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The illusion of influence : Soviet-Indian strategic relations in the 1970's Robinson, Peter C. 1979

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THE ILLUSION OF INFLUENCE SOVIET-INDIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS IN THE 1970' by PETER C. ROBINSON B . S c , Southampton U n i v e r s i t y , 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard. THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA • September 1979 Q P e t e r C. Robinson, 1979 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 2075 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a V6T 1W5 D E - 6 B P 75-51 1 E A b s t r a c t T h i s study i s concerned with a n a l y z i n g aspects of the i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t has grown up between the U.S.S.R. and I n d i a s i n c e the l a t e 1 9 5 0 's. I t s c h i e f c o n c e n t r a t i o n i s upon the a b i l i t y of the U.S.S.R. to exert c o n s t r a i n i n g i n f l u -ence upon the d i r e c t i o n of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y making i n the p r e s e n t decade. In the past there has been a tendency f o r Western a n a l y s t s to g r e a t l y overestimate the degree of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e on T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s . In l a r g e p a r t , t h i s has been a r e s u l t of an undue c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the range of d i p l o m a t i c t o o l s a v a i l a b l e to the S o v i e t Union without s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n being p a i d to the concrete r e t u r n s from t h e i r usage. T h i s study, u t i l i z i n g a framework of enquiry i n p a r t suggested by R u b i n s t e i n i n Red S t a r on the N i l e , t h e r e f o r e , c o n c e n t r a t e s on an a n a l y s i s of the e f f e c t of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e techniques on i s s u e s i n the area of Indo-Soviet s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . The study proceeds through d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of a s m a l l number of the more s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s t h a t have a r i s e n i n r e c e n t years between the two c o u n t r i e s . I t assumes that by t r a c i n g the development of these i s s u e s and the manner i n which they were r e s o l v e d (or o t h e r w i s e ) , one can g a i n a v e r y v e r y r e a l i n d i c a t i o n of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of S o v i e t attempts at i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g . The s u b s t a n t i v e chapters of the study i n v o l v e d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of Indo-Soviet i n t e r a c t i o n d u r i n g the Bangladesh c r i s i s of 1 9 7 1 , the Russian attempts to g a i n I n d i a n endorsement of Brezhnev's p l a n f o r c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n A s i a , and r e c e n t trends i n Indo-Soviet s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g a n a l y s i s of I n d i a ' s m i l i t a r y procurement p o l i c i e s and i t s d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with P a k i s t a n , China and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h i s l a s t case study i s then supplemented hy a n a l y s i s of r e c e n t trends i n Indo-Soviet economic coopera-t i o n . On the "basis of the evidence p r o v i d e d by these case s t u d i e s i t i s suggested t h a t S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e upon I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n making i n t h i s decade has been, and w i l l l i k e l y c o n t i n u e - t o be, v e r y i n s u b s t a n t i a l . i v . Table of Contents T i t l e Page • i A b s t r a c t i i Table of Contents i v L i s t of Tables v Acknowlegements v i Chapter I INTRODUCTION . . . 1 Prologue S e t t i n g Academic R a t i o n a l e •• Framework of Enquiry I I INDO-SOVIET INTERACTION AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH 16 I I I ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY . 37 IV • RECENT TRENDS IN INDO-SOVIET SECURITY RELATIONS 56 V CONCLUSIONS 76 VI APPENDIX 83 Footnotes 9k B i b l i o g r a p h y 103 V . L i s t of Tables Table Page I Arms T r a n s f e r r e d to I n d i a , I965 - 7 4 . . . . . 5 9 I I I n d i a ' s Export Trade 84 I I I I n d i a ' s Import Trade 85 v i . Acknowledgements I would l i k e to thank P r o f e s s o r s P e t e r Busch and John Wood who combined to provide me with i n t e l l e c t u a l support and advice on p r e p a r i n g and o r g a n i z i n g the m a t e r i a l i n t h i s study. I would a l s o l i k e to express my a p p r e c i a t i o n of K.T.'s t y p i n g and myriad other " s e c r e t a r i a l s k i l l s " . F i n a l l y , my thanks to the f e l l o w t o i l e r s i n 'Brock Summer School' who kept me i n the r i g h t frame of mind to be able to f i n i s h on time. 1. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION l a . Prologue T h i s study c o n t r i b u t e s to an understanding of the S o v i e t -I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p , . i n the 1970's by examining the behaviour of the two p a r t i e s i n the f i e l d of s t r a t e g i c i n t e r -a c t i o n . I t s primary t h e s i s i s t h a t i n s p i t e of I n d i a n depend-ence on S o v i e t s u p p l i e s of c e r t a i n v i t a l commodities and s e r -v i c e s the S o v i e t Union has been unable to e x e r c i s e a d e c i s i v e c o n s t r a i n i n g i n f l u e n c e upon the d i r e c t i o n of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y outputs. In the p e r i o d from roughl y 19&9 "to 197^ t h i s i n a b i l i t y d i d not s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t the attainment of S o v i e t p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s on the I n d i a n subcontinent c h i e f l y because I n d i a n and S o v i e t goals were l a r g e l y congruent. However, t h i s study puts forward the argument t h a t s i n c e the mid-1970's v a r -i o u s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e s by s u c c e s s i v e I n d i a n govern-ments have l e s s e n e d the degree of congruence between S o v i e t and I n d i a n goals and have s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduced the success p o t e n t i a l of S o v i e t goals i n the r e g i o n . A l l s t a t e s indulge i n i n f l u e n c e - b u i l d i n g , attempting to i n f l u e n c e the behaviour of another s t a t e to redound to t h e i r own i n t e r e s t . A p r e l i m i n a r y g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of i n f l u e n c e , which has to be viewed as both a process and the outcome of t h a t process would be, ... whatever causes i n any s o c i a l , and e s p e c i a l l y p o l i t i c a l c ontext i n d i v i d u a l s or groups to d e v i a t e from a p r e d i c t e d path of behaviour. More s p e c i f i c a l l y the term i s used to denote changes i n behaviour of a .person or group" due to the a n t i c i p a -t i o n of the response of o t h e r s . In t h i s sense the 2. i term connotes the outwardly q u i e t and p o s s i b l y gradual e x e r t i o n of power and persuasion r a t h e r than the more demanding" l e g a l or overt exercise of power connected with formal a u t h o r i t y . 1 Attempts a t i n f l u e n c i n g another s t a t e may take many forms, ranging from the o f f e r of rewards - such as a i d commitments, or p r e f e r e n t i a l t a r i f f agreements to the a p p l i c a t i o n of sanc-t i o n s - m i l i t a r y force being the most extreme example. A government w i l l choose a p a r t i c u l a r t a c t i c (or combination there-of) depending upon the past t r a d i t i o n of f r i e n d s h i p or h o s t i l i t y w i t h the ta r g e t s t a t e and the amount of c o m p a t i b i l i t y between t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e o b j e c t i v e s and i n t e r e s t s . This study i n examining the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the 1 9 7 0 ' s , works from the assumption that the p a t t e r n of i n f l u e n c e between these c o u n t r i e s approximates to an example of H o l s t i ' s sub-type of " r e l a t i o n s of overt manipulation". That i s to say, i n the general p a t t e r n of i n t e r a c t i o n i n f l u e n c e w i l l i n c l u d e , i f normal persuasion f a i l s , (a) o f f e r s of rewards, (b) gr a n t i n g of rewards, (c) t h r e a t s to withhold r ewards (such as not to give f o r e i g n a i d i n the f u t u r e ) , or (d) t h r e a t s of non-violent punishment, i n c l u d i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , the r a i s i n g of t a r i f f s on the other's products. M i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s are of l i t t l e relevance to the power of each stat e toward the other i n the i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n -ship.-^ However, the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y of one or both p a r t i e s may w e l l be seen as an important f a c t o r i n r e l a t i o n to t h i r d p a r t i e s , which w i l l a f f e c t the o v e r a l l content and value of the i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p . Our concern i s , t h e r e f o r e , to assess how s u c c e s s f u l the Sov i e t Union has been, i n i t s use of v a r i o u s instruments of 3. s t a t e c r a f t , i n e x e r t i n g i n f l u e n c e upon the g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n and s p e c i f i c a s p e c t s of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Conversely, how s u c c e s s f u l has I n d i a been i n i n f l u e n c i n g S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the subcontinent i n such a way as to preserve the max-imum degree of autonomy i n i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y execution? S e t t i n g As many authors have noted, the S o v i e t Union d i r e c t e d major a t t e n t i o n to I n d i a a t an e a r l y stage i n i t s e f f o r t s to penetrate the T h i r d World. In 1 9 5 ^ "the p o s t - S t a l m movement toward a rapprochement with Nehru's I n d i a p e r c e p t i b l y gathered speed. T h i s advance was g r e a t l y a i d e d by developments i n India's r e l a t i o n s with both the U n i t e d S t a t e s and China. The year 1 9 5 ^ marked a major downturn i n r e l a t i o n s with the U.S. as a r e s u l t of i t s m i l i t a r y a i d agreement with P a k i s t a n , w h i l s t S i n o - I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s underwent a marked p e r c e i v e d improvement with the c o n c l u s i o n of the Panch S h i l a agreement.^ In the f o l l o w i n g year Nehru p a i d a triumphal and much p u b l i c i z e d v i s i t to the S o v i e t Union which would have been u n t h i n k a b l e a mere two or three years e a r l i e r when Nehru was being denounced as a " l a c k e y of the i m p e r i a l i s t s " i n S o v i e t propaganda. An even more s i g n i f i c a n t example of the S o v i e t d e t e r m i n a t i o n to strengthen t i e s with I n d i a was the r e t u r n v i s i t p a i d by Khruschev and B u l g a n i n i n November-December 1 9 5 5 - The s i g n i f i -cance of t h i s t r i p was t h a t I n d i a , a l o n g with Burma and Afghanistan,made up the I t i n e r a r y f o r the f i r s t s t a t e v i s i t by Russian l e a d e r s to c o u n t r i e s i n the T h i r d World. S o v i e t diplomacy i n these three c o u n t r i e s was motivated, as i t was subsequently i n the Middle E a s t , by the t h r e a t of an American sponsored m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the U.S.S.R. Thus these e a r l y d i p l o m a t i c o v e r t u r e s were intended to st r e n g t h e n the n e u t r a l i t y of these c r u c i a l s t a t e s . Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s developed c o n s i d e r a b l y over the next decade and a h a l f , never s e r i o u s l y hampered by the l a c k of i d e o l o g i c a l a f f i n i t y between the two, to the p o i n t where the S o v i e t Union was i n t i m a t e l y i n -v o l v e d in-..'India's economic and p o l i t i c a l development and in- i t s o v e r a l l s t r a t e g i c s e c u r i t y . S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s i n , and p o l i c y towards, i n d i v i d u a l d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s had 'been shaped by a combination of: ( i ) the c o u n t r y ! a c t u a l or p o t e n t i a l s t r a t e g i c importance f o r the U.S.S.R., ( i i ) i t s importance as a p o t e n t i a l market f o r S o v i e t manufactured goods and as a source of raw m a t e r i a l s or r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive consumer goods, and ( i i i ) the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s r u p t i n g i n f l u e n c e p a t t e r n s of e i t h e r the 7 U.S. or China i n the country and surrounding r e g i o n . I n d i a , of course, proved a t t r a c t i v e on a l l three counts and was thus the t a r g e t f o r assiduous and p e r s i s t e n t S o v i e t attempts a t i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g . W h i l s t the gr a d u a l nature of the develop-ment of t h i s complex r e l a t i o n s h i p cannot be ignored, i n c l u d i n g as i t d i d such s i g n i f i c a n t i s s u e s as the S o v i e t stance on Sino-I n d i a n c o n f l i c t i n 19^2, t h i s study w i l l c oncentrate on the i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the p e r i o d a f t e r g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i c c o o p e r a t i o n between the two was developed. I t should be r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p has been g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d by the nature of p o l i t i c a l developments on the In d i a n subcontinent. Throughout the 1960's 5 . and f o r p a r t of the p r e s e n t decade, Indo-Pakistan a n i m o s i t y was perhaps the dominant i n t e r a c t i v e i n f l u e n c e on the p a t t e r n of e x t e r n a l s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the subcontinent. T h i s was e s p e c i a l l y the case f o r the S o v i e t Union which had v e r y r e a l reasons f o r wanting to develop c l o s e r e l a t i o n s with P a k i s t a n as w e l l as I n d i a . In p a r t i c u l a r , as S i n o - S o v i e t d i f f e r e n c e s i n c r e a s e d there was a g r e a t i n c e n t i v e f o r the U.S.S.R. to attempt 8 to curb Chinese i n f l u e n c e i n P a k i s t a n . Moreover, success i n the campaign to woo P a k i s t a n would have meant a f u r t h e r weaken-i n g of the "containment" a l l i a n c e s c o n s t r u c t e d by the U.S. on Russia's southern f l a n k . ^  These i n c e n t i v e s combined i n 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 to i n c r e a s e S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s to c u l t i v a t e a presence i n P a k i -stan. Ayub Khan's v i s i t to Moscow i n A p r i l 1965 p r o v i d e d the f i r s t i n t i m a t i o n of a change i n S o v i e t p o l i c y , which was r e - .. f l e e t e d i n the n e u t r a l a t t i t u d e Moscow adopted over the Rann of Kutch i n c i d e n t . In the l a r g e r Indo-Pakistan c o n f l i c t i n September 1 9 6 5 , the S o v i e t Union c a r e f u l l y maintained t h i s n e u t r a l i t y i n order to be able to p l a y the peacemaker a t Tash-kent i n January 1 9 6 6 . " * " ° I n i t s f i r s t s u b s t a n t i v e chapter t h i s study f o c u s s e s upon the development of the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the p e r i o d a f t e r the Tashkent Conferenca I t d e a l s with the S o v i e t attempt.to m a i n t a i n a p o l i c y of balanced s u b c o n t i n e n t a l i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g i n the f a c e of growing Indo-Pakistan animos-i t y which culminated i n the Bangladesh War of 1 9 7 1 . 6. Academic Ra t i o n a l e I t i s hoped t h a t t h i s study w i l l add to our u n derstanding of two important aspects of the contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l system. F i r s t l y , and most o b v i o u s l y , i t w i l l c o n t r i b u t e f u r t h e r to our understanding of the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of S o v i e t p o l i c y t o -wards T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s - a t o p i c t h a t i s i n c r e a s i n g l y coming under the s c r u t i n y of Western academics and p o l i c y a n a l y s t s a l i k e . I t i s c l e a r t h a t the need f o r such i s pronounced. More than two decades a f t e r the s t a r t of d i r e c t S o v i e t involvement i n the T h i r d World the time has come to; u t i l i z e the r e l e v e n t data f o r t a k i n g a c r i t i c a l look a t what i n f l u e n c e the S o v i e t s have a c t u a l l y wielded and the b e n e f i t s they have person-a l l y d e r i v e d as a consequence of t h e i r a s s o r t e d pro-grammes and p o l i c i e s . In-depth s t u d i e s of the S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p with other T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s are f e a s i b l e . They can provide the b a s i s f o r an informed, r a t i o n a l , f a r - s i g h t e d approach to the v e r y r e a l problem of coping with the S o v i e t c h a l l e n g e i n the T h i r d World, and e l s e -where, i n the years ahead.H An i n - d e p t h study of the s t r a t e g i c aspects of the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p recommends i t s e l f because I n d i a , t o g e t h e r with Egypt and Indonesia, represent;'.the major r e c i p i e n t s of S o v i e t trade and a i d i n the T h i r d World i n the 1960's and thus can be c o n s i d e r e d to have been the major t a r g e t s "for ;p>ro jecte'd S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . Of these th r e e , the S o v i e t experiences with I n d i a and Egypt have generated the most debate i n the West as to the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g and seem to 12 l e n d themselves more e a s i l y to a study of such. R u b i n s t e i n i n Red S t a r on the N i l e has w r i t t e n an a u t h o r i t a t i v e account of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g i n Egypt and has a l s o s t i m u l a t e d 13 a p r e l i m i n a r y study by Barnds on the I n d i a n case. J I i n t e n d 7. to develop and b u i l d on some of the ideas provided by these authors but with l e s s c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the t o o l s of Soviet i n f l u e n c e and more upon an a c t u a l assessment of i t s e f f e c t upon the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of the t a r g e t s t a t e . The second c o n t r i b u t i o n that t h i s study makes i s to our understanding of the r o l e s and c a p a b i l i t i e s of r e g i o n a l a c t o r s i n t h e i r complex dealings w i t h g l o b a l superpowers. This study demonstrates that to understand the p a t t e r n of bargain i n g out-comes i n the b i l a t e r a l i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p one has to devote major a t t e n t i o n to the continuous process of p o l i c y adjustment on the p a r t of the Soviet Union i n response to the continuously expanding r e g i o n a l - r o l e adopted by the Indian government i n the 1970's. I t does seem that I n d i a , i n i t s dealings w i t h the Sovi e t Union i n t h i s p e r i o d , e x h i b i t s c e r t a i n major s i m i l a r i t i e s to the "weak t y r a n t s " of She f f e r ' s study, Vietnam, I s r a e l and 14 Egypt. These are a l l s t a t e s that have e x h i b i t e d a d i s c e r n i b l e independence i n determining and pursuing t h e i r own goals; y e t, while possessing s i g n i f i c a n t m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s i n a r e g i o n a l context, they nevertheless are i n continuous need of v a r i o u s kinds of support from e x t e r n a l sources. This need f o r e x t e r n a l support stems from inadequate indigenous resources to s u s t a i n t h e i r ongoing p o l i c i e s . The dependence on imports of va r i o u s v i t a l commodities and s e r v i c e s creates the p o t e n t i a l f o r ex t e r -n a l p e n e t r a t i o n and c o n t r o l and puts l i m i t s on independence 15 of a c t i o n . This study o u t l i n e s the kinds of is s u e s on which I n d i a has been able to r e s i s t or manipulate a c t i o n s d i r e c t e d by the 8. U.S.S.R. towards the subcontinent. Conversely, i t examines how I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y making has been c o n s t r a i n e d by India's c l e a r dependence on S o v i e t support, as f o r example, as a s u p p l i e r of s o p h i s t i c a t e d m i l i t a r y hardware. A balanced understanding of the c a p a b i l i t i e s of r e g i o n a l powers to l i m i t or channel 'superpower p e n e t r a t i o n of t h e i r subsystems i s a prime;-prerequi-s i t e i n our e f f o r t s to understand contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . W h i l s t t h i s study i s i n no way a comprehensive attempt to provide t h i s , i t can be seen as f u r n i s h i n g m a t e r i a l and a n a l y s i s on the In d i a n experience t h a t c o u l d be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n some f u t u r e study to t h i s end. Framework of Enquiry There i s l i t t l e to be gained from another- i n - d e p t h a n a l y s i s of S o v i e t t r a d e , a i d and c u l t u r a l l i n k s with I n d i a , as numerous accounts a l r e a d y d e t a i l most c o n c e i v a b l e aspects of these t r a n s -a c t i o n s . In g e n e r a l , we have an overabundance of such data on the types of S o v i e t t r a n s a c t i o n s with I n d i a ; what i s needed i s a n a l y s i s of the c a p a c i t y of such as instruments of i n f l u e n c e . As R u b i n s t e i n puts i t , to what extent has the S o v i e t Union been able to t r a n s l a t e l a r g e s s e i n t o i n f l u e n c e ? " ^ To t h i s end, w h i l s t t h i s study c o n c e n t r a t e s on the s t r a t e g i c s e c u r i t y aspect of the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p , i t does i n c l u d e a s h o r t appendix on the nature of S o v i e t - I n d i a n economic t i e s . T h i s i s not intended to be seen as an exhaustive a n a l y s i s of t h i s s u b j e c t - an un d e r t a k i n g which would r e q u i r e a format f a r more complex than the p r e s e n t study c o u l d encompass. Rather, i t should be seen as a supplement to the f i n a l s u b s t a n t i v e 9-chapter which l o o k s a t c u r r e n t trends i n Indo-Soviet s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s , d e a l i n g with c u r r e n t developments where the l i n k a g e between In d i a n s e c u r i t y and economic development requirements i s of c e n t r a l importance. I t i s obvious t h a t any i n f l u e n c e the S o v i e t Union may exert w i t h i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p can be manifested i n many d i f f e r e n t s e c t o r s of the Ind i a n p o l i t i c a l system. Thus other s t u d i e s have p r o f i t a b l y focussed on, f o r example, the e f f e c t t h a t I n d i a ' s c l o s e t i e s with the S o v i e t Union have had upon the 17 p o l i t i c a l f o r t u n e s of the pro-Moscow Communist P a r t y of I n d i a . ' W h i l s t o c c a s i o n a l r e f e r e n c e s w i l l be made to such domestic r e p e r c u s s i o n s , t h i s study w i l l l a r g e l y c o n f i n e i t s e l f to a n a l y z -i n g the e f f e c t the S o v i e t l i n k has had upon I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y and g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n . W h i l s t i t might be r a t h e r hackneyed, i t i s nonetheless v a l i d to suggest t h a t t h i s emphasis i s j u s t i f i e d because t h i s aspect of an i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p c o n s t i t u e s the " u n d e r s t r u c t u r e " , as i t were, d i s -c i p l i n i n g the nature of the " s u p e r s t r u c t u r e " of economic and 18 c u l t u r a l l i n k s between the two c o u n t r i e s . Before a n y t h i n g e l s e , we should be c l e a r about what i n f l u -ence a c t u a l l y i s - i t i s not simply a r e f l e c t i o n of the d i s p a r i t y i n the power c a p a b i l i t i e s of the a c t o r s i n the i n f l u e n c e r e l a -t i o n s h i p . I n f l u e n c e i s manifested when a s t a t e advances i t s own i n t e r e s t s by modifying the behaviour of another. I t i s c l e a r t h a t the power i n v o l v e d i n t h i s a c t can be seen as a 19 process, a r e l a t i o n s h i p , a means to an end and even a q u a n t i t y . ' F u r t h e r , i n f l u e n c e may be c o n s i d e r e d to have a number of 10. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , of which the most s i g n i f i c a n t i s t h a t : I t i s a r e l a t i o n a l concept i n v o l v i n g the t r a n s f e r r a l of a p a t t e r n of p r e f e r e n c e s from a source (the c o n t r o l l i n g a c t o r ) to a d e s t i n a t i o n (the responding a c t o r ) , i n such a way t h a t the outcome p a t t e r n corresponds to the o r i g i n a l p r e f e r e n c e p a t t e r n . 