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The impact of modernization on British Columbia electoral patterns : communications development and the… Wilson, Robert Jeremy 1978

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THE IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION ON BRITISH COLUMBIA ELECTORAL PATTERNS: COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT AND THE UNIFORMITY OF SWING, 190 3-1975 by ROBERT JEREMY WILSON M.A B.A University of Alberta, 1967 University of Alberta, 1970 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1978 (cT) Robert Jeremy Wilson, 1978 In presenting th is thes is in p a r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary shal l make it f ree l y ava i lab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thes is for scho lar l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h is representat ives . It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th is thes is for f i nanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wri t ten permission. Department The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 ABSTRACT T h i s study e x p l o r e s changes i n B r i t i s h Columbia e l e c -t o r a l p a t t e r n s d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, and r e l a t e s these changes t o dimensions of s o c i e t a l and p o l i t i c a l m o dernization. I t focusses on swing, the percentage p o i n t s h i f t i n a p a r t y ' s support between two s u c c e s s i v e e l e c t i o n s , and examines c o n s t i t u e n c y - arid s u b c o n s t i t u e n c y - l e v e l r e s u l t s i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s between 1903 and 1975. The t h e s i s t e s t e d i s t h a t development of the p r o v i n c e ' s communications i n f r a s t r u c t u r e was a c e n t r a l cause of the e l e c t o r a l develop-ments which took p l a c e . The f i r s t p a r t o f the study c l a r i f i e s the e l e c t o r a l developments by t r a c i n g changes i n the l e v e l of swing u n i -f o r m i t y and the degree of swing p a t t e r n i n g . I t begins w i t h evidence t h a t swings became much more uniform as the century progressed. Analyses o f e l e c t o r a l s h i f t s i n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and nonmetropolitan communities both show t h a t swings of p a r a l l e l d i r e c t i o n and magnitude were much more l i k e l y i n e l e c t i o n s a f t e r 1952. T h i s t r e n d to swing u n i f o r m i t y i s taken to i n d i c a t e a d e c l i n e i n the importance o f l o c a l e l e c -t o r a l f o r c e s . I t i s hypothesized t h a t the t w e n t i e t h century communications r e v o l u t i o n c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h i s decrease i n e l e c t o r a l l o c a l i s m by f a c i l i t a t i n g the establishment o f l o c a l i t y - a r c h i n g p a t t e r n s of p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . A f t e r demonstrating the i n c r e a s e i n swing u n i f o r m i t y , we examine three developments which c o u l d e x p l a i n the t r e n d . The premise u n d e r l y i n g t h i s p a r t of the study i s t h a t i n c r e a s e d p a t t e r n i n g of swing by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s or communities may account f o r i n c r e a s e d u n i f o r m i t y . Tests f o r c r o s s - e l e c t i o n changes i n the explan-a t o r y power o f t h r e e v a r i a b l e s — e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , socio-economic composition, and r e g i o n — s h o w t h a t the o v e r a l l d e c l i n e i n swing v a r i a n c e was not accounted f o r by i n c r e a s e d p a t t e r n i n g . The t r e n d t o u n i f o r m i t y was unpatterned; v o t e r aggregates with d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and l o c a t i o n s were simply more l i k e l y t o produce p a r a l l e l swings i n l a t e r e l e c -t i o n s . The second p a r t of the study ex p l o r e s the reasons f o r these developments. The communications development i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n i s t e s t e d and a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d . The communications i n t e r p r e t a t i o n argues t h a t improvements i n communications i n f r a s t r u c t u r e c o n t r i b u t e d t o an i n c r e a s e i n the u n i f o r m i t y of e l e c t o r a l f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g on d i s p e r s e d c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and communities, and thus helped to b r i n g about i n c r e a s e d swing u n i f o r m i t y . Chapters 7 and 8 t e s t f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s which are d e r i v e d from t h i s i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n . These s t a t e : (a) t h a t there should be a d e t a i l e d correspondence between the pace of communications development and the t r e n d t o swing u n i f o r m i t y ; (b) t h a t the appearance of i n t e n s e r e g i o n a l communications p a t t e r n s should p r e d i c t the i i i regional swing patterns which marked the 1969, 1972 and 1975 elections; (c) that regional differences i n the timing of the trend to uniformity should be explained by differences i n the pace of communications development; and (d) that com-munications i s o l a t i o n should explain the tendency of some contemporary communities to swing i n ways which indicate that they are insulated from p r e v a i l i n g e l e c t o r a l forces. The results of these tests enhance the c r e d i b i l i t y of the communications interpretation. In speculating about alternative interpretations we acknowledge that a complete causal map wduld have to grant other factors an important place. But the evidence supporting the tes t propositions, and the fact that the most plausible alternative interpre-tations complement the communications interpretation, argue that communications change was a p r i n c i p a l cause of the p r o v i n c i a l i z a t i o n of B r i t i s h Columbia e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s . Communications modernization altered the relationship between geography and the s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of e l e c t o r a l r e s u l t s . Supervisor: i v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i LIST OF TABLES v i i i LIST OF FIGURES x i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x i v Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1 E l e c t o r a l Localism and Communications Change 2 Patterning of Swing by E l e c t o r a l Competitiveness 8 Patterning of Swing by Socio-Economic Composition 9 Patterning of Swing by Region 13 An Unpatterned Trend to Swing Uniformity 16 Conclusion 20 2 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE STUDY 30 Inferences from Uniform Swings to Uniform Forces: The Stokes-Katz Exchange 33 Conceptualizing Uniformity of Swing: Percentage Point versus Proportionate Measures 46 Comparison of Swings Where There i s Constituency V a r i a t i o n i n the Presence of Minor Parties on the B a l l o t ' 54 Data Related Problems 57 3 DESCRIPTION AND PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE TREND TO UNIFORMITY OF ELECTORAL SWING . 76 Findings: Swing Uniformity Across Voter Aggregates, 1903-1975 77 The Argument that Trends are an A r t i f a c t of the Increased Size of Voter Aggregates 87 The Argument that Trends to..Uniformity.i.Would Disappear i f the E f f e c t s of S h i f t s i n Community Composition Were Removed 90 The Argument that Differences i n Consistency of Minor Party Presence on the B a l l o t Cause the Observed Trends 91 v Chapter The Argument that the Findings May be A r t i f a c t u a l of Increased Uniformity of Base Levels of Party Support 95 The Argument that the Observed Trends Are an A r t i f a c t of Changes i n the E l e c t o r a l System 98 A Further Test: Uniformity Within Constituencies 102 Conclusion 106 4 PATTERNING OF SWING BY ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS 109 Methodology 112 The Findings 117 5 THE PATTERNING OF ELECTORAL SWING BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION 123 Socio-Economic Correlates of Voting i n B r i t i s h Columbia: Introduction 124 Design of Analysis: Construction of the P a r a l l e l Regression Equations 129 T r i a l Runs of the Models: Socio-Economic Composition and Party Support 134 The Methodology Employed i n Testing f o r Explanatory Power of Patterning Models 142 The Findings 145 Interpretation of Findings 164 6 THE PATTERNING OF SWING BY REGION 183 The Impact of the Metropolitan-Hinterland D i v i s i o n 184 The Impact of a More Refined Regional Categorization 189 Detailed Examination of Regionalism i n Nonmetropolitan Areas 199 Evaluation of Some Straightforward Explanations of the Findings 205 Conceptualizing Regionalism 214 Conclusion 218 v i Chapter 7 EXAMINATION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT INTERPRETATION 225 Correspondence Between the Trend to E l e c t o r a l Uniformity and the Pace of Communications Development 228 The Communications Thesis and the Appearance of Regional Swing Patterns i n the 1966-1975 Period 250 Regional Differences i n Paths to Swing Uniformity 262 8 EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN ELECTORAL INSULARITY 279 The Dependent Variables: Measures of E l e c t o r a l I n s u l a r i t y 282 Remoteness and E l e c t o r a l I n s u l a r i t y 285 Marginality and D i v e r s i t y as Predictors of E l e c t o r a l I n s u l a r i t y 291 Examination of Cases with Extreme I n s u l a r i t y Scores 302 Conclusion: The Status of the Communications Development Interpretation 308 9 CONCLUSION 323 BIBLIOGRAPHY 338 Appendix A LIST OF PLACES IN THE SAMPLE OF NONMETROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES 367 B AVAILABILITY OF CENSUS INFORMATION AND LEVEL OF AGGREGATION, 1931-1971 371 C INTRODUCTION TO THE DATA SETS USED IN ANALYSIS OF PATTERNING AROUND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES IN CHAPTER 5 . . 375 D REGRESSION EQUATIONS USED TO OBTAIN PREDICTED SWINGS IN 1972 AND 1975 381 E MAPS SHOWING CONSTITUENCY VARIATION IN STATIC SUPPORT LEVELS: LIBERAL SUPPORT, 1941; SOCIAL CREDIT SUPPORT, 1963; AND NDP SUPPORT, 197:2.- 385 v i i LIST OF TABLES Table 1 A comparison of proportionate and percentage point measures of swing 48 2 Swings to be analyzed using constituency l e v e l data 59 3 Comparison of sampled nonmetropolitan communities of various sizes with t o t a l number of p o l l i n g places of various sizes i n each constituency 63 4 Size of the nonmetropolitan community sample for e l e c t i o n years, 1933-1972 66 5 H i s t o r i c a l comparison of swing uniformity across constituencies, 1903-1975, where swing i s measured as percentage point s h i f t 78 6 Hypothetical swings i n two communities: votes and percentages °^ 7 H i s t o r i c a l comparison of swing uniformity across nonmetropolitan communities, 1933-1973 85 8 Trends i n swing uniformity across nonmetropolitan communities a f t e r controls on community s i z e 89 9 H i s t o r i c a l comparison of swing uniformity across constituencies, 1903-1975, where swing i s measured proportionately 97 10 H i s t o r i c a l comparison of swing uniformity across communities within the same constituency, 1933-1972 105 11 Trends i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between swings i n government party support and assumed party e f f o r t : constituencies, 1903-1975 118 12 E t h n i c i t y variables as predictors of party support 135 13 I n d u s t r i a l and e t h n i c i t y - r e l i g i o n variables as predictors of party support 137 14 Occupation and income variables as predictors of party support 139 v i i i Table 15 Regression r e s u l t s from an i l l u s t r a t i v e case in v o l v i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of explanatory model C l to swing i n NDP support, 1969-1972 144 16 E t h n i c i t y - r e l i g i o n variables as predictors of swing 152 17 I n d u s t r i a l composition variables as predictors of swings 155 18 Occupational composition and income variables as predictors of S o c i a l Credit and CCF-NDP swings; 1960, 1972 and 1975 159 19 Income as a pr e d i c t o r of swings; 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1975 163 20 Models ERC2 and C l compared with models which include a f u l l range of census variables 172 21 Best p r e d i c t o r variables emerging as a r e s u l t of stepwise regression with the a l l i n c l u s i v e model of c l a s s , e t h n i c i t y and r e l i g i o n e f f e c t s 173 22 The changing impact of regionalism on swing; constituencies, 1903-1975 196 23 The changing impact of regionalism on swing; nonmetropolitan communities, 1933-1972 201 24 The changing impact of regionalism on swing a f t e r controls; constituencies, 1903-1975 210 25 Changes i n within-region uniformity a f t e r controls; constituencies, 1903-1975 213 26 I n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among absolute deviations from swings expected i n 1972 and 1975 284 27 Relationships between the i s o l a t i o n of communities and t h e i r e l e c t o r a l i n s u l a r i t y , 1972 and 1975 287 28 Relationships between the i s o l a t i o n of communities and t h e i r e l e c t o r a l i n s u l a r i t y , 1972 and 1975 a f t e r controls on population s i z e 287 i x Table 29 Relationships between the i s o l a t i o n of communities and e l e c t o r a l i n s u l a r i t y ; 1941, 1952 and 1960, a f t e r controls on population si z e 290 30 Relationships between ethnic and i n d u s t r i a l d i v e r s i t y , and e l e c t o r a l i n s u l a r i t y , 1972 and 1975 292 31 Relationships between measures of s o c i e t a l marginality and e l e c t o r a l i n s u l a r i t y , 1972 and 1975 296 32 Predictors of e l e c t o r a l i n s u l a r i t y , 1972 and 1975 selected by stepwise multiple regression 298 X LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Diagram depicting the evolution of within- and between-groups variance components 31 2 Three possible trends i n the r e l a t i v e magnitude of within- and between-groups components 32 3 Swings r e s u l t i n g when uniform e l e c t o r a l forces operate on hypothetical constituencies with varying resistance l e v e l s 36 4 The Katz model: r e s u l t s showing c o r r e l a t i o n between national vote movement and vote movement i n three hypothetical d i s t r i c t s across s i x elect i o n s 39 5 Diagram showing the probable evolution of e l e c t o r a l forces and resistance l e v e l s involved i n producing increased swing uniformity 44 6 The e f f e c t of c o n t r o l l i n g f o r differences i n Ei support l e v e l 55 7 Two hypothetical constituencies with d i f f e r e n t e l e c t i o n - t o - e l e c t i o n contest patterns 56 8 Trends i n swing uniformity across constituencies, 1903-1975 80 9 Trends i n swing uniformity across nonmetropolitan communities-,; 1933-1972 84 10 Trends i n swing uniformity across constituencies, 1903-1975 94 11 Trends i n swing uniformity across constituencies, 1903-1975, a f t e r exclusion of cases where base l e v e l of support i s extreme 99 12 Trends i n swing uniformity across nonmetropolitan communities within the same constituency, 1933-1972 104 13 Diagram depicting assumptions about party e f f o r t i n government and opposition ridings 115 14 L i s t of regression models with variables included i n each model -. 133 xi Figure 15 Trends i n the explanatory power of two models inclu d i n g ethnic, r e l i g i o u s and class v a r i a b l e s , 1952, 1972 and 1975 147 16 Trends i n the explanatory power of three models inc l u d i n g ethnic, r e l i g i o u s and class v a r i a b l e s , 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1975 swings 148 17 Trends i n the explanatory power of three models inclu d i n g ethnic and r e l i g i o u s variables; 1941, 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1975 swings 150 18 Trends i n the explanatory power of three models inclu d i n g class variables; 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1975 swings 158 19 Depiction of composition patterning i n early and modern periods and as hypothesized i n the modern period 177 20 Trends i n the explanatory power of the metro-po l i t a n - h i n t e r l a n d d i v i s i o n ; constituency swings, 1903-1975 187 21 A regional d i v i s i o n of B r i t i s h Columbia with a l i s t of constituencies i n each region 191 22 Trends i n the explanatory power of the ten region d i v i s i o n ; constituency swings, 1903-1975 193 23 Trends i n within-region uniformity of swing; constituency swings, 1903-1975 195 24 Trends i n the explanatory power of region; swings i n nonmetropolitan communities, 1933-1972 202 25 Trends i n within-region uniformity of swing; nonmetropolitan communities, 1933-1972 203 26 Trends i n the explanatory power of the ten region d i v i s i o n a f t e r controls; constituency swings, 1903-1975 209 27 Trends i n within-region uniformity of swing a f t e r controls; constituency swings, 1903-1975 212 28 Depiction of regional patterning i n d i f f e r e n t periods 219 x i i Figure 29 Growth of the B r i t i s h Columbia railway network, 1911-1971 231 30 Growth of the B r i t i s h Columbia highways network, 1921-1971 231 31 Growth i n the number of registered motor vehicles i n B r i t i s h Columbia, 1921-1971- 232 32 Growth i n Canadian a i r passenger t r i p s , 1941-1971 232 33 Growth i n the number of telephones i n B r i t i s h Columbia, 1921-1971 233 34 Growth of long distance telephone c a l l i n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia, 1951-1971 233 35 Growth i n the percentage of B r i t i s h Columbia dwellings with radio, 1931-1971 241 36 Growth i n the percentage of B r i t i s h Columbia dwellings with t e l e v i s i o n , 1953-1971 241 37 The pace of communications development curve juxtaposed against curves describing the trend to swing uniformity 247 38 Trends i n the c i r c u l a t i o n of newspapers i n non-metropolitan areas, 1920-1975 252 39 Growth of radio and t e l e v i s i o n s t a t i o n s , 1939-1975 257 40 Percentage of dwellings i n d i f f e r e n t census d i v i s i o n s with radio, 1951 263 41 Percentage of dwellings i n d i f f e r e n t census d i v i s i o n s with telephones, 1951 264 42 Percentage of dwellings i n d i f f e r e n t census d i v i s i o n s with t e l e v i s i o n , 1961, 1971 265 43 Percentage of dwellings i n d i f f e r e n t census d i v i s i o n s with passenger automobiles, 1951, 1961 266 44 Trends to within-region uniformity for f i v e non-metropolitan regions, 1937-1972 269 45 L i s t of places with extremely high e l e c t o r a l i n s u l a r i t y scores, 1972 and 1975 .. 303 x i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e t o thank s e v e r a l people f o r t h e i r a s s i s -tance with t h i s p r o j e c t . None bear any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s flaws. Bob McDonald, Andrew P e t t e r and Don MacDonald were i n t e r e s t e d and h e l p f u l f r i e n d s . V i r g i n i a Green, David Amos, and Mel Klassen were ready with a d v i c e when the l i m i t s of my knowledge of computer techniques were reached. Deborah Watson a s s i s t e d w i t h the maps, and G a i l Chin Bryant helped w i t h the graphic d i s p l a y s . Eleanor Lowther deserves thanks f o r more than her e x c e l l e n t t y p i n g and her advice about many f a c e t s o f the p r e s e n t a t i o n . Her p a t i e n c e was a calming i n f l u e n c e throughout the f i n a l months of the p r o j e c t . Don Blake and David E l k i n s were always generous with t h e i r time and encouragement, and s u p p l i e d p e r c e p t i v e and prompt c r i t i c i s m o f numerous d r a f t s . Most of a l l , I want to thank my f r i e n d -Durdica f o r her love and support. x i v CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION T h i s t h e s i s explores the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the modernization o f B r i t i s h Columbia s o c i e t y and the e v o l u t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n swing p a t t e r n s i n the t w e n t i e t h cen-t u r y . I t focusses on e l e c t o r a l swing, which i s d e f i n e d as the percentage p o i n t s h i f t i n a p a r t y ' s support between two s u c c e s s i v e e l e c t i o n s . Swings of c o n s t i t u e n c y - and subcon-s t i t u e n c y - l e v e l v o t e r aggregates i n e l e c t i o n s throughout the century are examined i n order to i d e n t i f y changes i n swing u n i f o r m i t y and swing p a t t e r n s . The beginning p o i n t f o r the a n a l y s i s i s p r o v i d e d by evidence presented i n Chapter 3, which shows t h a t swings became much more uniform as the century progressed. Separate analyses o f c o n s t i t u e n c y and nonmetropolitan community r e s u l t s show t h a t swings of p a r a l l e l d i r e c t i o n and magnitude were much more l i k e l y i n e l e c t i o n s a f t e r 1952. A two-part i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s undertaken i n order to c l a r i f y t h i s t r e n d t o swing u n i f o r m i t y . The f i r s t p a r t , which i s i n t r o d u c e d below and r e p o r t e d i n Chapters 4 through 6, ex p l o r e s changes i n the extent to which swing was pat-terned by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f v o t e r aggregates. I t i s p o s t u l a t e d t h a t an i n c r e a s e i n swing p a t t e r n i n g accounts f o r 1 2 the t r e n d to u n i f o r m i t y . The r e s u l t s of the p a t t e r n i n g s t u d i e s c l a r i f y e l e c t o r a l developments, and s e t the stage f o r the second p a r t of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n which examines the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these developments and aspects of modernization. The p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s g u i d i n g t h i s p a r t of the r e s e a r c h i s t h a t modernization of the p r o v i n c e ' s commun-i c a t i o n s i n f r a s t r u c t u r e was a c e n t r a l cause of i n c r e a s e d swing u n i f o r m i t y . Thus, i n the f i r s t p a r t of the study we e l u c i d a t e changes i n B r i t i s h Columbia e l e c t o r a l s o c i o l o g y by determin-i n g the values which our dependent v a r i a b l e s — t h e l e v e l of swing u n i f o r m i t y and the degree of swing p a t t e r n i n g — t a k e on f o r d i f f e r e n t e l e c t i o n s . In p l o t t i n g changes i n these values we sketch a p i c t u r e of e l e c t o r a l developments ac r o s s the century. At the second stage of a n a l y s i s we i n t r o d u c e our independent v a r i a b l e s — c o m m u n i c a t i o n s development along w i t h o t h e r dimensions of s o c i e t a l and p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e — i n an attempt to e x p l a i n t h i s p i c t u r e . Electoral Localism and Communications Change B r i t i s h Columbia p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t t e s t i n g ground f o r p r o p o s i t i o n s about the e f f e c t s of t w e n t i e t h century developments on the e l e c t o r a l s o c i o l o g y of g e o g r a p h i c a l l y l a r g e and d i v e r s e p o l i t i e s . The p r o v i n c e ' s v a s t n e s s , and the o b s t a c l e s to communication presented by i t s s i z e , t e r -r a i n and c l i m a t e are easy to a p p r e c i a t e . I t covers 366,255 3 square m i l e s . In 1971 there were s l i g h t l y over s i x people per square m i l e , but o u t s i d e the two l a r g e m e t r o p o l i t a n areas, d e n s i t i e s were reduced by more than h a l f . I t i s over 500 miles by road from the major m e t r o p o l i s of Vancouver to the community ne a r e s t the p r o v i n c e ' s g e o g r a p h i c a l c e n t r e , and 742 and 541 m i l e s r e s p e c t i v e l y t o the major communities i n the n o r t h e a s t e r n and southeastern r e g i o n s . P r i n c e Rupert, the major c e n t r e on the northern c o a s t , i s almost 475 m i l e s by boat and over 9 00 m i l e s by road from Vancouver. The pockets of p o p u l a t i o n which dot the p r o v i n c e ' s v a l l e y s and p l a t e a u s are separated by e i g h t mountain ranges and t h i s t e r r a i n , along w i t h the c l i m a t e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h B r i t i s h Columbia's n o r t h P a c i f i c l o c a t i o n , exaggerates ±he impact of d i s t a n c e on p a t t e r n s o f s o c i a l interaction."'" These g e o g r a p h i c a l r e a l i t i e s have not gone unchallenged. The p r o v i n c e ' s governments and c i t i z e n s have a s s i d u o u s l y a p p l i e d the wealth and t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances of the twen-t i e t h century t o the task of overcoming the n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s of geography. One need on l y compare a road map of 50 years ago with a contemporary one, or c o n s i d e r the r a p i d d i s semin-a t i o n of i n n o v a t i o n s l i k e r a d i o , t e l e v i s i o n , the telephone or the automobile, to get some i n k l i n g of the success of 2 these e f f o r t s . I t was c u r i o s i t y about the impact of developments l i k e these which s t i m u l a t e d the present study. The communications r e v o l u t i o n , which undoubtedly had a great e f f e c t on p a t t e r n s 4 of economic and s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e , should a l s o have a f f e c t e d p a t t e r n s o f p o l i t i c a l communica-t i o n . By examining changes i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between geography and e l e c t o r a l swing p a t t e r n s , and by r e l a t i n g these changes t o communications developments, we hope to reach important and g e n e r a l i z a b l e c o n c l u s i o n s about the impact of modernization on s o c i e t i e s l i k e B r i t i s h Columbia. Our f i n d i n g s argue t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between geo-graphy and e l e c t o r a l s o c i o l o g y was very much a l t e r e d by modernization. The r e l a t i v e l y non-uniform swings which c h a r a c t e r i z e d e l e c t i o n s i n the f i r s t h a l f o f the century suggest t h a t l o c a l s t i m u l i and i n f l u e n c e s had a r e l a t i v e l y g reat e f f e c t on e l e c t o r a l s h i f t s i n e l e c t i o n s p r i o r to 1952. The t r e n d t o swing u n i f o r m i t y i n d i c a t e s t h a t modernization undermined t h i s e l e c t o r a l l o c a l i s m . We hypothesize t h a t development of the communications i n f r a s t r u c t u r e helped i n t h i s process by a m e l i o r a t i n g the e f f e c t s of the g e o g r a p h i c a l f a c t o r s which had served t o i s o l a t e p a r t s of the p r o v i n c e from one another, and had hindered the es t a b l i s h m e n t of l o c a l i t y - a r c h i n g p a t t e r n s of p o l i t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n . The apparent d i m i n u t i o n of e l e c t o r a l l o c a l i s m seems c o n s i s t e n t w ith communications changes which, by i n c r e a s i n g the p o s s i -b i l i t y o f c r o s s - a r e a i n t e r a c t i o n , should have changed the s p a t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e networks. The i d e a t h a t improvements i n communication systems l e a d t o p o l i t i c a l change, and s p e c i f i c a l l y , the i d e a t h a t 5 such developments cause a breakdown of p o l i t i c a l l o c a l i s m , has been prominently p l a c e d i n models of p o l i t i c a l develop-ment. Probably the b e s t known example i s K a r l Deutsch's theory o f s o c i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n . I t p r e d i c t s t h a t a c o n s t e l l a -t i o n of developments i n c l u d i n g advances i n e d u c a t i o n stand-ards and l i t e r a c y , u r b a n i z a t i o n , expansion o f communications i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and i n c r e a s e d mass media exposure, w i l l s e t i n motion "the process i n which major c l u s t e r s of o l d s o c i a l , economic and p s y c h o l o g i c a l commitments are eroded or broken and people become a v a i l a b l e f o r new p a t t e r n s of s o c i a l i z a t i o n 3 and behavior." In a s i m i l a r v e i n , Rokkan has noted t h a t "development of c r o s s - l o c a l c o n t a c t s , " and "entry i n t o a wider market of i n f o r m a t i o n exchange w i t h i n the n a t i o n , " are among the i n d i c a t o r s o f economic and s o c i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n of the k i n d " r e q u i r e d to t r i g g e r processes of within-community p o l a r i z a t i o n and c r o s s - l o c a l p a r t y development." V a r i a t i o n s and e l a b o r a t i o n s of these ideas have been put forward by 5 other t h e o r i s t s l i k e Lerner and Huntington. A l l focus to some e x t e n t on p o l i t i c a l changes a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the e r o s i o n of p a t t e r n s o f p o l i t i c a l behaviour which are perpetuated by l o c a l i n f l u e n c e agencies. We might term t h i s e r o s i o n process " d e l o c a l i z a t i o n . . " Models of d e l o c a l i z a t i o n are s u g g e s t i v e here even though B r i t i s h Columbia was not, d u r i n g the t w e n t i e t h century, under-going c r i s e s of i n t e g r a t i o n o r n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g l i k e those experienced i n the modernizing s o c i e t i e s which are examined by the aforementioned s c h o l a r s . " The concept of e l e c t o r a l l o c a l i s m i n t r o d u c e d here i s d i f f e r e n t than the k i n d of l o c a l i s m which i s p o s i t e d as an impediment to n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n or regime maintenance. B r i t i s h Columbia i s a s o c i e t y of s e t t l e r s , a s o c i e t y of people who, i n u p r o o t i n g themselves from o l d e r s o c i e t i e s and moving to the western f r o n t i e r , u s u a l l y f r e e d themselves from the t r a d i t i o n a l 7 commitments which are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p a r o c h i a l i s m . But i f the communities which grew up were not, f o r the most p a r t , c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t r a d i t i o n a l l i n g u i s t i c , r e l i g i o u s or c u l -t u r a l s o l i d a r i t i e s , they s t i l l were, a c c o r d i n g to our assumptions, s u b j e c t to a k i n d of p a r o c h i a l i s m . T h i s new p a r o c h i a l i s m had g e o g r a p h i c a l r o o t s . I t s e s s e n t i a l charac-t e r i s t i c r e v o l v e d around i s o l a t i o n and the extent to which p a t t e r n s o f i n t e r a c t i o n and i n f l u e n c e were l o c a l l y bounded. I t should be made c l e a r at the o u t s e t t h a t we are not s u g g e s t i n g t h a t the t w e n t i e t h century saw B r i t i s h Columbia leap from the p o l i t i c s of p a r o c h i a l i s m to the p o l i t i c s of modernity. The g e o g r a p h i c a l l y based p a r o c h i a l i s m which we have p o s t u l a t e d was never present i n pure form. Nor have a l l o f i t s v e s t i g e s been e r a d i c a t e d . But i f the evidence presented i n t h i s study i s v a l i d , then we can say t h a t the p r o v i n c e ' s e l e c t o r a l s o c i o l o g y changed s u b s t a n t i a l l y , and t h a t the nature of the change suggests a d e c l i n e i n e l e c t o r a l l o c a l i s m . 7 In the remainder of t h i s chapter we i n t r o d u c e the pat-t e r n i n g s t u d i e s which were designed to e x p l o r e p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s of the t r e n d t o swing u n i f o r m i t y . Separate s t u d i e s focus on temporal changes i n the p a t t e r n i n g (or, i n other words, explanatory) power of three v a r i a b l e s — e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , socio-economic composition and r e g i o n . Each study i s premised on the simple t r u i s m t h a t t o t a l swing v a r i a n c e i n a given e l e c t i o n can be p a r t i t i o n e d i n t o w i t h i n -and between-groups components. We want t o e s t a b l i s h , f o r each o f the p a t t e r n i n g v a r i a b l e s , (that i s , f o r each of the v a r i a b l e s which take a t u r n d e f i n i n g "group"), how the w i t h i n - and between-groups components move i n r e l a t i o n t o one another. I f comparative a n a l y s i s of a s e r i e s of e l e c -t i o n s shows t h a t the within-groups component d e c l i n e s more r a p i d l y , then we w i l l conclude t h a t i n c r e a s e d p a t t e r n i n g around the v a r i a b l e i n q u e s t i o n helps to account f o r the d e c l i n e i n t o t a l swing v a r i a n c e . In e f f e c t , the search f o r new o r t i g h t e n i n g p a t t e r n s of swing v a r i a t i o n i n v o l v e s e x p l o r a t i o n of t h r e e p o s s i b l e paths away from e l e c t o r a l l o c a l i s m . A s i t u a t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z e d by swings which were r e l a t i v e l y non-uniform and, we surmise, determined by l o c a l f a c t o r s , may have been superseded by a s i t u a t i o n i n which swing d i f f e r e n c e s c o r r e l a t e d s t r o n g l y w i t h the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of v o t e r aggregates. In s k e t c h i n g the p o s s i b l e paths away from l o c a l i s m i n the s e c t i o n s which f o l l o w , we seek on l y to e s t a b l i s h t h a t each p o s s i b i l i t y has 8 a c e r t a i n amount of p l a u s i b i l i t y . More d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n w i l l be l e f t u n t i l the f a c t s have c l a r i f i e d developments. Patterning of Swing by Electoral Competitiveness The f i r s t p a t t e r n i n g h y p o t h e s i s , and the one advanced most s p e c u l a t i v e l y , focusses on d i f f e r e n c e s i n the e l e c t o r a l competitiveness or s a f e t y of r i d i n g s , and on the extent to which these d i f f e r e n c e s c o r r e l a t e with swing. The l a y e r s o f assumptions s u p p o r t i n g t h i s hypothesis are d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter 4. Most c e n t r a l i s the assumption t h a t p a r t y s t r a t -e g i s t s c o n s i d e r the s a f e t y o f c o n s t i t u e n c i e s when making d e c i s i o n s about the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f campaign r e s o u r c e s . I f t h i s i s so, and i f s t r a t e g y i s pursued s u c c e s s f u l l y , then the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f resources should c o r r e l a t e w i t h swing, and an a s s o c i a t i o n between swing and the l e v e l of s a f e t y should f o l l o w . The l o g i c u n d e r l y i n g the hyp o t h e s i s t h a t t h i s a s s o c i a -t i o n should have strengthened over time i s not beyond c o n t e n t i o n , but at l e a s t one argument can be made i n i t s support. Modernization may have enhanced the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u c c e s s f u l , c e n t r a l l y - d i r e c t e d e l e c t o r a l s t r a t e g i e s by making i t e a s i e r f o r s t r a t e g i s t s to d i s t r i b u t e resources r a t i o n a l l y . For example, the a b i l i t y of campaign planners t o a l l o c a t e the pa r t y l e a d e r ' s time to r i d i n g s where i t would achieve the g r e a t e s t p a y o f f s , may have i n c r e a s e d as a r e s u l t of changes 9 which made i t e a s i e r t o move about the p r o v i n c e . I f modern-i z a t i o n d i d f a c i l i t a t e the a p p l i c a t i o n of e l e c t o r a l s t r a t e g y , then our success i n p r e d i c t i n g c o n s t i t u e n c y swings w i t h the competitiveness v a r i a b l e should i n c r e a s e as more re c e n t e l e c t i o n s are c o n s i d e r e d . Patterning of Swing by Socio-Eoonomic Composition The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t socio-economic composition might have i n c r e a s e d i n importance as a c o r r e l a t e of e l e c t o r a l swing i s c o n s i d e r e d i n Chapter 5. The hypothesis owes i t s d e r i v a t i o n t o a v a r i e t y of t h e o r e t i c a l o r i g i n s . F i r s t , m odernization may have brought developments a k i n to those p o s i t e d i n models o f cleavage e v o l u t i o n . Since B r i t i s h Colum-b i a d i d not undergo a n a t i o n a l or i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n d u r i n g the p e r i o d s t u d i e d , these models are not a p p l i c a b l e h o l i s bolus to our case. N e v e r t h e l e s s , they do suggest some p o s s i b l e e l e c t o r a l developments. Most n o t a b l y , we f i n d i n these models the theme t h a t l o c a l i s t i c e l e c t o r a l p a t t e r n s may, g i v e n the occurrence of c e r t a i n determining f a c t o r s , be r e p l a c e d by cleavages which overarch areas and b i n d together g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i s p e r s e d c i t i z e n s with shared c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s g and i n t e r e s t s . L i p s e t and Rokkan, f o r example, note t h a t there may be an e v o l u t i o n towards f u n c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s which " . . . produce a l l i a n c e s of s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d or s i m i l a r l y o r i e n t e d s u b j e c t s and households over wide ranges of l o c a l i -10 t i e s and tend t o undermine the i n h e r i t e d s o l i d a r i t y of the 9 e s t a b l i s h e d t e r r i t o r i a l communities." In p a r t , t h i s e v o l u t i o n t o f u n c t i o n a l cleavages i s seen as coming about because d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s become p o l i t i c a l l y s a l i e n t as the s o c i e t y changes. For example, as s o c i e t i e s t r a n s f o r m from r u r a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l t o urban and i n d u s t r i a l i n c h a r a c t e r , new i n d u s t r i a l c l a s s d i v i s i o n s emerge and supplant t e r r i t o r i a l d i v i s i o n s . In p a r t a l s o , the e v o l u t i o n may be a consequence of d e c l i n e i n o l d p a t t e r n s o f s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n or communication, and the growth of new ones. U r b a n i z a t i o n , i n c r e a s e d i n t e r r e g i o n a l m i g r a t i o n , and the e x t e n s i o n o f mass media may a l l c o n t r i b u t e to an e r o s i o n of l o c a l s o l i d a r i t i e s , and to a heightened sense of common-a l i t y among g e o g r a p h i c a l l y s c a t t e r e d i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h l i k e i n t e r e s t s . Communications changes should make i t e a s i e r f o r cleavage o r g a n i z i n g agencies l i k e t r a de unions t o i n f l u e n c e and p u l l t o g e t h e r t h e i r d i s p e r s e d members or c l i e n t e l e s . In e f f e c t , cleavage e v o l u t i o n theory proposes t h a t modernization may cause l o c a l e l e c t o r a l i n f l u e n c e p a t t e r n s to be r e p l a c e d by c r o s s - l o c a l i t y p a t t e r n s . Kevin Cox has hypothesized t h a t : Those belonging to [informal or formal] s o c i a l networks at the l o c a l l e v e l w i l l be much more influenced i n t h e i r p a r t i s a n attitudes by the p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u at the l o c a l l e v e l than w i l l be those belonging to . . . s o c i a l networks at the e x t r a l o c a l l e v e l . 