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A comparative analysis of corporatism in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy Kardam, Nukhet 1980

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CORPORATISM IN NAZI GERMANY AND FASCIST ITALY '. B.A., Istanbul University, 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF. BRITISH COLUMBIA by NUKHET KARDAM i n A p r i l 1980 Nukhet Kardam In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. . . . . . . ?o Department of The University of Brit ish Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date Abstract This study i s a comparative analysis of corporatism as expressed by the National S o c i a l i s t Party i n Germany i n i t s 1920 Program and of I t a l i a n corporatism as formulated by the F a s c i s t government i n the mid-1920's. The main question of the study i s : Why did the National S o c i a l i s t Party discard the c o r p o r a t i s t proposals i n i t s 1920 Program, while corporatism i n I t a l y became an important facet of the F a s c i s t state ideology? In the f i r s t chapter, the c o r p o r a t i s t proposals of the NSDAP are examined, s t r e s s i n g the following problems: Why were cor p o r a t i s t proposals included i n the 1920 Program? To what extent were they implemented? If they were not implemented, why not? In the second chapter, the same issues are examined, this time i n the context of I t a l i a n corporatism. The l a s t chapter i s devoted to a compara-ti v e analysis of German and I t a l i a n corporatism. On the basis of the analysis and evidence provided, I suggest that F a s c i s t corporatism served as a u n i f y i n g myth to create the i l l u s i o n i i i . that both class c o n f l i c t and national economic poverty had been over-come. At the same time, t h i s ideology integrated the working class into corporations which were designed and c o n t r o l l e d by the state. In contrast, the c o r p o r a t i s t proposals of the 1920 NSDAP Program contradicted the goals of the German state because the regressive, Utopian c o r p o r a t i s t proposals of the early Party Program did not serve the goals of the Nazi state which were rearmament and external power. i v . Table of Contents T i t l e Page i Abstract i i Table of Contents i v Acknowledgements v INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER I 5 CHAPTER II 3 6 CHAPTER I I I 6 0 Footnotes 71 Bibliography 76 V . Acknowledgements I would l i k e to thank Professors P h i l i p Resnick and Janos Bak whose i n t e l l e c t u a l support and advice enabled me to prepare and organize the material i n this study. I would also l i k e to thank Professor David Haglund f or his valuable comments and Professor Mark W. Zacher for his moral support and understanding. 1. INTRODUCTION 2. The purpose of this study i s a comparative analysis of the corp o r a t i s t proposals of the National S o c i a l i s t Party i n Germany as expressed i n i t s 1920 Program and of I t a l i a n corporatism as formulated by the Fa s c i s t government i n mid-1920's. The main question that this study addresses i t s e l f to i s : Why did the National S o c i a l i s t Party discard the co r p o r a t i s t proposals i n i t s 1920 Program, while corporatism i n I t a l y became an important part of the F a s c i s t state ideology? Our thesis i s that F a s c i s t corporatism served to further the aims of the I t a l i a n state by functioning as a unif y i n g myth to promote s o c i a l harmony and national unity whereas the c o r p o r a t i s t proposals of the 1920 NSDAP Program contradicted the goals of the German state. In the f i r s t chapter, the co r p o r a t i s t proposals of the NSDAP are exa-mined, s t a r t i n g with a b r i e f survey of the or i g i n s of German corpora-t i s t theory, with s p e c i f i c reference to those theories that influenced the Nazi w r i t e r s . Then, the following problems are addressed: Why were c o r p o r a t i s t proposals included i n the 1920 Program? Which s o c i a l groups did they appeal to? To what extent were they imple-mented by the Nazi government? I f they were not implemented, what were the reasons f o r the i r elimination? 3. In the second chapter, the same method of analysis i s directed at I t a l i a n corporatism. Starting with a de s c r i p t i o n of i t s o r i g i n s that l e d up to the formulation of corporatism as part of the Fas c i s t doctrine, the enquiry then moves to the examination of whether or not corporatism as stated i n the laws was r e a l i z e d . As the evidence turns out to be negative, we then address the problem of why i t was not r e a l i z e d . Since corporations were a c t u a l l y implemented, even though they did not serve t h e i r stated purposes and since c o r p o r a t i s t p r i n c i p l e s continued to be stressed, i t i s important to f i n d out what the 'actual' functions of corpo-ratism were. The t h i r d chapter i s devoted to a comparative analysis of both German and I t a l i a n corporatisms, i n terms of both c o r p o r a t i s t theory and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to society. The analysis includes a comparison of the o r i g i n s of c o r p o r a t i s t theory i n both countries, the s o c i a l groups i t appealed to and the socio-economic structure of each country. As i t i s revealed at the end of the study, i n I t a l y , with the existence of stark class and regional d i v i s i o n s , a powerful revolutionary s y n d i c a l i s t movement and a low l e v e l of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , corporatism 4. served as a un i f y i n g myth to create the i l l u s i o n that both .class c o n f l i c t and national economic poverty had been overcome, at the same time i n t e g r a t i n g the working class into corporations designed and c o n t r o l l e d by the state. Thus, corporatism, as advocated by the I t a l i a n state, coincided with i t s goals of achieving n a t i o n a l unity and rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n to bring I t a l y to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y powerful status. In Germany, on the other hand, the regressive, Utopian c o r p o r a t i s t proposals of the 1920 Program of the NSDAP had no chance of l i f e because they did not serve the goals of the Nazi state, which were rearmament and external power. Besides, by 1933, Germany was a f u l l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d country; employers organizations c o n t r o l l e d the labor market; t r u s t s , combines and c a r t e l s covered the whole economy with a network of a u t h o r i t a r i a n organizations. Thus, the business leaders were also powerful enough to impede the imple-mentation of the c o r p o r a t i s t proposals, while they supported the goals of the Nazi state. 5. CHAPTER I 6. The 1920 Program of the National S o c i a l i s t Party demanded the creation of estate and occupational chambers f o r the execution of statutes enacted by l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s i n order to implement the p r i n c i p l e that public i n t e r e s t comes before self-interest."'' I t also proposed the i n s t i t u t i o n 2 of self-governing guilds for trade and small business. A b r i e f survey of the German co r p o r a t i s t t r a d i t i o n would serve to c l a r i f y the l i n k s of the Nazi corporatism with the German c o r p o r a t i s t t r a d i t i o n and thus add to our understanding of the above proposals. Corporatism made i t s appearance i n Germany as a d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l and / economical 'Weltanschauung' at the beginning of the nineteenth century. I t was an expression of conservative and n a t i o n a l i s t antipathy to the philosophy and pr a c t i c e of the French Revolution, i t s f i r s t manifesta-tions having been l a r g e l y the products of a desire to defend Germany's 3 4 t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s - the estates and corporations of the ancien regime. Corporatist ideas are c l o s e l y associated with the German romantic movement which represented the f i r s t protest against ca p i t a l i s m and parliamentarism, as w e l l as tending to safeguard the t r a d i t i o n a l German i n s t i t u t i o n s . In the f i r s t h a l f of the nineteenth, century., the emphasis was on the r e s t o r a t i o n and maintenance of these i n s t i t u t i o n s , which l a t e r gave way to the proposals of a corporative e l e c t o r a l system and the creation of a fu n c t i o n a l parliament. In other words, the emphasis p r i o r to the 7. revolution of 1848 on the status quo for the hereditary estates s h i f t e d to a new emphasis on occupational representation although a clear d i v i d i n g point i s d i f f i c u l t to f i n d . The reasons for t h i s change i n emphasis must be sought i n the socio-economic transformations which took place i n Germany. Since the broad masses of the population enjoyed few p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s i n the f i r s t h a l f of the nineteenth century, the main forces operative during this period were the hereditary estates which were anxious to r e t a i n t h e i r priveleges. However, when the influence of modern party l i f e and the emerging classes created by i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n began to cut across s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s , occupational representation became an important a l t e r n a t i v e to overcoming economic and s o c i a l anta-gonisms. Besides the hereditary estates, the a r t i s a n s , craftsmen and r e t a i l merchants opted for occupational representation. The l a t t e r wanted a return to the corporative economy organized along guilds, as i n the Middle Age because they were threatened by the consequences of the i n d u s t r i a l revolution. They were ra p i d l y sinking to working-class status. In short, corporatism for both of the above groups was a way of accomodating the newly emerging classes, as w e l l as r e t a i n i n g t h e i r own status. The t h e o r e t i c a l basis for adopting the corporatism of the Middle Age to new circumstances was provided by German Romantic the o r i s t s of the nineteenth century. They rejected i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y and equality i n favor of an 'organic'"^ hierarchy of estates. An organic state r e s t i n g 8, upon estates was thought to provide a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l freedom and growth with s o c i a l harmony and s t a b i l i t y . In short, estates were praised for t h e i r intermediary function between the i n d i v i d u a l and the state; the i n d i v i d u a l facing the state alone could only produce chaos. The intermediary function assigned to estates and corporations, however, presented d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n mainly because the attempts to adopt medieval corporatism to the ce n t r a l i z e d n a t i o n a l state of the nineteenth century proved to be u n r e a l i s t i c . If the estates were allowed too much autonomy and t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s were allowed to come to the fore, then s o c i a l harmony would not be provided for and the state would face the danger of l o s i n g i t s unity. On the other hand, i f the estates were subject to the authority of the state, then they faced the danger of l o s i n g t h e i r intermediary function and becoming organs of the state. Adam Milller was probably the f i r s t German th e o r i s t at the s t a r t of the nineteenth century to postulate estate organization against class organization. He feared that Germany would s p l i t into two classes and sought to prevent the r e s u l t i n g antagonism by an estate system composed of an ari s t o c r a c y , clergy, industry and merchants which would integrate the i n d u s t r i a l into the p o l i t i c a l system. At the same time, he i n s i s t e d on a strong c e n t r a l i z e d state which absorbed "the t o t a l i t y of human a f f a i r s " . 9, Understandably, he did not provide any c l e a r guideline as to how such a state, which absorbed the t o t a l i t y of human a f f a i r s , would l e t the estates function. Like Muller, Fichte also assigned the state the duty of control over the estates, but the estates derived t h e i r v a l i d i t y from state laws which eliminated t h e i r intermediary function. It was Hegel who provided a t h e o r e t i c a l s o l u t i o n to the problem of how the estates would function as intermediaries between the i n d i v i d u a l and the state. For him, the only way an i n d i v i d u a l could be brought into the economic, p o l i t i c a l and e t h i c a l order was by making him a member of a corporation where, at the same time, he i s educated to see beyond the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of h i s corporation to consider the i n t e r e s t s of the whole public sphere. As for the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the corporations and the state, they form a unity of opposites. The corporations need the recognition of t h e i r autonomy by some higher body, i . e . the state. In turn, the state owes i t s power and existence to the recognition of each corporation that i t s p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s are maintained by the state. This synthesis, however, remained on a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l e v e l . Hegel himself did not intend i t to have p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n s , as he expressed i t i n the introduction to The Philosophy of Right: "This book, then, contain-ing as i t does the science of the state, i s to be nothing other than the endeavor to apprehend and portray the state as something inherently r a t i o n a l . As a work of philosophy, i t must be poles apart from an i , ,,8 attempt to construct a state as i t ought to be. 10. In the wake of the revolution of 1848, K a r l Mario Winkelblech postu-lated an estate organization based on 'economic federalism'. I t was designed to preserve many features of the g u i l d organization crowned by 9 a " s o c i a l parliament of occupational estates". This program r e f l e c t e d the misgivings of artisans and craftsmen. K a r l Mario advocated the coexistence of an occupational and of a p o l i t i c a l chamber, and the subor-dination of the former to the l a t t e r . This idea was seized by the reactionary movement who used occupational representation for the purpose of suppressing parliamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s , as for instance i n Bismarck's p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l theory. Bismarck depicted his i d e a l p o l i t i c a l scheme as one of a strong monarchy, r e s t r i c t e d by a system of corporate representation. Bismarck's scheme possibly represented the misgivings of the a r i s t o c r a c y . As mentioned e a r l i e r , corporatism was most favorable to those two groups: the aristocracy and the a r t i s a n s , who wanted to preserve t h e i r status. K a r l Mario Winkelblech's demand of the coexistence of an occupational and of a p o l i t i c a l chamber and the subordination of the former to the l a t t e r was l a t e r f u l f i l l e d under the Weimar Republic. The p r o v i s i o n a l economic council composed of industry, labor, consumers, free professions and experts that was formed did not function, however. I t had no achievements to boast of and i t s l e g i s l a t i v e power and advisory functions were p a r t l y dispensed with during the great depression. Possibly the most important c o r p o r a t i s t t r a d i t i o n that served as a stimulus to National S o c i a l i s t writers i s the Volkish Movement. 