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Concepts of space and time in traditional China : notes towards a predictive theory of culture Koch, Tom 1978

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cover designed by Shui Yim Tse CONCEPTS OF SPACE AND TIME IN TRADITIONAL CHINAt Notes towards a predictive theory of culture by Thomas Koch B.A., Clark University, 1971 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of Geography) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA 1978 .(c) Thomas Koch 1978 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Brit ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Thomas Koch Department of Gftnyranhv The University of Brit ish Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date /-W" £ /<f%? i i ABSTRACT This thesis seeks to examine the hypothesis that states that s o c i a l organization i s based on discernable and l i m i t e d patterns of order, s p e c i f i c a l l y culture-bound d e f i n i t i o n s of space and time. I t suggests that concepts of space and time, once defined by a culture group, may remain r e l a t i v e l y constant through long periods of culture change i n other areas and, once defined, can be used by the student of culture to describe more adequately many areas of s o c i o - c u l t u r a l behavior. I t pursues t h i s thesis through an examination of some t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese texts, extant by the time of the Han dynasty, and c r i t i c a l to Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e at l e a s t through the Ch'ing period. Having defined the p r i n c i p a l space-time concepts through an analysis of these texts, the thesis examines t h e i r u t i l i t y as descriptive tools i n the analysis of other areas of Chinese culture, including postal codes, landscape painting and board games. Geographers and anthropologists concerning themselves with the concepts of loc a t i o n , culture and i t s organization, perception and related phenomena have consistently found both space and time c r i t i c a l to an understanding of man and h i s environment. Building on t h i s research, the thesis begins with the theory that i n d i v i d u a l s interested i n understanding broad categories of human organization w i l l of necessity have recourse to s p e c i f i c culture-bound concepts of space and time. That i s to say, any investi g a t i o n of human perceptual organization r e l a t i n g man and h i s environment w i l l uncover an innate system i i i of co-ordinates using space and time as the definers of location and environment. Further, this thesis tests the structuralist hypothesis that, once discerned, these "metalanguages of order" can be used as descripters for other, seemingly unrelated areas of culture. This thesis i s the f i r s t work to apply structural anthro-pological techniques to the analysis of a non-technological, literate society through the examination of histor i c a l documents. It thus provides a potential expansion of techniques heretofore limited primarily to pre-modern, "peasant" and "primitive" societies. The thesis also breaks new ground by coupling the geographer's concern for the concepts of location with the structuralist's interest i n broad patterns of order. The unification of location and category provides the principal analytic tool by which specific cultural artifacts are examined. As a Sinologic exercise i t i s hoped these relatively modern, social s c i e n t i f i c techniques can better explain certain heretofore anomalies i n the Chinese tradition. Specifically, i t seeks to describe the function of seals and colophones in Chinese art as well as the relation, noted by Scott A. Boorman, between wei-ch'i game play and military behavior. Given the experimental nature of the thesis and the relative youth of i t s inter-disciplinary emphasis, i t diverges from the standard practice of limiting such academic exercises to a deep investigation of a narrow topic. Rather, i t attempts t o suggest a g e n e r a l framework i n which f u t u r e S i n o l o g i c r e s e a r c h can pursue a s i m i l a r l i n e of reasoning and r e s e a r c h i n s e v e r a l areas. The case i t attempts t o present i s thus not de .justes but r a t h e r prima f a c i e . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract i i List of Tables and Illustrations v i Acknowledgements v i i Chapter It Structuralism* Space and Time 1 Introductioni Anthropology; Structuralism; Structuralims, Space and Time; Hypothesisi Notes and References Chapter II i Space and Time i n Chinese Thought 3-4-Introductioni History of Science; Explorations; The Problem of Text; Space and Timet Categoriesi Interaction and Chances Paradox; Discussion; Paradox II; Discussion; Notes and References Chapter H i t Traces; Space and Time i n Chinese 88 Culture Areas Introductioni Postal Codes; Landscape Painting; Wei ch'i; Chinese War; Notes and References Chapter IVt Wei Ch'it A Description 129 Game Theory; Wei Ch'i Description; Notes and References Chapter Vt Convergence 155 Introduction; Spacet The Wei Ch'i Board; Rules; Play; Distance; Linearity and Movement; Time; "As i n Chess — So in War"; Notes and References Conclusion 186 Bibliography I99 1 v i LIST OF TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS Page Illustration At Text of 10 Paradoxes 81 Illustration Bi Text of 4 Paradoxes 85 Table It Distance from Peking Measured in Time 98 and L i Wei Ch'i Figure l i Basic Positions 137 2» Capturing' 138 3» Encirclement, Territory 140 4i "Tempo" 1-4-1 5i wKo" 142 6i M S e k i M 143 7» Completed Game 144 8i Completed Game with Connections 145 Figure 9« Schematic Grid Map 159 v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In t h i s exercise debts have been incurred. In my attempts to learn Chinese between academic teaching r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , Mrs. Yvonne Walls and Szu-du Chen provided both encouragement and assistance, the l a t t e r most c r i t i c a l l y when I needed someone to check and consider some f a l t e r i n g t r a n s l a t i o n from some (to me) unfamiliar texts. Dr. Constantine Dung of the State University at Buffalo, my f i r s t year i n s t r u c t o r , i n s t i l l e d a knowledge of elementary grammar and, most importantly, a love f o r the language arid i t s early forms. His excitement about and love f o r the language sustained me while I struggled with academic footnotes to obscure t r a n s l a t i o n s . Both Edward Schaffer and Nathan S i v i n offered early encouragement and suggestions, reading an early draft of t h i s material. S i v i n e s p e c i a l l y provided resources and encouragement which were of great assistance as t h i s work passed from i t s embryonic form to i t s present state. My father maintains he understands nothing of the material included within. Maybe he doesn't, but he has w i l l i n g l y sat fo r hours while I attempted to explain and define what I mean, and through h i s i n t e r e s t I better understood what I hoped to do. More than anyone else, t h i s project owes i t s genesis and completion to Denis Wood, now at the North Carolina State. University i n Raleigh, N.C. I t was he who introduced me to the physics which, i n i t s theories about space and time, f i r s t directed my research} he who f i r s t introduced me to Chinese poetry. Having continually urged me to return to school and v i i i once there to pursue the thesis, he kindly read successive dra f t s , o f f e r i n g c r i t i c i s m both so complete and at the same time so aff i r m a t i v e , the f i n a l drafts seemed to write themselves. No one i s more aware than their author of the vast unexplored reaches of history and data that make such an interpretation necessarily tentative and imperfect. Yet I believe the scholar should occasionally stand back and contemplate the whole continuum of time and of problems which give meaning to his specialized studies. He should, i t seems to me, report the results of his reflections.... Arthur K. Wright 1 CHAPTER I S t r u c t u r a l i s m , Space and Time 2 Bertrand Russell once said that, with the rise of modern physics, the traditional division of man's study into two categories — history and geography — no longer sufficed in dealing with the reality of human existence. As he put i t i The separation of history from geography rests upon the separation of time from space $ i f we amalgamate the two in space-time, we need one word to describe the combination of geography and history ... Geography, i n this sense, includes everything that as a matter of crude fact, distinguishes one part of space-time from another.... 1 As a result of the unification of space and time as well as the subsequent collapse of "simple location", Russell said p there remained only "geography and truisms". Although Russell's comments are f u l l y i n accord with the notion of a ho l i s t i c geography given to what Yi-fu Tuan described as an interest i n "fundamental human concerns and thought patterns,"-^ geographers have rarely employed the concept of space i n so eclectic a fashion. Indeed, the idea of space-time i t s e l f i s of such recent vintage i n geography, and then primarily in location theory, that one wonders about the appropriateness of Russell's heady compliment. If geography has been tardy in i t s adoption of the space-time definitions of modern physics, i t i s probably due to at least two factors. On the one hand, the applicability of virtually a l l concepts of physics are a p r i o r i suspect in their applicability to man, according to some human geographers. Thus i t was, for example, that Marwyn Samuels wondered aloud about the misappropriation of a "centerless", l et alone heliocentric universe in so thoroughly anthropocentric a 3 d i s c i p l i n e as geography.14. In t h i s , he followed the writings of J. May,-* and May's i n t e r e s t i n the importance of neo-Kantian thought i n the modern geographic t r a d i t i o n . One can also discern elements of anti-scientism i n the work of geographers l i k e Annette Buttimer, or Wilbur Zelinsky of "The Demigod's Dilemma" fame.^ Their charges against what Zelinsky c a l l e d the " r e l i g i o n of science", and more importantly against Buttimer's charge that " s c i e n t i f i c procedures f a i l to provide adequate descriptions of experience because of t h e i r i m p l i c i t separation of body and mind"'' o f f e r f a i n t recommenda-t i o n f o r the serious study or a p p l i c a t i o n of the l o g i c and d e f i n i t i o n s of modern physics, and the concept of space-time i n geography. On the other hand, t h i s sentiment i s i t s e l f of such recent vintage i n geography that i t cannot alone explain a reluctance to adopt t h i s idea of space-time among geographers who, almost u n i v e r s a l l y , accept the notion that geography i s a science. That reluctance must also be traced- to the philosophical wellsprings of the d i s c i p l i n e which i s , as D. R. Stoddard stressed! ... derived from Hettner and Hartshorne, from the writings of Kant, occupies what Schaefer c a l l s an 'exceptionalist p o s i t i o n , ' that of a branch of knowledge with a unique integrating function, synthesizing more  spec i a l i z e d f i e l d s i n space as h i s t o r y does  i n time (emphasis mine).o" Just so. Founded and b u i l t upon the structure of the Kantian a p r i o r i , the geographical t r a d i t i o n i d e n t i f i e d by Stoddard c l e a r l y followed i n the tracks of t r a d i t i o n a l physics, and thus preserved the distinction between spatiality and temporality. Por Richard Hartshorne, as for most geographers who closely followed his The Nature of Geography, this was something best l e f t to historians and philosophers, and was in any case only an adjunct to the main geographic concern Q with space via the sub-field of histor i c a l geography. In much the same vein, economic geographers have been less than enthusiastic about adopting the definitions of modern physics and i t s a l l i e d f i e l d s . As Gunnar Olsson commented, "the most central of geographic principles i s the one inherited from Descartes and Leibnizj a point i s a point, 10 a line i s a line, a hexagon i s a hexagon." It i s because of the centrality of this idea that, Olsson argued, in the arena of "geographic inferencej certainty i s i n 11 spatial form. Ambiguity i s i n human action." And in a slightly different context, David Harvey seconded Olsson, sayingi ... i f we are to build an analytically tractable theory of spatial form, we must eventually resort for (sic) formal geometry."2 Space i n the geographic spatial tradition i s thus Euclidean by definition. Euclidean space provided a world of simple location whose regions were essentially static, and on whose surface man could identify sites and places as points on lines fixed by an absolute grid without regard to time. This understanding of the world was implicit in.the work of men like Carl 0. Sauer and A. von Humboldt, who i n their attempts to understand man and his relation to the world assumed that 5 relation occurred in a static world of what i s now called 13 "simple location." J This does not mean, of course, that non-Euclidean geometry or that a post-Kantian view of space and time failed to i n f i l t r a t e modern geographic thought. On the contrary, T. Hagerstrand has argued that individuals l i v e in envelopes of space-time, and those interested in examining the lives and perceptions of people must look to a space-time framework I k such as the one he proposed i n his "time geography" model. In a similar vein Edward Ulman suggested i n his work on American commodity flows that the notion of space-time as a geographic device was implicit i n much of what became the "spatial interactionist" tradition i n modern geography. As Ulman put the mattert To use he earth requires organization of spacing and timing. The amount of space and the scheduling of time are interrelated. Single-track railroads take more time to move t r a f f i c and require more elaborate scheduling than double-track railroads... the more space, the less time. Hans Blumefeld notes the same thing i n the Ulman*s recognition that there i s no space out of time and no time devoid of place, like Hagerstrand•s "time geography", revealed a sensitivity to non-Euclidean space-time as a factor i n human organization. Similarly, Denis Wood recently argued for the need to understand space-time 16 co-ordinates i n any "Cartography of Reality". Among the implications of this view are a recognition of the va r i a b i l i t y of distance and direction in different event contexts. 6 ambiguity where geographers like Olsson and cartographers like 17 Robinson and Sale ' saw only Euclidean certainty. But i f a few geographers like Ullman and Wood have been aware of the issue of space-time in human perception and organization, geography by i t s e l f has not been i n the forefront of the social sciences i n the adoption, examination or empirical verification of space-time co-ordinates. Rather, this has been in great part a contribution of modern social anthropology, and especially a contribution by those anthropologists who follow Levi-Strauss* structural approach to the examination of human place and organization. ANTHROPOLOGY Determinations of space (like a l l knowledge) are not neutral factors i n regard to other aspects of society and culture. They play a decisive role i n the construction of the world the society inhabits, which world in i t s turn plays a role i n the constitution of the society. James LittleJohn. ' The Tenme House1" In their study of man and his relation to environments, anthropologists were among the f i r s t social scientists to question the Euclidean nature of perception and cultural organization. In the attempt to identify the general principles whereby groups organize their world, many anthro-pologists have focused their attention on the nature of location i n human perception. One of the f i r s t explicit statements of this concern came shortly after the f i r s t World War i n a debate between 7 H. Evans-Pritchard and R. Nilsson concerning the Nuer's concept of organization. The debate was c r i t i c a l to an under-standing of seasonality and v i l l a g e structure i n the Nuer culture — indeed to Evans-Pritchard's and Nilsson*s under-standing of the complex of Nuer organization. Nilsson believed the Nuer*s world was synchronic, one i n which space and time were i n t e r r e l a t e d and the punktell (event), as he c a l l e d i t , was the primary kernel of d e f i n i t i o n among the people he studied. As David F. Pocock explained i t i Nilsson's work Time Reckoning (Lundt (1920)) i s the e s s e n t i a l s t a r t i n g point» In the matter of the indications and reckoning of time we have not to do with a number of concepts... at the basis l i e s an accurately determined and l i m i t e d number of phenomena which are the same f o r a l l people a l l over the globe ( i . e . b i r t h , death, seasons, location) and can only be combined i n a c e r t a i n number of ways.19 Although h i s primary concern was time, Nilsson"s c o n t r i -butions were twofold. One was the r e a l i z a t i o n that a l l men must come to grips with c e r t a i n fundamental organizational p r i n c i p l e s , and that the methods of dealing with these p r i n c i p l e s would, by d e f i n i t i o n , be l i m i t e d . Levi-Strauss 20 restated t h i s point f o r t y years l a t e r as s t r u c t u r a l i s t canon. Nilsson also argued that human perception was not necessarily continuous, as most researchers assumed. He maintained that, at l e a s t f o r the Nuer, what was most important was the discontinuous event occurring i n what can be best described as a four-dimensional world. He c a l l e d these events, located i n space at an instant, punktell. Evans-Pritchard argued, however, the Nuer could best be described through recourse to 8 the concept that time was constant and consistent. He denied the importance of the punktell and argued, in effect, for an understanding of the Nuer based on what in retrospect seems to be a traditionally Western separation of space and time. Confirmation of Nilsson's view by researchers i n other regions suggested the more universal application of his ideas concerning Nuer spatial-temporal perception. In a discussion of the Tiv tribe, Paul Bohannon said, for examplei A man knows that an event happened long ago because there was a different spatial distribution (then) than i s to be found at the present.... 21 Similarly, James LittleJohn discussed the idea of spatial perception in Temne organization and found the Temne perception of a metric i s not opposed to, but irresolvably united with time i It i s not in fact the application of a unit to distance, but a meaning which arises out of the Temne (perceptual) landscape and human movement in i t , just as the measure of short length i s a meaning inherent i n the Temne body. 2 2 That i s to say, size and distance are relative in the Temne world. The distance between villages A and C, for example, i s determined by the number of intervening villages. This apparently frustrated researchers who, like LittleJohn, would ask "how far" i t was from Village A to Village C. They wanted a metric evaluation and were told merely i t was "not far". To the Temne, the distance was short because the intervening Village B could be reached rather quickly. The time of travel between a starting point and the next village on 9 the way to some future destination was for them the c r i t i c a l measure, not the metric or the time required at a constant pace for the total distance. This measure of time and travel 23 i s one replicated at other levels of that culture. J Similar ideas can be found i n the work of Mircea Eliade whose examination of paradisical myths and the "savage Oil mentality" defined a spatio-temporal universe. Prom his readings of the socio-anthropologic literature, he maintained a l l peoples organized their worlds into sacred and profane space, the center of the world being at the individual village center. That i s , there was a spatial organization of the world centered like a logarithmic azimuthai map based on the specific village. And in each case the cosmology also was centered around a paradisical time before some mythic f a l l from grace. The f a l l broke the cosmic connection and provided the beginnings of "real" time — history, he argued. But i f a l l individuals wished to be at the center of their world, they also wanted to regain that mythic time, and their perceptual organization centered on the tension between space — sacred and profane — and between mythical and histor i c a l times. A more recent study serves to draw these strands together. In his examination of Chamula cosmology and socio-geographic organization, Gary Gossen discovered that the Chamula Indians of Chiapas, Mexico, perceived their world according to a time-space yardstick in which as one moved away from the center of their world (the village), one moved back in time.2-* That i s , the Chamula see themselves as the center of the world and at the center of present time. As one moves away from t h e i r highland v i l l a g e , one moves both towards the corners of the world and into the past simultaneously. To the Chamula, distant North Americans seemed to be l i v i n g at the creation of the world, and they expected such foreigners to behave accordingly. Echoing h i s mentor, Harvard anthropologist 26 Evon Z. Vogt , Gossen makes clea r that t h i s occurs not only i n the cosmology of h i s subjects but also serves as a primary ordering p r i n c i p l e operative at a l l l e v e l s of that culture. ... i n Chamula thought time and space form the p r i n c i p a l axis i n such a superordinate system f o r r e l a t i n g classes of events.2? I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that Gossen, an anthropologist, used techniques i n h i s study which are f a m i l i a r to the geographer. For example, he had native informants create sketch maps of t h e i r world and l a t e r asked them to interpret a e r i a l photographs. He then analyzed o r a l t r a d i t i o n and joking language, a r r i v i n g at r e s u l t s which r e p l i c a t e d and strengthened the other data. I f the f i r s t techniques were 28 psycho-geographic , the content analysis was avowedly s t r u c t u r a l i s t . He thus was among the f i r s t to apply psycho-geographic techniques to describe what Talcott Parsons once c a l l e d "patterns of or i e n t a t i o n to problems of meaning." 2^ By doing t h i s he foundt The fundamental components of a community's world view, s p e c i f i c a l l y i t s categories of time and space, provide one u s e f u l conceptual metalanguage f o r a contextural analysis of o r a l t r a d i t i o n . For one reason, cosmology and o r a l t r a d i t i o n are a l i k e i n that both contain assumed public knowledge about the nature of 11 order. In nearly a l l societies, concepts of time and space provide the underpinnings for the way in which the moral universe i s supposed to behave. In a specific culture, these fundamental axes -- time and space — are shared with other culture specific notions about order.30 The crucial phrase here, and the one tying Gossen both to Parsons and to the structuralists i s "conceptual metalanguage". By this I take him to mean general and shared principles of organization and perception important to a l l areas of culture and cognitive orientation. By suggesting time and space concepts form such "fundamental axes", he i s suggesting both their importance at a l l levels of a given culture and also their comparative importance for an understanding of other cultures.3 1 Like the works of other structuralists, the concept of language i s c r i t i c a l to an understanding of Gossen*s argument. In the same way people are not necessarily aware of the primary categories of their languages, they are also often unaware of their systems of cultural organization and cognition, the "fundamental axes" by which individual and group behavior i s formed and constrained. Thus, the conceptual metalanguage and the primary principles i t implies are not necessarily explicit-ly evident to those people who hold a certain view of the world. Gossen*s discussion of universal principles of organization and perception, like his concept of "conceptual metalanguage", are primarily structuralist in origin. Hence, in order to understand them f u l l y , we need to examine b r i e f l y the structuralist argument in modern anthropology. 12 STRUCTURALISM Structuralism provides a broad framework for the investigation of human organization, taking as i t s subject a "cognitive nucleus which i s common to a l l subjects at a certain level of abstraction."-^ 2 That cognitive nucleus i s seen by structuralists as common to a l l men, a general pattern of cognition which organizes data in fundamentally similar ways. Structural anthropology grew out of linguistics and the work of De Saussere and Roman Jacobsen, who identified a common "deep structure", a general organizational similarity between a l l languages. Applying that concept of similarity to culture, structuralists arguedi The structuring a b i l i t y of the mind i s not acquired, but i s there; therefore i t must be innate, an attribute which i s species: specific... an i n i t i a l schemata which i s generic and categorical and which predisposes a member of the human species to acquire certain modes of behavior which hitherto (at least to the last 50 years) were considered to be i n some sense culture or learnt.33 Recognizing the diversity of human manifestations, structuralists presume certain commonalities among men on the basis of similar necessities and psycho-motor attributes. For example, as Nilsson argued earlier, a l l individuals, whatever society they belong to, live in a specific region and deal with seasonal, solar and lunar changes. A l l men must eat and most give a large portion of their lives to the procurement of food. Mobile, a l l men must have a system of navigation in their respective regions and patterns of behavior allowing them to assimilate new conditions, situations and regions. A l l men attempt to explain and describe their environment and their relation to i t , and a l l men paint — graphically representing i n one or another media aspects of their world. Recognizing the apparent diversity which seems to pervade the multiplicity of human cultures, structuralists suggest that, at a high level of abstraction (at a different scale to use the geographer's jargon) there are a number of principles which may be fundamentally the same for a l l men. That i s to say, there are cachete specifiques. in M. Michott's cogent phrase, or basic "kernels*' of meaning relating to specific areas of human experience. The metalanguage of human organization referred to by Gossen i s the general pattern which structural-i s t s claim they can discern in man, and which they hope to someday prove i s common to a l l men. Levi-Strauss calls this the order of orders, which he argues ... i s not a mere logical reformulation of phenomena which have been subjected to analysis. (Rather) It i s the most abstract expression of the inter-relationships between the levels to which structural analysis can be applied.35 One basis for this i s the uniformity of the psycho-physical apparatus common to a l l men. That i s to say, a l l men have similar physical attributes and exemplify similar sensory systems, with brains, sensors and receptors operating i n the same way. As Edmund Leach put i t i Phenomena have characteristics we attribute to them because of the way the human brain i s designed to order and interpret the stimuli fed into i t . . . . 3 6 To Jean Piaget, structuralism i s the description of this general pattern, in the same way transformational grammar extends our knowledge of the common basis of a l l language's structures "studies of the brain w i l l find the mechanism (ejif behavior) but w i l l change nothing of the structure."-^ Attempts to uncover these abstractions, these meta-languages of order, have often rested on other than the conscious statements of members of a group. The language in which a l l cultures couch their public explanations i s neither necessarily complete or completely accurate. Presuming the mind imposes form upon external content, what i s needed i s an examination of the unconscious structure underlying individual groups? customs and behavior. As Levi-Strauss saidi If, as we believe to be the case, the unconscious activity of the mind consists i n imposing forms upon content, and i f these forms are fundamental-l y the same for a l l minds... i t i s necessary and sufficient to grasp the unconscious structure underlying each institution and each custom, i n order to obtain a principle of interpretation valid for other institutions and other customs, provided of course that analysis i s carred far enough.38 Nor are these blind suppositions. Based on developmental psychology and linguistic research, the structuralist argument expands the application of these principles to the realm of cultural organization so that, for example, "categorization", a functional necessity of thought, achieves a reduction i n the complexity of the human environment, a reduction in the *5 necessity of constant learning and the opportunity to relate classes of events. Structuralist researchers i n linguistics and the social sciences take such categorization as their area of primary interest. For both the social scientist and the psychologist, to categorize i s "to render descriminably different things equivalent, to group the objects and events and people around us into c l a s s e s . W e do this by accepting a culturally defined " c r i t i c a l attribute", a "descriminable feature used as a means of inferring the identity of some thing," to sort out and allow response to the world around us. Clair Jacobsen, one of Levi-Strauss* translators, provides a thumbnail description of structuralist thought! How does structural analysis proceed? The f i r s t step i s the definition of the constituent units of an institution t these are conceptually equivalent to the phonemes or morphemes of a language and, therefore, comparable cross-culturally. Once the various aspects of culture have been reduced to their structural elements, relationships of opposition and correlation and transforation among these elements can be defined. Similarities between institutions within the same society or among various societies can be explained, not i n terms of mechanical causality, but rather i n diale c t i c a l terms. Correspondences or isomorphisms should be sought... between systematized forms or models, which are abstracted on different levels and which can be compared either intro or cross culturally.^ 1 This suggests, among other things, that certain categories and patterns operative i n one society w i l l also be operative i n another. More importantly, for this study, i t suggests that categories operative at one level of culture or in one area of cultural organization w i l l be replicated in another. Like a symphony, c u l t u r e i s based on c e r t a i n themes which are d i s c e r n i b l e throughout the whole, and can be i d e n t i f i e d and examined i n the work's e n t i r e t y . T h i s r e l a t i o n of s c a l e , of p a r t to whole, i s explained by L e v i - S t r a u s s j I f a l l human a c t i v i t y i s simultaneously generated and c o n s t r a i n e d by the conscious a c t i v i t y of the mind which has only one s t r u c t u r e , then i t i s only l o g i c a l t o assume tha t the various more s p e c i a l i z e d 'micro' s t r u c t u r e s of which we may become conscious are i n f a c t v a r i o u s r e a l i z a t i o n s of the same fundamental p r i n c i p l e s . ^ 2 I t i s i n t h i s sense t h a t s t r u c t u r a l i s t s examine and attempt the e x p l i c a t i o n of an "order of orders", of the a b s t r a c t expression of i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s between l e v e l s and areas of c u l t u r e , and one b u i l t upon b a s i c c u l t u r a l iso-rythms which are or may be "outside or beneath consciousness and w i l l . " T h i s theory of r e p l i c a t i o n was f i r s t introduced i n t o geography by Denis Wood i n h i s study of urban o r g a n i z a t i o n and r e s i d e n t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of San C r i s t o b a l l a s Casas, M e x i c o . ^ R e p l i c a t i o n i s defined by him as " c e r t a i n formal s t r u c t u r e s or r e l a t i o n s h i p s (that) are maintained across l e v e l s of v a r y i n g s c a l e . " He quotes Evon Z. Vogt who, i n h i s study of l a t e Mayan Indians, wrotet The world of the Zinacantecos i s segmented co n c e p t u a l l y i n systematic ways t h a t are r e p l i c a t e d i n d i f f e r e n t domains of the Zinacanteco c u l t u r e . . . i t i s as i f the Zinacantecos have constructed a model f o r r i t u a l behavior and f o r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of the n a t u r a l and c u l t u r a l world which f u n c t i o n s l i k e a k i n d of computer t h a t p r i n t s out r u l e s f o r appropriate behavior a t each o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l e v e l of the s o c i e t y and f o r the appropriate c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g of phenomena i n the d i f f e r e n t domains of the c u l t u r e . ^ 17 In more general terms, a mountain, a f i e l d , a house or a human body are seen by members of this community to have a spatial-temporal symbolism following from a single category. It i s as i f in the pattern of a complex huipile or an elaborate fa.ia, a certain motif i s repeated and elaborated, sometimes in a different color and other times i n a different context, time and again throughout the whole of the work.^ STRUCTURALISMi SPACE AND TIME In the search for the elements of this structure, some investigators have distinguished between synchronic and diachronic aspects. Where the synchronic has often been taken to be the spatial, static aspect, the diachronic has been associated with the dynamic and causal aspects of culture. Intimately concerned with space and time, structuralist theory sees no necessary division between them, or any real division between the spatial and temporal elements. As Roman Jacobsen wrotei It would be a serious error to consider static and the synchronic as synonymous. The static cross-section i s a fiction? i t i s only a helpful scientific device, and not a particular mode of being. & Some confusion between structuralists and their c r i t i c s arises out of a misunderstanding over the relations between the binary opposites discussed by a l l structuralists. The either/or binome (yes-no, good-bad, we-they) i s i n structuralist theory the building block of human cognition, the irreconcil-able " b i t " or , ,kernel M, as the transformational grammarians 18 c a l l i t , of human thought. It i s this principle of structur-alism which has seemed least convincing to some c r i t i c s , closest to an a r t i c l e of faith in the definitions of the structuralist. The basic logical underpinning of binomic theory comes from traditional Greek logic and thought. Based in part on the law of the excluded middle, the either/or concept i s closely related to concepts of logical paradox. This problem i s considered in more detail i n Chapter II but, briefly, the similarity l i e s i n the limits of possibility growing out of equally true and conflicting statements pertaining to a single statement. The power of classical paradoxes arises from having only one alternative (true or false) by which the validit y of a statement set can be judged, and within that set having neither function adequately. In part, the power of the paradoxes to be considered l i e s i n the true-false, yes-no nature of binomic truth adjudged to be the single standard acceptable in classic Western thought. The existence of continual pairs of irreconcilable opposites on the one hand seems to f l y in the face of Bruner's research, which suggests the purpose of categorization i s to allow a reduction in the complexity of the environment, to bring order and unity to chaos. If binary opposites exist as paradoxes, and not as elements in isomorphic category, then i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how a reduction of order i s to be carried out. Instead of a set of isobars, we have as a graphic representation the analogy of sets of graph theory diagrams. I 19 On the other hand, logicians provide no necessity for binomes as the fundamental premise of order. It was Marcel du Champ who once said he saw an alternative to yes and no — "for instance I do not consider the question." Given these problems, I tentatively prefer not to consider these binomes as irreconcilable opposites, but as boundaries within a complete set. Good and bad thus become not unmeetable opposites, but the parameters and mutual definitions of a moral category. In this sense too, space and time are the basis of location, the parameters and necessary conditions for the mental sets of place and location, not removed from but grounded in experience. As Levi-Strauss wrotei The object of social structure studies i s to understand social relations with the aid of models. Now i t i s impossible to conceive of social relations outside a common framework. Space and time are the frames of reference we  use to situate social relations, either alone or together. These space and time dimensions i ... have no properties outside those which derive from the properties of the social _^ phenomena which furnish them (emphasis added). ' Although space and time have been used and discussed separately in this context, what i s true of one i s true of the other, and a l l Vocational definitions use both, because they are grounded i n experience which necessitates both. Speaking of time alone, J. T. Frasier sayst If Leibniz i s correct, as I believe he i s , and i f time refused to conform to the law of contradiction, then we must conclude that time i s not independent of experience.48 The relation between space and time, logical and experiencial, i s described i n a passage by Jean Piaget. 