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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The philosophy of Bernard Bosanquet Stedman, Ralph Elliott 1928

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THE PHILOSOPHY of BERNARD BOSANQUET  t>y  Ralph Elliott  Stedman  \  A Thesis submitted for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Department of PHILOSOPHY  The University of British Columbia April - 1928  THE PHILOSOPHY OF B E R N A R D BOSANQUET  PREFACE  In undertaking a w o r k of this kind it is obvious that the writer, inasmuch as his appreciation"of his  subject  expands geometrically with greater understanding of and penetration into it, will always feel that his task is poorly done.  This essay is rather an attempt to understand  Bosanquet's thought  than to criticise and evaluate it  It is certain that criticism will creep in, at least  Justly. in  implication, and that evaluation cannot be escaped even in exposition.  It should suffice to say that, at present,  Bosanquet's position seems to the writer to be trery strong; and far more comprehensive and thorough than any of the somewhat easy-going pluralisms which are springing up around us.  That there are difficulties remainiiig none can doubt,  but this study is a beginning rather than an end.  CONTENTS  PART I INTRODUCTORY Chapter "  I II  His Life His Philosophical  Affiliations  1. Remote a.Plato b.Spinoza c.Rousseau a.Hegel. E. Immediate a.Green and the Neo-Hegelians b.Bradley. "  III  Some General Comments Concerning His Philosophy. 1. Originality S.  Peculiarities of His Idealism. a.Its placing of Mind. b.Not Subjectivism c.Not an "ancilla fidei"  3.  His Starting Point. a.The'best experience.' b.The 'full of impression' c . i m p o r t a n c e and Reality'  4.  Comparison with Bradley. a.Positive and optimistic "b.Diffusene3s of style and argument.  CONTENTS  PART I INTRODUCTORY Chapter "  I II  His Life His Philosophical  Affiliations  1. Remote a.Plato b.Spinoza c.Rousseau a.Hegel. E. Immediate a.Green and the Neo-Hegelians b.Bradley. "  III  Some General Comments Concerning His Philosophy. 1. Originality S.  Peculiarities of His Idealism. a.Its placing of Mind. b.Not Subjectivism c.Not an "ancilla fidei"  3.  His Starting Point. a.The'best experience.' b.The 'full of impression' c . i m p o r t a n c e and Reality'  4.  Comparison with Bradley. a.Positive and optimistic "b.Diffusene3s of style and argument.  -IIIPART II-A  Chapter VI  Mind, Body and Nature. 1. Paradox of His View of Mind. 2. Theories of Mind. 3. Nature and Mind. a. As complimentary b. As indistinguishable at their 'edges.* 4. Body and Mind. a. Mechanism b. Rejection of "teleology,'  'entelechy,' 'sponteneity.'  5. Recapitulation.  Chapter VII  The Self-Transcendence of the Finite Individual. 1. Are Selves Exclusive and  Substantive?  2. Self-Transcendence. a. The fluctuation of the self between a bare potentiality and the absolute. b. The defect of the finite  self.  c. Accentuation of vitality in self-transcendence. d. Difficulty of finding suitable terms. 3. Illustrations. a. Art. b. Love. c. Society.  -IIPART II-A METAPHYSIC AND LOGIC Chapter  IV  The Concrete Universal.  1. Statement of the Principle. £. Univer3als. a. Defect of the general rule. b. A true theory of identity. c. The Concrete Universal. 3. The Individual Rather than the Particular. 4. Ultimately there can only be One Individual. Chapter  V  Thought. 1. The Appeal to the Whole. a. The gulf between the 'real and the ideal.' b. The stability of a 'world.' c. Thought is 'self expression of reality in finite minds.' 2. Questions Remaining. a. Why'toward a world?' b. Why 'thought' rather than will, activity, intuition or feeling?' c. The relation of thought to existence.  -VI-  PART III Chapter XIII  The World of Spiritual Membership.  Hoi Chapter XVI  Freedom. 1. The Capture of Mechanism by Freedom. 2. The Rejection of Contingency. 3. The Rejection of Pre-determination. Self-Determination  the Rule.  4. Objections Reviewed. a. That this is not freedom b. That initiative is denied c. Creativity Is not ®de novo' but none the less real. 5. Responsibility. Chapter XV  Religion and God. 1. His Attitude to Religion. 2. Bhat is the Religious  Consciousness?  3. Its Independence of an Independently Existent Deity. 4 . Difficulties Inherent in any Statement of God. a. 'Good' rather than b . A Person. c. An 'Existent'  'Perfection'  5. Religion an Attitude and a Devotion. Chapter XVI  Immortality 1. Survival Rejected a. For Its heedlessness, b. Its extreme difficulty. c. Its naivete of belief.  -IIIPART II-A  Chapter VI  Mind, Body and Nature. 1. Paradox of His View of Mind. E. Theories of Mind. 3. Nature and Mind. a. As complimentary b. As indistinguishable at their 'edges.* 4. Body and Mind. a. Mechanism b. Rejection of "teleology,'  'entelechy,' 'sponteneity.'  5. Recapitulation.  Chapter VII  The Self-Transcendence of the Finite Individual. 1. Are Selves Exclusive and  Substantive?  E, Self-Transcendence. a. The fluctuation of the self between a bare potentiality and the absolute. b. The defect of the finite  self.  c. Accentuation of vitality in self-transcendence. d. Difficulty of finding suitable terms. 3. Illustrations. a. Art. b. Love. c. Society.  -IVPART II-A Chapter VIII  The Absolute. ' 1. The Notion of the Absolute. a. Mistaken notions. b. The absolute implied in judgment. c. And in experience. 2. Is Knowledge of the Absolute Possible? There are clues. 3. What the Absolute cannot be. 4. What the Absolute may be. a. Formula of inclusion. b. Formula of transmutation. 5. Is the Absolute a 'Conscious Being? 9 6. Examination of Criticism.  PART II-B LOGIC Chapter IX  Logic. 1. The Continuity of the Logical Forms.  ^  2. Criticism of a. b. c. d.  Formal logic. Inductive logic. Symbolic logic Instrumental logic.  -X-  PART III Chapter XIII  The World of Spiritual Membership.  Hoi Chapter XVI  Freedom. 1. The Capture of Mechanism by Freedom. 2. The Rejection of Contingency. 3. The Rejection of Pre-determination. Self-Determination  the Rule.  4. Objections Reviewed. a. That this is not freedom b. That initiative is denied c. Creativity is not ®de novo' but none the less real. 5. Responsibility. Chapter XV  Religion and God. 1. His Attitude to Religion. 2. Bhat is the Religious  Consciousness?  3. Its Independence of an Independently Existent Deity. 4 . Difficulties Inherent in any Statement of God. a. 'Good' rather than b . A Person. c. An 'Existent'  'Perfection'  5. Religion an Attitude and a Devotion. Chapter XVI  Immortality 1. Survival Rejected a. For Its heedlessness, b. Its extreme difficulty. c. Its naivete of belief.  -XIPART II-B Chapter X  The Logic of the Whole. 1. Sensation to Science. 2. Judgment. 3. Inference. 4. Intuition.  PART III ETHICS AND RELIGION Chapter X I  The Finite-Infinite Life 1. Contradiction and  (Pleasure and P a i n ) Tension.  2. Pleasure and Pain. a. Their common root. b. Refutation of Pessimism. 3. The Weight of Suffering. 1 a. Transmutation to tragedy. of '"brute agony b. Dens and Slums!  Chapter XII The Finite-Infinite Life (The Moral  Struggle)  1. The Conflict of the Whole M a n 2. Good and Evil a. Have a common content b. And are correlative 3. This View does not Minimize the Moral Struggle. 4. The 'Final Victory of Good.' 5. 'Beyond  Justice.'  -VII-  Chapter XVI  (Cont'd) 2. What is Wanted is Survival of Values,  Progress  Chapter XVII  PART IV FINIS Criticism Reviewed and a Word as to His Influence.  Chapter XVIII  1. Criticism a. Reviewed "b. Of his logic, especially of the 'concrete universal' c. Criticism rejected 2. His  Influence  A very tentative  fore-cast  ABBREVIATIONS USED "Principle"  "Principle of Individuality and Value"  "Value and Destiny"  "Value and Destiny of the  "Meeting of Extremes"  "Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy"  "Symposium"  "Life and Finite Individuality" In Aristotelian Society - N.S. IS  Individual"  HIS LIFE  Part I  Chapter  I  All who have written of the life of Bernard Bosanquet have done so with the feeling that they wrote of a very great man.  And this is the more remarkable in that in  the company of philosophers it is the more  difficult to  attain distinction because of the greatness of the to be maintained.  tradition  Both by the depth and breadth of his  thought, and by the fineness of his character Bosanquet  counts  as among the foremost Englishmen of his generation, and that a generation rich in great men. Within his life's span fell most of the changes which have made our'modern world.'  These movements he watched  closely, and interpreted in the light of a knowledge of all that had been the most real in times previous, unexcelled by any contemporary.  It is remarked that T.H. Green, his master  at Balliol, considered him'the best equipped man of his generation.'  S  For an account  of his life the reader should  to the memoir by his wife.  turn  Only a brief note w i l l be written  here, for, as Bosanquet himself has said "the best of him is in his books." He was born in 1848 near Alnwick in Northumberland, of Huguenot-Scottish stock, and spent his early years after the manner of the sons of the  'country family.'  His father  was the squire of Rock, a tiny village, and the incumbent also, of the tiny church.  His mother was an able and  woman, who varied the management deal of stiff reading.  charming  of her family w i t h a great  Doubtless both parents by their broad  intellectual interests shaped the mind and hence the future of their son to no small degree. evident influence.  His love of  Shakespeare,  throughout his pages, he traced to his mother's The usual  'prep' school, and then Harrow, provided  whatever of an education such places do provide, and at nineteen years of age he went up to Balliol as a scholar. At Oxford the influence of Jowett and of T.H. Green was at its height.  It was during his undergraduate  that he decided against  entering the church, and the atmosph-  ere of his college was probably no small determinant decision.  years  In 1870 he took a first in  elected a fellow of University College.  in this  Lit. Hum., and was Here he lived as a  don for eleven years. His creative career began when he moved to London. Here for sixteen years he lectured in University Extension played then a new thing - and/a prominent part in the w o r k of the  3  Charity Organisation Society, and of the London Society.  Ethical  During these years his writing commenced, and he  published in 1888 his  'Logic/  and in 1892 his  Aesthetic,' and many other w o r k s of permanent  'History of value.  At the end of the London period he married M i s s Helen Dendy, also a scholar of distinction, and moved into  Surrey;  living for a while at Caterham, and then building a house on the edge of Oxshott Common.  To 1903 he published, among  other  lesser volumes his 'Philosophical Theory of the State' for which alone, he would have attained distinction in the of political philosophy.  Throughtout  ies, social and academic, were  these years his  field activit-  undiminished.  In 1903 he accpeted the  chair of M o r a l Philosophy  at St. Andrews, and taught there for the five following years. Of his class work it is said that "Even the weakest  student,  though he might understand only half of what w a s said, yet realized that something great and grave was being  communicated  to him - an interpretation of human life and experience which, all along the line, challenged easy-going surface impressions and customary prejudices; which deepened insight here, expanded it there, and throughout acted as a powerful  f  pull'  towards 1  a fresher and profounder understanding of the world."  In the  life of the university he took a keen interest, and his  influen-  ce was so great that philosophy became, if anything, too popular,  1.  Professor Hoernle - quoted in "Bernard Bosanquet" p . 110  both in the class and w i t h o u t .  Professor Burnet  writes  "Another thing w h i c h none of us who were his colleagues will ever forget is his readiness to engage in long philosophical discussions with anyone who cared for such things.  To these  discussions  admitted,  junior members of the staff were freely  and he often took them, and even their seniors, quite out 1 their depth - which was very good for With his retirement  them."  in 1908 from the chair at St.  Andrews the most fruitful period of his life began. his sixtieth  Between  and his seventy-fifth year he published  books as well as numerous papers for the Aristotelian and for the magazines.  of  ten Society  Not all of them were large books but  they included the most important volumes of all, the Gifford lectures of 1911-12.  The little book "Some Suggestions in  Ethics," the only purely ethical writing he published,  contains  some of his best thought, expressed with great beauty of style. Examples of his style will appear throughout this essay, but not as models of English.  A passage, therefore, to be read  for its beauty alone, will be quoted.  In a little  excursion  on our relation to animals he writes: "Everyone who has had a friend among dogs or horses or birds must have felt much enlarged in sympathy and in faith and courage by having a representative, Court of Pan. to a whole 1.  so to speak, at the  Just because it lacks the intelligence  directed  beyond the individual, which forms the glory His Memoir for the British Academy.  5  and the imperfection of a man, the lower animal  carries in  itself a peculiar anticipation of the Absolute.  The dog w h i c h  runs beside one seems a middle term and an interpreter one's worrying mind and the tranquil life of things.  between This  quickness and simple trustfulness of an animal which is once your friend is surely the secret of its attractiveness. It is, I have fancied, as if the Absolute came to eat out of your hand. It is a world or kingdom, foreign and unbiased by interests, which recognizes you of its sovereign indulgence.  See two or  three people in a garden, and how gratified that one is to whom a robin makes advances, 1  just as if it were a child or a  king that did so." There is in this a beauty of thought, of mind, and of expression, and a touch of whimsicality which ought  to be  an answer to the accusation that Bosanquet is stern and without  humor. It is, in conclusion, the always  astonishing  discovery of a man 'wholly at home with himself' and serene, not hurrying  strongly  through life in search of a guide to tell  him the way, but finding in every experience  joyous or tragic,  great or small, something which makes stronger and clearer his grasps on the single dominant conviction that there is value in living, which most arrests the rediscoverer of Bosanquet, as he lives in his books. 1.  Some Suggestions in Ethics - p.79 - 80  H I S PHILOSOPHICAL  AFFILIATIONS  Chapter II  In order to place Bosanquet  in his true  station  among philosophers, and to evaluate with any semblance of Justice the streams of influence that have centred in his system we would be compelled to have before us every detail of his philosophy and every nuance of his writing.  This we  cannot claim to have either here or at the end of this essay. For nothing less than a history of philosophy would  suffice.  This outline is intended only to indicate in the barest manner those who upon his own admission or by the most of evidence have influenced his thought.  obvious  A word or two only  need be given to each. 1  First  in order of time, and perhaps of deeper  influence is Plato.  From Plato, whom he constantly  quotes  and refers to, he has taken, in whole or in part, his sense of the need of synopsis in philosophy. 'the whole-spectacle' will serve.  Nothing less than  Then too, the solution of  the problem of the one and the many' he feels to have been suggested in Plato's equally 'passionate' demand for multiplicity as well as unity; for differentiation as well as integration and coherence.  His own view of reality as a  'world'  he takes to be foreshadowed in the concept rightly understood.  of  'the good,'  In the field of ethics the view of  just-  ice contained in the Republic he holds to be fundamental in the life of the state and of the individual.  That  'spiritual' is not reached by abstraction from the  both  the  mechanical  and quantitative, but is rather reached through the refinement and organisation of the physical, he finds to be in harmony w i t h 'Plato's deepest views.  Details might be multiplied,  but it will serve our purpose to note how profoundly his reading of Plato has coloured all of his thought. Leaping a millennium and more we come to Spinoza. While in his expression Bosanquet  does not tend to reproduce  that of Spinoza, nevertheless his spirit is at many points not dissimilar.  In detail he accepted Spinoza's view of  causality and of freedom, and particularly agrees w i t h him in his view of what Spinoza called Substance, but what he called the Absolute.  "It is that which the mind necessarily  thinks as the ground of all being." of thought.  It is the starting point  The agreement, therefore, extends downward into  the nature of things and of individuals who, both philosophers insist, may only be known as they are when considered parts of an all-embracing whole.  as  "The essences of individual  things are not to be discovered by looking at the series or order of their existence, for in that way we can only get external marks or relations, but not the explanation of things in themselves ....  These changeable things are so intimately  and in their essence, dependent on those things which are  8  eternal, that, apart from them, the former can neither 1  exist  nor "be conceived."  the  Bosanquet  acknowledges also that  third kind of cognition mentioned by Spinoza is noe  other  than that which Plato refers to as the contemplation of  'the  good' and which he himself sometimes calls intuition, or at times,  'theoria.'  That it is the nature of the thinking  being, moreover, to frame true or adequate thoughts, he  derives  equally from Spinoza and He&el and from the whole  classical  tradition.  Spinoza  termed  Finally we may note that the attitude  'amor intellectualis dei' is that which Bosanquet  himself  maintains toward the whole, and which he cites as the highest of experience. One recent writer characterizes Bosanquet as "A great and consistent  student of Spinoza.  All his life long  he seems to have kept Spinoza by him, and in all his books down to the very last there are to be found discussions not only of Spinozist  conceptions but even of Spinozist  "One may suspect indeed," he continues,"that  texts."  the increase of  his attention to Spinoza in his later years is evidence of his own recognition of the fact that the good which he had received from Hegel he could have derived, in a more simple and concrete  (and perhaps 2 in a less dubious) form directly  from Spinoza himself."  If this is exaggeration it is no  more so than a fair-minded Spinefeist is likely to fall into. 1. 2.  3)e Intell. Emend. Chapter XIV. I. Roth in Mind, U.S. 36 p.2C8.  9  For his influence upon Bosanquet's political philosophy - though w e are not dealing at length w i t h this phase in our essay - Rousseau must be mentioned. of the  'Real W i l l 1  a part  of his social  Rousseau.  so often misunderstood, but  The  doctrine  so important  theory is descended directly from  But it may be pointed out that Bosanquet  more clearly the real bearing of the Rousselian  saw far  doctrine  than did its founder. The mark made upon the world of thought, and hence, upon Bosanquet  (who, in a way, is in the direct line of  descent) by Hegel is too deep to more than indicate, for it is obvious of itself. would  The chief acknowledgments w h i c h Bosanquet  offer to Hegel are; that philosophy begins and  ends in  the actual and the concrete; that the real is the rational, and the rational the real, and that man by his dependence upon the real is guaranteed the ability to think true or thoughts of the real; that finite minds in no way  thoughts, constit-  ute nature, but are themselves elicited by nature, and with nature are expressions of the real; that mind and freedom reach their summit in civilization, the ranges of mind; 1  'objective  and finally that in art, especially, is an analogue  of the absolute, and an aspect of experience most valuable to man.  Bosanquet's high appreciation of this last is evidconcerning Hegel enced by his remark/ "The Philosophy of Fine Art is almost a 1 microcosm of his entire system." 1.  In his Introduction.  S  These affiliations are more or less remote.  Mention  may be made also of those whose influence was immediate.  It  has been said that Hegel did not come into his own until he was transplanted into the more suitable constitutional and liberal England.  soil and climate of  The neo-Hegelian  school  of the mid-nineteenth century was the atmosphere of Bosanquet's early years.  Especially was he influenced by T.H. Green,  to whom he acknowledges a deep debt.  As to this school in  general he has written somewhere "Not that German Idealism has introduced into English thought an element wholly exotic unknown, but rather that it has suggested certain  and  intellect-  ual forms and presented certain organized regions of experience, drawn from the analogous, though distinct development a kindred nation, which may aid in the systematic  of  expression  of that many sided ideal reality which our rational mind also has been grappling with, and gradually comprehending."  From  this school of English Hegelianism, and from Green in particular .Bosanquet drew two conceptions very pronounced in their influence.  The first is the conception of  self-realization  in the social whole, which co-operating with what he had taken of Rousseau, directly shaped his social and political philosophy. Bosanquet  The practical interest  came to share it.  of Green was intense, and  The second is not a single  concept so much as a wealth of detailed theory, derived from Green's Cairds, and Wallace  suggestion in ethical  'Prolegomena.'  Then too the  and Nettleship, also of this group have  afforded Bosanquet much material and  inspiration.  11  He with whom Bosanquet will always tend to be coupled, and whose w o r k in a large measure paralleled own, and to whom he acknowledged more debt  his  than to any other  modern is F.H. Bradley, fellow of M e n t o n College. conditions under which they worked were wholly  The  different,  their temperaments were different, but the bearing and cter of their philosophy is strangely alike.  chara-  Since space is  taken below to differentiate the general tone and method  of  these two, we need not remark upon it here; but we may point their similarity.  Bosanquet's logic, in the main, is th$  same as that of Bradley; this metaphysic is, apart difference of terms,  from  (and possibly one real departure of  thought) almost alike.  Characteristic phrases as "the degrees  of truth and reality" are common to both.  The only reason  why Bosanquet did not write at length in the field of ethics was his appreciation of Bradley's  'Ethical Studies.®  12  SOME GENERAL COMMENTS  Chapter III  1.  The genuine originality of the philosophy of  Bernard Bosanquet must not be minimized on account of the generous acknowledgment  of indebtedness to former and to  contemporary philosophers which is found in all of his writings. His membership of a great  tradition is, to him, a greater  source of pride than any distinctiveness he may have Nevertheless, that he has contributed to English  Idealism  something quite distinctive and in the truest sense cannot be questioned.  achieved.  If it were only the unbending  original honesty  of purpose coupled with a consideration for the thoughts of others, the complete absence of any controversial  spirit  even  in sharp disagreement, his originality in this alone would not be undeserving of comment,  but there is something more.  As we shall amply see, creation is never  'de novo;' and  therefore, if old materials are worked up into new forms, and old views are re-stated in astonishingly varied and fresh ways, the work may justly claim to be creative.  In a single  generation the total atmosphere of thought may undergo ible  modification, incredible, that is, before the  incred-  event.  Forces long at work below the surface of common appreciation may suddenly emerge, and in a moment of world interests.  shift the whole  bearing  Nothing that was not implicit before has  13  borne to light, but as soon as the implicit has become  explicit  and obvious, every attitude of mind and every activity, of thought must undergo adjustment Tinder the pressure of the emphasis that is, for the time,  dominant.  The situation of Idealism underwent et' s life-time radical re-adjustment.  during Bosanqu-  A new world and a new  theory both had their birth in the Nineteenth Century.  The  world after Napoleon and after the Industrial Revolution could never be the same. pressing.  Its problems were new and very  The political interest of Bosanquet  before him was rooted in this changed world.  and of G-reen Then too, from  the first careful enunciation of the hypothesis to the present day, it is not too much to say, no other topic has had influence to be compared with that which evolution has exerted on the public, the scientific, and the philosophic mind. Absolute idealism, regnant in 1860,  successfully  withstood the tide of Nationalism toward the close of the century,  (and for this, F.H. Bradley bears the laurels),  suffered somewhat under the guerilla warfare of the  earlier  Pragmatisms, and was eclipsed by the rapid rise of the New Realism of these latter days.  Throughout  these  shifting  times, and for over half a' century Bosanquet has shown the ability of an Absolutism that  'knows its business' to meet  all challengers on their own ground, to take to itself everything of value which the new emphases express, and to  14  emerge whole and vigorous at the  end.  There is a sanity in a system of thought which, while insisting above a'll that the wide and deep of twenty-three centuries merit  agreements  consideration, if not as the  norm, at least as the guiding light of philosophy, and that newness alone is no recommendation, draws virtually all of its material for philosophising, and its method, from to which the most recent  sources  science can take no exception.  task undertaken by Bosanquet  The  is no less than a re-statement  of the best of Idealism in the light of the most recent So successful is he in this attempt, that  thought.  'enemies' have  accused him openly of materialism. The philosophy of Bosanouet  claims, then, to be a  fresh expression of all honest and thoroughgoing philosophy; 1 not a syncretism but a synthesis; the best of experience interpreted in the light of the whole, which is the ground of all  intelligibility. His preference,  therefore, as to the title by which  his thought may be known, is not Idealism, but  "Speculative  Philosophy," and in view of its catholicity of interest, title is not unwarranted.  Titles, too, around which  has long been waged may darken rather than illumine  the  controversy counsel.  Professed realists may be found in agreement with idealists on vital issues, and any reading of contemporary philosophy 1. That is, the great and obviously important experiences, rather than the more obviously trivial and incomplete.  will show the lines between the camps to be quite and never for long in the same place.  arbitrary  "Every philosophy"  Bosanquet writes "and not idealism alone is attempting to 1 do justice to the standpoint of the whole." It is a tenet of his speculative philosophy that good may come from any quarter. ts 1 assertion that  He "Welcomes the neo-realis-  the world of sense perception has being  in its own right, and that the splendour and values which we seem to contemplate directly are apprehended by us as they truly are."  And further "Pnilosophy does not  volatilize,  so to speak, our world and externality but accepting it for all that it claims of existence and reality, then passes on to interpret its conditions and assign its significance more S profoundly." The material which, worked together,  constitutes  this 'Speculative Philosophy' is the subject of Part our essay, but in order that its most from 'idealism' as popularly thought  II of  obvious difference of may be known in  advance, the following points may be noted. E  Since idealism is commonly known to have been  generous in its estimate of mind the student of Bosanquet must be prepared to discover a theory of mind far less 1.  M . of Ex. P.vi.  S.  Ibid. p.S  flattering than the popular tradition of idealism has assigned it. Bosanquet  Whatever the ultimate nature of things may be,  is firmly persuaded that it is not  particular minds.  constituted  by  By his own admission he belongs to a  "faction of the idealistically minded who refuse to see in mind and nature either the factors  of an ultimate  antithesi  or provinces of data either of which is simply reducible to 1 the other."  "You do not," he writes elsewhere "make the  world, it communicates your nature to you." b.  It follows from this that the idealism so ably  refuted by the New Realists,(Professor Perry, for  example,)  an idealism, that is, for which particular minds are the ult imate reals, has no relation whatever to the thought of Bosanquet.  The persistent  attempt  to reduce such a system  as "his to subjectivism can only be characterised as perverse Moreover, it is now becoming an article of agreement both realists (Mr. Whitehead, for example) and  between  idealists  (as Professor Hoernle) that Bishop Berkeley himself is radic ally misinterpreted, if he is understood  to conceive of  constituted ky  reality as A particular minds as we know them. c.  Idealism, also, has been viewed as an  fidei,' a handmaid of revealed religion.  'ancilla  It may be said  without equivocation that, although Bosanquet's writing is 1.  M . of Ext. p-vi.  17 instinct with religion, his philosophy attempts no ation of the w a y s of God. to men. is frankly denied.  justific-  Indeed, any such purpose  Bertrand Russell, it w i l l be recalled,  maintains that philosophy must  "repudiate the attempt  prove that particular pleasant  things are true because  are pleasant" and must also "decline to inquire into  to they  any  problems of the nature or conditions, the presence or absence 1 in the universe of satisfaction former of these most  or satisfactoriness."  'necessary repudiations'  Bosanquet  The  would  certainly accept, but the latter he has denied.  Satis-  factoriness, he maintains, is an element of the universe, and its conditions may, in some measure, be known; but pursuit  its  to the neglect of logical necessity, and the attempt  to pin it onto the -universe as a whole he condemns.  Philoso-  phy cannot be 'ethically neutral' nor can it neglect  the  contribution of religion to experience as a whole, but philosophy must be severe and honest.  An uncriticised  desire  must not cause her to demand for mankind that which careful and reflective theory will be compelled to deny. The robustness of Bosanquet's philosophy makes William James' foolish witticism about the'tender minded' idealist so reflect upon the confortable inclusiveness of pragmatism as to make it appear quite hospitable in comparison. 3.  In his lecture entitled "Science and Philosophy,"  Bosanquet remarks that philosophy may be approached from any 1.  Quoted in  Sc. and Ph. p .  avenue, and that given thoroughness and an obstinate  attempt  to penetrate the problems w h i c h will emerge on the way result will be very m u c h the same.  the  The reason, he would  point out, for M r . Russell's failure to advance beyond his present  impasse  (and any careful criticism of the notion of  'neutral particulars' would  seem to indicate that it is an  impasse), and his failure to come to any agreement w i t h the traditional philosophers is th be found in his refusal to face the implication of great areas of experience for the sake of a predilection  (doubtless temperamental) for symbolic logic.  In so far as his method is adequate to the whole of any sphere of experience, only by lack of persistence does it fall short of adequacy in the entire  field.  It is Bosanquet's contention, therefore, that  as  there is a -universal in art which transcends the peculiarities of different artists and ages, there is an essential agreement in philosophy,  shared by all serious thinkers end all generat-  ions which is even more marked than the differences of emphasis which, upon a superficiel reading withdraw attention to themselves.  He has a very apt phrase.  "To be right as the  great men are right is to have traversed thousands of ingenuities and come back to the centre enriched by their negative results."  