1 Q The p o s s i b i l i t y posed i n Chapter 5 r e s t s on a v e r s i o n of t h i s h y p o thesis which speaks t o the q u e s t i o n of -temporal 11 change: as the extensiveness of networks i n c r e a s e s , the importance o f the l o c a l m i l i e u or context should d e c l i n e . Increased p a t t e r n i n g of swing by d i f f e r e n c e s i n composition should f o l l o w . Other developments might have caused the a s s o c i a t i o n between socio-economic composition and swing t o strengthen. For i n s t a n c e , i t may be t h a t an i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n where v o t e r s r e a c t e d t o r e l a t i v e l y l o c a l i z e d e l e c t o r a l s i m u l i was transformed i n t o one where those s t i m u l i were more " p r o v i n -c i a l i z e d . " Changes i n the r o l e o f p a r t y l e a d e r s , changes i n campaign s t y l e , or i n c r e a s e s i n government p r o v i s i o n of out-puts w i t h u n i v e r s a l impacts, are some of the developments which might have c o n t r i b u t e d to a p r o v i n c i a l i z a t i o n o f s t i m u l i . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of p r o v i n c i a l i z a t i o n f o r our expecta-t i o n s can be e x p l a i n e d as f o l l o w s . The socio-economic com-p o s i t i o n o f v o t e r aggregates may have i n f l u e n c e d swing throughout the century. But s t r o n g c o r r e l a t i o n s between composition and swing would a r i s e o n l y when v o t e r s i n d i f -f e r e n t areas began to r e a c t t o common, p r o v i n c i a l i z e d s t i m u l i . That i s , swing c o u l d be determined by composition, but i f v o t e r s were r e a c t i n g t o l o c a l i s s u e s and p e r s o n a l i t i e s , then the r e s u l t a n t swings would be l o c a l l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c , and h i g h l y v a r i a n t . On the oth e r hand, response determined by composition, but based on r e a c t i o n t o p r o v i n c i a l i s s u e s , would r e s u l t i n swings which c o r r e l a t e d with c o m p o s i t i o n . ^ The make-up of v o t e r aggregates may r e l a t e to e l e c t o r a l swing because of i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between socio-economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and e l e c t o r a l switches, or a l t e r n a t e l y because c o n t e x t u a l p r o p e r t i e s which r e l a t e t o composition cause swings which are d i f f e r e n t from what would 12 be expected given those i n d i v i d u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . What i s important i s t h a t n e i t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p would be l i k e l y to appear unless v o t e r s i n d i f f e r e n t areas were r e a c t i n g t o the same s t i m u l i . And the l i k e l i h o o d of t h i s c o n d i t i o n being f u l f i l l e d should have i n c r e a s e d over time as i s s u e s were p r o v i n c i a l i z e d . Our l i m i t e d understanding of how these ideas apply to B r i t i s h Columbia's t w e n t i e t h century development leads us to frame hypotheses i n very s p e c u l a t i v e terms. We know t h a t change i n some of the c a u s a l v a r i a b l e s d i s c u s s e d has been c o n s i d e r a b l e , but there i s l i t t l e evidence which would sup-p o r t or deny our s p e c u l a t i o n about s p i n o f f changes i n i n t e r -vening v a r i a b l e s . The l i t e r a t u r e on B r i t i s h Columbia p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y p r o v i d e s l i t t l e guidance, f o r example, about changes i n the q u a l i t y and extensiveness of the com-munication networks which b i n d together members of c o l l e c -t i v i t i e s or i n t e r e s t groups. As a r e s u l t , we are not able to s e t down complex models of the change process. We begin with the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t , given s o c i e t a l changes which d i d occur, i t i s p l a u s i b l e to expect an i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r o n g a s s o c i a t i o n between swing and the composition of v o t e r 13 aggregates. The p o s s i b i l i t i e s sketched i n t h i s s e c t i o n j u s t i f y i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h i s h y p o t h e s i s ; evidence of the p r e d i c t e d e l e c t o r a l developments would j u s t i f y f u r t h e r exam-i n a t i o n o f the processes i n v o l v e d . Patterning of Swing by Region The t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t e l e c t o r a l r e g i o n a l i s m i n c r e a s e d as l o c a l i s m d e c l i n e d . Rather than c a u s i n g the impact o f a r e a l i n f l u e n c e contexts t o d i m i n i s h , modernization may have broadened these c o n t e x t s . The m i l i e u x a s s o c i a t e d w i t h areas would continue t o i n f l u e n c e swings w h i l e becoming more s p a t i a l l y e x t e n s i v e . E l e c t o r a l i n f l u e n c e c l i m a t e s whose boundaries synchronized with r e g i o n a l ones would i n c r e a s i n g l y a f f e c t v o t e r s as r e g i o n a l boundaries came t o d e l i m i t r e l a -t i v e l y i n t e n s e p a t t e r n s of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , media d i f f u -s i o n , and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n t e r l o c k . V o t e rs would tend t o adopt r e g i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s . These e x p e c t a t i o n s run counter t o those which can be d e r i v e d from the cleavage e v o l u t i o n l i t e r a t u r e d i s c u s s e d i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n . The s c h o o l of thought i n t r o d u c e d t h e r e suggests t h a t a l l t e r r i t o r i a l e l e c t o r a l response p a t t e r n s , and not j u s t l o c a l i s t i c ones, should d e c l i n e as a consequence of modernization. As summarized by Blake, the argument i s t h a t : Over time, one can expect to see a s h i f t from a " t e r r i t o r i a l " cleavage pattern i n which "voting geography" i s highly c l u s -tered and i s characterized by the population of a region 14 defending p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l , ethnic or r e l i g i o u s , or econo-mic i n t e r e s t s against the nation i t s e l f or against other regions, to a "f u n c t i o n a l " cleavage pattern i n which s o c i a l c l a s s cleavages predominate.^ Although t h i s model of p o l i t i c a l e v o l u t i o n has r e c e i v e d some support i n t e s t s i n v o l v i n g European n a t i o n s , Blake's study-i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t does not f i t the E n g l i s h Canadian exper-i e n c e . In Canada, r e g i o n a l context has p e r s i s t e d as an important determinant of the vote i n s p i t e of the occurrence of some of the developments which the t h e o r i e s suggest w i l l cause e v o l u t i o n . There are, a c c o r d i n g to Blake, s e v e r a l 14 p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s o f these r e s u l t s . They may i n d i c a t e the p e r s i s t e n c e of r e g i o n a l socio-economic d i f f e r e n c e s such as those connected to v a r i a t i o n i n the r a t e of i n d u s t r i a l i -z a t i o n . Or they may s i g n a l the r i s e o f what J.M.S. C a r e l e s s r e f e r s t o as " l i m i t e d i d e n t i t i e s " based on ascendant p r o v i n -15 c i a l metropoles and p r o v i n c i a l governments. Some of these ideas c o n t r i b u t e t o the argument t h a t a t i g h t e n i n g of r e g i o n a l swing p a t t e r n s might p a r t i a l l y account f o r our o v e r a l l i n c r e a s e i n swing u n i f o r m i t y . Even though a l l regions w i t h i n B r i t i s h Columbia c o n t a i n mixes of economic groups, they are somewhat d i s t i n c t from one another i n t h e i r economic bases and i n the way they r e l a t e to the p r o v i n c i a l , n a t i o n a l , and t r a n s n a t i o n a l econo-mic systems. They d i f f e r i n t h e i r dependence on f o r e s t r y , tourism, mining, and a g r i c u l t u r e , as w e l l as wit h r e s p e c t t o 16 t h e i r s t a t u s along a m e t r o p o l i t a n - h i n t e r l a n d dimension. 15 With d i f f e r e n c e s l i k e these, presumably, go d i f f e r e n c e s i n o r i e n t a t i o n s towards p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and government p o l i -c i e s . Thus i t may be t h a t r e g i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n shared p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c ethos e x i s t , w i t h the p r e v a i l i n g preoccu-p a t i o n of each r e g i o n t e n d i n g to be widely shared across communities w i t h d i f f e r e n t economic bases, as w e l l as d i f -f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s w i t h i n the r e g i o n . Communities which vary i n these r e s p e c t s may c o a l e s c e around a d e s i r e f o r r e g i o n a l economic growth, a demand f o r government a c t i o n t o s t i m u l a t e the r e g i o n ' s main i n d u s t r y , a p e r c e p t i o n of u n f a i r treatment from a government, or a resentment of another r e g i o n . But why would modernization be expected to b r i n g about i n c r e a s e d r e g i o n a l i z a t i o n of e l e c t o r a l l y s a l i e n t a t t i t u d e s ? One argument may be drawn from C a r e l e s s ' d i s c u s s i o n of metro-p o l i t a n i s m . The nonmetropolitan p a r t s o f B r i t i s h Columbia are d o t t e d by r e g i o n a l c e n t r e s l i k e Kamloops, P r i n c e George, P r i n c e Rupert, Dawson Creek and Cranbrook. Perhaps, as the century progressed, these became more v i b r a n t , c o n f i d e n t c e n t r e s of r e g i o n a l economies i n the same way t h a t C a r e l e s s suggests c e n t r e s l i k e Vancouver and Edmonton became more ag g r e s s i v e l e a d e r s of p r o v i n c i a l economies. The growth of st r o n g r e g i o n a l c e n t r e s would, i n p a r t , have r e s u l t e d from improvements i n l i n k a g e s between these c e n t r e s and t h e i r p e r i p h e r i e s . And wit h these changes, i t c o u l d be argued, i n t e r e s t s based i n the submetropoles would become more e f f e c t i v e d i s s e m i n a t o r s of p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s and images to surrounding areas. An increasing degree of coincidence between swing patterns and regional boundaries would be expected as a consequence of t h i s i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of within-region p o l i t i c a l communications. While l i t t l e i s known about regionalism i n B r i t i s h Columbia e l e c t o r a l behaviour, most renderings of the conven-t i o n a l wisdom about p o l i t i c s i n the province do assert that region has had a role i n determining e l e c t o r a l preferences. Especially prominent i s the notion that tensions and d i f f e r -ences between the metropolitan and hinterland parts of the province have been important."*"^ The investigation of regional e f f e c t s reported i n Chapter 6 begins with analysis of differences across a crude metropolitan-hinterland d i v i s i o n . Our attention then turns to a more refined configuration of regions, and to additional analysis of regional differences within the nonmetropolitan parts of the province. Once again, the tests are designed to compare the extent to which e l e c t o r a l swing was patterned in d i f f e r e n t elections. The hypothesis, suggested by the arguments outlinedlhere,, i s that patterning of swing by regional differences should have increased over time. An Unpatterned Trend to Swing Uniformity Our three forays i n search of swing patterns produced negative r e s u l t s , and led us to j e t t i s o n most of the ideas 17 which underlie the patterning p o s s i b i l i t i e s . In eliminating these p o s s i b i l i t i e s , we added c r e d i b i l i t y to the view that the trend to swing uniformity was unpatterned. That i s , there simply appears to have been an increase i n the extent to which scattered and diverse voter aggregates produce par-a l l e l swings. The forces behind the trend to uniformity seem to have affected a l l voter aggregates, regardless of t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or geographical positions. Although t h i s path away from localism was i n i t i a l l y viewed as our "default option," i t does have p l a u s i b i l i t y . Several related arguments can be mounted i n support of the view that an unpatterned trend to uniformity should, indeed, have been expected. In developing these arguments we again face two ques-tions. F i r s t , what conditions would account for differences in the general uniformity of swing; and second, why would modernization enhance these conditions? Common sense suggests that o v e r a l l uniformity of swing should vary with the nature of e l e c t o r a l campaigns and the nature of the stimuli placed before voters. For example, i n elections featuring charismatic leaders, or i n "time of emergency" elections i n which appeals are made for s o l i d a r i t y against a common enemy, we would expect to f i n d greater than average uniformity of swing across scattered voter aggre-gates. In such elections, partisan forces would p r e v a i l r e l a t i v e l y evenly across the entire society, with issues 18 which operate d i f f e r e n t i a l l y across l o c a l i t y , c l a s s or r e g i o n a l l i n e s , b e i n g r e l e g a t e d to secondary importance behind what c o u l d be termed d i f f u s e i s s u e s . D i f f e r e n c e s which would normally be important would not be s i g n i f i c a n t i n such e l e c t i o n s and, i n e f f e c t , a l l v o t e r aggregates would be r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous with r e s p e c t to t h e i r concerns and r e a c t i o n s t o the dominant e l e c t o r a l s t i m u l i . A two p a r t argument can be presented i n support of the view t h a t modernization should i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of uniform swing. The f i r s t p a r t d e a l s with developments which should render an i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of the s o c i -e t y ' s v o t e r s s u s c e p t i b l e to u n i f y i n g or d i f f u s e appeals. The second p a r t suggests t h a t modernization put i n p l a c e the c o n d i t i o n s which make such appeals p o s s i b l e . Key elements f o r the f i r s t p a r t of the argument can be drawn from what may be termed the "new middle m a j o r i t y " p e r s p e c t i v e , 1 8 and from mass s o c i e t y theory. The f i r s t p e r s p e c t i v e emphasizes the way i n c r e a s e s i n a f f l u e n c e and the s i z e of the middle c l a s s d i m i n i s h the i n t e n s i t y of i d e o -l o g i c a l commitment. The second focusses i n p a r t on the weakening of connections between i n d i v i d u a l s and s o c i a l groups. Both suggest t h a t modernization may i n c r e a s e the pool of v o t e r s who are v u l n e r a b l e t o d i f f u s e appeals such as those c e n t r i n g on l e a d e r s h i p a t t r i b u t e s , or g e n e r a l i s s u e s l i k e honesty and competence. Such appeals are more l i k e l y t o have uniform impact across the s o c i e t y i f socio-economic 19 d i s t i n c t i o n s are weak and i f there i s less reliance on primary group opinion leaders. The second part of the argument proposes that the growth and universal penetration of elec t r o n i c mass media, espe c i a l l y t e l e v i s i o n , w i l l have important e f f e c t s . The advent of these media opens the way for elections conducted according to "advertising" or "mercantilist" campaign s t y l e s . During e l e c t i o n campaigns, party advertisers can di r e c t the same message at large undifferentiated pools of voters. And between elections, the d i f f e r e n t community- and constituency-l e v e l aggregates comprising the t o t a l electorate are pre-sented with s i m i l a r interpretations of p o l i t i c a l events and similar images of p o l i t i c s . Even more generally, " . . . the mass media encourage common c u l t u r a l patterns and values 21 among i t s heterogeneous audience." Contrary to the argu-ments we made above i n delineating the composition pattern-ing p o s s i b i l i t y , the role of groups and organizations may be undermined i n the age of t e l e v i s i o n , with the r e s u l t that there i s an increased p r o b a b i l i t y of a di r e c t flow of com-22 munication from source to audience. An extension of these arguments states that, with the preconditions for undifferentiated appeals i n place, agencies of p o l i t i c a l influence change the content of t h e i r messages to s u i t the new media. The way i s opened for successful appeals made on the basis of personality, or image, and for p o l i t i c a l messages which simplify r e a l i t y by constructing i t 20 i n terms of p r e v a i l i n g myths, or by l i n k i n g i t to powerful 23 symbols. With mass audiences i n reach, "lowest common denominator" appeals make more sense than appeals which s t r e s s d i v i s i o n w i t h i n s o c i e t y or the p a r t i c u l a r concerns o f l o c a l e l e c t o r a t e s . Conclusion We have i n t r o d u c e d the ideas which guided the f i r s t stage o f our e x p l o r a t i o n i n t o changes i n B r i t i s h Columbia e l e c t o r a l s o c i o l o g y . A f t e r t r a n s l a t i n g these ideas i n t o a workable r e s e a r c h d e s i g n i n Chapter 2, and o u t l i n i n g the~trend t o swing u n i f o r m i t y i n Chapter 3, we t e s t the p a t t e r n i n g hypotheses i n Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The p i c t u r e of e l e c t o r a l developments which emerges from these chapters serves as the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r the second stage of our a n a l y s i s . In t h i s second p a r t of the study we seek to e x p l a i n the t r e n d to swing u n i f o r m i t y by r e l a t i n g i t to communications develop-ments. In Chapters 7 and 8 we t e s t f o u r hypotheses which are d e r i v e d from the communications development t h e s i s . The r e s u l t s , w h i le not unambiguously s u p p o r t i v e of t h i s i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n , do suggest t h a t communications improvements had a key r o l e i n ca u s i n g the e l e c t o r a l developments. At the end of Chapter 8 we c o n s i d e r a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and s p e c u l a t e about a more d e t a i l e d map of c a u s a l mechanisms. That d i s c u s s i o n w i l l r e t u r n us t o the thoughts j u s t presented about the reasons f o r an unpatterned t r e n d t o swing u n i f o r m i t y . 21 The g e n e r a l focus of the t h e s i s , h i s t o r i c a l change i n e l e c t o r a l p a t t e r n s , has r e c e i v e d l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n from Canadian p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . P o l i t i c a l s o c i o l o g i s t s have sub j e c t e d the v o t i n g h i s t o r i e s of other s o c i e t i e s t o thorough analyses and have been rewarded with important i n s i g h t s con-24 cernxng the impact of modernization. But the " h i s t o r i c a l t r a c e s " c o n s t i t u t e d by data on Canada's e l e c t o r a l h i s t o r y 25 have remained f o r the most p a r t u n t i l l e d . Whatever the 2 6 reasons, t h i s n e g l e c t has had unfortunate i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t has meant t h a t Canadian p o l i t i c a l s o c i o l o g i s t s have i m p e r f e c t l y understood the r o o t s of the phenomena they study, and t h a t students of p o l i t i c a l modernization have been d e p r i v e d of the knowledge which might have been produced by more s t u d i e s of Canada's unique path to modernity. This study r e p r e s e n t s a step towards overcoming t h i s n e g l e c t . I t should advance our knowledge of B r i t i s h Columbia p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y , w h i l e at the same time p r o v i d i n g g e n e r a l i n s i g h t s about the impact of t w e n t i e t h century developments on the p o l i t i c a l s o c i o l o g i e s of g e o g r a p h i c a l l y d i v e r s e p o l i t i e s . 22 Footnotes ''"For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s on B r i t i s h Columbia geography see: J . Lewis Robinson, ed., Studies in Canadian Geography: B r i t i s h Columbia (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto P r e s s , 1972); and J . Lewis Robinson and Walter Hardwick, "The Canadian C o r d i l l e r a , " i n Canada: A Geographical I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , ed. J . Warkentin (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), chap. 13. 2 See i n f r a , chap. 7, f o r a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n of these developments. 3 . . K a r l W. Deutsch, " S o c i a l M o b i l i z a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l Development," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review.IN (Septem-ber 1961):494. 4 S t e i n Rokkan, wit h Angus Campbell, Per T o r s v i k and Henry Valen, C i t i z e n s , Elections, P a r t i e s : Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development (New York: David McKay Co., 1970), pp. 238-39. 5 See, f o r example, D a n i e l Lerner, The Passing of Trad%-t i o n a l Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1958); D a n i e l Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of M o d e r n i z a t i o n : A Set of C o n s i d e r a t i o n s , " i n Commun-i c a t i o n s and P o l i t i c a l Development, ed. L u c i e n Pye ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963), pp. 327-50; D a n i e l Lerner, "Communication Systems and S o c i a l Systems: A S t a t i s t i c a l E x p l o r a t i o n i n H i s t o r y and P o l i c y , " Behavioral Science 2 (1957):266-75; Samuel P. Huntington, P o l i t i c a l Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968). See a l s o the essays by S t e i n Rokkan e n t i t l e d : "Methods and Models i n the Comparative Study of N a t i o n - B u i l d i n g , " "Nation-B u i l d i n g , Cleavage Formation and the S t r u c t u r i n g of Mass P o l i t i c s , " "The M o b i l i z a t i o n of the P e r i p h e r y , " and " E l e c t o r a l M o b i l i z a t i o n , Party Competition and N a t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n , " i n Rokkan e t a l . , C i t i z e n s , Elections, P a r t i e s . A d d i t i o n a l w r i t i n g s by Deutsch on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between communica-t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l development i n c l u d e : K a r l Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of N a t i o n a l i t y (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953); and essays by Deutsch i n P h i l i p E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of P o l i t i c a l Communities ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : J . B. L i p p i n c o t t , 1964). There are i n t e r e s t i n g and important q u e s t i o n s concern-i n g the way the p r o v i n c i a l e q u i v a l e n t s of the n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g and i n t e g r a t i o n c r i s e s were n e g o t i a t e d d u r i n g the n i n e t e e n t h centuy. But d u r i n g t h i s century there have not been s e r i o u s t h r e a t s to the p e r s i s t e n c e of the B r i t i s h Columbia p o l i t i c a l 23 community even though i n t e r e s t s i n both border and non-border communities have p e r i o d i c a l l y expressed s e p a r a t i s t urges (see, f o r example, "Towns.I'in.e r a i l to jump s h i p — Golden, F e r n i e , Cariboo:., mutinous," Vancouver Sun3 February 15, 1974, pp. 1, 2). And not s i n c e Douglas and Begbie i n the 18 50's and 18 60's has there been any r e a l q u e s t i o n about regime l e g i t i m a c y . For the most p a r t , B r i t i s h Columbia's non-indigenous people a r r i v e d to f i n d p o l i t i c a l community w e l l d e f i n e d and p o l i t i c a l regime f i r m l y i n p l a c e . On the est a b l i s h m e n t o f p o l i t i c a l o r d e r i n n i n e t e e n t h century B r i t i s h Columbia see Margaret A. Ormsby, B r i t i s h Columbia: A History, Student ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1958), chaps. 5-11. 7 On settlement o f the p r o v i n c e see A l f r e d H. Siemens, "Settlement," i n Studies in Canadian Geography: B r i t i s h Columbia, pp. 9-31; and John Norris_, Strangers Entertained: A History of the Ethnic Groups of B r i t i s h Columbia (Vancouver: Evergreen Press, 1971). A few communities based on t r a d i -t i o n a l e t h n i c s o l i d a r i t i e s d i d take r o o t . Examples i n c l u d e Doukhobor communities i n the Kootenays, and the F i n n i s h community o f S o i n t u l a on the c o a s t , g An a b s t r a c t model o f cleavage e v o l u t i o n and d i s c u s s i o n of the impact of the n a t i o n a l and i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n s on cleavage and p a r t y systems i n European n a t i o n s i s p r o v i d e d i n Seymour M. L i p s e t and S t e i n Rokkan, "Cleavage S t r u c t u r e s , Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An I n t r o d u c t i o n , " i n Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspec-t i v e s , eds. Seymour M. L i p s e t and S t e i n Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-65. See a l s o Rokkan, "Nation-B u i l d i n g , " and "The M o b i l i z a t i o n of the P e r i p h e r y . " For a more g e o g r a p h i c a l approach to cleavage e v o l u t i o n see Kevin Cox, "The S p a t i a l E v o l u t i o n of N a t i o n a l V o t i n g Response Su r f a c e s : Theory and Measurement," a paper presented at the 1969 annual meeting of the American P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , New York. For a summary of cleavage e v o l u t i o n l i t e r a t u r e see Donald E. Blake, "The Measurement o f Region-a l i s m i n Canadian V o t i n g P a t t e r n s , " Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science V (March 1972):55-59. For a study of h i s t o r i c a l realignments i n American e l e c t o r a l support bases which i s based on a d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e than the t h e o r i e s of European cleavage e v o l u t i o n , and which f i n d s t h a t r e a l i g n -ments r e c u r p e r i o d i c a l l y , see Walter Dean Burnham, C r i t i c a l ' 1 -Elections and the Mainspring of American P o l i t i c s (New York: Norton, 1970). In a s i m i l a r v e i n see V. O. Key, "A Theory of C r i t i c a l E l e c t i o n s , " Journal of P o l i t i c s 17 (February 1955): 3-18. Donald E. Stokes has a l s o t r e a t e d h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n of American vote behaviour and found evidence of d e c l i n i n g l o c a l i s m . T h i s change, i t i s s p e c u l a t e d , may be l i n k e d t o the changing s t r u c t u r e of mass communications. See " P a r t i e s 24 and the N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of E l e c t o r a l F o r c e s , " i n The American Party System: Stages of P o l i t i c a l Development, eds. Walter Dean Burnham and W i l l i a m N i s b e t Chambers (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967), pp. 182-202. 9 L i p s e t and Rokkan, "Cleavage S t r u c t u r e s , " p. 10. "^Kevin R. Cox, "The S p a t i a l S t r u c t u r i n g of Information Flow and P a r t i s a n A t t i t u d e s , " i n Social Ecology, eds. M a t t e i Dogan and S t e i n Rokkan (Cambridge: MIT P r e s s , 1969), p. 165. Cox f i n d s support f o r the p a r t of the h y p o t h e s i s which con-cerns the r o l e of formal s o c i a l networks. That i s , people b e l o n g i n g to " a r e a l l y i n t e n s i v e " formal o r g a n i z a t i o n s (e.g., l o c a l s e r v i c e groups, church groups) but not " a r e a l l y exten-s i v e " formal o r g a n i z a t i o n s (e.g., labour unions, v e t e r a n s ' clubs) are much more a f f e c t e d by the l o c a l c o n t e x t . No s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s are found when the comparison i s made acr o s s i n t e n s i v e and e x t e n s i v e i n f o r m a l networks. For r e l a t e d f i n d i n g s which concern the e f f e c t s of membership i n d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o u s groups on the power of the l o c a l c ontext see David R. Segal and M a r s h a l l W. Meyer, "The S o c i a l Context of P o l i t i c a l P a r t i s a n s h i p , " i n Social Ecology, pp. 217-32. r e l a t e d p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t g r e a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s ' exposure to p r o v i n c i a l i z e d communications might s u r f a c e once p r o v i n c i a l i z e d s t i m u l i became more impor-t a n t . For example, s t u d i e s of exposure to the Nixon-Kennedy t e l e v i s i o n debates found marked v a r i a n c e across e d u c a t i o n a l and r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n d i f f e r e n c e s . Such d i f f e r e n c e s might t r a n s l a t e t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n e l e c t o r a l response across c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . P a t t e r n s of swing would then be r e l a t e d t o community composition. See E l i h u Katz and Jacob J . Feldman, "The Debates i n the L i g h t of Research: A Survey of Surveys," i n The Process and Effects of Mass Communications, rev. ed., eds. Wilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts (Urbana: U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s P r ess, 1971), pp. 715-21. 12 The c o n t e x t u a l p e r s p e c t i v e has been emphasized i n Donald E. Blake, "Constituency Contexts and Canadian E l e c -t i o n s : An E x p l o r a t o r y Study," Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science XI (June 1978). Blake argues t h a t the c o n s t i t u e n c y context w i l l be p a r t i a l l y determined by i t s competitiveness and the b a l l o t a l t e r n a t i v e s o f f e r e d , as w e l l as by i t s com-p o s i t i o n . His study shows t h a t c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , p a t t e r n of c o n t e s t , t urnout, along w i t h c e r t a i n e t h n i c and o c c u p a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s r e l a t e t o d e v i a t i o n s from c o n s t i t u e n c y vote (f o r the L i b e r a l P arty i n 1968) p r e d i c t e d from knowledge of composition and i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . For a study which summarizes a good d e a l of the American r e s e a r c h on c o n t e x t u a l e f f e c t s see G e r a l d C. Wright, J r . , "Contextual Models of E l e c t o r a l Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote," 25 American P o l i t i c a l Science Review LXXI (June 1977):497-508. 13 Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism i n Canadian V o t i n g P a t t e r n s , " p. 57. For a b r i e f summary of the "de-r e g i o n a l i z a t i o n " theory see M i l d r e d A. Schwartz, P o l i t i c s and T e r r i t o r y , the Sociology of Regional Persistence in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974), pp. 7-12. 14 Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism i n Canadian V o t i n g P a t t e r n s . " 15 J . M. S. C a r e l e s s , " ' L i m i t e d I d e n t i t i e s ' i n Canada," Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review L (March 1969):1-10. 16 For i n t r o d u c t i o n to B r i t i s h Columbia's r e g i o n a l economic geography see Ronald A. Shearer, "The Development of the B r i t i s h Columbia Economy: The Record and the Issues," i n E x p l o i t i n g Our Economic Potential, ed. R. Shearer (Toronto: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 5-8; K. G. Denike and Roger Leigh , "Economic Geography, 1960-70," i n Studies in Canadian Geography: B r i t i s h Columbia, chap. 4; and James George N e s b i t t , "Regional D i f f e r e n c e s i n the S t r u c t u r e and Growth of Manufacturing i n B r i t i s h Columbia" (M.A. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1973). 17 See, f o r example, E. R. Black, " B r i t i s h Columbia: The P o l i t i c s o f E x p l o i t a t i o n , " i n E x p l o i t i n g Our Economic Poten-t i a l , p. 25; and M a r t i n Robin, "The P o l i t i c s of C l a s s Con-f l i c t , " i n Canadian P r o v i n c i a l P o l i t i c s : The Party Systems of the Ten Provinces, ed. M a r t i n Robin (Scarborough: P r e n t i c e -H a l l , 1972), pp. 36-37. 18 For example, see Seymour M a r t i n L i p s e t , "The Changing C l a s s S t r u c t u r e and Contemporary European P o l i t i c s , " Daedalus, No. 93 (1964), pp. 271-303; Otto Kirchheimer, "The T r a n s f o r -mation of the Western European Party Systems," i n P o l i t i c a l Parties and P o l i t i c a l Development, eds. Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966), pp. 177-200; and Robert E. Lane, "The P o l i t i c s of Consensus i n an Age of A f f l u e n c e , " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review LIX (December 1965):874-95. 19 On mass s o c i e t y theory see W i l l i a m Kornhauser, The P o l i t i c s of Mass Society (Glencoe: The Free P r e s s , 1955); Edward A. S h i l s , "The Theory of Mass S o c i e t y , " i n Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology, by Edward A. S h i l s (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1975); and Harold L. Wilensky, "Mass S o c i e t y and Mass C u l t u r e , " i n Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, 2d ed., eds. Bernard B e r e l s o n and M o r r i s Janowitz (New York: The Free Press, 26 1966), pp. 293-327. For a b r i e f review of c l a s s i c a l v e r s i o n s of mass s o c i e t y w r i t i n g from Comte through Tonnies and Durk-heim see Me l v i n L. D e f l e u r and Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Theories of Mass Communication, 3d ed. (New York: David McKay Co., 1975), chap. 6. 20 Ric h a r d Jensen, "American E l e c t i o n Campaigns: A Theo-r e t i c a l and H i s t o r i c a l Typology," a paper d e l i v e r e d at the 1968 convention of the Midwest P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , c i t e d i n Walter Dean Burnham, C r i t i c a l Elections and the Mainspring . of American P o l i t i c s , pp. 72-73, 95-96. Jensen c o n t r a s t s the a d v e r t i s i n g campaign s t y l e w i t h the m i l i t a r i s t s t y l e which was r e l i a n t on a s t r o n g l y motivated o r g a n i z a t i o n at the l o c a l l e v e l . In the a d v e r t i s i n g s t y l e "an appeal must be made to u n a f f i l i a t e d o r independent v o t e r s and i t can no lo n g e r be made by r e a c t i v a t i o n o f p a r t y l o y a l t y . A d v e r t i s i n g i s the b a s i c technique of the m e r c a n t i l i s t i c s t y l e , and v o t e r s are t r e a t e d l i k e p o t e n t i a l consumers of merchandise" (Jensen quoted i n Burnham, p. 96). 