UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

A theory of rights and obligations Carter, Rosemary Ann 1979

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A THEORY OP RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS fey ROSEMARY ANN CARTER B.A., U n i v e r s i t y ;of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1973' M.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 197^ -A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OP GRADUATE; STUDIES; i n the Department of P h i l o s o p h y We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard, D.G. Brown J.F. Bennett J.C. Dybikowski THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February, 1 9 7 9 © Rosemary C a r t e r , 1979 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l m a k e i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may b e g r a n t e d b y t h e H e a d o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f PJ T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 D a t e /j^^^t^y 7L-1} / <? 7 ? Abstract I attempt in this thesis to present a comprehensive theory of rights. The theory is composed of two major parts, the f i r s t containing a theory of natural rights, and the second, a theory of what I c a l l special rights. In the f i r s t part, I argue that for A to have a natural right to X i s for i t to be the case that, in virtue of certain natural characteristics of A (which I specify), and in the absence of limiting and certain other conditions (which I also specify), i t is prima facie seriously wrong for others to be positively instrumental i n A's not having X. I argue that the general natural rights are to l i f e , well-being and autonomy; I then specify what character-i s t i c s a creature must have in order to possess any of these general rights. In particular, I argue that a crea-ture must be conscious in order to have a right to well-being, and must be self-conscious in order to have a right to l i f e or autonomy. I follow this with a discussion of what the limitations are on the general natural rights, what constitutes a violation, and when violations are permissible. The second part of the thesis consists of a theory of special rights. An analysis of obligations forms an important part of this theory. I come to the conclusion that for A to have an obligation to B to do 0 i s for the i i i . f o l l o w i n g to be t r u e : i . A i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e which says, i f event e occurs, then a i s to do o f o r b, except under c o n d i t i o n s t v v i i . e o c c u r s ; i i i . none of the c o n d i t i o n s " t ^ - t ^ h o l d ; i v . the event e i n v o l v e s both the o b l i g e d and e i t h e r the intended b e n e f i c i a r y o f the r u l e or someone who i s so N r e l a t e d to the intended b e n e f i c i a r y t h a t h i s l o s s i s a l s o a l o s s to the intended b e n e f i c i a r y ; v. one o f the f o l l o w i n g i s t r u e : (a) the o b l i g e d c o u l d have prevented e by e x e r c i s i n g due care ; (b) the o b l i g e d could have prevented t h e ^ o b l i g i n g event by d e c i d i n g not to a c t i n an o b l i g e d n e s s -c r e a t i n g way; i . e . he c o u l d have decided not to do e, and he knew e had (or would have) an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g p r o p e r t y . I argue t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s and s p e c i a l r i g h t s are s t r i c t l y c o r r e l a t i v e ; t h a t i s , i f A has an o b l i g a t i o n to B to do 0, then B has a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t A to h i s doing 0, and v i s e v e r s a . So, to say t h a t B has a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t A to h i s doing 0, i s f o r the same c o n d i t i o n s to h o l d as f o r A to have an o b l i g a t i o n to B to do 0. I then c o n s i d e r when a s p e c i a l r i g h t can be waived, what c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n o f a s p e c i a l r i g h t , and when v i o l a t i o n s are p e r m i s s i b l e . I conclude by a r g u i n g t h a t s p e c i a l and n a t u r a l r i g h t s are both r i g h t s because of c e r t a i n important f e a t u r e s which they have i n common, and t h a t there are no other kinds of genuine r i g h t s . v. Table o f Contents page Abstract 1 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 P a r t I . N a t u r a l R i g h t s S e c t i o n 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n k (a) An a n a l y s i s k (b) The n a t u r a l r i g h t s are to l i f e , w e l l -b e i n g and autonomy 12 S e c t i o n 2 . C o n d i t i o n s f o r p o s s e s s i o n of n a t u r a l r i g h t s 16 S e c t i o n 3 . The l i m i t s on n a t u r a l r i g h t s 27 S e c t i o n 4. C o n d i t i o n s o f v i o l a t i o n and non-v i o l a t i o n kz S e c t i o n 5 . P e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s 50 S e c t i o n 6 . Some s p e c i a l problems 61 (a) G u i l t y t h r e a t s 61 (b) Punishment 65 (c) R e d i s t r i b u t i o n 66 P a r t I I . S p e c i a l R i g h t s S e c t i o n 1. D u t i e s , O b l i g a t i o n s , and Ought 68 (a) The case f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ' d u t i e s ' , ' o b l i g a t i o n s ' and 'ought' 68 (b) P r e v i o u s attempts a t a n a l y s i s 72 S e c t i o n 2 . Obligedness 75 S e c t i o n 3 . Normative Obligedness 87 S e c t i o n k. O b l i g a t i o n s 98 (a) T r u t h c o n d i t i o n s 98 v i . S e c t i o n 4, continued (b) R e s o l v i n g p u z z l i n g cases 109 (c) Some s p e c i a l problems 112 S e c t i o n 5« D u t i e s 114 (a) An a n a l y s i s 114 (b) The r e l a t i o n s h i p between d u t i e s , o bligedness and o b l i g a t i o n 119 S e c t i o n 6. S p e c i a l r i g h t s 121 (a) How s p e c i a l r i g h t s r e l a t e to o b l i g a -t i o n s and d u t i e s 121 (b) Simple and complex o b l i g a t i o n s and s p e c i a l r i g h t s 124 (c) Waiving s p e c i a l r i g h t s 128 (d) F a i l u r e s to f u l f i l l o b l i g a t i o n s which are n o n - v i o l a t i o n s of s p e c i a l r i g h t s 131 (e) P e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s of s p e c i a l r i g h t s 133 ( f ) S p e c i a l r i g h t s and t h i r d p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r i e s 136 (g) The needy and s p e c i a l r i g h t s 137 (h) What i s s p e c i a l about s p e c i a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s ? 139 C o n c l u s i o n 141 B i b l i o g r a p h y 148 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n J u d i t h J a r v i s Thomson once expressed the o p i n i o n t h a t i n order to a r r i v e a t s o l u t i o n s to most of the c e n t r a l moral problems one had to have a theory of r i g h t s , but t h a t to date no one had p r o v i d e d an adequate one. I concur w i t h Thomson's o p i n i o n t h a t r i g h t s have a c e n t r a l p a r t to p l a y i n the s o l u t i o n to many moral p r o b l e m s — f o r example, those concerning the a c c e p t a b l e treatment of f e t u s e s , c h i l d r e n , a d u l t humans, c r i m i n a l s , and animals. In order to a r r i v e a t c o r r e c t moral judgments about how these c r e a t u r e s ought to be t r e a t e d we need to know whether or not they have r i g h t s , what the l i m i t s of t h e i r r i g h t s a r e , when they are v i o l a t e d , and when they can be o v e r r i d d e n . In t h i s t h e s i s I attempt to p r o v i d e a theory of moral r i g h t s which c o n t a i n s the answers to these and other q u e s t i o n s . I n order to provide a complete theory of moral r i g h t s I found t h a t I had to d i s t i n g u i s h two d i s t i n c t kinds of moral r i g h t s : ones which I c a l l n a t u r a l r i g h t s because they a r i s e out of c e r t a i n n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s ; and ones which I c a l l s p e c i a l r i g h t s , because they a r i s e out o f s p e c i a l kinds of events. Thus my theory r e a l l y c o n s i s t s of two s u b - t h e o r i e s , one d e a l i n g w i t h n a t u r a l r i g h t s and the other with s p e c i a l r i g h t s , the f i r s t o f which i s found i n P a r t I and the second i n P a r t I I . I s h a l l defend i n the c o n c l u s i o n to t h i s t h e s i s the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t these are the two and o n l y two kinds of moral r i g h t s ; c l a i m s to the e f f e c t t h a t there are a d d i t i o n a l senses o f r i g h t which mean 2. "not wrong t o ' , or ' p r i v i l e g e ' or 'permission' w i l l be shown to be f a l s e . I s h a l l a l s o p r o v i d e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r the views t h a t there are these a d d i t i o n a l senses. In P a r t I , I develop the sub-theory on n a t u r a l r i g h t s . I b egin with an a n a l y s i s o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s , and a defence of my view t h a t the three g e n e r a l n a t u r a l r i g h t s a r e : the r i g h t to l i f e ; the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g ; and the r i g h t to autonomy. I then c o n s i d e r the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which a cre a t u r e must have i n order to possess one or more o f these r i g h t s ; the l i m i t s on a c r e a t u r e ' s n a t u r a l r i g h t s ; when i n t e r f e r e n c e with the o b j e c t o f a n a t u r a l r i g h t i s , and when i t i s not a v i o l a t i o n o f t h a t r i g h t ; the c o n d i t i o n s under which a v i o l a t i o n i s p e r m i s s i b l e ; and I conclude with c o n s i d e r a t i o n of some s p e c i a l problems. In P a r t I I , I develop the sub-theory on s p e c i a l r i g h t s . I s t a r t with a f a i r l y e x t e n s i v e a n a l y s i s o f o b l i g a t i o n s , and then argue t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s and s p e c i a l r i g h t s c o r r e -l a t e , i . e . t h a t i f A has an o b l i g a t i o n to do X f o r B, then B has a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t A to h i s do i n g X, and v i c e v e r s a . Because of t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n , once we have an ana-l y s i s of o b l i g a t i o n s , we can f a i r l y e a s i l y produce an a n a l y s i s o f s p e c i a l r i g h t s . I p r o v i d e t h i s a n a l y s i s , and then c o n s i d e r q u e s t i o n s s i m i l a r to those which I c o n s i d e r e d with r e s p e c t to n a t u r a l r i g h t s ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , how one waives s p e c i a l r i g h t s , when f a i l u r e to f u l f i l l an o b l i g a t i o n i s a n o n - v i o l a t i o n o f a s p e c i a l r i g h t , and when v i o l a t i o n s 3 . are p e r m i s s i b l e . Before t u r n i n g to P a r t I , I should l i k e to p o i n t out t h a t I do not see moral r i g h t s ( n a t u r a l and s p e c i a l ) as being the o n l y k i n d of moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t h i n k that j u s t i c e and c h a r i t y must a l s o be taken i n t o account. Since i t i s not e s s e n t i a l to my t h e s i s , I s h a l l not take a p o s i t i o n on whether these three a r e a s — m o r a l r i g h t s , j u s t i c e and c h a r i t y — a r e s p e c i a l p a r t s of some more g e n e r a l , a l l - i n c l u s i v e area of m o r a l i t y , such as u t i l i t y , or whether they c o n s t i t u t e d i s t i n c t and i r r e d u c i b l e areas of m o r a l i t y . A l l I maintain i s t h a t a l l three are r e l e v a n t to any moral judgment or d e c i s i o n . I hope by the end of t h i s t h e s i s to have provided s u f f i c i e n t evidence i n favour o f t h i s c l a i m to make i.t a p l a u s i b l e one. And I hope to have pro v i d e d evidence t h a t a moral theory which i n c o r p o r a t e s these three d i v i s i o n s and a s s i g n s r i g h t s the r o l e I do w i l l s i t w e l l with our most b a s i c i n t u i t i o n s , w i l l r e f l e c t our most con s i d e r e d moral judgments, and w i l l be the simp-l e s t of a l l m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s . 4. P a r t I . N a t u r a l R i g h t s S e c t i o n 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n a) An a n a l y s i s . I propose to defend the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s : A has a n a t u r a l r i g h t to X i f and only i f i t i s the case t h a t i n v i r t u e o f c e r t a i n  n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of A, and i n the absence of c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r others  to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n A's not having X. We s h a l l see i n S e c t i o n 3 t h a t a f u l l e r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the analysans w i l l i n d i c a t e p r e c i s e l y who the r i g h t i s a g a i n s t , and a t what time. And thus so w i l l the a n a l y s a n -dum. In a d d i t i o n , i n t h a t s e c t i o n , we s h a l l see that the analysandum must s p e c i f y t h a t no ' l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s ' are i n e f f e c t . But i t would n e e d l e s s l y complicate t h i n g s to i n c l u d e these f e a t u r e s here. I s h a l l s p e c i f y i n S e c t i o n 2 what the ' c e r t a i n n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ' are which are r e f e r r e d to i n t h i s a n a l y s i s . And I s h a l l i n d i c a t e i n S e c t i o n 4, when I d i s c u s s the c o n d i t i o n s o f v i o l a t i o n and n o n - v i o l a t i o n o f r i g h t s , what the ' c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s * a r e . What I o f f e r above, then, i s r e a l l y a p r e l i m i n a r y a n a l y s i s , the f u l l a n a l y s i s t o be presented l a t e r . Before I begin the defense o f t h i s a n a l y s i s , I should f i r s t l i k e t o i n d i c a t e why I say i t i s 'prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r any moral c r e a t u r e . . . ' . F i r s t , l e t us c a l l 'be-i n g p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n A's not h a v i n g X, 'doing Y'. I f B's doing Y i s prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong, t h i s means t h a t d o ing Y i s a s e r i o u s l y wrong-making c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 5 . of B's behaviour. But there might be other aspects of B's behaviour, such as i t s being a 'preventing-more-i m p o r t a n t - r i g h t s - f r o m - b e i n g - v i o l a t e d ' , which are r i g h t -making c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Now, i f there are right-making c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f B's behaviour of s u f f i c i e n t moral weight, they might w e l l outweigh the s e r i o u s l y wrong-making aspect of B's behaviour, and thus render h i s d o i n g Y m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e , a l l t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . Those con-d i t i o n s under which prima f a c i e s e r i o u s wrongness can be overridden w i l l be taken up i n S e c t i o n 5* P e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s of n a t u r a l r i g h t s . I s h a l l now defend t h a t p a r t of the a n a l y s i s i n which I c l a i m t h a t i f A has a n a t u r a l r i g h t to X i t i s prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n A's not having X. I d i v i d e t h i s defense i n t o two p a r t s . In the f i r s t I defend the view t h a t v i o l a t i n g a r i g h t i s prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong. And i n the second, I defend the view that i t i s p o s i t i v e and not n e g a t i v e instrumenta-l i t y i n a c r e a t u r e ' s not having something he has a r i g h t to which i s prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong. When I say t h a t i t i s s e r i o u s l y wrong to v i o l a t e a n a t u r a l r i g h t I mean t h a t one must have reasons of a very powerful s o r t i n order to j u s t i f y the v i o l a t i o n , more powerful than would be necessary to j u s t i f y d e p r i v i n g a c r e a t u r e of something he does not have a r i g h t t o . To see t h a t t h i s i s the case c o n s i d e r the d i f f e r e n t kinds o f 6 . reasons one would have to give in order to justify k i l l i n g one's dog (who we w i l l assume does not have a right to l i f e ) and k i l l i n g one's grandfather. We might well be able to justify k i l l i n g the dog i f i t i s old and inconti-nent, or i f i t k i l l i n g a l l the cats in the neighborhood. However, we could hardly justify k i l l i n g our grandfather on the grounds that he_ i s old and incontinent or is k i l l i n g a l l the cats in the neighborhood. Our reasons must be of a much more powerful sort than that. 1 Involved in the serious wrongness of violating a creature's rights i s the fact that where u t i l i t i e s w i l l be gained, or d i s u t i l i t i e s avoided by the violation, they must be much larger in order to justify that violation than they would have to be were a right not at stake. In the above example, even i f the total u t i l i t i e s would be significantly greater were my grandfather dead than they are with him alive, this would s t i l l not make i t permissible to k i l l him. Before presenting arguments in support of the second half of my thesis, that i t is seriously wrong to be positively instrumental in a creature's not having some-thing he has a right to, I need to explain what i t is to McCloskey makes the same point in 'The Right to Life', Mind. LXXXIV ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 410. 7. be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l w i t h r e s p e c t to some event. In doing so I r e l y on Bennett's a n a l y s i s of p o s i t i v e and 2 negative i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y . The t h i n g s A can do a t any time can be d i v i d e d i n t o those which are such t h a t i f A does them upshot U w i l l ensue, and those which are such t h a t i f A does them upshot U w i l l not ensue. I f the former c l a s s o f things i s s m a l l i n comparison with the l a t t e r c l a s s , then i f A does any one of the former c l a s s he i s p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the occurrence o f upshot U. But, i f the former c l a s s o f things i s l a r g e i n comparison w i t h the l a t t e r , then, i f A does any one of the former c l a s s , he i s n e g a t i v e l y i n s t r u -mental i n the occurrence o f upshot U. Take f o r example the f o l l o w i n g two cases. I n the f i r s t t h ere i s a car r o l l i n g down a h i l l , which w i l l go over a c l i f f u n l e s s A i n t e r p o s e s a rock. Here there i s a very l a r g e c l a s s o f t h i n g s which A can do which are such that i f he does any one of them the c a r ' s going over the c l i f f w i l l ensue. He can dance a j i g , chew h i s f i n g e r n a i l s , s c r a t c h h i s head, climb a t r e e , hum a song, e t c . , e t c . I f he does any one of these and n o t h i n g e l s e he w i l l be n e g a t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the d e s t r u c t i o n of the c a r . In the second case, the car i s s i t t i n g a t the top of ' P o s i t i v e and Negative I n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ' i n K i l l i n g and L e t t i n g Die, ed. B. Steinbock (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1 9 7 9 ) . 8. the h i l l ; i t w i l l s t a y there u n l e s s A pushes i t . Here there i s a v e r y s m a l l c l a s s of t h i n g s A can do which are such that i f he does any one of them the c a r ' s d e s t r u c t i o n w i l l ensue. I f he does any of the t h i n g s i n t h a t c l a s s , i . e . pushes the c a r , then he i s p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n i t s d e s t r u c t i o n . My p o s i t i o n i s t h a t i f one has a r i g h t to X, i t w i l l be s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r anyone to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the r i g h t - h o l d e r ' s not having X. I s h a l l make two p o i n t s i n defense of t h i s p o s i t i o n . The f i r s t has to do with the concept of v i o l a t i o n . I f my a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t , a r i g h t i s v i o l a t e d i f and only i f someone i s p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a r i g h t -h o l d e r ' s not h a v i n g the o b j e c t of a r i g h t . I f we were to i n c l u d e n e g a t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i n the a n a l y s i s , then someone's being n e g a t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a r i g h t - h o l d e r ' s not having the o b j e c t of a r i g h t would a l s o v i o l a t e t h a t r i g h t . But to say t h a t a r i g h t i s v i o l a t e d i n such c i r -cumstances w i l l u s u a l l y be h i g h l y m i s l e a d i n g . Consider the f o l l o w i n g cases. 1. A i s b e i n g h e l d u n j u s t l y as a p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r by h i s government. Although B, a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n , knows of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , he f a i l s to t r y to o b t a i n A's r e l e a s e ; he simply goes about h i s own b u s i n e s s . A i s not r e l e a s e d . Given the p o s i t i o n that negative i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y c o n s t i -t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n o f a r i g h t , we must conclude that B 9 . v i o l a t e s A's r i g h t to autonomy. 2. A i s s u f f e r i n g from a kidney ailment from which he w i l l d i e u n l e s s someone with good kidneys i s plugged i n t o him. B t who i s a s u i t a b l e person, knows that t h i s i s the case, but f a i l s to o f f e r a s s i s t a n c e . A d i e s . Given the p o s i t i o n t h a t negative i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of a r i g h t , we must conclude t h a t B v i o l a t e s A's r i g h t to l i f e . 3. A needs to have an o p e r a t i o n which w i l l c o s t $4,000. I f he does not have the o p e r a t i o n he w i l l d i e . B knows that t h i s i s the case, and has $4,000, but does not o f f e r to pay f o r the o p e r a t i o n . A d i e s . We must, as above, conclude t h a t B v i o l a t e s A's r i g h t to l i f e . I t seems to me t h a t the c l a i m s o f v i o l a t i o n i n the above cases are extremely c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e . This i s because when we say someone has v i o l a t e d another's r i g h t we imply t h a t i t i s he i n p a r t i c u l a r who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the r i g h t - h o l d e r ' s not having what he has a r i g h t to; and t h a t i t would t h e r e f o r e be a p p r o p r i a t e , were he a b l e to do so, f o r the r i g h t - h o l d e r to make a c l a i m a g a i n s t him f o r r e p a r a t i o n . But i n the above cases, and i n most other cases of n e g a t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y — t h e e x c e p t i o n s being those cases i n which B i s i n such a p o s i t i o n t h a t he i s the o n l y one who c o u l d prevent the event i n q u e s t i o n — t h e s e t h i n g s are not t r u e . I t i s not B i n p a r t i c u l a r who f a i l s to o b t a i n A's r e l e a s e from p r i s o n , who f a i l s t o o f f e r t o 10. be plugged i n t o the p a t i e n t , or who f a i l s t o g i v e the boy $4,000 f o r an o p e r a t i o n , i n the r e s p e c t i v e cases c i t e d above. Rather, he, a l o n g w i t h numerous ot h e r s , have f a i l e d to do these t h i n g s . Because i n most cases o f negative i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y one i s not the one r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an event, nor f o r r e p a r a t i o n f o l l o w i n g the event, and because the concept of v i o l a t i o n i m p l i e s that one is_ r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the event and f o r r e p a r a t i o n , t h a t c o n c e p t — o f v i o l a t i o n — has come to be s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d with p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y . And thus to use i t with n e g a t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y w i l l u s u a l l y be very m i s l e a d i n g . The other p o i n t i n the defense of my a n a l y s i s of r i g h t s i n terms of p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y has to do with the i m p l a u s i b i l i t y o f the p o s i t i o n that i t i s s e r i o u s l y wrong to be n e g a t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a r i g h t - h o l d e r ' s not having the o b j e c t of one of h i s r i g h t s . T h i s c e r t a i n l y doesn't appear to be the case i n the cases c i t e d above. That i t would be very i n c o n v e n i e n t to be plugged i n t o a kidney p a t i e n t , t h a t $4,000 i s one's t o t a l s a v i n g s , or that h e l p i n g a p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r would cause one to j e o p a r d i z e one's job, are reasons which, i t seems to me, would be s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y n e g a t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y . But these reasons would not j u s t i f y one's b e i n g p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u -mental i n the r i g h t - h o l d e r s ' l o s i n g the o b j e c t s of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s . (For example, t h a t one would j e o p a r d i z e 11. one's job by r e f u s i n g to u n j u s t l y imprison persons f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, would not j u s t i f y one's being p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h e i r imprisonment.) T h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t such reasons are not s t r o n g j u s t i f y i n g reasons, f o r i f they were they could j u s t i f y p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y as w e l l as n e g a t i v e . And t h i s means that negative i n s t r u -m e n t a l i t y i n the cases c i t e d i s not s e r i o u s l y wrong. This f e a t u r e i s not p e c u l i a r to these cases. I t i s a f a i r l y g e n e r a l phenomenon: n e g a t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y w i l l u s u a l l y not r e q u i r e s t r o n g j u s t i f y i n g reasons i n order to make i t m o r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e , and so i s u s u a l l y not s e r i o u s l y wrong. Because o f these two f e a t u r e s of n e g a t i v e i n s t r u -m e n t a l i t y — t h a t i t i s u s u a l l y m i s l e a d i n g to use i t i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the concept of v i o l a t i o n and t h a t i t i s u s u a l l y not s e r i o u s l y wrong to be n e g a t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the occurrence o f some event—we have developed a con-cept of r i g h t which i s d e f i n e d i n terms of p o s i t i v e i n s t r u -m e n t a l i t y , tout c o u r t , r a t h e r than one which i s d e f i n e d i n terms of p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y and those r a r e i n s t a n c e s o f n e g a t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y which don't have the above f e a t u r e s . A t l e a s t t h a t i s the p o s i t i o n which I take. The p o s i t i o n t h a t n a t u r a l r i g h t s e n t a i l the s e r i o u s wrongness of p o s i t i v e and not negative i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i s i n accordance w i t h the c l a s s i c a l p o s i t i o n as espoused by 1 2 . 3 Locke^ i n which the p o s s e s s i o n o f a r i g h t c a l l e d f o r non-i n t e r f e r e n c e with i t s o b j e c t . Many w r i t e r s a t pr e s e n t a l s o f o l l o w t h i s t r a d i t i o n . For example, Tooley i n 'Abor-t i o n and I n f a n t i c i d e ' a n a l y s e s n a t u r a l r i g h t s i n terms o f what others are t o r e f r a i n from doing; P h i l l i p a Foot i n 'Euthanasia'^ makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between r i g h t s , which normally r e q u i r e only negative a c t s , and c h a r i t y , which r e q u i r e s p o s i t i v e a c t s ; and J e f f r e y Murphy i n 'The K i l l i n g o f the Innocent'^ holds t h a t r i g h t s are v i o l a t e d by p o s i t i v e , not n e g a t i v e a c t s . T h i s concludes my argument i n defense o f t h a t p a r t of my a n a l y s i s o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s which says t h a t A has a n a t u r a l r i g h t to X i f and only i f i t i s prima f a c i e s e r -i o u s l y wrong to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n A's not having X. b) The n a t u r a l r i g h t s are to l i f e , w e l l - b e i n g and  autonomy In t h i s s u b - s e c t i o n , I s h a l l defend the p o s i t i o n t h a t the o n l y p o s s i b l e o b j e c t s o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s are l i f e , 3 ^Second T r e a t i s e of C i v i l Government, ed. Thomas P. Peardon (New York, N.Y.: The B o b b s - M e r r i l l Company, Inc., 1 9 5 2 ) . I n p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n 6 where he says: '...no one ought to harm another i n h i s l i f e , h e a l t h , l i b e r t y , or p o s s e s s i o n s : . . . ' ; and s e c t i o n 7 , where he says: '...and may not, u n l e s s i t be to do j u s t i c e to an o f f e n d e r , take away or impair the l i f e , or what tends to the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the l i f e , the l i b e r t y , h e a l t h , limb or goods o f another.' 4 P h i l o s o p h y and P u b l i c A f f a i r s , 2 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 46. ^Philosophy and P u b l i c A f f a i r s . 6 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 9 7 . 6The Monist. 57 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 546-547. 1 3 . w e l l - b e i n g and autonomy. The f i r s t premise i n t h i s argument i s as f o l l o w s : Premise 1 : The fundamental goods f o r a c r e a t u r e f a l l under e i t h e r the c a t e g o r y of w e l l - b e i n g or the c a t e g o r y of autonomy. Under some conceptions of w e l l - b e i n g and autonomy the l a t t e r might be c o n s i d e r e d a s p e c i e s of the former, but g i v e n the way I use these terms, t h i s i s not the case. I mean by a t t r i b u t i n g w e l l - b e i n g to someone that he i s not s u f f e r i n g from any e p i s o d i c s t a t e s o f i l l - b e i n g , say from the pangs of hunger, the p a i n of an i n j u r y , a c r i p p l i n g n e u r o s i s , an emotional trauma, e t c . And by a t t r i b u t i n g autonomy to someone I am a s s e r t i n g t h a t h i s power or capa-c i t y to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g has not been c u r t a i l e d by the a c t i o n s of o t h e r s , as would be the case were he locked i n a c e l l , kept i n a fenced compound, chained to a stake, or had h i s l e g s amputated. Laws a l s o d i m i n i s h one's autonomy by r e s t r i c t i n g the t h i n g s one can do without t h r e a t of punishment. They d i m i n i s h , not one's p h y s i c a l powers or c a p a c i t i e s , but one's l e g a l powers or c a p a c i t i e s . F r e q u e n t l y , of course, when one's autonomy i s r e s t r i c -ted one's w e l l - b e i n g a l s o s u f f e r s , but t h i s i s not always the case. I t f r e q u e n t l y i s not when the r e s t r i c t i o n i s o f a l e g a l s o r t . I n f a c t there are laws which d i m i n i s h one's autonomy but promote one's w e l l - b e i n g . There are a l s o examples o u t s i d e the l e g a l sphere. Say A i s c o n f i n e d to a c e l l . O b v i o u s l y h i s autonomy i s r e s t r i c t e d . But he might 14. well not suffer any physical or mental ill-being while being so confined. He might exercise regularly, eat well, suffer no physical brutality, and spend his time in medi-tation. He might, in fact, be better off mentally and physically than he is when his autonomy i s not restricted. The second premise in the argument that the three basic natural rights are to l i f e , well-being and autonomy is as follows: Premise 2: One's treatment of others has moral implications i f and only i f one i s either posi-tively or negatively instrumental in others' having or not having some good. This I take as a conceptual point about goods and morality. I hope that i t i s a sufficiently plausible claim not to be in need of supporting arguments, as I do not wish to take the time or space to marshall them in this work. From these two premises I draw the following conclu-sion: Conclusion 1: One's treatment of another creature has moral implications i f and only i f one i s posi-tively or negatively instrumental in that creature's having or not having well-being or autonomy. Now there are two different ways in which one can be positively or negative instrumental in a creature's not having either well-being or autonomy. One can be instru-mental in another's not having well-being (1) by being instrumental in his ill-being; or (2) by being instrumental in his death. And similarly, one can be instrumental in a creature's not having autonomy (1) by being instrumental 1 5 . i n h i s l o s s o f autonomy other than "by being i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s death; or (2) by b e i n g i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s death. These d i f f e r e n c e s are o b v i o u s l y m o r a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t and should t h e r e f o r e be r e g i s t e r e d i n any statement which p u r p o r t s to say what a c t i o n s or i n a c t i o n s have moral i m p l i -c a t i o n s . I propose then t h a t we r e - w r i t e c o n c l u s i o n 1 as f o l l o w s : C o n c l u s i o n 1 " : One's treatment of another c r e a t u r e has moral i m p l i c a t i o n s i f and only i f : ( i ) one i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h a t c r e a t u r e ' s having w e l l - b e i n g or autonomy; ( i i ) one i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h a t c r e a t u r e ' s i l l -b e ing or l o s s o f autonomy other than by being i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s death; ( i i i ) one i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s death. T h i s i s a very cumbersome statement. In order to s i m p l i f y i t and some subsequent m a t e r i a l I w i l l use being i n s t r u -mental i n a c r e a t u r e ' s l o s s of autonomy as s h o r t f o r being  i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a c r e a t u r e ' s l o s s of autonomy other than  by being i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s death. I w i l l a l s o use being  i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a c r e a t u r e ' s l o s s o f w e l l - b e i n g to mean being i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a c r e a t u r e ' s i l l - b e i n g . So we can w r i t e c o n c l u s i o n 1' as f o l l o w s : C o n c l u s i o n 1 ' ' : One's treatment of another c r e a -ture has moral i m p l i c a t i o n s i f and onl y i f : ( i ) one i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h a t c r e a t u r e ' s h a v i n g w e l l - b e i n g or autonomy; ( i i ) one i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h a t c r e a t u r e ' s not having w e l l - b e i n g or autonomy; ( i i i ) one i s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h a t c r e a t u r e ' s death. 