Agreement too soon may be a token of superficial-  ity, but agreement, at the last, with the best thought of the race, is a sign of greatness. His own philosophy began with logic.  "When I wrote  about logic," he confesses, " am afraid that I really thought, 1.  And a strong dislike of the conditions of the present world.  19 though I did not loudly proclaim it, that logic was the whole of philosophy," but with the advance of years and the broadening of his outlook and too, by some sweeping  modification  of his view of the scope and function of logic, he came to draw upon the whole of life for his data. his argument  Leaving the course of 1  to clear him of ambiguity he states belief  that  from the great and central experiences alone, from, for example, love, art, religion, the social life, can the philosopher  come  to a full appreciation of man and find clues (if he can) w h i c h will lead him on to clearer knowledge of reality.  Rather than  be brought to these experiences in the long run, he will make them his starting point, take them for his inspiration, and conceive of his purpose in terms of a deeper understanding and appreciation of them.  It cannot be too much stressed  here lies the key to Bosanouet's philosophy. intricate passages;  that  When, in reading  concerning, say, the Absolute, or some  other supposedly'abstract purpose that is implicit  theme;' it is well to remember the throughout, asand not to write it off  impatiently (as one reader has done)/"Superficial  and illogical  idealism." "We begin" he writes, "with the principle,  the  truism if y o u like, that in our attitude to experience and through experience to our world, we are going to put the central thing in the centre 1.  ... to take for our standard what  In the Introduction to Principle.  20  man recognises as value when his life is fullest soul at its highest  and his  strength."  For lack of taking the full impression of the world as he finds it, in all the strength of its  opposition,  and "by over anxiety to order his theory early, the philosopher may fall into the error of the  'first look' and fall  dismally  short of the whole, and offer a deformed picture of reality. Thus, for example, the moralist, receiving his either of the weight  impression  of evil, or the depth of good in the  world may feel tempted to ignore the one for the sake of the other, and will readily form the habit  of selection.  He will  present an ethical pessimism on an Emersonian optimism which does gross injustice to the fact of opposition of good and evil in the world, and which shirks its responsibility by too easy a resolution.  Any lover of the world's great  readers of the Greeks, of Shakespeare,  tragedies,  of Chekov, will  witness that it is in the apparently irreconcileable diction of the tragedy, and  contra-  in the inevitableness of its  opposition that its strength and its value as a representation of experience  lies.  "You have rather to open your eyes to the higher obvious, and look at the greater experiences as they are. You have to apprehend the sublimity and splendour  actually 1  lighting up the lines of homribleness and squalor." immediate 1.  Not  an  impression of the world, nor a near and narrow Principle - p.5  21  reading of experience, but a steady and strong grasp things as they are is the beginning  of  of philosophy.  W i t h Hegel, Bosanquet maintains that philosophy is concerned with the concrete, and not the abstract,  with  life, and not w i t h a theory for its own sake. 1  Professor  Hoernle  of  writes of it as a "literal transcript  experience,"  and Professor Leighton adds that "He gives us a positive  and  constructive interpretation of the main concrete forms of human culture."  A brief word of B o s a n q u e t f s .  Philosophy  looks for "the greatness and ideality of life in its commonest actual phases." On the other hand, though the riches of life are necessary to philosophy, philosophy is not necessary to life. "In suggesting  that philosophy gives usthe. quintessence  life I am not," he remarks, "suggesting in life is the pursuit  of philosophy.  that the best  thing  What I mean is that  the things which are the most important in a man's are also the things which are most  of  certain to his  experience thought.  And further, I should urge, this is not an accident  but  inevitable, because importance and reality are sides of the same  characteristic." In thus coupling the w o r d s "importance and reality"  we have the central thought of Bosanquet again brought sharp focus.  Existence is a concern only as it is the guaran-  tee of importance. its own sake.  into  Ontology is not a game to be played  for  It is from the logical connection and inter-  pretation of all that interests the human spirit and matters  most to man that  the web of our understanding of reality is  mad©. This is not  'humanism,' for what is important to  man is not itself the truly real, but is the only possible clue to the real.  M a n is not being made the 'measure of  all things,' but that w h i c h is most  significant  to man, his  longings, loves, and all his experience, is subjected to thoroughgoing  criticism iri order to detect, if possible,  in  the wide range of difference some strands of essential agreement,  some common movement, w h i c h may be traced  out, and which, in its manifestations,  through-  and in its projection  beyond them, may lead to some knowledge, incomplete but veridical  of the truly real.  It is the discoirerable  streak  of continuity in the world and in man as he finds himself, and obviously beyond him that links  'importance and reality.'  We shall return to this theme under the title of the Transcendence of the Finite  "Self  Individual."  A further consideration of this  'movement of  experience,' of the daily fluctuation of the human  spirit  (for although at present definition of the human spirit  is  not possible - we come to that later - it would be a pedantry to avoid the use of the term) leads us to see the of philosophy.  inevitability  If man is to be reflective at all, life is of  such a sort that he cannot rest in it but must look for its reasons and its grounds and advance upon a 'pilgrim's progress' of thought until he reaches the limit of his capacity for reflection, or dies.  There is no way out, nor any standing  23  ground, either of a solid and given self, or of immediate and. given fact to w h i c h we can retire and ignore the movement experience which always carries us  'beyond ourselves' and  beyond every artificial limit we have  set for  ourselves.  Not everyone will consciously philosophise, but everyone in the adventure w h i c h makes philosophy of some sort able . To the question,  t  of  is  inevit-  4 sometimes  asked.  "If we have life, what need have we of philosophy?" Bosanquet would reply. ' "Philosophy is not an abstraction alien to life, it is the best of life made the most of.  It is the  obvious  things, the platitudes, even, which taken in their full . significance, bring us into the midst of philosophy." 4.  „ As has already been indicated the tone of Bosanquet's  writing is, for all its severity, serene, and its tendency is toward the positive rather than the negative a situation.  statement  But he does not expound a 'meliorism, 1  of  which  so often is the outcrop of a deeply laid pessimism, or an ultimate optimism which would involve the fallacy of a universe judged to be good by some standard external to it - a criterion  i  '  of value that can have no possible meaning.  His optimism is  reflected rather as a strong assurance of the worth whileness of life and a deep appreciation of the wealth, both material and cultural of the world.  Professor C.C.J. Webb remarks  upon this quality of serenity in Bosanouet, and it has been noticed by many others, as refreshing after the brilliant  24 negations of F.H. Bradley. an "air of almost inhuman  He  (Professor W e b b ) complains of  serenity while dismissing much that  has been precious to many generations of our spiritual 1 fathers." fitting.  M r . Bradley's  fore-  'melancholy' he finds more  For his own part, Bosanquet  feels that his philosop-  hy offers enough for "any reasonable man" of security for all he values most highly. Dr. fficTaggart,however, sees in this attitude signs of presumption too obvious to u a s s without  2  comment.  But Dr. McTaggart belongs to another camp, and as  it is a camp of one, his criticism of Bosanquet for tion' need not be taken too  'presump-  seriously.  Another difference from the method and tone of Bradley note.  (with whom he has so much in common) is also w o r t h y of Bradley advances to the heart of his problem, the  defect of relational thought, by an inevitable almost diabolic in its destructiveness. by a reading of relentlessly. Bosanquet  dialectic  The feeling  induced  "Appearance and Reality" is of a doom moving Contrasted w i t h this dreadful precision  is diffuse  in his style, almost  to distraction.  But w h e n entered into, his argument is no less vigorous, and his logical skill no less refined.  The argument is slowly,  even effortlessly,gathered 3 up from the four quarters of his world which is not a narrow one, and is illustrated now from this 1.  Divine Personality and Human life - by C.C.J. Webb, 19, p.253.  2.  In his Review for Mind of "Principle.  3.  It is reported that T.H. Green regarded Bosanquet as the "best equipped man of his generation."  area of. experience, now from that, with fresh light from a whole firmament of philosophers, until having attained purpose, it gives place to some further thought.  The  its style  is as conversational as the subject matter will allow, breaking, here and there into sheer beauty, but the mind at work is as massive as the more trenchant  Bradley.  The latter writes as a controversialist clarity of a frosty night;  and w i t h the  the former as a philosopher,  with charity toward all man.  He concludes, for  and  illustration,  his "Meeting of Extremes," a w o r k of his later years, with a recognition of the values that may fall to philosophy by the working out of a tendency he had resisted strenuously all his life.  Moreover, to all we have said, it may be added;  every line that Bosanquet published conviction.'  is the  'record of a strong  26 V  THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL  Part  Chapter  II  IT  The philosophy of Bosanquet about its central principle  that it is not easy to treat  effectively with any one aspect 'passim®  to others also.  is so closely built  or problem without  referring  Nor is it possible to expound his i  central principle without venturing into the wider ranges of his philosophy.  The central thesis, that truth is a coherent  system, which cannot be understood except in the light of the whole is exemplified in the architechtonic  of his theory.  single principle which comprehends the whole i.s the of Individuality."  The  "Principle  By means of this principle logic is knit  into Metaphysics, and Ethics, Aesthetics  and^PolitiLcji^^vei!)  are brought in as the very material of Ontology.  Nor is this  strange.  It follows from the conviction that the truth is the  whole - a  'world' - and that within a world these can be no  hard and fast lines.  And a world is the type, as we shall see,  of the universal, and the formula of Bosanquet's scheme of reality.  27  In this chapter the concept  of the logical  universal,  the defeat of the general rule, the importance of a true  theory  of identity, the character of the concrete universal, a*nd the emergence of the principle of individuality will be "It is difficult a doctrine that meant  to condense without  elaborated.  evaporation  so much to Bosanquet as the  "Concrete  Universal,'" writes M r . Muirhead in his obituary notice of 1 Bosanquet in "Mind."  Upon its elaboration alone  fifty  pages of the "Principle" is spent, but the entire series of lectures is, in a sense, an amplification of the same theme. As is suggested by the name, the concrete universal is set over against the-abstract universal, and is preferred as the higher and more adequate type.  Universals are  commonly  defined as 'qualities characterising a number of distinct particulars, or relations recurring in a number of different situations.'  The universal, therefore, is, when so  consider-  ed, of the nature of a general rule, and is an identity disconerable in particulars which, because of the identity  (the  quality which they exhibit in common) are taken together as members of a class. a.  To Bosanauet, however, the formulation of a general  rule, while a step in the direction of system in knowledge appears to be an insufficient  step.  Every generalization  (or abstract universal) does, it is true, illuminate the 1.  U.S. 32, p.393  situation it covers.  The assignment  of particulars to  classes does throw-light both on them and on their world, but this defect remains.  For the sake of a very narrow  (which, indeed, is not in the fullest  identity  sense an identity at  all, as we shall show later) wide areas of difference overlooked.  The abstract universal, proceeding by  are  successive  generalization toward the whole can never give a picture of the whole.  Valuable information it can afford, but it  cannot  approach any closer to the nature of the universe, or of any 'concrete subject®  as a work of art, for example, than a  number of piecemeal assertions can take it. of the whole  In falling  short  it fails completely as a means to the understand-  ing of its world, however close its approximation to the whole may be.  "Its method" Bosanquet writes "is omission."  another put it, "It murders to dissect."  Or,as  If it only failed  of reaching, for us, the ultimate whole, the defect would be less grievous; but as it is inadequate to the of the  consideration  'concrete nature of any individual,' it must be  super-  ceded by a type of universal which will take in difference as well as formal identity, and which will thus allow of the those formulation of/ 'ideal s y n t h e s e s w h i c h are the chief desiderata 1 of Bosanquet's b.  speculation.  The theory of identity which is defended by Bosanquet  in this connection may be briefly stated as, "An individual is itself." 1.  The identity that disregards difference is, Science and Philosophy - p.35.  strictly,  not an identity at all, "because no part may be  considered  as unconditioned by the whole of which it is a part. identity is a meeting point of differences and 1 always, in a sense, concrete."  "An  therefore  It is, in other words,  the element of continuity that persists through differences, and not in spite of difference.  "A great  country" for  example, "does not represent itself by mapping itself on a portion of its surface, but by developing, say, a university at one point, a church at another, a manufacturing town at £ a third." c.  To cover this higher form of identity Bosanquet  has  taken over the Hegelian theme, the'concrete universal,' and the term  'abstract universal' is left to cover those  ies which disregard differences.  This abstract  identit-  universal  expresses the common element which constitutes a class, but the concrete, universal expresses the nature of a an 'organism,'  'a system of members,' a 'cosmos.'  way to understand a world is to realize that it sorts' to make it. of nothing.  'world,' The only  'takes all  It is essentially inclusive, and  exclusive  The class, on the other hand "is essentially  one sort only."  of  In a world the members, though formally  distinct, contribute to the unity their of the whole by virtue the peculiarities which constitute/distinctness. 1.  Science and Philosophy, p.35  2.  Principle, p.38  of  "The universal is no longer treated," Bosanquet writes in his essay "On a True Theory of Identity,""as an -abstraction, but, so to speak, as a concretion.  We can no  longer see why the universal, within which a certain falls should.be more abstract  than that element; why for  example, the state should be a more abstract 1 the citizen." 1  element  existence  The formula of reality which Bosanquet  than  is developing  may be briefly stated as "The typical structure of reality is that of worlds within worlds.' diversity  His own phrase is "A  recognized as a unity, a macrocosm constituted by  microcosms is the type of the concrete universal; a living  2 world, complete and acting out of itself." As an illustration  of the type of identity of a  world or organism he points to the unity in difference of a steam engine. . It is not,in bare repitition of parts each the same, that- the engine functions, but by the movement  co-operative  of many parts each different, but each so shaped as  to form together a systematic whole.  For further examples  we may go to the membership of the human body, and finally the membership of man and woman and their whole in what we call civilization.  environment  Stated logically "The test of  universality which is imposed by the concrete universal  is  not the number of subjects v/hich share a common predicate, but the number of predicates state) 1. 2. 3.  (as the complex members in a  that can be attached to a single Science and Philosophy p.37 Principle p.38 Ibid p.39  subject."  31 \  We have glimpsed thus the  'key thought' of  Bosanquet's philosophy, which like an air with its variations, runs through the whole. From the recognition  of the concrete universal the  principle of individuality arises.  Correlative  to the  abstract universal is the particular, and particularity is itself an abstraction.  The term  'particular' leaves the  idea of isolation and exclusiveness, an idea untenable in the light  of the conditioning of the part by the whole  it is a member.  of which  The better term is the "individual," a term  which is, in this sense,  (and throughout Bosanquet's writing)  technical, but which he feels to do justice not only to the element of diversity and formal particularity, but also  to  the "maintenance and expression of an abiding unity." Particularity is the first obvious judgment  concerning  almost  any object, the more valuable discovery lies in the further judgment as to its  connections.  The individual, however, cannot be considered  as  correlative to the concrete universal, as the particular was to the abstract universal, for the notion of membership introduces a new factor, and the hard opposition sides is broken down.  of the two  Once the type of universal is recognized  as a system of members the character of which  (members) lies as  much in the whole as it does within themselves, then the member is, to that extent, at least the system.  That is, the  true character of the member is the system, or the whole of which it is a part.  Bosanquet is very emphatic.  "The Concrete  32 Universal is the Individual," or again "The key to a l l  sound  philosophy lies in taking the concrete universal, that 1  is,  the  individual, as the true type of universal." The Principle  of Individuality, or of membership  within living wholes is manifested in every phase of experience and in every movement  in the universe; in  'finite  individuals'  - men and women are the obvious examples - in society and in every sphere of human interest  and  activity.  This concept of the concrete universal and the Principle  of Individuality is the theoretical basis of all  Bosanquet's speculation, but it is from the fields of life, as we shall see, that  the clues  to the concept are drawn.  It must be noted that the principle of individuality, taken to its logical conclusion, points ultimately to an individual.  Strictly there can only be one self-complete  whole, which is  the Absolute, and within this individual all  other individuals will show signs of incompleteness, of lack on several sides.  The ultimate individual is not,  therefore  arrived at arbitrarily, but is reached in the attempt to complete the statement of a principle discoverable in every experience.  The road to the absolute individual is of the  nature of a necessary inference from the observed fact of individuality.  THOUGHT  Chapter V  The picture of reality suggested in the preceding section, a macrocosm, that is, of microcosms, an orderly whole of distinct but contributory members is, it must be admitted, a picture on the  'grand scale.'  It appears to be,  so to speak, somewhat of a marble palace shining on a hill; a beautiful fabrication built altogether out of reach of the warring world; fine enough to contemplate, it is true; but with such a gulf fixed between it, the ideal, and the world, the real, as to be no more potent in motivating conduct  and  affairs than something that never was and never will be. In short, it is so divorced from 'things as they are' as to be no more than a lovely dream. Bosanquet, however, would urge that the defect  lies  not in the ideal, but in the failure to see all that is in the real; that  'things as they are' if understood more  completely would take one over the gulf that only our impoten ce has put between.  He would point out that this picture,  far from doing violence to common experience is indeed no more than an outline of something any reasonably penetrating  34  mind can discern through and in the confusion of daily events and everyday experiences; and that only the dullness of the or the lack of appreciation it for a moment.  of an ordinary insight  eye  obscures  The defect again, is not in the structure  of reality, but in our conception of it. see it we could "Experience  If only we would  the Absolute better than anything  else," the movement of a single day being enough to  establish  it beyond any doubt. The contradiction  and flux of everyday  experience,  rather than being evidence against the truth of our picture, is, in fact, the very source from which its support is derived. The possibility of complete scepticism which refuses to give its reasons Bosanouet admits, but that there is any ground upon which to stand and deny the proposition that is the whole he does not admit.  the truth  And once the scepticism  has  declared itself, and taken its stand upon any proposition, then, he declares, the 'game is up.'  The movement of experien-  ce will do the rest; the discovery of contradiction attempt to overcome it will lead inevitably to the  and the conclusion  that the truth is the whole, and that the activity of thought is towards that whole. "Every day experience" Bosanquet borrows from Plato, "tumbles backward and forward between  'is' and 'is not.'  Today a thing is experienced as beautiful, tomorrow as ugly," &nd "this is because the beauty we not a world."  judge by is a fragment and  Neither can be taken as 'of the character  being,' for each undoes itself.  of  The only way out is to accept  them both, the  judgment of beauty and the judgment of ugliness  as cooperating(and not conflicting) members of a world. "The removal of contradiction involves  the character of a  world; and this character we must ascribe to P l a t o ' s ' a y a B o y and in ultimate interpretation to Kant's noumenon, to every principle, in fact, which seriously aspires to express the 1 full nature of being." attempt  This necessity of experience to  the resolution of its contradictions,  this  "appeal  to the whole' is technically stated as the principle of non-contradiction.  Hot only does this principle apply to  those few propositions the formal negation of which is tantamount to ions whatever.  an  affirmation, but extends to all proposit-  It is the  'emptiness' of t h e so called necess-  ary propositions which gives them their apparent  logical  advantage, but the larger content of the so called propositions, propositions,  contingent  that is, which affirm the general  trueness and being of whole provinces of advanced  experience,  such as religion or morality or the world of beauty,  affords  them, in fact, a deeper and fuller logical necessity than that which is enjoyed by the formally necessary  proposition.  Particular propositions relating to these large areas of experience may be denied, but as the content becomes larger, the self-maintenance becomes stronger and it is increasingly difficult to deny them and leave the world  standing.  The concrete universal, it will be remembered, is an identity, a world, which expands through the inclusion of wide areas of difference. 1.  Principle p.46  And the movement of experience  toward an even larger whole, w h i c h we have stated as the principle  of non-contradiction,  is the same thing as the  principle of individuality which is logically stated as the concrete universal.  The character of experience is toward  a whole, and the type of reality, the concrete universal is of the same character, the latter indeed, being, as we have seen, a theoretical  statement  This is the  of logic,' and the working of this  'spirit  in human minds is called 2.  of what experience  offers.  thought.  Thought, then, is the*nisus toward the whole.'  It is at once the motive and the method of achieving between finite minds and reality as a whole. ing our illustration, the sight by which the  of it in anticipation and attainment. all of the mystics agree, and Bosanquet the strength of their evidence.  That  contact  It is, maintain'shining palace'  is seen, the way by which it is approached, and the  principle  spirit  enjoyment  it is attained  is the first to admit  Put another way, if the  of individuality is the formula of reality, it is  in thought that the principle  comes to consciousness in  human minds, and by the process of thought, in turn, that formula is discovered.  the  It is by 'thought' that men know the  nature of things, but it is by the working of things according to their nature that they become known. words, is the  Thought, in other'  'self expression of reality' in finite minds;  it is the concrete universal as it functions in man.  The  above are not Bosanquet's own words, therefore, lest misinterpretation be suspected, a quotation or so may be added.  "Thought is the nisus of experience toward the 1 world."  And again, "It is an affirmation  about  2  through the processes of particular minds." multitude of common experiences are brought  reality  By it the into an organic,  living whole, and become replete with new meaning. There are three further considerations which arise: a. said to be b.  Upon what grounds can the process of thought be 'towards a world?' Is thought a suitable word to be used thus in view  of the claims which have been advanced in favor of Will, Feeling, Activity, c.  What  Intuition?  is the relation of thought  to Existence?  Or  how valid is thought as an instrument of knowledge of the real? a.  This point has been made reasonably clear  It remains only to simplify the thought  above.  advanced.  It is commonly held that thought is discursive, and that its advance is always linear, in a straight from judgment to judgment; that falls short of any whole.  line  it pieces together and hence  The defect of this theory is, as  we have remarked, is in taking the wrong kind of universal, the abstract universal or the general rule, for its type of the logical process. 1. 2.  Once the concept of the  concrete  Principle - p.55 Contemporary British Philosophy - p.60  universal is seized, then the question of thought  being  discursive or towards a whole is no longer open.  Concreteness '  consists in the number of predicates that m a y be predicated a single subject, and not the number of subjects,  of  scattered  here and there, of which the same predicate may be predicated. And finally the subject  of all predication is the whole,  for  except as considered in the implied context of the whole nothing is what it is.  In essence, therefore, the process of  thought is a gathering together, and not a scattering. ing with the given, a slender is to pursue the  'what' beyond  in an ever widening context pursuit  Start-  'that' the tendency of thought the  'that' and finding  itself  of new meanings, to continue  the  of new meanings which, however, only have meaning at  all as they are linked up with the whole which thought is ever enlarging.  To the truth of this the commonest experience will  bear witness.  The tendency to link experiences w i t h a living  whole none-can deny.  All thought attempts to be  self-contain-  ed, to have no loose fragments lying around, but to form a system of members, to be  'at home with itself.'  That elements of disharmony remain, wide  crevices  in the ambitious arch, is more than an inevitable defect, it is the motive to unceasing effort in overcoming that which 1 'jars'  the spirit of the whole. "Thought" Bosanquet writes, is the active form of  totality present in all and every experience of a rational 1.  To use Bradley's phrase.  being."  A somewhat extended statement makes his position very-  clear. "We may take as an example art.  (of thought) a w o r k of  This is an object in which we can realize what the Greeks  meant by Theoria.  In its essence, as a thing of beauty, and  neglecting its aspect as a physical self-contained  object or movement, it is  and a true whole, possessing its  significance  in itself, and not driving our thought beyond it to a detached meaning and explanation.  Every point in it carries the  burden, or lives w i t h the life, of the w h o l e .  Of course its  unity and indpeendence are imperfect, but that makes no difference when once we understand that we are talking  about  matters of degree within finite experience.  to be  The point  grasped is simply the contrast between the relation of abstract generalization on the one hand, and of concrete modes of thinking on the other, to completeness of experience.  In the  latter we see the return to the fulness of experience which thought in the former appeared to abandon. law or principle  Pursuing the same  - the removal of contradiction - the mind  tends to arrive at experience incomparably more living and intense, as also incomparably more logical and rational, that of everyday perception.  than  The true office of thought we  begin to see, is to build up, to inspire with meaning, to intensify, to "vivify."  The object which thought is the true  sense has worked upon is not a relic of decaying sense, but is a living world, analogous to a perception of the beautiful, in which every thought - determination adds fresh point  and  V  40  deeper "bearing to every element b.  of the whole."  Is 'thought' a suitable term for the nisus  towards  a whole, in view of the claims put forward for Will, Feeling, Activity, Contemplation or Intuition? This, Bosanquet would maintain, is, relatively, a minor point, since it concerns terms, and if agreement as to wide meanings may be achieved, the particular  terms used are  unimportant. That minds do display  some such nisus or appeal  toward a whole as we have suggested above offers a ground of agreement; but in statement of the nisus or the factor of experience, or the character of mind by which it gains its contact with, or insight into the whole there is radical difference of opinion.  F.H. Bradley, for example, denies  thought any ability to know or apprehend the whole on the grounds of the inherent defect of the relational method by which thought works, and by which it can never arrive at reality, but will lead inevitably into irresoluble of appearance.  This perversity of thought  contradictions  cannot be  As an analogy of 'supra-relational experience' which ises the real he has chosen  'feeling 1  overcome. character-  inasmuch as feeling  grasps its object and itself, as it were, together; 'possesses' its experience as a 'felt whole.'  and  It does not  take over its field piecemeal, but seizes it at once, and 'in toto.' But Bosanquet is not striving for a word. possible" he writes, "that 1.  Principle - p.58  "It is  those philosophers may prove to  41  hold the more suitable language who deny that thought can ever be one with the real.  But at any rate, we are bound to follow  thought as it obviously develops itself toward higher vitality, and a fuller perfection in the certainty that if it is itself a vanishing form, it will point us the w a y to what lies beyond, and when necessary, introduce us to its nature."  This is  the position he is interested to defend. That there is an underlying difference here, however, between the philosophy of Bosanquet be recognized, his distrust  and that  diould  since it is from his preference for feeling and  of thought, there can be little doubt, that B r a d l e y s  philosophy derives its formidable and acter.  of Bradley,  (almost) depressing  char-  It appears that Bosanquet"s position, stated in the  quotation above, is the more measured of the two.  