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The Rod Young affair in the B.C. Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Bernard, Elaine 1979

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THE ROD YOUNG AFFAIR IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION by ELAINE BERNARD B.A., University of Alberta, 1976 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of History We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 197 9 © Elaine Bernard, 1979 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I a g r e e t h a t the L ibrary sha l l make it f ree ly ava i l ab le for r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying o f t h i s t h e s i s for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head o f my Depar tment o r by his representat ives. It is understood that c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f th i s thes is for f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my written permission. Depar tment of The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C anada V6T 1W5 Abstract The years 1949 to 1956 saw a period of constant warfare between two factions within the B r i t i s h Columbia Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. These groups repre-sented b a s i c a l l y the ri g h t and l e f t i n the party. The l e f t wing challenged what they considered to be a continuing rightward d r i f t of the party. Fearing that the party was on the road to becoming "Liberals-in-a-hurry" the l e f t attempted to organize an opposition to t h i s rightward d r i f t , and to r a l l y support for s o c i a l i s t p o l i c i e s within the party. As early as 1949, the rig h t wing was tryin g to blame the l e f t for the party's f a i l u r e i n the pr o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n of that year. The ri g h t argued that the l e f t kept the party divided organizationally and that i t frightened o f f supporters and potential supporters with i t s rhetoric. In the fa c t i o n a l battles the name of Rod Young figured prominently as a widely recognized leader of the l e f t wing. During his twenty-one year party membership, Young held such important elected positions as national Vice- • President of the Co-operative Commonwealth Youth Movement, Second Vice-President of the BC party, and CCF member of Parliament from Vancouver Centre. He was d i s c i p l i n e d by the party on three separate occasions, each one a r i s i n g out of a major i d e o l o g i c a l dispute: in 1937 the united front question, in 1950 the organizing of the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship and i n i 1954 the debate on relations between Communists and the CCF. It was the l a s t of these episodes which led to Young's resignation from the CCF. The d i s c i p l i n i n g of Rod Young in 1954 and his subsequent resignation from the party was a key v i c t o r y for the r i g h t wing. Young came under attack for his l e f t wing views and his c r i t i c i s m of trends within the party. The motive for the attack was c l e a r l y i d e o l o g i c a l differences, but injudicious actions by Rod Young enabled the r i g h t wing to characterize a p r i n c i p l e d opposition as "personal idiosyn-cracy" and "an organizational question." By thus avoiding d i r e c t i d e o l o g i c a l confrontation the r i g h t wing was able to defuse membership opposition to action against the l e f t . Rod Young became the s t i c k with which the right successfully beat the l e f t . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter 1. YOUNG'S FIRST SUSPENSION 9 2. YOUNG'S EMERGENCE AS A LEADER OF THE NEW LEFT IN THE BC CCF 24 3. YOUNG'S SECOND SUSPENSION 39 4. THE 1954 CONVENTION AND AFTERMATH 58 CONCLUSION 83 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 8 9 i i i Introduction The decade following the second world war was one of the stormiest i n the history of the B r i t i s h Columbia Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. Heated i d e o l o g i c a l disputes and i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s plagued the party through-out t h i s period. In face of widespread anti-communism and anti-socialism the party leadership was prepared to abandon the f o r t h r i g h t s o c i a l i s t aims of the Regina Manifesto for a program of moderate reform. This rightward d r i f t of the party was vehemently opposed by many party members who fought to reaffirm the s o c i a l i s t character of the organization. The i d e o l o g i c a l disputes which characterized the party i n the postwar decade became so intense as to lead to severe antagonisms between party members. As a r e s u l t , the l i n e between p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c i s m and personal attack became blurred. Similar disputes had plagued the party since i t s o r i g i n s , but i n the climate of the postwar period these disputes were debated with a new urgency. On one side i n the debate was a l e f t wing which i d e n t i f i e d with the S o c i a l -i s t Party of Canada t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l education and the need to maintain "Marxian" p r i n c i p l e s as the guide to p o l i t i c a l action. To t h i s l e f t wing, the f a i l u r e of the party i n both the long and the short terms were caused by the abandoning of s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s . In opposition to 1 2 the l e f t was a r i g h t wing which f e l t that the party's major problem was i t s f a r - l e f t image. Communists and S o c i a l i s t s , they argued, tended to be synomynous i n the public mind, and the party had to make i t clear that "democratic s o c i a l i s t s " had nothing i n common with "Marxist-Leninists." For both sides the bat t l e within the party was a l i f e and death struggle. For the l e f t , the party by i t s continual abandonment of basic s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s ran the ri s k of becoming " L i b e r a l s - i n - a - h u r r y . F o r the r i g h t wing the threat to the party came from the l e f t c r i t i c s i n the party who were aiding the opponents of the CCF by d i v i d i n g the party and through t h e i r rhetoric making i t appear as dangerous and r a d i c a l . For the ri g h t wing, the task was more than simply winning a voting majority at party conventions. They had to silence the l e f t wing inside the party. They would have agreed which with the Vancouver Province argued i n an e d i t o r i a l during t h i s period that though the "extremists" were not the main body of the party, i t was "disquieting" that they were able to "get 2 a hearing, and some support, at a party convention." But the s i l e n c i n g of the l e f t wing was no simple task . There was considerable sympathy for th e i r views i n the BC party; furthermore, the CCF was proud of i t s democratic t r a -d i t i o n , a point often raised i n distinguishing i t from the Communist Party, and the leadership was hesitant to take d i s -c i p l i n a r y action against a member solely for his or her ideo-l o g i c a l views. The r i g h t wing tackled the problem of s i l e n c i n g the 3 l e f t i n two ways. They f i r s t t r i e d to blame the l e f t wing for the decline i n the party's growth and the f a i l u r e of the CCF to form a p r o v i n c i a l government i n BC. Secondly, they t r i e d to avoid d i r e c t confrontation on i d e o l o g i c a l questions, choosing instead to deal with t h e i r opponents' actions as organizational questions, and to deal with i d e o l o g i c a l d i s -putes as personality c o n f l i c t s . The r i g h t wing took advantage of a dynamic which occurred i n party controversies: the ten-dency of i d e o l o g i c a l disputes to develop into personality clashes. The leading proponents of opposing i d e o l o g i c a l views tended to become completely i d e n t i f i e d with those views. Getting r i d of the proponent of a p a r t i c u l a r view was thereby seen as the way to defeat his or her p o l i c y . Rodney Young, a leader of the l e f t wing and the defendent i n the most celebrated d i s c i p l i n a r y case i n t h i s period, provides an excellent focus to study i d e o l o g i c a l disputes i n the BC CCF. Young was a s k i l l e d debater and a popular, i n f l u e n t i a l speaker whose p o l i t i c a l roots went back to the doctrinaire "impossiblists" of the S o c i a l i s t Party of Canada. He was described by the Vancouver Sun as an i n d i s c r e e t r a d i c a l "who i n s i s t e d upon being ruggedly honest with C s i c J fundamental 3 s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s . " During his twenty-one year party membership, he held such important elected positions as national Vice-President of the Co-operative Commonwealth Youth Movement, the party's youth organization, Second Vice-President of the BC party, CCF member of Parliament for Vancouver-Centre and candidate for the party in. numerous 4 elections. Young was suspended from the party on three separate occasions, each one a r i s i n g out of a major ideolog-i c a l dispute: i n 1937 the united front question, i n 1950 the organizing of the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship, and i n 1954 the debate on the rela t i o n s h i p between Communists and the CCF. The l a s t of these episodes led to Young's resignation from the party. In short, Young was a prominent and v i s i b l e leader of the l e f t wing of the party. The Rod Young a f f a i r , as the 1954 suspension has come to be known, has not been considered i n depth by any of the scholars studying the CCF. There i s only one published account, that which appears i n Walter Young's history of the national 4 CCF, The Anatomy of a Party: the National CCF 1932 - 1961. Professor Young uses the c o n f l i c t which surrounded Rod Young to i l l u s t r a t e the death of " l e f t wing sentiment" i n the BC party. Rod Young, he t e l l s us, was one of a group "who 5 caused more damage than good." But, he adds, "sympathy for these people was such that there seemed l i t t l e the party 6 could do i n convention to r i d i t s e l f of Lsuch] i n d i v i d u a l s . " Rod Young's forced departure i n 1954, says Walter Young, marked the v i c t o r y of the "moderates" over the "doctrinaire l e f t . " The party was then able to d i s c i p l i n e those members who wished "to go whichever way they chose i n as public a manner as t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l egos demanded - provided always that i t was to the l e f t . 1 , 7 Aside from Professor Young's the only other treatment of the incident appears i n an unpublished M.A. thesis by D.J. 5 Roberts, "Doctrine and Disunity i n the BC Section of the CCF g 1932 - 1956." Roberts views the Rod Young a f f a i r i n a wider context as one of a series of d o c t r i n a l disputes within the BC CCF. These d o c t r i n a l disputes, Roberts argues, were be-tween the "moderates" and the "doctrinaire" Marxists of the old S o c i a l i s t Party of Canada. The c o n f l i c t s resulted i n the eventual decline and disappearance of the SPC influence i n the BC CCF. In her view, Not only had Young brought the CCF into disrepute i n the eyes of the public, but he had also brought the l e f t wing of the CCF into disrepute within the party. The mood of the rank and f i l e membership had changed and they were no longer w i l l i n g to tolerate contentious remarks from Marxist individuals as they had i n the past.9 Both Roberts and Walter Young interpret the Rod Young suspen-sions of 1954 as a turning point i n the b a t t l e between the l e f t wing and the "moderates" i n the party. However another study by Professor Young, an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d , "Ideology, Personality and the Origins of the CCF i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , t h o u g h not dealing with the Rod Young a f f a i r , r e f l e c t s a change i n Professor Young's view. In t h i s essay which analyses the events leading to the resignation of Reverend Robert Connell,CCF party leader i n 1936,he argues that i d e o l o g i c a l differences i n the CCF "invariably" disguised personal ambitions. It would be simple to describe the c o n f l i c t as purely a matter of ideology, but the Connell a f f a i r l i k e the events that preceded and followed i t , demonstrated what might be a truism of the l e f t i n B r i t i s h Columbia; 6 that i s , the d i s t i n c t i o n s that were in v a r i a b l y drawn i n such disputes must be seen as covers for c o n f l i c t i n g ambitions.H Where i n The Anatomy of a Party Professor Young saw the Rod Young a f f a i r as an i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t , he now argues that such struggles are mere "covers" for personal ambition. In thi s he echoes a view frequently expressed at the time of the Rod Young a f f a i r . The BC CCF party president referred to the Rod Young dispute as "a l i t t l e problem of human rela t i o n s which p o l i t i c a l parties, unfortunately f i n d they 12 have to deal with." Indeed Rod Young's opponents within the party, time and again, made the point that actions against Young were of a personal nature. The d i s c i p l i n i n g of Young, they claimed, was not for his p o l i t i c a l views, but for his irresponsible actions or statements. The Rod Young a f f a i r provides an excellent opportunity for an examination of these two c o n f l i c t i n g interpretations. This paper w i l l attempt to show through a detailed analysis of the record, that the conclusion drawn by D. J . Roberts and by Walter Young i n The Anatomy of a Party i s a v a l i d one. The Rod Young a f f a i r was the culmination of an ideo-l o g i c a l dispute marking the v i c t o r y of the moderates over the doctrinaire l e f t . Young came under attack i n the BC CCF for his l e f t wing views and his c r i t i c i s m of the d i r e c t i o n i n which the party was headed. The motivation for the attack was c l e a r l y i d e o l o g i c a l differences; the concentration on the "personal idiosyncrasies" of Young was only a cover for what was e s s e n t i a l l y an i d e o l o g i c a l dispute. 8 Notes I c o l i n Cameron, "An Analysis of the El e c t i o n Results," CCF News, July 6, 1949, p. 3. 2"Undoing A Lot of Good Work," E d i t o r i a l , Vancouver  Province, July 14, 1954, p. 6. 3"Shedding a L i a b i l i t y , " E d i t o r i a l , Vancouver Sun, July 13, 1954, p. 7. 4Walter Young, The Anatomy of a Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969). ->Young, p. 283. 6Young, p. 283. 7Young, p. 284. ^Dorothy June Roberts, "Doctrine and Disunity i n the BC Section of the CCF 1932 - 1956," M.A. University of V i c t o r i a 1972. ^Roberts, p. 121. 1 0Walter Young, "Ideology, Personality and the Origins of the CCF i n B r i t i s h Columbia," BC Studies, No. 32 (Winter 1976-77). HYoung, p. 161. 1 2Frank McKenzie, "Closing Address of President," P r o v i n c i a l Convention Minutes 1954, Angus Maclnnis C o l l e c t i o n , UBC. jHereafter entered as AMCJJ Chapter 1 YOUNG'S FIRST SUSPENSION To understand the i d e o l o g i c a l basis of disputes i n the BC CCF, one must look f i r s t at the history of the S o c i a l -i s t Party of Canada which i n BC was the major founding com-ponent of the CCF. Founded i n 1902 as the S o c i a l i s t Party of BC (later changing i t s name to the SPC), thi s party domi-nated the l e f t i n BC for most of twenty years. As Ross Johnson points out i n his history of the SPC e n t i t l e d , "No Compromise, No P o l i t i c a l Trading," "for twenty years the party had been a strong enough force to ensure that, when-ever socialism or r a d i c a l p o l i t i c a l action was discussed, a representative of the SPC would be involved.""'" The SPC brought to the CCF an important legacy: a non-Leninist Marxist t r a d i t i o n i n s t i l l e d i n the membership through twenty years of p o l i t i c a l struggle as a party. Viewing themselves as "Marxists" and " s c i e n t i f i c e s o c i a l i s t s , " the SPC members saw i t as t h e i r duty to educate the masses about Marxian economics, class, and Marxism i n general. The party took great pride i n the "purity" of i t s Marxism, refusing to j o i n the Second (Soci a l i s t ) International, because i t f e l t that too many of the a f f i l i a t e s were not pure 2 Marxists. In fact, the SPC was a party of "impossiblists" 9 10 3 frozen i n nineteenth century English Marxism. I t f a i l e d to develop and apply Marxist theory to the economic s i t u a t i o n i n BC. Ignoring the "immediate" issues a r i s i n g out of the day-to-day struggles of working people, the SPC opted instead to educate i t s audience on the absolute necessity of a f u l l 4 s o c i a l i s t revolution. Anything short of a revolution was regarded as doomed to f a i l u r e and was denounced by the party as reformism and revisionism. As Ross Johnson pointed out, "the impossiblists could act as just men by describing the inequities of c a p i t a l i s t society but they could not act as p o l i t i c a l men by r e l a t i n g to s p e c i f i c problems requiring 5 immediate attention." Not every member of the SPC was an impossiblist. The pressure on m i l i t a n t s to get involved i n the immediate struggles of working people - the struggle for reform - led to a number of s p l i t s from the SPC. An important case i n point was the 1907 s p l i t i n which a number of members l e f t the SPC to form the Social Democratic Party of BC, an orga-nization committed to placing a greater emphasis on the immediate struggles for reforms. In spite of numerous s p l i t s and desertions there was not, u n t i l the end of the f i r s t world war, a labour or s o c i a l i s t party i n the province that did not have members or former members of the SPC i n i t s leading ranks. The party produced a whole generation of s o c i a l i s t leaders and educated them i n Marxism. The war and the changes i t brought about led to the collapse of the SPC. A s i g n i f i c a n t factor contributing to 11 the decline of the SPC was the decision by the BC Federation 7 of Labour, i n 1918, to launch the Federated Labour Party. This party consisted of the SDP, some members of the SPC, and some union a f f i l i a t e s . Changes i n the inte r n a t i o n a l s o c i a l i s t movement brought about by the Russian Revolution also contributed to the SPC 1s decline. In the early period of the revolution, the SPC supported the Bolsheviks, seeing the revolution as a step towards socialism. But i n 1919 when the c a l l went out from Moscow for s o c i a l i s t parties to reorganize themselves along democratic c e n t r a l i s t l i n e s and jo i n the new Communist Third International, the SPC s p l i t on the a f f i l i a t i o n question. Approximately half of the remaining SPC members l e f t the party to form the Vancouver branch of the Workers Party of '.Canada (as the new communist 8 party was called) i n January 1922. The s p l i t was the death blow for the SPC. Its paper, the Western Clarion, continued u n t i l 1925, but the party was e s s e n t i a l l y f i n i s h e d . Most former SPC members could now be found i n the ranks of either the communist Workers Party of Canada or the s o c i a l i s t Federated Labour Party. In 1924, on the i n i t i a t i v e of the BC Executive of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, a "united front" of s o c i a l i s t and labour parties i n BC was formed. The FLP, the WPC, the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council, and a number of unions joined together to form the BC branch of 9 the Canadian Labour Party. The CLP was quite late i n get-ting organized i n BC; the f i r s t c a l l for the union of the 12 l e f t and labour groups had come out of the 1921 TLCC national convention. The CLP i n BC, as i n other parts of the country, was a federated party to which p o l i t i c a l and labour groups a f f i l i a t e d , although they maintained t h e i r independent iden-t i t i e s . Shortly af t e r a f f i l i a t i n g to the CLP, the FLP joined with several small labour parties i n the lower mainland to form the Independent Labour Party. The CLP then consisted of two p o l i t i c a l p a rties, the ILP and the WPC which now c a l l e d i t s e l f the Communist Party of Canada. Though a minority i n the CLP, the Communists, by "acting as a u n i f i e d caucus" were able to have the CLP adopt many r a d i c a l resolutions."