Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

An investigation into the choice of control behaviors within organizations Haridas, Thenkurussi P. 1979

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1979_A1 H38.pdf [ 9.58MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0094804.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0094804-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0094804-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0094804-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0094804-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0094804-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0094804-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0094804-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0094804.ris

Full Text

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHOICE OF CONTROL BEHAVIORS WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS by THENKURUSSI P. HARIDAS B.Com., U n i v e r s i t y of Madras, I n d i a , 1967 Graduate Cost Accountant, I n s t i t u t e of Cost & Works Accountants o f I n d i a , I n d i a , 1971 Post Graduate Diploma i n Management, Indian I n s t i t u t e of Management, C a l c u t t a , I n d i a , 1972 M.Sc.(Commerce), U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE'REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (FACULTY OF COMMERCE AMD BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION) We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1979 (c) Thenkurussi P. Haridas, 1979 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head of my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f _ ! .—J — The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , Canada V6T 1W5 E-6 BP 75-51 I E A b s t r a c t The o b j e c t i v e o f the presen t study was to examine the e f f e c t s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , nature o f the d e c i s i o n problems, and the p e r s o n a l i t y o f the c o n t r o l l e r on the choice o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A review o f the l i t e r a t u r e on c o n t r o l systems was conducted as a f i r s t step. The review i n d i c a t e d t h a t r e s e a r c h on c o n t r o l systems u n t i l now i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by g l o b a l normative models and t h e o r i e s f o c u s i n g on s i n g l e independent v a r i a b l e s as p r e d i c t o r s o f a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t r o l systems w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Depending upon the s p e c i f i c r e s e a r c h e r ' s i n c l i n a t i o n s , v a r i o u s c o n s t r u c t s such as o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , technology, environment and member needs have been suggested i n the p a s t as determinants o f o p t i m a l c o n t r o l systems w i t h i n o r g a n i z a -t i o n s . An attempt was made here to formulate a model which c o n s i d e r s a l l the above v a r i a b l e s and i n t e g r a t e s the s e v e r a l (and o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g ) p a s t f i n d i n g s . One major segment o f the above model was t e s t e d during the presen t study. For t h i s purpose c o n t r o l behaviors were c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two major c a t e g o r i e s : behaviors that i n f l u e n c e the ' i n t r i n s i c - m o t i v a t i o n o f the subordinates and Behaviors that i n f l u e n c e the ' e x t r i n s i c ' ' m o t i v a t i o n o f the subordi n a t e s . Four major hypotheses were formulated. The f i r s t h y p o t hesis suggested t h a t members of 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s are more l i k e l y to use ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y ' m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l b ehaviors than those who work i n 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a -t i o n s . Conversely, members o f 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s were h y p o t h e s i z e d to use ' e x t r i n s i c a l l y ' m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s more f r e q u e n t l y than those i n 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The second hypothesis r e l a t e d the c o n t r o l l e r ' s t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity w i t h h i s or her cho i c e o f c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t was suggested t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity are more l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y ' m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s than those w i t h low t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity. The t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s suggested that i n d i v i -duals a re more l i k e l y to choose ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y ' motiva-t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s when they are faced w i t h an unimportant d e c i s i o n problem than when fa c e d w i t h an important d e c i s i o n problem. Conversely, i t was suggested t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s are more l i k e l y to use ' e x t r i n s i c a l l y ' m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l behaviors when faced w i t h an important d e c i s i o n problem than when faced w i t h an unimportant d e c i s i o n problem. The f i n a l h y p o thesis attempted to i v examine the comhi.ned effects of, three independent variables; i t was, suggested that i n d i v i d u a l s who have high tolerance of ambiguity working i n 'organic 1 firms and making unimportant decisions are most l i k e l y to use ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y ' motivating control strategies and least l i k e l y to use ' e x t r i n s i c a l l y ' motivating strategies. Conversely, persons with low tolerance of ambiguity working in :'mechanistic' firms and making important decisions were hypothesized to make maximum use of ' e x t r i n s i c a l l y ' motivating strategies and minimal use of ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y ' motivating strategies. A laboratory experiment (n = 172) was conducted to test the various hypotheses. The f i r s t and t h i r d hypotheses were sustained; the fourth hypothesis received moderate support and the second hypothesis was at best p a r t i a l l y supported. The research methodology used i n the study, the implications of the present findings and directions for future research i n the area of choice of control strategies are discussed. V TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of contents L i s t of Tables L i s t of F i g u r e s L i s t o f Appendices Acknowledgements CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f c o n t r o l H systems D y s f u n c t i o n a l e f f e c t s o f 22 c o n t r o l systems CHAPTER I I : AN OVERVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH ON 33 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS The s t r u c t u r a l views 33 The environmental approach 42 to c o n t r o l The t e c h n o l o g i s t s 47 The p e r s o h a l i s t i c views on 53 c o n t r o l A suggested i n t e g r a t i n g model of 56 o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems CHAPTER I I I : PRESENT RESEARCH PROPOSAL AND 62 METHODOLOGY Dependent v a r i a b l e i n the study 64 Independent v a r i a b l e s 66 v i i i x x x i v i . Page Hypotheses i n the prese n t 76 study Method o f data c o l l e c t i o n 79 Measure of dependent v a r i a b l e 82 Measures of independent 88 v a r i a b l e s Research design 92 The p i l o t study 95 The experiment 100 CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 103 R e s u l t s o f supplementary 132 analyses CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 145 I m p l i c a t i o n s 155 L i m i t a t i o n s o f the p r e s e n t 165 study Summary 169 B i b l i o g r a p h y Appendices v i i L i s t o f Tables Table No. Page II.1 The r e l a t i o n s h i p between environmental 46 v a r i a b i l i t y and response g e n e r a t i n g c a p a c i t y o f c o n t r o l systems. I I I . l I n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among r a t i n g s on 94 three dimensions of d e c i s i o n problems by a panel o f 32 persons. IV.1 I n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among r a t i n g s on 105 three dimensions o f d e c i s i o n problems by 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s . IV.2 R e s u l t s o f m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s o f 107 v a r i a n c e on e x t r i n s i c and i n t r i n s i c scores o f 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s . IV.3 R e s u l t s o f a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e o f ' 109 scores r e c e i v e d by 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the study. IV.4 A n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e on i n t r i n s i c H I scores r e c e i v e d by 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s . IV.5 A n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e on e x t r i n s i c 112 scores r e c e i v e d by 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s . IV.6 R e s u l t s o f T - t e s t s o f e x t r i n s i c scores 114 of 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the study. IV. 7 R e s u l t s of a one-way a n a l y s i s o f 116 v a r i a n c e on the e x t r i n s i c scores o f 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s . IV.8 R e s u l t s o f T - t e s t s o f i n t r i n s i c scores 118 of 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the study. IV.9 R e s u l t s o f a one-way a n a l y s i s o f 119 v a r i a n c e on the i n t r i n s i c scores o f 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s . IV.10 R e s u l t s o f mean d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t r i n s i c 121 scores of low and h i g h t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity groups. v i i i T able 'No, Page IV.11 T - t e s t s of mean d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t r i n s i c 123 scores of low and high, t o l e r a n c e of amBiguity persons working i n d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s . IV.12 R e s u l t s o f a one-way a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e 125 on the i n t r i n s i c scores of 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s . IV.13 T - t e s t s of mean i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c 127 scores r e c e i v e d By 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s on two types o f d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s . IV.14 Means and standard d e v i a t i o n s o f i n t r i n - 130 s i c and e x t r i n s i c scores of 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the p r e s e n t study. IV.15 Degree of r o l e i d e n t i t y f e l t By the 133 p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the study. IV.16 Responses of 96 p a r t i c i p a n t s to the 136 q u e s t i o n 'how d i d you f i n d the d e s c r i p -t i o n of North S t a r A i r l i n e ? ' IV.17 Responses from 120 p a r t i c i p a n t s to the 139 q u e s t i o n 'to what extent d i d you l i k e the managerial s t y l e s and p r a c t i c e s at North S t a r ? ' IV.18 R e s u l t s o f a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e of scores 140 r e c e i v e d By 52 p a r t i c i p a n t s who n e i t h e r l i k e d nor d i s l i k e d the s i m u l a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s . IV.19 R e s u l t s o f a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e o f 141 scores r e c e i v e d By 53 p a r t i c i p a n t s who l i k e d the simulated o r g a n i z a t i o n s . IV.20 Summary of p r e s e n t f i n d i n g s . 143 IX L i s t o f F i g u r e s F i g u r e No. Page 1.1 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c o n t r o l systems 20 producing h i g h e x t r i n s i c and i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n . 1.2 S i m p l i f i e d Merton Model of c o n t r o l 26 which leads to b u r e a u c r a t i c and d y s f u n c t i o n a l member behavior. II.1 A proposed model o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 59 c o n t r o l . 111.1 F a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g choice of c o n t r o l 63 behaviors i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l context. 111.2 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f m e c h a n i s t i c and 68 o r g a n i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s . X L i s t of Appendices Appendix No. Page 1-A I n s t r u c t i o n s to the p a n e l o f judges 184 (n = 16) f o r r a t i n g the b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s on i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n dimension. 1-B I n s t r u c t i o n s to the panel of judges 187 (n = 16) f o r r a t i n g the b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s on e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n dimension. 2 L i s t of 18 d e c i s i o n problems g i v e n to 190 p a r t i c i p a n t s d u r i n g the s i m u l a t i o n . 3 Q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r measuring 212 p a r t i c i p a n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n s about the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 4-A 'Mechanistic' d e s c r i p t i o n of the 214 o r g a n i z a t i o n . 4-B 'Organic' d e s c r i p t i o n of the 218 o r g a n i z a t i o n . 5 Items i n Budner S c a l e f o r measuring 222 I n t o l e r a n c e o f Ambiguity. 6 Measure of r o l e i d e n t i t y d u r i n g 225 s i m u l a t i o n . 7-A Q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r measuring 227 p e r c e i v e d d e c i s i o n importance. 7-B Q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r measuring 229 p e r c e i v e d d e c i s i o n complexity. 7-C Q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r measuring 231 p e r c e i v e d d e c i s i o n u n c e r t a i n t y . 8 Instrument used f o r g e t t i n g 233 p a r t i c i p a n t s ' g l o b a l assessment of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 9 M u l t i v a r i a t e and U n i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s 235 of V a r i a n c e - a note. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to P r o f e s s o r Vance F . M i t c h e l l f o r h i s i n v a l u a b l e a s s i s t a n c e , a d v i c e , and support duri n g t h i s study. S p e c i a l thanks are a l s o due to P r o f e s s o r s Merle Ace, Pe t e r F r o s t , David Hayes, C r a i g Pinder, and Ron T a y l o r who spent a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n o f t h i e r time a d v i s i n g me on the s e v e r a l aspects o f the study. P r o f e s s o r s M i t c h e l l , F r o s t and Hayes p a t i e n t l y went through my manuscript p o i n t i n g out grammatical, o r t h o g r a p h i c a l , s t a t i s t i c a l , s t y l i s t i c and l o g i c a l e r r o r s . I would l i k e to say a b i g 'thank you' to them. G r a t i t u d e i s a l s o expressed to P r o f e s s o r s G.J.Johnson, E.G.Robinson, W.Boldt, and K.R.MacCrimmon and Dr.A.L.Anantanarayanan f o r t h e i r support and a s s i s t a n c e d u r i n g the study; the former two spent s e v e r a l hours o f t h e i r time h e l p i n g me on the v a r i o u s s t a t i s t i c a l matters. The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Graduate F e l l o w s h i p and f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e from the F a c u l t y o f Commerce of U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia helped to make t h i s study p o s s i b l e . I t i s q u i t e l i k e l y t h a t t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n would not have taken i t s p r e s e n t shape but f o r the continued support o f my- wi f e , M a l l i k a Das. M a l l i k a p l a y e d the d e v i l ' s advocate f o r a l l my important thoughts and idea s , p r o v i d e d the much needed p s y c h o l o g i c a l support to me du r i n g the many d e p r e s s i v e phases c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f most d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n s and f i n a l l y p r o o f - r e a d and typed the e n t i r e manuscript. To t h i s great lady I would l i k e to d e d i c a t e t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION C o n t r o l i s an i n e v i t a b l e aspect o f o r g a n i z a t i o n . Indeed, o r g a n i z i n g i n many i n s t a n c e s i s synonymous w i t h the design and maintenance of e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l systems. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n most cases, seems to be dependent on the a b i l i t i e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members to design and m a i n t a i n a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t r o l systems w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The i d e a of ' c o n t r o l ' i s a t l e a s t as o l d as the' p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y o f a n c i e n t Greece. S e v e r a l Greek p h i l o s o p h e r s l i k e P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e were concerned w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g the b e s t system of government that leads to the g r e a t e s t amount o f happiness f o r the g r e a t e s t number o f people. P l a t o f o r i n s t a n c e , b e l i e v e d t h a t the i n t e l l e c t u a l s were b e s t f i t t e d to r u l e the s o c i e t y or the ' a r i s t o c r a c y ' was the b e s t form o f government. Only an i n t e l l e c t u a l , a c c o r d i n g to P l a t o , c o u l d develop an o p t i m a l balance between the three key p a r t s o f human behavior: the r e a s o n i n g or r a t i o n a l element, the p a s s i o n a t e or a p p e t i t i v e element, and the s p i r i t e d or adventurous element. As such, i n t e l l e c t u a l s should guide and c o n t r o l the behavior o f 2 the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . T h i s i s q u i t e s i m i l a r to the n o t i o n of ' c o n t r o l of i n p u t s ' t h a t we t a l k about today. A r i s t o t l e i n h i s d i s c o u r s e s a l s o emphasized the need f o r c o n t r o l of a l l human a c t i v i t i e s to make them purposive, g o a l seeking, and i d e a l i n nature. The w r i t i n g s of l a t e r day p h i l o s o p h e r s are a l s o r e p l e t e w i t h the i d e a of ' c o n t r o l ' . Hobbes f o r i n s t a n c e , suggested the establishment of a set of r u l e s or conventions f o r each s o c i e t y which determined the a p p r o p r i a t e behavior w i t h i n t h a t s o c i e t y . A c c o r d i n g to Hobbes, there should a l s o be a law e n f o r c i n g agency which monitored the behavior o f a l l members of the s o c i e t y and took a p p r o p r i a t e c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n s whenever d e v i a t i o n s were observed. T h i s of course, i s a c o n t r o l mechanism as we understand i t today. Even p h i l o s o p h e r s l i k e John Locke, and S t u a r t M i l l who advocated l i b e r a l and democratic forms of government suggested the establishment of c o n t r o l agencies (e.g., laws, i n s t i t u t i o n s , c o u r t s ) f o r d i r e c t i n g and m odifying the behavior of the common man. In the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior l i t e r a t u r e , the concept o f c o n t r o l i s perhaps as o l d as the f i r s t w r i t i n g s on management theory i t s e l f . A l l the c l a s s i c a l t h e o r i s t s l i k e Henry F a y o l , L y n d a l l Urwick, and James 3 Mooney, emphasized c o n t r o l as one o f the key f u n c t i o n s of a s u c c e s s f u l e x e c u t i v e . F r e d e r i c k T a y l o r (1911) who i s c o n s i d e r e d as the f a t h e r o f ' s c i e n t i f i c management 1 a l s o emphasized c o n t r o l of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s through f u n c t i o n a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and s e p a r a t i o n o f p l a n n i n g and doing. A c c o r d i n g to T a y l o r , a t y p i c a l worker's job was to perform a h i g h l y s p e c i a l i z e d a c t i v i t y a s s i g n e d to him or her by the s u p e r i o r . I t was the manager's f u n c t i o n to p l a n and c o n t r o l the performance o f '. a l l workers i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e d i v i s i o n s . Almost a l l the l a t e r w r i t e r s on management have e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y d e a l t w i t h the c o n t r o l aspect o f a manager's f u n c t i o n . That s o c i a l systems have an i n h e r e n t tendency to become un-coordinated and . . d i s i n t e g r a t e d i n the absence o f e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l mechanisms has been noted by s e v e r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s (Baker, 1973; H a i r e , 1959; Tannenbaum, 1968). As such, i n a l l v i a b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s there are some c o n t r o l mechanisms to cou n t e r a c t the e n t r o p i c tendencies i n h e r e n t i n the system. As Tannenbaum (1968; page 3) p o i n t e d out, " o r g a n i z a t i o n i s i m p o s s i b l e without some form of c o n t r o l " . S i m i l a r l y , March and Simon (1958; page 37) a f t e r r e v i e w i n g the works o f Merton, Gouldner, and S e l z n i c k concluded t h a t the key theme of these w r i t e r s 5 e v o l u t i o n (Dunbar, 1979). There i s a second s t r a n d of meanings which h i g h l i g h t the i d e a of feedback o f i n f o r m a t i o n . The l a t t e r use o f the term i s more,in l i n e w i t h the o r i g i n a l f r e n c h term meaning ' i n s p e c t i o n ' . Some o f the popular d e f i n i t i o n s o f c o n t r o l are g i v e below: " O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i s the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f the a c t i v i t i e s o f v a r i o u s subunits o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n i n order to a t t a i n the aims o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n as a whole." (Charnes and Stedry, 1964; page 3) "/.'..the process by which managers assure that resources are o b t a i n e d and used e f f e c t i v e l y i n the accomplishment o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s o b j e c t i v e s . " (Anthonys 1965, page 27) "The meaning o f c o n t r o l as we d e f i n e i t , can be seen ...as a c y c l e b e g i n n i n g w i t h an i n t e n t on the p a r t o f one person, f o l l o w e d byyan i n f l u e n c e attempt addressed to another person who then acts i n some way t h a t f u l f i l l s the i n t e n t o f the f i r s t . " (Tannenbaum, 1968; page 5) " C o n t r o l i s the determining that programmed a c t i v i t i e s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n are c a r r i e d out, t h a t the a c t i v i t i e s are a p p r o p r i a t e , t h a t the programs a c t i v a t e d are the proper ones, and that the s e t o f programs a v a i l a b l e i s m o d i f i e d and improved." ( C h u r c h i l l and Teitelbaum, 1967; page 419) " ( C o n t r o l system c o n s i s t s of) a l l s e t s o f a l l o c a t i o n procedures and o p e r a t i n g r u l e s which d i r e c t and c o n s t r a i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . " (Dunbar, 1977; page 1) "Management c o n t r o l i i s . . a process of e n s u r i n g c o n t i n u i n g s u r v i v a l (and p r o s p e r i t y ) by 4 has been on s t r u c t u r i n g the o r g a n i z a t i o n so as to f a c i l i t a t e c o n t r o l o f a c t i v i t i e s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members. In t h e i r words: "... the ge n e r a l s t r u c t u r e o f the theore-t i c a l systems o f a l l three w r i t e r s i s remarkably s i m i l a r . They use as the b a s i c independent v a r i a b l e some form o f o r g a n i z a t i o n or o r g a n i z a t i o n a l procedure designed to c o n t r o l the a c t i v i t i e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members " C o n t r o l has been v a r i o u s l y d e f i n e d . Quite o f t e n teEias l i k e power, a u t h o r i t y , and i n f l u e n c e t have been used synonymously w i t h i t (see f o r example, JDahl, 1957). Rathe (1960) l i s t e d 57 v a r i e t i e s o f i t s nuances. The most common usage i s to imply the domination by one i n d i v i d u a l or group over another (e.g., d i r e c t i n g , m a n i p u l a t i n g , r e s t r a i n i n g ) by the e x e r c i s e o f power, a u t h o r i t y , or i n f l u e n c e . For example, Tannenbaum (1968) focused on c o n t r o l as an i n f l u e n c e process t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n organizations.. He argued t h a t c o n t r o l was presen t whenever an attempt was made to i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n f l u e n c e b e h a v i o r . In a s i m i l a r v e i n , Katz and Kahn (1966) suggested t h a t the aim o f c o n t r o l systems i s to ensure t h a t d e s i r e d b e h a v i o r s and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e s are achieved. In g e n e r a l , o r g a n i z a t i o n s develop c o n t r o l systems to dominate other i n f l u e n c e sources and to guide o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 6 r e l a t i n g and adapting to a dynamic e x t e r n a l environment a c c o r d i n g to s t i p u l a t e d c r i t e r i a . " (Lowe and Mclnnes, 1971;, page 213). " C o n t r o l process .... c o n s i s t s o f the f o l l o w i n g s t e p s : (1) e s t a b l i s h i n g standards o f performance (2) measuring c u r r e n t performance i n r e l a t i o n to the e s t a b l i s h e d standards, and (3) t a k i n g c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n . " ( S i s k , 1977; page 439). "Management c o n t r o l i s . . . . a s e t o f human working r e l a t i o n s h i p s and r u l e s f o r p e r s o n a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y w i t h i n the context o f the a c t i v i t y , o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e , and o b j e c t i v e s of an e n t e r p r i s e . " (Lowe and Mclnnes, 1971,; page 213). 11 ( c o n t r o l ) ... . r e f e r s to a l l processes by which a person or group determined the'" a c t i v i t i e s o f another person or group w i t h i n the same o r g a n i z a t i o n . " (McMahon3 and Ivancevich, 1976; page 66). F i n a l l y , the Webster's d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s the term ' c o n t r o l ' as: " a p p l i c a t i o n o f p o l i c i e s and procedures f o r d i r e c t i n g , r e g u l a t i n g , and c o o r d i n a t i n g p r o d u c t i o n , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and other b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t i e s i n a way to achieve the o b j e c t i v e s o f the e n t e r p r i s e . " As may be seen, d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s and r e s e a r c h e r s have d e f i n e d the c o n s t r u c t i n somewhat d i f f e r e n t ways to h i g h l i g h t c e r t a i n b e h a v i o r a l dimensions that they were s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n at a p o i n t of time. For example, Charnes and Stedry's (1964) d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n t r o l emphasizes the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between subunits o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n andwiews them as interdependent p a r t s of a whole. Emphasis here i s on m a i n t a i n i n g harmony among the s u b u n i t s . On the other hand, w r i t e r s l i k e F a y o l (1949) and S i s k (1977) view c o n t r o l i n terms o f conformity to plans or as a means o f e n s u r i n g subunit e f f i c i e n c y thus emphasizing separateness o f subunit a c t i v i t y . Other w r i t e r s l i k e C h u r c h i l l and Teitelbaum (1967) and Anthony (1965) have combined these views. Yet another group of w r i t e r s have suggested that one o f the key o b j e c t i v e s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems i s to enable the o r g a n i z a t i o n to d e a l c w i t h i t s environment e f f e c t i v e l y (e;g:, Ashby, 1956; Beer, 1966; Lowe & Mclnnes, 1971). Weick (1969) a l s o suggests t h a t the o b j e c t i v e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l design (which more or l e s s determines the c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s ) i s to design a system t h a t has the necessary v a r i e t y of r esponse-generating c a p a c i t y to remove the e q u i v o c a l i t y i n the environment i n such a way that the o b j e c t i v e s are achieved. I t would thus seem t h a t the term ' c o n t r o l ' i s used to d e s c r i b e d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s . The emphasis o f d i f f e r e n t c o n t r o l systems may consequently be on a c h i e v i n g d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t i v e s . However, i t should be noted that there i s a l s o 8 a c e r t a i n degree o f o v e r l a p i n a l l the d e f i n i t i o n s o f c o n t r o l . Most w r i t e r s on c o n t r o l e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y note t h a t the purpose of any c o n t r o l system i s to f a c i l i t a t e the achievement o f some predetermined o b j e c t i v e s (although the l i s t o f o b j e c t i v e s themselves seems to d i f f e r from one r e s e a r c h e r to an o t h e r ) . As Tocher (1970) p o i n t e d out, a l l c o n t r o l systems focus on f u t u r e b e h a v i o r . A c c o r d i n g to Tocher, a c o n t r o l l e r can not c o n t r o l the past s i n c e the o p p o r t u n i t y to do so i s p a s t . He (she) can not c o n t r o l the presen t s i n c e i n any n a t u r a l system there i s an i n e r t i a so th a t any a c t i o n can onl y a f f e c t the f u t u r e . T h i s means t h a t every c o n t r o l l e r must have some method o f p r e d i c t i n g the f u t u r e . C o n t r o l a c c o r d i n g to Tocher i s i m p o s s i b l e without t h i s p r e d i c t i v e a b i l i t y . The focus on f u t u r e i s observable i n most other d e f i n i t i o n s o f c o n t r o l we have l i s t e d above. There i s a l s o a h i g h degree o f agreement on the c o n d i t i o n s necessary f o r m a i n t a i n i n g any system under c o n t r o l . E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f standards o f performance, measurement o f a c t u a l performance and comparing i t w i t h standards, and t a k i n g a p p r o p r i a t e c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n ( s ) to a v o i d f u t u r e d e v i a t i o n s from standards seem to be the e s s e n t i a l steps i n any 9 c o n t r o l process., The d e f i n i t i o n s o f S i s k (1977) and C h u r c h i l l and Teitelbaum (1967) e x p l i c i t l y p o i n t t h i s out w h i l e the w r i t i n g s o f others are l e s s so on t h i s p o i n t . Tocher (1970 ; page 160) l i s t s the other c o n d i t i o n s n ecessary f o r a good c o n t r o l system: 1. There must be a s p e c i f i e d s e t o f times at which a choice o f a c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , 2. At each such time, there must be a s p e c i f i e d s e t o f a c t i o n s from which to choose, 3. A model must e x i s t which can p r e d i c t the f u t u r e h i s t o r y o f the system under every p o s s i b l e c h o i c e , and 4. There must be a c r i t e r i o n or o b j e c t i v e on which the c h o i ce o f a c t i o n i s based by a comparison o f p r e d i c t e d b ehavior o f the system w i t h the o b j e c t i v e . In the same v e i n , E i l o n (1962) p o i n t e d out t h a t f o u r key elements namely, g o a l s e t t i n g , p l a n n i n g o f a c t i v i t i e s , e x e c u t i o n o f a c t i v i t i e s , and g a t h e r i n g o f i n f o r m a t i o n about deviances from plans are necessary f o r m a i n t a i n i n g any e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l system. For the present purpose, ' c o n t r o l ' i s d e f i n e d to mean a l l s t r u c t u r e , p r o cesses, and behavior by which a person or group d i r e c t s , motivates, c o n s t r a i n s , and/or i n f l u e n c e s the b e h a v i o r o f one or more i n d i v i d u a l s or groups to achieve predetermined o b j e c t i v e s - economic 10 or otherwise. T h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the v a r i o u s d e f i n i t i o n s o f c o n t r o l suggested i n the p a s t . However, i t i s a l s o broader and more exhaustive than most other d e f i n i t i o n s i n one sense: i t i s suggested t h a t c o n t r o l can be achieved through a v a r i e t y o f methods such as changes i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , s t r a t e g i e s and p o l i c i e s , and use o f s e v e r a l procedures and power bases. Even changes i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l , communication and l e a d e r s h i p processes may be used as c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . Not many past d e f i n i t i o n s on c o n t r o l have viewed c o n t r o l i n t h i s broadest sense. For example, Dunbar's (1977) d e f i n i t i o n o f c o n t r o l focuses mainly on the a l l o c a t i o n procedures and o p e r a t i n g r u l e s without p l a c i n g too much emphasis on changes i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l processes w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n ; Anthony's (1965) d e f i n i t i o n emphasizes t h a t the key o b j e c t i v e o f a c o n t r o l system should be the e f f i c i e n t use o f resources a v a i l a b l e to the o r g a n i z a t i o n - p r i m a r i l y meaning attainment o f economic g o a l s . On the other hand, Lowe and Mclnnes (1971) suggest t h a t f a c i l i t a t i n g s u r v i v a l o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s the key g o a l o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l system. I t i s f e l t t h a t these goals p l u s a number o f others may be the o b j e c t i v e of 11 a c o n t r o l system. Indeed, many o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s may not be e c o n o m i c a l l y motivated at a l l . As Perrow (197 0) p o i n t e d out, q u i t e o f t e n o r g a n i z a t i o n s and groups may have d e r i v e d goals which may be p u r e l y p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l i n nature. However, c o n t r o l procedures are a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l even i n these cases. CLASSIFICATION OF CONTROL SYSTEMS: T y p i c a l l y , every o r g a n i z a t i o n uses a v a r i e t y o f c o n t r o l systems such as budgets, performance a p p r a i s a l s , p r o c e d u r a l manuals, management i n f o r m a t i o n , systems, v a r i a n c e r e p o r t s , and s t a n d a r d i z e d terms o f employment. In most o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f today there are p r o c e d u r a l and p o l i c y manuals which d e f i n e the -.: a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n f o r most r o u t i n e s i t u a t i o n s . Depending upon the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and s i t u a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a v a r i e t y o f the above c o n t r o l systems may be used by each o r g a n i z a t i o n to a t t a i n i t s o b j e c t i v e s . For t h i s purpose a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f e x i s t i n g c o n t r o l mechanisms may be found u s e f u l . However, i n the c u r r e n t s t a t e o f r e s e a r c h , no s i n g l e e xhaustive c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f c o n t r o l systems i s a v a i l a b l e although a number o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o f 12 c o n t r o l systems have been suggested i n the p a s t . Reeves and Woodward (1970) proposed two c o n t i n u a f o r c l a s s i f y i n g c o n t r o l systems: 'Personal-Mechanical' and 'Unitary-Fragmented'. The personal-mechanical dimension r e f e r s to how c o n t r o l i s e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . An example o f the p e r s o n a l c o n t r o l system i s a manager g i v i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s to h i s employees and m o n i t o r i n g t h e i r work p e r s o n a l l y w h i l e mechanical systems i n c l u d e a l l impersonal c o n t r o l s such as c o s t c o n t r o l and v a r i a n c e c o n t r o l . The unitary-fragmented dimension r e f e r s to how v a r i o u s c o n t r o l processes are l i n k e d w i t h each other. In ^ an u n i t a r y system a l l c o n t r o l systems w i l l be w e l l i n t e g r a t e d w h i l e i n a fragmented system they w i l l not be. Ouchi (1977) gave yet another c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f c o n t r o l systems depending upon whether they focus on changing the worker's behavior or output. ^ B e h a v i o r a l ' c o n t r o l systems focus on changing the worker's be h a v i o r w h i l e 'output' c o n t r o l i s concerned w i t h m o n i t o r i n g and c o n t r o l l i n g a c t u a l outputs. A l s o , u n l i k e b ehavior c o n t r o l s , i n .the case o f output c o n t r o l the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n process w i t h i n the f i r m need not be known at l . a l l , but r e l i a b l e and 13 v a l i d measures of the outputs must be a v a i l a b l e . In an i n t e r p e r s o n a l or i n t e r g r o u p context, an i n d i v i d u a l may t r y to i n f l u e n c e the o t h e r ' s b e h a v i o r by a v a r i e t y o f s t r a t e g i e s . P a u l S i t e s (1973) has suggested seven such s t r a t e g i e s : c u l t u r a l s t r a t e g i e s , exchange s t r a t e g i e s , c o e r c i v e s t r a t e g i e s , m a n i p u l a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s , c o a l i t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s , withdrawal s t r a t e g i e s and p r o c e d u r a l s t r a t e g i e s . While t h i s indeed seems to be an exhaustive l i s t o f s t r a t e g i e s open to an i n d i v i d u a l (or group) to i n f l u e n c e the other's behavior, f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f these s t r a t e g i e s i s needed b e f o r e t h i s typology can be advantageously used i n the context o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . A l s o , there appears to be some o v e r l a p among the v a r i o u s s t r a t e g i e s . No matter what type o f c o n t r o l system i s being used, the types o f data t h a t are generated i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r c o n t r o l purposes can be grouped i n t o f i n a n c i a l , p r o d u c t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e (Lawler, 1976). McMahon and I v a n c e v i c h (1976) have p r o v i d e d yet another broad c l a s s i f i c a t i o n based on the u n d e r l y i n g assumption o f a l l c o n t r o l systems: ' c l a s s i c a l ' and 'contemporary 1. The c l a s s i c a l model 14 assumes that c o n t r o l i s to be v e r t i c a l i n d i r e c t i o n , i s a f i x e d amount, i s u n i l a t e r a l and i s a f u n c t i o n o f s t r u c t u r e and a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . On the other hand, the contemporary model (which has a b e h a v i o r a l base) assumes that c o n t r o l flows i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s , i s a v a r i a b l e amount, performed by mutual understanding, and i s a f u n c t i o n o f i n t e r p e r s o -n a l i n f l u e n c e . V i c k e r s (1967) d i s t i n g u i s h e d between ' p o s i t i v e ' and 'negative' c o n t r o l s . P o s i t i v e c o n t r o l , a c c o r d i n g to V i c k e r s , i s a means whereby courses are chosen and kept so as to reach goals w h i l e n e g a t i v e c o n t r o l s are means whereby courses are changed so as to escape t h r e a t s . In p o s i t i v e c o n t r o l s , then, there must be a course, an 'ought-to-be' which the c o n t r o l l e r can compare w i t h the a c t u a l . A l s o , the assembly under c o n t r o l must be able to s e l e c t from the s i g n a l and make an apt response. Negative c o n t r o l s on the othe r hand, focus on keeping the system w i t h i n c r i t i c a l l i m i t s . C o n t r o l s o f b o i l e r p r e s s u r e and process temperature are good examples from e n g i n e e r i n g . In g e n e r a l , n e g a t i v e c o n t r o l s are a reminder t h a t every system works w i t h i n l i m i t s which can not be passed without d i s a s t e r . 15 Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1973) have p r o v i d e d another model of c o n t r o l l i n g a person's b e h a v i o r . A c c o r d i n g to them, the i n f l u e n c e modes t h a t a person may employ i n dyadic i n t e r a c t i o n s can be c l a s s i f i e d i n a 2 X 2 m a t r i x . The f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n i s between 'open' and 'manipulatory' modes o f i n f l u e n c e ; the second d i s t i n c t i o n i s between whether the source mediates reinforcements to the c o n t r o l l e e or not. The open-manipulatory dimension r e f e r s to the extent to which the source attempts to i n f l u e n c e another's behavior through open or c l a n d e s t i n e s t r a t e g i e s . The manipulatory attempts may take s e v e r a l forms, "but the i d e n t i f y i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s t h a t the source behaves as i f the t a r g e t were unaware t h a t i n f l u e n c e was b e i n g e x e r t e d or as i f the t a r g e t d i d not p e r c e i v e the source's own i n t e r e s t s i n making the i n f l u e n c e attempt" (Tedeschi et a l . , 1973, page 88). The authors suggest t h a t depending upon the o b j e c t i v e s o f the c o n t r o l l e r , s i t u a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the c o n t r o l l e r and the t a r g e t , d i f f e r e n t i n f l u e n c e modes may be a p p r o p r i a t e . In a r e c e n t a r t i c l e Ouchi and Johnson (1978) suggested two ' i d e a l ' types o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . The authors c a l l e d t h i s 'Type A' and "Type Z' c o n t r o l 16 systems. Type A i s a t i g h t l y monitored c o n t r o l system w h i l e Type Z maintains c o n t r o l through a process o f a c c u l t u r a t i o n or s o c i a l i z a t i o n o f employees. The Type A o r g a n i z a t i o n i n c o r p o r a t e s those elements o f a c o n t r o l meachanism which are adapted to h i g h r a t e s o f employee turnover and consequently e v a l u a t i o n o f employee performance takes p l a c e f r e q u e n t l y i n a Type A o r g a n i z a t i o n . The performance e v a l u a t i o n process i n such an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s o tends to be f o r m a l i z e d and to r e l y upon 'hard' measures which have h i g h apparent l e g i t i m a c y and i m p e r s o n a l i t y . F i n a l l y , i n a Type A o r g a n i z a t i o n c l o s e f r i e n d s h i p t i e s among employees are not formed to any great extent. The Type Z c o n t r o l system on the other hand emphasizes c o o r d i n a t i o n between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t s r a t h e r than s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . A Type Z o r g a n i z a t i o n may d i s p l a y s t r u c t u r a l l y the same l e v e l o f task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n as a Type A o r g a n i z a t i o n , but c a r e e r paths f o r employees w i l l tend to cut across s p e c i a l i t i e s , thus y i e l d i n g an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h h i g h s t r u c t u r a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n but low i n d i v i d u a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . The emphasis i n a Type Z o r g a n i z a t i o n i s on p a r t i c i p a t i v e r a t h e r than i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n making. Performance e v a l u a t i o n tends to take p l a c e over the long term, and 17 r e l i e s on s u b t l e , i n f o r m a l c r i t e r i a . F i n a l l y , the people i n t h i s type o f o r g a n i z a t i o n tend to develop broad i n t e r e s t i n and knowledge o f each o t h e r as a whole person i n c l u d i n g f a m i l y and ©mtside work a s s o c i a t i o n s . Ouchi and Johnson (1978) suggested t h a t each i d e a l type r e p r e s e n t e d a mechanism o f o r g a n i z a t -i o n a l c o n t r o l which i s a d a p t i v e toaa s p e c i f i c s o c i a l environment. The r e s e a r c h e r s observed t h a t many o f the U.S. companies tend to be Type A o r g a n i z a t i o n s where as Japanese o r g a n i z a t i o n s - t e n d to possess c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s i m i l a r to Type Z o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Nelson and Machin (1976) p r o v i d e d a framework f o r c l a s s i f y i n g c o n t r o l system dynamics t h a t focused more on the c o g n i t i v e aspects o f c o n t r o l . The r e s e a r -chers i d e n t i f i e d three o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o b j e c t i -ves: to promote e f f i c i e n c y , to assure i n t e r n a l i n t e g r a t i o n , and to f a c i l i t a t e i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h e x t e r n a l agencies. They then suggested t h a t depending upon the extent to which c o n t r o l l e r s were prepared to acknowledge t h e i r s u s c e p t a b i l i t y to e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s , c o n t r o l e f f o r t s might be d i r e c t e d towards three a l t e r n a t i v e environments: resource c o n t r o l , the c o n t r o l of interdependent i n t e r n a l commitments, and the c o n t r o l or r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h 18 e x t e r n a l agencies. A 3 X 3 m a t r i x made up o f d i f f e r e n t combinations o f c o n t r o l o b j e c t i v e s and c o n t r o l environments was generated f o r the purpose o f c l a s s i f y i n g v a r i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems. In h i s r e c e n t a r t i c l e , Dunbar (1979) i d e n t i f i e d f o u r l e v e l s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . These were c a l l e d : m e c h a n i s t i c , adaptive, c o g n i t i v e and s t r u c t u r a l . M e c h a n i s t i c c o n t r o l i s c l o s e d to e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s o f a system. The task to be c a r r i e d out i s regarded as f i x e d ; the goals and work r o u t i n e s are however c o n s i d e r e d changeable. Feedback i n the system r e l a t e s to system e f f i c i e n c y and task accomplishment. Adaptive c o n t r o l on the other hand i s open to e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s . The tasks are c o n s i d e r e d v a r i a b l e and the feedback i s focused on i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l - e n v i r o n m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Organiza-t i o n a l plans are, however, c o n s i d e r e d f i x e d a t l e a s t i n ths s h o r t run. At the c o g n i t i v e c o n t r o l l e v e l , the focus i s on i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n c o l l e c t e d . Feedback p r o v i d e s i n f o r m a t i o n on deviances from p r e d i c t i o n s and on e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f a c t i o n p l a n s . Where feedback i n d i c a t e s t h a t standards are not b e i n g met, members o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n may modify t h e i r plans' or images o f o r g a n i z a t i o n or both. At the 19 s t r u c t u r a l l e v e l , c o n t r o l may be based on u n i v e r s a l s e l f o r g a n i z i n g p r i n c i p l e s or h i e r a r c h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s r e l e v a n t to p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l . members' p r e f e r e n c e s f o r the s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l system, however, remain f i x e d . Dunbar (1979) p o i n t s out t h a t h i g h e r l e v e l c o n t r o l systems ( v i z . , s t r u c t u r a l , c o g n i t i v e ) focus on q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t v a r i a b l e s and feedback i n f o r m a t i o n more than lower l e v e l systems (e.g., m e c h a n i s t i c ) . The f i n a l typology o f c o n t r o l systems that w i l l be b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e d here i s the one g i v e n by Lawler arrd Rhode (1976) . The above r e s e a r c h e r s c l a s s i f i e d a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems i n t o two broad c a t e g o r i e s : those producing h i g h e x t r i n s i c work m o t i v a t i o n , and those producing h i g h i n t r i n s i c work m o t i v a t i o n . Figure"'-1.1 shows the key c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f c o n t r o l systems t h a t produce h i g h e x t r i n s i c and i n t r i n s i c work m o t i v a t i o n i n employees. The f i g u r e i s s e l f e x p l a n a t o r y . The authors emphasize t h a t d i f f e r e n t combinations o f these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s have w i d e l y d i f f e r i n g consequences on p r o d u c t i v i t y , s a t i s f a c t i o n , d e f e n s i v e n e s s , r i g i d i t y , and i n f o r m a t i o n r e p o r t i n g b e h a v i o r o f the controllee.