exercises "sovereignty." While ordinary man perceives a s i t u a t i o n forced upon him, the Buddha creates or manifests a s i t u a t i o n i n response to the needs of others. Hsuan-tsang c e r t a i n l y understood "sovereignty" i n t h i s sense, as" he repeatedly t r a n s l a t e s Asvabhava's commentary by: "He obtains the sovereign power of manifesting . . . " X:_l By how many sovereignties does the Dharmakaya obtain sovereignty? The answer i s , i n short, by f i v e of them. X:5.1 By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the rupaskandha i t obtains sover=-eignty over the Buddhafield, the body, the laksanas, the minor marks, the i n f i n i t y of phonemes, and the i n v i s i b l e c r a n i a l mark. A possible misunderstanding of X:5 can be avoided by bearing i n mind that the skandhas are not f i v e groups of factors comprising an i n d i v i d u a l . They are the factors comprising a moment of r e l a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e — i n c l u d i n g the epistemic subject, the epistemic object, the schemata of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and the f i n a l perceptions. Therefore, when the text speaks of the rupaskandha becoming Buddhafields etc., i t i s not portraying the conversion of the i n d i -vidual's p h y s i c a l form into a cosmic Buddha. It i s simply saying that the ordinary world (included i n the rupaskandha) i s transformed into a Buddhaland. The statement at X:5.1 says that the Buddhaland replaces the former ph y s i c a l world. Asvabhava says they may be gold or s i l v e r according to the desires of sentient beings.. The Buddha also obtains the a b i l i t y to manifest a body which, according to 110 Asvabhava, corresponds to the capacities of beings to be taught, i . e . , the Nirmanakaya.and Sambhogakaya. While t h i s w i l l be dealt with l a t e r , l e t us note that "Dharmakaya" i s here used as a general term for Buddhahood,' while., the-rupakaya i s the s p e c i f i c way i n which i t appears. The laksanas and minor marks are the 32 major and the 80 minor marks of a ^3 great man. The i n f i n i t y of phonemes r e f e r s to the Buddha's a b i l i t y to speak to any sentient being i n any s i t u a t i o n . The i n v i s i b l e (to gods and men) c r a n i a l mark i s the usntsa, or - fle s h y kk protuberance on the - crown of the headT' - The author's reason for mentioning i t here i s obscure. X:5.2 By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the vedanaskaridha i t obtains sover-eignty over the irreproachable, immeasurable, vast happy residences. The vedanaskaridha i s the second l o g i c a l moment i n perception. When sense object and f a c u l t y are juxtaposed, the immediate r e s u l t i f v e d a n a — " s e n s a t i o n " — the f e e l i n g of pleasure, pain or i n d i f f e r e n c e which i s inherent i n any normal perception, and over which one has no c o n t r o l . These sensations are the basis of involvement i n samsara. The text i s saying that, f or the Dk, reoriented vedana i s a sovereignty c a l l e d "residence." Asvabhava explains that "irreproachable" means that there are no klesas, "immense" that they are replete with gunas, and "vast" that they surpass a l l the pleasures of the t r i p l e world. It i s not clear i f t h i s i s one residence or several, or i f sukhavihara i s synonymous with brahmavihara (of X:10). However, i t i s clear that f e e l i n g -toned reactions (klesas) based on past encounters with a c e r t a i n class of I l l object have "been replaced by " b l i s s " (sukha)—a transcendent pleasure grounded i n the attitude of the Buddha rather than the appearance of the object. X:5-3 By r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the samjnaskandha i t obtains sover-eignty over explaining groups"of names, of statements, and of phonemes. The samjnaskandha i s the aspect of the perceptual process i n which the perception, having acquired the feeling-tone of vedana, i s i d e n t i f i e d as a c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c by the a f f i x a t i o n of a verbal l a b e l . In Buddhist thought such l a b e l s are discussed under the theory of "names, statements and phonemes."^ When reoriented the samjnaskandha becomes the a b i l i t y to master t h i s v e r b a l i z a t i o n . As there are various theories, and Vasubandu and Asvabhava disagree on the exact import of t h i s passage, i t i s probably unwise to push i n t e r p r e t a t i o n much further. X:5.^ By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the samskafaskandha i t obtains sovereignty over creation (nifmana), transformation,•con-vening the great assemblies, and c o l l e c t i n g white dharmas. The samskaraskandha i s the c o l l e c t i o n of personal predispositions which have been b u i l t up through past experience i n t h i s and former l i v e s . They are the forces d r i v i n g the i n d i v i d u a l into c e r t a i n types of action which lead him to c e r t a i n types of perception. Asvabhava (u *+38a8) says that here the author i s r e a l l y speaking about cetana, "motivation,"^ 6 the a l l - i n c l u s i v e samskara. In the Dk t h i s has been reoriented to y i e l d the sovereignty of creating appearances and.of transforming things •' as -desired, of bringing together great assemblies of those who wish to l e a r n , and of bringing together white dharmas. 112 Again, the basic idea i s a switch from being driven into s i t u a t i o n s (cetana), to being able to create appropriate ones. X : 5 . 5 By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the vijnanaskandha i t obtains sover-eignty over the m i r r o r - l i k e j nana, the self-same j nana, the contemplative 1 jnana, and the action-accomplishing jnana. In abhidharmic thought the vijSanaskandha i s the f i f t h skandha, the f u l l -fledged feeling-toned recognition of an object a r i s i n g from the preceding process. In the Vijnanavada, vijflana r e t a i n s t h i s sense but i s also elevated to an overarching framework within which the other skandhas f i n d t h e i r place. While t h i s was not e n t i r e l y absent i n e a r l i e r schools insofar as each skandha could be described only as an aspect of a process i n c l u d i n g a l l , i t s d e t a i l e d development became a major concern of the Vijnanavadins, who posited four s t r a t a of vijnana. F i r s t , the alayavijnana which stores the b i j a s and serves as the ground for the others. Second, the klistamanas as the locus of atmadrsti (the idea of the s e l f as a d i s c r e t e e n t i t y ) , which discriminates and divides. Third, a r i s i n g from the klistamanas, the manovijnana, the c e n t r a l synthesizing-discriminating consciousness where concepts are formed from sense data. F i n a l l y , the sense data from each of the f i v e sense f a c u l t i e s are _ c a l l e d a vijnana and the f i v e together are c a l l e d p r a v r t t i v i j n a n a — " a c t i v e vijnana." As each of these four classes of vijKana i s reoriented, an "accurate awareness" (jnana)"results.. The sense i n which t h i s jnana i s an "accurate" awareness i s explained by the trisvabhava theory of chapter I I . The jnana i s not an awareness of the r e a l thing, nor i s i t some amorphous mystical experience. Both common man and 113 Buddha f i n d themselves engaged i n a perceptual s i t u a t i o n (.paratantra). The common man r e i f i e s h i s perceptions and mistakes them f o r objects ( p a r i k a l p i t a ) . The Buddha sees through t h i s r e i f i c a t i o n and so understands the perceptions to be just that (parinispanna). The former type of perception i s vi-jnana, "awareness of c e r t a i n things," while the l a t t e r i s jnana, "accurate awareness." The r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the alayavijnana gives the " M i r r o r - l i k e jnana" which provides an accurate r e f l e c t i o n unhindered by s p a t i a l or temporal b a r r i e r s . The r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the klistamanas y i e l d s the self-same jnana which i s aware of the lack of difference between oneself and others and so i s able to manifest images of the Buddha as required. The r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the manovijnana y i e l d s the "Contemplation-jnana" which i s the reasoning aspect of the Buddha. F i n a l l y , the f i v e sensory vijnanas are reoriented to obtain the "Action-accomplishing jnana" which comprises the various a c t i v i t i e s of a Buddha. Thus, the entire Dk—perception and a c t i v i t y — i s included i n X:_5. b. The Dharmakaya — What Is It? In the preceding sections we have seen that, ,inthe Mahayanasamgraha, the Dharmakaya, having both e f f e c t i v e and noetic aspects, i s a synonym for Buddha-hood. These sections have shown the cont i n u i t y of common man and Dk by l i m i t i n g t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n to those sets of concepts applicable to both, and by s t r e s s i n g the p r a c t i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y the meditative ones, which e f f e c t the t r a n s i t i o n from one to the other. However, the Dk i s not simply the terminus of the praxis but i s also a new r e a l i t y . We may legitimately.; ask-, "What i s i t ? " as well as - "What was i t ? " As t h e r e - i s ho metalanguage i n which a "true" description of the Ilk Dharmakaya may he framed (see X:3-5= " i n c o n c e i v a b i l i t y "*),.. Asanga i s l i m i t e d to .the Abhidharmic concepts which-were the standard t o o l s of Buddhist-reasoning. He attacks from a v a r i e t y of angles with various questions, each y i e l d i n g a d i f f e r e n t type of^answer; -Interpreting these r e d u c t i o n i s t i c answers presents a formidable challenge. F i r s t , the Abhidharmic language, which i s i t s e l f mysterious to us, must be t r a n s l a t e d into contemporary concepts. The more serious problem arises from the fact that Asanga has done only part of the task. Chapter X of the Mahayana- samgraha i s not a systematic t r e a t i s e on Buddhahood, but i s more l i k e a c o l l e c -t i o n of materials toward such a work. Even with the commentator's opinions, t h i s doctrine i s merely nascent. Implications are not worked'-out, minor inconsistencies remain unresolved, loose ends abound, and nowhere has a simple theory of the Dk been separated from the confusing mass of d e t a i l s . Since Asanga's approaches follow no d i s c e r n i b l e pattern, they w i l l simply be taken as they occur. i . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (laksanas) of the Dharmakaya The Dharmakaya has f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : X:3.1 Reorientation: because it:'_is reoriented toward the destruc-t i o n of a l l obstacles belonging to the samklesa aspect of the paratantra svabhava and Cit i s reoriented] toward obtaining l i b e r a t i o n from a l l the obstacles to sovereignty over the dharmas; and .because_it i s reoriented toward the presence of the pure aspect-of paratantra. This passage i s very concise because " r e o r i e n t a t i o n " has already been 115 described i n d e t a i l at IX:1-2, where the notion that the world i s renounced, upon reaching enlightenment i s integrated within the Vijnanavada. The key. passage (IX:.l) reads:. "Renunciation•is the Bodhisattva's- non-abiding nirvana. Its laksana i s the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the double support, i . e . , r e j e c t i n g the samklesas while not r e j e c t i n g samsara." That i s , "renunciation" does not imply an escape from the world, but only from those disturbing emotions' (samklesa) which are c o n t i n u a l l y d r i v i n g man into improper, misery-inducing perceptions and reactions. This in-the-world-but-not-of-it state, c a l l e d "non-abiding" ( a p r a t i s t h i t a ) nirvana, i s characterized by "reorien-t a t i o n . " Here, at X:3.1, Asanga places t h i s idea within the structure of the Mahaya- nasamgraha by r e l a t i n g i t to the trisvabhava doctrine. The "double support" whose r e o r i e n t a t i o n constitutes renunciation i s simply the p ar at ant r a- s vab ha va, the "given-ness" of a perceptual s i t u a t i o n . The term "double" points to the ambiguity of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , which may be experienced e i t h e r as a determinate world or as an occasion for enlightened action. The f i r s t of these p o s s i b i l i -t i e s i s explained i n chapter I I I . An i n d i v i d u a l becomes more deeply enmeshed i n samsara when the emotional reactions attached to h i s b e l i e f i n h i s own ultimate r e a l i t y force him to ascribe a f a l s e ultimate r e a l i t y to the given (paratantra) perceptual s i t u a t i o n , thus transforming i t into a t o t a l l y imaginary ( p a r i k a l p i t a ) perception. On the other hand, there i s also the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o r r e c t l y appreciating (parinispanna) the true nature of the perceptual s i t u a t i o n and, rather then r e i f y i n g i t , simply acting properly upon i t . This i s the perceptual process of the enlightened i n d i v i d u a l . Therefore,-.Asanga i s saying that when the sutras apply the term "renuncia-t i o n " to a Buddha they do not mean that he has become cut-off from experience. 116 They mean that h i s reaction i n a perceptual s i t u a t i o n i s an accurate apprecia-t i o n rather than a r e i f i c a t i o n . Furthermore, at IX:2.5-6, Asanga distinguishes the Hinayana r e o r i e n t a t i o n from the Mahayana r e o r i e n t a t i o n , and l i s t s the "advantages" (anusamsa) of the l a t t e r . This provides yet another capsule d e f i n i t i o n of Buddhahood. IX:2.6 reads: " . . . The. Bodhisattvas understand dharmanairatmya, and, considering samsara to he peaceful, they sever a l l the disturbing emotions but do not abandon Cthe worldD. . ." The advantages of t h i s are: "Being grounded i n t h e i r own r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the base, they obtain sovereignty over a l l samsaric things. By manifesting.appropriate sentient bodies to the d i f f e r e n t classes of.Miving beings, ..they use t h e i r p r o s e l y t i z i n g s k i l l s to a i d the converted beings to obtain the highest b i r t h s and to set out on the three s p i r i t u a l careers (yanas)." .That i s , a reoriented, accurate appreciation of the true nature of the perceived world automatically e n t a i l s a compassionate involvement with helping others i n i t . This brings us to the second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Dk,- i t s true nature. X:3.2 Having white dharmas as i t s r e a l nature (svabhava), because the ten masteries (vasita) are obtained through the f u l f i l l -ment of the s i x paramitas. To the d i r e c t question, "What r e a l l y i s the nature of the Dk?" Asanga r e p l i e s that i t i s not a s t u f f (vastu) of any k i n d — i t i s a b i l i t y . Nor i s i t simply an indiscriminate omnipotence, but a s p e c i f i c set of a b i l i t i e s which have been developed by long p r a c t i c e on the Bodhisattva stages. These a b i l -i t i e s are indicated by the term "white dharmas," which.are here synonymous with the "masteries."' 4^ It i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine a stronger possible affirmation of the continuity between the i n d i v i d u a l who has set out on the Mahayana path and the Dk which i s the eventual r e s u l t . The true nature of the l a t t e r i s simply the developed a b i l i t i e s which have been c u l t i v a t e d by the former. Each of the ten masteries i s described. Asvabhava's explanations (U i+36bli+-l8) are i n square brackets. (1) By f u l f i l l i n g the danaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains the ayurvasita [ a b i l i t y to abandon l i f e of one's own free w i l l l , the c i t t a v a s i t a [ a b i l i t y to undergo transmigration without being s o i l e d ! and the pariskara (sambhara) v a s i t a [ a b i l i t y to accumulate food, drink, etc., as one wishes!. (2) By f u l f i l l i n g the silaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains the karmavasita [ a b i l i t y to do only good a c t s ! and the upapattivasita [ a b i l i t y to be born i n whichever destiny one wishes!. (3) By f u l f i l l i n g the ksantiparamita the Bodhisattva obtains the adhimuktivasita [ a b i l i t y to change a land to gold, etc., simply by forming as a s p i r a t i o n to do so!. (k) By f u l f i l l i n g the viryaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains the pranidhanavasita [ a b i l i t y to r e a l i z e one's vowsl. (5) By f u l f i l l i n g the dhyanaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains the rddhi v a s i t a [ a b i l i t y to accomplish a l l types of miraculous deeds! that . goes along with the f i v e abhijna. (6) By f u l f i l l i n g the prajnaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains the jnanavailita C r o u g h l y — a b i l i t y t r u l y to understand teaching], and the dharmavasita [ a b i l i t y to preach as one wishes]. In each case the forces which drive an ordinary man through samsara have been mastered and can now be used by the Dk f o r the ben e f i t of others. There-fore, the true nature of the Dharmakaya i s mastery. A c l o s e l y r e l a t e d passage appears at X : l . l : "The Svabhavikakaya i s the Tathagata's Dharmakaya because i t i s the support f o r sovereignty (vibhutva) over a l l the dharmas." Asvabhava (U l436al-5) suggests two explanations of the term Dharmakaya. E i t h e r , " i t i s c a l l e d Dharmakaya because the nature of the dharma (dharmata) i s to be a body," or, " i t i s c a l l e d Dharmakaya because i t i s the support f o r a l l dharmas." The phrase, ". . . because i t i s the support f o r sovereignty over a l l dharmas," i s glossed as ". . . because i t i s the support for obtaining sovereignty over a l l dharmas." That i s , kaya implies both a coherent organic u n i t , and a support or occasion f o r something, just as a human body supports human a c t i v i t i e s . X : 3 . 3 Non-duality (advaya): (a) Of Being and Non-Being, because Con the one hand] none "of" the dharmas e x i s t s , Chut on the other hand] t h e i r character-i s t i c , sunyata, r e a l l y does e x i s t . (b) Of samskrta and asamskrta because Con-the one. hand! i t i s not caused by karma or klesas, Chut on the other hand] i t does possess the sovereignty of being able to appear as conditioned. 119 (c) Of p l u r a l i t y and unity, because Con the one hand! the support of a l l the Buddhas i s not d i f f e r e n t i a b l e , [while.on the other] innumerable streams of existence are enlightened. This passage presents two d i f f i c u l t i e s : that caused by the three sets of unfamiliar concepts, and the fundamental one of grasping the sense of advaya. The three sets are unexplained simply because Asanga presupposes an under-standing of them. The f i r s t , existence/non-existence of the dharmas, harks back to the dichotomizing analyses of the early Buddhist schools, e s p e c i a l l y of the Vaibhasikas. They began with experiences. These were f i r s t divided into those which were believed to represent existent things ("being"), and those which were i l l u s o r y ("non-being"), the outcome of the i n t e r p l a y of the true existence. The existents were further divided i n t o samskrta, which p a r t i c i p a t e i n the i n t e r a c t i o n which engenders the i l l u s o r y , and the asamskrta which do not, and which thus become the key to the eventual destruction of the i l l u s o r y . This reduction of the existent continued u n t i l a c e r t a i n set of fundamental things (dharmas) were posited. In addition, the process by which the i l l u s o r y non-existents gain credence was also analyzed. Near the basis of t h i s process was found the tendency to divide experiences into "mine" and "others," a tendency v i r t u a l l y synonymous with the " u n i t y / p l u r a l i t y " of our passage (Ui+37aT-8). This passage emphasizes the inadequacy of the o l d analysis i n the face of Mahayana ideas. F i r s t , the d i s t i n c t i o n between the concretely existent and the i l l u s o r y f a i l s when one takes the Mahayana p o s i t i o n (developed at great length i n the prajnaparamita l i t e r a t u r e ) that none of the dharmas are concrete r e a l -i t i e s . This does not simply mean that everything i s s h i f t e d to the non-being category. These dharmas do have one t r u l y existent a s p e c t — t h e fact that they 120 are characterized by sunyata,- whichyon a purely predicative l e v e l , implies a complete absence of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . " ^ While t h i s has s h i f t e d the sense of the term " e x i s t i n g " from "being a concrete th i n g " to "being an absolutely true f a c t , " the l a t t e r i s merely a wider d e f i n i t i o n of the same type, not a new l i n e of thought. We must remember that even the Vaibhasikas did not regard the dharmas as r e a l i n the common Western sense of being s e l f - e x i s t e n t e n t i t i e s . Secondly, the d i s t i n c t i o n between'samskrta and asamskrta f a i l s . In Abhi-dharma thought samskrta ("put together") r e f e r s to the factors composing a moment i n the r e l a t i o n a l existence of an ordinary being. They are brought together i n t h i s moment by past action (karma) and automatic reactions estab-l i s h e d by past experience (klesa). The a c t i v i t i e s of t h i s assemblage set up the conditions f o r future combination. The asamskrta, on the other hand, ar i s e from a c e r t a i n few actions such as meditation, but do not engender future combinations of dharmas. Hence, t h e i r production breaks down samsara, and leads to nirvana. The Mahayana concept of Dharmakaya does not submit to such an analysis. It i s not brought about by karma or kle s a but by the v a r i -ous practices already outlined. While t h i s might be said of the t r a d i t i o n a l asamskrta, the Dk cannot simply be asamskrta since i t leads not simply to nirvana but to future appearances i n samsara. F i n a l l y , the u n i t y / p l u r a l i t y category also f a i l s . This point i s very important'.to Asanga since i t becomes v i r t u a l l y synonymous with the question of how many Buddhas are i n existence. His denial of unity i s e a s i l y understood. Insofar as many i n d i v i d u a l s obtain Dharmakayas upon reaching enlightenment, there are many Dharmakayas. His further contention, that the concept of multiple Dharmakayas i s also unsatisfactory, i s more complex. He says that the Dk cannot be e n t i r e l y p l u r a l because "the support of a l l Buddhas i s not 121 d i f f e r e n t i a b l e (T: 'not m u l t i p l e ' ) . " To t h i s Asanga has appended two stanzas which have been commented upon by Asvabhava. The second stanza (X:3.3b) gives a v a r i e t y of reasons f o r which the idea of e i t h e r one Buddha or many i s unacceptable. I t s place here suggests that Asanga d i d not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between "Buddha" and "Dharmakaya." Asvabhava's commentary t o the f i r s t stanza ( l A 3 7 a 6-13) says that the concept of p l u r a l i t y does not apply t o the Dharmakaya because t h i s concept i s based on a d i v i s i o n of the world i n t o " I " and "others," a d i v i s i o n not made by a Dharmakaya. This curious reasoning b r i n g s us t o the heart of the problem. .By appealing t o the p u b l i c , observable f a c t that, many i n d i v i d u a l s have reached enlightenment, Asanga has proven that the Dk cannot be u n i t a r y . That i s , the ord i n a r y man has made a common sense and (to the b e l i e v e r ) v e r i f i a b l e observation. Now, t o support h i s d e n i a l of the e n t i r e t r u t h of the conclusions drawn from that o b s e r v a t i o n , Asanga appeals t o a p u r e l y i n t e r n a l , p r i v a t e f a c t about the Dk's perceptions. Suddenly he i s no longer speaking about how the Dk appears t o the observer, but about how the observer appears t o the Dk'. Our task i n under-standing t h i s s e c t i o n now becomes one of f i n d i n g a hermeneutical framework which w i l l r e s o l v e the apparent confusion. At t h i s p o i n t i t w i l l be h e l p f u l t o d i s t i n g u i s h the general Buddhist use of the term advaya from the Vedantic a d v a i t a which i s a l s o o f t e n t r a n s l a t e d by "non-dual." The Buddhist term never stands f o r an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d r e a l i t y u n d e r l y i n g appearances, w h i l e the Vedantic one may. As T. R. V. M u r t i says: Advaya i s knowledge f r e e from the d u a l i t y of the extremes of ' I s ' and 'Is not,' Being and Becoming, e t c . I t i s knowledge fr e e d of conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n s . A d v a i t a i s knowledge of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n l e s s e n t i t y . . . . 'Advaya' i s a pur e l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l approach, the ad v a i t a i s o n t o l o g i c a l . 