ELECTORAL STABILITY AND ELECTORAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF THE CATHOLIC PARTY IN THE NETHERLANDS by HERMAN BAKVIS B.A. Queen's University, 1971 M.A. University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June 1978 (T) Herman Bakvis, 1978 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n • In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l fu l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make i t f ree ly ava i lab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is thesis for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th i s thes is fo r f i nanc i a l gain sha l l not be allowed without my writ ten permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 7 7 S p p t P i n h p T 1 Q 7 S A B S T R A C T Catholics in the Netherlands are unique. For a period of 45 years 85 percent or more of Dutch Catholics continuously voted for a single party—the Catholic party. Then in 1967 support began to decline so that by 1972 only 38 percent of Dutch Catholics were s t i l l voting for this party. No other West European country offers a similar example of long term con-sistency and sudden change on the part of a bloc of voters. The aim of the study is to account for this unusual pattern of electoral s t a b i l i t y and decline. Two competing explanatory frameworks are evaluated, the party identification and subcultural influence models. The former i s rejected. The evidence suggests that party identification was not important in linking Catholics with the Catholic party. It was found that the loyalties of Catholics lay primarily with the Church and the Catholic subculture—not with the party. Support for the party was a by-product of subcultural cohesion and the drop in support after 1963 was a result of subcultural fragmentation. The importance of subcultures in influencing voting behaviour has long been recognized; however, the internal organization and dynamics of the subcultures themselves have received much less attention. In part this study attempts to redress the balance by examining the factors responsible for both the cohesion and the disintegration of the Dutch Catholic subcul-ture. For data the study relies on material from Catholic party archives, newspapers, interviews and the secondary analysis of aggregate and survey data. The f i r s t section of the study outlines the role of the Dutch Church in creating a miniature society within a larger society. Bishops and clergy were affected by an ideology which stressed the importance of insulating Catholics from non-Catholic influences. This insulation was achieved largely i i through the use of organization and the rigorous application of sanctions. Rank-and-file Catholics obediently joined organizations l i k e Catholic trade unions and the Catholic broadcasting organization, subscribed to Catholic newspapers and at el e c t i o n time voted for the Catholic party. At the same time the Church and Catholic i n s t i t u t i o n s provided t h e i r c l i e n t e l e with s p i r i t u a l , s o c i a l and economic rewards which were equal to, and often greater than, those provided by competing blocs. The second section i s concerned with the changes within the Dutch Church which occurred during the 1960s. The bishops r a d i c a l l y altered the boundaries of the subculture, suggesting that Catholics could now decide for themselves questions of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and p o l i t i c s . Many Catholics decided to no longer vote for the Catholic party. The Catholic party i n turn, racked by i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t and no longer enjoying the blessing of the Church, was incapable of finding an altern a t i v e basis of support. In 1976 the party merged with the two major Protestant parties to form a single C h r i s t i a n Democratic party. The t h e o r e t i c a l contributions of the study are twofold. One theme i n the l i t e r a t u r e on e l e c t o r a l behaviour argues that party-system s t a b i l i t y i s a function of the degree to which the sense of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the parties i s rooted i n mass public consciousness. The case of Dutch Cath-o l i c i s m demonstrates that a cohesive subcultural bloc can provide a stable and robust basis of support for a p o l i t i c a l party, making high levels of party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , unnecessary. Secondly, the study suggests that i n party systems of the kind found i n the Netherlands, subcultures can vary greatly i n t h e i r cohesion. I t points to the role of leadership, ideology and organization i n sustaining or a l t e r i n g the consistency of blocs over time and by implication the success and s t a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Page ABSTRACT i i TABLE OF CONTENTS i v LIST OF TABLES v i LIST OF FIGURES v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i x Chapter I INTRODUCTION 1 II THE DUTCH CATHOLIC SUBCULTURE: ETHNICITY, IDEOLOGY, ORGANIZATION AND CLIENTELE 18 1. The Ethnic Dimension 23 2. Ideology 32 3..Organization 47 4. Clientele 77 5. Summary 91 III POLITICAL COHESION AS A FUNCTION OF SUBCULTURAL COHESION 104 1. The Catholic Party as a P o l i t i c a l Organization .... 106 2. Mobilization 136 3. The Vote 147 4. Summary 163 IV THE THEOLOGICAL REVOLT AND CHANGES IN THE CATHOLIC SUBCULTURE 174 1. Changes within the Church 175 i v Chapter Page 2. Changes i n the Clientele 192 3. Mobilization 204 4. Socio-Economic Organizations and Deconfessionalization 210 5. Summary 226 V THE CATHOLIC PARTY: DECLINE AND FALL, 1963-72 233 1. Organizational Decline 233 2. The Vote, 1963-72 255 3. Summary 294 VI CONCLUSION 304 BIBLIOGRAPHY 322 APPENDICES 336 I Map of the Netherlands 336 II Interview Procedures 337 III Aggregate Data and the Catholic Vote 340 v LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1.1 Parliamentary E l e c t i o n Results, 1946-77 4 1.2 Percentage of Catholics P r e f e r r i n g KVP by Age, 1970 10 2.1 Reading Preferences by Religion 28 2.2 Recreational A c t i v i t i e s by Religion 30 2.3 Catholics per P r i e s t by Country 58 2.4 University Degree Holders by Year by Religion 81 2.5 TV Program Recognition by Broadcasting Organizations ... 85 2.6 Easter Observance by Diocese, 1951 89 3.1 Type of Organization by Mass Attendance 150 3.2 KVP Vote by B i r t h Rate by Province, 1952 151 4.1 P o s i t i o n on Celibacy by Age Cohort 189 4.2 C l e r i c a l Defection and Recruitment, 1955-1971 193 4.3 Mass Attendance by Age 195 4.4 Attitude of Dutch Catholics towards B i r t h Control, 1965 and 1968 200 4.5 Mass Attendance by Year, 1966-74 203 4.6 Broadcasting Organizational Membership by Year 211 4.7 Trade Union Membership by Year 212 5.1 Vote by Deconfessionalization by Year 257 5.2 Voting Choice by Self-Assigned Social Class, 1970 265 5.3 Voting Choice by Occupational Level, 1970 266 5.4 Voting Choice by Organizational Membership, 1970 267 5.5 Voting Choice by Geographical M o b i l i t y , 1970 270 v i Table Page 5.6 Voting Choice by Intergenerational M o b i l i t y , 1970 272 5.7 Analysis of Variance—Occupation and Intergenerational M o b i l i t y with Vote f o r the KVP as Dependent Variable ... 273 5.8 Vote by Age Cohort 275 5.9 % KVP Vote by Age by Urbanization 275 5.10 % KVP Vote by Age by North-South 276 5.11 % KVP by Age Cohort by Year 277 5.12 Mult i p l e Regression f o r KVP Voting Choice, 1970 279 5.13 Voting Choice by Attitudes on Soc i a l Welfare, 1970 282 5.14 Voting Choice by P o l i t i c a l Interest, 1970 283 5.15 D e p i l l a r i z a t i o n by Religion by Sex 285 5.16 Where Did the Ex-KVP Vote Go? 288 5.17 Where Did the KVP Vote Come From? 289 5.18 Vote i n 1970, 1971 and 1972 of Catholics Who Voted KVP i n 1967 293 6.1 Vote by Self-Assigned Social Class for Non-KVP Voting Catholics 315 v i i LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1.1 Percentage of Catholics Voting f o r European Catholic Parties 5 3.1 Percentage of Catholics Voting KVP by Context 160 4.1 Dutch Wages and Prices, 1946-1969 196 5.1 Percentage of Catholics Voting KVP by Urbanization 259 5.2 Percentage of Catholics Voting KVP by Region 260 5.3 Percentage of Catholics Voting KVP by Urbanization and Region 261 5.4 Percentage of Catholics Voting KVP by Catholic Concentration, Urbanization and Region 262 v i i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study examines the i n t e r n a l workings of the Dutch Catholic subculture. Without the cooperation of several Catholic i n s t i t u t i o n s and agencies i n the Netherlands the study would not have been poss i b l e . The Catholic S o c i a l Research I n s t i t u t e (KASKI) i n the Hague, under the d i r e c t o r s h i p of B. J . M. Engbersen, l e t me have access to numerous reports and memoranda. H. van Zoelen of KASKI graciously helped guide me through the material. Extensive use was made of the archives of the Catholic Documentation Centre at the Catholic University i n Nijmegen. The d i r e c t o r of the Centre, J . Roes, and J . M. G. Thurlings of the Catholic University were very h e l p f u l . Executive o f f i c e r s of the major Catholic socio-economic organizations and the Catholic party gave several hours of t h e i r valuable time to answer my questions. So too did several members of the Dutch clergy. While i n the Netherlands, I used the f a c i l i t i e s of the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science at the University of Leiden as a base of operations. I am grateful to the chairman of the Department, Hans Daalder, not only for providing me with work space but also with invaluable advice. Jan Verhoef was responsible for introducing me to the study of Dutch p o l i t i c a l behaviour back i n 1973 and made me f e e l welcome to the Netherlands i n 1976. Arend L i j p h a r t , Karl D i t r r i c h , Galen Irwin, and Ben Wempe were very generous with t h e i r advice. As well, Arend and Karl made av a i l a b l e to me a considerable amount of unpublished research material. The P o l i t i c a l Science Department at Leiden kindly l e t me take back to Canada a copy of t h e i r e c o l o g i c a l data f i l e . Joe Houska, for h i s own d i s s e r t a t i o n work, assembled a data set co n s i s t i n g of Dutch national e l e c t i o n returns. I am deeply indebted to him for allowing me to have a copy of ix these data. The 1970 and 1971 Dutch e l e c t i o n surveys were made av a i l a b l e through the Inter-University Consortium f o r P o l i t i c a l Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Lewis James at the Un i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia proved to be indispensable when i t came to deciphering Dutch codebooks and merging data sets. Mike Burke a s s i s t e d with the data analysis. In the preliminary stages of the project several people helped by commenting on my prospectus and giving encouragement. Among them were P h i l Goldman, Val Lorwin, Stephen Milne, Lynda Erickson, B i l l Irvine, Richard Simeon, Ian S l a t e r , Alan Cairns, and David Winterford. Steve Wolinetz acted as an extremely useful c r i t i c throughout the duration of the research phase. Don Blake and Ken Carty were unusually h e l p f u l not only i n the beginning stages but also during the w r i t i n g stage when they made de t a i l e d comments on the en t i r e f i r s t d r a f t of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . Don Story, David Smith, J e f f Steeves, John Courtney, and Duff Spafford read sections of the penultimate d r a f t . Mrs. Mary-Ann Barr did an excellent job of typing the f i n a l d r a f t . I thank them a l l . David E l k i n s , i n h i s r o l e of supervisor, helped i n numerous ways. His most important contribution, however, was i n the beginning to force me to l i m i t the scope of the thesis and l a t e r to t e l l me when I was f i n i s h e d . I am g r a t e f u l to him for h i s guidance. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to express my gratitude to the Canada Council for t h e i r generous f i n a n c i a l support. None of the above should be interpreted i n any way as an e f f o r t to apportion blame. I take f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l errors of fact or i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Herman Bakvis, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 12 June 1978 x Chapter I INTRODUCTION This study i s concerned with an unusual case of e l e c t o r a l s t a b i l i t y and e l e c t o r a l change involving the Catholic party* i n the Netherlands. In contrast with Catholic p a r t i e s elsewhere i n Western Europe, t h i s party i s unique i n that f o r several years i t managed to a t t r a c t almost a l l e l i g i b l e Catholic v o t e r s . 1 Then i n the mid 1960s the vote began to decline so that by 1972 i t enjoyed only a f r a c t i o n of i t s former support. My aim i s to provide an explanation f o r t h i s pattern of extremely high and consistent p o l i t i c a l cohesion and then sudden decline. The explanation w i l l focus on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between voting and subcultural influences. It w i l l be shown that the high degree of p o l i t i c a l orthodoxy of Dutch Catholics was p r i m a r i l y a function of subcultural cohesion. This cohesion was a r e s u l t of the Church's success i n enforcing a rigorous code of r e l i g i o u s , s o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l behaviour. In the enforcement of t h i s code the Church was aided by a w i l l i n g lay leadership. Catholic e l i t e s exacted a high degree of l o y a l t y from Catholics through au t h o r i t a r i a n means, at the same time providing s p i r i t u a l , s o c i a l and economic rewards which helped cement that l o y a l t y . * The Catholic party has gone by various names: from 1904 to 1926 i t was c a l l e d the "League of Roman Catholic E l e c t o r a l Associations" (BRKKV); from 1926 to 1940 (when the party was disbanded because of the German occupation), i t was known as the "Roman Catholic State Party" (RKSP); and from 1946 to 1976 i t was c a l l e d the "Catholic People's Party" (KVP). Use of the term Catholic party r e f e r s to the party i n i t s e n t i r e t y . Use of a s p e c i f i c t i t l e (e.g. RKSP) means I am r e f e r i n g only to that p a r t i c u l a r period. 1 2 The disintegration of the vote i n the 1960s occurred i n part because of a si g n i f i c a n t re-orientation on the part of the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy and i n part because of changed socio-economic conditions which no longer permitted the high degree of soci a l control. These changes placed the Catholic party at a competitive disadvantage, vis-a-vis i t s electoral opponents. The pattern of electoral s t a b i l i t y and decline on the part of Dutch Catholics i s an extreme case. Yet i t does allow insight into the relationship between voting behaviour and subcultural cohesion, a r e l a t i o n -ship which may operate at a p a r t i a l l y submerged level i n other s o c i e t i e s . Examining Catholicism and i t s influence on Dutch p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s also relevant to the study of Catholicism and p o l i t i c s i n such countries as Germany, Switzerland, Canada and the United States. Furthermore, t h i s study w i l l have a bearing on the nature and operation of subcultures i n modern societies generally and the conditions under which they become p o l i t i c a l l y relevant. Let us consider the de t a i l s of the Dutch Catholic party a l i t t l e more closely. Since 1918 when universal suffrage was f i r s t introduced, the party achieved a record of almost perfect electoral s t a b i l i t y up to and including 1963.2 For a period of nearly h a l f a century the Catholic party consistently received between 29 to 32 percent of the t o t a l popular vote. And i n every election i n t h i s period at least 85 percent of Catholics, drawn from a l l classes of Dutch society, voted for the Catholic party. Yet i n 1967 the party experienced a sharp decline i n support, dropping from 31.9 percent of the popular vote to 26 percent. In 1971 the vote for the Catholic party dropped to 21.9 percent and i n 1972 to 17.7 percent. While i n 1963 85 percent of Cutch Catholics voted 3 for the Catholic party, i n 1972 only 38 percent did so. In 1976 the party entered into a federation with the two major Protestant p a r t i e s . Although s t i l l separate, they run under a common C h r i s t i a n Democratic Party banner (CDA). Within the Netherlands, the C a t h o l i c party i s unusual. Table 1.1 (1946-77) indicates that the other four major p a r t i e s competing i n the Dutch e l e c t o r a l arena, the C a l v i n i s t Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), the C h r i s t i a n H i s t o r i c a l Union Protestant (CHU), the Labour party (PvdA) and the L i b e r a l party (WD), although r e l a t i v e l y stable, were not as consistent i n t h e i r e l e c t o r a l support as the Catholic party (KVP) p r i o r to 1967. During the 1967-72 period they did indeed lose ground along with the KVP. However, with the exception of the CHU, the smallest of the f i v e , t h e i r decline was neither as spectacular nor as l i n e a r as that of the KVP. These p a r t i e s managed e i t h e r to s t a b i l i z e t h e i r vote, to regain l o s t votes or, i n the case of the WD, to improve t h e i r o v e r a l l p o s i t i o n . The duration and consistency of Catholic party support, and then i t s r a p i d d e c l i n e , i s also unique by West European standards. The 85 percent plus f i g u r e , representing the proportion of Dutch Catholics constantly voting f o r the party, i s exceptional compared with other West European countries with Catholic p a r t i e s or with C h r i s t i a n Democratic pa r t i e s depending i n large part upon Catholics for t h e i r e l e c t o r a l support. 3 The contrast between the KVP and other West European Catholic and C h r i s t i a n Democratic p a r t i e s i s shown i n fi g u r e 1.1. In Belgium and I t a l y one can see that support varied more from e l e c t i o n to e l e c t i o n than i t di d i n Holland. However, f o r these p a r t i e s support d i d not t a i l o f f as d r a s t i c a l l y i n the l a s t decade. Since both Belgium and I t a l y are countries where the e n t i r e populations are at least nominally Catholic, the percent-age of people voting f o r Church-supported p a r t i e s may not be meaningful. Table 1.1 Parliamentary Election Results, 1946-1977 Party 1946 1948- 1952 1956 1959 1963 1967 1971 1972 1977 Major Parties: Catholic Peoples' Party (KVP) 30.8% 31.0% 28.7% 31.7% 31.6% 31.9% 26.5% 21.9% 17.7% Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) 12.9 13.2 11.3 9.9 9.4 8.7 9.9 8.6 8.8 Christian Historical Union (CHU) 7.9 9.2 8.9 8.4 8.1 8.6 8.1 6.3 4.8 Christian Democratic Appel (CDA) 31.9% Liberals (WD) 6.4 8.0 8.8 8.8 12.2 10.3 10.7 10.4 14.4 17.9 Socialists (PvdA) 28.3 25.6 29.0 32.7 30.3 28.0 23.5 24.7 27.4 33.8 86.3 87.0 86.7 91.5 91.6 87.5 78.7 71.9 73.1 83.6 Minor Parties: (Protestant) P o l i t i c a l Reformed Party (SGP) 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.1 Reformed P o l i t i c a l League (GPV) .7 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.6 1.8 1.0 (Catholic) Catholic National Party (KNP) 1.3 2.7 Roman Catholic Party (RKPN) .9 .4 (Secular) Communists (CPN) 10.6 7.7 6.2 4.8 2.4 2.8 3.6 3.9 4.5 1.7 Pacifist Socialists (PSP) 1.8 3.0 2.9 1.4 1.5 .9 Farmers Party (BP) .7 2.1 4.7 1.1 1.9 .8 Democrats '66 (D'66) 4.5 6.8 4.2 5.4 Democratic Socialists '70 (DS'70) 5.3 4.1 .7 Radical Party (PPR) 1.8 4.8 1.7 Middenstands (NMP) 1.5 .4 Other Parties: 1.0 1.6 1.3 .8 .8 1.5 2.7 2.4 1.0 1.5 13.7 13.0 13.3 8.5 8.4 12.5 21.3 28.1 26.9 16.4 Source: S. Wolinetz, "Electoral Change and Attempts to Build Catch-Ail Parties in the Netherlands," Paper presented to the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science Association Annual Meeting, 1973; Uitslagen Tweede Kamerverkiezingen, May 1977. 5 Figure 1.1. Percentage of Catholics voting f or European Catholic Parties (Source: Annuaire Statique de l a Suisse 1965; Central Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , The Netherlands, H i s t o r i c a l S t a t i s t i c s of the Netherlands, 1899- 1974; T. Mackie $ R. Rose, The International Almanac ofElectoral History.) 6 In these countries i t i s d i f f i c u l t to sort out those i n d i v i d u a l s who have l o s t a l l contact with the Church and those who have not.1* However, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that of the I t a l i a n s who attend mass re g u l a r l y , 67 percent voted DC while i n the Netherlands, according to 1956 survey data, 90 percent of those who re g u l a r l y attended mass voted KVP.5 Belgium and I t a l y are also less v a l i d as cases for comparison insofar as the Catholics i n the Netherlands are in a minority, c o n s t i t u t i n g only 38 percent of the population. Sixty-two percent of the Dutch popu-l a t i o n i s Protestant or non-religious. Much more s i g n i f i c a n t f o r compara-t i v e purposes i s the case of Switzerland. There the Catholic population, 40 percent of the t o t a l population, i s i n a minority s i t u a t i o n s i m i l a r to that of Dutch C a t h o l i c s . 6 The Swiss Catholic party has a record of s t a b i l i t y which more or less matches that of the KVP. However, the Swiss Catholic vote has remained stable through 1971 while the vote for the KVP drops o f f r a p i d l y between 1967 and 1972. No more than 50 percent of Swiss Catholics voted for t h e i r party which i s considerably less than the proportion i n the Netherlands. 7 Probably the best example with which to compare the Dutch Catholic vote i s the Catholic vote f o r the German Catholic Centre party during the Weimar republic (1918-1933). Conditions were very s i m i l a r to conditions i n the Netherlands. There was a d i r e c t proportional e l e c t o r a l system and the r a t i o of Catholics to the rest of the population was v i r t u a l l y the same.8 The Centre party was very stable i n i t s voting support from 1920 ri g h t up to the end of the Weimar republic i n 1933, obtaining from 11.2 to 12.2 percent of the popular vote. 9 There was v i r t u a l l y no decline i n i t s vote even during those f a t a l years of c r i s i s i n the early 1930s. Yet the Centre party never did obtain more than 40 percent of the Catholic 7 vote, much lower than i n the case of the Dutch Catholic party i n both post-war and pre-war t i m e s . 1 0 By most standards the case of the Dutch Catholic party i s unique. How does one go about e x p l i c a t i n g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r pattern of voting s t a b i l i t y and then sudden decline? Why did such a high proportion of Dutch Catholics vote f o r the Catholic party? Why did the Catholic vote suddenly drop? In providing answers to these questions there are two competing explanatory frameworks a v a i l a b l e , the party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and subcultural influence models. Party Identification. Undoubtedly the most sophisticated and voluminous l i t e r a t u r e on e l e c t o r a l s t a b i l i t y and change i s concerned with what i s generally r e f e r r e d to as "party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . " In the early 1950s at the University of Michigan, researchers were confronted by what appeared to be the unusual s t a b i l i t y of American voters i n t h e i r party preference e l e c t i o n a f t e r e l e c t i o n . Some of the e a r l i e r voting studies by Lazarsfeld et al. had assumed the existence of some sort of decision-making on the part of voters i n the few weeks before the e l e c t i o n . 1 1 They were quickly disabused of t h i s assumption when they discovered that few voters consciously a r r i v e d at a decision s h o r t l y before the e l e c t i o n and only a small minority diverged from t h e i r party choice at the time of the previous e l e c t i o n . To account f o r t h i s s t a b i l i t y i n voting behaviour Campbell et al. at the Uni v e r s i t y of Michigan developed the soci a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l notion of " p a r t y - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " or " p a r t i s a n s h i p . 1 , 1 2 According to t h i s model i n d i v i d u a l s are s o c i a l i z e d into t h i s " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " by t h e i r parents. Upon reaching voting age there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y that young adults may 8 defect from t h e i r parental p a r t y - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . But once voters have s e t t l e d down to a p a r t i c u l a r party choice over a number of e l e c t i o n s , t h e i r l o y a l t y to that party tends to harden. Once t h i s stage i s reached, party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s considered to be a potent independent v a r i a b l e . On occasion voters may deviate and vote for another party but t h e i r party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i l l tend to act as a homing device to draw them back i n future e l e c t i o n s . The party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n model has been applied to countries other than the United States, l a r g e l y i n order to explain the s t a b i l i t y or i n s t a b i l i t y of party systems. According to researchers, the extent to which voters i n a given population have developed l o y a l t i e s to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s determines how muted p o l i t i c a l change w i l l be and whether or not " f l a s h p a r t i e s " w i l l a r i s e . Thus Dennis and McCrone claim: "Party system s t a b i l i t y , i n the sense of a p e r s i s t i n g configuration of organized partisan competition, i s a function of how widely rooted i n mass public consciousness i s the sense of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the p a r t i e s . " 1 3 Long term party system s t a b i l i t y , where i t does e x i s t , i s accounted for not only by party l o y a l t i e s on the part of current generations but also by the f a c t that these l o y a l t i e s w i l l be transmitted and imparted to future generations. Long term e l e c t o r a l change i s often explained as being due to the growth and decline of the d i f f e r e n t blocs of party i d e n t i f i e r s because of d i f f e r e n t rates of fecundity, mortality and s o c i a l i z a t i o n . The best example of the party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n approach to change can be found i n Butler and Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change in Britain.11* They argue, for example, that the r e s u l t s of the 1964 B r i t i s h general e l e c t i o n can be explained not by the defection of supporters from one party to another but by the growth of the working-class, the majority of workers 9 being Labour supporters, and the decline of the Conservative support base (the Tory support base being older, many Tory supporters dropped out of the e l e c t o r a t e ) . Butler and Stokes allow that cataclysmic events, such as war or severe economic depression, may a l t e r the basis of party alignment and lead to the development of new party l o y a l t i e s among v o t e r s . 1 5 However, even i n such instances Butler and Stokes claim there i s a very close connec-t i o n between the renewal of the electorate (through the entrance of new voters and the death of older voters) and changes i n party alignment. A voter i s most susceptible to change when he i s young while the older "partisan" voter i s much less responsive to change when new grounds for party cleavage develop. Thus i t may take many years before a change i n alignment i s f u l l y r e f l e c t e d i n party support. 1 6 In the case of the Netherlands before 1967 the vote for the KVP was e s p e c i a l l y stable. Voters by c o n s i s t e n t l y voting for the same party undoubtedly developed strong party l o y a l t i e s , or so one would expect i n terms of the Michigan model. A number of students of Dutch p o l i t i c s state that high proportions of strong party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s provided a firm prop for the old party alignment during t h i s p e r i o d . 1 7 I f so, the rapid drop-ping o f f of the KVP vote in the three elections subsequent to 1963 i s somewhat s u r p r i s i n g . During the 1963-72 period the s i z e of the Catholic population (the natural base of the KVP), declined only marginally. Table 1.2 shows Catholi c support f o r the KVP among the d i f f e r e n t age groups. In terms of the party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n model, even i f one assumes severe d i s c o n t i n u i t y i n the transmission of KVP partisanship to younger Catholics, i t i s obvious that many older Catholics must have abandoned t h e i r party l o y a l t i e s , since i n 1963 85 percent of a l l Catholics voted KVP. 10 Table.1.2 Percentage of Catholics P r e f e r r i n g KVP by Age, 1970 Age 65+ 50-64 35-49 25-34 21-24 Overall KVP 76.1% 65.4% 59.8% 48.6% 31.0% 57.2% N = 67 127 179 148 58 579 Source: 1970 Dutch e l e c t i o n survey ( p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s ) . Respondents were asked how they would vote i f national e l e c t i o n were held. What evidence i s there for the claim that the Netherlands, during the period of party system s t a b i l i t y , enjoyed high l e v e l s of party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ? In the main, these high l e v e l s have been i n f e r r e d on the basis of responses to a survey question asking what party the respondent supported. 1 8 Yet even i f there had been a more d i r e c t measure of party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , there i s a problem of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . For example, Campbell and Valen, i n t h e i r examination of Norwegian voting behaviour, wonder whether party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n did have an independent e f f e c t : "The Norwegian labour union member who i s a member of the Labour Party may display a strong party attachment, but one wonders i f t h i s does not merely express i n d i f f e r e n t form hi s basic i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the working-c l a s s . " 1 9 On the whole, the party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n model i s not very s a t i s f a c t o r y . It does not provide an adequate framework for explaining e l e c t o r a l s t a b i l i t y and decline among Dutch Catholics. Subcultural Influence. Recently P h i l l i p s Shively r a i s e d doubts about the party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n model s i m i l a r to those of Campbell and 11 V a l e n . 2 0 However, he went one step further and developed an a l t e r n a t i v e framework, the subcultural influence model, to explain e l e c t o r a l s t a b i l i t y and e l e c t o r a l change. He used the case of the Weimar republic i n the inter-war period i n Germany to test h i s argument. Shively argues that large blocs of voters, whom one would have expected to be unstable i n t h e i r voting behaviour, for example women who had only just obtained the ri g h t to vote i n Weimar Germany, were i n fact just as stable i n t h e i r voting behaviour as those who would have had ample opportunity to develop party l o y a l t i e s , f or example male Protestant voters. In the l a t e r Weimar period, 1928-33, when there was a surge of support for the Nazi party, Shively notes, ". . . those groups which added dispropor-t i o n a t e l y to the Nazi gains i n the early ' t h i r t i e s were the ones that had been r e l a t i v e l y stable i n the more "normal" elections of the mid-1 t w e n t i e s . " 2 1 On the basis of his analysis of voting behaviour i n Weimar Germany Shively makes the following propositions: I f the s o c i a l or economic c o n f l i c t s i n which a voter i s involved are s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r ; and i f the p o s i t i o n of p a r t i e s or groups of p a r t i e s with regard to these c o n f l i c t s i s s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r ; then there i s no need for the voter to develop l a s t i n g t i e s to any party 'per se' and he w i l l not do so. . . . [A] voter who i s a member of a clear and d i s t i n c t s o c i a l or economic group, for which he f e e l s that some party or group of pa r t i e s i s the cl e a r spokesman—a Catholic i n the Weimar Republic, for instance, or a Welsh miner—may not need a further guide i n voting. Since h i s s o c i a l and economic p o s i t i o n , coupled with the linkage of some party(ies) to that p o s i t i o n , provides him with s u f f i c i e n t voting cues, he does not need to i d e n t i f y d i r e c t l y with 2 2 a party. Shively's propositions could be applied to the Netherlands with regard to party system s t a b i l i t y before 1967. In terms of t h i s model, one can see the Dutch KVP supporter as a conscientious Catholic who perceives the KVP as the only party which properly represents the i n t e r e s t s 12 of the Catholic subculture. The bond between the Catholic and h i s Church would be quite strong while the bond between the Catholic and the KVP would be an instrumental one at best. In general, Shively's model i s quite a t t r a c t i v e , although there are several points that need to be c l a r i f i e d . For example, from where would a voter, as a member of a p a r t i c u l a r subculture, receive h i s cues to vote for a p a r t i c u l a r party? Would these cues derive from the voter's own evaluation of the s i t u a t i o n , from neighbours, union leaders, r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t i e s ? The largest d i f f i c u l t y i n Shively's model, however, stems from his explanation of e l e c t o r a l change. In terms of the model as applied to Weimar Germany, e l e c t o r a l change occurs when an a l t e r n a t i v e party moves i n and s u c c e s s f u l l y competes for the vote of a p a r t i c u l a r bloc. The new party i s seen by voters as being able to represent better the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r subculture. The subcultural blocs themselves do not change. Unfortunately, with respect to the Netherlands, Shively's model cannot r e a l l y be used to explain party system i n s t a b i l i t y i n the post 1963 period. P a r t i c u l a r l y , i t cannot be used to explain the decline i n the KVP vote. In the case of the Catholic bloc or p i l l a r 2 3 i n the Netherlands no a l t e r n a t i v e Catholic party has s u c c e s s f u l l y moved i n . 2 1 * Moreover, most commentators focus on the theme that the Catholic p i l l a r i n the Netherlands, with i t s 'cradle to the grave' organizations, i s undergoing a process of decay or " d e p i l l a r i z a t i o n . " 2 5 For Shively's examination of voting i n Weimar Germany, i t was s u f f i c i e n t to assume subcultural cohesion. In t h i s study, however, the cohesiveness of the Dutch Catholic subculture cannot be simply assumed. What needs to be explained i s the unusual degree of cohesion on the part 13 of the Dutch Catholic subculture. This requires a s p e c i a l focus on those fa c t o r s making f o r subcultural cohesion. Secondly, i t w i l l be argued that i t was a change i n those factors which resulted i n the transformation of the Dutch Catholic subculture into a much less cohesive body which i n turn r e s u l t e d i n the decline of the KVP vote. Subcultural Cohesion. The subcultural influence model i s c l e a r l y the most a t t r a c t i v e for the purpose of e x p l i c a t i n g the case of the Dutch Catholic party. But what are the factors making for subcultural cohesion i n the Netherlands? Some of the more prominent writers on subcultures i n Western Europe, for example L i j p h a r t , Lorwin and Roth, a l l argue the importance of ideology both as a source of authority and as a means of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a bloc from other blocs and society as a whole. 2 6 Secondly, they suggest that organizations, and the e l i t e s operating them, are important i n i n s u l a t i n g the members of a bloc from outside i n f l u e n c e s . 2 7 A t h i r d set of factors mentioned r e l a t e s to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the c l i e n t e l e . The willingness of the rank-and-file to comply with d i r e c t i o n s , the degree to which they accept the tenets of the ideology, and the type of benefits they receive are a l l factors which are important i n accounting f o r the v i a b i l i t y of a s u b c u l t u r e . 2 8 In the f i r s t part of the study, I w i l l focus on these three sets of f a c t o r s . The ideology of Dutch Catholicism w i l l be examined, p a r t i c u -l a r l y with regard to the way i t was used by the Church a u t h o r i t i e s . Secondly, I w i l l show that an extensive range of i n s t i t u t i o n s , operated by a w i l l i n g c l e r i c a l and lay leadership, helped insulate Catholics from the outside world. Equally important these i n s t i t u t i o n s , as well as the Church i t s e l f , provided an adequate range of benefits and services, both 14 s p i r i t u a l and economic, allowing the Catholic subculture to remain competitive with other blocs i n Dutch society and preventing the a l i e n a -t i o n of large numbers of Catholics from the Church. I w i l l discuss s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the c l i e n t e l e , such as the low l e v e l of education among Cat h o l i c s , which f a c i l i t a t e d s o c i a l control by the Church. The successful e f f o r t s of Church a u t h o r i t i e s w i l l also be rela t e d to the larger p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic context. The timing and slow pace of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n the Netherlands provided Dutch clergy with the opportunity to pre-empt the s o c i a l i s t s i n organizing Catholic workers. The rule of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y in disbursing state funds permitted the Catholic subculture to set up i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e the Catholic Radio Broadcasting Organization and the Catholic University to further insulate the membership from outside influences. As well, the r o l e of the Catholic party w i l l be discussed. The Catholic party, and i t s support base, was pr i m a r i l y a function rather than a cause of subcultural cohesion. Yet the party did make a contribu-t i o n to the well being of the Catholic bloc by acting as a bridge between c o n f l i c t i n g elements within the bloc and as a point of communication with the outside world. The l a t t e r part of the study focusses on the changes within the Catholic subculture which occurred during the 1960s and the impact of these d r a s t i c changes on the Catholic party and the voting behaviour of Catholics. 15 FOOTNOTES Jean Laponce notes: "[The] Catholics of the Netherlands merit some attention. They are unique, i n the states of Western Europe, i n having a party with a r e l i g i o u s basis which a t t r a c t s a l l the votes of the members of that r e l i g i o n . . . . Because the proportion of Catholics to the t o t a l population i s 35%, the r a t i o of communal support i s close to 90%. This indicates a p o l i t i c a l cohesion compar-able to that of the more u n i f i e d r a c i a l groups. No other C a t h o l i c party i n Europe o f f e r s a s i m i l a r example." J. Laponce, The Protection of Minorities (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1960), p. 139. Before 1918 a d i f f e r e n t e l e c t o r a l system based on two member d i s t r i c t s was i n operation which provided a d i f f e r e n t set of incentives for e l e c t o r a l m obilization. Thus i n the north and west where Catholics were i n a minority, Catholics threw t h e i r support f i r s t behind the L i b e r a l s and l a t e r the Anti-Revolutionaries ( C a l v i n i s t s ) . This s t i l l i ndicates a high degree of control on the part of the clergy and Catholic p o l i t i c a l organizations. See H. Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition i n a Segmented Society," i n R. Dahl (Ed.), P o l i t i c a l Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 204; J . Verhoef, " K i e s s t e l s e l s en p o l i t i e k e samenwerking i n Nederland, 1888-1917," Acta P o l i t i c a , Vol. VI, No. 3 (July 1971), pp. 261-268. Laponce, p. 139. In the case of I t a l y , Hazelrigg notes that less than h a l f the popula-ti o n could be c a l l e d e i t h e r a moderate or s t r i c t Catholic. L. Hazel-r i g g , "Religious and Class Bases of P o l i t i c a l C o n f l i c t i n I t a l y , " American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 75, No. 4, Part I (January 1970), p. 502. Ibid., p. 502; S. Wolinetz, "Party Re-alignment in the Netherlands," Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , Yale U n i v e r s i t y , 1973, p. 97. It i s worth noting that 89 percent of Dutch Catholics f e l l into the "regular mass attendance" category i n 1956. Annuaire Statique de la Suisse 1965 (Bale: Bureau Federal de Statique, 1965), p. 41. Ibid., p. 41. R. Morsey, Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei, 1917-1923 (Diisseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1966), pp. 11-25. T. Mackie and R. Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History (London: MacMillan, 1974), p. 157. Laponce, pp. 154-155. 16 1 1 P. Lazarsfeld et al., The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944). 1 2 A. Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). 1 9 J . Dennis and D. McCrone, "Pre-Adult Development of P o l i t i c a l Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n Western Democracies," Comparative P o l i t i c a l Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (July 1970), p. 247; see also P. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan S t a b i l i t y , " Comparative P o l i t i c a l Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July 1969), pp. 141-142. l h D. Butler and D. Stokes, P o l i t i c a l Change in Britain (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971). 1 5 Ibid., p. 17. 1 6 Ibid., p. 18. 1 7 E. van T h i j n , " K r i t i s c h e Kanttekeningen b i j een Trek naar Rechts," Sociologische Gids, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1963), p. 239; Wolinetz, pp. 85, 111. Wolinetz states that both "party and subcultural i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s were strong factors i n the Netherlands" (p. I l l , f n. 1). It could be that Wolinetz i s r e f e r r i n g to d i f f e r e n t subpopulations, some having strong party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s , others subcultural i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . I would argue, however, that at the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l i t i s not possible to have both. Furthermore, i f party i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s seen as a function of subcultural i d e n t i f i c a t i o n then t h i s would considerably reduce the status of the former as an independent v a r i a b l e . At best i t can only be seen as an intervening v a r i a b l e . For further discussion of the problem, see D. Robinson, "Surrogates for Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n the Rational Choice Framework," i n I. Budge, I. Crewe and D. F a r l i e (Eds.), Party Identification and Beyond (London: Wiley, 1976), pp. 365-382; K. MacCorquodale and P. Meehl, "On a D i s t i n c t i o n between Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables," Psychological Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 1948), pp. 95-107. 1 8 Wolinetz, p. 90. 1 9 A. Campbell and H. Valen, "Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n Norway and the U.S.," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1961), p. 57. 2 0 W. Shively, "Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , Party Choice, and Voting S t a b i l i t y : The Weimar Case," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 4 (December 1972), pp. 1203-1225. 2 1 Ibid., p. 1214. 2 2 Ibid., p. 1222. 2 3 I am using the term p i l l a r i n the sense that L i j p h a r t and Rogowski use the term. According to Rogowski, "In any highly s t r a t i f i e d society, a f a c t i o n that contains members of every stratum in. rough proportion to t h e i r respective f r a c t i o n s of the t o t a l population of the society w i l l 17 be ca l l e d a p i l l a r . " R. Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1974), p. 102; see also A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1968), passim. 2 l f A new party which appeared i n 1972, called the "Roman Catholic Party of the Netherlands" (RKPN), received only .9 percent of the t o t a l vote. Another new party, the "Party of P o l i t i c a l Radicals" (PPR), contains a number of ex-KVP'ers as well as former members of the Anti-Revolutionary Party. It has attracted some of the Catholic vote but i t has not done so on an e x p l i c i t l y r e l i g i o u s basis. 2 5 For an overview of t h i s theme concerning the Netherlands as well as other countries see: V. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and P o l i t i c a l Cohesion i n the Smaller European Democracies," Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 1971), p. 163ff. 2 6 L i j p h a r t , pp. 16-18; Lorwin, pp. 141-144; G. Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany: A Study in Working-Class I s o l a t i o n and National Integration (Totowa: Bedminster, 1963), pp. 11-12. See also S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments," i n Lipset and Rokkan (Eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64. 2 7 Lijphart, pp. 36-58; Lorwin, pp. 153-156. 2 8 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). Chapter II THE DUTCH CATHOLIC SUBCULTURE: ETHNICITY, IDEOLOGY, ORGANIZATION AND CLIENTELE Several writers on West European politics have stressed the importance of subcultures as factors in structuring political behaviour.1 In what ways are subcultures important? How did they come to play such a role? In this chapter I will show that in the Netherlands the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church and lay Catholic leaders were largely responsible for the creation of a highly insular and cohesive miniature society involving virtually a l l Catholics residing within the Netherlands. The existence of this miniature society resulted in a high degree of uniformity in the behaviour of Dutch Catholics. Prior to the changes in the 1960s,Dutch Catholics rigorously followed prescribed norms of behaviour. Interfaith marriages were virtually non-existent.2 Catholics not only attended mass and confession regularly but also limited their reading to Catholic newspapers and periodicals, joined Catholic trade unions i f they were workers, joined the Catholic employer federation i f they owned or operated large commercial enterprises, and joined the Catholic middle-class organization i f they were shop-keepers or small businessmen.3 And at election time the vast majority of Catholics voted for the Catholic party. The Catholic subculture, however, never was, and is not presently, primarily political in nature. The main purpose in the insulation of Catholics from the rest of Dutch society prior to 1963 was to protect the 18 19 core values of the Catholic community, values which were s p i r i t u a l and s o c i a l rather than p o l i t i c a l i n nature. The s p i r i t u a l and s o c i a l cohesiveness of Dutch Catholics had p o l i t i c a l implications i n s o f a r as t h i s greatly f a c i l i t a t e d the mobilization of Catholics behind the C a t h o l i c party. And, as w i l l be shown i n the subsequent chapter, the C a t h o l i c party did help i n maintaining s p i r i t u a l and s o c i a l unity among Cat h o l i c s . Nevertheless, i t was the Church which was mainly responsible for the maintenance of t h i s unity, and, therefore, an examination of i t s r o l e w i l l be the primary focus of t h i s chapter. Before beginning to probe the nature of the Dutch Catholic sub-culture one should ask more s p e c i f i c a l l y , what i s a subculture? What are the factors that make for subcultural cohesion? Unfortunately the term subculture has not been well defined. People have attached d i f f e r e n t meanings to i t . At the same time i t i s possible to discern at least two and perhaps three basic conceptions of the term. Guenther Roth, i n h i s study of the Social Democratic Party i n Imperial Germany, i s an example of someone who uses the organizational concept of subculture. 1* He r e f e r s to an e n t i t y c a l l e d the S o c i a l Democratic subculture which for Roth was p o l i t i c a l i n nature, consciously created by German labour leaders through organization. It encompassed a large proportion of the German working-class, but i t was not i d e n t i c a l to the German working-class as a whole. Rather, i n terms of membership, i t formed a subset of the German working-class. Individual choice on the part of p a r t i c i p a n t s and organization are seen as the basic elements of such a subculture. As well organization i s seen as the major factor making for subcultural cohesion. A d i f f e r e n t notion of subculture i s often used by those studying 20 developing countries, f o r example J . S. F u r n i v a l l on Indonesia and M. G. Smith on the Carribean. 5 These analysts focus mainly on c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s common to a group of people, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as race, language, r e l i g i o n or "primordial sentiments" which serve to impart a sense of i d e n t i t y to the members of the group and to demarcate them from other groups i n society. In such a case the basis f o r subcultural cohesion i s e t h n i c i t y , not organization. Which conception of subculture i s most appropriate f o r analyzing the Dutch Catholic bloc? Val Lorwin, i n his important a r t i c l e on segmental pluralism, argues that the l a t t e r notion of subculture, that i s one seeing race or caste as important elements, i s not appropriate for analyzing most segments or 'families s p i r i t u e l l e s ' i n Western Europe. 6 He points out that membership i n such segments i s , i n theory at any rate, voluntary. People i n Western Europe are not permanently marked by stigmata such as race or caste. The lack of such stigmata make opting out of a subculture r e l a t i v e l y easy, at least compared with the type of subcultures which e x i s t i n many developing s o c i e t i e s . Lorwin admits that i n countries l i k e A u s t r i a or the Netherlands there are some conversion costs involved i f an in d i v i d u a l decides to switch from the Catholic subculture to the s o c i a l i s t subculture,but such a conversion i s not impossible. In a country such as Malaysia i t would be v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r a Malay to drop his a f f i l i a t i o n with the Malay community and become a member of the Chinese community. Lorwin's point i s that a West European subculture such as the Catholic bloc i n the Netherlands, based on organization, i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from an ethnic bloc i n a developing society. This i s not i n dispute. Nevertheless, there are instances i n the West European context, and to some extent the North American context as we l l , 21 where one does speak of a working-class subculture or a middle-class subculture. And i n doing so one does not imply that such a subculture has a defined leadership or organization. At the same time, stigmata such as race are not n e c e s s a r i l y present. Yet Richard Hoggart and Richard Hamilton, for example, r e f e r to the unique and d i s t i n c t i v e c u l t u r a l patterns of workers which help set them apart from the rest of s o c i e t y . 7 Furthermore, they do not see the working-class subculture as a whole as being i d e n t i c a l to the organized working-class. P h i l l i p s Shively also seems to use the concept of subculture i n t h i s sense. For Shively subcultural blocs i n Weimar Germany consisted of aggregates of i n d i v i d u a l s who had c e r t a i n charac-t e r i s t i c s i n common. They were workers or Protestants or Catholics. He imputed to these blocs c e r t a i n economic and c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s but not ne c e s s a r i l y o rganization. 8 In t h i s chapter I w i l l document that the organizational structures developed by the Catholic Church i n the Netherlands were c r u c i a l i n i n s u l a -t i n g Catholics from the rest of Dutch society. However, these organizations did not become f u l l y developed u n t i l shortly a f t e r World War I. And p r i o r to 1853 the Dutch Church did not even have an e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy i n place. Yet one can s t i l l speak of a Catholic subculture i n the period of the mid sixteenth century to the early twentieth century: Dutch Catholics formed a community and were conscious of having a unique i d e n t i t y . Basic stigmatic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s were of minimal importance i n accounting for the cohesion of Dutch Catholics. But t h i s does not mean that these ch a r a c t e r i s -t i c s were t o t a l l y absent. And i n the post 1963 period, to be discussed i n chapter IV, when pressure from the Church was relaxed, one can s t i l l t a l k of 22 a C a t h o l i c c u l t u r e which i s d i s t i n c t from one a c t i v e l y fostered through organization. Thus the term subculture or bloc with respect to Dutch C a t h o l i c s w i l l be used i n the wider sense of the term, that i s i t w i l l r e f e r to a group of people having c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common, shared symbols, r i t u a l s and the l i k e but not n e c e s s a r i l y i n s t i t u t i o n s . This helps to f a c i l i t a t e comparison with other blocs both within and without the Netherlands. 9 Thus by r e f e r r i n g to the Ca t h o l i c bloc i n Germany, the Netherlands or Switzerland I am r e f e r r i n g to a l l i n d i v i d u a l s who are Ca t h o l i c and not to a subset of Ca t h o l i c s who may be organized within p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s . The organization of the remainder of t h i s chapter i s as follows: The f i r s t part w i l l examine b r i e f l y the ethnic dimension of Dutch Catholicism to see i f r a c i a l , l i n g u i s t i c or l i f e s t y l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s may have played a r o l e i n demarcating the Catholi c bloc from the re s t of Dutch so c i e t y . The bulk of the chapter, however, w i l l focus on the i d e o l o g i c a l and orga n i z a t i o n a l dimensions and the socio-economic charac-t e r i s t i c s of the c l i e n t e l e . The emphasis w i l l be p r i m a r i l y on the period 1918 to 1963, the period generally considered to be the zenith of the Dutch C a t h o l i c subculture i n terms of cohesiveness and c u l t u r a l d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s . Through nec e s s i t y , however, reference w i l l be made to e a r l i e r eras with regard to the development of ideology and the beginnings of organizational l i f e . ' 23 1. THE ETHNIC DIMENSION We often f i n d that subcultures, e s p e c i a l l y those with ghetto l i k e q u a l i t i e s , are based on d i s t i n c t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as race or language. And often a series of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as language, race and r e l i g i o n r e i n f o r c e each other to provide a basis for the d i v i s i o n of s o c i e t i e s into separate groups. 1 0 Such objective c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are usually highly i n t e r r e l a t e d and produce, or are associated with, a c o n s t e l l a t i o n of shared c u l t u r a l elements. People belonging to such a subculture are usually said to have t h e i r own ethos and unique customs, habits and r i t u a l s . These elements make for what i s sometimes referred to as e t h n i c i t y . This i s usually thought of as being subjective but has the objective e f f e c t of further d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a subculture from other subcultures or from the dominant culture i n a society. E t h n i c i t y imparts to an i n d i v i d u a l a sense of i d e n t i t y , a sense of belonging to a p a r t i c u l a r group. To what extent was the Catholic subculture i n the Netherlands based on or reinfo r c e d by factors such as race, language or even t e r r i -tory? A review of some of the basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Dutch Catholic population suggests that beyond the r e l i g i o u s factor, r a c i a l , l i n g u i s t i c and ethnic f a c t o r s , serve only i n a lim i t e d way to help demarcate the Catholic subculture from the other blocs i n Dutch society. The Catholic population has usually constituted from 35 to 40 percent of the t o t a l Dutch population. Approximately 45 percent of the Catholic population resides i n the two southern most provinces of North Brabant and Limburg (see appendix I ) . Both provinces have always been at least 95 percent C a t h o l i c . 1 1 As well the southern part of the province of Gelderland, the province just above Limburg, i s l a r g e l y 24 Catholic. This part of Gelderland along with a l l of Limburg and North Brabant i s usually r e f e r r e d to as the area below the r i v e r s . Thus less than h a l f the Catholic population resides i n t h i s homogeneous Catholic region. The r e s t are dispersed i n the northern section of the Netherlands where, with the exception of several v i l l a g e s and a number of towns, Catholics are i n a d i s t i n c t minority p o s i t i o n . For example 23 percent of the population of Amsterdam, 21 percent of Rotterdam and 29 percent of the Hague i s C a t h o l i c . 1 2 Within these non-Southern c i t i e s and towns there are v i r t u a l l y no areas which could be referred to as Catholic ghettoes. Catholics i n these c i t i e s have always l i v e d side by side with Protestants, s o c i a l i s t s and the l i k e . As w i l l be discussed l a t e r , contextual factors such as amount of Catholic concen-t r a t i o n ( i . e . whether Catholics are i n a minority or majority i n a given area), region and urbanization do have some e f f e c t on the degree of l o y a l t y by Catholics to the subculture. However, i t i s worth noting that Catholics are by no means segregated within t h e i r own t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s . There i s no evidence that race i s an important factor. Some attempts have been made to categorize Catholics from the south as being from a l p i n i c stock while people in the north are said to be from nordic s t o c k . 1 3 However attempts to v e r i f y t h i s have not been s u c c e s s f u l . l l f The same i s true of theories which attempted to r e l a t e Catholicism to those of C e l t i c stock. I f these patterns have ever existed migration over the centuries would have blurred them considerably. This was e s p e c i a l l y true around the turn of the century when thousands of Catholics from North Brabant migrated to Rotterdam, many of them ceasing to regard themselves as Catholic. More importantly, there i s no evidence that the Dutch people use physical stereotypes as a guide to pinpointing the 25 r e l i g i o u s persuasions of t h e i r fellow c i t i z e n s . What about language? The Netherlands i s b a s i c a l l y a u n i l i n g u a l nation. There i s an ancient regional language c a l l e d F r i s i a n spoken mainly by people i n the province of F r i e s l a n d . They constitute only a small proportion of the t o t a l population and among them are very few Catholics. There are a number of regional d i a l e c t s which contrast some-what with what i s formally known as "Universal C i v i l i z e d Dutch," the o f f i c i a l Dutch taught i n schools and based p r i m a r i l y on the Dutch spoken i n the provinces of North and South Holland. People from the south can usually be i d e n t i f i e d by t h e i r speech. E s p e c i a l l y people i n the southern part of Limburg have an intonation which i s quite akin to German. And generally people from any part of the south can be i d e n t i f i e d by t h e i r pronunciation of the l e t t e r "g". In the northern part of the Netherlands i t i s made to sound quite harsh while i n the south i t i s pronounced i n a much s o f t e r , gentler fashion. However t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c does not apply to Catholics l i v i n g outside of the south and thus i s not a general i d e n t i f y i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the majority of C a t h o l i c s . 1 5 Generally a l l Catholics are said to be more prone to use c e r t a i n types of greetings and i d i o m s . 1 6 However these are r e l a t i v e l y minor var i a t i o n s on the Dutch language. The o v e r a l l differences i n language between Catholics and non-Catholics c e r t a i n l y would not act as an impediment to communication nor i n themselves would they act to demarcate and insulate the Catholic population from the rest of Dutch society. The idea of a subculture often implies that i t s members have d i s t i n c t i v e r i t u a l s , habits, a unique music and l i t e r a t u r e beyond those d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the r e l i g i o u s factor. To what extent i s or was t h i s true of the Dutch Catholic subculture? There i s some evidence that there 26 are differences between Catholics and t h e i r fellow Dutchmen on t h i s dimension. As noted Catholics tend to use c e r t a i n idiomatic expressions and ways of pronunciation. But t h i s i n i t s e l f would not have constituted a d i s t i n c t i v e c u l t u r a l s t y l e although the Dutch h i s t o r i a n I. Schoffer argues that before the second world war these differences were more pronounced even for Catholics l i v i n g outside of the s o u t h . 1 7 In the early 1950s a team of researchers under the d i r e c t i o n of I. Gadourek did an intensive case study of a Dutch v i l l a g e named Sassenheim. 1 8 They noted that i n t h i s v i l l a g e Catholic children learned d i f f e r e n t rhymes and verses compared to Protestant c h i l d r e n . In terms of r e c r e a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s they discovered that Catholics tended to favour pianos as opposed to the organs favoured by Protestants. It appears, however, that the c i t i z e n s of Sassenheim were rather indiscriminate i n t h e i r radio l i s t e n i n g habits. Although radio broadcasting i s divided along r e l i g i o u s l i n e s , and u n t i l 1965 i t was o f f i c i a l l y forbidden for Catholics to l i s t e n to s o c i a l i s t radio programs, both Catholics and non-Catholics often ignored these d i v i s i o n s . Most preferred l i g h t music and would switch to the s t a t i o n o f f e r i n g i t at the time, regardless of the r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n of that s t a t i o n . One expects any subculture to have i t s own d i s t i n c t i v e l i t e r a r y t r a d i t i o n . For example Richard Hoggart i n his The Uses of Literacy notes that t h i s i s the case of the B r i t i s h working-class. 1 9 However t h i s i s only p a r t i a l l y true for the Dutch Catholic subculture. The period between the two world wars, an era i n Dutch Catholic h i s t o r y r e f e r r e d to as the epoch of the "Rich Roman L i f e , " 2 0 saw the production of a voluminous amount of Catholic l i t e r a t u r e , l i t e r a t u r e that played upon the sense of being Catholic and the Catholic ethos. However more talented Catholic poets and writers such as Anton van Duinkerken tended to offend the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of the Church a u t h o r i t i e s and as a r e s u l t the c i r c u l a t i o n of t h e i r work was rather c u r t a i l e d . More common fare for Catholics was a vast amount of pious l i t e r a t u r e of low q u a l i t y e x t o l l i n g the v i r t u e s of sainthood. Although Catholics were inundated by t h i s type of l i t e r a -ture, how much was a c t u a l l y consumed i s another q u e s t i o n . 2 1 During the inter-war period there were popular Catholic magazines such as the Catholic Illustrated. This p a r t i c u l a r magazine was f i l l e d with photographs of p r i e s t s , nuns and brothers celebrating t h e i r golden or diamond j u b i l e e or standing on the deck of an ocean l i n e r departing for distant lands to carry out t h e i r duties as missionaries. One p a r t i c u l a r feature was a large photograph of the "Roman family of the week" with captions such as "here we have the Jansen family with no less than 16 healthy c h i l d r e n . " Radio programs c a r r i e d by the Catholic Broadcasting Organization (KRO) propounded s i m i l a r themes. Generally the period of the Rich Roman L i f e was when Dutch Catholicism was most d i s t i n c t i v e i n terms of c u l t u r a l s p i r i t and elan. Against a background of processions, prayer sessions, retreats for young and old, most Catholics c e r t a i n l y f e l t themselves to be d i f f e r e n t from, and i n f a c t superior to, n o n - C a t h o l i c s . 2 2 In the post-World War II period much of the overwrought piousness had disappeared, at least the more pu b l i c manifestations of i t . Catholics were s t i l l exposed to large amounts of "approved" Catholic novels and magazines. However, Gadourek reports that i n Sassenheim both Catholics and Protestants tended to read the same popular novels. Catholic and Protestant women also tended to share tastes i n home-making magazines. 2 3 This f i n d i n g i s borne out by a 1956 nationwide survey c a r r i e d out by the 28 Dutch Central Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s . 2 1 * The survey asked respondents, among other things, which radio program guide and newspaper they subscribed to and the kind of novel they had last read ( i . e . whether the novel was Catholic, Protestant or neutral i n orientation). The results are shown i n Table 2.1. Although the various groups are r e l a t i v e l y segregated Table 2.1 Reading Preferences by Religion Moderate Orthodox Other No Catholic Protestant C a l v i n i s t Church Church (%) c%) (%) (%) (%) Radio Program Guide Catholic 89 1 - - 2 Protestant - 31 96 17 3 Neutral 10 68 4 81 93 Unspecified 1 1 - 2 1 100 N = (823) (797) (235) (97) (509) Daily Newspaper Catholic 79 1 1 1 1 Protestant - 8 58 7 -Neutral 13 87 26 87 96 R.C. + Protestant - - 2 - -R.C. + Neutral 7 1 - 1 1 Protestant + Neutral - 2 13 4 2 N = (1235) (1146) (300) (151) (712) Last Read Novel Catholic 16 5 3 5 6 Protestant 5 19 31 17 8 Neutral 79 77 66 78 85 N = (833) (858) (260) (130) (562) Source: Vrije-tijdsbesteding in Nederland Winter 1955/56 Deel 9 Centraal Bureau Voor de S t a t i s t i e k , p. 19. 29 with regard to which newspaper they read and which radio guide they subscribed to, these differences tend to disappear i n the case of reading material l i k e novels. In the Netherlands there are a number of popular images or stereo-types concerning the d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o u s groupings. C a l v i n i s t s are thought to be much more serious and soberminded than the less serious, fun loving Catholics. For example Dutch Catholics e s p e c i a l l y i n the south of the Netherlands, l i k e t h e i r brethren i n the more l a t i n countries, celebrate c a r n i v a l , a week long period of f e s t i v i t i e s i n the month of February. Gadourek discovered that the Catholics of Sassenheim did tend to indulge more i n card playing and dancing compared to t h e i r Protestant counterparts. These findings are again confirmed by the 1956 nationwide survey. Table 2.2 repeats the responses to questions asking whether or not the person engaged in a number of re c r e a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s . There are indeed a number of contrasts evident i n t h i s table, p a r t i c u l a r l y between Catholics and C a l v i n i s t s with regard to card playing, chess, dancing and spectating which may indicate differences i n l i f e s t y l e s . Nevertheless compared with the Dutch population as a whole Catholics do not d i f f e r that d r a s t i c a l l y . One cannot conclude from t h i s table that Catholics have a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t l i f e s t y l e . In terms of basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s such as race, language and e t h n i c i t y generally the Catholic population does not d i f f e r greatly from the rest of Dutch society. And the differences that do ex i s t would not by themselves support the development of a highly i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d subculture without the help of addit i o n a l f a c t o r s . With s l i g h t exaggera-t i o n one could say that the only obvious c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which serves to best d i s t i n g u i s h Catholics from non-Catholics has been, and s t i l l i s , the 30 fact that Catholics of both sexes wear their wedding ring on the l e f t hand while other Dutch people wear theirs on the right hand. Table 2.2 Recreational Activities by Religion (Percentages indicate proportion of respondents engaging in each activity) (Men Only) Recreation Catholics Protestants Calvinists Other Church No Church Total (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) Cards 71 51 21 33 65 57 Chess 15 16 24 20 21 18 Checkers 35 36 40 35 33 36 Dancing 33 20 5 9 28 24 Walking 6 7 8 8 6 7 Spectating at sports events 57 48 26 41 58 51 N = (697) (644) (182) (95) (393) (2016) Source: Vrije-tijdsbesteding in Nederland Winter 1955/56 Deel 9, Centraal Bureau Voor de S t a t i s t i e k , p. 13. Thus the ethnic dimension of Catholicism in the Netherlands is rather weak. It has been suggested, particularly by c r i t i c s , that many of the differences in culture and l i f e s t y l e between Catholics and others were the products of Church influence rather than manifestations of r a c i a l , linguistic or ethnic factors. It is the religious factor, in particular the Roman Catholic Church as an organizational force, which was obviously a major, i f not the major factor in creating and maintaining 31 subcultural cohesion. The Catholic Church with i t s h i e r a r c h i c a l structure and emphasis on the acceptance of c e n t r a l i z e d authority does appear to o f f e r an i d e a l format for creating subcultural cohesion. The formal elements of the Catholic "Weltanschauung" include the b e l i e f s that the Church represents God on earth, that s a l v a t i o n can be obtained only through the Church and that Papal authority i s absolute. Before the second Vatican council i n the 1960s the c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Roman Catholicism were that the b e l i e f s and doctrines of the Church were held to be absolutely true. For example, transubstantiation, the holy t r i n i t y , the c h a s t i t y of the V i r g i n Mary were believed to be l i t e r a l l y true and seen not merely as symbols. Other important features of Catholicism have included the stress placed on the unitary nature of the Church and the b e l i e f i n the importance of absolution i n order to be received by God i n a state of g r a c e . 2 6 It should not be thought that these basic features o f Catholic doctrine have always been accepted or f u l l y understood by both ordinary Catholics and c l e r i c s . Papal i n f a l l i b i l i t y has come under attack both within and without the Church. And there have been a number of movements to transform the teachings of the Church, the modernist movement i n France and Germany at the turn of the century to c i t e one example. 2 7 However i n the past most questioning of Church doctrine occurred within seminaries and u n i v e r s i t i e s . Rank-and-file C a t h o l i c s , although not f u l l y understanding or aware of many aspects of Catholic doctrine, nevertheless accepted the authority of the Church. J . Poeisz w r i t i n g about Dutch Catholics c i r c a 1958 noted that the good Dutch Catholic " . . . f a i t h f u l l y followed the d i r e c t i v e s for behaviour i n Church and society l a i d down by the Church. He asked no questions but simply did 32 what was expected of him. He had no specifically religious motives for his conduct. Normally his actions were motivated by an awareness that i t was his duty to live in accordance with the Church's expectations." 2 8 The Church has available a number of sanctions to back up i t s directives. In extreme cases those Catholics breaking the rules of the Church can be threatened with ex-communication. This involves not being allowed to take part in communion and being denied the holy sacraments. As well, the confessional can be used as a control mechanism. By being obliged to confess his sins to his parish priest the Catholic places himself in a position further obliging himself to the authority of the Church. The priest in turn is subject to control from his bishop and, through his bishop, from the pope. In the Netherlands the authority of the Church and the use of sanctions were used by the ecclesiastical hierarchy to isolate Dutch Catholics socially and p o l i t i c a l l y from the rest of Dutch society. Yet the Roman Catholic Church is a universal church. Its organization does not differ drastically from country to country. Why was the Church so effective in the Netherlands? To answer this question one has to look at the ideology of Dutch Catholicism and the particular way in which the authority and sanctions of the Church were used by Dutch bishops and clergy. 2, IDEOLOGY What is ideology? What function does i t serve? One writer has stated that ideology may be seen "as a systematic set of ideas with action consequences serving the purpose of creating and using organization." 2 9 33 As we s h a l l see the ideology of Dutch Catholicism was neither systematic nor l o g i c a l l y coherent; i t was often contradictory. In p a r t i c u l a r there were tensions between ultra-montane sentiments and b e l i e f s concerning the need for the p h y s i c a l s u r v i v a l of the Dutch Catholic minority within a society dominated by Protestants. Nor were these b e l i e f s always used d i r e c t l y f o r purposes of creating and using organization. Nevertheless, p a r t i c u l a r ideas or strands of ideas can be i d e n t i f i e d which had important consequences for the behaviour of Dutch Catholics. And i n the twentieth century these ideas became of paramount importance in the creation and usage of organization. The ideology p e c u l i a r to Dutch Catholicism i s far from simple. There are various elements within t h i s ideology; they have d i f f e r e n t sources yet at the same time are c l o s e l y i n t e r r e l a t e d ; there has been continuity yet the d i f f e r e n t elements have played a variable r o l e i n the d i f f e r e n t phases i n the h i s t o r y of Catholicism i n the Netherlands. To make sense of the aspects of the ideology p e c u l i a r to Dutch Catholicism I have developed three categories to deal with what I see are the three main aspects or elements of t h i s ideology. They are: (1) the i s o l a t i o n -i s t mentality r e s u l t i n g from the post-reformation period when Dutch Catholics had to go underground i n order to p r a c t i c e t h e i r r e l i g i o n ; (2) the emancipation ideology dating from when Catholics were l e g a l l y free to p r a c t i c e t h e i r r e l i g i o n and Rome had restored the Dutch hierarchy; and (3) the C a l v i n i s t p e n e t r a t i o n — t h i s concerns the b e l i e f s under-l y i n g the r i g i d adherence to the rules and regulations of the Church by Dutch Catholics which has been ascribed to the influence of Calvinism. 34 A d i s t i n c t i o n i s sometimes made between pure and p r a c t i c a l ideology. 3 0 In the case of Dutch Catholicism i t i s possible to see b e l i e f s i n the Holy T r i n i t y and the V i r g i n Mary as elements of pure ideology while the i s o l a t i o n i s t mentality, for example, can be seen as p r a c t i c a l ideology intended to protect and further these elements of pure ideology. In practice pure and p r a c t i c a l ideology are often interrelated and the d i s t i n c t i o n becomes d i f f i c u l t to maintain. In t h i s analysis the different elements of ideology w i l l be examined i n terms of how they developed i n r e l a t i o n to concrete h i s t o r i c a l circum-stance. The Isolationist Mentality. The reasons for the i s o l a t i o n i s t mentality of Dutch Catholics must be sought i n t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l experi-ence dating back to the time of the reformation. In the sixteenth century the Netherlands did not become Protestant as a result of a f i a t on the part of government authorities as i n the case of Sweden and England. Rather the a r r i v a l of Protestantism i n the Netherlands was i n t r i c a t e l y linked with the 80 Years War and the revolt of the Netherlands against Spanish r u l e . The Church sided with Spain. However, merchants i n large c i t i e s and several members of the n o b i l i t y who were influenced by the l i b e r t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n s of Erasmus feared the c e n t r a l i z i n g tendencies of the Church. They joined with more sectarian Protestant groups i n revolting against Spanish rule and the Church i n 1566. Calvinism, which previously was r e s t r i c t e d to lower and middle-class elements i n Dutch society, proved to be increasingly a t t r a c t i v e to the higher c l a s s e s . 3 1 Among the p r e c i p i t a t i n g factors which led to the revolt were the bad economic conditions, the introduction of new taxes by Spanish 35 a u t h o r i t i e s and the establishment of a new e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy by the Catholic Church. The P a c i f i c a t i o n of Ghent i n 1576 marked the begin-ning of a united Netherlands. By t h i s treaty the provinces of the Netherlands decided to j o i n t l y oust Spanish r u l e . At the same time they agreed to maintain the Catholic r e l i g i o n outside the provinces of Holland and Zeeland. The m i l i t a r y successes i n the Northern part of the Nether-lands brought about the co-operation of others previously i n a c t i v e who, perceiving a change i n the t i d e , joined the revolution. This led to the union of Utrecht i n 1597, a union of the Northern p r o v i n c e s . 3 2 Only about 5 percent of the population of the Netherlands could be considered to belong to the Reformed ( C a l v i n i s t ) Church before the r e v o l t s . However, Calvinism soon spread mainly because the emerging economic and p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s found i n Calvinism a more tolerant and p l u r a l i s t i c outlook which f i t t e d i n much better with t h e i r m e r c a n t i l i s t i c b e l i e f s than Catholicism. It was at t h i s stage that a more systematic attempt was made to convert Catholics i n the northern provinces. The p r a c t i c e of the Catholic r e l i g i o n was o f f i c i a l l y banned and Catholics were barred from holding public o f f i c e . Nevertheless large pockets of Catholicism remained. For example i n 1656 i n what i s now the province of North Holland 45 percent of the population was s t i l l C a t h o l i c . 3 3 Why these substantial blocs of the population remained l o y a l to the Catholic Church i s a question on which there i s considerable disagreement among h i s t o r i a n s . One explanation has i t that i n communities where there was a "worthy" p r i e s t , a p r i e s t who could command respect and l o y a l t y from h i s parishioners, the community remained l o y a l . 3 1 * Other explanations place more stress on the apparatus of the Church. Thus the h i s t o r i a n Rogier 36 notes that i n those areas where the Church's organization had been effect i v e and after the reformation had succeeded i n re-organizing i t s e l f , the population remained Catholic. This, according to Rogier, would explain the "Catholic s t r i p " along the coast of the current provinces of North and South Holland. 3 5 Another important variable, one stressed by the h i s t o r i a n Geyl, i s that of force. In certain places the magistrate would c a l l on the use of armed troops i n order to ensure the removal of the pr i e s t i n a local community.36 In one such community, for example, the priest was removed and banished to foreign parts yet succeeded i n returning and re-establishing himself. He was again f o r c i b l y removed and again he succeeded i n making his way back. The t h i r d time the magistrate f i n a l l y was successful and the priest did not return. The v i l l a g e r s , l e f t without s p i r i t u a l care, succumbed gradually to Calvinism with the exception of one or two families. In other places force was not used and the authorities would either be indifferent or depend upon the lo c a l C a l v i n i s t minister and the parish council to ensure conformity. Undoubtedly the variables discussed by different historians such as l o c a l leadership, Church organization and the use of force a l l played a role i n determining where Catholicism would survive. The important point to remember i s that pockets of Catholicism which did survive were i n a rather tenuous position. Catholics had no c i v i l rights and l e g a l l y p r i e s t s were subject to deportation. Catholic services were carried out i n hidden locations. At f i r s t these locations were private homes; l a t e r more elaborate permanent structures were b u i l t but s t i l l hidden. These were known as "underground churches" and often the i s o l a t i o n i s t mentality of Catholics i n the past has been referred to as the "under-37 ground church m e n t a l i t y . " 3 7 Given the d i s t r i b u t i o n of force i n the northern provinces the Church, p r i e s t s and i n d i v i d u a l Catholics were i n no p o s i t i o n to f i g h t back or indulge i n p r o s e l y t i z i n g a c t i v i t i e s . Instead they became highly introverted, nurturing a fervent hope that the Church would be f u l l y restored sometime i n the future and the wayward f a l l e n , namely the C a l v i n i s t s , would return to the f o l d . Their a t t i t u d e was characterized by considerable anxiety of the dominant non-believers, paired with a high l e v e l of i n t e r n a l intolerance with regard to deviant tendencies among t h e i r fellow C a t h o l i c s . 