20 Although long, i t i s we l l worth quoting i n extensot Space... " i s the t o t a l i t y of the r e l a t i o n -ships between the bodies we perceive or imagine, or rather, the t o t a l i t y of the relationships we use to endow the bodies with structure. Space i s , i n fact, the l o g i c of the apparent world, or at least one of the two e s s e n t i a l aspects (the other being time) of the l o g i c of things. The process of f i t t i n g i t s parts into a meaningful whole ( c o l l i g a t i o n ) i s analogous to the c o l l i g a t i o n s and series that classes and introduce among concepts, and i t s metric system i s that of numbers and numerical operations. Because i t i s a form of l o g i c , space i s above a l l a system of concrete operations, inseparable from the experiences to which they give r i s e and which they transform.... Now, exactly the same thing happens with time,  the more so as time and space form an  inseparable whole... More pre c i s e l y , space s u f f i c e s f o r the co-ordination of simultaneous positions, but as soon as displacements are introduced, they bring i n t h e i r t r a i n d i s t i n c t and therefore successive s p a t i a l states whose co-ordination i s nothing more than time i t s e l f . Space i s a s t i l l of time, while time i s space i n motion — the two taken together  constitute the t o t a l i t y of the ordered characterizing objects and t h e i r d i splac ement s. **9 I f t h i s i s true, as the combined voices of philosophy, physics and anthropology suggest, then space and time are an inseparable whole. They are the parameters and definers, not the opposites s t r u c t u r a l i s t binomic theory seems to suggest. PHere" and "there" are the boundaries of a d e f i n i t i o n of place at an instant, or of unity i n an area of more than one. But s t r u c t u r a l i s t s themselves are not cl e a r on the manner i n which space and time are to be taken together. General s t r u c t u r a l i s t theory suggests these two are i n some way the poles of location, and can probably best be understood 21 as a principal binomic definition of location (space/time). If they are not binomes, then what i s the reason for taking a l l other definers of a type of situation (good/badf we/they) as irreconcilable opposites? And i f they are binomes, what does that mean, outside of locational paradox? The separation of space and time, and the problems which arise from i t , were a basis for Zeno's famous paradoxes of motion. The theoretical position of structuralism, which emphasizes the importance of space and time and their inter-dependence, i s unsatisfactory regarding this point. Although Gossen did not discuss this question explicitly, he seems to have accepted Piaget's position in his study of the oral traditions of the Chamula Indians in Chiapas, Mexico. The ambiguity of structuralist thinking on space and time has not prevented useful work from being done, although i t may have deprived some of that work of wider and more general application to culture theory. Gossen, for example, used oral tradition as the material with which he was to work and isolated locational variables — time and space — as phonemes of order i n his description of the informants* categories. He defends his use of these phonemes by asserting i The most useful metalanguage for dealing with isomorphic features of oral tradition i n relation to the rest of society i s provided by culture-specific concepts of space and time. These concepts have generality in that they may refer simultaneously to aspects of culture as diverse as ethnocentrisra and demographic patterns... they also provide re p l i c a b i l i t y , for people can talk substant-ively and consistently about concepts of space and time. 5° 22 Moreover, he argued furthen In nearly a l l societies, concepts of time and space provide the underpinnings for the way in which the moral universe i s supposed to behave. In a specific culture these fundamental axes — time and space — are shared with other culture-specific notions about order. 51 In great part this must stand as hypothesis. If i t i s true in nearly a l l societies, for example, what about the others? And i f these notions are shared with "other culture-specific notions", then i n what areas of culture w i l l we find them replicated? If this i s true for non-literate peoples, i s i t also true for literate societies? The works of Levi-Strauss, Piaget and others are peppered with " i f . . . then" constructions and " i f as we believe" qualifying phrases. HYPOTHESIS If these and other unanswered questions suggest the structuralist position remains in part an untested hypothesis, i t offers a f i t t i n g introduction to this thesis, and to any general concern for the cross-cultural and intra-societal comparison of space and time concepts. Thus, even as the adequacy of structuralist ideas in a modern geography of man remains to be shown, the analysis of spatial-temporal concepts in different cultural regions and at different scales of society seems only appropriate to a discipline whose exponents include the likes of J. K. Wright, Clarence Glacken, David Lowenthal and others who have stressed the cultural r e l a t i v i t y of spatial concepts and arrayments. Indeed, i t would seem too 23 that we w i l l not know which, i f any, of the structuralist arguments about space and time and category are correct u n t i l more research i s carried out not only i n psychology and anthropology, but also i n geography, where, spatiality looms large as a central concern and whose task, following Russell, i s to "distinguish one part of space-time from another..." This question — the appropriateness of structuralist ideas of space-time to an understanding of traditional Chinese concepts of space-time — serves as one, though not the sole, concern of this thesis. Even as structuralists assert universal validity, i t remains to be shown that what may be true in one society i s also and necessarily true in others. Indeed, most of their research has been carried out at the level of "primitive" or pre-literate peoples and one can only wonder about the applicability of structuralist principles in highly li t e r a t e , historic cases. If only for this reason, in 1976 my own attentions to the problem of space-time concepts and location turned to the case of China, whose liter a r y tradition, i f not the oldest, i s at least the most continuous of any culture s t i l l extant. By adopting a modified structuralist approach for the analysis of Chinese concepts of space and time, then I would seem to be approaching the known boundaries of applicability historically, and perhaps geographically. This thesis seeks to explore the hypothesis that by the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 219 A.D.) Chinese intellectuals adhered to a consistent set of space-time concepts, traces of which are revealed in and accessible to content analysis of major literary works of that period. It further seeks to examine the hypothesis that these concepts were c r i t i c a l to the continuity of that cultural tradition and can be used to describe more precisely various elements of Chinese culture through the Ming Dynasty ( 1 3 6 8 - 1 6 2 8 A.D.) than traditional histor i c a l techniques have so far allowed. To the extent that this thesis operates on the hypothesis that there was a consistent metalanguage of order in Chinese thought, and that general patterns of meaning can be best investigated through an examination of principles of space and time, i t subscribes to the structuralist principles discussed in this chapter. By applying the structuralist hypothesis to an h i s t o r i c a l study of a highly literate people i t seeks also to examine the limits of structuralism and substantiate or invalidate Jean-Paul Sartre's criticism that structuralism ignored (and may be inapplicable to) history. Historians, and especially Sinologists, have considered concepts of culture continuity, replication between various levels of cultural activity (especially in Confucian theory CO where this idea was c r i t i c a l ^ ), etc. But while historians have examined the concept of continuity, they have rarely attempted to define the basis f<3r a consistency i n culture over time, l i t t l e less attempted to define elements which can be used for h i s t o r i c a l cross cultural comparison. That has been the aim and hope of structuralism, and this thesis differs from most his t o r i c a l studies in suggesting space and time are 25 the c r i t i c a l roots of culture and, in this specific case, the Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n . By concerning i t s e l f with both definitions of space and time as well as the nature of location, distance, direction and place i n Chinese thought, the thesis i s ex p l i c i t l y geographic. It seeks to examine the nature and meaning of spatiality within a specific culture, and to use those general principles to seek a greater understanding of that culture's perception of place and definitions of location at varying times. In an attempt to discern the limits of this approach, i t does not confine i t s e l f to the study of one text ot one area of replication, tracing that text's commentary or that specific subject's transformation through varying periods. Rather i t examines, with less depth, a number of areas of activity at varying periods, seeking the parameters of this method of research rather than substantiation of i t s validity when applied to only one aspect of the total culture complex. The thesis, i n this manner, attempts only to provide directions for further and more complete research rather than a complete and f i n a l confirmation of i t s applicability. This "shotgun" approach was adopted with a f u l l awareness that i t provides room for criticism. But the newness of the approach seemed to argue for a broad and preliminary report as the more honest and more logical form for such a project to take. By concentrating on one section of one classical text in Chapter II, the Chuang-tzu, and one the board game wei-ch'i in subsequent chapters, i t i s hoped these areas of more penetrating analysis w i l l provide a check against such c r i t i c i s m . Chapter II seeks to examine concepts of space and time derived from several texts c r i t i c a l to Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y by the Han Dynasty. Beginning with a b r i e f discussion of the problems of i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y and a review of major sources i n English, i t concentrates on an examination of Chapter 33 of the Chuang-tzu, one of the c r i t i c a l Taoist texts i and a basic work studied f o r over 2000 years i n China. Chapter 33 was chosen i n part because of i t s long i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by Sinol o g i s t s l i k e Hu-Shih, Fang Yu-lan, and Joseph Needham as a c r i t i c a l landmark i n the his t o r y of Chinese l o g i c a l thought. By re-examining a well-known section of a c r i t i c a l text, the in e v i t a b l e problems of t r a n s l a t i o n might be minimized and a greater and more general perspective on the work i t s e l f could be provided. Chapter I I I takes the categories i d e n t i f i e d i n Chapter II and attempts to use them as descripters f o r varying Meets of Chinese culture. I t deals f i r s t with the measurement of distance i n postal codes, an exercise which provided a near cartographic picture of the " r e a l world" and the greatest scale of analysis i n an examination of the basics of l o c a t i o n and movement. I t then examines the landscape painting t r a d i t i o n i n T*ang (618-906 A.D.) and Sung (960-1279) China. Landscape painting provided a more abstract picture of place i n Chinese thought, and a laboratory f o r analysis l e s s pedestrian and le s s easy to discuss without recourse to secondary source works. The Chapter ends with an introduction to the importance of wei-ch'i and i t s u t i l i t y as an analog f o r Chinese behavior. This board game provides a t o t a l l y abstract l e v e l of analysis i n which the general categories of Chapter I I can be applied, and through i t s continuous play by Chinese from the Ch'in reign (221-207 B.C.) to the present, a s u r v i v a l through which the continuity of the categories of thought could be studied. Chapter IV provides a short description of the game f o r readers who may be unfamiliar with i t s ru l e s , allowing them to follow Chapter V's discussion of the game and i t s r e l a t i o n to the p r i n c i p l e s of space and time e a r l i e r elucidated. This sets the forum f o r a re-examination of the game i t s e l f and i t s u t i l i t y as a descriptor f o r Maoist revolutionary theory. Through a b r i e f discussion of the or i g i n s of Mao's wr i t i n g and the debt i t owes to Sun-tzu's Ping-fa ( m i l i t a r y t r e a t i s e on war), the thesis returns both to the realm of the h i s t o r i a n and the problem of continuity through Chinese h i s t o r y . 28 CHAPTER It NOTES AND REFERENCES ^•Bertrand Russell, The ABC of R e l a t i v i t y (Mentort New York, 1959). The question of the nature of geographic thought and i t s h i s t o r i c separation from h i s t o r y i s also discussed by Denis Wood, The Geometry of Ecstasy (North Carolina State University, School of Design, Raleigh, N.C.i 1977). For those interested i n the problem as an appendage to the h i s t o r y of science, there are few better texts that Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (Mentor Paperbacks, New Yorkt 1958). Shmuel Sarabursky's Physical Thought from the Presocratics to  The Quantum Ph y s i c i s t s (Pica Press* New Yorkt 1975) provides an invaluable source book of writings i n the Western t r a d i t i o n . J.C.C. Smart (ed.), Problems of Space and Time (Macmillan Co., New Yorkt 196*0 provides a l u c i d set of c r i t i c a l a r t i c l e s which bear d i r e c t l y on the problem. For an overview of the r e l a t i o n of some of these p r i n c i p l e s with the h i s t o r y of mathematics (and e s p e c i a l l y the problem of paradoxes), James R. Newman, The World of Mathematics (k volumes) (Simon and Schuster, New Yorkt 1956) i s an invaluable companion. Russell, i b i d . Simple l o c a t i o n i s the des c r i p t i o n of an event with reference only to i t s s p a t i a l co-ordinates, and the b e l i e f that adequately and completely describes a place's lo c a t i o n . The a l t e r n a t i v e acknowledges the necessity of defining a l l places with reference to both space and time. Most of the references above, and e s p e c i a l l y Smart and Newman, deal with the problem of l o c a t i o n en extenso. ^ Y i - f u Tuan, "Geography, Phenomenology and the Study of Human Nature", Canadian Geographer." Vol. 15» 1971» PP. 181-192. Marwyn Samuels, Science and Geographyt An E x i s t e n t i a l  Appraisal (University of Washington!1971 ) » Chapter 1. -*As quoted i n Samuels, i b i d . ^Wilbur Zelinsky, " P r e s i d e n t i a l Address", Annals of the  Association of American Geographers. Vol. 66, No. 1, 1975. 7 'Annette Buttimer, "The Dynamism of the Lifeworld", Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Vol. 66, No. 2, 1976, p. 277. D.R. Stoddard, "Geography and the E c o l o g i c a l Approach! The Ecosystem as a Geographic P r i n c i p l e and Method". Also see F.K. Schaefer, "Exceptionalism i n Geography! A Methodological Examination", Annals of the Association of  American Geographers, pp. 226-249. ^ H i s t o r i c a l geographers, l i k e t h e i r peers i n other areas of geography, have also held to a des c r i p t i o n of the d i s c i p l i n e 29 based on "simple location". Attempting to bridge the gap between history sind geography, they have remained content with the traditional definitions provided by both, and have rarely examined the philosophic roots of the discipline. In this they, like most geographers, have remained consistent with definitions which have, u n t i l recently, been unchallenged, assumptions presumed on the basis of Western history. See Denis Wood, "The Cartography of Reality" (presented to the National Council for Geographic Education, Washington, D.C.i 1973). 1 0Gunnar Olsson, "The Dialectics of Spatial Analysis", Antipode. Vol. 6, No. 3» December 1974, p. 53. 1 101sson, i b i d . In the late 1950*s and earlyll96o's some geographers attempted to define an area of geographic study which would take the parameters of modem physics into consideration. Gunnar Olsson i s , in works like Distance and  Human Interaction, an example of this line of work and typifies the problems encountered. In effect, he never rejected traditional definitions of space, attempting instead to jury r i g time as another variable. The quote included i n the text was used by Olsson to explain his later dissatisfaction with this research direction, considered by most geographers to be one of bankrupt logical positivism. The failure of logical positivism i n human geography rests precisely on this adherence to static form and simple location as typified by Olsson i n the 1960's. One critique of the position can be found i n Denis Wood's I Don't Want To But I Wi l l (Clark University Cartographic Laboratory, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.t 1973)» PP. 359-369. Historical geographers seem to be in the same trap which Wood describes in relation to the work of James M. Blaut. 12 David Harvey, Explanation in Geography (St. Martin's Press, New Yorki 1969)* p. 13. Also of interest i s David Harvey, Social Justice i n the City (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md.» 1974). 13 ^This argument does not invalidate or make less important the work of men like Sauer. It does suggest, I think, limits to the approach taken by men following his lead, and reasons why they did not pursue other avenues of research concerning individual perception and psychogeographic learning, ik "The 'time geography' model developed by Hagerstrand provides a promising perspective for investigating the dynamism of everyday environment. Each movement, event, and activity i n a person's daily behaviour can be represented in a four-dimensional gridi space i s represented on a horizontal two-dimensional plane, and time on a vertical one." Quoted from "The Domain of Human Geography", New Directions i n Geography. R. Chorley (ed.) (Cambridge University Press, New 30 Yorki 1974), pp. 67-68. Also see Buttimer, op. c i t . Time geography i s a misnomer justified by the belief geography "stands for" space so time geography means "space and time". Alan Pread. personal communication, 3/77. Hagerstrand has sparked a cult following, of which Pread i s an avowed member. 1^Edward L. Ulman, "Space and or Time" (presented Western Regional Science Association, San Diego, Cal . t 1973). 16 Denis Wood, "The Cartography of Reality" (presented National Council for Geographic Education, Washington, D.C.t 1973). Elegant and simple, Wood's paper i s a superb statement on the nature of location and perception. It i s scheduled to be published in 1979 i s an as yet untitled book edited by Marwyn Samuels and David Ley, both at the University of British Columbia. Samuels, personal communication. 4/77. 17 fArthur H. Robinson and Randall Sale, Elements of  Cartography (John Whiley and Son, Inc., New Yorki 1949). 18 In Myth and Cosmost Readings i n Mythology and Symbolism. John Middleton (ed.) (Natural History Press, Garden City, N.J . i 1967), P. 334. ^David F. Pocock, "The Anthropology of Time Reckoning", in John Middleton (ed.), Myth;arid.Cosmos» Readings i n Mythology and Symbolism (Natural History Press, Garden City, NT3\1 1967). P. 7. 20 See for example Claud Levi-Strauss, Structural  Anthropology, Claire Jacobsen and Brooke Grundfest, trans. (Basic Bookst New York, 1963). This i s but one of Levi-Strauss* works, and the best summary of general structuralist principles. For a general overview of the concepts of structuralism, and of Levi-Strauss* work, see The Anthropologist  as Hero. E. Nelson and Tanya Hayes (eds.) (MIT Press« Cambridge, Mass.i 1970). Special attention should probably be paid to Sanche de Gramont's "There Are No Superior Societies" and H. Stuart Hughes, "Structure and Society", both in that volume. 21 "Concepts of Time Among the Tiv of Nigeria" in Myth and  CosmosI Readings i n Mythology and Symbolism. John Middleton (ed.) (Natural History Press, Garden City, N.J . i 1967)» p. 326. 22 James LittleJohn, "The Terane House", in John Middleton (ed.), Myth and Cosmost Readings i n Mythology and Symbolism (Natural History Press, Garden City, N.J.J 1967), p. 333. 2^Compare this with CD. Broad's discussion of location in "Ostensible Temporality" i n Problems of Space and Time. J.C.C. Smart (ed.), (Macmillan Co., New York* 1964), pp. 321-338. 31 2k Marcea Eliade, Cosmos and History (Harper and Row, New Yorkt 1952*). 2-*Gary Gossen, Chamula. Children of the Sun (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.t 197**-). This book both summarizes the sketch map and a e r i a l photographic i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n studies he did as a Master's candidate and the contextual analysis of o r a l myth which makes up the body of t h i s book and was the basis f o r h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . 26 Evon Z. Vogt, Zinacantan (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.t 1969). This book provides one of the most intensive and extensive attempts to plumb the depths of any community that I know of. 27 'Gossen, op. c i t . , p. 28. 2 8Gossen, i b i d . 2^By "psychogeographic" I mean the study of man's in d i v i d u a l perception of the environment, and the way he learns i t . The term was f i r s t coined, to my knowledge, by James M. Blaut at Clark University i n the 1960's, and has become a general term describing areas of interface between psychology and geography. -^Gossen, op. c i t . , p. x i . Also see Alfonso O r t i z , Tewe  Worldt Space. Time. Being and Becoming i n a Pueblo Society (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, I l l . t 1969). Ortix i s that rarest of researchers, a man who l e f t h i s society and l a t e r returned to examine i t . Primarily concerned with the concept of moiety, he writes i n h i s notest M I n Tewe mythology, and i n a l l thinking about distance events, there i s the tendency... of reducing time and space into minimally meaningful u n i t s . " 31 Ta l c o t t Parsons as quoted i n Gossen, op. c i t . , p. x. This theory i s not unique to Gossen but i s c r u c i a l to s t r u c t u r a l i s t theory, which i s discussed i n the next section of t h i s chapter. ^ 2 E . Nelson and Tanya Hayes (eds.), The Anthropologist As  Hero (MIT Press* Cambridge, Mass.t 19707T •^Varda Langholz Leymore, Hidden Myth (Basic Books, New Yorkt 1976), p. 16. Her f i r s t chapter provides an excellent review of and introduction to the ideas of structuralism, as well as an enormously successful attempt i n l a t e r chapters to standardize and apply s t r u c t u r a l techniques i n a modern concept. 34 ^ A. Michotte, "A Propos de le Permanence Phenomenalet Faits et Theories", in Acta Psychologjque. No. 7, p. 298. Quoted in Jerome S. Bruner, J.J. Goodnow, and George A. Austine, A Study of Thinking (John Whiley and Son, Inc., New Yorki 1964), p. 3. -^Levi-Strauss, op. c i t . , p. 333. •^Edraond Leach, Levi-Strauss (Viking Press, New Yorkt 1970), p. 36-37. •^Jean Piaget, New York Times October 19# 1972, as quoted in David Stea and Roger Downs, Maps i n Mindst Reflections on  Cognitive Mapping (Harper and Row, New Yorkt 1975). -^Levi-Strauss, op. c i t . , p. 24-. •^Jerome S. Bruner, J.J. Goodnow and George A. Austine, A Study of Thinking (John Whiley and Son, Inc.i New Yorkt 1964), p. 3. ^ G I b i d , Chapter 1. The importance of these phrases l i e s in their a b i l i t y to define ex p l i c i t l y and describe the parameters of the structuralist argument, which has attempted to allay i t s e l f with the more rigorous investigative techniques of "modern science", in comparison to the interpret-ive investigations of some social scientists. 41 Clair Jacobsen i n Levi-Strauss, op. c i t . , pp. 279-280. ^2Leymore, op. c i t . , p. 11. ^Denis Wood, Fleeting Glimpses (Clark University, 1971, Master's thesis), pp. 44-52. 44 Evon Z. Vogt, op. c i t . , p. 380-391. ^ T h i s theory was put forward i n an unreleased study of Chiapan costume design by Denis Wood. The paper, Patterns, has been privately circulated and i s available from i t s author. ^Roman Jacobsen, "Principles de Phonologie Historic", Travoux de Circle Linguistiaue de Prague II. 1929* P. 333-334, translated in Levi-Strauss, op. c i t . 47 'Levi-Strauss, i b i d . 48 J. Y. Frasier, Of Time. Passion and Knowledge (G, Brasiller Co., New Yorkt 1975). p. 45. ^9Jean Piaget, The Child's Concept of Time (Ballantine Books, New Yorkt 1971), pp. 1-2. 33 J UGossen, op. c i t . , p. x i , x i i . 5 1 I b i d . The very idea of "Confucian China" suggests an interlocking and ordered culture, which i s noted i n Chapter II. For a clearer picture of the historical perspective, J.K. Fairbank, Chinese Thought and Institutions (university of Chicago Press, Chicago, 111. i 1957) or A.F. Wright, Confucian  and Chinese Ci v i l i z a t i o n (Atheneum, New Yorkt 1964) provide excellent backgrounds. CHAPTER II Space and Time i n Chinese Thought A l l the concepts we use to describe nature are l i m i t e d , they are not features of r e a l i t y , as we tend to believe, but creations of the mindi parts of the maf>, not of the t e r r i t o r y . F r i t j o f Capra 35 INTRODUCTION There are a number of problems immediately raised i n any attempt to describe and discuss Chinese categories of space and time. They range from philosophical to methodological, from s p e c i f i c objections on the part of Sino l o g i s t s to general problems of i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y . These are ongoing debates, and i f t h i s thesis touches upon them, i t cannot hope to provide any immediate resolution to a l l — or perhaps any — of them. Before I begin to describe the categories of space and time i n t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese thought, i t may be valuable to sketch f i r s t a few of the problems the topic r a i s e s , and to o f f e r some tentative and l i m i t e d answers. On one hand, Leon Hurvitz* has suggested the topic (attitudes to space and time) i s inappropriate when applied to the Chinese case. Neither Taoist nor Confucian scholars concerned themselves with the s p e c i f i c , separate categories we i d e n t i f y with such ease today, and any attempt to impose them upon Chinese his t o r y w i l l create — at best — a d i s t o r t i o n , he argues. In e f f e c t , he suggests because the topic may have been meaningless to a T'ang or Han gentleman, we who are interested i n t h e i r world must banish such enquiries at the outset. Edward Schaffer has said the idea i s i n t e r e s t i n g , but so vast and complex as to preclude any reasonable discussion by those who have not spent years t r a n s l a t i n g , e d i t i n g and thinking about the works of Chinese scholars. For him the problem seems to be one of l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , or at l e a s t one susceptible only to li t e r a r y analysis. If the topic i s peripheral to Hurvitz, i t i s interesting to Schaffer. But both argue for an approach which necessitates countless translations and textual elucidations, very much in the Sinological tradition. Neither Hurvitz nor Schaffer argue the Chinese have been without definitions of space and time. The evidence i s clearly to the contrary. Rather, both seem to suggest an examination of these questions in any modern sense represents an imposition of 20th Century rationalism on a people whose cognitive orientation did not necessarily coincide with our current predilictions. There are at least two replies to such objections. The structuralist response i s simply that because a people do not state clearly and e x p l i c i t l y certain categories are c r i t i c a l to their social and cognitive orientation does not mean these orders have no value to the people. An earlier quotation from Levi-Strauss suggested just the opposite, and the work of Gossen, Vogt and others has demonstrated that cultural principles readily identified by the researcher may be, in their underlying meaning, hidden from the informant.-^ It i s not necessary nor probable that the individuals whose myths and texts we examine should state e x p l i c i t l y the import-ance of a set of abstract categories buried i n them. These are largely unconscious orderings, metalanguages of order of which the individual i s largely unaware. In the same way, we, looking at a skyscraper, can infer an infrastructure without 37 having seen the building as the girders were f i r s t set, so the structuralist can attempt to investigate the cognitive order of a culture without having those individuals of the culture stating ex p l i c i t l y ! "This Is Our Underlying Principle." By choosing to examine questions of spatio-temporal discrimination, I am focusing on an area of cultural definition identified by anthropologists as c r i t i c a l to a l l cultures. By focusing on this area and advocating, with the structural anthropologists, i t s importance in culture theory, I agree with F r i t j o f Capra's assessment that! The concepts of space and time are so basic for the description of natural phenomena that their modification entails a modification of the whole framework that we use to describe nature.4 The thesis merely applies this view to the subject of Chinese thought. Far from being an imposition, this analysis i s an elucidation of primary concepts, and can be seen as the handmaiden to a more traditional philologic research out of which i t grows. To borrow an analogy from A. N. Whitehead, this approach merely seeks algebraic generality, the general pattern of specific functions. If this answers the reservations of Hurvitz, i t also i s directed towards Schaffer's objections, which can be restated! what i s the rationale for assuming these principles have a general currency throughout Chinese culture, through the range of a c t i v i t i e s and ideas and problems with which any generation must deal? Here the principle of replication i s c r i t i c a l , for i t suggests there are basic patterns of culture which operate at a l l levels of social organization. Replication may be seen, for example, when the social organization of the family i s , as was the case in China, intimately related to a theoretical microcosm of the social organization as a whole. This type of relation between part and whole has been observed and discussed both in Chapter I and by those anthropologists whose works were identified in that chapter. By examining texts i n general use by the Han Dynasty and applying the principles observed in them to later events, I am suggesting there may be an as yet unacknowledged constancy in the culture which has held over time. By so doing I am not intimating the once prevalent view that the Chinese were stagnant, a backwater of culture and advancement. Rather I do suggest some basic principles c r i t i c a l to the Chinese culture view may have remained fundamentally unchanged over a large part of their culture history. Such a suggestion seems in accord with the known importance of histor i c a l antecedents i n Chinese intellectual traditions through to the present. Even the most modem of Chinese thinkers make constant reference to traditional sources and ideas. This hypothesis does not preclude divergent views on the part of individuals during and through that period. It does suggest that, i f these divergent views were accepted as basic truths — and the cultural manifestations following that change were founded on different principles — i t may have led to a totally different set of experiences. In the Western t r a d i t i o n , f o r example, Heraclitus was making mystical statements about space and time at the same time contemporaries were r e j e c t i n g the views of proto-r e l a t i v i t y f o r c o n s t a n c y . I f h i s views had been accepted at the time of t h e i r issue, or i n the 12th Century, or the 17th, then ours would be a very d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r y today. HISTORY OF SCIENCE Any study of Chinese concepts of space and time must draw upon the work of h i s t o r i a n s of science. In r e l a t i o n to China, there have been two major paths followed by most Western researchers i One takes as i t s subject matter a l l systematic abstract thought about nature (while the) second takes as s c i e n t i f i c any idea, discovery or method that also plays a role i n modern science. 