^ The most controversial was a resolution demanding enfranchisment of "Orientals" and making th i s demand a part of the party's e l e c t i o n platform. The adoption of t h i s p o licy led i n 1928 to the d i s a f f i l i a t i o n of the unions and the ILP. Members of the ILP f e l t that the party's stand on "Orientals" had alienated i t s labour sup-port. The "united front" experience i n the CLP between the Communists and the S o c i a l i s t s l e f t much mutual h o s t i l i t y . The Communists saw the S o c i a l i s t s as "class c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s t p o l i t i c i a n s " who were looking to sabotage the CLP and destroy 12 the united front. I t was the opinion of the CPC "that the Labour Party could only be a success i f i t were an e f f e c t i v e instrument of class struggle and i f i t followed the lead 13 of the Communists and the Left Wing." This p o l i c y of the CPC was viewed by the ILP as a po l i c y of Communist takeover 13 and domination. The lesson drawn by the ILP was that common work with the CPC was impossible. The whole s i t u a t i o n escalated when the Communist International, the Comintern, adopted a new set of theses in t h i s same year and labeled the s o c i a l i s t the " l a s t re-serve" of the old order. The "united front" with the s o c i a l -i s t s was to be abandoned and Communists were asked to take up the battle against the s o c i a l i s t " t r a i t o r s " , who were lab e l l e d " s o c i a l f a s c i s t s . " The s p l i t between the S o c i a l -14 i s t s and the Communists was then complete. Though there had been some h o s t i l i t y since the s p l i t from the SPC of the "pro-Leninists" i n 1922 i t was s i g n i f i -cant that S o c i a l i s t s and Communists had been able to work together i n a common, federated party. But after the demise of the CLP i n 1928, the S o c i a l i s t s would never again work i n a common party with the Communists, and exclusion of Communists from s o c i a l i s t and labour parties became an accepted norm. Since both the S o c i a l i s t s and the Communists i n BC came from the same Marxian roots i n the SPC, i t was inevitable that each party would see i t s e l f as the r e a l Marxists. The ILP eventually changed i t s name back i n June 1932 to the SPC and became the major founding component of the CCF i n BC. Into the CCF, the SPC ca r r i e d i t s h o s t i l i t y towards the CPC, i t s negative experience with the united front, and i t s claim to be the true heir to Marx. From the beginning of the CCF i n BC, SPC members saw i t as t h e i r duty to lead and maintain the Marxist purity 14 of the new organization. Their long experience on the l e f t and i n p o l i t i c a l organizations assured that SPC members would lead the party, but they f e l t i t necessary to take a number of precautions to ensure SPC dominance of the CCF, at least u n t i l the new membership attracted to the organi-zation could be educated i n basic Marxism. They guaranteed t h e i r dominance by inc l u s i o n i n the constitution of a clause requiring that the P r o v i n c i a l President and Secretary-Trea-surer of the CCF would be from the SPC. In addition to these two key posts, three other representatives on the 15 Executive were to be from the SPC. To assure the ideo-l o g i c a l purity of the candidates chosen to represent the CCF i n elections, they were to be quizzed on t h e i r competence i n s o c i a l i s t theory, before receiving the necesary endorse-16 ment of the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive. In the f i r s t e l e c t i o n that the CCF contested, the p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n of 1933, six of the seven members elected as CCFers were from the SPC. Rod Young was a founding member of the CCF. He was an immigrant to Canada, a r r i v i n g i n 192 6 after having l o s t his job i n his hometown of Liverpool England for p a r t i c i p a t i n g 17 i n the General s t r i k e of that year. As a member of the ILP-SPC he had voted with the majority to endorse p a r t i c i -pation i n the CCF. In the SPC, Young had been aligned with the Marxian impossiblist wing and was influenced i n p a r t i c u l a r by the popular Marxist educator and lawyer, Wallis W. Lefeaux. 15 and other Marxist educators from the SPC. In 193 5, the whole question of the united front resurfaced i n BC. After the disaster of the v i c t o r y of fascism i n Germany, the Comintern reversed the l i n e of the Third International and advocated a "popular front" of a l l 18 democratic progressives to stop fascism. In Canada, the CPC interpreted t h i s position to mean, amongst other things, a popular front with the CCF, progressive Liberals and 19 Social Crediters. The CPC wanted to involve CCFers i n t h e i r anti-war organization, the League Against War and Fascism, and sought common work amongst the unemployed and i n trade unions where both parties were active. The CCF was forced by the united front issue to debate the question of i t s r e l a t i o n to the Communists. Support for the popular front came from people within the CCF who, for the most part, saw i t as a simple extension of the union of the l e f t or "united front" brought about through the formation of the CCF. Was not the CCF i t s e l f , a f t e r a l l , a united front of Farm, Labour, and S o c i a l i s t p a rties, as the f u l l name of the party indicated? Opposition to the popular front came from two quarters. Some CCFers followed long time ILP-SPC a c t i v i s t Angus Maclnnis, who vehemently opposed the CCF 1s having anything to do with the CPC' The anti-communist attitude of Maclnnis and his supporters went back to the SPC - WPC s p l i t . As a "moderate" he viewed any association with the CPC as dangerous for the CCF's public image, and the negative experience of working 16 with the communist i n the CLP was s t i l l fresh i n his mind. As one member underlined sharply i n a l e t t e r to the CCF newspaper, the Federation i s t "the test of a Popular Front 20 in action may show i t to be more Front than Popular." The second group of opponents to the popular front comprised the "doctrinaire" or " i m p o s s i b i l i s t " SPC members and those they influenced, including Rod Young. The popular front, they reasoned, was a t a c t i c which persuaded people to maintain the status-quo - bourgeois democracy - as opposed to f i g h t i n g for socialism. They c r i t i c i z e d the popular front for being "class c o l l a b o r a t i o n i s t , " arguing that the popular front would cut across labour p o l i t i c a l action by l i n k i n g labour and the CCF to the "old l i n e p a r t i e s " or "parties 21 of big business" such as the L i b e r a l s . The National Executive and the BC P r o v i n c i a l Execu-t i v e of the CCF were i n t h e i r majority opposed to the popular front. They pointed out that the CCF as a Farm:, Labour, S o c i a l i s t party brought together many groups and associations, making i t i n e f f e c t the united front i n Canada. If people seriously wanted a popular front they would j o i n the CCF 22 and abide by i t s program and constitution. A l l those opposed to the popular front agreed on one point: that the independence of the CCF was the most important question i n the debate. As early as the 1935 P r o v i n c i a l Convention, the CCF adopted a resolution on the united front, stating i n part; "No good purpose can be served by the a r t i f i c i a l weld-ing together of organizations the working methods of which 17 23 d i f f e r i n p r i n c i p l e and practice." The resolution went on to make clear the co-operation with other groups on s p e c i f i c a c t i v i t i e s and issues was not ruled out. The main proponent of the popular front within the CCF was A.M. Stephen. Stephen, a poet and a member of the Pro v i n c i a l Executive, was a popular s o c i a l i s t educator. As President of the l o c a l chapter of the League Against War and Fascism, he wanted to involve the CCF i n common cause with the Communists i n campaigns such as that against fascism, and i n support of the Republican forces i n Spain, as well 24 as through adoption of the popular front by the CCF. The debate on the popular front became extremely heated i n 1936, raging at a l l levels of the party - at con-stituency meetings, club meetings, and on executive bodies. A number of l e t t e r s from club executives inquiring into the party's position and asking for instructions on work with the CPC were received by the Pr o v i n c i a l o f f i c e . The r i s e of fascism i n Europe and the C i v i l War i n Spain pushed a c t i v i s t s within the CCF into closer collaboration with the CPC. In the heated atmosphere of inner party debate, charges were thrown back and for t h . The main charge leveled against the supporters of the popular front was that they were "communist stooges," members of the Communist Party out to disrupt and destroy the CCF. The counter charge hurled at the opponents of the popular front was that they were 25 "Trotskyists." Young i n p a r t i c u l a r was la b e l l e d a Trotskyist for his attacks on A.M. Stephen. As editor of the s o c i a l i s t 18 youth paper Ameoba, Young had published a number of attacks on the popular front and so s t i r r e d up the issue that the party Executive ordered the paper to cease publication. Stephen, at a September 19th P r o v i n c i a l Executive meeting, introduced a notice of motion that he would be bringing charges against Young for dual membership (a charge that he was a member of another p o l i t i c a l party, i n t h i s case the "Trotskyist" Workers Party of Canada). After some months, however, Stephen was forced to withdraw his notice for lack of evidence. I t was inevitable that the debate would f i n d i t s way into the party paper,the Federationist. In the December 10th e d i t i o n Gerald Van, a leader of the CCYM and Young's collaborator on the Ameoba e d i t o r i a l board, challenged A.M. Stephen to a public debate on the popular front question. Van's l e t t e r of challenge led to a barrage of comments from others, for and against the popular front. Young, i n a sub-sequent Federationist, also challenged Stephen to a debate 2 6 on the question. Charges and counter charges went back and forth for a month. F i n a l l y , on January 7th, the Provin-c i a l Executive cut o f f debate and published a statement i n the Federationist d i r e c t i n g the editors not to publish any further l e t t e r s on the question of the popular front. But before the month was through, the P r o v i n c i a l Executive was forced to deal once more with the issue. Matthew Glenday and Rod Young brought a series of charges against Stephen, including " v i o l a t i o n of executive confidence" and "intent 19 to injure a member of the movement." The P r o v i n c i a l Executive appointed a t r i a l committee which looked into the charges. While not sustaining any of the s p e c i f i c charges, the t r i a l committee gave the following assessment of the s i t u a t i o n . It seems clear to your committee that a controversy which commenced as a difference i n ideology has developed into a vicious clash of p e r s o n a l i t i e s , r e s u l t i n g i n the determined e f f o r t of a l l p a rties, including Corns. Stephen, Glenday and Young, to accept every opportunity to embarrass opponents for a p a r t i c u l a r point of view.^7 The committee recommended that i t was " i n the best i n t e r e s t of the CCF" that A.M. Stephen " r e t i r e v o l u n t a r i l y " from active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the CCF for a period of one year. This included resigning his position on the P r o v i n c i a l Executive. They also recommended that Rod Young "be sus-pended from membership" for one year. The recommendation concerning Young was without precedent, as no charges had been l a i d against him, and he was, i n f a c t one of the accusers i n the A.M. Stephen's t r i a l . But the committee f e l t that the conduct of Young's attacks and goading had contributed to Stephen's misbehaviour. At the P r o v i n c i a l Convention i n July of 1937, both Young and Stephen appealed t h e i r suspensions. Stephen was expelled by a vote of 96 - 61 for having run as an indepen-2 8 dent i n the Alberni-Nanaimo r i d i n g while under suspension. Young did not successfully appeal his suspension either. According to Dorothy G. Steeves, members f e l t , " i t would do 20 him and the movement both good to keep him 'on ice' for an-other nine months."" The convention took a very strong stand on the popular front question decisively defeating resolutions favouring a popular front. The popular front fight of 1935 - 37 demonstrates Young's particular a b i l i t y to snatch defeat out of the jaws of victory. In this dispute, Young was on the side of the majority, which included almost a l l of the Provincial Execu-tive and a substantial number of the rank and f i l e . Glenday's and Young's charges against Stephen fi n a l l y got Stephen sus-pended. But at the same time Young managed to get himself disciplined. While a number of popular front supporters were expelled or suspended, Young was the only opponent of the popular front to be suspended. The incident also demonstrates Young's abil i t y to goad his opponents and get himself in trouble. The t r i a l committee, recognizing this characteristic of Young's, chose to suspend him for a year to allow the party to recover from the dispute. It is interesting to note that Colin Cameron, who would later be a leader with Young of the l e f t in the postwar CCF referred to Young's "natural mode of address" as "supercilious and offensive." 3^ A second aspect of this early dispute i s that i t reveals a certain dynamic in party disputes and in the role of Rod Young. The t r i a l committee's summary notes that what had begun as an ideological difference had developed into a personality clash. This sequence of events in which 21 i d e o l o g i c a l differences heated up and became vicious personal c o n f l i c t s , happened over and over i n the CCF. Stephen's suspension r e f l e c t s the tendency for ideological disputes to become personality c o n f l i c t s . The f i g h t against the pop-ular front became a f i g h t against the advocates of the popular front, and A.M. Stephen, as a recognized leader with-i n the CCF, became a focus. What was e s s e n t i a l l y a question of p o l i t i c a l t a c t i c s , whether or not the CCF would j o i n i n a common e l e c t o r a l front with the Communist party,was trans-formed into a personal attack. Both Stephen and Young ac-cepted t h i s dynamic and were accessories i n continuing and escalating i t . Stephen accused those who d i f f e r e d with him on the popular front of being Trotskyists, and Young s i m i l a r l y attacked Stephen and the popular front advocates as S t a l i n -i s t s . The l i n e between p o l i t i c a l c r i t i c i s m and personal attack had been crossed and i n the process, the cause for the whole dispute, ideology, appears to have become obscured. This early incident prefigures l a t e r ones i n that p o l i t i c a l questions become confused and obscured by the personal l e v e l of the debate. 22 Notes "'"Ross A. Johnson, "No Compromise, No P o l i t i c a l Trading," Diss. University of BC 1975, p. 358. 2Johnson, p. 15. Johnson, p. 17. 4Johnson, p. 152. ^Johnson, p. 153. (^Italics Johnson's] ^Johnson, p. 282. ^Martin Robin, Radical P o l i t i c s and Canadian Labour (Kingston: Queen's University, 1968) pp. 149-150. o Johnson, pp. 357-8; and Robin, p. 200. q ^Robin, p. 252. -^William Rodney, Soldiers of the Interational (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968) p. 101. 1 1R.G. Stuart, "The Early P o l i t i c a l Career of Angus Maclnnis," M.A. University of BC 1970, p. 30. 