On this point,  as has often been said, the two divide in more than terms. It is important to bear in mind, however, that by thought, Bosanquet does not mean cognition merely, nor reflective judgment, nor the course of inference.  Thought is for him.  "The self-assertion of reality according to its  characteristic  laws within a complex of psychical matter which may be  I  the mind.  called  The operation, in a word, whereby the growing and  2 coherent body of experience governs our psychical processes." All experience,  therefore, whether cognitive, affective  conative is thought, and its characteristic  forms in life are  "knowledge, including sense-perception, love and work." broadening of the base of thought from intellection to 1. Principle - p.39 2.  Ibid.  - p.60  or  This  experience is in accord with the whole trend of recent psychology which refuses to divide the mind  into faculities.  The underlying unity of the mind as it functions, and common character that emerges either as will, feeling, ity, or as cognition  the activ-  seems to have been as necessary to the  great philosophers of old as to the moderns. The feeling of may be mentioned Plato,/that w h e n there is harmony among the members of the mind, the spirited, the rational, and the appetitive parts, then there is something more superadded, as it were, to the three.  The reconciliation of the ancients is a speculative  business, but it does not  seem altogether unjustifiable to  ascribe a deep feeling for unity as well as for multiplicity  y^h i  to Plato.  From an area of experience^Bosanquet  another illustration may be drawn.  In the  often quotes,  'touch of a hand  we love' sensation moves over with affection,  cognition,  ' Theoria,' even, and in such experience as this, thought is at its highest.  Bosanquet  suggests that what  the common man  tends to call feeling, or intuition, is what the great philosophers have meant by thought. Nevertheless, in the cognitive side of thought, in judgment, by virtue of which the judging  consciousness  'sustains its world,' in the quick apprehension of far-reaching relations; in this, thought reaches a degree of concreteness exceeded only by that form of apprehension which the Greeks called Theoria - the pure aesthetic act in which  sense-percep-  tion, feeling, understanding are blent into a perfect whole in which the finite being is at once infinite.  43  c,  To the third question, "What is the relation  thought to existence?"  of  some answer has already been implied.  Thought, it is true, may "never be one with the real," but is it the only clue there is, and may be taken to be reliable; for not only is thought an affirmation about reality, reality is'the together.  correlative affirmant  This is not an attempt  rationalist  of thought.  to resurrect  fallacy that the laws of thought  but  Both h a n g  the old  can generate the  matter of concrete knowledge; rather it is an assurance  founded  upon the extremely intimate relation which holds between the finite creature and his world, and the complete dependence of the creature upon the universe for all that he is. not that  It is  'I think reality to be such and such' but that  'Reality thinks in me thus and so,' which is the ground confidence.  of  In my thought, reality reaches some sort of a  conscious focus, working from below, with such factors as the "universe (i.e. itself) so far has provided, and with whatever immanent  spirit of totality an age-long history of selection  may have achieved; and it is not, therefore,  altogether  presumptuous to suppose that my nature is its own nature (that is, of the universe) subject material used.  to the limitations of the  M y activity is its activity.  M y love, work,  art, and so forth, are the "Stuff of reality taking  control."  It is none the less I who think because my thought is inevitable.  It is the more my own, because, being what  I am, I could do no other.  And the degree to which my thought  involves existence is "in proportion to its coherence wi&h  44 the world, and this defends on the nature of the thought, how 1 far it is a pure deliverance of mind, without  confusion."  That is, w h e n most myself I am most in touch w i t h reality. To the development  of this last a chapter will be given.  The extreme of scepticism is here, as elsewhere, possible; but rather than being a sign of any becoming modesty, it is the  'extreme of arrogant  audacity.' the"You make"  says Bosanquet, "your own private defect a limit nature of thought."  of/coherent  Scepticism involves the assumption that  thought in man is something utterly divorced from all that it has sprung from; cut quite adrift from the rock from whence it was hewn; which assumption is not acceptable.  The whole  is immanent in experience, and upon coherence with the whole all aspiration  depends.  "I hold" Bosanquet writes in 'Mind', "that we must not raise the question of existence apart from knowledge. If we do we break up our synthesis of reality, restore  the  chasm between knowledge and existence and with it the whole epistemological mystification which we claimed to have set E aside."  Knowledge herein is, of course, not limited to  cognition.  Another suggestive  sentence, "thought is that  activity in which mind, so far as at any moment  it can reach  and penetrate, makes itself one with the whole life of reality and affirms in form and intention 3 that all existence into and sustains its decree." 1.  Meeting of Extremes  - p.81  S.  Mind, U.S. £6  - p.474  3.  Meetings of Extremes  - p.EO  enters  MIND, BODY AND NATURE  Chapter VI  The purpose of the chapter is to develop Bosanquet's theory of mind, as a  1  supervenient  perfection' appearing at  a certain stage in the organization of matter, with its in the history of the species,' and its growing point  'roots  toward  the perfection which is the whole; to distinguish his theory on the one hand from materialism, and one the other hand, from the miraculous;  to point its dependence upon mechanism and its  'emptiness' except as functioning it becomes filled w i t h meaning; and finally to gather up what remains to be said as to the relation of mind and matter, and as to the status, so far as we can determine it, of the external world, whether as independent, as indistinguishable  from mind, or as compli-  mentary to it. 1.  For his theory of mind Bosanquet has been called a  materialist.  Professor Laird finds his writing  materialistic except that  flagrantly  somehow it is all of it  'bathed  in logic' - an inefficacious immersion, we may gather; and Dr. McTaggart writes "Almost  every word that Dr. Bosanquet  has written about the relation of mind and matter might have been written by a complete materialist."  The reason for Bosanouet's severity beyond which is expected of  idealists, we have seen.  that  In the first  place he is determined to do justice to the new data of the post-Darwinian world.  The emergence in time of mind from that  in which, if mind is present at all, it is not present explicit.  as  The fact, too, of mechanism as the 'way the world  works' appeals very strongly to him, and his final explanation of or assignment  of status to mind must therefore be one in  which mechanical intelligibility is the prime factor.  Then  too, he has expressed the belief that neither matter nor mind can be adequately explained and assigned reduction' to one or other of the two.  places by  'simple  The situation is not  relieved by the recurrence of such sentences in his writing as "I doubt not that anything which can ultimately be, must 1 be of the nature of mind or experience."  And his expression  of what he takes to be the lesson of Hegel, that "The world is a single spirit of which all appearances are manifestations that all its manifestations fall within a single  experience,  compact of experiences; that all of it is life and activity, and that outside of this living experience there can be E nothing."  To all of this Bosanauet  agrees.  The paradox of his position is apparent.  Professor  Watson points a way out when he says, with reference to the former quotation above "To be of the nature of mind, and to 1. Principle -.135 2.  Quoted by Professor Hoernle in the Philosophical Review Vol.32 - g.583.  47  exist only as an object  for a mind are two quite  things."'1' That is, there may be in mind as the  different  'spirit' of a  highly specialized range of matter something, if only an 'empty form of totality,' a way that things,  coming  gather meaning, which may indicate the direction  together,  in which we  are likely to find the real nature of both matter and mind. Returning to the paradox, the two poles of Bosanquet's conception of nature and of mind are these, that  the natural  world, clothed in its qualities, primary and secondary, is 'out there' to individual minds and is all that and more; and  appears,  secondly that the only adequate expression of  the character of nature is activity, in a word, 2.  it  'of the nature of mind, life and  spirit.'  Theories of mind are too many to enumerate, much  less to expound.  Professor Hoernle remarks that the theory  of Bosanquet is one of 'genuine original ity.'  We  ought,  therefore, to have before us an outline of other theories in order to discover the distinctiveness of the one.  This  cannot be attempted; but it may be suggested that this originality lies in the steady maintenance of a position  somewhere  between the two extremes into which theories of mind tend to fall, and these are, that minds are substantive, are independent units, or 'self subsistent angelic beings;' and that minds are  'non est' except as useful  fictions,  convenient  terms,  merely, to cover 'all that is going on in the body including the nervous system.'  For the former view it is necessary to go,  not to idealists of the older school, but either to certain 1.  Philosophical Review - Vol.33 p.230  48  of the New Realists or Of the New Idealists. view in its extremest committed.  To the latter,  statement, the modern behaviourist  is  Shades of opinion are far too varied to so much  as mention them all.  Dr. McTaggart  and Gentile, whatever  their  divergence in other directions agree that all that is, is finite minds, and that although finite minds are in their passing they  sustain the universe.  Bosanquet has nothing in common. with the opposing theory.  impermanent,  With this notion  He has far more  sympathy  "We need" he writes, "no  original  pure subject nor any acts distinctive of a being cr substance 1 to be considered as the mind."  Indeed he leans so strongly  toward a view of mind so purely functional mind is what  (that is, that  the body does) as to call for the closest  in order to discover any saving difference remaining.  the  scrutiny There  is a marked similarity between Bosanquet's theory, and that of Bertrand Russell, and in America., of E.B. Holt, which will offer a point of departure.  According to their  ('cross-section')  theory, mind is all that focuses upon a centre at which is a nervous system of a certain degree of complexity. agreement lies here, that Bosanquet  The  also maintains mind to be  a centre or focus of externality; the difference is this, that the centre for Bosanquet is not passive,  receptive  merely, but is active, with the power of the real behind it. 3.  Knowing his insistence upon the coherence of reality  we may not expect Bosanquet 1.  to see in mind something to break  Meetings of Extremes - p.EE  49  the continuity, or introduce some element alien to the  system.  Mind appeared late in the process of evolution, and in its appearance introduced nothing which was not implicit character of the w o r l d before mind made its debut. physical world had reached - by a teleology below ness no less remarkable  in the When the  conscious-  than that above consciousness - a cert-  ain stage of complexity, then along side of or at the peak of all that had been, mind emerged as a supervenient "Mind is" Bosanquet writes,"the self-guidance  perfection.  of that  world  which appears as matter when it reaches a certain level of organisation." cannot  say.  What  'nature' was before mind appeared we  We know that it was there; and know too that it  cannot be conceived of at all except  in terms which imply  meanings that minds have themselves introduced.  Mind  is  necessary to the conception of a world, but a world we shall, have occasion to repeat is equally necessary as a basis of material for mind. mind  Bosanquet does not  allow, however,  that  (in the sense of a consciousness in any way akin to that  of man) can have been present.  The  'mind' that may be ascribed  say to, an orchid could no more "contrive its own fertilization" than a man could ^choose the century of his birth."  "Everywhere  finite consciousness makes its appearance, so far as this is obvious and unmistakable, at a relatively high level,  focusing  and revealing the significance of a huge complication of mute history and circumstance behind it and surrounding 1.  Principle  - p.194  2.  Ibid.  - p.154  it."  2  50  Not any mind  'in the phases' of evolution, directed  their  advance, but the determination was of a 'deeper wisdom, which lay hidden in the general structure of the The  environment.'  'hidden wisdom 1 which is that of the Absolute, comes to  light, becomes explicit, as we have said, in the advancing stages of a continuous process, which appears to have been in the order, matter, life, and mind.  Each of them is  "essential to the whole of things, but not capable of independent reality." The world, then, gained advent of mind.  But what we must  r  'meaning' with the  call'nature'was.before  finite minds ever were. The external world must not be reduced, by philosophy to anything other than itself.  So to reduce nature to mind  is to deprive it of its 'raison d'etre,' its distinctiveness, by which it is of value to the whole.  It is to take away from  nature its character, and from mind its necessary material. The formula of the 'full impression' must be applied here as elsewhere.  The harsh nativeness of nature, that  stubborn  externality of it,which is the substance of the Realist emphasis, is the very reason of its being.  It is the  business  of externality to stay external and to defy sub Rectification. This, in brief, is the attitude taken by Bosanquet. 'Reality'he defines as'something that resists efforts to destroy it and refuses to be remodelled at our pleasure.' plainly, according to this specification, has strong claim to be real.  the external world  But on the other hand it  cannot  be maintained that nature is 'impenetrable' to minds, as has  been supposed.  The critical realists may claim as their  most notable achievement their more  the refutation of this notion of  'naive' colleagues.  "Nature is penetrated with  mind" Professor W a t s o n points out, but this does not  imply  that nature is constituted by the minds of men, but that in the mind of a man is a faculty or power by which he is able to comprehend the meaning, the nature of the world as it is presented in each individual's experience."  Mind gives meaning  to and finds meaning in nature. From this it follows that neither nature nor mind can be dispensed with unless the whole of reality is to suffer loss.  They must be considered as complimentary terms of an  inclusive system.  Any attempt at reduction weakens the  differences upon which their underlying unity depends. Another line of approach to the problem tends to offer the suggestion  that mind and the external world,  although  complimentary and irreducible, are not divided by any hard and fast line.  Although difference is their important  element,  wherever the two approach they tend to fuse at their edges. "Either term seems inconceivable without the other; and there must b e something of arbitrariness in any attempts to draw  2  a line between them." is not quite everything." cannot  Nature "though nearly  everything,  Where the line can be drawn we  say, for it is not a single line at all.  Nature  fuses  with, or diffuses into mind, but there is something distinctive in mind which resists complete assimilation. 1. 2.  Philosophical Review Vol.33, p.230 Principle p.358  All of the  106"  detailed content  of a mind is drawn from the external world,  including the special contribution of the bodily and the nervous system;  'everything positive' comes from Nature;  but  yet there is something which mind alone can do, and that is to give unity to the manifold of nature; to the a vital connection.  disconnected,  "If" writes Bosanquet, "you ask what  mind is not Nature, you can ohly answer,  in  'the spirit of  totality,' the attitude which makes everything alive in its bearing 1 bearing on the whole."  "If you ask what  in Nature is not  mind, you can only answer, the fragmentary, the qua fragmentary and  disconnected  disconnected."  Looked at from one angle, as a piece of silk, all looks as if it were nature, while regarded from another aspect, the whole  is shot through with mind.  whole, the one would not be what  B o t h are aspects of the  it is without  the other, and  neither can be divided arbitrarily from the other. A favorite word of Bosanquet's is that minds are 'elicited' from nature, but an active factor in the eliciting is the growing mind itself.  Another typical phrase is that  "Man (speaking of the human mind) is organic to nature, and nature is organic to man; man is the voice of nature, and  2  nature the basis of man." The relation of mind and body is the same, in a narrower  sense, as of mind and nature.-  Mind is no more than  the body can make it, but the meaning of the body is the mind. 1. Principle p.367 2.  Mind N.3. 26  p.474  Bosanquet  states it thus.  "We -understand them best  take mind as the significance and interpretation  if we  (not  the  effect) of body, and body as the stored acquisitions and adaptations which are the foundation and machinery of the 1 single but complex world which is mind." "Mind is not a separate  Or otherwise,  thing, but a perfection and  cooperat-  ion of the adaptations stored in a body which is a complex bit of external  Nature."  Clearly this theory is mechanism, through and through, and so, Bosanquet insists it should be.  Mechanism  is the method of the external world, and is, if it is only seen as such, the truly man's misunderstanding  'spiritual®  method.  of the nature and the  It is only conditions of  the physical world, that makes him flee to miracle  or to  sponteneity, or some form of contingency as the way to the spiritual.  Philosophy will best be served by recognising  and accepting the presence of mechanism, and by taking it as a clue to the real than by ignoring a province of experience so obvious and so inescapable.  If the obviously mechan-  ically conditioned were to be removed, the heart, as it were, would be cut out of the whole. Discontinuity, not mechanism is the enemy.  The  spirit of the whole is either the spirit of logic, of coherence and of totality, of system and intelligibility, or there is none.  Nowhere is this spirit so plainly evidenced as  in the ordered realm of mechanical causation.  The introduct-  ion of any new factor, a spiritual entelechy, or free will, 1.  Principle  p . XXV  can only defeat  the end of spirituality by breaking  logical nexus.  Every  'movement  in the physical system.'  the  of the spirit is represented  Every alternative to mechanism  offered either falls unawares into the physical system, or i9 meaningless.  That is, some  'inappreciable  something'  which may be supposed to tilt the beam in mind either way, or that, will turn out to be either a  co-operating  mechanical factor or will be nothing at all. a spiritual  this  The theory of  'entelechy' advocated by Hans Drieschr- for example,  would fall under this condemnation.  That  the  'force' it  exerts is 'negligible' is no excuse for its surreptitious introduction. the physical  Any formation of'spiritual  energy' outside of  system is, very properly, scouted; for the  term spiritual, thus used, is misused; and the thought it implies is contrary to all  coherence.  Bosanquet rejects, as well, the notion of an as determinative of the present working of the mind.  'end' Any  "Far off divine event" cannot for a moment be considered by philosophy as motivating present movements. means, and the selection of any conceivable  Ends run into end as the  'raison d'etre' of the universe at large is absurd.  Teleology,  if it is to have any cosmic bearing must be free from  the  whole analogy of finite contrivance and selection, and fall back on the characteristics of value which, apart from time and from selected purposes, attach to the nature of a totality which is perfection.^" Herein teleology becomes no less than the principle of individuality, and might be 1.  Bee Principle  - p.126  stated thus,  'The universe is itself, and is perfection;  to  approach this perfection is the characteristic of every part; the end is no less than the whole. 1  The notion of  teleology  therefore, as an alternative to mechanism is rejected. Sponteneity too, in the sense of miracle, no "place in an intelligible world. attempt  to philosophise, Bosanquet  impotent an answer.  Individuality,  Better give up the suggests, than admit  transparent  of causation or sufficient reason.'  so  that is, system and non-  contradiction, as it were, incarnate, in any system which is not  can find  'could not "be realized according to the law There can be no  'meaning'  in miracle. "The overwhelming weight  of probability rests on the  side of the assumption that all tendencies and capacities are 1 transmitted through bodily arrangements." this is no debasement  Insisting that  of mind from the high place it  hold in philosophy Bosanquet repeats that "true  should  spirituality  must be seen in mechanical intelligibility." This does not imply prediction, for prediction is 'predoing,' and universe does not repeat  the  itself; but it does imply that  the  mind is a centre that does logically express and give meaning to all that focuses in it, the history of the race, the present  environment and the total habituations  of that exquisitely refined  'shopful of machines' which is  a man. 1.  Principle  -  and adaptations  p.171  106"  In recapitulation the arguments are a.  these:  Continuity is essential, the logical nexus must not  be severed, or intelligibility goes. b.  The direction of the world was not and is not left  to finite minds; but is the work of a deeper  'world wisdom,'  which must be trusted "It is not," Bosancuet  writes,"finite  consciousness that has planned the great phases of  civilization  which are achieved by the linking of finite minds on the essential basis of the geological structure of the globe. Each separate mind reaches but a little way, and relating to the whole of the movement must be counted as  'unconscious.'  Neither city nor coral reef were ever any design of the men or the insects who constructed them; they lay altogether deeper 1 in the roots of things." confidence in this  It is nothing other than lack of  'wisdom of the world' which drives men to  seek relief in miracle, monadism, in spiritual or in the power of their own 'free will.'  entelechies,  It is fear of the  physical that makes men look elsewhere for the spiritual. c.  The expression of perfection in some whole, as a  work of art  (the absolute  'in propria persona') waits for  mechanical refinement and is dependent upon mechanical ments of the material world. writes of man, "are not represent  adjust-  "His very ideas," Bosanciuet  created from the void, but  the immanent capacities of his world."  simply His distin-  ctive contribution lies in the possibility of infinitely" varied adjustments to a vastly wider range of materials, and in his 'more concrete world* rather than in any principle 1.  Principle  - p.143  foreign to the rest d.  of reality.  It is only as complimentary members of the  that Nature and mind are maintained.  Take the gift  absolute of  nature out of mind, and only a 'mere form of totality' is left.  But this  'mere form' is itself enough to afford a  foundation for all that we call spiritual, inasmuch as it is the means of focussing all that  it touches, of bringing  'worlds' together to form wider worlds. 'external' only for minds, and  Externality is  the inward and spiritual is  only so as it is a centre of externality in which the is made the inner" and the'inner  is the converted outer. '  Reflective experience will defend this view, that 'makes- things its own.'  'outer  the mind  It is a principle of system working  in every possible kind of material. An extended quotation will illumine the whole situation.  "The distinction between mental purpose and  natural selection is superceded  so far as this, that we  should look for the value of the universe in its entire and continuous working; and-while its order or unity would be recognised as expressing itself in part consciousness, we should not treat  through human  this as super-adding a  new principle of plan and direction upon the ordinary laws of nature considered as directionless.  We should consider the  whole, nature and mind, as the revelation of the value of the universe.  The bearing and result of these  considerations  would be to lay greater stress on natural selection"  (includ-  ing the highly important phase of social selection, i'n which  a most important part  of the environment  of a mind is other  minds) "that is to say on the moulding of the organic world and even the world of mind, in relation to the environment which we know as physical nature, by and through w h i c h the possibility of life and mind are elicited and determined; while they in turn elicit This is the  and determine  those of nature.""*"  'genuinely original' view of mind  developed by Bosanquet.  It is a spiritual view, and too, one  doing justice to the claim of externality to be all that it seems, and unconstituted by finite minds. Nature is not a shadow creation of the minds of many observers, nor is it akin to mind, in the sense of 'panpsychism' - a reduction to a one-sided homogeneity. less nature is 'organic to spiritual ends': deep in the nature of the whole. from the brute creation  Neverthe-  the ends lying  In the rise of finite minds  (in the high order of which no small  degree of 'mind in embryo' appears), and the birth of life from an inaminate world, the spirit of totality or  'principle  of individuality' has been expressing itself, even in wider and more comprehensive wholes.  The capacity of stored response  in the animal,made reaction to a larger world possible;  larger,  that is in the sense of variety, than the laws of the inorganic world would allow.  In man the principle of individuality, as the  it were, finds itself in a new form.  The spirit o ^ whole,  which is the power of the teleology below  consciousness  reaches a microcosmic representation of itself in finite consciousnesses, which, in turn, offer a material of infinite 1.  Principle  - P . XXIV  adaptability for the same spirit to w o r k with in the  creation  of those higher obRectifications of mind in civilization  and  institution w h i c h Hegel is not alone in regarding as mind at its best.  To the finite mind is given the double role of  spectator and player in the theatre of life. the whole drama  'sub specie aeternitatis'  M a n cannot  see  but he can reflect,  in the wings, upon the part he is playing, and form at least some idea of the whole.  THE SELF-TRANSCENDENCE OF THE FINITE  INDIVIDUAL.  Chapter VII  Most of the criticism of Bosanquet's philosophy, whether directed openly at his conception of the Absolute, f at his treatment  of the subject of immortality, or at his  theory of the state has as its underlying discontent that the finite individual(what prefer to call the particular  a feeling  members of other schools  'person') is being belittled;  that the status of m a n in the cosmos is being set too low. Professor Pattison, for example, urges that Bosanquet  "Professor  completely fails to realize the elementary  conditions  of self-hood.""1" This is a sweeping criticism, in order to evaluate it the view actually presented by Bosanquet must  be  fully understood. Professor Laird has written, in his "Problems of the Self,"  "We know what our souls are, we know the meaning of  their identity, we know the sense in which they are distinct  2 and independent in the world." remarked, is that of a special  The distinctness, it may be 'soul substance.'  Bosanquet is 'anxious to deny.'2. 1. Symposium - 517.  Page 364  All of this  106"  As in the preceding pages it has been shown that minds are denied any independent  substantive  existence  considered as isolated from the whole range of  externality  to w h i c h th^r give coherence and meaning, so in these pages, the thesis will be carried further, that what is generally thought of as an isolated highly independent  'person,' having an existence  and exclusive, is better interpreted, as  an 'individual,' that is, as a world w i t h a widely content.  fluctuating  There is, therefore, no line between the thought  of the last chapter, aid the argument  of this chapter.  The  latter is an expansion of the former having especial reference to the higher phases of the individual's We may elaborate Pattison.  environment.  the criticism of "Professor  He writes, "Finite centres may  in content, but'ex vi termini'they cannot  'overlap' indefinitely overlap at all in  existence; their very raison d'etre is to be distinct in that  and,  sense, separate and exclusive focalizations of a 1  common universe."  His complaint  continues,  that  the destiny  of the finite self is always in "Terras of objective impersonal content," instead of in the "distinct that focus it."  and  personalities  "Each self is a unique existence which is  perfectly impervious to other selves - impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint  analogue."  (It might be pointed out that the 'impenetrability of matter' is a very uncertain analogue in the light of the new 1.  Symposium  p.513  conception  of matter which the new physics affords).  Professor Pattison  denies that he is especially pleading for a view with the survival of  consistent  'distinct personalities' after death, but  the denial is not half as urgent particularity of persons,  as his insistence upon the  and in any case, the absence of any  other reason for his warmth would almost imply an underground interest  in survival.  His vigor in defence of  'self-hood'  would hardly be justified by the maintenance of an impersonality of existence which is doomed to be so impermanent. Bosanquet would  admit Professor Pattison's right  ested in immortality, but would  to be inter-  condemn any attempt, either  to force the evidences of experience into  a form shaped by an  underground interest, or to belittle the values which are open and on the surface of every present movement  of experience.  By no means all of those philosophers who uphold a theory  of  the self as substantive do so on the basis of the necessity of personal survival.  Many realists, for example,  'sit loose'  on the problem of immortality. N.  Returning to the immediate problem, the issue may be put thus.  All philosophers agree that the individual  is  conditioned to a greater or less degree by the complex situation in which he has his being.  The opponents of Bosanouet  maintain, however, that in spite of his overlapping in content with other selves, he enjoys a particularity which is the most real thing about him.  On the other hand, Bosanquet  insists that not his exclusiveness, but his tendency to 'go outside of himself' is the true character of his being.  In  106"  support of this thesis material may be drawn from a wide variety of non-philosophical writing. of the "fluid  Dean Inge, for example, writes  conception of personality which we find in the  New Testament" referring thereby to the  Johannine and the  Pauline conception of 'membership one of another' and of 1 "Fellowship with Christ  and Christ with us."  And a modern  novelist who representa a not uncommon trend, "Men must get back into touch. and the  And to do so they must forfeit  the vanity 2  'noli me tangere' of their own absoluteness."  Bosanquet's own statement  of the same thought  is "Our contin-  ued self-identity is apt to be a fetish which becomes a slavery."  3  The sheer emptiness of the ego conceived as-  exclusive is something his opponents "misconceive with really 4 amazing jaerverseness." The true character of the self always lies outside of the arbitrary limits which it tends to set for itself only to transcend; and its nature and spirit are best movement of  seen in the  self-transcendence.  Unreflective opinion may venture to interrupt at this point, and express its impatience with the general line taken.  