5 1 122 In the present instance, t h i s should warn against an overly l i t e r a l understanding of the English t r a n s l a t i o n of advaya laksana as a "non-dual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Dharmakaya." Asanga i s not a s c r i b i n g a q u a l i t y to an existent thing. Such a q u a l i t y would be a svabhava and would belong i n the previous passage (X:3.2). Asanga i s not making any assertions about the o n t o l o g i c a l status of e i t h e r Dk or perceiver of i t . Once we "go behind" the d i v i s i o n into " i " and "other," our question about "Whose perception?" must be dropped, as i t i s an o n t o l o g i c a l l y based one which simply cannot occur within t h i s system. I f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "non-dual" describes the process of percep-t i o n rather than either subject or object, the problem becomes, "What does i t reveal about t h i s process?" I can see no a l t e r n a t i v e to concluding that "non-dual" defines the viewpoint or stance of the perceiver. That i s , a stance from which one simultaneously perceives, on a conventional l e v e l , the Bodhisattvas reaching Buddhahood, and on an ultimate l e v e l , the lack of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between Buddhas. This b i f o c a l view i s developed e a r l i e r i n t h i s text ( i l l , the trisvabhava) and i s the subject of the entire Madhyantavibhaga. This d e f i n i t i o n would also apply to the e a r l i e r points (a) and (b) of the above-quoted passage. X:3.4 Perpetuity, because i t i s characterized by the p u r i f i c a t i o n of the true nature, i t i s the outcome of a former vow, and i t s a c t i v i t y i s never completed. It would seem natural to extend the reasoning of the preceding section on non-duality to the t r a n s i t o r y / e t e r n a l dichotomy which, for schools l i k e the Vaibhasikas, was v i r t u a l l y synonymous with the samskrta/asamskrta categories. Asanga's clear statement to the contrary warns us that the subject i s much more 123 complex. He i s not merely e s t a b l i s h i n g a method for avoiding any extremes, but i s making assertions about s p e c i f i c cases. He takes the same b i f o c a l view as i n the previous section, seeing the Dharmakaya i n both an ultimate and a r e l a t i v e sense. But he now finds the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "perpetuity" applicable to both views. The argument that from a worldly standpoint the Dk i s perpetual,'because i t s a c t i v i t y i s never, completed, i s e a s i l y understood. Note that t h i s unceasing a c t i v i t y i s not an e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , but an observable fact about the Dk. Note also that again the Dk_ i t s e l f i s capable of a c t i o n with no reference to a Sambhogakaya or a Nirmanakaya. The former-vow argument i s much the same. The Bodhisattva on the way to acquiring t h i s Dharmakaya has vowed to continue acting i n the world so long as sentient beings require h i s a i d ; and, since many have s t i l l not reached nirvana, the Dharmakaya continues to act. Again, i t s continuation i s grounded i n the common world: f i r s t , through a vow taken by the Bodhisattva; second, through the a c t i v i t i e s of others. The l o g i c of t h i s w i l l be worked out i n d e t a i l by use of the t r i k a y a at X:37-39. F i n a l l y , the Dk i s also perpetual i n the ultimate sense because i t i s characterized by a pure true nature (tathata), which Asvabhava (u437b7-8) says i s perpetual and immutable. This r a i s e s a major problem of Vijnanavada scholarship. Asanga makes statements—such as "the Dharmakaya i s eternal"— :which appear to attach the same predicate to an object from both the ultimate and the conventional view-points, and by these to explain the way i n which the two i n t e r a c t . For example, the fact that the Dk i s e t e r n a l l y present i s the basis for i t s constant work for the welfare of a l l sentient beings. To be able to do t h i s , Asanga posi t s 12k a "true nature" (tathata) which, as the ultimate object, hears the predicate. This reduces many problems to one—"What i s tathata?" I f i t i s a t r u l y e x i s -tent r e a l s t u f f , then t h i s doctrine d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y from that i n the rest of t h i s system (or indeed, of any Buddhist system). I f not, how can one p o s s i b l y c a l l i t perpetual any more than existent? While t h i s question i s examined i n the Vijnanavada sastras, i t does not seem to concern the author of t h i s text. X : 3 . 5 Inconceivable (acintya), because i t s true, pure nature must be known by i n t r o s p e c t i o n , because there i s no worldly equivalent, and because i t i s not an object for speculative reasoners. Asvabhava explains that the phrase, " . . . because there i s no worldly equivalent, and because i t i s not the object for speculative reasoners," i s an abbreviation i n d i c a t i n g the entire process of reaching a f i r m l o g i c a l conclu-sion, including reasoning, r e f l e c t i o n , meditation, speculation and examples. That i s , the ultimate nature.of the Dharmakaya i s inconceivable because i t 53 cannot be ascertained by normal reasoning. However, there must be some sense i n which the true nature of the Dk i s knowable, otherwise the entire concept of a Dk would be merely a l o g i c a l a r t i f a c t — p a r i k a l p i t a rather than parinispanna. This sense i s defined by, " i t s true, pure nature must be known by i n t r o s p e c t i o n . " Although our commen-t a r i e s leave " i n t r o s p e c t i o n " ^ ^ undefined, t h i s term i s common throughout the Mahayana debates on perception. It r e f e r s to the Vijnanavada b e l i e f that primary sense-data are a source of absolutely v a l i d knowledge ( i . e . , knowledge of the "true, pure nature," nirmalatathata) which may be either c o r r e c t l y appre-ci a t e d or misapprehended. Other Buddhist schools, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Prasangika, 125 rejected t h i s d o c t r i n e . ^ Therefore, Asanga i s maintaining that the r e a l nature of the Dk can be appreciated only by d i r e c t experience of i t rather than by reasoning about i t . i i . X :7 The Buddhadharmas Asvabhava (U,U38c25) explains that the question, "How many Buddhadharmas are involved i n the Dharmakaya?" i s a request f o r information about the true nature (svabhava) of the Dk. The ensuing l i s t of s i x Buddhadharmas which comprise the svabhava i s r e l a t e d to the laksanas v i a X : 3 . 1 , " r e o r i e n t a t i o n laksana." Each reoriented aspect of the Bodhisattva r e s u l t s i n an a t t r i b u t e which belongs to the svabhava of the Dk. There also may be some r e l a t i o n s h i p v i a X : 3 . 2 , "having-white-dharmas-as-svabhava-laksana," but Asvabhava glosses them i n quite d i f f e r e n t ways.. The f i r s t Buddhadharma i s : X : 7 . 1 P u r i f i c a t i o n (visuddhi) because by r e o r i e n t i n g the alaya-v i jnana, the Dharmakaya" "Is obtained. Asvabhava (u.U38c26-l+39a3) explains that the Dharmakaya i s "pure" as i t i s free from the tendencies to b l i n d emotional reactions (samklesabij a). Thus, the Dk i s fundamentally defined as that which i s free from klesas. As these are factors which drive the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o i n c r e a s i n g l y unhappy s i t u a t i o n s , t h i s point may be p o s i t i v e l y expressed by saying that the Dk i s that which can control or dominate (vasita) i t s s i t u a t i o n , an idea already seen at X : 3 . 2 and developed below at X : 7 « ^ . We have already encountered the idea of r e o r i e n t i n g the alayavijnana at X : 5 . 5 . However, there the reoriented alayavijnana was the M i r r o r - l i k e 126 awareness. Here, i t i s the Dk i t s e l f . This apparent contradiction i s due to d i f f e r e n t ways of regarding the alayavijnana. At X:5 i t was the basis of the perceptual process. Here, i t i s the container f o r impure tendencies. X:7.2 Result (vipaka) because by r e o r i e n t i n g the rupendriya, the vipakavijnana i s obtained. Vipaka may simply mean that one thing i s the outcome or r e s u l t of another. In the AbhidharmakoIa i t indicates that something ( e s p e c i a l l y an indriya) pertains to a l i v i n g being and arises from e a r l i e r causes but i s not i t s e l f good or bad. For example, the j i v i t e n d r i y a , the simple fa c t of being a l i v e , i s vipaka because the i n d i v i d u a l i s a l i v e through his past.action, yet has the option .,of •' moving toward ei t h e r samsara or nirvana. The present passage retains t h i s general meaning. When the material sense organs (rupendriya) of the Bodhisattva are reoriented, he obtains a new type of awareness (jnana). By l a b e l l i n g t h i s awareness "vipaka," Asanga stresses -the idea that the Buddha's awareness reveals no new and independent r e a l i t y to which the Bodhisattva i s suddenly opened upon reaching enlightenment, but i s the outcome of the Bodhisattva's previous state. Therefore, i t i s the very nature of the Dharmakaya to be grounded i n the sensory l i f e of the Bodhisattva. X:7.3 Residence (vihara) because by r e o r i e n t i n g the residences, such as the a c t i v e - l i f e - o f - d e s i r e residence, etc., the immeasurable jnana-residence i s obtained. By s t r e s s i n g the transformation, rather than the elimination, of a spe-c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p to the world (vihara), the idea of an u t t e r l y transcendent Dharmakaya i s rejected. The l i f e dominated by worldly desire i s replaced by one dominated by immeasurable'jfiana. Obviously, vihara, l i k e the previous two Buddhadharmas, deals with the Buddha's awareness. The model here i s one of broadening, from a l i f e of reacting to a c e r t a i n narrow range of pleasurable s t i m u l i , to an a b i l i t y to take i n and appreciate the immeasurable richness of r e a l i t y . J.:J.k • Sovereignty", '..^-because, by r e o r i e n t i n g the various l u c r a t i v e actions, t:he; sovereignty of the jnana, which i s abhijna unhindered throughout a l l the regions of the world, i s obtained. The " l u c r a t i v e actions" are worldly occupations such as a g r i c u l t u r e and commerce. The "jnana which i s abhijna unhindered throughout a l l the regions of the world" i s not a member of the t r a d i t i o n a l l i s t of a b h i j n a s . ^ Asvabhava (U439al0-12) seems to hold that i t r e f e r s to the entire l i s t , to the general idea of abhijna. This passage c l e a r l y indicates that the s h i f t from common man to Dharma- kaya does not displace the cognizing i n d i v i d u a l from his c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n . I t seems to mean that h i s " l u c r a t i v e " a s s i m i l a t i o n of the world i s replaced by unhindered appreciation of i t . X:7>5 Discursus (vyavahara) v ° vecause, by "reorienting the- discursus of everything seen, heard, f e l t , and known, the sovereignty co n s i s t i n g of-.the awareness which s a t i s f i e s the. mind of a l l centient beings i s obtained. Asvabhava (uU39al2-15) seems to understand by t h i s that ordinary ways of speaking about experience become, for the Dharmakaya, a way of speaking which 128 i s i n e v i t a b l y able to s a t i s f y (Lamotte: "charm") a l l sentient beings. I f t h i s i s Asanga's meaning, there i s no idea of the Dk i n h a b i t i n g some i n e f f a b l e absolute. Ordinary speech simply changes to pleasing speech. X:7.6 Expulsion (samudgh£ta), because, hy. r e o r i e n t i n g toward an expulsion of s u f f e r i n g and f a u l t s , a destruction of the su f f e r i n g and f a u l t s of a l l sentient beings i s obtained. Following Asvabhava (U*l39al5-l8), because the Dharmakaya has expelled i t s own s u f f e r i n g and f a u l t s , i t can then destroy the s u f f e r i n g and f a u l t s of others. This i s possible because the r e o r i e n t a t i o n y i e l d s the marvelous awareness that destroys the sufferings and f a u l t s of others. i i i . X:9-27 Gunas Associated with the Dharmakaya F i n a l l y , the Dharmakaya i s described by a'set of q u a l i t i e s (gunas). Unlike the inherent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (laksanas) or fundamental nature (dharma), the gunas are merely "associated with" (samprayukta; T: dang-ldan-par; H: ) the Dk. This term u s u a l l y i n d i c a t e s : e x i s t e n t i a l conjunction without r a i s i n g the question of e s s e n t i a l b a s i s . Here, Asvabhava (U^39bl2) regards i t as an i n d i c a t i o n that these gunas are not exclusive to the Dk but also occur with the Sravakas, and so on. Perhaps because the e s s e n t i a l basis f o r them does not come into question, t h i s passage affords l i t t l e fresh i n s i g h t into the, author's p r i n c i p l e s . These gurtas are, i n f a c t , merely an o l d and widely accepted set of concom-it a n t s to Buddhahood... . The .fact that 'this , t r a d i t i o n a l "list... i s . there applied to the Dk i s yet another i n d i c a t i o n that, for Asanga, "Buddhahood" equals "Dharmakaya." 129 This p a r t i c u l a r l i s t and explanatory karikas are drawn d i r e c t l y from the Mahayanasutralaxtkara, XXI:43-59. As they are well known and as Lamotte has provided excellent references t o other texts i n which they are discussed and defined, 6"^" I have simply reproduced the basic l i s t below, and have paraphrased rather than t r a n s l a t e d a few of the more obscure ideas. X:10 The four immeasurables (apramana). X : l l The eight freedoms-from (vimoksa), the e i g h t f o l d non-disturbing perception (abhibhvayatana); and the ten all-bases (krt snayat ana). X:12 The a b i l i t y to prevent emotional reactions i n others (arana). X:13 The awareness which i s an outcome of the Bodhisattva vow (pranidhijnana). X:lk The four aspects of expertise i n the study and proclamation of 62 the dharma (pratisamvid). X:15 The s i x superior knowledges (abhijna). X:l6 The thirty-two major and eighty minor marks of a superior man. Asanga lays very l i t t l e stress on these. When he l a t e r d i s t r i b u t e s the Dk's a t t r i b u t e s among the three kayas, he does not r e a l l y say whether the Nirmanakaya or Sambhogakaya exhibits them. They remain simply "associated with" Buddhahood. X:17 The f o u r f o l d universal p u r i t y (sarvakaraparisuddhi). X:l8 The ten powers (bala). X:19 The four grounds for self-confidence (vais"aradya). X:20 The t h r e e f o l d absence of anything-to-conceal (araksya), and the three applications of mindfulness (smrtyupasthana). X:21 The t o t a l destruction of habitual reactions (vasanasamudghata). X:22 Opportune a i d to others (asammosata). X:23 Great compassion (mahakaruna). X:2h The eighteen a t t r i b u t e s s p e c i f i c to the Buddha (avenika Buddhadharmah).. X:25 Universal awareness (sarvakarajnata). X:26 F u l f i l l m e n t of the s i x perfections (paramitaparipuri). Asvabhava's commentary on universal awareness (X:25) and the summary (X:2T) w i l l be examined l a t e r , as they contain information on the t r i k a y a . c. The Dharmakaya as -Seen by the Bodhisattva The d e s c r i p t i o n of the Dharmakaya thus far might be termed p h i l o s o p h i c a l . That i s , the s c r i p t u r a l facts have been arranged i n a r a t i o n a l pattern compre-hensible to any reasoning man. No ex t r a - r a t i o n a l q u a l i t i e s — n o mystical i n s i g h t or believer's commitment—have been required. Since, to the Vijnanavada; common man and Buddha are not two d i f f e r e n t beings, but two d i f f e r e n t epistemic a t t i t u d e s , there i s no e s s e n t i a l reason that the Buddha cannot" be described i n common language. None of t h i s reasoning would be a l i e n or incomprehensible to a Western 131 metaphysician—provided he was induced to accept the above set of " f a c t s . " Our r e l i g i o u s author, however, cannot be content with merely describing how the Dk appears to ordinary man. He not only believes that his reader ( o r i g i n a l l y "auditor") can make the gradual t r a n s i t i o n to Buddhahood but wishes to encour-age him to do so. Therefore, to f a c i l i t a t e t h i s t r a n s i t i o n he o f f e r s several descriptions of Buddhahood, each from a viewpoint nearer the f i n a l goal. The major such intermediate stage i s that of the Bodhisattva. The Bodhi-sattva 's view of the Dk i s not cast i n the same l o g i c a l form as that of the common man, because the Bodhisattva's perceptions are not l i m i t e d by the same l o g i c a l categories. In-the Mahayanasamgraha h i s view i s characterized as "profound" (gambhira) and i s described at X:28 by passages obviously taken from or i n s p i r e d by the prajnaparamita w r i t i n g s . Asvabhava (\jhk3b6-9) i d e n t i f i e s t h i s passage as the Bodhisattva view by maintaining that "profound, very profound" means that neither worldly sages nor Sravakas can understand-63 the basic nature of the Dk. , „ The description of the Dk proceeds i n the normal prajnaparamita s t y l e . Each c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s mentioned twice—once to a f f i r m i t , and again to negate i t , the p a i r of a n t i t h e t i c a l statements being fused into a single l i n e of verse. The r e s u l t i n g nonsensical image derives i t s convincing power from poetic e f f e c t s e s p e c i a l l y when the stanza i s chanted. That i s , there i s no being born at the Buddha's b i r t h , his residence:is no residence, and so on, through a l i s t of twelve t o p i c s . While X:28 expresses the "profound" b i f o c a l v i s i o n of the Buddha enjoyed by the Bodhisattva, i t gives no hint of the intense p o s i t i v e evaluation of the Buddha expected from a p r a c t i t i o n e r . This view of Buddha held by Bodhisattva-as-devotee i s contained i n X:29 where i t i s c a l l e d "review of the Dharmakaya." 132 The term "review" (anusmrti) i s derived from s m r t i , an ambiguous term whose root meaning "memory" gives l i t t l e clue to the complex s e r i e s of terms generated from i t . B a s i c a l l y , i t r e f e r s t o the process of m a i n t a i n i n g a s t a b l e epistemic object f o r purposes of meditation. In t h i s passage the object of a t t e n t i o n i s the Buddha. Asvabhava (\]kh^c2-3) comments th a t anusmrti means a s t a b l e r e c o l l e c t i o n of the Buddha. The Mahayanasamgraha and i t s commentaries t e l l us nothing about the a c t u a l meditation r i t u a l , but X:29 says t h a t when the Bodhisattva does f i x h i s a t t e n t i o n upon the Buddha he focuses upon seven p r o p e r t i e s : X:29.1 The Buddhas have obtained sovereignty over a l l dharmas because they have obtained unhindered awareness which penetrates throughout the e n t i r e world. To t h i s i s added a stanza t o the e f f e c t that Buddha does not enjoy a s i m i l a r sovereignty over the beings i n the world. Asvabhava (uUU5t>l—5) e x p l a i n s t h a t , while the Buddha enjoys sovereignty i n the sense t h a t he i s aware of every- " t h i n g , he cannot abrogate the law of karma and immediately introduce a l l beings t o n i r v a n a . X:29.2 The bodies of the Tathagatas are e t e r n a l because the Tathagatas 65 are c o n t i n u a l l y f r e e from s t a i n . Here, as elsewhere i n t h i s t e x t , the e p i t h e t " e t e r n a l " i m p l i e s not an i n f i n i t e s u b s t a n t i a l existence but an u n i n t e r r u p t e d c o n t i n u i t y of some f o c a l c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c ( i . e . , freedom from s t a i n ) . X:29-3 The Tathagatas are t o t a l l y i r r e p r o a c h a b l e because they are t o t a l l y exempt from the k l e s a and jneya avaranas. 133 X:29.k The Tathagatas are spontaneous because a l l t h e i r Buddha actions flow i n an uninterrupted e f f o r t l e s s stream. X:29-5 The Tathagatas enjoy great pleasure due to the pleasures of the pure Buddhafield and of the dharma. X:29.6 The Tathagatas are unsoiled because, although appearing i n the world, they are not s o i l e d by any worldly dharmas. X:29.7 The Tathagatas have a grand purpose because, by manifesting enlightenment and nirvana, they mature a l l sentient beings who are not yet matured and l i b e r a t e those who are already matured. d. The Dharmakaya—A Summary It i s now obvious that, i n the Mahayanasamgraha, the term Dharmakaya designates Buddhahood, the terminus of the Mahayana p r a c t i c e s . It i s w e l l summarized i n the t i t l e of chapter X: "Resulting-Awareness" (phalajfiana). The Dk i s a " r e s u l t " i n the sense that each of i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s the f u l f i l l -ment of some pr a c t i c e previously adopted by the Bodhisattva. It does not involve a r e b i r t h or any sort of new being. C a l l i n g t h i s r e s u l t an "awareness" does not define i t s o n t o l o g i c a l state. It indicates that the Dk i s being described within the same epistemological framework that was applied to the common man and the as p i r i n g Bodhisattva. Within t h i s framework, the phys i c a l body of the common man i s an "idea" ( v i j n a p t i ) r e s u l t i n g from a l i m i t e d , biased awareness (vijnana). This notion of the body as v i j f i a p t i i s s i m i l a r to that of a "self-image." As the i n d i v i d u a l begina Mahayana pr a c t i c e s and his v i s i o n broadens, the vijnana changes (through the stages of preparatory, fundamental and subsequent) into a non-discriminating awareness (nirvikalpajnana) or, i n 13k t h i s text, simply "awareness" (jnana). His s t a t i c self-image gives way to the r e a l i z a t i o n of himself as the perfect embodiment (kaya) of the Mahayana id e a l s (dharmas), i . e . , a Dharmakaya. The notion of "self-image" must not be pressed too f a r , since i t presup-poses some " s e l f " (pudgala) or transcendental ego to experience the image. Such an ego i s denied throughout Buddhist thought. In the Mahayanasamgraha Asanga has cast the theory e n t i r e l y i n epistemological terms. The mechanism by which the self-image of the common man maintains i t s e l f i s described. The way i n which t h i s can be reoriented to become the resulting-awareness which i s the DJk i s explained. And the r e s u l t i n g awareness i t s e l f i s described i n var-ious ways. But these descriptions are confined to the process of perception. There i s no mention of a r e a l perceiver or object. Even a t t r i b u t e s of the Dk —which appears to imply an ontology—are interpreted i n epistemic terms. For example, the apparent affirmation that the. Dk i s immortal (nitya). i s i n t e r -preted as a reference to the Incessant nature of the perception. Therefore, while the concept of "self-image" i s .applicable to the:.common man's v i j n a p t i , i t i s not applicable to the Dk. The d e s c r i p t i o n of the Dk as resulting-awareness i s the key to under-standing most of the previous passages. I t prevents the misunderstanding of the Dk's a c t i v i t i e s which occurs when one sees the Dk as a god-like figure exerting sovereignty or mastery over the things of t h i s world. The concept that the Dk i s awareness, not an accurate perception of external e n t i t i e s but a breadth of v i s i o n , reminds us that there are no "things" to be mastered by the Dk. The actions through which mastery or sovereignty i s exercised are themselves aspects of the awareness. This point can be understood more c l e a r l y i f we compare the actions of the common man, the Bodhisattva and the Dk. 135 For the common man, past events have planted the seeds of present perceptions, which present a concrete s i t u a t i o n including i n d i v i d u a l , world, and perception of the world. The i n d i v i d u a l i s driven to c e r t a i n actions by the s i t u a t i o n , and perceives "himself" carrying out the actions. When the aspirant enters the Mahayana and becomes a Bodhisattva, he develops the s i x perfections (paramitas) which w i l l eventually form the Dk. These are customarily divided into two groups: the f i r s t f i v e , which define the Bodhisattva's action (upaya); and the s i x t h , the in s i g h t (prajna) which i s his perception of the s i t u a t i o n . Applied to the present t e x t , these categories can be misleading, since the Bodhisattva's insight (prajna) can be e a s i l y confused with the awareness ( n i r v i k a l p a j nana) which i s the basic nature of the entire process. A l l s i x paramitas, including both ins i g h t and action, are simply abstractions from the t o t a l i t y of one pattern (see IV:7.6) which, when f u l l y developed, i s c a l l e d the Dk. At t h i s point, the perception i s no longer interpreted as " s e l f " and "other" locked into a f i x e d r e l a t i o n s h i p . Therefore, the idea of perceiving an environment and then acting on the perception, while misleading when applied to the Bodhi-sattva, i s incorrect when applied to the Dk. The Dk's awareness includes the r e a l i z a t i o n that both i t s view and i t s actions have the same l o g i c a l status, i . e . , they are aspects of the perception. It i s often easier to consider them both as "actions" through which the sovereignty or mastery i s exercised. Because the Dk i s the r e s u l t of the p r a c t i c e of the paramitas, i t s ac-tions do not constitute an empty omnipotence or simple "freedom-from." As the outcome of the Bodhisattva vows and p r a c t i c e s , a l l a c t i v i t y i s direc t e d toward the welfare of others ( s t r i c t l y defined as aiding others eventually;,to"develop 136 a s i m i l a r outlook). Freed from concern f o r i t s " s e l f , " the Dk can reach out with compassionate concern. This outreach involves perceiving ( i . e . , creating) a s i t u a t i o n within which the needs of others are both appreciated and s a t i s f i e d . The appreciative insight'"(prajna) into t h e i r p l i g h t is-.