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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The determinants of collective bargaining strategy in the British Columbia hospital industry Lambert, Paul Gerald 1979

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c.l THE DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY IN THE HOSPITAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BRITISH. COLUMBIA INDUSTRY by PAUL GERALD LAMBERT B.Sc. , Y o r k U n i v e r s i t y , 1971 B . S c , U n i v e r s i t y of G u e l p h , 1973 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF : MASTER OF SCIENCE in BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Commerce) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA O c t o b e r , 1979 © P a u l G e r a l d L a mbert, 1979 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . It i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of Commerce The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date August 1, 1980 i i A B. S T R A C T The t He's i s a t t e m p t s t o i l l u s t r a t e , t h r o u g h th e c a s e s t u d y approach., t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c r i t e r i a * d e s c r i b e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Based on, a r e v i e w of t h e l i t e r a t u r e a model i s p r e s e n t e d i n w h i c h s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a n t s a r e i d e n t i f i e d u nder the g e n e r a l h e a d i n g s o f P o l i t c a l and Economic C l i m a t e ; R e l a t i v e Power of t h e B a r g a i n i n g P a r t i e s ; B a r g a i n i n g S t r u c t u r e and I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; P a r t y O b j e c t i v e s ; L e g i s l a t i o n ; I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s ; and, P e r s o n a l i t y . The c a s e s t u d i e d i s t h e b a r g a i n i n g f o r t h e 1976-77 M a s t e r Agreement between the H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 180, and t h e H e a l t h L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n r e p r e s e n t i n g the h o s p i t a l s of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . In o r d e r t o put t h e c a s e i n t o p e r s p e c t i v e , a d i s c u s s i o n of h o s p i t a l e c o n o m i c s i s p r e s e n t e d . As w e l l , t h e o t h e r l a b o u r a s s o c i a t i o n s i n the h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y a r e i n t r o -d u ced, as i s t h e l e g i s l a t i o n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s d i s -c u s s e d . W h i l e the s t u d y of a s i n g l e c a s e p r o h i b i t s v a l i d g e n e r a l -i z a t i o n s t o o t h e r b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s , i t would appear t h a t p o l i t i c a l d e t e r m i n a n t s most a f f e c t the c h o i c e of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y . T A B L E 0 }<" C O N T E N T S . TITLE PAGE. i ABSTRACT i i TABLE OF CONTENTS i i i LIST OF FIGURES V ACKNOWLEDGEMENT v i I INTRODUCTION 1 I I THE DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY 9 - Tnterorganizational Relationships 11 Relative Power of the Bargaining P a r t i e s 23 Economic and P o l i t i c a l Climate 34 Pe r s o n a l i t i e s and Personality Perception 43 Tnsti.tuti.onal C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 46 Party Objectives 50 L e g i s l a t i o n 53 III BACKGROUND TO THE H..E.U./H..L.R.A. MASTER AGREEMENT 61 Hosp i t a l Economics 61 The Registered Nurses' Association of Bxitish. Columbia 64 Health. Sciences Association of B r i t i s h Columbia 65 International Union of Operating Engineers 68 The Professional Association of Residents and Interns 69 The Hospital Employees' Union 70 The Health. Labour, Relations Association 72 L e g i s l a t i o n 77 IV A CASE STUDY; BARGAINING FOR THE H..E.U./H..L.R.A. 1976-77 MASTER AGREEMENT 85 The Events 85 Determinants of Strategy: H..E.U. 97 Early Strategy 97 Later Strategy 106 Determinants of Strategy; H.L.R.A. 112 Early Strategy 112 Later Strategy 123 i v V CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 128 Interorganizational Relationships 129 Relative Power of the Bargaining Parties; 132 Economic and P o l i t i c a l Climate 134 P e r s o n a l i t i e s and Personality Perception 137 I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 138 Party Objectives; 139. L e g i s l a t i o n 140 C l o s i n g Comments 142 BIBLIOGRAPHY 148 L I S T O F F T G U R E S 1. Determinants of Strategy 10 2. Settlement Range 15 3. Settlement Gap 16 4. A l t e r i n g Union P e r c e p t i o n of Management's Resistance Point 18 5. S h i f t of Union's Resistance Point Toward Management's Target Point 18 6. I n t e g r a t i v e Payoff Matrix 20 7. High Bas i c Power P o s i t i o n - One Party Only 26 8. High Bas i c Power P o s i t i o n - Both P a r t i e s 26 9. Ba r g a i n i n g Power to Party A 28 10. P e r c e i v e d Power 28. 11. Groups Included i n Health Sciences A s s o c i a t i o n 67 12. Steps to 1976-77 Master Agreement 87 13. E a r l y S t r a t e g y : H.E.U. 98 14. E a r l y S t r a t e g y : H.L.R.A. 114 v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e t o thank Dr. A l l e n Ponak, Chairman of the T h e s i s Committee, f o r h i s h e l p f u l s u g g e s t i o n s , c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m , and u n w a v e r i n g p a t i e n c e o v e r the e x t e n d e d p e r i o d of t i m e r e q u i r e d by my u n o r t h o d o x work h a b i t s t o c o m p l e t e t h i s p r o j e c t . I would a l s o l i k e t o thank Dr. A l b e r t D e x t e r and Dr. Mark Thompson f o r t h e i r i n p u t i n t o the f i n i s h e d p r o d u c t . Thanks must a l s o go t o P a t , S h a r , Toby, J u l i e , J a n e , and L e s l e y , whose combined and c o n t i n u a l s u p p o r t made the c o m p l e t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s b o t h p o s s i b l e and n e c e s s a r y . 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The p u r p o s e of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o i n v e s t i g a t e and a n a l y z e t h o s e f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g the c h o i c e o f s t r a t e g i e s and t a c t i c s t a k e n d u r i n g c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g : i . e . , the d e t e r -m i n a n t s of s t r a t e g y . The f o c u s w i l l be on t h e l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s s c e n e i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ' s h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y . A d e t a i l e d r e -v i e w of the d e t e r m i n a n t s of s t r a t e g y w i l l be p r e s e n t e d , f o l l o w e d by a r e v i e w o f t h e l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s s i t u a t i o n i n the h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , c u l m i n a t i n g i n an a n a l y s i s of the n e g o t i a t i o n s l e a d i n g t o the 1976-1977 H.E.U./E.L.R.A. M a s t e r Agreement. Based l a r g e l y on a r e v i e w of t h e l i t e r a t u r e , a model i s d e v e l o p e d i n C h a p t e r Two i n w h i c h s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a n t s a r e i d e n -t i f i e d under t h e g e n e r a l h e a d i n g s of P o l i t i c a l and Economic C l i m a t e ( e . g . e f f e c t of i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n p o l i t i c s , government p o l i c i e s , i n f l a t i o n , unemployment, and r e c e n t l a b o u r s e t t l e m e n t s ) ; R e l a t i v e Power of the B a r g a i n i n g P a r t i e s Ce.g. a b i l i t y of e i t h e r s i d e t o impose i t s demands on, or t o d e f l e c t t h o s e of t h e o t h e r s i d e ) ; B a r g a i n i n g S t r u c t u r e and I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Ce.g. o r g a n i z a t i o n of b o t h the u n i o n and e m p l o y e r s .agents , f i n a n c -i n g , . m u l t i r r e m p l o y e r v e r s u s s i n g l e e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g ) ; P a r t y O b j e c t i v e s ; L e g i s l a t i o n (.e.g. the e f f e c t of t h i r d - p a r t y i n t e r -v e n t i o n , e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s l e g i s l a t i o n , and t h e A n t i - I n f l a t i o n B o a r d ) ; I n t e r o r g a n i z a t l o n a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s ( e . g . c h o i c e o f p r o b l e m 2 r e s o l u t i o n p r o c e s s , p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e of t h e b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ) ; and, f i n a l l y , N e g o t i a t o r s ' P e r s o n a l i t i e s . The model d e v e l o p e d i n C h a p t e r Two i s t h e n used t o a n a l y z e the s t r a t e g i e s employed by t h e H o s p i t a l Employees U n i o n , L o c a l 180, and t h e H e a l t h L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n d u r i n g the b a r g a i n i n g f o r t h e i r 1976-1977 M a s t e r Agreement. B e f o r e a t t e m p t -i n g a m e a n i n g f u l d i s c u s s i o n of the a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , , however, t h e r e a r e a few b a c k g r o u n d f e a t u r e s of the h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y t h a t w i l l r e q u i r e some d i s c u s s i o n : f o r example, the u n i o n s a r e n o t d e a l i n g w i t h an e m p l o y e r but r a t h e r an e m p l o y e r s ' a s s o c i a t i o n ; t h e e m p l o y e r i s a p u b l i c l y f i n a n c e d p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y ; t h e i n d u s t r y i s n o n - p r o f i t ; t h e e m p l o y e r has l i t t l e or no c o n t r o l o v e r th e o p e r a t i n g budget t o be r e c e i v e d by the i n d u s t r y d u r i n g the l i f e of any p a r t i c u l a r agreement; the h o s p i t a l s a r e h e l d i n p o s i t i o n s of s p e c i a l s t a t u s i n the minds of the p u b l i c ; and so on. A l l o f t h e s e f a c t o r s a f f e c t the c h o i c e of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . C h a p t e r T h r e e a t t e m p t s t o d i s c u s s t h e above f a c t o r s as b a c k g r o u n d m a t e r i a l t o t h e a n a l y s i s of the 1976-77 b a r g a i n i n g r o u n d . Key e l e m e n t s of the e c o n o m i c s of h o s p i t a l o p e r a t i o n a r e i d e n t i f i e d as i s the h i s t o r y of t h e l a b o u r movement w i t h i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y . The l a b o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y a r e i d e n t i f i e d and t h e f i v e major o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e d i s c u s s e d at some length.. F o r e ach of the f i v e , a t t e n t i o n i s g i v e n t o t h e i r f o r m a t i o n and d e v e lopment w i t h i n t h e h o s p i t a l s , t h e i r p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n , and i n d i v i d u a l p r o b l e m a r e a s . The u n i o n s ' r i v a l r i e s o v e r b a r g a i n i n g r i g h t s f o r c e r t a i n j o b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s a r e t o u c h e d upon, as i s the p o s s i b l e e v o l u t i o n of m e d i c a l u n i o n s . 3 The e m p l o y e r s ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , t h e H e a l t h L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t o n , i s a l s o i n t r o d u c e d i n C h a p t e r T h r e e . The d i s c u s s i o n p r o v i d e s an h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e t o the growth of the l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s f u n c t i o n i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , from b a r g a i n i n g as i n d i v i d u a l h o s p i t a l s , t o i n f o r m a l group b a r g a i n i n g w i t h the B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a H o s p i t a l s ' A s s o c i a t i o n , to p r o v i n c e - w i d e b a r g a i n i n g by an a c c r e d i t e d b a r g a i n i n g a g e n t . The l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e bounds w i t h i n w h i c h c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g can t a k e p l a c e i s a l s o p r e s e n t e d . The f o c u s of t h e d i s c u s s i o n i s on t h e L a b o u r Code of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a (1973, s e c o n d s e s s i o n as amended). I t i s the L a b o u r Code w h i c h g i v e s l e g a l a t t e n t i o n t o the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l w o r k e r s t o j o i n u n i o n s and t o b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y . The Code's s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n s f o r e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s ( p r i o r t o the e nactment of t h e E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s : A c t , 19 77) when e n f o r c e d c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y l i m i t the e x e r c i s i n g of c e r t a i n of t h o s e r i g h t s . The Code, however, does not p r o v i d e any r u l e s or g u i d e l i n e s f o r the p r o c e s s of b a r g a i n i n g , o u t s i d e of the s i n g l e c r i t e r i o n t h a t i t be c o n d u c t e d i n "good f a i t h . " F u r t h e r m o r e , i n s e v e r a l d e c i s i o n s the B.C. L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d has c l e a r l y a d o p t e d a " l a i s s e z -f a i r e " a p p r o a c h t o b a r g a i n i n g b e h a v i o u r . ' 1 C h a p t e r F o u r d e s c r i b e s t h e 1976-77 M a s t e r Agreement b a r -g a i n i n g betwe en t h e H e a l t h L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n and the H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e l e t t e r of i n t e n t t o s t a r t n e g o t i a t i o n s and e n d i n g w i t h the s i g n i n g of the m a s t e r agreement. The f o c u s of t h e a n a l y s i s i s on t h o s e f a c t o r s w h i c h i n f l u e n c e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of s t r a t e g y t a k e n , and t a c t i c s u s e d , d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g . The n e g o t a t i o n s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g 4 to study i n that they were the f i r s t b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s i n v o l v -ing a newly a c c r e d i t e d employers' agent; they i n v o l v e d not only the c a l l i n g of mediation s e r v i c e s , but a l s o the appointment of an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission, and the f u r t h e r appointment of a S p e c i a l Mediator; they were one of the f i r s t to come under the s c r u t i n y of the f e d e r a l A n t i - I n f l a t i o n Board; they i n v o l v e d s t r i k e a c t i o n and the subsequent use of e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s l e g -i s l a t i o n ; and, l a s t l y , ended with an imposed agreement based not on a r b i t r a t i o n but through O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l . Chapter Four i s based almost e n t i r e l y on i n t e r v i e w s and d i s c u s s i o n s h e l d between t h i s w r i t e r and the s t a f f of both the H o s p i t a l Employees' Union and the Health Labour R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g the n e g o t i a t o r s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n the 1976-77 c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . D i s c u s s i o n s were a l s o h e l d with b a r g a i n i n g committee members, h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , and other unions' l e a d e r s . These i n t e r v i e w s and d i s c u s s i o n s were h e l d at v a r i o u s times over a p e r i o d of approximately two and one-half years, the f i n a l meetings taking place i n May, 1980. Of those quoted d i r e c t l y , a number wished t h e i r comments to remain anonymous; thus, sources throughout t h i s chapter w i l l be i d e n t i f i e d as f o l l o w s : 1. Union n e g o t i a t o r - the union s t a f f member respon-sible f o r the d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s of the b a r g a i n i n g committee. 2. Union spokesman - the union s t a f f member a s s i s t i n g the n e g o t i a t o r i n drawing up demands, developing s t r a t e g i e s 5 and t a c t i c s , and c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e r e s e a r c h f u n c t i o n . 3. U n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e - a u n i o n s t a f f member who p r o v i d e d i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m v a r i o u s m i n u t e s , c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , and P r o v i n c i a l Wage C o n f e r e n c e n o t e s . 4 . H..L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r - the H.L.R.A. s t a f f p e r s o n r e s p o n s -i b l e f o r t h e d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s of t h e b a r g a i n i n g c ommittee. 5 . H.L.R.A. b a r g a i n i n g - a h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r who too k committee member p a r t i n n e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n s . 6. H o s p i t a l A d m i n i s t r a t o r - an E.L.R.A. B o a r d member who d i d not s i t on the b a r g a i n i n g commit-t e e . The c h a p t e r i s p r e s e n t e d as a c a s e s t u d y . I t i s d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e s e c t i o n s : 1. E v e n t s 2. D e t e r m i n a n t s of s t r a t e g y : E.E.U. 3. D e t e r m i n a n t s of s t r a t e g y : H..L.R.A. The f i r s t s e c t i o n i s d e v e l o p e d as a c h r o n o l o g i c a l r e p o r t of the e v e n t s t h a t l e a d to the s i g n i n g of t h e M a s t e r Agreement. T h i s s e c t i o n e x p l a i n s what happened d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g . No a t t e m p t i s made to e x p l a i n why e v e n t s happened, l e a v i n g t h a t t o t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s . The s e c o n d and t h i r d s e c t i o n s d e s c r i b e and a n a l y z e t h o s e f a c t o r s w h i c h d e t e r m i n e d t h e s t r a t e g i e s c h o s e n by H.E.U. and H. L.R.A.. The d e t e r m i n a n t s a r e p r e s e n t e d as th e y were p e r c e i v e d , 6 r i g h t l y o r w r o n g l y , by t h e n e g o t i a t o r s and o t h e r s a t t h e t i m e t h e s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s were made. An a t t e m p t has b e e n made, how-e v e r , t o i d e n t i f y t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s i n t e r m s of t h e m o d e l d e v e l -oped i n C h a p t e r Two. C h a p t e r F i v e p r o v i d e s some c o n c l u d i n g , comments and d i s -c u s s i o n . I t compares what a c t u a l l y h a p p e n e d i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r -g a i n i n g w i t h what t h e m o d e l s u g g e s t s . As t h e c o m p a r i s o n s a r e made on t h e b a s i s of o n l y one c a s e s t u d y , no g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c -a b l e c o n c l u s i o n s c a n be r e a c h e d . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e c a s e s t u d y c a n be u s e d t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e manner i n w h i c h d e t e r m i n a n t s can be p e r c e i v e d , and why, u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , some d e t e r -m i n a n t s w i e l d more i n f l u e n c e o v e r s t r a t e g y c h o i c e t h a n do o t h e r s . I t p r o v i d e s , i n s h o r t , a r e l a t i n g o f s u b s t a n t i v e i n s t a n c e t o c o n c e p t u a l a r g u m e n t . I t i s p e r h a p s w o r t h w h i l e a t t h i s j u n c t u r e , b e f o r e p r o c e e d -i n g i n t o C h a p t e r Two and t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a m o d e l i l l u s t r a t i n g s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a n t s , t o e s t a b l i s h d e f i n i t i o n s f o r c e r t a i n of t h e t e r m s t o be u s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e t e x t . F o u r t e r m s i n p a r t i -c u l a r r e q u i r e e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e s e b e i n g b a r g a i n i n g , n e g o t i a t i o n , s t r a t e g y , and t a c t i c . 2 F o l l o w i n g H a r b i s o n and Coleman , b a r g a i n i n g can be v i e w e d as a s y s t e m i n v o l v i n g power r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n i n t e r e s t s r e p r e s e n t i n g management and i n t e r e s t s r e p r e s e n t i n g l a b o u r . I t i s a s y s t e m by w h i c h i s s u e s o f i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o n c e r n c a n be r e s o l v e d t h r o u g h t r a n s a c t i o n and i n t e r a c t i o n . B a r g a i n i n g , as 3 4 e x p l a i n e d by S t e v e n s and C h a m b e r l a i n , i s t h e b r o a d e r , more a l l -e n c o m p a s s i n g t e r m , r e f e r r i n g t o any t r a n s a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g an 7 exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n . Not a l l s u c h t r a n s a c t i o n s w i l l i n v o l v e i n t e r a c t i o n , or n e g o t i a t i o n . N e g o t i a t i o n , t h e n , can be t a k e n t o mean a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y or e v e n t w i t h i n t h e s y s t e m of b a r g a i n i n g . T h a t a c t i v i t y , t o quote W a l t o n and M c K e r s i e ^ , i s " t h e d e l i b e r a t e i n t e r a c t i o n of two or more complex s o c i a l u n i t s w h i c h a r e a t t e m p t i n g to d e f i n e or r e d e f i n e t h e terms of t h e i r i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . " Thus, n e g o t i a t i o n i s c o n s i d e r e d p a r t of b a r g a i n i n g ; t h a t i s , n o t a l l of b a r g a i n i n g i s n e g o t i a t i o n . J u s t as n e g o t i a t i o n i s a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y w i t h i n b a r g a i n i n g , so can . . " t a c t i c " be e x p l a i n e d as a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y w i t h i n an o v e r a l l " s t r a t e g y . " S t r a t e g y i s d e f i n e d as a p l a n of one p a r t y t o d i r e c t or m a n i p u l a t e p e o p l e and e v e n t s i n t o the most a d v a n t a g e o u s p o s i t i o n f o r t h a t p a r t y . S t r a t e g y i s e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r t o i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h an o p p o s i n g p a r t y , i n o r d e r t o a t t a i n some p r e d e t e r m i n e d g o a l . T a c t i c , as d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m s t r a t e g y , i s t h e a c t i o n t a k e n by one p a r t y t o maneuver i n t o t h e most ad v a n -tageous p o s i t i o n , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a p r e d e t e r m i n e d s t r a t e g y . H e r e , a g a i n , s t r a t e g y i s seen as t h e b r o a d e r , more a l l -e n c o m p a s s i n g term; t a c t i c , t h e more s p e c i f i c . T hus, i t w i l l be more common t o speak of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y and n e g o t i a t i n g t a c t i c t h a n v i c e v e r s a . 8 F o o t n o t e s - C h a p t e r I 1. CAIMAW v s . Noranda, C1974) 151 B.C.L.R.B. D e c i s i o n s ; B.C.  Sugar R e f i n i n g Co. L t d . v s . RWDSU, L o c a l 517 , (.1978) 49 B.C.L.R.B. D e c i s i o n s ; ICBC vs OTEU, (1978) 1 C a n a d i a n L.R.B.R. 53. 2. F r e d e r i c k H. H a r b i s o n and John R. Coleman, G o a l s and S t r a t e g y  i n C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g (New Y o r k : H a r p e r and B r o s . , 1951), p . 5 . 3. C a r l M. S t e v e n s , S t r a t e g y and C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g N e g o t i a - t i o n ( T o r o n t o : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1963), p . l . 4. N e i l W. C h a m b e r l a i n , C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g (New Y o r k : McGraw-H i l l , 1 9 5 1 ) , p.16. 5. R.E. W a l t o n and R.B. M c K e r s i e , A B e h a v i o r a l T h e o r y of L a b o u r  N e g o t i a t i o n s (New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 3 9 CEAPTER I I THE DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY In t h i s c h a p t e r t h e component p a r t s of a model o f s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a t i o n a r e p r e s e n t e d and d i s c u s s e d under the f o l l o w i n g h e a d i n g s : 1. I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n R e l a t i o n s h i p s 2. R e l a t i v e Power of t h e B a r g a i n i n g P a r t i e s 3. Economic and P o l i t i c a l C l i m a t e 4 . P e r s o n a l i t i e s 5. I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 6. P a r t y O b j e c t i v e s 7 . L e g i s l a t i o n On the b a s i s of a r e v i e w of t h e l i t e r a t u r e , the above a r e assumed h e r e i n t o be the m a j o r a r e a s of i n f l u e n c e w h i c h a r e c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y . T h e r e has been no a t t e m p t made i n t h i s c h a p t e r t o g i v e any r e l a t i v e w e i g h t i n g o f i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e v a r i o u s f a c t o r s as t h a t w i l l emerge from the d i s c u s s i o n s i n C h a p t e r F i v e . I t s h o u l d a l s o " be n o t e d t h a t most of t h e l i t -e r a t u r e c i t e d d e a l s w i t h b a r g a i n i n g i n t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r , c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of w h i c h may n o t be d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e t o p u b l i c s e c t o r b a r g a i n i n g . T e c h n i c a l l y , however, h o s p i t a l employees a r e p a r t of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r ( f a l l i n g under the p r o v i s i o n s of the L a b o u r C o d e ) , even though the i n d u s t r y i s p u b l i c l y f u n d e d . T h i s p o i n t w i l l be d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r i n C h a p t e r T h r e e . 10 Figure 1;  Determinants of Strategy Interorganizational Relationships Economic and P o l i t i c a l Climate Party Objectives R e l a t i v e Power of the Bargaining P a r t i e s STRATEGY P e r s o n a l i t i e s I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s JL TACTICS 11 The p u r p o s e of t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o r e v i e w t h e m a j o r f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y t o d e v e l o p a base from w h i c h an a p p r a i s a l of s t r a t e g y i n an a c t u a l b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n can be made. T h e r e w i l l be a r e a s of o v e r l a p among t h e f a c t o r s t o be d i s c u s s e d as t h e i n f l u e n c e of any one f a c t o r may i n t u r n be an i n f l u e n c e on a n o t h e r f a c t o r . I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s I t i s w i d e l y known t h a t d u r i n g the 1971-72 s e r i e s of n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e B.C.R.A. r e f u s e d to b a r g a i n i n good f a i t h . . . the " o f f i c i a l " p o l i c y of t h e B.C.H.A. has been t o r e j e c t " f o r m a l r e q u e s t s " t h a t u n r e s o l v e d b a r g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s be r e f e r r e d t o a b i n d i n g t r i b u n a l m u t u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d . The p o l i c y of t h e B.C.H.A. has been t o f o r c e h o s p i t a l employees to e i t h e r go on s t r i k e or a c c e p t t h e u n i l a t e r a l p r o p o s a l s o f the A s s o c i a t i o n . B i t t e r n e s s and d i s t r u s t , n e v e r f a r below the s u r f a c e i n our d e a l i n g s w i t h B.C.H.A., (^threatens) to f l o o d i n t o t h e o p e n . 2 The u n i o n has become an o v e r l y m i l i t a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n whose c o n s t a n t b e l l i g e r e n c e d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s , and e q u a l l y c o n s t a n t d i s s e m i n a t i o n of d i s t o r t e d i n f o r m a t i o n between n e g o t i a t i o n s , has r e s u l t e d i n a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h employee e x p e c t a t i o n s have r e a c h e d u n r e a s o n a b l e l e v e l s i n terms of c o s t and e f f e c t on t h e o p e r a t i n g f l e x i b i l i t y of the h o s p i t a l . ^ We're w o r k i n g now t o b e a t t h e enemy o u t s i d e o f our g a t e i n s t e a d of w a s t i n g our e n e r g i e s s c r a p p i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r i n s i d e the g a t e . We've got s o m e t h i n g h e r e t h a t no o t h e r company i n our l i n e of work has been a b l e t o a c h i e v e . We can l i c k a l m o s t any k i n d of p r o b l e m w h i c h comes up.^ The f o u r q u o t a t i o n s above r e p r e s e n t two h i g h l y d i v e r g e n t a t t i t u d e s t oward union-management r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The f i r s t two were made by u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p and c o n c e r n the a c t i v i t i e s of an e m p l o y e r s ' b a r g a i n i n g a g e n t . The t h i r d was t h e o p i n i o n of an e m p l o y e r ' s p e r s o n n e l o f f i c e r w i t h r e g a r d to the u n i o n t h a t made 1 2 t h e f i r s t two s t a t e m e n t s . The f o u r t h q u o t a t i o n was p a r t of a j o i n t union-management pronouncement from a company's " p r o -d u c t i o n c o m m i t t e e . " A l l f o u r were made on the b a s i s of p r e v i o u s i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e and a l l w i l l d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e a t t i t u d e s t a k e n by each p a r t y i n f u t u r e i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The f i r s t t h r e e q u o t a t i o n s a r e i n d i c a t i v e of h i g h l y c o n f l i c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The e m p l o y e r ' s s t a t e m e n t i m p l i e s a b e l i e f t h a t b a r g a i n i n g w i t h t h e u n i o n i s s t r i c t l y a w i n / l o s e p r o p o s i t i o n : any g a i n s made by t h e u n i o n a r e e x a c t l y e q u a l t o the l o s s e s s u s t a i n e d by t h e e m p l o y e r . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e u n i o n i s d e a l i n g w i t h an e m p l o y e r s ' " a s s o c i a t i o n " i n d i c a t i n g t h a t b o t h u n i o n and management r e p r e s e n t r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e o r g a n -i z a t i o n s . The f o u r t h q u o t a t i o n , on t h e o t h e r hand, i s made by a s m a l l e r u n i o n d e a l i n g w i t h a s i n g l e "company." T h e i r r e l a t i o n -s h i p i s one of t r u s t , i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , and c o o p e r a t i o n . The o b j e c t i v e of t h e two p a r t i e s i s t o f i n d m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e s o l u t i o n s t o the p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n i n g them b o t h . J u s t as one p e r s o n ' s a t t i t u d e towards a r e l a t i o n s h i p with, a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s b a s e d l a r g e l y on t h e p e r s o n ' s p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h i n t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p , so an o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s a t t i t u d e towards a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a n o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n i s ba s e d l a r g e l y on the p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . A h i s t o r y of i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l a n i m o s i t y , of bad f a i t h b a r -g a i n i n g , and so on, w i l l t e n d to c r e a t e an atmosphere of c o n -f l i c t - o r i e n t a t i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , a h i s t o r y of union-management 13 c o m p l i a n c e and use of j o i n t p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g t e c h n i q u e s w i l l t e n d t o i n f l u e n c e b o t h p a r t i e s t o f o l l o w a c o o p e r a t i v e a p p r o a c h t o t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . ~* W h i l e t h e union-management r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a dynamic one, i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s one i n w h i c h b e h a v i o u r b a s e d on p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e i s d i f f i c u l t t o m o d i f y or r e v e r s e . The q u o t a t i o n s p r o v i d e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h i s s e c t i o n i l l u s t r a t e two t y p e s of b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s e s , each a p p r o a c h i n g o p p o s i t e e n d p o i n t s a l o n g a c o n t i n u u m of b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s e s . The two t y p e s a r e l a b e l l e d by W a l t o n and M c K e r s i e as d i s t r i b u t -i v e C c o n f l i c t - o r i e n t a t i o n ) and: i n t e g r a t i v e ( c o o p e r a t i v e p r o b l e m -s o l v i n g ) . ^ I t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y of b a r g a i n i n g s i t -u a t i o n s w i l l f a l l somewhere between t h e s e two. Where one or b o t h p a r t i e s a r e l a r g e , p o w e r f u l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the c h o s e n p r o c e s s a p p e a r s most o f t e n t o be more d i s t r i b u t i v e i n n a t u r e . T r u e i n -t e g r a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s r a r e , o c c u r r i n g most f r e q u e n t l y when the two p a r t i e s a r e r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l . ^ I n a d d i t i o n , s p e c i f i c i s s u e s w i t h i n the b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n may be h a n d l e d i n a more d i s -t r i b u t i v e or more i n t e g r a t i v e manner t h a n o t h e r s . M o n e t a r y i s s u e s , as w e l l as i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s , d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and p o l i c y c o n t r o l , a r e a l l i t e m s most t y p i c a l l y h a n d l e d t h r o u g h a d i s t r i b u t i v e - t y p e p r o c e s s . I s s u e s s u c h as j o b s e c u r i t y and s e n i o r i t y , j o i n t j o b e v a l u a t i o n , and work e f f i c i e n c y s t u d i e s , a l l non-monetary i t e m s (.although t h e r e may e v e n t u a l l y be c o s t s a t t a c h e d ) can be h a n d l e d i n a more i n t e g r a t i v e a p p r o a c h . Coleman p r o v i d e s d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g the manner i n w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r p r o c e s s ( i . e . d i s t r i b u t i v e or i n t e g r a t i v e ) i s 8 c h o s e n with, r e g a r d t o a p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m r e q u i r i n g s o l u t i o n ; 14 a t t h i s t i m e , however, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o n o t e t h a t , b a s e d on p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , e a c h p a r t y assumes t h e p r o c e s s w h i c h the o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n o f b a r g a i n i n g w i l l t e n d t o f o l l o w . The p r o c e s s a n t i c i p a t e d t h e n l a r g e l y d e t e r m i n e s t h e range of s t r a t e g i e s t o be c o n s i d e r e d . In d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , each p a r t y i s assumed to have a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n h a v i n g upper and l o w e r l i m i t s , or t a r g e t p o i n t s and r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t s r e s p e c t i v e l y , d e f i n i n g a range of outcomes below w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s would r a t h e r l e a v e t h e nego-t i a t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . A " s e t t l e m e n t r a n g e " i s t h e n t a k e n as the a r e a of o v e r l a p between t h e u n i o n ' s u t i l i t y r a n g e and t h e employ-e r ' s u t i l i t y r a n g e , n o r m a l l y d e s c r i b e d as the a r e a bounded by the r e s p e c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t s . I f no o v e r l a p o c c u r s ( i . e . a " s e t t l e m e n t gap" e x i s t s ) , a breakdown i n n e g o t i a t i o n s can be e x p e c t e d u n l e s s u t i l i t i e s can be s h i f t e d t o c r e a t e a s e t t l e m e n t 9 r a n g e i n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e . (See F i g u r e s 2 and 3, pp.15-16.) In o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n a s e t t l e m e n t r a n g e , each p a r t y must a c c u r a t e l y a s s e s s the o t h e r p a r t y ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n , or at l e a s t t h e o t h e r p a r t y ' s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t . In d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , however, i t i s e x a c t l y t h a t w h i c h each p a r t y a t t e m p t s t o c o n c e a l from the o t h e r . As e a c h p a r t y ' s p r i m a r y g o a l i s t o d e r i v e a maximum s h a r e f r o m what i t vi e w s as a f i x e d - s u m outcome, each p a r t y w i l l make an e f f o r t t o s h i f t the s e t t l e m e n t range towards i t s own t a r g e t p o i n t . T h i s i s a c c o m p l i s h e d t h r o u g h the s u c c e s s -f u l use of one ( o r b o t h ) of two b a s i c s t r a t e g i e s (as u s e d by management, i n t h i s e x a m p l e ) : 1. A l t e r u n i o n ' s p e r c e p t i o n as t o t h e p o s i t i o n of management's 15 Figure 2  Settlement Range settlement range Possible Outcomes 16 Figure 3  Settlement Gap Level of U t i l i t y settlement gap Possible Outcomes 17 r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t t h u s n a r r o w i n g the s e t t l e m e n t r a n g e toward management's t a r g e t p o i n t ; 2. Cause u n i o n to r e - a s s e s s i t s own r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t r e s u l t i n g i n a d e c i s i o n by u n i o n t o r e p o s i t i o n i t s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t c l o s e r t o management's t a r g e t p o i n t . F i g u r e s 4 and 5 Cp.18) i l l u s t r a t e the above two s t r a t -e g i e s . T a c t i c s employed t o implement t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s under d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a r e g e n e r a l l y t h o s e d e s c r i b e d by S t e v e n s as " C l a s s I t a c t i c s " : 1 ^ t a c t i c s i n t e n d e d t o r a i s e the t e n d e n c y of a p a r t y t o a v o i d i t s own t a r g e t p o i n t . C l a s s I t a c t i c s a r e i n t e n d e d t o be c o e r c i v e i n n a t u r e , t o c r e a t e i n s e c u r i t i e s i n the o t h e r p a r t y and t h u s , i n c r e a s e t h e l e v e l of t e n s i o n e x p e r i e n c e d by t h a t p a r t y . As Coleman p o i n t s o u t : I t i s f a i r l y w e l l documented t h a t i n c r e a s e d t e n s i o n i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a v a r i e t y of a b e r r a n t b e h a v i o u r s s u c h as r e d u c e d l e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y and i n a b i l i t y t o pay a t t e n t i o n . H Th.e p a r t y most a f f e c t e d by t h e s e t a c t i c s can be e x p e c t e d t o r e v e a l more and a b s o r b l e s s t h a n t h e o t h e r p a r t y . T h i s may i n d u c e t h e a f f e c t e d p a r t y to make an e a r l i e r commitment, b a s e d on more ambiguous i n f o r m a t i o n , and c l o s e r t o the o t h e r p a r t y ' s t a r g e t p o i n t t h a n o t h e r w i s e may have been a n t i c i p a t e d . Of c o u r s e , t h e r i s k i s alw a y s p r e s e n t t h a t t h e a f f e c t e d p a r t y may be i n d u c e d t o make an e a r l i e r commitment c l o s e r t o i t s own t a r g e t p o i n t t h a n o t h e r w i s e may have been n e c e s s a r y -- a commit-ment f r o m w h i c h i t may be v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o move w i t h o u t " l o s i n g f a c e . " C l a s s I I t a c t i c s may a l s o be used i n d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r -Figure 4 . A l t e r i n g Union Perception of Management's Resistance Point M^ = management's perceived resistance point perceived settlement range I 1 f f — I 1 1 H-lOc/hr. t f +20c/hr. true settlement range Figure 5 S h i f t of Union's Resistance Point Toward Management's Target Point U = union's s h i f t e d resistance point Rs true settlement range M i \i DR \ D i | 1 1 1 1 1 1 +10c/hr. 1 +20c/hr. perceived settlement range 19 g a i n i n g , a l t h o u g h t h e i r use becomes more common as t h e b a r -g a i n i n g , p r o c e s s becomes more i n t e g r a t i v e . C l a s s I I t a c t i c s 12 a r e t a c t i c s of p e r s u a s i o n , d e s i g n e d t o r e d u c e t e n s i o n . They a r e u s e d as a means of c o n v i n c i n g a p a r t y t o r e d u c e i t s a v o i d -ance of t h e o t h e r p a r t y ' s t a r g e t p o i n t . However, C l a s s I I t a c t i c s i n v o l v e t h e s h a r i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e a c e r t a i n d e g r e e of m u t u a l t r u s t , a f e a t u r e not u s u a l l y a s s o c -i a t e d w i t h d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . I n t e g r a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g can e x i s t when b o t h p a r t i e s p e r -c e i v e a p o t e n t i a l s e t t l e m e n t as h a v i n g a.win/win outcome. As t h e maximum p a y o f f can o n l y be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h maximum c o -o p e r a t i o n ( s e e F i g u r e 6, p. 2 0 ) , each p a r t y must be made aware of t h e o t h e r p a r t y ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . O b v i o u s l y , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e o r e x p l o i t i v e p a r t y c o u l d t a k e a d v a n t a g e of a f u l l y c o o p e r a t i v e p a r t y and, at l e a s t i n the " s h o r t - r u n , a c h i e v e a n e t g a i n . As b o t h p a r t i e s a r e u n d o u b t e d l y aware of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , t h e p r i m a r y s t r a t e g y of a p a r t y t r u l y w i s h i n g t o b a r g a i n i n t e g r a t i v e l y must r e l a t e t o r e d u c i n g the o t h e r p a r t y ' s 13 f e a r of e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t h e e a r l i e s t s t a g e s of b a r g a i n i n g . Even on t h o s e p r o b l e m s i d e n t i f i e d as p o t e n t i a l l y s o l v a b l e t h r o u g h i n t e g r a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , t h e r e e x i s t s o n l y a o n e - i n - f o u r chance of f o l l o w i n g an i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s . I f a n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e p a r t y p e r c e i v e s the o t h e r p a r t y t o be e i t h e r e q u a l l y n o n - c o o p e r -a t i v e or f u l l y c o o p e r a t i v e , t h e r e s u l t a n t p r o c e s s w i l l be d i s t r i b -u t i v e . I f a c o o p e r a t i v e p a r t y p e r c e i v e s t h e o t h e r p a r t y t o be n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e , a d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s w i l l a l s o r e s u l t . O n l y when a c o o p e r a t i v e p a r t y p e r c e i v e s the o t h e r p a r t y t o be e q u a l l y c o o p e r a t i v e w i l l an i n t e g r a t i v e p r o c e s s be i m p l e m e n t e d . Figure 6  Integrative Payoff Matrix 2 0 m i n Level of Cooperation Party B max mm Level of Cooperation Party A max >v 1 1 >v \ y 1 2 \ . \ ° 3 >v 2 2 \ . 