16. The t h i r d premise i n the present argument i s as follows: Premise 3 : When we say that A has a natural r i g h t to X, we mean that i n virtue of his having ce r t a i n natural c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and i n the absence of certain conditions, i t i s prima facie seriously wrong for anyone to be p o s i t i v e l y instrumental i n his not having X. Those parts of thi s premise which are needed for my present purposes have already been defended i n sub-section (a). What I intend to do now i s use conclusion 1*' and premise 3 to draw my f i n a l conclusion. Premise 3 says that i t i s prima facie seriously wrong to be p o s i t i v e l y instrumental i n a creature's not having the object of one of his r i g h t s . Such interference then, obviously has moral i m p l i c a t i o n s — i t i s prima facie ser-iously wrong. And conclusion 1'' says that only posi t i v e or negative instrumentality i n a creature's having or not having well-being, autonomy or l i f e has moral implications. I t follows from these two considerations that Conclusion 2: The only things a creature can have a natural r i g h t to are l i f e , well-being and auto-nomy. Whether a creature does i n fact have any of these natural r i g h t s w i l l depend on whether he has the natural character-i s t i c which i s necessary for i t s possession. What charac-t e r i s t i c s are necessary for the possession of what natural rights i s the question I take up i n the next section. Section 2. The conditions for the possession of natural  r i g h t s . In t h i s section I s h a l l f i r s t defend the following 17. claims: 1. that a creature's being self-conscious i s neces-sary for i t s having a r i g h t to l i f e ; 2. that a creature's being self-conscious i s neces-sary for i t s having a r i g h t to autonomy; and 3. that a creature's being conscious i s necessary for i t s having a r i g h t to well-being. In order to defend the above three claims, I must f i r s t make some remarks about r i g h t s and desires. I t was Michael Tooley who had the important insight that r i g h t s and desires are conceptually connected, desires being important i n determining both who has what r i g h t s , and when a r i g h t has been viol a t e d . I owe a great deal to that insight, and to some of the d e t a i l s of his development of i t . However, Tooley does not c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h nor deal separately with the questions: what a r i g h t i s ; what the necessary conditions are for having a r i g h t ; and what the conditions are under which a r i g h t i s vi o l a t e d ; although he a c t u a l l y has things to say about a l l three. I t was not e s s e n t i a l for h i s purposes to do so. However, I separate these questions as I have found doing so e s s e n t i a l for my development of a theory of natural r i g h t s . This means that the way I present the r e l a t i o n s h i p between desires, r i g h t s and v i o l a t i o n s d i f f e r s somewhat from Tooley's, although I think he would probably find my way of doing things congen-i a l . Because of the way my work re l a t e s to Tooley's with 18. r e s p e c t to r i g h t s and d e s i r e s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to be p r e -c i s e about what comes d i r e c t l y from Tooley and what was merely suggested by him. We s h a l l see i n S e c t i o n 4, t h a t only i f a c r e a t u r e d e s i r e s , or would d e s i r e under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t a c e r t a i n s t a t e of a f f a i r s be the case, can i n t e r f e r e n c e with t h a t s t a t e of a f f a i r s c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t to i t . Now, i f he cannot d e s i r e — i s not capable of d e s i r i n g — t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c e r t a i n s t a t e of a f f a i r s , n o t h i n g t h a t c o u l d be done c o u l d ever, c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t to the e x i s t e n c e of t h a t s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . I take the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f v i o l a t i n g a r i g h t to be.equiva-l e n t to the absence o f such a r i g h t . T h i s suggests t h a t the a b i l i t y to d e s i r e X i s n e c e s s a r y f o r a c r e a t u r e to have a r i g h t to X. However, there are some obvious problems which i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s i s not q u i t e r i g h t . One might, f o r example, be i n a temporary s t a t e i n which i t i s not p o s s i b l e to d e s i r e anything, as i s the case when one i s a s l e e p or i n a temporary coma. But we do not want such temporary c o n d i t i o n s to be r e l e v a n t to whether someone has any n a t u r a l r i g h t s . An obvious way to a v o i d such an u n d e s i r a b l e r e s u l t i s to take i n t o account not o n l y p r e s e n t 'For d e t a i l s of Tooley's p o s i t i o n , see h i s a r t i c l e , 'Abortion and I n f a n t i c i d e ' (Philosophy and P u b l i c A f f a i r s . 2 (1972), 37 - 6 5 ) and the correspondence on t h a t paper (Philosophy and P u b l i c A f f a i r s , 2 (1972), 419-4-32). a b i l i t i e s , but p a s t ones as w e l l . So l e t us c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s a l , that A has a r i g h t to X only i f he i s capable a,t p r e s e n t of d e s i r i n g X, or was capable i n the p a s t of d e s i r i n g X. T h i s means t h a t ' k i l l i n g someone i n h i s s l e e p v i o l a t e s h i s r i g h t to l i f e , even though he i s not capable o f d e s i r i n g to l i v e while i n t h a t s t a t e . But i t a l s o means t h a t those i n permanent comas, whose s t a t e of e x i s t e n c e i s not r e l e v a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from p l a n t s , a l s o have a r i g h t to l i f e . And t h a t , i t seems to me, i s unacceptable. I suggest that the way to a v o i d t h a t r e s u l t i s to e l a b o r a t e the c o n d i t i o n s t i l l f u r t h e r so i t reads as f o l l o w s : A has a r i g h t to X only i f he i s capable a t p r e s e n t of d e s i r i n g X; or, he was capable i n the past of d e s i r i n g X and i t i s e m p i r i c a l l y p o s s i b l e that he w i l l be capable o f d e s i r i n g X a g a i n i n the f u t u r e . I must a l s o p o i n t out before c o n t i n u i n g , t h a t what a c r e a t u r e i s capable of d e s i r i n g i s l i m i t e d to those t h i n g s of which he has a concept. He cannot d e s i r e to go to the moon unl e s s he has a concept of the moon, and he cannot d e s i r e yams u n l e s s he has a concept o f yams. U s i n g t h e above r e s u l t s I can now defend my c l a i m s about what n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are necessary f o r a c r e a t u r e to have the v a r i o u s n a t u r a l r i g h t s . Before c o n s i d e r i n g the r i g h t to l i f e we should be c l e a r e r as to j u s t what t h a t r i g h t i s a r i g h t t o . Tooley has p o i n t e d out t h a t we are not r e a l l y concerned with the 20. continued existence of a biological organism, as i s suggested by the word ' l i f e * , but rather with the continued existence 8 of a subject of experiences and other mental states. He illustrates this with the following example. Say some technology is developed whereby the brain of an adult human can be completely reprogrammed so that that organism ends up with memories, beliefs, attitudes, and personality traits completely different from those associated with i t before i t was subjected to reprogramming. Surely we want to say that i n such a case a right to l i f e has been violated even though no biological organism has been ki l l e d . In order for that to be the case we must really be concerned with the subject of experiences and not biological organ-isms. The right to l i f e , then, i s really the right to continue to exist as the subject of experiences and other mental states. Given the relationship between rights and desires defended above, i t i s clear that i f a creature is to have a right to continue to exist as the subject of mental experience, he must be either capable now of desiring to continue as such a being, or have been capable in the past of such a desire and w i l l again be capable of such a desire in the future. In order to desire to continue as the Tooley, 46. 21. s u b j e c t of mental experiences a c r e a t u r e must have a con-cept o f h i m s e l f as s u b j e c t , which i s to say, he must be s e l f - c o n s c i o u s . And, although I cannot prove t h i s i s the case, i t seems t o me t h a t a c r e a t u r e needs no f u r t h e r c h a r -a c t e r i s t i c s i n order to be capable o f d e s i r i n g to continue as the s u b j e c t o f mental ex p e r i e n c e s . We can conclude, then, that i n order f o r a c r e a t u r e to have a r i g h t to continue as the s u b j e c t o f mental exper-i e n c e s , he must e i t h e r be s e l f - c o n s c i o u s now, or have been s e l f - c o n s c i o u s i n the past and w i l l be again i n the f u t u r e . Any c r e a t u r e who s a t i s f i e s e i t h e r one o f these d i s j u n c t s i s a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s type o f c r e a t u r e . And t h i s means t h a t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s the n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which a cr e a t u r e must possess i n order to have a r i g h t to l i f e . I now have the t o o l s to handle some o f the problems surrounding e u t h a n a s i a . There are three kinds o f cases which need to be co n s i d e r e d : 1. where a human has ceased to have any b r a i n a c t i v i t y , but whose body c o n t i n u e s to operate. As I understand what the c e s s a t i o n o f b r a i n a c t i v i t y i n v o l v e s , the onl y way the body c o u l d be kept o p e r a t i n g would be with the help o f v a r i o u s machines; 2. where a human i s i n a s t a t e o f permanent unconscious-ness ; 3 . where a human i s consc i o u s , but i n severe and r e l e n t l e s s p a i n which w i l l cease only with., death. 22. Now, i n the f i r s t case, the human i s c l i n i c a l l y dead, so he i s no lon g e r a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s type o f being. Thus, he cannot have a r i g h t to l i f e . So unhooking h i s body from whatever machines are keeping i t going c o u l d h a r d l y c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t to l i f e . Furthermore, as keeping h i s b o d i l y f u n c t i o n s going i s l i k e l y to be expensive and w a s t e f u l of r e s o u r c e s , i t i s m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d that he be unhooked. In the second case, although the human i s not c l i n i -c a l l y dead, he has nonetheless ceased to be a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s type of organism. And thus, as i n the f i r s t case, he no longer has a r i g h t to l i f e . So, i f machines are being used to keep h i s body going, they can be unhooked even i f t h i s r e s u l t s i n h i s b i o l o g i c a l death. And i f unhooking him does not r e s u l t i n h i s b i o l o g i c a l death, then i t would be p e r m i s s i b l e to use some other means of s t o p p i n g the continued b o d i l y f u n c t i o n s . In the t h i r d case, the human, s t i l l b eing a s e l f -c onscious type, does indeed have a r i g h t to l i f e . There-f o r e , t a k i n g any means whatever to b r i n g about h i s death, or even to speed h i s death, w i l l v i o l a t e h i s r i g h t to l i f e , u n l e s s c e r t a i n s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s to be d i s c u s s e d i n Sec-t i o n 4 are i n e f f e c t . I have i n the above r e l i e d on what i s p e r f e c t l y obvious, t h a t n o r m a l l y a f u l l y developed human being i s a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s type o f c r e a t u r e , and so does indeed have 2 3 . a r i g h t to l i f e . But there are much more c o n t r o v e r s i a l s o r t s of cases. Are two-week o l d i n f a n t s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ? And what of chimpanzees, dogs and h o r s e s ? The g e n e r a l consensus o f o p i n i o n i s t h a t very young i n f a n t s and most, but perhaps not a l l , animals are: not s e l f - c o n s c i o u s , and so do not have a r i g h t to l i f e . T h i s means o f course, t h a t k i l l i n g i n f a n t s before they are s e l f - c o n s c i o u s w i l l not v i o l a t e t h e i r r i g h t to l i f e , s i n c e they w i l l not have one. And t h a t no doubt w i l l go counter to many people's i n t u i t i o n s on the matter. However, I do not t h i n k i t i s as d r a s t i c a r e s u l t as some might t h i n k . F i r s t , i t leaves us f r e e to k i l l those i n f a n t s who are so s e v e r e l y m e n t a l l y or p h y s i c a l l y d e f e c t i v e that l i f e c o u l d not p o s s i b l y b r i n g them a m i n i m a l l y a c c e p t a b l e l e v e l o f goods. And t h a t , i t seems to me, i s a d e s i r a b l e conse-quence o f t h i s p o s i t i o n . And second, because q u e s t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y are not r e s o l v e d s o l e l y on the b a s i s o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s , i t does not l i c e n s e the wholesale k i l l i n g o f i n f a n t s . Rules and p r i n c i p l e s generated by other areas of m o r a l i t y must be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t seems to me l i k e l y t h a t we c o u l d generate from p r i n c i p l e s o f u t i l i t y moral r u l e s which would p r o h i b i t the k i l l i n g o f a c r e a t u r e whose l i f e b r i n g s i t some minimal amount of goods, u n l e s s there are extremely s t r o n g moral reasons f o r d o i n g so. T h i s would make the k i l l i n g o f i n f a n t s , as w e l l as other c onscious beings, prima f a c i e wrong. 24. I cannot leave t h i s p r e s e n t t o p i c without s a y i n g something about the a b o r t i o n i s s u e . C l e a r l y , g i v e n my theory thus f a r developed, f e t u s e s do not have a r i g h t to l i f e . Furthermore, u n t i l such time as a f e t u s i s con-s c i o u s (I do not know when or i f th a t happens i n f e t a l development, but I suspect i t i s f a i r l y l a t e , i f a t a l l ) , l i f e cannot b r i n g i t any goods. So u n t i l the p o i n t a t which a f e t u s becomes conscious there w i l l be no moral reasons generated by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to do wit h ijt ( i n d i s t i n c t i o n from reasons which might be generated by con-s i d e r a t i o n s t o do with the mother or ot h e r s ) which w i l l make k i l l i n g i t wrong. The only way I see to a v o i d t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , although I p e r s o n a l l y do not f e e l compelled to a v o i d i t , i s with some kind of argument from p o t e n t i a -l i t y . To my knowledge, no one has succeeded i n showing th a t the p o t e n t i a l f o r a c q u i r i n g c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s a m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e of a c r e a t u r e . I s h a l l now c o n s i d e r what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ( s ) a c r e a t u r e must have i n order to possess the r i g h t to autonomy. Aut-onomy, as I am u s i n g t h a t term here, i s the a b i l i t y to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g , so the r i g h t I am a c t u a l l y concerned with i s the r i g h t to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g . Given the c o n n e c t i o n noted above between r i g h t s and d e s i r e s , we can say t h a t a cr e a t u r e has the r i g h t t o be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g only i f he i s capable now o f d e s i r i n g to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g , or was cap-ab l e o f such a d e s i r e i n the past and w i l l a g a i n be capable 2 5 . of such a d e s i r e i n the f u t u r e . I n order to have such a d e s i r e a c r e a t u r e must be a s e l f - c o n s c i o u s type o f c r e a t u r e , because otherwise he co u l d not d e s i r e to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g . Furthermore, although I cannot prove t h i s i s the case, i t seems to me t h a t a c r e a t u r e needs no a d d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s i n order to be capable o f d e s i r i n g t o be s e l f -d i r e c t i n g . From t h i s we can conclude t h a t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s the a t t r i b u t e which a c r e a t u r e must possess i n order t o have a r i g h t to autonomy. We should note t h a t while conscious c r e a t u r e s who l a c k s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s are capable o f d e s i r i n g to do par-t i c u l a r t h i n g s , they are not capable of d e s i r i n g to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g with r e s p e c t to doing those t h i n g s . And while the d e s i r e simply to do something can be s a t i s f i e d by one's b e i n g p e r m i t t e d to do t h a t t h i n g , the d e s i r e to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g with r e s p e c t to doing something i s s a t -i s f i e d o n l y when the w i l l s o f others do not form p a r t o f the c a u s a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c t i o n . T h i s means that one's r i g h t to autonomy can be v i o l a t e d even i f i n f a c t one does what one d e s i r e s to do i f p e r m i s s i o n to do so must be sought. F i n a l l y , I should l i k e to c o n s i d e r what c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c s ) are n e c e s s a r y f o r a c r e a t u r e to have the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g . Before I can do so I must be more p r e c i s e i n my f o r m u l a t i o n o f the statement o f t h a t r i g h t . I c l a i m t h a t when we a t t r i b u t e to a c r e a t u r e the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g 26. what we are r e a l l y a t t r i b u t i n g to him i s a s e t of r i g h t s which c o n t a i n s an i n d e f i n i t e l y l a r g e number of r i g h t s o f the f o l l o w i n g form: A has the r i g h t to do or be X, where be i n g p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s n o t doing or b e i n g X i s to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s i l l - b e i n g , a g a i n s t b a t time t . I n the next s e c t i o n I develop and defend t h i s p o s i t i o n . Given the c o n n e c t i o n between r i g h t s and d e s i r e s , i f a c r e a t u r e i s to have a r i g h t to do or be X, i t must be the case t h a t he i s a b l e to d e s i r e to do or be X now, or was a b l e to do i n the p a s t and w i l l a g a i n be a b l e to do so i n the f u t u r e . And i n order to be capable of d e s i r e s , a c r e a t u r e must be c o n s c i o u s . I t seems obvious t h a t he doesn't need any other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . So we can con-clude t h a t i n order f o r a c r e a t u r e to have a r i g h t to do or be X, where being p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s not doing or b e i n g X i s to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s i l l - b e i n g , i t must be the case e i t h e r t h a t he i s conscious now, or was c o n s c i o u s i n the p a s t and w i l l a g a i n be con-s c i o u s i n the f u t u r e . I f he s a t i s f i e s e i t h e r one of these d i s j u n c t s he i s a conscious type of c r e a t u r e . So con-sc i o u s n e s s i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which a c r e a t u r e must have i n order to have a r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g . T h i s concludes my defense o f the claims w i t h which I s t a r t e d this< s e c t i o n : 1. t h a t a c r e a t u r e ' s being s e l f -conscious i s n e c e s s a r y f o r i t to have a r i g h t to l i f e ; 2. t h a t a c r e a t u r e ' s b e i n g s e l f - c o n s c i o u s i s necessary f o r 27. i t to have a right to autonomy; and 3. that a creature's being conscious is necessary for i t to have a right to well-being. Although I cannot prove this is true, i t seems to me that self-consciousness is also sufficient for a creature's having a right to li f e and a right to autonomy, and that consciousness is sufficient for a creature's having a right to well-being. I base these claims on the moral judgment that i t is in virtue of these characteristics alone that i t is seriously wrong to be positively instrumental in a creature's death, loss of autonomy, or loss of well-being, respectively. I expect that this judgment will be in accordance with most people's intuitions on the matter. Section 3. The limits on natural rights A discussion of the limits of rights requires that the structure of each of the natural rights be made expli-cit. This I now propose to do. I suggest that what we actually mean when we attribute to a creature a right to l i f e , a right to well-being, or a right to autonomy is that he has rights of the following forms, respectively: the right to continue existing as the subject of experiences and other mental states against b  at time t; the right to do or be X, where being positively instrumental in the right-holder's not doing or being X is to be positively instrumental in his ill-being, against b at time t; and the right to be self-directing with respect 28. to doing X a g a i n s t b a t time t and p l a c e p. For the f i n e s t i n d i v i d u a t i o n of r i g h t s , the time and, where a p p l i c a b l e , p l a c e , w i l l be measured i n the s m a l l e s t p o s s i b l e u n i t s , and b w i l l be an i n d i v i d u a l moral c r e a t u r e . However, we w i l l u s u a l l y not be i n t e r e s t e d i n such f i n e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s , but r a t h e r with f a i r l y l a r g e s e t s o f such i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . I f no l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s are i n e f f e c t f o r a c r e a -t ure's n a t u r a l r i g h t to X, then h i s s e t of r i g h t s to X w i l l c o n s i s t o f a l l p o s s i b l e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s o f the a p p r o p r i a t e form. But i f a l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n i s i n e f f e c t , then c e r -t a i n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s or se t s o f i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s w i l l be excluded so t h a t h i s s e t of r i g h t s to X w i l l c o n t a i n a subset of a l l p o s s i b l e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s to X. We can now see that the analysans f o r an a n a l y s i s o f r i g h t s should read: A has a r i g h t to (do or be) X a t time t (and p l a c e p f o r autonomy r i g h t s ) a g a i n s t b; and the analysandum should r e a d : In v i r t u e of c e r t a i n n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f A ( e i t h e r consciousness or s e l f -c o nsciousness, depending on what X i s ) , and i n the absence of both l i m i t i n g and c e r t a i n other c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r b to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n A's not having X a t time t (and p l a c e p f o r autonomy  r i g h t s ) . I s h a l l s t a r t t h i s d i s c u s s i o n on l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s with the r i g h t to autonomy, as the l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s with 29. r e s p e c t to t h a t g e n e r a l r i g h t are the most numerous. We saw i n S e c t i o n 2 t h a t i n order f o r a c r e a t u r e to have a r i g h t to X he had to have the concept o f X. T h i s meant that i n order f o r a c r e a t u r e to have a r i g h t to "be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g he had to have a s e l f - c o n c e p t . I t a l s o means t h a t i n order f o r him to have a r i g h t to be s e l f -d i r e c t i n g w i t h r e s p e c t to doing X he must have a concept of 'doing X'. I f he does not have such a concept, then the r i g h t to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g with r e s p e c t to doing X cannot be a member of h i s s e t o f autonomy r i g h t s . So, the concepts one possesses w i l l form one of the l i m i t i n g con-d i t i o n s on one's s e t of autonomy r i g h t s . What concepts one possesses w i l l v a r y from time to time, so the r i g h t to a t time t ^ might not be i n c l u d e d i n one's s e t of autonomy r i g h t s because one l a c k s the concept of doing x^ a t t ^ ; while the r i g h t to do a t time t ^ might w e l l be i n c l u d e d i n t h a t s e t of r i g h t s because a t t 2 one has the concept of d o i n g x^. (In order to s i m p l i f y the prose, i n t h e remaining d i s c u s s i o n of autonomy r i g h t s I s h a l l r e f e r to the r i g h t to do c e r t a i n t h i n g s , r a t h e r than the r i g h t to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g w i t h r e s p e c t to doing c e r t a i n t h i n g s . I n each case the lo n g e r statement i s to be understood.) A person's autonomy r i g h t s are a l s o l i m i t e d by the more important n a t u r a l r i g h t s o f o t h e r s . For example, i f by p u l l i n g the t r i g g e r on my gun a t time t ^ and p l a c e p^, I would g r a t u i t o u s l y k i l l another c r e a t u r e who has a r i g h t 30. to l i f e a t time t ^ , then I do not have a r i g h t to p u l l the t r i g g e r a t time t ^ and p l a c e p^. Of course, I might w e l l have the r i g h t to p u l l the t r i g g e r a t time t ^ and p l a c e p 2 , or a t time t 2 and p l a c e p^. I t depends on whether there are l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s which w i l l exclude those p a r -t i c u l a r r i g h t s from my s e t of autonomy r i g h t s . S i m i l a r l y , i f I harm another by smoking i n an e l e v a t o r a t time t ^ , then I do not have the r i g h t to smoke i n the e l e v a t o r a t that time, a l t h o u g h I might have the r i g h t to do so a t some other time, or i n some other p l a c e . One's s e t o f autonomy r i g h t s can a l s o be l i m i t e d by one's doing something which c o n s t i t u t e s r e n u n c i a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t or s e t o f p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s . T h i s r e n u n c i a t i o n might be made by p r e v i o u s consent to someone's i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h one's a c t i o n , by t a k i n g on an o b l i g a t i o n , or by t a k i n g p a r t i n a f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n . I s h a l l c o n s i d e r each of these i n d e t a i l , s t a r t i n g with consent. Say A has r e s o l v e d to r e f r a i n from buying c i g a r e t t e s , but knowing t h a t once tempted, he w i l l p r obably break h i s r e s o l v e , he informs B t h a t he would a p p r e c i a t e b e i n g p r e -vented from making such a purchase. Subsequently, B does i n t e r f e r e i n the envisaged circumstances. Because A has consented to B's i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h h i s buying c i g a r e t t e s , he has i n e f f e c t renounced h i s r i g h t a g a i n s t B to be s e l f -d i r e c t i n g w i t h r e s p e c t to buying c i g a r e t t e s . So a l l such r i g h t s are thereby excluded from h i s s e t o f r i g h t s to 3 1 . autonomy. Thus, when B i n t e r f e r e s with h i s a c t i o n he does not v i o l a t e A's r i g h t to autonomy, because the r e l e v a n t r i g h t i s not i n c l u d e d i n A's s e t . However, h i s r i g h t s to buy c i g a r e t t e s a g a i n s t everyone e l s e remain i n t a c t , so that anyone e l s e ' s i n t e r f e r e n c e with A's purchase w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t . I t i s important though t h a t consent not r e s u l t from brainwashing, an abnormal mental s t a t e (such as d e p r e s s i o n ) or misinforma-t i o n . For i f i t does, i t w i l l not serve as a l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n , the r e l e v a n t r i g h t ( s ) w i l l remain i n t a c t , and any i n t e r f e r e n c e with i t s o b j e c t w i l l be a v i o l a t i o n of the r i g h t . These same c o n d i t i o n s come up a g a i n i n S e c t i o n 5 . I d e a l w i t h them i n more d e t a i l i n t h a t s e c t i o n , and so r e f e r the r eader to t h a t s e c t i o n f o r a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n of them. Another way t h a t the s e t of autonomy r i g h t s can be l i m i t e d , which i s i n a way r e l a t e d to the above, i s by a person t a k i n g on an o b l i g a t i o n . I f A promises B t h a t he w i l l take him to the movies on the coming F r i d a y n i g h t , then A does not have the p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s a g a i n s t B to do a n y t h i n g which i s incompatible with h i s keeping h i s promise. He has, by t a k i n g on the o b l i g a t i o n to take B to the movies, i n e f f e c t renounced a l l the r i g h t s a g a i n s t B which are i n c o m p a t i b l e with h i s f u l f i l l i n g t h a t o b l i g a t i o n , so they are excluded from h i s s e t of autonomy r i g h t s . T h i s means t h a t B would not be v i o l a t i n g any o f A's r i g h t s 3 2 . by c o e r c i n g him to keep h i s promise. I should p o i n t out t h o u g h ^ t h a t A s t i l l has r i g h t s a g a i n s t everyone e l s e to do whatever he wants on F r i d a y n i g h t , so t h a t i n t e r f e r e n c e by anyone other than B, or someone a c t i n g on B's b e h a l f , would c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t to autonomy. I t h i n k i t i s t h i s f a c t — t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s can l i m i t one's n a t u r a l r i g h t s — w h i c h p r o v i d e s the o n l y p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r why the laws of one's country do not n e c e s s a r i l y v i o l a t e one's r i g h t s to autonomy. I t h i n k i t must be the case t h a t there i s something l i k e an i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t , a convention, a p r i n c i p l e o f m u t u a l i t y o f r e s -t r i c t i o n s , or some such t h i n g , which g i v e s r i s e to o b l i -g a t i o n s to obey the laws o f one's own country and of those one v i s i t s . T h i s i s why laws r e q u i r i n g t h a t one d r i v e on the r i g h t , pay income tax, e t c . , do not v i o l a t e one's r i g h t to autonomy. The s e t of r i g h t s has been l i m i t e d by our o b l i g a t i o n to obey those laws. Working out the d e t a i l s o f t h i s p r o p o s a l would take a g r e a t d e a l o f time, and belongs i n another p r o j e c t . A l l I want to do here i s p o i n t out t h a t g i v e n my theory, l e g a l requirements do not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e v i o l a t i o n s o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s (although some may w e l l ) . A theory which i m p l i e d t h a t they d i d would be i n t r o u b l e . Now l e t us c o n s i d e r c o m p e t i t i o n s . I t h i n k t h a t when a person takes p a r t i n a f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n he, i n e f f e c t , renounces h i s r i g h t to whatever he i s competing f o r 33. c o n d i t i o n a l on h i s l o s i n g the c o m p e t i t i o n . We need t h i s s o r t o f mechanism when there i s a c o n f l i c t "between two r i g h t s o f equal importance, as when two persons both want to do the same t h i n g , where one can succeed only by p r e -v e n t i n g the oth e r from succeeding. For example, i n order f o r one boy to get the $10 b i l l l y i n g on the sidewalk, he must prevent the other boy from g e t t i n g i t . Now I assume t h a t they both have, a t the time of d i s c o v e r i n g the $10 b i l l , a r i g h t to p i c k i t up. Say the time i s t ^ . I f e i t h e r boy p i c k s the b i l l up, he does so a t the expense of the oth e r ' s r i g h t to p i c k up the b i l l , and so v i o l a t e s i t . But i f they take p a r t i n a f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n , say they draw straws, f l i p c o i n s , or race to i t , then the l o s e r of the c o m p e t i t i o n no lon g e r has a r i g h t to the b i l l and so the winner i s f r e e to p i c k i t up. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i f the c o m p e t i t i o n occurs a t t g , A has no r i g h t s a g a i n s t B to p i c k up the b i l l a f t e r t h a t time. But note, the r i g h t s a g a i n s t others are not excluded. I f C were to swoop down and snatch the b i l l , he would v i o l a t e n ot o n l y B's r i g h t Q to i t , but A's as w e l l . o 7H.L.A. Hart says i n 'Are There Any N a t u r a l R i g h t s ? ' ( P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review. 65 (1955), 179) t h a t what we have i n t h i s case a re two ' l i b e r t y - r i g h t s ' ; t h a t what we mean when we say t h a t each boy has a r i g h t to p i c k up the $10 b i l l i s t h a t he does n o t h i n g wrong i n do i n g so, but t h a t we say n o t h i n g about i t s being wrong f o r the other boy to i n t e r f e r e w i t h him. Obv i o u s l y I do not t h i n k t h i s i s the c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s o f the s i t u a t i o n . See the C o n c l u s i o n f o r a defense o f t h i s p o s i t i o n . 