3 8 In t h i s atmosphere Catholicism c e r t a i n l y did not f l o u r i s h . lather the Church declined numerically as many of the weaker elements dropped o f f with the r e s u l t that only the more fervent p r i e s t s and t h e i r followers survived. Thus the Catholic population i n a l l the provinces of the Netherlands dropped from 47 percent i n 1656 to 34 percent i n 1726. V i r t u a l l y a l l of t h i s drop i s accounted for by the northern provinces. Thus i n what i s now the province of North Holland the percentage of Catholics i n t h i s period dropped from 45 percent to 20 p e r c e n t . 3 9 A f t e r the r e v o l t of the Netherlands, Rome suspended the C a t h o l i c hierarchy i n the Netherlands and the country reverted to the status of a mission ruled by a nuncio appointed by Rome. Leaders of the Dutch Church such as Sasbout and Rovenius during the Eighty Years War and l a t e r Neerkassel i n the second h a l f of the seventeenth century did much to ensure the s u r v i v a l of Catholicism i n the Netherlands. They re-organized the Church according to the p r i n c i p l e s of the counter-reformation yet at the same time steered a middle course when i t came to dealing with the a u t h o r i t i e s of the r e p u b l i c . Although Dutch Catholics remained true to 38 Rome to the best of t h e i r a b i l i t i e s , the Papal a u t h o r i t i e s themselves did not always reciprocate. In 1702 Codde, the immediate successor of Neerkassel, was suspended by Rome following charges of heresy i n v o l v i n g Jansenism. 1* 0 Three-quarters of the secular p r i e s t s (as opposed to those i n r e l i g i o u s orders) followed Codde and refused to recognize h i s successor De Cock. This led to the so- c a l l e d Schism of Utrecht 1* 1 which i n turn resulted i n what i s ref e r r e d to i n the Netherlands as the Old Catholic Church, a sect which has survived to the present day.1*2 However, since so much of the i d e n t i t y of the Dutch Church was based upon the premise of l o y a l t y to Rome, many p r i e s t s who had followed Codde f e l t caught i n a c r i s i s of conscience. By 1706 more than two-thirds of those p r i e s t s who had l e f t returned to the side of Rome. The Schism of Utrecht helped r e i n f o r c e the introverted nature of the Dutch Church. In rather i r o n i c fashion the Dutch clergy helped maintain t h e i r b e l i e f i n the Church of the counter-reformation and t h e i r l o y a l t y to Rome by becoming even more in s u l a r and independent not only of Dutch society but also of Rome i t s e l f . By keeping the influence of Rome at a distance, the Dutch Church could maintain the b e l i e f that Rome was s t i l l the centre of s p i r i t u a l authority on earth. Clashes which occurred between the Dutch Church and Rome were blamed by Dutch clergy on f a u l t y communication or on intermediaries who di d not understand the intentions of the Pope or misconstrued the true p o s i t i o n of Dutch p r i e s t s . The independence of the Dutch Church was further reinforced by f r i c t i o n between secular p r i e s t s and those i n r e l i g i o u s orders. The Dutch secular p r i e s t s j e a l o u s l y guarded t h e i r autonomy and independence against what they f e l t were unwarranted intrusions by orders such as the J e s u i t s . 1 * 3 39 The s u r v i v a l of Roman Catholicism i n the Netherlands i n the early post-reformation period did not depend upon the exercise of control from above. Local clergy took the i n i t i a t i v e i n organizing and protecting t h e i r own parishes with progressively less and less outside help. As we l l , while s t i l l b e l i e v i n g that Roman Catholicism was the only true r e l i g i o n , Dutch clergy nevertheless co-operated to some degree with the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s . They paid extra taxes and permitted the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s to perform marriage ceremonies. In return the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s remained tolerant and, for example, allowed clergy to perform an addit i o n a l marriage ceremony so that i n the eyes of the Church the marriage was a proper one. The commonly held b e l i e f was that t h i s co-operation was a temporary necessity which would disappear when the Netherlands returned to the Roman Catholic f o l d . Through t h i s means clergy maintained a high degree of control over t h e i r flocks and were r e l a t i v e l y free from outside c o n t r o l . A l l t h i s was part and parcel of the i s o l a t i o n i s t mentality and could be observed i n attitud e and behaviour: a r i g i d emphasis on orthodoxy i n t e r n a l l y and a pronounced wariness, combined with prag-matic considerations, when communicating with the outside world. This curious posture on the part of the Dutch Church was maintained well into the twentieth century. For example, i n the late nineteenth century the priest,Herman Schaepman, considered to be the father of the Catholic party i n the Netherlands, had to defend himself from considerable c r i t i c i s m by both the bishops and conservative Catholics, when he engaged i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . He was t o l d h i s actions were endanger-ing the p o s i t i o n of Catholics i n the Netherlands by arousing the i r e of the non-Catholic majority. In 1904 the bishops ordered that an 40 association of reform minded p r i e s t s and lay Catholics be disbanded on the grounds that p r i e s t s and laymen could not consort with each other i n a common society. The motives of the bishops were i n part due to puritanism ( i . e . the corruption of p r i e s t s by s o c i a l i z i n g with laymen), but also i n part due to fear of disturbing the s o c i a l equilibrium i n the Netherlands by having untoward demands made upon Dutch society by l i b e r a l minded Catholics. **5 Another manifestation of the i s o l a t i o n i s t mentality occurred i n 1954. In that year the bishops, i n a well p u b l i c i z e d l e t t e r , r e i t e r a t e d the ban on belonging to non-Catholic organizations, l i s t e n i n g to s o c i a l i s t radio programs, and reading non-Catholic newspapers and ordered that communication with the non-Catholic majority could occur only through o f f i c i a l Church sanctioned agencies.** 6 This again was i n large part due to t h e i r b e l i e f that Catholics had to be insulated and protected from the influence of non-Catholic Dutch society. The Emancipation Ideology. A f t e r the Reformation Catholics i n the Netherlands were reduced to the rank of second-class c i t i z e n s . Catholics were shut out from a l l c i v i l service functions. These p o s i -tions were not only ones such as mayor but also minor posts such as lantern l i g h t e r and t u r f c a r r i e r . Catholics were also kept out of the guilds contributing further to t h e i r economically backward p o s i t i o n . And as noted e a r l i e r there was always the threat of force on the part of c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s . The Church i t s e l f was harrassed. Between 1703 and 1727 the papal internuncio was denied entry to the Netherlands. 1* 7 In socio-economic terms Catholics tended to be located i n the less, well o f f categories. 41 Jan Rogier, i n an a r t i c l e , described the p a r i s h of Saint Antonius i n Delfshaven c i r c a 1829. Aside from the pastor and his a s s i s t a n t , not a s i n g l e Catholic could be c a l l e d a member of the i n t e l l e c t u a l and merchant c l a s s . In the categories of small businessmen, salesmen (e.g. f i s h wives) and workers Catholics were over-represented i n comparison with Protestants. 1* 8 In the c i t y of Den Bosch i n 1786, a c i t y which was 95 percent C a t h o l i c , only four of the 20 registered lawyers and medical doctors were Catholic. 1* 9 Much of t h i s socio-economic imbalance was due to discrimination although some as well was due to the rather narrow and r e s t r i c t e d a t t i t u d e towards education by the Church. 5 0 A number of better o f f Catholics were c e r t a i n l y aware of the second-class p o s i t i o n of Catholics i n Dutch society. Yet i n the seven-teenth and eighteenth centuries t h i s i n i t s e l f did not lead to organized protest. One well known Catholic writer even went so far as to suggest that there were d i s t i n c t advantages to having c i v i l service posts reserved for Protestants o n l y . 5 1 Generally Catholics accepted t h e i r l o t and focused on preserving what they had. In 1795 with the beginning of the Batavian republic under Napoleonic r u l e Catholics were f i n a l l y granted t h e i r f u l l c i v i l r i g h t s . This development, although generally welcomed, did not lead to great r e j o i c i n g . Objectively i t did not lead to any s i g n i f i c a n t improvement for Catholics with regard to c i v i l service p o s i t i o n s . Catholics concerned themselves with seeking an improvement i n the status of t h e i r Church. A number of p r i e s t s and lay Catholics began a g i t a t i n g for the r e s t o r a t i o n of the Catholic hierarchy in the Netherlands, though according to Thurlings there was no consensus among Catholics on how t h i s was going to be achieved or even i f t h i s was a desirable goal. L i b e r a l non-42 Catholic p o l i t i c i a n s were ready to permit the return of the Catholic hierarchy but there was resistance from several quarters; from the C a l v i n i s t s , from Rome, and not least from p r i e s t s who valued t h e i r independence r e s u l t i n g from the lack of e f f e c t i v e control from Rome. In 1848 William I I , under the influence of the l i b e r a l r e v o l t s that took place a l l over Europe, i n s t i t u t e d responsible government with the r e s u l t that L i b e r a l statesmen, l i k e Thorbecke, men who were very t o l e r a n t , humanistic and secular i n outlook, were given a great deal of influence. Thorbecke and l i b e r a l l y minded Catholics opened the way f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n of the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy. This f i n a l l y came about i n 1853 when Rome overcame i t s hesitancy. This combination of secular statesmen and l i b e r a l minded Cat h o l i c s , r e f e r r e d to as the Papo-Thorbecke c o a l i t i o n , hoped for the integration of the Catholic Church into Dutch society. L i b e r a l Catholics placed great stress on openness as opposed to i s o l a t i o n and at the same time pressed for the emancipation of C a t h o l i c s . 5 3 However, t h e i r influence soon faded. Directives from Rome i n the form of the Syllabus of Errors and the e n c y c l i c a l Quanto Cura i n 1864 warned the f a i t h f u l about the dangers of l i b e r a l i s m and instructed that children could not go to non-Catholic schools. The "true to Rome" i s o l a -t i o n i s t tendency i n Dutch Catholicism re-asserted i t s e l f but now combined with emancipationist f e e l i n g s to produce a unique force. There was a new tendency on the part of Dutch Catholics to be somewhat less cautious and attempt to arrogate to themselves more influence over what they considered t h e i r own a f f a i r s . F o r t u i t o u s l y the orthodox C a l v i n i s t s under the leadership of Groen van Prinsteren and l a t e r Abraham Kuyper also began to press f o r 43 educational r i g h t s as a defence against the l i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s . Catholics and C a l v i n i s t s joined i n an e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e and began pressing t h e i r case i n parliament. Changes i n the administration of the education act i n 1888 and 1889 gave them p a r t i a l v i c t o r y . In 1917 what i s known as the P a c i f i c a t i o n resulted i n Catholics and C a l v i n i s t s obtaining f u l l state support for t h e i r school systems. 5 1* The P a c i f i c a t i o n of 1917 set a precedent for the meeting of further Catholic demands which were incr e a s i n g l y framed not i n terms of freedom and equality of Catholics as i n d i v i d u a l s but i n terms of the freedom of the Church to set up i t s own organizations. Catholics took great pride i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l e d i f i c e that was developing. Emancipa-t i o n came to mean more Catholic i n s t i t u t i o n s . The best examples were the founding of the Catholic University at Nijmegen i n 1923 and the founding of the Catholic Broadcasting Organization (KRO) i n 1926. In 1926 as well the Catholic p o l i t i c a l party was founded (before i t was simply e n t i t l e d the Association of Catholic E l e c t o r a l Associations). Many Catholics believed that since they now had the same i n s t i t u t i o n a l trappings as the other blocs, the l i b e r a l s f or example, they were on an equal footing. Catholics also began to see themselves as l o y a l Dutch c i t i z e n s . This was reinforced by the events of 1918. The leader of the Social Democrats, Troelstra,. who was under the influence of the revolutions that had occurred i n Russia and Germany, advocated open r e v o l t against the established order i n the Netherlands. In retrospect t h i s c a l l for r e v o l t was only a minor c r i s i s . No one heeded T r o e l s t r a ' s c a l l . However, i n 1918 the bishops and Catholic lay leaders threw t h e i r support behind the government and the throne. For a period of time several Catholics were convinced that i t was they and they alone who were the saviours of the f a t h e r l a n d . 5 5 44 In the 1920s a Catholic became prime minister for the f i r s t time and the important post of minister of s o c i a l welfare was given to a Catholic. A l l t h i s was cause for r e j o i c i n g and aided i n the development of a triumphalist s p i r i t which characterized the period known as the Rich Roman L i f e . But at the same time there was a feeling that Catholics were s t i l l being discriminated against. Catholics were s t i l l under-represented i n the c i v i l service and among those graduating from u n i v e r s i t i e s . This feeling persisted well into the 1950s and the early 1960s. In the early 1950s the leader of the Catholic party said that Catholics would only be t r u l y emancipated when more than 50 percent of the population was C a t h o l i c . 5 6 The Mandement of 1954 as well as r e f l e c t -ing i s o l a t i o n i s t sentiments also reflected the perception of the bishops that discrimination against Catholics s t i l l existed i n the Netherlands and that Catholic i n s t i t u t i o n s were s t i l l necessary not only to protect but also to further the interests of Dutch Catholics. The Calvinist Penetration. Calvinism i s thought to be unusually severe and unyielding, stressing r i g i d adherence to the norms and values found i n the bible and as l a i d down by the re l i g i o u s community. Catholicism, on the other hand, i s generally considered to be more forgiving i n matters involving the breaking of Church laws, so long as the practicing Catholic ultimately accepts the authority of the Priest and the Pope. However, the Dutch Catholic Church, i n contrast to -the Catholic Church elsewhere, has always been characterized by the extremely r i g i d manner i n which i t applied sanctions against Catholics who broke the rules and norms of the Church. This rigorous approach to rule 45 application by Dutch priests has been linked to the a l l pervasive influence of Calvinism i n the Netherlands. The f i r s t apostolic vicar to the Dutch Roman Catholic mission, Sasbout Vosmeer, was extremely sparing i n giving absolution or dispensa-tion with regard to fasting laws. In fact the dispute with Rome at the turn of the eighteenth century which led to the schism of Utrecht was due to complaints brought to the Pope of the rigorous behaviour on the part of Dutch p r i e s t s . 5 7 This behaviour has been ascribed to the influence of Jansenism, a highly moralistic stream of Roman Catholic thought which probably comes closest to Protestantism i n s p i r i t i f not form of a l l the various i n t e l -lectual movements within the Church. Cornelius Jansenius, the s p i r i t u a l father of th i s movement, taught at the University of Louvain and was Bishop of Ypres (1585-1638). 5 8 Jansenist teachings have the tendency to deprecate the authority of the Church and to increase the emphasis on personal motivation. Holy communion can be received only under conditions of the utmost purity which requires intensive preparation. Absolution at confession could be received only after the priest was convinced that the parishioner was thoroughly repentant. The sociologist Van Heek suggests that Jansenism had an unusually strong influence on Dutch Catholicism. 5 9 He cite s the fact that during the seventeenth century many of the missionaries sent to the Netherlands received t h e i r education at Louvain. The evidence i s not clear enough to suggest such a direct l i n k . Nevertheless there i s no doubt that the moralistic aspects of Jansenism had a ready market i n the Netherlands. And i t was received sympathetically, i n part because of a basic 46 p r e d i s p o s i t i o n by the Dutch population as a whole to take matters of r e l i g i o n very s e r i o u s l y . The s o c i o l o g i s t Thurlings points out that both Protestants and Catholics i n the Netherlands take r e l i g i o u s r u les and edicts i n a much more l i t e r a l fashion than i s the case i n Mediterranean countries l i k e France and I t a l y . 6 0 Secondly, there i s evidence that the Catholic Church i n the Netherlands had taken over many attitudes and practices from the C a l v i n i s t s . It was with the C a l v i n i s t s , m i l i t a n t and well organized, that Catholics had the most s o c i a l contact outside of t h e i r own c i r c l e . And i n defending themselves from C a l v i n i s t p r o s e l y t i z i n g the p r i e s t s i n p a r t i c u l a r , consciously or unconsciously, picked up many of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Calvinism; they became d i s t i n c t l y more p u r i t a n i c a l than Catholics i n other countries. Rogier gives several examples of t h i s . Observance of Sunday as a day of rest i s minimal i n most Catholic countries. In the Nether-lands Catholics are much s t r i c t e r i n t h e i r Sunday observance. 6 1 The Carnival celebrations were banned i n the Netherlands u n t i l 1815. A f t e r -wards because of the Belgian influence, Carnival f e s t i v i t i e s penetrated into the two southern provinces adjacent to Belgium. When t h i s occurred, however, Catholic p r i e s t s did t h e i r utmost to discourage the f e s t i v i t i e s 6 2 This process of learning from the C a l v i n i s t s was not r e s t r i c t e d to the early post-reformation period. In the l a t e nineteenth century i t was from the C a l v i n i s t s under Abraham Kuyper that Dutch Catholics learned how to organize themselves p o l i t i c a l l y i n order to achieve t h e i r goal of state support for Catholic s c h o o l s . 6 3 The norms as to what was to be observed or adhered to are, of course, d i f f e r e n t f o r C a l v i n i s t s and Cat h o l i c s . Yet the s p i r i t with which these norms were c a r r i e d out has often been quite s i m i l a r . 47 The ideology of Dutch Catholicism up to the early 1960s can be summarized as follows. Considerable stress was placed on physically i n s u l -ating Catholics from the rest of the Dutch population. In the early post-reformation period t h i s was achieved through the means of the so-called underground churches. Much l a t e r , organizations were developed to ensure that Catholics had no need to interact with non-Catholics i n so c i a l and cul t u r a l spheres. The idea that Catholics were an oppressed minority who needed to be emancipated became an important element i n the ideology. In the early part of the nineteenth century l i b e r a l Catholics hoped to achieve a degree of equality not only for the Catholic Church but also for individual Catholics. In the l a t t e r part of the nineteenth century, however, largely because of the bishops, emancipation came to be defined i n c o l l e c t i v i s t terms; Catholics needed to be emancipated as a group, not as individuals. Throughout the years, Dutch Catholicism was marked by a zealous application of sanctions and stringent demands upon the in d i v i d u a l . Church law, interpreted i n a s t r i c t l y l i t e r a l form, represented a major element of control. The ideology which evolved had a s i g n i f i c a n t impact upon the development and use of organization. The structures of the Church and the subculture w i l l now be examined with a view to highlighting the way the bishops, clergy and lay Catholic leaders used organization to severely l i m i t the range of individual behaviour. 3. ORGANIZATION Struature. The Dutch Church province i s divided into seven dioceses (before 1956 there were only f i v e dioceses) each with a bishop. 6 1* The archbishop for the entire province i s based at Utrecht. Each diocese i s divided into dekenaten or deaneries and each deanery i s further 48 subdivided into parishes. There are a t o t a l of 129 deaneries and 1800 parishes i n the entire country. Each parish handles anywhere from 800 to 10,000 parishioners. In the southern Netherlands, which i s s o l i d l y Catholic, there might be two or more parishes i n a single v i l l a g e or town. In the northeastern part of the Netherlands, however, where there are very few Catholics, one parish might cover several v i l l a g e s . Before changes i n Church organization and the c l e r i c a l manpower c r i s i s i n the 1960s each parish had at a minimum one pastor and usually one or more assistants. Their duties involved not only the preparation and performance of mass and the taking of confession but also work done under the heading of pastoral care. In fact the largest part of the day's work was devoted to t h i s a r e a . 6 5 Concretely i t meant v i s i t i n g parishioners i n t h e i r homes on a regular basis, v i s i t i n g them when they were i l l , administering the sacraments, tendering advice on the whole gamut of problems that might a f f l i c t a household. Systematic records were kept on each family i n the parish using a card index system. Along with t h e i r other duties parish priests also had a number of " s p i r i t u a l advisorships" to the different Catholic lay organizations operating i n t h e i r parishes. A newly a r r i v i n g pastor would be handed a l i s t of such advisorships i n organizations such as the l o c a l branch of the Catholic Farmers' Association, the Catholic Choral Society, the Catholic Watch Makers Association and so on. The numerous Catholic socio-economic organizations themselves were, and for the most part s t i l l are, organized on a diocesan basis by both p r i e s t s and lay Catholics. Organizations such as the Catholic Health Care organization (the White and Yellow Cross) began on a diocesal basis under the aegis of diocesan approval. After a period of development 49 organizations from the different dioceses usually decided to create a national organization on a federated basis or at least have a national co-ordinating o f f i c e . The national organization would then also have a s p i r i t u a l advisor appointed by the bishops. Catholic trade unions such as the woodworkers, p r i n t e r s , painters started o f f on a diocesan basis with chapters organized i n terms of parish boundaries. 6 6 Later i t became apparent that national organizations were needed and industry and geography became the basis for more functional organization. This process of re-organization occurred not without con-siderable argument with the bishops. 6 7 Most Catholic organizations, however, even now tend to be organized i n terms of e c c l e s i a s t i c a l boun-daries. Organizations such as the Catholic Broadcasting Organization (KRO) and the Catholic University were founded after f i r s t receiving approval from the bishops, have s p i r i t u a l advisers s i t t i n g on the board of directors and s t i l l have revisions i n t h e i r statutes approved by the bishops. 6 8 This i s the bare outline of the Catholic Church and the Catholic subculture i n the Netherlands. The next step i s to see how these organi-zational structures were used by the bishops, clergy and lay Catholics to create cohesion among Catholics and to look at how tensions and c o n f l i c t s between different organizations within the Catholic subculture were resolved. The Bishops. The bishops have played the most active role i n promoting the authority of the Church. And they have performed t h i s i n a manner quite different from that i n other countries. In the Netherlands, p a r t i c u l a r l y since the turn of the century, the bishops have tended to act c o l l e c t i v e l y as a c o l l e g i a l body, speaking on behalf of a l l Catholics and 50 issui n g i n s t r u c t i o n s or appeals to the f a i t h f u l as a j o i n t group. In doing so they i n fac t v i o l a t e one of the p r i n c i p l e s of the Catholic Church, namely the p r i n c i p l e of t e r r i t o r i a l i t y which states that a bishop i s the sole authority within h i s d i o c e s e . 6 9 This means that pronouncements from the top carry the f u l l . weight of a l l the bishops. It also makes for a high degree of standardi-zation and cohesion. Decisions of a l l the bishops are v a l i d not ju s t f o r one p a r t i c u l a r diocese but f o r the en t i r e province. It lessens the scope f o r leeway by i n d i v i d u a l bishops whereby, f or example, one p a r t i c u l a r bishop might decide to disregard or considerably change some i n s t r u c t i o n from Rome. Thus i n the Netherlands o f f i c i a l l e t t e r s to the f a i t h f u l i n v a r i a b l y carry the signature of a l l the bishops. In Belgium the exact opposite occurs. There only i n exceptional cases do the Bishops act i n a c o l l e c t i v e f a s h i o n . 7 0 This c o l l e g i a l i t y of the Dutch episcopate i s due i n part to the fact that the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy i s a r e l a t i v e l y new a r r i v a l i n the Netherlands. P r i o r to 1853 there was no diocesal autonomy thus diocesal t e r r i t o r i a l i t y was not i n s t u t i t o n a l i z e d nor given a chance to harden over time. The parishes themselves, however, were f a i r l y autonomous. F a i r l y strong c o l l e c t i v e action on the part of the bishops was needed to r e j u -venate Catholic l i f e at the time of the h i e r a r c h i c a l r e s t o r a t i o n . Another major f a c t o r that makes f o r episcopal c o l l e g i a l i t y i s the f a c t that there are very few bishops i n the Netherlands, e s p e c i a l l y i n proportion to the number of Cath o l i c s . Ireland, f o r example, with a t o t a l population considerably lower than the t o t a l C a t h o l i c population i n the Netherlands (2.8 m i l l i o n versus 5 m i l l i o n ) has 26 bishops while the Netherlands has only seven (and only f i v e before 1956).7,1 A small number of bishops greatly facilitated the reaching of common decisions and in turn enhanced centralized control in the period up to 1963. The chief interests of the bishops lay in ensuring that the faithful were suitably protected and sheltered from the non-Catholic world. Beyond the hope of obtaining Catholic schools, the hierarchy was not interested in institutional or subcultural development per se. Their attitudes were ones of conservatism and caution. They did not provide leadership in the sense of having a set of goals, a vision of the future which led to the transformation of the Catholic community in the Nether-lands. Rather their role was one of defining the boundaries of the Catholic subculture, deciding what was acceptable or unacceptable behaviour. Initiatives for progress and change came not from the bishops but from progressive-minded priests lower in the ranks and lay Catholics. The attitude of the bishops was that i f Catholics were going to be involved in organizations those organizations had to be Catholic. 7 2 This divergence in orientation between the bishops and some of the clergy is best illustrated by the case of Unitas at the turn of the century. Unitas was an interdenominational Christian union for textile workers based mainly in the eastern part of the Netherlands. Some members of the clergy, particularly those involved in helping to organize Unitas, favoured interdenominational organizations. Some of the members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, however, were far from certain they favoured trade unions let alone interfaith ones. In 1906 the Dutch bishops collectively defined the official Church position: Catholics should "unite and remain united in Catholic organizations." 7 3 It took another two pastoral letters over a six year period before a l l vestiges of interconfessional trade unionism were eradicated. But at the end of this 52 period the bishops had achieved their goal. By the post World War I period the bishops had become convinced of the need for Catholic trade unions, and their u t i l i t y , particularly after what happened to Catholic migrants from the south who came to work in the harbours of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and environs. Starting in 1800, a steady stream of poor Catholics from the rural areas of Zeeland, Brabant and Limburg flowed into the northern cities, especially Rotterdam. Rogier estimates that the rise in the population of Rotterdam from 210,000 to 340,000 between 1890 to 1900 was due almost entirely to the influx of Catholics from the above-mentioned regions. 7 l f Unfortunately the clergy in the northern cities were unable to cope with this massive expansion of their flocks. The strongly conservative bishop of Haarlem, whose diocese encompassed cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, remained blind to the needs of the Catholic migrants. Considerable work was done by a limited number of priests mostly in the way of help for the destitute. But i t was not sufficient. Many of the Catholic migrants found help from the x socialists who were well organized. In the process the migrants, removed from the influence of the Church, lost their faith "by the tens of thousands."75 It was not until 1910 that the bishop of Haarlem realized what was happening. He called in the Capucin order for help in Amsterdam. However, they were not called into action in Rotterdam until 1918. When the magnitude of the disaster was realized the bishops began to place stronger emphasis on organizing several aspects of Catholic l i f e in order to ensure the spiritual protection of Catholics. As well the tendencies towards collegiality among the bishops were reinforced even further. Increasingly, Catholic institutions such as the Catholic Trade 53 Union Federation, the Roman Catholic State Party (RKSP), the KRO and the Catholic U n i v e r s i t y began to be established on a national l e v e l . The bishops perceived that only on a c o l l e c t i v e basis could they maintain t h e i r authority over developments. Conferences and meetings between the bishops became more and more frequent. O f f i c i a l l y an informal body, t h i s council of bishops developed into a de facto governing body of the Dutch Church. This image of the bishops being j o i n t l y at the head of the Dutch Church was d e l i b e r a t e l y c u l t i v a t e d by the bishops themselves. 7 6 The bishops also became more farsighted. In what was probably t h e i r most perceptive move of the twentieth century they condemned National Socialism, both i n Germany and the Netherlands, at a very early stage. Their behaviour with regard to Naziism was a good example of the way the bishops used t h e i r authority and the sanctions made ava i l a b l e to them by the Church. In 1934 when the National S o c i a l i s t Bond (NSB), the Dutch version of the German Nazi party, was f i r s t organized i t was immedi-ate l y condemned by the bishops under the leadership of the archbishop Cardinal de Jong. Any Catholic who gave "measurable support" to the NSB was not permitted to receive the holy sacraments. 7 7 In 1936 when i t was evident that a number of Ca t h o l i c s , e s p e c i a l l y i n Limburg, had voted for the NSB the bishops repeated t h e i r warning and urged clergy and Catholic socio-economic organizations to make the utmost e f f o r t s to bring to the attention of Catholics the dangers of National Socialism. In 1940 when the Netherlands were occupied by German forces the bishops became even more rigorous i n t h e i r demands. S p e c i f i c guidelines were sent out concerning appropriate behaviour on the part of clergy and Ca t h o l i c s : members of the NSB could not be married i n Church or receive a Church b u r i a l . I f there was any doubt as to the status of any Catholics 54 with regard to the NSB, clergy were required to refer these cases to their bishop for a decision. There are several cases on record where Catholics were denied a Church burial on the personal order of the bishops because of their links with the NSB.79 Even more significant were the lengths to which the bishops went in order to safeguard the autonomy of the Church especially with regard to Catholic organizations. The German authorities had ordered the integ-ration and rationalization of organizational l i f e in the Netherlands by saying that only one general or neutral organization was permitted for each sphere of activity whether i t be trade unions or soccer clubs. The bishops ordered Catholic organizations not to co-operate with the German authorities. To prevent organizations from being forcibly taken over by the Germans the bishops simply ordered many Catholic organizations to disband. Henceforth membership in such an organization served as the basis for ex-communication. Thus the Catholic university and higher schools were promptly shut down by the bishops. The KRO, the White-Yellow Cross, the Catholic Trade Union Federation, the Catholic Farmers Association and several other organizations were disbanded. Full-time officers of these organizations were given relief payments from an emergency fund specially set up by the bishops. 8 0 To the bishops the maintenance of subcultural unity, "our sacred unity" as they called i t , was of prime importance. In the immediate post-war period the bishops again asserted their will. Cardinal de Jong announced that i t was the wish of the bishops that a l l Catholic organi-zations, including the Catholic party, be revived. 8 1 Having proved that Catholic unity and solidarity had been an important force in resisting the German occupation, the bishops again felt that a highly insulated 55 Catholic subculture would be invaluable i n the future. They s t i l l perceived the outside world as uncertain and threatening, e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of what was happening i n eastern Europe and the attempts made by the Communist influenced Unity movement to dominate the trade union movement i n the Netherlands. In the 1950s the bishops perceived that matters were s l i p p i n g , that the sacred unity of the Dutch Church was being compromised. The Labour party (PydA) had made some inroads on Catholic party (KVP) support in the Catholic s o u t h ; 8 2 the Catholic caucus i n the PvdA had refused to heed e a r l i e r requests from various sources to leave the PvdA and come to terms with the KVP; 8 3 there was evidence that Catholics were s t i l l under-represented i n the c i v i l s e rvice. 8 I* A l l t h i s r e i n f o r c e d the basic b e l i e f of the bishops, e s p e c i a l l y that of Cardinal de Jong, of the importance of maintaining the i s o l a t i o n of Catholics from the rest of society. In 1953 at the time of the celebration of the one-hundredth anniversary of the r e - i n s t a l l a t i o n of the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy, Cardinal de Jong, pleaded in a radio broadcast: "Dear fellow b e l i e v e r s , we must remain one. What-ever we have accomplished i n the past, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n p u b l i c l i f e , we owe to our unity in our dealings with the outside world. But as our emancipation progresses, that unity w i l l be exposed to ever greater dangers. . . . Therefore, dear fellow b e l i e v e r s of the Netherlands, stay one, one!" 8 5 In 1954 the l e t t e r of the bishops appeared, the "Mandement," renewing the c a l l f o r Catholic unity, warning of the dangers of s o c i a l i s m and l i s t i n g the penalties for indulging i n inappropriate behaviour such as l i s t e n i n g to the s o c i a l i s t radio s t a t i o n or j o i n i n g a non-Catholic trade u n i o n . 8 6 The l e t t e r i s i n t e r e s t i n g both for the 56 insi g h t i t gives into the i s o l a t i o n i s t and emancipatory s p i r i t of Dutch Catholicism and because i t was p u b l i c l y supported and defended by a l l the bishops. It was defended i n pu b l i c even though i n private there was strong disagreement among the b i s h o p s . 8 7 Mgr. A l f r i n k who succeeded Cardinal de Jong continued to defend the document i n the s p i r i t of c o l l e g i a l i t y long a f t e r de Jong had died although he opposed the document in private when i t was f i r s t discussed. In p r a c t i c e the penalties l i s t e d i n the Mandement (denial of the sacraments) were r a r e l y c a r r i e d out. Nevertheless the bishops gave l i t t l e p u b l i c i n d i c a t i o n that they were w i l l i n g to t o l e r a t e deviance. When asked to r u l e on s p e c i f i c cases, f o r example a sports organization asking f o r permission to play with non-Catholics, the bishops refused to give dispensation. 8 8 Along with the emphasis on strong c o l l e c t i v e leadership i n defining the boundaries of the Catholic subculture, the bishops have also been characterized by an unusually severe approach even to issues i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to subcultural unity. The Dutch e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy was much more l i t e r a l and rigorous i n the interpretations they placed on orders from Rome compared with bishops elsewhere. 8 9 For example i n 1929 Rome sent out a l e t t e r noting that i t was desirable that clergy not be members or attend meetings of Rotary International. The tenor of the l e t t e r did not indicate a ban on membership i n the Rotary Club nor did i t apply to Catholic l a i t y . Within a year, however, the Dutch Church hierarchy i n s t i t u t e d a general ban on membership i n the Rotary Club for both clergy and l a i t y . In no other country did the Church attempt to c l a s s i f y Rotary International as a banned organization. In the matter of f a s t i n g the Dutch hierarchy was also considerably 57 more severe. Because of World War II the Canon law regarding f a s t i n g and abstention was suspended. In 1950 a new l e t t e r from the bishops was issued d e t a i l i n g f a s t i n g days i n the Netherlands. There were i n t o t a l 56 f a s t i n g days i n the year. In Belgium, i n contrast, only four days i n the year were c l a s s i f i e d as required f a s t i n g d a ys. 9 0 The Clergy. In the Catholic Church, p r i e s t s perform functions which we associate usually with ' l i n e ' p o s i t i o n s of organizational theory. They are the ones who i n a concrete fashion represent God on earth. They a c t u a l l y carry out the tasks of celebrating the mass, administering the sacra-ments and hearing confession. When Catholics have contact with the Church i t i s usually with t h e i r l o c a l p arish p r i e s t or pastor. The p r i e s t i s responsible for the s p i r i t u a l well being of h i s parishioners. Before the t h e o l o g i c a l changes of Vatican I I , the p r i e s t p r i m a r i l y guarded and maintained the f a i t h of h i s f l o c k . The p r i e s t was d i r e c t l y responsible for boundary maintenance, applying sanctions against those who transgressed the rules of the Church. In order that the tasks involved i n s p i r i t u a l care be properly c a r r i e d out there had to be an adequate supply of manpower. A too high a r a t i o of parishioners to p r i e s t s might have res u l t e d i n the lowering of standards. The Church i n the Netherlands has usually been quite fortunate i n t h i s regard. On the basis of data gathered i n 1960 the Dutch Church compares favourably with the Churth i n other West European countries. As one can see i n table 2.3 below, only Switzerland with a r a t i o of 477:1 i s marginally better than the Netherlands with a r a t i o of 480:1. 