21 Harvey Waterman, P o l i t i c a l Change in Contemporary France: The P o l i t i c s of an I n d u s t r i a l Democracy (Columbus: Charles E. M e r r i l l , 1969), p. 35. 22 Arguments about the importance of the mass media (and about the tendency of primary and secondary group r e l a t i o n s to atrophy i n mass s o c i e t y ) have, of course, been met with arguments based on the well-known evidence t h a t the impor-tance of f a c e - t o - f a c e o p i n i o n l e a d e r s p e r s i s t s even a f t e r mass media. T h i s evidence i s put forward i n s e v e r a l s t u d i e s which p o s t u l a t e a two-step flow o f communication from the media t o o p i n i o n l e a d e r s , and then to l e s s i n v o l v e d members of the mass p u b l i c . See, f o r example, Paul F. L a z a r s f e l d , Bernard B e r e l s o n , and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1948); Bernard B e r e l s o n , Paul F. L a z a r s f e l d and W i l l i a m N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a P r e s i d e n t i a l Campaign (Chicago: U n i -v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1954); E l i h u Katz and P. F. L a z a r s -f e l d , Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955); and Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: The Free Press, 1960). The argument t h a t the mass media's importance should not be downplayed has been l e d by Kurt and Gladys Lang. They argue t h a t campaign s t u d i e s such as the E l m i r a study " . . . have focused on the short-range i n f l u e n c e s o p e r a t i n g d u r i n g the p e r i o d of a c t i v e e l e c t i o n e e r -i n g and on how these culminate i n a f i n a l v o t i n g d e c i s i o n . I t so happens . . . t h a t t h i s approach t o the problem, w i t h i t s emphasis on i n d i v i d u a l c o n v e r s i o n d u r i n g the ' o f f i c i a l ' campaign, minimizes the important cumulative i n f l u e n c e s of the mass media and emphasizes i n s t e a d how p o l i t i c a l communi-27 c a t i o n s are t r a n s m i t t e d through p e r s o n a l networks." Accord-in g to the Langs, i n s t e a d of f o c u s s i n g on the l i m i t s o f media i n f l u e n c e we should t r y to c l a r i f y the "cumulative and so c i e t y - w i d e e f f e c t s about which we o f t e n t a l k vaguely as s h i f t s i n p u b l i c moods or d r i f t s i n p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n . " Such s h i f t s o f t e n occur between, r a t h e r than d u r i n g , campaigns. See Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, "The Mass Media and V o t i n g , " i n American Voting Behavior, eds. Eugene Burdick and A. Brodbeck (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 234-35. A l s o s u p p o r t i v e o f the "unmediated communications flow" hypothesis are: Denis McQuail, "The I n f l u e n c e and E f f e c t s of Mass Media," i n Mass Communication and Society, eds. James Curran, Michael G u r e v i t c h , and Janet W o o l l a c o t t (London: Edward A r n o l d Pub-l i s h e r s i n a s s o c i a t i o n with The Open U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977); D o r i s A. Graber, Verbal Behavior and P o l i t i c s (Urbana: U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s P r ess, 1976), chap. 6, "Mass Media and the V e r b a l D e f i n i t i o n o f P o l i t i c a l R e a l i t y " ; John P. Robinson, " I n t e r p e r s o n a l I n f l u e n c e i n E l e c t i o n Campaigns: Two Step-Flow Hypotheses," Public Opinion Quarterly 40 ( F a l l 1976):304-19; Walter Weiss, " E f f e c t s of the Mass Media of Communication," i n Handbook of Social Psychology, 2d ed., V o l . 5, eds. Gardner Lindzey and E l l i o t Aronson (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 141-54; and Karen Siune and F. G e r a l d K l i n e , "Communication, Mass P o l i t i c a l Behavior, and Mass S o c i e t y , " i n P o l i t i c a l Communication: Issues and Strat-egies for Research, ed. Steven H. Chaffee (Beverly H i l l s : Sage P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1975), pp. 65-84. 23 On "image" and "symbolic" p o l i t i c s see Graber, Verbal Behavior and P o l i t i c s ; Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of P o l i t i c s (Urbana: U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s P r ess, 1964); and Murray Edelman, P o l i t i c s as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago: Markham P u b l i s h i n g , 1972). 24 For examples, see essays c o l l e c t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g : Rokkan e t a l . , C i t i z e n s , Elections, P a r t i e s ; L i p s e t and Rok-kan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments; Burnham and Chambers, eds., The American Party System; Dogan and Rokkan, eds., Social Ecology, p a r t s 5 and 6; La Palombara and Weiner, eds., P o l i t i c a l Parties and P o l i t i c a l Development; S t e i n Rokkan, ed., Approaches to the Study of P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a -tion (Bergen: The Michelson I n s t i t u t e , 1962); R i c h a r d L. Mer-r i t t and S t e i n Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Crossnational Research (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966); E r i k A l l a r d t and Y r j o L i t t u n e n , eds., Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative P o l i t i c a l Sociology ( H e l s i n k i : Westermarck S o c i e t y , 1964); R i c h a r d Rose, ed., Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook (New York: Free P r e s s , 1974); and E r i k A l l a r d t and S t e i n Rokkan, eds., Mass P o l i t i c s (New York: Free Press, 1970). Survey r e s e a r c h e r s have a l s o shown 28 i n c r e a s i n g i n t e r e s t i n h i s t o r i c a l change i n v o t i n g p a t t e r n s . See, f o r example, Paul R. Abramson, Generational Change in American P o l i t i c s (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975); and Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. P e t r o c i k , The Changing American Voter (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1976). 25 The most no t a b l e r e s e a r c h on change i n Canadian e l e c -t o r a l p a t t e r n s i s Donald E. Blake, "The Measurement of Regionalism i n Canadian V o t i n g P a t t e r n s . " For e x p l o r a t i o n of a theory which connects modernization to changes i n the p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y systems and p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s , see John Wilson, "The Canadian P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e s : Towards a R e d e f i n -i t i o n o f the Nature of the Canadian P o l i t i c a l System," Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science VII (September 1974): 438-83. 2 6 S e v e r a l reasons may be put forward. The Canadian p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e p r o f e s s i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l and the labours of i t s members are spread t h i n l y a c r o s s a l a r g e num-ber of s u b j e c t areas. Most of those i n t e r e s t e d i n e l e c t o r a l behaviour have favoured survey r e s e a r c h , and d u r i n g the l a s t decade or so have found ample o u t l e t f o r t h e i r e n e r g i e s i n the task of a n a l y z i n g the r e s u l t s of n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s u r -veys conducted i n 1965, 1968 and 1974. For a review of e l e c t o r a l behaviour r e s e a r c h i n Canada, see Donald E. Blake, and David J . E l k i n s , " V oting Research i n Canada: Problems and P r o s p e c t s , " Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science V I I I (June 1975):313^25; arid J . C. T e r r y and R. S c h u l t z , "Canadian E l e c t o r a l Behaviour: A P r o p o s i t i o n a l Inventory," i n The Canadian P o l i t i c a l Process: A Reader, rev. ed., eds. Orest M. Kruhlakj, ,, R i c h a r d S c h u l t z and Sidney I. Pobihushchy (Toronto: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 248-85. Those i n c l i n e d t o examine h i s t o r i c a l e l e c t o r a l r e t u r n s may have been discouraged by the p r a c t i c a l problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h f i t t i n g h i s t o r i c a l census and e l e c t o r a l data, the q u a l -i t y of data, or by s k e p t i c i s m about the v a l i d i t y of i n f e r -ences from aggregate data a n a l y s i s . For d i s c u s s i o n of these problems see: W. S. Robinson, " E c o l o g i c a l C o r r e l a t i o n s and the Behavior of I n d i v i d u a l s , " American Sociological Review 15 (June 1950):351-57; and W. P h i l l i p s S h i v e l y , " ' E c o l o g i c a l ' I n f e r e n c e : The Use of Aggregate Data to Study I n d i v i d u a l s , " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review 63 (December 1969):1183-96. For more g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n s concerning the use o f aggregate e l e c t o r a l data see Juan J . L i n z , " E c o l o g i c a l A n a l y s i s and Survey Research," i n Dogan and Rokkan, eds., Social Ecology, pp. 91-132; and John Wilson, "The Use of Aggregate Data i n the A n a l y s i s of Canadian E l e c t o r a l Behaviour," a paper pre-sented t o the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n Confer-ence on S t a t i s t i c s , C a r l e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , Ottawa, 1967. For comments on the p a s t and f u t u r e use of aggregate data i n 29 American e l e c t o r a l s t u d i e s see Walter Dean Burnham, "The Un i t e d S t a t e s : The P o l i t i c s of Heterogeneity," i n Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook, ed. Rose, pp. 695-97. CHAPTER 2 INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE STUDY Th i s chapter o u t l i n e s the steps i n v o l v e d i n t r a n s l a t i n g the e x p l o r a t o r y sketch o f the p r e v i o u s chapter i n t o a work-able r e s e a r c h design. The f i r s t p a r t of the chapter con-s i d e r s i n f e r e n c e s which can be drawn from evidence about l e v e l s of swing u n i f o r m i t y and swing p a t t e r n i n g . The second p a r t i n t r o d u c e s the a v a i l a b l e data, and c o n s i d e r s o p t i o n s concerning the a p p l i c a t i o n of these data to the questions before us. The a n a l y s i s d e a l s w i t h e l e c t o r a l swing--the s h i f t i n a p a r t y ' s percentage support between two s u c c e s s i v e e l e c t i o n s . We adopt swing as our c e n t r a l focus because i t i s the b e s t a v a i l a b l e i n d i c a t o r of an aggregate's response to e l e c t o r a l f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g at a given time. F o l l o w i n g from t h i s , we can say t h a t measures based on swing p r o v i d e the b e s t b a s i s f o r i n f e r e n c e s about the u n i f o r m i t y and p a t t e r n i n g of f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g i n one e l e c t i o n , and thus, the b e s t grounds f o r comparison across e l e c t i o n s . The study begins w i t h evidence t h a t the swings of v o t e r aggregates ( c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and communities) became more uniform as the t w e n t i e t h century progressed. We seek to account f o r t h i s i n c r e a s e i n u n i f o r m i t y by examining changes 30 31 i n the way swing was p a t t e r n e d by c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the aggregates. The s t u d i e s of p a t t e r n i n g are based on the simple t r u i s m t h a t t o t a l swing v a r i a t i o n i n a given e l e c t i o n can be d i v i d e d i n t o within-groups and between-groups compon-ents. As the diagram i n F i g u r e 1 i n d i c a t e s , we begin w i t h knowledge t h a t the t o t a l magnitude of swing v a r i a t i o n d e c l i n e d , but with no knowledge about changes i n the r e l a t i v e s i z e s of the w i t h i n - and between-groups components. T o t a l Swing V a r i a t i o n at E l e c t i o n 1 (E1;) (declines) T o t a l Swing Va r i a t i o n at E~ Within-Groups V a r i a t i o n at Ei + (?) Within-Groups V a r i a t i o n at E„ Between-Groups V a r i a t i o n at Ei (?) + Between-Groups V a r i a t i o n at E n FIGURE 1: Diagram depicting the evolution of within- and between-groups variance components. We w i l l conduct three separate analyses of changes i n the w i t h i n - and between-groups components. E l e c t o r a l com-p e t i t i v e n e s s , socio-economic composition, and r e g i o n w i l l each take t h e i r t u r n as the p a t t e r n i n g agent under i n v e s t i -g a t i o n or, i n other words, as the v a r i a b l e which d e f i n e s "group." Each of these analyses should t u r n up one of th r e e t h i n g s : the w i t h i n - and between-groups components may d e c l i n e i n unison, o r e i t h e r of these components may d e c l i n e more r a p i d l y than the other. That i s , the p a t t e r n i n g s t u d i e s w i l l t e l l us which of the combinations shown i n F i g u r e 2 should r e p l a c e the q u e s t i o n marks i n F i g u r e 1. Wi thin-Groups Between-Groups Component Component Combination (a) Rate of decline = Rate of decline Combination (b) Rate of decline > Rate of decline Combination (c) Rate of decline < Rate of decline FIGURE 2: Three possible trends i n the r e l a t i v e magnitude of within-and between-groups components. Combination, (b) would i n d i c a t e t h a t the v a r i a b l e i n q u e s t i o n had i n c r e a s e d i n importance as a c o r r e l a t e of swing. Some of the d e c l i n e i n t o t a l v a r i a t i o n i n swing c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d to t i g h t e r p a t t e r n i n g around d i f f e r e n c e s on t h i s dimension. Combination (c) would i n d i c a t e a decrease i n p a t t e r n i n g w h i l e combination (a) would i n d i c a t e no change. I f the r e s u l t s i n Chapters 4, 5, and 6 i n d i c a t e t h a t e i t h e r (a) or (c) d e s c r i b e s developments, then we w i l l conclude t h a t the d e c l i n i n g o v e r a l l v a r i a t i o n i n swing was unpatterned. E s s e n t i a l l y , then, the examination of swing p a t t e r n i n g i n v o l v e s t e s t s f o r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and comparison of r e l a t i o n -s h i p s o b t a i n i n g i n d i f f e r e n t e l e c t i o n s . The techniques range from simple a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e to m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n , but i n a l l t e s t s the degree of p a t t e r n i n g w i l l hinge on whether u n i f o r m i t y of swing among cases s h a r i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s occurs i n combination with v a r i a t i o n across cases d i f f e r i n g i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 33 The proposed a n a l y s i s r a i s e s three q u e s t i o n s about the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of uniform swing. None of these would a r i s e i f the concern was simply t o p r e s e n t d e s c r i p t i v e i n f o r -mation about the changing degree of v a r i a t i o n i n swing. A l l a r i s e because of a concern, i n t h i s and o t h e r s t u d i e s u s i n g aggregate data and thus swing as a measure of e l e c t o r a l s h i f t s , t o draw i n f e r e n c e s about the d i r e c t i o n and magnitude of i n f l u e n c e s o p e r a t i n g on d i f f e r e n t v o t e r aggregates. Inferences from Uniform Swings to Uniform Forces: The Stokes-Katz Exchange The conceptual q u e s t i o n s to be d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n r e l a t e to a model of e l e c t o r a l f o r c e s which was developed by Donald Stokes.^" T h i s model has subsequently been a p p l i e d , i n o r i g i n a l or '.adapted form, i n analyses of e l e c t o r a l s h i f t s 2 i n a number of n a t i o n s . The model cannot be adopted i n the present study s i n c e a c o n d i t i o n f o r i t s a p p l i c a t i o n — " r u n s " of e l e c t i o n s between c o n s t i t u e n c y boundary a d j u s t m e n t s — i s not s a t i s f i e d f o r the e a r l y p e r i o d s which we wish to examine. But arguments concerning the v a l i d i t y of the Stokes model deserve f u l l a t t e n t i o n s i n c e our methodology r e s t s on the same g e n e r a l assumptions. The Stokes model a s s i g n s v a r i a n c e i n e l e c t o r a l swing to n a t i o n a l , r e g i o n a l ( s t a t e or p r o v i n c i a l ) , and l o c a l l e v e l s of i n f l u e n c e . The main assumption i s t h a t uniform swings by the l o c a l u n i t s comprising a l a r g e r t e r r i t o r y (that i s , a 34 r e g i o n or nation) i n d i c a t e t h a t uniform e l e c t o r a l f o r c e s are o p e r a t i n g a c r o s s t h a t t e r r i t o r y . So, f o r example, n a t i o n a l f o r c e s are i n f e r r e d to be stro n g to the exte n t t h a t there i s u n i f o r m i t y of swing across the n a t i o n . A high p r o p o r t i o n of v a r i a n c e i n swing i s a t t r i b u t e d to r e g i o n a l f o r c e s i f th e r e i s h i g h w i t h i n - r e g i o n u n i f o r m i t y o f swing i n combination w i t h marked between-region d i f f e r e n c e s . L o c a l f o r c e s are assumed to be st r o n g where there i s l i t t l e u n i f o r m i t y of swing across e i t h e r n a t i o n o r r e g i o n . In the words of Stokes: I t can be seen i n t u i t i v e l y that i f the forces moving the el e c -torate were p e r f e c t l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c to i n d i v i d u a l constituen-c i e s , v a r i a t i o n s of turnout or party strength would show no more than a chance s i m i l a r i t y across the constituencies of a state or region or across the whole nation. Detecting no more than a chance s i m i l a r i t y , the model would a t t r i b u t e a l l forces on e l e c t o r a l change to the constituency, l e v e l . But i f p o l i t i c s at the state or national l e v e l d i d have common e f f e c t s across a number of constituencies, turnout or party strength would show p a r a l l e l movements, and the model would a t t r i b u t e an influence to these higher l e v e l s of p o l i t i c s according to the degree of observed s i m i l a r i t y . In t h i s manner the t o t a l average variance of turnout or party strength can be p a r t i t i o n e d into components due to forces acting on the electorate at each of several l e v e l s . Stokes c o n f r o n t s the argument t h a t h i s model may produce i n f l a t e d estimates o f the n a t i o n a l component's importance by i n c o r r e c t l y a t t r i b u t i n g to hi g h e r l e v e l s , s t a t e (or d i s t r i c t ) swing v a r i a t i o n which i s uniform but which i s a c t u a l l y caused by s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t f o r c e s . (A p a r a l l e l argument c o u l d be made about estimates of s t a t e e f f e c t s being i n f l a t e d by l o c a l l y determined, but uniform, d i s t r i c t swings.) Acco r d i n g to Stokes, i f the number of s t a t e s and d i s t r i c t s i n the n a t i o n i s l a r g e , ". . . i t would be very u n l i k e l y t h a t the average o f the vote over the whole country would be d e f l e c t e d by the net e f f e c t of what i s happening a t the s t a t e l e v e l . " To the extent t h a t s t a t e and d i s t r i c t e f f e c t s are independent from one area to the next, they tend to c a n c e l each o t h e r . "Therefore, when the n a t i o n a l turnout or p a r t y d i v i s i o n moved, we c o u l d be sure t h a t i t s v a r i a t i o n was due to n a t i o n a l f o r c e s which i n f l u e n c e the vote i n most or a l l of the s t a t e s and d i s t r i c t s — a n d not to a sum of s t a t e or d i s -5 t r i c t f o r c e s . " A more b a s i c problem i s a t the hub of R i c h a r d Katz's c r i t i c i s m s of the Stokes model. Katz argues t h a t i f l o c a l d i s t r i c t s are not i d e n t i c a l on e l e c t o r a l l y s a l i e n t i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s (such as socio-economic c o m p o s i t i o n ) , then we should not expect t h a t uniform f o r c e s w i l l r e s u l t i n uniform swing. And c o n v e r s e l y , evidence of uniform swing across d i s t r i c t s which vary i n i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s , should be taken to i n d i c a t e t h a t the o p e r a t i v e f o r c e s are d i f f e r e n t r a t h e r than uniform. As Katz puts i t , i f i t i s accepted t h a t l o c a l u n i t s d i f f e r on c e r t a i n dimensions, then ". . . s i n c e d i f f e r -ent groups may r e a c t i n o p p o s i t e ways to the same s t i m u l u s , the d i r e c t i o n as w e l l as the magnitude of the s h i f t caused 7 by a s i n g l e f a c t o r may vary across d i s t r i c t s . " Katz's p o i n t can be seen i n the diagram presented i n F i g u r e 3. T h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n i s modelled on a simple stimulus-organism-response paradigm. I t i s assumed t h a t aggregates (such as c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ) can be assigned d i s t i n c t " r e s i s t a n c e " scores t o s i g n i f y d i f f e r e n c e s i n e l e c t o r a l l y Four hypothetical constituencies with shading to ind i c a t e Strength of net the degree of resistance p a r t i s a n force to p a r t i s a n force E l e c t o r a l swing FIGURE 3: Swings r e s u l t i n g when uniform e l e c t o r a l forces operate on hypothetical constituencies with varying resistance l e v e l s . s a l i e n t i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s . These scores i n d i c a t e the aggre-gate's r e s i s t a n c e (or o p p o s i t e l y , i t s s u s c e p t i b i l i t y ) t o p r e v a i l i n g p a r t i s a n f o r c e s . In the diagram, these r e s i s t a n c e l e v e l s are represented by the shading of the h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , w i t h those which are more r e s i s t a n t (say, f o r example, t o pro-government f o r c e s ) shaded more h e a v i l y . I t can r e a d i l y be seen t h a t net p a r t i s a n f o r c e s o f the same d i r e c t i o n and magnitude, represented by arrows of equal l e n g t h i n the l e f t s i d e o f the diagram, cause d i f f e r e n t swings. C l e a r l y , then, non-uniform swings do not n e c e s s a r i l y s i g n a l the o p e r a t i o n of non-uniform f o r c e s . And j u s t as c l e a r l y , i t c o u l d be i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t uniform swings are not n e c e s s a r i l y produced by uniform f o r c e s . Katz o f f e r s an a l t e r n a t i v e model as a b a s i s f o r i n f e r -ences about the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f n a t i o n a l , s t a t e , and l o c a l f o r c e s . T h i s model i s s i m i l a r to the Stokes model i n i t s assumption t h a t f o r c e s from these l e v e l s determine swings around the normal d i s t r i c t vote, but i t i s grounded on d i f -f e r e n t assumptions about the way i n which l o c a l vote d e f l e c -t i o n s should be a t t r i b u t e d t o hig h e r l e v e l f o r c e s . Katz proposes a l e s s s t r i n g e n t s e t of c o n d i t i o n s f o r the a t t r i b u -t i o n of v a r i a n c e t o n a t i o n a l and s t a t e components. Stokes assumes t h a t a l o c a l u n i t i s n a t i o n a l i z e d to the degree t h a t i t s swings match n a t i o n a l swings i n d i r e c t i o n and magnitude. Katz, on the other hand, argues t h a t i t i s the degree of covari a n c e between l o c a l and n a t i o n a l (or st a t e ) swings which should determine the importance a t t r i b u t e d to the 38 h i g h e r l e v e l f o r c e s . Thus, i n the Katz model, i t i s accepted t h a t the same f o r c e s -may have d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s on d i f f e r e n t l o c a l u n i t s . I f l o c a l and n a t i o n a l swings covary c l o s e l y a c r o s s a s e r i e s of e l e c t i o n s ( i f , i n other words, there i s a c l o s e l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between swings at the two l e v e l s ) , then the l o c a l swing i s taken to be determined by n a t i o n a l f o r c e s . L o c a l u n i t s may be e q u a l l y n a t i o n a l i z e d whether t h e i r s h i f t s are n e g a t i v e l y or p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to n a t i o n a l s h i f t s ; i t i s the maintenance o f a c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n of c o v a r i a t i o n which i s c r u c i a l . And the magnitude o f c o n s t i t u e n c y swing need not match the magnitude of the n a t i o n a l swing f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p to be s t r o n g — a d i s t r i c t which, f o r example, swings +10 percentage p o i n t s each time the n a t i o n swings +10 percentage p o i n t s i s assumed to be no more a f f e c t e d by n a t i o n a l f o r c e s than one which s h i f t s +5 p o i n t s i n response to each n a t i o n a l s h i f t of +10 p o i n t s . In the Katz model, then, the' c o n s i s t e n c y o f c o v a r i a t i o n i n l o c a l and n a t i o n a l or s t a t e swings i s the c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n e s t i m a t i n g the importance of h i g h e r - o r d e r f o r c e s . The p r o p o r t i o n of d i s t r i c t v a r i a n c e e x p l a i n e d by n a t i o n a l f o r c e s w i l l be low where, on an average across d i s t r i c t s , t h e r e i s a poor f i t between the data and the l i n e a r equation express-i n g l o c a l swings as a f u n c t i o n of n a t i o n a l swings. In the h y p o t h e t i c a l example diagrammed i n F i g u r e 4, D i s t r i c t s A and B were both s t r o n g l y a f f e c t e d by n a t i o n a l f o r c e s d u r i n g the E i to E 6 p e r i o d . D i s t r i c t A's swings c o r r e l a t e n e g a t i v e l y FIGURE 4: The Katz model: r e s u l t s showing c o r r e l a t i o n between national vote movement and vote movement i n three hypothetical d i s -t r i c t s across s i x e l e c t i o n s . 40 with the n a t i o n a l swings, w h i l e D i s t r i c t B's c o r r e l a t e p o s i -t i v e l y , but i n both cases the c o r r e l a t i o n i s s t r o n g . Vote movements i n D i s t r i c t C, on the other hand, do not seem to r e l a t e t o the n a t i o n a l movements. Katz's o v e r a l l estimate of the importance of n a t i o n a l f o r c e s i s based on an average of r e s u l t s from d i s t r i c t s l i k e these. The n a t i o n a l estimate w i l l c l e a r l y be h i g h i f there are few cases l i k e D i s t r i c t C. I t i s our c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Katz f a i l s t o s o l v e a l l of the problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the Stokes v a r i a n c e a t t r i b u t i o n g model. Katz has c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d the problems a s s o c i -ated with Stokes's r e s t r i c t i v e assumptions concerning c o n d i -t i o n s necessary f o r the a t t r i b u t i o n of uniform f o r c e s . I t i s t r u e t h a t uniform f o r c e s may cause swings which are not uniform i n magnitude and d i r e c t i o n . By t a k i n g o t h e r p o s s i -b i l i t i e s i n t o account, Katz c o n s t r u c t s a model which a t t r i -butes t o h i g h e r - l e v e l f o r c e s those swings which d i f f e r i n magnitude and d i r e c t i o n but which are a c t u a l l y produced by the same f o r c e s . But there i s another s i d e t o the problem. N e i t h e r u n i -form swings nor c l o s e c o v a r i a t i o n between l o c a l and h i g h e r o rd er swings necessarily means t h a t p a r a l l e l f o r c e s are o p e r a t i n g across the t e r r i t o r y . I f we r e t u r n to the hypo-t h e t i c a l cases shown i n F i g u r e 4, we can see why. The a s s e r t i o n t h a t swings i n D i s t r i c t s A and B are e q u a l l y (and t o t a l l y ) determined by n a t i o n a l f o r c e s depends on assumptions about the i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s (or r e s i s t a n c e l e v e l s ) p r e v a i l i n g i n these two d i s t r i c t s . Since these d i s t r i c t s always move 41 i n o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s , t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s v a l i d o n l y i f we assume t h a t they d i f f e r i n terms of s a l i e n t i n i t i a l c o n d i -t i o n s . I f they are s i m i l a r , and n a t i o n a l f o r c e s do determine the swings of both, then we expect t h e i r swings t o p a r a l l e l one another. Conversely, i f we had two d i s t r i c t s whose vote movements were e x a c t l y the same, we would have to be assured t h a t they were s i m i l a r i n i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s b e f o r e we c o u l d conclude t h a t they were a f f e c t e d by the same f o r c e s . Thus, i n c o r r e c t i n g f o r problems on one s i d e of the c o i n , Katz r e a l l y compounds problems on the o t h e r . His procedure a t t r i b u t e s to n a t i o n a l f o r c e s the v a r i a t i o n which r e s u l t s , f o r example, when d i s t r i c t s with o p p o s i t e c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s respond o p p o s i t e l y t o the same n a t i o n a l f o r c e s . The problem though i s t h a t the model i s b l i n d to these charac-t e r i s t i c s , and thus unable t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the case where d i s t r i c t s w i t h o p p o s i t e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s swing oppo-s i t e l y , and the case where d i s t r i c t s w i t h s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s do the same. In the f i r s t case we can conclude t h a t uniform f o r c e s are o p e r a t i n g , w h i l e i n the second we cannot. As a r e s u l t , the Katz procedure may i n c o r r e c t l y a t t r i b u t e v a r i a t i o n t o h i g h e r l e v e l f o r c e s , and may thus exaggerate the importance of n a t i o n a l and s t a t e i n f l u e n c e s . The problems which undermine attempts t o draw c o n c l u s i o n s about p a t t e r n s of i n f l u e n c e from evidence about p a t t e r n s of swing can only be circumvented by c o n t r o l l i n g f o r d i f f e r e n c e s i n what have been termed r e s i s t a n c e l e v e l s . In e f f e c t , c o n t r o l s would i n v o l v e weighting swings a c c o r d i n g to whether they o c c u r r e d i n more or l e s s r e s i s t a n t areas. In terms of the s i t u a t i o n as i t was p o r t r a y e d i n F i g u r e 3, the c o n t r o l o p e r a t i o n would "grey" or homogenize the d i f f e r e n t l y shaded areas so t h a t we c o u l d i n f e r d i r e c t l y from magnitude of swing t o magnitude o f f o r c e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the a p p l i c a t i o n of these c o n t r o l s on any-t h i n g other than an experimental b a s i s would be d i f f i c u l t . S t i p u l a t i o n of s a l i e n t i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s (that i s , s t i p u -l a t i o n of determinants of d i f f e r e n c e s on the r e s i s t a n c e con-tinuum) , and measurement of the net p a r t i s a n advantage or disadvantage a s s o c i a t e d with p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s , would have to precede the c o n t r o l o p e r a t i o n . Obviously these antecedent steps r e q u i r e i n f o r m a t i o n which i s not normally a v a i l a b l e to the r e s e a r c h e r u s i n g aggregate v o t i n g data. And i t should f u r t h e r be p o i n t e d out t h a t a t a u t o l o g y i s q u i c k l y c o n f r o n t e d i f we attempt to draw c o n c l u s i o n s about d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e s i s t a n c e l e v e l s from aggregate data. In order to draw such c o n c l u s i o n s , one would have to know about d i f f e r e n c e s i n the f o r c e s a p p l i e d to d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , or have some b a s i s f o r assuming t h a t these f o r c e s were equal. But t o know the magnitude o f f o r c e s , one has t o assume equal r e s i s t a n c e l e v e l s . I d e a l l y , the r e s e a r c h e r would possess i n f o r m a t i o n , such as data on c o n s t i t u e n c y d i f f e r e n c e s i n p a r t y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p a t t e r n s , which would support c o n t r o l s of the type suggested. But, a l a s , such i n f o r m a t i o n i s not u s u a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o the e l e c t o r a l h i s t o r i a n . 43 A f i r s t response to these problems i s embodied i n the design of our study. The analysis of patterning represents an attempt to explore three factors which may determine differences i n resistance l e v e l s . We have acknowledged that e l e c t o r a l localism may have been supplanted by a s i t u a t i o n where swings were patterned by composition or other dimen-sions, and we have argued that patterning by composition or e l e c t o r a l s i t u a t i o n would represent a type of p r o v i n c i a l i z a -tion of forces. Our second response must be to adjust notions about the meaning of increased uniformity of swing (either across the province, across regions, or across cases with similar char-a c t e r i s t i c s ) . In l i g h t of what has been argued, i t must now be noted that increased uniformity requires the j o i n t occur-rence of two developments—increased homogeneity of resistance levels (or maintenance of consistently high l e v e l s ) , and increased uniformity of e l e c t o r a l forces. Thus, to deal with an example which assumes no increase i n patterning, the interpretation of an increase i n o v e r a l l swing uniformity would have to note that developments are probably l i k e those portrayed i n Figure 5. The probable s i t u a t i o n i n pre-modern elections finds non-uniform forces and non-homogeneous r e s i s -tance levels combining to produce non-uniform swings. The other possible combinations which would produce non-uniform swings—non-uniform forces with homogeneous resistance l e v e l s , or uniform forces with non-homogeneous resistance l e v e l s — 44 PROBABLE PRE-MODERN SITUATION INVOLVING NON-UNIFORM SWING Forces Resistance Levels Swings PROBABLE MODERN SITUATION INVOLVING RELATIVELY UNIFORM SWING Forces Resistance Levels Swings FIGURE 5: Diagram showing the probable evolution of e l e c t o r a l forces and-resistance l e v e l s involved i n producing increased swing uniformity. would seem to be less l i k e l y given what we suspect about pre-modern conditions. The probable s i t u a t i o n i n modern elections involves r e l a t i v e l y uniform forces and r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous resistance levels combining to produce quite uniform swings. The other p o s s i b i l i t y h e r e — t h a t non-uniform forces and non-homogeneous resistance le v e l s just happen to combine i n a way which produces uniform swings—seems t o t a l l y u n l i k e l y . Acceptance of the idea that increased uniformity of forces and increased homogeneity of resistance levels must operate j o i n t l y to produce a trend to swing uniformity, does not necessitate major adjustment i n our thinking about the 45 e f f e c t s o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n . The two d e v e l o p m e n t s r e p r e s e n t c l o s e l y r e l a t e d s i d e s o f t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n c o i n . U n i f o r m i t y o f f o r c e s r e l a t e s t o t h e p a r a l l e l a p p l i c a t i o n o f s t i m u l i w h i c h a r e s p e c i f i c t o one e l e c t i o n , and s h o u l d i n c r e a s e as e l e c t i o n campaigns become more p r o v i n c i a l i z e d . H omogeneity o f r e s i s t a n c e l e v e l s r e l a t e s t o p a r a l l e l i s m o f s t a b l e p r e d i c -t o r s o f r e s p o n s e , and s h o u l d i n c r e a s e w i t h d i m i n u i t i o n o f l o c a l i s m . We do n o t a r g u e t h a t s c a t t e r e d l o c a l e l e c t o r a t e s were t o t a l l y h o m o g e n i z e d by m o d e r n i z a t i o n . I n d e e d , i n d e c i d -i n g t o examine p a t t e r n i n g , we a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t e l e c t o r a l l y r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s may c o n t i n u e t o e x i s t . We do, however, a s s e r t t h a t m o d e r n i z a t i o n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y c o m m u n i c a t i o n s d e v e l o p m e n t , s h o u l d have h o m o g e n i z e d d i v e r s e p a r t s o f t h e p r o v i n c e by i n c r e a s i n g t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h l o c a l e l e c t o r a t e s v i e w e d p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s f r o m p r o v i n c i a l , r a t h e r t h a n l o c a l , p e r s p e c t i v e s . