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An observational study of social influence processes in small group decision making Roed, Jon Christian 1978

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AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE PROCESSES IN SMALL GROUP DECISION MAKING by \ JON CHRISTIAN ROED B.A. (Honours), University of Manitoba, 1975 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Psychology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA / May, 1978 © Jon C h r i s t i a n Roed, 1978 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Psychology The University of Brit ish Columbia 2075 W e s b r o o k P l a c e V a n c o u v e r , C a n a d a V6T 1W5 Date March 26, 1978 Abstract This research investigated a number of hypotheses concerning the form of s o c i a l influence between factions in small group decision making. In an e f f o r t to avoid the bias which may r e s u l t from the use of confederates i n such re-search, the six person groups used i n t h i s study were composed e n t i r e l y of experimentally naive subjects. Five s p e c i f i c hypotheses were investigated: a) that the influence of a f a c t i o n depends upon the extent to which they are perceived as cohesive and consistent by the others ( i . e . , on t h e i r apparent s o l i d a r i t y ) ; b) that as the size of a f a c t i o n increases, that f a c t i o n w i l l be perceived by the others as being both more competent and less confident with respect to the issue at hand; c) that the f a c t i o n which wins the f i r s t convert w i l l exert more influence on the f i n a l decision; d) that disagreement w i l l be solved by compromise; e) that the influence of a f a c t i o n i s a function of the frequency of communication by that fac t i o n . The problem discussed was a labour-management dispute. Eight to ten volunteer subjects whose responses to a wage settlement item on an opinion survey f e l l into either the range of 87o-127o or 307o-407o were scheduled to par-t i c i p a t e i n a group, with t h i s scheduling manipulated in such a way that there was a majority of "high" subjects assigned to each group. On a r r i v i n g for the experiment, subjects were given a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of a labour dispute and asked to indicate t h e i r personal b e l i e f regarding the proper percentage wage increase. Six of the subjects were then selected to serve as the discussants, and the remaining subjects were asked to act as observers. Because the survey opinions proved to be u n r e l i a b l e indicators of the responses to the issue used i n the experiment, the i n i t i a l groups of eight to ten subjects often did not have a d i s t i n c t "high" -"low" s p l i t , and for t h i s reason the s e l e c t i o n of the six discussants was done so as to maximize the p o l a r i z a t i o n within the discus-sion group. The discussants were then given twenty-five minutes i n which to simulate an a r b i t r a t i o n of the dispute and to reach an agreement. During the discussion, the observer subjects and the two experimenters observed the group from an adjacent room through an observational glass. The discussion was recorded on audio tape and the two experimenters also independently coded each comment made by the subjects i n terms of which person was speaking, to whom she spoke, and whether her comment favoured a "high" or "low" decision. When the group reached consensus (or at the end of the a l l o t t e d time), a l l subjects completed a questionnaire concerning the course of the discussion, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the discussants, and opinions on a s i m i l a r case. F i f t e e n discussion groups were used in the study. The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e : a) that compromise was not the means by which decisions were reached; b) that while the f i n a l decision did not always favour the f a c t i o n which won the f i r s t convert, that f a c t i o n was generally more i n f l u e n t i a l ; and c) that the other three hypotheses were unsupported. There are c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s to the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of these data, based upon the combination of the small sample size and the amount of between group v a r i a b i l i t y . The implications of these factors are discussed i n de-t a i l , both with respect to the r e l i a b i l i t y of the obtained r e s u l t s and the problems for future research. i v . Table of Contents Page L i s t of Tables v Acknowledgments v i I. INTRODUCTION 1 The role of s o c i a l influence 5 Majority influence 9 Minority influence 12 Conclusion and research problem 16 Spe c i f i c hypotheses 20 II. METHOD 23 Issue s e l e c t i o n 23 Subjects 23 Materials 24 Experimental setting 26 Procedure 26 III. RESULTS 30 General re s u l t s 32 Spe c i f i c hypotheses 34 Otherlie^sul'ts" : s 41 IV. DISCUSSION 47 Interpretations 47 Methodological considerations 52 Conclusions 55 References 59 Appendix A: Materials 64 Opinion Survey form 65 Pretest form 67 Discussion Information form 68 Observational data recording form 72 Appendix B: Computational Details 73 Computational formulae 74 Corr e l a t i o n matrices 76 V . L i s t of Tables Page 1. I n i t i a l Group Compositions 25 2. Group Means and Standard Deviations 33 3. Subgroup Composition under Di f f e r e n t 36 Pa r t i t i o n i n g s 4. Hypothesis I: Influence as a Function 38 of S o l i d a r i t y 5. Hypothesis II:- Confidence and Competence 38 as Functions of Size 6. Hypothesis III: Influence as a Function 40 of Movement 7. Hypothesis V: Influence as a Function 42 of Communication Frequency 8. Influence as a Function of the Four 44 Best Predictors v i . Acknowledgments It i s a pleasure to be able to acknowledge the assistance of those who provided advice and support during the course of th i s t h e s i s . I am especi-a l l y g r a t e f u l to Doug K e l l e r , who served as my research assistant and whose energy and enthusiasm proved invaluable during the long task of r e c r u i t i n g volunteers and conducting the experimental sessions. I would also l i k e to extend my appreciation to those who served on my committee: to Dr. Charlan Nemeth, who provided many of the resources which were required for the study; to Dr. Robert Knox, for his c a r e f u l reviews of the manuscript d r a f t s ; to Dr. Ralph Hakstian, for h i s advice concerning the data analyses; and to Dr. Jerry Wiggins, for the continuous encouragement which he provided. F i n a l l y , I owe a p a r t i c u l a r debt of gratitude to my wife, Donna, who contributed patience, understanding, and an invaluable a b i l i t y to produce meticulously typed copy from my almost i l l e g i b l e handwriting. Without her support, the completion of t h i s thesis would have been a much more arduous task. 1. Introduction Perhaps the single most inescapable fact of modern existence i s the extent to which group process has become responsible for the great majority of the decisions which af f e c t the l i f e of each and every i n d i v i d u a l . In every sphere - s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , educational, occupational - i t i s the group which i s charged with the d i r e c t i o n of the vast number of functions which, through increasing complexity or sheer size alone, have been placed beyond the c a p a b i l i t i e s of the single i n d i v i d u a l . As an example, consider the mod-ern i n d u s t r i a l plant. Even though there may be a single person who possesses the appearance of power, t h i s appearance i s increasingly a matter more of form than of function. It has become impossible for even an i n d i v i d u a l of genius to master s u f f i c i e n t l y the content and continuing developments of such diverse areas as technology, administration, labour r e l a t i o n s , market-ing, and so on which are required to exert e f f e c t i v e d i r e c t c o n t r o l over such an operation. In most, i f not a l l , cases, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for d i s -crete areas of operation devolves on q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l s or groups i n each area, and the decisions attributed to the president or general manager i n fact r e f l e c t the decisions of a management group or groups (cf. Galbraith, 1971, Ch. 6). With t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n of the prevalence of groups which hold decision making powers, there also comes a very realLconcern for the q u a l i t y of t h e i r execution of that function. Undoubtedly, the great strength of the group format i s that i t allows the bringing together of i n d i v i d u a l s with diverse and preferably complementary areas of competence, who i n combination pos-sess resources far exceeding those of even the most capable i n d i v i d u a l . This fact gives the decision making group a d i s t i n c t p o t e n t i a l advantage over the lone i n d i v i d u a l . But i s t h i s p o t e n t i a l r e a l i z e d i n p r a c t i c e , and under what 2. c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? D e s p i t e i t s u b i q u i t y , the d e c i s i o n making group a p p a r e n t l y e n j o y s l i t t l e p u b l i c c r e d i b i l i t y , a f a c t r e f l e c t e d i n the p o p u l a r adage "A camel i s a h o r s e d e s i g n e d by a committee." Nor i s the e x p e r i m e n t a l l i t e r a t u r e r e s o u n d i n g l y f a v o u r a b l e toward the group. W h i l e thousands o f s t u d i e s have been c o n d u c t e d t o a s s e s s the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e group i n r e l a t i o n t o i n -d i v i d u a l s ( e . g . , Hare, 1972), t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e r e s u l t s f o r a s s e s s i n g (and more i m p o r t a n t l y , i m p r o v i n g ) t h e v a l u e o f group p r o c e s s a r e s t i l l u n c l e a r . On the p o s i t i v e s i d e , some r e s e a r c h has shown t h a t a group, w o r k i n g t o -g e t h e r , can be s u p e r i o r t o even the b e s t member w o r k i n g i n i s o l a t i o n ( e . g . , A nderson, 1961; F a u s t , 1959; Goldman, 1965; Husband, 1940; L a u g h l i n , Branch & Johnson, 1969; Shaw, 1932; T a y l o r & F a u s t , 1952). Upon e x a m i n a t i o n , how-e v e r , t h i s f i n d i n g seems l i m i t e d t o t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h b e n e f i t from a d i -v i s i o n o f l a b o u r , i n v o l v e the c r e a t i o n o f a v a r i e t y o f i d e a s by i n d i v i d u a l members, and a l l o w members t o r e c o g n i z e and c o r r e c t each o t h e r ' s e r r o r ( c f . Shaw, 1971). Examples o f t h i s t y p e o f p r o b l e m a r e l o g i c a l p u z z l e s , anagrams, and c r e a t i v e problems such as t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f as many words as p o s s i b l e f r o m a s e t o f l e t t e r s . I n o t h e r s i u t a t i o n s , p r i m a r i l y t h o s e i n v o l v i n g m a t t e r s o f f a c t such as r e s p o n s e s t o m u l t i p l e c h o i c e achievement t e s t i t e m s (Gurnee, 1937) o r e s t i m a t i o n o f t h e number o f beans i n a b o t t l e ( J e n n e s s , 1932), group performance can e q u a l but w i l l n o t g e n e r a l l y exceed t h a t o f the most p r o f i -c i e n t member. I t a p p e a r s , t h e n , t h a t when t h e p r o b l e m i n v o l v e s r e l a t i v e l y few s t e p s and the p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s c a n be r e l i a b l y e v a l u a t e d by a l l members, the group w i l l f u n c t i o n at l e a s t as e f f e c t i v e l y as i t s b e s t member and may even be s u p e r i o r ( K e l l e y & T h i b a u t , 1969). I f t h e s e were t h e s o r t s o f problems w i t h w h i c h a c t u a l groups were con-cerned, then there would be considerable support for an o p t i m i s t i c view of the group's a b i l i t y to deal with them. This i s not the case, however. It i s p r e c i s e l y those problems which do not involve the a p p l i c a t i o n of straight f o r -ward methods or the discovery of e a s i l y v e r i f i a b l e solutions which tend to f a l l into the province of the decision making group, and i t i s with regard to these sorts of problems that the l i t e r a t u r e i s most pes s i m i s t i c . For ex-ample, when a task i s complex, involving thinking through a number of i n t e r -dependent steps and applying a number of decision c r i t e r i a at each stage (e.g., Faucheux & Moscovici, 1958, c i t e d i n Kelley & Thibaut, 1969), a group w i l l perform below the l e v e l of even an average group member. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , i t appears that the group i n t e r a c t i o n generates simple "noise" or confusion which detracts from the group's a b i l i t y to follow a consistent strategy (Kelley & Thibaut, 1969; Maier, 1967). Another factor which may seriously detract from a group's problem solving a b i l i t y i s the degree of uncertainty associated with the various possible s o l -utions. When the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which d i s t i n g u i s h "good" and "bad" solu-tions are ambiguous, or when the consequences of various decisions are not c e r t a i n but rather only p r o b a b i l i s t i c , then the m u l t i p l i c i t y of suggestions which a group can produce becomes a p o t e n t i a l disadvantage. In the absence of any objective c r i t e r i a for se l e c t i n g one solution from among the many avai l a b l e , the movement toward an eventual decision by the group w i l l have to be based on other, possibly task i r r e l e v a n t , factors. As evidence of the ex-istence of t h i s problem, i t has been found that i n cases where the v e r i f i a -b i l i t y of solutions i s low, a group discussion of the problem w i l l encour-age convergence on a single solution (even i n the absence of a need for con-sensus) but that t h i s convergence w i l l not necessarily be i n the d i r e c t i o n of the best solution (Thomas & Fink, 1961). In such cases, the outcome of the group discussion depends more upon the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the persons involved then upon the r e l a t i v e q u a l i t y of the solutions considered. It seems that the adoption of a given solution i s determined more by a process of s o c i a l influence than by a c r i t i c a l evaluation of the alter n a t i v e s a v a i l -able, as the sol u t i o n forwarded by the most convincing, most confident or, possibly, most vocal member tends to be the one most l i k e l y to be accepted regardless of i t s v e r i d i c a l status. In short, whether or not a group w i l l function e f f e c t i v e l y i n the per-formance of problem solving or judgment appears to be a function of the i n -t e r a c t i o n which i s required by the task (cf. Hackman & Morris, 1975). If the problem involves the pooling of i n d i v i d u a l e f f o r t s , then the group w i l l per-form more e f f e c t i v e l y than a single i n d i v i d u a l , although i t w i l l not neces-s a r i l y exceed the performance of a "nominal" group - iv.,e% , the group's pro-ducts may not surpass the sum of the e f f o r t s of an equal number of i n d i v i d u a l s working, independently (Anderson, 1961). In addition, when the task benefits from mutual error checking to reject incorrect solutions, then the group per-formance w i l l exceed that of a nominal group (e.g., Faust, 1959). In these problems, the i n t e r a c t i o n required i s c l e a r l y defined and can generally be considered to be simply the maintenance of a forum i n which i n d i v i d u a l con-t r i b u t i o n s can be accumulated and t h e i r legitimacy evaluated according to some r e l a t i v e l y unambiguous standard available to a l l members. When, however, the task requires a cooperative e f f o r t on a more complex problem, p a r t i c u l a r l y one for which the optimum solution cannot be determined beyond a c e r t a i n l e v e l of p r o b a b i l i t y , then the group may perform more e f f e c t i v e l y than the most able member or i t may perform more poorly than the least able member, depending upon the nature of the i n t e r a c t i o n which takes place. S p e c i f i c a l l y , i n such a s i t u a t i o n the effectiveness of the group apparently depends not upon the discovery of the best solution, but upon the success of the discoverer i n hi s attempts to advance that solution; i t i s a function of the dynamics of the group rather than the c r e d i b i l i t y of the s o l u t i o n . In view of t h i s rather c r i t i c a l importance of s o c i a l influence i n determiningntheuoutcome of a group process, i t i s necessary to consider the r o l e of interpersonal influence i n group discussion and the e f f e c t s which such influence has upon the products of the decision process. The Role of S o c i a l Influence It has been noted (Maier, 1967) that a group has c e r t a i n assets and l i -a b i l i t i e s which i t brings to a decision s i t u a t i o n . The assets which d i s t i n -guish a group of a given size n from an i n d i v i d u a l i n such a s i t u a t i o n can be expressed i n terms of the n heads r u l e , which i s summed up i n the time worn adage "Two heads are better than one." Simply stated, t h i s rule asserts that i t i s l o g i c a l l y necessary that the members of a group of size n w i l l pos sess at least as much i f not more information pertaining to the problem at hand than the same group less any number of i t s members. S i m i l a r l y , that group which i s largest w i l l contain the greatest number of viewpoints from which to assess that information and the widest v a r i e t y of backgrounds upon which to base suggestions for the r e s o l u t i o n of the problem. Therefore, i n p r i n c i p l e at l e a s t , on any question ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i f i t i s one of uncertain s o l u t i o n ) , that group which comprises the greatest possible number of mem-bers should be at least as able as any smaller group at generating an op-timum solu t i o n . Unfortunately for the q u a l i t y of group decisions, however, i t i s equally true that the n group members possess at least as much misinformation and bias as any lesser number, and that i n the absence of a guaranteed method of separating the desirable from the undesirable components, i t may well be that i t i s the misinformation and bias which are incorporated into the f i n a l deci-sion. It i s worth noting here that the n heads rule r e f e r r e d to above i n -volves only the size of the group, and thus the assets which the group pos-sesses are unaffected by e i t h e r task or group factors other than s i z e . However, the method of extracting and integrating information and opinions to form a group decision does not share t h i s exemption. The t r a d i t i o n a l method of pooling the information and opinions held by various persons i n order to reach a single group judgment i s one of face to face i n t e r a c t i o n , and i t i s t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n