6 In the f i r s t , "abstract thought" may mean not only defining concepts on a more general plane than that of concrete experience, but also seeking objective d r i v i n g forces of change within nature i t s e l f rather than looking f o r explanations i n terms of w i l l or emotion. The key phrase i n t h i s f i r s t d i r e c t i o n i s "systematic abstract thought", which I take to mean general and consistent theories b u i l t upon s p e c i f i c investigations. This d e f i n i t i o n , with which I am i n fundamental accord, i s obviously conducive to and consistent with a s t r u c t u r a l i s t framework which seeks to avoid modern bias i n i t s examination of general "abstract" patterns. Joseph Needham has been c r i t i c i z e d by A. K. Wright'for h i s adherence to what Wright sees as the presumption of "the development of science as a universal progress to a single goal". A common defect i n the hi s t o r y of science, Wright argues, t h i s i s compounded i n Needham*s work by a b e l i e f that the single goal i s Marxist i n character. Needham i s an avowed Marxist, but whether h i s p o l i t i c a l view has influenced h i s research on Chinese science remains to be shown conclusively. Moreover, the charge that Needham subscribes to the idea of u n i d i r e c t i o n a l progress toward Western science seems unjust. In h i s voluminous Science and  C i v i l i z a t i o n i n China. Needham seems to be more than w i l l i n g to take any systematic thought about nature put forward and to examine i t i n i t s own r i g h t . Indeed, from i t s inception h i s research has been a reaction to that view which suggested Western modernity as the only correct standard. Needham has argued that there have been at l e a s t two main dir e c t i o n s man o can take i n h i s research and development. One i s exemplified by the Chinese and by what Needham sees as a type of proto-r e l a t i v i t y i n t h e i r emphasis on change. The other i s that t r a d i t i o n begun i n earnest by the Greeks and followed down through the age of exploration to the upheavals of the 20th Century i n the West. What i s more important, Needham seems to argue i m p l i c i t l y , through h i s constant comparisons among various t r a d i t i o n s , f o r a consistent set of problems common to d i f f e r e n t groups. The techniques and questions of the hi s t o r i a n s of science 41 are important to the project at hand because i t relies in part on the work of men like Needham. Its approach i s different from his in that this project focuses on a lesser scale of abstraction. In this I more closely follow the traditions of social science in an attempt to isolate a central cachete  specifique t and then use i t as the basic pattern of discourse. EXPLORATIONS A number of others have examined Chinese concepts of space or time, though usually as a side issue in their discussion of other, and to them, more important elements of thought. Needham, for example, paid attention to concepts of space and time, i f only in so far as they were central to his belief that traditional Chinese science was based on a type of proto-r e l a t i v i t y principle. In his study of urban organization, Paul Wheatley was concerned with space and directionality in Q the orientation of traditional urban areas. Richard Wilhelm, C. G. Jung and others have, i n their enthusiasm for texts like the I Ching. seen the Chinese concept of time as c r i t i c a l , glorying in i t as a "concrete continuum which contains qualities of basic conditions manifesting themselves simultaneously."* - 0 But i n each case either space or time has been examined as a subset of other problems rather than as the crucial part of a general system of order. I am suggesting the opposite, that the nature of that general order must be examined within the context of space-time concepts which served as the central underpinning of the Chinese world view. There i s l i t t l e doubt that i n discussing Chinese thought we are dealing with an elaborate system of observation, a science by almost any general definition. To be sure, H. G. Creel has argued that by virtue of the lack of experimental epistemologies, the name "science M ought not be employed to describe Chinese thought. The long history of astronomy and physical science opens his jnajor premise to question. And too, he noted "... there was developed a vast and intricate system for the analysis and control of 11 phenomena." Moreover, as Needham pointed out in the case of the Mohistsi They sketched out what amounts to a complete theory of scie n t i f i c method. They treated of sensation and perception, of causality and classification, of agreement and difference, of the relations of parts and 12 whole. They recognized the social elements. In short, Chinese thinkers were from an early point concerned with the careful documentation and examination of their world, and with the consideration of principles on which that examination was ordered. A l l of this suggests that, i f not synonymous with the posi t i v i s t science of the 20th Century, Chinese "science" was nonetheless a traditional and recognizable variant. THE PROBLEM OF TEXT This discussion leads to the general problem of trans-lation and text. Much of the material to be discussed here comes from texts common in China from the Han Dynasty at least 43 through the Ch'ing. This chapter, for example, deals principally with a selection from the Chuang tzu, a Third Century B.C. text whose study was a necessity for a l l those who wished to pass the imperial examinations. A later chapter makes constant reference to the Fourth Century B.C. Tao Te  Ching. the Fourth Century B.C. Mo Ching and the Fif t h Century B.C. Bing-Fa. one of the most important military texts in the Chinese tradition. In a l l h istorical research, but especially i n research concerning China, traditional Japan and India, there i s a problem with the modern interpretation of old words. The question i s , simply, presuming a basic a b i l i t y to understand the words, how can they best be conveyed into modem English? The problem i s not unique to historical work. Indeed, i t i s a fact of l i f e for a l l modern cross-cultural research carried out by individuals i n areas where a language other than their mother tongue i s the medium for common discourse. The ideographic nature of Chinese accentuates the problem i n this instance. Later commentaries attempting to elucidate an original author's meaning, reference dictionaries and commentaries by scholars whose professional lives have been spent in translation obviously help. But i t i s necessary to remember we are at a l l times dealing with reconstructions and approximations. Given these ambiguities, I have used whenever possible the Chinese characters and texts themselves, including in brackets or appendices the original text for the reader's convenience. In other places I have relied on translations. In those instances where t r a n s l a t i o n s have been used, I have attempted to use s e v e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n s simultaneously, checking v a r i o u s authors l i k e Hu Shih, Needham and Fung Yu-lan, p l a y i n g one a g a i n s t the other. I n t h i s way i t i s hoped the i n a c c u r a c i e s of one w i l l be spotted through the unanimity of the others. In the d e s c r i p t i o n of Chinese c a t e g o r i e s of space and time, I have f o l l o w e d Needham*s d i s c u s s i o n c l o s e l y , c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the d e f i n i t i o n s of the Mo Ching and Chapter 33 of the Chuang- tzu.13 By d e a l i n g w i t h these primary t e x t s , innumerable t r a n s l a t i o n s and commentaries were made a v a i l a b l e f o r c r o s s -reference. By l i m i t i n g the problem to these t e x t s , the t o p i c was narrowed and made e a s i e r to handle than i f I were to attempt a l i t e r a r y a n a l y s i s of poems and l a r g e s e c t i o n s of other, l e s s e r known T a o i s t and Confucian t e x t s . A f u t u r e and more comprehensive e f f o r t d e a l i n g w i t h the t o p i c o u t l i n e d i n t h i s t h e s i s would r e q u i r e such a comprehensive e f f o r t . But f o r t h i s f i r s t statement of the problem, the m a t e r i a l s e l e c t e d seems an appropriate beginning. SPACE AND TIMEi CATEGORIES Space and time, as defined i n the Mo Ching, were each considered s e p a r a t e l y , but despite t h i s they were b e l i e v e d to be equal and necessary p a r t s of l o c a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n . Separate, they were equal, one o f t e n c l a r i f y i n g d e f i n i t i o n s of the other. Place ( s o / / ) and time ( s h i h 8$ ) were s p e c i f i c , l i m i t e d p a r t s of event p o i n t s w i t h i n the l a r g e r c a t e g o r i e s of space (yu '-J7 ) and d u r a t i o n (cho X. ) Space, the general category of more s p e c i f i c place, includes a l l d i f f e r e n t places ( i suo l^fjj ) north, south, east and west. I t i s thus categorical, and the more abstract. The a r t i c l e .jyan ( ^ f 5 was used to s i g n i f y s p e c i f i c and small but not necessarily named locations. I t i s defined i n the Mo Ching; as a place i n space, what i s inserted between l i n e s and does not reach the sides (pang ) of the space. This word .jyan i s a combination of two characters meaning "gate" ( m e n ^ ) and "sun" (r 0 ). Together they suggest a crack i n a door l e t t i n g i n l i g h t , or as the Mo Ching explains i n Chapter 62, i t i s the space between the point between the door and doorjam. Duration (chow ^ ) i s , according to the same text, i n f i n i t e l y d i v i s i b l e ! former times, $he present time, the morning and the evening are combined together to form duration. Han lexographers described the pictograph as representing a man ( r e n ^ . ) stretching. The intimate r e l a t i o n between space and time i s made e x p l i c i t i s Chapter 13 and 33 of the Mo Ching. This section makes cl e a r a b e l i e f that p a r t i c u l a r locations i n the general category were constantly s h i f t i n g over long periods, much i n the same sense we see time as passing from one moment to another. The relevant passages following are from Hu Shih's t r a n s l a t i o n ! C. The boundaries ( 5$c. ) of space ( ^  ) ( i . e . the s p a t i a l universe) are constantly s h i f t i n g . C S . There i s the south and the north i n the morning, and again i n the evening. Space, 46 however has long changed i t s place. C. Spatial positions are makes for that which i s already spast. The reason i s given under 'reality*. CS. Knowing that 'this* i s no longer 'this* and 'this* i s no longer 'here*, we s t i l l c a l l i t south and north. That i s , what i s already past i s regarded as i f i t were s t i l l present. We called i t south and therefore we continue to c a l l i t south now.15 The capital letter "G" i n the above designates the primary proposition, and "CS." designates i t s explanation i n the original text. These categorical distinctions included both i n the propositions and their explanations seem to be surprisingly in accord with modern thought. J. N. Findlay, for example, writest In a l l those (modern) arguments (on the recent 'now*) we are being persuaded to apply linguistic principles which are established in the case of happenings of f a i r l y long duration to happenings of very short duration (emphasis mine).1" That i s , anomalies in discussion of time often revolve for us around the tendency for English language speakers to use the word "time" as category, when what i s meant i s a period of specific and bounded duration. The same i s true when discussing space. As Ernest Mach notedi As the outcome of the labors of Lobatchevski, Bolyai, Gauss and Reiman, the view has gradually obtained currency that that which we c a l l space i s a particular, actual case of a more general conceivable case (i.e. category)....17 The relation of general to specific suggested by the immediately preceding quotes seems to be a deeply-ingrained 47 facet of traditional Chinese thought. Like the modern structuralists, the Chinese seem to have a concept of replication, of the relation between organizing patterns active in one aspect of society being important to other a c t i v i t i e s . This seems as true for Confucian as for Taoist theory. As the Taoist had i t , a truly enlightened man may be famous at one thing, but the knowledge garnered there would make him a master of a l l things. In the Chuang-tzu. for example, the Prince of Hui's cook explains the Tao as simpli-city, and demonstrates through this by cutting up an animal. His i s merely the application of the principle of Tao, found equally important in the story of the stone cutter who, asked to remove a blemish from a man's nose, did so with his normal tools, not even touching the patient. For the Confucian, the hierarchy was also explicit, with the relation between heaven and man one of continuous steps 18 of successive replication. Heaven's order was there determined by the government, which rested on the "correct" home, whose foundation was healthy individuals, each with strong souls, which meant virtuous ideas, and down to the level of healthy bodies to house those souls. The general category and i t s relation i s also seen i n the word yu-chou (^"g?" ), translated by a number of scholars as "universe". The individual characters mean "space" and "duration", or infinitude. Space here i s endless, and can be divided endlessly, as time can be. Combined, the binome . presents location (space and time) in the universe as a number of s e t s of v a r i a b l e d i r e c t i o n a l i t y (names f o r t h a t which i s past, etc.) Mote suggests the binome i m p l i e s roof and r i d g e p o l e together, both d e s c r i b i n g "boundaries of a known k i n d of i n enclosed p l a c e . " 7 This u n i v e r s e , l i k e the o r i g i n s of the concept of space and time i n China, may i t s e l f d e r i v e from an e a r l i e r Turko-Tartar steppe conception of the universe as 20 s h e l t e r , as the sky p r o t e c t i n g the e a r t h and l i f e on e a r t h . Thus t h e i r s h e l t e r was seen as a microcosm of the world, y u r t c e i l i n g r e p r e s e n t i n g the heaven, r i d g e p o l e s r e p l i c a t i n g the support of the world. I f the universe could be seen, on a t l e a s t one l e v e l , as the amalgam of space and time, n e i t h e r r e a l l y stood alone, although each could i n some p a r t be s e p a r a t e l y d e f i n e d . The word l i (-^lE ) i m p l i e s d i s t a n c e , but depending on context can mean distance i n space from subject or distance i n time, or both. Chang ( ) l i k e w i s e i m p l i e s long and l a s t i n g a t the same time. Thus both space and time were independent v a r i a b l e s w i t h phenomena as t h e i r u n i f y i n g f u n c t i o n — c o n s t a n t l y s h i f t i n g w i t h p o s i t i o n or names f o r what was a l r e a d y past ( d i s t a n t ) . As the Mo Ching s a y s i When an object i s moving i n space, we cannot say whether i t i s coming nearer or going f u r t h e r away ... t a l k i n g about space one cannot have i n mind one s p e c i a l d i s t r i c t . I t i s merely t h a t the f i r s t step i s nearer and h i s l a t e r steps of d u r a t i o n ( i . e . one s e l e c t s a c e r t a i n p o i n t i n time or space as the beginning and then reckons from i t ) . 2 * What i s of particular interest here i s the importance of space and time for orientation, or geographic location. The quotation was used by Needham as an example of what he c a l l s the Chinese concept of r e l a t i v i t y (in a "less than modern sense") and i t s centrality to Chinese cosmology. The same idea i s repeated in another section of the Mo Ching» The distances l e f t behind by a moving body, an observer, constitute space. The changes of position of an observed moving body, such as the sun or the moon, awaken the concept of time.23 In other words, there i s no fixed time, no necessary directionality for space and time. Concepts of near and far are relative to a set of actions within a perceived context. 2k As Hu Shih suggests in a different context, there i s only one time and one space, continuous, i n f i n i t e l y divisible and constantly changing. It i s because of this arbitrary nature of location that Ssu-ma Piao wrote in his Third Century A.D. commentary that the "world has no compass points, therefore wherever we may happen to be i s the center." By suggesting compass users live in a world without compass points, Ssu-ma Piao suggests the a r t i f i c i a l i t y of nature and the limits of fixed direction. This does not preclude the use of the compass, which the Chinese invented, but does suggest the essentially arbitrary basis of our concepts of place, i n time and space. 50 INTERACTION AND CHANGE Some of the logical ramifications of these definitions w i l l be discussed i n the next section dealing with the nature of paradoxes in Chinese thought. At f i r s t reading, however, i t would seem evident that a framework of constantly shifting time and space must give rise to problems which, i f they are to be resolved, should have some greater unifying principle. That principle has to do with the Chinese conception of change. Richard Wilhelm suggests change i s of pre-eminent concern of the Chinese understanding of the cosmos. That i s , change i s an observable phenomenon f i l l i n g the function of unit — of and by time — with content. Carl Jung states this clearly in his commentary on Wilhelm*s translation of the I Ching, noting that what i s of interest i s "the configuration of chance events at a moment of observation. Within this cosmology, change would appear to be king." 2-' Wilhelm*s idea i s not dissimilar to Nilsson*s discussion of the punknell in Nuer thought discussed here i n Chapter I. And the idea of change as an observable phenomenon i s not very different from modern concepts of data and trace suggesting that we know only what i s past, that we reason on the basis of inference and the remains of completed events. Within the Chinese cosmology, the universe i s governed by seen as unifying and universal principles of organization operative in a l l areas and at a l l levels of the universe. It is this concept of inherent and observed order which makes ) and fired by chi ( j ^ ). L i refers to what was possible and necessitates the complementarity of opposites, the co-existence and unity of the tao ( ) with the permutations of change. L i orders the continual relations between polar principles yin ( ) and yang (Pl%> ), which are at once positive and negative, light and dark, etc. Yin and yang pervade the category of space because "despite vast distances (they) complement and communicate with each 2 6 other", and by definition they need no intermediary. Chi refers to the "stuff", the "breath" of the universe, i t s basic energy.2'' Virtually untranslatable, i t i s a complex of ideas encapsulated in one word which has been abused by many who, no like F r i t j o f Capra , wax rhapsodic over what they see as resemblance between the ideas suggested by chi and the energy f i e l d of modern physics. Thus l i i s described by the Chinese as the order, the pattern of the universe in which the opposites yin and yang provide a constant set of defining opposites. If l i provides an inherent logic and order, then the tao i s a more individual program, the basic path and way of i t s implementation on the earth. Where Plato saw a universe of constant form and principle buttressing the Greek world of imperfection and impermanence, the Chinese saw a world of more general constancy in a universe of change. Plato assumed the total l y real must be totally knowable, unlike the Chinese for whom a general pattern or principle might be knowledge, but only i n a universe of constant change. The l i and tao were buttresses against chaos, ordering principles for events set in a cosmos 52 of change. The l o g i c a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s of t h i s take us t o the paradoxes, where these general p r i n c i p l e s are seen a t work. Paradoxes stand f i r s t as important statements of l o g i c , and cl u e s towards the reasoning system which formed the b a s i s of the c u l t u r e i n que s t i o n . I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t paradoxes i n the West have e x c i t e d such study and debate. They are c l o s e l y a l l i e d to the mathematic systems a t use during any one time. Important as l o g i c , they are o f t e n used to d i s c u s s p r i n c i p l e s of l o c a t i o n and motion, the problem of the i n f i n i t e and the i n f i n i t e s i m a l . Por our purposes, the c l a s s of paradoxes which can be seen to d i s c u s s l o c a t i o n , space and time would be most c r u c i a l . Thus these paradoxes from the Chuang t z u are e s p e c i a l l y a p p ropriate i n t h a t they can be seen to r a i s e e x p l i c i t l y the i s s u e of space-time and l o c a t i o n . That i s to say, they are r e d u c i b l e to questions and statements concerning l o c a t i o n . PARADOX To examine more c l o s e l y Chinese concepts of space and time, and t h e i r r a m i f i c a t i o n s , I have chosen a s e c t i o n of the Chuang t z u , Chapter 33» f o r d e t a i l e d examination. Commonly known as the paradoxes, t h i s s e c t i o n contains a s e r i e s of statements, some of which f a l l w i t h i n the Western d e f i n i t i o n of a paradox. In Chapter I , the question of binome and i t s p o s i t i o n i n s t r u c t u r a l i s m was posed. In the West, paradoxes s e a l opposites w i t h mutual i r r e c o n c i l i b i l i t y and i t was hoped, when the research on this section began, an examination of Chinese paradoxes would shed some light on the problem of binomes as they may affect Chinese thought. In the West, paradoxes reveal general rules of category and l o g i c . 2 ^ The introduction of paradoxes into a system of thought furthermore often indicates a period of "intense intellectual activity with very different ideas and systems in competition with each other." Defined by Rosemary Colie as a s e l f - c r i t i c a l tooli ... particular paradoxes, especially logical and mathematical paradoxes, are often •fixed* into adamantine hardness, because they mark a regular edge to progressive thinking.30 More simply, i n the Western tradition paradoxes have been a thorn in the side of those who found their logical irregularity discomforting. Western logicians, for example, butted against Zeno of Eliade's legacy for almost two thousand years, before subsuming this criticism of classical Greek definitions of motion, space and time. Interestingly, I have not found a similar discomfiture on the part of Chinese thinkers. Indeed, the Chinese have no word for paradox, which i s translated in most modern dictionaries as fan lun (JsL Bifijr ) , or,"contrary discourse". This usage .seems to be borrowed from the West, for fan lun originally meant "negative proof" and was used in the classics to distinguish between .iueng lun ( JE f^lffe ), righteous arguments, and other arguments. My description of this section as "the paradoxes", while contrary to the traditional Chinese view, i s in accord with the writings of modern analysts like Hu Shih, Feng Yu-lan and Joseph Needham, who have a l l discussed this chapter in detail. Logically, a paradox can be defined as the conjunction of at least two statements which, while individually true, give rise to a logical impossibility when joined. The l i a r ' s paradox can stand as an examplet 1. Ephimenides i s a Cretan. 2. A l l Cretans are l i a r s . 3. Ephimenides wrote this. Any one of the above three statements can be taken and tested individually as a potentially true statement. Similarly, any two of the three statements can be logically accurate. But i f a l l three are taken as being individually true, the set then stands as a logical impossibility. If Ephimenides the Cretan (honestly) wrote " A l l Cretans are l i a r s " , then Ephimenides the l i a r could not have spoken truthfully. But i f he did not write truthfully, then the statements are incorrect. But knowing they are incorrect, statement two i s false, and i f i t i s false.... This paradox, like a l l paradoxes, exploits the fact of relative or competing value systems. In Western intellectual history, the paradox i s always somehow involved i n dialectic, challenging some orthodoxy. The paradox i s an oblique criticism of absolute judgment or absolute contentions. The l i a r c r i t i c i z e s linguistic and logical limitations. The nature of the paradox demands inconsistency between dependent statements, which i s what makes them so d i s t u r b i n g i We desire to have i n our language only those kinds of statement that are not dependent, as regards t h e i r truth or f a l s i t y , on any circumstances i n which the statements happen to be made.32 But we have seen the Chinese d e f i n i t i o n s of space and time seem to suggest a world of apparent r e l a t i v i t y and dependence, of change. The absolute was a more r i g i d , platonic view of l o g i c and the world. What, then, i s the nature of the Chinese paradox, and does i t d i f f e r either i n use or i n statement from i t s Western counterparts? Paradoxest Chuang tzu. Chapter 33*^3 1. The greatest has nothing beyond i t s e l f , and i s c a l l e d the great uni t ( j t — )} the smallest has nothing within i t s e l f , and i s c a l l e d the small u n i t ('/«•— ).34 2. That which has no thickness cannot be increased i n thickness, yet i n extent may cover a thousand miles. 3. The heavens are as low as the earth. Mountains are on the same l e v e l as marshes. 4. The sun at noon i s the sun declining; the creature born i s the creature dying. 5. A g r e a t - s i m i l a r i t y d i f f e r s from a s m a l l - s i m i l a r i t y ; t h i s i s c a l l e d l i t t l e ( s p e c i f i c ) similarity-and-difference ( 'h fei ?t ). A l l things are i n one way a l l s i m i l a r , i n another way a l l d i f f e r e n t . This i s c a l l e d the great (general) similarity-and-difference (A ). 6. The South has no l i m i t and has a l i m i t . 7. Going to the State of Yueh today, I a r r i v e d there yesterday. 8. Connected rings can be separated. See Appendix A f o r Chinese. 9. I know the center of the world» i t i s north of Yen (the country farthest north) and south of Yueh (the most southerly country). 10. Love a l l things equally i the universe i s one. DISCUSSION Although these are referred to as the ten paradoxes by virtua l l y a l l English language commentators, some of the statements are clearly not paradoxical. Numbers 1, 5# and 10 can be more precisely described as definitions within this set. Paradox 10 has, i n the words of Hu Shr, "troubled many a translator". One of the aims of the rest of this chapter i s to attempt to understand the importance of the non-paradoxical statements within the set and, through an examination of concepts of space and time inherent within the whole, to see better the meaning of the whole group. In the analysis of these ten statements, and those following, there are two basic viewpoints and two basic systems of examination which have been used by modem scholars. Feng Yu-lan and, to a lesser extent, Hu Shih described the paradoxes i n their relation with other sections of the Chuang tzu, f i t t i n g the ten statements into a general dialogue which they believe to have importance to the text as a whole. Needham, summarizing both, prefers to concentrate on what he sees as the general thrust of the section as a whole and i t s relation to larger patterns M Ithe history of Chinese thought. A l l three men build on the analysis of Chang Pin-Ling, who i s quoted by Hu Shih and Needham as believing the set of ten attempts as a group to establish the Mohist doctrine that a l l quantitative measurements and a l l spatial distinctions are illusory and unreal. That ...since no mathematical division can arrive at the ultimate and indivisible unit, therefore quantitative movements have nothing for their i n i t i a l unit... therefore a l l measurement i s illusory.3 5 In Chang Ping-Ling's interpretation, paradox 1 defines the lack of boundary in the i n f i n i t e l y large and the infinitesmial-l y small. 2 and 3 deny the real i t y of thickness, altitude and depth, while 4 and 7 argue for the unreality of time. Summing up his argument, Hu Shih maintains that these show that "time-distinctions are human made, and have no (intrinsic) r e a l i t y . " The other paradoxes seem to be, for Chiang Ping-Ling, logical denials of the distinctions between ultimate similarity and difference in relation to finiteness (5)i d i v i s i b i l i t y and individuality (6), necessary directionality (9)» and as a denial of basic difference (10) (which Hu Shih sees as the moral of the set). The interpretations of Hu Shih and Needham differ not in kind but in c r i t i c a l emphasis. Neither argue with Chang Ping-Ling for the illusory nature of quantification in Mohist thought, although both would agree the set of paradoxes deals with man-made distinctions and categories. They both argue along atmoist or r e l a t i v i s t i c lines, suggesting the set of ten statements hints at the arbitrary nature of a l l distinctions and the limits of human perception. In this Needham follows 58 Hu Shih who, reviewing the Mohist d i s t i n c t i o n s between space and place, and between time and duration, believes these paradoxes are a l l based on the p r i n c i p l e of "only one space and one time f o r the sections which we have a r t i f i c i a l l y devised our units of (space and time)." Feng Yu-lan agreed with t h i s point to the extent that he believed "we f i n d that he (Hui Shr) argues always from the viewpoint that 'the greatest has nothing beyond i t s e l f , 1 to show that a l l things are l i m i t e d and receptive." So f o r a l l three scholars, the f i r s t paradox describes the nature of space at the macro and micro l e v e l s , quickly embracing the idea of r e l a t i v i t y to the observer. I t i s the d e f i n i t i o n of greatness that there i s nothing beyond i t and smallness that i n i t s frame there i s nothing within. The r e l a t i v e nature of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n — f o r i t i s a d e f i n i t i o n and not a paradox which confronts us here — i s bolstered by a quote from Section III of the Doctrine of the Meant ... when the Englightened man speaks of supreme bigness i t cannot be contained i n the world of our experience, nor when he speaks of supreme smallness, can i t be s p l i t up i n the world of our experience to nothing. Paradox 2 i s a paradox, and can be understood i n conjunction with 3 to emphasize the p l a s t i c i t y and two-dimensionality of perceived (and possibly mapped) depth, and i t s v a r i a b i l i t y . The t h i r d paradox buil d s on t h i s to suggest the v a r i a b i l i t y of the earth's surface, as when high mountains seem minimal i n the distance. Mountains are on the same l e v e l as the marshes when viewed from the perspective of the-universe. In a map, the symbol f o r a mountain has no thickness, but covers (and represents i n the map-world) a huge distance of thousands of miles. Here Feng Yu-lan quotes Chapter 17 of the Chuang tzu's discussion of the nature of "graduate differences", i n which a l l things can be considered b i g or small, depending on t h e i r scale. When we considered as the most great only that which has 'nothing beyond i t s e l f and compare the universe with t h i s , i t i s then, r e l a t i v e l y speaking, but a tareseed ... Using the same p r i n c i p l e , i f we take things as r e l a t i v e l y high, there i s nothing that i s not high, whereas i f we take them as r e l a t i v e l y low, there i s nothing that i s not low. Therefore i 'the heavens are as low as the earthj mountains are on the same l e v e l as marshes'. A l l three scholars — Feng Yu-lan, Hu Shih and Needham -argue the next paradox (4) enlarges the above explanation to include time which i s seen as being unfixed and, l i k e space, r e l a t i v e to the viewer. As Kuo Hsian (d. 312 a.m.) said i n h i s commentary on the Chuang tzu and the importance of what Feng Yu-lan translates as "revolutionary transforma-a l l things are not undergoing change." Needham believes t h i s describes the concept of r e l a t i v e time frames i n the same way paradox 3 described varying s p a t i a l perspectives, the idea being simply that, as Needham suggests, "... noon occurs at d i f f e r e n t times at d i f f e r e n t ), there " i s no time when the universe and 60 places on the earth's surface.1* Neither Hu Shih nor Needham are comfortable with paradox 5» which like the f i r s t proposition i s not a paradox but a definition. Feng Yu-lan argues that a passage in Chapter 5 of the Chuang tzu c l a r i f i e s this paradox as well as the third statement i n this set. His translation of the passage followsI If we see things from the point of view of their difference, even l i v e r and g a l l are as far from each other as (the adjoining states of) Ch'u and Yueh. If we see things from the point of view of similarity, a l l things are one. Thus, what ordinary people see as similarity or difference i s merely the distinction between a particular object and another particular object. Paradox 5 thus seems to summarize those preceding statements which discuss the nature of space and time as perspective, relative to the perceiver. It i s an algebraic formulation of relative perspectives (in time and space), the cap to statements which preceded i t . This interpretation i s bolstered by one commentator on the Chuang tzu who wrote, as elucidation for this statement 5» that i f the essence of things i s distinguished, i t appears to have greater or lesser commonality.^ Paradoxes 6, 7 and 9 cover similar gound, using human, spatial and temporal distinctions to make the same points made in the preceding paradoxes about general space and time. These statements differ i n their use of specific directional (south, north) and place (Yueh) names. Statement 6, f o r example, argues f o r the a r b i t r a r y nature of selected human boundaries. The South has a l i m i t , to those who have t r a v e l l e d l i t t l e and see the world as ending at China. In r e l a t i o n to the universe (paradoxes 1 and 3), China i s a mere grain of sand, and "South" i s meaningless and l i m i t l e s s i n r e l a t i o n to "what has nothing beyond i t s e l f " . Feng Yu-lan d i s l i k e s paradox 7t saying i t "comes close to sophistry." He notes that Chapter 2 of the Chuang tzu describes a "type of d i s t i n c t i o n as being as inconceivable as going to Yueh today, but having a r r i v e d there yesterday." Hu Shih and Needham argue c o r r e c t l y , however, t h i s i s the temporal equivalent of 6, and describes the a r b i t r a r y nature of a single time-frame. Needham says simply i t "recognizes the existence of d i f f e r e n t time-scales i n d i f f e r e n t places." Chapter 17 of the Chuang tzu sums up the idea n i c e l y when i t states "you cannot speak of i c e to a summer insect, who i s r e s t r i c t e d by hi s time." This idea i s i n accord with Hu Shih's and Needham1s interpretations of the paradox. The ninth paradox i s s i m i l a r to the si x t h and seventh, d i f f e r i n g i n i t s s p e c i f i c i t y . I t asserts the a r b i t r a r y nature of cardinal d i r e c t i o n s and i s of a part with Ssu-ma Piao *s comment already quoted, s t a t i n g there are no (necessary) compass points i n the world. I t thus merely suggests the changing viewpoints of d i f f e r e n t observers and various scales. This same idea i s found i n Chapter 17 of the Chuang tzu. where the circumscribed boundaries of the well-f r o g are described.. In a geographic sense, the same point i s made elsewhere i n the same text, s t a t i n g (with Feng Yu-lan's translation) since "a c i r c l e has no s t a r t i n g point, wherever we may happen to be (on i t s circumference) i s the beginning." The eighth paradox has received no completely s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation. A l l commentators have seen i t as an anomaly within the chapter's context. Feng Yu-lan describes i t as being one with paradox 4 i n suggesting "separation i s the same as construction; construction i s the same as destruction." Chang Ping-Ling says i t , l i k e paradox 6, denies d i s t i n c t i o n s between d i v i s i b i l i t y and i n d i v i s i b i l i t y , which i s merely to say i t intends a comment on the i l l u s o r y nature of measurement. But construction and destruction do d i f f e r , and measure-ments are not t o t a l l y i l l u s o r y , although t h e i r meaning may derive from a s p e c i f i c context. The in t e r p r e t a t i o n should f i t with the tone and meaning of the res t of the set, while these two interpretations suggest a break with the other ten paradoxes. Hu Shih may have provided the key when he pointed out that the story of linked jade rings i s the Chinese equivalent of the parable of Alexander and the Gordian Knot. The Queen Dowager of Chi, given a set of i n t e r l o c k i n g jade rin g s , i s informed that no-one can separate them. She smashes them, and thus separates the rings, both t h e i r connection and t h e i r t o t a l i t y . The meaning of paradox 8 i s cleare r i f considered i n the context of both the parable and paradox 5, which I suggested i s a general algebraic formulation of preceding statements. I suspect paradox 8 serves a similar generalizing function i n relation to paradoxes 6 and 7. It i s neither solely temporal nor spatial in nature, unless one wants to do i t and the admirably practical Queen Dowager grave injustice. It does suggest, i n the context of her solution to a problem, that by releasing oneself from the prison of a single perspective, a single category of solutions, new interpretations and r e a l i t i e s are possible. In a similar vein, the tenth paradox, when f i r s t examined, does not seem to be of a part with i t s preceding brothers. Hu Shih sees i t as a kind of Christian injunction, a kicker to the set. Although usually translated as "love a l l things equally, the universe i s one (thing)," I suspect that translation with i t s Christian overtones obscures the import and meaning of the paradox i n Chinese. The last four charact-ers individually raeanj heaven, earth, one, body. The last word is visually almost identical to the l i ( ) which means order, rule, category. If the sentence i s translated! love a l l things equally, heaven and earth (have) one order, the sentence becomes one not of ersatz universal love, but one suggesting that i n a world of relative space and time, of multiple perspectives with each dependent on the observer (be i t man, frog or summer insect), there i s an order observed or observable in our world. In this world we a l l obey universal laws which allow for rational analysis and discussion.