11. I d e o l o g i c a l l y , Volkish thought i s a product of the Romanticism of the nineteenth century, but i t was combined with elements unique to Germany. Within the Romantic Movement, the longing f o r s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as a reaction to the socio-economic transformation of Europe, l e d to a contradictory urge to belong to something greater than oneself, to f i n d a u n i v e r s a l i d e n t i t y , by being i n harmony with the Cosmos. In Germany, the quest for 'cosmological i d e n t i t y ' was found i n the form of 'Volk'. The i n d i v i d u a l , by belonging to the Volk, could achieve unity with 'higher r e a l i t y ' . Belonging to the Volk also meant l i v i n g i n harmony with nature and e n t a i l e d a condemnation of urban l i f e brought about by i n d u s t r i a l i z a -t i o n as unnatural. The s o c i a l structure that the Volkish ideology envisaged was put forward by Wilhelm Heinrich R i e h l , one of i t s important protagonists. S t a r t i n g with the i d e a l of nature, Riehl held up the unspoiled countryside as a model f o r the s o c i a l structure he desired. He saw i n the contrast i n nature, a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r preserving the equally natural diff e r e n c e between s o c i a l estates. His society was to be h i e r a r c h i c a l i n nature and patterned a f t e r the medieval estates. He viewed peasantry and n o b i l i t y as the two estates which s t i l l l i v e d according to prescribed customs. However, the estates that came into being a f t e r the Middle Age, namely the bourgeoisie and the workers had to be accomodated as w e l l . The s o l u t i o n was to f i n d the bourgeoisie a place within the Volk as inhabitants of the small town, which had been part of the h i s t o r i c a l landscape for centuries. The workers, on the other hand, were regarded 12. as a genuine estate by Riehl. This d i s t i n c t i o n permitted the workers to act i n concert, since h i s t o r i c a l l y , estates had acted as a unit to gain t h e i r own ends. In t h i s vein, Riehl praised the f i r s t of Germany's cooperative e f f o r t s on the part of the workers as analogous to the medieval guilds i n which master, journeyman and apprentice were parts of an har-monious order. A f t e r the u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany i n 1871, another trend c a l l e d 'New Romanticism' combined Romanticism and Volkish ideas i n an attempt to f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the socio-economic consequences of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . The form of society that i t proposed was a hierarchy established according to estates or corporations, composed of professions, s k i l l s and trades, crowned by a chamber of corporations. The o r i g i n a l i t y of New Romanticism lay i n i t s introduction of corporatism as the 'Third Way', an a l t e r n a t i v e to both l i b e r a l capitalism and Marxist socialism. The 'Third Way', a l t e r -nately c a l l e d 'German Socialism' by Moeller van den Bruck, who coined i t , was described as a " s o c i a l order forged from the union of a medieval corporatism and the c u l t u r a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the German V o l k " . F i r s t , the bourgeois s o c i a l order would be dissolved; Germany would somehow revert back to the Middle Age, with allowance for c e r t a i n requirements of the Modern Age - such as i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade, t a r i f f s , taxes and a r e l a t i v e l y large amount of p u b l i c spending. How was the 'Third Way' going to be achieved? According to van den Bruck, i t would be achieved by a ' s p i r i t u a l revolution', whereby the general 13. i n t e r e s t of the community would come before i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s and the antagonisms of i n d u s t r i a l society would thus be reconciled. The Volkish and New Romantic version of corporatism which imposes the medieval order upon i n d u s t r i a l i z e d society by way of a s p i r i t u a l revolu-t i o n i s of s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r our understanding of the Nazi corpo-r a t i s t proposals. These ideas were embraced by small businessmen, a r t i -sans and craftsmen who comprised the i n i t i a l membership of the NSDAP. Therefore, i t i s not unreasonable to assume that Nazi c o r p o r a t i s t propo-sals followed the Volkish t r a d i t i o n i n order to appeal to the above groups who feared, or ac t u a l l y suffered the s o c i a l and economic displacement associated with the emergence of modern i n d u s t r i a l society. A second source of Nazi corporatism i s Othmar Spann's estate theory. Othmar Spann and his school worked out a r a d i c a l - e s t a t e theory on the basis of a u n i v e r s a l i s t doctrine. Spann's conception of society rested on his d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between ' i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ' and ' u n i v e r s a l i s t i c ' conceptions. Rejecting the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c concept, which accepts society as a 'summation of independent inviduals who are self-determined, he found the ' i n t r i n s i c essence' of the i n d i v i d u a l to e x i s t i n 'the 12 mental or s p i r i t u a l a s s o c i a t i o n among the many'. This u n i v e r s a l i s t i c conception implied the complete precedence of society over i n d i v i d u a l s who were not even permitted to have any immediate r e l a t i o n s h i p except through the mediation of society. 14. The s o c i a l order proposed by Spann was a series of ' p a r t i a l t o t a l i t i e s ' or 'estates' arranged i n an ascending order of rank and crowned by the state which i s both the most general estate of a l l the 'the leader and 13 judge of a l l other estates'. Economic l i f e , a subordinate estate but autonomous within i t s e l f , i s further divided into p a r t i a l estates, each corresponding to a s i n g l e occupation. The economic estate i s led by employers, where workers are c a l l e d 'followers' and employers 'leaders'. This d i v i s i o n i s j u s t i f i e d by c a l l i n g c a p i t a l the function of a higher order i n the s o c i a l hierarchy. For Spann, the state i s ruled by the estate of r u l e r s (Herrenstand) whose business i s to attend to state a f f a i r s , while employers lead the economic estate. Spann's theory presented d i f f i c u l t i e s regarding i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . If the state i s seen as an estate, even though i t i s above other estates, h i s theory i s interpreted as allowing too much autonomy for the estates. On the other hand, i f his universalism and the precedence of the whole over the parts are emphasized, then the state might be interpreted as an a b s o l u t i s t , d i c t a t o r i a l s tate. In other words, we are again faced with the problem of the r e l a t i o n of estates v i s - a - v i s the state. In s p i t e of t h i s problem, Spann's writings were given wide c i r c u l a t i o n a f t e r 1932, and i n 1933, an organization c a l l e d ' I n s t i t u t fur Standewesen' was set up to t r a i n future leaders based on Spann's ideas. His ideas were also used to j u s t i f y the economic power of indus-try and business leaders by i n t e r p r e t i n g corporatism as state being 15. divorced from functions belonging to the economy, thus j u s t i f y i n g the power and self-government of industry under the name of corporatism. Spann's ideas were nevertheless rejected when corporatism was given up i n 1934. A t h i r d source of Nazi corporatism i s the Occupational Estates School. The general aim of this school was to bring about a 'community of labor' i n which s o c i a l harmony could be r e a l i z e d . To th i s end employers, super-v i s o r s and workers were to be organized i n a hierarchy of 'factory commu-n i t i e s ' (Arbeitsgemeinshaften). A l l enterprises engaged i n the same kind of production were to be organized by d i s t r i c t and then united i n national groupings. A functional parliament would then coordinate these occupational estates and act as a buffer to prevent p o l i t i c a l encroachment on economic a f f a i r s as well as undue interference by economic groups i n the a f f a i r s of the sta t e . For our purposes, this shool's importance l i e s i n the fa c t that the concept of factory communities was l a t e r adopted i n the Third Reich and was given a cen t r a l place i n the Labor L e g i s l a t i o n of 1934. The theories that served as a stimulus to Nazi writers had the following points i n common: 1) an opposition to a parliamentary system r e s t i n g on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 2) a h i e r a r c h i c a l conception of society and a r e f u s a l to recognize equal p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . 3) an acceptance of an organic con-ception of society 4) a n t i - l i b e r a l i s m . 5) a r e j e c t i o n of Marxism and i t s explanation of the necessity of class c o n f l i c t . 16. After t h i s b r i e f survey of the German co r p o r a t i s t t r a d i t i o n , we w i l l now turn to the National S o c i a l i s t theorists of corporatism and the cor p o r a t i s t proposals i n the 1920 and 1926 Party Programs. In the 1920's, the main National S o c i a l i s t theorists on economic issues were G o t t f r i e d Feder and Gregor Strasser. They represented the r a d i c a l f a c t i o n within the NSDAP. Feder's writings on economic issues had a pervasive influence on the Party's approach, and i n fac t he was appointed 'supreme a r b i t e r ' by H i t l e r on debates a r i s i n g from the economic issues of the Party Program. Feder proposed the establishment of a form of govern-ment which i s democratic, highly c e n t r a l i z e d and cor p o r a t i s t i n his book, 14 The S o c i a l State , The new state, for him, had to make a r a d i c a l break with a l l the p r i n c i p l e s of l i b e r a l democracy. I t had to break with par-liamentary p a r t i e s , but, above a l l , i t had to provide a separation between economic and p o l i t i c a l types of popular representation by a two-chamber system. The House of the People as the f i r s t chamber was to represent the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of the whole people, while the Central Council represented the economic i n t e r e s t s of the working population and was supposed to be a cor p o r a t i s t body. Each occupation was represented by one employer and one employee. The work of this Council was planned to be the control of production and d i s t r i b u t i o n . I t also was to function ' s o c i a l l y ' to prevent the representation of the s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s of the i n d i v i d u a l occupational groups and to encourage t h e i r better incor-poration into the whole. Gregor Strasser d i f f e r e d from Feder i n his emphasis on s o c i a l i s t i c 17. elements. His ' s o c i a l i s t ' proposals included the "far-reaching trans-f e r of the ownership of the means of production to the general public, with regard f o r the sense of property"."'""' He suggested that c a p i t a l and property should be apportioned the following way: the workers should hold the r i g h t s to 10%, the state 41% and private owners the remaining 49%. P r o f i t s , meanwhile, should go 49% to the workers and 51% to the 16 owners and respect for private property should be maintained. What Strasser meant by 'German Socialism" becomes cl e a r e r i n his statement below: "We are s o c i a l i s t s , are enemies of the present c a p i t a l i s t i c system with i t s e x p l o i t a t i o n of the economically weak, with i t s i n j u s t i c e i n wages, with i t s immoral evaluation of i n -dividuals according to wealth and money instead of respon-s i b i l i t y and achievement and we are determined to abolish t h i s system! Yet i t i s not enough to change a system, to replace one economic system with another - necessary above a l l i s a change of s p i r i t ! We have to learn that i n the economy of a people, i t i s not p r o f i t , not gain which are important - but only s a t i s f y i n g the needs of the members of the people'.'"'"^  As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the 1920 Program of the NSDAP demanded the creation of estate and occupational chambers for the execution of statutes enacted by l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s i n order to implement the p r i n c i p l e that public i n t e r e s t comes before s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I t also proposed the i n s t i t u t i o n of self-governing guilds for trade and small business. In 1926, Gregor Strasser and 18. Joseph Goebbels prepared a more de t a i l e d program based on the previous one. The c o r p o r a t i s t proposals i n t h i s program were: "Trade and Small Business P o l i c y : 1. Those businesses or i n d i v i d u a l s employing fewer than twenty people are to be grouped by law i n compulsory guilds. 2. Taxation of these self-governing bodies w i l l take the form of a lump sum which the guilds themselves w i l l divide and levy on i n d i v i d u a l members.... Structure and Character of Corporations: 1. The various p r i n c i p a l occupational groups are to be combined i n regional, state and Reich chambers... 2. The following chambers are to be formed: a. Chamber of A g r i c u l t u r e b. Chamber of Industry and Trade c. Chamber of Labor d. Chamber of C i v i l Service and employees e. Chamber of the Free Professions Conclusion: On the domestic problem: the d i v i s i o n of authority between centralism and federalism with the introduction of an orga-n i c a l l y structured system of corporations i n the place of an a r t i f i c i a l parliamentarism. On the economic problem: the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the r i g h t s of the general public with the personal egoism which i s j . , ,,18 rooted i n human nature. The c o r p o r a t i s t proposals of the Party Program and those of Feder and Strasser serve to indicate the following main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Nazi corporatism. F i r s t , i t i s a n t i - l i b e r a l and anti-Marxist. Second, 19. i t i s Utopian. The r a t i o n a l constructs of economics are refused i n favor of s p i r i t u a l values which would help to achieve s o c i a l and economic harmony of i n t e r e s t . Third, i t advocates corporations as intermediary organizations within a c e n t r a l i z e d state with unlimited authority. Fourth, i t proposes the creation of self-governing guilds for artisans and small businessmen, s i m i l a r to the guilds of the Middle Age. What functions did these c o r p o r a t i s t proposals serve? The lower middle classes of a r t i s a n s , craftsmen and small businessmen who suffered the s o c i a l and economic displacement associated with the emergence of modern i n d u s t r i a l society were most receptive to the a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t , Utopian corporatism of the NSDAP. Arthur Schweitzer i n Big Business i n the Third Reich divides the 19 German middle class of the 1920's into the following groups: 1. Salaried employees i n industry and government. 