58 Table 2.3 Catholics per P r i e s t by Country Country Number Country Number Switzerland 477 I t a l y 727 Netherlands 480 France 791 Luxembourg 495 A u s t r i a 910 Belgium 564 Spain 921 Ireland 636 West Germany 1,000 B r i t a i n 667 Portugal 1,635 Source: KASKI, "Het katholicisme i n West-Europa," Memorandum No. 113, p. 18 In most countries the l o c a l pastor was not only the authority on matters of s p i r i t u a l i t y but was also an authority i n most other f i e l d s . In the Netherlands the r o l e of the pastor as a generalized authority f i g u r e l a s t e d well into the 1950s. E s p e c i a l l y i n the r u r a l areas i n homogeneously Catholic v i l l a g e s the pastor was the prime c a r r i e r of the s o c i a l e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n of not only the national and i n t e r n a t i o n a l Church but also of the l o c a l group. He was the r e f l e x element i n the v i l l a g e c o l l e c t i v i t y . What the pastor believed, the v i l l a g e b e l i e v e d . 9 1 He c a r e f u l l y watched over the morals and orthodoxy of the v i l l a g e . He was the prime authority i n matters such as marriage, the family, the upbring-ing of c h i l d r e n , organizational l i f e and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Most agencies of s o c i a l control were at h i s d i s p o s a l . Well into the nineteenth century the l o c a l constabulary was frequently given the task of ensuring that parishioners attended mass and that the v i l l a g e r s observed the rules 59 concerning Sunday as a day of r e s t . 9 2 The leadership of the p r i e s t was c e r t a i n l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n . In the popular l i t e r a t u r e he was usually depicted as being stern and unyielding but at the same time compassionate and h e l p f u l . Textbooks used by Catholic school children i n the 1920s and 1930s frequently featured the pastor i n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , f or example rescuing a postman who had imbibed too much .and putting him back on the path of righteousness. The pastor was one of the few educated persons i n the v i l l a g e or neighbourhood along with the mayor and the school teacher. Therefore he was also the dispenser of advice on a whole range of subjects. He could help people f i l l out t h e i r income tax papers, s e t t l e disputes between neighbours and re l a t e d matters. He could also be h e l p f u l i n a more material sense. A pastor i n a v i l l a g e i n the province of North Brabant noted: "You could say that u n t i l say 10-12 years ago here i n t h i s v i l l a g e my pastorate served as a general s o c i a l welfare agency. People would come here with every conceivable problem and very few of these problems had anything d i r e c t l y to do with r e l i g i o u s questions" (Interview No. 23).* The pastor was also s p i r i t u a l advisor to any l o c a l chapters of Catholic organizations i n h i s parish. Thus he would be a member of the l o c a l school board, the Catholic Farmers' Association, Catholic Action and so on. His r o l e extended f a r beyond that of merely commenting upon s p i r i t u a l matters. At meetings he did not f u l f i l l a chairman or a r b i t e r r o l e — h e i n fact dominated the meeting and h i s advice or suggestions were i n v a r i a b l y followed. In the post-war period the r o l e of s p i r i t u a l advisor diminished somewhat i n importance, e s p e c i a l l y i n trade unions and i n urbanized areas. In smaller centres, however, the pastor continued to be an * For d e t a i l s on the interviews, see appendix I I . 60 important figure at meetings of Catholic organizations. And in a number of rural areas, especially those outside of the Catholic south, the traditional conception of the role of the spiritual advisor s t i l l lingers to the present day. A pastor in a Catholic village in the eastern part of the Netherlands (outside of the Catholic south) describes his role: When I fi r s t arrived as pastor in 1971 I was asked to be spiritual advisor for the various Catholic organizations. I said no. The time for such a role has passed. Besides I just do not have the time. . . . Now and then I do go to a meeting. . . . I suspect my word s t i l l carries a lot of weight, that people look up to me because I am the pastor. Usually I am asked to give a few words and I will say something on spiritual matters. Sometimes I am asked to give business advice at these meetings and I will give i t because I may be the only one with sufficient education to give such advice. (Interview No. 12) The authority of the priest was made apparent not only in Church and at organizational meetings but also on a personal face-to-face basis in at least two contexts; during regular visits at the homes of parish-ioners and in the confessional. * They were important not only for the face-to-face contact but also because they involved the application, or threat of application, of sanctions. As Mancur Olson has argued in the Logic of Collective Action, the use of incentives or sanctions with regard to individuals is an extremely powerful weapon in obtaining compliant behaviour on the part of a group as a whole.91* Of the two contexts the home was much more important and this was viewed as such by priests. An 82 year old priest, retired since 1972 stated: House visits: I found that so important. . . . I would put i t f i r s t on my l i s t of duties as a priest. That was the way you maintained contact with the people. By seeing people in their homes you could sense immediately what the situation was like, i f there were any problems. (Interview No. 17) The prime function of house visits was control. The priest would ask about reading and listening habits, ensure that the union the person belonged to was Catholic and check the "condition" of the marriage: 6 1 "I would check the ages of the c h i l d r e n and i f there was a gap of three years between say the f i f t h and s i x t h oldest c h i l d r e n I would ask, 'What happened here?" 1 (Interview No. 8). Parishioners, i f they had erred with regard to t h e i r reading habits and so on would be t o l d that what they had done was a s i n and t h e i r behaviour, i f l e f t unchecked, would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t t h e i r well being i n the hereafter. I f t h e i r sins were s u f f i c i e n t l y severe t h e i r names might be put on the black l i s t so that at Easter time they would not receive the sacraments. Parishioners i n turn would r a r e l y argue or disagree with the pastor. They would meekly nod t h e i r agreement and promise to amend t h e i r ways. Someone who openly disagreed was r a r e l y found. 9 5 Not a l l p r i e s t s would use the threat of denial of the sacraments or the imperative mode of persuading parishioners to change t h e i r ways. One p r i e s t , of admitted conservative persuasions, claimed to use a more l i b e r a l approach i n c o n t r o l l i n g the behaviour of parishioners. When I v i s i t e d a home I would keep my eyes open i n order to evaluate the s i t u a t i o n . I f I saw a copy of the " V r i j e Volk" (the s o c i a l i s t d a i l y newspaper) I would not comment on t h i s at a l l . I would avoid negative comments altogether. The important thing was to keep the conversation open, not to break o f f communica-t i o n . . . . I would t r y to lure them out of the s o c i a l i s t camp. . . . I would never say "you must not" but t r y to set a personal example. For instance I would say, "I read the Katholieke Volk-skrant. I t r e a l l y i s a very i n t e r e s t i n g newspaper." (Interview No. 12) Although the techniques of control might vary, the object was the same: to ensure as much as possible compliance with the rules and norms of the Church. The confession was never quite as useful as a means of control or source of information. In e a r l i e r times i t may have been more important. "Before the war [ i n Rotterdam] people came to confession quite often. 62 I asked a l o t of questions. . . . I had considerable influence i n the confessional" (Interview No. 21). Yet i n the main the evidence f o r the post-war period i s that the confessional was not taken very s e r i o u s l y by eith e r p r i e s t s or rank-and-file Catholics. Often people would come to confession and rhyme o f f a verse, a verse that they had known since childhood. Several p r i e s t s had anecdotes concerning older women who would confess, "Last week I pestered my l i t t l e brother and sto l e from the the sugar pot." [A S clergy] we never r e a l l y d i d much about t h i s . . . . We more or less condoned t h i s kind of r o u t i n i z a t i o n of an important aspect of being a Ca t h o l i c . I f we pushed too hard they may simply not have come at a l l . . . . I t was not a healthy s i t u a t i o n . We probably l e t i t continue too long. (Interview No. 23) The degeneration of confession into a rather perfunctory r i t u a l made i t somewhat more akin to s u p e r s t i t i o n than a genuinely r e l i g i o u s experience. Yet t h i s element of s u p e r s t i t i o n had i t s uses f o r reasons of s o c i a l c o n t r o l . It was apparently needed by many people and t h i s was r e f l e c t e d not only i n t h e i r treatment of confession but other practices as well. In my f i r s t years as an as s i s t a n t i n a parish i n the Hague [l a t e 1940s, early 1950s] I remember the verger would go trundling around the neighbourhood with a cart s e l l i n g b o t t l e s of holy w a t e r — a good business for the verger i f I do say so myself—and the people would use i t for everything. I f there was a storm, for" example, people would spray holy water around so that l i g h t n i n g would not s t r i k e t h e i r homes. (Interview No. 8) Prie s t s did not f u l l y approve of these p r a c t i c e s but condoned them i n d i r e c t l y by catering to some extent to the superstitions of t h e i r f l o c k . It was another way which helped the Church maintain contact with people. In a large parish the pastor would have one or more a s s i s t a n t s . 63 They would often be assigned to p a r t i c u l a r neighbourhoods to carry out pastoral tasks. The data gathered from t h e i r house v i s i t s were put on f i l e cards. A f t e r the evening meal the pastor would discuss t h e i r work and not infrequently check through some of the cards, thus c o n t r o l l i n g the work of h i s assistants and the state of h i s parish. There were also other means by which the pastor maintained contact with h i s parish. Parishioners would frequently inform the pastor of any unusual events or cases, a parishioner who was i l l i n h o s p i t a l f or example. One pastor, who l i v e d i n a medium-sized c i t y , had an arrangement with the milkman. I f a new family moved into the parish the milkman would ascertain whether or not the family was C a t h o l i c . I f so the pastor paid the newcomers a v i s i t , thus ensuring continuity i n t h e i r r e l i g i o u s observance (Interview No. 8). Control of the pastor himself came most d i r e c t l y i n the form of v i s i t s from the l o c a l dean. He would drop i n for tea two or three times a year and have a chat with the pastor. V i s i t s could also be expected from the administrative o f f i c i a l s of the diocese. They would check the f i n a n c i a l records, the condition of the b u i l d i n g s , the furnishings and the gold and s i l v e r . Authority was also exercised by the bishops i n the form of l e t t e r s and missives, documents which often had to be read to the parish at mass. Pr i e s t s could be s h i f t e d from t h e i r posts at very short notice. Orders to move to another parish would come from the diocese; appealing such a decision would be unthinkable. In those parishes under the control of r e l i g i o u s orders, decisions governing the posting of members might be made by a u t h o r i t i e s as f a r away as Rome. The behaviour of p r i e s t s with regard to r e l a t i o n s with the community, i n t e r a c t i o n with female servants 64 and so on was governed by a document known as the Codex. 9 6 On the whole there was very l i t t l e i n the way of d i r e c t personal control of the behaviour of parish p r i e s t s by higher a u t h o r i t i e s within the Church. It was not r e a l l y needed. Provision of a set of rules and expectations appeared to have been s u f f i c i e n t . Though many p r i e s t s were not always happy with the rules of the Church, they i n v a r i a b l y c a r r i e d out t h e i r duties to the l e t t e r . When asked i f they ever t r i e d to experi-ment with the mass or to challenge the authority of the Church, most p r i e s t s responded i n a negative fashion. "No that was something you just did not attempt." "You could think about i t , but a c t u a l l y doing i t ? No you would never date!" " I f you did ever t r y to do anything they [the bishops] would soon f i n d out about i t and you would be sure of getting rapped across the knuckles" (Interview Nos. 8, 21 and 23 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . There was not only a perception that there would be r e t r i b u t i o n i f they attempted to deviate from the norm but also acute awareness of the minority p o s i t i o n of Catholics i n the Netherlands. Many undoubtedly believed that u n f a i l i n g devotion was necessary for the Church's s u r v i v a l i n the Netherlands. Question: Did you ever think of disregarding an order of the bishop, of bucking the system? Answer: Oh heavens no, you couldn't begin to think of anything l i k e that. . . . But that was well for the best. Unity had to be safeguarded. You couldn't s t a r t experimenting. Where would i t end. I t would have been much too dangerous. (Interview No. 17) The manner i n which candidates f o r the clergy were re c r u i t e d and educated a l l helped contribute to t h e i r l o y a l and rigorous behaviour. Before 1795 candidates for the priesthood received t h e i r t r a i n i n g outside of the Netherlands, mostly Belgium and Germany. It was not u n t i l a f t e r -wards that the diocesan p r i e s t s obtained t h e i r own seminaries. C l e r i c a l 65 refugees from Bismarck's Kulturkampf i n Germany organized a number of new seminaries i n the Netherlands i n the la t e nineteenth century. But i t was not u n t i l the twentieth century that large scale expansion i n the number of seminaries took place. In 1910 there were 52 seminaries; i n 1952 there were 139. 9 7 None was connected with any of the u n i v e r s i t i e s . In fact even i n the 1950s i n the diocese of Haarlem students at the seminaries were forbidden to have any contact with the u n i v e r s i t i e s of Amsterdam and L e i d e n . 9 8 The aim of the seminary, according to Cardinal de Jong, was to cure students of the habit of thinking c r i t i c a l l y . 9 9 The students themselves were disproportionately drawn from the sons of farmers and shop k e e p e r s . 1 0 0 The usual route f o r the a s p i r i n g p r i e s t began at around age 12 and went v i a the so-called small seminary. These seminaries were located well away from urban areas. Selection procedures were designed to admit only those who had a good chance of s u c c e s s f u l l y completing the several years of study necessary to become a p r i e s t . S t a r t i n g i n the inter-war period many seminaries used the services of psychologists to weed out unsuitable c a n d i d a t e s . 1 0 1 At the seminary there was l i t t l e contact with the outside world. While on holiday breaks with t h e i r f a m i l i e s student p r i e s t s were encouraged and i n many cases required to report to t h e i r l o c a l pastor for advice, guidance and protection. The seminary system was responsible for a continuing supply of manpower for the priesthood and for ensuring that Dutch clergy received an education which stressed l o y a l t y to the goals of the Church. It should not be thought, however, that q u a l i t i e s of l o y a l t y and obedience were coupled with low i n t e l l i g e n c e and lack of common sense. The Dutch clergy f o r the most part were hi g h l y capable people. Up to the l a t e 1950s the priesthood was considered not only an important profession but also a 66 prestigious one. The b r i g h t e s t , most capable students, p a r t i c u l a r l y those with leadership t a l e n t s , were considered to be obvious candidates f o r the priesthood. The priesthood was considered a highly p r i z e d means of becoming upwardly mobile e s p e c i a l l y f o r fam i l i e s i n the less well o f f sectors of society such as farmers and small shop keepers. In summary the attitudes of p r i e s t s toward t h e i r parishioners were aut h o r i t a r i a n and highly p a t e r n a l i s t i c . "You had to do everything for them." "They were much too undeveloped to think for themselves." They were very s t r i c t when i t came to following the rules of the Church, e s p e c i a l l y with regard to b i r t h control and mixed marriages. Yet there were l i m i t s . Many p r i e s t s now w i l l confess to having given a Church b u r i a l to a s o c i a l i s t p r i o r to 1965. In the case of divorce or re-marriage a number of p r i e s t s were w i l l i n g to bend the r u l e s . Furthermore, most p r i e s t s had a reasonably well developed s o c i a l conscience. In fact i t was the lower clergy, many with an acute awareness of the s o c i a l problems of t h e i r day, who were mainly responsible f o r s e t t i n g up several of the socio-economic organizations i n the lat e nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Socio-economic Organizations. The bishops l a r g e l y concerned themselves with maintaining the boundaries and keeping a l i v e the u l t r a -montane tendencies within the Church. It was lower l e v e l clergy who were deeply concerned with s o c i a l questions and who provided the leadership which considerably changed the character of the Dutch Catholic subculture. It was mainly they who were responsible f o r the vast increase i n the number and size of Catholic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the twentieth century. Most of the early C a t h o l i c trade unions were started by p r i e s t s . 67 Even before the beginnings of a rudimentary trade union organization a number of p r i e s t s were active i n caring f o r workers, protecting them from undue e x p l o i t a t i o n and using t h e i r influence to prevent the worst excesses involved i n the use of c h i l d l a b o u r . 1 0 2 Many Catholic organizations received t h e i r s t a r t i n t h i s era. The Catholic Goat Breeders Associ-a t i o n — l a t e r to become the source of many jokes—was started by a p r i e s t , Father van der Noort, whose aim was to provide some help for poor farmers. Since the keeping of goats was the common denominator among these people, he decided to use t h i s as a basis f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n . 1 0 3 Father Ariens i n the eastern part of the Netherlands played an important r o l e i n organizing workers i n the developing t e x t i l e industry i n 1889. At approximately the same time i n the province of North Brabant, Father Mutsaers helped organize Saint Raphael, a union f o r railway and str e e t c a r workers. There were also other p r i e s t s involved i n t h i s type of organizational work, mostly i n the eastern and southern parts of the Netherlands. 1 0 1* The diocese of Haarlem was an exception. Although some work of a s o c i a l work nature was performed, the bishop was unsympathetic and gave l i t t l e support. A number of p r i e s t s and progressively minded lay Catholics such as P. J . M. Aalberse of Leiden were keenly interested i n what was gener-a l l y r e f e r r e d to as the s o c i a l question. In 1891 t h i s movement received a boost i n the form of a Papal e n c y c l i c a l by Pope Leo XIII. This e n c y c l i c a l , Rerum Novarum, said that i t was the task of the Church to help the downtrodden and to confront the e v i l s of i n d u s t r i a l i s m . It recognized the r i g h t of workers to organize i n order to a l l e v i a t e t h e i r conditions. By 1901 Aalberse and h i s compatriots had founded Catholic Soc i a l Action, an organization intended to help f u l f i l l the promises 68 contained i n Rerum Novarum. 1 0 5 None of t h i s , however, was intended to promote class c o n f l i c t . One of the purposes of founding the Federation of Roman Catholic Trade Unions i n 1888 was to help r e c o n c i l e the i n t e r e s t s of the d i f f e r e n t classes. The emphasis was on harmony. Clergy and Catholic lay leaders e x p l i c i t l y disavowed the notion of class c o n f l i c t . This disavowal of class c o n f l i c t was never rejected, but i n the years following Rerum Novarum the needs of the less well o f f received increasing attention. In the early 1900s many Catholic businessmen re f e r r e d to Catholic S o c i a l Action as Catholic s o c i a l i s m . 1 0 6 Nevertheless i n 1903 Catholic and Protestant workers refused to j o i n other workers during a s t r i k e against the railway s y s t e m . 1 0 7 They were praised f o r t h e i r l o y a l t y and at the same time lay Catholic leaders such as Aalberse increased t h e i r e f f o r t s to improve conditions which had o r i g i n a l l y led to the s t r i k e . The best example of a farsighted p r i e s t who managed to organize a large bloc of Catholic workers i s the case of Dr. H. A. Poels i n the mining d i s t r i c t of south Limburg. Nowhere i n Western Europe but the Netherlands d i d the Church maintain i t s hold over mining communities. A l l other coal mining d i s t r i c t s , such as those i n Belgium (contiguous to those i n the Netherlands), France and Germany, became strongholds of socialism and a n t i - c l e r i c a l i s m . 1 0 8 The mining industry i n Limburg expanded r a p i d l y at the turn of the century. The area of South Limburg was quickly transformed from a mainly a g r i c u l t u r a l region to one where mining became the dominant i n f l u -ence i n terms of employment. Many of the indigenous populace went d i r e c t l y from farming into mining. At the same time the si z e of several 69 towns and v i l l a g e s quintupled. The population grew from 69,736 i n 1900 to 242,444 by 1935. 1 0 9 For the most part t h i s increase was due to a vast i n f l u x of outside workers not only from other parts of the Netherlands but also from countries l i k e Germany, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. By 1927 native Limburgers working i n the mines were i n a m i n o r i t y . 1 1 0 The rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of southern Limburg had p o t e n t i a l l y grave s o c i a l consequences. Well before World War I the crime rate and incidence of immorality was much higher than elsewhere i n the Netherlands. In 1910 Poels was appointed as f u l l - t i m e chaplain to the miners, most of whom were Catholic. For the next 20 years he was instrumental i n shaping the nature of s o c i a l and economic l i f e i n south Limburg. The Catholic Miners Union was strengthened with f i n a n c i a l and moral help from the bishop. Co-operatives f o r food and clothing were organized. One of Poels' aims was to avoid the growth of large urban con-glomerates. Through the housing society he ensured that at every mine there would be a s u f f i c i e n t number of homes for those working at the mine. At the centre of each community would be the parish C h u r c h . 1 1 1 Considerable e f f o r t was made to ensure the s p i r i t u a l and material welfare of miners. Dutch p r i e s t s were sent to countries l i k e Hungary and Poland to learn the languages of those countries i n order to be able to communicate better with foreign m i g r a n t s . 1 1 2 Socialism and l i b e r a l i s m were condemned i n no uncertain terms by Poels and his co-workers. The proponents of those ideologies found i t extremely d i f f i c u l t to penetrate the bulwark created by the Church i n Limburg. Before World War I the s o c i a l question was an important, i f not the most important factor impelling many clergy and lay Catholics to set up the d i f f e r e n t Catholic socio-economic organizations. A f t e r World War I 70 the emphasis s h i f t e d . It was f e l t that many of the organizations, p a r t i c u l a r l y the trade unions, had achieved t h e i r goals of obtaining s o c i a l j u s t i c e and that t h e i r protective r o l e was now most important. Catholics were urged by the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy to safeguard what had been achieved and to maintain t h e i r sacred unity. Subsequent organizational developments were frequently a r e s u l t of copying the other blocs. The Catholic University (1923) and the KRO (1926) are good examples of t h i s . These two i n s t i t u t i o n s were frequently seen as the jewels of the whole gigantic organizational e d i f i c e . Catholic organizational l i f e came to be seen as a testimonial, a monument to the Roman Catholic Church. Nowhere else i n the Western world had Catholics managed to achieve a l l t h i s and i t was a source of immense pride. S p i r i t u a l advisors were s t i l l very important i n the inter-war period. The Papal e n c y c l i c a l Quadragesimo Anno (1931) expounded further on themes f i r s t broached i n Rerum Novarum: the benefits of capitalism should be d i s t r i b u t e d more widely; there should be greater co-operation between the d i f f e r e n t classes; owners should be prepared to l e t workers and consumers help i n the management of t h e i r enterprises. These themes were picked up and propagated by a number of Catholic clergy and Catholic i n t e l l e c t u a l s . 1 1 3 Retreats were organized by parishes and the d i f f e r e n t socio-economic organizations. The people at a r e t r e a t would a l l be of one s o c i a l group, e.g. housewives, students, butchers or metal workers. They would be lectured as to t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r obligations i n society. Thus, for example, Catholic tobacconists at a r e t r e a t would receive not only purely r e l i g i o u s i n s t r u c t i o n but would also be t o l d about the e v i l s of u n f a i r competition, p r i c e - c u t t i n g and s i m i l a r p r a c t i c e s . These edicts 71 would be based d i r e c t l y on Rerum Novarum or Quadragesimo Anno. 1 1 1* In the immediate post World War II period a f t e r the various Catholic organizations had been revived, the climate changed once again. Much of the r e l i g i o u s elan of the inter-war period had disappeared. Many organizations became more bureaucratized, r o u t i n e l y carrying out t h e i r functions. Many s p i r i t u a l advisors for the more important socio-economic organizations, such as the trade unions and the employer federa-tion, d e l i b e r a t e l y cut back the scope of t h e i r r o l e or at least recognized that the lay leadership i n these organizations was s u f f i c i e n t l y well developed that they could function without continual guidance. In addition, they recognized that these organizations might no longer be w i l l i n g to t o l e r a t e t h e i r interference. In most trade unions at the national l e v e l during the post-war period s p i r i t u a l advisors sat i n on meetings but took no or l i t t l e part i n the proceedings. They were c a l l e d upon to say a s p e c i a l prayer or o f f i c i a t e at b u r i a l s . On the other hand, i n the Catholic Farmers Associ-ation s p i r i t u a l advisors continued to play a strong r o l e . For example, the s p i r i t u a l advisor to the C a t h o l i c Farmers Association i n Limburg from 1946-1962 had a degree i n a g r i c u l t u r a l engineering. He v i r t u a l l y ran the organization single-handedly. Catholic organizations which were organized on a l a r g e l y diocesal basis were more prone to control from the Church. This could have been the r e s u l t of a vacuum more than anything else. I f a pastor perceived a need for a Catholic harmonica club, i n response to the appearance of a non-Catholic harmonica club, more often than not he might have l i t t l e choice but to organize and run one himself. What e f f e c t did socio-economic organizations have i n terms of 72 i n f l u e n c i n g Catholics to behave i n ways they would not have without the presence of these organizations? They c e r t a i n l y had some e f f e c t . William Petersen has drawn attention to an i n t e r e s t i n g case involving Catholic lay organizations. As has been pointed out the Dutch Church placed a high value on large f a m i l i e s . Shortly a f t e r World War II the boundary between Germany and the Netherlands was s l i g h t l y redrawn. As a r e s u l t a parish which had previously been i n German t e r r i t o r y became part of the Nether-lands and henceforth came under the influence of Catholic lay organizations (the pastor remained under the control of h i s German diocese). From 1949 to 1959 the b i r t h rate among Catholics i n t h i s community rose from 19.5 per 1,000 to 25.0 per 1,000. The b i r t h rate i n the adjoining t e r r i t o r y i n Germany f e l l from 16.3 to 12.9 i n the same period. Petersen a t t r i b u t e s most of t h i s increase to the a c t i v i t i e s of Catholic welfare organizations such as the White-Yellow C r o s s . 1 1 5 Catholic organizations undoubtedly played a r o l e i n i n s u l a t i n g Catholics from the rest of society by l i m i t i n g t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n with non-Catholics. Yet the p r o s e l y t i z i n g or pastoral functions of these organizations should not be overestimated. In many organizations there was very l i t t l e of t h i s , even i n an organization l i k e Catholic A c t i o n . 1 1 6 One of the most important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Catholic organizations was, and to a large extent s t i l l i s , that the services and benefits offered were v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l to those of the s o c i a l i s t , l i b e r a l and Protestant organizations. With the exception of the educational system, most Catholic organizations were s o c i a l or economic rather than r e l i g i o u s i n o r i e n t a t i o n . This was most evident i n the area of trade unions. By the early 1950s the Protestant, C a t h o l i c and S o c i a l i s t trade union centrals had set up a j o i n t c o u n c i l , a forum where j o i n t programs, proposals and p o s i t i o n s 73 were hammered out and presented to the government and employers with regard to wages, taxes and so on. Dues and membership benefits such as insurance, l e g a l aid and other services were v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l for the three trade union c e n t r a l s . 1 1 7 The Catholic Trade Union Federation (KAB/NKV) cast i t s appeals to p o t e n t i a l members i n terms of the useful work i t had done and i t s performance i n providing services and b e n e f i t s . In 1954 a f t e r the bishops released t h e i r Mandement, Catholic trade union leaders hastened to inform the leaders of the s o c i a l i s t trade union federation (NVV) that t h i s document would not be used by the KAB i n membership d r i v e s . 1 1 8 In most spheres of socio-economic l i f e i n the 1950s there was mutual t o l e r a t i o n among the d i f f e r e n t blocs. Protestants thought i t p e r f e c t l y natural that Catholics would want t h e i r own organizations and would not think of competing for c l i e n t s among C a t h o l i c s . 1 1 9 To a lesser extent t h i s was also true for r e l i g i o u s l y neutral organizations, both s o c i a l i s t and l i b e r a l . C atholic organizations i n areas l i k e sports, culture and services, for example Catholic soccer leagues, music federations and health insurance associations, were under l i t t l e p r e s s u r e . 1 2 0 They met a necessary need for Catholics. The performance of t h e i r s p e c i f i c r o l e was r a r e l y questioned, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t did not bring them into c o n f l i c t with other Catholic organizations. There were c e r t a i n areas where c o n f l i c t was i n e v i t a b l e however. The four major groupings i n Catholic society whose spe c i a l i n t e r e s t s did c o n f l i c t were, of course, the Catholic Trade Union Federa-t i o n (KAB/NKV), the Catholic Employers Federation (NKWV), the Middle-Class Organization (NKOV) and the Catholic Farmers Association (KNBTB). Over the years a number of structures were set up to r e c o n c i l e the d i f f e r i n g economic i n t e r e s t s of these organizations or at least to 74 mitigate the consequences of c o n f l i c t i n g p o s i t i o n s taken by them. For example, i n 1919, i n large part due to the climate created by T r o e l s t r a ' s abortive attempt at revolution, Catholic workers and employers i n four d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i a l sectors announced the creation of the "Roman Catholic Central Council of Corporate O r g a n i z a t i o n . " 1 2 1 The goal of t h i s council was to implement an elementary form of workers p a r t i c i p a t i o n at the l e v e l of the d i f f e r e n t branches of industry (but not at the i n d i v i d u a l plant level) with regard to the determination of wages and hours. This experi-ment i n co-operation collapsed, however, i n 1922, a recessionary period, when the largest industries walked out of the c o u n c i l . In 1945, as part of the general post-war re-construction plan, Dutch government planners hoped to set up a c o r p o r a t i s t society i n v o l v i n g the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of every relevant socio-economic grouping, including consumers, at a l l l e v e l s of i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e . 1 2 2 This concept was known as " P u b l i c l y Ordered Enterprises" (PBO) and was influenced by Catholic thought as derived from Rerum Novarum and Quadrogesimo Anno and by s o c i a l democratic thinking of the 1930s. It was also strongly favoured by Catholic p o l i t i c a l leaders i n the late 1940s. Unfortunately the PBO scheme, which was supposed to cover v i r t u a l l y every type of commercial a c t i v i t y , was unsuccessful except i n c e r t a i n a g r i c u l t u r a l sectors. Never-theless PBO i l l u s t r a t e d the willingness on the part of many groups i n the Netherlands, e s p e c i a l l y C a t h o l i c s , to f i n d schemes which would r e c o n c i l e the d i f f e r e n t economic i n t e r e s t s into one harmonious whole. Within the Catholic subculture one i n s t i t u t i o n which did enjoy some success i n the post World War II period was the "Catholic Council of Discussion" (Raad van O v e r l e g ) . 1 2 3 In t h i s council were represented the leaders of the four major Catholic socio-economic organizations. However, 75 i t was not a decision-making body. During meetings agreements were never arrived at; not even possible solutions to problems were likely to be discussed. The major purpose of these meetings was to provide the leaders of the four socio-economic organizations with a mutual understanding of their differing positions. The council met no more than two or three times a year. Meetings stopped completely in the early 1970s.ll>* A mutual understanding of their respective positions may have helped leaders in the development of compromises on major socio-economic issues in arenas outside of the Catholic bloc. One important arena in which decisions were often arrived at was the Social Economic Council (SER). 1 2 5 This body was created in the post-war reconstruction period and i t s t i l l exists today. All major interest groups in Dutch society are represented in this council. It is responsible for providing the Dutch government with concrete advice and proposals on socio-economic questions. Up to the late 1960s i t was the single most important economic policy-making body in the Netherlands. Generally i t appears that during meetings of the SER in the 1950s and 1960s, Catholic employers and labour leaders tended to support their Protestant, socialist or liberal counter-parts rather than their co-religionists. 1 2 6 Thus the Catholic Council of Discussion may indirectly have contributed to helping mute potential conflicts between leaders of Catholic trade unions and Catholic employers. An additional factor which may have helped to bring about amicable agreements between them was the common educational background of at least some of the Catholic socio-economic leaders. People in the top positions of employer and middle-class organizations, and to some extent even the trade unions and farmers association, had often been to the Catholic University at 76 Nijmegen or the Catholic Higher School for Economics at Tilburg. In a number of cases they may even have been classmates. What other conflict reducing bodies or co-ordinating agencies existed within the Catholic subculture? There was (and s t i l l is) a committee to provide some co-ordination among Catholic organizations active in social welfare, youth work, care for senior citizens and so on. 1 2 7 The KRO has a policy of drawing its 26 directors from the differ-ent sectors of the Catholic subculture. This policy of ensuring that its board represents a cross-section of the Catholic population is enshrined in the KRO statutes. 1 2 8 The Catholic party, as we shall see in the next chapter, did try, in a more informal fashion, to ensure that major sectors within the Catholic subculture were represented within the parliamentary party. At the top of the different Catholic organizations there were cases of overlapping memberships. For example a top executive of the Catholic Middle-Class organization, W. Perquin, was simultaneously on the board of the KRO and chairman of the Catholic party. Mr. van der Campen was active in several social welfare organizations such as the Catholic Emigration Bureau, the Catholic Bureau for Internal Migration and the Catholic Council for Social Welfare. 1 2 9 Yet even these leaders operated within a limited circle. Rare indeed was a leader who was involved in Catholic education, cultural organizations, socio-economic organizations and the Catholic party. Rather they operated within restricted areas such as economic l i f e or cultural l i f e . Leaders from these spheres might meet leaders from other spheres only within organi-zations such as the KRO or the Catholic,party. On the whole l i t t l e attempt was made to co-ordinate the activities 77 of the different Catholic organizations or to enforce a uniform standard. The common denominator was that these organizations were Catholic. Their statutes were a l l approved by the-bishops. Before World War II the bishops were quite stringent in their approval of new organizations and occasion-ally applications would be rejected. In the 1950s, however, approval from the bishops became a more routine matter. The statutes of virtually every Catholic organization s t i l l contain the preamble that the organization is based upon Catholic principles and the Catholic vision of society and that the goal of the organization is to implement these principles in everyday l i f e . 1 3 0 Yet after receiving approval the organization, particularly in socio-economic and service areas, would proceed to operate in a manner very similar to that of liberal, socialist or Protestant organizations. There was very l i t t l e about them that was distinctively Catholic. 4, C L I E N T E L E Without doubt the bishops, clergy and lay Catholic leaders invested a great deal of energy in ensuring the cohesion of the Catholic subculture. Yet in focussing on the leadership and the role of organi-zations one should not neglect the other factor in the equation making for subcultural cohesion, namely the clientele. Why did ordinary Catholics willingly follow the instructions of the bishop and the clergy for so many years? The second question concerns the unusual composition of the clien-tele: insofar as the Catholic population represents a cross-section of Dutch society containing Catholic nobility, Catholic manufacturers and businessmen as well as Catholic workers, how did they reconcile their class or group interests with that of being a member of the Catholic subculture? 