1 3 >v 3 0 \ . N . 3 1 \ . 5 5 >v 21 I t makes s e n s e f o r a p a r t y t o c o o p e r a t e , t h e r e f o r e , o n l y t o the e x t e n t t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t y can be t r u s t e d t o coop-e r a t e . ^ T h i s t y p e of t r u s t , however, b a s e d on one p a r t y ' s p e r c e p t i o n of t h e o t h e r ' s l i k e l y b e h a v i o u r , must i n t u r n be b a s e d on t h e p a r t i e s ' p r e v i o u s b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . To t h i s p o i n t , the o n l y I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p d i s c u s s e d has been t h a t of t h e u n i o n and empl o y e r d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n b a r g a i n i n g w i t h e a c h o t h e r . W h i l e o b v i o u s l y b e i n g of major i m p o r t a n c e as an i n f l u e n c e on c h o i c e of s t r a t e g y , i t i s n ot t h e o n l y s u c h r e l a t i o n s h i p t o be c o n s i d e r e d . The employ-e r ' s c h o i c e of s t r a t e g y w i l l a l s o be a f f e c t e d by h i s r e l a t i o n -s h i p t o o t h e r e m p l o y e r s i n t h e p r o d u c t m a r k e t , as w e l l as o t h e r u n i o n s i n t h e l a b o u r m a r k e t . The u n i o n ' s c h o i c e of s t r a t e g y w i l l a l s o be i n f l u e n c e d by o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , , w i t h r i v a l u n i o n s as w e l l as w i t h o t h e r e m p l o y e r s . An e m p l o y e r who i s c o n s i d e r e d an i n d u s t r y l e a d e r can be p l a c e d i n the s i t u a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g f o r t h e p a t t e r n t h a t a l l o t h e r e m p l o y e r s i n the i n d u s t r y w i l l s u b s e q u e n t l y be f a c e d w i t h . Thus t h e r e may be p r e s s u r e e x e r t e d on t h e key e m p l o y e r t o not g i v e away more t h a n i s n e c e s s a r y n o r t o e s t a b l i s h new s t a n d a r d s which, o t h e r e m p l o y e r s c o u l d n o t e a s i l y meet. ( T h i s l a t t e r p o i n t may under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s have a r e v e r s e e f f e c t on a key e m p l o y e r ' s s t r a t e g y . By s e t t i n g s t a n d a r d s o t h e r s would have d i f f i c u l t y i n m e e t i n g , t h e key e m p l o y e r may be a b l e t o e x c l u d e t h e s m a l l e r c o m p e t i t o r s from t h e p r o d u c t m a r k e t . ) An e m p l o y e r ' s s t r a t e g y would a l s o depend t o some d e g r e e on whether t h e empl o y e r i s a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l l y , as a s i n g l e 22 company, o r b a r g a i n i n g on a m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g b a s i s , as p a r t of an i n d u s t r y - w i d e agreement. M u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n -i n g s o l v e s many of t h e p r o b l e m s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g a c o m p e t i t i v e p o s i t i o n , as a l l c o m p e t i t o r s a r e s u b j e c t e d t o the same n e g o t i a t i o n s and the same f i n a l c o n t r a c t . F o r the same r e a s o n , m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g would a f f e c t u n i o n s t r a t e g y i n t h a t t h e economic s a n c t i o n of a s t r i k e would be somewhat l e s s t h r e a t e n i n g t o each i n d i v i d u a l e m p l o y e r . On the o t h e r hand, i t can p r o t e c t t h e u n i o n i n d e c r e a s i n g t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of a r i v a l u n i o n ' s e n t e r i n g t h e i n d u s t r y by " p i c k i n g o f f " one company a t a t i m e . R i v a l u n i o n i s m w i l l a f f e c t a u n i o n ' s s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n -a t i o n i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n to t h e p r e s s u r e i t p l a c e s on u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p t o a c h i e v e a b e t t e r r e s u l t t h a n a c h i e v e d e l s e w h e r e . Thus, where t h e r e e x i s t s d i r e c t c o m p e t i t i o n f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r p a r t i c u l a r j o b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , or where a n o t h e r u n i o n r e -p r e s e n t s a s i m i l a r employee g r o u p , a u n i o n w i l l be i n f l u e n c e d by the need t o e n s u r e t h a t i t s members r e c e i v e at l e a s t a p a r i t y p o s i t i o n w i t h t h a t of i t s r i v a l s . F o r t h i s p u r p o s e , i t i s t h e wage r a t e w h i c h forms the g r e a t e s t s i g n of s u c c e s s . As a r e s u l t , w h i l e c o m p e t i t i o n i n t h e p r o d u c t market may i n d u c e p r o d u c t p r i c e s to d r o p , c o m p e t i t i o n i n t h e l a b o u r market may i n d u c e l a b o u r p r i c e s t o r i s e . ^ These p o i n t s w i l l be t o u c h e d upon a g a i n under "Economic and P o l i t i c a l C l i m a t e " and " I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s . " In summation, the s t a t u s of i n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n r e l a t i o n -s h i p s of p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n b a r g a i n i n g , t o e a c h o t h e r and t o 23 o t h e r p a r t i e s , w i l l a f f e c t the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y . As t h e p r o c e s s of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s b a s i c a l l y c o n f l i c t - o r i e n t e d , i n t e g r a t i v e p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g w i l l o n l y o c c u r when each p a r t y p e r c e i v e s the o t h e r as b e i n g t r u s t w o r t h y , open, and c o o p e r a t i v e . The p e r c e p t i o n of a n o t h e r p a r t y ' s a t t i t u d e s toward b a r g a i n i n g i s l a r g e l y b a s e d on p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h a t p a r t y . R e l a t i v e Power of the B a r g a i n i n g P a r t i e s I f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s , as S t e v e n s m a i n t a i n s , "a s o c i a l - c o n t r o l t e c h n i q u e f o r r e f l e c t i n g and t r a n s m u t i n g the b a s i c power r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h u n d e r l i e t h e c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t 16 i n h e r e n t i n an i n d u s t r i c a l r e l a t i o n s s y s t e m , " and i f , as L e v i n s o n s t a t e s , " t h e f i n a l outcome of a p u r e b a r g a i n i n g s i t -u a t i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d i n some way by t h e r e l a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 17 power of the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d , " t h e n " b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s " can be u n d e r s t o o d , i n ^ t h i s c o n t e x t , t o d e n o t e th e p l a n s of a c t i o n d e v i s e d by one p a r t y t o b e s t e x p l o i t and advance i t s own power p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e t o t h a t of t h e o t h e r p a r t y . Taken but one s t e p f u r t h e r , as does S t a g n e r , the e n t i r e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s can be i d e n t i f i e d s i m p l y as a means of d e t e r m i n i n g l e v e l s of power, g i v e n t h a t the two p r i m a r y a r e a s of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t , t h o s e b e i n g economic and s o c i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n , a r e the m a j o r 18 b u i l d i n g b l o c k s of the power p a r a m e t e r i t s e l f . B a r g a i n i n g , i t i s c l a i m e d , " c e n t e r s a round i s s u e s of power w i t h e conomic 19 b e n e f i t s u s e d l a r g e l y as s y m b o l i c c o u n t e r s i n t h e game'." Thus, t h e r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n s o f t h e b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s i s t o be r e c o g n i z e d as p r o v i d i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l i n f l u e n c e on t h e c h o i c e of 2 4 b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . In d e a l i n g w i t h power as a d e t e r m i n a n t o f b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y , i t i s w o r t h w h i l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h " b a r g a i n i n g power." from " a b s o l u t e power" on the b a s i s of two c o n c e p t u a l d i f f e r -e n c e s : r e l a t i v i t y and p e r c e p t i b i l i t y . A b s o l u t e power i s de-f i n e d as t h e a b i l i t y of one p a r t y t o i n f l u e n c e or a l t e r t h e range of outcomes a v a i l a b l e t o a n o t h e r p a r t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o 2 0 t h e g o a l s of t h a t o t h e r p a r t y . B a r g a i n i n g power, t h e r e f o r e , i s d e f i n e d as t h e a b s o l u t e power one p a r t y p e r c e i v e s t h e o t h e r p a r t y of b e i n g c a p a b l e of w i e l d i n g r e l a t i v e t o t h e f o r m e r p a r t y ' s own s i m i l a r c a p a b i l i t i e s . To f u r t h e r c l a r i f y t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s , an example i s r e q u i r e d . The example g i v e n h e r e , w h i l e u s i n g a s l i g h t l y d i f -f e r e n t t e r m i n o l o g y , i s l a r g e l y e x t r a p o l a t e d from T h i b a u t and K e l l e y . 2 1 P a r t y A i s a . l a r g e , e c o n o m i c a l l y sound, p o l i t i c a l l y v i s i b l e union, d e a l i n g w i t h a number of i n d i v i d u a l e m p l o y e r s . I t w i l l g e n e r a l l y f i n d i t s e l f i n ' b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s where i t can a c t i n an e x p l o i t i v e manner, more or l e s s d i c t a t i n g t h e outcomes 2 2 r e l e v a n t t o P a r t y B, s u b j e c t o n l y t o v a r i o u s e x t e r n a l c o n -s t r a i n t s i n c l u d i n g government, p u b l i c o p i n i o n , and economic c l i m a t e . In o t h e r words, P a r t y A i s a p o w e r f u l o r g a n i z a t i o n ; put a n o t h e r way, P a r t y A has a h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n ( i . e . a b s o l u t e p o w e r ) . R e g a r d l e s s of what P a r t y B d o e s , i t s outcomes are t o t a l l y d e pendent on what P a r t y A i n t e n d s t o do. '25 In F i g u r e 7 (p.26 ) , i f P a r t y A c h o o s e s s t r a t e g y a^, t h e n r e g a r d l e s s o f P a r t y B's c h o i c e of s t r a t e g y , P a r t y B's outcome i s 1. P a r t y B, b e i n g i n a much l o w e r b a s i c power p o s i t i o n t h a n P a r t y A, has no i n f l u e n c e on the outcomes a c h i e v e d by P a r t y A. I n t h i s f i r s t c a s e , t h e r e f o r e , P a r t y A no t o n l y has a h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n ' b u t a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r b a r g a i n i n g power t h a n P a r t y B. Now assume t h a t the same P a r t y A i s s u d d e n l y f a c e d w i t h an e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l m u l t i - e m p l o y e r l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s a s s o c i a t i o n . T h i s new P a r t y B i s n o t o n l y i n an e q u a l l y h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n as i s P a r t y A, b u t i t s p a r t i c u l a r a r e a s of s t r e n g t h a r e j u s t t h o s e i n w h i c h P a r t y A i s t h e w e a k e s t . B o t h p a r t i e s now have the o p p o r t u n i t y t o c h o o s e s t r a t e g i e s w h i c h w i l l d e t e r m i n e s p e c i f i c outcomes f o r t h e o t h e r p a r t y , r e g a r d l e s s o f what the o t h e r p a r t y d o e s . In t h i s s e c o n d c a s e , as shown i n F i g u r e 8 (p.26 ), i f P a r t y A c h o o s e s s t r a t e g y a^, t h e n r e g a r d l e s s o f P a r t y B's c h o i c e o f s t r a t e g y , t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e outcome f o r P a r t y B i s 1 ( t h e same outcome as i n t h e f i r s t c a s e ) . T h i s t i m e , however, i f P a r t y B c h o o s e s s t r a t e g y b2> t h e n P a r t y A's o n l y p o s s i b l e outcome i s a l s o 1, r e g a r d l e s s o f what P a r t y A t h e n c h o o s e s to do. Both p a r t i e s have e q u a l l y h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s b u t n e i t h e r has any b a r g a i n i n g power o v e r t h e o t h e r . Not so c o i n c i d e n t l y , t h e outcome p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e t h o s e of an i n t e g r a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g model and as s u c h p r e s e n t a w i n / w i n s i t u a t i o n (a^b^) i f the p a r t i e s can r e c o g n i z e i t and a r e c a p a b l e o f t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of i t . 26 Figure 7 . High Basic Power P o s i t i o n - One Party Only Party A's strategy choices Party B's strategy choices Party B's Possible Outcomes Figure 8 High Basic Power P o s i t i o n - Both P a r t i e s Party A's strategy choices Party B's strategy choices Possible Outcomes 27 The s e c o n d c a s e j u s t d e s c r i b e d assumes t h a t t h e p o s s i b l e outcomes a v a i l a b l e to e a c h p a r t y a r e e q u a l . I f the p o s s i b l e outcomes a r e not e q u a l , however, t h e n the b a r g a i n i n g power would b e l o n g to the p a r t y h a v i n g the r e l a t i v e a d v a n t a g e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e outcomes to the o t h e r p a r t y . I n t h i s t h i r d c a s e , i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 9 (p.28 ), b o t h p a r t i e s a r e o f e q u a l l y h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s as t h e t o t a l p a y o f f under a l l c o n d i t i o n s i s e q u a l f o r b o t h p a r t i e s . I f P a r t y A c h o o s e s s t r a t e g y a^, t h e n r e g a r d l e s s o f P a r t y B's s t r a t e g y c h o i c e , t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e outcome to P a r t y B i s 4. S i m i l a r l y , i f P a r t y B c h o o s e s s t r a t e g y b^ t h e n the o n l y p o s s i b l e outcome to P a r t y A i s 0. But i n t h i s c a s e , i f P a r t y B d i d choose s t r a t e g y b^> P a r t y A would i n t u r n choose s t r a t e g y a^> m a i n t a i n i n g i t s own outcome a t 0 b u t i n f l i c t i n g an outcome of -2 on P a r t y B. Thus, w h i l e the b e s t p o s s i b l e outcome f o r P a r t y A i s o n l y 2 as compared to a b e s t p o s s i b l e outcome of 4 f o r P a r t y B, P a r t y A c a n n o t s u s t a i n any i n j u r i o u s n e g a t i v e outcomes whereas P a r t y B can i f P a r t y A so d e c i d e s . Even though b o t h p a r t i e s a r e i n h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s , P a r t y A has th e g r e a t e r b a r g a i n i n g power as i t c a n n o t l o s e under any c o m b i n a t i o n of c h o i c e s b u t can e s t a b l i s h a c e r t a i n d e g r e e o f b a r g a i n i n g l e v e r a g e by a l l o w i n g P a r t y B i t s maximum outcome (wh i c h a l s o happens to be P a r t y A's maximum o u t c o m e ) . I n o t h e r words, P a r t y A has the power to choose a s t r a t e g y w h i c h w i l l r e w ard P a r t y B i n o r d e r to r e c e i v e a f u t u r e r e w a r d on a n o t h e r i s s u e . M e r e l y h a v i n g t h e o p t i o n to ch o o s e s u c h a 2 8 Party B's strategy choices Figure 9 .  Bargaining Power to Party A Party A's strategy choices a. a„ 2 4 >v 2 -2 0 4 0 -2 possible outcomes Figure 10 Perceived Power Party A's strategy choices Party B's strategy choices 2 4 \ 2 -2(4) >v 0 4 -2(4) 29 s t r a t e g y g i v e s P a r t y A r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r b a r g a i n i n g power t h a n P a r t y B. I t s h o u l d be c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t b a r g a i n i n g power i s " r e l a t i v e " power. I t i s n o t t h e i n d i v i d u a l or a b s o l u t e power of a p a r t i c u l a r p a r t y , p e r s e , t h a t i s t h e d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r ; i t i s , r a t h e r , the power i n h e r e n t i n one p a r t y r e l a t i v e to t h a t of t h e o t h e r p a r t y w h i c h a f f e c t s t h e c h o i c e of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y . W h i l e t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f a c e r t a i n l e v -e l o f power i n i t s e l f may c a r r y w i t h i t many p o s i t i v e b e n e f i t s f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a nd/or t h e p e r s o n n e l i n v o l v e d i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s , t h e b a s i c power p o s i t i o n o f one p a r t y o n l y i n d i r e c t c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e b a s i c power p o s i t i o n o f a n o t h e r p a r t y w h i c h a f f e c t s the r e s p o n s i v e b e h a v i o u r each p a r t y d i s p l a y s to t h e b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n . The c o n c e p t o f r e l a t i v e power has been s t u d i e d by numerous e x p e r i m e n t a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s and s u c c i n c t l y r e v i e w e d by R u b i n and Brown. They p o i n t out t h a t r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e a b s o l u t e power of t h e b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s , w hether b o t h have h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s or low b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s , b a r g a i n i n g t e n d s to be more e f f e c t i v e ( i . e . r e s u l t i n g r e a t e r p a y o f f to b o t h p a r t i e s ; be s t r u c t u r e d i n a l e s s d i s t r i b u t i v e or more i n t e g r a t i v e f a s h i o n ) when b o t h p a r t i e s b a r g a i n i n g p e r c e i v e each o t h e r as b e i n g of e q u a l r a t h e r t h a n u n e q u a l 23 power. Over s e v e n t y p e r c e n t of t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d i e s r e v i e w e d by R u b i n and Brown s u p p o r t e d t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , as R u b i n and Brown e x p l a i n , " t h e g r e a t e r t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between b a r g a i n e r s ' power, t h e l e s s e f f e c t i v e l y 30 t h e y a r e l i k e l y to be a b l e to f u n c t i o n as a u n i t . E x p r e s s e d i n o t h e r words, the more c l o s e l y t h e b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p a p p r o x i m a t e s one o f power e q u a l i t y , t h e more b a r g a i n i n g 2 4 e f f e c t i v e n e s s s h o u l d i n c r e a s e . " F o l l o w i n g t h i s l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g , i t can be e x p e c t e d t h a t a p a r t y h a v i n g a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n w i l l t e n d to behave i n a m a n i p u l a t i v e and e x p l o i t i v e manner i n b a r g a i n i n g w i t h a p a r t y h a v i n g a r e l a t i v e l y low b a s i c power p o s i t i o n . The p a r t y h a v i n g t h e h i g h e r b a s i c power p o s i t i o n has t h e p o t e n t i a l to r e c e i v e a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of p o s i t i v e outcomes from t h e b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h r o u g h i t s g r e a t e r a b i l i t y to o f f e r r ewards o r i n f l i c t c o s t s , the h i g h e r powered p a r t y can i n d u c e r e s p o n s e s f r om i t s o p p o s i t e number such t h a t maximum p o s i t i v e outcomes can be a c h i e v e d by the f o r m e r . R e t u r n i n g to t h e d e f i n i t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g power, the two i m p o r t a n t c o n c e p t s w i t h w h i c h t o be c o n c e r n e d a r e t h o s e o f r e l a t i v i t y and p e r c e p t i b i l i t y . I t i s n o t enough t h a t one p a r t y have r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r power t h a n a n o t h e r . The r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n s must be p e r c e i v e d i n o r d e r to a f f e c t s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n o t h e r words, the b a s i c power p o s i t i o n o f one p a r t y r e l a t i v e to t h a t o f t h e o t h e r p a r t y w i l l c e r t a i n l y i n f l u e n c e the c h o i c e of s t r a t e g i e s t a k e n , b u t t h a t i n f l u e n c e w i l l be m o d i f i e d by t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h the power d i f f e r e n t i a l 25 i s a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v e d . C h a m b e r l a i n n o t e s t h a t b a r g a i n i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the a b i l i t y of a p a r t y to a c c u r a t e l y 31 2 g e s t i m a t e both, i t s own and i t s o p p o n e n t ' s power p o s i t i o n . I n C h a m b e r l a i n ' s model, h i g h e r power i s a r e s u l t of l o w e r " d i s -agreement c o s t s : " I f t h e c o s t s of d i s a g r e e m e n t e x c e e d t h o s e of agreement t h e n the p a r t y must succumb t o the p r e s s u r e t o a g r e e . Thus b a r g a i n i n g power b e l o n g s t o t h e p a r t y w h i c h can b e s t s u s t a i n t h e c o s t s of d i s a g r e e m e n t . T h i s means, however, t h a t i n o r d e r t o p r e p a r e an e f f e c t i v e s t r a t e g y each p a r t y must be aware of the o t h e r p a r t y ' s d i s a g r e e m e n t c o s t s . I f one p a r t y can i n f l u e n c e the p e r c e p t i o n of i t s d i s a g r e e m e n t c o s t s , t h e n i t can a l s o g a i n some b a r g a i n i n g power. F o r example, assume the same s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s as i l l u s -t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 9. In t h i s v e r s i o n , however, P a r t y A has p e r -c e i v e d t h e p o s s i b l e outcomes t o P a r t y B as shown i n p a r e n t h e s i s i n F i g u r e 10 ( p . 2 8 ) . I n o t h e r words, P a r t y A now b e l i e v e s t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of what s t r a t e g y i t c h o o s e s , P a r t y B w i l l r e c e i v e a p a y o f f of 4. The f a c t t h a t P a r t y A's p e r c e p t i o n i s f a l s e , m e r e l y h i g h l i g h t s t h e s u c c e s s of P a r t y B's t a c t i c s t o m i s r e p r e s e n t i t s t r u e p o s i t i o n . The r e s u l t i s t h a t P a r t y A now must nego-t i a t e w i t h P a r t y B i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h e a.^b^ outcome. I n a d d i t i o n , the o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e f u r t h e r r e ward now c l e a r l y r e s t s w i t h P a r t y A, not P a r t y B as was p r e v i o u s l y t h e c a s e . Thus t h e g r e a t e r b a r g a i n i n g power has been s h i f t e d t o P a r t y B, no t t h r o u g h any change i n i t s b a s i c power p o s i t i o n but t h r o u g h a change i n P a r t y A's p e r c e p t i o n of t h a t p o s i t i o n . B a r g a i n i n g power can be c o n c e p t u a l l y s u b d i v i d e d i n t o two major components; t h e economic component and t h e n e g o t i a t i n g component. A p a r t y ' s b a s i c power p o s i t i o n i s f o r t h e most p a r t 3 2 d e t e r m i n e d by the s t r e n g t h of i t s economic component. When t h i s component i s s t r o n g enough t o p l a c e one p a r t y i n a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n as compared t o i t s o p p o s i t e p a r t y , t h e b a r g a i n i n g power a d v a n t a g e w i l l have been e s t a b l i s h e d p r i o r t o any i n p u t f r o m the s e c o n d component. In c a s e s , however, i n w h i c h the b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s of the two b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s a r e a p p r o a c h i n g e q u a l i t y , i t i s l a r g e l y t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the n e g o t i a t i o n component t h a t w i l l c r e a t e a b a r g a i n i n g power ad-v a n t a g e . I t i s a l s o t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n com-ponent w h i c h i n p a r t d e t e r m i n e s th e d e g r e e t o w h i c h b a r g a i n i n g power c r e a t e d t h r o u g h b a s i c power p o s i t i o n d i f f e r e n t i a l s i s u t i l i z e d . E a ch component of t h e power p a r a m e t e r w i l l have i t s own u n i q u e i n f l u e n c e on the c h o i c e of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . The key f a c t o r of t h e economic component of b a r g a i n i n g power i s a p a r t y ' s a b i l i t y t o c a r r y out t h e t h r e a t of work s t o p p a g e (.strike by u n i o n , l o c k - o u t by management). A p a r t y w i l l have a l o w e r b a s i c power p o s i t i o n t h a n i t s o p p o s i t e p a r t y i f i t i s known t h a t i t c a n n o t w i t h s t a n d t h e i m p o s i t i o n of e c o -nomic s a n c t i o n s (i.e. work s t o p p a g e ) . A u n i o n must be a b l e t o s u p p o r t t h e c o s t of a s t r i k e i f i t i s t o use t h e t h r e a t of such a c t i o n d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n . I f t h e u n i o n c a n n o t s u p p o r t a s t r i k e b u t management, on t h e o t h e r hand, can e a s i l y overcome the r e s u l t -i n g l o s s e s , t h e n management would m a i n t a i n a m a j o r b a r g a i n i n g power a d v a n t a g e . T h i s p o i n t i s d i s c u s s e d i n more d e t a i l u nder "economic c l i m a t e . " The s e c o n d component o f b a r g a i n i n g power i s t h e nego-t i a t i o n component. The power of (.or w i t h i n ) the n e g o t i a t i o n 33 component i s b a s e d p r i m a r i l y on t h e a b i l i t y of t h e n e g o t i a t o r 2 7 to m a n i p u l a t e t h r o u g h th e use of c e r t a i n t a c t i c s . T h i s com-ponent i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t t o the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of b a r -g a i n i n g power p o s i t i o n s when b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s a r e a p p r o x -i m a t e l y e q u a l . In s u c h c a s e s n o t o n l y the c h o i c e of t a c t i c s but t h e manner i n w h i c h t h o s e c h o i c e s a r e e x e c u t e d w i l l h e l p t o e s t a b -l i s h or r e i n f o r c e b a r g a i n i n g power p o s i t i o n s . As has been d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y , the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a p a r t i c u l a r s t r a t e g y may be d ependent on how one p a r t y ' s power p o s i t i o n i s p e r c e i v e d by the o t h e r p a r t y . T h e r e a r e v a r i o u s t a c t i c s w h i c h , s u c c e s s f u l l y employed, may h e l p t o i n d u c e the d e s i r e d p e r c e p t i o n s . F o r example, a n e g o t i a t o r a p p e a r i n g to be u n a f f e c t e d by h i s o p p o n e n t ' s b e h a v i o u r may be p e r c e i v e d as b e i n g " i n s c r u t a b l e , " a t r a i t commonly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a h i g h e r powered p a r t y . On t h e o t h e r hand, f r i e n d s h i p toward th e o p p o s i t e p a r t y ' s n e g o t i a t o r can o f t e n be an e f f e c t i v e t a c t i c f o r a l o w e r powered p a r t y to use as a means of d i m i n i s h i n g the u s a b l e .power a v a i l a b l e 2 8 t o t h e h i g h e r powered p a r t y Ca S t e v e n s ' C l a s s I I t a c t i c ) . To summarize t h u s f a r , i t has been p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e power of t h e b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s i s a major i n f l u e n c e on the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of s t r a t e g y . The g r e a t e r the i n e q u a l i t y i n b a r -g a i n i n g power between two p a r t i e s , t h e l e s s i n t e g r a t i v e i s the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . As b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s a r e p e r c e i v e d t o a p p r o a c h e q u a l i t y , t h e g r e a t e r i s t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r p r o b l e m -s o l v i n g o r i n t e g r a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e g r e a t e r the r e l i a n c e on b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s d e s i g n e d t o r e - e s t a b l i s h the b a r g a i n i n g power d i f f e r e n t i a l . A p a r t y i n a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h power p o s i t i o n w i l l t e n d t o a c t e x p l o i t i v e l y of a p a r t y i n a much 34 l o w e r power p o s i t i o n . One f i n a l comment i s r e q u i r e d . The d e g r e e t o w h i c h power can be used i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n p r o c e s s i s dependent upon the s t a b i l i t y of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d . As R u b i n and Brown p o i n t o u t , t o o g r e a t a show of power w i l l t e n d t o b r e a k the bond of v o l u n t a r y i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y 29 t o n e g o t i a t i o n . In o t h e r words, power can be u s e d by one p a r t y o n l y t o s u c h a d e g r e e t h a t the o t h e r p a r t y w i l l s t i l l f i n d i t a d v a n t a g e o u s t o r e m a i n i n t h e n e g o t i a t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . The s t a b i l i t y of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s d e t e r m i n e d i n l a r g e p a r t by the p a r t i e s ' dependence on t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . As l o n g as b o t h p a r t i e s a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t each w i l l r e c e i v e b e t t e r outcomes by s t a y i n g i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e n th e r e l a t i o n s h i p i s s t a b l e . However, i f one p a r t y ' s dependence on t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r i t s b e s t outcomes d e c l i n e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p becomes u n s t a b l e . When t h i s h a p p e n s , t h e amount of u s a b l e power ( a n d , t h u s , the amount of b a r g a i n i n g power) t h a t one p a r t y has o v e r th e o t h e r g r e a t l y d i m i n i s h e s . E c onomic and P o l i t i c a l C l i m a t e The e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e of t h e l o c a l r e g i o n , t h e s u r r o u n d i n g t e r r i t o r i e s , and t h e c o u n t r y as a whole a r e i m p o r t a n t t o s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Not o n l y the e conomic s t a b i l i t i e s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n any p a r t i c u l a r b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p have t o be a c c o u n t e d f o r , but a l s o t h e e c onomic s t a b l i t y of s o c i e t y a t l a r g e : t h e l e v e l of unemploy-ment; the r a t e of i n f l a t i o n ; th:e s u p p l y of l a b o u r compared t o t h e demand f o r l a b o u r ; t h e demand f o r t h e p r o d u c t s of l a b o u r ; and so 3 5 on. E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a t i o n I s t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e a t the time of b a r g a i n i n g : the o r i e n t a t i o n of p r e v a i l -i n g government p o l i c y ; t h e d i r e c t i o n of g e n e r a l p u b l i c o p i n i o n ; t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s g e n e r a t e d w i t h i n t h e b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s t h e m s e l v e s . S t r a t e g i e s w h i c h do n o t t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r -a t i o n t h e i n f l u e n c e s and c o n s t r a i n t s , of e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n d i t i o n s w i l l f i n d l i t t l e s u c c e s s i n m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s towards a p a r t y ' s o b j e c t i v e s . L e v i n s o n p r o v i d e s summary d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e two f a c t o r s . Economic v a r i a b l e s a r e " d e f i n e d as t h o s e t h a t r e f l e c t demand and s u p p l y c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e p r o d u c t or l a b o u r m a r k e t s . !' P o l i t -i c a l v a r i a b l e s a r e " d e f i n e d as t h o s e t h a t a p p l y p r e s s u r e on the u n i o n ' s l e a d e r s h i p t o match o r e x c e e d t h e w a g e - f r i n g e i m p r o v e -ments n e g o t i a t e d by o t h e r u n i o n s i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n or e x t e n d the s t r e n g t h of t h e u n i o n as an i n s t i t u t i o n a n d/or t o p r e s e r v e or enhance t h e s t a t u s and p r e s t i g e of the e x i s t i n g u n i o n l e a d - . , 3 1 e r s . " S i m i l a r d e f i n i t i o n s can be g i v e n w i t h r e s p e c t t o e m p l o y e r s and e m p l o y e r s ' a g e n t s . F o r the p u r p o s e s of t h i s p a p e r , i t would a p p e a r t o m a t t e r l i t t l e w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n b a r g a i n i n g a r e c o n s i d e r e d as e s s e n t i a l l y economic i n s t i t u t i o n s o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n a p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t , or e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n an economic e n v i r o n m e n t . D e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c h o i c e s o f s t r a t e g y w i l l t e n d t o be r e f l e c t i v e of b o t h e c o n o m i c and p o l i t -i c a l p r e s s u r e s . In some m a t t e r s t h e economic p r e s s u r e s may weigh more h e a v i l y on t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s t h a n the p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s , but i n o t h e r m a t t e r s t h e r e v e r s e w i l l he t r u e . What 36 i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e h e r e i s t h a t b o t h a r e t o be c o n s i d e r e d as i n f l u e n t i a l d e t e r m i n a n t s . F o r example, i n a t i m e of h i g h unemployment due t o an o v e r -s u p p l y of l a b o u r , t h e u n i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o e c o n o m i c t h e o r y , s h o u l d be w i l l i n g to a c c e p t a l o w e r wage r a t e i n o r d e r to m a ximize the employment-wage e q u a t i o n . That i s t o s a y , the u n i o n would a l l o w the wage t o be l o w e r e d to a p o i n t a t w h i c h , due t o i n c r e a s e d employment of l a b o u r , t h e t o t a l wage b i l l w o uld be a t a maximum l e v e l . T h i s assumes, of c o u r s e , t h a t the u n i o n can a c c u r a t e l y a s s e s s t h e e l a s t i c i t y of demand f o r l a b o u r , a f e a t w h i c h has p r o v e n i t s e l f to be n e a r i m p o s s i b l e under p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . In any c a s e , a c c o r d i n g t o p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , t h e u n i o n membership a l r e a d y employed would demand t h a t wage l e v e l s be m a i n t a i n e d , f o r c i n g u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p t o e n s u r e t h a t a downward wage s h i f t would n o t o c c u r . H i g h unemployment c o u l d be the r e s u l t of a n e g a t i v e s h i f t i n consumer demand. T h i s n e g a t i v e s h i f t would f o r c e t h e p r o d u c e r ( i . e . the e m p l o y e r ) t o r e a s s e s s t h e p r o d u c t market and s u b s e -q u e n t l y e x p l o r e the a v a i l a b l e s o l u t i o n p o s s i b i l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g l e a v i n g the p r o d u c t m a r k e t , a t t e m p t i n g t o a l t e r consumer p e r -c e p t i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r o d u c t , or a t t r a c t i n g more consumers by r e d u c i n g the p r o d u c t p r i c e . In the l a t t e r c a s e , a r e d u c t i o n i n l a b o u r c o s t may be r e q u i r e d . L a b o u r c o s t can be r e d u c e d i n one of e s s e n t i a l l y two ways: e i t h e r r e d u c e t h e t o t a l number employed o r r e d u c e t h e wage r e c e i v -ed by t h o s e p r e s e n t l y employed. In a c a s e s u c h as n o t e d above, the u n i o n (and i t s membership.) may s u p p o r t a wage r e d u c t i o n i n 3 7 o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n t h e e m p l o y e r and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e i r own employment. T h i s r e s p o n s e on the p a r t of l a b o u r would be most common i n s i t u a t i o n s In w h i c h the t h r e a t e n e d i n d u s t r y i s the m a j o r o r , i n f a c t , t h e o n l y e m p l o y e r i n t h e l o c a l a r e a (.i.e., 3 2 the c o m p e t i t i o n f o r l a b o u r i s r e l a t i v e l y l o w ) . The above example a l s o i l l u s t r a t e s one of the few p o i n t s on w h i c h b o t h Ross and Dunlop a g r e e : p r i c e r e d u c t i o n i n the p r o -d u c t market has a g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e on r e d u c t i o n of l a b o u r c o s t s 3 3 than does o v e r s u p p l y i n t h e l a b o u r m a r k e t . T h i s a p p e a r s t o be t r u e i n b o t h the p r i v a t e and p u b l i c s e c t o r s , a l t h o u g h p e r h a p s l e s s d i r e c t l y i n the l a t t e r i n s t a n c e . A p u b l i c e m p l o y e r most o f t e n w i l l n o t have e s t a b l i s h e d a "market p r o d u c t p r i c e " and w i l l a l s o n o t l i k e l y go out of b u s i n e s s . P r e s s u r e to r e d u c e l a b o u r c o s t s , t h e r e f o r e , w i l l be i n v e r s e l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o a g o v e r n -ment's e s t i m a t e s of p u b l i c demand and p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y of any p a r t i c u l a r s e r v i c e . T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n would a p p e a r t o s u p p o r t the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t e conomic v a r i a b l e s a f f e c t the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of s t r a t e g i e s more from t h e i r d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e on e m p l o y e r s t h a n on u n i o n s . The e m p l o y e r ' s c o n s t r a i n t s , t i e d as t h e y a r e t o the v a g a r i e s of t h e p r o d u c t m a r k e t , t e n d t o b r o a d e n o r narrow r e l a t i v e to s h i f t s of the s u p p l y and demand f u n c t i o n s w i t h i n t h a t m a r k e t . Such s h i f t s w i t h i n the l a b o u r m a r k e t , however, a p p e a r t o a f f e c t s t r a t e g i e s to a much l e s s e r d e g r e e , as the c o n c u r r e n t p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s t e n d t o m o d i f y , or even c a n c e l i n t h e s h o r t - t e r m , the r e s u l t a n t economic p r e s s u r e s . P e r h a p s the g r e a t e s t p r e s s u r e , on b o t h an e c o n o m i c and p o l i t i c a l b a s i s , i s t h a t of p e e r p r e s s u r e . F o r the u n i o n , wage 38 r a t e s and f r i n g e b e n e f i t s a c h i e v e d i n r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s by o t h e r u n i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y r i v a l u n i o n s , o f t e n d e t e r m i n e the minimum terms a c c e p t a b l e i n a new agreement. " C o m p a r i s o n " t h u s becomes a common s t r a t e g y i n b a r g a i n i n g . W h i l e the f a i r p r i c e f o r l a b o u r may be s a i d t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e by means of some form of s u p p l y and demand f u n c t i o n s , i n p r a c t i c e i t a p p e a r s t o be e s t a b l i s h e d i n any p a r t i c u l a r segment of t h e l a b o u r f o r c e l a r g e l y by means of p r e c e d e n t . T h i s may i n e f f e c t be t h e p r o -j e c t i o n of t h e supply-demand i n t e r a c t i o n as p r e c e d e n c e d o e s , a f t e r a l l , r e f l e c t the " g o i n g r a t e s " , ( a l s o c a l l e d " c o m p a r a t i v e 34 and c o m p e t i t i v e r a t e s " by R e y n o l d s ; "wage c o n s t e l l a t i o n s " by 3 5 36 H a r b i s o n ; " o r b i t s o f c o e r c i v e c o m p a r i s o n " by R o ss; "wage 37 c o n t o u r s " and " c l u s t e r a n a l y s i s " by D u n l o p ; " c o m p a r a t i v e - n o r m 3 8 p r i n c i p l e " by S l o a n e and W i t n e y ).. What r e s u l t s i s the p r e s s u r e from u n i o n membership on i t s l e a d e r s t o o b t a i n f o r them what has been a t t a i n e d e l s e w h e r e . P e e r p r e s s u r e can a l s o be f e l t by management. An e m p l o y e r may f e e l the e c o n o m i c p r e s s u r e t o a v o i d l a b o u r s e t t l e m e n t s w h i c h w i l l e s t a b l i s h a new p a t t e r n i n the i n d u s t r y . As Ross s t a t e s : C o m p a r i s o n s a r e i m p o r t a n t to t h e e m p l o y e r , whose g r e a t -e s t a n x i e t y , i n t h e a b s e n c e of i m p e r a t i v e e conomic p r e s s u r e s , i s to a v o i d " g e t t i n g out of l i n e . " One of t h e c a r d i n a l s i n s of b u s i n e s s c o n d u c t i s t o o f f e r a wage r a t e , or a wage i n c r e a s e , w h i c h p r o v e s e m b a r r a s s i n g t o o t h e r e m p l o y e r s . In a p e r i o d of a g g r e s s i v e u n i o n demands, t h e r e i s a t i g h t e n i n g of d i s c i p l i n e i n t h e b u s i n e s s community: " g e t t i n g out of l i n e " becomes as c r i m i n a l as g r a n d l a r c e n y . 