-not^'pure. openhess.-to experience, for there i s nothing to be experienced. I t i s the epistemic aspect of the mature patterned concern f o r others. The action which solves the problem i s not a manipulation of the l i v e s of others, f o r there are no l i v e s to be manipulated. The perceived-encounter, created by compassionate concern, within which the needs of the other can be appreciated, i s also the very one within which these needs are sa t i s f i e d . . That-is, through the very process of appreciating the other's problem, the so l u t i o n develops" spontaneously. This explanation r a i s e s the obvious problem of the l o g i c a l status of the re c i p i e n t of the Dk's assistance. He seems to have no standing- apart from the s i t u a t i o n which has been created by the Dk. There can be no question of t r a d i t i o n a l solipsism because there i s no r e a l s e l f involved, but some sort of quasi-solipsism appears to be unavoidable. I believe that t h i s problem i s inherent i n the doctrine of t h i s text as a byproduct of the presentation of an epistemology divorced from metaphysics. The l a t e r Vijnanavada thinkers seem to have r e a l i z e d the problem and developed doctrines that avoid i t . This brings us to the r e a l methodological problem of the present section, that of proposing a metaphysical.interpretation of Asanga's theory. We must f i r s t note that the pure epistemology of the text apparently s a t i s f i e d many within the samgha. Why?. While t h i s question must be l e f t to the h i s t o r i a n , I w i l l make a simple suggestion based on observation of present-day bKa'-brgyud-pa communities 137 that follow a s i m i l a r doctrine. I suspect that epistemology may s a t i s f y the "believer who l i v e s within a d i s c i p l i n e d community under the d i r e c t i o n and i n s p i r a t i o n of a s p i r i t u a l master. He may draw d i r e c t l y from his i n t e r a c t i o n with the master the" reassurance.and guidance that we expect from a metaphys-i c a l statement. He may require•the theory to do nothing more than to explain . how h i s practices and meditational experiences are related'to the main points of Buddhist dogma. Such a requirement .would "be e a s i l y met by the theory of .the Mahayanasamgraha. The scholar needs more. The p r a c t i t i o n e r has h i s guru, a l i v i n g symbol of his goal, c o n t i n u a l l y before him. His task i s to emulate the guru, not to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of his existence. The scholar deals i n ideas, not persons. He requires an i n t e l l e c t u a l formulation of the Buddha rather than an incarnation. He l e g i t i m a t e l y asks, "What i s the Dharmakaya?" The answer may not be e n t i r e l y s a t i s f y i n g , but i t must give him some concrete p o r t r a i t of the Buddha. We could, l i k e Guenther, turn to a l a t e r school of Vijnanavada thought and accept i t s metaphysic. I f such a school had appeared i n immediate post-Asafiga India, t h i s would be the proper t a c t i c . Emphasis could then be trans-ferred to the writings of that school, and the Mahayanasamgraha interpreted as a forerunner of the mature doctrine. However, Guenther's source—the rNying-ma-pa masters—appeared much l a t e r , i n a d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e , and were influenced by intervening developments; i t s ideas may not be a legitimate v e h i c l e for i n t e r p r e t i n g the early Indian t r a d i t i o n . Therefore, I s h a l l attempt to derive an answer d i r e c t l y from the contents of the Mahayanasamgraha. At t h i s point idealism reappears. Even though Asanga has f a i l e d to develop such a doctrine, i s i t not the obvious concomitant to his epistemology? The answer i s Ho. An i d e a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n involves one of two unaccept-able alternatives-. E i t h e r some element of the epistemic process must be declared more basic than the others, or some very abstract u n i f y i n g concept, such as an "absolute," must be introduced. In the former case i t i s v i r t u a l l y impossible to avoid regarding the chosen element as an existent e n t i t y , thus introducing an unacceptable substantialism. A crude example of t h i s would be the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the alayavijnana as a r e a l substratum of personal existence. I f the second choice i s accepted and an Absolute that i s s u f f i c i e n t l y transcendent to avoid o n t o l o g i c a l problems i s posited, the u n i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e has simply been elevated to a r a r e f i e d status where i t i s of s l i g h t help with actual problems. The task of: deriving a. more satisfactory•explanation i s simultaneously rendered both more and l e s s d i f f i c u l t by the need to avoid ontology. It i s more d i f f i c u l t because we cannot simply use the p u d g a l i s t i c notion of an i n d i -v i d u a l who sees things f i r s t as a common man and l a t e r In an enlightened manner. Nor can we assign o n t o l o g i c a l status to any other element of the epistemology theory. The .=task. becomes less, d i f f i c u l t because we are forced to acknowledge the view of many philosophers that the metaphysician's task i s not to uncover r e a l e n t i t i e s , but to devise a scheme within which experience may be interpreted. In the words of A. N. Whitehead, "Speculative Philosophy i s the endeavour to frame a coherent, l o g i c a l necessary system of general ideas i n terms of which 66 every element"of our experience can be i n t e r p r e t e d . " As a demand for a perfect system, t h i s sounds l i k e an o n t o l o g i c a l quest i n disguise. However, Whitehead means i t only as the i d e a l i n the sense that 139 a perfect s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis i s the i d e a l . Any a c t u a l theory may s t i l l be acceptable, although f a l l i n g short of t h i s . He adds: Philosophers can never hope f i n a l l y to formulate these metaphysical f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s . Weakness of i n s i g h t and d e f i -c iencies of language stand i n the way inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality f o r e i g n to t h e i r ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be s t a b i l i z e d as t e c h n i c a l i t i e s , they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap. Throughout t h i s study I use the term "metaphysics" to mean t h i s search for an i n t e g r a t i v e perspective. That i s , I s h a l l follow what S. K. Verma i n The Nature of Metaphysics c a l l s the "root-metaphor" theory of metaphysics. Our problem i s much more modest than that of the general metaphysician i n search of a scheme embracing the t o t a l i t y of experience. We need only a root-metaphor that i s capable of u n i f y i n g the ideas about the Dk. While i t need not be t o t a l l y s e l f - c o n s i s t e n t , i t must be a v i v i d , concrete metaphor which w i l l s t a y-firmly i n our-mind and (almost.Miterally) r e s t r a i n the tendency to d r i f t of "into meaningless inhuman abstractions. Materials f o r such a metaphor l i e r e a d i l y at hand. Asanga's t a l k of ground, seeds, maturation and f r u i t suggests an organic metaphor i n whiclf'the ordinary p e r s o n a l i t y becomes a self-perpetuating weed-patch (klesas). The paramitas are desirable plants which, i f planted among the weeds and properly tended, w i l l eventually crowd them out. The r e s u l t i s a mature crop of paramitas, which i s c a l l e d the Dharmakaya. This metaphor has several useful features. F i r s t , i t c l e a r l y i s no more than a metaphor. No one w i l l take i t l i t e r a l l y . Second, i t i l l u s t r a t e s two of the most puzzling aspects of the Dk: the fact that i t i s both obtained at the s t a r t of the aspirant's career and developed throughout and the f a c t that iko i t i s neither singular nor p l u r a l . The ordinary use of the term "crop" exhibits exactly those p e c u l i a r i t i e s . Furthermore, the notion of a "crop" and "seeds" i s e a s i l y extended to account f o r the ideas of the dharma which, as an outflow of the dharmadhatu, i n i t i a t e d the spread of Dharmakaya(s). F i n a l l y , the metaphor maintains the continuity between common man and Dk. Its f a i l u r e s are inherent i n the nature of metaphor. The actual s i t u a t i o n i s always perceived from within by one standing somewhere on the continuum between common man and Dk. Yet the metaphor portrays a s i t u a t i o n from without, as a thing, thus r e i f y i n g and d i s t o r t i n g the "ground" of the s i t u a t i o n . Therefore, d e t a i l e d conclusions about the ground or basic nature cannot be drawn from such a p o r t r a i t . Despite the apparent t r i v i a l i t y of t h i s metaphor, i t i s a true metaphysical view which w i l l serve better than many couched i n more formal p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms. It i s a model which exhibits many important character-i s t i c s of the s i t u a t i o n described by Asanga, and can e a s i l y be kept i n mind to provide a perspective within which any ideas about the Dk can be kept within the system. No one having t h i s metaphor i n mind could mistake the Dk for a d e i f i e d f i g u r e , speak of a cosmic Buddha, or see i t as a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of some i n e f f a b l e ultimate r e a l i t y . It provides a us e f u l way to grasp Asanga's general sense of Buddhahood and w i l l be h e l p f u l l a t e r as we deal with s p e c i f i c questions under each of the three kayas into which the Dk may be analyzed. The most s t a r t l i n g aspect of t h i s p o r t r a i t may be i t s conservatism. Most scholars have seen the Mahayana Buddhology as a r a d i c a l departure from e a r l i e r concepts, i n v o l v i n g the s u b s t i t u t i o n of a t h e l s t i c , god-like, transcendent 68 Buddha for the e a r l i e r awakened aspirant. Yet, the previous passages contain none of t h i s . The Dk i s not a god and his a c t i v i t i e s are not god-like. His a b i l i t i e s are remarkable only for t h e i r s o t e r i o l o g i c a l e f f i c a c y , i . e . , he can control both himself and the s i t u a t i o n i n order to teach e f f e c t i v e l y . There is, no suggestion of any cosmic powers such as world creation or d i s s o l u t i o n . He c e r t a i n l y i s no deus ex machina meddling with the fate of man, even for the l a t t e r ' s b e n e f i t . He i s even unable to abrogate the karma of another without that .individual's conscious co-operation (X:38-39)-3. THE TRIKAYA While Asanga drew the preceding ideas d i r e c t l y from other a u t h o r i t i e s , the arrangement of t h i s f i n a l set into a t r i k a y a doctrine appears to be his own contribution. I s h a l l f i r s t v e r i f y that Asanga a c t u a l l y p o s i t s a u n i f i e d t r i k a y a , and, as the text mentions four kayas, discover which three form the t r i k a y a and c l a r i f y t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to the fourth.: The core of the present study, an examination of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between'the three elements and-.of the develop-ment of the-key ideas, w i l l follow. As Asanga mentions several' perennial •• . .'Buddhological dilemmas i n connection with these kayas, I- s h a l l , i n v e s t i g a t e ' t h e u t i l i t y of the t r i k a y a i n s o l v i n g them. F i n a l l y , • I s h a l l propose a model of the t r i k a y a doctrine which can guide i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . i n t o r e l a t e d doctrines. a. A U n i f i e d Trikaya or Three Kayas? The l a t e r standard term " t r i k a y a " i s not used i n the Mahayanasamgraha; Asanga speaks of the " t r i p l e Buddhakaya" (sangs-rgyas-kyi sku-gsum; ^~j$f ^ ): P. 3-10 The t r i p l e Buddhakaya . . . i s the 'phala.jnana of these X : l lh2 [three Bodhisattva observances!. 111:2; 111:1"+ and V:2.10 [These three s i m i l a r passages l a b e l the r e s u l t of p r a c t i s i n g non-conceptual and subsequent awareness as "omniscience," "the t r i p l e Buddhakaya," and " f i l l i n g the Dharmakaya," r e s p e c t i v e l y . ! VIII: 13 . . . the terminus of the nirvikalpa.jnana i s the obtainment of the three pure kayas and of the highest masteries. To Vasubandhu (Bh 365b8), "pure" indicates that they have reached the tenth bhumi. X:28 By the three kayas, You have obtained t o t a l mahabodhi . . . X:28.2 A l l Buddhas have three kayas. II:33.l8 e . . . the unlimited domain of• the t r i p l e Buddhakaya. In these passages, " t r i p l e Buddhakaya" i s synonymous with the "Dharmakaya" previously examined. Furthermore, none of these passages suggests that one kaya may be obtained by i t s e l f or before 'the" others-. This strengthens the assumption that none of them can stand alone, and that the " t r i p l e Buddhakaya" i s a unitary concept, equivalent to Dharmakaya or "Buddhahood." The evidence that i t s three aspects are obtained and developed simultane-ously (VIII:13; X:25) also warns us not to misconstrue the various assertions that one kaya "depends upon" another as an i n d i c a t i o n that one i s temporally p r i o r to the others. 11*3 b. Which Three Kayas? The i d e n t i t y of the three kayas (are they Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Nirmanakaya, or are they Svabhavikakaya, Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya?) i s bound up with the meaning of the term Svabhavikakaya. This question w i l l be answered on the basis of the following passages: P.3.10 The t r i p l e Buddhakaya: Svabhavikakaya, Sambhoghakaya and \ Nirmanakaya, i s the r e s u l t i n g awareness of these [Bodhi-sattva p r a c t i c e s ! . . . There can be no mistake. The f i r s t i s d e f i n i t e l y Svk, not Dk, i n the Tibetan as well as the Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s by Hsuan-tsang, Dharmagupta and Paramartha. Buddhasanta uses j|l rather than |j 'l"-^ but t h i s should c e r t a i n l y be also understood as "svabhava." Vasubandhu (Bh 32.3&?.3-?h ) comments that • The t r i p l e Buddhakaya i s c a l l e d the ' r e s u l t i n g awareness' —'.'resulting' because' i t - i s the result, of previously ;mentioned practices and ' r e s u l t i n g awareness' because t h i s r e s u l t i s aware. [Thus,] i t s basic nature (svabhava) i s to be 'the aware r e s u l t of these.' Now, i f there were no Svabhavikakaya ET:- ' i f - t h e r e were no svabhava'] there would be. no Dharmakaya . . . Asvabhava (U38lal6) says that the three are the Svk, Sbk and Nk, and adds (,38lcll|) that the "Svabhavikakaya i s unimpeded and s t a i n l e s s awareness (jnana). As such, i t i s a term for Dharmakaya." X : l . l The Svabhavikakaya i s the Tathagata's Dharmakaya because i t i s the support for the sovereignty over a l l dharmas. Asvabhava (uH36al-5) o f f e r s several explanations for the term Svk i n th above passages: It i s c a l l e d 'svabhava' because i t contains nothing a r t i -f i c i a l and 'kaya' because i t i s the support. Because the dharma-nature (dharmata) i s a body, i t i s c a l l e d 'Dharmakaya' Cu333al: "the body composed of the dharmas i s the dharmatakaya"j or because i t i s the support for the dharmas, i t i s c a l l e d 'Dharmakaya.' The phrase, ' i t i s the support f o r sovereignty over a l l dharmas' means i t i s the support for obtaining such sovereignty. X:3.2 [The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (laksanas) of the Dharmakaya are being explained. The second laksana i s : II "Having white dharmas as svabhava—because the ten masteries are obtained through the f u l f i l l m e n t of the s i x paramitas." [The ten masteries are explained by the commentators. These w i l l be taken up later.1 X:25 "The three kayas. . ." glossed by Asvabhava as "the Svabhavikakaya,"-etc. X:28.2 [Vasubandhu. refe r s to the f i r s t of the three as "Svabhavikakayav X:23.1 A l l Buddhas have obtained sovereignty over a l l dharmas, because throughout the ent i r e world they have obtained unhindered penetrating awareness . . . X:31 The Buddha's dharmadhatu at a l l times exhibits f i v e sorts of a c t i v i t y . . . [Asvabhava i d e n t i f i e s the dharmadhatu as the Dk.: X:35 Why i s the Sambhoghakaya not the Svabhavikakaya? 11+5 X:36 Why i s the Nirmanakaya not the Svabhavikakaya? The answers to X:35 stress the fact that the Svk cannot appear i n diverse ways. The answers to X:36. stress the fa c t that the Svk cannot act i n an inconsistent manner. Asvabhava (Tjl+U8bl5-l6) seems to suggest that the Svk i s enlightened i n the T u s i t a heaven but acts i n the world by means of a nirmana. These passages appear to contain two contradictory ideas: — that Svk is. synonymous with Dk. — that Svk r e f e r s to the f i r s t of three kayas, whereas Dk has been used as a general term for enlightenment, roughly synonymous with the " t r i p l e Buddha-kaya."-.' The only d i r e c t discussion of whether Dk and Svk are synonymous,,- Vasuban—• dhu's commentary to P:3.10 (Bh 323a23-bl+), i s rendered no more i n t e l l i g i b l e by Asvabhava's apparent contradiction. This question must be resolved by comparing statements about the Svk with those made about the Dk. Before doing t h i s , two types of passages must be deleted from the descriptions of the Svk. Those i n which the Svk i s equated with the Dk and those in which the Svk i s l i s t e d as the f i r s t of the three merely repeat our basic problem. In addition, those that speak of the "svabhava of the Dharmakaya" w i l l be considered as references to the Svk. Two types of descriptions of the Svk. (or the svabhava of the Dk) remain. They are: — an awareness r e s u l t i n g from the Bodhisattva practices (.P:3.10; X:35-6 (U)). This compound idea may be divided into those concepts of being a ' r e s u l t ' of Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s , and of being e s s e n t i a l l y 'awareness.' 146 — a support for sovereignty or mastery over the dharmas ( X : l . l ; X:3.2). Thus, the Svk e n t a i l s three basic concepts: r e s u l t , awareness and sovereignty. In order to explore the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Svk and the Dk, we w i l l now reorganize the Dk passages from the previous section under the above three headings. Again, c e r t a i n passages which would obscure the argument have been set aside: the l i s t of eighteen avenika Buddhadharmas at X:24 (which are c l e a r l y of l i t t l e i n t e r e s t to Asanga and contain nothing new), the profundity of the Dk (X:28; which deals with the Bodhisattva's view and has been explained as such), and the question of whether the Dk i s unitary (X:8; which w i l l be considered l a t e r ) . When the remaining passages are examined, we f i n d that the Dk, l i k e the Svk, i s the culmination or r e s u l t of the Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s . It i s obtained by "Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s , " i . e . , by p r a c t i s i n g the paramitas (X:4.3; X:26), by l i s t e n i n g to the dharma (1 :46-48) , and by meditation. (.III:12,l4; V:2.10; X : l ; X:4.2, 4; X:7-2). Like the Svk, the Dk i s "awareness" (jnana). Dk awareness i s described i n great d e t a i l . It i s pure and unobstructed by vasanas, klesas and avaranas which prevent accurate perception (.1:46-48; X:7.1; X : l l ; X:17; X:20; X:21; X:29.3; X:29.6). This awareness i s an omniscience directed to questions necessary for the salv a t i o n of others ( X : l l ; X:13; X:l4; X:15; X:19; X:25). As such, i t i s not merely an accurate, unemotional perception of surrounding objects, but i s compassionate concern f or others* welfare (.X:6.1; X:7-3; X:10; X:23). -From t h i s concern spring the various a c t i v i t i e s of protection and a i d which eventually lead others to a s i m i l a r way of perception (,X:6.2-3; X:7-6; X:l6; X:22; X:29-7; X:3l). As these a c t i v i t i e s are ceaseless or at l e a s t coterminous with the l i b e r a t i o n of a l l sentient beings, the Dk may be c a l l e d e t e r n a l (X:3.^; X:29.2,k). The c e n t r a l idea that awareness ne c e s s a r i l y involves action i s treated as a t h i r d category: the Svk as the support for sovereignty over the dharmas. The connection between sovereignty (or mastery) and awareness i s explained at X:29-l, while sovereignty i s described at X : l . l ; X:3-2; X:7.^ and X:7.5. The key passage at X:5 outlines the way i n which each skandha of ordinary man i s reoriented i n order to obtain a s p e c i f i c sovereignty of Buddha. Reori-entation i s discussed i n several passages, but X:3-l i s e s p e c i a l l y relevant to the present t o p i c . D e t a i l s on sovereignty may be found at X:ll,12 and X:l8. From the ease with which the Dk passages have been subsumed under the three aspects of the Svk, we may conclude that the Svk and the Dk are not two d i f f e r e n t things or even the same e n t i t y ("Buddhahood") viewed by d i f f e r e n t types of i n d i v i d u a l s . They are descriptions of the same phenomena viewed at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of generality. The Svk i s very general, while the Dk i s exceedingly d e t a i l e d . When Asanga wishes to r e i f y the phenomenon of Buddhahood to "a Buddha," he uses Svk or Dk interchangeably. When he wishes to stress the broader categories, he r e f e r s to the "svabhava of the Dharmakaya," or "Svabhavikakaya." His p r i n c i p a l use of t h i s term i s as the f i r s t member of the t r i k a y a , to d i f f e r e n t i a t e the fact of being a Buddha from the way i n which the Buddha appears to sentient beings. In b r i e f , the members of the t r i p l e Buddhakaya are Svabhavikakaya, Sambho- gakaya and Nirmanakaya, and together they form a unity which i s equivalent to the term "Dharmakaya." Ik8 c. The Nirmanakaya: Buddha i n the World The Nirmanakaya i s usually considered to "be the form i n which Buddhahood i s manifested within the world, i . e . , the h i s t o r i c a l Buddhas such as Dipaiiikara, Sakyamuni or Maitreya. P:3-10 [Commenting on the f i r s t mention of the NkT,. Vasubandhu (Bh323a29) says:! I f there were no Nirmanakaya, the Bodhisattvas on the ^ ^ T O ' - ^ adhimukticaryabhumi .' and the Sravakas etc /whose a s p i r a -t i o n i s i n f e r i o r , would not be able to escape from samsara. VI:5.2 [Asanga i s explaining that the supreme morality i s to lead others to p r a c t i c e the dharma, and that the question of means used to do t h i s transcends ordinary categories of morality,3 "Furthermore, the affected (nirmana) b o d i l y and vocal actions are to be understood as the profound morality of the Bodhisattva. By them, he exercises authority, i n f l i c t -ing various torments on sentient beings i n order to secure them i n [the p r a c t i c e o f l Buddhist d i s c i p l i n e (vinaya)." VIII:10 The r e t r i b u t i o n (vipaka) of the Bodhisattva's n i r v i k a l - pajnana occurs i n the two Buddha assemblies according to preparation and a c q u i s i t i o n . "Retribution" indicates'the fate of an i n d i v i d u a l i n his next incarnation. ». 71 "Nirvikalpajnana" (non-conceptualizing awareness) i s a general term for enlightened awareness. Here the question i s , "Where w i l l the Bodhisattva who Ik9 possesses nirvikalpajnana be reborn?" The commentators (Bh 365alO-l"+; U"+30cl8-2"4-) agree that, i f his n i r v i k a l p a j nana i s only i n preparation, he w i l l be born i n the Nirmanakaya assembly, while» i f he has a c t u a l l y acquired n i r v i k a l p a j Sana, he w i l l be reborn i n the Sambhogakaya assembly. That i s , the assembly surrounding the Buddha's Nk_ i s composed of those who are "preparing" t h e i r awareness. This preparation i s further characterized (vTII:l"+) by a s p i r a t i o n (adhimukti) and simple confidence (sraddhamatra). X:1.3 The Nirmanakaya also depends upon the Dharmakaya because i t manifests Lthe following Buddha-activities!: r e s i d i n g i n the T u s i t a heaven, descending, being born, leaving the household l i f e , frequenting t i r t h i k a s , p r a c t i c i n g auster-i t i e s , a r r i v i n g at mahabodhi, and entering mahaparinirvana. Asvabhava (U"+36al7-19) says, "Because of h i s developed i n s i g h t , he leaves the. T u s i t a heaveniCand^performs a l l the Buddha a c t i v i t i e s ! , f i n a l l y • e n t e r i n g nirvana. Such i s the way i n which anthropomorphic mental images a r i s e i n another's stream of being." X:6.3 CThe Dharmakaya! i s the support for the various Nirmanakayas because i t p r i n c i p a l l y assures the maturation of the Sravakas. Asvabhava (u"+38cll-15) explains that " p r i n c i p a l l y " indicates that.the Bodhisattvas on the lowest l e v e l — t h e adhimukticaryabhumi—also need the Nk: "Because of t h e i r i n f e r i o r a s p i r a t i o n , the Sravakas and adikarmika Bodhisat--tvas are not completely matured i f they do not see the Buddha. But the Bodhi-sattvas who have entered the great bhumis are not matured by the Nirmanakaya because they penetrate the vast and profound dharma." 