That there is a 'given self,' it may be again mainta-  ined, is the most obvious thing in the world.  Pressed  further  the nature of this self may be given as like a 'boatman in a 1.  "Personal Idealism and Mysticism"  -  p.104-5  2.  D.H. Lawrence in a Book Review For the "Dial"  3.  Science and Philosophy - p.110  4.  Ibid., p.107  boat.'  This naive notion is foundational  to much  'psuedo-  metaphysical' doctrine, theosophies, and such; but can find no favour in thoroughgoing philosophy any longer. could suppose  Empedocles  souls to be peculiarly shapely atoms among  other atoms, and be blameless; but since psychology has the dependence of self-hood upon the whole physical and psychical  shown  environment,  of the growing child, none other may  assume a soul substance without high "risk of for leaping to too hasty an answer.  condemnation  For purposes of public  administration the isolation of finite selves may be assumed, but it must be remembered  that isolation, even in justice, is  not the only thing that can be said of a man. of him than his "given self."  There is more  In good philosophical  theory the  stream can and does rise higher than its source, and the individual, as he goes outside of himself becomes, plainly, a 'new creature.'  As mind, when it is not  'energizing' is a  'mere empty form;' but when active, makes alive with new meanings an illimitable range of material; as such, is a bare  so the finite  potentiality, and a very shallow  but when most itself it may mirror the universe.  self,  thing,  In it  "The absolute appears as a soul with the capacity for forming a self, because the stuff and pressure for utterance are there, to which nothing less than a soul can do  justice."  It becomes the responsibility of the individual  to work out  all the possibilities which the stored adaptations,  the  acquisition of aeons of history, have bequeathed him.  So  immeasurable is the reach of their possibilities that the old  attempt to draw arbitrary lines and and there divinity" can no more be  say, "Here is humanity, countenanced.  On the side of exclusiveness, only the bare  separation  of bodies can be offered, and that, it may be urged, is no 1 insuperable barrier;  while the heights and depths of shared  experience, in love, for example, and the social life, may be adduced in favour of the essential formally separate  community of existence of  beings.  The self which is most fully his own is the self which an individual  cannot withdraw from others, and which  on every boundary blends into the individuality  of his group,  and with the richer material world which his group life makes his own.  "So, Bosanquet writes, "when we look round us today  for appreciations of the unity of man with himself and his fellows, and nature, and the universe, and God; we find not so much an appeal to abstract argument as a consensus from innumerable sources based on a subtle study and  appreciation  of the emotional continuities by which man betrays his incompleteness in all these directions, and affirms intuitively  2  and emotionally the connection he cannot break." It is important to realize the full measure of fluctuation of the self from its lowest point, to its highest. According to the view we are developing it is obvious that the self or soul is 'a power or quality of which there can be more 1.  W.E. Hocking, "Meaning of God in Human Experience." p. 265.  2.  Meeting of Extremes  - p.66  or less. 1  The low level is, of course, the form of totality  that accompanies the union of two mature cells which have reached the limit of their own solitary growth, and which at the same time contain as potential within them, the history of the race and the possibility of a new generation.  The low  level in the sense of attainment,, is virtually nothing. high level is obviously the Absolute. the finite individual has his being.  The  Between these two points He cannot, as we have  said, rest on any island out of the universal flow, but he can observe the general direction  that it takes.  "Our given  nature implies and carries us to the Absolute."  How is it,  then, that the finite individual stays finite?  Why does his  fullest flow not tide him into the Absolute?  Becaiise of the  defect of insularity which asserts itself and holds him short of his destiny. . The finite consciousness fails 1 stops short of its own nature.*  With a hint in it o f  whole, and a thirst for self-completion  (that  of every contradiction and the achievement  of  coherence) it is denied its fulfilment by the of its quality.  'because it the  is, the overcoming complete correlative  defect  It takes a nervous system to focus snd to  bring to significance a world, and the same nervous  system  sets its own limitation of possible response as the limit of expansion and self transcendence o f the finite But the limits are wider than we have supposed.  individual. It is the  fat e of the finite being that he should stretch out his hands 1.  Principle  - p.310  toward that w h i c h he cannot reach.  But, since the real,  its expression must have multiplicity as well as unity, impotence  while a defect  a defect in the real.  in finite individuality,  For were the goal of all  for this  is not  self-transcen-  dence attained, the universe would become quiescent.  It is  a fact of experience, however, to w h i c h we can bring many evidences, that the movement of self-transcendence to finite life, and that to become  is  'at their strongest' selves  central 'tend  confluent.' Professor Pattison, it would appear, is anxious to  hold, as it were, in the one hand, both a high degree of exclusiveness, and a degree of confluence.  The difficulty of  this attempt lies in the nature of self-transcendence, the typical self-transcendence does not itself,'but rather  'gives itself away.'  that  'set a reserve upon In the face of such  a demand it is well nigh impossible to hear the egoistic cry for exclusiveness.  It is typical of all devotion that it  'holds itself of no account' and seeks only to be absorbed in the perfection that is sought after.  The immeasurable  accentuation of vitality, the wealth of new values which come to a being  'when it throws itself completely outside of  'itself' is too well known to need pressing, but the far reaching significance which its recognition lends and the illumination it gives to philosophy cannot be overemphasised. It offers the key to the house of knowledge  'of the self-  maintenance and self-assertion of the universe.'  106" The acceptance of the theory of  self-transcendence  is rendered difficult by the popular tendency, not without its influence in philosophy to set up arbitrary 'Self' and  divisions.  'other' are assumed to be set in opposition, the  self versus the other.  This is not a valid picture at all.  The relation is rather of self in other, and the other made over into the self.  "The universal  of experience which overcomes the  is just  that  character  'is not' by reducing it to  an element harmonious and corroborative of the 'is-' the 'self in the other."'  The Self-transcendence  It is  of the finite  individual is the same in principle as the principle of noncontradiction.  The former is a 'close up' of the movement  of  every day life, the latter is the same movement as expressed in logical theory.  In summary Bosanquet remarks that  "There  is nothing in the world worth having, doing, or being which 1 does not involve enormous self-transcendence." Lest this be swept aside as a mere assertion  certain  examples may be taken. 3.  In every artistic effort the artist, using as his  means of expression certain materials and instruments, paints, oils, stone and chisels, and also the skill which is the sum and the significance of his bodily mechanism, highly trained and refined, sets himself to mirror some aspect of the universe in such a way that his work of art will be of itself a little  1.  Principle - p.258  universe,  self sustaining and complete - regarded as a work  of art - in itself.  Plainly the artist  example of self-transcendence;  or a man  at work is a living 'absorbed in his  And in this absorption he is far more himself than when, he is aping the  'artistic temperament.'  task!' say,  In this common phrase,  'Absorbed in his work' there is a truth for philosophy which can be made much of. The work of art also, the picture or the statue is a model of reality and an example of self-transcendence.  The  trees are no less themselves because they are also a wood. The minutiae of the picture are no less real because  their  highest reality is not as details in isolation but as small things supporting the unity of the whole. the whole to give full meaning to the part.  Obviously it takes The stone set as  the key of an arch is as m u c h a stone as it was on the rock pile, but it is more.  This common fact, Bosanquet  insists,  must be seen in its full strength, if the part played by finite selves is to be understood. in his appreciation of it, is gone, in a sense The observer of a work of art,/ outside of himself. This truth also, Bosanquet holds to be so obvious as to have been overlooked, if not altogether, at any rate, in its full significance.lt must be taken in 'bitter earnest.' degree of self-transcendence  The full  in aesthetic appreciation, with  its swallowing up of every trace of the  'given self,' or the  self we have taken ourselves to be, must be whole accepted as a datum of philosophy.  heartedly  To the accusation that,  since in such high self-transcendence we can hardly or are  unable to recognize ourselves, it cannot matter very much to us, Bosanquet has a quick answer.  Of course you hardly know  yourself "When, for a moment, Shakespeare or Beethoven has laid his spell upon you," for you so seldom live at the level you might. In love, too, the self-transcendence of the ual is not beyond the discovery of the most  v  individ-  unreflective.  In love the movement is from isolation to absorption, from exclusiveness to inclusion in a new unity which is wider and higher than either individual taken alone.  The example of  V  Antony and Cleopatra will serve. heat"of a single passion condemnation) into  These two were fused by the  (too great to fall under moral  a single being, in which there remained  enough residual perversity to be their undoing.  But  the  climax of the tragedy and the death of both by the same passion is said to perfect a unity which otherwise remained Thus love  incomplete.  (like all finite experience) lies somewhere  between  the poles of isolation and absorption, but its perfection would be absorption. To this view of self-transcendence 1 taken.  It is asked "Does this world of deeper  membership mean absorption?"  *  exception has been spiritual  The answer given is,"Ho, for  though the ego goes out of itself it does so only to become richer,  'more adequate to response, more capable of the joy  and intensified life in the experience of love.'" Bosanouet 1.  For example, Braham in Personality in Post-Kantian Thought, p.123.  ha3  and Immortality  106" replied, in effect, thus.  "With all that you have said as  to the enrichment and intensification of life in love but you do not take w i t h sufficient the experience at its best.  strength the  We agree that  I agree;  'abandon' of  'love seeks not  its own,' and we have only to remember the world's greatest lovers to know that  quite often they do not get it.  One of  them, at any rate was crucified; and the greatest measure of r^fh e r enrichment, by far, has been that of the race^than that which was consciously his own.  There is, of course, a sense in  which a 'return with an enriched self' can be said to follow self-transcendence,  but it is only by a misunderstanding  the conditions of self-hood along the lines of that it can be said other than in this The defect is one of language.  of  'thing-hood'  colloquial  sense.  The self is the flow, or the  rising and falling tide of experience.  There is no  structure into and out of which the self can pass.  spiritual The narrower  or smaller self, and the wider self are convenient names, merely for different levels of the same experience.  To over-  come these difficulties a s 1 f a r as possible, the term  'individ-  ual' is preferred to  'self  or person, and an individual is  'a whole' whatever its degree of comprehensiveness.  So, in  love, enrichment of the self need not be expressed in terms of a 'return', but of greater comprehension.  And, after all,  since the love we allude to is a finite and imperfect we use it only as a pointer as the quality of love  towards perfection.  experience,  Inasmuch  (and to this all agree) intensifies  geometrically with the more complete self-transcendence,  that  is doing, writes his book, builds his empire, preaches his 'good tidings;' and in the long run he does far more, or less than he thought. ordered  And, viewed as a part of the  'whole  spectacle,' the latter is the true w o r k of the man,  and it is a work, in a very real sense, outside of himself. He is a co-operating factor in a whole world of influences, and the result is - as it is.  Strictly speaking he does not  do it at all, yet it'is historically, the. most real about him.  thing  He is an agent, with other agents of the same  'world wisdom' that worked below consciousness.  Great men  have never begun to know their influence in the world, though some have felt it.  In the movement of life  every  individual is undergoing self-transcendence, whether he knows it or not. his private self  He is so identified with the whole  that  'personality' is but a fragment of himself, which  is genuinely present throughout his group, and which is  projected in time, for thousands of years and which, in fact modifies the whole.  "Individuals," Bosanouet writes, "not  merely exist for a brief space in the world, but it as  permanent  our lips,  characterize  qualifications." "*"What is a platitude upon  'the solidarity of the race,'  Bosanquet would  exalt into an every day demonstration of a whole field of private self-transcendence;  the blending, that is, of/purpose and of  will with the purpose and will of the race.  The larger  wholes of society are as real, in fact more real than the individuals which compose them. the is more concrete,in / 1.  As a universal, a society,  sense of taking in wider ranges of  Science and Philosophy - p.Ill  106" difference, than the finite individual.  "The unity of the  individual human as a 'concrete universal' is not to be exaggerated above the unity of human beings in identical  senti-  ments, ideas, purposes or habits, as something not a datum, not real, the mere creation of our comparing  intelligence."  Of self-transcendence in the social situation and elsewhere Bosanquet writes thus,  "The individual, then, does  not attain the maximum of originality in his exclusive when he feels himself repellent against others. personality is taken in the  strict  self  And if  sense of the character of  being a subject of rights and duties among other  similar  subjects, then personality itself is only possible in virtue of an individuality which already transcends it .... individuality, the principle  so  of reality takes us beyond  personality in the strict sense, beyond the consciousness of self which is mediated by an opposing not self, into the region where we go out of the self and into it by the same movement, in the q\iasi-religion of social unity, in knowledge, art, and in religion proper. the repellent  And in all these experiences,  as  self-consciousness diminishes, and the sense of  unity with the world and with man becomes pre-eminent, - and in all these individuality is strengthened, and the self, though less in opposition to a not-self, is more itself, and is more at home  .... In religion the self no longer insists  on its exclusive claim, and the whole being goes out into the service which is perfect freedom  ... It is plain that  height of individuality is to be looked for in the  the  experiences  106" which raise to the actuest pitch the sense and fact of identity 1 with man, nature and God." To this whole view yet further objection is raised, though along lines similar to that noticed above Dr. McTaggart maintains that because A is in the relation B to a thing C, and in the relation E to a thing F and so on, does not from the distinctness of A. but can very well be  "Of course A is not  detract  'isolated,'  2  "really and ultimately distinct.'"  is well to remember that Dr. McTaggart  finds nothing but  pluralism in pluralism in Hegel, and is therefore fitted to find things  It  peculiarly  'really and ultimately distinct.'  difference would appear to be foundational.  McTaggart  The begins  with things apparently distinct and takes distinctness to be the last word that may be said of them; whereas Bosanquet .is impressed above all with the connections of things and takes their apparent distinctness as offering no clue to their actual nature.  Scratch the surface of the disconnected, and  you will find roots of a common membership.  In his whole  emphasis both on differentiation and multiplicity, and on a fundamental unity - upon the basis of which alone  intelligibil-  ity can rest - Bosanquet's view seems the more synoptical and hence the most truly philosophical. The life of the finite individual is, Bosanauet remarks - and with him the common man agrees, an adventure. His imperfections and inconsistenceis drive him to remove them and in so doing he moves 'towards the Absolute." He rejoices in that 'greater than himself which underlies and surrounds him.' In his 'life, love, and death' there is before him what Bosanquet pleases to call the 1.  'open secret of the Absolute.'  Principle - p.270-371  2.  *s Revi w  f Pri  pie  THE ABSOLUTE  Chapter VIII  We have been compelled to make use of a term without attempting any adequate definition of it.  The Absolute  stands  (if the imperfect analogy is permitted) in the shadow of almost every word that  is written in the spirit of Bosanquet.  nature of the concept  The  covered by the term has doubtless been  illuminated by its numerous contexts, but the central!ty of the docttine, its liability to confusion, and the that has been hurled about  criticism  it call for a clear and fairly  full statement of what the Absolute stands for in the philosophy of Bosanquet. Any reader of contemporary philosophy or indeed of the literature of theology, sociology or any of the special fields of a philosophical  colour will not have read far  without detecting a high scorn of 'Absolutism.'  The terms  'Monist' or 'Absolutist' are almost missiles in the hands of Pluralists and Pragmatists.  What is the reason for this?  It grows, there can be little doubt from an acute misunderstanding of what the Absolute implies.  For the misunderstanding  there may be a number of reasons adduced.  106" The healthy democratic mood of the American philosopher has engendered an unreflective distaste for the name, as tinged, somehow w i t h Imperialism and autocracy, and has therefore failed to recognize the absolute, even in the midst  the inevitable presence of  of pragmatism.  It is slipped  in surreptitiously, but is there none the less, as the reader of John Dewey can be sure.  Moreover, William  James' impish  delight in 'calling names' has confused the issue in the minds of the unreflective, without helping to any understanding of the situation.  We have seen that an absolutism can be  rather than 'tender.'  William  'tough'  James' notion of idealism was  drawn too exclusively from Josiah Royce, who, it has been said, never entered quite to the heart of English Hegelianism. James did not begin to understand what T.H. Green and the Cairds were driving at. revelation.  He thought they were  It is probable that  defending  the too neat triadic  steps  of Hegel's dialetic, and the too brilliant axe-manship  of  Bradley in his "Appearance and Reality" have frightened many away with the feeling that for the sake of a theory Absolutism was carving all experience into a shape of its own.  To such  as these the more diffuse dialectic of Bosanquet would been less disturbing.  It is a gross misconception,  have  however,  to accuse either Hegel or his successors, particularly Bosanquet, of striving for a theory. We have pointed to the roots of in his theory in life ancl/the daily fluctuation of experience.  In particular  the popular misconception of the  Absolute is that it is outside of or other than the universe.'  Or, in James' phrase that it is  lie back on.'  'something to  Nothing could be more erroneous.  meritorious interest  "living  The  quite  of the present day in present and pract-  ical affairs has tended to dissatisfaction with anything to be 'transcendent.'  tak£n  The tendency is evident in writers as  widely divided both in thought and in space as Croce, on the one hand, and Professor Perry, on the other. best answer to this current  Perhaps the  complaint from Bosanquet's point  of view is to be found in his essays "The True Conception cf Another World," and "The Kingdom of God on Earth."  But  the  fancy yet prevails that the absolute is a 'sort of a myth' or in philosophical phrase  'a hypostatization;'  something  beautifully conceived, but  'in the air,' and nowhere grounded  in experience. If all of this were confined to the popular mind it would be idle to refute it, but since writings of ophers'  'philos-  are full of it, some attempt at re-statement  must be  made, not only here and for the sake of this essay, but at large and for the sake of the philosophy of the day. be pointed out that the Absolute  'strictly concerns  It must ourselves;'  is present in the simplest experience when properly understood is 'one with its world' and that this is 'all the world we have.'  The n o t i o n of the absolute arises in the mind as a result judgment  of the attempt  to judge at all.  there is implied a reference  reflective In every  to the whole  of reality.  The most incomplete knowledge of  the finite demands at  some knowledge  In order to offer a rational  of the infinite.  explanation of any local or particular  situation, the  least  order  and rationality of the whole of w h i c h it is a part must be assumed. whole.  There is no meaning in a part  This necessary inference to unity which even  pluralist  propositions, That  is sufficient  or  somewhere in his series of  to establish the absolute  for  this is no equivocation, merely, is the 1  ance of B o s a n q u e t ' s essay "Time and the Absolute." whole need not be given in order to condition "Within our experience  of a  the  affirms as implied in his world of essences,  which he introduces without notice  thought.  except as a part  substThe  the part.  there is no limit to the  transformation  which a given part may undergo by being seen in 2connection with a whole w h i c h w a s not given along with it." Also, as the absolute is implied every judgment  (and affirmed) in  so every experience likewise bears us on to the  like affirmation.  Action and argument  carry us, like the  wind, to the absolute for logical stability. prompted by the principle  of non-contradiction  The movement  immanent in all  experience by the tendency towards self-transcendence we have elaborated above.  is  which  "The general formula of the absolute"  1.  Science and Philosophy,  2.  Ibid., p . 1 2 2  p.113-122.  Bosanquet remarks, "is the transmutation and  re-arrangement  of particular experiences "by inclusion in a completer whole of experience." The absolute, therefore, cannot be less than all that is, including impotence, defect, and every degree of reality. 2.  There is no escape from the fact of the absolute,  but the question remains,  '7/b.at knowledge of the absolute is Concerning  within the reach of finite intelligences?' /such a subject dogmatism  is  impossible  necessary to rest  but it is not  content with sheer aqnosticism.  A measure  of acquaintance w i t h the Absolute is man's daily portion. There are  clues. The type of self-transcendence in art has been  noted above.  We may also conceive of art as an analogue  the Absolute.  of  "The spiritual world", Bosanquet writes in his  Introduction to 'Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art," "which is present, actual and concrete much besides beauty. a whole  (that is, the Absolute) contains  But to apprehend one element of such  (as in some great picture) constitutes and pre-supposes  a long step towards apprehending the rest."  The character of  a picture or a poem is that it is, and must be regarded as, a whole.  It is lifted above serial enumeration of content;  it "does not refer beyond itself for explanation or for justification."  "It raises no questions of cause or compar-  ison, but is, in respect analogue of the Absolute.  of its beauty, infinite."  It is an  So too the other examples chosen  above reveal an infinite side as well as a finite, in their characteri  finite, in that the unity and  self-dependence  breaks down at a point, infinite in that they are, in their genuine unity in difference, and in principle,  concrete  universals. In the state individuals, themselves dependent  on  many sides, "begin to be re-inforced by others, their deficiencies supplied, in a word, their immanent  contradictions  removed by readjustment and supplementation, of particularized  so that the body  centres begins to take on a distinct  resemblance to what we know must be the character of the Absolute." It is religion, however, which as the most experience, offers the clearest approach to the Absolute.  type of, and the nearest  The typical attitude of religion  is of complete devotion to the object of worship, as perfection,  concrete  conceived  so that only complete identifi-cation with the  object can satisfy the worshipper. must "come nearest  The religious attitude  to indicating a state of  consciousness  that can exemplify the Absolute." Knowledge, therefore,  of the general  outline  of  reality as a whole is possible to finite minds wholly devoted to the quest.  It is possible  vision' that is the universe.  to glimpse the The quest  "vast unitary  ot philosophy which,  for its satisfaction rests on 'the whole spectacle of the ordered -universe, and on the judgments of value which are  106"  essentially and rationally implied in that vision' is net altogether in vain,  Bosanquet's own statement  maintain indeed, and will not  is, "Now I  surrender the position,  that what  thought ultimately reveals and expresses through necessity, can be nothing less than the nature of reality. not - as Croce maintains - the  Reality is  'thinking' of finite minds,  neither can reality be reached by wholly cognitive processes, but we do, it is his contention, and that, in a sense, 3.  We  'experience' the Absolute;  'better than anything else.'  'experience' the Absolute, thus and so, but what  may be said of the  'nature of the Absolute?'  The two  questions  are not altogether separable, but there is a difference of 1 emphasis. Bosanquet  A writer in the Philosophical Review  remarks that  "writes more about our experience of the whole  of the nature of the Absolute as such." to be wondered at. the inevitable  than  Surely this is not  It is one thing to recognize cuite  clearly  implication of judgment and experience, and to  feel the approach to unity that the highest grades of experience afford, but quite another thing to venture far in the detailed drawing of the Absolute. What the Absolute cannot be he is not diffident declaring.  Against  in  the tendency of many moderns he maintains  that the Absolute cannot be thought of on the analogies of Will or Purpose or Activity; neither can the Absolute as a whole be changeable. 1.  M.C. Carrol, Philosophical Review, Vol. 30  p. 179  106"  In refuting the theory that purpose Bosanquet  the Absolute is will or  follows closely the line marked out by  Bradley in his chapter "The Absolute and its Appearances." The argument  is this, that "will implies relation and process,  and an unsolved discrepancy of elements,'1  something which  be imputed to the Absolute that would fill the logical for complete comprehensiveness. "uncritical attempt  cannot  demand  It is no less than an  to make play with the unknown."  The same,  Bradley adds, holds of "energy or activity, or anything else of the kind."  Bosanquet puts it thus  can never be the whole of a world.  "A purpose or a will  A purpose always means  that, founding yourself on matter accepted as a basis y o u recognise a certain alternation as essential in view of the admitted situation, for the restoration or partial 1 of harmony."  An Absolute that was  restoration  'will would be a meaning-  less pursuit of nothing in particular.  Purpose and will are  in the Absolute but they are not the Absolute. Against  the notion of change as the form of the  Absolute (in the sense of an Absolute that  changes as a whole)  Bosanquet directs the entire weight of his logic. there be change without identity?  How can  Change, in order to be  change needs some standard fixed and external to that which changes; in other words, change must be of something less than the Absolute.  The conception of 'progress of or outside the  whole' or of any movement which is not wholly exhausted within 1.  Principle,  p . 391  1 the Absolute cannot  'falls to pieces at a touch.'  "The whole  change or depart from its unity of character and value,"  for the whole is "simply everything," the theatre of all that happens."  Change, of course, goes on within the Absolute, 2  hut not beyond it, for there is no beyond. remarks  As Bradley  tersely  "The Absolute has no seasons," for every season falls  within it. So far the emphasis has been laid upon the unity of the Absolute, arrived at by logical necessity from the simplest process of thought or from the most But  elementary  this is no more than half a tale.  experience.  In view of the way  thought has been going of late, emphasis on unity is necessary enough, but for a whole picture of reality or of  'logical  necessity' there must be a like emphasis upon multiplicity. "Our inference to any total perfection must be what might be called a matter of concomitant variations variations  "we must be in earnest  ...."  W i t h these  ... I have noted"  Bosanquet  continues "the passionate vehemence of Plato's belief in the multiplicity as well as the unity, which is actual in the 3 universe."  If parts are nothing without  the whole, the  whole is likewise nothing without the parts. earnest  We  'must be in  about the relation of part and whole,' letting neither  association nor dissociation have the upper hand.  We are  presented at every point with a multiplicity which must advance 1. 2.  Meeting of Extremes, Ibid., p.177  p . 125  3.  Contemporary British Philosophy - p.70.  for its stability toward unity, yet whether the unity or the multiplicity is the more real is an idle questionhang together.  The two  "The hardness and ultimate giveness of fragmen  tary appearances, and the miraculous alchemy with which the t^uch of thought and progressive experience is perpetually dissolving them, are fundamental  facts of practical  theoretical life, which none but the very greatest 1 ophers seem to have adequately appreciated." self expression of the real, would without  and of philos-  Thought,  cease, if ever  the •  unity  'concomitant variation' were attained. The argument  as to the nature of the Absolute,2 as  pictured in the nature of thought has been given above. It will be recalled that,in terns at any rate,'Bradley away from Bosanquet at this point. the establishment  Since thought advances by  of relations,.every relation  demanding  another for its support, it can never reach a single experience.  breaks  coherent  The experience of the Absolute must be supra-  relational, and analogous to feeling.  We have felt that in  meaning the two, who differ in terms, tend to approximate, except for a difference of mood remaining.  Bosanquet,  however,  is on more distinctive ground in his insistence upon a character of dissociation as essential to the nature of the Absolute, as its unity.  "It is not an imperfection of the  supreme being," Bosanquet writes - in the language of Edward Caird, "but an essential of his completeness, that his nature, 1.  Science and Philosophy, p.121.  2.  See p.121 above.  summing up all of Reality,  should go out into its "other" to  seek the completion which in this case alone is absolutely 1 found."  It is a fundamental error to consider either side  of the Absolute experience apart from the ohter.  