78 To answer these questions one has to examine fi r s t l y the general social and economic conditions which allowed the Church to mobilize and encapsulate the Catholic population. Throughout most of the nineteenth century the Dutch economy was basically stagnant. It was based primarily on agriculture, trade and commerce. There existed only a low level of industrialization. Generally the Netherlands had not changed much since the golden years of the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century the Netherlands was not highly urbanized and in fact never did develop large urban centres on the model of British cities like Manchester or Glasgow. Rotterdam is the only city which comes at a l l close to this type of model. 1 3 : In the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries i t is even possible to talk of a process of de-urbanization. The population of Amsterdam f e l l from 241,000 in 1748 to 180,000 in 1815. Cities like Leiden and Haarlem had their populations drop by almost h a l f . 1 3 2 Poor crops and lack of industrial activity resulted in conditions which, according to Petersen, were just as bad, i f not worse, as those in Ireland. Perhaps because of this the Dutch working-class throughout the nineteenth century has usually been characterized as docile, grateful to receive work of any kind. The Dutch economic historian Brugmans writes that the Dutch worker was "one dully resigned to his miserable existence, lacking the physical and spiritual strength to rouse himself, with too limited a development to make even the possibility of an improvement in his situation conceivable." 1 3 3 Employers were often seen as father figures, "philanthropists who gave work to the poor."131* This was true of both Catholic and non-Catholic workers. Many of the early trade unions were first conceived of as mutual aid societies and were decidedly non-militant. Their 79 statutes often contained a preamble denying the notion of class-conflict or noting that their aim of improving the lot of the working-class was done with a l l due respect for the different classes in society. In 1872 a local of the cigar makers union in Rotterdam (non-Catholic) in a collective letter to their employer thanking him for a raise noted that "workers themselves and not necessarily society were largely to blame for their poverty." 1 3 5 A number of commentators in the second half of the nineteenth century make note of the harmonious relations existing between employers and employees in the Netherlands compared with the situation in countries like France. 1 3 6 When industrialization did begin in the late nineteenth century i t was s t i l l not as rapid or explosive as had been the case in Germany. Secondly many Catholic clergy could draw upon the lessons of history. Many had seen at first hand the consequences of industrialization in other countries and tried to forestall them in the Netherlands by organ-izing workers. The work of Father Poels in the mining district of Limburg has already been described. In attempting this task priests discovered that many workers were rather unco-operative and lacking in interest. Father Ariens in setting up a trade union for textile workers complained that he often could not entice workers to come to organizational meetings with a view to improving their condition unless alcoholic refreshments and entertainment were provided. 1 3 7 Although the working-class in the Netherlands was generally less militant than in other West European countries, the religious workers were particularly quiescent. Catholic and Protestant workers refrained from participating in the railway strike of 1903.138 In the case of 80 Catholic workers their attitudes can best be described as uncritical. These attitudes were in large part due to the influence of the Church and the Catholic educational system. Catholics were taught to accept the authority and guidance of the Church without question. Many Catholic priests thought that acquiring skills beyond elementary reading and arithmetic was their prerogative alone. If ordinary Catholics received any further education i t was in a trade school (boys) or a household school (girls). On an aggregate basis Catholics were less well educated than other blocs in Dutch society. For example in table 2.4 below one can see that Catholics are significantly underrepresented among those holding university degrees. Thus in 1947 while Catholics constituted 38.5 percent of the total population, only 18 percent of those holding degrees were Catholic. Over the years Catholics have been catching up with the rest of the population in terms of educational achievement, though as of 1961 they s t i l l lagged behind. 1 3 9 According to Catholic sociologist Matthyssen, this low level of educational achievement in the past can largely be explained by the lack of an extensive Catholic secondary school system. Before 1917 there were virtually no Catholic secondary schools in the Netherlands and Catholic students were discouraged from attending non-Catholic secondary schools.1**0 In the 1920s, when the Catholic emancipation movement was at its strongest, a program of building schools was begun which continued right up to the 1970s. By 1930 18 percent of a l l secondary students attended Catholic schools (Catholic population 35 percent of total). In 1947 26 percent of secondary students attended Catholic schools and in 1964 38 percent of a l l 81 Table 2.4 University Degree Holders by Year by Religion (per 10,000) Year C +J crJ t/> C •H +J cej rH « e U O CO •H CO JZ 4-> > JC + J O i-H • P crJ rH er) 3 U a. u to • C O c CO M o U Cu -H +-> p If) rH X CC) C r-( , , O 1-1 rH O (4 W U cS 3 g 6 CJ 3 +J Oi a) in <u o x : o o 1930 28 40 27 244 618 172 62 1947 51 73 52 371 982 174 92 1960 74 88 87 446 1157 204 116 Source: P. van Hooijdonk, "Intellectuele Emancipatie van de Nederlandse Katholieken in de laatsen jaren," Sooiale Wetensahappen, Vol. 8 (1965), p. 219, table No. 1. Note: Population consists of everyone over age 30. secondary students were attending Catholic schools (Catholics 38.5 and 40.4 percent of total population in 1947 and 1960 respectively). 1 1* 1 This shows the dramatic increase which occurred in the level of education of Catholics. Nevertheless the important point is that up to the 1960s Catholics were generally less well educated than the rest of Dutch society. This helps to explain why Catholics were less critical than non-Catholics and more open to suggestion and was one reason why clergy spent a great deal of time protecting their flocks from wayward influences. It should not be thought, however, that Catholics were completely undemanding or docile when faced by pressures from within or without their subculture. One can think of the Catholic population in terms of a market for services delivered by the 82 Church and one of the reasons for the v i a b i l i t y of the Church i n the Netherlands was the fac t that i t delivered goods i n a s a t i s f a c t o r y manner. In terms of the market analogy one can begin by asking to what degree the Dutch Catholic s p i r i t of Jansenism, so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy and the clergy, was evident i n the Catholic population at large. Could one say that there was a market for the rigorous control of the bishops? In the years following the reformation the p r a c t i c e of Catholicism was forbidden i n the northern part of the Netherlands. It took a high degree of motivation f o r Catholics to overcome t h e i r fears and pr a c t i c e t h e i r r e l i g i o n by attending mass at the so - c a l l e d secret churches. According to Thurlings, over the years the less motivated Catholics ceased to be Cath o l i c s . Only the more strong w i l l e d s u r v i v e d . 1 4 2 Most Catholics received a stern upbringing wherein not only the l o c a l pastor played a r o l e but also the school teacher and the parents. There i s evidence that Dutch Catholics quite w i l l i n g l y accepted many tenets of the Catholi c f a i t h and acted upon them. A. E. Die l s d i d a study i n 1951 on the attitudes of young women of d i f f e r e n t f a i t h s as to the number of future o f f s p r i n g they would l i k e . 1 1 * 3 She found that both Catho l i c and C a l v i n i s t women wished a s i g n i f i c a n t l y larger number of c h i l d r e n than other groups. Inst r u c t i v e are some of the responses given by Catholic women when asked how many ch i l d r e n they would l i k e : No occupation, 27 years of age: As many as our dear Lord finds s u i t a b l e . Household servant, 21 years of age: As many as God sees f i t to send me and I am not a f r a i d of 10. 83 Nurse, 32 years old: No limit, the more, the better, in the hope that God will bless me with a large number of children. Cleaner, 23 years of age: Even i f there would be 20, each child brings its blessing and every child is a new wonder. I find i t beautiful to work with God in the creation of a child; that is why they would a l l be welcome. God will help us whatever the circumstances. I enter into my marriage f i l l e d with joy.1**1* The Church catered to religious needs which to a large extent genuinely felt. To go to mass, to partake of communion and to receive absolution provided comfort and peace of mind for many Catholics. Although this market for religious needs was in large part created by the Church through early socialization i t nevertheless did exist and would not have immediately disappeared i f the Church had suddenly ceased to exercise its mechanisms of social control. What about the market for services less directly linked to religious needs? Did Catholics join Catholic sports organizations or sign up with Catholic health insurance programs purely because they were told to do so by their pastors? The influence of the Church did indeed tend to limit freedom of choice. The important point, however, is that for the most part this did not involve any unusual sacrifice on the part of Catholics. Or to put i t another way: there was no particular incentive for Catholics not to join or partake of a service offered by the relevant Catholic organization. As mentioned earlier many Catholic organizations provided services that were identical to or at least competitive with the services offered by their Protestant and neutral counterparts. This was particularly true in the area of trade unions in the post-war period. But i t was also largely true in the areas of broadcasting, newspapers, health services and so on where there were no marked differences in the 84 quality of the services rendered. In fact there is evidence that ordinary Catholics may have felt that the services offered by some of their own institutions were superior in quality—by non-religious standards. In 1960 the KRO did some marketing research asking which programs Catholics recognized. The names of both KRO programs and those of the other broad-casting organizations were included in the survey. The data are presented in table 2.5 below. The question asked of respondents was i f they recog-nized the program rather than i f they actually watched i t . Nevertheless i t is reasonably safe to infer that a high rate of recognition does tend to indicate that people watch the program as well. It is interesting to note that four out of the five top ranked programs were those broadcast by the KRO. Even more interesting is the fact that for the most part these programs can best be described as popular light entertainment. Catholics watched these programs not for religious reasons but because they wanted to be entertained. And i t appears the KRO was highly successful in catering to those tastes. Looking at the history of Dutch trade union development, i t is evident that the Catholic unions won a number of crucial economic battles. Father Poels was highly successful in playing upon the sentiments of Catholic workers. He exploited latent anti-north Holland feelings of the miners pointing out that the socialists had their base there. He led protests against mine management complaining that virtually a l l the higher executives of Dutch State Mines (the mines were operated by a state owned enterprise) were non-Catholic. Yet in the final analysis he was also able to exact decent wages from management. In 1915 the socialist as Table 2.5 TV Program Recognition by Broadcasting Organizations AVRO KRO NCRV VARA Program (Liberal) (Catholic) (Protestant) (Socialist) % Rank % Rank % Rank % Rank Attention (religious) Father Knows Best TV Dance Program Piste (cabaret) St. Germain des Pres (cabaret) Brandpunt (news program) Rooster (news program) 20.5 18 Saturday Evening Accords (religious) Monthly Concert Hour From Our Sports Editor Flipje the Sorcerer's Apprentice The Bennett Sisters Dutch Evening Lecture Quiz Show Ivanhoe Top or Flop Hitchcock (film series) Memo Source: KASKI, "De betekenis van het sociaal onderzoek van radio en tenevisie. Voorstel voor een onderzoek ten behoeve van de KRO," Memorandun No. 130 (1961), p. 18. 22.2 14 43.2 2 33.2 6 21.2 17 26.6 8 39.3 4 52.2 1 21.3 16 21.7 15 26.0 9 23.5 11 38.7 5 39.8 3 22.2 13 30.0 7 22.3 12 24.3 10 86 mineworkers went on s t r i k e demanding a 10 percent increase. They were joined by the Catholic unions. Mine management proved to be unyielding. F i n a l l y leaders of both Catholic and s o c i a l i s t unions asked Poels to intervene on t h e i r behalf. Poels talked to management and succeeded i n obtaining the f u l l 10 percent r a i s e . According to Th. Woltgens the influence of the s o c i a l i s t mineworkers union diminished considerably t h e r e a f t e r . l f * 5 On a European wide basis the success of the Dutch Church i n not a l i e n a t i n g Catholic workers has already been noted. Yet t h i s r a i s e s a further question: How did the Dutch Church also succeed i n not a l i e n a t i n g middle and upper-middle class C a t h o l i c s , Catholics with i n t e r e s t s not infrequently i n c o n f l i c t with those of Catholic workers? The answer l i e s i n that the Catholic Church, and the Catholic subculture as a whole, was s u f f i c i e n t l y f l e x i b l e and d i f f e r e n t i a t e d to provide a r o l e and status for Catholics of a l l classes. During the inter-war period and to some extent i n the 1940s and 1950s the parish church would organize r e t r e a t s for the d i f f e r e n t classes ensuring that a group on a r e t r e a t was homogeneous i n terms of socio-economic status. In the parish church i t s e l f people could, and did, pay for s p e c i a l l y reserved places. Those places nearer the a l t a r were correspondingly more expensive. Weddings and funerals could be arranged on a scale ranging from the austere to the grandiose, again p r i c e d accordingly. There were, and s t i l l are, several organizations catering to the r e c r e a t i o n a l , p r o f e s s i o n al and economic i n t e r e s t s of non-working-clas s C a t h o l i c s . In the south the p r e v a i l i n g anti-north sentiments helped r e i n f o r c e the l o y a l t y of Catholic businessmen and entrepreneurs to Catholic socio-economic organizations. Certain sectors l i k e the pottery 87 and porcelain industry, which were predominantly located i n the south of the Netherlands and i n Catholic hands, meant that for such businessmen a Catholic based organization was a natural choice. 1 1* 6 At the organizational l e v e l there was always a degree of tension between Catholic employers and Catholic trade unions and t h i s tension did at times threaten to damage the " b e a u t i f u l unity" of the Catholic sub-culture wrought by the Church. Yet generally the Catholic middle-classes played an important r o l e i n helping to maintain the cohesion and v i a b i l i t y of the Catholic subculture. Denied entrance to the c i v i l service and many professional a c t i v i t i e s l i k e medicine, f i r s t by law and l a t e r by covert and sometimes not so covert d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , many Catholics went into commerce and l i g h t manufacturing such as the pottery industry, gin making and the making of cigars. Many early Catholic entrepreneurs around the 1800s were newly a r r i v e d immigrants from Germany and played an important r o l e i n r e v i t a l i z i n g the rather stagnant condition of Catholic l i f e at that time. Later i n the nineteenth century Bismarck's Kulturkampf brought more Catholic businessmen and e n t r e p r e n e u r s . l k 7 Most of the major department store chains i n the Netherlands were started by such immigrants and these chains are s t i l l i n the hands of t h e i r o f f -spring . Firms i n the hands of Catholics often provided employment f o r C a t h o l i c s , thus helping to provide an environment suitable for i n s u l a t i n g Catholics from p o t e n t i a l l y damaging influences. The Church a c t i v e l y encouraged the development of enterprises owned by Catholics, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n areas i n the northern section of the Netherlands where Catholics were in a m i n o r i t y . l l t 8 The existence of a middle and upper middle-class within the 88 Catholic subculture, a l b e i t r e l a t i v e l y smaller than those of the other blocs, provided avenues for upward mobility. Although v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y among Catholics has been quite low,1"*9 i t did mean that those a s p i r i n g to higher goals could for the most part attempt to reach those goals without denying t h e i r Catholicism or having to move outside of the Catholic subculture. Generally speaking i n the twentieth century the range of Catholic organizations and i n s t i t u t i o n s was s u f f i c i e n t l y extensive to cater to the needs of Catholics whether they were plumbers or sculptors. There was always some tension between working and non-working-class elements; between the Church and c e r t a i n c u l t u r a l organizations such as those for a r t i s t s and writers. However the occurrence of Catholics r e j e c t i n g t h e i r f a i t h because of c o n f l i c t s of t h i s sort was rare. Most c o n f l i c t s were contained within the .confines of the Catholic subculture. There i s one further aspect of the c l i e n t e l e worth discussing. It i s r e l a t e d to the question of s o c i a l c o n t r o l . The notion of s o c i a l control usually implies control from above. Thus i n the case of the Catholic Church control emanates from the top, f i l t e r i n g down through the clergy onto the l a i t y . S o c i a l c o n t r o l , however, can also be h o r i z -o n t a l , that i s , control from one's peers. One c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Dutch society i s the high degree of s o c i a l conformity, a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c often thought to be r e l a t e d to the influence of Calvinism. In several respects Dutch c i t i z e n s appear to want to show to both God and t h e i r neighbours that they are good c i t i z e n s , that they have nothing to h i d e . 1 5 0 At a minimum Dutch people both Catholic and non-Catholic are very s e n s i t i v e as to what the neighbours might think of t h e i r behaviour. In the evening on a t y p i c a l street one i s able to observe through large p i c t u r e windows 89 fa m i l i e s going about t h e i r business. Many Catholics i n the past undoubtedly conformed to the precepts of the Church not only because of what the pastor might do or say but also because of what the neighbours might think. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the south, which was e n t i r e l y C a t h o l i c , and i n l a r g e l y homogeneous Catholic v i l l a g e s and towns i n the northern h a l f of the Netherlands, one's absence from mass could lead to a good deal of speculation among the neighbours. In more urbanized areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c i t i e s l i k e Rotterdam, pressure from one's peers, as well as from the Church may have been easier to avoid. Before the mid 1960s no mass attendance data were gathered, at least not on a systematic and r e l i a b l e b a s i s . 1 5 1 There are data, however, on the rate of Easter observance for the year 1956. Table 2.6 below gives some i n d i c a t i o n as to the v a r i a t i o n i n Easter observance within the Table 2.6 Easter Observance by Diocese, 1956 Location Percentage Groningen 92. .6 Utrecht 90, ,1 Haarlem 78. ,0 Rotterdam 72, ,5 Breda 94, .5 Den bosch 95, .4 Roermond 94, .9 Total 87, .9 Source: KASKI Memorandum No. 113, Table 20, p. 16. Netherlands. The highest rate of observance occurred i n the dioceses of Breda, Den bosch and Roermond which b a s i c a l l y cover the Catholic 90 southern part of the Netherlands. The dioceses of Groningen and Utrecht cover the eastern and northeastern part of the Netherlands which i s less populated and urbanized than the western part. In these two dioceses the rate of Easter observance i s almost as high as i n the south. The rate i s lowest i n the dioceses of Haarlem and Rotterdam which encompass major c i t i e s l i k e Amsterdam, Haarlem, Rotterdam, the Hague and Leiden. How did the l o y a l t y and willingness of Dutch Catholics to follow the di c t a t e s of the Church compare with that of Catholics i n other countries? In 1954 53.7 percent of West German Catholics attended mass at Easter. In A u s t r i a the figure was 42 percent for the year 1955. 1 5 2 In contrast i n the Netherlands the rate was 87.9 percent f o r the year 1956. Rates of Easter observance and even of mass attendance are not the best measures of r e l i g i o u s l o y a l t y . It i s d i f f i c u l t to p a r t i a l out the d i f f e r e n t influences or to judge how much s a c r i f i c e i s involved i n going to Easter mass. The best t e s t for observing the l o y a l t y of Dutch Catholics i s to note t h e i r behaviour under circumstances of s t r e s s . A number of times the allegiance of Catholics was severely tested. Yet i n a l l cases they ended up by obediently following the orders of the bishops. There was never a c r i s i s whereby a substantial number of Catholics revolted against the authority of the Church nor did there ever develop a strong a n t i - c l e r i c a l i s m based upon a pool of d i s a f f e c t e d Catholics such as i n France, Belgium, I t a l y or A u s t r i a . The example of the t e x t i l e workers union, Unitas, c i t e d e a r l i e r , i s worth describing i n greater d e t a i l . In 1912 i n a l l the churches of the eastern part of the Netherlands p r i e s t s read from the p u l p i t a l e t t e r from the bishops to the e f f e c t that t e x t i l e workers were forbidden to 91 remain as members of the inter-confessional textile workers union Unitas. Father Ariens, one of the founders of the union, was personally most upset by the decision of the bishops and feared the alienation of the Catholic workers from the Church. Nevertheless he proceeded to help carry out the order. The Catholic workers did give up their membership in Unitas but stubbornly refused to join the new Catholic union, Saint Lambertus. For the next four years the clergy worked to the utmost until the changeover to the new union was completed. Upon the completion of this task Father Ariens breathed a sigh of relief and noted gratefully "that not a single soul has been lost as a result of the Unitas conflict." 1 5 3 SUMMARY In this chapter, the discussion centered on the different elements of the Catholic subculture which accounted for its cohesion over time. Of particular importance was an ideology, dating from the time of the reformation, which emphasized rigorous orthodoxy and minimal contact with the rest of Dutch society. Since the re-installation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in 1853 in the Netherlands several generations of bishops per-ceived Dutch society as threatening and anti-Catholic. At the same time they fostered ultra-montane sentiments hoping that one day a l l of the Netherlands would once again be Roman Catholic. While pragmatically pursuing a course of peaceful co-existence with the rest of Dutch society, they also attempted to insulate Catholics from that society. The bishops were aided in this by a willing clergy, a willing lay leadership and a willing clientele. In part the impetus for the development of the vast organizational network that began to take shape at the turn of the century and which came 92 into its fu l l bloom in the inter-war period, derived from a heightened social awareness on the part of progressive clergy and Catholic laity. As well, there was the feeling that Catholics needed to be emancipated on a collective basis. However, the predominant theme and role of most Catholic organizations came to be the protection of Catholics from outside influences. Social control and coercion on the part of the Church were important in ensuring the loyalty of rank-and-file Catholics to the Church. But i t should be stressed that loyalty to the Church did not involve an unusual degree of self-sacrifice or voluntarism. There was a strong element of self-interest involved in the behaviour of Catholics. First of a l l the individual Catholic's spiritual needs and comforts were catered to by the Church. Secondly the services rendered by Catholic organizations in secular areas were of sufficient quality that a working-class Catholic, for example, did not need to join a socialist trade union. Clergy played an important role in obtaining social justice for workers, poor farmers and less well off groups during the period of industrialization. In the post World War II period, when the predominant motive was the insulation of Catholics from the rest of society through the means of Catholic organizations, these organizations nevertheless remained competitive in quality with other organizations. Catholic organizations offered services which were often identical to those of their neutral and Protestant counterparts. Another point that should be noted is that the Catholic subculture became highly differentiated over the years. There came into existence several highly specialized organizations which had l i t t l e in common with one another. Many of them operated quite autonomously. This can be seen as a factor contributing to the strength of the Catholic subculture; the flowering and institutionalization of many interests allowed the Catholic 93 population to operate i n numerous ways as a miniature society within a larger society. There was a c e r t a i n amount of i n t e r a c t i o n between the leaders of the major national socio-economic organizations within the Catholic sub-culture. These were also the organizations l i k e l y to have c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . But usually c o n f l i c t s between, for example, labour and employers remained within c e r t a i n bounds and were often resolved by agree-ing to disagree. Rigid subcultural boundary maintenance, as well as a degree of co-ordination, was provided by a h i e r a r c h i c a l l y structured Church. The bishops acted as o v e r a l l watchdogs. Chaplains were appointed to national Catholic organizations and at the l o c a l l e v e l the parish p r i e s t s acted as s p i r i t u a l advisers to l o c a l or diocesan organizations. And when serving the s p i r i t u a l needs of Catholics at mass, confession, and during home v i s i t s the Church obtained a further degree of control over the behaviour of Dutch Catholics. 94 FOOTNOTES S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (Eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967); V. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and P o l i t i c a l Cohesion i n the Smaller European Democracies." Comparative P o l i t i c s , Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jan., 1971), pp. 153-155ff.; R. Rose and D. Urwin, "Soc i a l Cohesion, P o l i t i c a l Parties and Regime S t r a i n s . " Comparative P o l i t i c a l Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 ( A p r i l , 1969), pp. 7-67. G. Dekker, Ret Kerkelijk Gemengde Huwelijk in Nederland (Meppel: J . A. Boom, 1962), p. 99. Centraal Bureau voor de S t a t i s t i e k (CBS), Vrije-tijdsbesteding in Nederland Winter 1955/56, Deel 9 (Zeist: W. de Haan, 1959), pp. 19, 21; Katholiek S o c i a a l - K e r k e l i j k Instituut (KASKI), "De pastorale funktie van het katholiek verenigingsleven. Een godsdienst-sociologisch onderzoek i n een middelgrote stad van N.O. Nederland." Rapport No. 227, 1959, p. 47. G. Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany: A Study in Working-Class Isolation and National Integration (Totowa: The Bedminster Press, 1963). J . S. F u r n i v a l l , Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cam-bridge: Cambridge Uni v e r s i t y Press, 1939); M. G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1965). Lorwin, p. 143. R. Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967); R. Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 3 f f . See also F. Parkin, Class Inequality and P o l i t i c a l Order (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1971), pp. 79-102; E. Popitz et a l . , Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters (Tubingen: Mohr, 1957). P. Shively, "Party I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , Party Choice, and Voting S t a b i l i t y : The Weimar Case," The American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 4 (December 1972), pp. 1220-1223. K. D. McRae has taken t h i s approach as well although I think he errs i n seeing l i n g u i s t i c and r a c i a l cleavages as being s i m i l a r i n nature to r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l cleavages. See K. D. McRae (Ed.), Consocia-tional Democracy: P o l i t i c a l Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 26. My approach i s what Przeworski and Teune would c a l l a "Most D i f f e r e n t Systems" design. A. Przeworski and H. Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry . 95 (New York: Wiley, 1970), pp. 34-39. For a discussion of the d i f f e r e n c between r e l i g i o u s l y based blocs and r a c i a l l y based blocs see R. Rogowsk Rat-tonal Legitimacy: A Theory of P o l i t i c a l Support (Princeton: Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974), esp. p. 100. A. Rabushka and K. A. Shepsle, P o l i t i c s in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus: M e r i l l , 1972), pp. 12-21; J . S. F u r n i v a l l , passim; M. G. Smith, passim. Netherlands Central Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s (CBS), Historical Statistics of the Netherlands, 1899-1974 (The Hague: S t a a t s u i t g e v e r i j , 1975), p. 37. CBS, Statistich Zakboek 1974 (The Hague: S t a a t s u i t g e v e r i j , 1974), p. 57. See f o r example, G. Weil, The Benelux Nations: The P o l i t i c s of Small-Country Democracies (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 60. Unfortunately Weil does not c i t e the source of h i s information. For a c r i t i q u e of the l i t e r a t u r e on race i n the Netherlands see J . P. K r u i j t , De Onkerkelikheid in Nederland: Haar Verbreiding en Oorzaken; Proeve ener Sociografiese Verklaring (Groningen: Noordhoff, 1933), esp. pp. 311-323. J . Goudsblom, Dutch Society (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 59. Ibid., p. 60. I. Schoffer, "De Nederlands Confessionele P a r t i j e n 1918-1939," i n L. Scholten et al. (Eds.), De Confessionelen (Utrecht: Ambo, 1968), pp. 53-54. I. Gadourek, A Dutch Community (Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1956). R. Hoggart, passim. M. van der Plas, Uit het Rijke Roomsche Leven: Een Documentaire over de Jaren 1925-1935 (Utrecht: Ambo, no date), passim. For example many Catholic f a m i l i e s subscribed to a magazine written i n I t a l i a n , emanating from Rome. It i s highly u n l i k e l y that the majority of Dutch Catholics would be conversant with the I t a l i a n language i n the inter-war period. See Van der Plas, p. 11. Ibid., p. 20. Gadourek, pp. 220-221. Vrije-tijdsbesteding in Nederland Winter 1955-56, p. 20. Gadourek, p. 221. 96 R. A. Knox, The Belief of Catholics (New York: Harper, 1927); N. van Doornik, Bet Katholiek Geloof in Hedendaagse Gestalte (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1965), p. 190. M. Williams, The Catholic Church in Action (New York: MacMillan, 1934), pp. 3, 59. J . Poeisz, "God's People on the Way," i n M. van der Plas and H. Suer (Eds.), Those Dutch Catholics (London: Chapman, 1967), p. 89. F. Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1966), p. 18. Ibid., p. 23ff. J. Ellemers, "The Revolt of the Netherlands: The Part Played by Religion i n the Process of Nation-Building," Social Compass, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1967), p. 96. Ibid., p. 99. J . de Kok, Nederland op de Breuklijn Rome-Reformatie (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1964), p. 69. R. Fruin, "De Wederopluiking van het Katholicisme i n Noord-Nederland, omstreeks den Aanvang der XVIie Eeuw," c i t e d i n Ellemers, p. 103. L. J . Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme in Noord-Nederland in 16e en 17& Eeuw, Vol. 4 (Amsterdam: E l s e v i e r , n.d.), pp. 749-766. P. Geyl, "De Protestantisering van Noord-Nederland," i n G. Beekelaar (Ed.), Vaderlands verleden in Veelhoud (The Hague: N i j h o f f , 1975), pp. 209-221. J. Thurlings, De Wankele Zuil: Nederlandse Katholieken tussen Assimilatie en Pluralisme (Nijmegen: Katholieke Documentatie Centrum, 1971), p. 56. Ibid., p. 64. Ibid., p. 77. Rogier, p. 703. Ibid., p. 733ff. H. Laan, De Rooms-katholieke Kerkorganisatie in Nederland: een Sociologisch Structuur Analyse van het Bisschoppelijk Bestuur (Utrecht: B i j l e v e l d , 1967), p. 91. Rogier, p. 747. Thurlings, p. 64. 97 J. G r i b l i n g , P.J.M. Aalberse (Utrecht: De Lanteern, 1961), p. 96. De Katholiek in het Openbare Leven van deze Tijd. B i s s c h o p l i j k Mandement van 1954 (Zeist, 1954), passim. Thurlings, p. 73. Cited i n Thurlings, p. 24. Ibid., p. 25. L. J . Rogier, Het Verschijnsel der Culturele Inertie b i j de Nederlandse Katholieken (Amsterdam: Urbi et Orbi, 1958), passim. Thurlings, p. 27. Ibid., p. 91. L. J . Rogier and N. de Rooy, In Vrijheid Herboren: Katholiek Nederland, 1853-1953 (The Hague: Pax, 1953), pp. 34-73. J . de Jong, P o l i t i e k e Organisatie na 1800 in West Europa (The Hague: N i j h o f f , 1951), p. 331. Rogier and De Rooy, p. 623. C. Ruygers, "De Katholiek i n de PvdA," Socialism en Democratie, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1954), p. 427. Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme in Noord-Nederland, p. 703. F. van Heek, Eet Geboorte-Niveau der Nederlandse Rooms-Katholieken (Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1954), p. 126. Ibid., pp. 125-128. Thurlings, "The Case of Dutch Catholicism," Sociologica Neerlandica, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1971), p. 136. For a d e s c r i p t i o n of the generally C a l v i n i s t i c character o f the Dutch population as a whole i n the s i x -teenth and seventeenth centuries, see Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme in Noord-Nederland, Vol. 5, 1072ff; for a discussion of the Dutch national character and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to Calvinism i n the twentieth century, see A. Chorus, De Nederlander i n n e r l i j k en u i t e r l i j k : Een characteristiek (Leiden: S i j t h o f f , 1964). Cited i n Van Heek, p. 169. Ibid., p. 131. De Jong, p. 320; H. Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition i n a Segmented Society," i n R. Dahl (Ed.), P o l i t i c a l Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale-University Press, 1966), pp. 200-201. 98 6<* Laan, p. 31. 6 5 Ibid., p. 155. 6 6 J. Windmuller, Labor Relations in the Netherlands (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 36. 6 7 Ibid., p. 36. 6 8 See, for example, Statuten van de katholiek radio omroep (Hilversum, 1973), pp. 18-20. 6 9 Laan, p. 188. 7 0 Van Heek, p. 164. 7 1 W. Goddijn, De beheerste kerk (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973), p. 102. 7 2 Daalder, p. 208 (fn. 43). 7 3 Windmuller, p. 23. 7 h Rogier and De Rooy, p. 469. 7 5 Ibid., p. 469. 7 6 Laan, p. 190. 7 7 S. Stokman, Het verzet van de Nederlandse Bisschoppen tegen nationaal-sooialisme (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1945), p. 23. 7 8 S. Vellenga, Katholiek Zuid-Limburg en het Fascisme (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1975), p. 41. 7 9 Ibid., p. 27. 8 0 Stokman, p. 40. 8 1 A. Manning, "Geen doorbraak van de oude structuren," i n Scholten, p. 72. 8 2 J. Beaufays, Les Partis Catholiques en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas 1918-1958 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1973), p. 410. 8 3 Ibid., p. 410. 8 l f KASKI, "Enige aspekten van de religieuze en sociale achtergrond van het mandement van de nederlandse bisschoppen betreffende de katholiek i n het openbare leven van deze t i j d , " Memorandum No. 7, 1954. This docu-ment presented evidence on the under-representation of Catholics i n higher strata with p a r t i c u l a r reference to the c i v i l service. 8 5 D. de Lange, "Dutch Catholicism," Delta, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 1966), p. 22. 99 Bisschoplijk Mandement van 1954, -pp. 38-46. A. Manning, "Uit de voorgeschiedenis van het Mandement van 1954," Jaarboek van het Katholieke Documentatie Centrum, Vol. I (1971), pp. 140-142. KASKI, Rapport No. 227, p. 47. Thurlings, "The Case of Dutch Catholicism," p. 132. Van Heek, p. 167. KASKI, "Het beeld van en de waardering voor het g e e s t e l i j k beroep; probleem-stelling voor een so c i o l o g i s c h onderzoek naar het roepingen- . vraagstuk i n Nederland," Memorandum No. 155, 1964, pp. 35-36. Ibid., p. 37. Van de Plas, Uit het Eijke Roomsohe Leven, pp. 40-59. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1965), passim. One pastor had a parishioner with a chip on his shoulder, someone who supported the Catholic caucus i n the PvdA. This person was quite argumentative and would have long t a l k s with the pastor. Yet t h i s person was an exceptional case. " I f people r e a l l y disagreed with the Church they j u s t l e f t . You never heard from them again" (Interview No. 23). The document, Codex-Juris Canonici, contains the o f f i c i a l Canon law of the Church and was handed down by the Pope i n 1918. In 1924 the Dutch Church province revised a l l i t s statutes to ensure that a l l rules and regulations were consistent with the provisions of the Codex of 1918. Among other things the d e t a i l e d Codex of 1924 for the Dutch Church province s p e l l e d out the colour of shoes to be worn by p r i e s t s , the type of b i c y c l e to be used, etc. In order f o r a p r i e s t to attend a play or f i l m , permission from h i s bishop was required. This l a t t e r regulation was changed i n 1949 but the document remained e s s e n t i a l l y the same u n t i l 1965. See Laan, pp. 52-53, 174-181. KASKI, "Rapport over de priesterroepingen van sekulieren en regulieren i n Nederland," Rapport No. 72 (n.d.), p. 1. W. Goddijn, p. 102. Ibid., p. 102. KASKI, "Memorandum betreffende de priesterroepingen u i t de boerenstand i n het gebied van de noordbrabantse c h r i s t e l i j k e boerenbond," Memorandum No. 67, 1958; J . Poeisz, "Determinants sociaux des i n s c r i p t i o n s dans les seminaires et des ordinations de nouveaux pretres aux Pays-Bas," Social Compass, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1963), p. 508. 100 1 0 1 KASKI, Rapport No. 72, p. 8. 1 0 2 Rogier and De Rooy, p. 464. 1 0 3 A. Querido, De wit-gele vlam: gedenkboek tev gelegeriheid van het 50-jarig bestaan van de Rationale Federatie het Wit-Gele Kruis 1923-1973 (Tilburg: Bergmans, 1973), p. 80. 1 0 h Rogier and De Rooy, pp. 460-463. 1 0 5 J . G r i b l i n g , P.J.M. Aalberse (Utrecht: De Lanteern, 1961), pp. 47, 85. In terms of ideology i t i s d i f f i c u l t to c l a s s i f y these lay Catholics and clergy concerned with the ' s o c i a l question.' Some, l i k e Aalberse, were d e f i n i t e l y i n favour of i n s u l a t i n g Catholics from the rest of Dutch society as well as helping them i n a material sense and thus they can be said to have been under the influence of the i s o l a t i o n i s t ideology. Others, more concerned with s o c i a l welfare than i s o l a t i o n , can perhaps be broadly defined as emancipationist i n outlook as well as affected by an acute sense of s o c i a l j u s t i c e . A l l , however, took the provisions of Rerum Novarum extremely s e r i o u s l y and the l i t e r a l n e s s with which they interpreted these provisions can be said to be i n part a function of the Dutch C a l v i n i s t s p i r i t . 1 0 6 Ibid., p. 86. 1 0 7 Windmuller, pp. 28-29. 1 0 8 Van Heek, p. 135. For a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the l i f e and work of Father Poels see J . Colsen, Poels (Roermond: Romen en Zonen, 1955). 1 0 9 R. Dieteren, De migratie in de mijnstreek 1900-1935 (Nijmegen: Centrale Drukkerij, 1962), p. 34. 1 1 0 Ibid., p. 37. 1 1 1 Van Heek, p. 135. 1 1 2 Dieteren, p. 24. 1 1 3 Windmuller, p. 70; Rogier, p. 624. 