150 X:8 [To the question of whether or not the various Sarabhogakayas are d i f f e r e n t or not d i f f e r e n t , Asanga replies:"! . . . As t h e i r intentions and actions do not d i f f e r , they are not d i f f e r e n t . It i s not the case that t h e i r d i f f e r e n t supports do not d i f f e r — a n immeasurable v a r i e t y of supports are found. The preceding remarks on the Sambhogakaya also apply to the Nirmanakaya. X:12 [Asvabhava (u440cl-l6) i s commenting on the a b i l i t y of the Tathagata to destroy klesas of sentient beings. He says that , i f the Tathagata sees that sentient beings w i l l produce klesas i n regard to the Buddha's body, i f they are capable of enjoying a nirmana of the Buddha, he approaches them and s k i l l f u l l y d i s c i p l i n e s them. Asvabhava contrasts t h i s Tathagata with the Sravaka who, upon f i n d i n g that h i s presence i n a town or grove might excite passion, r e f r a i n s from entering it.1 X:l6 When a l l sentient beings see you, They recognize you as a mahapurusa. By a mere glimpse they achieve f a i t h . Homage to you, the e f f e c t i v e one. Asvabhava (uU4lbT-12) says that sentient beings see the thirty-two major and eighty minor marks which convince them that the Buddha i s the good arranger (H: "dharma-opener") of the world. Unfortunately, there i s no clear i n d i c a t i o n of which kaya(.s) manif est (s) these, Hsuan-tsang probably understood both. Sbk. and Nk, but t h i s i s not supported by.the Tibetan. 151 X:27 . . . [You the BhagavanH are i n the world and i n the Buddha assemblies. . . Asvabhava (u4U3a23) says,". . . the Nirmanakaya i s manifested i n ( & ) the world, while the Sambhogakaya resides i n ( ) the great assembly." X:31.1 [The Dharmakaya] protects sentient beings from s u f f e r i n g because a mere glimpse of i t protects against such miseries as blindness, deafness, madness, etc. Asvabhava (W6cl6-21; u351b8-352a3) deals with the d i f f i c u l t y r a i s e d by the fact that elsewhere the Dk has been declared to be i n v i s i b l e . How can a "mere glimpse" of i t protect someone? He r e p l i e s : [I w i l l now explain the way i n which ordinary beings may"! 'see the Dharmakaya.' The Dharmakaya i s perfected by the p r o j e c t i n g power of i t s previous Great Vow. I t then manifests a functioning ( $\ ) Nirmanakaya which causes the b l i n d to see, etc. From the p r o j e c t i n g power of previous equipment i t obtains ( ^ ) the Dharmakaya, spontaneously ) sending f o r t h [actions 1 l i k e a wheel which f i n a l l y returns to i t s s t a r t i n g point. So although we say they 'see the Dharmakaya; they r e a l l y see only a nirmana. X:36 Why i s the Nirmanakaya not the Svabhavikakaya? This question receives a complex re p l y i n eight sections. In the f i r s t f i v e ,the t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s p r a c t i c e d by a Buddha between his l a s t earthly r e b i r t h and h i s parinirvana are shown to be i n e x p l i c a b l e i f t h i s worldly form (Nk) were, quite simply, the Buddha. To avoid such, c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , i t i s neces-sary to p o s i t an earthly body (Nk) and an e s s e n t i a l body (Svabhavikakaya). X:36.1 It i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattva who has long ago acquired the imperishable samadhis, should be born i n the T u s i t a heaven or among men. A being i s reborn according to" h i s past actions .arid 'the act ion "of p r a c t i s i n g the meditation i n v o l v i n g imperishable samadhis throughout the Bodhisattva career cannot r e s u l t i n r e b i r t h i n the kamadhatu. But s c r i p t u r e reveals that the Buddha i s reborn i n the T u s i t a heaven and then i n Jambudvipa, both of which are i n the kamadhatu. Thus, we must pos i t a bimodal Buddha. This reasoning i s extended i n Paramartha's t r a n s l a t i o n of Vasubandhu's Bhasya (T. v o l . 31, p. 26Tcl6) ,' where the human body that the Buddha takes i n order to convert sentient beings i s said to e x i s t without cause (^^, 1^ 1 ) and therefore to be Nk rather than Vipakakaya or Svabhavikakaya. That i s , we must also recognize that no r e l a t i o n of karmic c a u s a l i t y holds between the two modes. This w i l l be an important point for understanding the sense of "nirmana•" X:36..2 I t i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattva, who has long since remembered h i s . former b i r t h s , should The Ignorant 'of .. • • ' • - • • 1 '• 75 w r i t i n g , caTculatioh, numbers,: finger reckoning, a r t s , sciences, and the enjoyment of objects of desire. X:36.3 I t i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattva, who has long since known the dharma, badly preached or well preached, should go to the t i r t h i k a s . X:36.U I t i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattva, who has long since known the good dharma of the path of the three v e h i c l e s , should p r a c t i c e asceticism. X:36.5 It i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattvas should neglect one - -153 hundred k o t i s of Jambudvipas i n order to achieve complete, enlightenment and turn the dharmkacakra i n a sin g l e place. The problem i s here thrown into the starkest possible r e l i e f by the cosmological s e t t i n g . To the Mahayana authors, the cosmos consists of endless r e p l i c a t i o n s of the four-continent.universe. Now, the Bodhisattva has vowed to save a l l beings, presumably i n c l u d i n g those of other universes. I f the Buddha were merely a single e n t i t y , he would have to choose one of these i n which to exercise h i s s a l v i f i c a c t i v i t y , thus v i o l a t i n g his vow. Furthermore, Asvabhava (uUl+8bl2) says that these d i f f e r e n t places are i d e n t i c a l . Thus, the choice i t s e l f would necessa r i l y be made on purely fo r t u i t o u s grounds, a concept a l i e n to Buddhist thought. X : 3 6 . 6 I f , instead of manifesting complete enlightenment Cin every JambudvipaU, the Buddha performed Buddha a c t i v i t i e s everywhere else by Nirmanakayas Ewe could say t h a t l he had reached enlightenment only i n the T u s i t a heaven. X:36.7 Why not admit that i n Jambudvipas, Buddhas are born simultaneously? There i s no sc r i p t u r e or reason hindering t h i s conclusion. Asvabhava (U^"+8bl5) sees t h i s as a reply to those who would attempt to maintain the i d e n t i t y of Svk and Nk by p o s i t i n g a quasi-unitary Buddha who becomes enlightened i n t h i s Jambudvipa and sends nirmanas to act i n other Jambudvipas. Surely these thinkers would be w i l l i n g to go further and admit that the enlightenment takes place i n the T u s i t a heaven and that a l l a c t i v i t i e s i n the Jambudvipas are by means of nirmanas. Asvabhava sees no harm i n t h i s , and such an admission i s quite enough to support the claim that the Svk must be distinguished from the Nk. This argument assumes that various Nks may be present simultaneously. The author must now explain why t h i s does not contradict the s c r i p t u r a l maxim that two Buddhas cannot appear-in_the world at the'same time. He says:-X:36.8 Even i f many nirmanas appear, because "the world" i s a four-continent world-system, the b i r t h of two Tathagatas i n the world does not contradict the sutra which [asserts 1 that two Tathagatas do not a r i s e i n the world, just as two Cakravartins cannot a r i s e i n the same world. Asvabhava explains that the "world" of the sutra i s one four-continent world-system, not an entire universe containing one thousand four-continent world-systems. There i s no s c r i p t u r a l obstacle to simultaneous Buddhas, as long as each world-system contains only one; A stanza i s quoted to close this.argument: Many of the Buddha's subtle Nirmanakayas Are i n the womb simultaneously, In order to manifest The Manifold Enlightenment. The commentary (Bh 379b8-13; U 41i8c2-5) introduces an important idea. When the Buddha's Nk descends from'the T u s i t a heaven into i t s mother's womb, nirmana !3ravakas such as Sariputra are created by the Buddha and descend to t h e i r mothers' wombs. Without t h e i r i n f e r i o r i t y , the s u p e r i o r i t y of the Buddha would not be apparent. This s u r p r i s i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n shows that the phrase 155 77 "manifold enlightenment" i s not "the various types of enlightenment," hut a single synonym for the highest enlightenment, thus j u s t i f y i n g the s u p e r i o r i t y of the Mahayana enlightenment. While I t may he possible to see t h i s as the basis of the l a t e r notion that various beings may be Nks, there i s no i n d i c a -t i o n that Asanga or h i s commentators entertained such a notion. X:36.8 CThe Buddha"! made his vow and p r a c t i s e d the r e l i g i o u s l i f e i n order to achieve great enlightenment for the welfare and happiness of a l l sentient beings. It i s i l l o g i c a l to hold that he has completely gone to nirvana, because that would render his vow and p r a c t i c e s t e r i l e and useless. Asvabhava explains that we are to conclude that the Buddha who has entered nirvana i s the Nk, d i s t i n c t from the Svk, which i s s t i l l present to a i d others. X:37 CIn t h i s discussion (which w i l l be studied l a t e r ) of whether the Buddha's body i s e t e r n a l , Asanga maintains that the Nk i s not eternal (nitya) but i s repeatedly manifested.] X:38 The Nirmanakayas of the Buddha Bhagavans do not remain Cin the worldl f o r s i x reasons: ( l ) Because t h e i r . a c t i v i t y i s complete when the matured sentient beings have been l i b e r a t e d . The Nk i s c l e a r l y a r e l a t i o n a l body whose appearance depends on both the Buddha and the sentient beings for whom i t i s manifest. When they no longer need i t , i t w i l l disappear. 156 (2) To prevent [sentient beings3 from not d e s i r i n g nirvana while seeking the Tathagata's eternal body. (3) To prevent mistaken ideas about the Buddha and to cause sentient beings to understand the profound teachings of the true dharma. (U) In order to cause [sentient beings!] to long f o r the Buddha's profound b i r t h because they [the BhagavansU fear that, i n those who often see the Buddha, a f e e l i n g of contempt w i l l a r i s e . (5) In order to cause [each sentient beingl personally to exert himself when he knows that the r e a l teacher i s d i f f i c u l t to f i n d . (6 ) In order that sentient beings be quickly matured by not r e j e c t i n g the yoke of personal exertion. These are a l l s p e c i f i c i l l u s t r a t i o n s of one point. The Nirmanakaya ex i s t s because i t i s the most e f f i c a c i o u s way i n which the Buddha may a i d sentient beings. The help which can be given i s not an action-on-behalf-of, but i s a stimulus to personal exertion and a d i r e c t i o n f o r i t . For t h i s purpose, an eternally-present Buddha would be useless to the Sravaka who sees the Buddha as an external, a u t h o r i t a t i v e , god-like f i g u r e . To one with such an a t t i t u d e , the d e b i l i t a t i n g presence of the eternal within the t r a n s i t o r y would lead to a passive dependency, the precise opposite of the desired maturation. i . The Nirmanakaya: a Summary The preceding passages portray the Nirmanakaya as the Buddha-form 157 manifested i n the world by the Dharmakaya. As such, i t i s the f a m i l i a r Buddha (Dipamkara, iSakyamuni, Maitreya, etc) defined by a set pattern of actions. These passages also suggest solutions to the p r i n c i p a l problems a r i s i n g from such a p o r t r a y a l . The f i r s t problem, "Who can see the Nk?",. i s not•as simple as i t may appear. While VIII:10 suggests that the Nk appears to those Sravakas who have made some s p i r i t u a l progress, the remainder of the passages suggest that the Nk i s v i s i b l e to a l l sentient beings, but i s necessary only for the s p i r i t u a l progress of the Sravakas and Bodhisattvas on the adhimukti- caryabhumi. That i s , a l l sentient beings can see the Nk, but only the !3ravakas and novice Bodhisattvas benefit from t h i s exposure. A second problem involves the action of the Nk. The question, "What does the Nk do?" receives two d i f f e r e n t types of answers. F i r s t , (VI:5-2) Asanga suggests that the Bodhisattva, by means of b o d i l y and vocal actions which are nirmanas, can do anything (including apparent harm) which might help e s t a b l i s h sentient beings i n the Mahayana d i s c i p l i n e . While t h i s passage appears to r e f e r to the Nk, there are no s i m i l a r ones elsewhere i n the Mahayanasamgraha. Furthermore, the Tibetan t r a n s l a t o r i s c a r e f u l to use the word lus ("physical body") rather than sku used elsewhere, to t r a n s l a t e the kaya of Nirmanakaya. Therefore, t h i s idea of taking d i r e c t action upon the aspirant does not seem to belong to Asanga's basic v i s i o n of the Nk. Second, the Nk performs c e r t a i n actions i n a p r e s c r i p t i v e mythical pattern- It i s born, leaves the house- . hold l i f e , achieves enlightenment, turns the dhafmacakra, and so on. The pattern of these a c t i v i t i e s defines the Nk_ and constitutes i t s h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y , i . e . , i t s v i s i b i l i t y to sentient beings. However, there i s no sugges-t i o n that the Nk's main task—maturation of the Sravakas—is d i r e c t l y achieved by these actions. Not even preaching ("turning the dharmacakra") i s ce n t r a l to t h i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l action. This maturation seems to he achieved not by the Nk 'doing' something to the laravaka, but by the s i t u a t i o n i n which the Nk (present by v i r t u e of the Buddha a c t i v i t i e s ) i s seen by the Sravakas, by Bodhisattvas on the adhimukti- caryabhumi, and by sentient beings i n general. In addition to i t s maturing action, a mere glimpse of the Nk protects the Sravakas from worldly calamitie This maturation involves f a i t h (sraddha) and a s p i r a t i o n (adhimukti). VIII:10 holds that the Sravaka must have these i n order to be born i n the presence of a Nk; X:6.3 says that t h e i r i n f e r i o r adhimukti c a l l s for a glimps of the Buddha; and X:l6 says that t h i s glimpse r e s u l t s i n adhimukti. A reasonable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s would be that the Sravakas and the Bodhisattvas see the Nk because they have a cer t a i n confidence and a s p i r a t i o n and that these are strengthened by the experience. This i s i n general agree-ment with the de s c r i p t i o n of the benefits of hearing about the pe r f e c t i o n of the Tathagatas which i s found i n the Abhidharmakosa viil:3^cL. The verb "to see" ( ^ , mthong-baj implies ordinary grasping perception and Is contrasted by Asvabhava at X:6.3 with the Bodhisattva's "penetration" of the dharma. This leads into the question of the r e l a t i o n between Nirmana-kaya, Sambhogakaya and Dharmakaya, a discussion which w i l l be taken up a f t e r the data on the Sbk have been examined. But what does 'seeing the Nirmanakaya' mean? Does Asariga l i t e r a l l y mean that the mere sight of the Nk i s e f f i c a c i o u s , or i s t h i s a metaphor for being able" to meet with, and undertake the r e l i g i o u s l i f e under, an h i s t o r i c a l Buddha? We should f i r s t note that 'seeing' the Buddha cannot be a metaphor for hearing or understanding the Buddha-word. Both hearing and understanding have t h e i r own consistent terminology throughout the Mahayanasamgraha, and 159 that terminology i s not found here. Furthermore, Asvabhava (Ulj-36al9) r e f e r s to "anthropomorphic mental images." While there i s also some chance that 'seeing' means j o i n i n g the Buddha's entourage, the majority of passages seem to be based upon the more l i t e r a l notion. Asvabhava's statement that the glimpse of the Buddha i s a c t u a l l y a glimpse of h i s thirty-two major and eighty minor c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e (X:l6) ' suggests that the recognition of a Buddhais the essence-of•the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l event. Such an understanding makes good sense of these passages. Ordinary sen-t i e n t beings can see, but not recognize, the Nk. The Sravaka does recognize i t . His career i s already well launched—he knows the basic doctrine, p r a c t i c e the meditation, and keeps the precepts. He requires assurance. A 'mere glimpse' of the Buddha w i l l indeed assure him that the goal and foundation of his p r a c t i c e i s r e a l i z a b l e , and w i l l therefore increase his confidence and a s p i r a t i o n . The question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Nirmanakaya and Svabhavika- kaya w i l l be taken up l a t e r . d. The Sambhogakaya—-Buddha i n the Buddhafield In the Mahayanasamgraha, the Sambhogakaya i s the form i n which Buddhahood resides within a Buddhafield, teaching an enjoyable doctrine to the Bodhisat-tva.. Relevant passages w i l l be examined under three headings: 1. The Sambhogakaya; i i . The Buddhafield; i i i . The Bodhisattva. i . The Sambhogakaya—General Prastavana LThe commentators (Bh323a25-29; U38lcl7-20) say t h a t , due 3.10 l6o to the Sambhogakaya, the Great Bodhisattvas who have entered the great bhumis experience the pleasures of the dharma and these pleasures assure the p e r f e c t i o n of t h e i r equipment.1 VIII:10 [This passage on the r e t r i b u t i o n of nirvikalpajnana was quoted when discussing the Mrmanakaya. Asvabhava adds that being born i n the Sambhogakaya Buddha assembly i s the r e t r i b u t i o n for having obtained the fundamental n i r v i k a l p a j nana (described at VIII:iht).] The i m p l i c a t i o n seems to be that the fundamental n i r v i k a l p a j nana leads to r e b i r t h i n t h i s assembly, and that there the "subsequent (.prsthalabdha) n i r v i k a l p a j nana," "whose possessor can.circulate throughout the world without being s o i l e d , " i s obtained. X:6.2 [The Dharmakaya] i s the support for the various Sambho-gakayas because i t assures the maturation of the Bodhisattvas. X:8 [To the question of whether the various Sambhogakayas are d i f f e r e n t ^ o r not d i f f e r e n t , Asanga r e p l i e s : ] . . . As t h e i r intentions and actions do not d i f f e r , they are not d i f f e r e n t . It i s not the case that t h e i r various supports do not d i f f e r — i n n u m e r a b l e supports occur. Asvabhava (.UU39b2-5) explains that the Buddhaf i e l d s , assemblies, verbal expressions, sizes of the bodies, major and minor marks, taste'O'f the doctrine, 161 etc., d i f f e r i n various universes. X:27b . . . [You, the Bhagavan! are present i n the world and the Buddha assemblies. ... . Both commentators agree that the Buddha appears i n the world by the Nirmanakaya and i n the Buddha assemblies by the Sambhogakaya. X:35 Why i s the Sambhogakaya not the Svabhavikakaya? For s i x reasons: (1) Because a rupakaya can be seen. Again, Vasubandhu i s ambiguous. Asvabhava (;Tjl+l+7c27-28). says, " . . . the Sambhogakaya has a material (rupa) appearance while the Svabhavikakaya does not." (2) Because i t appears v a r i o u s l y i n the innumerable Buddha assemblies. Asvabhava (u"+"+7c29-^8al) says the Sambhogakaya exhibits diverse forms whereas the Svabhavikakaya does not. (.3) Because i t can be seen according to the aspirations Cof the devotee], i t appears to have an indeterminate svabhava. Asvabhava (uHU8al-l+) says that the Sambhogakaya i s manifest i n accord with the "as p i r a t i o n s " (adhimukti)_ of the observer and lacks a f i x e d nature. He quotes "a sutra" to the e f f e c t that some see a ' 'Sambhoga-Buddha, others a' young man, and s t i l l others a c h i l d . (h) Because i t appears i n d i f f e r e n t ways, i t can be seen 162 to have a changing svabhava. Asvabhava explains that the Sbk appears d i f f e r e n t to the same observer at various times. (5) Because i t can be seen mixed with various assemblies of Bodhisattvas, Sravakas, devas, etc. The term "mixed" i s taken f o r granted by the commentators. I t probably means that the Sbk i s seen "as a member of" the various assemblies. This i s c e r t a i n l y the case at X:1.2 where the Sbk i s said ". . . to be characterized by the various Buddha assemblies because i t experiences the very pure Buddha-f i e l d s . . . . " (6) Because the two reorientations-of-support, that of the alayavijnana and that of the p r a v r t t i v i j n a n a , do not appear l o g i c a l l y to coincide. Asvabhava (uUWalC—12) explains that the reo r i e n t a t i o n " o f the alayavi jnana y i e l d s the Svabhavikakaya while that of the other active vijnanas y i e l d s the Sambhogakaya. X:37 As neither the Sambhogakaya nor the Nirmanakaya i s ete r n a l , how can the sutra say that the Tathagata's body 1 i s eternal? Because both Nisyandakaya and Nirmanakaya depend upon the eternal Dharmakaya. As the enjoyment i s never interrupted and the nirmanas are repeatedly manifest, i t i s proper to regard the Tathagata's body as eternal. . . . Asvabhava ( u W 8 c l 9 ) equates the Nisyandakaya with the Sambhogakaya. 163 X:1.2 The Sambhogakaya depends on the Dharmakaya and i s characterized by various Buddha assemblies because i t experiences the very pure Buddhafields and pleasures of the Mahayana dharmas. 80 The term " i s characterized by" indicates that t h i s i s the way the Buddha i s perceived, not that the Buddha assemblies, etc. are inherent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Asvabhava (TjU36a6-12) explains that the "Buddhafield" i s a gathering'of various groups of Great Bodhisattvas (as i n Sukhavati, e t c . ) . The "pleasures" are: the pleasures of jewels and precious metals; the pleasures of understanding the meaning of Mahayana sutras, etc.; and the pleasures of s c h o l a s t i c reasoning enjoyed by the Buddha and Bodhisattvas. I t might be possible to in t e r p r e t Asvabhava (.TjU36all-12) as saying that both the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas possess Sambhogakayas, but t h i s passsage i s obscure and i s not supported by the Tibetan. In these passages, the Bodhisattva who has perfected nirvikalpajnana finds himself i n the presence of the Tathagata (the Sambhogakaya) i n a Buddha assembly. The p h y s i c a l appearance (rupa) of the Sbk i s projected by the aspi r a t i o n (adhimukti) of the observer, and hence varies from s i t u a t i o n to s i t u a t i o n . The Bodhisattva takes great pleasure i n the occasion, and h i s pleasure i s instrumental i n furthering h i s s p i r i t u a l progress. There i s no suggestion that the Sbk can appear apart from the Buddhafield; i t i s an i n t r i n s i c part of the d e f i n i t i o n of Sbk. Asanga devotes more space to describing the Buddhafield than to the Sbk i t s e l f . 161+ Q-i i i . The Buddhafield The primary d e s c r i p t i o n of the Buddhafield occurs at X:30. The Bhagavan of t h i s passage should be understood as the Sbk of others. To the possible objection that i f Asanga had meant "Sambhogakaya" he would have used that term, I can only r e p l y that, asX:30 i s based upon a d i r e c t quotation from an e a r l i e r text (presumably a version of the Samdhinirmocanasutra), i t i s determined by the l a t t e r ' s terminology. Just as the Sambhogakaya could be considered the superimposition of an appearance projected by the Bodhisattva on the fact of Buddhahood, so the Buddhafield can be considered to be a symbol which maintains the perfect congru-ence of the image of a s p a t i a l country r u l e d by the Tathagata, and the notion of the Bodhisattva's s o t e r i o l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n within which j o y f u l and enriching communion i s possible. X:30 How should we understand the pure Buddhafields of the Buddhas? In the introduction to the Bodhisattvapitaka- satasahasrikasutra, they are described as follows: The Bhagavan resides i n an i n f i n i t e grand palace: (.1) which i s adorned with the blaze of the seven jewels f i l l i n g the i n f i n i t e universe with a great radiance, (.2) whose immense rooms are well disposed, (.3) whose compass i s unbroken, (.k) whose domain t o t a l l y transcends the three dhatus, (.5) which a r i s e s from supremely wholesome world-transcending roots. 