The one will  lead to a conception of a 'static' Absolute; the other to a conception of the Absolute as a series. is the popular misinterpretation  The former of these  of Bosanouet's theory;  latter is indefensible in that "The determinate  the  self-contain-  edness of a truly infinite whole" could never be reached by adding unit  to "unit.  conception of the maintained  We are brought back again to the  'Concrete Universal,' in which identity is  through difference, as the true character of the  Absolute. Further, the Absolute cannot be in Time, time must be housed in the Absolute.  though  If the Absolute were in  Time, then Time would be a category prior to, in a sense external to, the whole; which is absurd.  The argument to an  'Absolute Time' from the relativity of personal is fallacious.  durations  "No one should think that in connecting  relative systems of space - Time with a total of their relativities, we are cojrabining them into a real time which supercedes their individual lives.  The total of  time systems is more concrete than the single  connected  standardised  time-flow, but it is still a world of times and not a time. 2 So at least it appears to me."  Moreover, contained within  1.  Principle, p.243  2.  Meeting of Extremes, p.155  temporal experience are suggestions w h i c h point transcendence of succession in, say, 5.  Positive  to the  contemplation.  statement of the nature of the Absolute is  necessarily by analogy, and every analogy may obscure as well as illuminate.  The capital difficulty is to find meaningful  enough terms without resorting Parmenides  too freely to pictures.  'perfect sphere' is the classical example  pictorial defect in thought of the whole. any "thing" will never do.  of  The analogy of  To talk of the Absolute as one  does of a finite being is to be "on the brink of the meaningless.  Again, the problem is wrongly put if, in asking  philosophy for the nature of the Absolute we really mean, "What is God like?" or some question of a similar  sort.  Neither will the attempt to reach the infinite by abstraction from the finite succeed.  It is by participation in the  infinite that the finite is what  it is, and the road to the  infinite lies in the direction of the finite and beyond rather, so to speak, than away from it.  it,  For the infinite  is everything that the finite is, end more. The first word that must be said of the Absolute, and it has already been said, is that it is inclusive.  It  takes in everything and every value and in it none is lost. The manner in which variety, even what appears to be defect, may be taken up is probably the acutest problem of Absolutism. Bosanauet meets the problem squarely.  How can. one mood  contain another; how can one very distinct experience 'sorrow for sin') move over into another without  loss?  (as of  The answer is contained in the preceding  chapter, and is  stated as, "by self-transcendence. " In religion for example, the local character of occasional moods, the various of the individual's life are seen to in a single  'high level' experience.  blend  aspects  and to be  absorbed  "This comparison of  the higher regions of experience with each, other, and with those that are less complete enables us in principle understand  the relation of the less to the more  to  inclusive...  and thus to meet one of the fundamental difficulties in the conception of an Absolute experience.  Such an  experience,  we say, includes and absorbs the experiences which we possess severally - includes them positively in a fuller form of each, 1 yet without reproducing them in their separate  distinctness."  That we have no experience of our own by which to parallel the perfect experience does not mean that we cannot its conditions, and sense its nature.  The point is that  everything must be there, failures no less than  successes;  just as the many failures of the artist are truly in the final perfect production.  understand  contained  Transmutation, which in  living experience is exemplified in the advance from brute suffering to 'divine tragedy,' is the key to inclusion in the Absolute.  The way in which,in Art, Philosophy and Religion  the  "Time spirit has practically lost its power, or rather has S become the spirit that conquers time," in the sense of succession, is a clear example of transmutation. 1.  Principle, p.273  S.  Science and Philosophy, p.118  "For us,"  106"  Bosanquet writes, "the Absolute is the living source of the series, a source with which we can identify ourselves by faith and will, and can therefore unite ourselves with its perfection although not in factual existence 1  transcending  the temporal series." Finite life belongs to the Absolute. " H e individual) is a member of the universe  (the finite  'inter pares'; he is  something, however, trifling without which it v/ould not be what it is.  He is, indeed, an organ through which, 2  however  slightly in degree, the whole maintains i t s e l f . "  The  Absolute needs him, and he needs the Absolute: as the  'flower'  which gives brightness to its wall, needs its cranny and the whole world to sustain it.  He takes a bit of material,  fills  it with new meaning, and commits it again to the whole from which together they sprang.  Neither finite life, nor any  of its appearances are defects in the Absolute.  If this saying  offends the moral sense, it is only an offence by misunderstanding.  M e n are living members of a universe spiritual  through-  out, showing their life on all sides by their continuity with the world and their fellows, and by their upward  striving  which is, in Bosanquet's phrase, the spirit of logic alive in them.  The relation of selves to the Absolute is pictured  by Dante in his Divine Comedy, in which "We have actual persons shown as moving freely and obviously themselves and selfdetermined, while no less obviously, though merely 1.  Meeting of Extremes, p.215  2.  Principle, p.159  through  a deeper insight into their selves, exhibited as elements within an embracing spiritual  universe."  Another question concerning the Absolute or the universe is:  Is it good or bad?  Philosophical.pessimism  on the one hand, and an ultimate optimism on the other may both be shown to be impossible conclusions as to the nature of the v/hole.  The whole cannot be valued for it is the source  of all values.  The popular criterion,  'values are for and in  persons' is modified by the conception of self-hood which we have accepted.  Value lies in individuality, but finally there  is only one individual, that is, the Absolute.  Just as we  cannot value specific qualities except as in an individual, so also we cannot universe. whole.  evaluate the individual except as in the  There is no reason for drawing a line short of the  The only possible measure of value is the Absolute,  and it is therefore meaningless to pronounce upon it as good, bad or indifferent.  "In itself, though perfect, it is not  good, because it is not on one side in the contrast of what ought to be with that which is not what it ought to be but is becoming so.  Good and bad are not appropriate  expressions  by which to raise a question about it, but if it is raised, the universe must be pronounced good as opposed to bad.  It  is, however, though in the above sense not strictly good certainly not morally good in the ordinary sense - yet perfection and the standard of all goodness and value." 1.  Principle, p.310  The last question as to the nature of the Absolute which we shall attempt is this:  Is it a self-conscious  being?  The predecessors of Bosanquet, T.H. Green and the Cairds, affirm that it is? but Bosanquet is non-committal. denies the applicability of the term, but Bosanquet at this point, so outright. greater grace than the other.  Bradley is not,  He will accept an analogy with Bradley is unhesitating, and  will not have instruments and expressions fitted to appearance taken over into the realm of reality.  But the chasm between  appearance and reality is not, for Bosanquet despair 1  that it is for Bradley.  the "gulf of  There are bridges that rise  over the abyss. Professor Pattison equates God and the Absolute, and, of course, calls it a self-conscious being. the equation and doubts the rider.  Bosanquet denies  The substantial  agreement  of Bradley and Bosanquet in meanings, however, makes it doubtful whether the latter, though hospitable to every analogy will allow their too close application to reality. Its rich variety of analogy is the especial merit of Bosanquet' writing, but how far they may be trusted is an open question. To no small extent, it would  appear.  The 'concept' of the  Absolute, therefore, is approached by a splendid series of pictures.  With 'a maximum of reservation' the Absolute is  faintly outlined in the great works of mind, the state, a great poem, religion, and the like.  Hence it ought not to be  inapplicable to characterise the Absolute as 'a self-conscious being' if we remember that the nature of the self is not seen  106" in its exclusiveness, but in its inclusiveness, and that the • highest ranges of 'objective mind' in, say, a greet ation, are more truly individual  civiliz-  and concrete than the  self of a solitary person. There are passages which, at least, do not deny that the Absolute is a self-conscious being. Extremes' Bosanquet  In the  takes issue with those who  there is a universal mind.'  Again, he writes.  'Meeting of 'deny that "The infer-  ence (to the Absolute) is to a unitary perfection lying in the complete individuality of the universe as a conscious being."  The type of the 'conscious being,' however, is the  'individual' and not the 'person.' * It is because of the tendency to treat personality and self-consciousness as features of exclusiveness that Bosanquet is chary of their use as applied to the Absolute.  A defect of  finite-conscious-  ness must not be made a character of the infinite. 'the perfect experience' remains.  The term  There can be 110 question  at all as to the sort of analogy that does serve to illuminate our concept  of what we are  completely convinced is real and  is, at the last, the only real. It may be repeated, for the sake of emphasis, that Bosanquet'3 interest  in the Absolute is solely on the ground  of the security it affords the myriad manifestations w h i c h make up the world of every day. It is the Infinite variety of life, its shape, colour and texture that moves him most deeply. call to finer and higher appreciation of and  It is the  responsiveness  106"  to its beauty, its rewards and its opportunities that belong alike to men of high degree and of low; it is the whole wealth of the world  that  own satisfaction and that  sends the thinker out to find to his of others, the roots of all of this  in some sure and unshaken ground.  The appeal to the Absolute  and to the ideal is not a venture into the upper air, but a groundward movement; it is not a 'racking of the about remote matters' but an attempt  imagination  to know the underlying  conditions of the near and the real. 5.  Criticism of Bosanquet's theory of the Absolute has  its rise, we have seen, in his treatment  of the finite  self.  It reaches its climax in the criticism that he is advocating a 'static absolute,' which, to our dynamic age is a very grievous thing.  In the attack many are joined, but a detailed  examination of the views of one will suffice.  Sir Henry Jones  has devoted several chapters to a detailed criticism of the allied phases of self-transcendence and the concept of the 1 2 Absolute. With his general position Watson appears to agree. The attack is directed primarily against  the self-Transcendence  of the finite individual, and is in much the same spirit as 3 that noticed above.  It is maintained that  is the preferable term. himself,'  self-realization  Man does not seek to 'go beyond  he is "endeavouring to reach or become  himself."  "I cannot admit," Sir Henry complains, "that man is a fore1. 2.  A Faith that Inquires - p.174 - 213 Philosophical Review Vol.34 p.427  3.  See p. ro.  above.  doomed failure."  This last  when we remember that  sentence sounds a trifle  the motive of Bosanquet's philosophy  beyond any doubt, the establishment permanent value. for of success.  Bosanouet  of the  'wealth of values' inconsist-  If man is "endeavouring to reach himself,' his self  beyond h i m s e l f ?  against  affords  If it falls short  In the first two phrases there is an  truly lies outside of him.  of the  is looked  immortality it does so not with a sense  of loss, but with a clear statement  ency.  to what  feels that his philosophy  all that any 'reasonable man would w a n t . '  that remain.  is,  of the grounds of man's  'Failure' varies according  of granting personal  odd  How then does he not seek to  Bosanquet maintains the  inappropriateness  'inside and outside' interpretation, 1 its dangers.•  'go  and guards himself  The position of Bosanouet  is that  man always is 'more or less' of himself, according as he  a is  'energizing,' but that he never need be a failure in any sense of the word.  That simply because man is seldom or  never all he would be, and because he is doomed to die, he is therefore doomed to be a failure is a palpable piece of bad philosophy.  It would be, for example, a strange view of  values that  saw any failure in the life of an Easter lily,  just because it died down before Whit Sunday. over the whole argument  We cannot go  for self-trangcendence again.  must be taken as established already.  And from this reading  of experience the rest follows; or if it be denied, there is nothing more to be said. 1.  See p.68. above  It  In any event  then  'fore-doomed  to failure 1  is a strange reaction to Bosanquet's view, whether  accepted, or rejected. Self-Transcendence ation, which is  'too cruel.'  in the Absolute becomes transmutWhy cruel?  It is plain that  in  a 'dynamic' "absolute, changing as a whole, transmutation would not be less but more.  In some way also, Sir Henry has missed  the point of identity in difference and of unity and multiplicity as the joint Bosanouet  character of the real, and has fancied  to have set up two worlds, with an abyss between.  He writes "In this world man is condemned to failure, and the next world is the scene of such transmutation that nothing is 1 any longer recognizable."  This is a charicature and not  an interpretation of Bosanquet, who has said often that world is all the world there is."  "This  It is by penetration with  the secret of this world that we discover it to be more  than  we ever thought, so much more that, in popular speech, it is known as another world.  The true  'other' is 'this' understood.  Further, it is written "The Absolute stands aloof aft'er all, from the world of finite happenings, of which by the way, world is crammed full."  Obviously Bosanquet would not  this  claim  to be unassailable, but attack on the side of dualism must come as a surprise.  "Multiplicism, the variety of levels of  experience each possessing its peculiar range and area becomes th§ obvious truth.  Dualism loses its prominence as the one  antithesis of monism, and the question of monism and the Absolute becomes simply the question how far we are able to 1.  A Faith that Inquires - p.192  maintain a unity within multiplicism while following it out into its higher which are also necessarily its deeper ranges." Perhaps Bosanquet's phrase  'He has not been in earnest  the relation of part and whole' may be turned against critic.  over the  If the abyss is conceived as between appearance and  reality, it may be  answered  break between the two.  that at no point is there any  Bosanquet does not, even in terms  (as Bradley does) lay himself open to this criticism. Appearance is held away from Reality by opposition to be overcome; but reality is not independent of the opposing appearances which blend and break sway within it. ion is the  'spirit of logic.'  The little quip  Contradict-  "Contradiction  is thus, for Mr. Bosanquet, the ultimate word regarding world of time and tears,"and"It  this  is a contradiction between 2  two things, each of which is fixed,"  fail completely of inter-  preting the place of contradiction, and reveal a gulf of misunderstanding.  The principle of non-contradict ion, we  have seen, is the spirit of unity, and is so by virtue of its impulse toward the removal of every contradiction.  Contradict-  ion is, therefore, in a very real sense a 'prime mover, 1 is in no sense the  but  'last word.'  The final criticism is of the Absolute as static. It is the 'shining palace on the hill' all over again.  William  James, if he had thought of it, would have called it "Bosanquet-2 Folly" - a round tower, set uselessly on the horizon. accusation is directed against its inclusiveness.  The  That in a  sense, therefore, the Absolute is static, Bosanquet would agree, 1.  Principle  - p.373  2. A Faith That Enquires - p.212  106"  inasmuch as it never has any call to go outside of itself. But that this is adequate ground of criticism he does not admit, for it cannot be escaped by any path of logic. Sir Henry admits that  'all process is in the  Absolute 1  and yet demands that the Absolute be not  static.  Estimated  strictly, the criticism is meaningless.  The  'process,' for which he pleads cannot go outside of the "Theatre of all that is going on everywhere," and the Absolute is the theatre.  Nevertheless "It is" he writes, "a dead  Absolute, like the static substance of Spinoza. turmoil is all elsewhere."  The living  It is inconceivable that Sir Henry  has read the Gifford lectures without bias  (and the bias,  which sways him, and others also, is not improbably the demand that man be a permanent  'angelic spirit' with title clear to  the skies) when he says of the Absolute that "It does not express itself in the changes" of this world. turmoil 1  The  'living  is, all of it, in the Absolute, only it suffers  transmutation as the various moods of man undergo moment by moment.  "You cannot" Bosanquet  transmutation  objects, "heap up  contents all relevant to each other, within a single experience 1 and prevent them from reacting on each other." what transmutation, simply seen, amounts to.  That is "Accidental  views, imperfect essays, lower forms of beauty and goodness are really present in the totals which must gain depth and weight from all that has led up to them." 1.  Principle, p.390  1  Bosanquet has an excellent phrase "The  universe 1  does not move from its nature, but reveals The issue is this. of anything else  What  it."  stability of values or  can there be in a universe  that cannot  at home, but must go outside of itself for satisfaction, is likely at any moment  1.  stay and  to change its mind and its nature.  M e e t i n g o f Extremes  - p.216  UBC Scanned by UBC Library  LOGIC  Part  II - (B)  Chapter IX  With the detail of Bosanquet's logic  (said by a  recent American critic to be, "The greatest masterpiece  of  logical writing in our tongue," we  For  are not concerned.  the purposes of this essay it will suffice to indicate its general trend and so to clear the mind of any confusion as to the logical basis of Bosanquet's wider philosophical system. We have already remarked upon his 'change of heart' concerning the place of logic in philosophy, and  throughout  our 'oages have touched on points of logic, particularly the general theory of the -universal, and Bosancuet's in that direction.  contribution  It is all-important to keep in mind that  logic for him never was an arid discussion of forms. general attitude never varied.  In his large book on Logic,  published in 1888, is the seed of his latest same field.  The sub-title  His  thought in the  is significant, "The Morphology  of Knowledge," in that it emphasises connection and life, rather than the division traditional to 'logic  chopping.'  Logic, we have seen, is not a part of the field of philosophy, but a spirit which pervades the whole.  Divisions between  the areas of inquiry could only be for convenience and by no means insurmountable.  A typical sentence is, "Lcgic, or the  spirit of totality, is the clue to reality, value and freedom." Within the area, even, of logical theory, divisions are not final.  It is useful to indicate the various grades of the  same essential process by terms such as, judgment and inference deduction and induction; but their continuity is the most important thing about them, and not the separation that formal logic has accentuated.  "The conception of Logical Science,"  he writes in the introduction to his  "Logic,* "which has been  my guide in the present work is that of an unprejudiced study of the forms of knowledge in their development, their interconnection and their comparative value as embodiments of truth. In elaboration of his subtitle he remarks, "If I have at all reproduced for others the spectacle of continuity and unity in the intellectual life, combined with the most varied and precise adaptation of its fundamentally identical  function  to manifold conditions and purposes, which this comparison never fails to present to my own mind, I shall, so far, have 1 succeeded in the object of my work."  thus.  2  Bosanquet  criticises certain other schools of logic  1.  Logic, 1888 - p.VII  2.  An article by R.C. Lodge in 'Philosophical Review' has been of service in the Dresent outline.  106"  a.  Formal logic, the logic of tradition and of the  schools is defective, and is bound to fail in that it attempts to treat the form of knowledge without reference to It may be admitted that  content.  'forms of knowledge' may be tentatively  isolated and compared as to their place and function; that an intuition may be compared, for example, with a judgment of fact or an inference from some very concrete ground. vital connection is there, none the less. aimed at by abstraction,  But  the  For a principle,  to attempt to assess the reality of,  say, a whole province of experience or of research, is the 1 sheerest nonsense.  It is, as we have said,  the concrete  filling of a bare form that gives it stability and a strong claim to necessity.  The place given to the syllogism and  its modes in his Logic, is evidence of his attitude. b.  Inductive Logic, too, falls under the charge of  absorption in abstractions.  The advance of induction is by  means of the enumeration of a number of recurrent  cases in  which an identity appears,- and which can therefore be grouped under a single abstraction, a general rule.  The universal  thus appealed to is of the lower order, and must be replaced by the higher, the concrete mniversal, if the situation is to be seen at all as a whole.  The path of induction is straight  and narrow, whereas the progress of knowledge depends upon the deepening and filling in of a concrete world.  The logical  method, commonly held to be quite adecuate to the work of the 1.  See p . 3 5". above.  106" natural sciences is, in fact, successful only when it is an •enumerative subsumption.' Bosanquet would see the principle of induction stated something as "Every universal nexus tends to continue itself inventively  in new matter."  "And the  value of an inductive conclusion lies in the amount of material which it enables us to grasp and this is very slightly tested by the number of cases in which the nexus is repeated in fact. And if the idea of identical repetition could be realized (which it cannot, for every so-called repetition is differenced by a new context) the frequency of recurrence would have no 1 connection w i t h universality at all." c.  Symbolic logic, the favorite instrument  of the new  realist, deals not with knowledge or experience of this world, but with the conditions of 'possible worlds' built upon a foundation of premises assumed for the purpose. no interest  It evinces  in the world of affairs whatever, nor in the  principles which an investigation of its movements reveals. It is essentially  'a game of counters,' find therefore of no  possible attraction to the philosopher of Bosanauet's character; but is a happy retreat from reality, as indeed, Bertrand Russell, confesses more or less accidentally.  Behind  the cloak of his devotion to truth 'though it lead to an abyss' is a very strong aversion to the conditions of the real world. However brilliant 1.  its flights (and abstruse) and however  Science and Philosophy  - p.72  106"  peaceful its atmosphere once away in its own world of fancy, it cannot either displace or even supplement interpret d.  the attempt to  soundly the discerned data of experience. Instrumental Logic is, of course, quite  to Bosanquet.  inacceptable  Its reduction of truth to the biologically  useful cannot be conceded.  That wherever, there is biological  adaptation or any useful adjustment, reality is at work in self-expression, is his way of putting  the case.  Instrumental  T  Logic, it may be maintained is no logic at all, inasmuch as it denies the fundamental principle rationality of things. entalist  of logic, which is the  Everything of value which the Instrum-  emphasises may be given place in a speculative  philosophy.  It is a loss to limit  the field of inquiry as the«  result of an alleged impotench of thought to know the real. Instrumental!sm, while superficially whole and competent, is by its own self-limitation permanently  decapitated.  THE LOGIC OF T H E WHOLE  Part  II - (B)  Chapter X  "Truth is individual, and no general principle, no abstract reflection can be adeouate to the content of what individual."  These are the opening words of the  In his smaller book he cites with approval  is  'Logic.'  the reply of a  certain teacher who, when asked to give his reasons for teaching logic, said, "If the  m  en  ence is, it would be something." added "That  could learn what an inferAn inference is, it may be  single development which in some stages we call  judgment and in others  inference."  The three important  elements of Bosancuet's logic  are his theory of Identity, of Judgment, and of Inference. With the first of these it was necessary to introduce the metaphysics of this essay. remain.  The twp, judgment and inference  These are "forms in which our gradually  knowledge and experience have precipitated  evolving 1  themselves."  The evolution of knowledge is from blank to an ever growing maximum in very concrete and comprehensive experience, 1.  such as,  R.C. Lodge in Philosophical Review Vol.32 - p.395  106" for example, the aesthetic is sensation.  appreciation.  In sensation the real world  Its earliest  form  offers some direct  evidence as to its nature but the evidence may be chaotic and untrustworthy without a great  deal of interpretation.  It must  be transcended if knowledge is to achieve any high order. The systematized world of exact science, built up by progressive criticism of the data of sense is an immeasurable improvement upon the world of sense per se.  Judgment and inference  are stages in this organisation of a concrete world of knowledge.  Finally, the spatio-temporal world of the sciences  must be transcended, if insight is to advance yet farther into the real. The function of judgment, therefore, is that of 1 "progressive articulation within a postulated  system."  The system is 'postulated' for although without it science would be inconceivable, infer it,  and although we are carried on to  'it is not a direct observation that can be made  from the nature of the world we live in.'  The penetration  needed, however, to become aware of the'system' in the shadow of experience is not, Bosanquet is quite sure, very great. The postulate is forced upon us by present perception.  Judg-  ment is the filling in of the spaces within the postulated world.  "Judgment," Watson writes, "is what we mean by thought,  when thought is properly understood, and in judgment reality .... is a constituent." 1. 2.  2  Agnes Cumming in 'Mind' - N.S. 26, p.167 ,  Philosophical Review Vol.23 - p.  106" The forms of judgment pass over into each other. "We should accustom ourselves to think of these forms as constituting a progression in the sense that each of them betrays a reference  to an ideal of knowledge which in itself  it is unable to fulfil and therefore suggests some further 1 or divergent form."  In the categorical judgment  elements of the hypothetical and vice versa. judgment is both analytic and synthetic.  there are  So also every  "This alone would  not" Bosanouet proceeds, "by itself be a sufficient ground for our refusing to employ these terms as heads of classification, for it is more or less the case through the whole of Logic that terms must be employed to mark predominant rather than exclusive  aspects  characters."  "Inference," he begins in the second volume, the essence of judgment, but at least in  qua explicit  has/addition a differentia of its own."  inference,  The problem  inference is "How can we know one thing by knowing  If the line of identity that established  universal were maintained in spite of very wide  of  another?"  This is answered by reference to the principle of the universal.  "shares  concrete the  differences  which were necessarily ignored, then the inference from one situation to another would be very dubious; because of the unconsidered difference, but if the identity were to persist by the organic relations of very widely different  details and  many parts, then, within the organic whole, the inference should be broad and relatively secure. 1.  Logic, 1888 - Vol. 1, p.87  Subject to the reservation  106" that  'part' and  'whole' are not necessarily to be  considered  quantitatively, the position is theoretically stated  thus:  "Inference is the indirect reference to reality of parts within a whole on the strength of the nature of that whole 1 as revealed in parts directly referred to reality." The change that this new illumination brings over the face of logical theory is'little short of revolutionary.' What has passed for logic retains no more than archaeological interest.  Thought, must be considered to be free from  abstraction and an orderly evolution. and Reality.  Logic is one with Life  We have seen it working in the various phases  of experience, always moving towards harmoniousness.  Any one  of its forms may fail or be superceded, but the same  'omnipot-  ential principle' remains. It is of more than passing interest  to remark that  many men have been convinced of their actual contact with the real; and the form of their knowledge has been variously called vision, insight, or Intuition.  Bosanquet insists that  intuition is as genuine a form of knowledge as the simplest judgment.  Intuition is the method of a mind sensitive to  the less obvious sort of evidence.  It entails "Looking at an  object intrinsically systematic and distinct and discovering  2  its constitutive terms and relations." The goal, therefore of logic, as Bosanquet  sees it,  is that it bridges the gap between the theoretical statement 1.  Logic, Vol.11  - p.4  2.  Kathleen Gilbert, "Philosophical Review" Vol., 23, p.549.  106"  of 'laws of thought' and  the "actual mode in which expert  writers on general  subjects develop  arguments."  'precipitated form' of thought, we have  Every  their  comprehensive  seen, is not insoluble, but may be blended w i t h other forms to achieve yet more remarkable results.  This is the unfailing  and abundant resource of thought, that no limit to its adventure or its rewards.  1.  can be set  It is indeed an  Implication and linear Inference - p.4  UBC Scanned by UBC Library  'Alchemy.'  106"  THE FINITE INFINITE LIFE (Pleasure and P a i n )  Part  III  Chapter XI  Bosanquet's interest  in the ethical bearing of  philosophy, always very keen, is so pronounced in his Gifford Lecture s that, by their title and content, they imply a preeminently human and ethical preoccupation.  The only reason,  he has said, why no large ethical book came from his pen was his high regard for Bradley's "Ethical Studies" which, he felt, dealt so thoroughly with the whole problem of conduct and of ethical  theory.  The ethical implication has not been scrupulously avoided in the preceding pages, but the actual amount repetition need be quite small in the present  of  section.  The phrase so often repeated hitherto,  'the self-  transcendence of the individual' is the link between our Metaphysics and Ethics.  The  'impulse and movement toward the  overcoming of contradiction' we have discovered as the formula of all life and activity.  The pressure is that of  the ideal within the real, or of Reality in all of its forms. Man is a finite-infinite being because the infinite is especially present and active in him, while, at the same time,  106" his particularity and peculiarity of structure set limits (not necessarily where we have fancied them to be, but none the less) to his self-transcendence. out of it, in a way, he is more or less  limits  Though he may go  'within his own skin.'  The obstruction w h i c h the finite offers to the infinite up a tension within him.  "The finite self" Bosanquet writes,  "is inherently a contradiction. same time infinite.  