2 0 I' s h o u l d . s t r e s s t h a t t h i s study does not pu r p o r t to be an 21 attempt a t o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g the concept of i n f l u e n c e . The importance of t h i s s u b j e c t to our understanding of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s cannot be underestimated. However, i t i s o b v i o u s l y of such complexity to be beyond the c a p a c i t y of a study such as t h i s . Rather, our concern i s with c o n t r i -b u t i n g to an understanding of the dynamics of one type of i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t has come under i n c r e a s i n g s c r u t i n y by a n a l y s t s of contemporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . The most obvious approach i n a s s e s s i n g S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i s to i s o l a t e and s c r u t i n i z e i n s t a n c e s i n which I n d i a has modi-f i e d i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y behaviour i n a manner advantageous to the S o v i e t Union. However, j u s t as v a l i d f o r s c r u t i n y are i s s u e s on which the S o v i e t Union has demonstrably t r i e d to induce a m o d i f i c a t i o n i n I n d i a n behaviour and has f a i l e d . Thus a t the out s e t we seek to i s o l a t e i s s u e s upon which I n d i a and the S o v i e t Union have h e l d c o n f l i c t i n g p r e f e r e n c e s or o b j e c t i v e s . Then, as A b e l l has suggested, when d e a l i n g with b a r g a i n i n g i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l framework, "the power and i n f l u e n c e of an a c t o r w i l l be d e f i n e d i n terms of h i s ( i t s ) a b i l i t y to o b t a i n h i s ( i t s ) o b j e c t i v e s i n the face of others with competing ob-22 j e c t i v e s . " However, j u s t c o u n t i n g outcomes would be too crude a measure of i n f l u e n c e when we are unaware of the value a t t a c h e d 11. by e i t h e r side to i t s p r e f e r r e d o p t i o n . One thus has to de-v e l o p the context w i t h i n which the i s s u e occurs and, i n p a r t i c -u l a r , the b a r g a i n i n g t a c t i c s adopted by both s i d e s , to enable one to determine how s i g n i f i c a n t the i s s u e outcome a c t u a l l y i s to the i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p . F o r example, one has to ex-clude s i t u a t i o n s i n which the I n d i a n government adopts the same p o s i t i o n as the U.S.S.R. because i t was convinced t h a t the a c t i o n was i n i t s own i n t e r e s t s and had intended to a c t t h a t way anyway, as i n the s i m i l a r i t y of S o v i e t and I n d i a n 23 p o s i t i o n s on d e c o l o n i z a t i o n debates m the U n i t e d Nations. J I t i s , of course, important to concentrate on what are p e r c e i v e d to be "important" i s s u e s because minimal a d a p t a t i o n s i n behaviour w i l l be made r e g u l a r l y . These might be seen as a reward f o r s e r v i c e s rendered or requested and are performed because the c o s t s i n v o l v e d are n e g l i g i b l e , as f o r example, Ind i a n p u b l i c endorsement of S o v i e t g l o b a l p o l i c i e s t h a t do not impinge on I n d i a n n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . We are thus i n t e r e s t e d only i n i s s u e s where the stakes i n v o l v e d are c o n s i d e r e d by both s i d e s to be high, and where s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e i s r e -q u i r e d to change the other s i d e ' s p r e f e r e n c e s . I t i s c l e a r t h a t the number of c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s of major importance w i l l be l i m i t e d and we can determine them l a r g e l y by c o n s u l t i n g analyses by concerned p o l i t i c a l commentators. In a d d i t i o n , i n a r e l a t i v e l y open s o c i e t y l i k e I n d i a , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of dissonance i s not d i f f i c u l t . The debates i n Parliament, com-mentaries i n the p r e s s , and access to o f f i c i a l s and i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r p r o v i d e v a r i e d i n f o r m a t i o n ade-1 2 . quate f o r f i n d i n g examples of i n f l u e n c e and f o r a s s e s s i n g the S o v i e t Union's impact on I n d i a ' s p o l i c y outputs. T h i s study a l s o c o n c e n t r a t e s , to some extent, on the a n a l y s i s of j o i n t communiques i s s u e d a t the c o n c l u s i o n of s t a t e v i s i t s to g a i n f u r t h e r i n s i g h t s i n t o the s i g n i f i c a n c e of b i l a t e r a l b a r g a i n i n g . W h i l s t not convinced of the value of thematic content a n a l y s i s of such communiques, I would suggest t h a t some of t h e i r b a s i c d e t a i l s of scope and p h r a s i n g do provide important c l u e s to i s s u e s d e a l t with i n c l o s e d b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s and on the pro-gress made i n r e s o l v i n g p o i n t s of c o n t e n t i o n . When c o n s t r u c t i n g case s t u d i e s t h a t c e n t r e on the outcomes of v a r i o u s i s s u e s w i t h i n the b i l a t e r a l b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p one has to be f u l l y aware t h a t i n f l u e n c e can a l s o be viewed as t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n a h i g h l y important s t r a t e g i c context. That i s to say, the U.S.S.R. might be prepared to commit r e s o u r c e s to m a i n t a i n i n g the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p even though- i t s i n -f l u e n c e from so doing might seem to be s l i g h t . I t would do so because t h i s might advance i t s i n t e r e s t s i n r e l a t e d f o r e i g n p o l i c y areas. F o r example, the S o v i e t Union has reasoned t h a t by committing resources to m a i n t a i n i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h I n d i a i t c o u l d both c u r t a i l Chinese i n f l u e n c e i n South A s i a and -'promote g e n e r a l r e g i o n a l s t a b i l i t y . Indeed t h i s study makes the assumption t h a t the U.S.S.R. i s mainly concerned with the gen e r a l r e g i o n a l value of s u p p o r t i n g I n d i a n p o l i c i e s r a t h e r than i n g a r n e r i n g immediate r e s u l t s from s p e c i f i c i n p u t s on s p e c i f i c b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . The importance of ad o p t i n g t h i s per-s p e c t i v e i s t h a t i t enables one to o b t a i n a balanced a p p r e c i a -1 3 . t i o n of the a b i l i t y of r e g i o n a l powers to manipulate s u p p o r t i v e superpowers on c e r t a i n w e l l - d e f i n e d i s s u e s of r e g i o n a l , as opposed to g l o b a l f o c u s . The three s u b s t a n t i v e chapters of t h i s study w i l l , t h e r e -f o r e , o u t l i n e what can r e a d i l y be seen as the major c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s t h a t have a r i s e n i n the 1970's i n the area of the S o v i e t -I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p p e r t a i n i n g to t h e i r s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . The f i r s t of these w i l l d e a l with the r o l e s of I n d i a and the S o v i e t Union i n the Bangladesh War of 1971- T h i s chapter w i l l i n c l u d e a b r i e f assessment of the development of Indo-Soviet t i e s i n the p e r i o d a f t e r the Tashkent Conference, s t r e s s i n g the growth i n congruence of t h e i r s t r a t e g i c concerns t h a t l e d to the s i g n i n g of the T r e a t y of Peace and F r i e n d s h i p i n August 1 9 7 1 . However, the major emphasis i s ' o n examining the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the p r o t r a c t e d b a r g a i n i n g between the two on an agreeable j o i n t response to the c o n f l i c t , more p a r t i c u -l a r l y , i n t h e i r disagreements over a p o l i t i c a l versus a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n to the problem imposed by the mass of refugees from East P a k i s t a n i n t o I n d i a . The second chapter d e t a i l s the Ind i a n response to the S o v i e t p r o p o s a l f o r an A s i a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y scheme, which has been d e s c r i b e d as the S o v i e t s ' "major d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e of 2^ the 1970's." J The focus i s upon the wide v a r i e t y of contexts w i t h i n which the S o v i e t s have presented the p l a n f o r I n d i a n endorsement and upon the " s u b t l e " m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n content t h a t i t has undergone since i t s i n c e p t i o n i n 1 9 6 9 . 26 These two case s t u d i e s were b r i e f l y examined by Barnds 14. but h i s i n t e n t i o n was more to pro v i d e an i n c e n t i v e and guide-l i n e s f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h than to c l a i m exhaustive a n a l y s i s of these i s s u e s . These two cases are important because they i n v o l v e a s e t of i n t e r r e l a t e d i s s u e s which, i n many r e s p e c t s , can be s a i d to e s t a b l i s h the parameters of the s t r a t e g i c content of the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p . By t h i s I mean tha t one cannot m e a n i n g f u l l y look a t Indo-Soviet i n t e r a c t i o n over the i s s u e of Bangladesh, or the I n d i a n response to Brezhnev's c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p l a n , i n i s o l a t i o n from S o v i e t r e g i o n a l p o l i c y towards P a k i s t a n and g l o b a l p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s the U n i t e d S t a t e s and China, nor from the s t a t e of S i n o - I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s . The t h i r d chapter develops the a n a l y s i s presented i n the prec e e d i n g case s t u d i e s by p u t t i n g forward some thoughts on the b a s i c nature of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g i n the mid - 1 9 7 0 , ;s, o u t l i n i n g trends t h a t have developed i n the sphere of s t r a t e g i c c o o p e r a t i o n between I n d i a and the S o v i e t Union i n the l a s t few years. There i s no e x p l i c i t end p o i n t i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l terms; the study d e t a i l s events t h a t have taken p l a c e s i n c e the Jan a t a p a r t y took o f f i c e i n 1976 but i t does not focus upon t h a t e l e c -t i o n as being a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . Rather, i t adopts the p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t c e r t a i n important trends i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p became apparent from about 1975 onwards and t h a t Janata p o l i c y towards the S o v i e t Union was l a r g e l y a c o n t i n u a t i o n of p o l i c i e s t h a t the pr e v i o u s Congress government had i n i t i a t e d . T h i s chapter c o n s i s t s of f a i r l y d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of two major i s s u e s , the p a t t e r n of I n d i a n defense spending and procurement, 1 5 . and the nature of I n d i a n diplomacy towards former a d v e r s a r i e s , i n an e f f o r t to p r o v i d e p o i n t e r s to the c u r r e n t trends i n the S o v i e t - I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p . The study concludes with some g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , d e r i v e d from the cases reviewed, on the o v e r a l l e f f e c t of S o v i e t i n f l u -ence upon the nature of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n s i n t h i s decade. As suggested e a r l i e r , t h i s study has concluded t h a t t h i s S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i s f a r more apparent than r e a l . The outcomes of b i l a t e r a l b a r g a i n i n g on the i s s u e s analyzed i n the case s t u d i e s c l e a r l y show t h a t I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g can c e r t a i n l y be c o n s i d e r e d autonomous i n s p i t e of I n d i a n de-pendence on S o v i e t development a s s i s t a n c e and m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s . Perhaps as important, r e c e n t trends i n Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s show t h a t the I n d i a n d e s i r e to r e a l i z e i t s r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y manager a s p i r a t i o n s has i n v o l v e d major m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n the s t r a t e g i c context of the r e l a t i o n s h i p - not n e c e s s a r i l y to the advantage of the S o v i e t Union. 1 6 . CHAPTER I I INDO-SOVIET INTERACTION AND THE BIRTH OF BANGLADESH 16a. F o r the purposes of t h i s study there i s l i t t l e to be gained from an in-dep t h survey of the r o o t s of the p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n P a k i s t a n t h a t l e d to the move towards s e c e s s i o n i m 1 9 7 1 . Rather,the emphasis w i l l be on Indo-Soviet i n t e r -a c t i o n a f t e r the s e c e s s i o n s t r u g g l e gained a s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l dimension,through the p e r i o d of mounting host-i l i t i e s between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n and c u l m i n a t i n g i n the Indi a n m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t i v e t h a t secured the independence of Bangladesh. In t h i s survey of events from March-December 1 9 7 1 » the f o l l o w i n g themes w i l l be h i g h l i g h t e d : t h e c o m p a t i b i l i t y of S o v i e t and I n d i a n p r e f e r r e d outcomes,the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the d i p l o m a t i c moves taken by both p a r t i e s , a n d the i n t e r -n a t i o n a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s of the c o n f l i c t . However,before dev-o t i n g a t t e n t i o n to the events of 1 9 7 1 , i t i s worthwhile t r a c i n g the e v o l u t i o n of S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the subcontinent from the time of the Tashkent Conference i n 1 9 6 6 . The aim of t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s to pl a c e i n p e r s p e c t i v e the e f f e c t the events of 1 9 7 1 had upon the b a s i c nature of the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u -ence r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t had developed i n the 1 9 6 0 s . In response to the 1 9 6 5 c o n f l i c t between I n d i a and Pak-i s t a n the S o v i e t Union formulated a g e o p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e of i n t e r v e n t i o n i n South A s i a n a f f a i r s s n a m e l y . i t c o u l d not remain i n d i f f e r e n t to a c o n f l i c t t h a t had broken out on i t s borders. Thus,together with the U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t adopted an e x p l i c i t superpower c o n f l i c t management s t r a t e g y designed to minimize both the d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t s of war on the sub-continent,and the degree of Chinese i n f l u e n c e on the p a r t i c -i p a n t s . T h i s attempt to " b r i n g South A s i a w i t h i n the o r b i t 17. of the s e c u r i t y of the S o v i e t s t a t e , " was most c l e a r l y seen i n the Tashkent Conference where the two e r s t w h i l e combatants met,as a r e s u l t of S o v i e t good o f f i c e s , i n an attempt to reach some k i n d of settlement of the i s s u e s t h a t had infl a m e d the subcontinent f o r two decades. The S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n the t a l k s , o f course,was t h a t the beginnings of a rapprochement might have been reached between the s u b c o n t i n e n t a l n e i g h -bours. T h i s would have " c o n t r i b u t e d enormously to the prim-ary - and unspoken - S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e i n t h i s area:the con-tainment of Chinese i n f l u e n c e and expansion i n A s i a . " v A l -though t h i s promise was not f u l f i l l e d , t h e conference was s t i l l seen as a gre a t triumph of S o v i e t diplomacy., S o v i e t e f f o r t s i n the years f o l l o w i n g Tashkent were devoted to b u i l d i n g a presence i n both I n d i a and P a k i s t a n and to appear as even-handed .in t h e i r d e a l i n g s with the c o u n t r i e s as p o s s i b l e . The most n o t i c e a b l e f a c e t of t h i s was the S o v i e t arms supply p o l i c y . In the e f f o r t to demonstrate t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y the S o v i e t s chose to provide arms to P a k i s t a n w h i l s t c o n t i n u i n g LL the l o n g e s t a b l i s h e d trade with I n d i a . T h u s , i n the months f o l l o w i n g the Tashkent Conference,the S o v i e t Union p r o v i d e d j e e p s , t r u c k s and some h e l i c o p t e r s to P a k i s t a n . T h i s trade became more s u b s t a n t i a l as p o l i t i c a l d i v i d e n d s appeared to accrue to the S o v i e t s from t h i s i n i t i a l investment. One ex-ample of t h i s was the d e c i s i o n by Ayub Khan to terminate American use of i t s i n t e l l i g e n c e base a t Peshawar,a move t h a t was q u i c k l y f o l l o w e d by the c o n c l u s i o n of a major S o v i e t - P a k i s t a n i arms d e a l i n v o l v i n g s u p p l i e s of t a n k s , a r t i l l e r y 18. and armoured personnel c a r r i e r s . Of c o u r s e , g i v e n t h a t the S o v i e t s had been unable to s i g n i f i c a n t l y improve Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s i n the i n t e r i m p e r i o d , a n arms d e a l of such magnitude was bound to have r e -p e r c u s s i o n s f o r S o v i e t - I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s . In a d d i t i o n to f o r m a l p r o t e s t s from the I n d i a n government,news of the S o v i e t - P a k i s t a n i arms d e a l produced l a r g e s c a l e r i o t i n g a t the Sov-i e t embassy i n New D e l h i . T h i s widespread d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t with I n d i a ' s a l l e g e d ' s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ' with the U.S.S.R. i n c l u d e d the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a motion of censure by a p a r l -iamentary o p p o s i t i o n group of the government's f r i e n d l y p o l i c y toward the S o v i e t Union. W h i l s t Mrs.Gandhi p u b l i c l y stood by the S o v i e t connection,there i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t i n p r i v a t e she too was d i s a p p o i n t e d with the way Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s had developed s i n c e 19^5• In a d d i t i o n to the thorny i s s u e of arms to Pakistan,she was v i s i b l y annoyed by Kosygin's proddings t h a t she should s e t t l e the Kashmir and Farakka d i s -putes with her Muslim neighbour. Other w e l l p u b l i c i z e d i r r -i t a n t s w e r e : i n f l e x i b l e S o v i e t trade p o l i c i e s ; h o s t i l e commen-t a r y from a Moscow sponsored r a d i o s t a t i o n on I n d i a n p u b l i c figures;and,perhaps most s e r i o u s of a l l g i v e n the s e n s i t i v i t y of the Indians,the arrogance of Russian o f f i c i a l s i n t h e i r d e a l i n g s with I n d i a n c o u n t e r p a r t s . A l l of these f a c t o r s com-bined to b r i n g Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s to t h e i r lowest ebb i n the l a t t e r h a l f of 1968. I t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t such a s t a t e -o f - a f f a i r s c o u l d have been co m f o r t a b l y endured f o r long.As i t happened events both on and o f f the subcontinent i n 1969 combined to produce a s i g n i f i c a n t change,leading to "the e s t -19. ablishment of a r e l a t i o n s h i p a t l e a s t as c l o s e as i n the pre-1965 p e r i o d , i f not c l o s e r - i n the f a l l of I969."7 The primary c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r to t h i s rapprochement was the marked d e c l i n e i n S i n o - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s , b e s t i l l u s - v t r a t e d by the f i e r c e armed c l a s h e s a c r o s s the U s s u r i r i v e r i n March. T h i s t h r e a t , c o u p l e d with the p r o s p e c t of Sino-American rapprochement,led the S o v i e t s to i n t e n s i f y t h e i r e f f o r t s a t i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g on the subcontinent.(Foremost among these was the campaign f o r c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y - which w i l l be d e a l t with i n the next chapter).However.Pakistan proved u n r e c e p t i v e to S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s , r e j e c t i n g Kosygin's p r o p o s a l f o r r e g i o n a l economic c o l l a b o r a t i o n and l a t e r ex-p l i c i t l y r e j e c t i n g the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p r o p o s a l . Perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t l y i t a l s o proceeded to improve i t s defence t i e s with B e i j i n g . Moscow was thus v e r y conscious of the need to shore up i t s p o s i t i o n i n the r e g i o n , t o ensure t h a t i t c o u l d count on a t l e a s t one r e l i a b l e a l l y . At the same time the Indians were preocc u p i e d with the l a t e n t t h r e a t from P a k i s t a n which had v o c i f e r o u s l y g i v e n t e s t -imony to i t s s t r o n g t i e s with China. T h e r e f o r e , a s t e n s i o n s rose on the s u b c o n t i n e n t , t h e y f e l t the need to secure a l e s s i s o l a t e d s e c u r i t y p o sture. With the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a r d l y Q appearing as a v i a b l e option,the only route open to the I n d i a n government appeared to be to welcome S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s f o r a q u a l i t a t i v e improvement i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t seems t h a t one p r i c e the Indians were able to exact: f o r t h i s was a S o v i e t promise to d i s c o n t i n u e arms s u p p l i e s to P a k i s t a n . As Burke notes: 2 0 . A Russian embassy note i s s u e d i n New D e l h i on 7 / 7 / 7 1 assured Indians t h a t no Russian arms had been g i v e n to P a k i s t a n s i n c e A p r i l 1 9 7 0 , when d e l i v e r i e s c o n t r a c t e d f o r i n 1968 had been com-p l e t e d . Since a p i p e l i n e takes a while to dry up, the d e c i s i o n not to supply any more war m a t e r i a l to P a k i s t a n was probably taken by the Russian l e a d e r -s h i p i n 1 9 6 9 , when i t began to urge I n d i a to j o i n the S o v i e t sponsored A s i a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y system.9 I tend to concur with Horn's assessment"^ t h a t the f e l t need of both the S o v i e t Union and I n d i a to a v o i d seeming d i p -l o m a t i c i s o l a t i o n 'probably l e d to t h e i r drawing up the frame-work of the T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p i n September I 9 6 9 . 1 1 I f t h i s was the case, why was the agreement not made p u b l i c , s i n c e t h i s would have heightened i t s deterrence p r o p e r t i e s ? I t h i n k the answer may l i e i n the f a c t t h a t f o r both p a r t i e s the t h r e a t the T r e a t y was designed to counter was not a t t h a t time s u f f i -c i e n t l y p r e c i s e or acute to warrant f o r e c l o s i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a n o e u v e r a b i l i t y . I t was probably decided by both p a r t i e s t h a t the T r e a t y would not be made p u b l i c u n t i l i n t e r l o c k i n g S ino-S o v i e t and I n d o - P a k i s t a n i c o n f r o n t a t i o n s proved unavoidable 1 2 (which became the case i n 1 9 7 1 ) - T h i s arrangement l e f t the S o v i e t Union f r e e to continue to attempt to wean P a k i s t a n away from China, and I n d i a to improve r e l a t i o n s with P a k i s t a n and, more i m p o r t a n t l y , with China. Indeed, there are numerous r e -p o r t s t h a t the Indians d i d proceed to put out f e e l e r s to B e i j i n g towards the end of 1 9 6 9 about the p o s s i b i l i t y of n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s between the two. Whatever the reason f o r secrecy, i t does seem reasonable to suggest t h a t some broad s e c u r i t y r e l a t e d agreement was reached between I n d i a and the S o v i e t Union i n the autumn of 1 9 ^ 9 ' From 21. the S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e , i t should be emphasized t h a t w h i l s t t h i s r e p r e s e n t e d a move away from the balanced s u b c o n t i n e n t a l i n f l u -ence b u i l d i n g of the Tashkent era, i t d i d not s i g n i f y an aban-donment on Moscow's p a r t of the attempt to m a i n t a i n some k i n d of presence i n Islamabad. For example, a v i s i t by Yahya Khan to Moscow i n June 1970 l e d to an agreement on l a r g e s c a l e S o v i e t -P a k i s t a n i economic c o o p e r a t i o n and the S o v i e t pledge to help b u i l d the f i r s t P a k i s t a n i s t e e l p l a n t and to develop n u c l e a r 13 energy f o r p e a c e f u l purposes. J Indeed, as the next s e c t i o n d e a l i n g with the events of 1971 w i l l show, a l a r g e p a r t of Indo-S o v i e t d i s c u s s i o n s d u r i n g the Bangladesh c r i s i s c e n tered around Moscow's d e s i r e not to openly support the I n d i a n p o s i t i o n f o r f e a r t h a t t h i s would t o t a l l y a l i e n a t e i t from the West P a k i s t a n regime. The Bangladesh C r i s i s The c r i s i s occasioned by Mujibur Rahman's demand f o r a l a r g e l y autonomous Bangladesh w i t h only loose f e d e r a l l i n k s to West P a k i s t a n was n e i t h e r unusual nor unexpected g i v e n the c h r o n i c i n s t a b i l i t y of P a k i s t a n i p o l i t i c s . N e g o t i a t i o n s had been t a k i n g p l a c e f o r some three years on the i s s u e of p r o v i n -c i a l autonomy throughout P a k i s t a n , but s u c c e s s i v e m i l i t a r y govern-ments had been u n w i l l i n g to make any s e r i o u s concessions. The p o i n t of no r e t u r n was reached a f t e r the e l e c t i o n s of December 1 9 7 0 , when Rahman's Awami League captured not only a l l but two s e a t s i n the East P a k i s t a n l e g i s l a t u r e but a l s o an absolute m a j o r i t y i n the n a t i o n a l assembly. The West P a k i s t a n i power establishment, a u n i t e d f r o n t c o n s i s t i n g of Bhutto's P a k i s t a n 22. Peoples P a r t y (the l a r g e s t i n the West) and the m i l i t a r y regime, r e f u s e d to l e t the Awami League take power a t the c e n t r e . A f t e r three months of h i g h l y complicated and o f t e n deceptive n e g o t i a t i o n s , Yahya Khan determined i n the l a s t days of March 1971 to crush the Bangladesh s t r u g g l e with m i l i t a r y f o r c e . Rahman was a r r e s t e d and whisked away to West P a k i s t a n . The P a k i s t a n i army, composed e n t i r e l y of West P a k i s t a n i p e r s o n n e l , was ordered to r e s t o r e law and order. The hulk of the Awami League l e a d e r s and 7-10 m i l l i o n refugees took s h e l t e r i n I n d i a , where the Awami Leaguers proclaimed a " s o v e r e i g n people's r e p u b l i c of Bangla-desh" with Mujibur Rahman as p r e s i d e n t . 