1 1 1 1 As per Interview No. 37. Respondent was an o f f i c i a l of the Catholic Middle-Class Organization. 1 1 5 W. Petersen, " F e r t i l i t y trends and population p o l i c y : some comments on the Van Heek-Hofstee debate," Sociologioa Neerlandioa, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1967), pp. 2-16. 1 1 6 Catholic Action was f i r s t organized by Pope Pius XI i n 1922 (Papal e n c y c l i c a l Urbi Arcano) i n order to give the l a i t y some r o l e i n a p o l o s t i c work as well as to a l l e v i a t e the problem of a shortage of p r i e s t s i n the world i n general. In the Netherlands there r e a l l y was no shortage of p r i e s t s . Furthermore since the Dutch Church was much 101 stricter in i t s interpretation of the rules and regulations of the Church i t could see no clear role for Catholic Action. As a result this organization performed mainly technical tasks such as setting up chairs at Church functions etc. See Rogier and De Rooy, pp. 832-836. 1 1 7 Windmuller, pp. 135-138. 1 1 8 Ibid., p. 125. 1 1 9 In the village of Sassenheim, for example, Catholic and Protestant organizations kept s t r i c t l y to themselves in terms of looking for clientele. Gadourek, pp. 195-214, 238-271. 1 2 0 Thurlings, "The case of Dutch Catholicism," p. 133. 1 2 1 Rogier, p. 624. 1 2 2 Windmuller, pp. 69-71; M. P. Fogarty, C h r i s t i a n Democracy in Western Europe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 59-63; Rogier and De Rooy, p. 627; J. Veraart, Beginselen der P u b l i e k r e c h t e l i j k e B e d r i j f s o r g a n i s a t i e (Bussum: Brand, 1947); W. Rip, Landbouw en PubliekrechteliQke B e d r i f f s o r g a n i s a t i e (Wageningen: Veenman, 1952). 1 2 3 Windmuller, p. 137 (fn. 8). 12"* As per an interview with an o f f i c i a l of the Christian Employers Federation (1976). (Interview No. 3) 1 2 5 Ibid., p. 117. 1 2 6 R. Singh, Policy Development: A Study of the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1972), p. 120. 1 2 7 The name of the co-ordinating committee i s "Stichting Katholiek Maatschappelijk Beraad." See Pius Almanak: Adresboek Katholiek Nederland 1971 (The Hague, 1971). 1 2 8 Statuten van de katholieke radio omroep, pp. 18-20; Omroep ABC (Hilversum: Uitgave van het college van perschefs van AVRO, KRO, NCRV, NOS, TROS, VARA, VPRO, 1971), p. 58. 1 2 9 Pius Almanak 1971, pp. 265, 352. 1 3 0 Ibid., passim. 1 3 1 See P. Hall, "A Polycentric Metropolis: Randstad Holland," Delta, Vol. 10, Nos. 1 and 2 (Spring/Summer 1967), pp. 5-32. 1 3 2 W. Petersen, Planned Migration: The Social Determinants of the Dutch-Canadian Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 20. 102 1 3 3 Brugmans, "Koning Willem I als Neo-Mercantilist," c i t e d i n Petersen, p. 59. 1 3 1 > H. Hoefnagels, Een Eeuw Sooiale Vroblematiek: De Nederlandse Sooiale Ontwikkeling van 1850 tot 1940 (Alphen aan den Ri j n : Samson, 1974), p. 10. 1 3 5 Ibid., p. 7. 1 3 6 Ibid., p. 11. 1 3 7 Ibid., p. 71. 1 3 8 L. G. Verberne, De Nederlandse arbeidersbeweging in de 19e eeuw (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1959), p. 179. 1 3 9 CBS, De Ontwikkeling van het Onderwijs in Nederland Deel I (The Hague: Centraal Bureau S t a t i s t i e k , 1966), pp. 306-307. l l f 0 M. Matthijsen, Katholiek Middelbaar Onderwijs en Intellectuele Emanoipatie (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1958), p. 42. l k l De Ontwikkeling van het Onderwijs in Nederland, p. 148. l k Z Thurlings, De Wankele Zuil, p. 62. 1 1 + 3 A. D i e l s , "Opvattingen van ondertrouwde vrouwen omtrent de grootte van haar toekomstig gezin," c i t e d i n Van Heek, p. 171. l k k Ibid., pp. 172-173. 1 4 5 Th. Woltgens, "Mislukte Doorbraak: Geschiedenis van de S o c i a l i s t i s c h e Mijnwerkersbond 1909-1965" ( S c r i p t i e : Volkshogeschool Valkenburg, 1966), p. 13. l l f 6 Petersen, p.183. l h 7 Thurlings, pp. 25-26. 1 1 + 8 KASKI, "Godsdienstig-sociale aspekten van de i n d u s t r i e l i s a t i e i n Nederland," Rapport No. 85, 1952, passim. l k S J . van Tulder, Sooiale Stijging en Daling in Nederland, Vol. I l l (Leiden: H. E. Stenferd Kroese, 1962), p. 219. 1 5 0 A. Chorus, p. 79. 1 5 1 KASKI did not begin gathering mass attendance data u n t i l 1965 when i t became evident that attendance was beginning to decline. Some in d i v i d u a l parishes and deaneries c o l l e c t e d data. But t h e i r means of measuring mass attendance varied considerably so as to make these data u n r e l i a b l e . 103 1 5 2 KASKI, "Katholicisme i n West-Europa en de wereldkerk," Memorandum No. 113, 1960, pp. 21-22. 1 5 3 Cited i n Van Heek, p. 167. There are further examples. The mine-workers had at f i r s t received dispensation from the Bishops i n 1906 concerning the 'Catholics only' r u l e . By 1918, however, Cathol i c miners were also asked to become members of 'Catholics only' trade unions. They duely complied. During the 1930s most Dutch Catholics who had joined the National S o c i a l i s t League (NSB) did give up t h e i r membership when asked to do so by the Church. Thus i n the vast majority of cases the edicts of the bishops met with a p o s i t i v e response. Windmuller, r e f e r r i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y to the Unitas case, notes: " I t i s i n d i c a t i v e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Catholic workers and the Church, indeed of the e n t i r e r e l a t i o n s h i p between Dutch Catholics i n general and t h e i r Church, that i n t h i s and s i m i l a r issues the ultimate decisions were made by the highest d i g n i t a r i e s of the Church and were obediently accepted by the f a i t h f u l " (p. 23). In the case of Catholics and the NSB see Stokman, passim; Velenga, passim. Chapter III POLITICAL COHESION AS A FUNCTION OF SUBCULTURAL COHESION Why did the vast majority of Dutch Catholics vote f o r the Catholic party up to and including 1963? One obvious answer i s that the i n s t i t u -t i o n a l i z e d elements of the Catholic subculture such as the Church hierarchy, the clergy and various lay organizations had a high degree of control over the behaviour of Catholics, thereby ensuring a s o l i d basis of support f o r the Catholic party. Yet such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by i t s e l f would be inadequate. The Catholic party, l i k e the Catholic Broadcasting Organization (KRO) and Catholic trade unions, could not r e l y s o l e l y on the authority of the Church. There had to be some minimal' return, there had to be some j u s t i f i c a t i o n for i t s existence beyond the c a l l of the bishops that a Catholic party was necessary f o r the cohesion of the Catholic subculture. Even assuming that the Catholic population i n the Netherlands before 1960 voted simply on the basis of c l e r i c a l guidance, t h i s s t i l l leaves an important question: How did Dutch Catholics manage to f i e l d a party i n e l e c t i o n a f t e r e l e c t i o n , p a r t i c i p a t e i n v i r t u a l l y every government c o a l i t i o n from 1917 onwards and at the same time maintain a semblance of unity at the parliamentary l e v e l well into the 1960s? There were c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and economic i n t e r e s t s within the Catholic subculture which needed to be reconciled. Furthermore, the Catholic party could not 104 105 simply absolve i t s e l f of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the actions of Catholic cabinet ministers and for the behaviour of Catholic party members i n the Second Chamber.* I f the actions or p o l i c i e s of the Catholic party had been unsatisfactory or detrimental to the i n t e r e s t s of Catholic labour, farmers or employers the r e s u l t might have been s p l i t s within the party, defections or withdrawal of support. I f such incidents had occurred on a s u f f i c i e n t l y large scale then i t would have been a d i f f i c u l t matter marketing a viable and cohesive Catholic party. The electorate might have been faced with two or more competing Catholic p a r t i e s . Thus i n t h i s chapter I want to look f i r s t of a l l at how the Catholic party came into existence, how i t maintained a semblance of unity and the role i t played i n r e c o n c i l i n g d i f f e r i n g i n t e r e s t s . I w i l l show that the Catholic party was never important i n terms of advancing the i n t e r e s t s of the Catholic subculture; i t s r o l e was p r i m a r i l y a defensive one. Further-more the load placed upon the Catholic party with regard to being respon-s i b l e for r e c o n c i l i n g interests and f o r p o l i c y was never excessive. As well I w i l l examine the r o l e of the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy i n maintaining the unity of the Catholic party, i n ensuring that the number of defections and breakaway factions were kept at a minimum. Secondly, I want to look at the manner i n which the Catholic party and the Church were able to d e l i v e r the Catholic vote, the agencies involved and the techniques used, and the changes which occurred i n these processes * The Second Chamber constitutes the elected legislature i n the Netherlands and i s thus the most important of the two chambers. The equivalent i n a Parliamentary system based on the Westminster model would be the House of Commons. 106 over the years. And I want to examine how the Catholic population at large responded to these mobilization techniques, how they reacted to appeals over the years to remain true to the Catholic party, to maintain unity at a l l costs. I intend to argue that although a f a i r amount of energy was spent by the Church and other institutions, these efforts at mobilization were not unusually extravagant. In fact, particularly after World War II, the indirect use of the Church's authority was often suf-fic i e n t to ensure that unity was maintained at election time. 1. THE CATHOLIC PARTY AS A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION To what extent could the Dutch Catholic party be described as a well organized and disciplined p o l i t i c a l organization with a well-defined program, an organization which energetically and systematically tried to advance and implement the goals of the Catholic subculture? 1 In most respects the picture that emerges of the Catholic party i s the exact opposite; as a parliamentary party i t bordered on being a loose coalition of individual and group interests even at the best of times. In terms of ' policy the party's major role was the defence of the subculture's position vis-a-vis Dutch society. The behaviour of the Catholic party with regard to the other parties was marked by definite feelings of i n f e r i o r i t y . Furthermore, there was often a wide gulf between Catholic ministers in the cabinet and members of the parliamentary party and between the parliamentary party and the grass-roots level. At the same time the parliamentary party, from the late nineteenth century on, was usually blessed by the presence of a strong leader. This leader was usually in close touch with, and in turn highly dependent upon, the ecclesiastical hierarchy for maintaining the unity of the party, to 107 minimize the damage that breakaway factions could i n f l i c t upon the party. A l l these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n turn r e f l e c t elements of Dutch Catholic ideology described i n the previous chapter. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l be discussed a f t e r a h i s t o r i c a l overview. Origins. Attempts to e s t a b l i s h a Catholic p o l i t i c a l presence can be traced back to the e f f o r t s of Le Sage ten Broek i n 1813. Catholics had recently been given f u l l c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s . His e f f o r t s were aimed not so much at p o l i t i c a l organization as p o l i t i c a l education. Through his newspaper, De Ultramontaan, he t r i e d "to awaken even the most p r i m i t i v e f e e l i n g s of p o l i t i c a l confidence among C a t h o l i c s . " 2 In 1848 King William II granted responsible government. There were to be d i r e c t elections for municipal councils, p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e and the Second Chamber.3 The elections for the Second Chamber were to be based on the d i s t r i c t system. In that year Dommer van Poldersveldt proposed an " e l e c t o r a l organization for Catholics." 1* A central co-ordinating committee came into being but a f t e r a short period of time i t was disbanded by the organizers themselves. The reason given was that "awareness by the general p u b l i c of the existence of a Catholic e l e c t o r a l organization would place our fellow Catholics i n physical jeopardy." 5 This fear of non-Catholics and t h e i r reactions was to continue for well over a century. A f t e r 1848 Dutch e l e c t o r a l organizations of a l l kinds began to develop at the d i s t r i c t l e v e l (there were 50 d i s t r i c t s i n a l l ) , u s u ally dominated by l o c a l notables. Along with the various l i b e r a l and conser-vative organizations there was a handful of Catholic ones. Many Catholics, however, tended to support the secular L i b e r a l s e s p e c i a l l y i n the provinces of North and South Holland. These Cat h o l i c s , mainly young i n t e l l e c t u a l s centred around the Amsterdam newspaper, De Tijd3 saw t h e i r support for 108 liberalism as a means of securing their religious institutions. Specific-ally, they hoped i t might serve their cause of re-establishing the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy.6 They managed to obtain the support of the clergy in the south, who were important in mobilizing the vote, 7 and as a result many of the Catholics elected in the south were liberal in orientation. Aside from helping to mobilize the vote the clergy as a whole remained aloof from politics. 8 There was no Catholic party as such although Catholic politicians did tend to coalesce on certain issues such as those concerning parochial schools. One Catholic politician, Nuyens, writing in 1857 noted: If one understands the word "party" to mean a certain number of men, who share the same principles, and who defend similar interests then indeed there does exist a Catholic party. However, i f one understands this word to mean an association, organized with the aim of obtaining certain objectives, disciplined and led by a recognised leadership . . .no! then there exists in our group no such party. 9 In 1853 the Catholic-Liberal coalition, the Papo-Thorbecke coalition, was successful in re-establishing the Catholic hierarchy. However, the Liberals had not been so favourably disposed towards parochial education as had first been hoped. As well, many secular Liberals were rather snobbish which tended to offend Catholics. In 1864 the papal encyclical Quanta Curia demanded that a l l Catholics do their utmost to ensure their children received a Catholic education and warned against the dangers of liberalism. In 1868 the Dutch bishops reaffirmed the intent of Quanta Curia. 1 0 This contributed to a falling out between the Catholics and the Liberals. In 1870 the Roman Catholic Electoral Association "North Brabant" was organized under the leadership of J. B. van Son. It attacked the Liberal-Catholic coalition, thereby obtaining the support of 109 l o c a l clergy who were strongly influenced by Quanta Curia. It had immediate e l e c t o r a l success taking v i r t u a l l y a l l the seats i n that p r o v i n c e . 1 1 This marked the s h i f t away from the Papo-Thorbecke c o a l i t i o n of the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s. This s h i f t occurred l a r g e l y at the urgings of the clergy i n the two southern provinces. As well, manufacturers i n North-Brabant began to oppose the L i b e r a l s for economic reasons, namely the t a r i f f law of 1862 which had placed them at a disadvantage. 1 2 There was s t i l l no national l e v e l organization or federation of Catholic e l e c t o r a l associations, however. It was the example of the C a l v i n i s t s under the leadership of Groen van Prinsteren and Abraham Kuyper that gave the Catholics impetus towards developing some sort of party organization. Just as the Catholics were r e b e l l i n g against the L i b e r a l s , the orthodox C a l v i n i s t s were r e b e l l i n g against the Conservative party. Appealing to the 'small people' (kleyne Luyden ) with the claim that government i n s t i t u t i o n s and schools were no longer s u f f i c i e n t l y Protestant i n character, Van Prinsteren and Kuyper began organizing the Anti-School Law League i n 1872. 1 3 In that same year they also started the d a i l y newspaper, De Standaard. In 1879 the League, having enjoyed phenomenal growth, transformed i t s e l f into the A n t i -Revolutionary Party (ARP) (by 'revolution' they r e f e r r e d to the c e n t r a l i z -ing and secular p r i n c i p l e s of the French Revolution). 1" 1 In 1880 Father Herman Schaepman was elected to the Second Chamber and came to play a c r u c i a l r o l e over the next 23 years i n nurturing a nascent Catholic party. He perceived that there was a common cause to be made between Catholics and Anti-Revolutionaries with regard to the schools issue; both groups wanted control over t h e i r own educational system. Schaepman, i n s p i r e d by the proposed Anti-Revolutionary Program of 110 1878, designed a s i m i l a r document for Catholics and i n 1883 introduced "The Catholic Party: A Proposed Program." 1 5 Although an extremely energetic and imposing f i g u r e , Schaepman's e f f o r t s yielded only large scale c r i t i c i s m . A number of Catholic p o l i t i c i a n s f e l t that the needs of Catholics were best served by supporting the Conservative party. Within the Second Chamber there was a time during the f i r s t few years of the 1890s when there were a c t u a l l y two Catholic f a c t i o n s : a conservative f a c t i o n led by Ballmann from North Brabant and the democratic f a c t i o n led by Schaepman. 1 6 The two factions had meals i n separate sections of the parliamentary dining room; there was l i t t l e i n t e r a c t i o n between them. The point at issue between the two fac t i o n s was not so much t h e i r views on Catholic i n t e r e s t s with regard to schools, for example, but rather t h e i r views on the extension of the franchise and on how aggressive Catholics should be i n pursuing t h e i r goals. Conservative Catholics tended to r e f l e c t the i n t e r e s t s of Catholic businessmen. As w e l l , they f e l t that Catholics should maintain a low p r o f i l e i n p o l i t i c s . Schaepman, i n contrast, had connections with the already developing Catholic trade union movement and was quite w i l l i n g to use p o l i t i c a l means to achieve his aims. It was during t h i s period that Schaepman engineered the a l l i a n c e with the Anti-Revolutionaries. With an e l e c t o r a l system based on d i s t r i c t representation Catholics were at a disadvantage i n d i s t r i c t s outside of the south. Schaepman persuaded a number of Catholic e l e c t o r a l associations and clergy to support ARP candidates, thus allowing the e l e c t i o n of several ARP members where they normally would not have won. This meant that A n t i -Revolutionaries tended to be over-represented i n the Second Chamber compared with the C a t h o l i c s . 1 7 As well, since the ARP was better organized and more m i l i t a n t i t tended to take a leading r o l e i n the b a t t l e f or I l l confessional schools. Concessions were obtained i n 1889 and 1891 giving p a r t i a l state support to confessional schools. These concessions were due to the fact that the Catholic-ARP c o a l i t i o n had obtained an absolute majority within the Second Chamber i n the e l e c t i o n of 1888. And t h i s v i c t o r y i n turn was l a r g e l y due to the fact that the franchise q u a l i f i c a t i o n s had been lowered i n 1887. Most of the new voters turned out to be a n t i - L i b e r a l . In 1896 the franchise was extended once again. Schaepman's influence grew i n the 1897 e l e c t i o n . 1 8 As w e l l , he was helped consid-erably by the progressive papal e n c y c l i c a l Rerum Novarum. In 1896 the Catholic members of the Second Chamber gathered i n the c i t y of Utrecht. They promised to accept f a i t h f u l l y a l l papal e n c y c l i c a l s i n the formulation of t h e i r programs and i n p a r t i c u l a r to use Rerum Novarum as the basis for t h e i r program with regard to s o c i a l q u e s t i o n s . 1 9 The acceptance of a common program by Catholic members of the Second Chamber did not imply the development of a national party organi-zation. That event did not occur u n t i l 1904—one year a f t e r Schaepman's death—when the General League of Roman Catholic E l e c t o r a l Associations came into being. This league consisted of a central o f f i c e and a l l Roman Catholic e l e c t o r a l associations who were considered co-equal with the c e n t r a l o f f i c e . In spite of attempts to provide as much autonomy as possible for i n d i v i d u a l associations, the North Brabant association refused to j o i n the league. 2 0 At t h i s point the bishops were s t i l l ambivalent about Catholics p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p o l i t i c s and thus made no e f f o r t s to ensure a cohesive Catholic party. There were annual meetings of the League with representatives from the i n d i v i d u a l associations as well as an executive. The League for the 112 most part remained a purely e l e c t o r a l organization. In the Second Chamber Catholic members were not a very cohesive group. From the av a i l a b l e evidence i t appears that they were highly u n d i s c i p l i n e d when i t came to voting on d i f f e r e n t b i l l s . 2 1 In 1917 the j o i n t e f f o r t s of the ARP and Catholics came to f r u i t i o n with the so-called " P a c i f i c a t i o n . " This agreement, the r e s u l t of a bargain among the L i b e r a l s , ARP and Cath o l i c s , with the S o c i a l Democratic Party (SDAP) playing a supporting r o l e , resolved an unusually severe cabinet c r i s i s . P a c i f i c a t i o n not only gave f u l l state support f o r confessional schools but also f u l l suffrage for a l l males over 21 (women received the vote i n 1919) and a d i r e c t proportional e l e c t o r a l system. 2 2 The new e l e c t o r a l system had two e f f e c t s on the cohesiveness of the Catholic party. For one, the l i s t system, as required by the propor-t i o n a l e l e c t o r a l system, meant that a greater degree of c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and co-ordination was necessary on the part of the League i n order to present a single l i s t to the ent i r e country. On the other hand, the p o s s i b i l i t y of a u n i f i e d party was threatened by the ease with which Catholi c s p l i n t e r groups could enter parliament by v i r t u e of the extremely low threshold requirement. The League was helped, however, by the Church hierarchy. The bishops i n 1918 forbade Catholic s o c i a l organi-zations from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p o l i t i c s and ruled that the R.C. League was the only appropriate p o l i t i c a l organization for Catholics. Smaller Catholic p a r t i e s which did compete i n the e l e c t o r a l arena were e f f e c t i v e l y cut o f f from such s i g n i f i c a n t bases of d i r e c t support as the Catholic trade unions and the c l e r g y . 2 3 113 The most powerful competitor of the Catholic party in the early 1920s was the Saint Michael's League, a left-wing Catholic political movement attracting the support of many young Catholics and Catholic workers. It did not actually run in elections but threatened to do so and proved to be a,demoralizing force for the Catholic party. At the request of the bishops, negotiations were begun between the R.C. and the Saint Michael's Leagues. In 1923 an agreement was reached. Saint Michael would be incorporated into the main R.C. League with the understanding that the R.C. League would.transform itself from a mere league to a genuine demo-cratic national Catholic party. A committee was named and the Roman Catholic State Party (RKSP) was bom in 1926.Zk The re-organization involved a central party council and greater supervision of the 18 riding associa-tions. A research bureau was set up which was responsible for drafting election programs and consulting Catholic social organizations as to their interests and demands. This did not end centrifugal tendencies within the party or the rise of competing Catholic political organizations. However, the Catholic party from then on demonstrated a remarkable capacity to contain conflict within the confines of the organization and to absorb or co-opt the competition. These central features of the Catholic party endured well into the late 1960s when significant elements of the party walked out never to be re-absorbed. The Instrumentality of the Catholic Party. What explained the unusual capacity of the Catholic party to contain and absorb conflict? In part the party did not require rigid adherence to a set of principles and rules on the part of the membership. The bishops merely said that there should be only one Catholic party. This allowed for a 114 great deal of f l e x i b i l i t y which was enhanced by the fact that most people viewed the party, and the need f o r a party, i n instrumental terms. Much of the l i t e r a t u r e on p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and p o l i t i c a l processes focusses not only on the concrete functions they perform but also on t h e i r a f f e c t i v e or symbolic r o l e s . 2 5 Not only mass publics but also e l i t e members of s o c i e t i e s tend to develop l o y a l t i e s and emotional t i e s to t h e i r party. In the case of Dutch Catholics and the Catholic party i t would be f a l s e to say that the Catholic party was t o t a l l y without emotional s i g n i f i c a n c e or that those involved i n the Catholic party did not take pride i n t h e i r work. A common denominator, however, among many Catholic p o l i t i c a l leaders, as well as the bishops, was t h e i r ambivalence about the very need for a Catholic party. The only emotional s i g n i f i c a n c e of the party lay i n i t s contribution to the unity of the Catholic subculture. Schaepman himself, usually seen as the father of the Catholic party, favoured an inter-confessional p a r t y . 2 6 He had hoped that co-operation with the ARP would lead to the development of a sing l e C h r i s t i a n party. For Schaepman, the development of a Catholic party was necessary only insofar as there was no a l t e r n a t i v e . In his view Catholic i n t e r e s t s needed p o l i t i c a l representation and goals such as state support for confessional schools could only be obtained through p o l i t i c a l a ction. For these functions, i n Schaepman's view, a centre party with an i n t e r -confessional basis was s u f f i c i e n t and therefore preferable. But since the ARP was unw i l l i n g to j o i n i n such a venture a strong Catholic party remained necessary. Schaepman's feelings were not unique. The p o s i t i o n of most Catholic p o l i t i c i a n s during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was to look to e x i s t i n g p a r t i e s as vehicles for promoting both Catholic i n t e r e s t s and 115 their own personal socio-economic interests and those of the special interest groups to which they belonged. Thus we have Catholic political leaders f i r s t supporting the Liberals; then fli r t i n g with the Conservatives; and then supporting the ARP. In the years immediately following the introduction of a propor-tional electoral system in 1918 the proposal for a more centralized Catholic party received considerable opposition from certain Catholic political leaders. P. J. M. Aalberse, considered to be one of the more outstanding figures in Dutch Catholic history, protested this development. He thought a Catholic party unnecessary and even dangerous. A Catholic political party would have to take at least some responsibility for un-popular government measures. Blame might f a l l on the Church thus doing irreparable damage to its position in Dutch society. Finally, i t might evoke retaliatory measures by non-Catholics against Catholics. 2 7 Aalberse was one of the most active, intelligent and socially progressive of Catholic leaders. Furthermore, he was an avowed Catholic and proud of i t . As a student at the University of Leiden he was instru-mental in organizing the Catholic Student Society as a reaction against the secular, liberal oriented Leiden Student Corps. He was a strong proponent of national Catholic trade unions. In fact he was an advisor to, and a supporter of, the bishops in their decision to order Catholic workers to abandon the textile workers union, Unitas. Yet when i t came to defining the Catholic position vis-a-vis the political world, Aalberse stopped short. In part his views were based on perceptive analysis but also in part they were influenced by the isolationist tendencies of Dutch Catholicism and the collective inferiority complex from which the Dutch Catholic subculture suffered. 116 Generally the Catholic party lagged behind other Catholic organi-zations i n terms of i n s t i t u t i o n a l development. When i t did achieve a formal existence i n 1926 i t tended to be overshadowed i n importance by the newly formed KRO and the Catholic University. These i n s t i t u t i o n s , during the inter-war period, were much more l i k e l y to s t i r f e e l i n g s of pride i n the hearts of Dutch Catholics. And Catholic trade unions and employer associations were much more advanced when i t came to obtaining approval and support from the b i s h o p s . 2 8 The period immediately following World War II i s also i l l u s t r a t i v e The German occupation had brought many people from the d i f f e r e n t blocs together, e s p e c i a l l y within the resistance movement. And i t was during t h i s time that several Catholics decided that the p i l l a r i z e d structures i n Dutch society were unnecessary and wasteful. The post-war Labour party (PvdA, based on the pre-war SDAP) made a point of guaranteeing freedom of r e l i g i o n and r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s . Several left-wing Catholi joined the Labour p a r t y . 2 9 The Catholic hierarchy, however, led by Cardinal de Jong, made known i t s wish to see resurrected not only Catholic s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s but also the Catholic party. This process of re-bu i l d i n g Catholic i n s t i t u t i o n s received a head s t a r t by the fact that the southern Catholic part of the Netherlands was l i b e r a t e d f i r s t by the A l l i e and was thus a f e r t i l e area f o r the re-establishment of these i n s t i t u -3 0 t i o n s . Those left-wing Catholics who were committed to not r e s u r r e c t i n g the Catholic party were for the most part located i n the northern part of the country and unaware of what was happening i n the south. One of the more prominent leaders within the post-war Catholic party described what happened: 117 During the war I was active i n the "Nederlandse Volksbeweging" [a resistance movement] . . . I intended to become a member of the PvdA. . . . On thinking back I remember being quite upset when I saw a l l these Catholic party bureaucrats from before the war come down from T i l b u r g and Den Bosch [ c i t i e s i n the south of the Nether-lands] s e t t i n g up shop i n the Hague as i f absolutely nothing had changed. I asked, "Where di d you guys come from? I haven't seen you for years?" In the end I became involved with the Catholic party [KVP] because a f t e r a l l I was C a t h o l i c . I was a rather un w i l l i n g r e c r u i t , however. (Interview No. 4) Commitment to the Catholic party before the war was low. Among several Catholics at the end of the war, t h i s commitment had been lowered even further, l a r g e l y because of t h e i r experiences of co-operating with non-Catholics during the German occupation. Most p o l i t i c a l l y active C a t h o l i c s , however, did r e j o i n the new Catholic party. In part the leverage used by Catholic party leaders was emotional. They c i t e d the moral reasons given by the bishops, namely to safeguard the Catholic r e l i g i o n to ward o f f the e v i l s of communism. However, the three important Catholic leaders who did the actual work of resurrecting the party—Romme, Stokman and Witteman—also stressed pragmatic aspects. They were success-f u l i n r e c r u i t i n g not only older Catholics but also a number of young Catholic i n t e l l e c t u a l s by emphasizing the proposed s o c i a l l y progressive o r i e n t a t i o n of the new Catholic party. The party name was changed from the Roman Catholic State Party to the Catholic People's Party (KVP). The party's research bureau was given a new la b e l and a non-partisan a i r . 3 1 One such new r e c r u i t , hired to work i n the research i n s t i t u t e , noted: "For me the programmatic aspects were extremely important. I had to be convinced that the new party would be s o c i a l l y progressive, that i t would co-operate to the utmost with the PvdA. . . . My commitment was to the program not r e a l l y to the party" (Interview No. 16). 118 There were other p r a c t i c a l aspects as well. The ARP had f i r m l y re-established i t s e l f as had the C h r i s t i a n H i s t o r i c a l Union (CHU). The s i t u a t i o n was uncertain and the safest p r e d i c t i o n one could make i n the early post-war period was that the pre-war s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l structures would re-assert themselves. For many p o l i t i c a l l y a ctive Catholics i t seemed best to r e j o i n the Catholic party. A commitment to the Catholic party based on a strong l o y a l t y to the Church and a pragmatic commitment to the party meant that no unusual loads were placed upon the p a r t y — a t least f or the time being. There were no r i g i d p r i n c i p l e s to be upheld or to define beyond a commitment to uphold the i n t e g r i t y of the Church. This resulted i n a high degree of f l e x i b i l i t y and the a b i l i t y to co-opt diverse p o l i t i c a l tendencies. Policy and Programs. The Catholic party's f l e x i b i l i t y with regard to d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l a t titudes amongst the membership i s also r e f l e c t e d i n i t s p o l i c i e s and orientations towards the other p a r t i e s . The major stimulus which o r i g i n a l l y brought Catholics together i n the p o l i t i c a l arena was the schools issue. The agreement which resolved the demands involved i n that issue, the P a c i f i c a t i o n of 1917, served as a template for the r e s o l u t i o n of s i m i l a r issues as they came up. Broad-casting was organized on s o c i o - r e l i g i o u s l i n e s and state funds for health-care were channelled to s o c i o - r e l i g i o u s health-care agencies. The issues which were pushed by the Catholic party that could i n some sense be defined as Catholic were p r e c i s e l y these issues. Since the major goals had been achieved i n 1917 the t a c t i c s employed on most of the other issues can best be described as defensive ones aimed at safeguarding what had been won. For example, at various times attempts were made (mostly by the Li b e r a l s ) to do away with the p i l l a r i z e d nature of broadcasting and to 119 substitute an organization based on the model offered by the B r i t i s h Broadcasting C o r p o r a t i o n . 3 2 Each time t h i s topic was broached, the Catholic party, as well as the other confessional p a r t i e s , made i t known that they strongly opposed such a change. In 1965 when t h i s issue arose, the cabinet f e l l because one of the L i b e r a l ministers resigned when he f a i l e d to get h i s way i n d r a s t i c a l l y revamping the broadcasting system. The inter-war period (1918-1940) i s usually r e f e r r e d to as the heydey of the confessional p a r t i e s . At e l e c t i o n time the three p a r t i e s (ARP, CHU and RKSP) p o l l e d between them 50 to 60 percent of the vote. They dominated the cabinet usually taking the most important p o r t f o l i o s . Yet the Catholic party was never successful i n obtaining even modest r e l i g i o u s goals such as the repeal of the ordinance against r e l i g i o u s parades i n the northern section of the Netherlands. In part, t h i s was because the confessional p a r t i e s were l a r g e l y concerned with the problems of running a government. E s p e c i a l l y during the depression years the RKSP was pre-occupied with the debate about what to do with the overwhelming economic problems of the day. There were b a t t l e s within the Catholic party between the l e f t and the r i g h t wings as to what p o l i c i e s to support. The f l e x i b i l i t y of Catholic party ideology, however, permitted the party to flow with the general t i d e of opinion, whose tenor was set by the ARP. During the 1930s the RKSP supported, f o r the most part, f a i r l y conservative f i s c a l p o l i c i e s aimed at balancing the books and main-t a i n i n g the value of the gui l d e r . 3 1 * Religious issues remained i n the back-ground . In the post-war period Catholic party p o l i c y , again demonstrating a high degree of f l e x i b i l i t y , supported the Labour party. The emphasis i n the. immediate post-war period was on co-operation, the re b u i l d i n g of the economy and a high degree of s o c i a l j u s t i c e so that people would never 120 have to suffer again as in the depression of the 1930s. In this atmos-phere a series of coalition cabinets were formed in which the PvdA and the KVP were the major partners. The KVP stressed bread and butter issues such as increasing the stock of housing and family allowances. They noted that the resulting government policies were policies for the household, a theme which dovetailed nicely with Roman Catholic beliefs concerning the sanctity of the family. The only action by the KVP which was directly related to religious beliefs was their vetoe of a proposal to give a government grant to the humanist association, allegedly a group of atheists whom the KVP felt were determined to undermine the Christian basis of Dutch society. 3 5 It was in their relations with other parties that the general lack of self-confidence and uncertainty on the part of the Catholic subculture becomes evident. It was the ARP which had taken the initiative in fighting for f u l l state support for confessional schools. According to I. Schoffer in the inter-war period, in examining relations between Catholic and Protestant leaders, i t was plain to see who were the leaders and who were the led. 3 6 The fact that in 1920 Rhuis de Beerenbroeck became the first Catholic prime minister had a certain symbolic value, but he was generally conceded to be a rather weak figure. He was a kindly diplomatic person but had no strong leadership qualities. The ARP political leader, Colijn, who later became prime minister, was considered a much stronger (some would say obstinate) figure. 3 7 It was not that the Catholic parliamentary party lacked strong figures. P. J. M. Aalberse did outstanding work in his cabinet port-folio of social affairs, pushing through much needed social welfare legislation in the 1920s. He was considered a centrist and not part 121 of the RKSP's l e f t wing. Yet his one term cabinet appointment was not renewed though i t was known he would have continued i n that post i f i t had been offered to him again. Furthermore, he was never seriously pushed by the RKSP as a candidate for the prime m i n i s t e r s h i p . 3 8 On the other hand, the Catholic party was never unrepresented i n the cabinet, a record equaled by no other party. From 1918 to 1976 there was, with one exception, never a cabinet without Catholic representation. The one exception occurred i n 1939 but t h i s cabinet lasted only 15 days, demonstrating that a cabinet without Catholic representation would not have a very long l i f e expectancy. As Daalder points out i t has been more or less axiomatic i n Dutch p o l i t i c s that one can not bu i l d a cabinet without the Catholic p a r t y . 