12 Rodney, p. 103. •^Rodney, p. 101. "*"4Ivan AVakumovic, The Communist Party of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1975.) p. 54. 1 5 P r o v i n c i a l Executive Minutes, S.P.C. (BC) March 12, 1933, AMC. 1 6 C o n s t i t u t i o n BC CCF, September 30, 1933, Section 9a. AMC "^Personal Interview with Rod Young, March 15, 1978 x oAvakumovic, p. 96. l^Avakumovic, p. 106. 2 0Darwin Charlton, Letter, F'ederationist, January 7, 1937, p. 4. 7 1 Gerald Van. L e t t e r , Fede rat ion i s t , December 10, 1936, p. 8. 22 Statement from P r o v i n c i a l Executive,^Federationist, January 7, 1937. 2 3 ^Federationist, January 7, 1937. 2 4 ~" " Dorothy G. Steeves, The Compassionate Rebel, (Vancouver: J . J . Douglas Ltd., 1960) p. 114. 25 Steeves, pp. 114-115. 2 g Federationist, December 23, 1936. 27 "Report of the T r i a l Committee Appointed to Hear Charges Against Comrade A.M. Stephen by Comrade M. Glenday," February 1937, p. 2. AMC. 2 8 P r o v i n c i a l Convention Minutes, July 5, 1937, AMC. 2^Steeves, p. 115. 30 Colin Cameron, Letter to Arnold Webster, March 1, 1937, AMC. Chapter 2 YOUNG'S EMERGENCE AS A LEADER OF THE NEW LEFT IN THE BC CCF By the outbreak of the Second World War the CCF had changed from the small party which the SPC had controlled. The party now incorporated a number of a f f i l i a t e s , including the Reconstruction Party and the province-wide Associated CCF Clubs. The SPC members had become a very small minority within the party. By 1935 the parties and organizations which had been admitted to the CCF dissolved their separate identities, and the party ceased to be a federated party. Less than a year after this consolidation the BC party was shaken by a c r i s i s . Leader Robert Connell l e f t the CCF and launched his own short-lived Social Constructive party. 1 Connell l e f t the CCF for a number of reasons. The immediate cause was his disagreement with the party's "financial platform" adopted at the 1936 convention. But as CCF caucus member Dorothy G. Steeves notes, i t was an old feud between Connell and old time SPC organizer E.E. Winch that was the underlying reason.^ In leaving the CCF, Connell accused Winch of leading a Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n of. the CCF. I cannot approve tacitly or openly of an Executive which has for chairman of the organization committee E.E. Winch, one who is a self-declared pro-Communist and whose efforts show their f r u i t in the 24 25 invasion of CCF Clubs and of the convention i t s e l f by Communists and their sympathizers.3 The accusation added to the heat of the popular front dis-cussion. But as Connell and the three other CCF MLA's who had s p l i t with him, were not re-elected in the following year's election, the party soon recovered from the Connell s p l i t . They went leaderless for about two years, with Harold Winch acting as caucus leader although the party did not actually endorse him as leader. Finally he was confirmed as leader in the f a l l of 1938. Connell's desertion and Winch's election to the leadership post represented a small coup for the SPC. E.E. Winch had been one of the central leaders of the SPC. When the BC CCF was founded he had desired the leadership himself, though he eventually became content to have his son, also an SPC member, become party leader. Winch had been associated with the "impossiblist" wing of the SPC, and the fact that Harold was now party leader signaled a victory for the SPC. During the war years a "new l e f t " started to emerge in the CCF. While not from the SPC, this new l e f t also saw themselves as Marxists and scientific socialists, and along with some of the old SPC members they took up the role of socialist educators within the party. Two of the people who emerged as leaders of the new l e f t were Dorothy G. Steeves and Colin Cameron. Both were CCF members of the legislature during the war. They conducted a much publicized fight against Canada's participation in the war, viewing 26 the war as a, product of imperialist r i v a l r i e s ; against the federal government's War Loans and enforced savings plan, and against the federal government's conscription program.4 The CCF was badly s p l i t across the country over the war. National party leader and l i f e long pacifist J.S. Woodsworth resigned as party leader, feeling that his oppo-sition to the war would hurt the party. Though s t r i c t adherence to the party program, the Regina Manifesto, with i t s clause that "Canada must refuse to be entangled in any more wars fought to make the world safe for capitalism" would have required the party to oppose the war, the National Executive refused to take a position on the war until Par-liament met in September 1939.5 At that point Canada was already at war, and the caucus and Executive had managed to skirt the issue. Throughout the war, the CCF national caucus backtracked further and further from the position of the Regina Manifesto; f i r s t supporting Canada's p a r t i c i -pation in the war, then, the sending of troops to Europe, and f i n a l l y conscription.^ In spite of the abandonment of the Regina Manifesto on the question of the war, or as the National Council argued, because of i t , the fortunes of the party took a positive turn during the war years. By 1944 the CCF had become the o f f i c i a l opposition in Ontario and the government in the province of Saskatchewan and i t was reaching i t s highest level of popular support. While opposition to the national party's position 27 on the war was an embarrassment to the caucus i n Ottawa, i t was not unpopular i n the party i n BC.^ Both Cameron and Steeves were elected to Executive posts i n the BC party during the war years, Cameron served as party President i n 1945 and 1946, and was succeeded by Steeves i n 1947. The l e f t was not only accepted but played a prominent role i n the BC CCF i n the period immediately after the war. But BC as always was a b i t of an anomaly. As the positions of the National Council on the war i l l u s t r a t e d , the party as a whole was moving away from the Regina Manifesto and towards a moderate program. But the postwar period brought a new wave of a n t i -communism, and the CCF suffered from a concerted smear campaign aimed at l a b e l l i n g the CCF as communist.^ It was i n t h i s early postwar period that Rod Young returned to the limelight i n the CCF. In 1948, a by-election was held for the federal seat i n Vancouver Centre. The largest CCF Club i n the r i d i n g (and one of the largest i n the province) was the bastion of the l e f t ; the Stanley Park Club. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , s o c i a l i s t educator W.W. Lefeaux had been the CCF candidate i n Centre, but as he was unavailable at the time of the by-election, Rod Young was chosen to run i n his place. Young had e n l i s t e d i n the Canadian Army with the introduction of the National Resources Mobilization Act and had served with the Canadian expeditionary forces i n I t a l y , France and Germany. As a veteran he was attending law school at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia. He was an a c t i v i s t i n the Stanley Park Club, and was viewed as an 28 a r t i c u l a t e Marxist educator i n his own r i g h t and an able replacement for the absent Lefeaux. As part of the by-election campaign Young was sent to address a May Day meeting i n Nanaimo. Though Nanaimo was c l e a r l y a good distance from Vancouver Centre, the CCF t r a d i t i o n a l l y attended labour sponsored May Days, and the sending of a candidate as party spokesperson would give the candidate some free p u b l i c i t y . With Young on the p l a t -form of the r a l l y were a number of labour leaders, some of whom were prominent supporters and members of the communist Labour Progressive Party. When news of Young's Nanaimo May Day engagement reached party leader M.J. Coldwell, he imme-di a t e l y sent o f f a b l i s t e r i n g telegraph to acting P r o v i n c i a l Secretary Colin Cameron, threatening to cancel his appearance at a Vancouver Centre by-election r a l l y . He wired, Find reported appearance of CCF candidate Vancouver Centre with P r i t c h e t t [[Harold, president of the BC d i s t r i c t of the International Woodworkers of AmericaJ at Nanaimo most embarrassing. This action contrary to both Federal caucus and National Council decision. Without s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation must cancel Vancouver engage-ment May 29. 9 Cameron sent back an equally b l i s t e r i n g reply to Coldwell's telegraph. Nanaimo meeting sponsored by a f f i l i a t e d union C U n i t e d Mineworkers of AmericaJ BC Executive decided propriety of atten-dance at such meeting. Deeply resent threat to cancel meeting. Communicating protest to National Secretary. 1^ The issue continued to heat up with a series of 2 9 letters back and forth from Cameron to Coldwell. Angus Maclnnis, CCF MP from BC, fi n a l l y stepped into the exchange in an attempt to mediate. In a letter to Maclnnist, Cameron expressed his view of why Coldwell reacted so sharply to the May Day item. I have a suspicion that Coldwell has been twitted in the house by some other member, probably Gibson or Sinclair, on Rod's appearance on the same platform as Harold Pritchett. As I see by Hansard that Cold-well went far beyond the decision of the National Council and Executive in his speech in the House on the question of the CCF attitude towards the LPP, I can readily understand that even a perfectly legitimate participation in a May Day ra l l y , called by an a f f i l i a t e d trade union, would provide the opportunity for such twitting. That however is Mr. Coldwell's problem, neither the Provincial Council nor the National Council has laid down a rule that CCF speakers must not attend meetings at which there may be communist speakers. In fact I see that at their meeting on February 15th the National Executive spe-c i f i c a l l y discussed this matter and agreed that no hard and fast rule could be laid down. If Mr. Coldwell had taken i t upon himself to go beyond that decision then he must be prepared to face the consequent embarrassment to which he refers in his telegraph.H Maclnnis in mediating the dispute suggested to Cameron that what was really at the root of things was the egos of Cameron and Coldwell. Maclnnis agreed with Coldwell that the May Day appearance of Young was an embarrassment, and they both f e l t that any association between the Commu-nists and the CCF, regardless of circumstances, was to be avoided at a l l costs. Cameron and the BC Executive took a different view. 30 Cameron agreed with Maclnnis that there had been a certain degree of ruffled ego in the exchange between himself and Coldwell, but he disagreed with the questionable role of the leader and by implication of the National Office's interferance in the BC party's affairs. I suppose I should have been more tact-fu l in my reply to M.J. though really I'm damned i f I know why. I have always been allergic to the Voice of God. But then I have few peers when i t comes to being a cantankerous and disputatious creature... 1 3 Underlying the May Day incident was a dispute about how to deal with Communists. Young, who had been suspended in the pre-war period for the zeal with which he attacked A.M. Stephen and the supporters of the popular front, had strong credentials as an anti-Communist. As Cameron pointed out in a letter to Maclnnis, the implied charge made by Coldwell, "that Rod Young is a person fwholl would lend aid and comfort to the Communists" was "ridiculous."-'"4 But the anti-communism of people like Young and Cameron was rather complicated. They viewed themselves as the real communists, as Marxists, and their distaste for and oppo-sition to the Communist Party was motivated by their belief that this party, was not a real communist party. Their opposition was different from that of Coldwell and Maclnnis, who opposed the CPC and association with Communists because i t might hurt the public image of the CCF. What seems like an insignificant distinciton, had rather sharp consequences when i t came to making party policy. Coldwell f e l t i t would 31 be better to boycott a meeting rather than be caught on the same platform with LPP members. Cameron and Young, on the other hand, f e l t i t better to be on the same platform with LPP members than to boycott a May Day Rally. The l a t t e r , they believed, would hurt the party image far more than the former. Coldwell eventually backed down and came to the e l e c t i o n r a l l y for the Vancouver Centre by-election. But the differences over relations with Communists and how to take on the Communists as p o l i t i c a l opponents was f a r from solved. The incident during the by-election occurred at the beginning of the Cold War, and as anti-communism and anti-socialism increased within Canadian society, the party would have to deal again with the question of i t s r e l a t i o n to communists. As for Young, though elected to Parliament i n the by-election, he got off to a rather poor s t a r t with the party's parliamentary leader. Before he was elected he had already managed to come to the attention of Coldwell and had been viewed as an embarrassment by him. As i t turned out, the problems that had surrounded Young's el e c t i o n campaign were minor compared with those of his short career as the CCF MP from Vancuver Centre. Even before Young took his seat on June 21st, 1948, just nine days before the House adjourned for the summer, the attention of MP's was drawn to Young's l e f t image within the party. The Progressive Conservative member from Calgary-West, Arthur L. Smith warned the House that Young was a 32 Communist,, Later, while speaking i n the House Young was heckled by opposition members c a l l i n g him a Trotskyist. Young i n describing his f i r s t days i n Ottawa i n a l e t t e r i n the CCF News appears to have taken t h i s communist b a i t -ing i n his st r i d e and even joked of i t . Our whip, Stanley Knowles of Winnipeg, commenced the r i t e s of i n i t i a t i o n . He remarked at once that the new member did not look l i k e a communist (referring to the warning issued the House by Tory member from Calgary, Mr. Smith). This pleased me somewhat as I had once been t o l d I resembled Tim Buck C l e a d e r of the communist p a r t y D i n appearance, a state-ment that could give an impressionable soul a complex. 5 A more serious challenge to Young faced him when the new session opened early the next year. On January 26, 1949, the very day aft e r the opening, Young was attacked by BC L i b e r a l MP James S i n c l a i r . S i n c l a i r , r i s i n g on a question of p r i v i l e g e , drew the House's attention to state-ments by Young to the Vancouver Centre CCF Forum, reported i n the Vancouver News-Herald. According to the press account, Young had stated that the Canadian people had been sending "a bunch of crooks" to Parliament. He further vowed that he would not take back his statement. 1^ So with only ten days experience i n Parliament, Young was faced with a demand to substantiate the charges he had made at the Forum or resign. Young had indeed said that MP's were a bunch of crooks, but the News-HeraId and a good number of other papers which l a t e r picked-up the story f a i l e d to point out 33 the context i n which the statement was made. Young had been explaining how MP's were absent from the House for much of the time while public business was being conducted. Yet, he noted, they nevertheless col l e c t e d f u l l salary. MP's were crooks, concluded Young, because they took t h e i r f u l l and ample salary and did not show up f u l l time i n Parliament. One newspaper, the Winnipeg C i t i z e n took the comments i n the l i g h t manner i n which they were given. The C i t i z e n suggested that the r e a l problem was Young's choice of words. The C i t i z e n suggested i n an e d i t o r i a l that i t might have 17 been more appropriate to c a l l MP's "a bunch of l o a f e r s . " Young was, of course, unable to bring any evidence to prove his a l l e g a t i o n , and the government and the Conser-vatives used the occasion to roast the CCF caucus. F i n a l l y , under pressure from the caucus, Young rose i n the House on February 18th and withdrew unconditionally the statements he had made at the Forum. The main p o l i t i c a l b attle of Young's parliamentary career was however the North A t l a n t i c Pact. This treaty, presented to Parliament i n the early part of 1949, resulted i n Canada's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the forming of the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization. The Pact was opposed by the l e f t i n the CCF which saw i t as a war a l l i a n c e . They point-ed out that such a l l i a n c e s more often, led to war, not to peace. The l e f t was also of the opinion that the threat to world peace was not simply the communists, but that the United States and western nations were equally responsible. 