1 ^ How then d i d I n d i a and the S o v i e t Union r e a c t to t h i s dra-matic t u r n of events? The S o v i e t s q u i c k l y demonstrated t h e i r concern i n a s t e r n o f f i c i a l message i s s u e d by P r e s i d e n t Podgorny on 2 A p r i l , which requested t h a t Yahya Khan "take the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and r e p r e s s i o n s a g a i n s t the p o p u l a t i o n i n East P a k i s t a n " and work towards a p e a c e f u l r e s o l u t i o n of the c o n f l i c t . In a s e r i e s of pro-nouncements over the next three months, the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p continued to r e i t e r a t e the need f o r a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n - a r i d , above a l l , calm on the p a r t of a l l concerned l e s t war should break out on the subcontinent. Moscow's most c h e r i s h e d hope a t t h i s stage was s t i l l t h a t the Awami League might become the government of a u n i t e d P a k i s t a n . Rahman was c o n s i d e r e d the most p r o - S o v i e t of Pa k i s t a n ' s p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s and h i s p a r t y ' s socio-economic programme was, i n Moscow's eyes, " p r o g r e s s i v e " . He was opposed to P a k i s t a n ' s membership i n SEATO and CENTO and stood f o r c l o s e l i n k s , e c o n o m i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y , with I n d i a . As Sen Budhraj notes, "As the S o v i e t s c a l c u l a t e d , P a k i s t a n -the whole of i t - r u l e d by the Awami League c o u l d b e t t e r serve t h e i r p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s i n the r e g i o n . " " ^ W h i l s t i n c r e a s i n g l y 2 3 -aware of the burden p l a c e d upon the a l r e a d y s t r a i n e d I n d i a n economy by the refugees, the U.S.S.R. c o n f i n e d i t s e l f to d i p -l o m a t i c pressure upon the P a k i s t a n government to make the .. . necessary p o l i t i c a l reforms i n the East t h a t would a l l o w the refugees to f e e l safe enough to r e t u r n . The I n d i a n government i n i t i a t e d two s t r a t e g i e s i n response to the c r i s i s ; one p u b l i c , the other p r i v a t e . In p u b l i c i t a c t e d with a - c o n s i d e r a b l e degree of r e s t r a i n t : f o r example, i t d i d not recognize Bangladesh u n t i l December. I t worked through normal d i p l o m a t i c channels to focus world a t t e n t i o n upon the p l i g h t of the refugees, and sent i t s F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r to v i s i t the c o u n t r i e s p r o v i d i n g economic a i d to P a k i s t a n , demand-i n g t h a t t h i s be cut o f f to pressure Yahya to r e l e a s e Rahman 17 and reach a p o l i t i c a l s ettlement. However, a t the same time, I n d i a was p r o v i d i n g s u b s t a n t i a l c o v e r t a s s i s t a n c e to the Mukti B a h i n i , the East P a k i s t a n i g u e r r i l l a movement d e d i c a t e d to e s t a b l i s h i n g an independent Bangladesh. Indeed, some a n a l y s t s suggest that I n d i a had g i v e n advance assurances of m i l i t a r y and other support to the Awami Leaguers who then launched the 1 ft i n s u r r e c t i o n i n March 1971- I n d i a p r o v i d e d the g u e r r i l l a s with sanctuary, arms, t r a i n i n g , c o v e r i n g f i r e and the a s s i s t a n c e of some personnel from the I n d i a n Border F o r c e . In order to c o n c e a l t h i s involvement the I n d i a n government asked a l l f o r e i g n r e l i e f workers i n the refugee camps to leave i n August, and the f o l l o w i n g month p l a c e d r e s t r i c t i o n s on f o r e i g n j o u r n a l i s t s . As Burke notes, " i t was hoped t h a t the r e b e l s would be able to g a i n a f o o t h o l d i n s i d e E a st P a k i s t a n , s e t up a p r o v i s i o n a l 24. government the r e , and g r a d u a l l y render the p o s i t i o n of the P a k i s t a n i army untenable.""^ However, n e i t h e r the Indians nor the S o v i e t s appeared to be making much headway i n a c h i e v i n g t h e i r separate o b j e c t i v e s . The West P a k i s t a n regime proved t o t a l l y obdurate i n the face of S o v i e t pressure to adopt a p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n , and the I n d i a n a i d e d g u e r r i l l a s , although e n j o y i n g wide popu l a r support, were unable to c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n East P a k i s t a n . Meanwhile, the pressure of the refugees upon the I n d i a n economy and the s o c i a l f a b r i c of the s t a t e s housing them continued to grow, and as i t d i d , so d i d the pressure upon the I n d i a n government 20 to take some form of d e c i s i v e a c t i o n . Indeed, as Simon has noted, a growing number of I n d i a n a n a l y s t s began to argue t h a t a war with P a k i s t a n to achieve an independent Bangladesh would be e c o n o m i c a l l y p r e f e r a b l e to the l o n g term c o s t of i n t e g r a t i n g the refugees i n t o a r e g i o n a l r e a d y t o r n by e x t r e m i s t p o l i t i c a l 21 movements. T h i s mounting pressure upon the I n d i a n government to t h i n k i n terms of a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n was q u i c k l y a p p r e c i a t e d by both P a k i s t a n and the S o v i e t Union. The former warned omin-o u s l y t h a t i t would not t o l e r a t e any o u t s i d e attempt to impose a s o l u t i o n to the East P a k i s t a n q u e s t i o n and t h a t , i n the event of a c o n f r o n t a t i o n , P a k i s t a n "would not stand alone". There was a seemingly p l a u s i b l e degree of substance to t h i s c l a i m as P a k i s t a n ' s defence t i e s with China had been strengthened over the summer and, although r e s t r a i n e d , o f f i c i a l Chinese pronounce-ments s t r e s s e d the dangers of e x t e r n a l powers i n t e r f e r i n g i n what they c o n s i d e r e d to be an i n t e r n a l P a k i s t a n i problem. 2 5 . The prospect of Chinese m i l i t a r y support f o r P a k i s t a n i n the event of a c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the l a t t e r and I n d i a alarmed the S o v i e t Union as w e l l as I n d i a . They were both f u r t h e r d i s -turbed by the growing s i g n s t h a t a Sino-American rapprochement was t a k i n g p l a c e . I n d i a , i n p a r t i c u l a r , was alarmed by the r o l e P a k i s t a n had played i n b r i n g i n g these two s t a t e s together by s e t t i n g up the groundwork f o r K i s s i n g e r ' s s e c r e t v i s i t to B e i j i n g . In the event of another c o n t r o n t a t i o n with P a k i s t a n , 22 % c o u l d I n d i a even count on American n e u t r a l i t y ? I t seems' l i k e l y t h e r e f o r e , that t h i s p r ospect of Sino-American rapproche-ment c o n f e r r e d upon I n d i a and the U.S.S.R. a community of s t r a -t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n the summer of 1971 which l e d them to r e a c t i -vate d i s c u s s i o n s on the completion of the T r e a t y of Peace and F r i e n d s h i p . I t i s worthwhile going i n t o some d e t a i l on t h i s i s s u e , o u t l i n i n g the p e r s p e c t i v e s of the two s i d e s i n s i g n i n g the Treaty, and what i t s p r o v i s i o n s , both e x p l i c i t and other-wise, e n t a i l e d f o r the g e n e r a l content of the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p . As o u t l i n e d above, i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t the s i g n i n g of the T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p i n August 1971 represented I n d i a n acquiescence i n the face of continued S o v i e t p r e s s u r e . Indeed, i t seems j u s t as p l a u s i b l e to suggest that the prompting to s i g n came from the I n d i a n s i d e , i n order to demonstrate g r e a t power support i n the u n f o l d i n g c r i s i s . Domestic pressure f o r a more a c t i v e response grew p e r c e p t i b l y d u r i n g June-July. J The Jana Sangh, campaigning f o r immediate r e c o g n i t i o n of Bangladesh, organized a 12 day demonstration i n New D e l h i f o r e a r l y August 2 6 . which was to have been capped by a massive satyagraha. "With a t i m i n g t h a t suggests design, the Indo-Soviet T r e a t y was announced j u s t before the climax of these demonstrations -24 completely d e f l a t i n g o p p o s i t i o n p r e s s u r e . " However, the most l i k e l y e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t both p a r t i e s saw t h e i r i n t e r e s t s 2^ served by such a t r e a t y and acted a c c o r d i n g l y . v From the I n d i a n s i d e , a p a r t from the hoped f o r d e t e r r e n t to Chinese support of P a k i s t a n , there might a l s o have been an attempt to f o r c e the U n i t e d S t a t e s to reexamine the consequences of i t s p o l i c y towards the subcontinent. From the S o v i e t s i d e , the T r e a t y appeared to be the means to a t t a i n both s h o r t and l o n g term o b j e c t i v e s i n the r e g i o n . I t s most immediate, and I f e e l main g o a l - v e r y d i f f e r e n t from the Indian i n t e n t i o n - was to f o r e c l o s e the p o s s i b i l i t y of war on the subcontinent. As Donaldson notes, The t r e a t y ' s main purpose from the S o v i e t p o i n t of view, was to f o r m a l i z e and extend Russian i n f l u e n c e f o r the immediate purpose of s t a b i l i z i n g the s i t u a -t i o n i n South A s i a , both by d e t e r r i n g the P a k i s t a n i s and t h e i r Chinese patrons, and by p r o v i d i n g a  •psychological c r u t c h to the Indians designed to  f o r e s t a l l an emotional d r i f t toward war on the  p a r t of New D e l h i . ^ 6 With t h i s i n mind, i t should be s t r e s s e d t h a t the T r e a t y d i d not embody any major s e c u r i t y commitment on the p a r t of the U.S.S.R. th a t would not have e x i s t e d anyway, g i v e n the emerging c o n s t e l l -a t i o n of f o r c e s - so i t c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d something of a cheap investment. Obviously the c h i e f l o n g e r term g o a l was to draw I n d i a ever more c l o s e l y i n t o an a n t i - C h i n e s e d i p l o m a t i c c o a l i t i o n . The I n d i a n response to t h i s was, of course, to argue t h a t the t r e a t y merely served to strengthen I n d i a ' s t r a d i t i o n a l 2 7 . p o l i c y of nonalignment. I t should, be emphasized, a t t h i s p o i n t , t h a t the whole gamut of Indo-Soviet t i e s were d e a l t with i n the t r e a t y d i s c u s s i o n s , t h a t i s , although c o o p e r a t i o n i n the f i e l d of s e c u r i t y was the h e a d l i n e s t e a l e r , there were ext e n s i v e d i s -c u s s i o n s on economic and t e c h n i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n . The c o n c l u s i o n of the t r e a t y d i d help to defuse the explo-s i v e s i t u a t i o n f o r a time but i t d i d not stop the refugees from po u r i n g i n to I n d i a . The S o v i e t response was to continue to put pressure on the P a k i s t a n i government to reach a p o l i t i c a l s e t t lement. However, i t soon became c l e a r t h a t Moscow s t i l l wished to a v o i d saying or doing a n y t h i n g t h a t would damage r e l a t i o n s with Islamabad beyond r e p a i r . F o r example, the S o v i e t p r e s s r e f u s e d to use the word Bangladesh and s t r e s s e d t h a t the Indo-Soviet T r e a t y was not d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n . S i m i l a r l y , the S o v i e t government d i d not suspend economic a i d to P a k i s t a n , 27 u n l i k e most Western donors. The o c c a s i o n of Mrs. Gandhi's v i s i t to Moscow i n September f u l l y demonstrated the divergence i n o p i n i o n between the "two t r e a t y p a r t n e r s " on how the c r i s i s should be handled. The S o v i e t l e a d e r s f i r m l y r e i t e r a t e d the need f o r a p o l i t i c a l s o l u -t i o n , c a u t i o n e d Mrs. Gandhi a g a i n s t contemplating any m i l i t a r y moves and s t r e s s e d t h a t the Indo-Soviet T r e a t y d i d not mean S o v i e t endorsement of the Bangladesh l i b e r a t i o n movement. How-ever, the K r e m l i n l e a d e r s d i d take n o t i c e of Mrs. Gandhi's f i r m statement of I n d i a ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n to "take a l l necessary measures" to stop the i n f l o w of refugees and to "ensure t h e i r 28 speedy r e t u r n " . The p u b l i c pronouncements of the two s i d e s 28. suggest t h a t Sen Gupta i s c o r r e c t i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t some p r i v a t e b a r g a i n was reached a t t h i s time on the c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n of I n d i a n m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . He puts forward the argument t h a t Mrs. Gandhi agreed to give the S o v i e t l e a d e r s 2-3 months (presumably without any I n d i a n moves to e s c a l a t e t e n s i o n s ) to bend the West P a k i s t a n i a u t h o r i t i e s to the task of n e g o t i a t i n g a p o l i t i c a l s e ttlement with the Awami League. In r e t u r n , she a p p a r e n t l y got an assurance of f u l l S o v i e t support should she be compelled 29 to a c t i n East P a k i s t a n . 7 T h i s assessment i s g i v e n support by a knowledgeable I n d i a n commentator who was l o c a t e d i n Moscow at the time of the v i s i t . He summarized the outcome of the v i s i t as f o l l o w s , ... the S o v i e t s i d e , i n s p i t e of i t s known and s t r o n g l y expressed p r e f e r e n c e f o r peace, has accepted the i d e a t h a t , i f unavoidable, I n d i a can take v e r y f i r m steps i n East Bengal without being concerned about S o v i e t support a t any l e v e l - p o l i t i c a l , econ-omic or otherwise.3® I t has been s u b s t a n t i a t e d from v a r i o u s sources t h a t the S o v i e t s began a major arms shipment programme to I n d i a from the end of August - thus i t seems c l e a r t h a t although they were p u b l i c l y c o u n s e l l i n g a g a i n s t war, they were p r o v i d i n g the necessary m a t e r i a l should I n d i a f i n d such a s o l u t i o n "unavoidable". As t e n s i o n s rose between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , a f u r i o u s d i p l o m a t i c campaign was conducted by a l l p a r t i e s concerned. There was a f r e n e t i c h u r r y i n g to and f r o between Moscow and New D e l h i by S o v i e t and I n d i a n o f f i c i a l s . Mrs. Gandhi h e r s e l f undertook a journey to i n f l u e n t i a l Western n a t i o n s , with p a r t i c -u l a r a t t e n t i o n to the U n i t e d S t a t e s , hoping to (a) i n c r e a s e the pressure on West P a k i s t a n to accommodate the Awami League; 2 9 . . (b) impugn the c r e d e n t i a l s of the,puppet c i v i l i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n that had been set up i n the East; and (c) s t r e s s the magnitude of the burden that I n d i a was s u f f e r i n g . This t r i p r e c e i v e d strong Soviet backing. I t seems the Russians were desirous of securing American cooperation i n persuading Islamabad to abandon i t s c o n f r o n t a t i o n i s t p o l i c y , a move reminiscent of the j o i n t c o n f l i c t management s t r a t e g y of the two during the 1 9 ^ 5 Indo-P a k i s t a n i c o n f l i c t . At the same time, a high ranking P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y mission was despatched to c u l t i v a t e Chinese, support. In a d d i t i o n , the P a k i s t a n i s were r e c e i v i n g what Bhutto l a t e r termed "tremendous pressure" from the S o v i e t s to make p o l i t i c a l 31 concessions m the East. This intense diplomatic a c t i v i t y came to a h a l t i n mid-November and from the S o v i e t side t h i s presaged a dramatic s h i f t i n p o l i c y . I t had become i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r that the P a k i s t a n i regime would never be responsive to Soviet inducements to accommodate the Awami League and, perhaps more s e r i o u s l y , f e l t able to maintain t h i s p o s i t i o n of intransigence because of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of Chinese m i l i t a r y support. The f i n a l straw f o r the Soviets occurred when Yahya Khan, a f t e r ordering the army i n West P a k i s t a n to forward p o s i t i o n s as an " e x e r c i s e " , pro-ceeded to keep them there throughout November and then despatched the c h i e f s of s t a f f to B e i j i n g f o r c o n s u l t a t i o n s . ~ The Soviet leaders must a l s o have r e a l i z e d that the domestic pressures upon the Congress government to take some d e c i s i v e a c t i o n were s t e a d i l y mounting and t h a t , perhaps, I n d i a could not be r e s t r a i n e d much longer. Both the S o v i e t s and the Indians were a l s o wary 30. of r e l y i n g on a prolonged g u e r r i l l a s t r u g g l e i n East P a k i s t a n because i t seemed l i k e l y t h a t the e s s e n t i a l l y bourgeois l e a d e r -s h i p of the Awami League would be g r a d u a l l y bypassed by more 33 r a d i c a l and dynamic elements w i t h i n the l i b e r a t i o n movement. J I f the p a t t e r n of subversive a c t i v i t y i n the neighbouring r e -gions of I n d i a was anything to go by i t seemed more l i k e l y t h a t r a d i c a l elements w i t h i n the Awami League would be of a pro-B e i j i n g r a t h e r than pro-Moscow p e r s u a s i o n . In - l i g h t ,of these. -d-e-veloprnfent/sy-iit ,-appea-r.e -• t h a t -the ^ S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p e v e n t u a l l y became r e c o n c i l e d to the p r o s p e c t of an I n d i a n m i l i t a r y move. They were secure i n the knowledge t h a t t h e i r arms shipments had p r o v i d e d the wherewithal to a c t e f f e c t i v e l y and t h a t the onset of winter would make Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n a c r o s s the Himalayas extremely u n l i k e l y . With the S o v i e t Union t a k i n g away the r e s t r a i n i n g l e a s h , the I n d i a n m i l i t a r y planners moved i n t o top gear to execute the p l a n f o r i n t e r v e n t i o n , which almost c e r t a i n l y had been 34 drawn up a t an e a r l y stage of the c r i s i s . One of the more s i g n i f i c a n t a c t s i n the p e r i o d l e a d i n g up to d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a -t i o n was Mrs. Gandhi's d e c l a r a t i o n to the e f f e c t t h a t her govern-ment c o n s i d e r e d the. very presence of West P a k i s t a n i troops i n the East to be "a t h r e a t to.-our s e c u r i t y " . v Four days l a t e r , I n d i a n armed u n i t s advanced r a p i d l y i n t o East P a k i s t a n , to which the P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y responded by bombing I n d i a n a i r -f i e l d s i n the West, thus opening a second f r o n t . However, n e g l i g i b l e damage was done by t h i s r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e i n the West as I n d i a h e l d a 3-1 advantage i n a i r c r a f t and stayed l a r g e l y 3 1 . on the d e f e n s i v e a l l o w i n g the P a k i s t a n i f o r c e s to h a t t e r them-s e l v e s a g a i n s t h e a v i l y f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n s . The I n d i a n army q u i c k l y advanced i n the East; Bangladesh was r e c o g n i z e d on 7 December and nine days l a t e r , upon the f a l l of Dacca, I n d i a d e c l a r e d a c e a s e f i r e on both f r o n t s . P a k i s t a n , having l i t t l e c h o i c e , accepted the next day and the b r i e f I n d o - P a k i s t a n i war came to an end.-^ Meanwhile, on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r o n t , the S o v i e t s stood f i r m l y behind the I n d i a n move. Two days a f t e r the outbreak of f i g h t i n g the S o v i e t government warned a l l powers to a v o i d i n -volvement i n the c o n f l i c t , and f o r the f i r s t time p l a c e d a l l the blame f o r the war upon the West P a k i s t a n i a u t h o r i t i e s . S o v i e t and I n d i a n p o s i t i o n s were c o o r d i n a t e d throughout the con-37 f l i c t by the exchange of h i g h l e v e l d i p l o m a t i c personnel. In the heated debates i n the U n i t e d Nations the S o v i e t s , f o r the f i r s t time i n many years, d i s a s s o c i a t e d themselves from the mainstream of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n by r e j e c t i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i n an armed c o n f l i c t , p r i o r i t y should be g i v e n to the impo-38 s i t i o n of a c e s s a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s . Moscow took the stand t h a t a c e a s e f i r e was i n c o n c e i v a b l e without a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e -ment i n East P a k i s t a n and thus vetoed three r e s o l u t i o n s backed by the U.S. and China c a l l i n g f o r an immediate c e a s e f i r e . In a c t u a l f a c t the l e n g t h of S o v i e t o p p o s i t i o n to a U.N. c e a s e f i r e r e s o l u t i o n was determined s o l e l y by the l o g i s t i c a l p o s i t i o n of the I n d i a n army i n East P a k i s t a n . Perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the U.S.S.R. was a l s o w i l l i n g to make m i l i t a r y moves to d e t e r both China and the U.S. To 3 2 . d e a l with the former, the Russians were r e p o r t e d to have made exte n s i v e troop movements a l o n g the S i n o - S o v i e t border thereby d i v e r t i n g the a t t e n t i o n of the Chinese m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s . Sim-i l a r l y , when the U.S. government decided on a p e t u l a n t show of f o r c e by sending a n a v a l task f o r c e i n to the Bay of Bengal, the S o v i e t s q u i c k l y despatched a shadowing f o r c e and assured the I n d i a n government t h a t i t would not permit the Seventh F l e e t 39 to i n t e r v e n e i n Bangladesh. 7 Moscow adopted t h i s p o l i c y of a g g r e s s i v e support f o r I n d i a because i t was convinced t h a t , i f the I n d i a n m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t i v e was s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l timed and l i m i t e d to l i b e r a t i n g E a s t P a k i s t a n , n e i t h e r the U.S. nor China would p h y s i c a l l y i n t e r f e r e . Furthermore, the g l o b a l commitments of the U.S.S.R. put a l o t of pressure on i t to demonstrate e f f e c t i v e support f o r i t s t r e a t y bound p a r t n e r . In t h i s r e s p e c t , i t was f e l t t h a t the S o v i e t support f o r I n d i a helped to erase the memory of the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of i t s support to the Arabs i n 1967• As Sen Budhraj notes, "the f e a r of Sino-American c o l l u s i o n ... made i t a l l the more necessary f o r Moscow to demonstrate to i t s non-communist a l l i e s t h a t the Kremlin would not a l l o w i t s e l f to be browbeaten by Peking or Washington." However, the S o v i e t s were not prepared to provide open-ended support f o r any Indian moves t h a t might t h r e a t e n the p h y s i c a l v i a b i l i t y of West P a k i s t a n . The Indian m i l i t a r y i n i -t i a t i v e had been s u c c e s s f u l i n the East because of i t s e f f i c i e n t t i m i n g and execution, but a l s o because n e i t h e r the U.S. nor China saw East P a k i s t a n as b e i n g c e n t r a l to t h e i r s t r a t e g i c 3 3 . i n t e r e s t s (nor was i t seen as such by the U.S.S.R.). However, a l l these a c t o r s regarded the e x i s t e n c e of West P a k i s t a n as b e i n g e s s e n t i a l , f o r should i t have d i s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o three or f o u r non-viable s t a t e s w i t h i n t h i s v i t a l s t r a t e g i c area a l l these e x t e r n a l a c t o r s would have been a f f e c t e d by the l o n g term i n s t a b i l i t y i n the r e g i o n . Thus, "maintenance of the s t a t u s quo seemed p r e f e r a b l e to the superpowers, f o r the poten-t i a l f o r big-power c o n f r o n t a t i o n under such c o n d i t i o n s would h o l d dangers f o r a l l . " I t i s not c l e a r t h a t the Indians ever s e r i o u s l y contemplated such.'..a move - the b e n e f i t s would have been v e r y d o u b t f u l . Nonetheless, i f such a p l a n was ever mooted i t would have r e c e i v e d extremely s h o r t s h r i f t from the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p , without whose bac k i n g i t would have been h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c a l i n outcome. Moscow demonstrated i t s apprehension over I n d i a n i n t e n t i o n s by twice postponing the departure of i t s c o o r d i n a t o r from New D e l h i u n t i l a f t e r the surrender of Dacca i n the East and r e c o g n i t i o n of the c e a s e f i r e i n the West. y Whatever i t s a c t u a l say m the t i m i n g of t h i s cease-f i r e , the U.S.S.R. r e c e i v e d the p o l i t i c a l kudos f o r i t , with even Nixon p r a i s i n g the r e s t r a i n i n g e f f e c t S o v i e t diplomacy had had upon I n d i a . So the Indo-Soviet p a r t n e r s h i p s u c c e s s f u l l y s u r v i v e d t h i s f i r s t t e s t of i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s . I n d i a had removed the major thorn of a P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y t h r e a t from i t s s i d e , and i n "~ s e c u r i n g the independence of Bangladesh hoped t h a t the p r e v i o u s safe haven, t r a i n i n g and supply area f o r the N a x a l i t e s , Nagas and Mizos would cease to e x i s t . The S o v i e t Union, although being f o r c e d to change from i t s p r e f e r r e d posture of balanced 3 4 . s u b c o n t i n e n t a l i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g , appeared to have secured a more advantageous p o s i t i o n i n the r e g i o n . India, m i l i t a r i l y s t r o n g e r , more c o n f i d e n t and g r a t e -f u l f o r S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e and dependent on f u r t h e r a i d , was i n the new circumstances an even more v a l -uable p a r t n e r i n the e f f o r t to o u t f l a n k China. What then does t h i s case study t e l l us about the e f f e c t i v e -ness of S o v i e t .attempts to i n f l u e n c e the d i r e c t i o n of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y moves and v i c e versa? At the most g e n e r a l l e v e l , we can see t h a t i n the p e r i o d from the c l o s e of the 1965 c o n f l i c t to the summer of I969 S o v i e t p o l i c y toward the subcontinent d i c t a t e d the w e l l - n i g h impossible task of u n i t i n g P a k i s t a n and I n d i a i n a common grouping a g a i n s t 4 7 Chinese i n f l u e n c e . ' W h i l s t S o v i e t p o l i c y m the next two years d i d not e x p l i c i t l y change, the f o r m a l i z a t i o n of l i n k s with I n d i a g i v e n a context of growing I n d o - P a k i s t a n i a n i m o s i t y l e f t S o v i e t p o l i c y very dependent upon In d i a n a c t i o n s and i n -t e n t i o n s . With t h i s background s i t u a t i o n i n mind, I have to concur with Kapur's assessment t h a t S o v i e t p o l i c y throughout the Bangladesh c r i s i s was s t a t u s quo o r i e n t e d and t h a t the major m o t i v a t i o n f o r c o n c l u d i n g the T r e a t y i n 1971 was to attempt to defuse the f a s t approaching c r i s i s . Thus i t d i d not attempt to e x p l o i t an e x p l o s i v e situation',but r a t h e r , when fa c e d with growing I n d i a n d e t e r m i n a t i o n to seek a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n , pro-4 8 v i d e d support to a v o i d ending .up on the l o s i n g s i d e . T h i s example h i g h l i g h t s the n e c e s s i t y t h a t , when d e t a i l i n g an i n f l u -ence r e l a t i o n s h i p , one should be aware t h a t w h i l s t the depen-dence of the " i n f l u e n c e e " i s more r e a d i l y apparent (such as i n i t s m i l i t a r y hardware requirements), the dependence of the 3 5 . " i n f l u e n c e r " may "be nonetheless r e a l , manifested in;.this case hy the e s s e n t i a l l y r e a c t i v e nature of S o v i e t p o l i c y d u r i n g the c r i s i s . One of the main p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r a r e g i o n a l power to s u c c e s s f u l l y p r o j e c t i n f l u e n c e , when con f r o n t e d by i n t r u s i v e superpowers, i s the c a p a c i t y to recognize when the complex i n t e r l o c k i n g i n t e r e s t s of these e x t r a - r e g i o n a l a c t o r s render e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n by any of them i m p o s s i b l e . Such was the case i n South A s i a i n 1 9 7 1 . The d i p l o m a t i c t r i a n g l e of the U.S.S.R.