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f t y p e I e r r o r s ( t h o s e i n v o l v i n g r e j e c -t i o n o f a t r u e h y p o t h e s i s o r , t h a t i s , f a i l u r e t o i d e n t i f y s o m e t h i n g w h i c h happened) does r e m a i n s i n c e e i t h e r a t r e n d t o u n i f o r m i t y o r a t r e n d t o h o m o g e n e i t y c o u l d o c c u r w i t h no d i s c e r n i b l e e f f e c t on s w i n g u n i f o r m i t y . B u t i f o u r assump-t i o n s a b o u t t h e i m p a c t o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n a r e r e a s o n a b l e , t h e n we c a n be f a i r l y c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s w i l l o c c u r t o g e t h e r . Thus, t h e e f f e c t s o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n on t h e e l e c -t o r a l s o c i o l o g y o f t h e p r o v i n c e s h o u l d show up i n e v i d e n c e a b o u t c h a nges i n t h e u n i f o r m i t y and p a t t e r n i n g o f e l e c t o r a l 46 swing. We must now t u r n to an examination of q u e s t i o n s which concern the way i n which swing i s measured. Conceptualizing Uniformity of Swing: Percentage Point versus Proportionate Measures Most r e s e a r c h on e l e c t o r a l swing has been based on the premise t h a t swings i n two or more c o n s t i t u e n c i e s are uniform when the percentage p o i n t s h i f t s i n support f o r the p a r t y (or 9 p a r t i e s ) i n q u e s t i o n are equal. However, the v a l i d i t y of t h i s assumption has come under c o n s i d e r a b l e q u e s t i o n i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y from B r i t i s h psephologists."*"^ I t should be noted a t the o u t s e t t h a t the arguments are not concerned with the measurement o f swing u n i f o r m i t y per se, but r a t h e r with a l t e r n a t i v e grounds f o r i n f e r e n c e s from evidence about swing to c o n c l u s i o n s about the magnitude of e l e c t o r a l i n f l u e n c e s . The f i r s t p o i n t r a i s e d i n t h i s l i t e r a t u r e i s the obvious one t h a t swings t e l l us only about the net r e s u l t of the s e v e r a l f o r c e s which determine e l e c t o r a l s h i f t s . Changes i n the make-up of the e l e c t o r a t e and changes i n turnout, as w e l l as m i g r a t i o n s of v o t e r s back and f o r t h between p a r t i e s , determine s h i f t s i n aggregate results."'""'' Since swings of equal d i r e c t i o n and magnitude only s i g n i f y t h a t these v a r i o u s components had the same net e f f e c t , i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t two equal swings are ever t r u l y uniform. 47 The p r o b l e m s stemming f r o m t h i s t r u i s m a r e n o t t o o s e r i o u s so l o n g as i t i s a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t we c a n o n l y s p e a k o f u n i f o r m net e l e c t o r a l i n f l u e n c e s . I f t h e government p a r t y ' s p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e v o t e goes up i n one a r e a and down i n a n o t h e r we c a n ( i f we i g n o r e t h e p o i n t o f t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n f o r t h e moment) c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e n e t p r o - g o v e r n m e n t f o r c e o p e r a t i n g i n t h e f i r s t a r e a i s s t r o n g e r . We c a n n o t t e l l a n y t h i n g more a b o u t t h e r o l e s w h i c h v o t e r m i g r a t i o n s among p a r t i e s , c h a n g e s i n t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e e l e c t o r a t e , o r changes i n t u r n o u t had i n p r o d u c i n g t h e s e s h i f t s . A m a j o r c h a l l e n g e t o t h e p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t measure o f s w i n g has come i n t h e argument t h a t a p r o p o r t i o n a t e measure o f s w i n g p r o v i d e s a more v a l i d b a s i s f o r ju d g e m e n t s a b o u t 12 e l e c t o r a l i n f l u e n c e s . A s i m p l e example h e l p s t o e l u c i d a t e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a p r o p o r t i o n a t e measure, and show how i t d i f f e r s f r o m t h e p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t measure. E a c h row i n T a b l e 1 r e p r e s e n t s h y p o t h e t i c a l r e s u l t s f o r a d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n c y i n a t w o - p a r t y e l e c t i o n . E q u a l p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t l o s s e s i n P a r t y X's s h a r e o f t h e v o t e a r e e x p r e s s e d a s p e r -c e n t a g e s o f i t s f i r s t e l e c t i o n ( E i ) s u p p o r t o r , i n o t h e r words, as p r o p o r t i o n s o f i t s " v o t e a t r i s k i ' , ' I t c a n be s e e n t h a t t h e s e p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h i f t s i n c r e a s e as we move down t h e rows t o s u c c e s s i v e l y l o w e r v o t e a t r i s k t o t a l s . I t c a n a l s o be s e e n t h a t t h e c o r o l l a r y measure o f P a r t y Y's s w i n g s i s d e r i v e d i f we t r e a t Y's g a i n s as p r o p o r t i o n s o f i t s " v o t e t o g a i n > " o r t h a t i s , as a p e r c e n t a g e o f t h e (100% minus Y's Ei TABLE 1: A COMPARISON OF PROPORTIONATE AND PERCENTAGE POINT MEASURES OF SWING. HYPOTHETICAL RESULTS FOR A TWO-PARTY CONTEST IN TEN CONSTITUENCIES, SHOWING EQUAL PERCENTAGE POINT SHIFTS FROM DIFFERENT BASE SUPPORT POSITIONS EXPRESSED PROPORTIONATELY PARTY X PARTY Y Constituency Ei Support Percentage Point Swing E;i-E 2 Swing as a Percentage of X's Vote at Risk Ei Support Percentage Point Swing E i - E 2 Swing as a Percentage of Y's Vote to Gain CI 100 -10 -10.0 0 +10 +10.0 C2 90 -10 -11.1 10 +10 +11.1 C3 80 -10 -12.5 20 +10 +12.5 C4 70 -10 -14.3 30 +10 +14.3 C5 60 -10 -16.7 40 +10 +16.7 C6 50 -10 -20.0 50 +10 +20.0 C7 40 -10 -25.0 60 +10 +25.0 C8 30 -10 -33.3 70 +10 +33.3 C9 20 -10 -50.0 80 +10 +50.0 CIO 10 -10 -100.0 90 +10 +100.0 49 support l e v e l ) remainder. The argument i n defence of the p r o p o r t i o n a t e measure can be expressed i n v a r i o u s ways. I t can be p o i n t e d out, f o r example, t h a t what happens to P a r t y X i n C o n s t i t u e n c y 2 (C2) i s very d i f f e r e n t , and much l e s s s e r i o u s , than what happens to i t i n C o n s t i t u e n c y 9 (C9). The p r o p o r t i o n a t e measure seems to express these d i f f e r e n c e s i n s e r i o u s n e s s — the net r e s u l t o f a n t i - P a r t y X f o r c e s i n C2 i s e q u i v a l e n t to the d e f e c t i o n o f one i n nine o f i t s E\ s u p p o r t e r s , w h i l e i n C9 the l o s s i s e q u i v a l e n t t o one i n two of i t s E i s u p p o r t e r s . I f f o r c e s equal t o those o p e r a t i n g i n C9 had operated i n C2, then the percentage p o i n t swing a g a i n s t Party X i n the l a t t e r r i d i n g would have been 45% or, t h a t i s , one-half of i t s E x support of 90%. From P a r t y Y's p e r s p e c t i v e the gains i n C9 are more pronounced than i n C2. In the former r i d i n g , the p r o - P a r t y Y f o r c e s cause gains e q u i v a l e n t to c o n v e r s i o n of one out of two people who d i d not support the p a r t y a t E i , w h i l e i n C2, the gains are e q u i v a l e n t to c o n v e r s i o n of o n l y one out o f nine E i non-supporters. There i s a convergence between these arguments and the i m p l i c a t i o n to be drawn from r e s u l t s which o b t a i n e d when we t e s t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p a r t i e s ' percentage p o i n t swings and t h e i r base l e v e l s o f support (Ej s u p p o r t ) . C o n s t i t u e n c y l e v e l data on a l l swings around S o c i a l C r e d i t and the CCF-NDP 13 i n s i x e l e c t i o n s between 1953 and 1972 were analyzed. Each c o n s t i t u e n c y swing to o r from one of these p a r t i e s i n one of 50 the e l e c t i o n s was t r e a t e d as a case. In t h i s way a sample of 522 cases was assembled. The o v e r a l l c o r r e l a t i o n between swing and E x support was -.42. P a r t i e s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y more l i k e l y to s u f f e r percentage p o i n t l o s s e s i n r i d i n g s where t h e i r support i n the f i r s t e l e c t i o n of the p a i r i s high, and more l i k e l y t o achieve gains where t h e i r base l e v e l of support i s low. In other words, r e g r e s s i o n e f f e c t s oper-ate, w i t h a p a r t y more l i k e l y t o l o s e percentage p o i n t s where i t s t a r t s from a high l e v e l of base support. One reason why r e g r e s s i o n e f f e c t s operate should be q u i t e apparent. We are measuring change w i t h i n a range w i t h a b s o l u t e l i m i t s ; t h a t i s , no p a r t y can improve on an E{ sup-p o r t l e v e l of 100% or do worse than a l e v e l of zero. The consequence i s t h a t p a r t i e s with high Ej support l e v e l s are l i m i t e d t o p o t e n t i a l percentage p o i n t gains which are s m a l l e r than those w i t h i n L t h e grasp of p a r t i e s w i t h low E i support. For example, the percentage p o i n t s h i f t from 30% t o 60% achieved by a p a r t y i n one c o n s t i t u e n c y , cannot be matched where i t s Ex support i s above 70%. The converse p o i n t can be made about the way percentage p o i n t l o s s e s are d i f f e r e n t i a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d a t the o p p o s i t e end of the spectrum. What can be termed "empirical'' l i m i t s may a l s o c o n s t r a i n the s i z e of percentage p o i n t s h i f t s from d i f f e r e n t base sup-p o r t l e v e l s . For example, the p a r t y w i t h E i support of 20% may have an e a s i e r time a c h i e v i n g a percentage p o i n t gain of 10% than a p a r t y with E x support of 80%. The p a r t y i n the 51 l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n would probably be more l i k e l y to l o s e sup-p o r t . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s argument i s the premise t h a t , from a p a r t y ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , the p r e v i o u s l y non-supportive p o r t i o n of the e l e c t o r a t e (100% minus i t s Ei support) comprises s t r a t a which are s u c c e s s i v e l y l e s s "conquerable^" while the E i support base comprises s t r a t a which are s u c c e s s i v e l y l e s s prone t o d e f e c t i o n . The p a r t y w i t h support of 80% has prob-ably captured most of the e l e c t o r a t e which i s remotely i n c l i n e d t o support i t (the conquerable s t r a t a ) , w h i l e the p a r t y w i t h support of 20% can more e a s i l y g a i n because sympathetic s t r a t a have not y e t been converted. From the o p p o s i t e p e r s p e c t i v e , a l o s s from an Ej support l e v e l of 20% probably means d e f e c t i o n o f bedrock s u p p o r t e r s , and i s thus l e s s l i k e l y than the l o s s from 80% which would i n v o l v e d e s e r t i o n by d e f e c t i o n - p r o n e s t r a t a . I t should be noted t h a t the o p p o s i t e l o g i c i s sometimes pursued i n what might be l a b e l l e d the " r i c h get r i c h e r " argu-14 ment. B a s i c a l l y t h i s i s the argument t h a t a s t r o n g support base p r o v i d e s a context o r c l i m a t e which i s f a v o u r a b l e to f u r t h e r g a i n s . T h i s argument might be expected to apply e s p e c i a l l y w i t h i n c e r t a i n support ranges (say perhaps the 20% to 50% range) where the f o r c e s envisaged i n the r i c h get r i c h e r argument might n e u t r a l i z e those i n t r o d u c e d i n the s t r a t a argument. A check of the p l o t of p o i n t s a s s o c i a t e d with the swing-base support c o r r e l a t i o n a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e s , however, t h a t the negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between Ez support 52 and percentage p o i n t swing o b t a i n s even when cases i n v o l v i n g extreme (low or high) E i support l e v e l s are removed. The 46-45% range of f i r s t e l e c t i o n support seems to mark the watershed—when the major p a r t i e s s t a r t e d from an E i support base below 40% they were l i k e l y (on the average) to ga i n support; when they s t a r t e d w i t h E i support h i g h e r than 45% they were l i k e l y (on the average) t o l o s e support. Use of the p r o p o r t i o n a t e measure of swing would n e u t r a l -i z e some of the problems stemming from the a b s o l u t e l i m i t s problem. From any l e v e l of f i r s t e l e c t i o n support a p a r t y can s u f f e r l o s s e s amounting t o between zero and 10 0% of t h a t support, o r achieve gains e q u i v a l e n t to between zero and 100% of the p r e v i o u s l y non-supportive e l e c t o r a t e . But w h i l e the e f f e c t s o f what were termed e m p i r i c a l l i m i t s on growth or wastage of support may be a m e l i o r a t e d by a p r o p o r t i o n a t e measure, they w i l l not be n e u t r a l i z e d . The arguments made e a r l i e r about t h i s second type o f c o n s t r a i n t can apply j u s t as w e l l where the p r o p o r t i o n a t e measure i s used. For example, a p a r t y w i l l have an e a s i e r time a c h i e v i n g a c e r t a i n propor-t i o n a t e gain when i t s E i support i s very low, and the uncon-quered s t r a t a are r e l a t i v e l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o c o n v e r s i o n . In s p i t e of the d i f f e r e n t underpinnings of the propor-t i o n a t e and percentage p o i n t measures, t e s t s u s i n g c o n s t i t u -ency data i n d i c a t e t h a t there i s l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between the two. We c a l c u l a t e d a p r o p o r t i o n a t e measure of c o n s t i t u e n c y swing which was based on the l o g i c u n d e r l y i n g 53 Table 1. P o s i t i v e swings were t r e a t e d as a p r o p o r t i o n of the p a r t y ' s vote t o gain (100% minus i t s E i s u p p o r t ) , w h i l e negative swings were t r e a t e d as a p r o p o r t i o n of the p a r t y ' s vote a t r i s k ( i t s Ei s u p p o r t ) . Then we c o r r e l a t e d the pro-p o r t i o n a t e and percentage p o i n t c o n s t i t u e n c y swings of the government p a r t y . Separate analyses of r e s u l t s from e l e c -t i o n s throughout the century were conducted. The c o e f f i c i e n t s which o b t a i n e d were always s t r o n g l y p o s i t i v e — o n the average t h e i r magnitude was i n the .90 range. R e l a t i v e l y l a r g e percentage p o i n t swings t r a n s l a t e t o r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e pro-p o r t i o n a t e swings and so on. Evidence of a s t r o n g c o r r e l a t i o n between percentage p o i n t and p r o p o r t i o n a t e measures l e d to the d e c i s i o n t o r e l y p r i m a r i l y on the percentage p o i n t measure. Where p o s s i b l e , our a n a l y s i s w i l l be r e p l i c a t e d u s i n g p r o p o r t i o n a t e measures and the r e s u l t s w i l l be compared. But th e r e i s no reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t analyses based on d i f f e r e n t measures wouGL'd y i e l d d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s . In response to the evidence o f a s t r o n g n e g a t i v e r e l a -t i o n s h i p between swing and the p a r t y ' s l e v e l o f base support, i t was decided t o apply c o n t r o l s on E i support l e v e l s i n the p a r t s o f the a n a l y s i s designed to uncover c o r r e l a t e s of swing. The e f f e c t o f these c o n t r o l s i s t o weight swings a c c o r d i n g t o whether they are l a r g e r or s m a l l e r than expected given the p a r t y ' s Ej support i n the c o n s t i t u e n c y , and the p r e v a i l i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between E i support and swing. We can i l l u s t r a t e 54 with the aid of the hypothetical regression l i n e shown in Figure 6. This l i n e describes the relationship between a party's percentage point swings i n one e l e c t i o n and i t s Ei support l e v e l s . The v e r t i c a l l i n e s show the difference between actual and expected swings i n three constituencies and thus indicate the degree to which a swing i s stronger or weaker than was expected on the basis of Ei support l e v e l s . By c o n t r o l l i n g for Ei support, we focus our explanatory e f f o r t s on adjusted swings or, i n other words, on swing above or below what i s expected given the way Ei support constrains. 15 swing. And we remove the p o s s i b i l i t y that an observed relationship between swing and an explanatory variable could be the spurious r e s u l t of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between swing, Ei support l e v e l s , and the explanatory variable. Comparison of Swings Where There i s Constituency Variation in the Presence of Minor Parties on the Ballot Throughout the analysis we deal with swings around the two major parties. We examine L i b e r a l and Conservative swings in the 1903-1928 period, L i b e r a l and CCF swings i n the 1933-1941 period, C o a l i t i o n and CCF swings i n the 1941-1952 period, and Social Credit and CCF-NDP swings i n the 1952-1975 period. Third party swings are not studied. The fact that t h i r d (and additional) parties generally have an inconsistent presence across constituencies leads to certain d i f f i c u l t i e s . In most of the elections studied, 55 +20%' 100% E l e c t i o n 1 Support Level FIGURE 6: The e f f e c t of c o n t r o l l i n g f or differences i n Ei support l e v e l . Hypothetical r e s u l t s f o r three constituencies showing actual percentage point swings i n a party's vote, and swings expected given the party's Ei support i n the constituency. 56 there was s u b s t a n t i a l v a r i a t i o n across r i d i n g s i n the number of minor p a r t i e s on the b a l l o t . There was, i n other words, v a r i a t i o n i n the " p a t t e r n of c o n t e s t . " " ^ As a r e s u l t , v o t e r s i n d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s have u s u a l l y responded t o b a l l o t s c o n t a i n i n g d i f f e r e n t s e t s o f p a r t y o p t i o n s . The d i f f i c u l t i e s presented by t h i s s i t u a t i o n w i l l be f a m i l i a r to those who study p a r t y v o t i n g i n m u l t i - p a r t y p a r l i a m e n t a r y systems. Here, wi t h the focus on swings between e l e c t i o n s , the d i f f i -c u l t i e s are encountered i n compounded form. In the a n a l y s t ' s best world, swing would be compared across c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which f e a t u r e d congruent c o n t e s t a n t s l a t e s i n both e l e c t i o n s . Instead, the r e s e a r c h e r i s apt to f i n d h i m s e l f comparing swings ac r o s s c o n s t i t u e n c i e s l i k e the two i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 7. ..: CONSTITUENCY ONE Election One Slate: Governing party, main opposition party & two minor p a r t i e s 4-+ Election Two Slate: Governing party & major opposition party CONSTITUENCY TWO Election One Slate: Governing party & main opposition party + Election Two Slate: Governing party, main opposition party & three minor p a r t i e s FIGURE; 7: Two hypothetical constituencies with d i f f e r e n t election-to-e l e c t i o n contest patterns. I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o p r e d i c t p r e c i s e l y what the e f f e c t s of these o p p o s i t e movements of c o n t e s t a n t s l a t e s w i l l mean, 57 although we would expect the government and main o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s t o f a r e worse i n C o n s t i t u e n c y 2 where v o t e r s ' a l t e r -n a t i v e s i n c r e a s e . We can be sure t h a t t h i s k i n d of v a r i a t i o n confounds comparison of swings. A c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e w i l l be i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the a n a l y s i s at s e v e r a l j u n c t u r e s so t h a t we can monitor the e f f e c t s of the c o n t e s t p a t t e r n f a c t o r . We w i l l want to see whether trends t o more uniform c o n t e s t p a t t e r n s have anything to do with the t r e n d to swing u n i f o r m i t y . And we w i l l want to be assured t h a t swing p a t t e r n s which o b t a i n are not the spurious r e s u l t of a c o n n e c t i o n between the explanatory v a r i a b l e and d i f f e r e n c e s across " c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n the number of c a n d i d a t e s . The c o n t e s t p a t t e r n c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e w i l l be coded f o r each r i d i n g a f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c o n t e s t a n t s l a t e s i n both of the e l e c t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n the swing under a n a l y s i s . Thus, f o r example, those c o n s t i t u e n c i e s f e a t u r i n g government p a r t y versus main o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y c o n t e s t s i n both e l e c t i o n s of the p a i r w i l l be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from c o n s t i t u e n c i e s f e a t u r i n g t h i s type of c o n t e s t i n the f i r s t e l e c t i o n and a t h r e e - p a r t y c o n t e s t i n the second. Data Related Problems In t h i s s e c t i o n , we o u t l i n e the f i n a l steps i n c o n v e r t -i n g the e x p l a n a t o r y framework i n t o a workable design f o r r e s e a r c h . Our main task i s to c o n s i d e r s t r a t e g i e s f o r d e r i v i n g maximum value from the a v a i l a b l e data. E m p i r i c a l 58 s t u d i e s seldom f i n d the r e a l world completely r e c e p t i v e to the types of a n a l y s i s o u t l i n e d i n r e s e a r c h designs, and t h i s study i s no e x c e p t i o n . The data do have c e r t a i n shortcomings, and these l i m i t our a b i l i t y t o c a r r y out a l l f a c e t s of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n as envisaged. A catalogue of data r e l a t e d problems should not, however, cause us to l o s e s i g h t of the f a c t t h a t the a v a i l a b l e data c o n s t i t u t e a r i c h and v i r t u a l l y untapped resource f o r e x p l o r a t i o n of B r i t i s h Columbia's p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y , and t h a t , f o r the most p a r t , these data are amenable to the analyses we wish to undertake. We use c o n s t i t u e n c y l e v e l data to compare swings a c r o s s the breadth of the p r o v i n c e i n e l e c t i o n s throughout the cen-17 t u r y . Twenty-two p r o v i n c i a l g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s o c c u r r e d between 19 03, when p a r t i e s f i r s t competed i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s , and 1975. F i f t e e n of the 21 p o s s i b l e i n t e r -e l e c t i o n .swings are analyzed. Table 2 s p e c i f i e s which e l e c t i o n p a i r s are i n c l u d e d or excluded, and i n d i c a t e s t h a t c o n s t i t u e n c y boundary changes are the main reason why s i x 18 p a i r s have to be excluded from a n a l y s i s . I t should a l s o be noted t h a t two of the p a i r s which are i n c l u d e d (1933-37 and 1953-56) f l a n k boundary changes. Since i t i s extremely important t h a t e l e c t i o n s from a l l h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s be examined, the expedient of dropping these e l e c t i o n s had to be r e s i s t e d . F o r t u n a t e l y , the adjustments i n v o l v e d i n these two r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s a f f e c t e d l i m i t e d numbers of c o n s t i t u e n -c i e s , so we are l e f t w i t h ample cases f o r a n a l y s i s a f t e r 59 TABLE 2: SWINGS TO BE ANALYZED USING CONSTITUENCY LEVEL DATA. ELECTION PAIRS, 1903-1975, SHOWING THOSE PAIRS INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED FROM ANALYSIS WITH REASONS FOR EXCLUSION E l e c t i o n Pairs Excluded/ Included Reason f or Exclusion 1903-1907 Included 1907-1909 Included 1909-1912 Excluded Dearth of L i b e r a l candidates, high number of acclamations. 1912-1916 Excluded Redistribution, 1915. 1916-1920 Included 1920-1924 Excluded Re d i s t r i b u t i o n , 1923. 1924-1928 Included 1928-1933 Excluded Re d i s t r i b u t i o n , 1932. 1933-1937 Included* 1937-1941 Excluded Redistribution, 1938 1941-1945 Included 1945-1949 Included 1949-1952 Included 1952-1953 Included 1953-1956 Included* 1956-1960 Included 1960-1963 Included 1963-1966 Excluded Re d i s t r i b u t i o n , 1966. 1966-1969 Included 1969-1972 Included 1972-1975 Included *Certain cases w i l l be excluded from the analysis of the 1933-1937 and 1953-1956 swings due to constituency boundary changes. See footnote 19 to text. 60 19 r i d i n g s which were a f f e c t e d by the changes were dropped. The c o n s t i t u e n c y data were transformed i n t o machine-readable form and vote percentages f o r p a r t i e s were c a l c u -l a t e d . Then, a f t e r the data were org a n i z e d i n a f i l e which allowed comparison o f each c o n s t i t u e n c y ' s vote i n s u c c e s s i v e e l e c t i o n s , the percentage p o i n t and p r o p o r t i o n a t e swings of 20 the government and major o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s were computed. The second data s e t c o n t a i n s r e s u l t s f o r a l a r g e sample of nonmetropolitan c i t i e s , towns, and v i l l a g e s i n e l e c t i o n s 21 between 1933 and 1972. T h i s data s e t , which w i l l be r e f e r -red t o as the community data s e t , i s used i n a d d i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of the h i n t e r l a n d area. We undertake these a d d i -t i o n a l s t u d i e s because t h i s area p r o v i d e s an i d e a l t e s t s i t u a t i o n f o r p r o p o s i t i o n s about the impact of modernization on e l e c t o r a l u n i f o r m i t y and p a t t e r n i n g . In p a r t i c u l a r , we expect the nonmetropolitan area to have been most a f f e c t e d by the communications developments about which we are so c u r i o u s . Although many h i n t e r l a n d communities remain q u i t e i s o l a t e d , most have had t h e i r i s o l a t i o n d i m i n i s h e d substan-t i a l l y by t w e n t i e t h century developments. I n t e n s i v e i n v e s -t i g a t i o n o f t h e i r e l e c t o r a l s h i f t s should y i e l d important i n s i g h t s about the impact of these developments. In drawing the sample of nonmetropolitan communities, an attempt was made to achieve: the goals noted below: (1) Communities f o r which census data are a v a i l a b l e i n any of the censuses between 1941 and 1971 should be i n c l u d e d 61 i n order to allow the f u l l e s t p o s s i b l e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the socio-economic c o r r e l a t e s of swings i n Chapter 5. (2) As many a d d i t i o n a l major p o p u l a t i o n c e n t r e s as p o s s i b l e should be i n c l u d e d . (3) Communities v a r y i n g i n t h e i r remoteness from m e t r o p o l i -tan and submetropolitan c e n t r e s should be i n c l u d e d i n order to a l l o w e x p l o r a t i o n of hypotheses about the e f f e c t s of remoteness. (4) A l l of the nonmetropolitan c o n s t i t u e n c i e s should be represented, w i t h enough communities taken from each t o a l l o w e x p l o r a t i o n of u n i f o r m i t y w i t h i n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . These goals were weighed a g a i n s t p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s . The sampling s t r a t e g y which emerged can be d e s c r i b e d as s t r a t i f i e d sampling w i t h i n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . The sample was chosen from communities which were l i s t e d as p o l l i n g s t a t i o n s i n the 1960 e l e c t i o n . A t a r g e t of 10-25 communities per c o n s t i t u e n c y was s e t , w i t h t h i s number t o vary a c c o r d i n g to the number of p o l l i n g p l a c e s i n the c o n s t i t u e n c y and i t s g e o g r a p h i c a l d i v e r s i t y . In i t s f i n a l form the community sample i n c l u d e d c l o s e to one-half of a l l nonmetropolitan communities with p o l l i n g s t a t i o n s . The p l a c e s chosen i n c l u d e d a l l census r e p o r t i n g ( i n o t h e r words, incorporated) c i t i e s , towns and v i l l a g e s , and most p l a c e s which had more than 500 v o t e r s r e g i s t e r e d 22 f o r the 1960 e l e c t i o n . In the sample drawn from each 62 c o n s t i t u e n c y , t h i s group o f major c e n t r e s was augmented by a number of s m a l l e r , more remote p l a c e s . These were s e l e c t e d randomly from pools of p l a c e s i n d i f f e r e n t s i z e ranges. Table 3 p r o v i d e s a c o n s t i t u e n c y by c o n s t i t u e n c y breakdown showing the number of p l a c e s sampled from each p o p u l a t i o n range, and the t o t a l number of p o l l i n g p l a c e s i n each range. T h i s t a b l e i n d i c a t e s t h a t the sample i n c l u d e s most l a r g e and medium-sized communities, about one-half of communities w i t h between 100 and 250 v o t e r s ( i n 1960), and about o n e - t h i r d of communities w i t h fewer than 100 v o t e r s . Commmunities i n c l u d e d i n the sample are l i s t e d i n Appendix A. The v o t i n g r e s u l t s of these communities were coded f o r e l e c t i o n s between 1933 and 1972. Table 4 shows the t o t a l number o f communities f o r which data c o u l d be found i n each e l e c t i o n . Many o f the p l a c e s extant a t 1960 were e i t h e r n o n - e x i s t e n t , or not l a r g e enough to rank a p o l l i n g s t a t i o n , at the time of e a r l i e r e l e c t i o n s , so the s i z e of the sample d e c l i n e s as we move backwards from 1960. Amalgamations of p o l l i n g s t a t i o n s caused the d e c l i n e i n numbers a f t e r 1960. Since a l a r g e number of these amalgamations seem to have c o i n c i d e d w i t h the c o n s t i t u e n c y boundary changes of 1966, and s i n c e modern swings are w e l l represented, i t was decided to ignore the 1963-1966 swing. Communities which were s h i f t e d from one c o n s t i t u e n c y t o another i n the r e d i s t r i b u -t i o n s of 1934, 1938 or 1955 are dropped from the sample when a n a l y s i s focusses on the e l e c t i o n s immediately f o l l o w i n g 63 TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF SAMPLED NONMETROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES OF VARIOUS SIZES WITH TOTAL NUMBER OF POLLING PLACES OF VARIOUS SIZES IN EACH CONSTITUENCY. SIZES BASED ON NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE 1960 ELECTION Number of Registered Voters T o t a l : A l l Sizes Under 50 50-100 101-250 251-500 501-1000 Over 1000 Total A l l Constituencies Sample 286. 84 149 57 197 99 75 51 47 36 53 46 807 373 Total Alberni Sample 12 2 4 2 5 5 6 6 0 0 2 2 29 17 Total A t l i n Sample 7 2 1 1 7 7 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 15 10 Tot a l Cariboo Sample 18 6 8 4 18 9 3 2 1 1 2 2 50 24 Tota l Columbia River Sample 13 5 3 2 7 5 1 1 2 2 0 0 26 15 Tot a l Comox Sample 12 3 10 1 18 4 13 5 6 3 5 3 64 19 Tot a l Cowichan-Newcastle Sample 0 0 0 0 10 2 2 0 3 1 4 3 19 6 Tota l Cranbrook Sample 5 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 14 9 Total Fernie Sample 4 3 5 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 16 12 Tota l Fort George Sample 18 5 12 5 8 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 43 17 64 Table 3 (continued) Number, of Registered Voters . T o t a l : A l l Sizes Under 50 50-100 101-250 251-500 501i-1000 Over 1000 Total Grand FkSrGreenwd* Sample 2 1 2 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 8-; Tot a l Kamloops Sample 19 3 8 4 9 5 5 3 2 1 2 2 45 18 Tot a l KaslorSlocan Sample 15 4 9 2 3 2 3 3 1 1 0 0 31 12 Total L i l l o o e t Sample 11 4 7 2 8 5 3 2 4 4 1 1 34 18 Total Mackenzie Sample 13 3 9 3 17 6 6 1 4 3 4 3 53 19 Total Nelson-'Creston Sample 8 1 12 4 11 5 4 4 0 0 2 2 37 16 Total North Okanagan Sample 7 1 5 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 24 12 Total North Peace Sample 16 4 3 0 9 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 31 11 Total Omine'ca Sample 19 2 6 3 9 4 2 2 3 3 0 0 39 14 Total Prince Rupert Sample 12 6 5 1 8 4 2 2 0 0 1 1 28 14 Tot a l Revelstoke Sample 11 5 6 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 22 11 *Grand Forks-Greenwood 65 Table 3 (continued) Number of Registered Voters T o t a l : A l l Sizes Under 50 50-100 101-250 251-500 501-1000 Over 1000 Total Ro s s1and-Tra i l Sample 8 3 3 2 3 3 6 3 4 3 5 3 29 17 Tot a l Salmon Arm Sample 13 3 7 3 9 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 34 M5 Total Similkameen Sample 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 4 4 11 10 Tot a l Skeena Sample 16 7 4 0 7 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 32 14 Total South Okanagan Sample 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 7 4 3 2 16 9 Tot a l South Peace Sample 15 4 9 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 31 12 Total Yale Sample 10 4 6 3 4 4 1 1 0 0 2 2 23 14 66 TABLE 4: SIZE OF THE NONMETROPOLITAN COMMUNITY SAMPLE FOR ELECTION YEARS, 1933-1972 E l e c t i o n Number of Year Communities 1933 272 1937 294 1941 308 1945 320 1949 338 1952 330 1953 336 1956 340 1960 373 1963 369 1966 326 1969 319 1972 318 67 those r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s . The c o n s t i t u e n c y and nonmetropolitan community data s e t s are both u t i l i z e d i n Chapter 3, where changes i n u n i f o r m i t y of swing are documented, and i n Chapter 6 where the changing impact of r e g i o n i s i n v e s t i g a t e d . The examination of the e f f e c t s o f e l e c t o r a l competitiveness i n Chapter 4 i s c a r r i e d out w i t h c o n s t i t u e n c y data. The e x p l o r a t i o n s of p a t t e r n i n g by socio-economic composition r e p o r t e d i n Chapter 5 r e l y on v a r i a n t s o f the community sample. Measures of the independent (patterning) v a r i a b l e s t e s t e d i n Chapters 4 and 6 can be generated without any problems. A l l cases i n both c o n s t i t u e n c y and community samples were assigned r e g i o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n codes i n accordance w i t h boundaries o u t l i n e d i n Chapter 6. Measures of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ' e l e c t o r a l competitiveness a t the time of each swing were generated from the e l e c t o r a l data and from a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on the government or o p p o s i t i o n s t a t u s of the seat. P r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a n a l y s i s of p a t t e r n i n g around socio-economic composition d i f f e r e n c e s were more complicated. Before o p t i o n s f o r f i t t i n g census data to e l e c t o r a l data are d i s c u s s e d , i t should be noted t h a t the l o g i c of the pro-posed t e s t s f o r p a t t e r n i n g c a l l f o r comparison of the impact of the same v a r i a b l e (or s e t of v a r i a b l e s ) across e l e c t i o n s . For example, comparison of the changing impact of c l a s s r e q u i r e s examination of the e x p l a n a t o r y impact of the same c l a s s v a r i a b l e on swings i n d i f f e r e n t e l e c t i o n s . Compara-68 b i l i t y should a l s o extend t o the matter of measurement. The v a r i a b l e i n q u e s t i o n should be measured i n a c o n s i s t e n t way, and, s i n c e we are d e a l i n g w i t h aggregate data, i t i s impor-t a n t t h a t p a r a l l e l i s m i n the l e v e l of aggregation should a l s o be maintained. R e s u l t s from a n a l y s i s of c o n s t i t u e n c y data i n one p e r i o d , f o r i n s t a n c e , are not r e a l l y comparable wi t h those from a n a l y s i s of more homogeneous p o l l s i n another p e r i o d . When the a v a i l a b l e census data were surveyed i n the l i g h t of these c o m p a r a b i l i t y c r i t e r i a , the r e s u l t s proved d i s a p p o i n t i n g . A f i r s t glance of the p i t f a l l s can be gleaned from Appendix B which i n d i c a t e s whether e t h n i c , r e l i g i o u s and c l a s s composition data were pr o v i d e d i n the 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961, and 1971 census r e p o r t s . Where data were a v a i l a b l e , the t a b l e a l s o shows the s m a l l e s t u n i t of aggregation r e p o r t e d . I t can be seen t h a t p r i o r t o 1961, the census p r o v i d e d s p o t t y data a t the l e v e l s of aggregation which are of use to us here. Three important d e c i s i o n s were taken a f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the a v a i l a b l e data, the need f o r p a r a l l e l v a r i a b l e s and measures, and p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s . These d e c i s i o n s very fundamentally determined the shape of the a n a l y s i s of pat-t e r n i n g around composition d i f f e r e n c e s planned f o r Chapter 5. The e x p l o r a t o r y scheme which r e s u l t e d r e p r e s e n t s a ' c o n s i d e r -able lowering of s i g h t s from what would have been d e s i r a b l e . 