3 4 -The second k i n d of c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n i s one i n which two persons both want to do d i f f e r e n t but incompatible t h i n g s . For example, A wants to bathe and B wants to wash c l o t h e s , and there i s not enough hot water to a l l o w both of them to do what they want. So, i f A bathes he prevents B from washing, and v i c e v e r s a . Unless a f a i r means i s used to s e t t l e the c o n f l i c t , one or the other's r i g h t w i l l be v i o l a t e d . The most a p p r o p r i a t e means i n the circum-stances would be generated by the f i r s t - c o m e - f i r s t - s e r v e d p r i n c i p l e . I f A g e t s s t a r t e d f i r s t , then B's r i g h t s a g a i n s t A to wash from the time A s t a r t s to bathe u n t i l he i s f i n -i s h e d , are excluded from B's s e t of a c t i o n r i g h t s . And v i c e v e r s a . There i s a c o m p l i c a t i o n here, though: A might see that B i s p l a n n i n g to wash, and so rush i n t o the bathroom and turn on the water f o r h i s bath, thereby b e a t i n g B to the punch. I n such circumstances, the f i r s t - c o m e - f i r s t -served p r i n c i p l e has o b v i o u s l y been abused. The competi-t i o n has t h e r e f o r e not been r e s o l v e d f a i r l y , and thus A i s g u i l t y of v i o l a t i n g B's r i g h t to wash. We are now i n a p o s i t i o n to e x p l a i n why someone's u s i n g a p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e of p r o p e r t y , P, does not n e c e s s a r i l y v i o l a t e the r i g h t s of others touse and dispose of t h a t p i e c e of p r o p e r t y . I t w i l l not when the c o n f l i c t among a l l the r i g h t s has been r e s o l v e d by some f a i r means. This might be done on the b a s i s of who bought P, who made i t , who i t 3 5 . was g i v e n t o , who needs i t most, e t c . , depending on the p r e c i s e circumstances o f the case. Whoever the r e s u l t s of the f a i r means a s s i g n s P to has the r i g h t to use P i n c l u d e d i n h i s s e t of a c t i o n r i g h t s , while the r i g h t to use P i s excluded from everyone e l s e ' i s . T h i s e x p l a i n s why I have an e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to the use o f my c a r , saddle, t y p e w r i t e r , e t c . F i n a l l y , the s t a t u s of other beings i n v o l v e d i n an a c t puts c o n s t r a i n t s on what p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s are i n c l u d e d i n one's s e t of r i g h t s to autonomy. Nothing of the form: •A has a r i g h t a t time t and p l a c e p to be s e l f - d i r e c t i n g with r e s p e c t to doing x to V w i l l be i n c l u d e d when b i s a c r e a t u r e with a r i g h t to autonomy, and A's doing x to b r e q u i r e s t h a t b do y, so long as b has not done something which commits him to doing y. For example, i t i s f a l s e t h a t 'A has a r i g h t to marry B' where B i s an autonomous c r e a t u r e , u n l e s s B has promised to do so because A's marry-i n g B r e q u i r e s t h a t B marry A. I t w i l l s u r e l y be agreed t h a t , p r o v i d i n g B has not promised to marry A, there i s n o t h i n g prima f a c i e wrong with B r e f u s i n g to do so. And s i m i l a r l y , i t i s f a l s e t h a t A has a r i g h t to h i r e the best b u t l e r i n town, because the b e s t b u t l e r , h a v i n g a r i g h t to autonomy, can work f o r whom he p l e a s e s , and thus does n o t h i n g wrong by r e f u s i n g to work f o r A. I s h a l l examine i n the c o n c l u s i o n the q u e s t i o n as to whether A might have a r i g h t to marry B or h i r e the best b u t l e r i n 3 6 . some weaker sense of ' r i g h t ' . In summary, the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s and s i t u a t i o n s put l i m i t s on the r i g h t s i n c l u d e d i n anyone's s e t of r i g h t s to autonomy: h i s a b i l i t i e s ; o t h e r s ' more important r i g h t s ; p r e v i o u s consent; t a k i n g on o b l i g a t i o n s ; l o s i n g f a i r com-p e t i t i o n s ; and the s t a t u s o f other beings i n v o l v e d i n an a c t . Although the f o l l o w i n g remarks do not concern a l i m i -t i n g c o n d i t i o n , I t h i n k t h i s i s the most a p p r o p r i a t e p l a c e to make them because they are r e l e v a n t to what r i g h t s are i n c l u d e d i n a c r e a t u r e ' s s e t of autonomy r i g h t s . I f A has a r i g h t to do X, then he must have a r i g h t to do e v e r y t h i n g e n t a i l e d by h i s doing X. For example, i f A has a r i g h t to swim from Pt. A t k i n s o n to Bowen I s l a n d , then he must have a r i g h t to swim, because h i s swimming from P. A t k i n s o n to Bowen I s l a n d e n t a i l s h i s swimming. But i t does not f o l l o w that he has a r i g h t to swim from M i l i t a r y Zone A to M i l i t a r y Zone B, because swimming from A to B i s not e n t a i l e d by swimming from Pt. A t k i n s o n to Bowen I s l a n d . S i m i l a r l y , although A has a r i g h t to ampu-tat e B's l e g (B has gangrene), he does not have a r i g h t to amputate B's l e g with a r u s t y k n i f e . T h i s i s because h i s amputating B's l e g with a r u s t y k n i f e i s not e n t a i l e d by h i s amputating B's l e g , and would be excluded from h i s s e t of r i g h t s by B's r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g . Because o f the d i f f e r e n c e s between the r i g h t to 3 7 . autonomy, the r i g h t to l i f e and the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g , we cannot assume t h a t a l l of the l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n s r e l e -vant to one w i l l be r e l e v a n t to the o t h e r s . So, I s h a l l now c o n s i d e r what l i m i t s there are f o r the r i g h t to l i f e , and then c o n s i d e r the same problem with r e s p e c t to the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g . We have seen t h a t whether a p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t to do X i s i n c l u d e d i n a c r e a t u r e ' s s e t of autonomy r i g h t s depends on whether t h a t c r e a t u r e has the concept of doing X. H i s a b i l i t i e s , then, are r e l e v a n t not o n l y to whether he has the g e n e r a l r i g h t to autonomy, but a l s o to what p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s are found i n t h a t s e t . There i s n o t h i n g comparable to t h i s f o r the r i g h t to l i f e . Once we have a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t a c r e a t u r e has a s e l f - c o n c e p t , h i s a b i l i t i e s w i l l not a g a i n be r e l e v a n t . So one's a b i l i t i e s w i l l not put any l i m i t s on one's r i g h t to l i f e . Because on l y a c t s can i n t e r f e r e with the o b j e c t of a r i g h t , l i v i n g , not b e i n g i n i t s e l f an a c t cannot i n t e r f e r e with o t h e r s ' r i g h t s . T h i s means t h a t the second l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n — w h e n an a c t would i n t e r f e r e with a more impor-t a n t r i g h t — w i l l not have any c o u n t e r p a r t f o r the r i g h t to l i f e . And, because l i v i n g , per se, cannot i n v o l v e any other i n d i v i d u a l i n the way t h a t doing can (e.g. marrying) the s t a t u s of other c r e a t u r e s a l s o w i l l not be r e l e v a n t to what p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s are i n c l u d e d i n anyone's s e t of 3 8 . r i g h t s to l i f e . F i n a l l y , I do not t h i n k (although I am not sure about t h i s ) t h a t one can take on an o b l i g a t i o n which w i l l make l i v i n g , per so, wrong, as one can take on an o b l i g a t i o n which w i l l make doing something wrong. So o b l i g a t i o n s , too, f a i l to be r e l e v a n t to the l i m i t s o f the r i g h t to l i f e T h i s l e a v e s the other two c o n d i t i o n s o f r e n u n c i a t i o n — c o n s e n t and l o s i n g a f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n — a s the onl y can-d i d a t e s f o r l i m i t i n g the r i g h t to l i f e . And indeed, they do. I f one e x p l i c i t l y consents to being k i l l e d , p r o v i d i n g of course t h a t such consent does not r e s u l t from some abnormal c o n d i t i o n such as t h a t induced by i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , brainwashing or d e p r e s s i o n or from e i t h e r the l a c k o f , or m i s l e a d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , then one has i n e f f e c t renounced h i s p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to l i f e a g a i n s t whomever he has g i v e n the consent. So, i f a p a t i e n t , who i s s u f f e r i n g from severe p a i n and f o r whom there i s no hope o f being cured o f the c o n d i t i o n c a u s i n g i t , consents to h i s d o c t o r ' s k i l l i n g him, then h i s p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to l i f e a g a i n s t the d o c t o r a f t e r t h a t time are excluded from h i s s e t of r i g h t s to l i f e . L o s i n g a f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n has the same e f f e c t . Say, f o r example, t h a t there are two men i n a one-man l i f e r a f t . Because i t i s overloaded, u n l e s s one of the men gets out, i t w i l l be over-turned by the h i g h seas and both 39. men w i l l drown. I f e i t h e r one throws the other overboard without t h e i r h a v i n g f i r s t used a f a i r means f o r d e c i d i n g who should go, he w i l l thereby v i o l a t e the other's r i g h t to l i f e . However, i f they use a f a i r means—say drawing straws, f l i p p i n g c o i n s , or some s u c h — t o decide who should leave the r a f t , then the winner's throwing out the l o s e r w i l l not v i o l a t e the l o s e r ' s r i g h t to l i f e , because by l o s i n g the c o m p e t i t i o n h i s s e t o f r i g h t s to l i f e has been l i m i t e d so as to exclude a l l the p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to l i f e a g a i n s t the winner a f t e r the time o f the c o m p e t i t i o n . However, because h i s s e t o f r i g h t s t o l i f e s t i l l i n c l u d e s a l l the p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s a g a i n s t everyone e l s e , i f anyone other than the winner of the c o m p e t i t i o n k i l l s him, t h a t a c t w i l l v i o l a t e h i s r i g h t to l i f e . I would l i k e to p o i n t out t h a t we now have the the-o r e t i c a l underpinnings f o r a judge's o p i n i o n i n a famous case i n which a l i f e r a f t was overloaded. Those i n charge, i n order to prevent the c a p s i z i n g of the boat, and the sub-sequent drowning o f a l l i t s passengers, threw a number of men (no women or c h i l d r e n ) overboard, while they s l e p t . They were subsequently charged w i t h murder. I do not remember the outcome o f the case, but I do remember t h a t the judge h e l d that i f they had a l l drawn straws, and only l o s e r s had been thrown overboard, then no o f f e n s e would have been committed. I b e l i e v e I have shown why t h i s should be the case. 40. With the e x c e p t i o n of the remarks d i r e c t e d towards the q u e s t i o n of how the i n d i v i d u a t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to l i f e d i f f e r s from the i n d i v i d u a t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to freedom of a c t i o n , a l l of the above remarks about the l i m i t s on the r i g h t to l i f e apply, mutatis mutandis, to the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g . As was the case f o r the r i g h t to autonomy, because the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g c o n s i s t s o f p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s of the form, 'A has a r i g h t to do or be X. where being p o s i -t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s not d o i n g or being X c o n s t i t u t e s being p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h i s i l l - b e i n g ' , a c r e a -t u r e ' s a b i l i t i e s are r e l e v a n t not only to the q u e s t i o n of whether or not he has the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g , but a l s o to what p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s are i n c l u d e d i n t h a t s e t . That i s , A must have the concept of doing or b e i n g X, i f the r i g h t to do or .be X i s to be i n c l u d e d i n h i s s e t o f r i g h t s to w e l l - b e i n g . T h i s means t h a t u n l e s s A has the concept, p o i s o n , he w i l l not have the r i g h t to be n o t -poisoned. However, i f A can d e s i r e not to f e e l h o r r i b l e , then he has a r i g h t to not f e e l h o r r i b l e , and any p o s i -t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i n h i s f e e l i n g h o r r i b l e , such as p o i s -oning him w i l l v i o l a t e t h a t r i g h t . I t seems to me l i k e l y t h a t a l l c o n s c i o u s c r e a t u r e s are capable of d e s i r i n g t h a t c e r t a i n kinds of s e n s a t i o n s cease, s e n s a t i o n s which we would c a l l p a i n s e n s a t i o n s . T h i s means t h a t a l l conscious c r e a t u r e s have a r i g h t to be p a i n - f r e e , and t h e r e f o r e any 4 1 . p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i n t h e i r h a ving p a i n w i l l v i o l a t e t h e i r r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g . Although the f o l l o w i n g remarks do not d e a l , s t r i c t l y speaking, with a l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n , they do concern what p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s can be i n c l u d e d i n any c r e a t u r e ' s s e t of r i g h t s to w e l l - b e i n g . For t h i s reason i t seems appro-p r i a t e to make them here. What I want to p o i n t out i s th a t what c o n s t i t u t e s harm f o r one c r e a t u r e might w e l l not c o n s t i t u t e harm f o r another. And what does c o n s t i t u t e harm w i l l o b v i o u s l y be r e l e v a n t to what p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s a c r e a t u r e can have i n h i s s e t o f r i g h t s to w e l l - b e i n g . For example, because a wolf would s u f f e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l and p h y s i c a l harm by being kept i n even a f a i r l y l a r g e cage, i t s s e t of r i g h t s to w e l l - b e i n g w i l l i n c l u d e r i g h t s not to be kept i n a cage. On the other hand, because a b i r d would l i k e l y n ot s u f f e r e i t h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l or p h y s i c a l harm by being kept i n even a f a i r l y s m a l l cage, i t s s e t of r i g h t s to w e l l - b e i n g w i l l not i n c l u d e r i g h t s not to be kept i n a cage. In t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g I have been o p e r a t i n g with a ve r y rough i n t u i t i v e n o t i o n o f what i t i s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s harming. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to make t h i s n o t i o n p r e c i s e , but there are some th i n g s which can be s a i d . F i r s t , c a u s i n g s u f f i c i e n t p h y s i c a l p a i n even i f only b r i e f l y , w i l l c o n s t i t u t e harming p h y s i c a l l y . And ca u s i n g s u f f i c i e n t mental d i s t r e s s or d i s c o m f o r t even i f 42. only b r i e f l y , w i l l c o n s t i t u t e harming mentally. I am a f r a i d I am unable to say what w i l l be " s u f f i c i e n t * . Perhaps t h i s i s a f a i r l y s u b j e c t i v e matter. In a d d i t i o n to these f a i r l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ways of harming an i n d i v i -d u a l , I t h i n k we w i l l a l s o want to i n c l u d e as harmful a c t s those which w i l l cause one to l e a d a l e s s happy l i f e than one would otherwise have l e d , where those a c t s do not a t the time c o n s t i t u t e p h y s i c a l or mental harm. T h i s concludes my d i s c u s s i o n of the l i m i t s of n a t u r a l r i g h t s . S e c t i o n 4. C o n d i t i o n s of v i o l a t i o n and n o n - v i o l a t i o n Under normal c o n d i t i o n s , i f some p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t does indeed belong to one of a c r e a t u r e ' s s e t s o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s , then being p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h a t c r e a -t u r e ' s not h a v i n g the o b j e c t of the r i g h t w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n o f t h a t r i g h t . T h i s means th a t such t h i n g s as k i l l i n g someone by p u l l i n g a t r i g g e r while p o i n t i n g a gun a t h i s head, s n a t c h i n g a l i f e j a c k e t away from someone who i s u s i n g i t to s t a y a f l o a t , r e t r i e v i n g a l o a f o f bread when doing so r e s u l t s i n the t h i e f ' s s t a r v a t i o n , unplugging a kidney machine which i s keeping someone a l i v e , e t c . , e t c . , w i l l a l l c o n s t i t u t e v i o l a t i o n s of the a s s o c i a t e d r i g h t s . But i t i s n o t o n l y p r e s e n t p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i n a c r e a t u r e ' s not h a ving the o b j e c t o f a r i g h t which w i l l v i o l a t e t h a t r i g h t . Having been p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u -mental i n a c r e a t u r e ' s not having something which he now 43. has a r i g h t t o , even though he d i d not a t the time of the i n t e r f e r e n c e have a r i g h t to i t , w i l l a l s o c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n o f the p r e s e n t r i g h t . For i n s t a n c e , i f one i n the p a s t p a i n l e s s l y c u t the l e g s o f f an i n f a n t , one d i d not v i o l a t e any r i g h t s t h a t the i n f a n t had a t t h a t time. T h i s i s "because the i n f a n t was i n c a p a b l e a t t h a t time of d e s i r i n g t h a t he not he m u t i l a t e d i n t h a t way, and so the r i g h t not to have h i s l e g s c u t o f f was not i n c l u d e d i n h i s s e t o f r i g h t s to w e l l - b e i n g . However, he i s capable at p r e s e n t of d e s i r i n g t h a t h i s l e g s not have been cu t o f f , and so he has a r i g h t to the s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n which h i s l e g s were not cut o f f . The a c t i n the p a s t o f c u t t i n g o f f h i s l e g s c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n of ithis p r esent r i g h t . I would l i k e to emphasize t h a t I am not modifying the c o n d i t i o n s I presented e a r l i e r as those necessary and s u f f i c i e n t f o r the p o s s e s s i o n of a r i g h t . I am merely s p e c i f y i n g what i s to count as a v i o l a t i o n of that r i g h t . And I am s a y i n g t h a t not only p r e s e n t p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i n the c r e a t u r e ' s not having the o b j e c t o f t h a t r i g h t , but a l s o p a s t p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y can c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n o f that r i g h t . I should now l i k e to c o n s i d e r those s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s under which one's b e i n g p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a c r e a -t u r e ' s not having something he has a r i g h t to w i l l not c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t . When these c o n d i t i o n s 44. h o l d the p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y w i l l not he even prima f a c i e wrong. (In the f o l l o w i n g m a t e r i a l I s h a l l f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r t o ' i n t e r f e r e n c e with the o b j e c t of a r i g h t * r a t h e r than ' p o s i t i v e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y i n a c r e a t u r e ' s not having the o b j e c t o f a r i g h t ' . Although these phrases are not i n f a c t e q u i v a l e n t i n meaning, I s h a l l t r e a t them as such i n t h i s work i n order to a v o i d annoying r e p e t i t i v e n e s s . ) The f i r s t c o n d i t i o n concerns s i t u a t i o n s i n which i t i s p h y s i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r a person to avo i d p r e v e n t i n g a c r e a t u r e from having the o b j e c t of a r i g h t . Because the person cannot a v o i d h i s i n t e r f e r e n c e , i t i s i n a p p r o p r i -ate to m o r a l l y censor him f o r i t , and thus i t w i l l be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to accuse him of v i o l a t i n g a r i g h t . For example, i f a person a c c i d e n t a l l y f a l l s o f f a balcony and k i l l s someone upon l a n d i n g on the ground below, we would not accuse him o f v i o l a t i n g t h a t person's r i g h t to l i f e . The next c o n d i t i o n concerns the r e l a t i o n s h i p between d e s i r e s and the v i o l a t i o n of r i g h t s . I argued i n S e c t i o n 2 t h a t o n l y i f a c r e a t u r e was capable o f d e s i r i n g something, co u l d he have a r i g h t to t h a t something. And I based t h a t argument on a r e l a t i o n s h i p which I a l l e g e d to e x i s t between d e s i r e s and the v i o l a t i o n of r i g h t s ; v i z , that o n l y i f someone d e s i r e s X, or would under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s d e s i r e X, c o u l d h i s r i g h t to X be v i o l a t e d . I should now l i k e to defend t h a t c l a i m . C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a few examples should be s u f f i c i e n t to do so. 4 5 . I t i s s u r e l y true t h a t i f A i s a masochist i n v o l v e d i n a m a s o c h i s t i c - s a d i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p with B, that B does not v i o l a t e A's r i g h t not to he harmed by b e a t i n g him. And i t seems r i g h t t h at i f B l o c k s A i n h i s room he does not v i o l a t e A's r i g h t to leave so l o n g as he p r e f e r s not to. And i f B d e s t r o y s something b e l o n g i n g to A, he w i l l not have v i o l a t e d h i s r i g h t to i t i f A d i d not want i t . I could go on, but the p a t t e r n should be c l e a r . In each of these cases, A does not d e s i r e the e x i s t e n c e of a c e r t a i n s t a t e o f a f f a i r s (e.g. i n which he i s not beaten by B); and so, although A does indeed have a r i g h t to t h a t s t a t e of a f f a i r s because he i s capable o f d e s i r i n g i t , B does not v i o l a t e h i s r i g h t to the e x i s t e n c e of t h a t s t a t e of a f f a i r s by p r e v e n t i n g or i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h l t . T h i s suggests the g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e : The r i g h t A has to X w i l l not be v i o l a t e d by someone's p r e v e n t i n g him from having X i f A does not d e s i r e X. T h i s p r i n c i p l e , I should p o i n t out, i s not q u a l i f y i n g the c o n d i t i o n f o r having a n a t u r a l r i g h t , but merely i n d i c a t i n g , g i v e n t h a t someone has a r i g h t , when t h a t r i g h t i s not v i o l a t e d by someone's ^ i n t e r f e r i n g with i t . But t h i n g s are not q u i t e as simple as t h i s p r i n c i p l e suggests. There are three c o n d i t i o n s under which, although one does n o t i n f a c t d e s i r e X, i n t e r f e r e n c e with X w i l l n onetheless c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of one's r i g h t to X. (The s u b j e c t does indeed have a r i g h t to X. What i s i n 46. q u e s t i o n i s whether p r e v e n t i n g him from having X c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n o f t h a t r i g h t , i n the absence o f an a c t i v e d e s i r e . ) D i s t o r t e d d e s i r e s comprise one of these c o n d i t i o n s . D i s t o r t i o n of d e s i r e s might r e s u l t from a temporarily-a l t e r e d s t a t e o f consciousness, such as t h a t which can be brought about by deep d e p r e s s i o n s . While i n a depressed s t a t e one c o u l d , f o r example, f a i l to d e s i r e to continue l i v i n g , or f o r t h a t matter, a c t u a l l y d e s i r e death. But i t would h a r d l y be a s u f f i c i e n t defense f o r someone who k i l l s another while he i s i n such a s t a t e to p o i n t out t h a t h i s v i c t i m d i d not a t the time d e s i r e to l i v e . D e s i r e s might a l s o be d i s t o r t e d by such processes as brainwashing, i n d o c t r i n a t i o n or c o n d i t i o n i n g . I f the o n l y reason someone does not d e s i r e X i s because he has been brainwashed, c o n d i t i o n e d , or i n d o c t r i n a t e d so as to d e s i r e the absence o f X, then p r e v e n t i n g X from being the case, or i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h X, w i l l v i o l a t e h i s r i g h t to X, none-t h e l e s s . For example, i f a s l a v e does not d e s i r e freedom because he has been c o n d i t i o n e d not to do so, h i s r i g h t to autonomy i s , n o n e t h e l e s s , v i o l a t e d by h i s s t a t e o f s l a v e r y , even i n the absence of the d e s i r e f o r freedom. These o b s e r v a t i o n s suggest t h a t i f someone would d e s i r e that X be the case were i t not f o r the f a c t t h a t h i s d e s i r e s have been d i s t o r t e d by e i t h e r an a l t e r e d s t a t e of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , or c o n d i t i o n i n g , brainwashing, or 4 7 . i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , then i n t e r f e r i n g with X w i l l , even i n the absence o f d e s i r e , c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t to X. There i s a problem here i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between e d u c a t i n g and i n d o c t r i n a t i n g or c o n d i t i o n i n g . These p r o -cesses are perhaps r e a l l y two ends of a continuum, with education a t one end and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n and c o n d i t i o n i n g a t the other. We are able to c a t e g o r i z e any process which f a l l s c l e a r l y on one end or the other. But i t i s much more d i f f i c u l t to do so when they f a l l i n the f u z z y middle area. We need c r i t e r i a f o r making these f i n e r d i s t i n c -t i o n s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , a t p r e s e n t , I do not have any to o f f e r . Because o f t h i s , i t w i l l not always be c l e a r when a r i g h t has been v i o l a t e d , because i t w i l l not always be c l e a r whether e d u c a t i o n or i n d o c t r i n a t i o n has occurred. The other c o n d i t i o n has to do with the p o s s e s s i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n . S u r e l y , i f someone f a i l s to d e s i r e X because he e i t h e r f a i l s to a c q u i r e r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , or has m i s l e a d i n g or f a l s e i n f o r m a t i o n , then others* i n t e r f e r i n g with X w i l l v i o l a t e h i s r i g h t to i t . Given the above c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about the presence and absence o f d e s i r e s , I suggest t h a t i f a c r e a t u r e does not d e s i r e to l i v e , to be f r e e from some p a r t i c u l a r harm, or to do some p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g (y) then, p r o v i d i n g none of the f o l l o w i n g h o l d , h i s r i g h t to those s t a t e s of a f f a i r s i s not v i o l a t e d by someone's being p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l 48. i n h i s death, harm, or i n a b i l i t y to do t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g : 1. he would d e s i r e to l i v e , be f r e e from t h a t p a r t i -c u l a r harm, or do y, were i t not f o r the f a c t that h i s d e s i r e s have been d i s t o r t e d by h i s be i n g i n a t e m p o r a r i l y a l t e r e d s t a t e o f consciousness (e.g. d e p r e s s i o n ) , or by h i s h a v ing been brainwashed, c o n d i t i o n e d or i n d o c t r i n a t e d i n t o not d e s i r i n g to l i v e , be f r e e from t h a t harm, or do 2. he would d e s i r e to l i v e , be f r e e from t h a t p a r t i -c u l a r harm, or do y, were i t not f o r the f a c t t h a t he e i t h e r l a c k s r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , or has m i s l e a d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . There i s one more c o n d i t i o n under which i n t e r f e r e n c e with something a person has a r i g h t to does not v i o l a t e that r i g h t . I t w i l l apply, I t h i n k , o n l y to those r i g h t s i n c l u d e d i n the s e t of r i g h t s to autonomy. I t i n v o l v e s a kind o f c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , but u n l i k e those which c o u l d be r e s o l v e d by a f a i r means, thus a v o i d i n g the v i o l a t i o n of any r i g h t s by one or the other's s e t of a c t i o n r i g h t s being l i m i t e d so as to exclude t h a t p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t , i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to r e s o l v e the c o n f l i c t by any o f the ^ p o s s i b l e f a i r means used i n l i m i t i n g r i g h t s . For example, i t seems to me t h a t i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to f l i p a c o i n to r e s o l v e a c o n f l i c t between A's s t u d y i n g and B's, mowing h i s lawn. Nor do we want to say t h a t , because A s t a r t e d to study b e f o r e B got ready to mow, B's r i g h t to 49. mow has been excluded from h i s s e t of a c t i o n r i g h t s . I suggest t h a t e i t h e r one's a c t i n g i n a c o n f l i c t such as t h i s w i l l not v i o l a t e the other's r i g h t because of the e x i s t e n c e of some ki n d of t a c i t understanding which allows c e r t a i n reasonable i n t e r f e r e n c e s i n r e t u r n f o r per-m i s s i o n to make comparable i n t e r f e r e n c e s . So, although A does i n t e r f e r e with B's s t u d y i n g by mowing the lawn, he does not v i o l a t e B's r i g h t to study, because the p e r m i s s i o n to mow one's lawn would be i n c l u d e d i n any reasonable agreement about a l l o w a b l e i n t e r f e r e n c e s . Only when some-one oversteps the extent of the t a c i t agreement, say by mowing h i s lawn a t 4:00 a.m., thereby p r e v e n t i n g others from s l e e p i n g , i s there a v i o l a t i o n o f r i g h t s . I n summary, i f one of the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s h o l d s , then someone's be i n g p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a c r e a t u r e ' s not having the o b j e c t of one o f h i s r i g h t s w i l l not c o n s t i -tute a v i o l a t i o n of t h a t c r e a t u r e ' s r i g h t s : 1. the i n t e r f e r e n c e i s unavoidable; 2. the s u b j e c t o f the i n t e r f e r e n c e does not d e s i r e the o b j e c t o f the r i g h t ; 3. the i n t e r f e r e n c e i s such t h a t i t would be covered by a t a c i t u n d erstanding about what c o n s t i t u t e s a c c e p t a b l e i n t e r f e r e n c e . When none o f these c o n d i t i o n s h o l d , p o s i t i v e i n s t r u -m e n t a l i t y i n someone's not having the o b j e c t of one of h i s r i g h t s w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n o f t h a t r i g h t . Except 5 0 . under the s p e c i a l circumstances to be considered i n the next s e c t i o n , such an a c t w i l l be m o r a l l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e . S e c t i o n 5 . P e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s of n a t u r a l r i g h t s I p l a n i n t h i s s e c t i o n , to show under what c o n d i t i o n s i t i s p e r m i s s i b l e to v i o l a t e someone's r i g h t to l i f e ; w e l l - b e i n g and autonomy. (In t h i s and subsequent s e c t i o n s whenever I use ' k i l l i n g ' I s h a l l mean 'being p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a c r e a t u r e ' s death'. And whenever I use ' l e t t i n g d i e ' , or 'not s a v i n g ' I s h a l l mean 'being n e g a t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n a c r e a t u r e ' s death'. These equivalences do not q u i t e f i t common usage, but i t s i m p l i f i e s the t e x t to use them. That they do not can be i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g pro-p o s i t i o n s taken from Bennett's, ' P o s i t i v e and Negative I n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ' (op_. c i t . ) : 1. A v e h i c l e stands, unbraked, on a s l o p e ; John pushes i t ; and i t r o l l s to i t s d e s t r u c t i o n . 2 . A v e h i c l e i s a l r e a d y t o l l i n g ; John k i c k s away a rock which would otherwise have stopped i t ; and i t r o l l s to i t s d e s t r u c t i o n . 3 . A v e h i c l e i s a l r e a d y r o l l i n g ; John c o u l d , but does not i n t e r p o s e a rock which would have stopped i t i f i t had been i n t e r p o s e d ; and i t r o l l s to i t s d e s t r u c t i o n . Given the e q u i v a l e n c e s s t a t e d above, we would have to say t h a t i n 1 and 2 , John destroyed the v e h i c l e , while i n 3 he l e t i t be d e s t r o y e d . For 1 and 3 t h i s f i t s our common 5 1 . usage. But, we would, not normally say t h a t i n 2 John destroyed the v e h i c l e , but r a t h e r that he l e t i t be des-troyed by removing the rock. However, I do not t h i n k t h i s i s cause f o r concern. I agree with Bennett's view t h a t ' l e t t i n g ' i s not a t h e o r e t i c a l l y tough enough n o t i o n to support any t h e o r i z i n g , while 'negative i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ' and 'positive i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ' are.) I f u t i l i t i e s promoted or d i s u t i l i t i e s prevented are la r g e enough, they w i l l o v e r r i d e a person's r i g h t and thus make a v i o l a t i o n o f t h a t r i g h t p e r m i s s i b l e . But there i s a problem i n det e r m i n i n g when l a r g e i s l a r g e enough. One of the important f a c t o r s t o be taken i n t o account i s what I c a l l the m o r a l i t y o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t . I t seems c l e a r t h a t i f promoting some good or p r e v e n t i n g some e v i l w i l l r e q u i r e a g r e a t d e a l o f p e r s o n a l s a c r i f i c e , then u n l e s s t h a t good or e v i l i s overwhelming, one i s not r e q u i r e d t o do the promoting or p r e v e n t i n g . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we do not a t present have a developed theory of the m o r a l i t y o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t , so we must r e l y on our i n t u i t i o n s as to when some d e s i r a b l e a c t w i l l r e q u i r e too much p e r s o n a l s a c -r i f i c e . I suggest t h a t i f , a f t e r having taken i n t o account c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f u t i l i t i e s or d i s u t i l i t i e s and c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s of s e l f - i n t e r e s t , i t turns out that a person would be m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d to give up h i s l i f e , w e l l - b e i n g , or p a r t or a l l o f h i s autonomy, then i t w i l l be p e r m i s s i b l e 5 2 . to f o r c e that person to make the r e l e v a n t s a c r i f i c e . The v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t to l i f e , h i s r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g , or r i g h t to autonomy, r e s p e c t i v e l y , would be m o r a l l y per-m i s s i b l e . Consider the f o l l o w i n g case. A madman has demanded t h a t I be k i l l e d , and has threatened to blow up Great B r i t a i n i f I am not. We a l l know that he w i l l do as he says, and that there i s no way of s t o p p i n g him. What am I r e q u i r e d to do i n such a case? I t seems to me t h a t i n such circumstances, where the d i s -u t i l i t i e s which would r e s u l t from my r e f u s i n g to s a c r i f i c e myself are so overwhelming, I would be m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d to s a c r i f i c e my l i f e . I n t h a t case, the d i s u t i l i t i e s are l a r g e enough to make k i l l i n g me a g a i n s t my w i l l , and thus v i o l a t i n g my r i g h t to l i f e , m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e . But l e t us a l s o c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g case. I d i s c o v e r that my death c o u l d save the l i v e s o f two people, A and B. S u r e l y I am not r e q u i r e d to s a c r i f i c e my l i f e i n t h i s c a s e — m e r e l y to save two people. The u t i l i t y o f doing so, i t seems to me, simply i s not s u f f i c i e n t to o v e r r i d e the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . And t h i s means that i f someone e l s e takes i t upon h i m s e l f to k i l l me i n order to save the l i v e s of A and B, he w i l l imper-m i s s i b l y v i o l a t e my r i g h t to l i f e . I f these claims are c o r r e c t , then we have the t o o l s f o r s o l v i n g some p u z z l i n g cases which are c u r r e n t i n the 53. l i t e r a t u r e on k i l l i n g and l e t t i n g d i e . Let us c o n s i d e r a case envisaged by J u d i t h J a r v i s Thomson i n ' K i l l i n g , L e t t i n g Die, and the T r o l l e y Problem'. 1 A d o c t o r has f i v e p a t i e n t s a l l of whom are .'dying of v a r i o u s a i l m e n t s . And he has one p a t i e n t who f o r v a r i o u s reasons would be a p e r f e c t donor o f the needed p a r t s . I f he k i l l s t h i s p a t i e n t and d i s t r i b u t e s h i s p a r t s to the other f i v e he w i l l save t h e i r l i v e s . Ought he to k i l l the one i n order to save the f i v e , or should be r e f r a i n from k i l l i n g the one and l e t the others d i e ? The answer to t h i s depends, i f the above p r i n c i p l e s are c o r r e c t , on whether or not the one would be m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d to s a c r i f i c e h i m s e l f to save the f i v e . I n t u i t i o n s here may w e l l v a r y, but p e r s o n a l l y I t h i n k i t would be q u i t e beyond moral requirements to make such a s a c r i f i c e . I f t h i s i s the case, then the d o c t o r ' s k i l l i n g the one to save the f i v e would be an i m p e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s o f the one's r i g h t to l i f e . The above does not commit me to the p o s i t i o n t h a t k i l l i n g i s worse than l e t t i n g d i e . I can s t i l l admit, and indeed do admit, t h a t i t i s as wrong t o f a i l t o save a c h i l d from drowning when one can e a s i l y do so as i t i s to g r a t u i t o u s l y k i l l a c h i l d . Of course, the reasons are d i f f e r e n t . The f i r s t i s wrong because i t i m p e r m i s s i b l y v i o l a t e s the c h i l d ' s r i g h t to l i f e , and the second, because i t breaks a moral r u l e generated by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f c h a r i t y . What the above examples show, and a l l that they 1 0 T h e Monist. 59 (1976), 204-217. 5 4 . show, i s t h a t i t i s im p e r m i s s i b l e to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u -mental i n another's death even to save o t h e r s , u n l e s s that person would be r e q u i r e d to s a c r i f i c e h i m s e l f . The next k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n to be con s i d e r e d i s one i n which a person has the choice between s a c r i f i c i n g h i m s e l f i n some way, or v i o l a t i n g another's r i g h t ( s ) . Consider the f o l l o w i n g case. Say A has been h u r l e d down a mine s h a f t by some v i l l a i n and w i l l k i l l B upon l a n d i n g , through no f a u l t of h i s own, who i s a t the bottom. We s h a l l assume t h a t A i s i n f u l l c r a s h gear so he w i l l not be k i l l e d by the f a l l . What we want to know i s : I s i t p e r m i s s i b l e f o r B to take h i s r a y gun and with i t d i s -i n t e g r a t e A, thus k i l l i n g him, i n order to save h i s own l i f e ? 1 1 Were A a non-innocent t h r e a t ( i . e . an aggressor) we would have no h e s i t a t i o n i n s a y i n g t h a t k i l l i n g him would be a l l r i g h t . P r e c i s e l y why i t i s a l l r i g h t i s a q u e s t i o n I take up i n the next s e c t i o n . But because the t h r e a t i s innocent, i t i s not so c l e a r what ought to be done. I should p o i n t out t h a t i f i t were p o s s i b l e f o r A and B to use some f a i r means o f r e s o l v i n g t h i s c o n f l i c t between t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s to l i f e , i t should be used. (See S e c t i o n T h i s example was i n s p i r e d by a s i m i l a r one envisaged by Nozick i n Anarchy. S t a t e and U t o p i a (New York, N.Y. : B a s i c Books, Inc., 1 9 7 4 ) when he c o n s i d e r s problems to do with innocent t h r e a t s . See pp. 3 4 f . 55. 3 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s . ) But, s i n c e there i s no oppor-t u n i t y to do so, we have to c o n s i d e r whether B i s r e q u i r e d to s a c r i f i c e h i s l i f e r a t h e r than k i l l A. Again, because I l a c k a theory o f the m o r a l i t y o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t , I have to r e l y on my i n t u i t i o n s . I t seems to me t h a t B i s not r e q u i r e d to s a c r i f i c e h i s l i f e i n order to a v o i d k i l l i n g A. Nor would A be r e q u i r e d to s a c r i f i c e h i m s e l f i n order to a v o i d k i l l i n g B, were he abl e to do so. But because one or the other has to d i e , e i t h e r one's k i l l i n g the other w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a p e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n of the other's r i g h t to l i f e . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r other s i t u a t i o n s . Say A, i n s t e a d o f being h u r l e d down the mineshaft, has been ordered to shoot B, where f a i l u r e to do so w i l l r e s u l t i n h i s own death. I see no way i n which t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s r e l e v a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the above, so we w i l l have to conclude t h a t i t i s p e r m i s s i b l e f o r A to shoot B. Of course, i n e i t h e r o f these s i t u a t i o n s , i f we make the number of people to be shot or crushed g r e a t enough, A w i l l indeed be r e q u i r e d to s a c r i f i c e h i s own l i f e , r a t h e r than k i l l those people. K i l l i n g them w i l l , i n those circumstances, c o n s t i t u t e an im p e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t s to l i f e . P a r a l l e l cases c o u l d be c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the r i g h t s to w e l l - b e i n g and autonomy, but I do not t h i n k there i s any p o i n t i n do i n g so. 5 6 . I would l i k e to c o n s i d e r how one's s p e c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s might be r e l e v a n t here. Say a t r o l l e y car d r i v e r has p r o -mised A t h a t he w i l l meet with no ca t a s t r o p h e s i f he goes f o r a walk a l o n g the r i g h t hand t r a c k . But when the d r i v e r a r r i v e s a t a j u n c t i o n , he f i n d s t h a t there are two p e o p l e — B and C — w a l k i n g on the l e f t hand t r a c k , and A on the r i g h t hand t r a c k . I f he turns l e f t he w i l l k i l l them, but i f he turns r i g h t he w i l l k i l l A. Normally, the d r i v e r should choose the l e s s e r o f the two e v i l s , but t h i s case i s a l t e r e d by the f a c t t h a t he has a s p e c i a l o b l i g a t i o n to A. I thin k t h i s might be a s u f f i c i e n t l y sitrong c o n s i d e r a t i o n to make h i s k i l l i n g A i m p e r m i s s i b l e , and thus h i s only other course of a c t i o n — k i l l i n g B and C — p e r m i s s i b l e . I expect though t h a t t h i s o b l i g a t i o n can be f a i r l y e a s i l y o v e r r i d d e n , so that i f the number of people on the l e f t t r a c k i s i n c r e a s e d somewhat, he w i l l be r e q u i r e d to break h i s promise and t u r n the t r o l l e y to the r i g h t . The v i o l a t i o n o f A's r i g h t to l i f e w i l l be p e r m i s s i b l e . A q u i t e d i f f e r e n t condition which w i l l render a v i o l a -t i o n p e r m i s s i b l e has to do with the consent o f the person whose r i g h t has been v i o l a t e d . We saw e a r l i e r , i n S e c t i o n 3, i n the d i s c u s s i o n o f the l i m i t s of r i g h t s , that p r i o r consent c o u l d exclude c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s from one of a c r e a t u r e ' s s e t of n a t u r a l r i g h t s . We are concerned here with subsequent consent. My b a s i c c l a i m i s that i f the s u b j e c t o f a v i o l a t i o n subsequently consents to the 57. i n t e r f e r e n c e then t h a t consent renders the v i o l a t i o n p e r -m i s s i b l e . Consider the f o l l o w i n g example. A i s p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n B's not b e i n g s e l f -d i r e c t i n g by p r e v e n t i n g him from committing s u i c i d e . Sub-sequentl y B e x p l i c i t l y consents to the i n t e r v e n t i o n by e x p r e s s i n g h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r A's a c t i o n . T h i s subse-quent consent makes the v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t p e r m i s s i b l e . So although i t was prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r A to i n t e r f e r e with B i n the way he d i d , t h i s prima f a c i e wrong-ness i s c a n c e l l e d by h i s subsequent consent. But there are c e r t a i n c o m p l i c a t i o n s . Consider a g a i n the s u i c i d e case, but suppose t h a t , i n s t e a d of A r e c e i v i n g e x p l i c i t consent, there i s b e h a v i o u r a l evidence i n d i c a t i n g that were he asked, B would consent to the i n t e r f e r e n c e , i . e . he i s disposed to consent. Consider a l s o a case where the o n l y reason f o r f a i l i n g to o b t a i n subsequent consent f o r one's i n t e r f e r e n c e i s t h a t the s u b j e c t f a i l s to o b t a i n a r e l e v a n t p i e c e of i n f o r m a t i o n , e.g. that the water i s poisonous, that t a k i n g the drug has h i g h l y danger-ous consequences, t h a t 99% of the people who swim here get eaten by a l l i g a t o r s , t h a t the s i g n s a i d 'Quicksand'. Given h i s other d i s p o s i t i o n s , b e l i e f s , i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t i e s , v a l u e s , and l i f e s t y l e , the r e c e i p t of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n would have l e d him to r e a s s e s s the r e l e v a n t s i t u a t i o n , and to consent to the i n t e r f e r e n c e . Death soon a f t e r the i n t e r v e n t i o n , or simply an odd s e t of circumstances, might 58. prevent the s u b j e c t ' s a c q u i r i n g t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . I should p o i n t out though, that the i n f o r m a t i o n must not be m i s l e a d i n g , . e l i c i t i n g consent when i t would not have been g i v e n were the s u b j e c t aware of i t s nature. These examples i n d i c a t e t h a t subsequent consent, or the d i s p o s i t i o n to consent e i t h e r upon r e q u e s t or upon the r e c e i p t of a non-misleading p i e c e of i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l render i n t e r f e r e n c e with something the s u b j e c t has a r i g h t to a p e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t . There are some c o n d i t i o n s , however, under which consent w i l l not be s u f f i c i e n t to make a v i o l a t i o n p e r m i s s i b l e . Here i s an example of the f i r s t k i n d of case. Someone i n f u l l p o s s e s s i o n of h i s reason and w i l l i s s u b j e c t e d a g a i n s t h i s expressed wishes to a process of brainwashing aimed a t changing a c e r t a i n s e t o f h i s b e l i e f s . As a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the brainwashing he comes to c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y a ccept a new s e t of b e l i e f s , and as a r e s u l t of a c c e p t i n g those b e l i e f s , consents to the brainwashing which brought them 12 about. C l e a r l y , any i n t e r f e r e n c e which i s c a u s a l l y s u f -f i c i e n t f o r e l i c i t i n g subsequent consent w i l l not be r e n -dered p e r m i s s i b l e by. t h a t consent. The cases which belong i n the second c l a s s i n which T h i s i s an a d a p t a t i o n of a case envisaged by John Rawls i n A Theory of J u s t i c e (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19.71), when he c o n s i d e r s the problem of p a t e r n a l i s m . See pp. 249f. 5 9 . subsequent consent w i l l not render a v i o l a t i o n p e r m i s s i b l e are those i n which the consent r e s u l t s from a d i s t o r t i o n i n the s u b j e c t ' s v a l u e s , b e l i e f s , or d e s i r e s . I n t e r f e r e n c e with c h i l d r e n i s the source o f most of these s o r t s o f cases because o f the f a c t t h a t the i n t e r f e r e n c e which a c h i l d comes to approve o f , w i l l depend i n p a r t on what b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s h i s parents attempted to i n s t i l , and on how s u c c e s s f u l they were i n doing so. I f they have been v e r y s u c c e s s f u l he might not d i s s e n t from c e r t a i n kinds o f treatment which have impaired h i s a b i l i t y to l e a d a f u l l and happy l i f e , or which were u n d e s i r a b l e f o r other reasons. He might, f o r i n s t a n c e , come to approve o f the p r e s s u r e s used to f o r c e him i n t o the mold of a narrow r e l i g i o u s s e c t which f o r b i d s the development of c e r t a i n a r t i s t i c or i n t e l -l e c t u a l s k i l l s , because he now accepts the te n e t s o f the r e l i g i o n , and has been t r a i n e d to be the ki n d o f person who does not value those t h i n g s . H i s b e l i e f s , d e s i r e s and pr e f e r e n c e s have been d i s t o r t e d by h i s u p b r i n g i n g and i t i s because o f t h i s t h a t he consents to h i s parent's i n t e r -f e r e n c e . Consent which r e s u l t s from such d i s t o r t i o n w i l l not make a v i o l a t i o n p e r m i s s i b l e . And f i n a l l y , consent does not make a v i o l a t i o n p e r -m i s s i b l e i f i t would have been w i t h h e l d or would be w i t h -drawn upon the r e c e i p t o f a r e l e v a n t , non-misleading i n f o r m a t i o n . In summary, a v i o l a t i o n of a c r e a t u r e ' s r i g h t to w e l l -60. being or autonomy w i l l be p e r m i s s i b l e i f the s u b j e c t sub-sequent l y consents or would subsequently consent upon request or upon the r e c e i p t o f r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , p r o-v i d i n g none o f the f o l l o w i n g holds 1 . the i n t e r f e r e n c e was c a u s a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f o r sub-sequent consent; 2. the consent i s the r e s u l t o f d i s t o r t i o n o f d e s i r e s , b e l i e f s , or v a l u e s ; 3. the consent i s the r e s u l t o f the absence o f r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s c o n d i t i o n i s very s i m i l a r to one which I o f f e r e d i n my paper ' J u s t i f y i n g P a t e r n a l i s m ' J as r e n d e r i n g a pa t -e r n a l i s t i c i n t e r f e r e n c e j u s t i f i e d . However, I saw the r e l a t i o n s h i p between consent and r i g h t s i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t way. I saw both p r i o r and subsequent consent as being c o n d i t i o n s under which a r i g h t was a l i e n a t e d . Or, p u t t i n g that c l a i m i n terms o f t h i s paper, I saw both p r i o r and subsequent consent as c o n d i t i o n s under which a c r e a t u r e could exclude a p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t or r i g h t s from one o f h i s s e t o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s . I t h i n k the way I have handled these c o n d i t i o n s i n t h i s t h e s i s i s to be p r e f e r r e d , w i t h p r i o r consent being a c o n d i t i o n which l i m i t s one's s e t of r i g h t s , while subsequent consent i s a c o n d i t i o n which r e n -ders a v i o l a t i o n p e r m i s s i b l e . I t seems to me to be a much The Canadian J o u r n a l of Ph i l o s o p h y . VII ( 1 9 7 7 ) , I 3 7 f . 6 1 . more p l a u s i b l e p o s i t i o n to h o l d t h a t by i n t e r f e r i n g with the o b j e c t of someone's r i g h t t h at one does indeed v i o l a t e that r i g h t , but t h a t the v i o l a t i o n can be rendered per-m i s s i b l e by subsequent consent from the s u b j e c t o f the i n t e r f e r e n c e . In summary the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s w i l l make the v i o l a t i o n of a r i g h t p e r m i s s i b l e : 1. when the u t i l i t i e s gained or the d i s u t i l i t i e s prevented are s u f f i c i e n t l y g r e a t ; 2. when a v o i d i n g the v i o l a t i o n would r e q u i r e one to make too g r e a t a p e r s o n a l s a c r i f i c e ; 3 . when one's o b l i g a t i o n s o v e r r i d e the v i o l a t e d r i g h t ; k. when the r i g h t - h o l d e r g i v e s h i s subsequent con-sent f o r the v i o l a t i o n . S e c t i o n 6. Some s p e c i a l problems a.) G u i l t y t h r e a t s A g u i l t y t h r e a t i s one who aggresses a g a i n s t another i n such a way as to v i o l a t e one or more of h i s r i g h t s . A l o o t e r v i o l a t e s h i s v i c t i m ' s r i g h t to the use o f h i s p r o p e r t y , and i f the l o o t i n g i s thorough enough, probably v i o l a t e s h i s r i g h t not to be harmed, as w e l l ; a kidnapper v i o l a t e s h i s hostage's r i g h t to freedom and u s u a l l y t h r e a -tens h i s l i f e and w e l l - b e i n g ; t o r t u r e r s v i o l a t e t h e i r v i c -tims' r i g h t t o freedom from harm. Obv i o u s l y none o f these g u i l t y t h r e a t s have a r i g h t to do what they are doing. 62. T h e i r s e t o f r i g h t s to autonomy i s l i m i t e d "by t h e i r v i c t i m ' s r i g h t s , so as to exclude the r i g h t to do those t h i n g s . T h e r e f o r e , p r e v e n t i n g them from d o i n g what they are d o i n g w i l l not v i o l a t e any of t h e i r autonomy r i g h t s . But what i f we k i l l a kidnapper or t o r t u r e r i n order to f r e e h i s v i c t i m ; or shoot l o o t e r s on s i g h t ? Presumably, i n many circumstances, such a c t i o n s are m o r a l l y permis-s i b l e . What I need to show, then, i s how my theory o f n a t u r a l r i g h t s a l l o w s f o r them. There are two p o s s i b l e ways. F i r s t , such a c t s c o u l d c o n s t i t u t e p e r m i s s i b l e v i o -l a t i o n s of the g u i l t y t h r e a t ' s r i g h t to l i f e on the grounds of the overwhelming u t i l i t i e s o f t a k i n g such measures. Even i f sh o r t - t e r m u t i l i t i e s would not be s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y the v i o l a t i o n , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t the u t i l i t i e s taken over the l o n g run would o f t e n be q u i t e s u f f i c i e n t to c o u n t e r a c t the wrong of v i o l a t i n g the t h r e a t ' s r i g h t to l i f e . For example, i n some circumstances, i f l o o t e r s were not shot on s i g h t there would be i n s u f f i c i e n t d e t e r -rence to prevent mass l o o t i n g . The c o s t to others i n l o s t p r o p e r t y , d e s t r o y e d b u s i n e s s , and the emotional s t r a i n o f being bankrupt would add up to s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e d i s -u t i l i t i e s to j u s t i f y the k i l l i n g . T h i s doesn't mean, o f course, t h a t k i l l i n g such people w i l l always be j u s t i f i e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f u t i l i t y ; sometimes they w i l l be i n s u f f i c i e n t . And when they a r e , v i o l a t i n g t h e i r r i g h t s 63. to l i f e w i l l be i m p e r m i s s i b l e . There i s another way of e x p l a i n i n g how k i l l i n g a l o o t e r , t o r t u r e r or kidnapper c o u l d be p e r m i s s i b l e . I t might be t h a t by t a k i n g up the stance of a g u i l t y t h r e a t , one's r i g h t s to l i f e a t t h a t time are excluded from one's s e t of r i g h t s to l i f e ; t h a t i s , t h a t b e i n g a g u i l t y t h r e a t i s another l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n on the g e n e r a l r i g h t to l i f e and r i g h t to freedom from harm. And i f t h a t i s the case, then k i l l i n g the l o o t e r , kidnapper or t o r t u r e r w i l l not v i o l a t e t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s to l i f e . T h i s , perhaps, more c l o s e l y f i t s our i n t u i t i o n s on the m a t t e r — t h a t we do not r e a l l y have to worry about whether k i l l i n g a g u i l t y t h r e a t i s a p e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t to l i f e because he does not have a p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t to l i f e a t such times. Of course, before he i s a t h r e a t and a f t e r he ceases to be a t h r e a t , k i l l i n g him would indeed v i o l a t e one of h i s p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to l i f e . And that, s u r e l y , i s how i t should be. I t i s because t h i s i s true t h a t i t would not be p e r m i s s i b l e , a f t e r c a p t u r i n g a kidnapper, to hand him over to a v i g i l a n t e group f o r d i s p o s a l . But, i f a l o o t e r does not a t the time of l o o t i n g , have a p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t to l i f e , why i s i t m o r a l l y wrong, as I t h i n k i t i s , to k i l l a l o o t e r when i s s u i n g a warning would be s u f f i c i e n t to stop him? I t h i n k the s o l u t i o n to t h i s and many s i m i l a r problems w i l l be found by l o o k i n g to one of the other areas of m o r a l i t y — u t i l i t y i n the case 64. a t hand. I t i s because the net u t i l i t i e s o f simply i s s u -i n g a warning would f a r exceed the u t i l i t i e s of k i l l i n g , t h a t i t would be wrong to k i l l . But t h i s s o l u t i o n w i l l not handle a l l the problems. Consider the f o l l o w i n g case. A c h i l d , A, i s t h r e a t e n i n g to s l a p another c h i l d , B. An a d u l t see t h i s , but i s unable to reach the c h i l d r e n i n time to prevent the a s s a u l t . However, he does have a gun with which he c o u l d shoot A. Now, I t h i n k i t i s not only because s h o o t i n g A would be counter t o u t i l i t a r i a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t i t would be m o r a l l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e , but a l s o because i t would wrong A,, i . e . i t would v i o l a t e h i s r i g h t to l i f e . But how can t h a t be? I suggest t h a t the l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n i s r e a l l y a much more complex one t h a t I suggested above. I t i s not j u s t b e i n g a g u i l t y t h r e a t which l i m i t s the r i g h t s to l i f e and freedom from harm, but r a t h e r being a g u i l t y t h r e a t where the t h r e a t i s of a c e r t a i n s e r i o u s nature. The l i m i t s on the r i g h t s w i l l be i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n to the s e r i o u s n e s s o f the threatened a c t . I do not propose to develop these p r o p o s a l s any f u r t h e r . I merely wanted to i n d i c a t e here how my theory o f r i g h t s c o u l d a l l o w f o r v a r i o u s measures being taken a g a i n s t g u i l t y t h r e a t s , which i t seems we must a l l o w f o r . I have i n d i c a t e d two ways i n which t h i s c o u l d be done. 65. b) Punishment S i m i l a r l y , i f my theory i s to have any i n i t i a l p l a u -s i b i l i t y , i t must be p o s s i b l e to r e c o n c i l e i t with a t l e a s t some forms o f punishment. I t h i n k the o n l y r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y f o r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , and one which f i t s our i n t u i t i o n s f a i r l y c l o s e l y , i s t h a t by h a v ing committed a crime a g a i n s t some-one's l i f e , w e l l - b e i n g or autonomy, the o f f e n d e r has l i m i t e d h i s n a t u r a l r i g h t s so that c e r t a i n forms o f punishment w i l l not v i o l a t e any o f them. T h i s w i l l be a t h e o r e t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n to develop because of the d i f f i c u l t y i n d e t e r m i n i n g to what extend the o f f e n d e r ' s r i g h t s are l i m i t e d . Presumably t h i s w i l l be r e l a t e d to the s e r i o u s -ness of h i s crime, j u s t as above the measures p e r m i s s i b l y taken a g a i n s t g u i l t y t h r e a t s were r e l a t e d to the s e r i o u s -ness o f the t h r e a t . The i d e a i s t h a t minor crimes, say an i s o l a t e d case of s t e a l i n g something o f r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e v a l u e , w i l l r e s u l t i n r e l a t i v e l y few p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s being excluded from the o f f e n d e r ' s s e t s o f r i g h t s . No p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to l i f e w i l l be excluded from the r e l e -vant s e t ; and no p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to freedom from harm w i l l be excluded from t h e i r r e l e v a n t s e t . But some of h i s p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to autonomy w i l l be excluded from h i s s e t o f r i g h t s to autonomy. S e r i o u s crimes, on the other hand, such as those a g a i n s t l i f e , w i l l r e s u l t i n the e x c l u -s i o n of a g r e a t number of p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s from t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s e t s . I should p o i n t out though that even 66. murderers and p r a c t i s i n g s a d i s t s r e t a i n some o f t h e i r r i g h t s . For example, n o t h i n g they do w i l l l i m i t t h e i r r i g h t s so as to exclude the r i g h t not to be t o r t u r e d . So even when many other forms of punishment are p e r m i s s i b l e , t o r t u r e w i l l never be. As I do not wish to attempt a theory o f punishment here, I s h a l l not pursue t h i s matter any f u r t h e r . c) R e d i s t r i b u t i o n Concern i s f r e q u e n t l y expressed about whether a theory of n a t u r a l r i g h t s w i l l permit the r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o -p e r t y . I s h a l l show t h a t f e a r s t h a t i t w i l l not be per-m i s s i b l e are unfounded. F i r s t , I should remind the reader t h a t the r i g h t to pr o p e r t y i s simply a subset o f the r i g h t s c o n t a i n e d i n the se t o f autonomy r i g h t s . T h i s sub-set w i l l c o n t a i n p a r t i -c u l a r r i g h t s of the form: A has a r i g h t to use and dispose of a r t i c l e a a t time t a g a i n s t b. The r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f A's p r o p e r t y w i l l be p e r m i s s i b l e i f e i t h e r one o f the f o l l o w i n g h o l d s : (1) there i s i n o p e r a t i o n some c o n d i t i o n which excludes some p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s from A's more g e n e r a l r i g h t to p r o p e r t y ; (2) the u t i l i t y o f r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e to o v e r r i d e some o f those p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s . Regarding (1): We saw i n the d i s c u s s i o n on the l i m i -t a t i o n s on r i g h t s t h a t when there was c o m p e t i t i o n between two people to do some p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g , t h i s had to be 6 7 . r e s o l v e d by some f a i r means. There i s always a t l e a s t c o v e r t c o m p e t i t i o n f o r the use of p r o p e r t y . The r e s o l u t i o n of the c o n f l i c t s should probably u s u a l l y be made on such grounds as who made i t , who p a i d f o r i t , who earned i t , who worked f o r i t , who i t was g i v e n t o, e t c . But such p r i n c i p l e s f o r r e s o l v i n g a co m p e t i t i o n are not ex h a u s t i v e . In some circumstances, say when the owner o f some p r o p e r t y has i n excess o f what he needs, i t might be t h a t the f a i r way to decide who ought to get to use t h a t p r o p e r t y i s on the b a s i s of who needs i t most. The owner w i l l thus l o s e the c o m p e t i t i o n f o r the goods. H i s r i g h t to them w i l l thereby be excluded from h i s sub-set o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s , and thus f o r c i b l e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l not v i o l a t e h i s r i g h t to p r o p e r t y . Regarding ( 2 ) : We saw i n the d i s c u s s i o n o f permis-s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s t h a t i f the u t i l i t i e s gained or d i s u t i l i -t i e s prevented were s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e then the v i o l a t i o n of a r i g h t c o u l d be rendered p e r m i s s i b l e . T h i s p r i n c i p l e i s a p p l i c a b l e here. I f the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a c e r t a i n amount of p r o p e r t y w i l l r e s u l t i n very l a r g e u t i l i t i e s , then i t w i l l be m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e to v i o l a t e the r e l e v a n t p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t s to p r o p e r t y i n order to b r i n g about those u t i l i t i e s . I conclude, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t my theory of n a t u r a l r i g h t s does not pr e c l u d e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f p e r m i s s i b l y r e d i s t r i -b u t i n g p r o p e r t y . 6 8 . P a r t I I . S p e c i a l R i g h t s In t h i s p a r t of the t h e s i s I o f f e r an a n a l y s i s of what I c a l l s p e c i a l r i g h t s . The concept of o b l i g a t i o n i s used i n a v e r y c e n t r a l way i n the a n a l y s i s , and i t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t I devote the f o l l o w i n g s e v e r a l s e c t i o n s to i t s a n a l y s i s . S e c t i o n 1 . D u t i e s , O b l i g a t i o n s , and Ought a) The case f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ' d u t i e s ' , ' o b l i g a t i o n s ' , and 'ought' Although i t has been common i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i t -e r a t u r e to assume t h a t the three statements: 'A has an o b l i g a t i o n to do X', 'A has a duty to do X', and 'A ought to do X' a l l mean the same t h i n g , there have been s e v e r a l r e l a t i v e l y r e c e n t a r t i c l e s which c h a l l e n g e the l e g i t i m a c y of one or more o f these assumed e q u i v a l e n c e s . I have found the evidence i n favour of the view t h a t the three p r o p o s i t i o n s do d i f f e r i n meaning q u i t e c o m p e l l i n g . Before p r e s e n t i n g what I b e l i e v e to be the c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s of those statements, I should l i k e to p r e s e n t some o f the evidence which makes t h i s view a p l a u s i b l e one. In doing 14 See H a rry Beran, 'Ought, O b l i g a t i o n and Duty', A u s t r a l a s i a n J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h y . 5 0 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 2 0 7 - 2 2 1 ; R. B. Brandt, 'The Concepts of O b l i g a t i o n and Duty', Mind, 7 3 ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 3 7 4 - 3 9 3 ; H.L.A. Hart, 'Legal and Moral O b l i g a t i o n ' i n Essays i n Moral P h i l o s o p h y , ed. A . I . Melden ( S e a t t l e : U n i v e r s i t y of Washington P r e s s , 1 9 5 8 , pp. 8 2 - 1 0 7 ; F . J . Lemmon, 'Moral Dilemmas', The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, LXXXI ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 3 9 - 1 5 8 ; R o l f S a r t o r i u s , ' U t i l i t a r i a n i s m and O b l i -g a t i o n ' , The J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h y . LXVI ( I 9 6 9 ) , 6 7 - 8 1 ; 69. so I r e l y h e a v i l y on Beran. I m a i n t a i n three theses: 1. t h a t 'A ought to do X' and 'A has an o b l i g a t i o n to do X' are not e q u i v a l e n t i n meaning; 2. t h a t 'A ought to do X* and 'A has a duty to do X' are not e q u i v a l e n t i n meaning; and 3- that 'A has an o b l i g a t i o n to do X' i s not e q u i v a l e n t i n meaning to 'A has a duty to do X'. P a r t o f the evidence f o r the f i r s t of these theses c o n s i s t s of the f a c t t h a t we f r e q u e n t l y get a change i n t r u t h value when we s u b s t i t u t e ' o b l i g a t i o n ' f o r 'ought' i n an ought-statement, or 'ought* f o r ' o b l i g a t i o n ' i n an o b l i g a t i o n - s t a t e m e n t . As an example of the f i r s t c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g . Say I have an o b l i g a t i o n to someone to pay him $ 5 . T h i s might be true on the grounds that I borrowed $5 from him. Nonetheless, i t might be f a l s e , t h a t I ought to pay him the $5 because of the e x i s t e n c e o f o v e r r i d i n g moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , e.g. th a t my baby w i l l d i e u n l e s s I spend t h a t money on some medicine f o r i t . Here are some examples o f t r u t h value change where ' o b l i g a t i o n ' i s s u b s t i t u t e d f o r 'ought' i n ah ought-statement: 1. I t might w e l l be true on t e c h n i c a l grounds t h a t an a r t i s t ought to c o l o u r a c e r t a i n area i n h i s p a i n t i n g H. Whiteley, 'On D u t i e s ' , Proceedings o f the A r i st.nt.Ai i an S o c i e t y . L I U ( 1 9 5 2 - 5 3 ) , 9 5 - 1 0 4 . 