-U.S.-P.R.C. which began to c r y s t a l l i z e i n t h i s year:-precluded any of these s t a t e s from e x e r t i n g d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e on the emergence of Bangladesh. As the l e a d i n g expert on Ind i a n s e c u r i t y a f f a i r s reasoned i n September 1 9 7 1 , "the then r e c e n t developments i n Sino-American r e l a t i o n s would " r e s u l t i n a s t r a t e g i c s t a n d - o f f between the U.S. and China on the one hand and the S o v i e t Union on the other, thereby r e t u r n i n g to I n d i a kg the f u l l i n i t i a t i v e i n the subcontinent." y The I n d i a n govern-ment f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d t h i s and, a f t e r s e c u r i n g S o v i e t support, i t undertook a neat and c l e a n m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n f o r which a p o l i t i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n had been l a i d i n the months up to December.^ F u r t h e r , w h i l s t the S o v i e t Union had pro v i d e d I n d i a with the wherewithal to achieve i t s r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g i c g o a l s , t h i s d i d not mean th a t the Indian government would view i t s " i n d e b t -edness" to the U.S.S.R. as a major c o n s t r a i n t on i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a n o e u v e r a b i l i t y . In the next chapter we w i l l see t h a t t h i s was ve r y c l e a r l y the case with regard to the S o v i e t 3 6 . c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y scheme, but there are other examples of I n d i a n i n g r a t i t u d e i n the immediate post-Bangladesh p e r i o d . F o r example, i n the slow process of n o r m a l i z a t i o n of Indo-P a k i s t a n i r e l a t i o n s a f t e r the war, I n d i a c a l c u l a t e d l y excluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of S o v i e t Tashkent s t y l e mediatory diplomacy and i n s t e a d i n s i s t e d on a p u r e l y b i l a t e r a l framework f o r nego-tiations.^"'" S i m i l a r l y , i n s p i t e of the S o v i e t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t an a n t i - C h i n e s e o r i e n t a t i o n was c e n t r a l to t h e i r r e l a t i o n -s h i p , the Indians d u r i n g the Bangladesh c r i s i s were r e l u c t a n t to p l a y up the Chinese r o l e i n the c o n f l i c t . On the Chinese s i d e , too, v e r b a l a t t a c k s on I n d i a were muted soon a f t e r the Avar's t e r m i n a t i o n . " I r o n i c a l l y , Moscow's backing of I n d i a strengthened the l a t t e r ' s p o s i t i o n i n the subcontinent to such an extent t h a t made i t l e s s dependent on S o v i e t s u p p o r t . " - ^ The prime i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s was the r e a l i z a t i o n on the p a r t of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y p l a n n e r s t h a t n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s with B e i j i n g was to be the c h i e f g o a l of the 1970's, i n s t a r k c o n t r a s t to the g o a l envisaged f o r I n d i a by the S o v i e t Union when i t had p r o v i d e d the former with d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y support d u r i n g the Bangladesh c r i s i s . CHAPTER I I I ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY 3 7 a . As suggested i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , I t h i n k i t i s as v a l i d to analyze i s s u e s on which the S o v i e t Union has t r i e d to e x e r t i n f l u e n c e hut f a i l e d , as a t those where i t was s u c c e s s f u l . Without pre-empting the f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n unduly, I t h i n k t h a t a n a l y s i s of S o v i e t e f f o r t s to promote "Asian c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y " and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t s e f f o r t s to g a i n Indian en-dorsement of i t s p l a n , do g i v e a v e r y r e a l i n s i g h t i n t o the l i m i t a t i o n s upon the e x e r c i s e of i n f l u e n c e . A n a l y s i s of the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i s s u e i s a l s o a t t r a c t i v e because of the way i t complements study of the 1 9 7 1 Bangladesh c r i s i s . Here the i n i t i a t i v e came from the S o v i e t Union, was repeated over a number of years (although s u b t l e y changing i n scope and f o r -mat), and i n e x t r i c a b l y i n v o l v e d a number of other A s i a n n a t i o n s i n the i n t e r p l a y of S o v i e t g l o b a l concerns with the r e g i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s of both I n d i a and China. F u r t h e r , as with the previous case, t h i s i s s u e was suggested to m e r i t f u r t h e r a t t e n -t i o n by Barnd's e a r l i e r work."'" The p u t a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e of the S o v i e t p l a n ( s ) f o r an A s i a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y scheme should not be underestimated. As Sen Gupta suggests, i t p r o v i d e s a thematic u n i t y to the S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s towards the d i f f e r e n t A s i a n c o u n t r i e s i n the 2 1 9 7 0 ' s . Nor should I n d i a ' s importance to the S o v i e t p l a n be underestimated. Whatever may come of the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y campaign i t has p r o v i d e d f u r t h e r evidence of the continued S o v i e t i n t e r e s t i n I n d i a as a bulwark of containment of Chinese i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a . Given t h i s s i g n i f i c a n c e and the complex c o n t e x t u a l nature of the i n i t i a t i v e i t i s worthwhile d e t a i l i n g 38. the stages i n i t s u n f o l d i n g ; the S o v i e t aims t h a t i t was intended to s a t i s f y ; and, of course, the I n d i a n r e a c t i o n to attempts to i n f l u e n c e i t s response to t h i s i n i t i a t i v e . I t should be s t r e s s e d a t the o u t s e t t h a t to understand the outcome of Indo-S o v i e t b a r g a i n i n g on t h i s i s s u e one must f u l l y r ecognize the m u l t i l a t e r a l context t h a t i n f l u e n c e d and shaped the nature of the b i l a t e r a l b a r g a i n i n g . The S o v i e t concern f o r South A s i a n s t a b i l i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y pronounced a f t e r the I n d o - P a k i s t a n i war of 1965 and so i n e v i -dence i n i t s d e a l i n g s with the two c o u n t r i e s f o r the r e s t of the decade, had begun to take a more concrete form d u r i n g Kosygin's t r a v e l s i n South A s i a d u r i n g the s p r i n g of 1969. Indeed the Russians and Indians a t t h i s time d i s c u s s e d the concept of an " E a s t e r n Locarno Pact". I n d i a ' s p l a n was never comprehensively a r t i c u l a t e d but can be viewed as a grand sequel to i t s much pub-l i c i z e d campaign f o r a "no-war" pact with Pakistan.'' I t en-t a i l e d an agreement among a group of A s i a n c o u n t r i e s to r e s p e c t one another's s o v e r e i g n t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y without any o b l i g a t i o n to come to anyone's a i d i n any emergency. Pre-sumably att a c h e d to t h i s was the j o i n t endorsement of major e x t e r n a l powers.^ How meaningful t h i s p r o p o s a l was i s open to debate as i t i s not adequately documented by the two authors p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d and there i s no mention of p u b l i c d i p l o m a t i c campaigning on the p a r t of the I n d i a n government to secure A s i a n adherents to i t . However, the t i m i n g of t h i s p r o p o s a l d i d v e r y c l o s e l y precede the f i r s t a u t h o r i t a t i v e S o v i e t pronouncement on A s i a n 39 . c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , by no l e s s a f i g u r e than Brezhnev, i n Pravda of 8 June, 1969- T h i s r e f e r e n c e i s worth qu o t i n g i n some d e t a i l because i t t y p i f i e s the p a t t e r n of S o v i e t pronounce-ments on the s u b j e c t . The b u r n i n g problems of the c u r r e n t r e l a t i o n s do not c o n c e a l from our view l o n g term t a s k s , namely, the c r e a t i o n of a system of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n those p a r t s of the globe where the dangers of another world war, of armed c o n f l i c t s , are concen-t r a t e d . Such a system i s the best replacement f o r the e x i s t i n g m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l groupings. ... We are of the o p i n i o n t h a t the course of events i s a l s o p u t t i n g on the agenda the task of c r e a t i n g a system of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n A s i a . The a c t u a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s of such a system were never s p e l l e d out a t t h i s time and most commentators see Brezhnev's comments as being p u r p o s e f u l l y ambiguously formulated to serve as some s o r t of t r i a l b a l l o o n . However, the ti m i n g of the p r o p o s a l g i v e s an important c l u e to i t s i n t e n t i o n s . I t was launched s h o r t l y a f t e r the most s e r i o u s border c l a s h e s with China and at the h e i g h t of p o l e m i c a l exchanges between the two when there was open debate as to the l i k e l i h o o d of a Russian "sur-g i c a l s t r i k e " a g a i n s t Chinese n u c l e a r f a c i l i t i e s . Thus the a n t i -Chinese t h r u s t of the p r o p o s a l i s unquestionable. At t h i s e a r l y stage the bulk of S o v i e t d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s were d i r e c t e d a t o b t a i n i n g a f a v o u r a b l e I n d i a n response to the p r o p o s a l . W h i l s t I n d i a ' s government d i d not appear s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s i l l u s i o n e d with i t s t r a d i t i o n a l nonalignment to be prepared to p u b l i c a l l y embrace the Brezhnev p r o p o s a l , n e i t h e r was i t pre-pared to o f f e r an immediate and e x p l i c i t r e b u f f . I t has been suggested t h a t the I n d i a n government had to pay l i p s e r v i c e to the p l a n i n view of the growing ani m o s i t y with P a k i s t a n and the 40. l i k e l i h o o d t h a t S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c support might he needed i n the near f u t u r e . Mrs.Gandhi's own r e a c t i o n was to put the most "benevolent face p o s s i b l e on the S o v i e t p l a n . She s a i d t h a t she f e l t the Russians were more i n t e r e s t e d i n economic c o o p e r a t i o n - to which I n d i a was not averse - than i n a m i l i -7 t a r y a l l i a n c e . \ The response of other A s i a n governments was even more n o t i c e a b l y c o o l . Indeed the only f a v o u r a b l e response was drawn from the I n d i a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Dinesh Singh ( i n what seems to have been an unguarded moment) d u r i n g h i s v i s i t to Moscow i n September 1 9 6 9 ; " I n d i a welcomes the p r o p o s a l by the S o v i e t Union on the c r e a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n A s i a ...the essence of the S o v i e t p l a n i s the development of coop-e r a t i o n amongst the A s i a n n a t i o n s f o r the purposes of s t r e n g t h -8 ening peace." The importance t h a t the Russians a t t a c h e d to t h i s seeming endorsement can be garnered from the l a r g e number of times and contexts w i t h i n which they managed to quote i t i n the f o l l o w i n g few months. However,the f r a g i l i t y of; t h i s response was demonstrated i n December,when Singh r e t r e a t e d from h i s p r e v i o u s p o s i t i o n and i s s u e d a m o d i f i e d v e r s i o n of I n d i a ' s r e a c t i o n , s t a t i n g t h a t the I n d i a n government d i d not b e l i e v e i n the concept of b i g powers a c t i n g as the guardians 9 of I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y or of t h a t of i t s neighbours. I n s p i t e of t h i s c o o l A s i a n response the S o v i e t s cont-inued to belabour the value of t h e i r p l a n d u r i n g the f i r s t h a l f of 1 9 7 0 ,without ever f i l l i n g i n i t s concrete d e t a i l s . I tend to concur with Donaldson's assessment t h a t , w i t h i n the South A s i a n context,the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p r o p o s a l o n l y accentuated trends i n S o v i e t p o l i c y t h a t had developed i n the mid-1960's. Thus the S o v i e t s continued m i l i t a r y a i d t o , and d i p l o m a t i c c o u r t s h i p of,both I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , s e e k i n g to t u r n t h e i r a t t e n t i o n from t h e i r q u a r r e l s with one another 10 and"toward a common e f f o r t to meet the Chinese t h r e a t . " However.it became g r a d u a l l y apparent to the Russian l e a d e r s h i p t h a t t h e i r words of wisdom were f a l l i n g on deaf ears a t t h i s time. Thus the Brezhnev p r o p o s a l , w h i l e not dropped,was r e l -egated to the s i d e l i n e s i n f a v o u r of attempts to secure b i -l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y t r e a t i e s with some of the more s i g n i f i c a n t 11 c o u n t r i e s i n A s i a . I t i s the o p i n i o n of the above author t h a t t h i s temporary r e t r e a t from m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m , t o w a r d s the end of 1970,also i n v o l v e d a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the S o v i e t f o r -e i g n a i d programme tov/ards " c o u n t r i e s where a i d might be expected to produce s i g n i f i c a n t d i r e c t economic b e n e f i t and 12 i n d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s r e l a t i v e l y q u i c k l y . " However, I t h i n k t h i s assessment i s something of an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . The s e l e c t i v e c o u r t s h i p of A s i a n c o u n t r i e s by means of a i d p o l i c i e s had been going on f o r some time p r i o r to the f i r s t l a u n c h i n g of the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p r o p o s a l . I t i s true t h a t there was some r e o r i e n t a t i o n of S o v i e t e f f o r t s a t i n f l -uence b u i l d i n g i n South A s i a a t t h i s time but,as was suggested i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , t h i s was more r e a c t i v e than i n n o v a t i v e . The S o v i e t move away from the Tashkent s t y l e b a l a n c i n g a c t was a r e s u l t of the growing congruence i n Indo-Soviet s t r a t -egic c o n c e r n s , r a t h e r than-from a S o v i e t reassessment of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of A s i a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . F u r t h e r , I would suggest that from the S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e the p u r s u i t of b i -42. l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s with states' such as I n d i a , I r a q and Egypt was i n no way incompatible with the g e n e r a l t h r u s t of S o v i e t A s i a n p o l i c y towards a m u l t i l a t e r a l c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y a r r -angement. As C l a r k notes,these t r e a t i e s e s s e n t i a l l y f o r m a l i z e d the concept of ' p o s i t i v e n e u t r a l i t y ' which was the S o v i e t response to t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of the g r a d u a l demise of simple b i - p o l a r c o m p e t i t i o n f o r i n f l u e n c e . That i s to say,no l o n g e r was an anti-Western o r i e n t a t i o n by a T h i r d World s t a t e an automatic p l u s f a c t o r f o r S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g . They p e r c e i v e d the need to e l i c i t p o s i t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s of support 13 from such s t a t e s . J As C l a r k goes on to say: T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y true i n the case of I n d i a -because of the presence of China,the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e most c l o s e l y approximates to a t r i p o l a r system. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h e r e f o r e t h a t the Sov-i e t Union has sought - through i t s s e c u r i t y p r o p o s a l s - so to i n f l u e n c e developments i n A s i a as to give f u l l e x p r e s s i o n to the p o t e n t i a l sympathies and mutual i n t -e r e s t s which e x i s t between the S o v i e t Union and some of the A s i a n s t a t e s . l r The e s s e n t i a l complementarity w i t h i n the S o v i e t frame-work of t h i s promotion of p o s i t i v e n e u t r a l i t y with the m u l t i -l a t e r a l search f o r c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y can be seen i n the v i g o r o u s p u b l i c r e v i v a l of the l a t t e r i n the months f o l l o w i n g the c o n c l u s i o n of the Indo-Soviet T r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p . In-deed t h i s t r e a t y was i n t e r p r e t e d from the S o v i e t s i d e as b e i n g "the f i r s t and probably most important step i n the e f f o r t to e r e c t a system of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . " T h i s was brought out most f o r c e f u l l y i n a speech by Brezhnev i n March 1972 when,after d i s c u s s i n g the marked improvement i n the S o v i e t p o s i t i o n on the subcontinent as a r e s u l t of the t r e a t y , h e went. 4 3 . on to say: The i d e a of guaranteeing the s e c u r i t y i n A s i a on a c o l l e c t i v e b a s i s i s a r o u s i n g i n c r e a s i n g i n t e r e s t In many A s i a n c o u n t r i e s . I t i s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r e r t h a t the r e a l path to s e c u r i t y i n A s i a i s not the path of m i l i t a r y b l o c s and groupings but the path of good neighbour c o o p e r a t i o n among a l l the s t -ate s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s . C o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n A s i a , must,in our view.be based on such p r i n c i p l e s as re.-n u n c i a t i o n of the use of f o r c e i n r e l a t i o n s between s t a t e s , r e s p e c t f o r s o v e r e i g n t y and the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of b o r d e r s . n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e i n i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and the broad development of economic and oth e r cooper-a t i o n on the b a s i s of f u l l e q u a l i t y and mutual advant-age. We are ready to cooperate with a l l s t a t e s w i t h a view to the implementation of t h i s i d e a . However,the I n d i a n government r e f u s e d to accept t h i s i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n of the l i n k a g e between t h e i r t r e a t y with.the S o v i e t s and the e d i f i c e of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y and c o n t i n u a l l y p l a y e d down the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the l a t t e r . I t i s a t t h i s stage t h a t the m u l t i l a t e r a l context en-v i s i o n e d by the S o v i e t s f o r t h e i r p l a n most c l e a r l y i n t r u d e d upon t h e i r b a r g a i n i n g a b i l i t y to g a i n Indian endorsement. Even i f the I n d i a n government had been e n t h u s i a s t i c about i t (which i t never was ).both the S o v i e t and I n d i a n l e a d e r s seemed to r e a l i z e a t t h i s time t h a t I n d i a should be one of the l a s t , a n d not one of the f i r s t , c o u n t r i e s to f o r m a l l y en-dorse the S o v i e t s e c u r i t y model,or to take any u n i l a t e r a l or j o i n t step i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . "The support of I n d i a would be the k i s s of death f o r the concept as f a r as P a k i s t a n and sev-17 e r a l other s m a l l e r A s i a n c o u n t r i e s are concerned." ' i t i s important to recognize t h a t the b i l a t e r a l b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n of I n d i a was improved by the r e p e r c u s s i o n s i t s a c t i o n s would have had upon the m u l t i l a t e r a l s e t t i n g of the c o l l e c t i v e sec-4 4 . u r i t y proposal. This f a c t o r , t o g e t h e r with the heightened Indian s e n s i b i l i t i e s w i t h regard to arm t w i s t i n g probably precluded S o v i e t usage of hard ba r g a i n i n g t a c t i c s that they f e l t f r e e to use with smaller A s i a n c o u n t r i e s . For example, Choudhury (who at the time was s e r v i n g i n the P a k i s t a n i gov-ernment) documents the ' s u b t l e t y ' o f the So v i e t b a r g a i n i n g approach: Kosygin t o l d Yahya that he could not expect S o v i e t arms as long as P a k i s t a n was u n w i l l i n g to endorse the Asian S e c u r i t y System.18 So v i e t attempts to secure Indian endorsement were i n t -e n s i f i e d towards the end of 1973- Brezhnev undertook an almost week long v i s i t to New D e l h i i n November and the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p l a n was the c e n t r a l t o p i c on the agenda. Indeed i n the p e r i o d from the beginning of August to the end of Nov-ember, the Russian leader made three major p o l i c y statements and i n each one he st r e s s e d the v i r t u e s of h i s p l a n f o r c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n A s i a . The ti m i n g of t h i s renewed campaign seems to have been prompted by intense Chinese dipl o m a t i c a c t i v i t y aimed at d i s c r e d i t i n g the S o v i e t Union i n non-aligned c i r c l e s , a prime example being Chinese support f o r a 'zone of peace' i n the Indian Ocean. Thus Brezhnev journeyed to I n d i a to squeeze out maximum p o l i t i c a l support and to check on repor t s that I n d i a might have begun to explore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 19 improved r e l a t i o n s v/ith China. y I t a l s o seems that the Russian l e a d e r s h i p had g r a d u a l l y come to the co n c l u s i o n t h a t , i n s p i t e of the r i s k s i n v o l v e d , I n d i a n p u b l i c endorsement could be no 4 5 . worse than the t o t a l l a c k of support the p l a n had garnered over the preceeding years. The Brezhnev v i s i t was undoubt-e d l y intended to both promote A s i a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y and to develop f u r t h e r Indo-Soviet economic c o o p e r a t i o n . The Russians had worked hard to c r e a t e as f a v o u r a b l e a c l i m a t e as p o s s i b l e f o r the t a l k s . One example of t h i s was the Sov-i e t g r a i n l o a n i n September when I n d i a was i n the g r i p of a mounting food c r i s i s and e x p e r i e n c i n g severe p o l i t i c a l t e n -s i o n s , a gesture which the I n d i a n l e a d e r s h i p regarded as gen<-e r o u s . a l l the more so because i t was u n s o l i c i t e d . When the v i s i t was over,the j o i n t communique announced major advances In the f i e l d of economic cooperation,hov/ever.progress on c o l l -e c t i v e s e c u r i t y was l e s s n o t i c e a b l e . In s p i t e of a l e n g t h y and f e r v e n t speech by Brezhnev to the I n d i a n Parliament on the need f o r the scheme (and I n d i a n endorsement t h e r e o f ), the l a c k of I n d i a n support was i n d i c a t e d by the t o t a l omission 20 of the phrase from the v i s i t ' s f i n a l communique. Some commentators have chosen to ignore t h i s l a t t e r f a c t and have concluded t h a t because progress was made In economic cooper-a t i o n some "broad agreement was a l s o reached on the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i s s u e . In f a c t , there was a l a r g e p u b l i c o u t c r y i n I n d i a a f t e r the v i s i t , w ith j o u r n a l i s t s and o p p o s i t i o n mem-bers of parliament d e c r y i n g s e c r e t s e c u r i t y agreements t h a t had been concluded, prompting government d e n i a l s t h a t any such concessions had been made to the U.S.S.R. However, on the b a s i s of a v a i l a b l e p u b l i c evidence, i t seems t h a t the I n d i a n government was able to decouple b a r g a i n i n g on economic coop-4 6 . e r a t i o n from the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i s s u e . Their a b i l i t y to do t h i s , of course, was made much e a s i e r because the bar-g a i n i n g forum could never c o n v i n c i n g l y be presented by the • Russians as i n v o l v i n g a s t r a i g h t t r a d e - o f f when the bargain-in g on economic cooperation was obviously mutually b e n e f i c i a l . I t seems c l e a r that so long as the Sov i e t p l a n was con-sidered by f e l l o w Asian c o u n t r i e s as being p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d towards c o n t a i n i n g Chinese i n f l u e n c e , i t was much too r e -s t r i c t i v e a f o r e i g n p o l i c y move f o r the Indian government to endorse. Thus one can concur with Donaldson's basic assess-ment of Indo-Soviet dealings on t h i s subject. "The f l e x i b i l i t y the S o v i e t s wish to r e t a i n i n t h e i r own dealings with South A s i a (and even to an extent i n t h e i r dealings w i t h China) 21 they wish to deny the Indians." Thus when Sino-Indian r e -l a t i o n s seemed on the verge of thawing, the Russians went to New D e l h i bearing g i f t s i n an e f f o r t to i n v e i g l e ? I n d i a i n t o endorsing what was un e q u i v o c a l l y regarded as an anti-Chinese grand plan. I t should be noted that the Indians d i d not forego these " g i f t s " by r e f u s i n g to endorse the Sov i e t s e c u r i t y plan. This h i g h l i g h t s a major problem f o r a superpower i n attempt-ing to e x t r a c t s t r a t e g i c dividends from an i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n -ship,:, t h a t i s , the d i f f i c u l t y i n o b t a i n i n g d e s i r e d outcomes from b i l a t e r a l b argaining when the p o l i c i e s and a c t i o n s of important t h i r d p a r t i e s impinge on the bargain i n g framework. Refusing to be put o f f by the c o o l response thus f a r , the Soviet Union repeatedly r e a c t i v a t e d the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y campaign over the next two years w i t h I n d i a c o n t i n u i n g to be 4 7 . a prime t a r g e t f o r d i p l o m a t i c c o u r t s h i p . For example, i n August 1 9 7 4 , the t h i r d anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and F r i e n d s h i p provided the Russians w i t h an occasion f o r f a l s e l y p r e s e n t i n g the pact as p r o v i d i n g the b a s i s f o r a 22 c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p l a n . Again there was no such i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n forthcoming from the Indian government, although c e r t a i n pro-Soviet a n a l y s t s w i t h i n I n d i a c a s t i g a t e d ... a s e c t i o n i n the South Block bureaucracy which, apprehensive of being dubbed pro - S o v i e t , assumes that t h i s might