3 9 P o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s a r i s i n g from government p o l i c y and p u b l i c o p i n i o n can a l s o d e t e r m i n e s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s . T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n p u b l i c s e c t o r b a r g a i n i n g . B e s i d e s g i v i n g 39 c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g l e g i s l a t i o n , which, i n i t s e l f may be somewhat p r o - u n i o n or a n t i - u n i o n , or pro-management o r a n t i -management, b o t h p a r t i e s have t o a c c o u n t f o r the g e n e r a l l e a n i n g s of t h e government i n c a s e th e e v e r - p r e s e n t p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r -v e n t i o n s h o u l d become a r e a l i t y . In d e v e l o p i n g s t r a t e g i e s , e a c h p a r t y must a s s e s s the p o s s i b l e g a i n s a t t a i n a b l e w i t h i n n e g o t i a t i o n s v e r s u s the p o s s i b l e g a i n s a t t a i n a b l e o u t s i d e n e g o t i a t i o n s . Thus the p o l i c i e s of government i f i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g more f a v o u r -a b l e t o one p a r t y t h a n the o t h e r can be an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n d e t e r m i n i n g how b a r g a i n i n g w i l l p r o c e e d . The A m e r i c a n government of 1947, f o r example, was c o n s i d e r e d t o be s t r o n g l y a n t i - u n i o n , c o n t i n u a l l y r a i s i n g the t h r e a t of r e p r e s s i v e l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n . As a r e s u l t t h e u n i o n s t r a t e g y of t h e day was g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d 40 by a d e s i r e t o a v o i d an i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h any l e v e l of government. In 1949, t h e U n i t e d S t e e l w o r k e r s of A m e r i c a were r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n t h a t P r e s i d e n t Truman would n o t a t t e m p t to i n v o k e the i n j u n c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s of t h e T a f t - H a r t l e y A c t a g a i n s t an o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h had g i v e n h i s p a r t y much needed h e l p i n the p r e v i o u s y e a r ' s e l e c t i o n s . The a p p o i n t m e n t by Truman of a F a c t - F i n d i n g B o a r d w i t h power t o make recommendations f o r a " j u s t and e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n of t h e i s s u e s " ^ g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d the S t e e l w o r k e r s ' b a r g a i n i n g power. More r e c e n t l y , i n A u g u s t , 1973, t h e H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n b y p a s s e d the e m p l o y e r s ' agent to e n t e r i n t o an "Agreement" w i t h t h e New D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y ' s M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h . The Agreement c a l l e d f o r t h e upward a d j u s t m e n t of a number of wage l e v e l s . The e m p l o y e r s ' a g e n t , h a v i n g not p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e c r e a t i o n of the Agreement, i m m e d i a t e l y s o u g h t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n from th e L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d as t o the l e g a l s t a t u s of t h e Agreement. The L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d , however, i n f o r m e d th e e m p l o y e r s ' agent 40 t h a t d i s c u s s i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e m a t t e r had been " t a b l e d . " B o t h u n i o n and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n t e r v i e w e d by t h i s w r i t e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e Agreement would have been f a r l e s s l i k e l y under a S o c i a l C r e d i t government. Government p o l i c y can o f t e n be i n t e r p r e t e d as an e x p r e s s i o n of p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t . However, the g e n e r a l c l i m a t e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n can o f t e n a f f e c t the s t r a t e g i e s t a k e n i n b a r g a i n i n g i n more d i r e c t f a s h i o n s . I n s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h p r o d u c t c o m p e t i t i o n i s h i g h , a s t o p p a g e i n p r o d u c t i o n c o u l d l e a d t o a l o n g - t e r m income l o s s t o t h e p r o d u c e r due to s h i f t s i n consumer a l l e g i a n c e . But, i n s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t i s a l s o h e a v i l y p r o -u n i o n i n n a t u r e , i t may n o t r e q u i r e a work s t o p p a g e t o c a u s e a damaging s a l e s d e c l i n e : w i d e s p r e a d p u b l i c i t y of "bad f a i t h " b a r g a i n i n g p o l i c i e s or " u n j u s t " l a b o u r p r a c t i c e s on t h e p a r t of t h e e m p l o y e r can s t i m u l a t e a s i m i l a r r e s p o n s e ( e . g . p r o d u c t boy-c o t t s ) . S i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s can o c c u r i n p u b l i c s e c t o r b a r g a i n i n g : i f p u b l i c o p i n i o n i s s u p p o r t i v e of l a b o u r as opposed to management ( i . e . g o v e r n m e n t ) , a l e n g t h y d i s p u t e c o u l d be d e t r i m e n t a l t o the g o v e r n i n g p a r t y ' s p o l i t i c a l a c c e p t a n c e . T h i s i s o b v i o u s l y an u n e n v i a b l e p o s i t i o n f o r a p u b l i c e m p l o y e r t o have p l a c e d i t s e l f i n as i t r e p r e s e n t s a s e p a r a t i o n of p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t from t h a t of government. P u b l i c o p i n i o n can a l s o be damaging t o the u n i o n p o s i t i o n . I n a p e r i o d of " l a b o u r u n r e s t , " f o r example, p u b l i c o p i n i o n may t u r n d e c i d e d l y a n t i - u n i o n , due t o , s a y , an a b n o r m a l l y l a r g e number of work s t o p p a g e s a t any one t i m e . The r e s u l t i n g i n c o n -v e n i e n c e and g e n e r a l u n s e t t l i n g e f f e c t to the p u b l i c would In t u r n r e s u l t i n the p u b l i c ' s h a v i n g l i t t l e , i f any, empathy w i t h t h e 41 o u t - o f - w o r k w o r k e r s , and l i t t l e , i f any, s u p p o r t f o r the. be-l e a g u e r e d u n i o n . In s u c h a c a s e , t h e f u l l n e g a t i v e e f f e c t of a work s t o p p a g e may n o t a c c r u e to the e m p l o y e r as a n t i c i p a t e d by u n i o n s t r a t e g y . In f a c t , i f p u b l i c o p i n i o n were f o r c e f u l enough, i t c o u l d i n s t i g a t e some form of government i n t e r v e n t i o n t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of t h e u n i o n p o s i t i o n . T h i s , f o r example, o c c u r r e d i n A u g u s t , 1975, i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , when a " l a b o u r " government f e l t c o m p e l l e d to i s s u e a g e n e r a l b a c k - t o - w o r k o r d e r , e n d i n g a l l s t r i k e s and l o c k - o u t s i n the p r o v i n c e , i n no s m a l l p a r t due t o t h e p r e s s u r e s of p u b l i c o p i n i o n . The m a j o r economic s a n c t i o n one p a r t y can l e v y a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r i s work s t o p p a g e (.1 • e. s t r i k e or l o c k - o u t ) . F o r t h e u n i o n , a work s t o p p a g e means l o s s of wages f o r i t s members, l o s s of income f o r t h e u n i o n i t s e l f , and p o t e n t i a l d e p l e t i o n of t h e u n i o n ' s c a p i t a l r e s o u r c e s i n o r d e r t o s u p p o r t b o t h th e u n i o n and i t s membership d u r i n g the p e r i o d of t h e work s t o p p a g e . F o r the e m p l o y e r , a work s t o p p a g e may c a u s e l o s s of r e v e n u e (.either s h o r t -term o r l o n g - t e r m , d e p e n d i n g on t h e p r o d u c t market and t y p e of b a r g a i n i n g : s i n g l e or m u l t i - e m p l o y e r ) ; permanent shut-down (^depending on the l e n g t h - of t h e work s t o p p a g e and t h e f i x e d c o s t s of o p e r a t i o n ) ; or p o s s i b l y a n e t s a v i n g due to d e c r e a s e d o p e r -a t i o n a l c o s t s . Thus, w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the u n i o n may s u f f e r g r e a t e r damage d u r i n g a work s t o p p a g e t h a n the e m p l o y e r , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t u n i o n s t r a t e g y be b a s e d i n p a r t on an a c c u r a t e a n a l y s i s of the e m p l o y e r ' s economic s t a t u s at the t i m e s u c h a s t o p p a g e i s a n t i c i p a t e d . Eowever, the c o s t t o the u n i o n of a 42 s t r i k e c a n n o t s i m p l y be c a l c u l a t e d on t h e b a s i s of d o l l a r s g a i n e d t h r o u g h a new c o n t r a c t l e s s d o l l a r s l o s t t h r o u g h f o r -f e i t e d income. Any g a i n a c h i e v e d w i l l o f t e n have o t h e r r e s u l t s more i m p o r t a n t to t h e u n i o n t h a n th e immediate monetary i n c r e a s e s t o i t s members. A h a r d - f o u g h t v i c t o r y f o r t h e u n i o n can mean i n c r e a s e d r e c o g n i t i o n i n the l a b o u r movement, an i n c r e a s e d power p o s i t i o n , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a new p a t t e r n o r key b a r g a i n f o r t h e i n d u s t r y , or a new b a s e . l e v e l f r o m w h i c h t o b e g i n f u t u r e b a r -g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s . I t i s o f t e n a c a s e of p r e s t i g e or s a v i n g ^ f a c e f o r t h e u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p t o c o n t i n u e s t r i k e a c t i o n l o n g a f t e r 42 i t s e conomic v i a b i l i t y has d i s a p p e a r e d . D u r i n g work s t o p p a g e s i t o f t e n becomes the f o c a l p o i n t of management s t r a t e g y t o a t t e m p t t o c o n v i n c e l a b o u r t h a t a c e r -t a i n o f f e r i s i n d e e d a f a i r one. The c o n t i n u a t i o n o f an "uneco-n o m i c a l " s t r i k e t h e n shows management t h a t i t has b e e n . i n e f f e c t -u a l i n a l t e r i n g t h e a t t i t u d e s of l a b o u r . I t c a r r i e s w i t h i t an i n f e r e n c e of management weakness, and of u n i o n s t r e n g t h . I t d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t u n i o n t h r e a t s o f s t r i k e a r e n o t t o be i g n o r e d now or i n t h e f u t u r e . I t i s , above a l l , a show of power, a p o s -i t i v e and open d e m o n s t r a t i o n of u n i o n " e s p r i t de c o r p s , " and, 43 most i m p o r t a n t , a v o t e of c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p . When u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p has been s u c c e s s f u l i n m a n i p u l a t -i n g the e x p e c t a t i o n s of i t s members t o a g i v e n l e v e l , i t must t h e r e a f t e r be a b l e t o p r o v i d e a s u b s t a n t i a l d i s p l a y of a c t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n toward m e e t i n g t h o s e e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s i s p a r -t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t t o u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p where t h e r e i s a r i v a l u n i o n on t h e s c e n e whose c o n t r a c t a l r e a d y a p p r o x i m a t e s t h o s e 43 e x p e c t a t i o n s : t h e s i g n i n g of a c o n t r a c t f o r even.one penny p e r hour more o r l e s s t h a n t h a t of a r i v a l u n i o n can s p e l l t h e d i f -f e r e n c e between v i c t o r y and d e f e a t . COf c o u r s e , i t may j u s t be management s t r a t e g y t o o f f e r a wage d i f f e r e n t i a l to a r i v a l u n i o n , as an a t t e m p t t o weaken a p o w e r f u l u n i o n . ) I t seems t o m a t t e r l i t t l e t h a t t h e w o r k e r s may n e v e r r e - e a r n t h e wages l o s t d u r i n g a work s t o p p a g e , as l o n g as t h e r e e x i s t s a s t r o n g l y sup-p o r t i v e , , p o s i t i v e , and e n t h u s i a s t i c a t t i t u d e towards the new agreement. The f i n a n c i a l l o s s t o the membership i s more t h a n compensated f o r by t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l ( . p o l i t i c a l ) g a i n t o the u n i o n . In summation, i t can be s a i d t h a t p o l i t i c a l d e t e r m i n a n t s e f f e c t s t r a t e g i e s f o c u s i n g on c o m p a r a t i v e and c o m p e t i t i v e l e v e l s of wages and b e n e f i t s t h r o u g h a n a l y s i s of r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s i n the l a b o u r m a r k e t p l a c e . Economic d e t e r m i n a n t s e f f e c t s t r a t -e g i e s b a s e d on such p a r a m e t e r s as l e v e l s of unemployment, i n -f l a t i o n , and c o m p e t i t i o n i n t h e p r o d u c t m a r k e t p l a c e . C a r t t e r and M a r s h a l l n o t e t h a t p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e s may change but w i l l n o t o b v i a t e t h e e f f e c t s of economic c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e m a r k e t -44 p l a c e . Rees comments t h a t t h e r e i s not l i k e l y t o e v e r be a " r e p l a c e m e n t of e conomic by p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s i n t h e s e t t i n g of wages; r a t h e r , t h e e conomic f o r c e s a r e f i l t e r e d t h r o u g h p o l i t i c a l g r o u p i n g s , w h i c h can d e l a y or r e d i r e c t them but n o t r e v e r s e t h e i r P e r s o n a l i t i e s and P e r s o n a l i t y P e r c e p t i o n The d e t e r m i n a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s i s o b v i o u s l y i n f l u e n c e d by s u c h f a c t o r s as p a r t y o b j e c t i v e s , p r e v i o u s p a r t y 44 e x p e r i e n c e , power r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and p o l i t i c a l and economic p r e s s u r e s . P e r h a p s l e s s o b v i o u s is the i n f l u e n c e b r o u g h t t o b e a r on the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of s t r a t e g y by the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s of the n e g o t i a t o r s t h e m s e l v e s . As t h e c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r s n o r m a l l y have much i n p u t i n t o t h e i r p a r t y ' s s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s , o f t e n t o the p o i n t of n e a r t o t a l c o n t r o l , t h e i r p e r s o n a l p r e j u d i c e s and b i a s e s , p r e c o n c e p t i o n s and p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , as w e l l as o t h e r p e r s o n a l i t y p a r a m e t e r s w i l l a f f e c t the c h o i c e of both, s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s . One p a r t y ' s p e r c e p t i o n of t h e o t h e r p a r t y i s shaped t o some d e g r e e by the e x p e r i e n c e g a i n e d from i n t e r p e r s o n a l i n t e r -a c t i o n s w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h a t p a r t y . Here a g a i n , i t i s not m e r e l y the p e r s o n a l i t i e s a l o n e t h a t a f f e c t t h e p r o c e s s b u t a l s o how each i s p e r c e i v e d by the o t h e r s i d e . F o r example, a newly h i r e d n e g o t i a t o r , s a y , i s b e s t known f o r h i s s u c c e s s f u l " h a r d l i n e a p p r o a c h " i n t h e h i g h l y c o n f l i c t - o r i e n t e d b a r g a i n i n g e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h w h i c h he was p r e v i o u s l y a s s o c i a t e d . The p a r t y now h a v i n g t o s i t a c r o s s t h e t a b l e from him p e r c e i v e s him • to be a " t o u g h c u s t o m e r , " a s t u b b o r n i n d i v i d u a l , and g e a r s i t s s t r a t e g i e s a c c o r d i n g l y . F u r t h e r m o r e , i f a n x i e t y l e v e l s a r e r a i s e d at the p r o s p e c t of h a v i n g to d e a l w i t h the new n e g o t i a t o r , c o o p e r a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g becomes a l e s s l i k e l y o p t i o n as i n c r e a s e d a n x i e t y l e v e l i s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d e c r e a s e d d e s i r e t o . 4 6 i n t e r a c t . D i f f e r e n c e s i n p e r s o n a l i t y Qe.g. p r o p e n s i t y t o c o o p e r a t e , t o t a k e command, t o a c c e p t d i r e c t i o n , t o a c c e p t c r i t i c i s m , t o gamble; i n d i v i d u a l needs and b e l i e f s ) shape th.e manner i n wh i c h 45 p e o p l e p e r c e i v e and, i n t u r n , a r e p e r c e i v e d . E x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d i e s c o n c e r n i n g p e r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as t h e y r e l a t e t o b a r g a i n i n g have n o t been numerous. R u b i n and Brown, however, p r o v i d e a c o n c i s e r e v i e w of the more r e c e n t s t u d i e s t h a t have i , . 47 been done xn t h i s a r e a . In p r e p a r i n g the c a s e s t u d y p r e s e n t e d i n C h a p t e r F o u r , i t was not p o s s i b l e f o r t h i s w r i t e r t o a s s e s s the n e g o t i a t o r s ' p e r s o n a l i t i e s . Thus, no d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y c h a r -a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l be p r e s e n t e d h e r e . However, i t s h o u l d be n o t e d , as a c l o s i n g word, t h a t t h e p e r c e p t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y i s i n f l u e n c e d t o a g r e a t e x t e n t by t h e e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h i t i s p e r c e i v e d . M e r e l y b e i n g l a b e l l e d " u n i o n " or "management" w i l l i n f l u e n c e the manner i n w h i c h a p e r s o n i s p e r c e i v e d . D o u g l a s has shown t h a t b o t h management and u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p e r c e i v e t h e m s e l v e s as b e i n g more h o n e s t and more t r u s t w o r t h y t h a n t h e i r o p p o s i t e numbers. Management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a l s o p e r c e i v e t h e m s e l v e s as b e i n g n o t as s u s p i c i o u s as u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , whereas u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s to be j u s t as s u s p i c i o u s as t h o s e of management. In a d d i t i o n , D o u g l a s s t a t e s t h a t : . . . (on) t h e b a s i s of t h r e e e v a l u a t i o n d i m e n s i o n s : (_good-bad, h o n e s t - d i s h o n e s t , t r u s t w o r t h y - u n t r u s t w o r t h y ) . . . ( t h e r e ) was the t e n d e n c y f o r b o t h l a b o u r and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o t h i n k t h e o t h e r p a r t y p e r c e i v e d them i n a l e s s f a v o u r a b l e manner t h a n i t a c t u a l l y d i d . ^ 8 Not o n l y do t h e n e g o t i a t o r s of b o t h u n i o n and management t e n d t o f e e l more p o s i t i v e about t h e m s e l v e s t h a n t h e y do about the o t h e r p a r t y ' s n e g o t i a t o r s , but t h e y f e e l the o t h e r p a r t y v i e w s them more n e g a t i v e l y t h a n th e o t h e r p a r t y r e a l l y d o e s . T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n once a g a i n t e n d s t o m i t i g a t e a g a i n s t the p o s s i b -46 i l i t y of t r u e i n t e g r a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , as t h a t p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s m u t u a l t r u s t , m u t u a l r e s p e c t , and a d e t e x m i n a t i o n t o work towards m u t u a l l y p o s i t i v e outcomes. A p a r t y w i l l f e e l somewhat r e t i c e n t t o be open and c o o p e r a t i v e i f i t b e l i e v e s the o t h e r p a r t y w i l l be s u s p i c i o u s and u n t r u s t i n g of i t s t r u e m o t i v e s . I f c o o p e r a t i o n i s t r u l y d e s i r e d t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n t a c t i c s w h i c h can be us e d (.called " a t t i t u d i n a l s t r u c t u r i n g " by W a l t o n 49 and M c K e r s i e ) , t o m a n i p u l a t e p e r s o n a l i t y p e r c e p t i o n s t o t h i s end. Use of l a n g u a g e , f o r example, s i m i l a r t o t h a t commonly use d by t h e o t h e r p a r t y i m p l i e s use of s i m i l a r t h o u g h t p r o c e s s e s , thus making t h e n e g o t i a t o r u s i n g t h e t a c t i c a p p e a r l e s s d i s t a n t , l e s s t h r e a t e n i n g , and more a c c e p t a b l e . I n f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n on " n o n - b u s i n e s s " t o p i c s p r i o r t o n e g o t i a t i o n s e s s i o n s l e n d s a f r i e n d l y a tmosphere to the p r o c e e d i n g s . Use of c o m p l i m e n t s and o t h e r s i g n s of a p p r o v a l a l l o w s a p a r t y t h e f e e l i n g t h a t i t s a c t i o n s and s e n t i m e n t s a r e b e i n g a c c u r a t e l y I n t e r p r e t e d . D i s c o v e r i n g a m u t u a l d i s l i k e f o r a t h i r d p a r t y a l s o h e l p s t o b r i n g t h e two s i d e s of t h e t a b l e c l o s e r t o g e t h e r . Use of s m a l l group d i s c u s s i o n s , as a f i n a l example, t e n d s t o a l l o w f o r a more open f l o w of com-m u n c a t i o n , g r e a t e r i n t e r p e r s o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n , and th u s a more p o s i t i v e p e r c e p t i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y . I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s The manner i n w h i c h a p a r t y f u n c t i o n s i n t e r n a l l y may i n f l u e n c e the manner i n w h i c h i t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f e x t e r n a l l y . Such f a c t o r s as t h e p a r t y ' s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , t h e r e l a t i o n -s h i p of the n e g o t i a t o r t o t h e p a r t y , t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e b a r -g a i n i n g s y s t e m (.i.e. m u l t i - e m p l o y e r v e r s u s s i n g l e e m p l o y e r ) and 47 t h e d e g r e e of f a c t i o n a l i s m w i t h i n t h e p a r t y may a f f e c t t h e p a r t y ' s b e h a v i o u r i t e x h i b i t s d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g . The r a n k - a n d - f i l e of t h e u n i o n and the members of t h e m u l t i - e m p l o y e r a s s o c i a t i o n p l a c e s i m i l a r demands upon t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s : s u p p o r t w i l l o n l y be g i v e n so l o n g as t h e i r g o a l s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d i n the g o a l s of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . To e n s u r e c o n t i n u e d commitment t o the o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , each d e v e l o p s p r o c e s s e s t h r o u g h w h i c h the u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n -making r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a p p e a r s t o r e s t at t h e g r a s s r o o t s l e v e l . In r e a l i t y , and p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t h e u n i o n , g r a s s r o o t s d e c i s i o n s a r e so s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p t h a t i t i s f a i r t o say t h a t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s e t s g o a l s and t h e membership f o l l o w s . The a c c e p t a n c e of a p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t ( a g a i n , p a r t i c -u l a r l y f o r t h e u n i o n ) i s a l s o l a r g e l y a f u n c t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p as the r a n k - a n d - f i l e w i l l not n o r m a l l y a c c e p t any agreement t h a t does n o t r e c e i v e the u n q u a l i f i e d recommendation of the l e a d e r -s h i p . A v o t e a g a i n s t a n e g o t i a t o r ' s recommendation i s a s i g n of the membership's l a c k of c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s a b i l i t y t o r e p r e s e n t them. Thus t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of p e r s o n a l s t a t u s becomes an i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n d e t e r m i n i n g b a r g a i n i n g b e h a v i o u r . Under m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g , management s i m i l a r l y r e l i e s on t h e e x p e r t i s e and knowledge of i t s a s s o c i a t i o n ' s n e g o t i a t o r s . In t h i s c a s e , however, t h e members making demands are fewer i n number and somewhat more a b l e t o a c c u r a t e l y a s s e s s what i s t e n a b l e and/or a f f o r d a b l e t h a n t h e i r u n i o n c o u n t e r p a r t s . F o r b o t h p a r t i e s , however, t h e r e can e x i s t t h e p r o b l e m of f a c t i o n -5 1 a l i s m , o r t h e s p l i t t i n g of membership s u p p o r t i n t o two o r more g r o u p s h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t i v e s . I f the o b j e c t -4 8 i v e s s u p p o r t e d by t h e f a c t i o n s w i t h i n management, f o r example, become known to t h e u n i o n , t h e n an a t t e m p t t o i n f l u e n c e t h e p r e s t i g e and a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h e f a c t i o n whose o b j e c t i v e s most c l o s e l y a p p r o x i m a t e t h o s e of the u n i o n , can be used as a u n i o n b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y . T h i s c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d t h e b a r g a i n i n g - e q u i v a l e n t of a " d i v i d e and c o n q u e r " s t r a t e g y . Weakness i n the management p o s i t i o n t h r o u g h f a c t i o n -a l i s m i s p e r h a p s the major drawback to an employer i n m u l t i -e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g . The l o s s of autonomy f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l e m ployer i s a s e c o n d drawback but n o t one t h a t has any a p p r e c i a b l e n e g a t i v e e f f e c t on b a r g a i n i n g . The a d v a n t a g e s to management o v e r s i n g l e e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g a r e many. Under m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g , management i s p l a c e d i n a h i g h e r b a s i c power p o s i t i o n due to i t s a b i l i t y to h i r e n e g o t i a t o r s , to d e v e l o p a r e s e a r c h c a p a b i l i t y , and t o b e t t e r w i t h s t a n d work s t o p p a g e s . T h i s l a s t p o i n t i s t r u e b e c a u s e each employer no l o n g e r has to w o r r y about l o n g - t e r m l o s s of b u s i n e s s t o a c o m p e t i t o r , w h i l e u n i o n has to w o r r y about the c o s t s of an i n d u s t r y - w i d e r a t h e r t h a n s i n g l e company a c t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n t h e u n i o n can no l o n g e r "whip-saw" e m p l o y e r s i n t o a c c e p t i n g demands a c c e p t e d e l s e w h e r e . A s m a l l employer can be f o r c e d t o a c c e p t whole " p a t t e r n s " when b a r g a i n i n g s i n g l y but w i l l have a say i n t h e outcomes of an agreement b a r g a i n e d c e n t r a l l y . M u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g a l s o has some f a i r l y m ajor a d v a n t a g e s to o f f e r t h e u n i o n s . W h i l e th e employer p r o t e c t s h i m s e l f a g a i n s t w h i p - s a w i n g , the u n i o n has t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to impose one l a s t " g i a n t whip-saw." By t h i s i t i s meant t h a t 49 t h r o u g h m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g the u n i o n w i l l a t t e m p t , u s u a l l y w i t h some modicum of s u c c e s s , t o r a i s e wage r a t e s , f o r p a r t i c u l a r j o b s or c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , t h r o u g h o u t t h e i n d u s t r y t o t h a t of t h e h i g h e s t s c a l e p a i d i n any s i n g l e i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h i n t h e i n d u s t r y . T h i s can be done t h r o u g h a s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of j o b t i t l e s and j o b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t h u s n e c e s s i t a t i n g a d e g r e e of u n i f o r m i t y of wage r a t e s among e m p l o y e r s . T h e r e i s one f i n a l a d v a n t a g e f o r t h e u n i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y a l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l . u n i o n , t o be f o u n d i n m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r -g a i n i n g . A u n i o n w h i c h can s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s i g n agreements w i t h a l a r g e number of e m p l o y e r s g a i n s a much h i g h e r p r o b a b i l i t y of e x c l u d i n g r i v a l u n i o n s f r om e s t a b l i s h i n g a s e r i o u s f o o t h o l d i n the i n d u s t r y . M u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g l e s s e n s the chance of a r i v a l u n i o n ' s e n t e r i n g the i n d u s t r y by " p i c k i n g o f f " one company at a t i m e . The m a j o r d i s a d v a n t a g e of m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g f o r the u n i o n i s the i n c r e a s e d d i f f i c u l t y and expense of g e t t i n g r a n k - a n d - f i l e s u p p o r t f o r a s h i f t i n g o a l s a n d / o r s t r a t e g i e s d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . Thus u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p may f i n d i t l e s s t r o u b l e s o m e to c o n t i n u e w i t h s t r a t e g i e s a p p r o v e d by t h e member-s h i p t h a n to s h i f t t o a more t e n a b l e p o s i t i o n i n m i d - s t r e a m . M u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g i s c o n s i d e r e d to be a more mature and r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m o f b a r g a i n i n g , and as s u c h , p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d t e n d t o be b e t t e r i n f o r m e d and more f a r - s i g h t e d i n 52 a p p r o a c h . Work s t o p p a g e s a r e fewer under m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r -g a i n i n g . In a d d i t i o n , m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g has the p o t e n t i a l t o i n f l u e n c e t h e use of more i n t e g r a t i v e l y - o r i e n t e d s t r a t e g i e s 50 t h r o u g h such i t e m s as j o b s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , wage s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n 53 and e l i m i n a t i o n of w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n i n e q u i t i e s . P a r t y O b j e c t i v e s As was d i s c u s s e d under " e c o n o m i c s , " one of the p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e s of t h e u n i o n i s t o a c h i e v e a wage-employment a g r e e -ment s a t i s f a c t o r y t o i t s membership and a t t r a c t i v e t o any p o t e n -t i a l a d d i t i o n s t o the membership. The wage-employment o b j e c t i v e , however, i s not e q u a l l y b a l a n c e d between the two f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d . The u n i o n membership c l e a r l y s e e s the wage p a c k a g e , i n c l u d i n g i n c r e a s e s to b o t h wage r a t e s and f r i n g e b e n e f i t s , as t h e most i m p o r t a n t outcome of b a r g a i n i n g . A r e d u c t i o n i n wages o r an " i n s u f f i c i e n t " i n c r e a s e , can be i n t e r p r e t e d by u n i o n membership as a r e d u c t i o n i n the b a s i c power p o s i t i o n of the u n i o n . A r e -d u c t i o n i n employment can g e n e r a l l y be e x p l a i n e d by u n i o n l e a d e r -s h i p i n terms of management's mismanagement and/or t e c h n o l o g i c a l change. O t h e r m a j o r o b j e c t i v e s of u n i o n membership i n c l u d e j o b s e c u r i t y and e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a power base t o e q u a l , or a t l e a s t c h a l l e n g e , t h a t of t h e e m p l o y e r . T h e s e , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e wage pack a g e , a r e n o r m a l l y the d r a w i n g c a r d s of t h e u n i o n i n t h e f i r s t 5 4 p l a c e . I t i s t h r o u g h " c o l l e c t i v e s t r e n g t h , " be i t b a s e d on r e a l ( i . e . c o n t r a c t u a l ) or p s y c h o l o g i c a l g a i n s , t h a t t h e u n i o n membership a c h i e v e s t h e s e n s e of d e s t i n y c o n t r o l t h a t i n p a r t a c c o u n t s f o r t h e s u r v i v a l of the u n i o n as an i n s t i t u t i o n . The u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p must p r o v i d e t h e membership w i t h e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e y a r e c o n t i n u a l l y i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r power o v e r 51 t h e e m p l o y e e s ' w o r k i n g e n v i r o n m e n t . Thus the u n i o n w i l l a t t e m p t t o g a i n a f o o t h o l d on s u c h a r e a s of management d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g as h i r i n g p o l i c i e s , f i r i n g p o l i c i e s , d e m o t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , p r o -m o t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n s and s e n i o r i t y b e n e f i t s . The p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e of t h e u n i o n i t s e l f i s t o expand and s t r e n g t h e n as an o r g a n i z a t i o n . One of the f i r s t c l a u s e s to be s e t t l e d i n any agreement i s the u n i o n s e c u r i t y c l a u s e . T h i s becomes p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t when r i v a l u n i o n s a r e p r e s e n t i n t h e i n d u s t r y and a r e v y i n g f o r j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r s p e c i f i c j o b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . A u n i o n may d e c i d e t o use a " f r o n t - r u n n e r " s t r a t e g y , a t t e m p t i n g to e s t a b l i s h a new p a t t e r n , as a means of a t t r a c t i n g or m a i n t a i n i n g s u p p o r t . A n o t h e r u n i o n , f i n d i n g i t s e l f b e h i n d a r i v a l , may be f o r c e d i n t o a " c a t c h - u p " s t r a t e g y , p o s s i b l y making use of an " e m p l o y e r ' s p r e f e r e n c e " argument, i m p l y i n g c o l -l u s i o n between the e m p l o y e r and t h e r i v a l u n i o n . The o b j e c t i v e i n a l l c a s e s i s t o promote the u n i o n and l e s s e n t h e a t t r a c t i v e -n e s s of a r i v a l u n i o n . Management's p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e a p p e a r s t o be r a t h e r s i m i l a r t o t h a t of t h e u n i o n ' s : t o promote t h e growth a n d / o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g df t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , be i t p u b l i c or p r i v a t e , to e n s u r e i t s o n g o i n g v i a b i l i t y and power p o s i t i o n . Management must s t r i v e t o m a i n t a i n the i n t e g r i t y of the i n s t i t u t i o n , i n c l u d i n g s u c h a s p e c t s as a s t a b l e and p r o d u c t i v e work f o r c e and, u l t i m a t e l y , a p o s i t i v e c o s t : b e n e f i t r a t i o . . I n p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y , t h i s may mean the m a x i m i z a t i o n ( o r p r o x i m a t e max-i m i z a t i o n ) of t h e p r o f i t c r i t e r i o n , o r , at the v e r y l e a s t , the c o n t i n u e d i n f l o w of a s u p p l y of d o l l a r s s u f f i c i e n t t o m a i n t a i n 52 the company's s o l v e n c y . I n p u b l i c s e r v i c e , t h e e q u i v a l e n t g u i d e p o s t may be t h e m a x i m i z a t i o n o f t h e s e r v i c e p o t e n t i a l w i t h i n g i v e n b u d g e t a r y l i m i t s . I n e i t h e r c a s e , management i s p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d with, a c o n t i n u i n g and s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n . In a c h i e v i n g t h e above p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e , management u s u a l l y w i s h e s to r e s i s t any c o s t i n c r e a s e s w h i c h may a d v e r s e l y e f f e c t the o r g a n i z a t i o n (.i.e. l o s s of p r o f i t ; r e d u c t i o n of s e r -v i c e ) . As wage i n c r e a s e i s n o r m a l l y t h e u n i o n ' s p r i m a r y demand, a c o n f l i c t o r i e n t a t i o n t o b a r g a i n i n g i s most o f t e n e x p e c t e d . A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t management o b j e c t i v e i s t o a v o i d l o s s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s p e r s o n n e l . In p a r t i c u l a r , management would s t r i v e t o m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l of p o l i c y i n s u c h a r e a s as f i n a n c i n g , p r o d u c t s t a n d a r d s , h i r i n g , f i r i n g , p r o m o t i o n , d e m o t i o n , d i s c i p l i n e , work r u l e s , and so on. Management's o b j e c t i v e s may a l s o i n c l u d e b r e a k i n g o r weakening t h e u n i o n . I n s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h r i v a l u n i o n i s m i s p r e s e n t , management may f i n d i t a worthwhile s t r a t e g y t o a l l o w a wage d i f f e r e n t i a l i n f a v o u r of a weaker or more c o o p e r a t i v e u n i o n as a means of n e g a t i v e l y e f f e c t i n g a more p o w e r f u l and c o m p e t i t i v e u n i o n . In t h i s manner, management would hope to r e d u c e the power p o s i t i o n of the l a t t e r u n i o n so t h a t , f u t u r e b a r g a i n i n g power a d v a n t a g e s may a c c r u e t o management. In more extreme c a s e s , management may a t t e m p t t o f o r c e the u n i o n i n t o a s t r i k e p o s i t i o n , i f i t f e e l s t h a t the u n i o n c o u l d n o t s u r v i v e a l e n g t h y work s t o p p a g e . 53 To sum up: . . . i f t h e o b j e c t i v e of t h e p a r t i e s i s t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n to t h e i r m u t u a l p r o b l e m s on the b a s i s of r a t i o n a l i t y and f a i r n e s s , the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l be c o n d u c t e d i n an atmosphere q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r o m one i n w h i c h t h e f u n d a m e n t a l o b j e c t i v e of the u n i o n i s t o "put management i n i t s p l a c e , " o r where t h e c h i e f o b j e c t i v e of t h e company i s t o weaken or even d e s t r o y the u n i o n . A l l t h e s e f a c t o r s , as w e l l as o t h e r s , w i l l have a p r o f o u n d i n f l u e n c e upon the c o n d u c t of c o l l e c t -i v e b a r g a i n i n g . ^ 5 L e g i s l a t i o n As d i s c u s s e d under " p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e " l e g i s l a t i o n can be c o n s i d e r e d a s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a n t i n t h a t a p a r t y ' s o p t i o n s may become more l i m i t e d as a r e s u l t of c e r t a i n g o v e r n m e n t a l d e c i s i o n s . F o r example, wage and p r i c e c o n t r o l s may be i n t e r -p r e t e d as somewhat a n t i - l a b o u r as wages t e n d t o be e a s i e r t o c o n t r o l t h a n p r i c e s . R i g h t - t o - w o r k l e g i s l a t i o n may be d e s c r i b e d by management as the embodiment of d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s , or by l a b o u r as t h e l e g a l i z a t i o n , of u n i o n - b u s t i n g . L e g i s l a t i o n a l l o w i n g c e r t i f i c a t i o n v o t e s when o n l y t h i r t y - f i v e p e r c e n t , i n s t e a d of f i f t y p e r c e n t , of employees i n a u n i t a r e i d e n t i f i e d as u n i o n members g i v e s the u n i o n g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o o r g a n i z e and expand. E s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s l e g i s l a t i o n may be i n t e r p r e t e d as p r o t e c t i n g p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s o f l i m i t i n g u n i o n ' s r i g h t t o s t r i k e and t h u s w e a k e n i n g t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . A l l s u c h l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l a f f e c t the l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s e n v i r o n m e n t .and as such a f f e c t b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y . The d i s c u s s i o n i n t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l f o c u s o n l y on t h e manner i n w h i c h l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n a l l o w s f o r t h i r d - p a r t y i n t e r -v e n t i o n i n the r e s o l u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s (.i.e. i n t e r e s t s 5 4 d i s p u t e s ) . More so t h a n i n p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s , t h e d i s c u s s i o n w i l l r e l a t e s p e c i f i c a l l y t o e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . T h e r e a r e e s s e n t i a l l y two t y p e s of t h i r d - p a r t y i n t e r -v e n t i o n : m e d i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n . M e d i a t i o n ( o r c o n c i l i a t i o n ) i s a means f o r two p a r t i e s t o r e a c h a v o l u n t a r y agreement through the m o d e r a t i n g a c t i v i t i e s of a t h i r d p a r t y . The f i n a l agreement i s made by t h e two p a r t i e s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d , and, as s u c h , the same f a c t o r s d e t e r m i n i n g s t r a t e g y i n d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s would d e t e r m i n e s t r a t e g y b e f o r e a m e d i a t o r . However, as m e d i a t i o n can have a m o d i f y i n g e f f e c t on the p a r t i e s , i t can be p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l i n c a s e s where p a r t i e s of a l m o s t e q u a l power ca n n o t s e t t l e m i n o r i s s u e s w h i c h xn t u r n d e l a y a c c e p t a n c e of m a j o r a g r e e m e n t s . In some s i t u a t i o n s , more t h a n one l e v e l of m e d i a t i o n may e x i s t . I n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a t h i s s e c o n d l e v e l of m e d i a t i o n t a k e s the form of an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. U t i l i z e d on an adhoc b a s i s i n d i s p u t e s w h i c h a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t or p r o b l e m a t i c , t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission a c t s as a " f a c t -f i n d e r " i n t h a t i t not o n l y m e d i a t e s n e g o t i a t i o n s but a l s o a t t e m p t s t o r e v e a l and a n a l y z e t h e " f a c t s " on w h i c h a s e t t l e m e n t can be b a s e d . The recommendations of t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission a r e made p u b l i c and s u b s e q u e n t l y o f t e n form the b a s i s f o r imposed a g r e e m e n t s . These f a c t o r s a r e i n t e n d e d as i n d u c e -ments f o r more r e s p o n s i b l e b a r g a i n i n g as b o t h p a r t i e s must n o t o n l y p r e s e n t w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d arguments t o s u p p o r t t h e i r demands but t h e demands t h e m s e l v e s must a p p e a r t o be i n o f f e n s i v e t o p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s . I t has been s u g g e s t e d , however, t h a t t h e I n d u s t r i a l 55 I n q u i r y Commission, as a s e c o n d l e v e l of m e d i a t i o n , somewhat n e g a t e s the v a l u e of t h e f i r s t l e v e l of m e d i a t i o n . To some de g r e e dependent on the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e , the b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y p u b l i c e m p l o y e r s ) may p u r p o s e l y a v o i d e a r l y n e g o-t i a t i o n i n o r d e r t o argue from uncompromised p o s i t i o n s b e f o r e t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission, t h e r e a f t e r t o have the Com-5 8 m i s s i o n ' s R e p o r t become p u b l i c knowledge. I f an agreement i s s u b s e q u e n t l y to be imposed, p u b l i c r e a c t i o n t o t h e Commission's R e p o r t may be a d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r of t h e award. In B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , p o l i c e , f i r e f i g h t e r , and h e a l t h c a r e u n i o n s have b o t h the r i g h t t o s t r i k e and t o i n v o k e a s e t t l e m e n t t h r o u g h b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , f o r e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s i n g e n e r a l , t h e M i n i s t e r may a p p o i n t a S p e c i a l M e d i a t o r whose recommendations may be us e d as t h e b a s i s f o r an imposed b i n d i n g agreement ( i . e . "med-arb"). Under t h e l a t t e r i n s t a n c e , w h i l e the p a r t i e s have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o n e g o t i a t e a s e t t l e m e n t , t h e r e i s , n o n e t h e l e s s , a d e g r e e of c o m p u l s i o n i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the system, The c r i t i c s of c o m p u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n c l a i m i t d e s t r o y s the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s and impedes any p o s s i b l e e v o l v e m e n t i n t o a more i n t e g r a t i v e form, s i n c e the d i s a g r e e i n g p a r t i e s a r e n e v e r 59 f a c e d w i t h the f u l l c o s t of t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t . A C a n a d i a n Task F o r c e r e p o r t e d t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s d w i n d l e as t h e p a r t i e s b e g i n t o r e l y on a r b i t r a t e d a w a r d s . ^ R e s e a r c h has shown t h a t once p a r t i e s have u s e d a r b i t r a t i o n , t h e r e e x i s t s a low p r o b a b i l i t y 61 of s e t t l i n g i n the f u t u r e w i t h o u t a r b i t r a t i o n . Under compul-s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n , the p a r t i e s may f e e l l e s s c o m p e l l e d t o b a r g a i n i n good f a i t h as c o n c e s s i o n s made p r i o r to a r b i t r a t i o n would 56 6 2 n e g a t i v e l y e f f e c t t h e r e s u l t i n g "compromise" award. The d e g e n e r a t i n g e f f e c t s on b a r g a i n i n g a p p e a r t o be l e s s when a r b i t r a t i o n i s used e i t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y or with: " a t 6 3 l e a s t t h e t a c i t s u p p o r t of b o t h p a r t i e s . " F u r t h e r m o r e , i t a p p e a r s a "med-arb" a p p r o a c h may b e s t a v o i d the e r o s i o n of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s w h i l e s t i l l m a i n t a i n i n g i t s c o m p u l s o r y a s p e c t s i n t h a t i t combines the p r e s s u r e t o b a r g a i n r e s p o n s i v e l y (as i n t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission) w i t h the p r e s s u r e of a d e a d l i n e f o r s e t t l e m e n t (.as i n c o m p u l s o r y a r b -. s 64 l t r a t i o n ) . I n summation, i t may be s a i d t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n i s a s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a n t i n t h a t i t c r e a t e s t h e bounds w i t h i n w h i c h b a r g a i n i n g can o c c u r . These bounds may be c o n s i d e r e d more l i m i t i n g on the s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s of one p a r t y t h a n t h e o t h e r . In p a r t i c u l a r , the t w o - t i e r e d s y s t e m of m e d i a t i o n may i n v o k e s t a l l i n g s t r a t e g i e s or s t r a t e g i e s of n o n — c o m m i t a l n e g o t i a t i o n i n the e a r l y s t a g e s i n o r d e r t o a v o i d the r i s k of l o s i n g " b a r g a i n i n g p o i n t s " p o t e n t i a l l y u s e f u l a t t h e f i n a l t i e r . Use of c o m p u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n , l a s t l y , may, i n the l o n g term, s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e d u c e a p a r t y ' s dependence on the b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r i t s b e s t outcomes, th u s i n -d u c i n g a more d i s t r i b u t i v e a p p r o a c h t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . 57 Footnotes- - C h a p t e r I I 1. H o s p i t a l Employees'. U n i o n , L o c a l 180, Recommendations f o r  Change i n He a l t h - Care D e l i v e r y and H o s p i t a l O p e r a t i o n ( V a n c o u v e r ) , May 1973, p.52. 2. "A Welcome A p p o i n t m e n t , " The H o s p i t a l G u a r d i a n , September 1974, p.4. 3. S t a t e m e n t made to t h i s w r i t e r d u r i n g i n t e r v i e w w i t h a p e r s o n n e l o f f i c e r of a l a r g e V a n c o u v e r h o s p i t a l . Name w i t h h e l d a t h i s ( h e r ) r e q u e s t . 4. F r e d e r i c k H. H a r b i s o n and John R. Coleman, G o a l s and S t r a t e g i e s  i n C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g (New Y o r k : H a r p e r & B r o s . , 1951), pp. 111-12. 5. C L . G r u d e r , " E f f e c t s of P e r c e p t i o n of Opponent's B a r g a i n i n g S t y l e and A c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o Opponent and P a r t n e r on I n t e r -p e r s o n a l M i x e d - M o t i v e B a r g a i n i n g , " D i s s e r t a t i o n A b s t r a c t s , 2 9 ..'(•1969).., p. 4555-56 ; C. L. G r u d e r , " R e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h Opponent and P a r t n e r i n M i x e d - M o t i v e B a r g a i n i n g , " J o u r n a l of  C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 15, No. 3 (.19 71), p . 403-16 . 6. R i c h a r d E. W a l t o n and R o b e r t B. M c K e r s i e , A B e h a v i o r a l  T h e o r y of L a b o u r N e g o t i a t i o n s (New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1965). 7. H a r b i s o n and Coleman, op. c i t . , p. 89. 8. R i c h a r d S. Coleman, P r o c e s s C h o i c e i n t h e R e s o l u t i o n of L a b o u r - Management R e l a t i o n s P r o b l e m s , M.Sc. T h e s i s i n B u s i n e s s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( V a n c o u v e r : U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1977) . 9. W a l t o n and M c K e r s i e , op. c i t . , p. 41-45. 10. C a r l M. S t e v e n s , S t r a t e g y and C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g Nego- t i a t i o n ( T o r o n t o : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1963), p. 21. 11. Coleman, op. c i t . , p. 34. 12. S t e v e n s , op. c i t . , p. 21. 13. J e f f r e y Z. R u b i n and B e r t R. Brown, The S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y  of B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a t i o n (New Y o r k : Academic P r e s s , 1975), p. 263. 14. R u b i n and Brown, op. c i t . , p. 24 15. A r t h u r M. Ros s , T r a d e U n i o n Wage P o l i c y ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 19.48), pp. 63-4. 16. S t e v e n s , op'.' c i t . , p. 2 58 17. H a r o l d M. L e v i n s o n , D e t e r m i n i n g F o r c e s i n C o l l e c t i v e Wage B a r g a i n i n g (New Y o r k : John W i l e y & Sons, 1966), p. 7. 18. Ross S t a g n e r , P s y c h o l o g y of I n d u s t r i a l C o n f l i c t (New Y o r k : John W i l e y , 1956), p. 291. 19. Ross S t a g n e r and H j a l m a r Rosen, P s y c h o l o g y of U n i o n - Management R e l a t i o n s ( B e l m o n t : Wadsworth P u b l i s h i n g , 1 956), p. 130. 20. John T. D u n l o p , Wage D e t e r m i n a t i o n Under T r a d e U n i o n s (New Y o r k : A.M. K e l l e y , 1950), p. 78. 21. John W. T h i b a u t and H a r o l d H. K e l l e y , The S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y  of Groups (New Y o r k : John W i l e y & Sons, 1959). 22. R u b i n and Brown, op. c i t . , p. 221. 23. I b i d . , pp. 213-29. 24. I b i d . , p. 223. 25. W a l t o n and M c K e r s i e , op. c i t . , p. 60. 26. N e i l W. C h a m b e r l a i n , A G e n e r a l T h e o r y of Economic P r o c e s s (New Y o r k : H a r p e r & B r o s . , 1955). 27. S t e v e n s , op. c i t . , p. 3. 28. T h i b a u t and K e l l e y , op• c i t . , pp. 120-23. 29. R u b i n and Brown, op. c i t . , p. 197. 30. T h i b a u t and K e l l e y , op. c i t . , p. 119. 31. L e v i n s o n , o p . - c i t . , p. 13. 32. John T. Dun l o p , I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s Systems (New Y o r k : Henry H o l t & Co., 1959), p. 64. 33. R o s s , op. c i t . , p. 55; D u n l o p , op. c i t . , p. 145. 34. L l o y d G. R e y n o l d s , "The Impact of C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g on the Wage S t r u c t u r e i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , " The T h e o r y  of Wage D e t e r m i n a t i o n , ed. John T. Dunlop (New Y o r k : M a c M i l l a n & Co., 1964). 35. H a r b i s o n and Coleman, op. c i t . , p. 94. 36. R o s s , op. c i t . , p. 53. 37. D u n l o p , op. c i t . , pp. 95-121. 38. A r t h u r A. S l o a n e and F r e d W i t n e y , L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s , 2nd ed. CEnglewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 261. 59 39. Ross, op. c i t . , p. 5 0-51.' 40. I b i d . , p. 30. 41. H a r b i s o n and Coleman, op. c i t . , p. 126. 42. Ross, op-, c i t . , p. 48. 43. S t e v e n s , op. c i t . , p. 8 7. 44. A l l a n M. C a r t t e r and F. Ray M a r s h a l l , L a b o r E c o n o m i c s :  Wages, Employment and T r a d e U n i o n i s m ( G e o r g e t o w n : I r w i n -D o r s e y L t d . , 1972). 45. A l b e r t Rees, The E c o n o m i c s o f T r a d e U n i o n i s m (.Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1962), p. 64. 46. I . S a r n o f f and P.G. Z i m b a r d o , " A n x i e t y , F e a r , and S o c i a l A f f i l i a t i o n , " J o u r n a l of Abnormal and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 62,N6.2(1961), pp. 356-63. 47. R u b i n and Brown, op. c i t . , pp. 174-94. 48. R o n a l d Lew D o u g l a s , A L a b o r a t o r y S t u d y of the Labor-Manage- ment B a r g a i n i n g R e l a t i o n s h i p , M.A. T h e s i s i n P s y c h o l o g y ( V a n c o u v e r : U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1970), pp.59-63. 49. W a l t o n and M c K e r s i e , op. c i t . , pp. 222-68. 50. Ross, op. c i t . , p. 39. 51. W a l t o n and M c K e r s i e , op. c i t . , p. 288. 52. S l o a n e and W i t n e y , op. c i t . , p. 154. 53. H a r o l d W. Davey, Co n t e m p o r a r y C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g (Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1 959), pp. 93-94. 54.' H a r b i s o n and Coleman, op. c i t . , p. 110. 55. S l o a n e and W i t n e y , op. c i t . , p. 183-84. 56. K u r t B r a u n , L a b o r D i s p u t e s and t h e i r S e t t l e m e n t ( B a l t i m o r e : Johns H o p k i n s P r e s s , 1955), p. 53. 57. Loewenberg, G e r s c h e n f e l d , G l a s b e c k , H e p p l e , and W a l k e r , Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n : An I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o m p a r i s o n (/Toronto: L e x i n g t o n Books, 1976), p. 51. 58. B r a u n , op. c i t . , p. 81 59. H e r b e r t R. N o r t h r u p , Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n and Government  I n t e r v e n t i o n i n L a b o r : D i s p u t e s ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: L a b o r P o l i c y A s s o c i a t i o n , 1 9 6 6 ) , p. 183. 60 60. D o n a l d Brown, I n t e r e s t A r b i t r a t i o n : Task F o r c e on L a b o u r  R e l a t i o n s , S tudy No. 18 COttawa: P r i v y C o u n c i l O f f i c e , 1968), p . 26 . 61. John C. A n d e r s o n and Thomas A. Kochan, "An E x a m i n a t i o n of the D u a l Impasse P r o c e d u r e s i n the F e d e r a l P u b l i c S e r v i c e of Canada," I n d u s t r i a l arid L a b o r R e l a t i o n s Review, 30, No. 3, ( A p r i l 1977 ) . 62. Derek C. Bok and John T. D u n l o p , L a b o r arid t h e A m e r i c a n  Community (New Y o r k : Simon and S c h u s t e r , 1970), p. 237. 63. Mark Thompson and James C a i r n i e , " C o m p u l s o r y A r b i t r a t i o n : The Case of the B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a T e a c h e r s , " I n d u s t r i a l  and L a b o r R e l a t i o n s Review, 27, No. 1 ( O c t o b e r 1973). 64. Bok and D u n l o p , op. c i t . , p. 333; S t e v e n s , op. c i t . , p. 101. 61 CHAPTER III : BACKGROUND TO THE H.E.U./H.L.R.A. MASTER AGREEMENT H o s p i t a l E c on o'm 1 c s I n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , where e i g h t y p e r c e n t of t h e a v e r a g e h o s p i t a l ' s o p e r a t i n g budget i s a l l o c a t e d t o p a y r o l l , even a r e l a t i v e l y modest i n c r e a s e i n t h e wages t o employees w i l l c a u s e a l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n the t o t a l c o s t of h o s p i t a l c a r e . The c o s t s i n v o l v e d i n the p r o v i s i o n of h e a l t h c a r e p r e s e n t l y consume more of t h e p r o v i n c i a l budget t h a n any o t h e r s o c i a l service"'"; f u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s e c o s t s a r e s t i l l r i s i n g a t 2 a f a s t e r r a t e t han th e c o s t s of any o t h e r s e r v i c e . T h i s , of c o u r s e , i s n o t a phenomenon u n i q u e t o B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . In b o t h Canada and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , h e a l t h s e r v i c e e x p e n d i t u r e s have r i s e n t o the p o i n t where t h e y now a r e more t h a n d o u b l e th e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e G r o s s N a t i o n a l P r o d u c t s p e n t on h e a l t h s e r v i c e s f i f t e e n t o twenty y e a r s ago. H i s t o r i c a l l y , h o s p i t a l s a t t e m p t e d t o m i n i m i z e l a r g e i n c r e a s e s i n o p e r a t i n g e xpenses by m i n i m i z i n g wage i n c r e a s e s . T h i s was a c c o m p l i s h e d i n t h e most p a r t by h i r i n g w o r k e r s ( p r e -d o m i n a n t l y f e m a l e ) at somewhat l e s s t h a n the p r e v a i l i n g market p r i c e f o r l a b o u r . Over the l a s t few d e c a d e s , however, the mod-e r n h o s p i t a l has been s u b j e c t t o e x t r e m e l y r a p i d changes i n t e c h n o l o g y . As one d o c t o r r e c e n t l y r e p o r t e d : (At one t i m e ) , when my p a t i e n t d e v e l o p e d k i d n e y f a i l u r e , the: most 1 c o u l d do was t o r e l i e v e some 62 symptoms while he d i e d . Today h i s l i f e and reason-able h e a l t h can be maintained i f he enters i n t o a d i a l y s i s program r e q u i r i n g ' that he be t r e a t e d on an a r t i f i c i a l kidney about three h.alf days per week C c o s t i n g about $16,000 per year) or have a r e n a l t r a n s -p l a n t o p e r a t i o n C c o s t i n g maybe the same amount but followed by continuous c a r e f u l treatment to prevent r e j e c t i o n and f a i r l y frequent r e - o p e r a t i o n ) . ^ These advancements i n technology have had to be matched with an upgrading of the l e v e l of personnel employed by the hos-p i t a l . H o s p i t a l s now comprise a labour I n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r y de-manding a r e l a t i v e l y high l e v e l of employee competence by v i r t u e of the s e r v i c e s performed. Thus i t i s not e n t i r e l y s u r p r i s i n g that r a p i d l y r i s i n g s a l a r i e s and wages, f a r more so than the p u b l i c ' s r i s i n g demand f o r care, have been the major c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s to the e s c a l a t i o n of h e a l t h care c o s t s . Labour i n the h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y began moving towards o r g a n i z a t i o n somewhat l a t e r i n h i s t o r y than did labour i n the i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r . By mid-1974, however, h o s p i t a l workers were among the most m i l i t a n t of organized labour. Across Canada, non-medical workers, nurses, and i n t e r n s were a l l c a l l i n g f o r s t r i k e a c t i o n . The most common demand was f o r "catch-up" with workers i n " p r i v a t e " i n d u s t r y . Each of the h o s p i t a l unions were watch-ing the others f o r the best p a t t e r n s to emerge so that they could 5 be used as new b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s . In 1974, Canadian workers staged more man-days on s t r i k e per c a p i t a than workers i n v i r t u a l l y any other western country except I t a l y ; and, Canadian wage in c r e a s e s f o l l o w i n g c o n t r a c t disputes ran at n e a r l y twice the l e v e l of American c o n t r a c t settlements i n 1974 . . . . The l e a d e r s h i p came from teachers and h o s p i t a l workers.^ During the 1930's, B r i t i s h Columbia began to s u b s i d i z e h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n expenses a r i s i n g from the care of i n d i g e n t s . 63 I n a d d i t i o n , t h e P r o v i n c e made g r a n t s a v a i l a b l e t o h o s p i t a l s i n amounts e q u a l to a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w e n t y - f i v e p e r c e n t of t o t a l o p e r a t i n g c o s t s . C o m p u l s o r y h o s p i t a l i n s u r a n c e was i n t r o d u c e d i n 1948, t h r o u g h p a s s a g e of t h e H o s p i t a l I n s u r a n c e A c t . In 1954, f i n a n c i n g of t h e H o s p i t a l I n s u r a n c e Fund e s t a b l i s h e d by the A c t was s e c u r e d through, the p r o c e e d s of t h e p r o v i n c i a l s a l e s t a x . ^ P r e s e n t l y , i n B r i t i s h . C o l u m b i a , the Fund f i n a n c e s one hu n d r e d p e r c e n t of h o s p i t a l s ' " h e a l t h c a r e " o p e r a t i n g c o s t s and Is a d m i n i s t e r e d by B r i t i s h . C o l u m b i a H o s p i t a l Programs (B.C.H..P.) f o r m e r l y the B.C. H o s p i t a l I n s u r a n c e S e r v i c e ( B . C . H . I . S . ) , a dep a r t m e n t w i t h i n t h e M i n i s t r y of H e a l t h . B.C.H.P. m a i n t a i n s a d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e on t h e p r o v i s i o n of h e a l t h c a r e t h r o u g h i t s a u t h o r i t y t o ap p r o v e new programs f o r p a t i e n t c a r e , and t o e s t a b l i s h s t a f f i n g p a t t e r n g u i d e l i n e s . T h i s l a t t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , B.C.H.P. has a b s o l u t e no c o n t a c t w i t h h o s p i t a l l a b o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A l l employee r e l a t i o n s , r a n g i n g f r o m p e r s o n n e l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n up t o and i n c l u d i n g c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , i s l e f t s t r i c t l y i n t h e hands of t h e i n d i v i d u a l e m p l o y e r s . Thus, the h o s p i t a l u n i o n s a r e p l a c e d i n the p o s i t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g w i t h an e m p l o y e r who has l i t t l e c o n t r o l o v e r o p e r a t i n g b u d g e t s (as t h e s e a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by B.C.H.P), who o f t e n has l i t t l e knowledge of t h e n e x t y e a r s ' a v a i l a b l e d o l l a r s at the time of b a r g a i n i n g (as a p p r o v e d b u d g e t s a r e n o t u s u a l l y r e c e i v e d by t h e h o s p i t a l s u n t i l m i d - y e a r ) , and t h e r e f o r e has l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e s t i m a t e the employment e f f e c t of any wage i n c r e a s e s g r a n t e d . T h e r e a r e f i v e major u n i o n s or employee a s s o c i a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n t h e h o s p i t a l I n d u s t r y i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . They a r e 64 1. H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 180 (.22,000 members i n n i n e t y - n i n e h o s p i t a l s ) 2. R e g i s t e r e d N u r s e s ' A s s o c i a t i o n of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a (.7,500 members w o r k i n g i n a c u t e c a r e h o s p i t a l s ) 3. I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i o n of O p e r a t i n g E n g i n e e r s (.160 members i n t w e n t y - e i g h t h o s p i t a l s ) 4. H e a l t h S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n (.3, 200 members i n n i n e t y - s i x h o s p i t a l s ) 5. P r o f e s s i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of R e s i d e n t s and I n t e r n s (.350 members i n e i g h t t e a c h i n g h o s p i t a l s ) E a ch one of t h e above has i t s own n e g o t i a t i n g teams and b a r g a i n s with, management i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the o t h e r u n i o n s and a s s o c i a t i o n s . The R e g i s t e r e d N u r s e s ' A s s o c i a t i o n o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a In 1946, a g r a d u a t e n u r s e i n V a n c o u v e r e a r n e d a b a s i c s a l a r y of $125 p e r month, each week of w h i c h c o n s i s t e d of f o r t y -e i g h t t o f i f t y - t w o w o r k i n g h o u r s . By 1956, l a r g e l y t h r o u g h u n i o n e f f o r t , m o n t h l y s a l a r i e s i n c r e a s e d t o $240 p e r month w h i l e t h e work week d e c r e a s e d t o f o r t y h o u r s . In terms of d o l l a r s r e c e i v e d a l o n e , t h i s r e p r e s e n t e d a n i n e t y - t w o p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e d u r i n g a decade i n w h i c h t h e c o s t of l i v i n g i n d e x r o s e o n l y f o r t y - t h r e e p e r c e n t . These g a i n s were n o t made by the R e g i s t e r e d N u r s e s ' A s s o c i a t i o n of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a (.R. N . A. B . C . ) , a c t i n g as e i t h e r a p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n or a t r a d e u n i o n , b u t r a t h e r by t h e n u r s i n g d i v i s i o n of the H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 180. The a d v a n c e s of the " s e r v i c e " u n i o n i n t o t h e r e a l m of p r o f e s -s i o n a l n u r s i n g soon r e s u l t e d i n an awareness by the p r o f e s s i o n 6 5 f o r the need to b e t t e r organize t h e i r labour r e l a t i o n s f u n c t i o n . The R.N.A.B.C. became the f i r s t nurses' a s s o c i a t i o n i n Canada to secure c e r t i f i c a t i o n f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , suc-c e s s f u l l y n e g o t i a t i n g an agreement f o r the nurses at St. Paul's H o s p i t a l i n Vancouver i n 1946. This a c t i o n by the nurses' a s s o c i a t i o n was taken d i r e c t l y i n response to the impingement of trade unionism i n t o the p r e v i o u s l y "sacred" t e r r i t o r y of p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m . The j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d i s p u t e over the n u r s i n g p o s i t i o n s covered by the H o s p i t a l Employees' Union continued u n t i l 1956 when the union l o s t the graduate nurses to R.N.A.B.C.. R.N.A.B.C. p r e s e n t l y represents approximately 7,500 r e g i s t e r e d nurses i n p u b l i c h o s p i t a l s and an a d d i t i o n a l 2,500 i n other h e a l t h care f a c i l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g p u b l i c h e a l t h u n i t s , mental h e a l t h c e n t r e s , and p r o v i n c i a l h o s p i t a l s . As a pro-f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n , R.N.A.B.C. i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the l i c e n s -ing of r e g i s t e r e d nurses throughout B r i t i s h Columbia. 9 Health Sciences A s s o c i a t i o n of B r i t i s h Columbia The Health Sciences A s s o c i a t i o n (H.S.A.) i s a trade union r e p r e s e n t i n g approximately 3,200 t e c h n i c a l and paramed-i c a l employees of p u b l i c h o s p i t a l s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, plus approximately 100 employees of v a r i o u s other h e a l t h agencies. When f i r s t c e r t i f i e d as a b a r g a i n i n g agent by the Labour Re-l a t i o n s Board of B r i t i s h Columbia i n 1971, H.S.A. bargained on behalf of the department h.eads i n only two h o s p i t a l s (.i.e. Lions Gate H o s p i t a l , i n North. Vancouver; St. Paul's H o s p i t a l , i n Vancouver C i t y ) . By the time of the s t a r t of n e g o t i a t i o n s 66 f o r t h e 1978 agreement, s t a f f members of n i n e t y - s i x h o s p i t a l s t h r o u g h o u t t h e p r o v i n c e were r e p r e s e n t e d by H.S.A. H.S.A. o r i g i n a t e d t h r o u g h t h e e f f o r t s of a s m a l l number of h o s p i t a l d e p artment h e a d s . L a c k i n g any o r g a n i z e d means of b a r g a i n i n g f o r t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , t h e y were n o n e t h e l e s s n o t d e s i r o u s of j o i n i n g t h e same b a r g a i n i n g u n i t t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d most of t h e i r d e p a r t m e n t a l s t a f f C i . e • th e H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 1 8 0 ) . They moved i n s t e a d to e s t a b l i s h an i n d e p e n d -ent l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s a s s o c i a t i o n t o c o l l e c t i v e l y b a r g a i n on be-h a l f of p a r a m e d i c a l and t e c h n i c a l employees h a v i n g s u p e r v i s o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I n s h o r t t i m e t h e a s s o c i a t i o n expanded i t s terms of r e f e r e n c e t o i n c l u d e any " p e r s o n s engaged i n h e a l t h „10 s c i e n c e p r o f e s s i o n s or o c c u p a t i o n s . The r e v i s e d d e f i n i t i o n o f membership e l i g i b i l i t y p l a c e d U.S.A. i n d i r e c t c o m p e t i t i o n f o r members w i t h the H o s p i t a l Em-p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , as a number of t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l c l a i m e d by the f o r m e r were a l s o c l a i m e d by t h e l a t t e r . In a d d i t i o n , the B.C.H.A. ( i . e . t h e e m p l o y e r s ' a s s o c i a t i o n ) was i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g somewhat s u p p o r t i v e of t h e move to keep t e c h n i c a l and p a r a m e d i c a l s t a f f ( / p a r t i c u l a r l y d e p a r t m e n t heads) out of a " s e r v i c e e m p l o y e e s " u n i o n . I n f a c t , i t was s u b s e q u e n t l y c l a i m e d by a H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t h a t t h e B.C.H.A. was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n e s t a b l i s h i n g E.E.U.'s main r i v a l u n i o n s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a as a means of c h i p p i n g away at the p o t e n t i a l power b l o c k of H.E.U.. T h i s may be c o n s i d e r e d a r a t h e r s i m p l i s -t i c v i e w p o i n t ; however, H.E.U. p o i n t s t o t h e wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s g i v e n t h e o t h e r u n i o n s as a c l e a r d i s i n c e n t i v e f o r employees 6 7 Figure 11 GROUPS INCLUDED IN HEALTH SCIENCES ASSOCIATION March 10, 1976 1. Audiologist-Technician 21. Nuclear Medicine Technologist 2. B a c t e r i o l o g i s t 22. Occupational Therapist 3. Bio-Chemist 23. Orthoptist 4. Bio-Medical E l e c t r o n i c Technician* 24. Or t h o t i s t and Trainee 5. Cardiology Technician 25. Pharmacist 6. C l i n i c a l Chemist 26. Physics Technician 7. Computer Programmer 27. Physiotherapist 8. D i e t i t i a n 28. P s y c h i a t r i c Nurse 9. Electrocardiograph Technician 29. Psychologist 10. Electroencepholograph Technologist 30. Psychometrician 11. Electromyograph Technician 31. Pulmonary Functions Technologist 12. Electronystagmography Technician 32. R a d i o l o g i c a l Technician* 13. In f e c t i o n Control O f f i c e r 33. Radiotherapist 14. L i b r a r i a n 34. Recreational Therapist 15. L i b r a r i a n Technician 35. Remedial Gymnast 16. Masseuse 36. Respiratory Therapist* 17. Medical Records L i b r a r i a n 37. Speech Pathologist 18. Medical Technologist 38. S o c i a l Worker 19. Mold Room Technician* 39. Vocational Counsellor 20. Neuro-Psychologist 40. X-Ray Service Technician* * a l s o c o v e r e d by H.E..U. S o u r c e : J . C a m p b e l l , D i r e c t o r of L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s , H e a l t h S c i e n c e s .. : A s s o c i a t i o n : p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n 68 to j o i n -.H.. E . U . I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i o n of O p e r a t i n g Engineers"*""*" The I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i o n of O p e r a t i n g E n g i n e e r s (.I.U.O.E.), L o c a l s 882 and 882B, r e p r e s e n t s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 160 employees i n t w e n t y - e i g h t p u b l i c h o s p i t a l s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . I.U.O.E. had been s t r i c t l y a c r a f t u n i o n up u n t i l 1971. I t has s i n c e undergone o r g a n i z a t i o n a l changes i n o r d e r t o keep a b r e a s t of c h a n g i n g t e c h n o l o g y . W i t h a d e c r e a s i n g need f o r f u l l -t i me steam e n g i n e e r s i n many h o s p i t a l s , I. U.O.E. f o u n d i t s e l f c o m p e l l e d t o move beyond the b o u n d a r i e s imposed by c r a f t u n i o n -i z a t i o n i n o r d e r to keep i t s membership from l e a v i n g t o j o i n the m a j o r i n d u s t r i a l u n i o n ( H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 1 8 0 ) . Thus, w h i l e t h e v a s t m a j o r i t y of I.U.O.E. members r e m a i n e d t r a d e q u a l i f i e d ( T Q ' d ) , many were p l a c e d i n j o b s w i t h t i t l e s i m p l y i n g a more g e n e r a l m a i n t e n a n c e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n : f o r example, M a i n -t e n a n c e E n g i n e e r , M a i n t e n a n c e P e r s o n , and U t i l i t y E n g i n e e r . W h i l e t h e s h i f t i n s t a t u s of I.U.O.E. from t h a t of a c r a f t u n i o n t o w a r d t h a t of an i n d u s t r i a l u n i o n may have been q u i t e a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e h o s p i t a l s , i t does n o t a ppear t o have been t a k e n i n good s p i r i t by t h e H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n . H.E.U.-180 has h i s t o r i c a l l y c l a i m e d j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a l l s e r -v i c e employees i n the h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , o u t s i d e t h e w a l l s of the powerhouse. However, when I.U.O.E. e x t e n d e d i t s r e a c h be-yond t h o s e w a l l s , i t came i n t o d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e u n c e r -t i f i e d (non-TQ) m a i n t e n a n c e and u t i l i t y p e o p l e a l r e a d y c o v e r e d by H.E.U. As a r e s u l t , t h e r e a r e f r e q u e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b a t t l e s 69 f o u g h t between the two u n i o n s o v e r such, j o b s as r o u t i n e m a i n -t e n a n c e of m a c h i n e r y , e l e c t r i c a l r e p a i r s , equipment o v e r h a u l , and even c a r p e n t r y . The P r o f e s s i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of R e s i d e n t s and I n t e r n s I n c o r p o r a t e d as a s o c i e t y i n 1973, t h e P r o f e s s i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of R e s i d e n t s and I n t e r n s (P.A.R.I.) d i d n o t a p p l y f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n as a b a r g a i n i n g agent under t h e L a b o u r Code u n t i l December, 1975. P r i o r t o t h a t t i m e , P.A.R.I. r e p r e s e n t e d r e s i d e n t s and i n t e r n s i n n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h h o s p i t a l s on a s t r i c t -l y v o l u n t a r y b a s i s as the Code d i d not a l l o w f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n of e i t h e r p r o f e s s i o n a l s or s t u d e n t s . P.A.R.I. now n e g o t i a t e s on b e h a l f of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 350 members i n e i g h t h o s p i t a l s l o c a t e d i n V a n c o u v e r and V i c t o r i a . M e d i c a l u n i o n s have been d e v e l o p i n g i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t o o . Not o n l y a r e house s t a f f s b e i n g o r g a n i z e d ( t h e Committee of I n t e r n s and R e s i d e n t s i n New Y o r k CiJ:y formed more t h a n twenty y e a r s a g o ) , b u t p r i v a t e p r a c t i c e p h y s i c i a n s as w e l l . Some have 12 gone so f a r as t o become a f f i l i a t e d w i t h the A . F . L . - C . I . 0 . In t h i s l i g h t , t h e d e c i s i o n of r e s i d e n t s and i n t e r n s to u n i o n i z e p r o v i d e s some i n c e n t i v e t o H.E.U. to a t t r a c t t h i s s m a l l but e x t r e m e l y i n f l u e n t i a l group of p o t e n t i a l members. A u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t a t e d t h a t t h e H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n i s q u i t e p r e p a r e d t o e s t a b l i s h , a " p r o f e s s i o n a l arm" so as n o t t o a ppear t o compromise the m e d i c a l i n t e g r i t y of th.e r e s i d e n t s and i n t e r n s w h i l e p r o v i d i n g them w i t h a much g r e a t e r base, of power from w h i c h t o b a r g a i n . 70 13 The H o s p i t a l Employees'- Union The s i n g l e l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l union i n B r i t i s h Columbia's h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y i s the H o s p i t a l Employees'. Union, L o c a l 180 (H.E.U.). The union represents over 22,000 members i n n i n e t y -nine h o s p i t a l s and h e a l t h care I n s t i t u t i o n s . H.E.U. members are i n v o l v e d i n v i r t u a l l y every f a c e t of h o s p i t a l o p e r a t i o n , from p r a c t i c a l nurses, to o r d e r l i e s , to i n h a l a t i o n t h e r a p i s t s , to housekeepers, to op e r a t i n g engineers, to c a r p e n t e r s , to laundry workers, to t e c h n i c i a n s of v a r i o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . As an i n d u s t r i a l union, the s t a t e d object of H.E.U. i s "to u n i t e and a s s o c i a t e together a l l employees employed i n h o s p i t a l , medical, or r e l a t e d work f o r the purpose of s e c u r i n g concerted a c t i o n i n whatever may be regarded as conducive to 14 t h e i r best i n t e r e s t s . " This all-encompassing approach to labour o r g a n i z a t i o n has r e s u l t e d i n a number of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d i s p u t e s with the other unions and a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h i n the h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y In f a c t , comments made to t h i s w r i t e r from v a r i o u s labour r e p r e -s e n t a t i v e s i n d i c a t e that i n t e r - u n i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s are "very poor." H.E.U. f i r s t organized i n 1944 at the Vancouver General H o s p i t a l . There had been a union at V.G.H. si n c e 1936 ( H o s p i t a l Group of C i v i c Employees' Union) but the h o s p i t a l employees con-s i d e r e d i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to be inadequate. In 1946, a Nursing D i v i s i o n of H.E.U. was e s t a b l i s h e d , . p l a c i n g the union i n d i r e c t competition with R.N.A.B.C. f o r the next ten years. While the r e g i s t e r e d nurses e v e n t u a l l y moved i n t o t h e i r own p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n , there r e c e n t l y has been some I n t e r e s t shown by nurses i n r e t u r n i n g to H.EiU. The Union, h o w e v e r , s t i l l represents a l l 71 l i c e n s e d p r a c t i c a l n u r s e s as; t h e y a r e c o n s i d e r e d p a r t of s e r v i c e , r a t h e r t h a n p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f i n t h e h o s p i t a l . The u n i o n i s a d m i n i s t e r e d t h r o u g h t h e a u t h o r i t y of i t s P r o v i n c i a l E x e c u t i v e , c o m p r i s e d of t h e S e c r e t a r y - B u s i n e s s Manager (a s t a f f p o s i t i o n , t h e u n i o n ' s c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r ) and s e v e n t e e n p o s i t i o n s e l e c t e d d u r i n g the B i e n n i a l C o n v e n t i o n . The P r o v i n c i a l P r e s i d e n t and F i n a n c i a l S e c r e t a r y , once e l e c t e d , become f u l l -t ime s t a f f p o s i t i o n s . As t h e P r o v i n c i a l E x e c u t i v e meets o n l y t h r e e t i m e s y e a r l y , t h e d a i l y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of u n i o n a f f a i r s n e c e s s a r i l y becomes a f u n c t i o n of s t a f f . I t i s s t a f f who d e a l w i t h t h e e m p l o y e r or e m p l o y e r ' s agent i n any d i s p u t e s or g r i e v a n c e s w h i c h may a r i s e d u r i n g t h e l i f e of an agreement. I t i s s t a f f who m o n i t o r i n c r e a s e s i n t h e Consumer P r i c e I n d e x , r e v i e w r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s a c h i e v e d by o t h e r u n i o n s , a t t e m p t to gauge ( o r i n f l u e n c e ) t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e , s u p p l y i n f o r m a t i o n and o p i n i o n s t o t h e membership, and recommend b a r g a i n i n g demands and s t r a t e g y o p t i o n s t o t h e P r o v i n -c i a l E x e c u t i v e . . I t i s at t h e u n i o n ' s P r o v i n c i a l Wage P o l i c y C o n f e r e n c e , h e l d p r i o r to the r e - o p e n i n g d a t e of t h e M a s t e r Agreement, t h a t t h e P r o v i n c i a l E x e c u t i v e p r e s e n t s the demands t o t h e a s s e m b l e d d e l e g a t e s f o r t h e i r r a t i f i c a t i o n . The d e l e g a t e s a l s o have an o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e s e n t t o t h e C o n f e r e n c e any demands a r i s i n g f rom w i t h i n t h e i r own u n i t s . F o l l o w i n g a p p r o v a l of b a r g a i n i n g p r o p o s a l s the P r o v i n c i a l B a r g a i n i n g Committee i s t h e n e l e c t e d from t h o s e a t t e n d i n g the C o n f e r e n c e . Due i n p a r t t o t h e t i m e and expense i n v o l v e d i n s t a g i n g 72 a c o n f e r e n c e a t t e n d e d by d e l e g a t e s from b a r g a i n i n g u n i t s a c r o s s t h e p r o v i n c e , demands and b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s once a p p r o v e d a r e v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o m o d i f y o r r e v e r s e . Thus demands and s t r a t e g i e s b r o u g h t f o r w a r d by t h e P r o v i n c i a l E x e c u t i v e are, nor-mally t h o s e w h i c h s t a f f b e l i e v e w i l l be most s u c c e s s f u l i n b a r -g a i n i n g , and i t i s u s u a l l y t h e s e w h i c h ar e r a t i f i e d by the Con-f e r e n c e . In o t h e r words, w h i l e t h e r e e x i s t s some o p p o r t u n i t y f o r " g r a s s r o o t s " i n p u t , f o r t h e most p a r t , the C o n f e r e n c e r a t i f i e s an a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agenda. The H e a l t h L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n The H e a l t h L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n (H.L.R.A.) was c r e a t e d by r e s o l u t i o n a t the 1974 a n n u a l m e e t i n g of the B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a H e a l t h A s s o c i a t i o n (.B.C.H.A.). The r e s o l u t i o n recom-mended s e p a r a t i o n of B.C.H.A.'s l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s d i v i s i o n , c a l l e d the Employee R e l a t i o n s C o u n c i l , f r o m the p a r e n t body. W h i l e the B.C.H.A. was s t u d y i n g how t h e s e p a r a t i o n m ight b e s t be a c h i e v e d , the M i n i s t e r of L a b o u r ' s S p e c i a l O f f i c e r , Mr. D.R. B l a i r , b r o u g h t down h i s r e p o r t on the s t a t u s of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y . In h i s r e p o r t B l a i r w r o t e : I f i t i s a c c e p t e d t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n of (.1) u n i -f o r m i t y of wages and w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s , ;(_2) s t a -b i l i t y of t h e work f o r c e , (.3) r e a s o n e d c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n s , through, i n d u s t r y — w i d e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g c o n s t i t u t e a sound and l o g i c a l g o a l f o r t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , from e v e r y o n e ' s p o i n t of v i e w , t h e n t o a c h i e v e t h i s end, t h e p a r t i e s w i l l have t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e y must d e a l RESPONSIBLY w i t h one a n o t h e r and t h a t t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e agreement must, i n a l l f u n d a m e n t a l a s p e c t s , be ADMINISTERED and INTERPRETED on a b a s i s of UNIFORMITY t h r o u g h o u t t h e I n d u s t r y . 