-^ I can find no evidence to suggest the word l i ( ) was the original character in the text, gratifying as i t would be to ascribe this confusion to a copyist's error. More simply I am suggesting the meaning of the phrase here can be c l a r i f i e d by a realization that what i s meant by tu ) i s "order". The translation of the sentence "The world i s one" may not fu l l y convey the original meaning of the sentence which suggests one body, in the sense of varying parts of the body obeying one s p i r i t and order. Taken thus, i t ties the nine preceding statements into a belief in an operative universal perspective acknowledging regularity as well as change and individual perspective. With this interpretation, which does no violence to the character reading, we come f u l l c i r c l e i n the paradoxes, from definition to definition, from perspective to order, with a context of specific change. This interpretation gains weight when one considers the basic principles of the I Ching, the Book of Changes. Wei Tat suggests as a basic concept unifying the changes observed in the world the statementi "Under heaven, there i s one ultimate principle for a l l things."^® He sees this as the logical conclusion and point of the nature of yin and yang, of their unity and periodicity, of the difference between a world of change and one of chaos. The tenth paradox seems to function as a similar ordering principle in this set. PARADOX II The Chuang tzu's Chapter 33 contains a further set of twenty-one paradoxes, some of which extend and c l a r i f y those already discussed. These, like the former, have been trans-lated and examined by the same authors whose commentaries are again consulted. Chih do not reachi things never come to an end. 2. The shadow of a flying bird never moves. 3. There are times when a flying arrow i s neither in motion nor at rest. 4. If a rod one foot i n length i s cut short every day by one-half i t s length, i t w i l l have something l e f t even after ten thousand generations. The character chih ( ) i s variously translated as "marks", "finger" and "universals". It can also mean in modern Chinese "indicate" or "point". Feng Yu-lan argues that here the character means "universals", as opposed to "particular things", wu (fyz> ). He supports this with a passage from Kung-sun Lung, i n which the idea of universal i s both more consistent with the tenor of the paradoxes as a whole, and more comprehensible i n their context i Chih do not reach (our perception). Things bounded by space and time, however, in which the universal becomes manifested, are ever changing and are being perpetuated i n endless successionj hence 'things never come to an end. • Regarding the shadow of a flying bird paradox, Feng Yu-lan offers three separate interpretations, championing none. These range from a reiteration of the problem of universal and particular to a Platonic distinction between ideal and actual movements. Hu Shih follows a line later expanded by A.C. Graham and Nathan Sivin, who examine the concept i n the light of Mohist optics. y The c r i t i c a l phrase i s found in the Mo Tzut "A shadow does not shift, explain by remaking." ( j ^ ^ j ^ J ^Mi^^^M^MJ • H u S n^- n believes the idea of remaking, or renewal, explains this phrase becausei The shadow seen at the next moment i s a new or 'renewed* onet i t i s no longer the same shadow which, though unseen, remains i n the original position (in space and time). This interpretation i s strengthened by Graham and Sivin*s reference to the Mohist proposition "Both North and South are present at dawn and sunset." The shifting of space involves  duration. (^ItSiAMtM^L ) >k° In short, this paradox and the preceding deal again with space and time, with relations between categories of time and space as seen by observers. The third paradox i n this set i s of a kind with the preceding. The basic idea i s , as Bertrand Russell said in a discussion of Zeno*s similar paradox, that at a specific moment and place, things are where they are. At any instant, a thing i s at a specific four-dimensional location, and motion i s a succession of separate events which we perceive as motion. The last paradox to be considered here i s the spatial equivalent of the preceding statement. Paradox k i n this sense denies the Euclidean postulate that there are an infinitude of geometric points on a line. The problem of in f i n i t y i s , according to modern mathematicians, central to and inseparable from that of motion. The interpretation and meaning of paradoxes 3 and 4 here are likewise inseparable. DISCUSSION Interestingly, one of the most recent commentators on this section of the Chuang tzu was Mao tse Dung, who i s quoted by S. Schran as explaining the f i n a l paradox considered here as meaning the "myriad things develop continuously and limitlessly, and they are i n f i n i t e . Time and space are i n f i n i t e . " In this context Mao praised an a r t i c l e on basic particles in a modern science magazine, saying, "I have never seen this kind of a r t i c l e before, this i s diale c t i c a l materialism." There i s the tantalizing suggestion of a similarity between this section of the Chuang tzu and diale c t i c a l materialism. I do not suggest, of course, that the authors of this or other sections of the Chuang tzu were proto-Maoists, good Hegelians or early structuralists. In fact, the interpre-tations offered here indicate a position contrary to dialectic in i t s Hegelian form. Simply, dialectic l i k e paradox depends on the limitations of the specific, and both thus seem to have their roots i n Platonic metaphysics where objects of the sensible world were unreal to the extent they could be said to be both A and not-A. Plato's view resulted i n a plurality of "forms", each distinct in character from a l l others, much as Hegelian dialectic later postulated a continuing series. <5f statements (representations of a reality) and their negations (alternatives). These two would be incompatible and give rise to antithesis, a new statement which would eventually meet i t s alternative and then be changedt thesis, antithesis, synthesis ad infinitum. This i s s i m i l a r to the function of paradoxes i n the West, those "cutting edges" of l o g i c a l thought which to Rosalie Colie always involved d i a l e c t i c . The Western view of paradoxical statement i s Hegelian i n the conjunction of l i m i t e d , s p e c i f i c statements which when placed together force an attempt at synthesis. In Chinese, or at l e a s t Taoist, thought, the opposite l o g i c a l pattern seems to have developed. In the Tao Te Ching. for example, there i s no necessity of defining by exclusion what l o g i c i a n s c a l l the Law of Contradiction. Rather, there i s a consistent conjunction of subject and contradictory, l i k e y i n and yang. as aspects of a single d e f i n i t i o n . Limited and apparently contradictory facets formed instead a system of c o r r e l a t i v e categories which functioned as a basic set of d e f i n i t i o n s and descriptions u s e f u l because they seem to have provided a c l e a r general boundary of d e f i n i t i o n based on the perspective of the perceiver. I f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s correct, there was no problem saying, as a student of the Chuang tzu. that things were true and not true simultaneously — a statement l o g i c a l l y impossible f o r Hegel and Plato a l i k e . Here things are true and not true depending on the observer and h i s context. The difference between the two systems may be i l l u s t r a t e d by reference to a f a m i l i a r o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n which shows a l i g h t area bordered on both sides by an i r r e g u l a r dark surface such that the viewer looking at the l i g h t area as f i g u r e sees the dark area as ground and the l i g h t as a vase-shaped object. I f the dark area i s seen as subject, the vase i s merely background separating the two silhouetted f i g u r e s . To the d i a l e c t i c i a n i t i s a question of either/or. To the Chinese i t would have been both, depending on the perspective of the viewer. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t r i k e s at the heart of the s t r u c t u r a l i s t l o g i c and i t s reliance on a n t i t h e t i c a l and paired ideas (yes/ho, good/bad, l i f e / d e a t h , e t c . ) . On the surface, s t r u c t u r a l i s t s and t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese l o g i c i a n s would seem compatable. Yin and yang, f o r instance, seem to be a c l a s s i c set of paired ideas. But the problem a r i s e s i n the mutuality of y i n and yang, t h e i r simultaneity which Wei Tat argues i s the p r i n c i p l e of d u a l i t y ("^"PMisS^ )• I t i s t h i s d u a l i t y and enantiodromia, or r e v i s i o n to opposite and return, which i s the essence of s h i f t i n g perspective, the re s o l u t i o n of and the opposite to what Western l o g i c i a n s took as the heart of paradox. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the paradoxes as statements of c o r r e l a t i v e categories rather than l i m i t e d s p e c i f i c s i s consistent with the interpretations of space and time categories examined at the beginning of t h i s chapter. Indeed, i t i s the very heart of the discussion. Neither space nor time alone adequately define motion or event or place f o r the simple reason that a s p e c i f i c event cannot be so l i m i t e d . Rather, events can only be defined by reference to the observer, and to his perception of time and space. The very d i s t i n c t i o n made by the Chinese and noted at the beginning of t h i s chapter i s a clear clue. The difference between time and (event) duration, between space as category and specific place, indicate an apparent acceptance of general categories and specific event definitions, and at either level of the mutual interdependence of space and time as correlative categories of definition. Hu Shih and Needham, who both use paradoxes to show what they believe to be a similarity between the Chinese and Western logical traditions, may have missed the proverbial forest for the metaphorical trees. In the West, the paradoxes of Zeno were not seen as descriptions of re a l i t y . They were logical conundrums, the "cutting edge of logical thought", as Colie said. In the Chinese tradition the reverse was true, and these paradoxes, i f they do indeed provide a key to Chinese thought in antiquity, provided the description of a rea l i t y organized along a fundamentally different line than that of Plato and his Western successors, one which I have called "correlative". This suggests Hu Shih and Needham were injudicious i n their attempts to compare Platonic/Aristotelian categories with the Chinese, despite a seeming similarity between the two sets of paradoxes. Indeed, i t here seems that the Western system of analysis was "dialectical", and contrasts with the Chinese correlative reasoning. The Chinese logical system successfully bypasses the problem of binome, subsuming both poles into a single event distinction. The reasons for this are uncertain, and may be lost forever in the murk of history. Maybe i t had to do with the tensions between Taoist, Buddhist and Confucian learning and an attempt to formulate basic principles acceptable to a l l . Given certain broad similarities between the Chinese solution and that of other non-Western societies, i t i s conceivable that the Greek answer which formed a basis of our Western tradition i s the anomaly, and the Chinese case provides the fulle s t development of a line of thought anthropologists have consistently observed i n non-technological, non-Western cultures as diverse as the Mexican Chamula and the Nigerian Tiv. If that i s true, there i s no need for apologists, or rationalization of why China didn't "develop". There are parallels between elements of traditional Chinese thought and modern views of logic and physics, although these are too often taken to suggest the Chinese were "modern" and endowed with a type of proto-relativity physics. They were not. They were men of their age and, most historians would agree, ahead of their contemporaries elsewhere on the globe. In respect to the int r i n s i c differences suggested here between Greek and Chinese logic and definitions, the Chinese solution was probably superior. Allowing for both algebra and geometry, i t was simpler than the Platonic, providing a single consistent vision of the universe without recourse to the higher plan and innumerable "perfect" forms of Plato. By acknowledging change as a universal principle, they allowed for a world both of diversity and individual perception, as well as a world ordered at the experiential level. The Platonic alternative attempted to impose order as a constant p r i n c i p l e and through the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h a t view separated space and time i n t o separate c a t e g o r i e s , denied i n d i v i d u a l p e r c e p t i o n as a determiner of p e r c e p t u a l r e a l i t y and l a i d the seed of l o g i c a l problems whose u l t i m a t e f r u i t may indeed have been the Copernican r e v o l u t i o n . Any attempt a t comparison between the Greek and the Chinese views which attempts to put one over another, to a s c r i b e merit and demerit, i s doomed to f a i l u r e . They both were and i n t h e i r v a r i o u s ways s a t i s f i e d both the o r i g i n a l men who debated the p r o p o s i t i o n s and those who b u i l t upon them. This b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n has been of value only i f i t has, through the comparison w i t h a t r a d i t i o n most of us know w e l l , served to i l l u m i n a t e f a c e t s of the l e s s w e l l s t u d i e d t r a d i t i o n s of China. REVIEW Based on the s t r u c t u r a l p r i n c i p l e s and a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l research discussed i n Chapter I , t h i s chapter attempted to i s o l a t e and d e s c r i b e general c a t e g o r i e s of space and time d i s c e r n i b l e through an a n a l y s i s of grammatical, p h i l o l o g i c and t e x t u a l a n a l y s i s . S t r u c t u r a l anthropology suggested not only t h a t a c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n of c a t e g o r i c a l thought would be evident, but a l s o t h a t t h a t p a t t e r n would probably i n c l u d e the co n j u n c t i o n of space and time i n t o a s i n g l e set of d e f i n i t i o n s . This hypothesis was taken w i t h a r e c o g n i t i o n of Leon H u r v i t z ' s c a u t i o n and found ample evidence suggesting t h a t the Chinese, 73 by the time of the Han Dynasty, had developed a conceptual metalanguage of order involving a unified category of space and time. That some of the data was taken from a text as c r i t i c a l and as studied as the Chuang tzu to some extent allays the cautions of Schaffer. I hope that later works w i l l check and recheck these preliminary findings through an analysis of other texts and poems both during the Han and in other periods, as well as some of the innumerable commentaries which have been written over the last two millenia i n the Chinese liter a r y tradition. The Chinese categories of space and time treat both aspects not as irreconcilable, either/or binomes, but rather as necessary elements of a single definition of event. Further, i t distinguishes consistently between levels of space and time, acknowledging both a general intellectual order (time, space) and a specific event definition (duration and place). This variance of scale i s a c r i t i c a l factor within the paradoxes, and i s used to describe the va r i a b i l i t y of direction (north, south), time (going to Yueh today, arriving yesterday), motion (a flying bird i s both at motion and rest), and distance. These categories seem to have gained currency in the context of a world view fundamentally different from that found i n what history books c a l l the "Golden Age of Greece", and the very use of the Western label "paradox" may i n fact be a misnomer. One was founded on permanence, the other on change. One attempted to use specifics i n a constant and l i m i t e d sense to define phenomena l i k e motion and place while the other denied constancy and a type of l o g i c using what seem to use as opposites to describe varying worlds, each dependent on an observer at an instant. In the Chinese order, chaos i s avoided because the whole universe i s also a perspective, and within that frame seems to obey ce r t a i n changes and r u l e s . To Plato, apparent chaos was only an imperfect v i s i o n of a "perfect" world, and one which would have seemed strange to Lao-tzu or h i s followers. I f t h i s view i s correct, then these parameters of p o s s i b i l i t y should have influenced a l l aspects of society, and t h e i r traces should be evident "replicated", to use the jargon of s t r u c t u r a l anthropology, i n culture areas as diverse as board gaming and landscape painting. The following chapters attempt to examine various culture areas at d i f f e r e n t points i n Chinese i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y to see whether or not the information gained i n t h i s chapter and the view i t leads to provide a better descripter than those which have been used i n the past. By concentrating on concepts of space and time, we have considered two basic elements c r i t i c a l not only to a l l c u l t u r a l organization but also to the basic elements of l o c a t i o n . The following chapter attempts to use the basic Chinese metalanguage of spatio-temporal order to describe aspects of l o c a t i o n at various l e v e l s of manifestation, and i n so doing seeks both to define more pr e c i s e l y the d e f i n i t i o n s of that order and to use them as a n a l y t i c tools i n the study of a culture accessible to us now only through the traces l e f t by the past. 76 CHAPTER H i NOTES AND REFERENCES Leon Hurvitz, personal communication. December .1975• Nathan Sivin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has indicated his sympathy with aspects of this position, and his interest in ways I have attempted to overcome i t . n ... . . . . . _ _ Edward Schaffer, personal communication. August 1976. •^ See the previous chapter for my discussion of their views. ^ F r i t j o f Capra, The Tao of Physics (Berkeleyi Shambala, 1975), p. 63 . Capra i s excellent on modern physics, and a simple explanation of basic principles. He i s aware, as a physicist, of the crucial importance of space-time i n modern thought. Unfortunately, his understanding of Mohist, Taoist or Confucian thought leaves a great deal to be desired. Examples of the centrality of these concepts to natural phenomena abound in the literature of this century i n the West. In addition to the basic science texts quoted in Chapter I (Heisenberg, Lincoln Barnett, etc.), see the literature of art (Pali, by Max Gerard, Abrams, 1968» Max Ernst, by John Russell, Abrams, New York; Arturo Schwartz, Marcel Duchamp, Abrams, New York), as well as William S. Rubin's overview of Dada and Surrealist Art (Abrams, New York) for discussions of the relation of these ideas to art i n the 10th Century. "^We step and do not step into the same rivers, we exist and do not exist." Heraclitus. Compare this with the paradoxes from the Chuang tzu discussed i n this chapter. I am not suggesting diffusion at this point between East and West, of course. For an overview of Western thought, see Shmuel Sambursky (ed.), Physical Thought from the Presocratics to the  Quantum Physicists (Pica Press. New Yorki 1975)» from which the above quotation i s taken. ^Nathan Sivin and Shigeru Nakayama(eds.), Chinese Science» Explorations of an Ancient Tradition (MIT Press, Cambridge1 1973)# PP. x i i i , xiv. ^Arthur F. Wright, "Review of Volume II, Science and  Ci v i l i z a t i o n in China". American Historical Review (Vol."1)2. 1957), PP. 918-920. 8 Joseph Needham, Science and Ci v i l i z a t i o n i n China (II) (Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 285. o 'Paul Wheatley, The Pivot of the Four Quarters (Chicago University Press, Chicago, I l l . t 1959). Richard Wilhelm, The Secret of the Golden Flowert A  Chinese Book of Life. Gary F. Baynes, trans., with a commentary by C.G. Jung (Harcourt Brace and World, New Yorki 1937), p. 141. 11 G. Creel, Chinese Thought (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 111.i 1953). p. 173. l ? Joseph Needham, Science and Civ i l i z a t i o n i n China (II) (Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 182. For convenience, this w i l l be referred to i n following citations as SCC and volume. 13Needham, ibid., pp. 185-200. l2*Mo Ching (Bk 32t40, 41). Quoted by Needham, SCC II, pp. 90-93? SCC III, p. 93-94; and by Hu Shih, The Development  of Logical Thought i n China (Paragon Book Reprint Corp., New Yorki 1968, 2nd edition), p. 113. * % u Shih, as quoted i n Needham, op. c i t . , p. 193. 16 J.N. Findlay, "Timet A Treatment of Some Puzzles", in J.C.C. Smart (ed.), Problems of Space and Time (Macmillano Col, New Yorkt 1973)* p. 344. 17 'Ernst Mach, "The Economy of Science", i n James R. Newman (ed.), The World of Mathematics (Simon and Schuster, New Yorkt 1966), Volume 3» P. 1794. 18 Consider for example the folk adage whiclvl have been unable to t r a c e t M . & , M 1 £ . iRW, H &&%T¥. which says that Heaven w i l l be at peace when the nation i s well, which depends on correct familiar relations, which i n turn are based on healthy physical conditions; this i s based on proper s p i r i t determined by virtuous ideas which i s based on knowledge, i t s e l f based on individual things. I am indebted to Szu-du Chen of the University of British Columbia, who uses this adage i n his Chinese language classes. 19 ^Frederick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China (Alfred A. Knopft New York, 1971), p. 27. 20 Yi Fu-tuan, Topophilia (Prentice Hall, New Jerseyt 1974), p. 131. The information on Turko-Tartar cosmology i s his; the inference i s my own. 21 Mo Ching, as quoted in Needham, SCC I, p. 55. 78 22 Joseph Needham, The Grand Titration, Science and Society  in East and West (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Londoni i960), p. 221. 23Needham, SCO II, p. 221. 2k . Hu Shr, op. c i t . 2^C.G. Jung in Richard Wilhelm, op. c i t . as quoted in Needham, SCO II. 2^For one discussion of Chi, see Mitukuni Yosida, "The Chinese Concept of Nature", in Sivin and Nakayama (eds.), Chinese Sciencei Explorations of an Ancient Tradition (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.t 1973), p. 77. 28 Capra, op. c i t . , p. 63. 2^Rosalie L. Colie, Paradoxica Epidemical The Renaissance  Tradition of Paradox (Princeton University Press, New Jerseyi 1966), p. 7. This spectacular book deals lovingly with the use and meaning of paradoxical thought. Erudite in the extreme, i t i s rare and lovingly done. Those interested in the mathematical and philosophical problems of the Eliadic paradoxes would do well to see Bertrand Russell, "Mathematics and Metaphysicians", Hans Hahn, "Infinity", Edware Kasner and James R. Newman, "Paradox and Paradox Regained", Hans Hahn, "The Crisis in Intuition", a l l in James R. Newman (ed.), The World of Mathematics. I l l (Simon and Schuster, New Yorki 1956). What i s of particular interest here in the handling of concepts concerning i n f i n i t y , the infinitesimal and point, in East and West. In both Asia and Greece there were individuals holding to Euclidean and non-Euclidean views. An intensive analysis of this topic could lead to a greater understanding of spatial and perceptual categories in both cultures. Unfortunately, a f u l l treatment of the topic i s beyond the scope of this paper. 3°Rosalie L. Colie, ibi d . 31 J Rosalie L. Colie, op. c i t . , p. 7. ^ 2 J . Findlay, "Timei A Treatment of Some Puzzles" i n J.C.C. Smart (ed.), Problems of Space and Time (Macmillan Co., New Yorki 1973), p. 352. I have attempted to cite only c r i t i c a l a rticles, texts and essay collections, preferring to lean on the heavies without padding an already diffuse bibliography. Thus an intensive reliance on Messrs. Smart, Newman, etc. 79 X ^Constant discussion i s made in the description of the paradoxes of three major authors who have discussed and described the original statements extensively. For the reader's ease, the pertinent sections of the works cited are included here onlyt Feng Yu-lan, A History of Chinese  Philosophy, Derk Bodde, trans. (Princeton University Press» Princeton, New Jerseyt 1952), pp. 209-220? Joseph Needham, SCC II, pp. 189-196; Hu Shih, Development of the Logical  Method in Ancient China (Paragon Book Reprint Corp., New Yorkt 1968), pp. 111-130. References to the Chuang tzu i t s e l f are, like the appendix,taken fromt ffijifiJkfca ^Small ( ) can be taken here to mean "specific". Large ( 7^ ) thus signifies "general". 3^Hu Shr, op. c i t . , Chapter V, p. 112. 3 6 ^ 1^ WS>)i M ^ i t ' l ^ ^ C -^This interpretation gains some legitimacy through a consideration of the basic principle of organization i n the I Ching. "For Heaven and Earth, one principle, for men one principle, for a l l things — one principle." Wei Tat sees this concept of universal order as a logical conclusion to the concepts of periodicity and enantidromia. ^ m. ->fc X X -yk +Js $fjo — yk^k see Wei Tat, An Exposition of the I Ching or the Book of Changes (Institute of Cultural Studies, Taipei, Taiwan (no publication date)), p. 337. 3 8Wei Tat, ibi d . -^A.C. Graham and Nathan Sivin, "A Systematic Approach to Mohist Optics" in Sivin and Nakayama (eds.), Chinese Sciencet  Explorations in an Ancient Tradition (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1973)» p. 116-118. Sivin shows the length of detailaarid analysis one can go to in an attempt to describe completely and understand what, on the face of i t , are apparently simply understood characters in sentence. "•mid* 41 S. Schran, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, 1956-1971 (Pantheon Books, New York, 1974), p. 229. 42 Lao tzu, Tao Te Ching. D.C. Lau, trans. (Penguin Books, Baltimore, Md.t 1972). In his Introduction, Lau makes this point i n a brief discussion of Plato, comparing his theory plurality of Forms with the Taoist view. Illustration A» Text of 10 Paradoxes (i) 82 Illustration Ai Text of 10 Paradoxes ( i i ) Illustration Ai Text of 10 Paradoxes ( i i i ) 83 Illustration At Text of 10 Paradoxes (iv) 84 87 Illustration Bi Text of second set of k paradoxes ( i i i ) CHAPTER III Traces i Space and Time i n Chinese Culture Areas 89 INTRODUCTION So far we have identified time and space as general concepts, basic categories common to a l l human cultures, and identified a general system of analysis designed to f a c i l i t a t e the study of cultural categories. Chapter II isolated a con-sistent set of space and time statements expounded in the Chuang tzu and found consistent with definitions articulated in the Mo Ching. We know further that *he Chuang tzu was a primary text studied by a l l those who hoped for c i v i l advance-ment in China from the f i r s t days of the Imperial examination system to the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty. For Chinese scholars through almost two millenia, these were among the basics of educated discourse, the bedrock on which each generation argued and bu i l t . If my argument has been correct, then the concepts identified in Chapter II represent ordering categories, metalanguages of order that functioned as the prime co-ordinates of social behavior, models for the creation of landscape. Thus we should be able to discover their traces, their imprint both in geographical ideas and behavior. The reasoning i s simplet i f we assume the importance of spatial and temporal categories in a structuralist framework, then ipso facto we must accept their importance and necessity as metalanguages of order. Having identified the categories, we need to look for their traces. Concrete expressions of these categories should be discernible in the history of urban design, cartography, landscape painting, p o l i t i c a l and war theory, the design and rules of total information board games, poetry and other areas. It i s this chapter's task to examine some of these areas for evidence of specific and concrete examples of the function of spatial and temporal categories.* In examining information on postal codes (a subset of cartography), art, board games and poetry, two things are needed. One i s some factor evident in those areas discussed which allows them to be lumped together in other than the most arbitrary fashion. This relation can be thematic, with some constant idea running through each topic considered, making them consistent subsets of the larger topic, and subsets with some similar underlying concept. What links these seemingly disparate aspects of tradition-a l culture i s the common thread of spatial-temporal concepts. A l l deal with the relation between individual locations (distance, direction) and individuals who must traverse these distances. Wei ch'i, a purely spatial board game, provides a forum for examination of these concepts in a pure frame. That i s , there i s no individual use of the wei ch'i board as map, but as a purely spatial game, i t functions as an analog for "real-world" principles and action. It thus provides the cap to *he other areas of analysis, and a laboratory for the examination of the principles of space and time free of specific regional anomalies. In this i t i s the algebraic generality, standing as rule to the specific (arthimetics) of more specific location. While I do not emphasize or belabor i t , there i s a thematic relation between those areas I have chosen to examine. The Chinese did not recognize narrow distinctions between sc i e n t i f i c and a r t i s t i c , poetic and graphic areas of endeavour. Poetry and landscape painting, for example, were considered as unified and inseparable arts expressing individual feelings and experience. In both poetry and painting there were extensive genres primarily concerned with the articulation of specific places, and often the authors* exile to or from a place. The information gained from the postal codes provides a more prosaic example of similar place-relation material. Designed to regulate the transmission of o f f i c i a l documents, i t i s the raw material of maps, themselves portraits of place at a smaller scale. This material provides a systematic body of data allowing the reader to attempt to come to terms with the way the Chinese in antiquity considered places and the relation between them. A complete study of the codes does much more than that, but for my purposes here this i s enough.3 Board games like wei ch*i are also expressions of environment, models of man*s relation to the world and the rules which govern i t . On the one hand, board games are more abstract, rarely providing identifiable components immediately recognizable as one or another real-world phenomena. On the other hand, they are more "concrete M — and dynamic — allowing the individual who has subsumed the rules to manipulate and portray the environment, or an aspect of i t . 92 Despite i t s obvious importance, I have had to omit from this thesis a section dealing with urban organization. City • building i s an a l l i e d but separate area of study. In the Chinese case an analysis of city organization and urban planning i s based in great part on a series of four-dimensional k locational propositions called fungshui. Despite the abundance of information in Chinese and English,-* even a barely adequate analysis of the spatio-temporal underpinnings of Chinese urban organization as i t related to even one cit y would have taken this project too far from i t s direct line of research. The second necessity in this preliminary attempt to transform categories of thought into a coherent description of individual facets of the Chinese experience i s a system of transformations bringing the general rules discussed in Chapter II to a greater and more specific scale of activity. What, for example, i s the relation between Chapter 33 of the Chuang tzu and the specific paintings of Ni Tsan, the poems of Tu fu, or individual games of wei ch'i? Can the categories already discussed help in a discussion of these individual facets and, i f so, do they need to be applied through specific areas? Certainly they themselves have a descriptive power sufficient to describe some facets of landscape imagery in painting, poetry and game behavior. At the same time, the specifics of these general categories become concerned with the nature of distance, direction and scale, the cognitive blocks of spatial perception. 0 These three factors are themselves treated in the Chuang tzu. but in that discussion they were not emphasized. Here, in the application of those principles, they become crucial. In recent years, psychogeographers have been increasingly concerned with the nature of place learning and perception. Among their contributions to our understanding of man has been a recognition that the individual perceives his environment not as a world of constant "survey" distance, but as one of variable distance between supposedly fixed locations, a world in which direction can s h i f t . In his discussion of relative distance, for example, Denis Wood discusses the variable distance perceived in travel from work to home, the shortness of the f i r s t relative to the perceived length of the return t r i p . This i s over a single route of home-work-home. The difference i s perceptual, and in his study measured in length of time perceived by the traveller for each t r i p . The mapping of individual routes can best be likened to a Moebius strip whose center i s variable, moving to one end or another depending on personal circum-stances. Similarly, he argues elsewhere that direction i s also variable, that i n a blizzard one i s always walking into the wind. The pdint i s that distance, the measurement of separation between two events, and direction, which can be defined as the individual orientation of a specific set of events, are crucial to an understanding of individual (or communal) place perceptions. Thus this chapter attempts to treat distance and direction as specifics determined by the general categories of thought discussed previously, and presumes that they w i l l be as ubiquitous as the general categories in a discussion of individual examples. In their description of place, the Chinese seem to have operated consistently on objective principles which* portray relative location as a function of several factors besides "actual" (that i s to say "surveyed") distance. One word meaning distance in Chinese, IjL ( .J§ ), connotes both place, distance and index. The character i s composed of two phonemes, the upper meaning " f i e l d " , tien ( ff7 ) and the lower meaning " s o i l " or- "place", tu ( iz ).