jeopardize i t s planned fence mend-in g w i t h Peking. Such an unwarranted s o l i c i t u d e towards the U.S. and China i s coming i n the way of I n d i a t a k i n g a vigorous i n i t i a t i v e towards c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n Asia. 2 3 However, i t appears t h i s represented very much a m i n o r i t y view w i t h i n the Indian e l i t e and was not i n f l u e n t i a l w i t h i n Mrs. Gandhi's government. The next, and f i n a l d i r e c t Soviet e f f o r t to g a i n Indian endorsement to be d e a l t with i n t h i s paper occurred i n February 1 9 7 5 , the occasion of a high-powered So v i e t m i l i t a r y team's v i s i t to I n d i a headed by Defence M i n i s t e r Grechko, c h i e f of the Soviet Navy Admiral G O T s f f i t o , and Chief of the Sov i e t A i r Force General Kutakhov. According to K u l d i p Nayar, a l e a d i n g a n a l y s t of Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s , during d i s c u s s i o n s of India's m i l i t a r y hardware needs Marshal Grechko again mentioned the plan, i n d i c a t i n g the seriousness w i t h which the concept was 24 viewed i n Soviet c i r c l e s . However, the Indian government was again unreceptive to S o v i e t overtures, Mrs. Gandhi agree-i n g only to a reference i n the j o i n t communique to the e f f e c t that I n d i a "attached s p e c i a l importance to the strengthening 48. of peace and s t a b i l i t y i n A s i a by the j o i n t e f f o r t s of a l l 2^ st a t e s of t h i s r e g i o n . " y This was, as Franda r i g h t l y notes, "an ambiguous diplomatic phrase which p o i n t e d l y omitted any 26 reference to c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . " In the wider pan-Asian forum the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y cam-paign was b r i e f l y r e a c t i v a t e d i n the autumn of 1 9 7 5 ? s h o r t l y a f t e r the c o n c l u s i o n of the European S e c u r i t y Conference. Soviet commentators noted t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s adopted at H e l s i n k i were " u n i v e r s a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to A s i a and to a l l coun-t r i e s s t r i v i n g to ensure s e c u r i t y and development f o r p e a c e f u l 27 purposes." ' As an example of the c o n t i n u i t y of Sov i e t t h i n k -i n g on t h i s t o p i c , an a r t i c l e i n the August 1 9 7 5 issue of a le a d i n g S o v i e t j o u r n a l , I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . f i r m l y r e i t e r a t e d the importance of - b i l a t e r a l t r e a t i e s w i t h c o u n t r i e s such as In d i a and I r a q as intermediate steps i n the process of estab-28 l i s h i n g a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y framework. Since that time some attempt has been made to c l a i m t h a t indigenous moves i n Asian c o u n t r i e s to d i s a s s o c i a t e themselves from Western sponsored a l l i a n c e s and groupings, such as SEATO, and moves towards n e u t r a l i s m i n ASEAN, are i n s p i r e d by growing 29 r e g i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the Soviet plan. ' However, these claims r i n g very hollow indeed as the Soviets have c l e a r l y been no more s u c c e s s f u l i n g a i n i n g supporters i n South East A s i a than i n other p a r t s of the continent. In summary, i n the pe r i o d under review the Sov i e t Union strenuously campaigned to secure Asian acceptance of i t s p l a n to determine the p a t t e r n of A s i a n s e c u r i t y arrangements. How-4 9 . ever, the format that t h i s proposed s e c u r i t y p l a n would take s i g n i f i c a n t l y v a r i e d i n both scope and d e t a i l over the years. Quite c l e a r l y the s e c u r i t y aspect was most f i r m l y accentuated i n the context of n e g o t i a t i o n s with P e r s i a n Gulf and South Asia n s t a t e s , and w i t h Japan. With'the other A s i a n nations g r e a t e r emphasis was placed upon the aspect of p o s i t i v e economic cooperation as one way of reducing the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r s t a t e c o n f l i c t . However, even on t h i s issue much more e f f o r t was devoted by the Soviets to the former group. The major t a r g e t s f o r S o v i e t d i p l o m a t i c a t t e n t i o n have been I r a n , I r a q , P a k i s t a n , Afghanistan and above a l l I n d i a , as e x e m p l i f i e d by Kosygin's proposal f o r an economic grouping of these f i v e s t a t e s . I t can be presumed that t h i s s e l e c t i v e c o u r t s h i p was l a r g e l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to a combination of: (a) the perceived high s a l i e n c e of these s t a t e s to S o v i e t s e c u r i t y concerns, and (b) the l i m i t e d diplomatic c a p a b i l i t i e s at the S o v i e t s ' d i s -p osal (both i n a v a i l a b l e economic a s s i s t a n c e p o t e n t i a l and personnel s k i l l e d i n c u l t i v a t i n g l i n k s with T h i r d World coun-t r i e s ) . This n e c e s s i t a t e d S o v i e t c o n c e n t r a t i o n on a few t a r g e t s where they f e l t i n f l u e n c e could be most r e a d i l y brought to bear. As s a i d above, the a n t i - C h i n a content of the p l a n has been g r a d u a l l y toned down but, i n l i e u of any e x p l i c i t S o v i e t f o r m u l a t i o n of the working d e t a i l s of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , t h i s has s t i l l bothered Asian leaders and i s the primary reason f o r t h e i r l a c k of enthusiasm about i t . As a r e s u l t , ... the Soviet Union i s s t i l l the l o n e r in' the-f i e l d of A s i a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y . I t s promo-t i o n a l e f f o r t s are being shared by no Asian 5 0 . country, not even among those with s o c i a l i s t r e -gimes, wi t h the sole and. not very h e l p f u l exception of Mongolia.3 0 W h i l s t never e x p l i c i t l y dropped, the p l a n has g r a d u a l l y faded i n t o the background when Soviet pronouncements on A s i a have been made. In the forumoof Indo-Soviet b a r g a i n i n g , the to p i c no longer appears to be on the agenda. For example, Menon d e t a i l e d the wide range of is s u e s discussed between '. Gromyko and Desai s h o r t l y a f t e r the Janata government took o f f i c e and noted that the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y proposal which had been r e i t e r a t e d p e r i o d i c a l l y since 19°9 was conspicuous by i t s absence.-^ 1 When attempting to place the Indian r e j e c t i o n of c o l l e c -t i v e s e c u r i t y i n some ki n d of p e r s p e c t i v e , the f i r s t p o i n t that should be emphasized i s that of a l l the candidates f o r endorsement, I n d i a was the t a r g e t of the most in t e n s e , pro-longed and v a r i e d campaign of Sov i e t persuasion. I t should a l s o be str e s s e d that the long term Soviet investment i n I n d i a i n trade, a i d and diplom a t i c support terms was the gr e a t e s t i n A s i a and that I n d i a was the only "true Asian" state to be inv o l v e d i n a t r e a t y bound r e l a t i o n s h i p with the Soviet Union. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t was a l l the greater w i t h the Russians choosing to i n t e r p r e t the Treaty of F r i e n d s h i p as a p o t e n t i a l cornerstone f o r a wider Asian s e c u r i t y scheme.-Given the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Indian response to the Sov i e t t h i n k i n g on t h i s subject, how can one account f o r Indian i n - a u transigence and what does t h i s t e l l us about the basic nature of the Indo-Soviet i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p ? 5 1 . At the most basic l e v e l , I n dian i n t r a n s i g e n c e can be ex-p l a i n e d because there was very l i t t l e to be gained from endors-i n g the S o v i e t plan. As Barnds noted, I n d i a , already i n v o l v e d i n a t r e a t y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the U.S.S.R. saw few advantages and many p o t e n t i a l drawbacks from any a d d i t i o n a l formal t i e s to Moscow outside the economic sphere. No matter how they sought to d i s g u i s e the p r o p o s a l , the S o v i e t s ' prime concern i n attempting to gain Indian endorsement was to use I n d i a as 33 a bulwark of containment of Chinese i n f l u e n c e m A s i a . J As i n t i m a t e d e a r l i e r , the primary goal of S o v i e t g l o b a l p o l i c y i n the 1970's has been the containment of Chinese i n f l u e n c e . I n A s i a t h i s has been attempted through the c u l t i v a t i o n of as f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s as p o s s i b l e w i t h important r e g i o n a l l e a d e r s , most n o t i c e a b l y I n d i a , Japan and Vietnam. However, from the Indian p o l i c y making perspective a pragmatic f l e x i b l e approach to B e i j i n g c u l m i n a t i n g i n a n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s has seemed a f a r s u p e r i o r goal to being drawn i n t o supporting the S o v i e t plan. Thus i t would seem reasonable to suggest that as long as the Soviet c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p l a n i s i n t e r -preted as having an anti-Chinese o r i e n t a t i o n i t w i l l continue to be r e j e c t e d by the Indian government. Fu r t h e r , i n general one has to concur w i t h Ghebhardt's e a r l i e r assessment t h a t , "the new o r i e n t a t i o n of India's f o r e i g n and defence p o l i c y towards r e g i o n a l i s m i s hindered by the S o v i e t proposal f o r a z. 3k system of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i n A s i a . " ^ Perhaps more i n t e r e s t i n g l y , i t appears that by r e s i s t i n g Soviet pressure on t h i s issue I n d i a d i d not forego any major 5 2 . b e n e f i t s from t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p , e i t h e r i n terms of d i p l o m a t i c support or p r o j e c t s f o r economic c o o p e r a t i o n . Indeed, as men-t i o n e d e a r l i e r , one of the major breakthroughs i n the develop-ment of trade and a i d l i n k s between the two c o u n t r i e s o c c u r r e d d u r i n g Brezhnev's v i s i t to I n d i a i n 1973• T h i s was i n s p i t e of the S o v i e t f a i l u r e to g a i n I n d i a n support f o r t h e i r c o l l e c -t i v e s e c u r i t y p l a n , which had p r o v i d e d the impetus f o r the v i s i t . Thus i t would appear that the Indians were capable of compartmentalizing the v a r i o u s aspects of the b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p , not a l l o w i n g themselves to be s u b j e c t e d to econ-omic c r o s s - p r e s s u r i z a t i o n on t h i s i s s u e of major p o l i t i c a l importance. I t a l s o seems t h a t New D e l h i has i t s e l f been able to e x e r c i s e i n f l u e n c e on the manner i n which the S o v i e t s pre-sented the p l a n to the r e s t of A s i a . T h i s can be seen i n the way i n which the S o v i e t s t r e s s upon the aspect of economic c o o p e r a t i o n becamemmore pronounced as i t continued to be f a v -ourably r e c e i v e d by the I n d i a n l e a d e r s h i p . I t i s a l s o c l e a r that New D e l h i ' s a b i l i t y f o fend o f f ;•' Moscow on t h i s i s s u e was made e a s i e r by the • ^ v-ague and s h i f t -i n g nature of the S o v i e t p r o p o s a l . The Russian l e a d e r s con-s i s t e n t l y attempted to m a i n t a i n as h i g h a degree of f l e x i b i l i t y as p o s s i b l e i n both the g e o g r a p h i c a l area to be i n c l u d e d and s u b s t a n t i v e content t h a t t h e i r p l a n might e n t a i l , i n an e f f o r t to secure adherents by being " a l l t h i n g s to a l l men". However, there was a l s o probably an element of face; s a v i n g i n t h i s p u r p o s e f u l ambiguity. Only when they c o u l d be assured of acceptance by a t l e a s t s e v e r a l f r i e n d l y A s i a n s t a t e s l i k e 5 3 . I n d i a , A f g h a n i s t a n and I r a q would they come out with the s e c u r i t y p l a n "wrapped i n h i g h sounding p r i n c i p l e s " and un-35 a m b i v a l e n t l y presented f o r g e n e r a l A s i a n endorsement. For some p e r i o d of time the S o v i e t s were d e t e r r e d from too v i g o r o u s l y p u r s u i n g I n d i a n support because of the p o s s i b l e r e g i o n a l r e p e r c u s s i o n s i n v o l v e d . When they l a t e r chose to mount an i n t e n s i v e d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t to t h i s end they were m a n i f e s t l y unable to exert s i g n i f i c a n t leverage upon the ••-I n d i a n government. In r e t r o s p e c t , they may have r e g r e t t e d not having i n t e n s i f i e d p r essure f o r I n d i a n acceptance when the b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n was more f a v o u r a b l e , t h a t x i s , p r i o r to 1 9 7 2 . Having s a i d t h i s , i t i s s t i l l by no- means c l e a r t h a t the I n d i a n government would, or c o u l d , have succumbed to such p r e s s u r e . P r i o r to Mrs. Gandhi's c r u s h i n g e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y i n 1 9 7 1 i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t she was i n s t r o n g enough domestic p o s i t i o n to undertake such a move (g i v e n the degree of a n t i -Russian f e e l i n g ) which would have a l i e n a t e d s e c t i o n s of her own p a r t y and p r o v i d e d ammunition to o p p o s i t i o n groups. Then, a f t e r the events of December 1 9 7 1 » the I n d i a n a b i l i t y to r e -s i s t S o v i e t blandishments was i n c r e a s e d by the p e r c e i v e d d e c l i n e i n the need f o r S o v i e t s e c u r i t y support on the subcontinent. F u r t h e r , i t i s by no means c e r t a i n t h a t I n d i a n endorsement would have pr o v i d e d the momentum f o r a wider A s i a n acceptance of the p l a n . The e a r l y S o v i e t assessment was probably f a i r l y a c c u r a t e . I n d i a n alignment behind the S o v i e t p l a n would have been viewed as c a u s i n g a dangerous p o l a r i z a t i o n i n A s i a , not o n l y h e i g h t e n i n g S i n o - I n d i a n t e n s i o n s but probably a l s o prompt-5 4 . i n g most of the other A s i a n n a t i o n s to q u e s t i o n I n d i a ' s creden-t i a l s to speak as a l e a d e r of the nonaligned. However, i t should be noted t h a t the I n d i a n government has never p u b l i c l y denounced the S o v i e t p l a n i n the h e c t o r i n g tones i t has r e s e r v e d f o r American i n i t i a t i v e s i n A s i a , such as the Nixon d o c t r i n e , or the l i f t i n g of the arms embargo on the subcontinent i n 1975- T h i s has been true of other major dontentious i s s u e s between the two, even on matters germane to I n d i a n r e g i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s : f o r example, i t has stead-f a s t l y put as benign a face as p o s s i b l e upon the S o v i e t n a v a l a c t i v i t y i n the I n d i a n Ocean. I n d i a w i l l p robably continue to r e f r a i n from making d i s p a r a g i n g a t t a c k s t h a t might r e f l e c t b a dly on S o v i e t p r e s t i g e i n the T h i r d World. However, the following;; p o i n t s should be borne i n mind which h i g h l i g h t the d i f f i c u l t y i n coming to an u n e q u i v o c a l assessment of the success or f a i l u r e of S o v i e t attempts a t i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g . In the f i r s t p l a c e , there i s the r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the S o v i e t s attempted to keep t h i s i s s u e a l i v e i n order to use i t as a s t y l i z e d b a r g a i n i n g counter. By doing so and p l a c i n g i t on the agenda of g e n e r a l b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s the S o v i e t s may have im-proved t h e i r a b i l i t y to o b t a i n f a v o u r a b l e outcomes on other i s s u e s . By t h i s I mean t h a t i f the S o v i e t s p l a u s i b l y presented themselves as being d i s a p p o i n t e d with I n d i a n r e j e c t i o n of t h i s "non-issue", they might w e l l have obtained recompense i n the form of the promise of " f u t u r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " . •55. Also i t should be remembered that the Soviet leaders always viewed Asian c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y as a long term goal and, i n s p i t e of i t s lack l u s t r e r e c e p t i o n , " i t was worth keeping a l i v e as a s i g n of S o v i e t i n i t i a t i v e i n A s i a and f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n on an o p p o r t u n i s t i c b a s i s . " J I t should a l s o be remembered how long the e q u a l l y ambiguous Soviet i n i t i a t i v e f o r European Peace and S e c u r i t y l a y on the i c e before i t was f i n a l l y a c t i v a t e d . CHAPTER IV RECENT TRENDS IN INDO-SOVIET SECURITY RELATIONS 5.6a. As the pr e v i o u s chapters have i l l u s t r a t e d , s i n c e the l a t e I960's the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the S o v i e t Union has heen c e n t r a l to I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y p l a n n i n g . The l i n k a g e between the S o v i e t Union and major I n d i a n p o l i c y areas and goa l s has been most v i s i b l e i n the areas of s e c u r i t y p o l i c y and economic development."'" In t h i s chapter we w i l l examine trends i n I n d i a n s e c u r i t y p o l i c y s i n c e the mid-1970 1s, to d e t e r -mine how they r e f l e c t t h i s l i n k a g e with the U.S.S.R. T h i s w i l l i n v o l v e ana-lysis of two major i s s u e s , I n d i a n armaments procurement and defence p r o d u c t i o n p o l i c i e s , and d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h past a d v e r s a r i e s . F i r s t of a l l i t might be i n s t r u c t i v e to o u t l i n e the d e v e l -opments of Indo-Soviet m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n thus f a r . The i n i t i a l arms supply agreement was concluded i n I960, but i t was only a f t e r the S i n o - I n d i a n c l a s h of 1962 t h a t S o v i e t a i d became s i g n i f i c a n t to I n d i a ' s defence needs. Before t h i s time I n d i a had r e f u s e d to accept m i l i t a r y a i d from any source, l e s t i t compromise i t s nonaligned s t a t u s , p r e f e r r i n g to pay f o r a l l weapon imports. S i m i l a r l y , i t had avoided making purchases from e i t h e r g r e a t power, l a r g e l y c o n f i n i n g i t s e l f to purchases from B r i t a i n , i t s t r a d i t i o n a l s u p p l i e r . From the e a r l y 1960's onwards the fl o w of S o v i e t weapons i n c r e a s e d d r a m a t i c a l l y f o r a number of reasons. In the f i r s t p l a c e , S o v i e t weapons have been f i n a n c i a l l y a t t r a c t i v e to I n d i a n buyers. F o r example, a 1964 agreement to buy Mig-21's i n c l u d e d a S o v i e t c r e d i t of $14-2 m i l l i o n , c o n s i s t i n g of t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e and machinery f o r three f a c t o r i e s to be b u i l t i n I n d i a to assemble and manu-57... f a c t u r e more Mig's. The new agreement r e v i s e d and enlarged the o r i g i n a l one signed i n 1962. The deal was a t t r a c t i v e to the Indians because the c r e d i t was repayable i n rupees r a t h e r than i n scarce hard currency and the i n t e r e s t terms were very low. Secondly, there i s the o p e r a t i o n a l s u i t a b i l i t y of Soviet arms; i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e i r robustness and s i m p l i c i t y i n main-tenance which have been t e s t e d under a c t u a l c o n f l i c t c o n d i t i o n s . A l s o , design changes are more incremental, thus ensuring the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a l a r g e r percentage of interchangeable p a r t s m each f a m i l y of Sov i e t weaponry. T h i r d l y , the Indian government became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s -enchanted w i t h Western s u p p l i e r s who both refused to supply the types of advanced equipment the Indian Armed Forces sought, and demonstrably attempted to manipulate Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y by aspects of t h e i r arms supply programmes. For example i n I 9 6 3 the Indians refused to accept an American and B r i t i s h commit-ment f o r a i r defence i n case of attack. The Indian government made i t q u i t e c l e a r that i t . would p r e f e r to purchase i t s own air-defence system. But the Western powers were u n w i l l i n g to supply such a system. The Sov i e t Union, on the other hand, was w i l l i n g to extend support to I n d i a and agreed to provide a i r -t o - a i r m i s s i l e s f o r the Mig f i g h t e r s and to e s t a b l i s h i n I n d i a an SA-2 a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e complex. Perhaps the most g l a r i n g example of the d i f f e r e n c e s i n Soviet and Western arms p o l i c i e s was seen i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e s to supplying arms to the combatants i n the 19^5 I n d o - P a k i s t a n i War. Whilst the U.S. 5 8 . and B r i t a i n immediately imposed a t o t a l embargo, the U.S.S.R., although c o o p e r a t i n g with the U.S. i n j o i n t management of the c o n f l i c t , d i d not reduce i t s s u p p l i e s of. m i l i t a r y hardware to I n d i a . F i n a l l y , m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n between the two developed apace with the g e n e r a l growth i n congruence of t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c y o ptions towards the end of the 1960's„ The most mean-i n g f u l demonstration of t h i s , of course, was the h u r r i e d l y d e l i v e r e d arms shipments t h a t I n d i a a c q u i r e d i n 1 9 7 1 , g i v i n g i t the wherewithal to undertake the m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t i v e i n East P a k i s t a n . I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t a f t e r the war the S o v i e t Union r e p l e n i s h e d most, i f not a l l , of I n d i a ' s weapons l o s s e s . Given the above f a c t o r s , i t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the I n d i a n p a t t e r n of defence procurement from 1964 onwards should have overwhelmingly concentrated on the U.S.S.R. How-ever, i t should be noted t h a t i t was l e s s n o t i c e a b l y so with regard to the Army's requirements than with the other two s e r -v i c e s . Table I d e t a i l s the extent of the S o v i e t c o n t r i b u t i o n i n arms t r a n s f e r r e d to I n d i a i n the decade 1 9 6 5 - 7 4 , when com-pared w i t h other arms s u p p l i e r s . Thus.in the mid - 1 9 7 0 *s we have a s i t u a t i o n i n which the S o v i e t Union i s by f a r and away the c h i e f s u p p l i e r of I n d i a ' s armaments. As C l a r k noted, " I n d i a ' s main a i r and n a v a l s t r i k e f o r c e s are S o v i e t a c q u i s i t i o n s , the Mig be i n g i t s major f i g h t e r aeroplanee and the Petya and Osa c l a s s v e s s e l s having proven t h e i r . u t i l i t y i n the 1971 I n d o - P a k i s t n i war."-' Indeed commentators of a l l shades of o p i n i o n appear to agree 59-TABLE I Arms Transferred to I n d i a , 1965-74 Country M i l l i o n s Current U.S. $ Soviet Union 1375 Czechoslovakia 84 United Kingdom 78 United States 41 F ranc e 39 Poland 27 Fed e r a l Republic of Germany 4 A l l Others 42 T o t a l 1690 Adapted From: U.S. Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency. World M i l i t a r y ' Expenditures and Arms  Transfer s , 1966-75 (Washington, D.D.: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1976), p. 78. 6 0 . with Barnds' assessment t h a t t h i s dependence upon the S o v i e t Union would seem to o f f e r i t the g r e a t e s t o p p o r t u n i t y to ex-e r c i s e s u b s t a n t i a l i n f l u e n c e upon I n d i a . ^ However, i t i s hard to p o i n t to concrete examples of S o v i e t success i n t h i s r e s p e c t . At the most g e n e r a l l e v e l , there have been no much sought a f t e r s t r a t e g i c gains; t h a t i s to say, there are no S o v i e t m i l i t a r y bases i n I n d i a and, although S o v i e t s h i p s bunker i n I n d i a n p o r t s , I n d i a n government o f f i c i a l s have r e p e a t e d l y denied t h a t there are, or w i l l be, any S o v i e t n a v a l bases i n I n d i a . On a more s p e c i f i c l e v e l , i t has been suggested t h a t the S o v i e t s have attempted to use I n d i a n d e s i r e s f o r s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons s u p p l i e s to i n c r e a s e t h e i r own b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n i n 1 areas of disagreement between the two c o u n t r i e s . F o r example, Choudhury puts forward the argument t h a t d u r i n g Brezhnev's v i s i t i n 1 9 7 3 , when c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y was on the agenda, the S o v i e t s coupled Indian acceptance of the scheme with the p o s s i b i l i t y of a c q u i r i n g advanced Mig - 2 3 i n t e r c e p t o r s , f i g h t e r -bombers and mobile SAM-6 a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s . As he goes on to say, "The S o v i e t s g e n e r a l l y provide arms, p a r t i c u l a r l y of the most s o p h i s t i c a t e d v a r i e t y , only i n r e t u r n f o r p o l i t i c a l 7 as w e l l as cash rewards."' W h i l s t i t seems t h a t I n d i a d i d e v e n t u a l l y r e c e i v e s u p p l i e s of these s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms i n g 1977 , i"t i s not c l e a r what p o l i t i c a l p r i c e was p a i d - as the p r e v i o u s chapter has d e t a i l e d , i t c e r t a i n l y was not endorsement of the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y p l a n . T h i s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , i t does seem c l e a r t h a t Mrs. Gandhi's government and l a t e r the Janata government r e a l i z e d t h a t too 6l.