73 I t i s my f i r m b e l i e f t h a t t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n t h e B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s - w i s e , d i c t a t e s the need f o r a c o m p l e t e r e -s t r u c t u r i n g and r e - p o s i t i o n i n g of i t s c o l l e c t i v e b a r -g a i n i n g - i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s arm, and t h a t s u c h arm s h o u l d be p r o v i d e d w i t h a C o n s t i t u t i o n and By-Laws of i t s own, w h i c h w i l l p r o p e r l y r e f l e c t and a i d i t s p u r p o s e i n l i f e . I t has l o n g been my view t h a t , where an i n d u s t r y b a r -g a i n s on an i n d u s t r y - w i d e b a s i s , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h i t c r e a t e s t o do i t s c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g and t o c a r r y o u t , a t the p o l i c y l e v e l , the u n i f o r m a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of i t s c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t s , s h o u l d s t a n d a p a r t f r o m any o t h e r a s s o c i a t i o n s w h i c h e x i s t i n t h a t i n d u s t r y . By May 1975 , H..L.R.A. was i n e x i s t e n c e as a s e p a r a t e and a c c r e d i t e d b a r g a i n i n g agent f o r t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y . The l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n of H.L.R.A. as a b a r g a i n i n g agent was c o n s i d e r e d an i m p o r t a n t s t e p f o r w a r d . P r e v i o u s l y , B.C.H.A. had b a r g a i n e d on b e h a l f of h o s p i t a l s w i t h o u t any l e g a l s t a t u s to do so. D u r i n g the 1950's, many of t h e s m a l l n o n - m e t r o p o l i t a n h o s p i t a l s began to band t o g e t h e r i n o r d e r t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t t h e e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g power of t h e u n i o n s . H o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s were coming to the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t m e r e l y b e i n g competent w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e o p e r a t i o n of a h o s p i t a l d i d not make them competent n e g o t i a t o r s . W i t h no t r a i n i n g and l i t t l e o r no e x p e r i e n c e , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t e n d i d n o t u n d e r s t a n d or i m m e d i a t e l y r e c o g n i z e the t e c h n i q u e s used i n w o r d i n g s e e m i n g l y s t a n d a r d p r o v i s i o n s such as s e n i o r i t y , j o b s e c u r i t y , u n i o n s e c u r i t y , j o b p o s t i n g , p r o m o t i o n , d e m o t i o n and d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o c e d u r e s . W h i l e b a r g a i n i n g i n d i v i d u a l l y , the h o s p i t a l s became aware t h a t t h e y , u n l i k e t h e u n i o n s , c o u l d n o t m a i n t a i n the p r o f e s s i o n a l p e r s o n n e l n o r t h e q u a l i t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d t o r e m a i n an i n f l u e n t i a l f o r c e a t the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e . As t h e r e l a t i v e b a r -g a i n i n g s t r e n g t h of the s m a l l e r h o s p i t a l s d w i n d l e d , t h e y became 7 4 i n c r e a s i n g l y more s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h e f o r c e d a c c e p t a n c e of whole " p a t t e r n s " as s e t out by t h e u n i o n s . H o s p i t a l s , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t u n c o o r d i n a t e d autonomous a c t i o n c o u l d be d e t r i m e n t a l t o a l l i n v o l v e d i n u n i o n n e g o t i a t i o n s , began t o see the a d v a n t a g e s i n d e v e l o p i n g g e n e r a l p o l i c i e s and h i r i n g the e x p e r t i s e needed t o b r i n g t h e s e p o l i c i e s t o t h e b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e . Thus, as u n i o n i s m became s t r o n g e r , m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g d e v e l o p e d , f i r s t on a l o c a l b a s i s , t h e n on a r e g i o n a l b a s i s , and t h e n on a p r o v i n c i a l b a s i s . In November 1959 B.C.H.A. a t t e m p t e d i t s f i r s t p r o v i n c e -wide s e t of n e g o t i a t i o n s . The l a b o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n i n v o l v e d was R.N.A.B.C. N e g o t i a t i o n s l a s t e d two days and r e s u l t e d i n a two-y e a r c o n t r a c t i n c l u d i n g u n i f o r m s a l a r y s c h e d u l e s f o r some f o r t y i n d i v i d u a l c e r t i f i c a t i o n s . L e g a l l y , however, the agreement was between R.N.A.B.C. and e a c h i n d i v i d u a l h o s p i t a l . T h i s l e d t o a p r o b l e m of l a c k of u n i f o r m i t y among h o s p i t a l s i n the manner i n w h i c h the agreement was i n t e r p r e t e d , a d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h c o n t i n u e d t o p l a g u e B.C.H.A. t h r o u g h o u t i t s h i s t o r y of i n v o l v e m e n t i n c o l -l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . B.C.H.A. d i v i d e d t h e p r o v i n c e i n t o a number of h o s p i t a l a r e a s such t h a t each member h o s p i t a l was r e p r e s e n t e d by a r e g i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n . E a c h o f t h e s e r e g i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n s e l e c t e d r e p r e -s e n t a t i v e s t o s i t as members of t h e B o a r d of G o v e r n o r s of B.C.H.A. B e f o r e H.L.R.A., each r e g i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n a l s o e l e c t e d r e p r e -s e n t a t i v e s . ( m o s t l y h o s p i t a l t r u s t e e s and h o s p i t a l a d m i n s t r a t o r s ) t o s i t on the Employee R e l a t i o n s C o u n c i l ( j E . R . C ) . The E.R.C. t h e n chose a b a r g a i n i n g committee w h i c h would a c t as the B.C.H.A. 75 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t t h e b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s f o r any p a r t i c u l a r c o l -l e c t i v e agreement. From a l e g a l p o i n t of v i e w , B.C.H.A. m e r e l y p r o v i d e d a forum In wh i c h t h e b a r g a i n i n g f u n c t i o n c o u l d t a k e p l a c e . As s u c h , t h e r e was always some doubt as t o t h e l e g a l i t y of t h e nego-t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t s i n c e B.C.H.A. c o u l d n e i t h e r e n f o r c e an a g r e e -ment n o r be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any d i s p u t e s between h o s p i t a l e m p l o y e r s and h o s p i t a l employees a r i s i n g out of c o n t r a c t u a l i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n s . In a 1973 b r i e f to the M i n i s t e r of L a b o u r , the H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 180, w r o t e : A l t h o u g h the B.C.H..A. r e c e i v e s a mandate from member h o s p i t a l s t o a c t on t h e i r b e h a l f , some h o s p i t a l s i g n o r e t h i s . The e f f e c t i s t o make a mockery of t h e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . I t has an e x t r e m e l y ^ d i s r u p t i n g i n f l u e n c e on labour-management r e l a t i o n s . A y e a r l a t e r , i n an e d i t o r i a l i n the H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n p u b l i c a t i o n , "The H o s p i t a l G u a r d i a n , " i t was s t a t e d t h a t t h e u n i o n o f t e n f o u n d i t s e l f " f a c e d w i t h the l u d i c r o u s s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e e m p l o y e r ' s c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g spokesmen a g r e e w i t h t h e u n i o n ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i l e t h e e m p l o y e r t a k e s an o p p o s i t e v i e w p o i n t and u l t i m a t e l y d e c i d e s n o t t o implement t h e C o l l e c t i v e ..17 Agreement. W i t h the c r e a t i o n o f H.L.R.A. and t h e demise o f E.R.C., the u n i o n s ' major a r e a of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the e m p l o y e r s ' agent was s a t i s f i e d . H.L.R.A. i s l e g a l l y a c c r e d i t e d as t h e e m p l o y e r s ' b a r g a i n i n g a g ent under t h e L a b o u r Code. I t thu s can be h e l d f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of any agreement i t s i g n s . The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of H.L.R.A. i s v e r y s i m i l a r 76 t o t h a t of t h e E.R.C. The e i g h t " d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l s " of B.C.H.A. each send at l e a s t one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o s i t on t h e H.L.R.A. B o a r d of D i r e c t o r s . I t i s t h e B o a r d t h a t c h o o s e s t h e b a r g a i n i n g c o m m i t t e e , g i v i n g t h a t committee t h e bounds w i t h i n w h i c h i t w i l l have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o n e g o t i a t e . One change made w i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of H.L.R.A., however, was t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n of H.L.R.A. P r e s i d e n t . The P r e s i d e n t i s t h e o n l y s t a f f member of H.L.R.A. t o r e p o r t t o the B o a r d and has s o l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r recommending b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y to t h e B o a r d , A c c o r d i n g t o the C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e P r e s -i d e n t i s n o t r e s p o n s i b l e to t h e i n d i v i d u a l h o s p i t a l s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , b u t o n l y to t h e B o a r d of H.L.R.A. I t was i n t e n d e d by the h o s p i t a l s t h a t s u c h a " s e p a r a t i o n " would a l l o w f o r a t o u g h e r b a r g a i n i n g s t a n c e on the p a r t of t h e i r agent t h a n would have o t h e r w i s e been f e a s i b l e . F o r i t s f i r s t s e t of n e g o t i a t i o n s , ( i . e . , the c a s e exam-i n e d i n C h a p t e r I V ) , H.L.R.A. d i d n o t have a P r e s i d e n t . W h i l e a p e r s o n had been named i n September, 1975, to f i l l t h e p o s i t i o n , t h e P r e s i d e n t d i d n o t assume h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s u n t i l J a n -u a r y , 1976. Thus, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l s f e l t t h a t t h e y s h o u l d t a k e a d i r e c t p a r t i n t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s by h a v i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n d i v i d u a l l y r e s p o n d t o t h e u n i o n ' s demands ( t h r o u g h t h e H.L.R.A. Board ) b e f o r e t h e b a r g a i n i n g agent chose a s t r a t e g y and d e v e l o p e d t a c t i c s . The i m p o r t a n c e of t h i s s e e m i n g l y m i n o r p o i n t w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d i n C h a p t e r F o u r . 77 L e g i s l a t i o n L a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n i n Canada i s p r i m a r i l y a p r o v i n c i a l c o n c e r n . W h i l e t h e r e I s l i t t l e f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n w o r t h y o f n o t e In the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t , t h e r e i s one i t e m w h i c h i n i t s e l f l a r g e l y d e t e r m i n e d the s t r a t e g i e s and outcomes o f the 1976-77 M a s t e r Agreement. On O c t o b e r 14, 1975, the f e d e r a l government e n a c t e d the A n t i - I n f l a t i o n A c t , c r e a t i n g the A n t i - I n f l a t i o n B o a r d and i t s a n t i - i n f l a t I o n g u i d e l i n e s . The P r i m e M i n i s t e r i n t r o d u c e d t h e A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n t o the c o u n t r y t h a t n i g h t v i a n a t i o n a l t e l e v i s i o n , s t a t i n g : The p r i c e and income g u i d e l i n e s w i l l t a k e e f f e c t a t m i d n i g h t t o n i g h t . They w i l l be e n f o r c e d on the f e d e r a l government and a l l i t s e m p l o y e e s , on the f i f -t e e n h u n d r e d l a r g e s t companies i n Canada, i n c l u d i n g v i r t u a l l y e v e r y company i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y , and on a l l the employees of a l l t h o s e c o m p a n i e s . The g u i d e l i n e s a p p l y as w e l l to a l l p r o f e s s i o n a l p e o p l e , such as d o c t o r s , l a w y e r s , a c c o u n t a n t s , and e n g i n e e r s . Today I a s k e d a l l the P r e m i e r s t o j o i n as f u l l p a r t n e r s i n t h i s a t t a c k upon i n f l a t i o n . I a s k e d them to a p p l y the f e d e r a l p r i c e and income g u i d e l i n e s t o a l l p r o v -i n c i a l and m u n i c i p a l p u b l i c s e r v i c e s , t o a l l r e n t s , and a l l p r o f e s s i o n a l f e e s u nder t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n . - ^ The g u i d e l i n e s r e s t r i c t e d c o m p e n s a t i o n i n c r e a s e s t o e i g h t p e r c e n t i n 1976, s i x p e r c e n t i n 1977, and f o u r p e r c e n t i n 1978. A d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e s c o u l d be g r a n t e d by A. X. B. A d m i n i s t r a t o r s i f t h e y f e l t s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n was w a r r a n t e d . The A c t was law, however, o n l y i n t h o s e p r o v i n c e s w h i c h a d o p t e d i t . B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a a d o p t e d A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n on June 23, 1976, and, i n agreement w i t h th e f e d e r a l government, i n c l u d e d t h e i r p u b l i c 19 employees under the g u i d e l i n e s . By 1948, a l l p r o v i n c e s had e n a c t e d a s t a t u t e g o v e r n i n g l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s . M o d e l e d . a f t e r t h e U.S. Wagner A c t , the l e g -78 i s l a t i o n o b l i g a t e d an e m p l o y e r t o r e c o g n i z e and b a r g a i n c o l l e c -t i v e l y w i t h t h e e m p l o y e e s ' e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Each p r o v i n c e a l s o i n c l u d e d i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e A c t a s e c t i o n p r o v i d i n g f o r c o m p u l s o r y c o n c i l i a t i o n i f and when the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s b r o k e down. And f i n a l l y , a l l p r o v i n c e s , e x c e p t S a s k a t c h e w a n , p r o h i b i t e d work s t o p p a g e s d u r i n g t h e l i f e of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement, i n s t e a d m a n d a t i n g b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n of a l l u n s e t t l e d r i g h t s d i s p u t e s . S i n c e 1952, the p o l i t i c a l s c ene i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a has been d o m i n a t e d by t h e S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y , w h i c h h e l d power f o r a l l but t h e p e r i o d from mid-1972 t o l a t e 1975. D u r i n g t h e S o c i a l C r e d i t y e a r s , t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e was one of c o n s e r v a t i s m w i t h a " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " o r " p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s " o r i e n t a t i o n . L a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n was seen as b e i n g somewhat pro-management, p r o v i d i n g " f e w e r p r o t e c t i o n s to o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r t h a n c o m p a r a b l e laws 20 e l s e w h e r e i n Canada." L a b o u r , t h e r e f o r e , s t r o n g l y s u p p o r t e d t h e New D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y , t h e o p p o s i t i o n d u r i n g t h e S o c i a l C r e d i t y e a r s , and t h e p a r t y i n power d u r i n g t h e S o c i a l C r e d i t h i a t u s . As a r e s u l t , s t a t e m e n t s made by l a b o u r l e a d e r s w h i l e d e b a t i n g S o c r e d p o l i c i e s were seen by t h a t government to be l a r g e l y 21 e q u i v a l e n t t o NDP p o l i t i c k i n g . F u r t h e r m o r e , when the NDP f i n a l l y d i d become the government of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a t h e r e was an immediate r e s p o n s e on t h e p a r t of o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r t o "make up f o r l o s t t i m e . " The new NDP government r e p e a l e d the L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A c t of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a i n 1973, a l o n g w i t h t h e M e d i a t i o n Commission A c t and the T r a d e U n i o n s A c t , and r e p l a c e d them w i t h the L a b o u r Code of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . Most i m p o r t a n t was the r e p e a l of the M e d i a t i o n Commission A c t , an a c t w h i c h had c r e a t e d a s t a n d i n g 79 l a b o u r c o u r t e m p o w e r e d t o h a n d down c o m p u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n a w a r d s a s a means o f e n d i n g a n y d i s p u t e s t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t f e l t t o be p o t e n t i a l l y h a r m f u l t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . L a b o u r b e l i e v e d t h e M.C.A. t o b e a p u n i t i v e m e a s u r e , u n n e c e s s a r i l y r e s t r i c t i v e t o f r e e b a r g a i n i n g , t o o o p e n - e n d e d i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d , i n t h e e n d , t o t a l l y l a c k i n g i n c r e d i b i l i t y . I t s r e p e a l was h e r a l d e d as t h e b e g i n n i n g o f an e r a o f p r o - u n i o n l e a n i n g s on t h e p a r t o f 2 2 g o v e r n m e n t a n d p u b l i c o p i n i o n a l i k e . T h e " e r a " was t o be r a t h e r s h o r t - l i v e d . T h e L a b o u r C o d e r e l i e s m o r e on v o l u n t a r i s m t h a n com-p u l s i o n i n s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s a n d a l l o w s a l l e m p l o y e e s , a t l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , i n c l u d i n g h o s p i t a l w o r k e r s , t h e r i g h t t o s t r i k e . T h e o n l y s p e c i f i c m e n t i o n a c t u a l l y made o f h o s p i t a l s i s i n r e f -e r e n c e t o e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s ( s e c t i o n 73) a n d p r o v i d e s t h e b a s i s f o r w h a t was l a t e r , i n 1 9 7 7 , e x p a n d e d i n t o t h e E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s 2 D i s p u t e s A c t . P a r t I o f t h e L a b o u r C ode n o t e s t h a t c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n -i n g m u s t be c o n d u c t e d i n g o o d f a i t h a n d p r o v i d e s t h e m e a ns by w h i c h a c h a r g e o f b a r g a i n i n g i n b a d f a i t h c a n b e made. P a r t I V o f t h e L a b o u r C o d e , a l t h o u g h e n t i t l e d " C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g P r o c e d u r e s , " a c t u a l l y p r o v i d e s n o g u i d e l i n e s f o r how t h e n e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s a r e t o be c a r r i e d o u t . I n f a c t , e v e n t h e t e r m " g o o d f a i t h " i s l e f t u n d e f i n e d . T h u s , t h e C o d e a l l o w s f o r a v e r y b r o a d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f w h a t w i l l be a c c e p t e d a s p r o p e r b a r g a i n i n g p r a c t i c e , w i t h t h e e x a c t i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n o f " b a d f a i t h " f o r a n y s p e c i f i c c a s e l e f t up t o a d e c i s i o n o f t h e L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d . N e g o t i a t o r s i n t e r v i e w e d b y t h i s w r i t e r e x p r e s s e d t h e v i e w 80 that the Board's i n v e s t i g a t i o n s are e x c e s s i v e l y lengthy and unduly d i s r u p t i v e to the b a r g a i n i n g process while at the same time have very l i t t l e e f f e c t i v e i n f l u e n c e on the outcome of the o v e r a l l proceedings. Thus, while accusations of bad f a i t h b a r g a i n i n g are common, formal charges to the Labour R e l a t i o n s Board are much l e s s common. The Code p r o h i b i t s s t r i k e s or lockouts during the term of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement, a l l o w i n g them only when n e g o t i a t i o n s are s t i l l unresolved f o l l o w i n g an attempt to bargain i n good f a i t h . The use of mediation s e r v i c e s i n v o l u n t a r y ; however, once a mediator has been appointed, no work stoppage can occur u n t i l the mediator has concluded h i s mediation e f f o r t s . Before a s t r i k e can l e g a l l y begin, a s t r i k e vote must be taken and seventy-two hours n o t i c e given to the employer. Part VII provides f o r the use of an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission as an i n v e s t i g a t i v e or f a c t - f i n d i n g procedure. I t can be used as a second l e v e l of mediation i n s i t u a t i o n s where the normal mediation process has been u n s u c c e s s f u l . I t i s gen-e r a l l y employed only i n disputes i n v o l v i n g a high l e v e l of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t (e.g. p o l i c e , h o s p i t a l s , supermarkets). When the ap-pointment of an I n d u s t r i a l Inquiry Commission i s a n t i c i p a t e d , the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d may be u n w i l l i n g to n e g o t i a t e during mediation, f e a r i n g the l o s s of " t r a d i n g p o i n t s " f o r use during t h i s second mediation l e v e l . P r i o r to the passage of the E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Disputes Act, 1977, s e c t i o n 73 of the Code allowed a h o s p i t a l union (or a f i r e f i g h t e r ' s or policemen's union) to c a l l f o r b i n d i n g 81 a r b i t r a t i o n , t h e r e b y f o r e g o i n g t h e r i g h t t o s t r i k e and e l i m i n a t i n g t h e t h r e a t o f l o c k o u t . H o w e v e r , i f s u c h v o l u n t a r y a r b i t r a t i o n was n o t r e q u e s t e d , and i t was s u b s e q u e n t l y t h e o p i n i o n of t h e M i n i s t e r t h a t c o n t i n u a n c e of t h e d i s p u t e c o u l d be d a n g e r o u s t o p u b l i c h e a l t h and w e l f a r e , t h e n a " c o b l i n g - o f f " p e r i o d of up t o f o r t y d a y s c o u l d be c a l l e d , d u r i n g w h i c h t i m e no s t r i k e s o r l o c k -o u t s c o u l d o c c u r . I f a s t r i k e d i d o c c u r , c e r t a i n of t h e e m p l o y e r ' s f a c i l i t i e s and s e r v i c e s c o u l d s u b s e q u e n t l y be d e s i g n a t e d " e s s e n t i a l " by t h e L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d and t h e r e a f t e r r e q u i r e d t o r e m a i n i n f u l l o p e r a t i o n by u n i o n and management. The L i e u t e n a n t - G o v e r n o r i n C o u n c i l c o u l d a l s o " a p p o i n t one o r more s p e c i a l m e d i a t o r s t o c o n f e r w i t h t h e p a r t i e s t o 2 A a s s i s t them i n s e t t l i n g t h e t e r m s o f a c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t . " I f no a g r e e m e n t was r e a c h e d , h o w e v e r , t h e M i n i s t e r c o u l d a c c e p t t h e r e p o r t and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of t h e s p e c i a l m e d i a t o r as t h e b a s i s f o r s p e c i a l "ad h o c " l e g i s l a t i o n as a means of s e t t l i n g t h e d i s p u t e . T h i s added a d e g r e e o f c o m p u l s i o n t o t h e s y s t e m b u t c l e a r l y as a l a s t r e s o r t and t h e r e f o r e t e n d e d t o a p p e a r as more of a "med-arb" a p p r o a c h t h a n one of s t a n d i n g c o m p u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n . The O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l t h e n s p e c i f i e d t h e t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t . T h e r e a r e a number of i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r h e a l t h c a r e b a r g a i n i n g w h i c h a r i s e f r o m e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s l e g i s l a t i o n . I t l i m i t s t h e power o f t h e u n i o n as any s t r i k e a c t i o n can be r e n d e r e d somewhat l e s s t h a n t o t a l l y e f f e c t i v e due t o t h e com-p u l s o r y m a i n t e n a n c e o f most o f a h o s p i t a l ' s s e r v i c e s . Thus i t w o u l d a p p e a r t o be i n t h e u n i o n s ' i n t e r e s t t o t a k e a s o f t e r a p p r o a c h t o n e g o t i a t i o n i n an a t t e m p t t o a v o i d m a j o r d i s p u t e s ; 82 of c o u r s e , management i s w e l l aware o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n and can t h e r e f o r e a f f o r d t o t a k e an even h a r d e r a p p r o a c h . Under t h e p r e s e n t " t i g h t money" economy, and somewhat pro-management p o l i t -i c a l c l i m a t e , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y d i s t r i b u t i v e b a r -b a i n i n g p r o c e s s i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , t h e l e g i s l a t i o n c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as r e m o v i n g a l m o s t any i n c e n t i v e f r o m h o s p i t a l management t o b a r g a i n w i t h a p o w e r f u l u n i o n , r e l y i n g i n s t e a d on t h e outcome of b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n . F i i r t h e r m o r e , w i t h more emphasis b e i n g p l a c e d on a r b i t r a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n n e g o t i a t i o n , management i s g i v e n more i n c e n t i v e t o c r e a t e i t s own demand l i s t r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y c o u n t e r i n g t h a t of t h e u n i o n . These p o i n t s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d more f u l l y as t h e y a r i s e i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r . 8 3 F o o t n o t e s - C h a p t e r I I I 1. P u b l i c A c c o u n t s of B r i t i s h : C o l u m b i a ( V i c t o r i a : Queen's P r i n t e r , 1974, 1975 , 1976).. 2. I b i d . ; a l s o , same f o r y e a r s 1970, 1971, 1972. 3. M. McGregor, "No H o l d i n g Rack March of S c i e n c e , " H o s p i t a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Canada, 20, No. 1 ( J a n . 1978), p. 18. 4. M. McGregor, op. c i t . , p. 19. 5. R o b e r t L a x e r , Canada's U n i o n s ( T o r o n t o : James L o r i m e r and Co., 1976), pp. 226-32. 6. I b i d . , pp. x - x i . 7. G. H a r v e y Agnew, C a n a d i a n H o s p i t a l s 1920 t o 1970, A D r a m a t i c  H a l f C e n t u r y ( T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y of T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1974), pp. 164-68. . 8. J o h n D. B r a d f o r d , "B.C. H o s p i t a l s L e a r n t o L i v e w i t h L a b o u r , " C a n a d i a n H o s p i t a l , 52, No. 1 ( J a n . 1975), 33. 9. The i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s b a s e d l a r g e l y on p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h Mr. J a c k C a m p b e l l , D i r e c t o r of L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s , H e a l t h S c i e n c e s A s s o c i a t i o n of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . 10. H e a l t h S c i e n c e s A s s o c i a t i o n of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , C o n s t i t u t i o n  and By-Laws, amended May 1977, p.3. 11. The i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s b a s e d l a r g e l y on p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h Mr. W i l l i a m A.R. Kadey, B u s i n e s s Manager, I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i o n of O p e r a t i n g E n g i n e e r s , L o c a l 882. 12. S y l v i a U r l i c h , " W i l l y o u r appendectomy be p e r f o r m e d by a member of t h e AFL-CIO?," Modern H o s p i t a l , 117, No. 10 ( O c t o b e r 1973), pp. 63-67. 13. The i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s b a s e d l a r g e l y on p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h Mrs. L e i g h W h i t e , A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y - B u s i n e s s Manager, H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 180. 14. H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 180, C o n s t i t u t i o n and  By-Laws, r e v i s e d 1972, p. 3. 15. D. R. R l a i r , S p e c i a l O f f i c e r R e p o r t : H o s p i t a l I n d u s t r y  C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g System, B.C. M i n i s t r y of L a b o u r , November 1 9 7 4 , p p . 5 - 6 . 16. H o s p i t a l E m p l oyees' U n i o n , L o c a l 180, Recommendations f o r  Change i n P r o v i n c i a l L a b o u r S t a t u t e s , May 1973, p. 34. 84 •17. " R e s p o n s i b i l i t y or C o n f r o n t a t i o n , " an e d i t o r i a l , The  H o s p i t a l G u a r d i a n , J u l y 19 74, p. 4. 18. V a n c o u v e r Sun, O c t o b e r 14, 19 75, p. 8. 19. James E. D o r s e y , E m p l o y e e / E m p l o y e r R i g h t s i n B r i t i s h Co- l u m b i a ( V a n c o u v e r : I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e l f - C o u n s e l P r e s s , 1 976), p. 6 2. 20. Mark Thompson and James C a i r n i e , "Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n : The C a s e of the B r i t i s h : C o l u m b i a T e a c h e r s , " I n d u s t r i a l  and L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s Review, 27, No. 1 ( O c t . 19 73) 21. James M a t k i n , "Government I n t e r v e n t i o n i n L a b o u r D i s p u t e s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , " C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g i n the E s s e n t i a l  and P u b l i c S e r v i c e S e c t o r s , ed. M o r l e y G u nderson (.Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1 975), p. 81. 22. I b i d . , pp. 82-84. 23. E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s D i s p u t e s A c t , (1977) , P a r t IV, s e c t i o n 19. 24. Under j o i n t a u t h o r i t y of t h e P u r b l i c I n q u i r i e s -Act and the L a b o u r Code of B.C.-, the a p p o i n t m e n t of a S p e c i a l .Mediator was a p p r o v e d - f o r t h i s c a s e on May 25, 1976, as O r d e r - i n -C o u n c i l No. 1623. D e l e t i n g the s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e s to t h i s c a s e , the O r d e r w a s ' l a t e r i n c l u d e d i n the E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s D i s p u t e s A c t ( 1 9 7 7 ) , P a r t I I I , s e c t i o n 8 ( e ) . 85 CHAPTER IV A CASE STUDY: BARGAINING FOR THE H . E . U ./H . L . R . A . 1976-77 MASTER AGREEMENT The: E v e n t s On September 11, 1975, t h e H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 180, s e r v e d n o t i c e t o commence c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g on t h e i n d i v i d u a l h o s p i t a l s o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t n o t i c e was s e r v e d on t h e h o s p i t a l s i n d i v i d u a l l y , not on the h o s p i t a l s ' r e c e n t l y a c c r e d i t e d b a r g a i n i n g a g e n t , the H e a l t h L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n . The e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t was t o e x p i r e on December 31, 1975. A p r e - n e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n was h e l d September 18 t o d i s c u s s the p r o p o s e d t i m e t a b l e and agenda, as w e l l as c e r t a i n g e n e r a l p r o c e d u r e s t o be f o l l o w e d d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s . The s e s s i o n was a t t e n d e d by t h e u n i o n ' s f u l l b a r -g a i n i n g committee ( . c o n s i s t i n g of t h e P r o v i n c i a l P r e s i d e n t , the S e c r e t a r y - B u s i n e s s Manager ( u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r ) , and f i v e u n i t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) ; t h e e m p l o y e r s ' a g e n t , however, was r e p r e s e n t e d by a s u b s t i t u t e committee c o n s i s t i n g o n l y of p e r s o n s not on t h e b a r g a i n i n g committee. t ember- 23, at w h i c h ti m e demands were ex c h a n g e d . At t h i s m e e t i n g , the e m p l o y e r s ' f u l l b a r g a i n i n g committee a t t e n d e d (.i.e. t h e H.L.R. n e g o t i a t o r , one h o s p i t a l t r u s t e e , one h o s p i t a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r , A p r e l i m i n a r y n e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n was c a l l e d f or. Sep-86 one p e r s o n n e l d i r e c t o r , and a s e c o n d H..L.R.A. s t a f f member). The u n i o n ' s major demands were: 1. Wages -- H o u r l y i n c r e a s e of $1.50 the f i r s t y e a r and $1 t h e s e c o n d y e a r ; p a r i t y with, s i m i l a r o c c u p a t i o n s i n s i d e and o u t -s i d e t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y ; no r e d u c t i o n i n m o n t h l y r a t e s b e c a u s e of r e d u c t i o n i n h o u r s of work 2. COLA -- C o s t of l i v i n g a d j u s t m e n t of one p e r c e n t f o r each o n e - p o i n t r i s e i n the V a n c o u v e r Consumer P r i c e I n d e x , pay-a b l e q u a r t e r l y , w i t h no h u r d l e s 3. Hours of work — T h i r t y - f i v e h o u r s p e r week, e i g h t h o u r s p e r day i n c l u s i v e of meal p e r i o d s , w i t h a c c u m u l a t e d time o f f t a k e n w i t h r e g u l a r days o f f 4. V a c a t i o n s -- Twenty work days a f t e r one y e a r ' s s e r v i c e ; t w e n t y - f i v e a f t e r f i v e ; t h i r t y a f t e r t e n ; t h i r t y - f i v e a f t e r f i f t e e n ; s u p p l e m e n t a r y v a c a t i o n s a f t e r twenty y e a r s ' s e r v i c e 5. M e d i c a l - D e n t a l --".Extended h e a l t h c a r e p l a n and d e n t a l p l a n , w i t h premiums p a i d e n t i r e l y by e m p l o y e r 6. S t a t s -- A l l t w e l v e s t a t u t o r y h o l i d a y s t o be p a i d at time and o n e - h a l f r a t e s i n a d d i t i o n t o r e g u l a r pay p l u s r e s c h e d u l i n g of s t a t u t o r y h o l i d a y w i t h pay 7. S e v e r a n c e a l l o w a n c e — One week's pay f o r e ach y e a r of s e r -v i c e p a y a b l e upon t e r m i n a t i o n or r e t i r e m e n t a f t e r t e n y e a r s ' s e r v i c e . O t h e r u n i o n demands p e r t a i n e d t o s i c k l e a v e , c o m p a s s i o n a t e l e a v e , v a c a t i o n s c h e d u l i n g , c l o t h i n g a l l o w a n c e , s p e c i a l l e a v e , and on-c a l l d i f f e r e n t i a l s . A c c o r d i n g to b.oth H.E.U. and H.L.R.A. c a l -c u l a t i o n s , t h e i n c r e a s e d c o s t to the e m p l o y e r would have been 87 F i g u r e 12  S t e p s t o 1976-77 M a s t e r Agreement 19 75 Aug. - LRB I s s u e s a c c r e d i t a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e t o HLRA S e p t . - - HEU s e r v e s n o t i c e on h o s p i t a l s , n o t HLRA -- p r e l i m i n a r y s e s s i o n - exchange demands Oct . P r i m e M i n i s t e r announces AIB l e g i s l a t i o n HEU b r e a k s o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s Nov. HLRA a p p l i e s f o r m e d i a t i o n Dec. HEU r e f u s e s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n m e d i a t i o n HEU/HLRA a p p l y f o r I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission M i n i s t e r a p p o i n t s B l a i r E l e c t i o n : S o c i a l C r e d i t Party forms government 19 76 A p r i l B l a i r R e p o r t ; recommendations c o s t i n g 13.95% i n 1976 BCHP announces 1976 h o s p i t a l b u d g e t s @ 8.5% o v e r 1975 HEU a c c e p t s , HLRA r e j e c t s B l a i r R e p o r t May HEU s e r v e s s t r i k e n o t i c e a t VGH government i n v o k e s s e c t i o n 73(7) of L a b o u r Code HEU s t r i k e s 21 day c o o l i n g - o f f p e r i o d M c T a g g a r t a p p o i n t e d S p e c i a l M e d i a t o r June M c T a g g a r t R e p o r t recommends 13.95% i n 1976; 2 - y r . agreement a l l o w i n g " r e - o p e n e r " on 3 i s s u e s f o r 2nd y e a r of agreement H o s p i t a l S e r v i c e s C o l l e c t i v e Agreement A c t AIB a d o p t e d by p r o v i n c e HEU s i g n s agreement, HLRA r e f u s e s S e p t . AIB r o l l s back award t o 8% O c t . M c T a g g a r t " i n t e r i m award" as p e r AIB Dec. r e - o p e n e d i s s u e s n o t s e t t l e d ; L a d n e r t o a r b i t r a t e L a d n e r awards. 6% i n c r e a s e i n 1977 19 7 7 J a n . . HEU a p p e a l s AI.R d e c i s i o n Feb. AIB A d m i n i s t r a t o r r u l e s 8%-1976, 6%-1977, 4%-1978 88 F i g u r e 12 ( c o n t i n u e d ) March. M c T a g g a r t " f i n a l award" A p r i l HEU/HLRA memorandum of agreement S e p t . LRB r u l e s Agreement as p e r HEU v o i d i 89 approximately twenty percent i n the f i r s t year. Also during the p r e l i m i n a r y s e s s i o n , the union n e g o t i a t o r announced to H.L.R.A. that H..E.U. would not Involve i t s e l f i n a r b i t r a t i o n , as only a n e g o t i a t e d settlement would be "accept-a b l e " to the membership. The announcement was intended as a warn-ing to H.L.R.A. that i f settlement was not reached by the end of the f i n a l mediation stage, the union would c a l l f o r a work stop-page. The employers' major demands were: 1. E l i m i n a t e a p p r e n t i c e s h i p program f o r p r a c t i c a l nurses and o r d e r l i e s 2. E l i m i n a t e super s t a t s (.i.e. premium pay rat e s f o r time worked on Christmas Day, Good F r i d a y , Labour Day, plus a d d i t i o n a l day-off with pay) 3. E l i m i n a t e r e t r o a c t i v i t y on Government Job E v a l u a t i o n 4. E l i m i n a t e present pay rate adjustment request mechanism .5. Expand grievance procedure to seventy days before advancing to a r b i t r a t i o n N e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n s began September 29 and continued throughout October, the two p a r t i e s meeting each Monday through Thursday. At the l a s t s e s s i o n , held on October 31, H.L.R.A. made i t s " f i n a l o f f e r " to H.E.U., which i n c l u d e d : 1. No wage i n c r e a s e f o r 1976 2. No wage i n c r e a s e f o r 19 7 7 3. E l i m i n a t i o n of a p p r e n t i c e s h i p program 4. E l i m i n a t i o n of super s t a t s 5. E l i m i n a t i o n of r e t r o a c t i v i t y on Government Job E v a l u a t i o n 6. E l i m i n a t i o n of pay r a t e adjustments 90 7. No change i n n o r t h e r n d i f f e r e n t i a l 8. No change i n h o u r s of work 9 . No change i n o n - c a l l d i f f e r e n t i a l 10 . No change i n a n n u a l v a c a t i o n s 11. No change i n s i c k l e a v e 12 . No change i n m a t e r n i t y l e a v e 13. No change i n s e v e r a n c e a l l o w a n c e 14. No d e n t a l p l a n 15 . No e x t e n d e d h e a l t h c a r e p l a n 16 . No s p e c i a l l e a v e Upon r e c e i v i n g t h e above " f i n a l o f f e r , " H.E.U. b r o k e o f f nego-t i a t i o n s . On O c t o b e r 14, the f e d e r a l government announced the c r e a t i o n o f t h e A n t i - I n f l a t i o n B o a r d ( A . I . B . ) . Under A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n , the t o t a l wage b i l l i n c r e a s e s f o r 1976 were t o be h e l d to a maximum of e i g h t p e r c e n t . I n c r e a s e s f o r 1977 were pegged at s i x p e r c e n t , and 1978 at f o u r p e r c e n t . The l e g i s l a t i o n was u n c l e a r as t o how b r o a d l y or r i g o r o u s l y t h e g u i d e l i n e s were t o be imposed. F u r t h e r m o r e , P r e m i e r Dave B a r r e t t announced t h a t B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a would not i n s t i t u t e the f e d e r a l g u i d e l i n e s u n t i l c o n v i n c e d of t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e c o n t r o l s on p r i c e s and p r o -f i t s . " ' " The u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r , t h e r e f o r e , s t a t e d i n n e g o t i a t i o n s e s s i o n t o H.L.R.A., and t h r o u g h t h e " B a r g a i n i n g N e w s l e t t e r " to u n i o n membership, t h a t H.E.U. would c o n t i n u e t o b a r g a i n under t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t p u b l i c l y - f u n d e d employees were e x c l u d e d from A.I.B. r e g u l a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r n o t e d t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t i o n d i d i n any ca s e a l l o w the A.I.B., i n s p e c i a l c i r -c u m s t a n c e s , t o g r a n t awards i n e x c e s s of the g u i d e l i n e l i m i t s . 91 H.. L.R.A. c o u n t e r e d t h e u n i o n s t a t e m e n t at t h e same s e s s i o n by a n n o u n c i n g to H.E.U. t h a t H.L.R.A. would b a r g a i n o n l y w i t h i n the bounds e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e A.I.B. r e g u l a t i o n s . On November 3, H.L.R.A. made a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e M i n i s t r y of L a b o u r f o r the a p p o i n t m e n t of a m e d i a t o r . The a p p l i c a t i o n was g r a n t e d and Mr. Ed Sims was named as m e d i a t o r . W h i l e b o t h p a r t i e s d i d meet w i t h Mr. Sims i n d i v i d u a l l y , H.E.U. r e f u s e d t o h o l d m e e t i n g s w i t h H.L.R.A. p r e s e n t , u n t i l , as p r i n t e d i n the " B a r g a i n i n g N e w s l e t t e r " of November 21: . . . t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s b a r g a i n i n g committee r e -v e r s e s i t s r e a c t i o n a r y p r o p o s a l (.i.e. the " f i n a l o f f e r " ) t h a t would l e a d to a c u t b a c k i n r e a l wages and b e n e f i t s . The U n i o n i s r e j e c t i n g m e d i a t i o n t h a t i n v o l v e s H.L.R.A. i n o r d e r t o l e a v e i t s o p t i o n s open, i n c l u d i n g j ob a c t i o n . In l a t e November, H.E.U. c o n t a c t e d H.L.R.A. and r e q u e s t e d t h a t m e d i a t i o n be f o r e g o n e i n s t e a d o f f e r i n g t o make j o i n t a p p l i -c a t i o n w i t h H.L.R.A. p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 122 of t h e L a b o u r Code f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. H.L.R.A. a c c e p t e d t h e o f f e r on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t H.E.U. a g r e e t o f o r e g o i t s r i g h t t o a p p l y f o r a r b i t r a t i o n i f a s e t t l e m e n t was n o t r e a c h e d . The u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r gave v e r b a l a p p r o v a l of t h e p l a n t o H.L.R.A. ( l a t e r c o n f i r m i n g i t i n w r i t i n g ) , and on December 3, Mr. D. R. B l a i r was a p p o i n t e d as the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y C ommission. D u r i n g t h e l a t t e r h a l f of November, t h e u n i o n made p r e -p a r a t i o n s f o r s t r i k e v o t e s to be t a k e n at twenty h o s p i t a l s a c r o s s B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . F o l l o w i n g Mr. B l a i r ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , t h e p l a n n e d s t r i k e v o t e s were c a n c e l l e d . On December 11, a p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n t o o k p l a c e , r e s u l t -i n g i n t h e d e f e a t of the Incumbent New D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y 92 and t h e c r e a t i o n of a new government under th e S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . H e a r i n g s b e f o r e th;e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission began December 15. M e e t i n g e a c h Monday t h r o u g h T h u r s d a y , w i t h a one-week r e c e s s at C h r i s t m a s , the h e a r i n g s c a r r i e d on t h r o u g h o u t J a n u a r y and F e b r u a r y , e n d i n g March 2, 1976. The R e p o r t of t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission was d e l i v e r e d t o t h e M i n i s t e r of L a b o u r on A p r i l 5 and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r t o b o t h H.E.U. and H.L.R.A. The R e p o r t made recommendations on t e n i s s u e s t o be i n c l u d e d i n a o n e - y e a r agreement at a c o s t of a p p r o x i m a t e l y f o u r -t e e n p e r c e n t . The u n i o n was p r e p a r e d t o a c c e p t t h e .recommen-dations, b u t , on A p r i l 26, H.L.R.A. announced i t s r e j e c t i o n of t h e p r o p o s e d terms of s e t t l e m e n t as e x c e e d i n g b o t h t h e A.I.B. g u i d e -l i n e s (.i.e. e i g h t p e r c e n t ) and the 1976 h o s p i t a l b udget i n c r e a s e s a l l o w e d by B.C.H.P. ( i . e . 