3 9 The refusal to take a strong position i n government, and the fear of being l e f t i n opposition, indicated both the Catholics' lack of self-confidence and t h e i r pragmatic, cautious approach. As w e l l , the behaviour of Catholic p o l i t i c a l leaders was ind i c a t i v e of the d i f -f i c u l t i e s involved i n balancing the different socio-economic interests within the Catholic subculture. By taking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for contro-v e r s i a l decisions there was considerable chance of alienating one or more of the factions within the party. And during the 1930s the Catholic Trade Union Movement did i n fact withdraw t h e i r support from the Catholic party. The constant Catholic presence i n cabinet was frequently c i t e d by Catholic party leaders as a reason why different interests should support the party: they would always have some voice i n and connection with government. Thus although the Liberals or SDAP/PvdA may have appeared to be more i n tune with t h e i r interests Catholics were t o l d that those parties 122 or any new Catholic s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s could do l i t t l e f o r them i f they were i n opposition. Leadership. I f the Catholic party had the reputation of d e l i v e r -ing weak and v a c i l l a t i n g cabinet members the exact opposite was true of parliamentary leadership. Since 1880 when Schaepman f i r s t entered the Second Chamber, the Catholic party always had a strong, a u t h o r i t a r i a n leader within parliament who stood head and shoulders above h i s colleagues. This person played a c r u c i a l r o l e i n dampening c o n f l i c t within the Catholic party, i n putting together c o a l i t i o n cabinets with leaders of the other p a r t i e s and i n leading and c o n t r o l l i n g the Cathol i c party caucus i n parliament. A companion of the unwritten r u l e that no cabinet s h a l l be formed without Catholic representation i s one that the Catholic party parliamentary leader never enters a cabinet himself. 1* 0 At f i r s t i t was a general percep-t i o n among Catholics, probably an accurate one, that non-Catholic Dutch society would never be able to accept a p r i e s t as a cabinet minister. Both Schaepman and h i s successor, Nolens, were p r i e s t s . This t r a d i t i o n of remaining outside of the cabinet was maintained by n o n - c l e r i c a l Catholic leaders following them. Undoubtedly strong leadership was necessary to help maintain some semblance of control within the Catholic party caucus. However, the r o l e of the Catholic party leader i s also i n d i c a t i v e of the ambivalence of the Catholic subculture towards the re s t of Dutch society; a subculture remaining i s o l a t e d , communicating with the non-Catholic world through a leadership which remained aloof, never f u l l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the a f f a i r s of state. 1 2 3 The three major Catholic party leaders, who between them c o n t r o l l e d the parliamentary party f o r well over 60 years, were stern, a u t h o r i t a r i a n f i g u r e s . Schaepman, Nolens and Romme were not well l i k e d by t h e i r fellow C a t h o l i c s . Yet they were e f f e c t i v e . For example, a member of the Catholic parliamentary caucus during the 1950s noted: Yes at times there was a great deal of discussion and argument. But usually at a ce r t a i n point Romme would stand up, everyone would become s t i l l , and Romme would say, "We are going to do so and so . . . " and that would be i t . No one would dare cross words with Romme. . . . I f he did he would pay for i t dearly. (Interview No. 1 6 ) . h l Relations between Cabinet and the Parliamentary Party. In parliamentary systems the l i n k between the government parliamentary party and the cabinet receives considerable attention from those concerned with questions of responsible government. The party i n power i s , i n the pu b l i c mind at le a s t , perceived as being responsible f o r government p o l i c i e s . The cabinet i s supposed to pay some attention to the wishes of the caucus. The parliamentary caucus i n turn i s obliged to support the cabinet; to defend government p o l i c y i n parliament and i n committees and to vote i n favour of government b i l l s . There i s often considerable tension between cabinet and the parliamentary caucus. Whips play an important r o l e i n maintaining party d i s c i p l i n e . A break i n government ranks usually indicates a p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s of some s i g n i f i c a n c e . The Dutch p o l i t i c a l system also enjoys responsible government. However, i n the Dutch system the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the parliamentary party and the cabinet i s much more muted. This has the consequence of helping parliamentary p a r t i e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r the Catholic party, to avoid major r i f t s or s p l i t s since they are to some degree absolved of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the cabinet's behaviour. A l l Dutch cabinets have been 124 c o a l i t i o n cabinets usually incorporating anywhere from four to eight p a r t i e s . Parties are r a r e l y regarded as responsible for p o l i c i e s c o l l e c t i v e l y decided upon by cabinets, although i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i e s have occa s i o n a l l y been seen as being responsible f o r the f a l l of cabinets. The f a c t that there i s l i t t l e or no sign of a party's platform or program i n government p o l i c i e s can be explained away by references to compromises that had to be made upon entering a c o a l i t i o n . Cabinet b u i l d i n g i n the Netherlands i s usually a long and arduous process often l a s t i n g f o r several months a f t e r an e l e c t i o n . Not infrequently an emergency cabinet w i l l govern the country while the cabinet b u i l d i n g process takes i t s course. Often a party's j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r entering a cabinet i s that i t does so in the national i n t e r e s t , as a means of r e s o l v i n g a deadlock. Another feature of the Dutch cabinet system i s the rather non-pa r t i s a n manner with which the cabinet i s regarded compared with the B r i t i s h and the Canadian systems. In order to enter the cabinet a member of parliament must resign h i s seat i n the Second Chamber. He or she i s no longer a member of e i t h e r parliament or the party caucus. A cabinet p o s i t i o n i s seen i n very statesman-like terms, a r o l e that must be performed i n very proper, d i g n i f i e d and at the same time bu s i n e s s - l i k e fashion. Certain cabinet members remove themselves almost e n t i r e l y from party a f f a i r s . 1 * 2 In a somewhat d i f f e r e n t way Daalder has described these at t i t u d e s and values as the "regents' mentality" i n government. He c i t e s tendencies toward r e j e c t i o n of c r i t i c i s m , secrecy and an i n f l a t e d sense of self-importance by Dutch cabinet ministers as evidence of t h i s mentality. 1* 3 The parliamentary caucusses tend to assume a f a i r l y c r i t i c a l , often i d e o l o g i c a l stance i n parliament, even when t h e i r party i s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the cabinet. 1* 1* But they are u s u a l l y r e l i a b l e i n t h e i r support f o r 125 government b i l l s . Withdrawal of support by a p a r t i c i p a t i n g party i s extremely rare. The fact that the Catholic party was never dominant within cabinet aided i n dampening c o n f l i c t and maintaining cohesion. In a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n , where, f or example, the Catholic party had a majority of seats and f u l l control over cabinet appointments, the demands and expectations within and without the party would have been too much of a load f o r the party to bear. As i t was, the a b i l i t y of the Catholic party to di s c l a i m r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or many of the a f f a i r s of state helped considerably to placate the widely d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s within the party. At the same time the Catholic party at e l e c t i o n time usually claimed c r e d i t f o r the performance of i n d i v i d u a l Catholic party cabinet members, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r those i n the p o r t f o l i o s of housing and education which often went to the Catholic party i n c o a l i t i o n cabinets. Relations between the Parliamentary and Non-Parliamentary Party. Another p o t e n t i a l source of s t r a i n within any p o l i t i c a l party l i e s i n the linkage between the party leadership, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n parliament, and the grass-roots organization. Rank-and-file members and l o c a l party o f f i c i a l s often have p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l or regional concerns and they may want to ensure that these receive p r e f e r e n t i a l treatment. Dis-a f f e c t i o n i n the ranks or supporting organizations may r e s u l t i n the withdrawal of support, a factor which could s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t a p o l i t i c a l party at e l e c t i o n time. The Dutch Catholic party i n the period* up to the mid 1960s never l o s t the support of i t s l o c a l l e v e l organizations. Yet the g u l f between the leaders and the rank-and-file was extremely wide. I. Schoffer, writing on the confessional parties of the inter-war period notes: Inside the Roman Catholic State Party there was a broad and vi r t u a l l y unbridgeable gap between the party leadership which was then more or less in the hands of Catholic nobility and proper middle-class citizens from "above the rivers", and the Catholic population consisting of f a i r l y simple people i n large part l i v i n g "south of the rivers".'* 5 In the post-war period the party leadership was more representative in terms of social origins. Greater efforts were made to place repre-sentatives from labour on the executive and in parliament. But there was s t i l l a large gap between leaders and led. 1* 6 The relationship between lower-echelon party officials and the leadership can best be described as deferential. The party leadership was more or less left with a free hand; very few demands were placed upon them from the lower echelons. Nationally the Catholic party was organized in terms of the 18 national electoral districts (at election time the same candidate l i s t is presented in each of these districts). Each electoral district (kieskring) had a separate organization with an executive. These kieskring organiza-tions were subdivided into smaller units (statenkvingen) and these in turn were subdivided into local organizations often using parish boundaries as a basis, particularly in the south.1*7 The chairmen of the kieskringen wielded considerable power. They were more or less in charge of election campaigns and collectively the 18 chairmen in the post-war period were responsible for putting together approximately half the election l i s t , that i s , they determined in large part who would get into parliament (central party headquarters was responsible for the remainder of the l i s t ) . They always tried to obtain some regional representation but the main emphasis was on quality. 127 Potential candidates were those who had done outstanding work either at universities or in community affairs. There was l i t t l e overt competition. Potential candidates would be asked by the chairman of a statenkring or kieskring i f he or she was willing to let themselves be considered for a position on the l i s t . It was considered in very poor taste to actually let i t be known that you were willing to be a candidate or worse yet, that you wanted to be a candidate. There was a fair amount of competition for places on list s for municipal and provincial elections, especially in the south where the KVP was the only party. But this did not occur for places on the Second Chamber li s t s . "There were only one or two places on the l i s t (for each kieskring') and everyone in the district realized who would be the best qualified" (Interview No. 43). Statesman-like qualities were preferred; those who could f i l l a cabinet position i f need be or act as a responsible crit i c of a particular portfolio would be seen as good candidates. As well as regional representation there was also a demand for "specialist" or "expert" qualifications. And i f both regional and "expert" criteria could be met in the same person so much the better. Specialists would be, for example, a high ranking military officer for defence matters, professors in various specialities such as agriculture, social welfare, or economics. This penchant for "expertise" has not been restricted to the Catholic party. All parties place a great deal of emphasis on expertise. For example, as of 1976 the last two ministers of education (one KVP, the other PvdA) have been professors of education. Once the candidates had been selected, the l i s t finalized (through joint bargaining between the hieskring chairmen and party headquarters) and hopefully elected to parliament, the newly elected members of the 128 l e g i s l a t u r e were more or less l e f t to t h e i r own devices. They were r a r e l y c a l l e d upon to f u l f i l l o bligations to kieskring chairmen or others. The kieskring chairmen themselves were mostly volunteers with f u l l - t i m e occupations outside of p o l i t i c s (many of them were school teachers) and were involved not only in organizing national elections but l o c a l and p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n s as well. To have influence over l o c a l party a f f a i r s with l i t t l e outside interference may have been a s u f f i c i e n t reward i n i t s e l f f o r kieskring chairmen. The expectations i n the Catholic party were that members of the Second Chamber were i n Parliament to defend Catholic i n t e r e s t s when the relevant issues came up, but t h e i r primary task was to help administer the a f f a i r s of state in the i n t e r e s t of the country as a whole. This ethos generally helped reduce the pressure placed upon the parliamentary party. They were neither expected to advance m i l i t a n t l y the i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r e s t s of Catholics nor to deal constantly with p a r t i c u -l a r i s t i c i n t e r e s t s of Catholic i n d i v i d u a l s or groups. The Party and Pressure Groups. What were r e l a t i o n s l i k e between the Catholic party and organized groups? In 1918 the bishops expressly forbade Catholic s o c i a l organizations to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s or even to formally nominate candidates to the Catholic party. The Catholic party, however, did develop as one of i t s p r i n c i p l e s that a l l i n t e r e s t s within the Catholic subculture had to be consulted i n the drawing up of party programs and i n the s e l e c t i o n of candidates for the Second Chamber. This consultative process came to mean that s p e c i f i c people from the d i f f e r e n t socio-economic organizations would be asked to become members of the party executive or to become candidates on the Second Chamber e l e c t o r a l l i s t . E f f o r t s would always be made to ensure that two or more candidates would 129 be from the major socio-economic organizations, as well as from the m i l i t a r y , banking, education and so on. 1 1 8 These people would usually be r e f e r r e d to not as representatives but, again, as s p e c i a l i s t s . Thus Father Stokman, a p r i e s t and a member of the parliamentary party i n the post-war period, was always r e f e r r e d to as the KVP's s p e c i a l i s t on r e l i g i o u s a f f a i r s , " i n case any questions arose i n the house on r e l i g i o u s matters." 1* 9 The socio-economic organizations closest to the Catholic party were always the Catholic Middle-Class Association and the Catholic Farmers Association. Mr. W. Perquin, for example, was for several years chairman of both the Catholic Middle-Class Organization and the KVP. O f f i c e r s of the Catholic Middle-Class Organization were often seconded to the campaign committee of the KVP and the organization also served as an important conduit for e l e c t i o n funds. The Catholic Farmers Association was also t i g h t l y linked to the KVP, supplying many members of the executive and the F i r s t and Second chambers. Of a l l the organizations i t was considered the Catholic party's strongest supporter. The Catholic Employers Associ-ation was also a l o y a l supporter although they did not have as many d i r e c t l i n k s with the party. The weakest l i n k was always between the party and Catholic labour. In 1934 the Catholic Workers Movement (RKWV) ac t u a l l y withdrew i t s support from the RKSP because of the government's p o l i c i e s during the d e p r e s s i o n . 5 0 In the post-war era r e l a t i o n s between Catholic labour (KAB, l a t e r NKV), and the KVP were always, i f not c o o l , at least distant even during the Roman-Red (KVP-PvdA) c o a l i t i o n period. The KVP always had trouble i n obtaining enthusiastic representatives from Catholic labour, e s p e c i a l l y i n l a t e r years. In 1966 the NKV was the f i r s t and only major Catholic socio-economic organization to break with the Catholic party. One strong KVP supporter, 130 formerly of the NKV and later a member of the Second Chamber for the KVP, notes he had always urged his colleagues in Catholic trade unions that they could have had much more influence within the KVP i f only they had participated more in its activities (Interview No. 32). Thus the picture that emerges is one where demands placed upon the Catholic party from its regional, lower level organizations were limited. In large part this was because of the deferential ethos which stressed giving central leadership a free hand in handling the affairs of the nation and because central leaders, in turn, gave a free hand to local leaders with regard to municipal and provincial affairs. The emphasis on states-manlike qualities, the transformation of interest representation into the giving of 'expert' opinions by 'specialists' a l l helped maintain the cohesion and stability of the parliamentary party. Special interests like agriculture> the self-employed middle-class and businessmen and industrial-ists were solidly entrenched within the party and were reasonably satisfied with the way their demands were handled. Communications between these organizations and their 'specialists' in the Second Chamber were good. Conflict between these three organizations was minimal.51 The potential for conflict lay in the relationship between Catholic labour and these three interests. Nevertheless, although Catholic labour as a whole tended to be aloof from the Catholic party, representatives from Catholic labour in the Second Chamber were usually committed to the party and got along well with their party colleagues. Catholic labour leaders both within and without the party frequently received appointments to the First Chamber (roughly the equivalent of the Canadian Senate) or to provincial senates. Perhaps because those in the Catholic trade unions less favourably disposed to the Catholic party did not in fact 131 enter the party, c e n t r i f u g a l pressures within the party i t s e l f were minimized. From 1946 to 1958 the KAB/NKV supported the KVP i n part because of l o y a l t y to the Church and i n part because the KVP was i n a serie s of c o a l i t i o n cabinets with the PvdA. The i n t e r v a l from 1958 to 1965, when the KVP ruled i n conjunction with the Li b e r a l s and the other confessional p a r t i e s , was a period of economic growth (stimulated by the discovery of natural gas i n the North Sea i n 1959) and saw the removal of r i g i d wage controls much to the benefit of Dutch labour as a whole. 5 2 Even though the PvdA was then i n opposition the KAB/NKV was reasonably s a t i s f i e d with government p o l i c i e s and economic conditions. Furthermore, the KVP p a r l i a -mentary leader Romme i n 1958 stressed that he was not r u l i n g out any future c o a l i t i o n s with the PvdA. 5 3 The Church and the Catholic Party. The above factors were a l l important i n helping to impose a degree of s t a b i l i t y and cohesion upon the parliamentary party. Yet these factors i n themselves would have been i n s u f f i c i e n t . It was the influence of the Church hierarchy which insured that the Catholic party was not rent asunder. According to Schoffer i t would have been v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r the RKSP during the inter-war period to have stayed i n one piece i f i t had not been for the o f f i c i a l b l e s s i n g and support of the Church hierarchy. 5 1* As well as making pu b l i c statements as to the need to preserve unity i n the p o l i t i c a l arena the bishops also operated on a less public l e v e l to t r y to ensure that t h e i r wishes were implemented. In the 1920s the bishops were important i n bringing the Saint Michael League and the League of R.C. E l e c t o r a l Associations together, a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of which the RKSP was the f r u i t i o n . 132 In 1922 a dissident left-wing Catholic party c a l l i n g i t s e l f the Roman Catholic People's Party made i t s appearance. It was p u b l i c l y con-demned by the bishops and never obtained more than 1.19 percent of the t o t a l popular v o t e . 5 5 In 1926 the leaders of t h i s party t r i e d to obtain, i f not the approval then at least the tolerance, of the hierarchy. The leaders of the party received back a l e t t e r from Mgr. C a l l i e r of the diocese of Haarlem writing on behalf of the bishops: "The R.K. V o l k s p a r t i j i s located outside of the RKSP. As such i t causes a d i v i s i o n among Catholics. We cannot comprehend how a good Catholic could.even possibly think of helping to f o s t e r such a d i v i s i o n l e t alone be the cause of i t . " 5 6 RKSP leaders frequently consulted the bishops on various p o l i t i c a l issues. Furthermore, Father Nolens, parliamentary leader of the RKSP, and Father Stokman, KVP member i n the post-war period, would as p r i e s t s c e r t a i n l y have known what constituted appropriate behaviour. Through these channels the bishops undoubtedly made t h e i r feelings known. It i s d i f f i c u l t to know how often the bishops intervened d i r e c t l y i n p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s . In a l l l i k e l i h o o d they did not often intervene d i r e c t l y on a personal l e v e l . Usually i t was the case that the bishops might respond to a p a r t i c u l a r request for dispensation or some sort of action rather than act on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e . I n i t i a t i v e s made on t h e i r own would i n v a r i a b l y be of the more general, public kind such as a statement i n d i c a t i n g t h e i r wishes and hopes. Thus i n 1945-46 the bishops expressed a fervent desire to see the various Catholic socio-economic organizations and the Catholic party resurrected but did not issue s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n s to p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s . 5 7 In the early 1950s the bishops, i n p a r t i c u l a r Cardinal de Jong, were disturbed at a number of developments. The Catholic caucus i n the 133 PvdA, those Catholics who helped found the PvdA i n 1946, had up to that time refused overtures by the KVP to return to the f o l d . Secondly, i n 1948 a former pre-war Catholic party minister of c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s , Ch. Welter, l e f t the KVP and founded the Catholic National Party because of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the KVP's decolonization p o l i c y (carried out i n conjunction with the PvdA). 5 8 In 1948 the KNP received only 1.26 percent of the vote and i n 1952 a l i t t l e more than 2 percent. As we l l , i n 1952 i t appeared that the PvdA had increased i t s vote somewhat i n the s o l i d l y Catholic s o u t h . 5 9 A l l these developments caused consternation within Catholic c i r c l e s . In January of 1953 the KVP set up a spe c i a l commission, "the commission Van der Grinten," to study the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l unity among C a t h o l i c s . 6 0 The commission returned a few months l a t e r with a report which concluded that p o l i t i c a l unity among Catholics was indeed both desirable and necessary and that the KVP was the appropriate v e h i c l e . In May 1953 Cardinal de Jong, on the occasion of the centennial of the re-establishment of the episcopal hierarchy, launched an appeal for the p o l i t i c a l unity of a l l C a t h o l i c s . In Ju l y of that year the KVP i n v i t e d Welter of the KNP and Ruijgers of the Catholic PvdA caucus to a meeting to discuss the Cardinal's declaration and the contents of the Van der Grinten commission report. Discussions continued throughout that year and into the next. On May 1, 1954 the bishops came out with t h e i r Mandement which again e x p l i c i t l y stated the Church's wish for p o l i t i c a l unity among Catholics. The Catholic caucus of the PvdA, a f t e r studying the consequences of the Mandement for some time, rejected the idea of entering the KVP. The KNP, however, announced that i n view of the wishes of the bishops they would be w i l l i n g to r e j o i n the KVP. 6 1 134 These public calls of the bishops were the most direct forms of political intervention. They were not direct orders but attempts to delineate general guidelines or boundaries, to define what was appropriate and inappropriate behaviour without necessarily calling specific indiv-iduals to task. In the post-war period the KVP tried to develop itsel f as a programmatic party rather than a purely religious party, to sell i t s e l f on the basis of its platforms rather than relying on the exhortations of the bishops. Romme, leader of the KVP from 1946 to 1958, publicly defended the calls of the bishops such as the 1954 Mandement, but personally was reported to have been made most unhappy by these interventions. Yet without the urgings of the bishops i t is doubtful whether the Catholic party would have been revived in 1946, the work of many lay Catholics notwithstanding. And without the continuing support of the bishops, the KNP splinter party may have been a prelude to further defections in the 1950s. For example, during the 1950s as well as the "Welter" group there was another element in the party, the "Steenberghe" group, which publicly announced that the KVP was going too far to the left and was neglecting the interests of large business in the Netherlands. As a reaction against the "Steenberghe" group the "De Bruyn" group, centred around the KA.B representative De Bruyn, threatened to leave the KVP and form a Catholic labour party. Protracted negotiations with the two groups finally resulted in the promise that the interests of the Steenberghe group would be given greater attention but that the partnership with the PvdA would not be broken off in the foreseeable future. Throughout these negotiations KVP leaders made continual references to the expressed wishes of the bishops. 6 2 At the same time there is evidence that the Church was quietly 135 beginning to extricate itsel f from political affairs after the death of Cardinal de Jong in 1955. For example, in 1961 Father Stokman retired from the KVP and the Second Chamber. The KVP requested the Church to appoint another priest to replace Father Stokman. The bishops refused to to do so implying that the KVP could easily find a lay person to handle the chores of KVP religious specialist in the Second Chamber. The ecclesiastical hierarchy did not, however, begin publicly redefining the nature of authority or the basic parameters upon which the KVP depended until much later. Obedience to the concept of political unity among Catholics as outlined by the bishops was one reason why potential splinter groups returned to or remained within the Catholic party. The idea of being Catholic imparted a sense of common purpose. One Catholic party politician during the 1960s noted that when discussions within the KVP became pro-tracted, "there was always the thought 'Well we're a l l Catholic thus we have to come to some sort of solution.' And we usually did" (Interview No. 4). There was one additional factor which undoubtedly preyed upon the minds of those contemplating setting up a competing party: Catholic splinter parties in the past enjoyed remarkably l i t t l e success. Even i f Catholic leaders did not heed the call for the maintenance of political unity then this call was usually much more successful among the Catholic populace at large. This raises the question as to how the authority of the Church was used in the mobilization of the Catholic vote. 136 2. MOBILIZATION One can state with reasonable-confidence that the authority of the Church was the most important force in impelling Catholics to vote for the Catholic party. Yet one has to be careful in specifying the manner in which this authority was used and the paths along which i t travelled. As in the case of the Catholic parliamentary party, the authority of the Church was not always used directly. The Inter-war Period and Church Mobilization. It was during the inter-war period, the time of the 'Rich Roman Life,' when the Church intervened most directly. At election time the bishops would issue a pastoral letter warning Catholics to remember their duty, to remain one in order to safeguard their sacred unity. This message would be read from the pulpit by the pastor at mass. This occurred for national, provincial and local elections. As well there would be warnings directed against the evils of socialism (i.e. the SDAP), the Communists, and, in the 1930s, the National Socialist Party. Thus there was a constant stream of directives from the clergy as to the need to remain within the fold and to keep other political parties or movements at arm's length. In many cases the clergy did far more than merely preach from the pulpit. S. Vellenga reports that in Limburg before World War II the RKSP asked the local clergy directly for help in mobilizing voters. Pastors and their assistants responded by holding special classes for their parishioners, many of whom were only semi-literate, on how to f i l l out election ballots (the lists on the ballots did not use party labels but numbers and the numbers often varied in the different election districts). 6 3 137 The parish newspapers contained considerable political propaganda for the Roman Catholic cause. Father Poels, the major force behind the Catholic mineworkers union, was highly active at election time. He urged his fellow priests to participate saying he had no use for "supra^naturalists," those priests who put their trust in God but did no practical work.61* Post-war Period and Church M o b i l i z a t i o n . In the immediate post-war period messages from the bishops were read from the pulpit before the elections of 1946 and 1948. Thus on May 4, 1946 just before the oncoming elections the Dutch bishops declared: "It belongs to the authority of the Church to explain to the faithful the moral obligations which result from the right to vote." It went on to say that i t was a Catholic's duty to elect persons who were guided by the norms of Christianity, the bishops never actually said "vote KVP" but advised Catholics to maintain unity and indicated that the KVP offered the best guarantee for t h i s . 6 5 The election of 1948 was the last time that the bishops specific-ally made statements on behalf of the KVP during an election campaign.66 In 1953, a non-election year, Cardinal de Jong urged the Catholic popula-tion to "remain one" socially and politically and this appeal was made again in greater detail in the Mandement of 1954. The KVP used these instructions and documents in their propaganda material. But after 1948 the pulpit was no longer used by the bishops as a direct means of influ-encing Catholics at election time. More importantly, there is l i t t l e or no evidence that the rank-and-f i l e clergy were as involved in mobilizing Catholics as was the case before the war. A chairman of a KVP local, who had been active in his village in the eastern part of the Netherlands since 1947, noted that his local never 138 had a spiritual advisor. Furthermore, the respondent claimed that the pastor never said anything about politics from the pulpit. "It was not necessary" (Interview No. 34). After World War II virtually no KVP local had a spiritual advisor. Although pastors were always very active in organizations such as the local Catholic Farmers Association, they rarely intervened in the operations of the KVP. Another KVP activist described a KVP meeting he chaired just after World War II in Rotterdam. At one point during the meeting the local dean came in and sat down. . . . I didn't say anything. After the meeting a number of people came up to me and said that I had shown Father a discourtesy in not introducing or welcoming him and in not having invited him to say a few words. I disagreed with them for several reasons. . . . A few days later I saw the dean again and he told me I had done the proper thing; that he was to be treated like everyone else. He felt the KVP had to stand on its own two feet. . . . (Interview No. 29) A priest, 82 years of age, retired in 1972, and who had had parishes in various towns and villages in the northeastern part of the Netherlands, noted that he treated political matters differently. To t e l l people squarely that they had to vote KVP—that I did not dare do. . . . With politics you had to be a l i t t l e more careful. Just after the war, from the pulpit once or twice I said 'support our party'. . . . Dntil perhaps 1960 I would t e l l people to vote KVP i f they asked for advice. . . . But people never asked much. People were not so political. They were much less developed. . . . 50 years ago, of course, you could do everything. (Inter-view No. 17) No direct pressure was applied by priests in part because of diffidence, that i s , not wanting to become involved in political matters, and in part because i t was not necessary. Parishioners rarely asked how they should vote, and i f they did they knew what the answer would be. 139 These expectations of voting KVP were not actively fostered, at least not by the clergy, but they were there nevertheless and nothing was done by priests to disabuse parishioners of their appropriate duties. With two exceptions, a l l 15 priests interviewed believed that the Mandement of 1954 had specified that voting for a party other than the KVP could lead to the denial of the sacraments.67 The Catholic Party and Mobilization. What role did the RKSP/KVP play in mobilizing voters, in ensuring that the vast majority of Catholics voted for the one and only Catholic party? It should be remembered that their role was greatly facilitated by the compulsory voting law that existed in the Netherlands up to 1970.68 The task, therefore, of actually getting voters to the polls was in large part resolved. Furthermore, their dependence upon the Church, especially before World War II, also lightenjed their work load. Before the war the running of election campaigns was the respon-sibil i t y of the 18 different kieskring associations. They restricted themselves to pamphleteering, the painting of slogans and the organization of election rallies. Since parades and processions were forbidden by law, bicycle rallies at election time were very popular. Large numbers of Catholic youths—bicycles festooned with streamers, flags and slogans in Catholic party colours (yellow and white)—would pedal furiously through town and country. Catholic party leaders would talk over the radio and address special meetings. The strongest language was reserved not for attacking their major opponents such as the SDAP but Catholic splinter parties such as the New Catholic Party and the Roman Catholic People's Party, those parties which would "dare to damage our beautiful unity." 6 9 140 The post-war KVP took over much of the RKSP machinery. The 18 kieskring organizations were reactivated and the pre-war weekly party newspaper, De Opmars, was revived under the same name. Between national elections the machinery of the KVP was kept ticking over. Besides national election campaigns there were also provincial and municipal elections which required the organizational resources of the KVP. The KRO provided ample broadcasting time. According to an official of the KRO, "You could say that up to the early 1960s the KRO was more or less the mouth piece of the KVP" (Interview No. 14). Romme, leader of the KVP, had a bi-weekly radio program at prime time on Friday evenings until 1955. From 1956 to 1961 the KVP had a special political program on the KRO entitled "Are you also a member of the party." 7 0 Romme was also political editor of the largest Catholic daily newspaper, De Volkskrant. The party frequently held membership drives. At one time member-ship in the KVP totalled over 400,000.71 The vast majority of these peopl however, were members in name only, although theoretically they were * eligible to participate in meetings and to vote in primaries to help deter mine the order of candidates on election l i s t s . Memberships were sold on door-to-door basis or in blitzes in shopping areas. They were marketed much like other Catholic items, for example, calendars for missionary work "To t e l l you the truth most people probably did not know the difference. To them i t was a l l for the 'Roman business'." (Interview No. 44). Some rural party officials claimed in the 1940s and 1950s to have virtually every adult signed up as members in their locality. These claims were probably not too far fetched in that there were instances of villages where the number of KVP members tallied perfectly with the number of votes 141 cast f o r the KVP. 7 2 Memberships were a prime source of funds for the KVP and those who took out a membership were re f e r r e d to as betalers 3 which means, l i t e r a l l y t ranslated, "those who pay." For each e l e c t i o n campaign a s p e c i a l national "Propaganda Counc i l " was set up drawing upon expertise outside of the f u l l - t i m e members of the party organization. Thus, for example, J. Schaferen, parliamentary reporter for De Volkskrant, and Dr. Kusters of the Catholic S o c i a l Research I n s t i t u t e (KASKI) were both members. Full-time members of the central party o f f i c e organized a s p e c i a l blue book denoting various speaking engage-ments, placement and timing of advertisements and r e l a t e d matters. Several months before the e l e c t i o n there would be appeals for contributions i n the party newspaper, De Opmars. Up to 1952 party workers would a c t u a l l y stand outside of the Church to s o l i c i t parishioners for contributions to the cause. Contributions were also received from Catholic firms, p a r t i c u l a r l y the large department store chains. The Catholic Middle-Class Organization was usually heavily involved i n fund r a i s i n g as well as acting as a funnel for funds generally. Those involved i n helping to organize KVP e l e c t i o n campaigns characterized t h e i r e f f o r t s as amateurish. Public r e l a t i o n s firms were not consulted u n t i l the 1960s. The party was heavily dependent upon volunteer labour. And much of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or the campaign f e l l upon the shoulders of the kieskring organizations. Every kring would have a propaganda committee which was responsible for formulating the party program i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t as well as helping to draw up the candidate l i s t . The kieskring propaganda committees were given a large proportion of the a v a i l a b l e e l e c t i o n funds and were responsible for spending i t . 142 The kieskring program was usually based upon documents and guidelines sent out from party headquarters. Thus party programs would not vary much from region to region. Decisions as to how to spend available funds involved- questions like what sort of give-away items to buy, e.g. ballpoint pens, balloons, how much to spend on placards and pamphlets and whether or not to invest in a sky-writing plane. After 1956 there was more and more emphasis on the f r i l l s of electioneering with campaign buses, pompom girls, flowers and illustrated folders. During the 1950s the party was reasonably successful in mobilizing volunteers in handing out handbills and pamphlets, distributing placards for display in windows and so on. In 1952 the KVP claimed to have at least 10,000 hardcore activists. 7 3 In the smaller villages virtually every Catholic would be assured of receiving something in the mailbox from the KVP. In larger cities the Catholic Action would often be utilized for this sort of work. One party worker in one of the large Western cities was chairman of both the KVP local and the Catholic Action local. He called the Catholic Action a !,purely technical organization" specifically designed for tasks such as helping to set up chairs for a Church meeting and in the case of elections to help distribute pamphlets and placards. At special election meetings there would be speakers and films. The KVP was reasonably successful in attracting substantial crowds. In the f i r s t number of years these meetings would be mostly local affairs. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, probably because of American influences, there was much more emphasis on large-scale meetings drawing up to two or three thousand people. Yet curiously enough there was not much personal contact. The KVP, like most other political parties in the Netherlands, did no door-143 knocking or canvassing i n order to get out the vote (only the PvdA experimented with t h i s ) . 7 1 * The clo s e s t thing to t h i s s t y l e of e l e c t i o n -eering by the KVP would be a small pamphlet e n t i t l e d "A morning greeting" put i n mailboxes on the morning of the e l e c t i o n . Even i n small v i l l a g e s very l i t t l e d i r e c t pressure was put upon people to vote KVP. But then as one party o f f i c i a l described i t : " I t was not r e a l l y needed" (Interview No. 34). The KVP depended heavily upon the media for i n f l u e n c i n g Catholics i n t h e i r voting behaviour. There would be t a l k s on the KRO by the " l i s t leaders" on the KVP e l e c t i o n l i s t and Romme would remind Catholics of t h e i r duty i n h i s newspaper column i n De Volkskrant and on h i s radio t a l k show. Publications of organizations l i k e the Catholic Middle-Class Organization and the Catholic Farmers Association urged t h e i r members to vote for the KVP. As well, members of the Catholic Farmers Association were given personal reminders at meetings. The KAB/NKV was much less enthusiastic i n m o b i l i z i n g support f o r the KVP but nevertheless s t i l l suggested to i t s membership to vote KVP. This would be done through trade union publications with statements to the e f f e c t that the chairman had approved the KVP program. But l i t t l e was done beyond t h i s . "To t e l l you the t r u t h the climate i n which to do that sort of thing ( t e l l i n g Catholic workers to vote KVP) was lacking. They would have resented i t . . . . There were a number of study days for NKV members on p o l i t i c a l matters to the e f f e c t that one was a c i t i z e n and should vote. But the implication of these sessions was that the choice of party was a member's own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " (Interview No. 32). To what extent did the KVP appeal to the voters on s t r i c t l y r e l i g i o u s or i d e o l o g i c a l issues? To what extent did the KVP play upon 144 the Catholic i d e n t i t y of voters? In the early post-war period De Opmars makes several references to the need for cohesion evoking images of dikes, walls and f o r t r e s s e s . The chairman of the KVP wrote that, "The KVP stands there as the p o l i t i c a l bulwark of Catholic might, a stable might which gives strength to the Dutch n a t i o n . " 7 5 Just before the e l e c t i o n of 1948 De Opmars warned about e v i l outside forces "against which we have to form a front, i n which no breach can be formed, on which a l l attacks w i l l f a i l . " 7 6 In the mid 1950s at e l e c t i o n time De Opmars contained statements that the emancipation of Catholics was not yet complete and that a great deal of work remained to be done. However, the Catholic voter was not inundated with t h i s sort of electioneering propaganda. At e l e c t i o n time there were no d i r e c t references to d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against C a t h o l i c s . Rather the programmatic aspects were stressed, often i n the form of out-l i n i n g the records of KVP cabinet ministers. The p o s i t i v e aspects of the diverse socio-economic base of the KVP was emphasized. The KVP was depicted as the only genuinely balanced p o l i t i c a l party because i t s support base represented a v i r t u a l mirror image of Dutch society i n terms of class 7 7 0 and region. This does not mean that appeals based on the Dutch Catholic i d e n t i t y were lacking. It was not at e l e c t i o n time but i n between elec-tions that the KVP often played upon the fears and r e l i g i o s i t y of Catholics. De Opmars contains several references to the alleged second-class c i t i z e n -ship status of Catholics and to the idea that the KVP was the one and only party for C a t h o l i c s . P a r a l l e l s would be drawn between b a t t l e s from the past and contemporary c o n f l i c t s . Thus i n the 18 March 1956 issue, De Opmars headlined an a r t i c l e c r i t i c i z i n g a non-Catholic cabinet minister 145 for refusing funds for a second Catholic h o s p i t a l i n Amsterdam as follows: "After the struggle f o r schools, the struggle for h o s p i t a l s . " In the 24 September 1954 issue of De Opmars there i s an a r t i c l e on the KRO s t a t i n g boldly that the existence of the KRO was conditional upon the existence of the KVP. "Without the KVP there would be no KRO." In the 21 January 1955 issue of De Opmars there i s an a r t i c l e a l l e g i n g that Catholics were d e l i b e r a t e l y being discriminated against i n the province of Gelderland with regard to c i v i l service appointments. In the October 1957 issue of De Opmars an e n t i r e page i s devoted to the theme that the Dutch Catholic was s t i l l a second-class c i t i z e n and that there were s t i l l strong a n t i -Catholic sentiments. It gave the example of a ceremony involving the laying of the f i r s t stone of a new Church. The ceremony took place behind a screen which the a r t i c l e claimed was used for fear of evoking the wrath of non-Catholic Holland i f the ceremony were to be held i n the open. Much was made of the Catholic connection. Reports on party congresses usually included d e t a i l e d descriptions and i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the s p e c i a l masses held f o r the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The 20 January 1956 issue of De Opmars contains a number of photographs of Cardinal A l f r i n k with various leaders of the KVP at a special banquet commemorating the tenth anniversary of the KVP. A gigantic motorized b i c y c l e r a l l y , organized by the KVP just before the e l e c t i o n of 1956, ended i n the c i t y of Assen with an open a i r mass. 7 8 Members of the Church hierarchy were often c i t e d with regard to p o l i t i c a l matters. In the 4 March 1955 issue of De Opmars Mgr. Hanssen i s quoted as saying that although the socialism of the PvdA had become "more moderate i t was s t i l l unacceptable." The r e l i g i o u s bond between Catholics was used as a d i r e c t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p o l i t i c a l unity. Thus (5 146 Romme i n De Volkskrant (2 December 1955) noted that "The i n d i v i d u a l members of the d i f f e r e n t classes do not s i t together only on Sundays within the same room. It i s also i n d a i l y l i f e that they are obliged to remain con-scious of t h e i r C h r i s t i a n u n i t y . " The persistent use by the KVP of r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l issues can i n part be explained by the intervention of the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l h i e r -archy. The KVP had to provide some sort of reaction to the pu b l i c state-ments of the bishops such as the Mandement of 1954. In contrast to Cathol i c organizations such as the KAB, which paid l i t t l e attention to t h i s document and downplayed i t s importance, the KVP vigorously defended the Mandement. Since they were i n a sense "the ministry of external a f f a i r s " ! 9 for the Dutch Catholic bloc, KVP leaders undoubtedly f e l t i t was t h e i r respon-s i b i l i t y to defend the document. However, the u n c r i t i c a l and enthusiastic acceptance of the document by the KVP indicates that many of the leaders genuinely did believe that they were s t i l l second-class c i t i z e n s and that i t was t h e i r duty, and the duty of a l l C a t h o l i c s , to f a i t h f u l l y follow the d i r e c t i o n s of the Church hierarchy. KVP propaganda undoubtedly a r t i c u l a t e d the feeli n g s of many other Catholics and at the same time rein f o r c e d those f e e l i n g s . De Opmars (11 June 1954) heralded the Mandement i n large type. Cat h o l i c Holland can with a great deal of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f e e l enriched. I t i s a genuine Catho l i c g i f t given to us by men who are deeply conscious of t h e i r great r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of carrying out t h e i r p a s t o r a l r o l e . Those . . . who do not understand that Catholics accept t h i s Mandement as among the most b e a u t i f u l of a l l possible g i f t s and those who complain about the infringement of l i b e r t y , do not know what i t means to be Catholic and even l e s s what true l i b e r t y i s for a Ca t h o l i c . Professor Gielen, the minister of education (KVP) at the time, i n i n t e r -preting the Mandement, stated that as Cat h o l i c s , "We cannot entertain Q A thoughts which i n large measure go against the wishes of the bishops." 147 And even before the appearance of the Mandement the leader of the Catholic party, Romme, asked r h e t o r i c a l l y i n De Volkskrant (19 J u l y 1953) i f one could s t i l l t a l k about freedom of choice i f Catholics were morally obliged to vote KVP. "Yes c e r t a i n l y because one i s not compelled to be C a t h o l i c , that i s to say, one has the freedom to leave the Church i f one wants." Whatever the personal f e e l i n g s of KVP leaders, the 1954 Mandement undoubtedly had the e f f e c t of stimulating greater a c t i v i t y within the party. Jean Beaufays has demonstrated that KVP membership had gradually dropped from 409,084 members i n 1948 to 269,376 in 1954. In 1955 the figures jumped to 429,939, the highest membership figure ever. A f t e r t h i s high point membership started to drop again, f a l l i n g to 218,374 i n 1965. 8 1 Since most memberships were sold on a door-to-door basis the sudden increase probably indicated greater energy on the part of KVP a c t i v i s t s i n a more receptive market. Although the party had suffered some losses i n 1952 i t was not u n t i l 1955, a f t e r the appearance of the Mandement, that the KVP did further spade work to ensure that the party was i n better shape for the e l e c t i o n i n 1956. 8 2 Thus i n the post-war period the KVP was s t i l l highly dependent upon the authority of the Church both i n providing a basis for mobilizing support and i n giving the party a necessary j o l t at appropriate times to keep party workers ac t i v e , thereby helping to ensure e l e c t o r a l success. 3. THE VOTE What s p e c i f i c propositions can be put forward concerning the behaviour of Catholic voters up to 1963? I have shown that the influence 148 of the Church had made most Catholics highly dependent upon the Church for guidance. (1) The f i r s t p r oposition, therefore, i s that Catholics tended to view voting for the Catholic party as being l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t from going to mass, attending Catholic schools and reading Catholic newspapers. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the expectation i s that Catholics behaving i n an appropriately confessional manner would also have voted for the Catholic party. Catholics would tend to fuse a l l t h i s behaviour under one r u b r i c , making l i t t l e or no d i s t i n c t i o n between d i f f e r e n t modes of behaviour. It i s u n l i k e l y that they would have chosen a Catholic organi-zation i n one context and a non-Catholic organization i n another context. (2) Secondly, Catholics would have had the f e e l i n g that they were receiv-ing some minimal return f o r t h e i r support. There was a pragmatic or r a t i o n a l element i n t h e i r behaviour. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e i r l o y a l t y to the Catholic cause, including the p o l i c i e s of the Catholic party, did not undermine t h e i r economic or s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s . The Church attempted to make i t s influence f e l t a l l across the Netherlands. Yet there are a number of factors which made the s o c i a l control of the Church much more e f f e c t i v e i n some areas than i n others as i l l u s t r a t e d by the regional differences i n observance of Easter mass (see table 2.6, p.89). The following propositions concern these f a c t o r s : (3) Catholics were more l i k e l y to vote KVP i n the Catholic south where the high concentration of Catholics provided an a d d i t i o n a l means of s o c i a l c o n t r o l . (4) Catholics l i v i n g i n non-urbanized or less urbanized areas outside of the Catholic south are also more l i k e l y to vote KVP. (5) Catholics l i v i n g i n major urban areas, where conditions for s o c i a l control were less 149 favourable and exposure to non-Catholic influences greater, were less likely to vote KVP. In testing these propositions some reference will be made to the RKSP of the inter-war period. However, the availability of data will restrict much of the discussion to the post-war period, particularly with regard to propositions three to five. Religiosity^ Assooiational Life and Voting. High quality measures of religiosity are lacking. It can be demonstrated, however, that Catholics who regularly attended mass also participated in Catholic organizational l i f e or were at least members of Catholic organizations. It can also be demonstrated that those who regularly attended mass also tended to vote KVP. Reference will-be made to studies made at the national and local levels. A study done in Amsterdam in 1963 of young parishioners between the ages 13 to 19 noted that those who " f e l l out," that i s , stopped going to mass, quickly lost a l l contact with Catholic organizational l i f e . Those who continued to attend mass regularly remained loyal. The difference is quite clear cut as can be seen in table 3.1 where the two groups, those who attend mass and those who do not, are compared. Table 3.1 illustrates the degree of difference between the two groups. Mass attenders remain largely insulated within Catholic organizations; the latter are almost completely cut off from Catholic organizational l i f e . Since this sample is drawn from Catholic youth in Amsterdam only, i t is not representative of the entire population. Nevertheless, a 1955 national survey found that 69 percent of a l l practicing Catholic males belonged to Roman Catholic organizations only, versus 9 percent for those who did not attend mass 150 regularly. 8 3 Another study of a medium-sized northeastern city in 1960 reports that 77 percent of a l l Catholics in that city were "organized" with each such Catholic boasting an average of 1.42 memberships.81* Table 3.1 Type of Organization by Mass Attendance Do Not Attend Mass Attend Mass Member of R.C. organization only 73.5% 3. 7% Member of both R.C. and non-R.C. 10.6 3. 7 Member of non-R.C. only 15.9 92. 5 Total: 100.0% 100. 0% (N = 94) (N = 27) Source: KASKI, Rapport No. 293, 1963, p. 64 There are no studies or surveys of that era combining information on religious practice, organizational membership as well as voting behaviour. There is evidence, however, that those Catholics who attend mass regularly also voted KVP. Wolinetz, analyzing a 1956 national public opinion poll originally used by Lijphart, found that 90 percent of Catholics who attended mass regularly voted KVP (N = 346) versus 41 percent of Catholics who went to mass irregularly (N = 41). 8 5 It is worth noting that nearly 90 percent of Catholics were "practicing" Catholics, thereby ensuring that 85% of a l l Catholics in the sample voted KVP.86 What further evidence is there that voting behaviour and religious orthodoxy among Catholics are closely linked together? It was noted in 151 chapter II that the Dutch Church placed a very high value on those marriages which resulted in families with several children. It was further documented that parish priests during visits to the homes of families would inquire into the number and ages of children. One would expect, therefore, that in areas where the birth rate among Catholics was very high the KVP vote would be very high. In table 3.2 below the different degrees of political orthodoxy of municipal districts in the largely Catholic provinces of Limburg and North Brabant are related to the annual birth rate. The data show a definite rela-tionship between political orthodoxy among Catholics and the birth rate. Table 3.2 KVP Vote by Birth Rate by Province (No. of births per 1000 married women) % KVP Vote among Catholics (1952) North Brabant (1952) Limburg (1952)' 95% + 22.0 20.1 89-94 20.4 19.6 93-88 19.3 18.9 77-82 17.1 17.7 70-76 15.5 15.5 69 and less 14.2 13.9 Source: KASKI Rapport No. 171, p. 60. Perhaps the best evidence that confessional loyalty, organizational membership and voting behaviour were highly interrelated is that the Church itself used voting statistics as a measure of Church loyalty on the part of Catholics. For the Church a low level of political orthodoxy among 152 Catholics i n any area of the country was cause for anxiety. Not only was the goal of p o l i t i c a l unity of concern but, more importantly, the s p i r i t -ual and s o c i a l well-being of the Catholics within such areas would be open to question. The C a t h o l i c S o c i a l Research I n s t i t u t e i n the Hague (KASKI) was frequently c a l l e d upon by the d i f f e r e n t dioceses to do studies of problem areas where there was concern over high l e v e l s of unemployment, crime and immorality among Catholics. One of the f i r s t tasks performed by KASKI, in examining such an area, was a d e t a i l e d analysis of the voting patterns, often on a p o l l by p o l l b a s i s . 8 7 Using t h i s technique they could quickly i d e n t i f y p a r t i c u l a r neighbourhoods or pockets where s o c i a l conditions were l i k e l y to be p a r t i c u l a r l y bad. These data would be c o l l a t e d with reports from parish p r i e s t s , s o c i a l workers, data on unemployment, disease and so on. KASKI reports of t h i s nature would lead to recommendations such as increased welfare services or the encouragement of Catholic enterprises both to provide jobs for unemployed Catholics and to insulate Catholics from secular influences. Thus for the Church, examining the voting behaviour of i t s f l o c k was a way of checking the pulse rate, a way of keeping an eye on the s p i r i t u a l as well as the s o c i a l and economic well-being of the Catholic population. As noted i n chapter I I , most Catholics d i d not j o i n C a t h o l i c organizations for purely s p i r i t u a l reasons. Nor did these organizations perform or attempt to perform any s p i r i t u a l or a postolic functions, not even organizations such as Catholic Action. Catholics joined such organi-zations because i t was expected of t h e m — i t defined the essence of being Catholic. Most Catholics accepted t h i s duty u n c r i t i c a l l y and there i s no 153 evidence that t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the Cathol i c party was any d i f f e r e n t . Gadourek reports that Catholics r e s i d i n g i n the v i l l a g e of Sassen-heim displayed a l e v e l of knowledge concerning p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s that was lower than that of Protestants and those having no r e l i g i o n . 8 8 A 1958 indepth study by KASKI of the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s and attitudes of Catholic workers revealed that these workers were barely, i f at a l l , acquainted with the KVP party program, even though t h i s document was widely d i s t r i b u t e d at e l e c t i o n time and p u b l i c i z e d i n the Catholic and KVP press. A l i t t l e more than h a l f of the sample of 105 knew of the existence of a party program but were unaware of the contents. The remainder of the sample knew nothing of a KVP program. 8 9 There i s also evidence that Catholics did not r e a l l y perceive p o l i t i c s and support f o r the KVP as a d i s t i n c t form of behaviour. Gadourek notes that for Catholics i n Sassenheim i t was very d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s from other Church, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . "The lack of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the sphere of r e l i g i o n and that of p o l i t i c s was thus repeatedly affirmed by our r e s e a r c h . " 9 0 The Catholic Vote and Rationality. Catholics voted f o r the Catholic party i n large part because of t h e i r u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of strong Church pressures. Catholics as a whole tended to be over-represented i n the less well o f f sectors of Dutch society. There i s evidence that they were less interested and less well informed about p o l i t i c s i n comparison with non-Catholics. On the basis of t h i s evidence a Marxist might ar-gue that i n voting for the Catholic party Catholics were behaving i n less than r a t i o n a l fashion, that i s to say, voting against t h e i r own 154 economic i n t e r e s t s . Let us begin with the Catholic working-class. One could make the case that the highly conservative f i s c a l p o l i c i e s of confessional cabinets during the 1930s were i n part responsible for keeping unemployment at very high l e v e l s causing hardship for both manual and non-manual workers. 9 1 Catholic workers might have been better o f f i f they had given t h e i r support to the SDAP. The SDAP had p o l i c i e s and programs with strong Keynesian overtones designed by economists of the c a l i b r e of Jan Tinbergen. Yet one must remember that the year 1918, the year that SDAP leader T r o e l s t r a made a c a l l f o r revolution, was s t i l l strongly imprinted on the memories of both Catholics and non-Catholics. Furthermore, even accepting the fact that a f t e r 1918 the SDAP had quickly changed i t s p o s i t i o n and become more moderate and responsible, many Catholics may not n e c e s s a r i l y have perceived the e l e c t i o n of an SDAP goverment as leading to an improve-ment of t h e i r objective conditions. In view of what happened i n France (e.g. the popular front government of Leon Blum) and the conservative p o l i c i e s of Ramsay MacDonald in Britain,such a view would have been r e a l i s t i c . 9 2 As w e l l , even i f the C a t h o l i c working-class had decided en masse to support the SDAP t h i s would not n e c e s s a r i l y have meant e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y f o r that p a r t y . 9 3 It i s impossible to reconstruct the mental processes of Catholic workers of that time. C e r t a i n l y the Church was worried that the SDAP, as well as the National S o c i a l i s t s , would be making inroads into Catholic support, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the mining areas and large c i t i e s l i k e Rotterdam. However, given the e f f e c t i v e work done on behalf of Catholic workers by Cath o l i c p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l leaders many workers may well have concluded that t h e i r fate was at least more secure i n the hands of Catholic leaders. 155 In the post-war period the KVP and the PvdA were the two major participants i n a series of c o a l i t i o n cabinets l a s t i n g from 1946 to 1958. The two parties are usually considered the major architects of post-war economic recovery programs which involved r i g i d wage and price controls. The KVP i n i t s propaganda sold i t s e l f as the 'socia l party' that was strongly attuned with the needs and wishes of Catholic workers. The 1958 KASKI study c i t e d e a r l i e r , concerning the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s of Catholic workers, noted that both KVP and non-KVP voters were highly suspicious of the government's wage and price control p o l i c y . They voiced the opinion that unspecified "powerful groups i n society" were being given undue advantages. 9 1* Yet at the same time both KVP and non-KVP voters were i n favour of the Red-Roman c o a l i t i o n and were strongly against the c o a l i t i o n breaking up. The KVP voters i n the sample were a l l reasonably concerned with t h e i r economic p o s i t i o n i n l i f e and alleged that t h e i r support was i n part contingent upon the continuation of the Red-Roman c o a l i t i o n or at least that a break with the PvdA would r e s u l t i n a great deal of conster-nation on t h e i r p a r t . 9 5 During t h i s period the KVP also emphasized that i t represented a l l classes. Since the only non-confessional business oriented party, the Libera l party, was i n opposition for a large part of the time, the KVP could claim with some v a l i d i t y that t h e i r party was a highly suitable conduit for Catholic business i n t e r e s t s to communicate with government and have some influence on government p o l i c y . This argument was credible since the Catholic party was represented i n v i r t u a l l y every cabinet i n the period from 19.18 to 1972. On an aggregate basis i t received a higher number of cabinet positions i n proportion to i t s numerical support i n comparison with the other p a r t i e s . 9 6 156 In 1958 as a r e s u l t of changes i n leadership the PvdA decided to take a more left-wing stance breaking the Red-Roman c o a l i t i o n . For the next seven years the KVP ruled i n a c o a l i t i o n with the L i b e r a l s and the two other main confessional p a r t i e s (ARP and CHU). During t h i s period large reserves of natural gas were discovered i n the North Sea which were su c c e s s f u l l y exploited much to the benefit of the Dutch economy. Real income rose, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 1963 when p r i c e and wage controls were f i n a l l y phased o u t . 9 7 At the same time KVP leaders emphasized that they would not rule out future c o a l i t i o n s with the PvdA and i n 1965 the KVP once again p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a c o a l i t i o n cabinet with the PvdA. In short the p o s i t i o n of the Catholic party was usually competitive vis-a-vis the other p a r t i e s . In the post-war period the natural i n c l i n a -t i o n on economic grounds of Catholic workers may have been to support the PvdA and that of the middle-classes to support the L i b e r a l s . However, t h e i r support for the KVP, as a r e s u l t of t h e i r l o y a l t y to the Church, involved no economic s a c r i f i c e s . There was no basic inconsistency i n voting KVP and being concerned with one's economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t . As with the case of the KRO, Catholic trade unions and other Catholic i n s t i t u t i o n s and organizations, there was no incentive for Catholics to switch t h e i r support to an a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i c a l party i n order to gain s a t i s f a c t i o n or i n the hope of obtaining s i g n i f i c a n t l y better conditions. Conversely, there were no losses involved i n obeying the wishes of the Church and supporting the C a t h o l i c party. Homogeneity, Urbanization and Church Influence. Two basic sets of f a c t o r s , boundary maintenance and pressure by the Church, and the provision of adequate services by the socio-economic i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Catholic 157 subculture, were important i n ensuring that the vast majority of Catholics voted f o r the Catholic party. Nevertheless, the operation of these two sets of factors was governed to some extent by c e r t a i n basic s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . There was some leakage from the Cathol i c subculture as evidenced by the gradual decline over the years i n the proportion of Catholics who voted KVP. Thus i n 1948 89.0 percent of a l l Catholics voted Catholic. By 1963 t h i s percentage had gradually dropped down to 84.8 p e r c e n t . 9 8 How-ever, t h i s was not a major de c l i n e . Moreover, there i s no evidence that the KVP paid much attention to i t or were even aware of i t . During t h i s period the Catholic proportion of the t o t a l population grew from 38.5 percent (1947 census) to 40.4 percent (1960 c e n s u s ) . 9 9 This explains the fac t that although the percentage of Catholics voting KVP slowly declined the percentage of the t o t a l popular vote f o r the KVP remained r e l a t i v e l y constant. Looking at where t h i s leakage occurred, however, can t e l l us something about the conditions which f a c i l i t a t e d or hindered the e f f e c -tiveness of the Church and the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Catholic subculture. I w i l l now proceed to demonstrate the e f f e c t of two v a r i a b l e s ; urbanization and the degree of Cathol i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n . 1 0 0 In chapter II data were presented on the rate of Easter observance by Catholics i n the d i f f e r e n t dioceses. Unfortunately a broad category l i k e diocese covers up important v a r i a t i o n s such as the degree of urbani-zation, f o r example. For the period 1946 to 1963, however, there are av a i l a b l e data at the municipal d i s t r i c t l e v e l concerning urbanization, proportion of the population which i s Cathol i c and the voting returns f o r the d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s . 1 0 1 These data allow one to te s t propositions 158 concerning urbanization and Catho l i c concentration i n some d e t a i l . The f i r s t important factor i s that of urbanization. The r u r a l -urban d i s t i n c t i o n i s e s p e c i a l l y important i n the area above the r i v e r s . It was i n the large urban centres l i k e Rotterdam where the s o c i a l i s t s made considerable e f f o r t to wean Catholics away from the Church. As well modern, cosmopolitan influences had an e f f e c t . And those who were less than enthusiastic about the Church would f i n d i t easier to escape the s o c i a l control mechanisms of the Church and the influence of friends and family. In the non-southern, non-urban areas one might well expect the KVP vote to have been higher than i n urban areas (e.g. i n terms of orthodoxy of C a t h o l i c s ) . In v i l l a g e s and towns where l i f e tends to be quite t r a d i t i o n a l the Church would be well entrenched and there was less l i k e l i h o o d of escaping control from the Church. As Goddijn has noted the Church made considerable e f f o r t to ennure that Catholics outside of the south, e s p e c i a l l y i n the so - c a l l e d diaspora areas where there were few Cat h o l i c s , would remain within the f o l d . The rural-urban diff e r e n c e can also be of relevance within the Catholic south, In the south are a number of urban centres and a great deal of the urbanization which occurred i n the Netherlands during the inter-war period and the post-war period took place i n t h i s r e g i o n . 1 0 3 For example the multi-national P h i l i p s Corporation began l i f e i n the la t e nineteenth century i n the North Brabant town of Eindhoven with a handful of employees. By 1937 the concern employed 19,500 people and by 1955 i t employed 56,000. The rapid expansion of the firm had a s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the province drawing scores of Catholics from the r u r a l hinterland to the c i t y of Eindhoven. 1 0 1* 159 The second factor is that of Catholic concentration. A higher proportion of Catholics within a given area offers an additional means of social control. There would be fear of gossip, pressure from neighbours and friends and so on which would persuade people to be good Catholics or at least give the impression of being good Catholics and this could carry-over to the ballot box. This factor would be especially important in the solidly Catholic areas below the rivers. It would also be important in those pockets of Catholicism above the rivers where often entire villages would be solidly Catholic. One way of looking at the effects of urbanization and Catholic concentration is to look at the political orthodoxy, over time, of Catholics located within the categories resulting from combinations of the two variables. The data are shown in graph form in figure 3.1. One can see that the greatest difference results from the rural-urban cleavage (categories 1, 2 and 3 versus 7 and 8). Catholics residing in non-urban areas were much more likely to support the KVP even outside of the Catholic south. Thus i t appears that Church control was much more effective in non-urban areas. Catholics residing in the area below the rivers, the Catholic south, gave on the whole more support to the KVP than those residing in the area above the rivers (compare category 4 with category 6). In the south the mutual reinforcement of fellow Catholics, along with Church influence, probably helped to ensure a high vote for the KVP. Breaking down the data further, however, reveals some interesting differences. Catholics most likely to vote KVP were those residing in non-urban areas in the north where the majority of the population within a village or town was Catholic (i.e. at least 60 percent). 1 0 5 In northern communities of this 160 Figure 3.1 Percentage of Catholics Voting KVP by Context (Source: Houska and Leiden E c o l o g i c a l data sets. For d e t a i l s see Appendix III) 161 Key to Figure 3.1 1. Catholics i n non-urban municipal d i s t r i c t s i n the north (area above the Rhine) which are at least 60% Catholic (non-urban = population less than 30,000). 2. Catholics i n non-urban d i s t r i c t s i n homogeneous Catholic south (area below the Rhine encompassing provinces of North Brabant, Limburg and part of Gelderland). 3. Catholics i n a l l non-urban d i s t r i c t s i n the north. 4. A l l Catholics i n the south. 5. Catholic population as a whole. 6. A l l Catholics i n the north. 7. Catholics i n urban d i s t r i c t s i n the south (urban = population more than 30,000). 8. Catholics i n urban d i s t r i c t s i n the north. 162 type, where the C a l v i n i s t penetration and the i s o l a t i o n i s t mentality were much more important, v i g i l a n c e of the clergy and past t r a d i t i o n s (combined with mutual support from l o c a l Catholics) probably account for the very high vote for the KVP among Cat h o l i c s . It should be remembered that within some of the above-listed categories there i s also considerable v a r i a t i o n . Thus the Catholic vote i n Rotterdam (60 percent) was much lower than that i n Amsterdam (74 per-cent) . The Catholic vote i n the mining areas of Limburg was also somewhat lower than i n other areas i n the south. Strong l o c a l h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n s appear to be at work i n these cases. It was i n Rotterdam at the turn of the century where the Church was least e f f e c t i v e i n handling the problems of an i n d u s t r i a l i z i n g society involving large-scale migration of workers. The consequences of those f a i l u r e s appear to have been c a r r i e d well into the post-war period. Thus s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s such as the rural-urban cleavage and the degree of Catholic concentration do appear to have had an e f f e c t on the KVP vote. There i s a spread of more than 20 percentage points between Catholics r e s i d i n g i n northern, urban areas and those i n northern, non-urban areas where Catholics were i n a majority (category 1 versus category 8). Factors such as urbanization and lack of Catholic concentration tended to hinder the e f f o r t s of the Church i n i n s u l a t i n g and mobilizing Catholics. The data shown i n figure 3.1 reveal further aspects of the r o l e played by the Church i n Catholic p o l i t i c a l l i f e . In 1948 the bishops intervened d i r e c t l y by asking Catholics just before e l e c t i o n day to support the KVP. The bishops had not done so i n the 1946 e l e c t i o n . One can see the increase i n support for the KVP i n the e l e c t i o n of 1948. In the 1952 e l e c t i o n the bishops did not intervene and as well the dissident 163 KNP under the leadership of Welter competed with the KVP for Catholic votes. Support f o r the KVP i n 1952 dropped by more than f i v e percentage points. In 1954 the bishops issued t h e i r Mandement urging Catholics to maintain s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l unity. This resulted i n increased organizational a c t i v i t y by the KVP and i n the return of the KNP to the KVP. Support f o r the KVP i n the 1956 e l e c t i o n was at i t s highest l e v e l ever, higher even than l e v e l s attained by the pre-war RKSP. F i n a l l y , i t should be noted that i n spite of s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r -ences between the various categories as shown i n figure 3.1, the support for the KVP i n a l l categories was very high i n terms of cross-national c r i t e r i a . Even the support shown by Dutch Catholics r e s i d i n g i n northern urban centres was s u b s t a n t i a l l y higher than the o v e r a l l support given by Catholics to Catholic p a r t i e s i n other nations. One of the more important conclusions one can draw from these data i s that the Catholic subculture was remarkably successful i n maintaining p o l i t i c a l cohesion among Catholics i n a l l sectors of Dutch society. 4. SUMMARY The dominant theme that comes through i s the overwhelming import-ance of the Church i n determining a l l aspects of Catholic p o l i t i c a l l i f e . It was the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l hierarchy which was responsible for keeping the Catholi c party i n t a c t and holding defections and s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s to a minimum. It was the hierarchy i n combination with a w i l l i n g and able clergy which ensured that Catholics voted en masse for the Catholic party. The major goal of the bishops was to maintain "the sacred unity" of the Catholic subculture. In the 1920s the bishops expressly forbade Catholic socio-economic organizations from p a r t i c i p a t i n g d i r e c t l y or even 164 i n d i r e c t l y i n p o l i t i c s and permitted the existence of only one Catholic p o l i t i c a l organization. At the behest of the bishops the Saint Michaels League and the League of R.C. E l e c t o r a l Associations coalesced to form the R.C. State Party. Other Catho l i c s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s i n the inter-war period were condemned both p u b l i c l y and p r i v a t e l y i n no uncertain terms. As a r e s u l t such p a r t i e s d i d extremely poorly at e l e c t i o n time. In the post-war period the Catholic party was resurrected l a r g e l y at the request of the hierarchy. Again pressure was applied by the bishops, mostly i n the form of p u b l i c statements, on dissident Catholic p a r t i e s and movements to return to the f o l d . During the inter-war period the Church was d i r e c t l y involved i n mobilizing the Catholic vote for the Catholic party. Messages from the hierarchy were read by p r i e s t s from the p u l p i t at e l e c t i o n time. The clergy a c t i v e l y worked to help d e l i v e r the vote including the holding of s p e c i a l classes i n order to i n s t r u c t parishioners on how to f i l l out the b a l l o t . In the post-war period the Church was less d i r e c t l y involved i n mobilizing the vote. Nevertheless they a c t i v e l y fostered the ideology of preserving unity including the expectation that parishioners should and would vote KVP. In the post-war period the Catholic party was s t i l l highly dependent upon the Church i n spite of i t s aim to turn i t s e l f into a programmatic party. Yet at the same time p r e c i s e l y because the Church was responsible f o r maintaining the p o l i t i c a l cohesion of Catholics, the Catholic party was able to be extremely f l e x i b l e i n carrying out functions such as i n t e r e s t group representation and regional representation. Since the party's r o l e was not to p r o s e l y t i z e i t needed only to act defensively when issues in v o l v i n g the Catholic subculture such as broadcasting and education came 165 i n t o the p o l i t i c a l arena. Furthermore, the party was s u f f i c i e n t l y competitive, catering to the needs of both working-class and non-working-class Catholics. The Catholic party was aided i n t h i s by the r e l a t i v e s i z e of competing p a r t i e s ( i . e . t h e i r probable lack of success) most l i k e l y to prove a t t r a c t i v e to Catholic voters (the SDAP/PvdA and the L i b e r a l s ) . The s i t u a t i o n was such that most Catholics could give t h e i r support to the Catholic party and remain l o y a l to the Catholic subculture while at the same time not doing violence to t h e i r economic i n t e r e s t s . Contextual factors such as urbanization and concentration of Catholics had an e f f e c t i n varying the vote among Catholics. This was a t t r i b u t e d to the way the s o c i a l control of the Church was affected by these v a r i a b l e s , s o c i a l co
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UBC Theses and Dissertations
Electoral stability and electoral change: the case of the catholic party in the Netherlands Bakvis, Herman 1978
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