„. g r e a t a degree of dependence on S o v i e t arms s u p p l i e s might i n - . , volve i n t o l e r a b l e p r e s s u r e s f o r I n d i a i n some f u t u r e b a r g a i n -i n g s i t u a t i o n . In an attempt 1 to reduce t h i s dependence success-i v e I n d i a n governments have devoted major e f f o r t s towards improv-i n g the c a p a c i t i e s of I n d i a ' s indigenous defence i n d u s t r i e s . To t h i s end, a Department of Defence Supply was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1965 to encourage import s u b s t i t u t i o n of defence s t o r e s and i t i s noteworthy t h a t of a l l T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s only I s r a e l and I n d i a can be s a i d to have reached s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y i n . . . Q . ordnance f a c i l i t i e s . There i s a l s o complete indigenous pro-d u c t i o n of s m a l l arms and medium range weapons, as w e l l as v a r i o u s s m a l l n a v a l v e s s e l s and a i r c r a f t bodies and engines. However, more r e l e v a n t to the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n i s the p r o d u c t i o n under l i c e n s e of f o r e i g n equipment, which has been a c e n t r a l f e a t u r e of v i r t u a l l y a l l I n d i a n arms agreements of r e c e n t years. Once the l i c e n s e to produce has been a c q u i r e d the key p o i n t i s the percentage of indigenous content i n the p r o d u c t i o n run - the h i g h e r t h i s i s , the l e s s dependent a coun-t r y Is upon supply p o l i c i e s of the donor country. Two obser-v a t i o n s are worth making i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s p o i n t . F i r s t l y , i t i s g e n e r a l l y more expensive f o r a T h i r d World country to produce under l i c e n s e than to import d i r e c t l y . Although l a b o u r c o s t s might -well be cheaper than i n the l i c e n s i n g country, they occupy a v e r y s m a l l percentage of the t o t a l p r o d u c t i o n c o s t . F o r example, i n I n d i a l a b o u r c o s t s v a r y from 1 to 5 percent of t o t a l p r o d u c t i o n c o s t s . T h i s s a v i n g i s more than o f f s e t by the much hi g h e r m a t e r i a l c o s t s i n v o l v e d i n domestic p r o d u c t i o n . 6 2 . In I n d i a , the share of m a t e r i a l costs i n t o t a l production costs v a r i e s from 40 to 8 0 % , while i n Western c o u n t r i e s the share v a r i e s from 35-kOfo. M a t e r i a l costs are not only high because of i n d i g e n i z a t i o n but a l s o because the import of p a r t s tend to be more expensive than the import of complete a i r c r a f t . This can be due to d i f f e r -i n g t r a n s p o r t c o s t s , to manufacturers' p r i c i n g p r a c t i c e s , and to m o d i f i c a t i o n s made to s u i t the purchasing country.9 These are only a few of the f i n a n c i a l costs i n v o l v e d but i t i s c l e a r that i f , i n the face of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s go ahead and attempt domestic production i t can only mean that they perceive the dependence issue to be of major importance. "^ Secondly, the general impression i s that the Soviet Union i s more loathe than other arms producers to provide t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the manufacture of sup p l i e d models and attempts to "manage" the domestic production under l i c e n s e . With regard to the more s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n s of the Mig - 2 1 , I n d i a i s s t i l l a long way from being i n a p o s i t i o n to produce i t s own a i r c r a f t , should i t f e e l necessary to do so, although i t should be pointed out that under the l i c e n s e , I n d i a produces the more complex p a r t s of the a i r c r a f t , i n c l u d i n g engine, e l e c t r o n i c s and m i s s i l e s . H In another attempt to decrease i t s dependence on the Soviet Union, I n d i a has, i n the l a s t few years, attempted to d i v e r s i f y i t s sources of supply of s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons that could not be produced indigenously. I n the mid - 1 9 7 0's Leander c l a s s f r i g a t e s were acquired from the U.K. and v a r i o u s advanced h e l i -copters from France, most notably the SA - 3 1 5 Cheetah high a l t i -tude model designed f o r work i n the v i c i n i t y of the Sino-Indian 12 border. However, of even greater s i g n i f i c a n c e was the recent 63. d e c i s i o n to o b t a i n H a r r i e r STOL a i r c r a f t f o r i t s o n l y a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r . In a d d i t i o n , p r o t r a c t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s were conducted f o r p r o c u r i n g a s u i t a b l e s t r i k e a i r c r a f t . A d e c i s i o n was u l t i -mately taken to o b t a i n the Anglo-French Jaguar, and a r e c e n t l y concluded agreement p r o v i d e s f o r the o u t r i g h t purchase of kO, an i n i t i a l l i c e n s e d p r o d u c t i o n of about 60, t o g e t h e r with spare p a r t s and a n c i l l a r y equipment. " I t i s noteworthy t h a t t h i s e n t i r e d e a l , i n v o l v i n g between $1§ - 2 b i l l i o n , i s the s i n g l e 13 l a r g e s t arms t r a n s a c t i o n entered i n t o by I n d i a . " J Again the p o i n t should be made t h a t t h i s i s a conscious p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n because although d i v e r s i f y i n g sources of supply does promise g r e a t e r independence, i t a l s o e n t a i l s significant.''problems of separate maintenance and l o g i s t i c s management. S i m i l a r l y i n the areas of space r e s e a r c h and of m i s s i l e technology, there are once a g a i n s i g n s of both widespread s u p p l i e r d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n and of an i n c r e a s i n g indigenous capa-c i t y . In c o n c l u s i o n , we should not underestimate the degree of m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n between I n d i a and the S o v i e t Union, stemming as i t does from a p e r i o d i n which there was a f a i r l y developed c o n g r u i t y i n s t r a t e g i c outlook between the two. However, i t i s apparent, as C h a r i notes, t h a t : I n d i a i s c a u t i o u s l y d i v e r s i f y i n g i t s sources of e x t e r n a l arms supply and a t the same time proceed-i n g more v i g o r o u s l y i n the development of i t s own defense p r o d u c t i o n base as i t searches f o r a l a r g e r measure of autonomy on s e c u r i t y and defense i s s u e s . 1-5 6 4 . Recent I n d i a n D i p l o m a t i c I n i t i a t i v e s I n c r e a s i n g l y i n t h i s decade I n d i a n d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s have moved awayfrom g l o b a l i s s u e s , except the N.I.E.O. and n u c l e a r disarmament, and have s h i f t e d to s p e c i f i c concrete i s s u e s , most n o t a b l y r e l a t i o n s with i t s immediate neighbours. Nowhere has t h i s been more apparent than i n i t s 1 d e a l i n g s with P a k i s t a n . Despite the r o l e I n d i a p l a y e d i n t h a t country's dismemberment, i n the p e r i o d a f t e r 1972 the two have made s u b s t a n t i a l progress i n m i t i g a t i n g t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l h o s t i l i t y . T h i s process of n o r m a l i z a t i o n s t a r t e d by Mrs. Gandhi and A l i Bhutto a t Simla i n 1972 has been c a r r i e d f u r t h e r by a s e r i e s of meetings which have s e t t l e d many of the o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e s c r e a t e d by the 1965 and 1971 wars on the subcontinent. While they have remained i n deadlock on the q u e s t i o n of Kashmir, i t has l a r g e l y been . t a c i t l y accepted t h a t the i s s u e should remain e s s e n t i a l l y dormant. The s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t i e s with P a k i s t a n and Bangladesh a l s o r e c e i v e d major a t t e n t i o n from the Janata government. Pro-gress was made i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n l a r g e l y because I n d i a adopted a more f l e x i b l e and accommodating posture when d e a l i n g with l 6 i t s s u b c o n t i n e n t a l neighbours. A good i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s was the I n d i a n d e c i s i o n , i n November 1 9 7 7 , "to y i e l d to many of Bangladesh's l o n g s t a n d i n g demands on the FarraOkka barrages i s s u e . T h i s thenp.aved the way f o r the o f f i c i a l v i s i t by General Ziaurr- to New D e l h i i n December. T h i s s i g n a l l e d the b e g i n n i n g of a new p e r i o d of c o r d i a l Indo-Bangladesh r e l a t i o n s , 17 which had soured soon a f t e r the euphoria of 1971 wore o f f . ' 65. R e l a t i o n s with P a k i s t a n a l s o improved d r a m a t i c a l l y w h i l s t the Janata government was i n power. The v i s i t by Foreign M i n i s t e r Vajpayee to Islamabad i n February 1978 was p a r t i c u l a r l y f r u i t -f u l . I t does seem that the two neighbours have begun to work out some form of modus v i v e n d i f o r l i f e on the subcontinent based on b i l a t e r a l i n t e r a c t i o n l a r g e l y f r e e from e x t e r n a l promptings. In many respects t h i s has become p o s s i b l e because the Indian p o s i t i o n of r e g i o n a l predominance has been g r a d u a l l y , although grudgingly, accepted by P a k i s t a n . F r i c t i o n between the two has been f u r t h e r reduced by the P a k i s t a n i d e c i s i o n to r e o r i e n t i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y towards e s t a b l i s h i n g c r e d e n t i a l s as a West Asian s t a t e . These r e g i o n a l d i p l o m a t i c moves would appear to lend credence to Kapur's e a r l y assessment that: Indian attempts to b u i l d a system of s e c u r i t y i n the subcontinent by t r y i n g to exclude outside s e c u r i t y managers from the process of c o n f l i c t management thus seems to be the c e n t r a l t h r u s t of India's post-Bangladesh diplomacy.1 8 Although the Soviets welcomed the r e s u l t s of these nego-t i a t i o n s because they l e d towards the r e a l i z a t i o n of one of t h e i r major r e g i o n a l goals - s t a b i l i t y on the subcontinent -they must undoubtedly have been disappointed to have been ex-cluded from the n e g o t i a t i n g framework. W h i l s t the improve-ment i n I n d o - P a k i s t a n i r e l a t i o n s might a l l o w Moscow to indulge i n anti-Chinese i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g i n P a k i s t a n without a l i e n a t -in g I n d i a , i t does not seem that t h i s new c o n f i g u r a t i o n r e a l l y advances S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e . Rather, i t would seem that any major progress i n I n d o - P a k i s t a n i r e l a t i o n s would only serve to under-6 6 . score the d e c l i n e i n I n d i a n dependence on S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c support that has occurred s i n c e 1971- F u r t h e r , w h i l s t these developments undoubtedly enhance the value of I n d i a to the S o v i e t Union as a counterweight to the expansion of Chinese i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a , they would appear to decrease the I n d i a n need to be c a s t as such. S i n o - I n d i a n R e l a t i o n s W h i l s t t e n t a t i v e moves had been made by the I n d i a n govern-ment towards a n o r m a l i z a t i o n of / r e l a t i o n s with China as e a r l y as 1968,- there had been l i t t l e p r o g r e s s . Indeed the Indo-Soviet T r e a t y and the Bangladesh War served to h e i g h t e n t e n s i o n s between the two! However, i t should be noted" t h a t in/the- course "of the l a t t e r the I n d i a n government d i d not match the a n t i - C h i n e s e polemics of the S o v i e t Union and there was a r e l u c t a n c e i n 19 New D e l h i to p l a y up the Chinese r o l e i n the c o n f l i c t . 7 The mid - 1 9 7 0 's saw some slow progress towards a l e s s h o s t i l e Sino-I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p . Nonetheless, a number of s p e c i f i c events prompted p e r i o d i c v i t r i o l i c Chinese a t t a c k s upon I n d i a , p a r t i c u -l a r l y i n 1 9 7 k when I n d i a both detonated a n u c l e a r device and 20 annexed ' i t s Himalayan p r o t e c t o r a t e of Sikkim. However, i n the f i r s t h a l f of 1976 Mrs. Gandhi's govern-ment undertook a s e r i e s of s w i f t f o r e i g n p o l i c y moves "which had the p o t e n t i a l i t y of a l t e r i n g the p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s h i p s 21 with the major powers." Foremost among these was the announced agreement between I n d i a and the Peoples Republic to exchange ambassadors a f t e r a break of some f o u r t e e n y e a r s . The most 6 7 . i n t e r e s t i n g t o p i c f o r s p e c u l a t i o n i s , of course, how t h i s development was received i n the Soviet Union. Whilst i t i s hard to he d e f i n i t i v e given the l a c k of o f f i c i a l . S o v i e t response, I concur w i t h Barnds' assessment of the episode. A v i s i t by Mrs.' Gandhi to the Soviet Union i n June probably r e f l e c t e d New D e l h i ' s d e s i r e to make i t c l e a r that any improvement I n India's r e l a t i o n s w i t h China would not weaken i t s t i e s w i t h the U.S.S.R., but the absence of anyi Soviet commentary acknow-le d g i n g the move towards Sino-Indian " n o r m a l i z a t i o n " suggests that Moscow was anything but e n t h u s i a s t i c about t h i s development and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . 2 2 In l i n e w i t h i t s p o l i c y of improving r e l a t i o n s w i t h immediate neighbours, the Janata government evinced a strong i n t e r e s t i n patching up r e l a t i o n s w i t h B e i j i n g . A v i s i t by the Foreign M i n i s t e r Vajpayee was scheduled f o r the autumn of 1 9 7 8 , only to be postponed due to h i s i l l n e s s . His eventual v i s i t i n February 1979 has given r i s e to widely d i f f e r i n g i n -t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the success of the b i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s . s The bulk of press o p i n i o n i n I n d i a , w h i l s t s t r e s s i n g the pre-l i m i n a r y nature of the v i s i t , saw i t as having been a l i m i t e d success. They considered the most t a n g i b l e outcome from the Indian p o i n t of view as being the Chinese pronouncement that 23 t h e i r a i d to the Nagas and Mizos "was a t h i n g of the past". J However, Choudhury suggests that the t a l k s d i d not go w e l l and that Vajpayee's d e c i s i o n to break o f f the t a l k s , when China i n -24 vaded Vietnam was only a p r e t e x t . I have to disagree with t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , ..^ I f e e l that the Chinese, i n v a s i o n provoked a'strong emotional response on the pa r t - o f the Indian ..emissary because . of" i t s parallels-".-with the. p a i n f u l . I ndian . experience "of 1962-. . . - - .... 6 8 . I t cannot be denied t h a t the number of u n r e s o l v e d i s s u e s of d i s p u t e between the two c o u n t r i e s i s g r e a t and t h a t the c h i e f one, the boundary q u e s t i o n , has not been m e a n i n g f u l l y d i s c u s s e d s i n c e 196.2. W h i l s t B e i j i n g has always been w i l l i n g to s e t t l e the border q u e s t i o n with r e s p e c t to the North East F r o n t i e r Agency, i t has shown no w i l l i n g n e s s to compromise on the matter of the A k s a i Chin i n the west, f o r t h i s i s i n -e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d to Chinese defences a g a i n s t the U.S.S.R. i n X i n j i a n g . I n a d d i t i o n , both c o u n t r i e s continue to compete f o r i n -f l u e n c e i n the s m a l l e r c o u n t r i e s of South A s i a , the supply of Chinese arms to Bangladesh being one of the c.learest examples of t h i s . With regard to S i n o - P a k i s t a n i t i e s , the growth i n c o r d i a l i t y of I n d o - P a k i s t a n i r e l a t i o n s has l e s s e n e d I n d i a n s e n s i t i v i t y on t h i s p o i n t . However, a t times the I n d i a n govern-ment has viewed China's l i n k s with P a k i s t a n as slowing down the progress of I n d o - P a k i s t a n i rapprochement, as f o r example, when the Chinese continue to propound the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r -m i n a t ion f o r the people of Kashmir. From the Chinese perspec-t i v e the other major impediment to n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s i s the s u s p i c i o n t h a t I n d i a i s l i t t l e more than the t o o l of S o v i e t expansionism, a theme i t c o n t i n u a l l y r e t u r n s to when viewi n g such a c t s as the i n t e r v e n t i o n i n East P a k i s t a n . The nature of S i n o - I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s i s o b v i o u s l y of para-mount importance to the S o v i e t Union. Indeed i t has been suggested t h a t Moscow's a b i l i t y to prevent I n d i a from normal-i z i n g r e l a t i o n s with China would provide a v e r y r e a l i n d i c a t i o n 25 of s u b s t a n t i a l S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e upon In d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 6 9 , Of course, t h i s assumes a d e s i r e on the p a r t of B e i j i n g to normalize r e l a t i o n s with I n d i a , which f o r a l o n g p e r i o d a f t e r 1962 simply was not the case. Indo-Soviet d i s c u s s i o n s on t h i s t o p i c were v e r y h i g h on the agenda of Kosygin's v i s i t to I n d i a i n March of t h i s year. I t seems t h a t the Russians and Indians were able to agree i n a s s e s s i n g China's r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l o b j e c t i v e s but were i n disagreement on how to d e a l with these. I t i s c l e a r t h a t I n d i a b e l i e v e s t h a t n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s with China c o u l d prevent the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n -c r e a s i n g t e n s i o n s and, although the a t t a c k on Vietnam i s a setback, has served n o t i c e to the S o v i e t Union t h a t i t i n t e n d s -26 to resume the d i a l o g u e . However, the Russians should r e a l i z e t h a t there are v e r y r e a l s u b s t a n t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s to much im-proved S i n o - I n d i a n r e l a t i o n s . The two c o u n t r i e s have l i t t l e to o f f e r each other i n any p o s i t i v e sense, i n view of the b a s i c sim-i l a r i t y of t h e i r economies and the g r e a t d i f f e r -ences i n t h e i r c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l systems. T h e i r b a s i c m o t i v a t i o n f o r a rapprochement would thus be the e s s e n t i a l l y negative and long-range g o a l of r e d u c i n g the p o t e n t i a l harm t h a t c o u l d r e s u l t from h o s t i l e r e l a t i o n s . The e l i m i n a t i o n of t h i s t h r e a t would r e q u i r e short-term s a c r i f i c e s i n n e g o t i a t i n g a border agreement as w e l l as nebulous understandings (which would be open to c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ) about the two coun-t r i e s ' f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s and spheres of i n f l u e n c e . Making short-term concessions f o r u n c e r t a i n l o n g -term gains i s seldom an a t t r a c t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n to p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s u n l e s s the dangers of -:not doing so are g r e a t , a s i t u a t i o n which h a r d l y a p p l i e s to I n d i a and China i n view of the q u i e t c o n d i t i o n s a l o n g t h e i r f r o n t i e r s f o r more than a decade.2 7 Thus i t seems safe to say t h a t there i s l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d of New D e l h i p u r s u i n g c l o s e r e l a t i o n s with B e i j i n g as an a l t e r n a -t i v e to i t s a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d c l o s e r e l a t i o n s with Moscow. 70. Rather, i t w i l l seek a n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s to i n c r e a s e i t s m a n o e u v e r a b i l i t y and reduce a p o t e n t i a l s e c u r i t y t h r e a t . However, what seems e q u a l l y c l e a r a t t h i s stage i s t h a t the S o v i e t Union continues to view i t s c o m p e t i t i o n with China f o r i n f l u e n c e i n zero-sum terms (which i t no l o n g e r appears to do with the U.S.) and w i l l r e g ard any moves by I n d i a to l e s s e n antagonisms wi t h B e i j i n g as a n t i t h e t i c a l to i t s campaign f o r i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a . Indo-American R e l a t i o n s The t h i r d aspect of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n which there has been s u b s t a n t i a l change s i n c e the mid-1970's has been I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with the U n i t e d S t a t e s . The i n i t i a t i v e to reduce f r i c t i o n with the U.S. appears to have been taken by Mrs. Gandhi d u r i n g the Emergency p e r i o d . However, i t was then pursued with renewed v i g o u r by the Janata government. T h i s has not amounted to a fundamental r e a p p r a i s a l of I n d i a n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n s and, i n and of i t s e l f , i t would be s i m p l i s t i c to suggest t h a t improved Indo-American t i e s have been at the ex-pense of the U.S.S.R. The c h i e f reason f o r the improvement i n r e l a t i o n s between the two seemed to stem from the assumption of power i n the U.S. by the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s team i n -cluded a number of o f f i c i a l s who were i n c l i n e d to a c c o r d the T h i r d World i n g e n e r a l a somewhat more important p l a c e i n world a f f a i r s , and who were i n f a v o u r of a s s i g n i n g I n d i a a h i g h e r p r i o r i t y r e l a t i v e to P a k i s t a n than had been the case d u r i n g 28 the Nixon and Ford p r e s i d e n c i e s . I t seems t h a t C a r t e r ' s human r i g h t s programme was a p p l i e d to P a k i s t a n and i t s government was 7 1 . found wanting. 7 One r e s u l t was that the U.S. government announced i t was h o l d i n g up d e l i v e r y of 110 C o r s a i r bombers -thus s i g n a l l i n g New D e l h i that U.S. t i e s w i t h P a k i s t a n had be-r come more f l e x i b l e and that they no longer sought to promote P a k i s t a n i m i l i t a r y power i n the region. This i n c l i n a t i o n on the p a r t of the Carter a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was r e i n f o r c e d by the r e t u r n of democracy i n I n d i a and the more f r i e n d l y I ndian a t t i t u d e towards the U.S. During the p e r i o d of Janata r u l e there was a v i s i t by Carter to I n d i a and a r e t u r n v i s i t by Desai, and i t seems that the two leaders were able to e s t a b l i s h a good deal of personal rapport. In p a r t t h i s was made p o s s i b l y by the U.S. coming to accept India's p o s i t i o n of preeminence on the subcontinent and, as mentioned above, toning down i t s support f o r P a k i s t a n . A f u r t h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l b a r r i e r , the d o n o r - c l i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p imposed by massive U.S. economic a s s i s t a n c e had a l s o been removed. The Indians had learned how to come to terms wi t h the termina-t i o n of o f f i c i a l American economic a s s i s t a n c e . W h i l s t welcoming the Carter a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to resume a i d g i v i n g , they no longer judged the o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 30 two c o u n t r i e s s o l e l y on t h i s i s s u e . Problems do remain, and, as i n d i c a t e d , the c h i e f one of these centres around the nuclear n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s s u e , more p a r t i c u l a r l y , on the safeguards re q u i r e d by the U.S. f o r the sale of enriched uranium to the Indian p l a n t a t Tharapore. This has been an extremely p o l i t i -c i z e d issue on the Indian domestic scene and one on which no Indian government could a f f o r d to be seen to be making con- •.-72. c e s s i o n s . However,some progress might have been made on t h i s i s s u e by the rec e n t U.S. government d e c i s i o n to grant a l i c e n s e to the I n d i a n government f o r a shipment of 16.8 31 tonnes of e n r i c h e d f u e l . Again the c h i e f q u e s t i o n to be asked is:what e f f e c t does t h i s undoubted improvement i n Indo-U.S. r e l a t i o n s imply f o r the development of Indo-Soviet t i e s ? One should f i r s t s t r e s s t h a t I n d i a n d e c i s i o n makers must by now be extremely conscious of the way i n which American p o l i c y toward the subcontinent has f l u c t u a t e d d r a m a t i c a l l y over time. The ' Uni t e d S t a t e s never seems to have evolved an autonomous p o l i c y f o r determining the nature of i t s r e l a t i o n s with I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . Rather,the manner and extent of U.S. concern with the subcontinent has been d i c t a t e d by the s t a t e of i t s r e l -a t i o n s w i t h the U.S.S.R. and/or China. T h e r e f o r e , w h i l s t the p s y c h o l o g i c a l underpinnings e x i s t f o r c l o s e t i e s between the Uni t e d S t a t e s and India,such as the s i m i l a r i t y of valu e s supposedly h e l d by t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l systems,Indian d e c i s i o n makers w i l l be wary of p l a c i n g any g r e a t f a i t h i n these on t h e i r own. C e r t a i n l y not to the extent of jeopor-d i z i n g r e l a t i o n s with the: U./S .-S/R.^which has demonstrated con-s i s t e n c y over a number of years i n p r o v i d i n g support i n s p i t e of i t s l a c k of p s y c h o l o g i c a l r a p p o r t with the I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l system. I n d i a ' s approach to I n d i a n Ocean s e c u r i t y i s i l l u m -i n a t i n g i n t h i s r e s p e c t . The Indians.