69 T h e f i r s t d e c i s i o n , o n e t o t a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f d a t a , was t o r e s t r i c t o u r e x p l o r a t i o n s i n C h a p t e r 5 t o t h e e l e c t i o n s o f 1941, 1952, 1960, 1972, a n d 1975, a n d t o f o c u s mos t h e a v i l y o n t h e s w i n g s o f 1949-1952 a n d 1969-1972-1975. A s a r e s u l t , we a r e l i m i t e d t o o b s e r v i n g c h a n g e s i n t h e i m p a c t o f c o m p o s i t i o n d u r i n g a n a r r o w s l i c e o f t h e p e r i o d e x a m i n e d i n o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e s t u d y . The s e c o n d d e c i s i o n was t o r u l e o u t t h e i d e a o f f i t t i n g c e n s u s d a t a t o c o n s t i t u e n c y l e v e l e l e c t o r a l r e s u l t s . I t seemed more r e a s o n a b l e t o t r y t o f i t c e n s u s d a t a t o r e s u l t s a t t h e s u b c o n s t i t u e n c y l e v e l . The f i r s t o p t i o n was r e j e c t e d b e c a u s e t h e f i t b e t w e e n c e n s u s a n d c o n s t i t u e n c y b o u n d a r i e s i s p o o r , a n d b e c a u s e t h e s m a l l number o f c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ( t h e i r number n e v e r e x c e e d s 48) w o u l d r e s t r i c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e m u l t i v a r i a t e t e c h n i q u e s w h i c h , a s w i l l be e x p l a i n e d i n C h a p t e r 5, r e p r e s e n t t h e b e s t a p p l i e d m e t h o d o l o g y . T h e t h i r d d e c i s i o n was t o d e a l e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h n o n -m e t r o p o l i t a n p a r t s o f t h e p r o v i n c e i n t h e a n a l y s i s o f p a t -t e r n i n g a r o u n d c o m p o s i t i o n d i f f e r e n c e s . T h i s d e c i s i o n was d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e v i e w , s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y , t h a t t h e i m p a c t o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n on e l e c t o r a l p a t t e r n s s h o u l d h a v e b e e n mos t a p p a r e n t i n n o n m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a s . A s a r e s u l t , i t was f e l t t h a t f i r s t p r i o r i t y s h o u l d be g i v e n t o i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e s e a r e a s . I n c l u s i o n o f t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a s c e r t a i n l y w o u l d h a v e b e e n d e s i r a b l e , b u t i t w o u l d h a v e b e e n n e c e s s a r y t o u s e r e s u l t s f o r l a r g e a n d h e t e r o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n a g g r e g a t e s . 70 The data s e t s c o n s t r u c t e d by merging census and e l e c t o r a l data f o r nonmetropolitan p l a c e s are d e s c r i b e d i n Appendix C. In c o n c l u s i o n , the proposed analyses of e l e c t o r a l swing p a t t e r n i n g by r e g i o n and e l e c t o r a l s i t u a t i o n can be a p p l i e d without a l t e r a t i o n . The t h i r d p r o p o s a l , f o r a n a l y s i s of the changing e f f e c t s o f composition, emerges r a t h e r s c a r r e d from i t s c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a r e a l world f u l l of census data l i m i t a t i o n s and p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s . The p a t t e r n i n g a n a l y s i s planned f o r Chapter 5 should i d e n t i f y changes i n nonmetropolitan areas i n the l a s t 25 to 40 y e a r s , and e v i -dence about these changes should p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r i n f e r -ences about the more gen e r a l v a l i d i t y of the composition p a t t e r n i n g p o s s i b i l i t y . But the word e x p l o r a t o r y should be u n d e r l i n e d i n d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h i s s e c t i o n of the a n a l y s i s . 71 Footnotes ''"Donald E. Stokes, " P a r t i e s and the N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of E l e c t o r a l F o r c e s , " i n The American Party Systems: Stages of P o l i t i c a l Development, eds. Walter Dean Burnham and W i l l i a m N i s b e t Chambers (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967), pp. 182-2 02; and Donald E. Stokes, "A V a r i a n c e Components Model of P o l i t i c a l E f f e c t s , " i n Mathematical Applications in P o l i t i c a l Science, ed. John M. Claunch ( D a l l a s : A r n o l d Foun-d a t i o n , 1965), pp. 61-85. 2 See Don A i t k i n , " E l e c t o r a l Forces i n F e d e r a l P o l i t i c s , " a paper presented to the Tenth Annual Conference of the A u s t r a l a s i a n P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s A s s o c i a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of Tasmania, 1968; Robert W. Jackman, " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , V o t i n g , and N a t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n : The Canadian Case," Comparative P o l i t i c s 4 ( J u l y 1972):511-36; and R. P. W o o l s t e n c r o f t , "The I n t e r p l a y between Geography and P o l i t i c s : The Case of Canada, 1953 to 1965," a paper presented to the annual meeting o f the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science A s s o c i a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f A l b e r t a , Edmonton, 19 75. 3 Stokes, " P a r t i e s and the N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of E l e c t o r a l F o r c e s , " p. 185. 4 Stokes, "A Va r i a n c e Components Model of P o l i t i c a l E f f e c t s , " p. 71. 5 I b i d . , pp. 71-72. Ric h a r d S. Katz, "The A t t r i b u t i o n of Va r i a n c e i n E l e c -t o r a l Returns: An A l t e r n a t i v e Measurement Technique," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review LXVII (September 1973):817-28. See a l s o Stokes's response, "Comment: On the Measurement of E l e c t o r a l Dynamics," i b i d . , 829-31; and Katz, "Rejoinder t o 'Comment by Donald E. S t o k e s 1 , " i b i d . , 832-34. 7 Katz, "The A t t r i b u t i o n o f V a r i a n c e , " p. 819. g I am indebted to P r o f e s s o r David E l k i n s f o r h i s help i n i d e n t i f y i n g problems w i t h the Katz model. 9 T h i s , f o r example, i s the assumption made by Stokes and Katz i n the r e s e a r c h a l r e a d y noted. The B r i t i s h g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s t u d i e s , which have pioneered the a n a l y s i s o f swing, have used a percentage p o i n t measure. But i t should be noted t h a t the measure used i n the B r i t i s h s t u d i e s has t r i e d t o summarize s h i f t s between the two major p a r t i e s . Thus, i n The B r i t i s h General Election of 1945, swing was d e f i n e d as the average of the [winning p a r t y ' s ] g a i n and the [ l o s i n g p a r t y ' s ] l o s s . C a l c u l a t i o n s were based on percentages of 72 t o t a l votes cast. See R. B. McCallum and Alison Readman, The B r i t i s h General E l e c t i o n of 1945 XLondon: Oxford Univer-s i t y Press, 1947), pp. 263-64. The analysis i n the 1964 and subsequent volumes i s based on a revised d e f i n i t i o n which calculates swing "on the basis of the votes cast for the two major parties only." See Michael Steed, "The Analysis of the Results," Appendix II i n The B r i t i s h General Election of 1964, by D. E. Butler and Anthony King (London: Macmillan, 1965), p. 338. This d e f i n i t i o n a l s h i f t i s pointed out.'.in Austin Ranney, "Review A r t i c l e : Thirty Years of 'Psephology'," B r i t i s h Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science 6 (April 1976):223-225. "^On the conceptualization of swing, see Hugh B. Ber-rington, "The General Ele c t i o n of 1964," Journal of the Royal S t a t i s t i c a l S o c i e t y , Series A, 128 (1965):17-51 (with discussion, 51-66); Michael Steed, "The Analysis of the Results"; W. L. M i l l e r , "Measures of E l e c t o r a l Change Using Aggregate Data," Journal of the Royal S t a t i s t i c a l Society, Series A, 135 (1972):122-42; A. G. Hawkes, "An Approach to the Analysis of E l e c t o r a l Swing," Journal of the Royal S t a t i s t i c a l S o c i e t y , Series A, 132 (1969):68-73; Jorgen Rasmussen, " D i s u t i l i t y of the Swing Concept i n B r i t i s h Pse-phology," P a r l i a m e n t a r y A f f a i r s 18 (Autumn 1965) : 442-54; David Butler, "A Comment on Professor Rasmussen's A r t i c l e , " P a r l i a m e n t a r y A f f a i r s 18 (Autumn 1965):455-57; Ian Robinson, "The Candidate's Share of the Vote: The Construction of Indices of E l e c t o r a l Proximity," P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s XIX, 4 (1971):447-54; Nigel S. Roberts, "The Roundabout Swings of Australian Psephology," P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s XIX, 3 (1973): 380-84; Alan Taylor, "Measuring Movements of Electors Using Elec t i o n Results," P o l i t i c a l S t u d i e s XXII, 2 (1973):204-09; J. I. Gershuny, "The Non-paradox of Swing," B r i t i s h Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science 4 (January 1974):115-19; and David Butler and Donald Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change i n B r i t a i n (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 303-12. ^On the components of e l e c t o r a l change, see Butler and Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change in B r i t a i n , pp. 4-5; and Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of E l e c t o r a l Change," i n Elections and the P o l i t i c a l Order, -.by, Angus Campbell, P h i l i p E. Converse, Warren E. M i l l e r and Donald E. Stokes (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 40-62. 12 See es p e c i a l l y , Hugh Berrmgton, "The General Election of 1964"' and I. McLean, "The Problem of Proportionate Swing." 13 CCF-NDP stands for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, and i t s successor aft e r 1960, the New Democratic Party. The swings included i n th i s t r i a l were those of 1952-1953, 1953-1956, 1956-1960, 1960-1963, 1966-1969, and 1969-1972. The swing of 1963-1966 was omitted because con-stituency boundary changes intervened between the two elec-tions . 73 B u t l e r and Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change in B r i t a i n , pp. 305-07. 15 That i s , a d j u s t e d swings would be o b t a i n e d by sub-t r a c t i n g expected swings from a c t u a l swings. Thus, i n these three examples, a d j u s t e d swings would equal: f o r A, -1'6%; f o r B, +4%; and f o r C, -9%. ( f i g u r e s approximate). 16 Reference i s made to " p a t t e r n of c a n d i d a t u r e s " and " p a t t e r n of c o n t e s t " i n B e r r i n g t o n , "The General E l e c t i o n of 1964." 17 Data on vote by p a r t y f o r the 1903-,- 1907, 1909 and 1916 e l e c t i o n s are from The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1905, 1908, 1910 and 1917. C e r t a i n e r r o r s and omissions i n the r e t u r n s given f o r the 1903, 1907, and 1909 e l e c t i o n s were c o r r e c t e d a f t e r comparison wi t h r e s u l t s given i n R. E. G o s n e l l , The Yearbook of B r i t i s h Columbia and Manual of P r o v i n c i a l Information ( V i c t o r i a : n.p., 1911), pp. 76-80. The f o l l o w i n g c o r r e c t i o n s were made: (a) The Parliamentary Guide of 1905 excluded Kaslo i n i t s r e p o r t o f 1903 r e s u l t s , so G o s n e l l ' s f i g u r e s were used; (b) G o s n e l l ' s r e s u l t s were used f o r L i l l o o e t i n 1907; (c) G o s n e l l ' s 1907 r e s u l t s f o r Vancouver and V i c t o r i a were used because those given i n The Parliamentary Guide are incomplete; (d) w,e replaced!."the r e s u l t s given i n The Parliamentary Guide f o r Dewdney and F e r n i e in-19.09..with those given i n G o s n e l l ; (e) we r e s o l v e d d i s c r e p a n c i e s between G o s n e l l and The Parliamentary Guide on the matter of p a r t y l a b e l s attached to candidates i n favour of the i n f o r m a t i o n given i n G o s n e l l . The f o l l o w i n g should a l s o be noted: (1) A c e r t a i n number of MLAs were e l e c t e d by acclamation i n e a r l y e l e c t i o n s . C o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n which candidates were acclaimed i n one or both e l e c t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n an e l e c t i o n p a i r were excluded from a n a l y s i s of t h a t swing. (2) Data on the number of r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s per c o n s t i t u e n c y were not given i n The Parliamentary Guide f o r 1903, 1907, 1909, or 1916 e l e c t i o n s but were given by G o s n e l l (p. 81) f o r 1903, 1907, and 1909. Data on vote by p a r t y , and number of r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s i n the 1920 and 1924 e l e c t i o n s were taken from B r i t i s h Colum-b i a , Department of the P r o v i n c i a l S e c r e t a r y , B r i t i s h Columbia General E l e c t i o n , 1920--Statement of the P o l l s as C e r t i f i e d by Returning O f f i c e r s on Completion of Final Count; and General Election and P l e b i s c i t e , 1924--Statement of the P o l l s as C e r t i f i e d by Returning O f f i c e r s on Completion of Final Count. The p a r t y l a b e l s o f candidates were not given i n these two statements so p a r t y l a b e l s were taken from the re t u r n s given i n The Parliamentary Guide. Data on vote by p a r t y and number of r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s i n a l l other e l e c t i o n s were taken from B r i t i s h Columbia, C h i e f E l e c t o r a l O f f i c e r , Statement of Votes: General Election (1928, 1933, 1937, 1941, 7 4 1 9 4 5 , 1 9 5 2 , 1 9 5 3 , 1 9 5 6 , 1 9 6 0 , 1 9 6 3 , 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 6 9 , 1 9 7 2 , 1 9 7 5 ) ( V i c t o r i a , v a r i o u s d a t e s ) . 1 8 For a d i s c u s s i o n o f c o n s t i t u e n c y boundary adjustments i n t h i s century see John Robert Chalk, "A Proposed R e d i s t r i -b u t i o n of P r o v i n c i a l E l e c t o r a l D i s t r i c t s on the B a s i s of Nodal Regions" (M.A. t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1 9 6 6 ) , pp. 2 3 - 3 1 ; B r i t i s h Columbia, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Redefinition of Electoral D i s t r i c t s ( V i c t o r i a , 1 9 6 6 ) , and B r i t i s h Columbia, C h i e f E l e c t o r a l O f f i c e r , Provin-c i a l Electoral D i s t r i c t s : R e d i s t r i b u t i o n of 1966 ( V i c t o r i a , 1 9 6 6 ) . 1 9 In 1 9 3 4 the Columbia-Revelstoke c o n s t i t u e n c y was s p l i t i n t o the Columbia and Revelstoke c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . There were a l s o minor changes i n the Cranbrook c o n s t i t u e n c y . In 1 9 5 5 the Peace R i v e r c o n s t i t u e n c y was d i v i d e d i n t o the North Peace Ri v e r and South Peace R i v e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . 2 0 F i r s t b a l l o t r e s u l t s of the 1 9 5 2 and 1 9 5 3 e l e c t i o n s were used. In a l l e l e c t i o n s , p a r t y percentages i n m u l t i -member r i d i n g s were estimated by f i r s t d i v i d i n g the t o t a l votes o b t a i n e d by the p a r t y ' s candidates by the number of members to be r e t u r n e d from the c o n s t i t u e n c y , and then d i v i d i n g the r e s u l t by the f i g u r e reached when the t o t a l number of votes c a s t was d i v i d e d by the number of members to be re t u r n e d . 2 1 The 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 7 2 p e r i o d of a n a l y s i s was determined by the a v a i l a b i l i t y of data. R e s u l t s on v o t i n g at the p o l l l e v e l were not p u b l i s h e d f o r e l e c t i o n s p r i o r t o 1 9 2 8 , w h i l e p o l l l e v e l r e s u l t s f o r the 1 9 7 5 e l e c t i o n were not a v a i l a b l e when most of the a n a l y s i s was c a r r i e d out. The 1 9 2 8 - 1 9 3 3 swing was ign o r e d because the 1 9 3 3 e l e c t i o n i n v o l v e d a number of s p e c i a l circumstances which might b i a s r e s u l t s . P o l l data were ob t a i n e d from B r i t i s h Columbia, C h i e f E l e c t o r a l O f f i c e r , Statement of Votes: General Election ( 1 9 3 3 , 1 9 3 7 , 1 9 4 1 , 1 9 4 5 , 1 9 4 9 , 1 9 5 2 , 1 9 5 3 , 1 9 5 6 , 1 9 6 0 , 1 9 6 3 , 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 6 9 , 1 9 7 2 , 1 9 7 5 ) ( V i c t o r i a , v a r i o u s d a t e s ) . P o l l boundaries have never been r i g i d l y d e f i n e d i n nonmetropolitan c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . For example, the d e s c r i p t i o n o f p o l l s i n these c o n s t i t u e n c i e s a f t e r the 1 9 6 6 r e d i s t r i b u t i o n reads: the c o n s t i t u e n c y i s " d i v i d e d i n t o the f o l l o w i n g [x] p o l l i n g s t a t i o n s , being the p l a c e s named and the t e r r i t o r y t r i b u t a r y t o them from the standpoint of a c c e s s i b i l i t y . " See B r i t i s h Columbia, Depart-ment of the P r o v i n c i a l S e c r e t a r y , P o l l i n g Divisions for the 48 Electoral D i s t r i c t s Established by the 1966 R e d i s t r i b u t i o n ( V i c t o r i a , 1 9 6 6 ) . Although exact c o m p a r a b i l i t y of the areas i n c l u d e d i n s u c c e s s i v e e l e c t i o n s cannot be assumed, the correspondence should be very c l o s e . The steps i n c a l c u l a t -i n g percentages and swings f o r p o l l s were the same as those 75 f o l l o w e d w i t h the c o n s t i t u e n c y data. F i r s t b a l l o t r e s u l t s were used f o r the 1952 and 1953 e l e c t i o n s . 22 In o r d e r to leave room i n c o n s t i t u e n c y quotas f o r more remote p l a c e s a few communities i n excess of 500 v o t e r s were excluded i n Comox, Kamloops, R o s s l a n d - T r a i l , Cowichan-Newcastle, Mackenzie and South Okanagan. CHAPTER 3 DESCRIPTION AND PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE TREND TO UNIFORMITY OF ELECTORAL SWING The t r e n d t o i n c r e a s e d u n i f o r m i t y o f e l e c t o r a l s w i n g i s d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r . A n a l y s i s o f s w i n g s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a e l e c t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e c e n t u r y shows t h a t w i d e l y d i v e r g e n t s w i n g s were much more l i k e l y i n e l e c t i o n s p r i o r t o 1952. S e p a r a t e s t u d i e s o f c o n s t i t u e n c y and community s w i n g s b o t h l e d t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . I n i t i a l e f f o r t s a t i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e t r e n d t o u n i f o r m i t y a r e r e p o r t e d i n t h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h e c h a p t e r . The s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e x p l a n a t i o n s o f f e r e d a r e , f o r t h e most p a r t , r e j e c t e d and t h u s t h e s t a g e i s s e t f o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f s w i n g p a t t e r n s w h i c h a r e r e p o r t e d i n C h a p t e r s 4, 5, and 6. The two d a t a s e t s e x a m i n e d were i n t r o d u c e d i n C h a p t e r 2. The f i r s t c o n t a i n s r e s u l t s on s w i n g s i n a l l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s f o r 15 e l e c t i o n s between 1907 and 1975. A n a l y s i s o f t h e s e d a t a y i e l d s g e n e r a l e s t i m a t e s o f t h e c h a n g i n g d e g r e e o f s w i n g u n i f o r m i t y . The s e c o n d s e t c o n t a i n s r e s u l t s f o r a sample o f n o n m e t r o p o l i t a n c o m m u n i t i e s i n 12 e l e c t i o n s a f t e r 1933. A n a l y s i s o f t h e s e r e s u l t s h e l p s t o c l a r i f y e l e c t o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e a r e a s w h i c h s h o u l d have been most a f f e c t e d by m o d e r n i z a t i o n , and p a r t i c u l a r l y by communica-t i o n s c hange. The uniformity of swing i n a given e l e c t i o n i s gauged by the dispersal of swings around the mean p r o v i n c i a l swing. Both the standard deviation, and the percentage of cases f a l l i n g within a narrow range of the mean p r o v i n c i a l swing are taken as evidence of t h i s d ispersal. If swing i s r e l a -t i v e l y uniform, then the standard deviation i s small, and a large proportion of cases produce swings f a l l i n g within f i v e (or ten) percentage points of the mean swing. Swings around the government party and the major opposi-t i o n party are analyzed separately to ensure that we have more than one indicator of the pr e v a i l i n g swing patterns. In order to maintain as much parsimony as possible i n report-ing of r e s u l t s , the s t a t i s t i c s presented are usually averages of those obtained i n the separate analyses. Findings: Swing Uniformity Across Voter Aggregates, 1903-1975 Table 5 shows the marked increase i n cross-constituency uniformity of swing. The entries describe average levels of dispersal around mean swings during four periods: 1903-28, 1933-52, 1953-63, and 1966-75.1 The period demarcation points were chosen with an eye to -having each period include equal numbers of elections. The 1933 and 1952 elections pro-vide natural cut-off points since each marked the beginning of a d i s t i n c t period i n the history of the party system. The CCF f i r s t ran candidates i n 1933, while 1952 marked the a r r i v a l of Social Credit as a major force, and the s t a r t of TABLE 5: HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF SWING UNIFORMITY ACROSS CONSTITUENCIES, 1903-1975, WHERE .; SWING IS MEASURED AS PERCENTAGE POINT SHIFT. PERIOD AVERAGES OF STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND PROPORTIONS OF CONSTITUENCY SWINGS WITHIN CERTAIN RANGES. AVERAGES ACROSS RESULTS FROM ANALYSES OF GOVERNMENT PARTY AND MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY SWINGS, AND ACROSS ELECTIONS WITHIN PERIODS Number of Average S.D. Around Average Percentage of Constituencies Within: Period Swings i n P e r i o d 3 Mean Percentage Point Swings (±) 5 Percentage Points of Mean Swings^ (±) 10 Percentage Points of Mean Swings 1903-28 8 10.1 38.5 64.2 1933-52° 8 10.5 43.2 72.4 1953-63 8 5.9 66.8 89.5 1966-75 6 7.0 59.4 85.4 'The number of swings i n a period i s equal to the number of elections times two (the number of pa r t i e s whose swings were analyzed i n each e l e c t i o n ) . I f we were looking at swings i n one party's support i n one el e c t i o n , and found a mean percentage point swing across constituencies of *10%, the figure i n t h i s column would t e l l us the percentage of constituencies i n which percentage point swings to that party were between +5% and +15%. The figures given, as noted, are averages across the two major parties and a series of ele c t i o n s . In 1952 the government party swing was taken to be the difference between C o a l i t i o n support i n 1949 and combined L i b e r a l and Conservative support i n 1952. 79 the period i n which Social Credit and the CCF-NDP were the p r i n c i p a l protagonists. Perhaps the most dramatic indica t i o n of the trend to uniformity i s found i n the column of Table 5 which gives the proportion of cases within f i v e percentage points of mean swing. Prio r to 1952 the average on t h i s indicator i s about 40%—on the average, about t h r e e - f i f t h s of constituency swings diverge by more than f i v e percentage points from the mean swing i n a given e l e c t i o n . For elections a f t e r 1952 the average i s over 60%—on the average, only about one-third of constituency swings diverge by more than f i v e percentage points from mean swings. Thus, frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n curves constructed to show the proportion of constituencies which produce swings of various deviations would vary considerably in peakedness. Curves for the early period would be much less peaked, i n d i -cating the greater dispersal around mean swings i n that period. The period summation s t a t i s t i c s indicate that the trend to greater uniformity of swing l e v e l l e d o f f a f t e r 1963. Figure 8, which plots the movement of standard deviations across 15 elections, allows more detailed scrutiny of t h i s trend. This map of dispersal rates indicates that the l e v e l -l i n g o f f period came i n the early 1960's, with the degree of uniformity obtaining in 1963 not matched i n subsequent elec-tions. The 1963 e l e c t i o n featured more uniformity than any 8 0 • i i i i • i i i I I i i 1 i , ( 1907 1909 1920 11928 1937 1945 1949 1952 1953 1956 1960 1963 1969 1972 1975 Year of Swing FIGURE 8: Trends i n swing uniformity across constituencies, 1903-1975. Standard deviations around mean percentage point swings. Averages from separate analyses of government party and main opposition party swings. 81 o t h e r with the e x c e p t i o n of the 1953 e l e c t i o n . Reasons f o r the e x c e p t i o n a l l y h i g h u n i f o r m i t y of 1953 are i n i t i a l l y d i f -f i c u l t to fathom, but i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t i f the 1953 e l e c t i o n i s ignored, we f i n d a steady decrease i n d i s p e r s a l from 1937 to 1963. Swings i n the 1937 e l e c t i o n were l e s s uniform than i n any o t h e r analyzed. I f the downward t r e n d c u l m i n a t i n g i n 19 6 3 i s i n t e r e s t i n g , so i s the apparent movement away from u n i f o r m i t y which began ; a f t e r t h a t date. Trends cannot be c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d on the b a s i s o f three e l e c t i o n s , but the evidence does sug-gest t h a t a t r e n d towards g r e a t e r h e t e r o g e n e i t y of swing took h o l d i n the mid-1960's. Swing i n the 1975 e l e c t i o n was l e s s uniform than i n any e l e c t i o n s i n c e the b e g i n n i n g of the S o c i a l C r e d i t e r a . The above a n a l y s i s was r e p l i c a t e d u s i n g the data on . nonmetropolitan communities i n e l e c t i o n s from 1933 to 1972. This a d d i t i o n a l study allows c l o s e r examination of trends i n the p a r t s o f the p r o v i n c e where, according to our ideas about the importance of the communications development, change should be most apparent. In comparison with the c o n s t i t u -e n c i e s j u s t examined, the nonmetropolitan communities com-p r i s e a l a r g e r sample of s m a l l e r , more homogeneous v o t e r c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . In t h i s sample, each c o n s t i t u e n c y i s r e p r e -sented by s e v e r a l communities, so the r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e some-t h i n g about u n i f o r m i t y w i t h i n , as w e l l as a c r o s s , c o n s t i t -uencies . 82 The tests of dispersal were applied to two versions of the basic community sample. This duplication of tests was undertaken i n order to minimize cert a i n methodological dan-gers which stem from the fact that swings i n very small voter c o l l e c t i v i t i e s are not s t r i c t l y comparable with swings i n larger ones. The comparison of hypothetical communities presented i n Table 6 shows that large swings (either p o s i t i v e or negative) are more l i k e l y i n very small communities and thus i l l u s t r a t e s why sets of small communities are l i k e l y to i n f l a t e s t a t i s t i c s on dispersal... . • TABLE 6: HYPOTHETICAL SWINGS IN TWO COMMUNITIES: VOTES AND PERCENTAGES Small Community Large Community E l e c t i o n 1 E l e c t i o n 2 E l e c t i o n 1 E l e c t i o n 2 Party A 5 (20%) 10 (40%) 200 (20%) 400 (40%) Party B 20 (80%) 15 (60%) 800 (80%) 600 (60%) 25 25 1000 1000 It i s assumed i n t h i s example that swings res u l t from pre-ference switching among members of fixed electorates. In the small community, a change of mind by f i v e voters leads to the doubling of party A's support and a percentage point swing of 20%. In the large community, the same swing requires change by 200 voters. Our argument i s that the change i n the small community i s much more l i k e l y . The small community i s more homogeneous so a l l of i t s voters 83 co u l d e a s i l y be i n f l u e n c e d by one o p i n i o n l e a d e r . Indeed, a l l of i t s v o t e r s c o u l d belong t o one f a m i l y or l o g g i n g crew. The i m p l i c a t i o n i s c l e a r . One would expect t o see more extreme v a r i a t i o n i n swing ac r o s s a sample c o n t a i n i n g small p l a c e s , because l a r g e swings are more l i k e l y i n such p l a c e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t o re c o g n i z e t h i s problem i s not to s o l v e i t . Questions remain about the s i z e t h r e s h o l d s which must be cro s s e d b e f o r e c o m p a r a b i l i t y can be assumed. For example, i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f swings produced by communities ranging i n s i z e from 100 to 200 v o t e r s comparable w i t h the d i s t r i b u t i o n produced by communities wi t h more than 1000 v o t e r s ? C l e a r -c u t answers t o ques t i o n s l i k e t h i s are not p o s s i b l e , so the most s e n s i b l e o p t i o n i n v o l v e s m u l t i p l e t e s t s on samples which have very s m a l l communities excluded. The f i r s t c o l l e c t i o n of communities examined c o n s i s t s of a l l p l a c e s i n the com-munity sample which had more than 35 people v o t i n g i n the f i r s t e l e c t i o n o f the swing p a i r . T h i s l e f t a sample which ranges i n s i z e from 183 communities i n 1937 to 271 i n 1972. A second sample was a r r i v e d at by s e t t i n g 100 v o t e r s as the c r i t e r i o n f o r s e l e c t i o n . T h i s sample ranges i n s i z e from 87 communities i n 1937 to 199 i n 1972. The t r e n d l i n e s i n F i g u r e 9, and the p e r i o d averages i n Table 7 both t e l l a s t o r y which i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t r e v e a l e d i n the study o f c o n s t i t u e n c y swings. A sharp t r e n d towards swing u n i f o r m i t y i s apparent i n both community FIGURE 9: Trends i n swing uniformity across nonmetropolitan communities, 1933-1972. Standard deviations around mean percentage point swings. Averages from separate analyses of government party and main opposition party swings. Tests on two samples of communities selected by applying d i f f e r e n t s i z e c r i t e r i a . 3 Both samples were drawn from the basic community sample ou t l i n e d i n Chapter 2. They d i f f e r i n terms of the siz e of communities selected. For an explanation see the text, pp. 82-83. 85 TABLE 7: HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF SWING UNIFORMITY ACROSS NONMETRO-POLITAN COMMUNITIES, 1933-1973. PERIOD AVERAGES OF STANDARD DEVIATIONS IN TWO SAMPLES OF COMMUNITIES3 Average S.D. Around Govt. Party Swings Average S.D. Around Main Opposition Party Swings Average S.D. Both Parties Sampled communities with fewer than 100 voters excluded: 1933-41 b 1945-52 C 1953-63 1966-72 15. 2 13.8 10.4 10.4 16.8 13. 3 9.1 8.9 16.0 13.6 9.8 9.6 Sampled communities with fewer than 35 voters excluded: 1933-41 b 1945-52° 1953-63 1966-72 18.8 17.3 12. 2 12.2 21.2 16.2 11.2 10.6 20.0 16.8 11.7 11.4 Both samples were drawn from the basic community sample out l i n e d i n Chapter 2. They d i f f e r i n terms of the s i z e of communities excluded. For an explanation see the text, pp. 82-83. 'in 1941 the CCF was treated as the main opposition party. In 1952 the government party swing was taken to be the differe n c e between C o a l i t i o n support i n 1949 and combined L i b e r a l and Conservative support i n 1952. 86 samples. The magnitude of the change over time i s c o n s i d e r -2 a b l e . When we compare across f o u r p e r i o d s , we f i n d t h a t the average standard d e v i a t i o n s around mean swings i n the 1953-63 and 1966-72 p e r i o d s are about h a l f the s i z e o f the d e v i a t i o n s f o r the pre-1952 p e r i o d . With a few e x c e p t i o n s , the trends are i n v a r i a n t across the two samples. The 1953 swing again appears a b e r r a n t . Here, as i n the c o n s t i t u e n c y r e s u l t s , i f the 1953 swing i s i g n o r e d , we f i n d a q u i t e steady d e c l i n e i n v a r i a t i o n from 1937 to 1963. The l a t t e r e l e c t i o n again marks the beginning of a l e v e l l i n g o f f p e r i o d but, i n these nonmetropolitan r e s u l t s , the 1969 and 1972 e l e c t i o n s r e v e a l a l e s s pronounced t r e n d away from the highwater mark of u n i f o r m i t y . The 1969 and 1972 r e s u l t s suggest t h a t the decrease i n u n i f o r m i t y across c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n these e l e c t i o n s may have been balanced by an i n c r e a s e i n w i t h i n - c o n s t i t u e n c y u n i f o r m i t y . The remainder of the chapter r e p o r t s on f o u r attempts to e s t a b l i s h the meaning of the observed trends i n swing uniform-i t y . Each, attempt focusses on a f a i r l y simple e x p l a n a t i o n . C o n f i r m a t i o n o f any of the arguments would u n r a v e l the mys-t e r y s u r rounding the f i n d i n g s and save us the t r o u b l e of undertaking f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n s . 