165 At X:30 the physical model for the Buddhafield i s a great palace b l a z i n g with jewels, possessing immense, well-proportioned rooms, an unlimited area and immeasurable dimensions. Asvabhava (uU^6al2-ll+) explains " i t s domain transcends the three dhatus" to mean that the Buddhafield i s not something that can be e i t h e r desired or attained l i k e an ordinary p h y s i c a l palace. Rather, i t "arises from supreme and world-transcending wholesome roots," which Vasubandhu (Bh377alO) i d e n t i f i e s as. non-conceptual awareness and subsequent awareness. This idea- of an epistemic nature i s supported by (.6): (.6) which may be characterized as very e f f i c a c i o u s and very pure v i j n a p t i • Asvabhava (U^U6al7-20) explains that no jewels, etc., can be found apart from the awareness of them. Thus, the Buddhafield i s not a "more r e a l " place than the common world. Both are "ideas" ( v i j n a p t i ) ; the d i f f e r e n c e originates from the d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s placed on experience by the common man, Sravaka and Bodhisattva. Vasubandhu has confirmed the suggestion (noted previously at VIII:10) that the'Bodhisattva i n the Buddhafield exercises subsequent awareness (prsthalabdha- jnana). As t h i s i s the awareness whose possessor can c i r c u l a t e f r e e l y throughout the world without being s o i l e d , t h i s i s another i n d i c a t i o n that the Buddhafield i s not some "place" apart from the world. Further, hints that the Buddhafield i s simply the present environment viewed from a revaluating perspective occur at X:35-6," where Asvabhava .affirms that the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of-the alayavijnana y i e l d s the Dharmakaya, while r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the other active vijnanas y i e l d s the Sambhogakaya; and at X:5> where the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the rupakaya i s said to y i e l d sovereignty over the Buddhafield, i . e . , the 166 Buddhafield i s a revaluation of the common world. (.7) which i s the residence of the Tathagata. X:30 . l U [The BuddhafieldH surpasses a l l other arrays (vyuha) because i t i s displayed by the Tathagata's b l e s s i n g . Asvabhava (U^6b5) says that i t surpasses the arrays of the Bodhisattva because i t i s the seat (asana) of the Tathagata's manifestation. These passages, which portray a figu r e seated i n the middle"of a space arranged and b e a u t i f i e d by his. presencej leave no doubt-that the Tathagata has a r e a l i t y apart from the'Bodhisattva, even though the l a t t e r ' s expectation •provides the • form under which he,..beholds the Tathagata. ... Later i n X:30 we f i n d : ' "(••.15'-') whose roads are great memory, i n t e l l i g e n c e and i n s i g h t , (.16) whose vehicles are samatha and vipasyana, (.17) which i s entered through the great doors to l i b e r a t i o n : sunyata and animitta. (.18) which rests upon the arrangement con s i s t i n g of a great jewelled r o y a l lotus ornamented by innumer-able q u a l i t i e s . Like a p h y s i c a l region, the Buddhafield has gates, roads and v e h i c l e s . The gates are the great entries to liberation—sunyata,.animitta,.and passion-l e s s n e s s V The roads are the paths (marga) to l i b e r a t i o n — h e a r i n g , r e f l e c t i o n and meditation. The vehicles are calm (samatha) and i n s i g h t (vipasyana). F i n a l l y , i t rests upon a "great jewelled r o y a l l o t u s " which Asvabhava (U*+"+6bl5-23) says may be either a p h y s i c a l thing or the lotus seat of the Tathagata himself. X:30 (.10) which i s maintained by the j o y f u l t aste of the dharma and great b l i s s , (.11) whose actions are e n t i r e l y f o r the benefit of a l l sentient beings, (.12) which t o t a l l y excludes klesa-induced torments, (.13) which expels a l l maras. Any d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding Asanga's concept of the Buddhafield arises from our preconceptions. The f i r s t preconception.comes from our f a m i l i a r i t y with' the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s placed upon such passages by the Pure Land schools of China and Japan, which regard the Buddhafield as a place reached by pilgrimage, as an a e r i a l region?in which one may be reborn or as a s i t u a t i o n created by meditation. These ideas may be comprehended by regarding the Buddhafield as a symbolic environment i n which both the p h y s i c a l place and the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n are equally and simultaneously.Indicated by the'term' "Buddha-f i e l d . " But such a symbolic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot be applied to Asanga's explana-t i o n „ He gives a highly r a t i o n a l i z e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the Buddhafield which so exhaustively i n t e r p r e t s the myth of the Buddhafield as a b e a u t i f u l dwelling that i t retains l i t t l e of i t s polyvalence. Instead, the d e s c r i p t i o n becomes a d i d a c t i c allegory i n which Buddhafields a r i s e from supremely pure, world-transcending roots; t h e i r roads are great memory, i n t e l l i g e n c e and i n s i g h t ; they are t r a v e l l e d by the vehicles of samatha and vipasyana, and so on.. Even the most basic s p a t i a l question: Where i s the Buddhafield?" i s l e f t dangling. 168 Asvabhava (uU36a9) says that they are "Sukhavati, etc. i n the four d i r e c t i o n s . " However, there i s no other mention i n t h i s text of t h i s notion. The d i d a c t i c nature of X:30 i s underlined by the fac t that Asanga has not applied the same type of hermeneutic as he d i d to the e a r l i e r (11:33) descrip-t i o n of the Buddhafields and residences. There i s l i t t l e need to int e r p r e t the present d e s c r i p t i o n — i t i s i t s e l f an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the myth. i i i . Bodhisattvas—Residents of the Buddhafield The Buddhafield: X:30 (.8) i s the refuge of the Great Bodhisattvas, (.9) i s the promenade of i n f i n i t e numbers of nagas, yaksas, gandharvas, asuras, garudas, kimnaras, mahoragas, manusyas, and amanusyas. The image of the Buddha surrounded by a group of attendants i s a f a m i l i a r scene from the sutras. At X:1.2 the followers are only Bodhisattvas, while at X:35-5 the Sambhogakaya i s surrounded by assemblies of Sravakas, devas, and so on. At X: 30.8-9, Asvabhava (u4^6a21-26) reconciles these by saying that the Buddhafields are r e a l l y inhabited only by the Bodhisattvas who have entered the great bhumis, and who a s s i s t the Tathagata. The remaining i n h a b i t a n t s — the devas, nagas, and so o n — a r e nirmanas, not r e a l aspirants. The question of whether the Sravaka i s , i n any sense, capable of entering a Buddhafield or seeing the Sbk i s not answered i n t h i s text,- However, even i f he can see the Sbk, his Buddha i s the Nk. The Sbk i s the form.related to the Great Bodhi-sattvas . The Bodhisattva perceives the Buddha and h i s environment as a Sambhogakaya i n a Buddhafield. Both are permeated with pleasure (sambhoga: enjoyment; successful love; sexual union) j u s t as the world of the common man or the Sravaka i s pervaded with s u f f e r i n g (duhkha). Even the fact that the c e n t r a l Sbk "dwells" within the f i e l d rather than being "manifested ,'v as was the Nk, i s interpreted as a reference to the aspirant's constant pleasure, rather than as an i n d i c a t i o n of the presence of a subsistent being. This pleasurerls such an important element of the theory that a systematic examination of i t s nature and cause w i l l form an excellent framework within which to examine Asanga's understanding of the Bodhisattva who. experiences i t . Let us f i r s t note that t h i s p l e a s u r e - f i l l e d Buddhafield i s one of the most s u r p r i s i n g innovations to appear within the Buddhist t r a d i t i o n . E a r l i e r thinkers had pictured a world permeated with the misery a r i s i n g from the in d i v i d u a l ' s inveterate tendency to c l i n g to objects generated by r e i f i c a t i o n of experience. Such immediate and l i m i t e d pleasure as might be gained from these pseudo-objects would be more than offset.by the pain, and f r u s t r a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from the i n e v i t a b l e termination of the basic experience. The object of Buddhist p r a c t i c e was seen as the eradication of the misapprehensions that caused the r e i f i c a t i o n . When t h i s p r a c t i c e was successful, the aspirant was beyond s u f f e r i n g and, i n c i d e n t a l l y , beyond pleasure. Suddenly, the Vijnanavada presents, along with, t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l model, the notion that the Bodhisattva enjoys pleasure rather than abandoning both pleasure and pain as he nears enlightenment. How can Asanga hold that the Bodhisattva simultaneously experiences pleasure and abandons pleasure? We cnannot avoid the problem by the f a c i l e assumption that "pleasure i n the Buddhafield" denotes a Bodhisattva-emotion which i s forever beyond the grasp of ordinary man. Statements of that type are c l e a r l y l a b e l l e d "profound" 170 (gambhira), a l a b e l not attached to these pleasures. Asanga i s attempting to construct a r a t i o n a l system, and his ideas must be given a l o g i c a l i n t e r -p r etation. At f i r s t reading, the Mahayanasamgraha might appear to contain a symbolic 83 arrangement such as that frequently found i n l a t e r Indo-Tibetan works, which would explain the contradiction: the aspirant abandons the three basic klesas i n reverse order, i . e . , he f i r s t abandons revulsion-misery, then d e s i r e -pleasure, and f i n a l l y nescience-dullness. The aspirant who was o r i g i n a l l y dominated by misery moves to a s i t u a t i o n dominated by pleasure. This c e r t a i n l y would be i n accord with the move of the aspirant to the Buddhafield. It would reduce the pleasures of the Buddhafield to a s p e c i a l case of the older theory, i . e . , the Bodhisattva has simply not yet abandoned them. However, i n t h i s pattern the text would then show him moving to a s i t u a t i o n dominated by d u l l -ness, and then to f u l l enlightenment. The Mahayanasamgraha does not mention the dullness, and the f u l l enlightenment i s not simply a further stage. In addition, the pleasures of the Buddhafield are obviously not the r e s u l t of l i n g e r i n g k l e s a s — t h e y are healthy, p o s i t i v e f a c t o r s . Therefore t h i s expla-nation f a i l s . I suggest that the problem can be resolved by viewing the concept of pleasure within the basic trisvabhava framework of the Mahayanas amgraha. That i s , both common man and Bodhisattva are constantly engaged i n perceptual 'situations that may be analyzed'through the same c a t e g o r i e s — t h e skandhas. These include the vedanaskandha'- (feeling-tone) of which pleasure i s one possible aspect. '-The' difference i s that the common man-reifies his • exper-iences and.finds himself within"a f i e l d of f i x e d external objects that dominate his existence. The Bodhisattva may be said to share the same basic 171 experience, but i n a reoriented manner. He sees through the nature (which i s that of mere idea, v i j n a p t i ) of. the experience by his non-conceptual awareness (jnana or nirvikalpajnana), and so inhabits a world of creative p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Rather than being driven by imaginary external objects, he himself creates, or exercises sovereignty over, the world. Both may experience pleasure but, while the common man experiences i t as an inherent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of c e r t a i n t r a n s i t o r y objects, the Bodhisattva experiences i t as a phenomenon which he can maintain. I s h a l l now v e r i f y the above s o l u t i o n by examining relevant passages of the t e x t . As these are scattered throughout the Mahayanasamgraha, they w i l l be abstracted and arranged under the following headings: Pleasure, Reorientation, Sovereignty, Awareness, Pleasure and the Other, Pleasure and the Bodhisattva's Maturation. Pleasure The Bodhisattva's pleasure i s defined as "the enjoyment of the Mahayana dharma" (X:1.2). This has both an obvious and a subtle sense. The obvious gloss i s given by Asvabhava (.U*+36a9-12) as the enjoyment of the jewels, etc., i n the Buddhafield and the pleasure of discussing and understanding the Mahayana text s . This must be intended for those with a l i t e r a l concept of the Buddhafield. The "jewels" are the contents of the Buddhafield, and are seen as valuable just as the "objects" of the common world are valueless. The pleasures of discussing and understanding the teachings are almost c e r t a i n l y an i d e a l i z a t i o n of the f a m i l i a r monastic delight i n the evening discussion between master and d i s c i p l e s . Neither of these rather l i t e r a l explanations i s c e n t r a l or i s developed further. 172 The subtle sense i s r e a l i z e d when we r e c a l l that by "the Mahayana" Asanga means his trisvabhava-based doctrine, and that chapters II-IV teach that understanding the doctrine and being able to understand one's world i n the reoriented way i t describes are equivalent. Therefore, enjoyment of the Mahayana dharma i s equivalent to seeing the world i n a reoriented manner. Reorientation X:5.2 By r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the vedanaskandha i t Cthe Sbk] attains sovereignty over irreproachable, immeasurable, immensely pleasant residences. Both Vasubandhu (Bh372a3) and Asvabhava (U^38a2) agree that the residence i s "immensely" {J^jf ) pleasant because i t "transcends" ( fcji ) the pleasures of the three worlds. That i s , the Bodhisattva also experiences any perception as p a i n f u l , pleasurable or i n d i f f e r e n t but, because he sees through i t s nature, he evaluates i t d i f f e r e n t l y . Unlike the ordinary i n d i v i d u a l within "the three worlds," the Bodhisattva does not ascribe these fee l i n g s to some external object and hence his pleasure i s not l i m i t e d by the caprice of such an object. He exercises sovereignty which i s "immense" and "transcendent." Sovereignty Sovereignty (yibhutva) and mastery (vasita) both imply a r e v e r s a l of r e l a t i o n s h i p s within a l i f e , rather than-the abandonment of any maj-or aspect of a r e l a t i o n s h i p . In the most general sense, the "drivenness" i s replaced by " c o n t r o l , " even i f the actual actions are i d e n t i c a l . For example, the Bodhisattva abandons l i f e of h i s own free w i l l rather than being "taken" by death; he i s able to choose the sta t i o n of r e b i r t h rather than being driven to a womb; he i s able to perceive accurately and minister e f f e c -t i v e l y instead of being gripped by misapprehensions and preached to by others. The most important such r e v e r s a l i s connected with the Bodhisattva's vow to work for the welfare of others. The common man, working for h i s own worldly gain, i s permeated with misery. The Sravaka, working f o r h i s own s p i r i t u a l b e n e f i t , becomes free from misery. But the Bodhisattva, working for the s p i r i t u a l welfare of others (X:7.6; X:10; X:12; X:29-5; X:37), i s permeated with pleasure. While the common man.or Sravaka s t r i v e s t o ingest.desirable aspects of his environment, the Bodhisattva donates these to others. The former a c t i v i t y engenders s u f f e r i n g ; the l a t t e r , pleasure. The idea that the worlds of the Bodhisattva and of the common man are mirror-images suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Bodhisattva's pleasure i s the an t i t h e s i s of the common man's s u f f e r i n g . Such an idea would be very conven-i e n t , f o r , while the pleasures -of• the Buddhafield are discussed i n general, oblique, and symbolic terms, s u f f e r i n g (duhkha)—in p a r t i c u l a r , the famous dictum " a l l that is:'Impermanent i s suff e r i n g " (yad - anityam tad duhkham)—has been treated very d i r e c t l y and exhaustively i n the Abhidharma l i t e r a t u r e . Therefore, we should expect t h i s l i t e r a t u r e to further our understanding of the Bodhisattva's pleasure. This l i n e of thought leads to a f a s c i n a t i n g consideration. Were we to view the question of the Bodhisattva's pleasure i n a s t r i c t Abhidharmic frame of reference ( i . e . , not invoking the trisvabhava), i t could be rephrased as follows: The Bodhisattva must have the same i n d i v i d u a l experiences, either pleasant or p a i n f u l , as does the common man. The o v e r a l l tone, however, i s pleasant. How can t h i s be? How can a s p e c i f i c p a i n f u l experience have an o v e r a l l pleasant tone? The i n t e r e s t i n g thing about t h i s question i s that i t i s a mirror-image of the actual Abhidharma question regarding misery. How can l i f e , which has both pleasant and p a i n f u l experiences, be said to be permeated with suffering? The answer of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (also a t t r i b u t e d to Asanga) may be summarized as follows. Various s p e c i f i c instances of misery or s u f f e r i n g (duhkhaduhkhata) are concomitants to common experiences. However, t h i s ex-perience i s not s u f f e r i n g as such, but i s only, one l i m i t e d - aspect.of a broader, phenomenon: " s u f f e r i n g o f i a l l conditioned existence" (samskaraduhkhata). B. K. M a t i l a l has described t h i s as the "anguish of the human heart caused by 8h our constant awareness of lack of freedom." Since both pleasure and s u f f e r i n g are f e e l i n g s that r e s u l t from the primary processes, they need not be understood.as t i g h t l o g i c a l concepts. The joy which an i n d i v i d u a l may occasionally f e e l need not in v a l i d a t e the statement that his l i f e i s permeated with misery (or anguish), nor i s i t necessary to deny the s i m i l a r i t y between the momentary joy and the pervasive, anguish. If t h i s way of understanding misery i s applied to the Bodhisattva's • . pleasure, the l a t t e r i s seen as a thoroughgoing enjoyment of the Buddhafield, d i f f e r e n t only i n degree from common pleasure. I can f i n d no passages i n the Mahayanasamgraha which would r u l e out such an understanding, and many t a c i t l y support i t . For example, i n the desc r i p t i o n of the Buddhafield at X:30.12-13, Asanga says that i t i s free from a l l the torments caused by klesas and that a l l the maras are expelled. This does not nec e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e an absence of pain caused by the automatic emotional reactions (klesas). Asvabhava (U^l+8b3) says that everything associatedtwith fear, i . e . , klesamara, rskandhamara, mrtyumara (death) and devaputramara (the d e v i l ) , i s expelled. Again, while 1 7 5 pain may be present, i t does not engender d r i v i n g fear. Notice that we have been able to explain the pleasure i n Abhidharmic terms, without recourse to the trisvabhava. Thus, both the trisvabhava explanation and our Abhidharma-derived view show the close connection between ordinary pleasure and the pleasure of the Buddhafield, and stress the concept of sovereignty as the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g f a c t o r . Awareness (inana or nirvikalpajnana) An examination of the l o g i c a l status of the pleasurable experience reveals s t i l l more features. As we have seen, t h i s text does not contain an ontology. Asanga regards any s i t u a t i o n as an experience formed by a complex preconscious process ( c a l l e d "dependent upon another," paratantra). The experience can appear only as the experience of a subject who completes i t by taking a c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e , thus assigning to i t some p a r t i c u l a r status. I f the observer i s a commoner or Sravaka, the experience i s r e i f i e d into an "awareness of" (vi-jnana) some t o t a l l y imaginary ( p a r i k a l p i t a ) object. I f he i s a Bodhisattva, he sees through the nature of the experience and so has a "non-conceptual awareness" ( n i r v i k a l p a - j nana) without any o n t o l o g i c a l referent, i . e . , i t i s "perfected" (parinispanna). We can i n f e r that the Bodhisattva's pleasurable perceptions are the non-conceptual awareness, and that descriptions of the l a t t e r w i l l also be i n d i r e c t descriptions of the former. This inference i s upheld by X : 7 - 3 : CThe Svk involves the a t t r i b u t e ofH "residence" because from the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the l i f e of desire, etc., the immeasurable "awareness" (jnana) residence i s obtained. Chapter VIII, which appears to he the c h i e f passage i n Vijnanavada  sastras devoted to the n i r v i k a l p a j nana, i s p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l . I t l i s t s three types of n i r v i k a l p a j nana: — the preparatory n i r v i k a l p a j nana (prayogika°), the attainment of which enables the aspirant to enter the Nirmanakaya assembly. — the fundamental n i r v i k a l p a j nana (mula°)—often simply c a l l e d n i r v i k a l p a j nana or even jnana—the attainment of which enables the aspirant to enter the Sambhogakaya assembly or Buddhafield. — the subsequent nirvikalpajfiana (prsthalabdha° ) which i s developed by the Bodhisattva within the Buddhafield, and which enables him to c i r c u l a t e i n the world without being stained. The notion of the subsequent nirvikalpajnana has been noted previously when examining the way i n which the Dk may be obtained. The basic passage i s worth repeating: 111:12 . . . the subsequent awareness,.which sees-everything a r i s i n g from the alayavijnana and merely mental appearances to be l i k e an i l l u s i o n , arises by i t s very nature free from misap-prehensions. Thus, just as a magician i s free from misappre-hensions about the r e a l i t y of things he has created, so the Bodhisattva, although speaking of causes and e f f e c t s , i s always free from misapprehensions about them. Furthermore, we have also seen (at X-,30.5 and . 6 ) that the Buddhafield arises from supremely wholesome world-transcending roots (.which Vasubandhu i d e n t i f i e s as fundamental and subsequent nirvikalpajnana), and that i t may be characterized as very e f f i c a c i o u s and very pure v i j n a p t i • 177 These passages leave no doubt that, despite the negative form of the term nirvikalpajnana, the Bodhisattva's awareness ("subsequent"- nirvikalpajnana) -" i s not a mental blankness or an i n e f f a b l e state. It i s the perception of an environment which, although i t may have the same form as that perceived by the common man, i s understood to be simply a transient experience rather than a binding and oppressing assemblage of objects. This conclusion suggests that the pleasure experienced by the Bodhisattva i s connected with h i s awareness of freedom. I f misery r e s u l t s from a percep-t i o n of oneself as driven within a world of objects, then pleasure r e s u l t s from a perception of oneself as being i n a c o n t r o l l i n g p o s i t i o n within a f i e l d of experiences.. Reversing M a t i l a l ' s d e f i n i t i o n of duhkha gives an equally good des c r i p t i o n of pleasure: the joy of the human heart caused by our constant awareness of the presence of freedom. Pleasure and the Other The previous discussion notwithstanding, there i s s t i l l something odd about applying such an apparently egocentric f e e l i n g as pleasure to a non-egocentric phenomenon. This objection disappears before the r e a l i z a t i o n that the Bodhisattva's p l e a s u r e i i s not s e l f i s h but i s the pleasure taken i n the l i b e r a t i o n of both s e l f and others.. The key to further information i s the note at Prastavana: 3.10 which states that the Bodhisattva simultaneously enters the Buddhafields and f i r s t great bhumi, the j o y f u l (pramudita) bhumi. Therefore, a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s bhumi w i l l also describe the Bodhisattva's pleasure. The Vijnanavadin doctrine of the bhumis finds i t s c l a s s i c a l statement i n the Dasabhumikasutra. That t e x t , the Mahayanasutralamkara (XX-XXII, 32) and the Mahayanasamgraha (V:2) a l l agree that: 178 V:2.1 [The pramud.itabhumi takes i t s name from the fact that thereD . . . one obtains, for the f i r s t time, the a b i l i t y to assure both h i s own personal welfare and that of others. Asvabhava (ul+2^al8-23) adds that the Sravaka, working only for h i s own welfare, obtains a clear i n s i g h t (abhisamaya) but does not and never w i l l f e e l joy, whereas the Bodhisattva experiences joy which w i l l continue u n t i l f u l l enlightenment i s reached. It i s tempting to suppose that the former i s the basic n i r v i k a l p a j nana and the l a t t e r i s the subsequent n i r v i k a l p a j nana, but there i s no r e a l support fo r t h i s assumption. Note that Asanga i s not suggesting that the Sravaka takes pleasure i n h i s own l i b e r a t i o n while the Bodhisattva takes pleasure i n the l i b e r a t i o n of others, an idea which would require the Sravaka to f e e l pleasure and the Bodhisattva e g o c e n t r i c a l l y to "evaluate h i s experiences d i f f e r e n t l y from those of others. Both of these ideas are r e j e c t e d i n the text. The Bodhisattva f e e l s pleasure i n h i s perception of both himself and others as l i b e r a t e d . The Bodhisattva has vowed to e s t a b l i s h a new pattern of l i f e based upon an a l t r u i s t i c regard for others. While t h i s i s described i n chapter IV, i t Is e a s i l y overlooked i n the present context. At X:30.8, Asvabhava (uU"+6a23) says that the Bodhisattva " a s s i s t s " the Tathagata, and at VII:5 t h i s assistance i s described: " . . . CThe Bodhisattva,! while r e s i d i n g i n meditative b l i s s , takes b i r t h where he wishes." Pleasure and the Bodhisattva's Maturation The Bodhisattva's pleasure has been pictured as an epiphenomenon a r i s i n g from his engagement with h i s world. This impression i s contradicted by the commentators who, i n several passages (e.g., P:3.10, Bh323a25-29; U38lcl7-20), i n s i s t that the pleasure i s i t s e l f instrumental i n the Bodhisattva's maturation, 179 or i n the c o l l e c t i o n or p e r f e c t i o n of h i s equipment (samhhara). At X: 30.10 Asvabhava (Ul+U6a27) says that i n the pure Buddhafield the joy and pleasure i n the taste of the Mahayana dharma serves as food, and at X:8 (uU39b5) that i n each universe the "enjoyment of the taste of the dharma" i s s p e c i a l . The same point i s made i n d i r e c t l y at X:6.3, where Asvabhava (uU38clU-15) comments, " . . . the Bodhisattvas who have entered the great bhumis do not need to see the Buddha's Nirmanakaya i n order to be matured,' because they themselves penetrate the profound and extensive dharma." The equivalence of the "penetrating ( i . e . , understanding) the dharma" and of-the Bodhisattva's pleasant awareness has been noted. The concept of pleasure cannot be f u l l y understood u n t i l the mechanism whereby i t assures the Bodhisattva's maturation has been accounted f o r . The fact that the Mahayanasamgraha does not explain i t d i r e c t l y indicates that Asanga had some straightforward concept i n mind, probably that the pleasure i s simply the motive for the Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s . The Mahayanasamgraha maps the Bodhisattva's progress within the Buddhafield into ten stages (bhumis, chapter V), which the Bodhisattva ascends as he develops the s i x facets of a l t r u i s t i c p e r sonality (paramitas, chapter IV). It mentions the vow by which t h i s a l t r u i s t i c a c t i v i t y i s di r e c t e d and channelled. What i t does not mention i s the motivation required by any model of goal-oriented a c t i v i t y . The common man's motivation i s the pleasure and s u f f e r i n g that drive him through h i s l i v e s . In the Sravaka, the motive force i s the confidence (sraddha) and a s p i r a t i o n (adhimukti) i n s p i r e d by his encounter with the Nirmanakaya. It seems reasonable that the Bodhisattva's motive for continual p r a c t i c e of the paramitas i s the increasing joy which i s present from the f i r s t bhumi onward. 