„ Of course, the importance o f the. d i f f e r e n t ..dimensions v a r i e s as a FIGURE 1.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS PRODUCING HIGH EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC MOTIVATION I n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g work s i t u a t i o n s E x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g work s i t u a t i o n s C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f sensor measures Nature o f standards Source o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n Reeepient of communication A. Complete B. O b j e c t i v e C. Influenceahke D. Set by person being measured E. Moderately d i f f i c u l t F. Person being measured or other c r e d i b l e source G. Person being measured Speed o f communication H. Immediate Frequency of communis c a t i o n Type o f a c t i v i t y I. Close to time span f o r job J . High autonomy K. High task i d e n t i t y L. High v a r i e t y A. Complete B. O b j e c t i v e C. I n f l u e n c e a b l e D. J o i n t process between person and s u p e r v i s o r E. Moderately d i f f i c u l t F. J o i n t process between per-son & other t r u s t e d person( G. Person with reward power, person being measured and others doing s i m i l a r work H. Fast I. As f a s t as allowed by the time span o f d i s c r e t i o n J . Not a c r u c i a l f a c t o r (Source: Lawler & Rhode, 1976) 21 f u n c t i o n o f the b e h a v i o r a l r e a c t i o n and group o f people b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d . F i n a l l y , i t should be noted t h a t some o f these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are continuous w h i l e others are not. In the p r e v i o u s p f i g u r e ( f i g u r e I.1) the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s A, B, C, E, H, I, and J a c c o r d i n g to the authors, can be thought o f as continuous v a r i a b l e s and the others as d i s c r e t e . Summary: The past w r i t i n g s on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l have c l a s s i f i e d c o n t r o l systems i n t o v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s on the b a s i s o f t h e i r s i m i l a r i t y and d i s s i m i l a r i t y on s p e c i f i c dimensions. At present, there seems to be nolzexhaustive c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f c o n t r o l systems c o v e r i n g a l l the dimensions o f c o n t r o l b ehavior. Reeves and Woodward's (1970) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f c o n t r o l systems deals p r i m a r i l y w i t h the mode of e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n . Ouchi's (1977) model again simply focused on the c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c s o f sensor measures, namely output versus b e h a v i o r of the c o n t r o l l e e . McMahon and Ivancevich's (1976) typology c o n c e n t r a t e d mostly on the assumptions behind s e v e r a l c o n t r o l systems. S i m i l a r comments can be made about other e x i s t i n g t y p o l o g i e s o f c o n t r o l systems. I t i s suggested t h a t c o n t r o l systems are 22 i n e x o r a b l y l i n k e d to p r e v a i l i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , managerial and m o t i v a t i o n a l s t y l e s used w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , goals o f the f i r m , and the g e n e r a l p r e v a i l i n g a t t i t u d e s w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Hence, any exhaustive typology o f c o n t r o l systems should d e s c r i b e the o b j e c t i v e s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n i n g e n e r a l and those o f the f o c a l c o n t r o l system i n p a r t i c u l a r , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l processes and behaviors a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the c o n t r o l system, s t r u c t u r e o f the c o n t r o l system, and the managerial s t y l e and assumptions w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . The typology g i v e n by kawler and Rhode seems to be a b e t t e r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d s i n c e t h e i r typology i d e n t i f i e s a number o f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f c o n t r o l systems t h a t have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the s t r u c t u r e , processes, and behavior w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . However, even here the impact o f v v a r i o u s f a c t o r s such as o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , p e r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the s u p e r v i s o r and the s u b o r d i n a t e s , and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c l i m a t e have not been e x p l i c i t l y c o n s i d e r e d . DYSFUNCTIONAL EFFECTS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS: T h i s chapter w i l l not be complete without a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n on the d y s f u n c t i o n a l e f f e c t s of 23 c o n t r o l systems. S e v e r a l w r i t e r s have p o i n t e d out i n the past t h a t c o n t r o l systems i n l a r g e b u r e a u c r a c i e s o f t e n work a g a i n s t , r a t h e r than toward, the accompli-shment o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l goals.(Merton, 1940; S e l z n i c k , 1949; and Gouldner, 1954). T h i s consequence has been a t t r i b u t e d to the r i g i d b u r e a u c r a t i c b e h a v i o r t h a t seems to emerge i n these o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In ge n e r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members tend to act i n ways which w i l l make them look good on the measures t h a t are used by c o n t r o l systems. In s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s , t h i s may l e a d to d y s f u n c t i o n a l consequences f o r the l a r g e r organization:?„ For example, Babchuk and Goode (1951) show how c o n t r o l systems when combined w i t h reward can l e a d to d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . These i n v e s t i g a t o r s s t u d i e d the s a l e s d i v i s i o n o f a l a r g e department sfcfrre where a pay i n c e n t i v e p l a n was i n t r o d u c e d to reward the employees on the b a s i s o f i n d i v i d u a l s a l e s volume. The r e s u l t was i n c r e a s e d c o m p e t i t i o n among the employees, n e g l e c t o f long term goals o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n , and i n g e n e r a l g r e a t c o n f u s i o n . For example, there was c o n s i d e r a b l e 'sales grabbing' and ' t y i n g up the tr a d e ' as w e l l as a g e n e r a l n e g l e c t o f such unrewarded and unmeasured f u n c t i o n s as stock work 24 and a r r a n g i n g merchandise f o r d i s p l a y s . B l a u (1955) a l s o c i t e s an example o f d y s f u n c t i o n a l outcomes o f some c o n t r o l systems. He analyzed the o p e r a t i o n o f a department i n the p u b l i c employment agency of a s t a t e government. The s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e o f the agency was " t o serve workers seeking employment and employers seeking workers'1' (Blau, 1955; page 19). For t h i s purpose, the agency performed a v a r i e t y of f u n c t i o n s such as i n t e r v i e w i n g c l i e n t s , h e l p i n g them to f i l l out a p p l i c a t i o n forms, c o u n s e l l i n g them, and r e f e r r i n g them to p r o s p e c t i v e employers. The o r g a n i -z a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d a l l the a c t i v i t i e s to be very important f o r accomplishment o f i t s major o b j e c t i v e mentioned above. The management a l s o i n s t i t u t e d a c o n t r o l system to make sure t h a t these f u n c t i o n s were indeed performed.well. To e v a l u a t e the performance of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r v i e w e r s , managers kept records o f such things as the number o f i n t e r v i e w s conducted.rby each employee. The r e s u l t s were however, q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those expected by the managers. Employees ( i n t e r v i e w e r s ) performed onl y those k i n d s o f behaviors t h a t were measured by the system (e.g., i n t e r v i e w i n g ) . They avoided o p e r a t i o n s which would take time without h e l p i n g them 25 to improve t h e i r ( i n t e r v i e w ) r e c o r d , such as i n t e r v i e w i n g c l i e n t s f o r whom a p p l i c a t i o n forms had to be made out. They wasted t h e i r own time and the p u b l i c ' s time on a c t i v i t i e s which d i d not i n any way l e a d to the accomplishment of the o v e r a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e but which would improve t h e i r r e c o r d . Blau f u r t h e r notes t h a t the i n t e r v i e w e r s ' . c o n c e n t r a t i o n on t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l g o a l s made them unresponsive to any requests from c l i e n t s and p u b l i c which would i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e i r g o a l attainment. I t i s p o s s i b l e to c i t e s e v e r a l other examples of s i t u a t i o n s where c o n t r o l systems l e d to d y s f u n c t i o n a l behavior on the p a r t of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members. The views of a number of s o c i o l o g i s t s on b u r e a u c r a t i c behavior have been summarized by March and Simon (1958). Merton's (1940) e x p l a n a t i o n of the emergence of b u r e a u c r a t i c behavior i s shown Ih F i g u r e 1.2. I t shows that r i g i d i t y stems from the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s emphasis on r e l i a b i l i t y and from the f e l t need f o r d e f e n s i b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s . But as Rhode and Lawler (1976) note, t h i s model does not e x p l a i n why a l l i n d i v i d u a l s do not respond t h i s way to the emphasis on r e l i a b i l i t y . Indeed, Frank (1959) has noted how some managers v i o l a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r u l e s FIGURE 1.2 SIMPLIFIED MERTON MODEL OF CONTROL WHICH LEADS TO BUREAUCRATIC AND DYS-FUNCTIONAL MEMBER BEHAVIOR Demand f o r c o n t r o l D e f e n s i b i l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n J Emphasis on 3 r e l i a b i l i t y R i g i d i t y o f behavior; o r g a n i z a t i o n a l defense o f status. i\ A m o u n t n o f o d i f f i c u l t y w i t h c l i e n t s F e l t need f o r d e f e n s i b i l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n Intended r e s u l t s Unintended r e s u l t s (Source: March & Simon, 1958) 27 and standards i n order to keep t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s f u n c t i o n i n g e f f e c t i v e l y . I t would seem t h a t s e v e r a l i n d i v i d u a l , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , t a s k - r e l a t e d , and c o n t r o l system c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n t e r a c t to decide the s p e c i f i c outcomes o f c o n t r o l systems i n each case. Lawler (1976) suggests t h a t the d y s f u n c t i o n a l e f f e c t s o f c o n t r o l systems can be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o three maj or heads: 1- Emergence o f r i g i d b u r e a u c r a t i c behavior: as r mentioned above, r i g i d i t y i n procedures and beh a v i o r seems to occur i n most b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Lawler suggests a v a r i e t y o f s i t u a t i o n s when such i n f l e x i b l e and b u r e a u c r a t i c behavior may emerge. These are: a. when a l l behaviors an i n d i v i d u a l performs are not measured, b. when the standards are seen by p a r t i c i p a n t s as unreasonable, c. when the person(s) who s e t s . t h e standards has low e x p e r t i s e and l e g i t i m a c y , d. when the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f u n c t i o n i s performed by some one other than the a c t o r whose performance i s be i n g measured, e. when h i g h rewards, are t i e d o n l y to c e r t a i n (or:.:a s m a l l number) o f b e h a v i o r s , f. when o r g a n i z a t i o n a l goals are not very c l e a r to the p a r t i c i p a n t ( s . ) and/or are not w e l l - a c c e p t e d by them, and. g. when a h i g h l e v e l o f subunit i d e n t i f i c a t i o n e x i s t s w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 28 2. P r o d u c t i o n o,f i n v a l i d i n f o r m a t i o n : C o n t r o l systems may* generate two k i n d s o f i n v a l i d data: i n v a l i d data about what bas been done and i n v a l i d data about what can be done. The f i r s t k i n d makes c o n t r o l o f day-to-day a c t i v i t i e s v ery d i f f i c u l t w h i l e the second makes p l a n n i n g v e r y d i f f i c u l t . A c c o r d i n g to Lawler, some of the c o n d i t i o n s which f a c i l i t a t e the emergence of i n v a l i d data i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s are: a. when the data are s u b j e c t i v e i n nature, b. when the data are measuring a dimension t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l sees as r e f l e c t i n g on h i s or or her competence i n the area, c. when the standards are set by a process which does not permit p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the i n d i v i d u a l s being measured and standards are seen by them as unreasonable, d. when the i n d i v i d u a l has c o n t r o l over the i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r i n g and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f u n c t i o n , e. when the i n f o r m a t i o n i s being passed to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s s u p e r i o r who uses i t as a b a s i s f o r rewarding or p u n i s h i n g the i n d i v i d u a l . f. when the i n d i v i d u a l v a l u e s the rewards that are r e l a t e d to the data and the i n d i v i d u a l i s a l i e n a t e d from the system, g. when the outcomes of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s performance are d i f f i c u l t to measure, h. when the a c t i v i t y i s r e l a t i v e l y unimportant f o r the e f f e c t i v e and continued s u r v i v a l o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n , and i . when s e v e r a l l i n k s e x i s t i n the communication channel through which the i n f o r m a t i o n has to t r a v e l b e f o r e i t reaches the c o n t r o l l e r . 2 9 3. R e s i s t a n c e to c o n t r o l systems: C o n t r o l systems may be seen as t h r e a t s to the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f many i n d i v i d u a l needs and hence r e s i s t e d by i n d i v i d u a l s and groups w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . C o n t r o l systems may a l s o change the e x i s t i n g power r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n - another reason why they may be r e s i s t e d by i n d i v i d u a l s and groups who h o l d r e i n s o f power w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Some s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s and c o n t r o l system c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which generate h i g h r e s i s t a n c e to c o n t r o l systems a c c o r d i n g to Lawler are: a. when the proposed c o n t r o l system r e p l a c e s a system t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members.have a h i g h stake i n m a i n t a i n i n g , b. when the performance standards are s e t without any member p a r t i c i p a t i o n , c. when the r e s u l t s from the c o n t r o l system are not f e d back to the people whose performance i s measured, d. when the c o n t r o l system measures performance i n a new area, e. when the r e s u l t s from the c o n t r o l system are used as the b a s i s o f d i s t r i b u t i n g key rewards w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , r:::A f . when the people who are a f f e c t e d by the y.'.r.. proposed system are r e l a t i v e l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h things as they are and they see themselves as committed to the o r g a n i z a t i o n , and g. when the people who are a f f e c t e d by the system are low i n s e l f esteem and a u t h o r i t a r i a n . 30 The above d i s c u s s i o n should not be taken to mean that most people r e s i s t c o n t r o l systems. As Lawler (1976) p o i n t e d out, c o n t r o l systems f u l f i l l some o f the important needs o f people and f o r t h i s reason many i n d i v i d u a l s d e s i r e to have a good c o n t r o l system w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Lawler a l s o notes that the employees i n many cases express a sense o f ambivalence toward c o n t r o l systems. In sum, c o n t r o l systems when w e l l planned and p r o p e r l y i n s t i t u t e d can b r i n g s e v e r a l b e n e f i t s to the o r g a n i z a t i o n . The more important c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f c o n t r o l systems to o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n c l u d e : 1) they pr o v i d e a means o f measuring a c t u a l performance o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n , i t s subunits and members and compare these w i t h predetermined o b j e c t i v e s thus e n a b l i n g the d e c i s i o n makers to i n i t i a t e c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n s wherever necessary, 2) they p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r performance e v a l u a t i o n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members, 3) when p r o p e r l y i n s t i t u t e d , they i n c r e a s e the work m o t i v a t i o n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members and groups, 4) they help to c o o r d i n a t e the a c t i v i t i e s o f v a r i o u s subunits thus l e a d i n g to h i g h e r g o a l congruence w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , and 5.) i n some i n s t a n c e s they p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n to e x t e r n a l agencies which guide thexiiagencies i n t h e i r d e a l i n g s w i t h the 31 o r g a n i z a t i o n . However, i f the c o n t r o l system i s not p r o p e r l y designed and wel l - e x e c u t e d , i t can a l s o generate s e v e r a l d y s f u n c t i o n a l b e h a v i o r s on the p a r t o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members. As Lawler and Rhode (1976) p o i n t e d out, d y s f u n c t i o n a l behaviors are most l i k e l y to emerge when: a. sensor measures used by the system are incomplete, s u b j e c t i v e , and u n i n f l u e n c e a b l e by o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members and groups, b. the performance standards used by the system are s et without any p a r t i c i p a t i o n from members whose performance i s b e i n g . e v a l u a t e d n.and are very d i f f i c u l t to a t t a i n , c. when the a c t i v i t y b e i n g measured i s very important to the o r g a n i z a t i o n , d. when the speed and frequency o f communication e::of r e s u l t s i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e , e. when the r e c i p i e n t s o f communication are s u p e r i o r s who have reward power, and f . when the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f u n c t i o n i s performed by someone other than the person b e i n g e v a l u a t e d . Of course, we may never be ab l e to achieve a ' p e r f e c t ' c o n t r o l system which e l i m i n a t e s a l l d y s f u n c t i o n a l outcomes. What we are aiming at u s u a l l y : i s to design a system whose b e n e f i t s f a r exceed the a s s o c i a t e d problems and c o s t s . The purpose of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n i s to make a smal l c o n t r i b u t i o n to the search f o r a u s e f u l and v i a b l e c o n t r o l system. S p e c i f i c hypotheses 32 and research proposals are set fo r t h i n l a t e r chapters. Before proceeding to them, i t w i l l be useful to b r i e f l y review the past research on control systems. This w i l l be done i n the next chapter. 33 CHAPTER I I AN OVERVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH ON ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS The p a s t r e s e a r c h on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems can be b r o a d l y c l a s s i f i e d i n t o f o u r major groups: the s t r u c t u r a l , environmental, t e c h n o l o g i c a l and p e r s o n a l i s -t i c approaches to c o n t r o l . An overview of the major f i n d i n g s on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems under these headings i s p r o v i d e d here. THE STRUCTURAL VIEWS: T r a d i t i o n a l l y , i n the l i t e r a t u r e on o r g a n i z a t i o n s , c o n t r o l and s t r u c t u r e have not been c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from each o t h e r . Max Weber (1947) f o r i n s t a n c e , suggested a theory o f b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l or o f b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e or both. Graicunas (1937) d i s c u s s e d c o n t r o l problems between i n d i v i d u a l s i n a p u r e l y s t r u c t u r a l manner. That the c o n t r o l system of an o r g a n i z a t i o n i s c l o s e l y embedded i n i t s s t r u c t u r e was p o i n t e d out by Caplow (195 7), and Anderson and Warkov (1961). Other w r i t e r s l i k e March and Simon (1958), B l a u and S c o t t (1962), and Katz and Kahn (1966) 34 have a l s o d i s c u s s e d c o n t r o l systems i n s i m i l a r v e i n s . T h i s ' s t r u c t u r a l i s t 1 or ' c l o s e d system p e r s p e c t i v e ' has l e d to the assumption t h a t c o n t r o l i s to occur i n a c l o s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l system (Dunbar, 1977). For example, i n Weber's b u r e a u c r a t i c model, the i d e a o f impersonal r a t i o n a l i t y i s fundamental to the b u r e a u c r a t i c n o t i o n o f c o n t r o l . The tasks to be accomplished are assumed to be known and w e l l d e f i n e d and the manager's job i s to r a t i o n a l l y design a c o n t r o l system to achieve these t a s k s . I d e a l l y , the p e r s o n a l views, i n c l i n a t i o n s and i d i o s y n c r a c i e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members should not be co n s i d e r e d when de s i g n i n g c o n t r o l systems. The c o n t r o l system should be h i e r a r c h i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d w i t h t h e . u l t i m a t e c o n t r o l l e r o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n h o l d i n g the p o s i t i o n at the top o f the h i e r a r c h y . Bennis (1959) c r i t i c i z i n g t h i s model has p o i n t e d out t h a t the b u r e a u c r a t i c model has tended to deny the very presence of people i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Max Weber, h i m s e l f , as quoted i n Bennis (1973), a l s o saw and deplored t h i s t r e n d towards i m p e r s o n a l i t y which can be seen i n today's b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Indeed, as Reich (1975) found b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s may c r e a t e f e e l i n g s o f h e l p l e s s n e s s and a l i e n a t i o n among i t s members. 35 A r g y r i s (1971), L e a v i t t (1962), and L i k e r t (1967) have a l s o p o i n t e d out i n gre a t d e t a i l the n e g a t i v e consequences of such a b u r e a u c r a t i c p e r s p e c t i v e of c o n t r o l i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Pugh, Hickson, H i n i n g s , McDonald and Turner (1968; 1969) suggested three major methods of e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s : c o n t r o l through c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , c o n t r o l through s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and c o n t r o l through s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n . S e v e r a l o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e measures of each of these types of c o n t r o l are a v a i l a b l e today; however, the f i n d i n g by Payne and Pugh (1976) t h a t the r e l a t i o n s between o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e measures of these c o n s t r u c t s i s o f t e n u n c l e a r should be c a r e f u l l y noted. C e n t r a l i z a t i o n of a l l d e c i s i o n making a u t h o r i t y i s one major form of e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l i n o r g a n i z a -t i o n s . Pugh e t . a l (1968) o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d c o n t r o l through c e n t r a l i z a t i o n by developing a l i s t of t h i r t y r e c u r r e n t d e c i s i o n s which o r g a n i z a t i o n s t y p i c a l l y make i n the course of t h e i r day to day a c t i v i t i e s . They are made at lower l e v e l s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y . The c e n t r a l i z a t i o n score f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n was obtained by summing these assessments. Holdaway, Newberry, Hickson and Heron (1975) developed 36 s i m i l a r measures to assess the ex t e n t o f c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n c o l l e g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A l t e r n a t i v e measures of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n were proposed by B e l l (1966), Hage and Aike n (1967) and C h i l d (1973). In l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s i t i s almost i m p o s s i b l e to make a l l c o n t r o l d e c i s i o n s by a s i n g l e c o n t r o l l e r . By d i v i d i n g the work to be done i n t o s p e c i a l i z a t i o n s and then a s s i g n i n g , t h e s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to i n d i v i d u a l members whose ^ . a c t i v i t i e s are then c o n s t r a i n e d to these a s s i g n e d f u n c t i o n s , a c o n t r o l l e r can t h e o r e t i c a l l y delegate d e c i s i o n making a u t h o r i t y to lower l e v e l s b u t i . s t i l l m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l . To o p e r a t i o n a l i z e t h i s concept, Pugh e t . a l (1968) i d e n t i f i e d a l i s t o f s i x t e e n s p e c i a l i z e d a c t i v i t i e s common to a l l o r g a n i z a -t i o n s . By counting the number o f s p e c i a l i z e d a c t i v i -t i e s which were performed by o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members, comparisons across o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o u l d be made. Holdaway e t . a l (1975) developed a s i m i l a r measure o f s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . B l a u and Schoenherr (1971) and H a l l , Haas and Johnson (1967) proposed that degree o f s p e c i a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o u l d be measured by simply counting the major d i v i s i o n s and departments i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n . B l a u and Schoenherr (1971) proposed the number of d i f f e r e n t job t i t l e s u t i l i z e d 37 by an organization as yet another measure of the extent of role s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . A t h i r d way a c o n t r o l l e r can exercise control i s by defining and standardizing work practices. Fixed procedures for recurring situations are established and then followed invariably (Hickson, 1965). Pugh e t . a l (1968) operationalized this concept by developing a l i s t of thirteen procedures, including a c t i v i t i e s such as inspection, stock control, f i n a n c i a l control, which could be standardized by an organization. The researchers then u t i l i z e d 157 rather heterogeneous rat i n g scales to assess the extent to which these a c t i v i t i e s were, i n fact, standardized. Hage (1965) proposed that standardization can be measured by the proportion of jobs within an organization for which formal job descriptions exist and the extent to which v a r i a t i o n i n a c t i v i t y i s not allowed for i n these descriptions. Blau and Schoenherr (1971) measured standardization by assessing the extent to which the performance evaluation reports focused on standard a c t i v i t i e s . One s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c that seems to be more or less consistently related to the type of organizational control systems i s the size of the 38 o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , as o r g a n i z a t i o n s grow i n s i z e they would tend to be more d e c e n t r a l i z e d , to have more s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s and to have more s t a n d a r d i z e d procedures. E m p i r i c a l l y , however, i t has been found t h a t these tend to be n o n - l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s . . ^ Thus t h e o r e t i c a l l y w h i l e an i n v e r s e r e l a -t i o n s h i p between the. s i z e o f the u n i t and the degree of c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l may}-be expected t h i s does not always seem to happen. The i n c r e a s e i n d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n tapers o f f as o r g a n i z a t i o n : s i z e becomes l a r g e r (Blau, 1955; Starbuck, 1965). Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Shoek, and R o s e n t h a l (1964) suggested that t h i s phenomenon may be a t t r i b u t a b l e to an a v e r s i o n to the o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r e s s that emerges w i t h any i n c r e a s e i n v a r i e t y i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Payneeand-Pughi(1976) haveasummarized the r e s u l t s of a number o f s t u d i e s r e l a t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i z e w i t h d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n . In g e n e r a l , the a v a i l a b l e e m p i r i c a l evidence seems to support the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , s p e c i a l i -z a t i o n and " s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n g e n e r a l l y i n c r e a s e w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n s i z e . The s u p e r v i s o r y span of c o n t r o l tends to i n c r e a s e as o r g a n i z a t i o n s become l a r g e r i n s i z e (Starbuck, 1965; Ouchi 6c Dowling, 1974: Blau, Falbe, McKinley & Tracy, 1976). 39 Th i s i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s i z e and c e n t r a l i z a t i o n may however occur o n l y i n business o r g a n i z a t i o n s . B l a u e t . a l (1976), f o r example, found th a t i n c r e a s e d s i z e i n p u b l i c p e r s o n n e l agencies i n f a c t r e s u l t e d i n more c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f d e c i s i o n makingp S i m i l a r l y , Holdaway e t . a l (1975) i n a study o f Canadian c o l l e g e s , found that c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as w e l l as s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n were a l l p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h s i z e . The s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between s i z e , s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n may a l s o be d i f f e r e n t f o r d i f f e r e n t types of o r g a n i z a t i o n s (Dunbar, 1977). A few r e s e a r c h e r s i n the pas t have focused on the s p e c i f i c methods o f c o n t r o l adopted by b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s as they grow i n s i z e . M a n s f i e l d (1973) proposed t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i z e c o u l d a c t as a contingency v a r i a b l e which determined the type o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g y u t i l i z e d . M a n s f i e l d r e a n a l y z e d the data e a r l i e r c o l l e c t e d by C h i l d (1972), d i s t i n g u i s h i n g sub-samples s t r a t i f i e d by o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i z e . I t was found t h a t f o r l a r g e b usiness o r g a n i z a t i o n s (with average number o f employees = 6,348) the r e l a t i o n s h i p between c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n was n e g a t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t (Pearson r = -.67). 40 On the oth e r hand, f o r r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s (with average number o f employees = 150), the same r e l a t i o n s h i p was s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o s i t i v e (Pearson r = .51). M a n s f i e l d suggested t h a t i n the s m a l l f i r m s the s p e c i a -l i s t s were probably c l o s e a d v i s o r s to the top managers. By u t i l i z i n g s p e c i a l i s t s e r v i c e , the top managers c o u l d s t i l l m a i n t a i n a good knowledge o f the day to day a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s and e x e r t c o n t r o l over them. In l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , however, i t was not p o s s i b l e f o r the s p e c i a l i s t to c o n s u l t f r e q u e n t l y w i t h the top managers and hence d e c i s i o n making had to be d e c e n t r a l i z e d . M a n s f i e l d a l s o found t h a t c o r r e l a t i o n s between c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n were g e n e r a l l y low f o r s m a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . These c o r r e l a t i o n s were a l s o not c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r d i r e c t i o n across a l l s m a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The c o r r e l a t i o n s became l a r g e r and c o n s i s t e n t l y n e g a t i v e as the s i z e o f t h e z o r g a n i z a t i o n i n c r e a s e d . M a n s f i e l d concluded t h a t the r e l a t i o n between c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n was probably weakly n e g a t i v e . Ouchi and Maguire (1975) found t h a t as respondents were h i g h e r up i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y , they were more l i k e l y to r e l y on s t a n d a r d i z e d records o f output performance to e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l . As respondents were i n a lower h i e r a r c h i c a l p o s i t i o n , they 41 were more l i k e l y to use closer., i n d i v i d u a l i z e d s u p e r v i s i o n to c o n t r o l s u b o r d i n a t e s ' b e h a v i o r . Thus a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n was o b s e r v e d I n t h i s study. Ouchi and Maguire a l s o found that the two c o n t r o l methods i n the same o r g a n i z a t i o n were independent o f each other. E a r l i e r , Hage and A i k e n (1967) had r e p o r t e d s i m i l a r f i n d i n g s : i n t h e i r study o f s i x t e e n s o c i a l w e l f a r e and h e a l t h agencies, no s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n was found. Given these f i n d i n g s , i t seems unwise to p o s t u l a t e any s p e c i f i c type o f r e l a t i o n s h i p between c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n , s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n f o r a l l types o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s (Dunbar, 1977). In summary, d i f f e r e n t methods o f b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l s are used by o r g a n i z a t i o n s more or l e s s independently of one another and there seems to be no ground to assume t h a t s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s alone determine the type o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g y chosen by any s p e c i f i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . As Barnard (1938) argued, e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s i s l i k e l y to be a h i g h l y p e r s o n a l and i n d i v i d u a l . p r o c e s s involvingajmany emotion provoking changes r a t h e r than i m p e r s o n a l l y - r a t i o n a l and unchanging r o l e s which are imposed from h i g h e r l e v e l s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n . 42 THE ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH TO CONTROL: S e v e r a l past s t u d i e s have focused on environmental u n c e r t a i n t y as a c r i t i c a l dimension a f f e c t i n g the c o n t r o l s t r a t e g y chosen by the management o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n . In t h e i r c l a s s i c study, Burns and S t a l k e r (1961) concluded t h a t there e x i s t e d two r e l a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t approaches to management c o n t r o l systems and t h a t these approaches were i n l a r g e measure a f u n c t i o n o f ' t h e r e l a t i v e degree o f s t a b i l i t y i n the e x t e r n a l environment. 'Mechanistic' systems (found i n r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e environments) are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f c o n t r o l and a u t h o r i t y , a hjfcghgdegree o f task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and p r i m a r i l y v e r t i c a l l i n e s o f communication. 'Organic' systems, on the other hand, were found to e x h i b i t a h i g h e r degree o f task interdependence, more d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of c o n t r o l and a u t h o r i t y , and more h o r i z o n t a l communication w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Chandler (1962) a f t e r s t u d y i n g the growth and development o f n e a r l y one hundred major U.S.'^business o r g a n i z a t i o n s concluded t h a t each major change i n s t r u c t u r e i n these o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e s u l t e d from environmental s h i f t s t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e d such changes, a g a i n i m p l y i n g t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f c o n t r o l systems i s a f u n c t i o n of the 43 environments surrounding the organizations.... In another important study, Lawrence and L o r s c h (1967) concluded t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n s o p e r a t i n g i n more dynamic and complex environments (e.g., the p l a s t i c s i n d u s t r y ) r e q u i r e d a g r e a t e r degree o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between f u n c t i o n a l departments than d i d those f i r m s o p e r a t i n g i n l e s s t u r b u l e n t environments. A l s o , more e f f e c t i v e f i r ms i n each i n d u s t r y had h i g h e r scores on both d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n . The authors concluded t h a t d i f f e r e n t environments c a l l f o r v a r y i n g s t r u c t u r a l approaches to i n t e g r a t i o n . For example, o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h v e r y t u r b u l e n t environments employed a formal i n t e g r a t i n g department w h i l e i n moderately dynamic environments only i n d i v i d u a l i n t e g r a t o r s were employed. The r e s u l t s of Dornbusch and S c o t t ' s (1975) study supported the f i n d i n g s o f Lawrence and L o r s c h . Dornbusch and S c o t t found t h a t the number o f persons i n v o l v e d i n c o o r d i n a t i o n o f c o n t r o l a c t i v i t i e s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r i n a p r o f e s s s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n (e.g., a:.,hospital) than i n a f i r m u s i n g assembly l i n e p r o d u c t i o n techniques (e.g., an e l e c t r o n i c s f i r m ) . T h i s was mainly a t t r i b u t a b l e , a c c o r d i n g to the 44 r e s e a r c h e r s , to the r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y o f environment surrounding the simple o p e r a t i o n s o f assembly l i n e j o b s . The environment o f a p r o f e s s i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n on the other hand i s more v a r i a b l e which n e c e s s i t a t e s 'more d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n (and hence more c o o r d i n a t i o n ) o f c o n t r o l e f f o r t s w i t h i n the u n i t . Duncan (1973) suggested t h a t as the v a r i a t i o n i n the environment was p e r c e i v e d to be h i g h l y u n c e r t a i n , d i f f e r e n t types o f o r g a n i z i n g s t r u c t u r e s were u t i l i z e d to make r o u t i n e as opposed to non-routine d e c i s i o n s . When the environment was p e r c e i v e d to be u n c e r t a i n but c o n t r o l l a b l e , more s t r u c t u r e d procedures and more impersonal methods were used to make r o u t i n e d e c i s i o n s ; l e s s s t r u c t u r e d , more p e r s o n a l approaches were adopted to make non-routine d e c i s i o n s . .C T h i s s t i l l leaves us w i t h the qu e s t i o n , how i s the o p t i m a l amount o f s t r u c t u r e tov.be determined? Weick (1969) has suggested t h a t the o b j e c t i v e should be to design a system t h a t has the necessary v a r i e t y of response-generating c a p a c i t y to remove the e q u i v o c a l i t y i n the environment i n such a way that c o n t r o l o b j e c t i v e s are achieved. T h i s means t h a t i f a c h i e v i n g c o n t r o l w i t h minimum co s t and maximum; e f f i c i e n c y are the o b j e c t i v e s of the designer (of 45 c o n t r o l systems), then he/she should a l s o attempt to remove any e q u i v o c a l i t y i n the c o n t r o l system which i s not needed to match environmental e q u i v o c a l i t y . Table II.1 summarizes the r e l a t i o n s h i p between environmental v a r i a b i l i t y and response-generating c a p a c i t y of the c o n t r o l system as d i s c u s s e d by Dunbar (1977; page 29). A s i m i l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n from a somewhat d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e i s presented i n Hage (1974). Two c e l l s i n the t a b l e d e s c r i b e a congruence between environmental v a r i a b i l i t y ; the two other c e l l s denote incongruent s i t u a t i o n s . When there i s too much s t r u c t u r i n g and too l i t t l e response g e n e r a t i n g c a p a c i t y , the members of the c o n t r o l system may become i n v o l v e d i n too many i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s and e v e n t u a l l y l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h the environment to be c o n t r o l l e d . With too much response g e n e r a t i n g c a p a c i t y , new environments which are beyond the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s c o n t r o l s are enacted. In both s i t u a t i o n s , the o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l l o s e c o n t r o l over i t s a c t i v i t i e s . Nemiroff and Ford (1976) have p r o v i d e d a contingency model of c o n t r o l somewhat r e l a t e d to the above schemet of Dunbar. The above d i s c u s s i o n i s not intended to be an exhaustive review of a l l past s t u d i e s r e l a t i n g c h o i c e of c o n t r o l systems to environmental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 46 TABLE I I . 1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIORNMENTAL VARIABILITY AND RESPONSE-GENERATING CAPACITY OF CONTROL SYSTEMS C o n t r o l system has r e l a t i v e l y Low response-g e n e r a t i n g c a p a c i t y Low v a r i a b i l i t y High s t r u c t u r e Congruent: High v a r i a b i l i t y High s t r u c t u r e Incongruent: P r o t e c t e d by subunits at orga-n i z a t i o n a l bound-a r i e s which handle remaining v a r i a b i l i t y C o n t r o l systems cannot keep i n con t a c t w i t h env-ironment to be c o n t r o l l e d and hence l o s e c o n t r o l High response-g a t h e r i n g c a p a c i t y Low s t r u c t u r e Incongruent: C o n t r o l system uses excess e q u i -v o c a l i t y to enact i t s own environment which i s beyond the c o n t r o l of the o r g a n i z a t i o n Low s t r u c t u r e Congruent: Low b u f f e r i n g of o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h h i g h dependence on autonomous i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r o l l e r s w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n (Source: Dunbar, 1977) 47 The emphasis here. has. been to h i g h l i g h t the d i r e c t i o n of major f i n d i n g s i n t h i s area. The major c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w i n g from the above s t u d i e s would seem to be that the o p t i m a l c o n t r o l system w i t h i n any o r g a n i z a t i o n i s dependent upon the p e r c e i v e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the environment. I t should be emphasized here t h a t i t i s the p e r c e p t i o n o f the environmental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (by the d e c i s i o n maker) which i s c o n s i d e r e d to be more c r u c i a l i n understanding the type o f c o n t r o l b ehaviors he/she e x h i b i t s , than., the environmental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s per se. Of course, the f i t between the 'perceived' and ' r e a l ' environments would s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e the o p t i m a l nature o f these c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . As p o i n t e d out by Weick (1969), managers respond .to what they p e r c e i v e and such p e r c e p t i o n s may or may not correspond to o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . Weick c a l l s t h i s the "enacted" environment. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f any;- c o n t r o l system would seem to be a f u n c t i o n o f the accuracy w i t h which the management p e r c e i v e s i t s environments. •THE TECHNOLOGISTS: Woodward (1958; 1965) was one o f the p i o n e e r s r e l a t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and processes w i t h 48 the p r o d u c t i o n technology c u r r e n t l y used by the o r g a n i z a t i o n . A f t e r her study of approximately 100 firms l o c a t e d i n south, e a s t England, Woodward suggested that the t e c h n i c a l complexity o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n i n c r e a s e s as i t moves from u n i t , through mass, to continuous process p r o d u c t i o n . She a l s o concluded t h a t a more h i g h l y s t r u c t u r e d , f o r m a l i z e d b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l system may be more a p p r o p r i a t e f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s u s i n g mass p r o d u c t i o n technology. However, at the two ends o f the t e c h n o l o g i c a l continuum ( i . e . , u n i t and continuous p r o c e s s ) , more s u c c e s s f u l f i r m s employed l e s s s t r u c t u r e d , l e s s f o r m a l i z e d managerial s t y l e s w i t h fewer r u l e s and c o n t r o l s and a g r e a t e r degree of i n t e r p e r s o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n . Hickson e t . a l (1969) and Pugh (1973) ("the Aston Group") found t h a t technology a f f e c t e d the s t r u c t u r a l and c o n t r o l design of an o r g a n i z a t i o n but o n l y as moderated by a d d i t i o n a l i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e s , such as o r g a n i z a t i o n s i z e , or departmental f u n c t i o n . In s m a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , technology l a r g e l y d i c t a t e s s t r u c t u r e o n l y i n p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t e d u n i t s . Such f i n d i n g s would seem to q u e s t i o n the v a l i d i t y of e a r l i e r c o n c l u s i o n s by Woodward and others 49 t h a t technology determines s t r u c t u r e ( S t e e r s , 1977). Thompson (1967) d e f i n e d technology or t e c h n i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y as the extent to which a c t i v i t i e s d i c t a t e d by p r e v a i l i n g b e l i e f s about c a u s e - e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s produce d e s i r e d outcomes. Thompson c l a s s i f i e d technology i n t o three groups: (1) long l i n k e d technology, (2) mediating technology, and (3) i n t e n s i v e technology. Long l i n k e d technology i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by s e r i a l interdependence o f a number o f d i f f e r e n t o p e r a t i o n s or departments. M e d i a t i n g technology, on the other hand, i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a l i n k i n g of otherwise interdependent o p e r a t i o n s or departments through standard o p e r a t i n g procedures. I n t e n s i v e technology i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by uniqueness o f task sequence. In the i n t e n s i v e technology a v a r i e t y o f techniques i s drawn upon i n order to achieve a change i n some s p e c i f i c o b j e c t , but the s e l e c t i o n , combination, and order of a p p l i c a t i o n are determined by feedback from the o b j e c t i t s e l f (Thompson, 1967; page 17). Thompson suggested t h a t s t r u c t u r e i s a fundamental v e h i c l e by which o r g a n i z a t i o n s attempt to achieve bounded r a t i o n a l i t y . The s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f i s , however, dependent upon the type o f interdependence 50 among s u b u n i t s . . o f a s y s t e m w h i c h may f a l l i n t o o n e o f t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s : (1) p o o l e d , ( 2 ) s e q u e n t i a l , o r ( 3 ) r e c i p r o c a l . T h e t y p e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g o r c o n t r o l m e c h a n i s m t o b e u s e d w i l l d e p e n d t o a v e r y g r e a t e x t e n t o n t h e t y p e o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e among s u b u n i t s . F o r e x a m p l e , i n a s i t u a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y ,.: p o o l e d i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , t h e p a r t s o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n may n o t b e d e p e n d e n t u p o n e a c h o t h e r i n a n y d i r e c t w a y . Y e t t h e y may b e i n t e r d e p e n d e n t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t u n l e s s e a c h p e r f o r m s a d e q u a t e l y , t h e t o t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l n o t b e e f f e c t i v e ; f a i l u r e o f a n y o n e p a r t c a n , h e n c e , t h r e a t e n t h e c o n t i n u e d s u r v i v a l o f t h e w h o l e s y s t e m . T h o m p s o n s u g g e s t e d t h a t c o o r d i n a t i o n b y ' s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n ' o f a l l r u l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n ~ , s . u c h a s i t u a t i o n . T h e s e t o f r u l e s m u s t b e i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t a n d b e u s e d f o r m a k i n g r e c u r r i n g d e c i s i o n s . W h e r e t w o s u b u n i t s a r e n s e q u e n t i a l l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n t ( i . e . , w h e n t h e o u t p u t o f o n e s u b u n i t i s t h e i n p u t f o r t h e n e x t ) c o o r d i n a t i o n b y ' p l a n s ' may h o w e v e r b e m o r e r e l e v a n t . U s e o f p l a n s i n v o l v e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s c h e d u l e s f o r t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n t u n i t s a n d i s v e r y a p p r o p r i a t e f o r d y n a m i c s i t u a t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y c h a n g i n g t a s k e n v i r o n m e n t s . F i n a l l y , i n a s i t u a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d 51 by r e c i p r o c a l interdependence or where outputs of each u n i t become in p u t s f o r the o t h e r s , c o o r d i n a t i o n by 'mutual adjustment' may be more a p p r o p r i a t e . T h i s e s s e n t i a l l y i n v o l v e s the t r a n s m i s s i o n o f new i n f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g the process of a c t i o n or something almost resembling an o n - l i n e c o n t r o l system. Extending t h i s n o t i o n , Mahoney and F r o s t (1974) s t u d i e d t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y homogeneous o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t s , but f o c u s i n g on heterogeneous o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s u b u n i t s . 297 o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t s were c l a s s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g to technology as proposed by Thompson (1967): l o n g - l i n k e d , mediating, and i n t e n s i v e technology. Managers were asked to r a t e t h e i r u n i t s on 24 s p e c i f i c f a c e t s of u n i t e f f e c t i v e n e s s (such as, p l a n n i n g , development, i n i t i a t i v e , e t c ) and one g l o b a l measure of o v e r a l l u n i t e f f e c t i v e n e s s . I t was found t h a t although c r i t e r i a were o f t e n s i m i l a r , the p r i o r i t i e s a s s i g n e d were d i f f e r e n t as a r e s u l t of u t i l i z a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t t e c h n o l o g i e s . Smoothness of p r o d u c t i o n was most important f o r l o n g - l i n k e d task t e c h n o l o g i e s , f l e x i b i l i t y was most important f o r mediating t a s k t e c h n o l o g i e s , and mutual support ensuring the u t i l i z a -t i o n o f a l l s k i l l s made the most important c o n t r i b u t i o n to g e n e r a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n i n t e n s i v e task t e c h n o l o g i e s . 52 I t would thus seem t h a t as:, . d i f f e r e n t t e c h n o l o g i e s are u t i l i z e d , d i f f e r e n t e v a l u a t i o n c r i t e r i a can be expected to be more or l e s s r e l e v a n t f o r s u c c e s s f u l c o n t r o l . Harvey'(1968) a l s o found t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h more s t a b l e t e c h n o l o g i e s e x h i b i t e d h i g h e r degrees o f s t r u c t u r i n g measured by degree of s p e c i a l i -z a t i o n , c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , span of c o n t r o l , and program s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . Hage and A i k e n (1967) a f t e r s t u d y i n g 16 s o c i a l w e l f a r e agencies, concluded that r o u t i n e n e s s o f technology and subordinate p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d e c i s i o n making were n e g a t i v e l y r e l a t e d . Many oth e r s t u d i e s a l s o have examined the r e l a t i o n s h i p between technology and s t r u c t u r e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n although no c o n s i s t e n t f i n d i n g s have been r e p o r t e d ( F u l l a n , 1970; H r e b i n i a k 1974) . In summary, there seems to be a d e f i n i t e l i n k between t e c h n o l o g i c a l complexity and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . However, the nature o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f seems to be f a r from a simple one. A l s o , there appears to be some r e l a t i o n s h i p between technology and worker a t t i t u d e s ( E u l l a n , 1970), which suggests that c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n has to be p a i d to the e f f e c t o f s t r u c t u r e on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l processes and b e h a v i o r 53 before deciding to introduce any major changes i n the s t r u c t u r a l design. THE PERSONALISTIC VIEWS ON CONTROL: Many researchers and writers i n organizational behavior have maintained that the structure and control systems within organizations should be designed so as to f a c i l i t a t e free expression of the needs of i n d i v i d u a l members of the organization. Using Maslow's (1954) theo r e t i c a l formulations emphasizing a person's inherent need to use his/her capacities and s k i l l s i n a mature and productive manner, these writers have argued f o r a l t e r i n g the organization's structure and control system to allow for the human quest for s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n and growth. One of the major advocates of this view has been Chris Argyris (1964) whose major premise i s that there i s a lack of f i t between requirements of bureaucratic organizations and the needsjof i n d i v i d u a l members to achieve 'psychological success'. McGregor (1960) i n a similar vein proposed 'Theory Y' as:a solution to the problem of organizational improvement. Other theorists have also ( i n whole or 54 p a r t ) f o s t e r e d a s i m i l a r p o i n t of., view... L i k e r t (1967) d i d so by arguing t h a t 'System - 4' ( t r u s t and p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) i s the o n l y l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e which can y i e l d maximum e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Gellerman (1963) suggested that competence and power should be c o n s i d e r e d as g e n e r a l motives and t h a t s t r u c t u r e and c o n t r o l systems should take these i n t o account. Blake and Mouton (1964) a l s o suggested t h a t the most e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e i s one where the l e a d e r shows h i g h concern f o r both the task and the s u b o r d i n a t e s . S e v e r a l other r e s e a r c h e r s have departed from these g l o b a l views o f human beh a v i o r w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . W r i t e r s l i k e Schein (1965), Hunt (1969), and Yates and K u l i c k (1977) f o r example, maintained t h a t people r e a c t to t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n on the b a s i s o f t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s o f i t . These p e r c e p t i o n s are based on people's needs, v a l u e s , and motives. Hence, to understand and c o n t r o l human beh a v i o r w i t h i n o r g a n i z a -t i o n s , one must understand how i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r : w i t h r e s p e c t to s e v e r a l p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s . A l s o , to change o r g a n i z a t i o n s means i n most cases b r i n g i n g about a major change i n the p e r c e p t i o n s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members. T h i s view has o r i g i n a t e d p r i m a r i l y from the w r i t i n g s of Kurt Lewin and the 55 Hawthorne group. The p e r c e p t u a l model of human Behavior has s i n c e been a p p l i e d to the stud}?- of s e v e r a l o r g a n i z a -t i o n a l phenomena. Vroom £L964) f o r i n s t a n c e , has a p p l i e d Lewin's ge n e r a l theory of p e r s o n a l i t y to the study of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior, h y p o t h e s i z i n g performance to be a f u n c t i o n of the worker's p e r c e p t i o n of the a b i l i t i e s r e q u i r e d on the j o b , the degree to which the person p e r c e i v e s h i m s e l f as having these a b i l i t i e s and the degree to which he v a l u e s the p o s s e s s i o n of such a b i l i t i e s . S i m i l a r assumptions u n d e r l i e the w r i t i n g s of s e v e r a l others i n c l u d i n g Cyert and March (1963), P o r t e r and Lawler (1968), Van Maanen (1975), and Yates and K u l i c k (1977). Yates and K u l i c k (1977) f o r example, suggested t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members have o n l y an i n t u i t i v e , quasi-normative understanding concerning how environmental v a r i a b l e s may be r e l a t e d to one another and to member performance. Newly r e c r u i t e d members of o r g a n i z a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y b e l i e v e that there should be a h i g h p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between e f f o r t and, success on a j o b , but p r a c t i c a l experience m o d i f i e s t h i s n a i v e view (Yates & K u l i c k , 1977). As Dunbar (1979) p o i n t e d out, i n the long run o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l processes are dependent on i t s member's b e l i e f s about the ; p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g the process, 56 A SUGGESTED-INTEGRATING. MODEL. .OF, ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS: As was mentioned i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n p r o v i d i n g an overview o f r e s e a r c h on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems, the focus o f most p a s t r e s e a r c h has been on t e s t i n g r e l e v a n c e o f s p e c i f i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l (e.g., s t r u c t u r e ) , o r g a n i z a t i o n - r e l a t e d (e.g., technology, environments), or p e r s o n - r e l a t e d (e.g., human needs theory) f a c t o r s i n e x p l a i n i n g the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f f o c a l c o n t r o l system. I t was a l s o observed that r e s e a r c h to date has not e s t a b l i s h e d any c o n s i s t e n t set o f v a r i a b l e s e x p l a i n i n g the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l systems. T h i s , : i t i s f e l t , i s due l a r g e l y to the attempts by past r e s e a r c h e r s to t r e a t the above f a c t o r s as d i s c r e t e v a r i a b l e s . The u n d e r l y i n g assumption would seem to be th a t the e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l system more or l e s s a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e s u l t s from a p p r o p r i a t e changes i n any one of these v a r i a b l e s . For example, the s t r u c t u r a l t h e o r i s t s would suggest t h a t the e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l system i s more o r l e s s a f u n c t i o n of a p p r o p r i a t e s t r u c t u r a l changes. The t e c h n o l o g i s t s on the other hand, would g i v e the p i v o t a l p o s i t i o n to p r e v a i l i n g technology and task sequence w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n and recommend necessary 57 changes i n these v a r i a b l e s to a t t a i n e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l . The p e r s o n a l i s t s emphasize human d i g n i t y and s e l f - g r o w t h of employees as necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l performance, s i n c e to most of them e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i s more or l e s s synonymous w i t h s e l f c o n t r o l by employees. A suggested i n t e g r a t i n g approach takes the p o s i t i o n t h a t a l l the above three o r g a n i z a t i o n a l dimensions are c l o s e l y i n t e r r e l a t e d , and that by understanding t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l , b e t t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l and h i g h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s can be achieved. I t i s suggested that the c e n t r a l c o n s t r u c t connecting the three areas i s i n d i v i d u a l c o g n i t i o n and a t t i t u d e s . The responses of the i n d i v i d u a l s to persons and t h i n g s i n t h e i r r e l e v a n t environment are shaped by the way they appear to the i n d i v i d u a l s . Each person has an i n d i v i d u a l i z e d image of the w o r l d because h i s / h e r image i s a product of p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s , p ast l e a r n i n g , p h y s i c a l and s o c i a l environments, needs and v a l u e s and r e l e v a n t p e r c e p t u a l s e t . We q u i t e o f t e n see around us not the r e a l i t y , but an image of the r e a l i t y c r e a t e d by us. T h i s i d e a i s n o t h i n g new i n psychology, and i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 58 behavior, at l e a s t one s c h o o l o f thought (headed by K a r l Weick) views o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e a l i t i e s i n terms o f 'enacted environments'. S i n c e c o g n i t i o n i s v e r y s e l e c t i v e l y organized, d i f f e r e n t persons are l i k e l y to r e a c t very d i f f e r e n t l y even to i d e n t i c a l s t i m u l i . Even i f there were i d e n t i c a l c o g n i t i o n o f a s i t u a t i o n by a l l members, they are l i k e l y to behave d i f f e r e n t l y depending upon t h e i r needs, a b i l i t i e s , and p e r c e i v e d i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s o f a c t i o n s . However, p e r c e p t i o n s o f e x t e r n a l r e a l i t i e s by i n d i v i d u a l s would seem to be c o n c e p t u a l l y b e t t e r p r e d i c t o r s o f t h e i r a c t i o n s than the e x t e r n a l r e a l i t i e s per se. F i g u r e I I . l^shows 'a'; model of c o n t r o l systems which h e a v i l y r e l i e s on p e r s o n a l i t y and p e r c e p t u a l v a r i a b l e s as p r e d i c t o r s o f a person's c h o i c e o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . I t i s suggested t h a t a f i r s t s e t o f v a r i a b l e s i n f l u e n c i n g a manager's c o n t r o l behaviors i s h i s / h e r p e r c e p t i o n s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , These i n c l u d e e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , a u t h o r i t y and reward system w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , and the nature o f d e c i s i o n making and communication processes w i t h i n i t . A second major v a r i a b l e i s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r c e p t i o n of his/her...task. I t i s suggested here t h a t the same i n d i v i d u a l w i l l r e a c t FIGURE IJ. S A PROPOSED MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL & TASK CHARACTERISTICS * .PERSONALITY VARIABLES 7TC ORGANIZATIONAL & ORGANIZATION RELATED FACTORS ( S t r u c t u r e , technology, environments, etc) i CHOICE OF CONTROL BEHAVIOR INDIVIDUAL & 4 ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES 60 q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y depending on the nature o f the task (e.g., i t s importance). Indeed, the e x i s t i n g r e s e a r c h on l e a d e r s h i p seems to i n d i c a t e t h a t d i f f e r e n t d e c i s i o n making and c o n t r o l s t y l e s are a p p r o p r i a t e f o r d i f f e r i n g task s i t u a t i o n s ( F i e d l e r , 1967; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). A t h i r d s e t o f v a r i a b l e s i n the model t h a t determines a manager's choice o f s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s i s h i s / h e r p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s , needs and b e l i e f s . The p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s a l s o i n c l u d e a l l past l e a r n i n g and the manager's g e n e r a l b e l i e f system. The i n t e r a c t i o n between the p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s and i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e p t i o n s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l andx task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s hy p o t h e s i z e d to determine the ex e c u t i v e ' s c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r i n the present model. Summary: Research on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems u n t i l now i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by g l o b a l normative models and t h e o r i e s f o c u s i n g on s i n g l e independent v a r i a b l e s . Depending upon the s p e c i f i c r e s e a r c h e r ' s i n c l i n a t i o n s v a r i o u s c o n s t r u c t s such as s t r u c t u r e , environment, technology, and human needs have been used as determinancts o f optimal c o n t r o l systems w i t h i n an 61 o r g a n i z a t i o n . Among these c o n s t r u c t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e has always enjoyed the prime p o s i t i o n . Indeed, many authors have c o n s i d e r e d c o n t r o l to be synonymous w i t h the s t r u c t u r e o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n . Very l i t t l e c o n s i s t e n t f i n d i n g s however, e x i s t which j u s t i f y such assumptions. In the case o f environmental and t e c h n o l o g i c a l models o f c o n t r o l a l s o there e x i s t very l i t t l e c o n s i s t e n t f i n d i n g s which can guide us i n s e l e c t i n g a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t r o l mechanisms. In the case o f p e r s o n a l i t y and c o g n i t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s o f c o n t r o l systems, most w r i t e r s have taken a normative and g l o b a l approach. Only a few w r i t e r s have emphasized the need to c o n s i d e r the p e r c e p t i o n s o f members o f v a r i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s b e f o r e choosing an a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t r o l s t r a t e g y . In t h i s chapter, an attempt was made to formulate a c o n t r o l model t h a t r e l i e s h e a v i l y on the p e r c e p t u a l s t y l e and p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s o f i n d i v i d u a l managers. T h i s model d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from a l l c u r r e n t models of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l process, a l l o f which g i v e minimal importance to these v a r i a b l e s . The presen t r e s e a r c h i s an attempt to t e s t the e m p i r i c a l v a l i d i t y o f t h i s model. The s p e c i f i c r e s e a r c h p r o p o s a l , hypotheses and r e s e a r c h methodology are presented i n the next chapter. 62 CHAPTER I I I PRESENT RESEARCH PROPOSAL AND METHODOLOGY In the l a s t chapter a model of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l was proposed which c o n s i d e r s the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , task, and p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I t was a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t d i f f e r e n t c o n t r o l s t y l e s may have v a r y i n g impact on the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , processes, and behavior. C l e a r l y , t e s t i n g the complete model would i n v o l v e a l o n g i t u d i n a l r e s e a r c h d e s i g n which i s not f e a s i b l e at t h i s p o i n t of time. What was attempted i n the present study was to t e s t the f o l l o w i n g h y p othesized r e l a t i o n s h i p s among f o u r v a r i a b l e s : namely, p e r c e p t i o n s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f a c i n g the d e c i s i o n maker, p e r s o n a l i t y of the c o n t r o l l e r , and the c h o i c e of c o n t r o l behavior by the f o c a l c o n t r o l l e r . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s study i n v e s t i g a t e d how s p e c i f i c p e r c e p t i o n s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , t a s k c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and the p e r s o n a l i t y of the c o n t r o l l e r determine the c h o i c e of c o n t r o l behavior i n v a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n s (see F i g u r e I I I . l ) . FIGURE I I I . l FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CHOICE OF CONTROL BEHAVIORS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT PERCEIVED ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CHOICE OF CONTROL STRATEGIES (BEHA VIOR) BY CONTROLLER PERSONALITY CHARACTERIS TICS OF CONTROLLER ) CHARACTERISTICS OF DECISION PROBLEM(S) FACING THE CONTROLLER 64 DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN THIS STUDY: For the purpose of t h i s study, an i n d i v i d u a l manager's c o n t r o l behaviors were s c a l e d on two dimensions: i ) the extent to which such behaviors i n f l u e n c e ( i . e . , i n c r e a s e or decrease) the e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f h i s or her s u b o r d i n a t e ( s ) , and i i ) the extent to which such behaviors i n f l u e n c e ( i . e . , i n c r e a s e or decrease) the i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f h i s or her s u b o r d i n a t e ' s ) . E x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g work s i t u a t i o n s are those where rewards f o r good performance by the employee come from o u t s i d e the .task. O f f e r o f l a r g e monetary rewards and other b e n e f i t s , and good working c o n d i t i o n s , a e t c . , are some f a c t o r s which l e a d to h i g h e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f workers. Of course, the importance o f such rewards i n the context o f work m o t i v a t i o n w i l l d i f f e r from one employee to another depending upon the s t r e n g t h o f d i f f e r e n t needs i n the i n d i v i d u a l concerned. I n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g s i t u a t i o n s , on the other hand, are those "where performing w e l l i s a rewarding 65 experience, to. the. i n d i v i d u a l even though no pay r a i s e or promotion i s i n v o l v e d " (Lawler and Rhode, 1976; page 65). L i k e a good g o l f shot o r ' p a i n t i n g a good landscape, good job performance must l e a d to f e e l i n g s o f accomplishment. In g e n e r a l i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g s i t u a t i o n s are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by h i g h v a r i e t y , autonomy, task i d e n t i t y and feedback. V a r i e t y ; Autonomy. Task i d e n t i t y Feedback the degree to which the c o n t r o l behaviors f a c i l i t a t e employees to perform a wide range of a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e i r work or to use a v a r i e t y o f equipment and procedures on the j o b . the degree to which the c o n t r o l behaviors a l l o w the employees to have a major 'say' i n s c h e d u l i n g t h e i r work, i n s e l e c t i n g the equipment they w i l l use, and i n d e c i d i n g on procedures to be f o l l o w e d . the degree to which the c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s f a c i l i t a t e the employees to do an e n t i r e or 'whole' p i e c e o f work and c l e a r l y i d e n t i f y the res.ults of t h e i r e f f o r t s . the degree to which the c o n t r o l behaviors enable the employees to r e c e i v e as they are working, i n f o r m a t i o n which r e v e a l s how w e l l they are working. S e v e r a l past r e s e a r c h s t u d i e s have r e l a t e d the presence o f these core dimensions to i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n . Oldham (1974) f o r example, found that v a r i e t y , feedback, and autonomy were s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e l a t e d to i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f the employee. Hackman and Lawler (1971) i n a study 66 i n v o l v i n g 208- employees o f a telephone company found that when jobs are high.^on the f o u r core dimensions, employees who are de s i r o u s o f h i g h e r order need s a t i f -f a c t i o n tend to have h i g h e r m o t i v a t i o n . F a r r (1976) found t h a t jobs which are h i g h on the core dimensions tend to generate h i g h e r i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f workers. Past r e s e a r c h s t u d i e s have a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t these core dimensions are p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d (although weakly i n some c a s e s ) ; as such we can expect them to covary i n the same d i r e c t i o n (Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Oldham, 1974). INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 1. P e r c e i v e d O r g a n i z a t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : The f i r s t independent v a r i a b l e was the manager's p e r c e p t i o n s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I t i s f e l t t h a t a person's p e r c e p t i o n s about the e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e , processes and b e h a v i o r w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e h i s / h e r a t t i t u d e s towards the appropriateness o f v a r i o u s c o n t r o l systems i n general.. S t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s p a r t i c u l a r l y are l i k e l y to a f f e c t a person's choice o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s . 67 F o l l o w i n g Burns and S t a l k e r (1961) o r g a n i z a t i o n s were c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r i e s based on t h e i r s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and managerial s t y l e s : 'mechanistic' and 'organic'. As i n d i c a t e d i n F i g u r e I I I . 2 , the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of these two s t y l e s are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from one another. M e c h a n i s t i c systems are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f c o n t r o l and a u t h o r i t y , h i g h task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and p r i m a r i l y v e r t i c a l l i n e s o f communication. Organic systems on the other hand e x h i b i t a h i g h e r degree o f task interdependence, g r e a t e r d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y and h o r i z o n t a l communication. I t i s suggested t h a t managers i n o r g a n i c o r g a n i z a -t i o n s are more l i k e l y to use c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s which l e a d to i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e s . T h i s i s because i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n which g e n e r a l l y adopts a democratic or p a r t i c i p a t i v e approach to making important d e c i s i o n s , p a r t i c i p a t i v e performance a p p r a i s a l s and s e l f c o n t r o l of a c t i v i t i e s by the workers develop n a t u r a l l y (Lawler & Rhode, 1976). On the other hand, i n an a u t o c r a t i c a l l y run o r g a n i z a -t i o n , i t i s u n l i k e l y that meaningful p a r t i c i p a t i o n and autonomy on the p a r t of workers can develop. Hence the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and v e r t i c a l FIGURE I I I . 2 CHARACTERISTICS OF 'MECHANISTICo AND 'ORGANIC' ORGANIZATIONS M e c h a n i s t i c Tasks are h i g h l y f r a c t i o n a t e d and s p e c i a l i z e d ; l i t t l e r e g a r d p a i d to c l a r i f y i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between tasks and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s . Tasks tend to remain r i g i d l y d e f i n e d u n l e s s a l t e r e d f o r m a l l y by top management. S p e c i f i c r o l e d e f i n i t i o n ( r i g h t s , o b l i g a t i o n s , and t e c h n i c a l methods p r e s c r i b e d f o r each member). H i e r a r c h i a l structure:'' of ^control ? a u t h o r i t y , and communication. Sanc-t i o n s d e r i v e from emphoyment c o n t r a c t between employees and o r g a n i z a t i o n . I n f o r m a t i o n r e l e v a n t to s i t u a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r m a l l y assumed to r e s t w i t h c h i e f e x e c u t i v e . Communication i s p r i m a r i l y v e r t i c a l between s u p e r i o r and s u b o r d i n a t e . Organic Tasks are more interdependent; emphasis on r e l e v a n c e of tasks and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l obj e c t i v e s . Tasks are c o n t i n u a l l y a d j u s t e d and r e d e f i n e d through i n t e r a c t i o n o f o r g a n i -z a t i o n a l members. G e n e r a l i z e d r o l e d e f i n i t i o n (members accept general r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r task accomplishment beyond i n d i v i d u a l r o l e d e f i n i t i o n . Network s t r u c t u r e of c o n t r o l , a u t h o r i t y , and communication. Sanctions d e r i v e more from community of i n t e r e s t than than from c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Leader not assumed to be omniscient, knowledge centers i d e n t i f i e d where l o c a t e d throughout o r g a n i z a t i o n . Communication i s both v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l depending upon where needed i n f o r m a t i o n r e s i d e s . M e c h a n i s t i c Communications p r i m a r i l y take form of i n s t r u c t i o n s and d e c i s i o n s i s s u e d by s u p e r i o r s , o f i n f o r m a t i o n and req u e s t s f o r d e c i s i o n s s u p p l i e d by i n f e r i o r s . I n s i s t e n c e on l o y a l t y to o r g a n i z a -t i o n and obedience t o s u p e r i o r s . Importance and p r e s t i g e a t t a c h e d to i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s members. Organic Communications p r i m a r i l y take form o i n f o r m a t i o n and advice. Commitment to o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s tasks and goals more h i g h l y v a l u e d than l o y a l t y or obedience. "Importance and p r e s t i g e a t t a c h e d to a f f i l i a t i o n s and e x p e r t i s e i n e x t e r n a l environment. 70 communication . c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f m e c h a n i s t i c o r g a n i z a -t i o n s are l i k e l y to make managers r e l y on c o n t r o l systems t h a t generate . e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n . . Indeed, i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t the two v a r i a b l e s ( v i z . , o r g a n i z a -t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s ) m u t u a l l y i n f l u e n c e each'other and i n s e v e r a l cases r e i n f o r c e the o t h e r . Thus the more o r g a n i c an o r g a n i z a t i o n i s , the more l i k e l y i t i s t h a t i t s members would use i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l behaviors which i n t u r n w i l l l e a d to more worker autonomy and p a r t i c i p a t i o n , thereby i n c r e a s i n g the o r g a n i c nature o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 2. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the d e c i s i o n problems f a c i n g  the c o n t r o l l e r : A second independent v a r i a b l e i n the model i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the d e c i s i o n problems f a c i n g the c o n t r o l i e r . D e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s f a c i n g the c o n t r o l l e r d i f f e r w i d e l y i n terms o f t h e i r importance, complexity and u n c e r t a i n t y . 'Importance' here connotes how c r u c i a l the d e c i s i o n s are to the c ontinued s u r v i v a l aifd success o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . For example, c o n t r o l over purchase and s a l e o f c a p i t a l a s s e t s i s t y p i c a l l y seen, as more important than c o n t r o l over the l e n g t h of 71 coffee, breaks. that, a subordinate takes d u r i n g the day. I t i s f e l t t h a t how people adopt d i f f e r e n t c o n t r o l behaviors i s s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by how important the a c t i v i t y i s p e r c e i v e d to be by them. 'Complexity' r e f e r s to both the sheer- m u l t i p l i c i t y o f f a c t o r s to be c o n s i d e r e d and the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s among these f a c t o r s . R e c r u i t i n g a new work s u p e r v i s o r , f o r example, i n v o l v e s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n of a g r e a t many candidates both ;within t h d : o r g a n i z a t i o n and o u t s i d e . Each candidate must be c o n s i d e r e d i n the l i g h t o f a v a r i e t y of c a p a b i l i t i e s and p o s s i b l e f u t u r e b e h a v i o r s . Many of these f a c t o r s are a l s o h i g h l y i n t e r - r e l a t e d adding to the complexity o f the problem at hand. C o n t r o l d e c i s i o n s can a l s o be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o 'simple' and 'complex' based on the number and i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s among the f a c t o r s to be c o n s i d e r e d by the d e c i s i o n maker. F i n a l l y , managerial d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s vary w i d e l y i n terms of the u n c e r t a i n t y surrounding the d e c i s i o n maker. The d e c i s i o n maker may or may not know about the exact nature o f the problem, the consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e courses o f a c t i o n ? the a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s , and the c o n s t r a i n t s f a c i n g him/her. Thus some o f the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s are c e r t a i n w h i l e o t h e r are not. In the l a t t e r case, there i s a l a c k o f 72 a p p r o p r i a t e and. adequate, information, about v a r i o u s f a c t o r s on the p a r t o f the. ^ d e c i s i o n maker. In the same v e i n , a l l c o n t r o l d e c i s i o n s can a l s o be c l a s s i f i e d i n t o ' c e r t a i n ' and ' u n c e r t a i n ' . Of course, the three dimensions of d e c i s i o n importance, complexity, and u n c e r t a i n t y may be r e l a t e d to each other. 3. P e r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the c o n t r o l l e r : While i n c l u s i o n o f s e v e r a l p e r s o n a l i t y measures would seem to be j u s t i f i e d on c onceptual grounds, p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s n e c e s s i t a t e the choice of a i s i n g l e , important, and r e l e v a n t p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t f o r the purpose o f the p r e s e n t study. 'Tolerance o f ambiguity' was chosen as t h i s s i n g l e measure s i n c e t h i s t r a i t seems to be c o n c e p t u a l l y more r e l a t e d to c o n t r o l behaviors than any other t r a i t . I n t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity may be d e f i n e d as "the tendency to p e r c e i v e ( i . e . , i n t e r p r e t ) ambiguous s i t u a t i o n s as sources o f t h r e a t " and t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity as "the tendency to p e r c e i v e ambiguous s i t u a t i o n s as d e s i r a b l e . " Ambiguity a r i s e s i n s i t u a t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i -zed by n o v e l t y , complexity, and/or i n s o l u b i l i t y . I n d i v i d u a l s who are i n t o l e r a n t o f ambiguity tend to p r e f e r r e g u l a r i t y to change, c l a r i t y to ambiguity, 73 balance to imbalance, concreteness to a b s t r a c t i o n , e t c . , w h i l e those who are t o l e r a n t seem to p r e f e r the o p p o s i t e . T o l e r a n c e iof: ambiguity i s an important t r a i t i n the context o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n making. March and Olsen (1976) p o i n t out t h a t a d e c i s i o n maker i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n faces f o u r major types o f ambiguity: ambiguity o f i n t e n t i o n ( i . e . , the presence of i n c o n s i s t e n t and i l l - d e f i n e d g o a l s ) , ambiguity of understanding ( i . e . , l a c k o f knowledge about technology, environments, e t c ) , ambiguity o f h i s t o r y ( i . e . , what happened i n the p a s t , why i t happened, and whether i t had to happen), and ambiguity of o r g a n i -z a t i o n ( i . e . , p a t t e r n o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n by members i s u n c e r t a i n ) . In such circumstances, i t can be hypothe-s i z e d t h a t persons w i t h low t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity are l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e h i g h e r degree o f c o n t r o l and make most d e c i s i o n s by themselves. Indeed, the p a s t r e s e a r c h on t o l e r a n c e -of ambiguity has shown t h a t persons w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e are l e s s s e n s i t i v e to deviance from others ( S t r e u f e r t , 1966). They are a l s o l i k e l y to be more c r e a t i v e and suggest n o v e l ways of doing t h i n g s (Tuckman, 1966). Based on the above f i n d i n g s , i t can be h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t persons w i t h 74 h i g h tolerance, of . ambiguity are. more l i k e l y to use ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g .control systems' thus g i v i n g more autonomy and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e s . T h i s i s because any d e l e g a t i o n of d e c i s i o n making i n v o l v e s c r e a t i o n o f u n c e r t a i n t y (or ambiguity) and persons who have low t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity may not be f a v o u r a b l y i n c l i n e d to open up new sources o f u n c e r t a i n t y . Past r e s e a r c h has shown t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e c i s i o n making a b i l i t y i s i n f l u e n c e d by h i s / h e r conceptual s t r u c t u r e . Shroeder, D r i v e r , and S t r e u f e r t (1965) proposed a dimension of ' a b s t r a c t n e s s ' versus 'concreteness' to measure a person's conceptual s t r u c t u r e . 'Concreteness' i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the use o f a few dimensions of i n f o r m a t i o n and a simple i n t e g r a t i n g schemata; ' a b s t r a c t n e s s ' i s the tendency to process many dimensions o f i n f o r m a t i o n and to use a complex i n t e g r a t i v e schemata. The authors suggest t h a t t o l e r a n c e .of. ambiguity i s c o n c e p t u a l l y r e l a t e d to ' a b s t r a c t n e s s ' . In other r e s e a r c h by S t o g d i l l , Goode, and Day (1965) i t was found t h a t t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity was a v e r y important p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t among a l l s u c c e s s f u l U.S. senators, c o r p o r a t i o n 75 p r e s i d e n t s , and union, leaders... Persons w i t h low t o l e r a n c e 'ip.f. ambiguity, have been, found to be more c o n v e n t i o n a l i n values and b e l i e f s and to adopt proven ( r a t h e r than novel) courses o f a c t i o n (Budner, 1962). T h i s i s l i k e l y to make persons w i t h low t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity somewhat i n e f f e c t i v e i n d e a l i n g w i t h complex and r a p i d l y changing s i t u a t i o n s c a l l i n g f o r n o v e l s t r a t e g i e s . I t i s expected t h a t persons w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e 6f:r ambiguity w i l l engage i n i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g b o h t r o l r b e h a v i o r s on yet another ground. A c c o r d i n g to Deci (1975), one type o f i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g b e h a v i o r i n v o l v e s conquering c h a l l e n g e s and r e d u c i n g i n c o n g r u i t y . Thus, i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n a r i s e s from an i n d i v i d u a l ' s tendency to seek and conquer c h a l l e n g e s which are optimal f o r him. Thus i t seems l i k e l y t h a t persons w i t h h i g h i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n w i l l a l s o have h i g h t o l e r a n c e of., ambiguity. Since an i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d person i s l i k e l y to p r o j e c t h i s own needs and values to others ( i n c l u d i n g h i s subordinates) i t would seem t h a t persons w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e of " ambiguity ( i n c o n t r a s t to those w i t h low t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity) are more l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e i n t r i n s i c a l l y 76 motivating, c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . HYPOTHESES IN THE PRESENT STUDY: The pre s e n t study r e l a t e s the c o n t r o l l e r ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , charac-t e r i s t i c s o f d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s , and p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s o f the c o n t r o l l e r to h i s or her choice o f c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . The study i s designed more to open up new areas o f enquiry and to generate new r e s e a r c h hypotheses than to make r i g o r o u s t e s t o f c a r e f u l l y formulated hypotheses. With the above caveat i n mind, the f o l l o w i n g were adopted as hypotheses f o r the prese n t study. Hypothesis I A: I n d i v i d u a l s who work i n 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s are more l i k e l y to choose c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s t h a t generate ' e x t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n than persons who work i n .'.organic' u o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Hypothesis I B: I n d i v i d u a l s who work i n 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s are more l i k e l y to choose c o n t r o l b ehaviors t h a t generate ' i n t r i n s i c ' work m o t i v a t i o n than persons who work i n 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s . 77 Hypothesis I I : I n d i v i d u a l s who are h i g h i n t o l e r a n c e of"- ambiguity are more l i k e l y to adopt c o n t r o l behaviors that l e a d to ' i n t r i n s i c ' work m o t i v a t i o n than those who are low i n t o l e r a n c e o f r ambiguity. Hypothesis I I I A: I n d i v i d u a l s are more l i k e l y to choose c o n t r o l behaviors t h a t l e a d to ' i n t r i n s i c ' work m o t i v a t i o n when the d e c i s i o n s they have to make are r e l a t i v e l y unimportant than when these d e c i s i o n s are important. Hypothesis I I I B: I n d i v i d u a l s are more l i k e l y to choose c o n t r o l behaviors that l e a d to ' e x t r i n s i c ' work m o t i v a t i o n when the d e c i s i o n s they have to make are r e l a t i v e l y important than when these d e c i s i o n s are unimportant. Hypothesis IV: Choice o f s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y 'influenced by the combined e f f e c t s o f p e r s o n a l i t y , d e c i s i o n - r e l a t e d , and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s . An i n d i v i d u a l who i s low i n t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity, employed i n a 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n and f a c i n g an important d e c i s i o n problem i s l e a s t l i k e l y to use c o n t r o l behaviors that generate ' i n t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f s u b o r d i n a t e ( s ) and most 78 l i k e l y to use c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s , t h a t l e a d to ' e x t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n on their, p a r t . I n d i v i d u a l s h i g h i n t o l e r a n c e 6-f ambiguity employed i n 'organic' f i r m s and f a c i n g unimportant d e c i s i o n problems are l e a s t l i k e l y to use c o n t r o l behaviors that l e a d to ' e x t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e ( s ) and most l i k e l y :to choose behaviors t h a t l e a d to ' i n t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n . The reader may note t h a t no hypotheses were proposed about the s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s between complexity and u n c e r t a i n t y o f d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s f a c i n g the c o n t r o l l e r and h i s or her c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r ( s ) . The work of Hermann (1963), Khandwalla (1971), and Smart and V e r t i n s k y (1977) pr o v i d e s s o m e - i n d i c a t i o n t h a t when an o r g a n i z a t i o n faces ' c r i t i c a l ' d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s , there i s a tendency to c e n t r a l i z e a l l important d e c i s i o n making a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n the u n i t . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t may be h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t there i s i n g e n e r a l , l e s s autonomy giv e n to lower l e v e l p a r t i c i p a n t s whenever the d e c i s i o n s i n v o l v e d are c r i t i c a l to the continued s u r v i v a l and success o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s o f course i m p l i e s that c o n t r o l behaviors t h a t l e a d to h i g h ' i n t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f subordinates are l e s s l i k e l y to be used when the 79 d e c i s i o n s are. very important. However, s i m i l a r hypo-theses /cannot be made r e l a t i n g , d e c i s i o n complexity and u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s , s i n c e no p a s t r e s e a r c h s t u d i e s c o u l d be found l i n k i n g these v a r i a b l e s . The present i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n -s h i p between these two v a r i a b l e s and c o n t r o l b ehavior thus was e s s e n t i a l l y e x p l o r a t o r y . METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION: For the purpose o f t e s t i n g the hypotheses s t a t e d i n the l a s t s e c t i o n , a l a b o r a t o r y e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n design was used. I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t s y s t e m a t i c v a r i a t i o n o f the independent v a r i a b l e s and c o n t r o l over 'treatments' i s more e a s i l y p o s s i b l e i n a l a b o r a t o r y . Such sys t e m a t i c v a r i a t i o n and c o n t r o l of v a r i a b l e s a l s o p r o v i d e s the p o t e n t i a l to s p e c i f y c a u s e - e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s : t h a t i s , to s t a t e w i t h a f a i r l y h i g h degree o f confidence that changes i n one or more independent v a r i a b l e s (e.g., p e r s o n a l i t y o f the c o n t r o l l e r ) cause changes i n the dependent v a r i a b l e (e.g., choice o f c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r / s t r a t e g y ) . Besides, as Weick (1969; page 303) p o i n t e d out: "they ( l a b o r a t o r y experiments) i l l u s t r a t e the d e t e c t i o n o f u n n o t i c e d causes, causes t h a t 80 are worth n o t i c i n g and t h a t bear continued n o t i c i n g . I t seems c l e a r t h a t experimental o r g a n i z a t i o n s are u s e f u l f o r l o c a t i n g problems as f o r v e r i f y i n g hypotheses." On the other hand, l a b o r a t o r y experimentation has been s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d on s e v e r a l counts: the l i m i t e d g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of f i n d i n g s , the a r t i f i c i a l i t y o f lab s e t t i n g s , and l a c k of r e a l i s m i n many s t u d i e s have been p o i n t e d out again and a g a i n by s e v e r a l c r i t i q u e s . A good d i s c u s s i o n o f l a b o r a t o r y experimen-t a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e i n Campbell and St a n l e y (1963) and Fromkin and S t r e u f e r t (1976). F u r t h e r , A r g y r i s (1969), Orne (1969), and Rosenthal and Rosnow (1969) p r o v i d e good d i s c u s s i o n s of some of the weaknesses of t h i s r e s e a r c h methodology. Notwithstanding these c r i t i c i s m s , l a b o r a t o r y e x perimentation has continued to be popular i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior r e s e a r c h because of the o p p o r t u n i t y i t p r o v i d e s the r e s e a r c h e r to c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e s and e l i m i n a t e u n c o n t r o l l e d v a r i a t i o n (thus r e d u c i n g the number of p o t e n t i a l a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s ) . A m u l t i t u d e of p r a c t i c a l problems h i n d e r the wide use of r e a l l i f e o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o r r e s e a r c h purposes (e.g., l a c k of a c c e s s i b i l i t y to a l l r e l e v a n t types .of o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the n ature of the hypothesis being t e s t e d and the l a r g e number of v a r i a b l e s to be c o n t r o l l e d , the l i m i t e d 81 time and r e s o u r c e s at the command of the r e s e a r c h e r , e t c . ) . A l s o , as Weick (.1964) p o i n t e d out, experiments are used to t e s t s p e c i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n s and t h e i r content i s l a r g e l y determined by the theory and not by the r e f e r e n t event. In t h i s sense a one to one s i m i l a r i t y between l a b o r a t o r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s and n a t u r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t e n i s absent and unnecessary (Weick, 1964, page 4). The use of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i m u l a t i o n i n l a b o r a t o r y s e t t i n g has v a r i e d from r e l a t i v e l y simple forms of r o l e p l a y i n g experiments (e.g., Bern, 1968; Jones, L i n d e r , K i e s l e r , Zanna, & Brehm, 1968; Penner 6c Patten, 1970) and experimental s i m u l a t i o n s (e.g., S t r e u f e r t , Clardy, D r i v e r , K a r l i n s , Schroder 6c Suedfeld, 1965) to more or l e s s f r e e s i m u l a t i o n s (e.g., Kennedy, 1962) and computerized s i m u l a t i o n s (e.g., Abelson, 1968). Many s i m u l a t i o n s are i n t e n t i o n a l l y designed to be p a r t i a l r e p l i c a t i o n s of r e a l - w o r l d events ( Z e l d i t c h , 1969), w h i l e some others are designed to be p e r f e c t m i n i a t u r e r e p l i c a s of r e a l - l i f e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Indeed, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i m u l a t i o n s i n l a b o r a t o r y s e t t i n g s have taken a v a r i e t y ; ' of forms i n the past such as proof r e a d i n g (Adams 6c Jacobsen, 1964), r a i l r o a d - g a m e (Jensen, 1961), 82 c a r d s o r t i n g (French & Snyder, 1959), d e t e c t i v e s t o r i e s (Burns, 1964) and common t a r g e t games ( L e a v i t t , 1960). In t h e i r review a r t i c l e on the s u b j e c t Fromkin and S t r e u f e r t (1976) suggested t h a t l a b o r a t o r y experimentation as a method of r e s e a r c h possesses unique advantages and can p r o v i d e v a l u a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s to knowledge. A l s o , as Z i g l e r (1963; page 353),pointed out: "what the experimenter i s saying i s that i f such and such holds i n the r e a l world because of the p r i n c i p l e s expounded i n the p a r t i c u l a r theory under i n v e s t i g a t i o n , then such and such should h o l d i n the world which the experimenter has c r e a t e d . T h i s t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y i s what g i v e s t h e o r e t i c a l import to experiments which i n v o l v e phenomena which, taken i n i s o l a t i o n , not o n l y appear picayune but seem to have l i t t l e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h what one observes i n n a t u r e . " MEASURE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE: The dependent v a r i a b l e i n the study r e p o r t e d here as mentioned i n the l a s t s e c t i o n , was the c o n t r o l b ehaviors of d e c i s i o n makers w i t h i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Since there are no s c a l e s c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e f o r measuring ' i n t r i n s i c a l l y ' and ' e x t r i n s i c a l l y ' m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l behaviors of i n d i v i d u a l s , i t was necessary to decelop some o p e r a t i o n a l measures of these 83 concepts. For t h i s purpose, an i n v e n t o r y was developed c o n s i s t i n g of 18 managerial d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s along w i t h s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e courses o f a c t i o n ( i n behav-i o r a l terms) open to the d e c i s i o n maker f o r each o f the 18 s i t u a t i o n s . The v a r i o u s steps i n the design o f the b e h a v i o r a l i n v e n t o r y are g i v e n below: 1) As a f i r s t step, twenty s i x managerial d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s ( i n c i d e n t s ) were i d e n t i f i e d which were i l l u s t r a t i v e o f one or more dimensions o f c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r . The v a r i o u s dimensions o f c o n t r o l b ehavior t h a t i n f l u e n c e the i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n o f the d e c i s i o n maker's subordinates are v a r i e t y , autonomy, task i d e n t i t y and feedback. The dimensions of c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r t h a t a f f e c t the e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n o f the s u bordinates i n c l u d e items such as pay, promotion, d i s m i s s a l , tenure, warnings and a number o f s t a t u s symbols. These i n c i d e n t s were s e l e c t e d from some of the c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e i n - b a s k e t t e s t s , case books on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b ehavior and based on ideas coming from p r o f e s s i o n a l c o l l e a g u e s . 2) Next, a job p o s i t i o n w i t h i n a s i m u l a t e d o r g a n i z a t i o n 84 s e t t i n g was i d e n t i f i e d to:which, many of these i n c i d e n t s c o u l d be r e a l i s t i c a l l y f i t t e d . . The p o s i t i o n i d e n t i f i e d was t h a t o f a Manager, Cargo D i v i s i o n , o f a s i m u l a t e d a i r l i n e c a l l e d North S t a r A i r l i n e s , Canada. The i n c i d e n t s were m o d i f i e d where necessary, to s u i t the above job p o s i t i o n . One i n c i d e n t which c o u l d not be f i t t e d i n t o the context o f the above mentioned o r g a n i z a t i o n and r o l e was dropped. 3 ) The v a r i o u s courses o f a c t i o n ( i n b e h a v i o r a l terms) open to the job incumbent when f a c e d w i t h each d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n were next i d e n t i f i e d . To i l l u s t r a t e , when the d e c i s i o n maker f i n d s t h a t one o f h i s V h e r subordinates i s coming c o n s i s t e n t l y l a t e to the o f f i c e , he (she) may among other t h i n g s , do any of these: (a) warn the subordinate, (b) punish, (c) reward on a l l those occasions when the subordinate comes on time, or (d) impress upon the subordinate the need to come on time. These are c a l l e d the ' b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s ' = open to the manager. 4) Two managers (working i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n Vancouver) and one graduate student i n the F a c u l t y o f Commerce, U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h - C o l u m b i a (with seven.years' managerial experience) were shown the l i s t o f twenty 85 f i v e i n c i d e n t s , along w i t h t h e i r b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s and asked to eva l u a t e them f o r a) the r e a l i s m o f the i n c i d e n t s and a l t e r n a t i v e s , and b) the exhaustiveness o f the b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s mentioned under each i n c i d e n t . The i n c i d e n t s and b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s were m o d i f i e d where necessary, based on comments from these three persons. 5) A pan e l o f judges (n=16) next r a t e d each b e h a v i o r a l ' a l t e r n a t i v e V i n d i c a t i n g to what extent i t r e p r e s e n t s c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r t h a t would i n f l u e n c e the i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n o f the s u b o r d i n a t e s . A second p a n e l (n=16) s i m i l a r l y r a t e d each b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e to i n d i c a t e the extent to which i t - r e p r e s e n t s c o n t r o l behavior that would i n f l u e n c e the e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n o f su b o r d i n a t e s . Each pa n e l c o n s i s t e d o f two f a c u l t y members, f i v e graduate students and n i n e undergraduate students, a l l o f the F a c u l t y o f Commerce, at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia. The judges were asked to r a t e each b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e on a 7-point s c a l e , a r a t i n g o f '-3' to i n d i c a t e t h a t the behavior i s low on a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r o l dimension and a r a t i n g o f '3' to i n d i c a t e t h a t i t i s h i g h on the dimension (Appendix 1A, IB). 86 The judges a l s o were asked to r a t e each i n c i d e n t on a 5 p o i n t s c a l e on the f o l l o w i n g three dimensions: 1) importance o f the d e c i s i o n problem mentioned, 2) degree o f u n c e r t a i n t y surrounding the d e c i s i o n problem, and 3) the complexity of the d e c i s i o n . A r a t i n g o f '1' meant t h a t the d e c i s i o n problem i s 'not a t a l l important', 'very c e r t a i n ' , or 'very simple', w h i l e a r a t i n g o f '5' meant t h a t the d e c i s i o n problem was 'very important', vvery u n c e r t a i n ' , or 'very complex'. 6) The mean r a t i n g s and the standard d e v i a t i o n o f r a t i n g s by the two panels f o r each b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e were next c a l c u l a t e d . A l l b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s whose r a t i n g s had a standard d e v i a t i o n o f more than 1.0 were removed. T h i s i s s t r i c t e r than the c r i t e r i a used by H a r a r i arid Zedeck (19$3) and Smith and K e n d a l l (1963) i n developing b e h a v i o r a l l y anchored instruments. A l l i n c i d e n t s which l o s t more than 20% o f t h e i r a s s o c i a t e d b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s because o f h i g h v a r i a n c e i n t h e i r r a t i n g s by pan e l members were e l i m i n a t e d from the f i n a l l i s t o f d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s to be used d u r i n g the experiment. Nineteen i n c i d e n t s q u a l i f i e d f o r i n c l u s i o n i n the f i n a l i n v e n t o r y . However, one a d d i t i o n a l d e c i s i o n 87 s i t u a t i o n where there was no agreement among the p a n e l members as to whether i t was an 'important' or 'unimportant' d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n , a l s o was excluded from the f i n a l l i s t . 7) The f i n a l b e h a v i o r a l i n v e n t o r y c o n s i s t i n g o f 18 d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s and a s s o c i a t e d b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a -t i v e s was p r e t e s t e d on a group o f 21 students a t t e n d i n g evening c l a s s e s at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia. I t appeared from t h i s p r e t e s t t h a t no s u b s t a n t i v e changes were c a l l e d f o r i n the f i n a l i n v e n t o r y . Next, the mean i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c scores g i v e n by the two panels f o r the e i g h t y f i v e b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s i n c l u d e d i n the f i n a l instrument were examined f o r s t a t i s t i c a l independence. I t was found t h a t the scores g i v e n by the two panels c o r r e l a t e d p o s i t i v e l y , although to a modest degree (pearson r = .30; p<£.005). T h i s o v e r l a p was more or l e s s expected as the two m o t i v a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s are not t o t a l l y mutually e x c l u s i v e . A l s o , though the c o r r e l a t i o n i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , i t s a b s o l u t e value i s s m a l l , and was not expected to cause any major problems i n implementing the r e s e a r c h design. F i n a l l y , the d i f f e r e n c e between mean scores o f the 88 85 b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s on i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c c o n t r o l dimensions p r o v i d e d by the two panels of judges was t e s t e d . T h i s was done to ensure that the item scores are f r e e of b u i l t i n b i a s towards any one c o n t r o l dimension ( i . e . , i n t r i n s i c or e x t r i n s i c ) . The Wilcoxen t e s t f o r two matched samples was used f o r t h i s purpose. The t e s t does not r e q u i r e n o r m a l i t y of d i s t r i b u t i o n of data and i s c o n s i d e r e d to have v e r y h i g h power e f f i c i e n c y when compared to other methods designed f o r the matched-pair s i t u a t i o n (Hays, 1973). The p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the two sample means are i d e n t i c a l was found to exceed 0.76 and hence was c o n s i d e r e d s a t i s f a c t o r y . The f i n a l e i g h t e e n d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r a s s o c i a t e d b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s a re g i v e n i n Appendix 2. MEASURES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 1. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : As s t a t e d e a r l i e r , a r o l e d e s c r i p t i o n , o f Manager, Cargo D i v i s i o n was formulated i n the context of a simulated o r g a n i z a t i o n c a l l e d 'North S t a r A i r l i n e s , Canada". The o r g a n i z a t i o n was d e s c r i b e d i n two ways: the f i r s t v e r s i o n gave the p i c t u r e of a 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n by h i g h l i g h t i n g such dimensions as 89 c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n making, v e r t i c a l communication networks, h i g h task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l span of c o n t r o l and a f a i r l y l a r g e number of formal r u l e s and procedures. The second v e r s i o n h i g h l i g h t e d the f e a t u r e s of an 'organic' f i r m such as h i g h degree of d e c e n t r a l i z e d d e c i s i o n making, l o o s e l y d e f i n e d and interdependent t a s k s , r e l a t i v e l y h i g h e r emphasis on h o r i z o n t a l and upward communication ( r a t h e r than mere downard communication), the non-omniscient nature of c the l e a d e r and a s m a l l e r number of formal procedures and r u l e s as compared to a 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n . A p a n e l of f i v e judges ( t h r e e f a c u l t y members i n the O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Behavior f i e l d , and two graduate students) e v a l u a t e d the degree to which these d e s c r i p t i o n s p o r t r a y e d 'mechanistic' and 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s (as o u t l i n e d i n Burns and S t a l k e r , 1961). Changes where necessary were made to h i g h l i g h t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The f i n a l v e r s i o n was p r e t e s t e d u s i n g a group of 21 evening students in.:the F a c u l t y of Commerce at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia. Each p a r t i c i p a n t a f t e r r e a d i n g the d e s c r i p t i o n (mechanistic or o r g a n i c v e r s i o n ) of North Star was asked to i n d i c a t e h i s / h e r p e r c e p t i o n s about the o r g a n i z a t i o n on the form g i v e n 90 i n Appendix 3. I t was found that a l l the p a r t i c i p a n t s except oner, p e r c e i v e d the o r g a n i z a t i o n as p r e d i c t e d by the r e s e a r c h e r . The f i n a l v e r s i o n o f the d e s c r i p t i o n o f North S t a r A i r l i n e s i s g i v e n i n Appendix 4A and 4B. 2. Task importance, u n c e r t a i n t y and complexity: As mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter, the 32 judges ( i n two panels) were asked to r a t e each i n c i d e n t (or d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n ) f o r i t s importance, u n c e r t a i n t y , and complexity. Based on the scores g i v e n by the judges, a l l i n c i d e n t s were c l a s s i f i e d i n t o 'important -unimportant', ' u n c e r t a i n - c e r t a i n ' , and 'complex-simple'. In the f i n a l v e r s i o n o f the s c a l e ( c o n s i s t i n g o f 18 i n c i d e n t s ) , 9 i n c i d e n t s were important and 9 unimportant, 12 u n c e r t a i n and 6 c e r t a i n , and 11 complex and 7 simple. 3. T o l e r a n c e ;of ambiguity: As mentioned e a r l i e r , i n t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity may be d e f i n e d as the tendency to p e r c e i v e ambiguous s i t u a t i o n s as sources o f t h r e a t (Budner, 1960). While the concept o f i n t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to r i g i d i t y , s t h e former i s a p e r c e p t u a l 91 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w h e r e a s : r i g i d i t y i s a q u a l i t y o f b e h a v i o r . The a v a i l a b l e measures o f ' i n t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity i n c l u d e the Azzagaddi t e s t (see Davids, 1956), McReynold's concept fo r m a t i o n t e s t (see Davids, 1956), s o c i o m e t r i c r a t i n g s (MaCandless & Holloway, 1955), T o l e r a n c e - I n t o l e r a n c e o f C o g n i t i v e Ambiguity t e s t ( S i e g e l , 1954), the Cat-Dog t e s t (French, 1955), and Budner's I n t o l e r a n c e o f Ambiguity S c a l e (Budner, 1960). D e t a i l s o f other t e s t s f o r measuring i n t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity such as the Hamilton S c a l e , the Walk S c a l e , the C o u l t e r Scale and the P r i n c e t o n S c a l e are d i s c u s s e d i n Saunders (1955). In the p r e s e n t study, Budner's 16 item s c a l e was used to measure the s u b j e c t ' s t o l e r a n c e .'of ambiguity as t h i s had by f a r the g r e a t e s t t e s t - r e t e s t r e l i a b i l i t y and e m p i r i c a l evidence s u p p o r t i n g i t s c o n s t r u c t v a l i d i t y . T h i s s c a l e designed by S t a n l e y Budner i n 1960 c o n s i s t s o f e i g h t p o s i t i v e l y worded items and e i g h t n e g a t i v e l y worded items; a l l the items b e i n g s c o r e d on a 7-point s c a l e r a n g i n g from ' s t r o n g l y agree' to ' s t r o n g l y d i s a g r e e ' . The t e s t - r e t e s t r e l i a b i l i t y f o r the s c a l e over a p e r i o d o f two weeks was found to be .85 or above. The s p l i t h a l f r e l i a b i l i t i e s f o r the s c a l e have ranged 92 between .39 to .62. Although the alpha r e l i a b i l i t i e s appear lower than the more common s p l i t h a l f c o e f f i c i e n t s , the instrument seems to have a c c e p t a b l e r e l i a b i l i t y c o n s i d e r i n g i t s probable m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y (Robinson & Shaver, 1976). There i s some e m p i r i c a l evidence to support the v a l i d i t y o f t h i s instrument. The c o r r e l a t i o n s o f scores on Budner's s c a l e w i t h those on other t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity s c a l e s (e.g., the P r i n c e t o n s c a l e , the Walk s c a l e , the C o u l t e r s c a l e ) have been s i g n i f i c a n t and ranged between .36 and .54. Other v a l i d i t y s t u d i e s i n v o l v i n g i n t e r j u d g e agreement on r a t i n g s on respondents' i n t o l e r a n c e of- ambiguity a l s o supported the v a l i d i t y o f Budner's instrument (Robinson & Shaver, 1976). Budner's 16 item s c a l e i s reproduced i n Appendix 5. A h i g h score on the instrument i n d i c a t e s t h a t the respondent i s r e l a t i v e l y i n t o l e r a n t o f ambiguous s i t u a t i o n s where as a low score i s i n d i c a t i v e . o f the respondent's h i g h t o l e r a n c e Sfz ambiguity. RESEARCH DESIGN: There were three independent v a r i a b l e s i n the experiment (1) o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , (2) t o l e r a n c e of • ambiguity o f the d e c i s i o n maker, and 93 (3) importance of the d e c i s i o n problems f a c i n g the d e c i s i o n maker, The f i r s t two were manipulated across groups of s u b j e c t s ; the l a s t independent variable-was designed as a ' w i t h i n s u b j e c t v a r i a b l e ' . W i t h i n s u b j e c t or repeated measures design allows the r e s e a r c h e r to d i s c o u n t the e f f e c t s of i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s among su b j e c t s w i t h r e s p e c t to extraneous v a r i a b l e s and thus p r o v i d e s more powerful t e s t s of the e f f e c t s of experimental treatments. T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l where a l l i n d i v i d u a l . d i f f e r e n c e s cannot be s p e c i f i e d p r e c i s e l y and/or measured r e l i a b l y ( H a r r i s , 1975; Johnson, 1977). The ' u n c e r t a i n t y ' and 'complexity' a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e c i s i o n problems were not s e p a r a t e l y manipulated as these had v e r y h i g h p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the" r a t e d importance of the d e c i s i o n problems. The Pearsonian c o r r e l a t i o n s among the t h r e e d e c i s i o n dimensions are shown i n Table I I I . l . The f i n a l d e s i g n was thus a 3 X 2 f a c t o r i a l d e s ign w i t h two repeated measures on d e c i s i o n importance. Each p a r t i c i p a n t i n the experiment r e c e i v e d two scores f o r each d e c i s i o n he/she made: Cl) the extent to which the p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n was l i k e l y to i n f l u e n c e the TABLE I I I . 1 INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG RATINGS ON THREE DIMENSIONS OF DECISION PROBLEMS BY A PANEL OF 32 PERSONS Importance Complexity Uncertainty-Importance 1.00 0.89 0.96 Complexity , 1.00 0.92 U n c e r t a i n t y 1.00 Note: A l l c o r r e l a t i o n s are s i g n i f i c a n t at p <'. 001 l e v e l . 95 e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n of the s u b o r d i n a t e ( s ) , and (2) the extent to which the p a r t i c u l a r d e c i s i o n was l i k e l y to i n f l u e n c e the i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n of the s u b o r d i n a t e ( s ) . The former i s c a l l e d the ' e x t r i n s i c : score' of the p a r t i c i p a n t and the l a t t e r i s c a l l e d the ' i n t r i n s i c score' of the p a r t i c i p a n t f o r the r e s t of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s had t h r e e l e v e l s i n t h i s study: m e c h a n i s t i c , o r g a n i c , and c o n t r o l . T o l e r a n c e of ambiguity had two l e v e l s : h i g h t o l e r a n c e and low t o l e r a n c e . D e c i s i o n importance as mentioned before, was a w i t h i n s u b j e c t v a r i a b l e , each p a r t i c i p a n t making both 'important' and 'unimportant' d e c i s i o n s during the experiment. The d e t a i l s of the experimental task and steps i n data c o l l e c t i o n are d e s c r i b e d i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s . Before the a c t u a l experimental study was conducted, a p i l o t study was done to i d e n t i f y the problems i f any, a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the d e s i g n and to r e f i n e the procedures. THE PILOT STUDY: Twelve students (two graduate students and ten undergraduates) p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the p i l o t study. E i g h t were males and f o u r were females. Data were c o l l e c t e d from the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n two i n s t a n c e s . On the f i r s t 96 o c c a s i o n the p a r t i c i p a n t s were requested to p r o v i d e some background i n f o r m a t i o n such as age, sex and work experience. At the same time, they were a l s o requested to complete the Budner S c a l e f o r I n t o l e r a n c e o f Ambiguity. Based on t h e i r scores on the Budner Instrument, the p a r t i c i p a n t s were c l a s s i f i e d i n t o two groups: those w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e f o f ambiguity and those w i t h low t o l e r a n c e fof ambiguity depending upon whether t h e i r scores were below or above the mean score of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the the group. Each o f these two groups was s u b d i v i d e d i n t o three groups o f two persons each: these groups were c a l l e d 'mechanistic', ^ o r g a n i c ' , and ' c o n t r o l ' . Thus each o f these three l a t t e r groups c o n s i s t e d o f f o u r members. On the second o c c a s i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 'organic' group were p r o v i d e d w i t h a d e s c r i p t i o n o f North S t a r A i r l i n e s ('organic v e r s i o n ' ) . They were asked to assume the r o l e o f Manager, Cargo D i v i s i o n i n the a i r l i n e and make 18 d e c i s i o n s . The d e c i s i o n s were arranged randomly. The p a r t i c i p a n t s , a f t e r making the 18 d e c i s i o n s were asked to r a t e on a 5-point s c a l e the extent to which they c o u l d i d e n t i f y themselves w i t h t h e . r o l e o f the manager i n the si m u l a t e d a i r l i n e . A score o f '1' meant t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t c o u l d i d e n t i f y 97 h i m s e l f / h e r s e l f 'very l i t t l e ' w i t h the r o l e , w h i l e a r a t i n g o f '3' meant 'moderately' and '5' 'very much'. (See, Appendix 6). The d e s c r i p t i o n s o f North S t a r g i v e n to each p a r t i c i p a n t f o r the purpose o f making the 18 d e c i s i o n s were next taken back from the p a r t i c i p a n t s by the r e s e a r c h e r . Each p a r t i c i p a n t was then asked to i n d i c a t e h i s / h e r p e r c e p t i o n s about North S t a r A i r l i n e s on s e v e r a l dimensions such as degree o f d e c e n t r a l i z a -t i o n , number o f formal r u l e s , task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , number o f h i e r a r c h i c a l l e v e l s , and a u t h o r i t y based on p o s i t i o n present i n the a i r l i n e . The q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r t h i s purpose i s given i n appendix 3. The p a r t i c i p a n t s were next asked to r a t e each o f the 18 d e c i s i o n problems i n terms o f o v e r a l l importance, u n c e r t a i n t y , and complexity as p e r c e i v e d by the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The forms used f o r t h i s purpose are g i v e n i n appendix 7A, 7B, and 7C. The o b j e c t i v e here was to f i n d out which d e c i s i o n problems were co n s i d e r e d as important, complex, and u n c e r t a i n by the p a r t i c i p a n t s . F i n a l l y , the p a r t i c i p a n t s were asked to p r o v i d e 98 a g l o b a l 'organic' versus 'mechanistic' assessment of the o r g a n i z a t i o n i n which they had j u s t worked i n the experimental s e t t i n g . For t h i s purpose, a b r i e f d e f i n i t i o n o f an 'organic' and 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a -t i o n was g i v e n to each p a r t i c i p a n t ( p l e a s e see, appendix 8). I d e n t i c a l steps were f o l l o w e d f o r the 'mechanistic' group except t h a t they were gi v e n a 'mechanistic' v e r s i o n o f North S t a r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n i n s t e a d o f an 'organic' v e r s i o n . In the case o f the c o n t r o l group, the p a r t i c i p a n t s were not gi v e n any d e s c r i p t i o n of the o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r which they worked duri n g the course o f the experiment. They were simply asked to "assume the r o l e o f Manager, Cargo D i v i s i o n o f an a i r l i n e i n Canada" and respond to the 18 d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s p r o v i d e d to them. A l s o i n t h i s case, the p a r t i c i p a n t s were not r e q u i r e d to gi v e t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r which they worked; nor were they asked to make the f i n a l g l o b a l e v a l u a t i o n 6f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . The p i l o t study p r o v i d e d the r e s e a r c h e r w i t h an o p p o r t u n i t y to t e s t how r e a l i s t i c v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n 99 problems and the two o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n s were. I t a l s o enabled the r e s e a r c h e r to f i n d out whether the p a r t i c i p a n t s c o u l d i n f a c t i d e n t i f y themselves w i t h the r o l e o f the manager d u r i n g the study. F i n a l l y , i t gave an o p p o r t u n i t y to the r e s e a r c h e r to t e s t the f e a s i b i l i t y o f m a n i p u l a t i n g the s u b j e c t s ' p e r c e p t i o n s about the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s d u r i n g the s tudy. The r e s u l t s of the p i l o t study were extremely encouraging. Of the twelve persons who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the study, o n l y one f a i l e d to p e r c e i v e some of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s c o r r e c t l y . Even here, the g l o b a l r a t i n g g i v e n to the s i m u l a t e d a i r l i n e on the o r g a n i c - m e c h a n i s t i c dimension was i n the a p p r o p r i a t e d i r e c t i o n . An a n a l y s i s o f the p i l o t study data a l s o showedtthat :the p a r t i c i p a n t s c o u l d i d e n t i f y w i t h the a s s i g n e d r o l e s q u i t e w e l l . A l l o f them had a score o f '3' (moderately) or above on the 5-point s c a l e used f o r the purpose. In f a c t , f i v e persons had a score of '4' and f o u r had a score o f '5' (very much). During the post experimental b r i e f i n g , the p a r t i c i p a n t s a l s o mentioned to the r e s e a r c h e r t h a t they found the v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s to be q u i t e 100 r e a l i s t i c and i n t e r e s t i n g . THE EXPERIMENT: 180 students i n the F a c u l t y o f Commerce and Business A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the f i n a l experiment. 132 were males and 48 were females. The median age f o r the group was 22 ye a r s . 151 were undergraduates, 20 were graduate students, and 9 were diploma or other students. The v a r i o u s steps i n the f i n a l experiment were i d e n t i c a l to those f o l l o w e d i n the p i l o t study. The on l y changes i n t r o d u c e d were: a f t e r each p a r t i c i p a n t had r a t e d the 18 d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s f o r t h e i r importance, u n c e r t a i n t y , and complexity, he or she was a l s o asked to i n d i c a t e on a 5-point s c a l e ( ' s t r o n g l y d i s l i k e d ' , ' m i l d l y d i s l i k e d ' , ' n e i t h e r l i k e d nor d i s l i k e d ' , ' i r i i i l d l y l i k e d ' , and ' s t r o n g l y l i k e d ' ) the extent to which the p a r t i c i p a n t l i k e d the managerial s t y l e and p r a c t i c e s a t North S t a r . A l s o , d u r i n g the d e - b r i e f i n g p e r i o d , each p a r t i c i p a n t was requested to i n d i c a t e on a 5-point s c a l e the extent to which he or she found the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f North S t a r A i r l i n e s r e a l i s t i c . The s c a l e used here 101 was: 'very u n r e a l i s t i c ' , ' m i l d l y u n r e a l i s t i c ' , ' n e i t h e r r e a l i s t i c nor u n r e a l i s t i c ' , ' m i l d l y r e a l i s t i c ' and 'very r e a l i s t i c " , The responses o f a l l those persons who d i d not (1) p e r c e i v e a t l e a s t 5 o f the 7 dimensions o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n appendix 3 c o r r e c t l y , or (2) d i d not make the c o r r e c t g l o b a l r a t i n g o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n on the o r g a n i c - m e c h a n i s t i c dimension, were removed from a l l subsequent a n a l y s i s . Seven p a r t i c i p a n t s were removed from the a n a l y s i s u s i n g these c r i t e r i a . 173 usable responses were a v a i l a b l e f o r the purpose o f data a n a l y s i s . One case from t h i s l i s t was dropped (randomly picked) to make the numbers i n the two c o n t r o l groups ( i . e . , h i g h t o l e r a n t and low t o l e r a n t ) even and equal. For data a n a l y s i s purpose, 60 responses were a v a i l a b l e f o r the 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n , 60 f o r the 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n , and 52 ::in the c o n t r o l group. H a l f o f each o f these samples were persons w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity and h a l f were w i t h low t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity. On average, each p a r t i c i p a n t took 40-50 minutes 102 f o r making the 18 d e c i s i o n s . In a l l , each p a r t i c i p a n t devoted approximately two hours to the e n t i r e study. Each s u b j e c t was p a i d $3.-50 f o r h i s / h e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the study and two chances to win a l o t t e r y o f $25.00 The f i n a l sample o f 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s c o n s i s t e d of 128 males and 44 females. T h e i r median age was 22 y e a r s . T h i s group c o n s i s t e d o f 145 undergraduates, 20 graduate students, and 7 diploma students. 98% o f t h i s group had some work experience e i t h e r as a f u l l time or p a r t time employee. Of these, 34% had f u l l time work experience. Of the 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s , 477o had some s u p e r v i s o r y or managerial experience. The average score o f the respondent group on the Budner s c a l e f o r I n t o l e r a n c e o f Ambiguity was 48.8 w i t h a standard d e v i a t i o n o f 9.7. The data emerging from the study were next a n a l y z e d . The d e t a i l s o f data a n a l y s i s and the f i n d i n g s are giv e n i n the dext" chapter. 103 CHAPTER IV FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION The primary o b j e c t i v e of the c u r r e n t study was to assess how o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , d e c i s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s i n f l u e n c e the choice o f c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s by d e c i s i o n makers i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . For t h i s purpose, the data from the experiment were su b j e c t e d to A n a l y s i s o f V a r i a n c e and Co-variance. Some o f the c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e computer programs on A n a l y s i s of V a r i a n c e i n the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver, and Dalhousie U n i v e r s i t y , H a l i f a x , were used f o r the purpose o f data a n a l y s i s . These i n c l u d e d the S t a t i s t i c a l Package f o r the S o c i a l Sciences (SPSS) and BMDP: Biomedical computer programs developed i n the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Los Angeles. As mentioned i n the p r e v i o u s chapter, d e c i s i o n importance was designed as a ' w i t h i n s u b j e c t v a r i a b l e ' i n the p r e s e n t study. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (namely, 'mechanistic', 'organic', and ' c o n t r o l ' ) and t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity were 'within group v a r i a b l e s ' d u r i n g the study. 104 The p e r c e p t i o n s o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the experiment on the o v e r a l l importance of the v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n problems were compared w i t h the importance scores g i v e n e a r l i e r to the same problems by the panel o f 32 judges. I t was found that there was 84% agreement between the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n done e a r l i e r by the judges and those by the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the experiment. As i n the case o f the p a n e l o f judges, there was c o n s i d e r a b l e p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between respondent's p e r c e p t i o n s o f d e c i s i o n problems' importance, u n c e r t a i n t y and complexity. The c o r r e l a t i o n s among these dimensions f o r the p a r t i c i p a n t s group i s shown i n T a b l e IV.1. In view of the h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n s among these dimensions, no-separate a n a l y s i s of data u s i n g the two dimensions of ' u n c e r t a i n t y ' and 'complexity' was attempted. Thus the e n t i r e a n a l y s i s was done f o r two major d e c i s i o n types: !(1) d e c i s i o n s which were important (and u n c e r t a i n and complex), and (2) d e c i s i o n s which were unimportant (and c e r t a i n and s i m p l e ) . Each, p a r t i c i p a n t had two s c o r e s : an ' e x t r i n s i c ' score and an ' i n t r i n s i c ' s core. These scores were used i n data a n a l y s i s j o i n t l y ( i n the case of m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e ) and s e p a r a t e l y ( i n the case of TABLE IV. 1 INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG RATINGS ON THREE DIMENSIONS OF DECISION PROBLEMS BY 172 PARTICIPANTS Importance Complex U n c e r t a i n t y Importance 1.00 0.76 0.91 Complexity 1.00 0.70 U n c e r t a i n t y 1.00 Note: A l l c o r r e l a t i o n s are s i g n i f i c a n t at p < .001 l e v e l . 106 u n i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e ) . The d e t a i l s of these analyses and f i n d i n g s are g i v e n i n the remaining pages of t h i s chapter. A b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n on m u l t i v a r i a t e and u n i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e and the t e s t s used f o r a s s e s s i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e of prese n t f i n d i n g s are g i v e n i n Appendix 9. As a f i r s t step, a M u l t i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s of Va r i a n c e (MANOVA) was performed on the dependent v a r i a b l e s ( v i z . , i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c scores) w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity l e v e l , and d e c i s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as the independent v a r i a b l e s . The r e s u l t s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s are shown i n Table IV.2. As may be seen, on a l l three c r i t e r i a (namely, P i l l a i ' s c r i t e r i o n , H o t e l l i n g ' s t r a c e s t a t i s t i c , and Wilks Lambda) a l l the independent v a r i a b l e s were s i g n i f i c a n t a t .001 l e v e l . The i n t e r a c t i o n s among a l l independent v a r i a b l e s were a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t at .005 l e v e l or b e t t e r , except i n the case of the i n t e r a c t i o n between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( v i z . , m e c h a n i s t i c , o r g a n i c or c o n t r o l ) and the t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity l e v e l o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s . TABLE, IV,2 RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON 'EXTRINSIC' AND 'INTRINSIC' SCORES OF 172 PARTICIPANTS Source o f v a r i a t i o n Type o f Orgn (0) T o l e r a n c e of ambiguity (A) P i l l a i ' s c r i t e r i o n D e c i s i o n importance 0 X A 0 X D A X D 0 X A X D (D) v a l u e .817/ .063 .093 .021 .367 .033 .062 114.537* 11.131* 17.055* 1.739 37.278* 5.735** 5.312* H o t e l l i n g ' s s t a t i s t i c v a l u e F 4.181 229.937* Wilks' Lambda ,067 ,103 ,021 539 035 065 11.131* 17.055* 1.163 29.653* 5.735** 3.579** value .191 .937 .907 .979 .643 .967 .938 2,12.718* 11.131* 17.055* 1.742 40.856* 5.735** 5.341* .* P ^ -001 **.p t .005 P L • 01 o 108 Box's M s t a t i s t i c (.see, Appendix 9) was computed f o r t e s t i n g the homogeneity of d i s p e r s i o n m a t r i c e s . At the p 4 .001 s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l , the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s of homogeneity of v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e m a t r i c e s was r e j e c t e d (F = 5.498 w i t h 33, 224012 degrees of freedom). The B a r t l e t t ' s index o f s p h e r i c i t y , which has a chi - s q u a r e d d i s t r i b u t i o n had a v a l u e of .618 w i t h one degree of freedom. The n u l l h y p o t h e s i s namely, the dependent v a r i a b l e s are orth o g o n a l t o each other was s u s t a i n e d at the p 4 .001 l e v e l . Based on the r e s u l t s of the above two t e s t s , an u n i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e (ANOVA) was c o n s i d e r e d more a p p r o p r i a t e i n the present study although the i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c scores of the b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s had e a r l i e r shown a c o r r e l a t i o n o f .30. An a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e was next c a r r i e d out on: the i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c s c o r e s . A repeated measures design was used. The r e s u l t s of t h i s a n a l y s i s are shown i n Table IV.3. As may be seen, a l l the main e f f e c t s namely, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , l e v e l of t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity, and d e c i s i o n importance are s i g n i f i c a n t at p 4 .001 l e v e l . A l l i n t e r a c t i o n s among the independent v a r i a b l e s except the i n t e r a c t i o n between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity are s i g n i f i c a n t a t p ^ .005 l e v e l . TABLE IV. 3 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SCORES RECEIVED BY 172 PARTICIPANTS ".IN THE STUDY Source o f v a r i a t i o n Mean squares degrees of freedom F O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (0) 2876. ,58 2 211.26* L e v e l o f t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity (A) 121, ,99 1 8.96* 0 X A 22. ,08 2 1.62 E r r o r 13, ,62 166 -D e c i s i o n importance (D) 280. ,56 1 28.43* D X 0 441. .59 2 40.69* D X A 95, .61 1 8.81** D X 0 X A 82, .37 2 7.59*. E r r o r 10, .85 166 -*p ^ .001 **p ^ .005 ,01 ****p 4 .05 110 Next, an ANOVA was c a r r i e d out on i n t r i n s i c scores o f p a r t i c i p a n t s u s i n g the th r e e independent v a r i a b l e s . A s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s was done on the e x t r i n s i c scores o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The d e t a i l s o f these analyses are gi v e n i n t a b l e s IV.4 and IV.5 r e s p e c t i v e l y . As may be seen, the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and d e c i s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s came out as s i g n i f i c a n t p r e d i c t o r s ( at .004 l e v e l or b e t t e r ) o f the i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c scores r e c e i v e d by p a r t i c i p a n t s . The p a r t i c i p a n t ' s l e v e l o f t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity was a s i g n i f i c a n t p r e d i c t o r o f h i s or her i n t r i n s i c s c o r e s , but not the e x t r i n s i c s c o res. The i n t e r a c t i o n s between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and d e c i s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s were good p r e d i c t o r s o f the dependent v a r i a b l e s . The i n t e r a c t i o n s among a l l t h r e e independent v a r i a b l e s were s i g n i f i c a n t p r e d i c t o r s o f a person's i n t r i n s i c s c o r e s , but not the e x t r i n s i c s c o res. Based on these i n i t i a l a n a lyses, i t would seem t h a t the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and d e c i s i o n importance are indeed good p r e d i c t o r s o f a person's i n c l i n a t i o n t o use i n t r i n s i c a l l y versus e x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s or b e h a v i o r s . A person's l e v e l o f t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity appeared t o be a good p r e d i c t o r o f a person's i n c l i n a t i o n to use i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g , c o n t r o l .behaviors, but not the e x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g ones. Same c o n c l u s i o n s may be drawn-about the TABLE IV. 4 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON INTRINSIC SCORES RECEIVED BY 172 PARTICIPANTS Source o f v a r i a t i o n Mean squares degrees of freedom Type o f o r g a n i z a -t i o n (0) Tol e r a n c e f o r Ambiguity l e v e l (A) D e c i s i o n importance (D) 0 X A 0 X D A X D 0 X A X D E r r o r 9184.37 327.11 128.38 50.37 86.00 43.42 143.51 15.41 1 1 2 2 1 2 332 608.85 21.22 8.33 3.27 5.58 2.82 9.31 P' .001 .001 .004 .039 .004 .094 .001 TABLE IV, 5 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON EXTRINSIC SCORES RECEIVED BY 172 PARTICIPANTS Source o f v a r i a t i o n Type o f o r g a n i z a t i o n (0) T o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity l e v e l (A) D e c i s i o n importance (D) 0 X A 0 X D A X D 0 X A X D E r r o r Mean squares Degrees of freedom 460.65 4.57 185.56 1.44 651.79 71.59 11.63 7.72 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 332 59.65 0.59 24.03 0.19 84.40 9.27 1.51 .001 .443 .001 .830 .001 .003 .223 Ni 113 p r e d i c t i v e a b i l i t y of the i n t e r a c t i o n s among the three independent v a r i a b l e s . Hypotheses I A- and IB: As the reader may remember, the f i r s t h ypothesis (hypothesis IA) was: I n d i v i d u a l s who work i n 'mechanistic' o r g a n i -z a t i o n s are more l i k e l y to choose c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s t h a t generate ' e x t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n than persons who work i n 'organic' o r g a n i z a -t i o n s . To t e s t t h i s h y p o t h e s i s , the mean ' e x t r i n s i c ' score of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n was compared w i t h s i m i l a r score, of those i n the 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n . The mean e x t r i n s i c score of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s o was compared w i t h t h a t of the c o n t r o l group. T - t e s t s were performed f o r t e s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s of mean scores of d i f f e r e n t groups. The r e s u l t s of the a n a l y s i s are shown i n Table IV. 6 . The a n a l y s i s was repeated a f t e r c o n t r o l l i n g f o r importance of the d e c i s i o n s made by the p a r t i c i p a n t s . These r e s u l t s are a l s o shown i n Table IV. 6 . As may be seen, the mean d i f f e r e n c e s of the groups are s i g n i f i c a n t and i n the hyp o t h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n f o r the 'important' d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s . The r e s u l t s were v e r y s i m i l a r when a l l d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s were co n s i d e r e d together. TABLE IV. 6 RESULTS OF T-TESTS OF EXTRINSIC SCORES OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE STUDY (n = 172) Group A l l d e c i s i o n s Mean S.D. Important d e c i s i o n s only Mean S.D. t Unimportant d e c i s i o n s o n l y Mean S.D. t Organic 78.49 2.31 10.14* M e c h a n i s t i c 86.03 5.16 C o n t r o l 7.61* 79.61 3.51 37.97 1.93 14.34* 46.22 4.02 40.02 2.90 9.20) 40.52 1.56 -1.55 39.81 3.18 39.59 2.43 0.40 * P ^ .001 ** p ^ .01 *** p 4 .05 115 In the case o f 'unimportant' d e c i s i o n s , the d i f f e r e n c e s i n mean sco r e s o f ''mechanistic* and 'organic' groups were n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t , hut i n a d i r e c t i o n o p p o s i t e to what was hypothesized. A one-way a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e was performed on the e x t r i n s i c scores o f p a r t i c i p a n t s u s i n g the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as the s i n g l e independent v a r i a b l e . The o b j e c t i v e o f t h i s a n a l y s i s was to f i n d out the extent of v a r i a t i o n i n the"dependent v a r i a b l e a t t r i b u t a b l e to the d i f f e r e n c e s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s alone. The r e s u l t s o f the a n a l y s i s are shown i n Table TV.7. As may be seen, the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s d i d come out as a s i g n i f i c a n t p r e d i c t o r o f the v a r i a t i o n i n the dependent v a r i a b l e s . The Sch e f f e T e s t and Duncan's M u l t i p l e Range Tes t were performed to t e s t the s i g n i f i c a n c e and d i r e c t i o n a l i t y o f mean d i f f e r e n c e s o f the three groups (see Appendix 9 f o r d e t a i l s o f these t e s t s ) . As may be seen, the d i f f e r e n c e s are s i g n i f i c a n t and i n the hyp o t h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n . O v e r a l l , the r e s u l t s seem to s t r o n g l y support hypothesis IA except f o r those s i t u a t i o n s when p a r t i c i p a n t s make•'unimportant' d e c i s i o n s . TABLE IV. 7 RESULTS OF A ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE EXTRINSIC SCORES OF 172 PARTICIPANTS Source of v a r i a t i o n Mean squares degrees of freedom O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s W i t h i n groups 941.55 14.87 2 169 63.30* Mean score M e c h a n i s t i c Orgn (M) Organic Orgn (0) C o n t r o l group (C) 85.89 78.49 79.61 Sc h e f f e ' s t e s t = M>0 and C; 0 = C Duncan's :test = M>0 and C; 0 = C * p ^ .001 117 Hypothesis IB was; I n d i v i d u a l s who work i n 'organic' o r g a n i z a -t i o n s are more l i k e l y to choose c o n t r o l B e h a v i o r s that generate ' i n t r i n s i c ' work m o t i v a t i o n . To t e s t the hy p o t h e s i s , mean i n t r i n s i c c o n t r o l scores o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 'organic' group were compared w i t h the mean scores o f those i n 'mechanistic' and c o n t r o l groups. T - t e s t s were performed to t e s t the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f :'these d i f f e r e n c e s . The r e s u l t s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s are shown i n Table IV.8. The a n a l y s i s was repeated a f t e r c o n t r o l l i n g f o r d e c i s i o n importance. The r e s u l t s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s are a l s o shown i n Ta b l e IV.8. As may be seen, a l l mean d i f f e r e n c e s are s i g n i f i c a n t at the p 4: .001 l e v e l and i n the hypo t h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n . A one-way a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e was performed on the i n t r i n s i c scores o f p a r t i c i p a n t s u s i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as the s i n g l e independent v a r i a b l e . The r e s u l t s are shown i n Table IV.9. As may be seen, the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s d i d come out as a s i g n i f i c a n t p r e d i c t o r o f a person's i n c l i n a t i o n to use i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . Based on the r e s u l t s o f the above an a l y s e s , i t TABLE IV. 8 RESULTS OF T-TESTS OF 'INTRINSIC 1 SCORES OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE STUDY Group A l l d e c i s i o n s 'important' d e c i - 'unimportant' d e c i -s i ons o n l y sions o n l y Mean S.D. t Mean SiD. t Mean S.D. t M e c h a n i s t i c 67.05 7.32 32.75 4.66 34.30 4.44 31.28* 24.14* 23.61* Organic 101.72 4.50 49.44 2.64 52.28 3.89 10.11* 4.24* 9.96* C o n t r o l 90.03 6.91 45.00 7.63 45.03 3.79 * p ^ .001 ** p 4 .01 *** p ^ .05 TABLE IV. 9 RESULTS OF A ©NE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE INTRINSIC SCORES OF 172 PARTICIPANTS Source of v a r i a t i o n Mean squares Degrees of 'freedom O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Within groups 1877:0.16.6 4:0/;lr6 2 169 467.40* Mechanistic Orgn Organic Orgn Control group Mean score (M) 67:. 