8.5 p e r c e n t ) . T h a t same e v e n i n g , a d i n n e r - d a n c e p a r t y f o r t h e members of t h e b a r g a i n i n g committees ( i . e . E.L.R.A.'s as w e l l as H.E.U.'s) and t h e i r s p o u s e s was h e l d a t t h e B a y s h o r e Inn i n V a n c o u v e r . Mr. B l a i r was a l s o i n a t t e n d a n c e . T h i s was t h e l a s t t i m e t h e two b a r g a i n i n g committees would meet f a c e - t o - f a c e . As r e l a t e d by an H.L.R.A. b a r g a i n i n g committee member, the a f f a i r had an a i r of u n r e a l i s m about i t . A l l the t e n s i o n of p r e v i o u s e n c o u n t e r s had d i s s i p a t e d . E v e r y o n e p r e s e n t knew t h a t the n e x t s t e p would be a s t r i k e . E v e r y o n e p r e s e n t a l s o knew t h a t t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s would not l i k e l y r e - e n t e r a n e g o t i a t i n g p h a s e , but would i n s t e a d p r o c e e d to c o m p l e t i o n through, a c o m b i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l l o b b y i n g and p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s . E v e r y o n e seemed t o be s a y i n g , " W e l l , we've n e v e r done t h i s ( i . e . s t r i k e ) b e f o r e , so l e t ' s j u s t see what h a p p e n s . " 93 On May 1, 1976, t h e u n i o n s e r v e d s e v e n t y - t w o hour s t r i k e n o t i c e on the V a n c o u v e r G e n e r a l H o s p i t a l . L a t e r t h a t same day, the M i n i s t e r of L a b o u r I n v o k e d s e c t i o n 73(7) of t h e Lab o u r Code. The n e x t day h e a r i n g s began i n f r o n t of the L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d t o d e t e r m i n e the e s s e n t i a l i t y of s p e c i f i c p o s i t i o n s and employees i n the h o s p i t a l . The r e s u l t was a l i m i t e d s t r i k e , s t a r t -i n g on May 4, c l o s e l y m o n i t o r e d by t h e I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s O f f i c e r s on s i t e . By May 20, a l m o s t s i x t h o u s a n d employees from s e v e n h o s p i t a l s i n V i c t o r i a and V a n c o u v e r were on s t r i k e . On t h a t day, t h e L i e u t e n a n t - G o v e r n o r i n C o u n c i l o r d e r e d a twenty-one day c o o l i n g - o f f p e r i o d , d u r i n g w h i c h s t r i k i n g employees were to r e t u r n t o work. On May 21, employees at ' • . a l l but t h e V a n c o u v e r G e n e r a l H o s p i t a l d i d r e t u r n t o work. These l a t t e r H.E.U. members r e t u r n e d on May 23, a f t e r t h e L.R.B. o r d e r e d V.G.H. t o i m m e d i a t e l y r e h i r e a l l s t r i k i n g e m p l o y e e s . On May 26, t h e L i e u t e n a n t -G o v e r n o r i n C o u n c i l a p p o i n t e d a S p e c i a l M e d i a t o r w i t h the a u t h o r i t y t o c a l l m e e t i n g s between H.E.U. and H.L.R.A. i n o r d e r to c o n c l u d e a c o l l e c t i v e agreement, and, t o r e v i e w the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission's R e p o r t i n l i g h t of t h e maximum c o m p e n s a t i o n i n c r e a s e s a l l o w e d by t h e A.I.B. The S p e c i a l M e d i a t o r , Judge D. E. M c T a g g a r t , s u b m i t t e d h i s R e p o r t t o t h e M i n i s t e r of Lab o u r on June 7. The R e p o r t sup-p o r t e d and recommended a c c e p t a n c e of the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Com-m i s s i o n R e p o r t , b u t changed the term of t h e p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t from one to two y e a r s . T h r e e i s s u e s (wages, j o b e v a l u a t i o n , COLA) were to be r e - o p e n e d t o n e g o t i a t i o n f o r t h e s e c o n d y e a r of the c o n t r a c t , b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n to be used i f t h e i s s u e s c o u l d n ot 94 be s e t t l e d . M c T a g g a r t ' s R e p o r t d i d n o t l i m i t th_e award t o t h a t a l l o w a b l e under A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s b u t r a t h e r l e f t i t open f o r f u r t h e r r e v i e w . The u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r s t a t e d t h a t t h e R e p o r t ' s recommendations were a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e u n i o n . The H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r s t a t e d t h e recommendations were n o t a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e e m p l o y e r s . On June 9, B i l l 75, t h e H o s p i t a l S e r v i c e s C o l l e c t i v e  Agreement A c t , was e n a c t e d . The b i l l imposed t h e S p e c i a l M e d i a t -o r ' s r ecommendations on t h e two p a r t i e s as t h e c o l l e c t i v e a g r e e -ment, r e t r o a c t i v e t o J a n u a r y 1, 1976, and i n e f f e c t u n t i l Dec-ember 31, 1977. The "agreement" was s u b j e c t o n l y t o the f i n a l a p p r o v a l of the A.I.B. H.E.U. s i g n e d t h e agreement. H.L.R.A. r e f u s e d . T h i s was p r i m a r i l y f o r show as s e c t i o n 2 ( 1 ) ( c ) of t h e A c t r e a d s : i f H.L.R.A. or the t r a d e - u n i o n f a i l s t o e x e c u t e doc-uments i n t h e form o f A p p e n d i x I t o t h e r e p o r t w i t h i n 5 days a f t e r t h e d a t e on w h i c h t h i s A c t comes i n t o f o r c e , t h e p a r t y f a i l i n g t o e x e c u t e t h e documents s h a l l be deemed t o have e x e c u t e d them. On June 23, B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a a d o p t e d t h e A. I . B . l e g i s l a -t i o n . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , t h e P r o v i n c i a l M i n i s t e r of F i n a n c e announced t h a t p u b l i c l y - f u n d e d s e r v i c e s would t a k e the l e a d i n 2 h o l d i n g t o t a l wage b i l l i n c r e a s e s f o r 1976 to e i g h t p e r c e n t . A l m o s t t h r e e months l a t e r , on September 13, t h e A.I.B. o r d e r e d a r o l l b a c k of t h e imposed H.E.U./H.L.R.A. agreement t o e i g h t p e r c e n t f o r 1976, n o t i n g t h a t the maximum a l l o w a b l e f o r 1977 would be s i x p e r c e n t . On September 15, t h e u n i o n made a p p l i c a t i o n t o a p p e a l the A.I.B. r u l i n g i n f r o n t of A.I.B. A d m i n i s t r a t o r , Mr. D o n a l d 95 T a n s l e y . I n i t s " B a r g a i n i n g N e w s l e t t e r " of September 20, and a g a i n on O c t o b e r 7, the u n i o n recommended " t h a t u n i o n members at a l l B.C. h o s p i t a l s show t h e i r d i s g u s t with, t h e A n t i - I n f l a t i o n B o a r d by s u p p o r t i n g the O c t o b e r 1 4 t h N a t i o n a l Day of P r o t e s t . " H.E.U. members f o l l o w e d t h e u n i o n ' s recommendation by s t a g i n g noon-hour d e m o n s t r a t i o n s i n f r o n t of h o s p i t a l s a c r o s s B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . On O c t o b e r 12, Judge M c T a g g a r t i s s u e d an " i n t e r i m award" w h i c h v a r i e d t h e l e g i s l a t e d c o l l e c t i v e agreement t o comply w i t h the A.I.B. r u l i n g . In d o i n g s o , a l l new b e n e f i t s i n c l u d e d i n the imposed agreement, e x c e p t t h e d e n t a l p l a n , were s u s p e n d e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , employees had t o pay back any overpayment of wages r e c e i v e d t o d a t e . On O c t o b e r 18, n e g o t i a t i o n s began r e g a r d i n g the t h r e e i s s u e s t o be r e - o p e n e d f o r t h e s e c o n d y e a r of the agreement. No s e t t l e m e n t was r e a c h e d and Mr. Hugh G. L a d n e r , as a r b i t r a t o r , commenced h e a r i n g s on the i s s u e s on December 13. The r e s u l t i n g award of December 22, e f f e c t i v e f o r one y e a r as of J a n u a r y 1, 1977, e l i m i n a t e d c o s t - o f - l i v i n g a d j u s t m e n t s , p o s t p o n e d j o b e v a l u a t i o n p e n d i n g f u r t h e r r e v i e w , and a l l o w e d a g e n e r a l wage i n c r e a s e e q u a l t o s i x p e r c e n t of t h e maximum c o m p e n s a t i o n a l l o w -a b l e i n 1976. The A.I.B. A d m i n i s t r a t o r h e a r d a p p e a l arguments from H..E..U. and H.L.R.A. on J a n u a r y 13 and 14, 1977 , and handed down h i s d e c i s i o n on F e b r u a r y 18. Mr. T a n s l e y ' s d e c i s i o n r e a f f i r m e d t h e A.I.B. o r d e r t h a t the maximum a l l o w a b l e i n c r e a s e f o r 1976 was to be h e l d t o e i g h t p e r c e n t , f o r 1 9 7 7 — s i x p e r c e n t , and f o r 19-78 — f o u r p e r c e n t . 96 On F e b r u a r y 28, Mr. L a d n e r s u b m i t t e d h i s award r e g a r d -i n g j o b e v a l u a t i o n , t h e r e b y c r e a t i n g a union-management j o i n t j o b e v a l u a t i o n committee. On March 18, 1977, Judge M c T a g g a r t handed down h i s " f i n a l award" f o r the 1976-77 M a s t e r Agreement. The f i n a l award p r o -v i d e d f o r the r e i n s t a t e m e n t of t h r e e c l a u s e s s u s p e n d e d by the i n t e r i m award. The r e i n s t a t e d c l a u s e s , e f f e c t i v e J a n u a r y 1, 1977, were: 1. S p e c i a l l e a v e Cpaid l e a v e f o r c e r t a i n p e r s o n a l m a t t e r s ) 2. O n - c a l l d i f f e r e n t i a l ( s i x t y c e n t s p e r hour on top of r e g -u l a r pay f o r employees r e q u i r e d : t o be o n - c a l l ) : 3. I n j u r y - o n - d u t y l e a v e ( f u l l pay f o r employees i n j u r e d at work w i t h no l o s s of s i c k d ays) B e n e f i t s s u s p e n d e d by the i n t e r i m award and now t o be removed from the M a s t e r Agreement i n c l u d e d : 1. New s c h e d u l i n g p r o v i s i o n s ( g u a r a n t e e i n g e v e r y s e c o n d week-end o f f ) 2. I n c r e a s e d o v e r t i m e a l l o w a n c e s 3. C o s t - o f - l i v i n g a d j u s t m e n t s . On A p r i l 6, a memorandum of agreement was s i g n e d by H.E.U. and H.L.R.A. t h u s f i n a l i z i n g t h e 1976-77 M a s t e r Agreement. I n the memorandum, t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e d to sus p e n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the s p e c i a l l e a v e c l a u s e u n t i l J u l y 1, 1977, i n o r d e r t o a v o i d p o s s i b l e f u r t h e r r e c o v e r y payments by employees and t h u s keep t o t a l b e n e f i t s and wages w i t h i n the A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s . In J u n e , b o t h p a r t i e s p r i n t e d t h e i r own v e r s i o n s of t h e M a s t e r Agreement f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e memberships. 97 The H.L.R.A. v e r s i o n i n c l u d e d t h e terms of t h e l e g i s l a t e d a g r e e -ment of June 1976, as amended and v a r i e d by t h e S p e c i a l M e d i a t o r , the a r b i t r a t o r , and t h e A.I.B. The H.E.U. v e r s i o n r e f l e c t e d o n l y the o r i g i n a l June 1976 l e g i s l a t e d a greement, a d d i n g " s u p p l e m e n t s " at t h e end t o n o t e t h e v a r i o u s changes t h a t had been made. In J u l y , H.L.R.A. a p p l i e d t o the L.R.B. to have the u n i o n v e r s i o n d e c l a r e d i m p r o p e r and v o i d . On September 28, 1977, t h e L.R.B. r u l e d t h a t o n l y the agreement as c o m p i l e d by H.L.R.A. was t o be a c c e p t e d as the p r o p e r 1976—77 M a s t e r Agreement. Determinants of S t r a t e g y : H.E.U. E a r l y S t r a t e g y The mood at t h e H.E.U. p r o v i n c i a l wage c o n f e r e n c e , September 6 and 7, 1975, was one of " c a t c h - u p , " and, i n p a r t i c u - : l a r , c a t c h - u p t o B.C.G.E.U. and H.S.A. W h i l e the u n i o n d e s i r e d to r e g a i n i t s p re-1973 p o s i t i o n as h e a l t h c a r e i n d u s t r y wage l e a d e r , i t demanded to at l e a s t c a t c h - u p . A r e p o r t to t h e c o n f e r e n c e from t h e u n i o n ' s D i r e c t o r of T e c h n i c a l S e r v i c e s n o t e d t h a t t h e 1974-75 agreement had i n c l u d e d a g e n e r a l wage i n c r e a s e of twenty-one p e r c e n t , and t h a t w i t h COLA c l a u s e i n c r e a s e s , u n i o n members' wages had a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e d 35.3 p e r c e n t o v e r 1973 r a t e s i n t h e p e r i o d from J a n u a r y 1, 1974, to September 1, 1975. I t was a l s o n o t e d t h a t o v e r t h e same p e r i o d the c o s t o f l i v i n g as measured by the V a n c o u v e r Consumer P r i c e Index had i n c r e a s e d 20.6 p e r c e n t , t h e r e b y d r o p p i n g t h e p u r c h a s i n g power of t h e members' i n c r e a s e s down t o o n l y 14.7 p e r c e n t . How-e v e r , w i t h t h e f e d e r a l government t h r e a t e n i n g t o impose wage Figure 13  Early Strategy: H.E.U. Determinants Strategies T a c t i c s recent settlements wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s to r i v a l unions previous experience .intra-union p o l i t i c s comparison re j e c t A.I.B. guidelines argue wage rate consistency p o l i t i c a l climate I n d u s t r i a l Inquiry Commission «. b avoid mediation ' — / * threaten s t r i k e renounce a r b i t r a t i o n s e t t l e minor issues early 99 c o n t r o l s i n an e f f o r t t o keep i n f l a t i o n below t h e " t w o - d i g i t " l e v e l , t h e u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p f e l t i t t o be an i n a p p r o p r i a t e time t o be a r g u i n g f o r wage i n c r e a s e s on t h e b a s i s of e i t h e r e r o d i n g d o l l a r v a l u e o r s t a y i n g ahead o f i n f l a t i o n . Thus, most of t h e r e p o r t t o the c o n f e r e n c e - d e a l t w i t h t h e r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n of H.E.U. members w i t h r e s p e c t t o members o f s u c h o t h e r u n i o n s as C.U.P.E., H.S.A., I.U.O.E., and B.C.G.E.U. The H.E.U. members were shown t h a t t h e i r wage r a t e s had f a l l e n b e h i n d . They were t o l d t h a t r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s had p r o v i d e d f o r a v e r a g e a n n u a l i n c r e a s e s of 18.9 p e r c e n t . U n i o n l e a d e r s h i p b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e most e f f e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y would t h u s be one of c o m p a r i s o n , a r g u i n g i n d u s t r i a l wage r a t e c o n s i s t e n c y and e q u a l pay f o r e q u a l work. The u n i o n would a l s o p o i n t out the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between wages e a r n e d by H.E.U. mem-b e r s and t h o s e e a r n e d by o t h e r u n i o n s ' members ( i . e . the f o r m e r " l e a d e r s h i p " p o s i t i o n of H.E.U.), a r g u i n g t h a t t h e e m p l o y e r was p a y i n g wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s t o t h e o t h e r u n i o n s as a means of p r o -m o t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d i s p u t e s and the p r a c t i c e of r a i d i n g . A s e c o n d r e p o r t , g i v e n t o t h e c o n f e r e n c e by t h e P r o v i n c i a l P r e s i d e n t , d e s c r i b e d t h e b a r g a i n i n g f o r t h e 1974-75 M a s t e r A g r e e -ment as b e i n g s u c c e s s f u l l y c o n c l u d e d i n f r o n t o f I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y C o m m i s s i o n e r , Mr. D. R. B l a i r . The r e p o r t a l s o d e s c r i b e d t h e e x i s t i n g l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s c l i m a t e i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y as poor and t o l d members i t was now " t i m e t o g e t t o u g h " and t o be p r e p a r e d t o " t a k e a s t a n d a g a i n s t a t t e m p t s t o s u b s i d i z e t h e d e l i v e r y of p u b l i c s e r v i c e s a t t h e c o s t of s u b - s t a n d a r d wages and f r i n g e b e n e f i t s . " The u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p f e l t t h a t i t s s t r a t e g y 100 of " c o m p a r i s o n " would b e s t a c h i e v e i t s c o e r c i v e p o t e n t i a l i n f r o n t of an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i n the p e r s o n of D. R. B l a i r . To t h a t end, the u n i o n would a t t e m p t t o c o n v i n c e t h e e m p l o y e r s ' agent t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n would n o t be u s e d as a means of o b t a i n i n g a c o n t r a c t , and t h a t t h e u n i o n would s t r i k e i f a s e t t l e m e n t was not n e g o t i a t e d w i t h i n an a c c e p t a b l e p e r i o d of t i m e . The u n i o n ' s i n i t i a l b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y was t h e r e f o r e t w o-pronged: 1. S u p p o r t demands f o r wages and f r i n g e b e n e f i t s on the b a s i s of c o m p a r i s o n 2. Use the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission as the forum i n w h i c h to n e g o t i a t e the s e t t l e m e n t . The above s t r a t e g y was d e v e l o p e d i n l i g h t of f i v e major d e t e r m i n a n t s : 1. Recent s e t t l e m e n t s i n t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r 2. Wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s r e c e i v e d by r i v a l u n i o n s 3 . P r e v i o u s b a r g a i n i n g e x p e r i e n c e , and a n t i c i p a t e d d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e e m p l o y e r s ' new agent 4 . P o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e (.i.e. l a b o u r ' s r e a c t i o n t o p r o p o s e d a n t i -i n f l a t i o n l e g i s l a t i o n ) 5 . I n t r a - u n i o n p o l i t i c s The c o m p a r i s o n s t r a t e g y was b a s e d i n l a r g e p a r t on a r e -view of r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s i n t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r . A c c o r d i n g to a u n i o n spokesman, H.E.U. l e a d e r s h i p b e l i e v e d t h e s e s e t t l e m e n t s t o be q u i t e g e n e r o u s and f e l t th.ey would do w e l l t o f o l l o w s i m i l a r p a t t e r n s . T e l e p h o n e w o r k e r s and B.C. T e l e p h o n e Company had s e t -101 t i e d a t t h . i r t y - f i v e p e r c e n t o v e r a t w e n t y - f o u r month p e r i o d . C.U.P.E., L o c a l 116, and U.B..C. had s e t t l e d a t a g e n e r a l wage i n c r e a s e of t w e n t y - f i v e p e r c e n t o v e r t w e l v e months. V a r i o u s l o c a l s of C.'U.P.E. and the G r e a t e r V i c t o r i a R e g i o n a l M u n i c i p a l -i t i e s , a f t e r a work s t o p p a g e , b a r g a i n e d "a g e n e r a l wage i n c r e a s e of a l m o s t t w e n t y — e i g h t p e r c e n t o v e r t w e n t y - f o u r months p l u s a COLA c l a u s e . O t h e r r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s i n c l u d e d t h e r e p o r t of I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y C o m m i s s i o n e r N o e l H a l l who had recommended a g e n e r a l wage i n c r e a s e of 39.5 p e r c e n t o v e r t w e n t y - e i g h t months i n the O.T.E.U. L o c a l 378-I.C.B.C. d i s p u t e . W i t h s e t t l e m e n t s s u c h as t h e s e t o use as c o m p a r i s o n s , H.E.U. f e l t c o n f i d e n t i n demand-i n g a g e n e r a l wage i n c r e a s e o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h i r t y - t h r e e p e r c e n t o v e r t w e n t y - f o u r months p l u s COLA. In r e v i e w i n g o t h e r s e t t l e m e n t s , H.E.U. gave p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o m o n i t o r i n g t h e wage r a t e s and f r i n g e b e n e f i t s . b y h o s p i t a l w o r k e r s r e p r e s e n t e d by the B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a Government E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n (B.C.G.E.U.). S i n c e the f i r s t agreement nego-t i a t e d w i t h t h e N.D.P. government, B.C.G.E.U. had s u r p a s s e d H.E.U. as t h e i n d u s t r y wage l e a d e r f o r h o s p i t a l s e r v i c e e m p l o y e e s . A c c o r d i n g t o H.E.U. r e s e a r c h , h o u s e k e e p i n g a i d e s r e p r e s e n t e d by B.C.G.E.U. were s e v e n t y - f o u r d o l l a r s p e r month ahead of t h o s e r e p r e s e n t e d by H.E.U. C l e a n e r s r e p r e s e n t e d by B.C.G.E.U. were e l e v e n d o l l a r s p e r month ahead. O r d e r l i e s were t h i r t y - n i n e d o l l a r s p e r month ahead. In a d d i t i o n , B.C.G.E.U. had r e c e i v e d a COLA c l a u s e a l l o w i n g f o r a one p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n wages f o r each one p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n the Consumer P r i c e I ndex. W h i l e H.E.U.'s u l t i m a t e g o a l was t o r e g a i n i t s l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n , t h e y were o p t i m i s t i c t h a t l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y would be e n c o u n t e r e d I n a t 102 l e a s t a c h i e v i n g p a r i t y with. R.C.G.E.U., a r e s u l t w h i c h i n i t s e l f t h e l e a d e r s h i p f e l t would be s a t i s f a c t o r y t o t h e membership. As w e l l as r e v i e w i n g t h e R.C.G.E.U. s e t t l e m e n t , H.E.U. compared t h e r a t e s r e c e i v e d by i t s r i v a l u n i o n s , H.S.A. and I.U.O.E., f o r t h o s e s p e c i f i c p o s i t i o n s a l s o c o v e r e d by H.E.U. T e c h n i c i a n s r e p r e s e n t e d by H.S.A. were e a r n i n g 149 t o 170 d o l l a r s p e r month more t h a n t h o s e r e p r e s e n t e d by H.E.U. F o u r t h c l a s s s h i f t e n g i n e -e r s r e p r e s e n t e d by I.U.O.E. were e a r n i n g s e v e n t y - f o u r t o 109 d o l l a r s p e r month more. H.E.U., t h e r e f o r e , would demand p a r i t y w i t h i t s r i v a l u n i o n s as a minimum f o r s e t t l e m e n t . The " c o m p a r i s o n s t r a t e g y " of the u n i o n was a l s o i n f l u -e nced by the p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e t h e n t a k i n g shape between o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r and t h e f e d e r a l government. The d e b a t e c o n c e r n e d t h e wage c o n t r o l s t o be i n c l u d e d i n a p r o p o s e d a n t i - i n f l a t i o n p r ogram. The u n i o n t o o k t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t p u b l i c l y - f u n d e d employees would n o t be s u b j e c t t o any s u c h c o n t r o l . F u r t h e r m o r e , i f wage i n c r e a s e s were e v e n t u a l l y l i m i t e d , t h e base r a t e s on w h i c h i n c r e a s e s would be c a l c u l a t e d s h o u l d at l e a s t be c o n s i s t e n t f o r a l l p o s i t i o n s i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y . T h u s , t h e u n i o n assumed t h e t a c t i c a l p o s -i t i o n t h a t s h o u l d a p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t be r e f u s e d by H.L.R.A. on the grounds of e x c e e d i n g f e d e r a l l i m i t a t i o n s , j o b a c t i o n would be r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o f o r m a p r o t e s t v i s i b l e t o government o f f i c i a l s . As s t a t e d by a u n i o n spokesman, t h i s was i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n of o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r i n g e n e r a l and what H.E.U. l e a d e r s h i p b e l i e v e d to be the e x p e c t a t i o n of i t s membership. The " I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission s t r a t e g y " was d e t e r -mined In p a r t t h r o u g h a r e c o g n i t i o n by u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p of t h e b a s i c c o n f l i c t o r i e n t a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y . 103 I n l i g h t o f a p a s t h i s t o r y of union-management d i s t r u s t , i n c l u d -i n g numerous a l l e g a t i o n s of bad f a i t h b a r g a i n i n g , t h e u n i o n ne-g o t i a t o r assumed t h a t l i t t l e would be a c c o m p l i s h e d d u r i n g d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , H.E.U. was now b a r g a i n i n g w i t h t h e newly a c c r e d i t e d H e a l t h L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c i a t i o n w h i c h was i n the p o s i t i o n of h a v i n g t o p r o v e i t s e l f t o i t s p r i n c i p a l s . The u n i o n was aware of t h e o p i n i o n h e l d by c e r t a i n h o s p i t a l t r u s t e e s t h a t t h e p r e v i o u s agreement w i t h H.E.U. was " t o o r i c h " and had been the r e s u l t of " s o f t b a r g a i n i n g . " A h a r d l i n e a p p r o a c h from H.L.R.A. was t h e r e f o r e a n t i c i p a t e d . T h i s f e e l i n g , was s u b s t a n -t i a t e d when H.L.R.A. announced i n e a r l y September, 1975, t h a t i t s P r e s i d e n t was t o be a n e g o t i a t o r known t o t h e u n i o n by h i s r e -p u t a t i o n as a " h a r d l i n e r " and " u n i o n - b u s t e r . " H.E.U. t h u s f e l t t h a t s e r i o u s n e g o t i a t i o n s would l i k e l y t a k e p l a c e o n l y i n f r o n t of a h i g h l e v e l m e d i a t o r whose recommendations c o u l d , i f n e c e s s a r y , be used as t h e b a s i s f o r an imposed s e t t l e m e n t . The u n i o n , however, was n o t d e s i r o u s of an imposed s e t t l e -ment and s p e c i f i c a l l y w i s h e d t o a v o i d a r b i t r a t i o n . The u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r s t a t e d t h a t t h e u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p f e l t i t had an o b l i -g a t i o n to i t s membership to a c h i e v e a n e g o t i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y r e c e i v e one t h r o u g h a r b i t r a t i o n . A u n i o n spokesman s t a t e d t h a t w h i l e t h e n e g o t i a t o r was under no p r e s s u r e " t o p r o v e h i m s e l f , " i t was n o n e t h e l e s s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e membership would vie w the o p t i n g f o r a r b i t r a t i o n a s - a n a b r o g a t i o n of t h e r e s p o n -s i b i l i t y , i n h e r e n t i n the n e g o t i a t o r ' s p o s i t i o n . These s t a t e m e n t s , however, r e q u i r e some f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s . The n e g o t i a t i o n s were the f i r s t n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r th:e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r . The u n i o n ' s 104 p r e v i o u s n e g o t i a t o r , a w e l l - l i k e d and w e l l - r e s p e c t e d s t a f f member, was now h o l d i n g a s e n i o r a d v i s o r y p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e u n i o n h i e r -a r c h y . E a s e d on comments made by b o t h a u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and an H.L.R.A. b a r g a i n i n g committee member, i t would a p p e a r t h a t the u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r ' s a p p o i n t m e n t t o t h a t p o s i t i o n r e c e i v e d unan-imous s u p p o r t from n e i t h e r s t a f f n o r membership. I t i s v e r y l i k e -l y , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r was, i n f a c t j u nder a g r e a t d e a l o f p r e s s u r e " t o p r o v e h i m s e l f . " To a c h i e v e even a "good" s e t t l e m e n t through a r b i t r a t i o n may have a p p e a r e d to the u n i o n as an i n d i c a t i o n of weak n e g o t i a t i n g s k i l l s . The u n i o n a l s o b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e was a l e s s e r p o s s i b i l -i t y f o r an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y C o m m i s s i o n e r , as opposed t o an a r b i t r a t o r , t o be i n f l u e n c e d by t h e c u r r e n t a n t i - u n i o n p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t . The p r e v i o u s agreement ( i . e . the 1974-75 M a s t e r A g r e e -ment) had been s u c c e s s f u l l y n e g o t i a t e d i n f r o n t o f Mr. D.R. B l a i r as I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y C o m m i s s i o n e r . F u r t h e r m o r e , Mr. B l a i r ' s S p e c i a l O f f i c e r R e p o r t , a f t e r w h i c h H.L.R.A. i t s e l f was c r e a t e d , had assumed t h a t an a c c r e d i t e d e m p l o y e r s ' b a r g a i n i n g agent would l e a d to more "mature and c o o p e r a t i v e " l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s , a d i r e c -t i o n.In w h i c h H.L.R.A. was now a p p a r e n t l y n ot moving. T h e r e f o r e , i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e t h e n e c e s s a r y i m p e t u s t o H.L.R.A. t o a c c e p t an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission's r e p o r t , w h i l e c o n c u r r e n t l y m a i n t a i n i n g a to u g h b a r g a i n i n g a t t i t u d e , H.E.U. announced e a r l y on i n n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t i t would not seek a r b i t r a t i o n as a means of o b t a i n i n g a s e t t l e m e n t . The t a c t i c of r e n o u n c i n g a r b i t r a t i o n was I n t e n d e d as a c l e a r t h r e a t to H.L.R.A.: i f H.L.R.A. would not s e t t l e , H.E.U. would s t r i k e . 10 5 D u r i n g the d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n s the u n i o n t a c t i c was t o r e a c h agreement on as many p o i n t s as p o s s i b l e , however s m a l l . The u n i o n b e l i e v e d t h i s would t e n d t o improve t h e i r p o s i t i o n when the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s moved on t o t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission s t a g e . T h e r e would r e m a i n fewer m i n o r i s s u e s t o c o n f u s e d i s c u s s i o n , and fewer i s s u e s f o r H.L.R.A. to use as t r a d i n g p o i n t s a g a i n s t u n i o n demands. I t was d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s ( O c t o b e r 14, 1975) t h a t t h e A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n was e n a c t e d by the f e d e r a l g overnment. As p e r u n i o n s t r a t e g y , H.E.U. announced t o H.L.R.A. t h a t t h e u n i o n c o n s i d e r e d t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y t o be o u t s i d e t h e bounds o f the A.I.B. and would c o n t i n u e t o b a r g a i n a c c o r d i n g l y . The t a c t i c was a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d means of i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e u n i o n would n o t s e t t l e a t e i g h t p e r c e n t , a f i g u r e f a r below p a r i t y w i t h B.C.G.E.U. and t h e r i v a l u n i o n s . F o l l o w i n g r e c e i p t of the " f i n a l o f f e r " f r o m H.L.R.A., the u n i o n b r o k e o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s and s u b s e q u e n t l y r e f u s e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n m e d i a t i o n . T h i s t a c t i c s e r v e d t h r e e p u r p o s e s . F i r s t , by a v o i d i n g t h e m e d i a t i o n s t e p , H.E.U. was b r i n g i n g b a r -g a i n i n g more q u i c k l y to t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission s t a g e . T h i s was i m p o r t a n t t o t h e u n i o n as t h e y were d e s i r o u s of r e a c h i n g an agreement b e f o r e the P r o v i n c e announced i t s d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e f e d e r a l A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s . Second, i t a l l o w e d H.E.U. a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e m i n d t h e e m p l o y e r s ' a g e n t of t h e u n i o n ' s i n t e n t i o n to s t r i k e s h o u l d agreement not be r e a c h e d . T h i r d , i t a l l o w e d t h e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r an o p p o r t u n -i t y to i m p r e s s upon t h e membership t h e u n i o n ' s " t o u g h " b a r g a i n -i n g s t a n c e . 106 S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , a j o i n t E. E . U ./H . L . R. A. a p p l i c a t i o n was made f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. H.E.U. was more t h a n w i l l i n g t o g i v e i t s v e r b a l a s s u r a n c e t o H.L.R.A. t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n would n o t s u b s e q u e n t l y be u s e d t o s e t t l e o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e s . F o r t h e u n i o n , t h e a s s u r a n c e was m e r e l y a r e a f f i r m a t i o n of t h e i r p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to a u n i o n spokesman, t h e u n i o n d i d n o t r e a l l y a n t i c i p a t e h a v i n g t o go on s t r i k e . I t n o n e t h e l e s s chose t h e t a c t i c of s t r i k e t h r e a t as an a t t e m p t t o f o r c e c o n c e s s i o n s from H.L.R.A. i n f r o n t of t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. Thus, by the b e g i n n i n g of December, H.E.U. had made p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r s t r i k e v o t e s t o be t a k e n at twenty h o s p i t a l s a c r o s s B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . U n t i l t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of Mr. B l a i r as I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y C o m m i s s i o n e r , t h e u n i o n a t t e m p t e d to m a i n t a i n i t s member-s h i p ' s s u p p o r t f o r j o b a c t i o n t h r o u g h the " B a r g a i n i n g N e w s l e t t e r , " i n w h i c h H.L.R.A. was d e p i c t e d as an o r g a n i z a t i o n " s e t up f o r CONFRONTATION n o t CO-OPERATION," thu s l e a v i n g u n i o n members "no c h o i c e b u t t o meet t h i s c h a l l e n g e . " The p r o p o s a l s of H.L.R.A. were d e s c r i b e d as " f l y i n g i n t h e f a c e of t h e u n i o n ' s p o s i t i o n . . the w o r s t e v e r put t o any of t h e u n i o n ' s B a r g a i n i n g Com-m i t t e e . . . an i n s u l t t o a l l members." The u n i o n b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e open t h r e a t of work s t o p p a g e would p r o v i d e t h e c o e r c i v e s t i m -u l u s r e q u i r e d f o r an agreement w i t h H.L.R.A. t o be o b t a i n e d . L a t e r S t r a t e g y T h e r e were e v e n t s w h i c h o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission t h a t i n f l u e n c e d the: u n i o n t o 107 m o d i f y i t s o r i g i n a l s t r a t e g y p o s i t i o n s . F o r t h e l a t e r s t a g e s of b a r g a i n i n g the s t r a t e g y t h u s became: 1. A c h i e v e " s a t i s f a c t o r y " r ecommendations from t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission w h i c h c o u l d l a t e r be u s e d as s u p p o r t f o r u n i o n demands i n e x c e s s of A.I.B. l i m i t a t i o n s 2. C o n t i n u e t o use c o m p a r i s o n , but e mphasize h i s t o r i c a l r e l a -t i o n s h i p s 3. S t r i k e The f a c t o r s t h a t d e t e r m i n e d t h e s e s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s were: 1. P r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e 2. F e d e r a l p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e and A.I.B. 3. B a r g a i n i n g t a c t i c s of t h e r i v a l u n i o n s 4. I n t r a - u n i o n p o l i t i c s In e a r l y December, the l a b o u r - s u p p o r t e d N.D.P. g o v e r n -ment l o s t the p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n and was r e p l a c e d by a S o c i a l C r e d i t government. The r e t u r n o f the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y t o power p a r t i a l l y r e f l e c t e d p u b l i c d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the manner i n w h i c h the f o r m e r government had d e a l t w i t h l a b o u r . Even a g e n e r a l b a c k - t o - w o r k o r d e r i s s u e d t h e p r e v i o u s August c o u l d n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y t u r n p u b l i c o p i n i o n a r o u n d . W i t h i n a d e c i d e d l y pro-management, a n t i - i n f l a t i o n , r e s t r a i n t - o r i e n t e d c l i m a t e , u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p f e l t t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n would p r o d u c e an award r e f l e c t i v e o f t h e s e t r e n d s i n p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t , t h u s making a h i g h a r b i t r a t e d award i m p r o b a b l e . I t was t h e r e f o r e i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t f o r H.E.U. to r e a c h a s a t i s f a c t o r y agreement i n f r o n t of B l a i r r a t h e r t h a n have the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s c o n t i n u e f u r t h e r . D u r i n g the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission h e a r i n g s , i t 108 became o b v i o u s t o t h e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r t h a t the p r o c e s s was t o c o n t i n u e f u r t h e r . W h i l e H.L.R.A. was now b a r g a i n i n g s e r i o u s l y and was w i l l i n g to make c o n c e s s i o n s on non-monetary i s s u e s , t h e i r p o s i t i o n on A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s r e m a i n e d unchanged. H.L.R.A. would a l l o w the u n i o n t o choose f o r i t s e l f any c o m b i n a t i o n o f f r i n g e b e n e f i t s and wage I n c r e a s e s , so l o n g as the t o t a l c o s t f o r 1976 d i d n o t e x c e e d e i g h t p e r c e n t . The u n i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o . a u n i o n spokesman, f o r the f i r s t time began t o c o n s i d e r i t l i k e l y t h a t a s e t t l e m e n t would n o t be r e a c h e d . A.I.B. r e g u l a t i o n s were t a g g e d as the s t u m b l i n g b l o c k . T h e r e was s t i l l no i n d i c a t i o n , however, as to whether A.I.B. r e g u l a t i o n s i n c l u d e d n o n - f e d e r a l p u b l i c e m p l o y e e s , and, i n f a c t , no i n d i c a t i o n as to when or i f t h e p r o v i n c e would e v e n t u a l l y adopt t h e r e g u l a t i o n s . Thus t h e u n i o n c o n t i n u e d t o b a r g a i n on t h e b a s i s of c o m p a r i s o n , b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission's R e p o r t would n o t be i n f l u e n c e d by A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n . As a r e s u l t , even i f H.L.R.A. wou l d n o t s e t t l e (as now a p p e a r e d l i k e l y ) , H.E.U. c o u l d a r g u e f o r " s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n " i n f r o n t of the A.I.B., c i t i n g as s u p p o r t t h e recommendations of t h e g o v e r n m e n t - a p p o i n t e d I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. The s t r a t e g y of a r g u i n g c o m p a r i s o n s had t o be s l i g h t l y m o d i f i e d i n m i d - F e b r u a r y , 1976. In t h a t month b o t h R.N.A.B.C. and H.S.A. were a l s o i n v o l v e d i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g w i t h H.L.R.A. The u n i o n s ' demands c o m p r i s e d a r e a s o f i n t e r e s t s i m i l a r to t h o s e of H.E.U.; f o r example, h o u r s of work, s t a t u t o r y h o l i d a y pay, wages, d e n t a l p l a n , o n - c a l l d i f f e r e n t i a l , s p e c i a l l e a v e , and s e v e r a n c e a l l o w a n c e . In r e c o g n i t i o n of a n t i - i n f l a t i o n l e g -i s l a t i o n , b o t h R.N.A.B.C. and H... S.A. a g r e e d to r o l l back some of 10 9 t h e i r demands. These a c t i o n s p l a c e d g r e a t p r e s s u r e on H.E.U. t o f o l l o w s u i t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n v i e w o f t h e c o m p a r i s o n s t r a t e g y . The u n i o n d e c i d e d not t o l o w e r i t s demands but to r e a d j u s t the f o c u s of i t s arguments to h i g h l i g h t the h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of H.E.U.'s c o m p e n s a t i o n package to t h a t of t h e o t h e r u n i o n s . Because of H.E.U.'s " f o l l o w e r " p o s i t i o n o v e r th e p a s t y e a r s , a c c o r d i n g to t h e m o d i f i e d s t r a t e g y , the u n i o n s h o u l d n o t be e x p e c t e d , n o r c o u l d t h e y a f f o r d , to l o w e r t h e i r demands m e r e l y b e c a u s e one o r more of t h e " l e a d e r " u n i o n s had done so. None-t h e l e s s , a u n i o n spokesman s t a t e d t h a t H.E.U. l e a d e r s h i p now w o r r i e d t h a t the r o l l b a c k s a p p r o v e d by the o t h e r u n i o n s would n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission's recommenda-t i o n s . S t r i k e a c t i o n as opposed t o s t r i k e t h r e a t was n o t o r i g -i n a l l y p a r t of t h e u n i o n ' s s t r a t e g y . W i t h l i t t l e hope f o r e c o -nomic g a i n as a r e s u l t of s u c h a c t i o n , the u n i o n f o u n d i t s e l f i n a "no c h o i c e " s i t u a t i o n f o l l o w i n g H.L.R.A.'s r e f u s a l , t o a c c e p t B l a i r ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . The u n i o n had p r e v i o u s l y t o l d i t s mem-b e r s h i p t h a t a s t r i k e would be n e c e s s a r y i f a p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t was r e j e c t e d due t o A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , o r g a n i z e d l a b o u r had been a c t i v e l y c a m p a i g n i n g a g a i n s t t h e wage c o n t r o l p o l i c i e s of t h e f e d e r a l government, d e s c r i b i n g A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s as t o t a l l y i n e f f e c t u a l as a means of c u r b i n g i n f l a t i o n and i n t e n d -ed p r i m a r i l y to d e p r i v e t h e w o r k i n g p u b l i c of a f a i r wage. U n i o n l e a d e r s a c r o s s the c o u n t r y were c a l l i n g f o r g e n e r a l s t r i k e a c t i o n i n p r o t e s t . The H.E.U. l e a d e r s h i p f e l t the membership had t h u s been p r e p a r e d f o r and were e x p e c t a n t of a work s t o p p a g e s h o u l d A .I.B. b l o c k t h e i r way t o a " j u s t " s e t t l e m e n t . I n a d d i t i o n , 110 r e g a r d l e s s of the outcome of a s t r i k e , t h e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r s t a t e d t h a t i t would have been p o l i t i c a l l y unwise and u n n e c e s -s a r i l y e x p e n s i v e t o c a l l a n o t h e r p r o v i n c i a l c o n f e r e n c e i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n t h e f a i l u r e s of p r e v i o u s s t r a t e g i e s and a t t e m p t t o o b t a i n a p p r o v a l f o r a new s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n . T h i s l a t t e r comment r e q u i r e s some f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . A l l t h i n g s ~.being e q u a l , a u n i o n p r e s e n t i n g i t s e l f as a p o w e r f u l b a r g a i n i n g p a r t y would u s u a l l y be e x p e c t e d t o s p a r e no expense to h e l p b r i n g about a f a v o u r a b l e s e t t l e m e n t . The expense of a c o n f e r e n c e , i f i n d e e d a f u l l p r o v i n c i a l c o n f e r e n c e was a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e d , c o u l d c e r t a i n l y not be so g r e a t as to be p r o h i b i t i v e i f u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p t h o u g h t i t n e c e s s a r y . However, t o admit t h e f a i l u r e of a c h o s e n s t r a t e g y to a f u l l p r o v i n c i a l c o n f e r e n c e would be, at t h e v e r y l e a s t , d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e s t a t u s of t h e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r . Thus, w h i l e u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p must have r e c o g -n i z e d t h e l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by S e c t i o n 73, a h o s p i t a l s t r i k e was n o n e t h e l e s s s u p p o r t e d as a p u b l i c d i s p l a y of u n i o n power, a show of u n i o n s o l i d a r i t y , a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t the " a n t i - w a g e " l e g -i s l a t i o n , and p e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t , a v o t e of c o n f i d e n c e i n the u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r . I t was now a l m o s t f i v e months s i n c e t h e December e l e c -t i o n of the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . The p r o v i n c e had n o t y e t a d o p t e d t h e A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s . The u n i o n t h u s s p e c u l a t e d t h a t the g o v e r n -ment would n o t p e r m i t a l e n g t h y h o s p i t a l s t r i k e , b ut i n s t e a d would impose a s e t t l e m e n t b a s e d on t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Com-m i s s i o n ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . In f a c t , the u n i o n was h_opeful of r e c e i v i n g an award i n c l u d i n g the f u l l 13.96 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e of t h e B l a i r R e p o r t . I l l On May 1, H.E.U. gave 72-hour s t r i k e n o t i c e t o the V a n c o u v e r G e n e r a l H o s p i t a l . A s t r i k e v o t e h e l d e a r l i e r t h a t day had r e s u l t e d i n an 87.1 p e r c e n t m a j o r i t y i n f a v o u r of s t r i k e 3 a c t i o n . A u n i o n spokesman s t a t e d t h a t V a n c o u v e r G e n e r a l H o s p i t a l was ch o s e n as the f i r s t un.it t o s t r i k e b e c a u s e i t was t h e l a r g e s t u n i t i n t h e p r o v i n c e , t h e p r o v i n c i a l r e f e r r a l h o s p i t a l , and t h e ma j o r t e a c h i n g h o s p i t a l . A work s t o p p a g e t h e r e c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y c a u s e the g r e a t e s t s e r v i c e d i s r u p t i o n and r e c e i v e the g r e a t e s t p r e s s c o v e r a g e . P e r h a p s e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , though n o t s t a t e d by t h e u n i o n spokesman, was the n e e d ' f o r t h e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r t o r e c e i v e a s t r o n g s t r i k e mandate. Of t h e n i n e t y - n i n e h o s p i t a l s r e p r e s e n t e d by H.E.U., o n l y t h e V a n c o u v e r G e n e r a l v o t e d a g a i n s t a c c e p t a n c e of t h e B l a i r R e p o r t ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , on t h e b a s i s t h a t the recommendations 4 were t o o f a r under t h e u n i o n ' s o r i g i n a l demands. S i n c e t h e u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r r e q u i r e d a s t r o n g show o f s u p p o r t i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e h i s own c r e d i b i l i t y w i t h i n t h e u n i o n , i t was p o l i t i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y t o choose a h o s p i t a l f o r t h e f i r s t v o t e from w h i c h a l a r g e m a j o r i t y i n f a v o u r o f s t r i k e a c t i o n was v i r t u a l l y g u a r a n t e e d . By u s i n g the V a n c o u v e r G e n e r a l v o t e as t h e p r e c e d e n t - s e t t e r , o t h e r h o s p i t a l u n i t s would be s u b s e q u e n t l y s u b j e c t t o p e e r p r e s s u r e t o f o l l o w s u i t . I f , i n d e e d , t h i s was t h e t h i n k i n g b e h i n d t h e t a c t i c , i t can be s a i d t h a t t h e t a c t i c was s u c c e s s f u l : S u r r e y M e m o r i a l H o s p i t a l v o t e d 87.0 p e r c e n t i n f a v o u r o f s t r i k e " * ; V i c t o r i a G e n e r a l , 75.4 p e r c e n t ; R o y a l J u b i l e e , 63.4 p e r c e n t ; and, L i o n s Gate H o s p i -feal 72.0 p e r c e n t . The s t r i k e l a s t e d s i x t e e n d a y s , e n d i n g on May 20, 1976. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , Judge D.E. T c T a g g a r t was named S p e c i a l Me-. 112 d i a t o r . H i s 'recommendations, embodied i n the H o s p i t a l S e r v i c e s  C o l l e c t i v e Agreement A c t (June 9, 19 76) gave H.E.U. e x a c t l y what i t had hoped f o r . The u n i o n s i g n e d t h e imposed agreement imme-d i a t e l y . H.L.R.A. r e f u s e d . The r e m a i n i n g e v e n t s l e a d i n g t o t h e March 1977 memo-randum of agreement c o n s i s t e d , f o r t h e most p a r t , of a s e r i e s of p r e s e n t a t i o n s to the A.I.B. The u n i o n ' s s t r a t e g y was t o c o n t i n u e a r g u i n g on t h e b a s i s of c o m p a r i s o n with. B.C.G.E.U., H.S.A., and I.U.O.E. In a d d i t i o n , the u n i o n p r e s e n t e d b o t h B l a i r ' s and M c T a g g a r t ' s r e p o r t s as e v i d e n c e of t h e s u p p o r t th e H..E.U. p o s i t i o n had r e c e i v e d from two government a p p o i n t e e s . H.E.U.'s f i n a l t a c t i c i n v o l v e d t h e p r i n t i n g of t h e 1976-77 M a s t e r Agreement. The t a c t i c was a c t u a l l y p a r t of t h e s t r a t e g y d e v e l o p e d f o r t h e 1978 c o n t r a c t b a r g a i n i n g , soon t o commence. In p r i n t i n g a M a s t e r Agreement e m p h a s i z i n g the o r i g i n a l June 1976 award, H.E.U. p l a n n e d t o argue t h a t I t s h o u l d r e c e i v e i n 1978 a t l e a s t what i t had a l r e a d y b a r g a i n e d f o r i n 1976-77, p l u s , of c o u r s e , t h e a l l o w a b l e A.I.B. i n c r e a s e . W i t h 1978 nego-t i a t i o n s s c h e d u l e d to b e g i n i n September 1977, the u n i o n f e l t i t would do w e l l to demand the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of p r e v i o u s l y b a r g a i n -ed f o r b e n e f i t s , a l r e a d y i n c o n t r a c t l a n g u a g e , and a l r e a d y w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d . The t a c t i c , as p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , was u n s u c c e s s f u l as the L.R.B. e v e n t u a l l y r u l e d t h e H..E..U. v e r s i o n t o be i m p r o p e r and, t h e r e f o r e , v o i d . D e t e r m i n a n t s of S t r a t e g y : H.L.R.A. E a r l y S t r a t e g y The b a r g a i n i n g f o r t h e 1976-77 M a s t e r Agreement--was. a 113 f i r s t f o r t h e H.L.R.A. H a v i n g Keen r e c e n t l y a c c r e d i t e d , i t was now n e c e s s a r y to e s t a b l i s h : an image, n o t m e r e l y f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f the u n i o n w i t h whom H.L.R.A. would be b a r g a i n i n g , but f o r t h e h o s p i t a l t r u s t e e s and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s who c o m p r i s e d H. L.R.A.'s membership. The s t a f f member ch o s e n as c h i e f nego-t i a t o r was t o l d by h i s p r i n c i p a l s t h a t t h e y wanted " t o u g h e r " b a r g a i n i n g t h an had been the ca s e under the E.R.C. " H a r d l i n e " t a c t i c s were r e q u i r e d . A c c o r d i n g t o s t a t e m e n t s made by t h e ne-g o t i a t o r to t h i s w r i t e r , h a r d l i n e a r e the e a s i e s t t a c t i c s f o r management t o use: a l l a n e g o t i a t o r need do i s say "no." How-e v e r , i f us e d as a s t r a t e g y i n i t s e l f , r a t h e r t h a n as a s e r i e s of t a c t i c s f o l l o w i n g a s t r a t e g y , h a r d l i n e w i l l more t h a n l i k e l y c a use t h e u n i o n t o w i t h d r a w from n e g o t i a t i o n s and seek a t h i r d -p a r t y award. G o i n g i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s , t h e H.L.R.A. s t r a t e g y p o s i t i o n s can be l i s t e d as f o l l o w s : I . E s t a b l i s h H.L.R.A. as tou g h n e g o t i a t o r s 2. S t a l l t he b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s 3. A v o i d a r b i t r a t i o n — s e t t l e a t f i n a l m e d i a t i o n s t a g e ( i . e . e x p e c t e d t o be an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission) 4. I f p o s s i b l e , use A.I.R. g u i d e l i n e s as t a r g e t b a r g a i n i n g p o i n t The H.L.R.A. s t r a t e g y was c h o s e n i n l i g h t of t h e f o l l o w -i n g d e t e r m i n a n t s : 1. I n t r a o r g a n l z a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s (.i • e. t h e new b a r g a i n i n g agent had t o i m p r e s s i t s p r i n c i p a l s ) 2. I n s t i t u t i o n a l - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s C l.e. d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l s n ot a b l e t o q u i c k l y r e s p o n d t o u n i o n demands) 114 Figure 14 Early Strategy: H.L.R.A. Determinants Strategies T a c t i c s Intraorganizational p o l i t i c s I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s jAnti-Union P o l i t i c a l Climate A.I.B. Labour L e g i s l a t i o n Recent Settlements B.C.H.P.-Hospital's Budgets E s t a b l i s h H.L.R.A. as Hardline Negotiators S t a l l the process Avoid A r b i t r a t i o n : s e t t l e @ IIC H i r i n g of " h a r d l i n e " President Use A.I.B. guidelines as maximum Prepare demand-for-demand Substitute Committee sent to APre-negotiation sessions Avoid discussion of monetary issues App l i c a t i o n for Mediation Serious negotiation i n f i n a l mediation stage, only "Offer" l i t t l e or nothing i n early stages Refuse to negotiate beyond eight percent increase 115 3. P e n d i n g a n t i - i n f l a t i o n l e g i s l a t i o n 4. T i m i n g of B.C.H.P. h o s p i t a l b udget announcements 5. A n t i - u n i o n p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e 6. O t h e r r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s i n t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r (.i.e. B.C.G.E.U.) 7. M u l t i - s t e p p e d m e d i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e s s e s In August 1975, t h e L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d i s s u e d an a c c r e d i t a t i o n c e r t i f i c a t e t o the H.L.R.A. making i t the a c c r e d -i t e d b a r g a i n i n g a gent f o r t h e h o s p i t a l s of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . F o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , t h e u n i o n would be b a r g a i n i n g w i t h an e m p l o y e r s ' agent who c o u l d be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the agreement f o r w h i c h i t had b a r g a i n e d . D u r i n g an i n t e r v i e w w i t h t h i s w r i t e r , a u n i o n spokesman s t a t e d , t h a t t h e u n i o n , p e r h a p s u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y , was h o p i n g t h a t the new o r g a n i z a t i o n would p r o d u c e a "more c o o p e r a t i v e and m a t u r e " b a r g a i n -i n g a t t i t u d e on t h e p a r t of t h e e m p l o y e r s . However, a number of h o s p i t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n B.C.H.A. and H.L.R.A. had been c r i t -i c a l of t h e 1974-75 agreement, l a b e l l i n g i t s p r o v i s i o n s " t o o r i c h " and i t s . . n e g o t i a t o r s " t o o s o f t . " The h o s p i t a l s now e x p e c t e d a show of s t r e n g t h f r o m t h e i r new b a r g a i n i n g a g e n t s . The a p p o i n t -ment of a " h a r d l i n e r " to t h e p o s i t i o n of P r e s i d e n t i n e a r l y Sep-tember, 1975, c o n f i r m e d t h e a p p r o a c h e x p e c t e d by t h e p r i n c i p a l s . H.L.R.A. s t a f f , i n c h o o s i n g t a c t i c s , a lways k e p t i n mind the toug h b a r g a i n i n g i m p r e s s i o n t h e i r a c t i o n s had t o make on b o t h t h e u n i o n and t h e h o s p i t a l s . W i t h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n j u s t i n the p r o c e s s of s e t t i n g up, H.L.R.A. was p e r h a p s a l i t t l e t o o slow i n a p p o i n t i n g a s t a f f member t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e upcoming b a r g a i n i n g . Such an a p p o i n t -116 merit was not made u n t i l a f t e r t h e f i l l i n g of the P r e s i d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n was announced. As a r e s u l t , H.L.R.A. f o u n d i t s e l f un-p r e p a r e d when n o t i c e t o commence b a r g a i n i n g was s e r v e d . The n e g o t i a t o r a s s i g n e d knew the H.L.R.A. B o a r d ' s f e e l i n g s about t h e 1974-75 agreement w e l l enough, t o be a b l e t o p r e p a r e a l i s t o f management demands to g i v e t o t h e u n i o n , b u t t h e Bo a r d had made no d e c i s i o n s n o r g i v e n any a p p r o v a l s r e g a r d i n g s t r a t e g y p o s i t i o n s . When n e g o t i a t i o n s d i d g e t underway and demands were e x c h a n g e d , the d i s t r i c t c o u n c i l s were so l o n g i n r e s p o n d i n g t h a t i t was O c t o b e r 20 b e f o r e the B o a r d c o u l d g i v e i t s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the b a r g a i n i n g c ommittee. As a r e s u l t , H.L.R.A. had t o s t a l l t h r o u g h the e a r l y s t a g e s of n e g o t i a t i o n , a v o i d i n g d i s c u s s i o n of any " h a r d " i s s u e s . S t a l l i n g t h r o u g h t h e e a r l y s t a g e s had a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i t s t o o f f e r . I t a l l o w e d t i m e f o r t h e f e d e r a l government t o r e l e a s e I t s a n t i - i n f l a t i o n l e g i s l a t i o n . W h i l e t h e l i m i t s t o be p l a c e d on wage i n c r e a s e s were unknown (as was, i n d e e d , even the a p p l i c -a b i l i t y of t h e p r o p o s e d l e g i s l a t i o n t o t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y ) , i t n o n e t h e l e s s a p p e a r e d t o be unwise t o n e g o t i a t e a wage p a c k -age when imposed f e d e r a l g u i d e l i n e s would soon p r o v i d e , a t the v e r y l e a s t , an e x t r e m e l y p o w e r f u l b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . F o l l o w i n g t h e O c t o b e r 14 p a s s a g e of t h e A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n , H.L.R.A. r e -fused to b a r g a i n beyond t h e e i g h t p e r c e n t l i m i t a t i o n . At t h i s t i m e , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r , t h e b a r g a i n i n g com-m i t t e e b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s would p r o b a b l y n o t be h e l d a p p l i c a b l e to t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , and t h a t an a r b i -t r a t o r , i f c a l l e d I n , would hand down a p a r i t y award to the u n i o n . 117 N o n e t h e l e s s , e i g h t p e r c e n t became the e m p l o y e r s ' t a r g e t p o i n t --a p o i n t s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s t h a n th.e c o s t of p a r i t y . S t a l l i n g would a l s o g i v e B.C.H.P. a b e t t e r chance t o c a l c u l a t e and r e l e a s e the h o s p i t a l s ' 1976 o p e r a t i n g budget f i g -u r e s p r i o r t o the c o m p l e t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g . W i t h t h e s e f i g u r e s i n hand, H.L.R.A. would be i n a s a f e r p o s i t i o n f r o m w h i c h t o n e g o t i a t e t h e wage package as t h e h o s p i t a l s ' a b i l i t y t o pay would no l o n g e r be an unknown f a c t o r . F o l l o w i n g t h e a c c e p t e d p r a c t i c e of p r e v i o u s y e a r s , n o t i c e t o commence b a r g a i n i n g was s e r v e d on the i n d i v i d u a l h o s p i t a l s , r a t h e r t h a n on t h e newly a c c r e d i t e d b a r g a i n i n g a g e n t . H.L.R.A. chose t o i n t e r p r e t t h i s a c t i o n as a s i g n of d i s r e s p e c t and b e l -l i g e r e n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e u n i o n , . c l a i m i n g t h a t H.E.U. was not r e c o g n i z i n g the l e g i t i m a c y of the e m p l o y e r s ' a g e n t . As d e s c r i b e d by t h e H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r , t h i s t a c t i c n ot o n l y . e s t a b l i s h e d t h e c o n f l i c t o r i e n t a t i o n and l a c k of good f a i t h b a r g a i n i n g i n t e n t i o n s of the u n i o n Cat l e a s t f o r H.L.R.A.'s p r i n c i p a l s ) , i t a l s o a l l o w e d H.L.R.A. to argue i n f r o n t of the L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s B o a r d t h a t p r o p e r n o t i c e had y e t to be g i v e n and, as s u c h , no n e g o t i a t i o n s c o u l d e n s u e . Due to s e c t i o n 62(4) of the L a b o u r Code, w h i c h a l l o w s t h a t n o t i c e i s t o be assumed by a c e r t a i n d a t e w h e t h e r g i v e n or n o t , H.L.R.A. e v e n t u a l l y had t o abandon i t s argument. However, t h e l e g i t i m a c y of the e m p l o y e r s ' agent was e s t a b l i s h e d t o the s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e H.L.R.A. Bo a r d and the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s was e f f e c t i v e l y h a l t e d f o r one week. A s u b s t i t u t e b a r -g a i n i n g committee t h e n a t t e n d e d the p r e - n e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n on b e h a l f of H.L.R.A. to e n s u r e t h a t d i a l o g u e of o n l y v e r y l i m i t e d 118 v a l u e would r e s u l t . The p u r p o s e , a g a i n , was t o s t a l l the: b a r -g a i n i n g p r o c e s s and d e l a y the. o n s e t of n e g o t i a t i o n . The p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e i n t h e p r o v i n c e was a l s o a s t r a t -egy d e t e r m i n a n t . W h i l e a l a b o u r - s u p p o r t i v e government was s t i l l i n power, p u b l i c o p i n i o n a p p e a r e d t o H.L.R.A. to be t u r n i n g a n t i -u n i o n i n r e s p o n s e t o the high, number of work s t o p p a g e s i n the p r o v i n c e . H.L.R.A. f e l t t h a t i f s e r i o u s b a r g a i n i n g c o u l d he a v o i d e d u n t i l t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission s t a g e , t h e s e a n t i - u n i o n s e n t i m e n t s might have a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on the r e s u l t -i n g recommendations of the Commission. H.L.R.A. d i d n o t want the- b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s to r e a c h a r b i t r a t i o n . As n o t e d by an H.L.R.A. b a r g a i n i n g committee mem-b e r , H.L.R.A. f e l t t h a t an a r b i t r a t o r would be l e s s i n f l u e n c e d by p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e t h a n by r e c e n t l a b o u r s e t t l e m e n t s . Thus b o t h H.E.U. and H.L.R.A. wanted t o a v o i d a r b i t r a t i o n ; however, one p a r t y ' s r e a s o n s were e x a c t l y the o p p o s i t e of t h e o t h e r ' s . The u n i o n b e l i e v e d t h a t p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t might have a g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e on an a r b i t r a t o r t h a n an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission, on the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t the f o r m e r a c t e d more as a p u b l i c r e p r e s e n t -a t i v e w h i l e t h e l a t t e r - a c t e d more as an i n d e p e n d e n t r e f e r e e - c u m -j u d g e . The e m p l o y e r s ' r e s p r e s e n t a t i v e , on t h e o t h e r hand, assumed t h a t t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission h e a r i n g s would be l e s s f o r m a l t h a n t h o s e of a r b i t r a t i o n and would t h e r e f o r e be more r e -c e p t i v e t o arguments b a s e d on s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p u b l i c ' s a n t i - u n i o n , a n t i - i n f l a t i o n s e n t i m e n t s . The H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r b e l i e v e d t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n would n o t be i n f l u e n c e d by p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and would r e s u l t In an award b a s e d 119 l a r g e l y on c o m p a r i s o n with, o t h e r r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s . The most r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t with: which, t o compare was t h a t of K.C.G.E.U. Under t h e N.D.P. government, t h e s e t t l e m e n t a c h i e v e d by t h a t u n i o n was c o n s i d e r e d by H.L.R.A. t o be e x t r e m e l y g e n e r o u s . H.L.R.A. would use p a r i t y w i t h t h a t agreement as a r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t , and H.L.R.A. b e l i e v e d a r b i t r a t i o n would r e s u l t i n p a r i t y . Thus a r b i t r a t i o n was t o be a v o i d e d . The e a r l y announcement by H..E.U. t h a t t h e y would n o t seek a r b i t r a t i o n as a means of o b t a i n i n g a s e t t l e m e n t would a p p e a r , i n r e t r o s p e c t , t o have w e l l s u i t e d H.L.R.A.'s s t r a t e g y . At the t i m e , however, t h e announcement was not t a k e n s e r i o u s l y s i n c e H.L.R.A. b e l i e v e d t h e u n i o n would l i k e l y a c h i e v e i t s b e s t p o s s i b l e s e t t l e m e n t t h r o u g h a r b i t r a t i o n . T hus, as the H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r s t a t e d t o t h i s w r i t e r , H.L.R.A. f e l t n e i t h e r t h r e a t e n e d by the p o s s i b i l i t y of a s t r i k e (Ithe t h r e a t b e i n g H.E.U.'s i n t e n t i o n ) n o r c o n s o l e d by the p r o m i s e of no a r b i t r a t i o n . H.L.R.A. s t i l l b e l i e v e d t h a t i f a s e t t l e m e n t was not r e a c h e d i n f r o n t of t h e I n -d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission, t h e n H.E.U. would r e q u e s t the a p p o i n t -ment of an a r b i t r a t o r . The L a b o u r Code p r o v i d e d a n o t h e r d i s i n c e n t i v e f o r H.L.R.A. to n e g o t i a t e e a r l y i n the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . I n a r e l a t i o n s h i p i n which, some form o f t h i r d - p a r t y i n t e r v e n t i o n was a s t r o n g p o s s i -b i l i t y , t h e H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r b e l i e v e d t h a t c o n c e s s i o n s made i n e a r l y n e g o t i a t i o n s would o n l y r e s u l t i n t r a d i n g p o i n t s l o s t f o r f u t u r e use i n f r o n t of a m e d i a t o r . W i t h more, t h a n one l e v e l of m e d i a t i o n p o s s i b l e , H.L.R.A. had l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t o n e g o t i a t e u n t i l the l a s t l e v e l was: r e a c h e d . The H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r be-l i e v e d t h a t e a c h s u c c e s s i v e l e v e l of I n t e r v e n t i o n would o n l y c o n -120 c e r n i t s e l f w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e , between what the u n i o n demanded and what i t had a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d . Thus, H.L.R.A. would not b a r -g a i n u n t i l i t b e l i e v e d t h a t no a d d i t i o n a l l e v e l s of i n t e r v e n t i o n would be so u g h t by the u n i o n . I t was t h e i n t e n t i o n (and hope) of H.L.R.A. t h a t t h e f i n a l l e v e l be t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Com-m i s s i o n . The t a c t i c of p r e p a r i n g a l i s t o f e m p l o y e r s ' demands was done s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r use b e f o r e t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Com-m i s s i o n . H.L.R.A. was p r e p a r e d t o b a r g a i n s e r i o u s l y at t h i s s t a g e t o a v o i d a r b i t r a t i o n . H.L.R.A. was a l s o aware t h a t recommendations from an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission o f t e n f o r m t h e b a s i s f o r imposed agreements when s e t t l e m e n t s a r e n o t r e a c h e d . As t h e s e recommendations u s u a l l y r e f l e c t some d e g r e e of compromise between u n i o n and e m p l o y e r p o s i t i o n s on any g i v e n i s s u e , H.L.R.A. d e c i d e d t o make demands r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y r e s p o n d to t h o s e of t h e u n i o n . Thus, t h e p o t e n t i a l e x i s t e d f o r t h e e m p l o y e r s t o a c t u a l l y " w i n " an i s s u e i n s t e a d of m e r e l y m i n i m i z e a l o s s . I t a l s o p r o v i d e d the e m p l o y e r s w i t h t r a d i n g p o i n t s t o use a g a i n s t u n i o n demands. D u r i n g the p e r i o d of d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s , H.L.R.A. would not d i s c u s s monetary i s s u e s . I t s " f i n a l o f f e r " of O c t o b e r 31, 1975, was c o n s i d e r e d by t h e H.L.R.A. B o a r d t o be s u f f i c i e n t l y h a r d l i n e : no wage i n c r e a s e f o r 1976, no wage i n c r e a s e f o r 1977, p l u s the e l i m i n a t i o n of a number of b e n e f i t s . T h i s " f i n a l o f f e r , " a c c o r d i n g t o an H.L.R.A. b a r g a i n i n g committee member, was i n t e n d e d p r i m a r i l y t o i m p r e s s H.L.R.A.'s p r i n c i p a l s , and, s e c o n d l y , to move n e g o t i a t i o n s toward the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission s t a g e . T h e r e was no i n t e n t i o n of t a b l i n g an o f f e r w h i c h c o u l d i n any way 121 be a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e u n i o n . As c a l c u l a t e d by H.E.U., the f i n a l o f f e r amounted t o a t e n p e r c e n t c u t b a c k o v e r two y e a r s . As e x p e c t e d by H.L.R.A., t h e u n i o n r e j e c t e d the. o f f e r and b r o k e o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s . In e a r l y November, H.L.R.A. a p p l i e d f o r m e d i a t i o n , under s e c t i o n 69 of t h e L a b o u r Code. W h i l e h a v i n g no i n t e n t i o n of ne-g o t i a t i n g at t h i s e a r l y l e v e l of m e d i a t i o n , t h e t a c t i c of making the a p p l i c a t i o n p r o v i d e d a d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f good f a i t h , b o t h t o the u n i o n and any o t h e r p a r t y who may have c a u s e to r e v i e w the e v e n t s (.e.g. an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission). I t a l s o p r o v i d e d a means of f u r t h e r s t a l l i n g the p r o g r e s s of b a r g a i n i n g . The most i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n - f o r - m e d i a -tion t a c t i c was one n o t a n t i c i p a t e d by H..L.R.A. W h i l e H.E.U. would n o t meet w i t h the e m p l o y e r s ' agent i n f r o n t of m e d i a t o r Ed Sims, t h e u n i o n d i d r e q u e s t H.L.R.A. t o w i t h d r a w i t s m e d i a t i o n a p p l i c a t i o n i n o r d e r t o f i l e a j o i n t a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e a p p o i n t -ment of an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. The H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r s u b s e q u e n t l y i n f o r m e d t h e H.E.U. n e g o t i a t o r t h a t he c o u l d n ot r e -t r e a t from h i s assumed p o s i t i o n on the b a s i s of a u n i o n r e q u e s t as t h i s would a p p e a r to h i s p r i n c i p a l s to be a s i g n of weakness. However, i f H.L.R.A. were t o r e c e i v e s o m e t h i n g i n r e t u r n , say the a s s u r a n c e of t h e u n i o n t h a t i t would not seek a r b i t r a t i o n f o l l o w -i n g the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission, t h e n the j o i n t a p p l i c a -tion c o u l d be made. While, t h i s had been t h e u n i o n ' s p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d p o s i -t i o n i n any c a s e , H.L.R.A- had n o t t a k e n t h a t p o s i t i o n s e r i o u s l y and was now l o o k i n g f o r a commitment from the u n i o n . Though the 122 a s s u r a n c e would n o t be l e g a l l y b i n d i n g , a s u b s e q u e n t r e v e r s a l by H.E.U. would e l i c i t a c h a r g e o f bad f a i t h b a r g a i n i n g from H.L.R.A. Th.e a s s u r a n c e t h a t a r b i t r a t i o n would n o t be u s e d , how-e v e r , would a l l o w H.L.R.A. t o b a r g a i n s e r i o u s l y i n f r o n t o f an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. W i t h o u t t h a t a s s u r a n c e , H.L.R.A. would n o t be w i l l i n g t o make c o n c e s s i o n s t o t h e u n i o n as t h e y f e l t an a r b i t r a t o r would s u b s e q u e n t l y r e v i e w o n l y the a r e a between what had been c o n c e d e d and what was s t i l l demanded. I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission h e a r i n g s began on Decem-b e r 15, 1975. H.L.R.A. s t r a t e g y was t o a v o i d a r b i t r a t i o n by s e t -t l i n g a t t h i s f i n a l m e d i a t i o n s t a g e . Thus, t h e e m p l o y e r s ' agent was p r e p a r e d t o make r e a l i s t i c p r o p o s a l s f o r s e t t l e m e n t . However, H.L.R.A.'s p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g A .I.B. r e g u l a t i o n s had not changed: e i g h t p e r c e n t f o r 1976 was the maximum a l l o w a b l e . As an a t t e m p t to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i r good f a i t h i n t e n t i o n s , H.L.R.A. o f f e r e d to b r i n g i n t o the h e a r i n g s an u n b i a s e d p a r t y t o r e v i e w the A.I.B. r e g u l a t i o n s and a d v i s e as t o p o s s i b l e w a g e - b e n e f i t c o m b i n a t i o n s . The o f f e r was r e j e c t e d by t h e u n i o n and t h u s n o t h e a r d by the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. Had t h e New D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y been v i c t o r i o u s on Dec-ember 11, 1975, t h e H.L.R.A. may have been moved t o n e g o t i a t e beyond t h e A.I.B. l i m i t a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g t o a member o f t h e b a r g a i n i n g committee, however, w i t h t h e S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y ' s f o r m i n g the new government, H.L.R.A. assumed t h a t A .I.B. l e g i s -l a t i o n would be a d o p t e d by the p r o v i n c e as a f i r s t m a t t e r of bus-i n e s s . W h i l e t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission c o n t i n u e d w i t h s t i l l no d e c i s i o n from V i c t o r i a , H.L.R.A. r e m a i n e d h o p e f u l t h a t 123 A.I..B-. would be a d o p t e d b e f o r e the h e a r i n g s ended. I f s u c h were to o c c u r , Mr. B l a i r ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s would have t o f a l l w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of t h e A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s . I f n o t , H.L.R.A. would c o n -t i n u e t o a r g u e t h a t p u b l i c l y - f u n d e d e m p l o y e r s were o b l i g a t e d to t a k e " f r o n t - r u n n i n g " p o s i t i o n s i n the: f i g h t a g a i n s t i n f l a t i o n , h o p i n g t h i s m i ght c o n v i n c e Mr. B l a i r t o recommend a l e s s e r s e t t l e -ment t h a n t h e u n i o n demanded. L a t e r S t r a t e g y On A p r i l 5, 1976, the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission R e p o r t was d e l i v e r e d to t h e M i n i s t e r of L a b o u r . The r e p o r t , r e c -ommended a s e t t l e m e n t c o s t i n g 13.96 p e r c e n t , 5.96 p e r c e n t beyond t h a t a l l o w e d i n t h e g u i d e l i n e s of t h e y e t — t o - b e - a d o p t e d A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n . Two weeks l a t e r , B.C.R.P. announced t h a t 1976 h o s p i t a l b u d g e t s would be l i m i t e d t o 8.5 p e r c e n t o v e r 1975 b u d g e t s . An 8.5 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e t o a h o s p i t a l ' s o p e r a t i n g b u d g e t t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a maximum wage b i l l i n c r e a s e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y e i g h t p e r c e n t , a s s u m i n g no change i n o p e r a t i o n s . The b u d g e t announcement was the f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n of the government's p r o b a b l e i n t e n t i o n s with, r e s p e c t t o A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n . I t was t h e t y p e o f e v i d e n c e H. L.R.A. had been a s s u m i n g would s u r f a c e : h o s p i t a l s ' a b i l i t y t o pay would be l i m i t e d to e i g h t p e r c e n t . Thus t h e s o l e s t r a t e g y p o s i t i o n H.L.R.A. r e q u i r e d i n l a t e r b a r g a i n i n g was: I. S u p p o r t and r e f u s e t o b a r g a i n beyond A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s . On A p r i l 26, H.L.R.A. r e j e c t e d t h e recommended terms of s e t t l e m e n t as e x c e e d i n g b o t h t h e A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s and the 12 4 h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y ' s a b i l i t y ' to pay. The impending s t r i k e was considered unavoidable. The: H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r was h o p e f u l that the S o c i a l C r e d i t government would soon adopt the A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n and, through some form of I n t e r v e n t i o n , impose a settlement on the p a r t i e s w i t h i n the g u i d e l i n e s of that l e g i s l a t i o n . U n t i l such time, however, H.L.R.A, intended to support t h e i r a n t i - i n f l a t i o n s t r a t e g y p o s i t i o n by garn e r i n g as much p u b l i c empathy as p o s s i b l e . Thus, on May 1, when 72-hour s t r i k e n o t i c e was given to the Vancouver General H o s p i t a l , the press c a r r i e d an announcement s t a t i n g that the hos-p i t a l was f o r c e d to implement i t s "contingency p a t i e n t s a f e t y p l a n " , i n c l u d i n g : 1) c a n c e l l a t i o n of a l l e l e c t i v e admissions 2) discharge of a l l p a t i e n t s t r e a t a b l e by home care 3) t r a n s f e r of a l l c h r o n i c care p a t i e n t s 4) f u l l maintenance of a l l c r i t i c a l care f u n c t i o n s 5) r e f u s a l of a l l but most urgent r e f e r r a l s . ^ On May 4, H.E.U. st r u c k the Vancouver General H o s p i t a l . If the union intended the s t r i k e as a means of b r i n g i n g some form of pressure to s e t t l e on H.L.R.A., then the s t r i k e was doomed to f a i l u r e from the s t a r t . F o l l o w i n g the., i n v o c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 73(7), the union was l e f t with only a l i m i t e d s t r i k e , as a l l e s s e n t i a l s t a f f p o s i t i o n s had to be maintained. While the Labour R e l a t i o n s Board r u l e d that only one hundred of twenty-one hundred H.E.U. members were e s s e n t i a l , i t al s o r u l e d that 12 5 a l l o t h e r s t a f f p l u s a l l p h y s i c i a n s , and a l l v o l u n t e e r s would he a l l o w e d -to c r o s s the p i c k e t l i n e s i n o r d e r t o s a f e l y o p e r a t e the h o s p i t a l . Thus the c o s t t o the u n i o n was g r e a t w h i l e t h e e f f e c t on the h o s p i t a l was- m i n i m a l . N o n e t h e l e s s , on May 7, t h e f r o n t page of t h e e v e n i n g newspaper q u o t e d t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e B.C. M e d i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n as s a y i n g t h a t p a t i e n t c a r e was d e t e r -i o r a t i n g ; as w e l l , p i c k e t s were h a r a s s i n g emergency p a t i e n t s t o su c h a de g r e e t h a t p o l i c e had to be c a l l e d i n on t h r e e s e p a r a t e o c c a s i o n s . A s m a l l a r t i c l e on page n i n e a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e M i n i s t e r of H e a l t h , t h e H o s p i t a l A d m i n i s t r a t o r , and H.E.U.'s B u s i n e s s Manager a l l c l a i m e d t h a t t h e d o c t o r ' s a l l e g a t i o n s were u n f o u n d e d . The o v e r a l l e f f e c t however, s u i t e d t h e H.L.R.A. s t r a t e g y as w e l l as c o u l d have been hoped f o r . The economic r e a l i t i e s of h o s p i t a l o p e r a t i o n s f o r c e most of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t o be r a t h e r h e a v i l y i n v o l v e d i n d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g . As e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s were t o be m a i n t a i n e d i n any c a s e , the s t r i k e would do l i t t l e more t h a n p r o v i d e some r e l i e f t o t h e h o s p i t a l s ' f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . I n f a c t , some o f t h e h o s p i t a l s , i n c l u d i n g the V a n c o u v e r G e n e r a l and S u r r e y M e m o r i a l , d i s c o v e r e d t h a t c e r t a i n s t a f f p o s i t i o n s were u n n e c e s s a r y and p l a n n e d not. t o r e a c t i v a t e them f o l l o w i n g the s t r i k e . Thus t h e H..L.R.A. t a c t i c was t o make no move t o s h o r t e n t h e work s t o p p a g e , r e l y i n g i n s t e a d on government i n t e r v e n t i o n to e v e n t u a l l y b r i n g the employees back t o work. A l l o w i n g the s t r i k e t o c a r r y on a l s o gave the government some a d d i t i o n a l time t o adopt the A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n . On May 20, the s t r i k e was ended. On May 26, t h e g o v e r n -126 merit a p p o i n t e d Judge M c T a g g a r t as S p e c i a l M e d i a t o r , h i s recom-m e n d a t i o n s t o f o r m an imposed c o l l e c t i v e a greement. As the S p e c i a l M e d i a t o r was to r e v i e w th:e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission's recommendations i n l i g h t of A.I.B. r e g u l a t i o n s , t h e H.L.R.A. s t r a t e g y of s u p p o r t i n g A.I.B. f i t t h e s i t u a t i o n w e l l . The S p e c i a l M e d i a t o r ' s R e p o r t d i d n o t c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o the hounds e s t a b l i s h e d by A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s , however, and, w i t h some m o d i f i c a t i o n s , recommended t h a t the B l a i r R e p o r t be a c c e p t e d . By O r d e r - i n - C o u n c i l , on June 9, 19 76, t h i s was done, t h u s c r e a t i n g the H o s p i t a l S e r v i c e s C o l l e c t i v e Agreement A c t . H.E.U. i m m e d i a t e l y s i g n e d t h e imposed agreement. H.L.R.A. r e f u s e d t o s i g n . T h i s was l a r g e l y f o r show on t h e p a r t o f H.L.R.A. as t h e A c t was t o become e f f e c t i v e June 14 w h e t h e r s i g n e d o r n o t . S i g n i n g , however, would have been of some v a l u e t o H.E.U. d u r i n g the A.I.B. h e a r i n g s of J u l y and A u g u s t as i t would have i n d i c a t e d H.L.R.A. a p p r o v a l of the terms of s e t t l e m e n t . In a d d i t i o n , had H.L.R.A. s i g n e d t h e agreement, i t would have been p r o h i b i t e d from a r g u i n g a g a i n s t i t i n f r o n t of t h e A.I.B. Thus, H.L.R.A. m a i n t a i n e d i t s s t a n c e of r e f u s i n g t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n any agreement c o s t i n g i n e x c e s s of t h e l e g i s l a t e d e i g h t p e r -c e n t c e i l i n g . On June 23, the p r o v i n c e a d o p t e d t h e A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n . F o r t h e r e m a i n d e r of b a r g a i n i n g , H.L.R.A. m e r e l y had t o i n d i c a t e i t s s u p p o r t f o r t h e law. I n t h e end, i t was t h e A.I.B. r e g u l a -t i o n s w h i c h determined t h e e x t e n t of the s e t t l e m e n t t o be i n c l u d e d i n the 19 7 6-77 M a s t e r Agreement. 127 F o o t n o t e s - C h a p t e r IV 1. V a n c o u v e r Sun, 2. V a n c o u v e r Sun 3. V a n c o u v e r Sun 4. I b i d . 5 . V a n c o u v e r Sun 6 . V a n c o u v e r Sun 7. V a n c o u v e r Sun, O c t o b e r , 17, 19.75, pp. 1-2 June 25 , 1976 , p. 1 May 1, 19 76, p. 1 May 6, 1976, p. 45 May 7, 1976, p. 9 May 1, 1976, p. 1 12 8 CHAPTER V CONCLUDING DISCUSSION The c a s e d i s c u s s e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r i l l u s t r a t e s t h e manner i n w h i c h v a r i o u s f a c t o r s can d e t e r m i n e b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s . As t h i s was but a s i n g l e c a s e , g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s a p p l i c a b l e t o o t h e r b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s c a n n o t be made. How-e v e r , t h i s does n o t n e g a t e t h e v a l u e of t h e c a s e s t u d y . The model p r e s e n t e d i n C h a p t e r Two a t t e m p t e d to e x p l a i n how the f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d may d e t e r m i n e t h e s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s made by b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s . The c a s e s t u d y a t t e m p t e d t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e f a c t o r s w h i c h d i d i n f l u e n c e the s t r a t e g y c h o i c e s made by b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s i n one s p e c i f i c s e t o f n e g o t i a t i o n s . In o r d e r t o a r r i v e a t some g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s , a s e r i e s of s i m i l a r c a s e s t u d i e s would have to be u n d e r t a k e n and t h e r e s u l t s of each s y s t e m a t i c a l l y a n a l y z e d . No a t t e m p t has been made i n t h i s p a p e r t o e m p i r i c a l l y measure the c o n c e p t u a l d e t e r m i n a n t s i d e n t i f i e d i n C h a p t e r Two as to t h e i r r e l a t i v e i n f l u e n c e on s t r a t e g y c h o i c e . In r e s e a r c h i n g the l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s t o p i c , the a u t h o r was u n a b l e t o f i n d any p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s w h i c h d i d a t t e m p t such a r i g o r o u s a n a l y s i s . A number of r e c e n t a r t i c l e s , however, have d e s c r i b e d s t u d i e s i n t e n t on q u a n t i f y i n g b a r g a i n i n g outcomes r e l a t i v e t o e n v i r o n m e n t a l , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , and h a r g a l n i n g p r o c e s s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s } T hese s t u d i e s were a b l e t o a t t a c h , n u m e r i c a l v a l u e s t o I d e n t i f i a b l e b a r g a i n i n g outcomes (.I.e. th:e s t u d i e s ' dependant v a r i a b l e s ) ; 129 e v e n s o , t h e i r r e s u l t s w e r e l e s s t h a n t o t a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y a s t h e y r e l i e d on s t a t i c m o d e l s , s u b j e c t i v e s c o r i n g o f o u t c o m e s on an i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s (.thus i g n o r i n g i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among i n d e p e n d -e n t v a r i a b l e s ) , a n d w e r e u n a b l e t o a s s e s s p o l i t i c a l a n d p e r s o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . To a t t e m p t a s u b s t i t u t i o n o f o u t c o m e s f o r s t r a t -e g i e s a s t h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s i n s u c h s t u d i e s w o u l d a p p e a r t o r e q u i r e s u c h a d e g r e e o f s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d i m p r e c i s e o v e r s i m p l i f i -c a t i o n a s t o r e n d e r a n y e m p i r i c a l m e a s u r e m e n t v a l u e l e s s . Much o f f u t u r e r e s e a r c h w i t h r e s p e c t t o s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , w i l l h a v e t o c o n c e r n i t s e l f w i t h d e s c r i p t i v e c a s e a n a l y s e s i n o r d e r t o f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e t h e d y n a m i c n a t u r e o f t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . T h e f o l l o w i n g c o m m e n t s a t t e m p t t o r e l a t e t h e s u b s t a n t i v e i n s t a n c e o f C h a p t e r F o u r t o t h e c o n c e p t u a l a r g u m e n t s o f C h a p t e r Two. T h e d i s c u s s i o n i s s u b d i v i d e d a s p e r t h e s e c t i o n t i t l e s u s e d i n C h a p t e r Two. I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s I n C h a p t e r Two, i t i s s t a t e d t h a t b o t h b a r g a i n i n g p a r t i e s a n t i c i p a t e t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s t o be f o l l o w e d b a s e d l a r g e l y on t h e i r p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h e a c h o t h e r . A h i s t o r y o f d i s -t r i b u t i v e b a r g a i n i n g w o u l d i n f l u e n c e t h e p a r t i e s t o c h o o s e d i s -t r i b u t i v e s t r a t e g i e s a g a i n . T h i s a p p e a r s t o h a v e b e e n t r u e f o r b o t h H.E.U. a n d H.L.R.A. Both- r e c o g n i z e d t h e c o n f l i c t o r i e n t a t i o n o f p a s t H.E.U.