which gives r i s e to a group's p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t i e s . As we noted i n the previous section, when a task involves r e l a t i v e l y simple operations and allows clear d i s c r i m i n a t i o n of v a l i d and i n v a l i d solutions, the i n t e r a c t i o n process does not adversely af-fect the group's functioning. In such a s i t u a t i o n , the influence which does occur during the discussion can be seen to be primarily simply informational, as for example i n Shaw's (1932) study which found that group problem solving a b i l i t y exceeded i n d i v i d u a l a b i l i t y largely due to the much greater r e j e c t i o n of incorrect suggestions by other group members than i s the case with i n d i -viduals assessing t h e i r own ideas. This sort of influence i s c l e a r l y r e l e -vant to the task's requirements. When, on the other hand, the correct s o l u t i o n i s not e a s i l y distinguishec and e s p e c i a l l y i f i t s correctness cannot be conclusively demonstrated within the confines of the group's experience, then the group i n t e r a c t i o n experience gives r i s e to a number of factors such as s o c i a l influence, goal c o n f l i c t , and simple "noise" which a f f e c t the group's deliberations i n ways unrelated to the task requirements and thus may decrease the group's performance. The most important of these factors is s o c i a l influence. Since i n f l u -ence i s defined as an "action of a person or thing on or upon another, per-c e p t i b l e only i n i t s e f f e c t s " (Concise Oxford Dictionary), i t i s perhaps belabouring the obvious to assert that s o c i a l influence occurs i n situa t i o n s such as those referred to above. The very fact that some group member (or members) must renounce an i n i t i a l l y preferred s o l u t i o n i n favour of the group's consensus necessarily means that influence occurs i n the formation of every group decision. However,in. problems involving uncertainty of solu-t i o n , t h i s s o c i a l influence assumes a ce n t r a l r o l e . Here the acceptance of a sol u t i o n cannot be dictated s o l e l y by the solution's merit, either because that merit i s not measurable or because various solutions appear equally appropriate depending upon the subjective values assigned to aspects of the problem and consequences of a chosen sol u t i o n . This being the case, s o c i a l influence factors such as talkativeness (Thomas & Fink, 1961), confidence (cf. Hollander & W i l l i s , 1969, p. 63), and convergence on a consensus (e.g. , Sherif, 1935; Janis, 1972) determine the outcome of the group process. In fact, i t can be said that with regard to problems for which .there are not un-equivocal arguments compelling the s e l e c t i o n of one s p e c i f i c s o l u t i o n or con-sensus point, i t i s only the operation of some form of s o c i a l influence which allows a decision to be reached at a l l . In considering the nature of s o c i a l influence i n group decision making, the concepts used by Kelman (1961) w i l l prove u s e f u l . He based h i s discus-sion of the process of s o c i a l influence on the form of acceptance of the influence attempt, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g among three not e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t types; compliance, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , and i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n . The f i r s t , compliance, occurs when "an i n d i v i d u a l accepts influence from another person or group because he hopes to achieve a favourable reaction from the other." (Kelman, 1961, p. 62). It i s distinguished by the fact that the person's expression .of the b e l i e f , behaviour or attitude involved i s dependent s o l e l y upon considera-tions of the s o c i a l e f f e c t of such expression. The second type, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , occurs when a person adopts behaviours, b e l i e f s or attitudes c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of another person or group because t h i s adoption places the person i n a de-si r a b l e role r e l a t i o n s h i p to that other person or group. Thus, influence r e s u l t i n g i n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n proceeds from the attractiveness of the i n f l u -encing agent (whether based upon the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , power, or p o s i t i o n of said agent). The t h i r d response, i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , occurs when an i n d i v i d u a l accepts influence because the content of that influence i s consistent with the person's value system or with perceived r e a l i t y . In th i s case, the issue of whether or not influence i s accepted rests upon the u t i l i t y of the i n -tended change and so the basis of the influence process must involve either the objective v a l i d i t y of the arguments presented when such can be estab-lished or the c r e d i b i l i t y of the communicator when d i r e c t evaluation of the communication i s not possible. From t h i s point of view, i t i s apparent that the process through which agreement i s achieved has implications for the q u a l i t y of the f i n a l decision. Only when consensus i s a r e s u l t of i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n by the members w i l l the process of group i n t e r a c t i o n enhance the group's a b i l i t y to i d e n t i f y an op-timum solution, because t h i s i s the only r e s u l t which implies evaluation of the arguments presented and the c r e d i b i l i t y of those presenting them. In contrast, the processes involved i n producing compliance or i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , while not precluding the s e l e c t i o n of an optimum outcome, operate with res-pect to the group's s o c i a l context and independently of the i n t r i n s i c merit of the possible outcomes. Therefore, they may enhance the group's e f f e c t i v e -ness, but they might equally well detract from i t . I f , then, i t i s the case that s o c i a l influence plays a major part in group judgment and decision mak-ing, and th i s major part may be either b e n e f i c i a l or detrimental, a question n a t u r a l l y arises regarding the way i n which influence a c t u a l l y operates i n groups. Majority Influence Immediately the question of influence i n a group setting i s raised, the issue of conformity springs to mind. This i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g , since the phenomenon i s so pervasive that everyone has at least occasionally experienced the need to "go along with the r e s t " , to l i v e up to the expectations of others. As a r e s u l t , the major emphasis of research on s o c i a l influence has been con-cerned with the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of conformity (cf. Hollander & W i l l i s 1 9 6 7 ; Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972). In the research l i t e r a t u r e , conformity has generally been defined as "a change toward a group as a r e s u l t of r e a l or imagined group pressure." K i e s l e r & K i e s l e r , 1969). The c l a s s i c demonstration of the power of a major-i t y to induce such movement i n an i n d i v i d u a l was presented by Asch (1951). In his c l a s s i c series of experiments, a number of subjects were asked to compare a reference l i n e of a c e r t a i n length on one card with three comparison l i n e s of d i f f e r i n g lengths on another card held up beside the f i r s t . In a l l cases, one of the comparison li n e s was c l e a r l y the same length as the rest and so the discrimination required was quite simple. However, i n a c t u a l i t y a l l but one of the supposed subjects were confederates of the experimenter, and on cer-t a i n of the t r i a l s they unanimously chose the wrong l i n e . On these t r i a l s , faced with the unanimous opinion of the group, subjects conformed to the group judgment on about t h i r t y percent of the t r i a l s , and f u l l y seventy-four per-cent of the subjects conformed on at least one t r i a l . This r e s u l t has also been shown to obtain when a unanimous majority i s as small as three persons (Asch, 1951) and on various other perceptual and judgmental tasks (cf. Krech, C r u t c h f i e l d , & Ballachey, 1962). Furthermore, the e f f e c t i s even stronger when the stimulus s i t u a t i o n i s more ambiguous (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 10. T h i s r e s e a r c h on c o n f o r m i t y p r o v i d e s s t r i k i n g e v i d e n c e o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f the m a j o r i t y , e v i d e n c e w h i c h has p r o v e n so c o m p e l l i n g t h a t i t has v i r t u a l l y do-m i n a t e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e i n f l u e n c e p r o c e s s i n groups ( s e e , f o r example, t h e w e i g h t p l a c e d on d i s c u s s i o n s o f c o n f o r m i t y i n contemporary s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y t e x t s , f o r example Aronson, 1972; Baron & Byr n e , 1977; B e r k o w i t z , 1975). T h i s i s not t o say t h a t c o n f o r m i t y i s the o n l y o r even t h e most impor-t a n t form w h i c h m a j o r i t y i n f l u e n c e can t a k e . The m a j o r i t y a l s o w i e l d s a p o t e n t form o f s o c i a l i n f l u e n c e by v i r t u e o f the c r e d i b i l i t y w h i c h i t s num-bers g i v e t o i t s b e l i e f s , a f a c t o r w h i c h i n Kelman's (1961) framework would p r o v i d e a s o r t o f i n f o r m a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e l e a d i n g t o i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n c o m p l i a n c e o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Through e x p e r i e n c e , one l e a r n s t h a t i n the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f c a s e s the judgments of a number o f d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s c o n c e r n i n g q u e s t i o n s o f p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y w i l l c o i n c i d e , and t h a t even when the r e l e v a n t a s p e c t s o f the s t i m u l u s s i t u a t i o n a r e not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d , t h o s e judgments, w h i l e showing some degree o f v a r i a b i l i t y , w i l l s t i l l c e n t r e about th e t r u e answer ( c f . Shaw, 1971. p. 6 0 ) . Thus the a c t o f d e f e r r i n g t o t h e m a j o r i t y p o s i t i o n i s not n e c e s s a r i l y an a b d i c a t i o n o f one's i n t e l l e c t u a l d u t y , as i s o f t e n assumed, but a r a t i o n a l r e s p o n s e t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n about r e a l i t y w h i c h i s c o n t a i n e d i n a m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n . C o n s i d e r a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h i n -d i v i d u a l s must make some d e c i s i o n about a s t a t e o f n a t u r e o r an outcome o f an e v e n t , t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h w i l l n o t be i m m e d i a t e l y a p p a r e n t . I f each p e r s o n ' s p e r s o n a l d e c i s i o n i s made independent o f the o t h e r s and has a s s o c i -a t e d w i t h i t some non-zero p r o b a b i l i t y o f b e i n g c o r r e c t , t h e n the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t any number who choose t h e same p o s i t i o n a r e i n e r r o r ( w h i c h i s t h e p r o -d u c t o f the i n d i v i d u a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f e r r o r ) d e c r e a s e s g e o m e t r i c a l l y as t h e i r number i n c r e a s e s . F o r example, i f t e n p e r s o n s agreed on some p o i n t , and each had a 507» chance o f b e i n g wrong, t h e n the l i k e l i h o o d o f them a l l being wrong i s only 0.17o. S i m i l a r l y , i f some n persons were to judge the value of some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of physical r e a l i t y (e.g., weight of an object) and t h e i r judgments were centred about the true value with a standard devi-ation of 1 unit, then the standard error of t h e i r mean judgment would be only the r e c i p r o c a l square root of n. In such cases, i t i s c l e a r that the confidence with which one could espouse a b e l i e f would be enhanced consider-ably i f that b e l i e f r e f l e c t e d the majority opinion. This l i n e of reasoning also has i t s counterpart i n terms of nonobjective or s o c i a l r e a l i t y ( cf. Festinger, 1950, 1 9 5 4 ) . Many elements i n a person's b e l i e f structure involve b e l i e f s , attitudes or opinions concerning matters the true state of which cannot be established with reference to empirical data. While the question of objective v a l i d i t y generally does not apply to these elements, they do enjoy a subjective v a l i d i t y depending i n large part upon the extent to which relevant others share them, i . e . , whether a consen-sus exists concerning them. It i s often said that humans s t r i v e to determine the i n t r i n s i c properties of the world around them and to acquire v e r i d i c a l perceptions concerning causal r e l a t i o n s h i p s and response-outcome contingencies operating i n that world (cf. for example, Kelley & Thibaut, 1969, p. 6; K i e s l e r & JKiesler, 1969, p. 9 2 ) . Certainly the attainment of such knowledge i s adaptive, increasing the p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of events which concern one and concomitantly reducing uncertainty and i t s accompanying stress (cf. Seligman, 1 9 7 5 ) . There are e s s e n t i a l l y four ways i n which one establishes the l e v e l of confidence with which he can view such b e l i e f s (Heider, 1 9 5 8 ) . The f i r s t three are p r i n c i p l e s of induction which were proposed by John Stuart M i l l a century ago, and involve the examination of the conditions associated with the presence, absence and v a r i a t i o n s of the phenomena of i n t e r e s t . The f o u r t h , however, i s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f c o n s e n s u s , and t h u s r e f e r s not t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e phenomena and the p h y s i c a l w o r l d but t o the c o i n c i -dence o f d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s ' p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I n o t h e r words, when the e v i d e n c e o f r e a s o n f a l l s s h o r t o f r e d u c i n g u n c e r t a i n t y below some a r b i t r a r y l e v e l , t he i n d i v i d u a l r e l i e s upon consensus t o d e f i n e the s a -l i e n t a s p e c t s o f s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e m a j o r i t y p o s i t i o n on an i s s u e can c o n t a i n a s t r o n g i n f o r m a t i o n a l component w h i c h may e x e r t i n -f l u e n c e e n t i r e l y independent o f any " r e a l o r i m a g i n e d group p r e s s u r e . " I t appears t h e n , t h a t a b e l i e f e n d o r s e d by a m a j o r i t y e x e r t s s u b s t a n t i a l i n f l u e n c e i n a group s i t u a t i o n , whether as a r e s u l t o f the m a j o r i t y ' s w i e l d i n g o f s o c i a l p r e s s u r e o r t h e i n h e r e n t c r e d i b i l i t y w h i c h i t s numbers l e n d i t , and i t i s t h i s s o r t o f i n f l u e n c e w h i c h i s i n v o k e d most o f t e n when s o c i a l i n f l u -ence i s d i s c u s s e d i n r e l a t i o n t o group dynamics. But i s i t t h e w e i g h t o f numbers w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s i n f l u e n c e ? What about the i n f l u e n c e o f t h e i n d i v i -d u a l on the group? M i n o r i t y I n f l u e n c e I t i s r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l c a n sway a m a j o r i t y when t h a t i n d i v i d u a l p o s s e s s e s some s p e c i a l power by v i r t u e o f b e i n g a l e g i t i m a t e l e a d -e r , a c o n t r o l l e r o f e f f e c t i v e rewards and p u n i s h m e n t s , o r a r e c o g n i z e d e x p e r t ( F r e n c h & Raven, 1959). Upon r e f l e c t i o n , however, t h e r e a l s o appear t o be i n s t a n c e s where i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h no such s p e c i a l powers c a n advance an i n i -t i a l l y u n p o p u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n i n t h e f a c e o f m a j o r i t y o p p o s i t i o n and c a n e v e n t u a l l y w i n o v e r o r a t l e a s t p r o f o u n d l y i n f l u e n c e t h a t m a j o r i t y ( e . g . , C o p e r n i c u s , Marx, F r e u d , 'or even H i t l e r ) . There a re a l s o examples o f t h i s o c c u r r i n g i n e x p e r i m e n t a l g r o u p s , a s , f o r example, when a t a l k a t i v e o r h i g h l y c o n f i d e n t i n d i v i d u a l i n d u c e s t h e r e s t o f a group t o a c c e p t h i s p o s i t i o n ( e . g . , Thomas & F i n k , 1961; T h o r n d i k e , 1938). But i t i s o n l y r e c e n t l y t h a t t h i s 13. i s s u e o f m i n o r i t y i n f l u e n c e has become th e s u b j e c t o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h ( c f . M o s c o v i c i & Faucheux, 1972; M o s c o v i c i & Nemeth, 1974) aimed a t d e t e r m i n -i n g j u s t how i t f u n c t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e l a t i o n t o the a p p a r e n t l y sub-s t a n t i a l power o f t h e m a j o r i t y t o p r e v e n t such i n f l u e n c e . Two t y p e s o f p a r a d i g m have been used t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s phenomenon. The f i r s t i n v o l v e s p e r c e p t u a l judgments o f c o l o u r s t i m u l i , g e n e r a l l y pure b l u e s l i d e s o f v a r y i n g l u m i n a n c e . I n a t y p i c a l e x p e r i m e n t , M o s c o v i c i , Lage and N a f f r e c h o u x (1969) had s i x p e r s o n s (two o f whom were c o n f e d e r a t e s ) make c o l o u r judgemnts o f p h o t o g r a p h i c s l i d e s . The s u b j e c t s were t e s t e d f o r c o l o u r v i s i o n as a group and t h e n i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e y w o u l d be shown a number o f c o l o u r s l i d e s , t o each o f w h i c h t h e y were t o r e s p o n d a l o u d , naming the c o l o u r o f t h e s l i d e and r a t i n g i t s b r i g h t n e s s on a s c a l e from 0 t o 5. S i x b l u e s l i d e s d i f f e r i n g o n l y i n luminance were p r e s e n t e d s i x t i m e s each i n random o r d e r f o r a t o t a l o f t h i r t y - s i x t r i a l s . Each t r i a l l a s t e d f i f t e e n s e c o n d s , and t r i a l s were s e p a r a t e d by f i v e second i n t e r s t i m u l u s i n t e r v a l s . T h i s s i -t u a t i o n i s v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h a t used i n the c o n f o r m i t y r e s e a r c h , a l t h o u g h t h e c o l o u r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n r e q u i r e d may be somewhat more s u b j e c t i v e t h a n j u d g i n g l i n e l e n g t h . The r e s u l t s showed t h a t when o n l y n a i v e s u b j e c t s are u s e d , t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f