2. The marginal independents (quasi-proletarians) who operated shops or stores on t h e i r own account, c u l t i v a t e d a few acres of land or sold t h e i r labor as services to customers. 3. Artisans, dealers i n goods and services and most of peasants. P o l i t i c a l l y , a l l groups held some form of middle-class outlook on l i f e . They took a u n i f i e d stand, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the d e t e r i o r a t i n g economic s i t u a t i o n threatened t h e i r existence against both c a p i t a l and labor. Economically, t h e i r i n t e r e s t s were so diverse that a common class i n t e r e s t 20. did not develop. However, the artisans and small businessmen did develop t h e i r own program demanding a corporative organization, and i t was th i s program that was mainly adopted by the NSDAP. It should be noted, though, that the 'Mittelstand' as a whole was sympathetic to corporatism because i t o ffered an a l t e r n a t i v e to l i b e r a l democracy and Marxist socialism, both of which were regarded unfavorably by them. The s p e c i f i c c o r p o r a t i s t proposals of the artisans and small business-men, mostly influenced by the Volkish Romantic ideas, are outlined 20 below i n order to provide a comparison with the NSDAP proposals: 1. A n t i - c a p i t a l i s m - Artisans and small businessmen asked f o r the c l o s i n g of a l l department stores and chain stores. A l l p u b l i c l y owned enterprises would be dissolved and public orders would be f i l l e d by a r t i s a n shops. Big business would be replaced by small business and modern large-scale industries would be transformed into a primarily handicraft economy. 2. Self-government of guilds - A l l artisans would belong to a d i s t i n c t economic organization, membership i n which would be compulsory. These organizations would have the r i g h t to f i x prices and regulate the markets. 3. Economic corporativism - The a r t i s a n s ' organizations would govern t h e i r economic a f f a i r s by either forming estates, guilds or corporatives. A comparison of the NSDAP Program with the above demands suggests that the proposals of the small businessmen and artisans were taken into 21. account. On a n t i - c a p i t a l i s m , the Party Program included the creation and maintenance of a sound middle c l a s s , immediate communalization of the great department stores and t h e i r leasing to small businessmen at low rents; most favorable consideration to small businesses and 21 breaking the bondage of i n t e r e s t . On the organization of g u i l d s , i t had the following points: Those businesses or i n d i v i d u a l s who employ fewer than twenty are to be grouped i n compulsory g u i l d s ; taxation of these self-governing bodies w i l l take the form of a lump sum which the 22 guilds themselves w i l l divide and levy on t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l members. These points on a n t i - c a p i t a l i s m and the formation of self-governing guilds i n the NSDAP Program i n d i c a t e a close s i m i l a r i t y to the demands of artisans and craftsmen to suggest that one of the main reasons why the Party Program included c o r p o r a t i s t proposals was to appeal to those groups. And indeed, when t h e i r program was adopted, they f i l l e d the 23 ranks of the party. A second possible function of Nazi corporatism i s the a l t e r n a t i v e i t offered to both l i b e r a l democracy and Marxist socialism. Because the r o l e of corporations within the state i s not well defined i n c o r p o r a t i s t theory, the NSDAP could propose the formation of a chamber of corporations subject to the unlimited authority of the c e n t r a l parliament and thus ru l e out parliamentary democracy i n favor of a d i c t a t o r i a l state. S i m i l a r l y , the organic concept of corporatism, favoring inequality among men may have appealed to the party leaders, because I t opposed equal p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . The h i e r a r c h i c a l conception of society was adopted by H i t l e r to enforce the party hierarchy and the absolute obedience to the 'Fuhrer'. The concept of the 'common good before i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t ' helped to j u s t i f y absolute authority since the 'Fuhrer' knew the common i n t e r e s t s of the people best. As G o t t f r i e d Feder explained: "The good of the people i s the highest law....there can be no question of s e t t i n g up guidelines for the highest leader of the state; h i s guideline i s contained i n the above-mentioned p r i n c i p l e . " F i n a l l y , i t should be remembered that c o r p o r a t i s t proposals were made by the r a d i c a l f a c t i o n within the NSDAP. Therefore the power struggles withiflthe party might have necessitated a compromise with the r a d i c a l f a c t i o n to include t h e i r proposals i n the Party Program. Konrad Heiden i n History of National Socialism points out that H i t l e r himself was not an enthusiastic supporter of cor p o r a t i s t ideas but that struggles within the party i t s e l f forced him to declare the 1920 Program unalterable, although he himself was doubtful about many of i t s statements and had 25 expressed these doubts openly i n his book. Corporatist proposals originated from a f a c t i o n within the party who had to be accomodated i n order to keep the party u n i f i e d when i t was s t i l l i n opposition. This may be a reasonable assumption since c o r p o r a t i s t proposals were elimina-ted once the power of the r a d i c a l f a c t i o n was reduced a f t e r the NSDAP came to power. In short, the four main functions of the cor p o r a t i s t proposals i n the 1920 NSDAP Program can be c i t e d as the following: 1) They appealed 23. to the middle c l a s s , s p e c i a l l y the artisans and small businessmen. 2) Corporatism provided an a l t e r n a t i v e to l i b e r a l democracy and Marxist s o c i a l i s m as a 'Third Way'.3) Corporatist concepts such as organicism, s o c i a l hierarchy and the common good before i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s served to r e i n f o r c e the NSDAP's leadership-oriented ideology. 4) The r a d i c a l f a c t i o n within the party who advocated co r p o r a t i s t proposals was accomo-dated and thus the unity of the party was maintained. The c o r p o r a t i s t proposals, however, were not put into e f f e c t a f t e r the NSDAP came to power i n 1933. In f a c t , they were abandoned by H i t l e r as early as 1930. In May 1930, i n the course of a debate i n B e r l i n with Otto Strasser, then leader of the left-wing of the party, H i t l e r disclaimed any in t e n t i o n of conducting 'dangerous f i n a n c i a l or economic experiments' that would disturb business leaders i n the event of h i s 26 securing power. In 1934, Walter Heinrich, a member of the Spann school headed an organiza-t i o n c a l l e d ' I n s t i t u t fur Standewesen' i n Dusseldorf to t r a i n future leaders. In the same year. 'Bureaus for Corporative Organization of the Party and the Labor Front' were founded by Max Frauendorfer. By 1935, however, both Spann-Heinrich proposals and Frauendorfer's ideas were cast aside and the i n s t i t u t i o n s that were set up were abolished. The Labor Front which had o r i g i n a l l y intended to organize a l l employers and employees as a corporative organization did not succeed, e i t h e r . 24. Its i n i t i a l function was to insure ' s o c i a l harmony' by r e c o n c i l i n g the i n t e r e s t s of employers and employees, but i n f a c t i t could only organize the employees. Robert Ley, the head of the Labor Front, i n s t r u c t e d his subordinates to go slowly i n organizing employers. The corporative order was f i r s t to be introduced i n the plants and b u i l t from the bottom upwards. The Labor Front organized a l l g a i n f u l l y employed persons outside c i v i l s e r v ice and comprised a l l blue-and-white c o l l a r workers. The leaders of the Labor Front were selected from among party o f f i c i a l s . Thus^ i t served as a dependent p o l i t i c a l organization which dominated labor but could not organize employers. Its function became to promote a ' s o c i a l p o l i c y ' , meaning the supervision and p o l i t i c a l c ontrol of employees, but to r e f r a i n from engaging i n the formulation of any economic p o l i c y . The l a t t e r function was given to business organizations. Thus, we see that Feder's dream of s e t t i n g up an 'Economic Council' comprising emplo-yers and employees which would control production was not f u l f i l l e d . The f a i l u r e of the e f f o r t s to organize business organizations and the Labor Front as equal partners was due to the resistance of the former, 27 as evidenced by the 1935 L e i p z i g Agreement. The purpose of t h i s agreement was to provide f o r mutual cooperation and for a d i v i s i o n of functions between the two organizations. A new system of chambers of labor was devised i n which both organizations were to discuss mutual problems. Yet the business organizations never p a r t i c i p a t e d 25. i n these chambers which became a mere appendage of the Labor Front. Turning to the 'estates' (Stande) created i n the Third Reich, we again see that corporative proposals only remained on paper. I t w i l l be remembered that artisans and craftsmen s p e c i f i c a l l y asked for the f o r -mation of guilds to govern th e i r own a f f a i r s , topped by an estate of handicraft. They also demanded the r i g h t to f i x prices and regulate the markets. When the Nazis assumed power, they appointed party men as the leaders of the guilds. By monopolizing the leadership p o s i t i o n s , they transformed the guilds into a f f i l i a t e d organizations of the party. Furthermore, the self-government of guilds, i n terms of regulating the markets and f i x i n g prices did not take place. A decree was issued i n May 1934 by the Ministers of Labor and Economics, forbidding guilds and chambers to set minimum prices on e s s e n t i a l consumer goods without permission. In the same year, when Schacht became the Minister of Economics, as representative of b i g business concerns, the power of the party over the Estate of Handicraft was lessened. Gradually, i t came under the control of b i g business. The other estates that were formed were either under the control of the Party or business organizations. The National Food Estate was formed under the control of the Party and included a l l a g r i c u l t u r a l organizations and trade. Taylor Cole i n h i s a r t i c l e "Corporative Organization i n the Third Reich" states that " . . . i n r e a l i t y the Food Estate was an enormous state c a r t e l which c o n t r o l l e d the transmission of a g r i c u l t u r a l products from the producer through the processor and 26. r e t a i l e r to the consumer."'" The National Chamber of Culture was also c o n t r o l l e d by the Party. A t h i r d estate, the National Economic Chamber was c o n t r o l l e d by the Ministry of Economic A f f a i r s , which i n turn was controlled by Schacht who was the representative of b i g business i n t e r e s t s during the period 1933-1936., (For the purposes of this study, we are not concerned with the period a f t e r 1936, because i n 1936 corporatism was o f f i c i a l l y abandoned.) The fourth and l a s t estate formed i n the Third Reich i s the Estate of Industry. This estate was established i n June 1933, comprising Employer Associations and the Reich Association of German Industry. A preliminary law for the business associations i n February 1934 introduced the p r i n c i p l e s of compulsory membership, of unity of representation and of appointed leadership. A l l forms of econo-mic a c t i v i t y were put into separate organizations that broke down the formerly united industry into seven c r a f t - l i k e unites. However, a f t e r Schacht became the Minister of Economics, this move to impose a g u i l d organization on b i g business was halted. His decree on the organiza-t i o n of the economy i n November 1934 c a l l e d a stop to a l l attempts to organize guilds i n industry and trade. Thus, big business maintained i t s economic organizations independently of any compulsory party orga-n i z a t i o n s . I t i s clear from the above facts that the estates that were formed were e s s e n t i a l l y s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d agencies which had administra-t i v e functions, rather than policy-determining functions, i f they ever functioned. In 1934, the o l i g a r c h i c clique of the Party reinterpreted i t s stand on corporatism. Point 25 of the Party Program on corporatism, i t was s a i d , had to be understood i n the l i g h t of the p r e v a i l i n g s i t u a t i o n of 1920. In the Third Reich, the Fuhrer had decided that the corpora-t i v e order could come only a f t e r an extensive education of the German people. In 1936, corporatism was completely abandoned when the o f f i c e s responsible f o r corporatist organization were o f f i c i a l l y dissolved as superfluous. It i s also s i g n i f i c a n t that the party leaders who wrote on corporatism did not remain i n power a f t e r 1933. Gregor Strasser broke with H i t l e r a f t e r 1932 and G o t t f r i e d Feder's a c t i v i t i e s were s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced i n 1931. The l a t t e r was powerless a f t e r 1934. Why was corporatism abandoned i n the Third Reich? If co r p o r a t i s t proposals appeared i n the o r i g i n a l Party Program and were promised to be put into e f f e c t if/when the NSDAP came to power, the reasons must be sought why they were denounced. In my view, one of the weaknesses of corporatist theory l i e s i n the fa c t that i t does not provide an adequate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ro l e of corporations within the state and the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the corpora-tions and the state. This renders the a p p l i c a t i o n of corporatism very d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible. I t i s given that corporations are i n t e r -mediary i n s t i t u t i o n s , that t h e i r primary function i s to mediate between the p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s and the 'common good' of the people i n order to achieve s o c i a l harmony. However, the state's r o l e within this scheme i s very precarious. The state may e a s i l y absorb the corporations and make them i t s organs under the guise of 'super-28. v i s i n g ' them, as i t happened i n the Third Reich. A t h e o r e t i c a l s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem would be the one that was