^ have been c o n s i s t e n t l y i n f a v o u r of the I n d i a n Ocean b e i n g d e c l a r e d a 'zone of peace' which would minimize e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n and thereby i n c r e a s e 7 3 , the p o t e n t i a l f o r e x e r c i s i n g i t s own i n f l u e n c e i n the region. Whilst i t has repeatedly come out i n favour of j o i n t S o v i e t -American t a l k s designed to l i m i t t h e i r naval a c t i v i t y there, i t has regarded the S o v i e t presence as very much the l e s s e r of two e v i l s . I t has deferred to the S o v i e t Union and made a d i s t i n c t i o n between a naval base and a naval presence,with the former being regarded as much the more o b j e c t i o n a b l e . "In l i n e w i t h t h i s p o l i c y . A m e r i c a 1 s upgrading of f a c i l i t i e s at Diego G a r c i a were v o c a l l y denounced by the Indian govern-ment while references to the S o v i e t navy have been fewer and 3 2 more subdued. Although the d i p l o m a t i c moves d e t a i l e d i n t h i s chapter have lessened the Indian need f o r a superpower s e c u r i t y guar-antor, i f such support were r e q u i r e d the U.S.S.R. as a known q u a n t i t y would be the most a t t r a c t i v e to Indian s e c u r i t y : • planners.This i s a l l the more l i k e l y when one bears in.mind the low s a l i e n c e of. South A s i a (when-compared to the Middle East f o r example ) to present American f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t e r e s t s . lEtsis';uhldikelyathat •thisksl^uacbiohp.w-illi 'so6hcGhange: rbecause /.'6fh the dominant domestic preoccupations that a P r e s i d e n t -i a l e l e c t i o n and the ongoing e n e r g y / i n f l a t i o n problems pro-vide . I t i s a l s o c l e a r that to the Soviet Union Chinese i n -fluence on the subcontinent i s s t i l l seen as the primary t h r e a t to be countered. Thus i t might be prepared to accept increased Indo-American cooperation as being non-competitive. Indeed,the U.S.S.R. might welcome a s i t u a t i o n i n which the 7 k., burden of India's economic development costs was more com-p l e t e l y taken up by the United States,so long as the s t r a t -e g i c cooperation between i t s e l f and I n d i a was not a f f e c t e d . On t h i s p o i n t one might speculate that the Sov i e t r e a c t i o n to the Indian moves to d i v e r s i f y the sources of i t s arms su p p l i e s might have been more v o c a l had these moves i n v o l v e d American r a t h e r than European s u p p l i e r s . F u r t h e r . i t could be argued t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t progress i n Indo-American r e l a t i o n s , w h i l s t Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s remained i n a st a t e of deadlock, would g r e a t l y serve the U.S.S.R. i n i t s e f f o r t s to decrease the p a r a l l e l i s m i n i n t e r e s t s that have drawn China and the 33 United S t a t e s together m recent years. J J In summary,this chapter has c l e a r l y shown tha t the dom-inant current L -cnS trend i n Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s i s the determination on the p a r t of I n d i a to increase i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y manoeuverability. by reducing i t s dependence on Sov i e t arms s u p p l i e s and by seeking to e s t a b l i s h more v i a b l e r e l a t i o n s w i t h Pakistan,China and the United S t a t e s . However,certain of these moves can be s a i d to t i e - i n w i t h Soviet goals i n the region,such as the promotion of s t a b i l i t y . I t i s i n c r e a s i n g l y the case that the status quo o r i e n t -a t i o n of the Soviet Union i n South A s i a has become dependent on the maintenance of close t i e s w i t h I n d i a . At the same ' time,India's enhanced p o s i t i o n on the subcontinent,although i n large p a r t due to past S o v i e t backing,has reduced India's need f o r f u r t h e r s t r a t e g i c support. However,there i s no suggestion that New D e l h i w i l l seek to d r a m a t i c a l l y loosen •75, i t s t i e s with the S o v i e t Union. F o r these continue to pro-v i d e unquestioned "benefits and t h e i r ' c o s t ' , a t l e a s t i n terms of c o n s t r a i n t s upon I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y options,seems to be more symbolic.than r e a l . I n c r e a s i n g l y I n d i a has been able to r e s i s t S o v i e t e f f o r t s to i n f l u e n c e the d i r e c t i o n of i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n . T h i s has been best e x e m p l i f i e d by the e x c l u s i o n of Moscow from p l a y i n g a mediatory r o l e i n r e s o l v i n g I n d o - P a k i s t a n i t e n s i o n s a f t e r 1971.and i n the det-e r m i n a t i o n of New D e l h i to pursue a dialogue with B e i j i n g . In c o n c l u s i o n , D o n a l d s o n 1 s assessment of the t r e n d i n Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s i n 1975 seems a l l the more p e r t i n e n t today. The e v o l u t i o n of Indo-Soviet relations;' has- thus r e s u l t e d i n a symbiosis but-one in"which the b a l -ance of dependency has changed d r a m a t i c a l l y . In-"• deed developments s i n c e 1971 suggest t h a t S o v i e t importance to I n d i a and a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n s peaked d u r i n g the Indo-Pak c r i s i s and have subsequently declined,whereas I n d i a ' s value to the S o v i e t Union may be i n c r e a s i n g . 3^ C H A P T E R V C O N C L U S I O N S 7 6 a . Although the number of cases examined i n t h i s study has been s m a l l i t has i n v o l v e d a n a l y s i s of most aspects of Indo-S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . Thus the c o n c l u s i o n s d e r i v e d from these cases should be c o n s i d e r e d to be g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c -able to t h i s dimension of the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n -s h i p . The most g e n e r a l and c l e a r cut c o n c l u s i o n to be made i s t h a t the S o v i e t Union has been unable to exert d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e upon I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n making. T h i s i n a b i l i t y to c o n s t r a i n the d i r e c t i o n of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y , present throughout the; p e r i o d under review, but most n o t i c e -able from 1 9 7 ^ - 7 5 onwards, has c o n t i n u o u s l y f o r c e d the S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p to modify aspects of i t s South A s i a n r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g y . As yet, t h i s has never i n v o l v e d s e r i o u s l y q u e s t i o n -i n g the primacy of I n d i a i n the S o v i e t s ' scheme of t h i n g s . The most co m p e l l i n g reason f o r the S o v i e t s to seek to m a i n t a i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p has been t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n t h a t by p r o v i d i n g New D e l h i with the m a t e r i a l support necessary to pursue i t s r e g i o n a l g o a l s , they have made gains w i t h i n the s t r a t e g i c con-t e x t of the r e l a t i o n s h i p . As R u b i n s t e i n notes: The i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a superpower and a T h i r d World country b e i n g asymmetrical, a super-power, though unable to impose i t s p r e f e r e n c e s on the domestic or f o r e i g n p o l i c y b e h a v i o r of the c l i e n t , may nonetheless be q u i t e s a t i s f i e d with the r e l a -t i o n s h i p because of the a c c r e t i o n of r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l advantages t h a t i t sees as stemming from f a c i l i t a t i n g a c l i e n t ' s g e n e r a l p o l i c y o r i e n t a -t i o n . 1 On the b a s i s of a c l o s e a n a l y s i s of S o v i e t pronouncements and behaviour, Donaldson has suggested t h a t there have been three major o b j e c t i v e s which the S o v i e t Union has c o n s i s t e n t l y sought i n i t s d e a l i n g s with the subcontinent. F i r s t of a l l , 77-to e n l i s t I n d i a ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n as a counterweight to China i n the A s i a n balance of power game, which r e q u i r e s the e x c l u -s i o n of Chinese i n f l u e n c e from I n d i a and Bangladesh and i t s m i n i m i z a t i o n i n P a k i s t a n . Secondly, to e n l i s t I n d i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l i m i t a t i o n of American (and European) presence and i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a . As p a r t of t h i s , i n . p u r s u i t of i t s expanded n a v a l a c t i v i t y i n the P e r s i a n Gulf and I n d i a n Ocean, i t would l i k e to have from I n d i a both d i p l o m a t i c support and the p r a c t i c a l a s s i s t a n c e t h a t I n d i a ' s p o r t f a c i l i t i e s can l e n d . F i n a l l y , to g a i n I n d i a n endorsement of the S o v i e t p o s i t i o n s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s and thereby i n c r e a s e f t h e ' i r n . a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n T h i r d -World forums. Related to t h i s has been the d e s i r e to p r o j e c t I n d i a as a showcase of the b e n e f i t s t h a t f r i e n d l y 2 t i e s with the S o v i e t Union can produce. In the f i r s t h a l f of the p e r i o d covered by t h i s study, roughly from 19^9 "to 1 9 7 ^ , the S o v i e t Union was a t l e a s t par-t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l i n o b t a i n i n g a l l these o b j e c t i v e s by pro-v i d i n g the support necessary f o r I n d i a to achieve r e g i o n a l predominance i n 1 9 7 1 . In t h i s p e r i o d the i n f l u e n c e , r e l a t i o n -s h i p was mutually b e n e f i c i a l because although the s t r a t e g i c goals of the two p a r t i e s were v e r y d i f f e r e n t they were c l e a r l y congruent. However, as I t h i n k Chapter IV has demonstrated, t h i s con-gruence i n s t r a t e g i c outlook has decreased s i n c e the middle of the decade. W h i l s t the o b j e c t i v e s of the S o v i e t Union as the s t a t u s quo e x t e r n a l power i n the r e g i o n have remained 7 8 . e s s e n t i a l l y the same, I n d i a n o b j e c t i v e s have n e c e s s a r i l y changed as s e c u r i t y t h r e a t s from P a k i s t a n and China have be-come l e s s r e l e v a n t . Most n o t i c e a b l y , I n d i a n d e c i s i o n makers i n the l a s t few years have co n c e n t r a t e d on c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n of r e g i o n a l predominance by c u l t i v a t i n g more v i a b l e r e l a t i o n s with a l l t h e i r s u b c o n t i n e n t a l neighbours, most par-t i c u l a r l y P a k i s t a n . W h i l s t c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the subcontinent, I n d i a has s i m u l t a n e o u s l y attempted to a c t as r e g i o n a l security-manager and has s t r i v e n to minimize the i n f l u e n c e of e x t e r n a l powers upon the s e c u r i t y framework of the r e g i o n . F u r t h e r , the Indians d i d not a l l o w t h e i r g r a t i -tude f o r S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c support to prevent them from attempting to l i m i t S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n t h i s r e s p e c t any l e s s than t h a t of the U.S. or China. T h i s combination of a d e c l i n e i n t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n s and the d e s i r e to adopt the r o l e of r e -g i o n a l s e c u r i t y manager has both l e s s e n e d I n d i a ' s dependence on S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c support and brought the two i n t o an i m p l i c l i m i t e d a d versary r e l a t i o n s h i p . There have been a number of other f a c t o r s which have a l -t e r e d the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n r e c e n t years F o r example, the growing I n d i a n need to o b t a i n forms of d e v e l -opment a s s i s t a n c e which the S o v i e t s have been u n w i l l i n g or unable to supply has i n c r e a s e d the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of improv-i n g Indo-American r e l a t i o n s . However, i t i s the r e c e n t moves to pursue a dialogue with China t h a t the S o v i e t s c o n s i d e r to be the most fundamental c h a l l e n g e to Indo-Soviet s t r a t e g i c c o n g r u i t y . As mentioned e a r l i e r , these moves are s t i l l a t a v e r y t e n t a t i v e stage and the o b s t a c l e s to p o s i t i v e coopera-79. t i o n between I n d i a and China should not be underestimated. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t does seem c l e a r t h a t the I n d i a n government i s s t r i v i n g f o r a degree of f l e x i b i l i t y i n i t s e x t e r n a l r e l a -t i o n s t h a t the S o v i e t Union has c o n s i s t e n t l y sought to deny i t . The format of the p l a n f o r A s i a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s p r i n g s r e a d i l y to mind i n t h i s r e s p e c t . As s a i d , t h i s does not imply t h a t c l o s e Indo-Soviet t i e s are about to be s h a t t e r e d , as both s i d e s recognize there i s s t i l l the b a s i s f o r mutually b e n e f i c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n . However, i t does seem l i k e l y t h a t the S o v i e t Union w i l l have to recon-c i l e i t s e l f to r e c e i v i n g g r a d u a l l y d e c r e a s i n g r e t u r n s from the s t r a t e g i c context of the r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h i s then r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of whether the S o v i e t s w i l l seek a compensatory m o d i f i c a t i o n i n the p a t t e r n of p a y - o f f s i n b a r g a i n i n g over p u r e l y b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . As I have suggested i n the b r i e f appendix to t h i s study, i t c e r t a i n l y appears t h a t S o v i e t n e g o t i a t o r s are i n c r e a s i n g l y prepared to seek shor t term econ-omic p a y o f f s from the r e l a t i o n s h i p even a t the r i s k of o f f e n d -i n g I n d i a n s e n s i b i l i t i e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h i s study i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y comprehensive to advance more complete c o n c l u s i o n s i n t h i s r e s p e c t . However, i t does i n d i c a t e t h a t a d e t a i l e d study of the outcomes of economic b a r g a i n i n g between the two c o u n t r i e s would be a v e r y worthwhile undertaking. Such a study c o u l d t e s t the hypothesis t h a t a superpower w i l l more v i g o r o u s l y pursue economic p a y - o f f s from an i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n -s h i p as i t s p e r c e i v e d r e t u r n s from the s t r a t e g i c context d i m i n i s h . 80. A r e l a t e d s u b j e c t t h a t a l s o recommends i t s e l f f o r f u r t h e r study i s the n o t i o n of compartmentalization w i t h i n a b a r g a i n -i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t i s obvious t h a t Indo-Soviet d e a l i n g s i n the v a r i o u s dimensions of t h e i r complex r e l a t i o n s h i p are i n t e r r e l a t e d . What i s l e s s c l e a r i s the nature of t h i s i n t e r -r e l a t i o n s h i p ; can, as Kapur suggests,a " m i l i t a r y " u t i l i t y be 3 traded f o r an "economic" or " p o l i t i c a l " u t i l i t y ? In attempt-i n g to p r o v i d e an answer to t h i s there i s , of course, the b a s i c problem of o b t a i n i n g the r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n on the nature of behind-the-scenes b a r g a i n i n g t a c t i c s . V a r i o u s authors have suggested t h a t , o h - c e r t a i n key occasions ( f o r example, Brezhnev's v i s i t to New D e l h i i n 1973 i n p u r s u i t of A s i a n c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y ) l a r g e s c a l e S o v i e t economic programmes have been e x p l i c i t l y coupled w i t h the f o r t u n e s of v a r i o u s p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e s . However, no d e f i n i t i v e p a t t e r n has emerged from the cases reviewed here. Again i t would be i n -t e r e s t i n g to analyze the changes over time i n the t a c t i c s of both s i d e s to i n c r e a s e p a y - o f f s from the d i f f e r e n t dimensions of the i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p . R u b i n s t e i n concluded, i n h i s study on S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g i n Egypt, there i s no demonstrable c o r r e l a t i o n between .' - : i n t e n s i f i e d i n t e r a c t i o n s and i n f l u e n c e . Increased trade or i n p u t s of economic a s s i s t a n c e might have improved the m i l i e u w i t h i n which i n f l u e n c e i s ex-c e r c i s e d , but the i n c r e a s e d i d not b r i n g f a v o u r a b l e outcomes on key i s s u e areas. However, on ths b a s i s of a v a i l a b l e evidence one should q u e s t i o n R u b i n s t e i n ' s assumption t h a t i n c r e a s e d economic i n t e r -a c t i o n ought to l e a d to i n c r e a s e d p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . F u r t h e r , 8 1 . u n t i l i t can be demonstrated t h a t the S o v i e t Union c o n s i s t e n t -l y i n t e g r a t e s i t s b a r g a i n i n g approach to economic and s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s i t i s m i s l e a d i n g to assume t h a t the p a t t e r n of economic agreements can be used as an. i n d i c a t o r of o v e r a l l i n f l u e n c e w i t h i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h i s study has a l s o u n d e r l i n e d the value of the concept of s t r a t e g i c context to an understandings of an i n f l u e n c e r e l a -t i o n s h i p . I t i s important t h a t when making judgments about the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n the T h i r d World one should not simply r e l y on a study of S o v i e t d i r e c t s t r a t e g i c g a i n s , such as m i l i t a r y bases or p o r t f a c i l i t i e s . F i n a l l y , a n a l y s i s of the S o v i e t - I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n -s h i p i n the 1 9 7 0 ' s suggests t h a t not only may a T h i r d World country more than ho l d i t s own i n ' b i l a t e r a l b a r g a i n i n g on s t r a t e g i c concerns; i t may a l s o possess both the c a p a b i l i t y and d e t e r m i n a t i o n to autonomously pursue i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . In so doing i t may a l s o u n i l a t e r a l l y r e d e f i n e the p a t t e r n of p a y o f f s from the s t r a t e g i c content of the r e l a t i o n -s h i p . We have d e a l t with trends i n the Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t are s t i l l of v e r y r e c e n t o r i g i n , and as yet the S o v i e t Union has not o r c h e s t r a t e d an unambiguous p o l i c y response. I t does seem c l e a r , however, t h a t both the United S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union have come g r a d u a l l y to r e a l i z e the l i m i t a -t i o n s upon e f f e c t i v e ' i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g i n major T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s with r e g i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , un-l i k e l y t h a t the S o v i e t s w i l l i n i t i a t e a massive new campaign 82. of economic blandishments i n an attempt to i n f l u e n c e the d i r -e c t i o n of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . However, the c o n t i n u i n g pre-o c c u p a t i o n i n Moscow with c o n t a i n i n g the spread of Chinese i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a should ensure continued S o v i e t e f f o r t s to mai n t a i n a h e a l t h y presence i n New D e l h i . However, i t i s l i k e l y t h a t the S o v i e t s w i l l p l a c e i n c r e a s e d emphasis upon the value of e x t r a c t i n g m a t e r i a l b e n e f i t s from the realm of economic c o o p e r a t i o n between the two. However, g i v e n the b a s i c l i m i t a t i o n s i n S o v i e t donor c a p a b i l i t i e s , I suppose there i s always the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t Moscow might, as f a r as i s p r u d e n t l y p o s s i b l e , d i r e c t i t s a t t e n t i o n s to advancing the r e g i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s of i t s most re c e n t protegee, Vietnam. I f such were to be the case, i t would on l y be a matter of time before the S o v i e t Union was a g a i n f a c e d with a s i t u a t i o n i n which i t s a b i l i t y to c o n s t r a i n and d i r e c t the f o r e i g n p o l i c y options of a " c l i e n t " r e g i o n a l power would prove to be man-i f e s t l y i l l u s o r y . CHAPTER VI APPENDIX 8 3 a . T h i s appendix i s e s s e n t i a l l y an e f f o r t to p l a c e the S o v i e t c o n t r i b u t i o n to I n d i a ' s economic development i n some k i n d of p e r s p e c t i v e . To what extent can I n d i a be s a i d to be dependent upon the economic p o l i c i e s of the S o v i e t Union? More important-l y , to what extent does t h i s enable the S o v i e t s to e f f e c t i v e l y e x e r t i n f l u e n c e upon I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y ? Indo-Soviet Trade As the two t a b l e s i n d i c a t e , the S o v i e t Union i s one of I n d i a ' s most important trading;, ipartners, more so as a market f o r I n d i a n exports than as a source of imports. However, I n d i a ' s trade s t i l l remains overwhelmingly t i e d to the Western economies and i n t h i s r e s p e c t i t should be noted t h a t the European Economic Community r e p r e s e n t s by f a r the l a r g e s t mar-ket f o r both I n d i a n imports and exports. On the b a s i s of f a i r l y r e c e n t I n d i a n trade s t a t i s t i c s , 1 t o t a l turnover with the U.S.S.R. r e p r e s e n t s something c l o s e to 1 0 percent of I n d i a ' s o v e r a l l trade which, although not an i n s i g n i f i c a n t percentage, i s not an expanding one. F o r example, a c c o r d i n g to the Indo-Soviet trade agreement signed to cover the p e r i o d 1 9 7 6 - 1 9 8 0 , t o t a l trade t u r n o v e r between the two w i l l reach p some R s . 9 3 5 c r o r e s by the end of the decade (note I n d i a n t o t a l trade at the beginning of the p e r i o d was R s . 8 , 8 0 0 c r o r e s ) . That Indo-Soviet trade i s expanding a t only a modest pace can be seen i n the f a c t t h a t t h i s p r o j e c t e d t a r g e t f i g u r e f o r the end of the decade i s only some R s . 2 3 5 c r o r e s over the s t a r t f i g u r e f o r 1 9 7 5 of R s . 7 0 0 c r o r e s . S i m i l a r l y , while the monetary value of trade expanded from j u s t over R s . 4 0 0 c r o r e s i n 1 9 7 3 TABLE I I I n d i a ' s Export Trade ( M i l l i o n s of U.S. D o l l a r s ) Year I n d i a ' s T o t a l Exports I n d i a ' s E xports To UK % of T o t a l Exports I n d i a ' s Exports To USA % of T o t a l Exports I n d i a *s Exports To USSR % of T o t a l Exports i 9 6 0 1 3 3 2 . 5 3 6 6 . 2 2 7 2 1 3 . 6 1 6 1 6 . 9 5 1 9 6 5 1 6 8 6 . 0 3 1 1 . 6 18 3 1 0 . 3 ' 18 184 . 2 1 1 1 9 7 0 2 0 . 2 6 . 4 2 3 4 . 7 1 2 9 8 2 . 9 48 2 7 1 . 5 1 3 1 9 7 5 4 2 9 9 . 3 4 2 7 . 3 1 0 5 0 4 . 8 1 2 5 6 0 . 9 1 3 Source: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r Reconstruction and Development, D i r e c t i o n of Trade 1 9 5 8 - 6 2 , p. 340; i b i d . . 1 9 6 3 - 6 7 * p V : 2 Q 7 ; 'Ibid. , 1 - 9 7 0 - 7 4 , .p. • 1 6 7 : • i b i d . , 1 . 9 6 9 - 7 5 vv,p-. 1 3 6 . TABLE I I I India's Import Trade ( M i l l i o n s of U.S. D o l l a r s ) Year I n d i a 1 s To t a l Imports Imports From UK % of •Total Imports Imports From US % of To t a l Imports Imports From USSR % of To t a l Imports i 9 6 0 2 1 2 3 . 6 4 2 3 . 2 20 5 0 4 . 0 24 2 7 . 9 1 1965 2 9 1 2 . 0 3 3 0 . 3 11 9 7 4 . 8 33 I 6 9 . 6 6 1970 2 1 2 5 . 4 140.3 7 1 2 6 7 . 7 60 1 6 4 . 4 8 1975 6134 3 5 1 . 5 6 1 3 4 1 . 1 22 3 9 0 . 9 6 Source: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r Reconstruction and Development, D i r e c t i o n of Trade 1 9 5 8 - 6 2 , p. 340; i b i d . , - 1 9 6 3 - 6 7 . p. 2 0 7 ; i b i d . , 1 9 7 0 - 7 4 , p. 1 6 7 ; i b i d . . 1 9 6 9 - 7 5 , p. 1 3 6 . 86. to the f i g u r e of Rs.700 c r o r e s i n 1975» much of t h i s i n c r e a s e was due to the marked i n f l a t i o n i n the p r i c e of I n d i a n imports of S o v i e t petroleum and f e r t i l i z e r s . There are a number of n o t a b l e o b s t a c l e s to any major ex-pansion i n trade between these two c o u n t r i e s . In the f i r s t p l a c e , there i s the S o v i e t u n w i l l i n g n e s s to supply I n d i a w i t h s u r p l u s raw m a t e r i a l s when i t c o u l d s e l l the same at premium p r i c e s f o r hard c u r r e n c y i n the West. Secondly, the bulk of I n d i a V s / t r a d i t i o n a l exports to the U.S.S.R. such as t e a , jute goods, and h a n d i c r a f t s are h i g h l y i n e l a s t i c i n demand. In a d d i t i o n , I n d i a ' s export problems are l i k e l y to i n t e n s i f y as the Russian economy p l a c e s g r e a t e r emphasis on h i g h q u a l i t y consumer goods, u n l e s s poor p r o d u c t i o n standards i n I n d i a can be improved. The e x t e n s i v e p a t t e r n of Indo-Soviet t r a d i n g t i e s has g r a d u a l l y developed over a p e r i o d of some 20 to 30 years and i t i s v e r y hard to assess whether t h i s development has acted to i n c r e a s e the c a p a c i t y of the S o v i e t Union to exert i n f l u -ence upon In d i a n d e c i s i o n making. I t i s c l e a r t h a t s u c c e s s i v e I n d i a n governments have p l a c e d a h i g h value upon expanding trade with the S o v i e t Union. F u r t h e r , Moscow's w i l l i n g n e s s to do t h i s has undoubtedly made I n d i a more r e c e p t i v e to S o v i e t requests f o r g e n e r a l c o o p e r a t i o n than i t otherwise would have been. A l s o the f a c t t h a t S o v i e t and East European trade i s under d i r e c t government c o n t r o l has made i t e a s i e r f o r those i n New D e l h i who wanted t h i e r government to e x e r c i s e g r e a t e r 3 c o n t r o l over f o r e i g n trade to move m t h a t d i r e c t i o n . 87. There are, of course, b e n e f i t s to the S o v i e t Union i n d e v e l o p i n g trade t i e s with I n d i a . F o r much of the p e r i o d un-''der review, the bulk of S o v i e t imports from I n d i a have been, i n e f f e c t , p a i d f o r by S o v i e t exports of c a p i t a l goods. These have helped i n the u t i l i z a t i o n of spare p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y t h a t has plagued c e r t a i n s e c t o r s of S o v i e t i n d u s t r y . F u r t h e r , on the b a s i s of S o v i e t pronouncements on t h i s s u b j e c t , Donaldson a s s e r t s t h a t from the S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e there are the f o l l o w i n g a t t r a c t i o n s : the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of I n d i a ' s trade away from the " c a p i t a l i s t " markets of the West and towards COMECON markets not o n l y weakens the f a b r i c of " c a p i t a l i s t " economies but a l s o can serve to r e i n f o r c e I n d i a ' s d i p l o m a t i c o r i e n t a t i o n and i n f l u e n c e the d i r e c t i o n of i t s i n t e r n a l development.^ The value of S o v i e t trade to the I n d i a n economy i s v e r y r e a l but i t i s not c l e a r t h a t t h i s has enabled the S o v i e t s to e x e r t i n f l u e n c e upon I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . W h i l s t the S o v i e t Union i s a major s u p p l i e r of c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l raw m a t e r i a l s to I n d i a , i t i s h a r d l y ever i n a monopoly p o s i t i o n . Even i n the case of petroleum s u p p l i e s , which have become an i n c r e a s -i n g l y important p a r t of I n d i a ' s imports from the U.S.S.R., In d i a ' s pro-Arab West A s i a n p o l i c y has ensured a number of a l t e r n a t i v e s u p p l i e r s . T h i s s e v e r e l y l i m i t s the S o v i e t s ' a b i l i t y to use d e l i v e r y s a n c t i o n s i n an e f f o r t to manipulate I n d i a n p o l i c y (given the tenor of r e l a t i o n s between the two, t h i s i s an u n l i k e l y o p t i o n anyway). 