70. blue. But he won't on those grounds have an o b l i g a t i o n to c o l o u r t h a t a r e a b l u e . So i n t e c h n i c a l ought-statements, ' o b l i g a t i o n ' cannot be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r 'ought'. 2. I t i s true on p r u d e n t i a l grounds that I ought to brush my t e e t h , but I do not, on those grounds, have an o b l i g a t i o n to do so. ' O b l i g a t i o n ' cannot be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r 'ought' i n p r u d e n t i a l ought-statements. 3. Say I have a t i c k e t to an opera which I cannot use, and I know a music student who would b e n e f i t g r e a t l y from s e e i n g the opera, but who cannot a f f o r d a t i c k e t . P l a u s i b l y I ought to gi v e her my t i c k e t , but I don't have an o b l i g a t i o n to do so. T h i s p r o v i d e s evidence t h a t a t l e a s t f o r some moral ought-statements, ' o b l i g a t i o n ' cannot be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r 'ought'. Furthermore, the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s among o b l i g a t i o n -statements are d i f f e r e n t from those among ought-statements. Consider, on the one hand, the statements 'A has an o b l i -g a t i o n to do X* and 'A has an o b l i g a t i o n not (to do X'. These statements can both be t r u e . For example, a man might have an o b l i g a t i o n to h i s wife to t e l l her what work he does, but he might a l s o have an o b l i g a t i o n to h i s employer (the S e c r e t S e r v i c e ) not to t e l l h i s wife what work he does (espionage). On the other hand, the statements 'A ought to do X' and 'A ought not to do X' are e i t h e r c o n t r a r i e s or c o n t r a d i c t o r i e s . F i n a l l y , with r e s p e c t to o b l i g a t i o n statements, i t i s 7 1 . always a p p r o p r i a t e to ask, to whom does the o b l i g e d have the o b l i g a t i o n . But no such q u e s t i o n i s a p p r o p r i a t e when 1 *5 the statement i s an ought-judgment. J Much of the above evidence can be adapted t o support the second t h e s i s — t h a t 'duty' and 'ought' statements are • not e q u i v a l e n t i n meaning. I t might be my duty to g i v e a l e c t u r e a t 3 p.m., but there might be o v e r r i d i n g moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s such t h a t I ought not to g i v e t h a t l e c t u r e . And i t might be the case t h a t as a policeman, i t i s my duty to a r r e s t my son f o r smoking marijuana, but i t might be my duty as a parent to p r o t e c t him from g e t t i n g a c r i m i n a l r e c o r d . Although i t may w e l l be the case t h a t one ought to t r y to be happy, i t would be a t l e a s t p e c u l i a r t o say th a t one has a duty to t r y to be happy. And f i n a l l y , i t might be the case t h a t I ought to g i v e the student the t i c k e t to the opera, but s u r e l y I don't have a duty to g i v e her the t i c k e t . And i n support of the t h i r d t h e s i s , c o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s : One does or performs one's d u t i e s while one meets or d i s c h a r g e s one's o b l i g a t i o n s ; one i s under an o b l i g a t i o n but not under a duty; one can be on and o f f duty but n e i t h e r on nor o f f o b l i g a t i o n . Firms a d v e r t i z e jobs i n terms o f d u t i e s , n ot These p o i n t s are ones which Beran makes i n h i s a r t i c l e , 'Ought, O b l i g a t i o n s and Duty', pp. c i t . 207-209. I owe much to h i s i n s i g h t s . 7 2 . o b l i g a t i o n s , and urge customers to i n s p e c t t h e i r wares without o b l i g a t i o n , not without duty. One can speak o f something being one's duty as_ a f a t h e r or chairman or c i t i z e n , i . e . d u t i e s seem to be t i e d to r o l e s i n a way o b l i g a t i o n s are not. One might attempt to e x p l a i n away some of t h i s e v i -dence i n support o f the three theses, on the grounds t h a t there are two d i f f e r e n t senses of 'ought*, the moral and the p r u d e n t i a l ; and one might t r y to e x p l a i n away the r e s t by a p p e a l i n g to a d i s t i n c t i o n between prima f a c i e and a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s and d u t i e s . But Beran (see pp. 2 1 0 -216) has shown t h a t there are d e c i d e d disadvantages i n doing so. We s h a l l see that once we have a r r i v e d a t ade-quate a n a l y s e s o f 'duty', ' o b l i g a t i o n ' and 'ought' we w i l l be a b l e to e x p l a i n , r a t h e r than e x p l a i n away, the f a c t s of usage presented above. b) P r e v i o u s attempts a t a n a l y s i s Beran has o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s o f ought-statements: 'A ought to do X' means 'There are c o n c l u s i v e reasons f o r A's d o i n g X'. Although I'm not sure whether one must have c o n c l u s i v e reasons f o r doing X, r a t h e r than simply have the balance o f reasons i n favour o f doing X, i n order f o r i t to be the case t h a t one ought to do X, i t does seem c l e a r t h a t , whatever the p a r t i c u l a r s a r e , the a n a l y s i s o f ought-statements w i l l be i n terms of the reasons one has f o r a c t i n g . T h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t to d i s t i n g u i s h ought-statements from duty and o b l i g a t i o n - s t a t e m e n t s l 6 B e r a n , 2 0 9 f . 73. and so i s adequate f o r my p r e s e n t purposes. However, I do need a f u l l and a c c u r a t e a n a l y s i s o f 'duty' and o f ' o b l i g a t i o n ' , and the attempts to p r o v i d e us with these have not been e n t i r e l y s u c c e s s f u l . I s h a l l c o n s i d e r two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e examples o f such attempts. Beran suggests t h a t ' O b l i g a t i o n s have t h e i r l o g i c a l b a s i s i n c e r t a i n t h i n g s t h a t people may do by way of 17 commitment.' But we are not r e a l l y sure what t h i n g s do commit us. And furthermore, a c e r t a i n important c l a s s of o b l i g a t i o n s has been l e f t o u t — t h o s e which a r i s e from i n j u r i n g another, i . e . o b l i g a t i o n s of r e p a r a t i o n . Brandt has been somewhat more s u c c e s s f u l i n p r o v i d i n g t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r o b l i g a t i o n statements, although he does not see the c o n d i t i o n s he o f f e r s i n t h i s way, but r a t h e r as c o n d i t i o n s common to what he c a l l s the ' p a r a d i g -matic use' of ' o b l i g a t i o n ' . (A use i s 'paradigmatic' i n the sense i n which Brandt uses that term i f (a) i t would be an e s p e c i a l l y n a t u r a l use of the term; and (b) i f the term has come to suggest c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of the s i t u a t i o n 1 8 i n which i t i s used.) They are as f o l l o w s : (a) A r o u g h l y s p e c i f i a b l e s e r v i c e i s ' r e q u i r e d ' o f one person. 17 'Beran, 216. 18 For d e t a i l s , see R.B. Brandt, op_. c i t . , 384-389. 74 . (b) Two p a r t i e s are i n v o l v e d : the one who i s r e q u i r e d to perform a s e r v i c e , and the one f o r whom, or a t the b i d d i n g o f whom, the s e r v i c e i s to be performed. (c) A p r i o r t r a n s a c t i o n , the promise or benefac-t i o n , i s the cause of the r e l a t i o n s h i p . * 9 Taking these c o n d i t i o n s as t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s f o r o b l i g a t i o n - s t a t e m e n t s , they leave us with a number of pu z z l e s . We don't know, f o r example, what counts as a t r a n s a c t i o n , nor whether a l l kinds of t r a n s a c t i o n s w i l l give r i s e to o b l i g a t i o n s , nor whether t r a n s a c t i o n s which are i n v o l u n t a r y or a c c i d e n t a l w i l l do so. Because these pu z z l e s are not r e s o l v e d by the a n a l y s i s o f f e r e d , I do not f i n d i t s a t i s f a c t o r y , and so propose to attempt an a n a l y s i s o f my own, which I p r e s e n t i n S e c t i o n 4 ( a ) . As f a r as ' d u t i e s ' are concerned, Beran has suggested that *A person's d u t i e s are determined by the r o l e s he 20 has.' Before we can assess t h i s statement we need to analyze the concept o f ' r o l e ' . When we do so we s h a l l see t h a t i t i s not r o l e s , but r a t h e r jobs and p o s i t i o n s which g i v e r i s e to d u t i e s . In a d d i t i o n , i t seems to me tha t i t i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to s t a t e simply t h a t a person's d u t i e s are determined by the r o l e s he has without s p e c i f y -i n g how they are determined. As he d i d f o r o b l i g a t i o n s , Brandt o f f e r s the c o n d i t i o n s Brandt, 387 . Beran, 216. 75. f o r the paradigmatic uses of 'duty': (a) An i n d i v i d u a l occupies an o f f i c e or s t a t i o n i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n or some k i n d o f system. (b) A c e r t a i n job i s deemed of some value f o r the wel f a r e o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . (c) T h i s job i s a s s o c i a t e d , somehow or other, with the o f f i c e , occupied by the i n d i v i d u a l . (d) Performance i s expected and ' r e q u i r e d ' of him. As we d i d with the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the 'paradigmatic uses o f ' o b l i g a t i o n ' ' l e t us c o n s i d e r the m e r i t o f these as t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r duty-statements. I t seems to me t h a t , as they stand, they are both too complex and too vague. Once we have adequate a n a l y s e s o f 'jobs' and • p o s i t i o n s ' , we s h a l l f i n d t h a t we can do much b e t t e r . Other attempts to analyze 'duty' and ' o b l i g a t i o n * have been no more s u c c e s s f u l than these two examples. So the task o f p r o v i d i n g adequate a n a l y s e s l i e s before us. The route I take i s through the l o g i c a l l y more b a s i c con-cept o f 'being o b l i g e d ' . S e c t i o n 2. Obligedness Consider the f o l l o w i n g statements: 1. A was o b l i g e d by the change i n wind d i r e c t i o n to tack s e v e r a l times. 2. A was o b l i g e d by having promised to do X, to do X. 3 . A was o b l i g e d by l a n d i n g on the ' g o - t o - j a i l ' square, to miss three t u r n s . Brandt, 3 8 8 . 7 6 . 4. A was o b l i g e d by the s t r e n g t h o f the wind to r e e f h i s m a i n s a i l . 5. A was o b l i g e d by the a i r l i n e ' s r e g u l a t i o n s t o take the t r a i n to Vancouver. In each of these A i s o b l i g e d by_ s o m e t h i n g — e i t h e r an event, circumstance, or r e g u l a t i o n . A l a n White contends that t h i s i s an e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f being o b l i g e d — t h a t one i s always o b l i g e d by_ something—and I concur w i t h t h i s 22 judgment. I s h a l l f o l l o w White, and use the l a b e l • o b l i g i n g f a c t o r * f o r whatever does the o b l i g i n g . What s o r t s o f th i n g s can be o b l i g i n g f a c t o r s ? I think t h a t , s t r i c t l y speaking, o n l y events and circumstances (which w i l l i n c l u d e r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s ) can be o b l i g i n g f a c t o r s . T h i s means th a t i t w i l l never be c o r r e c t , except as an e l l i p s i s , to say, 'I was o b l i g e d by the Chairman to atten d the meeting*, or 'I was o b l i g e d by the gunman to give up my w a l l e t * . But r a t h e r , one must s p e c i f y what the Chairman or gunman d i d which o b l i g e d one. So, 'I was o b l i g e d by the Chairman's r e q u e s t i n g my attendance, to att e n d the meeting' and 'I was o b l i g e d by the gunman's t h r e a t e n i n g me, to g i v e up my w a l l e t ' . (White's p o s i t i o n on t h i s matter i s a l i t t l e u n c l e a r . On the one hand he says: * . . . i f I am o b l i g e d by the V i c e -Modal T h i n k i n g . (Oxford: B a s i l B l a c k w e l l , 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 124f. 77. C h a n c e l l o r , a u n i v e r s i t y r e g u l a t i o n or the i l l n e s s of a c o l l e a g u e , to a t t e n d a meeting, the V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r , a u n i v e r s i t y r e g u l a t i o n or the i l l n e s s o f a c o l l e a g u e , o b l i g e d me to a t t e n d a m e e t i n g . ' 2 ^ (My emphasis.) But he a l s o says, 'Whether I am o b l i g e d to someone f o r what he has done or o b l i g e d by him by what he has done..., I 24 am o b l i g e d by h i s doing of something.' (My emphasis.) I t h i n k , on the b a s i s of the l a t t e r statement, t h a t White would agree t h a t were he b e i n g c a r e f u l and n o n - e l l i p t i c a l , he would have i d e n t i f i e d the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r i n the f i r s t quote as being something the V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r d i d , such as r e q u e s t i n g the attendance.) What an o b l i g i n g f a c t o r does i s to c l o s e o f f v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e ways o f a c t i n g . But i t can do t h i s o n l y i n the presence o f what I s h a l l c a l l 'background c o n d i t i o n s ' . For example, i n (1) above, A c o u l d o n l y be o b l i g e d by the change i n wind d i r e c t i o n to tack, i f he has some g o a l which he cannot, i n the presence of the change i n wind d i r e c t i o n , r e a l i z e without t a c k i n g . In ( 2 ) , A c o u l d be o b l i g e d by having promised to do X, to do X, only i f there i s a r u l e which r e q u i r e s t h a t promises be kept. And A i n (3) c o u l d be o b l i g e d by having landed on the ' g o - t o - j a i l ' square to miss three t u r n s o n l y i f he i s p l a y i n g a game i n which one of the r u l e s says t h a t t h i s i s what he must do i n the White, p. 124. White, p. 125. 78. circumstances. I f the s a i l o r has no g o a l , he cannot he o b l i g e d by the change i n wind d i r e c t i o n to do a n y t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r , and u n l e s s one i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e r e g a r d -i n g l a n d i n g on the ' g o - t o - j a i l * square, one cannot be o b l i g e d by doing so, to do a n y t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r . These obs e r v a t i o n s suggest the f o l l o w i n g t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r a statement of o b l i g e d n e s s : 'a i s o b l i g e d by event e, or circumstance c to do o' (where o c o u l d be a d i s j u n c t i o n ) i f and o n l y i f i . a has g o a l g, or i s s u b j e c t to r u l e r? i i . because e or c o b t a i n s , u n l e s s a does o he w i l l f a i l to r e a l i z e h i s g o a l , g, or a c t i n accordance with r u l e r . The background c o n d i t i o n i s e i t h e r the g o a l or the r u l e . And the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r i s e i t h e r e or c. These are a c t u a l l y the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r prima f a c i e o b l i g e d n e s s , and thus they are to be understood as being s u b j e c t to 'In the absence of o v e r r i d i n g c o n s i -d e r a t i o n s * . T h i s p r o v i s o w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r when I d i s t i n g u i s h o v e r r i d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s from the e x c e p t i n g c o n d i t i o n s found i n the r u l e . I f the background c o n d i t i o n i s a g o a l , I s h a l l c a l l the n e c e s s i t y i n v o l v e d 'instrumental'.. The f o l l o w i n g examples, wi t h t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s should p r o v i d e ample i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s k i n d o f o b l i g e d n e s s . 1. A i s o b l i g e d by the wind's changing d i r e c t i o n to tack. 79. i . A has the g o a l , g e t t i n g to p o r t ; i i . because the wind changed to the SE, unlesss A tacks he w i l l f a i l to r e a l i z e h i s g o a l . 2. A i s o b l i g e d by the wind's being too s t r o n g to r e e f h i s m a i n s a i l . i . A's g o a l i s to a v o i d c a p s i z i n g ; i i . because the wind i s too s t r o n g , u n l e s s A r e e f s h i s m a i n s a i l he w i l l c a p s i z e . 3. A i s o b l i g e d by the a i r l i n e r e g u l a t i o n s to take the t r a i n to Vancouver. i . A's g o a l i s to take h i s dog to Vancouver; i i . because there i s a r e g u l a t i o n f o r b i d d i n g dogs on planes, Unless A takes the t r a i n to Vancouver, he w i l l be unable to take h i s dog to Vancouver. 4. A i s o b l i g e d by h i s f a t h e r ' s r u l e s to go to bed a t 10:00 p.m. i . A's g o a l i s to avoid punishment; i i . because h i s f a t h e r has a r u l e r e q u i r i n g t h a t A go to bed a t 10:00 p.m., u n l e s s he goes to bed a t 10:00 p.m., he w i l l be punished. 5. A i s o b l i g e d by h i s f a t h e r ' s r u l e s to bed a t 10:00 p.m. i . A's g o a l i s to obey h i s f a t h e r ' s r u l e s ; i i . because h i s f a t h e r has a r u l e r e q u i r i n g t h a t A go to bed a t 10:00, u n l e s s A goes to bed a t 10:00, he w i l l 80. disobey one o f h i s f a t h e r ' s r u l e s . I should l i k e to emphasize t h a t i t i s the background c o n d i t i o n , and not the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r , which determines what k i n d o f obl i g e d n e s s i s i n v o l v e d . Note that both r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s can be o b l i g i n g f a c t o r s f o r i n s t r u -mental o b l i g e d n e s s . Rules can be d i v i d e d i n t o c a t e g o r i e s i n v a r i o u s ways, depending on one's concerns. For my pr e s e n t purposes, i t i s most u s e f u l to d i v i d e them i n t o two c a t e g o r i e s , with game r u l e s a p p e a r i n g i n one and a l l other kinds o f r u l e s , which I s h a l l c a l l normative r u l e s , appearing i n the other. The important d i f f e r e n c e between these two c a t e g o r i e s i s that one can choose not to be s u b j e c t to a game r u l e by choosing not to p l a y the game, while one cannot (or a t l e a s t cannot so e a s i l y ) choose not to be s u b j e c t to other kinds o f r u l e s (e.g. s o c i a l r u l e s , moral r u l e s , l e g a l r u l e s ) . I f the background c o n d i t i o n f o r a statement o f o b l i g e d -ness i s a game r u l e I s h a l l c a l l the n e c e s s i t y i n v o l v e d game-generated. By the g e n e r a l form of the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r o b l i g e d n e s s l a i d out above, the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r a statement o f game-generated n e c e s s i t y w i l l be as f o l l o w s : •a i s o b l i g e d by event e or circumstance c to do o', i s true i f and o n l y i f i . a i s s u b j e c t to the r u l e o f game g which says: i f e or c o b t a i n s , then a i s to do o, except under 81. c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ j i i . because e or c does o b t a i n , u n l e s s a does o he w i l l f a i l to a c t i n accordance with the r u l e s o f g, pr o -v i d i n g none o f the exceptions h o l d . i i i . none of the exceptions to the r u l e h o l d . N o t i c e t h a t from (•£) and the f a c t sthat e or c o b t a i n s we can draw the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t 'unless a does o he w i l l f a i l to a c t i n accordance w i t h the r u l e s o f game g'. T h i s means t h a t there i s some redundancy i n the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s as they a re s t a t e d above. I n order to remedy t h i s s i t u a -t i o n I suggest t h a t we amend them so they read as f o l l o w s : i . a i s s u b j e c t to the r u l e o f game g which says: i f e or c o b t a i n s , then a i s to do o, except under c o n d i -t i o n s t 1 - t ^ ; i i . e or c does o b t a i n ; i i i . none o f the exceptions t o the r u l e h o l d . Consider the f o l l o w i n g example. 1. A i s o b l i g e d by ha v i n g landed on the ' g o - t o - j a i l ' square to miss three t u r n s . i . A i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e o f the game o f monopoly which says: i f a p l a y e r ' s 'man* lands on the 'go-to-j a i l ' square he i s to miss three t u r n s , except i f he has a ' g e t - o u t - o f - j a i l - f r e e ' c a r d ; i i . A lands on the ' g o - t o - j a i l ' square; i i i . A does not have a ' g e t - o u t - o f - j a i l - f r e e * c a r d . 82. 2. A i s o b l i g e d by having been checked, to move h i s k i n g . i . A i s s u b j e c t to the r u l e of chess which says: i f a p l a y e r cannot p r o t e c t h i s k i n g from check byr. moving another p i e c e , then he must move h i s ki n g ; i i . A's k i n g i s checked, and he cannot l e g a l l y p r o -t e c t i t by moving another p i e c e . I f the background c o n d i t i o n f o r a statement of o b l i g e d -ness i s a normative r u l e , then I s h a l l c a l l the k i n d o f n e c e s s i t y i n v o l v e d , normative. The t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r a statement of normative obligedness are s i m i l a r to those f o r game-generated n e c e s s i t y . They read as f o l l o w s : a i s o b l i g e d by event e or circumstance c~> to do o, i f and only i f i . a i s s u b j e c t to a normative r u l e which says: i f e or c o b t a i n s , then a i s to do o, un l e s s c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ o b t a i n ; i i . e or c does o b t a i n ; i i i . none of the c o n d i t i o n s " t ^ - t ^ h o l d . Before g e t t i n g i n t o the v a r i o u s i n t r i c a c i e s of normative ob l i g e d n e s s , l e t us look a t some examples and t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . 1. A i s o b l i g e d by having promised to do 0, to do 0. i . A i s s u b j e c t to a normative r u l e which says: i f a promises to do o, then a i s to do o, except when c o n d i -t i o n s t 1 - t i o b t a i n ; i i . A has promised to do 0; 8 3 . i i i . none of the c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ h o l d . 2. A i s o b l i g e d by having accepted a d i n n e r from B to i n v i t e B to d i n n e r . i . A i s s u b j e c t to a normative r u l e which says: i f a accepts a d i n n e r from b, then a i s to i n v i t e b to d i n n e r , except under c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ ; i i . A has accepted a din n e r from B; i i i . none of the exceptions to the r u l e h o l d . 3 . A i s o b l i g e d by being the grandparent o f B to care f o r B. i . A i s s u b j e c t to a normative r u l e which says: i f a i s the grandparent of any c h i l d r e n , then a i s to care f o r those c h i l d r e n except i f c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ h o l d ; i i . A i s the grandparent o f B; i i i . none of the exceptions to the r u l e h o l d . 4. A i s o b l i g e d by being the onl y one capable of s a v i n g the man, to t r y to save him. i . A i s s u b j e c t to a normative r u l e which says: i f a i s the only one capable of s a v i n g b, then he i s to t r y to save b, u n l e s s c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ h o l d ; i i . A i s the o n l y one capable o f s a v i n g B; i i i . none of the c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ h o l d . In a l l o f these examples, the r u l e which appears as the background c o n d i t i o n i s a c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e , with i t s 84. antecedent b e i n g the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r . I n the f i r s t example, •A i s o b l i g e d by having promised to do 0, to do 0' the background c o n d i t i o n i s the r u l e ' i f a promises to do o, then a i s to do o, except when c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ o b t a i n ' , and the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r i s a's promising to do o. I f the obligedness i s to be one of normative n e c e s s i t y the back-ground c o n d i t i o n must be a r u l e , and the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r must be i t s antecedent. The o b l i g i n g f a c t o r cannot i t s e l f be the r u l e . But why i s t h i s the case? Why cannot the f o l l o w i n g be statements of normative n e c e s s i t y ? 1. A i s o b l i g e d by the r u l e a g a i n s t l y i n g to r e f r a i n from l y i n g . 2. A i s o b l i g e d by the r u l e a g a i n s t c r u e l t y to r e f r a i n from t o r t u r i n g animals. 3. A i s o b l i g e d by the r u l e about r e t u r n i n g favours to r e t u r n a f a v o u r to B. 4. A i s o b l i g e d by the r u l e about promises to keep h i s promise to do X. 5. A i s o b l i g e d by the r u l e r e q u i r i n g that one gi v e -to c h a r i t y , to gi v e to some c h a r i t y . To see why these, s t r i c t l y speaking, are not w e l l -formed statements of normative o b l i g e d n e s s , we need to co n s i d e r what the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s would be f o r such statements. Take, as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e example, *A i s o b l i g e d by the r u l e a g a i n s t l y i n g to r e f r a i n from l y i n g ' . I f t h i s i s a statement of normative n e c e s s i t y , the back-8 5 . ground c o n d i t i o n must be a normative r u l e , v i z : the r u l e a g a i n s t l y i n g . But a c c o r d i n g to the statement of o b l i g e d -ness the r u l e about l y i n g i s the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r . So the background c o n d i t i o n and the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r are i d e n t i c a l . But s u r e l y t h a t does not make s e n s e — a n o b l i g i n g f a c t o r cannot be i t s own background c o n d i t i o n . And i f there i s no background c o n d i t i o n , then the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r cannot be c l o s i n g o f f o p t i o n a l ways of a c t i n g which would o t h e r -wise have been i n accordance with the background c o n d i t i o n . But that i s j u s t to say t h a t we don't r e a l l y have an o b l i -g ing f a c t o r . T h i s i s , of course, true of a l l well-formed o b l i g e d -ness statements: the background c o n d i t i o n and the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r can never be i d e n t i c a l . Otherwise we don't have true o b l i g e d n e s s . So a g o a l cannot be the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r f o r i n s t r u m e n t a l n e c e s s i t y , and s i m i l a r l y the r u l e o f a game can never be the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r f o r game-generated n e c e s s i t y . 2 ^ I have taken the statements (1) - ( 5 ) as normative statements. And although I t h i n k they would u s u a l l y be '"•''White makes the same p o i n t i n Modal T h i n k i n g , pp. 136f with r e s p e c t to o b l i g i n g f a c t o r s and g o a l s , but he doesn't c o n s i d e r the cases o f normative or game-generated n e c e s s i t y , where I t h i n k the temptation to use o b l i g e d n e s s statements i n c o r r e c t l y i s more p r e v a l e n t . Furthermore,^ White does not r e a l l y present any arguments f o r h i s p o s i -t i o n . I t h i n k i t i s important to p o i n t out, as I have done, t h a t one does not get the needed s e p a r a t i o n between the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r and the background c o n d i t i o n i f one takes 8 6 . u t t e r e d with such i n t e n t , they would not have to be. They might a c t u a l l y be statements of i n s t r u m e n t a l n e c e s s i t y , with the g o a l of the s u b j e c t b e i n g say, the d e s i r e to be known as a t r u t h t e l l e r ( f o r 1), a k i n d i n d i v i d u a l ( f o r 2), a f a v o u r - r e t u r n e r ( f o r 3 ) . a promise-keeper ( f o r 4 ) , or a c h a r i t y - g i v e r ( f o r 5 ) . I f t h i s i s the case, then we get the needed s e p a r a t i o n between the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r (the u n c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e as s t a t e d i n each) and the g o a l (being known as a t r u t h - t e l l e r , f a v o u r - r e t u r n e r , e t c . ) . So as statements of i n s t r u m e n t a l n e c e s s i t y , they are w e l l -formed, but ve r y m i s l e a d i n g i n the absence o f some i n d i -c a t i o n t h a t they are not to be taken as statements o f normative n e c e s s i t y . One does not always say what the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r i s when one makes a statement of o b l i g e d n e s s . One might simply say, 'A i s o b l i g e d to r e f r a i n from l y i n g ' or 'A i s o b l i g e d to keep h i s promise' or 'A i s o b l i g e d to r e t u r n B's favour'. In order to determine whether these e l l i p t i -c a l statements c o u l d be turned i n t o well-formed statements of o b l i g e d n e s s , we have to determine with what i n t e n t they were u t t e r e d , and what the u t t e r e r i d e n t i f i e s as the o b l i g -i n g f a c t o r . For the l a t t e r two, i f the u t t e r e r i s making the g o a l f o r the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r i n i n s t r u m e n t a l n e c e s s i t y , or the r u l e f o r the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r i n normative or game-generated n e c e s s i t y . 87. assertions of normative necessity, and identifies the obliging factors as A's promising, and A's accepting a favour, respectively, then they could be rewritten as well-formed statements of normative obligedness as follows: 'A is obliged by having promised to do 0 to do 0*; and 'A is obliged by having accepted a favour from B to reci-procate with a favour.* Section 3. Normative Obligedness There are three intertwined problems connected with normative obligedness which I shall consider in this sec-tion: on what grounds we determine whether one is socially, legally, familially, or morally obliged to do something; when rules can be said to exist; and how we determine what the exceptions are to rules. Part of the solution to the first problem—how we determine the kind of obligedness—requires that we deter-mine what kind of rule i t is which supports the obligedness statement. We find that there are a large number of differ-ent kinds of rules, among which are the following: 1. Legal rules. These rules are those which are embodied in any society's legal system. Although there are problems involved in specifying what a legal system is , and when a society has one, we do have a fairly good intuitive under-standing of what is involved. This is a l l I require for my present purposes. An example in our own society of a 88. l e g a l r u l e which supports a statement of normative o b l i g e d -ness i s the r u l e of c o n t r a c t . 2. S o c i a l r u l e s . There are r u l e s which r e g u l a t e the i n t e r a c t i o n between members o f a s o c i e t y or f a i r l y l a r g e s u b - s e c t i o n o f a s o c i e t y . Examples are as f o l l o w s ; favours are to be r e t u r n e d ; promises are to be kept; d i n n e r s are to be r e c i p r o c a t e d ; parents are to care f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n ; borrowed items are to be r e t u r n e d ; and compensation i s to be p a i d to one you have i n j u r e d . 3. Family r u l e s . These are r u l e s which r e g u l a t e the con-duct o f members of a f a m i l y which have t h e i r source i n the f a m i l y i t s e l f . These r u l e s w i l l vary widely from one f a m i l y to another. 'Mother i s to do the washing', 'Father i s to do the cooking', ' C h i l d r e n are to go to bed e a r l y i f they q u a r r e l ' could a l l be such r u l e s . 4. School r u l e s . Rules which have been adopted by those i n a u t h o r i t y to govern the conduct of those i n v o l v e d i n the s c h o o l system, or i n a p a r t i c u l a r s c h o o l are i n c l u d e d under 'school r u l e s ' . These co u l d i n c l u d e the f o l l o w i n g : • P r i n c i p a l s are to maintain d i s c i p l i n e i n the s c h o o l ' , 'Those who have not done t h e i r homework are to c l e a n the boards', 'Those who a r r i v e l a t e are t o s t a y a f t e r s c h o o l ' . 5. Club r u l e s . The r u l e s which govern the o p e r a t i o n of any c l u b a r e i n c l u d e d here. 'The members are to a t t e n d the Christmas p a r t y ' , 'Those who break r u l e s are to pay a 8 9 . f i n e ' , 'The p r e s i d e n t i s to c a l l the meetings', c o u l d a l l be r u l e s o f t h i s k i n d . 6 . Rules o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Any o r g a n i z a t i o n , whether i t be simply a c l u b , or a busi n e s s or s p o r t s c o r p o r a t i o n , w i l l u s u a l l y have r u l e s governing the conduct o f i t s mem-bers, o f the k i n d which support statements of o b l i g e d n e s s . 7. Rules between f r i e n d s . These are r u l e s which f r i e n d s have adopted to r e g u l a t e t h e i r conduct to one another. 