offered by Hegel. The cor-porations would need the recognition of t h e i r autonomy by some higher body, i . e . the state. In turn, the state would owe i t s power and existence to the recognition of each corporation that i t s p a r t i c u l a r in t e r e s t s are maintained by the state. Whether this can also be a p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n cannot be dealt with here. The problem that remains i s that corporatism can be deemed applicable within an a b s o l u t i s t state, as w e l l as a f e d e r a l i s t state, depending on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the role of the corporations. My contention i s that the NSDAP could pro-pose a corporative organization that would provide a d i v i s i o n of autho-r i t y between centralism and federalism, as well as a c e n t r a l parliament with unlimited power due to t h i s weakness of c o r p o r a t i s t theory. But a corporative organization could not be applied to r e a l i t y within an a b s o l u t i s t state and the corporations were bound to become organs of the state. We might examine the Romantic Volkish theory to see how this shortcoming was dealt with i n theories that appealed to the NSDAP. Volkish thinkers demanded a corporative organization side by side with a strong national leader. What they did not r e a l i z e was that the w i l l of a strong leader might wipe out the autonomy of the corporations. The danger that the Volkish thinkers saw was i n the d i v e r s i t y of corporations which could lead to the disunity of the nation, whereas a strong leader would bridge 29. this d i v e r s i t y and unite the nation by v i r t u e of h i s charismatic leader-ship. However, they did not see that the w i l l of strong leader would render the corporations f u t i l e by overriding t h e i r norms. In other words, i f a strong leader could unite the people by h i s charisma and sharing of Volkish values and can demand absolute obedience from the people, then there i s no need for any mediation between the people and the state, which i s now symbolized by the leader. A second weakness of c o r p o r a t i s t theory, s p e c i a l l y of those that influenced the NSDAP, i s i t s l a c k of concern with economic issues. This i s a para-dox because c o r p o r a t i s t theory, at the same time,^proposes an economic reorganization of society. However, since the primary concern of corpo-r a t i s t theory i s ' s o c i a l harmony', economic i n e f f i c i e n c i e s were preserved i n the Interest of s o c i a l harmony. Instead, c o r p o r a t i s t theorists sought to r e c o n c i l e c o n f l i c t s on a moral and s p i r i t u a l l e v e l and could not o f f e r any concrete proposals f o r economic reorganization as they b a s i c a l l y ad-vocated ' s p i r i t u a l and a t t i t u d i n a l change' to achieve s o c i a l harmony and s t a b i l i t y . This i s e s p e c i a l l y true of the Romantic Volkish theory and Othmar Spann's theory which influenced NSDAP t h e o r i s t s . Therefore, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that Nazi c o r p o r a t i s t proposals were inap p l i c a b l e on a concrete, economic l e v e l . This lack of economic guidelines understandably caused considerable confusion f o r those National S o c i a l i s t s who were i n favor of a corpo-30. r a t i v e organization. The degree of confusion i s demonstrated by the fa c t that a competition was organized for the best work written on II 'What are estates?' (Was sind Stande?). Opinions on how a corporative organization would be set up varied widely. Feder envisaged a 'true corporative organization' based i n i t i a l l y upon the n e c e s s i t i e s of food, c l o t h i n g and s h e l t e r . Dr. von Renteln, the President of the Diet of Industry and Commerce}viewed the Chambers of Industry and Commerce as the c e n t r a l agencies of the coming corporative organization. Develop-ment along the l i n e s of I t a l i a n corporatism was also occasionally advocated, but p r i o r i t y was claimed for the German cor p o r a t i s t ideas. In short, as Sombart suggested, an estate could be formed based on class membership, based on membership i n a branch of the economy or based on a l l who produce, from the peasants on, through dealers and banks, to the conserve and sausage manufacturers such as i n the Food 29 Estate. Besides the vagueness of c o r p o r a t i s t theory regarding the r o l e of cor-porations within the state and the actual s e t t i n g up of a corporative organization, i t s t h i r d weak point i s i t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y to diverse i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s by d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l groups. Corporatism was proposed as a remedy for class c o n f l i c t and for keeping the t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l groups i n t a c t within an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d society which threatened t h e i r status. Some proposed to return to the s o c i a l system of the Middle Age by bringing back the guilds and estates. The Volkish thinkers, 31. for example, proposed to bring back medieval corporatism . i . e . the medieval g u i l d system, while the a r i s t o c r a c y , such as Von Papen and Edgar Jung, demanded the reestablishment of i t s powers based on heredity, t r a d i t i o n and culture, i n other words, the reestablishment of the estate system. Others, such as Othmar Spann, were more concerned with preser-ving the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l order and preventing class c o n f l i c t by bringing employers and employees together i n corporations where they would work harmoniously. After t h i s examination of the nature of c o r p o r a t i s t theory, a further factor to be considered i n explaining why corporatism was dropped i n the Third Reich i s the state of the German economy and the power of b i g business concerns. By 1933, Germany was a f u l l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d country; employers organizations controlled the labor market, and b i g business lobbies aimed at placing the l e g i s l a t i v e , administrative and j u d i c i a l machinery at the service of monopoly c a p i t a l , In these circum-stances, i t was clear that a g u i l d - l i k e organization of the economy or the sharing of the c o n t r o l of production by employers and emplo-yees were going to be very d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, because both were against the i n t e r e s t s of b i g business concerns. The i n f l a t i o n of the early 1920's had permitted entrepreneurs to b u i l d up giant economic empires at the expense of the middle and working classes. Foreign loans that flowed into Germany a f t e r 1924 gave German industry the l i q u i d c a p i t a l needed to r a t i o n a l i z e and enlarge t h e i r plants. Trusts,Jcombines and c a r t e l s covered the whole economy with a network of a u t h o r i t a r i a n organizations. Thus, the corporatism of the 'Mittelstand' was dropped as the NSDAP needed the support of these organizations. Arthur Schweitzer i n Big Business i n the Third Reich notes that as the middle classes became more N a z i f i e d , the Party leaders became more property-minded and f r i e n d l i e r to 'German' c a p i t a l 30 ism. 'German c a p i t a l ' was deemed good because i t was 'creative', whereas f i n a n c i a l c a p i t a l which was associated with the Jews was said to be 'rapacious'. This d i s t i n c t i o n made clear that the Nazis had no i n t e n t i o n of destroying the c a p i t a l i s t order and s e t t i n g up a new economic system organized along gu i l d s . In 1932, even before the NSDAP came to power, the economic p o l i c y of the Party was revised to accomodate the wishes of the business leaders Thus, the co r p o r a t i s t proposals i n the 1920 Program were doomed even before H i t l e r acquired power. The new points that were included i n 1932 were: 1) the elimination of unions and managerial freedom of employers within concerns. 2) a program of public works and rearmament which would lead to recovery and many orders for business concerns. 3) the entrusting to the leaders of big business the task of d i r e c t i n g 31 the economy through the economic organizations under t h e i r c o n t r o l . In return for these promises, the Party received the f i n a n c i a l aid and p o l i t i c a l support of many business leaders. T.W. Mason i n his 33. a r t i c l e "The Primacy of P o l i t i c s - P o l i t i c s and Economics i n National S o c i a l i s t Germany" observes that the seizure of power by the National S o c i a l i s t s would hardly have been possible without the support of con-32 siderable c i r c l e s i n heavy industry during the years of c r i s i s . This view i s seconded by F.L. Schuman i n "The P o l i t i c a l Theory of Fascism" who wrote that "In May 1930, i n the course of a debate i n B e r l i n with Otto Strasser, then leader of the left-wing of the Party, H i t l e r disclaimed any i n t e n t i o n of disturbing business i n the event 33 of h i s securing power.". Schuman also remarks that the r a d i c a l economic proposals of the o r i g i n a l program have repeatedly been r e i n -terpreted to assure the business world that no dangerous f i n a n c i a l or 34 economic experiments were to be anticipated from-a Nazi government. When H i t l e r did come to power, the left-wing of the party was preven-ted from applying the o r i g i n a l c o r p o r a t i s t proposals to r e a l i t y by the o l i g a r c h i c c l i q u e of the Party i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n with business leaders. The l a t t e r fought to preserve t h e i r power and independent business organizations against the party-controlled 'estates'. As a r e s u l t of the Schmitt-Hitler Agreement, they succeeded i n securing control of the m i n i s t r i e s of economics, finance and labor. In short, business leaders r e s i s t e d the organization of the economy along guilds, as well as the incorporation of t h e i r organizations within the Labor Front and thus kept t h e i r economic power and independence. As S.J. Woolf remarks i n his a r t i c l e "Did a F a s c i s t Economic System E x i s t ? " : 34. "The existence of large p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l complexes could only be challenged by massive d i r e c t state i n -tervention i n the economy, and then at considerable r i s k of upheaval and loss of s k i l l e d personnel. Thus, despite the sporadic protests of the f a s c i s t l e f t wings, the regimes r a p i d l y abandoned any attempt to r a d i c a l l y change the e x i s t i n g structure of economic power, and endeavored instead to turn t h i s structure to the ser-35 v i c e of p o l i t i c a l l y motivated economic aims." This seems to be a true assessment of the s i t u a t i o n i n Germany and also brings us to the l a s t reason why corporatism was dropped, namely because i t contradicted the ' p o l i t i c a l l y motivated economic aims' of the o l i g a r c h i c clique. It i s clear that H i t l e r himself was not interested i n corporatism, as evidenced by the purge of left-wing leaders, as w e l l as his following words: "I had to l e t the party experiment with the corporate idea. I had to prove experimentally how f a r things had gone and whether there was anything to achieve there. You can understand that I had to give people something to do. They were f u l l of f i r e , I had to o f f e r them something. Well, l e t them have a crack at i t . A f t e r a l l , the c o r p o r a t i s t organization i s 36 not so important that i t could do much damage." H i t l e r ' s goals were to a t t a i n m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l equality with other European nations and rearmament which entailed the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a l l the sources of the nation for an active m i l i t a r y p o l i c y . 35. These aims coincided with the i n t e r e s t s of m i l i t a r y and business lead and contradicted the i n t e r e s t s of artisans and craftsmen who wanted corporatism. Although the NSDAP paid l i p - s e r v i c e to the protection of the ' l i t t l e man', the various measures for recovery and rearmament nec e s s a r i l y favored the firms which could operate on a large scale. Consequently, i t seems that corporatism was dropped because i t d i d not promote the o v e r a l l NSDAP p o l i c y of economic strength, m i l i t a r y power and independence i n the world. 36. CHAPTER II I t a l i a n corporatism originated from the ideas of the r a d i c a l r i g h t N a t i o n a l i s t Party which was formed i n 1910 by Enrico Corradini and Gabriele D'Annunzio, and the revolutionary s y n d i c a l i s t s who were mainly influenced by Georges Sorel. These ideas were merged under the name of 'national syndicalism' which formed the basis of the ' I t a l i a n corpo-rate s t a t e ' under Fascism. Both the n a t i o n a l i s t s and revolutionary s y n d i c a l i s t s shared the views of the e l i t i s t t h e o r i s t s , Pareto and Michels. Pareto believed that: "The r u l i n g class or those who hold and administer p u b l i c power w i l l always be a minority and subordinate to them are the multitude of i n d i -viduals who never, i n any r e a l sense, p a r t i c i p a t e i n a government but merelyvsubmit to it.""' " This view was reinforced by I t a l y ' s s i t u a t i o n . I t a l y had become a u n i f i e d nation i n 1870 under the leadership of a newly emergent and numerically small middle class who appeared too weak to r u l e . Thus, the majority of I t a l i a n s construed the state to be, at best the executive committee of the bourgeoisie, or at worst a s e l f -2 serving 'camarilla'. The manifest corruption i n the I t a l i a n govern-ment also reinforced the view that the agencies of the state did not serve the general i n t e r e s t . Consequently, the c e n t r a l parliamentary government never succeeded i n gaining the confidence of the vast majority of the population. Pareto conceived of h i s t o r y as an endless t r a n s i t i o n of e l i t e s where one e l i t e supplants another. This conception appealed to both 38. n a t i o n a l i s t s and revolutionary s y n d i c a l i s t s . They both maintained that the cry of 'popular r u l e ' was a piece of p o l i t i c a l f i c t i o n through which a minority sought to l e g i t i m i z e i t s r u l e . Both agreed that society had entered a period of revolutionary t r a n s i t i o n and i n s i s t e d on the v i r t u e of struggle. They stressed the concept of a 'myth' to mobilize support by making s t r a t e g i c appeal to 'moral sentiments' i n order to 3 gain t a c t i c a l advantage i n a p o l i t i c a l struggle. N a t i o n a l i s t s agreed with Pareto that "Humanitarianism and reluctance to use force were the sure signs of an e l i t e i n decline; what was needed was a new r u l i n g c l a s s , a revived, strong bourgeoisie which would res-cue I t a l y from G i o l i t t i a n stagnation and would succeed i n i n t e g r a t i n g 4 the masses i n the state where e a r l i e r e l i t e s had f a i l e d . " The two possible reasons for the above conception are the