87 The Argument that Trends are an A r t i f a c t of the Increased Size of Voter Aggregates The f i r s t and most disturbing alternative to the view that the observed trends indicate a profound change i n the province's e l e c t o r a l sociology has been suggested i n the argument about the relationship between the size of voter aggregates and t h e i r propensity for large swings. The d i f -ference between the two trend l i n e s shown in Figure 9 bears out the contention of that argument—when the sample analyzed includes smaller communities, the rates of dispersal are larger. The possible implication of t h i s argument i s clear. The greater swing uniformity of the modern period may be a r t i f a c t u a l since modern samples contain larger voter aggre-gates (the same places grown l a r g e r ) . It i s d i f f i c u l t to counteract t h i s argument without a f u l l understanding of the relationship between community size and the propensity for large swings. Certainly there i s no reason to assume l i n e a r i t y of e f f e c t s . That i s , communities of 10 voters may be ten times more prone to wild fluctuations than communities of 100 voters, but those of 100 are probably not ten times as prone as those of 1000. It should be r e i t e r -ated that, i n the analysis of the community r e s u l t s , the trends p e r s i s t as more of the small places are removed from the sample. And i t i s also important to remember that i n the analysis of constituency data, the c o l l e c t i v i t i e s dealt with contained hundreds and thousands of voters, not dozens and 88 hundreds of v o t e r s . The same source of spuriousness should not have operated. In o r d e r t o t e s t the a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the community a n a l y s i s of u n i f o r m i t y was r e p l i c a t e d u s i n g samples of s i m i l a r l y s i z e d communities. Swing i n f o u r e l e c t i o n s (1941, 1952, 1960 and 1972) was analyzed. In each e l e c t i o n , only communities f a l l i n g w i t h i n narrow p o p u l a t i o n ranges were s e l e c t e d from the b a s i c community sample f o r examination. The r e s u l t s are presented i n the four p a r t s of Table 8. The number of communities i n c l u d e d i n each study and the average s i z e o f community are given f o r each e l e c t i o n . These f i n d i n g s i n f l i c t f a t a l damage to the f i r s t a l t e r -n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The f a m i l i a r t r e n d towards u n i f o r m i t y of swing p e r s i s t s even when we compare d i s p e r s a l among com-munities which are roughly equal i n s i z e . Thus, f o r example, where communities i n the 75 to 500 v o t e r range are s e l e c t e d , and the average s i z e of community remains i n the 175 to 200 range, we f i n d average standard d e v i a t i o n s d e c l i n i n g from 16.0 and 16.8 f o r the 1941 and 1952 swings, to 12.6 and 10.7 f o r the 1960 and 1972 swings. Where only sampled communities wi t h more than 250 v o t e r s are examined, the average standard d e v i a t i o n s are n e a r l y h a l v e d as we move from 1941 t o 1972. In a l l f o u r t e s t s , the trends match those found t o e x i s t i n the e a r l i e r i n v e s t i g a t o n . Thus we can be sure t h a t the trends toward u n i f o r m i t y are not s p u r i o u s l y r e l a t e d i n the way proposed by the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . TABLE 8: TRENDS IN SWING UNIFORMITY ACROSS NONMETROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES AFTER CONTROLS ON COMMUNITY SIZE. ANALYSES OF 1941, 1952, 1960 AND 1972 SWINGS AMONG NONMETROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES OF SIMILAR SIZES. STANDARD DEVIATIONS AROUND MEAN SWINGS. FOUR PARTS FOR DIFFERENT SIZE PARAMETERS. Swing Between No. of Cases Average Size of Communities Included (Voters) S.D. for Government Party Swings S.D. for Main Opposition Party Swings Average S.D. Both Parties Sampled communities with more than 500 voting voters: 1937-41 27 1344 14.1 14.8 14.4 1949-52 56 1624 12.8 10.5 11.6 1956-60 65 1663 7.9 9.0 8.4 1969-72 90 2124 8.0 6.1 7.0 Sampled communities with more than 250 voting voters: 1937-41 46 928 13.5 15.6 14.6 1949-52 90 1143 12.1 10.3 11.2 1956-60 102 1185 8.5 10.1 9.3 1969-72 129 1591 8.5 7.0 7.8 Sampled communities with between 75 and 500 voting voters: 1937-41 99 111 14.9 17.0 16.0 1949-52 145 190 18.6 14.9 16.8 1956-60 148 193 12.4 12.7 12.6 1969-72 144 202 11.4 10.0 10.7 Sampled communities with between 75 and 250 voting voters: 1937-41 80 140 15.4 17.2 16.3 1949-52 111 140 20.4 16.2 18.3 1956-60 111 142 13.0 12.7 12.8 1969-72 105 143 11.8 10.4 11.1 90 The Argument that Trends to Uniformity Would Disappear i f the Effects of S h i f t s in Community Composition Were Removed A second argument i s that the trends to swing uniformity simply r e f l e c t the fact that major s h i f t s i n the composition of voter aggregates were more common i n some h i s t o r i c a l per-iods. Composition s h i f t s such as the one taking place when a community of farmers i s transformed into a community of construction workers, would naturally cause wide election-to-el e c t i o n s h i f t s i n the vote. Thus, when major changes i n composition are common, extreme swings should be prevalent and rates of swing dispersal high. Different results than those presented above might obtain i f rates of dispersal across stable communities were compared for d i f f e r e n t elec-tions. If so, we would have to a l t e r our ideas concerning the causes of the trends. No evidence can be brought to bear on t h i s argument, but two points can be made in asserting that i t does not s e r i -ously challenge our interpretation of the trends. In the f i r s t place, the argument should not apply where constituency results are concerned since constituencies, unlike communi-t i e s , are unlikely to undergo r a d i c a l s h i f t s i n composition. In the second place, the period of B r i t i s h Columbia history which seems most l i k e l y to have featured a disproportionate number of major s h i f t s i n community composition, the 1950-1970 period, i s the period of highest uniformity. This 91 suggests t h a t c o n t r o l s f o r community s t a b i l i t y , i f they c o u l d be a p p l i e d , would probably show t h a t the f i n d i n g s a c t u a l l y underestimate p e r i o d d i f f e r e n c e s i n u n i f o r m i t y . The Argument that Differences in Consistency of Minor Party Presence on the Ballot Cause the Observed Trends A t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t the b a l l o t o p t i o n s o f f e r e d v o t e r s i n d i f f e r e n t r i d i n g s became more uniform, and t h a t i t was t h i s development r a t h e r than more profound changes i n e l e c t o r a l s o c i o l o g y which produced the observed t r e n d s . T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e f i x e s a t t e n t i o n on a p o s s i b l e t r e n d which can be t r e a t e d as d i s c r e t e , and i s o l a t e d f o r a n a l y s i s , even though i t would be connected t o more general s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l d e v e l -opments. The premise u n d e r l y i n g the argument i s t h a t g r e a t r i d i n g - t o - r i d i n g v a r i a t i o n i n swing should be expected where there i s wide v a r i a t i o n across c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n the presence of minor p a r t i e s on the b a l l o t . Where minor p a r t y presence i s constant, v o t e r s i n a l l r i d i n g s face s i m i l a r s l a t e s , and swings around the major p a r t i e s should be more uniform. For example, i n 1975, when there were s u b s t a n t i a l c o n s t i t u e n c y d i f f e r e n c e s i n L i b e r a l and P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e presence, swing should have been l e s s uniform than i n 1972 when minor p a r t y presence was more uniform. I f there was a t r e n d t o gr e a t e r c o n s i s t e n c y o f minor p a r t y presence, and i f such a development can be l i n k e d t o trends t o u n i f o r m i t y , then we w i l l have t i e d the observed trends t o a systemic development 92 which i s a good d e a l more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d than the develop-ments envisaged i n some of our e a r l i e r arguments. The p r e s e n t argument does not deny t h a t i n c r e a s e d u n i f o r m i t y of b a l l o t o p t i o n s would probably stem from broader developments. I t simply p o i n t s t o one d i s c r e t e v a r i a b l e which may i n t e r v e n e between s o c i e t a l and e l e c t o r a l change, and suggests t h a t our explanatory task would be s i m p l i f i e d i f we c o u l d c o n f i r m the c o n n e c t i o n p o s i t e d . An i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c survey suggests t h a t e a r l i e r e l e c t i o n s had no p a r t i c u l a r monopoly on the c o n d i t i o n s which, a c c o r d i n g to the argument under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , should encourage gr e a t v a r i a t i o n i n swing. But the hypothesis seems important enough t o demand a more strenuous response. In order to i n s t i t u t e the c o n t r o l s advised, i t i s necessary to apply the " c o n t e s t p a t t e r n " c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e i n t r o d u c e d i n Chapter 2. Temporal v a r i a t i o n i n swing u n i f o r m i t y connected to v a r i a t i o n i n the c o n s i s t e n c y of minor p a r t y presence w i l l be removed when the e x p l a n a t o r y impact of the c o n t e s t v a r i a b l e i s c l a r -i f i e d . We w i l l be concerned w i t h the amount of u n i f o r m i t y w i t h i n groups of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s s h a r i n g the same E l e c t i o n 1-E l e c t i o n 2 c o n t e s t p a t t e r n s . For i n s t a n c e , i n the case of the 1952-53 swing, we want to see how much u n i f o r m i t y there i s a c r o s s the 24 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n which f o u r p a r t i e s con-t e s t e d both e l e c t i o n s , how much th e r e i s across the 10 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which had f o u r p a r t y - p l u s c o n t e s t s i n 1952 93 and f o u r p a r t y - p l u s c o n t e s t s i n 1953, and so on. In e f f e c t , we want t o compare the average " w i t h i n - c o n t e s t type" v a r i a -t i o n f o r t h i s e l e c t i o n w i t h averages f o r other e l e c t i o n s . I f we perform a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e on swings u s i n g c o n t e s t pat-t e r n as the Independent v a r i a b l e , then the within-groups mean square s t a t i s t i c p r o v i d e s a good i n d i c a t o r o f the average l e v e l o f u n i f o r m i t y across c o n s t i t u e n c i e s s h a r i n g the same c o n t e s t p a t t e r n s . T h i s component r e p r e s e n t s a v a r i a n c e e s t i -mate which i s uncontaminated by c r o s s - c o n s t i t u e n c y v a r i a t i o n i n minor p a r t y presence. The t r e n d i n the average v a r i a n c e among c o n s t i t u e n c i e s s h a r i n g c o n t e s t p a t t e r n s i s p l o t t e d i n F i g u r e 10. C l e a r l y the c o n t r o l s on the c o n t e s t v a r i a b l e do not erode the t r e n d evidenced e a r l i e r i n the chapter. The l i n e i n F i g u r e 10 c o r r e l a t e s q u i t e c l o s e l y w i t h the l i n e i n F i g u r e 8 which showed the t r e n d b e f o r e these c o n t r o l s . U n i f o r m i t y i s s t i l l s u b s t a n t i a l l y h i g h e r i n the post-1952 p e r i o d , w i t h the peak l e v e l reached i n 1960 and 1963. I t might have been expected t h a t some of the 19 75 v a r i a t i o n would have been r e l a t e d t o i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n L i b e r a l and P r o g r e s s i v e C o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y presence, but i t i s found i n s t e a d t h a t t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n i n major p a r t y swings even across c o n s t i t u e n c i e s s h a r i n g the same 1972-1975 c o n t e s t p a t t e r n s . The 1975 e l e c -t i o n s t i l l appears t o have been marked by l e s s u n i f o r m i t y o f c o n s t i t u e n c y swing than any e l e c t i o n s i n c e the 1940's. 94 170 150-1907 1909 1920 1928 1937 1945 1949 1952 1953 1956 1960 1963 1969 1972 1975 Year of Swing FIGURE 10: Trends i n swing uniformity across constituencies, 1903-1975, a f t e r controls on pattern of contest. Within-groups mean square s t a t i s t i c s which r e f l e c t the average l e v e l of uniform-i t y among constituencies sharing the same contest patterns. Averages from separate analyses of government party and main opposition party swings. 95 I t must be concluded t h a t trends to u n i f o r m i t y o f swing o c c u r r e d i n s p i t e o f any i n c r e a s e i n the c o n s i s t e n c y o f con-t e s t a n t s l a t e s . There was a s u b s t a n t i a l d e c l i n e i n swing v a r i a t i o n among c o n s t i t u e n c i e s s h a r i n g the same E l e c t i o n 1-E l e c t i o n 2 c o n t e s t p a t t e r n s . The Argument that the Findings May Be A r t i f a c t u a l of Increased Uniformity of Base Levels of Party Support The f o u r t h argument about the f i n d i n g s begins by p o i n t -i n g t o the s t r o n g n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p (which was demon-s t r a t e d i n Chapter 2) between the base l e v e l o f support o f a p a r t y ( i t s E i support) and i t s swing. T h i s evidence sug-gests a p a i r of connected p r o p o s i t i o n s . The number of extreme c o n s t i t u e n c y swings experienced by a p a r t y , and thus the o v e r a l l h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f i t s swing, should be h i g h e r where the p a r t y begins from very low Ei support l e v e l s i n some c o n s t i t u e n c i e s and from very h i g h l e v e l s i n o t h e r s . I f the i n c i d e n c e of extreme base l e v e l p o i n t s i s , f o r some reason, more p r e v a l e n t i n e a r l y e l e c t i o n s , then the r e s u l t s i n d i c a t i n g l e s s uniform swing i n e a r l y e l e c t i o n s may be spu r i o u s . The f i n d i n g s may i n d i c a t e n o t h i n g more than the obvious f a c t t h a t the o p e r a t i o n of r e g r e s s i o n e f f e c t s w i l l d i f f e r a c c o r d i n g t o the homogeneity of base l e v e l s of p a r t y support. Two i n q u i r i e s were c a r r i e d out i n order t o ev a l u a t e t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . F i r s t , the .a-aalysis of trends i n the uniformity of constituency swings was re p l i c a t e d using the proportionate measure of swing outlined i n Chapter 2. We developed t h i s measure to circumvent the l i m i t s i n growth (or decline) problem which seemedoto.;.explain^.partiallyi;Athe negative c o r r e l a t i o n between swing and base l e v e l of support. The new measure takes swing as a proportion of the party's "vote at r i s k " ( i t s E x support) i n cases where swing i s negative, and as a proportion of i t s "vote to gain 1' (or 100% minus i t s Ei support) i n cases where swing i s p o s i t i v e . The problem of absolute l i m i t s on growth and wastage of support i s at least p a r t i a l l y at issue here. A party's swings are not l i k e l y to be uniform where i t s base support levels c l u s t e r at opposite extremes because possible per-centage point changes i n constituencies where base support levels are low, cannot be matched where levels are high and vice versa. Use of the proportionate measure should undercut the argument that our findings may be spurious of trends i n base l e v e l extremity. Non-uniformity of proportionate swings should not be caused by heterogeneity of extreme base l e v e l s . The results from analysis of proportionate swing which are presented i n Table 9 suggest that the fourth alternative interpretation can be rejected. The f a m i l i a r trend towards uniformity p e r s i s t s i n unaltered form when the dispersal rates of proportionate swings are examined. The standard deviations for the post-1952 period are s t i l l about two-third the magnitude of those for the pre-1952 period. TABLE 9: HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF SWING UNIFORMITY ACROSS CONSTITUENCIES, 1903-1975, WHERE SWING IS MEASURED PROPORTIONATELY. PERIOD AVERAGES OF STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND PROPORTIONS OF CONSTITUENCY SWINGS WITHIN CERTAIN RANGES. AVERAGES ACROSS RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF GOVERN-MENT PARTY AND MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY SWINGS, AND ACROSS ELECTIONS WITHIN PERIODS Period No. of Swings Analyzed i n P e r i o d 3 Average S.D. Around Mean Proportionate Swing Average Percentage of Constituencies Within: (±)5 Percentage Points of Mean Proportionate Swing'3 (±)10 Percentage Points of Mean Proportionate Swing 1903-28 8 18.3 25.4 44.4 1933-52° 8 18.1 19.3 48.4 1953-63 8 11.6 40.9 67.2 1966-75 6 o 12.5 37.5 64.6 The number of swings i n a period i s equal to the number of elections times two (the number of pa r t i e s whose swings were analyzed i n each e l e c t i o n ) . ' i f we were looking at swings i n one party's support i n one e l e c t i o n , and found a mean proportionate swing across constituencies of +20%, the figure i n the column would t e l l us the percentage of con-sti t u e n c i e s i n which proportionate swings to that party were between 15% and 25%. The figures given, as noted, are averages across the two major parties and a series of e l e c t i o n s . In 1952 the government party swing was taken to be the difference between C o a l i t i o n support i n 1949 and combined L i b e r a l and Conservative support i n 1952. 98 A simpler test of the alternative interpretation can be applied by returning to the percentage point measure and r e p l i c a t i n g the e a r l i e r analysis on samples from which cases with extreme E l e c t i o n 1 support levels have been removed. This honing was done by dropping cases where the party's E l e c t i o n 1 support was below 20% or above 60%. If there i s more base l e v e l extremity i n early elections, i t s hypothe-sized e f f e c t s should be neutralized when we examine swings from t h i s narrowed range of base l e v e l positions. Figure 11 plots the standard deviations which r e f l e c t the uniformity across t h i s reduced sample of constituencies. As usual, the points plotted are averages of results obtained in separate tests on government party and main opposition party swings. Comparison with the trend l i n e shown in Figure 8 reveals a few minor differences (for example, the 1937 and 1945 elections reverse positions r e l a t i v e to one another while remaining the elections which featured extreme heterogeneity of swing), but i n general, the major findings of the chapter again p e r s i s t i n the face of an attempt to explain them away as spurious. The Argument that the Observed Trends Are an A r t i f a c t of Changes in the E l e c t o r a l . System One f i n a l question must be directed at the assumption that the findings r e f l e c t broader changes i n the e l e c t o r a l sociology of the province. Is i t possible that these findings 99 14 ~ Year of Swing FIGURE 11: Trends i n swing uniformity across constituencies, 1903-1975, a f t e r exclusion of cases where base l e v e l of support i s extreme. 3 Standard deviations around mean percentage point swings. Averages from separate analyses of government party and main opposition party swings. 3That i s , cases where base l e v e l of support(or support i n the f i r s t e l e c t i o n of the pair) was below 20% or above 60% have been excluded. 100 can be accounted f o r by r e f e r e n c e to systemic changes? In p a r t i c u l a r , might i n c r e a s e d u n i f o r m i t y have been a s s o c i a t e d w i t h changes i n the r u l e s governing the conduct of e l e c t i o n s ? L e g i s l a t e d change i n regards to e l e c t o r a l f i n a n c e r e p r e -sents one suspect. For example, changes which would l i m i t or s u b s i d i z e c o n s t i t u e n c y campaign spending might be expected t o cause l e v e l l i n g of spending across c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , and t h i s development might i n t u r n ramify i n more uniform swing r e s u l t s . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y can be r e j e c t e d s i n c e no such change i n p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t o r a l law o c c u r r e d d u r i n g the per-i o d under a n a l y s i s . A l t e r a t i o n s t o the form of the b a l l o t might a l s o l e a d to u n i f o r m i t y . Changes i n the p r o v i s i o n s of e l e c t o r a l law concerning the i n c l u s i o n of p a r t y a f f i l i a t i o n on the b a l l o t c o u l d be p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t . Swings would be expected t o be more uniform where p a r t y l a b e l s were at t a c h e d t o c a n d i -dates' names s i n c e the importance o f p a r t y and l e a d e r would be heightened, and the importance of the l o c a l candidate d i m i n i s h e d . Thus, when a f f i l i a t i o n i s not i n c l u d e d , l o c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f swing should be more important, and there should be l e s s u n i f o r m i t y of swing. This argument cannot be s e t a s i d e . Changes r e g a r d i n g the i n c l u s i o n o f p a r t y a f f i l i a t i o n were l e g i s l a t e d i n t o 3 p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t o r a l law i n 1921 and 1939. The second change was more c o n s e q u e n t i a l than the f i r s t which amended the e l e c t o r a l law to p r o v i d e f o r grouping of candidates by 101 p a r t y i n the Vancouver C i t y and V i c t o r i a C i t y r i d i n g s which both e l e c t e d m u l t i p l e members. Each group of candidates was to be i n d i c a t e d by placement of the name of the p o l i t i c a l p a r t y o r i n t e r e s t with the candidates' names. Wholesale i n t r o d u c t i o n o f p a r t y l a b e l s onto the b a l l o t came with the new p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n law of 1939. Without a l t e r i n g the s i t u a t i o n i n the m u l t i p l e member r i d i n g s , t h i s Act p r o v i d e d t h a t the " p o l i t i c a l p a r t y or i n t e r e s t " r e p r e -sented by each candidate would be p r i n t e d on the b a l l o t i n a l l o t h e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . T h i s p r o v i s i o n remained i n e f f e c t i n a l l e l e c t i o n s from 1941 onwards. I t i s , o f course, i m p o s s i b l e to know the extent to which the observed trends i n swing u n i f o r m i t y were accounted f o r by t h i s simple change. C e r t a i n l y a l l the t r e n d l i n e s l a i d out do i n d i c a t e a sharp i n c r e a s e i n u n i f o r m i t y of swing a f t e r the 1930's. But none show the immediate a r r i v a l of a new p l a t e a u of u n i f o r m i t y . Such a development, we t h i n k , should have taken p l a c e i n response t o the change we are e x a m i n i n g — t h e e f f e c t of the change i n e l e c t o r a l law should have been immed-i a t e r a t h e r than gr a d u a l . While t h i s systemic f a c t o r no doubt c o n t r i b u t e d t o i n c r e a s e d u n i f o r m i t y of swing, the d i f -f erences between the u n i f o r m i t y l e v e l s marking the 1945, 1949 and 1952 swings, and the l e v e l s p r e v a i l i n g a f t e r 1952 i n d i c a t e t h a t a d d i t i o n a l important f o r c e s operated t o b r i n g about u n i -f o r m i t y . T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e would c l e a r l y be more d i f f i c u l t to r e j e c t i f the changes t o a p a r t y b a l l o t had taken p l a c e 102 between 1952 and 1953 or, i n other words, at the t h r e s h o l d p o i n t marking the advent of the modern p l a t e a u of u n i f o r m i t y . A Further Test: Uniformity Within Constituencies The argument t h a t the d e c l i n e i n swing v a r i a t i o n was caused by a l e v e l l i n g o f c o n t e s t d i f f e r e n c e s can be f u r t h e r examined through an a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e i n swing a c r o s s com-munities w i t h i n the same c o n s t i t u e n c y . I f the argument i s c o r r e c t , then the observed trends r e s u l t e d from a l e v e l l i n g o f d i f f e r e n c e s across c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . Since communities w i t h i n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s faced the same b a l l o t , any l e v e l l i n g of minor p a r t y presence should have had no impact on w i t h i n -c o n s t i t u e n c y u n i f o r m i t y o f swing. Evidence of a g e n e r a l i z e d i n c r e a s e i n w i t h i n - c o n s t i t u e n c y u n i f o r m i t y would argue t h a t causes o t h e r than those p o s i t e d i n t h i s argument operated. Examination of w i t h i n - c o n s t i t u e n c y u n i f o r m i t y l e v e l s a l s o allows us t o t e s t c e r t a i n c o r o l l a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s which l i n k the t r e n d i n u n i f o r m i t y to homogenization of other c o n s t i t u e n c y - r e l a t e d f a c t o r s . For example, the observed trends might stem from a l e v e l l i n g i n the q u a l i t y o f c a n d i -dates r e p r e s e n t i n g given p a r t i e s i n d i f f e r e n t p a r t s o f the pr o v i n c e . .Again/, j t h i s i s a development which would l e v e l a c r o s s , but not w i t h i n , c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . Voters i n d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s have always faced the same b a l l o t , so d i f f e r e n c e s i n f a c t o r s l i k e candidate q u a l i t y and incum-bency, which may e x p l a i n v a r i a t i o n i n swing ac r o s s c o n s t i t u -103 e n c i e s , should not r e l a t e t o d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n c o n s t i t u e n -c i e s . An i n c r e a s e i n w i t h i n - c o n s t i t u e n c y u n i f o r m i t y would have to be caused by f a c t o r s other than those l e v e l l i n g a cross c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . W i t h i n - c o n s t i t u e n c y v a r i a t i o n was s t u d i e d u s i n g the two samples of nonmetropolitan communities. A n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e was a p p l i e d to swings f o r e l e c t i o n s between 1933 and 1972, with c o n s t i t u e n c y s e r v i n g as the independent v a r i a b l e . Our concern i s with trends i n the magnitude of the within-groups (or, t h a t i s , w i t h i n - c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ) v a r i a n c e component. The within-groups mean square s t a t i s t i c i n d i c a t e s the average w i t h i n - c o n s t i t u e n c y u n i f o r m i t y o f swing. Once again we average ac r o s s r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d i n separate analyses of government and main o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y swings. I f the a l t e r n a t i v e argument or i t s c o r o l l a r i e s are v a l i d then the r e s u l t s p l o t t e d i n F i g u r e 12, and summarized f o r p e r i o d s i n Table, 10, should show no evidence of the p r o v i n c e -wide d e c l i n e i n v a r i a n c e observed e a r l i e r . In f a c t , the exact o p p o s i t e o b t a i n s ; i n d e t a i l the t r e n d l i n e s are not i d e n t i c a l with those shown e a r l i e r , but the f a m i l i a r downward t r e n d i s apparent. And the average l e v e l of w i t h i n - c o n s t i t -uency v a r i a t i o n f o r swings a f t e r 1952 i s c o n s i d e r a b l y s m a l l e r than t h a t f o r swings b e f o r e 1952. The w i t h i n - c o n s t i t u e n c y u n i f o r m i t y o b t a i n i n g i n the 19 69 and 1972 e l e c t i o n s i s e s p e c i a l l y noteworthy i n l i g h t of the f a c t t h a t the 1966 r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i n c r e a s e d the g e o g r a p h i c a l 104 20 1937 1941 1945 1949 I 1952 1953 I 1956 I 1960 I 1963 1969 1972 Year of Swing FIGURE 12: Trends i n swing uniformity across nonmetropolitan communities within the same constituency, 1933-1972. Changes i n the within-constituency mean square s t a t i s t i c which r e f l e c t s average uniformity within constituencies. Averages from separate analyses of government party and main opposition party swings. Results f o r two samples of communities selected by applying d i f f e r e n t s i z e c r i t e r i a . 3 Both samples were drawn from the basic community sample outlined i n Chapter 2. They d i f f e r i n terms of the s i z e of communities excluded. For an explanation, see the text, pp. 82-83. TABLE 10: HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF SWING UNIFORMITY ACROSS COMMUNITIES WITHIN THE SAME CONSTITUENCY, 1933-1972. PERIOD AVERAGES OF THE WITHIN-CONSTITUENCY MEAN SQUARE STATISTIC WHICH INDICATES AVERAGE UNIFORMITY WITHIN CONSTITUENCIES. RESULTS FROM ANALYSES OF TWO SAMPLES OF COMMUNITIES3 Period Sampled Communities with Fewer than 35 Voters Excluded from the Sample Sampled Communities with Fewer than 100 Voters Excluded from the Sample Average Witl Government Party Swings lin-Constituenc Main Oppos. Party Swings :y M.S. for: Average Both Parties Average With Government Party Swings in-Constituenc Main Oppos. Party Swings y M.S. for: Average Both Pa r t i e s 1933-41 b 1945-52° 1953-63 1966-72 183.6 165.1 174.4 178.9 154.2 166.6 109.3 88.5 98.9 106.5 80.6 93.6 123.8 102.9 113.4 78.5 73.4 76.0 67.4 50.2 58.8 68.9 54.4 61.6 Both samples were drawn from the basic community sample outlined i n Chapter 2. They d i f f e r i n terms of the size of communities excluded. For an explanation, see the text, pp. 82-83. In 1941 the CCF was treated as the main opposition party. In 1952 the government party swing was taken to be the difference between C o a l i t i o n support i n 1949 and combined L i b e r a l and Conservative support i n 1952. 106 s i z e and d i v e r s i t y of many of the nonmetropolitan c o n s t i t u -e n c i e s s t u d i e d here. The t r e n d i s i l l u s t r a t e d by develop-ments i n the Similkameen area of the p r o v i n c e . The 1941 swings o f seven communities with more than 100 v o t e r s i n the c o n s t i t u e n c y o f Similkameen were c o n s i d e r a b l y more d i s p a r a t e (a standard d e v i a t i o n o f 15.4 around the mean government pa r t y swing), than were the 19 72 swings of 13 communities (meeting the same s i z e c r i t e r i o n ) sampled from the l a r g e r c o n s t i t u e n c y of Boundary-Similkameen (a standard d e v i a t i o n of 4.3 around the mean government p a r t y swing). Conclusion T h i s chapter r e p o r t e d on the i n i t i a l steps i n our e x p l o r -a t i o n of h i s t o r i c a l change i n B r i t i s h Columbia e l e c t o r a l swing p a t t e r n s . The f i n d i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t the u n f o l d i n g of the t w e n t i e t h century brought sharp i n c r e a s e s i n the u n i f o r m i t y of swing. Our s t u d i e s of g e o g r a p h i c a l l y s c a t t e r e d c o n s t i t u -e n c i e s and communities pr o v i d e s t r o n g evidence of d e c l i n i n g e l e c t o r a l l o c a l i s m . Modern l e v e l s of u n i f o r m i t y appear to have been reached a f t e r the mid-century p o i n t . The second p a r t of the chapter presented r e s u l t s b e a r i n g on a s e r i e s of hypotheses about reasons f o r i n c r e a s e d swing u n i f o r m i t y . Each hypothesis argued t h a t the developments c o u l d be e x p l a i n e d away as r e s u l t i n g from some s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d change which, w h i l e perhaps connected t o g e n e r a l s o c i e t a l develop-ments, c o u l d be regarded as d i s t i n c t . In r e j e c t i n g these 107 hypotheses we add c r e d i b i l i t y to the notion that the observed trends r e f l e c t important changes i n the e l e c t o r a l sociology of the province which are related to broader s o c i e t a l and p o l i t i c a l developments. We now turn to consideration of three swing patterning developments which may account for the trend to uniformity. The evidence set out i n t h i s chapter i s consistent with the argument that the trend was unpatterned, but evidence that patterning did not increase i s needed before that argument can be accepted. 108 Footnotes "''The swings examined i n each p e r i o d were as f o l l o w s : f o r the 1903-28 p e r i o d , L i b e r a l and C o n s e r v a t i v e swings i n 1907, 1909, 1920 and 1928; f o r the 1933-52 p e r i o d , L i b e r a l and CCF swings i n 1937, C o a l i t i o n and CCF swings i n 1945, 1949 and 1952 (with C o a l i t i o n swing i n the 1952 e l e c t i o n taken as the d i f f e r e n c e between C o a l i t i o n support i n 1949, and the combined support of the L i b e r a l s and C o n s e r v a t i v e s i n 1952); f o r the 1953-63 p e r i o d , S o c i a l C r e d i t and CCF-NDP swings i n 1953, 1956, 1960 and 1963; and f o r the 1966-75 p e r i o d , S o c i a l C r e d i t and NDP swings i n 1969, 1972 and 1975. 2 The swings examined i n each p e r i o d were as f o l l o w s : f o r the 1933-41 p e r i o d , L i b e r a l and CCF swings i n 1937 and 1941; f o r the 1945-52 p e r i o d , C o a l i t i o n and CCF swings i n 1949 and 1952 (see note 1 above concerning c a l c u l a t i o n of the 1952 C o a l i t i o n swing); f o r the 1953-63 p e r i o d , S o c i a l C r e d i t and CCF-NDP swings i n 1953, 1956, 1960 and 1963; and f o r the 1966-72 p e r i o d , S o c i a l C r e d i t and NDP swings i n 1969 and 1972. 3 See, B r i t i s h Columbia, Statutes, 1921 ( F i r s t S e s s i o n ) , chap. 17, "An Act to amend the ' P r o v i n c i a l E l e c t i o n s A c t ' , " S e c t i o n 9; and B r i t i s h Columbia, Statutes, 1939, chap. 16, "An Act Respecting E l e c t i o n s o f Members of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly," S e c t i o n s 88(4) and 88(5). See a l s o B r i t i s h Columbia, Revised Statutes, 1960, chap. 306, " P r o v i n c i a l E l e c t i o n s A c t , " S e c t i o n 86(4). CHAPTER 4 PATTERNING OF SWING BY ELECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS This chapter r e p o r t s the f i r s t p a r t of a three-pronged i n v e s t i g a t i o n of changes i n e l e c t o r a l swing p a t t e r n s which i s designed to a s c e r t a i n whether p a t t e r n i n g changes c o i n c i d e d w i t h i n c r e a s e d u n i f o r m i t y of swing. The s t r a t e g y which has been mapped r e q u i r e s examination of three p o s s i b l e p a t t e r n i n g agents. The f i r s t o f these, c o n s t i t u e n c y c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , w i l l be e x p l o r e d here. A two-layered network of assumptions supports the argu-ment t h a t e l e c t o r a l competitiveness or s a f e t y took on i n c r e a s e d importance as a determinant of swing. The f i r s t l a y e r i n c l u d e s g e n e r a l premises about the e x i s t e n c e and nature of p a r t y s t r a t e g y , while the second c o n s i s t s of pro-p o s i t i o n s about the e f f e c t s of modernization on s t r a t e g y . Our f i r s t and most fundamental assumption i s t h a t , i n a l l p e r i o d s , the competing p a r t i e s w i l l p e r c e i v e an i n c e n t i v e t o apply an e l e c t o r a l s t r a t e g y — a p l a n based on the goal of seat maximization which embodies d e c i s i o n s about the most advantageous d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources to d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t -u e n c e i s . Second, i t i s assumed t h a t e l e c t o r a l s t r a t e g y w i l l c o r r e l a t e w i t h d i f f e r e n t i a l e l e c t o r a l success. T h i r d , i t i s assumed t h a t c o n s t i t u e n c y competitiveness or s a f e t y , and p o s s i b l y the s t a t u s of the seat (as government or o p p o s i t i o n 109 110 held) w i l l a f f e c t d e c i s i o n s about the d i s t r i b u t i o n of vote i n f l u e n c i n g r e s o u r c e s . F i n a l l y , i t i s assumed t h a t judge-ments concerning competitiveness w i l l be based on i n f o r m a t i o n about the e l e c t o r a l h i s t o r i e s of r i d i n g s . The l a t t e r two assumptions are most arguable. Lovink, whose r e s e a r c h on the s u b j e c t i n c l u d e d i n t e r v i e w s with e i g h t o r g a n i z e r s and campaign d i r e c t o r s of the two major n a t i o n a l p a r t i e s , concluded t h a t p a r t i e s do attempt to rank c o n s t i t u -e n c i e s a c c o r d i n g to degree of safety."*" But, a c c o r d i n g to Lovink: Neither party bases t h i s r a t i n g s o l e l y on a seat's e l e c t o r a l h i s t o r y ; each also takes account of the estimated r e l a t i v e appeal of the party's candidate, the condition of the l o c a l organization, and of any other relevant information that may be available (for example, data on s h i f t s i n the socio-economic make-up of the l o c a l population). A l l respondents also agreed i n assigning considerable importance to the q u a l i t y of the l o c a l candidate. F u r t h e r r e s e a r c h would probably suggest survey p o l l r e s u l t s , or b y - e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s i n contiguous or s i m i l a r c o n s t i t u e n -c i e s as examples of a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s which may be taken i n t o account by s t r a t e g i s t s . Lovink a l s o notes t h a t even i f e l e c t o r a l h i s t o r y i s an important c o n s i d e r a t i o n , q u e s t i o n s remain about how p a r t y s t r a t e g i s t s weigh more and l e s s recent r e s u l t s i n coming to a r e c k o n i n g of a c o n s t i t u e n c y ' s s a f e -3 ness. Some measure o f v a l i d i t y i s accorded our assumptions by the r e s u l t s of a study of B r i t i s h Columbia highway expendi-4 t u r e s by John Munro. Munro t e s t e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between I l l c o n s t i t u e n c y margin of v i c t o r y and l e v e l s of highways expenditures across c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . Margin of v i c t o r y was i n c l u d e d w i t h s e v e r a l other v a r i a b l e s i n a model which was t e s t e d on spending i n f i v e two-year p e r i o d s between 1954 and 1969. With the e f f e c t s of other v a r i a b l e s taken i n t o account, the margin of v i c t o r y v a r i a b l e was a reasonably good p r e d i c t o r i n three of the p e r i o d s — 1 9 5 4 - 5 6 , 1961-63 and 1967-69. In a l l three p e r i o d s the r e l a t i o n s h i p was i n the expected d i r e c t i o n — m o r e was spent i n more co m p e t i t i v e con-s t i t u e n c i e s than expected on the b a s i s o f the s i z e of the c o n s t i t u e n c y , the number of r e g i s t e r e d v e h i c l e s i n the con-s t i t u e n c y , and so on. A v a r i a b l e which i n d i c a t e d whether or not the r i d i n g was h e l d by a Cabinet M i n i s t e r , was s i g n i f i -c a n t l y r e l a t e d t o expenditures i n the 1954-56 and 1964-66 p e r i o d s . There i s , then, some evidence t h a t B r i t i s h Columbia governments i n the post-1952 era d i d , at l e a s t s p o r a d i c a l l y , base one instrument o f e l e c t o r a l s t r a t e g y . o n p e r c e p t i o n s about d i f f e r e n c e s i n the s a f e t y or competitiveness of con-s t i t u e n c i e s . And t h e r e are grounds f o r the surmise t h a t p r e v i o u s margin of v i c t o r y i n the r i d i n g was adopted as one i n d i c a t o r of competitiveness. We can now t u r n t o arguments about the impact of modern-i z a t i o n on the a p p l i c a t i o n o f e l e c t o r a l s t r a t e g y . The propo-s i t i o n to be t e s t e d i s t h a t s u c c e s s f u l a p p l i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g y should have i n c r e a s e d . Modernization should have enhanced 112 the a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l parties to "target" e l e c t o r a l resources and increased the p r o b a b i l i t y that party resources would be directed towards the ridings where they would achieve the most benefit. Communications developments are central to this argument. With improvement in province-wide communication and transportation networks, parties should have found i t easier to apply c e n t r a l l y directed campaign strategy based on targeting of resources. For example, as movement about the province became easier, more e f f e c t i v e use should have been made of party leaders' campaign time. This argument i s very speculative and obviously, other facets of modernization suggest contradictory expectations. For example, modernization may have increased the r e l a t i v e importance of u n i v e r s a l i s t i c , i n d i v i s i b l e government outputs, and magnified the amount of p o l i t i c a l advertising based on a "shotgun" approach. In t h i s chapter, quite to the contrary, we propose that there should have been an increase i n the strategic d i s t r i b u t i o n of e l e c t o r a l and governmental resources. •Methodology Munro's findings suggest that a simple margin of victory indicator should serve as a v a l i d measure of s t r a t e g i s t s ' perceptions concerning constituency safety. A measure of safety which takes into account margins i n several previous elections, i n addition to evidence about the riding's past 113 vote v a r i a b i l i t y and t u r n o v e r p a t t e r n s , has been developed by Lovink, but there i s l i t t l e evidence t h a t s t r a t e g i s t s ' p e r c e p t i o n s of s a f e t y are based on the complex c a l c u l u s i m p l i e d by the measure.