sets  The spirit  It is finite, and at the of the whole working in it  drives it to seek satisfaction, but that which it seeks it never finds; but, like Socrates, it continues dissatisfied with what is, in the interest  of what may be.  The being of  man, then, is double; and his life is essentially and inherent1 ly one of hazard and hardship."  As common experience will  agree, he is drawn asunder between the'old man and the new.' W i t h this general position, we have seen, Sir Henry Jones disagrees, but apparently by misunderstanding significance.  its  Bosanquet's belief is that contradiction is  necessary to the maintenance of the finite-infinite life of man.  Sir Henry agrees that there is contradiction, but holds  that in religion, overcome.  (for example) all contradiction is completely  To this Bosanquet  can reply, "If all  contradiction  were overcome, then the finite individual would no longer be a finite individual but the Absolute."  But the  "contradiction,  he insists, does not constitute the really significant of a finite being."  2  1.  Value and Destiny  - p.  2.  Ibid.  - p.25  essence  Ill  The tension which characterizes the life of man is three-fold.  There is the conflict  of truth and error, of  pleasure and pain and of good and evil.  The first is the  conflict of coherence and incoherence,' the second is the preeminent factor in the evolution of the species, and the last, the moral struggle, is the central conflict which belongs to human life as such.  While not itself the Absolute, the moral  struggle presents itself to man as if it were absolute. It may be argued that his sense of the beautiful and of the true are elements quite as characteristic of his being, but in actual living there is no conflict  so severe, nor any  imperative so categorical as that of the moral 2.  life.  With the conflict of truth and error we are not  strictly concerned in a chapter on ethics.  It is enough to  repeat that error is "made through and through of the same stuff as truth."  "The character of falsity is a matter of  degree, normally reducible to exaggerated emphasis on one element  in a whole."  It is by rearrangement  that error is made over into truth.  and systematization  ''Error is what  stands out  and refuses to come into the system though of one substance and texture with it."  Since the ' s t u f f  of truth and error  is the same, neither truth nor error can characterize the Absolute, but they are essential to the life of the finite individual.  The conflict arises out of his attempt to 1 systematize his world. 1.  Value and Destiny, p.213-15.  Our first real concern in this chapter is the conflict of pleasure and pain, a conflict  so intense that  pessimism, the philosophy of pain predominant and universal has never been far from the centre of the world of thought. Bosanquet's concern is to trace the two, pleasure and pain to their common root, and to show that root as the source of all our values.  He disclaims any anxiety to show a balance of  'compensation,' or to justify the ways of God to men.  A whole  theory of the psychology of pain and pleasure, Bosanquet not attempt. very  does  His intention is simply to show that life is  'costing,' and that its high cost is the corollary of  its value. The place of pain in organic evolution may not be overemphasised.  It is possible to complain that the world  a painful place, but it cannot very well be wished unless it is to be wished away altogether.  is  otherwise,  Sensitivity seems  to have been the first instrument of adaptation, and hence, of selection, that painful process by which, at last, our species for better or for worse, appeared. obstruction to activity.  Pain follows an  Theories as to its origin in  evolution vary, but as to its actual conditions this brief definition will serve. 1 contradiction.'  The condition of pain is a 'felt  No line can be drawn between the condition  of pain and of pleasure.  In general  pain appears to us as  correlative to contradiction, while pleasure is correlative 1.  Value and Destiny, p.166.  106"  to successful union.  It is a commonplace of experience that  the two go hand in hand. B o t h in the sub-human world, and in the world of man it appears that pain has nothing in it of a special curse, but is rather a "characteristic belinging to the position of finite members of an infinite universe, which is perpetually remoulding them by struggle and death to a wealth of expressions of itself, including at least in our case, the becoming vehicle of intelligence."  the  P a i n does not belong to evil any  more than pleasure does to the good, which is not at all. Their only kindship is the common root in the double nature 1 of man. bffth  A word word further as to the common root and pain.  The movement  of^pleasure  of Self-Transcendence is promoted by  both: by pleasure in that the unobstructed  activity is encour-  aged, and by pain in that the organism is compelled to seek relief from obstruction. result do the same thing.  The two from the point of view of That as experienced pleasure and  pain are often so fused as to defy separation we have remarked. This is true of every degree of the two.  "True pleasure,"  Bosanquet writes, "must include pain."  Small pleasures readily  pass into pain; higher pleasures are so  'touched with pain '  that the language of pain is often more appropriate; and the 1.  There is no reason to raise the whole question of Hedonism here. It is dead to all reflective minds. See "Ethical Studies," or for a brief modern statement John Baillie in the Hibbert Journal for October, 1927.  fiercer sort of pleasures, rising out of the basic  instincts,  have, unquestionably, in them, as much of pain as pleasure. 1 "They are infected w i t h fierceness and restlessness."  The  many refinements of this common experience need no further emphasis. There is no ground, in the prevalence of pain, for pessimism, Bosanquet points out, once its conditions are understood.  We have stated above the argument  that the whole  is the only standard of value, and that therefore pessimism is a false valuation.  To this it may be objected "That may  be so, but, in any case, I have my own standard, and however relative or imperfect a standard it may be, it still suffices to convince me that pain is more prevalent life to me, can excuse."  than the worth of  This view is less easily refuted,  and for many will remain; but Bosanquet would defective experience and defective reasoning.  see in it both Pain cannot  'predominate,' for it is correlative to pleasure, advancing  'pari passu.'  the two  Moreover it is as idle as undignified  for a man to cry out against the conditions that made him. 3  Nevertheless, any shallow attempt to minimize the  place and the prevalence of pain is equally culpable. reduce the "full impression" of the world.  It would  It is not by  accident that Christianity has, as the centre of its system, a symbol of suffering.  The instinct that  saw in the tragedy  of its founder the central truth of its message was sure. 1.  Value and Destiny - (note below p.163)  The  The full weight  of the contradiction of finite life and its  ever impending threat  of calamity and of death is, in a  sense, the price paid for a slight hold on the infinite.  The  wealth of art, of love, of religion must be paid for. Any theory which tended to reduce the place of pain, by, for example an appeal to the future in which 'sorrow and sighing' are extinguished cannot be accepted as in the spirit of Bosanquet's thought.  The danger inherent in the use of  pictures of future bliss is ever present and acute in popular theology.  "If," he writes, "we really think the race is  progressing to a stage of felicity in which without any jot of participation in tragic experience, it is to draw from it a painless enjoyment, then I think that the doctrine of hell contributing to the pleasure of heaven is not far away." The weight  of pain must be recognized to the full  before any theory can do it justice; the depth of the final problem created by the apparent  cessation of all activity at  death must be squarely met before it can be solved. that is a mere  A death  'Translation' is an evasion of an issue, and  too, a thing without value, Bosanquet remarks, compared with "the love and courage which make death seem a little thing." We have touched here (and above) the secret by which pain in the life of man becomes a positive means of his exhaltation.  There i& in pain as such no mysterious good, but  as transmuted from pain into tragedy it becomes one of life's 1.  Principle, p.18  116 most potent instruments.  There is the spiritual induction to  which the experience of suffering is instrumental. The w a y out of the problem which Tragedy affords is not through abolition but by way of the conversion of "brute agony and dumb endurance and despair with spiritual conflict and triumph."  A writer whom Bosanquet both loved and admired  has put this experience of tragedy and noted its ennoblement 1 thus, and though not every word bears directly on our argument, he leaves the impression which we desire. "We are left by contemplation of Tragedy, with an idea showing two sides or aspects, which we can neither.separate nor reconcile.  The whole or order against which the individual  part shows itself powerless, seems to be animated with a passion for perfection: we cannot towards evil.  otherwise explain its behaviour  Yet it appears to engender this evil within  itself, and in its effort to overcome and expel it it is agonised with pain and driven to mutilate its own substance and to loose not only evil but priceless good.  That  this  idea, though very different from the idea of blank fate, is no solution of the riddle of life is obvious; but only should we experience such a solution.  Shakespeare is not  to justify the ways of God to men .... impressions.  attempting  But there are other  Sometimes from the very furnace of affliction  a conviction seems borne to us that somehow, if we could see it, this agony counts as nothing against the heroism and love 1.  A.C. Bradley - "Shakespearian Tragedy" p.38.  117 which appears in it and thrills our hearts....  Somewhere  from these sources, and from others comes a presentiment, formless but haunting and profound that  all the fury of  conflict, with its waste and woe is less than half the truth But these faint and scattered intimations that  the  Tragic world, being but a fragment of the whole beyond our vision, must needs be a contradiction and no Truth, avail nothing to interpret  ultimate  the mystery."  Bosanouet  feels all of this, but would go on, in the manner of Hegel to show the reconciliation,  even the e x a l t a t i o n which this  mysterious burden of tragedy bears in with it, a reconciliation which Bradley himself is aware of and which he puts thus, writing of that heaviest  of tragedies, Othello.  "And pity  itself vanishes, and love and admiration alone remain; in the majestic dignity and sovereign ascendency of the close  ....  , And when he dies upon a kiss the most painful of all tragedies leaves us for the moment  free from pain and exulting in the 1  power of 'love and man's unconquerable mind.'" If we were to attempt to set limits to what pains we would and what we would not bear we would be  closing  doors deliberately upon life's way of ennoblement, and estranging ourselves from its inner grandeur. One other correction of much popular thought on the subject of pain remains.  As it is weak to minimize the pain  in the world, it is equally mistaken to suppose pain to be where it is not. 1.  It is characteristic  Shakespearian Tragedy, p.198.  of Bosanquet,  both  early and late, to deprecate the tendency to ascribe all manner of ^miseries  to the poor: to call their dwellings  (the homes of the vast majority of working class Londoners) slums and dens.  For all the disadvantages they endure  there  is, he maintains, a quality of decent living that ought not to be poorly thought  of, and a degree of simple cheer,  to the irrepressible  quality of mankind that would be hard  to surpass. of 'sheer first  owing  Criticism from without may detect all manner  miseries'  which those who criticise would be the  to "make the best of" (they would say) if forced into  them.  The poor, because they are poor are not  "wholly wretched"  The comfortable, he complains, will say, with an affectation of practical insight, "That people whose lives are a struggle cannot be expected to take pleasure in beauty and knowledge. " His reply is, "I agree so far as this, that they cannot be expected to take such pleasure. take i t . " 1  From this view no political or social  may rightly be assumed. outside  All I know is that  they do  conservatism  The position is this that seen from  (and we usually tend to except  ourselves from  analysis)  pain and misery may appear to predominate, but as known from within, life even in narrowly restricting  circumstances and  under severe hardship, has large elements of all its own.  satisfactoriness  There is a 'Treasure of the humble.'  The  kindred view is that which owns the claims of savage life and primitive societies to an excellence, and a satisfactoriness of their own. 1.  The association of real delight in living with  Essays and Addresses  - p.30  119 the conditions w e w i t h our i  'confortable, cultivated and  peaceful w a y s ' are accustomed  to is quite mistaken.  reverse might almost be assumed  to be nearer the truth.  Finally, it has been . s a i d treatment  The  that in his whole  of the place of suffering in life, Boaanquet  minimizes the side of humor.  There can be little  question  that he is severe, both in character, and in his reading of life, but to the sensitive reader there is not a little humor in his thought, and in his theory it is not wholly absent.  The world is a painful place.  This cannot be  denied; and it is true also that pain can be transcended by laughter as well as by tragedy.  In support of this notion  the lighter side of the war may be quoted, but it seems to remain that, when all is said and done, the greatest utation of severe suffering lies not in the direction mirth, but of the'spiritual induction  transmof  that accompanies it.  It may be remarked, however, and in defence that for Bosanquet "tears are made human by laughter and laughter over tears."  triumphant  — 1  120  THE FINITE INFINITE LIFE (The Moral  Struggle)  Chapter XII  The conflict of pleasure and pain is present in all sub-human animal forms, but the moral struggle is, though its rudiments certainly appear in the higher animal creation, a peculiarly human conflict.  It belongs to the life of those  who have eaten the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.  All philosophies agree that the moral struggle is very  important; and too,however they differ in their statement of the source or the nature of the struggle they agree that its imperative once imposed is binding upon the life of the individual.  Theories of a special moral faculty have given of  way before the advance /modern psychology; but only the unimportant and unreflective can diminish their awe of "the moral law within " as a result of any 'explanation' of it. If it is not the most real thing about a man, it presents itself to him as such.  certainly  Goodness, beauty and truth  are equally contended for as characters of the Absolute  (and  by Bosanquet equally denied more than a place in the Absolute) but it is goodness that bulks demand  of human endeavour.  largest as the  characteristic  121  As an "Absolutist" Bosanquet is much  criticised  for belittling the conflict of good and evil. will not be selective, it is complained  Absolutism  it takes  things  "all in" and will not discriminate as thought between good and evil.  Idealists as Sir Henry Jones, Seth  Pringle,  Pattison, and of course, numerous Pragmatists and accuse him of shirking the problem of evil. Pattison regards his treatment  others  Professor  of good and evil as "the  crowning instance of his tendency to disintegrate  the indiv-  idual personality and reassemble its abstract elements in 1 the Absolute."  This criticism as it bears on the problem  of good and evil is taken up throughout  this  chapter.  With every phase of this most complex and vexed problem we cannot possibly deal.  At the most  the struggle  may be shown (as we have done w i t h pleasure and pain) as a characteristic of the double life of man, striving  toward  perfection,' yet grounded in defect and impotence. P a i n and pleasure, we have seen, arise from partial obstruction of particular activities, or impulses to activity in the organism.  They are the outcome of 'felt  and its attempted adjustment.  contradiction'  The moral struggle, however,  concerns no partial activities, but the whole  individual.  Every choice presents itself as the whole man versus the universe.  Bosanquet writes of the moral struggle, "It takes  the whole object - that is the moral of Plato's Republic 1.  Symposium  - p.522  122  to satisfy the whole man.  But then, the man cannot  receive  the whole object, and therefore ex hypothesi, cannot his whole nature into correspondence with any  bring  satisfaction."  The infinite in him makes him reach out for the universal object, but he cannot but fall short of it.  Put another way,  he seeks to be completely at one with himself, but since h i s true self is utterly beyond him, is, indeed, the Absolute, there is always in him, a large residue of unresolved contradiction and of unsatisfied striving. "loose ends" left unravelled. harmony which is the 2.  There are always  The struggle to attain that  'good' of the self, is never  The good, it is agreed, must  finished.  satisfy desire, but  the desire to be satisfied is not uncriticised or occasional desire, but the desire for perfection.  "The  identification  of goodness with the trained and formed character,  skilled  and enthusiastic in realizing the ideal self which is the whole, has always been my delight." 1  So does M r . Muirhead  quote Bosanquet as saying. Evil is the reverse of this.  It is a desire or a  self assertion that does not want to be in harmony with the whole.  It 'wants its own way.'  are necessarily the same.  In content good and evil  They are made up, both of them,  of desires and their attempted satisfactions, but in attitude they differ, and that radically. points out, are not 1.  Evil desires, Bosanquet  'desires for evil.'  His Obituary Notice in Mind.  Strictly no one  desires evil, "but none the less the.re are many evil selves, and all selves, inasmuch as they can never be altogether unified, partake in some degree of evil. That it is the same content or 'material' that enters into both good and evil must be stressed in moral theory.  "No tendency or desire could be pointed out in the  worst of lives or o f actions which is incapable of being with 1 addition or readjustment, incorporated with the good The point may be pressed further.  self.  Not only do good and evil  represent different attitudes or arrangements of the same stuff of human desires and attempted satisfactions, but it may be shown that without the character of good there would be no character of evil, and without that which is evil there would be no good.  It may be shown, that is, that good and  evil are correlates, like pleasure and pain, known only by opposition to each other.  2  Reality of Evil"  The chapter "On Doubting the  is a simple statement of this ^iew,- which  is not, of course, original at all.  The common sense view  that evil is strictly evil and is untouched with good, and that good is uninfected with evil; that the war between them is one of extermination is obviously untenable in reflective theory.  Either is inconceivable without the other.  "The  contradiction," he writes, "is necessary to the nature of both." To be good is to overcome the evil; to be evil"is to 1.  Value and Destiny, p.215  2.  Some Suggestions in Ethics.  124 "be in contradiction w i t h the good.  If the evil were  over-  come in a man, there could be for him no good. 3.  In ethical theory this view is old, being in  agreement w i t h both Plato and Hegel, but the criticism it arouses is ever new.  Professor Macintosh in his  "Some  Aspects of Christianity" complains bitterly of this "all in" policy of Idealism.  The good must be good for good and all,  and the evil, evil, or there is no pleasing a theologian. Inasmuch as both he and those who are agreement w i t h his general thesis insist as m u c h as they upon the finality of the opposition between good and evil as given in the individual, and guarantee his striving for the good by an imperative rising out of his very nature, the rancour *  of the critic is not readily understood.  Professor Pattison  again is 'on the other side, 1 but though he expresses much dissatisfaction, he offers no possible alternative to the solution that sets good and evil over against correlates.  As we have seen above,  each other as  'goodness' in the moral  sense may not be ascribed to the Absolute as its especial character.  There must be room for error and for evil.  But  as long as the moral struggle, a conflict inevitable to the double nature of man as a finite-infinite being, drives him ever to seek higher satisfactions, and to set for himself an ideal of harmony far beyond his attainment, it should the moralist.  suffice  In any event, he will find difficulty in fitting  another view into the frame of a consistent philosophy.  It  125  is a wild guess to suppose that the struggle will ever end as long as there are finite beings whose business it is to convert disorder into order, and to give to all manner of material, themselves included, spiritual meanings.  "A spirit  which has its being in transforming the external world into the Absolute must proceed by trial and error and so by setting itself against itself."  The moral struggle, whatever  the theory as to its origin, is central to life as it is lived. 4.  They who criticise this view require 11  that  Somehow good  Shall be the final goal of ill" The final'victory of good' is their demand.  The defect of  this desire is, of course, that were it granted, the moment of victory would also be one of defeat, for the good would cease to have any meaning, unless by the good one means something other than mere moral good. The strength of the Kantian ethic is in its assurance that the attitude rather than content of conduct is all important.  It is true that content may not be so stripped  away and thus the a 'good for 1  'good 1 arrived at; for the good is always  something; but the good for the situation arises  out of the attitude the individual as a whole adopts toward the whole object of his desire.  It is to a very  considerable  extent true that not what one does so much as how one does it, constitutes goodness.  The point of this excursus is that  126  if goodness is conceived in terms of a 'heavenly host' its victory is a tenable hypothesis,  or if goodness is a certain  body of solid rules of conduct, even, then the total accomplishment  of them is at least  conceivable; but when  goodness is a good will, a total motive, or a consistent  and  harmonious attitude, or as Bosanquet put it a 'trained and formed character' then plainly there must have been a process of trial and error, a series of attempts before  anything  approaching a good will, or a trained character can have been achieved.  The term 'victory of good' is one unsuited to  ethical theory, except in the sense of individual  achievement.  It is, if the term may be used, a victory that must be re-won, or it is lost.  constantly  It must never be forgotten that  goodness rises out of concrete situations, and is a character of adjustment to those situations.  It is not  something  'suspended in the heavens,' but a character of growing unity with himself and his world that the individual, driven forward by the contradiction he encounters, is enabled to achieve. When contradiction  5.  ceases, goodness ceases with it.  Moreover, there is another difficulty in the way of  our accepting the notion of good finally victorious.  It aoes  injustice to a very deep and subtle form of appreciation. In some situations there is borne in upon one the that the moral  judgment is not enough: that there is more about  a man than his morality. thus.  certainty  Bosanquet illustrates this point  "Everyone, I should think must have had his moral  judgment  127 and his general estimate of values brought into  collision  by the character of Falstaff.  We cannot conceive him in 1 hell any more than he could himself." Because of this and other kindred evidence he says, "We are convinced by daily life, I think, that the ethical struggle is in place, sd speak, only as it can be serviceable as an instrument of the necessary self-assertion of the finite mind. that point is passed or that aspect subordinated,  to  that  is  When  there is  room only for love or pity, or again for faith and triumph. We feel, as we constantly admit, that our real judgment  of  morality and of failure is not all there is to be said about  2  a man.  His value and his reality lie deeper than that."  Again, "Good (in the sense of perfection) we feel, needs and includes the ethical struggle, but is much more than it, or the struggle itself would be impossible,"  It is interesting  to note that Dean Inge is in essential agreement with Bosanquet in this regard (i.e.'Confess!o  Fidei').  Passing the thought of the last two chapters in review we find that Truth and Error, Pleasure and Pain, Good and Evil,  'spring from the general source of satisfaction and  value,* namely the finite-infinite life of man. ion is, in  Each imperfect  Truth, a direct challenge to pursue perfection;  the  immeasurable greatness of the ideal of perfection itself being the guarantee of the continuance of the auest.  "The self in  striving to complete itself will welcome the chapter of accidents (incidental to his hazardous life) and clothe itself in conflict and adventure." 1.  Note on p.17 - "Principle"  2.  Principle - p.17  3.  Value and Destiny p  '17  THE WORLD OF SPIRITUAL MEMBERSHIP  Chapter XIII  A concept which, with the maturing of Bosanquet's philosophy came to have ever deeper meaning for him is expressed in the phrase "The World of Spiritual Membership." In all that we have said as to the non-particularity and nonexclusiveness of finite individuals, and in the thought of minds as the'whole'finding in them a 'local habitation;' and in the emphasis we have placed throughout upon the higher phases of'objective mind' the notion of spiritual membership has been implied.  In his 'last will and testament,' the  essay on 'Life and Philosophy' written for Mr. Muirhead, Bosanquet returns time and again to it, as the secret of the 'Art of living together.'  It is t h e lack of appreciation of  this element in his thought, in all probability, which brings some of his critics to portray him a3 one stripping life of its bloom.  In Sir Henry Jones chapter on "The World of the  Individualist" it is the opposition and contradiction between —(«.«-•; ___ individuals A that draws his fire* H ^ t h e "World of Claims and C o u n t e r c l a i m s ^ IliaI ire uuulmnmrgg.  It is true that this  129 last is much mentioned by Bosanquet, but it is mentioned only as the ground upon which to build his higher concept the World of Spiritual Membership. Bosanquet that no 'prima facie 1  of  It is characteristic of  view will do.  it were, upon a 'firm foundation of despair 1  It is only, as  (anjfl. he goes so  far as to approve this phrase of M r . Russell's)that a philosopher has a right to build comfortable doctrines.  Otherwise  his integrity of vision is in danger of impairment.  The full  weight, therefore, of conflict in human contacts must be measured before putting forward so pregnant a notion as this of which we write. enriched  Only so can we appreciate fully its gift of  individuality. Alone "The finite-infinite being retains only enough  hold on infinity to realize its own finiteness in impotence 1 and despair."  Out of the sharpest contradiction of the  finite life arises this solution, by which, in going outside of himself and entering into membership with all men and the whole, insofar as it may be apprehended, he grasps the infinite with a firmer hand.  But in a very real sense he  'loses his  life,' before he gains it. We may examine further the conditions of the 'World of Claims and Counterclaims.'  It is a world of rights and  duties of individuals considered as isolated units, each 'fighting for his own hand.' 'at arm'slength.' 1.  It is a world in which men are  "It has," Bosanquet writes, "the peculiar  Value and Destiny - p.276  130  characteristics which belong to these quasi-natural worlds of isolated units -  natural selection, formative discip-  line and hardship, a condition where every man is for himself 1 subject to claims arising-out of relations."  It is a world  of individualistic morality, of which the justice is the rights and duties of each duly met and fulfilled.  There is,  in fact, no such world, but it is the world of the  'first  look, 1 and the world for which everyday notions of morality are made.  Religious thought has long been infected with this  notion of the individualistic  claim.  "That will be glory for me"  is fortunately no  longer considered good religion. It remains, however, that "The finite self (in religion) is burdened by the sense of duty to a superior being, with whom it is in relation, and this duty constitutes its morality, its sense of good and bad.  The self makes on its  side a number of demands upon the Supreme Being and upon the other beings that are the terms of its universe, and their fulfilment or non-fulfilment impresses it with a contradictory sense of justice and injustice."  The justice of this world  is cast in terms of 'compensation,' "an eye for an eye;" but is no more than a pale shadow of the real relation of membership in which men live.  When  'justice'is done, experience so often  shows that the sore spot in the organism is not healed. 1.  Value and Destiny - p.276  \  131  The fact is that this world of rights and duties must be merged into a world of membership in w h i c h all flow together as members of a widely differentiated whole. bars must be put down.  That  The  this is already the unrecognized  law of social life is revealed by the constant every 'established order 1 by which claims and  splintering of counterclaims  are allocated, a break up of all crystalised forms which no degree of conservatism can restrain for long.  This is so  because there is no fixed standard of individual right.  Merit  can never be judged upon the basis of the man in isolation from his world.  The justification of any man's lot can never  be in terms of himself alone, but must take in as much of the whole as can be apprehended.  It is certain that  fortunes betray no approximation individualistic  "Individual  to any single standard of  justice." "  , _ and of  Obviously the whole problem of inequality/ 'vicarious suffering' is raised, and a way out is suggested.  M e n are  bound together more closely than they realize, and must therefore suffer together.  The typical expression of this community  of disaster and of advantage is to be found in the Christian doctrine of the  'vicarious atonement.'  This, Bosanquet  remarks,  was a 'stumbling block' in his earlier years, but took on ever deepening meaning as his appreciation of the underlying law of membership in all life grew. very significant,  The phrase, lightly used, but  'the solidarity of the race' bears this same  thought in which Bosanquet is interested.  The suffering of any  132 member is spread over all and weighs especially heavily on those who can "bear the most.  Thus the strong bear the burdens  of the w e a k , and the supremely good, carry the transgression of us all.  The least guilty and the most able bear the  of the race.  There can be no doubt that  sins  it is the same  principle, that of common membership, which lies behind the hard sayings "Love your enemies, and do them good," and "Judge not, that ye be not  Judged;" for in a world  of  spiritual  membership the central fact is that all are responsible,  and  none may take pride to himself for any virtue. If mankind is Tnan . a unit (and A not in any strict sense cut off from his w o r l d ) * the part cannot possibly part  judge another part any more than the  (as we have seen) can judge the whole.  cannot  And, as one  judge of the rights or wrongs of another, so too he  cannot decide as to his own.  He obviously does not  know.  What measure of goods or of suffering belongs to his life in its place he cannot tell for he has not the necessary  conspectus.  