following. F i r s t , i n 1918, at the Treaty and peace conferences, President Wilson set himself against Orlando's claims as to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of t e r r i t o r y between I t a l y and Yugoslavia. I t a l y l o s t some of what i t claimed. Because Orlando was a l i b e r a l , I t a l y ' s loss was used as evidence for the bankruptcy and treason of l i b e r a l s , with regard to the 'sacred cause of the nation'. Second, the revolutionary d i r e c t i o n of the growing S o c i a l i s t movement provoked a r i g h t i s t reaction among the establishment. In 1919, the S o c i a l i s t s became the l a r g e s t parliamentary party. The middle groups began to d i s i n t e g r a t e . Thus, the N a t i o n a l i s t Party, supported by the army and heavy industry, proposed a strong bourgeoisie which would succeed i n i n t e g r a t i n g the masses i n the state. In order to integrate 39. the masses i n the state, i t was necessary to eliminate class struggle. The n a t i o n a l i s t s proposed to eliminate class struggle by t r a n s f e r r i n g i t to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l plane, perceiving a c o n f l i c t between 'prole-t a r i a n ' and ' i m p e r i a l i s t ' nations. In th i s way, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the nation with i t s bourgeoisie could be wiped out and the I t a l i a n p r o l e t a r i a t could be integrated into the national community. I f class struggle was to be eliminated, making the 'nation' the ce n t r a l concept, i t was also necessary to replace class syndicalism with 'national syndi calism', whereby syndicates would be made to work for the 'national i n t e r e s t ' instead of 'class i n t e r e s t ' . Revolutionary s y n d i c a l i s t s , on the other hand, supported Pareto's detestation of parliament and his conviction that p o l i t i c a l ideologies cannot be measured by c r i t e r i a of objective truth b^Vonly by t h e i r greater or l e s s e r effectiveness i n moving men to action by way of 'myth For Sorel, the main protagonist of revolutionary syndicalism, a revolu-tionary s o c i a l element could only accede to dominance i f organized and directed by an e l i t e which effectivelymobilized sentiment through a com-p e l l i n g s o c i a l myth or a un i f y i n g p o l i t i c a l formula which, i n i t s e l f , was not true i n any cognitive sense. In other words, the d e s c r i p t i v e content of the myth was not s i g n i f i c a n t i n i t s e l f , but ins o f a r as i n d i -v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e action was governed by i t as i f i t were an objec-t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y . ^ Since Sorel's myth could d e l i v e r a sense of s o l i -d a r i t y and conviction to a s p e c i f i c sect, s o c i a l stratum, class or 40. nation, endowing them with a 'sublime sense of commitment and dedi-cation' , i t followed that any contending s o c i a l element which advocated an alternate view of the future could adopt i t . Not only a c l a s s , but a l l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t y required an organizing myth. Sorel applied his analysis to the organization of the p r o l e t a r i a t because he conceived the p r o l e t a r i a t as possessed of elemental energy. But by 1910, h i s disillusionment with syndicalism led him to associate himself with the n a t i o n a l i s t s of the Action Francaise. We see that Sorel himself switched e a s i l y from revolutionary syndicalism to nationalism, opening the way for national syndicates, instead of class syndicates. The basis of the F a s c i s t corporate state was formulated by Alfredo Rocco, the chief n a t i o n a l i s t spokesman on economics, who proposed a new 'corporative' order to organize the forces of production. I t i s important to note, however, that the 'national syndicalism' of the N a t i o n a l i s t Party and that of the F a s c i s t Party were quite d i f f e r e n t before they adopted the same stand at the National Congress of the F a s c i s t Party i n 1921. The n a t i o n a l i s t s thought that s o c i a l i s m was maladapted for under-developed countries l i k e I t a l y . I t a l y did not require i n t e r n a l class warfare which could only undermine her i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n s t i l l further, as the i n t e r n a t i o n a l setbacks that I t a l y had suffered because of the i n e f f e c t i v e parliamentary regime and i t s underdeveloped status 41. already put her into a weak p o s i t i o n . Therefore, the national goal could only be to turn I t a l y into an economically and p o l i t i c a l l y power-f u l nation. This could be achieved by national syndicalism, i . e . by the co l l a b o r a t i o n of a l l classes within the nation who would work together to increase production and turn I t a l y into a f u l l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nation. Alfredo Rocco, the chief n a t i o n a l i s t spokesman on economics, recognized that syndicates were e s s e n t i a l but i n s i s t e d that they be placed under the control of the state, which must lay down t h e i r precise functions i n order to achieve national aims. The o r i g i n a l economic program of the F a s c i s t Party before i t came to power was quite d i f f e r e n t from Alfredo Rocco's proposals. I t contained both n a t i o n a l i s t and s y n d i c a l i s t elements, appealing to unemployed workers, war veterans, landless peasants as w e l l as landowners, indus-t r i a l i s t s and i m p e r i a l i s t s . As Mussolini s a i d : "We are reactionaries and r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , a r i s t o c r a t s and democrats, conservatives and progressives." When he spoke of corporatism, i t was only with a vague idea of 'associations i n which industry and labor would c o l l a -borate' and the 'right of such associations to p o l i t i c a l representation'. In other words, the f i r s t program of the party sought to accomodate both l e f t i s t and r i g h t i s t elements and did not show any i n d i c a t i o n of subordinating syndicates to the control of the state and supressing the working c l a s s , as was l a t e r done i n the Fa s c i s t state. 42. After 1921, the l e f t i s t elements of the early F a s c i s t Program were given up. At the National Congress of the Fas c i s t Party, Mussolini spoke of h i s support f o r the army, landowners, monarchy, industry, nationalism and the sanc t i t y of private property. A f t e r the march on Rome i n 1922, the period of 1922-1925 denotes the f i r s t stage of corpo-ratism or ' i n t e g r a l syndicalism' when the Party attempted to eradicate a l l non-Fascist unions and subject both workers' unions and employers' associations to government c o n t r o l . The following stage denoted the formation of 'corporations' comprised of employers and workers who would together control production. The task of formulating the l e g i s -l a t i v e basis of the new corporative order was conferred on Rocco, by Mussolini. The name 'corporation', as i t appeared i n the 1926 syndical laws f o r -mulated by Rocco, designated a cen t r a l government agency established as the connecting l i n k between employers' and workers' syndical orga-n i z a t i o n s . I t would be a board or council formed by the representatives of the higher employer and employee organizations e x i s t i n g within the major f i e l d s of national production; as such i t was to be authorized to enforce regulations on c o l l e c t i v e labor r e l a t i o n s and on the coor-g dination of production. Up to 1930, no corporation as defined by Rocco came into existence. Nonetheless, the laws were prepared and presented. The law of 1926 created t h i r t e e n national confederations of l e g a l l y recognized syndical associations: s i x representing employers, 43. an equal number representing the workers, and one representing pro-f e s s i o n a l men and a r t i s t s . However, there were no 'corporations' that l i n k e d them. The obvious i n e f f i c i e n c y of the proposed corporative order prompted the drawing up of a Charter of Labor, which was taken up by workers' unions eagerly. I t was hoped that the Charter would e s t a b l i s h guaran-tees of the workers' rights enforceable by law. However, i t was not issued as a decree-law or as the dr a f t of an act of Parliament, but as 'a statement of intent' a ffirming c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s without binding force. For our purposes, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t as the d e s c r i p t i o n of the 'intended' corporate state. The Charter states that:"The corporative state considers private i n i t i a t i v e i n the f i e l d of production as the most e f f i c a c i o u s and most useful instrument i n the i n t e r e s t of the Nation. Since the private organization of production i s a function of national concern, the organizer of the enterprise i s responsible to the state for the 9 d i r e c t i o n of production." It was also added that the intervention of the state i n economic production occurs only when pri v a t e i n i t i a t i v e i s l a cking or i s i n s u f f i c i e n t or when the p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of the state are at stake. Because of the vagueness of these statements, i t was unclear where the power of p r i v a t e enterprise ended and the con-t r o l of the state over production began. 44. The Charter exalted labor without giving any actual power to i t . Instead of being c a l l e d the Charter of Labor, i t could probably be c a l l e d the Charter of Nation, stated i n vague, grand words such as the following: "The I t a l i a n nation i s an organism endowed with purposed, a l i f e and means of action transcending i n power and duration, those of the separate i n d i v i d u a l s or groups of in d i v i d u a l s which compose i t . I t i s a moral, p o l i t i c a l and economic unity which r e a l i z e s i t s e l f completely i n the F a s c i s t state. It has been mentioned e a r l i e r that no corporations came into existence u n t i l 1930. In 1930, a National Council of Corporations was set up, made up of seven sections, s i x of them composed of the representatives of s i x pairs of confederations of F a s c i s t employers' and workers' associations and the seventh of the representatives of the thirteenth confederation of professional men and a r t i s t s . The Council included ten ministers and undersecretaries, about fourty high o f f i c i a l s , ten 'experts' chosen by the Minister of Corporations and about a hundred members designated by the national directorates of the th i r t e e n confederations according to F a s c i s t procedure, i . e . the president chooses and announces the names and the dire c t o r a t e agrees. The Council was to perform the following functions: 1 ) C o n c i l i a t e contro-versies a r i s i n g among a f f i l i a t e d organizations. 2) Promote, encourage and subsidize a l l e f f o r t s aiming at the coordination and improvement of production."'""'' A general assembly of the National Council of 45. Corporations was empowered to formulate binding rules for the coordi-nation of a c t i v i t i e s of the various branches of nat i o n a l production and thus, i n e f f e c t , regulate the economic plans and programs which the assembly would work out and approve i f a l l associations concerned were i n agreement. The National Council of Corporations was destined to be, as Mussolini put i t , "the general s t a f f , the supreme regulator of the I t a l i a n economy, the highest economic authority which would be ready and able to act on the major problems of the nation's economic l i f e " . 1 2 The Council did not f u l f i l l i t s intended duties. Its a c t i v i t i e s consisted s o l e l y i n giving advisory opinions which the government was not obliged to seek or follow when offered. G. Salvemini i n Under the Axe of Fascism provides the following evidence on the a c t i v i t i e s of the Council: "Only once i n November 1931 was the Council asked to express an opinion on a question of v i t a l importance -the problem of exports and imports. The Council discussed the subject with great solemnity, Naturally, there was a clash between the free trade group and the p r o t e c t i o n i s t group. Mussolini ended the d i s -cussion by declaring himself to be i n favor of the p r o t e c t i o n i s t regime. This discussion took place two months a f t e r a royal decree of September 24, 1931 had imposed a duty of 15% ad valorem on a l l imported commodities. The discussion therefore could not have any p r a c t i c a l importance whatsoever. I t was 13 merely Mussolini's one of l i t t l e j e s t s . " 46. The fa c t that the Council had only an advisory function was even wit-nessed by the strongly pro-Fascist Rome correspondent of the New York 14 Times. On November 19, 1933, he wrote: "Hitherto, the National Council of Corporations has had no l e g i s l a t i v e power, i t s functions being advisory. Its transformation into the p r i n c i p a l l e g i s l a t i v e body w i l l represent a great step toward the r e a l i z a t i o n of the corporate state, which has always been among the F a s c i s t s ' aspirations Up to 1934, no corporations as such had come into being, although there was a Council of Corporations. The corporations that were f i n a l l y established i n 1934 were composed of an equal number of representatives of workers' and employers' syndical associations, a small number of technical experts and representatives of the F a s c i s t Party. The corporations were organized v e r t i c a l l y including repre-sentatives of a l l economic a c t i v i t i e s involved i n a complete produc-t i o n cycle, beginning with the processing of the raw material to the marketing of the f i n i s h e d product. The twenty corporations that were formed were divided into three groups: 1) corporations represent-ing ^branches of economic a c t i v i t y which involve a g r i c u l t u r a l , indus-t r i a l and commercial operation. 2) corporations representing economic a c t i v i t e s involving i n d u s t r i a l and commercial operations only. 3) cor-porations representing enterprises established for the performance of services. The law of 1934 empowered the corporations to elaborate rules for the c o l l e c t i v e regulation of economic conditions and for the unitary 47. d i s c i p l i n e of production. According to the government, t h i s power made of the Corporation the instrument of a u t o - d i s c i p l i n e and control of the economic a c t i v i t i e s ; i t marked the d e f i n i t i v e passing beyond 16 the system of economic l i b e r a l i s m to that of corporative economy. The powers granted to corporations were never exercised. As William Welk i n F a s c i s t Economic P o l i c y points out: "Despite the independent normative powers conferred upon the corporations by law, they are, i n actual f a c t , l i t t l e more than advisory organs, whose recommenda-t i o n may or may not be accepted by a c e n t r a l government with which a l l f i n a l decisions r e s t . 