34 T h e N a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d v i e w e d t h e c o m m u n i s t s a s t h e n u m b e r o n e t h r e a t t o w o r l d p e a c e a n d s a w t h e A t l a n t i c p a c t a s a n e c e s s a r y a l l i a n c e a g a i n s t t h e c o m m u n i s t t h r e a t . N e e d l e s s t o s a y , t h e i s s u e d b a d l y d i v i d e d t h e p a r t y o n c e m o r e . I n January 1 9 4 9 , t h e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l t o o k a p o s i -t i o n o f s u p p o r t f o r t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c P a c t . On M a r c h 2 8 t h , P a r l i a m e n t v o t e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n t h e P a c t . Y o u n g , W i l l i a m I r v i n e £ C a r i b o o J a n d H a r r y A r c h i b a l d CskeenaJ, t h r e e o f t h e s e v e n BC C C F M P s a b s e n t e d t h e m s e l v e s f r o m t h e H o u s e f o r t h e v o t e . A l l t h r e e w e r e o p p o s e d t o t h e P a c t , a n d w e r e u n d e r p r e s s u r e f r o m t h e c a u c u s t o m a i n t a i n p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e a n d v o t e i n f a v o u r o f i t . T h e y h a d c o n s u l t e d w i t h o t h e r l e a d i n g l e f t i s t s i n t h e BC p a r t y a n d r e c e i v e d t h e a d v i c e f r o m D o r o t h y G . S t e e v e s t h a t " a f t e r t h i n k i n g t h e m a t t e r o v e r . I am s t i l l o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t y o u s h o u l d v o t e w i t h t h e g r o u p . " - ^ w h i l e s t r o n g l y o p p o s e d t o t h e P a c t h e r s e l f , S t e e v e s f e l t t h a t a v o t e a g a i n s t i t w o u l d b e " a v o t e o f n o n - c o n f i d e n c e w i t h d e c l a r e d C C F p o l i c y " a n d t h a , t i t m i g h t r e s u l t i n t h e i r b e i n g " p u t o u t o f t h e m o v e -m e n t . " 1 9 T h e o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e t h r e e BC M P s t o t h e P a c t , was l e a k e d t o t h e p r e s s . T h e N e w s p a p e r s b e g a n t o s p e c u l a t e a b o u t t h e " r e v o l t i n B C . " C o l d w e l l t r i e d t o s q u e l c h t h e s e r u m o u r s b y t e l l i n g t h e p r e s s t h a t h i s w h o l e c a u c u s w o u l d f o l l o w t h e N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l ' s d e c i s i o n a n d a l l w o u l d b e p r e s e n t a n d v o t e f o r t h e P a c t o n t h e t h i r d a n d f i n a l r e a d -ing of the b i l l . " New speculation of a rupture i n the party grew with the opening of the BC P r o v i n c i a l Convention i n A p t i l of 1949. Submitted to the convention were six resolutions opposing the Pact. David Lewis, then National Secretary of the CCF, was sent to BC to attend the Convention and to help win the BC party's acceptance of the national party's position. The six resolutions opposed to the Pact were shelved and not debated on the f l o o r of the convention. In t h e i r place a resolution which simply noted the position of the National party, and neither approved nor condemned i t , was adopted.21 But the adoption of t h i s compromise resolution did not end the question at the convention. An emergency resolution was brought i n , c a l l i n g for the conven-ti o n to approve the federal party's p o s i t i o n . This resolu-t i o n was voted down, causing the press to further speculate on the r e v o l t i n BC. Typical of the press coverage of the convention was the Vancouver Sun's Monday headline stating i n large type; "Convention Refuses Approve A t l a n t i c Pact" and then i n much smaller type; "also rejects move for d i s -a p proval." 2 2 After the Convention/newly-elected P r o v i n c i a l Executive adopted a resolution approving the Pact, but the damage had already been done. 2^ Young spoke against the Pact at the convention and suggested that the convention ask the BC MPs to vote against the Pact i n Parliament. His p o s i t i o n received much p u b l i c i t y and caused a great deal of bitterness towards 36 him i n the federal caucus. Nevertheless, i n the f i n a l vote on the Pact, Young voted with his Parliamentary colleagues, and the A t l a n t i c Pact was adopted unanimously by the Canadian Parliament. The North A t l a n t i c Pact issue had l e f t the party badly divided. Young and the l e f t i n BC viewed the p o s i t i o n they had been forced by party d i s c i p l i n e to accept as a fundamental betrayal of s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s . The National Executive, and i n p a r t i c u l a r Coldwell and Maclnnis, were angered by the public a i r i n g of d i v i s i o n s i n the party on an issue that they considered to be c r u c i a l to .... estab-l i s h i n g . the CCF's c r e d i b i l i t y as a mature, responsible p o l i t i c a l party. Young's parliamentary career was b r i e f . At the end of June 1949, he l o s t his seat to a L i b e r a l i n the general el e c t i o n , and returned to UBC to complete his law degree. His short term i n Parliament had brought him to the attention of the national leadership. I t had further helped e s t a b l i s h Young as a leader of the new l e f t i n the BC party, at a time when the party was experiencing e l e c t o r a l setbacks both federal l y and p r o v i n c i a l l y . Notes Steeves, p. 112 and Young, Origins of CCF i n BC, p. 160. Note: Young refers to Connell*s party as the B r i t i s h Columbia Constructives. 2Steeves, p. 107. ^Steeves, p. 110. 4Roberts, pp. 57-60. 5Roberts, p. 55. 6Roberts, pp. 55-70. 7Young ' suggests i n Anatomy of a Party, "In fac t most CCF members probably were against the war, one way or another." p. 103. ^Young, p. 117, and Ivan Avakumovic, Socialism i n  Canada , pp. 101-103. ^M.J. Coldwell, Telegraph to Colin Cameron, May 12 1948, AMC. - ^ c o l i n Cameron, Telegraph to M.J. Coldwell, May 1 1948, AMC. 1 1 C o l i n Cameron, Letter to Angus Maclnnis, May 13, 1948 AMC. 12 Angus Maclnnis, Letter to Colin Cameron, May 17, 1948 AMC. 13colin Cameron, Letter to Angus Maclnnis, May 13, 1948 AMC. 1 4 C o l i n Cameron, Letter to Angus Maclnnis, May 13, 1948 AMC. 1 5Rod Young, " F i r s t Days i n Ottawa," CCF News, June 24, 1948, p. 5. 1 6News Herald, January 23, 1949. ^Winnipeg C i t i z e n , January 28, 1949. •^Dorothy G. Steeves, Letter to Harry Archibald, March 17, 1949, Rodney Young Papers, UBC. l^Steeves, Letter to Archibald. 20Dillon O'Leary, "CCF Rebels Agree to Vote for Pact," Vancouver Sun, A p r i l 12, 1949, p. 1. 21"'BC Executive Supports National Council on Pact CCF News, A p r i l 20, 1949, p. 1. 2 2 R a l p h Daly, "Convention Refuses Approve A t l a n t i Pact," Vancouver Sun, A p r i l 18, 1979, p. 1. 23"BC Executive Supports National Council on Pact CCF News. Chapter 3 YOUNG'S SECOND SUSPENSION The year 1949 was an important turning point for the BC CCF. Tn the p r o v i n c i a l and federal elections of June the Party suffered a sharp setback. The June 15th p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n reduced the party's seats i n the l e g i s l a t u r e by three, leaving i t with seven seats i n a forty-eight seat l e g i s l a t u r e . The C o a l i t i o n government established during; the war to stop the spectacular r i s e of the CCF, had i n -creased both i t s percentage of the popular vote and i t s seats i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . In the federal e l e c t i o n of June 27th, the CCF was reduced from 32 seats on d i s s o l u t i o n to 13 seats with a small drop i n i t s popular vote declining from 15.6% i n 1945 to 13.4%.1 On July 6th, a l i t t l e over a week afte r the p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n , Colin Cameron wrote an assessment of the elections i n the CCF News e n t i t l e d , "An Analysis of the Ele c t i o n Results." 2 Although the a r t i c l e appeared under Cameron's name and therefore was not the e d i t o r i a l opinion of the CCF News nor of any o f f i c i a l body of the BC CCF, the a r t i c l e was to have an important impact because of Cameron's prestige and standing and his association with the l e f t wing of the party. 40 Cameron began his analysis of the e l e c t i o n results by refuting a number of theories which he suggested the " p o l i t i c a l coroners" had advanced for the party's f a i l u r e . Foremost amongst these theories was the view that the BC Convention's re f u s a l to toe the l i n e on the A t l a n t i c Pact issue had caused voters to r e j e c t the CCF. Cameron pointed out that members of the party had taken very unpopular posi-tions i n the past, including his and Steeves po s i t i o n on the war, J.S. WOodworth's pacifism, and more recently the defense by the CCF i n the 1945 elections of the rights of Japanese Canadians. In spite of these unpopular stands the CCF vote had continued to increase. A further argument advanced by the " p o l i t i c a l cor-oners," said Cameron, was the adverse e f f e c t of the "Red Flag" incident. This incident refers to the singing of the B r i t i s h Labour anthem, the "Red Flag," at a forum during the e l e c t i o n . The newspaper played up the claim by BC Attorney General Gordon Wismer, that the substitution of the "Red Flag" for "God Save the Queen" was a clear i n d i -cation of the CCF's communist leanings. Cameron suggested that the only harm from the "Red Flag" incident was "the f r a n t i c a l l y defensive attitude of our spokesmen." Noting that " i t must have been disconcerting, to say the least, to recent immigrants from B r i t a i n to f i n d the CCF i n Canada so desperately disowning the t r a d i t i o n a l anthem of the B r i t i s h Labour Party, which Mr. Attlee himself sang i n the House of Commons after the Labour v i c t o r y . " Cameron 41 also dismissed the theory that the CCF defeat was a r e s u l t of the people's being too prosperous. He suggested that there had been even more prosperity i n 1941 and 1945, and that the current trend was i n fa c t the reverse, with pros-p e r i t y "noticeably on the wane for some time." He concluded by noting that the r u l i n g BC C o a l i t i o n government's "campaign of d i s t o r t i o n , misrepresentation and a n t i - s o c i a l i s t propaganda was no worse than i t had been i n the previous elections." Cameron f e l t that there was a "germ of truth" i n the theories advanced by the "coroners", but the r e a l reason rested with the CCF i t s e l f . "Something \_ ha&~] happened' since 1945." The CCF p r o v i n c i a l l y had "ceased to; be an aggressive f i g h t i n g force promulgating a new society and economic doctrine with vigor and persistence and t h a d 3 started to become a mere opposition sniping, not too eff e c -t i v e l y , at the Government's administrative record." The CCF had displayed a "playing safe" attitude that had put the party on the defensive. P r a c t i c a l l y a l l the CCF 'drive' was directed towards c r i t i c i s m of the C o a l i t i o n government's methods of administration and with defending the CCF against the charge of being a s o c i a l i s t party with s o c i a l i s t aims. We became mere contenders for the job of administering the status quo. For while the CCF has a program containing quite revolutionary im p l i -cations, a l l those implications were subtly toned down i n the sacred name of ' p r a c t i c a l i t y . ' ^ Cameron suggested that the CCF would have to begin 42 again to recapture the support i t had enjoyed " i n our less careful and cautious days." The CCF would have to cease concentrating "on seeking o f f i c e " and "become searchers of truth." We s h a l l have to revise Acton's famous dictum that ' a l l power corrupts.' In .. l i g h t of our experience i n B r i t i s h Columbia we now know that the l i v e l y a n t i c i p a t i o n of power corrupts. I t breeds t i m i d i t y and caution and evasion. Fear of f a i l u r e to achieve power creates a tendancy to r e s t r i c t and c u r t a i l plans and commitments. And yet history t e l l s us that almost any worthwhile accomplishment has been the f r u i t of f a i l u r e to accomp-l i s h something greater. I t i s s t i l l true that i f we hope to reach the tree-tops we must aim at the stars. If we content ourselves with aiming at the tree-tops we inevitable f a l l on our faces i n the mud.4 Cameron agreed that the f a i l u r e of the p r o v i n c i a l party had had an adverse e f f e c t on the CCF i n the federal e l e c t i o n . But the federal party's focussing of t h e i r attack on the Tories helped make possible the massive L i b e r a l v i c t o r y . As with the p r o v i n c i a l party, the f a i l u r e was brought about by the party's concentration on c r i t i c i z i n g the L i b e r a l administration and the Tory a l t e r n a t i v e , and not putting forward the s o c i a l i s t program. There has been a notable absence of any ef f e c t i v e and concerted presentation of positive s o c i a l i s t ideas. Instead there has been a growing tendency to make common cause with the Li b e r a l s , u n t i l by the time the el e c t i o n r o l l e d around both Liberals and Conservatives were i n the happy position of being able to dismiss the CCF as mere 'Liberals-in-a-hurry.' 43 This t r a g i c and ludicrous position had not been attained overnight. I t i s the r e s u l t of a long series of compro-mises, a whole catalog of d e l i c a t e evasions, of c a r e f u l e f f o r t s to appease a,nd placate various elements i n our society. What a few years ago was a burning crusade d r i v i n g r i g h t to the heart of the economic and s o c i a l i l l s of our age has become a mere p o l i t i c a l party engaged i n clever footwork to outwit our opponents. Instead of bending every e f f o r t to the e f f e c t i v e presentation of truth, however un-palatable, our spokesmen have f a l l e n into the disastrous and immoral habit of t r y i n g to please. More damning than any p o s i t i o n on the North A t l a n t i c Pact, more s u i c i d a l than any singing of the •Red Flag', has been the gentle, piece-meal abandonment of s o c i a l i s t ideas and p r i n c i p l e s which has f i n a l l y resulted i n the CCF being held up to comtempt as the lackey of the L i b e r a l party.^ In his concluding paragraph, Cameron made his plea for a change i n the party's d i r e c t i o n . Having made the case that the CCF was on the road to abandonment of s o c i a l i s t p o l i c i e s he saw the setback of the 1949 elections as the proof of the disastrous results of the recent evolution of the party. I t was necessary to turn the party around, and return to the "less careful and cautious days" when the party was "an aggressive f i g h t i n g force promulgating a new society and economic doctrine with vigor and persistence." The set-back CsicJ of 1949 may yet prove a blessing i n disguise i f i t r e s u l t s i n d i s c r e d i t i n g those influences i n the CCF which for some years have been gently pushing us down the primrose path of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y and caution. The most disastrous r e s u l t of these elections would be for the CCF to be stamped i n 44 i t s turn into s t i l l more caution, s t i l l further attempts to placate elements i n our society who w i l l never accept the s o c i a l i s t idea no matter how the p i l l may be sweetened. That way l i e s complete o b l i v i o n . ^ Cameron's evaluation of the recent evolution of the party provoked an immediate response. For the remainder of the summer, the CCF News was f i l l e d with l e t t e r s and comments on Cameron's assessment. In the a r t i c l e Cameron had spelled out a sentiment shared by many a c t i v i s t s i n the CCF. This sentiment was shown c l e a r l y i n the l e t t e r s sup-porting his a r t i c l e that poured into the CCF News. In the postwar period the cry that the CCF was "abandoning s o c i a l -ism" had been raised a number of times. But the most recent case, the debate over the North A t l a n t i c Pact had l e f t much bitterness. The 1949 a r t i c l e became a r a l l y i n g c a l l to those who thought the rightward d r i f t had to be halted and who f e l t that the party should return to i t s s o c i a l i s t o r i g i n s . R i g h t i s t response to Cameron's a r t i c l e appeared with-i n two weeks. Angus Maclnnis, wrote an a r t i c l e attacking Cameron's c r i t i c i s m of the party. The tone and emphasis i n Maclnnis' reply i s important, for i n many ways these two a r t i c l e s represented the battle lines of the f a c t i o n a l war that was developing within the CCF. Maclnnis began by attacking Cameron for his a r t i c l e which was "rushed" into p r i n t before the democratic and "accepted method of consultation and discussion" had occurred. He further 45 suggested that the a r t i c l e was f i l l e d with "innuendos" and "charges" which were untrue. Maclnnis accused Cameron of blaming everyone i n the CCF for the e l e c t i o n defeat except himself. Pointing out that Cameron had been party President since 1945, Maclnnis suggested that Cameron should assume a major share of the blame. Having begun by appor-tioning blame, Maclnnis then wrote, "I do not intend to try and apportion blame for our f a i l u r e to win the successes we hoped for and expected. I s h a l l leave that for our opponents and for any inside the CCF who are anxious to help them."7 Maclnnis, l i k e Cameron discounted the "Red Flag" incident, but suggested that there was some v a l i d i t y to the charge that the North A t l a n t i c Pact debate had contributed to the party's defeat. According to Maclnnis, "the CCF BC Section vote on the North A t l a n t i c Pact was used more widely by our opponents than any other e l e c t i o n issue." Maclnnis also took issue with Cameron's contention that the CCF started i t s decline i n 1945. According to Maclnnis 1948 was "the CCF's best year," with the r e - e l e c t i o n of the CCF Government i n Saskatchewan, with v i c t o r i e s i n two impor-tant federal by-elections i n BC and with the CCF replacing the Liberals as the o f f i c i a l opposition i n Ontario. Because there had been steady progress for the CCF from 1945 to 1948, Maclnnis suggested that the defeat of 1949 "must be attributable mainly to the general economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l conditions and circumstances of t h i s present time." 4 6 One immediate factor, he said, was the Drew-Duplessis a l l i -ance which made the Tories unattractive to the voters. An equally important factor was the slackening of the i n t e r -national "trend towards socialism." This trend he a t t r i -buted to "disagreements between the Soviet Union and the Western nations" and to the " d i f f i c u l t i e s s o c i a l i s t govern-or ments are having i n organizing t h e i r economies." Maclnnis concluded his analysis by pointing out that Cameron's appeal to the CCF to cease to be o f f i c e -seekers and become seekers of truth was argued on the basis that the new d i r e c t i o n would bring the CCF to o f f i c e sooner. In Maclnnis 1 view there was "no c o n f l i c t between adhering to truth and seeking o f f i c e . " He ended by advancing the opinion that members must f i r s t decide "what i s truth" and stated that Cameron's a r t i c l e was far o f f the mark.