^ The original meaning of the character was as a place of residence,* 0 f i e l d and s o i l . But i t i s also a measure of length referring to 360 paces, bu ( ), and both meanings seemed to have been simultaneous from the days of Mencius. Another word for distance i s also pronounced l i ( ) and i t s e l f means "separation". It can and has been used to mean separation in time (i.e. an event i s "x" distance i n the past) and separation in space (i.e.\two places are separated by "x" miles). This meaning seems to be a l l i e d with that of l i ( J E ) where distance i s both 360 bu and the time required to pace those steps. For entry into the discussion of distance and location, we turn f i r s t to the Chinese postal codes. In this discussion 95 what we are concerned with i s , f i r s t , the problem of 12 indexicality, the definition of measurement. Geography 13 students in cartography classes using standard texts J are taught that each map must use a consistent and usually a constant index of distance. It i s assumed this measure w i l l use some standard measure like feet, inches or light-years to describe as accurately as possible the "real world". This assumption, as Chapter I suggested, comes from the originators of our geographic and logical tradition — the Greeks.^ And that tradition was foreign to China u n t i l the 17th Century, when Matteo Ricci unveiled his world map to the Chinese. The definitions of distance in the postal codes provide the simplest area for analysis and discussion of the concepts of space and time detailed i n the previous chapter. Describing travel times between Peking and the rest of China, the postal codes provide the greatest scale of analysis of the sections investigated in this thesis. Through their necessary emphasis on the measurement of distance they offer a clear picture of how the Chinese dealt with one of the determiners of location. And because the codes were a feature of a l l dynastic statutes through the Ching. they provide a continuous stream of data which i s tied to the bureaucracy that created and used them. POSTAL CODES From the time of Mencius through the Ching, communications were carried by the Chinese postal service. There were private carriers set up to handle individuals' private mail, as 96 well as an o f f i c i a l post which transmitted government documents to and from Peking and the hinterlands* It i s the- latter which concerns us here. Praised by Mencius for i t s efficiency, the o f f i c i a l post was throughout most of China's history the most efficient of agencies, with tables published i n dynastic codes detailing the distances from Peking to distant c i t i e s . While not maps themselves, the codes provided raw data from which maps could be made. I turned to the codes for an idea of the Chinese measurement of distance, expecting to find the separa-tion of Peking and, for example, Mukden, measured in a number of l i consistent for foot carriers and mounted riders alike. While my data i s drawn from one text, the Collected  Statutes and Sub-statutes of the Ch'ing (Da Ch'ing Hui Dien Shr L i ) , an examination of other dynastic atlases indicates the system discussed here was typical of at least those statutes found during the later Chinese periods of the 18th and 19th -Centuries. In the Ch'ing codes, documents were transported at rates of 300, 600, or even 900 l i a day, depending on their rate of urgency. Both the importance of the message i t s e l f and the accessibility of i t s destination determined whether i t was to be carried by runner or by horseman, and within this context the relative distance of transmission. It i s as i f North American postal authorities had a system for the posting of b i l l s , late b i l l s and over-charge drafts, as i f letters were to be sent at varying rates depending on whether they were general notices, friendly letters, important missives, and life-or-death bulletins. The rate of transmission, an index of distance, was not only in terms of physical distance, "as the crow f l i e s " from Peking to city or station, but was defined in terms of the urgency of the document as well. Thus, for example, the distance between Peking and Mukden may have been l i s t e d as 1500 l i , but that was either 28 hours or five days, depending on the urgency of the message. This refers only to the mounted carriers, of course. For messages transmitted by foot carriers, the rate would be much slower. Although the general rate of mounted transmission was 300 l i a day, the codes recognize certain areas as having physical barriers making distance a more d i f f i c u l t barrier to travel. Thus the codes say that, i n an area necessitating the climbing of peaks and mountain passages, the distance to be travelled in a day i s dropped to 240 l i . In statutes referring to individual places, some destinations are given two general rates, one for the rainy season when passage i s d i f f i c u l t , one for the rest of the year.* 0 And for the travel where a water route could be used, the distance, as computed in time, was significantly less than i f the "real distance" were computed. Table 1 provides a basic description of time from Peking to different c i t i e s as l i s t e d i n days (i? B ) and 11. In different sections of the codes, distance i s computed for the mounted carrier in l i and in travel time. For foot carriers, distance i s at once computed in time and in distance, both entries being given for each place. Foot transmission was obviously slower, and subject to more variables. Foot carriers were used to transmit non-priority documents. S t i l l , 98 Table ...l. Distances from Peking Measured in Time and L i (from the Da Ch'ing Hui dien shr l i ) Mounted Carrier Runner To (city) (davs) (days) l i C h i l i 3 4 360 Chahar 4 4 410 Jehol 5 4 430 Shanhai Guan 4 7 670 Shandung 5 9 920 Ching Chou fu 8 10 1000 Kwei hwa Chung 6 11 1125 He Dung He Tao 7 11 1145 Shan Si 6 12 1250 He Nan 8/7 hr. 15 1545 Mukden 8 15 1500 Kirin 12 29 2882 Shansi 13 25 2550 HuNan 18/9 hr. 37 3757 An Wei 15 25 2526 Dainlung Chang 18 40 3983 Shansi 17 41 4150 Ningsia 23 40 4050 Laing chow fu 24 43 4300 SiChow 24 43 4300 LiangGuan 32 56 5570 Canton 32 60 6015 YunGwei 40 60 6015 99 the time and distance measures were both considered necessary for an accurate description of travel distance by the code organizers, who were following dynastic traditions of compila-tion stretching far back into Chinese history. This seems to accord with the general principles elucidated in Chapter II. If, as seemed to be the case, space and time were equal categories necessary for location definition, then i t would seem logical to presume distance in space would be measured by time or space interchangeably. If, as the paradoxes suggest, time i s a function of perspective and context, then distance and i t s measure w i l l depend on the type of document to be transmitted and the condition of the terrain to be covered. Urgency can make the "mountains as low as the marshes", by increasing the rate of transmission to a level where increased energy made those barriers relatively minimal. Given the variable road conditions and the multiplicity of routes to certain places, transmissions were, like Chuang tzu's summer insect, restricted by their time. When wheel ruts and burdensome mud made passage d i f f i c u l t , transmission rates of necessity reflected those conditions. Thus the codes present a multiplicity of scales, each a suitable measure of distance depending on the conditions of the region to be traversed and the importance of the message being sent. The physical distance between Peking and certain d i s t r i c t s i s relative to the route taken, land or sea, direct or indirect, mounted or fast message? to the urgency of the message and to the specific physical conditions of the 100 territory to be covered. This distance i s computed both in l i (.6 miles) and in time. As to orientation, here the world i s centered on Peking, the nerve centre of Imperial China. It i s from or to Peking that a l l messages travel, and that centrality of the capital i s , as we shall see, the fixed star i n the Chinese perceptual constellation. This material presents a promising line of enquiry. A complete analysis of the concepts of distance in the dynastic codes would require an analysis of not only those codes available from the Ch'ing but also earlier dynastic records dating back at least to the T'ang. With a complete set of records (and local gazetters), changes in specific distances could be traced, and perhaps explained through references to local and temporary environmental conditions. Similarly, an expanded outline for this work could concentrate on an analysis of the Ch'ing atlas, that profoundly Chinese document compiled i n association with the results and with their f u l l knowledge of the then expanding and new-found cartographic and geographic knowledge of the West. Through an examination of the notes extant in Jesuit journals as well as in Chinese records, a reconstruction of the disagreements between those two groups engaged on a single project could t e l l us much about those areas each saw as c r i t i c a l to measurement, mapping and distance. That project must remain in the future. A complete set of dynastic atlases i s not available at this time, and an 101 analysis of the Ch'ing atlas project would require many documents also unavailable to me at the present. Instead, I turn to landscape painting as another area for analysis. Like cartography, landscape painting has a long tradition complete with commentaries and technical treatises. Like cartography, i t too i s concerned with the description of distance and space. Further, landscape painting provides a lesser scale of analysis, a more abstract picture, of the real world than was found i n the postal codes. The latter were concerned with distance. The paintings depict place. Paintings include techniques for the description of distance^ and direction providing, for us, a laboratory which i s more general than the codes, more specific than the information coded in, say, board games. LANDSCAPE PAINTING The history of art i s one strand i n the seamless garment of l i f e which cannot be isolated from the strands of economic, social, religious or institutional history, without leaving any number of loose threads.1? Geographers have looked to art and landscape rendering both for information about specific locales at specific times and for clues to individual and cultural perceptions of the 18 environment. In the Chinese tradition, writers and arti s t s have written technical treatises and, at least from the T'ang Dynasty onwards, debated the nature of landscape painting, including i t s aims and philosophy. As data and delight, there 102 are also the paintings themselves, complete with seals and colophons, as well as comments on these works and the literature of art historians who have devoted their lives to the investigation and cataloguing of various collections. A principal problem confronting this area of analysis i s the nature of art history. Most Western historians of art have considered their job complete when they have placed a work in i t s correct historical perspective, describing what each writer believes to have been the strengths and failings of a particular work or movement. Until recently there has been l i t t l e attempt to use painting, design or landscape gardening as more than a footnote to intellectual history, an i l l u s t r a t i o n to complement descriptions of worlds long gone. 19 Sinologists like James Cahill , art c r i t i c s like E. R. 20 Gombrich and scholars like RosaMe Colie have begun to change the scholarly perception. For them, and most avowedly for Gombrich, art i s to be seen as science, as a consistent attempt to portray, ever more accurately, individual and group views. It i s sci e n t i f i c in the sense of repeated experimenta-tion, of a continual attempt to describe the environment correctly and with increasing accuracy. Thus Rosalie Colie, for example, uses this idea i n a discussion of Renaissance art and the problem of vacuum (empty space), which to her i s a subset of the problems of space and time. For some, this new view of art history can, and perhaps should, rest on a structuralist base. Gombrich saidi 103 Alas, I belong to the school of thought which does not think i t makes much sense to ask whether the warp or the woof i s more essential to the cloth. The warp may here correspond to the threads of tradition, to what linguists nowadays c a l l the diachronic study of a language... but the existence of such traditions does not absolve us from studying what i s called the synchronic structure of a style, the way the design responded to the pressures of the moment. Both these elements are relevant to our description.... 21 Working within this context, Wen C. Fong says, in an a r t i c l e on the structural analysis of Chinese painting i The aim of structural analysis i s to reconstruct the formal problem to which s t y l i s t i c changes must cofrespond as linked solutions. 2 2 In painting as i n cartography, we are dealing with a two-dimensional abstraction of space and time, 2 3-and in any one work a single answer to an i n f i n i t e set of problem solutions. The nature of the investigation in the Chinese tradition i s made clear by Michael Sullivan who says "the evolution of Chinese painting was an inexorable series of solutions to 2k spatial problems...." Specialists are unanimous i n identifying the nature of space, and i t s depiction, as especially c r i t i c a l in Chinese art. Where Western European art moved early towards a portrayal of volume and mass, the Chinese tradition was one of the brush line, of delineation. This i s the f i r s t essential of Chinese art texts, the emphasis on the line, of describing the basics of figure and word. The character hua. "painting" ( ^  ), depicts a hand holding a brush over paper and beneath i t i s a f i e l d — and the delineating l i n e . The relation of this " f i r s t essential" to the representation of space i s made clear by Mai-mai Sze who writes i n her translation of the Mustard-seed Manual painting texti The F i r s t Essential also emphasized the importance of the brush i n drawing and creating form, including the space surrounding and containing forms. Such space... was a factor strongly influenced by Taoist ideas about the emptiness, the space that i s f i l l e d with TAO. The  magnificent rendering of space in Chinese paintings, particularly landscapes... were deliberately placed and drawn so as  to emphasize the space, was a direct result of Taoist ideas about the great void. 25 In these discussions of space, Sze and others are usually talking about empty space, blank areas i n the painting, or an area suggesting haze and mist. As Anil de Silva writes, space i n this sense i s ...not a mere emptiness but a positive agent. The feeling for (empty) space as a positive rather than a negative element i s one of the continuing „/• characteristics of Chinese painting. As a category and an element of landscape portrayal, space becomes, in the words of Cahill, a "spatial continuum within the picture." For some, this i s most clearly seen in the relative absence of color i n most Chinese painting. To Shermann Lee, as to others, the absence of color i s of a part with the Chinese emphasis on line and space. The use of color i s , to the West, both a component of reality and a purveyor of volume, of verisimilitude and of mass — none of which was crucial or 27 even desireable to the Chinese landscape tradition. ' Instead of a linear perspective, we have, by the T'ang and early Sung, paintings i n which space i s compartmentalized, pictures composed of several areas and which can each be entered in stages with a receding plane t i l t e d at a different angle towards the viewer. Here there i s variable depth instead of linear perspective. The landscape i s defined through techniques of overlap, texture, contrast, relative location 28 (of components i n the painting) and variable size. This may be clearer i f we consider a single s c r o l l like Wang fu's "Thatched Hut among Clouds and Flowers" <(#^^ft ). The eye i s not drawn immediately to either of the painting's two figures but to the foreground pine, and from there to the crag piercing the sky at the painting's upper l e f t . The tree's dense texture overlapping on the sparser middle h i l l leads us away from the thatched hut, and the crag's dense foliage suggests a nearness which i s probably not the case, i f the painting were taken as an accurate representation of real i t y . Certainly the figure i n the grass hut i s too large, i f we are to consider i t i n relation to the solitary individual at lower l e f t . The laws of linear perspective now seem suspended. The painting i s one of successive overlaps, of multiple texturing to emphasize the relative location of the painting's components. If the figures do not obey laws of linear perspec-tive, they emphasize both the importance of individuals and their relative insignificance in relation to nature. 106 This i s possible and perhaps necessary because of the Chinese view of the world and i t s order. If what mattered in the Chinese view of the world was the configuration of chance events at a moment, the continuum of space and time when seen at a specific moment from a single perspective, then a painting like Wang fu's must remain honest to both the author's vision and sensibilities as well as provide an opportunity for the viewer to bring his feelings to the fore. A painting becomes not only a record of physical reality, but a vehicle for dialogue and a world of i t s own. The scale of a painting comes from the world, but i s separate from i t . As Taung Ping saidi A vertical stroke of three inches may equal a height of several thousand feet; a horizontal passage of ink of a few feet may represent a distance of 100 miles. 29 This i s similar to the earlier paradox which described the mountains as low as the marshes, as heaven on the same level as earth. In painting that becomes transformed into a rationale for variable scale, and the manipulation of physical distance to give the work meaning. It also suggests the imperative of depth as opposed to linear perspective, a u t i l i z a t i o n of the techniques of distance and location for the representation of relations in a landscape. Following most writers, the discussion so far has concentrated on the explicit spatial characteristics of Chinese painting, but time was no less c r i t i c a l , no less crucial an element of the genre. This becomes clearer when we examine the importance of seals and colophons i n relation to paintings 107 as a whole. Like Chinese poetry, painting was done not merely for sale or as a technical document describing for posterity a specific individual or event. In the Confucian tradition, there i s a genre of portraiture designed to preserve for moral instruction the countenances of past rulers. But on the whole paintings, and especially landscape paintings, were commemora-tives of a parting, immortalizations of the juncture or reunion of two friends. Although most writers have concentrated on the unique spatial treatment of Chinese paintings, Anil de Silva at least recognizes the treatment of time implicit within these worksi By this I take him to mean part of a greater event, bounded not by place or time, but within their context and that of individuals. This i s of a part with the traditional view of the past in Chinese history where, as A. F. Wright sayst These views are normally associated with the Taoist tradition, as opposed to the Confucian. James Cahill argues b r i l l i a n t l y i n his Confucian Elements i n the Theory of Painting have been the victims of bad press. For them, as for the Taoists, the idea of painting was one of the junction of space Life i s treated neither as an instant of time or as a reflection of light from a given place at that moment, but as a continuous process...30 that this was not the case. 32 He suggests that the Confucians 108 and time, of a moment which — like yin and yang — could communicate with others despite vast distances. His theory which he translates as "lodging". That i s , a painter places his feelings on paper at a certain moment, hoping to include the essence of his emotional state i n whatever scene he chooses to portray. Those feelings, lodged in art, can be later discovered by the individual who sees the painting. When, for a moment, he "knows" that original painter's feelings at the instant of creation, the original ideas which were "lodged" i n the piece are set free. On f i r s t reading, this simultaneity sounds mystical indeed. An i l l u s t r a t i o n of i t s use i n a colophon by 14th Century painter and theorist T'ang Hou may help to il l u s t r a t e the concepti This painting of Secluded Bamboo and a Withered  Tree i s simple i n substance but antique i n conception... What was for him (artist Wang Tiing-Yun) only a means of giving lodging to a moment's exhilaration i s passed down over a hundred generations, and a l l who see i t s torn s i l k and remnant paper must give i n admiration, loving and revering i t . . . The embodiment of a single moment i s the treasure of a hundred ages, and one feels, unrolling i t . a fondness, as i f seeing the man himself.33 Colophons are inscriptions and poems, statements and criticisms written by collectors, authors and friends after a painting i s f i r s t completed. They are the traces of lodging, signals that people after the painter regarded, understood, appreciated and participated i n the work. In the same way, collectors each placed their seal on the painting, usually in crystallizes around a discussion of the term 109 an empty space. Great paintings are in a very real sense not completed when f i r s t sold or given away. Over several hundred years they gather colophons and seals, each f i l l i n g the work u n t i l i t looks like a complete wei-eh'i game. Wang fu's painting considered earlier i s one graphic example of this. An example of the importance of colophons can be seen in a landscape painting by Ni Tsan and Wang Meng. The f i r s t inscription by Ni Tsan describes him sit t i n g alone under an old pine, desolate and lonely. Listening to a stream he paints, then hears the sound of footsteps. After this he dates the painting and mentions that he sends the painting to his friend "to reprove him for frequently missing our appointments". Wang Meng, the absent friend, responds with a poem of his own and the comment that he f i r s t painted the picture for Ni Tsan and has patched up what he considered to be inferior brushwork, added a poem and generally "put matters straight". There i s then an inscription by the Ch'ien Lung emperor which states i t i s a joint work by both a r t i s t s . Thus the painting i s at once a dialogue between two friends, a statement on communing and solitude and a painting which carries the idea of solitude, dialogue and reunion i n i t s subject matter. The shortness of l i f e and the ephemeral nature of a brush stroke on paper are, i n one sense, complete and perishable. In another sense, they grow and move across centuries joining to the future. For the a r t i s t , a piece i s usually completed 110 when he downs his brush, but the completed work i s never 'ih, done. Here the painting i s i n essence changei over time, i t s space i s anchored by the additions of later years. If the paintings reveal depth and usually lack linear perspective, they seem to have a temporal perspective. The colophons, comments and seals added to paintings provide a ground on which the painting's figure can be seen. This temporal perspective i s not separate from, but intimately combined with the space rendered i n the paintings — i t i s complementary to the nature of painted space. Functionally, the space and mist in a Chinese painting allow room for seals to be stamped. These two (space and seal) function in relation, providing a multiple perspective i n space and time, a four-dimensional depth to pervade each work. In Chapter II we saw space and time as mutual aspects of location, variables subject to the perspective of the individual and, i n various context, subject to different scales. This four-dimensional depth in Chinese painting seems to be intimately related to that general category of order f i r s t identified in Chapter II, a logical ramification of a complex of assumptions which our i n i t i a l hypothesis suggested would be found throughout areas of culture. If, with other commentators, we f i r s t framed the discussion of this relation by a use of paradox, the logical resolution comes i n this type of graphic representation. It i s i n this sense that the Chinese copyist tradition may also be best seen. Most Chinese painters would render I l l landscapes "in the tradition of" an earlier painting they admired. Sometimes they copied the painting exactly, other times they rendered the same scene with personal touches and revelations. These works done on works representing others* work were not seen as forgeries, mere scholasticism or sheer pedantry, but as a temporal perspective, a reflection on the changes both in the nature of individual places and in the artists* respective times. Indeed, they provide a running dialogue on the importance of specific places and scenes, creating a vast and continuous scroflil across centuries of individual journies i n a communal enterprise. Poets did the same thing, using phrases and styles made popular by earlier masters. These echoes of the past in subject and style are a type of perspective and lodging, a relating of times and places, of time and place. If a r t i s t s are separated by decades and centuries, they are in another sense joined through the scene each painted and through the poetic forms and phrases each used. The distance i s overcome through an emphasis on the centrality not of progres-sive time or an exile's home, but of shared concerns and the created mutuality evident i n a similarly painted event. For Anil de Silva the logical expression of this idea or attitude is« The use of multiple perspective. When the intention i s simplyto record what one person sees from one particular point, then of course the linear or ' s c i e n t i f i c ' perspective developed in Europe?.during the Renaissance i s the appropriate means of expression. But i f the whole conception 112 of a landscape i s the mind, then a multiple perspective i s natural. In Europe, linear perspective was f i n a l l y rejected by the Cubists, who returned to various forms of the multiple view. Perhaps i n this aspect they have something i n common with Asian painting. 35 It i s interesting that de Silva makes a comparison here with the Cubists who are the direct ancestors of the tradition Baigel, already quoted, discusses. In his study of 1960*s art, Baigel recognizes the necessity of discussing space and time as facets of individual art works. De Silva says "of course", as i f the " s c i e n t i f i c " 37 perspective were a constant in Western art history. The linear perspective was really among the hardest won of a number of technical and theoretical advances of the Renaissance. Irwin points out that the creation of rules of " s c i e n t i f i c " perspective as worked out by Desargues was hampered for several hundred years by Euclid's f i f t h postulate which states that parallel lines nevermeet.-^ The mathematical disavowal of this postulate became the basis of 19th Century non-Euclidean geometry which was crucial to the revolution which i s 20th Century mathematics and physics. The space-time categories f i r s t examined in the context of the paradoxes also seem to function as ordering principles for Chinese art. We have mountains as high as the marshes in a two-dimensional rendering of space; we have painters joining with the work of their earlier fellows ("going to Yueh today and arriving yesterday"), we have space and time relative to the specific event and the scale of each work dependent on the 113 painting's individual scene. Thus, i n the Chinese landscape painting tradition we see operating the general principles identified i n Chapter II. Space and time function in relation to the specific event, variables whose scale of action i s not determined by any yard-stick but that of the actor in a specific context. The traditions of copyist and colophon replicate the Confucian idea of lodging, allowing for a reveral of time's direction which could have been a predictable outgrowth of the paradoxes (going to Yueh today, arriving yesterday). Here distance i s variable, dependent not only on the components of the scene i t s e l f , but of the arti s t ' s individual context as well. And that context i s presented through the poems and comments which provide such a crucial dimension to the Chinese painting tradition. But i f this scale of analysis provides insight, i t also presents barriers. It i s not general enough to function as analog for other types of behavior. Nor i s i t so specific as to readily yield the type of hard, computable data found in the dynastic codes. Realizing this, I turned my attention to the board game wei ch'i. Considered by Asians and Westerners alike as an analog for p o l i t i c a l and military activity, i t s influence can be seen throughout Chinese culture, from urban design to the strategies of war, from poetry to autistic representation. This discussion i s broken into three parts. The f i r s t , which w i l l conclude Chapter III, introduces wei ch'i and 114 provides a background to the game, i t s history and importance.. The next chapter opens with a brief discussion of game theory and then provides a basic description of the wei ch'i rules which should allow the reader unfamiliar with the game to follow Chapter V's discussion of the game's relation to principles of space and time. WEI CH'I I m A U B t « 1 ff it « n 4 m & * tt H I hear i t said Chang-An resembles a wei ch'i game. One hundred years of worldly aff a i r s won't vanquish sorrow, Princes and Nobles each dwell i n new positions, Warriors and gentry alike marvel at olden times. Directly North at Mt. Pass gongs and drums excite, quicken as Chariots and horses attack west, feathered notices are fast dispatched. Fish and Dragons are solitary, alone i n the icy autumn Yang Tse River. To li v e i n peace, the old country, in such thoughts I currently dwell. ~ Q Tu fu^* The next area of examination was the board game wei ch'i ), known by most Westerners by the Japanese name, "Go". 115 Certainly played by the time of the later Han Dynasty, i t has functioned in China as an analog for war, urban planning concepts, and cosmology. It has been the li t e r a r y subject of poems, the basis for myths, and a minor motif i n courtly paintings. Any analysis of wei ch'i can be checked and deepened by volumes of game theory developed by Western analysts in recent years, or compared with analysis of strategy and t a c t i c a l essays written i n China and Japan by devotees over the last two millenia. When Tu fu tapped the board game wei ch'i for imagery, the game was already at least a thousand years old in China. Both Herbert A. Giles and Joseph Needham place the earliest records of the game at 300 B.C. It i s mentioned in a military context i n the L i Chin, one of the Ch'i Shu, a collection of military writings including the Sun tzu. Several of the strategists i n the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a f i c t i o n a l piece describing the period after the Han, were avid players. According to one legend, the game was invented by Emperor Shun (reign 225 to 2206 B.C.) to strengthen the mind of his weak son, Shang Kiun. Some sources credit Emperor Ya, his precedessor, with the game's creation. These are mythic originsi the truth i s not, and w i l l probably never be known. Tu fu's comparison of the capital city of "Long Peace", Chang-An, to wei ch'i i s not pure metaphor. The city i s l a i d out, like a wei ch'i board, on a 19-line grid. If, as Needham suggests, the original game served divinitory functions and was fraught with cosmological significance, so was the ci t y . Takeo Hinoke suggests Chang-An was l a i d out with attention paid to numerical correctness, f i t t i n g the city parts into a magic square. As Needham translates the 1st Century A.D. writer Pan Kui The board has to be square, for i t signifies the earth, and i t s right angles signify uprightness. The pieces (of the two sides) are yellow and black, this difference signifies the Yin and the Yang — scattered in groups a l l over the board, they represent heavenly bodies. These significances being manifest, i t i s up to the players to make the moves. And this i s connected with kingship. Following what the rules permit, both opponents are subject to them — this i s the rigor of the Tao.