180 e. The Three Kayas: In t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s The essence of the t r i k a y a doctrine l i e s i n the way i n which each member i s r e l a t e d to each of the others. Only a few passages address t h i s question d i r e c t l y . They are: P:3.10 The three types of Buddhakaya: Svabhavikakaya, Sambho-gakaya and Nirmanakaya, are the -awareness-result of-these [Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s ] . Both commentaries explain t h i s by a succinct preview of the t r i k a y a doctrine. Vasubandhu (,Bh 323a22-b4) says, The t r i p l e Buddhakaya i s c a l l e d the 'aware r e s u l t ' (phalajnana)—'result' because i t i s the r e s u l t of the p r e v i -ously mentioned p r a c t i c e s , and 'aware r e s u l t ' because t h i s r e s u l t i s aware. [Thus,] i t s basic nature (svabhava) i s to be 'the aware r e s u l t of these.' Now i f there were no Svabhavikakaya [T: " i f there were no svabhava ], there would be no Dharmakaya—this i s s i m i l a r to the caksurindriya. I f there were no Dharmakaya, there would be no Sambhogakaya—this i s s i m i l a r to the caksurvi- jnana. In t h i s simile the support and the supported should be considered as equals. I f there were no Sambhogakaya, the Bodhisattvas would not enjoy the pleasure of the dharma a f t e r entering the great bhumis. Without t h i s pleasure t h e i r equipment f o r enlighten-ment would not be p e r f e c t e d — t h i s i s s i m i l a r to the rupa [bh: " s i m i l a r to not seeing the rupa"]. I f there were no Nirmanakaya, the Bodhisattvas on the adhlmukti-practi.cing bhumi, and the Sravakas, etc. of l e s s e r adhimukti, would f a i l ' from the very f i r s t to .'leave the stations of r e b i r t h ( g a t i ) . ' Therefore, i t i s established that there must be three kayas. VIII:10 [This passage on the r e t r i b u t i o n of the n i r v i k a l p a j nana has already been included under both Nirmanakaya and 181 Sambhogakaya. Vasubandhu (Bh 365all+) adds that both kayas are the outflows (nisyanda) of the n i r v i k a l p a j nana. I f the Dharmakaya (or Svabhavikakaya) i s i d e n t i f i e d with the nirvikalpajnana, we now have the r e l a t i o n of "outflow" between i t and the other two kayas. This term i s not as simple as i t appears, since i t cannot imply temporal p r i o r i t y and s t i l l be consistent with VIII:13, below. 1 VIII:13 The terminus of the Bodhisattva's n i r v i k a l p a j nana i s the a c q u i s i t i o n of the three pure Buddhakayas and highest sovereignty (vasita)» Vasubandhu (Bh 365b7-9) and Asvabhava (U^31al0-ll) agree that the three are obtained on the f i r s t bhumi, but that they become "pure" only on the tenth. This surely eliminates any p o s s i b i l i t y that one might be acquired p r i o r to the others. The commentators also i d e n t i f y the sovereignty with those sovereignties whose svalaksana i s discussed l a t e r , presumably at X:3.2. X:1.2 The Sambhogakaya depends upon (brten-pa; ) the Dharmakaya . . . because i t experiences the very pure Buddhafields and the enjoyment of the Mahayana dharma. Asvabhava (U^36a6) explains that "depends upon" means that "because of the existence of a, Dharmakaya, a Sambhogakaya i s 'obtained." X:1.3 The Nirmanakaya depends upon the Dharmakaya because i t manifests Cthe various Buddha a c t i v i t i e s 3 . 182 X:5 [This passage was quoted e a r l i e r . Each of the skandhas, when reoriented, becomes an aspect of the Dharmakaya. Two of them are relevant to the t r i k a y a question:: X:5.1 By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the rupaskandha, i t Cthe Dharmakaya1 obtains sovereignty over the Buddhafield, the body, the laksanas, the minor mark(s), the i n f i n i t y of phonemes and the i n v i s i b l e c r a n i a l marks, From t h i s we might conclude that a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the rupaskandha y i e l d s the Sambhogakaya and associated Buddhafields, etc. However, both Vasubandhu (Bh 371c24-29) and Asvabhava (U^37c22-29) say that the "body" i s manifested i n various great assemblies according to the p a r t i c u l a r c apacities of the sentient beings to be taught. I f the Sambhogakaya i s -visible only to the Bodhisattva, then t h i s passage may also r e f e r to the Nirmanakaya. X:5 -^ [Reorientation of the samskaraskandha r e s u l t s i n sover-eignty over: . . . nirmana, transformation, convening the great assemblies, and c o l l e c t i n g white dharmas. This would appear to ind i c a t e the Nirmanakaya, but again the commentators do not support such a view. They explain these as the Buddha's a b i l i t i e s to create, transform, etc., as desired, but do not l i n k these a b i l i t i e s more d i r e c t l y to the Nk. X :6 How many things does the Dharmakaya support? (1) I t i s the support f o r the various Buddha residences. . . (2) It [the Dk: i s the support for the various Sambhogakayas because i t assures the maturation of the Bodhisattvas. 183 The Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n (U*+38clO-ll) of the key portion of the Asvabhava commentary d i f f e r s from the Tibetan (u337b2). The Chinese says that the Dharmakaya i s the adhipatipratyaya for the transformation into a Sambhogakaya, but not i n the same way that the sun supports i t s rays. The Tibetan says: "The Dharmakaya i s the support for the Sambhogakaya. I f i t Cthe Dharmakaya! e x i s t s , then i t manifests Cthe Sambhogakaya!. This i s l i k e the sun and i t s rays." It i s probably unwise to conclude anything beyond the simple fact that the Sbk i B p r i m a r i l y dependent upon the Dk. (3) I t i s the support for the various Nirmanakayas because i t p r i n c i p a l l y assures the maturation of the Sravakas. X:37 . . . both the nisyandakaya Ci.e., the Sambhogakaya! and the Nirmanakaya depend upon the eternal Dharmakaya . . . Calthough i n d i f f e r e n t ways!. In these passages, the key term i s obviously "dependence." The Sbk and Nk each "depend upon" or "are supported by" the Dk, but do not depend upon each other. We should note i n passing that t h i s eliminates any p o s s i b i l i t y that the Dk (or Svk) i s the .real^transcendent Euddha^wha^msnif est.s a- Sbk which i n turn manifests a worldly Nk_. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of both Nk and Sbk i s d i r e c t l y to the Dk. The most important clue to a proper understanding of the dependence r e l a t i o n s h i p i s Asvabhava's commentary to P:3.10 i n which he compares the kayas to the perceptual t r i a d : rupa-caksurindriya-caksurvijnana. Unfortunately, i t i s not c l e a r which factor i s being likened to which kaya, and the d e t a i l s are very ambiguous. However, I f t h i s simile simply means that the r e l a t i o n s h i p 181* between the kayas should be understood i n the same way as that between the perceptual elements,':the d e t a i l s are superfluous. It i s based upon the Abhidharmic analysis of a moment of r e l a t i o n a l existence i n t o : an epistemic object (in the case of v i s i o n , the rupa), an epistemic subject (the f a c u l t y of v i s i o n or caksurindriya), and the awareness a r i s i n g from t h e i r conjunction (the caksurvijnana). Most the o r e t i c i a n s accepted the subject and object as dharmas ( i . e . , components found at a f i n a l l e v e l of analysis) and did not attempt to go further than saying that the j u x t a p o s i t i o n of subject and object gave r i s e to awareness. The j u x t a p o s i t i o n was explained by other factors i n the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n , such as habits and memories. The simile must mean that we should adopt a s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e to the three kayas. Instead of searching for the mechanism by which three d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s are r e l a t e d , we should regard them as abstractions from a single given s i t u a t i o n c a l l e d Buddhahood or Dk. The reasons for p o s i t i n g the three, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them, become equivalent questions to be answered by reference to t h e i r power of explaining s p e c i f i c aspects of the t o t a l group of phenomena termed "Dk." Thus, the statement that the Nk and Sbk "depend upon" the Dk points to the l a r g e r s i t u a t i o n within which each of them makes sense. This l i n e of reasoning i s exactly the one followed at X : l : ". . . because i t experiences the very pure Buddhafields . . . because i t manifests . . . because i t p r i n c i p a l l y assures the maturation of the Bodhisattvas . . . because i t p r i n c i p a l l y assures the maturation of the Sravakas. . . .." The Asvabhava commentary to X :6 .2 may support t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n even more e x p l i c i t l y , but t e x t u a l problems, including wide divergences between the Chinese and Tibetan versions, render i t suspect. 185 i . Nirmanakaya and Sambhogakaya Compared The question of r e l a t i o n s h i p s can be seen more c l e a r l y i f Asanga's ideas about the Nk and Sbk are summarized and compared. The f i r s t s i m i l a r i t y i s that both are ways i n which the Buddha appears to a c e r t a i n class of observers, rather than being aspects or parts of the Buddha. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s v a l i d a t e d by the fact that both exhibit the same three basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as do the Dk or the Svk, i . e . , each i s the r e s u l t of c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e s , each can be described as an awareness, and each exhibits sovereignty. That i s , the Sbk r e s u l t s from the p r a c t i c e s by which the aspirant perfects hi s non-conceptual awareness. Like the Svk, the Sbk i s an "awareness" rather than a concrete object. This i s ' i m p l i c i t i n the previous point and e x p l i c i t at X:35»6(u). F i n a l l y , l i k e the Svk, the Sbk exercises sovereignty, which involves the joy or pleasure aroused i n the Bodhisattva (P:3.10; X:1.2; X:30.10; X:3l), and which ensures h i s maturation (P:3.10; X:6.2). Like the Svk, the Sbk i s eternal because t h i s maturing a c t i v i t y does not cease (X:3l). The s i x differences between the Svk and the Sbk l i s t e d at X:35 amount to one p o i n t — t h e Sbk, unlike the Svk, appears i n a series of s p e c i f i c determinate forms depending upon s p e c i f i c circumstances. The passages describing the Nk are very s i m i l a r i n form and may be grouped under the same three main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Like the Sbk,. i t r e s u l t s from two types of p r a c t i c e s : those by the Buddha and those by the aspirant. However, the l a t t e r are not r e a l l y Bodhisattva practices i n s o f a r as they are accom-pl i s h e d by Sravakas or low-level Bodhisattvas. The action of the Buddha, not of the aspirant, i s emphasized. The Nk_ and Sbk both appear i n s i t u a t i o n s where both the Buddha, who has vowed to a i d a l l sentient beings, and a sentient being who i s prepared to 186 accept such assistance, are present. The Buddha's vow remains the same i n each case, but the stage of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s progress e l i c i t s e i t h e r a Nk or a Sbk. The various passages examined generally agree that the Nk appears only to the Sravakas and to the adhimukticaryabhumi Bodhisattvas (novice Bodhisattvas on the f i r s t and lowest Bodhisattva l e v e l ) . X : l 6 , the only passage which might be read as suggesting that ordinary beings who are not Bodhisattvas may see the Nk, i s glossed by Asvabhava as a reference to those who, sooner or l a t e r , w i l l see the Nk (presumably as Sravakas). A major problem arises from the differences between the information i n chapter VIII and chapter X. In V I I I : 1 0 - l U the Bodhisattvas who are "preparing" t h e i r nirvikalpajnana—who l i s t e n to others explain the non-conceptual ( n i r v i - kalpa ) character of things but cannot see i t d i r e c t l y themselves—are s a i d to be reborn i n the Nk assembly. The Bodhisattvas who have perfected t h e i r n i r v i k a l p a j nana—who have personally grasped the t r u t h of t h i s d o c t r i n e — a r e reborn i n the Sbk assembly. On the other hand, at X:2T Asvabhava (U^ll3a23 - 2 6 ) says that the Dk is:" i n v i s i b l e to gods and men, the Nk i s manifested i n ( These two versions must be based e i t h e r upon d i f f e r e n t theories or upon d i f f e r e n t viewpoints. Since the Mahayanasamgraha i s reasonably free of contradictions, I believe that the difference i s one of viewpoint. VIII : 1 0 i s a mythical statement of an omniscient narrator recounting, from some detached cosmic standpoint, the place of each i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e b i r t h . The viewpoint of chapter I, on the contrary, i s that of an ordinary man f o r whom the Nk appears to "enter" the world as a pro j e c t i o n from somewhere outside. The Sbk assembly, on the other hand, i s i t s e l f outside t h i s commonplace world and i t s aspirant i s seen to move toward i t . ) the assembly. 187 The Sbk affords a more complex s i t u a t i o n . The aspirant sees not only the Sbk, but an e n t i r e transformed environment i n which he i s able to hear or receive the Buddha-word from which he attains an understanding which involves pleasure. This pleasure encourages him to continue p r a c t i c i n g the paramitas and i n t h i s way helps perfect a l i f e dedicated to the welfare of others. Exactly what the aspirant must do to enter the Buddhaland i s unclear. In chapter VIII Asanga suggests that he i s reborn there. The idea, known i n l a t e r p r a c t i c e , that the Buddhaland i s entered during meditation i s not 85 contradicted i n the Mahayanasamgraha. F i n a l l y , the t r a d i t i o n that a f t e r many years of r i t u a l p r a c t i c e Asanga was taken to the T u s i t a heaven and taught by Maitreya may also be relevant. i i . The Trikaya and the C l a s s i c a l Problems Many developments i n Buddhology appear to have been forced by the need to resolve c e r t a i n basic contradictions i n the concept of the Buddha. The most ubiquitous of these can be considered to be the " c l a s s i c a l " problems. They are: — One Buddha, or many Buddhas? — Is the Buddha mortal, or- immortal? — Does the Buddha remain i n nirvana, or not? As the i n t e l l e c t u a l horizons of the early Buddhist thinkers expanded and the implications of t h e i r basic dogmas became better understood, e a r l i e r attempts to set aside such questions or to provide simple answers were seen as inadequate. It became clear that these questions c a l l e d for a d e s c r i p t i o n of a transcendent Buddha i n worldly terms. A s a t i s f a c t o r y answer must be mediated 188 by a frame of reference which w i l l allow the ambiguity inherent i n t h i s concept. As the t r i k a y a i s the fundamental Buddhology of the Mahayanasamgrahawe should expect that Asanga and h i s commentators would have applied i t to these ques-t i o n s . In the following section, I s h a l l examine t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n and, from i t s e f fectiveness, attempt to judge the degree to which such questions might have encouraged the development of t h i s concept. One Buddha, or Many Buddhas? A l l Buddhist t r a d i t i o n s share a common myth of successive Buddhas, each t r a i n i n g a d i s c i p l e who, upon reaching Buddhahood, t r a i n s another. This myth rai s e s the u n i t y / p l u r a l i t y problems that a r i s e from one basic dilemma. On the one hand, "Buddha" i s a c e r t a i n c l u s t e r of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I t makes no sense to speak of more than one. It i s a s i n g l e concept applied when an i n d i v i d u a l has become coterminous with t h i s i d e a l . On the other hand, although the Buddhist cannot speak of a p l u r a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a state known as Buddha-hood, he can and does speak of the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and practices of various i n d i v i d u a l s who have reached Buddhahood. It seems unreasonable to deny any sense of p l u r a l i t y to the r e s u l t i n g Buddha(s). Note that t h i s i s a p e c u l i a r l y Buddhist problem. In almost a l l other systems of thought a d i s t i n c t i o n between the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s must be maintained. No matter what set of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s the i n d i v i d u a l acquired, the "one, or many".problem could be solved simply by counting the i n d i v i d u a l s i n the class of those possessing the set of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In the Buddhist system, which recognizes no i n d i v i d u a l apart from his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , an aspirant who has s u c c e s s f u l l y taken on those of Buddha i s "Buddha"—totally. Most Buddhist thinkers have solved the problem by recognizing a Buddha 189 possessing two aspects. For example, i n Abhidharmakosa, v i i : 3 U the question, "Are the Buddhas s i m i l a r to each other?" receives the reply, "The Buddhas are si m i l a r with regard to equipment for enlightenment, Dharmakaya, and the service of sentient beings. They are d i s s i m i l a r with regard to the length of l i f e , caste, height, and so on." The subsequent commentary implies a t h r e e - f o l d Buddha: a Dharmakaya and i t s v i s i b l e aspect c a l l e d the rupakaya (which are i d e n t i c a l f o r a l l Buddhas), and the appearance of the i n d i v i d u a l who eventually reaches Buddhahood (which d i f f e r s from one Buddha to another). This argument i s adopted and expanded i n the Mahayanasamgraha: X:8 Is i t necessary to say that the Dharmakayas of Buddhas are d i f f e r e n t or not d i f f e r e n t ? As t h e i r support, i n t e n t i o n , and actions do not d i f f e r , we must say that they are not d i f f e r e n t . But, insofar as innumerable persons reach enlightenment, we must say that they do d i f f e r . What has been s a i d about the Dharmakaya may also be applied to the Sambhogakayas. As t h e i r intentions and a c t i v i t i e s are not d i f f e r e n t , then we must say that they are not d i f f e r e n t . But as t h e i r supports are d i f f e r e n t , they are not non-different because innumerable supports appear. 'The preceding remarks on the Sambhogakaya also apply to the Nirmanakaya. Asvabhava (Ul*39a25-b6) explains that the "support" (for the Dk) i s tathata; i t s " i n t e n t i o n " i s the in t e n t i o n to work for the be n e f i t of a l l 190 sentient beings; and i t s "actions" are the various Buddha-activities. The supports that d i f f e r f o r the Nk and Sbk are the Buddhafields, the assemblies, the s i z e of bodies, and so on. X:3i3 [The Dharmakaya i s characterized by a non-duality] of p l u r a l i t y and unity because, Eon the'one hand,! the support of a l l the Buddhas i s not d i f f e r e n t i a b l e , ' [while, on the other,! innumerable streams of existence are enlightened. Two stanzas develop t h i s point. These are bext expressed by a paraphrase based upon Asvabhava's commentary: In the case of a Dharmakaya, no element i n the cognitive process i s i d e n t i f i e d as more fundamental than the others, i . e . , as an " I " or a " s e l f . " Therefore, no d i v i s i o n i n t o " i " and "other," or i n t e r i o r and ex t e r i o r occurs. Since no s e l f and no d i v i s i o n i s recognized, and the Dharmakaya c e r t a i n l y i s hot seen; as a s e l f , then there i s no reason to speak of several Dharmakayas. However, from a worldly viewpoint, many.individuals appear to have reached Buddhahood. Therefore., we must also say that there are multiple Dharmakayas. The second stanza (drawn from Mahayanasutralamkara IX:77) o f f e r s a series 8 6 of reasons to r e j e c t the "one, or many" choice. The f i r s t reason i s based on the concept of gotra o r . s p i r i t u a l lineage. As t h i s i s a complex passage, I w i l l paraphrase: There are two types of l i n e a g e s — i n n a t e and acquired. When we regard only the f i r s t , we can say that because the same inborn tendencies lead to enlightenment, the r e s u l t i s the same. However, the acquired lineage which depends on the . s p i r i t u a l guide, etc., i s of d i f f e r e n t types and l o g i c a l l y should give r i s e to d i f f e r e n t Buddhas. It i s inadmissible to maintain only that there i s one Buddha, because: — i f only one Buddha arri v e d at enlightenment, the pra c t i c e s 191 of h i s fellow Bodhisattvas would he i n vain, an inadmis-s i b l e conclusion. — there must be more than one Buddha i n order to lead various types of beings to enlightenment. — i t i s always necessary for a Bodhisattva to p r a c t i c e under a Buddha, who must himself have previously p r a c t i c e d under a Buddha. Thus, there must be a m u l t i p l i c i t y of Buddhas. On.the other hand, we cannot simply say that there i s a m u l t i p l i c i t y of Buddhas because the "immaculate" ( i n the sense that i t destroys adventitious stains) support or dharmadhatu cannot contain d i f f e r e n t Buddhas. X:33 I f the Dharmakayas of a l l Buddhas are the same, why do we speak of many Buddhas? This question i s answered i n a stanza: CWe say there i s one BuddhaD because there are not two Buddhas i n the same world. CHowever,_i because innumer-able [BodhisattvasI f i n i s h c o l l e c t i n g t h e i r equipment at the same time, because Cthe idea ofl an orderly progression Cof Buddhas! a r r i v i n g at enlightenment i s inadmissible, we a f f i r m the p l u r a l i t y of Buddhas. The preceding passages a l l o f f e r s i m i l a r arguments which do not depend upon, or even harmonize with, the t r i k a y a doctrine. They group the Nk and Sbk together as the p l u r a l , and regard the Dk as the singular, aspect of the Buddha. To the objection that a p l u r a l i t y of Nks contradicts the maxim that only one Buddha may appear at one time, Asanga r e p l i e s : X:36.8 Even:".if many nirmanas appear, because "the world" i s a four-continent world system, the b i r t h of two Tathagatas i n the world does not contradict the sutra which CassertsD that two Tathagatas do not a r i s e i n the world, just as 192 two Cakravartins cannot a r i s e i n the same world. That is-, the af f i r m a t i o n of the::existence of several Nks i s orthodox i f they inhabit d i f f e r e n t world-systems. From t h i s i t appears not only that Asanga did not need the t r i k a y a i n order to solve the one-or-many problem, but that he was forced to reduce i t to a two-kaya system to deal with t h i s problem. Is the Buddha Mortal, or Immortal? The most obvious approach to t h i s problem, v i a the Buddhist concept of 87 time, i s impractical because no su i t a b l e study of that top i c i s a v a i l a b l e . Therefore, I w i l l merely point out a few conclusions a r i s i n g d i r e c t l y from our text. The Majjhima Nikaya: 63 l i s t s four questions which the Buddha declined to answer on the grounds that the answer would not be conducive to sa l v a t i o n : Is the universe eternal? Is the universe i n f i n i t e ? Are the j i v a and the body i d e n t i c a l ? Does the Tathagata survive death? I suggest that l a t e r thinkers devoted a great deal