It is a truism, the repetition of which may be pardoned,  that  if we refuse to face the point of life's danger, we miss its best. The only sort of justice that can fit in with the nature of a world of spiritual membership is the justice of Plato's Republic; that is, an 'organized righteousness' in which individuals are not treated as abstractions, and isolated, but as members contributory each in his own way to the harmony of the w h o l e r  It is the justice of 'every man in  133  his p l a c e , 1  and by it, the servant  is no less than his lord.  We have said that the "World of Claims and Counterclaims" is not the real world. "World of Spiritual Membership."  Neither is the  But it is the truer picture  of the underlying conditions of the social life, and is the only pattern by w h i c h a better actual world may be won. Bosanquet doubts its complete practicability in the world of affiars.  "This attitude," he writes, "is not wholly possible  for a finite society in Space and Time, composed of finite individuals having many characteristics of isolation and distinctiveness - material  characters such as a body and its  accessories in the way of property.  He must have protection  for his life and his property and be recognized as a legal person."  It is notorious that an unscrupulous group will  sacrifice the individual in the sacred name of the  whole,  and that this likelihood of abuse must be considered. the level of the leaders was that of  Unless  'philosopher kings'  the danger*would be too acute7\g?~tyranng^  Yet, since the two  views of justice, as individual, or as of a spiritual membership, are mutually exclusive, it is not unprofitable to consider the conditions necessary to the successful working in the world of affairs of the latter, and the better view.  134  FREEDOM  Chapter XVI  The conception of Freedom  is dependent upon the  conception of the nature of the mind and of the  individual.  The two theories therefore, of mind and of freedom tend to overlapj or at least, to suggest one another. found Bosanquet to interpret as a 'supervenient  Mind, we have perfection'  accompanying a certain advanced stage of mechanical  develop-  ment; and freedom is the character of, or the quality  enjoyed  "by the centre of an expanding range of externality when it is brought to that degree of adaptability and responsiveness which makes a mind the only possible expression and instrument of its nature.  M i n d s are, we have seen,  'forms of  totality'  and the reaction of a mind to a situation is that of a totality acting out of itself, and the act is in that its own individual act, and is therefore free.  sense  "Freedom,"  Bosanquet writes, "Is the process viewed from the point  of  view of the soul (that is, the centre) which is being moulded." Already we have been schooled to "look for the differentia of the spiritual rather in the most comprehensive and organised harmony than in the escape from determination and reason."  sufficient  In more than one connection Bosanquet is moved to  135 express 'a strong repugnance to finding freedom in anything that savoured of chance or  caprice."  "The world imposes," he writes, "its plan upon the incipient  centre of life and mind, but in proportion as that  centre acquires a nature of its own, this nature what it can or w i l l accept."  determines  This centre is an 'active unity'  and is its own critic and its re-creator.  "Here", he adds,  "we have the root of Will." Again Bosanquet's method of defence is a vigorous offensive.  He captures the camp of the enemy and encloses it  within his own lines.  Having accepted the challenge of the  new scientific knowledge he can do no other.  This is a point  at which "thoroughgoing determinism must be met by a theory even more  thorough-going." The part played by circumstance in moulding  action,  having once been acknowledged is likely to carry us on finally to a fatalistic conclusion unless we can show that active in the environment and the individual is a category potent enough to save what is essential of freedom; and this Bosanquet claims to have achieved by re-affirming  the spirit of logic,  the determination of reality to woik toward the whole and in wholes.  In other words, his intent is to absorb mechanism to  freedom as, both of them, the intelligible working of a system. It is the 'spirit of toted ity' that  saves freedom.  What we  call 'environment' as if it were a blank determination and a blind force is, in reality, itself a living and active world.  136 The principle of individuality,  of microcosms within microcosms  is again the means of maintaining our point. It is not, however, with the abstract or why is Free Will? that Bosanquet  question  'What  is deeply concerned, but  with the more concrete inquiry "When, in what and as what does man carry out his will with least hindrance and with fullest satisfaction?  In attempting this question we have before us  'the actual phenomena of civilization instead of an idle and 1 abstract Yes or No."  The history of human freedom,  then,  would be no less than the history of human institutions ideals.  and  Any other inquiry is empty and leaves the true miracle  of w i l l undiscovered. If it is asked  'What is the will of which freedom  is the character?' then the answer may be given that  the will  of a man is none other than the man himself regarded as active. Will is but a term for thought  on its functional side as  distinguished from its more purely cognitive character.  The  difference, however, between cognition and volition is one of 'degrees in the same scale' or of aspects of the same process. 2.  From all that we have said it follows that  contingency,  or miracle,and not mechanism, is the enemy. a.  Free will in the sense of 'I might have done other-  wise had I chosen'is a sheer shirking of responsibility.  It  is as if after a thousand actions and before the thousand and first, he could be any less committed than after the 1.  Introduction to "Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art." p . XXIX.  137  thousand and first.  Obviously such a view is an evasion of  the inevitable results of one's actions; is an attempt'to disavow what one, by a long series of choices has become; to wish to be oneself and yet to reject all that has made one what one is.  Setting out to make of the self something, It  ends in making him nothing, for all his positive content of stored response is taken away from him. "b.  Free-will, considered as the introduction of an  element of chance into every choice would make all scientific prediction hypothetical, if not impossible, and would drive out reason from the universe as bad money drives out the good. The arguments that may be marshalled against any theory of a 'fountain  of spiritual energy'  iuu.y be brought  equally  against the notion of will as some similar fountain of caprice. The evidence is overwhelming that  'all capacities are transm-  2  itted through bodily ( i . e . mechanical) arrangements.' "There is," he writes, "a road from every natural group of facts to every spiritual reality in the universe" and of course the road may be traversed in either direction. c.  Creation can never be  'de novo.'  The  self-shaping  centre that is a mind and will, however original its work, can not but build with materials (having their especial characteristics) and by means of the ability its history has laid at its disposal; by what has been called its  Value and Destiny,  p.106  'fundamental  138 brainwork.'  In other words, the plan of a man's  creation  lies as much in the metal he is moulding as in his own mind. The artist's  'finished w o r k , ' so often taken as the type of  creativity is obviously a composite product of the possibilities that lay in his material, and the abilities of his mind and body, especially his refinement of sense and motor mechanism. 3.  If contingency in all its forms is scouted by  Bosanquet, so too is pre-determination. ethics ha3 long been tbe bogey of the  The bete noir of  'predictability.'  If, as  'reductio aj$d absurdum' has been made to run, all that  happens is the outcome of what has happened before, given a knowledge of the beginnings  then  (of, say, a life) its  farthest reaches and most complex development may be predicted with certainty.  The bogey is the  'calculator' of conduct, and  people generally object to the notion that any machine however intricately devised, is competent before they have chosen.  to predict  their  choices  Bosanquet treats the matter  Yes, he admits, prediction is possible, but upon one To predict  thus. condition.  the whole you must be the Absolute, and the same  applies to the whole of any part.  Or again, you may predict  a special act, but only if you are at the active centre, if you are at the growing point of a mind, and are adequately gifted.  At this point, however, you cannot be.  If you were  it would be your own action that you were predicting, which would distress no one.  Prediction, in short, implies pre-  doing, and would pass over into  doing.  Fatalism is a defective determination,  taken as  linear, actions being considered on the false analogy  of  things, of, as it were, sausages on a string.  In every  fatalistic theory, the last and most important  determination  of all is neglected, namely the self-shaping of the world the individual.  of  Determination is complete, or chance would  have crept in somewhere, but the last factor is the total character of the individual. determination,  The only adequate form of  therefore, is self-determination.  This does  not imply that the self hovers, as it were, above a number of possible actions, and chooses as it will from among them, but that it does act more or less as a whole. its whole  It may act upon  self or upon a fragment of itself, but its freedom  lies in its action as a whole. be said to determine  conduct.  No fragment of the past  can  It is, as we have observed,  of  the nature of a mind to gather up its world, and its will is expressed in the movement of its world.  Reflection that  precedes action is the more or less conscious unification of and the self.  The whole situation of freedom / determination  Bosanquet illuminates by such a phrase as this. cannot be thought of as the "Rattling results inevitably decreed.  Conduct  off of a chain of  The decree is a universal and  spiritual one, and is the proclamation of the true of the individual.  character  The inevitability is that of logic and of  life, and not of any dead  causation."  140  It is frequently said that a man does this or that because he wants to.  Analysis, however, of his want will  resolve it into a contradiction to be overcome.  Being what  he is he finds himself a contradiction if he does not do this or that, as the case may be.  If the total condition be  modified, then the want is modified  also.  We are able, therefore to define freedom as the character of an individual whose actions proceed, not froib external determination, but from the necessity of his own nature. himself.  Briefly, freedom is a man's right ana ability to be W h e n most himself, he is most free.  Bad  choices  are those which proceed, not from himself, but those which proceed from some single character of the individual single desire which, in its moment whole man as a 'means merely.'  or some  of dominance uses the  A bad self is an incoherent  self w h i c h seldom or never acts out of itself but always upon some passion or fragmentary motive.  Another way of defining  freedom in keeping w i t h our general attitude is to say that it consists of being  'equal to the situation. 1  And the full  range of human possibility cannot be over-estimated. impossibility is to a very great and indefinite relative."  "Physical  extent  Or as Bosanquet puts it again "The power of  character against than a miracle.  so called impossibilities" is little less The adequate will is the will that can enter  with the full heritage which the whole past has brought together into its present world.  141  W e can very well see, at this point in the  argument,  how essential to wide freedom are all the conditions which enlarge the private  self.  member of an enlightened  The freedom  enjoyed by, say, the  state, in a highly advanced  stage  of civilisation, is not to be compared with the mere form of freedom that belongs to the character of a mind considered  as  excluded from the inheritance of the r a c e . Obviously freedom is a concrete and not an abstract thing, and is achieved the more by the mind that  maintains  wide and varied relationships with other minds and which gathers about itself a multitude of interests and 4.  occupations.  To the objection that, if this is freedom, it is  certainly not freedom as we have thought  of it hitherto.  The  reply may be made at once; while it is true that freedom has been popularly confused with caprice or the right to 'do as we please and choose' yet what men ordinarily  serious  want when they demand freedom, is just this concrete that w e have attempted to expound.  freedom  When a man seeks freedom  it is not the right to play havoc with the stability  and  system of the universe, but the right to 'be h i m s e l f  that  he desires.  This is granted him.  Throughout  cur argument we have been expressing the  thought of F.H. Bradley as well as of Bosanquet. especially remarks, in his whatever his moral  The former  'Ethical Studies' that a man does,  theory, expect those who know him well to  have a very clear notion of what may be expected of him in  142  the w a y of conduct in any particular situation.  Prediction,  in this sense he will welcome, as the proper recognition of a unity of purpose and outlook and attitude in his life. The further objection has been pressed, that according to this notion of freedom, initiative is well applied to the specifically human activity may or may not be established; but that that activity is of such a sort that  some meaningful word must be found for it, is evident  from the least understanding of its 'miraculous' nature. The special characteristic w i t h which the human being among other kindred beings, or alone, we cannot  (whether  tell) is  endowed may be put as 'the ability to transfigure and so to conquer circumstance.'  Bosanquet notes that mind as will  elicits its own world out of the nature that is available to it.  Inasmuch as w h e n ^ s will^a mind*acts it gathers up  all that is past in the agent's career and all that is significant of its surroundings and acts as a totality, it is not straining an interpretation to say that the thing he does is 'his creative production of a new deed.' ordinary minds overlap  It is true that  tremendously, but in the  'act of acting'  each mind does that which is itself, and is something new. It is enough to urge the point Moore's  (without entering upon Dr.  'Would have, if I had chosen') that whatever a man  does, is his own and in a very real sense an original act. Any observer unbiased by speculation may see signs clear enough of the creativity of the  'Art of Thought' to be  satisfied that man has initiative in the world, though the  143  conditions are all prescribed for him beforehand except the single condition of his own nature as will, and that is a condition given to him by the 'wisdom of the world.'  All  the wonders of a civilization are the product of willing agents working in a situation in which they are  'at home,'  and in which their abilities are met with possibilities lying ready as it were, in their world. That the world of freedom is a world orderly in every way, and suffering from no insurmountable gaps in its structure is self-evident.  Every defect, for example, in  the social order in which men find their freedom, itself sets those forces to w o r k which will mend it. no reactionary doctrine  This is obviously  (though it is in the spirit of Hegel)  but is evolutionary through and through; and even in evolution there appear to have been times of sudden and revolutionary change.  Forces more or less pent suddenly topple the crust,  and new forms appear.  As we have shown, there is 'hazard and  hardship,' but it is thus that man's freedom expands. 'great man' is not excluded from such a world. its greatest  The  He is indeed  asset; but his stronger will is not in that he  'breaks the rules,' but in that he understands them better, and can see connections where average minds can only see chaos.  The  'miracle of will' is that "There are always  openings to the larger horizons and thinking will is always 1 in search of them." 1.  Value and Destiny - p . 2 7 6  But freedom is achieved, paradoxical) by w a y of necessity.  (though it apuears as "Necessity is laid u p o n  me," Bosanquet writes, "seemed in all the higher walks of life, in conduct, in religious unity, in art and in love to be the utterance which the human soul at its fullest 1 demanded and embodied."  stretch  It is not from our small, even  trivial choices, that, by niggling, the philosopher may arrive at a just evaluation  of will; nor from our  'moments  of hot rebellion,' but from the "Great logical choices which occupy years in the making, as when a man chooses his religion, or his profession, working by long processes of suggestion and elimination, till he has found, or nearly 2found, a selfexpression which includes the whole of him." 5.  From all of the above Bosanquet's position on  'responsibility' can be very well gathered.  Since a man's  act proceeds from what he is, and he is a self-shaping individual, he, and none other is 'responsible' for his act. Inasmuch, however, as men are all 'members one of another' the responsibility of society for the individual is as great as that of the individual to society, hence  justice, to be  just, must remember this spiritual membership. 'down and out' is responsible  The embittered  to the full for his act of  sabotage, but so is the social system that cruelly conditioned his life.  For my bad conduct, which is conduct less than it  1.  Quoted in "Bernard Bosanouet" - p.18  2.  Science and Philosophy - p.233.  156  might be as proceeding from my whole character, and which may be ascribed to defective  self-knowledge,  to momentary  unbalance, or as y o u please, I am culpable, and  society must  act accordingly; but it will also inquire into the conditions of my defective  self-knowledge or whatever it w a s that made  me, for the moment, less than myself.  For society needs  •whole men' for its own good health. Bosanquet has an interesting  sentence.  "It is  true that in the moral emergency, all depends on the  individ-  ual will which, as explained above, is in the right when it recognizes this.  But it is true that  the individual will is  a principle and content having far deeper roots than what  is  commonly taken to be the individual mind, and the task which is really its taak is set it by the universe."  By this  phrase we are taken out beyond the place of man in his society, and are bidden to glimpse his place  'sub  specie  aeternitatis.' That we may be brought back from so distant a speculation to the field of immediate activity our ation of freedom may well conclude with this fine of Bosanquet.  considersentence  "Our actions issue from our world as a  conclusion from its premises, or as a poem from its author's spirit.  RELIGION A N D GOD  Chapter V  The attitude of Bosanquet to religion in his Gifford Lectures, and in all his later writings is more than a modification, merely, of that which he took, say, in his early essay on "The Kingdom of God on Earth."  The change is, it is tr*ue,  rather of emphasis and sympathy than of material, but is sufficiently significant  to have been widely remarked, and to  offer foundation for the view that religion, once as an ancillary  conceived  interest of man, and secondary to morality, of  came to be seen as perhaps the central fact, certainly a very high form of experience.  It is assumed throughout  the Gifford  Lectures, and directly stated here and there, that  the general  theory they advance is wholly sympathetic to and adequate to the real demands of the religious consciousness.  Religion,  it is remarked, can do without philosophy, but philosophy cannot possibly dispense with religion.  The coming to maturity  of his mind, and the discovery of the freedom of the religious consciousness from the objectionable forms in which religion had been presented, and the growth in him of a really mystical  147  spirit may be credited w i t h the motivation of his change of attitude toward this wide area of experience.  From first to  last he had a high respect for the practical side of religion as it bears on conduct, and the modification was in the direction of the 'inner and solitary' quality of religion. In this his own experience played a profoundly part.  any of their 'stiffness 1  Without  influential  about him, Bosanquet  cannot have been altogether without a quaker tinge. luminosity  of the religious life he often suggests. As an  example of this in 1892.  The  'volte  face' we may notice a line written  "If we speak of duties to God we mean the same as  duties to man.  Worship or prayer, in the sense of meditation 1  are good things if they help us to do our duties."  This  is no ignoble attitude, but we may feel that although he could say in 1912 "Religion is at least half practical" he could not repeat  the phrase as to  'worship  .. in the sense of  2 meditation.'  The central religious attitude came for him to  be the strongest  single self-Transcendence,  in which the  individual is, for thecompletely moment, and subject to recall by reason iS  of his limitations,^gone  d i m  outside of himself in adoration  of his perfection seen as perfect. that Professor Pattison,  It is interesting to notice  in criticism of Bosanquet,  him beside Labadie, the mystic.  a^ign^s  The connection is more than  accidental, for in Bosanquet the man of intense social 1. Essays and addresses - p. 2.  Unless moral.  3.  In The'Symposium'  'Duty' be taken as different  from the  sense strictly  149 and practical interest fused with the serenity of the mystic. That which he knew only as Theoria in the beginning came more and more merged into his concept of the religious consciousness.  The spirit  of Spinoza, "that God intoxicated 1  man* seems to hover in the shadow of Bosanquet. It goes without  saying that there is nothing in  the religious experience not also found in some measure in other phases of life; nothing, in other words, with the rest.  discontinuous  "In religion," he writes, "we have a glowing  intensification of the ordinary attitude of the finite being in inherent and normal  self-Transcendence."  Reversed,  the  same thought appears as "The religious consciousness permeates the whole of life." 2.  What, then, is the religious consciousness and the  religious attitude, expressed more specifically?  2  Bosanquet answers, "all devotion."  "It  includes,"  This narrows the field.  But devotion always has some special object.  So we have it  that "The essence of religion is wherever certain  characteris-  tics are ascribed with a certain intensity by the finite subject to the object with which in his  Self-Transcendence 3  in thought and will, he identifies himself."  In other  words, wherever you have a man caring supremely for something, there is religion.  The excellence of the object must seem so  great that the devotee is as "less than nothing" when 1.  See L. Roth in "Mind" - 1927.  2. 3.  Value and Destiny - p.239. Ibid. - p.25  compared  150 with it.  The  'character ascribed' is  'absolute perfection,'  and the only concern of the self is identification with that perfection, even though it involve the loss of all else. "The general formula of religion is the surrender or completion of finite self-hood in the world of spiritual membership." But by no means all religion is social.  There are many forms  of varying value, ranging from pure devotion to a lofty ideal of perfection to self-sufficiency which is at once the narrowest religion and the  'height of irreligion.'  last is the devotion of the man whose  This  'god is his belly;'  or of the coward who is 'religious in it.'  Thus there will  be "false religions, conflicting religions, partial and 1 hesitating religions."  Whatever is taken as the highest  good, that a man makes his God. 'there may be  It follows, therefore,  that  'god's many,' all of them cast in more or less  imaginary forms.  The terms for instance, by which Christianity  seeks to represent its God; the Almighty, the Creator, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, all of them are plainly representations more or less pictorial.  Obviously for the  religious consciousness some object of devotion is necessary, but it need neither be clearly defined, nor even  considered  as the same for all worshippers. 3.  The religious experience indeed, is prior to and  independent of the notion of an independently 1.  Value and Destiny  - p.236  existent  ty.  It is religion that makes its gods, rather than the  gods who make religion. but the sober truth.  This is, for Bosanquet, no flippancy  To this conclusion he is forced by  consideration first of the needlessness of an existent and objective God to make the religious experience valid, that all it claims to be; and secondly of the insoluble tions inherent in any concept  is,  contradic-  of God.  "The religious consciousness," Bosanquet  maintains,  "is self-contained, and stands on its own basis, although it must be remembered that in our view that basis is exceedingly broad, and includes indeed the greater part of our most 1 vital experience."  Whether a God may be proved to be or  not, the religious consciousness remains as vital and vitalizing as ever.  "The truth of the experience in which  we are aware implicitly or explicitly of the finite-infinite nature of the finite spirit is actually present and within the religious experience."  contained  Were it not for one consid-  eration, this self-containedness of the religious experience would be welcomed even by the most orthodox; and that  condit-  ion is the fear that, unless religion has an objectively existent God to attach itself to, it may turn out to be no more than men's fancy. The view of Bosanquet, at this point, must be made quite clear.  He does not for a moment suggest that  religion,  because its typical experience is self-contained is a fancy 1.  Value and Destiny - 252.  such as psychologists  (of a sort) like to treat lightly as  •merely subjective.'  The whole tenor of his thought  this categorically.  As man's nature and his  denies  task is  communicated to him, so also his experience is guaranteed by the universe.  We have insisted that inasmuch as a man  is himself, and utters-. : bis nature purely, he can only think true thoughts.  So is it w i t h the religious  experience.  It is the nature of the universe in him that expresses itself thus, in devotion, that is, in Self-Transcendence to the highest power.  raised  In religion we may justly say that  the universe expresses and supports itself, and man is brought as near perfection as his limitations will 4.  allow.  As to the inherent defect in all attempted  statements  of God there is no doubt, even in the minds of the orthodox. Bishop Westcott  (quoted by Bosanquet) Notices the contradiction  implied in his own attribution of 'infinity' and  'personality'  to the same God."1" Every name of God, it may be objected, is defective, but none the less, God is.  Against  this it may  be urged that not only the names of God, and the statements of his attributes contain contradictions, but there is a contradiction at the heart of the necessary demand that religion makes of its God.  The God of religion must be less  than the Absolute, for it is demanded of him that he take a side.  A God to which good and evil are equally necessary  is a God whom religion cannot worship, for the religious attitude is the adoration of a perfection in which every 1.  Value and Destiny  - p.254  153 element of evil is overcome.  "The characteristic faith of  religion is not merely that the good is real, but that nothing 1 else than the good is real." It is equally true, however, that even in religion, as in morality "Good is still loaded with the inherent  contrast to evil, and if evil were entirely  to disappear, the practical attitude, which depends upon its presence, would vanish, and with it would go the attitude to  2  perfection as a good; as something to be realized."  The  problem is that of Sin or evil in the consciousness of God, a problem which cannot be solved without doing violence either to the demand of religion or the foundations of all other experience.  The solution of Canon Rashdall, the  postulation of a Finite God, is no solution, but the attempt in such a direction by a serious scholar, at least  serves to  show the intensity of the problem and the centre at which it is most acute.  If God, (as some philosophers, Professor  Pattison among them,tend to assume) is the Absolute, or the whole conceived as adorable, then he must be characterized by moral evil as well as by good, but if he is less than the whole, he is not the "Absolute perfection" that religion insists that he be. We have mentioned the difficulty inherent in the demand for a God at once personal and infinite.  It is the  same difficulty of the part and the whole that we have touched 1. 2.  Value and Destiny Ibid.,  -  p.242.  - p. 248.  on above.  All that has been said on the subject  of the  exclusiveness implied in Personality apt)lies at this point also.  It is widely conceded that the demand of religion for  a'personal God 1  is, in effect, for a 'God not less than  personal,' but the difficulty, though mitigated is not come.  over-  Still, if as a super-person God is either the whole,  or less than the whole, the demand of religion is unsatisfied at one or other of its poles, for the religious attitude is itself a paradox.  It is the necessity of maintaining  the claims both of morality and of religion; of good against  equally striving  evil and of good the only r e a l that drives Bosanquet  to re-affirm h i s conviction that the religious attitude must be self-contained  and independent  of a God any attempt at the  of the objective existence •  statement of whom does violence  to one or other of the two. It may also be noted that the attribution of 'existence' to God is not without its difficulty.  Existence,  as we know it, is successive appearance in time and  space,  which is not at all the wayinw/iickreligion claims to  experience  him. But because religion makes demands that cannot be met, and is paradoxical and full of contradiction it is not on that account, we may repeat, any less valid.  In this it  but shows its continuity with the whole fabric of experience. But as it is experienced religion is not a contradiction, but a complete identification with the whole, which becomes  155 luminous  and transparent  to the finite being.  Whatever the  object, partial or very concrete, which becomes the object of his devotion, the experience is much the same, and in it and by it, the finite individual is made to feel his w i t h the real, his  identity  'at homeness' in the world, and h i s spirit-  ual connection on every side w i t h man, with nature, and with God.  In effect, he becomes a new  creature.  In support of this whole thesis that religion is a devotion and an attitude which is in no need of a God conceived as independently existent evidences may be drawn from many of the most religious minds.  Religion  inevitably  talks the language of God, but the variety of its tongues points to a unity as lying elsewhere than in its concepts of God. to  Religion, according to such minds is to  'Love man.'  of individual the phrase  'Love God,' and  The Hatter may be conceived upon the analogy experience, but the former is not so easy.  If  'heart and mind and soul and strength' be taken  to mean the whole man, every bit of him, as it were,  focused  and at a white heat; then to love God so would be to throw 'oneself outside of o n e s e l f  in abandon to a type of perfection  compared with which all else drops away and is gone.  This  is the religious attitude, and as to its supremacy in the whole range of human experience there cannot be a moment's doubt.  IMMORTALITY  Chapter X V I  At no point in his writing, where he touches the question at all, does Bosanquet fail to make his toward immortality clear.  attitude  Prom first to last his view is  quite consistently negative.  He does not attempt  the  impossible, and dogmatize, but his own mind is made up on 1 the matter.  In this essay on "The Kingdom of God on Earth"  he disagrees w i t h Kant's notions of God  'unnecessary clinging' to the  (in the sense of a Ruler of the world) and  of a future life.  