^3 More recently, i t has been considered an excellent training aid for m i l i t a r i s t s . The late Ch'ing Dynasty General Tso Tsung-T'ang was reported to be an avid player who played two games a day, even when on campaign. Mao tze Dung himself was a devotee, apparently influenced by the generals i n the Romance of the Three Kingdoms (which he admired as a boy) In his military writings, Mao likens war to wei ch'i several times, and does so i n describing wei ch'i-like tactics. In "Problems of Strategy i n Guerilla War Against Japan", for example, he wrote Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own — rather like a game of wei ch'i. Campaigns and battles fought by two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of stronghold by the enemy and of guerilla base areas by us resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. It i s i n the matter of 'dominating 117 the spaces' that the great strategic role of guerilla base areas to the read of the enemy i s revealed. * According to Scott Boorman, wei ch'i can be used as an anaology for Maoist military and p o l i t i c a l activity, both i n the war against the Japanese, and i n the c i v i l war which preceded and followed i t . He quotes Mao's statement just cited, along with others to suggest the relation of wei ch'i to Maoist military activity. Basing his argument on what he believes to be the uniquely "protracted" nature of the wei ch'i game, i t s unusually large number of moves, i t s t e r r i t o r i a l objectives and i t s "linearity", Boorman argues board positions can be used as specific analogs for specific military situations. The advantage of his approach i s i t s attempt to isolate certain elements of the game which seem to him, as to Mao, to provoke comparisons between the game and a type of war situation. The problems of his analysis are twofold. One i s the question of faith, and the other of one-to-one comparisons. For those who are not certain the "reasonableness of the ensuing deductions" w i l l justify such a leap of faith, he says e a r l i e r i It i s safe to assume that, historically, there has probably been considerable interaction between the strategy 6$ wei ch'i and the strategy used i n Chinese warfare. If indeed wei ch'i and Chinese Communist strategy are products of the same strategic tradition, wei ch'i may be more r e a l i s t i c a l l y used as an analogic model of that strategy than any purely theoretical structure generated by a Western social scientist,47 That begs the question. The historic connection between strategy and tactics i n war and wei ch'i i s simply the number of famous generals who have played and used i t as an analogy for positions. Those same gentlemen probably played Syiang Ch'i and Mah Jong too. In fact, at least one military historian has used Syiang Ch'i, the Chinese chess derived from Chataranga, which gave birth to our modern variant, as an analog for military behavior. Nor does Boorman deal with basic structural elements, as structuralists use the term. Rather he uses the game — aphorism and positions — to attempt to describe Maoist strategy i n p o l i t i c a l and military campaigns. He argues tautologically for the relevance of one to the other. Western military historians intuitively agree with him about the c r i t i c a l place wei ch'i has i n Asian strategic planning. The Japanese passion for the game moved the U.S. War Department at the time of the Second World War to acquire as many texts as possible, in an attempt to understand the Japanese military mind. Those same generals attempted to plumb the depths of Sun Tzu's famous Treatise on War. for similar reasons. This thesis attempts to show at least one rationale for the apparent compatibility of wei ch'i and politico«military tactics. Any analog depends on a recognition of the abstraction formulating i n general terms specific definitions and rules operative in the real-world situation. That i s , in structural terms, both the situation and i t s analog w i l l share a single order-systemi one w i l l be an abstraction, and an encoding of 119 the other. I suggest wei ch'i replicates traditional concepts of space and time important i n the Chinese cultural tradition which can be applied to what Boorman calls "conflict situations". In many ways these are too abstract to function as pure analog. A war position i s not wei ch'i. Medieval knights carried chess sets to battle. But, unlike the religious troops, the chess pieces did not bleed, pillage or rape. Liu Pai-Yu's reports of battles i n the Chinese c i v i l war make clear the variance between board positions and real l i f e with i t s variances i n terrain, heroic individuals, and uncertainties. To move from one to another, i t i s necessary to use a system of transformations. For this thesis, I w i l l use Sun Tzu 1s Bing-Pa, a military treatise which was written as wei ch'i became popular, and has been studied by every general and mi l i t a r i s t from the Han Dynasty through Mao, i t s best know modern devotee. Before we move into a description of the game i t s e l f , and an analysis of i t s similarities and differences with spatio-temporal ideas, i t i s important to step back and remember the history of Chinese warfare. CHINESE WAR Primitive Chinese battles, that i s , wars fought before 500 B.C., were both savage and chivalrous a f f a i r s . Kings and 120 princes were far less l i k e l y to be bloodied than the peasant foot soldier. Tales abound of gentlemen kings who lent their enemies c r i t i c a l supplies, because that was the correct conduct of gentlemen. Battles were rather limited a f f a i r s with limited objectives. By the time of the Han Dynasty, things were changing quickly. The traditional feudal society which had accepted chivalrous war had changed. With i t changed the aims and means of armed conflict. Armies were capable of co-ordinated move-ment in accord with detailed plans, and systems of communica-tion were now c r i t i c a l . A whole set of writings emerged, each supposedly vying for a position as the best series of strategic guidelines available. Sun Tzu's Bing-Fa. written around 500 B.C., was the most famous. It advocated a type of limited war in which territory, not slaughter, was the objective. Wars were won not by mere numbers alone, according to Sun Tzu, but by intelligence. Information on terrain, armies, weapons and costs — both for the enemy and for the commanding general -- were what won a war. Intelligence, that i s , both i n the military sense of communication, and human knowledge, was his key. His wars were total, but the aim was not crushing the enemy. "Its object was not victory, but the re-establishment of order, and for this the arts of peace were equally necessary. Samuel G r i f f i t h paints a nice picture of Chinese war, a 121 thumbnail sketch of tradition and the changes i n which wei ch'i and Sun Tzu prospered! The battles of ancient China were primitive melees in which armies usually encamped opposite one another for several days while the diviners studied the auguries and the respective commanders conducted propitiatory sacrifices. When the auspicious moment selected by the soothsayers arrived, the entire array, whose roars shook the heavens, threw i t s e l f precipitately upon the enemy. A local decision was produced speedily... Victory was rarely exploited — limited operations were undertaken to achieve objectives.** Shortly before 500 B.C. the concepts which had moderated warfare began to change. War became more ferocious... when Sun Tzu appeared on the scene, the feudal structure, in the ultimate stages of disintegration, was being replaced by an entirely different type of society in which there was much more opportunity for a talented individual... Battle had become directed effortt the valiant no longer advanced unsupported, nor did the coward flee. Elements of the new armies, capable of co-ordinated movement in accord with detailed plans, were responsive to systematic signals. The science (or art) of tactics was born.52 It did not always work well. One example where the •'advice of the sages" helped out i s given by Kierman, who discusses the battle of Ching Hsing i A l l the Han generals, who had been gloomy back i n the gorge when Han Hsin promised them victory, asked why he had adopted so unorthodox a position with his troops backed up to a river; he responded by countering their citation of Sun Tzu with one of his own; 'Put the men in the position of death and they w i l l l i v e , place them i n a hopeless position and they w i l l survive!' Furthermore, I did not possess officers and men I had taken care of regularly. This was what they c a l l driving 122 driving men to fight straight from the marketplace... had I not set them i n the position of death, causing every man to fight for himself ... a l l would have run away.53 Questions of death and l i f e , placement and distance, are also the problems of wei ch'i. CHAPTER IIIi NOTES AND REFERENCES 123 ATheoretically any area of human expression should he accessible to analysis. These are, for a his t o r i c a l and cultural geography, only those which come most immediately to mind. 2 The relation between poetry, painting and lanscape imagery can be seen through studies of brush technique, poetry or painting. For the f i r s t , there i s Fritz Van Briessen, The Way of the Brush (Tuttle Co., Rutland, Vt.i 1962), a good introduction. For poetry, any anthology w i l l do, including the usual college texts 300 Years of T'ang Poetry (Wittier Brynner, trans.) i n numerous editions, or 100 Poems  from the Chinese, Kenneth Rexroth, trans. (Tuttle Co., Rutland, W7T. o -^ John Fairbanks and Teng Ssu-yu, "On the Transmission of Ching Documents" and "Types and Uses of Ch'ing Documents", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 4ili12-46 and 5 t l i l - ? l , respectively. (I stumbled upon these articles after plowing through the documents myself. Ah well, t^^^^^^ L James M. Blaut as quoted i n Denis Wood, I Don't Want To  But I Will (Clark University Cartographic Laboratory, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.t 1974), pp. 359-364. Wood's analysis was one of the f i r s t seeds of interest which led to this project. ^H. Chatley defines Fengshui in the Encyclopedia Sinical. Si Couling, ed. (Shanghai, 1917), p. 175, as the "art of adapting the residences of the l i v i n g and the dead so as to co-operate and harmonize with the local (and specific) currents of the cosmic breadth." Quoted in Yifu Tuan's "Discrepancies between Environmental Attitude and Behavior1 Examples from Europe and China", Canadian Geographer. XII«3 (1968), p. 182. He also cites Andrew Marche's "An Appreciation of Chinese Geomancy", Journal of Asian Studies. XXVII (1968), pp. 2 5 3 - 2 6 7 . Also of interest i s L.C. Porter, Fend-shui or How the Chinese Keep i n Time with Nature", Chinese Recorder. Vol. 51 (1920), pp. 837-850, cited i n Shuen Yan David Lai, "A Feng-shui Model as Location Index", Annals of the Associa- tion of American Geographers (Dec. 1 9 7 4 7 1 ^ S t i l l among the best general studies to date i s Paul Wheatley, The Pivot of the Four Quarters (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1 1959). Wheatley provides leads for anyone wishing to venture where I now fear to tread. °For more on this, see Denis Wood's Cartography of  Reality (1973) and Geometry of Ecstacy (1977). Copies of both are available from the author at North Carolina state 124 University at Raleigh, Raleigh, N.C., School of Design. Also of interest along these lines may be Place Perception Research  Report No. 7, Roger A. Hart and Gary T. Moore (Clark University, Worcester, Mass.t 1971). W^ood, Cartography of Reality, i b i d . o Wood, Geometry of Ecstacy. i b i d . ^Bernard Karlgren, Analytical Dictionary of Chinese and  Japanese (Parisi 1923). See ordinal #529. Also see his Grammatica Senica Recensa (Stockholmi 1957). The necessity of etymologic elucidation was impressed upon me by Marwyn Samuels. 1 0 6A t spoken Language Character Study text, defines l i as "residing place", .iu ye (mW. T~, 1 1 T h i s definition^comes from^the Tzu Hai C$^^& ), 12 I am indebted to Denis Wood for a suggestion I frame parts of this discussion with reference to the problem of indexicality. 13 •'See, for example, A.H. Robinson and R.D. Sale, Elements  of Cartography (John Whiley and Sons, New Yorki 1969) or Erwin Raisz. Principles of Cartography (McGraw-Hill, New Yorki 1962). Por a review of this tradition and i t s relation to problems of direction, see Wood, especially Geometry of  Ecstasy, op. c i t . 14 As quoted in Ying-wan Cheng, ib i d . See Mencius, Kung-sun Ch'ou, part 1. 1 5Da Ching Hui Lien Shr l i . p. 141831 Bff^WS. This i s but one of a number of codes published at different times, each including postal information. For a f u l l treatment of the codes, and an accumulated index of distances based on a cross-referencing of different editions, see Fairbanks and Teng, op. c i t . , 1939. The translations here are my own. 16 Ibid. For examplei „ a t = l , , 17 'E. H. Gombrich, Art History and the Social Sciences. (Oxford, Clarendon Pressi 1975), p. 9. 125 18 See for example and most recently Pradyamna P. Kasan and Cotton Mather, "Art and Geographyt Patterns i n the Himalaya", Annals of the Association of American Geographers (Dec. 1974)} also to be considered in this context i s "Discrepancies between Environmental Attitude and Behaviori Examples from Europe and China", Canadian Geographer (XII, 3i 1968), pp. 176-191* by the p r o l i f i c Yi-fu Tuan. ^James Cahill, "Confucian Elements i n the Theory of Painting", in A.F. Wright (ed.). The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford University Press, Cal.i I960). 20 E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusions A Study in the  Psychology of Pi c t o r i a l Representation (Bollingen Series, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J . i i960). While this does not deal with Asian art, outside of a statement detailing Gombrich*s ignorance of the subject and his refusal to speak from ignorance, i t provides one of the most intelligent analyses of art history. A superb book. 21 Gombrich, op. c i t . , p. 10. It i s in his Art and  Illusion that Gombrich expounds on the sc i e n t i f i c nature of art. 22Wen C. Fong, "Towards a Structural Analysis of Chinese Painting", Art Journal XVIII Vol. 4, Summer 1969. p. 396. I quote Fong*s a r t i c l e with some misgivings. The only mention of structural analysis of Chinese painting, i t i s hard to see exactly what he means by his statement in the context of his paper. He seems in the end to be applying a type of ersatz functionalism, rather than a structuralism. 23 vThis simple statement opens a can of worms which i s currently being debated by specialists in cartography and the history of cartography, as well as geographers. For a sample of what this means, see Denis Wood, I Don't Want To But I Will (Clark University Cartographic Laboratory, Worcester, Mass.t 1974), Vol. II, Chapter 14, and his discussion of James M. Blaut's statements 01S space and progress in cartography. 24 Michael Sullivan, The Birth of Landscape Painting i n  China (University of California Press, Los Angeles 1 1962), p. 156. 2^Mai-mai Sze, The Way of Chinese Paintingi Its Ideas  and Technique (Vintage Books, 1959), p. 55. 26 Anil de Silva, The Art of Chinese Landscape Painting (Crown Publishers, New Yorki 1967). p. 67. 27 'See Shermann Lee, The Colors of Ink (Asia Society, Inc., 1974). 126 28 See Mathew Baigel, "American Paintingi On Space and Time i n the Early 60's", Art Journal XXVIII Vol. 4, Summer 1969. In this, he discusses the representation of depth, and the varieties of time they apply. I find i t interesting and suggestive to see theoretical similarities between the paintings he discusses and those which make up the bulk of the T'ang and Sung paintings and theories, and further between the antecedents of the tradition he discusses — surrealism, cubism, in specific. 2^Tsung Ping, "Pei-wen-Chai", Shu-huan-pu chuan r/2a, trans. Alexander C. Sopher in "Early Chinese Landscape Painting", The Art Bulletin XXIII/2 June, 1941, p. 164. 3°Anil de Silva, op. c i t . 3*Arthur F. Wright, "Sui Huang-Tii Personality and Stereotype", in Arthur F. Wright (ed.), The Confucian  Persuasion (Stanford University Press, Cal.1 I960), p. 44. Interestingly, A.A. Robb maintains an event can only be said to precede another i f one can be said to influence the other in some way. This gets to the nitty-gritty of temporal directionality and some of the modern work being done in that, i f you'll pardon the pun, direction. 3 2James, Cahill, Chinese Painting (Skira, Lucernei i960), p. 95. This was my f i r s t introduction to Chinese art, picked up on a whim at a remainder sale. Of a l l those books I have read since, none can compare as a loving and lucid introduction. 33 -^Karen Brock and Rob Thorp, trans., Four Great Painters  of the Yuan {70^^^. ) (National Palace Museum of Taiwan, Tai Pei1 T975), print 302. 34 J Again, this view has modern currency. The most famous example of works and their change over time are those of Marcel du Champ, especially "The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelor, Even". Also known as the big glass. See Arturo Schwartz, 3?he Complete Works of Marcel du Champ (Abrams, New Yorki 196FTT •^Anil de Silva, op. c i t . , p. 34-35. 3°Baigel, op. c i t . 3^De Silva seems to suggest linear can be taken as a synonym for s c i e n t i f i c , which i t s e l f usually means exact, good and modern. In this he ignores what seems to me that crucial foundation of equality on which good art history must build. Chinese art was based on different but no less exact principles, as I have tried to show. Its use of mist, variable figure size and figure/ground relations are a l l acceptable 127 means of non-linear representation, no less exact (i.e. "scientific") than their European counterparts. 3 8William Irwins, Jr., Art and Geometry (Dover Publica-tions, New Yorki 194$). This i s a central thesis i n Irwins* book. -^Tu fu, "Autumn Meditations", No. 4. The translation i s mine. Herbert A. Giles, "Wei Ch'i or the Chinese Game of War" (Temple Bar Vol. XLIX, #194). 4 1Joseph, Needham, SCC Vol. IV, p. 314-316. ^Takeo Hiraoka, ^FfflM^M't ^ ^ ^ (Introduction by Kaijuka Shigeki, Tokyo University, Japan 1958&. I am indebted to Beth Upton for this reference and i t s explanation. 43 JJoseph Needham, op. c i t . , p. 322. Scott A. Boorman quotes Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, for this insight. The Romance of the Three Kingdoms i s published i n English by Tuttle, Rutledge, Vermont, in two volumes. ^Mao tze Dung, Selected Miltarv Writings (Peking Foreign Language Press, Peking! 1963), p. 174. 46 Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Gamei A Wei Ch'i  Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (Oxford University Press! 1969), p. 5. ^ I b i d , p. 38. 48 Sun Tzu's Treatise on War has been translated by H. Giles, C. Lin, and others. The edition I use includes the original characters and both Giles' and Lin's translation. Obtained at The Caves Bookstore in Taipei, Taiwan, i t unfortunately lacks publisher data. ^ L i u Pai-yu, Six A.M. and Other Stories (Peking Foreign Language Press, Peking! 1973). Any book on battles written honestly by men who were there w i l l t e l l the same chaotic story. The works of James Jones and Hemingway come f i r s t to mind. ^°John K. Fairbank, "Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience" and Introduction to Chinese Ways i n Warfare. Frank A. Kierman, Jr. (ed.) (Harvard Asian Series #74! 1974). 5 1Samuel G r i f f i t h , Sun Tzui The Art of War (Oxford University Pressi London, 1963)» P. 32. 5 2 G r i f f i t h , op. c i t . , p. 33-35. 5 3 G r i f f i t h , op. c i t . , p. 60. CHAPTER IV Wei Ch'i i A Description In the idea of chess and the development of the chess mind we have a picture of the intellectual struggle of mankind. Richard Reti 130 GAME THEORY Analog or metaphor, wei ch'i i s a game. Unlike backgammon, poker, chutes and ladders, scrabble or monopoly, wei ch'i i s a total information game. That i s to say i t shares with chess and similar games a salient feature i at any moment through the length of play, a l l factors which can determine subsequent play are observable and accessible to a l l players. Before describing the game and i t s uniqueness, i t may be well to review what a game i s , and where wei ch'i s i t s with i t s members of that enormous and diversified group of ac t i v i t i e s . Games are different from play, although they may be a subset of that category. The difference i s in rules. Play has no necessary prescribed rules which unchangingly define the activity. Games do. At i t s most elementary level, then, we can define a game as an exercise of voluntary control systems i n which there i s an opposition between forces, confined by a procedure and rules in order to produce a disequilibrial outcome.1 Rules — the voluntary control systems — are the subject of this chapter, and with the board and pieces define the game. It i s these rules which differentiate "play" from "gaming", and make the later an ongoing subject of discourse by devotees, and take the activ i t y from oral history to an hist o r i c a l study. Rules, as Roger Callois notes, "transform i t (play) into an instrument of fecund and decisive culture." He has divided games into four categories which help to define the difference between and function of specific games. Games are, for instance, either agonistic or aleatic. The former are competitive with equality of chance. Boxing and chess are two examples. Aleatic games are the opposite, relying in great part on chance (the throw of the dice or the turn of a random card) to determine the winner. Craps can stand as exemplar here. In games whose appeal l i e s i n mimicry, the attraction i s the player's a b i l i t y to escape from himself, to be absolved of his identity and responsibility, l i k e a spectator shouting for G.J. Simpson. Or games can possess the quality of vertigo, allowing for the loss of self and an alteration of conscious-ness (often through intense concentration). By this classification system chess, as i t i s played i n the West, i s agonistic (as are most, i f not a l l , t o t a l -information board games) and creates a vertiginous state. Freudians like Ruben Fine interpret chess as an Gedipal drama and would thus emphasize a mimicry inherent in i t s play, but that i s an interpretation rejected by many. Certainly, the origins of chess are in the camp of the aleatic, for i t has been suggested i t s original Indian prototype Chataranga was a divinitory exercise as well as a passtime. None of this accounts for the fascination of chess or wei ch'i. Those who argue the import of games extend beyond the joy their players receive from their passion f a l l into two not necessarily opposing camps. George Santyana sums up these two groups neatly when he 132 asks i How much of the fascination of chess comes from the excitement of carrying out a purpose under opposition! a suggestion of after-images of d i f f i c u l t i e s i n living? And how much comes from the interest in formal relations, as i n mathematics or stained glass or arabesques?* C.H.O.D. Alexander answers Santayana, saying i The player's motive power... i s 'the excitement of carrying out a purpose under opposition'... The interest in formal relations i s the reason for the individual choosing chess rather than, say football... makes him enjoy the problems of play and enables him to solve them.5 The distinction between "formal relations" and " l i v i n g " i s s i l l y . Formal relations i n games are information codified, and information important to l i v i n g . The a b i l i t y to solve problems requires an understanding of the relation between events and the internalizing and manipulation of rules by which those events act. The relation between games and l i f e i s the relation between algebra and numbers. The general rules concern and regulate the manipulation of individual sets. The great chess player and theorist Richard Reti understood this when he wrotet ...chess presents practical problems such as we meet with i n everyday l i f e . Yet chess i s purely abstract... the idea underlying chess i s to bring the methods of practical dealing into agreement with methods that have no ultimate objects in themselves. Although these quotations were written to describe chess, they apply with equal power to wei ch'i, which resembles chess in so many ways. Both had their origins i n India and were 133 divinitory games which became overt models for war. Both were at one time considered "royal games" (i.e. the "game of kings"). Each has a long history of recorded analysis and devotees developed systems for both by which individual games and 7 specific systems of moves could be recorded and analyzed. Each i s , in i t s respective culture region, a sign of i n t e l l e c t -ual prowess and enormous devotion by i t s players. Both are total information games of enormous elegance and complexity. If we are to believe Reti, both provide a set of abstract relations which can operate not only as board game rules but also as tools for the solution of real l i f e problems. Their respective histories as military training devices emphasizes this practical side of each. The remarks made in the context of Callois* game classification system are, disregarding Fine's psychoanalytic interpretation, equally applicable to wei ch'i and chess. In the next chapters I analyze the game rules of wei ch'i and examine their relation to the categories discussed i n Chapter II as well as i t s potential as an analog for military activity. But for those readers who are not familiar with the game, i t would be a discussion in a foreign tongue, potentially pleasant but unintelligible. So before discussing the relation of wei ch'i, socio-political behavior and space-time, i t i s necessary to describe the game i t s e l f . Any such attempt w i l l be brief, and thus unsatisfactory to those who love and are earnest students of the game. To them I offer my apologies. Although this brief chapter can only provide an introduction to 134 the game, i t should give the complete novice sufficient insight to follow the succeeding analysis. Total information board games (chess, wei ch'i, checkers, and so on) seem to inspire a studious diligence in their devotees and a diligence rarely found in other areas of relaxation. A total information game i s one in which a l l information necessary for a total description of the game situation, and thus for an understanding of the future po s s i b i l i t i e s , i s evident at any moment on the board. Chess qualifies, for at each moment a l l pieces and their respective positions are open to analysis. Backgammon, of course, i s not a total information board game. While the position of each man and the total configuration of the backgammon situation i s overt, the game depends at each move on the throw of dice. Thus the information concerning future throws i s not open. There i s a rule of thumb in game theory which suggests that the more rules a game has, the easier i t i s to play. Children's games give players few options. Throw the dice and make the move — there are few options in "Chutes and Ladders". On the other hand, chess, whose rules are relatively simple, i s considered an enormously complex game. Wei ch'i, with a larger board and simplified pieces, has far fewer rules than chess, and i s correspondingly more complex. WEI CH'I DESCRIPTION8 Wei ch'i i s a two-person game. It i s played on a monocromatic board covered by a simple square grid surface of 135 19 horizontal and 19 vertical lines spaced equidistantly and o forming 19 or 361 intersections on which individual plays are to be made. The game i s played with light and dark pieces, called "stones" or "men". 180 @f each color comprise the game's total stock of pieces. Each player uses one color exclusively, as in chess, and can be referred to as the "black" or the "white" player. Unless a handicap i s given, play begins with a clear board. Black always plays f i r s t , placing a stone on an intersect anywhere on the board, and white replies by placing a stone on the playing surface. The object of the game i s to surround and secure as many empty intersects as possible, the player with the most "space" at the end of the game being declared the winner. In the pursuit of this goal, pieces are sometimes captured, and those captured pieces, taken from the board, are placed i n the opponent's territory at the end of the game, thus decreasing his free, unoccupied space. The basic rules of the game can be summarized as followst (1) The objective of both sides i s to encircle vacant intersections. C2) Stones are placed on intersects and can be placed in any vacant intersection a player chooses, provided that that intersect i s not surrounded on a l l four sides by the stones of the other player. Once played, pieces cannot be moved, except i f captured, i n which case they are taken from the board by the opponent. 136 (3) A stone or group of stones i s captured when every board intersection adjoining the stone or stones i s occupied by pieces of the opposite color. (4) Stones not actually captured but which can be taken at w i l l be the opponent are termed "dead" and count at the end of the game as captured. (5) Captured stones are used at the end of the game to f i l l and decrease territory belonging to the stones of the same color as the captured stone. (6) The game ends when neither side considers i t s e l f able to secure additional territory or to capture or k i l l more enemy stones. (7) Score i s the sum of the intersections secured by either side at the end of the game. The side with the highest score wins. Basic Definitions and Concepts Positions are formed by groups of two or more stones connected along one of the board's lines. Each stone i s placed on an intersect, and forms a part of a group when i t i s directly adjacent to a stone of the same color along a line of the board. Groups of stones are the phonemes of wei ch'i, used to secure territory. Within the game context, territory may be defined as intersections impregnably surrounded by the stones of one or the other side. Territory i s a connected set of empty intersections so completely surrounded by one player that men from the other side would not be able to capture the area secured. 13? g h B / — / V r 3 ... V. ( s 'A. Figure 1 In the above Figure, group B forms a group, a unit joined on the east-west axis. Area C, on the other hand, provides two stones not connected and each totally vulnerable. A play at "q M or "p" would join the two. Group A shows the development of a larger group of stones, each connected. During the game, and especially during i t s early plays, groups of stones w i l l p a r t i a l l y command areas of the board such that i t i s probable that territory w i l l be secured by the end of the game. During any point of the early middle game, there may be four or f i v e o f these "areas of influence", each secured by a base group. Often, these form the major areas of 138 attack and defence. The fight for territory i s in part a battle for tempo, or shien shou ($t ^ ~ ). The player assigned the black stones moves f i r s t , and by dint of this f i r s t move has the freedom to play and to force response. His opponent's f i r s t task i s to attempt to wrestle the i n i t i a t i v e from his r i v a l , thus gaining the tempo himself. Stones are captured when they, individually, or as part of a group, are completely surrounded on a l l directly adjacent cardinal intersections by enemy stones. For groups on the end of the board, they must be surrounded such that the group has no adjacent intersects on which to play, either at the edge or moving into the board. Figure 2 In Figure 2, group A, white i s nearly surrounded. When black plays at "p",.white w i l l be total l y surrounded by black and the white .pieces would be then removed. A similar situation exists in B where white i s totally surrounded, except for an interior point which i s indefensible. In diagram C, however, black cannot be taken, having formed a territory in which two intersects are totally defended (intersects " r " and "s"). In Diagram D, white w i l l be surrounded. Often groups whieh seem hopelessly encircled w i l l be abandoned both by attacker and defender. The defender moves his attention elsewhere, cutting his losses. The attacker does not f i l l potential territory he can gain anytime, but attempts rather to maintain his i n i t i a t i v e . These nearly-encircled groups are "dead", unless future developments (i.e. greater encirclement of the whole area by the original defender) change the situation. At the end of the game, but before the scoring, "dead" groups are removed from the board. To be captured, the stones must be completely surrounded inside and outside a configuration. In Figure 2, Diagram IX, for example, black i s completely surrounded by white on the outside, but not within, ^here there are three spaces. If black were to play at N - l l , the central interior spot, white would be unable to capture the group. If he were so foolish as to play on either side, his stone would be immediately surrounded on four sides and removed from the board. This i s position C i n Figure 3. If white plays at N - l l f i r s t , however, the black stones 140 w i l l soon be captured and removed, as in Diagram X. If white plays at N-ll and black plays at M-ll, there i s one space l e f t . Playing there, white i s surrounded when he places his stone down but, while placing his man i n jeopardy, effects the immediate capture of the surrounding and threatening group. Thus the move i s allowed, and despite that momentary surrounding, white can capture a l l the black. A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T Figure 3 This exception, and the following, make the importance of tempo clear. In Figure 4, Diagram I, i f white plays f i r s t at A-12, he completely surrounds the adjacent black group and can remove i t from the board. If black plays f i r s t , and at the 141 same intersect, he has surrounded the white pieces inside and out, capturing the whole series. In Diagram II, i f black plays at J-2, he w i l l inevitably f i l l up the entire inside and capture white's group. Whatever white's response, i t w i l l merely decrease and constrict his surrounded territory. If white plays there f i r s t , however, we have a secured white territory, as seen in Diagram III. If black plays at K-18, M-18, or L-l?, he i s immediately surrounded on four sides, and gains nothing by doing this. It i s therefore i l l e g a l and there i s no way white can be taken. The intersect guarded on four sides by the stones of one color i s c r i t i c a l . The conjunction of two such eyes defines secured territory. Figure 4 142 The a b i l i t y to place a man in temporary jeopardy to gain another's stone gives rise to a situation called "ko" (eternity) by the Japanese. Consider the following insert from a board« A B C D E F G Figure 5 If white plays at D-17, he can take black's stone C-17. Black could then again play at C-17 and take white's last stone. And on and on. To prevent an "eternity" of repeating moves, the player whose stone i s f i r s t taken must wait at least one move before attempting to regain the position. That c r i t i c a l move barrier can allow the player to maintain his tempo, to move to another area of the board, or to solid i f y his position with another stone. Diagram II shows a similar position with the colors 143 reversed. But i n Diagram III, i f white plays at C-8, he captures the three adjoining black stones to i t s right. Black cannot immediately play at D-8, and looses the board position. In the following diagrams we have "seki" positions where neither player can advantageously touch the configuration. If, for instance, white plays at S-16, black would then play T-16, capturing. If black plays f i r s t , white could immediately capture the inner black stones, and secure the territory. The configuration remains, then, an incomplete world u n t i l or unless influenced by other areas of the game. If white surrounded the total position, including the stone at Q-16, for instance, the situation would be different. Figure 6 ILL Figure 7 145 A game i s over when no more territory can be taken, when additional play would be f u t i l e . It i s a rarity that both players use their total allotment of stones. If a l l stones were played, there could be no winners, because a l l space would be u t i l i z e d for pieces — and occupied spaces do not count. Play i s ended by agreement between the players and, to the novice at least, this appears arbitrary. The next diagram shows a completed game included in Smith's teaching book, and i t in turn i s taken from Korschvelt. The heavy lines drawn show the connections between various groups of stones. One could as easily define the end of the game as a mutual recognition by the two players that their respective A B C D E F G H J K L M N O P Q R S T Figure 8 groups are each self-contained, or connected. 