88. S o v i e t Economic A i d S o v i e t economic c r e d i t s to I n d i a have l a r g e l y been t i e d to S o v i e t p r o j e c t a s s i s t a n c e and have been repayable v i a a c e n t r a l rupee account. The i n f l e x i b i l i t y of the S o v i e t a i d programme has been one of the g r e a t e s t s t r a i n s on Indo-Soviet economic c o o p e r a t i o n . As I n d i a has g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r e d a major heavy i n d u s t r i a l base, there has been a decreased need f o r the type of p r o j e c t a s s i s t a n c e t h a t t h e S o v i e t s were w i l l i n g to p r o v i d e . Thus by the end of 1976 S o v i e t p r o j e c t l o a n commit-ments amounting to some U.S. $200 m i l l i o n remained u n u t i l i z e d and I n d i a had been drawing l e s s than U.S. $ 20 m i l l i o n a n n u a l l y d u r i n g the l a s t s e v e r a l y e a r s . ^ As s a i d above, S o v i e t a i d has l a r g e l y been " t i e d " , ! o f t e n i n the form of "turn-key" p r o j e c t s i n which a complete manufac-t u r i n g p l a n t i s assembled i n I n d i a under S o v i e t t e c h n i c a l super-v i s i o n and o f t e n producing goods to S o v i e t s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . I t can be argued t h a t S o v i e t c r e d i t s f o r t h i s s o r t of p r o j e c t d i r e c t l y boost S o v i e t exports of c a p i t a l goods. F u r t h e r , t h i s has helped i n the past to f i l l the s u r p l u s p r o d u c t i o n c a p a c i t y of s e c t o r s of S o v i e t heavy i n d u s t r y . As mentioned, there i s l e s s and l e s s demand f o r t h i s type of S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e ; there i s , however, a growing demand f o r programme a s s i s t a n c e i n the form of raw m a t e r i a l s , components, e t c . The importance of S o v i e t development to the Indians has a l s o been g r a d u a l l y d i m i n i s h e d because of the sheer i n a b i l i t y of the S o v i e t s to a s s i s t with many p r o j e c t s that have a h i g h p r i o r i t y i n New D e l h i , such as f o o d g r a i n s or o i l e x p l o r a t i o n . 8 9 -In the case of food g r a i n s , the S o v i e t s d i d " l o a n " 1 . 8 m i l l i o n tons of wheat i n 197^ to be r e p a i d i n k i n d over a number of y e a r s , but S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s have made i t c l e a r t h a t t h i s was an e x c e p t i o n a l gesture and one t h a t i s u n l i k e l y to be repeated. In the case of o f f - s h o r e o i l p r o s p e c t i n g , i S o v i e t t e c h n i c i a n s have on o c c a s i o n attempted to b i d f o r I n d i a n con-tracts, but 6 have been turned down i n f a v o u r of American companies. S o v i e t repayment terms f o r i t s c r e d i t s are a l s o g i v i n g cause f o r concern i n I n d i a . When the U.S.S.R. f i r s t entered the a i d f i e l d i t s terms were g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d to be the most f a v o u r a b l e , with i n t e r e s t r a t e s of 2 § percent and repay-ment over some 12 to 20 years. However, w h i l s t s e v e r a l Western donor c o u n t r i e s have r e c e n t l y cut i n t e r e s t r a t e s ( f o r example, Belgium from 2 percent down to 1 percent) i t seems the U.S.S.R. 7 i s r e f u s i n g to do the same. Another i r r i t a n t i s t h a t p r o j e c t s f i n a n c e d by m u l t i l a t e r a l agencies c o n s i s t e n t l y c o n t a i n much l a r g e r grant elements than those p r o v i d e d by the S o v i e t s . F o r example, the grant element i n S o v i e t c r e d i t s may reach some 40 percent of the t o t a l , whereas World Bank loans t h a t are channeled through the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development Agency reach Q some 85 percent. These f a c t o r s have combined to produce the seemingly incongruous s i t u a t i o n f o r much of t h i s decade i n which I n d i a has been a r e c i p i e n t of "negative a i d " from the S o v i e t Union; t h a t i s , having to pay out more i n i n t e r e s t and c r e d i t repayments f o r past help than i t r e c e i v e d i n new commit-ments . The whole c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e of debt repayments was f u r t h e r 9 0 . compounded by the u n i l a t e r a l S o v i e t d e v a l u a t i o n of the rupee a g a i n s t the rouble by over 20 percent i n March 1 9 7 5 ' The Russians argued t h a t the d e v a l u a t i o n was necessary because of the rupee's l i n k to the pound s t e r l i n g , which had d r a m a t i c a l l y d e c l i n e d i n value i n r e l a t i o n to g o l d i n the e a r l y 1 9 7 0 's. However, the Indians argued t h a t d e v a l u a t i o n of the rupee was "untenable" because the g o l d content of the rouble i s a r b i t r a r -i l y f i x e d by the'U.S.S.R. and, as i t i s not used i n cu r r e n c y t r a n s a c t i o n s , i t i s not s u b j e c t to p r i c e f l u c t u a t i o n s . Since p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t repayments by I n d i a to the S o v i e t s are made e x c l u s i v e l y i n rupees, which are i n t u r n used by the :~ ' S o v i e t s to purchase I n d i a n goods, the d e v a l u a t i o n meant t h a t Indians would have to pay more f o r the e q u i v a l e n t amount of ro u b l e s . Thus i t cou l d be argued t h a t the Russians were ob-t a i n i n g I n d i a n goods a t p r i c e s s i g n i f i c a n t l y below world mar-ket l e v e l s . A f u r t h e r charge l e v e l l e d a g a i n s t S o v i e t and East European c o u n t r i e s i s t h a t of the re - e x p o r t of imported I n d i a n commod-i t i e s . I f t h i s i s t r u e , I n d i a gains n o t h i n g by d e a l i n g with the U.S.S.R. through the rupee account. What i t saves on f o r -e i g n exchange through the b a r t e r system, i t l o s e s by the S o v i e t trade d i v e r s i o n because these goods are re-exported f o r f o r -e i g n exchange which then accrues to the S o v i e t Union and not to I n d i a . On the b a s i s of a v a i l a b l e evidence, i t seems c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s p r a c t i c e has occurred although i t i s d i f f i c u l t to 9 measure i t s extent. However, i n s p i t e of these u n r e s o l v e d d i f f i c u l t i e s Indo-91. S o v i e t economic c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s being f i r m l y sought by both p a r t i e s . Both Indian and S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s are committed to b u i l d i n g a s o l i d f o u n d a t i o n f o r l o n g l a s t i n g economic a i d and trade l i n k s . An important milestone i n t h i s r e s p e c t was c r e a t e d on Brezhnev's v i s i t to I n d i a i n 1 9 7 3 - "the s i g n i n g of a major 15 year agreement on economic and t e c h n i c a l coopera-t i o n . T h i s and subsequent agreements have c o n t r i b u t e d to the b u i l d i n g up of a v a s t c o o p e r a t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . At the centre of t h i s i s the Indo-Soviet P l a n n i n g Group, which seeks to co o r d i n a t e the lo n g term p l a n n i n g of the two econ-omies, to search f o r new avenues of p r o f i t a b l e c o o p e r a t i o n and to i n v e s t i g a t e p o s s i b l e p r o d u c t i o n c o l l a b o r a t i o n schemes. A good d e a l of progress has been made r e c e n t l y i n the f i e l d of p r o d u c t i o n c o l l a b o r a t i o n , t h a t i s , where I n d i a s u p p l i e s the machinery f o r S o v i e t a i d e d t h i r d country p r o j e c t s and i s a l s o a s s o c i a t e d with the c i v i l c o n s t r u c t i o n work. These S o v i e t orders w i l l p r ovide a stim u l u s to c e r t a i n S o v i e t sponsored s e c t i o n s of the I n d i a n economy, thus i n c r e a s i n g the u t i l i z a -t i o n of some of the more n o t o r i o u s "red elephants" t h a t were c o n s t r u c t e d i n the 1 9 6 0's. However, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s form of c o l l a b o r a t i o n does make t h e ' p r o f i t a b i l i t y of s e c t o r s of I n d i a ' s i n d u s t r y extremely dependent upon S o v i e t g o o d w i l l -thus opening up the p o t e n t i a l f o r leverage? On the s u r f a c e , perhaps the c l e a r e s t i n d i c a t o r of the value p l a c e d by both s i d e s upon f u r t h e r i n g economic coopera-t i o n i s the r i t u a l i s t i c i n c l u s i o n of glowing r e p o r t s of the advances made i n the communiques a t the c l o s e of s t a t e v i s i t s . 92. Indeed,even where there have been profound disagreements over the p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s t h a t l e d to the s t a t e v i s i t s , t h e s e have almost been g l o s s e d over i n the rush to r e i t e r a t e the need f o r i n c r e a s e d economic c o o p e r a t i o n . In g e n e r a l . p r o g r e s s i n t h i s f i e l d does not seem to have been i n t i m a t e l y a f f e c t e d by the g e n e r a l s t a t e of r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s at any g i v e n time. I f e e l t h a t the massive i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework t h a t has grown up over the years has p a r t l y been able to generate i t s own b u r e a u c r a t i c momentum towards i n -creased economic c o l l a b o r a t i o n . I t i s only when the b a s i c s t r u c t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s of t h i s economic r e l a t i o n s h i p throw up a s e r i o u s c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e , s u c h as the rupee d e v a l u a t i o n , t h a t major account has to be taken of the p o l i t i c a l s e n s i b i l i t i e of the o v e r a l l i n f l u e n c e r e l a t i o n s h i p . In r e c e n t y e a r s . i t seems t h a t S o v i e t d e c i s i o n makers have become l e s s i n c l i n e d to make concessions on c o n t e n t i o u s economic i s s u e s i n order to r e t a i n I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l g o o d w i l l . Rather,as the i n f l u e n c e t h a t might accrue from such g e s t u r e s has i n c r e a s i n g l y proved to be r a t h e r i n s u b s t a n t i a l , t h e p u r s u i t of m a t e r i a l economic b e n e f i t s has become more a t t r a c t i v e . Thus on i s s u e s such as the rupee-rouble exchange r a t e , i n t e r e s t r a t e s on economic a s s i s t a n c e , a n d p r i c e s p a i d f o r I n d i a n produced consumer goods,the S o v i e t s are i n c r e a s i n g l y p r o v i n g to be / v e r y hard b a r g a i n e r s and seem ready to pursue narrow economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t a t the r i s k of o f f e n d i n g - I n d i a n s e n s i b i l i t i e s . However . w h i l s t the S o v i e t Union has been able /to manip-9 3 -u l a t e s t r u c t u r a l i n e q u a l i t i e s i n i t s economic t i e s with I n d i a to f u r t h e r c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c economic i n t e r e s t s . i t has not been able to use these to i n f l u e n c e i s s u e s of h i g h f o r e i g n p o l i c y concern. In t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e recent d e c i s i o n by the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to resume economic a i d to I n d i a might w e l l a f f e c t the r e l a t i v e b a r g a i n i n g s t r e n g t h s of I n d i a and the U.S.S.R. on economic i s s u e s b u t , i n and of i t s e l f . i t means l i t t l e f o r the f o r t u n e s of Sovie-t--s-trategic i n f l u e n c e i n I n d i a . In c o n c l u s i o n , t h i s b r i e f r e p o r t i n no way pretends to be an exhaustive a n a l y s i s of the e f f i c a c y of the S o v i e t use of trade and a i d p o l i c i e s as a means of i n f l u e n c e b u i l d i n g . However, i t does serve to warn a g a i n s t making unwarranted assumptions about the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of S o v i e t t r a d e / a i d p o l i -c i e s simply on the b a s i s of;voluminous t r a n s a c t i o n flows d i v o r c e d from the " p o l i t i c a l context" of the r e l a t i o n s h i p . 9 4 . FOOTNOTES 94 a. Footnotes Chapter I 1 . John P. Vloyantes, S i l k Glove Hegemony (Kent State U n i v e r s i t y - P r e s s , 1975)» P- 5 • 2 . K a l e v i J . H o l s t i , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : A Framework  For A n a l y s i s , 3rd ed. (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1977), P- . 1 7 9 . 3. I b i d . , p. 1 8 0 . 4 . Charles B. McLane, S o v i e t Asian R e l a t i o n s (London: C e n t r a l A s i a n Research Centre, 19731^ 5 . Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet P o l i c y Towards I n d i a : Ideology  and Strategy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 7 4 ), p. 1 1 2 . 6 . McLane, So v i e t Asian R e l a t i o n s , p. 8 . 7 . Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, eds., S o v i e t Economic and  P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i o n s With the Developing World (New York: Praeger, 1 9 7 5 ), P- 1 2 . 8 . The Times of I n d i a , August 1 0 , - 1 9 7 1 . 9 . Donaldson, Soviet P o l i c y Towards I n d i a , p. 204. 1 0 . The Times of I n d i a , August 1 0 , 1 9 7 1 . 1 1 . A l v i n Z. Rubins t e i n , Red S t a r on the N i l e ( P r i n c e t o n , N.J.: Pr i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 7 7 ) . P- 3 4 5 -1 2 . For the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d e a l i n g w i t h the Indonesian exper-ience see the a r t i c l e by Justus Van Derkroef i n A-lv-in Z. Rubi n s t e i n , ed., Soviet and Chinese Influence i n the Thi r d  World (New York: Praeger, 1 9 7 5 ) . 1 3 . In Rubins t e i n , ed., Sov i e t and Chinese Influence. 14. G. Sh e f f e r , "Independence i n Dependence of Regional Powers: The Uncomfortable A l l i a n c e s i n the Middle East Before and . A f t e r the October 1973 War", Orbis 19=4 (Winter 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 1 5 1 8 . 1 5 . I b i d . , p. 1 5 1 9 . 1 6 . R u b i n s t e i n , S o v i e t and Chinese I n f l u e n c e , p. 3-17 . Donaldson, So v i e t P o l i c y Towards I n d i a , p. 2 5 3 -9 5 -1 8 . Baldev Raj Nayar, "American P o l i c y Toward I n d i a : the Larger Framework", Economic and P o l i t i c a l Weekly 1 1 : 2 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 4 6 7 . 1 9 . Holst.i, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , p. 181. 2 0 . Jack H. Nagel, The D e s c r i p t i v e A n a l y s i s of Power (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 7 5 )1 P• 3 3 • 2 1 . R u b i n s t e i n , •• Red S t a r on the N i l e , p. 34-1. 2 2 . P e t e r A b e l l , Organizations as Bargaining and Influence  Systems (London: Heinemann, 1 9 7 5 ), P« 14. 2 3 . W i l l i a m J . Barnds i n R u b i n s t e i n , ed., S o v i e t and Chinese  I n f l u e n c e , p. 1 2 . 2 4 . R u b i n s t e i n , Soviet and Chinese In f l u e n c e , p. 1 2 . 2 5 . Alexander 0 . Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y i n A s i a " , A s i a n Survey 1 3 : 1 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , P- 1 0 9 0 . 2 6 . In Rubins t e i n , ed. ,. Sov i e t and Chinese Influence. Chapter I I 1. For d e t a i l e d treatment of p o l i t i c a l developments i n P a k i s t a n p r i o r to 1971 see Robert V. Jackson, South A s i a C r i s i s (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975); Robert LaPorte, " P a k i s t a n i n 1971, the D i s i n t e g r a t i o n of a Nation", A s i a n  Survey (February 1972); Richard S. Wheeler, The P o l i t i c s of P a k i s t a n (Ithaca and London: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, I970T; and Lawrence Z i r i n g , The Ayub Khan Era: P o l i t i c s i n P a k i s t a n , 1958-69 (Syracuse: Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971TT 2. Bh'abani Sen Gupta i n Roger E. Kanet, ed. , The Soviet Union  arid the Developing Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974T7 p. 127. 3 . Donaldson, Soviet P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 208. 4. See McLane, Soviet A s i a n R e l a t i o n s . 5. Donaldson, Soviet P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 217. 6. S. M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and P a k i s t a n i F o r e i g n  P o l i c i e s (Minneapolis: U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota Press, 1974), p. 201. •7. Robert C. Horn, "Indian-Soviet R e l a t i o n s i n 1969: A Watershed year?", Orbis (Winter 1976), p. 1560. 96. 8J L a r g e l y because of i t s e s t a b l i s h e d s t r a t e g i c t i e s w i t h P a k i s t a n i n r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as CENTO and SEATO. Further the e l e c t i o n of the Nixon a d m i n i s t r a -t i o n had increased support f o r a pro-P a k i s t a n p o l i c y by the United States. 9 . Burke, Mainsprings, p. 2 0 2 . 1 0 . Op. C i t . 1 1 . Although there i s a good chance that the agreement was not f o r m a l l y signed at t h i s time- but r a t h e r was l e f t i n a sta t e of readiness to be f o r m a l l y concluded when the occasion demanded. 1 2 . Horn, "Indian-Soviet R e l a t i o n s " , p. 1 5 6 2 . 13. Bhabani Sen Gupta, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s i n the 1970's  and Beyond (New York: Praeger, 1976) , p. l4~4T 14. I b i d . , p. 1 4 3 . 1 5 . Donaldson, So v i e t P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 218. 1 6 . V i j a y Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the B i r t h of Bangladesh", A s i a n Survey (May 1 9 7 3 ), P- 4 8 5 . 17. Z. Mustafa, "1971 C r i s i s i n P a k i s t a n - I n d i a , the Sov i e t Union and China", P a c i f i c Community ( A p r i l 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 3 0 0 . 18. I b i d . 1 9 . Burke, Mainsprings, p. 2 0 8 . 2 0 . The Times of I n d i a , June 1 3 , 1 9 7 1 ; a l s o see commentary by Jayaprakesh Narayan, The Times of I n d i a , J u l y 8, 1 9 7 1 . p. 12 and M o r a r j i Deasi, The Times of I n d i a , J u l y 1 1 , 1 9 7 1 , p. 1 , both t a l k i n g about the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war w i t h P a k i s t a n . 2 1 . Sheldon W. Simon, "China, the Soviet Union and the Sub-c o n t i n e n t a l Balance", Asian Survey ( J u l y 1 9 7 3 ) , :P- 649. 2 2 . Donaldson, So v i e t P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 2 2 6 . 2 3 . The Times of I n d i a . J u l y 2 1 , 1 9 7 1 . 2 4 . David H. Bayley, " I n d i a - War and P o l i t i c a l A s s e r t i o n " , A s i a n Survey (February 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 9 3 -2 5 . Barnds i n Rubinstein, ed., Soviet and Chinese I n f l u e n c e , P. 4 3 . 9 7 . 2 6 . Donaldson, S o v i e t P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 227- Emphasis added. 2 7 . Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the B i r t h of Bangladesh", p. 4 8 9 . 2 8 . Donaldson, S o v i e t P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 2 2 9 -2 9 . Bhabani Sen c Gupta i n Roger E.Kanet ,-.'ed;.',-' The S o v i e t Union  and the- Developing Nations,p. "136. 3 0 . Devi.Murarka i n a r e p o r t made re f e r e n c e to hy Sen Gupta i b i d . 3 1 . Henry Tanner i n The New York Times, December 1 6 , 1 9 7 1 , p. 1 7 . ' 3 2 . Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the B i r t h of Bangladesh", p. 4-91. 3 3 - M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, O r g a n i z a t i o n , S t r a t e g i e s and T a c t i c s of the Bangaldesh Movement", A s i a n Survey (March 1 9 7 2 ), pp. 1 9 8 - 9 9 -3 4 . Simon, "China, the S o v i e t Union and the S u b c o n t i n e n t a l Balance", p. 6 4 9 . 35« Quoted i n Donaldson, S o v i e t P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 2 3 . 3 6 . Most of the d e t a i l s taken from Burke, Mainsprings, p. 2 1 1 . 3 7 . Simon, "China, the S o v i e t Union and the S u b c o n t i n e n t a l Balance", p. 6 5 1 . 3 8 . Mustafa, " 1 9 7 1 C r i s i s i n P a k i s t a n " , p. 5 0 8 . 3 9 . Sen Gupta, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s , p. 1 3 9 -4 0 . Ashok Kapur, " S t r a t e g i c Choices i n Ind i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l ( 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 ) , p. 4 5 8 . 4 1 . Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the B i r t h of Bangladesh", p. 4 9 4 . 4 2 . Leo Rose, "The Superpowers i n South A s i a : A G e o s t r a t e g i c A n a l y s i s " , Q r b i s (Summer 1 9 7 8 ) , p. 4 1 0 . 4 3 . Sen Budhraj, "Moscow and the B i r t h of Bangladesh", p. 4 9 4 . 4 4 . Bhabani Sen Gupta i n Roger E. Kanet, ed., The S o v i e t Union and the Developing Nations, p. 1 4 0 . 4 5 . Simon, "China, the S o v i e t Union and the S u b c o n t i n e n t a l Balance", p. 6 5 4 . 4 6 . Robert H. Donaldson, " I n d i a ; the S o v i e t Stake i n S t a b i l i t y " , A s i a n Survey (June 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 4 8 6 . 9 8 . 4 7 . I b i d . 48. I b i d . , p. 4 6 7 . 49. K. Subrahmanyam i n Sen Gupta, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s , p. 1 3 3 . 5 0 . Kapur, " S t r a t e g i c Choices i n Indian Foreign P o l i c y " , p. 4 5 6 . 5 1 . I b i d . , p. 4 7 2 . 5 2 . See a very i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n of behind the scenes In d i a n i n i t i a t i v e s towards China during 1971 i n The Times  of I n d i a , August 2 6 , 1971-5 3 . Barnds i n Rubins t e i n , ed., So v i e t and Chinese In f l u e n c e , p. 4 4 . Chapter I I I 1 . I b i d . , p. 42. 2 . Sen Gupta, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s , p. 7 4 . 3 . Donaldson, So v i e t P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 241. 4 . I b i d , p. 218. 5 . Golam W. Choudhury, Brezhnev's C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y P l a n  For A s i a (Georgetown: Georgetown U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 14. 6 . Sen Gupta, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s , p. 7 8 . 7 . Donaldson, Soviet P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 2 2 0 . 8 . I b i d . , p. 2 2 1 . 9 . Choudhury, Brezhnev's C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y P l a n , p. 17• 1 0 . Donaldson, So v i e t P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 2 2 5 . 1 1 . Geoffrey Jukes and Ian Clark i n Roger E. Kanet, ed., Sov i e t Economic and P o l i t i c a l R e l a t i o n s with the Developing  World (New York: Praeger, 1 9 7 5 ) . P- 14?. 1 2 . I b i d . 1 3 . Ian Cla r k , " C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y i n A s i a " , Round Table (October 1 9 7 3 ) , P- 480. 14. I b i d . , p. 481. 9 9 . 1 5 . Alexander 0. Ghebhardt, "The So v i e t System of C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y " , p. 1086. 16. Pravda (Moscow), March 21, 1 9 7 2 , p. 3 -17 . Sen Gupta, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s , pp. 9 2 - 9 3 -18. Choudhury, Brezhnev's C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y P l a n , pp. 22-24. 1 9 . The Observer (London), November 28, 1 9 7 3 -20. Sen Gupta, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s , p. 9 3 -21. Donaldson, So v i e t P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 2 1 9 . 22. Choudhury, Brezhnev's C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y P l a n , p. 3 5 . 2 3 . D. Kaushik and S. Peerthamm, Towards C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y  i n A s i a (Bombay: A l l i e d P u b l i s h e r s , 1973~T, p. 4 7 . 24. Marcus F. Franda,-"India and the S o v i e t s : 1 9 7 5 " , American  U n i v e r s i t i e s F i e l d S t a f f Reports 19:8 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . p. 1 0 . 2 5 . I b i d . 2 6 . I b i d . 2 7 . Choudhury, Brezhnev's C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y P l a n , p. 1 . 28. A. Sergeyev, "Problems of C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y i n A s i a " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (Moscow)(August 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 5 0 . 2 9 . Malcolm Mackintosh, "T*he North A s i a n - P a c i f i c Region: Sov i e t I n t e r e s t s and P o l i c i e s " , A u s t r a l i a n Outlook ( A p r i l 1 9 7 7 ) , PP- 167-68. 3 0 . Sen Gupta, S o v i e t - A s i a n R e l a t i o n s , p. 9 4 . 3 1 . Rajan Menon, " I n d i a and the Soviet Union: A New Stage of R e l a t i o n s ? " , A s i a n Survey ( J u l y 1978), p. 738. 3 2 . Barnds i n Rubins t e i n , ed., Soviet and Chinese In f l u e n c e , p. 4 2 . 3 3 . Donaldson, Soviet P o l i c y Toward I n d i a , p. 2 4 l . 3 4 . Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y " , -•p. 1087. 3 5 . Choudhury, Brezhnev's C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y P l a n , p. 3 5 -3 6 . Mackintosh, "North A s i a n - P a c i f i c Region", p. 1 6 8 . 1 0 0 . Chapter IV 1. Menon, " I n d i a and the S o v i e t Union", p. 733. 2 . SIPRI, Arms Trade With the T h i r d World (London: Penguin, 1 9 7 5 ) , P. 188 3. P. R. C h a r i , "Indo-Soviet M i l i t a r y Cooperation: A Review", A s i a n Survey (March 1 9 7 9 ) , p. 2 3 9 . . 4 . SIPRI, Arms Trade, pp. 1 8 9 - 9 0 . 5. Ian C l a r k , "Autonomy and Dependence i n Recent Indo-Soviet R e l a t i o n s " , A u s t r a l i a n Outlook ( A p r i l 1 9 7 7 ) , P- 1 5 4 . 6. Barnds i n Ruhinstein, ed., S o v i e t and Chinese I n f l u e n c e , p. 42. 7. Choudhury, Brezhnev's C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y P l a n , p. 35-8 . C l a r k , "Autonomy and Dependence", p. 1 5 4 . 9 . SIPRI, Arms Trade, p. 2 8 3 . 1 0 . I b i d . , p. 2 9 3 -1 1 . C l a r k , "Autonomy and Dependence", p. 1 5 5 . 1 2 . I b i d . 1 3 . C h a r i , "Indo-Soviet M i l i t a r y Cooperation", p. 2 3 8 . 14. See Jayaraman i n Indian and Foreign Review, March 1 , 1 9 7 4 . 1 5 . 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"Problems of C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t y i n A s i a " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (Moscow) 8 (August 1 9 7 5 ) • S h e f f e r , G. "Independence i n Dependence of Regional Powers: The Uncomfortable A l l i a n c e s i n the Middle East Before and A f t e r the October 1973 War", Orb i s 19:4 (Winter 1976). Simon, Sheldon W. "China, the S o v i e t Union and the Subcontin-e n t a l Balance", A s i a n Survey 13:7 ( J u l y 1973). . A s i a n N e u t r a l i s m and U.S. P o l i c y . Washington, D.C.: American E n t e r p r i s e f o r P u b l i c P o l i c y Research, 1975. Stockholm I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Research I n s t i t u t e . Arms Trade  With the T h i r d World. London: Penguin, 1975-S u l l i v a n , M i c h ael J . " R e o r i e n t a t i o n of In d i a n Arms C o n t r o l P o l i c y , 1969-72", A s i a n Survey 13:7 ( J u l y 1973)-1 0 7 . V l o y a n t e s , John P. S i l k Glove Hegemony - F i n n i s h - S o v i e t R e l a t i o n s 19 k 4 - 7 4 : A Case Study of the Theory of the S o f t Sphere of I n f l u e n c e . Kent State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975-Wheeler, Richard S. The P o l i t i c s of P a k i s t a n . I t h a c a and London: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 7 0 . Z i r i n g , Lawrence. The Ayub Khan E r a : P o l i t i c s i n P a k i s t a n , 1 9 5 8 - 6 9. Syracuse: Syracuse U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1971-. " P a k i s t a n and I n d i a : P o l i t i c s , P e r s o n a l i t i e s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y " , A s i a n Survey 1 8 : 7 ( J u l y 1 9 7 8 ) . In a d d i t i o n c e r t a i n s e c t i o n s of t h i s study have r e l i e d h e a v i l y upon key I n d i a n sources; Chapter I drawing from the voluminous coverage of the 1971 C r i s i s i n The Times of I n d i a , and Chapter I I I u t i l i z i n g m a t e r i a l from the I n d i a n and F o r e i g n  Review (New D e l h i ) 1 9 7 7 - 7 9 -

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