0.4: (0) 1GLL..72. (C) 9,0;. W Scheffe's test: 0>C>M i Duncan's test: 0> C> M *.p <1 .001 120 would seem that t h e r e i s st r o n g support f o r hypothesis IB, Hypothesis I I As the reader may remember, the second hypothesis i n the present study was: I n d i v i d u a l s who are h i g h i n t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity are more l i k e l y to adopt c o n t r o l b ehaviors t h a t l e a d to i n t r i n s i c work m o t i v a t i o n than those who are low i n t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity. To t e s t the h y p o t h e s i s , the i n t r i n s i c scores of p a r t i c i p a n t s w i t h low t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity were compared w i t h those of p a r t i c i p a n t s who had a h i g h score on t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity. As mentioned p r e v i o u s l y , low t o l e r a n t persons were those who had a score h i g h e r than 48.8 on the Budner s c a l e . The r e s u l t s o f t - t e s t s on the mean i n t r i n s i c scores of low and h i g h t o l e r a n t groups are shown i n Table IV.10. The mean d i f f e r e n c e s between groups were s i g n i f i c a n t at the p . 02 l e v e l . S i m i l a r t e s t s were performed t a k i n g 'important' and 'unimportant' d e c i s i o n s s e p a r a t e l y . In the case o f unimportant d e c i s i o n s , the mean d i f f e r e n c e s were again s i g n i f i c a n t at the TABLE IV.10 RESULTS OF T-TESTS OF MEAN DIFFERENCES IN 1INTRINSIC' SCORES OF LOW AND HIGH TOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY GROUPS Group A l l d e c i s i o n s Mean S.D. 'important' deci-s i ons only Mean S.D. 'unimportant' deci-sions o n l y Mean S.D. •t Low t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity High t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity 83.92 17.00 41.49 9.78 -2.09*** 1.15 88.25 15.00 43.06 7.91 42.43 8.84 2.13*** 45.20 8.13 * P .001 ** P -01 P -05 122 p 4 -02 level.,' In the case of important d e c i s i o n s , the mean d i f f e r e n c e s were i n the hyp o t h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n , but not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . The above analyses were performed without c o n t r o l l i n g f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . However, i t i s reasonable to assume t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity of members w i l l i n t e r a c t to produce somewhat d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s . The next attempt was to i d e n t i f y these i n t e r a c t i o n s . R e s u l t s of T - t e s t s performed on the scores of the study are shown i n Table IV.11. In f o u r out of n i n e comparisons, the mean d i f f e r e n c e s were s i g n i f i c a n t a t p $ .01 l e v e l or b e t t e r . For 'mechanistic' and 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n the case of unimportant d e c i s i o n s , the r e s u l t s were i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n and s t a t i s -t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . For the c o n t r o l group, however, two out of three mean d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t r i n s i c scores were not s i g n i f i c a n t . One somewhat b a f f l i n g f i n d i n g was t h a t f o r important d e c i s i o n s , low t o l e r a n t members of the 'organic' group used more i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s than members who had h i g h t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity. At the present time t h e r e i s no sound e x p l a n a t i o n a v a i l a b l e f o r t h i s phenomenon. One TABLE IV.11 T-TESTS OF MEAN DIFFERENCES IN 'INTRINSIC' SCORES OF LOW AND HIGH TOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY PERSONS WORKING IN DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS A l l d e c i s i o n s n Mean S.D. t M e c h a n i s t i c Orgn Low t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity 30 High t o l e r a n c e 30 of ambiguity Organic Orgn Low t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity High t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity C o n t r o l group Low t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity High t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity 63.64 70.45 26 89.30 26 92.17 6.27 6.76 •4.04* 30 100.67 5.11 -1.65 30 102.67 3.63 6.52 -1.51 7.11 Important d e c i -sions o n l y Mean S.D. 31.55 3.80 -2.26*** 34.25 5.35 50.38 2.31 2.93** 48.50 2.65 44.13 5.10 -2.36*** 47.28 4.50 Unimportant d e c i s i o n s only Mean S.D. t 32.10 4.18 •3.93 36.20 .3.90 50.40 4.47 •4.27* 54.16 1.84 45.17 3.22 0.27 44.89 4.35 * p ^ .001 ** p 4 .01 *** p £ .05 ( o n e - t a i l ) 124 p o s s i b l e c o n j e c t u r e i s t h a t low t o l e r a n t i n d i v i d u a l s may a l s o have l e s s a b i l i t y to w i t h s t a n d c o g n i t i v e dissonance and i n t r a p e r s o n a l c o n f l i c t . Hence when fa c e d w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e i r own managerial s t y l e and p r e v a i l i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s , they chose to comply w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n a l norms more r e a d i l y than those i n d i v i d u a l s who had h i g h t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t may be t h a t low t o l e r a n t persons when f a c e d w i t h an o r g a n i c work s i t u a t i o n c o u l d not cope w i t h the s i t u a t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y and l i t e r a l l y threw up t h e i r hands. In d e s p a i r , they chose a l a i s s e z - f a i r e l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e which was i n t e r p r e t e d as ' . i n t r i n s i c ' c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s dur i n g the study. However, u n t i l f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h evidence i s a v a i l a b l e , no f i r m c o n c l u s i o n s can be reached on the phenomenon. A one-way a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e was performed on the i n t r i n s i c scores of p a r t i c i p a n t s u s i n g the l e v e l of t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity as the s i n g l e independent v a r i a b l e . The r e s u l t s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s are shown i n Table IV.12. As may be seen, the mean d i f f e r e n c e s between low and h i g h t o l e r a n t groups are not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , although the d i f f e r e n c e s are i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n . Based on the above f i n d i n g s , i t may be concluded TABLE IV. 12 RESULTS OF A ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE INTRINSIC SCORES OF 172 PARTICIPANTS ^Source o f v a r i a t i o n Mean squares Degrees of freedom F L e v e l o f t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity W i t h i n groups 653.84 256.91 1 170 2.55 Low t o l e r a n c e group (I) High t o l e r a n c e group(H) Mean score 84.35: 88\ 2*5-.Scheffe's t e s t : L = H Duncan's t e s t : L = H Note: F hot s i g n i f i c a n t a t p ^.05 l e v e l ho 126 t h a t t h e r e Is some support f o r the second h y p o t h e s i s . However, there are a l s o a few f i n d i n g s which d e v i a t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the hypothesized d i r e c t i o n s . Hence, i n the absence of a d d i t i o n a l e m p i r i c a l evidence no f i r m c o n c l u s i o n s can be a r r i v e d at about the p r e c i s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a person's t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity l e v e l and h i s / h e r c h o i c e o f s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . Hypotheses I I I A and IIIB Hypothesis I I I A was: I n d i v i d u a l s are more l i k e l y to choose c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s that l e a d to ' i n t r i n s i c ' work m o t i v a t i o n when the d e c i s i o n s they have to make are r e l a t i v e l y unimportant than when these d e c i s i o n s are important. Hypothesis IIIB was: I n d i v i d u a l s are more l i k e l y to choose c o n t r o l behaviors that l e a d to ' e x t r i n s i c ' work m o t i v a t i o n when the d e c i s i o n s they have to make are r e l a t i v e l y important than when these d e c i s i o n s are unimportant. To t e s t h y p o thesis I I I A the mean i n t r i n s i c scores of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s on important and unimportant d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s were compared. T - t e s t s were performed. The r e s u l t s o f the a n a l y s i s are shown i n Table IV.13. For the purpose o f t e s t i n g h y p o t h e s i s IIIB the mean e x t r i n s i c scores of the p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r the two TABLE IV.13 T-TESTS OF MEAN 'INTRINSIC' AND 'EXTRINSIC' SCORES RECEIVED BY 172 PARTICIPANTS ON TWO TYPES OF DECISION SITUATIONS I n t r i n s i c score Important d e c i s i o n s Unimportant d e c i s i o n s E x t r i n s i c : score Important d e c i s i o n s 41.49 4.73 , 0 . 3.68" Unimportant d e c i s i o n s 39.99 2.51 * p 4-001 ** p ^ .01 *** P • 05 ho Mean S.D, 42.47 8.40 , ... -1.45 43.79 8.57 128 types of d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s were compared. The r e s u l t s of t h i s a n a l y s i s a re a l s o shown i n Tab l e IV.13. In the case o f hypothesis I I I A ( r e l a t i n g ' i n t r i n s i c ' c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s w i t h d e c i s i o n importance), t h e r e was o n l y weak support i n the present study. The mean d i f f e r e n c e s were i n the hyp o t h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n , but not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t (p = .08). For e x t r i n s i c scores ( t h a t i s , hypothesis I I I B ) , the mean d i f f e r e n c e s were i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n and s i g n i f i c a n t at p .001. Thus the r e s u l t s supported hypothesis IIIB f u l l y and IIIA weakly. I t may be concluded t h a t t h e r e i s a t l e a s t p a r t i a l support f o r the hyp o t h e s i s t h a t importance of d e c i s i o n problems i s a good p r e d i c t o r of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s c h o i c e of c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . Hypothesis IV: As the reader may remember, the f i n a l h y p o thesis was: Choice of s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l behaviors i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d by the combined e f f e c t s of p e r s o n a l i t y , d e c i s i o n - r e l a t e d and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s . An i n d i v i -d u a l who i s low i n t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity, employed i n a 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n and f a c i n g an important d e c i s i o n problem i s l e a s t l i k e l y to use c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s t h a t generate ' i n t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n on 129 the p a r t o f subordinates and most l i k e l y to use c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s that l e a d to ' e x t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n on t h e i r p a r t , I n d i v i d u a l s h i g h i n t o l e r a n c e f o r ambiguity employed i n 'organic* f i r m s and f a c i n g unimportant d e c i s i o n problems are l e a s t l i k e l y to use c o n t r o l behaviors that l e a d to ' e x t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n on the p a r t o f t h e i r subordinates and most l i k e l y to choose behaviors t h a t l e a d to ' i n t r i n s i c ' m o t i v a t i o n . For the purpose o f t e s t i n g t h i s h y p o t h e s i s , the mean i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c scores o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l groups were c a l c u l a t e d and compared. The mean scores o f d i f f e r e n t groups along w i t h t h e i r standard d e v i a t i o n s are shown i n Table IV.14. The mean d i f f e r e n c e s were i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n the case o f ' i n t r i n s i c ' s c o r e s . Persons working i n 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w i t h h i g h l e v e l o f t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity and f a c i n g unimportant d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s had the h i g h e s t mean i n t r i n s i c scores (mean = 54.16). When t h i s score was compared w i t h the next h i g h e s t i n t r i n s i c score ( v i z . , 50.40) the mean d i f f e r e n c e s were found to be '--s t a t i s t i c a l l y " - s i g n i f i c a n t (p <- .001) . In the case o f ' e x t r i n s i c ' scores the d i f f e r e n c e s were i n the hypot h e s i z e d d i r e c t i o n , but not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . Persons working i n m e c h a n i s t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w i t h .TABLE IV. 14 .MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF 'INTRINSIC' AND 'EXTRINSIC' SCORES OF 172 PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRESENT STUDY Organiza-t i o n , (Tolerance o f ambiguity l e v e l D e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n M e c h a n i s t i c Organic C o n t r o l Low High Low High Low High Important i n t r i n s i c 47.28 e x t r i n s i c 31.55 47.16 (S.D. 3.80) (S.D. 4.41) 34.25 45.29 (S.D. 5.35) (S.D. 3.42) 50.38 38.27 (S.D. 2.31) (S.D. 1.79) 48.50 37.67 (S.D. 2.65) (S.D. 2.05) 44.13 40.46 (S.D. 5.10) (S.D. 3.54) 39.58 Unimportant i n t r i n s i c e x t r i n s i c 32.10 39.03 (S.D. 4.18) (S.D. 3.30) 36.20 40.69 (S.D. 3.90) (S.D. 2.90) 50.40 40.09 (S.D. 4.47) (S.D. 1.68) 54.16 40.94 (S.D. 1.84) (S.D. 1.33) 45.17 39.58 (S.D. 3.22) (S.D. 2.12) 44.89 39.60 (S.D. 4.50) (S.D. 2.04) (S.D. 4.35) (S.D. 2.75) 131 low t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity and f a c i n g important d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s i n f a c t had the h i g h e s t e x t r i n s i c scores (mean =47.16). But when t h i s was compared w i t h the next h i g h e s t mean ' e x t r i n s i c ' score ( v i z . , 45.29) the d i f f e r e n c e was not found to be s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t (p =.07). F o l l o w i n g h y p o t h e s i s IV, persons working i n or g a n i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity and f a c i n g unimportant d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s were expected to have the lowest mean e x t r i n s i c score. But t h i s was not found to be the case. T h e i r mean score ( v i z . , 40.94) was i n f a c t h i g h e r than t h a t o f some other groups i n the study. Again, a c c o r d i n g to the hy p o t h e s i s , persons who work i n m e c h a n i s t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w i t h low t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity and f a c i n g important d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s were p r e d i c t e d to have the lowest mean i n t r i n s i c s c o r e s . T h i s p r e d i c t i o n d i d h o l d good. The mean i n t r i n s i c score o f t h i s group ( v i z . , 31.55) when compared to the next lowest score ( v i z . , 32.10) was found to be s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t (p <..005). Based on the above f i n d i n g s , there seems to be p a r t i a l support f o r hypothesis IV. Comparisons o f mean i n t r i n s i c scores gave st r o n g support f o r the h y p o t h e s i s . 132 However, i n the case of ' e x t r i n s i c ' s cores the f i n d i n g s d i d not support the p r e s e n t h y p o t h e s i s t o any g r e a t extent. RESULTS OF SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES: Besides the above an a l y s e s , the e f f e c t s o f other p o s s i b l e independent v a r i a b l e s and c o v a r i a t e s on the ' i n t r i n s i c ' and ' e x t r i n s i c ' scores of p a r t i c i p a n t s were a l s o examined. Analyses of v a r i a n c e s were performed u s i n g the sex, past work experience and past s u p e r v i s o r y experience of p a r t i c i p a n t s as c o v a r i a t e s . None of these v a r i a b l e s emerged as a s i g n i f i c a n t p r e d i c t o r (at p ^ .05) of the scores r e c e i v e d by the p a r t i c i p a n t s . As was mentioned e a r l i e r , the r o l e i d e n t i t y , f e l t by the p a r t i c i p a n t s d u r i n g the experiment was measured on a 5-point s c a l e C.1 = v e r y l i t t l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the r o l e and 5 = v e r y h i g h i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the r o l e ) . When the data were analyzed across o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i t was found t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between r o l e i d e n t i t y f e l t by the p a r t i c i p a n t s and the type of o r g a n i z a t i o n they worked i n was s i g n i f i c a n t . The r e s u l t s of t h i s a n a l y s i s are shown i n Tab l e IV.15. As may be seen p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a -t i o n f e l t the maximum r o l e i d e n t i t y , f o l l o w e d by those TABLE IV.15 DEGREE OF ROLE IDENTITY FELT BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE STUDY Type o f O r g a n i z a t i o n v e r y l i t t l e Degree of 'role i d e n t i t y 2 3 t modera- ., t e l y v e r y much T o t a l M e c h a n i s t i c 31 21 60 Organic 18 22 11 60 C o n t r o l 17 14 16 52 Ch i square = 35.00 w i t h 8 degrees of freedom (p <,001) E t a = .43 w i t h r o l e i d e n t i t y as the dependent v a r i a b l e , u> u> 134 who worked i n 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s , The members of the c o n t r o l group had the l e a s t r o l e i d e n t i t y . One p o s s i b l e reason f o r t h i s might be the f a c t t h a t t r u l y 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s are s t i l l a m i n o r i t y i n r e a l l i f e and hence the p a r t i c i p a n t s who worked f o r such an ' i d e a l ' o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d not f u l l y i d e n t i f y themselves w i t h the r o l e o f the manager who works f o r the o r g a n i z a -t i o n . Note., t h a t persons who were i n the c o n t r o l group ( i . e . , those who were asked to imagine t h a t they are managers i n an a i r l i n e i n Canada) had the l e a s t r o l e i d e n t i t y . T h i s i s more or l e s s understandable: imagining the r o l e of a manager i n a company without any i n f o r m a t i o n about the company may*in:fact p.Eove'-'-to be a v e r y d i f f i c u l t task. Using f e l t r o l e i d e n t i t y as a c o v a r i a t e , an a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e was performed on the ' i n t r i n s i c ' and ' e x t r i n s i c ' scores r e c e i v e d by p a r t i c i p a n t s . Role i d e n t i t y d i d emerge as a s i g n i f i c a n t c o v a r i a t e (p .001 i n both c a s e s ) ; however the o v e r a l l p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the dependent v a r i a b l e s d i d not improve s i g n i f i c a n t l y . Before r o l e i d e n t i t y was i n t r o d u c e d as a c o v a r i a t e the m u l t i p l e R was .88 i n the case of ' i n t r i n s i c ' scores and .47 i n the case o f ' e x t r i n s i c ' s c o r e s . These f i g u r e s remained unchanged even a f t e r r o l e i d e n t i t y was 135 i n t r o d u c e d as a c o v a r i a t e , In the p o s t - e x p e r i m e n t a l d e b r i e f i n g , the p a r t i c i -pants were asked f o r t h e i r comments on the ' r e a l i s m ' p r e s e n t i n the d e s c r i p t i o n of North S t a r A i r l i n e s and the 18 d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s g i v e n to each p a r t i c i p a n t s . The comments that came from the p a r t i c i p a n t s were q u i t e encouraging. Most people c o n s i d e r e d the d e s c r i p t i o n of the o r g a n i z a t i o n and the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s v e r y r e a l i s t i c and i n t e r e s t i n g . T h i s was an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t d u r i n g the experiment most p a r t i c i p a n t s were w e l l - i n v o l v e d i n the task. In p a r t i c u l a r , to the q u e s t i o n "how d i d you f i n d the d e s c r i p t i o n of North S t a r ? " (which was to be responded to on a 5-point s c a l e o f 'very u n r e a l i s t i c ' , ' u n r e a l i s t i c ' , ' s l i g h t l y r e a l i s -t i c ' , 'somewhat r e a l i s t i c ' , and 'very r e a l i s t i c ' ) most people responded 'somewhat r e a l i s t i c ' or b e t t e r . The summary o f responses to t h i s q u e s t i o n are g i v e n i n Table IV.16. I t may be noted t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s who worked i n 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s d u r i n g the study c o n s i d e r e d the d e s c r i p t i o n to be more r e a l i s t i c . As .mentioned e a r l i e r , t h i s might p o s s i b l y be,on account of the f a c t that t r u l y 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s are s t i l l a r a r i t y TABLE IV.16 RESPONSES OF 9 6 PARTICIPANTS TO THE QUESTION "HOW DID YOU FIND THE DESCRIPTION OF NORTH STAR AIRLINES?" O r g a n i z a t i o n v e r y u n r e a l i s - t i c t i c u n r e a l i s - s l i g h t l y somewhat very r e a l i s t i c r e a l i s t i c r e a l i s t i c T o t a l M e c h a n i s t i c Organic T o t a l 2 0 2 13 26 21 47 18 51 10 45 28 96 Chi-square = 9.07 w i t h 4 degrees of freedom (p < .06) E t a = 0.31 w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as dependent v a r i a b l e . 137 i n r e a l l i f e and s i n c e a major percentage of the p a r t i c i p a n t s had some work experience i n the p a s t , they f e l t the 'organic' form to be more an i d e a l r a t h e r than a true model of today's o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Note that the d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s about r e a l i s m i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n s are however, not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . An a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e was performed on the ' i n t r i n s i c ' and ' e x t r i n s i c ' scores o f p a r t i c i p a n t s u s i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( i . e . , m e c h a n i s t i c and o r g a n i c ) , t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity l e v e l and d e c i s i o n importance as independent v a r i a b l e s and p e r c e i v e d r e a l i s m i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n as a c o v a r i a t e . P e r c e i v e d r e a l i s m i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n d i d emerge as a s i g n i f i c a n t c o v a r i a t e (p <v01); apart from t h i s , however, the o v e r a l l p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f the scores d i d not change. No observable d i f f e r e n c e s i n the main e f f e c t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s among independent v a r i a b l e s occured. At the end of the experiment, the p a r t i c i p a n t s who worked i n the simulated o r g a n i z a t i o n s were asked to show t h e i r l i k e or d i s l i k e f o r the managerial p r a c t i c e s at No r t h S t a r A i r l i n e on a 5-point s c a l e 138 Gstrongly d i s l i k e d , m i l d l y d i s l i k e d , neither liked-in'or d i s l i k e d , mildly l i k e d , and strongly l i k e d ) . The summary of t h e i r responses are shown, i n Table IV.17. I t may be seen from the table that the differences between members of the two organizations i n t h e i r l i k e or d i s l i k e for the organizations are not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t (p ss . 47). The reader may also note that 52 of the 120 participants neither l i k e d nor d i s l i k e d t h e i r organiza-tions (calle d 'group 1' for short). An almost equal number of participants (v i z . , 53) either mildly or''.strongly l i k e d t h e i r organizations ( c a l l e d 'group 2' here)'. An analysis was done to f i n d out whether there were any s i g n i f i c a n t differences i n the response pattern of these two groups. F i r s t , an analysis of variance was done on the ' i n t r i n s i c ' and 'e x t r i n s i c ' scores received by members of group 1 using organizational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , t o l e r a - -j nee of ambiguity l e v e l and decision importance as the independent variables. The res u l t s of th i s analysis are shown i n Table IV.18. A sim i l a r analysis of variance was performed for scores received by group 2. These are shown i n Table IV.19. As the res u l t s indicate TABLE 'IV.17 RESPONSES FROM 120 PARTICIPANTS TO THE QUESTION "TO WHAT EXTENT DID YOU LIKE THE MANAGERIAL STYLES AND PRACTICES AT NORTH STAR?" O r g a n i z a t i o n v n e i t h e r s t r o n g l y ( m i l d l y , l i k e d nor v m i l d l y , s t r o n g l y d i s l i k e d d i s l i k e d d i s l i k e d l i k e d l i k e d t o t M e c h a n i s t i c 29 18 6 Organic 23 23 6 T o t a l 12 52 41 12 12 Chi square = 3.60 w i t h 4 degrees of freedom, (p = ,47) E t a = .019 w i t h ' l i k i n g f o r managerial p r a c t i c e s at North Star' as dependent v a r i a b l e . TABLE IV.18 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SCORES RECEIVED BY 52 PARTICIPANTS WHO NEITHER LIKED NOR DISLIKED THE SIMULATED ORGANIZATIONS Mean squares I n t r i n s i c scores F p O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s CO) 7643. 05 724. 70 .001 274 23 32.00 .001 L e v e l of t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity (A) 134. 34 12. 74 .001 15 .02 .894 Decisionsimportance (D) o x;*A 99. 39. 31 88 9. 3. 42 78 .003 .055 225 80 82 26.35 .10 .001 .758 0 X D 49. 53 4. 70 .033 592 12 69.10 .001 A X D 54. 54 5. 17 .025 11 05 1.29 .259 0 X A X D 13. 20 1. 25 .266 37 30 4.35 .030 E r r o r 10. 55 8 57 - -M u l t i p l e R .94 .50 E x t r i n s i c scores Mean squares o TABLE IV,19 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SCORES RECEIVED BY 53 PARTICIPANTS WHO LIKED THE SIMULATED ORGANIZATIONS I n t r i n s i c scores E x t r i n s i c scores Mean F P' Mean F P squares squares O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (0) 7045.50 428.20 .001 459.24 70.15 .001 L e v e l o f t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity (A) 144.88 8.81 .004 36.42 5,56 .020 D e c i s i o n Importance 144.85 8.81 .004 34.63 5.29 .024 (D) 0 X A 39.20 2.38 .004 : 1.67 .26 .615 0 X D .21 .01 .910 488.47 74.61 .001 A X D 64.96 3.95 .050 95.57 14.60 .001 0 X A X D ; 37.03 2.25 .137 4.11 .63 .430 E r r o r 16.45 - - 6.55 - -M u l t i p l e R .90 .55 142 th e r e a r e a, few d i f f e r e n c e s i n the mean sco r e s , FVvalues, and s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l s o f independent v a r i a b l e s i n the two groups. Note t h a t the m u l t i p l e R's are not a p p r e c i a b l y d i f f e r e n t i n the two cases, An a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e was performed on the ' i n t r i n s i c ' and ' e x t r i n s i c ' scores of the 120 p a r t i c i ^ pants i n c l u d i n g t h e i r score on the above q u e s t i o n ( v i z . , 'to what extent d i d you l i k e the managerial s t y l e s and p r a c t i c e s at Nort h S t a r ? ' ) as a c o v a r i a t e . I t d i d emerge as a s i g n i f i c a n t c o v a r i a t e (p *=. .003): but there were no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s on the main e f f e c t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s among the three independent v a r i a b l e s (namely, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , l e v e l of t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity and d e c i s i o n importance). Summary: The major f i n d i n g s a r i s i n g from the pr e s e n t study were d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s chapter. A n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e and c o v a r i a n c e ( u n i v a r i a t e and m u l t i v a r i a t e ) and t - t e s t s were used to analyze the data and t e s t the s e v e r a l hypotheses. R e s u l t s o f the study seem to s t r o n g l y support some o f the hypotheses set f o r t h i n 143 TABLE IV.20 SUMMARY OF PRESENT FINDINGS Hypothesis Present f i n d i n g s IA. IB I I . IIIA. Members o f 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s tend to use ' e x t r i n s i c ' c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s 'organic' Members o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s tend to use ' i n t r i n s i c ' c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s I n d i v i d u a l s w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity tend to choose ' i n t r i n s i c ' c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s I n d i v i d u a l s choose ' i n t r i n s i c ' c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s when they have to make unimport-ant d e c i s i o n s Moderate support Strong support Some support; there are a l s o a few f i n d i n g s which s i g n i -f i c a n t l y d e v i a t e from p r e d i c t i o n s . Weak support IIIB. I n d i v i d u a l s choose ' e x t r i n s i c ' c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s when they Strong support have to make important d e c i s i o n s IV. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , d e c i s i o n importance, and l e v e l o f t o l e r a n c e Moderate support of ambiguity i n t e r a c t a d d i t i v e l y to determine an i n d i v i d u a l ' s c h o i c e o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . 144 chapter 3; and p r o v i d e some support f o r the o t h e r s , A B r i e f summary of the prese n t f i n d i n g s i s g i v e n i n TaBle TV.20. The i m p l i c a t i o n s o f these f i n d i n g s are d i s c u s s e d i n the next chapter. 145 CHAPTER V CONCLUSION The most important f i n d i n g i n the prese n t study was th a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e x e r t a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e on the choice of c o n t r o l behaviors by the d e c i s i o n makers who work w i t h i n these o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In p a r t i c u l a r , the c u r r e n t r e s e a r c h evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t c o n t r o l l e r s working i n 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s are most l i k e l y to use i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s and those who work i n 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s are most l i k e l y to use e x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . While three independent v a r i a b l e s were used i n the pr e s e n t r e s e a r c h design, the s i n g l e most important independent v a r i a b l e t h a t i n f l u e n c e d the c o n t r o l d e c i s i o n s of p a r t i c i p a n t s was the nature of the o r g a n i z a t i o n they were assigned to d u r i n g the experiment. Based on the., c u r r e n t r e s e a r c h evidence i t would appear t h a t major changes i n managerial s t y l e s ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the context o f the c o n t r o l r e l a t e d behaviors) can not be expected to emerge u n t i l some important s t r u c t u r a l and c l i m a t i c changes occur w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Thus a mere i n t r o d u c t i o n of s o p h i s t i c a t e d t r a i n i n g programs i n l e a d e r s h i p p r a c t i c e s may not b r i n g about the d e s i r e d 146 e f f e c t s i n the c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s of managers i f they do not p e r c e i v e the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : : and c l i m a t e to be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h these new practices.. In t h i s sense, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l ' s o c i a l i z a t i o n ' and p r e v a i l i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l norms about a p p r o p r i a t e managerial b e h a v i o r may have g r e a t e r e f f e c t s on c o n t r o l behaviors of managers than has h i t h e r t o been suspected. A l s o , w h i l e the c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s w i t h i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n are i n f l u e n c e d by the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , the r e v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between these v a r i a b l e s may a l s o be s i g n i f i c a n t . Thus i f 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s tend to encourage use of i n t r i n s i c c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s which r e s u l t i n more autonomy an inter-member t r u s t at a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l s , these may i n t u r n make the o r g a n i z a t i o n more 'organic'. S i m i l a r l y , 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r emphasis on the use of e x t r i n s i c rewards to m o t i v a t e members may i n c r e a s e the reward power of the managers at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Consequently, the power d i f f e r e n t i a l s between any two l e v e l s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y may show an i n c r e a s i n g t r e n d over a p e r i o d to time.- a f a c t o r which u l t i m a t e l y adds to the 'mechanistic' n ature of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . 147 T h i s two-way- r e l a t i o n s h i p Between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l charac^ t e r i s t i c s and c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s - of the .managers c o u l d not Be examined w i t h i n the framework of the p r e s e n t r e s e a r c h d e sign, But may Be a v e r y f r u i t f u l , a rea f o r f u r t h e r research., The second most important f i n d i n g emerging from the study i s the e f f e c t s of d e c i s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on the c h o i c e of c o n t r o l Behaviors By d e c i s i o n makers. Three dimensions o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s were examined i n the p r e s e n t study: d e c i s i o n importance, d e c i s i o n u n c e r t a i n t y and d e c i s i o n complexity. The p r e s e n t evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t the more important, u n c e r t a i n and complex the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n i s , the J l e s s l i k e l y the c o n t r o l l e r i s to delegate the d e c i s i o n making power to h i s or her suBordinates. In the above mentioned d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s the c o n t r o l l e r s ' a l s o seem to Be l e s s concerned w i t h p r o v i d i n g autonomy, task i d e n t i t y , immediate feedback and task v a r i e t y to t h e i r suBordinates. T h i s i s not too s u r p r i s i n g : i n such cases, p r o v i s i o n of f u r t h e r autonomy to the suBordinates may i n c r e a s e the a l r e a d y h i g h l e v e l of complexity and u n c e r t a i n t y . I t can Be expected t h a t the c o n t r o l l e r s w i l l be averse to t a k i n g any a c t i o n s which w i l l i n c r e a s e the d e c i s i o n complexity and u n c e r t -148 ainty,. Two major q u a l i j ; I c a t t o n s to the ahoye statement should be made, F i r s t , i f the d e c i s i o n maker has a h i g h degree o f conf i d e n c e i n the d e c i s i o n making a b i l i t i e s o f h i s o r her subordinates (and hence the' s u b o r d i n a t e s ' a b i l i t i e s to reduce the o v e r a l l uncertainty..of the v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n outcomes)., the former may s t i l l use i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . T h i s i s t y p i c a l l y a s i t u a t i o n where the d e c i s i o n makers do not possess the s p e c i f i c knowledge or s k i l l s r e l e v a n t f o r the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n , but p e r c e i v e t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e s to have t h i s knowledge or s k i l l . T h i s may occur e i t h e r on account o f e x i s t i n g h i g h task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o r inadequacies o f the p r e v a i l i n g management i n f o r m a t i o n system. Secondly, a manager may choose to delegate the d e c i s i o n making to h i s / h e r subordinates i f i t i s p e r c e i v e d t h a t such d e l e g a t i o n b r i n g s long term b e n e f i t s which more than compensate f o r s h o r t term c o s t s ( i n the form o f i n c r e a s e d u n c e r t a i n t y of outcomes). However, no c o n c l u s i o n s can be a r r i v e d a t i n the absence of f u r t h e r e m p i r i c a l evidence.; Some g u i d e l i n e s f o r c h o i c e o f s p e c i f i c s t r a t e g i e s i n s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s are p r o v i d e d by Vroom and Ye t t o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) which may be used as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h i n the area. The three dimensions df d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s used 149 i n the p r e s e n t study are perhaps the most apparent ones. However, o t h e r important dimensions do e x i s t and may he r e l e v a n t f o r s i m i l a r r e s e a r c h i n the f u t u r e , Three other dimensions come immediately to mind: degree of r i s k a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the d e c i s i o n , r e p e t i t i v e n ature o f the d e c i s i o n and degree of c o n f l i c t i n the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n . As MacCrimmon and T a y l o r (1976) p o i n t e d out, r i s k y d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s are those where the d e c i s i o n maker i s .uncertain about the outcomes and about the p o s s i b i l i t y of l o s s e s of r e s o u r c e s due to a bad d e c i s i o n . The r e p e t i t i v e n e s s dimension i s perhaps more apparent. Many of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s are r e p e t i t i v e i n nature whereas- s e v e r a l others ( e s p e c i a l l y p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s ) are n o n - r e p e t i t i v e , In g e n e r a l , r e p e t i t i v e d e c i s i o n problems can be s o l v e d u s i n g standard d e c i s i o n r u l e s and a l g o r i t h m s and hence may be l e s s u n c e r t a i n (and perhaps l e s s complex) i n n a t u r e . C o n f l i c t i n a d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n a r i s e s when (a) there are m u l t i p l e p a r t i e s , (b) the a c t i o n s of one person can a f f e c t the outcomes o f o t h e r s , (c) the p a r t i e s have d i f f e r e n t p r e f e r e n c e o r d e r i n g s on the outcomes and (d) the p a r t i e s are aware of the s i t u a t i o n (MacCrimmon.& T a y l o r , 1976). In the p r e s e n t study, r i s k y d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s were c o n s i d e r e d as a s p e c i a l case o f uncer-t a i n s i t u a t i o n s and not t r e a t e d as a d i f f e r e n t dimension 150 as such., I t Is. a l s o l£kely t h a t most h i g h . r i s k d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s are By n a t u r e important and a t l e a s t to some extent t h i s dimension was i n c l u d e d (In one„..fo,rm or another) i n the presen t study, I t i s B e l i e v e d , however, that the h i g h r i s k and low r i s k d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s are fundamentally d i f f e r e n t i n c h a r a c t e r as f a r as t h e i r e f f e c t s on c h o i c e o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s are concerned. The d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s i n c l u d e d i n the pr e s e n t study are mostly non r e p e t i t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r although i t i s l i k e l y t h a t some of the d e c i s i o n problems i n c l u d e d i n the l i s t may r e c u r , ( e . g , , the problem of s e v e r a l subordinates coming l a t e to the o f f i c e ) . I t may a l s o be noted that most n o n - r e p e t i t i v e d e c i s i o n problems are a l s o by nature more u n c e r t a i n and complex. T h i s i s because a l l b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s tend to develop standard d e c i s i o n procedures f o r making most r o u t i n e and r e p e t i t i v e d e c i s i o n s . For d e c i s i o n s which are , n o n - r e p e t i t i v e , there i s no p r e v a i l i n g p o o l o f knowledge to help the d e c i s i o n maker to i d e n t i f y the interdependencies among d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s and the consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s - and t h i s by d e f i n i t i o n i s ann u n c e r t a i n and complex d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n . The t h i r d dimension, namely, degree of c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e d i n the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n was not 151 s t u d i e d to any s i g n i f i c a n t extent i n the present study. Many of the d e c i s i o n problems i d e n t i f i e d f o r the purpose of the present study do r e f l e c t some u n d e r l y i n g c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s between the c o n t r o l l e r and the c o n t r o l l e e s ; f o r example, i n d e c i s i o n problem number 14 the manager may l i k e to m a i n t a i n the present speed of the conveyor b e l t used f o r l o a d i n g and u n l o a d i n g cargo, whereas the workers would l i k e to reduce the speed of the b e l t . However, there i s no ground to assume t h a t the v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s d i d p e r c e i v e t h i s c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s and a c ted a c c o r d i n g l y . No measures were taken of the degree of c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s the c o n t r o l l e r s p e r c e i v e d and hence no c o n c l u s i o n s are p o s s i b l e at t h i s time concerning the e f f e c t s of c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s on c h o i c e of c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s by p a r t i c i p a n t s . Some p o s s i b l e s t r a t e g i e s t h a t may be adopted by a d e c i s i o n maker i n c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s are d e s c r i b e d by MacCr imon and T a y l o r (1976) and i t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to see which of these s t r a t e g i e s are l i k e l y to be chosen by d e c i s i o n makers i n s p e c i f i c types of o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The p r e s e n t f i n d i n g s a l s o i n d i c a t e the p o s s i b l e i n f l u e n c e of p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s on an i n d i v i d u a l ' s c h o i c e of c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . The s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between 152 the p e r s o n a l i t y t£a,£;t used £n the present study ( y i z , , t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity l e v e l ) and.choice of c o n t r o l behavior by the p a r t i c i p a n t s i s not c l e a r . f r o m the cu r r e n t evidence but the data indicate., that, some p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between these v a r i a b l e s e x i s t s . As the reader may remember, i n f o u r out of n i n e compari-sons of mean i n t r i n s i c scores of p a r t i c i p a n t s (belonging to d i f f e r e n t experimental groups) the mean d i f f e r e n c e s were s i g n i f i c a n t at p ^.01 l e v e l or b e t t e r (please see Table IV.11; f o r d e t a i l s ) . But i n some cases the mean d i f f e r e n c e s were i n a d i r e c t i o n o p p o s i t e to what was hypothesized. At presen t there i s no one t h e o r e t i c a l model which e x p l a i n s the observed r e l a t i o n s h i p between the v a r i a b l e s . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between a person's l e v e l o f t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity and ch o i c e o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s by no means appears to be a simple one. As mentioned i n Chapter I I I , t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity was chosen as the s i n g l e p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t to be used i n the presen t study. P a r t l y t h i s was due to the f a c t t h a t t h i s t r a i t seemed to be c o n c e p t u a l l y more r e l a t e d to; a person:'s c h o i c e of c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s than any other t r a i t , However, a v a r i e t y of other p e r s o n a l i t y dimensions are worthy of i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o r t h e i r p o s s i b l e i n f l u e n c e on a person's c h o i c e o f 153 c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . To mention a few, a person's s e l f concept, a n x i e t y l e v e l , need f o r power, locu s of c o n t r o l , o r i e n t a t i o n towards persons and th i n g s i n the e x t e r n a l world, need f o r achievement, dogmatism and M a c h i a v e l l i a n i s m and many others would seem to be r e l a t e d i n g r e a t e r or l e s s e r degrees to a person's c h o i c e of s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . P s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t r i b u t e s l i k e p e r c e p t u a l a b i l i t y , i n f o r m a t i o n s t o r i n g and p r o c e s s i n g c a p a c i t y , r i s k t a k i n g p r o p e n s i t y and ge n e r a l a s p i r a t i o n l e v e l may a l s o a f f e c t a d e c i s i o n maker's c h o i c e o f s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . P r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s n e c e s s i t a t e d the ch o i c e of a s i n g l e p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t i n .'.the p r e s e n t study but t h i s should not be i n t e r p r e t e d to mean the i r r e l e v a n c e of other p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s f o r the study of c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . Indeed, f o c u s i n g on the s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s used by a d e c i s i o n maker may o f f e r a p o s s i b l e way of i n t e g r a t i n g the v a r i o u s models of l e a d e r s h i p e f f e c t i v e n e s s c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e . A v a r i a b l e that was not i n c l u d e d i n the presen t study but c o n c e p t u a l l y seems r e l a t e d to a person's c h o i c e of c o n t r o l behavior i s h i s / h e r p e r c e p t i o n s about the p e r s o n a l i t y of the c o n t r o l l e e . There are many i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h i s world who p r e f e r d i r e c t i v e or 154 ,au-to.cr£'tic_leadership ; to a,, p a r t i c i p a t i v e or democratic s t y l e of l e a d e r s h i p , The s t u d i e s of Vroom (19-60) and French, I s r a e l , and As ([I960) i n d i c a t e t h i s f a c t , Use o f i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s i s not l i k e l y to be s u c c e s s f u l w i t h persons who have h i g h need f o r dependence and c l e a r j o b i n s t r u c t i o n s from above. F u r t h e r r e s e a r c h r e l a t i n g the p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s o f subordinates t o the c h o i c e o f s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s by t h e i r s u p e r i o r s i s c o n s i d e r e d f r u i t f u l . F i n a l l y , the pr e s e n t study i n d i c a t e s the combined e f f e c t s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s and d e c i s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s oh a person's c h o i c e o f c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . The data i n d i c a t e an a d d i t i v e model of r e l a t i o n s h i p among the three independent v a r i a b l e s but onl y f u r t h e r r e p l i c a t i o n s o f the presen t study can c o n f i r m t h i s f i n d i n g . In t h i s study i t was found t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and d e c i s i o n importance e x e r t e d very s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e on a person's c h o i c e of c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s - i n d i v i d u a l l y and j o i n t l y . Thus i n d i v i d u a l s who were assig n e d to one s p e c i f i c type o f o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the study d i d choose s t r a t e g i e s which were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those who worked i n other types o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A l s o , w i t h i n the same o r g a n i z a t i o n p a r t i c i p a n t s s y s t e m a t i c a l l y v a r i e d 155 t h e i r c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s depending upon the type of d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n f a c i n g them. In the case o f t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity, the - v a r i a t i o n s i n c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s d i d happen, although, not to a v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t degree or i n the d i r e c t i o n s p r e d i c t e d e a r l i e r i n t h i s study - but v a r i a t i o n s d i d happen even here (please see Table IV.14 f o r the d e t a i l s ) . The c u r r e n t evidence would thus seem to support the n o t i o n t h a t these three v a r i a b l e s d i d e x e r t i n f l u e n c e (to g r e a t e r or l e s s e r degrees) on a personAs c h o i c e of c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . The reader may note t h a t the i n t e r a c t i o n s among the three v a r i a b l e s are s i g n i f i c a n t at p -C.005 l e v e l or b e t t e r (please see Tables IV.3, IV.4, and IV,5), IMPLICATIONS: Perhaps the s i n g l e most important i m p l i c a t i o n of the c u r r e n t f i n d i n g s i s the r e c o g n i t i o n of the c r u c i a l r o l e t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e and c l i m a t e p l a y i n a l l c o n t r o l d e c i s i o n s made by members o f the o r g a n i -z a t i o n . Hence e x p e c t a t i o n s of any major changes i n c o n t r o l p r a c t i c e s may have to be preceded by changes i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and c l i m a t e . However, s t r u c t u r a l changes may be hard to implement - e s p e c i a l l y i f the o r g a n i z a t i o n i s l a r g e and has been i n e x i s t e n c e 156 as; a, s u c c e s s f u l u n £ t , a , /£ela.t$yely: long p e r i o d of t^me,' Although members of the o r g a n i z a t i o n are d i s s a t i s f i e d By c u r r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and p r a c t i c e s , they may not Be w i l l i n g to experiment w i t h major s t r u c t u r a l changes Because of the g r e a t u n c e r t a i n t y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h any major change. There i s . n o guarantee t h a t the new s t r u c t u r e w i l l Be any B e t t e r and By going f o r the new s t r u c t u r e some of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l memhers may i n f a c t l o s e t h e i r c u r r e n t p r i v i l e g e s and power. R e s i s t a n c e to any new s t r u c t u r e and p r a c t i c e s w i l l emerge. Unless there i s a v e r y strong commitment on the p a r t of a s i z a h l e numBer of key o r g a n i z a t i o n a l memBers change attempts may f a i l , ' In t h i s sense, any c o n t r o l system may Be s e l f - r e i n f o r c i n g , e s p e c i a l l y i f the system has Been aBle to p r o v i d e s a t i s f a c t o r y outcomes to a m a j o r i t y of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l memBers. There i s some evidence a v a i l a B l e c u r r e n t l y to i n d i c a t e t h a t a person's l e v e l i n the managerial h i e r a r c h y a f f e c t s h i s or her c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . I t a l s o seems reasonaBle to assume t h a t a person's s t a t u s i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h e i r a r c h y would p a r t i a l l y determine the c o n t r o l measures others would use to monitor the former's performance (HreBiniak, 1973). The nature of the tasks c a r r i e d out By the memBers i n 157 d i f f e r e n t h i e r a r c h i c a l l e y e l s and t h e . p r e y a i l i n g managerial assumptions about the work r e l a t e d a t t i t u d e s o f these members would i n f l u e n c e the degree o f c o n t r o l e x e r t e d over them, T y p i c a l l y , lower l e v e l workers are seen as l a c k i n g i n commitment to the o r g a n i z a t i o n and assumed to p r o v i d e o n l y minimum performance n e c e s s a r y to remain w i t h i n the system. T h i s assumption may l e a d to c l o s e r c o n t r o l of a l l the a c t i o n s of lower l e v e l members. Top l e v e l managers, on the o t h e r hand, are assumed to be s e l f - m o t i v a t e d and achievement o r i e n t e d and are g e n e r a l l y g i v e n a f r e e hand u n t i l t h i n g s go wrong. In the p r e s e n t study the simulated managerial p o s i t i o n ( v i z . , Manager, Cargo D i v i s i o n ) was hoped to r e p r e s e n t the r o l e of a manager who was somewhere i n the middle of "the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y . However, i n the case o f a t o t a l l y 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n , the d i f f e r e n c e s i n managerial s t y l e s may not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y across v a r i o u s managerial l e v e l s as the emphasis i n such an o r g a n i z a t i o n i s l e s s on p o s i t i o n power and more on t a s k r e l a t e d competence of members. In a t r u l y 'mechanistic' o r g a n i z a t i o n c l e a r cut r u l e s , procedures and j o b d e s c r i p t i o n s w i l l e x i s t at a l l l e v e l s o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n and some amount of u n i f o r m i t y i n c o n t r o l p r a c t i c e s may thus be expected to occur a t d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , The 158 importance of mana.ger.ial h e i r a r c h y i s l i k e l y to be f e l t i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n t b a t is- somewhere i n between these extremes (and t h i s i s where a t y p i c a l modern bureaucracy l i e s ) , Only f u t u r e r e s e a r c h , can i n d i c a t e the s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between the above two v a r i a b l e s . The d i f f e r e n c e s i n managerial h i e r a r c h y may a l s o account f o r some of the v a r i a n c e in.responses of members of the c o n t r o l group, As the reader may remember the members o f the c o n t r o l group were simply asked to assume the r o l e of Manager, Cargo D i v i s i o n i n an a i r l i n e i n Canada. In the absence of any f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s , i t i s q u i t e l i k e l y t h a t d i f f e r e n t p a r t i c i p a n t s may have made v a r y i n g assumptions about t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h e i r a r c h y . There i s no evidence to show that t h i s happened i n the study, but i t seems reasonable to assume t h a t i t d i d happen. Another o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t may have an e f f e c t on the c h o i c e of c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s by d e c i s i o n makers i s the s i z e o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n i t s e l f . As the reader may remember, i n Chapter I I i t was p o i n t e d out t h a t p a s t r e s e a r c h has i n d i c a t e d s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between s i z e and other o r g a n i z a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s . In g e n e r a l , s i z e i n c r e a s e s complexity and the need f o r c o n t r o l , In many cases 159 t h i s i s accomplished hy h i g h e r v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of job d u t i e s . There i s c u r r e n t l y no c o n c l u s i v e evidence to show t h a t a l l l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s adopt any s i n g l e c o n t r o l system to accomplish b e t t e r c o n t r o l . M i c h e l s (1962) p r o v i d e d a t h e o r e t i c a l model (which he c a l l e d the ' i r o n law of o l i g a r c h y ' ) which suggested t h a t i n l a r g e and complex o r g a n i z a t i o n s ' c o n t r o l must i n e v i t a b l y become o l i g a r c h i c . There i s no e m p i r i c a l evidence which c o n c l u s i v e l y shows t h a t t h i s i n f a c t happens. However, i f t h i s model i s t r u e , we would expect members of a l a r g e o r g a n i c f i r m to use i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s l e s s o f t e n than those working i i n a s m a l l 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n , I t would a l s o be i n t e r e s t i n g to f i n d out the p o i n t at which s i z e of an o r g a n i z a t i o n begins to reduce the i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g nature of the c o n t r o l systems., (assuming of course t h a t s i z e in. f a c t reduces the use of i n t r i n s i -c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s ) . W i t h i n the framework o f the p r e s e n t l a b o r a t o r y experiment, the e f f e c t s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i z e on c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s of managers c o u l d not be examined. However, i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y f r u i t f u l area f o r f u r t h e r enquiry. 160 The pr e s e n t f i n d i n g s I n d i c a t e t h a t .members w i t h low t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity working i n ^organic * o r g a n i z a t i o n s are l i k e l y to use more i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l behaviors than those .who.have h i g h t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity. I t was a l s o mentioned e a r l i e r t h a t c u r r e n t l y no sound e x p l a n a t i o n e x i s t s f o r t h i s phenomenon. Co n c e p t u a l l y , i t would be expected that persons w i t h h i g h t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity a r e l i k e l y to get a h i g h e r i n t r i n s i c score than those w i t h low t o l e r a n c e o f ambiguity. I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to f i n d out i n f u t u r e s t u d i e s why t h i s d i d not happen. I t i s a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t persons who have h i g h t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity are l i k e l y to f i t b e t t e r i n t o 'organic' o r g a n i z a t i o n s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by h i g h task interdependency and complexity. However, there i s no pr e s e n t evidence to support t h i s . The c u r r e n t evidence i n d i c a t e s that when the d e c i s i o n s the c o n t r o l l e r s have to make are ve r y important, they are l e s s l i k e l y to use i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s . Some of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s f i n d i n g have been p o i n t e d out e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter. T h i s f i n d i n g seems to be q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p a s t r e s e a r c h evidence and our day to day experiences, 161 Are i n t r i n s i c a l l y and e x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e ? I t would appear t h a t they are not, There i s no reason why a manager cannot p r o v i d e more job autonomy to the subordinates (±,& % , Improve t h e i r job content f a c t o r s ) and at the same time g i v e the subordinates more m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s ( i . e . , improve job context f a c t o r s ) . At the f i r s t glance, i t might appear that a c o n t r o l s t r a t e g y t hat maximises both i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c rewards of the subordinates (or c o n t r o l l e e s ) would be o p t i m a l . However, a v a i l a b l e r e s e a r c h evidence on t h i s i s s u e i s somewhat c o n t r a d i c t o r y . D e c i (1971) suggested that the a p p l i c a t i o n of c o n t i n g e n t e x t r i n s i c rewards to a task which a l r e a d y o f f e r s some i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n to the person may i n f a c t r e s u l t i n a decrease i n the l e v e l o f i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n . R e s u l t s of some l a t e r s t u d i e s have c o r r o b o r a t e d t h i s h y p o t h e s i s (e.g., P r i t c h a r d , Campbell 6c Campbell, 1975; P i n d e r , 1976). However, there are a few o t h e r s t u d i e s which have supported the o p p o s i t e p o s i t i o n : namely, th a t the i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c rewards are a d d i t i v e (e.g., Hamner & F o s t e r , 1975; Ross, 1976). Thus w h i l e the c o n t r o l l e r s can i n f a c t use both types of rewards sim u l t a n e o u s l y f o r the purpose of m o t i v a t i n g t h e i r subordinates whether such, a s t r a t e g y i s a p p r o p r i a t e 162 i s somewhat debatable. Are i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s p r e f e r a b l e to e x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g s t r a t e g i e s ? I t would be tempting to answer i n the a f f i r m a t i v e because of the former's emphasis on democratic and e g a l i t a r i a n v a l u e s - something c h e r i s h e d by our whole s o c i e t y . I n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s might a l s o be very a p p e a l i n g to the adherents of s e v e r a l schools of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l development who c o n s i d e r power s h a r i n g as the essence of any o r g a n i z a t i o n a l development. Indeed there i s some e m p i r i c a l evidence to show t h a t i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l systems i n g e n e r a l i n c r e a s e member s a t i s f a c t i o n (Tannenbaum, 1962; Smith & Tannenbaum, 1963; Bowers, 1964; H r e b i n i a k , 1978). Tannenbaum (1968) noted t h a t the e x e r c i s e of c o n t r o l i n i t s e l f has a p o s i t i v e v a l u e f o r most o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members. In a s i m i l a r v e i n , M c C l e l l a n d (1975) p o i n t e d out t h a t the power motive i s i n h e r e n t i n the lowest to the h i g h e s t worker, although i n v a r y i n g degrees. The management l i t e r a t u r e i s r e p l e t e w i t h d i s c u s s i o n s p o i n t i n g out the advantages of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ( M o r r i s , 1968; MacKenzie, 1978). Given a l l these, can i t not be s a f e l y s a i d that i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l systems are by f a r p r e f e r a b l e i n any o r g a n i z a -163 t i o n a l s e t t i n g ? The answer i s i n the n e g a t i v e . F i r s t l y , i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t y l e s are l i k e l y to be e f f e c t i v e only when the c o n t r o l l e e s v a l u e the i n t r i n s i c rewards. There i s no reason to assume that every one does v a l u e i n t r i n s i c rewards. In .'fact the a v a i l a b l e e m p i r i c a l evidence shows the op p o s i t e to be t r u e . Secondly, use of i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n t r o l s t y l e s , w h i l e they i n c r e a s e member autonomy and p o s s i b l y member s a t i s f a c t i o n do so o n l y at a c o s t : namely, i n c r e a s e i n o v e r a l l u n c e r t a i n t y f o r the top managers about the ope r a t i o n s at v a r i o u s l e v e l s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . T y p i c a l l y , a good c o n t r o l system should ensure t h a t the v a r i o u s a c t i o n s the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l members take i n accordance w i t h t h e i r p e r c e i v e d s e l f i n t e r e s t are a c t i o n s t h a t are a l s o i n the best i n t e r e s t s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n , or i n other words there i s h i g h g o a l congruence w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n (Anthony & H e r z l i n g e r , 1975). U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t cannot be assumed that g o a l congruence e x i s t s i n a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . So, i n the absence of a mechanism to i n t e g r a t e the a c t i o n s of v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n makers i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , chaos and e n t r o p i c tendencies may emerge w i t h i n the system. T h i r d l y , the p a r t i c i p a t i v e - o r g a n i c system i s l i k e l y to 164 be much, more complex to understand and manage,• As Tannenbaum Q.9J)2I p o i n t e d out the or g a n i c o r g a n i z a t i o n compromises trie p r i n c i p l e . o f s i m p l i f i c a t i o n upon which the t r a d i t i o n a l m e c h a n i s t i c systems are premised. Members of the or g a n i c o r g a n i z a t i o n would t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e a v e r y h i g h l e v e l of t a s l o r e l a t e d and i n t e r p e r s o n a l management s k i l l s , Unless the o r g a n i z a t i o n can a t t r a c t such h i g h c a l i b r e people, a t r u l y p a r t i c i p a t i v e c o n t r o l system may in.:.,fact generate s e v e r a l d y s f u n c t i o n a l outcomes, F i n a l l y , as noted i n chapter I I the ap p r o p r i a t e n e s s of any s i n g l e c o n t r o l system i s dependent on the s t r u c t u r a l , techno-l o g i c a l , p e r s o n a l i t y and environmental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the o r g a n i z a t i o n . Unless there i s a p e r f e c t f i t between the c o n t r o l requirements n e c e s s i t a t e d by these v a r i a b l e s and the c a p a b i l i t i e s o f the p r e v a i l i n g c o n t r o l system o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s and e f f i c i e n c y would s u f f e r . The reader should note t h a t the e v a l u a t i o n of app r o p r i a t e n e s s of any s i n g l e c o n t r o l s t r a t e g y was not an o b j e c t i v e o f the presen t study. The focus here was on understanding the f a c t o r s t h a t i n f l u e n c e the emergence of s p e c i f i c c o n t r o l s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s r a t h e r than an e v a l u a t i o n of these c o n t r o l s per se. I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the a p p r o p r i a t e -165 ness of v a r i o u s c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s w i l l be a' very-u s e f u l one, LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY: Many of the l i m i t a t i o n s of the prese n t study emerge from the experimental design used here. I n order to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y v a r y the three independent v a r i a b l e s , a l a b o r a t o r y d esign was used. However, t h i s has brought along w i t h i t questions of e x t e r n a l v a l i d i t y of the f i n d i n g s . I t must be emphasized t h a t the e x t e r n a l v a l i d i t y of the f i n d i n g s i s y e t to be e s t a b l i s h e d . While reasonable p r e c a u t i o n s were taken to ensure t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t s indeed adopted the r o l e of a manager, cargo d i v i s i o n of an a i r l i n e d u r i n g the study, there i s y e t no b a s i s to i n f e r t h a t they would act i n the same f a s h i o n i n r e a l l i f e s i t u a t i o n s where shor t term c o n t i n g e n c i e s and s i t u a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e s might b i a s or sway the c o n t r o l l e r i n an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n . H y p o t h e t i c a l r o l e p l a y i n g as Spencer (1978) p o i n t e d out, may pose a t h r e a t to both i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l v a l i d i t y of a study. Two p o i n t s may however be o f f e r e d i n defense of the prese n t study: 987Q of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the study had some work experience i n the past and of these, 47% had some s u p e r v i s o r y or 166 managerial experience, I t i s hoped that t h i s f a c t o r helped to make t h e i r responses d u r i n g the study r e a l i s t i c , A second p o i n t i s t h a t o f the 172 p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the study, 134 persons (or approximately 78%) r e p o r t e d that they c o u l d i d e n t i f y w i t h the assig n e d r o l e at l e a s t 'moderately' (a score o f at l e a s t 3 on a 5-point s c a l e ) . A l s o , as the reader may remember, o n l y those p a r t i c i p a n t s who had p e r c e i v e d the v a r i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i -s t i c s c o r r e c t l y were i n c l u d e d i n the f i n a l data a n a l y s i s (of the t o t a l o f 180 p a r t i c i p a n t s , 173 were q u a l i f i e d f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t o the f i n a l group u s i n g t h i s c r i t e r i o n ) . As such there i s some evidence to show th a t the experimental m a n i p u l a t i o n d i d i n f a c t take p l a c e , As a l r e a d y mentioned s e v e r a l other p o s s i b l e independent v a r i a b l e s (e.g., o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i z e , environmental c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s o f c o n t r o l l e e s ) were not manipulated i n the presen t study f o r p r a c t i c a l reasons. I t would however seem t h a t some of these v a r i a b l e s are important determinants o f a person's choice of c o n t r o l b ehaviors, The f i n d i n g s emerging from the study should be i n t e r p r e t e d b e a r i n g i n mind the above f a c t , In the absence of any standard instruments f o r 167 measuring the dependent v a r i a b l e s , an i n v e n t o r y of d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s had to be designed s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t h i s study. The v a r i o u s d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s i n c l u d e d i n the i n v e n t o r y are b e l i e v e d to possess h i g h face v a l i d i t y . As the reader may remember, three i m p a r t i a l judges (with c o n s i d e r a b l e managerial experience) e v a l u a t e d them f o r t h e i r r e a l i s m and r e l e v a n c e . The p i l o t s t u d i e s u s i n g two d i f f e r e n t groups of students have a l s o confirmed t h i s b e l i e f . However, the v a l i d i t y of the scores a s s i g n e d to the v a r i o u s b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s i s by no means c o n c l u s i v e . Only f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o the psychometric p r o p e r t i e s of the measures can e s t a b l i s h t h i s . A l r e a d y a be g i n n i n g has, been made. In a study (subsequent to the experiment) u s i n g 13 members (2 f a c u l t y members, 3 graduate students and 8 undergraduates) of the F a c u l t y of Commerce, S a i n t Mary's U n i v e r s i t y , H a l i f a x , the t e s t - r e t e s t r e l i a b i l i t y of the i n t r i n s i c r a t i n g s of the v a r i o u s b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s over a three week p e r i o d was found to be 0.73. For the e x t r i n s i c r a t i n g s the e q u i v a l e n t f i g u r e was 0.79.(using a d i f f e r e n t panel of 13 members, w i t h 2 f a c u l t y members, 3 graduate students and 8 undergraduate There i s a l s o some evidence c u r r e n t l y to i n d i c a t e that the t e s t - r e t e s t r e l i a b i l i t y of the 18-item 168 d e c i s i o n i n v e n t o r y i s moderately high. In a. study u s i n g 12 students of the F a c u l t y o f Commerce, S a i n t Mary's U n i v e r s i t y , H a l i f a x , the t e s t - r e t e s t r e l i a b i l i t y of i n t r i n s i c scores of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the 'mechanistic' group over a seven week p e r i o d was found to be 0.72. The corresponding f i g u r e f o r e x t r i n s i c scores was 0.68. In the case of the 'organic' group, the t e s t - r e t e s t r e l i a b i l i t y f i g u r e s f o r i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c scores (over a seven week p e r i o d ) were found to be 0.81 and 0.74 r e s p e c t i v e l y . F i g u r e s f o r the c o n t r o l group were 0.54 f o r i n t r i n s i c scores and 0.49 f o r e x t r i n s i c scores. The study i n d i c a t e s t h a t except i n the case of the c o n t r o l group the r e l i a b i l i t y f i g u r e s are more or l e s s a c c e p t a b l e . One p o i n t i s worth mentioning: a l l ^ the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the above study were students i n a n ^ i n t r o d u c t o r y o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior c l a s s . Since t h i s was a course i n which many of them had t h e i r f i r s t exposure to m o t i v a t i o n a l and l e a d e r s h i p t h e o r i e s , i t i s v e r y l i k e l y t h a t t h e i r l e a r n i n g of v a r i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r concepts made them change t h e i r c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s on the second o c c a s i o n when data was c o l l e c t e d . The reader may note that the r e l i a b i l i t y f i g u r e s are lowest f o r the c o n t r o l group. In the absence of any a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n about p r e v a i l i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and p r a c t i c e s the p a r t i c i p a n t s 169 i n the c o n t r o l group may have found i t e a s i e r to change t h e i r c o n t r o l s t r a t e g i e s on the second o c c a s i o n . In view of the above f a c t , i t would seem that the evidence r e c e i v e d i n the present study i s perhaps i n d i c a t i v e o f the lower bounds of the r e l i a b i l i t y of the instrument. However more data p e r t a i n i n g to the v a l i d i t y of the measures are necessary b e f o r e any f i r m c o n c l u s i o n s can be a r r i v e d a t . SUMMARY: C o n t r o l i s an i n e v i t a b l e aspect of o r g a n i z a t i o n . C o n t r o l i m p l i e s a l l s t r u c t u r e , processes and behavior by which one or more persons d i r e c t , motivate, c o n s t r a i n and/or i n f l u e n c e the behavior of one or more i n d i v i d u a l s to achieve predetermined o b j e c t i v e s - economic or otherwise. V a r i o u s d e f i n i t i o n s of c o n t r o l e x i s t ; s e v e r a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of c o n t r o l systems have a l s o been p r o v i d e d by v a r i o u s w r i t e r s i n the past, but the essence of a l l c o n t r o l systems seems to be comparing a c t u a l performance w i t h predetermined standards and t a k i n g c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n s wherever necessary to i n f l u e n c e f u t u r e behavior. 170 In the pr e s e n t §tudy an attempt was made to understand the extent to which a manager's c h o i c e of c o n t r o l Behaviors was<i i n f l u e n c e d By o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , own p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s and d e c i s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . A l a B o r a t o r y experiment was conducted to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y v a r y the thr e e independent v a r i a B l e s . The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e that the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i -s t i c s and d e c i s i o n importance p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in>: determining a person's choice of c o n t r o l Behaviors. The p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t chosen f o r the present study ( v i z . , t o l e r a n c e of amBiguity) r e l a t e d o n l y weakly to the c h o i c e o f c o n t r o l Behaviors By d e c i s i o n makers. A l s o i n t h i s case the a c t u a l r e s u l t s were somewhat oppo s i t e to what was hypothesized. The v a r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the presen t f i n d i n g s were d i s c u s s e d . While f i r m c o n c l u s i o n s on the s e v e r a l hypotheses i n the study can Be made only a f t e r more r e p l i c a t i o n s and evidence Based on f i e l d i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , the r e s u l t s would suggest t h a t c o n t r o l r e l a t e d d e c i s i o n s are o f t e n complex. A model of c o n t r o l Behavior t h a t focuses oh the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , p e r s o n a l i t y , task and environmental d i f f e r e n c e s may hence Be a more r e a l i s t i c and u s e f u l one than a model which t r i e s to e x p l a i n c o n t r o l i n terms of merely one or two v a r i a B l e s only. 171 BIBLIOGRAPHY Abelson, R.P. S i m u l a t i o n of s o c i a l behavior. In G. L i n d z e y and E. Aronson (eds) ' Handbook c-f S o c i a l Psychology, V o l 2 (2nd ed), Reading, Mass;. Addison-Wesley, 1968, 274-356 Adams, J.S., and Jacobsen, P.R, E f f e c t s o f wage i n e q u i t i e s on work q u a l i t y , J o u r n a l o f Abnormal S o c i a l  Psychology, 1964, _69, 19-25. Anderson, T., and Warkov, S. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i z e and f u n c t i o n complexity: A study of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n h o s p i t a l s . American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 1961, 26, 23-28. Anthony, R.N. P l a n n i n g and C o n t r o l Systems: A Framework  f o r A n a l y s i s . Boston, Mass: Graduate School o f Business Admn., Harvard U n i v e r s i t y , 1965. Anthony, R.N., and H e r z l i n g e r , R. Management C o n t r o l i n  N o n - p r o f i t O r g a n i z a t i o n s . Homewood" I l l i n o i s : R i c h a r d D. Irwin, 1975. A r g y r i s , C. I n t e g r a t i n g the I n d i v i d u a l and the Organiza-t i o n . New York: Wiley, 1964. A r g y r i s , C. Some unintended consequences o f r i g o r o u s  r e s e a r c h . P s y c h o l o g i c a l B u l l e t i n , 1968, 70, 3, 185-197. A r g y r i s , C. Management and O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Development: the Path from YA t o YB. New York: McGraw H i l l , 1971. Ashby, W.R. An I n t r o d u c t i o n to C y b e r n e t i c s . London: Chapman and H a l l , 1956. Babchuk, N., and Goode, W.J. Work i n c e n t i v e s i n a s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d group. American S o c i a l Review, 1951, 16, 679-687. Baker, F. I n t r o d u c t i o n : O r g a n i z a t i o n s as open systems. In F. Baker (ed) O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Systems: General Approaches  to Complex O r g a n i z a t i o n s , Homewood, I l l i n o i s : R i c h a r d D. Irwin Inc., 1973. Barnard, C.I. The F u n c t i o n s o f the E x e c u t i v e . Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1938. B a r t l e t t , M.S. T e s t s o f s i g n i f i c a n c e i n f a c t o r a n a l y s i s . B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of Psychology, S t a t i s t i c a l section'.;.'1950} 3, 77-85. 172 Beer, S. D e c i s i o n and C o n t r o l . London; Wiley, 1966. B e l l , G.D. P r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f work demands and p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n as determinants of w o rker xs d i s c r e t i o n . Academy o f Management J o u r n a l , 1966, v9, 20^28. Bern, D.J. The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l s i m u l a t i o n s : A r e p l y to Jones, L i n d e r , K i e s l e r , Zarama, and Brehm. J o u r n a l o f Exp er itrien t a l S o c i a l Psychology, 1968, 4, 270-274. Bennis, W\:G. Leadership theory and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e behavior: the problem o f a u t h o r i t y . Admin i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y 1959, 4, 259-301. Bennis, W.G. Beyond Bureaucracy: Essays on the Development and E v o l u t i o n o f Human O r g a n i z a t i o n . New York: McGraw H i l l , T _ _ Blake, R.R., and Mouton, J.S. The Managerial G r i d . Houston: G u l f P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1964.' Blau, P.M. The Dynamics o f Bureaucracy. Chicago: U n i v e r -s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1955. Blau, P.M., F a l b e , C.,.McKinley, W., and Tracy, P.K. Technology and o r g a n i z a t i o n i n manufacturing. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1976, 21, 20-40. Blau, P.M., and Schoenherr, R.H. The S t r u c t u r e o f  O r g a n i z a t i o n s . New York: B a s i c Books, 1971. Blau, P.M., and S c o t t , W.R. Formal O r g a n i z a t i o n s . San F r a n s i s c o : Chandler P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1962. Bock, R.D. M u l t i v a r i a t e S t a t i s t i c a l Methods i n B e h a v i o r a l Research. NewlYork? McGraw H i l l , 1975. Bowers, D.G. O r g a n i z a t i o n c o n t r o l i n an insurance company. Sociometry, 1964, 27_, 230-244. Box, G.E.P. A g e n e r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n theory f o r a c l a s s o f l i k e l i h o o d r a t i o c r i t e r i a . B i o m e t r i k a , 1949, 36^ , 317-346. Box, G.E.P. Problems i n the a n a l y s i s of growth and wear curves. B i o m e t r i c s , 1950, 6_, 362-389. Budner, S. An I n v e s t i g a t i o n of I n t o l e r a n c e of Ambiguity. Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1960. Budner, S. I n t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity as a p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e . J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y , 1962, 30, 29-50. 173 Burns, T. The communication e x e r c i s e . Paper presented  at 3rd Seminar i n S o c i a l S c i e n c e o f O r g a n i z a t i o n s , U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h , 1964, Burns, T., and S t a l k e r , G.M. The Management of Innovation. London: T a v i s t o c k , 1961. Campbell, D.T., and S t a n l e y , J.C. Experimental and q u a s i experimental designs f o r r e s e a r c h on t e a c h i n g . In N.L. Gage (ed) Handbook of Research on Teaching, Chicago: Rand McNally, 19 63. Caplow, T. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i z e . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science  Q u a r t e r l y , 1957, 1, 484-505. Chandler, A. S t r a t e g y and S t r u c t u r e . Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1962. Charnes, A., and Stedry, A.C. The attainment of o r g a n i z a -t i o n a l g o las through the a p p r o p r i a t e s e l e c t i o n of subunit g o a l s . Unpublished Paper, Graduate School of I n d u s t r i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Carnegie I n s t i t u t e of Technology, 1964. C h i l d , J . O r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e and s t r a t e g i e s of c o n t r o l . A r e p l i c a t i o n of the Aston study. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science  Q u a r t e r l y , 1972, 17, 163-177. C h i l d , J . S t r a t e g i e s of c o n t r o l and o r g a n i z a t i o n behavior. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1973, 1_8, 1-17. C h u r c h i l l , N.E., and Teitelbaum, L.N. A u d i t i n g and management c o n t r o l - a h y p o t h e s i s . In M. A l e x i s and C.Z. Wilson C e d s ) , O r g a n i z a t i o n a l D e c i s i o n Making. Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1967. Cyert, R.M., and March, J.G. A B e h a v i o r a l Theory of the  Firm. Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1963. Dahl, R.A. The concept o f power. B e h a v i o r a l Science, 1957, 2, 201-218. Davids, A. I n f l u e n c e of ego development on the r e l a t i o n between a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and i n t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity. J o u r n a l of C o n s u l t i n g Psychology, 1956, 20, 179-184. Dec i , E.L. The e f f e c t s of e x t e r n a l l y mediated rewards on i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n . J o u r n a l of P e r s o n a l i t y and  S o c i a l Psychology, 1971, 18, 105-115. 174 D e c i , E.L, I n t r i n s i c M o t i v a t i o n , New York; Plenum Pr e s s , 1975, " ~ Dornbusch., S., and S c o t t , W.R. (with Busching, B.C., Lang; J.D.) E v a l u a t i o n and the e x e r c i s e o f a u t h o r i t y . San F r a n c i s c o ; Jossey Bass, 1975. Dunbar, R.L.M. Designs f o r s e l f o r g a n i z i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l systems. Working Paper, I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e of Management, B e r l i n , 1979. Dunbar, R.L.M. C o n t r o l i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Paper presented at the meeting h e l d i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e o f Manage-ment - Wissenschaftszentrum B e r l i n - g r i e g s t r a s e 5-7, D-1000, B e r l i n 33, January, 1977 ( D i s c u s s i o n Paper S e r i e s Number dp/77-8). Duncan, R.B M u l t i p l e d e c i s i o n making s t r u c t u r e s i n adapting to environmental u n c e r t a i n t y . The impact on o r g a n i z a t i o n e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Human R e l a t i o n s , 1973, 26, 273-292. F a r r , J.L. Task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , reward contingency, and i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Behavior and Human  Performance, 1976, 16, 294-307. F a y o l , H. General and I n d u s t r i a l Management. London: Pitman, 1949. F i e d l e r , F.E. A Theory o f Leadership E f f e c t i v e n e s s . New York: McGraw H i l l , 1967. Frank, A.G. Goal ambiguity and c o n f l i c t i n g standards: An approach to the study o f o r g a n i z a t i o n . Human O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1959, 17, 8-13. French, E.G. I n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among some measures of r i g i d i t y under s t r e s s and no n s t r e s s c o n d i t i o n s . J o u r n a l  of Abnormal and S o c i a l Psychology, 1955^1 51, 114-118. French, J.R.P. J r . , and Snyder, R. Leadership and i n t e r p e r s o n a l power. In D. Car t w r i g h t (ed) Studie s i n  S o c i a l Power Ann Arbor: U n i v e r s i t y o f Michigan P r e s s , 1959. French, J.R.P. J r . , I s r a e l , J . , and As, D. An experiment i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a,. Norwegian f a c t o r y . ' Human R e l a t i o n s , 1960, 13, 3-19. Fr a n k i n , H.L.,.and S t r e u f e r t , S. L a b o r a t o r y experimentation. In M.D. Dunnette (ed) Handbook o f I n d u s t r i a l and O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Psychology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976, 415-457. 175 F u l l a n , M. I n d u s t r i a l technology and worker i n t e g r a t i o n i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n . American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 1970, 35, 1028-1039. Gellerman, S.W. M o t i v a t i o n and" P r o d u c t i v i t y , New York: American Management A s s o c i a t i o n , 1963, -Gouldner, A..W. P a t t e r n s o f Indus t r i a l Bureaucracy. Glencoe, 111: Free P r e s s , 1954. Graicunas, V.A. In L. G u l i c k and L. Urwick (eds) Papers on the Science of A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , I n s t i t u t e of P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 1937. Hackman, J.R., and Lawler, E.E. Employee r e a c t i o n s to job c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . J o u r n a l of A p p l i e d Psychology  Monograph,, 1971,55, 259-286. Hage, J . An axiomatic theory of o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1965, 10, 289-320. Hage, J . Communication and O r g a n i z a t i o n a l C o n t r o l : C y b e r n e t i c s i n H e a l t h and Welfare S e t t i n g s . New York: John Wiley, 1974. Hage, J . , and Aiken, M. R e l a t i o n s h i p of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n to other s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science  Q u a r t e r l y , 1967, 12, 72-92. Ha i r e , M. B i o l o g i c a l models and e m p i r i c a l h i s t o r i e s of growth o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In M. H a i r e (ed) Modern Organiza-t i o n Theory, New York: Wiley, 1959, 272-306T H a l l , R.H., Haas, J.E., and Johnson, N.J. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l s i z e , complexity and f o r m u l a t i o n . American S o c i o l o g i c a l  Review, 1967, 32, 902-912. Hamrier, W.C., and F o s t e r , L.W. Are i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n -s i c rewards a d d i t i v e : A t e s t o f Deci's c o g n i t i v e e v a l u a -t i o n theory of task m o t i v a t i o n . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Behavior  and Human Performance, 1975, 14, 398-415. H a r a r i , 0., and Zedeck, S. Development of b e h a v i o r a l l y anchored s c a l e s f o r the e v a l u a t i o n of f a c u l t y t e a c h i n g . J o u r n a l of A p p l i e d Psychology, 1973, 58, 261-265. H a r r i s , R.J. A Primer o f M u l t i v a r i a t e S t a t i s t i c s . K N e w York: Academic Press, 1975. Harvey- E. Technology and the s t r u c t u r e o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s . American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 1968, 33, 247-259. 176 Hays, W,L, S t a t i s t i c s f o r the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s . 2nd e d i t i o n . New York; H o l t , JRinehart,. and Winston, Inc. , 1973, Hermann, C.F. Some consequences of c r i s i s which, l i m i t the v i a b i l i t y o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e " Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1963, 8, 61-82. Hickson, D.J. A convergence i n o r g a n i z a t i o n theory. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S c i e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , 11, 2, 224-237. ' Hickson, D.J., Pugh, D.S., and Pheysey, D.C. Operations technology and o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e : an e m p i r i c a l r e - a p p r a i s a l . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1969, 4, 378-397. Holdaway, E.A., Newberry, J.F., Hickson, D.J., and Heron, R.P. Dimensions o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n complex:- • s o c i e t i e s : the e d u c a t i o n a l s e c t o r . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1975, 20; 37-58. Hre b i n i a k , L. G. Job technology, s u p e r v i s i o n and work group s t r u c t u r e . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1974, 19, 395-410. Hr e b i n i a k , L.G. Complex Organizations'. St. P a u l , Minnesota: West P u b l i s h i n g Cov> 21978. Hunt, R.G. An essay on the p r o f i t motive. Defense  Management J o u r n a l , 1969, 5_, 6-11. Jensen, B.T. I n s t r u c t i o n s f o r the 'Railroad game'. T e c h n i c a l memorandum No.608, Santa Monica, C a l i f : Systems Development Corp., 1961. Johnson, G.J,, A n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e I I : w i t h i n s u b j e c t design, Unpublished Manuscript, Psychology Department, U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver, 1977. Johnson, R.T., and Ouchi, W.G. Made i n America (under Japanese management). Harvard Business Review, 1974, 52, 61=69. Jones, R.A. , L i n d e r , D.E., K i e s l e r , C A . , Zanna, M. , and Brehm, J. I n t e r n a l s t a t e s or e x t e r n a l s t i m u l i : o b s e r v e r s ' a t t i t u d e judgements and the dissonance theory s e l f p e r s u a s i o n c o n t r o v e r s y . J o u r n a l o f Experimental S o c i a l Psychology, 1968, 4, 247-26TT Kahn,.- R.L, Wolfe, D.M. , Quinn, R.P., Snoek, J.D., and Rosenthal, R.A. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l S t r e s s : S t u d i e s i n R o l e C o n f l i c t and Ambiguity. New York: John Wiley, 1964. 177 Katz, D, and Kahn, R.L. The S o c i a l Psychology of O r g a n i z a t i o n s . New York; John Wiley, 1966.• Kennedy, J.L. The system approach: o r g a n i s a t i o n a l development. Human F a c t o r s , February, 1962, 25-52. Khandwalla, P. Environment and i t s impact on the organization.. I n t e r n a t i o n a l , S t u d i e s o f Management and O r g a n i z a t i o n , 1972, 2, 297-313. K i r k , R. Experimental Design: Procedures f o r the B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n c e s . Belmont, Cali f . ; Brooks, 1968. Lawler, E.E. C o n t r o l systems i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In M.D. Dunnette (ed), Handbook of I n d u s t r i a l and Organiza- t i o n a l Psychology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976, 1247-1291. Lawler, E.E., and Rhode, J.G. Information and C o n t r o l i n  O r g a n i z a t i o n s . C a l i f o r n i a : Goodyear P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1976. Lawrence, P., and Lo r s c h , J.W. D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n i n complex o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1967, 12, 1-47. L e a v i t t , H.J. Task o r d e r i n g and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l develop-ment i n the common t a r g e t game. B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n c e , 1960, 5, 233-239. L e a v i t t , . H.J. Unhuman o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Harvard Business  Review, 1962, 40, 90-98. L i k e r t , R. The Human O r g a n i z a t i o n : i t s Management and Value. New York: McGraw H i l l , 1967. Lowe, E.A., and Mclnnes, J.M. C o n t r o l i n socio-economic o r g a n i z a t i o n s : a r a t i o n a l e f o r the design of management c o n t r o l systems. The J o u r n a l of Management S t u d i e s , 1971, 8, 213-227. MacCrimmon, K.R., and T a y l o r , R.N. D e c i s i o n making and problem s o l v i n g . In M.D. Dunnette (ed) Handbook of  I n d u s t r i a l and O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Psychology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976, 1247-1291. MacKenzie, K.D. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l S t r u c t u r e s . A r l i n g t o n Heights, 111: AHM P u b l i s h i n g Corp., 1978. Mahoney, T.A., and F r o s t , P.J. The r o l e of technology i n models of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s . O r g a n i z a t i o n a 1 Behavior and Human Performance, 1974, I I , 122-138. 178 M a n s f i e l d , R. Bureaucracy and c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ; an examination of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1973, 18, 477-488. March, J.G., and Olsen, J.P. Ambiguity and Choice i n  O r g a n i z a t i o n s . Bergen: U n i v e r s i t e t s f o r l a g e t , 1976. March, J.G., and Simon, H.A. O r g a n i z a t i o n s . New York: Wiley, 1958. Maslow, A.H. M o t i v a t i o n and P e r s o n a l i t y . New York: Harper, 1954. McCandles, B.R., and Holloway, H.D. Race p r e j u d i c e and i n t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity i n c h i l d r e n . J o u r n a l of  Abnormal and S o c i a l Psychology, 1955, 51, 692-693. M c C l e l l a n d , D.C. Power: the Inner Experience. New York: I r v i n g t o n P u b l i s h e r s Inc., 1975. McGregor, D. The Human Side of E n t e r p r i s e . New York: McGraw H i l l , 1960. McMahon, J.T., and Ivancevich, J.M. A study of c o n t r o l i n a manufacturing o r g a n i z a t i o n : Managers and non-managers. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1976, 21, 1, 66-83. Merton, R.K. B u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e and p e r s o n a l i t y . S o c i a l Forces, 1940, 18, 560-568. MIchels, R. P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s . New York: C r o w e l l , 1962. M o r r i s , W.T. D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n Management Systems: An  I n t r o d u c t i o n to Design. Columbus: Ohio S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968. M o r r i s o n , D.F. M u l t i v a r i a t e S t a t i s t i c a l Methods. 2nd ed., New York: McGraw H i l l , 1976. Nelson, E.G., and Machin, J . L . J . Management c o n t r o l : systems t h i n k i n g a p p l i e d to the development of a framework f o r e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s . J o u r n a l of Management  St u d i e s , 1976, 13, 294-307. Nemiroff, P.M., and Ford, D.L. Task e f f e c t i v e n e s s and human f u l f i l l m e n t i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s : a review and development of a conceptual contingency model. The  Academy of Management Review, 1976, 1, 69-82. Nie, N.H., H u l l , C.H., J e n k i n s , J.G., Steinbrenner, K., and Bent, D.H. S t a t i s t i c a l Package f o r the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , 179 2nd ed., New York: McGraw H i l l , 1975. Oldham, G,R, I n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n : R e l a t i o n s h i p to job c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and performance. Paper pre s e n t e d  a t the E a s t e r n P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n Convention, P h i l a d e l p h i a , Pa., 1974. Orne, M.T. Demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and q u a s i c o n t r o l s . In R. Rosenthal and R.L. Rosnow (eds) A r t i f a c t s i n  B e h a v i o r a l Research, New York: Academic Pr e s s , 19 69. Ouchi, W.G. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1977, 22, 1, 95-113. Ouchi, W?G;, and Dowling, J.B. D e f i n i n g the span of c o n t r o l . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1974, 19, 357-365. Ouchi, W.G., and Johnson, Jt'B; Types of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to emotional w e l l b e i n g . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1978, 23, 293-317. Ouchi, W.G., and Maguire, M.A. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l : two f u n c t i o n s . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1975, 20, 559-569. Payne, R.L.,-and Pugh, D.S. O r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e and c l i m a t e . In M.D. Dunnette (ed) Handbook of I n d u s t r i a l  and O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Psychology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976. 1125-1173. Pearson, E.S., and H a r t l e y , H.O. B i o m e t r i k a Tables f o r  S t a t i s t i c i a n s . 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1958. Penner, D.D. and Patten, R.L. Comments on the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a t u s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l s i m u l a t i o n s . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Research i n S o c i a l Psychology, 1970, 1, 62-66. Perrow, C. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l A n a l y s i s : A S o c i o l o g i c a l View. London: T a v i s t o c k P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1970. Pinder, C.C. A d d i t i v i t y v e r s u s n o n a d d i t i v i t y of i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c i n c e n t i v e s : i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r work m o t i v a t i o n , performance and a t t i t u d e s . J o u r n a l of A p p l i e d Psychology, 1976, 61, 6, 693-700. P o r t e r , L.W., and Lawler, E.E. Ma n a g e r i a l A t t i t u d e s and  Performance. Homewood, 111: Irwin-Dorsey, 1968. 180 P r e s s , S.J. A p p l i e d M u l t i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s . New'York: H o l t , Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1972, P r i t c h a r d , R.D. , Campbell, K.M. , and Campbell, D.J', The e f f e c t s o f e x t r i n s i c f i n a n c i a l rewards on i n t r i n s i c m otiva-t i o n . Working Paper, Department of P s y c h o l o g i c a l S c i e n c e s , Purdue U n i v e r s i t y , Indiana, 1975. Pugh, D.S. The measurement of o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e . O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Dynamics, 1973, 1, 19-34. Pugh, D.S., Hickson, D.J., H i n i n g s , C.R., McDonald, K.M. and Turner, C. Dimensions of o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1968, 13, 65-105. Pugh, D.S., Hickson, D.J., H i n i n g s , C.R., McDonald, K.M. and Turner, C. The context o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e s . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1969, 14, 91-114 Rathe, A.W. Management c o n t r o l s i n busin e s s . In . D.G. Malcolm and A.J. Rowe.. (eds) , Management C o n t r o l  Systems, New York: Wiley, 1960 Reeves, T.M. and Woodward, J . The study o f managerial c o n t r o l . In J . Woodward (ed), I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n : Behavior and C o n t r o l . London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970, 37-56. Robinson, J.P., and Shaver, P.R. Measures of S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g i c a l A t t i t u d e s . Ann Arbor; Michigan: Survey Research Center, I n s t i t u t e f o r S o c i a l Research, The U n i v e r s i t y o f Michigan, 1972. Rosenthal, R., and Rosnow, R.L. A r t i f a c t s i n B e h a v i o r a l  Research. New York: Academic Press, 1969. Ross, M. The s e l f p e r c e p t i o n o f i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n . In J.H. Harvey, W.J.Ickes, and R.F. Kid d (eds): New D i r e c t i o n s i n A t t r i b u t i o n a l Research. H i l l s d a l e , N.J..,. Lawrence Erlbaum A s s o c i a t e s , 1976. Saunders, D.R. Some p r e l i m i n a r y i n t e r p r e t i v e m a t e r i a l f o r the PRI. Research Memorandum No. 55-15. P r i n c e t o n , N.J., E d u c a t i o n a l T e s t i n g S e r v i c e , October, 1955. Schein, E.H. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Psychology. Englewood C l i f f s , N.J..: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1965 Schroeder, H.M., D r i v e r , M.J., and S t r e u f e r t , S. Information P r o c e s s i n g Systems i n I n d i v i d u a l s and Groups. 181 New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t , and Winston, 1965. S e l z n i c k . P, TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkeley; U n i v e r -s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1949., S i e g e l , S. C e r t a i n determinants and c o r r e l a t e s o f a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m . Genetic Psycho-logical Monographs, 1954, 49, 187-229. S i s k , H.L. Management and O r g a n i z a t i o n . C i n c i n n a t i : South-western P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1977. S i t e s , P. C o n t r o l : the B a s i s o f S o c i a l Order. New York: Dunelien P u b l i s h i n g . C o . , 1973. Smart, C., and V e r t i n s k y , I. Designs f o r c r i s i s d e c i s i o n u n i t s . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1977, 22^ 640-57. Smith, P . C , and K e n d a l l , L.M. R e t r a n s l a t i o n o f expecta-t i o n s : an approach to the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f unambiguous anchors f o r r a t i n g s c a l e s . J o u r n a l o f A p p l i e d Psychology, 1963, 47, 149-155. ~ ~ Smith, C.G., and Tannenbaum, A.S. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e : a comparative a n a l y s i s . Human R e l a t i o n s , 1963, 16, 299-316. Spencer, C D . Two types o f r o l e p l a y i n g : t h r e a t s to i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l v a l i d i t y . American P s y c h o l o g i s t , 1978, 33, 3, 265-268. Starbuck, W.H. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l growth and development. In J . C March (ed) Handbook of O r g a n i z a t i o n s . Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965. Stee r s , R.M. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l E f f e c t i v e n e s s : A B e h a v i o r a l  View. P a c i f i c P a l i s a d e s , C a l i f o r n i a : Goodyear P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1977 S t o g d i l l , R.M., Goode, O.S., and Day, D.R. The l e a d e r behavior o f u n i v e r s i t y p r e s i d e n t s . Columbus: Ohio U n i v e r s i t y Bureau of Business Research, Unpublished Report, 1965. S t r e u f e r t , S. Conceptual s t r u c t u r e , communicator importance and i n t e r p e r s o n a l a t t i t u d e s toward conforming and deviant group members. J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 1966, 4, 100-103. S t r e u f e r t , S., Clardy, M.A., D r i v e r , M.J., K a r l i n s , M., Schroder, H.M., and Suedfeld, P. A t a c t i c a l game f o r the 182 a n a l y s i s o f complex d e c i s i o n making i n i n d i v i d u a l s and groups. P s y c h o l o g i c a l Reports ,;• 1965, 17, 723-729. Tannenbaum, A.S. C o n t r o l i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s : I n d i v i d u a l ; adjustment and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l performance. ' A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1962, 7, 236-257 Tannenbaum, A.S. C o n t r o l i n O r g a n i z a t i o n s . New York: McGraw H i l l , 1968. Tatsuoka, M.M. M u l t i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s . New York: John Wiley, and Sons, Inc., 1971 T a y l o r , F.W. P r i n c i p l e s o f S c i e n t i f i c Management. New ' York: Harper and Row, 1911 Tedeschi, J.T., Schlenker, B.R., and Bonoma, T.V. C o n f l i c t , Power and Games. Chicago: A l d i n e P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1973. Thompson, J.D. O r g a n i z a t i o n s i n A c t i o n . New York: McGraw H i l l , 1967 Tocher, K. C o n t r o l . Operations Research Q u a r t e r l y , 1970, 21, 159-180. Tuckman, B.W. I n t e g r a t i v e complexity: i t s measurement and r e l a t i o n to c r e a t i v i t y . E d u c a t i o n a l and P s y c h o l o g i c a l  Measurement, 1966, 26, 369-382. Van'de Geer, J.P. I n t r o d u c t i o n to M u l t i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s f o r the S o c i a l S c i e n c e s , San F r a n c i s c o : W.H. Freeman, T _ T _ Van Maanen, J . P o l i c e s o c i a l i z a t i o n : a l o n g i t i t u d i n a l examination o f job a t t i t u d e s i n an urban p o l i c e depart-ment. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science Q u a r t e r l y , 1975, 20, 207-228. V i c k e r s , G. Towards a S o c i o l o g y of Management. London: Chapman and H a l l , 1967 . Vroom, V. Some P e r s o n a l i t y Determinants of the E f f e c t s  of P a r t i c i p a t i o n . Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1960. Vroom, V.H. Work and M o t i v a t i o n . New York: Wiley, 1964. Vroom, V.H., and Yetton, P.W. Leadership and d e c i s i o n  making. P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , T973. 183 Weber, M. The theory o f S o c i a l and .Economic O r g a n i z a t i o n , ' New York.: Free Press, 1947, Weick, K.E, L a b o r a t o r y experiments w i t h o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In J.C. March (ed) Handbook o f O r g a n i z a t i o n s . Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965, 194-260. Weick, K.E. O r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the l a b o r a t o r y . In V.H. Vroom (ed) Methods of O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Research. P i t t s b u r g h : U n i v e r s i t y o f P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1967. Weick, K.E. The S o c i a l Psychology o f O r g a n i z a t i o n s . Reading: Addison Wesley, 1969. Wilks, S.S. C e r t a i n g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s i n the a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e . Biometrika, 1932, 24, 471-474. Winer, B.J. S t a t i s t i c a l P r i n c i p l e s i n Experimental Design. 2nd e d i t i o n , New York: McGraw H i l l , 1971. Woodward, J . Management and Technology. London: Her Majesty's S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1958. Woodward, J. I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n : Theory and P r a c t i c e . London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965. Yates, J.F., and K u l i c k , R.M. E f f o r t c o n t r o l arid judgements. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Behavior and Human Performance, 1977, 20, 54-65. Z e l d i t c h , M. J r . Can you r e a l l y study an army i n the l a b o r a t o r y ? In A. E t z i o n i (ed) A S o c i o l o g i c a l Reader  on Complex O r g a n i z a t i o n s . New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t , and Winston, 1969. Z i g l e r , E. M e t a t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s i n developmental psychology. In. M. Marx (ed) T h e o r i e s i n Contemporary  Psychology. New York: MacMillan -^ 1963. A P P E N D I X 1-A I n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e p a n e l o f j u d g e s ( n = f o r r a t i n g t h e b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s o n i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n d i m e n s i o n 185 Dear Colleague, I am c u r r e n t l y conducting r e s e a r c h i m t h e area o f O r g a n i z a t i o n a l C o n t r o l Systems. B r i e f l y , I propose to i d e n t i f y the e f f e c t s o f some p e r s o n a l i t y , o r g a n i z a -t i o n a l , and task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on the choice o f managerial c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r s . For t h i s purpose, c o n t r o l b e h a v i o r i s d e f i n e d as any b e h a v i o r which i s aimed at d i r e c t i n g , c o n s t r a i n i n g , m o t i v a t i n g , and/or i n f l u e n c i n g the b e h a v i o r o f other o r g a n i z a t i o n a l member(s). One major method o f c o n t r o l l i n g the b e h a v i o r o f a person i s to manipulate h i s / h e r i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n to do the task. I n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g s i t u a t i o n s are those where performing i t s e l f i s a rewarding experience to the i n d i v i d u a l even though no m a t e r i a l rewards (e.g., pay r a i s e , promotion, e t c . , i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l context) or punishments (e.g., demotion, d i s m i s s a l , warning, etc.) are i n v o l v e d . L i k e a good g o l f shot or a g r a c e f u l s k i run, good job performance leads to f e e l i n g s o f accomplishment, fun, and s a t i s f a c t i o n . . ., In g e n e r a l , work s i t u a t i o n s t h a t f a c i l i t a t e the emergence o f i n t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by h i g h v a r i e t y , autonomy, task i d e n t i t y , and feedback. These are d e f i n e d as: V a r i e t y : the1 degree to which a job r e q u i r e s employees to perform a wide range o f o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e i r work or to use a v a r i e t y o f equipment and procedures on the j ob. Autonomy: the degree to which employees have a major 'say' i n s c h e d u l i n g t h e i r work, i n s e l e c t i n g the equipment they w i l l use, and i n d e c i d i n g on procedures to be f o l l o w e d . Task the degree to which employees do an i d e n t i t y : e n t i r e or 'whole' p i e c e o f work and can c l e a r l y i d e n t i f y the r e s u l t s o f t h e i r e f f o r t s . Feedback: the degree to which employees as they are working r e c e i v e i n f o r m a t i o n which r e v e a l s how w e l l they are performing. To summarize, an i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g work s i t u a t i o n i s h i g h on the above f o u r dimensions. 186 In the next few pages, I have l i s t e d 25 d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s f a c e d by the Manager, Cargo D i v i s i o n of an a i r l i n e . Immediately f o l l o w i n g each d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n are some a l t e r n a t i v e courses o f a c t i o n open to the manager. We w i l l c a l l these the " b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s " . 1. P l e a s e read each d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n - and i t s a s s o c i a t e d b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s c a r e f u l l y . 2. Next, r a t e each b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e on a 7-point s c a l e to i n d i c a t e the extent to which the p a r t i c u l a r b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e i s l i k e l y to a f f e c t the i n t r i n s i -c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c h a r a c t e r o f the work s i t u a t i o n of the subordinate. The f o c a l person mentioned i n each d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n i s the subordinate whose work s i t u a t i o n i s to be c o n s i d e r e d w h i l e r a t i n g each b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e . 3. Complete the r a t i n g i n t h i s manner f o r a l l d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s . The s c a l e to be used f o r t h i s purpose i s shown below: -3 -2 decreases to a v e r y g r e a t extent the i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g nature o f the work s i t u a t i o n of subordinate P l e a s e not t h a t : 1. You may r a t e each b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e any where on the above s c a l e . 2. For the purpose of r a t i n g , a b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e which changes one or more o f the f o u r task dimensions ( i . e . , v a r i e t y , autonomy, task i d e n t i t y , feedback) may be ao c o n s i d e r e d to a f f e c t the i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g n a t -... .ure of the work s i t u a t i o n of s u b o r d i n a t e ( s ) . 0 +1 +2 +3 has no i n c r e a s e s to a e f f e c t v ery g r e a t or i s extent the i r r e l e - i n t r i n s i c a l l y vant m o t i v a t i n g nature of the work s i t u a t i o n o f subordinate THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION APPENDIX 1*J3 I n s t r u c t i o n s to the p a n e l o f judges (n = f o r r a t i n g the b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s on e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n dimension 188 Dear Colleague, I am c u r r e n t l y conducting r e s e a r c h i n the area o f o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s y s t e m s . B r i e f l y , I propose to i d e n t i f y the e f f e c t s o f some p e r s o n a l i t y , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and task c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on choice o f managerial c o n t r o l b e h aviors. For t h i s purpose, c o n t r o l : b e h a v i o r : i s d e f i n e d as any behavior which i s aimed a t d i r e c t i n g , c o n s t r a i n i n g , m o t i v a t i n g , and/or i n f l u e n c i n g the behavior of other o r g a n i z a t i o n a l member(s). One major method o f c o n t r o l l i n g the behavior o f a person i s to manipulate h i s / h e r e x t r i n s i c m o t i v a t i o n to do the task. E x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g s i t u a t i o n s are those where performing w e l l leads to such rewards as pay r a i s e , promotion, p r a i s e from s u p e r v i s o r , bonuses and s t a t u s symbols. Some other t y p i c a l e x t r i n s i c rewards are good working c o n d i t i o n s , pension p l a n s , medical b e n e f i t s , e t c . Punishments l i k e demotions, f i n e s , warnings and reprimands are o c c a s s i o n a l l y used by o r g a n i z a t i o n s to e x t i n g u i s h u n d e s i r a b l e behaviors but these are by no means m o t i v a t o r s . Note that the emphasis here i s on m a n i p u l a t i n g rewards and punishments e x t e r n a l t o the task i t s e l f . Thus i n c r e a s i n g v a r i e t y , c h a l l e n g e , autonomy, feedback, e t c . , a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the job can not s t r i c t l y speaking be c o n s i d e r e d as e x t r i n s i c rewards. In the next few pages, I have l i s t e d 25 d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s f a c e d by the Manager, Cargo D i v i s i o n o f an a i r l i n e . Immediately f o l l o w i n g each d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n are- some a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n open to the manager. We w i l l c a l l these the " b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s " . 1. P l e a s e read each d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n and i t s a s s o c i a -ted b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s c a r e f u l l y . 2. Next, r a t e each b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e on a 7-point s c a l e to i n d i c a t e the extent to which the p a r t i c u l a r b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e i s l i k e l y to a f f e c t the e x t r i n s i - '. c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c h a r a c t e r of the work s i t u a t i o n o f the subordinate. The f o c a l person mentioned i n each d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n i s the subordinate whose work s i t u a t i o n i s to be c o n s i d e r e d w h i l e r a t i n g each b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e . 3. Complete the r a t i n g i n t h i s manner f o r a l l d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s . 189 The s c a l e t o be u s e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e i s shown b e l o w : -3 d e c r e a s e s t o a v e r y g r e a t e x t e n t t h e e x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g n a t u r e o f t h e w o r k s i t u a t i o n o f s u b o r d i n a t e -2 -1 0 has no e f f e c t o r i s i r r e l e -v a n t + 1 +2 +3 i n c r e a s e s t o a v e r y g r e a t e x t e n t t h e e x t r i n s i c a l l y m o t i v a t i n g n a t u r e o f t h e work s i t u a t i o n o f s u b o r d i n a t e P l e a s e n o t e t h a t y o u may r a t e e a c h b e h a v i o r a l a l t e r n a t i v e any where on t h e above s c a l e . THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION APPENDIX 2 L i s t of 18 d e c i s i o n problems g i v e n to p a r t i c i p a n t s d u r i n g the s i m u l a t i o n 191 You have r e c e i v e d a note from Nancy Bechker, one of the s a l e s c l e r k s to the e f f e c t that she i s f e d up w i t h her work and t h a t her t a l k s w i t h her s u p e r v i s o r d i d not l e a d to any r e s u l t s . Nancy has been doing a v e r y good job i n the p a s t but f e e l s that her a b i l i t i e s and i n t e r e s t s are s t i f l e d i n too narrow an area. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one o f the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s would you take? 1. Make Nancy's job more i n t e r e s t i n g by e i t h e r g i v i n g her a v a r i e t y of tasks or t e m p o r a r i l y t r a n s f e r i n g her to another j o b . 2. T e l l Nancy t h a t i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n to g i v e each employee the job he/she l i k e s and t h a t she should take e f f o r t s to s t a r t l i k i n g her present r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 3. F i n d out from Nancy what type of jobs she would l i k e to do and t e l l her you w i l l t r y your be s t to f i n d her a job t h a t she l i k e s . 4.. T e l l Nancy t h a t a t p r e s e n t you are not i n a p o s i t i o n to o f f e r her a d i f f e r e n t or more c h a l l e n g i n g j o b . O f f e r Nancy a pay r a i s e i n an e f f o r t to improve her morale. 5. T a l k to Nancy's s u p e r v i s o r about the matter and inform Nancy that you have i n s t r u c t e d her s u p e r v i s o r to look i n t o the matter and t h a t she w i l l be h e a r i n g form her s u p e r v i s o r s h o r t l y . I n c i d e n t # 1 192 Jim Brocket -, one of the s t a f f i n Overseas Cargo s e c t i o n has come to you w i t h an i d e a about a new cargo h a n d l i n g procedure. The procedure w i l l i n v o l v e an i n i t i a l c a p i t a l o u t l a y o f $2,300. Jim has done a c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s o f the procedure and f e e l s t h a t t h i s may prove to be a v e r y p r o f i t a b l e p r o -p o s i t i o n f o r the a i r l i n e . On a f i r s t examination, you c o u l d f i n d some e r r o r s i n the c o s t - b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s done by Jim. As the Manger (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one o f the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s are you l i k e l y to take? 1. T e l l Jim th a t you cannot accept h i s i d e a s i n c e there are many e r r o r s i n h i s a n a l y s i s . 2. D i s c u s s the matter w i t h Jim, p o i n t out the e r r o r s to him, make some suggestions and ask him to re-do the a n a l y s i s and come back to you. 3. Ask Jim to re-do the a n l a y s i s and come to a d e c i s i o n on the matter h i m s e l f , but s e t c l e a r c o n s t r a i n t s on c o s t , u t i l i z a t i o n of l a b o r hours e t c . 4. P r a i s e Jim f o r h i s e f f o r t i n f r o n t o f other employees; ask Jim to c o r r e c t the e r r o r s and come back to you. 5. T e l l Jim th a t he should have f i r s t t a l k e d to h i s s e c t i o n s u p e r v i s o r and got h i s ap p r o v a l b e f o r e coming to you. I n c i d e n t # 2 193 You have r e c i e v e d a l e t t e r from Manager (Finance) saying t h a t Gerry Smith, one of the s t a f f from cargo s a l e s d i v i s i o n who had been temporarily! loaned to the f i n a n c e d i v i s i o n has done an e x c e l l e n t j o b t h e r e . As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one o f the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s would you take? 1. Send the l e t t e r to Gerry along w i t h a s m a l l note o f your own c o n g r a t u l a t i n g him f o r the good work and e x p r e s s i n g your p l e a s u r e over the matter. 2. C a l l Gerry to your o f f i c e , show him the l e t t e r you r e c e i v e d from Manager (Finance) and congra-t u l a t e Gerry f o r h i s good work i n person. 3. Merely pass the l e t t e r from Manager (Finance) to Gerry. 4. C o n g r a t u l a t e Gerry on h i s good work, show him the l e t t e r you r e c e i v e d from Manager (Finance) and ask Gerry whether he would l i k e some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n that area i n f u t u r e . 5. Pass the l e t t e r to Gerry and g i v e him a s m a l l monetary reward i n r e c o g n i t i o n of h i s good work. 6. Pass the l e t t e r to Gerry and p r a i s e Gerry's work ( i n f i n a n c e d i v i s i o n ) i n f r o n t of Gerry's c o l l e a g u e s . I n c i d e n t # 3 194 At 35, Edward Jones was a v e r y e f f e c t i v e s u p e r v i s o r of 20 w o r k e r s . i n the cargo d i v i s i o n . He was c o n s i d e r e d to have gr e a t p o t e n t i a l by everyone i n the d i v i s i o n . However, about two years ago h i s marriage s t a r t e d to f a l l a p art; e v e n t u a l l y he was d i v o r c e d . For the pa s t s i x months h i s performance has been v e r y poor. He does not complete h i s assignments on time, f r e q u e n t l y a r r i v e s l a t e f o r work, and even misses some important meetings. He i s a l s o known to be d r i n k i n g h e a v i l y . You f e e l t h a t some c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y a t t h i s p o i n t o f time. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one of the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s w i l l you take? 1. Have a f r i e n d l y t a l k w i t h Ed, show concern f o r h i s problems, o f f e r a l l p o s s i b l e help and encourage him to once a g a i n s t a r t u s i n g h i s f u l l p o t e n t i a l . 2. T r a n s f e r Ed t e m p o r a r i l y to a new job and new surroundings. 3. Give Ed a new p r o j e c t which i s l i k e l y to be of i n t e r e s t to him w h i l e keeping him i n the prese n t p o s i t i o n . 4. Have a s e r i o u s t a l k w i t h Ed, t e l l him t h a t he has been s l a c k e n i n g i n h i s performance, and t h a t he has to improve h i s performance i f he wants to continue i n h i s p r e s e n t j o b . 5. Demote Ed. I n c i d e n t # 4 195 The E x e c u t i v e V i c e - P r e s i d e n t has asked you to set s a l e s t a r g e t s f o r the coming q u a r t e r . C u r r e n t l y , s a l e s s t a f f are p a i d a f i x e d s a l a r y and a commission o f 3% on s a l e s exceeding $15,000 per qu a r t e r ( t h e i r minimum i n d i v i d u a l s a l e s quota). You f e e l t h a t i n -c r e a s i n g the i n d i v i d u a l s a l e s quota to $20,000 per quart e r i s v i t a l f o r m a i n t a i n i n g the c u r r e n t growth of the company. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one of the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s are you l i k e l y to take? 1. Increase i n d i v i d u a l s a l e s quotas to $20,000 per q u a r t e r without c o n s u l t i n g your s t a f f . However, continue to pay 37o commission on . .'.. a l l s a l e s exceeding $15,000. 2. Increase i n d i v i d u a l s a l e s quotas to $20,000 'per quatef-;-' .. without c o n s u l t i n g your s t a f f . Commission w i l l h e n c e f o r t h be p a i d a t the r a t e o f 370 on s a l e s above $15,000 per qu a r t e r and 47o above $17,500. 3. C o n s u l t your subordinates and abide by t h e i r d e c i s i o n (That i s , i f the s t a f f suggest i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l s a l e s quota to $16,000 per qua r t e r , accept t h i s s u g g e s t i o n ) . 37o commission w i l l continue to be p a i d on a l l s a l e s above $15,000 per qua r t e r . 4. C o n s u l t your subordinates and abide by t h e i r d e c i s i o n ( t h a t i s , i f the s t a f f suggest i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l quota to $16,000 per quarter, accept t h i s s u g g e s t i o n ) . However, inform them that 37D commission w i l l be p a i d o n l y i f s a l e s exceed the newly e s t a b l i s h e d quota ( f o r example, $16,000). 5. Consult your subordinates and a f t e r d i s c u s s i o n s i d e n t i f y a compromise s o l u t i o n ( f o r example, i f the s t a f f suggested a quota of $16,000 per quart e r when you had wanted to a s s i g n them a quota o f $20,000, accept now $18,000). T e l l your s t a f f t h a t 27c commission w i l l be p a i d on a l l s a l e s up to the new quota ( f o r example, $18,000 per quarter) and 37o beyond t h a t . I n c i d e n t # 5 196 You observe t h a t a number of employees i n the S p e c i a l F r e i g h t S e c t i o n have been coming l a t e to the o f f i c e i n the p a s t few weeks. Since you are d i r e c t l y i n charge of t h i s s e c t i o n , you f e e l t h a t some c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n should be taken by you a t t h i s p o i n t of time. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one o f the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s would you take? 1. Keep an attendance r e g i s t e r to note the a r r i v a l time of each employee; t e l l the l a t e comers not to repeat such behavior i n f u t u r e . 2. Warn the l a t e comers t h a t a l l employees who come l a t e on more than a couple o f days each month w i l l have to pay a s m a l l f i n e . 3. Reward the l a t e comers v e r b a l l y on a l l those days they a r r i v e on time. 4. Meet the l a t e comers i n d i v i d u a l l y , f i n d out why they come l a t e , and o f f e r f l e x i b l e working hours to s u i t t h e i r convenience. 5. Pass a c i r c u l a r i n the s e c t i o n to the e f f e c t t h a t a l l employees should h e n c e f o r t h come on time to the o f f i c e . 6. T a l k to the l a t e comers, impress on them the importance of t h e i r jobs and how t h e i r p r a c t i c e o f coming l a t e to the o f f i c e a f f e c t s the e f f i c i e n c y and image o f the a i r l i n e (adversely).. 7. I n s t i t u t e a 'punctual employee award' ($100 cash p r i z e ) which w i l l be g i v e n to the employee who i s most p u n c t u a l i n each q u a r t e r i n the s e c t i o n . I n c i d e n t # 6 197 You f i n d t h a t your s e c r e t a r y has posted two r e l i g i o u s messages on the w a l l near her f i l i n g c a b i n e t . A lthough i t i s not uncommon p r a c t i c e i n the o f f i c e to post t h i n g s around, a l l o f these tend to be humorous. You f e e l t h a t these r e l i g i o u s p o s t e r s are u n b u s i n e s s l i k e . As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one o f the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s w i l l you take? 1. T e l l the s e c r e t a r y to remove the p o s t e r s immediately. 2. T a l k to the s e c r e t a r y and persuade her to remove the p o s t e r s , but do not f o r c e a d e c i s i o n on her. 3. While t a l k i n g to the s e c r e t a r y mention how important her job i s and how her o f f i c e should be a model f o r a l l other employees. C a s u a l l y mention how much b e t t e r i t w i l l l o o k i f she hangs some good p a i n t i n g or s c e n i c p i c t u r e s i n the p l a c e o f the r e l i g i o u s messages. 4. Buy two s i m i l a r p a i n t i n g s , hang one i n your own o f f i c e and the other i n your s e c r e t a r y ' s o f f i c e where she had hung the r e l i g i o u s p o s t e r s p r e v i o u s l y . T e l l her that i t i s a s u r p r i s e g i f t f o r her. I n c i d e n t # 7 ft 198 B i l l Gonzley, the staff.member a s s i g n e d to do market and customer survey, has come to you a s k i n g f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n s on a number of s t a t i s t i c a l i s s u e s . As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one of the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s w i l l you take? 1. T e l l B i l l to use h i s judgement and take care of the problems h i m s e l f . 2. Make some suggestions (e.g., r e f e r e n c e to a book) but do not p r o v i d e s o l u t i o n s to B i l l ' s problems. 3. T e l l B i l l the degree of accuracy i n estimates t h a t i s r e q u i r e d , but l e t B i l l make a l l other d e c i s i o n s . 4. T e l l B i l l t h a t s i n c e the r e s e a r c h needs to be done by a person who knows s t a t i s t i c a l methods thoroughly he should not a f t e r a l l be working on i t . A s s i g n another person to the job and ask B i l l to work on a d i f f e r e n t p r o j e c t . I n c i d e n t # 8 199 F i v e MBA students of M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y d i d a management p o l i c y p r o j e c t i n the a i r l i n e l a s t year. Now they have submitted a r e p o r t of t h e i r f i n d i n g s i n which they suggest i n s t a l l i n g a new cargo booking procedure. You went through t h e i r r e p o r t and f e e l t h a t the students have done a thorough job i n a n a l y z i n g the c o s t s and b e n e f i t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the proposed method. I t looks as i f the a i r l i n e can save a t l e a s t 1270 o f i t s p r e s e n t c o s t s ( r e l a t e d to cargo booking) i f i t implements the new procedure suggested by the students. On the other hand, the cargo booking s t a f f are not l i k e l y to be v e r y e n t h u s i a s t i c about the new system s i n c e i t i n v o l v e s changes i n prodecures and reassignment of s t a f f to other o f f i c e s and areas. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) , which one o f the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s are you l i k e l y to take? 1. Implement the new procedure on a p i l o t b a s i s a f t e r t e l l i n g the s t a f f how the new procedure w i l l be b e n e f i c i a l to the a i r l i n e . 2. Implement the new procedure on a p i l o t b a s i s a f t e r t e l l i n g the s t a f f how the new procedure w i l l be b e n e f i c i a l to the a i r l i n e . Promise to share a p o r t i o n of the c o s t savings (say, 17o) w i t h the s t a f f by g i v i n g them an a d d i t i o n a l bonus. 3 . T e l l the s t a f f the summary of students' f i n d i n g s and i n v i t e suggestions and comments from them. Decide to go ahead w i t h the p i l o t p r o j e c t i r r e s p e c t i v e of the s t a f f ' s r e a c t i o n s to the new procedure. Promise to share a p o r t i o n o f the c o s t savings (say, 1%) w i t h the s t a f f by g i v i n g them an a d d i t i o n a l bonus. 4. B r i e f the s t a f f about the students' f i n d i n g s and recommendations and i n v i t e suggestions and comments from them. Decide not to go ahead w i t h the p i l o t p r o j e c t i f m a j o r i t y of the s t a f f i s not e n t h u s i a s t i c about the i d e a . I n c i d e n t # 9 200 You come to understand t h a t the morale of f o r k l i f t o p e r a t o r s i n downtown and a i r p o r t cargo o f f i c e s has been r a t h e r poor i n the l a s t few weeks. T h e i r performance has a l s o been showing a d e c l i n i n g t r e n d . Bob Warren, S u p e r v i s o r (Fork L i f t Operations) met ?ou r e c e n t l y and asked f o r your adv i c e on the problem, oth you and Bob agree t h a t some a c t i o n i s . n e c e s s a r y at t h i s p o i n t of time to prevent the s i t u a t i o n from g e t t i n g worse. The f o r k l i f t o p e r a t o r s i n the a i r l i n e are not u n i o n i z e d . Bob Warren has agreed to implement your suggestions on the matter. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) , which one o f the f o l l o w i n g suggestions would you make to Bob Warren to improve the p r o d u c t i v i t y and morale of the f o r k l i f t o p erators? 1. Give a pay r a i s e to a l l f o r k l i f t o p e r a t o r s . 2. Make arrangements f o r improving the fe n e r a l working c o n d i t i o n s o f f o r k i f t o p e r a t o r s . 3 . C a l l a meeting o f a l l f o r k l i f t o p e r a t o r s , f i n d out from them t h e i r problems and reasons f o r poor morale, and implement t h e i r suggestions f o r improving the s i t u a t i o n . 4. Give a m i l d warning to the f o r k l i f t o p e r a t o r s t h a t u n l e s s they improve t h e i r performance now, the management would be . compelled to take some c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n . 5. Make the jobs of f o r k l i f t o p e r a t o r s more i n t e r e s t i n g ( f o r exmaple, i n t r o d u c e job r o t a t i o n , team d e c i s i o n making, e t c ) . I n c i d e n t # 10 201 Recently, M i l d r e d , one o f the s a l e s c l e r k s i n downtown cargo booking o f f i c e drew your a t t e n t i o n to a new device t h a t would enable the s a l e s c l e r k s to v e r i f y t h e i r bookings a g a i n s t a v a i l a b l e c a p a c i t y i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y . M i l d r e d had d i s c u s s e d the i d e a w i t h her c o l l e a g u e s i n the downtown and a i r p o r t o f f i c e s and a l l were v e r y e n t h u s i a s t i c about the new d e v i c e . M i l d r e d has now come to you r e p r e s e n t i n g the wishes of a l l c l e r k s on the matter. The instrument i s moderately expensive and not l i k e l y to add v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the o v e r a l l e f f i c i e n c y of the a i r l i n e , but would be of immense he l p to the s a l e s c l e r k s to monitor t h e i r own performance. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one o f the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s would you take? 1. Decide to purchase the d e v i c e . 2. Decide a g a i n s t p u r c h a s i n g the d e v i c e . 3. Decide a g a i n s t p u r c h a s i n g the d e v i c e , but t e l l the c l e r k s t h a t you w i l l make other arrangements to g i v e them feedback about t h e i r performance on a weekly b a s i s . 4. T e l l M i l d r e d t h a t she and her c o l l e a g u e s should have approached t h e i r s u p e r v i s o r on the matter f i r s t . Make i t c l e a r to M i l d r e d t h a t i t was i r r e g u l a r on her and her c o l l e a g u e s 1 p a r t to r e f e r the matter to your a t t e n t i o n without g e t t i n g t h e i r s u p e r v i s o r ' s a p p r o v a l f i r s t . I n c i d e n t # 11 202 An independent c o n s u l t i n g agency a f t e r a s i x month study o f passenger and cargo h a n d l i n g techn-iques i n the a i r l i n e concluded t h a t the c u r r e n t performance l e v e l s o f cargo s o r t e r s can be improved s i g n i f i c a n t l y . Many of the cargo s o r t e r s , a c c o r d i n g to the c o n s u l t a n t s , were working below t h e i r c a p a c i t y and had low morale. The c o n s u l t a n t s a l s o conducted a survey o f the a t t i t u d e s o f v a r i o u s groups of employees as p a r t o f t h e i r study. One f i n d i n g a r i s i n g from the study was tha t approximately 35% o f cargo s o r t e r s f e l t t h a t t h e i r pay was not keeping up wit h the i n c r e a s e s i n c o s t of l i v i n g and another 35% f e l t t h a t t h e i r j o bs were h i g h l y r o u t i n i z e d and u n i n t e r e s t i n g . The General Manager (Sales) to whom the r e p o r t was submitted has now asked you to take s u i t a b l e a c t i o n . C l e a r l y , a l l the problems cannot be so l v e d immediately, but you are convinced t h a t some a c t i o n i s necessary. You had a t a l k w i t h the Work Su p e r v i s o r (Cargo S o r t i n g ) y e s t e r d a y and he has agreed to c a r r y out your d e c i s i o n on the matter. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one o f the f o l l o w i n g suggestions would you make to the Work Su p e r v i s o r (Cargo S o r t i n g ) to improve the p r o d u c t i v i t y o f cargo s o r t e r s . 1. A f l a t r a i s e i n the s a l a r i e s of cargo s o r t e r s . 2. A r a i s e i n the s a l a r i e s / o t h e r monetary rewards o f cargo s o r t e r s which i s con t i n g e n t on b e t t e r work performance by them. 3. Improve the working c o n d i t i o n s of cargo s o r t e r s . 4. Provide more i n t e r e s t i n g jobs to the cargo s o r t e r s ( f o r example, i n t r o d u c e job r o t a t i o n , team d e c i s i o n making, e t c ) . 5 . Introduce s t r i c t e r s u p e r v i s i o n i n the cargo s o r t i n g department. I n c i d e n t # 12 203 As p a r t o f your j o b , every month you have to make s a l e s f o r e c a s t s f o r the month, and budgets f o r u t i l i z a t i o n o f equipment and personnel and route-wise l o a d f a c t o r s . Information necessary f o r p r e p a r i n g these f o r e c a s t s come from s e v e r a l sources w i t h i n and o u t s i d e the cargo d i v i s i o n . For the l a s t three months, Jim Schnoeck who i s i n charge o f Heavy F r e i g h t S e c t i o n has not been p r o v i d i n g some important i n f o r m a t i o n on time. The time delay has not so f a r been very much ( t y p i c a l l y , the de l a y i s o n l y 1-2 days), but the i n f o r m a t i o n that Jim p r o v i d e s i s v i t a l f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g o v e r a l l plans f o r the cargo d i v i s i o n . C o n s i d e r i n g the presen t c o n d i t i o n s , Jim cannot be g i v e n any a d d i t i o n a l personnel or equipment without d i s r u p t i n g the work of oth e r s e c t i o n s i n the d i v i s i o n ; however, you f e e l t h a t w i t h a l i t t l e e x t r a e f f o r t on the p a r t o f Jim he w i l l be able to g i v e the i n f o r m a t i o n on time. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one of the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s w i l l you take? 1. Of f e r same a d d i t i o n a l monetary compensation to Jim ( f o r example, overtime pay) f o r h i s e x t r a e f f o r t to f i n i s h the job on time. 2. T e l l Jim p o l i t e l y t h a t you may be f o r c e d to a s s i g n the task to some one e l s e u n l e s s Jim p r o v i d e s the i n f o r m a t i o n on time i n f u t u r e . 3. Impress Jim about the v i t a l nature o f the i n f o r m a t i o n he p r o v i d e s ; t e l l him how the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t he p r o v i d e s i s being used and f i t s i n t o the o v e r a l l s a l e s f o r e c a s t s . I n c i d e n t # 13 204 The performance of cargo l o a d e r s a t the a i r p o r t has not been v e r y s a t i s f a c t o r y s i n c e the new mechanized conveyor b e l t system was i n s t a l l e d . The job of the '.. l o a d e r s i s r e a l l y a simple one. The cargo from each f l i g h t i s p l a c e d on a conveyor b e l t . The l o a d e r s have to take each p i e c e of cargo from the moving conveyor b e l t , i n s p e c t i t as to i t s d e s t i n a t i o n , and put i t i n the a p p r o p r i a t e t r o l l e y w a i t i n g near by. I n s p i t e o f the simple nature of t h e i r j o b , the number ^ of cases of delays and e r r o r s i n shipment have i n c r e a s e d i n the p a s t few weeks. When i n q u i r e d , the h a n d l e r s s t a t e d t h a t the conveyor b e l t moved too f a s t thus not g i v i n g them enough time to i n s p e c t the l a b e l s p r o p e r l y . Before i n s t a l l i n g the system, e x t e n s i v e time and motion s t u d i e s had been c a r r i e d out to determine what the o p t i m a l b e l t speed should be. The super-v i s o r of cargo l o a d e r s has now come to you f o r your i n s t r u c t i o n s on the matter. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) , which one o f the f o l l o w i n g steps would you take? 1. I n s t r u c t the s u p e r v i s o r to convince the l o a d e r s t h a t the conveyor b e l t speed was determined a f t e r e x t e n s i v e s t u d i e s and hence the l o a d e r s should r e a c h up to i t . A l s o , ask the s u p e r v i s o r to i n f o r m the l o a d e r s t h a t the management may have to reduce t h e i r pay i f the l o a d e r s do not improve t h e i r performance. 2: I n s t r u c t the s u p e r v i s o r to a l l o w the .. l o a d e r s to a d j u s t the speed of the conveyor b e l t to s u i t t h e i r own needs. 3. I n s t r u c t the s u p e r v i s o r to o f f e r i n c r e a s e d monetary rewards to l o a d e r s which are c o n t i n g e n t on t h e i r performance. 4. I n s t r u c t the s u p e r v i s o r to improve the working c o n d i t i o n s of l o a d e r s ( f o r example, i n t r o d u c e more c o f f e e b r e a k s ) . 5. I n s t r u c t the s u p e r v i s o r to o f f e r the l o a d e r s a f l a t i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r pay. I n c i d e n t # 14 205 One o f the t r o u b l e spots w i t h i n the cargo d i v i s i o n i s the computer data p r e p a r a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of approximately a dozen key punch o p e r a t o r s , three coders and a few s u p p o r t i n g s t a f f . There have been s e v e r a l cases of e r r o r s i n punching, wrong a l l o c a t i o n of c o s t f i g u r e s , wrong coding, e t c . , i n the p a s t few months. In the l a s t few weeks, things have become even worse w i t h some delays and e r r o r s . . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y bad now s i n c e the volume of cargo handled by the a i r l i n e has been s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g and the importance o f v. c o r r e c t and t i m e l y i n f o r m a t i o n on v a r i o u s aspects o f o p e r a t i o n s i s i n c r e a s i n g . You f e e l t h a t some a c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y now b e f o r e the matters get worse. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one of the f o l l o w i n g steps would you take? 1. Increase the h o u r l y wages of a l l s t a f f i n the data p r e p a r a t i o n s e c t i o n . 2. T a l k to the employees i n . t h e s e c t i o n i n d i v i d u a l l y or as a group and t e l l them about the c r u c i a l nature of the data they prepare. Request them to take more care while p r e p a r i n g the data. 3. Improve the working c o n d i t i o n s o f the s t a f f ( f o r example, b e t t e r s i t t i n g f a c i l i t i e s , more r e s t p e r i o d s , more c o f f e e breaks, e t c . ) . 4. Attempt to make the jobs of the s t a f f more i n t e r e s t i n g by g i v i n g them more v a r i e t y and r o t a t i n g t h e i r jobs or adding to t h e i r p r e s e n t d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers. 5'.. I n t r o d u c e c l o s e r s u p e r v i s i o n i n the s e c t i o n . I n c i d e n t #•15 206 In the p a s t few months, the l a b o r c o s t s per u n i t of cargo handled i n the Heavy F r e i g h t S e c t i o n has been s i g n i f i c a n t l y exceeding the budgeted c o s t s although the wage r a t e s have remained more or l e s s the same. You f e e l t h a t some remedi a l a c t i o n : i s needed now. As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) which one o f the f o l l o w i n g steps w i l l you take? 1. Introduce s t r i c t e r s u p e r v i s i o n to reduce the man--,. hours l o s t , between s h i f t s , i n c o f f e e breaks, e t c . , and i n g e n e r a l to i n c r e a s e the p r o d u c t i v i t y l e v e l w i t h i n the s e c t i o n . 2. F i n d out from the workers i n the d i v i s i o n , what t h e i r problems are and i f necessary r a i s e the budget f i g u r e s . 3. F i n d out from the workers w h a t . t h e i r problems are and t r y to s o l v e them, but make i t v e r y c l e a r to the workers t h a t they have to meet the budget l e v e l s i n a l l i n s t a n c e s . 4. Introduce bonus payments hoping that:"this w i l l improve the work performance of employees i n the s e c t i o n . 5. Improve the working c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n the s e c t i o n ( f o r example, more r e s t p e r i o d s ) . I n c i d e n t # 16 207 Cargo booking c l e r k s at the r e g i o n a l cargo s a l e s o f f i c e s perform t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s ; r e c e i v i n g and i n i t i a l s c r e e n i n g of cargo f r e i g h t r e q u e s t s , checking f o r f l i g h t and space a v a i l a b i l i t y , and f i n a l hooking of each f r e i g h t on s p e c i f i c f l i g h t s , The cargo Bookings i n the p a s t have been growing s t e a d i l y i n most areas.• Recently, you r e c e i v e d a suggestion from of the cargo superintendents t h a t s p l i t t i n g of the d u t i e s of cargo c l e r k s i n t o three d i s t i n c t a c t i v i t i e s performed by three persons can improve o v e r a l l e f f i c i e n c y and speed o f cargo booking s i n c e each person w i l l be doing a h i g h l y s p e c i a l i z e d a c t i v i t y . As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) , which one of the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s w i l l you take? 1. Implement the s u p e r v i s o r ' s suggestion-. 2. T a l k the i d e a over w i t h the cargo booking c.-=»l« c l e r k s , get t h e i r o p i n i o n s , and implement the p r o p o s a l o n l y i f most of the c l e r k s agree to the i d e a ; p l a n to drop the i d e a i f necessary. 3. T r y to s e l l the i d e a to the c l e r k s by p o i n t i n g out to them how the new system would l e a d to p o s s i b l e i n c r e a s e i n monetary rewards ( i n the form of bonus) and g r e a t e r r e s t p e r i o d s i n between bookings. P l a n to implement the i d e a i n any case. I n c i d e n t # 17 208 You were away i n P a r i s f o r the l a s t t h r e e weeks. In your absence,.the Cargo Superintendent made a v e r b a l commitment to buy and i n s t a l l some cargo h a n d l i n g equipment worth about $2,700, The Cargo Superintendent f e e l s t h a t the investment would prove worthwhile f o r the a i r l i n e i n the long run, Since ,any such major expenditure has i n the u s u a l course, to be approved by you ahead of time, the t r a n s a c t i o n was a l i t t l e b i t i r r e g u l a r . I f you do not approve the Transaction, the superintendent w i l l have to go back on M s commitment which w i l l be embarassing f o r him, The Cargo S u p e r i n t e n -dent t e l l s you t h a t the o f f e r was a v e r y a t t r a c t i v e one and had he waited f o r your r e t u r n from P a r i s , he would have missed the o p p o r t u n i t y , As Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) , which one of the f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s would you take? 1. Approve the t r a n s a c t i o n , 2. Approve the t r a n s a c t i o n , but warn the Cargo Superintendent t h a t in.i.future a l l such t r a n s a c t i o n s have to be approved by you ahead of time. 3. Do not approve the t r a n s a c t i o n . 4. Do not approve the t r a n s a c t i o n and warn the superintendent t h a t i n f u t u r e he should not make any such commitment i n your absence. 5. Approve the t r a n s a c t i o n and p r a i s e the Superintendent f o r h i s t i m e l y a c t i o n i n f r o n t of other s t a f f . I n c i d e n t # 1 8 209 INTRINSIC SCORES OF VARIOUS BEHAVIORAL ALTERNATIVES D e c i s i o n B e h a v i o r a l A l t e r n a t i v e s s i t u a c i o n number 1 2 3 4 5 1 6 .19 1 .81 5.69 3 ,50 3,88 2 3 .31 6 .38 5. 94 4 .94 2.81 3 5 .56 5 .63 4.44 6 .56 4.06 4 5 .31 4 .94 6.06 1 .69 1.50 5 1 .25 1 .50 6.25 6 .31 5,19 6 2 .19 3 .13 4.06 6 .38 3,00 7 1 .44 4 .94 5.94 2 .75 8 4 .69 6 .38 5.44 1 .12 9 3 .81 3 .44 2.44 6 ,19 10 4 .06 4 .13 6.00 3 ,06 '6..50 11 6 .56 2 .06 3.94 1 .81 12 4 .13 4 .38 4.44 6 .50 2.63 13 3 .88 2 .31 5.56 14 2 .75 6 .31 4.38 4 .19 3.96 15 3 .88 5, .50 4.06 6 .38 2.06 16 2, . 75 5, .31 4.81 3 .94 4.06 17 1, .44 6, .50 2.81 18 5, . 81 4, .06 2.50 1. .44 6.69 4,81 5,93 4,06 21Q. EXTRINSIC SCORES OF VARIOUS BEHAVIORAL ALTERNATIVES Decision s i t u a t i o n 1 2 number 1 4, .06 2 .81 2 4, .13 4 .63 3 5. .06 6. .13 4 5. .75 4 .25 5 4. .25 6 .13 6 3. .50 1. .94 7 2. .56 3, .56 8 4. .06 4, ,31 9 3. 06 5. .94 10 6. 69 6. ,31 11 5. 06 3. ,50 12 6. 44 5. .94 13 6. 00 2. .88 14 2. 44 4. 69 15 5. 88 4. 81 16 2. 25 4. 25 17 3. 50 4. 25 18 4. 19 2. 88 Behavioral Alternatives 3 4 5 4 .19 6 .25 4 .19 4 .94 6 .06 2 ,06 4 .12 5 .50 6 .69 4 .31 3 .88 2 .81 4 .13 2 .94 3 .06 6 .06 4 .50 3 .69 4 .25 5 .50 3 .94 2 .63 4 .56 4 ,12 4 .94 1 .31 4 .13 3, .62 2 .38 5, .13 4 .13 2 .00 4, .63 5, .94 5 .56 6 .31 5, .75 4, .13 2. .81 3. ,25 5. .94 5 .69 5. .94 3. ,75 2, .56 5, .69 6 6,25 4.25 NATURE OF THE 18 DECISION SITUATIONS AS RATED BY 32 JUDGES :ident # Importance Complexity <C er t a i n t y 1 Unimportant Simple C e r t a i n 2 Unimportant Complex U n c e r t a i n 3 Unimportant Simple C e r t a i n 4 Unimportant Simple C e r t a i n 5 Important Complex U n c e r t a i n 6 Unimportant Simple C e r t a i n 7 Unimportant Complex C e r t a i n 8 Unimportant Complex C e r t a i n 9 Important Complex U n c e r t a i n 10 Important Complex U n c e r t a i n 11 Unimportant Simple U n c e r t a i n 12 Important Complex U n c e r t a i n 13 Important Simple U n c e r t a i n 14 Important Complex U n c e r t a i n 15 Important Complex U n c e r t a i n 16 Important Complex U n c e r t a i n 17 Important Complex U n c e r t a i n 18 Unimportant Complex U n c e r t a i n APPENDIX 3 Q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r measurin; p a r t i c i p a n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n s about the o r g a n i z a t i o n 213 E a r l i e r today you re a d some background i n f o r m a t i o n about North S t a r A i r l i n e s , Canada. Please i n d i c a t e your p e r c e p t i o n s about the a i r l i n e by p l a c i n g a mark i n the a p p r o p r i a t e p l a c e s on the f o l l o w i n g s c a l e s . 1. The number of h i e r a r c h i c a l l e v e l s a t North S t a r i s : 5 4 3 2 1 Many Few 2. The degree of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n a t North S t a r i s : 1 2 3 4 5 Low High 3. Number of formal r u l e s a t North S t a r i s : 1 2 3 4 5 Few Many 4. Task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and c l e a r - c u t r o l e d e f i n i t i o n s are: 1 2 3 4 5 Low High 5. A u t h o r i t y based on formal p o s i t i o n power i s : 5 4_ 3 2 1 High Low 6. D i r e c t i o n o f communications (check one) Main l y v e r t i c a l V e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l 7. Content of communications i n g e n e r a l i s : (check one) Main l y a d v i c e and i n f o r m a t i o n M a i n l y i n s t r u c t i o n s and d e c i s i o n s I.D.# 214 APPENDIX 4-A 'Mechanistic! description of the organization 215 N O R T H S T A R A I R L I N E S , C A N A D A You are Russell Hale, the Manager (Cargo Division) of North Star Airlines, Canada. The company was formed in the mid-50*s by merger of eight small regional and feeder a i r l i n e s under the leadership of an extremely dynamic pioneer of the Canadian air transport industry. North Star has i t s head offices and major operating b a 3 e in Montreal, with smaller operating bases i n Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, and Halifax. At the present time, the a i r l i n e services eastern Canada quite intensively and also operates transcontinental routes between Halifax and Vancouver with enroute services to each of the major intervening cities. Ey far, the greater part of the company's operation however, is overseas extending from north Africa through western Europe on the one hand, throughout the orient and into Australia and New Zealand on the other. Over the years, North Star has developed an outstanding reputation for safety, reliability, and customer service. The a i r l i n e industry is both highly competitive and very much hemmed in by government regulations. Accordingly, i t takes l o t 3 of initiative and hardwork to stay in the game. Considering this fact, your company has been doing quite well: the rate of return on total investment for North Star had increased from 5 $ in the 60»s to an average of Tl> in the f i r s t five years of the 70's and in 1977. Until recently, the long distance mainstay of the fleet has been DC-8 and 727 aircrafts with 737 a i r c r a f t servicing the shorter regional runs. Within the last eight years, six 747 aircrafts have been acquired by your company to cater to increasing passenger and cargo t r a f f i c . Tour job is a key one in this organization. On you and your staff rests the responsibility for projecting the market share for cargo traffic that can be captured by North Star, planning the necessary advertising and other promotional a c t i v i t i e s to attain the sales targets, and then following through on sales of cargo space. This essentially involves creating and maintaining an image for North Star as a fast, economic, and safe carrier of cargo. Accurate estimates of future airfreight must be developed and cargo movements have to be planned ahead to be in line with the customers' needs and North Star's existing flight schedules. You perceive your role as central i n determining the success or failure of North Star. You have to work within the constraints provided by operations, finance, maintenance, and/or corporate affairs divisions either in terms of their stated capabilities to meet demands you would like to lay upon them with short notice or in terras of availability of aircrafts, capital resources, .manpower and government regulations. •- . Your job as the Manager (Cargo Division) is a difficult one due to several reasons. Firstly, Cargo division was established as a separate unit not long ago and hence i t is s t i l l experiencing some 'teething problems'. Secondly, cargo sales have increased rapidly in the past few years and this has necessitatedrcareful planning and optimal scheduling of available freight space and manpower. Finally, the cargo freight market is becoming increasingly competitive. Hence North Star has to maintain its good service and carefully plan its promotional activities to protect its share of the market. Your own position within the company is shown in the organization chart given in the next page. • <D § pr o CD 1 o •1 H-K'O <D CD •1 1 u co Mgr. Passenger Division Mgr. Cargo Division Mgr. Market Planning Mgr. Properties & Leases Mgr. Flight Scheduling o w o 1 o H , H) H* O CO co CO 1 p? CO Mgr. Customer Relations GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) Mgr. Industrial Relations GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) Mgr. Staff Recruiting &, training GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) Mgr. Budgets Division J_ Mgr. Accounting Division Mgr. Purchase & Stores Mgr. Payroll, Receipts, & Expenditures o 1 o H-O 0> 1 CO Mgr. Maintenance & Overhaul Mgr. Engineering & Management Systems 91Z 217 As may be seen in the chart, the airlines has five major functional divisions! Sales, Operations, Corporate and Customer Affairs, Finance, and Technical Services. In each of these divisions there are several hierarchical levels. Indeed, the entire organization can be thought of as a t a l l pyramid. As one descends through the hierarchy, one finds more limited information, less control over resources, and lower discretionary authority at each level. At the lower levels, each person's tasks are also more and more clearly defined by his or her superior. Everyone in the organization knows the limits of his or her authority, information, and ability. Once a person approaches this limit, his duty is to report to his superior. There is a procedural manual (called the "Airline Bible" by the staff) which delineates the specific powers, duties, and responsibilities of each member, from the canteen boy to the Executive Vice-President. The President issues directives and policy decisions to his subordinates periodically, who in turn pass on the relevant information to their subordinates. These directives are carefully followed by everyone in the organization. The strict use of chain of command is considered by management as one of its strong points since this provides a l l organizational members the knowledge of exactly what is expected of him/her. Methods of communication used by top management to inform subordinates about various•decisions include letters, memos, and directives. As far as possible, written communications are encouraged since this ensures the transmission of accurate information. Considerable emphasis is also given on receiving accurate upward communication from lower levels to enable top management to establish overall objectives and strategies. The five general managers (in charge.of the five functional areas) and their immediate subordinates exist as the fountain heads of a l l relevant information in their respective areas. Consequently, the senior managers issue commands and instructions frequently to their subordinates. This does not in the least interfere with sociable friendliness on an equal footing on the many occasions in which members of the staff and the managers meet each other outside the office. The members of the organization seem to accept instructions and commands as appropriate to work relationships but isolate these relationships from outside activities. Yet another strong point of North Star's organizational structure, according to its management, is the strict practice of the unity of command principle! that i s , each subordinate reports formally to only one superior. The number of subordinates reporting to each superior is small (ranging from 2 - ^ ) , thus enabling the superior to closely monitor his unit's performance. Such a structure also facilitates high task speciali-zation leading to high overall efficiency. The jobs of operating employees have limited range and deptht for example, each employee in the stores supply division issues only a limited category of supplies, sometimes as few as six to eight items. Management feels that this is one of the major reasons for the high efficiency of North Star in a l l its internal and external dealings. As one of the supervisors put its " At North Star everyone knows exactly what is to be done, how i t is to be done, and by what time i t is to be done. Many organizations become sluggish because its people do not know what to do or who is to make a particular decision. Here, we try our best to avoid any such occurences " North Star is decentralized to a very limited degree. A typical indicator of a company's decentralization is where the decisions concerning investment and manpower utilization are made. At North Star a l l crucial decisions are made by.the top management. The top management committee (consisting of the Executive V.P., five general managers, and two other senior managers) virtually controls the entire flow of decisions that involve major expenditures, investments, and securing and developing of manpower. This practice enables top management to react to crisis situations quickly. For instance, the efficiency and speed with which North Star was able to react to the 'fuel crisis' in 1 9 7 2 was mainly attributed to the centralized decision making within the airline. Indeed, North Star actively attempts to maintain its distinct identity in several areas which have been commonly neglected by other airlines. To give an example, considerable research was done before the airline chose the present uniform for a l l its employees coming in contact with the travelling public (including baggage movers). All such employees also wore a fairly expensive ( $ 2 3 ) golden star on their right hand side pocket with the sign "the five star service of North Star". The company has received several acclamatory letters from the public about the good appearance and manners of its employees. North Star intends to keep this good image and is insistent that none of its employees damages i t . The salary and benefits that North Star offers its employees are competitive and moving up in the organization is possible for an employee who is knowledgeable and loyal to the organization. The employees of North Star are. not unionized; The airline als"o sponsors hockey and football teams. North Star's hockey team won a consolation prize i n 1 9 7 5 winter sports in Yugoslavia. 218 APPENDIX 'Organic' description of the organization 219 NORTH STAR AIRLINES, CANADA Tou are Russell Hale, the Manager (Cargo Division) of North Star Airlines, Canada. The company was formed in the mid-50*s by merger of eight small regional and feeder a i r l i n e s under the leadership of an extremely dynamic pioneer of the Canadian air transport industry. North Star has i t s head offices and major operating ba3e in Montreal, with smaller operating bases i n Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, and Halifax. At the present time, the a i r l i n e services eastern Canada quite intensively and also operates transcontinental routes between Halifax and Vancouver with enroute services to each of the major intervening cities. By far, the greater part of the company's operation however, is overseas extending from north Africa through western Europe on the one hand, throughout the orient and into Australia and New Zealand on the other. Over the years, North Star has developed an outstanding reputation for safety, reliability, and customer service. The airline industry is both highly competitive and very much hemmed in by government regulations. Accordingly, i t takes lots of initiative and hardwork to stay in the game. Considering this fact, your company has been doing quite well: the rate of return on total investment for North Star had increased from 5% in the 60's to an average of 7f> in the f i r s t five years of the 70's and 6*i# in 1977. Until recently, the long distance mainstay of the fleet has been DC-8 and 727 aircrafts with 737 aircraft servicing the shorter regional runs. Within the last eight years, six 747 aircrafts have been acquired by your company to cater to increasing passenger and cargo traffic. Your job is a key one in this organization. On you and your staff rests the responsibility for projecting the market share for cargo traffic that can be captured by North Star, planning the necessary advertising and other promotional a c t i v i t i e s to attain the sales targets, and then following through on sales of cargo space. This essentially involves creating and maintaining an image for North Star as a fast, economic, and safe carrier of cargo. Accurate estimates of future airfreight must be developed and cargo movements have to be planned ahead to be in line with the customers1 needs and North Star's existing flight schedules. You perceive your role as central in determining the success or failure of North Star. You have to work within the constraints provided by operations, finance, maintenance, and/or corporate affairs divisions either in terms of their stated capabilities to meet demands you would like to lay upon thera with short notice or i n terras of availability of aircrafts, capital resources, .manpower and government regulations.' •— . • ' Your job as the Manager (Cargo Division) is a difficult one due to several reasons. Firstly, Cargo division was established as a separate unit not long ago and hence i t is s t i l l experiencing some 'teething problems'. Secondly, cargo sales have increased rapidly in the past few years and this has necessitatedrcareful planning and optimal scheduling of*available freight space and manpower. Finally, the cargo freight market is becoming increasingly competitive. Hence North Star has to maintain its good service and carefully plan its promotional activities to protect its share of the market. given^^^he^xt'page." 1^ 1- 1 ^ i S S h ° W n i n t h e organization chart a § 7? O co n o i •* CD CD CO CO Mgr. Passenger Division Mgr. Cargo Division Mgr. Market Planning Mgr. Properties & Leases Mgr. Flight Scheduling CD PC CO o 1 ?c CO •1 CO c S3 M* O 1 o H» H i H * O CD CO o M CD pr CO ac o •1 ?r a> •i co o •1 o O » CO Mgr. Customer Relations GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) Mgr. Industrial Relations GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) Mgr. Staff Recruiting & training GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) GENERAL MANAGER (Corporate & Customer affair) Mgr. Budgets Division J. Mgr. Accounting Division Mgr. Purchase & Stores Mgr. Payroll, Receipts, & Expenditures Mgr. Maintenance & Overhaul Mgr. Engineering & Management Systems OZZ 221 While the major functional areas have been identified and responsibilities allocated within the airlines, specific Job duties have been continuously changing in the past few years. In North Star, there is a deliberate attempt to avoid specifying individual tasks (especially at middle and lower management levels) and to discourage any dependence on the management hierarchy as the primary means of defining functions and authority. The general managerial philosophy at North Star is that the company should make the fullest use of the capabilities of its members; any individuals job should be as l i t t l e defined as possible so that i t will 'shape i t s e l f to his/her special abilities and initiative. At North Star, insistence on the least possible specification of managerial positions is much more in evidence than any devices for ensuring adequate interaction among organizational members. Interaction among the members did occur, but as a consequence of internal conditions rather than prescription by top management. Some of these conditions are physical; a two storeyed building houses the entire head office, one thousand strong, from maintenance units to the cafeteria. Access to anyone is therefore, physically simple and direct; i t is easier to meet some one in his /her office or the plant and talk to him or her personally than even to telephone. Written communications inside the office is never emphasized. Most of the messages are passed from one level to another and from one employee to another through personal interaction. Most important of a l l , however, is the need for each individual manager for interaction with others in order to get his own tasks and functions defined in the absence of specification from above. Whsn the position of Manager (Engineering & Management Systems) was created for example, the firs t incumbents had, according to them, find out what their job duties were, and what authority and resources were available to them. In fact, this process of 'finding out* about one's job seems to be unending. Managers' and staff's roles are continuously defined and refined in connection with specific tasks and as members of specific cooperative groups. This happens through a perpetual sequence of encounters with maintenance chiefs, who are in charge of routine maintenance and periodic overhaul of the planes; with accountants who provide the cost-benefit information on a l l activities; with personnel and public relations managers who identify the impact of alternative strategies cr, the staff and the public; with operations personnel who provide detailed information on availability of flights and flight crew; and the sales people who constantly monitor market developments. In every case, the manager whose responsibility i t is 'to see the job through' has to determine his or her responsibilities and those of others in the company through complex, though often brief negotiations in which the relevant information and technical knowledge possessed by them would have to be declared. As one of the managers put i t : "When I was made a manager I was told to get on with the job - was just told 'you'll start in on Monday', so I came in started. The rest was for me to find out. That was really a l l that was said..." An even more important characteristic of North Star is the communality of beliefs and a sense of common purpose held by a l l its members. While a hierarchy of management does exist, positions are defined almost entirely in terms of technical expertise and not on the basis of formal power. There is a very high degree of decentralization at North Star: many of the important decisions are made at the middle and lower levels of the management hierarchy. Thus i t is not uncommon to see a supervisor in the maintenance plant deciding on the annual overhaul schedules for the aricraft, of course after consulting sales, finance, operations, and other staff on a personal basis. His own boss is more likely to provide advice and support than firm instructions. The underlying assumption is that the person who does a job knows more than any one else about i t . The emphasis is on 'doing the job well' and once the job is taken care of nobody raises any questions. North Star has been a progressive employer from the point of view of its staff. The salaries that i t pays are competitive and moving up the organization is possible for the competent employee. The employees of North Star are not unionized. The company also organizes frequent training programs which its managers and staff alike attend. North Star also encourages its staff to join professional bodies and pays a percentage of a l l annual dues to such institutions. The company also sponsors i t s own hockey and football teams. North Star*s hockey team won a consolation prize in the 1 9 7 5 Winter sports in Yugoslavia. 222 APPENDIX - 5" Items i n Budner S c a l e f o r measuring i n t o l e r a n c e of ambiguity 223 1. An expert who doesn't come up w i t h a d e f i n i t e answer pr o b a b l y doesn't know too much. 2. There i s r e a l l y no such t h i n g as a problem t h a t can't be s o l v e d . 3. A good job i s one where what i s to be done and how i t i s to be done are always c l e a r . 4. In the long run i t i s p o s s i b l e to get more done by t a c k l i n g s m a l l , simple problems r a t h e r than l a r g e and complicated ones. 5. What we are used to i s always p r e f e r a b l e to what i s u n f a m i l i a r . 6. A person who leads an even, r e g u l a r l i f e i n which few s u r p r i s e s or unexpected happenings a r i s e , r e a l l y has a l o t to be g r a t e f u l f o r . 7. I l i k e p a r t i e s where I know most of the people more than ones where a l l or most of the people are complete s t r a n g e r s . 8. The sooner we a l l a c q u i r e s i m i l a r v a l u e s and i d e a l s the b e t t e r . 9. I would l i k e to l i v e i n a f o r e i g n country f o r a w h i l e . 10. People who f i t t h e i r l i v e s to a schedule probably miss most of the j o y of l i v i n g . 11. I t i s more fun to t a c k l e a complicated problem than to s o l v e a simple one. 12. Often the most i n t e r e s t i n g and s t i m u l a t i n g people are those who don't mind being d i f f e r e n t and o r i g i n a l . 13. People who: i n s i s t upon a yes or no answer j u s t don't know how complicated t h i n g s r e a l l y a r e . 14. Many o f our most important d e c i s i o n s are based on s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . Please see f o l l o w i n g page 224 15. Teachers or s u p e r v i s o r s who hand out vague assignments g i v e a chance f o r one to show i n i t i a t i v e and o r i g i n a l i t y . 16. A good teacher i s one who makes you wonder about your way of l o o k i n g a t t h i n g s . APPENDIX 6 Measure of Role i d e n t i t y dur simulation 2 2 6 I.D. #• To what extend c o u l d you i d e n t i f y y o u r s e l f w i t h the r o l e o f Manager (Cargo D i v i s i o n ) d u r i n g the s i m u l a t i o n ? Very l i t t l e Moderately Very much APPENDIX 7 -A, Q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r measuring p e r c e i v e d d e c i s i o n importance 228 I n t h e p r e v i o u s p a g e s , y o u r e a d s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s . P l e a s e r a t e e a c h d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g s c a l e t o i n d i c a t e how i m p o r t a n t y o u t h i n k i t i s . I m p o r t a n c e o f t h e d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n D e c i s i o n < N o t a t ( N o t > S l i g h t l y i Somewhat • V e r y s i t u a t i o n a l l i m p o r t a n t i m p o r t a n t i m p o r t a n t i m p o r t a n t number i m p o r t a n t 1 2 3 4 5 APPENDIX 7-B Q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r measuring p e r c e i v e d d e c i s i o n complexity 230 The d e c i s i o n environments c o n f r o n t i n g the managers are some times complex i n terms of both the sheer m u l t i p l i c i t y of f a c t o r s to be c o n s i d e r e d and the i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s among these f a c t o r s . R e c r u i t i n g a work s u p e r v i s o r , f o r example, i n v o l v e s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n of a g r e a t many cand i d a t e s , both w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n and from o u t s i d e . Each candidate must be c o n s i d e r e d i n the l i g h t of a v a r i e t y of c a p a b i l i t i t i e s , f o r example, i n t e l l i g e n c e , education, experience, s k i l l s , e t c . , which are i n g e n e r a l . h i g h l y i n t e r - r e l a t e d . In other words, s e l e c t i o n d e c i s i o n s are i n g e n e r a l , q u i t e complex i n nature. I would a p p r e c i a t e i f you w i l l spend the next few minutes r a t i n g each d e c i s i o n f o r i t s complexity. The s c a l e to be.used i s g i v e n below which i s s e l f e xplanatory. Degree of complexity D e c i s i o n Very Not complex S l i g h t l y Somewhat Very s i t u a t i - simple (or simple) complex complex complex on number 1 2 3 4 5 APPENDIX 7-C Q u e s t i o n n a i r e used f o r measuring p e r c e i v e d d e c i s i o n u n c e r t a i n t y 232 T y p i c a l l y , managerial d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n v a r y w i d e l y i n terms ; of the u n c e r t a i n t y surrounding the d e c i s i o n maker. The d e c i s i o n maker may or may not know about the exact nature of the problem, consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n , a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s , and the c o n s t r a i n t s f a c i n g him/her. Thus some of the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s are c e r t a i n w h i l e others are not. In the l a t t e r cases there i s a l a c k of a p p r o p r i a t e i n f o r m a t i o n about v a r i o u s f a c t o r s on the p a r t of the d e c i s i o n maker. I would a p p r e c i a t e i f you w i l l spend the next few minutes r a t i n g each of the d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s ( d e s c r i b e d i n p r e v i o u s pages) f o r i t s c e r t a i n t y . The s c a l e to be used i s g i v e n below: Degree of U n c e r t a i n t y D e c i s i o n Very C e r t a i n Somewhat Moderately Very s i t u a t i - c e r t a i n u n c e r t a i n u n c e r t a i n u n c e r t a i n on number APPENDIX 8 Instrument used f o r g e t t i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s g l o b a l assessment of the o r g a n i z a t i o n 234 There are two major types of organizations: 'Mechanistic' and 'Organic'. Mechanistic organizations are character-ized by c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of control and authority, high degree of task s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , presence of many rules and regulations within the organization, and use of v e r t i c a l l i n e s of communications. Organic organizations on the other hand, exhibit high decentralization of deci sion making power, control, and authority, use of both horizontal and v e r t i c a l l i n e s of communications within the organization, presence of few formal rules, high degree of task interdependence, and continued changes i n the roles of organizational members. Based on your understanding of North Star, would you c a l l i t (Check one) Mechanistic OR Organic I . D . # 235 APPENDIX 9 M u l t i v a r i a t e and univariate analysis of variance - a note 236 A w i t h i n - s u b j e c t s or repeated measures design was used i n the presen t study to p r o v i d e c o n t r o l f o r i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s among the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the study. T h i s experimental d e s i g n p r o v i d e s more powerful t e s t s of w i t h i n - s u b j e c t s f a c t o r ( s ) when such i n t e r - s u b j e c t v a r i a b i l i t y i s hi g h . On the other hand, t h i s d e sign a l s o i n t r o d u c e s i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among the means on which the t e s t s o f both the main e f f e c t s and i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s among the w i t h i n - s u b j e c t s f a c t o r s are b a s e d . ( H a r r i s , 1975). A l s o , as more and more i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e f a c t o r s are brought i n t o the design, the s t a t i s t i c a l power of the a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e t e s t s a l s o decreases (Johnson, 1977). In o r g a n i z a t i o n a l behavior -• r e s e a r c h M u l t i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s of V a r i a n c e model (MANOVA) i s g e t t i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y popular because of i t s h i g h s t a t i s t i c a l power even when a n a l y z i n g s e v e r a l dependent v a r i a b l e s . MANOVA i s a l s o e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l when the dependent v a r i a b l e s are h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h each other. In such a case, a simple u n i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e (ANOVA) w i l l show more or l e s s i d e n t i c a l r e s u l t s f o r a l l dependent v a r i a b l e s . For example, i f X-^  and X£ are two dependent v a r i a b l e s which are h i g h l y i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d , then those independent v a r i a b l e s or treatments which have a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on X-^  w i l l a l s o tend to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e l a t e d to X£• Th i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g , as the second r e s u l t f o l l o w s more or l e s s (depending on the amount of c o r r e l a t i o n ) from the f i r s t . With separate ANOVA f o r each dependent 237 v a r i a b l e i t would not be known how much the r e s u l t s are d u p l i c a t i n g each other (Van de Geer, 1971). The approach taken by MANOVA however i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . Assume th e r e a re two dependent v a r i a b l e s , X-^  and X^, so t h a t a l l the a v a i l a b l e o b s e r v a t i o n s can be re p r e s e n t e d i n the ( X p X 2 ) plane. I f there are 'm' d i f f e r e n t treatments, the p o i n t s w i l l f a l l i n t o 'm' d i f f e r e n t subgroups. Imagine t h a t p o i n t s are drawn f o r 'm' subgroup averages. Then i f the 'm' subgroups are sampled from the same p o p u l a t i o n ( t h i s i s the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s ) , spread among the subgroup averages should be w i t h i n l i m i t s t h a t are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the spread of p o i n t s w i t h i n each of ' 1 ' subgroups. In other words, a co n f i d e n c e r e g i o n f o r the subgroup means i s s e t up so t h a t i f the means s c a t t e r o u t s i d e t h i s r e g i o n , the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s w i l l be r e j e c t e d . To r e j e c t the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s (at a chosen l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e ) what needs to be shown i s t h a t there i s a t l e a s t one v e c t o r of v a r i a b l e s i n the plane such t h a t the v a r i a n c e between the means p r o j e c t e d on i t r e l a t i v e to v a r i a n c e w i t h i n subgroups exceeds the c r i t i c a l r a t i o (Van de Geer, 1971). In MANOVA the a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t i s t i c t h e r e f o r e i s to take the v e c t o r f o r which t h i s r a t i o o f v a r i a n c e between means to v a r i a n c e w i t h i n groups i s maximum. Obviously, I f even t h i s l a r g e s t , r a t i o does n o t , r e a c h s i g n i f i c a n c e , t h e r e w i l l ' b e no ground f o r r e j e c t i n g the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s . I f the r a t i o i s l a r g e enough to permit r e j e c t i o n of the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s , search f o r another v e c t o r orthogonal to the f i r s t w i l l be made and a s i m i l a r t e s t a p p l i e d to the r a t i o o f v a r i a n c e s . Instead of t e s t i n g a r a t i o of 238 v a r i a n c e estimates, t e s t o f r a t i o of sums o f squares may a l s o be made. In the l a t t e r case, the s o l u t i o n becomes i d e n t i c a l to c a n o n i c a l d i s c r i m i n a n t a n a l y s i s . The above should not be construed to mean t h a t MANOVA i s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a l l o c c a s i o n s . Quite o f t e n the computational procedures f o r MANOVA are q u i t e complicated and the a d d i t i o n a l s t a t i s t i c a l power gained may not be worth the e f f o r t . A l s o when 'compound symmetry' of the p o p u l a t i o n from which the data i s sampled does e x i s t , w i t h i n - s u b j e c t s ANOVA pr o v i d e s more powerful t e s t s o f the e f f e c t s of t r e a t -ments than MANOVA ( H a r r i s , 1975). A c c o r d i n g to Box (1949, 1950) 'compound symmetry' e x i s t s when a l l main d i a g o n a l elements of the v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e m a t r i x are equal to a common v a l u e and a l l o f i t s o f f - d i a g o n a l elements are equal to a second, lower common v a l u e . Box's M s t a t i s t i c f o r homogeneity of v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e m a t r i c e s i s a f u n c t i o n o f the sample s i z e , the estimated v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e m a t r i x i n the i t h c e l l , and the pooled v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e matrix. The n u l l h y p o thesis o f homogeneity o f va r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n a c e m a t r i c e s can be accepted or r e j e c t e d depending upon the l e v e l at which M i s s i g n i f i c a n t . In the case of m u l t i v a r i a t e r e g r e s s i o n and the m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e and co v a r i a n c e , i t i s o f t e n important to determine whether the c o v a r i a n c e m a t r i c e s o f s e v e r a l p o p u l a t i o n s are equal. Suppose i t i s found t h a t the cov a r i a n c e m a t r i c e s are not equal, then many of the standard m u l t i v a r i a t e models w i l l not apply (Press, 1972; page 176-178). In the u n i v a r i a t e case, i f the v a r i a n c e s are unequal but not too d i f f e r e n t , 239 the t e s t procedures w i l l s t i l l g e n e r a l l y be a p p l i c a b l e . The a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of MANOVA i s a l s o t e s t e d by B a r t l e t t ' s t e s t o f s p h e r i c i t y ( B a r t l e t t , 1950). The B a r t l e t t t e s t assesses the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s H Q t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x o f 'q' measurements i s an i d e n t i t y m a t r i x (or, t h a t the v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e m a t r i x i s a di a g o n a l matrix) versus the a l t e r n a t i v e h y p o t h e s i s H t h a t a t l e a s t one c o r r e l a t i o n or .: a c o v a r i a n c e i s not equal to zero. The B a r t l e t t ' s i s a f u n c t i o n o f the e r r o r c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x and f o l l o w s the l a r g e sample c h i - s q u a r e d d i s t r i b u t i o n w i t h q ( q - l ) / 2 degrees o f freedom ( B a r t l e t t , 1950; Morrison, 1976). I f the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s H Q i s t r u e , the dependent v a r i a b l e s are orthogonal to each other and the u n i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e on each of the dependent v a r i a b l e s i s more a p p r o p r i a t e than the m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e . F i n a l l y , the r a t i o between maximum v a r i a n c e and minimum v a r i a n c e among 'q' measurements can be used as an i n d i c a t i o n o f the ap p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f a p p l y i n g MANOVA to the data. T h i s s t a t i s t i c ( c a l l e d F-max c r i t e r i o n ) developed by Pearson and H a r t l e y i s computed t o t e s t the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s o f homogeneity of v a r i a n c e among 'q' measurements(Pearson & H a r t l e y , 1958; Bock, 1975; Morrison, 1976). R e j e c t i o n of the n u l l h y p othesis H Q i n d i c a t e s t h a t the u n i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e i s a p p r o p r i a t e ; otherwise, the m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e i s to be p r e f e r r e d . 240 S i g n i f i c a n c e T e s t s : The F - t e s t of s i g n i f i c a n c e i n ANOVA i s to compare the r a t i o o f mean treatment sum-of-squares (MST) to mean e r r o r sum-of-squares (MSE). T h i s r a t i o i s used to t e s t the n u l l h y p o thesis of i d e n t i c a l means of d i f f e r e n t experimental groups. In MANOVA however, the treatment sum-of-squares i s a q X q m a t r i x (where, q= number of response v a r i a b l e s ) . T h i s w i l l be c a l l e d h e n c e f o r t h the 'hypothesis sum of products' (or, the H m a t r i x ) . The m u l t i v a r i a t e analogue of MSE i s a q X q ma t r i x o f e r r o r sum-of-squares and cr o s s products (or, the E m a t r i x ) . The m u l t i v a r i a t e analogue of F i s a r a t i o of the determinants o f H and E m a t r i c e s and i s u s u a l l y expressed i n terms of the eige n v a l u e s (or, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r o o t s of HE"). The s p e c i f i c s i g n i f i c a n c e t e s t s used f o r MANOVA and ANOVA are b r i e f l y o u t l i n e d below. MANOVA There are three popular c r i t e r i a used f o r t e s t s of s i g n i f i c a n c e of treatment e f f e c t s , namely, Wilks Lambda, H o t e l l i n g ' s t r a c e c r i t e r i o n , and P i l l a i ' s c r i t e r i o n . A l l three c r t i e r i a w i l l g i v e s i n g l e p r o b a b i l i t y statements to r e j e c t or accept n u l l h y p o t hesis of no treatment e f f e c t s . Wilks Lambda Wilks Lambda ( a l s o c a l l e d the U s t a t i s t i c ) i s gi v e n by the f o l l o w i n g formula: 241 s n i =i 1 + where A = Wilk s ' Lambda X E i g e n v a l u e s T o t a l number of ei g e n v a l u e s Lambda i s a f a m i l y o f three parameter curves, w i t h parameters based on the number of groups, the number of s u b j e c t s and the number of elements i n the v e c t o r v a r i a b l e . I t may be noted here t h a t Wilks (1932) d e s c r i b e d Lambda i n the context of a m u l t i v a r i a t e 2 g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f F i s h e r ' s c o r r e l a t i o n r a t i o ( n ) Wilks ' r e l a t i o n was: A = 1 - n 2 H o t e l l i n g ' s t r a c e s t a t i s t i c : T h i s i s based on the sum of eigen v a l u e s and g i v e n by: s T = E X where, T = H o t e l l i n g ' s Trace s t a t i s t i c s = T o t a l number of eigen v a l u e s = E i g e n v a l u e s X MANOVA transforms H o t e l l i n g ' s c r i t e r i o n i n t o an approximate F - r a t i o . 2 4 2 P i l l a i ' s c r i t e r i o n : T h i s i s g i v e n by: 6 x = l 1+ A i where, s 6 = P i l l a i ' s c r i t e r i o n = T o t a l number of e i g e n v a l u e s = E i g e n v a l u e s T h i s i s again transformed i n t o an approximate F - r a t i o and t e s t e d f o r s i g n i f i c a n c e . For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s on these s t a t i s t i c s , the reader i s r e f e r r e d to Bock (1975), M o r r i s o n (1976) and Tatuoka (1971). In the p r e s e n t study a l l three s t a t i s t i c s were used f o r t e s t i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of F. There are s e v e r a l t e s t s a p p r o p r i a t e f o r A - p o s t e r i o r i c o n t r a s t s . An A - p o s t e r i o r i c o n t r a s t t e s t i s a symmetric procedure f o r comparing a l l p o s s i b l e p a i r s of group means (Nie, H u l l , J e n k i n s , Steinbrenner & Bent, 1975). The groups are d i v i d e d i n t o homogenous subsets, where the d i f f e r e n c e i n the means of any two groups i n a subset i s not s t a t i s t i c a l l y ANOVA 243 s i g n i f i c a n t at a d e s i r e d l e v e l . Seven popular t e s t s e x i s t today only two of which w i l l be mentioned here. The i n t e r e s t e d reader i s r e f e r r e d to Nie e t . a l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , K i r k (1968), and Winer (1971) f o r a more exhaustive d i s c u s s i o n on these and other t e s t s . Duncan's t e s t : T h i s t e s t s the d i f f e r e n c e s between group means by u s i n g a d i f f e r e n t range v a l u e f o r subsets of d i f f e r e n t s i z e s . The Duncan's t e s t uses the concept of a s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n l e v e l r a t h e r than a s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l : the p r o b a b i l i t y of f i n d i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e g i v e n t h a t the two groups are i n f a c t equal, i s l e s s than or equal to the s p e c i f i e d s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l . When u s i n g t h i s t e s t i t must be borne i n mind that the l a r g e r the p o t e n t i a l subset, the l a r g e r the d i f f e r e n c e i n means r e q u i r e d to be d e c l a r e d s i g n i f i c a n t by t h i s procedure. The Duncan's t e s t can be used whether or not the a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e i s s i g n i f i c a n t ; Duncan's t e s t i s however o n l y approximate i f the groups are v e r y unequal i n s i z e . The S c h e f f e t e s t : The S c h e f f e t e s t uses a s i n g l e range v a l u e f o r a l l comparisons of group means. Hence, t h i s t e s t i s a p p r o p r i a t e even f o r examining a l l p o s s i b l e l i n e a r combinations of group means, not j u s t p a i r wise comparisons. T h i s t e s t i s s t r i c t e r than most other t e s t s and i s exact even f o r unequal group s i z e s . 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0094804/manifest

Comment

Related Items