146 Basic Strategy, Tactics, and Moves In very general terms, wei ch'i moves can be described as defensive or offensive« those which aim at consolidating stones already played, and those .moves which react to moves by the opponent. Offensive moves aim at extending territory, attacking an unsecured enemy base in one or another area of influence, or joining two separate spheres with a third series of moves. Defensively, eyes are made, stones separated by more than one space are connected by a third, and corners, locations i n which two stones abut on a diagonal, but not along intersect lines, and joined by a third stone at an intersect. Offensively, stones are placed where they can prevent the formation of eyes by the enemy, i n proximity to existing enemy stones where they may create territory exploiting enemy weakness, or i n areas of the board which are not at that time areas of conflict. In his discussion of wei ch'i strategy, Boorman identifies three "structural characteristics basic to the motifs of the game's high strategy i wei ch'i i s a protracted game"; i t i s a "war of jigsaw pattern"; and i t i s a game in which victory and defeat are relative phenomena;- "Briefly, these three aspects may be called the time, space and conflict dimensions of wei c h ' i . " 9 I doubt whether these are indeed structural character-147 i s t i c s of anything. Boorman does not defend the term, but I suspect he means functional, or general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . For reasons which w i l l be explained l a t e r , i n Chapter V, I prefer to consider them s t r u c t u r a l l y as temporal, s p a t i a l and r e l a t i o n a l (interface) categories. By protracted, Boorman means the game involves many moves and takes a long time with a " r e l a t i v e l y slow rate of play." C r i t i c a l to h i s whole theory, t h i s unique aspect of wei c h ' i (and Maoist strategy) i s due i n great part to the board size of 361 i n t e r s e c t s . He says " I t i s i n great part the differences i n board size between the Asian game and these 10 Western games that account f o r the discrepancy i n duration." When I studied wei c h ' i i n Taiwan, we often played the game on a quarter of the board, with each game taking a b i t more than h a l f an hour. A l l other game aspects remained constant — strategy, t a c t i c s , positions and ideas — but the board was smaller. Certainly, average players i n Taiwan took no longer f o r a game of wei c h ' i than a t y p i c a l chess player of the same s k i l l i n North America playing his game. E i t h e r time of play i s a l l or nothing, and the wide variances between players, tournament and private, indicate i t i s a poor base on which to b u i l d a theory. Further, "rate of play" means the amount of time a l l o t t e d f o r each player to place h i s piece on the board, rate r e f e r r i n g to speed of performance. In chess and wei c h ' i , rate i s variable, with players of both games often moving i n rapid succession (say, during the i n t e n s i v e l y studied opening moves 148 of either game) or with agonizing slowness and indecision at some c r i t i c a l moment. The difference l i e s not i n rate of play, but the relative importance of different pieces. In most games, different pieces have greater or lesser power. In wei ch'i, each piece i s equal. In chess the use of the queen speeds up any problemi mate usually requires only three major pieces. In wei ch'i, any situation w i l l involve upwards of twenty men, each equal i n power, for the total position to be clear. The idea of "protracted war" comes from several essays by Mao tze Dung in which he refers to Maoist guerilla strategy as that of protracted war. But Mao realized i t was but one phase of the conflict i n which he found himself, one dictated by the circumstances and not necessarily by the nature of the conflict i t s e l f . Maoist revolutionary strategy, which Boorman was studying, involves more than guerilla strategy, a point he never acknowledges. The "jigsaw pattern", a special characteristic of wei ch'i, means a game in progress looks like a "half completed jigsaw puzzled, a half-effaced mosaic, at once complicated and 11 indefinite," This i s because play i s "structurally non-linear or, more precisely, discontinuous." That i s to say, pieces of either color are not grouped into continuous lines or groups outflanking the opponent with a grand push. The reasons for this non-linear nature of wei ch'i are the blank board upon which play starts and the lack of restriction on players' movement, he reasons. That i s , one can begin 149 anywhere and work behind an enemy's lines, disrupt any emerging "frontline", and attempt patterns of encirclement and counter-encirclement in the fight for place. He i s correct i n his description of board play beginning with an empty surface and indescribing encirclement as a major tactic. And yet to argue from this to the non-linear nature of wei ch'i i s dangerous. Checkers begins with a non-linear arrangement of i t s men, who can never be on a single l i n e . Although chess begins with a l l i t s pieces set out on two rows, each side's pieces facing the opponent's, the situation quickly changes. Mate i s usually accompanied with at least one piece deep behind enemy lines, penetrating far into hostile territory. Early moves i n chess often take a jigsaw pattern (a S i c i l i a n defence responding with the Queen's bishop pawn to the King."pawn opening i s the best known example). In fact, chess players often aim for a "zum-zwag"-style finish in which pieces on opposite sides of the board press forward simultaneously, forcing the defender to s p l i t his barely adequate resources to defend against two invasions. This style of ending i s non-linear and t e r r i t o r i a l , much in the s p i r i t of Boorman's praises of wei ch'i. Boorman says the "conflict dimension" of wei ch'i i s related to the temporal and spatial characteristics he identifies as peculiar to wei ch'i. Unlike chess, in which victory rests on capture of one piece, "because of the ease with which both players can form safe groups and hence gain territory, victory i n wei ch'i i s incomplete." Victory i s "relative", a mere matter of having more territory than the opponent, he continues. "It i s only by convention — and courtesy — that the side with the higher terminal score i s labelled •victor*." That i s similar to a chess player arguing victory i s mere convention based on a convention which accepts capture of the second least powerful piece the king. Board games are by definition sets of rules, conventions, relative positions and acknowledged abstractions. In wei ch'i, victory i s absolute. Certainly i t depends on relative territory, but to say victory i s only "by convention" i s to argue, by his analogy, Mao*s forces captured China by "courtesy". Kawabata*s fictionalized account of the 1932 Go match i n Japan demonstrates the absolute nature of this, or any, strategic contest. In that game a man lost, and 12 what he stood for lost. And yet, i f Boorman i s abysmally confused in general categories, he i s consistently correct i n specific tactics. If wei ch*i i s not uniquely protracted as Boorman suggests, time i s a crucial element in play. The strategic importance and the ta c t i c a l relevance of hsien shou, or tempo, have been discussed here, for example. Timing refers to the correct co-ordination of various groups and subsets of the game at the correct moment. Economy of play (the use of the fewest possible moves) requires immediate knowledge of the position at any point, and the a b i l i t y to play at any moment the correct stone at the correct spot. 151 If Boorman*s use of the concept of jigsaw i s vague, he i s correct in saying that the opening moves of the game seem indescribably haphazard to the novice, a mere dropping of pieces at various unrelated areas of the board. He i s also correct in saying that play progresses throughout the game, jumping from one quadrant to another, occasionally with long lines of stones, white and black, "running" (one to avoid capture, another to effect i t ) diagonally across sections of the board. It does look uneven, and i n the uniformity of piece size and value, something like a regular jigsaw. This i s aided by the general and necessary tactic of encirclement, which sees various groups enclosed by the enemy, who are i n turn enclosed by more stones. There i s also an enormous f l u i d i t y in wei ch'i, a general pl a s t i c i t y in the creation of positions, the advance and retreat of positions across the board. Boorman considers this an example of "efficiency"j the harmony intr i n s i c i n the game design. Here I think he i s not far off. A l l game play aims at efficiency, of course, the maximum advantage to be derived from any move at any time. By harmony I take him to mean an overt interrelation between the pieces of opposing players, the unity across the board of black and white forces abutting and vying together. If this i s an aspect unique to wei ch'i, he has neither adequately described nor explained i t . In his discussion of wei ch'i theory, he has done l i t t l e more than offer us an ar t i c l e of faith on which to base his analysis of military 152 operation and game theory. And yet, Mao did liken wei ch'i to war strategy. A number of Chinese generals have used wei ch'i as an analogical teaching aid in the instruction of military principles. In Boorman's analysis of certain military areas and battles and definitions, there are similarities. His work does not go far enough or deep enough to account for them. If one replaces Boorman*s characteristics with general categories of space and time, however, aspects of relation become clearer. To discuss this, I w i l l f i r s t correlate concepts of space and time as stated i n Chapter II, and then relate them to elements of wei ch'i theory. Then, using Mao's writings and Sun Tzu's Treatise on War. I w i l l attempt to set up a system of transformations by which general categorical principles can be applied from the analog to military theory. 153 CHAPTER IVt NOTES AND REFERENCES •"•Elliott Avedon and Brian Sutton-Smith, The Study of  Games, quoted in Alexander Cockburn, Idle Passiont Chess and  the Dance of Death (Village Voice, Simon and Schuster, New Yorkl 1975), p. 200. Roger Callois, Man. Plan and Games, as quoted i n Alexander Cockburn, Idle Passion i Chess and the Dance of  Death (Village Voice, Simon and Schuster, New York* 1975), p. 202. 3Ibid, .p. 202. ^Geogge Santayana, "Chess Review", as quoted in CH. O'D. Alexander, A Book of Chess (Harper and Row, New Yorkt 1962) p. 11. -'CH.O'D. Alexander, A Book of Chess (Harper and Row, New Yorkt 1962), p. 13. ^Richard Reti, Modern Ideas i n Chess, John Hart, trans. (Dover Publications, New Yorkt I960), p. 179. ^See for example Frederick V. Grunefeld, Games of the  World (Holt Reinhart and Winston, New Yorkt 1975) or Edward Falkener, Games Ancient and Oriental and How to Play Them (Dover Publications, New Yorkt 1972 reprint of 1892 edition published in England by Longmans, Green and Co.) for brief descriptions of both games. For the history of Go, as wei ch'i i s best known in the West, the reader can consult Joseph Needham, SCC III, or Arthur Smith, The Game of Go (Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., Vermontt 1956) for further information. 8 The earliest description of wei ch'i i n the West may be Trigantuso's De Christiana Expeditione apud Sinas. 1616. According to Falkener, the f i r s t f u l l description seems to have been Herbert A. Giles, Wei Ch'i or the Chinese Game of War (Temple Bar Vol. XLIX, No. 194). The classic description of wei ch'i i s 0. Korschelt, i n "mittheilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft fur Natur- und Volkerkunde Qstasiens", written about 1880. Korschelt's work was used by Arthur Smith, who expanded on Korschelt's work in The Game of Got The National  Game of Japan (Moffat, Yard and Co., New Yorkt 1908| Charles E. Tuttle Co., Vermontt 1956 reprint). Also available to English readers i s Got The^World's Most Fascinating Game  Introduction (two volumes) (Nihon Kiin, Tokyot 1973). My description of the game closely follows Arthur Smith's, and a l l my illustrations of the game are from his work. ^Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Garnet A Wei-ch'i  Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (Oxford University Press, Londont 197U, p. 22. 1 G I b i d . , p. 210. U I b i d . , p. 23. Yasuneri Kawabata, The Master of Go. Edward G. Scidensticker, trans. (Random House Go., New Yorki 1972). CHAPTER V Convergence 156 INTRODUCTION This chapter's task i s twofold. F i r s t , i t discusses the relation between wei ch'i and theories of space-time. This discussion of necessity makes constant reference to the principles discussed in Chapter II and f i r s t applied in Chapter III to various realms of cultural manifestation. The latter half of this chapter then examines those relations between wei ch'i and space-time as they may be related to aspects of military theory i n China. This discussion centers on the writings of modern theoretician Mao tze Dung and his historical source, Sun Tzu. The board game i t s e l f provides our most abstract level of analysis. Unlike the postal codes or landscape painting, there i s no obvious relation between the game and r e a l - l i f e situations. The hypothesis that wei ch'i provides a forum for the discussion not only of space-time principles but also for other specific behavior i s bolstered by the references made by Chinese scholars and by Sinologists who have noted and discussed the importance of one to another. This chapter's hypothesis suggests the links between analog and subject can best be understood through reference to space and time, especially as they relate to the components of location — distance and direction. Needham has identified wei ch'i as an analog of the universe, with i t s square board representing the world, i t s i light and dark stones signifying forces of yin and yang. 157 Throughout the world, board games were originally associated with divination, later replicating facets of specific socio-2 p o l i t i c a l systems as well as general cosmologic principles. Western chess, for example, has been described as exemplifying military situations and principles, the royal hierarchy in Europe, and religious cosmology. That wei ch'i stands for a similar complex of replicative associations should not be surprising. If i t did not, i t would be unique among the important game systems of the world. SPACEi THE WEI CH'I BOARD The Chinese universe was one of undifferentiated space subject to an inherent universal order, as we saw in Chapter II. It i s unbounded without inherent directionality or arbitrary distance referent. Wei ch'i i s no different. Physically, board space i s differentiated by neither lighter nor darker coloring. Early boards were not entirely mono-chromatic, there was some variation caused by wood grain, for example, but the ideal board was light-colored and uniform. Where chess, parcheezi, and other board game surfaces have always used defined areas of differentiated space, the wei ch'i board defines location through a system of co-ordinate inter-sects imposed upon the board. The squares of a chess board are spaces, homes within which pieces l i v e . The intersects of wei ch'i are locators, resembling early astrologic maps of the later Han Dynasty in which locations were circles marked on grid intersects. A similar locational system can be found in some Chinese maps, including the. important Mongul maps of the 14th Century. These employed a similar grid system but used no topographic differentiation. Instead, the names of specific places were written on the map grid, allowing the cartographer to name specific places and show only their location relative to other specific places. The grid i t s e l f bears no relation to the "real" world but i s a device whose only function i s to simplify the job of the map-maker and to guide the map-reader. The wei ch'i board can be seen as generalized space ( ^  ) which uses the grid as a location reference system, and not as a topographic feature. Unlike the playing surface of many other games, wei ch'i begins with neilther differentiating places ( flf ) nor pieces on the board. Chess and checkers begin with a l l pieces on the board before the game begins. In wei ch'i there i s only the potential for particularization, the potential of meetings between light and dark places — yin and yang. This i s in accord with the f i r s t paradox, which stated "the greatest has nothing beyond i t s e l f . " At the beginning of the game, the playing surface i s that which has nothing beyond, the da-i (A.— ). There i s as yet no complementary small unit ( A\— ), that which has nothing smaller than i t s e l f . At the game's beginning, there are no men on the board, no eyes or groups which correspond with the syau-i ( -h — ). In the same vein, there i s neither the great nor the small 159 Figure 9 J 9 l 3 U an if \ \ \ \ M L S ft ft i i « : J 2 $ k» ^ _ It i n f 4 SI — s i J - i i l 1 in _ i l _ ni SI \\ A" *' i; V * .* *! j i t t. <* The schematic grid-map of the north-western countries i n the Yuan Ching Shih Ta Tien (History of I n s t i t u t i o n s of the Yuan Dynasty), +1329. North i s at the right-hand bottom corner. This system of marking nothing but place or t r i b e names on a scale g r i d has been c a l l e d the "Mongolian s t y l e " i n cartography. From Joseph Needham, SCC I I I . 160 similarity-and-difference discussed in paradox 5, because there i s nothing yet to be compared. In chess there i s directional-i t y from the time the pieces are f i r s t set out, a defined direction and distance based on the location of both sides 1 pieces and the enemy King whose capture i s the game's object. Here "South has no l i m i t " because there are no pieces on the board, although the edge of the board i t s e l f can be taken as a limit (paradox 6). This can perhaps best be understood through a description of the Tao ( i £ ) in Chapters IV and V of the Tao Te Ching»^ The way i s empty, yet use w i l l not f i l l i t . Deep, i t i s the source of myriad things. i & r f i t i i fH± imJL'iR The space between heaven and earth i s like a bellows. Empty without being exhausted, the more i t works, the more i t forms. Although empty, the wei ch'i board i s never f i l l e d . The game i s defined by empty spaces, whose control i s the game's object. The more a game i s played, and the longer a game progresses, the more combinations and variations are formed on the board. In Chapter XXXIV this theme i s carried on, and made more e x p l i c i t i The way i s broad, reaching l e f t and right. The myriad creatures depend on i t . Yet i t claims no authority.... Forever free of desire, i t can be called small; yet laying no claim to mastery when the myriad creatures turn to i t , i t can be called great, too. 161 Here the myriad creatures are the wei ch'i pieces, each free to move to any unoccupied intersect on the board. Because the board i s undifferentiated and the pieces have freedom of movement, the board i s small. Yet the pieces are ultimately circumscribed by the board surface which bounds the universe. Thus the board i s the smallest and the greatest unit. The importance of the board as frame can be seen in the Tao Te Ching*s Chapter VIIi Heaven i s long and the earth has duration. The universe (heaven and earth) i s enduring in that i t does not give i t s e l f l i f e . Wei ch'i, both the game i n general and games in particular, have a temporal dimension — they last through time and are often noted and collected over centuries. But the game (and the board) are not creatures of their own volition, and last as context for the activity of other things. RULES In Chapter IV we noted the simplicity of the rule structure, and the freedom given to players. The greatest good to the Taoist was symbolized by water, which i s soft and yielding and seeks i t own level (Tao Te Ching. Chapter VIII). There i s , I think, a similarity here too between wei ch'i and the rules of the cosmos. D.C. Lau suggests that, whereas in the Platonic tradition existence was the definition and articulation of specifics, i n Taoist epistemology limitations on ifche specific were seen as unnecessary and unproductive. General categories 162 of space and time discussed here f i r s t in Chapter II emphasized this idea, discussing categories and the specialized within them, defining the paradox as boundary and not as contradiction. In a similar vein, wei ch'i rules have no specific moves, no individual positions to categorize. The quality of water — i t s lack of conflict and contention, i t s a b i l i t y to flow around and envelop whatever stands in i t s way, i s similar here to the basic concept of wei ch'i where stones do not battle but rather seek to surround i n their communal search for territory. One can say the lack of rules mirrors the general categories of Taoist thought, reflecting the general philosophic categories and definitions. In the same vein, a beginning play can be anywhere, for there i s no fixed position, no necessary direction in the play. In most board games where the pieces are placed on the board before play begins, they prevent certain moves and dictate others. Here there are only the limits of the board-world i t s e l f to dictate potential areas of greater efficiency and expansion. As water seeks i t s own level, so we ch'i play allows general principles to operate, provides a context in which light and dark — the analogs of yin and yang — vie. The differences between white and black, time and tempo, general space and secured placej these are a l l examples of the great similar!ty-and-difference mentioned in the f i f t h paradox. The relations between tempo and specific situations like "eternity", between an eye and a secured eye creating a non-reversible situation which remains a "place", between "dead" men who can 163 be freed by later play and those who are captured or never freed — these are a l l the small-similarity-and-difference. As one commentator said regarding the f i f t h paradoxi (When) things' essence i s divided and examined, they are seen to have similarity and differences, and small difference-in-similarity. PLAY AMAzME^ : In dwelling, i t i s the place that matters. Tao Te Ching. Chapter VIII Once played, stones are not moved. In master-level play, few stones are ever captured, and those once placed on the board remain for the length of the game. Despite this relatively static factor, play i t s e l f i s dynamic, with each player attempting to control every increasing territory through his growing number of stones. As the Chuang tzu paradox suggests i n a different context, things are at rest and yet in motion. For those who have never played, the tension and dynamics of the game are as incomprehensible as the excitement engendered in chess by a b r i l l i a n t sacrifice. For the wei ch'i devotee, the continual formation of board regions of influence, the creation of barriers and their breaching gives each stone and configuration a different meaning at different moments in the board's growth. Put differently, i f the pieces are at rest, the game i s in 164 motion. As the Mo Ching suggests, "the boundaries of space are constantly shifting." Places formed i n the early opening game are often lost by the middle game, and i f they are secured they have become bases from which future attacks are begun or the site of new aggressions. Throughout, there i s the continual development of board-world, a proliferation and creation of "place", a constant modification of the more general "space". This observation coincides with Chapter XXXIII of the Mo Ching which sayst Knowing 'this* i s no longer 'this* and •this* i s no longer 'here' we s t i l l c a l l i t South and North. Direction i s thus used as a descripter of change as i t affects specific places on the board. This same phenomenon can be seen as an aspect of the concept of non-doing, wu-wei ( ^ B E ^ ). That i s , there i s no movement by individual stones, no direct capture of pieces by enemy pieces, yet despite the absence of direction action, the efficiency of non-action produces an order and growth. In Chapter LXII Lao Tze admonishes his readers to that which consists i n taking no action, pursue that which i s not meddlesome; savor that which has no flavor. The way to do this, he says, i s to begin with the small, the simple, and work to the large and complex. That means in wei ch'i, to make the simpler before the later and complex, to prepare for the large situations while they remain early moves, 165 and prepare in limited areas. Make the small big and the few many? do good to him who has done you an injury. Lay plans for the accomplishment of the d i f f i c u l t before i t becomes d i f f i c u l t ; make something big by starting i t small. As a wei ch'i adage, this statement recognizes the progression of board definition from small groups of stones in the early game (when confrontation between white and black i s to be avoided), to the middle and end games (where large territories are so l i d i f i e d and the complexities of the total board situation are numerous). By avoiding "meddlesome" action, one avoids early confrontations when spheres of influence should be "staked out", and when direct confrontation i s usually considered counter-productive. In terms of the earlier discussion of great and small similarity-and-difference, i t argues for a similar distinction in terms of size and complexity. This suggests, at least i n the opening moves, an emphasis on the small-similarity (mutual definition of spheres of influence, avoidance of major conflict) within the great similarity (the board i t s e l f ) . DISTANCE As the Mo Ching suggests, there i s i n wei ch'i no way to say whether an object on the board i s moving nearer or going further away. This simply means that space i s relative, dependent on the specific location of the groups between which distance i s to be measured, and not a function of the playing surface i t s e l f . Technically, distance statements presume a 166 triadic relation between at least two places besides the one in question." It i s not an arbitrary measurement, but one based on certain indices applied to a specific context. In chess, where both sides begin with their pieces set on the board, the situation i s different. With the object that of specific capture, pieces influence the length and width of the board. With the f i r s t move, each piece can be defined in relation to i t s own King, i t s supporting pieces across the board, i t s effect on the enemy King and the intervention potential of the enemy pieces. Throughout the board, distance i s a function of mobility towards the enemy King (who can move but one square at a time) minus the barriers created by the intervening pieces. With no set ranks and f i l e s , no men who can traverse board distances, and no single areas from which distance can be uniformly measured, the wei ch'i condition i s different. Here distance can only be measured in terms of territories secured and their potential for linkage (communication) with other areas. Distance i s not arbitrary, but variable, defined totally by board positions where one i s concerned with bases and areas but "one cannot have in mind only some special d i s t r i c t " . C r i t i c a l to ar t i s t s , this concept i s no less central in wei ch'i, defining the relation between specific place and general space, or board territory. Earlier i n Chapter II, I quoted Mo Tzu's dictumt "the distance l e f t behind a moving body... constitute space. The changes of position of an observed moving body... awaken the concept of time." In wei ch'i this becomes particularized. Specific distance i s the relation of two groups and their proximity or potential for connection at a moment. Board time i s a function of the changing distances between specific groups. As Ssu-ma Piao said, "...wherever we may happen to be i s the center." In the wei ch'i middle game there are several centers, nexuses of individual confrontations and the board's physical center. Thus, i t i s not that the "world has no compass points" (directionality), but rather that the game situation has too many, and each possibility i s crucial to one or another sphere of action. That i s , within any general situation, distance and direction can best be described in relation to individual and specific situations. Denis Wood, describes this specific v a r i a b i l i t y by suggesting the size of a shag rug in different contexts. It seems larger in the store than when placed on the floor at home, grows larger when hand cleaning i s necessary, and looms huge when a contact lens i s dropped within i t and needs to be found. He argues the perceptual reality (each in this case with a different scale) i s the real one.'' LINEARITY AND MOVEMENT Linear moves are the means of progression, of movement in wei ch'i. If a game were photographed by stop-action movie cameras, and then speeded up, there would be a phase where stones seemed to flow across the board, surrounding and 168 encircling areas changing them into territory. This connection i s created by the horizontal or vertical extension of a group of stones, or the linear conjunction of two stones already placed diagonally. I suspect this relation between static play and game motion i s related to Hui Shr's paradoxes 2 and 3» which state that a shadow of a flying bird never moves and "there are times when a flying arrow i s neither in motion nor at rest." The paradoxes admirably state the general problem, arguing, as Zeno's paradoxes did i n the West, that there can be no continuous motion i f a constant and i n f i n i t e l y divisibly progressive time i s assumed. In wei ch'i, the pieces once played are immobile and hence there can be no motion. And yet the game has progression, movement susceptible not only to a player's imagination, but also to 1the camera. Thus the shadow i s the equivalent of the individual board positions at any instant between the play of either white or black. The motion of the flying bird i s the game sequence i t s e l f , just as the f l i g h t of the arrow i s the game and i t s individual position at any instanct in the period between game moves. The explanation for both paradoxes i s that at an instant, things are where they are. There i s no necessary continuity between events, but there i s a progression of distinct events which seems to be continuous when viewed at a "normal" rate. The frozen-frame sequences of a camera and the 12.5 frames per second i s an excellent analogy for movement. In early movies, the jerky movement of individual 169 actors suggested movement, but indeed did not portray i t . This "frozen frame" explanation i s consistent with what we know of Chinese poetry and painting (where art was used to mark a specific event). What was of concern was action at an instant within a context, the frozen frame of individual a f f a i r s . This concern i s in accord both with the Chinese paradoxes and with Zeno's paradoxes in the West, which stood as a minority view. Before his paradoxes were disarmed and subsumed Q / into the body of Western philosophy in the 19th Century, the criticism stood to confound those who observed motion in their lives but who could not intellectually reconcile Zeno*3 statements with their apparent reality. This tension between paradox and observation was at the base of the science of trajectory and motion in the Renaissance, a study in which the Chinese never participated. That lack has troubled some historians of Asian science who, like Joseph Needham, see the absence of a study of trajectory as a f a i l i n g in the Chinese historical tradition. An explanation of the lack of a Chinese study of motion may be served by a re-examination of the paradoxes, and the apparent acceptance of their definitions of place and specific frames of motion. If the Chinese indeed based their theories on relative location (things are where they are at a specific instant), as my study suggests, then the lack of a study of motion may not come from their "lack of science", but from their acceptance of the profoundly modern view that "things are at any instant where they are." 170 It i s interesting to note that, during the Renaissance, chess moves changed in the West. Pieces which had moved one or o y two squares were given liberty to move across the board. 7 Where wei ch'i and (sying-chi) stayed static and limited, chess became more a game of visible motion. That this change occurred in the West at the time when the study of motion began to flourish may be coincidence. But given the relation here presumed between games and science, i t suggests the possibility of a cause and effect relation. TIME In our discussion of space, i t was impossible to avoid discussing time and temporal aspects of wei ch'i distance and location. The reverse, a focus on time divorced from space, i s for us even more d i f f i c u l t . Whereas we think of space as a reality, time has no physical referent. Time i s i n relation to place. Although any location mugrt be considered in time as well, the focus seems more abstract here, the separation of the two categories harder to deal with. Before we distinguished between space and place, categories within the wei ch'i context. Here we distinguish between duration ( ), the general time of the game from beginning to end, and specific time (shr). Duration encompasses the total game period, from the instant the players s i t down u n t i l they have finished counting the pieces. Duration also refers to the pattern of repetition within the game, the alternating moves of white and black, and the general progression of early 171 to middle to end game. The temporal parameters of the board context, and the limits of the game i t s e l f , are similar to the definition of the Great Unit ) in the f i r s t paradox. As i t has "nothing beyond i t s e l f " , so the total context of the game encapsulates a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of wei ch'i. Similarly, the basic general patterns of game progression (early, middle, end game, a series of games) and the alternations between white and black within the board context can be described by the f i f t h paradox's great similarity-difference. In a more specific description, the game's progression i s described by the fourth paradox which states the sun at noon i s the sun declining, a man born i s a man dying. A l l activity, of which wei ch'i i s but one example, i s cyclic, according to traditional Chinese philosophy. A l l things observe a pattern of growth and decline, and a replication at varying scales. At a smaller scale of time there i s shr ( ^ # ), or specific time, "small unit" ( '/»— ) of parddox 1. In wei ch'i "that which has nothing smaller than i t s e l f " i s the single move, or alternation of moves between white and black. The specific moment of placing stone-on-board i s the phenomenon of play, as the creation of groups at the beginning hints at various spheres within an area i s the grammar, the structure of the game. In the West, time has been most often likened to motion, to the r o l l i n g , moving river running from i t s source to i t s conclusion. In Chinese thought, time i s change. There i s 172 progression, of course, but the metaphor i s , like that of the sun, temporal and changing. This i s seen i n wei ch'i by the emphasis on the correct play at the moment. In the literature, b r i l l i a n t plays are often annotated with the explanation of the move's a b i l i t y to shift the play from one board d i s t r i c t to the other, of cutting at the proper instant and proper intersect, forcing a change while leaving behind po s s i b i l i t i e s for future develop-ment — a l l encoded in one move. Often such b r i l l i a n c i e s w i l l wrestler the "tempo", possession of the immediate time advantage in the general board context, from one player to another. It i s i n this sense that board time, like board territory, constantly shifts between players and their positions. "Dead" stones, those surrounded but not removed from the board, can be brought alive within a new configuration} an area once secure can become imperilled as territories shift and join with other, growing positions, or shrink. Thus a stone played at move 115 can justify an apparently suicidal configuration developed by move 30. In this sense, wei ch'i players adhere to and demonstrate the seventh paradox, "S/oing to Yueh today, I arrive yesterday." If Yueh stands for specific territory, each move aims to assist i n the securing of a specific region. Beset at move 30 and abandoned for an apparently unconnected sphere elsewhere on the board, a stone placed on the 115th move which connects and expands the two groups (separated as they were in space and 173 time) f u l f i l s the earlier group's plan, going to Yueh today, and arriving earlier. This can likewise be discussed i n terms of lodging, yu-i, earlier discussed in terms of Chinese art theory. A stone lodged at an intersect and at a specific time i s activated later by a second move confirming the f i r s t ' s importance and existence. The confirmation occurs through a collapse of time allowing a single concept to be joined across a series of f i f t y or a hundred moves. The ideas "lodged" i n the early move are "freed" by the later one. The idea of lodging i s framed such that we consider i t a conjunction of an act at instant T x with i t s future T x^. Each the inverse of the other, the central concept remains the same. This r e l a t i v i t y can be seen by referring to Figure 2, Diagram I (p. 138 ). Whoever i s to play, black or white, can win the situation described i n the diagram. But whichever plays, white or black, there i s an instant where his stone could be considered dead. If black plays at A-12, white i s surrounding his four-stone configuration. If white plays there, black would likewise be s t i f l e d . The position and the relative advantage of that space i s defined by the specific time, and whose i t i s . Board time i s relative not only to the specific configura-tion within the total context, but also to the specific time within a situation. To the chess player, i t i s not simply placing a man in temporary jeopardy (a pawn for example) but i s as i f he could sacrifice a piece and, by that act, prevent 174 the man from being taken. The "ko" i s an excellent example of this. In Figure 3» Diagram I (p.140) white plays at D-17, placing his stone on the chopping block. But he can immediately capture a black stone, thus breaking out in an instant. By placing his stone within an enclosed intersect, i t must die immediately, but in the "ko" i t i s as i f time i s for a moment suspended, suspended for an instant i n which i t i s surrounded. Then time i s reversed, the surrounding stones are themselves removed and play can continue. This i s i n one sense like going to Yueh today and arriving yesterday. By allowing a piece to play where i t i s "dead", and ignoring that fact for the instant in which a capture can be made, i t i s a reversal, a back-tracking similar to the idea suggested i n the paradox. The "ko" rule prevents a conflict between the general category of space duration ( ) and the specific instant of play ( i r f ). Without i t , board time could be stopped, forced into an eternity of repetitive instants, an endless progression of moves i n a single situation which would prevent the gane's completion. It functions as an interface between duration and a specific type of instant, allowing both-categories to continue simultaneously. The concept of distance i n wei ch'i can best be understood through a military analogy. In guerilla warfare, space i s "made relative to strategic mobility". Edward L. Katzenbach and Gene Z. Hanrahan have defined military space in a guerilla 175 context as "square mileage plus obstacles minus a workable communications network."