e r r o n e o u s c o l o u r r e s p o n s e s i s v e r y low (0.27»), but when con-f e d e r a t e s who c o n s i s t e n t l y r e s p o n d w i t h a judgment o f " g r e e n " on e v e r y t r i a l a r e i n c l u d e d , t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f e r r o r s jumps c o n s i d e r a b l y ( t o 8.47>). I t i s t h i s d i f f e r e n c e t h a t i s i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g i n d i c a t i v e o f m i n o r i t y i n f l u e n c e One o f the c r i t i c a l v a r i a b l e s i n v o l v e d i n p r o d u c i n g t h i s e f f e c t i s ap-p a r e n t l y t h e p e r c e i v e d c o n s i s t e n c y o f the c o n f e d e r a t e s . When t h e y responded w i t h " g r e e n " on o n l y t w o - t h i r d s o f the t r i a l s and " b l u e " on t h e o t h e r t h i r d , t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f " g r e e n " r e s p o n s e s was o n l y 1.257>. Moreover, t h i s c o n s i s -t e n c y does not n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e c o n s t a n c y o f the a c t u a l r e s p o n s e but r a t h e a c o n s i s t e n t c o v a r i a t i o n between r e s p o n s e and the s t i m u l u s s i t u a t i o n . I n an 14. e x p e r i m e n t s i m i l a r t o the above, Nemeth, Swedlund, and K a n k i (1974) compared f i v e l e v e l s o f c o n s i s t e n c y . I n t h r e e o f the c o n d i t i o n s , c o n f e d e r a t e s r e s -ponded " g r e e n " on h a l f o f the t r i a l s and " g r e e n - b l u e " on the o t h e r h a l f , w i t h t h e o r d e r o f r e s p o n d i n g e i t h e r a) random r e l a t i v e t o the l u m inance o f t h e s l i d e s , b) c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the luminance of the s l i d e s , " g r e e n " r e s p o n s e s b e i n g g i v e n t o the b r i g h t e r h a l f o f t h e s l i d e s o r c) c o r r e l a t e d w i t h l u m i n -ance but " g r e e n - b l u e " b e i n g g i v e n as t h e r e s p o n s e t o the b r i g h t e r s l i d e s . I n the o t h e r two c o n d i t i o n s , the c o n f e d e r a t e s ' r e s p o n s e s were c o n s t a n t , b e i n g " b l u e - g r e e n " i n one and " g r e e n " i n the o t h e r . The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t w h i l e the random o r d e r o f r e s p o n d i n g d i d not a f f e c t t h e n a i v e s u b j e c t s ' r e s -ponses, b o t h o f t h e c o r r e l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s produced s i g n i f i c a n t degrees o f i n f l u e n c e and t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s d i d not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y f rom each o t h e r or from the c o n s t a n t " g r e e n - b l u e " c o n d i t i o n . T h i s e f f e c t was a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e n a i v e s u b j e c t s r e p o r t e d p e r c e i v i n g the c o n s i s t e n t c o n f e -d e r a t e s i n b o t h the c o r r e l a t e d and t h e r e p e t i t i v e c o n d i t i o n s as b e i n g more c o n f i d e n t and more c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r judgments t h a n were the c o n f e d e r a t e s i n the random c o n d i t i o n . The r e s u l t s from the second paradigm,;whi"ch.uses a more n a t u r a l i s t i c d i s c u s s i o n s e t t i n g } t t e n d t o s u p p o r t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n one s t u d y , Nemeth and W a c h t l e r (1974), had f o u r s u b j e c t s and a c o n f e d e r a t e d i s c u s s a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y c a s e and attempt t o r e a c h a consensus on t h e s i z e o f damage award w h i c h would be a p p r o p r i a t e . On p r e t e s t i n g the i s s u e , i t was found t h a t the mean amount w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s would award was $14,670 and t h a t no one w o u l d propose l e s s t h a n $8,000. The c o n f e d e r a t e , ;pUaying the p a r t o f a h a r d - l i n e m i n o r i t y , t h e r e f o r e argued f o r a $3,000 d e c i s i o n , u s i n g the same s e t o f p r e -a r r a n g e d arguments i n a l l groups and n e v e r c o m p r o m i s i n g . The m a n i p u l a t i o n i n v o l v e d whether t h e c o n f e d e r a t e chose o r was a s s i g n e d t o the s e a t a t t h e 15. head of the table or a side seat, and the dependent va r i a b l e was the extent to which naive subjects would s h i f t t h e i r opinions toward the confederate's. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the overt e f f e c t s of influence were v i r t u a l l y non-existent, with none of the twenty-four groups reaching a consensus. However, on a questionnaire following the discussion, subjects i n the condition where the confederate chose the head seat (rather than being assigned to i t ) admitted to a s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater change i n t h e i r private opinion i n the d i r e c t i o n of the confederate's p o s i t i o n than was the case for the control groups. As i n the previous study, on questions regarding the extent to which the other group members were seen as confident and consistent, the condition which pro-duced the greatest influence also involved the confederate's being perceived as most confident and most consistent. On the basis of these and other studies (e.g., Nemeth & Wachtler, 1973; Nemeth, Wachtler, & Endicott, 1976), Moscovici and h i s associates (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974) have concluded that i t i s behavi-o r a l s t y l e , a purposeful arrangement of verbal and non-verbal cues, which determines a minority's success. They see the minority's effectiveness as stemming from i t s a b i l i t y to present a plausible a l t e r n a t i v e to the b e l i e f s of the majority, one which requires that majority to reassess the basis of i s s own p o s i t i o n . By being consistent, confident, and impervious to argument, the minority prevents the establishment of that consensus which would be ex-pected to develop around a reasonable b e l i e f . This r e f u s a l ' o f the minority to accept the majority's p o s i t i o n c a l l s into question the legitimacy of that p o s i t i o n and, as a r e s u l t , i n i t i a t e s i n the majority a search for explana-tions of the minority's resistance. It i s t h i s need to reconcile the assumed v a l i d i t y of t h e i r p o s i t i o n with the minority's i n a b i l i t y to recognize i t s obvious merit that forces the majority to s e r i o u s l y consider the basis of 16. t h e m i n o r i t y ' s o p i n i o n s . A l t h o u g h t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e m i n o r i t y ' s a r g u -ments may be m o t i v a t e d s o l e l y by a d e s i r e t o d i s c r e d i t them, i t may a l s o l e a d t o a r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e i r s t r e n g t h s ( i f t h e r e a r e any) and t h u s produce th e e v e n t u a l a c c e p t a n c e o f the m i n o r i t y p o s i t i o n by the m a j o r i t y . C o n c l u s i o n and R e s e a r c h P r o b l e m I n the p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f s o c i a l i n f l u e n c e i n g r o u p s , one element r e a p p e a r s c o n s t a n t l y and t h a t i s the tendency f o r groups t o con v e r g e on a con s e n s u s . Group members t e n d t o move toward consensus when t h e r e i s no r e -quirement t o do so (even a t t e m p t i n g t o a n t i c i p a t e the r e s p o n s e s o f o t h e r s when t h e y a r e unknown); c o n f o r m i t y i s the r e s u l t o f p r e s s u r e s t o c o n s e n s u s ; s o c i a l r e a l i t y depends upon t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f c o n s e n s u s ; m i n o r i t y i n f l u e n c e presumes the t h w a r t i n g o f consensus ( c f . Brown, 1965, p. 669; C o l l i n s & Raven, 1969, p. 173; K e l l e y & T h i b a u t , 1969, p. 71; M o s c o v i c i , 1974, p. 198). I n v i e w o f t h i s , i t may be p r o f i t a b l e t o r e c o n s i d e r the r a t h e r d i v e r s e f i n d i n g s p r e s e n t e d above i n terms o f t h i s need f o r consensus o r "consensus s e e k i n g . " That consensus s e e k i n g o p e r a t e s and t h a t i t c a n be v a l u a b l e i n terms o f f a c i l i t a t i n g group l o c o m o t i o n , d e f i n i n g r e a l i t y , and r e d u c i n g - i u n c e r t ' a i n t y has a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d . That c o n f o r m i t y i s r e l a t e d t o t h a t consensus s e e k i n g i s a l s o a p p a r e n t , because the e x i s t e n c e o f group p r e s s u r e toward u n i -f o r m i t y must a r i s e out o f a d e s i r e t o e l i m i n a t e d i f f e r e n c e , i . e . , t o r e a c h c o n s e n s u s . S i m i l a r l y , we have a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d n o n - c o e r c i v e m a j o r i t y i n -f l u e n c e as an i n s t a n c e o f consensus s e e k i n g and o f t h e v a l i d a t i o n o f b e l i e f s v i a c o n s e n s u s . But what o f the m i n o r i t y i n f l u e n c e l i t e r a t u r e ? I n f a c t , i t appears t h a t what i s l a b e l e d as m i n o r i t y i n f l u e n c e i s a v a r i a n t o f what has been o c c u r r i n g as a r e s u l t o f the consensus s e e k i n g p r o -c e s s i n much o f the c o n f o r m i t y l i t e r a t u r e , a l t h o u g h t h e meaning o f t h o s e r e s u l t s was o b s c u r e d by t h e more d r a m a t i c c o n f o r m i t y e f f e c t s . L e t us 17. c o n s i d e r consensus s e e k i n g i n i t s p u r e s t form t o be an a v e r a g i n g p r o c e s s by w h i c h a number o f i n d i v i d u a l judgments are c o n v e r t e d i n t o a group b e l i e f . T h i s i s b a s i c a l l y what o c c u r s i n s t u d i e s o f group judgments such as t h o s e r e f e r r e d t o e a r l i e r (e.g.,Gurnee, 1937; J e n n e s s , 1932) w h i c h f i n d t h a t the group judgment c o n v e r g e s upon the mean o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l judgments. U s i n g t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , i f a subgroup o f o p i n i o n s d e v i a t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y f r o m t h e modal tendency ( i . e . , i f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f judgments were b i m o d a l and skewed), t h e n one would a n t i c i p a t e t h a t the consensus p o i n t w o u l d move toward t h o s e p o s i t i o n s and i n f a c t t h e r e s u l t s o f a s t u d y by J a c o b s and C a m p b e l l (1961) show e v i d e n c e o f t h i s . I n o r d e r t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f an a r b i t r a r i l y e s t a b l i s h e d norm i n the S h e r i f a u t o k i n e t i c e f f e c t p aradigm, t h e y had groups o f f o u r p e r s o n s r a t e t h e movement o f a p o i n t o f l i g h t i n a darkened room d u r i n g a s e r i e s o f t r i a l s . Groups o f f o u r n a i v e s u b j e c t s i n such a s i t u a t i o n w o u l d judge the movement t o be about 4 i n c h e s , but on t h e f i r s t t r i a l , t h r e e c o n f e d e r a t e s responded w i t h an average judgment o f 16 i n c h e s and t h e l o n e s u b j e c t t h e n s a i d , on t h e a v e r a g e , n o t 4 but 14 i n c h e s . On subsequent t r i a l s , one c o n f e d e r a t e was removed from t h e group on each t r i a l and a new n a i v e s u b j e c t i n t r o d u c e d so t h a t by t h e f o u r t h t r i a l t he group mem-be r s were a l l t r u e s u b j e c t s but w i t h v a r y i n g amounts o f e x p e r i e n c e . From t h i s p o i n t , a t the b e g i n n i n g o f each t r i a l the " o l d e s t " s u b j e c t was removed and r e p l a c e d w i t h a n a i v e s u b j e c t . The r e s u l t s c l e a r l y f a v o u r the o p e r a t i o n o f c o n s e n s u s . As each new s u b j e c t was i n t r o d u c e d , h i s i n f l u e n c e l o w e r e d t h e n o r m a t i v e s t a n d a r d s l i g h t l y and i n a f a s h i o n w h i c h c l o s e l y a p p r o x i m a t e d the a v e r a g i n g o f each p e r s o n ' s p r e v i o u s s t a n d a r d o f judgment. I t i s c r u c i a l t o n o t e h e r e the f u n c t i o n o f a c o n f e d e r a t e i n such a scheme. Because t h e y do not move toward consensus i n t h e way a c t u a l group members do, t h e y c l e a r l y a c c e n t u a t e the o p e r a t i o n o f s o c i a l i n f l u e n c e d e f i n e d as an o v e r a l l s h i f t 18. toward t h e i r p o s i t i o n . In fact, subjects d e s i r i n g to achieve a group con-sensus have no a l t e r n a t i v e but to be influenced since the p o s s i b i l i t y for the converse does not e x i s t . The a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s idea to the r e s u l t s obtained i n the conformity and minority paradigms can account for what otherwise would be considered a paradoxical fin d i n g , namely that both majority and minority influence appear to exert e f f e c t s of the same size and that they do so regardless-.of_the. numbers involved i n e i t h e r the majority or the minority. That the influence of a majority remains r e l a t i v e l y constant for varying sizes greater than three has already been noted. In addition, though, a very s i m i l a r r e s u l t has been found to obtain with respect to minority influence. In a study examining the e f f e c t s on influence of the size of the minority (from a single confed-erate to four confederates) against a group of six naive subjects (Nemeth, Wachtler, & Endicott, 1 9 7 6 ) , i t was found that the magnitude of the influence e f f e c t was r e l a t i v e l y constant across conditions. In other words, neither majority nor minority influence would appear to depend upon the factor of group size per se. The more i n t e r e s t i n g aspect of t h i s comparison of majority and minority influence arises i n r e l a t i o n to the actual magnitude of influence produced. With a paradigm very s i m i l a r to that used i n minority influence research, the conformity studies have con s i s t e n t l y found that as long as the naive subject i s not the only person who d i f f e r s from the majority, then the i n f l u -ence e f f e c t hovers around 57o to 107=,, which i s p r e c i s e l y i n the range of what minority influence achieves (cf. A l l e n , 1975; Moscovici & Faucheux, 1 9 7 2 ) . In sum, i t appears that with the exception of the s i t u a t i o n where an i s o -lated i n d i v i d u a l faces a united majority opposition, a c o n s i s t e n t l y non-compromising c o a l i t i o n of any size can exert influence on a group. While 19. t h i s e f f e c t i s very s l i g h t (but constant) i n a r e l a t i v e l y unambiguous Asch-type s i t u a t i o n , i t can assume major proportions i n cases where the correct responses are less e a s i l y v e r i f i e d , as, for example, i n the autokinetic paradigm referred to e a r l i e r (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961). A p l a u s i b l e explanation for t h i s r e s u l t appears to be that i t r e f l e c t s the e f f e c t of an immovable anchor point on the convergence process. When the stimulus s i t u a t i o n i s amgibuous, then the s t a b i l i t y of t h i s anchor point lends i t an appearance of c e r t a i n t y which increases i t s weight i n the averaging process. This, i n e f f e c t , draws the consensus point toward i t . Even when the s i t u a t i o n i s c l e a r l y defined and the erroneous nature of the confederates' responses i s obvious, there s t i l l e x i s t s the tendency to reduce the differ e n c e i n positions by moving i n the d i r e c t i o n of a consensus. But here the nature of the problem allows only resistance or submission and thus the e f f e c t i s re-duced (although i t i s worth noting again that only 257. of the subjects never attempt the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ) . Considered from t h i s point of view, the research on s o c i a l influence i n groups which has r e l i e d on confederates appears to have a serious l i m i t a t i o n . If i t i s the case that i n d i v i d u a l s r e l y upon each other for information re-garding appropriate responses to situations ( e s p e c i a l l y when those sit u a t i o n s involve uncertainty) and i f t h i s involves a mutual re-evaluation of i n d i v i -dual b e l i e f s i n l i g h t of the informational content provided by others' actions, then i t i s u n l i k e l y that many such s i t u a t i o n s i n r e a l l i f e involve a r b i t r a r y and complete intransigence on the part of group members. But th i s i s p r e c i -sely what the group research with confederates i s producing. Because the confederates do not reassess t h e i r positions or respond to influence attempts, they must appear as unusually c e r t a i n of t h e i r p o s i t i o n and t h i s doubtless lends weight to i t . However, even i f i t did not, the fact s t i l l remains that 20. i n order to reach or even approach consensus the only response which the naive subjects can make i s to s h i f t toward the confederate's p o s i t i o n , regardless of t h e i r acceptance of i t . The research involving t o t a l l y naive groups strong-l y suggests that a v a r i e t y of factors (e.g., v o l u b i l i t y , confidence, status, and so on) can allow an i n d i v i d u a l to be e f f e c t i v e i n influencing a group by increasing the weight which i s associated with his p o s i t i o n i n the averaging process, and the immovability of the confederate may be one more such tac-t i c a l v a r i a b l e which af f e c t s such a weighting. The r e a l question, however, i s not whether a possible form of behaviour such as immovability could a f f e c t a discussion, but whether i n fact i t occurs with any frequency i n natural groups. Considering the pressure which i s brought to bear on persons who display such behaviour (e.g., Schacter, 1951), i t seems l i k e l y that there are more common forms of influence i n groups and that i t would be valuable to test the various conceptions of s o c i a l influence i n the context of a less a r t i f i c i a l s i t u a t i o n . In order to avoid the d i s -t o r t i o n which may r e s u l t from non-reciprocal i n t e r a c t i o n s , the research re-ported below r e l i e d upon groups composed e n t i r e l y of naive subjects. A problem for discussion was selected which had a continuous numerical scale of solutions and about which the general population expressed considerable disagreement. P o t e n t i a l subjects were then pretested i n order to determine t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l opinions on the issue. In th i s way groups of completely naive subjects could be constructed i n which the differences of opinion formed d i s t i n c t f a c t i o n s . S p e c i f i c Hypotheses The study examines f i v e plausible formulations of the influence process i n group decision-making. Hypothesis I. "Influence by a fa c t i o n i s a function of t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y . " A major emphasis o f the m i n o r i t y i