1 1 According to Adrian L y t t e l t o n , those f i n a l decisions were not taken independently by the government eit h e r . He remarks i n The Seizure of Power - Fascism i n I t a l y that: "The l e -gal corporation never had the p r a c t i c a l importance i n planning which was a t t r i b u t e d to i t by theory and propaganda, but the employers' associations, whose monopoly had been given sanction by Fascism 18 remained genuine centers of power." Why was corporatism not implemented i n the sense that corporations never had the power a t t r i b u t e d to them? Here, i t i s useful to con-sider the inherent contradiction i n corporatist theory, as w e l l as the d i s t i n c t i o n between fascism and corporatism. A l f r e d Stepan i n State and Society - Peru i n Comparative Perspective explains the contradiction i n c o r p o r a t i s t theory i n the following manner: 48. "Organic statism may represent a desirable balance between the two poles of c l a s s i c l i b e r a l i s m and command socialism, i n a c t u a l i t y , i t too contains inherent predicaments as a model. On the one hand, the s t a t i s t component of the model implies a strong r o l e f o r the state i n s t r u c t u r i n g society so that i t conforms with the model's assumption of fu n c t i o n a l parts that are p e r f e c t l y integrated into a s o l i -d a r i s t i c whole. On the other hand, each of the parts i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y self-managing, so that there i s a high degree of p a r t i c i p a t i o n within state-chartered organic structures. The predictable d i s t o r t i n g tension i n the model i s that i n the i n i t i a l construction of the system from above, the state, i n order to ensure i n t e g r a t i o n and con t r o l , builds such strong control mechanisms into the new state-chartered functional groups that the meaningful p a r t i c i p a t i o n posited 19 by the model never becomes a r e a l i t y . " The d i s t o r t i n g tension i n the organic s t a t i s t model mentioned above i s observable i n I t a l y ' s case. I t a l y ' s c o r p o r a t i s t structure was imposed from above by the F a s c i s t state i n order to ensure i n t e -gration and control which, i n turn, severely r e s t r i c t e d autonomy and p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The d i s t i n c t i o n s between fascism and corporatism also serve to explain why the power of corporations remained on paper. The state For Stepan, organic statism i s a model l i k e c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m and command so c i a l i s m and has frequently provided the guidance and r a t i o n a l e to cor p o r a t i s t p o l i c i e s . For our purposes, organic statism can be used interchangeable with 'corporatist theory' as has been done throughout this study. 49. i n fascism i s presented as being without checks, as evidenced by Mussolini's following words: "The foundation of Fascism i s the con-ception of the State, i t s character, i t s duty and i t s aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, i n comparison with which a l l in d i v i d u a l s or groups are r e l a t i v e , only to be conceived of i n t h e i r .,20 r e l a t i o n to the state. In c o r p o r a t i s t w r i t i n g , the state i s of course given a major r o l e i n bringing about an integrated society, but this society i s one i n which the component parts are accorded t h e i r own spheres of action that should not be eliminated. Fascism, on the other hand, united the doctrine of the omnipotent state as the source of a l l law and the point of reference f o r a l l values with the doctrines of corporatism which o r i g i n a l l y had evolved out of the resistance 21 to the growth of modern c e n t r a l i z e d government. O r i g i n a l l y , t h e corporations or guilds had been i d e a l i z e d not only as an i n s t r u -ment of s o c i a l d i s c i p l i n e but also because they protected i n d i v i -dual r ights and priveleges against the overriding power of the state. For Alfredo Rocco, however, the corporation was an i n s t r u -ment i n ensuring the i n d i v i d u a l ' s subordination to the state. The corporative p r i n c i p l e meant that the i n d i v i d u a l must be subjected to the ' c o l l e c t i v i t y ' and the ' c o l l e c t i v i t y ' to the state. The state i n Fascism, then, did not e x i s t i n order to reconcile or protect i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s or r i g h t s , but conceded the s a t i s -f a c t i o n of the l a t t e r only as a means of r e a l i z i n g i t s own ends, sa, defined as external power. Another d i s t i n c t i o n between corporatism and fascism i s that fascism has a 'leader p r i n c i p l e ' . As Adrian L y t t e l t o n points out: "Alfredo Rocco's whole framework of l e g a l i n s t i t u t i o n s were designed to serve a s i n g l e p o l i t i c a l w i l l . In his insistence that the power of the state should be unfettered, he f a i l e d to perceive the danger that the w i l l of the d i c t a t o r would, by overriding a l l p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u -22 tions, disorganize them." In the I t a l i a n F a s c i s t state, the cor-porations could not discuss any measure unless they were previously authorized to do so by Mussolini. Mussolini himself f i x e d the time and subject matter of the discussions within corporations, formu-lat e d t h e i r decisions, determined t h e i r method of voting and d e c i -ded whether t h e i r discussions were to be kept secret or to be communicated to the press. In short, i t i s clear that contradictions within c o r p o r a t i s t theory, as well as the d i s t i n c t i o n s between fascism and corporatism impeded the a p p l i c a t i o n of corporatism as stated i n the laws. A further problem that I t a l i a n corporatism faced was the tension created between the p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' a s s o c i -ations and the F a s c i s t state which aimed to turn them into obedient instruments of the regime by i n t e g r a t i n g them i n t o the corporations. The dilemma of the F a s c i s t state was that i t had committed i t s e l f 51. to a 'corporatist economy' that was 'neither c a p i t a l i s t nor communist' by replacing p r i v a t e i n i t i a t i v e with o v e r a l l public regulation through corporations i n economic l i f e , but at the same time retained the mar-ketplace as the basic mechanism for d i s t r i b u t i n g goods and services. Thus the Fas c i s t state retained a system that was heavily dependent on entrepreneurial i n i t i a t i v e and market flows which made the i n t e -gration of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' associations into corporations very d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible. The attempt of the Fa s c i s t Party to implement corporatism and the opposition of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' associations are evidenced by the following events. In 1923, the representatives of the F a s c i s t workers' and employers' organizations were c a l l e d to a meeting at the Chigi Palace i n Rome, where they agreed that, henceforth condi-tions of labor should be s e t t l e d through peaceful negotiation rather than through the t r a d i t i o n a l methods of class struggle.The syndical organizations would also be i n t e n s i f i e d and made more cooperative i n order to assure that both labor and c a p i t a l would have the "best possible conditions f o r the development of their functions and the 23 most equitable compensation f o r th e i r work". This agreement resulted i n the consent of the Confindustria (Confederation of Industry) to recognize the F a s c i s t unions. In return, the indus-t r i a l i s t s were reassured against the dangers of union militancy by the promise that unions would continue to be directed from above by t h e i r s e c r e t a r i e s , who would be selected by the Party. 52. By 1925, non-Fascist unions were eradicated and absorbed by the F a s c i s t unions, leaving the l a t t e r as the sole representatives of workers. By the Palazzo Vidoni Act i n the same year, the indus-t r i a l i s t s recognized the F a s c i s t unions' claim to monopoly. In return, the F a s c i s t workers' unions recognized the Confindustria as the sole representative of industry. However, th i s did not s i g n i f y that a l l problems r e l a t i n g to industry and corporative organization were solved. Confindustria was s t i l l l e f t outside the sphere of government co n t r o l , whereas the corporative program envisaged both i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' and workers' associations to be subordinated to a s i n g l e , u n i f i e d system of c o n t r o l . Otherwise, as F a s c i s t s y n d i c a l i s t s pointed out, the workers' unions, caught between the p o l i t i c a l needs of the government and the resistance of independently organized i n d u s t r i a l i s t s would have no p o s s i b i -l i t i e s of l i f e . The Confindustria, backed by the majority of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , remained f i r m l y opposed to entering a s i n g l e organization together with the F a s c i s t unions. The Palazzo Vidoni Act had been a v i c -tory for the Confindustria, because i t barred s t r i k e s and made the a r b i t r a t i o n of labor disputes compulsory, to be undertaken by a Labor Magistracy. Thus, F a s c i s t unions could no longer conclude c o l l e c t i v e agreements or conduct s t r i k e s , while the Confindustria's 5 3 . power was strengthened because i t became the sole representative of industry i n i t s dealings with the public administration. It prevented the a p p l i c a t i o n of the regulation which had given the Labor Magistracy the r i g h t to make enquiries into the costs and methods of i n d i v i d u a l firms. In this way, the Magistracy of Labor was shorn of i t s most e s s e n t i a l prerogative. I t was forced to accept the employers' pleas of poverty and the ne c e s s i t i e s of pro-duction at the i r face value and to make i t s judgments i n the dark. In short, the Confindustria r e s i s t e d being integrated within cor-porations. Most i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were suspicious of state planning and guidance of the economy. Centralized state planning and the o v e r a l l public regulation of economic l i f e was considered ' s o c i a l i s t i c ' , and without a revolutionary shake-up, i t would be extremely i n e f f e c t i v e , given the d e f i c i e n c i e s of the public bureaucracy compared with the much more e f f i c i e n t and highly paid s t a f f of the i n d u s t r i a l a s s o c i -ations. As S.J. Woolf commented i n his a r t i c l e , "Did a F a s c i s t Economic System e x i s t ? " : "The existence of large private i n d u s t r i a l complexes could only by challenged by massive d i r e c t state intervention i n the economy, and then at the r i s k of considerable up-heaval and loss of s k i l l e d personnel. Even then, the close connections between the commercial banks and indus-t r i a l complexes would have made i t d i f f i c u l t e f f e c t i v e l y 24 to combat the predominant influence of the complexes." 54. The above quotation indicates that within the e x i s t i n g economic structure of I t a l y , the intended corporative organization would have been impossible to r e a l i z e . In f a c t , the formal mechanisms of the corporate state were bypassed both by Mussolini's govern-ment and by the informal agreements among i n d u s t r i a l groups. The power of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' associations i n impeding the corpo-r a t i v e organization was admitted by Mussolini himself i n 1944. He wrote that: "Twenty years of experience had taught Fascists that the state could not l i m i t i t s e l f to the functions of mediation between classes because the s u b s t a n t i a l l y greater force the c a p i -t a l i s t classes were capable of deploying rendered inoperative the j u r i d i c a l equality upon which p a r i t y was predicated; t h i s superior force permitted the c a p i t a l i s t classes to dominate, and 25 turn to t h e i r own advantage, every action by the state". A f i n a l problem that I t a l i a n corporatism faced was the lack of a u n i f i e d perception of what i t was and how i t was going to be imple-mented. The o f f i c i a l view held by Mussolini was to introduce ' a t t i t u d i n a l change', leading to the creation of the 'corporative man'. The corporative man was going to be endowed with a f e e l i n g for the higher i n t e r e s t s of the national c o l l e c t i v i t y . The cor-porative society would see that private property should serve, not the egoism of the proprietor, but the well-being of the community and the power of the state. The motive force of the society 26 was going to be 'public i n t e r e s t ' rather than 'private i n t e r e s t ' . 55. A second view of corporatism held by more r a d i c a l members of the Fa s c i s t Party contained s o c i a l i s t and antibourgeois elements. According to t h i s view, the corporate state meant complete state control of production and d i s t r i b u t i o n , through the medium of cor-porations, c o n s i s t i n g of employers and employed, who would together own the c a p i t a l of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r branch of production. The em-ployer would then be transformed into the s a l a r i e d d i r e c t o r at the head of the productive pyramid. The i n d u s t r i a l i s t s ' associations held a s t i l l d i f f e r e n t view of corporatism. They maintained that the corporations could make i n -q u i r i e s , c o l l e c t s t a t i s t i c s , organize the employment bureaus and s o c i a l welfare, but they were not supposed to i n t e r f e r e with the i n d i v i d u a l enterprise. If they were to have any power of super-v i s i o n and coordination ' i n the i n t e r e s t s of production', a long-distance control was preferred, and the longer the distance, the 27 better. As E r i c Tannenbaum i n The F a s c i s t Experience remarks: "The r u l i n g economic class did not consider the corporations as innovating forces but rather as decorative l e g a l props for e x i s t i n g . -, . ,,28 c a p i t a l i s t arrangements . The r e s u l t s we can draw from the preceding analysis as to why the corporations remained powerless are i n l i n e with A l f r e d Stepan's 56. following observation: "Pa r t l y because of the inherent tensions i n the abstract model of organic statism, i n most concrete cases of regimes that i n i t i a l l y announce o r g a n i c - s t a t i s t p r i n c i p l e s , there i s a p o l i t i c a l tendency to move toward greater control over groups v i a manipulative c o r p o r a t i s t p o l i t i c s ( e s p e c i a l l y with regard to working class groups) than i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y posited i n the model, and there i s a tendency i n economic p o l i c y to allow greater entrepreneurial freedom f o r c a p i t a l i s m than i s posited 29 i n the model." In the case of I t a l y , ' o r g a n i c - s t a t i s t ' p r i n c i p l e s such as ' s o c i a l harmony', 'unity' and 'class c o l l a b o r a t i o n ' were u t i l i z e d f o r the purpose of smashing the power of the working class and i n t e g r a t i n g them within corporations. In other words, these p r i n c i p l e s performed the function of a 'myth' to solve the problems of class c o n f l i c t and national economic poverty, and provided the i d e o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l e for a more organized form of capitalism. The I t a l i a n F a s c i s t state's attempt of i n s t a l l i n g corporatism could be c l a s s i f i e d as 'exclusionary'. According to A l f r e d Stepan, i n c l u -sionary and exclusionary corporatism are e l i t e responses to perceptions of c r i s e s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and c o n t r o l , and both endeavor to use the power of the state apparatus to forge a new s t a t e - s o c i e t y e q u i l i b -30 rium. Inclusionary attempts are most l i k e l y when o l i g a r c h i c a l domination i s beginning to erode under the pressures of early mo-dernization, where p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n , although increasing, i s s t i l l r e l a t i v e l y l i m i t e d and u n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d , and where the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n process i s s t i l l at an early state. An exclusionary 31 attempt, however, i s most l i k e l y under the following conditions: 1. P o l i t i c a l m obilization i s more intense and i d e o l o g i c a l l y d i f f e -r e n t iated than that which precedes inclusionary attempts. The e l i t e that assumes control of the state apparatus, fearing a c r i s i s of intense i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t , attempts to expand the scope, penetration and coercive capacity of the state apparatus so as to impose a new order on the p o l i t i c a l system. The state e l i t e attempts to exclude from the p o l i t i c a l arena a v a r i e t y of r e l a t i v e l y autonomous, l a r g e l y working-class based, i n s t i t u t i o n a l structures capable of r e s i s t i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l design, and then seeks to reintegrate the excluded groups into a s s o c i a t i o n a l o r -ganizations designed and c o n t r o l l e d by the state. 