^ In th e i r analysis of what the problems had been and in the directions they posed i n the i r two a r t i c l e s , Cameron and Maclnnis introduced into the pages of the CCF News a debate which had been brewing i n the party for a number of years. Cameron a r t i c u l a t e d the l e f t wing view. According to t h i s view the party was sl i p p i n g to the r i g h t r a p i d l y . Party leaders were hiding or dropping t h e i r s o c i a l i s t program i n the name of " p r a c t i c a l i t y " and the party was i n danger of becoming "Liberals-in-a-hurry."-^ Maclnnis, representing the r i g h t wing, or "moderates" as they preferred to c a l l themselves, argued on a very d i f -ferent ground. He acknowleged no programmatic s h i f t by the 47 CCF. The e l e c t o r a l f a i l u r e was due primarily to a s h i f t by the voters and a change i n t h e i r sentiments brought about by new p o l i t i c a l and economic conditions. He raised the organizational question by asserting that Cameron should not have published his a r t i c l e and suggested, not very subtly, that Cameron had helped the opponents of the CCF by attaching blame to the party i t s e l f for the defeat. Cameron was d i v i d i n g the party p u b l i c l y at a time when i t most needed u n i t y . 1 1 Animosities between leading l e f t i s t s and the r i g h t continued to increase after the publications of the a r t i c l e s . In August of 1950 Cameron lodged a complaint against Prov-i n c i a l Executive member Tom A l s b u r y . 1 2 Cameron claimed that he was "the v i c t i m of a well organized campaign of character assassination" and that Alsbury had threatened him with 13 expulsion, at a public meeting at the Stanley Park Club, The t r i a l board of Frank McKenzie and E.E. Winch dismissed the charges against A l s b u r y . 1 4 But the incident demonstrated how the atmosphere i n the party had once again reached a c r i t i c a l point, and how the i d e o l o g i c a l dispute was causing 15 members to develop "vicious clashes of p e r s o n a l i t i e s . " In t h i s f a c t i o n a l atmosphere a " l e f t wing confer-ence" was c a l l e d . Meeting at UBC on August 2 5th 1950, the conference was attended by some 70 members including, Young, Cameron, Steeves, W.W. Lefeaux, as well as other prominent left-wingers l i k e Evelyn Smith, Robert Loosmore, Jack O'Brien and George Weaver.1^ 48 At t h i s conference, the charges that Cameron had made i n his a r t i c l e were the main points of discussion, along -with a discussion of the more recent s h i f t s i n party p o l i c y . The members expressed t h e i r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the recent moves by Coldwell, and i n p a r t i c u l a r his support for Canadian p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Korean War and the sub-sequent endorsement of his stand by the national convention. They resented Coldwell's taking a stand p u b l i c l y before the convention could express the views of the membership on the question. This move by Coldwell, they f e l t guaranteed the acceptance by the convention of his position, as a vote against i t would have been a vote of non-confidence and would have required a reversal of the o f f i c i a l CCF stand. In t h e i r eyes the CCF support of the North A t l a n t i c Pact and of NATO, of Canadian p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Korean C o n f l i c t , and of German "rearmament a l l represented a continuing rightward swing and an abandonment of the Regina Manifesto declaration that "Canada must refuse to be entangled i n any more wars fought to make the world safe for c a p i t a l i s m . I I X To add to th e i r alarm, the National convention had decided to re-draft the Regina Manifesto i t s e l f . Needless to say the l e f t wing f e l t that considering the recent evolution of the CCF any re-drafted statement would further abandon s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s and would no doubt remove what Cameron had referred to as the "revolu-18 tionary implications" of the document. Young took a prominent part i n the l e f t wing con-4 9 ference, absenting himself from the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive meeting held on the same day to do so, even though he was second Vice-President of the party. As speaker aft e r speaker expressed dismay over the evolution of the CCF and the dismal prospects for winning the organization to l e f t and Marxist positions, Young intervened to move a motion recom-mending d i s a f f i l i a t i o n from the CCF. 1 9 As Young would l a t e r claim, his intention was to "shock" those who "were questioning the a d v i s a b i l i t y of remaining within the move-ment." In speaking to his motion, he gave arguments f i r s t favouring then opposing d i s a f f i l i a t i o n . The motion was resoundingly defeated, with only three or four persons 9 0 voting for i t . . The P r o v i n c i a l Executive found out about the conference about a month after i t occurred when Donald C. McDonald, National Treasurer, obtained a copy of the confer-21 ence minutes while touring Vancuver Island. At the following P r o v i n c i a l Executive meeting the regular order of business was suspended and the Left Wing Conference was discussed instead. The Executive, acting on information from the minutes, l a i d charges against Young for actions "contrary to his duty as member and o f f i c e r of the CCF" and prepared to hold a t r i a l . Young was suspended pending t r i a l , though a special motion was passed to allow him to 00 s i t u n t i l the end of the Executive meeting." While the minutes of the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive meeting record the formal side of the Executive's action, they do 50 not explain the motives of some of the Executive members i n advancing the charge. Donald C. McDonald i n a l e t t e r to assistant National Secretary Lome Ingle reveals that a group on the P r o v i n c i a l Executive saw Young's actions at the l e f t wing conference as a perfect opportunity to "deal with him." Last night the Websters', Maclnnis' and I read through t h i s document Cthe minutes of the l e f t wing conference"! and the trend of the discussion was i n favour of seizing upon Rod's incredible faux pas (motion of d i s a f f i l i a t i o n ) to deal with him. I never dared to believe that Rod would make t h i s kind of a break so early; and as the v i c e -president of the movement. I think i t places his action c l e a r l y i n the category of d i s l o y a l , and therefore open to d i s c i -p l i n e . Frank MacKenzie (sic) (with whom I have just had lunch) i s not quite so convinced; though coming around perhaps to the b e l i e f that while " l e g a l l y i t might not be construed as d i s l o y a l t y , c e r t a i n l y i n f a c t i t could be presented as such to the membership and would be accepted as such by them." ...My own view i s that I don't think there i s l i k e l i h o o d of our ever getting more conclusive evidence against Rod for years; to repeat, I am extremely surprised that he made t h i s s l i p . Further, that since i t i s my b e l i e f sooner or l a t e r that they (sic) p r o v i n c i a l section i s going to have to deal with.him t h i s should be seized upon and the s i t u a t i o n i n Vancouver Centre i s permitted to d r i f t , Rod gets the federal nomination again, i n my view the National Council would have to refuse endorsation i f the p r o v i n c i a l council didn't.^3 On October 15th, 1950, Young was found g u i l t y by a T r i a l board chaired by Frank McKenzie. The g u i l t y v e r d i c t was not unanimous, nor was the recommendation that he be suspended for four months; one of the seven-man.board d i s -51 sented from both decisions. But i t appears that as McDonald had predicted, McKenzie had been brought around. In the report' of the T r i a l board, written by McKenzie as chairman, he gave his view on why Young had moved the motion of d i s -a f f i l i a t i o n . McKenzie did not deal with his e a r l i e r view that " l e g a l l y " Young's motion of d i s a f f i l i a t i o n "might not be construed as d i s l o y a l " but chose instead to make i t appear as a personality problem. There i s only one explanation of the conduct of the accused which I f i n d adequately supported by the evidence we heard. The f i r s t concern of the accused was not the welfare of the CCF, but his own vanity. He thought that most of those present would enjoy toying with the proposal of d i s a f f i l i a t i o n . They would admire his audacity and they would be grate-f u l to him for the exhilaration of temptation, or the 'shock' as he c a l l e d i t . His conduct was f o o l i s h and i n f a n t i l e i n the extreme. In g r a t i f y i n g his own c h i l d i s h vanity he acted with reckless disregard of his r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as an o f f i c e r and member for the welfare of the CCF. It follows that his intent was wrongful and that he vi o l a t e d his d u t y . 2 4 David Jaeger, the dissenting member of the Board, disagreed with McKenzie's assessment of Young's motives. In Jaeger's estimation, Young's purpose i n moving the motion was "to create discussion and to shock the meeting into facing the serious developments i n the movement."2^ Jaeger also maintained that Young "expected the motion to be l o s t and wanted i t to be l o s t . That i s why he placed the argu-ments for remaining i n the CCF at the end of his t a l k . " 2 ^ 52 Jaeger concluded his minority report with a suggestion that a reprimand would be more i n order than the suspension recommended by the board majority. I do not concede however, that a Pro-v i n c i a l O f f i c e r of the CCF should be so indiscreet as to have his name connected with a motion of d i s a f f i l -i a t i o n , regardless of how innocent or he l p f u l his intentions may be. His suspension pending our f i n a l decision, the p u b l i c i t y and his own inconveniences should further impress upon him that an o f f i c e r must be more guarded i n word and deed than an ordinary member.27 The P r o v i n c i a l Executive, on hearing the recommendation of the T r i a l Board, reduced the sentence as recommended i n the minority report, "to a reprimand and suspension for the time already served under suspension." 2^ Following the P r o v i n c i a l Executive's decision the whole incident was con-sidered closed. But the incident did not go unnoticed i n Ottawa. Coldwell got the f i n a l word on the incident i n a l e t t e r to Maclnnis when he wrote I saw a b r i e f press dispatch that Rod Young had been t r i e d by a rank and f i l e committee, convicted and his suspension recommended. Apparently the P r o v i n c i a l Executive did not con-cur on t h i s recommendation. That, I think, i s a p i t y . 2 9 The Rod Young suspension and t r i a l were viewed by many who attended the l e f t wing conference as a f i r s t step towards the d i s c i p l i n i n g of a l l who had attended i t . To lessen the l i k e l i h o o d of future d i s c i p l i n a r y actions, the group began to omit names from i t s published minutes. In 53 October, at a second meeting, the group took on the name the " S o c i a l i s t Fellowship."30 The new organization had an existence of only seven months, but i t was seen as a grave threat by some on the P r o v i n c i a l Executive and by the National Executive which during these seven months paid a great deal of attention to the Fellowship. On March 17th, 1951, the National Executive decided that the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship had developed " a l l the char-a c t e r i s t i c s of another p o l i t i c a l party," and recommended to the BC P r o v i n c i a l Council that, because the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship could "destroy the unity of our movement and paralyse our work" i t should "deal with t h i s matter promptly and effectively."31 i n a personal and c o n f i d e n t i a l l e t t e r to Angus Maclnnis, Lome Ingle, assistant National Secretary, made p l a i n the National Executive's feelings towards the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship. Ingle warned Maclnnis that although the Fellowship would probably dissolve to avoid expulsion, i t s members would continue "their disruptive a c t i v i t i e s up to and including the gaining of control of the P r o v i n c i a l Convention."32 ingle said that " i f there i s a r e a l danger that t h e i r supporters w i l l gain control at the convention then i t seems to me that the P r o v i n c i a l Executive must deal with these people p r i o r to the convention." He suggested the "no stone should be l e f t unturned to get r i d of Young, Cameron, and Weaver p r i o r to the convention." He recom-mended that the P r o v i n c i a l Executive should consider the fact that they had power to d i s c i p l i n e d i r e c t l y , up to and 54 including expulsion of any member. To add strength and to get the Pr o v i n c i a l party to d i s c i p l i n e the l e f t Ingle sug-gested that the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive should be t o l d that i f they did not "take firm action" the National Executive would. Ingle anticipated that the Fellowship members would try and avoid giving the Executive grounds for expulsion. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n he advised that "every e f f o r t must be made to b u i l d up a case against them and to draw them out at the P r o v i n c i a l Council meeting on the 7th." Ingle speculated that "Colin i s obviously the easiest to draw out and the people planning the strategy might discuss ways and means of getting him to come out i n his true c o l -ours at the council meeting." 3 3 On March 24th, the BC. LL-P r o v i n c i a l Executive and the National Executive was by t h i s time quite d i f f e r e n t from that during the e a r l i e r exchange between Cameron and Coldwell. The National party had i n t e r -vened d i r e c t l y i n the BC si t u a t i o n , and the BC P r o v i n c i a l Executive did not dispute i t s r i g h t to do so. The National leadership was attempting to bring the BC Section of the party into conformity with the national party, and was indeed planning to eradicate l e f t opposition to the changes they were contemplating. Ingle suggested that Cameron was the weak l i n k of the l e f t , the one to be drawn out and used as a d i s c i p l i n a r y example. Ingle was mistaken - Young was his man. Young's t r i a l and the banning of the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship marked a s i g n i f i c a n t turn i n the fortunes of 5 5 the l e f t . From the s t a r t the Fellowship was put on the defensive. Young's conviction caused some members to leave the Fellowship l e s t they too be d i s c i p l i n e d . The Fellowship was forced to defend i t s r i g h t to exi s t , instead of organi-zing opposition to policy. The id e o l o g i c a l questions, the very basis for the organizing of the Fellowship i n the f i r s t place, were now obscured and the organizational question of "a party within a party" became the focus. A second aspect of t h i s incident i s the stronger and firmer role of the National Executive i n the a f f a i r s of the BC section. As Ingle's private l e t t e r to Maclnnis discloses, they saw Young as one of the leaders of the l e f t and were out to r i d the party of him. The t r i a l r e f l e c t s the strategy which was to be followed i n getting r i d of Young. McKenzie sought to estab l i s h that Young was an irresponsible l e f t adventurer. The S o c i a l i s t Fellowship incident showed that Young's p o l i t i c a l views could be avoided by dealing with his per-sonal actions or supposed motives. The-focus of the attack was to be Young's personality, but the reason remained i d e o l o g i c a l . 56 Notes Iprovince of B r i t i s h Columbia, Chief E l e c t o r a l O f f i c e r , Statement of Votes, (1949) and J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd; 1968) pp. 272-273. 2 C o l i n Cameron, "An Analysis of the El e c t i o n Results," CCF News, July 6, 1979, p. 3. 3Cameron, p. 3. 4Cameron, p. 3. 5Cameron, p. 3. ^Cameron, p. 3. 7Angus Maclnnis, "The News, July 20, 1949, p.3. ^Maclnnis, p. 3. ^Maclnnis, p. 3. lOcameron, P« 3. UMacInnis, p. 3. l ^ C o l i n Cameron, Letter to the Pr o v i n c i a l Council, August 26, 1950. AMC. l^cameron, Letter. 1 4 E . E . Winch, Frank McKenzie, "Report of the T r i a l Board Appointed to Hear the Complaint of Colin Cameron Against A.T. Alsbury," September 1950, AMC. 15"Report of T r i a l Committee Appointed to Hear Charges Against Comrade A.M. Stephen by Comrade M. Glenday," February 1937, p.2. AMC. l^Minutes of Left Wing Conference, August 25, 1950, CCF Papers, Public Archives of Canada. I"7 Regina Manifesto, July 1933, Section 10. l^Cameron, "Analysis," p. 3. i 9Minutes of Left Wing Conference, August 25, 1950, CCF Papers, PAC. 2QFrank McKenzie, "Report of the T r i a l Board i n the Matter of the Complaint Against Rodney Young," October 28, 195Q, p. 2. AMC. 21oonald C. McDonald, Letter to Lome Ingles, Sept. 20, 1950, CCF Papers, PAC. 2 2 P r o v i n c i a l Executive Minutes, September 23, 1950. 23Donald McDonald, Letter. 24McKenzie, Report, p. 5. 2 5McKenzie, Report, p. 8. ^McKenzie, Report, p. 8. 2 7McKenzie, Report, p. 9. ^ p r o v i n c i a l ' Executive Minutes, October 28, 1950, AMC, 2 9M.J. Coldwell, Letter to Angus Maclnnis, November 7, 1950, AMC. 3 0Minutes of the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship, August 25, 1950 through March 11, 1951, CCF Papers, PAC. 3lNational Executive Minutes, March 17, 1951, AMC. 3 2Lorne Ingle, Letter to Angus Maclnnis, March 28, 1951, AMC. 33lngle, Letter. Chapter 4 THE 1954 CONVENTION AND AFTERMATH The P r o v i n c i a l Convention of 1951, though.'.) quite a stormy one, with press coverage concentrating on the disunity i n the CCF, nevertheless ended without any s p l i t s , d i s c i p l i n a r y actions or other overt signs of open r e v o l t . Ingle miscalculated the tenacity of the l e f t when he suggested that the l e f t was ant i c i p a t i n g expulsions and would therefore "be as quiet as mice u n t i l a f t e r the convention. 