n f l u e n c e l i t e r a t u r e i n v o l v e s the b e l i e f t h a t the i n f l u e n c e w h i c h a m i n o r i t y w i e l d s depends upon t h e i r c r e a t i o n i n o t h e r s o f t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a c o h e r e n t sub-group, c o n f i d e n t i n , committed t o and c o n s i s t e n t about t h e i r p o s i t i o n ( c f . M o s c o v i c i & Nemeth, 1974). I t f o l l o w s t h e n t h a t t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h w h i c h t h e y f u n c t i o n as a s o u r c e o f i n f l u e n c e depends upon t h e i r s u c c e s s i n c r e a t i n g t h i s i m p r e s s i o n . To t e s t t h i s , a measure o f p e r c e i v e d group s o l i d a r i t y ( o r "groupness") was c o n s t r u c t e d f o r each f a c t i o n based on t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e f a c t i o n ' s mem-ber s were p e r c e i v e d as s i m i l a r by the o t h e r s on a number o f p e r s o n a l c h a r a c -t e r i s t i c s ( e . g . , l i k e a b i l i t y , r i g i d i t y , w i l l i n g n e s s t o compromise), and t h i s measure was t h e n used t o p r e d i c t the i n f l u e n c e o f t h a t f a c t i o n on the members o f t h e o t h e r . H y p o t h e s i s I I . " I n c r e a s i n g s i z e o f a f a c t i o n i s accompanied by an i n -c r e a s e i n o t h e r s ' p e r c e p t i o n s o f them as competent and a d e c r e a s e i n p e r c e p -t i o n s o f them as c o n f i d e n t . " T h i s f o l l o w s d i r e c t l y from the r e s u l t s o f Nemeth, W a c h t l e r and E n d i c o t t ' s (1976) s t u d y w h i c h used c o n f e d e r a t e s w i t h p r e - d e t e r m i n e d r e s p o n s e p a t t e r n s as the m i n o r i t y . I t seems r e a s o n a b l e t o assume t h a t t h i s r e s u l t s h o u l d a l s o o c c u r i n a n a t u r a l s i t u a t i o n ( c f . A l l e n , 1975, p. 2 1 ) . H y p o t h e s i s I I I . "The w i n n e r o f t h e f i r s t b a t t l e w i l l l i k e l y w i n t h e war.' I n much o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f i n f l u e n c e , the emphasis on u n a n i m i t y and c o n s i s t e n c y i m p l i e s t h a t a p o w e r f u l argument a g a i n s t a p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e t o an a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n i s t h e d e f e c t i o n o f a p e r s o n from t h e former t o the l a t t e r . The f a c t t h a t a member o f one's own group f i n d s an a l t e r n a t i v e b e l i e f s y stem c o m p e l l i n g would seem t o be s t r o n g r e a s o n f o r one t o examine one's own j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and, i n f a c t , the p r e d i c t e d i n c r e a s e i n a c c e p t a n c e o f i n f l u e n c e when a s u p p o r t e r d e f e c t s has been found ( c f . A l l e n , 1975, p. 3 1 ) . I n t h e 22. present study, t h i s i s tested i n terms of the proportion of groups i n which the f i n a l decision favoured the d i r e c t i o n i n which the f i r s t person to change p o s i t i o n did so. Hypothesis IV. "Group disagreement i s solved by compromise." This a l t e r n a t i v e to the previous hypothesis i s based both on the evidence of convergence and on the prevalence of compromise as a r e a l i s t i c bargaining t a c t i c i n negotiations. This predicts that the f i n a l decision w i l l be located at the midpoint of the range of the i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n s . Hypothesis V. "The squeaky wheel gets the grease." The sheer frequency of communication has been noted as an important v a r i -able i n group process, both by laymen, as demonstrated by the above aphorism, and by researchers. Talkative i n d i v i d u a l s have been found to be i n f l u e n t i a l (Thomas & Fink, 1961) and co n t r o l by an i n d i v i d u a l of the communication i n a group promotes the emergence of that i n d i v i d u a l as a perceived group leader (cf. Shaw, 1971, p. 140). In t h i s study, the frequency of communication of a subgroup i s considered as a variable i n the p r e d i c t i o n of influence, with the f a c t i o n which dominates the discussion being predicted to be the most i n f l u -e n t i a l . 23. II. Method Issue Selection An issue was needed which involved an i n t e r v a l scale of measurement i n order to measure change i n opinion, but for which there was a f a i r l y even dichotomous s p l i t of opinion i n the population. One such issue was the set-tlement of wage demands i n labour disputes. At the time of the study, Anti-I n f l a t i o n Board (A.I.B.) regulations i n Canada prescribed an 87, l i m i t to wage settlements and i t seemed l i k e l y that this s i t u a t i o n would pol a r i z e opinions concerning the settlement of labour disputes. People who supported the aims of the A.I.B. would be expected to support low (87o - 127.) wage increases i n a wide v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n s , while those opposed to the A.I.B. would l i k e l y r e j e c t t h e i r suggestions and support much higher wage settlements. Pretest-ing of this issue showed that there was indeed such a s p l i t of opinion and so t h i s issue was used i n the study. Subjects Subjects were 106 female undergraduates at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia. As part of a procedure ostensibly to gather normative data on opin-ions of u n i v e r s i t y students, a large number of undergraduates were pretested on an issue involving the settlement of a labour dispute. The students were also asked to include t h e i r name and telephone number i f they would be i n -terested i n taking part i n a future experiment. Later, those females who had indicated a willingness to p a r t i c i p a t e and whose responses to the pretest ques-t i o n were either low (8 - 127,) or high ( 3 0 - 407.) were contacted and asked to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a group discussion experiment intended to examine the ways i n which groups of people make decisions. Students who agreed to take part were then given a choice of occasions for t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and asked to select the date and time which would be most convenient. The a l t e r n a t i v e occasions 24. with which a given subject was presented varied according to the subject's opinion and the number of subjects from each opinion group already booked. In general, at least f i v e persons with high opinions and three with low opinions were scheduled for each experimental session. Although only six subjects were needed for each group, eight to ten were scheduled i n an attempt to a l -low for changes i n opinion and f a i l u r e s to appear. The extra subjects i n each group served as observers. The composition of each group i s given i n Table 1. Materials Opinion Survey. The i n i t i a l screening measure was an opinion survey with four items on i t . Students were asked to give t h e i r estimate of a f a i r solu-t i o n to a question of c h i l d support following divorce, a wage settlement i n a labour dispute, a damage award i n a negligence law s u i t , and an alimony award following a divorce. In addition, the form had space for the name and telephone number of each person and some information about when he or she would be free to p a r t i c i p a t e i n an experiment on a voluntary basis. Posttest. Because t h i s was an observational study, data on a v a r i e t y of items were c o l l e c t e d . A Discussion Information Form, which was given to a l l subjects following the discussion, provided for the following information to be recorded: a) the f i n a l decision. b) the subject's personal opinion (for comparison with the group d e c i s i o n ) . c) the subject's r e c o l l e c t i o n of each person's o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . d) the i n i t i a l range of opinion i n the group - i n order to see whether there were any n a t u r a l l y occurring sub-groups. e) the reasons, i f any, for t h e i r change i n opinion. f) which subjects changed t h e i r opinions, i n what order, and i n which d i r e c t i o n . 25. T a b l e 1 I n i t i a l Group C o m p o s i t i o n s No. o f Group I n i t i a l P o s i t i o n s O b s e r v e r s 1 8 12 20 20 20 24 2 2 8 8 12 '12 20 20 1 '3 8 12 12 16 20 20 0 4 8 12 12 16 20 28 0 5 12 16 16 20 20 24 0 6 16 16 20 20 24 28 2 7 16 16 16 20 40 40 3 8 8 16 20 24 24 40 0 9 12 12 16 24 24 28 0 10 8 12 12 20 24 24 1 11 12 16 20 24 24 24 1 12 8 8 8 16 16 32 0 13 8 12 12 20 20 24 2 14 8 12 12 12 16 28 2 15 8 8 8 24 28 32 2 26. g) where each group member f e l l on eleven semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l scales involving reasonableness, confidence, consistency, willingness to compromise, i n t e l l i g e n c e , l i k e a b i l i t y , leadership, r i g i d i t y , knowledgeability, persona-b i l i t y and interpersonal a t t r a c t i o n . h) which group members seemed most compatible with each of the others -another attempt to assess natural intragroup categorization. i ) four opinion questions involving labour management issues. j) a generalization case consisting of a s i t u a t i o n s i m i l a r to the one discussed but d i f f e r e n t i n s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s . This was intenede to assess the subject's change i n opinion on the issue of labour-management r e l a t i o n s due to the discussion experience as opposed to the change i n opinion regarding the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n discussed. Copies of both the pretest and the posttest are included in Appendix A. Experimental Setting The group discussions were conducted i n a large room with an observational glass i n one w a l l . There was a single large table i n the centre of the room and a number of chairs spaced around the perimeter. On the table were place cards numbering s i x seating positions on three sides of the table, with the side facing the mirror l e f t empty. Behind the observational glass was an observation room. A microphone above the discussion table was connected to an amplifier i n the observation room, allowing the experimenter and an assistant to hear and record the group d i s -cussion. Procedure When the subjects arrived at the room, they were seated at some distance from each other around the room and asked not to converse p r i o r to the s t a r t of the experiment. When a l l subjects had arrived, they were given the 27. f o l l o w i n g s t o r y t o r e a d and asked t o c i r c l e the p e r c e n t a g e a t the b ottom w h i c h b e s t a p p r o x i m a t e d t h e i r own p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n : A l a b o u r d i s p u t e between a major u n i v e r s i t y (not U.B.C.) and i t s food s e r v i c e s s t a f f has been s u b m i t t e d f o r b i n d i n g a r b i t r a t i o n . The p r e v i o u s two y e a r c o n t r a c t , w h i c h e x p i r e d f o u r months ago, had p r o v i d e d wage i n c r e a s e s w h i c h b a r e l y met the r a t e o f i n f l a t i o n and t h u s the f o o d s e r v i c e s s t a f f made no r e a l g a i n s d u r i n g t h e p a s t two y e a r s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e i r u n i o n has asked f o r a 407, i n c r e a s e o v e r one y e a r , a sum w h i c h w i l l b r i n g the w o r k e r s up t o the l e v e l o f pay e n j o y e d by t h o s e d o i n g s i m i l a r work at o t h e r p l a c e s . The u n i v e r s i t y opposes such an i n c r e a s e f o r a number o f r e a s o n s . Recent i n c r e a s e s i n c o s t s and s h a r p l y r e d u c e d government f u n d i n g have s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l e d t h e u n i v e r s i t y ' s e d u c a t i o n a l programs, and f o r c e d many c u t b a c k s and economy measures. Thus t h i s i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y bad time f o r i t t o meet a l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n i t s p a y r o l l . A l s o , a l t h o u g h u n i v e r s i t i e s a re not n e c e s s a r i l y s u b j e c t t o wage and p r i c e c o n t r o l s , i t i s f e l t t h a t any i n c r e a s e o v e r 87, a t t h i s t i m e w i l l a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t pub-l i c c o n f i d e n c e i n economic r e s t r a i n t s because the u n i v e r s i t y i s a l m o s t e n t i r e l y s u p p o r t e d by government d o l l a r s . I f you were a p p o i n t e d a r b i t r a t o r o f t h i s d i s p u t e , w i t h c o m p l e t e a u t h o r i t y t o impose a s e t t l e m e n t w h i c h would be honored by b o t h s i d e s f o r one y e a r , what p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e would you a l l o w the u n i o n ? Assume t h a t a c o s t o f l i v i n g a l l o w a n c e w i l l be i n c l u d e d on top o f the p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e . ( C i r c l e one) 87. 127 167, 207, 247, 287 327, 367, 407= When t h e y had a l l g i v e n an o p i n i o n , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r c o l l e c t e d the s h e e t s , s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y n o t i n g the numbers marked on them. On t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e r e s p o n s e s the e x p e r i m e n t e r n o t e d w h i c h s i x had m a x i m a l l y d i s s i m i l a r - o p i n i o n s . These were chosen t o be t h e s i x d i s c u s s a n t s . At t h i s p o i n t the e x p e r i m e n t e r e x p l a i n e d t h a t he r e q u i r e d s i x p e r s o n s as d i s c u s s a n t s and t h a t the o t h e r s would a c t as o b s e r v e r s . I n d i c a t i n g (ap-p a r e n t l y a t random) the s u b j e c t s not s e l e c t e d t o s e r v e i n the d i s c u s s i o n , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r had them f o l l o w t h e a s s i s t a n t out o f t h e main room and i n t o the o b s e r v a t i o n room. There the a s s i s t a n t e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h i s p a r t o f the s t u d y d e a l t w i t h i m p r e s s i o n f o r m a t i o n . They were t o l d t h a t t h e y s h o u l d o b s e r v e the d i s c u s s i o n i n the n e x t room and t h a t a t the c o n c l u s i o n t h e y would be asked some q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n and t h e i r im-28. pressions of the people involved. Meanwhile, the experimenter began the experiment. The si x subjects were asked to s i t at the table, and when they were seated they were instructed as follows: We are interested i n the process of group discussions. Increasingly, a good many of the important decisions which a f f e c t our d a i l y l i v e s are the products of groups - c i v i c by-laws, u n i v e r s i t y course requirements, and student aid p o l i c i e s to name just a few - and we would l i k e to fi n d out something about how such groups come to th e i r decisions. So what we want to do i s create a group discussion s e t t i n g of t h i s sort and i n v e s t i -gate i t s dynamics. I'd l i k e you to discuss as a group the s i t u a t i o n you have just read. F i r s t , perhaps you should introduce yourselves to each other. Your name i s ? ( i n d i c a t i n g each subject i n turn). Now, as I said, I would l i k e you s i x people to discuss the issue before you as though you were an im-p a r t i a l a r b i t r a t i o n board, c a l l e d upon to make a f a i r decision regarding the percentage increase the union should receive. That i s , a l l of you should agree on the amount which you consider f a i r and appropriate. Let's f i r s t see i f there i s anything to discuss. We'll go around the table and I'd l i k e each of you to state aloud the percentage you've written down. Let's star t here. (Again, the experimenter indicates each subject i n turn.) Let's go over those again. (The experimenter states each person's opin-ion aloud.) You said %;• You said %; etc. Now, please discuss the case before you as though i t i s a r e a l d i s -pute and you are the actual a r b i t r a t i o n board, charged with d e l i v e r i n g a decision binding on both p a r t i e s . Try to come to what a l l of you" consider to be a proper settlement, and remember that your decision must be unani-mous i f i t i s to be implemented. Yo u ' l l have twenty-five minutes to d i s -cuss the case, and at the end of that time I ' l l return to see what you have decided. Again, i t i s very important that you treat t h i s as a r e a l s i t u a t i o n . Please take t h i s very seriously. During the discussion, the experimenter and assistant, watching from the observation room, recorded each remark made by the subjects on coding sheets divided into f i v e columns, representing f i v e minute blocks of time, and s i x rows, one for each person i n a group. On the sheets, the i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n , f i n a l p o s i t i o n and a l l remarks made during the discussion were recorded for each subject. Remarks were coded as to whom they were addressed (by seat number) and whether they favoured a high (H) or low (L) settlement. Time to consensus i n minutes and f i n a l agreement i n percentage were also recorded on those sheets. When a consensus was reached, or at the end of the twenty-five minutes, the 29. experimenter re-entered the room and had the p a r t i c i p a n t s f i l l out the Dis-cussion Information Form. At the same time, the assistant gave the same questionnaires to the observing subjects. When the questionnaires were completed, the observing subjects were returned to the discussion room, a limited version of the hypotheses of the study was disclosed and any questions were answered. 