2. In a context of intense p o l i t i c a l mobilization, the ' c r i s i s ' of further development i s perceived by the e l i t e s who assume control of the state coercive and planning apparatus (and nor-mally by t h e i r p r i v a t e . sector a l l i e s ) as one i n which further national development — e s p e c i a l l y public and private invest-ment planning - requires the expansion of the scope and subsequent controlled r e i n t e g r a t i o n of the workers re f e r r e d to above so as to lower the capacity to make demands to impede the implemen-ta t i o n of the state's politico-economic development design. 58. The above two conditions seem to a large extent to be present i n I t a l y ' s case. C l e a r l y , exclusionary corporatism i s not found s o l e l y within a f a s c i s t regime. But attempts of exclusionary corporatism within a f a s c i s t state i s possible i f the above conditions e x i s t . In other words, the s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of I t a l i a n Fascism and the conditions required to i n s t a l l an exclusionary c o r p o r a t i s t regime are not mutually exclusive. I t a l y i n the 1920's was i n the process of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n which had begun i n the decade before World War I. The aspirations of the F a s c i s t state, f o r an i n d u s t r i a l l y underdeveloped country l i k e I t a l y , to achieve i n t e r n a t i o n a l power and prestige could only be r e a l i z e d by increased national production, i . e . rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . However, rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , within an atmosphere of intense i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t such as I t a l y was i n , was d i f f i c u l t . t o r e a l i z e under the same e l i t e structure unless the scope, penetration and coercive capacity of the state apparatus i s expanded so as to exclude from the p o l i t i c a l arena a v a r i e t y of r e l a t i v e l y autonomous, l a r g e l y working-class based i n s t i t u t i o n a l structures. In I t a l y , the t r a d i t i o n a l I t a l i a n bour-geoisie i n the'1920's was i s o l a t e d , fragmented and was unable to deal with powerful labor unions. I t was also anxious to r e t a i n i t s s o c i a l and economic p o s i t i o n against the rest of society. It conceived of 59. i t s e l f as both r i g h t f u l l y i n f l u e n t i a l and very threatened by the advent of socialism, but i t could not seek p r i v i l e g e or protection through the o l d p o l i t i c a l mechanisms. Thus corporatism remedied a defective organization of the middle class and e l i t e elements, by excluding independent labor unions and rei n t e g r a t i n g them into corporations designed and c o n t r o l l e d by the st a t e . CHAPTER I I I 61. Our hypothesis i s that corporatism i n I t a l y served various purposes i n f u r t h e r i n g the goals of the F a s c i s t state, whereas i t contradicted with the Nazi goals and therefore was discarded. Before attempting to v e r i f y this hypothesis, i t i s useful to describe the common elements that the two versions of corporatism shared. Then, we can examine t h e i r differences i n terms of the i r o r i g i n s and the purposes they served i n order to prove the above proposition. The basic ideas of co r p o r a t i s t theory that provide a common denomi-nator for I t a l i a n and German versions of corporatism are the following: F i r s t , corporatism holds that economic i n t e r e s t s are among the most important for most people and therefore society should be organized along economic, i . e . occupational l i n e s . Second, i t accepts the p r i n c i p l e of private property and far from admitting a class struggle between owners and workers, i n s i s t s on the naturalness as well as the necessity of class c o l l a b o r a t i o n . Third, i t proclaims the organic and h i e r a r c h i c a l nature of society and claims as i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n a higher measure of s o c i a l equity and harmony. Fourth, i t opposes both c l a s s i c a l c apitalism and Marxist socialism on the basis that they have f a i l e d to provide s o c i a l harmony. Star t i n g from these basic tenets of corp o r a t i s t theory, we can point out to some common corp o r a t i s t elements i n both Nazism and Fascism. Both emerged as a reaction to c l a s s i c a l c a p i t a l i s m and Marxist socialism; both continually r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r determination to replace class c o n f l i c t by class c o l l a b o r a t i o n i n the national i n t e r e s t . Both pro-posed corporatism i n terms of occupational representation as an a l t e r n a t i v e to l i b e r a l democracy and Marxist socialism. F i n a l l l y , they both accepted the basic tenet of capitalism, the p r i n c i p l e of p r i v a t e property, but rejected c a p i t a l i s t ideology. I t i s also important to note that corporatist views were put forward as a s o l u t i o n by the n a t i o n a l i s t s i n both I t a l y and Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, the n a t i o n a l i s t s , such as d'Annunzio and Corradini i n I t a l y and Paul de Lagarde and Moeller van den Bruck i n Germany, presented corporatism as a way of achieving national unity and overcoming regional and class d i v i s i o n s . Their arguments possibly acquired more salience because of the l a t e u n i f i c a t i o n of both countries and the i n e f f i c i e n c y of t h e i r l i b e r a l democratic systems. P r i o r to World War I, the experience of both countries with p l u r a l i s t i c i n t e g r a t i o n was l i m i t e d to pseudo-constitutionalism. In I t a l y , the o l i g a r c h i c a l suffrage laws, the lack of a party system r e f l e c t i v e of the popular w i l l and the corruption of p o l i t i c i a n s meant that the national parliament had f a i l e d to provide p o l i t i c a l brokerage service for the society. In Germany, the Bismarckian c o n s t i -t u t i o n denied r e a l power to the National Parliament and thus encouraged i t to function mainly on behalf of i n t e r e s t groups instead of deciding n a t i o n a l p o l i c y . In this state of a f f a i r s , corporatism provided a means to overcome both the i n e f f e c t i v e parliamentary democracy, as well as the threat of Marxism i n favor of national unity and s o c i a l harmony. 63. In s p i t e of these s i m i l a r i t i e s , however, German and I t a l i a n n a t i o n a l i s t s d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e i r conception of the a p p l i c a t i o n of cor p o r a t i s t theory to society. These differences provide an important i n s i g h t to our understanding of the co r p o r a t i s t proposals of the Nazi and F a s c i s t p a r t i e s . The German cor p o r a t i s t t r a d i t i o n started as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century as a conservative reaction to the French Revo-l u t i o n . I t was a plea on one hand, to restore the t i g h t organic system of estates and on the other hand, to bring back the medieval structure of self-governing guilds. As the German N a t i o n a l i s t van den Bruck thought, the return to the medieval corporative order required the d i s s o l u t i o n of the bourgeois s o c i a l and economic order. Corporatism was to reap for Germany the benefits of a communal society, benefits which the bourgeoisie had not been able to provide. I t was b a s i c a l l y this regressive, Utopian view of corporatism, mixed with p s e u d o - s o c i a l i s t i c elements that was reproduced i n the 1920 NSDAP Program. Nazi corporatism originated from the a n t i c a p i t a l i s t i c , romantic ideology of the German 'mittelstand', the a r t i s a n s , shopkeepers and tradsmen. These groups proposed a retre a t to a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l age and medieval guilds; they sought to h a l t the growth of modern industry 64. and ultimately to dismantle i t . In short, they sought an i r r a t i o n a l and perhaps inobtainable s o c i a l and economic harmony of i n t e r e s t that would bring back the communal society of the Middle Ages. However, the corporative order of the Middle Age was unique and could not be repeated. As the Medieval p o l i t i c a l thought held, the corporations were part of the Whole as w e l l as Wholes i n themselves: "Medieval p o l i t i c a l thought started from the Whole but ascribed an i n t r i n s i c value to every P a r t i a l Whole down to and including the i n d i v i d u a l . I t did not set the Whole before the Parts or the Parts before the Whole. Its p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c was that i t saw the Uni-verse as one a r t i c u l a t e d Whole and every Being whether a joint-Being (community) or a single-Being as both a part and a Whole." ^ In other words, i n a s o c i a l organism, the Whole i s independent of the changes i n i t s parts, but on the other side, the Whole only l i v e s and comes to l i g h t i n i t s members. This f e d e r a l i s t structure c l e a r l y permitted the corporations to be autonomous, as w e l l as be part of the Whole. But with the advent of the c e n t r a l i z e d state, state power became opposed to the medieval thought of a harmoniously a r t i c u l a t e d Universal community whose structure from top to bottom was of a f e d e r a l i s t i c kind. Therefore, the l a t e r formulations of corporatism had d i f f i c u l t y a r t i c u l a t i n g a formula for the r e l a t i o n -ship of the corporations to the state. The demands of the a r t i s a n s , shopkeepers and small businessmen 65. l o s t t h e i r function and appeal i n the process of the NSDAP's tran-s i t i o n from a small counterrevolutionary sect with ideas fundamen-t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the society i n which they existed to becoming a mass p o l i t i c a l movement l i v i n g i n a r e a l p o l i t i c a l world and mobi-l i z i n g a wide range of support i n that world. In other words, when the Nazi movement became a mass movement, the romantic corporatist ideas of the middle class decreased i n s i g n i f i c a n c e due to both the Utopian nature of the proposals and the need of the NSDAP to accomo-date more powerful groups i n the society who were i n a p o s i t i o n to cooperate with the Nazi state i n furthering the l a t t e r ' s goals. Besides, Germany by 1933 was a f u l l y i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nation with organized i n t e r e s t groups who were completely and not s u r p r i s i n g l y opposed to the 1920 economic program of counterrevolutionary a n t i -capitalism. To H i t l e r , corporatism was mainly a propaganda device to keep c e r t a i n i n t e l l e c t u a l s l o y a l to the movement u n t i l he came to power. The aims of the Nazi government were rearmament and expan-sion of p o l i t i c a l and economical power which required the cooperation of industry instead of i t s destruction. It might be suggested that the Labor Front functioned as a c o r p o r a t i s t organization i n the sense that i t c o n t r o l l e d the workers, l i k e the corporations did i n F a s c i s t I t a l y . In my view, the Labor Front was a d i s t o r t e d adoption of c o r p o r a t i s t theory to r e a l i t y ; the o r i g i n a l Party Program did not envisage such an organization. I t i s important 0 66. to note that the o r i g i n a l corporatism of the 1920 Program had nothing to do with what was l a t e r defined as corporatism i n the 1930's to describe f a s c i s t economies. This new d e f i n i t i o n of corporatism entailed the c o n t r o l of the economy through representative organizations of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s or c a r t e l s , whose e x i s t i n g powers were reinforced by l e g i s l a t i o n . This was t y p i c a l of both f a s c i s t and a n t i - f a s c i s t econo-mies . Guillermo A.Ofjonnell i n "Corporatism and the Question of the State", points out to the following c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s shared by I t a l y and Germany regarding the emergence and transformation of capitalism i n both countries: 1. the more dynamic and v i s i b l e r o l e of the state i n comparison with the Anglo-Saxon countries 2. the d i f f i c u l t i e s of growth experienced by the national bour-geoisie without the a c t i v e tutelage of a state that c a r r i e s out entrepreneurial a c t i v i t e i s and i s " i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t " to a degree unknown i n the c l a s s i c cases of c a p i t a l i s t development 3. the tendency toward the appearance of highly bureaucratized and expansive patterns of p o l i t i c a l authoritarianism 4. the " s t a t i s t " content of dominant ideologies of s o c i e t a l organization and economic growth 5. the tendency to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e mechanisms of control of the 67, popular sector, including at some point the s t a t i z i n g c o r p o