of attention to the f i n a l question because i t proved to be far from peripheral f or s o t e r i o l o g i c a l purposes. The discussion i n the Mahayanasamgraha involves two types of answers: an abstract, p h i l o s o p h i c a l answer which shows that the mortal/immortal dilemma cannot undermine the l o g i c a l structure of the Vijnanavada system; and a s p e c i f i c answer which shows that orthodox statements questioning the Buddha's:'immortality cannot undermine his s o t e r i o l o g i c a l dependability. The most fundamental discussion i s found at 11:30 where any dharma ( i n -cluding the Buddha) i s said to be e t e r n a l , t r a n s i t o r y , or neither, depending on whether one i s speaking of parinispanna, p a r i k a l p i t a , or paratantra. In 193 the case of the Buddha, t h i s means that the experience "Buddha" (paratantra) w i l l e i t h e r be r e i f i e d as an i n d i v i d u a l who w i l l i n e v i t a b l y p e r i s h ( p a r i k a l - p i t a ) ; or i t w i l l be understood as pure experience and so become one pole of a l i b e r a t i n g encounter, i n which case i t need never end (parinispanna). Which of these views;'.is followed depends upon the past experience and r e l i g i o u s p ractices of the aspirant. Asanga i s p r i m a r i l y concerned with the dependability (the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l sense of nitya) of the Buddha, rather than with the s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l question of immortality. This s o t e r i o l o g i c a l sense i s best expressed i n terms of the Abhidharma from which i t developed. The Abhidharma masters analyzed a l l experience into a number of constituents (dharmas), which f e l l into one of two groups: samskrta or asamskrta. The dharmas composing any event i n samsara were termed s a m s k r t a — " p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the causal process"—while those which could be r e l i e d upon not to create new worldly s i t u a t i o n s were c a l l e d asamskrta. The samskrta dharmas were described as having three or four basic c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c s , t y p i c a l l y : j a t i (coming into existence), s t h i t i (remaining i n existence for some time), j a r a (reaching the end of t h e i r term), and anityata (going out of existence). While these were understood i n various ways, they are a l l forms of one idea which i n the Abhidharmasamuccaya i s c a l l e d a n i t y a t a , "impermanence." Therefore, as the major c r i t e r i o n of asamskrta. dharmas was n i t y a t a , "permanence," that term came to designate ultimate r e l i a b i l i t y . This idea that something i s n i t y a i f i t provides a f i r m basis for personal s a l v a t i o n underlies the Mahaya- nasamgraha. In passages which equate the Buddha with a unitary Dk the following statements appear: X:3.1+ CA laksana of the Buddha's Dharmakaya isH n i t y a because ±9h i t i s characterized hy the p u r i f i c a t i o n of the true nature; i t i s the outcome of a former vow; and i t s a c t i v i t y i s never completed. In the f i r s t statement n i t y a t a r e f e r s to the true pure' nature (tathatavisuddhi) which Asvabhava i d e n t i f i e s with the Dk. This i s equivalent to the trisvabhava explanation at 11:30, since the tathatavisuddhi characterizes the parinispanna. The same point i s repeated at X:29-2 where Asvabhava (lAU5bl5-l6) adds that " e t e r n a l " r e f e r s to the f a c t that the Dk's pure tathata, i t s r e a l nature, i s unalterable and immutably pure. The.other two explanations r e f e r to the Buddha's a c t i v i t y . As t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between nature and a c t i v i t y i s j u s t the d i s t i n c t i o n between Svk and Nk-Sbk, t h i s explanation of n i t y a can be brought into harmony with the t r i k a y a . The argument i s further developed at X:37, which begins from the contra-d i c t i o n generated by a naive view of the term n i t y a : X:3T As the Sambhogakaya and Mrmanakaya are not e t e r n a l , how can the sutra say that the Tathagata's body Is eternal? Because both the Nisyandakaya and the Nirmanakaya depend upon the eternal Dharmakaya. As the enjoyment i s never interrupted and the nirmanas are repeatedly manifest, i t i s proper to regard the Tathagata's body as e t e r n a l . This i s s i m i l a r to saying that, "CHe~] always nourishes." That i s , while the author must accept the t r a d i t i o n that the Tathagata's body i s n i t y a , the Sk and Nk, which are c e r t a i n l y bodies of the Tathagata, are not n i t y a . How i s t h i s contradiction to be explained? 195 Asvabhava ( l A l + 8 c l 8 ) advances two c r i t e r i a "for c a l l i n g something n i t y a ; i f i t s substance ( f £ ) i s n l t ^ , a s l n t h e c a s e o f t h e m a n d „ l t . support i s n i t y a , as i n the other two kayas. Hence, the fact that the other two depend upon the Dk i s s u f f i c i e n t to characterize a l l three as n i t y a . This explanation contains a t a c i t d i s t i n c t i o n between the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l sense of n i t y a ( i n which a l l three may be c a l l e d n i t y a as they possess or p a r t i c i p a t e i n the s a l v i e r e l i a b i l i t y ) , and the p h i l o s o p h i c a l sense: i n which the Nk and Sk are not n i t y a . By further explaining the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l sense as constant r e p e t i t i o n , he divorces i t from any f l a v o r of an e t e r n a l l y s u b s i s t i n g thing. As Asvabhava ( l M 8 c 2 7 - 2 8 ) says, The Buddha's Nirmanakaya i s to be understood i n t h i s way: i t i s not freedom from b i r t h and death which earns i t the epithet n i t y a , but the fact that i t incessantly appears again and again according to the needs of beings to- be converted.- This is>the i n t e n t i o n of the term n i t y a . This i s supported at X : 2 9 . ^ : X:29.h . . . The Tathagatas are spontaneous because t h e i r actions flow i n an uninterrupted, e f f o r t l e s s stream. The f i n a l two passages (X : 3 8 , 39) of our text explain the necessity f o r maintaining a clea r difference between a Dk which i s n i t y a , and a Nk which i s not. At X : 3 9 the notion that an e t e r n a l Dk n e c e s s a r i l y leads to quietism i s refuted on the grounds that i t would then undercut i t s own cause ( i . e . , s p i r i -t u a l e f f o r t ) , a unique argument not a v a i l a b l e to the theologians of t h e i s t i c r e l i g i o n s ! Therefore, there must be two aspects: the eternal Dk, and a mortal Nk which i s v i s i b l e to the aspirant. Asahga has already (X : 3 8 ) shown that the 196 second i s i d e n t i c a l with the Ek which does not "remain" ( t i s t h a t e ; gtan-du  bzhugs; ^*^> ) -*-n ^ e "world. In conclusion, an answer to the question of the Buddha's immortality, l i k e that of his p l u r a l i t y , requires a two-term rather than a three-term model. The t r i k a y a i s unnecessary and must "be reduced to a two-kaya by grouping the Nk and Sbk as one term. Does the Buddha Remain i n Nirvana, or Not? This perennial question, l i k e the l a s t one, also concerns the Buddha's s o t e r i o l o g i c a l e f f i c a c y . VIII:22 CThe awareness (jnana)] of the Bodhisattva i s distinguished from that of the Sravaka by i t s "non-staying" ( a p r a t i -s t h i t a ) , because i t stays i n non-staying nirvana." [This awareness i s further explained at X:13.1 Asvabhava (U"+3^all-12) explains that the Sravakas, etc., stay only i n nirvana while the B o d h i s a t t v a s b e c a u s e of t h e i r karuna and prajna-, stay i n non-staying nirvana. X:36.8 CThe BuddhaH made his vow and pr a c t i c e d the r e l i g i o u s l i f e i n order to achieve great enlightenment f o r the welfare and happiness of a l l sentient beings. It i s i l l o g i c a l to hold that he has completely gone to nirvana, because that would render h i s vow and p r a c t i c e s t e r i l e and useless. The a p f a t i s t h i t a - n i f v a n a i s only h a l f of Asanga's v i s i o n . The complete 1 9 7 statement at X:3h reads: X:3k How do we know that the Buddha's Dharmakaya i s neither wholly i n nirvana nor not wholly i n nirvana?. The question i s answered by the following stanza: Because Che Isl free from a l l obstacles, and Because ChisI a c t i v i t y i s not completed. The Buddha i s Cat the same timeD wholly i n nirvana Cbutn wholly not i n nirvana. This i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Buddha's actions as the continuing worldly aspect i s the key to the Mahayanasamgraha?s answer. At X:31.1, Asvabhava (Ukh6cl8) says that these a c t i v i t i e s proceed v i a the Nk. This does not imply immortality f o r the Nk. As we have seen, each Nk has a normal human l i f e s p a n , although a repeated series of them i s . p ossible. Even so, the series w i l l end when a l l beings are saved. The only.direct mention of the f u l l t r i k a y a - i n - connection, with.-, t h i s • problem i s X:28.2: X:28.2 . . . The Buddha's a c t i v i t y i s stable (dhruva; brtan-pa; ) and unstable, because a l l Buddhas have three kayas. Here also, the t r i k a y a i s more an embarrassment than a necessary concept. Both commentators reduce the t r i k a y a to a two-kaya model, although not i n the same way. Asvabhava says that the a c t i v i t y of the Svk i s stable, while that of the Nk and Sbk i s unstable. Vasubandhu holds that that of the Sbk i s stable while that of the Nk i s unstable. 198 Conclusion The importance of these c l a s s i c a l problems tempts us to regard the a b i l i t y of the t r i k a y a (or any other Buddhological doctrine) to resolve them as the key to the doctrine's popularity. Nagao has taken t h i s view (Eastern  Buddhist, 6, no. 1, p. 38). On closer examination, the t r i k a y a seems to be not simply unnecessary, but even a hindrance to t h e i r s o l u t i o n . Asanga has reduced i t to a two.,kaya system when dealing with them. Therefore, these problems cannot have been the motive force behind the development of the t r i k a y a doctrine, and my attempt to develop an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l not be focussed on them. f. Why Three Kayas? There seem.to be three possible classes of reasons why Asanga chose to develop a t r i k a y a rather than simply modify one of the two-kaya theories. These are: (a) He may have been the f i r s t to r e a l i z e that the e a r l i e r schemes were inadequate for the doctrines which they purported to systematize. (b) He may have incorporated r a d i c a l l y new ideas, which forced the addition of a t h i r d term into his system. (c) He may have been l e d to a t r i a d i c scheme by external forces, e.g., a general Indian vogue for t r i n i t i e s . In the l i g h t of the paucity of h i s t o r i c a l information on Indian culture, the l a s t i s the l e a s t desirable choice, and w i l l be considered only i f neither of the f i r s t two seems p l a u s i b l e . 199 The second choice seems most l i k e l y . As we have seen, e a r l i e r thinkers resolved the c l a s s i c a l dilemmas hy d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the v i s i b l e rupakaya from a basic Svk or Dk. Asanga found himself with two a d d i t i o n a l , mutually i r r e d u -c i b l e doctrines. The f i r s t was that of the vow of benevolent conduct (bhadra-carya-pranidhana) by which the aspirant binds himself to continual worldly manifestation i n any form necessary for the s a l v a t i o n of s u f f e r i n g sentient beings. As the actor, he i s i n general control of the encounter with them. Provided only that the practitioner:.is able to recognize the Buddha, the l a t t e r presents himself. This seems to be d i r e c t l y contradicted by the second new doctrine, that of the Buddhafield which the aspirant reaches by h i s own e f f o r t s , and within which he encounters the Buddha. Although the'other two p o s s i b i l i t i e s cannot be ignored, I suggest that the need to maintain both the unity and the mutual i r r e d u c i b i l i t y of these concepts forced Asanga t o adopt the t r i k a y a . Embryonic forms of the vow and the Buddhaland were present e a r l i e r , and we might say that Asanga was the f i r s t to recognize the problem that they r a i s e d . Furthermore,, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine that he remained unaffected by the t r i a d i c tendencies throughout the nascent Indian t h e i s t i c t r a d i t i o n s . However, during h i s era both of these new doctrines had become so e x p l i c i t that he was forced to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between a Nk. (which, went out.to the p r a c t i t i o n e r } , a Sbk (which the p r a c t i -t i o n e r approached i n a Buddhaland), and a Svk which maintained the unity of these two.., 200 NOTES Giuseppe T u c c i , On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of MaitreyaCnathaH and  Asanga ( C a l c u t t a : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l c u t t a , 1930; r e p r i n t e d by Chinese M a t e r i a l s Center, Inc., 1975), PP- 18-20. 2 Bimal K r i s h n a M a t i l a l , "A C r i t i q u e of Buddhist I d e a l i s m , " i n L. Cousins et a l . , eds., Buddhist Studies i n Honour of I . B. Horner (Dordrecht and Boston: 197M, p. 139-The wording of the Tibetan and the Chinese (l35a20-2l) versions d i f f e r . I have t r a n s l a t e d f r e e l y i n order t o emphasize the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e . The verb "embraces" i s no t i g h t e r i n the Tibetan (bsdus) than i n the Chinese ( J ^ l ). I t s exact meaning must be understood from the context. See a l s o note 26 below. h A p a r t i c u l a r l y v i v i d example of t h i s procedurerxs h i s d i s m i s s a l o f the tri s v a b h a v a d o c t r i n e : C'est a i n s i que j e ne t r a i t e r a i pas de l a t h e o r i e des t r o i s natures, i m a g i n a i r e , dependante et accomplie, b i e n q u ' e l l e appartienne en propre au Vijnanavada; e l l e n ' o f f r e en e f f e t aucun element de nature veritablement i d e a l i s t e (p. 272). ^ M a t i l a l does r e f e r t o the La V a l l e e Poussin t r a n s l a t i o n of the Ch'eng  Wei Shih Lun, and t r a n s l a t e s a key passage of the Samdhinirmocanasutra from Lamotte's rec o n s t r u c t e d S a n s k r i t . The l a t t e r contains a good example of the p e r i l s of r e l y i n g on such r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . He has missed the problem r a i s e d by disc r e p a n c i e s between the Chinese ( B o d h i r u c i — T . 675; Hsuan-tsang—T. 676) and Tibetan (Otani 77^) d e s c r i p t i o n s of the p a r i k a l p i t a and parinispanna. ^ Ashok Kumar C h a t t e r j e e , Readings on Yogacara Buddhism (Varanasi: Centre of Advanced Study i n Philosophy, Banaras Hindu U n i v e r s i t y , 1971). 7 Herbert V. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy i n Theory and P r a c t i c e ( B a l t i -more: Penguin, 1972). pp. 13-1h. Q H, V. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy i n Theory and P r a c t i c e , pp. 98-103-H. V. Guenther, "Mentalism and Beyond," JAOS, 86, no. 3:297-30*+. 201 This statement i s a paraphrase from Prastavana:^. The o r i g i n a l Sanskrit must have been ambiguous, as both commentators have glossed the key terms (U382al8-27; Bh323bl6-27) and the Tibetan and Chinese (l33a21-22) t r a n s l a t o r s seem to have understood the grammar d i f f e r e n t l y . The key terms describing the path are: , — " l o g i c a l l y sound": shin-tu 'thod-pa j | : iL» (Lamotte reconstructs: upapanna^._.and t r a n s l a t e s , "pleinement j u s t i f i e s " ) . This could be understood i n many ways, but the commentators agree that a l o g i c a l consistency i s meant. — "orthodox": mthun-pa; (Lamotte reconstructs: anukula, and t r a n s l a t e s , "conformes"). — "non-contradictory": 'gal-ba med-pa; jjt^ . (Lamotte reconstructs: aviruddha, and t r a n s l a t e s , "sans c o n t r a d i c t i o n " ) . Both commentators stress the idea of l o g i c a l consistency. The Tibetan reads: shes-par bya-bas na shes-bya'o, while the Chinese reads: . ; . Both are stronger than simply "may be." 12 These l a s t two paragraphs are an extremely s i m p l i f i e d statement of the "three natures" (trisvabhava) doctrine. Both the character and fundamental". importance of t h i s doctrine are frequently misunderstood by those who suppose the Vijnanavada to be an idealism. A more accurate understanding i s emerging as more early texts become known. An excellent modern work embodying such an appreciation i s Stefan Anacker's Vasubandhu: Three Aspects. Anacker's work has been p a r t i c u l a r l y encouraging for t h i s study as he, working from the Karmasiddhiprakarana and Madhyantavibhagabhasya, has a r r i v e d at the same view^ of the Vijnanavada as I have derived from the Mahayanasamgraha. He summarizes the importance of the trisvabhava as follows: Rather than pointing towards an i d e a l i s t i c system, the theory of the store-consciousness i s used for t o t a l l y d i f f e r -ent purposes by Vasubandhu. It i s the recognition that one's normal mental and psychical impressions are constructed, i . e . , a l t e r e d and seemingly s t a t i - i z e d by our consciousness-com-plexes , that forms the actual main point of the Trims-ika. "Cognition-only" involves p r i m a r i l y the doctrine of the three natures of r e a l i t y and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In f a c t , the store-consciousness serves only as a bridge to t h i s more e s s e n t i a l doctrine, which i n the l a s t analysis reduces i t s e l f to a Sunyavada which i s thoroughly all-embracing (p. 70). Janice D. W i l l i s comes to a s i m i l a r conclusion. ,t In "A Study of the Chapter 202 on R e a l i t y , Based upon the Tattvartha-Patalam of Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi" (p. 87) she states that the trisvabhava i s Asanga's basic ontology i n a l l texts except the Yogacarabhumi. 13 This is : . i m p l i c i t throughout chapter I I . The most nearly e x p l i c i t statement occurs at I I : l 6 . Ik . A very h e l p f u l work for understanding t h i s idea i s Harold N. Lee, Percepts, Concepts and Theoretic Knowledge: A Study i n Epistemology (Memphis: Memphis State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973). Dr. Lee has constructed an epistemology s i m i l a r to that of Asanga. His comments on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between such an epistemology and ontology are d i r e c t l y applicable to our problem: When I speak of the f l u x of process, I make an ontolog-i c a l assumption, but i t i s a most general one—simply that something i s going on and i t i s continuous. The f l u x i s posited to give a context for experience—parts of the f l u x i n t e r a c t , a f f e c t each other, and the i n t e r a c t i o n i s the experience of each part (p. 2h). The Mahayanasamgraha also requires the on t o l o g i c a l assumption that "some-thing i s going on and that i t i s continuous" whether the action i s thought of i n terms suggesting a container (the alayavijnana), or an object of perception (jneya, "the knowable"). However, his work demonstrates that, f or purposes of constructing an epistemology, the ontology need be taken no further; that there i s no need for a r e a l something (such as a mind) i n which such a c t i v i t y occurs. When throughout the pre'sent study I deny that the Mahayanasamgraha contains o n t o l o g i c a l presuppositions, I am not denying t h i s most general sense of ontology, merely any more s p e c i f i c and de t a i l e d a p p l i c a t i o n . That "something i s going on" i s indisputable, but Asahga has avoided the question of whether i t i s mental, m a t e r i a l , or something e l s e . I t would require a separate study (based on a d i f f e r e n t text) even to confront .the question of whether, or-not-he considered such a question to be legitimate. ^ Dharmadhatu, the realm or sphere of dharma (or "the dharmas"), i s a ubiquitous term which has been used i n a number of ways by Buddhist w r i t e r s . The Vijnanavada use of t h i s term i s s t i l l unclear. David Seyfort Ruegg touches up the question several times i n La Theorie du tathagarbha et du gotra (Paris: Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1969), but no comprehensive study 203 i s a v a i l a b l e . The f i r s t occurrence of the term i n the Mahayanasamgraha i s at I:H8, where the seed of enlightenment obtained by hearing the dharma i s declared to be an outflow from the transcendent and very pure dharmadhatu, i . e . , the dharmadhatu i s the provenance of the preaching which i n i t i a t e s the convert's career. At 11:9 and 11, the dharmadhatu i s the realm of parinispanna, i n which the Bodhisattva resides by d i r e c t perception, or which he penetrates. At X:31, the dharmadhatu i s said to undertake f i v e kinds of action. The dharmadhatu as actor rather than 'realm' creates problems which both Vasubandhu and Asvabhava solve by glossing i t as "Dharmakaya." These passages suggest that the dharmadhatu i s the Buddha's perceptual s i t u a t i o n and that t h i s i s not a s t a t i c way of .'seeing the t r u t h , ' but a state of continual outreach to others.. In addition to the a r t i c l e s mentioned i n the e a r l i e r survey of scholar-ship, see E. Lamotte, Le T r a i t e ' d e ' l a grande veftu de sagesse, tome 3 (1970), and a r t i c l e s on "Buddha" and r e l a t e d compounds i n G. P. Malalasekera, Encyclo- paedia of Buddhism '(Sri Lanka: Government of S r i Lanka, 1973), v o l . 3. 17 Etienne Lamotte, ed. and trans., Samdhinirmocanasutra (Louvain: Univer-s i t e de Louvain, 1935), Tibetan text at Introduction, 2, p. 32; t r a n s l a t i o n , pp. l67-l68. See also the sources l i s t e d by Lamotte i n his end-note to 11:33 of the Mahay arias' amgraha. 18 To Lamotte's note (.see end-note to chap. I l l ) that III-X form a unity, we may add that I-II. do also: As each of these segments ends i n a Buddhology, i t i s possible that the Mahayan as amgr aha was conceived as two texts that were l a t e r fused. However, i n the absence of early manuscripts i n which they are separate, or even of any Sanskrit o r i g i n a l which might be analyzed for s t y l i s -t i c d i f f e r e n c e s , such notions must remain as conjecture. 19 • -A concise explanation of t h i s process i s given by John MaeQuarrie i n The Scope of Demythologizing (.New York: Harper Torch-books, i960), p. 19: But although e x i s t e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a story does not i n i t s e l f deny the f a c t u a l content of the story, i t cer-t a i n l y does put that content ' i n brackets,' so to speak. The objective reference becomes bracketed i n the sense that i n t e r e s t has s h i f t e d away from i t to the e x i s t e n t i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . The 20h question of fa c t i s no longer being r a i s e d . We are not ask-ing what happened but about what the story says to us i n our s i t u a t i o n now. The objective reference has somehow become i r r e l e v a n t . Whether we a f f i r m i t or whether we deny i t or whether we suspend judgement about i t , the e x i s t e n t i a l r e l i g -ious message of the story can s t i l l speak home to us . . . 20 ^ Ruegg, Tathagatagarhha, pp. kll-k^h. 21 For Asvabhava's commentary to 11:33, see U4l0c22-iillb3 and u287a3-291bU. No i n d i v i d u a l references f o r t h i s passage w i l l be given. 22 <f thugs-su chud-pa-, . The Tibetan thugs-su chud-pa i s used to tr a n s l a t e both the Sanskrit root Jjna ("to understand") and y/gam ("to go"), The passage seems to read better i f we use "to understand" but as a l l Chinese versions have ("to a r r i v e at a c e r t a i n state or s i t u a t i o n " ) , the t r a n s l a -t i o n must be "has gone t o . " The same applies to t h i s term i n 5. and 9-23 A v i k a l p i t a ; T: rnam-par ma brtags-pa; H: ' f of $ 1 ] ^ the-t shorn med-pa' i ye-shes; ^ ">$j? • • Lamotte reconstructs: "nihsamsayaj nana." The key to t h i s compound i s "doubt" (the-tshom; v i c i k i t s a ) , an Abhidharmic term which Vasubandhu (Abhidharmakosa v.32c-33) places near the very root of incorrect perception. He says that from nescience (avidvjO arises confusion which leads to doubt about the Buddhist t r u t h s . This doubt leads to the f a l s e views and hence to the deluded l i f e . Asahga, i n the Abhidharmasamuccaya (pp. 10, hi), agrees. The term i s l i t e r a l l y "the accurate awareness (jnana) which involves the ut t e r absence of doubt ( v i c i k i t s a ) . " This implies that "accurate awareness" i s not something complete apart from "doubt" as a content^or an evaluation. The doubt i s a formative factor which d i s t o r t s the en t i r e perceptual process. I t s absence i s synonymous with the "accuracy" of the awareness. .To stress the fact that t h i s compound,is•one.awareness, not an awareness whose "freedom from doubt" i s a secondary non-essential c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , I have t r a n s l a t e d " v e r i d i -cal, awareness." 5 yinaya; T: 'dul-ba; H: \ ^ ^ . This i s the broadest term for the actions whereby a Bodhisattva leads sentient beings toward enlightenment. 