-B.C.H.A. e n c o u n t e r s a n d p r e p a r e d f o r b a r g a i n i n g a c c o r d i n g l y . T h a t t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s was e x p e c t e d a n d i n t e n d e d t o be d i s t r i b u t i v e was e s t a b l i s h e d e a r l y i n b a r g a i n i n g by b o t h 130 p a r t i e s . P r i o r t o t h e commencement of n e g o t i a t i o n s , R.E.U. l e a d e r s had d e s c r i b e d t h e e x i s t i n g l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s c l i m a t e i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y as p o o r and recommended " g e t t o u g h " s t r a t e g i e s t o t h e membership. H o s p i t a l t r u s t e e s were o p e n l y c r i t i c a l o f the p r e v i o u s agreement, c a l l i n g i t " t o o r i c h . " In a d d i t i o n , H.L.R.A. announced th:at i t s p o s i t i o n of P r e s i d e n t had j u s t been f i l l e d — with: a n e g o t i a t o r known t o t h e u n i o n by h i s r e p u t a t i o n as a " h a r d l i n e r . " In a d d i t i o n , H.L.R.A. 's r e f u s a l to send i t s b a r g a i n i n g committee to the p r e - n e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n , and H.E.U.'s e a r l y t h r e a t of s t r i k e a c t i o n (made d u r i n g the p r e -l i m i n a r y n e g o t i a t i n g s e s s i o n ) , a r e c l e a r l y examples of S t e v e n s ' C l a s s I t a c t i c s , i n t e n d e d t o d i s p l a y a n t a g o n i s m and r a i s e t e n s i o n l e v e l s . Thus, b a s e d on t h e i r p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h each o t h e r , b o t h p a r t i e s assumed t h a t b a r g a i n i n g would f o l l o w a d i s -t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s and p r e p a r e d s t r a t e g i e s a c c o r d i n g l y . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e model, c e r t a i n i s s u e s , even w i t h i n a p r i m a r i l y d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s , may be h a n d l e d In a more i n t e g r a -t i v e manner. In p r a c t i c e , however, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o i n t e r p r e t t h e p e r c e p t i o n s of a p a r t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o a s p e c i f i c i s s u e . The o v e r a l l i m p r e s s i o n of one p a r t y by a n o t h e r would a p p e a r to be more germane to s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . . . P e r h a p s the o n l y C l a s s I I t a c t i c a t t e m p t e d d u r i n g t h e c a s e was H.L.R.A.'s o f f e r t o H.E.U. to c h o o s e f o r t h e m s e l v e s any c o m b i n a t i o n o f wages and b e n e f i t s , so l o n g as the t o t a l c o s t d i d n o t e x c e e d e i g h t p e r c e n t . The use of t h i s t a c t i c may be seen as an a t t e m p t t o p e r s u a d e the u n i o n t h a t the i m p o s i t i o n of t h e e i g h t p e r c e n t l i m i t was beyond the c o n -t r o l of H.L.R.A. and t h e r e f o r e t h e u n i o n m ight r e a s o n a b l y r e d u c e 131 i t s a v o i d a n c e of what i t p e r c e i v e d t o be H.L.R.A.'s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h e t a c t i c may p r i m a r i l y have been i n -t e n d e d t o i m p r e s s upon t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission t h e good f a i t h , b a r g a i n i n g i n t e n t i o n s of H.L.R.A., and, w i t h i n t h e i r imposed l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e i r d e s i r e t o e s t a b l i s h a more c o o p e r a t i v e b a r -g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e u n i o n . T h e r e i s e v e r y i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e c a s e t o assume t h a t t h e above t a c t i c f a i l e d t o a c c o m p l i s h a n y t h i n g more t h a n t o r e - e s t a b -l i s h " e i g h t p e r c e n t " as H.L.R.A.'s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t . I f t h i s were i n d e e d i t s p u r p o s e , i t would have t o be l a b e l l e d a C l a s s I t a c t i c . As would be e x p e c t e d i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s , t h e t a c t i c e f f e c t i v e l y a l t e r e d the u n i o n ' s p e r c e p t i o n Cor r e i n f o r c e d t h e e x i s t i n g m i s c o n c e p t i o n ) of H.L.R.A.'s t r u e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . As n o t e d i n t h e c a s e , i t was n o t u n t i l l a t e r s t r a t e g y was f o r m -u l a t e d t h a t t h e A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s d i d a c t u a l l y become H.L.R.A.'s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t . P r i o r t o B.C.H.P.'s r e l e a s e of t h e h o s p i t a l b u d g e t s , e i g h t p e r c e n t was the t a r g e t p o i n t and p a r i t y was the r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t . S h o u l d A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s have been f o u n d t o be n o n - b i n d i n g on h o s p i t a l e m p l o y e e s , H.L.R.A. may s t i l l have been a b l e t o move th e u n i o n toward a compromise - p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission c o u l d be c o n v i n c e d t o make such a recommendation. The u n i o n e n t e r e d n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h demands d e s i g n e d t o a c h i e v e i t s " t a r g e t e d " l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n . H a v i n g no o p p o r t u n i t y to s u p p o r t i t s demands i n d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n , H..E..U. t h e r e a f t e r a r g u e d o n l y f o r p a r i t y (.i.e.' i t s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t ) . T h u s , d u r i n g e a r l y b a r g a i n i n g , a s e t t l e m e n t r a n g e Cor, i n t h i s c a s e , a s e t t l e -13 2 ment p o i n t ) d i d e x i s t . D u r i n g l a t e r b a r g a i n i n g o n l y a s e t t l e -ment gap e x i s t e d . As p r e d i c t e d i n t h e model, a breakdown i n n e g o t i a t i o n s was e x p e c t e d . Once t h e breakdown o c c u r r e d , and s t r i k e a c t i o n b e gan, the e f f e c t o f i n t e r - u n i o n r i v a l r y c o u l d be se e n on t h e s t r a t e g y o f management. W h i l e H.E.U. was f o r c e d t o s u p p o r t the v a s t m a j o r i t y of i t s s t r i k i n g members on s t r i k e pay, t h e h o s p i t a l s were o n l y m i n i m a l l y i n c o n v e n i e n c e d . No o t h e r u n i o n i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y made any a t t e m p t t o s u p p o r t t h e s t r i k e or r e s p e c t i t s p i c k e t l i n e s ; i n f a c t , e x t r a s t a f f were s u p p l i e d f r o m t h e o t h e r u n i o n s t o h e l p r e d u c e t h e e f f e c t o f t h e H.E.U. w a l k o u t . B o t h t h e H.L.R.A. ne-g o t i a t o r and an H.L.R.A. b a r g a i n i n g committee member commented t o t h i s w r i t e r t h a t under t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e h o s p i t a l s c o u l d have s u r v i v e d a l o n g enough s t r i k e to s e r i o u s l y weaken or even b r e a k t h e u n i o n . W h i l e t h e y c o n s i d e r e d t h e l a t t e r p o s s i b i l i t y u n l i k e l y , t h e y p o i n t e d o ut t h a t as H.E.U. was n o t a member o f the C a n a d i a n L a b o u r C o n g r e s s , t h e y had no s t r i k e f u n d backup once t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s were d e p l e t e d . Thus, w i t h H.E.U.'s r e c e i v i n g no s u p p o r t f r o m o t h e r u n i o n s , H.L.R.A.'s b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n c o u l d a f f o r d t o r e m a i n u n a f f e c t e d by t h e s t r i k e . R e l a t i v e Power of t h e B a r g a i n i n g P a r t i e s The model d e f i n e s b a r g a i n i n g power i n terms o f the a b i l i t y of one p a r t y t o impose i t s own o b j e c t i v e s on t h e o t h e r p a r t y , r e l a t i v e t o the s i m i l a r a b i l i t i e s of t h a t o t h e r p a r t y . The model a l s o s t a t e s t h a t when two p o w e r f u l p a r t i e s a r e b a r g a i n i n g , the p r o c e s s w i l l t e n d t o be more d i s t r i b u t i v e i n n a t u r e . 133 Those u n i o n and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n t e r v i e w e d by t h i s , w r i t e r had d i f f i c u l t y i n t r a n s l a t i n g t h e c o n c e p t o f b a r g a i n -i n g power i n t o p r a c t i c a l t e r m s . No one p a r t y p e r c e i v e d any o t h e r t o have t h e a b i l i t y t o u n i l a t e r a l l y i n f l u e n c e o r a l t e r a r a n g e of p o s s i b l e o u t c o m e s . The p r e v a i l i n g o p i n i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t H.E.U. and H.L.R.A. were p e r c e i v e d t o be i n e q u i v a l e n t b a s i c power po-s i t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e n e i t h e r c o u l d e x e r t any b a r g a i n i n g power o v e r t h e o t h e r . H owever, e v e n I.U.O.E., t h e s m a l l e s t u n i o n i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , p e r c e i v e d i t s e l f t o h a v e b a r g a i n i n g power e q u a l t o t h a t o f H.L.R.A., e v e n t h o u g h t h e e m p l o y e r s ' a g e n t was i n a h i g h e r b a s i c power p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o I.U.O.E.'s B u s i -n e s s M a n a g e r , and i n l i n e w i t h what i s s t a t e d i n C h a p t e r Two, t h i s was t r u e as l o n g as t h e o p t i o n e x i s t e d t o l e a v e n e g o t i a t i o n s i n f a v o u r o f b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n . The above s t a t e m e n t i m p l i e s t h a t w i t h o u t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a r b i t r a t i o n , H.L.R.A. w o u l d i n d e e d have s u b s t a n t i a l b a r g a i n i n g power o v e r t h a t o f t h e s m a l l e r u n i o n . The s m a l l e r u n i o n i s n o t c a p a b l e o f i m p o s i n g e f f e c t i v e e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s on t h e h o s p i t a l s and l i k e l y n o t a b l e t o s u p p o r t t h e c o s t o f a l e n g t h y s t r i k e . I n d e e d , e v e n w i t h r e s p e c t t o H.E.U., t h e b a r g a i n i n g power a d v a n -t a g e o f H.L.R.A. became a p p a r e n t o n l y a f t e r s t r i k e a c t i o n b e g a n . The e m p l o y e r s ' a g e n t r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e h o s p i t a l s c o u l d s u r v i v e t h e work s t o p p a g e w h e r e a s t h e u n i o n c o u l d have s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t -i e s i n m a i n t a i n i n g a l e n g t h y s t r i k e . T h u s , i f t h e g o v e r n m e n t had n o t i n t e r v e n e d , H.E.U. may have b e e n p r e s s u r e d t o e v e n t u a l l y mod-i f y i t s s t r a t e g y p o s i t i o n , s h i f t i n g i t s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t c l o s e r t o H.L.R.A. 's t a r g e t p o i n t . The m o d e l a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t two p a r t i e s h a v i n g e s s e n -134 t i a l l y e q u a l b a s i c power p o s i t i o n s , w i l l t e n d t o b a r g a i n more i n t e g r a t i . v e . i y i f t h e y a r e n o t p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h a t t e m p t i n g to r e -e s t a b l i s h a power d i f f e r e n t i a l . In the c a s e examined i n C h a p t e r F o u r , t h e r e was no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t e i t h e r p a r t y had any i n c l i n -a t i o n toward i n t e g r a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . B o t h p a r t i e s v i e w e d b a r -g a i n i n g as i n h e r e n t l y c o n f l i c t - o r i e n t e d and made no a t t e m p t t o a l t e r t h a t p r o c e s s . I n f a c t , even th e o n l y p o t e n t i a l l y i n t e g r a -tive outcome (.the j o i n t j o b e v a l u a t i o n program) was imposed on t h e p a r t i e s and would l a t e r p r o v e t o f a n the f i r e s of c o n f l i c t r a t h e r t h a n h e l p douse them. Economic and P o l i t i c a l C l i m a t e As s u g g e s t e d i n t h e model by the p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s , t h e s i n g l e g r e a t e s t i n f l u e n c e on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y i n t h i s c a s e was- t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , h i g h -l i g h t e d by the r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s a c h i e v e d by o t h e r u n i o n s . Most i m p o r t a n t was t h e " g e n e r o u s " s e t t l e m e n t o f B.C.G.E.U. W h i l e wage r a t e s f o r c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c p o s i t i o n s c o v e r e d by e i t h e r a.S.A. or I.U.O.E. were a l s o i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t s , i t was l a r g e l y the p r o s p e c t of p a r i t y w i t h B..C.G.E.U. t h a t d e t e r m i n e d the b a r -g a i n i n g s t r a t e g i e s of b o t h B..E.U. and B.L.R.A. P a r i t y became the r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t of b o t h u n i o n and management and, t h u s , i n i t s e l f , d e t e r m i n e d t h e s e t t l e m e n t r a n g e . I t was due to t h e b e l i e f of u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p t h a t t h e y must a c h i e v e p a r i t y f o r t h e membership t h a t t h e c o m p a r i s o n s t r a t e g y was a d o p t e d . The u n i o n chose t o n e g o t i a t e i n f r o n t of t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission b e c a u s e t h e y f e l t I t o f f e r e d the 135 b e s t chance of i m p r o v i n g on p a r i t y , but p a r i t y r e m a i n e d the f o c a l p o i n t . In t h e i r a r g u m e n t s , u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p e m p h a s i z e d " c o m p a r a t i v e and c o m p e t i t i v e l e v e l s of wages and b e n e f i t s " and a p p e a r e d to t a k e l i t t l e o r no a c c o u n t of any p o s s i b l e "employ-ment e f f e c t s " w h i c h c o u l d have r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e i r demands. Even f o l l o w i n g r e l e a s e of the h o s p i t a l s ' 1976 budget a l l o c a t i o n s , u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p gave no r e c o g n i t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t s t a f f i n g c u t b a c k s would have r e s u l t e d f r o m any agreement i n e x c e s s of e i g h t p e r c e n t . W h i l e H.E.U. p e r h a p s assumed t h a t B.C.H.P. would honour the h o s p i t a l s ' " y e a r - e n d o p e r a t i n g d e f i c i t s " as had been custom s i n c e 1972 (un d e r N.D.P. r u l e ) , t h e u n i o n c o u l d n o t have f o r g o t ^ t e n the 1971 s t a f f i n g c u t b a c k s made n e c e s s a r y when B.C.H.P. r e -f u s e d t o i n c r e a s e b u d g e t s s u f f i c i e n t l y t o c o v e r c o n t r a c t u a l ob-l i g a t i o n s . P a r i t y was a l s o the most I m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t of manage-ment s t r a t e g y . I t was b e c a u s e of p a r i t y t h a t H.L.R.A. ch o s e t o a v o i d a r b i t r a t i o n where i t was f e l t p a r i t y would be awarded. C o n s e q u e n t l y , i t was d e c i d e d t h a t p a r i t y m i g h t p o s s i b l y be u n d e r -c u t by a t t e m p t i n g to p r e s s u r e an I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission with, a n t i - u n i o n p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t and a n t i - w a g e f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n . D u r i n g i n t e r v i e w s w i t h t h i s w r i t e r , t h e H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r s t a t e d t h a t the b a r g a i n i n g committee was aware t h a t the l e g i s l a t i o n m i ght not have i n c l u d e d p u b l i c l y - f u n d e d e m p l o y e e s ; m o r e o v e r , w i t h an N.D.P. government i n power, t h e r e was a chance t h a t t h e A.I.B. g u i d e l i n e s m i g h t n o t even have been a d o p t e d by t h e p r o v i n c e . Thus, t h e H..L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r s saw t h e i r j o b as one of a v o i d i n g p a r i t y i n t o t a l or i n p a r t f o r as l o n g as p o s s i b l e . 136 F o r t h e u n i o n , p a r i t y w i t h o n l y B.C.G.E.U. was. not q u i t e enough. U n i o n l e a d e r s h i p a l s o f e l t I t must " a t l e a s t " match, the wage r a t e s r e c e i v e d by t h e oth.er u n i o n s f o r p o s i t i o n s a l s o c o v e r e d by H.E.U. U n i o n l e a d e r s h i p , as p r e d i c t e d i n t h e model, f e l t i t must a c h i e v e f o r I t s members what o t h e r u n i o n s had a c h i e v e d f o r t h e i r s . I n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s a l s o seem to have i n f l u e n c e d t h e s t r i k e d e c i s i o n by u n i o n . W i t h H.E.U. l e a d e r s h i p f u l l y c o g n i z a n t of the economic r e a l i t i e s of the s t r i k e , the d e c i s i o n to go ahead a p p e a r s to have been made s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of p o s s i b l e p o l i t i c a l g a i n . I t was a show of f o r c e n o t o n l y f o r t h e u n i o n , b u t , p e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t l y , f o r u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p . I n l o o k i n g a t the u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r , as t h i s was h i s f i r s t t i m e i n t h a t p o s i t i o n , i t c o u l d be i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e s t r i k e was n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n Cor c r e a t e ) an image as a " t o u g h n e g o t i a t o r . " The s u c c e s s of t h i s d e c i s i o n may be measured by t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r n e v e r a g a i n r e p r e s e n t e d H.E.U. i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . I n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s a l s o a f f e c t e d H.L.R.A.'s a p p r o a c h t o b a r g a i n i n g . T h e i r n e g o t i a t o r was w e l l aware of the f e e l i n g s of c e r t a i n v o c a l h o s p i t a l t r u s t e e s who f e l t t h e p r e v i o u s m a s t e r agreement had been t h e r e s u l t of " s o f t b a r g a i n i n g " : he had been t h e n e g o t i a t o r t h e n , t o o . The H..L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r was a l s o aware of t h e image h i s p r i n c i p a l s w i s h e d t o p o r t r a y , an image p e r s o n i f i e d i n the p e r s o n of t h e i r n ewly c h o s e n P r e s i d e n t : a man w i t h the r e p u t a t i o n of " h a r d l i n e r " and " u n i o n b'uster,". wh.o, a c c o r d i n g to t h e H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r , was q u o t e d as s a y i n g , 137 "Any n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h t h e u n i o n I s a s i g n of management weakness." Thus: t h e r e was much, p r e s s u r e on t h e n e g o t i a t o r t o o f f e r as l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e t o t h e u n i o n d u r i n g e a r l y b a r g a i n i n g , , and m a i n t a i n a low r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t d u r i n g l a t e r b a r g a i n i n g . The p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t c o u l d a l s o be s e e n t o have i t s e f f e c t on s t r a t e g y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . As A n d e r s o n w r i t e s , " P o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t i n the form of a g r e a t e r l e v e l of c i t i z e n v o t e f o r Canada's l a b o r p a r t y ( t h e New D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y } i s a s s o c -i a t e d w i t h i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s of b o t h wages and nonwage b a r g a i n i n g 2 outcomes." I t i s t h u s p o s s i b l e t h a t i f t h e N.D.P. were r e -e l e c t e d i n December, 1975, E.L.R.A. may n o t have s t a y e d so r i g i d l y w i t h i n t h e i r a n t i - i n f l a t i o n s t r a t e g y . However, w i t h i n an a n t i -l a b o u r p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e , and a S o c i a l C r e d i t e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y , H.L.R.A. o b v i o u s l y b e l i e v e d i t s p o s i t i o n was s e c u r e and most l i k e l y e x p e c t e d r e d u c e d l e v e l s of wage and non-wage outcomes ( r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s ) . P e r s o n a l i t i e s and P e r s o n a l i t y P e r c e p t i o n The p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s of t h e n e g o t i a t o r s a r e not w e l l enough known from the p r e s e n t s t u d y to be a b l e t o comment on t h e i r i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i v e t o t h a t s u g g e s t e d by t h e model. Rep-r e s e n t a t i v e s of b o t h u n i o n and management i d e n t i f i e d p e r s o n a l i t y as b e i n g of major i m p o r t a n c e t o most b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s . I n t h i s c a s e , however, the most p r e v a l e n t p e r s o n a l i t y a p p e a r s t o be t h a t o f t h e H.L.R.A. P r e s i d e n t , a p e r s o n n e v e r d i r e c t l y i n -v o l v e d i n th.e n e g o t i a t i o n s . H i s r e p u t a t i o n as a " h a r d l i n e r " w i t h a low p r o p e n s i t y f o r c o o p e r a t i o n b o t h r e i n f o r c e d t h e u n i o n ' s 138 e x p e c t a t i o n f o r a c o n f l i c t - o r i e n t e d p r o c e s s and d i r e c t e d H..L.R.A. s t a f f as t o the manner i n which: b a r g a i n i n g s h o u l d p r o c e e d . I n s t j t ut i o n a1 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s The model s t a t e s t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l w o r k i n g s of the o r -g a n i z a t i o n w i l l a f f e c t i t s e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The i n f l u e n c e of t h i s f a c t o r was a p p a r e n t i n t h e s t r a t e g i e s o f H.E.U. and H.L.R.A. i n the c a s e s t u d y . As s u g g e s t e d i n t h e model, s t r a t e g y f o r m a t i o n i n the u n i o n i s l a r g e l y a l e a d e r s h i p f u n c t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , as a l s o s u g g e s t e d i n the model, one e f f e c t of m u l t i - e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g on the u n i o n i s t h e r e s u l t i n g d i f f i c u l t y l e a d e r s h i p may have i n a t t e m p t i n g to e x p l a i n t o membership a change i n b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t -egy. As l e a d e r s h i p has g e n e r a l l y gone to much e f f o r t t o s u p p o r t the i n i t i a l s t r a t e g i e s i n f r o n t o f a p r o v i n c i a l c o n f e r e n c e , t h e r e i s much, p r e s s u r e on l e a d e r s h i p t o p r o d u c e a c c e p t a b l e r e s u l t s w h i l e making use o f th.ose s t r a t e g i e s . To do o t h e r w i s e m i g h t be i n t e r p r e t e d as a s i g n of weakness. T h i s a p p e a r s p a r t i a l l y t o e x p l a i n t h e u n i o n ' s d e c i s i o n t o s t r i k e : a f t e r h a v i n g c r e a t e d and m a i n t a i n e d membership s u p p o r t f o r a work s t o p p a g e , l e a d e r -s h i p c o u l d n o t s u b s e q u e n t l y have i n f o r m e d t h e membership t h a t t h e s t r i k e would have l i t t l e o r no p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on p r o b a b l e o u t -comes. Under s i n g l e e m p l o y e r b a r g a i n i n g where more p e r s o n a l l e a d e r s h i p - m e m b e r s h i p r e l a t i o n s can e x i s t , s u c h a r e v e r s a l I n s t r a t e g y may have been more e a s i l y e x p l a i n e d with, l e s s r e s u l t i n g " l o s s of f a c e . " F a c t i o n a l i s m , as d e s c r i b e d i n t h e m o d el, th o u g h a p r o b l e m 139 t o H.L.R.A. d u r i n g t h e 19 76-7-7 b a r g a i n i n g , was a p p a r e n t l y n ot an a i d t o t h e u n i o n p o s i t i o n . T h e r e i s no I n d i c a t i o n of a u n i o n a t t e m p t t o use a " d i v i d e and c o n q u e r " s t r a t e g y . The i n s t i t u t i o n -a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w h i c h most o b v i o u s l y a f f e c t e d H.L.R.A.'s b a r -g a i n i n g was i t s d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n . W h i l e n o t d e s c r i b e d i n t h e model, i t c o u l d p e r h a p s be l a b e l l e d as " s t a r t - u p phenomenon." As H'.. L.R.A. was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e p a r e d t o s t a r t b a r g a i n i n g when t h e u n i o n s e r v e d n o t i c e , s t a l l i n g became a n e c e s s a r y t a c t i c . F u r t h e r m o r e , as the P r e s i d e n t i n whom the e m p l o y e r s d e c i d e d to p l a c e t h e i r f u l l t r u s t and s u p p o r t was not y e t a v a i l a b l e , s t r a t -egy d e c i s i o n a p p r o v a l s had to be f i l t e r e d down t h r o u g h the d i s -t r i c t c o u n c i l s to the B o a r d and t h e n t o t h e n e g o t i a t o r s . T h i s , i n t u r n , l e d t o f u r t h e r s t a l l i n g . P a r t y O b j e c t i v e s I n t h e B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , t h e e x i s t e n c e of u n i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e l a b o u r f o r c e i s an a c c e p t e d f a c t of l i f e . Thus, u n l i k e t h e l e s s - o r g a n i z e d h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y i n th e U n i t e d S t a t e s on w h i c h much of t h e l i t e r a t u r e i s b a s e d , a c h i e v i n g a c o n t r a c t s e t t l e m e n t or n e g o t i a t i n g i s s u e s of u n i o n s e c u r i t y a r e n o t seen as p r i m e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e u n i o n . In the ca s e s t u d i e d i n C h a p t e r F o u r , t h e u n i o n a p p e a r e d to p e r c e i v e i t s e l f as a l r e a d y h a v i n g a b a s i c power p o s i t i o n e q u i v a l e n t t o t h a t of management ( a l t h o u g h u nder t h e s t r i k e o p t i o n t h i s would appear to be f a l s e ) and d i d not show any i n d i c a t i o n of w a n t i n g " t o put management i n i t s p l a c e . " Thus, f o r the u n i o n , t h e p a r t y ' s o b j e c t i v e was r a t h e r 140 s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : a c h i e v e p a r i t y . W h i l e not l o o k i n g t o i n c r e a s e t h e u n i o n ' s power p o s i t i o n , a c h i e v i n g any s e t t l e m e n t at l e s s t h a n p a r i t y w i t h i t s r i v a l u n i o n s w o u l d have l i k e l y been i n t e r p r e t e d as a r e d u c t i o n i n power f o r t h e u n i o n and a s i g n of weakness i n the u n i o n ' s l e a d e r s h i p . I n the c a s e s t u d i e d , t h e u n i o n and i t s l e a d e r s h i p c o u l d " s ave f a c e " as the r e s u l t a n t s e t t l e m e n t was one d i c t a t e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n . F o r management, beyond a v o i d i n g p a r i t y and thu s r e d u c i n g o p e r a t i n g c o s t s , t h e o b j e c t i v e was t o i n t r o d u c e i t s new b a r g a i n -i n g a g e n t , H..L.R.A., as b e i n g a b l e t o b a r g a i n " t o u g h e r " t h a n i t s p r e d e c e s s o r . Thus, s t r a t e g i e s c o u l d be e x p e c t e d t o f o l l o w a d i s -t r i b u t i v e p r o c e s s . W h i l e " b r e a k i n g t h e u n i o n " c o u l d n o t s e r i o u s l y be a c c e p t e d as a g o a l of H.L.R.A., i t would a p p e a r t h a t once t h e s t r i k e was underway, "weakening t h e u n i o n " may have been a c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Management c o u l d show t h e u n i o n t h a t a work s t o p p a g e would o n l y h u r t t h e emp l o y e e s . No e f f o r t on t h e p a r t of management t o end the s t r i k e w ould be n e c e s s a r y . Leg i s 1 a t i o n W h i l e t h e most i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t of s t r a t e g y may have been r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s , the most I m p o r t a n t , or more p r e c i s e l y , t h e o n l y d e t e r m i n a n t of outcome was the A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n . W i t h no A.I.B., as may have been t h e ca s e had t h e N.D.P. formed the 1976 government, H.L.R.A. would have l i k e l y s i g n e d an a g r e e -ment a p p r o x i m a t i n g p a r i t y . As t h e H.L.R.A. n e g o t i a t o r s t a t e d t o t h i s w r i t e r , "A.I.B. m e r e l y k e p t H.E.U. f r o m a c h i e v i n g p a r i t y 141 u n t i l 1980. W i t h o u t i t , t h e y would have most l i k e l y had p a r i t y i n 19 7 6." The A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n can a l s o be seen as one of t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of t h e u n i o n ' s c h o i c e t o s t r i k e . With: the p r e s s u r e f r o m th e g e n e r a l l a b o u r movement f o r each u n i o n t o o p e n l y r e j e c t wage c o n t r o l s , t h e H.E.U. n e g o t i a t o r may have f e l t t h a t any o t h e r r e s p o n s e to H.L.R.A.'s p o s i t i o n would have been p o o r l y v i e w e d by the. membership. The u n i o n was f o r c e d i n t o a show of s t r e n g t h , and A.I.B. can be i d e n t i f i e d as one of t h e f o r c e s . S p e a k i n g r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , a u n i o n spokesman n o t e d t h a t as l o n g as e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s l e g i s l a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o l i m i t t h e u n i o n ' s r i g h t to s t r i k e , H.E.U. would n e v e r r e p e a t i t s a c t i o n of 1976. Management was n e v e r s e r i o u s l y t h r e a t e n e d . On the o t h e r hand, s i n c e s u c h a s m a l l m i n o r i t y of H..E.U. members were r e q u i r e d to work, p e r h a p s i t was n o t m e r e l y the imposed l i m i t a t i o n s w h i c h h u r t t h e s t r i k e e f f o r t , but a l s o E.E.U.'s p o o r r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e o t h e r l a b o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n t h e i n d u s t r y . I f the o t h e r u n i o n s had s u p p o r t e d the s t r i k e , i f t h e y had a g r e e d t o r e s p e c t t h e p i c k e t l i n e s u n t i l t h e i r e s s e n t i a l i t y had a l s o been d e t e r -mined, management may have been p r e s s u r e d i n t o r e a s s e s s i n g i t s s t an ce . A l s o , under e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s l e g i s l a t i o n , one has t o wonder about th e wisdom.of s t r i k i n g o n l y i n two u r b a n c e n t r e s of the p r o v i n c e . W h i l e s u c h a s t r i k e may have been e a s i e r f o r u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p t o c o n t r o l , and may have p r o v i d e d w i d e r p r e s s c o v e r a g e of t h e e v e n t s , t h e s t r i k e was n o n e t h e l e s s weakened by t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of so many o t h e r h . o s p l t a l beds i n t o w h i c h 142 p a t i e n t s c o u l d be t r a n s f e r r e d . I f t h e u n i o n had s t r u c k i n such c i t i e s as P r i n c e George or P r i n c e R u p e r t , where t h e r e i s but one h o s p i t a l to s e r v e t h e p u b l i c , and i s , " i n i t s e l f , a major employer i n t h e a r e a , h o s p i t a l e m p l o y e e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when d e s -i g n a t e d " e s s e n t i a l , " would most l i k e l y have r e c e i v e d much g r e a t e r p u b l i c s u p p o r t . A l m o s t any s t r i k e l o c a t i o n o u t s i d e of V a n c o u v e r and V i c t o r i a ( t h e s t r o n g h o l d s of S o c i a l C r e d i t s u p p o r t ) would have g a r n e r e d more f a v o u r a b l e p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t t h a n H.E.U. d i d r e c e i v e . The two l e v e l s of m e d i a t i o n a l l o w e d by t h e L a b o u r Code were seen t o i n f l u e n c e management's s t r a t e g y . As p r e d i c t e d i n the model, H.L.R.A. f e l t i t c o u l d n o t a f f o r d t o make c o n c e s s i o n s at t h e f i r s t l e v e l of m e d i a t i o n and thu s a v o i d e d s e r i o u s nego-t i a t i o n s u n t i l r e a c h i n g the I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t i f o n l y a s i n g l e l e v e l of m e d i a t i o n were a v a i l -a b l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y one whose recommendations were made p u b l i c , b a r g a i n i n g m ight w e l l p r o c e e d somewhat more e x p e d i t i o u s l y . C l o s i n g Comments The c a s e s t u d y o f t h e 1976-77 H.E.U./H.L.R.A. M a s t e r Agreement i l l u s t r a t e d many of t h e p o i n t s i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e model as d e t e r m i n a n t s of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y . W h i l e o t h e r f a c t o r s d i s c u s s e d i n t h e model may not have i n f l u e n c e d t h e c o u r s e of e v e n t s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e i r v a l u e n o n e t h e l e s s c a n n o t be d i s c o u n t e d , F u r t h e r s t u d i e s w i l l have t o be made i n o r d e r t o a c c u r a t e l y a s s e s s t h e r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e v a r i o u s f e a t u r e s i d e n t i f i e d i n the model as d e t e r m i n a n t s of s t r a t e g y . 143 I t has a l r e a d y been s t a t e d t h a t t h e f i n a l outcome of 0 b a r g a i n i n g i n t h i s c a s e was d i c t a t e d by t h e A.I.B. l e g i s l a t i o n . Had A.I.B. n o t been i n v o k e d , or been f o u n d n o t t o be b i n d i n g on the h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y , w h i c h p a r t y ' s s t r a t e g i e s would t h e n have been most s u c c e s s f u l ? Assume t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s become aware of t h e non-impo-s i t i o n o f A.I.B. t o w a r d t h e l a t t e r s t a g e s of t h e I n d u s t r i a l I n q u i r y Commission's h e a r i n g s . In t h e eyes of t h e u n i o n , H.L.R.A. has c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d i t s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t as e i g h t p e r c e n t . T h e r e has been no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t H.L.R.A. wou l d c o n s i d e r a s e t t l e m e n t p o i n t c l o s e r to t h e p a r i t y l e v e l s o u g h t by H.E.U". (even though p a r i t y i s H.L.R.A.'s t r u e r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t ) . The u n i o n , on t h e o t h e r hand, has v i r t u a l l y abandonned i t s t a r g e t p o i n t ( i . e . " l e a d -e r s h i p ; " twenty p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e o v e r t w e l v e months) and has a r g u e d s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of a c h i e v i n g p a r i t y ( i . e . H.E.U.'s r e s i s t a n c e p o i n t ) . When Mr. B l a i r p r e s e n t s h i s r e p o r t ( i . e . " p a r i t y ; " 13.96 p e r c e n t o v e r t w e l v e m o n t h s ) , H.L.R.A. r e j e c t s the re c o m m e n d a t i o n s . H.E.U. i s now l e f t w i t h a d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n : e i t h e r (1) go t o a r b i t r a t i o n where, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , the 13.96 w i l l be awarded to the u n i o n ; o r , (.2) go on s t r i k e . W h i l e t h e f o r m e r c h o i c e would l i k e l y p r o v i d e an e c o n o m i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e r e s u l t , d u r i n g the c a s e u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p a p p e a r e d t o be v e r y much c o n c e r n e d about t h e i m p r e s s i o n a " n o n - n e g o t i a t e d " c o n t r a c t would have on t h e member-s h i p . The u n i o n n e g o t i a t o r s t a t e d from t h e b e g i n n i n g t h a t an a r b i t r a t e d s e t t l e m e n t would be u n a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e membership, and t h e y would i n s t e a d opt f o r j o b a c t i o n . The l a t t e r c h o i c e , however, would n o t o n l y be e c o n o m i c a l l y unsound (as was the s t r i k e i n the c a s e ) , but l e s s p o l i t i c a l l y sound s i n c e " p r o t e s t a g a i n s t 144 f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n " c o u l d n o t have been used as p a r t i a l v i n d i -c a t i o n f o r t h e work s t o p p a g e . U n i o n l e a d e r s h i p may have been f o r c e d i n t o a c c e p t i n g a t h i r d o p t i o n ; t h a t i s , (3) n e g o t i a t e an agreement f o r l e s s t h a n p a r i t y . W h i l e t h i s w ould have been a d i f f i c u l t c h o i c e t o make, i t c o u l d have been s o l d t o t h e membership on t h e b a s i s of r e c e i v i n g a d d i t i o n a l non-monetary b e n e f i t s ( s u c h a s , e a r l i e r s t a r t of Job E v a l u a t i o n Program) w h i c h , i n t h e l o n g r u n , c o u l d have been of g r e a t v a l u e t o t h e u n i o n . In the end, r e g a r d l e s s of outcome, one would ;have t o say t h a t H.L.R.A.1s s t r a t e g i e s were more s u c c e s s f u l t h a n t h o s e of H.E.U. However, i f t h e r e i s any s i n g l e o b s e r v a t i o n a r i s i n g from the c a s e s t u d y w h i c h may have some g e n e r a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y , i t i s t h i s : s t r a t e g i e s a p p e a r t o be d e t e r m i n e d i n most p a r t by the i n t r a o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s to a t l e a s t match ( f o r t h e u n i o n ) , or t o not e x c e e d ( f o r management), t h a t w h i c h has been a c h i e v e d i n r e c e n t s e t t l e m e n t s e l s e w h e r e w i t h i n t h e l o c a l e c onomic community ( i . e . the p r o v i n c e ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , where t h e r e e x i s t s s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n f a v o u r i n g management ( i . e . A.I.B.; e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s ) s t r i k e a c t i o n s h o u l d be a v o i d e d by t h e u n i o n as i t w i l l l i k e l y r e s u l t i n g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l and economic dam-age to t h a t o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a n t o management. T h i s l a t t e r p o i n t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r where l o s s of p r o f i t s or d e c r e a s e d demand f o r s e r v i c e ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h e r e l a t i v e i n e l a s -t i c i t y of demand f o r p u b l i c s e r v i c e s ) i s not an i n f l u e n t i a l f a c t o r on management b e h a v i o u r . T h e r e i s a d e g r e e of m u l t i l a t e r a l i t y to b a r g a i n i n g i n the h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a i n t h a t n e i t h e r of t h e two p a r t i e s a t the t a b l e have any c o n t r o l o v e r th e i n d u s t r y ' s 145 a b i l i t y t o pay. W h i l e s e t t l e m e n t s a r e n e g o t i a t e d f o r t h e h o s p i t a l s by H.L.R.A., t h e y a r e f i n a n c e d by B.C.H.P. Each h o s p i t a l i n d e p e n d -e n t l y s u b m i t s a p r o p o s e d b u d g e t t o a " r a t e b o a r d " at B.C.H.P. and t h e n w a i t s a p p r o x i m a t e l y s i x t o e i g h t months b e f o r e r e c e i v i n g b u dget a p p r o v a l . A h o s p i t a l ' s b u d g e t , t h e r e f o r e , i s not u s u a l l y a p p r o v e d u n t i l sometime a f t e r consummation of the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . I t i s p o s s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the h o s p i t a l s might not r e c e i v e the f u n d s r e q u i r e d t o b o t h f u l f i l l c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s and p r o v i d e as h i g h a l e v e l of s e r v i c e as may have been p l a n n e d . T h i s happened i n 1971 when B.C.H.P. u n d e r c u t a l l h o s p i t a l s ' p r o p o s e d b u d g e t s by a f u l l 30 p e r c e n t ; s u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e was a shutdown on a l l p l a n n i n g o p e r a t i o n s , a r o l l b a c k i n p e r s o n n e l , and a d e c r e a s e of s e r v i c e s p r o v i d e d . A l t h o u g h t h e p r o b l e m has n o t s u r f a c e d on such a l a r g e s c a l e s i n c e 1971, i t re m a i n s a p o s s i b i l i t y as l o n g as the b a r g a i n i n g arm of t h e i n d u s t r y has i n c o m p l e t e knowledge as t o what f u n d s t h e f i s c a l arm w i l l make a v a i l a b l e . The H o s p i t a l E m p l oyees' U n i o n has a d d r e s s e d t h e p r o b l e m s 3 i d e n t i f i e d i n the two p r e v i o u s p a r a g r a p h s . T h e i r s o l u t i o n would be t o a b o l i s h t h e h o s p i t a l s ' b a r g a i n i n g agency and, s u b s e q u e n t l y , i n t e g r a t e the s e r v i c e i n t o t h e M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h . In t h i s way, the u n i o n would be d e a l i n g w i t h the t r u e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r f o r h o s p i t a l management. P e r h a p s a more r e l e v a n t r e a s o n f o r t h e s o l u t i o n p r o -p o s a l i s the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t ' B . C . G . E . U . has m a i n t a i n e d a l e a d e r -s h i p p o s i t i o n i n t h e h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y s i n c e the e a r l y 1970's. P e r h a p s H.E.U. f e e l s i t would do b e t t e r by b a r g a i n i n g d i r e c t l y w i t h government. I t may be i n t e r e s t i n g f o r f u t u r e r e s e a r c h t o s t u d y the s t r a t e g y (and outcome) d i f f e r e n c e s of p r i v a t e s e c t o r b a r g a i n i n g ( e . g . as i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ' s h o s p i t a l i n d u s t r y ) v e r s u s p u b l i c 146 s e c t o r b a r g a i n i n g , s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r u n i o n s i n p u b l i c l y - f u n d e d i n d u s t r i e s . 1-4 7 F o o t n o t e s - C h a p t e r V 1. John C. A n d e r s o n , " B a r g a i n i n g Outcomes: An IR System A p p r o a c h , " I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s , 18, No. 2 ( S p r i n g 1979).; P a u l F. G e r h a r t , " D e t e r m i n a n t s of B a r g a i n i n g Outcomes i n L o c a l Government L a b o r N e g o t i a t i o n s , " I n d u s t r i a l and L a b o r  R e l a t i o n s Review, 29, No. 3 ( A p r i l 1976); Thomas A. Kochan and Hoyt N. W h e e l e r , " M u n i c i p a l C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g : A Model and A n a l y s i s of B a r g a i n i n g Outcomes," I n d u s t r i a l and  L a b o r R e l a t i o n s Review, 29, No. 1 ( O c t o b e r 1975). 2. A n d e r s o n , op. c i t . , p. 133. 3. H o s p i t a l E m p l o y e e s ' U n i o n , L o c a l 180, Recommendations f o r  Change i n H e a l t h Care D e l i v e r y and H o s p i t a l O p e r a t i o n , F e b r u a r y , 1973, p. 52. 148 BIBLIOGRAPHY Agnew, G. H a r v e y . C a n a d i a n H o s p i t a l s 1920 t o 1970, A D r a m a t i c H a l f C e n t u r y . T o r o n t o : U n i v e r s i t y of T o r o n t o P r e s s , 1974. A n d e r s o n , John C. " B a r g a i n i n g Outcomes: An IR System A p p r o a c h . " In d u s t r i a l Re 1at i o n s 18, No. 2 ( S p r i n g 19 7 9 ) . A n d e r s o n , John C. and Kochan, Thomas A. 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