^ At any r a t e , Lovink's index of s a f e t y cannot be u t i l i z e d here because i t can o n l y be a p p l i e d where there e x i s t m u l t i p l e e l e c t i o n runs unbroken by e l e c t o r -a l boundary r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s . Such runs do occur a f t e r the 1938 and 1965 r e d i s t r i b u t i o n s but boundary changes were frequent p r i o r t o the f i r s t date. Since i t i s important f o r our comparison o f e f f e c t s t h a t we use an independent v a r i a b l e which can be measured i n a p a r a l l e l way f o r a l l p e r i o d s , a measure of s a f e t y s t y l e d on Lovink's c o u l d not be a p p l i e d . We w i l l r e l y on a simple margin of v i c t o r y measure. How should margin of v i c t o r y i n the previous e l e c t i o n be expected to r e l a t e t o p a r t y e f f o r t ? The simple answer i s t h a t e f f o r t should r e l a t e n e g a t i v e l y to the margin of v i c t o r y . T h i s can be i l l u s t r a t e d u s i n g the government p a r t y ' s perspec-t i v e . G r e a t e s t campaign e f f o r t should be devoted to r i d i n g s where there i s the h i g h e s t p r o b a b i l i t y of l o s i n g a seat p r e s e n t l y h e l d , and to those where there i s the g r e a t e s t p o s s i b i l i t y of c a p t u r i n g an o p p o s i t i o n s e a t . Whether the seat i s h e l d by an o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y or the government p a r t y , a c c o r d i n g to t h i s assumption, the s i z e of v i c t o r y margin should be uppermost i n the c a l c u l a t i o n s of s t r a t e g i s t s . An a l t e r n a t i v e measure should be developed to take account of the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , given the same margin i n 114 government and o p p o s i t i o n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , the government p a r t y w i l l apply g r e a t e r e f f o r t to the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which i t h o lds. Where margin o f v i c t o r y i s s m a l l , the assumption i s t h a t governments are c o n s e r v a t i v e ; t h a t i s , t h a t they w i l l devote more e f f o r t t o r e t a i n i n g seats h e l d p r e c a r i o u s l y by t h e i r own members than they w i l l devote to c a p t u r i n g the winable^ 1 o p p o s i t i o n s e a t s . T h i s may be because p r e c a r i o u s incumbents have a r o l e i n s t r a t e g y making, or because the pl e a s o f such incumbents are more l i k e l y to reach the ears of s t r a t e g i s t s than are the appeals of those c h a l l e n g i n g i n o p p o s i t i o n h e l d s e a t s . Where margins are l a r g e , the assump-t i o n i s t h a t governments are i n c l i n e d to reward and punish. That i s , the c o n s t i t u e n c y which handed the government a l a r g e p l u r a l i t y i n the pr e v i o u s e l e c t i o n w i l l r e c e i v e more b e n e f i t s (and thus, i n our sense, more e f f o r t ) than s a f e o p p o s i t i o n s e a t s , which w i l l be punished or ignored. F i g u r e 13 helps t o c l a r i f y these new assumptions. In the top p a r t , we f i n d four h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s rang-i n g from safe o p p o s i t i o n t o safe government. In the bottom p a r t , f o r these f o u r s e a t s , we f i n d l i n e s which rep r e s e n t the government e f f o r t which would be p r e d i c t e d on the b a s i s of the assumptions j u s t noted. The argument, as so f a r s t a t e d , p r o v i d e s no guidance about comparative e f f o r t i n the safe government and co m p e t i t i v e o p p o s i t i o n s e a t s . In the diagram, and i n the measure developed below, i t i s assumed th a t the l a t t e r type of c o n s t i t u e n c y w i l l get more e f f o r t 115 20% Safe Opposition Seat Safe Government Seat !H o n-> o • r H > o fl •H Cn U rd S 1% Competitive Oppos. Seat Competitive Govt. Seat -p SH MH O O >H IH 4-> W B >1 Q H-> 6 M CM -P C U 0) •H g TJ C (1) M H^ 0) PH > O o Safe Opposition Seat + + + Competitive Opposition Seat Competitive Government Seat Safe Government Seat FIGURE 13: Diagram depicting assumptions about party e f f o r t i n government and opposition r i d i n g s . Predicted-'.party e f f o r t i n four hypothetical r i d i n g s varying i n competitiveness. 116 from the government. The f o l l o w i n g equation t r e a t s campaign e f f o r t as a f u n c t i o n of pr e v i o u s v i c t o r y margin and seat s t a t u s , and produces e f f o r t scores l i k e those p l o t t e d i n F i g u r e 1 3 : Government _ Weight Factor A Party E f f o r t (higher for government party) -,/- : . „.—• vMargin of Victory For the sake of i l l u s t r a t i o n we can s e t the weight fac-t o r a t 1 . 5 f o r government seats and at 1 f o r o p p o s i t i o n s e a t s , i n order t o r e f l e c t the assumption t h a t governments make 50% more e f f o r t i n the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s they h o l d . With t h i s assumption we get: For the safe o p p o s i t i o n seat, E f f o r t = 1 X = .22 ; For the c o m p e t i t i v e o p p o s i t i o n seat, E f f o r t = i x = 1 ; For the safe government seat, E f f o r t = 1.5 X —^— = .33 ; /20 For the c o m p e t i t i v e government seat, E f f o r t = 1.5 X = 1.5 . The choice of weight f a c t o r s must o b v i o u s l y be a r b i t r a r y . In order t o cover a range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , measures of p a r t y 117 e f f o r t based on 1.5:1, 1.2:1, and 2:1 r a t i o s w i l l be t r i e d . If we continue to assume that i t i s the government party which applies a successful e l e c t o r a l strategy, then govern-ment swing should relate negatively to the simple margin of victory variable, and p o s i t i v e l y to the measures of party e f f o r t . S i g n i f i c a n t correlations i n the reverse d i r e c t i o n would indicate that the opposition party successfully applies e l e c t o r a l strategy. It i s , then, the strength of association which signals whether the argument has any v a l i d i t y . A f i n a l methodological point concerns variables which should be controlled. Given the relationship between swing and base l e v e l support which was demonstrated i n Chapter 2, and given the high p r o b a b i l i t y of a p o s i t i v e relationship between margin of v i c t o r y and base support, i t seems advis-able to control the l a t t e r variable. Otherwise, correlations might be spurious. It i s important to remember, then, that we are r e a l l y looking for evidence that swing i s greater i n competitive seats than would be expected given the f i r s t e lection support l e v e l of the party i n those seats. The Findings The reader who i s dubious about any or a l l of the assumptions underlying the hypothesis and measures w i l l f i n d no surprises i n Table 11. The p a r t i a l correlations r e f l e c t -ing the relationship between government party swing and measures of expected party e f f o r t , are s i g n i f i c a n t i n only a 118 TABLE 11: TRENDS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SWINGS IN GOVERNMENT PARTY SUPPORT AND ASSUMED PARTY EFFORT: CONSTITUENCIES, 1903-1975. PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS WITH BASE LEVEL OF SUPPORT CONTROLLED Party E f f o r t Measures Swing E l e c t i o n E f f o r t as Predicted from Margin of Victory (in 1st elec-t i o n of pair) E f f o r t as Predicted by Assumptions About Differences i n E f f o r t Between Government and Opposition Seats. Measures Based on the Following Government Seat: Opposition Seat E f f o r t Ratios: 1.5:1 1.2:1 2.0:1 1903-07 -.27 .31* .32* .28 1907-09 .07 -.12 -.08 -.15 1916-20 .08 -.23 -.15 -.31* 1924-28 .14 .08 .09 .06 1933-37 .24 -.26 -.24 -.26 1941-45 -.04 -.17 -.16 -.17 1945-49 .11 -.07 -.10 -.03 1949-52 -.12 -.15 -.12 -.18 1952-53 .02 .23 .23 .22 1953-56 -.29* .34* .31* .33* 1956-60 -.03 .08 .05 .12 1960-63 .18 -.18 -.16 -.19 1966-69 -.04 -.00 .01 . -.03 1969-72 -.21 .16 .12 .20 1972-75 .19 -.07 -.15 .01 Significance l e v e l : *.05 119 few cases. And there i s no s i g n t h a t a connection between c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ' s t r a t e g i c a l importance and t h e i r swing i s more l i k e l y i n modern e l e c t i o n s . The e l e c t i o n s i n which s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s show up are i n t e r s p e r s e d across the century. In 1907 and 1956, arid t o a l e s s e r extent i n 1953 and 1972, s t r o n g pro-government swings were more l i k e l y i n c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which were more co m p e t i t i v e and thus, accord-i n g to our assumptions, more l i k e l y t o have r e c e i v e d s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n from the government. The r e s u l t s f o r 1920 and 1937 h i n t t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n had some success i n a p p l y i n g s t r a t e g y based on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u e n c y s a f e t y . A c c o r d i n g to Munro's a n a l y s i s of highways expenditures p r e -ceding the f i v e e l e c t i o n s between 1956 and 1969, c o m p e t i t i v e c o n s t i t u e n c i e s d i d r e c e i v e more a t t e n t i o n , a t l e a s t i n the form o f highway spending, p r i o r to those of 1956, 1963 and 1969. Our f i n d i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t the e x t r a a t t e n t i o n p a i d o f f f o r the government onl y i n the 1956 e l e c t i o n . In 1963 the e f f e c t seems, i f anything, to have been the o p p o s i t e of what was intended, w h i l e i n 19 69 the b i a s i n expenditure seems to have had no e f f e c t at a l l . We can s p e c u l a t e about why the hypothesis has not gained support. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t we e r r e d i n our i n i t i a l assump-t i o n s about the nature or consequences of p a r t y s t r a t e g y . I t may be t h a t p a r t i e s do t a r g e t r e s o u r c e s , but the c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s taken i n t o account i n d e s i g n i n g our measures may not r e f l e c t those germane to s t r a t e g i s t s . In other words, our 120 measures of the independent v a r i a b l e r e p r e s e n t p r e d i c t i o n s about l i k e l y p a r t y e f f o r t , and these p r e d i c t i o n s may not be a c c u r a t e . Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t the p o s t u l a t e d type of s t r a t e g y has a c t u a l l y been a p p l i e d , but t h a t t h i s s t r a t e g y does not have the assumed e f f e c t s . I f we accept t h a t the a p r i o r i assumptions are i n f a c t sound, and t h a t our t e s t s have c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d the i n s t a n c e s where seat maximizing s t r a t e g i e s were a p p l i e d , then we can s p e c u l a t e about why t h e r e was such i n c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i -c a t i o n of s t r a t e g y . Perhaps government p a r t i e s worry about d i s t r i b u t i v e s t r a t e g i e s when they f e e l t h e i r h o l d i s espe-c i a l l y p r e c a r i o u s , but not when they f e e l s a f e l y ensconced i n power. Or, perhaps government and o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y s t r a t e -g i e s u s u a l l y n e u t r a l i z e one another. Numerous ideas may help to e x p l a i n why modernization d i d not b r i n g about the p r e d i c t e d i n c r e a s e i n p a t t e r n i n g by e l e c -t o r a l s i t u a t i o n . One argument, which converges with t h a t made e a r l i e r i n s p e c u l a t i n g about an unpatterned t r e n d to u n i f o r m i t y , notes t h a t w h i l e modernization d i d make p o s s i b l e a t a r g e t i n g approach, i t a l s o made more p o s s i b l e a shotgun approach. That i s , while i t may be t r u e t h a t p a r t i e s were • i n an i n c r e a s i n g l y b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o apply resources i n a s t r a t e g i c way, i t a l s o i s probably t r u e t h a t they found i t e a s i e r (or more a f f o r d a b l e ) to b l a n k e t the p r o v i n c e with i n f l u e n c i n g communications. Perhaps i n f l u e n c e campaigns a s s o c i a t e d w i t h modern p o l i t i c s have more s p i l l o v e r e f f e c t s 121 from one area to another and thus neutralize attempts to target resources. Perhaps p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c government outputs have become r e l a t i v e l y less important compared to universal ones which, by d e f i n i t i o n , cannot be directed at certain constituencies. F i n a l l y , i t may be that communication changes which increased the capacity of parties to apply ce n t r a l l y directed strategies were neutralized i n t h e i r e f f e c t by decreased s o c i e t a l tolerance of government patron-age and favouritism. Contemporary governments may f i n d that i t i s much less acceptable to s p o i l some constituencies with spending programs while ignoring others. While more analysis, and a d i f f e r e n t type of analysis, would be required i n order to get to the bottom of the ques-tions raised by the above speculation, the results reported in t h i s chapter do serve our limited purposes. They allow us to set aside the f i r s t proposal concerning ascendant pat-terns of e l e c t o r a l swing. Our conclusion has to be tentative since the te s t rests on a network of assumptions, but pat-terning by e l e c t o r a l competitiveness does not help to account for the trend to swing uniformity. Footnotes X J . A. A. Lovink, "Is Canadian P o l i t i c s too Competitive Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science VI (September 1973): 372; 2 I b i d . 3 I b i d . , pp. 372-73. 4 John Munro, "Highways i n B r i t i s h Columbia: Economics and P o l i t i c s , " Canadian Journal of Economics V I I I (May 1975) 192-204. Lovink, "Is Canadian P o l i t i c s too Competitive," pp. 360-61. CHAPTER 5 THE PATTERNING OF ELECTORAL SWING BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPOSITION In t h i s chapter we examine the i d e a t h a t i n c r e a s e d pat-t e r n i n g by socio-economic composition may account f o r the t r e n d to swing u n i f o r m i t y . As i n the chapters which precede and f o l l o w , the goal i s to c l a r i f y the e f f e c t s of moderniza-t i o n . I f we f i n d t h a t the l o c a l l y determined swings which c h a r a c t e r i z e d the e a r l y p e r i o d were r e p l a c e d by swings which were s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h composition, then we w i l l have helped to account f o r the t r e n d to u n i f o r m i t y and improved our understanding of modernization's impact on p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e processes. A general o u t l i n e of the intended a n a l y s i s i s p r o v i d e d by the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s . F i r s t , we examine the e c o l o g i c a l c o r r e l a t e s of swing across samples of v o t e r aggregates. Second, the aggregates are not homogeneous so, to take an example, we are not i n a p o s i t i o n to compare swings i n work-i n g c l a s s and middle c l a s s communities. Instead, i n f e r e n c e s about p a t t e r n i n g must be based on evidence about the c o r r e l a -t i o n between swing and the p r o p o r t i o n of an aggregate having c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h i r d , the goal i s not to i d e n t i f y the e f f e c t s o f s p e c i f i c socio-economic v a r i a b l e s , but r a t h e r to compare the s t r e n g t h of a s s o c i a t i o n between swing and background v a r i a b l e s i n d i f f e r e n t e l e c t i o n s . Using m u l t i p l e 123 124 r e g r e s s i o n techniques, and t a k i n g swing as the dependent v a r i a b l e , we compare the explanatory power of p a r a l l e l s e t s of composition v a r i a b l e s . Changes i n p a t t e r n i n g are i n d i -c a t e d by changes i n the amount of v a r i a n c e e x p l a i n e d by the package of v a r i a b l e s . Socio-Economic Correlates of Voting in B r i t i s h Columbia:. Introduction Previous r e s e a r c h on e l e c t o r a l cleavage i n B r i t i s h Columbia pro v i d e s no evidence which bears d i r e c t l y on the h y p o t h e s i s . ^ There have been no other systematic h i s t o r i c a l analyses designed to compare the impact of socio-economic v a r i a b l e s across e l e c t i o n s . And no comparison can be adduced by p u l l i n g t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t s t u d i e s , because t h e r e i s l i t t l e c o n s i s t e n c y across s t u d i e s i n the v a r i a b l e s examined, o r the measures, samples and methodologies used. A l s o , p r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h d e a l s w i t h s t a t i c e l e c t o r a l support l e v e l s r a t h e r than with swing between e l e c t i o n s . We m aintain t h a t swing i s a more s e n s i t i v e i n d i c a t o r of response i n a given e l e c t i o n , and thus p r o v i d e s a b e t t e r b a s i s f o r comparison across e l e c t i o n s . In s p i t e of i t s l a c k of d i r e c t r e l e v a n c e , p r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h does i n t r o d u c e us to the socio-economic c o r r e l a t e s of B r i t i s h Columbia e l e c t o r a l behaviour. With one e x c e p t i o n noted below, s t u d i e s of c l a s s v o t i n g provide support f o r the view t h a t p a r t y p r e f e r e n c e s vary 2 across c l a s s c a t e g o r i e s . CCF-NDP support has been shown (or, 125 i n the case of aggregate data studies, inferred) to be higher (and Social Credit support lower), among working class and 3 4 marginally employed people, union members, and those with 5 lower incomes. Recent survey results show that NDP support i s above average among those employed i n the resource extrac-ti o n and education industries, and below average among those g involved i n the commerce sector. While class differences c e r t a i n l y do ex i s t , t h e i r magni-tude i s not as s t r i k i n g as the conventional wisdom implies. Differences are often especially small when Social Credit support i s examined. For example, i n the recent Koenig and Proverbs study i t i s shown that the difference i n NDP support between union and nonunion voters was 13.6 percentage points (49.4% among union members to 35.8% among nonunion members). But the difference i n Social Credit support between the two groups was less than 5 percentage points (27.9% among union members to 32.2% among nonunion members). Si m i l a r l y , across Koenig and Proverbs' "'objective occupational grouping 1 we see that NDP support f a l l s from 59.2% i n the working category, to 51.2% i n the marginally employed category, to 37.5% among the managerial group. Social Credit support across these categories i s much less variant; i t does not stray beyond the 23.3% to 27.2% range. The same conclusion emerges when we examine differences across Koenig and Proverbs' subjective measure of occupation. 126 S p r o u l e - J o n e s 1 s r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s of the 1960 vote leads him to express s i m i l a r qualms about the c l a s s p o l i t i c s 7 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . There i s an i n t e r e s t i n g p a r a l l e l between Sp r o u l e - J o n e s 1 s argument and our s p e c u l a t i o n i n Chapter 1 t h a t modernization might l e a d t o unpatterned u n i f o r m i t y of e l e c t o r a l swing or, t h a t i s , to u n i f o r m i t y across communities of d i f f e r e n t types as w e l l as d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g to Sproule-Jones, S o c i a l C r e d i t "has had a net p a r t i s a n advantage from e l e c t i o n t o e l e c t i o n i n p u l l i n g over more of the weaker i d e n t i f i e d NDP, L i b e r a l and Tory v o t e r s , and more g of the Independents." S o c i a l C r e d i t ' s success i n t h i s regard i s seen as stemming from appeals based on "sponsored concep-t u a l i d e o l o g y , " a term used t o d e s c r i b e the f r e e e n t e r p r i s e versus s o c i a l i s m c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of i s s u e a l t e r n a t i v e s d e f i n e d by S o c i a l C r e d i t . The e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s i d e o l o g y ' s appeal across c l a s s groups p o i n t s to the weakness or absence 9 of " i n t e r m e d i a t e s t r u c t u r e [ s ] of group i n f l u e n c e . " Without these s t r u c t u r e s there can be no two-step flow of i n f l u e n c e "from the p a r t i s a n appeals through the norms of the mediating group to the e l e c t o r a t e , " and v o t e r s , no matter what t h e i r c l a s s p o s i t i o n , w i l l be s u b j e c t e d to the same "one-step flow" of i n f o r m a t i o n from the p a r t i e s . " ^ U n i f o r m i t y of response across c l a s s e s w i l l , as a r e s u l t , be g r e a t e r than expected. Sproule-Jones's argument, then, runs counter to the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t modernization should sharpen d i f f e r e n c e s between c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . The a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m , embodied i n 127 the unpatterned u n i f o r m i t y p o s s i b i l i t y and i n Sproule-Jones*s a r t i c l e , i s t h a t modernization should i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of appeals which undermine e l e c t o r a l d i f f e r e n c e s across c o l -l e c t i v i t i e s . Black, Robin and Blake a l l take i s s u e with the Sproule-Jones case a g a i n s t the c l a s s interpretation.^"'" N e i t h e r Black nor Robin p r o v i d e any new evidence, but i n s t e a d p o i n t out p u t a t i v e weaknesses i n Sproule-Jones's methodology while c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n to those o f h i s r e s u l t s which do i n d i c a t e o c c u p a t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n p a r t y support. Blake c r i t i c i z e s S p r o u l e - J o n e s 1 s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f r e s u l t s , and prese n t s survey evidence running counter to h i s f i n d i n g s and a s s e r -t i o n s . I t i s hoped t h a t the present a n a l y s i s w i l l be of some help i n r e s o l v i n g these d i f f e r e n c e s . The c o n s i d e r a t i o n of e t h n i c - r e l i g i o u s c o r r e l a t e s of p a r t y support i n B r i t i s h Columbia has g e n e r a l l y taken a back seat i n s t u d i e s c o n c e n t r a t i n g on c l a s s determinants. But the s c a t t e r e d f i n d i n g s which are r e p o r t e d suggest t h a t 12 e t h n i c - r e l i g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s should not be ignored. The f o l l o w i n g are among the r e p o r t e d a s s o c i a t i o n s between r e l i g i o n and support f o r the two major combatants i n the post-1952 p e r i o d : h i g h e r support f o r the NDP among C a t h o l i c s 13 than among P r o t e s t a n t s i n the 1968-74 p e r i o d , above average support f o r the NDP i n the 1968-74 p e r i o d among those without 14 r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n , lower support f o r the NDP i n 1972 among Un i t e d Church and A n g l i c a n groups than among other 128 15 Protestant groups, a s i g n i f i c a n t regression c o e f f i c i e n t marking a negative relationship i n metropolitan areas between percentage of census t r a c t Catholic and Social Credit support in I960,"'"6 a tendency of urban Social Credit voters of the same period to come disproportionately from the "low-church" 17 end of a re l i g i o u s group ranking, and a posit i v e associa-tion between an area's Mennonite composition and i t s Social Credit vote i n 1952. 1 8 Few attempts have been made to fin d -relationships between et h n i c i t y and p r o v i n c i a l party support. The follow-ing are among the findings which are presented i n the l i t e r -ature: a positive relationship between 1960 CCF vote and proportion of the census t r a c t which i s German or Scandina-19 vian, a negative relationship between 19 60 CCF support and 20 proportion of B r i t i s h o r i g i n , and above average NDP support in 1972 among a group including Scandinavians, East Europeans, 21 Ital i a n s and Japanese. These findings are from studies of the Vancouver area. The task of summarizing previous research on socio-economic correlates of party preference i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s f r u s t r a t i n g . Associations which obtain i n one election disappear i n the next. Associations turned up i n aggregate data studies sometimes evaporate when a second study focusses on the in d i v i d u a l voter. One emerges from an attempt at generalization holding rather mixed emotions about just how regrettable the paucity of research i s . 129 Although some of the i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n r e s u l t s may be due to d i f f e r e n c e s i n methods a p p l i e d , the evidence suggests t h a t p a r t y support p a t t e r n s have been f a i r l y u n s t a b l e . The p r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h a l s o suggests t h a t i t would be f o o l h a r d y to draw c o n c l u s i o n s about changes i n the impact of composition from an examination of a few s p e c i f i c v a r i a b l e s . Instead, i t seems a d v i s a b l e to compare the t o t a l e x planatory impact of m u l t i p l e - v a r i a b l e s e t s . Design of Analysis: Construction of the P a r a l l e l Regression Equations We d e a l with the swings which took p l a c e i n nonmetropol-i t a n p a r t s of the p r o v i n c e i n 1941, 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1975. The absence of good data on composition makes i t i m p o s s i b l e to look a t e l e c t i o n s b e f o r e 1941. As i t i s , only c u r s o r y examination of the 1941 e l e c t i o n i s p o s s i b l e . C o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l l e l e c t i o n s s i n c e 1941 would have had to be preceded by p r o h i b i t i v e l y time consuming data coding and aggregating o p e r a t i o n s . The f i v e e l e c t i o n s s e l e c t e d were chosen because of t h e i r c l o s e p r o x i m i t y to census r e p o r t i n g y e a r s . I t should be noted t h a t governmental power changed hands as a r e s u l t of a l l but one of these e l e c t i o n s (that of 1960) and t h a t we thus o v e r r e p r e s e n t turnover e l e c t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n t o those which r e s u l t e d i n l e s s change. The d e c i s i o n to d e a l e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h nonmetropolitan p a r t s of the p r o v i n c e i n t h i s p o r t i o n of the study was 130 e x p l a i n e d i n Chapter 2. The aspects of modernization h i g h -l i g h t e d i n our t h i n k i n g about changes i n e l e c t o r a l s o c i o l o g y should have had t h e i r most marked e f f e c t s on the f a r - f l u n g communities of the h i n t e r l a n d , so these areas p r o v i d e the best t e s t i n g grounds f o r a comparison of the s h i f t i n g s i g -n i f i c a n c e of l o c a l and socio-economic determinants. Given t h a t m e t r o p o l i t a n census data f o r the e a r l y e l e c t i o n s are a v a i l a b l e only f o r very heterogeneous areas, the p r o f i t a b i l -i t y o f expanding the a n a l y s i s to i n c l u d e the m e t r o p o l i t a n areas i s deemed to be minimal. The development of a r e s e a r c h s t r a t e g y f o r t h i s p a r t of the study begins with the i d e a t h a t e l e c t o r a l swing can be t r e a t e d as a f u n c t i o n of a s e t of socio-economic v a r i a b l e s . The explanatory power of a r e g r e s s i o n equation encompassing a s e t of v a r i a b l e s should i n d i c a t e the impact of composition. And, i f swings i n d i f f e r e n t e l e c t i o n s are r e g r e s s e d on the same equation, then comparison o f s t a t i s t i c s which summarize explanatory power should t e l l us about changes i n the impact of composition. In implementing these ideas we are c o n f r o n t e d with c e r -t a i n d a t a - r e l a t e d c o n s t r a i n t s . In order to achieve compara-b i l i t y i t i s c l e a r l y important t h a t p a r a l l e l r e g r e s s i o n equations be t e s t e d on the d i f f e r e n t swings. In o rder t o be p a r a l l e l , the equations should i n c l u d e the same v a r i a b l e s , measured i n the same way. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , these p r e r e q u i s i t e s d i c t a t e t h a t we take a "lowest common denominator" approach i n building regression equations; the models constructed are determined by data available i n the worst census years rather than the best. The problems encountered i n merging e l e c t o r a l and census data are discussed at length i n Chapter 2 and Appendices B and C. In b r i e f , these problems stem from a poverty of good census data with which to f i t pre-1960 e l e c t o r a l aggregates. The problems are not too severe i n the case of ethnic and r e l i g i o u s variables. Census reports as far back as 1941 provide good data for incorporated c i t i e s , towns and v i l l a g e s i n the hinterland, although only about 30 communities are 22 reported i n 1941. And for variables i n these categories, data available at the census subdivision l e v e l allow us to augment the 1952 and 1972-75 community samples with cases arrived at by aggregating p o l l results up to the boundaries 23 of census subdivision areas. D i f f i c u l t i e s arise because of the paucity of data on class composition i n pre-1961 census reports. The 1951 cen-sus provided data on occupation and income for only about 30 nonmetropolitan communities, while e a r l i e r censuses were even less useful i n this regard. In an attempt to circumvent t h i s roadblock, we use data from a government publication f i r s t issued i n the late 1940's, the Regional I n d u s t r i a l Index 24 of B r i t i s h Columbia. The boundaries of the reporting units used i n the Regional I n d u s t r i a l Index f i t reasonably well with the boundaries of our e l e c t o r a l units but, unfortunately, t h i s 132 p u b l i c a t i o n p r o v i d e s only a rough measure of i n d u s t r i a l composition based on the percentage o f each area's p a y r o l l 25 going to v a r i o u s i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s . Income and occupa-t i o n a l data are not presented. C l e a r l y , data problems weaken our a b i l i t y t o t e s t the hyp o t h e s i s . We are r e s t r i c t e d to comparisons over the past three o r four decades so i t may be argued t h a t modern e l e c -t i o n s are j u s t b e i n g compared wi t h more modern ones.. S e v e r a l s e r i o u s problems stem from the poor data on c l a s s composition. Because of these problems we are unable t o experiment with a v a r i e t y of p a r a l l e l c l a s s equations. And the equations t e s t e d on the 1952 r e s u l t s are not p e r f e c t l y p a r a l l e l with those a p p l i e d t o 1972 and 1975 r e s u l t s . In s p i t e of these shortcomings i n the data, i t seems worthwhile t o conduct e x p l o r a t o r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n by r e g r e s s i n g e l e c t o r a l swings on the models o u t l i n e d i n F i g u r e 14. The v a r i e t y o f models r e f l e c t s our d e s i r e t o look s e p a r a t e l y a t the e f f e c t s o f e t h n i c - r e l i g i o u s and c l a s s composition, as w e l l as a t the o v e r a l l e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t combinations of these v a r i a b l e s . In order t o assure t h a t the maximum pos-s i b l e amount of v a r i a n c e a s s o c i a t e d with composition w i l l be captured, we have attempted t o r e p r e s e n t a v a r i e t y of i n d i -c a t o r s . Since we are p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the t o t a l v a r i a n c e e x p l a i n e d by these models, and not the impact of i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a b l e s , no attempt was made to e l i m i n a t e i n t e r -c o r r e l a t e d independent v a r i a b l e s . Thus the p o s s i b i l i t y of 133 FIGURE 14: L i s t of regression models with variables included i n each model MODELS INVOLVING ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND CLASS VARIABLES Model ERC3** Model ERC1 % Forestry industry % Manufacturing industry % Mining industry % Transportation industry % Trade & service industry % B r i t i s h % Roman Catholic % Other Protestant* Model ERC2 % Forest industry % Manufacturing industry % Mining industry % Transportation industry % Trade s service industry % B r i t i s h % German % Scandinavian * Roman Catholic % Anglican % Other Protestant* % Managerial S Profes-sional occupations % Transportation occupations % Primary occupations % Processing occupations Income % B r i t i s h % Roman Catholic % Other Protestant* MODELS INVOLVING ETHNIC-RELIGIOUS Model ER1 Model ER2 % B r i t i s h % B r i t i s h % Roman Catholic % German % Other Protestant* % Scandinavian VARIABLES Model ER3 % B r i t i s h % German % Scandinavian % Anglican % Roman Catholic % United % Other Protestant* MODELS INVOLVING CLASS VARIABLES Model CI Size of Indus-t r i a l Component: % Forestry industry % Manufacturing industry % Mining industry % Transportation industry % Trade & service industry Model C2*** Occupation: % Managerial occupations % Professional occupations % Processing occupations % Primary occupations Model C3**» Occupation: Models C4 & C5 Income added to models C3 and C4 respectively % Professional- -managerial occupations % Processing occupations % Transportation occupations % Primary occupations *The Other Protestant group includes Protestants other than those i n Anglican and United denominations and thus c l o s e l y r e f l e c t s the com-bined size of the Baptist, Lutheran and Presbyterian denominations. **Model ERC3 can be applied only to elections a f t e r 1960. ***Models C2-C5 can be applied only to elections a f t e r 1960. 134 m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y should be borne i n mind when examining the i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a b l e c o e f f i c i e n t s which are presented i n d i s -c u s s i o n s of the f i n d i n g s . T r i a l Runs of the Models: Socio-Economic Corn-position and Party Support T r i a l s of some of the r e g r e s s i o n models were run with s t a t i c p a r t y support l e v e l s a t s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t j u n c t u r e s used as dependent v a r i a b l e s . The r e s u l t s p r o v i d e evidence w i t h which to e v a l u a t e the equations to be used i n the a n a l -y s i s of swing. I f these r e s u l t s make no sense i n r e l a t i o n t o p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g s , then we should have doubts about our measures or the f i t t i n g procedures j u s t reviewed. In g e n e r a l , the t r i a l s p r o v i d e cause f o r moderate o p t i -mism about the v a l i d i t y of models. S i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s are s c a t t e r e d , but p r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h , which shows t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f t e n appear and disappear from e l e c t i o n to e l e c t i o n , suggests there i s nothing abnormal i n t h i s . I t i s troublesome t h a t a few of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s run counter to the d i r e c t i o n expected, but such r e s u l t s are outnumbered by those which are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g s and the c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom. In terms of the e t h n i c - r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t o r s , the most s t r i k i n g c o e f f i c i e n t s are those a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the German v a r i a b l e . These are shown i n Table 12 which r e p o r t s r e s u l t s from t e s t s of the t h r e e v a r i a b l e e t h n i c i t y model on samples TABLE 12: ETHNICITY VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OP PARTY SUPPORT. COEFFICIENTS OF SOCIAL CREDIT AND CCF-NDP SUPPORT, 1941-1975. REGRESSION MODEL ER2 APPLIED TO RESULTS ACROSS A SAMPLE OF COMMUNITIES3 Predictor Variables 1941 8 S.E. 1952 6 s • E. 1960 8 S. E. 1972 8 S. E. 1975 8 S.E. SOCIAL CREDIT SUPPORT: B r i t i s h .16 .16 .16 13 .13 10 .03 .11 German (n.a.) 1.80*** .40 1.25*** 30 1.36*** 25 1.36*** .28 Scandinavian .53 .47 .56 39 . 