30. III . Results Before turning to the r e s u l t s of the data analyses, a few words con-cerning those analyses are i n order. Because the research reported here i s observational, involving no manipulation of conditions, the t r a d i t i o n a l con-cepts of "independent" and dependent" variables do not apply. Instead, a l l the variables are observed variables which take on obtained rather than pre-scribed values. The r e s u l t i s that the task of data analysis becomes one not of assessing the status of causal hypotheses but rather of i n v e s t i g a t i n g the existence and nature of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between variables or groups of v a r i -ables. The emphasis, therefore, i s on determining what factors covary i n the s i t u a t i o n and i n what ways. While t h i s i s a v a l i d approach for dealing with a s i t u a t i o n i n which the natural structure of r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s of i n t e r e s t , i t does give r i s e to two p a r t i c u l a r problems with regard to the i n f e r e n t i a l status of the r e s u l t s . The f i r s t problem arises from the nature of the multiple regression model which i s used to analyze such data. The method involves expressing some c r i t e r i o n (or "dependent") variable as a l i n e a r combination of a set of predictor v a r i -ables, with the predictors being weighted i n such a fashion that the average squared error of p r e d i c t i o n i n the sample i s minimized. The problem i s that i n developing the weights, the zero-order c o r r e l a t i o n s between variables are treated as being error free. This r e s u l t s i n a c e r t a i n amount of c a p i t a l i -zation on chance, which in turn i n f l a t e s the obtained multiple c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t (R). As a r e s u l t , the proportion of the variance (expressed as 2 R ) i n the c r i t e r i o n v ariable which can be accounted for by knowledge of the predictor values i s higher i n the sample than would be the case for the population as a whole (cf. Darlington, 1968; Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973). In order to estimate the actual proportion of the variance which those pre-31. d i c t o r s can account f o r i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n , the o b t a i n e d sample v a l u e must be " s h r u n k e n " (Wherry, 1931) t o g i v e ^2 2 N - 1 ^ = s a m P i - e s i z e R = 1 - (1 - R ) • N - K - 1-' > K * number o f p r e d i c t o r s 2 I n what f o l l o w s , whenever an R v a l u e i s g i v e n , i t w i l l be accompanied by t h e ~2 R v a l u e i n p a r e n t h e s e s , but i n a l l c a s e s t h e a s s o c i a t e d £ v a l u e s w i l l be based on t h e sample v a l u e . The second p r o b l e m c o n c e r n s the e x p e r i m e n t w i s e Type I e r r o r r a t e . A g a i n , because t h i s r e s e a r c h i s o b s e r v a t i o n a l , the i d e a o f t e s t i n g a n u l l h y p o t h e s i s and e i t h e r r e j e c t i n g or f a i l i n g t o r e j e c t t h a t h y p o t h e s i s i n l i g h t o f the ob-t a i n e d t e s t s t a t i s t i c i s not e n t i r e l y a p p r o p r i a t e . When a number, n, o f such a c c e p t - r e j e c t d e c i s i o n s are t o be made d u r i n g the a n a l y s i s o f a s e t o f d a t a , t h e r e are good r e a s o n s f o r b a s i n g each i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n on a much more s t r i n g e n t c r i t e r i o n ( e . g . , a /n) t h a n would be used i f o n l y a s i n g l e d e c i s i o n were made, thus a t t e m p t i n g t o c o n t r o l the number o f e r r o n e o u s d e c i s i o n s r e a c h e d ( c f . Ryan, 1959). However, i n a s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s where the o b j e c t o f the d a t a a n a l y s i s i s t o d i s c o v e r the n a t u r e o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g i n the d a t a r a t h e r t h a n t o t e s t h y p o t h e s e s , such a c o n s e r v a t i v e s t r a t e g y w o u l d be d e c i d e d l y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s . I n t h i s c a s e , a more r e a s o n a b l e approach i s t o examine a l l t h e c omparisons o f i n t e r e s t and t o attempt t o a s s e s s t h e i r r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , we p r e f e r t o a v o i d the i s s u e o f e r r o r r a t e s by t r e a t i n g t h e £ v a l u e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a g i v e n s t a t i s t i c as t h e p a r t i a l i n t e g r a l o f the p r o b a b i l i t y d e n s i t y f u n c t i o n o f t h a t s t a t i s t i c under the n u l l h y p o t h e s i s o f no r e l a t i o n s h i p ( or no d i f f e r e n c e ) r a t h e r t h a n as t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n i n d i c a t e d i s e r r o n e o u s ( c f . Rozeboom, 1960). F o r most s t a t i s t i c s , t h e n , t h e e x a c t £ v a l u e s w i l l be r e p o r t e d as o b t a i n e d , and t h e s e w i l l be t r e a t e d as i n d i c a t o r s o f the r e l a t i v e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h e n u l l h y p o t h e s i s i n l i g h t 32. .1 of the obtained r e s u l t s . In t h i s way the r e s u l t s can be interpreted both i n d i v i d u a l l y and i n r e l a t i o n to each other, although actual decisions re-garding the rel a t i o n s h i p s cannot be made. The only exception to this practice w i l l be made with t - t e s t s , which w i l l be reported i n the customary terms. General Results Ten of the f i f t e e n groups reached a decision during the twenty-five minute discussion. The means and standard deviations of opinions i n each group on the Opinion Survey, pretest, posttest (Q. 2) and generalization ques-t i o n (Q. 13) are presented i n Table 2. The f i r s t r e s u l t to note i s that the Opinion Survey question was an un r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r of responses to the pre-test which was used to select discussants. The average difference between the two sets of means was sizeable (X n = 3.49) and s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , _t (14) = 2.94, £ £ .02 (two-tailed). Also, the average difference between the pretest and posttest means (X D = 1.89) was s i g n i f i c a n t , : t (14) = 2.87, £ < .02 (two-tailed), but that between the Opinion Survey and the generalization ques-t i o n ( i f r p l . 35)15wasohot j :< fc'(14) 1=^1. 29, £->0. 20 -(two-tailed) . Differences were also apparent i n the v a r i a b i l i t y of group opinions on the various measures. The variances were normalized v i a the cube root trans-formation (Wilson & H i l f e r t y , 1931) and then analyzed i n one-tailed paired sample J: - tests of the difference. The r e s u l t s showed that the variance of opinions was s i g n i f i c a n t l y smaller on the posttest than on the pretest, _t (14)= -5.06, p < .001, and also s i g n i f i c a n t l y less on the generalization question 1 It would have been preferable to report confidence i n t e r v a l s around the obtained s t a t i s t i c s , thus compactly expressing the range of pla u s i b l e hypotheses concerning the true population parameter. This was not done simply because there i s no currently available technique for e s t a b l i s h -ing such i n t e r v a l s about the squared multiple c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s which constitute the bulk of the s t a t i s t i c s reported. TABLE 2 Group Means and S t a n d a r d D e v i a t i o n s O p i n i o n Survey Group Mean S.D. 1 13.33 46.29 2 19.83 11.29 3 13.50 6.68 4 13.00 5.00 5 12.67 5.37 6 11.83 4.49 7 14.83 7.03 8 13.17 6.79 9 15.00 6.51 10 12.00 5.65 11 11.67 6.18 12 16.50 6.78 13 13.33 4.99 14 14.67 6.10 15 19.00 10.44 O v e r a l l Means 14.29 6.57 P r e t e s t Mean S.D. 17.33 5.50 13.33 4.99 14.67 4.42 16.00 6.53 18.00 3.83 20.67 4.27 24.67 10.93 22.00 9.73 20.00 6.93 16.67 6.29 20.00 4.62 14.67 8.54 16.00 5.66 14.67 6.39 18.00 10.26 17.78 6.48 P o s t t e s t ( Q . 2 ) Mean S.D. 14.67 3.77 11.33 4.85 12.67 2.21 14.00 1.15 18.67 2.98 18.33 2.92 24.00 6.11 19.33 2.75 18.67 5.50 12.67 3.59 20.00 2.31 16.00 0.00 10.67 1.89 16.67 1.49 10.67 4.42 15.89 2.86 G e n e r a l i z a t i o n q u e s t i o n ( Q . 1 3 ) Mean S.D. 12.50 3.82 10.83 1.86 12.83 2.27 12.00 2.83 15.00 4.12 16.00 4.16 19.67 9.34 11.83 4.56 11.50 1.80 10.17 2.34 13.00 3.65 12.00 2.00 11.00 2.00 15.17 4.81 10.50 1.12 12.93 3.22 34. than on the Opinion Survey, _t ( 1 4 ) = - 4 . 1 9 , p_ < .001. Comparisons between the variances on the Opinion Survey or the gene r a l i z a t i o n question and those on the pretest and posttest were not made because the issues with which the two pairs of questions dealt were formulated quite d i f f e r e n t l y . Many more d e t a i l s of the dispute i n question were presented for the pretest and post-test issue, and t h i s difference i n the information available about the s i t u -ations would l i k e l y a f f e c t the variances of opinion concerning them, thus confounding any comparisons made between them. Spe c i f i c Hypotheses A l l of the s p e c i f i c hypotheses outlined i n the Introduction involve the ex-amination of i n t r a - f a c t i o n influence within groups. For the purposes of the an-a l y s i s , each group was s p l i t into two subgroups i n two d i f f e r e n t ways, accord-ding to two d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a . Then i d e n t i c a l analyses were done for both p a r t i t i o n i n g s . The f i r s t p a r t i t i o n i n g was done on an a p r i o r i basis. On the strength of the pretest responses, groups were s p l i t into "high" and "low" subgroups. Those who expressed opinions of 127, or less were placed i n the low subgroup while those who responded with 167o or more became members of the "high" subgroup. There were two necessary exceptions to t h i s rule since for two, of the groups, 167o was the lowest opinion expressed (see Table 1 ) . In one of them, Group 6, the two subjects who responded with 167, became the "low" subgroup. In the other, Group 7, there was a clear s p l i t between four subjects who expressed opinions of 167, -207, and two whose opinion was 407, and on t h i s basis the two 407, sub-jects became the "high" subgroup. The second p a r t i t i o n i n g was done sociometrically. Question 8 on the post-test asked each group member to i d e n t i f y which of the group's members seemed to belong together, and the responses to t h i s question were analysed to i d e n t i f y two soc i o m e t r i c a l l y d i s t i n c t factions. These procedures yielded the two sets 35. of t h i r t y subgroups which formed the basis for the subsequent analyses (see Table 3 for the opinion composition of subgroups under each p a r t i t i o n i n g ) . The means, standard deviations and c o r r e l a t i o n matrices for a l l the variables used i n the analyses are included i n Appendix B, separately for each p a r t i -tioning . Hypothesis I. "Influence by a f a c t i o n i s a function of t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y . " Subgroup s o l i d a r i t y was conceptualized as the extent to which subgroup members were seen as being s i m i l a r along a number of dimensions. This was operation-a l i z e d by finding the variance of the perceptions of one subgroup's members as reported by the members of the opposing subgroup for each item of Question 7 of the posttest and then summing over the eleven items to y i e l d a measure of "groupness" (GRP). This measure then r e f l e c t e d the heterogeneity of the subgroup members over those eleven items, with a subgroup's score on the GRP variable increasing as i t s members were seen as more heterogeneous by the members of the other subgroup. A more de t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the computation of t h i s and other indices i s included i n the Appendix. The c r i t e r i o n v a r i a b l e , Influence, was operationalized i n two ways. The f i r s t measure, I n f l 1, was constructed for a given subgroup by taking the abso-lute value of the sum of the signed changes i n the opinions of the other sub-group's members (measured from the pretest to the f i n a l decision) and d i v i d i n g by the number i n the other subgroup. The ten subgroups contained i n groups which did not reach a decision were treated as having missing data on t h i s measure. The second measure, I n f l 2, was constructed to provide an in d i c a t o r of influence i n the private opinions of group members. This was cal c u l a t e d by taking the ab-solute value of the sum of the signed changes i n the opposing subgroup's opin-ions (measured from the pretest to the generalization question) and d i v i d i n g by the number summed over. This measure could be calculated for a l l subgroups. Four regression equations pr e d i c t i n g influence from GRP were then derived, 36. T a b l e 3 Subgroup C o m p o s i t i o n Under D i f f e r e n t P a r t i t i o n i n g s S o c i o m e t r i c A P r i o r i Group I I I I I I 1 12,20,20 8,20,24 8,12 20,20,20,24 2 8,8,12,12 20,20 8,8,12,12 20,20 3 8,12,12,20 16,20 8,12,12 16,20,20 4 8,16,20 12,12,28 8,12,12 16,20,28 5 12,16,24 16,20,20 12 16,16,20,20,24 6 16,16,24,28 20,20 16,16 20,20,24,28 7 16,16,16,20 40,40 16,16,16,20 40,40 8 8,16,20 24,24,40 8 16,20,24,24,40 9 12,12,16,28 24,24 12,12 16,24,24,28 10 8,12,12,20 24,24 8,12,12 20,24,24 11 12,16,20 24,24,24 12 16,20,24,24,24 12 8,8 8,16,16,32 8,8,8 16,16,32 13 8,12,20 12,20,24 8,12,12 20,20,24 14 8,12,12 12,16,28 8,12,12,12 16,28 15 8,8 8,24,28,32 8,8,8 24,28,32 37. the r e s u l t s of which are summarized i n Table 4. It can be seen that the on-l y instance i n which the predictor accounts for a substantial proportion of the variance i s i n the pr e d i c t i o n of Inf1 1 under the sociometric p a r t i t i o n -ing. Upon examination of the standardized regression c o e f f i c i e n t (the beta weight) however, even t h i s r e s u l t does not appear to be a predicted. Since the v a r i a b l e , GRP, increases as the variance among subgroup members increases, i t should be negatively r e l a t e d to influence. Contrary to t h i s , i t i s i n a l l cases p o s i t i v e l y r e l a t e d to influence i n these equations. Hypothesis I I . "Increasing size of a f a c t i o n i s accompanied by an i n -crease i n others' perceptions of them as competent and a decrease i n percep-tions of them as confident." The measures of perceived confidence (CONF) and competence (COMP) for a given subgroup were calculated by summing the respec-t i v e scores for each member of that subgroup as reported by each member of the opposing subgroup and then d i v i d i n g by both the number i n the former sub-group and the number i n the l a t t e r . Four regression equations which predicted either confidence or competence from siz e of the subgroup were developed, the res u l t s of which are summarized i n Table 5. These r e s u l t s indicate that the size of the subgroup was almost completely unrelated to the other subgroup's reported perceptions of t h e i r confidence or competence. Hypothesis I I I . "The winner of the f i r s t b a t t l e w i l l l i k e l y win the war." This hypothesis was evaluated i n a number of ways. The f i r s t and most obvious was a straight test of the proportion of groups i n which the f a c t i o n which won the f i r s t convert was also the most i n f l u e n t i a l . Two dichotomous measures of the winning of a f i r s t convert were constructed, the f i r s t (CVRT1) i n d i c a t i n g which was the f i r s t group to have a member change p o s i t i o n , the second (CVRT2) i n d i c a t i n g which subgroup was f i r s t to lose a member to the opposing subgroup. The l a t t e r measure could only be constructed for the a p r i o r i p a r t i t i o n i n g , T a b l e 4 H y p o t h e s i s I : I n f l u e n c e as a F u n c t i o n o f S o l i d a r i t y S o c i O m e t r i c P a r t i t i o n i n g 2 C r i t e r i o n B e t a R (R ) F £ I n f l 1 .506 .256 (.215) 6.194 .023 I n f l 2 .262 .069 (.036) 2.070 .161 A P r i o r i P a r t i t i o n i n g 2 ^ ? C r i t e r i o n B e t a R (R ) F £ I n f l 1 .361 .131 (.082) 2.705 .117 I n f l 2 .141 .020 (.000) 0.568 .457 Note• I n t h e case o f a s i n g l e p r e d i c t o r , t h e m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n i s e q u i v a l e n t t o a b i v a r i a t e r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n , and th g r e p o r t e d B e t a , R^, and F v a l u e s c o r r e s p o n d t o b i v a r i a t e r , r , and t v a l u e s . T a b l e 5 H y p o t h e s i s I I : C o n f i d e n c e and Competence as F u n c t i o n s o f S i z e  S o c i o m e t r i c P a r t i t i o n i n g 2 ~2 C r i t e r i o n B e t a R (R ) F £ C0NF -0.049 .002 (.000) 0.068 .797 COMP -0.127 .016 (.000) 0.461 .503 A P r i o r i P a r t i t i o n i n g 2 C r i t e r i o n B e t a R (R ) F £ CONF .136 .019 (.000) 0.530 .473 COMP .077 .066 (.000) 0.166 .687 39. since under the sociometric p a r t i t i o n i n g most subgroups did not define a cl e a r p o s i t i o n on the scale. In te s t i n g the proportion of groups i n which the move-ment of a member of one subgroup coincided with that subgroup's having r e l a -t i v e l y less influence on the f i n a l decision (calculated on the basis of the Inf1 1 measure of Hypothesis I ) , i t was found that none of the obtained values approached what would normally be considered s i g n i f i c a n c e . Under the socio-metric p a r t i t i o n i n g , the proportion was exactly .5 (p_ 5> . 2 0 ) , while under the a p r i o r i p a r t i t i o n i n g they were .33 (p_ > .16) and .67 (p_ > .16) for the f i r s t and second indicators r e s p e c t i v e l y . In order to assess whether the above dichotomization of the influence measure into simply "more" or " l e s s " i n f l u e n t i a l had obscured the r e l a t i o n -ship between movement of group members and influence, the indicators of move-ment were also used as predictors of the o r i g i n a l measures of influence from Hypothesis I. This procedure resulted i n s i x regression equations which are summarized i n Table 6. Under the sociometric p a r t i t i o n i n g , the r e s u l t s were not impressive, as the single predictor, CVRT1, accounted for less than 57, of the variance i n both cases. Under the a p r i o r i p a r t i t i o n i n g , however, there was a considerable r e l a t i o n s h i p . For these equations, the two predictors were entered step-wise, with the one having the highest zero-order c o r r e l a t i o n with the c r i t e r i o n being entered f i r s t . The r e s u l t s show that CVRT2 was the best predictor of Inf1 1 while CVRT1 was the best predictor of I n f l 2, and that when both variables are used as predictors, they accounted for a very substantial proportion of the variance i n I n f l 2 (567o) and a lesser but s t i l l s i g n i f i c a n t proportion of the variance i n I n f l 1 (347=) . Hypothesis IV. "Group disagreement i s solved by compromise." This hy-pothesis was tested i n three ways, each of which produced s i m i l a r r e s u l t s . If the midpoint of the group members' opinions i s defined as the mean of those T a b l e 6 H y p o t h e s i s I I I : I n f l u e n c e as a F u n c t i o n o f Movement S o c i o m e t r i c  C r i t e r i o n I n f l 1 I n f l 2 A P r i o r i C r i t e r i o n P r e d i c t o r I n f l 1 a) CFRT2 b) CVRT2 ' • . CVRT1 I n f l 2 a) CVRT1 b) CVRT1 CVRT2 B e t a * • R 2 ( R 2 ) -.066 .004 (.000) .218 .047 (.011) B e t a R 2 ( R 2 ) .428 .183 (.132) .618 .344 (.257) -.444 .689 .475 (.454) .551 .559 (.524) .322 I £ 0.104 .756 1.293 .266 I £ 3.593 .076 3.935 .042 23.483 .0001 15.842 .0000 41. o p i n i o n s , t h e n , from t h e _ t - t e s t c i t e d i n the G e n e r a l R e s u l t s s e c t i o n above, i t i s c l e a r t h a t the group's c e n t r a l tendency a f t e r the d i s c u s s i o n was s i g -n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t a t the b e g i n n i n g , _t (14) = 2.87, p < .02. S i m i l a r l y , i f t h e m i d p o i n t o f the range i s used as t h e measure o f c e n t r a l t e n d e n c y , t h e p r e t e s t and p o s t t e s t o p i n i o n s a g a i n d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y , X D = 2.267, t (14) = 3.011, p_ < .01. F i n a l l y , i f we c o n s i d e r o n l y t h o s e groups w h i c h a c t u a l l y r e a c h e d a d e c i s i o n , t h a t d e c i s i o n a l s o d i f f e r s s i g n i -f i c a n t l y from the i n i t i a l m i d p o i n t o f t h e range o f o p i n i o n s , X n = 2.20, t (14) = 2.40, £ $ .05. • H y p o t h e s i s V. "The squeaky wheel g e t s the g r e a s e . " D u r i n g t h e d i s c u s -s i o n , b o t h t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r and the a s s i s t a n t i n d e p e n d e n t l y r e c o r d e d each i n s t a n c e o f a group member s p e a k i n g . S i n c e the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between t h e s e two r e c o r d s was q u i t e h i g h ( r = .89), t h e y were averaged t o y i e l d a measure o f f r e q u e n c y o f communication f o r each s u b j e c t . Two measures o f f r e q u e n c y o f c ommunication by a subgroup were t h e n c a l c u l a t e d , one (TALK 1) the sum o f t h e members' i n d i v i d u a l s c o r e s and t h e o t h e r (TALK 2) t h e average o f t h o s e s c o r e s f o r t h a t subgroup. These were t h e n e n t e r e d s t e p - w i s e i n t o r e g r e s s i o n e q u a t i o n s p r e d i c t i n g i n f l u e n c e ( I n f l 1 and I n f l 2 ) , w i t h t h e b e s t s i n g l e p r e -d i c t o r e n t e r i n g f i r s t . The r e s u l t s appear i n T a b l e 7. A l t h o u g h none o f t h e s e e q u a t i o n s a c c o u n t e d f o r a v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n o f the v a r i a n c e i n t h e c r i t e r i o n v a r i a b l e , t h e r e i s one a s p e c t o f t h e s e f i g u r e s w o r t h n o t i n g . The B e t a w e i g h t s i n d i c a t e t h a t the two v a r i a b l e s , TALK 1 and TALK 2, a f f e c t t h e c r i t e r i o n v a r i a b l e i n o p p o s i t e ways, even though t h e y were p o s i t i v e l y c o r -r e l a t e d w i t h each o t h e r and t h e i r z e r o - o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e c r i t e r i o n v a r i a b l e s were always o f the same s i g n . In t h e s e e q u a t i o n s , i n f l u e n c e i n -c r e a s e s as t o t a l f r e q u e n c y i n c r e a s e s and as average f r e q u e n c y d e c r e a s e s . Other R e s u l t s : As a f i n a l way o f a s s e s s i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n f l u e n c e and t h e Table 7 Hypothesis V: Influence as a Function of Communication Frequency  Soc iometric C r i t e r i o n Predictor Beta R (R ) F £ I n f l 1 a) TALK2 -.288 .083(.032) 1.624 .219 b) TALK2 -.659 .137(.036) 1.352 .285 TALK1 .438 I n f l 2 a) TALK1 .232 .054(.020) 1.595 .217 b) TALK1 .672 .131(.066) 2.027 .151 TALK2 -.520 A P r i o r i C r i t e r i o n Predictor Beta R 2 (fi 2) F £ I n f l 1 a) TALK1 .252 .063(.011) 1.218 .284 b) did not enter * I n f l 2 a) TALK1 .102 .010(.000) 0.293 .592 b) did not enter * * The second v a r i a b l e was not entered i f i t s contribution to the pre d i c t i o n had an associated F r a t i o of less than 1. 