1 , 1 Neither the suspension of Young, nor the banning of the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship was s u f f i c i e n t to silence them and the Prov i n c i a l Executive was not prepared to move further and prec i p i t a t e a c r i s i s . Then i n the spring of 1953, the federal ridings held nominating conventions i n order to choose t h e i r federal candidates for the approaching general e l e c t i o n . Ridings were required, by a regulation which dated back to the founding of the CCF, to submit the names of nominees for approval by the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive. Approval of Rod Young who was seeking the nomination i n Vancouver Centre, was refused by a three to seven vote of the Prov i n c i a l Executive. The Executive further recommended that Vancouver Centre postpone i t s nominating convention. 2 However, the 58 r i d i n g defied the Executive by going ahead with the nomi-nating convention, and chose Rod Young as the CCF candidate for Vancouver Centre. A few days l a t e r , the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive declared the nominating convention " n u l l and void" and gave notice of d i s c i p l i n a r y action against Young. The minutes of the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive meeting which re-fused approval do not include d e t a i l s of the objections raised against Young's candidacy, but record only the decision to refuse approval. However, Angus Maclnnis wrote to at least one member of the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive before they discussed Young's nomination and advised him that there were very good reasons why Young's nomination should not be approved by the Executive. 4 Before any d i s c i p l i n a r y action could be discussed, the issue was raised at the 1953 Pr o v i n c i a l Convention. After a lengthy debate, the question was resolved by the adoption of the following motion: "that Rod Young's name be approved to come before a proper nominating convention i n Vancouver Centre." J The Executive was thus sustained i n i t s decision to n u l l i f y the nominating convention, but overruled i n i t s attempt to di s q u a l i f y Young as a candidate a contradiction .  which led Maclnnis to write i n a l e t t e r to newly elected party leader Arnold Webster, "we do do the damndest things at t i m e s . T h e upshot of the convention decision was that a second nominating convention was held i n Vancouver Centre, and Rod Young was once more nominated to represent the CCF. 60 The f i n a l b attle which resulted i n Young's leaving the CCF began at the 1954 Pr o v i n c i a l Convention. At the beginning of the Convention prospects looked quite good for the l e f t wing. Young was elected vice-chairman of the convention and was nominated along with Frank McKenzie for party president. Dorothy G. Steeves l a t e r suggested Young stood a very good chance of being elected president as McKenzie "was not a popular candidate." "McKenzie was seen as an authoritarian because he was the author of the new s t r i c t j u d i c i a l party rules. If Young had not won the presidency, Steeves reasoned, "he would most c e r t a i n l y have been elected to the executive." 7 But the statements which Young uttered during a debate on the CCF's attitude towards Communists allowed the r i g h t wing to reverse the l e f t ' s hopeful beginnings at the convention. In the elections which took place aft e r the newspapers had featured Young's statements but before the emergency resolution c a l l i n g for his resignation, Young polled a remarkable 43 votes to McKenzie's 78. 8 The resolution which launched the discussion on Communists and red-baiting was presented by the Sooke CCF Club. Whereas the drive against the Communists, the witch hunting and the red ba i t i n g i s merely a screen from the attack of Big Business on a l l working class organizations, bringing the threat of fascism. Be i t resolved that a l l members of the CCF be asked to r e f r a i n from a s s i s t i n g our class enemies by repeating t h e i r slanders on many fine class conscious workers. 9 61 The debate on the Sooke resolution polarized, with those In support of i t arguing that though the CCF was opposed to the Communist Party, they had to defend the Communists against persecutions, j a i l i n g s and f i r i n g s . The CCF, they argued, "should not j o i n with the boss i n destroying a working class organization" or the CCF would be the next to be destroyed.10 The opposition to the resolution feared that i t could be construed•as support of the Communist Party. They maintained that the Communist Party was i n fac t an enemy of the working class and the destruction of the CPC would only a f f e c t the class p o s i t i v e l y . F i n a l l y , they argued that acceptance of the resolution would mean that CCF members could not c r i t i c i z e the Communist Party. Leading the opposition to the resolution was Tom Alsbury, a P r o v i n c i a l Council member and a prominent leader of the ri g h t wing of the party. Alsbury argued that the adoption of the resolution meant that the CCF would be c a l l i n g the Communists fine working class-elements. He stated that i t was the aim of the Communist Party to "dominate or destroy" trade unions. Alsbury noted that whenever he "dared to reply" to the attacks on the CCF by the Communist Party, his re p l i e s were c a l l e d "red-baiting" and concluded by saying that i f defending the CCF from attacks by the Communist party was red-baiting, "I for one am proud to plead g u i l t y to the charge."11 Speaking only a few minutes afte r Alsbury, Young 6 2 opened his remarks by saying that he was not going to give either a pro-communist or an anti-communist speech. He addressed his comments primarily to Alsbury's reasons for voting against the resolution. Young agreed with Alsbury on the necessity of f i g h t i n g back against Communist attacks on the CCF, but made clear that i t would be wrong for the CCF to attack the Communists merely for being Communists. Young went on to t e l l the convention that amongst the Com-munist Party membership were "many fine people" and that the CCF i t s e l f had "many former members of the Communist party" i n i t s rank and f i l e . He warned the convention to r e s i s t "McCarthyism" and ended his argument by using a similar: turn of phrase,to that Alsbury had used to end his argument. Young stated: I have people come into my o f f i c e , see my name on the door, and walk out again because they say Rod Young i s a Communist. I'm proud to have them say that. I'm proud to have them say that, because the r e a l meaning of the term 'communist' i s an honorable one which every delegate here should be prepared at any time to acc e p t . 1 2 Young's speech was followed immediately by a point of p r i v i l e g e raised by the Pr o v i n c i a l Secretary Harold Thayer, who took exception to Young's suggestion that there were "many former members of the Communist Party i n the CCF." Thayer said that to his knowledge there was only one such member, Malcolm Bruce, who had "denounced" the Communist party long ago. Young rose to disagree with Thayer and said, "I can personally introduce the Secretary to at lea s t 63 f i f t y CCF members who at one time or another were members of the Communist Party, and he would be honored to meet them, whether he knows i t or not." Since the speaker imme-dia t e l y before Young, Byron Johnson of Sooke, had i d e n t i f i e d himself during his address as a former Communist Party member, Thayer said he feared the image "that the CCF i s i n f i l t r a t e d with a horde of former Communists." After the i n i t i a l exchange between Thayer and Young, the issue was dropped. Robert Strachan who was chairing that session of the convention simply asked a l l the delegates to try and "control t h e i r emotions."I 3 Now, Comrades, I'm going to ask you_in t h i s debate, to control your emotions, to control your tempers, and to think of the future of the CCF. I don't want any statements made here at th i s time that we of the movement w i l l regret. This has been a successful convention so f a r , and l e t ' s keep i t that way.14 A further p a r t i c u l a r l y heated exchange during t h i s debate suggests something of the f e e l i n g between the r i g h t wing and the l e f t at t h i s time. Reg Bullock, i n urging the convention to adopt the Sooke resolution, suggested that some people within the CCF were "joining with the boss i n tr y i n g to r a i l r o a d Cthe Communists^ p o l i t i c a l l y . " Tom Alsbury who had not been named personally took exception to Bullock's statement and demanded a withdrawal. Alsbury pursued the matter with the Chair, u n t i l he got a form of withdrawal, with Bullock withdrawing any remarks which could be"coristrudddas.^casting aspersions on certain members of the CCF."-L-> The debate was following the pattern seen i n e a r l i e r disputes, such as the united front debate of 1937; "A controversy which commenced as a difference i n ideology had developed into a vicious clash of p e r s o n a l i t i e s . " - ^ The debate ended with the convention voting to uphold the resolutions committee's recommendation of "no action" on the motion, which constitued a defeat of the resolution. The following day the Vancouver Province headlined Young's convention statement as "Proud If Called Red, Says CCF' s Rod Young." 17 >phe other c i t y newspapers also picked up on the story and i t was featured i n newspapers r i g h t across the country. But the Province's front page banner greeted delegates as they entered the following day's convention session. It was at thi s point, a f t e r the state-ments had been featured, and distorted, by the press, that the attacks against Young began. BC CCF MP Grant MacNeil on a point of p r i v i l e g e argued that the previous day's vote had not been understood by the press and public. MacNeil charged that Rod Young had made "wholly irresponsible remarks" and had set the "movement back ten years." But Strachan ruled that the convention had "rejected without much difference the ideas contained i n that p a r t i c u l a r resolution." ° Young followed MacNeil's point of p r i v i l e g e with one of his own. He pointed out that while MacNeil i n the f i r s t part of his query had "a genuine point of p r i v i l e g e , " the second part "was a matter of personal attack on myself as a delegate of 65 t h i s c o n v e n t i o n . " S t r a c h a n r e f u s e d Y o u n g ' s a p p e a l a n d l e t s t a n d M a c N e i l ' s c o m m e n t t h a t Y o u n g h a d " s e t t h e m o v e m e n t b a c k t e n y e a r s . " - ' - 9 B u t t h e r e a l b a t t l e o v e r Y o u n g ' s a l l e g e d s t a t e m e n t s b e g a n w i t h t h e a f t e r n o o n s e s s i o n a n d a n e m e r g e n c y r e s o l u t i o n i n t r o d u c e d b y G e o r g e H o m e , a t r a d e u n i o n l e a d e r a n d a m e m b e r o f t h e P r o v i n c i a l E x e c u t i v e . H o m e ' s r e s o l u t i o n c a l l e d u p o n t h e c o n v e n t i o n t o d e m a n d Y o u n g ' s r e s i g n a t i o n f r o m t h e p a r t y . WHEREAS o n s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s i n p r e v i o u s y e a r s t h e C C F ( B C - Y u k o n S e c t i o n ) h a s f o u n d i t n e c e s s a r y t o q u e s t i o n R o d Y o u n g ' s l o y a l t y t o t h e p o l i c i e s d e c l a r e d b y t h e C C F , AND WHEREAS h i s m e m b e r s h i p r i g h t s w e r e n o t w i t h d r a w n b e c a u s e o f h i s a s s u r a n c e t h a t h e w o u l d n o t c o m m i t f u r t h e r a c t s o f d i s l o y a l t y , AND WHEREAS i t i s r e q u i r e d u n d e r t h e C C F C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t a C C F m e m b e r c a n n o t r e t a i n m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e C C F i f o p e n l y p r o f e s s i n g l o y a l t y t o a n y o t h e r p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f , AND WHEREAS o n June t h e 1 1 t h i n a n o p e n c o n v e n t i o n o f t h e C C F R o d Y o u n g s t a t e d t h a t h e w a s p r o u d t o b e c a l l e d a C o m m u n i s t . B E I T R E S O L V E D t h a t i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h i s c o n v e n t i o n R o d Y o u n g s h o u l d r e s i g n f r o m m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e C C F f o r m a k i n g s t a t e m e n t s d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e C C F . 2 0 Home f u r t h e r a s k e d t h a t t h e d e b a t e t a k e p l a c e i n a c l o s e d s e s s i o n b u t t h e c o n v e n t i o n d e c i d e d t h a t a s t h e o f f e n d i n g c o m m e n t s h a d t a k e n p l a c e i n f r o n t o f t h e p r e s s , t h e e n s u i n g d e b a t e s h o u l d a l s o t a k e p l a c e i n a n o p e n s e s s i o n . 2 1 Y o u n g o p e n e d t h e d e b a t e o n t h e r e s o l u t i o n b y s u g -g e s t i n g t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n f o r t h e c o n t r o v e r s y w a s b e c a u s e t h e r e w e r e " g e n u i n e d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n " w i t h i n t h e C C F . Y o u n g r e m i n d e d t h e c o n v e n t i o n t h a t h e h a d m a d e h i s c o m m e n t " b e c a u s e i f Q p e o p l e j k n e w t h e r e a l m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d 6 6 'communist' there would be nothing to be disgraced about." He pointed out that his statement about ex-communist party members i n the CCF was merely to make the point that the CCF should work with and "give f u l l confidence" to "a communist who abandoned the Communist Party and t r u t h f u l l y joined the CCF." Young further pointed out that, i f he had said that he was i n favour of "the Communist party or Communism as i t i s used by ignorant people who do not under-stand s c i e n t i f i c socialism," he would have been expelled from his profession as a b a r r i s t e r . . As numerous speakers were to point out, Young used the work "communist" i n a very "p a r t i c u l a r sense," i n the old SPC t r a d i t i o n of r e f e r r i n g to Marxist and s c i e n t i f i c s o c i a l i s t s . 22 Among those defending Young was Margaret Erickson, secretary of the Stanley Park Club, who argued as Young had, that there was nothing wrong with the term "communist" and that the re a l problem was the newspaper's sen s a t i o n a l i s t coverage of Young's statements. Erickson explained that the word "communist" meant "communal property" and the "sharing of things i n common" and that she could "see nothing wrong with the word 'communist'" asking s a r c a s t i c a l l y i f she too was to be expelled. She further argued that a man had t o l d the convention just that morning that "women shouldn't have equal pay." '.She then pointedly .asked " i f that h i t s the headlines tonight, what are we going to do with him?"23 David Stupich, a member of the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive 67 took up the implied charge i n the resolution that Young was a Communist party member. Stupich t o l d the convention that u n t i l i t could be proven that Young was i n fact "an active supporter of some other p o l i t i c a l party," he should be taken at "his word that he i s a supporter of the CCF and as such i s a member of the CCF." Stupich concluded by saying that i f Young was forced to resign, he hoped that Young would apply to r e - j o i n and that he as a member of the Pr o v i n c i a l Executive would support Young's a p p l i c a t i o n . 