36 .84 .47 Intercept 4.3 18.4 14.2 29.2 F (d.f.) 6.92 (3, 61 ) 5.87 (3, 73) 9.96 (3, 89) 8.27 (3, 89) R 2 (x 100) 25.7 19.5 25.1 21.8 CCF-NDP SUPPORT: B r i t i s h - .22 .39 - .31 .14 - .20 13 - .06 12 - .19 .11 German -3.18* 1.25 - .63 .35 - .72* 32 -1.92*** 28 -1.37*** .27 Scandinavian .46 .75 .36 .42 .86* 42 - .37 46 .05 .44 Intercept 50.8 49.0 43.5 67.1 64.7 F (d.f.) 2.69 (3, 57) 2.67 (3, 61 ) 3.98 (3, 73) 16.7 (3, 89) 9.09 (3, 89) R.2 (x 100) 17.9 11.6 14.0 36.0 23.5 Significance l e v e l s : *** .001; ** .01; * .05 8 = Unstandardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t , a The number of cases v a r i e s ; see degrees of freedom reported at the foot of each column. 136 of incorporated places. Where the German group (which accounts for between 5% and 10% of the hinterland population) i s found in above average proportions, support for Social Credit has been above average. This association, which could be spurious of a relationship between r e l i g i o u s compo-s i t i o n and party support, appears to be a long-standing phenomenon. Across four elections since 19 52, each of the pertinent c o e f f i c i e n t s i s p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t . The lower part of Table 12 shows the reverse side of the c o i n — in elections since 1941, CCF-NDP vote has related negatively to the proportion of Germans. In his study of urban census t r a c t s , MacDonald found a strong negative relationship between CCF support in 19 6 0 2 6 and B r i t i s h composition. The evidence i n Table 12 i n d i -cates that t h i s negative association has existed i n non-metropolitan areas as well. But somewhat d i f f e r e n t results obtain when a model including the B r i t i s h variable along with i n d u s t r i a l and r e l i g i o u s composition variables (ERC1) i s tested on enlarged data sets including community and r u r a l area cases. This test shows that NDP support levels i n 19 72 were p o s i t i v e l y associated with the B r i t i s h variable. This association, i t can be seen from Table 13, i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l . Table 13 also provides an introduction to the impact of r e l i g i o u s composition on party support. It i s noteworthy that the c o e f f i c i e n t s describing the association between 137 TABLE 13: INDUSTRIAL AND ETHNICITY-RELIGION VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OF PARTY SUPPORT. COEFFICIENTS OF SOCIAL CREDIT AND CCF-NDP SUPPORT, 1952, 1972, 1975. REGRESSION MODEL ERC1 APPLIED TO RESULTS ACROSS COMMUNITIES AND RURAL AREAS 3 Predictor Variables 1952 8 S.E. 1972 6 S.E. 1975 6 S.E. SOCIAL CREDIT SUPPORT: b Forestry - .22 .12 - .27** .10 - .16 •1.1 Mining - .33** .11 - .36*** .09 - .12 .11 Manufacturing - .34 .33 - .17* .08 - .23** .09 Transportation - .68 .55 .09 .18 - .08 .20 Trade & Service . 30** .10 .03 .09 .14 .10 B r i t i s h .30* .13 - .13 .08 - .14 .09 Roman Catholic .46*"' .20 .08 .12 . 38** .13 Other Protestant .60 .33 .43* .20 .51* .22 Intercept 9.6 42.3 44.1 F (d.f.) 5 .29 (8, 104) 4 .74 (8, 140) 4 .92 (8, 140) R 2 (x 100) 28.9 21. 3 22. 0 CCF-NDP SUPPORT; b Forestry .35* .17 . 51*** .12 .15 .11 Mining .13 .15 .29* .11 .09 .10 Manufacturing .17 .47 m40*** .09 .31*** .08 Transportation .96 .80 .13 .22 .08 .20 Trade & Service - .14 . .15 - .02 .11 - .09 .10 B r i t i s h - .24 .19 .27** .10 .02 .10 Roman Catholic - .10 .28 - .18 .14 - .40** .13 Other Protestant .58 .47 - .89*** .24 - . 38 .22 Intercept 22.0 31.0 49.8 F (d.f.) 1 .74 (8, 104) 9 .24 (8, 140) 5 .55 (8, 140) R 2 (x 100) 11.8 34. 5 24. 1 Significance l e v e l s : *** .001; ** .01; * .05 6 = Unstandardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t . aThe number of cases varies; see degrees of freedom reported at the foot of each column. ^The f i r s t f i v e variables represent proportions i n i n d u s t r i a l groupings. 138 percentage C a t h o l i c and CCF-NDP support uncovered i n our a n a l y s i s are not what pr e v i o u s r e s e a r c h leads one to expect. Koenig et a l . found C a t h o l i c support f o r the NDP i n the 1968-74 p e r i o d to be h i g h e r than P r o t e s t a n t support, and MacDonald found a p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r o p o r t i o n C a t h o l i c and 27 CCF support i n 1960. We f i n d n e g a t i v e Catholic-CCF(NDP) c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r 1952, 1972 and 1975, with the l a s t of these s i g n i f i c a n t . Conversely, S o c i a l C r e d i t appears to be s t r o n g e r i n areas with above average c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of C a t h o l i c s , with the 1952 and 1972 c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t . The nature of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p seems to vary between m e t r o p o l i t a n and nonmetropolitan areas. In the S o c i a l C r e d i t s e c t i o n of Table 13 the s t r o n g p o s i t i v e a s s o c i a t i o n s between S o c i a l C r e d i t support and p r o p o r t i o n i n the "other P r o t e s t a n t " category are expected. The "other P r o t e s t a n t " v a r i a b l e c l o s e l y r e f l e c t s the combined s i z e of the B a p t i s t , Lutheran and P r e s b y t e r i a n denominations, and t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p probably i n d i c a t e s the s t r e n g t h of S o c i a l C r e d i t i n areas w i t h l a r g e B a p t i s t p o p u l a t i o n s . T h i s would support the c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom about the d i f f e r e n t i a l appeal of S o c i a l C r e d i t among members of "low church" or fundamentalist denominations. The r e s u l t s o b t a i n i n g i n the t r i a l runs are g e n e r a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h accepted n o t i o n s about the i n d u s t r i a l and o c c u p a t i o n a l support bases of the main p a r t i e s . In Tables 13 and 14, S o c i a l C r e d i t i s shown to f a r e worse, and the 139 TABLE 14: OCCUPATION AND INCOME VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OF PARTY SUPPORT. COEFFICIENTS FOR SOCIAL CREDIT AND CCF-NDP SUPPORT: 1960, 1972 AND 1975. REGRESSION MODEL C4 APPLIED TO RESULTS ACROSS A SAMPLE OF COMMUNITIES3 Predictor Variables 1960 8 S .E. . 1972 6 S.E. 1975 B .JS..E. SOCIAL CREDIT SUPPORT: Managerial .10 .36 .72 .62 .00 .72 Professional 1.27* .56 .07 .21 . .38 .24 Processing' 3 .03 .14 - .12 .15 -.22 .18 Primary 0 - .88*** .21 - . 35* .16 -.26 .19 Income' - .002 .003 - .002* .0007 .0009 .0009 Intercept 42.3 54.2 36.5 F (d.f.) 7.20 (5, 41 ) 3 .44 (5, 87) 2.20 (5, 87) R 2 (x 100) 46.8 16. 5 11. 2 CCF-NDP SUPPORT: Managerial - .69 .40 .03 .73 -.03 .64 Professional -1.96*** .62 - .13 .25 .06 .22 Processing' 3 .06 -16 .41* .18 .51** .16 Primary 0 .37 .23 .63** .20 .44* .17 Income - .002 .003 .0004 .0009 -.002** .0008 Intercept . 60.4 32.8 49.9 F (d.f.) 5.88 (5, 41 ) 4 .63 (5, 87) 4.55 (5, 87) R 2 (x 100) 41.8 21. 0 20. 7 Significance l e v e l s : *** .001; ** .01; * .05 8 = Unstandardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t . aThe number of cases varies; see degrees of freedom reported at the foot of each column. b The 1971 census lumps together processing, machining, product f a b r i c a t -ing, assembly and repair occupations. The p a r a l l e l category i n the 1961 census i s "craftsmen, production process and rel a t e d workers." The primary variable excludes those i n a g r i c u l t u r e . 140 CCF-NDP better, in communities with large primary industry components. In Table 13, both the percentage forestry and percentage mining variables are shown to be good predictors of 1952 and 1972 support, with negative coefficients appearing in the Social Credit part of the table. But interestingly (and perhaps ominously in terms of this chapter's main pro-position), neither variable is significantly related to the 1975 support levels of the main parties. It is also note-worthy, however, that when we focus on occupation rather than industry, and test the percentage in primary occupations variable, we do find a significant positive relationship with the 1975 NDP support level. This is shown in Table 14. Size of the manufacturing industry component is a good predictor of support in 1972 and 1975, with the relationships negative for Social Credit and positive for the CCF-NDP. The conventional wisdom about Social. Credit's differential appeal among p e t i t bourgeoise segments is confirmed by the signifi-cant coefficient which marks the relationship between Social Credit's 1952 support and percentage in the trade and service sector, but no relationship obtains in 1972 or 1975. The effects of occupation and income can be tested only in the 1960 and 1975 period. Table 14 details some of the relationships uncovered in an analysis of these variables. The coefficients for the primary occupation variable have already been noted, and those for the processing variable are what would be expected, given the observed associations 141 between party support and the size of the manufacturing industry component. No relationship exists between party support i n the two most recent elections and proportion engaged i n managerial-administrative, or professional occu-pations. A strong c o e f f i c i e n t does describe the relationship between per cent professional and 1960 party support, with So c i a l Credit f a r i n g much better where t h i s group accounts for above average proportions of a community's population. The relationship between the income variable and party support reverses i t s e l f between 1972 and 1975. A s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o e f f i c i e n t indicates that Social Credit's 1972 sup-port was lower where income l e v e l was higher. In 1975, i t was NDP support which f e l l as income increased. Since income l e v e l probably relates p o s i t i v e l y to the size of the union-ized work force i n these hinterland communities, the l a t t e r finding may indicate that the NDP l o s t some of i t s strength i n heavily unionized areas between 1972 and 1975. These results suggest that the examination of swing w i l l reveal that more affluent communities swung espe c i a l l y strongly against Social Credit i n 1972, and then reversed themselves in as accentuated a manner three years l a t e r . If the findings of t h i s section are cause for some over-a l l optimism about the v a l i d i t y of measures, they leave one less than sanguine concerning prospects for the hypothesis predicting increased composition patterning. This hypothesis w i l l receive i t s acid test when we turn our attention to the 142 c o r r e l a t e s of swing. But one cannot ignore the f a c t t h a t the f i n d i n g s r e p o r t e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n , and e s p e c i a l l y the R2~ values d e s c r i b i n g the f i t of the models across a p p l i c a t i o n s , suggest t h a t socio-economic composition d i d not i n c r e a s e i n importance as a determinant of e l e c t o r a l swing. The Methodology Employed in Testing for Explanatory Power of Patterning Models The explanatory power of a r e g r e s s i o n equation i s i n d i -c ated both by the F value and by the percentage of v a r i a n c e e x p l a i n e d . The explanatory power of a s e t of v a r i a b l e s e n t e r i n g an equation a f t e r other v a r i a b l e s , i s r e f l e c t e d by the magnitude of the v a r i a n c e e x p l a i n e d increment which r e s u l t s from the a d d i t i o n of those v a r i a b l e s . In a l l of the a n a l y s i s which f o l l o w s , base l e v e l of support (that i s , E i support) i s c o n t r o l l e d by a l l o w i n g i t f i r s t e n t r y i n t o the equations. I t was decided t o grant the base l e v e l v a r i a b l e a f i r s t crack at the v a r i a n c e because of the s t r o n g negative r e l a t i o n s h i p (demonstrated i n Chapter 2) between i t and swing. T h i s d e c i s i o n means, i n e f f e c t , t h a t we are t a k i n g as our dependent v a r i a b l e , the swing above and beyond (or below and beyond) t h a t which i s expected on the b a s i s of the p a r t y ' s p r i o r support i n the community. By c o n t r o l l i n g t h i s v a r i a b l e we a v o i d the p o s s i b i l i t y of spur-iousness which would a r i s e i f composition v a r i a b l e s were r e l a t e d t o a p a r t y ' s base l e v e l of support. A f t e r the base 143 l e v e l v a r i a b l e has e x p l a i n e d i t s p a r t of the swing v a r i a t i o n , the p a t t e r n i n g v a r i a b l e s are added t o the equation, thus producing the increments which are o f concern to us. As an example we can take the case p r o v i d e d by a p p l i c a -t i o n of model CI to NDP swing i n 1972. The r e s u l t s f o r t h i s i l l u s t r a t i v e case are s e t out i n Table 15. The l e v e l of base support v a r i a b l e , NDP support i n 1969, accounts f o r j u s t over 7% of the v a r i a n c e i n swing. Of c h i e f i n t e r e s t t o us i s the f a c t t h a t model CI e x p l a i n s an a d d i t i o n a l 6.4% of 2 8 v a r i a n c e . T h i s l a t t e r f i g u r e w i l l be compared wi t h the increments which r e s u l t when oth e r swings are regre s s e d on the same model. The c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a b l e s i n d i c a t e the s t r e n g t h and d i r e c t i o n of a v a r i a b l e ' s impact a f t e r base support l e v e l i s c o n t r o l l e d . Thus, i n t h i s example, we see t h a t i n communities wi t h above average f o r -e s t r y or manufacturing s e c t o r s , swing to the NDP i n 1972 was s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r than expected, given the NDP's 1969 support l e v e l s . Two reminders may help the reader i n f o l l o w i n g the r e s u l t s presented below. F i r s t , the main r e s u l t s are a r r i v e d a t by averaging those o b t a i n e d i n separate analyses o f government and o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y swings. The t r e n d l i n e s which c h a r t s h i f t s i n explanatory power across e l e c t i o n s are based on such averages. When we d i s c u s s the impact of i n d i -v i d u a l v a r i a b l e s , we w i l l look at the r e s u l t s of separate r e g r e s s i o n t e s t s . 144 TABLE 15: REGRESSION RESULTS FROM AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE INVOLVING APPLICATION OF EXPLANATORY MODEL C l TO SWING IN NDP SUPPORT, 1969-1972. REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS OF ESTIMATE AND CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED Independent Variables 6 S.E. Cumulative R 2 (x 100) NDP Support, 1969 -.20*** .05 7.2 Forestry .20* .09 9.3 Mining .00 .07 10.5 Manufacturing .14* .06 12.3 Transport .11 .14 12.7 Trade & Service .09 .07 13.6 Intercept 7.9 F for equation 3.7 d.f. (6, 142) Significance l e v e l s : *** .001; * .05 6 = Unstandardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t 145 Second, there i s some switching back and forth between discussion of results obtained in investigations of "commun-i t y " and "community plus r u r a l area" samples. The community samples include incorporated c i t i e s , towns, v i l l a g e s , and d i s t r i c t municipalities for which census data were available. The community plus r u r a l area data sets were constructed for additional investigation of the 1949-52 and 1969-72-75 swings. Gases i n the community sample were augmented with cases obtained by aggregating p o l l results to get t o t a l s for areas 29 defined by census subdivision and constituency boundaries. These additional cases are larger i n the geographical sense, and more rural,than the community cases. Only community data are available for 1941 and 1960. In order to assure some comparability i n sample size and the type of unit under analysis, the community samples of 1949-52 and 1969-72-75 are used i n comparisons involving the 1941 and 1960 elections. Comparisons which deal with just the 1952, 1972 and 1975 swings are based on the community plus r u r a l area data sets. The Findings The results lend no support to the composition pattern-ing hypothesis. The explanatory power of models including ethnic, r e l i g i o u s and class variables does not increase over time. If the aspects of socio-economic composition which would be expected to determine e l e c t o r a l swing are represented i n these models, and i f the share of community p o p u l a t i o n s b e l o n g i n g to each c o l l e c t i v i t y has been measured w i t h par-a l l e l accuracy i n d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s , then the evidence argues t h a t the impact o f composition has not i n c r e a s e d . Trend l i n e s which c h a r t changes i n the models' explanatory power take d i f f e r e n t shapes, but i n o n l y a few cases do we f i n d any suggestion of an upward t r e n d . We can look f i r s t a t the models which i n c l u d e e t h n i c i t y , r e l i g i o n , and c l a s s . The t r e n d l i n e s shown i n F i g u r e s 15 and 16 summarize changes i n the performance of models ERC1, ERC2, and ERC3 between 1952 and 1975 by p l o t t i n g average increments i n v a r i a n c e e x p l a i n e d . I t can be noted f i r s t , l e a v i n g p e r i o d comparisons a s i d e , t h a t the models g e n e r a l l y have modest success i n p r e d i c t i n g swings. There i s o n l y one case where a model produces an increment g r e a t e r than 25%. Since the v e r t i c a l axes are f i n e l y graded, the s l o p e s of the t r e n d l i n e s may be m i s l e a d i n g . In f a c t , p e r i o d to p e r i o d d i f f e r e n c e s are of l i m i t e d magnitude and p r o v i d e no evidence t h a t composition i n c r e a s e d i n p a t t e r n i n g s i g n i f i c a n c e . A s u b s i d i a r y hypothesis i s t h a t the impact of c l a s s i n c r e a s e d w h i l e the e f f e c t of r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y d e c l i n e d . The argument i s t h a t f o r c e s s e r v i n g to sharpen cleavage would, i n the case of e t h n i c i t y and r e l i g i o n , be n e u t r a l i z e d by developments such as the d e c l i n e of r e l i g i o u s worship, and the homogenization of second and t h i r d g e n e r a t i o n members of e t h n i c groups. Developments l i k e these should decrease the 147 c n (0 U CD > 10' 1949-52 (n=113) 1969-72 (n=149) 1972-75 (n=149) Year of Swing FIGURE 15: Trends i n the explanatory power of two models including ethnic, r e l i g i o u s and class v a r i a b l e s , 1952, 1972 and 1975. Tests of regression models on the community plus r u r a l area samples. Percentage point increments i n variance explained a f t e r base support l e v e l i s co n t r o l l e d . Averages from separate tests with government party and main opposition party swings. 148 FIGURE 16: Trends i n the explanatory power of three models including ethnic, r e l i g i o u s and class variables; 1952, 1960, 1972, and 1975 swings. Tests of regression models on the community samples. Percentage point increments i n variance explained a f t e r base l e v e l of support i s c o n t r o l l e d . Averages from separate t e s t s with government party and main opposition party swings. For the 1960 swings models ERC1 and ERC2 were applied to 68 cases while ERC3 was applied to 47 cases. The equation used when models ERC1 and ERC2 were tested on the 1960 swings included i n d u s t r i a l composition variables based on data i n the 1952 version of the Regional Industrial Index of British Columbia:- When occupational equivalents of the i n d u s t r i a l categories were used, and the equations applied to 47 cases, the increment for ERC1 in. 1956-60 was 35%. 149 impact of r e l i g i o n and e t h n i c i t y on p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s and behaviour, and weaken e c o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . We performed separate analyses of the c l a s s and e t h n i c - r e l i g i o u s models i n order to t e s t t h i s argument. V a r i a n c e - e x p l a i n e d increments a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the e M m i c - r e l i g i o u s models are p l o t t e d i n F i g u r e 17. The tem-p o r a l d i f f e r e n c e s found are n e i t h e r s t r i k i n g nor c o n s i s t e n t across t r i a l s with the two samples. In the community sample, increments a s s o c i a t e d with the most ge n e r a l model (ER3) d e c l i n e from about 18% f o r the 1937-41 and 1949-52 swing, to about 6% f o r the 1972-75 swing. But the impact of t h i s f u l l c o l l e c t i o n of e t h n i c - r e l i g i o u s v a r i a b l e s on the 1969-72 swing i s o n l y s l i g h t l y weaker than t h e i r impact i n the 1941 and 1952 e l e c t i o n s . When the models are a p p l i e d to v a r i a t i o n a cross the l a r g e r sample of towns and r u r a l areas there i s some evidence of i n c r e a s e d p a t t e r n i n g . In the case of the 1952 swings, s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s o b t a i n i n g i n the community data s e t are not r e p l i c a t e d when the l a r g e r sample i s con-s i d e r e d , and the average increment a s s o c i a t e d w i t h model ER3 i s j u s t over 5%. T h i s compares wi t h average ...increments of about 13% f o r the 1972 swings and about 10% f o r the 1975 swings. The impact o f the e t h n i c - r e l i g i o u s models v a r i e s across a p p l i c a t i o n s to government p a r t y and o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y swings i n some e l e c t i o n s . For example, the r e s u l t s f o r 1972 show t h a t the explanatory power of these models was much g r e a t e r 150 TESTS WITH. COMMUNITY.SAMPLES TESTS WITH COMMUNITY PLUS RURAL AREA SAMPLES D 0} n S S rd 0) H S-1 15: •rH rH O 113 G > H Cn GO (0 C 0 CM SH -H N O ni H > w ID-S'-.'. y ER3 ER2 ER1 •' ' " ' . 1952 (h=113); 1972 (n=149) Year of Swings 1975 (n=149) FIGURE 17: Trends i n the explanatory power of three models including ethnic and r e l i g i o u s variables; 1941, 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1975 swings. Tests of regression models on both community and community plus r u r a l area samples. • Percentage point increments i n variance explained a f t e r base l e v e l of support i s c o n t r o l l e d . Averages for separate t e s t s with government party and main opposition party swings. 151 i n the case o f the NDP. Ac c o r d i n g t o the c o e f f i c i e n t s shown i n Table 16, swing t o the NDP i n 1972 became s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s pronounced (or e l s e negative) as the s i z e of the);"other P r o t e s t a n t " p o p u l a t i o n s d e c l i n e d , and more pronounced as the p r o p o r t i o n B r i t i s h i n c r e a s e d . Three years l a t e r , i t appears t h a t areas with l a r g e r than average B r i t i s h p o p u l a t i o n s l e d the swing away from the NDP. The f a c t t h a t communities and areas w i t h above average p r o p o r t i o n s of B r i t i s h o r i g i n v o t e r s moved s t r o n g l y toward the NDP i n 1972, and s t r o n g l y away i n 1975 c o u l d perhaps be e x p l a i n e d w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h i s group, which should be most 'at home' i n B r i t i s h Columbia s o c i e t y , tends t o r e f l e c t or l e a d p o l i t i c a l t r e n d s . The evidence t h a t there was l i t t l e change i n the impor-tance o f r e l i g i o u s and e t h n i c composition i s matched by f i n d i n g s which show t h a t i n d i c a t o r s o f c l a s s composition d i d not become more s i g n i f i c a n t c o r r e l a t e s of swing. As the t r e n d l i n e s i n F i g u r e 18 show, no i n c r e a s e i n explanatory power i s e v i d e n t when s u c c e s s i v e l y more recent swings are reg r e s s e d on the c l a s s models. Model C l , which c o n t a i n s v a r i a b l e s r e p r e s e n t i n g f i v e i n d u s t r y components, was t e s t e d on the 1952, 1972 and 1975 swings. I t was most s u c c e s s f u l i n p r e d i c t i n g the swings of 1952. The o c c u p a t i o n a l d i f f e r -ences upon which models C2 and C3 are premised seem to have been more important i n 1960 than i n e i t h e r 1972 or 1975. Only i n the case of the income v a r i a b l e i s th e r e any evidence t h a t c l a s s cleavage sharpened. TABLE 16: ETHNICITY-RELIGION VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OF SWING. COEFFICIENTS FOR SWINGS IN GOVERNMENT AND MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY SUPPORT, 1941-1975. MODEL ER3 APPLIED TO RESULTS ACROSS Av.SAMPLE OF COMMUNITIES3 1937-41 1949-52 1956-60 1969-72 1972- 75 Predictor Variables L i b e r a l Coalition' 3 S o c i a l C r e d i t • S o c i a l Credit S o c i a l C r e d i t Base l e v e l c o n t r o l - .47** .15 -.49*** .09 -.32*** .07 -.46*** .07 —.34*** .10 Anglican .17 .40 M94*** .27 .10 .17 -.16 .15 .05 .18 United .06 .20 .05 .17 .32 .16 .08 .14 .02 .16 Roman Catholi c .09 .42 .18 .24 .02 .13 -.01 .13 .22 .16 Other Protestant .05 .30 .07 .29 .10 .11 -.14 .23 .00 .27 B r i t i s h -.. .02 .48 -.40* .17 -.02 .13 .04 .09 -.03 .11 German .79 1.00 -.85** .32 .20 .24 .31 .28 .49 .32 Scandinavian 1.31 .66 -.18 .39 .16 .29 -.54 .41 .72 .46 c Intercept 0.3 16.7 -8.2 8.6 11.5 F (d.f.) 2.55* (7, 33) 11.2***(8, 56) 4.13** (8, 68) 7.93***(8, 84) 2.06* (8 , .84) •CCF CCF CCF NDP NDP Base l e v e l control - .58** .20 -.42*** .11 -.44*** .06 -.24*** .07 -.52*** .09 Anglican - .38 .51 .20 .27 -.18 .17 -.25 .13 -.03 .18 United - .02 .16 -.10 .17 -.53*** .17 -.13 .12 .15 .16 Roman Catholi c - .78 .54 -.12 .25 .04 .14 .06 .12 .01 .16 Other Protestant .22 .39 .03 .30 -.14 .11 -.50* .20 .19 .27 B r i t i s h - .84 .61 -.08 .18 .07 .13 .20* .08 -.22 .11 German -4.06** 1.28 -.43 .33 .03 .24 -.50 .25 -.61 .34 Scandinavian -1.12 .86 .28 .40 .38 .30 .41 .35 .04 .46 c Intercept 115.4 11.8 35.0 23.7 31.7 F (d.f.) 2.52* (7, 33) 3.94** (8, 56) 11.99*** (8 ,68) 4.17***(8, 84) 5.53*** (8,84) See notes following. 153 Notes, Table .16 Significance l e v e l s : *** .001; ** .01; * .05 8 = Unstandardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t . aThe number of cases varies; see degrees of freedom reported at the foot of each column. The 1949-52 C o a l i t i o n swing i s the difference between combined L i b e r a l and Conservative support i n 1952 and C o a l i t i o n support i n 1949. The si z e of the intercept and the fac t they are usually p o s i t i v e r e f l e c t s the i n c l u s i o n of the base support l e v e l variable which i s negatively related to swing. 154 The e a r l i e r tests on s t a t i c party support levels i n 1952, 1972 and 1975 showed that model C l explained between 10% and 25% of v a r i a t i o n . Here i t i s found that model Cl has even less success i n explaining swing i n those three elections; none of the increments associated with the indus-t r i a l composition variables exceeds 10%. The poor showing of t h i s model i s r e f l e c t e d i n the paucity of s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s i n Table 17.. Remembering that the Cl figure plotted for the 1952 swings represents an average of results from t r i a l s on CCF and C o a l i t i o n (to o l d l i n e party total) swings, we decided to treat Social Credit support i n 1952 as that party's swing, and to consider model Cl's success i n predicting t h i s swing. What was found i s that the downward trend i n variance explained a f t e r 1952 i s more pronounced i f we take into account these r e s u l t s . About 22% of variance in Social Credit's 1952 support i s explained by model C l . The 19 61 census gives an i n d u s t r i a l breakdown only for communities with populations i n excess of 5000 so no precise r e p l i c a t i o n of model Cl could be applied to the 1960 r e s u l t s . But the 1960 swings across 47 communities were regressed on a model containing f i v e occupational variables which corre-spond to the i n d u s t r i a l categories underlying model C l . This revised model was quite successful. The increments obtained i n separate analyses of Social Credit and CCF swings averaged 31%, with s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s indicating strong negative relationships between swing around Social Credit and TABLE 17: INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OF SWINGS. COEFFICIENTS FOR SWINGS IN GOVERNMENT AND MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY SUPPORT; 1952, 1972 AND 1975. MODEL CI APPLIED TO RESULTS ACROSS COMMUNITIES AND RURAL AREAS a P r e d i c t o r Variables 1949-52 8 S.E. 1969-72 .8 S.E. 1972-75 8 S.E. C o a l i t i o n 3 S o c i a l C r e d i t S o c i a l C r e d i t Base l e v e l c o n t r o l Forestry-Manufacturing Mining Transportation Trade & Service c Intercept F (d.f.) - .31 .21 .57** .19 .44 .53 .25 .18 1.01 .89 - .11 .17 -24.5 2.6* (6, 106) -.50*** .05 -.15 .08 -.05 .06 -.10 .07 -.08 .14 -.00 .07 13.8 18.1*** (6, 142) -.35*** .08 .00 .10 -.08 .07 .21* .09 .08 .17 .12 .09 20.9 6.3*** (6, 142) Base l e v e l c o n t r o l Forestry Manufacturing Mining Transportation Trade & Service c Intercept F (d.f.) CCF NDP NDP - .38 .20 .43** .16 .36 .44 .15 .15 .91 .73 - .12 .14 -14.5 2.67* (6, 106) -.20*** .05 .20* .09 .14* .06 .00 .07 .12 .14 .09 .07 7.8 3.71*** (6, 142) -.49*** .06 -.10 .10 .09 .07 .12 .09 -.06 .16 -.10. .08 23.6 13.3*** (6, 142) See notes following. 156 Notes, Table 17 Significance l e v e l s : *** .001; ** .01; * .05 8 = Unstandardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t . aThe number of cases varies; see degrees of freedom reported at the foot of each column. The 1949-52 C o a l i t i o n swing i s the difference between combined L i b e r a l and Conservative support i n 1952 and C o a l i t i o n support i n 1949. The si z e of the intercept and the f a c t they are usually p o s i t i v e r e f l e c t s the i n c l u s i o n of the base support l e v e l variable which i s negatively r e l a t e d to swing. 157 the proportions i n forestry and transportation occupations.^ There was a strong p o s i t i v e relationship between CCF swing and the forestry variable. The success of t h i s occupational equivalents model would suggest either that occupation i s a better discriminator of swing differences than industry, or that occupational groups were unusually polarized in 1960. In order to evaluate these p o s s i b i l i t i e s , the occupational variables were tested on results from the recent elections. Unfortunately, an exact duplicate of the occupation model just reported could not be applied, because the 1971 census did not separate those with primary occupations into logger and miner categories as did the 1961 census. However, i t was possible to construct p a r a l l e l models based on occupation categories which the 1961 and 1971 census reports have i n common. Models C2 and C3 are two such models. Once more the results provide no evidence of increased patterning. The trend l i n e s for models C2 and C3 plotted i n Figure 18 indicate that occupation was a better predictor of swing differences i n 1960 than i n either 1972 or 1975. Part B of Table 18 shows that swings around the CCF i n 1960 were negatively associated with the percentage engaged i n profes-sional and managerial occupations, and p o s i t i v e l y associated with the percentage i n transportation. Social Credit swings in 1960 were higher i n communities with large professional components, and lower i n communities with large transport or 4-> a e CD U O c 35 30-CD •H 25' U3 4-> C •H O (0 CM 0H (U >? Cn 20 Ifi •P c a) U CD CM fD u Ci trj -H > CD Cn rd CD > 15 10^  158 c :2 c \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ I \ — — — _ — — — — 1952 (n=113) .1960 (n=47) 1972 1975 (Towns, n=93; Towns + RA's, n=149) Year of Swing FIGURE 18: Trends i n the explanatory power of three models including class variables; 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1975 swings. Tests of regression models on both community and community plus r u r a l area samples. 3 Percentage point increments i n variance explained a f t e r base l e v e l of support i s cont r o l l e d . Averages from separate tests with government party and main opposition party swings. aModel C l was tested on the community plus r u r a l area samples, while models C2 and C3 were tested on the community samples. TABLE 18: OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION AND INCOME VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OF SOCIAL CREDIT AND CCF-NDP SWINGS; 1960, 1972 AND 1975. REGRESSION MODELS C4 AND C5 APPLIED TO RESULTS ACROSS A SAMPLE OF COMMUNITIES.a SEPARATE PARTS FOR ANALYSES OF SOCIAL CREDIT AND CCF-NDP SWINGS A. SOCIAL CREDIT SWINGS Predictor Variables 1956-60 8 S.E. 1969-72 8 S.E. 1972-8 75 S.E. MODEL C4: Base l e v e l control -.43*** .12 -.47*** .06 -.20* .09 Managerial -.11 .30 .82 .45 -.58 .53 Prof e s s i o n a l .97* .46 .00 .15 .32* .18 Processing' 3 .12 .12 .00 .11 -.12 .13 Primary 0 -.33 .20 -.20 .12 .02 .14 Income .001 .058 -.0014* .0005 .0023*** .0006 Intercept 3.6 21.2 -6.9 F (d.f.) 4.9*** (6, 40) 11.6*** (6, 86) 4.7*** (6 , 86) MODEL C5: Base l e v e l c o n t r o l —. 37*** .10 -.47*** .06 -.22* .09 Managerial/Professional -.02 .22 .12 .13 .16 .16 Processing' 3 .02 .10 .01 .11 -.12 .13 Transport^ -.87*** .17 .10 .27 .32 .31 Primary 0 -.50** .16 -.10 .12 -.04 .14 Income .0035 .0020 -.0014* .0006 .0022*** .0006 Intercept 9.3 19.9 -4.8 F (d.f.) 10.8*** (6, 40) 10.9*** (6, 86) 4.4** (6, 86) See notes following. TABLE :i8< (contd.) B. CCF-NDP SWINGS Predictor Variables 8, 1 9 5 6 " 6 0 r. T, S . E . 8 1969 -72 S . E . 8 1 9 7 2 " 7 5 s • E . MODEL C4: Base l e v e l c o n t r o l _ .45*** .06 -.18* .07 -.47*** .08 Managerial - .50* .24 .18 .45 -.05 .52 Prof e s s i o n a l -1.54*** . 37 .06 .15 .12 •;i8 Processing' 3 - .12 .10 .07 .11 .29* .13 Primary 0 .04 .14 .21 .12 .11 .15 Income' - .006** .002 .001 .0005 -.0023*** .0006 Intercept 63.4 1.89 32.6 F (d.f.) 18.7*** (6 , 40) 2.24* (6, 86) 9.5*** (6, 86) MODEL C5 Base l e v e l c o n t r o l - .42*** .06 -.18* .07 _.47*** .08 Managerial/Professional - .67** .21 .09 .13 .10 .16 Processing* 3 - .10 .10 .06 .11 .29* .13 Transport" .47** .16 -.06 .26 -.05 . 30 Primary 0 .15 .14 .22 .13 .11 .15 Income'- * - .0089*** .0021 .001 .0005 -.0023*** .0006 Intercept 60.9 1.82 33.0 F (d.f.) 19.8*** (6 , 40) 2.24* (6, 86) 9.76*** (6 , 86 ) See notes following. 161 Notes, Table 18 Significance levels:. *** .001; ** .01; * .05 8 = Unsta'ndardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t . aThe number of cases varies; see degrees of freedom reported at the foot of each column. The 1971 census combines processing, machining, product f a b r i c a t i n g , assembly and repair occupations. The p a r a l l e l variable i n the 1961 census i s "craftsmen, production process and rel a t e d workers." Q The primary variable excludes those i n a g r i c u l t u r e . °"The 1971 census combines transportation, communication and p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s occupations. The 1961 census combines transportation and communications occupations. 162 primary s e c t o r s . Only a s p r i n k l i n g of s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i -c i e n t s show up o p p o s i t e occupation v a r i a b l e s i n the 1972 and 1975 columns of Table 18. The recent h i s t o r y of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between income and swing pro v i d e s the one b i t of evidence which b e l i e s the n o t i o n t h a t c l a s s i s d e c l i n i n g i n importance as a p r e d i c t o r of swing. Income r e l a t e s s t r o n g l y to swings i n both 1972 and 1975 as can be seen i n Table 19. T h i s t a b l e used 1951 census data to extend the comparison back to the 1952 e l e c -t i o n . L i m i t e d weight should be given the e a r l y f i n d i n g s s i n c e data on income were a v a i l a b l e f o r o n l y about 30 cases i n 1951, but the s t r e n g t h o f the p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n s (base l e v e l of support i s c o n t r o l l e d as usual) does i n c r e a s e over time. A l l of the p a r t i a l s f o r the 1972 and 1975 swings are s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at l e v e l s g r e a t e r than .05, w i t h those d e s c r i b i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the community p l u s r u r a l area sample s i g n i f i c a n t a t the .001 l e v e l . These c o n c l u s i o n s have t o be amended somewhat when the income v a r i a b l e i s added to the occupation models which were j u s t d i s c u s s e d . As Table 18 shows, income does not emerge as a s i g n i f i c a n t p r e d i c t o r of NDP swing i n 1972 when i t i s t e s t e d as p a r t of a model i n v o l v i n g o ccupation v a r i a b l e s , but does appear as s i g n i f i c a n t i n the other t r i a l s with 1972 and 1975 swings. Increments a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the a d d i t i o n of income to model C3 range from about 8.5% i n 1960, to about 4% i n 1972, and n e a r l y 10% i n 1975. 163 TABLE 19: INCOME AS A PREDICTOR OF SWINGS; 1952, 1960, 1972 AND 1975. PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS WITH BASE LEVEL OF SUPPORT CONTROLLED. ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY, AND COMMUNITY PLUS RURAL AREA SAMPLES. SIMPLE PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS IN PARENTHESES Swing S o c i a l C r e d i t CCF- NDP ! C o a l i t i o n 1949-52 (N = 29) N.A. (-40*) .26 ( .02) .20 (.26) 1956-60 (N = 47) .19 ( .34*) -.39** (-.52***) 1969-72 (N = 93) (N = 149) -.27** -.27*** (-.14) (-.22**) .22* 25*** ( .22*) ( .28***) 1972-75 (N = 93) (N = 149) .34*** .25*** ( .39***) ( .29***) -.33*** -.25*** (-.34***) (-.22***) Significance l e v e l s (two-tailed): *** .001; ** .01; * .05 164 The d i r e c t i o n o f income's impact on swing i n the two most r e c e n t e l e c t i o n s i