43. various dependent variables i n the study, four step-wise regression analyses were conducted, each using a l l the variables as possible predictors and se-l e c t i n g the best four predictors sequentially i n the order of t h e i r contribu.-t i o n to increasing the accuracy of pr e d i c t i o n . In addition to the predictor variables referred to previously, the variance measures on each of the eleven items (A to K) of Question 7 which had been used to construct the GRP va r i a b l e were also allowed to enter as i n d i v i d u a l predictors. Table 8 contains the T r e s u l t s . It l i s t s the predictors for each equation i n the order i n which they entered and the squared multiple c o r r e l a t i o n s , the F, and the p_ values which were obtained at each step. In addition, the beta weights which each var i a b l e was assigned i n the f i n a l equation and the p a r t i a l F values (which represent the F r a t i o s associated with the decreases i n the unexplained v a r i -ance which each would cause i f entered l a s t ) and associated £ values are i n -cluded. These l a s t can be loosely interpreted as indi c a t o r s of the r e l a t i v e importance of variables i n pred i c t i n g the c r i t e r i o n , although when the variables are not uncorrelated, the meaning of an assignment of a given proportion of the variance to any one variable i s ambiguous (cf. Darlington, 1968, p. 169). In general, the r e s u l t s i n Table 8 are heterogeneous. The f i r s t r e s u l t to note i s the strength of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In a l l cases, the proportions of the variance accounted for by the four predictors are sizeable (from 39% 2 to 827o), and remain so even af t e r allowing for shrinkage . In fa c t , i n a l l The R Z values obtained are c e r t a i n l y considerably i n f l a t e d as a r e s u l t of the c a p i t a l i z a t i o n on chance involved i n se l e c t i n g a set of four predictors from a much larger set ( 1 9 ) . Even the shrinkage c o r r e c t i o n does not take into account the e f f e c t s of a stepwise s e l e c t i o n procedure on t h i s c a p i t a l i z a t i o n , and so the R values are also i n f l a t e d to some extent. The r e s u l t i s that the absolute magnitudes of the reported pro-portions of variance accounted for are v i r t u a l l y meaningless for the purpose of generalization to population values. However they can and w i l l be used for comparisons within the sample. 44. T a b l e 8 I n f l u e n c e as a F u n c t i o n o f t h e Four B e s t P r e d i c t o r s S o c i o m e t r i c C r i t e r i o n I n f l 1 I n f l 2 A P r i o r i C r i t e r i o n I n f l 1 I n f l 2 P r e d i c t o r I ( k n o w l e d g e a b i l i t y ) B ( c o n f i d e n c e ) CONF COMP I ( k n o w l e d g e a b i l i t y ) CVRT1 SIZE J ( s o c i a b i l i t y ) P r e d i c t o r B ( c o n f i d e n c e ) G ( l e a d e r s h i p ) CVRT2 CVRT1 CVRT1 SIZE COMP CVRT2 P a r t i a l B e t a R (R ) F £ F £ .314 .343(.302) 8.339 .011 1.938 >.05 .406 .435(.360) 5.775 .014 3.007 >.05 .349 .489(.379) 4.465 .021 2.773 >.05 -.284 .553(.415) 4.019 .025 1.860 >.05 .244 .125(.092) 3.722 .065 1.748 >.05 .503 .225(.163) 3.634 .041 7.635 <.025 .409 .321(.236) 3.786 .024 4.729 <.05 .288 .392(.287) 3.711 .018 2.687 >.05 P a r t i a l B e t a R ( R 2 ) F £ F £ 1.098 .354(.314) 8.782 .009 18.252 <.01 -.849 .552(.492) 9.248 .002 11.156 <.01 .478 .627(.547) 7.841 .003 7.424 <.025 -.369 .727(.643) 8.662 .001 4.779 <.05 .952 .475(.454) 23.483 .000 44.612 <.01 .443 .610(.579) 19.539 .000 11.768 <.01 -.510 .755(.724) 24.590 .000 23.882 <.01 .336 .815(.783) 25.347 .000 7.535 <.05 45. but t h r e e o f t h e e q u a t i o n s a s i n g l e v a r i a b l e a c c o u n t s f o r s l i g h t l y mare t h a n 347, o f t h e v a r i a n c e . A second g e n e r a l r e s u l t i s the f a c t t h a t t h e p r e d i c t i o n o f e i t h e r v a r i a b l e i s b e t t e r under the a p r i o r i p a r t i t i o n i n g t h a n under t h e s o c i o m e t r i c p a r t i t i o n i n g , a l t h o u g h the r e l a t i v e o r d e r s o f p r e d i c t a b i l i t y a r e r e v e r s e d . Under the s o c i o m e t r i c p a r t i t i o n i n g I n f l 1 i s c l e a r l y more p r e d i c -t a b l e t h a n i s I n f l 2 (557= v s . 397, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , w h i l e t h e o p p o s i t e i s t r u e f o r t he a. p r i o r i p a r t i t i o n i n g (737> v s . 827, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . At the l e v e l o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a b l e s i n the e q u a t i o n s , the r e s u l t s are q u i t e d i v e r s e . The e q u a t i o n s p r e d i c t i n g I n f l 2 under the two c o n d i t i o n s have two v a r i a b l e s , CVRT1 and SIZE, i n common and i n b o t h t h e former (CVRT1) i s t he most u s e f u l o f the f o u r v a r i a b l e s i n the f i n a l e q u a t i o n . However, n e i t h e r i s i m p o r t a n t i n t h e p r e d i c t i o n o f I n f l 1, w i t h SIZE not a p p e a r i n g at a l l and CVRT1 a p p e a r i n g o n l y as the l e a s t u s e f u l o f the p r e d i c t o r s o f t h a t v a r i a b l e i n t h e a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n . On the o t h e r hand, t h e two e q u a t i o n s f o r I n f l 1 share o n l y one v a r i a b l e , B ( c o n f i d e n c e v a r i a n c e ) , w h i c h , w h i l e i t i s most i m p o r t a n t i n b o t h o f the c a s e s , appears i n n e i t h e r o f the I n f l 2 equa-t i o n s . A s i m i l a r r e s u l t h o l d s t r u e f o r p r e d i c t i n g the d i f f e r e n t measures w i t h i n a c o n d i t i o n . Under t h e s o c i o m e t r i c p a r t i t i o n i n g s , t h e p r e d i c t o r s a r e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t , w i t h o n l y the l e a s t i m p o r t a n t , I ( k n o w l e d g e a b i l i t y v a r i a n c e ) , b e i n g h e l d i n common. Under the a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n , two v a r i a b l e s , CVRT1 and CVRT2, are common but b o t h t h e i r o r d e r s o f i m p o r t a n c e r e l a t i v e t o each o t h e r and t h e i r s t a t u s i n r e l a t i o n t o the o t h e r v a r i a b l e s a r e d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e -s p e c t t o t h e two d i f f e r e n t e q u a t i o n s . I n summary, i t appears t h a t d i f f e r -ences i n the i n f l u e n c e o f subgroups can be a c c o u n t e d f o r by t h e o b s e r v e d v a r i a b l e s , t h a t t h i s i s more e v i d e n t i n the case o f i n f l u e n c e on t h e p r i v a t e o p i n i o n s o f t h e subgroup members ( I n f l 2) and under t h e a p r i o r i p a r t i t i o n i n g , and t h a t d i f f e r e n t v a r i a b l e s are i m p o r t a n t i n r e l a t i o n t o d i f f e r e n t measures o f 46. influence. On the other hand, i t does not appear that the same variables are necessarily important either i n r e l a t i o n to the same measures under d i f f e r e n t conditions or the d i f f e r e n t measures within a condition. 47. IV. Discussion In view of the r e s u l t s presented i n the previous chapter, what conclu-sions can be drawn concerning the process of s o c i a l influence i n small group decision making? Unfortunately i t must be said that the answer to t h i s ra-ther c e n t r a l question i s far from c e r t a i n . For one thing, the r e s u l t s , being somewhat diverse, do not r e a d i l y lend themselves to a straightforward i n -te r p r e t a t i o n . In addition, there are methodological considerations a r i s i n g from the sample size and the between group v a r i a b i l i t y which may l i m i t the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of those conclusions which do appear to be warranted by the data. Because of t h i s dual nature of the d i f f i c u l t i e s presented by the data, the following discussion of the r e s u l t s w i l l be separated into two parts i n an e f f o r t to simplify the task of i n t e r p r e t i n g those r e s u l t s . The f i r s t part w i l l consist of a summary of the r e s u l t s of the data analyses and an attempt to interpret them as though they f a i t h f u l l y r e f l e c t e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g i n the population. That i s , the question of the epistemic status of the r e s u l t s w i l l be held i n abeyance while possible i n -terpretations of the r e s u l t s are considered. The second part w i l l then pre-sent i n some d e t a i l the l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s treatment of the data, thus putting the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of the r e s u l t s into a properly conservative per-spective. By proceeding i n this fashion, i t i s hoped that the reader w i l l obtain both a complete picture of the observed r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the data and a proper basis for assessing t h e i r v a l i d i t y . Interpretations Taken at t h e i r face value, then, the r e s u l t s indicate a number of things. As expected, the group discussion resulted i n a convergence of both the pub-l i c judgments and the private opinions of the group members, a fact r e f l e c t e d by the reduced v a r i a b i l i t y i n these measures following the discussion. 48. Moreover, i t does not appear that t h i s convergence was simply a matter of each i n d i v i d u a l member compromising s l i g h t l y i n order to reach agreement. Were that the case, one would expect that the opinions expressed i n the discussion would converge on some c e n t r a l value while the private opinions remained un-changed. On the contrary, the r e s u l t s obtained for the fourth hypothesis show that the c e n t r a l tendency of group opinion (whether defineddass the-.mean or eHetmidpo-int of the tfa'ng'eO s h i f t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the i n i t i a l to the f i n a l measure and that t h i s occurred with nreg'ardcto both the issue discussed and the generalization question. In short, i t appears that some sort of s o c i a l influence did take place during the discussions. With regard to the s p e c i f i c hypotheses, the r e s u l t s are f a i r l y unequi-vocal, although t h e i r common i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s not immediately apparent. For the f i r s t hypothesis, i t appears that subgroup s o l i d a r i t y , as indicated by the covariance of the subgroup members on the person-perceptioncmeasures, does not enhance influence but rather the reverse. While the "groupness" variable could account for a moderate proportion of the variance i n influence, the way i n which i t did so was exactly opposite to that predicted. On the basis of these data, i t appears that factions which are perceived by others as more heterogeneous on the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s measured w i l l also be more i n -f l u e n t i a l i n a group discussion. In fa c t , a glance at the c o r r e l a t i o n mat-r i c e s included i n ""Appendix B.x w i l l show that, i n every case, the measures of variance on the person perception scales are p o s i t i v e l y correlated with influence. The second and the f i f t h hypotheses also fared rather poorly. With re-gard to the former, i n t h i s set of data at any rate, confidence and competence were not only unrelated to the size of a subgroup but were also p o s i t i v e l y related to each other. Both of these r e s u l t s are opposite to those predicted 49. by the f i n d i n g s o f Nemeth, W a c h t l e r , and E n d i c o t t (1976) c i t e d i n the I n t r o -d u c t i o n . As f o r t h e l a t t e r h y p o t h e s i s , i t was found t h a t the f r e q u e n c y o f communication by a subgroup, whether t o t a l o r a v e r a g e d , was c l e a r l y ( i n f a c t , a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y ) u n r e l a t e d t o i n f l u e n c e as i t was measured i n t h i s s t u d y . T h i s r e s u l t i s a g a i n o p p o s i t e t o what was e x p e c t e d . I n t u i t i v e l y , i t seems r e a s o n a b l e t o e x p e c t t h a t the more v o c a l are t h e members o f a subgroup, the more i'in7f•luen-ti'a>lj. w i l l , t h a t subgroup be but such was c e r t a i n l y n o t t h e c a s e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . For t he r e m a i n i n g two h y p o t h e s e s , t h e r e s u l t s were q u i t e s u b s t a n t i a l , i n one c a s e s u p p o r t i n g the h y p o t h e s i s w h i l e i n the o t h e r d i s c r e d i t i n g i t . As n o t e d above, the f o u r t h h y p o t h e s i s , w h i c h p r e d i c t e d compromise as t h e means t h r o u g h w h i c h o p i n i o n change would o c c u r , does not appear t e n a b l e . By any measure, t h e groups d i d not a p p a r e n t l y use compromise as a s o l u t i o n t o t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i t i s o n l y the r e m a i n i n g h y p o t h e s i s , H y p o t h e s i s I I I , w h i c h r e c e i v e d s u p p o r t from the d a t a . The r e s u l t s f o r t h i s h y p o t h e s i s i n d i c a t e t h a t when groups are p a r t i t i o n e d i n t o subgroups on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r i n i t i a l l y e x p r e s s e d p o s i t i o n s , t h e n a knowledge o f w h i c h subgroup f i r s t ex-h i b i t s movement (whether o r not toward the o t h e r subgroup's p o s i t i o n ) w i l l a l l o w a r e a s o n a b l y r e l i a b l e p r e d i c t i o n o f t h e magnitude o f t h e i n f l u e n c e w h i c h t h a t group w i l l w i e l d w i t h r e s p e c t t o ' b o t h the f i n a l d e c i s i o n o f t h e group and t o the p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s o f the group members. As was p r e d i c t e d , the subgroup w h i c h f i r s t e x h i b i t s such movement i s the l e s s i n f l u e n t i a l . To t h i s p o i n t , the r e s u l t s , w h i l e somewhat u n e x p e c t e d , do not appear p r o b l e m a t i c a l . There a r e , however, two problems w h i c h r e m a i n t o be d e a l t w i t h . The f i r s t i s t h e f a i l u r e t o f i n d s u p p o r t f o r the f i r s t and f i f t h hy-p o t h e s e s . I t seemed t h a t t h e r e were sound r e a s o n s t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e s e hy-p o t h e s e s would have h e l d t r u e i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , and t h e i r f a i l u r e t o do so 50. s h o u l d be e x p l a i n e d . The second p r o b l e m a r i s e s i n r e l a t i o n t o the "Other R e s u l t s " s e c t i o n i n c l u d e d a t t h e end o f the p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r . Upon a s k i n g a p e r f e c t l y r e a s o n a b l e q u e s t i o n - "Which of the a v a i l a b l e v a r i a b l e s most suc-c e s s f u l l y account f o r the d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n f l u e n c e between s u b g r o u p s ? " - we r e c e i v e d f o u r d i f f e r e n t answers, one f o r each measure o f i n f l u e n c e under each c o n d i t i o n . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e s e e q u a t i o n s are not h i g h l y r e l i a b l e ' ' ' , and t h i s c o m b i n a t i o n o f u n r e l i a b i l i t y and a p p a r e n t i n c o n s i s t e n c y would seem t o j u s t i f y t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e s e l a s t r e s u l t s . Upon r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , though, t h e y sug-g e s t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the i n f l u e n c e p r o c e s s w h i c h ca n a ccount f o r a l l o f t h e d a t a o b t a i n e d . I n t h r e e o f the f o u r e q u a t i o n s , t h e b e s t s i n g l e p r e d i c t o r s o r p a i r s o f p r e d i c t o r s i n v o l v e j u s t t h o s e f a c t o r s w h i c h one w o u l d e x p e c t t o p r e d i c t i n -d i v i d u a l i n f l u e n c e ( i . e . , c o n f i d e n c e , k n o w l e d g e a b i l i t y , l e a d e r s h i p ) a l t h o u g h , i n t h i s c a s e , t h e y r e p r e s e n t subgroup v a r i a n c e r a t h e r t h a n h i g h s c o r e s on t h o s e f a c t o r s . C o n s i d e r , then, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e may be i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l s as w e l l as i n f l u e n t i a l f a c t i o n s i n a group d i s c u s s i o n . I n a s i t u a t i o n where t h e v a r i o u s group members a r e m u t u a l s t r a n g e r s and t h e oppor-t u n i t i e s f o r i n t e r a c t i o n are l i m i t e d (as was the c a s e h e r e ) , i t may w e l l be t h a t i t i s l a r g e l y as i n d i v i d u a l s r a t h e r t h a n as members o f a c e r t a i n f a c t i o n t h a t the group's members i n f l u e n c e each o t h e r . In s u p p o r t o f t h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the f a c t i o n s were not p a r t i c u l a r l y s a l i e n t i n t h i s s t u d y , n o t e t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s o n l y t w i c e p a r t i t i o n e d t h e i r groups i n t o subgroups a l o n g the l i n e s o f o p i n i o n d i f f e r e n c e s . Thus i t may be t h a t the e x t e n t o f i n f l u -ence e v i d e n t i n a p a r t i c u l a r group i s a f u n c t i o n not o n l y o f the c h a r a c t e r -As was n o t e d i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , t h i s u n r e l i a b i l i t y a r i s e s from t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f a s m a l l sample s i z e and a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e p o o l o f p r e -d i c t o r s from w h i c h t h e few b e s t are c h o s e n . I n such a s i t u a t i o n i t has been s u g g e s t e d t h a t as many as 500 s u b j e c t s per v a r i a b l e a r e r e q u i r e d t o produce r e l i a b l e r e s u l t s ( c f . K e r l i n g e r & P e d h a z u r , 1973, p. 283). i s t i c s of the factions involved but also, and possibly more importantly, of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l (or i n d i v i d u a l s ) i n the group. On applying t h i s framework to the r e s u l t s of the data analyses, those r e s u l t s appear to be quite reasonable. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e s u l t s for the t h i r d and fourth hypotheses are r e l a t i v e l y unaffected, since the s h i f t from an emphasis on the i n f l u e n t i a l subgroup to an emphasis on a member of that subgroup does not a l t e r e i t h e r the measurement of t o t a l change i n group opinions (H. IV) or the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of which subgroup exhibited the f i r s t movement ( H . I l l ) . On the other hand, the r e s u l t s for Hypothesis I now become understandable. It can be argued that for an i n d i v i d u a l to be i n f l u e n t i a l , he or she must not only be perceived as confident and knowledgeable but must also be seen as being much more so than the rest of h i s or her group - i . e . , he or she must stand out. Therefore we would expect that the subgroup of which t h i s person i s a member would have r e l a t i v e l y high variances on the person perception items, as i s , i n fact, the case. Note that while i t could also be said that the i n f l u e n t i a l subgroups might also have gained such high variances as a r e s u l t of having one member who deviated i n the opposite d i -r e c t i o n , t h i s does not appear to have been the case here. In at least one instance, the best two predictors of influence were high heterogeneity on the confidence measure and a high average confidence score, a r e s u l t which would only be obtained when the subgroup members were perceived as being maximally d i f f e r e n t from one another while also having p o s i t i v e scores on the v a r i a b l e . A s i m i l a r l i n e of reasoning can be applied to explain the lack of sup-port for the frequency of communication hypothesis. If we postulate that the most vocal i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be most i n f l u e n t i a l and that t h i s w i l l hold true regardless of either the size of h i s subgroup or talkativeness of his fellow subgroup members, then i t becomes cl e a r that the c o r r e l a t i o n between the frequency of communication by factions and t h e i r influence on others could be quite low. There i s one l a s t issue to be considered. Upon applying t h i s argument to the r e s u l t s which suggested i t , another complication a r i s e s . While the idea of the i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l apparently holds for influence i n terms of the group decision, i t does not appear to apply to influence with respect to the private opinions of group members. For t h i s l a t t e r measure, i t seems that i t i s a c t u a l l y the subgroup which i s i n f l u e n t i a l , since the most impor-tant predictors are, i n t h i s case, group related (e.g.,SIZE, COMP). In other words, i t seems that i n d i v i d u a l s may be most s a l i e n t i n the consideration of influence on a group decision while factions may be more important with res-pect to influence on the personal opinions of the other members. Upon r e f l e c -t i o n , i t does not seem i n t u i t i v e l y unreasonable that t h i s may be the case i n group discussions such as t h i s . For example, i t may be simply that the need to reach a consensus forces the group members to accomodate t h e i r expressed opinions to the p o s i t i o n of the most dominant or committed member. However, i n order for modifications to also occur i n the personal b e l i e f s of members, there must be a subgroup or f a c t i o n whose numbers and apparent confidence render t h e i r p o s i t i o n believable. While these l i n e s of reasoning are e n t i r e l y post hoc and as such can be considered speculative, Ithey do r a i s e some important issues for future re-search concerned with s o c i a l influence. We w i l l return to a consideration of those issues at the conclusion of t h i s chapter. Methodological Considerations Having attempted to interpret the r e s u l t s of the study, i t now remains to examine the reasons why these interpretations should be viewed with caution. There are a v a r i e t y of reasons why the r e s u l t s may not be r e l i a b l e , and most of these can be deduced d i r e c t l y from the nature of the group com-positions presented i n Table 1 of the second chapter. As o r i g i n a l l y conceived, the study would have involved a rather larger number of groups, a l l having i d e n t i c a l compositions (2 persons i n the 87= - 127c range; 4 persons i n the 357o - 407, range). However, the Opinion Survey item which was used as a pre-test proved to be an inaccurate predictor of the opinions which subjects would express i n the experimental s i t u a t i o n . As a r e s u l t , the opinion compositions of the groups ultimately used i n the study were far less comparable than had been expected. It i s l i k e l y that i t was t h i s lack of sharply delineated sub-groups which led to the previously mentioned problem of group members not p a r t i t i o n i n g t h e i r groups along the l i n e s of opinion difference. In i t s e l f , t h i s between group variance would not have been as serious i f a much larger sample siz e had been employed. Unfortunately, however, t h i s was not pos-s i b l e , since the groups which were used exhausted the pool of those available volunteer subjects whose pretest responses made them suitable candidates for t h i s study. The ways i n which t h i s combination of heterogeneous groups and small sample size tend to v i t i a t e the r e s u l t s of the study are quite c l e a r . The f i r s t involves the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the number of variables i n a cor-r r e l a t i o n a l study and the sample size, a problem which has already been des-cribed i n the previous chapter. In a purely c o r r e l a t i o n a l study, the smaller the sample size on which a s i g n i f i c a n t R i s based, the less i s the c o n f i -dence which can be ascribed to that r e s u l t because of the compounding of error involved i n the c a l c u l a t i o n s . This argument c l e a r l y weakens many of the re-ported r e s u l t s . The second consequence of the combination of a small sample size and a 54. large between group variance (error variance) i s that a s t a t i s t i c a l test w i l l have r e l a t i v e l y low power to detect population differences or r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In other words, i t i s u n l i k e l y that the s t a t i s t i c a l procedure employed w i l l detect a s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the data even though such a r e l a t i o n -ship may e x i s t i n the population. The implication of t h i s i s that a f a i l u r e to f i n d r e s u l t s supporting an hypothesis cannot be interpreted to mean that the hypothesis i s untenable, simply because one cannot determine whether the f a i l u r e i s due to the q u a l i t i e s of the population or to the lack of p r e c i s i o n i n the study. While t h i s problem arises in any study which f a i l s to r e j e c t a n u l l hypothesis, i t i s exaggerated i n those with small sample s i z e s . While the p r o b a b i l i t y of erroneously r e j e c t i n g a true n u l l hypothesis (°t_) i s set a p r i o r i and i s unaffected by sample s i z e , the p r o b a b i l i t y of erroneously f a i l i n g to r e j e c t a f a l s e n u l l hypothesis i s not. As sample size decreases, the p r o b a b i l i t y of t h i s l a t t e r error increases, often to the point where an erroneous f a i l u r e to r e j e c t the n u l l hypothesis i s more probable then a cor-rect decision. For t h i s reason, the lack of support for three of the f i v e hypotheses i n t h i s study i s p a r t i c u l a r l y ambiguous. But what of the r e s u l t s which provide support for the remaining hypotheses? As we noted above, the p r o b a b i l i t y of a f a l s e r e j e c t i o n of the n u l l hypothesis does not vary with sample size or error variance and so we should be able to conclude that we have (1 - OL) % confidence i n these r e s u l t s . There i s , how-ever, one further complication. Because the groups did not contain the clear p o l a r i z a t i o n of opinions which had been expected, i t was often not c l e a r which subgroups.shifted from t h e i r i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n s . In view of t h i s , the nature of a problem with the r e s u l t s of Hypothesis III comes into focus. Because the groups had l i t t l e i n i t i a l variance i n t h e i r opinions, the influence mea-sures necess a r i l y had r e s t r i c t e d v a r i a b i l i t y . Thus a dichotomous measure of 55. conversion ( r e f l e c t i n g which of the two subgroups contained the member who f i r s t exhibited an opinion s h i f t ) may have captured a large part of what l i t t l e variance existed i n the c r i t e r i o n simply because 1 i t was l o g i c a l l y r e l a t e d to that c r i t e r i o n . Both were measures of the s h i f t i n that opposing group's opinions, and as such i t i s c e r t a i n l y not s u r p r i s i n g that they had a high c o r r e l a t i o n . Conelusions From the above, i t appears that the r e s u l t s , and therefore the i n t e r -pretations, of t h i s research are subject to more than the usual number of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and caveats. Nevertheless, i t may be claimed that t h i s re-search does r a i s e some important issues for further research. The f i r s t such issue concerns the use of confederates i n research on s o c i a l influence. It seems that the predictions derived from research r e l y -ing on confederates were not p a r t i c u l a r l y applicable to these data. While i t may be argued that t h i s study employed too few groups for the r e s u l t s to be highly r e l i a b l e , the fact remains that the predicted r e l a t i o n s h i p s were not found. This would tend to imply that the processes underlying those pre-di c t i o n s are r e l a t i v e l y weak (or nonexistent) i n the present s i t u a t i o n . For example, i t may be that the predicted r e l a t i o n s h i p between the size of a group and both i t s perceived confidence and competence does indeed obtain with res-pect to the intransigent behavior of confederate minorities but that i n natural groups the size factor i s less s a l i e n t . In view of t h i s , i t seems important to investigate the possible r e l a t i o n s h i p between the use of con-federates and the processes of s o c i a l influence, possibly using a design s i - • milar to t h i s but with confederates forming e i t h e r the majority or the min-o r i t y i n some of the groups while naive subjects would form both factions i n other groups. This would permit a d i r e c t comparison between the form of 56. influence which occurs i n response to confederate pressures and that which occurs i n more natural group settings. The second issue concerns the s t a b i l i t y of the opinions which researchers use as the targets of influence. In t h i s study, the attitudes measured were apparently unstable over s i t u a t i o n s , and t h i s i n s t a b i l i t y has a number of un-fortunate consequences. F i r s t , the construction of natural groups on the basis of unstable attitudes does not produce the expected group compositions. While on the basis of t h e i r Opinion Survey responses these groups had quite d i s t i n c t f actions, those s p l i t s were not r e f l e c t e d i n the opinion composi-tions i n Table 1. Secondly, i n such a s i t u a t i o n i t i s d i f f i c u l t , i f not im-possible, to determine whether a measured change i n an unstable attitude i n -dicates a genuine response to influence attempts or simply a more-or-less random error component. Th i r d l y , even i f the measured change did r e f l e c t a true change, i t can be argued that an unstable attitude i s r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y influenced and that a more firmly anchored b e l i e f might not be affected by the same factors or i n the same fashion. If studies of s o c i a l influence are to have n o n - t r i v i a l g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y , i t would seem imperative that they avoid these problems by using as dependent variables only those opinions or a t t i -tudes to which the subjects f e e l some i n i t i a l commitment. The t h i r d issue concerns the influence of the i n d i v i d u a l i n a group. In the l i t e r a t u r e reviewed i n the Introduction, there are discussions of the char-a c t e r i s t i c s of i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l s (e.g., confidence or v o l u b i l i t y ) and of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i n f l u e n t i a l subgroups (e.g., sheer numbers) but there i s l i t t l e discussion of whether an i n d i v i d u a l or a f a c t i o n w i l l be the most powerful agent of influence i n a given group. The i m p l i c i t assumption appears to be that the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l only be s a l i e n t as an agent of i n f l u -ence when there are no actual subgroups or factions of opinion, but t h i s 57. assumption i s not necessarily j u s t i f i e d . The r e s u l t s reported here would seem to indicate that i n some instances (or i n terms of some measures) an i n d i v i d u a l may be responsible for influencing the other group members while i n other cases i t w i l l be the subgroup as a unit which i s i n f l u e n t i a l . In view of this,the researcher who investigates majority or minority influence would be well advised to include a consideration of the role of the i n d i -v i d u a l i n these subgroups. For example, consider a study which finds that a majority wins over a minority i n 807« of the groups observed, a r e s u l t which apparently indicates that majorities are more powerful than m i n o r i t i e s . It may be, however, that i f one were to investigate which i n d i v i d u a l group mem-bers were seen as most i n f l u e n t i a l , one would f i n d that i n a l l cases the most i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l was a member of the most i n f l u e n t i a l subgroup. This finding would then lead to an a l t e r n a t i v e conclusion, namely that i t i s the presence of an i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l which gives a subgroup i t s power. Whe-ther or not such a r e s u l t would occur i s an empirical problem, but i n view of the r e s u l t s of t h i s study the p o s s i b i l i t y should be investigated. In summary, then, t h i s research has yielded four tentative r e s u l t s , two rather more d e f i n i t e conclusions, and at least three unresolved questions concerning the process of s o c i a l influence i n unmanipulated small groups. To r e i t e r a t e , i t was t e n t a t i v e l y suggested that: a) increased subgroup s o l -i d a r i t y i s not accompanied by increased influence; b) the confidence and competence which are attributed to a subgroup are not functions of i t s s i z e ; c) frequency of communication by a subgroup does not determine i t s influence; and d) there may be cases i n which the influence of a subgroup i s determined by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an i n f l u e n t i a l i n d i v i d u a l member-rather than, by the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the subgroup as a u n i t . Also, we concluded more con-f i d e n t l y that: a) compromise i s not the mode of s o l u t i o n by which groups 58. resolve t h e i r differences of opinion; and b) winning of the f i r s t convert (or at least not being the f i r s t to show movement i n opinion) may be a fac-tor i n determining a subgroup's influence. F i n a l l y , the unresolved issues which were raised concerning future research into s o c i a l influence were: a) the r o l e of confederates; b) the e f f e c t s of i n s t a b i l i t y i n the target b e l i e f , and c) the ro l e of the i n d i v i d u a l group member. As a cl o s i n g observation, i t should be noted that although t h i s par-t i c u l a r study developed some serious flaws as a r e s u l t of sampling d i f f i -c u l t i e s , the method may yet prove valuable for the study of s o c i a l i n f l u -ence. By s e l e c t i n g an issue for which opinions are more stable and choosing a more accurate method of pre-screening subjects, one might assemble groups of naive subjects with d i s t i n c t majority-minority s p l i t s t and-tihu's demon-strate more conclusively the extent to which the r e s u l t s of previous re-search with confederates can be applied t o more natural s i t u a t i o n s . While there i s c e r t a i n l y a need for research based on the c o n t r o l l e d manipulation of experimental conditions which i s possible using confederates, there i s also a need for research involving more r e a l i s t i c conditions. While t h i s second sort of research may not be well suited to i n v e s t i g a t i n g the sorts of "cause and e f f e c t " problems with which the former may deal, i t can be us e f u l i n es-t a b l i s h i n g l i m i t s to the generalization of the r e s u l t s of the former method. It i s i n th i s sense that studies such as the one reported here are l i k e l y to prove most valuable. 59. Re f e r e n c e s A l l e n , V. L. S o c i a l s u p p o r t f o r n o n c o n f o r m i t y . I n L. B e r k o w i t z , ( E d . ) , Advances i n e x p e r i m e n t a l s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y ( V o l . 