2 4 Dorothy G. Steeves opposed the resolution noting f i r s t that she had the previous year been one of Young's defenders i n his campaign to reverse the P r o v i n c i a l Execu-tiv e ' s decision d i s q u a l i f y i n g him as a federal candidate. Although, she said, she doubted whether she would be w i l l i n g to defend that r i g h t again, Steeves raised the point that the resolution amounted to t r i a l by convention and was a break with j u d i c i a l procedure i n the CCF, and undemocratic. Steeves suggested that Young's action showed a great deal about his " i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and his attitude towards the CCF" but not that he was "connected with or sympathetic to the Communist party." Steeves asked the convention to "dissociate" i t s e l f from and "censure" Young for his state-ments, but to vote against the resolution as i t was a 25 "motion of expulsion" without t r i a l . A day l a t e r i n a l e t t e r to Colin Cameron, Steeves explained her motive for her rather harsh treatment of Young during the resignation debate. She explained that 6 8 the purpose of Home's.emergency resolution was "to take an angry convention at flood tide and expel someone the r i g h t -i s t s had been tryi n g to get out for a long time." In t h i s s i t u a t i o n she saw i t as necessary to argue that Young should be censured and that the convention should dissociate i t s e l f from Young's remarks, as t h i s would be the only way to prevent his expulsion. The r i g h t wing, as Steeves c o r r e c t l y 2 6 observed, was out to get r i d of Young once and for a l l . D George Home, who followed Young i n the debate, began by taking up the question of Young's " p a r t i c u l a r " use of the term "communist." Home construed Young's statement to mean that "a true communist i s a s c i e n t i f i c s o c i a l i s t , " thus further proving his point that Young was indeed a communist. Home characterized Young as an " i n t e l l e c t u a l " and as "irresponsible," arguing that an " i n t e l l e c t u a l cannot be irresponsible," He contended that Young was therefore "deliberate" i n his i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Home also suggested that the CCF l o s t elections "because of irresponsible statements made by people:who profess to be expressing the p o l i c i e s of the CCF." 2 7 Joseph Corsbie, r e t i r i n g P r o v i n c i a l President added that i t was about time that the CCF showed 2 P the people of BC that they disagreed with Young. ° In reply to the defence that the r e a l problem was the newspaper's sensationalist coverage of Young's statements, a Mrs. Dawson rose to explain that t h i s was not the f i r s t time that a Rod Young statement had made front page news. She suggested that Young "had a v i r t u a l monopoly of i r r e -69 sponsible statements." She argued that Young had been making such statements for a number of years and t h i s time he had gone too far and had " l a i d himself wide open" and the party should take advantage of thi s opportunity to r i d themselves of him. 2 9 Alex Macdonald, a member of the P r o v i n c i a l Executive, attacked Young saying that i t was "no longer a matter of per s o n a l i t i e s . " i t was ess e n t i a l to "put the movement ahead of p e r s o n a l i t i e s " and Young represented "a time bomb t i c k i n g within the CCF." 3 0 Young, as the defendent i n the case, and as opening speaker was given the r i g h t to close the debate. He used his summation to defend, not s p e c i f i c a l l y what he had said, but his and the l e f t ' s view of the party. The object of the CCF, he argued, was to b u i l d a party not merely that people would want to vote for since "people have voted for some t e r r i b l e p a r t i e s , " but to bu i l d a party that would be "representative of the working class organized around the p r i n c i p l e s of socialism." Young concluded by t e l l i n g the convention, "You w i l l never get r i d of what I said. You'll only get r i d of me."31 By a close vote of 62 to 55 the convention voted down the resolution c a l l i n g for Young's resignation, and he retained his membership i n the CCF. After the resolu-tion's defeat, a second motion d i s s o c i a t i n g the convention "from any statements made by Rod Young on the question of Communists and Communism" was quickly adopted by a very 7 0 large majority. The convention was without doubt the best chance the r i g h t wing had to date to get r i d of Young, yet s t i l l the membership refused to allow him to be expelled and having polled over 1/3 of the vote for president ,Young represented a grave threat to the r i g h t wing. This they agreed on -Frank McKenzie said that Young would have to be gotten r i d of, and M.J. Coldwell expressed great displeasure at the thought of Young being a delegate to the federal party 33 convention. If Young could not be gotten r i d of at the convention, then i t would have to be done afterwards. After the Convention, BC newspapers continued to comment on the Young a f f a i r , generally suggesting that the party had to d i s c i p l i n e Young and the l e f t i f i t was going to be successful. Two days afte r the convention, for instance the Province published an e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d , "Undoing A Lot of Good Work." 3 4 The Province argued that even though "Mr. Young and some of the other extremists i n the CCF party" were not the main body of the party, the mere fact that they were able to "get a hearing, and some support at a party convention i s disquieting." The Province ap-plauded the e f f o r t s of the CCF leaders such as Grant MacNeil and Tom Alsbury who had attempted to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between "legitimate freedom of thought" and " d i s l o y a l t y to our own p o l i t i c a l system." The e d i t o r i a l i s t warned that the CCF "i n f a l l i n g over backwards to stay away from McCarthyism" ran the r i s k of " f a l l i n g into the waiting arms of the 71 Reds."35 Though i t would be wrong to suggest that these newspaper e d i t o r i a l s and stories by themselves caused further action to be taken, they had some impact as was made clear at the convention. In addition to agitat i o n by the newspapers, CCF meetings throughout the province discussed Young's conduct at the convention. Six CCF Clubs sent l e t t e r s to the Pro-v i n c i a l Executive demanding i t take d i s c i p l i n a r y action against Young.36 On July 10th, 1954, almost a month afte r Young had made his celebrated statement on Communists, the P r o v i n c i a l Executive acted i n response to these pressures by suspending Young pending t r i a l to be held on July 24th on the following charges: That Rod Young at the 1954 Pr o v i n c i a l Convention stated that he was proud to be c a l l e d a Communist, knowing that i n so doing he would misrepresent the CCF and bring i t into undeserved disrepute, contrary to his duty as a member and contrary to the constitution of the CCF. 3 7 The fa c t that Young had already been "acquitted" on the very same charges by the convention, made the move by the Executive c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y questionable. In the opinion of D.G. Steeves, who was widely recognized i n the CCF as an expert on i t s constitution, "the executive took the wholly i l l e g a l i n terpretation of the constitution that as the people had demanded that Rod be t r i e d , they had no a l t e r -native . "38 Young, on learning that he was once more to be t r i e d 7 2 by the party, resigned from the CCF. In a statement to the press he said that the question of his statements at the convention had been dealt with " i n open convention, the highest governing body of the CCF," the P r o v i n c i a l Executive 39 "had no power to try me on t h i s issue a second time." As he would be t r i e d by the Executive which had "already condemned" him, he f e l t that the t r i a l would be "unconsti-t u t i o n a l " and a "travesty." Young re-affirmed his "complete loy a l t y to the party's members and to the Regina Manifesto.." F i n a l l y he said that he was relinquishing his membership in the interests of the party so as to "defeat the e v i l intentions of those o f f i c e r s who desire to p r e c i p i t a t e a s p l i t . " 4 0 In a separate l e t t e r of resignation to Stanley Park Club Secretary, Margaret Erickson, Young said that he was driven to resign so as to answer p u b l i c l y the charges j that were being l a i d for a second t i m e . 4 1 Young was no doubt correct i n his claim that i t was unconstitutional for the Executive to try him a f t e r having been t r i e d by the Convention, but t h i s does not explain why Young resigned instead of taking the unconstitutional act by the Executive to the membership, to the P r o v i n c i a l Council, and to the Convention, as he had done so often before. The other reasons Young gave for resigning, the need to answer the charges p u b l i c l y and the desire not to p r e c i p i t a t e a s p l i t appear to be the main causes for his resignation. Young's argument that he needed to defend himself 73 publicly carries a great deal of weight when one considers his position as a newly-called lawyer. As Young had men-tioned in his convention speech, he already had a reputation A 9 as a "communist." Young had in fact been questioned specifically about his p o l i t i c a l views at the time of his admission to the bar. 4 3 i t i s possible that Young's expulsion from the CCF for being a "communist" might have resulted in action against him by the Law Society. As for the possibility of a s p l i t , Young and the l e f t were quite aware of the right wing's desire to discipline the l e f t . Steeves refers to the right wing as "smelling round (sic) 4 4 for evidence to try and convict others." Young's resignation was front page news for a number of days with the three Vancouver newspapers applauding the Executive's decision to take action. The Vancouver Sun in an editorial on July 13th, entitled, "Shedding a L i a b i l i t y , " commented on the resignation of Young stating that i t "appears to be the best thing both for himself and the party." An interesting aspect of the Sun's editorial was i t s estimation of the direction of the CCF. The editorial noted a change in "the mood of p o l i t i c s " and stated that "the CCF in BC today sees a reaction against l e f t wing radicalism and has hopes of proving an acceptable alternative government." The Sun stated that the CCF "must be discreet in i t s rad-icalism and those who refuse to be discreet, who insi s t upon being ruggedly honest with fundamental socialist principles, have to be disciplined or get out." The editorial ended by 74 suggesting that the only direction l e f t for the CCF "is to try to prove to the voters i t is actually the real Liberal party of BC. With a slight semi-socialist disguise of course."45 After reading Young's statement to the press and various newspaper articles dealing with his resignation, a meeting of the table officers of the Provincial Executive ordered that "additional charges against Rodney Young" arising out of his press statements should be heard at the July 24th t r i a l . 4 6 On learning of the new charges Young conveyed to Provincial Secretary Harold Thayer, his aston-ishment at s t i l l being treated as a member of the CCF even after he had resigned. He warned Thayer, that i f he did not cease attacks on Young's character, he would take legal action against him. Young baited Thayer by stating i t was a "well-known fact that no one i s ever allowed to resign from the Communist Party, but is always expelled and his character is always assassinated in the Communist-controlled press." Young suggested that this had not been the case with the "democratic socialist party where i t is customary 4 7 for resignations to be received automatically." As the date for the t r i a l approached the Provincial Executive took action to end the anomalous situation. At a special meeting on July 23rd i t declared that "in view of the resignation of Rodney Young from the CCF" the charges against Young were "adjourned;" and the executive would communicate i t s decision to a l l interested p a r t i e s . 4 8 In 75 t h i s same meeting l e t t e r s of protest opposing the laying of charges against Young were received from s i x CCF Clubs and a number of prominent individuals within the party. But the major stumbling block for Young's supporters and for those interested i n Young's reinstatement, was the fac t that Young had himself resigned. Young's resignation made i t d i f f i c u l t for his supporters even to press for condemnation of the Executive's action. Both the News-Herald and the Vancouver Sun ran a r t i - . cles on the p o s s i b i l i t y of Young being reinstated.^9 David Stupich a member of the P r o v i n c i a l Executive questioned the authority of the Executive i n taking action against Young and suggested that Young could be reinstated i n September by the Pr o v i n c i a l Council overruling the Executive's deci-s i o n . ^ 0 Frank Snowsell, another P r o v i n c i a l Executive member, suggested that i f Young was not reinstated by the P r o v i n c i a l Council, then action could be taken at the following year's convention.^ x The September Pr o v i n c i a l Council meeting sustained the Executive's action against Young, but more s i g n i f i c a n t l y adopted a new program e n t i t l e d , "The CCF Program For Action."52 This new program eliminated what Cameron had referred to as the "revolutionary implication" of the old program. Arguing that the CCF could "no longer go from defeat to defeat," i t defined the goals of the CCF - as those of a p o l i t i c a l party "organized for the purpose of assuming the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of government."53 The program 76 had a strong authoritarian tone. Our program for victory w i l l demand qualities of loyalty and self-discipline which we have not yet been prepared to impose upon our-selves, either as individuals or as a movement. Our program for victory w i l l demand that we keep our eyes on the long-range goals of socialism and our feet on the ground immediately beneath us. Unless we are prepared for such hard work, such over-all planning, such loyalty and such self-discipline, we may as- well resign ourselves to becoming merely a debating group, completely ineffective in the struggle for world socialism. The Provincial Executive w i l l now ask the membership to observe the necessary self-discipline in regard to statements outside of the party and expects the co-operation of the membership in dealing with those who consistently disregard the movement's welfare in their state-ments and action.54 These three paragraphs on loyalty and self-discipline were used by the Executive in justifying later actions against the North Vancouver Association and in condemning opposition within the party to majority policies. Though Young was outside of the party, his influence had not yet disappeared. After his resignation, some riding associations s t i l l sought to use Young to speak at their conferences. In the f a l l of 1954, the North Vancouver Constituency Association invited him to give a talk as part of their educational program on "The Human Race is not White." The Provincial Executive responded with a resolution declaring that no CCF organization would be permitted to i I 7 7 authorize, promote or a s s i s t i n a meeting addressed by "one Rod Young."55 >phe North Vancouver Constituency Asso-c i a t i o n continued to advertise t h e i r meeting and refused to accept the P r o v i n c i a l Executive's ban. The Executive therefore suspended the 23 memebers of the association involved i n the educational program and on January 10th 1955 t r i e d them. They were convicted and suspended for the remainder of the month. 5 6 The North Vancouver suspensions along with the handling of the Rod Young case were both protested at the 1955 Convention. But after the 1954 suspension of Young an important s h i f t had taken place i n the party. The l e f t was now completely on the defensive. D i s c i p l i n a r y action . could now take place with comparative ease and opposition to policy was now more e a s i l y l a b e l l e d d i s l o y a l . At the 1955 convention the r i g h t wing consolidated the positions they had gained. The Executive submitted a report with four s p e c i f i c recommendations; r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Executive's handling of the Rod Young case, t h e i r handling of the North Vancouver case, t h e i r ban on Young speaking at CCF sponsored events, and adoption of the "CCF Program For Action." Key to the Executive report and most contentious, was i t s analysis of the l a s t four years of party history. The Executive reported that i n the years 1950 and 1951""the<~par.;ty had experienced a dramatic drop i n membership. The f a l l i n party membership, they argued was the f a u l t of the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship, which they claimed 78 had "bled" the party. The report suggested that the f a i l u r e to obtain s u f f i c i e n t votes i n 1952 to form the government 5 7 rested with the s o c i a l i s t Fellowship. In 1952 a few more votes for the two CCF candidates i n a single r i d i n g , Vancouver-Burrard, would have resulted i n the formation of a CCF government and could have changed the course of B r i t i s h Columbia histo r y . Those extra votes would have been won had Vancouver-Burrard not been weakened by the long Fellowship struggle i n that constituency. There were other r i d i n g s , too, which could have been won but were l o s t by narrow margins because of the havoc wrought i n 1950 and 1951. Many factors determine the outcome of an e l e c t i o n . Our organizational strength i s one of them. Had the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship not reduced our strength i t would have su f f i c e d to bring i n the additional votes needed for the establishment of a CCF government i n 1952.58 There was some opposition to the Executive's report. Two Executive members, David Stupich and former party p r e s i -dent Joseph Corsbie, refused to sign the report because they disagreed with the " o f f i c i a l " history that i t incorpo-rated. ^ 9 The report's acceptance meant that the party now o f f i c i a l l y l a i d the blame on the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship and the l e f t wing for the defeats i t had experienced for the l a s t few years. The report was adopted and with i t , the r i g h t wing was securely i n the leadership and i n control of the BC CCF. The defeat of the l e f t i n the BC CCF brought an end to the acceptance by the party of Marxist views. Since i t s o r i g i n s , Marxist had been a legitimate component of the 79 widely varying views which made up the CCF. But 1954 marked the end of the Marxist t r a d i t i o n i n the CCF. A number of l e f t i s t within the party published i n the f a l l of 1954 a newsletter which was signed simply "Box more 16, Vancouver, B.C." The "Box 16" group demonstrated clearly than anything which followed i t , the complete defeat of the l e f t . The newsletter was not simply anonymous, i t was underground. From 1954 on, the l e f t did not dare again to overtly organize opposition i n the BC party. Individual Marxists, not Young of course, were able to remain i n the party but th e i r influence was greatly . reduced. Colin Cameron, who was elected to Parliament i n 1953, stayed for the most part out of the a f f a i r s of the Pr o v i n c i a l party. Steeves 1 name was removed from the mast-head of the CCF News, a step which she was gra t e f u l for, as the paper now contained very l i t t l e with which she 6 0 1 agreed. Both Steeves and W.W. Lefeaux acted as lawyers for the defense i n the t r i a l of the North Vancouver members. Key to the vi c t o r y of the rig h t wing, was the d i s c i p l i n i n g of Young. The charges of i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and vanity l e v e l l e d against Young were designed, or at least served, to disguise very r e a l p o l i t i c a l differences under a covering of personal abuse. I t further contributed to the righ t wing's a b i l i t y to make the l e f t the scapegoat for the party's f a i l u r e s . Rod Young became the s t i c k with which the r i g h t successfully beat the l e f t . 80 Notes -'-Lome Ingle, Letter to Angus Maclnnis, March 28, 1951, AMC. ^Pr o v i n c i a l Executive Minutes, March 22, 1953, CCF Papers, PAC. P r o v i n c i a l Executive Minutes, A p r i l 4, 1953, AMC. 4Angus Maclnnis, Letter to Alex Macdonald, March 19, 1953, AMC. ^P r o v i n c i a l Convention Minutes, A p r i l 10, 1953, AMC. 6Angus Maclnnis, Letter to Arnold Webster, A p r i l 19, 1953, AMC. 7Dorothy G. Steeves, Letter to Colin Cameron, June 13, 1954, Colin Cameron Papers, UBC. ^Prov i n c i a l Convention Minutes, June 10,. 