*0 In wei ch'i the square mileage i s the number 6f intersects within a specific framework of conflict, a specific within the total board area. Obstacles are the number of groups developed by the enemy within that area. Communication refers to the a b i l i t y to join one group with another within the specific conflict situation, which can be measured here as the number of moves (the playing time) required to join two or more groups, or merely to transform one sphere of influence into a solid territory. If "yin and yang need no intermediary", they can here surely "communicate despite vast distances." In wei ch'i there are no intermediaries between white and black, between offense and defense. Despite, the relatively vast distances of the open wei ch'i board, by the end of the board both white and black, offensive and defensive, beginning and end games are in conjunction. Here communication refers to conjunction, but in the military analogy used to describe specific conflict situations, i t meant specific time needed. As in art, i t i s imperative to consider not only a succession of specific small conflicts, but for the wei ch'i player constantly to keep the whole board i n mind. That i s only to say that a good player does not confuse his levels, playing at an instant to gain a specific situation. He understands that wei ch'i i s played for total territory throughout the board, within the total game's time period. 176 Beginners usually leap eagerly to some context, hoping to secure a corner or territory by move 15. Excellent players cede them that f i r s t rush, and at leisure gather the rest of the board. Japanese players "lament the beginner who doesn't know his men are dead", a Japanese aphorism for a player who cannot recognize the obvious. In both cases, one could with equal justice refer to beginners as summer insects restricted by their time. Wei ch'i i s in many ways the art of going to Yueh today, and arriving yesterday, a fact a l l beginners learn i f they are to advance. And i t can be a painful lesson, indeed. Boorman has suggested wei ch'i i s an abstraction and an analog for military behaviors, a suggestion made earlier by Mao tze Dung. But the isomorphic terrain of wei ch'i boards i s not the topographic map of China, and the 180 stones allotted each player do not correspond to the hundreds of thousands of fighting men i n real war. In outlining a relation between wei ch'i and Maoist strategy, Boorman attempted to describe h i s t o r i c a l reality through board situations. There were problems which required a leap of faith before one could accept his analysis. Another way of examining conceivable connections between wei ch'i and military a c t i v i t y i s through an analysis of the maxims set down in military manuals. If there are similarities between the principles stated in military texts and those which, as we have seen, relate wei ch'i to a broad corpus of 177 Chinese philosophical writing, then a tentative connection can be made not with one game as descriptive tool and one military situation, but between military activity and the mainstream of cultural thought. In 1938 Mao wrote a number of essay-length pieces analyzing the Sino-Japanese conflict to that time, and put forth his principles of guerilla and revolutionary war. In these writings, he quotes the premier Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu. When not quoting Sun Tzu directly, Mao often echoes principles f i r s t set forth by that writer i n his text of 500 B.C., the Bing-fa. The next section analyzes aspects of both Mao's and Sun Tzu's writings i n the light of theories of space and time both as they apply to wei ch'i and as they seem evident in Chinese thought over a long and involved period. "AS IN CHESS — SO IN WAR" (Sun Tzu) Both Mao and Sun Tzu believed the essence of military activity was f l e x i b i l i t y , the power to seize the i n i t i a t i v e at the correct moment and i n relation to the enemy's position and the enemy's circumstances. In one of his most c r i t i c a l passages, Sun Tzu wrotet The military i s in principle like water, water flows down, avoiding heights, attacking the vacant and avoiding strength. As water adapts i t s e l f to the ground, armies should plan for victory according to the enemy's condition. Just as water has no fixed form, warfare has no fixed r u l e s . 1 1 178 In this, warfare i s li k e the Tao, which i s constantly compared to water in i t s a b i l i t y to mold i t s e l f to i t s terrain without opposing force with direct force. The highest good i s like water, which benefits the myriad beings and does not strike. It settles where men are not, and so i s like the Tao. ^ Tao Te Ching V I I I 1 2 Throughout his military writings, Mao counsels avoiding the enemy at his areas of strength, and attacking at his weakness. He quotes a section of the Bing-fa which says "avoid the enemy when he i s f u l l of vigor, and strike when he 13 i s fatigued and withdraws.""^ Mao also stresses a recognition on the part of his forces that, i n the 1930*s, the practical situation required avoidance of pitched full-scale battles because, although China was large and populous, i t was weak, while Japan, a small country with fewer people, was m i l i t a r i l y strong. These specific conditions dictated the immediate battle strategy which employed f l u i d battle lines and f l u i d i t y i n the size of base areas. "The enemy tir e s , we attack." As in wei ch'i, neither Mao nor Sun Tzu saw annihilation as the aim of war. To Sun Tzu, " i t i s preferable to subdue a state whole rather than destroy i t , and i t was better to subdue an army, division, company or squad than to destroy them."lif This maxim i s of a part with his statement thati 179 The highest form of generalship i s to conquer by strategy. The next best i s by alliance. Next i s by battles. Lowest form of general-ship i s by siege,15 Destruction i s not only foreign to the Tao but, more practically, w i l l be more costly i n men and materials, and i s li k e l y to destroy materials in the area which would be useful to the state. As Mao saidi ...a battle has l i t t l e significance when there are no prisoners or war booty, when they do not outweigh the losses. Our strategy i s to 'pit 1 against 10* and our tactic i s to pit •10 against 1.' This i s one of our fundamental p r i n c i p l e s . 1 6 By emphasizing not annihilation but subduing, the gain of prisoners who were indoctrinated and who either became f i f t h -column members of the Red Army or fought outright i n Mao's legions, Mao emphasized territory. The idea was to gain in specific bases, which were abandoned temporarily i f the enemy launched an enormous counter-offensive, as pressure was then to be applied somewhere else. This, of course, i s similar to wei ch'i, where stones are f i r s t set on the board, and early confrontation i s avoided. In wei ch'i spheres of influence are defined and groups of stones develop i n the opening game which are only activated in the late middle game. Mao's theory of war stated here was similar. Tactically, battles were for limited objectives, for "fl u i d bases" which could be moved or abandoned u n t i l later i n the war. As Mao withdrew, of course, he l e f t agents behind, just as the player leaves some stones. Mao's reference to "1 to 10" and "10 to 1" i s from the 180 Bing-fa t In the conduct of war when the enemy i s outnumbered ten to one, best to surround them; five to one, i t i s best to attack them; two to one, best to divide them.17 This, too, hearkens to wei ch'i tactics and i t s techniques of encirclement, confrontation (although rare at early stages) and division, or "cutting". Mao makes a clear distinction between strategy and tactics, the former being the rules which direct and govern a war situation as a whole, the latter governing a specific situation. General victory, the control of the war area, i s of course dependent on the outcome of individual tactical situations. But "victory or defeat in war i s f i r s t and foremost a question of whether the situation as a whole and i t s various situations, are properly taken into account..." This i s obviously the same statement f i r s t encountered in Chapter II concerning concentration not on a specific situation but on the whole context. It was related in Chapter II to the history of art and in Chapter IV to the basic strategy of wei ch'i. Here as before, the difference ./between general and specific, between levels of category, flows from a common stream stated most ex p l i c i t l y i n the paradoxes defining large and small units, great and small similarity-and-difference. In both war and wei ch'i, there are not innumerable rules and, i f the situation i s one of flux, then one can only f i t general methods to specific situations. If wei ch'i.taken as a war analog has few rules, and those are applicable to a 181 multitude of possible board combinations, then management of war depends (mutatus mutandus) on general concepts applied to specific situations. Sun Tzu said "whether one fights against a large force or a small one, the principles are the same." For Mao, the general method in a l l situations i s familiarize ourselves with a l l aspects of the enemy situation and our own, to discover the laws governing the actions of both sides and make use of the laws (principles) in our own operations.*° Both writers were constantly concerned with time, both the general frame of.any conflict (and i t s ramifications in men, materials and supplies) and the specific. To Sun Tzu, the siege, a protracted and static engagement defined by i t s duration, i s the lowest form of tactic. Mao defined the war against Japan as a protracted one, a long duration which could be fought most effi c i e n t l y by taking advantage of i t s length. For both of them, in individual strategies the timing of specific moves depended on the situations of both combatants at a specific moment. In the 3ing-fa we find» The adept in war attacks with t e r r i f i c speed and perfect timing. Readiness i s like a taut bow, timing i s like i t s releasing. 1^ For Mao we findi In a military operation the direction and point of assault should be selected according to the actual situation of the enemy, the terrain, and the strength of our own forces at the moment (emphasis mine). The i n i t i a t i v e i s not something imaginary but i s concrete and material.20 182 In fact, his whole strategy was based on quick decisions in limited engagements at strategic places occurring at specific times. It i s for this reason he advocated the creation of base areas which could and should be abandoned in t a c t i c a l retreats. C r i t i c a l as bases were, they became disfunctional i n specific instances where the enemy massed enormous power. Through correct timing, armies as powerful as heaven could, in the language of the third paradox, be brought "as low as the marshes". This i s one of Mao's great contributions to limited war, and one he had to fight to s e l l other generals. In "Strategy . in China's Revolutionary War", Mao said of those who j r advocated ...•engaging the enemy outside the gates' oppose strategic retreat... to retreat means to lose territory, to bring harm on the people ...and to give rise to unfavorable repercussions outside. 21 More than any other general, he saw the conflict in China as part of a global conflict, a section of the total board in which both time and the general array of the a l l i e d forces boded well for his forces i n the long run. The temporary release of territory was of no great import to him, because that stage of the war was one of continual encirclement by the Japanese, and Chinese counter-campaigns. In the same way."connected rings can be broken", so the enemy's progressive encirclement could be countered. Members of the Kuomingtang captured by Mao's army were not k i l l e d , 183 although Chiang Kai-Chek*s propagandists said they would be. Captured men were instead given p o l i t i c a l indoctrination and returned to war on the side of the Communists. Then they had only to fear recapture by their former comrades. As Sun Tzu advisedi Throw men into positions where there i s no hope of escape and they w i l l fight instead of run. Officers and men w i l l both exhaust themselves.22 In the same way a "ko" situation allows for an instant of death, from which the doomed piece can be later freed, soldiers could be used and returned to the war Mreborn" as Communist fighters. The categories used to describe "ko" and timing in wei ch'i also describe the principles of Chinese warfare stated in the writings of Mao and Sun Tzu. CHAPTER Vi NOTES AND REFERENCES 184 1Joseph Needham, SCC I V i l , p. 318-326. 2 Needham, ibid. See also game references in Chapter IV. Those interested in chess should refer to Harold J. Murray, A History of Chess (Clarendon Press, Xofordi 1913) which remains the classic study in i t s f i e l d . .^This and a l l future references to the Tao Te Ching (ttW^ ) rely on D.C. Lau, Lao Tzui Tao de Ching (Penguin Books, Baltimore, Md.t 1963)" His translation seems to provide the best compromise between scholarly translation and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . The Chinese source quoted exclusively was D.C. Lau, ibid., i n Introduction. -*See Chapter II, discussion of paradox 5. ^C.D. Broad, "Ostensible Temporality", in The Problems of  Space and Time, J.C.C. Smart (ed.) (MacMillan & Corp., New Yorki 197*;, P. 321-323. 7 'Denis Wood, Cartography of Reality (presented at National Meetings of the National Council for Geographic Education (NCGE)i 1973). Q Bertrand Russell, "Mathematics and Mathematicians", in James R. Newman (ed.), The World of Mathematics III (Simon and Schuster Co., New Yorki 1956), pp. 1580-87. Also CD. Broad, "Notes on Achilles and the Tortoise", Mind XXII, pp. 318-321. Q ^Harold J. Murray, A History of Chess (Clarendon Press, Oxfordi 1913). 1 0Edward Katzenbach and G. Z. Hanrahan, P o l i t i c a l Science  Quarterly (7013, September 1965). 1 3 ,Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Cheng L i and Lionel Giles, trans. (Confucius Publishing Co., Taipei, Taiwan). 12 Tao Te Ching. op. c i t . , VIII. *-*This and a l l future quotes included here from Mao tze Dung are from Mao tze Dung, Selected Military Writings (Peking Foreign Language Press, Pekingi 1963), pp. 77-186. .This volume also includes Mao's "On Protracted War" quoted in extenso by Boorman. ^Sun Tzu, op. c i t . , Chapter III. 1 5 I b i d . l6Mao tze Dung, op. c i t . , p. 135'. 1 7Sun Tzu, op. c i t . , Chapter III. 18Mao tze Dung, op. c i t . , p. 85. 1 9Sun Tzu, op. c i t . , Chapter V. 20Mao tze Dung, op. c i t . , p. 83. 2 1Sun Tzu, op. c i t . , Chapter XI. 186 CONCLUSION 18? To receive an indictment from the Grand Jury, public prosecutors do not have to prove anything. They must only demonstrate a prima facie argument, to show there i s evidence which i n toto adds up to a reasonable suspicion. It i s then the task of the jury to decide the case on basis of a f u l l e r presentation, to award blame or bestow a belief i n innocence. In the same vein, this thesis sets out to argue a prima facie case for acceptance of the hypothesis stated in Chapter I, which can be described here in the affirmative i By the time of the Han Dynasty, Chinese intellectuals had elucidated a consistent set of space-time concepts s t i l l evident in a textual analysis of the Chuang tzu. Mo Ching, Tao Te Ching. These definitions functioned as metalanguages of order throughout much of Chinese history and are themselves useful as descriptors elucidating apparently disparate areas of cultural activity ranging from postal codes through landscape painting to board game rules which have been used as analogs for other behavioral manifestations. Before discussing the ramifications of this thesis, and the directions i t suggests for further study, i t may be useful to re-examine the line of argument by which the statement was put forward through the thesis. The thesis was introduced through i t s relation to geography, a discipline which identifies i t s e l f through i t s interest i n man as a spatial animal. In modern physics and in the writings of some geographers, space is identified through i t s relation to time as a definer of location. The importance of space and time i n varying cultures 188 was emphasized through reference to the literature of anthropology and especially that aspect of the modern literature which relies on structural theory for i t s ideologic underpinnings. Those underpinnings formed one basis for the research contained within this project. Chapter II outlined the basic problems inherent i n this type of intellectual history, and especially i n histori c a l Sinology where attempts to examine dispassionately the complex of beliefs extant in classical China began with the works of Joseph Needham over the last thirty years. Following Needham, Hu Shih and others, the bulk of Chapter II was given to an analysis of Chapter 33 of the Chuang tzu and an analysis of the concepts of space and time within i t . In that chapter i t seemed evident the Chinese recognized a profound relation between space and time. For them, space and time together formed the basis of any locational definition. Both location and direction were defined by the Chinese as having general categories subsuming a l l references to both specific space and time. By these definitions, space and time were relative to the individual situation, having themselves no inherent length or duration. Chapter III attempted to apply this information to specific areas of culture behavior i postal codes, landscape painting and wei ch'i. These three cases provided different levels of analysis and met with varying degrees of descriptive power. Definitions of distance in the postal codes; the use of seals, colophons and poetic inscriptions as well as technical 189 aspects of the paintings; board game rules — these a l l seemed to conform to the basic categories defined in Chapter II. Wei ch'i i t s e l f has been used as an analog for pol i t i c o -military behavior, although no rationale for that apparent relation had been offered previously. Chapter V attempted to relate wei ch'i to the categories of space and time elucidated in Chapter II and, by extension, then used wei ch'i as an analog for politico-military theory expounded both by Sun Tzu in the 5th Century B.C. and Mao tze Dung in the modern era. This last apparent relation between Mao, Sun Tzu and the board game (whose rules have been constant for two thousand years) suggests a continuity in cultural principle, a constancy of category stretching across most of recorded Chinese history. The relation between board game rules and space-time categories suggests a rationale previously missing i n attempts to relate the game to military behavior. While historians have concerned themselves with aspects of replication and types of continuity in Chinese culture, thet nature and basis of those factors have remained obscure. Boorman, for example, discussed the application of wei ch'i to war theory, noting Mao's use of the writings of Sun Tzu and the antiquity of the game i t s e l f . But the basis for the analogies he wished to make were a necessary leap of fai t h . One saw the connection, or one didn't. Art historians have discussed the generation of styles and the progression of the landscape art tradition i n Chinese history, but have rarely related that art either to general principles of Chinese 190 culture development or adequately described the reasons for uniquenesses in the tradition like seals and colophons. The body of this thesis suggests there was indeed a culture bui l t on replication and a consistent pattern running through Chinese history. That pattern can perhaps best be understood through an examination of concepts of space and time. While this thesis seeks those culture roots through an examination of one section of the Chuang tzu and through some elementary linguistics buttressed in latter chapters through passages in the Tao Te Ching. further research i s required to na i l down the specific nature of those principles, their points or origin and the history of their development. A content analysis of Chinese poetry, a comparison of definitions found i n sci e n t i f i c treatises written by followers of different traditions, and an extensive analysis of the Confucian works are a l l required before a truly complete description of these culture roots can be written. The preliminary work of this thesis suggests such further research w i l l describe a logical system based on correlative logic with a consistent conjunction of subject and contradictory. This w i l l be seen to stand in contrast to the Western tradition of dialectic logic. In the Chinese tradition, the relations between space and time, and thus the definitions of location, seem, on the basis of this work, to be i n contrast to those f i r s t articulated by the Greeks and later modified and expanded through the Renaissance. In the past, most researchers sympathetic to China have 191 attempted to show that the system of reasoning and analysis prevalent throughout much of that country's history has been similar to (and thus equal to) that of the West. Unfortunately, they have often tried to place both traditions on similar paths, and thus have always lamented when they diverged. Hu Shih, for example, wanted to show how Western the Chinese system of logic was, and Joseph Needham on occasion has bemoaned points of divergence where China seemed to have gone off on a tangent. Others more recently have attempted to describe traditional Chinese science and analysis as i f i t were really a variant of 20th Century physics and mathematics. Those attempts are built on certain very general comparisons between the two and at best are shaky structures of very dry sand. By suggesting a consistent set of principles and logic operative i n and c r i t i c a l to the development of Chinese thought, I do no more than others have done for Western c i v i l i z a t i o n . Einstein suggested, for example, that a l l Western history was a footnote to Aristotle, and many have found that statement adequate and trenchant as a clue to the progress of Western thought. Rosalie Colie, whose work was discussed i n Chapter II, sees i n the nature of paradox a thread which when unravelled explains a great deal about the development of the Renaissance, i t s Greek antecedents and i t s particular advances. By looking for a level of abstraction from which a general pattern of reasoning and system of thought can be described, I have hoped only to begin to define a tool 192 which w i l l allow other (and hopefully more erudite) students to describe better and more adequately the genesis of our own traditions. The u t i l i t y of this approach can be seen through the problems which Boorman encountered i n his analysis of wei ch'i and Maoist revolutionary theory. The validity of his argument was immediately open to question on the part of those who could not accept that "leap of f a i t h " which he required. Boorman provided no bridge between the game analog and real-world activity, and no adequate explanation of the relation between war games and war. I have here suggested that the basics of location (space and time) may provide that bridge, and a tool for the hi s t o r i c a l analysis of military history. These same principles seem to suggest, in a very different area, the genesis of Chinese art traditions. The Asian art tradition i s unique in i t s use of seals and colophons, of notes written on and around a supposedly finished work of art. Building off the Confucian theory of "lodging", i t seemed to me this must be more than an hi s t o r i c a l accident, a tradition begun by some errant pen defacing (in our tradition) another's piece. The traditional explanation that poetry and calligraphy were the basis of painting did not seem adequate. In some works there was no writing, and i n some cases calligraphy was completed as an art without the addition of painting. Working from the general principles of location and event relative to an observer, the explanation offered in Chapter III seems to me more comprehensive than those formerly 193 offered, and more consistent with other areas of cultural activity. Through i t s use of structuralism, the thesis sought to test the charge that structuralism did not concern i t s e l f with history or histori c a l development. It also offered an opportunity to re-examine the concept of binome and i t s relation to principles of space and time i n an histori c a l context. C r i t i c s may be correct in saying that structuralists have not applied themselves to his t o r i c a l cases or the study of development, but this thesis suggests that this i s not due to an inherent lack in the theory i t s e l f . More simply, structuralism may provide a system of analysis applicable to the description and analysis of histori c a l events and cultures and, through an examination!.of concepts of space and time (presumed aspects of cultural order) define a descriptive technique whose use can provide insights into histo r i c a l contexts. I suspect structuralist theory would be in general better served through a modification of i t s concept of binome by adopting a correlative definition i n which irreducible opposites are seen not as dialec t i c a l opposites, and thus irreducible bits, but rather as boundaries of a single definition. That seems to be an operational definition arrived at by writers l i k e Leymore, and i s consistent with the analysis used here. Such a re-examination and adoption would not negate the work done by anthropologists like Gossen, but rather would both provide their work with more general and 194 broader relevance while dispelling one logical problem of their research. Drawing as i t does from the well of anthropology, the thesis reaffirms the similarity between the investigations of the geographer and other social scientists who concern them-selves with man and his perception of the cosmos. Despite the recent rash of interdisciplinary studies, universities remain segregated institutions. Their departments are often over-specialized and jealously guarded by narrow-minded mandarins. The interdisciplinary nature of this thesis, i f nothing else, reaffirms the relations between disciplines separated on a campus map. More practically, the thesis provides for geographers a new approach to the examination of location concepts within specific complexes. Structuralist theory i s relatively foreign to geography. In recent years a new "humanist" tradition has given rise to many attempts to use phenomenology, Marxism, neo-Kantianism and other offshoots of philosophy as a basis for the examination of culture and man-land relations. Unfortunately, most of these attempts have been based on an adherence to articles of philosophic faith which themselves have, as part of their attraction, an anti-scientism. Thus, geography departments, like the campuses they inhabit, have often become separated by philosophic allegiances which too often seem to have dogma as their loyalty. Russell, the scientist and philosopher, named geography as the socio-spatial discipline and thus, the pinnacle of humanist 195 study. He based that on what he perceived as geography's unique position as the study of space and time, of location. Through this attempt to examine a culture tradition by i t s categories of space and time, through i t s traditions of location, I have hopefully remained f a i r l y clear of the philosophical battles currently raging i n the geographic annals, ideally provided a preliminary method of analysis which (in general accord with T. Haggerstrand's concepts of man and location) can be replicated and extended by others regardless of their personal p o l i t i c s . Exercises i n intellectual history are not the sole preserve of social scientists, but i t would seem to me that for those students of the history of ideas the accent should be i n attempting to find a basis in which the accent i s on science-like procedures which, ideally, minimize the prejudices of the individual researcher and provide a technique by which others can replicate his work, both with the same data and in other areas. It seems to me that structuralism comes closer to that than many other attempts at analysis currently in use, and that this i s one of i t s attractions for geographers. Social scientists who attempt to enter the s t r i c t realms of Sinology do so at their p e r i l . In an area where philology has long reigned supreme, social scientists like Boorman have often been dismissed out of hand for their lack of rigor and for their ignorance of the basic tools usually applied by students of China to a l l problems. For their part, social scientists who have once had recourse to attend a conference of 196 Asian scholars, or to ask them questions, have too often come away disgruntled and bewildered by an incomprehensibly erudite discussion of what seemed, to the social scientists, irrelevancies. Terrance McGee, a geographer specializing in urban development in Asia, speaks with wonder of a discussion he had with some China scholars several years ago — and vows to avoid a l l such fellows in the future. That i s a double shame, which must be l a i d at the feet of both academic groups. Language i s the ultimate tool, and our basis of knowing and describing the world. Social scientists who ignore that central fact do so at their p e r i l . By refusing to consider the hints and traces which linguistics and philology can provide (in Asia and elsewhere), by reducing literature to an i l l u s t r a t i v e quote, they leave one of their most potentially f e r t i l e grounds untouched. The traditional Sinologist who sneers at a l l those who try to t i e the study of Asia into attempts by other disciplines to understand the development of ci v i l i z a t i o n s and the changes which are progressively wrought, relegates himself to the backwoods of man's progressive concern with himself. Worse, he deprives others of one of their richest areas of data. In this thesis I have attempted to chart a neutral course, using both Sinologic and social s c i e n t i f i c techniques. If aspects of the analysis in Chapter II seem unnecessarily pedestrian to some geographers, they w i l l seem comparatively shallow to those who have spent their working lives on the history of the Chinese language and the elucidation of 197 individual texts. Structuralists could be outraged at the brevity of my discussion of their literature, while the breadth of that thesis (and the examples given from the history of structural anthropology) would seem impossibly broad to the Sinologist, as well as the historian. The c r i t i c a l point, however, seems to be that i n a l l these areas of research, each system of inquiry has relevance and merit. Eventually, a system of analysis incorporating a l l these individual specialties should be found. The thesis i s subtitled "Notes Toward a Predictive Theory of Culture" in hope that similar studies w i l l uncover cultural constants and human universals such that we w i l l be someday able to describe completely the complex of events which form and define human organizations. Such a system of description would provide the basis on which the actions of human organiza-tions could be studied dispassionately and group actions predicted. In individual studies, anthropologists have identified universals of human organization. Structuralists have attempted to draw these individual studies into a coherent theory of human organization which w i l l define the parameters of group action. The thrust of this thesis has been to apply those principles to an historic a l case, and to see whether there i s a constancy through the series of separated events which make up two thousand years of history. On that basis, Maoist revolutionary theory seems less innovative, less of a surprise. It i s b u i l t upon traditional works and broad spatio-temporal 198 concepts modified only to f i t more current allegiances. With hindsight, i t s appeal to the China of the 193©*s and 1940*3 — and i t s effectiveness i n the c i v i l war — seem i n e v i t a b l e . Hopefully there w i l l come a day when our understanding of human organization w i l l allow the certainty of hindsight to be applied to current events, and allow us to peer toward the future. I am thus i n accord with that school of thought which suggests human groups act with reason according to c e r t a i n definable p r i n c i p l e s , although they may not i n d i v i d u a l l y be , aware of the basis of those group actions. I t i s the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s * contribution to have observed continually a s i m i l a r i t y between the categories of those p r i n c i p l e s i n the many cultures which have been studied. I t i s t h i s theory and the observed s i m i l a r i t y which fue l s t h e i r b e l i e f that these basics can be opened to analysis, and to hope that we w i l l someday have as complete a knowledge of human c u l t u r a l organization as we have begun to develop f o r the s o c i e t i e s of other primate groups. I f t h i s thesis were to stand as some contribution towards that goal, I would be enormously s a t i s f i e d . But that judgment, with one of the success of the th e s i s , stands with the reader and not with me. 199 BIBLIOGRAPHY (ENGLISH) Alexander, C.H.O'D. A BOOK of Chess, Harper and Row, New Yorki 1962. Boorman, Scott. The Protracted Gamei A Wei Ch'i Interpreta- tation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy. Oxford University Press, Londont 1969. Brock, Karen and Thorp, Robert, trans. Four Great Painters of  the Yuan. National Palace Museum of Taiwan, Taipei 1 1975. Brunner, Jerome, et a l (eds.) A Study of Thinking. John Wiley and Sons, New Yorki 1964. Buttimer, Annette. "The Dynamism of the Lifeworld" in Annals  of the Association of American Geographers (AAG), Vol. 6612. Cahill, James. Chinese Painting. Skira, Lucerne 1 i960. Capra, F r i t j o f . The Tao of Physics. Shambala, Berkeley, Cal.j 1975. Chorley, R. New Directions in Geography. 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