8 ) . New Y o r k : Academic P r e s s , 1975. Anderson, N. H. Group performance i n an anagram t a s k . 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Proceedings  of the National Academy of Sciences, 1931, 1_7, 684-688. Appendix Materials 6 5 . NAME SEX YEAR & MAJOR TEL. NO. Please check your timetable and indicate with an "X" a l l the times when you might be available to p a r t i c i p a t e i n our research. Daytime 8:30 9:30 10:30 11:30 12:30 1:30 2:30 3:30 to to to to to to to to Evenings 9:30 10:30 11:30 12:30 1:30 2:30 3:30 4:30 Saturday Afternoon Sunday Afternoon 1) Mr. and Mrs. Smith have been married for fourteen years and are now getting a divorce. Mrs. Smith w i l l have custody of t h e i r two c h i l d r e n aged four and eight. Mrs. Smith i s 39 years old and has never worked. The Smiths l i v e i n a small town where daycare f a c i l i t i e s are somewhat l i m i t e d . Mr. Smith i s an executive i n a successful advertising firm. Mr. Smith cl e a r s $ 1 5 0 0 . 0 0 per month (af t e r taxes). Mrs. Smith sued Mr. Smith for the divorce on the grounds of his committing adultery. Assuming there i s no alimony, how much should Mr. Smith pay Mrs. Smith for c h i l d support per month? 100-250 2 5 0 - 4 0 0 4 0 0 - 5 5 0 5 5 0 - 7 0 0 700-850 8 5 0 - 1 0 0 0 ( c i r c l e one) 2) A labour dispute i s currently i n a r b i t r a t i o n . The management states that they cannot give more than the federal guideline of 87,. The union has demanded a 407o increase i n order to bring them up to the l e v e l paid f o r s i m i l a r jobs i n other i n d u s t r i e s . If you were appointed a r b i t r a t o r , with power to impose a settlement for a one year contract, what percentage increase would you allow the union. Assume that a c o s t - o f - l i v i n g allowance clause w i l l be included on top of the percentage increase. 7o (please turn to page two) 66. (page two) 3) Mr. and Mrs. Monroe are suing a Dr. Sanders on behalf of t h e i r fourteen year old daughter, Susan. Susan was a promising young swimmer and diver who had already won a number of competitions and was slated to compete interna-t i o n a l l y . However, she contracted an ear i n f e c t i o n which, due to an error i n judgment, Dr. Sanders neglected to treat and which resulted i n a damaged ear-drum which i s now extremely sensitive to pressure changes. As a r e s u l t , Susan can no longer dive and even her a b i l i t y to enjoy r e c r e a t i o n a l swimming i s greatly impaired. The damage did not r e s u l t i n any hearing loss or other prob-lem. The Court has already determined that Dr. Sanders i s indeed responsible for the condition and there only remains the determination of the amount of money that should be given to Susan as compensation for the pain and su f f e r i n g (past, present and future) that r e s u l t s from t h i s condition. The suit asks for $200,000 compensation. What would you consider to be a f a i r award? 0 - $20,000 $100,001 - $120,000 $20,001 - $40,000 ' $120,001 - $140,000 $40,001 - $60,000 $140,001 - $160,000 $60,001 - $80,000 $160,001 - $180,000 $80,001 - $100,000 $180,001 - $200,000 4) Mr. and Mrs. Gallagher have been married for 7 years and Mrs. Gallahger i s now f i l i n g s u i t for divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of her hus-band. Mr. Gallagher i s a senior engineer for a large firm and clears (after taxes) $1,800. per month. Mrs. Gallagher i s a secretary/receptionist i n a small law firm and clears (after taxes) $800. per month. The Gallaghers have no ch i l d r e n . How much do you think Mr. Gallagher should pay to Mrs. Gallagher i n alimony? 67. A labour dispute between a major u n i v e r s i t y (not U.B.C.)and i t s food services s t a f f has been submitted for binding a r b i t r a t i o n . The previous two year contract, which expired four months ago, had provided wage increases which barely met the rate of i n f l a t i o n and thus the food services s t a f f made no r e a l gains during the past two years. Therefore, t h e i r union has asked for a 40%, increase over one year, a sum which w i l l bring the workers up to the l e v e l of pay enjoyed by those doing s i m i l a r work at other places. The u n i v e r s i t y copposess such an increase for a number of reasons. Recent increases i n costs and sharply reduced government funding have se r i o u s l y cur-t a i l e d the un i v e r s i t y ' s educational programs, and forced many cutbacks and economy measures. Thus t h i s i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y bad time for i t to meet a large increase i n i t s p a y r o l l . Also, although u n i v e r s i t i e s are not necessarily sub-ject to wage and price controls, i t i s f e l t that any increase over 87o at this time w i l l adversely a f f e c t public confidence i n economic r e s t r a i n t s because the u n i v e r s i t y i s almost e n t i r e l y supported by government d o l l a r s . If you were appointed a r b i t r a t o r of t h i s dispute, with complete authority to impose a settlement which would be honored by both sides for one year, what percentage increase would you allow the union? Assume that a cost of l i v i n g allowance w i l l be included on top of the percentage increase. ( C i r c l e one) 87, 127, 167o 207o 247, 287, 327, 3 6 % 4 0 % Seat No. Discussion Information Form What settlement did the group f i n a l l y agree to? What settlement do you personally f e e l the union should receive? To the best of your r e c o l l e c t i o n , what was each person's opinion at the beginning of the discussion? Person 1 %; 2 %; 3 7.; 4 7.; 5 7; 6 7, If you changed your opinion, what reason did you have for changing? (Check one) Arguments of others were persuasive. Upon reconsideration, another percentage seemed more appropriate. So that the group could reach an agreement. Other (State b r i e f l y ) What was the i n i t i a l opinion range among the discussion participants? (Check one). Everyone was i n v i r t u a l agreement. There were b a s i c a l l y two d i s t i n c t p o s i t i o n s . There were b a s i c a l l y three d i s t i n c t p o s i t i o n s . There were more than three d i s t i n c t positions. Everyone was i n v i r t u a l disagreement. Who was: a) the f i r s t person to change from th e i r o r i g i n a l position? Seat No. Which way did they change? Higher Lower b) the second person to change? Seat No. Which way did they change? Higher Lower c) the t h i r d person to change? Seat No. Which way did they change? Higher Lower - 2 - 69. 7. Each of the following scales represents a dimension of some personal char-a c t e r i s t i c . For each scale, consider each person i n the group (including yourself) in turn and decide what point on the scale best describes that person. Then write down the number corresponding to that point i n the appro-pr i a t e space below the scale. Example: If one of the scales was aggressive-passive and you f e l t that Persons 2,3, and 5 were s l i g h t l y aggressive, Person 6 very aggressive and Persons 1 and 4 moderately passive, then you would complete that scale as follows: very moderately s l i g h t l y neutral s l i g h t l y moderately very aggressive ! ! '• '- ! '- passive +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 Person 1 ^2 ; 2 +1 ; 3 +1 ; 4 -2 ; 5 +1 ; 6 +3 a) very moderately s l i g h t l y neutral s l i g h t l y moderately very reasonable '• ! ! — '• ! '- unreasonable +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 Person 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 b) very moderately s l i g h t l y neutral s l i g h t l y moderately very confident • '• '• '• '• ! —unconfident +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 Person 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 c) very moderately s l i g h t l y neutral s l i g h t l y moderately very consistent ! • ! • '• — — inconsistent +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 Person 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 d) very moderately s l i g h t l y neutral s l i g h t l y moderately very r e s i s t a n t to -! ! ! • 1 1 w i l l i n g to compromise +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 compromise Person 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 e) very moderately s l i g h t l y neutral s l i g h t l y moderately very i n t e l l i g e n t ! '- ! ! ! — u n i n t e l l i g e n t +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 Person 1 _ ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 f) very moderately s l i g h t l y neutral s l i g h t l y moderately very l i k a b l e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 unlikable +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 Person 1 6 - 3 -70. g) v e r y m o d e r a t e l y s l i g h t l y n e u t r a l s l i g h t l y m o d e r a t e l y v e r y a l e a d e r ! > ! ! ! ' — a f o l l o w e r +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 P e r s o n 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 h) v e r y m o d e r a t e l y s l i g h t l y n e u t r a l s l i g h t l y m o d e r a t e l y v e r y r i g i d !_ ! ! ! ! ! ! f l e x i b l e +3 r + 2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 P e r s o n 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 i ) v e r y m o d e r a t e l y s l i g h t l y n e u t r a l s l i g h t l y m o d e r a t e l y v e r y w e H ! ! ! ! ! ! •—uninformed i n f o r m e d +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 P e r s p n 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ;! 5 ; 6 j ) g e t s v e r y m o d e r a t e l y s l i g h t l y n e u t r a l s l i g h t l y m o d e r a t e l y v e r y g e t s a l o n g w e l l ! • '• '• '• '• — a l o n g p o o r l y w i t h o t h e r s +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 - 3 w i w i t h o t h e r s k) v e r y m o d e r a t e l y s l i g h t l y n e u t r a l s l i g h t l y m o d e r a t e l y v e r y I l i k e ! ! ! ! * ! ! — I d i s l i k e +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 P e r s o n 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 8. I n the spaces below each p e r s o n ' s number, w r i t e i n t h e s e a t numbers o f th o s e p e o p l e w i t h whom he or she b e s t f i t s . P e r s o n 1 P e r s o n 2 P e r s o n 3 P e r s o n 4 P e r s o n 5 P e r s o n 6 For each o f the f o l l o w i n g f o u r s t a t e m e n t s , c i r c l e t he o p i n i o n w h i c h b e s t e x p r e s s e s y o u r own f e e l i n g s : 9. The r i g h t t o s t r i k e has been g r e a t l y abused by u n i o n l e a d e r s i n r e c e n t y e a r s . S t r o n g l y Somewhat Somewhat S t r o n g l y D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e N e u t r a l Agree Agree Agree 10. The r e a l cause o f i n f l a t i o n i s t h e huge p r o f i t s b e i n g made by the l a r g e i n d u s t r i e s . S t r o n g l y Somewhat Somewhat S t r o n g l y D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e D i s a g r e e N e u t r a l Agree Agree Agree - 4 - 71. 11, ;' Most workers are s t i l l getting le size of corporate p r o f i t s . Strongly Somewhat Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral : 12. The solution to i n f l a t i o n w i l l be t h e i r demands for material luxuries. Strongly Somewhat Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral s than they deserve i n r e l a t i o n to the Somewhat Strongly Agree Agree Agree found when everyone learns to moderate Somewhat Strongly Agree Agree Agree 13. Consider the following sit u a t i o n -^Negotiations are i n progress between a c i t y school board and the custodial workers employed by the board. The previous contract, which gave the workers a large increase i n salary, w i l l expire t h i s month and the union i s demanding a 387. increase plus a cost of l i v i n g allowance. Although the school board can afford to meet these demands, i t feels that they are unjust-i f i e d and that the money could be better spent on upgrading the schools. They therefore have offered only a 10% increase plus cost of l i v i n g allowance. What do you f e e l the union should recieve? 7> Group 5 min. 10 min. 15 min. 20 min. 25 min. Person 1 I n i t i a l F i n a l Change Person 2 I n i t i a l F i n a l Change Person 3 I n i t i a l F i n a l Change Person 4 I n i t i a l F i n a l Change Person 5 I n i t i a l F i n a l Change Person 6 I n i t i a l F i n a l Change Time to Consensus Consensus Po s i t i o n r o Appendix B Computational Details 74. C o m p u t a t i o n a l Formulae I n t h e f o l l o w i n g Formulae, the s u b t r o u p f o r w h i c h t h e i n d e x i s b e i n g c o n s t r u c t e d i s c a l l e d t he " i n g r o u p " and the o t h e r subgroup t h e " o u t g r o u p . " The symbols N i and N Q r e f e r t o the numbers o f s u b j e c t s i n t h e i n g r o u p and outgroup r e s p e c t i v e l y . Groupness (GRP) T h i s v a r i a b l e r e p r e s e n t e d a measure of t h e o u t g r o u p ' s p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e v a r i a b i l i t y among t h e i n g r o u p members on t h e e l e v e n p e r s o n p e r c e p t i o n s c a l e s o f Q u e s t i o n 7 o f t h e p o s t t e s t . I t was computed as f o l l o w s : 1. F o r each member o f t h e o u t g r o u p , t h e s c o r e s w h i c h she a s s i g n e d t o each member o f t h e i n g r o u p were mean d e v i a t e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o each i t e m . 2. The d e v i a t i o n s c o r e s f o r a s c a l e were t h e n s q u a r e d , summed, d i v i d e d by and the r e s u l t a n t number was r a i s e d t o t h e 1/3 power. 1/3 3. The v a r i a n c e j ' i s c o r e s f o r a g i v e n s c a l e were t h e n summed o v e r t h e numbers o f the outgroup and d i v i d e d by N Q, 1/3 4. F i n a l l y t h e s e t o f e l e v e n average v a r i a n c e . . s c o r e s were added t o g i v e t h e GRP s c o r e f o r the i n g r o u p . Example: Say t h e r e a r e two p e r s o n s (A and B) i n t h e out g r o u p and f o u r (C, D, E, and F) i n the i n g r o u p . The s c o r e s o f t h e f o u r i n g r o u p members on one o f t h e s c a l e s a r e as f o l l o w s : C D E F a c c o r d i n g t o A: +2 +1 0 +1 a c c o r d i n g t o B: +3 +1 +1 +2 1. The d e v i a t i o n s c o r e s a r e t h e n . C D E F A: +1 0 - 1 0 B: +1.25 -.75 -.75 -.25 2. The sums o f the squ a r e d d e v i a t i o n s c o r e s d i v i d e d by and r a i s e d t o the 1/3 power a r e : 75. 1/3 1/3 A: (1 + 1) / 4 = (0.5) 1 = 0.794 B: ( 1 . 2 5 2 + . 7 5 2 + . 7 5 2 + . 2 5 2 ) / 4 1 / 3 = ( 0 . 6 8 7 5 ) 1 / 3 = .883 3. The average s c o r e f o r t h e i t e m i s t h e n s i m p l y (.794 + .883) / 2 = .839 4. F i n a l l y , t h e o t h e r t e n v a l u e s c a l c u l a t e d s i m i l a r l y w o u l d be added t o t h i s one t o y i e l d t he f i n a l GRP s c o r e f o r t h e i n g r o u p . C o n f i d e n c e (CONF) The average c o n f i d e n c e s c o r e f o r t h e i n g r o u p was found by t a k i n g t h e average s c o r e w h i c h each member o f t h e outgroup a s s i g n e d t o t h e members o f the i n g r o u p on the c o n f i d e n c e s c a l e (Q. 7B) and t h e n f i n d i n g the average o f t h e s e f o r the ou t g r o u p as a whole. T h i s v a r i a b l e was c a l c u l a t e d as No - N i 2 X (Q- 7b s c o r e s ) / ( N i N Q ) j = l i = l I f t h e f i g u r e s used i n t h e example above r e f e r r e d t o t h e c o n f i d e n c e s c a l e , t h e n the CONF s c o r e would be (2 + 1 + 0 + 1 ) + (3 + 1 + 1 + 2) / ( 2 x 4 ) = 1.250  Competence (COMP) The average competence s c o r e was computed i n t h e same f a s h i o n as t h e c o n f i d e n c e s c o r e above, u s i n g the r e s p o n s e s t o Q u e s t i o n 7 i . Computations o f a l l the o t h e r i n d i c e s a r e d e s c r i b e d i n s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l w i t h i n t he t e x t . C o r r e l a t i o n Matrices The single matrix presented on the following pages contains the cor-r e l a t i o n s between variables obtained under both p a r t i t i o n i n g s of the d i s -cussion groups. The entries above the diagonal are the c o r r e l a t i o n s associ-ated with the sociometric p a r t i t i o n i n g while those below the diagonal were obtained under the a p r i o r i p a r t i t i o n i n g . The variables l a b e l l e d A to K are the measures of the variance between subgroup members on the scales a to k of Question 7 on the Discussion In-formation Form. The procedures by which these and the other variables were calculated are described i n d e t a i l either i n the text or i n the preceding section of t h i s Appendix. Variable A B C D E F G H I J K GRP SIZE INFL1 INFL2 CONF COMP CVRT1 CVRT2 TALK1 TALK2 A 1.000 .511 .489 .538 .469 .661 .615 .596 .485 .609 .583 .727 .254 .289 .036 -.154 .025 .055 .100 .478 .454 B .242 1.000 .563 .589 .679 .521 .819 .708 .766 .621 .447 .819 .457 .595 .193 .061 -.142 -.124 .306 .294 .065 C .289 .536 1.000 .696 .551 .553 .609 .585 .617 .424 .408 .741 .188 .195 .018 .118 -.237 -.121 .021 .426 .334 D .384 .474 .647 1.000 .401 .563 .642 .768 .556 .710 .637 .813 .472 .325 .031 .145 .106 -.197 .259 .437 .220 E .120 .569 .440 .416 1.000 .696 .622 .607 .726 .528 .418 .745 .398 .371 .166 .126 -.248 -.042 .085 .410 .196 F .568 .398 .471 .561 .507 1.000 .559 .612 .639 .795 .750 .817 .270 .282 .100 .108 -.071 -.017 -.059 .313 .249 G .194 .564 .464 .504 .571 .354 1.000 .740 .810 .598 .662 .875 .583 .233 .187 .226 -.036 -.143 .269 .401 .059 V a r i a b l e A B C D E F G H I J K GRP SIZE INFL1 INFL2 CONF COMP CVRT1 CVRT2 TALK1 TALK2 H .503 .602 .700 .835 .402 .566 .568 1.000 .633 .615 .612 .857 .467 .286 .106 .306 -.084 -.141 .165 .338 .130 I .138 .541 .461 .398 .673 .468 .606 .419 1.000 .654 .553 .839 .459 .267 .103 .137 -.215 -.209 .027 .352 .085 J .694 .387 .260 .514 .371 .777 .277 .541 .290 1.000 .809 .822 .394 .455 .118 -.008 .005 -.178 .048 .385 .232 K .461 .298 .220 .451 .405 .712 .465 .565 .335 .730 1.000 .774 .363 .079 .221 .181 .106 -.016 .015 .296 .151 GRP .578 .705 .727 .814 .656 .783 .703 .875 .662 .710 .684 1.000 .493 .361 .141 .150 -.084 -.136 .015 .466 .241 SIZE -.047 .507 .423 .424 .410 .070 .641 .486 .372 .008 .170 .457 1.000 .266 -.092 .136 .077 -.571 .143 .506 -.151 INFL1 .059 .572 .224 .453 .381 .212 .560 .457 .585 .231 .399 .506 .417 1.000 -.014 .027 -.035 -.179 .428 .252 .046 V a r i a b l e A B C D E F G H I J K GRP SIZE INFL1 INFL2 CONF COMP CVRT1 CVRT2 TALK1 TALK2 INFL2 .280 .350 .007 .027 .139 .159 .327 .134 .354 .240 .170 .262 .312 .654 1.000 -.164 -.024 .689 .558 .102 .083 CONF -.138 -.244 -.148 -.111 -.218 -.064 -.090 -.031 .029 -.134 .206 -.105 -.029 .144 -.002 1.000 .257 -.115 .164 -.170 -.194 COMP .119 -.287 -.319 -.148 -.178 .134 -.127 -.225 -.147 .196 .229 -.116 -.154 -.305 -.318 .406 1.000 .302 .490 .076 .200 CVRT1 -.008. -.314 -.314 -.223 -.399 -.117 -.235 -.181 -.250 9.242 -.164 -.292 -.378 -.066 .218 .008 -.257 1.000 .429 -.105 .300 CVRT2 *** *** *** *** *** ickit *** *** *** *** *** 000 211 147 TALK1 .335 .052 .304 .199 -.016 .135 .157 .277 -.016 .142 .234 .244 .363 -.119 .232 .209 -.015 -.144 1.000 .712 TALK2 .408 -.220 .130 .031 -.144 .215 -.106 .079 -.152 .207 .269 .091 -.142 -.288 .049 .291 .129 .020 .846 1.000 

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