205 Other t r a n s l a t i o n s , such as "to d i s c i p l i n e " and "to teach," are too narrow. ^ 6 "Involved with" (bsdus-pa; jfj^j ) i s reconstructed hy Lamotte as samgrhita and t r a n s l a t e d , " r e s s o r t i r au." As i t simply indicates general conjunction of two things, such t r a n s l a t i o n s as "contained i n " or "belongs t o " are much too s p e c i f i c . 27 adikarmika bodhisattva; T: byang-chub-sems-dpa' las-dang-po-pa, H: ^1 ^ . This i s the f i r s t stage of the t h i r t e e n i n a Bodhi-sattva's career. According to the summary of t h i s thirteen-stage theory found i n Herbert V. Guenther's The Jewel Ornament of L i b e r a t i o n by sGam-po-pa (Berkeley: Shambhala, 19Tl), PP- 232-256, the adikarmika stage i s equivalent to the sambharamarga (Path of Preparation) and designates the l e v e l of those i n d i v i d u a l s who have just begun Mahayana p r a c t i c e s . It i s followed by the adhimukticaryabhumi (equivalent to the prayogamarga,.Path of A p p l i c a t i o n ) , the ten great Bodhisattva bhumis and a f i n a l buddhabhumi. 28 For a discussion of the use of t h i s s i mile to i l l u s t r a t e a s i m i l a r question about the b i r t h of an i n d i v i d u a l i n the tathagata family, see Ruegg, Tathagatagarbha,pp. lli|-115. 29 The various types of n i r v i k a l p a j nana mentioned i n these passages are discussed by Alan Sponberg i n h i s "Dynamic Li b e r a t i o n i n Yogacara Buddhism" (.The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, ,2,-- no.. 1 (1979): iih-65). '. 30 See Walpola Rahula, t r a n s . , Le Compendium de l a super-doctrine (.philosophie), Abhidharmasamuccaya, d' Asanga (Paris: Ecole Frangaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1971), p. I l 6 . 31 Note that t h i s i s a s i m i l e , not a statement that the v i j n a p t i are i l l u s o r y . The trisvabhava theory i s not concerned with such o n t o l o g i c a l ques-tions., Asanga uses the simile of someone seeing through an i l l u s i o n to describe the enlightened mode,of perception. The c l a s s i c set of : the- similes-used for t h i s purpose is. found i n the Samdhinirmocanasutra, chapter VI., 32 Misapprehension (viparyasa; • T: phyin-ci-log-pa; H: jj| ) i s 206 described by Edward Conze i n "The Mahayana Treatment of Vi.paryas.us," Orlens- Extremus, Lessing Memorial (February 1962): 35-1+7- Unfortunately, Conze's i m p l i c i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Mahayana and prajnaparamita d i s t o r t s the present Vijnanavada use of the term. 33 A ^ Lamotte's "Dharmadhatu," rather than "Dharmakaya," i s i n c o r r e c t i n both text and commentary. ^ See Lamotte, Mahayanasamgraha, 1:1+5 and 111:1. ^ Sarvaj naj nana; T: thams-cad mkhyen-pa'i ye-shes; R: — ^3 36 itf] "-fe T: yongs-su rdzogs-pa; H: )JJ yplRt . Lamotte reconstructs: p a r i p i p a r t i . 37 * See Louis de La Vallee Poussin, trans,, "L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasu-bandhu," Melanges chinois,- et bouddhiques, 16 (Bruxelles: l ' I n s t i t u t Beige des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 197l), y i i : 3 3 , and.Honda Megumu, trans., Annotated  Translation of the Dasabhumika rSutra, §ata-pitaka Series, v o l . 7*+ (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, n.d.), fn. 12, p. 2l6. 38 ' ' See La Vall e e Poussin, trans., Abhidharmakosa, ; i i i : 53b-55d; i v : I05c-d; i v : 112b; v i : l+l+d-1+5; and Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 127. ^ H: ^ '•> Lamotte reconstructs: aklistam ajnanam. ^° Ting Fu-pao, Fo-hsiieh t a - t z ' u - t i e n (.Taipei: Tung Yii Wen Hua Ch'u Pan She, 19^ 6), p. 599b. 1+1 The Sanskrit p a r a v f t t i means, "turning back, revolving, change." The Tibetan '.gyur-ba i s extremely broad: "to change, to become, to revolve." " 1+ 3 can be read ehuan : "to revolve," of chuan : "to change d i r e c t i o n . " I have abandoned the usual t r a n s l a t i o n s of these as " r e v o l u t i o n " or "reversion." "Revolution" i s unsuitable because: Ca) throughout the Mahayanasamgraha a 180° change of d i r e c t i o n i s meant, not a 360° one; (b) the Tibetan would c e r t a i n l y have chosen skor-ba (as i n "turning the dharmacakra") had the t r a n s l a t o r under-stood "revolution"; and (c) "revolution" i s now a p o l i t i c a l or at l e a s t a s o c i a l term, and sounds odd i n t h i s more psychological context. . "Reversion" 207 Buddhist thought. "Reorientation" (from " o r i e n t a t i o n " — t h e p r a c t i c e of facing churches i n an e a s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n ) c a r r i e s the correct i m p l i c a t i o n . 1+2 ^ ^ The Mahayanasamgraha contains two important r e l a t e d terms for the Mahayana i d e a l of c o n t r o l of a l i f e - s i t u a t i o n : v a s i t a and vibhutva. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to judge how these d i f f e r as the various t r a n s l a t i o n s have obscured the o r i g i n a l Sanskrit term i n each passage. The main occurrences of these are as follows: X: 1.1: T: dbang-sgyur-ba; H: ^ jj^ jjj. ; a l l other Chinese tr a n s -l a t o r s : |"5 ^fc. . LC_ and Mvy t r a n s l a t e t h i s as v a s i t a (the sgyur and J^^-probably r e f l e c t the - t a ending). Lamotte, however, reconstructs: vibhutva, and t r a n s l a t e s : " l a souverainete." X:3.2 contains a l i s t of ten dbang-ba; H: . Lamotte's reconstruc-t i o n of v a s i t a , " l a m a i t r i s e , " i s c l e a r l y correct as t h i s i s the same as the ten Bodhisattva-vasita i n Mvy, 771-780. X:5; X:7.1*: T: dbang-'byor-ba, which Mvy gives as vaibhutikam; a l l Chinese translators-: ^ . Lamotte again reconstructs: vibhut va, and t r a n s l a t e s : " l a souverainete." However, he has reconstructed the abbreviated dbang or which stands for the contents of X:5 i n the verse summary at X:2 as v a s i t a , and translated: " l a m a i t r i s e . " VIII:13; the terminus of the r e l i g i o u s path i s said to involve the dbang-gi mchog; H: ^ ^x. which Lamotte reconstructs: agravaslta and t r a n s l a t e s : "les maitrises superieures." There appears to be l i t t l e l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between these two terms i f we follow Lamotte's reading. I f we read v a s i t a at X : l , X:3.2 and VIII:13, and vibhutva at X:2, X:5 and X:7-l+, a difference does become apparent. Vibhut va i s , i n each case, the outcome of r e o r i e n t a t i o n ( p a r a v r t t i ) . This may r e f l e c t the use of the term i n the Mahayanasutralahkara, IX: 1+1-1+8. V a s i t a i s used when r e o r i e n t a t i o n i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned. This may r e f l e c t the fact that v a s i t a seems to have been the customary term through the Mahayana schools. See Mvy, 771-780,; f o r ; the n s t of Bodhisattva-vaiita. Throughout the present study I have adopted the l a t t e r readings i n pref-erence to Lamotte's, and have t r a n s l a t e d vibhutva as "sovereignty," and v a s i t a as "mastery." 1+3 These thirty-two laksanas and eighty anuvyanj anas are the observable 208 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a great man (mahapurusa), whether a world r u l e r (.Cakra- . . va r t i n ) or a world savior (.Buddha). They include both v i s i b l e b o d i l y charac-t e r i s t i c s such as f o r t y teeth, a. golden hue, and so on, and behavioral charac-t e r i s t i c s such as bo d i l y bearing and tone of voice. Asvabhava obviously understands them to be the most exoteric c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Buddha, by which he may be recognized by even the d u l l e s t of sentient beings. A l i s t of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and references are given by Lamotte i n his end-notes to X : l 6 . To these should be added the expanded l i s t and references by Leon Hurvitz i n "Chih-I," Melanges chinois et bouddhiques 5 , no. 12 (.Bruxelles: l ' I n s t i t u t Beige des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1 9 6 0 - 6 2), pp. 3 5 3 - 3 6 1 . kh See Ting Fu-pao, Fo-hsiieh t a - t z ' u - t i e n , p. 1 9 5 2 c . Lamotte's p l u r a l t r a n s l a t i o n : "les marques" i s c e r t a i n l y i n c o r r e c t . ^ See Abhidharmakosa, i i : UT • ^ 6 Note that the common mistr a n s l a t i o n of cetana as " v o l i t i o n " would render t h i s passage nonsensical. Cetana indicates that l i t t l e v o l i t i o n i s possible , that the i n d i v i d u a l i s driven or motivated to a ce r t a i n type of per-ception or action by e x t r i n s i c previous influences. See Herbert V. Guenther, Philosophy and Psychology i n the Abhidharma (Lucknow: Buddha Vihara, 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 61-70. hi See Alex Wayman, "The M i r r o r - l i k e Knowledge i n Mahayana Buddhist L i t e r a t u r e , " A s i a t i c a Studien, 25 (.1971): 353.. h8 The term "white dharmas" designates a v a r i e t y of desirable things. , For a discussion of t h i s term i n Abhidharma thought, see Abhidharmakosa, i v : 6 0 . h9 See above,, note h2, ^ A Madhyamika understanding of sunyata must not be b l i n d l y applied here. Both, the Madhyamika and the Yogacara accepted the prajnaparamita l i t e r a t u r e with i t s terms such as sunyata and tathata, but each, worked out the implica-tions d i f f e r e n t l y . The Yogacara view of sunyata i s found i n chapter VII of the Samdhinirmocanasutra, and i s embedded i n the trisvabhava doctrine of the 209 Mahay anas amgr aha. G. M. Nagao offer's useful guidelines for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the two i n "From Madhyamika to Yogacara: An Analysis of MMK, XXIV.18 and MV, 1.1-2," The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist  Studies, 2, no. 1 (1979'): 29-1*-3. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (.London: George A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., i960), p. 217- Although Murti goes on to discuss the use of advaya i n the Vijnanavada w r i t i n g s , h i s analysis i s muddled and super-f i c i a l . A b r i e f mention of t h i s issue also appears i n Ruegg, Tathagata- garhha , p. 3. 52 For example, see Paul W i l f r e d O'Brien, A Chapter on R e a l i t y from the  Madhyantavibhaga Sastra (Tokyo: Monumenta Nipponica, v o l 5, "TX-X. 1953-5^1, v a h d Janice Dean W i l l i s , "A Study'of the Chapter", on R e a l i t y , Based upon, the Tattvartha-Patalam of Asahga's Bodhisattvabhumi" (Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , Columbia Un i v e r s i t y , 1976). 53 ^ See also Ruegg, Tathagatagarhha, fn; 1, p. 298, f o r comments on a s i m i l a r passage of the Ratnagotravibhaga. .'" Pratyatmavedha; T: rang-gis rig-pa; H: rt ? Vasubandhu (Bh371c2) glosses t h i s as, "the Tathagata's i n t r o s p e c t i o n , " thus i d e n t i f y i n g i t as an a b i l i t y of the s p i r i t u a l l y advanced. Asvabhava (ljl+37b20) makes the same point i n a negative manner: ". . . Cthe ordinary man3 can only adhere to Cthe Dharmakaya"! by f a i t h . " The doctrine i s explained i n chapter VI of Candrakirti's Madhyamaka- vatara. B r i e f English-language accounts may be found i n Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, 2 v o l s . (.New York: Dover Publi c a t i o n s , 1962), v o l . 1, p. 163, and i n Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy i n Theory and P r a c t i c e , pp. 91-93-^ Abhidharmakosa li.:57a-b. ^ Vihara: T: gnas-pa; H: Iff . The basic meaning of "a dwelling place" must be understood within the Buddhist cosmology, which assigns a cer-t a i n state of being or major preoccupation to the residents of each d i v i s i o n of the universe. Hence, vihara designates not only a monastery, etc., but 210 also the predominant factors i n an i n d i v i d u a l l i f e . E-Q Vibhutva. See above, note k2. ^ The abhijnas are the a b i l i t i e s which, i n Buddhist mythology, are gained by a Buddha during the night of his enlightenment. By the. exercise of these a b i l i t i e s he discovers the truths which form the content of h i s eventual preaching. The Vijnanavadin l i s t i s found i n Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasa- muccaya, pp. 166-167.: — rddhyabhijna—the supernatural powers such as f l y i n g , etc.; — d i v y a s r o t a b h i j n a — t h e divine ear; — c et ahparyayabhij n a — t h e a b i l i t y to know the thoughts of others; — purvanivasanusmrtyabhi j n a — t h e a b i l i t y to remember previous l i v e s ; — cyutyupapadabhijna—the a b i l i t y to see the b i r t h s and deaths of others; — asravaksayabhij n a — t h e a b i l i t y to see the e x t i n c t i o n of impurity. . ^ Vyavahara: T: tha-snyad-pa; H: ^t-Xj '• "the outward sign or s i g n a l by which communication occurs. I t i s u s u a l l y , but not n e c e s s a r i l y , vocal. This passage points -out the communicative nature of the Buddha. See also Abhidharmakosa iv:7^-75 and F r a n k l i n Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar  and Dictionary, 2 v o l s . (Delhi: M o t i l a l Banarsidass, 1972), v o l . 2, p. 5 l6 . • ^ Lamotte's references are a l l to primary te x t s . For t r a n s l a t i o n of the more important passages, see Abhidharmakosa y i i : 2 8 - 5 6 , and Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya, pp. 163-176. The most.exhaustive discussion of these i s found i n v o l . 3 of Lamotte's t r a n s l a t i o n of the '• Le T r a i t e de l a grande vertu de sagesse (Louvain: I n s t i t u t O r i e n t a l i s t e , 1970). 62 For a d e f i n i t i o n of the pratisamvids, see Asvabhava's commentary to V :2 .9 (.UU2Ubl8-2U). 63 A c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n that gambhira was commonly, understood t o r e f e r to the Bodhisattva's view i s found i n Lamotte, trans., Le T r a i t e , v o l . 1. This reads i n part: II en va de meme pour l a pensee: l e sot (bala), par I'action du savoir conceptuel, decouvre dans l e s Dharma divers caracteres. V o i r que l e v r a i caractere des Dharma n'est n i vide (sunya) n i non-vide (asunya), ni. existant 211 (sat) n i non-existant (asat), et penetrer profondement dans cette doctrine sans detours n i a r r e t s , c'est ce qu'on nomme "etre passe a l'autre r i v e de l a patience r e l a t i v e aux Dharma profonds" (gambhiradharmaksantiparamgata) (p. 338). 2. En outre, l e s Bodhisattva ont un savoir (jnana) profond (gambhira) et aiguise (tiksna) . . . (p. 370). 6k See Rahula, trans., Abhi dharma s amuc caya, p. 88 f f . ; Abhidharmakosa ii:2l+.7< A good summary i s given i n Guenther, trans., Jewel Ornament, pp. 229-230. A very c l e a r explanation by Tsong-kha-pa i s t r a n s l a t e d by Alex Wayman i n Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (.New York: Columbia Univer-s i t y Press, 1978), pp. 129-130; and a d e t a i l e d explanation by Kumarajiva i s found i n Lamotte, Le T r a i t e , v o l . 3, pp. 1329-11+30. 6 5 H. t r a n s l a t e s , ". . . because the tathata ( jit -£tl ) i s free from s t a i n . " » T _ ^ .j.,. . , ~ I &r IS 6 6 A l f r e d North Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y : An Essay i n Cosmology (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960),.pp. k-6. 6"7 Samarendra Kumar Verma, The Nature of Metaphysics (.Varanasi: Bharat-Bharati, 1976), Chapter k. ^ For example, see Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought i n India (.Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1970), pp. 172-173, 232; and David J . Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A H i s t o r i c a l Analysis (Honolulu: U n i v e r s i t y Press of Hawaii, 1976). X:38-39. 69 The term Nirmanakaya cannot be t r a n s l a t e d without severely b i a s i n g l a t e r arguments about i t s meaning. E a r l i e r scholars who did not doubt the t h e i s t i c nature of the Mahayana Buddha usually t r a n s l a t e d i t as "transformation-body," i . e . , as a form into which the Buddha transforms himself according to the needs of the aspirant. However, t h i s study questions the t h e i s t i c premise. The word nirmana i s so ambiguous that i t brings l i t t l e inherent meaning to the compound. I f the search for the "basic" meaning of nirmana i s l i m i t e d to the Mahayanasamgraha, we f i n d only a few uncompounded examples of the term. Asva-bhava 's commentary to X:30.9 ((,Ul+l+6a25; u350b8) says, i n Lamotte's t r a n s l a t i o n , that the devas, nagas, etc., of the Buddhalands are nirmanas," but as neither the Chinese nor the Tibetan uses the same term here as they do elsewhere for 212 nirmana i n Nirmanakaya, t h i s i s a questionable reconstruction. The only unequivocal d e f i n i t i o n i s given by Asvabhava at uUUlb20 where he defines nirmana as a creation of a form not previously i n existence, i . e . , as the very opposite of a "transformation." TO ^ The adhimukticaryabhumi i s the stage immediately preceding the f i r s t of the ten great Bodhisattva bhumis. In the Mahayanasamgraha t h i s i s properly the stage of the Bodhisattva who has heard, and adheres t o , the teaching that a l l dharmas are v i j napt imat r a ( I I I : 3 ) , but Asanga often uses i t simply as a category for those who have the a t t i t u d e of simple confidence and devotion of the Sravaka, but who hold a Yogacara rather than a Hmayana philosophy. See also Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 1^5 (for adhimukticarya- bodhisattva), and pp. 158-159; G. P. Malalasekera, ed., Encyclopaedia of  Buddhism (Ceylon: Government Press, 19&3), fasc. 2, s.v. adhimukti-carya- bhumi , pp. 202-203; and Guenther, trans., Jewel Ornament, p. 239- Por adhimukti, see below, note 72. 71 ». N i r v i k a l p a j nana i s a general term for enlightened awareness. I t must not be misunderstood as a state-of mind which i s n e c e s s a r i l y l a c k i n g i n d i s c u r -sive thought. It i s described i n d e t a i l i n chapter VIII of the Mahayanasamgraha where i t i s divided into three types: ( l ) prayogika, the awareness preparatory to f u l l nirvikalpajnana; (2) n i r v i k a l p a j nana proper; and (3) prsthalabdha / the awareness subsequent to n i r v i k a l p a j nana. For a d e t a i l e d discussion see Alan Sponberg, "Dynamic L i b e r a t i o n i n Yoga-cara Buddhism," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 2, no. 1 (1979): kk-6h. Adhimukti; T: mos-pa; H: This term u s u a l l y r e f e r s to the act of d i r e c t i n g the attention to a s p e c i f i c object with a c l e a r , or even fervent, expectation of a c e r t a i n perception. As t h i s object i s often a representation of the Buddha, adhimukti i s frequently t r a n s l a t e d , "devotion." But, as the expectation can amount to p r o j e c t i n g a v i v i d v i s u a l i z a t i o n , adhimukti should sometimes be "creative imagination." Since both elements are important i n t h i s t e x t , I have followed Lamotte's " a s p i r a t i o n . " See Abhidhar- makosa, ii : 2 l + . 9 ; 72. h; Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 180; and Guenther, trans., Jewel Ornament, p. 37• 213 73 ^ The precise meaning of "simple confidence" (sraddhamatra; T: dad-pa feam; H: \^% ) .is. unclear. In general, sraddha designates a warm and t r u s t i n g confidence. Rahula, i n h i s Abhi dharmas amuc caya, pp. 1U8-1U9 and lkQ, fn. 2, drawing from the Majjhimanikaya, pi c t u r e s an aspirant c a l l e d a sraddha- n u s a r i n — a rather d u l l i n d i v i d u a l of no great s p i r i t u a l a b i l i t i e s who attains enlightenment due to the confidence with which he follows i n s t r u c t i o n . The Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, p. 320, mentions three types of sraddha i n a l i s t which was l a t e r regarded as a standard Vijnanavada doctrine, e.g., see Guenther, trans., Jewel Ornament, pp. 19-21. Furthermore, sraddha i s frequently combined with adhimukti, e.g., sraddha- dimukta (Abhi dharmas amuc c aya, p. 1U9): " l a personne devouee a l a confiance." But the term sraddhamatra conjoined with adhimukti seems to occur only i n t h i s text. I have simply taken the term as an i n d i c a t i o n that the members of t h i s assembly cannot see the truths themselves, but are w i l l i n g to follow the i n s t r u c t i o n s of the Nk. ^ See UUU9bl l ( ^ 'ft-k ) and u3*+2b3-U. ^ Mudra; T: l a g - r t s i s ; H: £."p , i s the most obscure member of t h i s t r a -d i t i o n a l l i s t of subjects studied or r e c a l l e d by the Bodhisattva. The common meanings such as " r i t u a l hand gesture" or "object of a symbolic encounter' (e.g., karmamudra)" obviously do not apply. M. Monier-Williams i n A Sanskrit- English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1899) 5 P- 822, c i t i n g the Divyavadana, suggests that t h i s mudra re f e r s to a form of reckoning on the finge r s . This i s supported by J . J . Jones, trans., The Mahavastu, 3 v o l s . , Sacred Books of the Buddhists Ser i e s , v o l s . 16-19 (London: The P a l i Text Society and Luzac, 19^9-56), v o l . 2 , p. 376, who summarizes the comments of several scholars and opts f o r "reckoning with the f i n g e r s . " Lamotte's " l a gravure" almost c e r t a i n l y was suggested by Paramatha's t r a n s l a t i o n (paraphrase?) of Vasubandhu's explanation as yl* ^ £jl j<5^ ^g. (Taisho v o l . 3 1 , p. 367c25) . ^ T: mthun-pa; H: ^ ^yXw implies a very close s i m i l a r i t y , not an ontol o g i c a l i d e n t i t y . Lamotte t r a n s l a t e s : " p a r e i l . " ^ H: — \J\ - j j ^ ^ ^ j " ^ ^ ' r n a m ~ ^ u n mngon-rdzogs byang-chub-pa, but 21k u (335a6) reads: rnam-pa thams-cad mngon-par rdzogs-par byang-chub-pa. 78 The idea that the Buddha i s not" immediately recognizable to the non-b e l i e v e r forms an early and persistent feature of the accounts of Sakyamuni's l i f e . See the story of his encounter with Upaka, t r a n s l a t e d from several sources by Andre Bareau i n Recherches sur l a biographie du Buddha dans l e s  Sutrapitaka et l e s Vinayapitaka anciens, 3 v o l s . (Paris: Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1963), v o l . 3, pp. 155-160. ^ T: 'dres-pa; H: f^ci^ L i Lamotte reconstructs: samsrsta. 80 Rab-tu-phye-ba; H omits t h i s phrase; Lamotte reconstructs: prabhavita. 8 l Lamotte's t r a n s l a t i o n of t h i s term i s puzzling. Both T and H have used "Buddhafield" (Buddhaksetra; T: sangs-rgyas-kyi zhing; H: j£_ ) throughout most of the text. Lamotte, however, sometimes reconstructs: Buddha-bhumi ("les terres du Buddha") and sometimes: Buddhaksetra ("les champs des Buddha"). Many summaries of the l i t e r a t u r e on the Buddhafield concept are a v a i l a b l e i n Western languages. The c l a s s i c study i s Teresina Rowell's "The Background and E a r l y Use of the Buddha-ksetra Concept," Eastern Buddhist (published i n three installments: 6, no. 3 (193*0 ,' 6, no. £"(1935), 7, no. 2 (1937)... This i s s t i l l one of the best summaries of data towards a h i s t o r y of the proto-Mahayana developments. Ms. Rowell i d e n t i f i e s the e a r l i e s t Buddhafield concept with the idea that S a k y a m u n i could see anything i n h i s world (his " f i e l d " of knowledge), and that he could exercise benevolent influence or c o n t r o l over t h i s f i e l d . The main type of influence i s h i s teaching to the Bodhisattvas. She also discusses the early writings on how the Bodhisattva obtains and p u r i f i e s t h i s f i e l d by p u r i f y i n g his mind and acting for others, e s p e c i a l l y by worshipping the Buddha. However, her arguments about the developed Mahayana t r a d i t i o n wear extremely t h i n as she attempts to cover too many texts and ideas. Far-Eastern developments of the Buddhafield concept are introduced by David W. Chappell i n "Chinese Buddhist Interpretations of the Pure Lands" i n -Michael Saso and David.W. Chappell, eds.*., Buddhist .'and Taoist Studies I •'.(Honolulu: U n i v e r s i t y of Hawaii Press, 1977), pp. 23-5** • 215 82 In h i s end-notes to X:30, Lamotte notes a suggestion hy Demieville that t h i s text i s a version of the Samdhinirmocanasutra. See Francesca Fremantle and Chogyam Trungpa, trans, and comment., The  Tibetan Book of the Dead: The Great Li b e r a t i o n through Hearing i n the Bardo (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1975)-8k Bimal K. M a t i l a l , a t a l k delivered to the Department of Religious Studies, UBC, i n October 1975. O r See E. Obermiller, trans., History of Buddhism by Bu-ston (Heidelberg: 1931; Suzuki Reprint S e r i e s ) , pp. 137-1^0. 86 Ruegg has published an explanation of t h i s stanza i n h i s Tathagata- garbha, p. 83. As i t i s drawn from Vasubandhu's Mahayanasutralamkarabhasya i t d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from Asvabhava's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , which has been summarized here. 87 One of the most i n t e r e s t i n g attempts to date i s N i s h i t a n i K e i j i ' s "Emptiness and Time" i n Eastern Buddhist, 9 , no. 1: U2-71; 10, no. 2: 1-30. While t h i s Heidegger-on-his-head work i s a b r i l l i a n t apologetic f or the author's Zen-oriented r e l i g i o n , i t lacks the h i s t o r i c a l perspective required of any useful i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e a r l i e r Indian Buddhism. CHAPTER III CONCLUSION 217 In the l a s t section, the Buddhological passages of the Mahayanasamgraha were analyzed and the function of the t r i k a y a doctrine was c l a r i f i e d . A f u l l study of t h i s doctrine would require two further steps: (a) An examination. of other, texts. • -(b) An i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "the"doctrine. . These coul