11, 12, 1954, AMC. ^Pr o v i n c i a l Convention Minutes, 1954 lOpreamble to Resolution #42, (Sooke). U p r o v i n c i a l Convention Transcript, Afternoon Session, June 11, 1954, pp. 2-3. n o Transcript, pp. 4-5. 1 3 T r a n s c r i p t , pp. 5-6. 1 4 T r a n s c r i p t , p. 6. l^Transcript, pp. 8-11. 16"Report of the T r i a l Committe Appointed to Hear Charges Against Comrade A.M. Stephen by Comrade M. Glenday," February 1937, p. 2. AMC. 1 7Gordon McCallum, "Proud If Called Red, Says CCF 1s Rod Young," Vancouver Province, June 12, 1954, p. 1. -^ P r o v i n c i a l Convention Transcript, Morning Session, June 12, 1954, pp. 19A-19B, AMC. 1 9 T r a n s c r i p t , pp. 19A-19B. 2 0 P r o v i n c i a l Convention Transcript, Afternoon Session, June 12, 1954, p. 16. 81 ^ T r a n s c r i p t , pp. 16-17. 22Transcript, pp. 17-18. ^ T r a n s c r i p t i PP« 23-24. 2 4 T r a n s c r i p t , pp. 25-26. ^ T r a n s c r i p t , pp. 33-34. 26steeves, Letter. 2 7 T r a n s c r i p t , pp. 18-19. 2 8 T r a n s c r i p t , pp. 19-20. ^ T r a n s c r i p t , p. 25. 30Transcript, p. 27. -^Transcript, p. 41. 32provin'cial Convention Minutes, June 12, 1954. 3 3Young, Anatomy of a Party, p. 283. 3 4"Undoing A Lot Of Good Work," Vancouver Province, June 14, 1954. 3 5"Undoing A Lot Of Good Work," Vancouver Province. 3 6 P r o v i n c i a l Executive Minutes, July 10, 1954, AMC. 3 7Minutes, July 10, 1954. 3 8Dorothey G. Steeves, Letter to Colin Cameron, November 8, 1954, Colin Cameron Papers. 3 9Rod Young, "Statement to the Press," (No date, probably July 10, 1954), AMC. 4 0Young, "Statement to the Press." 4lRod Young, Letter to Margaret Erickson, July 10, 1954, AMC. 4 2 A t t h i s time professed communists were denied entry into the l e g a l profession. 4 3 P e r s o n a l Interview with Rod Young, March 15, 1978. 4 4Steeves, Letter, November 8, 1954. 82 4 5"Shedding a L i a b i l i t y " Vancouver Sun, July 13, 1954. 46 P r o v i n c i a l Executive Table O f f i c e r 1s Minutes, July 13, 1954, AMC. 4 7"Rod Young Warns CCF Secretary," Vancouver Sun, July 16, 1954, p. 1. 4 8 P r o v i n c i a l Executive Minutes, July 23, 1954, AMC. 4 9"Reinstatement of Rod Young Hinted," Vancouver News-Herald, July 14, 1954 and "Rod Young Could be Rein-stated," Vancouver Sun, July 14, 1954. 50"Reinstatement," News-Herald. 5 1"Reinstatement," News-Herald. ^ P r o v i n c i a l Council Minutes, September 18, 19, 1954, CCF Papers, PAC. 5 3"The CCF Program for Action," CCF News, September 29, 1954, pp. 4-5. 5 4"The CCF Program for Action." 55provincial Executive Minutes, December 1, 1954, AMC. 56provincial Executive Minutes, including Report on North Vancouver T r i a l , January 22, 1955, CCF Papers, PAC. 57"Report of the P r o v i n c i a l Executive on Organiza-t i o n a l A f f a i r s to 1955 P r o v i n c i a l Convention," pp. 32-34. 5 8Report, p. 33. 5 9 p r o v i n c i a l Convention Minutes, 1955. 6 0Dorothy G. Steeves, Letter to Colin Cameron, Colin Cameron Papers. Conclusion The 1954 suspension of Rod Young by the P r o v i n c i a l Executive of the BC CCF was an important d i s c i p l i n a r y action which signalled a l a s t i n g victory of the r i g h t wing over the l e f t wing of the party. The f a c t that the Executive could d i s c i p l i n e as prominent a leader of the l e f t as Young gave a clear warning to those who shared his views: There was no longer room i n the party for those "who i n s i s t e d upon being ruggedly honest with fundamental s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s . " 1 The d i s c i p l i n i n g of Young coincided with the adoption of the party's new program, "The CCF Plan For Action." This program freed the hand of the Executive to d i s c i p l i n e party dissidents and i n f a c t required i t . The party now had a new d e f i n i t i o n of l o y a l t y : acts which the Executive deemed to be harmful to the party were acts of d i s l o y a l t y . In the postwar period, a number of developments prepared the gound from which the Executive was able to d i s c i p l i n e the l e f t . The Executive throughout the period consisted of many "moderates" or r i g h t wingers and a few l e f t i s t s . The l e f t was always able to e l e c t some of i t s prominent spokespersons to the^Executive but was never able to win control of the Executive. The hesitancy of the r i g h t 83 84 wingers on the Executive i n taking d i s c i p l i n a r y action was based on the l i k e l i h o o d that t h e i r actions would be overturned by the membership, who, by party t r a d i t i o n , did not allow members d i s c i p l i n e d simply for t h e i r p o l i t i c a l views. Marxists from the S o i c a l i s t Party of Canada had been part of the major founding component of the BC CCF, and were viewed by the membership as an important and legitimate part of the party. But as early as 1949, the r i g h t wing attempted to place the blame for the party's e l e c t o r a l f a i l u r e on the l e f t . They argued that the l e f t wing kept the party divided organizationally, and that i t frightened off supporters and po t e n t i a l supporters by i t s r h e t o r i c . These accusations did not at f i r s t have the desired e f f e c t . Moreover, the BC party received i t s highest vote i n 1952, long af t e r other sections of the CCF, with the exception of Saskatchewan, had gone into decline. But af t e r the 1952 e l e c t i o n , which the party saw as a loss, the l e f t was pointed to more and more as the scapegoat for the party's f a i l u r e s . The problem remained to s t e e l the Executive into action against the l e f t . In 1951 the Executive moved to ban the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship only a f t e r i t had been declared "a party within a party" by the National Council. This move obscured the r e a l question i n the b a t t l e against the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship. Although i t was banned on organiza-t i o n a l grounds, the Fellowship was f i r s t and foremost an i d e o l o g i c a l challenge to the leadership. After i t s d i s -85 solution, t h i s method of opposition to party policy which the Fellowship had raised was avoided. The lesson was clear. D i s c i p l i n a r y action against the l e f t could take place on "organizational" and, as Young's 1950 suspension demonstrated, "personal" grounds. By avoiding d i r e c t ideo-l o g i c a l confrontation and substituting "personal" and "organizational" grounds the Executive was able to i n i t i a t e action against the l e f t without facing defeat from the membership. Rod Young, unfortunately for the l e f t of the party, f e l l easy prey to the r i g h t wing's strategy. He made state-ments which, the newspapers printed out of context - state-ments which, when presented i n such a sensational manner, embarrassed his friends as well as his opponents. But while embarrassing, his remarks would not have been seen as d i s l o y a l i n an e a r l i e r period. In the new atmosphere of the cold war, with the r i g h t wing arguing that anything that embarrassed the party was d i s l o y a l , the charge that Young's statements were d i s l o y a l was accepted by a majority of party members. The attack on Young as a leader of the l e f t placed the whole of the l e f t wing on the defensive. Rod Young was the test case out of which the new d i s c i p l i n -ary code was derived. Both D.J. Roberts i n her thesis, and Professor Walter Young i n Anatomy of a Party, are correct i n t h e i r general assessment of the Rod Young a f f a i r . They both recognize i t as being part of the campaign against the 86 l e f t of the party, and as such a key d i s c i p l i n a r y action. But the conclusion drawn by Professor Young i n "Ideology, Personality and the Origins of the CCF i n B r i t i s h Columbia," that ideology i s '"invariably" a cover for personal c o n f l i c t or personal ambition i s not born out i n the case of Rod Young. In fa c t , the opposite i s true. An important ideo-l o g i c a l dispute within the party was disguised as a problem of personality. I t i s far from being a "truism of the l e f t i n B r i t i s h Columbia," 2 as professor Young claims, that the l e f t i s t s disguised t h e i r ambitions with i d e o l o g i c a l disputes. Rather, i t was the ri g h t which disguised ideo-l o g i c a l disputes as "organizational" and "personal" c o n f l i c t s by persuading party members and the public the f i g h t against Young was a " l i t t l e matter of p e r s o n a l i t y . " 3 The Rod Young a f f a i r further c a l l s into question the underlying premise of Professor Young i n his writing on the Connell a f f a i r . Walter Young argues that to prove someone i s ambitious i s to show that he or she subordinates his or her i d e o l o g i c a l views to the drive for personal advancement. Again, t h i s does not appear to apply i n the case of Rod Young. Rod Young, i t can e a s i l y be conceded, was ambitious. He sought and ^an for important and pres-tigious positions i n the party. But he did not, as ambition would dic t a t e , abandon his unpopular views as i t became more and more clear that they were bringing him into c o n f l i c t with powerful elements i n the party. This was because his ambition and his id e o l o g i c a l views were inseparable. 87 Young was ambitious not simply to get ahead personally, but to win the party as a whole to his i d e o l o g i c a l views. The Rod Young a f f a i r i s a single but s i g n i f i c a n t incident i n the history of the BC CCF which shows how i d e o l o g i c a l disputes were consciously disguised as "organizational" and "personal" problems. One cannot avoid asking i f t h i s i s an i s o l a t e d case or does t h i s case represent a pattern for the r i g h t wing of the BC CCF? Further case studies are necessary to e s t a b l i s h whether such a pattern does indeed e x i s t . The period that followed Young's resignation from the party was not characterized by s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r n a l power struggles, or a least not i n terms of a l e f t and r i g h t wing. But with the late 1960's and early 1970's there occured a resurgence of the l e f t , i n p a r t i c u l a r with the appearance of the Waffle. Groupings such as t h e Waffle, the Vancouver Area Council, or even the Women's Committe have a l l represented i d e o l o g i c a l challenges within the BC NDP i n recent years. I t would be valuable to see to what extent, i f any, the t a c t i c s that were used against Rod Young were used against the l e f t of the 1970's. How did the success of the NDP i n forming a government i n 1972, and i t s defeat i n 1975, a f f e c t the i n t e r n a l struggles i n the party? A study of these years would be valuable i n estab-l i s h i n g whether the r i g h t wing t a c t i c employed i n the Young a f f a i r , was an i s o l a t e d incident, or remains a consistent strategy of the party's r i g h t wing. 8 8 Notes x"Shedding a L i a b i l i t y , " E d i t o r i a l , Vancouver Sun, July 13, 1954, p. 7. 2Walter Young, "Ideology, Personality and the Origin of the CCF i n B r i t i s h Columbia," BC Studies, 32, 1976-77, p. 162 . 3Frank McKenzie, "Closing Address by the President," P r o v i n c i a l Convention Minutes 19 54, AMC. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY I. MANUSCRIPTS Angus Maclnnis C o l l e c t i o n . Special Collections, Main Library, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver. Reports Report of the T r i a l Committee Appointed to Hear Charges Against Comrade A.M. Stephen by Comrade M. Glenday. February 1937. Winch, E.E. and McKenzie, Frank. Report of the T r i a l Board Appointed to Hear the Complaint of Colin Cameron against A.T. Alsbury. September 1950. McKenzie, Frank. Report of the T r i a l Board i n the Matter of the Complaint Against Rodney Young. October 28, 1950. Pr o v i n c i a l Executive. Report of the P r o v i n c i a l Exec-utive on Organizational A f f a i r s to 1955 P r o v i n c i a l Convention. Proceedings of the 1955 P r o v i n c i a l Con-vention . b. Correspondence Cameron, Co l i n . Letter to Arnold Webster. March 1, 1937, Cameron, Co l i n . Telegraph to M.J. Coldwell. May 12, 1948. Coldwell, M.J. Telegraph .to Colin Cameron. May 12, 1948 Cameron, Colin. Letter to Angus Maclnnis. May 13, 194 8. Maclnnis, Angus. Letter to Colin Cameron. May 17, -948. Cameron, C ^ l i n . Letter to P r o v i n c i a l Council. August 26, 1950. Coldwell, M.J. Letter to Angus Maclnnis. November 7, 1950. Ingle, Lome. Letter to Angus Maclnnis. March 28, 1951. 89 90 Maclnnis, Angus. Letter to Alex Macdonald. March 19, 1953. Maclnnis, Angus. Letter to Arnold Webster. A p r i l 19, 1953. Young, Rod. Letter to Margaret Erickson. July 10, 1954. c. Minutes P r o v i n c i a l Executive Minutes 1933-1956. Pr o v i n c i a l Council Minutes 1933-1956. Pr o v i n c i a l Convention Minutes and Proceedings 1933-1956. Constitution of the B r i t i s h Columbia Co-operative common-wealth Federation. September 30, 1933. d. Miscellaneous Transcript of 1954 Pr o v i n c i a l Convention. Young, Rod. "Statement to the Press." C No date, pro-bably July 10, 1954J. Colin Cameron Papers. Special Collections, UBC. b. Correspondence Steeves, Dorothy G. Letter to Colin Cameron. June 13, 1954. Steeves, Dorothy G. Letter to Colin Cameron. November 8, 1954. Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Papers. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. MG 28 IV - I. b. Correspondence McDonald, Donald C. Letter to Lome Ingle. September 20, 1950. c. Minutes National Executive Minutes 1933-1956. 91 National Council Minutes 1933-1956. d. Miscellaneous Minutes of the S o c i a l i s t Fellowship. August 25, 1950-March 11, 1951. Rodney Young Papers. Special Collections, UBC. b. Correspondence Steeves, Dorothy G. Letter to Harry C Archibald]! . March 17, 1949. I I . BOOKS Avakumovic, Ivan. Socialism i n Canada: A Study of the CCF - NDP i n Federal and P r o v i n c i a l P o l i t i c s . Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978. Avakumovic, Ivan. The Communist Party i n Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975. Abella, Irving. Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973. Beck, J. Murray. Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1968. McNaught, Kenneth. A Prophet i n P o l i t i c s : A Biography  of J.S. Woodsworth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959. Penner, Norman. The Canadian L e f t : A C r i t i c a l Analysis. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., 1977. P h i l l i p s , Paul. No Power Greater: a century of labour i n  B r i t i s h Columbia. Vancouver: BC Federation of Labour, 1967. Robin, Martin. Radical P o l i t i c s and Canadian Labour 1880- 1930. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queens University, 1968. Rodney, William. Soldiers of the International: A history  of the Communist Party of Canada 1919-192 9. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. Steeves, Dorothy G. The Compassionate Rebel - Ernest-Winch  and the Growth of Socialism i n Western Canada. Van-couver: J . J . Douglas Ltd., 1960. Webster, Daisy. Growth Of the NDP i n BC, 1900-197 0: 81  P o l i t i c a l Biographies. Vancouver: NDP P r o v i n c i a l O f f i c e , 1970. Young, Walter. Anatomy of a Party: the National CCF 1932- 1961. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969. Province of B r i t i s h Columbia. Statement of Votes 1949. V i c t o r i a : 1950. H I . ARTICLES Angus, H.F. "The BC Elect i o n , June 1952." Canadian Journal of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science, Vol. 18, 1952, pp. 518-525. Young, Walter D. "Ideology, Personality and the Origin of the CCF i n B r i t i s h Columbia." BC Studies, 32, 1976-77, pp. 139-162. IV. PAMPHLETS Bennett, William. Builders of B r i t i s h Columbia. Vancouver: Broadway Printers Ltd., 1937. Cross, Michael S. ed. The Decline and F a l l of a Good Idea CCF-NDP Manifesto, 1932-1969. Toronto: Hogtown Press, 1974. V. THESES Grantham, Ronald G. "Some Aspects of the S o c i a l i s t Movement i n B r i t i s h Columbia 1898-1933." MA. UBC 19.42.. Johnson, Ross A. "No Compromise - No P o l i t i c a l Trading: The Marxian S o c i a l i s t Tradition i n B r i t i s h Columbia." Diss. UBC 1975. Roberts, Dorothy June. "Doctrine and Disunity i n the B r i t i s h Columbia Section of the.CCF 1932-1956." MA University of V i c t o r i a 1972. Stuart, Richard G. "The Early P o l i t i c a l Career of Angus Maclnnis." MA UBC 1970. 93 Wickerson, Gordon S. "C o n f l i c t i n the BC-CCF and the 'Connell A f f a i r . ' " MA UBC 1973. VI. NEWSPAPERS  CCF News Young, Rod. " F i r s t Days i n Ottawa." CCF News, June 24, 1948, p. 5. "BC Executive Supports National Council on Pact" CCF News, A p r i l 20, 1949, p. 1. Cameron, Colin. "Analysis of the El e c t i o n Results." CCF  News, July 6, 1949, p. 3. Maclnnis, Angus. "The CCF and the Elections." CCF News, July 20, 1949, p. 4. "The CCF Program for Action." CCF News, September 29, 1954. F e de r a t i o n i s t Van, Gerald. Letter, Federationist. December 10, 1936, p. 8. Charlton, Darwin. Letter, Federationist. January 7, 1937, p. 4 . Vancouver News-Herald "Reinstatement of Rod Young Hinted." News-Herald, July 14, 1954. Vancouver Province McCallum, Gordon. "Proud If Called Red, Says CCF's Rod Young." Vancouver Province, June 12, 1954, p. 1. E d i t o r i a l . "Undoing a Lot of Good Work." Vancouver  Province, July 14, 1954, p. 6. Vancouver Sun O'Leary, D i l l o n . "CCF Rebels Agree to Vote for Pact." Vancouver Sun, A p r i l 12, 1949, p. 1. 94 Daly, Ralph. "Convention Refuses Approve A t l a n t i c Pact." Vancouver Sun, A p r i l 18, 1949, p. 1. E d i t o r i a l . "Shedding a L i a b i l i t y . " Vancouver Sun, July 13, 1954, p. 7. "Rod Young Could be Reinstated." Vancouver Sun, July 14, 1954. "Rod Young Warns CCF Secretary." Vancouver Sun, July 16, 1954, p. 1. VII. INTERVIEWS Stupich, David. Personal Interview. June 21, 197 9. Young, Rodney. Personal Interview. March 15, 1978. 

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