His general attitude to religion underwent  much modification as his life ran on, but a few years before S his death we find him writing to Br. Creighton  expressing  his complete satisfaction in the presence of immeasurable values, and his  'impatience of remoter inferences.'  It is  true that he grew up in an age when naturalism was rife, and he may be said therefore to have been unduly influenced by the atmosphere of his times, but it must be remembered 1. S.  that,  1889. A letter In "Philosophical Review" - Vol.30, p.S16  157  though he has been accused of being naturalistic nothing is further from his spirit and The probability of individual  himself,  intention. survival he rejects on  these grounds; its needlessness, its difficulty and its naivete of belief. In maintaining that any emphasis on personal survival tends to lower the tone and quality of religion in this day three out of four advocates of 'liberal ity' will end their argument  (and  Christian-  the note of immortality) he  has the support of m u c h reflective religious  opinion.  George Adam Smith, for example, is quoted as writing, "It is well for us all sometimes to pitch our religious life in. terms which do not include the hope of a future."  It is  doubtful whether so thoughtful a man would have written thus unless he felt keenly the dangers involved in the popular belief.  The prophetic religion of Israel, in its highest  expression in Amos and Hosea and the rest is cast in a shape exclusive of, or in any event, heedless of survival; and it is doubtful whether purer religious expression may anywhere be found.  The teaching of Jesus,  (as the present writer can  discover it) is quite non-committal.  "Where the corpses are  - there will the eagles be gathered together."  The one  phrase "God is the God of the living" may be cited, but unless approached with a bias, does not bear heavily toward survival. 1  'personal  These are quoted merely to show the possibility  of high religious life and expression in the absence of the  158  notion of immortality. 1 religious character also. f  Wherever modern writers  of  touch this auestion they are non-committal  As for philosophers, Bosanquet points out that  sit loose 1  they  on the issue.  The contention of Bosanquet is that the commonplace thought of survival is the expression of a want other than itself; a desire that what  is of most value to me shall tie  of value, and the same, when I am gone.  In other words,  the  thing that truly religious people ask for in immortality is no more than the security of value in the universe.  What  irreligious people ask for is of no importance. As to the difficulty of conceding the  continuity  after the death of the body of the finite self he is no less emphatic.  Our whole treatment of the individual as anything  but an 'isolated angelic here.  spirit' should support  our case  The extreme intimacy of the relation between mind and  body, or rather the dependence of what we call mind upon a long pre-condition of bodies sub-human and animal,  though  often mentioned, is seldom taken in its full strength. Apologists are always swift to leave the ticklish question and advance to Sir Oliver Lodge and the 'evidences' of  spiritualism.  Dr. Wildon Carr, even, begs the question of this intimate relation, and this long evolution in his question.  "May it  not be that in man life has found the means to carry forward living action by the individual in complete detachment from 1.  As T.R. Glover in "Jesus in the Experience of Men"  169 the material conditions of individuality?"  He does not  answer, but his question carries the required suggestion, a suggestion which over-rides every trace of evidence in favor of a deeply implanted desire - a type of desire to be scrutinised in argument.  closely  Bosanquet will have none of these,  philosophers who talk of "life" as a new category discontinuous with the categories of mechanism. new category will introduce  Their  'chance' irxto the system, and  through the breach all values will slip away.  unless taken  wildly, the evidences of evolution are all against survival.'  The popular argument  the individual  'personal  that evolution implies that  'goes on and on' is, of course, an obvious  error, but it is much repeated.  "The gradation of animal mind  presents an unbelievable difficulty to all theories which suggest that finite consciousnesses are correlative each to each with persistent and self-subsi stent differentiations of the Absolute."  Or again.  "We find no structure assigned to the  particular individual or substantive mind, and it seems to take its place just as an activity of the real, which is while and what it does, but reposes, so to speak, nowhere and on nothing." A further difficulty in the way of survival is the location of the self that is to survive.  We cannot repeat  the argument of Bosanquet as to the nature of the finite individual, but it may be recalled that it bears on this question. 1.  The  'Self  lies 'outside of itself.'  It has no  "Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics, p.174  160 •what and where,' hut lies somewhere between nothing and the whole.  What then, by w a y of  'crystal nuclei' can be  gathered up to represent each individual after death.  Moreover, if m y self survives as it is m y sense of  the fitness of things is violated, for the religious consciousness insists upon its defects; and if it survives other than it is, then by what manner  of means is it recogn-  izeably myself any more. The notion of exclusiveness must must be be broken down.  Selves  thought of as flowing  in an ideal harmony, in which particularity  together  i3 no longer  claimed. Then too, the naivete of the popular notion of survival, taken together with its very deep and far-reaching  influence as en  article of belief, points either to its beinp Mistaken wholly ( which is very improbable ) or none other than a vulgar expression of a real truth, hidden a little deeper than common reflection usually goes; a truth, that is, which is none the less feit by everyone because it is inadequately expressed by many. Of the two the latter is the more acceptable if experience is to be trusted at all.  jtjosanauet *s final word of criticism of the theory of survival is this, "I cannot believe that the supreme end of the Absolute is to give rise to beings such as I experience myself to be."  "Because men exist for a little while and  make a difference to it on the whole it does not follow that  161 they are worlds w i t h which the universe is primarily organised. n S.  It is Bosanquet's main contention that he is uphold-  ing to the limit all that a thorough going and consistent view of the whole can allow In the way of the value and destiny of the individual. finding?  What, therefore, is his positive  What is the truth as much obscured as illuminated  of the common talk of survival? and very variously.  His answer is put very often  "The level and quality of mind  attained"  he begins, "and not the destiny of its centres is the main  2 thing and the principle value."  To this.he adds further that,  "What interests us is rather to know if the real is to be found on the lines of what we experience as the greatest and best." It is, as we have said, security we ask for in the demand for survival, and that the security of what we hold to be of the most value.  To this his answer is quite definite.  and reality are sides of the same characteristic.'  'Importance What  matters for us of the character of the real. The question is further pressed.  How can values  survive w h e n the centres that embodied them are blotted out? If values are only 'in and for persons' then how may they not be obliterated in the catastrophe of the individual? answer is characteristic of Bosanquet.  The  "If we accept this as  a criticism of our theory of the self we are at the mercy of a demand which rests mainly on his (the person 1. S.  Science and Philosophy - p.111. Principle, p.20  self-feeling  172 or formal individuality."  It is the cloven-hoof of exclusive  ness that pokes out again.  To accede to the demand is to  do violence to everything of high level experience that differ en^iates it from the low. mere  To look back to the narrow ego, a  'empty form,' for what is in reality far away in sweeping  Self-Transcendence, is to look, so to speak, in the deserted tomb of the Easter story, for what is no longer there. Feeling' is not the secret of eternal value.  'Self  The line of hope  is in the direction of Transformation. All value, we have noticed, issues from the whole, and the ultimate goal implied in all striving is the Absolute. But the Absolute is here and now  (if the present tense may be  used to imply the transcendence of the time series) and the individual is admitedly a part of it now.  The finite self is  now as ever 'something without which the Absolute would not be what it is.'  The future, in the sense of 'after death' can  hold no more of value.  If we are of the opinion that, unless  we are on the spot to attend to things the Absolute is likely to 'lose its grip' we may remain in that opinion, but the the  thought does not imply great  confidence in-order of the cosmos.  The common longing to be with ones departed friends involves elements of present value in the way of devotion and remembrance, but involves also difficulties quite inseparable as the wish of a mother that her child remain a babe for her to all eternity. 1.  Value and Destiny -  p.276  163 The simplest this difficulty would  thoughtful attempt at the solution entail transmutation to a point not  short of that which Bosanquet insists upon. be urged that  of far  Indeed, it may  in discussion, even in serious books, of immort-  ality, the complications involved are rarely given any adequate consideration. to the assertion  Criticised desire, however, leads around again of  , not m y survival in any form, but the  permanence in some form of what  I have striven for.  If I have  striven for nothing, then, as Matthew Arnold has put it, I have failed to attain to  'eternal life.'  It is the wearing  out of 'hand and heart and nerve' that makes an eternal mark. There is plainly plenty of room left such a thought as this. is that  for'faith'in  All that can be said with certainty  all higher experience offers clues which give suffici-  ent reason for supposing that that which is most real in experience is the closest to the ultimately real, and that there are phases of experience in love, art, and religion w h i c h for their quality depend no more upon time  succession  or personal exclusiveness, but upon Self-Transcendence even (for why balk at it) absorption in the whole.  and  The life,  therefore, that is lived(in whatever conditions it matters n o t ) 'to the full* is not in any way wasted, however brief its temporal span; and is, in the best and only sense, for eternity. Bosanquet repeats that philosophy cannot attempt a 'map correct of heaven' and is hence at a disadvantage  compared with  theology, but a critical and comprehensive philosophy  can  admit that "We know that what we care for, in so far as it is  164 really what we care for, is safe through its continuity with the Eternal."  The finite creature cannot, by reason of his  limitation find any perfection completely, but by identifying himself wholly in thought and will  (and as he can in action)  w i t h something quite beyond him he can a t t a i n to a relative perfection of his own, but not his by right; yet by every standard w o r t h y of his striving.  He joins on every side w i t h  his fellows, in the high 'art of living together' and achieves something of very great  beauty.  As to his survival again, a verse of Meredith is in the spirit of Bosanquet. "Full lasting is the song, though he The singer, passes: lasting too For souls not lent in usury The rapture of the forward view." Bosanquet has expressed a similar thought in the letter to Br. Creighton mentioned  above.  "Does the conservation of value imply the conservation of personality? I picked up the December number of the 'Studio' and found myself in a world of supreme values .... is not made by looking; no doubt he must think.  A philosopher Nevertheless,  if he knows how and where to look, it seems to me that the inexhaustibleness in values, of human experience, is altogether  "beyond the need of reasoning.  To use a schoolboy phrase,  'There is plenty more where these came from.'  And the  revelation they bring leaves me, I confess, a little  indiffer-  ent to the remoter inferences which we may draw from it, and a little impatient of any discussion which implies that we are not constantly in presence of supreme realities and immeasurable values."  UBC Scanned by UBC Library  166  PROGRESS  Chapter XVII  Following from our last  chapter there is little  more to be said as to the 'value and destiny of the individual;' but a brief note as to the future of society as Bosanquet sees it may be added. From what has gone before we may assume without further argument that progress in the sense of a movement perfection in time is ruled out ab initio.  to  He several times  mentions to confute the motto "The End is Progress".Time is an appearance only,and is not a character of the real. Absolute is not progress, neither can it progress.  The  The  notion, too, that time now is the real, and that some day it will pass into Eternity is categorically denied.  Both these  theories make heavy drafts on the future at the expense of the present.  The only way to view the world of time is as the  self-revelation of a reality which as a whole is timeless. Every age in the history of the world has a perfection of its own, inasmuch as it  'does the works' of the Absolute.  The only sound way to see progress is in some way which will do justice equally to the demand of morality for  167  improvement, and the attitude of religion which takes in the whole, without  succession, identifying itself with perfection  conceived as already perfect; the two attitudes, that is, of morality as creative of the good, and of religion as adoring it. The manner in which a reality above time can express itself in a series is a question perennial to philosophy. The usual answer, to which Bosanquet agrees, is found in the dual nature of a musical phrase which, however surely it is grasped by the listener as a totality, is none the less constituted of notes in a series.  The illustration also of  the drama, in w h i c h its characters are at once  themselves,  moving thus and so, and at the same time, more than themselves, weaving a whole by which some universal truth may be portrayed. Since, as we have insisted, the individual  lives  and moves in an eternal world now, the place of progress must be other than that which it has been taken to occupy. can only resolve itself with further differentiation  Progress of the  real analogous to, and perhaps more refined and varied those of the present world.  than,  That thus justice is done to  'Time's past and the fathers that begot us 1 far more than by any insistence on a 'far off divine event' as the  'raison  d'etre' of present and past ages, can hardly be disputed. "I do think," Bosanquet writes, "as a matter of mere tendency and belief, that the analogy to be followed in forming views of the future is rather that of successive emphasis on different  sides of reality than that of progress and change  168 in toto, leaving everything old in all respects behind. seems to me that  It  the growth of our civilization is carrying 1  us away from some unquestionable values."  In other words,  every step forward implies some real loss as well as some gain. .  So we are brought  around to the hope which Bosanquet  has for the future of mankind, and especially of Western Civilizati on, that it may grow in appreciation of the spiritual values which, in its massive material development almost overwhelmed. Civilization  it has  The full indigtment against Western  cannot yet be laid, but the sense of its imperfect-  ion is growing.  One writing in 1902 put this accusation on  the lips of a Chinese critic of the West.  "Like the prince  in the fable you seem to have released from his prison the genie of competition, only to find that you are unable to control him  Your legislation for the past one hundred  years is a perpetual and fruitless effort to regulate the disorders of your economic system .... Y o u have dissolved all human and personal ties ... the salient of your civilization is its irresponsibility  characteristic ... you are  caught in your own levers and cogs .... Such is the internal 2 economy of your State as it presents itself to a Chinaman." The truth of all of this is to some extent borne out by the turn affairs have taken in the succeeding twenty-five years. Expectation for the future, therefore, may be in the direction of an increasing sense and discrimination of 1. Philosophical Review Vol.29 - p.577 2.  Letters of John Chinaman - G.Lowes Dickinson, p.14.  169  true values. better,'  Progress will not be toward things  but toward a more  complete and refined  'bigger and evaluation  of the riches that belong to the spirit of man; and a deeper enjoyment  of the concrete and real world with which his  knowledge of truth, beauty and goodness, together with all which the arts of social living m a y bring him.  But no hope for the  future may be entertained so much as for a moment if it diminished one iota the possible value of the immediate present, if the present be -understood and appreciated.  UBC Scanned by UBC Library  170  CRITICISM REVIEWED AND A WORD AS TO HIS  INFLUENCE  Part IV Chapter XVIII  1  W i t h those lines of criticism the intent of which  is to heighten the status of the individual we have dealt already.  This phrase of Sir Henry Jones' is the germ of the  dispute, "One may doubt if Professor Bosanquet's of'Self-Transcendence* a gain in metaphysics."  for  'Self-realization®  substitution  is altogether  In Chapter VII the grounds of the  doubt have been examined, and a conclusion ventured.  We have  also attempted to answer the criticism of Bosanquet's theory of the Absolute.  It appears to be founded upon a misunder-  standing. There is another, and a more fundamental criticism which has not been considered at all.  It takes the form of  an attack upon the logic underlying his whole system, and centres its condemnation upon the concept of the concrete universal.  With the ramifications of this difference it is  not possible to venture, for it would require a logical treatise of great length to expound and far more to evaluate the various alternatives which are put forward by logicians  such as C o o k - W i l s o n ,  Stout, and especially Norman Kemp Smith.  1  It must suffice to say, with the possibility of being hastily dogmatic, that the difference is either of terms,  (which though  productive of confusion, may be overcome) or of metaphysical bias (as Professor Smith's dissatisfaction with which is very difficult  'Absolutism')  to overcome, and probably, cannot be  met for lack of common ground to meet  on.  J. Cook Wilson complains "It has become  customary  to speak of a concrete and an abstract universal. terms to be avoided.  These are  Concrete was originally merely opposed  to abstract and should mean a particular existence.  Nothing  is gained by calling an existence concrete and the term has the danger of seeming to give an explanation.  Concrete  2  universals would be a veritable contradiction in terms." Professor Kemp Smith also changes Bosanquet with using terms in a special and also an ambiguous sense. 'individual,'  'concrete,' and  mis-step.  'identity'  'abstract' are radically misused,  and real confusion of thought results. Bosanquet makes  The terms  The step by which  'individual' synonymous with 'system' is a  His central concept of 'identity in difference,'  taken over from Hegel, should be displaced by the concept 'relatedness within a system.'  of  As a result of his personal  metaphysical absorption, "any distraction which cannot be so treated" (in terms of identity in difference) "is neglected 3 or denied." This is, obviously, a dangerous line of attack 1.  'The Nature of Universals' by N.K. Smith in 'Mind' - Vol.36, N.S.  2.  "Statement and Inference" - p.714  3.  Ibid., p.266  w h i c h m a y be turned against w h e n Professor  its initiator.  For instance,  Smith goes on to remark, that we have "no  reason to suppose that the physical system is also an organism," and that  therefore "we have overwhelming evidence against the  view that wider wholes are necessarily higher types of unity" he is expressing at once a judgment based upon ignorance, and also a judgment as to the probable superiority  of the individ-  ual man, as an organism, to the universe a3 a whole, both of which, and especially the latter Bosanquet would denounce.  strongly  On the one hand is a bias in favor of the perfection  of the universe, and on the other hand a bias in favor of the peculiarly high type of unity that Professor Smith takes himself to be. ion?  W h i c h of them is the less culpable pre-possess-  Professor Smith is impressed with the  'Selective  adaptation' of the individual; Bosanquet, with many profound spirits, is the more impressed with the 'Teleology below and the Teleology above consciousness' by which the physical world and civilizations came into being. Again "Logic, they declare" {i.e. Bradley and Bosanquet) "is being wrongly treated so long as it continues to be modelled upon the methods which have been successful in solving the theoretical problems of practical life and of the sciences."  This is palpably false.  We may refer again to a  sentence in "Implication and Linear Inference" which indicates Bosanquet's intention to show the "very real affinity which exists" between logic and "the actual mode in which  173 expert writers on general subjects develop arguments."  He may  not the other, is his  conceivably  their comprehensive  have failed, but this and  'declaration.'  We cannot pursue this criticism of Bosanquet's logic further, but may add another authority in his defence.  Says  Professor Muirhead "I believe that the difficulties" (in Bosanquet's philosophy and modern idealism) are to be met "by following further the clue that Professor Bosanquet's 1 interpretation of it puts into our hands." It may further be said that his central theory (as to the place of universals) can be stated, as Professor 2 Hoernle  has shown,  without introducing the terms 'abstract  and concrete,' which have become objects of contention, and are therefore to be avoided in serious writing. 2.  It is too early to trace the full influence Bosanquet  upon the philosophy of his day, but a word as to its direction may be added. We have seen that his central intention is to show an absolutism that  'knows its business' as able to meet the  problems of the 'new knowledge' and emerge unscathed. this, it may be granted, he succeeded.  In  It need not, however,  be conceded that in every particular his philosophy is above further attack, but only that his general position is very strong and very  consistent.  1.  His Obituary Notice in 'Journal of Philosophy.' p.678  2.  "Concerning Universals" in "Mind" Vol.36, N.S.  174  It is also relevant  to ask as to whether or in  what way this thought has shifted or influenced the trend of philosophy in our own day; to what extent his philosophy has flowed out w i t h the next generation.  Some have said that  Bosanquet reaffirmed and re-illumined the philosophy of Green, h i s predecessor, and no more: others are more certain of a 'genuine originality.'  His own opinion, firmly held, was  that a man's w o r k is the gift of his forebears  and his  times,  and that again, when he lays it down, it "grows at every 1 point into the general vitality that surrounds it."  He,  therefore, could be the last to ask for the preservation in anything like its original form, of his philosophy. M i s s Sinclair remarks that in spite of Bradley and Bosanquet the Hew Realism happened. This is true enough insofar as the New Realism  'happened' without reference  to the thought of these two, and the tradition they represent; but is not true if it be taken to mean that, having penetrated the heart of their idealism, and understood it, they have set about to remedy for philosophy its defect. the more ostentatiously  Any reading of  'new' realisms provokes the thought  that they are of the nature of a retreat from and an impatience w i t h the attempt to be consistent.  It is worthy of note  that where the New Realism, in its strongest exponents, becomes mathematics or philosophy (and not an appendix tc/ psychology) it moves over toward a "speculative philosophy."  2  1.  Some suggestions in Ethics - p.86.  2.  Meeting of Extremes.  175  There is no need to repeat  that, so far, such a  philosophy as B o s a n q u e t f s is not in the ascendant.  Wherever  the theological interest is dominant he is found wanting, and where mathematics is held to be the key to all philosophy, there also he is 'persona non grata.' who,either  But he has successors  as Professor Hoernle, trace their chief inspiration  to him, or as Dr. Muirhead, regard his especial emphasis as of all recent these  systems, the most suggestive.  The former of  writes very much in the spirit, and not a little in  the style of Bosanquet.  There are many others, from whom  occasional comments in the magazines come who acknowledge the value they have  found in  his work.  A series of articles  by Katherine Gilbert, in the Philosophical Review  (vols. 31  and 32) is especially worthy of note. It is not unlikely that tendencies now at work may emerge again in the direction of some gens ral interpretation of reality closely related to that of Bosanquet. present  tendency, however, toward  'monadism  The strong  "spiritual pluralism' or  * may draw off much of the revolt  from the  'nondes-  cript' pluralisms which have been current during the last two decades.  There is always the difficulty, nevertheless,  making such a theory quite thorough-going.  But there are many  who are anxious to accept a maximum of what, without too violent  of  contradiction, can be held in the one hand.  176  But w i t h this, or after this, the desire for coherence, for  'synopsis' in philosophy, and for concreteness  in its material, may bring Bosanquet yet more to the front in the thought of the English speaking world.  "Without professing  to understand, or to be able to expl-ain, everything in Bosanquet's philosophy"  Professor Hoernle writes, "I find  more of essential wisdom and truth in it than in the theories of any other philosopher of our time.  Whenever I return to  his writings after an interval, they give me more than they had done before.  This, of course, is no less true of the  writings of any other great philosopher - of Plato, or Spinoza, or Kant.  But it is precisely by this test that I would rank 1 Bosanquet in the small company of the very great."  1.  Journal of Philosophy - Vol.EO, p.516  BIBLIOGRAPHY  The Writings of Bernard Bosanquet Schomann: Athenian Constitutional History, Translated, 1878. Translation  of Lotze,  {Edited and part translated) 1884. Knowledge and Reality - 1885. 1  Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art - 1886.  ' Logic - 1888. ' Essays and Addresses - 1889. History of Aesthetic - 189E. Civilization of Christendom - 1893. Companion to Plato's Republic - 1895. Aspects of the Social Problem, (Edited and contributed) - 1895. ' Essentials of Logic - 1895. Psychology of the Moral Self - 1897. ' Philosophical Theory of the State - 1899. Education of the Young in Plato - 1900. ' Principle of Individuality and Value - 1912. Value and Destiny of the Individual  - 1913.  Distinction Between Mind and Its Objects - 1913. Three Lectures on Aesthetic - 1915. ' Social and International Ideals - 1917.  -II-  » Some Suggestions in Ethics - 1918. Zoar - 1919. ' Implication and Linear Inference - 1920 What Religion Is - 1920. ' Meeting of Extremes in ContemporaryPhilosophy - 1920. ' Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind - 1923 Science and Philosophy - 1926.  * Bernard Bosanquet, A short Account of His Life 1 By Helen Bosanquet, - 1924.  A-II  His contributions to magazines, and to the Aristotelian Society. omitted.  Collected essays and certain others  2  Proceedings of the Aristotelian U.S. 3  Society  "The Relation of Logic to Psychology with special reference to the views of Dr. Bosanquet." A reply by Bosanquet.  "  9  Symposium, "The Place of Experience in Democracy."  1.  Those read for this essay marked  (')  2.  Early contributions to Sristotelian Society.  -III-  N.S. IE  Symposium "Purpose and Mechanism."  "  15  A Note ."Conflicting Social  it  Obligations."  tiThe Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind."  MIND Vol. £6  N.S.  "Causality and  Implication."  "The Individual and the State." "The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic" A Reply. "The Notion of a General Will." "Croce's Aesthetic." 30  "  "The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic" Further comment.  31  "  "This or Nothing." "A Word about Coherence" A Note on "Professor Broad on the External World."  PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Vol.£6  "Realism and Metaphysics" "The Relation of Coherence to Immediate and Specific Purpose."  -IV-  Vol. 27  "Appearance and Reality and the Solution of Problems."  "  29  "Appearance and the Absolute."  "  30  A Hote "An Undesigned  31  "Humor in Bosanquet*s Theory of Experience" A Reply. "7  B-I  -  Coincidence"  5 = 12"  Other Articles Concerning Bosanquet.  MIND Vol. 21  U.S.  Notice of  'Principle'  J.E. McTaggart. "  22  "  Notice of 'Value and Destiny' J.H. Muirhead.  "  27  "  "The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic" L.J. Russell.  "  28  "  Notice of "Some Suggestions in Ethics" J.S. MacKenzie.  "  28  v  "The Basis of Bosanquet's Logic" L.J. Russell.  -VVol.32  N.S.  "Bernard Bosanquet" J.H. Muirhead.  "  33  "  Notice of "Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind" G.C. Field.  "  36  "The Nature of Universals" Norman Kemp  "  36  Smith.  "(Concerning Universals" R.F.A. Hoernle.  "  36  Notice of "Science and Philosophy" J.S. MacKenzie.  PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW Vol.28  Notice of "Some Suggestions in Ethics" G.S. Ferguson.  "  29  "The Method in the Metaphysics of Bernard Bosanquet" M.C. Carroll.  "  30  "The Principle of Individuality in the Metaphysics of Bernard Bosanouet." "The Nature of the Absolute" M.C. Carroll. Notice of "Implication and Linear Inference" R.F.A. Hoernle.  -VI-  (Philosophical Review Cont'd) Vol.31  "Humor in Bosanquet's Theory of Experience" Katherine  "  32  Gilbert.  "An Estimate of Bosanquet's Philosophy" J.A. Leighton. "Bosanquet on Teleology" G. Watts Cunningham. "The Principle of Reason in the light of Bosanquet's Philosophy" Katherine Gilbert. "On Bosanquet's  Idealism"  R.F.A. Hoernle. Bosanquet and the Future of Logic" R.C. Lodge. "Bosanquet's Theory of the Real Will" G.H. Sabine. "Bosanquet's Interpretation of Religious Experience" E.L. Schaube. "  33  "Absolutism and Realism" John Watson.  "  34  "Bosanquet on Mind and the Absolute" John Watson.  "  35  "Bosanquet on the Philosophic Method" G.W. Cunningham.  -VIIJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  Vol.18  "  20  Reviews of "Implication and Linear Inference" and "Meeting of Extremes." "Bernard Bosanquet as I knew Him" J.H. Muirhead. "In Memoriam: Bernard Bosanauet" R.F.A. Hoernle.  PROCEEDINGS OF T H E BRITISH ACADEMY  1913 - 1914  "The Basis of Realism" Alexander.  Vol.  X  Obituary Notice by A.C. Bradley and Lord Haldane.  -VIII•II Bradley, A.C.  Shakespearian Tragedy.  Bradley, F.H.  Appearance and Reality. Essays on Truth and Reality, Ethical  Studies.  Braham, E.G.  Post Kantian Thought.  Carr,  Changing Background in Religion and Ethics.  Wildon-  Hoernel, R.F.Alfred  Studies in Contemporary Metaphysi Matter, Mind, Life and God. Idealism.  Inge, W.R.  Personal Idealism and Mysticism. Confessio Fidei - in "Outspoken Essays."  Joachim, H.H.  A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza.  Jones, Sir Henry,  A Faith that Enquires.  Laird,  Our Minds and their Bodies.  John,  Problems of the Self. Pattison, Seth Pringle,  The Idea of Immortality. The Idea of God.  -IX-  Russell, Bertrand,  The Analysis of Mind. A Free Man's Worship - and other Essays in - Mysticism and Logic.  Sinclair, May,  The New  Idealism.  Six Realists,  The New Realism.  Webb, C.C.J.  Divine Personality and Human Life,  All of the above are quoted or referred to directly or indirectly. the  Many others, needless to say, form  'atmosphere' out of which this essay is  crystalized.  


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