'One i s to s t a y over n i g h t with the other when the othe r ' s roommate i s away' might be such a r u l e . I t i s important to d i s t i n g u i s h among these v a r i o u s k i n d s o f r u l e s , because, I contend, i t i s on t h i s b a s i s t h a t we determine whether the obl i g e d n e s s which i s i n v o l v e d i n any obl i g e d n e s s statement i s l e g a l , s o c i a l , or f a m i l i a l . How e l s e c o u l d we determine that A i s l e g a l l y o b l i g e d t o do 0 except on the b a s i s o f the f a c t t h at he i s s u b j e c t to a l e g a l r u l e which says anyone who i s i n A's p o s i t i o n i s to do 0? And how e l s e c o u l d we determine t h a t someone i s s o c i a l l y o b l i g e d t o do P, except on the grounds t h a t he i s s u b j e c t t o a s o c i a l r u l e which says t h a t anyone i n A's p o s i t i o n i s to do P? I do not t h i n k t h a t there i s any a l t e r n a t i v e . (We do not have a d j e c t i v e s to d e s c r i b e the ki n d o f ob l i g e d n e s s which a r i s e s from the r u l e s o f a s c h o o l , c l u b , or any other kind o f o r g a n i z a t i o n , or which e x i s t b e t -ween f r i e n d s . That, I c l a i m , i s an a c c i d e n t o f our langu-age.) I should p o i n t out t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r the r u l e 90. s u p p o r t i n g a statement of o b l i g e d n e s s to be o f more than one k i n d a t the same time, e.g. to be both a l e g a l and s o c i a l r u l e . Which a d j e c t i v e the speaker chooses to use i n d e s c r i b i n g the obligedness w i l l be determined by the aspect he wishes to emphasize. Conspicuously m i s s i n g from t h i s d i s c u s s i o n so f a r i s how to determine whether an obligedness i s moral or not. I have chosen to d i s c u s s t h i s q u e s t i o n s e p a r a t e l y , as there are some c o m p l i c a t i o n s not p r e s e n t w i t h other k i n d s of o b l i g e d n e s s . As i s the case f o r a l l other kinds of o b l i g e d n e s s , one i s m o r a l l y o b l i g e d to do something i f the background r u l e i s a moral one. I take a r u l e to be a moral one i f i t i s one which m o r a l l y ought to be u n i v e r s a l l y adopted. Such a r u l e as the f o l l o w i n g I t h i n k , s a t i s f i e s t h i s con-d i t i o n : i f one i s a bystander a t the scene o f an a c c i d e n t , then one should do what one can to r e l i e v e the s u f f e r i n g o f the v i c t i m s . I f t h i s i s a moral r u l e then the o b l i g e d -ness a r i s i n g from b e i n g a bystander w i l l be moral o b l i g e d -ness . But what o f such r u l e s as -'If one i s a f a t h e r then one i s to care f o r one's c h i l d r e n ' ? T h i s i s not one which ought m o r a l l y to be u n i v e r s a l l y adopted: there would be n o t h i n g m o r a l l y wrong with a s o c i e t y which had d i f f e r e n t k i n s h i p r u l e s , e.g. ones which r e q u i r e t h a t uncles care f o r t h e i r n i e c e s and nephews, r a t h e r than ones which r e q u i r e 91 that f a t h e r s care f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n . And y e t i t seems r i g h t to say of f a t h e r s i n a s o c i e t y which has the above r u l e about f a t h e r s c a r i n g f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n , t h a t they are m o r a l l y o b l i g e d to care f o r t h e i r c h i l d r e n . I t h i n k t h a t t h i s i s i n f a c t what one should say. And the reason i s th a t the p a r t i c u l a r r u l e s found i n any s o c i e t y about c a r i n g f o r c h i l d r e n w i l l be supported by a moral p r i n c i p l e , v i z : ' A l l s o c i e t i e s must pr o v i d e f o r the care o f t h e i r c h i l d r e n i n a f a i r and e q u i t a b l e way'. So although the r u l e i t s e l f i s not a moral one, i t i s supported by a p r i n c i p l e which i s moral, and i t i s because t h i s i s so t h a t the obligedness supported by the r u l e i s moral o b l i g e d n e s s . I f the above i s c o r r e c t , then statements o f o b l i g e d -ness w i l l be moral i f one of the f o l l o w i n g i s t r u e : i . the r u l e i n the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i s a moral r u l e ; or i i . the r u l e i n the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , although not a moral r u l e , i s supported by a moral p r i n c i p l e or some g e n e r a l moral r u l e . So f a r I have g l o s s e d over the q u e s t i o n of how we determine whether A i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e . I s h a l l d e a l with t h i s now. The answer i s r e a l l y v e r y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d f o r game r u l e s . A i s s u b j e c t to a game r u l e , r , i f and only i f he i s p l a y i n g the game i n which r i s one of the r u l e s , and he s a t i s f i e s any s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h a t 92. r u l e . For example, A i s s u b j e c t to the r u l e o f f o o t b a l l which says t h a t quarterbacks are to do X i f and onl y i f he i s p l a y i n g f o o t b a l l and he i s a quarterback. Determining when A i s s u b j e c t to s o c i a l , l e g a l , c l u b , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , f a m i l y or f r i e n d s h i p r u l e s i s a b i t t r i c k -i e r , but I t h i n k the f o l l o w i n g g i v e s us necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s . A i s s u b j e c t to s o c i a l , l e g a l , c l u b , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l , f a m i l y , or f r i e n d s h i p r u l e , r , i f and only i f : 1. A i s a member of the s o c i e t y , c l u b , f a m i l y or f r i e n d s h i p , r e s p e c t i v e l y , i n which r i s one o f the f o l l o w -i n g : (a) i n f o r c e , i . e . acknowledged by the s o c i e t y , c l u b , f a m i l y or f r i e n d s as a r u l e which they are to obey, and which they u s u a l l y do obey. Disobedience to these r u l e s w i l l u s u a l l y g i v e r i s e to some unpleasant r e s u l t s — f r o m the m i l d d i s a p p r o v a l o f other members of the s o c i e t y , c l u b , e t c . , to p h y s i c a l punishment; (b) recorded i n some document which a p p l i e s to the s o c i e t y , c l u b , f a m i l y or f r i e n d s and i s acknowledged to do so. Such r u l e s do not a c t u a l l y have to be i n f o r c e . They might be 'on the books', but because they are obse-l e t e , or i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r some other reason, they are no longer obeyed, and disobedience i s not punished. But, we might ask, i f they are not i n f o r c e , why should we say that they support a statement o f obl i g e d n e s s ? I t h i n k 9 3 . because so l o n g as they are 'on the books' someone co u l d i n s i s t upon t h e i r obedience, and c o u l d make a c l a i m a g a i n s t someone on t h e i r s t r e n g t h . 2. A s a t i s f i e s any s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of a p p l i c a t i o n f o r the r u l e . For example, say the r u l e i s ' I f the c h i l d r e n are n o i s y , they are to go to bed e a r l y ' . A would have to be one o f the c h i l d r e n i n the f a m i l y which has t h i s r u l e i n order to be s u b j e c t to i t . I t h i n k the only c o n d i t i o n which a c r e a t u r e must s a t i s f y i n order t o be s u b j e c t t o a moral r u l e i s t h a t i t have a moral p e r s o n a l i t y , i . e . t h a t i t be capable o f d i s -t i n g u i s h i n g between m o r a l l y r i g h t and m o r a l l y wrong. We should a l s o c o n s i d e r what must be the case i n order f o r there to be a moral r u l e r . I f we determine t h a t a r u l e i s a moral one on the grounds t h a t such a r u l e m o r a l l y ought to be i n f o r c e , as I suggested above t h a t we should, then i t o b v i o u s l y need not be i n f o r c e i n order to e x i s t . I t need only be m o r a l l y sound. Some examples o f moral r u l e s are as f o l l o w s : One i s not to g r a t u i t o u s l y k i l l another person; One i s not to t o r t u r e s e n t i e n t beings; One i s not to i n j u r e another s e n t i e n t being; One i s not to i n t e r f e r e w i t h another's freedom o f a c t i o n . These r u l e s support secondary r u l e s which t e l l us what one i s to do i n the event o f breaking any of the fundamental r u l e s . 'An i n j u r e r i s to o f f e r a s s i s t a n c e ( i f a p p r o p r i a t e ) to one 94. he has i n j u r e d ' and 'An i n j u r e r i s to compensate (when a p p r o p r i a t e ) one he has i n j u r e d ' are examples o f such secondary r u l e s . These secondary r u l e s , b e i n g c o n d i t i o n a l and moral, w i l l support statements o f moral o b l i g e d n e s s , r e g a r d l e s s of whether or not they are a c t u a l l y i n f o r c e i n a s o c i e t y . We are now prepared to t a c k l e another problem: de t e r mining what the exceptions are to the r u l e s which support statements o f o b l i g e d n e s s . There are r e a l l y two connected problems here: 1. determining what the exceptions are to r u l e s which do not have a l l o f t h e i r e xceptions e x p l i c i t l y b u i l t i n t o them; and 2. deter m i n i n g when something i s an excep t i o n to a r u l e as opposed to a c o n d i t i o n which over-r i d e s the r u l e . B a s i c a l l y , my suggestion i s t h a t we look to the r e a -sons f o r the e x i s t e n c e o f a r u l e i n order to determine what the exc e p t i o n s w i l l be t o t h a t r u l e . F o r a l l but moral r u l e s t h i s w i l l amount to d i s c o v e r i n g why the r u l e s are i n f o r c e , and f o r those which are no lon g e r i n f o r c e , but s t i l l appear 'on the books' why they were i n f o r c e . For moral r u l e s , to look f o r the reason f o r t h e i r e x i s -tence w i l l be t o determine why the r u l e i s a m o r a l l y sound one. (The reasons a moral r u l e i s i n f o r c e , when i t i s , might be d i f f e r e n t from why i t i s m o r a l l y sound. But i t i s on the l a t t e r b a s i s t h a t we a r r i v e a t e x c e p t i o n s , s i n c e i t i s the fundamental c o n d i t i o n f o r e x i s t e n c e . ) 9 5 . Consider the f o l l o w i n g example. The r u l e i s : I f a accepts a d i n n e r from b, then a i s to i n v i t e b to d i n n e r , except under c o n d i t i o n s t 1 - t i . Now, why i s t h i s r u l e i n f o r c e ? W e l l , there could be v a r i o u s reasons: i t might be thought to enhance s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y ; i t might be to ensure t h a t the c o s t of g i v i n g d i n n e r s i s shared, so t h a t no one person i s over-burdened. Given these reasons f o r the e x i s t e n c e of the r u l e , what might be found i n the e x c e p t i n g c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ ? W e l l , i f A and B d i s c o v e r that they do not l i k e each other a t the d i n n e r g i v e n by B, i t w i l l h a r d l y enhance community f e e l i n g to arrange another d i n n e r between those two p a r t i e s . So we might have the f o l l o w i n g e x c e p t i o n : Dinners are to be r e c i p r o -cated except when the a f f e c t e d p a r t i e s have found no p l e a -sure i n each other's company. A l s o , i f A and B d i f f e r r a d i c a l l y i n income l e v e l s , so t h a t B's g i v i n g a d i n n e r i s no burden, while A's r e c i p r o c a t i n g would be a burden, then r e c i p r o c a t i n g w i l l not r e a l l y be a f a i r way o f s h a r i n g the burden o f d i n n e r - g i v i n g . So we might have the f o l l o w -i n g : Dinners are to be r e c i p r o c a t e d except where the p a r -t i e s i n v o l v e d have w i d e l y d i s p a r a t e incomes. Consider the f o l l o w i n g example of a moral r u l e : I f a i n j u r e s b, then a i s to pay b damages. What i s i t t h a t makes t h i s a m o r a l l y sound r u l e ? I suggest i t i s because by paying damages a i n a way makes i t up to b f o r having v i o l a t e d h i s n a t u r a l r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g . Given t h a t t h i s 96. is the reason for its "being a sound moral rule, what would the excepting conditions be? The following, I suggest, are among them: 1 . B was injured in an area which he knew he entered at his own risk; and 2 . A injured B in the act of self-defense. And the reason these are except-ing conditions is because under the circumstances speci-fied, A's injuring B will not constitute a violation of B's natural right to well-being, and so there is nothing to be made up for. When an excepting condition to a rule does hold, then a person is not prima facie obliged by what would otherwise be an obliging factor. But overriding conditions are different. If A is prima facie obliged to do 0, i.e. there are no excepting conditions to the rule supporting the obligedness, but there is something which is more  important than his doing 0, then a 1though i t is s t i l l true~ that he is prima facie obliged to do 0, he will not be obliged, a l l things considered. For example, i f A has -injured B, and there are no excepting circumstances, then A is prima facie obliged to pay B damages. But i t might be the case that in order to compensate B, he would have to give him the grocery money for the month, which would result in his family going hungry. Such circumstances would provide overriding considerations, and thus A would not be obliged, a l l things considered, to pay B damages. I think i t is appropriate to say something here about 9 7 . the r e l a t i o n s h i p between obligedness and o b l i g a t i o n s . I s h a l l argue i n S e c t i o n 4(a) t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s are a s p e c i a l k i n d o f o b l i g e d n e s s . What I want to emphasize here i s t h a t they are a s p e c i a l kind o f prima f a c i e o b l i g e d n e s s . That i s , under c e r t a i n circumstances, i f one i s prima f a c i e o b l i g e d to do 0, then one w i l l have o b l i g a t i o n to 0. But i f one i s not, a l l things c o n s i d e r e d , o b l i g e d to do, i . e . there are o v e r r i d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , then although one w i l l s t i l l have the o b l i g a t i o n to do 0, t h i s o b l i g a -t i o n w i l l be o v e r r i d d e n . T h i s f i t s with the way we gen-e r a l l y t h i n k and t a l k about o b l i g a t i o n s , i . e . t h a t we can have an o b l i g a t i o n , and y e t i t w i l l be m o r a l l y r i g h t t h a t we not f u l f i l l i t . 1 There might be some temptation to t r y to s i m p l i f y ' matters by i n c l u d i n g a l l the o v e r r i d i n g c o n d i t i o n s dn the e x c e p t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . But t h i s would have three unacceptable r e s u l t s . F i r s t , we would have to deny what I t h i n k i s i n d i s p u t a b l y t r u e , that we can have an o b l i g a -t i o n , but not be r e q u i r e d to f u l f i l l i t because o f more p r e s s i n g moral, l e g a l or s o c i a l demands. Second, we would l o s e a p e r f e c t l y good and u s e f u l d i s t i n c t i o n between breaking a r u l e f o r good reason, and coming under one of the r u l e ' s e x c e p t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . And t h i r d , the r u l e s c o u l d no l o n g e r serve the u s e f u l purpose o f b e i n g guides to a c t i o n , to be taken i n t o account i n d e c i d i n g what the best t h i n g to do i s . T h i s i s because i f we i n c l u d e under-98. the e x c e p t i n g c o n d i t i o n s to our r u l e s such p r o v i s i o n s as those which I have termed o v e r r i d i n g c o n d i t i o n s , then we w i l l have r u l e s with unmanageably l o n g l i s t s of e x c e p t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . And they w i l l t h e r e f o r e be unable to h e l p us i n d e t e r m i n i n g what ought to be done. S e c t i o n k. O b l i g a t i o n s (a) T r u t h C o n d i t i o n s Of the three kinds of o b l i g e d n e s s — i n s t r u m e n t a l , game-generated and n o r m a t i v e — o n l y the l a s t w i l l y i e l d statements of o b l i g a t i o n . T h i s c l a i m should be c o n s i s t e n t with one's i n t u i t i o n s on the matter. Normally we are not tempted to put game-generated or i n s t r u m e n t a l obligedness statements i n terms of o b l i g a t i o n s . For i n s t a n c e , although someone i s o b l i g e d i n the game of monopoly, by having landed on the ' g o - t o - j a i l ' square, to miss three t u r n s , we are not i n the l e a s t tempted,to say t h a t he has an o b l i g a t i o n to miss three t u r n s . And s i m i l a r l y , we would have no i n c l i n a t i o n to say t h a t because A i s o b l i g e d by the wind's h a v i n g changed d i r e c t i o n , to tack, he has an o b l i g a t i o n to do so. But not a l l judgments of normative obligedness y i e l d o b l i g a t i o n s : there i s an important s u b - c l a s s of them which do not. I s h a l l now g i v e a l i s t o f examples of obligedness statements which can be w r i t t e n i n terms of o b l i g a t i o n s , f o l l o w e d by a l i s t o f examples of o b l i g e d n e s s 9 9 . statements which cannot be so w r i t t e n . L i s t I . 1. A i s o b l i g e d by having accepted a favour from B to do B a favour i n r e t u r n , i f the o p p o r t u n i t y a r i s e s . 2. A i s o b l i g e d by having accepted a d i n n e r from B to i n v i t e B to d i n n e r i n r e t u r n . 3. A i s o b l i g e d by having c o n t r a c t e d with B to v i s i t him when he i s s i c k , to v i s i t him now that he i s s i c k . k. A i s o b l i g e d by having promised B that he would do 0, to do 0. 5. A i s o b l i g e d by having borrowed a s h o v e l from B, to r e t u r n i t to B. 6. A i s o b l i g e d by having i n j u r e d B to pay him damages. 7. A i s o b l i g e d by having taken on the g u a r d i a n s h i p o f B to care f o r him. 8. A i s o b l i g e d by having ( c a r e l e s s l y ) i n j u r e d the horse to ensure t h a t i t gets proper medical treatment. 9 . A i s o b l i g e d by having ( c a r e l e s s l y ) i n j u r e d B to p r o -v i d e him with whatever a s s i s t a n c e he needs. 10. A i s o b l i g e d by having ( c a r e l e s s l y ) i n j u r e d the mayor's horse to compensate the mayor. 11. A i s o b l i g e d by having k i l l e d B to compensate h i s w i f e . 12. A i s o b l i g e d by having j o i n e d the c l u b , to obey the c l u b r u l e s . L i s t I I . 100, 1. A i s o b l i g e d by h i s i n t e n d i n g to t u r n r i g h t w i t h i n the next b l o c k to s i g n a l now. 2. A i s o b l i g e d by being i n a 30 mph zone not to exceed 30 mph. 3. A i s o b l i g e d by the l i g h t ' s t u r n i n g red to r e f r a i n from going through the i n t e r s e c t i o n . 4. A i s o b l i g e d by having witnessed the crime t o r e p o r t i t to the a u t h o r i t i e s . 5. A i s o b l i g e d by having a r r i v e d a t the scene o f the a c c i d e n t to o f f e r a s s i s t a n c e . 6. A i s o b l i g e d by being B's grandparent to care f o r him. 7. A i s o b l i g e d by being the guardian o f B to care f o r him. 8. A i s o b l i g e d by be i n g the only one capable o f s a v i n g . B to t r y to save him. 9 . A i s o b l i g e d by B's a s k i n g him f o r s h e l t e r , t o p r o v i d e B with s h e l t e r . 10. A i s o b l i g e d by being a member o f the c l u b , to go to the Christmas p a r t y . 11. A i s o b l i g e d by having not done h i s homework, to c l e a n the blackboards. 12. A i s o b l i g e d by being the e l d e s t b r o t h e r , to look a f t e r h i s s i s t e r s . I t h i n k we should note f i r s t t h a t among those examples which appear i n the f i r s t l i s t are ones which most people, 1 0 1 . e s p e c i a l l y those who are s e n s i t i v e to the d i f f e r e n c e between o b l i g a t i o n , duty, and ought (Brandt, F e i n b e r g , Hart, e_t al) w i l l be i n c l i n e d to r e w r i t e i n terms of o b l i g a t i o n s . People w i l l , f o r i n s t a n c e , g e n e r a l l y be q u i t e happy with 'A has an o b l i g a t i o n to r e t u r n B's f a v o u r ' , *A has an o b l i g a t i o n to r e c i p r o c a t e B's dinner i n v i t a t i o n ' , 'A has an o b l i g a t i o n to do whatever he promised he would do', and 'A has an o b l i g a t i o n to r e t u r n the borrowed shovel'. And among those examples which appear i n the second l i s t are ones which people w i l l i n g e n e r a l , be most d i s -i n c l i n e d to r e w r i t e i n terms of o b l i g a t i o n s . For example, we would not n o r m a l l y be tempted to r e w r i t e the f o l l o w i n g i n terms o f o b l i g a t i o n s : *A i s o b l i g e d by h i s i n t e n d i n g to t u r n r i g h t i n the next b l o c k to s i g n a l ' ; 'A i s o b l i g e d by being i n a 3 0 mph zone, to go 3 0 mph', 'A i s o b l i g e d by having not done h i s homework, to c l e a n the blackboards'. There i s , then some i n i t i a l p l a u s i b i l i t y i n the p o s i t i o n that i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e to r e w r i t e those i n L i s t I i n terms of o b l i g a t i o n s , and i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r those i n L i s t I I . But more can be s a i d about the d i f f e r e n c e s between these two l i s t s than what would be i n t u i t i v e l y s a i d about some of the members contained i n them. L e t us look c l o s e l y a t the examples contained i n L i s t I and I I . We w i l l n o t i c e t h a t the members of L i s t I have a number of f e a t u r e s i n 1 0 2 . common with one another, a t l e a s t one o f which i s not shared "by each member of L i s t I I . F i r s t , the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r , f o r each member of I i s an e v e n t — a n a c c e p t i n g , a c o n t r a c t i n g , a borrowing, a promising, e t c . — n e v e r simply a circumstance; while the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r s f o r many of the statements i n I I are c i r c u m s t a n c e s — b e i n g i n a 3 0 mph zone, being a grandparent, being the e l d e s t b r o t h e r . Second, f o r every member of L i s t I , one o f the f o l -lowing h o l d s : (a) A could have prevented the o b l i g i n g event e by e x e r c i s i n g due care ; or (b) A c o u l d have p r e -vented the o b l i g i n g event e, by d e c i d i n g not to a c t i n an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g way, i . e . he c o u l d have decided not to do e, and he knew e had (or would have) an o b l i g e d n e s s -c r e a t i n g p r o p e r t y . I t would be q u i t e n a t u r a l f o r us to say, when e i t h e r o f these c o n d i t i o n s are t r u e , t h a t the o b l i g e d brought h i s obligedness on h i m s e l f , that h i s o b l i g -edness i s h i s own f a u l t . N e i t h e r of these c o n d i t i o n s holds f o r many of the members o f L i s t I I . For example, i n 113, the l i g h t ' s t u r n i n g r e d i s not something which A co u l d have prevented i n e i t h e r way (a) or ( b ) . (And c e r t a i n l y we would not say i t was h i s f a u l t t h a t the l i g h t turned red.) And s i m i l a r l y , i n 119, B's a s k i n g A f o r s h e l t e r i s not some-t h i n g A c o u l d have prevented i n e i t h e r o f the above ways.-The examples 114 and 115 are a b i t more t r i c k y , so 103. l e t ' s look a t them more c l o s e l y . 114 says t h a t A i s o b l i g e d by h a v i n g witnessed the crime to r e p o r t i t to the a u t h o r i t i e s . I n t u i t i v e l y , we do not want to say t h a t A brought h i s o b l i g e d n e s s on h i m s e l f , or t h a t i t i s h i s f a u l t t h a t he i s o b l i g e d . And so he should not. Although i t i s true that he could have prevented h i s w i t n e s s i n g the  crime by d e c i d i n g not to look n o r t h a t Hastings and C a r r o l a t 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, he c o u l d not have decided n o t  to witness the crime, s i n c e he d i d not know h i s a c t would be one o f w i t n e s s i n g a crime, i . e . he d i d not know i t would have t h a t o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g p r o p e r t y . Nor of course c o u l d he have prevented h i s w i t n e s s i n g the crime by e x e r c i s i n g due care. So n e i t h e r (a) or (b) holds f o r 114. S i m i l a r r e a s o n i n g a p p l i e s to 115. T h i r d , i t i s true of a l l the members of L i s t I , but not of a l l the members o f L i s t I I , t h a t the o b l i g i n g event i n v o l v e s both the o b l i g e d and e i t h e r the 'intended bene-f i c i a r y ' or someone who has a s p e c i a l k i n d o f r e l a t i o n s h i p to the 'intended b e n e f i c i a r y ' , such t h a t h i s l o s s , i n j u r y or damaged c o n d i t i o n i s a l s o a l o s s or i n j u r y f o r the intended b e n e f i c i a r y . For example, the o b l i g i n g event i n I I — A ' s a c c e p t i n g a favour from B — i n v o l v e s both the o b l i g e d , A, and the intended b e n e f i c i a r y , B; the o b l i g i n g event i n 14—A's p r o m i s i n g B — i n v o l v e s both the o b l i g e d , A,and the intended b e n e f i c i a r y , B: the o b l i g i n g event i n 110—A's 104. i n j u r i n g the h o r s e — i n v o l v e s the o b l i g e d , A, and someone, the horse, who has a s p e c i a l kind of r e l a t i o n s h i p to the intended b e n e f i c i a r y — i . e . he i s owned by the intended b e n e f i c i a r y — s u c h t h a t h i s i n j u r y i s the intended bene-f i c i a r y ' s l o s s ; and the o b l i g i n g event i n 111—A's k i l l i n g B— i n v o l v e s both the o b l i g e d , A, and someone, B, who has a s p e c i a l k i n d of r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the intended b e n e f i c i a r y — i . e . that o f b e i n g the husband o f — s u c h t h a t h i s death i s the intended b e n e f i c i a r y ' s l o s s . I s h a l l now e x p l a i n what I mean by an 'intended b e n e f i c i a r y ' . F i r s t I s h a l l i n d i c a t e what kinds of t h i n g s can be intended b e n e f i c i a r i e s , and then I s h a l l i n d i c a t e how we i d e n t i f y who the intended b e n e f i c i a r y i s . In order f o r a c r e a t u r e to be capable of b e i n g an intended b e n e f i c i a r y i t must have i n t e r e s t s . I t seems to me f a i r l y obvious that o n l y conscious c r e a t u r e s w i l l s a t -i s f y t h i s requirement. Although a house might w e l l bene-f i t from being p a i n t e d (and be intended to do s o ) , a p l a n t from being f e r t i l i z e d , or a t r e e from being pruned, i t cannot be i n the house's i n t e r e s t to be p a i n t e d , nor the p l a n t ' s to be f e r t i l i z e d , nor the t r e e ' s to be pruned. And t h e r e f o r e , n e i t h e r a house, nor a p l a n t , nor a t r e e , nor any other unconscious t h i n g can be an 'intended bene-f i c i a r y ' as I use t h a t term here. In order to determine who the intended b e n e f i c i a r y i s , we must know what i n t e n t i o n s are r e l e v a n t . I t seems 1 0 5 . q u i t e c l e a r t h a t i t cannot he the a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s of the person with the o b l i g a t i o n , because these might be q u i t e p e r v e r s e . For example, say A has an o b l i g a t i o n to pay back the $4.00 he borrowed from B. A might i n t e n d not t h a t B b e n e f i t from h i s r e t u r n i n g the money, but r a t h e r t h a t he go on an a l c o h o l i c binge, as he i s i n c l i n e d to do when he has any cash i n h i s pocket, and make h i m s e l f s i c k . But i t i s c l e a r from the content of the r u l e which supports t h i s o b l i g a t i o n — t h a t i f A borrows money from B he i s to r e t u r n i t — t h a t B's i n t e r e s t s are supposed to be served by the r e t u r n of h i s money. I suggest t h a t the intended b e n e f i c i a r y i s not the person who the o b l i g e d intends to b e n e f i t , but r a t h e r i s the person who i s intended by the r u l e to b e n e f i t . Of course a r u l e cannot l i t e r a l l y i n t e n d to b e n e f i t anyone, not b e i n g the k i n d o f t h i n g which can have i n t e n t i o n s . What I have o f f e r e d i s r e a l l y a s o r t o f metaphor which i s to be unpacked i n terms of what . j u s t i f i e s the r u l e . The c l a i m i s that i f the r u l e i s a t l e a s t i n p a r t j u s t i f i e d by obedience to i t b e n e f i t t i n g a s p e c i f i c p a r t y , then t h a t p a r t y i s 'intended to b e n e f i t ' by the r u l e . For example, i f one o f the th i n g s which j u s t i f i e s the r u l e about r e t u r n -i n g borrowed items i s t h a t i t b e n e f i t s l e n d e r s , then the len d e r s are 'intended by the r u l e ' to b e n e f i t and so are the intended b e n e f i c i a r i e s . S i m i l a r l y , i f one of the th i n g s which j u s t i f i e s the r u l e about promises i s that the 1 0 6 . r e c i p i e n t o f a promise w i l l be abl e to make plans f o r the f u t u r e , or w i l l be reas s u r e d about something which i s important to him, or some such, then the r e c i p i e n t o f the promise i s 'intended by the r u l e ' to b e n e f i t , and thus i s the intended b e n e f i c i a r y . And, as a f i n a l example, i f one of the t h i n g s which j u s t i f i e s the r u l e t h a t f a v o u r s a r e to be r e t u r n e d i s th a t the doer o f the favour w i l l be secured i n the r e t u r n o f a favour, then the doer o f a favour i s 'intended by the r u l e ' to b e n e f i t . I t seems q u i t e obvious i n thes e examples t h a t the r u l e s a r e , a t l e a s t i n p a r t , j u s t i f i e d as suggested, and t h e r e f o r e l e n -d e r s , r e c i p i e n t s o f promises,and doers o f favours are indeed intended b e n e f i c i a r i e s . I c l a i m t h a t , c e r t a i n l y f o r any of the examples which I have o f f e r e d o f o b l i g a t i o n s , and I suspect o f a l l o t h e r s , i t w i l l be abundantly c l e a r who i s intended by the r u l e to b e n e f i t , and thus who the intended b e n e f i c i a r y i s . On the b a s i s of the r e s u l t s obtained i n the l a s t few pages, I c l a i m t h a t the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r a statement of o b l i g a t i o n are as f o l l o w s i 'a has an o b l i g a t i o n to do o, would l i k e to acknowledge the h e l p I r e c e i v e d from David Lyons' a r t i c l e 'Rights, C l aimants, and B e n e f i c i a r i e s ' (American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 6 ( I 9 6 9 ) , 1 7 3 - 1 8 5 ) i n which he uses the concept of an 'intended b e n e f i c i a r y ' . I thi n k t h a t the way I use that term here corresponds to the way Lyons intended i t to be used. I should say, though, t h a t I do not a c c e p t the a n a l y s i s o f r i g h t s i n terms of intended b e n e f i c i a r i e s which he o f f e r s i n t h a t a r t i c l e . 