r a t i z a t i o n of i t s organizations. In s p i t e of the above s i m i l a r i t i e s , there are c l e a r l y important d i f f e r e n -ces i n terms of the functions of corporatism between the two countries. In I t a l y , corporations were formed, whether they performed the i n i t i a l functions assigned to them or not. And o r g a n i c - s t a t i s t p r i n c i p l e s constituted an important part of the F a s c i s t state ideology. I t seems that these p r i n c i p l e s were useful because the I t a l i a n bourgeoisie needed to restore 1 ' s o c i a l peace' and overcome the ' c r i s i s ' of further develop-ment i n a context of intense p o l i t i c a l m o bilization, while at the same time maintaining a surface manifestation of 'class c o l l a b o r a t i o n ' . The goals of the I t a l i a n bourgeoisie aimed at economic growth so that I t a l y could a t t a i n an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y powerful status. Economic growth meant rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , but rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n within an unchanged e l i t e structure, could only be achieved by a surface manifes-t a t i o n of class c o l l a b o r a t i o n . Insofar as fascism represented an attempt to a r r e s t the dynamic of economic development and the s o c i a l changes that brought with i t by suppressing labor unions to keep the t r a d i -t i o n a l e l i t e structure i n t a c t , other p r i o r i t i e s had to be valued higher as to make that dynamic i r r e l e v a n t . This i s p r e c i s e l y how corporatism functioned; i t pushed socio-economic r e a l i t i e s into the background by focusing on ' a t t i t u d i n a l change'. In other words, i t performed the function of a 'myth' to solve the problems of class c o n f l i c t and 68. nati o n a l economic poverty. Corporatism was advertised as having combined the benefits of the me-dieval corporations which had harmonized the i n t e r e s t s of workers and employers i n a common productive e f f o r t with e f f i c i e n t control and regulation i n the i n t e r e s t of the society as a whole which the modern t o t a l i t a r i a n state alone could provide. It did not matter that t h i s had not been the case. As Sorel s a i d , the d e s c r i p t i v e content of a myth was not s i g n i f i c a n t i n i t s e l f but only i n s o f a r as the i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e action was governed as i f i t were an objective and 4 accurate representation of some objective p o s s i b i l i t y . In th i s vein, corporatism created the i l l u s i o n that class harmony existed, that a l l productive forces of the nation were made to serve the 'national i n t e -r e s t ' . The ' l i b e r a l man' who was greedy, s e l f i s h and i s o l a t e d was supposed to have been replaced by the 'corporative man' who was free from material desires, was heroic, noble and comradely.^ As the F a s c i s t s y n d i c a l i s t leader Rossoni remarked: "Corporation i s not to be defined i n l e g a l terms; i t i s - a state of mind, i t i s one big family".^ In the same l i n e , Paul E i n z i g i n The Economic Foundations  of Fascism wrote: "What matters from an economic point of view i s that within the framework of the corporative system, a f e e l i n g of s o l i d a r i t y between the apparently c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s of various groups has developed. The s p i r i t of s o l i d a r i t y and cooperation created 69. by the corporate system has not confined i t s e l f within the l i m i t s of trades and professions included i n the p a r t i c u l a r corporation, but i t has become nationwide..."^ And according to Mario Palmieri i n The Philosophy of Fascism, the corporative ideas was i n fact the p r i n c i p l e of Fas c i s t ethics translated and applied to the realm of economics. According to the Fa s c i s t e t h i c s , an i n v i s i b l e t i e binds together a l l the people of the nation. If this i s true, then i t i s also true that the terms of wealthy and pauper, c a p i t a l i s t and worker, landowner and farmer, employer and employee lose t h e i r antagonistic meaning altogether and remain to s i g n i f y brethren i n s p i r i t i f not i n f l e s h , engaged from d i f f e r e n t angles, on d i f f e r e n t planes i n the g ardous task of b u i l d i n g up a nation's l i f e . By creating the uni f y i n g myth of 'collaboration i n the name of national i n t e r e s t ' , corporatism also served to hold the divergent forces within the F a s c i s t Party and within the country together. This function allowed F a s c i s t corporatism to operate as a t a c t i c that could vary according to the needs of the movement; the l a b e l was used to cover a whole series of j u r i d i c a l and de facto arrangements during the l a t e 1920's and 1930's. The name corporatism was loosely used to describe a l l the government's economic p o l i c i e s during the 1930's, thus confusing the j u r i d i c a l structure with day-to-day adjustments to the world s i t u -a t i o n . The adjustments were accepted by l o y a l Fascists as long as the magic l a b e l was preserved. 70. Furthermore, corporatism served to improve the prestige of the F a s c i s t state i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena because i t created the impression that corporatism had transcended both l i b e r a l i s m and s o c i a l i s m by creating a new synthesis. In conclusion, i t i s evident that corporatism i n I t a l y was implemen-ted i n order to serve as a myth, attempting to mask the r e a l i t i e s of class c o n f l i c t i n a rap i d l y i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g s o c i e t y . In Germany, on the other hand, the goals of the NSDAP leadership i n power were not consistent with those of corporatism. 71. FOOTNOTES CHAPTER I 1. B.M. Lane and L.J. Rupp, Nazi Ideology Before 1933: A Documentation (Austin: University of Texas Press. 1978), p.43. 2. Ibid., p. 44. 3. The term estate (translated as "Stand" i n German) has the general meaning of status, rank or s t a t i o n , but i n h i s t o r i c a l usage, i t commonly refers to one of the estates i n the old regime, e.g. a r i s -tocracy clergy, etc. Estates i n t h i s form are orders or classes forming part of body p o l i t i c and sharing government. Estate may also mean corporation or g u i l d . 4. The term of corporation appears to have entered English as a loan word from the Romance languages, where corporation (French) and corporazione ( I t a l i a n ) are the usual terms for g u i l d . Guilds i n the Middle Age were formed so that a l l i n d i v i d u a l s and i n t e r e s t s i n a trade of a town should 'geld' together, i . e . submit to j o i n t taxation. Guilds also possessed monopoly of the l o c a l trade, set p r i c e s , f i x e d wages and hours. 5. The organic conception of the state derives from the assumption that v a l i d comparisons can be made between a l i v i n g body and a p o l i t i c a l community. I t i s held that i n the s o c i a l body, as i n a l i v i n g organism, the demands of the whole must come before those of the parts. Furthermore, j u s t as a l l the parts of the body are not equally indispensable to the whole, so men are unequal i n s o c i a l capacity and hence, unequal i n s o c i a l worth. Just as the brain or w i l l preside over the conscious a c t i v i t i e s of a human being, so the state must have a s i n g l e head and a h i e r a r c h i c a l organization of authority that corresponds to the subordination of lower bodily functions to the higher. 6. Ralph Bowen, German Theories of the Corporative State, (New York: McGraw H i l l , 1947), p.34 72. 7. Ibid., p. 35. 8. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 11. 9. Ralph Bowen, op . c i t . , p. 19. 10. George Mosse, The C r i s i s of German Ideology, (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1976), pp. 19-23. 11. Ibid., p. 281. 12. Andree Emery, "The T o t a l i t a r i a n Economics of Othmar Spann", Journal  of S o c i a l Philosophy, A p r i l 1936, p. 432. 13. Taylor Cole, "Corporative Organization i n the Third Reich", The  Review of P o l i t i c s , May 1940, p. 441. 14. Lane and Rupp, o p . c i t . , pp. 33-40. 15. I b i d . , pp.88-94. 16. George Mosse, o p . c i t . , p.101. 17. Lane and Rupp, o p . c i t . , p. 89. 18. Ibid., pp. 43-44. 19. Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business i n the Third Reich, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 63. 20. Ibid., pp. 114-117. 21. Lane and Rupp, o p . c i t . , p. 88. 22. I b i d . , p. 88. 23. Arthur Schweitzer, o p . c i t . , p. 116. 24. Lane and Rupp, o p . c i t . , p. 34. 25. Konrad Heiden, The History of National Socialism, (London; Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1934). p. 35. 26. F.L. Schuman, "The P o l i t i c a l Theory of Fascism" American P o l i t i c a l  Science Review, A p r i l 1937, p.222 73. 27. Arthur Schweitzer, o p . c i t . , p. 92. 28. Taylor Cole, o p . c i t . , p. 452. 29. Ibid., p. 457. 30. Arthur Schweitzer, o p . c i t . , p. 87. 31. I b i d . , p. 100. 32. T.W. Mason, "The Primacy of P o l i t i c s - P o l i t i c s and Economics i n National S o c i a l i s t Germany" i n Nature of Fascism, ed. S.J. Woolf, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968), p. 178. 33. F.L. Schuman, o p . c i t . , p. 222. 34. Ibid., p.222. 35. S.J. Woolf, "Did a F a s c i s t Economic System E x i s t " i n Nature of Fascism, o p . c i t . , p. 129. 36. David Schoenbaum, H i t l e r ' s S o c i a l Revolution, (_New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 130. CHAPTER II 1. A. James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism, (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 39. 2. Ibid., p. 46. 3. Ibid., p. 55. 4. Ibid., p. 56 5. Ibid., p. 57. 6. John Weiss, The F a s c i s t T r a d i t i o n : Radical Right Wing Extremism  i n Modern Europe, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. xx. 7. A. James Gregor, op . c i t . , p. 147. .74. 8. William Welk, F a s c i s t Economic P o l i c y , (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-s i t y Press, 1938), p. 59. 9. Ibid., p. 288. 10. Ibid., p. 287. 11. Herman Finer, Mussolini's I t a l y , (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965), p. 519. 12. Gaetano Salvemini, Under the Axe of Fascism, (New York: The Viking Press, 1936), p. 312. 13. Ibid., p. 105. 14. Ibid., p. 105. 15. Ibid., p. 98. 16. Herman Finer, o p . c i t . , p. 520. 17. William Welk, op . c i t . , p. 145. 18. Adrian L y t t e l t o n , The Seizure of Power: Fascism i n I t a l y , (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), p. 87. 19. A l f r e d Stepan, State and Society: Peru i n Comparative Perspective, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 42-43. 20. Ibid., p. 48. 21. I t a l i a n Fascisms from Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian L y t t e l t o n , (London: Jonathan Cape, 1973), p. 33. 22. Adrian L y t t e l t o n , The Seizure of Power, o p . c i t . , p. 115.. 23. William Welk, o p . c i t . , p. 50. 24. S.J. Woolf, "Did a F a s c i s t Economic System E x i s t ? " , o p . c i t ., p. 129. 25. A. James Gregor, o p . c i t . , p. 296. 26. Gaetano Salvemini, o p . c i t . , p. 135. 27. Herman Finer, o p . c i t . , p. 514. 75. 28. E. Tannenbaum, The F a s c i s t Experience, (London: Basic Books, 1972) p. 111. 29. A l f r e d Stepan, o p . c i t . , p. 45. 30. Ibid., pp. 77-78. 31. Ibid., pp. 79-80. CHAPTER III 1. Otto Gierke, P o l i t i c a l Theories of the Middle Age, trans, and foreword by F.W. Maitland, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 22-27. 2. Guillermo A, O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State" i n Authoritarianism and Corporatism i n L a t i n America, ed., James M. Malloy, (London, Feff e r and Simons, 19-771, pp. 54—55. 3. A. James Gregor, o p . c i t . , p. 56. 4. Gaetano Salvemini, o p . c i t . , pp. 134-135. 5. Herman Finer, o p . c i t . , p. 515. 6. Paul E i n z i g , The Economic Foundations of Fascism, (London: Mac-mil l a n , 1933), p. 31. 7. Mario Palmieri, The Philosophy of Fascism, (London: Macmillan, 1938), p. 87. 76. BIBLIOGRAPHY Azpiazu, Joaquin, S.J., The Corporative State, London: Herder Book Co., 1951. Bowen, Ralph H., German Theories of the Corporative State, New York: McGraw-H i l l , 1947. Brady, Robert A., The S p i r i t and Structure of German Fascism, New York: The Viking Press, 1937. Cole Taylor, "Corporative Organization i n the Third Reich", The Review  of P o l i t i c s , January 1974. E i n z i g Paul, The Economic Foundations of Fascism, London: Macmillan and Co., 1933. Elbow, Matthew H., French Corporative Theory 1789-1948, New York: Octagon Books, 1966. Emery Andree, "The T o t a l i t a r i a n Economics of Othmar Spann", Journal of  S o c i a l Philosophy, A p r i l 1936. Finer Herman, Mussolini's I t a l y , New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965. Gide C. and R i s t C., A History of Economic Doctrines, London: G.G. Harrap, 1961. Gierke Otto, P o l i t i c a l Theories of the Middle Age, trans, and introduced by F.W. Maitland, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913. Gregor, James A., The Ideology of Fascism, New York: The Free Press, 1969. Hayes, Paul M., Fascism, London: George A l l e n , 1973. H i t l e r Adolf, My B a t t l e , Boston: The Riverside Press, 1937. Knox, T.M., Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973. Kolnai Aurel, The War Against the West, London: V i c t o r Gollancz, 1938. Laqueur, Walter, ed. Fascism, A Reader's Guide, Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1976. L y t t e l t o n Adrian, ed. I t a l i a n Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile. London: Jonathan Cape, 1973. , The Seizure of Power: Fascism i n I t a l y 1919-1929, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973. Maier, Charles S., Recasting Bourgeois Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Malloy, James M., Authoritarianism and Corporatism i n L a t i n America, ed. London: F e f f e r and Simons, 1977. Mosse George, The C r i s i s of German Ideology, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1976. Neumann F r i t z , Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944, New York: Harper and Row, 1963. Nolte Ernst, Three Faces of Fascism, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965. Pelczynski, Z.A. ed. Hegel's P o l i t i c a l Philosophy: Problems arid Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Ropke Wilhelm, " F a s c i s t Economics", Economica, May 1935. Salvemini Gaetano, Under the Axe of Fascism, New York: The Viking Press, 1936. S a r t i Roland, " F a s c i s t Modernization i n I t a l y : T r a d i t i o n a l or Modern?", American H i s t o r i c a l Review, A p r i l 1970. Schoenbaum David, H i t l e r ' s S o c i a l Revolution, New York: Doubleday, 1966. Schweitzer Arthur, Big Business i n the Third Reich, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. Schmit C a r l , The Corporate State i n Action: I t a l y under Fascism, London: V i c t o r Gollancz, 1939. Schmitter, P h i l i p p e C , " S t i l l the Century of Corporatism?", The Review  of P o l i t i c s , January 1974. 

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