107. i f and o n l y i f : i . a i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e which says: i f e o c c u r s , then a i s to do o, except under c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ ; i i . e o c c u r s ; i i i . none of the c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ h o l d ; i v . The event e i n v o l v e s both the o b l i g e d and e i t h e r the intended b e n e f i c i a r y or someone who i s so r e l a t e d to the intended b e n e f i c i a r y t h a t h i s l o s s i s a l s o a l o s s to the intended b e n e f i c i a r y ; v. one o f the f o l l o w i n g i s t r u e : (a) the o b l i g e d c o u l d have prevented the event e by e x e r c i s i n g due c a r e ; (b) the o b l i g e d could have prevented the o b l i g i n g event e by d e c i d i n g not to a c t i n an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g way; i . e . he c o u l d have decided not to do e, and he knew e had (or would have) an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g p r o p e r t y . The c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) through ( i i i ) are the t r u t h c o n d i -t i o n s f o r statements of prima f a c i e o b l i g e d n e s s . And ( i v ) and (v) are the a d d i t i o n a l ones needed f o r t h a t statement to be c o r r e c t l y r e w r i t t e n as an o b l i g a t i o n s t a t e -ment. Taken altogether, the c o n d i t i o n s ( i ) through (v) are both necessary and s u f f i c i e n t f o r the t r u t h of o b l i g a t i o n statements. These c o n d i t i o n s are c o n s i s t e n t with a l l o f the p o i n t s t h a t Beran makes i n favour o f h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t o b l i g a t i o n 1 0 8 . statements and ought statements are d i s t i n c t i n meaning. They are a l s o c o n s i s t e n t with some f a i r l y s t r o n g i n t u i t i o n s . That one i s i n some sense r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e x i s t e n c e o f one's o b l i g a t i o n s i s one of these. This i n t u i t i o n i s some-times r e f l e c t e d i n the c l a i m t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s e from undertakings. However, t h i s way of c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the kind o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y does not capture a l l o f the kinds of events which g i v e r i s e to o b l i g a t i o n s . I t leaves out o b l i g a t i o n s o f r e p a r a t i o n and compensation. The above t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are a l s o c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the i n t u i t i o n t h at one always has an o b l i g a t i o n to some-one." That someone i s the person who i s the intended bene-f i c i a r y o f the r u l e s u p p o r t i n g the statement o f o b l i g a t i o n . (More w i l l be s a i d about t h i s i n S e c t i o n 6.) Th i s i n t u i -t i o n i s o f t e n r e f l e c t e d i n the statement t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s are always owed to someone. But t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t there has a r i s e n some kind o f d e b t - l i k e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the ob l i g e d and the person whom the o b l i g a t i o n i s to. Now, although there i s o f t e n t h i s d e b t - l i k e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the o b l i g e d and the person t o whom he has the o b l i g a t i o n — e . g . when someone borrows something, i n j u r e s another, accepts a d i n n e r i n v i t a t i o n , or r e c e i v e s a f a v o u r — t h e r e i s not always t h i s kind o f r e l a t i o n s h i p . A's pr o m i s i n g B to do 0 does not r e s u l t i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p of debt, no i n e q u a l i t y a r i s e s as a r e s u l t o f th a t promise, A does not have to make any t h i n g up to B (as he would i f he had 109. accepted a d i n n e r or f a v o u r ) . So i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to say that A owes B any t h i n g . T h i s shows, not only t h a t o b l i g a t i o n a re not always owed to someone, but a l s o that the concept o f ' o b l i g a t i o n ' cannot be f u l l y e x p l i c a t e d i n terms o f the concept o f 'owing'. I t has f r e q u e n t l y been claimed t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s e out o f c e r t a i n kinds of r e l a t i o n s h i p s . As a c r i t e r i o n f o r determining when i t i s c o r r e c t to say someone has an o b l i g a t i o n , t h i s i s o f no use, s i n c e i t has never been s p e c i f i e d what kinds o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s q u a l i f y . Nonetheless, there i s indeed always some k i n d o f r e l a t i o n s h i p e s t a b l i s h e d i n the o b l i g i n g event between the o b l i g e d and the person to whom he has the o b l i g a t i o n . So i t i s true t h a t when someone has an o b l i g a t i o n he does stand i n some ki n d o f r e l a t i o n s h i p to the person to whom he has the o b l i g a t i o n . For example, the person who has the o b l i g a t i o n and the person to whom he has the o b l i g a t i o n might be r e l a t e d as the g i v e r o f a promise to i t s r e c i p i e n t , or as someone who has behaved i n j u r i o u s l y to h i s v i c t i m , or as a debtor to h i s c r e d i t o r , or as f a t h e r to son and son to f a t h e r . (b) R e s o l v i n g p u z z l i n g cases. Given the c r i t e r i a I have o f f e r e d f o r determining when a statement o f obligedness can be r e w r i t t e n i n terms o f o b l i g a t i o n , we can e x p l a i n some p e c u l a r i t i e s o f the L i s t s I and I I , and we can e x p l a i n why some statements o f o b l i g e d -110. ness appear on I I r a t h e r than I , where our i n t u i t i o n s i n the matter are u n c l e a r . We n o t i c e t h a t i n L i s t I we have the statement, 'A i s o b l i g e d by having taken on the gu a r d i a n s h i p o f B to care f o r him* and i n L i s t I I we have the statement, 'A i s o b l i g e d by being B's guardian to care f o r him'. And the q u e s t i o n a r i s e s : why can we w r i t e the f i r s t but not the second i n terms of o b l i g a t i o n s ? I n order to answer t h a t we must f i r s t n o t i c e t h a t these statements do not say the same t h i n g . The f i r s t t e l l s us what A d i d i n order to e s t a b l i s h h i m s e l f as B's guardian; while the second t e l l s us merely t h a t A i s B's guardian. Now we might assume t h a t i f A has such a r e l a t i o n s h i p to B, he must have done something to b r i n g i t about. But that i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the case. Guardianship might be d e t e r -mined by some a u t h o r i t a t i v e persons, and so be beyond the w i l l o f the i n d i v i d u a l . Once t h i s has been understood, I do not thin k the f a c t t h a t being a guardian does not i n i t s e l f g i v e r i s e to o b l i g a t i o n s , while t a k i n g on gua r d i a n -s h i p does, should s t r i k e us as an i n t o l e r a b l y odd r e s u l t . S i m i l a r r e a s o n i n g e x p l a i n s why 'being a member o f a c l u b ' does not n e c e s s a r i l y g i v e r i s e to o b l i g a t i o n s . I t i s because i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r one to be a member o f some c l u b without having .joined i t . One might not have v e r y c l e a r i n t u i t i o n s as to whether 118—'A i s o b l i g e d by be i n g the onl y one capable o f s a v i n g 111. B, to t r y to save him* can be r e w r i t t e n i n terms o f o b l i -g a t i o n s , and the i n t u i t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t people might w e l l be d i f f e r e n t . But we can now r e s o l v e any c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h i s matter. The statement does not support o b l i g a t i o n s f o r two reasons. F i r s t , the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r i s not an event; and second, A i s not r e s p o n s i b l e i n the r e q u i r e d way f o r the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r . One might a l s o be i n i t i a l l y tempted to say t h a t i f 1112—*A i s o b l i g e d by being the e l d e s t b r o t h e r , to look a f t e r h i s s i s t e r s — i s the case, then the b r o t h e r has an o b l i g a t i o n to look a f t e r h i s s i s t e r s . And t h i s i n t u i t i o n c o u l d be fed by the b e l i e f t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p s give r i s e to o b l i g a t i o n s . But,because t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p does not a r i s e from A's doing an y t h i n g , and t h e r e f o r e i s not one f o r which he can be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e , i t does not give r i s e to o b l i g a t i o n s . However, i t may w e l l be true t h a t i n v i r t u e of h i s p o s i t i o n as e l d e s t b r o t h e r , t h a t i t i s A's duty to care f o r h i s s i s t e r s . T h i s i s because d u t i e s can a r i s e from jobs and p o s i t i o n s . (For d e t a i l s of an a n a l y -s i s o f d u t i e s , see S e c t i o n 5.) I should l i k e to p o i n t out here t h a t any of the o b l i g e d a c t i o n s i n L i s t I I c o u l d be r e q u i r e d by an o b l i g i n g f a c t o r which s a t i s f i e s a l l o f the c o n d i t i o n s f o r y i e l d i n g o b l i g a -t i o n s . For example, A might be o b l i g e d to s i g n a l now, because he promised B t h a t he would always s i g n a l before t u r n i n g . And A might be o b l i g e d to save B, because he 112. promised B t h a t i f ever he were i n need of s a v i n g , and he could save him, he would do so. And so on. (c) Some s p e c i a l problems. I should l i k e to c o n s i d e r some s p e c i a l problems con-c e r n i n g f a v o u r s , borrowing and promising. Favours. I have h e l d t h a t i t i s the a c c e p t i n g o f a favour which i s the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r f o r the o b l i g a t i o n to r e t u r n a favour, not as others have suggested, simply-being the r e c i p i e n t of a favour. I should l i k e to provide some arguments i n favour o f my view. I n order to do so, I t h i n k we need to analyze the phrase 'doing someone a favour'. I suggest t h a t an a c t ( f ) i s the doing o f a favour i f and only i f the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s holds there i s a person b such t h a t : b wants f to be done; the person a c t i n g b e l i e v e s t h a t the r e c i p i e n t wants f to be done, and i s doing i t because o f t h a t b e l i e f ; f i s not r e q u i r e d by any moral, l e g a l , s o c i a l , or other k i n d o f r u l e . T h i s means that you cannot do another a favour by doing f , even i f doing f would be a good f o r him, i f the r e c i p i e n t does not want you to do f (whatever h i s reasons might be). You may o f course t r y to do him a favour by doing f , but you w i l l not succeed i n doing so. T h i s means, I t h i n k t h a t a c c e p t i n g something intended as a favour i s e s s e n t i a l f o r i t s a c t u a l l y b e i n g a favour. So, one cannot a c t u a l l y be 113. the r e c i p i e n t o f a favour without having accepted i t . And t h a t means t h a t a c c e p t i n g a favour i s the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r f o r the o b l i g a t i o n to r e t u r n a favour. Borrowing. The q u e s t i o n i s : Can there be such a t h i n g as borrowing i n a s o c i e t y i n which one does not have an o b l i g a t i o n to r e t u r n borrowed items? Before we can answer t h a t q u e s t i o n we need to know what i t i s to borrow something. I suggest t h a t i t i s to take something from someone wit h the i n t e n t i o n o f r e t u r n i n g i t . And o f course, one can have t h a t i n t e n t i o n without one's being s u b j e c t to a r u l e which says t h a t borrowed items are to be r e t u r n e d . I n the absence o f such a r u l e i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t the members o f a s o c i e t y would lend t h i n g s to one another, but because one can borrow something without the p e r m i s s i o n of the owner t h i s does not a f f e c t my c o n c l u s i o n t h a t there can be borrowing i n a s o c i e t y which does not have a r u l e about r e t u r n i n g borrowed items. Promising. F i r s t , I should l i k e to p o i n t out t h a t the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r a statement to the e f f e c t t h a t •A i s o b l i g e d to do 0 by having promised B that he would do 0' are indeed the same as f o r any other statement o f obl i g e d n e s s : i t must be the case t h a t ( i ) A i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e which says: if a promises to do o, then a i s to do o, except under c o n d i t i o n s t ^ - t ^ ; ( i i ) A does indeed promise to do 0; and ( i i i ) none of the exceptions to the 114. r u l e s t a t e d i n ( i ) h o l d . And t h i s statement o f o b l i g e d -ness a l s o s a t i s f i e s the f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n s necessary f o r our being a b l e to r e w r i t e i t i n terms o f o b l i g a t i o n : ( i v ) the event, the promising, i n v o l v e s both the o b l i g e d and the intended b e n e f i c i a r y of the r u l e s t a t e d i n ( i ) ; (v) the o b l i g e d c o u l d have i n t e n t i o n a l l y prevented the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r by d e c i d i n g not to promise. So we can say, A has an o b l i g a t i o n to do 0, because he promised to do so. Promising, then, i s l o g i c a l l y the same as a c c e p t i n g a favour, borrowing some item, i n j u r y i n g someone, e t c . However, i t seems to me, t h a t u n t i l we r e s o l v e the c o n t r o v e r s i e s about what the concept o f p r o m i s i n g i n v o l v e s and what c o n d i t i o n s must be f u l f i l l e d i n order f o r one to have made a s u c c e s s f u l promise, we w i l l not be a b l e to say f o r sure what the exceptions are to the p r o m i s i n g - r u l e , or whether the r u l e i s a moral or non-moral one. S e c t i o n 5. D u t i e s . (a) An a n a l y s i s D u t i e s have o f t e n been confused with o b l i g a t i o n s . I n t h i s s e c t i o n I s h a l l g ive the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r duty-statements and e x h i b i t t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to o b l i g e d n e s s and o b l i g a t i o n s . The concepts 'job', ' p o s i t i o n ' , and ' r o l e ' have f r e -q u e n t l y been used i n attempts to d e f i n e d u t i e s . So I 1 1 5 . s h a l l s t a r t w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f these concepts. I s h a l l o f f e r examples of what I th i n k come under each of these concepts, and attempt t o pro v i d e a r a t i o n a l e f o r the way i n which I have chosen to c l a s s i f y . jobs: teacher, t y p i s t , j a n i t o r , e l e c t r i c i a n , r e p a i r -man, dishwashter, housekeeper, canvasser p o s i t i o n s : chairman, member of the board, d i r e c t o r , p r e s i d e n t , t r e a s u r e r , mother, f a t h e r , e l d e s t son, host, foreman, l o v e r , f r i e n d , husband, bystander, d r i v e r , passenger r o l e s : ' o l d e r woman', ' b i g s t u d ' , group clown, group 'mother' or ' f a t h e r ' , ' b i g b r o t h e r ' , i n t e l l e c -t u a l , f o o l . Before I can o f f e r a d e f i n i t i o n o f a job, I need to make a d i s t i n c t i o n between what I c a l l ' e x t e r n a l b e n e f i t s ' and ' i n t e r n a l b e n e f i t s ' . When a person r e c e i v e s from an a c t i v i t y , b e n e f i t s which are not d i r e c t l y connected with h i s own p h y s i c a l or mental w e l l - b e i n g , those b e n e f i t s are ' e x t e r n a l ' . I f someone engages i n an a c t i v i t y i n order to earn money, or i n order to h e l p the poor, or i n order to a s s i s t a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y or c h a r i t a b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n , then the b e n e f i t s are e x t e r n a l — t h e y c o n s i s t , r e s p e c t i v e l y , o f the money he r e c e i v e s , the he l p the poor r e c e i v e , and the a s s i s t a n c e the p o l i t i c a l p a r t y or c h a r i t a b l e o r g a n i z a t i o n r e c e i v e s . I n c o n t r a s t , when a person r e c e i v e s from an a c t i v i t y b e n e f i t s which are d i r e c t l y connected with h i s 116. own p h y s i c a l or mental w e l l - b e i n g , then those b e n e f i t s are ' i n t e r n a l * . For example, p l a y i n g a game of squash f o r fun and p h y s i c a l f i t n e s s has both mental and p h y s i c a l b e n e f i t s f o r the p l a y e r . Given t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , I can now d e f i n e a job: An a c t i v i t y i s a job i f and only i f i t s a t i s f i e s the f o l l o w -i n g c o n d i t i o n s : 1. i t r e q u i r e s f o r i t s proper d i s p o s i t i o n the doing o f one or more tasks f o r which there are e x t e r n a l b e n e f i t s ; and 2. one i s r e q u i r e d to perform those tasks e i t h e r because o f the p o s i t i o n one h o l d s , or because of an agree-ment one has made. The p o s i t i o n one has can be l i t e r a l l y the p h y s i c a l p l a c e which one occupies (e.g. s t a n d i n g by the doo r ) ; or one's s i t u a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to some s e t of circumstances (e.g. being the bystander a t a drowning); or one's p l a c e i n some o r g a n i z a t i o n or other s o c i a l group (e.g. p r e s i d e n t , mother). And a r o l e i s the p a r t one p l a y s i n a s o c i a l group, as determined and d e f i n e d by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ways one chooses to a c t , with these ways o f a c t i n g being seen as p a r t l y i n d i c a t i v e o f c h a r a c t e r . A d m i t t e d l y , these words tend to be used i n a f a i r l y loose f a s h i o n , f r e q u e n t l y b e i n g used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . T h i s probably arose from the f a c t that one o f t e n has, f o r example, both the r o l e o f mother and the p o s i t i o n of mother, or the 117. p o s i t i o n of p r e s i d e n t and the job o f p r e s i d e n t . But I t h i n k the a n a l y s e s I have o f f e r e d d i s p l a y both what i s e s s e n t i a l to each of these concepts, and what makes them d i s t i n c t . T h i s i s what i s needed i f they are to be of any use i n c o n c e p t u a l a n a l y s i s . I do not t h i n k , g i v e n t h i s a n a l y s i s o f r o l e s , t h a t anyone w i l l t h i n k t h a t d u t i e s a r i s e from them. We do not t h i n k , because someone p l a y s the r o l e o f 'clown'—-the person i n a s o c i a l group who i s always f o o l i n g around, t e l l i n g jokes, e t c . — t h a t he has a duty to f o o l around and t e l l jokes. Nor do we t h i n k t h a t someone p l a y i n g the r o l e of ' b i g s t u d ' has a duty to d r i v e a b i g f l a s h y c a r , nor that someone p l a y i n g the r o l e o f ' b i g b r o t h e r ' — t h e group's c o n f i d a n t and p r o t e c t o r — h a s a duty to be t r u s t w o r t h y and n u r t u r i n g . And I t h i n k t h a t the i n t u i t i o n t h a t r o l e s do not give r i s e to d u t i e s has i t s b a s i s i n the f a c t t h a t there are never any r u l e s governing the d i s p o s i t i o n of r o l e s . But the s i t u a t i o n with r e s p e c t to jobs and p o s i t i o n s i s d i f f e r e n t . T h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n i s f r e q u e n t l y governed by r u l e s s t i p u l a t i n g what tasks are to be performed. These remarks suggest the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n f o r d u t i e s : d u t i e s are those tasks which are r e q u i r e d f o r the proper d i s p o s i t i o n o f one's job or p o s i t i o n . Given the d e f i n i t i o n o f f e r e d f o r 'job', and t h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f 'duty*, we can see that a l l jobs must have d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with them—because a l l jobs have tasks 118. r e q u i r e d f o r t h e i r proper d i s p o s i t i o n , and these tasks f i t the d e f i n i t i o n f o r be i n g d u t i e s . What these d u t i e s are w i l l depend on what the r u l e s a re. These can o b v i o u s l y v a r y from one group to another, so that a job i n one might have d i f f e r e n t d u t i e s from those a s s o c i a t e d with the same job i n another. L i k e the d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a job, and f o r the same r e a s o n — t h a t the r u l e s can vary from one s o c i e t y to a n o t h e r — d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with a p o s i t i o n might va r y from one group to another. A mother i n one s o c i e t y might have d i f f e r e n t d u t i e s from a mother i n another s o c i e t y ; the p r e s i d e n t i n one o r g a n i z a t i o n might have d i f f e r e n t d u t i e s from the p r e s i d e n t i n another o r g a n i z a t i o n . However, u n l i k e jobs, i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r a p o s i t i o n to have no d u t i e s attached to i t . I n one s o c i a l g a t h e r i n g , the person s t a n d i n g by the door might have the duty to d i r e c t those who have j u s t a r r i v e d to the coat room; while i n another s o c i a l g a t h e r i n g the person s t a n d i n g by the door might have no d u t i e s a t a l l . And while i n some s o c i e t i e s an e l d e s t son might have d u t i e s a r i s i n g from t h a t p o s i t i o n , i n others t h a t p o s i t i o n w i l l g i v e r i s e to no d u t i e s . (By the way, most ta s k s a s s i g n e d to c h i l d r e n are not d u t i e s , because they do not a r i s e from any p o s i t i o n the c h i l d has. They are simply t a s k s . But, i f the c h i l d ' s tasks do a c t u a l l y a r i s e from some p o s i t i o n h e l d by the c h i l d , then those tasks w i l l indeed be d u t i e s . ) 119. •Mother' and ' f a t h e r ' appear i n both the l i s t s o f p o s i t i o n s and r o l e s . T h i s i s because 'mother' and ' f a t h e r ' can be used to r e f e r to the p o s i t i o n someone has i n a f a m i l y group, or to the r o l e someone i s p l a y i n g . (Some-one p l a y i n g the r o l e o f 'mother' w i l l e x h i b i t c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s s o c i a t e d with b e i n g a good mother.) One can adopt the r o l e without having the p o s i t i o n , and one can have the p o s i t i o n without a d o p t i n g the r o l e . A person who has the p o s i t i o n o f mother and p l a y s the r o l e o f mother has d u t i e s i n v i r t u e o f her p o s i t i o n , not i n v i r -tue o f her r o l e . (b) The r e l a t i o n s h i p between d u t i e s , o b ligedness  and o b l i g a t i o n . H o l d i n g or a c q u i r i n g a p o s i t i o n or job can serve as the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r i n a statement of o b l i g e d n e s s . So we can have such statements as: a i s o b l i g e d by h o l d i n g p o s i t i o n p, or job j , to do o, f o r which the t r u t h c o n d i -t i o n s w i l l be as f o l l o w s : i . a i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e which says: I f a has or a c q u i r e s p or j , then a i s to do o; i i . a has or a c q u i r e s p or j . Anything which s a t i s f i e s o i n the above s a t i s f i e s my d e f i n i t i o n f o r being a duty. So a i s o b l i g e d to do h i s d u t i e s . N o t i c e a l s o t h a t the o b l i g i n g f a c t o r might be 'con-t r a c t i n g to do job j ' as i n the f o l l o w i n g : A i s o b l i g e d 120. by having c o n t r a c t e d with B to do job J , to do J . T h i s statement s a t i s f i e s the c r i t e r i a f o r being r e w r i t t e n i n terms o f o b l i g a t i o n s . So we can say, 'A has an o b l i g a t i o n to B to do J . Now, i f J r e q u i r e s f o r i t s proper d i s p o s i -t i o n the d o i n g of tasks l - i , then i t i s A's duty to do task 1, and i t i s h i s duty to do task 2, e t c . I t i s both A's o b l i g a t i o n and A's duty to do tasks 1 through i . The f a c t t h at we can have both an o b l i g a t i o n and a duty-to do the same t h i n g might e x p l a i n why there has been a tendency to f a i l to d i s t i n g u i s h between o b l i g a t i o n s and d u t i e s . But one must bear i n mind t h a t there are some p o s i t i o n s which are t h r u s t upon one. And then, while one w i l l have the d u t i e s a s s o c i a t e d with such p o s i t i o n s , one w i l l have no o b l i g a t i o n s . Although i t i s not common to i n d i c a t e whether a duty i s s o c i a l , l e g a l , or f a m i l i a l , one could do so. And the b a s i s f o r the m o d i f i e r w i l l be the same as wit h o b l i g a t i o n s : i f the r u l e i s s o c i a l , the duty w i l l be a s o c i a l duty, and i f i t i s l e g a l , the duty w i l l be l e g a l , and i f the r u l e i s f a m i l i a l , the duty w i l l be f a m i l i a l . There are a l s o moral d u t i e s . As with o b l i g a t i o n s we determine whether a duty i s moral by dete r m i n i n g whether the r u l e r e q u i r i n g i t i s a moral r u l e , or i s supported by a moral r u l e or p r i n c i p l e . I submit t h a t a bystander a t the scene o f a drowning has the duty to t r y to ; h e l p the v i c t i m , i f t h i s can be done without g r e a t p e r s o n a l c o s t . 1 2 1 . and that this duty is amoral one because the rule requir-ing such assistance is a moral rule. Section 6. Special rights. (a) How special rights relate to obligations and  duties. If A has an obligation to do 0, and B is the intended beneficiary of the rule which supports that obligation, then A has an obligation to B to do 0. So, i f A is obliged by having accepted a favour from B to do B a favour in return ( i f the opportunity arises), then A has an obligation to B to do him a favour; and i f A is obliged by having promised B to do 0, then A has an obligation to B to do 0; i f A is obliged by having carelessly killed C to provide B (his wife) with compensation, then A has an obligation to B to provide her with compensation, and so on. In each of these examples, i t would be perfectly natural to say of B that he/she has a right against A— to A's doing him a favour in the f i r s t , to A's doing 0, in the second, and to A's compensation in the third. Notice that in each of these B satisfies the following two con-ditions: (a) he was either involved in the obliging event, or is so related to someone who was that loss to the latter is also loss to him; and (b) B is the intended beneficiary of the rule which supports the obligation statement. For every obligation-statement there is someone who satisfies 122. these c o n d i t i o n s . And anyone who does w i l l have a r i g h t T a g a i n s t the person who i s obliged, to h i s doing the o b l i g e d a c t . I s h a l l c a l l r i g h t s which a r i s e i n such a way s p e c i a l r i g h t s . I t should be q u i t e c l e a r that o b l i g a t i o n s and s p e c i a l r i g h t s a r i s e i n p r e c i s e l y the same circumstances; they merely s t a t e the moral r e l a t i o n s h i p from two d i f f e r e n t s t a n d p o i n t s , the f i r s t from the p o i n t o f view of the person who i s o b l i g e d , and the second from the p o i n t o f view of the person to whom the o b l i g a t i o n i s owed. They are then s t r i c t l y ' c o r r e l a t i v e ' , i . e . i f a hascan o b l i g a -t i o n to b to do o, then b has a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t a to h i s doing o, and v i c e v e r s a . Combining these r e s u l t s with the c o n d i t i o n s under which o b l i g a t i o n statements are t r u e , we get the f o l l o w i n g t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r s p e c i a l r i g h t s statements: b has a s p e c i a l r i g h t to a's doing o i f and only i f the f o l l o w i n g h o l d : i . a i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e which says: I f e occurs, then a i s to do o f o r b, except i f c o n d i t i o n s t 1 - t ^ h o l d ; i i . b i s the intended b e n e f i c i a r y o f the r u l e s t a t e d i n ( i ) above; i i i . e o c c u r s ; i v . none o f the exceptions h o l d ; v. event e i n v o l v e s both a and e i t h e r b or someone who i s so r e l a t e d to b=. th a t the former's l o s s w i l l a l s o 123. be b's l o s s ; v i . (a) a co u l d have prevented e by e x e r c i s i n g due care; or (b) a c o u l d have prevented e by d e c i d i n g not to a c t i n an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g way, i . e . he c o u l d have decided not to do e, and he knew e had (or would have) an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g p r o p e r t y . The r u l e s t a t e d i n ( i ) might be one which i s grounded i n a n a t u r a l r i g h t . For example, the r u l e t h a t a i s to compensate b f o r having i n j u r e d him, might w e l l be grounded i n b's n a t u r a l r i g h t to w e l l - b e i n g . I n such a case we would have a s p e c i a l r i g h t a r i s i n g out of a n a t u r a l r i g h t v i a the r u l e and the o b l i g i n g event. I t i s o f t e n assumed that d u t i e s and s p e c i a l r i g h t s a l s o c o r r e l a t e . No such c o r r e l a t i o n f o l l o w s from my e x p l i -c a t i o n o f d u t i e s . However, when one (A) has an o b l i g a t i o n to another (B) to perform h i s d u t i e s , then i n v i r t u e o f the c o r r e l a t i v i t y o f s p e c i a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s , B w i l l have a s p e c i a l r i g h t to A's performing h i s d u t i e s . For example, i f A has c o n t r a c t e d w i t h B to be h i s s e c r e -t a r y , and the d u t i e s i n c l u d e answering the phone, t y p i n g correspondence, and f i l i n g , then A has an o b l i g a t i o n to perform those d u t i e s . And B w i l l have a s p e c i a l r i g h t to A's answering the phone, t y p i n g correspondence, and f i l i n g . But i f A's d u t i e s a r i s e from h i s h o l d i n g a p o s i t i o n which he d i d not a c q u i r e , then even when the d u t i e s concern 124. another p a r t y , t h a t p a r t y w i l l not have a s p e c i a l r i g h t to t h e i r performance. For example, a grandmother's d u t i e s might i n c l u d e c a r i n g f o r her g r a n d c h i l d r e n , but her grand-c h i l d r e n w i l l not have a s p e c i a l r i g h t to her c a r e . (b) Simple and complex o b l i g a t i o n s and s p e c i a l r i g h t s Compare the f o l l o w i n g two l i s t s o f s p e c i a l r i g h t s : I. 1. the r i g h t to the r e t u r n o f a borrowed s h o v e l 2. the r i g h t to compensation i n the amount o f $1,000 3 . the r i g h t to be met f o r lunch as promised I I . 1. the r i g h t to the f u l f i l l m e n t o f the c o n t r a c t (which r e q u i r e s the doing of x, y, and z.) 2. the r i g h t of a young c h i l d to care from h i s p a r e n t s 3 . the r i g h t of an i n j u r e d person to h e l p from the person who i n j u r e d him The r i g h t s i n the f i r s t l i s t r e q u i r e t h a t the person with the c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n do one k i n d o f a c t — r e t u r n a s h o v e l , pay $1,000, meet the promisee f o r lunch. There a r e , of course, d i f f e r e n t ways i n which t h a t a c t can be c a r r i e d out. One might r e t u r n the s h o v e l w i t h the l e f t hand or with the r i g h t ; one might pay the $1,000 by cheque, or i n cash, i n $1.00 b i l l s or $100 b i l l s ; and one might meet the promisee f o r lunch i n a good mood or i n a bad one. But s t i l l , only one k i n d o f a c t i s r e q u i r e d . I s h a l l c a l l such r i g h t s , simple. The r i g h t s i n the second l i s t , on the other hand, are 1 2 5 . ones which r e q u i r e the doing o f s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t kinds of a c t s . The statement o f the f i r s t r i g h t s p e c i f i e s what p a r t i c u l a r a c t s are r e q u i r e d — t h e doing o f x, y, and z. Although the a c t s are not s p e c i f i e d i n the second, we have a f a i r l y good i d e a what belongs under the care o f a young c h i l d : making sure the c h i l d i s p r o p e r l y f e d , adequately c l o t h e d , educated, l o v e d . And while the r i g h t to h e l p w i l l not always c o n s i s t o f a number o f d i f f e r e n t a c t s , i t o f t e n w i l l . Whether i t does or not w i l l depend on what the i n j u r e d p a r t y needs. I f he only needs to be taken home, then the r i g h t to he l p w i l l r e q u i r e t h a t he be taken home. But i f he needs f i r s t a i d , an ambulance, and reassurance on the way to the h o s p i t a l , then the person with the co r r e s p o n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n w i l l be r e q u i r e d to give f i r s t a i d , c a l l an ambulance and accompany him to the h o s p i t a l . I s h a l l c a l l r i g h t s which r e q u i r e the o b l i g e d person to do more than one k i n d o f a c t , complex r i g h t s . To say that the r i g h t to the f u l f i l l m e n t o f the con-t r a c t r e q u i r e s the doing o f x, y, and z, i s to say t h a t the r i g h t - h o l d e r has a r i g h t to the o b l i g e d doing x, and a r i g h t to the o b l i g e d d o i n g y, and a r i g h t to the o b l i g e d doing z. So the complex r i g h t c o n s i s t s o f a number of simple r i g h t s . S i m i l a r l y , to say th a t the r i g h t o f a young c h i l d to care r e q u i r e s t h a t the parents feed him, c l o t h e him, eduate and love him, i s to say that the c h i l d has a r i g h t to be p r o p e r l y f e d , to be adequately c l o t h e d , 1 2 6 . e t c . The complex r i g h t o f care c o n s i s t s of those simple r i g h t s . And f i n a l l y , to say t h a t the r i g h t to help r e q u i r e s g i v i n g f i r s t a i d , c a l l i n g an ambulance, and accompanying the i n j u r e d to the h o s p i t a l , i s to say t h a t the complex r i g h t of h e l p c o n s i s t s of the simple r i g h t s to be g i v e n f i r s t a i d , e t c . Of course, those simple r i g h t s might be discharged i n any number of ways. Feeding one's c h i l d adequately can be done by f o l l o w i n g any number of d i f f e r -ent d i e t s , and a c h i l d might be adequately c l o t h e d i n any number o f d i f f e r e n t ways. I f one has a complex o b l i g a t i o n , say o f care, but only succeeds i n f u l f i l l i n g some of the simple o b l i g a t i o n s , then one has on l y p a r t i a l l y d i s c h a r g e d h i s complex o b l i g a -t i o n , and thus the c o r r e l a t i n g r i g h t has been p a r t i a l l y v i o l a t e d . We cannot always t e l l what simple o b l i g a t i o n s make up a complex o b l i g a t i o n . T h i s means th a t i t w i l l not always be p o s s i b l e to say whether a complex o b l i g a t i o n has been f u l f i l l e d , or whether the c o r r e l a t i n g complex s p e c i a l r i g h t has been p a r t i a l l y v i o l a t e d . For example, say A agrees to look a f t e r h i s f r i e n d , B, when B gets out o f the h o s p i t a l . A t h i n k s that he has agreed to do B's shopping, to cook h i s meals, and to t i d y h i s house, because these are the t h i n g s which A b e l i e v e s w i l l need to be done. But, because B a l s o needs someone to walk h i s dog, he t h i n k s that the agreement i n c l u d e s such help from A. I r e a l l y 127. do not see t h a t there i s any way of r e s o l v i n g t h i s d i s -agreement as to the content o f the complex o b l i g a t i o n o f care. Because the simple o b l i g a t i o n s were not s t i p u l a t e d i n the agreement between the f r i e n d s , the complex o b l i g a -t i o n has been l e f t i n d e t e r m i n a t e . T h e r e f o r e , we w i l l not be able to say c o n c l u s i v e l y whether the complex o b l i g a t i o n has been f u l l y d i s c h a r g e d by A's doing B's shopping, e t c . , or whether, because he f a i l s to walk B's dog, B's complex r i g h t i s p a r t i a l l y v i o l a t e d . I noted above t h a t simple o b l i g a t i o n s can be f u l -f i l l e d i n v a r i o u s ways, e.g. the borrowed s h o v e l can be ret u r n e d i n e i t h e r the l e f t or r i g h t hand. T h i s f a c t i s important when i t comes to such simple o b l i g a t i o n s as the o b l i g a t i o n to make sure that one's c h i l d i s fed p r o -p e r l y . Because a c h i l d can be p r o p e r l y nourished on many d i f f e r e n t d i e t s , the o b l i g a t i o n to feed a c h i l d does not imply an o b l i g a t i o n nor even an e n t i t l e m e n t to f o r c e a c h i l d to eat any p a r t i c u l a r d i e t . The judgment that an e n t i t l e m e n t to f o r c e the d i e t on him i s generated by h i s s p e c i a l r i g h t to be fed would have two i n a d m i s s i b l e r e s u l t s : (1) that the p o s s e s s i o n of a s p e c i a l r i g h t can be a burden f o r the r i g h t - h o l d e r ; and (2) t h a t there can be c o n f l i c t s between a person's s p e c i a l and n a t u r a l r i g h t s . ( I n the .case a t hand the c o n f l i c t would a r i s e between the s p e c i a l r i g h t to be fed a p a r t i c u l a r d i e t and the n a t u r a l r i g h t 128. to autonomy.) But what o f a c h i l d who, i f not f o r c e d to e at c e r t a i n t h i n g s , simply would not eat enough of the r i g h t k i n d of food to remain w e l l - n o u r i s h e d ? S u r e l y we can f o r c e such a c h i l d to eat? Indeed we can, as w i l l be seen i n my next s u b - s e c t i o n . (c) Waiving s p e c i a l r i g h t s . When can someone waive, and when can someone not waive a s p e c i a l r i g h t ? Before we can c o n s i d e r t h i s ques-t i o n we must be c l e a r about e x a c t l y what we mean by 'waive'. There are two f a i r l y common meanings g i v e n to t h a t term, and u n l e s s we are c l e a r i n what sense we are u s i n g i t , c o n f u s i o n w i l l r e s u l t . The Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y (The Compact E d i t i o n , Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1971) pr o v i d e s us with the f o l l o w i n g two d e f i n i t i o n s : 1. to r e l i n q u i s h (a r i g h t , c l a i m , or c o n t e n t i o n ) e i t h e r by express d e c l a r a t i o n or by doing some i n t e n t i o n a l a c t which by law i s e q u i v a l e n t to t h i s . (I would add a f t e r 'by law', 'or by custom'.) 2. to r e f r a i n from i n s i s t i n g upon (a p r i v i l e g e , r i g h t , c l a i m ) , to f o r e b e a r to c l a i m or demand. I propose to use 'waive* i n the f i r s t sense. So, i f one waives h i s s p e c i a l r i g h t to 0, he no longer has that r i g h t . Nothing he can do w i l l b r i n g i t back i n t o h i s 1 2 9 . p o s s e s s i o n . I t ceases to e x i s t . (Of course, he might w e l l come to possess a s i m i l a r r i g h t i f the same k i n d of event which gave r i s e to the waived r i g h t happens again.) I t w i l l only be waived i f the possessor e x p l i c i t l y says; 'I hereby r e l i n q u i s h my s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t B to 0 ' , or 'I hereby r e l e a s e B from h i s o b l i g a t i o n to do 0 ' , or 'I d e s i r e t h a t B not do 0 ' , or by doing something which i s e q u i v a l e n t to any o f these; f o r example, a c t i v e l y r e s i s t -i n g the performance o f the o b l i g a t i o n . But he does not waive h i s r i g h t , i n t h i s sense o f 'waive', i f he simply f a i l s to c l a i m or i n s i s t on i t . In a n u t s h e l l , someone's simply not i n s i s t i n g on the f u l f i l l i n g o f an o b l i g a t i o n to him does not c o n s t i t u t e w a i v i n g h i s c o r r e l a t i v e r i g h t , while someone's announcing that he i s not i n s i s t i n g on the f u l f i l l i n g of an o b l i g a t i o n to him does c o n s t i t u t e the waiving o f h i s r i g h t . Let us now c o n s i d e r the c h i l d who does not want to eat the t h i n g s which are necessary f o r being w e l l - n o u r i s h e d . We s h a l l assume t h a t he has expressed the d e s i r e i n some manner or other that he not be fed foods f ^ - f ^ t & n d we s h a l l assume t h a t without e a t i n g a t l e a s t some of those foods he w i l l become malnourished. Do we want to say t h a t he has r e l e a s e d h i s parents from t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n to feed him p r o p e r l y ? C e r t a i n l y not, but t h i s i s not because he i s i n c a p a b l e o f w a i v i n g s p e c i a l r i g h t s . I f h i s parents have promised him t h a t they w i l l take him to the movies, and 1 3 0 . then f i n d t h a t i t w i l l be ve r y i n c o n v e n i e n t to do so, the c h i l d might w e l l r e l e a s e h i s parents from t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n to him. What i s i t then which prevents him from waiving h i s r i g h t to t h i s a s p e c t o f care? I t i s because the c h i l d does not f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e the consequences of not e a t i n g p r o p e r l y t h a t he cannot succeed i n r e l e a s i n g h i s parents from t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n to make sure t h a t he eats w e l l . We met the same kind o f s i t -u a t i o n i n P a r t I when I c o n s i d e r e d the c o n d i t i o n s under which a p o s s e s s o r o f a n a t u r a l r i g h t could and co u l d not renounce a n a t u r a l r i g h t . I argued there t h a t i f the possessor o f a r i g h t would not want to renounce a r i g h t were he i n p o s s e s s i o n o f a p i e c e o f non-misleading informa-t i o n , then even i f he does something which n o r m a l l y con-s t i t u t e s r e n u n c i a t i o n , he w i l l not i n f a c t l o s e t h a t r i g h t . I t h i n k we can assume, i n the case under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h a t the c h i l d would not want to waive h i s s p e c i a l r i g h t were he a c t u a l l y i n p o s s e s s i o n o f the r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n — t h a t he w i l l be unhealthy un l e s s he eats the r i g h t foods. And because he would not, he w i l l not succeed i n waiving h i s s p e c i a l r i g h t , though he might t r y to. Furthermore, because he w i l l i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y subsequently consent to h i s parents* f o r c i n g him to eat p r o p e r l y , when he i s an a d u l t , the f o r c e w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a p e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n o f h i s n a t u r a l r i g h t to autonomy. The same s o r t o f r e a s o n i n g i s a p p l i c a b l e to a d u l t s . 131. Consider the f o l l o w i n g case. A has been i n j u r e d by B. So B has an o b l i g a t i o n to h e l p A, and c o r r e l a t i v e l y , A has a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t B to h i s h e l p . A's i n j u r i e s are s e r i o u s but because he i s i n a s t a t e of shock, he i s i n c a p a b l e o f a p p r e c i a t i n g t h a t f a c t . Under the i l l u s i o n t h a t he i s r e a l l y a l l r i g h t , A t e l l s B t h a t he need not bother t a k i n g him to the h o s p i t a l . Under normal circum-stances, A would have thereby waived h i s s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t B. But, because A does not possess i n f o r m a t i o n which would, were i t i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n , cause him not to t r y to waive h i s s p e c i a l r i g h t , he cannot waive t h a t r i g h t . T h e r e f o r e , B s t i l l has the o b l i g a t i o n to h e l p him. Furthermore, i t i s i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d p e r m i s s i b l e f o r him to f o r c e h i s h e l p upon A because A w i l l probably consent to t h a t i n t e r f e r e n c e once he r e c o v e r s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t B, too, i s i n ignorance of the extent o f A's i n j u r i e s . As a r e s u l t , when A t r i e s to r e l e a s e B from h i s o b l i g a t i o n to h e l p , B thinks he succeeds, and t h e r e f o r e does not take him to the h o s p i t a l . But because of h i s l a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n , A does not succeed i n r e l e a s i n g B from h i s o b l i g a t i o n . So by not h e l p i n g , B v i o l a t e s A's r i g h t to a s s i s t a n c e . However, because t h i s n o n - f u l f i l l m e n t i s due to B's non-culpable ignorance, he i s not blameworthy f o r h i s f a i l u r e . (d) F a i l u r e s to f u l f i l l o b l i g a t i o n s which are non-v i o l a t i o n s of s p e c i a l r i g h t s . 132. Say A has a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t B to B's meeting him f o r lunch, because B promised to do so. Circumstances a r i s e which make A d e s i r e t h a t B not t u r n up f o r the engagement, but he has been unable to co n t a c t B to express these sentiments. B l e a r n s o f the circumstances and r e a -l i z e s t h a t they are such t h a t A w i l l d e s i r e that he not meet him f o r lunch, and so he does not keep the engagement. Although A has not r e l e a s e d B from h i s o b l i g a t i o n , s u r e l y B has not a c t e d wrongly i n f a i l i n g to t u r n up f o r the luncheon date. I would say that the f a i l u r e to f u l f i l l an o b l i g a t i o n i n such circumstances w i l l not c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n of the c o r r e l a t i n g s p e c i a l right.' Say, to a l t e r the case s l i g h t l y , t h a t B l e a r n s , not that A d e s i r e s / t h a t he not t u r n up f o r lunch, but r a t h e r that A has no d e s i r e s one way or the other. B would, f o r some reason, p r e f e r not to meet A f o r lunch, but i s unable to reach A to get h i s r e l e a s e . I f he decides not to t u r n up, does he thereby v i o l a t e A's r i g h t a g a i n s t him? Again, I would say, because A does not have the a p p r o p r i a t e d e s i r e — i . e . t h a t B meet him f o r l u n c h — t h a t B's not doing so w i l l not v i o l a t e h i s s p e c i a l r i g h t . I t w i l l be another case where n o n - f u l f i l l m e n t o f an o b l i g a t i o n w i l l not con-s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i n g s p e c i a l r i g h t . We saw with r e s p e c t to n a t u r a l r i g h t s t h a t d e s i r e s were r e l e v a n t i n the same way i n determining whether an i n t e r f e r e n c e with a n a t u r a l r i g h t c o n s t i t u t e d a v i o l a t i o n 1 3 3 . of t h a t r i g h t . There were a number of other c o n d i t i o n s under which i n t e r f e r e n c e would not c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n . But none of them are r e l e v a n t t o s p e c i a l r i g h t s . So we have the f o l l o w i n g r e s u l t s : When A f a i l s to f u l f i l l h i s o b l i g a t i o n to B, t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a v i o l a t i o n o f B's c o r r e l a t i n g s p e c i a l r i g h t u n l e s s the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n h o l d s : the r i g h t h o l d e r does not d e s i r e t h a t o be done, where t h i s d e s i r e has not been expressed (otherwise the r i g h t would have be:en waived). T h i s c o n d i t i o n i n c l u d e s two s p e c i e s : (a) the r i g h t - h o l d e r d e s i r e s t h a t o not be done; and (b) the r i g h t - h o l d e r does not care whether or not o i s done. Of course we must b u i l d i n t o these c o n d i t i o n s the requirement t h a t the r i g h t - h o l d e r i s not l a c k i n g r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , which would, were i t i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n , cause him to d e s i r e the doing of 0 by B. I f t h i s were the case, then the l a c k of d e s i r e w i l l not render the n o n - f u l f i l l m e n t of the o b l i g a t i o n a n o n - v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t . (e) P e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s o f s p e c i a l r i g h t s Under c e r t a i n circumstances the r i g h t t h i n g to do w i l l be to v i o l a t e someone's s p e c i a l r i g h t , as has been f r e q u e n t l y i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g example. Say A has promised to meet B f o r l u n c h , but on the way to t h a t rendezvous A comes upon an a c c i d e n t , the v i c t i m s o f which are s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d . A stops to a d m i n i s t e r f i r s t a i d , 1 3 4 . and consequently i s unable to keep h i s date with B. In such circumstances, the n o n - f u l f i l l m e n t of the o b l i g a t i o n and thus the v i o l a t i o n o f B's s p e c i a l r i g h t i s not o n l y p e r m i s s i b l e , but i s a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e d . The s p e c i a l r i g h t has been o v e r r i d d e n by a more important moral concern. The same would be the case i f A's f u l f i l l i n g h i s o b l i g a t i o n would be s e r i o u s l y i n c o n f l i c t with c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s of j u s t i c e . An i l l u s t r a t i o n o f the l a t t e r k i n d o f case might be as f o l l o w s . Congressman A promises congress-man B to support him on B i l l 2 2 p r o v i d i n g congressman B supports him on B i l l 2 1 . B f u l f i l l s h i s p a r t of the b a r g a i n . But then A reads an economic a n a l y s i s which p r o v i d e s evidence t h a t the p a s s i n g o f B i l l 2 2 w i l l r e s u l t i n h i g h e r taxes f o r the poor and lower taxes f o r the r i c h . He b e l i e v e s , r i g h t l y we s h a l l assume, that such a r e s u l t i s u n j u s t . Because i t i s , he decides to break h i s promise to B, and to vote a g a i n s t B i l l 2 2 , thereby c o n t r i b u t i n g to i t s d e f e a t . I suggest that t h i s v i o l a t i o n o f B's r i g h t i s p e r m i s s i b l e because the i n j u s t i c e i t prevents i s o f more importance than the r i g h t i t v i o l a t e s . We must a l s o take i n t o account with r e s p e c t to the q u e s t i o n of the p e r m i s s i b i l i t y o f v i o l a t i n g a s p e c i a l r i g h t , the i n f l u e n c e of the m o r a l i t y o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t . J u s t how does the p e r s o n a l s a c r i f i c e r e q u i r e d to f u l f i l l an o b l i g a -t i o n bear on the q u e s t i o n o f the p e r m i s s i b i l i t y o f non-f u l f i l l m e n t ? Of course I am unable to g i v e a v e r y p r e c i s e 1 3 5 . answer to t h a t q u e s t i o n because, as I p o i n t e d out i n P a r t I, I do not have a developed theory o f the m o r a l i t y of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . However, there are some p o i n t s worth making. F i r s t , the s i t u a t i o n with r e s p e c t to o b l i g a t i o n s i s a b i t d i f f e r e n t from other moral requirements i n the sense t h a t one c o u l d have prevented them e i t h e r by d e c i d i n g not to a c t i n an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g way, or by being more c a r e f u l . L e t us c o n s i d e r these two d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f s i t u a t i o n . I submit, t h a t when one a c q u i r e s an o b l i g a t i o n by doing something he c o u l d have deci d e d not to do, when he knows i t i s an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g a c t , one thereby accepts r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l o f the f o r e s e e n c o s t i n f u l f i l l i n g t h a t o b l i g a t i o n . The s i z e o f the fo r e s e e n c o s t w i l l never j u s t i f y v i o l a t i n g the r i g h t - h o l d e r ' s c o r r e s p o n d i n g s p e c i a l r i g h t . The o b l i g e d must a l s o , I t h i n k , accept some of the unforeseen c o s t , but there are l i m i t s . I f the o b l i g e d a c t i s r e a l l y o f r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e importance, and the unforeseen s a c r i f i c e i s r e a l l y q u i t e l a r g e , then the o b l i g e d w i l l be j u s t i f i e d i n f a i l i n g to f u l f i l l h i s o b l i g a t i o n , and the v i o l a t i o n of the c o r r e l a -t i v e s p e c i a l r i g h t w i l l be p e r m i s s i b l e . I f the o b l i g a t i o n i s a c q u i r e d through c a r e l e s s n e s s , none o f the s a c r i f i c e o f f u l f i l l i n g i t w i l l be fo r e s e e n . But o b v i o u s l y , i f h i s having a moral o b l i g a t i o n i s to have any moral f o r c e a t a l l , the o b l i g e d must be r e q u i r e d to 1 3 6 . f u l f i l l i t even i f t h i s r e q u i r e s some s a c r i f i c e — a s indeed i t u s u a l l y w i l l . However, i f the s a c r i f i c e i s s u f f i c i e n t l y g r eat, the o b l i g e d w i l l be j u s t i f i e d i n f a i l i n g to f u l f i l l h i s o b l i g a t i o n . I do t h i n k , though, because i t i s h i s own f a u l t t h a t he has an o b l i g a t i o n , t h a t the s a c r i f i c e r e q u i r e d of the o b l i g e d w i l l be g r e a t e r than i t would be were he simply the v i c t i m o f some u n c o n d i t i o n a l moral r u l e . ( f ) S p e c i a l r i g h t s and t h i r d p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r i e s . Consider the f o l l o w i n g promise. A promises B t h a t he w i l l do 0 to or f o r C. What we want to know i s whether C has a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t A a r i s i n g from t h i s promise. I argued e a r l i e r (p. 1 0 5 ) t h a t the intended b e n e f i -c i a r y o f an o b l i g a t i o n i s i d e n t i f i e d by determining who the r u l e i s intended to b e n e f i t , and t h a t we co u l d d i s -cover t h i s by c o n s i d e r i n g what j u s t i f i e s the r u l e s . Now c o n s i d e r the r u l e governing promises: ' I f a promises b to do o, then a i s to do o'. I t does not even mention a t h i r d p a r t y , so on what grounds c o u l d we c l a i m t h a t a t h i r d p a r t y ' s b e n e f i t i s what p a r t l y j u s t i f i e s the r u l e ? We are no b e t t e r o f f i f we amend the r u l e to read: ' I f a promises b to do o to or f o r c, he i s to do o to or f o r c', s i n c e we cannot t e l l what doing o i s . Doing o f o r c might i n v o l v e k i l l i n g him (before he commits f u r t h e r rape-murders), or i t might i n v o l v e c a r i n g f o r him u n t i l he i s w e l l . And of course such d e t a i l s cannot be i n c l u d e d i n a 1 3 7 . g e n e r a l r u l e . Thus we can h a r d l y c l a i m t h a t what p a r t l y j u s t i f i e s t h i s r u l e about promises i s t h a t i t b e n e f i t s t h i r d p a r t i e s . I conclude t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h i r d p a r t i e s to promises cannot be intended b e n e f i c i a r i e s i n the t e c h -n i c a l sense used here. And so they cannot have s p e c i a l r i g h t s a r i s i n g from promises. Thus C i n the above example cannot have a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t A. However, a t h i r d p a r t y to a promise might have a s p e c i a l r i g h t a r i s i n g from some other o b l i g i n g f a c t o r . For example, A might encourage C to r e l y on h i s doing 0 f o r him. Encouraging someone to r e l y on one's doing something probably c o n s t i t u t e s an o b l i g i n g f a c t o r . And i t s a t i s f i e s the c o n d i t i o n s f o r g i v i n g r i s e to o b l i g a t i o n s and s p e c i a l r i g h t s . T h e r e f o r e , i f A promises B to do 0 f o r C, encour-ages C to r e l y on h i s doing 0, and f a i l s to do 0, he v i o -l a t e s not o n l y B's r i g h t , but C's r i g h t as w e l l . (g) The needy and s p e c i a l r i g h t s . I t has been argued that the government o f a country enters i n t o an i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t with the c i t i z e n s of t h a t country to do and r e f r a i n from doing c e r t a i n t h i n g s . I f there i s such a c o n t r a c t , then the government w i l l have o b l i g a t i o n s to the c i t i z e n s a r i s i n g from i t , and the c i t i -zens w i l l have s p e c i a l r i g h t s a g a i n s t the government. These o b l i g a t i o n s might w e l l i n c l u d e the o b l i g a t i o n to p r o -v i d e f a c i l i t i e s f o r c a r i n g f o r the needy; the o b l i g a t i o n 138. to t r y to run the economy so that a l l have the o p p o r t u n i t y to work; the o b l i g a t i o n to e s t a b l i s h a medical programme; and the o b l i g a t i o n to provide e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s . Then, i f these o b l i g a t i o n s are not f u l f i l l e d , the c i t i z e n s ' spe-c i a l r i g h t s w i l l be v i o l a t e d . Even i f there i s no such i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t between the governed and•the governors, one:.might argue t h a t there ought to be, on the grounds of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of j u s t i c e and/or u t i l i t y , and thus t h a t the government ought to have those o b l i g a t i o n s and the c i t i z e n s those s p e c i a l r i g h t s . The needy might a l s o have s p e c i a l r i g h t s a r i s i n g from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f r e p a r a t i o n . We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t when one person i n j u r e s another i n c e r t a i n circumstances, the i n j u r o r a c q u i r e s the o b l i g a t i o n to compensate and/or a s s i s t the i n j u r e d . The r u l e which supports t h i s o b l i g a -t i o n i s a moral r u l e , and so a p p l i e s to everyone. So, i f some group i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r another's being i n a s t a t e of need, then the former have an o b l i g a t i o n of a s s i s t a n c e to the l a t t e r , who have a s p e c i a l r i g h t a g a i n s t them. I t does not f o l l o w from t h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t i f former members o f a group are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r w r o n g f u l l y c a u s i n g the members o f another group to be i n need, then the p r e -sent members o f the f i r s t group have an o b l i g a t i o n to t r y to h e l p the members of the i n j u r e d group. I n order f o r t h i s to be the case o b l i g a t i o n s would have to be i n h e r i t a b l e . I doubt t h a t they a r e , on the grounds that one of the most 139. e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s o f o b l i g a t i o n s i s the element o f r e s -p o n s i b i l i t y , and one cannot be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r what one's an c e s t o r s d i d . T h i s , o f course, does not mean t h a t the f i r s t group i s not morally r e q u i r e d to he l p the second, but j u s t t h a t t h i s requirement w i l l not be one o f o b l i g a -t i o n , but r a t h e r would r e s t on u n c o n d i t i o n a l r u l e s o f u t i l i t y or perhaps j u s t i c e . (h) What i s s p e c i a l about o b l i g a t i o n s and s p e c i a l  r i g h t s ? Since o b l i g a t i o n s and s p e c i a l r i g h t s can be marked o f f as s p e c i a l cases o f moral requirements and c l a i m s , presumably there i s some p o i n t i n doing so. The p o i n t i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g f e a t u r e s o f these moral con-cepts (some o f which we have a l r e a d y met). 1. We can i n d i c a t e the source o f the moral r e q u i r e -ment or c l a i m by u s i n g the language of o b l i g a t i o n and s p e c i a l r i g h t , when i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e to do so. T h i s i s important to know because o f the next f e a t u r e o f s p e c i a l r i g h t s . 2. The s a c r i f i c e r e q u i r e d i n order to make a v i o l a -t i o n o f a s p e c i a l r i g h t p e r m i s s i b l e must have been u n f o r e -seen and l a r g e r than would be r e q u i r e d i n order to j u s t i f y the f a i l u r e to obey some other moral requirement. T h i s i s because one i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a c q u i r i n g one's o b l i g a -t i o n s , and thus f o r the e x i s t e n c e of the corresp o n d i n g s p e c i a l r i g h t . 140. 3. O b l i g a t i o n s share with a l l cases of obligedness the f e a t u r e t h a t they extend moral requirements. T h i s i s because there must be an o b l i g i n g f a c t o r present i n order f o r the r u l e s u p p o r t i n g the o b l i g e d n e s s or o b l i g a t i o n statement to come i n t o e f f e c t . Without the o b l i g i n g f a c -t o r , the r u l e w i l l be o f no r e l e v a n c e to one's a c t i o n s because i t s antecedent w i l l be u n f u l f i l l e d . The person who has promised to do 0, the person who has i n j u r e d another, and the person who has been asked f o r s h e l t e r a l l have thereby had t h e i r moral requirements extended. 4. Many (but not a l l ) r u l e s s u p p o r t i n g obligedness and o b l i g a t i o n statements are ones which the community has adopted i n order to d i s t r i b u t e b e n e f i t s and burdens among i t s members. I f someone does not do what he i s o b l i g e d to do, the burden w i l l f a l l on someone e l s e , while he continues w i t h h i s b e n e f i t s . So there i s o f t e n an e l e -ment of u n f a i r n e s s i n v o l v e d i n f a i l i n g to f u l f i l l an o b l i g a t i o n or not doing what one i s o b l i g e d to do. 141. C o n c l u s i o n I have argued i n t h i s t h e s i s t h a t there are two d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of r i g h t s : n a t u r a l and s p e c i a l . And I o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s of n a t u r a l r i g h t s : A has a n a t u r a l r i g h t to (do or be) X a g a i n s t B a t time t (and p l a c e p f o r autonomy r i g h t s ) i f and only i f i t i s the case that i n v i r t u e of c e r t a i n n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of A, and i n the absence of both l i m i t i n g and c e r t a i n other ( s p e c i f i e d ) c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r B to be p o s i t i v e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n A's not h a ving X a t t (and p ) . And I o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s of s p e c i a l r i g h t s : B has a s p e c i a l r i g h t to A's doing 0 i f and o n l y i f the f o l l o w i n g h o l d : i . A i s s u b j e c t to a r u l e which says: i f e occurs, then a i s to do o f o r b, except i f c o n d i t i o n s " t ^ - t ^ h o l d ; i i . B i s the intended b e n e f i c i a r y o f the r u l e s t a t e d i n ( i ) above; i i i . e o c c u r s ; i v . none o f the exceptions h o l d ; v. event e i n v o l v e s both A and e i t h e r B or someone who i s so r e l a t e d to B that the former's l o s s i s a l s o B's l o s s ; v i . (a) A c o u l d have prevented e by e x e r c i s i n g due care; or (b) A c o u l d have prevented e by d e c i d i n g not to 142. a c t i n an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g way, i . e . he c o u l d have decided not to do e, and he knew e had (or would have) an o b l i g e d n e s s - c r e a t i n g p r o p e r t y . These a n a l y s e s d i s p l a y the d i f f e r e n c e s between these two kinds o f r i g h t s . But they a l s o d i s p l a y a fundamental s i m i l a r i t y : both kinds have the wrongness of conduct o f agents other than the r i g h t - b e a r e r as p a r t of t h e i r ana-l y s i s . We have a l s o seen from the pr e c e e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n s of r e n u n c i a t i o n , c o n d i t i o n s o f v i o l a t i o n and n o n - v i o l a t i o n , and p e r m i s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n s , that t h e i r r o l e s i n our moral t h i n k i n g and decision-making have much i n common. I t i s a l s o true o f both kinds o f r i g h t s that they e n t i t l e the r i g h t - h o l d e r to s o m e t h i n g — a c e r t a i n k i n d o f treatment or good—and t h a t i f e i t h e r a s p e c i a l or n a t u r a l r i g h t i s v i o l a t e d , the r i g h t - h o l d e r has been wronged, he has grounds f o r complaint, and r e p a r a t i o n w i l l be a p p r o p r i a t e . I t h i n k i t i s because n a t u r a l and s p e c i a l r i g h t s have a l l o f these v a r i o u s f e a t u r e s i n common, t h a t they are both ' r i g h t s ' . I have contended t h a t these are the o n l y two kinds o f r i g h t s . I should now l i k e to defend t h a t c l a i m a g a i n s t arguments t h a t there are other senses o f ' r i g h t ' . I n par-t i c u l a r I s h a l l argue t h a t 'A has a r i g h t to do X' cannot be analyzed simply as ' I t i s not wrong f o r A to do X' or as 'A has p e r m i s s i o n to do X'. I s h a l l c a l l the r i g h t s which occur i n statements which are supposed to be a n a l y z -able a n e i t h e r o f these two ways 'weak r i g h t s ' as opposed to 143. the two 'strong r i g h t s ' which I have analyzed. I s h a l l begin by c o n s i d e r i n g a couple o f examples i n which 'A.has a r i g h t to do X' i s supposed to mean ' I t i s not wrong f o r A to do X'. The f i r s t comes from Hart: Two people walking a l o n g both see a t e n - d o l l a r b i l l on the road twenty yards away, and there i s no c l u e as to the owner. N e i t h e r o f the two are under a "duty" to a l l o w the other to p i c k i t up; each h a s - i n t h i s sense a r i g h t to p i c k i t up.2 / I contend t h a t i t cannot be true here t h a t i t i s permis-s i b l e f o r e i t h e r one to p i c k up the b i l l because, before a c o m p e t i t i o n which r e s o l v e s the c o n f l i c t between them, they both have a n a t u r a l r i g h t (a 'strong r i g h t ' ) to p i c k up the b i l l , and thus e i t h e r one p i c k i n g i t up w i l l v i o l a t e the other's r i g h t to do so. And, a f t e r a f a i r c o m p e t i t i o n , i t i s not wrong f o r the winner to p i c k up the b i l l , but i t i s wrong f o r the l o s e r to do so. So the winner has a st r o n g r i g h t to p i c k up the b i l l a f t e r a c o m p e t i t i o n , while the l o s e r has no r i g h t a t a l l , weak or s t r o n g . So t h i s case f a i l s to p r o v i d e us with an example of the 'weak' sin c e o f ' r i g h t ' . The f o l l o w i n g passage comes from an a r t i c l e by Dworkin: ...we say t h a t the captured s o l d i e r has a " r i g h t " to t r y to escape when we mean, not t h a t we do wrong to stop him, but t h a t he has no duty not to make the attempt. We a l s o use " r i g h t " t h i s way when we speak of someone having the " r i g h t " w ' N a t u r a l R i g h t s ' , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 62 ( 1 9 5 5 ) . 1 7 9 . 144. to a c t on h i s own p r i n c i p l e s , or the " r i g h t to f o l l o w h i s own c o n s c i e n c e . " We mean t h a t he does no wrong to proceed on h i s honest c o n v i c t i o n s , even though we d i s a g r e e with these c o n v i c t i o n s , and even though, f o r p o l i c y or other reasons, we must f o r c e him to a c t c o n t r a r y to them.^o I t seems to me that i f the s o l d i e r ' s c a p t o r s have been waging an u n j u s t a g g r e s s i v e war, then the s o l d i e r has a s t r o n g r i g h t to escape. H i s c a p t o r s r e a l l y do a c t wrongly.by p r e v e n t i n g h i s escape j u s t as they acted wrongly i n c a p t u r i n g him i n the f i r s t p l a c e . On :the other hand, i f the a l l i e s o f the s o l d i e r have been waging an u n j u s t a g g r e s s i v e war, then i t might w e l l be true t h a t the s o l -d i e r does wrong by e s c a p t i n g , and so does not have a s t r o n g or weak r i g h t to escape. I suspect t h a t these two p o s s i b i l i t i e s are exhaustive. And i f t h a t i s the case, then the s o l d i e r ' s ' r i g h t to escape' w i l l be e i t h e r a s t r o n g r i g h t , or n o n - e x i s t e n t . As f o r the ' r i g h t to f o l l o w one's own c o n s c i e n c e ' , i f i t i s i n f a c t t rue t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l , A, does n o t h i n g wrong i n f o l l o w i n g h i s own conscience with r e s p e c t to h i s doing X — t h a t i s , he breaks no moral r u l e s , v i o l a t e s no r i g h t s , n e g l e c t s no o b l i g a t i o n s , e t c . — t h e n i t must indeed be prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r others to prevent h i s doing X. I n t h a t case, he has a s t r o n g r i g h t to do X, and so a s t r o n g r i g h t to a c t on h i s own conscience with Ronald Dworkin, 'Taking R i g h t s S e r i o u s l y ' , New York  Review of Books. XV (Dec. 1970), 24. 145. r e s p e c t to do i n g X. A s i m i l a r l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g w i l l show t h a t i f one does n o t h i n g wrong by a c t i n g on h i s own p r i n -c i p l e s with r e s p e c t to X, then he has a s t r o n g r i g h t to do X, and thus a s t r o n g r i g h t to a c t on h i s own p r i n c i p l e s with r e s p e c t to X. I conclude, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Dworkin, too has f a i l e d to provide us with any examples o f ' r i g h t to do X' where ' r i g h t ' i s be i n g used i n a weak sense. I t has a l s o been claimed t h a t the statements 'A has a r i g h t to marry the woman of h i s c h o i c e ' and 'A has a r i g h t to h i r e the best b u t l e r i n town' are examples o f statements i n which ' r i g h t ' i s being used i n t h i s weaker sense. But t h a t too i s wrong. As I argued i n S e c t i o n 3, i n the absence o f any s p e c i a l agreement between A and the woman of h i s choice or the best b u t l e r , because there would be n o t h i n g prima f a c i e wrong with the woman r e f u s i n g to marry A or w i t h the b u t l e r r e f u s i n g to work f o r A, the above statements would be f a l s e i f ' r i g h t ' were being used i n a s t r o n g sense. But they would be f a l s e too i n the weak sense i f the woman has not agreed to marry A or i f the b u t l e r does not wish to work f o r A. And i f the woman has promised to marry A, or the b u t l e r promised to work f o r him, then A has a s p e c i a l r i g h t to marry the woman or to h i r e the b u t l e r . I n a d d i t i o n , because the woman has promised to marry him, and the b u t l e r to work f o r him, A's se t o f r i g h t s to autonomy has not been l i m i t e d as i t would 146. otherwise be by t h e i r s t a t u s as r i g h t - h o l d e r s . T h i s means tha t A has the n a t u r a l r i g h t to marry the woman and h i r e the b u t l e r , and so i t would be prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r anyone to i n t e r f e r e with h i s doing so. So none of the examples o f f e r e d as statement i n which ' r i g h t ' i s supposedly being used i n the weak sense o f 'not wrong t o ' have proven s u c c e s s f u l . I contend t h a t t h i s w i l l be a t y p e r f e c t l y g e n e r a l phenomenon, i . e . t h a t whenever some-one c laims t h a t someone has a r i g h t i n the sense t h a t i t would not be wrong f o r him to do something, t h a t he w i l l t u r n out e i t h e r to have no r i g h t a t a l l , or to have a s t r o n g r i g h t . The other 'weak' sense o f ' r i g h t ' which i s supposed to mean 'permission' f a i r s no b e t t e r . I f someone has p e r m i s s i o n to do X, then h i s s e t o f r i g h t s to autonomy has not been l i m i t e d by whatever c o n d i t i o n s would normally l i m i t i t so as to exclude h i s r i g h t to do X. And so he has a n a t u r a l r i g h t to do X, and i t would t h e r e f o r e be prima f a c i e s e r i o u s l y wrong f o r others to i n t e r f e r e with h i s doing X. Of course, the p e r m i s s i o n can be withdrawn. In t h a t case the c o n d i t i o n s which would normally l i m i t h i s n a t u r a l r i g h t to autonomy so as to exclude that p a r t i c u l a r r i g h t w i l l come i n t o a f f e c t , and he w i l l have no r i g h t to do X. T h i s means t h a t there i s no d i s t i n c t sense of ' r i g h t ' meaning 'permission'. 147. A s i m i l a r s o r t of r e a s o n i n g a p p l i e s to the c l a i m t h a t there i s a sense o f ' r i g h t ' meaning ' p r i v i l e g e ' . 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